Title: Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S266590
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JEFFREY PRANG, as County Assessor, etc., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD, 
Defendant and Respondent; 
LUIS A. AMEN et al., as Trustees, etc., 
Real Parties in Interest and Appellants. 
 
S266590 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Five 
B298794 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BS173698 
 
 
May 30, 2024 
 
Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT 
APPEALS BOARD 
S266590 
 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
Article XIII A of the California Constitution, added by 
Proposition 13, strictly limits increases in the assessed value of 
real property unless the property undergoes a “change in 
ownership.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 2, subds. (a), (b); 
see Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding (2018) 6 
Cal.5th 1, 10.) 
A change in ownership generally occurs with a transfer of 
real property.  In a typical real estate transaction where one 
party transfers real property to another, there is 
unquestionably a change in ownership as title passes from the 
transferor to the transferee.  Whether there has been a 
“change in ownership” in transactions involving a legal entity, 
however, is a more complex issue that can give rise to certain 
anomalies.  If individual owners transfer real property to an 
entity they own, for example, it can be argued that the transfer 
has not caused a change in underlying “ownership,” but merely 
a change in the form of holding title.  Likewise, when there is a 
significant change in the ownership of a legal entity, it can be 
argued that this causes a change in ownership of the entity’s 
real property despite no change in title. 
In enacting a statutory scheme to implement Proposition 
13, the Legislature sought to account for these anomalies.  It 
also chose to adopt different rules to govern these different 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
2 
situations.  Governing the transfer at issue here, Revenue and 
Taxation Code section 62, subdivision (a)(2)1 identifies 
property transfers that, although they result in a change in 
title, nonetheless do not constitute a “change in ownership.”  
The statute excludes from change in ownership any 
transaction involving a legal entity that “results solely in a 
change in the method of holding title to the real property and 
in which proportional ownership interests of the transferors 
and transferees, whether represented by stock, partnership 
interest, or otherwise, in each and every piece of real property 
transferred, remain the same after the transfer.”  (§ 62, 
subd. (a)(2), italics added.) 
Here, a family corporation transferred ownership of a 
pair of supermarkets to one of its shareholders, a revocable 
trust.  The trust held all the corporation’s voting stock.  The 
corporation also had a small number of individual shareholders 
who held nonvoting stock; those shareholders had no interest 
in the trust.  The transfer of the properties to the trust thus 
eliminated whatever interests the individual shareholders held 
in the corporation’s real property.  The question presented is 
whether this transfer of the properties nonetheless is excluded 
from change in ownership under section 62, subdivision (a)(2); 
that is, whether the proportional ownership interests in the 
real property transferred, as “represented by stock, 
partnership interest, or otherwise,” remained the same before 
and after the transfer. 
The trustees, appellants here, argue that no change in 
ownership occurred because the trust held all the corporation’s 
 
1  
Unless indicated otherwise, subsequent statutory 
citations are to the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
3 
voting stock.  According to the trustees, the term “stock” in 
section 62, subdivision (a)(2) must be interpreted to mean 
voting stock.  In advancing this argument, the trustees point to 
another Revenue and Taxation Code section concerning 
transfers of ownership interests in legal entities, which 
expressly refers to “voting stock” (§ 64, subd. (c)(1)), and argue 
that sections 62 and 64 must be read together.  Section 64 
provides a transfer of ownership interests in a corporation will 
result in a change in ownership of its real property only when 
there is a change in corporate “control,” which is determined by 
ownership of a majority of its “voting stock.”  (§ 64, subd. 
(c)(1).)  The county assessor, respondent here, argues section 
62, subdivision (a)(2) is unambiguous and measures ownership 
interests in real property transferred to or from a corporation 
by all stock.  Under that measure, a change in ownership 
occurred. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the county assessor and 
held the transfer of the property from the corporation to the 
trust resulted in a change in ownership.  The trustees 
challenge that holding on the ground that the Court of Appeal 
failed to accord proper deference to the implementing 
regulation and interpretative materials issued by the state 
Board of Equalization.  We conclude the agency’s 
implementing regulation and interpretative materials do not 
support the trustees’ reading of section 62, subdivision (a)(2).  
To understand why that is the case, however, it is necessary to 
begin with the plain language of the statute and the usual 
statutory interpretation framework. 
Applying this framework, we conclude that section 62, 
subdivision (a)(2) measures proportional beneficial ownership 
interests in corporate real property by corporate stock 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
4 
generally.  Further, because sections 62 and 64 concern 
different ownership interests — ownership interests in real 
property and ownership interests in legal entities, 
respectively — section 64 does not compel a contrary reading of 
section 62.  The Board of Equalization’s guidance either 
concerns section 64, and is therefore not pertinent, or fails to 
directly consider the issue presented here, and is therefore 
unpersuasive.  Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal, 
which held in a manner consistent with these conclusions. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The real property at issue consists of two Los Angeles 
supermarkets operating under the brand name “Super A 
Foods” (the properties).  In December 2014, Super A Foods, 
Inc., a corporation (the corporation), transferred the properties 
to the Amen Family 1990 Revocable Trust (the trust). 
At the time of the transfer, the corporation had two 
classes of stock, “Voting Common Stock” and “Non-Voting 
Common Stock.”  Under its articles of incorporation, the sole 
difference between the rights possessed by holders of these 
respective classes of stock concerned control over corporate 
governance.  Control over corporate governance was granted 
exclusively to holders of the voting stock:  “Except with respect 
to all voting rights being vested exclusively in the holders of 
the Voting Common Shares, as herein above provided, the 
Voting Common Stock and the Non-Voting Common Stock 
shall be equal in all other respects including, but not limited 
to, dividend and liquidation rights.”  
The trust owned 92.8 percent of the corporation’s stock, 
which included 100 percent of the voting stock.  The trust had 
two beneficiaries, Louis Amen and Dolores Amen.  Four 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
5 
individuals — other members of the Amen family and a long-
time employee of the corporation — owned approximately 
5.2 percent of the corporation’s stock, all nonvoting stock.    
The Los Angeles County Assessor, respondent Jeffrey 
Prang (assessor), determined that the transfer of the 
properties from the corporation to the trust constituted a 
change in ownership and conducted a reassessment of the 
properties, doubling their assessed value from $5,140,120 to 
$10,280,000.  The assessor looked at all corporate stock and 
determined that the proportional ownership interests in the 
properties were not the same before and after the transfer 
because the interests of the individual shareholders were 
eliminated.  
The Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board 
(Appeals Board) reversed the decision of the assessor.  The 
Appeals Board asserted, without supporting authority, that 
“the beneficial interest in [corporate] real property is 
ultimately held by the persons who control the corporation 
through its voting stock.”  Looking at the corporation’s voting 
stock only, the Appeals Board determined that the proportional 
ownership interests in the properties were the same before and 
after the transfer because they remained with the trust.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Appeals Board also relied on 
guidance issued by the Board of Equalization (State Board), 
the agency responsible for promulgating property tax 
assessment regulations and guidance.  
The assessor filed a petition for writ of mandate in the 
superior court.  The superior court granted the petition and 
issued an order directing the Appeals Board to vacate its 
decision.  The trustees appealed.  In a published opinion, and 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
6 
over a dissent, the Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting the 
Appeals Board’s interpretation of section 62 and agreeing with 
the assessor.  (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment 
Appeals Bd. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 246, 261 (Prang).) 
The Court of Appeal majority held that section 62, 
subdivision (a)(2) is unambiguous and measures 
proportionality by all corporate stock.  (Prang, supra, 58 
Cal.App.5th at p. 255, fn. 4; id. at pp. 254–261.)  It rejected the 
argument that the provision is rendered ambiguous when read 
in light of the statute as a whole or in light of the overall 
legislative scheme, which hinged on the trustees’ assertion that 
sections 62 and 64 must be read together.  (Id. at p. 259.)  The 
majority reasoned that the two sections address different kinds 
of transactions:  section 62 concerns the transfer of interests in 
real property, whereas section 64 concerns the transfer of 
interests in a legal entity.  (Ibid.)  For this reason, “section 64’s 
rules relating to control of a corporation do not fit in the 
proportionality exclusion under section [62, subdivision (a)(2)].”  
(Ibid.)  
The dissent did not undertake its own statutory 
interpretation.  (Prang, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 261–263 
(dis. opn. of Baker, J.).)  Rather, the dissent found it persuasive 
that the State Board “interpreted the term ‘stock’ to mean 
voting stock” in “related statutes” (i.e., § 64) and in “guidance 
. . . that discusses . . . section 62, subdivision (a)(2).”  (Id. at 
p. 262.)  The dissent saw “no good reason to deviate from” the 
agency’s interpretation.  (Ibid.)     
We granted review to resolve these issues of statutory 
interpretation and agency deference. 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Whether transfer of the properties from the corporation 
to the trust constitutes a “change in ownership” is a question of 
statutory interpretation, a task governed by long-settled 
principles.  “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is 
to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the 
law’s purpose.”  (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)  “We first 
consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is 
generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended 
purpose.”  (McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 
213, 227 (McHugh).)  “We consider the ordinary meaning of the 
relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of 
the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.”  (Ibid.)  
If the relevant statutory language permits more than one 
reasonable interpretation, we look to appropriate extrinsic 
sources, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and 
public policy.  (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc., 
supra, at p. 737.)  We also extend some deference to the State 
Board’s constructions of the Revenue and Taxation Code, “to 
the extent that [they] are embodied in quasi-legislative 
regulations or constitute long-standing, consistent, and 
contemporaneous interpretations.”  (McHugh, supra, at p. 227, 
citing Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12–13 (Yamaha).) 
A. Proposition 13 
Proposition 13, adopted in 1978, limits the ad valorem 
tax on real property to one percent of its “full cash value.”  
(Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a); Auerbach v. Assessment 
Appeals Bd. No. 1 (2006) 39 Cal.4th 153, 160 (Auerbach).)  The 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
8 
full cash value may be adjusted for inflation but only at a 
maximum rate of two percent per year.  (Cal. Const., art. XIII 
A, § 2, subd. (b).)  “Full cash value” is defined as the county 
assessor’s valuation of the property on the 1975–1976 tax bill 
“or, thereafter, the appraised value of real property when 
purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has 
occurred after the 1975 assessment.”  (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, 
§ 2, subd. (a); Auerbach, supra, at p. 160.)  As stated above, 
this case turns on whether a “change in ownership” occurred 
when the properties were transferred from the corporation to 
the trust. 
1. Section 60 
Because Proposition 13 did not define “change in 
ownership,” it fell to the Legislature to do so.  (Pacific 
Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 1 Cal.4th 
155, 160–161 (Pacific Southwest).)  To accomplish this task, 
the Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation created a 
35-member task force to study this and other aspects of 
Proposition 13 and to make recommendations “as to 
appropriate law changes.”  (Assembly Com. on Revenue & 
Taxation, Rep. of the Task Force on Property Tax 
Administration (Jan. 22, 1979) p. 1 (Task Force Report); see 
Pacific Southwest, supra, at p. 161.)  The work of the task force 
culminated in the Task Force Report.  (Pacific Southwest, 
supra, at p. 161.)   
The task force “sought to distill the basic characteristics 
of a ‘change in ownership’ and embody them in a single test 
which could be applied evenhandedly to distinguish between 
‘changes’ and ‘non-changes’, both those which the Task Force 
could and those which it did not foresee.”  (Task Force Report, 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
9 
supra, at p. 38.)  The task force formulated a three-part test 
intended to be generally “consistent with the normal 
understanding of ‘change in ownership.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Adopted 
verbatim by the Legislature as Revenue and Taxation Code 
section 60, and unchanged since, it provides:  “A ‘change in 
ownership’ means a transfer of a present interest in real 
property, including the beneficial use thereof, the value of 
which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest.”  
(Id. at p. 48; Pacific Southwest, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 161; 
see Stats. 1979, ch. 242, § 4.)   
2. Section 62, subdivision (a)(2) 
To aid in the implementation of section 60, the task force 
proposed the adoption of “specific statutory examples” to 
elaborate on “common transactions.”  (Task Force Report, 
supra, at p. 40.)  The task force stressed that the examples 
were designed to be “consistent with the general test,” as the 
“entire statutory design would be destroyed” if specific 
transfers were treated in an inconsistent manner.  (Id. at p. 40; 
id. at p. 41.)  The task force was concerned that inconsistency 
might result in the invalidation of the statutory scheme based 
on “the lack of any consistent, rational interpretation of the 
constitutional phrase, ‘change in ownership.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 40–
41; Pacific Southwest, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 161–162.)  The 
examples were embodied primarily in two statutes — section 
61, setting forth types of common transfers that do result in a 
change in ownership, and section 62, setting forth types of 
transfers that do not result in a change in ownership.  (Task 
Force Report, supra, at pp. 49–51; Auerbach, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
at p. 161.)   
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
10 
Section 61 provides, in pertinent part, “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in Section 62, change in ownership, as 
defined in Section 60, includes, but is not limited to . . . [t]he 
transfer of any interest in real property between a corporation, 
partnership, or other legal entity and a shareholder, partner, 
or any other person.”  (§ 61, subd. (j).)  The parties do not 
dispute that transfer of the properties from the corporation to 
the trust must be deemed a change in ownership under section 
60 and section 61, subdivision (j) unless it qualifies for 
exclusion under section 62, subdivision (a)(2) (section 62(a)(2)).   
Section 62(a)(2), which addresses transfers of real 
property involving legal entities, is intended to exclude 
transfers that constitute merely a change in the form of 
holding title.  It provides that “change in ownership” does not 
include “[a]ny transfer between an individual or individuals 
and a legal entity or between legal entities, such as a 
cotenancy to a partnership, a partnership to a corporation, or a 
trust to a cotenancy, that results solely in a change in the 
method of holding title to the real property and in which 
proportional ownership interests of the transferors and 
transferees, whether represented by stock, partnership 
interest, or otherwise, in each and every piece of real property 
transferred, remain the same after the transfer.”  (§ 62(a)(2), 
italics added.)  For example, if two individuals who own real 
property in equal shares transfer the property to a corporation 
they own in equal shares, such transfer is excluded from 
change of ownership. 
3. Section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) and (d) 
Section 64, which concerns the purchase or transfer of 
ownership interests in legal entities, is not directly implicated 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
11 
by the facts of this case.  The trustees do not argue otherwise.  
Instead, they contend section 64, namely subdivisions (c)(1) 
and (d), bear on the proper interpretation of the term 
“ownership interests” in section 62(a)(2).  According to the 
trustees, statutory uniformity requires that “ownership 
interests” have the same meaning across these three 
subdivisions.  
Section 64, subdivision (a) (section 64(a)) begins by 
declaring the general rule that a transfer of ownership 
interests in a legal entity does not cause a change in ownership 
of the entity’s real property.  Section 64, subdivision (c)(1) 
(section 64(c)(1)) provides an exception to this rule:  “When a 
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, other legal 
entity, or any other person obtains control through direct or 
indirect ownership or control of more than 50 percent of the 
voting stock of any corporation, or obtains a majority 
ownership interest in any partnership, limited liability 
company, or other legal entity through the purchase or transfer 
of corporate stock, partnership, or limited liability company 
interest, or ownership interests in other legal entities, 
including any purchase or transfer of 50 percent or less of the 
ownership interest through which control or a majority 
ownership interest is obtained, the purchase or transfer of that 
stock or other interest shall be a change of ownership of the 
real property owned by the corporation, partnership, limited 
liability company, or other legal entity in which the controlling 
interest is obtained.”  As to a corporation, then, a change in 
ownership of its real property occurs when there is a change in 
“control” of the corporation, which is determined by ownership 
of a majority of its voting stock. 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
12 
Section 64, subdivision (d) (section 64(d)) provides 
another exception to the general rule of subdivision (a), 
applicable only to real property that was previously 
transferred to an entity in a transaction covered by section 
62(a)(2).  Following such a transfer, “the persons holding 
ownership interests in that [transferee] entity immediately 
after the transfer shall be considered the ‘original coowners.’ ”  
(§ 64(d).)  “Whenever shares or other ownership interests 
representing cumulatively more than 50 percent of the total 
interests in the entity are transferred by any of the original 
coowners in one or more transactions, a change in ownership of 
that real property owned by the legal entity shall have 
occurred . . . .”  (Ibid.)  In effect, after an entity has obtained 
real property in a transfer covered by section 62(a)(2), a change 
in ownership of that property occurs if the original coowners 
subsequently transfer more than 50 percent of the total 
interests in the entity, even if no one person or legal entity 
thereby obtains control of the transferee entity so as to trigger 
the exception set forth in section 64(c)(1). 
B. The Language of Section 62(a)(2) 
As always, our inquiry begins with the language of the 
statute.  The parties agree that change in ownership here is 
governed by section 62(a)(2), which excludes “[a]ny transfer 
between an individual or individuals and a legal entity or 
between legal entities . . . that results solely in a change in the 
method of holding title to the real property and in which 
proportional ownership interests of the transferors and 
transferees, whether represented by stock, partnership 
interest, or otherwise, in each and every piece of real property 
transferred, remain the same after the transfer.”  We conclude 
the language of section 62(a)(2) indicates that:  the statute 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
13 
concerns ownership interests in real property; for legal entities, 
those ownership interests are the beneficial ownership interests 
that those who own the entity have in its real property; and for 
a corporation, those beneficial ownership interests are 
measured by corporate stock generally.   
1. “Proportional ownership interests” in section 
62(a)(2) refers to interests in real property 
A principal requirement of the exclusion set forth in 
section 62(a)(2) is that the proportional “ownership interests” 
remain the same before and after transfer of the real property.  
The Court of Appeal majority agreed with the assessor that the 
ownership interests to which section 62(a)(2) refers are 
interests in the real property transferred, whereas the 
ownership interests at issue in section 64 are interests in a 
legal entity.  The trustees dispute that “[s]ections 62 and 64 
measure different kinds of ownership,” arguing that “both 
statutes measure ‘ownership interests’ in legal entities.”  
Based on this understanding, the trustees assert that 
ownership interests in a corporation must be measured by 
voting stock only, because corporate ownership is measured by 
voting stock for purposes of section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) 
and (d). 
The assessor is correct that the statute must be 
interpreted to refer to proportional ownership interests in the 
transferred real property, rather than in any entities involved 
in the transfer.  This is the construction dictated by the 
express language of section 62(a)(2), which requires that the 
“proportional ownership interests . . . in each and every piece of 
real property transferred” remain the same.  (Italics added.)  
This interpretation also is necessary for the full application of 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
14 
the statute.  Section 62(a)(2) applies to transfers involving both 
entities and individuals.  If “proportional ownership interests” 
referred to interests in an entity, it could not be applied to a 
transfer involving individuals; there would be no entity in 
which their ownership interests could be measured.  
2. With regard to a legal entity, “proportional 
ownership interests” refers to beneficial ownership 
interests 
Though it is clear that section 62(a)(2) refers to 
ownership interests in real property, there is a further 
analytical inquiry we must engage with:  how are those 
ownership interests represented.  For an individual, ownership 
interests are represented by the individuals’ direct ownership 
interests in the real property.  As explained below, that cannot 
be the case when the transferor or transferee of the property is 
an entity.  With respect to entities, we conclude “proportional 
ownership interests” must be understood to refer, not to direct 
ownership interests, but to the beneficial ownership interests 
that the persons who own the entity hold in the property.  
(See § 60 [defining “change in ownership” as “a transfer of a 
present interest in real property, including the beneficial use 
thereof”].)  Two features of section 62(a)(2) compel this 
understanding.  
First, the statute refers to the proportional ownership 
interests “of the transferors and transferees” in the transferred 
property.  When real property is transferred by or to an entity, 
the entity conveys or obtains 100 percent of the direct 
ownership interests in the property.  For that reason, any 
transfer of real property involving an entity necessarily results 
in a change in the proportional direct ownership interests of 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
15 
the transferors and transferees.  In this case, for example, 
100 percent of the direct ownership interests in the properties 
transferred from the corporation to the trust.  Yet the statute 
plainly contemplates that such transfers fall within the ambit 
of section 62(a)(2).  It follows then, that with respect to 
entities, we must look, not to the transfer of direct ownership 
interests, but to the transfer of beneficial ownership interests 
to assess proportionality.  Although a corporation has full 
direct ownership of its property, its shareholders will have 
partial, proportional beneficial ownership interests therein. 
Second, this reading of the statute squares the mandate 
that “proportional ownership interests . . . in each and every 
piece of real property transferred” must remain the same with 
the assertion that those interests may be “represented by 
stock, partnership interest, or otherwise.”  (§ 62(a)(2).)  Stock 
and partnership interests represent ownership interests in 
entities.  Possession of an ownership interest in an entity 
owning real property does not afford a direct ownership 
interest in the entity’s property.  Thus, it is apparent that, 
when the transferor or transferee is an entity, “proportional 
ownership interests” refers to beneficial ownership interests in 
the real property as represented by indicia of ownership in the 
entity. 
This interpretation is consistent with the first mandate 
of section 62(a)(2) — that a transfer “results solely in a change 
in the method of holding title to the real property.”  (Italics 
added.)  A transfer results “solely” in a change in the method of 
holding title if ownership of the property does not change 
beyond a change in the identity of the titleholder(s).  That 
condition is satisfied, when two entities are involved, if the 
proportional beneficial ownership interests of the owners of the 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
16 
entities remain the same, or, when individuals and an entity 
are involved, the proportional direct ownership interests of the 
individuals are identical to their proportional beneficial 
ownership interests as owners of the entity.  In such 
circumstances, the identity of the titleholder(s) of the real 
property will change, but the underlying “ownership” of the 
property will not.  In contrast, if the beneficial owners change, 
or the proportionality of their ownership interests change, the 
transfer will result in something more than a change in the 
method of holding title; it will result in a change in the 
property’s underlying “ownership.”  The proportionality 
requirement gives substance to the first mandate of the 
statute.   
3. By the statute’s terms, as well as general corporate 
legal principles, beneficial ownership interests in 
corporate property are measured by corporate 
“stock” generally 
Although we reject the trustees’ threshold assertion 
regarding the “ownership interests” to which section 62(a)(2) 
refers, that does not fully dispose of their argument.  As section 
62(a)(2) recognizes in stating that proportional ownership 
interests are “represented by stock, partnership interest, or 
otherwise,” the beneficial ownership interests of the owners of 
a transferor or transferee entity in that entity’s real property 
are measured by, and are therefore identical to, their 
proportional ownership interests in the entity.  That is, a 
50 percent shareholder of a corporation owns a 50 percent 
beneficial ownership interest in the real property of the 
corporation.  The trustees argue that ownership interests in a 
corporation should be measured by voting stock only, rather 
than all stock.  We reject this argument as inconsistent with 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
17 
both the language of the statute and general corporate legal 
principles. 
Taken strictly as a matter of statutory construction, the 
argument falters because it seeks to “ ‘insert what has been 
omitted’ ” from the statute.  (Security Pacific National Bank v. 
Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 998, quoting Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1858.)  “ ‘Where the words of the statute are clear, we may 
not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not 
appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative 
history.’ ”  (In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 265.)  Section 
62(a)(2) refers to “ownership interests . . . represented by stock, 
partnership interest, or otherwise.”  (Italics added.)  The 
trustees point to nothing in the language of section 62(a)(2) or 
its legislative history that suggests the Legislature intended 
the term “stock” to refer only to voting stock.   
The trustees nonetheless seek to impose this limitation 
by reference to section 64, which expressly refers to “voting 
stock.”  (§ 64(c)(1).)  Yet, “[a]s a general rule, when the 
Legislature uses a term in one provision of a statute but omits 
it from another . . . we generally presume that the Legislature 
did so deliberately, in order ‘ “to convey a different 
meaning.” ’ ”  (Scher v. Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 136, 144–145 
(Scher), quoting Klein v. United States of America (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 68, 80; In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 638 
[“When language is included in one portion of a statute, its 
omission from a different portion addressing a similar subject 
suggests that the omission was purposeful.”].)  If the 
Legislature intended to limit section 62(a)(2)’s reference to 
“stock” to the single class of voting stock, it could have said so 
expressly, as it did in similar Revenue and Taxation Code 
provisions, such as section 64(c)(1).  Instead, the Legislature 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
18 
used the general term “stock,” suggesting it intended to refer 
more broadly to other classes of stock.2  Specifically, in this 
context, “stock” is most naturally understood to refer to all 
stock that carries a beneficial interest in the property of a 
corporation. 
We observe that this construction of section 62(a)(2) is 
consistent with general corporate legal principles.  Shares of 
stock are “the units into which the proprietary interests in a 
corporation are divided in the articles.”  (Corp. Code, § 184.)  A 
corporation “may issue one or more classes or series of shares 
or both, with full, limited or no voting rights and with such 
other rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions as are 
stated or authorized in its articles.”  (Corp. Code, § 400, 
subd. (a).)  “Voting stock” refers to a class of stock that has 
voting rights, which means, generally, “the power to vote for 
the election of directors.”  (Corp. Code, § 194.5.)  The authority 
to manage the business and affairs of a corporation is vested in 
its board of directors.  (Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 
1100, 1108.)  Holders of voting stock exercise indirect control 
over corporate affairs, however, through their voting power.  
(See Corp. Code, § 160, subd. (a).)   
The legal relationship between the shareholders of a 
corporation and the corporation’s property was summarized 
 
2  
As the Court of Appeal majority noted, there are many 
classes of stock:  “The [Revenue and Taxation] code expressly 
identifies numerous subcategories of stock: voting stock (§ 64), 
nonvoting stock (§ 23361), capital stock (§ 212), treasury stock 
(§ 24942), common stock (§ 23040.1), preferred stock 
(§ 23040.1), and qualified small business stock (§ 18038.4).”  
(Prang, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 259.)  The statutory 
references to these various classes of stock reaffirms our 
reading of “stock” in section 62(a)(2) as a general term.   
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
19 
over a century ago in MacDermot v. Hayes (1917) 175 Cal. 95 
(MacDermot):  “A corporation is created and given a legal 
existence in order that it may, in its legal capacity, hold and 
manage the property transferred and business committed to it 
by its stockholders.  They are the beneficial owners of the 
corporate property.  The corporation is their agency and holds 
the property for their benefit and in trust for them.  The 
interest of each stockholder in the property is the proportion 
which his shares of stock bear to all the stock outstanding.  
The [share] certificates are not property in the real sense, but 
are merely evidences of the undivided interests of the several 
stockholders in the corporate assets and business.”  (Id. at 
p. 114.)  Although shareholders do not hold legal title to the 
corporation’s property, they are said to have “an equitable 
interest therein” as beneficial owners.  (Newell-Murdoch Realty 
Co. v. Wickham (1920) 183 Cal. 39, 45 [“A stockholder in a 
corporation has a beneficial interest, in proportion to the 
amount of his stock, in all the property of the corporation”].)   
As the foregoing makes clear, beneficial ownership of 
corporate real property lies with shareholders generally; 
ownership of a share of a corporation’s voting stock ordinarily 
confers no greater beneficial ownership interest in the property 
of the corporation than ownership of a share of nonvoting 
stock.  That was certainly true in this case.3  Under the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation, the only difference 
between voting and nonvoting stock was the right of the former 
to exercise voting power.  The voting and nonvoting stock were 
 
3 
The present case does not implicate, and we leave for 
another day, questions regarding the proper application of 
section 62(a)(2) if a corporation were to issue shares with 
limited or subordinated interests in the corporate property. 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
20 
“equal in all other respects including, but not limited to, 
dividend and liquidation rights.”  Voting and nonvoting stock 
thus enjoyed identical economic rights in the corporation and 
its property.  If the corporation’s assets were liquidated, for 
example, “[i]t is not inconceivable” that each individual 
shareholder “would be entitled to between $92,520 and 
$174,760” based on their proportional shareholdings and the 
appraised value of the property.  (Prang, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 261, fn. 13.)  For purposes of section 62(a)(2), then, all of 
the corporation’s stock must be considered.  The trustees’ 
contrary argument conflates corporate ownership with 
corporate control.  Because section 62(a)(2) makes no reference 
to corporate control, the construction proposed by the trustees 
is inapt. 
C. The Language of Section 64 
The trustees’ fundamental argument for construing the 
term “stock” in section 62(a)(2) to mean “voting stock” is that 
this interpretation is necessary to maintain a uniform 
definition of “ownership interests” in section 62(a)(2) and other 
statutory provisions, namely section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) 
and (d).  We reject this argument because our interpretation of 
section 62(a)(2) creates no statutory conflict with section 64. 
As stated above, the term “stock” in section 62(a)(2) is 
used as a means for measuring the proportional beneficial 
ownership interests of corporate shareholders in real property 
transferred by or to a corporation.  Section 64, on the other 
hand, concerns the purchase or transfer of ownership interests 
in a legal entity.  Section 64(a) provides the general rule that 
“the purchase or transfer of ownership interests in legal 
entities, such as corporate stock or partnership or limited 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
21 
liability company interests, shall not be deemed to constitute a 
transfer of the real property of the legal entity.”  Notably, 
section 64(a) refers to “stock” generally, not just voting stock; 
the general rule thus applies to both voting and nonvoting 
stock, and neither the trustees nor the State Board have 
suggested otherwise. 
Section 64(c)(1) provides an exception to the general rule 
of section 64(a).  As set forth above, the exception provides 
that, although the transfer of ownership interests in a legal 
entity generally does not constitute a change in ownership, 
there is a change in ownership when an individual or other 
legal entity obtains a “majority ownership interest” or 
“controlling interest” in the entity in question; for a 
corporation, control is obtained through ownership of “more 
than 50 percent of the voting stock.”  (§ 64(c)(1).)  To the extent 
section 64(c)(1) refers to “ownership interests,” they are 
interests in “any partnership, limited liability company, or 
other legal entity,” not in transferred real property.  (Italics 
added.)  Further, although the subdivision refers to “voting 
stock,” it is used as a measure of corporate control, not of 
beneficial ownership interests in corporate real property.   
Section 64(d) is similar.  It applies to property previously 
transferred to a legal entity in a transaction covered by section 
62(a)(2).  Following such a transaction, “the persons holding 
ownership interests in that legal entity immediately after the 
transfer shall be considered the ‘original coowners.’ ”  (§ 64(d).)  
A change in ownership of the real property previously 
transferred from the original coowners to the entity occurs if 
the original coowners subsequently transfer “shares or other 
ownership interests representing cumulatively more than 
50 percent of the total interests in the entity.”  (Ibid.)  Like 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
22 
section 64(c)(1), section 64(d) makes no reference to 
proportional ownership interests in real property.  Rather, it 
refers to “ownership interests . . . in the entity.”  (§ 64(d).)  
Section 64(d) does not itself refer to “stock” or “voting stock.”4 
In sum, because section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) and (d) 
contain no reference to ownership interests in real property, 
they cannot create a definitional conflict with section 62(a)(2).  
Further, even insofar as section 62(a)(2) looks to ownership 
interests in an entity, such as “stock,” it does so as an indicium 
of beneficial ownership interests in the entity’s real property.  
The sole reference to “voting stock” in the cited subdivisions of 
section 64 indicates it is used as a measure of corporate 
control, not of the shareholders’ beneficial ownership interests 
in corporate real property.  Given that sections 62 and 64 reach 
 
4  
Section 64(d) refers to “ownership interests representing 
cumulatively more than 50 percent of the total interests in the 
entity.”  Because the relevant ownership interests are not 
otherwise specified, section 64(d) may be ambiguous.  The 
trustees read section 64(d) as referring to the same majority or 
controlling ownership interests expressly identified in section 
64(c)(1).  The relevant State Board regulation supports that 
interpretation.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 462.180, subd. (d)(2) 
[specifying the relevant ownership interests are those “defined 
in subdivision (d)(1),” which mirrors the language of section 
64(c)(1)].)  For a corporation, then, the relevant ownership 
interests would be voting stock.  We need not definitively 
construe section 64(d), however, to conclude it creates no 
conflict with our interpretation of section 62(a)(2).  Even if a 
majority or controlling ownership interest in a corporation is 
measured by voting stock for purposes of section 64(d), that in 
no way undermines the conclusion that ownership interests in 
corporate real property are measured by stock generally for 
purposes of section 62(a)(2). 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
23 
fundamentally different issues, the trustees’ call for statutory 
uniformity is without basis.  
The foregoing analysis points to a further infirmity in the 
trustees’ reasoning.  They assert that, “ ‘[i]f Section 62(a)(2) 
means “all stock,” the exclusion under Section 62(a)(2) would 
be measured under one standard — all stock — but under a 
different standard — voting stock — to measure when the 
exclusion ends under Section 64(d).’ ”  Tellingly, the trustees do 
not explain why application of these two measures would be 
problematic.  To be sure, if sections 62 and 64 used different 
measures for an identical or indistinguishable purpose, that 
might be problematic; but they do not.  Contrary to the 
trustees’ assertion, section 64(d) is not properly characterized 
as governing when the exclusion set forth in section 62(a)(2) 
“ends.”  Section 62(a)(2) applies, if at all, when real property is 
transferred to a corporation.  Once the real property is held by 
a corporation, it enjoys the benefit of the general rule set forth 
in section 64(a) — that is, ownership interests in the entity 
generally can be freely transferred without triggering a change 
in ownership.  Section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) and (d) set forth 
exceptions to the general rule of section 64(a).  Thus, section 
64(d) is more aptly characterized as governing where the 
benefit of section 64(a) ends, albeit only as to property 
transferred to the corporation by the original coowners and not 
all property held by the corporation.   
D. The Legislative History and Public Policy 
“Where statutory text ‘is unambiguous and provides a 
clear answer, we need go no further.’ ”  (Scher, supra, 3 Cal.5th 
at p. 148.)  Even if we were to assume that the statutory text is 
ambiguous, however, extrinsic sources — including the 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
24 
statute’s purpose, its legislative history, and public policy — 
are consistent with our reading of section 62(a)(2).  
1. The legislative history is consistent with our 
construction of section 62(a)(2) 
As discussed above, section 62 emerged from the work of 
a legislative task force assigned to propose implementing 
legislation for Proposition 13, including the definition of 
“change in ownership.”  One issue the task force “considered at 
length” was how to deal with real property owned by legal 
entities.  (Task Force Report, supra, at p. 45.)  It considered 
two alternative approaches:  the “separate entity” theory, 
which respects an entity’s “identity separate from its owners,” 
and the “ultimate control” theory, which “[l]ooks through the 
legal entity” to changes in majority control.  (Ibid.)  The task 
force adopted the separate entity theory and recommended 
that it “be followed consistently and without special 
exclusions,” though it recognized that this resulted in some 
anomalous outcomes.  (Id. at p. 46.)  “For example,” the Task 
Force Report observed, “incorporation of a sole proprietorship 
would be, an ownership change under the separate entity 
theory.  On the other hand, under the separate entity theory, 
the property of many corporations will never be fully 
reappraised, since no ‘change in ownership’ will ever occur.”  
(Ibid.) 
In keeping with the task force’s commitment to 
consistent application of the separate entity theory, its 
legislative proposals contained no analog of section 62(a)(2), 
which excludes transfers of real property to or from an entity 
that result solely in a change in the method of holding title.  
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
25 
(See Task Force Report, supra, at p. 51.)5  In the absence of 
such a provision, a transfer between entities or between 
individuals and an entity was necessarily regarded as a change 
in ownership because the identity of the titleholder changed, 
even if the underlying beneficial ownership of the property did 
not.  As noted, the task force cited as an example the 
incorporation of a sole proprietorship as perhaps the most 
straightforward example of a change only in the form of 
ownership.  (Id. at p. 46.) 
Although the task force’s approach had the virtue of 
consistency, the failure to exclude transactions that result 
merely in a change in the method of holding title proved 
unacceptable.  Within a year after the Legislature adopted the 
task force’s recommended version of section 62, it enacted the 
first version of the language now found in subdivision (a)(2), 
excluding such transfers.  (Stats. 1980, ch. 1081, § 2.3.)  As a 
contemporary bill analysis explained, the new provision “would 
allow a transfer of title into a distinct entity to be excluded 
from change in ownership, if . . . the proportionate share of 
ownership is not altered.”  (Department of Finance, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1260 (1980–1981 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 26, 
1980, p. 2.) 
 
5  
The Legislature originally enacted Section 62 essentially 
as proposed by the task force.  Recommended subdivision (a) 
excluded “[a]ny transfer between coowners which results in a 
change in the method of holding title to the real property 
without changing the proportional interests of the coowners, 
such as a partition of a tenancy in common.”  (Stats. 1979, 
ch. 242, § 4.)  It did not mention transfers involving legal 
entities. 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
26 
The language of the 1980 amendment did not specify 
which ownership interests must remain unchanged.  Rather, 
the provision excluded from a change in ownership any 
transfer involving an entity that results solely in a change in 
the method of holding title and “in which the proportional 
interests of the transferors and transferees, whether 
represented by stock, partnership interest, or otherwise, 
remain the same after the transfer.”  (Stats. 1980, ch. 1081, 
§ 2.3.)  This oversight was remedied two years later, when 
section 62(a)(2) was again amended and the language was 
changed to its present form, excluding transfers in which 
“proportional ownership interests of the transferors and 
transferees . . . in each and every piece of real property 
transferred, remain the same after the transfer.”  (Stats. 1982, 
ch. 1465, § 4.5, italics added.) 
The legislation proposing the 1982 amendment, 
sponsored by the State Board, explained, “[t]he proposal would 
. . . make technical changes to Section 62(a)(2) for the purpose 
of clarifying that the ‘proportional interests’ must remain the 
same in each and every piece of real property transferred.”  
(State Bd., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3382 (1982–1983 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Aug. 10, 1982, p. 4; see also id. at p. 1.)  To 
illustrate, the bill analysis provided the following example:  
“Corporation A owns Blackacre and Whiteacre, each of equal 
value.  X and Y are each 50% of [sic] shareholders.  Upon 
dissolution of Corporation A, X and Y receive a 1/2 undivided 
interest in both Blackacre and Whiteacre.  This transfer is 
excluded under proposed Section 62(a)(2), whereas a transfer 
of Blackacre to X and Whiteacre to Y upon dissolution of 
Corporation A would not be, since the proportional ownership 
interests in each property is [sic] not the same before and after 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
27 
the transfer.”  (Id. at p. 4.)  The example is fully consistent 
with our interpretation of section 62(a)(2) because it compares 
the beneficial ownership interests of the shareholders in the 
property prior to the transfer with their direct ownership 
interests afterwards.  The example makes no reference to 
voting shares. 
Section 62(a)(2) was therefore expressly amended by the 
Legislature, at the behest of the State Board, to make clear 
that the phrase “proportional ownership interests” refers to 
interests in real property.  To interpret the phrase to refer 
directly to interests in an entity, as the trustees urge, would 
contradict the Legislature’s clearly expressed intent.  Further, 
in proposing the amendment, the State Board used an example 
that makes no reference to voting shares, instead using 
ownership of corporate stock generally to represent 
proportional beneficial ownership interests.  As stated above, a 
beneficial ownership interest in corporate real property is not 
dependent on ownership of shares having voting rights.  To 
accept the trustees’ contrary argument would expand the scope 
of the exclusion provided by section 62(a)(2) beyond that 
intended by the Legislature — i.e., to identify transfers of real 
property that result solely in the method of holding title.   
An example is illustrative.  In the instant case, the 
nonvoting stock represented a relatively small portion of the 
outstanding stock.  Imagine, however, a corporation with two 
shareholders, one owning voting shares representing 
50 percent of the outstanding corporate stock, and another 
owning nonvoting shares representing the remaining 
50 percent.  If the corporation’s real property were transferred 
to the holder of the voting stock, the proportional ownership 
interests would remain unchanged when measured by voting 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
28 
stock.  Yet the beneficial ownership interests in the real 
property would have changed dramatically.  The interest of the 
holder of voting stock would increase from 50 to 100 percent, 
while the interest of the other shareholder would decrease 
from 50 percent to nothing.  The number of persons holding a 
beneficial ownership interest likewise would be reduced by 
half.  To exclude this transaction from “change in ownership” 
would be in considerable tension with the requirement of 
section 62(a)(2) that the transfer result solely in a change in 
the method of holding title. 
2. There is no policy basis for requiring a uniform 
measure of “ownership interests” across these 
provisions 
We also find no policy basis to require a uniform measure 
of “ownership interests” across these statutory provisions.  To 
reiterate, section 62(a)(2) and section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) 
and (d) are intended to remedy anomalies created by the 
“separate entity” theory but are otherwise dissimilar.  Section 
62(a)(2) describes transfers of real property by or to an entity 
that do not result in a change in ownership despite a formal 
change in the titleholder(s).  Section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) 
and (d) concern, in effect, the inverse of that situation.  
Section 64 concerns the transfer of ownership interests in an 
entity.  Such transfers generally do not result in a change in 
ownership of the real property owned by the entity because 
they do not result in a change in the titleholder(s).  However, 
section 64, subdivisions (c)(1) and (d) describe the 
circumstances in which the transfer of interests in an entity 
will result in a change in ownership of the entity’s real 
property despite no formal change in the titleholder(s).  The 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
29 
Legislature’s adoption of different rules to govern these 
different situations is entirely reasonable.   
 
As to section 62(a)(2), adoption of a rule governed by 
control over an entity, rather than by beneficial ownership 
interests in the entity’s real property, would be contrary to the 
express purpose of the proportional ownership interest 
exception:  the persons having a beneficial ownership interest 
in real property could be substantially changed without 
triggering a change in ownership.  So long as the persons 
holding the voting stock remained the same, no change in 
ownership would occur.  Recall the example above involving a 
corporation with two shareholders, one owning voting shares 
representing 50 percent of the outstanding corporate stock, and 
another owning nonvoting shares representing the remaining 
50 percent.  If section 62(a)(2) were governed by corporate 
control, the real property owned by the corporation — in which 
both shareholders have identical dividend and liquidation 
rights — could be transferred to the voting shareholder 
without triggering a change in ownership, even though doing 
so would eliminate the beneficial ownership interests of the 
nonvoting shareholder.  The Legislature’s decision to measure 
a change in ownership by proportional beneficial ownership 
interests, rather than control, thus limits application of the 
exception to transactions in which there is a change solely in 
the method of holding title.  
Conversely, a change in corporate control is a rational 
measure for determining when an entity’s real property is 
deemed to be subject to a change in ownership, despite no legal 
change in the titleholder.  In the absence of some such rule, the 
property of a corporation would never experience a change in 
ownership, even if the corporation itself changed hands 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
30 
entirely.  Yet a rule similar to that of section 62(a)(2), in which 
a change in ownership occurs whenever beneficial ownership 
changes, would put ownership of a public corporation’s real 
property in perpetual flux and seriously hamper changes in 
ownership of corporations.  A middle ground was necessary.  
The Legislature’s decision to equate a change in control of the 
corporation to a change in ownership of its real property 
represents a reasonable compromise. 
Borrowing an argument advanced by the State Board 
below, the trustees argue our construction “creates loopholes 
that allow for tax evasion.”  In the example they posit, if stock 
in section 62(a)(2) means “all stock,” a corporation can issue a 
new class of nonvoting stock and then dissolve, such that the 
entity’s former real property would then be partially owned by 
the new nonvoting shareholder.   
As an initial matter, the trustees’ example acknowledges 
that, upon dissolution, the corporation’s real property would be 
proportionally divided among all shareholders, not just voting 
shareholders.  Setting that aside, we acknowledge that neither 
our construction of the statute nor the one proposed by the 
trustees is likely to prevent all tax avoidance.  The trustees do 
not, however, establish that our construction would “ ‘frustrate 
the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole or otherwise 
lead to absurd results.’ ”  (Siry Investment, L.P. v. 
Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 362, fn. 17.)  The so-
called “absurdity exception” requires “ ‘much more than 
showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if 
the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different 
approach would have been wiser or better.’ ”  (Id. at p. 356.)  
We are not persuaded to a different view of the statutory text 
based on the mere potential for loopholes.  Of course, if the 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
31 
Legislature becomes concerned that any loophole is being used 
to the detriment of the statutory scheme, it can step in to 
amend the statute. 
Adopting another argument advanced by the State 
Board — and endorsed by the dissent — below, the trustees 
argue that reading “stock” in section 62(a)(2) to mean voting 
stock “avoids significant administrative difficulties.”  (Prang, 
supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 262 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.).)  
According to the State Board, evaluating the proportional 
ownership interests of voting stock is relatively 
straightforward whereas evaluating the proportional 
ownership interests of all stock would “ ‘necessitate an 
evaluation of all the different classes and types of stock and 
their attendant rights, having to assign what may amount to 
random percentages of ownership to particular classes of stock 
since . . . owners of corporations have no specific right to any 
corporate real property.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
The trustees’ assertion regarding the practicalities of 
assessing proportional ownership interests does not withstand 
scrutiny.  As noted above, corporations “may issue one or more 
classes or series of shares or both, with full, limited or no 
voting rights . . . .”  (Corp. Code, § 400, subd. (a), italics added.)  
Thus, evaluating the proportional ownership interests of 
different classes or series of voting stock, some with full voting 
rights and others with limited voting rights, is not necessarily 
straightforward.  Moreover, the notion that evaluating the 
proportional ownership interests of all corporate stock is 
unworkable seems to be based on a faulty premise, i.e., that 
owners of corporations have “no specific right to any corporate 
real property.”  (Prang, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 262 (dis. 
opn. of Baker, J.).)  Although shareholders have no direct 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
32 
ownership interest in corporate real property, each shareholder 
enjoys a beneficial ownership interest in the property of the 
corporation equal to “the proportion which his shares of stock 
bear to all the stock outstanding.”  (MacDermot, supra, 175 
Cal. at p. 114.)  This principle is not particularly complex to 
apply; indeed, it is applied rather simply here.   
Lastly, the trustees argue the construction of section 
62(a)(2) we adopt today undermines uniformity in the 
administration of property tax assessment practices 
throughout the state — a goal the State Board is charged to 
promote through its rulemaking authority.  (See Gov. Code, 
§ 15606, subds. (c), (e), (f).)  The trustees echo the view of the 
Court of Appeal dissent that our construction “permits the Los 
Angeles County Assessor to disregard the [State] Board’s 
instructions and expertise, thereby opening the door to a 
patchwork, county-by-county system of differing reassessment 
methods that is the opposite of what the Legislature intended.”  
(Prang, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 262 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.).) 
We do not question that uniform application of property 
tax assessment practices throughout the state is an important 
policy goal.  There is no evidence that our construction of 
section 62(a)(2) imperils that goal, however.  Although the 
trustees suggest that the Los Angeles County Assessor is an 
outlier in its application of section 62(a)(2), we note that the 
California State Association of Counties and the California 
Assessors Association, which purport to represent all 
58 counties, have filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the 
assessor here.  They note that “there is no information in the 
record or known to amici to suggest that the Assessor is an 
outlier in his interpretation of the statute or that other 
counties are applying the law differently.”  The State Board, 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
33 
which elected not to file an amicus curiae brief before this 
court, provided no evidence to the contrary below.  Moreover, 
as discussed in the section that follows, we conclude the State 
Board has not promulgated any controlling guidance that 
supports the trustees’ construction of section 62(a)(2).  
E. The Agency Guidance 
With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the trustees’ 
argument that the Court of Appeal majority failed to accord 
proper deference to the State Board’s implementing regulation 
and interpretative materials.  As set forth above, we may 
extend deference to the State Board’s constructions of the 
relevant Revenue and Taxation Code provisions “to the extent 
that [they] are embodied in quasi-legislative regulations or 
constitute long-standing, consistent, and contemporaneous 
interpretations.”  (McHugh, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 227, citing 
Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 12–13.) 
Although “the proper interpretation of a statute is 
ultimately the court’s responsibility” (American Coatings Assn. 
v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
446, 462), an agency’s interpretation is one of several tools 
available to the court.  (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 7.)  
Administrative rulemaking falls into two categories:  quasi-
legislative rules, whereby an agency creates new substantive 
standards under an express delegation of legislative authority, 
and interpretative rulemaking, whereby an agency clarifies 
existing substantive standards set forth in some law or 
regulation that it is called upon to administer.  (Alvarado v. 
Dart Container Corp. of California (2018) 4 Cal.5th 542, 556, 
citing Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 7–12.)  Quasi-
legislative rules, such as the regulations implementing the 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
34 
Revenue and Taxation Code, are afforded the “dignity of 
statutes.”  (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)  Interpretative 
rules, such as the other State Board materials cited by the 
trustees, are entitled to consideration and respect but are not 
binding or necessarily even authoritative.  (Id. at pp. 7–8.)  
“[Their] power to persuade is both circumstantial and 
dependent on the presence or absence of factors that support 
the merit of the interpretation.”  (Id. at p. 7.)  “Depending on 
the context, it may be helpful, enlightening, even convincing.  
It may sometimes be of little worth.”  (Id. at p. 8.) 
Here, the trustees assert that the State Board has 
consistently construed “stock” in section 62(a)(2) to mean 
“voting stock,” and that the Court of Appeal should have 
deferred to the agency’s construction.  In advancing this 
argument, they rely on the State Board’s regulation 
implementing section 62(a)(2), which is published at California 
Code of Regulations, title 18, section 462.180 (Rule 462.180).  
They also rely on subsequent State Board publications 
purporting to interpret Rule 462.180.  We conclude Rule 
462.180 supports our interpretation of section 62(a)(2) and the 
remaining materials are unpersuasive.   
1. Rule 462.180 is consistent with our interpretation 
of section 62(a)(2) 
Rule 462.180 addresses “Change in Ownership — Legal 
Entities,” a topic the regulation divides into two subtopics, 
“Transfers of Real Property to and by Legal Entities” (Rule 
462.180, subd. (a)) and “Transfers of ownership interests in 
legal entities” (Rule 462.180, subd. (c)).  Rule 462.180, 
subdivision (a) states the general rule, that “[t]he transfer of 
any interest in real property to a corporation, partnership, 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
35 
limited liability company, or other legal entity is a change in 
ownership of the real property interest transferred.”  This is a 
straightforward application of the separate entity theory.  The 
general rule is followed, in subdivision (b), with two exceptions.  
The first is not relevant here.  The second, “Proportional 
Transfers of Real Property,” reflects the exception contained in 
section 62(a)(2), stated in essentially the language of the 
statute.  (Rule 462.180, subd. (b)(2).)  It requires that “the 
proportional ownership interests in each and every piece of 
real property transferred remain the same after the transfer.”  
(Ibid.)  In this way, the rule provides no support for the 
trustees’ argument. 
Neither Rule 462.180, subdivision (b)(2), which reflects 
the language of section 62(a)(2), nor the explanatory examples 
that follow, mention voting stock.  On the contrary, the 
examples are fully consistent with our understanding of the 
proper application of section 62(a)(2).  Of particular interest is 
Example 2, which states:  “A transfer of real property from A 
and B, as equal co-tenants, to Corporation X where A and B 
each take back 50 percent of the stock.  No change in 
ownership.  However, if A and B each take back 49 percent of 
the stock and C receives 2 percent of the stock then there will 
be a change in ownership of the entire property.”  (Rule 
462.180, subd. (b)(2).)  Two aspects of this example are notable.  
First, the “proportional ownership interests” referred to in the 
regulation are measured by the shareholders’ beneficial 
ownership interests in the property, as measured by their 
shareholdings.  Second, the example does not mention voting 
stock; the beneficial ownership interests are measured by stock 
generally.  When the proportional beneficial ownership 
interests of the shareholders are the same as the proportional 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
36 
direct ownership interests of the individual owners, as in the 
first part of the example, the exception applies; when they are 
not, as in the second part of the example, the exception does 
not apply.  Example 5 is also of note.  It provides:  “A transfer 
of real property from Corporation X to its sole shareholder A.  
No change in ownership, even if A is an ‘original co-owner,’ 
because interests in real property, and not ownership interests 
in a legal entity, are being transferred.”  (Ibid.)  This tends to 
defeat the trustees’ argument that the distinction drawn by the 
Court of Appeal majority “between Section 62(a)(2) and 
Section 64 does not exist.”  
The trustees point to a different subdivision of Rule 
462.180.  Subdivision (c) of the rule concerns the transfer of 
ownership interests in legal entities, and it reiterates the 
general rule that the transfer of interests in a legal entity does 
not constitute a change in ownership of the real property 
owned by the entity.  Subdivision (d) then provides exceptions 
to the general rule, with subdivision (d)(1), labeled “control,” 
describing the exception set forth in section 64(c)(1).  Like 
section 64(c)(1), Rule 462.180, subdivision (d)(1)(A) describes 
the measure of corporate control as “more than 50 percent of 
the voting stock.”  Subdivision (d)(2) of the rule describes the 
exception set forth in section 64(d).  Rule 462.180, subdivision 
(d)(2) explains that the exception applies when original 
coowners subsequently transfer “more than 50 percent of the 
total control or ownership interests, as defined in subdivision 
(d)(1) of this rule, in that partnership, corporation, limited 
liability company or legal entity[.]”  (Italics added.)  The 
trustees point to this italicized language to argue that Rule 
462.180 measures ownership interests in a corporation as 
voting stock for all purposes.   
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
37 
As discussed above, however, subdivisions (c) and (d) of 
Rule 462.180 concern “[t]ransfers of ownership interests in 
legal entities.”  No portion of the rule suggests the definition in 
subdivision (d)(1) has any applicability to subdivisions (a) 
and (b), which concern “transfers of real property to and by 
legal entities.”  (Capitalization omitted.)  Thus, although the 
State Board’s regulation may be entitled to the dignity of 
statute, nothing in Rule 462.180 can be read to suggest that 
“stock” in section 62(a)(2) means voting stock.  In short, Rule 
462.180 does not support the trustees’ interpretation of section 
62(a)(2).  In the absence of any agency regulation to support 
their contrary interpretation, we have no cause to deviate from 
the plain meaning of the statute. 
2. The State Board’s other guidance is unpersuasive 
As the foregoing demonstrates, Rule 462.180, subdivision 
(b)(2) does not support the trustees’ argument that 
proportional ownership interests in corporate real property 
must be measured by voting stock.  Cognizant of this analytical 
gap, the trustees rely heavily on interpretive materials 
published by the State Board long after Rule 462.180 was 
adopted.  In deciding what deference, if any, to afford these 
materials, we consider several factors that bear on whether the 
agency’s interpretation is likely to be correct:  “indications of 
careful consideration by senior agency officials,” “evidence that 
the agency ‘has consistently maintained the interpretation in 
question, especially if [it] is long-standing,’ ” and “indications 
that the agency’s interpretation was contemporaneous with 
legislative enactment of the statute being interpreted.”  
(Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 13.) 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
38 
In an amicus brief filed below, the State Board 
represented to the Court of Appeal that its interpretation of 
section 62(a)(2) was “consistent and longstanding.”  Like the 
trustees, the State Board pointed to Rule 462.180, which was 
promulgated in 1981, as a “contemporaneous” interpretation of 
the relevant statutes.  As indicated, however, Rule 462.180 
does not mention voting stock in connection with section 
62(a)(2), and its examples refer only to “stock.”  We have been 
provided no State Board publication predating 2002 that can 
be read to interpret the reference to “stock” in section 62(a)(2) 
to mean “voting stock.”  The State Board’s amicus brief in the 
Court of Appeal did not acknowledge, let alone attempt to 
explain, the failure of Rule 462.180 to refer to “voting stock” in 
this context.  Thus, contrary to the State Board’s 
representations below, it appears the interpretation found in 
its more recent materials is neither “consistent” nor 
“longstanding.”  It was certainly not made contemporaneously 
with the enactment of section 62(a)(2). 
Of the materials cited by the trustees, the most salient is 
Section 401 of the Assessors’ Handbook, a 2010 publication 
that discusses a variety of issues raised by sections 60 through 
69.5.6  (State Bd., Assessors’ Handbook (2010) (Handbook) at 
p. ii.)  As the State Board acknowledges in its “Hierarchy of 
 
6  
The Assessors’ Handbook consists of over 30 independent 
sections discussing various aspects of property appraisal and 
assessment.  (See generally, Assessors’ Handbook <https:// 
www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/ahcont.htm> [as of May 30, 2024]; all 
Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket 
number, and case name at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
38324.htm>.)  Section 401 was approved by the State Board on 
September 15, 2010.  (Handbook, supra, at p. ii; see 
https://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/pdf/ah401.pdf.)  
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
39 
Property Tax Authorities,” issued May 29, 2003, the “Assessors’ 
Handbook and other Board-approved publications do not have 
the force of law”; they are “advisory only.”  Under the general 
heading “ownership of legal entities,” the Handbook states that 
“[f]or change in ownership purposes, ownership in a 
corporation is determined by the percentage of ownership or 
control of a corporation’s voting stock.”  (Handbook, at p. 38, 
italics added.)  The language and its placement within the 
Handbook suggest it is meant to apply only to ownership 
interests in legal entities, which corresponds to section 64, not 
to ownership interests in real property as may be represented 
by ownership interests in a legal entity, which would 
correspond to section 62(a)(2).7  In any event, no authority is 
cited in support of the proposition.   
Later, in a section discussing the “proportional 
ownership interest transfer exclusion,” the Handbook 
accurately states the statutory rule, essentially mirroring 
section 62(a)(2)’s language:  “Any transfer of real property 
between an individual or individuals and an entity, or between 
legal entities, that results solely in a change in the method of 
holding title to the real property, and in which the proportional 
ownership interests of the transferors and transferees in each 
and every piece of real property transferred remain the same 
 
7  
The Handbook generally acknowledges the distinction 
between interests in real property and interests in legal 
entities.  (See Handbook, supra, at p. 41 [“In general, there are 
two types of transfers involving legal entities that may trigger 
a change in ownership of real property. The first type is a 
transfer of real property between an individual and an entity 
or between entities. The second type is a transfer of an interest 
in an entity.”].) 
 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
40 
after the transfer, is excluded from a change in ownership.”  
(Handbook, supra, at p. 48.)  The Handbook contains the same 
examples contained in Rule 462.180, subdivision (b)(2).  
Example 2 under Rule 462.180, subdivision (b)(2), for instance, 
is included in the Handbook as Example 6-10.  Yet the 
references to “stock” in Example 2 of Rule 462.180, subdivision 
(b)(2), have been changed to “voting stock” in Example 6-10 of 
the Handbook.  (Handbook, at p. 49.)8  The Handbook contains 
no explanation for, or acknowledgment of, this change, nor is 
any authority cited to fill that void.  Notably, the example 
includes only a “single class of voting stock,” with no mention 
of other classes of stock, voting or nonvoting.  Consequently, 
the example does not suggest that voting stock alone should be 
considered for purposes of section 62(a)(2).  For this reason, 
even if we accept that the Handbook reflects the State Board’s 
interpretation of the meaning of the term “stock” in section 
62(a)(2), it fails to persuade.  There is no indication that the 
State Board’s new reference to voting stock was the product of 
a deliberative process, let alone that it received careful 
consideration by senior agency officials. 
 
8  
Example 6-10 from the Handbook states:  “D and B, 
equal co-tenants, transfer their real property to Corporation X 
and each take back 50 percent of the single class of voting 
stock.  No change in ownership occurs, since the proportional 
ownership interests remain the same before and after the 
transfer.  [¶]  However, if D and B each take back 49 percent of 
the voting stock and C receives 2 percent of the voting stock, 
there will be a change in ownership of the entire property since 
the proportional ownership interests did not remain the same 
before and after the transfer.”  (Handbook, supra, at p. 49.) 
 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
41 
The opinion letters cited by the trustees are similar in 
this respect — none directly address the question presented 
here and none appear to discuss a situation where a 
corporation had issued both voting and nonvoting stock.9  The 
State Board opinion letter regarding “Change of Ownership - 
Transfer from Revocable Trust to Corporation,” issued May 31, 
2007 to the Nevada County Assessor, for example, discusses 
“the transfer of real property from a husband and wife’s 
revocable trust to a corporation owned 51 percent by the wife 
and 49 percent by the husband.”  Although the letter, when 
analyzing section 62(a)(2)’s exclusion, later refers to “voting 
stock,” there is no indication that either spouse also held 
nonvoting stock.  Like the Handbook, then, the letter does not 
suggest that voting stock alone should be considered for 
purposes of section 62(a)(2).  The State Board opinion letters 
regarding “Exchange, Transfer and Conversion of Interests in 
a Limited Partnership Owning Real Property,” issued April 12, 
2002, and “Request for Legal Opinion - BOE-100-B, Statement 
of Change in Control and Ownership of Legal Entities for 
 
9  
Summaries of the conclusions reached in selected opinion 
letters may be posted on the State Board’s website as 
“[a]nnotations.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 5700, subd. (a)(1); 
Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 4–5; see State Board, 
Property Tax Annotations <https://www.boe.ca.gov/lawguides/ 
property/current/ptlg/annt/property-tax-annotations.htm> [as 
of May 30, 2024].)  Not all opinion letters “qualify for 
annotation.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 5700, subd. (b).)  It 
appears two of the opinion letters relied upon by the trustees 
were never annotated.  The other two — Annotations 220.0067 
and 220.0267 — were previously posted but are now marked 
“(Deleted 2020).”  (See State Board, Property Tax Annotations, 
220.0000 Change in Ownership 
<https://www.boe.ca.gov/lawguides/property/current/ptlg/annt/
220-0000-all.html [as of May 30, 2024].) 
PRANG v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J. 
 
42 
[Redacted] & Subsidiaries Assignment No. 10-265,” issued 
September 30, 2011, each contain a general statement that 
Rule 462.180, subdivision (d) defines “ownership interests” for 
purposes of sections 64 and 62(a)(2).  These letters, however, 
address the transfer of partnership interests and a complex 
merger of affiliated corporations, respectively; the definition of 
“stock” in section 62(a)(2) does not dictate the result in either 
case.  Again, there is no indication the general statements 
contained in these letters were the product of a deliberative 
process.  They provide no rationale to support the assertion 
that Rule 462.180 subdivision (d) defines “ownership interests” 
for purposes of section 62(a)(2).  Moreover, for the reasons 
discussed at length above, the statements conflict with our 
interpretation of section 62(a)(2) and the State Board’s own 
implementing regulation; the letters do not acknowledge, much 
less explain, this disconnect.  Accordingly, to the limited extent 
the opinion letters may reflect an interpretation of section 
62(a)(2), they are unpersuasive and entitled to no deference. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         EVANS, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals 
Board 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 58 Cal.App.5th 246 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S266590 
Date Filed:  May 30, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  James C. Chalfant 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Greenberg Traurig, Colin W. Fraser and Cris K. O’Neall for Real Party 
in Interest and Appellant. 
 
McDermott Will & Emery and Charles J. Moll III for Charles J. Moll 
III as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Appellant. 
 
Lamb and Kawakami, Renne Public Law Group, Thomas G. Kelch, 
Michael K. Slattery; Mary C. Wickham and Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, 
County Counsel, Nicole Davis Tinkham and Peter M. Bollinger, 
Assistant County Counsel, Richard Girgado and Justin Y. Kim, Deputy 
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties and 
the California Assessors Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Ajalat, Polley, Ayoob & Matarese, Richard J. Ayoob, Christopher J. 
Matarese and Gregory R. Broege as Amicus Curiae. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Tamar Pachter, Assistant Attorney 
General, Karen W. Yiu and Heather B. Hoesterey, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for California State Board of Equalization as Amicus Curiae.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Colin W. Fraser 
Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
18565 Jamboree Road, Suite 500 
Irvine, CA 92612 
(949) 732-6663 
 
Thomas G. Kelch 
Renne Public Law Group 
350 Sansome Street, Suite 300 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
(415) 848-7200