Title: JAMES MILLER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2007-SC-000656-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 2009

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . V. ,$uyrrmr (~ourf of 2007-SC-000656-MR ON APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE NO . 06-CR-00066 RENDERED : JANUARY 22, 2009 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING IN PART REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING JAMES MILLER APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE This is a matter of right appeal from a judgment in which Appellant, James "Hopsing" Miller, was convicted of first-degree possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), second or subsequent offense, and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender . Appellant received a sentence of twenty years imprisonment . On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court improperly amended his indictment to reflect second or subsequent offender status after the jury had convicted him of first-degree possession of a controlled substance . He also contends that comments by the prosecutor during his closing argument in the guilt phase were improper . On May 26, 2006, Columbia city police officer Brad Scholl, was patrolling the Log Cabin Apartments, an area known for drug trafficking . Officer Scholl was circling the apartments when he observed Appellant, whom he knew was an area resident, and a female, later identified as Lisa Neat, standing close to one another and appearing to be exchanging something. Officer Scholl stopped six to eight feet away from Appellant and Neat and yelled out of his cruiser window for the pair to stop and not move . Officer Scholl then approached Appellant and Neat and noticed that Appellant had a crumpled, white paper towel in his hand. On the ground between the pair appeared to Officer Scholl to be a small piece of crack cocaine . Neither Appellant nor Neat claimed ownership. Appellant and Neat were separated for questioning. Neat told Officer Scholl that she was at the apartments to see a friend and was asking Appellant for a key to her friend's apartment. Officer Scholl then interviewed Appellant who said that he did not know anything about a key or a friend of Neat's at the apartments. Appellant stated that he was giving Neat a cigarette pack that he found on the ground . No drugs were found on his person . After the small piece of suspected crack cocaine tested positive for cocaine, both Appellant and Neat were arrested for first-degree possession of a controlled substance . Neat was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia for a crack pipe she had on her person . Officer Scholl then searched the area for more crack cocaine, but did not locate any. He subsequently came across Steve Clem, who told him that he was at the apartments with Neat, but Clem was not arrested because Clem did not have any warrants . Appellant was indicted in July 2006, for first-degree possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO 1) . On August 6, 2007, the case proceeded to trial . Neat pled guilty to charges associated with this case and is serving an eight-year sentence. Neat testified that she was at the Log Cabin Apartments with Steve Clem to buy crack cocaine and that she had bought $25.00 worth of crack cocaine from Appellant, but that this was only a portion of what Appellant had. She stated that he had a $50.00 piece of crack cocaine, but she did not have the money for that so he took her portion from the larger piece. She further testified that when Officer Scholl approached, she had already given Appellant the money and he had just handed her the crack cocaine, which she threw when she saw Officer Scholl. Neat also stated that Appellant told her when they were in the police cruiser that his mouth was numb because he swallowed the rest of the crack cocaine . Steve Clem testified that he was at the apartments with Neat because they were going to visit a female friend of hers who lives in the complex and that Neat gets a little "freaky" when she does cocaine . He further stated that he had gotten a crack pipe from Neat's car and had just given it to her right before the police arrived. Appellant called two witnesses in the case, Taran Taylor and Melanie Harmon . Taylor testified that on May 26, 2006, Appellant had given him $5.00-$10.00 to take him to run errands . He further testified that he and Appellant had spent time at the Log Cabin Apartments, but that Appellant never mentioned drugs and did not appear to be under the influence . Melanie Harmon testified that she lived on the lower level of the Log Cabin Apartments on May 26, 2006, and that Appellant was at her apartment on that date with her, her sister, Taran Taylor, and Sandra Alexander (also a resident of the Log Cabin Apartments) . She further testified that Appellant did not have any drugs, nor appeared to be under the influence . She stated that Appellant left her apartment because someone was banging on Sandra Alexander's upstairs apartment door and she asked Appellant to go and investigate the situation. At the close of both the Commonwealth's and the defense's case, Appellant moved for a directed verdict for insufficiency of evidence, which the trial court overruled . The jury was only instructed on first-degree possession of a controlled substance, of which Appellant was found guilty. However, after the jury returned the verdict, the Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment to make the possession count a second or subsequent offense. The Commonwealth argued that there were three separate prior felony convictions that could be used for both the second or subsequent offender enhancement as well as for PFO I enhancement. The trial court sustained the motion and the jury was informed that Appellant pled guilty to one count of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance in 2003, and received a sentence of five years imprisonment . Thejury then found Appellant to be a second or subsequent offender. Finally, during the PFO phase, the jury was informed of two other convictions . In 1998, Appellant was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and in 2001, Appellant pled guilty to four counts of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second or subsequent offenses . The jury then heard from Officer Perry Parrish, a probation and parole officer, who testified that Appellant was on parole on May 26, 2006, the date he allegedly committed the offense in this case . He further testified that Appellant had been to drug rehab in the past. The jury found Appellant to be a first- degree persistent felony offender and recommended a sentence of twenty years . At final sentencing, Appellant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and made a renewed motion for a directed verdict, both of which were overruled. Appellant made a statement during this proceeding about his battle with addiction ; however, the trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment. Final judgment was entered on September 4, 2007, and a timely notice of appeal was filed on September 12, 2007 . Indictment Amendment Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the indictment after the jury had returned a verdict on the initial indictment charge, first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The Commonwealth then moved to amend the indictment to show second or subsequent offender status because Appellant had three separate prior felony convictions to use for both second or subsequent enhancement, as well as PFO I enhancement. Appellant argues that the plain meaning of RCr 6.16 was violated with this amendment . We agree. RCr 6.16 provides : The court may permit an indictment, information, complaint or citation to be amended any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced . If justice requires, however, the court shall grant the defendant a continuance when such an amendment is permitted. (emphasis added) . Under the plain language of the rule, this amendment was a violation. RCr 6.16 is a lenient rule and if the Commonwealth had moved for this amendment to reflect the second or subsequent status before the return of the verdict, the amendment could have been allowed. Therefore, the amendment to the indictment was error. 1 Improper Closing Statement Appellant also contends that comments by the prosecutor during his closing argument in the guilt phase were improper . Appellant argues that the prosecutor made an improper "send a message" argument ; that the prosecutor made an improper comparison between Appellant and Officer Scholl, the arresting officer, by praising Officer Scholl's "good solid police work" while Appellant spent the day "hanging out;" and that the prosecutor misstated testimony by Neat and ignored testimony of Officer Scholl, by implying that swallowing crack cocaine does not produce any effect on an individual's body . Luna v. Commonwealth , 571 S.W.2d 88 (Ky.App . 1977) involved an amendment before the verdict, which is not the issue herein . Because these alleged errors are unpreserved, we review for palpable error only. RCr 10 .26. Palpable error requires a showing of the "probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law." Martin v . Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006) . In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, an appellate court must focus on "the overall fairness of the trial and may reverse only if the prosecutorial misconduct was so improper, prejudicial, and egregious as to have undermined the overall fairness of the proceedings." Brewer v. Commonwealth , 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) . Near the beginning of his closing argument the prosecutor stated : Right is right and wrong is wrong. And you're asked as ajury to come up here and say what is right and what is wrong . . . What Hopsing Miller did on May the 26th 2006 is wrong. But, its only wrong as 12 people collectively say that's wrong and say we're going to take a stand for it . We represent a jury here in Adair County and we're going to stand and say that that is wrong. And that's what I'm asking you to do . Appellant contends that the prosecutor's exhorting the jury to "represent a jury here in Adair County, and . . . stand and say that that is wrong," is an improper "send a message" argument . The Commonwealth "is not at liberty to place upon the jury the burden of doing what is necessary to protect the community." Commonwealth v . Mitchell, 165 S.W .3d 129, 132 (Ky. 2005) (citing King v. Commonwealth , 253 Ky . 775, 70 S.W.2d 667 (1934)) . Although we disapprove of the comment at issue, when it is considered in the context of the overall trial, we cannot say that it was so egregious that it undermined the fairness of the proceedings or denied Appellant due process. Brewer , 206 S.W.3d at 349-51 ; Mitchell , 165 S.W.3d at 133 . Accordingly, there is no palpable error . As to Appellant's argument that the prosecutor made an improper comparison between Officer Scholl and Appellant, by praising Officer Scholl's "good solid police work" while Appellant spent the day "hanging out", error, if any, would not be palpable . Armstrong, v . Commonwealth , 517 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Ky. 1974) . Finally, Appellant argues that the prosecutor misstated testimony by Neat and ignored testimony of Officer Scholl by implying that swallowing crack cocaine does not produce any effect on an individual's body . Scholl had testified that if someone swallowed crack cocaine he might expect some type of reaction and that he thought it would depend on how much they swallowed and their tolerance, but he did not observe Appellant having any symptoms . Neat testified that she would smoke her crack cocaine . At issue, the prosecutor stated : Now Ms. Neat told you that that's not the way that you get an effect from cocaine, cocaine is smoked, that's the way it's ingested to get this effect . It's heated and injected or it's smoked . Swallowing cocaine would not cause that same effect . Swallowing cocaine was a way for him to dispose of it so the officer wouldn't find it and I submit to you the officer didn't find it. Counsel is permitted wide latitude in closing statements, and may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, propound his explanation of the evidence and why it supports a finding of guilt. Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 350; Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 39 (Ky. 1998) . Here the prosecutor was simply giving his take on the case, which was that Appellant swallowed the cocaine so that Officer Scholl would not find it. He did not say that swallowing cocaine would have no effect, but was referring to Neat's testimony to show that the desired effect is achieved through smoking, theorizing that one would only swallow cocaine to dispose of it . We see no error. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the conviction for first-degree possession of a controlled substance is reinstated ; the conviction as a second or subsequent offense is vacated ; and the matter remanded for a new sentencing (including PFO) phase of the trial. All sitting. Minton, C . J. ; Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ., concur . Venters, J ., concurs in result only . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Emily Holt Rhorer Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Joshua D . Farley Assistant Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601