Title: People v. Frierson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S236728
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 28, 2017

1 
Filed 12/28/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S236728 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B260774 
JAMES BELTON FRIERSON, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. GA043389 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the “Reform Act” or the “Act”), 
amended the Three Strikes sentencing scheme.  The Act reduced the class of 
defendants who are eligible for indeterminate prison terms following a third felony 
conviction.  It also permitted some inmates serving a Three Strikes term to petition 
for modification of their current sentences.  The Act excluded resentencing under 
certain circumstances.  The People acknowledge that they bear the burden of 
establishing that a petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.  The question here is 
what degree of proof is required to discharge that burden.  We hold that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is required.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Statutory Background 
We recently considered another aspect of the Reform Act in People v. 
Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646 (Conley).  The background provided there is helpful 
to an analysis of the current question.  “Enacted ‘to ensure longer prison sentences 
 
2 
and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously 
convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses’ (Pen. Code, former § 667, 
subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1, pp. 71, 72), the Three Strikes 
law ‘consists of two, nearly identical statutory schemes.’  [Citation.]  The first of 
these schemes was enacted by the Legislature in March 1994.  (Pen. Code, former 
§ 667, subds. (b)–(i).)  The second was enacted by ballot initiative in November of 
the same year.  (Pen. Code, former § 1170.12, added by Prop. 184, as approved by 
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) (Proposition 184).)  The two statutes differ only 
in minor respects not relevant here.[1]  [Citation.]   
“Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted, a felony defendant who 
had been convicted of a single prior serious or violent felony (a second strike 
defendant) was to be sentenced to a term equal to ‘twice the term otherwise 
provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.’  (Pen. Code, former § 
1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)  By contrast, a defendant who had been convicted of two or 
more prior serious or violent felonies (a third strike defendant) was to be 
sentenced to ‘an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of’ 
at least 25 years.  (Pen. Code, former § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).)”  (Conley, supra, 63 
Cal.4th at p. 652.)  Thus, under the original law, a defendant previously convicted 
of two qualifying strikes was subject to a life term if he was subsequently 
convicted of any new felony, regardless of whether it was a serious or violent one.   
“The Reform Act changed the sentence prescribed for a third strike 
defendant whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony.  [Citation.]  
Under the Reform Act’s revised penalty provisions, many third strike defendants 
                                              
1  
Because the relevant portions of the legislative and initiative versions of the 
Three Strikes law are the same, for convenience, we will hereafter refer to the 
initiative version.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.12.)   
 
3 
are excepted from the provision imposing an indeterminate life sentence (see Pen. 
Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)) and are instead sentenced in the same way as 
second strike defendants (see id., subd. (c)(2)(C)):  that is, they receive a term 
equal to ‘twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony 
conviction’ (id., subd. (c)(1)).  A defendant does not qualify for this ameliorative 
change, however, if his current offense is a controlled substance charge involving 
large quantities (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)), one of various enumerated sex offenses 
(id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(ii)), or one in which he used a firearm, was armed with a 
firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury (id., subd. 
(c)(2)(C)(iii)).  The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply in 
cases in which the defendant was previously convicted of certain enumerated 
offenses, including those involving sexual violence, child sexual abuse, homicide 
or attempted homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun 
on a peace officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or 
any serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death.  
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)–(VIII).)  The Act provides that these 
disqualifying factors must be pleaded and proved by the prosecution.  (§ 1170.12, 
subd. (c)(2)(C).)   
“In the Reform Act, the voters also established a procedure for ‘persons 
presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment’ under the prior version 
of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing under the Reform Act’s revised 
penalty structure.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (a).)  Under section 1170.126, 
‘within two years after the effective date of the act . . . or at a later date upon a 
showing of good cause,’ such persons can file a petition for a recall of sentence 
before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction.  (Id., subd. (b).)  If 
the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act 
version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying factors (§ 1170.126, 
 
4 
subds. (e), (f)), section 1170.126 provides that he ‘shall be resentenced pursuant to 
[the Reform Act] unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing 
the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ (id., 
subd. (f)).  In exercising this discretion, the court may consider the defendant’s 
criminal conviction history, the defendant’s disciplinary record and record of 
rehabilitation while incarcerated, and ‘[a]ny other evidence the court . . . 
determines to be relevant.’  (Id., subd. (g).)”  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 
652-653.)  The Act, therefore, enacted two kinds of reforms:  prospective, by 
exempting some newly-charged defendants from an indeterminate term, and 
retrospective, by permitting resentencing for some already convicted.   
Serious and violent felonies are defined in the Penal Code in two ways:  by 
definition or because of the circumstances of their commission.  Rape, robbery, 
murder and other listed offenses are serious or violent by definition.  (See Pen. 
Code,2 §§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c).)  Other felonies may qualify as 
serious based on a defendant’s conduct during their commission.  (See, e.g., 
§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23).)  The circumstances of commission requirements are 
similar to, but different from, the factors set out in the Reform Act’s resentencing 
provisions.  (See discussion post.)   
B.  Facts and Procedure 
Defendant James Frierson and his girlfriend, Lynn Thompson, had a stormy 
relationship.  In September 1998, he struck her in the head, broke her car 
windshield, and threatened to kill her.  Frierson was jailed but the couple 
reconciled and married.  When Frierson was subsequently sent to state prison, 
                                              
2  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted.   
 
5 
Thompson told him she was suing for divorce.  Frierson responded by sending 
Thompson a series of letters, threatening to “track [her] down,” and saying she 
“better run fast.”  He wrote:  “I will find you, Lynn, and kill you for causing me so 
much pain.  I want you to feel what I am going through.”  He indicated he would 
come to her job or son’s school to find her.  After Thompson filed divorce papers 
and secured a restraining order, Frierson sent more letters, threatening to rape and 
kill her.   
A jury convicted defendant of stalking and stalking while violating a 
restraining order.3  (§ 646.9, subds. (a), (b).)  Frierson had been convicted of 
robbery (§ 211) in 1981 and 1990, and of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant 
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)) in 1998.  The robbery convictions qualified as separate strikes.  
(§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).)  Accordingly, 
he was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life in prison on one stalking count.   
After passage of the Reform Act, defendant petitioned for resentencing.  
Stalking is not a serious or violent felony by definition.  The People opposed 
resentencing, however.  They urged Frierson was ineligible for relief because, 
during commission of that offense, he “intended to cause great bodily injury to 
another person.”4  (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii); see also § 1170.126, subd. 
(e)(2).)   
The court granted the People’s unopposed motion to admit six exhibits, 
which included trial testimony by Thompson and two officers, as well as a May 
2014 letter Thompson wrote to the sentencing court.  The court denied 
                                              
3  
Defendant was also convicted of two misdemeanor counts of disobeying a 
court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)), for which he received concurrent terms.   
4  
The People also urged that resentencing Frierson would pose an 
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.  (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)   
 
6 
resentencing, reasoning Frierson was ineligible because, “even assuming arguendo 
that the offense of stalking does not involve an intent to cause great bodily injury, 
the factual circumstances of petitioner’s stalking clearly evidence an intent to 
cause great bodily injury.”  The court concluded that “the People have amply met 
their burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that Petitioner is 
ineligible for resentencing because petitioner ‘[d]uring the commission of the 
current offense, . . . intended to cause great bodily injury to another person’ ([Pen. 
Code, §] 1170.12[, subd.] (c)(2)(C)(iii)).”  The Court of Appeal affirmed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Burden of Proof for Prospective Application of the Three Strikes Law 
The Three Strikes law, both before and after the Reform Act, does not 
directly mention the applicable burden of proof.  However, the Three Strikes law 
has always required that a qualifying prior conviction be “pled and proved” by the 
prosecution.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subds. (a), (c)(1), (c)(2)(A).)  It has long been 
settled that “[t]he burden is on the state as in the case of the trial of other factual 
matters in issue to prove beyond a reasonable doubt those alleged prior 
convictions challenged by a defendant.”  (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 862; 
see People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1032; People v. Newman (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 413, 418.)  Specifically, courts have held or acknowledged that the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior 
conviction is a serious or violent felony.  (See People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
1074, 1093; People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070; People v. Ledbetter 
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 896, 900; People v. Towers (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1273, 
1277.)  Evidence Code section 501 provides that “[i]nsofar as any statute, except 
[Evidence Code] Section 522 [concerning insanity pleas], assigns the burden of 
proof in a criminal action, such statute is subject to Penal Code Section 1096.”  
 
7 
Penal Code section 1096 articulates the presumption of innocence and provides 
that “the effect of this presumption is only to place upon the state the burden of 
proving him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”   
After passage of the Reform Act, the prosecution bears an additional 
burden to secure imposition of a third strike sentence.  If the current offense is not 
a serious or violent felony, the prosecution must plead and prove facts that 
demonstrate the defendant is not entitled to the ameliorative changes of the Act.  
The People do not dispute that stalking is not listed as a serious or violent felony 
by definition.  Accordingly, if Frierson had been prosecuted for stalking 
Thompson after the Reform Act’s passage, they could only have secured a third 
strike sentence if they had pled and proved he had two qualifying strikes and, 
while committing the current stalking offense, he intended to inflict great bodily 
injury on Thompson.5  The People concede that prospective application of the 
Three Strikes law “requires the prosecution to prove any disqualifying factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”  (Cf. In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 361-
364.)   
B.  Burden of Proof for Ineligibility Criteria at Resentencing 
The Reform Act’s resentencing mechanism has three separate aspects:  
(1) the initial petition for recall of the sentence, (2) a determination of eligibility, 
and (3) the court’s discretionary decision whether the defendant poses an 
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.  The defendant must file a petition for 
                                              
5  
As noted, there was no evidence that Frierson used or was armed with a 
firearm or deadly weapon when he stalked Thompson.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, 
subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).)  Likewise, there was no evidence that the current offense was 
an applicable sex or drug crime, or that the nature of his prior convictions were of 
a kind that would preclude a second strike term.  (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)-
(ii), (iv).)   
 
8 
recall of sentence (§ 1170.126, subd. (b)) and “specify all of the currently charged 
felonies” that resulted in a third strike sentence, as well as “all of the prior 
convictions alleged and proved under” the Three Strikes law.  (§ 1170.126, subd. 
(d).)   
“[T]he petitioning defendant has the initial burden of establishing 
eligibility, and if that burden is met, then the prosecution has the opportunity to 
establish ineligibility on other grounds.”  (People v. Johnson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 
953, 963.)  Placing the initial burden on the defendant is consistent with the 
electorate’s clear intent that resentencing not be automatic.  A defendant must seek 
out relief, and do so within a specified time period.   
Once that initial showing is made by the defendant, the prosecution bears 
the burden of proving that one of the ineligibility criteria applies.  The People do 
not argue otherwise.  Placing the burden of proving ineligibility on the prosecution 
is consistent with the recall statute’s statement that it should apply to one “whose 
sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life sentence.”  
(§ 1170.126, subd. (a).)   
Turning to Frierson’s petition, stalking is not, by definition, a serious or 
violent felony.  Thus, the People could only prove he was ineligible in one of two 
ways.  First, they could offer evidence that defendant’s stalking of Thompson was 
a serious felony because he (a) personally used a firearm or other dangerous or 
deadly weapon, or (b) personally inflicted great bodily injury on Thompson.  
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23).)  Such proof would establish his current offense for 
stalking was a serious felony because of the circumstances of its commission.  
Alternatively, they could prove that, while stalking Thompson, he intended to 
cause great bodily injury on her.  The People argued the latter.  Such proof would 
bring Frierson’s current offense within the exclusion provision of sections 
1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C)(iii) and 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2).   
 
9 
The court, in assessing the People’s opposition, applied a preponderance of 
evidence standard.  This application is consistent with People v. Osuna (2014) 225 
Cal.App.4th 1020.  Osuna concluded that “a trial court need only find the 
existence of a disqualifying factor by a preponderance of the evidence” (id. at p. 
1040), citing Evidence Code section 115, which states that “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  Osuna reasoned in part that “section 1170.126 does not impose the 
same requirements in connection with the procedure for determining whether an 
inmate already sentenced as a third strike offender is eligible for resentencing as a 
second strike offender” (id. at p. 1033), noting that it omits any pleading and proof 
requirement.   
People v. Arevalo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 836 disagreed with Osuna and 
concluded the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to ineligibility factors 
for resentencing.  Arevalo noted the parallel structure of the prospective and 
retrospective portions of the Reform Act and reasoned “not only must there be a 
heightened standard of proof for section 1170.126 resentencing eligibility 
determinations, but that—in order to safeguard the intended parallel structure of 
the Act—the heightened standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Under a lesser standard of proof, nothing would prevent the trial court from 
disqualifying a defendant from resentencing eligibility consideration by 
completely revisiting an earlier trial, and turning acquittals and not-true 
enhancement findings into their opposites.”  (Id. at p. 853.)   
The parties’ arguments here mirror the reasoning of Arevalo and Osuna.  
Defendant argues the parallel structure of the prospective and retrospective 
portions of the Reform Act reflects an intent that the same beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard applies for the finding of ineligibility for a second strike sentence 
in both contexts.  The People urge that the lack of a pleading and proof 
 
10 
requirement in the resentencing provision reflects an intent that the default 
preponderance of the evidence standard of Evidence Code section 115 should 
apply.   
Defendant has the better view.  The preponderance standard of Evidence 
Code section 115 applies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law . . . .”  Although 
the resentencing provision of Penal Code section 1170.126 does not expressly 
reference a standard of proof, as explained below, we conclude that the parallel 
construction of the prospective and retrospective portions of the Reform Act 
reflects an electoral intent to apply the same standard for proof of ineligibility for 
second strike sentencing in both contexts.  As such, the Reform Act “otherwise 
provide[s]” for a different standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 
default preponderance standard does not apply.   
As Arevalo observed, we have previously noted that “the parallel structure 
of the Act’s amendments to the sentencing provisions and the Act’s resentencing 
provisions reflects an intent that sentences imposed on individuals with the same 
criminal history be the same, regardless of whether they are being sentenced or 
resentenced.  Both the sentencing scheme and the resentencing scheme provide for 
a second strike sentence if the current offense is not a serious or violent felony, 
and they set forth identical exceptions to the new sentencing rules.”  (People v. 
Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 686 (Johnson), italics added.)  We conclude the 
parallel structure of the Act and section 1170.126’s wholesale incorporation of the 
ineligibility criteria of section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C) reflects an intent to 
apply the same burden of proof regardless of whether the Three Strikes law is 
being applied prospectively or retrospectively through a resentencing petition.  
The People’s position would create an anomaly with respect to proof of the 
ineligibility factors.  Although prospective application of such a factor would 
require proof of it beyond a reasonable doubt, the People’s position would allow a 
 
11 
similar defendant seeking resentencing to be declared ineligible based upon a 
finding of the same factor supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  Nothing 
in the parallel structure of the Act would suggest an electoral intent that similar 
defendants be subject to vastly different sentences simply by application of a 
different standard of proof.   
We disagree with the People’s suggestion that the failure to include a 
pleading and proof requirement in section 1170.126 reflected an intent to apply a 
different, and lesser, standard of proof.  On this point, People v. Conley, supra, 63 
Cal.4th 646, is instructive.  There, the Reform Act became effective after Conley’s 
sentencing but while his appeal was pending.  He argued that he was entitled to 
automatic resentencing under the new provisions of the Three Strikes law without 
having to file a recall petition.  He claimed the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 
Cal.2d 740, should apply:  “When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen 
the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was 
too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the 
commission of the prohibited act.  It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature 
must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now 
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally 
could apply.  The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied 
constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment 
convicting the defendant of the act is not final.”  (Id. at p. 745.)   
Conley rejected the claim, noting that “the Reform Act is not silent on the 
question of retroactivity” and section 1170.126 created “a special mechanism that 
entitles all persons ‘presently serving’ indeterminate life terms imposed under the 
prior law to seek resentencing under the new law.”  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 657; see § 1170.126, subd. (a).)  Conley further observed that the Act did “more 
than merely reduce previously prescribed criminal penalties” but also established 
 
12 
“a new set of disqualifying factors that preclude a third strike defendant from 
receiving a second strike sentence” and required such factors be pled and proved.  
(Conley, at p. 659.)  We observed it was unclear how the pleading and proof 
requirement would apply to a defendant who had already been convicted and 
sentenced, especially with respect to factors that “prosecutors may have had no 
reason to plead and prove” before the Act.  (Ibid.)  While noting that “mini-trials 
for the sole purpose of determining” a disqualifying factor “would not be 
unprecedented,” Conley concluded:  “But the question before us is not whether 
such trials are possible.  The question is whether this is the system the voters 
intended to create, though no provision of the Act contains any affirmative 
indication to that effect.  We find it difficult to escape the conclusion that the Act 
does not address the complexities involved in applying the pleading-and-proof 
requirements to previously sentenced defendants precisely because the electorate 
did not contemplate that these provisions would apply.  Rather, voters intended for 
previously sentenced defendants to seek relief under section 1170.126, which 
contains no comparable pleading-and-proof requirements.”  (Id. at pp. 660-661.)   
Although Conley was addressing the retroactive application of the Three 
Strikes law’s new ineligibility criteria, its reasoning regarding the awkward 
application of a pleading and proof requirement to an already-sentenced defendant 
applies equally here to explain why such a requirement was omitted from the 
resentencing statute.  Section 1170.126 places upon defendants the burden of 
petitioning for resentencing and specifying their current and prior offenses, which 
would indicate initial eligibility.  A pleading requirement aimed at prosecutors 
would not fit well under such a scheme.  The statute simply requires that the court 
thereafter determine at the outset “whether the petitioner satisfies the criteria in 
subdivision (e).”  (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)   
 
13 
Thus, the most reasonable explanation for the omission of a pleading and 
proof requirement in the resentencing statute is not that this omission was an 
implicit comment on the applicable burden of proof, but simply that the 
ineligibility inquiry happens in a different procedural context.  The Three Strikes 
law was amended for prospective application.  In this context, a pleading and 
proof requirement makes sense.  If the prosecution wishes to have a third strike 
sentence imposed, it must indicate what circumstance makes a defendant subject 
to an indeterminate sentence and prove that circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt at trial.  By contrast, a resentencing proceeding under section 1170.126 
necessarily looks backwards.  “Although the statute refers to it as the ‘current’ 
conviction because it is the conviction for which the petitioner is seeking to be 
resentenced, the underlying case has been fully litigated.  The trial has been held 
or a plea has been taken, and the defendant is serving his or her sentence.”  
(People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1337; see People v. White 
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512, 527 [acknowledging the prospective and retroactive 
parts of the Reform Act]; People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 
Cal.App.4th 1279, 1292 (Kaulick) [same].)   
The People urge that because the current offense has been fully litigated, 
the preponderance standard is appropriate:  “[I]mposing a beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard would in many cases make the prosecution unable to prove 
ineligibility even for those defendants who truly did have a disqualifying factor—
merely because of the happenstance that the prosecution, having no need to prove 
such a factor years ago, made a less than complete record.  Such a windfall for 
dangerous defendants would not fulfill the voters’ intent.”6  However, nothing in 
                                              
6  
We have no occasion here to consider what kinds of evidence may be 
offered on the subject of eligibility at a resentencing hearing.  The exhibits that 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
14 
the Reform Act’s language suggests the electorate contemplated that a lower 
standard of proof should apply at resentencing to compensate for any potential 
evidentiary shortcoming at a trial predating the Act.  As discussed, the parallel 
structure of the Act would suggest an opposite intent.   
The primary difference between the prospective and retroactive portions of 
the Act supports application of a reasonable doubt standard as to ineligibility 
criteria.  “The main difference between the prospective and the retrospective parts 
of the Act is that the retrospective part . . . contains an ‘escape valve’ from 
resentencing [for] prisoners whose release poses a risk of danger.”  (Kaulick, 
supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293.)  It is this “ ‘escape valve’ ” the electorate had 
envisioned would prevent dangerous felons from being released under the Reform 
Act, not application of a lower burden of proof as to ineligibility criteria.  Indeed, 
that the scheme included an additional requirement for resentencing reflects the 
electorate was aware of the differences between the prospective and retrospective 
portions of the Act and explicitly distinguished between them when it desired.7   
The determination whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of 
danger to public safety is discretionary (§ 1170.126, subd. (f)), and several Courts 
of Appeal have properly concluded that “[t]he facts upon which the court’s finding 
of unreasonable risk is based must be proven by the People by a preponderance of 
the evidence . . . and are themselves subject to [appellate] review for substantial 
evidence.”  (People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 901; see also People v. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
were received at Frierson’s hearing had been part of the record in the original 
prosecution proceedings.   
7  
In light of our resolution, we do not address defendant’s argument that due 
process requires application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.   
 
15 
Flores (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1075-1076; Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 1301-1305.)  As Kaulick reasoned, “it is the general rule in California that 
once a defendant is eligible for an increased penalty, the trial court, in exercising 
its discretion to impose that penalty, may rely on factors established by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  [Citation.]  As dangerousness is such a factor, 
preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard.”  (Id. at p. 1305.)  
Defendant does not argue otherwise, and recognizes that “to adjust for situations 
in which a dangerous defendant is deemed eligible for a sentence recall, for 
whatever reasons including shortcomings in the record of the prior, the recall court 
has discretion to decline resentencing to safeguard the public.”   
Our conclusion is both consistent with the intent behind the Reform Act 
and harmonizes its prospective and retroactive portions.  As we have explained:  
“There can be no doubt that the Reform Act was motivated in large measure by a 
determination that sentences under the prior version of the Three Strikes law were 
excessive. . . .  But voters were motivated by other purposes as well, including the 
protection of public safety.  The ballot materials explained that ‘dangerous 
criminals are being released early from prison because jails are overcrowded with 
nonviolent offenders who pose no risk to the public.’  [Citation.]  Voters were told 
that the Reform Act would protect public safety by ‘prevent[ing] dangerous 
criminals from being released early’ [citation] and would have no effect on ‘truly 
dangerous criminals’ [citation].”  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 658; see 
Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 686.)  The Reform Act expressly states it should 
apply to those “whose sentence under this act would not have been an 
indeterminate life sentence.”  (§ 1170.126, subd. (a).)  As noted, a prospective 
sentence under the Act could not be an indeterminate life term unless the 
prosecution establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant qualifies for 
a third strike term.  Applying a reasonable doubt standard to proof of ineligibility 
 
16 
for resentencing preserves the parallel structure between the prospective and 
retroactive application of the Three Strikes law as contemplated by the Reform 
Act.  Simultaneously, the trial court’s discretion to deny resentencing to a 
defendant who poses an unreasonable danger to the public acts as a safeguard in 
cases where the record does not establish ineligibility criteria beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In exercising its discretion, the court may consider a wide variety of 
factors, such as the petitioner’s whole criminal history, including “the extent of 
injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of 
the crimes,” a petitioner’s “disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while 
incarcerated,” and any other relevant evidence.  (§ 1170.126, subd. (g)(1)-(3).)  
Placing on the People a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to establish 
ineligibility for resentencing, while permitting the court to exercise its broader 
discretion to protect public safety, is an approach that comports with the overall 
structure and language of the Act and its dual intent.8   
                                              
8  
We disapprove the following cases to the extent they are inconsistent with 
our opinion:  People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 812, 833; People v. Newman 
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 718, 727-732; People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 
1020, 1038-1040.   
 
17 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded 
with directions to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings on 
defendant’s petition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.   
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
MILLER, J.* 
 
 
                                              
*         Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 
Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Frierson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 1 Cal.App.5th 788 
Rehearing Granted 
 
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Opinion No. S236728 
Date Filed: December 28, 2017 
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Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William C. Ryan 
 
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Counsel: 
 
Richard B. Lennon and Suzan E. Hier, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Louis W. Karlin and Robert 
C. Schneider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard B. Lennon 
California Appellate Project 
520 S. Grand Avenue, 4th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 243-0300 
 
Robert C. Schneider 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6064