Title: Craney v. State
Citation: 1990 WY 114, 798 P.2d 1202
Docket Number: 
State: Wyoming
Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date: October 17, 1990

Craney v. State Annotate this Case Craney v. State 1990 WY 114 798 P.2d 1202 Case Number: 89-86 Decided: 10/17/1990 Supreme Court of Wyoming LESTER CRANEY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J. Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender and Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for appellant. Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Roben D. Hunter and Camille Call, Student Interns, for appellee. Before CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. URBIGKIT, Chief Justice. [¶1] Lester Craney (Craney) was charged with attempted first degree sexual assault, first degree sexual assault and delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. He was convicted on three counts of attempted third degree sexual assault, third degree sexual assault and delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. We reverse the convictions and sentences for attempted third degree sexual assault and third degree sexual assault, but affirm the conviction and sentence for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. ISSUES [¶2] Craney raises four issues: I. Was it * * * plain error for the court to instruct the jury that third degree sexual assault is a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault. II. Did the trial court exceed its jurisdiction when it sentenced Appellant [for third degree sexual assault] to three years probation to commence on completion of the prison sentence imposed. III. Whether the order that the Appellant pay restitution in an amount to be determined as a condition of probation [for third degree sexual assault] must be stricken as in excess of jurisdiction. [IV]. Whether the trial court's failure to order the prosecution to produce reports used by witness Anderson to prepare for his testimony was error and resulted in a violation of Appellant's right to confrontation. [¶3] We reverse in favor of Craney on Issue I.1 FACTS [¶4] On August 18, 1988, a criminal complaint was filed against Craney. Count I of that complaint charged Craney with attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) and 6-1-301.2 Count II charged him with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i). Count III charged him with unlawful delivery of marijuana by a person eighteen years or older to a person under eighteen years and who is at least three years his junior which is a violation of W.S. 35-7-1014(d)(xiii) and 35-7-1036.3 [¶5] Without objection from the defense counsel, the trial judge gave jury instructions which permitted Craney's conviction of sexual assault in the third degree4 as a lesser included offense to sexual assault in the first degree. The jury found Craney not guilty of attempted sexual assault in the first degree, not guilty of sexual assault in the first degree, but guilty of attempted sexual assault in the third degree, guilty of sexual assault in the third degree, and guilty of delivering a controlled substance to a person under eighteen years of age. By judgment and sentence entered February 28, 1989, Craney was sentenced to prison for not less than three nor more than five years for attempted third degree sexual assault and a concurrent term of not less than five nor more than six years for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. The trial court also sentenced him to three years probation for his third degree sexual assault conviction. That probation was to run consecutively with the prison sentences. In effect, Craney's sentence of probation would not begin to run until after he had served his prison sentences. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE THIRD DEGREE RAPE CONVICTION [¶6] Craney argues it is plain error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that third degree sexual assault is a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault. We agree. [¶7] Lacking proper trial objection, the jury instruction at issue requires analysis under the plain error doctrine. See Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 , 383 (Wyo. 1989). Our standard of review under plain error is well established. "`First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced.'" Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132 , 1134 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156 , 1159 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 909, 104 S. Ct. 265, 78 L. Ed. 2d 249 and Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161 , 1164 (Wyo. 1981)). See W.R.Cr.P. 49(b). ANALYSIS [¶8] The first component under plain error review is established because the record is clear as to the incident alleged as error. Instructions nineteen through twenty-two allowed the jury to find Craney guilty of attempted third degree sexual assault and third degree sexual assault as a lesser included offense. [¶9] To establish the second component, Craney must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. This demonstration is made because third degree sexual assault is not a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault. Seeley v. State, 715 P.2d 232 , 238 (Wyo. 1986) held that for an offense to be a lesser included offense "every element of the lesser offense must be included in the greater, that is one cannot commit the greater offense without also necessarily committing the lesser offense." Seeley used that definition to explain why third degree sexual assault was not contained within the first degree sexual assault statute in force at that time. The Seeley discussion is helpful here. First degree sexual assault requires physical force or forcible confinement. Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244 (Wyo.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 882, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1986). Third degree sexual assault can be committed even if no force or confinement was used. The primary factor for commission of an offense is an age differential. Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1985). In fact, third degree sexual assault can occur even where there is agreement by the parties. Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 P. 299 , reh'g denied 16 Wyo. 285, 94 P. 217 (1908). Third degree sexual assault only requires sexual intrusion between two people, one of whom is less than sixteen5 years old and another who is more than four years older than the one who is less than sixteen. Third degree sexual assault cannot be a lesser included offense to first degree sexual assault because its elements are not contained within the set of elements for first degree sexual assault.6 Seeley, 715 P.2d 232 ; Carey, 715 P.2d 244 . The violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law is then demonstrated. [¶10] The third component is similarly established because Craney demonstrates that a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been materially prejudiced. The right not to be convicted of a crime for which one is not charged is substantial. The Wyoming Constitution prohibits a person from being convicted of a crime not charged.7 We explained in State v. Selig, 635 P.2d 786 , 793 (Wyo. 1981) that one is materially prejudiced when there is no notice of the charges to be defended against. In Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471 , 481 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929 (Wyo. 1976)), we said: Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., implements the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to be informed of the nature of the charge(s) against him. This court has said: "[i]n a criminal indictment, it is only necessary to allege sufficiently to allow the accused to understand the charge and prepare his defense." [¶11] To charge Craney with first degree sexual assault and attempted first degree sexual assault and then convict him of third degree sexual assault and attempted third degree sexual assault not only prevents an adequate defense, but allows for the conviction of an uncharged crime. Craney was materially prejudiced. DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT [¶12] Our review of the record of Craney's trial attorney's opening and closing arguments indicates this appellate issue can only relate to the third degree sexual assault convictions. We are left with this impression because his trial counsel appeared to concede during opening argument that Craney purchased alcohol for the minor child and that the two smoked marijuana together. During closing argument, his trial counsel seemed to make the same concession by indicating that Craney and the minor child had passed a marijuana pipe back and forth. Our impression that the delivery conviction is not being challenged was confirmed when Craney's appellate counsel responded in the negative during oral argument when asked if he was attacking the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. Since we are convinced that this appeal is directed to the convictions upon which Craney has prevailed, we leave undisturbed the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. Consequently, we will not consider the significant issue of denied access to the police officer's investigation report for cross-examination8 when consideration would be academic and advisory for appellate resolution of this case. Mari v. Rawlins Nat. Bank of Rawlins, 794 P.2d 85 (Wyo. 1990); Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1975); West v. Willey, 453 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1969). See also, in regard to interpretation of a rule of this court, Arland v. State, 788 P.2d 1125 , 1128 n. 5 (Wyo. 1990). CONCLUSION [¶13] For these reasons, we reverse Craney's convictions and sentences for attempted third degree sexual assault and third degree sexual assault. We affirm the conviction and sentence for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. FOOT