Title: Commonwealth v. Brown, Tavares
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090557
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 2010

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 090557 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
          
 
  January 15, 2010 
TAVARES LAMONT BROWN 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
may reverse a circuit court’s judgment on a basis not argued on 
appeal by the appellant. 
Background 
On October 24, 2006, Officer Morris Patrick Warner 
(Warner) of the Richmond Police Department received a police 
radio dispatch regarding two individuals selling drugs near a 
pedestrian bridge that crosses over the Downtown Expressway.  
As he walked up the ramp to the pedestrian bridge, Warner saw 
Tavares Lamont Brown (Brown) and Scott Pullen (Pullen) on the 
ramp.  Pullen was urinating and Brown was drinking from a 40-
ounce bottle of beer.  They were the only two people in the 
area and they were standing about six feet apart.  Warner did 
not observe them communicating with each other. 
Having observed the men violating the law, Warner, who was 
alone, “was going to try to escort them back to [his] vehicle 
where [he] could talk to them more.”  Warner spoke to both men; 
Brown bent over, placed the beer bottle on the ground, and 
slowly attempted to screw the cap on with his left hand.  As 
Brown was doing so, his right hand disappeared behind his back.  
Warner “saw movement with [Brown’s] arm, not really at his 
right pocket but more at his waistline in the back or towards 
his back right pocket.”  Warner told Brown to stop and stand 
up. 
Warner placed Brown in handcuffs because of his “furtive 
movements” and Warner’s situation as one officer dealing with 
two suspects.  The trio then walked back to Warner’s vehicle. 
Warner conducted “pat down” searches on both individuals.  
He detected no suspected contraband or weapons on Brown’s 
person.  On Pullen, however, Warner found a folded lottery slip 
that contained what appeared to be cigarette ashes. 
When a “backup” officer arrived, Warner asked that officer 
to stay with Brown and Pullen while Warner went back to the 
area where the two men had been standing.  Warner recalled that 
he had observed a folded lottery slip on the ground there, 
between the two men.  Near where Brown and Pullen had been 
standing, Warner found a folded lottery ticket, which contained 
what appeared to be a small rock of crack cocaine.  Warner 
placed Brown and Pullen under arrest.  In a search incident to 
arrest, Warner found a large rock of what appeared to be crack 
cocaine and a razor blade on Brown’s person. 
 
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Brown was charged with possession of cocaine with the 
intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248.  Brown 
filed a motion to suppress in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond.  At the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress, 
Brown argued that Warner detained and arrested him in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.  The circuit court denied the motion 
to suppress, finding that Warner did not violate Brown’s 
constitutional rights by detaining and then arresting him on 
suspicion of possessing and/or distributing cocaine. 
After a bench trial, Brown was found guilty of possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine and sentenced to ten years 
incarceration, with four years and nine months suspended.  
Brown appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
Brown’s petition for appeal to the Court of Appeals set 
forth the following question presented:  “Did the Circuit Court 
err in not suppressing the evidence found in this case when the 
detention of Brown . . . constituted a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment?”∗  In the petition for appeal, Brown argued that his 
detention by Warner violated the Fourth Amendment because 
Warner did not have a reasonable suspicion that supported his 
continued detention of Brown.  In its order granting Brown’s  
                     
∗ Brown’s petition for appeal contained a second question 
presented, which the Court of Appeals denied.  The denied 
question presented is not relevant to the present case. 
 
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appeal, the Court of Appeals more broadly referred to the 
question presented as “[w]hether the trial court erred by 
denying appellant’s motion to suppress.” 
In his subsequent brief in support of the appeal granted 
by the Court of Appeals, Brown argued that “[t]he Circuit Court 
erred in not suppressing the evidence found . . . when the 
initial stop of the defendant constituted a seizure of his 
person in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  Brown 
acknowledged in his brief that Warner had a right to detain him 
long enough for Warner to write a summons for drinking in 
public.  Brown argued, however, that Warner no longer had a 
basis to detain Brown after taking Brown to Warner’s police car 
and conducting a pat down search that revealed no weapons.  
Brown claimed that, after that point in time, his continued 
detention was without reasonable suspicion and in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, and the evidence obtained as a result of 
the continued detention by Warner was subject to exclusion.  
The Commonwealth’s brief responded to Brown’s argument that 
Warner did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to support 
his continued detention of Brown.  There was no argument or 
authority provided by either Brown or the Commonwealth 
concerning whether there was probable cause to arrest Brown. 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals held that 
Brown’s “ongoing detention for further investigation was 
 
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reasonable under the circumstances.”  Brown v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 0339-08-2 (Jan. 13, 2009).  However, the Court of 
Appeals reversed Brown’s conviction on the basis that Warner 
did not have probable cause to arrest Brown “for possession of 
the cocaine found on the ground in a folded lottery slip.”  Id. 
This Court granted the Commonwealth an appeal. 
Analysis 
The Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
reversing the circuit court’s judgment on a basis not argued to 
the Court of Appeals and in ruling that the police lacked 
probable cause to arrest Brown.  The Commonwealth asserts that 
Brown argued in his petition and briefs to the Court of Appeals 
that his continued detention by Warner violated Brown’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment.  It claims that Brown, by not 
asserting the matter by petition, brief or argument before the 
Court of Appeals, abandoned the argument made before the 
circuit court that Warner lacked probable cause to arrest 
Brown.  Noting that the Court of Appeals rejected Brown’s 
continued detention argument, the Commonwealth requests the 
reinstatement of the circuit court’s judgment. 
Responding, Brown asserts that the Court of Appeals did 
not err in ruling that the police lacked probable cause to 
arrest him.  Brown argues that he did not abandon the argument 
he made at trial concerning lack of probable cause for his 
 
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arrest.  Brown asserts that his question presented informed the 
Court of Appeals that his appeal involved a Fourth Amendment 
violation, and notes that the Commonwealth did not object to 
the way the Court of Appeals broadly characterized the question 
presented.  He also points out that at one point in his reply 
brief to the Court of Appeals he stated that Warner lacked 
“reasonable suspicion or probable cause” to detain Brown.   
In resolving whether the Court of Appeals decided Brown’s 
case on a basis not argued on appeal, we must interpret Rule 
5A:12.  Because this issue concerns a question of law, we 
review the lower court’s decision de novo.  Moore v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 747, 753, 668 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2008).   
 
Rule 5A:12 provides in part as follows: “Only questions 
presented in the petition for appeal will be noticed by the 
Court of Appeals.”  Rule 5A:12(c); see also Rule 5:17(c) (“Only 
errors assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed by 
this Court.”).  This Court has previously reversed the Court of 
Appeals when it based its holding on arguments not in the 
petition for appeal.  Clifford v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 23, 25-
26, 645 S.E.2d 295, 297 (2007) (sustaining the Commonwealth’s 
cross-error that the appellant had abandoned the rationale 
adopted by the Court of Appeals).   
We noted in Clifford, id. at 25, 645 S.E.2d at 297, that 
in regard to Rule 5A:12(c)’s Supreme Court Rule counterpart, 
 
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Rule 5:17(c), this Court has stated that “we will not consider 
. . . arguments [that] were not made in the petition for 
appeal.”  West v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 241, 243 n.1, 455 
S.E.2d 1, 2 n.* (1995); see also Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 
422, 423 n.*, 229 S.E.2d 864, 865 n.1 (1976) (expressing no 
opinion on a question not raised on appeal).  In Clifford, we 
also considered that the Court of Appeals had likewise 
construed its Rule 5A:12 to mean that “ ‘[o]nly those arguments 
presented in the petition for appeal and granted by this Court 
will be considered on appeal.’ ”  274 Va. at 25, 645 S.E.2d at 
297 (quoting McLean v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 322, 329, 516 
S.E.2d 717, 720 (1999) (en banc)).  “[A]n issue abandoned at 
trial may not be resurrected on appeal, and an appellate court 
may not ‘recast’ an argument made in a lower court into a 
different argument upon which to base its decision.”  Clifford, 
274 Va. at 25, 645 S.E.2d at 297. 
The relevant question presented by Brown in his petition 
for appeal was, “Did the Circuit Court err in not suppressing 
the evidence found in this case when the detention of Brown 
. . . constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment?”  
Brown’s question presented concerned whether the police had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Brown, not whether they had 
probable cause to arrest him. 
 
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In granting Brown’s appeal, the Court of Appeals restated 
Brown’s question presented as “[w]hether the trial court erred 
by denying appellant’s motion to suppress.”  It appears that 
Brown’s question presented, as amended by the Court of Appeals, 
without objection, in its order granting the appeal, may have 
been broad enough to include an argument that Warner lacked 
probable cause to arrest Brown.  However, Brown never made that 
argument to the Court of Appeals as a basis for reversing the 
circuit court’s judgment. 
Rule 5A:20(e) states that an opening brief must contain: 
“The principles of law, the argument, and the authorities 
relating to each question presented.”  In his brief in support 
of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, Brown argued and 
provided authority only for the position that the circuit court 
erred in not suppressing the evidence “when the initial stop of 
the defendant . . . [was] in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Brown did not allege as error that the circuit 
court found the officer had probable cause to arrest Brown, nor 
did he provide any argument or authority, as required by Rule 
5A:20(e) in support of that allegation.  See Rule 5A:20(e). 
The Court of Appeals can only consider issues properly 
brought before it by the litigants.  Clifford, 274 Va. at 25, 
645 S.E.2d at 297; Rule 5A:12.  Though the Court of Appeals 
broadly rephrased Brown’s question presented, the probable 
 
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cause to arrest argument was neither in Brown’s question 
presented nor briefed in the petition for appeal or in any 
briefs filed by either party.  Even though Brown raised the 
probable cause argument before the circuit court, the Court of 
Appeals cannot resurrect arguments Brown abandoned on appeal.  
Clifford, 274 Va. at 25, 645 S.E.2d at 297.  The Court of 
Appeals also cannot “recast” Brown’s arguments concerning his 
initial detention into a challenge on appeal to the probable 
cause for his arrest.  Id.  Moreover, the fact that Brown 
briefly mentioned the words “probable cause” in his petition 
does not change the fact that neither party asserted a probable 
cause to arrest argument before the Court of Appeals.  Thus, 
the Court of Appeals erred by considering the probable cause 
issue and reversing the circuit court’s judgment based on 
Warner’s lack of probable cause to arrest Brown. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed.  This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with 
direction to enter an order affirming the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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