Title: State v. John Loyal
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-29-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Stein, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This appeal requires the Court to consider whether the trial court was justified in declaring a mistrial over the objections of the prosecutor and defense counsel, based on defense counsel's prior representation of a significant and recanting State witness. It also requires the Court to determine whether defendant's retrial is permissible under the federal and State constitutions' prohibitions against double jeopardy. On February 7, 1996, Carl Watson, Wanda Colon and Amedeo Delacruz were looking to purchase heroin in a Newark neighborhood. Colon purchased a bag of heroin from Rahnzzan Johnson, who was accompanied by Sharonda Posey and John Loyal. When she returned to the car, Watson discovered the bag was empty. Colon and Watson returned to the apartment building where Colon made the purchase. After some arguments, Loyal gave Watson another bag of heroin. Upon exiting the building, Loyal pulled a gun and shot Watson several times, causing his death. Colon identified Loyal as the shooter from an array of photographs at police headquarters. Both Johnson and Posey also identified Loyal as the shooter. Loyal's trial for the murder of Watson commenced on April 16, 1997. At the trial, Posey recanted her earlier statement identifying Loyal as the shooter. After conducting a Gross hearing, the trial court determined that Posey's earlier statement was admissible at trial. Subsequent to the Gross hearing, the court inquired as to the representation of Posey by defense counsel, William Cucco. Neither Posey nor Cucco recalled such representation. In fact, Cucco had represented Posey on drug charges two years earlier. Both Loyal and Posey waived any potential conflict of interest. After initially requesting a mistrial, the prosecutor withdrew that request. The trial court, however, declared a mistrial sua sponte , primarily relying on RPC 1.7 and the prohibition against any appearance of impropriety. Loyal moved for dismissal of the charges based on his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. Loyal was retried in 1997. He was found guilty of murder, aggravated assault, and related weapons charges. Loyal renewed his motion for dismissal on double jeopardy grounds. The motion was denied and Loyal was sentenced to a thirty-year parole ineligibility period on the murder charge and concurrent sentences on the remaining charges. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unreported opinion. The Supreme Court granted Loyal's petition for certification. HELD: Defense counsel's prior representation of a material, recanting State's witness on drug charges constituted an appearance of impropriety and the ends of public justice necessitated a mistrial. In the absence of prejudice to the defendant, or bad faith or inexcusable neglect by the prosecutor, defendant's retrial did not violate the federal or State constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy. 1. Even if there is no actual conflict, RPC 1.7 precludes an attorney from representing a client where such representation creates an appearance of impropriety. Once an appearance of impropriety is discovered, that representation generally must cease. In criminal matters, disqualification is routinely required and in situations involving a recanting witness, the ethical dilemma is compounded. Depending on the egregious nature of the conflict, waiver may be ineffective. In determining the existence of an appearance of impropriety, the court must view the conduct as would an ordinary, knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts. (Pp. 14-24) 3. Addressing the issue from the perspective of a reasonable and informed citizen, the trial court correctly found that defense counsel's representation of Loyal, where counsel had previously represented a material, recanting State's witness, created an unacceptable appearance of impropriety. Counsel's representation of Loyal and his examination of Posey on the witness stand could be compromised by the prior relationship. However, the mistrial was not mandated solely because counsel may have violated the appearance of impropriety standards. The primary basis for the trial court's declaration of a mistrial in this matter was the vindication of the public's interest in a fair trial. (Pp. 32-38) Judgement of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE COLEMAN, dissenting, is of the view that in affirming the Appellate Division in this matter, the Court has elevated the status of the vague and questionable appearance of impropriety ethics rule over and above the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He believes that the majority decision is not supported by any case in New Jersey or in any other jurisdiction. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, LONG, VENIERO and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 29 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN LOYAL, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 13, 2000 -- Decided June 27, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Gerard C. Sims, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. I On February 7, 1996, Amedeo Delacruz drove Wanda Colon and Carl Watson to Prince Street in Newark to purchase heroin. Watson had recently ingested methadone to reduce his craving for heroin, but his need continued. Because Watson was violently ill in the car and was apprehensive about the neighborhood, Colon volunteered to purchase heroin for him in an apartment building on Prince Street. Colon saw Rahnzzan Johnson, Sharonda Posey and John Loyal in the hallway of that building. Colon did not know any of them prior to this encounter. Johnson asked Colon what she wanted and Colon told him that she wanted a bag of dope. Colon paid ten dollars for the bag of heroin. The transaction took place quickly and Colon left the building without looking in the bag. Colon returned to the car and Delacruz drove away. After Colon handed the bag to Watson, he opened it and discovered that it was empty. Watson convinced Colon and Delacruz that they should return to the building. Delacruz parked the car near the entrance to the building and Colon and Watson went inside. The same three individuals were present. Colon identified Johnson as the person who sold her the empty bag of heroin. After a brief argument between Loyal and Watson, Loyal gave Watson another bag that contained heroin. Watson then told Colon to leave the building. As Colon exited the building, she heard Watson and Johnson talking to each other as they followed her towards the car. Loyal exited the building directly behind the two men. At that point, Johnson ordered Loyal to shoot Watson. Loyal took a gun out of his jacket and shot Watson several times, causing his death. Loyal then pointed the gun in Colon's direction and warned her to leave before he blew [her] head off. Colon was shocked and immobilized until Johnson pushed her towards the street. Colon returned to the car to find Delacruz terrified and unable to drive. Colon managed to drive the car away from the scene although she was in the passenger seat. When Delacruz began to react, he drove to a nearby police station after Colon told him to do so. Colon explained what had occurred to a lieutenant at the police station before going to a back room to calm down. After waiting about one-half hour, Detective Ronald Soto of the Newark Police Department interviewed Colon. Soto asked her what had happened and then asked her to look at two photo books to try to identify the shooter. Colon looked through the first book without success. On the first page of the second book, she misidentified a photo of Omar Smalls as the man who sold her the heroin. Soto, based on his street knowledge, knew that Smalls was connected to an individual nicknamed Tank, whose name was John Loyal. Soto had been actively investigating Loyal on drug related charges and had two warrants for his arrest. Soto decided to prepare a photographic array for Colon and took a picture of Loyal from the file on his desk relating to the drug investigation. Colon completed her review of the second book without identifying the shooter. When Colon finished looking through the books, she stood up and walked over to Detective Soto's desk. Colon saw the picture of Loyal on Soto's desk and immediately identified Loyal as the shooter. When Soto asked her if she might be confused or still in shock, Colon insisted that Loyal was the shooter and said that she was sure. Following jury selection, defendant's trial for murder and other lesser charges commenced on April 16, 1997. Colon testified that she can't confuse [Loyal's] face with nobody's face, and stated that she would never forget that face when she identified defendant as the shooter. On the following day, Colon finished her testimony and the State then called Sharonda Posey, the other woman present at the scene, as a witness. She testified differently from the description of the incident she had provided in her sworn statement to the police. Posey then testified that her police statement was false. The trial court stopped the proceedings and excused the jury to conduct a Gross hearing, see State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 17 (1990), a procedure designed to determine whether a sworn statement given to the police is reliable and can be introduced substantively into evidence if the witness later recants the statement during his or her testimony. During the three-day Gross hearing, both Johnson and Posey recanted the sworn statements that they gave to the police implicating Loyal as the shooter. Johnson's description of the events leading up to the shooting was similar to the facts recounted in Colon's testimony. Johnson, however, recognized the shooter as an individual that comes in the neighborhood robbing, sticking up individuals, drug dealers. Johnson testified that he decided to tell the police what they wanted to hear to avoid a charge of conspiracy to commit murder because Watson had been killed after purchasing drugs from Johnson. Johnson admitted that everything else in his sworn statement was true except for the identity of the shooter. Detective Manuel Garcia, the officer who took Johnson's statement, refuted Johnson's testimony and testified that he did not threaten Johnson or promise him anything in return for his sworn statement. Posey testified that she was selling drugs with her boyfriend, Johnson, at the time of the shooting. Posey stated that Johnson and Watson were exiting the building together when someone came from the side of the building and shot Watson approximately ten times. Posey alleged that the police threatened her with life imprisonment if she did not identify Loyal as the shooter from a photo array. Posey testified that she implicated Loyal as the shooter because she thought she otherwise would go to jail and lose her children. Kirk Schwindel, an employee of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office who was present when Posey made her statement, testified that Posey voluntarily identified Loyal as the shooter and that she was not threatened in any way. Defense counsel argued that the Johnson and Posey statements were unreliable because they were induced by police officers who threatened potential criminal prosecutions. The State argued that Johnson and Posey testified voluntarily and that the specific testimony about the incident was substantially similar to Colon's, except for the detailed description of the shooting. The court was satisfied that the statements were sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence. After making that ruling, and before the jury returned to the courtroom, the court asked Posey whether she had ever been represented previously by defendant's counsel, William Cucco, who was employed as an attorney for the Essex County Public Defender's office. Posey replied that Cucco never represented her in any prior criminal matter. The prosecutor reminded Posey about her prior guilty plea on January 23, 1995 for possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within one thousand feet of school property, and her sentencing hearing on February 14, 1995 for that offense. She replied that she did not think that Cucco was her lawyer and recalled only that she was represented by the Public Defender's office. When an attorney's former client is the State's chief witness, it is beyond dispute that an appearance of impropriety is created requiring the attorney be disqualified. There is an appearance of impropriety. Even though I don't think Miss Posey could be classified as the _ _ as the State's chief witness, she clearly is a key witness in the fact that she indicates in a statement that the State is seeking to introduce that the defendant is the shooter. She says that. She is a key witness, though not the only key witness. After discharging the jury, the court restated its reasons for declaring a mistrial: First of all, as the Court stated in Needham, this Court does not take lightly its decision to disqualify Mr. Cucco, Mr. Loyal's attorney. I do not and will not suggest or imply that Mr. Cucco did anything wrong or will do anything improper or unethical. However, because of the very strong possibilities of the appearance of impropriety of a recanting eyewitness to a homicide being represented by defense counsel, I am satisfied that I must disqualify Mr. Cucco from continued representation of Mr. Loyal. Cucco asked that the mistrial be declared with prejudice because Loyal's right to a speedy trial had been compromised. The court informed Cucco of the necessity of filing a motion seeking that relief. In May 1997, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion for dismissal of the indictment based on a double jeopardy violation. The trial court again stated its reason for declaring the mistrial: I did not find that Mr. Cucco was in [possession] of some specified, specific information that he learned from his representation of Miss Posey that would, one, lead him to a cross-examination based on information garnered while he was representing Miss Posey. I did not disqualify Mr. Cucco because I felt that because of that representation of Miss Posey, the cross-examination of Miss Posey while representing Mr. Loyal would be less than adequate. Less than vigorous. I specifically disqualified Mr. Cucco because of the appearance of impropriety. Let's remember what was happening: Miss Posey was on the stand recanting, indicating that this defendant was not the shooter. Her boyfriend had already recanted and clearly, there was a jury question established as to who this jury was going to believe; or, what part of the testimony they were gonna believe. Were they going to believe Miss Colon, who identified Mr. Loyal as the shooter? Were they going to believe Miss Posey? And if so, were they going to believe the sworn statement given? Were they going to believe the testimony that she was about to proffer as to why she gave the sworn statement? That is, that she was forced to. . . . I don't sit here in a vacuum. I'm well aware of the family of the deceased The court relied primarily on State v. Nappo, 185 N.J. Super. 600 (Law Div. 1982), and State v. Laganella, 144 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 74 N.J. 256 (1976), in holding that the prosecutor's actions or inactions did not rise to the level of bad faith or inexcusable neglect, and that the inadvertent failure to notify Cucco that he had previously represented a State's witness did not warrant the extreme sanction of dismissal of the indictment. Loyal's second trial began in July 1997. Johnson testified that parts of his sworn statement were false and that Loyal did not shoot Watson. Johnson's testimony mirrored the testimony he gave during the Gross hearing at Loyal's initial trial. Detective Garcia testified about the investigation and the procedures used to acquire Johnson's voluntary sworn statement. Colon's testimony at the second trial described the incident and implicated Loyal as the shooter. Posey did not testify at defendant's second trial. II A Attorneys who practice law in New Jersey are required to comply with strict ethical rules concerning actual or possible conflicts of interests. Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation: Should the Appearance of Impropriety Rule Be Elmininated in New Jersey -- Or Revived Everywhere Else?, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 315, 318-19 (1997). In the case of a former client, attorneys must comply with RPC 1.9: (b) The provisions of RPC 1.7(c) are applicable as well to situations covered by this rule. [Emphasis added.] RPC 1.7(c) is part of the general rule that prohibits an attorney from representing a client when that representation would create a conflict of interest. RPC 1.7 forbids an attorney from representing a client in a situation that would create an appearance of impropriety, even if there were no actual conflict: (c) This rule shall not alter the effect of case law or ethics opinions to the effect that: (1) in certain cases or categories of cases involving conflicts or apparent conflicts, consent to continued representation is immaterial, and (2) in certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would conclude that the multiple representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of one of the An appearance of impropriety must be something more than a fanciful possibility and must have some reasonable basis. In re Opinion No. 653, 132 N.J. 124, 132 (1993) (quoting Higgins v. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 73 N.J. 123, 129 (1977)). The appearance of impropriety alone may be sufficient to present an ethical problem even though no actual impropriety exists. Higgins, supra, 73 N.J. at 129. The doctrine's purpose is to bolster the public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. State v. Catanoso, 222 N.J. Super. 641, 648 (Law Div. 1987) (citing In re Cipriano, 68 N.J. 398, 403 (1975)). Although the doctrine's imprecision has provoked criticism and requests for its rescission as applied to private civil litigation, see Report of the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee, 158 N.J.L.J. 472 (1999), the doctrine's relevance in criminal matters and to issues of public-entity representation remains unchallenged. This Court recently declined to implement a recommendation to eliminate the appearance of impropriety standard from the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Notice to the Bar, 159 N.J.L.J. 843 (2000). In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for finding an appearance of impropriety, we must view the conduct as would an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 216 (1988)(quoting RPC 1.7(c)(2)). That inquiry is highly fact sensitive; it does not occur in a vacuum. In re Opinion No. 415, 81 N.J. 318, 325 (1979). Where there exists an appearance of impropriety in an attorney's representation of a client, that representation generally must cease. In re Petition for Review of Opinion No. 569, 103 N.J. 325, 334-35 (1986); Ross v. Canino, 93 N.J. 402, 409-10 (1983); Opinion No. 415, supra, 81 N.J. at 325. Once an appearance of impropriety is found, only in extraordinary cases should a client's right to counsel of his or her choice outweigh the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession. Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 220. When an appearance of impropriety is found in a criminal matter, disqualification of an attorney routinely is required. In State v. Morelli, 152 N.J. Super. 67, 74 (App. Div. 1977), defendant's counsel was disqualified because his firm represented an important prosecution witness and employed an attorney who had worked in the prosecutor's office while the defendant was being investigated. The Appellate Division, citing caselaw as well as opinions of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, concluded that a defense attorney must be disqualified when there is a risk of the unacceptable appearance of possible impropriety. Id. at 72 (citing State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J. Super. 347 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 69 N.J. 31 (1975); State v. Jaquindo, 138 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div.), aff'd sub nom., State v. Rizzo, 69 N.J. 28 (1975); In re Opinion 361, 100 N.J.L.J. 1 (1977); In re Opinion 340, 99 N.J.L.J. 610 (1976); In re Opinion 276, 96 N.J.L.J. 1461 (1973); In re Opinion 207, 94 N.J.L.J. 451 (1971)). Defendant's waiver of his right to appeal a possible conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was found to be irrelevant. Morelli, supra, 152 N.J. Super. at 74. In In re Garber, 95 N.J. 597, 598 (1984), this Court suspended an attorney from the practice of law for one year because he represented a murder witness who recanted a positive identification of the defendant, an individual whom the attorney had represented earlier in matters unrelated to the murder indictment. Id. at 605. The Court held that a recanting witness is confronted by enormous legal pitfalls and thus is particularly in need of careful, objective and sound legal advice. Ibid. The Court found that the attorney's intertwined connections with both parties presented an indelible appearance of impropriety that breaches ethical standards. Id. at 610. The Court also was concerned with the attendant public perception that, as a consequence of respondent's compromised position, professional probity has been diluted and the administration of justice perverted. Id. at 611. See also In re Cohn, 46 N.J. 202, 213 (1966) (noting that public knowledge of attorney's dual representation of defendant and witness testifying against that defendant would engender, at the least, a serious doubt about the integrity of the proceeding. ). The Garber Court found that the witness's consent was immaterial and ineffective because [t]here are certain conflicts that are so egregious that they cannot be cured by consent. Id. at 613-14. Likewise, in Catanoso, supra, the Law Division found that if the defendant's counsel acted as a zealous advocate, he would have had to breach the duty of loyalty that he owes to his former client, the State's main witness against the defendant. 222 N.J. Super. at 648. Therefore, although the defendant was willing to waive the right to cross-examine the State's witness so that he could maintain his choice of counsel, the Law Division observed that the defendant's counsel's prior representation of the witness may have permitted him to acquire confidential information that could be used favorably by the defendant. Id. at 645. See also Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 473 (1980) (holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client, notwithstanding attorney's declarations to the contrary, may not be rebutted). The Law Division found that defendant's counsel created a high risk of impropriety when the State's witness stands to be discredited, on cross-examination, by his former attorney. Catanoso, supra, 222 N.J. Super. at 648. The court concluded that [i]f there is an 'adequate factual basis' for an informed citizen to conclude that there would be a 'high risk' of impropriety if [the] defendant's lawyer continued to represent his client, then the lawyer must be disqualified. Ibid. (citing In re Opinion No. 569, supra, 103 N.J. at 331). See also Reardon, supra, 83 N.J. at 471 (stating that [i]f there be any doubt as to the propriety of an attorney's representation of a client, such doubt must be resolved in favor of disqualification. ). In Needham, supra, a case relied on by the trial court in the matter before us, the issue was whether a defense attorney must be disqualified upon motion by the State when that attorney represented one of the chief prosecution witnesses in an entirely unrelated matter. 298 N.J. Super. at 102. The defendant was charged with multiple offenses and Officer Warner was expected to testify against the defendant. Ibid. The defendant's counsel had represented Warner in an indictable criminal matter seven years earlier and, more recently, in an internal affairs investigation that did not culminate in formal charges. Id. at 102-03. The Law Division held that that prior representation created an appearance of impropriety and warranted the disqualification of the defendant's counsel because [w]hen an attorney's former client is the State's chief witness, it is beyond dispute that an appearance of impropriety is created. Id. at 103. The Needham court found that [i]f the defendant is acquitted as a result of the trial, an inference of wrongdoing is created by the perception that the acquittal was the result of the relationship or influence between [the defendant's counsel] and Officer Warner. Id. at 105. The court also was concerned that Warner could provide strategic information to assist his former attorney, that the defendant's counsel might not cross examine his former client vigorously, or that the defendant's attorney might use confidential information from the prior attorney-client relationship to cross-examine his former client. Id. at 105-06. The court concluded that an adequate factual basis existed for an informed citizen to perceive an appearance of impropriety and that the defendant's attempt to waive the appearance of impropriety did not cure the disqualification of his attorney. Id. at 107. The court did not intend to suggest or imply that [the defendant's counsel] has done, or will do, anything improper or unethical but because the possibilities of impropriety are so strong and because there is a risk that [the] defendant will not be adequately represented, the court disqualified the defendant's attorney. Ibid. That defendant was prepared to waive any potential conflict of interest resulting from his counsel's prior representation of Posey does not absolve the trial court of the responsibility for assuring the fairness and reliability of the trial. In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988), the defendant in a drug conspiracy prosecution requested that the attorney for two of his co-defendants represent him in place of his original counsel, informing the court of that request two days before trial. The prosecution objected because of the potential for conflict between counsel's obligations to the co-defendants and his proposed responsibility as defendant's trial counsel. Defendant and the co-defendants agreed to waive any conflict, and defendant emphasized his right to select his own counsel. The district court denied the requested substitution because of counsel's conflict of interest. Defendant was tried and convicted, represented by his original counsel. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. U.S. v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399 (1987). The United States Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting defendant's contention that the waivers by the defendant and co-defendants adequately addressed the conflict issue: Federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. . . . Not only the interest of a criminal defendant but the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized by unregulated multiple representation. . . . . Nor does a waiver by the defendant necessarily solve the problem, for we note, without passing judgment on, the apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals to entertain ineffective-assistance claims from defendants who have specifically waived the right to conflict-free counsel. . . . . For these reasons we think the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses. [Id. at 160-63, 108 S. Ct. at ___ ___, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 149-51.] To the same effect is United States, ex. rel. Stewart v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1989). There, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of a habeas corpus petition and sustained the trial court's refusal to permit defendant to be represented by his preferred counsel because of that counsel's prior representation of a prosecution witness. Rejecting defendant's contention that his waiver of counsel's conflict should be controlling, the Court of Appeals observed: There is a presumption in favor of a defendant's choice of counsel, but this may be overcome "by a showing of a serious potential for conflict." . . . In balancing what can be competing interests of the Sixth Amendment, the trial court has "an independent duty to ensure that criminal defendants receive a trial that is fair." Id. at 856 (quoting Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 161, 164, 108 S. Ct. at 1697, 1699, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 150, 152). B Individuals are constitutionally protected against being tried twice for the same offense. The United States Constitution states: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. amend. V. Likewise, New Jersey's Constitution provides: No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense. N.J. Const. art. I, 11. Additionally, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9 states: A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of the same provision of the statutes based upon the same facts as a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: . . . d. The former prosecution was improperly Termination of a trial after jeopardy attaches does not automatically bar subsequent re-prosecution. State v. Lynch, 79 N.J. 327, 342 (1979). Only improper termination of proceedings by a trial court bars a retrial. State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 353 (1989); State v. Dunns, 266 N.J. Super. 349, 363 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 567 (1993); State in the Interest of D.P., 232 N.J. Super. 8, 13 (App. Div. 1989). Where the court finds a sufficient legal reason and manifest necessity to terminate a trial, the defendant's right to have his initial trial completed is subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials and reliable judgments. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S. Ct. 834, 837, 93 L. Ed. 974, 978 (1949). Whether manifest necessity or the ends of public justice require declaration of a mistrial depends on the unique facts of the case and the sound discretion of the trial court. That test was first articulated in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L. Ed. 165, 165 (1824), where the Supreme Court observed that the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes. That standard has guided judges in making the discretionary decision whether particular trial conditions warrant a sua sponte mistrial declaration. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 06, 98 S. Ct. 824, 830, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717, 728 (1978); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 481, 91 S. Ct. 547, 555, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543, 554 (1971); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 367-68, 81 S. Ct. 1523, 1526, 6 L. Ed. 2d 901, 904-05 (1961); State v. Rechtschaffer, 70 N.J. 395, 405 (1976); State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 170 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991, 87 S. Ct. 1305, 18 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1967). Under the standard enunciated in Perez, supra, a trial court has wide discretion in granting a mistrial. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462, 93 S. Ct. 1066, 1069, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425, 429 (1973); Gori, supra, 367 U.S. at 368, 81 S. Ct. at 1526, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 904; Farmer, supra, 48 N.J. at 171. Where a trial court declares a mistrial because of a substantial concern that the trial's result may be tainted, the trial judge's determination is entitled to special respect. Arizona v. Washintgon, supra, 434 U.S. at 510, 98 S. Ct. at 833, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 731. Where . . . the trial court acts sua sponte, over the objections of both parties, propriety of the mistrial depends upon the sound exercise of the court's discretion. Rechtschaffer, supra, 70 N.J. at 406. In Rechtschaffer, we discussed substantial United States Supreme Court precedent that established pertinent standards to determine whether declaration of a mistrial was proper: The common threads that run through the Supreme Court cases are centered about the propriety of the trial court's granting sua sponte the mistrial and its cause. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion so that a mistrial was justified? Did it have a viable alternative? If justified, what circumstances created the situation? Was it due to prosecutorial or defense misconduct? Will a second trial accord with the ends of public justice and with proper judicial administration? Will the defendant be prejudiced by a second trial, and if so, to what extent? [Id. at 410-11. (citation omitted).] In that case, we concluded that neither manifest necessity nor the ends of public justice warranted the grant of the partial mistrial because the mistrial was not justified and the defendant was prejudiced by the mistrial declaration. Id. at 415. In Arizona v. Washington, supra, the Supreme Court examined whether a mistrial was a manifest necessity where defendant's counsel made an improper and prejudicial comment during his opening statement. 434 U.S. at 498, 98 S. Ct. at 826, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 723. The federal District Court had concluded that the trial court did not adequately consider alternatives to a mistrial and did not made a finding of manifest necessity; the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 501-02, 98 S. Ct. at 828, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 725-26. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and concluded that the trial court exercised sound discretion when it declared a mistrial because it was concerned about the possibility of a double jeopardy violation, and that the trial court did not act precipitously in response to the prosecutor's request for a mistrial. Id. at 514 15, 98 S. Ct. at 835, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 733-34. Similarly in Illinois v. Somerville, supra, the Supreme Court held that if a mistrial vindicates a significant state policy and aborts a proceeding that at best would have produced a verdict that could be upset by one of the parties, a defendant's interest may be outweighed by the equally legitimate demand for public justice. 410 U.S. at 471, 93 S. Ct. at 1074, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 435. [Id. at 171.] We balanced the defendant's and the State's interests in determining whether the defense of double jeopardy barred the retrial of defendant for murder: If some unexpected, untoward and undesigned incident or circumstance arises which does not bespeak bad faith, inexcusable neglect or [Id. at 174-75 (citations omitted).] We noted that there is no over-all formula, no hard and fast rule for determining when an order of mistrial will cause the jeopardy bar to spring into being, [and that] each case must depend upon its own facts and the urgency of its circumstances. Id. at 177. After a careful review of the record, we concluded that the trial court's reluctant declaration of a mistrial constituted a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion, and that it represented the most sensible balancing of the interests of the defendant and the public. We have no doubt it came from a conscience acutely aware not only of the sacredness of the life at stake before him, but also of the sacredness of the life that [Id. at 290.] III Against this jurisprudential backdrop we must determine whether defense counsel's prior representation of Sharonda Posey created an appearance of impropriety and whether the trial court properly declared a mistrial. In considering whether a lawyer's responsibility to a client is compromised by his representation of a former client and constitutes an appearance of impropriety, we address the issue from the perspective of a reasonable and informed citizen. Opinion No. 653, supra, 132 N.J. at 132. We also consider whether the representation posed a substantial risk of disservice either to the public interest or the interest of one of the clients. Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 216 (quoting RPC 1.7(c)(2)). The trial court correctly found that Cucco's representation of defendant created an unacceptable appearance of impropriety. The trial court reasoned that Cucco may have obtained confidential information during his prior representation of Posey that he could now use to impeach her credibility on cross examination. We note that Posey's prior conviction was drug related and that defendant Loyal was charged with a murder that occurred during a drug transaction. Additionally, because of their prior relationship, the trial court may have been concerned that Cucco would cross-examine Posey less vigorously at the expense of defendant's interests. Moreover, Posey's decision to recant her statement implicating defendant enhanced the trial court's concerns. The prosecutor had contended that the jury would have to be notified of Cucco's prior representation of Posey in order to assess the proper weight to be given to both Posey's testimony and her statement to police. Both Posey's interest and defendant's interest may have been disserved by counsel's prior relationship with Posey. Additionally, the public interest would have been disserved by Cucco's continued representation of defendant. The trial court noted that an independent observer might believe that something is fishy when a witness who was previously represented by defendant's counsel recants a prior statement that identified defendant as the shooter. As we stated in Garber: The public itself has the greatest stake in the propriety of the legal relationships that are created to properly administer criminal justice. . . . Clearly, the public interest in the administration of criminal justice in the circumstances of this case compelled the unbiased and unstinted representation of [the witness]. [Garber, supra, 95 N.J. at 614 (quotation omitted).] IV STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN LOYAL, Defendant-Appellant. COLEMAN, J., dissenting The narrow issue in this case is whether a public defender's prior representation of a State witness created a manifest necessity for the trial court to declare a mistrial, over the objection of defendant, the State, and the witness. The trial court determined that the prior representation created an impermissible appearance of impropriety and declared a mistrial. In a second trial, a jury convicted defendant of murder. The Appellate Division concluded that the prior representation created an appearance of impropriety and held that the mistrial was a manifest necessity. A majority of this Court agrees. Mr. Cucco argued that he had requested judgments of conviction for all of the State's witnesses, and only received from the State one page of what should have been a two-sided document concerning Posey, who apparently had two previous convictions. Cucco argued that he had established a rapport with defendant over the last year and four months . . . which the State is now in the position of being able to interfere with. Furthermore, he believed that he made substantial . . . points . . . on the cross-examination of Colon . . . . [and now] the State's gonna get another chance at Mr. Loyal with the advantage of . . . having additional opportunity to prepare a case that was marked . . . ready for trial many months ago. After the jury had been discharged, defense counsel moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a second trial would place defendant in double jeopardy, in violation of the federal and New Jersey Constitutions. Defendant blamed the mistrial on the State's dereliction in failing to provide both sides of Posey's Judgment of Conviction. The State responded that it did, in fact, forward both sides of the document to Cucco, and insinuated that Cucco either misplaced the second page or deliberately lost it. The court, believing that an issue of fact existed concerning whether Cucco deliberately lost the document, called Cucco to the stand. Cucco testified that he only received one side of the Judgment of Conviction. At a second hearing, the court allowed the State assistant prosecutor who tried the case, Jerry Chambers, to testify with respect to whether he forwarded both sides of the document to defendant. Chambers testified that he remembered photocopying both sides of the document. In an oral opinion, the court observed that when a mistrial results from good faith prosecutorial error and is required as a matter of necessity, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a second trial. The court, citing State v. Laganella, 144 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1976), framed the issue before it as whether the prosecutor's actions or inactions bespeak bad faith and inexcusable neglect or oppressive conduct. The court concluded that the State's failure to provide the second side of the Judgment of Conviction was not deliberate. Thus, the court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy. In the subsequent trial, a jury convicted defendant on all counts and the court sentenced defendant to life in prison with thirty years of parole ineligibility for the murder. The State did not call Posey as a witness in the second trial. On appeal, in an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the appearance of impropriety arising from Cucco's previous representation of Posey made the trial court's sua sponte grant of a mistrial a manifest necessity. The appellate panel noted that under R.P.C. 1.7(c) a court should apply the ordinary knowledgeable citizen standard when determining whether a past representation poses substantial risk to the public or the client. The panel could not say with certainty that such a risk did not exist in this case. Instead, the panel observed that [t]here is the potential that Loyal's attorney may have obtained client confidences during that prior representation that could be used to aid in cross-examining Posey. The panel felt that the necessity for a mistrial increased because Posey was a recanting witness. Of course, noted the panel, we do not suggest that the assigned public defender had done or would do anything unethical. The panel remarked that neither party obtained an advantage as a result of the mistrial nor were there other alternatives available to the judge. Therefore, the Appellate Division concluded [t]he declaration of a mistrial in this case advances an important state policy and terminates a proceeding that would have produced results that potentially could have been overturned on appeal. Thus, the defendant's interests are outweighed by the competing demand for public justice. The phrase appearance of impropriety was first used in a 1932 Formal Opinion issued by an American Bar Association (ABA) Committee interpreting the Canons of Professional Ethics. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 77 (1932). The Committee determined that a part-time prosecutor could not defend a client in a civil action while prosecuting him on felony charges, even with the client's consent, because . . . . . . . The present New Jersey approach unduly limits lawyers' representation of clients where no actual conflict exists and it unduly limits clients' selection of lawyers where no actual conflict exists. It imposes upon attorneys a disciplinary rule that is vague and undefined. The rule's contours are defined in retrospect on a case-by-case method, which is not a satisfactory procedure when dealing with rules of conduct. The proposed Model Rules carefully define the situations in which representation is proper and provide safeguards to ensure against improper representation. [New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Report (1983).] The Court adopted most of the Committee's other recommendations, but chose to keep the appearance of impropriety standard, now codified at R.P.C. 1.7(c). In adopting R.P.C. 1.7(c), New Jersey rejected the approach adopted by the majority of states. As of the fall of 1995, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia had adopted all, or significant portions, of the Model Rules, including those provisions abandoning the appearance of impropriety standard. Green, supra, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 318, 318 n.20 (quoting Carol M. Rice, The Superior Defense in Legal Ethics: Sending the Wrong Message to Young Lawyers, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 887, 938 (1997)). The Model Rule is as follows: RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE (a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents after consultation. At the request of a group of eight New Jersey law firms, this Court considered during the present term whether to eliminate the appearance of impropriety standard contained in R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2). See Notice to the Bar, 159 N.J.L.J. 843 (2000). The Supreme Court's Professional Responsibility Rules Committee (PRRC) recommended to the Court the elimination of the appearance of impropriety standard contained in R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2). Ibid. The PRRC concluded that: There is no support for continuation of the appearance of impropriety standard. Efforts at its application are confounded by the vagueness and imprecision of the Rule itself, yet its specter creates undesirable adversarial tactics, which result in limitations on the free selection of counsel. Lacking any real and clear parameters, it is surplusage, which should be eliminated from our Disciplinary Rules. Other attorneys argued that the rule is impossible to apply because of its indefiniteness, unpredictability, and that if it were a penal statute, it would be held to be unconstitutionally vague. Professors Stephen Gillers of New York University School of Law and Bruce Green of Fordham University School of Law argued that the appearance of impropriety standard should be retained and applied only to government lawyers, criminal justice, and other situations that specifically implicate the public interest. Professor Geoffrey Hazard of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and former Director of the American Law Institute, argued that the appearance standard is superfluous and used in New Jersey only as an embellishment or exclamation point in decisions that rest on other grounds. Ultimately, the Court decided not to determine whether to abolish R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2) until after the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, known as Ethics 2000 Commission, has submitted its report. In the face of such emphatic condemnation of RPC 1.7(c)(2), even by the Court's own key committee, there are at least three substantial reasons why I do not believe that a violation of R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2) can satisfy the Perez manifest necessity requirement. First, New Jersey is one of an overwhelming minority of states that prohibit attorney-client relationships which, while not violating a specific conflict of interest rule, create an appearance of impropriety. Green, supra, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 318-19. One respected commentator from New Jersey has concluded that we stand alone. Cynthia M. Jacob, A Polemic Against R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2): The Appearance of Impropriety Rule, New Jersey Lawyer, June 1996. Although Jacob has asserted that New Jersey stands alone, in Berry v. Saline Mem. Hosp., 907 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Ark. 1995), the Supreme Court of Arkansas was asked in a pretrial application to reconsider its position on the appearance of impropriety standard because we are only one of three states retaining that standard. What is clear, however, is that no state has held that an appearance of impropriety that did not also involve an actual conflict can satisfy the Perez manifest necessity standard. Our rule concerning an appearance of impropriety is an ethics rule. In In re Garber, 95 N.J. 597, 610 (1984), an attorney disciplinary case, we determined that an attorney's multiple and simultaneous representation of a recanting murder witness and the murder suspect, in unrelated actions, created an appearance of impropriety. This Court has never suggested, however, that if an attorney engages in conduct in a criminal case that creates an appearance of impropriety, the trial court can unilaterally discontinue a criminal trial to vindicate that ethical rule, without regard for the Double Jeopardy Clause. Yet, the majority opinion today has reached the strained and unconstitutional conclusion that breach of such a rule can satisfy the Perez manifest necessity standard. Such a ruling disregards the ratio decidendi of the Court's decision of only two years ago, which held that breach of our Rules of Professional Conduct, patterned after the American Bar Association's Model Rules, does not create a civil cause of action. Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 197-204 (1998). Our ethics rules 'intended to make clear that the purpose of the Model Rules was to regulate lawyer conduct through the disciplinary process, not to serve as a basis for civil liability.' Id. at 198 (quoting Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Scope (1992)). Even twenty years earlier in our now famous case of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 456 (1979), the Court observed that the primary purpose of our rules of ethics is to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity and trustworthiness of lawyers in general. Ibid. If a breach of our appearance of impropriety rule cannot create civil liability, a fortiori such a violation may not satisfy the Perez manifest necessity standard. Further, nothing that we stated recently in State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201 (2000), in which the Court exercised its authority to amend a practice and procedure rule, supports the majority's decision. I am of the view that unless the violation of an ethics rule also violates a constitutionally-protected right of the State or a criminal defendant, such as the Fifth, Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment, an example of which is Farmer, supra, 48 N.J. at 167-177, such a violation may not satisfy the Perez manifest necessity standard required to justify granting a mistrial sua sponte once jeopardy has attached. Where jeopardy has attached, an appearance of impropriety violation should be addressed exclusively within the disciplinary system because that standard was intended as a moral or prudential principle, not a legally enforceable norm. Green, supra, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 357. That result is impelled, at least in part, by the fact that decision makers have no basis upon which to decide what the public would view as improper. The appearance of impropriety test does not appear to be based upon any empirical studies of public sentiment. Boyan, supra, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics at 1385. I agree with Boyan that judges themselves are critical of the appearance of impropriety standard because it calls upon them to 'divine' the public's interpretation of attorney actions. Ibid. Even if judges are able to determine public sentiment, the public may be wrong in certain cases. What lay persons sometimes perceive as impropriety is frequently in the highest tradition of the bar: for example, representing unpopular clients, defending the guilty, and being courteous to opposing counsel during the course of a trial. Victor H. Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 243, 265 (1981). Yet, despite the vagueness, indefiniteness, and unpredictability of R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2), the Court today has elevated its status above well-established constitutional law. Second, none of the cases decided under the appearance of impropriety rule raised any double jeopardy concerns. They all dealt with ethics problems, mostly in the context of pre trial applications to remove an attorney from the case based on a conflict of interest. I can find no case law in this or any other jurisdiction, and the Court's majority opinion has cited none, that holds that an appearance of impropriety falls within a trial court's outer discretionary limit for granting mistrials based on the Perez manifest necessity standard. I am persuaded that a violation of our rule governing the appearance of impropriety is an insufficient basis to conclude that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S. Ct. 547, 557, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971). Reliance by the trial court and the majority on State v. Needham, State v. Nappo, State v. Laganella, and State v. Farmer is misplaced. First, Needham is a Law Division opinion. Second, the facts of that case make its holding inapplicable to this case. In Needham, a defendant barricaded himself in a home while threatening police with a gun. The State's chief witness was Officer Warner, the arresting officer who endured defendant's threats. 298 N.J. Super. at 103. Defendant's attorney had represented Officer Warner seven years earlier in a criminal jury trial in which Officer Warner was acquitted, as well as in an unrelated internal affairs investigation that took place after defendant had been arrested in this case. Before the Needham trial began, the trial court disqualified the defendant's attorney based on an appearance of impropriety. Thus, Needham dealt with a pretrial motion to disqualify an attorney in an attempt to vindicate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to unconflicted representation. All of the interested parties waived any potential conflict. No Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause issues were implicated. State v. Nappo, 185 N.J. Super. 600 (1982), another Law Division decision, involved the dismissal of a municipal court complaint after some evidence had been presented, because the State refused to complete the trial within a reasonable time. Id. at 602-03. The dismissal was at the request of the defendant. A second prosecution was prohibited because of prosecutorial overreaching, such as a pattern of deliberate dereliction. A dismissal of a criminal complaint or indictment after some evidence has been presented is the functional equivalent to a mistrial. State v. Lynch, 79 N.J. 327, 341 (1979). A mistrial that is granted based on a defendant's application that does not involve prosecutorial overreaching or bad faith does not preclude a retrial under double jeopardy principles. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672-73, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2087-88, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1982); Farmer, supra, 48 N.J. at 171. [Ibid.] In this case, the trial court declared a mistrial after utilizing a short lunch recess to consider the State's motion. After lunch, the State withdrew its motion, but the court did not take time to reflect on this significant new development. The State, when it withdrew its mistrial application, provided a means for reducing the significance of Cucco's prior representation of Posey: an express waiver from defendant, representations from defense counsel that he had no confidential information or recollection of Posey, and representations from Posey that she did not recall Cucco's representation of her. The trial court apparently believed that consent was immaterial. Although R.P.C. 1.7(c)(1) does instruct that in certain cases consent may not overcome an appearance of impropriety, that statement is limited to whether the attorney may still face ethical charges. Clearly, State v. Purnell, supra, which is controlling in the area of criminal procedure, held that such a waiver is permitted. In this case, the representations of Cucco and Posey, when coupled with the State's and defendant's express waivers, provided the trial court with a viable alternative to a mistrial, even if an appearance of impropriety existed. In addition, the trial court also could have considered whether the substitution of a new attorney under Rule 1:11-2(a)(2) without the declaration of a mistrial would have been appropriate. Although I have the highest regard for the trial judge's judicial abilities, I am satisfied that the declaration of a mistrial was fatal to any further prosecution. NO. A-29 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN LOYAL, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 27, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz