Title: Ferri v. Powell-Ferri
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12070
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2017

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SJC-12070 
 
MICHAEL J. FERRI, trustee,1 & others2  vs.  NANCY POWELL-FERRI 
& another.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 8, 2016. - March 20, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Budd, 
JJ.4 
 
 
Trust, Assets of trust, Distribution, Irrevocable trust, 
Spendthrift provision. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
 
 
 
Charles L. Solomont (Nathaniel Bruhn also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Jeffrey J. Mirman for Paul John Ferri, Jr. 
                                                        
1 Of the Paul John Ferri, Jr., Trust and of the Declaration 
of Trust for Paul John Ferri, Jr. 
 
2 Anthony J. Medaglia, trustee of the Paul John Ferri, Jr., 
Trust and of the Declaration of Trust for Paul John Ferri, Jr.; 
and Maurice T. FitzMaurice, trustee of the Declaration of Trust 
for Paul John Ferri, Jr. 
 
3 Paul John Ferri, Jr. 
 
4 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Kenneth Walton (Patricia B. Gary also present) for Nancy 
Powell-Ferri. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case we are asked to answer three 
questions certified to us by the Connecticut Supreme Court 
concerning the authority of a trustee to distribute (i.e., to 
decant) substantially all of the assets of an irrevocable trust 
into another trust.  The questions, arising out of divorce 
proceedings pending in Connecticut between Nancy Powell-Ferri 
and her husband Paul John Ferri, Jr., the beneficiary of a 
Massachusetts irrevocable trust, are as follows: 
 
"1.  Under Massachusetts law, did the terms of the 
Paul John Ferri, Jr. Trust (1983 Trust) . . . empower its 
trustees to distribute substantially all of its assets 
(that is, to decant) to the Declaration of Trust for Paul 
John Ferri, Jr. (2011 Trust)? 
 
 
"2.  If the answer to question 1 is 'no,' should 
either 75% or 100% of the assets of the 2011 Trust be 
returned to the 1983 Trust to restore the status quo prior 
to the decanting? 
 
 
"3.  Under Massachusetts law, should a court, in 
interpreting whether the 1983 Trust's settlor intended to 
permit decanting to another trust, consider an affidavit of 
the settlor . . . , offered to establish what he intended 
when he created the 1983 Trust?" 
 
For the reasons we discuss, we answer the first question and 
third questions yes, and do not answer the second question. 
 
1.  Facts and procedural history.  We recite the relevant 
facts presented in the Connecticut Supreme Court's statement of 
facts for certification to this court. 
3 
 
 
 
 
The Paul John Ferri, Jr. Trust, dated June 24, 1983 (1983 
Trust), was settled by Paul J. Ferri for the sole benefit of his 
son, Paul John Ferri, Jr. (Ferri Jr. or beneficiary), when Ferri 
Jr. was eighteen years old.  The trust was created in 
Massachusetts and is governed by Massachusetts law. 
 
The 1983 Trust establishes two methods by which trust 
assets are distributed to the beneficiary.  First, the trustee 
may "pay to or segregate irrevocably" trust assets for the 
beneficiary.5  Second, after the beneficiary reaches the age of 
thirty-five, he may request certain withdrawals of up to fixed 
percentages of trust assets, increasing from twenty-five per 
cent of the principal at age thirty-five to one hundred per cent 
after age forty-seven. 
 
Ferri Jr. and Powell-Ferri were married in 1995.  In 
October, 2010, Powell-Ferri filed an action in the Connecticut 
Superior Court to dissolve the marriage.  See Ferri v. Powell-
Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 225 (2015).  In March, 2011, the then 
trustees of the 1983 Trust, Michael J. Ferri and Anthony J. 
Medaglia, created the Declaration of Trust for Paul John Ferri, 
Jr. (2011 Trust).  They subsequently distributed substantially 
                                                        
5 The beneficiary also may request, within thirty days of a 
gift to the trust, and subject to the donor's veto of any or all 
such distribution, to withdraw up to the amount of the gift, 
preferably from the gift property. 
4 
 
 
 
all of the assets of the 1983 Trust to themselves as trustees of 
the 2011 Trust. 
 
As with the 1983 Trust, Ferri Jr. is the sole beneficiary 
of the 2011 Trust.  The 2011 Trust is a spendthrift trust; under 
paragraph 1(a), the trustee exercises complete authority over 
whether and when to make payments to the beneficiary, if at all, 
and the beneficiary has no power to demand payment of trust 
assets.  The spendthrift provision, in paragraph 4(b), bars the 
beneficiary from transferring or encumbering his interest and, 
as with similar provisions in the 1983 Trust, shields the trust 
from the beneficiary's creditors.  The trustees decanted the 
1983 Trust out of concern that Powell-Ferri would reach the 
assets of the 1983 Trust as a result of the divorce action.  
They did so without informing the beneficiary and without his 
consent. 
 
At the time of the decanting, pursuant to art. II.B of the 
1983 Trust, Ferri Jr. had a right to request a withdrawal of up 
to seventy-five per cent of the principal.  During the course of 
this action, his vested interest matured into one hundred per 
cent of the assets the 1983 Trust. 
 
In August, 2011, the plaintiff trustees of the 1983 Trust 
and the 2011 Trust (trustees) commenced a declaratory judgment 
action against Powell-Ferri and Ferri Jr. in the Connecticut 
Superior Court, seeking a declaration that (1) the trustees 
5 
 
 
 
validly exercised their powers under the 1983 Trust to 
distribute and assign the property and assets held by them as 
trustees of the 1983 Trust to the 2011 Trust; and (2) Powell-
Ferri has no right, title, or interest, directly or indirectly, 
in or to the 2011 Trust or its assets, principal, income, or 
other property.  Powell-Ferri moved for summary judgment, and 
the trustees file a cross motion.  In support of their cross 
motion, to demonstrate the intent of the settlor of the 1983 
Trust, the trustees filed an affidavit from Paul J. Ferri, Sr., 
dated July 11, 2012. 
 
In August, 2013, the trial judge granted Powell-Ferri's 
motion for summary judgment and denied the trustees' cross 
motion, after first having allowed Powell-Ferri's motion to 
strike the affidavit.  In a subsequent memorandum of decision 
explaining the reasons for the allowance of Powell-Ferri's 
motion, and awarding specific remedies, the judge ordered 
restoration of seventy-five per cent of the assets of the 2011 
Trust, as they were held in the 1983 Trust; an accounting of the 
2011 Trust from inception to the date of restoration; and an 
award of reasonable attorney's fees to Powell-Ferri. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The interpretation of a written trust is a 
matter of law to be resolved by the court.  See Mazzola v. 
Myers, 363 Mass. 625, 633 (1973).  The rules of construction of 
a contract apply similarly to trusts; where the language of a 
6 
 
 
 
trust is clear, we look only to that plain language.  See 
Harrison v. Marcus, 396 Mass. 424, 429 (1985).  "Determining the 
existence of a contract ambiguity [also] presents a question of 
law for the court; when a trial judge undertakes the 
interpretation of an unambiguous contract, the judge's ruling is 
subject to plenary review on appeal."  Bank v. Thermo Elemental 
Inc., 451 Mass. 638, 648 (2008), and cases cited. 
 
In deciding whether there is ambiguity, "the court must 
first examine the language of the contract by itself, 
independent of extrinsic evidence concerning the drafting 
history or the intention of the parties."  Id. at 648, citing 
General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the U.S. of Am., Inc. 
v. MacKenzie, 449 Mass. 832, 835–836, 838 (2007) (analyzing 
indemnity provision in lease of real property held in trust).  
Language is ambiguous "where the phraseology can support a 
reasonable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the words 
employed and the obligations undertaken."  Bank, 451 Mass. at 
648, quoting President & Fellows of Harvard College v. PECO 
Energy Co., 57 Mass. App. Ct. 888, 896 (2003).  If a court 
concludes that such ambiguity exists, "[w]hen interpreting trust 
language, . . . we do not read words in isolation and out of 
context.  Rather we strive to discern the settlor's intent from 
the trust instrument as a whole and from the circumstances known 
to the settlor at the time the instrument was executed."  
7 
 
 
 
Hillman v. Hillman, 433 Mass. 590, 593 (2001), citing Pond v. 
Pond, 424 Mass. 894, 897 (1997). 
 
"It is fundamental that a trust instrument must be 
construed to give effect to the intention of the donor as 
ascertained from the language of the whole instrument considered 
in the light of circumstances known to the donor at the time of 
its execution."  Watson v. Baker, 444 Mass. 487, 491 (2005), 
quoting Powers v. Wilkson, 399 Mass. 650, 653 (1987).  
"[E]xtrinsic evidence may be admitted when a contract is 
ambiguous on its face or as applied to the subject matter.  The 
initial ambiguity must exist, however . . . .  [E]xtrinsic 
evidence cannot be used to contradict or change the written 
terms, but only to remove or to explain the existing uncertainty 
or ambiguity."  General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the 
U.S. of Am., Inc., 449 Mass. at 836.  "In determining the 
meaning of a contractual provision, the court will prefer an 
interpretation 'which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective 
meaning to all manifestations of intention, rather than one 
which leaves a part of those manifestations unreasonable, 
unlawful or [of] no effect'" (citation omitted)  Siebe, Inc. v. 
Louis M. Gerson Co., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 550 n.13 (2009). 
8 
 
 
 
 
We first authorized the trustee of an irrevocable trust to 
decant a trust in Morse v. Kraft, 466 Mass. 92, 99 (2013).6  In 
that case, we allowed the trustee to decant four subtrusts into 
four new subtrusts, one for each of the named beneficiaries, who 
had been minors when the first trust was created and who had 
reached the age of majority before the trust was decanted.  Id. 
at 93.  In doing so, we relied on specific language in the 
trust, which did not explicitly authorize decanting, and the 
trustee's broad powers under that trust instrument.  Id. at 97, 
99.  We declined, however, to recognize an inherent power 
allowing a trustee to decant irrespective of the language of the 
trust.  Id. at 99.  Accordingly, a trustee's decanting authority 
turns on the facts of each case and the terms of the instrument 
that establishes the trust.  Id. at 97. 
 
With these standards in mind, we turn to consideration of 
the questions certified by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
 
a.  Question 1.  The term decanting ordinarily is "used to 
describe the distribution of [irrevocable] trust property to 
another trust pursuant to the trustee's discretionary authority 
to make distributions to, or for the benefit of, one or more 
beneficiaries [of the original trust]."  Morse, 466 Mass. at 95.  
Decanting has the effect of "amend[ing] an unamendable trust, in 
                                                        
6 That decision was issued during the pendency of the 
proceedings in the Connecticut court; the trustees filed a copy 
of the decision in that court in July, 2013. 
9 
 
 
 
the sense that [the trustee] may distribute the trust property 
to a second trust with terms that differ from those of the 
original trust."  Id.  The rationale underlying the authority to 
decant is that if a trustee has the discretionary power to 
distribute property to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries, 
the trustee likewise has the authority to distribute the 
property to another trust for the benefit of those same 
beneficiaries.  Id. 
 
In the absence of a specific statutory provision allowing 
decanting, we have determined that a trustee of a Massachusetts 
irrevocable trust may be given the authority to decant assets in 
further trust through language in the trust.  Id.  In 
determining whether a trustee has such authority, the intent of 
the settlor is "paramount."  Id. at 98.  See C.E. Rounds, Jr., & 
C.E. Rounds, III, Loring & Rounds:  A Trustee's Handbook § 6.1.2 
(2017) (Loring & Rounds).  See also P.M. Annino, Estate Planning  
§ 13.42 (3d ed. 2007) (trust decanting).  While we explicitly 
have declined to adopt a formulaic rule regarding trustees' 
powers to decant trust assets, see Morse, 466 Mass. at 99, some 
general principles provide guidance.  The authority to decant 
need not be expressly granted to the trustee in the declaration 
of trust, id. at 98; a court may conclude that such authority 
exists based on other trust language, id. at 96-97.  The 
determination is reached by assessing the terms of a particular 
10 
 
 
 
trust instrument and other relevant evidence of the settlor's 
intent.  Id. at 97.  When deciding whether a particular trust 
authorized a trustee to decant, "the language used by the donor 
viewed in light of the rule of law in effect . . . at the time 
the powers in question were created" is "particularly 
significant" (citation omitted).  Id. at 98.  See S.M. Dunphy, 
Probate Law and Practice § 39.2 (2d ed. 1997) (powers of 
trustees). 
 
Here, after having examined the extremely broad authority 
and discretion afforded the trustees by the 1983 Trust 
declaration of trust, the anti-alienation provision of the 1983 
Trust, the beneficiary withdrawal rights afforded under the 
terms of the 1983 Trust, and the settlor's affidavit, we 
conclude that the terms of the 1983 Trust, read as a whole, 
demonstrate the settlor's intent to permit decanting. 
i.  Trustee's discretion.  A trustee's broad discretion to 
distribute the assets of an irrevocable trust may be evidence of 
a settlor's intent to permit decanting.  In Morse, 466 Mass. at 
98, for instance, we noted the trustee's "almost unlimited" 
discretion, and that the only constraint on the discretion to 
"distribute property directly to, or [to apply it] for the 
benefit of, the trust beneficiaries, [was] . . . that such 
distributions must be 'for the benefit of' such beneficiaries."  
We considered also that the trustee in that case had the 
11 
 
 
 
authority to "exercise his 'full power' and 'discretion,'" 
without seeking prior court approval.  Id. at 99.  States that 
have enacted explicit decanting provisions similarly look to a 
trustee's broad authority to distribute principal from the trust 
for the benefit of one or more of the beneficiaries when 
determining whether the trustee has the authority to decant.  
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 736.04117.7  Indeed, having reviewed what 
she concluded were the then eleven states to have enacted 
explicit statutory provisions allowing decanting, the 
Connecticut trial court judge noted this in her decision and 
commented that, if appropriate at all, the authority to decant 
would be, in her view, contingent upon a very broad discretion 
on the part of a trustee. 
 
The 1983 Trust contains three provisions relative to the 
trustee's discretion to distribute assets that are virtually 
                                                        
7 Florida Statutes § 736.04117 provides in relevant part: 
 
"(1)(a) Unless the trust instrument expressly provides 
otherwise, a trustee who has absolute power under the terms 
of a trust to invade the principal of the trust, referred 
to in this section as the 'first trust,' to make 
distributions to or for the benefit of one or more persons 
may instead exercise the power by appointing all or part of 
the principal of the trust subject to the power in favor of 
a trustee of another trust, referred to in this section as 
the 'second trust,' for the current benefit of one or more 
of such persons under the same trust instrument or under a 
different trust instrument; provided: 
 
"1.  The beneficiaries of the second trust may include 
only beneficiaries of the first trust . . . ."  
 
12 
 
 
 
identical to provisions in the Morse trust.  Article II.A 
provides, "So long as [the beneficiary] is living, [the trustee] 
shall, from time to time, pay to or segregate irrevocably for 
later payment to [the beneficiary], so much of the net income 
and principal of this trust as [the trustee] shall deem 
desirable for [the beneficiary's] benefit . . . ."  Article V.A 
states, "Wherever provision is made hereunder for payment of 
principal or income to a beneficiary, the same may instead be 
applied for his or her benefit."  In addition, art. VI provides 
that the trustee "shall have full power to take any steps and do 
any acts which he may deem necessary or proper in connection 
with the due care, management and disposition of the property 
and income of the trust hereunder . . . in his discretion, 
without order or license of court." 
 
The 1983 Trust also contains a number of additional 
provisions authorizing the trustee to distribute assets.  
Article II (Disposition of the Trust Property) sets forth the 
means by which the trustee may "dispose of the trust property" 
during the beneficiary's life.  Article II.A states that, so 
long as the beneficiary is living, the trustee shall "from time 
to time, pay to or segregate irrevocably for later payment to 
[the beneficiary], as much of the net income and principal of 
this trust as [the trustee] shall deem desirable for [the 
beneficiary's] benefit" (emphasis supplied). 
13 
 
 
 
 
Viewing the language of the 1983 Trust in its entirety, the 
trustee's extremely broad discretion is evident throughout the 
trust instrument.  The 1983 Trust plainly allows the trustee far 
more expansive discretion to act than even the broad discretion 
we recognized in Morse, supra, with no oversight other than the 
requirement to provide reporting from time to time at the 
request of the beneficiary. 
 
The explicit authority of the trustee of the 1983 Trust to 
"segregate irrevocably for later payment to" the trust 
beneficiary further indicates the settlor's intention to allow 
decanting.  In common usage, to "segregate" means "to separate 
or set apart from others or from the general mass or main body: 
isolate," "to cause or force the separation of," "to separate or 
withdraw (as from others or from a main body)."  Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 2056-2057 (2003) (Webster's).  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 1563 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
"segregate" as "[t]o separate or make distinct from others or 
from a general aggregate; to isolate" and "[t]o cause or require 
separation from others").  "Irrevocable" means "incapable of 
being recalled or revoked" and "unalterable."  Webster's, supra 
at 1196.  Decanting trust assets to an irrevocable trust is one 
way to "segregate" assets "irrevocably."  See Morse, 466 Mass. 
at 98, quoting Loring v. Karri-Davies, 371 Mass. 346, 349-350 
(1976) ("We believe that 'it is fair to suppose that the [donor] 
14 
 
 
 
in using the language which appears in the [trust] had in mind 
the interpretation of similar words and clauses"). 
 
This interpretation of art. II.A is supported by language 
in art. V.A:  "Wherever provision is made hereunder for payment 
of principal or income to a beneficiary, the same may instead be 
applied for his or her benefit" (emphasis supplied).  This power 
parallels the language and grant of authority that we concluded 
authorized decanting in Morse, 466 Mass. at 96-98 (trust 
authorized decanting under trustee's power to "pay to" 
beneficiary or to apply payments of income or principal for 
benefit of beneficiary).  We stated explicitly in Morse that we 
declined to rely on a particular form of words in determining 
whether the language of a particular trust allowed decanting, 
and that we would focus foremost on determining the settlor's 
intent.  Here, however, where the language of the trust is 
almost identical to that we found to have conveyed the authority 
to decant in Morse, and where the settlor's intention to convey 
to the trustee almost unlimited discretion to act is evident, 
the conclusion that the settlor intended to authorize decanting 
would seem to follow necessarily. 
 
There are, however, two sections of the trust language that 
might suggest, as Powell-Ferri argues, a conclusion to the 
contrary, and we turn next to these provisions. 
15 
 
 
 
ii.  Anti-alienation provision.  Article V.B of the 1983 
Trust provides that "[n]either the income nor the principal of 
any trust hereunder shall be alienable by any beneficiary . . . 
and the same shall not be subject to be taken by his or her 
creditors by any process whatever."  When interpreting trust 
language, words should not be read "in isolation and out of 
context."  Hillman, 433 Mass. at 593.  Courts "strive to discern 
the settlor's intent from the trust instrument as a whole and 
from the circumstances known to the settlor at the time the 
instrument was executed."  Id.  Viewing the 1983 Trust document 
"as a whole, and giving due weight to all of its language," id., 
we conclude that empowering the trustee to decant is consistent 
with this anti-alienation provision. 
 
We have said, when confronting similar language, that this 
type of anti-alienation provision "evidences the settlor's 
intent to protect the trust income and principal from invasion 
by the beneficiary's creditors."  Bank of New England v. 
Strandlund, 402 Mass. 707, 709 (1988).  It follows that if a 
settlor intended a trust's assets to be protected from 
creditors, he or she necessarily intended that the trustee have 
the means to protect the trust assets, consistent with his or 
her fiduciary duties.8 
                                                        
8 Nancy Powell-Ferri argues that, under Massachusetts law, a 
party to a divorce is not a "creditor" for the purposes of this 
16 
 
 
 
iii.  Beneficiary withdrawal provisions.  Article II.B of 
the 1983 Trust provides that the trustee "shall pay to [the 
beneficiary] after he has attained the age of thirty-five (35) 
years such amounts of principal as he may from time to time in 
writing request," with explicit limitations on the percentage of 
the principal that may be withdrawn at different ages, up to the 
age of forty-seven, after which the beneficiary is entitled to 
withdraw one hundred per cent of the trust assets.9 
At the time the trustees decanted the 1983 Trust assets 
into the 2011 Trust, under the terms of art. II.B, the 
beneficiary had the right to request a withdrawal of up to 
seventy-five per cent of the principal of the 1983 Trust.  
During the pendency of this action, the beneficiary reached the 
age of forty-seven, and his irrevocable vested interest matured 
into one hundred per cent of the corpus of the trust.  The 
beneficiary states that, throughout the life of the 1983 Trust, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
type of provision, and that a trust is marital property subject 
to equitable distribution notwithstanding an anti-alienation 
provision.  See Lauricella v. Lauricella, 409 Mass. 211, 216-217 
(1991).  Any question concerning the equitable distribution of 
the trust assets is not part of the certified questions to this 
court and is not properly before us.  See DiFiore v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 488 n.4 (2009). 
 
9 The limitations on the percentage of the principal that 
the beneficiary may withdraw are as follows:  beginning at age 
thirty-five, the beneficiary could request in writing a 
distribution of up to twenty-five per cent of the trust 
principal; after reaching age thirty-nine, up to fifty per cent; 
and beginning at age forty-three, up to seventy-five per cent.  
Beginning at age forty-seven, there is no limitation. 
17 
 
 
 
he has requested and received only a small percentage of the 
trust assets. 
Powell-Ferri argues that the beneficiary's right under the 
1983 Trust to request a withdrawal of a certain percentage of 
trust assets is wholly inconsistent with the authority to 
decant.  She contends that decanting the 1983 trust into the 
2011 spendthrift trust impaired the interests of the beneficiary 
to withdraw trust assets upon written request. 
 
We do not agree, for three reasons.  First, Powell-Ferri's 
contention runs counter to our mandate to read trust provisions 
consistently with the entire trust document, and in a manner 
that gives effect to all trust language.  See Hillman, 433 Mass. 
at 593 ("When interpreting trust language, . . . we do not read 
words in isolation and out of context.  Rather, we strive to 
discern the settlor's intent from the trust instrument as a 
whole . . .").  If the trustee were unable to decant the portion 
of trust assets made "withdrawable" as the beneficiary reached 
certain age milestones, the trustee correspondingly would lose 
the ability to exercise his or her fiduciary duties (including 
the duty to invest and protect the assets' purchasing power) 
over those assets, eventually losing power to control one 
hundred per cent of the assets upon the beneficiary turning 
forty-seven years of age, pursuant to art. II.B.  Under Powell-
Ferri's interpretation, the trustee effectively would be without 
18 
 
 
 
a role upon the beneficiary's reaching the age of forty-seven.  
This interpretation makes little sense. 
 
Second, a trustee holds "full legal title to all property 
of a trust and the rights of possession that go along with it." 
McClintock v. Scahill, 403 Mass. 397, 399 (1988).  See Welch v. 
Boston, 221 Mass. 155, 157 (1915) ("It is one of the fundamental 
characteristics of trusts that the full and exclusive legal 
title is vested in the trustee").  Here, at the time the 
trustees decanted substantially all of the 1983 Trust's assets 
to the 2011 Trust, the beneficiary had withdrawn only a small 
percentage of the assets under art. II.B.  Therefore, a 
substantial portion of the trust assets remained in the 1983 
Trust, subject to the trustee's authority and stewardship. 
 
In analyzing the meaning of this provision, it is 
instructive to consider the circumstance of the termination of a 
trust.  When a trust terminates, the beneficiaries obtain a 
vested interest in the trust property that is not unlike the 
beneficiary's withdrawal right here.  Notwithstanding this 
vested right, however, the trustee of a terminated trust retains 
ongoing duties to control and protect the trust assets, and may 
continue to act pursuant to the powers provided under the trust 
instrument.  See Rothwell v. Rothwell, 283 Mass. 563, 570, 572 
(1933) (following trust's termination date, "the duties and 
powers of the trustees do not cease" until trust property is 
19 
 
 
 
conveyed, and, until such conveyance, "the trustees [have] power 
to perform any act incidental to the conservation of the [trust] 
property").  See Loring & Rounds, supra at § 8.2.3 ("A trustee 
of a terminated trust has continuing fiduciary 
responsibilities. . . .  It is not until the trustee is done 
'winding up' the trust's administration, to include making 
distribution 'in a manner consistent with the purposes of the 
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries,' is the trustee 
relieved of fiduciary duties" [citations omitted]). 
 
Third, this mechanism for the beneficiary's withdrawal of 
trust assets does not limit the trustee's decanting authority.  
The two mechanisms for distribution provided under art. II are 
not mutually exclusive.  We read arts. II.A and II.B as 
comprising a unified framework governing distribution of the 
trust assets whereby, under art. II.B, the beneficiary has a 
graduating right of withdrawal of those trust assets that have 
not been distributed pursuant to the trustee's payment to him or 
to the irrevocable sequestering of trust property under art. 
II.A. 
 
Further, in reading arts. II.A and II.B as a coherent 
whole, we note that the 1983 Trust empowers the trustee to 
segregate assets irrevocably for "[s]o long as [the beneficiary] 
is living," in other words, both before the beneficiary's 
withdrawal rights began to vest at the age of thirty-five, and 
20 
 
 
 
thereafter.  This authority is counter to Powell-Ferri's 
argument that the settlor intended to bar decanting after the 
beneficiary gained withdrawal rights at the age of thirty-five.  
If decanting were so barred, art. II.A would not have allowed 
irrevocable sequestration for "[s]o long as [the beneficiary] is 
living." 
 
Accordingly, reading the entirety of art. II in harmony, it 
provides that, unless and until all of the trust assets were 
distributed in response to the beneficiary's request for a 
withdrawal, the trustee could exercise his or her powers and 
obligations under the 1983 Trust, including the duty to decant 
if the trustee deemed decanting to be in the beneficiary's best 
interest.10,11 
 
b.  Question 3.  The third certified question asks whether, 
under Massachusetts law, a court should consider an affidavit by 
the settlor, stating his intent in establishing the 1983 Trust, 
                                                        
10 We are cognizant that the Connecticut judge relied 
heavily in her determination that the decanting was not 
authorized under the terms of the 1983 Trust based on her 
understanding of divorce law in Connecticut, and its policies 
that all assets of a marriage on the date that an action for 
dissolution is filed are available for later distribution.  We 
note in this regard, as the trial judge herself apparently 
already has anticipated by suggesting an alternative order for 
payment of alimony if the decanting is deemed proper, that the 
alimony order may be revised in light of this determination as 
to the trust assets.  See Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 475 
Mass. 105, 106 (2016). 
 
11 Given this, we need not reach Question 2, which is 
applicable only if we were to have answered "No" to Question 1. 
21 
 
 
 
in reaching a determination whether, in creating the 1983 Trust, 
the settlor intended to permit decanting to another trust.  
Where, as here, there is any question of ambiguity concerning 
the settlor's intent, Massachusetts courts may consider 
extrinsic evidence.  See, e.g., General Convention of the New 
Jerusalem in the U.S. of Am., Inc., 449 Mass. at 835-836. 
 
In determining the settlor's intent on the question of 
decanting in Morse, 466 Mass. at 99, we considered the settlor's 
affidavit and noted that it provided "affirmative evidence of 
the settlor's intent that the terms of the [Morse trust] give 
the plaintiff decanting power in the form of affidavits from the 
settlor, draftsman, and trustee."  We also cited the Restatement 
(Third) of Property as further support for the use of 
postexecution affidavits as affirmative evidence.  See id.; 
Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other Donative 
Transfers § 10.2 & comment g (2003) ("In seeking to determine 
the donor's intention, all relevant evidence, whether direct or 
circumstantial, may be considered, including the text of the 
donative document and relevant extrinsic evidence").  See also 
Loring & Rounds, supra at Introduction ("In the case of an 
irrevocable inter vivos trust, the settlor's intentions at the 
time of funding are what determine its terms.  That having been 
said, postfunding statements of the settlor might be admissible 
to clarify what those intentions were" [emphasis in original; 
22 
 
 
 
footnote omitted]).  Indeed, this court has allowed the 
reformation of a trust instrument to conform to the settlor's 
intent, and has permitted the introduction of an affidavit by 
the drafter to show that the language of the instrument was 
inconsistent with the intent of the settlor.  See Walker v. 
Walker, 433 Mass. 581, 587 (2001). 
The settlor's affidavit, dated July 11, 2012, states, in 
pertinent part: 
 
"I intended to give to the trustee of the 1983 Trust 
the specific authority to do whatever he or she believed to 
be necessary and in the best interest of my son Paul John 
Ferri, Jr. with respect to the income and principal of the 
1983 Trust notwithstanding any of the other provisions of 
the 1983 Trust. . . .  Therefore, if the trustee thought at 
any time that the principal and income of the 1983 Trust 
could be at risk, the trustee could take any action 
necessary to protect the principal and income of the 1983 
Trust. . . .  This authority to protect assets would also 
extend to a situation where creditors of Paul John Ferri, 
Jr. may attempt to reach the assets of the 1983 Trust such 
as in the event of lawsuit or a divorce." 
 
Because, where there is ambiguity, a court may consider an 
affidavit of the settlor in interpreting whether the settlor 
intended to permit decanting to another trust, see, e.g., Bank, 
451 Mass. at 649, we consider the settlor's affidavit regarding 
his intentions at the time that he created the 1983 Trust, which 
the Connecticut trial court judge ordered struck on Powell-
Ferri's motion.  In considering this affidavit, we do not 
"create an ambiguity [where] the plain language is unambiguous."  
General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the U.S. of Am., 
23 
 
 
 
Inc., 449 Mass. at 835.  Nor do we agree with Powell-Ferri's 
argument that the affidavit was offered improperly to alter the 
terms of the declaration of trust.  Given that the declaration 
of the 1983 Trust expressly neither permits nor bars decanting, 
the affidavit does not contradict or attempt to vary the terms 
of the trust. 
 
The statements in the settlor's affidavit further support 
the settlor's evident intention in the language of the 
1983 Trust document, including the power to "segregate 
irrevocably" under art. II.A and the beneficiary's right to 
request withdrawals of trust assets at certain age milestones 
under art. II.B, to provide the trustee with the power to 
decant.  Because the intent of the settlor is "paramount," 
Morse, 466 Mass. at 98, and the settlor's affidavit evidences 
the settlor's intent at the time of execution, the settlor's 
affidavit should be considered. 
 
3.  Disposition.  An order shall issue to the Connecticut 
Supreme Court answering the certified questions as follows:  We 
answer Question 1, "Yes"; we do not answer Question 2; and we 
answer Question 3, "Yes." 
The Reporter of Decisions is directed to furnish attested 
copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in 
turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the 
clerk of the Connecticut Supreme Court, as the answer to the 
24 
 
 
 
questions certified, and will also transmit a copy to each 
party. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lenk and Budd, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court, for all the reasons given by the 
court, that under Massachusetts law the terms of the 1983 Trust 
empower its trustees to decant its assets to a trust newly 
created by the trustees.  I write separately to emphasize what 
we did not decide in answering the reported questions certified 
to us by the Connecticut Supreme Court:  whether Massachusetts 
law will permit trustees in Massachusetts to create a new 
spendthrift trust and decant to it all the assets from an 
existing non-spendthrift trust where the sole purpose of the 
transfer is to remove the trust's assets from the marital assets 
that might be distributed to the beneficiary's spouse in a 
divorce action. 
 
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that, under Connecticut 
law, the public policy that would prevent one spouse during a 
divorce proceeding from transferring marital assets to deprive 
the other spouse of those assets did not apply here because it 
was undisputed that the beneficiary husband did not have a role 
in creating the new 2011 Trust or in decanting the assets from 
the 1983 Trust to the 2011 Trust.  Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 
Conn. 223, 233-234 (2015).  The trial court had found that the 
trustees of the 1983 Trust, one of whom was the husband's 
brother, did not consult with the husband before taking these 
steps to frustrate the wife's equitable claim to these assets.  
2 
 
 
 
Our opinion, because it simply answered certified questions from 
another State Supreme Court, appropriately did not address 
whether we would find the creation of a new spendthrift trust 
intended solely to deprive the beneficiary's spouse of marital 
assets during a divorce proceeding through a decanting to be 
invalid as contrary to public policy under Massachusetts law. 
 
Under the Massachusetts Uniform Trust Code, G. L. c. 203E, 
§ 404, "A trust may be created only to the extent its purposes 
are lawful and not contrary to public policy."  Where, as here, 
the trustees created a new spendthrift trust for the sole 
purpose of decanting the assets of an earlier trust that, at 
least in part, would be included within the marital assets 
available for distribution during a divorce proceeding, § 404 
would require us to consider whether the creation of the new 
spendthrift trust was contrary to public policy. 
 
Before the enactment of § 404, we held under our common law 
that a trust is void when it is contrary to public policy.  See 
Perkins v. Hilton, 329 Mass. 291, 294-295 (1952) (trust for 
mother's benefit was "illegal and invalid" where it was part of 
attempt by defendant to obtain special benefits of servicemen's 
readjustment act to which only veterans are entitled, and was 
"in effect a fraud upon the act and contrary to public policy"); 
Otis v. Prince, 10 Gray 581, 581 (1858) (trust that required 
trustee to pay net income from trust to testator's grandson only 
3 
 
 
 
"so long as he shall remain unmarried" was void as contrary to 
public policy).  See generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
§ 29 (2003) ("An intended trust or trust provision is invalid if 
its purpose or performance is unlawful or against public 
policy"). 
 
Similarly, under our common law of contract, we have 
declared that "it is a principle universally accepted that the 
public interest in freedom of contract is sometimes outweighed 
by public policy, and in such cases the contract will not be 
enforced."  Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 
422 Mass. 318, 321 (1996).  We have applied this principle by 
declining to enforce various contracts that we concluded were 
contrary to public policy.  See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 431 Mass. 
150, 160 (2000) (contracts that "compel [a] donor [of frozen 
preembryos] to become a parent against his or her will" violate 
public policy); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 407 Mass. 354, 
360-361 (1990) ("a provision in an insurance policy that 
provides coverage only when there is no liability is void as 
against public policy"); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 599 
(1981) ("certain contracts may so unreasonably encourage divorce 
as to be unenforceable"). 
 
Under our common law of employment, we have held that, in 
certain limited circumstances, an employer may be held liable 
for discharging an at-will employee "for a reason that violates 
4 
 
 
 
clearly established public policy."  Upton v. JWP Businessland, 
425 Mass. 756, 757 (1997).  See, e.g., Flesner v. Technical 
Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 810 (1991) (terminating at-
will employee for cooperating with United States Customs Service 
officials who were investigating his employer violates public 
policy); DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 398 Mass. 205, 208-211 
(1986) (terminating at-will employee for failing to give false 
testimony against coworker violates public policy). 
I do not offer any prediction as to whether this court 
might invalidate as contrary to public policy a new spendthrift 
trust created for the sole purpose of decanting the assets from 
an existing non-spendthrift trust in order to deny the 
beneficiary's spouse any equitable distribution of these trust 
assets.  I simply make clear that, in this opinion, we do not 
decide this issue; we will await a case that presents such an 
issue before we decide it. 
I also note that the Legislatures of at least twenty-five 
States have codified limitations on decanting from one trust to 
another by statute.12  If our Legislature were to choose to enact 
                                                        
 
12 Alaska Stat. § 13.36.157; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-
10819; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-16-901 et seq.; Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 12, § 3528; Fla. Stat. § 736.04117; 760 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/16.4; Ind. Code § 30-4-3-36; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386.175; 
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 556.115a, 700.7820a; Minn. Stat. § 502.851; 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.4-419; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 163.556; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 564-B:4-418, 564-B:4-419; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 46-
12-101 et seq.; N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6; N.C. 
5 
 
 
 
its own decanting statute, I would urge it to consider the use 
of decanting presented in this case. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Gen. Stat. § 36C-8-816.1; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5808.18; R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 18-4-31; S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-816A; S.D. Codified 
Laws §§ 55-2-15 to 55-2-21; Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-816; Tex. 
Prop. Code Ann. §§ 112.071 et seq.; Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-778.1; 
Wis. Stat. § 701.0418; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816.