Title: Guinn v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 350, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
NATHAN GUINN, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§ 
No. 350, 2003 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0207018218 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  December 16, 2003 
Decided:  February 11, 2004 
 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
Upon Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Sandra W. Dean, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Dover, Delaware, 
for Appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
 
 
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The appellant, Nathan Guinn, appeals from his conviction by a 
Superior Court jury, of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Narcotic 
Schedule II Controlled Substance (in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4751); 
Possession of a Narcotic Schedule II Controlled Substance Within 300 feet 
of a Church (in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4768); and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia (in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4771).  Guinn claims that the trial 
court abused its discretion in two respects:  (1) by admitting into evidence 
the purported cocaine that was on Guinn’s person at the time of his arrest, 
and (2) by denying Guinn’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge 
of Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine.  In our view, neither ground 
has merit.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
Facts 
 
On the evening of July 27, 2002, probation officer Douglas Watts and City 
of Dover Police Officer Paul Kuntzi were patrolling as part of the Operation Safe 
Streets program in Dover, Delaware.  While they were driving toward the 
intersection of Reed and South New Streets, they observed Guinn walking toward 
their car.  Because Guinn was out past his probation curfew and was wanted for an 
outstanding capias, the officers stopped Guinn near the Holy Trinity Church and 
placed him in handcuffs while they searched him. 
 
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During his search of Guinn’s cargo pants, Officer Kuntzi discovered $424 
cash, a piece of suspected crack cocaine, and a small screwdriver.  Guinn claimed 
that the pants he was wearing did not belong to him, but he did not identify the 
owner of the trousers.  Guinn also initially claimed that the $424 of cash belonged 
to his girlfriend, but he later told the police that the cash belonged to someone else 
who had been accompanying him while he was walking down the street that 
evening. 
 
After his detention and search, Guinn was taken into custody.  Officer 
Kuntzi placed the drug evidence (the suspected crack cocaine) into an envelope 
and deposited the envelope in the secured evidence locker at the Dover police 
station.  The substance seized from Guinn was later analyzed by a forensic 
chemist, who determined, in October 2002, that the substance consisted of 2.45 
grams of crack cocaine. The police also photographed the cash that had been 
seized from Guinn, which consisted of one $100 bill, one $50, six $20 bills, and 
five $10 bills, plus assorted $5 and $1 bills. 
 
After being tested, the cocaine was then returned to the Dover Police 
Department, and was placed in an envelope that remained in a secure locker until 
December 16, 2002.  At that time, the envelope was removed from the locker, the 
cocaine was removed from the envelope, and the evidence was examined by 
Guinn’s former counsel.  After the December 16, 2002 inspection, the drugs were 
 
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not returned to the evidence envelope.  Two days later, however, Robert Neylan, a 
Dover Police Department evidence technician, located the drugs in the same Dover 
Police station conference room in which the inspection had occurred two days 
earlier.  The drugs were on the same blue folder in which they had been placed two 
days before.  There was no evidence that the cocaine had been tampered with. 
 
Guinn was convicted at the conclusion of his trial, at which he elected not to 
testify. 
The Alleged Improper Admission of 
The Seized Cocaine Into Evidence 
 
 
Guinn’s first claim is that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the 
cocaine that had been found in the police conference room on December 18, 2002. 
Guinn argues that the State did not meet its burden of authenticating the evidence 
by eliminating the possibility of misidentification or adulteration as a matter of 
reasonable probability. Both sides agree that the standard by which this claim is 
reviewed is abuse of discretion.1 
 
This claim lacks merit because as a matter of fact and law, the State did meet 
its burden.  The State may authenticate an item that it claims was involved in a 
crime in two ways.  The State “‘…may have witnesses visually identify the item as 
that which was actually involved with the crime, or it may establish a “chain of 
custody” which indirectly establishes the identity and integrity of the evidence by 
                                          
 
1 Trioche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 153 (Del. 1987). 
 
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tracing its continuous whereabouts.’”2 Here, the State used both methods to 
authenticate the contraband drug evidence. 
 
In this case, Guinn’s sole challenge is to the chain of custody.  His challenge 
fails, because the alleged break in the chain of custody occurred only after the 
contraband had already been tested by a forensic chemist (and determined to be 
cocaine) in October 2002, and after that evidence had been returned to the Dover 
Police Department.  Even if the entire substance had been consumed in the testing 
or had been lost (neither of which occurred here), the testing results were still 
admissible to establish, prima facie, that Guinn was in possession of cocaine.3   
Moreover, Guinn’s former counsel, who examined the contraband on 
December 16, 2002, testified that the cocaine introduced at trial appeared to be the 
same substance he had previously observed.  Both Officers Watts and Kuntzi gave 
similar testimony, and were able to make that identification because the crack 
cocaine rock had distinctive black markings on it.  Officer Watts testified that the 
cocaine rock had black markings all over it; Officer Kuntzi testified that the 
cocaine rock had black scribbling on it, and that he had never seen such markings 
before or since.  Thus, the drug evidence was properly authenticated by the 
alternative means of eyewitness identification permitted under Delaware law.   
 
                                          
 
2 Id, 525 A.2d at 152 (quoting Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 13, 16 (Del. 1987)). 
3 See Tilghman v. State, 734 A.2d 160, 1999 WL 486621 (Del. 1999) (ORDER). 
 
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In addition, Robert Neylan, the Dover Police evidence technician, confirmed 
the other links in the chain of custody.  There is no identification issue during the 
interval between the time of the seizure in July 2002 and the time the drugs were 
signed out to Guinn’s former attorney for inspection on December 16, 2002. 
Although the drugs were not returned to the evidence envelope immediately after 
the December 16 inspection, Neylan did locate the drugs two days later in the same 
envelope in the same conference room where the inspection had occurred two days 
before, and he testified that there was no evidence that the drugs had been altered 
or tampered with.  In these circumstances the State has discharged its burden to 
demonstrate to a reasonable probability that the cocaine admitted into evidence at 
trial was the same substance that was seized from Guinn in July 2002.  
 
The Denial of Guinn’s Motion for Acquittal 
For Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine 
 
At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, Guinn moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on the charge of Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine.  The trial 
judge denied the motion.  On appeal, Guinn claims that the denial of his motion 
was error.  We review this claim de novo, to determine whether any rational trier of 
fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have 
 
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found the essential elements of possession with intent to deliver cocaine beyond a 
reasonable doubt.4   
To prove the crime of possession with intent to deliver, the State must 
establish three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) knowing possession (2) a 
narcotic Schedule II controlled substance, and (3) an intent to deliver.  Guinn does 
not contest that the State established the first two elements.  His challenge is 
limited to the claim that the State did not prove that he possessed the cocaine with 
intent to sell or deliver it.  We disagree.  In our view, the evidence would permit a 
rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Quinn possessed the 
2.45 gram rock of crack cocaine for purposes of sale, and not for personal 
consumption.       
 First, the quantity of the drug – 2.45 grams – was indicative of an intent to 
sell or deliver.  The probation officer, Douglas Watts, testified that in his 
experience, crack cocaine users (as opposed to sellers) possess much smaller 
quantities, e.g., 0.1 or 0.2 gram pieces.  The single rock of cocaine found on Guinn 
was ten times that amount.  Second, when the police searched Guinn, they found 
no device to facilitate personal consumption, such as a pipe, stem or other device 
to ingest the crack cocaine.  Third, the fact that Guinn was found in possession of a 
small screwdriver was probative, because, as Officer Watts testified, a screwdriver 
                                          
 
4 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. 1999). 
 
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was the kind of instrument that crack cocaine dealers could use to break off smaller 
pieces of the drug for street sales of 0.1 or 0.2 grams.  Fourth, the amount of cash 
($424) found in Guinn’s cargo pants far exceeded the amounts that an active crack 
cocaine user would be expected to possess in the high crime area of South New 
Street.  As Officer Watts testified, active cocaine users have less money because of 
their drug habits.  Officer Kuntzi testified that he would have expected to see only 
one or two $20 bills if Guinn were solely a cocaine user.  In this case Guinn had 
six $20 bills, one $50 bill and one $100 bill; and in his years of experience, Officer 
Kuntzi had never encountered a crack cocaine user with a $100 bill.   
Fifth, and finally, Guinn’s contradictory and incongruous statements to the 
authorities when he was searched evidenced an intention to avoid any connection 
with either the cash or the drugs found in his pants. When he was taken into 
custody, Guinn initially claimed that the $424 cash belonged to his girlfriend.  He 
later contradicted that statement and claimed that the money belonged to another 
male subject who had been walking down the street with him.  Guinn also claimed 
that the pants he was wearing did not belong to him, but he never revealed the 
identity of the alleged true owner.  A rational trier of fact could reasonably find 
Guinn’s claim that he was wearing someone else’s pants containing over $400 in 
cash, to be implausible. 
 
 
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Although there may be alternative explanations for each of these five 
incriminatory circumstances, the totality of that evidence would have permitted a 
rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Guinn possessed the single crack cocaine rock with 
the intent to deliver that contraband.  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied 
Guinn’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, the Superior Court’s judgment of conviction is 
affirmed.