Title: Beck v. State
Citation: 171 N.E.2d 696, 241 Ind. 231
Docket Number: 29,964
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 1961

241 Ind. 231 (1961)
171 N.E.2d 696
BECK
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,964.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 25, 1961.
R.M. Rhodes, of Peru, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Richard M. Givan, Assistant Attorney General, Richard C. *232 Johnson, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LANDIS, J.
Appellant was charged with being an accessory after the fact to second degree burglary and after a trial by jury was convicted and sentenced for a period of two to five years. He appeals from the judgment.
Appellant on this appeal contends the court below erred in overruling his application for change of judge.
The relative facts pertaining to this matter follow. The affidavit charging appellant in this case was filed on December 1, 1959. On December 4, appellant appeared in person and by counsel and waived arraignment and entered plea of not guilty. On January 5, 1960, the cause was set for trial before a jury for January 12, 1960. On January 9, 1960, appellant made and filed affidavit for change of judge which in addition to alleging bias and prejudice of the judge stated:
On January 11, 1960, a hearing was had on appellant's application for change of judge and the State of Indiana called appellant to the witness stand concerning the matters contained in his affidavit for change of venue and after hearing evidence the court made the following order:
Appellant contends that in a criminal case if a motion for change of judge is in proper legal form and alleges it was made and filed as soon as the bias and prejudice of the judge were ascertained, it was error for the court to deny the change of judge, there being no discretion on the part of the court to exercise in considering the change of venue, citing: Asher v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 23, 29, 152 N.E. 171, 174.
Appellee however cites the Act of 1905 as amended in 1927[1] (providing for granting of change of judge) and states that the amendment intended the trial court should have some discretion in granting the change where an affidavit is not presented in the ten day period therein provided. Such statute with the 1927 amendment italicized is as follows:
Without passing on whether discretion was intended to be given by such Act of 1927, it will be noted that such statute does not specifically deal with the question of the recent learning of prejudice as set forth in appellant's affidavit.
*234 Rule 1-12B of this Court which, although it is not applicable to criminal cases, does make the following provision for change of venue after the time prescribed for such rule for taking a change (within ten days after closing of issues) has expired, viz.:
Cases cited by appellant, including O'Malia v. State (1934), 207 Ind. 308, 311, 192 N.E. 435, 437, decided in 1934, clearly indicate this Court there recognized the mandatory right to change of venue for subsequently learned prejudice when a good and sufficient affidavit was expeditiously filed setting up the same. It might be argued that the 1927 amendment was intended to remove the cause for change for subsequently learned prejudice if the affidavit was not filed within two days after setting of cause for trial.
However, in view of cases relied on by appellant including the recent O'Malia case, supra, and the form of Rule 1-12B, supra, which although not applicable to criminal cases, provides for procedure in cases of recently learned prejudice where the change is not applied for within ten days of closing issues, it is our view that in criminal cases the absolute right to a change of judge still exists for recently learned prejudice *235 upon a proper affidavit for change, and that any modification in the well established procedural law of this state should be clearly made by statute or court rule before we should consider that such modification has taken place in the law of this state. We believe this is fairer to the litigants than to make an alteration in our procedural law, if a change is desired, by court decision which has a retroactive effect.
It is therefore our view that the court below erred in denying the application for change of judge.
Judgment reversed.
Bobbitt, C.J., and Achor, Arterburn, Jackson, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 171 N.E.2d 696.
[1]  Burns' § 9-1301 (1956 Replacement), being Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 203, p. 584; 1927, ch. 132, § 10, p. 411.