Title: State v. Domke
Citation: 2011 WI 95
Docket Number: 2009AP002422-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2011

2011 WI 95 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2422-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
David W. Domke, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 1, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Oconto 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael T. Judge 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public defender. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak,  
Rebecca R. Lawnicki and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2011 WI 95
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2422CR 
(L.C. No. 
2006CF147) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David W. Domke, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 1, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction and remanding for a new 
trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  A jury 
convicted 
David 
W. 
Domke 
(Domke) 
of 
repeatedly 
sexually 
assaulting Alicia S., his stepdaughter, when she was ten years 
old, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) and § 948.025(1)(a) 
(2003-04).  Domke moved for postconviction relief and a new 
                                                 
1 State v. Domke, No. 2009AP2422-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
2 
 
trial based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, 
Terrence Woods (Woods).  In order to prevail on the ineffective 
assistance claim, Domke needed to establish both that Woods' 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced 
Domke——in 
other 
words, 
that 
counsel's 
errors 
undermine the court's confidence in the result.2  After a 
postconviction hearing, the circuit court denied the motion 
because it concluded that while Domke had shown that Woods 
performed deficiently, Domke had failed to show that the 
deficient performance had prejudiced him.  The court of appeals, 
however, 
concluded 
that 
Domke 
had 
established 
cumulative 
prejudice from three instances of deficient performance.  Thus, 
the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's denial of 
Domke's postconviction motion and remanded for a new trial. 
¶2 
We conclude that Domke is not entitled to a new trial 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel.  While we agree with 
the court of appeals that Woods performed deficiently in three 
respects during trial, we are not persuaded that these errors 
prejudiced Domke.  We hold that under the totality of the 
circumstances Domke received a fair trial, and our confidence in 
the result is not undermined.   
¶3 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND  
                                                 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984) 
(setting forth the standard for review of claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The charges against Domke are based on four incidents 
between June 20, 2005, and December 25, 2005, on which Alicia S. 
alleged 
that 
Domke 
engaged 
in 
sexual 
contact 
with 
her.  
Specifically, Alicia S. alleged that on all four occasions Domke 
rubbed his penis on her buttocks and on one occasion Domke also 
licked her vagina.  Alicia S. was ten years old at the time.  
Alicia S. did not disclose the full extent of the alleged 
assaults at first, but over time the details of the four 
incidents emerged.   
¶5 
Approximately six months after the first alleged 
assault, Alicia S. told two friends, L.H. and J.M., that Domke 
had sexually assaulted her.  J.M. told another friend, whose 
mother reported the allegations to Alicia S.'s elementary 
school.  The guidance counselor at the school notified the 
police, and a police officer, Corey Rank (Rank), and a child 
protection investigator, Bonnie Anderson (Anderson), interviewed 
Alicia S. at the school on January 17, 2006.  Alicia S. later 
went to a physician's assistant, Tracey BeFay (BeFay), on 
January 23, 2006, for a physical examination during which she 
repeated some of the allegations.  In February 2006, Alicia S. 
began seeing an outpatient therapist, Kim Rusch (Rusch), to 
address some emotional and behavioral problems she was having 
that Alicia S. and her natural father, David S., attributed to 
the alleged abuse.  It was through the approximately 20 to 25 
therapy sessions with Rusch that Alicia S. provided the full 
account of the four alleged sexual assaults.  
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On December 18, 2006, Domke was charged with the 
repeated sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 
948.025(1)(a) (2003-04)3 based on four alleged incidents of 
sexual contact with Alicia S. in violation of Wis. Stat. § 
948.02(1).4  A two-day jury trial was held on January 17 and 18, 
2008, in the Oconto County Circuit Court, the Honorable Michael 
T. Judge presiding. 
A. The Trial 
¶7 
Alicia S. 
testified first, providing a detailed 
account of the four alleged sexual assaults.  Alicia S. 
testified: "The first time we were at 344 South Adams Street of 
Oconto County [Oconto Falls] and we were watching 50 First 
Dates.  And I had woken up to my pants and underpants pulled 
down and that Dave was rubbing his penis up and down my -- near 
my anal area."   
¶8 
Regarding the second incident, Alicia S. testified: "I 
believe we were at 202 Wisconsin Street of Oconto County [Oconto 
Falls].  And we were downstairs watching TV, and I had woken up 
to him licking my vagina this time.  And he had flipped me over 
and he was rubbing his penis up and down near my anal area."  
                                                 
3 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 948.025(1)(a) 
(2003-04) 
provides: 
"Whoever commits 3 or more violations under s. 948.02(1) or (2) 
within a specified period of time involving the same child is 
guilty of: (a) A Class B felony if at least 3 of the violations 
were violations of s. 948.02(1)." 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) (2003-04) provides: "First 
degree sexual assault.  Whoever has sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 
years is guilty of a Class B felony."  
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Regarding the third incident, Alicia S. testified:  
The third time was also at 202 Wisconsin Street.  This 
time I had went into my mom's bedroom.  I crawled in 
at approximately 6:30 a.m. so I could spend time with 
her before she went to work.  And eventually she got 
up and went to work.  And I had woken up to Dave 
putting his penis near my anal area, and this time I 
had felt wetness.  And I pretended I was sleeping, and 
then he eventually got up and went –- took a shower 
and went hunting.  
¶10 Alicia S. indicated that the fourth incident took 
place in December of 2005 while she was watching television in 
her bedroom.  Alicia S. testified: 
I was watching [Country Music Television], and this 
time he had came into my bedroom and he was naked and 
he was rubbing his penis up and down my anal area.  
And this time he told me if I took off my clothes it 
would feel better and I said no.  I told him to get 
out and I locked my door, and I was really, really 
scared.  
¶11 Alicia S. also testified that she first reported the 
sexual assaults to her friends L.H. and J.M. at a sleepover.  
Alicia S. explained that she told her friends about the assaults 
because "it was really bothering" her, but that she did not want 
them to tell anyone and made them "pinky swear."  L.H. confirmed 
this and testified that Alicia S. told her "that her stepdad had 
licked her in the privates."  L.H. further testified that when 
Alicia S. told her this, she "acted very upset and she looked 
like she was going to actually throw up."  
¶12 Regarding her interview with Anderson and Rank, Alicia 
S. explained that she did not want to disclose the assaults to 
them.  Alicia S. testified that she was scared and, at that 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
6 
 
time, did not want Domke to go to jail, so she was not 
completely honest with Anderson and Rank.  Alicia S. stated 
that, when pressed, she did disclose some of the alleged abuse 
to them.  When Anderson testified, she agreed with Alicia S.'s 
description of the interview and stated that it was clear that 
Alicia S. liked Domke very much.  Anderson explained that in 
response to some of her and Rank's questions Alicia S. confirmed 
that Domke sexually assaulted her: 
[Alicia S.] told us without very specific details that 
on two different occasions at her mother's house -- at 
actually two different houses in Oconto Falls when she 
was visiting her mother that her stepfather, David 
Domke, did put his penis between her buttocks on two 
different occasions while she was pretending to be 
sleeping when they were all watching TV together in 
the living room.  
¶13 Alicia S. also testified that she was later examined 
by a physician's assistant, BeFay, to whom she revealed some 
details of the alleged assaults.  BeFay testified that Alicia S. 
was reluctant to talk with her about the alleged assaults, but 
that Alicia S. indicated that Domke put his penis on her 
buttocks and his mouth on her genitals.  BeFay testified that 
the physical examination was normal.  During Woods' cross-
examination of BeFay, he moved to enter into evidence BeFay's 
dictated report, which reflected the normal physical examination 
and also included a summary of what Alicia S. told BeFay about 
the alleged assaults.  
¶14 Alicia S. further testified that she began to see a 
therapist, Rusch, and that, after about 10 to 15 sessions, she 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
7 
 
told Rusch all of the details regarding the four alleged sexual 
assaults. Rusch testified regarding the services she provided to 
Alicia S.: 
She -- the problem focus that was on my intake form 
when she came to me was that she had been sexually 
assaulted and that she was having some problems with 
nightmares, intrusive thoughts, flashbacks.  She had a 
lot of fears.  She was scared, things like that.  So I 
was asked to deal with those symptoms that come along 
with that.  
Rusch also testified about the progression of her sessions with 
Alicia S.: 
The first few sessions we basically talked about how 
she could maybe not be having as many nightmares.  We 
implemented a safety plan because she was very afraid 
to be outside.  She would come home from school and 
she would be worried somebody was in the house, things 
like that. 
So we developed a safety plan for her to feel safer in 
her town here and also at her home and when she had to 
go to school.  So that's what we focused on just to 
make her more comfortable and have her to be able to, 
you know, be functioning relatively normally in the 
community and in her family.  
And then it was down the road a ways, not until June.  
I started seeing her in February.  And then in June 
when I finally –- Alicia [S.] and I had talked and she 
was ready to tell me her whole story.  She had told, 
you know, bits and pieces throughout, but that was 
when she told me her whole story.  
In a report that the State introduced into evidence, Rusch 
documented "Alicia [S.]'s whole story" regarding the four 
alleged sexual assaults.  
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
8 
 
¶15  On cross examination, Woods asked Rusch several 
questions about the first alleged incident.  This included the 
following exchange: 
Woods: Could this have just been like a bad dream or 
something?   
[The State objected, and the circuit court overruled 
the objection.] 
Rusch: No.  I do not believe it could have been a 
dream. 
Woods: All right.  You don't think it was a dream? 
Rusch: No.  In my professional opinion, it was not a 
dream.   
¶16 As his first witness, Woods called Tina Domke, who is 
Alicia S.'s mother and Domke's wife.  Woods asked Tina Domke 
whether 
she 
had 
told 
Anderson, 
the 
child 
protection 
investigator, that she did not believe Alicia S.'s allegations 
against Domke.  Tina Domke responded that, yes, she had told 
Anderson that she did not believe Alicia S. "[a]t that time."  
On cross-examination, the State elicited that Tina Domke now 
believes her daughter's allegations against her husband "100 
percent."  In response to further questioning, Tina Domke stated 
that Alicia S. was the bravest girl she knew and that she no 
longer had any doubt that Alicia S. was telling the truth.   
¶17 Woods then called Domke's ex-wife, Tina Baxter, and 
Domke's three children to testify.  From each of these witnesses 
Woods elicited testimony that Domke had never been accused of 
sexually abusing any of his biological children.  Two of Domke's 
children also testified that they had never seen Domke sexually 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
9 
 
abusing Alicia S. while they all lived together.  On cross-
examination, one of the children admitted that Alicia S. told 
her about the alleged sexual assaults before those allegations 
were reported to police, and that she reported Alicia S.'s 
statements to her when interviewed by Anderson and Rank.  
¶18 Domke testified and denied ever sexually assaulting 
Alicia S.  Domke stated that he knew Alicia S. lied a lot and 
that he and Alicia S. argued a lot about her refusal to abide by 
his rules.  On cross-examination, the State elicited from Domke 
that when he originally spoke to Anderson and Rank he told them 
that he and Alicia S. had a good relationship.  
¶19 The jury convicted Domke of all charges, and he was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison and 20 years of extended 
supervision.  
B. Domke's Postconviction Motion for a New Trial 
¶20 Domke filed a postconviction motion for a new trial on 
March 19, 2009, based on ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  Domke asserted that Woods performed deficiently in 
several respects, and that the deficient performance prejudiced 
him because Woods' errors had erroneously bolstered Alicia S.'s 
credibility.  Domke requested a Machner hearing on these issues.5   
¶21 First, Domke asserted that Woods erred when he failed 
to object to Rusch's hearsay testimony regarding the reason that 
                                                 
5 A Machner hearing is "[t]he evidentiary hearing to 
evaluate 
counsel's 
effectiveness, 
which 
includes 
counsel's 
testimony to explain his or her handling of the case."  State v. 
Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶31, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
10 
 
Alicia S. sought counseling services.  Domke argued that these 
statements were not covered by the hearsay exception for 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, 
Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4) (2007-08),6 because statements made to a 
counselor and social worker, like Rusch, are excluded from that 
exception.  See State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 695, 575 
N.W.2d 268 (1998) (declining "to apply the hearsay exception for 
statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(4), 
to 
statements 
made 
to 
counselors 
or 
social 
workers").  Domke asserted that these statements are not 
admissible as records of regularly conducted activity either, 
see Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6).  Second, Domke argued that Woods 
erred by asking Rusch whether she thought that Alicia S.'s 
allegations of the first incident may have been the result of a 
bad dream, which allowed Rusch to state that in her professional 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4) (2007-08) provides:  
Hearsay 
exceptions; 
availability 
of 
declarant 
immaterial.  The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness:  
. . .  
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment.  Statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, 
or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or 
the inception or general character of the cause or 
external 
source 
thereof 
insofar 
as 
reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
11 
 
opinion, it was not just a bad dream.  Third, Domke asserted 
that Woods erred when he failed to object to the hearsay 
testimony of L.H., Alicia S.'s friend, which was not covered by 
the excited utterance or records of regularly conducted activity 
exceptions, see Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2), (6); Domke said that 
while Woods may have hoped to establish inconsistencies between 
L.H.'s and Alicia S.'s testimony, he did not actually do so on 
cross-examination.  Fourth, Domke argued that Woods erred by 
moving BeFay's report into evidence because he did not have a 
valid strategic reason for doing so.  Fifth, Domke asserted that 
Woods' most serious error was his decision to call Tina Domke 
without investigating whether she still doubted the truth of 
Alicia S.'s allegations.7  
¶22 Domke asserted that these deficiencies prejudiced him 
because this case was ultimately a credibility contest between 
Alicia S. and Domke.  Domke argued that Woods' mishandling of 
the testimony of Rusch and L.H., his decision to introduce 
BeFay's report, and his decision to call Tina Domke as a witness 
led to the introduction of additional evidence corroborating 
Alicia 
S.'s 
allegations 
and 
generally 
bolstering 
her 
credibility.   
¶23 In the alternative, Domke also sought a new trial in 
the interest of justice.   
                                                 
7 Domke criticized other aspects of Woods' handling of 
Rusch's and BeFay's testimony as well.  Domke did not pursue 
those alleged errors before this court, so we do not address 
them further. 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
12 
 
¶24 The circuit court held a Machner hearing on June 12, 
2009, at which Woods testified.  In response to Domke's first 
allegation, Woods first stated that he thought some of Rusch's 
testimony "could have been objectionable" but that he did not 
want to draw attention to the testimony by objecting.  He then 
stated that this information was admissible because it was 
recorded in a regularly kept record or because the hearsay 
exception for statements made for the purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment may apply.   
¶25 Regarding Domke's second allegation, concerning Woods' 
decision to ask Rusch the dream question twice, Woods explained:  
It seemed to me that, you know, maybe the child was 
having problems.  As I understood Alicia, she was a 
special-ed student.  She was on some medication and 
maybe was just having, you know, nightmares.  And I'm 
not -- you know, I'm not an expert in that, but I did 
want to follow up and that was why.   
Woods admitted that he did not know what Rusch would say in 
response to these questions.  
 
¶26 Woods explained in regard to the third alleged 
deficiency that he did not object to L.H.'s testimony because he 
also wanted to allow her testimony so that he could bring out 
inconsistencies in Alicia S.'s testimony.  Woods also suggested 
that the excited utterance or regularly kept records hearsay 
exceptions might have applied, see Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2), (6).  
 
¶27 In regard to the fourth allegation, Woods responded 
that he introduced BeFay's report to show that Alicia S.'s 
physical examination was normal and also to establish the lapse 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
13 
 
in time between the alleged sexual assaults and the physical 
examination.  
¶28 In response to the fifth allegation, concerning 
calling Tina Domke to testify without checking her present 
position, Woods explained that he wanted "to elicit from [Tina 
Domke] that at the inception of this matter she had indeed not 
believed her own child."  Woods explained, "It was initially at 
least her view, as expressed to the social services people and 
the police, that indeed this was not a truthful child that we 
are talking to now."  Woods noted that the police report 
indicated that "Tina [Domke] said Alicia lies a lot."  Woods 
also stated that by the time of trial he had been "informed that 
indeed [Tina Domke] had been vacillating" in regard to whether 
she still believed Alicia S. was lying.  He admitted that he had 
not talked with Tina Domke before trial nor did he recall when 
he last spoke with her.  Woods stated that he relied on the 
police reports and what Domke told him.  
¶29 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Domke's 
postconviction 
motion, concluding that while Domke had shown that Woods 
performed deficiently in certain respects, he had failed to 
establish that the deficiencies prejudiced him.  The circuit 
court concluded that Woods' failure to object to the testimony 
of Rusch and L.H., and Woods' decision to call Tina Domke 
constituted deficient performance.  In its decision, the circuit 
court noted that it would have sustained an objection to Rusch's 
testimony based on Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671.  The circuit 
court concluded that Woods made reasonable strategic decisions 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
14 
 
to ask Rusch the dream questions and to introduce BeFay's report 
into evidence.  The circuit court denied Domke's motion because 
it concluded that, given the totality of the circumstances, 
including Alicia S.'s "very compelling" testimony, Domke was not 
prejudiced by Woods' errors. 
C. The Court of Appeals Decision 
 
¶30 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
denial of Domke's postconviction motion based on ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  State v. Domke, No. 2009AP2422-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2010).  The court 
of appeals concluded that Woods performed deficiently by failing 
to object to Rusch's testimony, by asking Rusch the dream 
question twice, and by calling Tina Domke as a witness without 
checking, prior to trial, what her present position was on her 
daughter's truthfulness.  Id., ¶¶3-7.  In a footnote, the court 
of appeals concluded that Woods' decisions regarding L.H.'s 
testimony and BeFay's report did not constitute deficient 
performance.  Id., ¶1 n.1.  The court of appeals concluded that 
it was reasonable for Woods not to object to L.H.'s testimony 
because it was likely admissible under the residual hearsay 
exception.  Id.  The court of appeals also concluded that Woods' 
decision to introduce BeFay's report into evidence was not 
deficient performance because in closing arguments he used the 
report to give an example of a prior inconsistent statement by 
Alicia S.  Id.    
¶31 The court of appeals first concluded that Woods 
performed deficiently by failing to object to Rusch's hearsay 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
15 
 
testimony without having a strategic basis for that decision or 
knowing the relevant law.  Id., ¶3.  A reasonable attorney would 
have been aware of Huntington's limitation on the medical 
diagnosis and hearsay exception and objected on that basis.8  
Domke, No. 2009AP2422-CR, ¶3.  Additionally, Woods' decision to 
ask Rusch the dream question twice constituted deficient 
performance because there was such a low probability that she 
would concede that it could have been a dream.  Id., ¶¶5-6.  
Finally, Woods erred by calling Tina Domke as a witness without 
knowing whether she still believed Domke or now supported 
Alicia S.  Id., ¶7.  The court of appeals concluded that because 
the credibility of Alicia S. and Domke was central to the case, 
the collective prejudice from the testimony of Tina Domke and 
Rusch required a new trial.  Id., ¶8. 
¶32 The State petitioned this court for review of whether 
Woods performed deficiently by failing to object to Rusch's 
hearsay testimony and asking Rusch the dream question twice, and 
if so, whether the collective prejudice of these errors and 
Woods' decision to call Tina Domke prejudiced the defendant. 
III. ANALYSIS 
                                                 
8 The court of appeals also rejected the State's argument 
that Rusch's testimony would have been admissible as a hearsay 
exception 
under 
the 
rule 
of 
completeness. 
 
Domke, 
No. 
2009AP2422-CR, ¶4.  The State does not argue before this court 
that the rule of completeness would have provided a basis to 
admit Rusch's hearsay testimony.  We thus do not address it 
further. 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
16 
 
 
¶33 Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. 
Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  This 
court will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact, 
"includ[ing] 'the circumstances of the case and the counsel's 
conduct and strategy,'" unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id. 
(quoting State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 514 n.2, 484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992)).  Whether counsel's performance constitutes 
constitutionally 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel, 
which 
requires a showing by the defendant that counsel performed 
deficiently and that the error or errors prejudiced the 
defendant, presents a question of law that this court decides de 
novo.  Id.; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (setting forth the two 
components of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.").  
 
¶34 Wisconsin criminal defendants are guaranteed the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel through the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. Trawitzki, 
2001 WI 77, ¶39, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801; Thiel, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶18.  We measure whether counsel's representation 
fell 
below 
the 
constitutional 
minimum 
for 
the 
effective 
assistance of counsel against the standard set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland.  Trawitzki, 244 
Wis. 2d 523, ¶39.  Counsel will be said to have provided 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
17 
 
constitutionally inadequate representation if the defendant can 
show that counsel performed deficiently and that such deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687.  "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result."  Trawitzki, 244 
Wis. 2d 523, ¶39 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). 
 
¶35 Because we conclude that Domke has not established "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," 
we reverse the court of appeals and affirm the circuit court's 
judgment of conviction.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  While 
the result is driven by our conclusion that Domke has not 
established prejudice from the alleged deficiencies, we also 
examine 
whether 
Woods' 
representation 
was 
constitutionally 
deficient. 
A. Deficient Performance 
¶36 To establish deficient performance, the defendant must 
show that counsel's representation fell below the objective 
standard of "reasonably effective assistance."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88.  Reviewing courts should be "highly deferential" 
to counsel's strategic decisions and make "every effort  . . . 
to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."  
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶22, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
18 
 
695 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  There is a "'strong 
presumption' that [counsel's] conduct 'falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.'"  Id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
¶37 Domke asserts that the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that Woods performed deficiently by failing to object 
to Rusch's hearsay testimony, by asking Rusch the dream question 
twice and by calling Tina Domke as a witness without checking, 
prior to trial, what her present position was on her daughter's 
truthfulness.  The State asserts that Woods did not perform 
deficiently in regard to his handling of Rusch's testimony but 
does not contest the court of appeals' conclusion that Woods 
performed deficiently by calling Tina Domke without checking, 
prior to trial, whether she still doubted her daughter's 
allegations.  We agree with Domke and the court of appeals that 
these three errors constituted deficient performance; however, 
because we conclude that these errors did not prejudice Domke, 
he is not entitled to a new trial.9 
1. Woods' failure to object to Rusch's hearsay testimony. 
¶38 On this issue, Domke and the State focus on whether 
this testimony was admissible as a statement made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment, Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4), or 
whether it was inadmissible because Huntington excludes, from 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals concluded that Woods' handling of 
L.H.'s testimony and BeFay's report did not constitute deficient 
performance.  Domke, No. 2009AP2422-CR, ¶1 n.1.  Domke did not 
challenge these decisions before this court; therefore, we do 
not address these alleged deficiencies further. 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
19 
 
that hearsay exception, statements made to counselors and social 
workers.  The State argues that Woods made a reasonable decision 
not to object to Rusch's hearsay testimony because it was 
arguably covered by the hearsay exception for statements made 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  The State 
asserts that even though Woods was not familiar with Huntington, 
attorneys are not required to know all obscure and unsettled 
points of law, and it is debatable whether Rusch's testimony was 
inadmissible under Huntington. 
¶39 Domke argues that Rusch is either a social worker or a 
counselor, and thus, her testimony recounting what Alicia S. 
told her was inadmissible hearsay under Huntington's clear 
limitation on the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay 
exception.  Domke asserts that Woods should have objected, at 
which point it would have been the State's burden to establish 
that the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception 
applied despite Huntington.10 
¶40 Our recent decision in Carter is instructive regarding 
the extent to which counsel is required to know or investigate 
the relevant law.  324 Wis. 2d 640.  In Carter, defense counsel 
clearly articulated that he made a strategic decision not to 
present evidence that the victim may have been previously 
sexually assaulted by another person.  Id., ¶¶24-35.  Counsel 
                                                 
10 See State v. Jenkins, 168 Wis. 2d 175, 187-88, 483 
N.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1992) ("A party objecting to the admission 
of evidence need not specify the rule into which the evidence 
does not fit.  Rather, the proponent has the burden to show why 
the evidence is admissible." (citation omitted)). 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
20 
 
explained that, as a result of this decision, he did not 
investigate the alleged previous assault or whether evidence of 
a previous assault would have been admissible.  Id., ¶¶25, 34-
35.  This court concluded that counsel did not perform 
deficiently because his decision not to investigate or introduce 
this evidence was based on a reasonable trial strategy that was 
consistent with the overall trial strategy that he pursued.  
Id., ¶¶24-35.  Therefore, it was reasonable for counsel not to 
investigate further if his strategy made such investigation 
unnecessary.   
¶41 In Carter we explained that "[s]trategic decisions 
made after less than complete investigation of law and facts may 
still be adjudged reasonable."  Id., ¶34.  Counsel must either 
reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable 
strategic 
decision 
that 
makes 
any 
further 
investigation 
unnecessary.  Id., ¶23 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).  
Woods did neither.  Woods did not articulate any valid strategic 
reason for not objecting to Rusch's hearsay testimony.  Having 
no strategic reason to allow the presentation of Rusch's 
testimony, 
a 
reasonable attorney should have investigated 
whether it was admissible under one of the hearsay exceptions 
and, if not, objected to that testimony.   
¶42 In the Machner hearing, Woods mentioned the hearsay 
exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis 
or treatment, see Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4), but he did not appear 
familiar with the limitations on that exception.  Wisconsin 
courts have applied that hearsay exception to statements made to 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
21 
 
psychologists, 
psychiatrists, 
chiropractors 
and 
nurse 
practitioners in addition to other medical doctors.  Huntington, 
216 
Wis. 2d at 
694-95. 
 
In 
Huntington, 
this 
court 
"decline[d] . . . to apply the hearsay exception for statements 
made for medical diagnosis or treatment, Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4), 
to statements made to counselors or social workers."  216 
Wis. 2d at 695.   
¶43 Rusch testified that she is an outpatient therapist 
with "a [b]achelor's degree in psychology and a [m]aster's 
degree in education with an emphasis in community counseling."  
She did not state that she fits within any of the professions to 
which Huntington allowed application of the exception.  Based on 
the available information, a reasonable attorney would have been 
familiar with Huntington's limitation on the medical diagnosis 
or treatment hearsay exception and would have objected to 
Rusch's hearsay testimony on that basis.       
¶44 Contrary to the State's argument, this rule from 
Huntington is not obscure or unsettled law.  State v. Maloney, 
2005 WI 74, ¶28, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583 (holding that 
counsel is not required to argue an unsettled or unclear point 
of law).  The annotations to Wis. Stat. § 908.03 in both the 
2005-06 and 2007-08 Wisconsin Statutes provide: "The hearsay 
exception for medical diagnosis or treatment under sub. (4) does 
not apply to statements made to counselors or social workers.  
State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 575 N.W.2d 268 (1998)."  
The edition of Professor Daniel Blinka's treatise on Wisconsin 
Evidence available at the time of trial also states, "With 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
22 
 
little 
discussion, 
§ 908.03(4) 
has 
been 
extended 
to 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and chiropractors.  The supreme 
court has drawn the line, however, at statements made to 
'counselors or social workers.'"  Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 803.4, at 611-12 (2d ed. 
2001) (footnote omitted).  Judge Ralph Adam Fine's treatise on 
Wisconsin Evidence, as updated in 2007, also explained that 
"[s]tatements made to counselors or social workers are not 
within" the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception.  
Ralph Adam Fine, Fine's Wisconsin Evidence, § 908.03(4), at 908-
45 (2007).     
¶45 Huntington provides a clear basis upon which Woods 
could have objected to Rusch's hearsay testimony.  While the 
State advocates an alternative reading of Huntington, the well-
settled 
interpretation 
of 
Huntington——that 
it 
excludes 
statements made to counselors and social workers from the 
medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception——would have 
been grounds for Woods' objection.  216 Wis. 2d at 695; see also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
Ann. 
§ 908.03 
(West 
2007-08). 
 
From 
Woods' 
perspective as defense counsel, and with no strategic reason to 
allow Rusch to present this hearsay testimony, he should have 
objected.  The circuit court noted in its decision on Domke's 
postconviction motion that it would have sustained an objection 
on that basis.   
¶46 Under all the circumstances set forth herein, Woods 
performed deficiently by failing to object to Rusch's hearsay 
testimony, not because allowing the testimony was part of his 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
23 
 
trial strategy, but because he was unfamiliar with Huntington's 
limitation on the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay 
exception. 
2. Woods' decision to ask Rusch the dream question twice. 
¶47 The State argues that it was reasonable for Woods to 
ask Rusch whether she thought that Alicia S.'s allegation 
regarding the first incident could have stemmed from a bad dream 
even though he was not sure what Rusch would say.  The State 
asserts that it was reasonable for Woods to explore this theory 
because he "did not have much to work with in preparing a 
defense."  According to the State, it was consistent with his 
overall trial strategy to establish that the first alleged 
sexual assault could have just been a bad dream.  
¶48 Domke argues that Woods' decision to ask Rusch the 
dream question twice was not a reasonable trial strategy.  Domke 
asserts that it was unreasonable for Woods to ask this question 
because he had no reason to believe that Rusch might concede 
that the first alleged assault could be based on a bad dream. 
¶49 This court will not second-guess a reasonable trial 
strategy, but this court may conclude that an attorney's 
performance was deficient if it was based on an "irrational 
trial tactic" or "based upon caprice rather than upon judgment." 
State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 503, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983).  
Woods asserted that his theory of the case would have been 
supported if Rusch had conceded that the first assault could 
have been just a bad dream.  However, Woods could not provide 
any information that he had to suggest that Rusch might concede 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
24 
 
that possibility.  When Rusch responded with a fairly emphatic 
"no" the first time, Woods asked Rusch this question again, 
which allowed Rusch to highlight that "[i]n [her] professional 
opinion, it was not a dream."  While it may have been reasonable 
to ask once, it was incautious and inconsistent with any 
rational trial strategy for Woods to ask Rusch a second time 
whether she thought the first assault might be the result of a 
bad dream.  We agree with the court of appeals that Woods' error 
in this regard constituted deficient performance. 
3. Woods' decision to call Tina Domke as a witness. 
¶50 The State does not argue that Woods' decision to call 
Tina Domke as a witness without knowing whether she still 
doubted Alicia S.'s allegations against Domke was consistent 
with constitutionally adequate representation.  Domke asserts 
that the circuit court and the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that Woods' decision to call Tina Domke as a witness 
under the circumstances constituted deficient performance.   
¶51 When Woods decided to call Tina Domke as his first 
witness, he had the following information.  The police report 
reflected that when Anderson and Rank first spoke with Tina 
Domke and the defendant about the alleged assaults, Tina Domke 
stated that Alicia S. often lied.  Domke also told him that his 
wife had been vacillating regarding whom she believed——Alicia S. 
or Domke.  Woods did not speak with Tina Domke before calling 
her to the stand or further investigate whether she still 
doubted Alicia S.'s allegations at the time of trial. 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
25 
 
¶52 "[C]ounsel 
has 
a 
duty 
to 
make 
reasonable 
investigations" or to make a strategic decision that makes 
further investigation unnecessary.  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶40 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).  Woods explained that he 
wanted to elicit from Tina Domke that she initially told police 
that Alicia S. lied a lot and that she believed Domke when he 
said he did not assault her.  This may have provided a reason to 
consider calling Tina Domke as a witness, but it does not 
provide a reasonable explanation for why Woods failed to talk 
with Tina Domke first or do any further investigation.  Tina 
Domke, as the mother of the victim and the wife of the 
defendant, 
was 
in 
a unique position to comment on the 
credibility of Alicia S. and Domke.  By calling her as a witness 
and 
asking 
whether 
she 
initially 
believed 
Alicia 
S.'s 
allegations, Woods allowed the State to elicit from Tina Domke 
that she now believed Alicia S. "100 percent."  A reasonable 
attorney, knowing that a witness had been vacillating regarding 
whom she believed, would have done some investigation when faced 
with the risk of calling a witness who may provide either 
extremely useful or extremely damaging testimony.  If Woods had 
talked with Tina Domke he would have discovered that at the time 
of trial she completely believed Alicia S. and would have 
realized that the harm from her testimony to that effect likely 
outweighed any benefit from her testimony that she originally 
doubted Alicia S.            
¶53 Woods' decision to call Tina Domke as a witness 
without doing any reasonable investigation into what she might 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
26 
 
say, even after Domke told him that Tina Domke was vacillating 
regarding whether she believed Alicia S. or Domke, constitutes 
deficient performance.  We now turn to whether this error along 
with Woods' errors regarding Rusch's testimony prejudiced the 
defendant.  We conclude they did not.  
B. Prejudice 
¶54  To establish prejudice "[t]he defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694.  "When a defendant challenges a conviction, the 
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable 
doubt respecting guilt."  Id. at 695.  We examine the totality 
of the circumstances to determine whether counsel's errors, in 
the context of the entire case, deprived the defendant a fair 
trial.  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶¶62-63; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695.  "It is not sufficient for the defendant to show that his 
counsel's errors 'had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 
the proceeding.'"  Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶37 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 
¶55 The State argues that even if Woods' performance was 
deficient regarding the testimony of both Rusch and Tina Domke, 
there was not sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial given 
the totality of the circumstances.  The State further argues 
that Rusch's testimony was merely cumulative of Alicia S.'s and 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
27 
 
BeFay's testimony because her report was what Alicia S. used to 
refresh her recollection, was admitted in evidence, and was 
consistent with Alicia S.'s testimony.  The State asserts that 
the court of appeals, in reaching its conclusion to the 
contrary, failed to consider the strong evidence against Domke.  
This included Alicia S.'s detailed and credible testimony, the 
testimony of L.H. and BeFay corroborating her testimony, and 
Alicia S.'s statements that she had loved Domke and initially 
did not want to report the abuse because she did not want to 
break up her family.  Such testimony strongly supported a 
conclusion that she had no motive to fabricate the allegations.     
¶56 Domke argues that the court of appeals properly 
concluded that the cumulative effect of these errors prejudiced 
Domke.  Domke further asserts that Rusch's corroboration of 
Alicia S.'s testimony and her testimony that she did not think 
the assault allegation was the result of a bad dream were 
damaging to Domke because of her familiarity with Alicia S. and 
her expertise.  In Domke's view, Tina Domke's testimony was the 
most damaging because of her close relationship to both Alicia 
S. and Domke. 
¶57 We are convinced, based on our review of the totality 
of the evidence, that Domke received a fair trial.  This case 
boiled down to a credibility contest between Alicia S. and 
Domke.  Woods' errors may have strengthened the State's case 
against Domke by providing additional corroboration for Alicia 
S.'s testimony and bolstering her credibility.  However, even 
excluding the evidence admitted due to his errors, the State had 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
28 
 
a very strong case.  Upon examining the totality of the 
circumstances we are not persuaded that, but for Woods' errors, 
the result would have been any different.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694-95.  Thus, Woods' errors did not prejudice Domke, 
and he is not entitled to a new trial.   
¶58 The circuit court noted in its decision denying 
Domke's postconviction motion that Alicia S.'s testimony "was 
very 
compelling." 
 
We 
will 
uphold 
the 
circuit 
court's 
credibility determination unless it is clearly erroneous.  
Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶23.  Our review of the record leads us 
to agree with the circuit court's determination in that regard.  
Alicia S. provided detailed, credible testimony including the 
details of each assault, details that were consistent with the 
testimony of L.H., Anderson and BeFay.  Alicia S. admitted that 
she did not disclose the details of all of the alleged assaults 
to each of these people, and that she initially lied to Anderson 
and Rank when they interviewed her because she was scared and 
wanted to protect Domke.  The prosecutor established through 
Anderson that it is not unusual for sexual assault victims to 
delay reporting or disclosing assaults.  He highlighted this 
point in his closing argument.  Woods vigorously cross-examined 
Alicia S. but failed to establish any inconsistencies other than 
those she had already admitted to and explained during her 
direct examination testimony.     
¶59 Other evidence also supported Alicia S.'s credibility.  
Alicia S. testified that she had loved Domke and initially lied 
to Anderson and Rank to hide the alleged assaults because she 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
29 
 
did not want Domke to go to jail.  This was confirmed by the 
testimony of both Anderson and Domke, who admitted that he told 
Anderson when she interviewed him that he and Alicia S. had a 
good relationship.  The fact that Alicia S. initially lied to 
protect Domke supports her credibility because it explains the 
inconsistencies 
between 
her 
testimony 
at 
trial 
and 
her 
statements to Anderson.  It also provides a potential reason for 
her delay in reporting the alleged abuse and her reluctance to 
disclose the full extent of the alleged assaults.  The 
prosecutor noted in closing that Alicia S.'s feelings towards 
Domke provide a reason for her to lie to Anderson and Rank to 
protect Domke, and suggest that she had no motive to make up the 
allegations against him.  Additionally, the testimony from L.H., 
Anderson, David S., and BeFay that Alicia S. was very upset by 
the alleged sexual assaults supports the conclusion that they 
actually occurred.  Specifically, David S. testified that Alicia 
S.'s behavior changed after the alleged assaults took place, 
which was why he took her to see Rusch.   
¶60 Domke does not argue that there was any evidence that 
he was precluded from presenting as a result of counsel's 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
30 
 
errors.11  Domke chose to testify.  He denied the allegations and 
attacked Alicia S.'s credibility by stating that she lied a lot 
and 
suggesting 
that she had a motive to fabricate the 
allegations because 
she and Domke did not have a good 
relationship.  On cross-examination, Domke admitted that he 
initially told Anderson and Rank that he and Alicia S. got along 
well, 
were 
affectionate 
and 
had 
a 
particularly 
close 
relationship.  Domke's ex-wife Tina Baxter and their three 
children testified that they never saw the alleged assaults or 
knew of other similar allegations against Domke.      
¶61 Even excluding the testimony of Rusch and Tina Domke 
that was admitted as a result of Woods' errors, it is clear that 
the State had a very strong case against Domke.  There were 
errors on the part of trial counsel, but under the totality of 
the circumstances, we cannot say that there is a reasonable 
                                                 
11 The nature of Woods' errors distinguishes this case from 
State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶¶63-80, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305, in which this court determined that Thiel was 
prejudiced by the cumulative effect of his counsel's errors.  In 
Thiel, this court examined the totality of the circumstances at 
trial and concluded that Thiel was prejudiced by his counsel's 
errors, which kept significant evidence from the jury that would 
have undermined the complainant's credibility.  Id.  In this 
case, Domke does not allege that Woods' errors precluded him 
from presenting evidence that would have impeached Alicia S.'s 
credibility, and we conclude that, under the totality of the 
circumstances in this case, the cumulative effect of Woods' 
errors did not prejudice Domke.   
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
31 
 
probability that but for Woods' deficient performance the result 
would have been different.12 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶62 We conclude that Domke is not entitled to a new trial 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel.  While we agree with 
the court of appeals that Woods performed deficiently in three 
respects during trial, we are not persuaded that these errors 
prejudiced Domke.  We hold that under the totality of the 
circumstances Domke received a fair trial, and our confidence in 
the result is not undermined.   
¶63 Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.       
 
                                                 
12 Domke 
also 
makes 
a 
one-and-a-half-page 
alternative 
argument inviting this court to affirm the court of appeals and 
grant him a new trial in the interest of justice because the 
real controversy was not fully tried.  See State v. Hicks, 202 
Wis. 2d 150, 159-60, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  We decline to do 
so.  The testimony of Rusch and Tina Domke did not "so cloud[] a 
crucial issue" such that the real controversy was not fully 
tried.  Id. at 160.  The real controversy was whether the jury 
believed Alicia S.'s allegations or Domke's denials.  As 
described above, there was substantial evidence supporting 
Alicia S.'s allegations, the circuit court found her to be a 
very credible witness, and Domke was not precluded from 
presenting a defense.  The real controversy was tried in this 
case. 
No. 
2009AP2422CR   
 
 
 
1