Title: Terhune v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S53487
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2006

FILED: December 21, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CHIP TERHUNE and LARRY WOLF,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(S53487)
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record June 15, 2006.
Margaret S. Olney, Smith, Diamond &amp; Olney, Portland, filed
the petition and reply for petitioners.
Judy C. Lucas, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
answering memorandum for respondent.  With her on the answering
memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.*
DURHAM, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
*Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Walters, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
DURHAM, J.
Petitioner seeks review of the ballot title for a
proposed initiative measure.  ORS 250.085(2). (1)  The
Secretary of State has denominated the proposed measure as
Initiative Petition No. 12 (2008).  The proposed measure, if
enacted, would prohibit individuals, companies, and organizations
from using money deducted from an employee's paycheck for a
political purpose, as defined in the measure, unless the employee
annually consents in writing to such use.  The proposed measure
contains special definitions of certain terms in the measure,
requires entities that use "the payroll deduction process" to
segregate those funds from other money, and prescribes penalties
if a person, company, or organization that collects or receives
payroll-deducted money uses that money for a political purpose
without the employee's authorization.        
The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title for Initiative Petition No. 12 (2008):
"RESTRICTS USE OF PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS FOR 'POLITICAL
PURPOSE' (DEFINED); REQUIRES SEGREGATING SUCH MONEY;
MANDATES PENALTIES
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote prohibits recipient's use of payroll deduction money for 'political
purpose' (defined), without specified employee
authorization; requires separate account for that money;
mandates penalties.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
law not restricting recipient's use of authorized
payroll deduction money, not requiring separate account
for funds used for a 'political purpose.'
"SUMMARY: Current law does not prohibit using
payroll deduction for political purposes or require
keeping that money separate.  Measure prohibits person,
company, organization from using any payroll-deduction
money for 'political purpose' (as defined), without
annual authorization from employee, on specified form. 
'Political purpose' includes: candidate, political
committee, political party, supporting or opposing
candidate or ballot measure, including efforts to
gather or to discourage signatures for proposed measure
or petition; excludes most lobbying.  'Money' includes
in-kind contributions, independent expenditures, pass-through contributions.  Requires recipient of payroll-deduction money to segregate political funds in account
separate from other funds.  Requires penalty against
recipient, double refund to employee by recipient using
payroll deduction for political purpose without
required authorization.  Authorizes sanctions for
violating commingling prohibition.  Other provisions."
Petitioners are electors who timely submitted written
comments to the Secretary of State on the Attorney General's
draft ballot title.  ORS 250.067(1).  Petitioners are therefore
entitled to seek review of the Attorney General's ballot title. 
ORS 250.085(2).  We review the ballot title to determine whether
it substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2).
A ballot title must contain a "caption of not more than
15 words that reasonably identifies the subject matter of the
state measure."  ORS 250.035(2)(a).  Petitioners assert that the
caption in this ballot title fails to comply with that standard
because it does not identify the entities affected by the measure
and, thus, renders the caption ambiguous.
We agree with petitioners that the caption does not
correctly identify the subject matter of the proposed measure. 
In Nesbitt v. Myers, 335 Or 219, 64 P3d 1133 (2003) (Nesbitt I),
this court considered a ballot title almost identical to the
ballot title at issue here.   In that case, the caption stated:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: PROHIBITS COLLECTING AND USING
PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS FOR 'POLITICAL PURPOSES' (DEFINED)
WITHOUT EMPLOYEE'S WRITTEN, ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION"
Id. at 223.  We rejected that caption, stating:
"We agree with petitioners that the caption as
written obscures the subject matter of the proposed
measure.  Although it is inescapable that the process
toward which the proposed measure is aimed must begin
with an authorized payroll deduction, it is equally
inescapable that the proposed measure would do nothing
to the collection process.  Instead, the proposed
measure focuses wholly on what organizations that
receive money through payroll deductions may do with
that money.  That focus is the 'subject' of the 
proposed measure, and the caption needs to say so."   
Id. at 224.
In this case, the caption suffers from the same defect
that this court identified in Nesbitt I.  The Attorney General's
wording here, like the wording of the ballot title caption in
that case, fails to disclose that the focus of the measure's
restrictions and penalties is on the individuals and
organizations that collect or receive the money from payroll
deductions.  It is those entities that the measure restricts from
using payroll deductions for political purposes.  It is
difficult, if not impossible, to understand the subject matter of
the measure without a disclosure that the measure will restrict
the operations of those individuals and organizations.  We hold,
therefore, that the caption does not substantially comply with
ORS 250.035(2)(a) in that it does not identify the subject matter
of the proposed measure. (2)  
Petitioners assert that the Attorney General's "yes"
vote result statement fails to identify whom the proposed
restriction governs and that the word "recipient" does not solve
that deficiency.  Petitioners also request that, if the court
requires modification, the Attorney General should include the
additional detail that the proposed measure requires the
"employee's written, annual authorization," rather than a
"specified employee authorization."
A ballot title must contain a "yes" vote result
statement that is a "simple and understandable statement of not
more than 25 words that describes the result if the state measure
is approved."  ORS 250.035(2)(b).  The use of unfamiliar or
technical terms can cause a "yes" vote result statement to run
afoul of the statutory requirement that it be a "simple and
understandable" description of the result of approval of the
proposed measure.  In considering whether a term, such as
"recipient," violates that standard, we must consider the entire
context of its use, including its common definition and its
proximity to other terms that may clarify its intended meaning. 
In applying the statutory standard, we acknowledge that no bright
line separates a simple and understandable "yes" vote result
statement from one that is not.
"Recipient" has a brief definition:  "one that
receives: RECEIVER * * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary
1895 (unabridged ed 2002).  Although "recipient" is a word of
common technical usage among lawyers, its use by laymen in
ordinary discourse is, in our view, not common.  That fact raises
a concern about whether the use of that term undermines the
reader's understanding of the result statement.
"Recipient" does not appear in the text of the proposed
measure.  The proposed measure instead uses the terms "person,
company, or organization" to describe the entities that collect
or receive money deducted from an employee's paycheck.  However,
the proposed measure also refers to other entities -- "a
candidate or political committee or party" -- whose receipt of
money deducted from an employee's paycheck will result in the
categorization of the contributed money as "used for a political
purpose" under the proposed measure.
Both groups described above are "recipients" of money
deducted from employee paychecks within the contemplation of the
proposed measure.  But the regulatory focus of the proposed
measure is on the conduct of the first group of those recipients
-- a "person, company, or organization" -- in collecting,
receiving, and using money from an employee's paycheck without
first obtaining the employee's annual, written authorization. 
That is the group to which the proposed measure's penalties
apply.  By contrast, the proposed measure does not regulate the
use of payroll-deducted money by the second group of recipients
described above, that is, "a candidate or political committee or
party."  The unmodified term "recipient" in the Attorney
General's "yes" vote result statement causes confusion in this
context, because it wrongly suggests that the prohibition on "use
of payroll deduction money" would apply to both groups of
recipients.  That inaccuracy indicates that the Attorney
General's "yes" vote result statement fails to describe the
proposed measure in terms that are "simple and understandable"
under ORS 250.035(2)(b).
The Attorney General argues that this court rejected a
similar argument in approving a modified "yes" vote result
statement in Nesbitt v. Myers, 335 Or 424, 429, 71 P3d 530
(2003), (Nesbitt II).  We disagree, because that case is
distinguishable.
The dispute addressed in Nesbitt II concerned (1)
whether the modified "yes" vote result statement wrongly implied
that satisfying the conditions in the proposed measure "would be
simple or routine"; and (2) whether the modified statement was
sufficiently specific in describing the objective of the
employee's written authorization:  a payroll deduction for
political spending.  Id.  Petitioners do not raise those claims
here.  We note that the approved modified "yes" vote result
statement in Nesbitt II used the phrase "entities receiving
payroll deductions," not the sole term "recipients," to describe
the entities that the proposed measure would regulate.  Id.  The
court did not address whether substituting the term "recipient"
also might have adequately served that purpose.
The petitioner in Nesbitt II also contended, in
connection with a challenge to the modified caption, that the
Attorney General should use the phrase "organizations receiving
money by payroll deduction" rather than "entities receiving
payroll deductions," to describe the entities that the proposed
measure would affect.  This court disagreed, because it concluded
that the average voter would read those phrases as having
equivalent meanings.  Id. at 428.  Again, this court's discussion
did not address or decide whether the sole term "recipient"
adequately would describe the regulatory targets of the proposed
measure.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the
Attorney Generals's "yes" vote result statement does not comply
substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(b).  We therefore refer the
"yes" vote result statement to the Attorney General for
modification.  The Attorney General may consider on referral
petitioner's separate claim that the "yes" vote result statement
should make clear that the employee must authorize the payroll
deduction annually and in writing.
The "no" vote result statement in a ballot title must
be a "simple and understandable statement of not more than 25
words that describes the result if the state measure is
rejected."  ORS 250.035(2)(c).  Petitioners contend that the
Attorney General's "no" vote result statement fails to describe
accurately the result of a "no" vote because it supplies no
information to voters about the state of affairs that will exist
if voters reject the proposed measure.  Instead, according to
petitioners, the "no" vote result statement recites only that
Oregon law will not contain the restrictions on the use of
payroll-deducted money that the proposed measure would impose. 
Petitioners also assert that the "no" vote result statement must
state that, under current law, unions have no authority to compel
individuals to make political contributions.  We address those
arguments in order.
This court has discussed previously the problem that
arises if the "no" vote result statement attempts to describe the
current state of the law that will continue if voters reject the
proposed measure by reciting, in effect, that the law will not
reflect the policy choices that the proposed measure embodies. 
In Kain v. Myers, 335 Or 228, 234, 64 P3d 1129 (2003), for
example, the Attorney General's "no" vote result statement
provided:
"'Result of "No" Vote:  "No" vote retains current
law, rejects proposed prohibition against receiving
public employee payroll-deducted money, for
organizations using such money for "political purposes"
(as defined).'"
The petitioners argued that the statement mentioned "current law"
but that that reference was devoid of content and required an
explanation.  This court agreed:
"We agree with petitioners that, however justified a
reference to 'current law' might be in other ballot
titles, the phrase in question has no substance in the
context of the present proceeding.  Including the
reference does not 'describe[] the result if the state
measure is rejected.'
"Petitioners further argue that the Attorney
General's 'no' vote result statement is not 'simple and
understandable,' as the statute commands, but is,
instead, 'extremely difficult to understand.'  We agree
with petitioners that the statement is not
understandable, because it provides no new information
to the reader.  Instead, it simply attaches the word
'rejects' to the same summary of the proposed measure
that appeared in the 'yes' vote result statement.  That
is, the substantive message of the Attorney General's
'no' vote result statement is that 'no' rejects 'yes.' 
That is not a sufficient explanation to meet the
requirement of ORS 250.035(2)(c).  We hold that the
Attorney General's 'no' vote result statement fails
substantially to comply with the requirement of ORS
250.035(2)(c).  On referral, the Attorney General shall
modify it."
Id. at 234-35.
In Nesbitt I, the Attorney General certified a "no"
vote result statement that provided:
"'Result of "No" Vote:  "No" vote retains, without
modification, current provisions governing payroll
deductions; rejects proposed limitations on collection,
use, and commingling of payroll deductions for
"political purposes" (defined).'"
335 Or at 225.  In sustaining a challenge similar to that
discussed above in Kain, this court stated:
"[T]he part of the 'no' vote result statement after the
semicolon simply parallels a part of the wording of the
'yes' vote result statement, preceded by the word
'rejects.'"
Id. at 226.
In Nesbitt II, the Attorney General, in response to
Nesbitt I, certified the following modified "no" vote result
statement:
"'RESULT OF "NO" VOTE:  "No" vote rejects
requirement that entities receiving payroll deductions
obtain employee's authorization and comply with
additional limitations before using payroll deductions
for "political purposes" (defined).'"
335 Or at 430.  On review, the Attorney General acknowledged that
he again had employed the "no rejects yes" formulation that this
court had rejected in Kain and Nesbitt I.  However, he defended
that approach as a permissible one, "'even if that means the "no"
vote result statement provides little or no new information.'" 
Id. at 432.  This court interpreted the Attorney General's
argument as a invitation to overrule Kain and rejected it.  Id. 
The court stated:
"[A]s this court explained in Kain, a statement that
says no more than that '"no" rejects "yes"' does not
much advance any voter's understanding of the choice
that a proposed measure represents.  Certainly, before
resorting to the '"no" rejects "yes"' statement as a
default position, the Attorney General needs to be
reasonably satisfied that he cannot compose other
possible formulations of the 'no' vote result statement
that will provide the voter with a greater amount of
information.  In this case, he has not persuaded us
that that is true.
"* * * * *
"The function of the 'no' vote result statement is
to provide a voter with a 'simple and understandable
statement of not more than 25 words that describes the
result if the state measure is rejected.'  ORS
250.035(2)(c) (emphasis added).  That emphasized
wording, examined in light of the contrasting
information that ORS 250.035(2)(b) requires in a 'yes'
vote result statement, in our view, states an
expectation that, when possible, the 'no' vote result
statement will provide information that should assist
the voter to understand the state of affairs that will
exist if the voters reject the proposed measure.  It is
no news to a voter that voting 'no' means 'not yes.' 
Thus, although simple parallelism may fulfill the
emphasized statutory goal in the abstract, it will do
so only mindlessly in many cases."
Id. at 432-33 (emphasis in original).
The Attorney General argues that his "no" statement in
this case does not simply insert the word "rejects" before the
"yes" statement.  That is true.  Petitioners argue, however, that
the Attorney General's chosen phrase -- "retains current law not
restricting recipient's use of authorized payroll deduction
money" (emphasis added) -- achieves the same effect by purporting
to describe what current law does not contain, rather than what
it does contain.
We disagree.  The Attorney General's introductory
phrasing ("retains current law not restricting") in this context
purports to describe present law; it does not simply describe the
result of a "no" vote as a rejection of the policy changes that
the proposed measure would enact.  That fact distinguishes this
case from the holdings reviewed above in Kain, Nesbitt I, and
Nesbitt II.  The words "not restricting" convey substantially the
same message that petitioners prefer, i.e., that current law
allows the use of certain funds.  We cannot say, of course, that
any sort of reference to current law in a "no" statement will
satisfy wholly the statutory policy promoting voter understanding
of "the state of affairs that will exist if the voters reject the
proposed measure[,]" as this court discussed in Nesbitt II, 335
Or at 433.  We agree, however, with the Attorney General that, in
this context, the "no" statement does not simply recite that a
"no" vote would reject the result of a "yes" vote.
Petitioners also argue that the Attorney General's "no"
statement fails to inform voters that "current law allows
organizations to spend and manage money collected through payroll
deductions in the same manner as other money."  They rely on
Towers v. Myers, 338 Or 542, 112 P3d 1184 (2005), in support of
that argument.
In Towers, this court sustained a challenge to the
following statement in a ballot title summary:  "[c]urrent law
neither limits use of public employees' payroll deductions nor
requires segregating deductions earmarked for political
purposes."  Id. at 546.  This court noted that the "no" vote
result statement contained the same erroneous message, that is,
the "no" vote result statement provided that a "'No' vote retains
current law, which neither limits uses to which payroll
deductions may be put nor requires segregating payroll deductions
earmarked for political purposes."  Id. at 545, 547 n 2.  This
court agreed that those statements of law were inaccurate because
"Federal First Amendment jurisprudence limits the power to impose
such deductions and imposes significant procedural requirements
respecting the process."  Id. at 546 (citing federal cases).
According to petitioners, when individuals and
organizations acquire money through a payroll deduction process,
current law allows them to manage and spend it in the same way
that they manage and spend other money in their possession.  They
assert that the Attorney General's "no" statement relies on an
irrelevant, and ultimately confusing, comparison between payroll
deducted funds collected with employee authorization and those
collected without that authorization.  The Attorney General
disagrees, pointing out that Towers confirmed that current law
imposes various procedural limitations on the collection and use
of "fair share" fees over the employee's objection.  The Attorney
General also contends that voters "will understand that the term
'authorized payroll deduction' does not include an imposed 'fair
share' contribution used, over the employee's objection, for
political purposes."
It is doubtful that the word "authorized" will carry
all the freight that the Attorney General places on it.  The
nuances that the Attorney General derives from that word in this
context likely will escape most voters.  It is also true, as
petitioners argue, that the substance of the proposed measure
concerns the use of all payroll-deducted funds by all individuals
and organizations that receive them, not only "fair share" fees
received by labor organizations.  Nonetheless, we are satisfied
that the inclusion of the term "authorized" properly identifies
the relevant funds as those deducted in compliance with
applicable laws. (3)
Finally, petitioners correctly identify an aspect of
the status quo that the "no" vote result statement fails to
address:  the inability of labor organizations to compel
employees to make political contributions.  The Attorney General
chose to address another feature of current law that a "no" vote
would retain:  the absence of a requirement for a separate
accounting of funds used for a political purpose.  Petitioners do
not challenge the accuracy of the Attorney General's description
of that point; rather, they strongly prefer that he address their
issue instead, calling it "essential" voter information.
The Attorney General permissibly could have elected to
state the point that petitioners advocate, but his choice to
focus on another significant feature of current law also is a
permissible one.  The Attorney General's "no" vote result
statement complies substantially with statutory requirements.
Lastly, petitioners challenge four aspects of the
Attorney General's summary.  A ballot title must contain a
summary that is a "concise and impartial statement of not more
than 125 words summarizing the state measure and its major
effect."  ORS 250.035(2)(d).  We have addressed and rejected the
substance of two of petitioners' challenges in our discussion
above of the "no" vote result statement.  We also reject those
arguments in this context without further discussion.
Petitioners argue that "the description of what
constitutes a 'political purpose' is extremely confusing,
rendering the statement deficient."  They assert that the
confusion stems from the omission of important terms that are
necessary to make the summary both readable and accurate.  They
draw attention to the following passage of the summary:
"'Political purpose' includes:  candidate,
political committee, political party, supporting or
opposing candidate or ballot measure, including efforts
to gather or to discourage signatures for proposed
measure or petition; excludes most lobbying."
The Attorney General disagrees with petitioners' reading of the
proposed measure but asserts that, if his reading seems
confusing, the confusion "is attributable to the language of the
measure itself, not the summary."
Petitioners' challenge is well-taken.  The measure
deems money to be "used for a political purpose" if the person,
company, or organization that possesses the money contributes the
money to a specified entity (i.e., "a candidate or political
committee or party") or spends the money for a particular
objective (i.e., supporting or opposing a candidate or a ballot
measure, including efforts supporting or opposing the gathering
of signatures on initiative petitions).  By leaving out
terminology that refers to the key elements of contribution and
expenditure, the summary wrongly states that the listed political
entities, "candidate, political committee, political party," are
themselves a "political purpose."  That deficiency also affects
the accuracy of the reference to "supporting or opposing
candidate or ballot measure * * *."  The proposed measure, as
relevant here, regulates the contribution or expenditure of
money; it does not reach other forms of supporting or opposing
candidates or ballot measures.  The Attorney General's phrasing
does not reflect that important distinction.  We refer the
summary to the Attorney General to address those deficiencies.
Petitioners also challenge the use of the modifier
"most" before the term "lobbying" at the end of the passage of
the summary quoted above.  That objection refers to the following
passage of the proposed measure:
"(b) For purposes of this section, money spent lobbying
an elected official shall not be deemed used for a
political purpose.  So as to prevent political
campaigning under the guise of 'lobbying,' money
spent on or contributed to any direct mail, print,
or electronic media or other campaign, which names
or otherwise identifies a person who is a
candidate for public office in an election to be
held within 90 days of the communication, shall be
deemed used for a political purpose."
According to that text, the proposed measure would create an
exception from its requirements for "lobbying" an elected
official, but then declares that certain identified contributions
and expenditures of money within the described 90-day period,
which could included lobbying activities, are deemed to be for a
political purpose and are not within the exception for lobbying.
Petitioners contend that the Attorney General can only
speculate about the extent of lobbying activities that will fall
under both the exception and the 90-day provision.  They agree
that the proposed measure excludes some lobbying activities, but
contend that the Attorney General cannot accurately state that
the proposed measure excepts "most" lobbying without resorting to
pure guesswork.
Petitioners' general proposition is undeniably correct: 
the summary must summarize the measure and its major effects, not
guess about them.  The voters require information, not
speculation, to "understand what will happen if the measure is
approved * * *."  Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Roberts, 308 Or 169, 175,
777 P2d 406 (1989) (emphasis added).
The Attorney General responds by noting that the
proposed measure exempts all lobbying of an elected official but
removes from the lobbying exemption certain campaign activities
occurring 90 days before an election.  He explains that the 90-day provision is a recognition that the term "lobbying"
potentially is ambiguous and, for that reason, the use of the
term "most" in the phrase "most lobbying" is justified.
In our view, the answer is unresponsive to petitioners'
challenge.  The term "most" in the phrase "most lobbying" creates
the inference that the exemption applies to the greatest part, in
quantity, extent, or degree, of all lobbying activities. 
However, the text of the proposed measure does not support use of
a term that incorporates such a quantitative judgment.  For
example, 90 days may seem to be a brief temporal limit on the
described campaign expenditures and contributions, but the timing
of those activities -- 90 days before a candidate's election --
can critically affect the outcome of the election.  Stating to
the voters that "most" lobbying occurs outside that 90-day period
necessarily involves speculation.  Only a different term, such as
"some" or "certain," will describe the lobbying exemption
accurately.  We refer the summary to the Attorney General to
address that problem.
We refer the certified ballot title to the Attorney
General for modification.  In the instances noted above, the
ballot title fails to comply with statutory requirements.  ORS
250.035(2).
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for
modification.
1. ORS 250.085(2) provides:
"Any elector dissatisfied with a ballot title for
an initiated or referred measure certified by the
Attorney General and who timely submitted written
comments on the draft ballot title may petition the
Supreme Court seeking a different title.  The petition
shall state the reasons that the title filed with the
Secretary of State does not substantially comply with
the requirements of ORS 250.035."
2. Petitioners' proposed caption states:
"RESTRICTS HOW INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS
MAY COLLECT, USE AND MANAGE PAYROLL-DEDUCTED
FUNDS; MANDATES PENALTIES"
That caption is not beyond criticism; the term "manage"
may describe too broadly the requirements in the proposed measure
concerning segregated accounts and the prohibition on
commingling.  However, that caption does describe accurately the
principal focus of the subject matter of the proposed measure. 
The Attorney General, of course, is under no legal obligation to
adopt words or phrases proposed by a ballot title challenger.
3. The Attorney General may choose to alter the wording of
the "no" vote result statement because of other changes that he
will make on referral to other parts of the ballot title.  See
Towers v. Myers, 338 Or 542, 547 n 2, 112 P3d 1184 (2005)
(recognizing that authority).