Title: Brannon v. Sharp
Citation: 554 So. 2d 951
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 1989

554 So. 2d 951 (1989)
William Billy BRANNON and The B.F. Goodrich Company
v.
Nathaniel SHARP, Jr.
87-1500.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 25, 1989.
Rehearing Denied December 22, 1989.
Thad G. Long, John M. Johnson and Victor L. Hayslip of Bradley, Arant, Rose &amp; White, Birmingham, for appellants.
David H. Marsh of Pittman, Hooks, Marsh, Dutton &amp; Hollis, Birmingham, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This suit arises out of an accident involving a tractor trailer driven by Brannon and owned by the B.F. Goodrich Company, and a Volkswagen automobile in which the plaintiff Sharp was a passenger. The plaintiff brought suit for injuries arising from the accident; the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $400,000. The defendants do not challenge the jury's finding of liability for the accident; their only contentions are that a psychologist was improperly allowed to testify as to medical causation and damages, and that, absent this testimony, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence of damages.
Sharp claims to suffer debilitating headaches, which he contends were caused by the accident. As part of his case in chief, Sharp called Dr. Vernon Pegram, a licensed psychologist. Dr. Pegram testified as follows:
At another point in the trial, Dr. Pegram testified on the issue of damages as follows:
The appellants, Brannon and B.F. Goodrich, argue that Dr. Pegram's testimony was improperly allowed, in direct violation of § 34-26-1(b), Alabama Code 1975, which states:
The appellants also cite the case of Kriewitz v. Savoy Heating &amp; Air Conditioning Co., 396 So. 2d 49 (Ala.1981), to support their position that a psychologist may not testify as to medical facts, and they contend that, absent Dr. Pegram's testimony, Sharp failed to prove either causation or disability.
We disagree. In Kriewitz the psychologists in question were not allowed to testify as to the medical causation of the plaintiff's injuries. In the present case, Dr. Pegram was asked questions concerning the cause-and-effect relationship between the accident and Sharp's chronic pain; he was not asked about medical causation. Similarly, on the issue of damages, Pegram was asked questions specifically limited to the field of psychology.
In this case, Sharp was referred to Dr. Pegram by his medical doctor in order to attempt to bring his pain under control. Dr. Pegram, who specializes in chronic pain problems, had treated Sharp for over two years prior to trial. In Fabianke v. Weaver, 527 So. 2d 1253 (Ala.1988), this Court found that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow a psychologist to *953 testify concerning the possible connection between complications at birth and the later condition of the plaintiff. In the present case, Dr. Pegram testified that, based upon Sharp's testimony that Sharp did not have headaches before the accident and that he did have them after the accident, Dr. Pegram believed there was a cause and effect between the two. Under the facts presented in this case, it was not error to allow Dr. Pegram to testify concerning Sharp's headaches.
Bell v. Hart, 516 So. 2d 562 (Ala.1987); Meadows v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 392 So. 2d 825 (Ala.1981).
Although we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Pegram to testify, we must reiterate that Dr. Pegram was specially qualified to testify in this case. Sharp was referred to Dr. Pegram by his treating physician, and Dr. Pegram had treated Sharp for a significant period prior to trial. We also note that Sharp's attorney, in the formulation of his questions, was particularly careful not to cross the line into the area of medical expertise.
After a review of the record, we find no merit in the appellant's other arguments on appeal. The judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.