Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11823
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 2015

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-11823 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 380316  vs.  
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 9, 2015. - December 11, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Burden 
of proof.  Due Process of Law, Sex offender, Hearing, 
Standard of proof.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Standard 
of proof.  Internet. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 21, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Dennis J. Curran, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Brandon L. Campbell for the plaintiff. 
 
David L. Chenail (Elisha W. Willis with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Beth L. Eisenberg & Larni S. Levy, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, & Eric B. Tennen, for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Andrew S. Crouch, for Youth Advocacy Division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, 
2 
 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  We are asked in this case to consider anew the 
standard of proof that the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) 
must satisfy in order to classify a convicted sex offender under 
the provisions of the sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 178C-178Q.  The plaintiff, John Doe No. 380316 (Doe), is a 
convicted sex offender who was classified by a preponderance of 
the evidence as having a moderate risk of reoffense.  In Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
428 Mass. 90, 91 (1998) (Doe No. 972), we held that SORB need 
only prove the appropriateness of a sex offender's risk 
classification by a preponderance of the evidence.  In light of 
amendments to the sex offender registry law and other 
developments since our decision in that case, however, Doe 
contends that the preponderance standard no longer adequately 
protects his due process rights.  We agree.  For the reasons 
stated below, we hold that SORB is constitutionally required to 
prove the appropriateness of an offender's risk classification 
by clear and convincing evidence.1 
 
1.  Background.  When Doe was thirty-five years old, he 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts 
Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, and by the 
Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services and the Children's Law Center of Massachusetts. 
3 
 
reportedly "twisted" the penis of his six year old nephew 
through the child's underwear while both were in the bathroom.  
Doe apologized to the boy immediately after the incident, and 
they hugged each other.  After several incidents of incontinence 
over the following weeks, however, the boy told his mother what 
had happened, and she thereafter reported the incident to the 
police.  Following a jury trial, Doe was found guilty of 
indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, G. L. 
c. 6, § 13B, a sex offense requiring SORB registration under 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178CD.2  Doe had not previously been 
convicted of a sex offense.  On or about June 14, 2013, while 
Doe was still incarcerated, SORB preliminarily recommended that 
Doe be classified as a level three sex offender, the level 
assigned to convicted sex offenders posing the highest risk of 
reoffense.  After Doe challenged that recommendation, however, a 
SORB hearing examiner determined by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was more appropriately classified as a 
level two sex offender, the level assigned to convicted sex 
offenders posing only a moderate risk of reoffense.  That 
determination was made on October 23, 2013. 
 
The hearing examiner relied on the regulatory factors 
promulgated by SORB, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(1)-(24) (2013), 
                     
 
2 Doe was also convicted of other offenses arising out of 
the same incident that are not relevant to our decision in this 
case. 
4 
 
to determine Doe's degree of dangerousness and risk of 
reoffense.  The examiner particularly noted that Doe had 
sexually abused his "extravulnerable" nephew,3 that he appeared 
to be unwilling to admit to the offense despite his conviction, 
and that the victim suffered continuing emotional trauma as a 
result of the incident.  The examiner recognized that some 
"favorable facts" diminished Doe's risk of reoffense, including 
that Doe had not been reported for disciplinary violations and 
had attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings during his 
incarceration, and that he would likely have a stable home 
environment living with his sister upon his release.4  
Nevertheless, the examiner found that these mitigating factors 
only somewhat offset the aggravating factors present in Doe's 
case, and determined that Doe was appropriately classified as a 
level two offender. 
 
Doe sought judicial review in the Superior Court, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and G. L. c. 6, § 178M.  His level two 
classification was affirmed and we granted Doe's application for 
direct appellate review.  On appeal, Doe argues that due process 
                     
 
3 As defined by 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(9)(c)(4) (2013), 
"'extra-vulnerable' means any condition or circumstance, 
including, but not limited to a physical or mental condition 
that tends to render a victim more susceptible to sexual 
assault.  An extra-vulnerable victim shall also include a victim 
under the age of ten and over the age of [sixty]." 
 
 
4 The sister is not the same person as the mother of Doe's 
nephew. 
5 
 
under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights requires SORB to prove its classification determinations 
by clear and convincing evidence.  Additionally, he argues that 
this court should reverse his classification because SORB failed 
to prove that he poses a level two degree of risk and 
dangerousness to the public even under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.  Finally, Doe asks this court to order SORB 
to stop disseminating his registry data on the Internet, on the 
grounds that the 2013 amendment to the sex offender registry law 
that required the Internet publication of level two offenders' 
registry information, St. 2013, c. 38, §§ 7, 9, was not 
retroactive as applied to him. 
 
We conclude that due process requires that a sex offender's 
risk level be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  The risk 
classifications that SORB must make now have consequences for 
those who are classified that are far greater than was the case 
when we decided Doe No. 972.  The preponderance standard no 
longer adequately protects against the possibility that those 
consequences might be visited upon individuals who do not pose 
the requisite degree of risk and dangerousness.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the decision of the Superior Court affirming SORB's 
classification of Doe as a level two sex offender.  We remand 
the matter to the Superior Court for entry of an order to SORB 
6 
 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing de novo under the heightened 
standard, and to cease disseminating Doe's registry information 
on the Internet while that hearing is pending.  At the hearing, 
both Doe and SORB may introduce new evidence relevant to a final 
classification determination.  The hearing examiner may also 
consider evidence, but not findings of fact, from Doe's original 
hearing.  Contrast Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475, 489-490 (2015) (Doe 
No. 7083). 
 
2.  Standard of review and stare decisis.  A reviewing 
court may set aside or modify a hearing examiner's decision if 
it was: 
 
"(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or 
 
 
"(b) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction 
of the agency; or 
 
 
"(c) Based upon an error of law; or 
 
 
"(d) Made upon unlawful procedure; or 
 
 
"(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence; or 
 
 
"(f) Unwarranted by facts found by the court on the 
record . . . ; or  
 
 
"(g) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  The appellant bears the burden of 
showing that one of these conditions has been met.  See Coe v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 442 Mass. 250, 258 (2004). 
7 
 
 
Doe argues that SORB committed a constitutional error by 
proving his risk of reoffense by only a preponderance of the 
evidence.5  Because we held explicitly in Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. 
at 91, that "the appropriateness of an offender's risk 
classification must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence," to rule in Doe's favor we must overrule our decision 
in that case.6  The principle of stare decisis would normally 
                     
 
5 Doe also argues that it was error for SORB to classify him 
as a level two sex offender even under the preponderance 
standard, because the evidence considered by the hearing 
examiner did not support the conclusion that he posed the 
requisite degree of risk and dangerousness.  If this claim were 
correct, we would not need to reach the question whether due 
process requires a higher standard of proof than a preponderance 
of the evidence.  In reviewing the hearing examiner's decision, 
however, we "give due weight to the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as 
to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g).  "A court may not displace an [agency's] 
choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the 
court would justifiably have made a different choice had the 
matter been before it de novo."  Ten Local Citizen Group v. New 
England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 231 (2010), quoting Southern 
Worcester County Reg'l Vocational Sch. Dist. v. Labor Relations 
Comm'n, 386 Mass. 414, 420 (1982).  Doe's level two 
classification was supported by substantial evidence and was not 
otherwise arbitrary or capricious:  the hearing examiner 
determined that mitigating factors present in Doe's case did not 
sufficiently counterbalance other factors indicating that Doe 
posed a risk of reoffense.  Given this, we conclude that Doe was 
appropriately classified as a level two risk and danger based 
upon a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
 
6 The Legislature codified the preponderance standard in 
1999, following our decision in Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90 (1998) (Doe 
No. 972).  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2), inserted by St. 1999, 
c. 74, § 2.  This is not dispositive of the question before us, 
however, since due process "is not a technical conception with a 
8 
 
prevent us from reconsidering settled law.  See Stonehill 
College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441 
Mass. 549, 562, cert. denied sub nom. Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. 
v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 
(2004).  However, "[t]he force of stare decisis is at its nadir 
in cases concerning procedural rules that implicate fundamental 
constitutional provisions."  Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2151, 2163 n.5 (2013).  Furthermore, "[t]he requirements of 
procedural due process are pragmatic and flexible, not rigid or 
hypertechnical."  Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 427 
(2001).  Given the flexible nature of the procedural due process 
right at issue in this case, and given the substantial changes 
to the sex offender registry law and other developments since 
our decision in Doe No. 972, we think it appropriate to revisit 
that decision. 
 
In order to determine whether reliance on the preponderance 
standard violated Doe's due process rights, we first consider 
our reasoning in Doe No. 972 in light of the 1996 sex offender 
law in effect at the time it was decided.  See St. 1996, c. 239, 
§ 1.  We then examine subsequent amendments to the sex offender 
registry law and other developments that draw into question 
                                                                  
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976), quoting Cafeteria 
& Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
9 
 
whether the preponderance standard continues adequately to 
protect Doe's due process rights.  Finally, we consider the 
standard of proof that due process requires in light of these 
changes. 
 
3.  The 1996 sex offender registry law.  In 1996, the 
Legislature passed the State's first sex offender registry law, 
St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.  An early version of the bill that was 
eventually enacted described its purpose as "to protect the 
public from the 'danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders' 
and to aid law enforcement officials in the apprehension of sex 
offenders by providing them with 'additional information 
critical to preventing sexual victimization and to resolving 
incidents involving sexual abuse and exploitation.'"  Doe No. 
972, 428 Mass. at 91-92, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 423 
Mass. 1201, 1204 (1996).  To achieve these aims, the enacted 
statute required individuals convicted of any offenses from a 
list of enumerated "sex offenses" to register with the State 
their names, addresses, and identifying information.  G. L. 
c. 6, §§ 178C-178F, inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.  The 
State disseminated that information publicly to a lesser or 
greater extent depending on the level of risk of reoffense that 
a registered offender was deemed to pose.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2), inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1. 
 
The 1996 law enumerated a set of factors that the 
10 
 
Legislature considered relevant to convicted sex offenders' risk 
of reoffense.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1), inserted by St. 1996, 
c. 239, § 1.  In addition, the law created SORB to "promulgate 
guidelines for determining the level of risk of reoffense" of 
convicted sex offenders, and to apply those guidelines "to 
assess the risk level of particular offenders."  Id.  An 
offender assessed by SORB as posing a low risk of reoffense was 
classified as a level one offender, and his or her registry 
information was only disclosed to police departments where he or 
she lived or worked, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
upon request to adults for their own protection or for the 
protection of individuals in their care.  G. L. c. 6, §§ 178I-
178K, inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.  An offender assessed 
by SORB as posing a moderate risk of reoffense was classified as 
a level two offender, and his or her registry information was 
additionally disclosed to organizations such as schools, day 
care centers, religious and youth organizations, and sports 
leagues in the offender's communities.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (b), inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.  A sex 
offender assessed by SORB as posing a high risk of reoffense was 
classified as a level three offender, and, in addition to the 
dissemination provided for level two offenders, his or her 
information was actively disseminated by the police to 
individual members of the public likely to encounter the 
11 
 
offender.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c), inserted by St. 1996, 
c. 239, § 1.  Sex offenders were not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing to contest SORB's risk assessment.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 178K-178M, inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1. 
 
4.  Doe No. 972.  In Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 98, we held 
that convicted sex offenders had a constitutional right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and art. 12 to an evidentiary hearing 
before SORB regarding the appropriateness of their risk level 
classifications.  We further held that SORB was required to 
prove the appropriateness of those classifications by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 103. 
 
To determine whether the preponderance standard satisfied 
due process, we applied the test set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 
(Mathews).  That test balances the private interests affected by 
an agency decision; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
those interests; the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and the governmental interests 
involved.  See Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 100, citing Mathews, 
supra at 335. 
 
With respect to the private interests affected, we 
explained that a convicted sex offender did not face a potential 
loss of liberty as a result of his or her classification level, 
and that "the stigma of being required to register as a sex 
12 
 
offender and of having information regarding sex offenses 
disseminated to the public" was not substantial enough to 
require a heightened standard of proof.  Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. 
at 102.  The risk of an erroneous classification was thought to 
be minimal because both the offender and SORB had the 
opportunity to present evidence and examine and cross-examine 
witnesses at a classification hearing, because SORB was required 
to make "particularized, specific, and detailed findings" based 
on a set of statutory factors, and because the offender could 
appeal SORB's decision in court.  Id.  We noted also that 
applying a higher standard might lead to erroneous 
underclassifications.  Id. at 102-103. 
 
Weighing the State's interest in "protect[ing] children and 
other vulnerable people from recidivistic sex offenders" against 
these factors, we decided that due process under the State and 
Federal Constitutions required proof of the appropriateness of 
an offender's risk classification only by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Id. at 103-104.  In our view at the time, the 
"possible injury to sex offenders from being erroneously 
overclassified" was "nearly equal" to "any harm to the State 
from an erroneous underclassification."  Id. at 104 n.14. 
 
5.  Subsequent developments.  The sex offender registry law 
has undergone significant revisions since our decision in Doe 
No. 972.  Amendments to the statute in 1999 provided for risk 
13 
 
classification hearings and codified the preponderance standard 
as constitutional safeguards.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2), 
inserted by St. 1999, c. 74, § 2.  On balance, however, 
legislative changes have more often imposed extra burdens on 
registered offenders than provided them with additional 
protections.  More offenses are now subject to a registration 
requirement.  Sex offenders face increasingly stringent 
affirmative reporting requirements, and the penalties for 
failing to meet those requirements are harsher.  They are also 
confronted with other limitations based on their registered sex 
offender status.  Information about registered offenders is 
being disseminated more broadly, including on the Internet.  
Furthermore, there is reason to question whether SORB's risk 
classification guidelines continue to reflect accurately current 
scholarship regarding statutory factors that concern risk 
assessment.  These developments are described in turn below. 
 
Additional offenses requiring registration have been added 
to the sex offender registry law at least four times since we 
decided Doe No. 972.  See St. 2011, c. 178, §§ 1-3; St. 2010, 
c. 267, §§ 1-3; St. 2003, c. 77, § 3; St. 1999, c. 74, § 2.  
While the sex offenses enumerated in 1996 were mostly crimes of 
physical violence against children and the developmentally 
disabled, see G. L. c. 6, § 178C, inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, 
§ 1, many of the offenses added later have not been similarly 
14 
 
targeted.  See, e.g., St. 2011, c. 178, §§ 1-3 (enticing child 
under eighteen via electronic communication); St. 1999, c. 74, 
§ 2 (enticing person for prostitution; incestuous marriage or 
intercourse; and disseminating child pornography).  The addition 
of these offenses may make more challenging the task of 
accurately classifying the risk of reoffense that specific 
offenders pose.  Cf. Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 105 (Marshall, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("careful and 
individualized due process is necessary to sort sexual predators 
likely to repeat their crimes from large numbers of offenders 
who pose no danger to the public"). 
 
Registration requirements have also steadily become more 
burdensome.  Already at the time we decided Doe No. 972, members 
of this court had recognized that registration represented a 
"continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person 
himself," Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997) 
(Fried, J., concurring), and that it cast "a continuing shadow 
of further criminal sanctions and possible reincarceration" on 
offenders, Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 106 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  These concerns 
resonate today:  in addition to the requirements imposed in 
1996, all offenders must now register any secondary addresses 
15 
 
they have,7 register the names and addresses of the institutions 
of higher learning they attend,8 and re-register ten days prior 
to establishing a new address.9  Homeless offenders are 
additionally required to re-register every thirty days, and to 
wear a global positioning system device at all times.10  
Furthermore, on release from prison, offenders are subject to 
intensive parole conditions.11  Taken together, compliance with 
                     
 
7 Secondary addresses include "all places where a sex 
offender lives, abides, lodges, or resides for a period of 
[fourteen] or more days in the aggregate during any calendar 
year and which is not a sex offender's primary address; or a 
place where a sex offender routinely lives, abides, lodges, or 
resides for a period of [four] or more consecutive or 
nonconsecutive days in any month and which is not a sex 
offender's permanent address, including any out-of-state 
address."  G. L. c. 6, § 178C. 
 
 
8 See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178E, as appearing in St. 2003, 
c. 77, §§ 1-4. 
 
 
9 See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (h), as appearing in St. 1999, 
c. 74, § 2.  At the time Doe No. 972 was decided, registration 
was only required within five days of moving.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178E (e), inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1. 
 
 
10 See G. L. c. 6, § 178F, as amended by St. 2010, c. 256, 
§ 41 ("[a] homeless sex offender shall verify registration data 
every [thirty] days with the board"); G. L. c. 6, § 178F1/2 
("[a] homeless sex offender shall appear in person at [the 
offender's] local police department every [thirty] days"); G. L. 
c. 6, § 178F3/4, inserted by St. 2010, c. 256, § 42 ("[a] 
homeless sex offender shall wear a global positioning system 
[GPS] device, or any comparable device, administered by the 
commissioner of probation"). 
 
 
11 For example, a level one offender is required to take a 
polygraph examination at least every six months, cannot use the 
Internet without permission of his or her supervising parole 
officer, cannot own or use computer programs without permission 
16 
 
all of these requirements can be exceptionally burdensome for 
registered offenders.12 
 
In addition to more extensive registration requirements, 
failure to register now may result in more significant 
penalties.13  If a judge determines that incarceration is a more 
appropriate penalty for a noncompliant offender than a fine, the 
judge now must impose a mandatory minimum sentence of at least 
six months.14  A second failure to register results in a 
mandatory minimum sentence of five years in State prison.15  When 
Doe No. 972 was decided, these penalties were uniformly less 
                                                                  
of the parole officer, cannot use personal advertisements or the 
Internet to contact or meet people, cannot possess a camera 
without permission of the parole officer, and may be fitted with 
a GPS monitoring device and required to remain outside of 
"Exclusion Zones" designated by the Parole Board.  See 
Massachusetts Parole Board, Sex Offender Conditions, Executive 
Office of Public Safety (Nov. 2006).  The parole conditions for 
level two and three offenders are more burdensome.  See id. 
 
 
12 See Levenson & Cotter, The Effect of Megan's Law on Sex 
Offender Reintegration, 21 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 49, 62 (2005) 
(Levenson & Cotter) ("Feeling alone, isolated, ashamed, 
embarrassed, hopeless, or fearful may threaten a sex offender’s 
reintegration and recovery and may even trigger some sex 
offenders to relapse"). 
 
 
13 An offender may be arrested without a warrant "[w]henever 
a police officer has probable cause to believe that [he or she] 
has failed to comply with the registration requirements."  G. L. 
c. 6, § 178P, as appearing in St. 1999, c. 74, § 2. 
 
 
14 G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a), as amended through St. 2010, 
c. 267, §§ 4-6. 
 
 
15 Id. 
 
17 
 
severe.16 
 
Furthermore, offenders face difficulty finding work and 
housing.  Stigma accounts for some of this difficulty -- 
employers and landlords often prefer to avoid the perceived 
risks of having a convicted sex offender on site.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Canadyan, 458 Mass. 574, 577 n.8 (2010) (noting 
" extraordinary obstacles facing sex offenders attempting to 
secure employment"); Platt, Gangsters to Greyhounds:  The Past, 
Present, and Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. Rev. L. 
& Soc. Change 727, 762 (2013) (describing how housing 
discrimination against sex offenders "forc[es] many to live in 
shelters or be rendered homeless").  Many restrictions also have 
been codified.  For example, sex offenders are subject to 
criminal penalties for engaging in ice cream truck vending, 
regardless of whether their offense involved harm to a child.  
See G. L. c. 265, § 48, inserted by St. 2010, c. 256, § 119.  
Moreover, households that include a person subject "to a 
lifetime registration requirement under a State sex offender 
registration program" are no longer eligible for certain Federal 
housing programs.  42 U.S.C. § 13663 (2012).  Level three sex 
offenders also face criminal penalties for living in a nursing 
                     
 
16 Under the 1996 sex offender registry law, there was no 
mandatory minimum sentence for a first conviction of failure to 
register.  G. L. c. 6, § 178H, inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, 
§ 1.  A second conviction resulted in a mandatory minimum 
sentence of ninety days in a house of correction.  Id. 
18 
 
home.17  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (e), inserted by St. 2006, 
c. 303, § 6.  Such restrictions likely intensify the stigma 
associated with being a registered offender. 
 
The sex offender registry law in its current form also 
calls for extensive dissemination of offenders' registry 
information.  Both level two and level three sex offenders' 
information is now posted on the Internet.  See St. 2013, c. 38, 
§§ 7, 9 (requiring Internet posting of level two offenders' 
information); St. 2003, c. 140, §§ 5, 11-14 (requiring Internet 
posting of level three offenders' information).  No limits are 
placed on the secondary dissemination of this information.  See 
Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 605 (2014) 
(Moe).  Furthermore, records of level two and level three 
classifications are no longer permitted to be sealed.  See 
St. 2010, c. 256, § 129.  The permanence of level two and level 
three classification attaches special importance to the accuracy 
of the classification in the first instance. 
 
The recent Internet dissemination requirements in 
particular have increased the extent of the private interests 
affected by classification.  Although in Coe v. Sex Offender 
                     
 
17 But see Doe v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 460 Mass. 342, 
342-343 (2011).  Until this year, a warren of city and town 
ordinances also prohibited offenders from living near parks, 
schools, playgrounds, and other areas commonly used by children.  
See Doe v. Lynn, 472 Mass. 521, 533-534 (2015) (determining that 
municipal restrictions on offender residency are preempted by 
sex offender registry law). 
19 
 
Registry Bd., 442 Mass. 250, 257 n.6 (2004), we determined that 
Internet publication did not amplify the consequences of 
classification as a level three sex offender, we have since 
acknowledged that that conclusion "may no longer be 
accurate . . . in light of all that we have learned about the 
operation of the Internet."  Moe, supra at 605 n.10.  Where 
previously the time and resource constraints of local police 
departments set functional limits on the dissemination of 
registry information, the Internet allows for around-the-clock, 
instantaneous, and worldwide access to that information -- a 
virtual sword of Damocles.  See id. at 605.  Internet 
dissemination "exposes [offenders], through aggressive public 
notification of their crimes, to profound humiliation and 
community-wide ostracism."  Doe No. 7083, 472 Mass. at 485, 
quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Consequences of such public dissemination may 
include housing and employment discrimination, harassment, and 
assault.18  See Moe, supra at 604.  Further, should a sex 
offender later be reclassified to level one such that Internet 
dissemination is no longer required, "information posted on the 
Internet is never truly forgotten."  Note, The Right to Be 
                     
 
18 These consequences persist despite the sex offender 
registry law's prohibition on the use of information published 
about sex offenders to discriminate against or harass them.  See 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 178D, 178N. 
20 
 
Forgotten, 64 Hastings L.J. 257, 259-260 (2012) (describing 
secondary dissemination of information posted on Internet). 
 
Even level one offenders' registry information is being 
disclosed more broadly.  Although level one sex offenders' 
information is not disseminated publicly, it still may be 
released to the local police departments where they attend 
institutions of higher learning, see St. 2003, c. 77, §§ 19-20, 
as well as to a variety of State agencies and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a); 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.28(3) (2013).  In addition, a level one sex 
offender's classification level and the city or town in which 
the offender lives, works, or attends an institution of higher 
learning may be released to a victim who submitted a written 
victim impact statement as part of the offender's classification 
hearing.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.28(3). 
 
Although the consequences of classification are now 
extensive, concerns have been raised as to the accuracy of the 
risk classifications that SORB must make.  Under the guidelines 
currently in place, SORB applies twenty-four separate risk 
factors in order to determine an offender's risk level.  
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(1)-(24).  However, "there is reason 
for some concern as to whether [SORB's] guidelines continue to 
reflect accurately the current state of scientific knowledge."  
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender 
21 
 
Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 116 (2014) (Doe No. 68549) (noting 
that most recent studies cited in guidelines were published in 
2001).  In addition, the Legislature has recently required SORB 
to update its regulations to "reflect recent [S]upreme 
[J]udicial [C]ourt or [A]ppeals [C]ourt decisions that have 
resulted in remands or reversals of [SORB's] final 
classification decisions."  St. 2015, c. 10, § 63. 
 
6.  Standard of proof.  In light of the new implications of 
classification at a given risk level, we consider what standard 
of proof is currently necessary to provide Doe with due process.  
As we have noted in the past, deprivation of more extensive 
private interests requires greater procedural protections.  See 
Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. at 140, citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 334-335. 
 
Adopting a "standard of proof is more than an empty 
semantic exercise" (quotation omitted).  Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (Addington).  Recognizing that a fact 
finder will sometimes err despite his or her best efforts, "a 
standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the fact 
finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he 
[or she] should have in the correctness of [his or her] factual 
conclusions."  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., concurring).  Although a preponderance standard is generally 
applied in civil cases, see, e.g., Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 
22 
 
592, 597 (1995), the clear and convincing standard is applied 
when "particularly important individual interests or rights are 
at stake."  Craven v. State Ethics Comm'n, 390 Mass. 191, 200 
(1983), quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
389 (1983). 
 
Proof by clear and convincing evidence is "not without 
teeth."  Matter of G.P., 473 Mass. 112, 120 (2015).  It is a 
greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 
but less than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in 
criminal cases.  Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 471 
(2015).  The evidence must be sufficient to convey a "high 
degree of probability" that the contested proposition is true 
(quotation omitted).  Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
372 Mass. 582, 588 n.3 (1977).  Otherwise put, requiring proof 
by clear and convincing evidence reflects a judicial 
determination that "[t]he individual should not be asked to 
share equally with society the risk of error."  Addington, supra 
at 427. 
 
The United States Supreme Court and this court have applied 
the clear and convincing standard in a variety of civil 
contexts.19  Both New Jersey and New York, the only two States 
                     
 
19 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758, 769 
(1982) (termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 427, 433 (1979) (civil commitment); Woodby v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285-286 (1966) 
23 
 
that provide for adversarial risk classification hearings that 
appear to have considered the standard of proof that such 
classifications require,20 require that the appropriateness of 
                                                                  
(deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) 
(denaturalization); MacDonald v. Caruso, 467 Mass. 382, 389 
(2014) (termination of abuse prevention order); Birchall, 
petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 851-853 (2009) (civil contempt); 
Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 859 (1999) (parental 
unfitness); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 
849, 870 (1975) (libel against public official or public 
figure). 
 
 
20 The Federal sex offender registry law assigns risk 
classifications based on the underlying sex offense; it does not 
allow for individualized assessment of risk of reoffense or 
current dangerousness.  42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2012).  Thirty-five 
States and the District of Columbia either provide the same 
public notice about all convicted sex offenders registered 
within their jurisdictions, or classify an adult sex offender's 
risk of reoffense solely based on the sex offender's crime of 
conviction or original sentence.  See Ala. Code §§ 15-20a-19, 
15-20a-27 (2015); Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010, 12.63.020, 
12.63.100 (2015); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3821, 13-3825, 13-
3827 (2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-22-102, 16-22-103, 16-22-112 
(2015); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250, 54-254, 54-256, 54-258 
(Supp. VI 2015); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 4120-4121 (2014); 
D.C. Code §§ 22-4001, 22-4002 (2012); Fla. Stat. § 775.21(4)-(5) 
(Supp. V 2015); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E-10 (2015); 730 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 150/2, 150/3, 150/3-5 (Supp. VIII 2014)  (risk assessment 
for juveniles only); Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-4.5, 11-8-8-5, 11-8-8-8 
(2015) (risk assessment for juveniles only); Iowa Code 
§ 692A.102 (2015); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-4902, 22-4904 (2015); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17.520, 17.554 (2015); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 15:541, 15:542.1.1, 15:544 (2015); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 
34-A, §§ 11273, 11281-11285 (Supp. IV 2014); Md. Code Ann., 
Crim. Proc. §§ 11-701, 11-704, 11-707 (Supp. VII 2015); Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 28.722 (Supp. III 2015); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 45-33-
23, 45-33-47 (2015); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 589.400.1-589.400.2 
(2015); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-23-502, 46-23-509 (2015); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4003, 29-4005, 29-4007 (2015); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 179D.113, 179D.115, 179D.117 (2015); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 651-B:1 (Supp. VII 2014); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-11A-3, 29-11A-
5.1 (2015); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-208.6, 14-208.6A (2013); Ohio 
24 
 
                                                                  
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2950.01(E)-(G) (2014); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 9799.14 (2014); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-430, 23-3-460 (2014); 
S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-24B-2.1, 22-24B-19, 22-24B-19.1, 22-
24B-19.2 (2015); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-202, 40-39-204, 40-39-
212 (2015); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-41-102(17), 77-41-110 (2015); 
Va. Code Ann. §§ 9.1-902, 9.1-904, 9.1-911 (2015); W. Va. Code 
§§ 15-12-2, 15-12-2a, 15-12-5 (2015); Wis. Stat. § 301.45 (Supp. 
IV 2014); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-19-301 to 7-19-304 (2015). 
 
 
Nine States classify a sex offender's risk of reoffense on 
a more individualized basis after sentencing, but do not provide 
for adversarial risk classification hearings.  See Ark. Code 
Ann. §§ 12-12-913, 12-12-917, 12-12-922 (2015); Cal. Penal Code 
§§ 290.04, 290.06, 290.46 (Supp. I 2015); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-
14 (2015); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18-8303, 18-8314, 18-8316 (2015); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-15 (12) (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, 
§§ 582.1, 582.5 (2015); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-12 (2015); Tex. 
Crim. Proc. Code Ann. arts. 62.001, 62.007, 62.403 (Supp. VIII 
2014); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.24.550, 4.24.5501, 9A.44.128, 
72.09.345 (2015). 
 
 
The remaining three States other than New Jersey, New York, 
and Massachusetts provide for adversarial risk classification 
hearings, but we are not aware of court decisions in those 
States addressing whether due process requires a higher standard 
of proof than a preponderance.  See Minn. Stat. §§ 243.166, 
244.052 (2015); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 181.800, 181.801, 181.821 
(2015); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 5401, 5405a, 5411b (Supp. VI 
2015).  In Minnesota, a convicted sex "offender has a right to 
be present and be heard" at an administrative risk 
classification proceeding, but the standard of proof required 
for risk classifications is not explicit in the statute.  Minn. 
Stat. § 244.052(3)(d).  In Oregon, in order to be relieved of 
the obligation to register, a convicted sex offender must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is statistically 
unlikely to reoffend and does not pose a threat to public 
safety.  Or. Rev. Stat. § 181.821(4)(a) (2015).  The Oregon 
statute does not, however, lay out what standard of proof is 
required to reclassify a sex offender at a lower risk level 
while preserving his or her registration obligation.  See Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 181.821(4)(b).  In Vermont, a convicted sex 
offender is guaranteed notice and an opportunity to be heard 
regarding whether he or she poses a "high risk" of reoffense.  
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5411b.  That determination is 
currently made by a preponderance of the evidence.  Vt. Code R. 
§ 12-8-4:4 (2015). 
25 
 
offenders' risk classifications be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence.  See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1110-
1111 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109 (1998); Doe v. 
Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  We consider now 
whether risk classifications in Massachusetts similarly should 
be held to the higher standard. 
 
7.  Procedural due process.  To determine whether the 
preponderance standard continues to satisfy due process, "we 
balance the private interests affected, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation, the probable value of additional or substitute 
safeguards, and the governmental interests involved."  Doe No. 
972, 428 Mass. at 100, citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.  
Consideration of these factors in light of changed circumstances 
leads us to conclude that due process now requires application 
of the clear and convincing standard. 
 
a.  Private interests.  As described above, Doe's risk 
classification level now has dramatic consequences for his 
liberty and privacy interests that were not present when we 
decided Doe No. 972.  He faces increasingly stringent 
affirmative reporting requirements, as well as the possibility 
of extended incarceration for failing to meet those 
requirements.  He is also likely to confront stigma and legal 
restrictions that will make it harder for him to find stable 
housing or employment, and may even face threats of physical 
26 
 
harm.  The dissemination of his registry information on the 
Internet only exacerbates these difficulties. 
 
b.  Erroneous deprivation.  The extensive private interests 
now affected by classification counsel in favor of requiring a 
higher standard of proof.  Admittedly, neither the risk of 
erroneous deprivation under the current preponderance standard 
nor the probable value of imposing a higher standard is 
altogether clear.  Even if Massachusetts-specific sex offender 
recidivism research were available, it would be difficult to 
establish the actual risk of an erroneous deprivation of a 
registered sex offender's privacy or liberty.21  Nevertheless, we 
are concerned that the current procedural safeguards do not 
adequately protect against this risk.  Doe's opportunity to 
present evidence and to examine and cross-examine witnesses at 
his classification hearing, and the requirement that SORB make 
particularized, detailed findings concerning his classification 
                     
 
21 At oral argument, counsel for SORB stated that he had "no 
idea" what percentage of registered sex offenders in 
Massachusetts actually recidivate.  We recognize that SORB has 
discretion as to how it fulfils its statutory mandate to 
"promulgate guidelines for determining the level of risk of 
reoffense and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public" 
by convicted sex offenders.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  
Nonetheless, it is troubling that little emphasis has apparently 
been placed by SORB on assessing the accuracy of its 
classifications.  This is especially true given the enormity of 
the consequences of such classification decisions.  Contrast 
Massachusetts Parole Board, Massachusetts Parole Board Three-
Year Recidivism Analysis:  2009 (Dec. 2013); Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., Trends in Revocation Among Massachusetts Parolees 
(Oct. 2013). 
27 
 
were and continue to be important features of the process that 
offenders are due.  See Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 102.  The harm 
to the State from an erroneous underclassification, however, is 
no longer "nearly equal" to the possible harm to Doe from 
erroneous overclassification.22  See id. at 104 n.14. 
 
Other developments since our decision in Doe No. 972 also 
support raising the standard of proof.  The 1996 statute 
envisioned that SORB's guidelines would augment a set of 
statutory factors that the Legislature considered relevant to 
convicted sex offenders' risk of reoffense.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (1), inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.  Yet these 
guidelines have not been updated in over fourteen years.  See 
Doe No. 68549, 470 Mass. at 116.  Ideally, the factors would 
                     
 
22 Some statistical evidence also appears to support the 
view that applying a higher standard of proof is appropriate.  
As of March 9, 2015, SORB classified over three quarters of all 
sex offenders in Massachusetts as having a moderate or high risk 
of reoffense.  Yet studies have indicated that relatively few 
sex offenders reoffend.  See, e.g., Hanson, Harris, Helmus, & 
Thornton, High-Risk Offenders May Not Be High Risk Forever, 29 
J. Interpersonal Violence 2792, 2796 (2014) (finding 11.9 per 
cent over-all rate of sexual recidivism, although high-risk 
offenders reoffend more frequently than low-risk offenders).  
Other reports have shown that, contrary to popular belief, the 
rates of recidivism for sex offenders are actually lower than 
the rates of recidivism for those convicted of other crimes.  
See, e.g., Council of State Governments, Sex Offender Management 
Policy in the States, Strengthening Policy & Practice:  Final 
Report 2 (2010).  Of course, SORB may accurately determine that 
specific offenders pose a moderate or high risk of reoffense 
without those people ever actually reoffending.  Even so, the 
sharp contrast between SORB's classification practices and the 
studies' conclusions suggests that SORB may be overclassifying 
offenders. 
28 
 
always reflect current research.  Requiring that whatever 
factors are currently in place be proved with increased rigor, 
however, will ensure at least that they are applied more 
accurately on their own terms.23  Furthermore, little evidence 
appears to support our concern in Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 103, 
that a heightened standard might lead to erroneous 
underclassifications.24  Accordingly, Doe "should not be asked to 
share equally with society the risk of error."  Addington, supra 
at 427. 
 
c.  Governmental interests.  The State has a strong 
interest in "protect[ing] children and other vulnerable people 
                     
 
23 In Doe No. 972, supra at 102, we acknowledged the 
possibility that SORB might "apply general factors to the 
offenders that may not correctly predict their propensity to 
reoffend," but concluded that other procedural protections than 
a heightened standard of proof were sufficient to protect 
against that possibility.  The changes to the statutory 
landscape since our decision in Doe No. 972 persuade us that a 
heightened standard is additionally necessary. 
 
 
24 Recent studies of sex offender recidivism in New York and 
New Jersey, the two States that already apply the clear and 
convincing standard to their risk classification proceedings, 
have noted that sex offenders' rates of committing an additional 
sex offense are low overall.  See R. Tewksbury, W.G. Jennings, & 
K. Zgoba, Final Report on Sex Offenders:  Recidivism and 
Collateral Consequences 6, 10 (2011); Sandler, Freeman, & Socia, 
Does a Watched Pot Boil?  A Time-Series Analysis of New York 
State's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 
Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 284, 297 (2008).  Although SORB argues 
that a cross-State comparison blurs important distinctions in 
the manner and means by which each State's registry board 
reaches its classification decisions, these studies provide at 
least mild support for the proposition that requiring a higher 
standard of proof does not lead to erroneous 
underclassifications of the risk posed by registered offenders. 
29 
 
from recidivistic sex offenders."  Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 
103.  As the Legislature recognized when it amended the sex 
offender registry law in 1999, classification "provide[s] law 
enforcement with additional information critical to preventing 
sexual victimization."25  St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.  Yet the State 
also has an interest in avoiding overclassification, which both 
distracts the public's attention from those offenders who pose a 
real risk of reoffense, and strains law enforcement resources.  
And the State has no interest "in making erroneous 
classifications and implementing overbroad registration and 
notifications."  Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 107 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  Cf. E.B. v. Verniero, supra at 1107-1108; Doe v. 
Pataki, supra at 470.  Given these interests, a clear and 
convincing standard would better "enable police and the 
community to focus on those offenders who may pose an actual 
threat to young children and others that the statute seeks to 
protect."  Doe No. 972, 428 Mass. at 104 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 
d.  Balancing.  Balancing the Mathews factors, we conclude 
that sex offender risk classifications must be established by 
                     
 
25 Some studies, however, have questioned whether 
registration and notification requirements have had any effect 
on convicted sex offenders' rates of reoffense.  See, e.g., 
Agan, Sex Offender Registries:  Fear Without Function?, 54 
J. L. & Econ. 207, 208 (2011); Levenson & Cotter, supra at 52. 
30 
 
clear and convincing evidence in order to satisfy due process.26 
Applying the higher standard to Doe's risk classification will 
provide greater certainty that the burdens placed on him by that 
classification are warranted.  Replacing the current 
preponderance standard will better help to advance the goal of 
ensuring that the Commonwealth's "classification and 
notification system is both fair and accurate."27  E.B. v. 
                     
 
26 Because our decision is a new constitutional rule, the 
higher standard should be applied retroactively only to 
classification proceedings pending before SORB, the Superior 
Court, or the appellate courts on the date of the issuance of 
the rescript in this case.  See MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 
423 Mass. 652, 657 (1996). 
 
27 Although the consequences of Internet dissemination 
provide a convicted sex offender with a particularly strong 
interest in avoiding classification as a level two or level 
three offender, the clear and convincing standard should be 
applied to all sex offender risk classification levels, 
including level one.  A level one offender's information may not 
be disseminated publicly, but it still may be released to a 
variety of State agencies and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, as well as to a victim who has submitted a 
written victim impact statement as part of the offender's 
classification hearing.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 1.28(3) 
(2013).  Level one offenders also are subject to extensive 
parole conditions.  See Massachusetts Parole Board, Sex Offender 
Conditions (Nov. 2006).  Furthermore, as noted above, many of 
the additional burdens placed on registered offenders apply to 
all levels of offenders.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178D 
(requiring registration of secondary addresses and of names and 
addresses of institution of higher learning attended by 
offender); G. L. c. 6, § 178E (h) (requiring re-registration ten 
days prior to establishing new address); G. L. c. 6, §§ 178F, 
178F1/2, 178F3/4 (requiring homeless offenders to re-register 
every thirty days and to wear GPS device at all times); G. L. 
c. 6, § 178H (a) (1)-(2) (imposing penalties for failure to 
register); G. L. c. 265, § 48 (prohibiting ice cream truck 
vending).  See also Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. 
31 
 
Verniero, supra at 1107. 
 
A convicted sex offender's risk classification now has far 
greater consequences than were present when we decided Doe No. 
972 over seventeen years ago.  "Classification and registration 
entail possible harm to a sex offender's earning capacity, 
damage to his reputation, and, 'most important, . . . the 
statutory branding of him as a public danger.'"  Poe v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 801, 813 (2010), quoting Doe v. 
Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. at 144.  Internet dissemination of 
level two and level three sex offenders' registry information 
magnifies these consequences.  Although the State has a strong 
interest in protecting the public from recidivistic sex 
offenders, allowing SORB to make classification determinations 
with a lesser degree of confidence does not advance that 
interest.  In short, greater circumspection is needed before 
offenders' risk classifications are made final. 
 
8.  Internet dissemination.  Doe's argument that the 2013 
amendment to the sex offender registry law requiring the 
Internet publication of level two offenders' registry 
information, St. 2013, c. 38, §§ 7, 9, was not retroactive as 
                                                                  
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 793 (2008) 
(recognizing that rights affected by level one classification 
are "substantial").  Cf. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1110-
1111 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109 (1998) 
(applying clear and convincing standard to classification at 
every risk level); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same). 
32 
 
applied to him is without merit.  Although we determined in Moe 
that that amendment was not retroactive as applied to 
individuals finally classified as level two sex offenders on or 
before July 12, 2013, the effective date of the amendment, we 
stated explicitly that "[n]othing in this order affects the 
ability of SORB to publish on the Internet the registry 
information of any individual who was given a final 
classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013."  
Moe, supra at 616.  Doe's final classification as a level two 
offender did not occur until October 23, 2013, so Internet 
dissemination of his information is permissible. 
 
Nevertheless, because Doe's classification as a level two 
offender is vacated, we remand to the Superior Court for entry 
of an order to SORB to cease disseminating Doe's registry 
information on the Internet; unless and until he is finally 
classified under the clear and convincing standard at a risk 
level that requires such dissemination, to do otherwise would 
violate Doe's due process rights.  Compare Doe No. 7083, 472 
Mass. at 489-490 (vacating final risk classification that 
violated procedural due process, and treating as preliminary 
SORB's attempted classification). 
 
9.  Conclusion.  The decision of the Superior Court judge 
affirming SORB's classification of Doe as a level two sex 
offender is vacated and set aside.  We remand the matter to the 
33 
 
Superior Court for entry of an order requiring SORB to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing consistent with this decision, and to 
cease disseminating Doe's registry information on the Internet 
during the pendency of such proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.