Title: Tammie J. C. v. Robert T. R.
Citation: 2003 WI 61
Docket Number: 2001AP002787
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2003

2003 WI 61 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2787 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Thomas J.R., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Tammie J.C.,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Robert T.R.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  251 Wis. 2d 483, 640 N.W.2d 566 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Lafayette   
 
JUDGE: 
James Welker   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
Guardian ad litem briefs were filed by Daniel P. Bestul and 
Duxstad, Vale & Bestul, S.C., Monroe, with oral argument by 
Daniel P. Bestul.  Petitioner-respondent-petitioner joined the 
guardian ad litem briefs. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Duane M. Jorgenson, Darlington. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard J. Auerbach, 
Auerbach & Porter, and Gretchen Viney, Madison, on behalf of the 
Dane County Guardian ad Litem Project; and Carol M. Gapen, 
Theresa L. Rotter and Stafford, Rosenbaum, LLP, Madison, on 
behalf of American Academy of Adoption Attorneys. 
 
2003 WI 61 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2787  
(L.C. No. 
00 TP 1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Thomas J.R., a Person Under the Age  
of 18: 
 
Tammie J.C.,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert T.R.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Tammie J.C., 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
reversing an order that terminated the parental rights of the 
respondent, Robert T.R.1 The court of appeals determined that a 
                                                 
1 Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R., No. 01-2787, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. January 10, 2002) (reversing a judgment of 
the circuit court for Lafayette County, James E. Welker, Judge). 
No. 
01-2787   
 
2 
 
court could terminate a person's parental rights only if it had 
personal jurisdiction over the person, and that the court's 
exercise of jurisdiction over Robert in this case had no basis 
because Robert, a resident of Arizona, lacked minimum contacts 
with Wisconsin. 
¶2 
We 
recognize 
that 
personal 
jurisdiction 
through 
minimum contacts is generally necessary for a judgment to bind 
any out-of-state person.  We conclude, however, that the status 
exception to the general personal jurisdiction requirements, as 
employed in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 
provides a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in a child 
custody case.  Such an exercise of jurisdiction is consistent 
with notions of fair play and substantial justice.  We also 
conclude 
that Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11), 
which 
references 
the 
UCCJA, provides sufficient due process protection to out-of-
state parents based on notice and an opportunity to be heard.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the case 
for a determination on the remaining issues previously raised in 
that court, but not briefed or argued here. 
I 
¶3 
Tammie and Robert were married in Wyoming in 1987.2  
Thomas J.R. was born in Wyoming in 1988, during the marriage.  
Tammie's daughter from a previous marriage (Robert's step-
daughter) lived with the family throughout their marriage.  The 
                                                 
2 The couple had been married previously, but divorced in 
1985. 
No. 
01-2787   
 
3 
 
family moved to Arizona in 1991.  In 1992, after Robert was 
accused of sexually assaulting Tammie's daughter, Tammie moved 
back to Wyoming with her daughter and Thomas, leaving Robert in 
Arizona.  Robert accepted a plea bargain related to the sexual 
assault charges, and he was sentenced to a ten-year prison term 
in Arizona. 
¶4 
Subsequently, Robert filed for divorce.  The Arizona 
court awarded sole custody of Thomas J.R. to Tammie and denied 
Robert all visitation rights.  It found such visitation would 
seriously endanger Thomas' physical, mental, and emotional 
health. 
¶5 
Tammie moved to Nebraska with Thomas and her daughter 
in 1993, and then in 1996, they moved to Wisconsin.  Tammie did 
not disclose either move to Robert, but he was aware of Tammie's 
general location while she was living in Nebraska. 
¶6 
Robert did not contact Thomas during his time in 
prison because Thomas lived with Robert's step-daughter, the 
victim of the sexual assault.  Arizona law prohibited anyone 
convicted of sexual assault from contacting any person at the 
address belonging to the sexual assault victim.  Robert began to 
send mail to Thomas after this rule was changed in 1998, but the 
Arizona Department of Corrections curtailed his mailings after 
Tammie complained about the correspondence. 
¶7 
Tammie remarried her daughter's biological father in 
Wisconsin, and on January 13, 2000, she filed a petition in 
Lafayette County Circuit Court to terminate Robert's parental 
rights.  At the same time, Tammie's husband petitioned the court 
No. 
01-2787   
 
4 
 
to adopt Thomas following termination of Robert's parental 
rights. 
¶8 
The circuit court issued a summons notifying Robert of 
the pending termination action and ordering him to appear on 
February 2, 2000.  The court continued the matter to February 
28, because of difficulties serving Robert, who was in prison in 
Arizona.  Robert was served on February 14, 2000.  On March 8, 
Robert moved, through his Wisconsin counsel, for an order 
requiring Tammie to pay his expenses in appearing personally at 
the termination trial, or alternatively, for a delay in the 
proceedings until he was released from prison.  The court found 
good cause to delay the trial, and noting that Robert was to be 
released from prison on August 28, 2000, it set the matter for a 
jury trial on September 19, 20, and 21, 2000. 
¶9 
Robert moved to dismiss, asserting that Wisconsin 
lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and that he had not 
received required statutory notice that the child custody decree 
in Arizona could lead to termination of parental rights in 
Wisconsin.  Robert claimed that the petition for termination did 
not afford him due process.  The circuit court denied the 
motion.  Robert moved for reconsideration after the case was 
transferred to a different judge, but the successor judge denied 
the motion. 
¶10 Before issuing a final ruling in the termination of 
parental rights proceeding, the circuit court afforded the 
parties an opportunity to seek resolution of the jurisdictional 
question in the Arizona courts.  Tammie filed a motion 
No. 
01-2787   
 
5 
 
requesting that the Arizona court decline jurisdiction.  Robert 
filed a separate motion to modify visitation, asking the Arizona 
court to grant him "reasonable periods of visitation with his 
son."  Pointing to A.R.S. § 8-532, an Arizona statute requiring 
that a child at issue in a termination proceeding be present in 
the state, the Pima County Juvenile Court granted Tammie's 
motion, declining to exercise jurisdiction over an action to 
terminate Robert's parental rights.3   
¶11 The circuit court in Wisconsin then determined that 
termination would be in the best interest of the child in this 
case and terminated Robert's parental rights on the ground of 
"continuing 
denial 
of 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
and 
visitation," under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) (1999-2000).4 
¶12 Robert appealed the order, again asserting that the 
circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over him to terminate 
his parental rights and that he had not received the proper 
notice that the Arizona child custody decree could lead to 
termination in Wisconsin.  The court of appeals determined that 
a parent must be provided with fundamentally fair procedures, 
including 
an 
adequate 
basis 
for 
exercising 
personal 
jurisdiction, in any action to terminate parental rights.  
Because it concluded that Wisconsin did not have personal 
                                                 
3 The record does not indicate what action the Arizona court 
took on Robert's motion to modify visitation. 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
01-2787   
 
6 
 
jurisdiction over Robert, the court reversed the termination 
order.     
II 
¶13 This case presents us with an issue involving the 
interpretation and application of the jurisdictional provisions 
of the UCCJA and Wisconsin's jurisdiction statutes, in the 
context of an action to terminate the parental rights of a 
person who is not a Wisconsin resident and does not have minimum 
contacts with the state.  A circuit court's determinations of 
whether 
statutory 
and 
constitutional 
bases 
exist 
for 
jurisdiction over a non-resident in a termination of parental 
rights 
proceeding 
present 
questions 
of 
law, 
subject 
to 
independent appellate review.  In the Interest of A.E.H., 161 
Wis. 2d 277, 299, 468 N.W.2d 190 (1991); State ex rel. N.R.Z. v. 
G.L.C., 152 Wis. 2d 97, 103, 447 N.W.2d 533, 535 (1989). 
¶14 In addressing whether the court in this case had 
jurisdiction to terminate Robert's parental rights, we first 
discuss the general requirement of minimum contacts to establish 
personal jurisdiction, and the exception to the requirement for 
cases involving determinations of status under the UCCJA.  We 
then consider Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11) which provides that child 
custody determinations are binding on persons who receive notice 
under § 822.05 and are afforded an opportunity to be heard.  
Finally, we address the requirement that an exercise of 
jurisdiction satisfies the due process standard of fair play and 
substantial justice, and assess the exercise of jurisdiction. 
III 
No. 
01-2787   
 
7 
 
A 
¶15 The court of appeals in this case determined that the 
termination of parental rights order issued by the circuit court 
was not binding on Robert because the circuit court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over him.  In essence, that determination 
left Thomas J.R. in a jurisdictional limbo.  Because the Arizona 
court concluded that it could not exercise jurisdiction, the 
court of appeals' determination left Thomas without any forum to 
address the termination of parental rights and accompanying 
adoption actions.   
¶16 We recognize that a court generally must have some 
type of territorial jurisdiction over a person for a judgment 
rendered by a court to bind the person.  Mayer v. Mayer, 91 
Wis. 2d 342, 283 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1979).  Territorial 
jurisdiction is typically either in personam or in rem.  
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877).  Historically, in 
personam judgments were binding on a person only if the person 
was physically present in the state issuing the judgment.  
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
(citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733). 
¶17 In Pennoyer, the Court determined that: "the tribunals 
of one State have no jurisdiction over persons beyond its 
limits, and can inquire only into their obligations to its 
citizens when exercising its conceded jurisdiction over their 
property within its limits."  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 731.  The 
Court also determined in Pennoyer that a judgment of a court 
lacking personal jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of 
No. 
01-2787   
 
8 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  "The Pennoyer rules generally favored 
nonresident defendants by making them harder to sue."  Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 200 (1977).   
¶18 More recent Supreme Court opinions have dramatically 
limited 
the 
requirements 
for 
personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
In 
International Shoe, the Court held that physical presence in a 
state is not necessary for personal jurisdiction over a 
corporation to satisfy due process when the out-of-state 
defendant has minimum contacts with the state that is exercising 
jurisdiction:  
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that 
the 
maintenance 
of 
the 
suit 
does 
not 
offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.' 
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (additional citations omitted). 
¶19 Wisconsin has codified the "minimum contacts" doctrine 
in its statute governing personal jurisdiction, Wis. Stat. 
801.05, which states in part: 
801.05 Personal jurisdiction, grounds for generally.  
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served 
in an action pursuant to s. 801.11 under any of the 
following circumstances: 
(1) Local presence or status.  In any action whether 
arising within or without this state, against a 
defendant who when the action is commenced: 
(a) Is a natural person present within this state when 
served; or 
No. 
01-2787   
 
9 
 
(b) Is a natural person domiciled within this state; 
or 
(c) Is a domestic corporation or limited liability 
company; or 
(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated 
activities within this state, whether such activities 
are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise. 
¶20 There is no dispute that in this case, Robert was not 
served while in Wisconsin, does not live in Wisconsin, and is 
not engaged in substantial activities in Wisconsin.  In fact, he 
has never been to Wisconsin.  The only tie Robert has to 
Wisconsin is that his son and ex-wife live here.  Robert did not 
have minimum contacts with Wisconsin, and Wisconsin did not have 
personal jurisdiction over him under Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1). 
 B 
¶21 While we have determined that Wisconsin does not have 
personal jurisdiction over Robert by virtue of minimum contacts, 
our determination does not necessarily mean that Wisconsin does 
not have jurisdiction to enter an order terminating Robert's 
parental rights.  The answer lies in an exception to the 
requirement of minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction, 
applicable to determinations of status. 
¶22 A "status" exception to the general requirement of 
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction has long been 
recognized by the Supreme Court: 
To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed 
in this opinion, it is proper to observe that we do 
not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that a 
State may not authorize proceedings to determine the 
status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, 
which would be binding within the State . . . . 
No. 
01-2787   
 
10 
 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734 (emphasis in original).  The Pennoyer 
Court excluded certain types of actions, such as marriages and 
divorces, from the minimum contacts requirement, explaining that 
each state has jurisdiction to "determine the civil status and 
capacities of all its inhabitants," even if an involved non-
resident cannot be served within the state.  Id. at 734-35. 
¶23 In 1977, in Shaffer, the Supreme Court reasserted the 
validity of the status exception it had recognized in Pennoyer.  
The Court stated that a minimum contacts analysis under 
International 
Shoe 
is generally required when determining 
personal jurisdiction.  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208.  In a 
footnote, 
however, 
the 
Shaffer 
court 
emphasized 
that 
an 
exception 
exists 
for 
"particularized 
jurisdictional 
rules 
governing adjudications of status": "We do not suggest that 
jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, 
such 
as 
the 
particularized 
jurisdictional 
rules 
governing 
adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard of 
fairness."  Id. at 208 n.30 (citations omitted). 
¶24 The Supreme Court has long required that for an 
exercise of personal jurisdiction not to offend the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must comply with 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."   
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. 
at 463); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.  In Burnham v. Superior 
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), the Court stated that any method of 
assuming jurisdiction over a person must satisfy the same due 
process standard required for personal jurisdiction based on 
No. 
01-2787   
 
11 
 
minimum contacts: "For new procedures, hitherto unknown, the Due 
Process 
Clause 
requires 
analysis 
to 
determine 
whether 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' have 
been offended."  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622 (quoting International 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
 
¶25 The 
status 
exception 
to 
the 
minimum 
contacts 
requirement has commonly been applied in the context of divorce 
actions.  For instance, the Supreme Court has held that states 
can enter divorce decrees binding on a non-resident spouse so 
long as the other spouse lives in the state.  See e.g., Estin v. 
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).  The Court reasoned in Williams that 
divorce decrees  
are more than in personam judgments.  They involve the 
marital status of the parties.  Domicile creates a 
relationship to the state which is adequate for 
numerous exercises of state power. . . . The marriage 
relation creates problems of large social importance.  
Protection of offspring, property interests, and the 
enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few 
of commanding problems in the field of domestic 
relations with which the state must deal.  
Williams, 317 U.S. at 298.  The Court concluded that "each state 
by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large 
interest in the institution of marriage can alter within its own 
borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even 
No. 
01-2787   
 
12 
 
though the other spouse is absent."   Id. at 298-99 (citations 
omitted).5 
¶26 Jurisdiction for the termination of parental rights 
action in this case was determined under the UCCJA.6 It governs 
child custody proceedings that determine the status of children, 
and bases the exercise of jurisdiction on the status exception 
to personal jurisdiction.  "Termination of parental rights" 
actions are not specifically included in the UCCJA's definition 
of "child custody proceedings," which are "proceedings in which 
a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an 
action for divorce or separation, and includes child neglect and 
dependency proceedings."  Wis. Stat. § 822.02(3).  This court 
has explicitly concluded, however, that termination of parental 
                                                 
5 The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that subjects 
such as alimony and child support are not covered by the status 
exception, and awards or changes in awards made in divorce 
decrees are not binding on a non-resident spouse.  Kulko v. 
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1978). 
6 The UCCJA, or the closely-related Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), has been adopted in each 
of the 50 states.  David S. v. Laura S., 179 Wis. 2d 114, 138, 
507 N.W.2d 94 (1993).  Wisconsin adopted the UCCJA in 1975, 
effective May 28, 1976, as chapter 822 of the statutes.  See ch. 
283, Laws of 1975. 
No. 
01-2787   
 
13 
 
rights actions are child custody proceedings under the UCCJA. 
A.E.H., 161 Wis. 2d at 298-99.7 
¶27 A comment to section 12 of the UCCJA, Binding Force 
and Res Judicata Effect of Custody Decree, adopted in Wisconsin 
as Wis. Stat. § 822.12, explains that the drafters of the UCCJA 
intended that jurisdiction under the UCCJA need not be based on 
technical personal jurisdiction, but rather on the theory that 
child custody proceedings are "proceedings in rem or proceedings 
affecting status."  The drafters noted that there must be strict 
compliance with the due process mandates of notice and the 
opportunity to be heard: 
This section deals with the intra-state validity of 
custody decrees which provides the basis for their 
interstate recognition and enforcement.  The two 
prerequisites are (1) jurisdiction under section 3 of 
this Act and (2) strict compliance with due process 
mandates of notice and opportunity to be heard.  There 
is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction, 
on the traditional theory that custody determinations, 
as 
distinguished 
from 
support 
actions . . . are 
proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status. 
See Commissioners' comment on § 12 of the UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 557. 
                                                 
7 Our conclusion in A.E.H. is supported by the legislative 
history of chapter 822.  After the introduction of A.B. 1246, 
the bill relating to chapter 822, the Legislative Reference 
Bureau received a drafting request to amend the definition of 
"custody proceeding" to except termination of parental rights 
actions, by inserting the phrase "but excludes proceedings to 
terminate parental rights under ss. 48.40 to 48.43."  See 
Legislative Reference Bureau drafting file for ch. 283, Laws of 
1975.  The drafting request was not incorporated into the final 
draft of the bill that later was enacted as chapter 822. 
       
No. 
01-2787   
 
14 
 
¶28 The purpose behind the UCCJA is explained in a 
prefatory note to the UCCJA stating why a uniform law regulating 
child custody jurisdiction was necessary when the UCCJA was 
drafted in 1968: 
There is growing public concern over the fact 
that thousands of children are shifted from state to 
state and from one family to another every year while 
their parents or other persons battle over their 
custody in the courts of several states. . . .  
 . . . . 
There 
is 
no 
certainty 
as 
to 
which 
state 
has 
jurisdiction when persons seeking custody of a child 
approach the courts of several states simultaneously 
or successively. . . . 
UCCJA Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 262-63 (1999). 
¶29 The UCCJA was enacted to address these concerns.  
Among the objectives of the UCCJA is to: "avoid jurisdictional 
competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters 
of child custody," and to "assure that litigation concerning the 
custody of a child takes place ordinarily in the state with 
which the child and family have the closest connection."  
Wis. Stat. § 822.01(1)(a) and (c).8  Moreover, "jurisdiction 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 822.01(1) provides that: 
  
(1) The general purposes of this chapter are to: 
(a) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with 
courts of other states in matters of child custody 
which have in the past resulted in the shifting of 
children from state to state with harmful effects on 
their well-being; 
(b) Promote cooperation with the courts of other 
states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in 
No. 
01-2787   
 
15 
 
exists only if it is in the child's interest, not merely the 
interest or convenience of the feuding parties, to determine 
custody in a particular state."  See Commissioners' comment on 
§ 3 of the UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 309 (emphasis in original). 
¶30 The 
UCCJA 
has 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
numerous 
constitutional challenges, on the grounds that it does not 
require minimum contacts.  Most courts that have considered the 
                                                                                                                                                             
that state which can best decide the case in the 
interest of the child; 
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a 
child takes place ordinarily in the state with which 
the child and family have the closest connection and 
where significant evidence concerning the child's 
care, protection, training, and personal relationships 
is most readily available, and that courts of this 
state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the 
child and family have a closer connection with another 
state; 
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over child 
custody in the interest of greater stability of home 
environment and of secure family relationships for the 
child; 
(e) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of 
children undertaken to obtain custody awards; 
(f) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other 
states in this state insofar as feasible; 
(g) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of 
other states; 
(h) Promote and expand the exchange of information and 
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of 
this state and those of other states concerned with 
the same child; and 
(i) Make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it. 
No. 
01-2787   
 
16 
 
validity of jurisdiction under the UCCJA have determined that 
the status exception applies to child custody cases under the 
UCCJA, and that personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts 
is not required.  See e.g., In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. 
App. 3d 443, 450-60 (Cal. App. 1981); People ex rel. State of 
Wyoming ex rel. Watson v. Stout, 969 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. App. 
1998); Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561, 563 & n.1 (Fla. 
App. 1993) (listing states which had made such determinations); 
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. App. 1999); Bartsch v. 
Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001). 
¶31 A few courts have differed, concluding that minimum 
contacts over an out-of-state parent are required in child 
custody proceedings.  In some of these cases, however, the 
circumstances or the statutes differed from those at issue in 
this case.  See e.g., In re Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984); In 
the Interest of John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1299 (Haw. 1996) 
(concluding that jurisdiction under the UCCJA without minimum 
contacts was improper where "neither parent ever was or intended 
to be a resident of the state"); In re Vernon R.V., 991 P.2d 
986, 987 (N.M. App. 1999) (concluding that minimum contacts were 
required in a "straight termination" proceeding that did also 
not involve adoption); Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 
1121, 1127-28 (Ohio 1980) (concluding that Illinois, which had 
not adopted the portion of the UCCJA relating to jurisdiction 
over 
an 
out-of-state 
parent, 
did 
not 
validly 
exercise 
jurisdiction absent minimum contacts).   
No. 
01-2787   
 
17 
 
¶32 Yet, 
recently, 
most 
courts 
that 
have 
dealt 
specifically with the termination of parental rights have 
determined that the status exception applies.  See e.g., S.B. v. 
State of Alaska, 61 P.3d 6, 15-16 & n. 38 (Alaska 2002) (listing 
states which have made such determinations); D.A. v. State of 
Utah, 63 P.2d 607 (Utah 2002).  The dissent's analysis focuses 
instead on a pre-Schaffer case, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 
(1953).  It cites this case as support for the conclusion that 
"minimum contacts" are required in this termination of parental 
rights case.  Dissent, ¶93.   
¶33 Although the dissent implies that May clearly supports 
its argument, no other jurisdiction has found May to be 
dispositive when addressing the status exception as it applies 
to termination of parental rights cases.  In fact, jurisdictions 
that have addressed May's effect on termination of parental 
rights proceedings have uniformly rejected its applicability.  
D.A., 63 P.3d 607, ¶27. 
¶34 The 
Court 
in 
May 
addressed 
an 
Ohio 
proceeding 
regarding children located in Ohio.  The issue was not whether 
the Ohio court had jurisdiction.  Rather, the issue was whether 
the Ohio court was required to recognize a custody decree that 
was obtained by the children's father from a Wisconsin court 
while the children were in Ohio.  May, 345 U.S. at 528-529. 
¶35 Justice Frankfurter, who provided the fifth of five 
votes in favor of not requiring Ohio to recognize the Wisconsin 
custody decree, wrote a concurrence in which he limited the 
court's holding to the specific circumstances before the court: 
No. 
01-2787   
 
18 
 
What is decided — the only thing the Court decides — 
is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not 
require Ohio, in disposing of the custody of children 
in Ohio, to accept, in the circumstances before us, 
the disposition made by Wisconsin.  
Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Accordingly, the 
dissent seems to stretch May beyond its holding.9 
¶36 A review of commentary regarding the constitutionality 
of relying on the status exception for jurisdiction under the 
UCCJA reaches varying conclusions.  See Rhonda Wasserman, 
Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 813, 816 n.15 (listing commentary on each side of the 
issue).  Some commentators have determined that the UCCJA's 
reliance on the status exception passes constitutional muster.  
See e.g., Anthony Dorland, Civil Procedure-Orders for Child 
Protection and Nonresident Defendants: The UCCJA Applies and 
Minimum Contacts are Unnecessary, 25 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 965 
(1999); 
Brigitte 
M. 
Bedenheimer 
& 
Janet 
Neeley-Kvarme, 
Jurisdiction over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and 
Kulko, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 229, 240-41 (1979).  Others have 
concluded that minimum contacts-based personal jurisdiction is 
necessary notwithstanding the UCCJA.  See e.g., Wasserman, supra 
                                                 
9  
The dissent lists Vernon R. v. Elizabeth V., 991 P.2d 
986 (N.M. 1999), and In the Interest of John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290 
(Haw. 
1996), 
as 
requiring 
"minimum 
contacts" 
for 
the 
establishment 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
non-resident 
defendants in termination of parental rights cases.  Dissent, 
¶92.  Neither of these two cases cites May as support.  In 
addition, neither of the cases is inconsistent with our 
analysis.  These cases do not stand for the proposition that 
"minimum contacts" are required in termination of parental 
rights cases such as the one before us today. 
No. 
01-2787   
 
19 
 
at 818 (concluding that "the status exception should not be used 
to sanction divorce or child custody proceedings in states that 
lack in personam jurisdiction over all interested parties"). 
¶37 We agree with the majority of the courts and many of 
the 
commentators 
that 
have 
considered 
the 
validity 
of 
jurisdiction 
under 
the 
UCCJA, 
that 
traditional 
personal 
jurisdiction is not required in child custody proceedings.  We 
find persuasive the cases and commentary concluding that child 
custody proceedings under the UCCJA are valid even in the 
absence of minimum contacts over an out-of-state parent.  A 
contrary determination fails to acknowledge the interests and 
rights of the child.  We also note that while child custody 
proceedings determine the "status" of children, they also 
implicate "the right and obligation of the state in its parens 
patriae role to consider the welfare of the child subject to its 
jurisdiction and to make a determination that is in the best 
interests of the child."  Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 454.     
¶38 A conclusion that minimum contacts are necessary for 
child custody determinations ignores the realities of child 
custody proceedings and leaves children in the position of 
Thomas J.R. with no practical forum to have their status 
adjudicated. 
 
A 
requirement 
of 
minimum 
contacts 
would 
necessitate that a child travel to the state in which his or her 
parent resides.  Under the UCCJA, the child would have to reside 
in the parent's state for six months for that state to have 
jurisdiction.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 822.02(5), 822.03(1)(a).  In 
the case of an abandoned child whose parents live in different 
No. 
01-2787   
 
20 
 
states, the child might be required to travel to both states to 
have his or her rights determined.  Custody determinations 
involving parents living in foreign nations would pose further 
complications. 
¶39 Children in the position of Thomas J.R. need a forum 
in which their status can be determined.  Requiring minimum 
contacts would often make termination of parental rights and the 
subsequent adoption proceedings impractical or impossible.  Such 
a child would essentially be left in "limbo," unable to have a 
court adjudicate his or her status.   
¶40 For these reasons we join the many states that have 
concluded that the status exception to the general personal 
jurisdiction requirements, as employed in the UCCJA, provides a 
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in a child custody case.  
Such an exercise of jurisdiction, for reasons more fully set 
forth below, is consistent with notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. 
C 
¶41 Subsection (11) of Wis. Stat. § 801.05 relies on the 
status exception to provide a basis for jurisdiction in the 
context of child custody proceedings under the UCCJA, by 
conditioning jurisdiction not on minimum contacts over the out-
of-state parent, but on the parent receiving notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.  It states in part: 
The effect of any determination of a child's 
custody shall not be binding personally against any 
parent or guardian unless the parent or guardian has 
been made personally subject to the jurisdiction of 
No. 
01-2787   
 
21 
 
the court in the action as provided under this chapter 
or has been notified under s. 822.05 as provided in s. 
822.12. 
Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11) (emphasis added). 
¶42 We think that the language of Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11) 
is clear——it provides that a child custody decree issued by a 
Wisconsin court is binding on a person outside of Wisconsin 
provided that (1) the court has personal jurisdiction over the 
person, or (2) the person received proper notice of the court's 
exercise of jurisdiction, and was afforded an opportunity to be 
heard.  Our reading of the statute is consistent with the 
legislative 
history 
of 
§ 801.05(11), 
and 
with 
Wisconsin 
precedent. 
¶43 The text of Wis. Stat. § 822.12 specifically provides 
that a child custody decree is binding on out-of-state persons 
who received sufficient notice of the child custody action and 
who were afforded the opportunity to be heard: 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this 
state which had jurisdiction under s. 822.03 binds all 
parties who have been served in this state or notified 
in accordance with s. 822.05 or who have submitted to 
the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given 
an opportunity to be heard. . . .    
Wis. Stat. § 822.12. 
¶44 The legislative history of § 801.05(11) indicates that 
the portion of the statute that allows jurisdiction based on 
notice and opportunity to be heard was enacted in response to 
the adoption of the UCCJA in Wisconsin.  Before the enactment of 
the UCCJA in Wisconsin, actions for child custody were governed 
by Wis. Stat. § 247.05(4), which stated in part that: 
No. 
01-2787   
 
22 
 
[A]n independent action for custody may be commenced 
in any county of this state in which the child is 
present.  The effect of any determination of a child's 
custody shall not be binding personally against a 
defendant parent or guardian unless the defendant has 
been made personally subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court in the action as provided in s. 247.06 
Wis. Stat. § 247.05(4) (1973). 
¶45 Section 247.06 allowed personal jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant only if the defendant "comes under the 
court's jurisdiction under s. 247.057."  Wis. Stat. § 247.06 
(1973).  Section 247.057, however, did not apply to independent 
child custody actions.  The effect of these statutes, therefore, 
was that if the parent could not be served in Wisconsin, then 
the Wisconsin courts did not have jurisdiction over out-of-state 
parents for the purposes of independent child custody actions.  
In 1977, in the first legislative session after Wisconsin 
adopted the UCCJA, the legislature amended subsection 11 of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11), previously numbered § 262.05(11), to 
its current form.10  In so doing, it allowed jurisdiction based 
on notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
¶46 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has recognized this 
alternative method of assuming jurisdiction over child custody 
matters.  In Davidson v. Davidson, the court did not refer to 
Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11), but left no doubt that it determined 
that 
personal 
jurisdiction 
by 
minimum 
contacts 
was 
not 
necessarily required in a child custody action under the UCCJA.  
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 262.05(11) was renumbered by ch. 157, 
Laws of 1973.   
No. 
01-2787   
 
23 
 
The court stated: "In a 'custody' proceeding under ch. 822, 
Stats., jurisdiction over a parent outside the state is acquired 
by notice given as prescribed in sec. 822.05, Stats."  Davidson 
v. Davidson, 169 Wis. 2d 546, 556, 485 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
D 
 
¶47 Having determined 
that the 
status 
exception and 
Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11) provide a basis for jurisdiction over a 
person absent minimum contacts,11 we must examine the statute's 
requirement of notice of the exercise of jurisdiction, and an 
opportunity to be heard, and assess them in the context of this 
case. 
¶48 Wisconsin Stat. § 822.12 requires that notice of an 
exercise of jurisdiction be given to out-of-state parties 
pursuant to § 822.05, which governs the mechanics of giving of 
notice.  Section 822.05 is entitled  "Notice to persons outside 
this state; submission to jurisdiction," and lists the different 
methods for serving notice of a child custody action on an out-
of-state person.12 
                                                 
11 Because we have determined that Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11) 
provided a basis for jurisdiction over a person who received 
proper notice of the court's exercise of jurisdiction and was 
afforded an opportunity to be heard, we need not address an 
alternative argument advanced by the guardian ad litem that 
§ 801.05(2) provides a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in 
this case.   
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 822.05(1) provides: 
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a person outside this state shall be given in a 
No. 
01-2787   
 
24 
 
¶49 In this case, there is no dispute regarding compliance 
with the notice requirements of § 822.05.  In fact, Robert 
received actual notice of the proceedings, and successfully 
requested that the court delay action on the petition to 
terminate until he was released from prison. 
 
¶50 There also is no dispute that Robert was given an 
opportunity to be heard, as required by § 822.12.  Section 
822.12 explains that if in addition to notice under § 822.05, a 
party is afforded an opportunity to be heard, "a custody decree 
rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction under 
s. 822.03" is binding on the party.   
Robert was afforded an 
opportunity to be heard under § 822.05, and participated by 
telephone in the trial and another hearing. 
¶51 We conclude that in this case Robert received notice 
and 
an 
opportunity 
to 
be 
heard 
as 
required 
by 
                                                                                                                                                             
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, 
and may be: 
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the 
manner prescribed for service of process within this 
state; 
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place 
in which the service is made for service of process in 
that place in an action in any of its courts of 
general jurisdiction; 
(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be 
served and requesting a receipt; or 
(d) As directed by the court, including publication, 
if other means of notification are ineffective. 
 
No. 
01-2787   
 
25 
 
Wis. Stat. § 822.12.  Statutory compliance alone, however, does 
not render an exercise of jurisdiction constitutional.  By 
requiring an opportunity to be heard, in addition to the notice 
requirement 
under 
§ 822.05, 
section 
822.12 
codifies 
a 
recognition that child custody determinations, especially those 
involving parents or guardians in different states, involve 
important rights and require additional procedural protections.  
Safeguards must be in place to protect against potential abuses. 
¶52 As noted above, the Due Process Clause requires that 
any exercise of jurisdiction comport with "'traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.'"  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 
622 (quoting 
International 
Shoe, 
326 
U.S. 
at 
316).  A 
determination of the validity of an exercise of jurisdiction 
based on minimum contacts or some other jurisdictional rule 
requires an evaluation of the reasonableness of the exercise of 
jurisdiction.  Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 113 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).  Reasonableness depends on several 
factors, including: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the 
interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in 
obtaining relief; (4) the interest of the interstate judicial 
system 
in 
obtaining 
the 
most 
efficient 
resolution 
of 
controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states 
in furthering fundamental social policies.  Id.  To determine 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction in this case satisfied due 
process, we will examine these factors, first in terms of the 
UCCJA generally, and then in terms of this case. 
No. 
01-2787   
 
26 
 
¶53 The first of the five Asahi factors is the burden on 
the defendant.  Being inconvenienced by an action in another 
state does not necessarily mean that the party's due process 
rights are violated.  See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 
220 (1957).  Moreover, the UCCJA contains provisions that help 
alleviate any burden on an out-of-state resident.  Section 
822.11(3) provides that a court may require another party to pay 
the travel and other necessary expenses of an out-of-state party 
that wishes to appear personally before the court if the court 
determines it is proper and just under the circumstances.  
Section 822.07 also allows an out-of-state party to move the 
court to dismiss the action on the grounds of inconvenient 
forum.  Finally, under Wis. Stat. § 822.18, any party "may 
adduce testimony of witnesses, including parties and the child, 
by deposition or otherwise, in another state." 
¶54 The second factor under Asahi is the interest of the 
forum state.  There is little question that Wisconsin has an 
interest under its parens patriae power to protect the best 
interests of children residing in the state.  See State v. B.S., 
162 Wis. 2d 378, 391, 469 N.W.2d 860 (Ct. App. 1991).  "As 
parens patriae, the State's goal is to provide the child with a 
permanent home."  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).  
The 
UCCJA 
section 
on 
jurisdiction, 
Wis. Stat. § 822.03(1), 
evidences the importance to a state of protecting children who 
live in the state.  It explains that factors for consideration 
in determining which state should have jurisdiction over a child 
custody matter include the home state of the child, presence of 
No. 
01-2787   
 
27 
 
the child in the state, and the best interests of the child.  
Wis. Stat. § 822.03(1). 
¶55 The third factor under Asahi is the plaintiff's 
interest in obtaining relief.  In cases governed by the UCCJA, 
the plaintiff is typically either the child in question, or a 
parent or guardian on behalf of the child.  Such a plaintiff has 
a very strong interest in obtaining relief in the form of a 
custody decree or a termination of parental rights.  The UCCJA 
is not a statute under which custody is determined or parental 
rights are terminated.  It is simply the means under which, when 
an order determining custody or terminating parental rights is 
appropriate, the court may exercise jurisdiction so that it may 
issue such an order. 
¶56 The fourth factor under Asahi is the interest of the 
interstate judicial system in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies.  Wisconsin Stat. § 822.01(1) makes 
clear that efficient resolution of controversies is a primary 
objective of the UCCJA.  One purpose of the UCCJA is to "avoid 
jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other 
states." Wis. Stat. § 822.01(1)(a).  Another is to "promote 
cooperation 
with 
the 
courts 
of 
other 
states."  
Wis. Stat. § 822.01(1)(b).  Still another is to "assure that 
litigation concerning the custody of a child takes place 
ordinarily in the state with which the child and family have the 
closest connection and where significant evidence concerning the 
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships 
is most readily available."  Wis. Stat. § 822.01(1)(c). 
No. 
01-2787   
 
28 
 
¶57 The final factor under Asahi is the shared interest of 
the several states in furthering fundamental social policies.  
The adoption of the UCCJA or the UCCJEA in each state 
demonstrates the shared interests states have in resolving child 
custody matters.  The prefatory note to the UCCJA further 
explains this interest:  
Underlying the entire Act is the idea that to 
avoid the jurisdictional conflicts and confusions 
which have done serious harm to innumerable children, 
a court in one state must assume major responsibility 
to determine who is to have custody of a particular 
child; that this court must reach out for the help of 
courts in other states in order to arrive at a fully 
informed judgment which transcends state lines and 
considers all claimants, residents and nonresidents, 
on an equal basis and from the standpoint of the 
welfare of the child.  If this can be achieved, it 
will 
be 
less 
important 
which 
court 
exercises 
jurisdiction but that courts of the several states 
involved act in partnership to bring about the best 
possible solution for a child's future.       
UCCJA Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 264-65 (1999) (emphasis in 
original).   
¶58 We conclude after considering all of the factors that 
the UCCJA generally provides sufficient due process protections 
to make reasonable an exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-
state parent.  Our conclusion does not end our analysis.  We 
must also consider whether on the facts of this case, the 
exercise of jurisdiction over Robert complied with traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice, and was reasonable 
in terms of the five Asahi factors. 
¶59 We begin with the burden placed on Robert by the 
Wisconsin court's exercise of jurisdiction.  Robert does not 
No. 
01-2787   
 
29 
 
allege that any inability to appear personally violated his due 
process rights, or contend that the Lafayette County Circuit 
Court's exercise of jurisdiction was unreasonably burdensome. 
¶60 When Robert was initially served with the petition for 
termination he asked that Tammie be ordered to pay his costs, or 
alternatively for an extension until he was released from 
prison.  The court granted the extension request.  Robert did 
not appear personally at the termination trial, but he was 
represented by counsel and appeared by telephone.  Robert was 
employed in Utah at the time of the trial, and he does not 
allege that he was unable to appear.  His earlier request for 
payment of his costs demonstrates that he understood that if 
appearing would pose an undue economic hardship, he could ask 
that his costs be paid.   
¶61 In considering the next two factors, we note that 
Wisconsin's exercise of jurisdiction was in the interests of 
Tammie and Thomas and in the interest of the State of Wisconsin.  
Tammie filed the petition for termination on behalf of Thomas.  
Thomas testified that he wanted Robert's parental rights to be 
terminated, and that he wanted to be adopted.  Thomas is present 
in Wisconsin, and by virtue of his having lived in Wisconsin 
with his mother for more than six months, it is his home state 
under Wis. Stat. § 822.02(5), and is clearly the state with 
which he has maximum contacts.  Wisconsin has an interest in the 
welfare of Thomas.   
¶62 Moreover, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
that 
termination was in Thomas' best interest.  Tammie, Thomas, and 
No. 
01-2787   
 
30 
 
Wisconsin all had strong interests in Wisconsin exercising 
jurisdiction, especially after Arizona declined jurisdiction.  
If Wisconsin did not exercise jurisdiction, Thomas would have 
been left without a forum.  We cannot conclude that the exercise 
of jurisdiction was unreasonable. 
¶63 As to the remaining two factors, we note initially 
that the termination proceeding in this case followed the 
procedures set out in the UCCJA.  The state that exercised 
jurisdiction was the one with the strongest ties to the child, 
to the child's mother, and to significant information about the 
child.  It therefore was the state for which the exercise of 
jurisdiction was most appropriate.  Wis. Stat. § 822.03(1)(a)-
(c).  The Lafayette County Circuit Court allowed Robert and 
Tammie to petition the Arizona Superior Court to determine 
whether 
Arizona 
would 
exercise 
or 
decline 
to 
exercise 
jurisdiction.  The Arizona court determined that it could not 
exercise jurisdiction over a termination proceeding because 
Thomas was not present in the state, and therefore declined to 
exercise jurisdiction.  After the Arizona court declined to 
exercise jurisdiction, there was no question that Wisconsin had 
jurisdiction over the matter.  Its exercise of that jurisdiction 
was not unreasonable. 
¶64 We conclude that the UCCJA provides sufficient due 
process 
protections 
to 
make 
reasonable 
an 
exercise 
of 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent.  We further conclude 
that in this case, Robert was afforded notice, an opportunity to 
be heard either in person or telephonically, and an opportunity 
No. 
01-2787   
 
31 
 
to petition the Arizona court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
matter.  Robert availed himself of all of these procedures.  
Under these circumstances, we conclude that Wisconsin's exercise 
of jurisdiction over Robert complied with traditional notions of 
substantial justice and fair play and did not violate his rights 
to due process. 
¶65 We note, however, that in reversing the circuit court 
order terminating Robert's parental rights, the court of appeals 
did not address the substance of another due process challenge 
that Robert raised.  Robert asserted that "continuing denial of 
periods of physical placement," which was the ground for his 
Wisconsin termination, is not a ground for termination under 
Arizona law.  He further advanced that he was not warned that 
his parental rights could be subject to termination in Wisconsin 
if he failed to challenge the child custody decree issued in 
Arizona.  The circuit judge to whom the case was initially 
assigned denied Robert's motion to dismiss, determining that 
"warnings are not a prerequisite to a termination action where 
the Respondent has been denied placement in a divorce judgment."  
The circuit judge to whom the case was later assigned recognized 
that the Arizona court order did not contain the notice required 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.356, but suggested that Robert had waived 
the issue. 
¶66 Robert raised this issue to the court of appeals, but 
the court did not address the substance of the argument because 
it reversed the circuit court order, finding that the court had 
No. 
01-2787   
 
32 
 
no jurisdiction.13  See Tammie J.C. v. Robert T.R., No. 01-2787, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. January 10, 2002).  Robert 
did not raise the issue in his petition to this court, and the 
parties neither briefed nor argued it here.  We therefore are 
unable to address whether the termination of Robert's parental 
rights afforded Robert due process.  Additionally, Robert raised 
other issues in the court of appeals, involving Equal Protection 
and the circuit court's exercise of discretion, that were not 
decided by the court of appeals and that were neither briefed 
nor argued in this court.  It will be necessary for the court of 
appeals to address these issues. 
IV 
¶67 In summary, we conclude that the status exception to 
the general personal jurisdiction requirements, as employed in 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, provides a basis for 
the exercise of jurisdiction in a child custody case.  Such an 
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.  We also conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(11), which references the UCCJA, provides sufficient 
due process protection to out-of-state parents based on notice 
and an opportunity to be heard.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
                                                 
13 The court of appeals noted in footnote 6 as follows: 
"Because we have concluded that the circuit court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over Robert and that personal jurisdiction 
was necessary before the court could terminate his parental 
rights, we do not reach the additional bases for reversal put 
forth by Robert."  Unpublished slip op. at ¶16 n.6 (citations 
omitted).   
No. 
01-2787   
 
33 
 
court of appeals and remand the case for a determination on the 
remaining issues previously raised in that court, but not 
briefed or argued here. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the court of appeals. 
  
 
 
No.  01-2787.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶68 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
court's reasoning and conclusions.  I write separately only to 
address the dissent's assertion that this court's decision in 
Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 
N.W.2d 768, recognizing parental rights as fundamental and 
acknowledging 
the 
severity 
of termination 
proceedings, is 
somehow incompatible with the court's finding of jurisdiction in 
this case.  I believe the principles in Evelyn C.R. and other 
cases like it are compatible with this case.  For the policy 
reasons relating to the State's and the child's interests 
discussed by the court in ¶¶37-39, cases such as the one before 
us present a situation where application of the recognized 
status exception to minimum contacts doctrine makes sense.   
¶69 In Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶21, 26, 36, this 
court found that a circuit court erred when it entered a default 
judgment on the issue of abandonment in a proceeding for 
termination of parental rights without first fulfilling its duty 
to take evidence sufficient to support a finding, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the mother had abandoned the child.  
However, we then concluded that the error was harmless because 
the circuit court remedied the situation by taking appropriate 
evidence before terminating the parent's rights.  Id., ¶¶33-36.  
In finding that the circuit court erred, this court acknowledged 
that parental rights are fundamental.  Id., ¶20.  We also noted 
that termination proceedings are of a "severe nature," and due 
process requires that there be proof, by clear and convincing 
No.  01-2787.jpw 
 
2 
 
evidence, that termination is appropriate, before parental 
rights may be terminated.  Id., ¶21.   
¶70 Nonetheless, acknowledging that a right is fundamental 
does not mean it is absolute and need never give way when other 
interests are at stake.  The issue in the present case is 
jurisdiction, whether a Wisconsin court has jurisdiction to go 
forward with a termination proceeding at all.  Although parental 
rights are fundamental and the effects of termination severe, 
the jurisdiction issue also involves other important interests, 
specifically those of the child and the State, that must be 
considered 
in 
the 
equation. 
 
The 
dissent 
argues 
that 
consideration of the "fundamental nature and importance of 
parental rights" is lacking in the majority opinion.  Dissent, 
¶76.  However, I submit that the recognition of parental rights 
as fundamental should not be determinative on whether the status 
exception to personal jurisdiction is applicable.  As one court 
recently explained: 
The fact that parental rights have been designated 
"fundamental liberty interest[s]," Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982), does not alter our 
analysis.  Cases dealing with status often involve a 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest. 
 
Nevertheless, 
the 
United States Supreme Court has allowed courts to 
exercise jurisdiction in such cases where standards of 
fairness are not violated. 
W.A. v. State, 2002 UT 127, ¶31, 63 P.3d 607.  As this court 
discussed in its opinion, we have determined that these 
standards of fairness have been met in the present case.  See 
majority op., ¶¶47-64.  The non-resident parent was given ample 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the balance of the 
No.  01-2787.jpw 
 
3 
 
Asahi factors——which examine the interests of the parent, the 
child, and the State——tips in favor of jurisdiction.  Id.   
¶71 We note in this decision that if the circuit court has 
no jurisdiction in cases such as this, the result is often a 
child caught in "jurisdictional limbo."  Majority op., ¶15.  
This is a significant concern, one that the Uniform Child 
Custody 
Jurisdiction 
Enforcement 
Act 
(UCCJA) 
was 
enacted 
specifically to address.  Majority op., ¶29.  I agree with the 
court's conclusion that the UCCJA allows Wisconsin to take 
jurisdiction in this case under the status exception.  I also 
agree that sufficient due process protections were provided to 
the non-resident parent.  In circumstances such as these, where 
the issue is jurisdiction and the conflict is between parental 
rights and the State's interest in protecting the child's best 
interests, it is appropriate to apply the UCCJA. 
¶72 Evelyn C.R. did not hold that default judgment in 
termination cases could not occur at all.  It simply held that a 
court must take sufficient evidence before entering such a 
judgment.  See Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.  The present 
case allows an alternative basis for jurisdiction, but only 
where sufficient due process protections are in place.  As the 
majority notes, whether the basis for jurisdiction over a person 
is minimum contacts or some other means, the applicable due 
process standard is the same.  Majority op., ¶24.  Today's 
holding is consistent with our recognition of the importance of 
parental 
rights, 
but 
it 
provides 
a 
balance 
such 
that 
jurisdiction is allowed where the balance of interests at stake 
No.  01-2787.jpw 
 
4 
 
indicates that the child's interests in getting a court 
determination and the State's interest in protecting the child's 
interests are in danger.   
¶73 The unique set of circumstances involved in a case 
such as Thomas J.R.'s allows Wisconsin to take jurisdiction 
under the status exception to personal jurisdiction.  This 
determination is in no way intended to minimalize the importance 
of parental rights.  The status exception has been a long-
accepted exception to personal jurisdiction and provides an 
alternative 
means 
of 
jurisdiction 
under 
very 
limited 
circumstances.  I therefore see no conflict between this court's 
recognition of a fundamental right and its decision to allow 
jurisdiction under the limited circumstances presented here. 
 
 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
1 
 
¶74 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent.  The majority concludes that the due process personal 
jurisdiction prerequisite of "minimum contacts" with the forum 
state pursuant to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945), is not applicable in termination of parental 
rights cases.  Majority op., ¶37.  The majority reaches this 
conclusion by characterizing termination of parental rights as a 
"status" 
determination 
not 
subject 
to 
"minimum 
contacts" 
personal jurisdiction requirements.  Majority op., ¶40.  The 
majority 
also 
concludes 
that 
the 
Uniform 
Child 
Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Wis. Stat. § 822.01-.25, read together 
with Wis. Stat. § 801.05(11), constitutes a sufficient basis for 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has no 
contacts with Wisconsin, provided that notice and an opportunity 
to be heard are afforded.  Majority op., ¶¶37-40. 
¶75  The majority places substantial emphasis on the 
interests and needs of the child, the parens patriae interests 
of the forum state, and the interest in avoiding the practical 
and very human problems associated with the "jurisdictional 
limbo" that can occur when biological parents reside in 
different states and grounds for termination of parental rights 
exist.  Id.  I agree that these are strong justifications for 
the jurisdictional rule the majority adopts.  However, the 
majority has not evaluated these justifications against the 
interest that occupies the other side of the scale: a parent's 
fundamental and constitutionally protected interest in the 
parent-child relationship. 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
2 
 
¶76  I recognize that the extreme facts of this case are 
not such as would induce a court to place much value on this 
particular 
non-resident 
father's 
rights 
or 
interests, 
particularly as against the compelling nature of this child's 
situation.  But resolving the question of whether due process 
requires "minimum contacts" with the forum state before a non-
resident's parental rights are terminated requires that we 
consider the fundamental nature and importance of parental 
rights in general, which the majority has not done.  Resolving 
the 
jurisdictional 
question 
presented 
here 
also 
requires 
consideration of the United States Supreme Court precedent most 
closely on point, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), which 
the majority mentions only summarily, in response to this 
dissent. 
¶77  The United States Supreme Court has "recognized on 
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and 
child is constitutionally protected."  Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246, 255 (1977).  Termination of parental rights implicates 
"a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).  This 
fundamental liberty interest "does not evaporate simply because 
[parents] have not been model parents or have lost temporary 
custody of their child to the State."  Id.  "When the State 
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the 
parents with fundamentally fair procedures."  Id. at 753-54. 
¶78  This court has characterized parental rights as among 
the most fundamental of human rights.  Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
3 
 
2001 WI 110, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  More 
specifically: 
Terminations of parental rights affects some of 
parents' most fundamental human rights.  T.M.F. v. 
Children's Serv. Soc'y, 112 Wis. 2d 180, 184, 332 
N.W.2d 293 (1983).  At stake for a parent [in a 
termination of parental rights action] is his or her 
"interest in the companionship, care, custody, and 
management of his or her child." Id.  Further, the 
permanency of termination orders "work[s] a unique 
kind 
of 
deprivation. 
 
In 
contrast 
to 
matters 
modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed 
circumstances, termination adjudications involve the 
awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently 
all legal recognition of the parental relationship."  
M.L.B. 
v. 
S.L.J., 
519 
U.S. 
102, 
127-28 
(1996)(citations and quotations omitted).  For these 
reasons, "parental termination decrees are among the 
most severe forms of state action."  Id.       
Id. 
 
¶79  The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires "that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the 
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.'"  International Shoe, 326 
U.S. at 316 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
¶80  In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977), the 
United States Supreme Court held that "all assertions of state-
court jurisdiction 
[over 
non-resident 
defendants] must be 
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International 
Shoe and its progeny," that is, on the basis of the quality and 
quantity of the non-resident's contacts with the forum state.  
In a footnote, however, the Court said that it was not 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
4 
 
suggesting "that jurisdictional doctrines other than those 
discussed in text, such as the particularized rules governing 
adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard of 
fairness [in International Shoe]."  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 
n.30.  The majority focuses its analysis on this footnote, and 
its reference to the so-called "status exception" to the 
"minimum 
contacts" 
personal 
jurisdiction 
requirement 
of 
International Shoe.  
¶81 
However, 
in 
a 
pre-Shaffer 
case 
with 
important 
implications for the issue presented here, the Supreme Court 
held that a child custody decree against a non-resident parent 
with no presence in or contact with the forum state is not 
entitled to full faith and credit enforcement in another state.  
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).  The issue in May was 
stated as follows: 
The question presented is whether, in a habeas 
corpus proceeding attacking the right of a mother to 
retain possession of her minor children, an Ohio court 
must give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree 
awarding custody of the children to their father when 
that decree is obtained by the father in an ex parte 
divorce action in a Wisconsin court which had no 
personal jurisdiction over the mother.  For the 
reasons hereafter stated, our answer is no. 
Id.  at 528-29. 
¶82  The Court noted that its prior decisions in Estin v. 
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), and Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 
(1948), had distinguished, 
for purposes of 
jurisdictional 
analysis, between a decree of divorce and the extinguishment of 
the right to support: 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
5 
 
In Estin v. Estin, supra, and Kreiger v. Kreiger, 
supra, this Court upheld the validity of a Nevada 
divorce obtained ex parte by a husband, resident in 
Nevada, 
insofar 
as 
it 
dissolved 
the 
bonds 
of 
matrimony.  At the same time, we held Nevada powerless 
to cut off, in that proceeding, a spouse's right to 
financial support under the prior decree of another 
state.  In the instant case, we recognize that a 
mother's right to custody of her children is a 
personal right entitled to at least as much protection 
as her right to alimony. 
May, 345 U.S. at 533-34 (emphasis added.) 
¶83  Noting that "[r]ights far more precious to [the 
mother] than property rights will be cut off if she is to be 
bound by the Wisconsin award of custody," the Court held that 
"where [a parent] is neither domiciled, resident nor present" in 
the forum state, that state may not "cut off her immediate right 
to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor 
children without having jurisdiction over her in personam."  Id. 
at 533 (emphasis added).  The majority in May also dismissed any 
argument based upon the "legal domicile" of the children (as 
opposed to their residence or presence): "We find it unnecessary 
to determine the children's legal domicile because, even if it 
be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin, certainly as 
against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in 
order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their 
immediate possession."  Id. at 534 (emphasis added). 
¶84 
In 
a 
concurring 
opinion, 
Justice 
Frankfurter 
characterized the decision of the Court as follows: "What is 
decided——the only thing the Court decides——is that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause does not require Ohio, in disposing of 
the custody of children in Ohio, to accept, in the circumstances 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
6 
 
before us, the disposition made by Wisconsin."  Id. at 535 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring.)  Justice Frankfurter went on to 
explain his position: 
Property, personal claims, and even the marriage 
status . . . generally give rise to interests 
different from those relevant to the discharge of a 
State's continuing responsibility to children within 
her borders.  Children have a very special place in 
life which law should reflect.  Legal theories and 
their 
phrasing 
in 
other 
cases 
readily 
lead 
to 
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to 
determination of a State's duty toward children. . . . 
[T]he child's welfare in a custody case has such a 
claim upon the State that its responsibility is 
obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication 
reflecting 
another 
State's 
discharge 
of 
its 
responsibility at another time.  Reliance on opinions 
regarding 
out-of-State 
adjudications 
of 
property 
rights, personal claims or the marital status is bound 
to confuse analysis when a claim to the custody of 
children before the courts of one State is based on an 
award previously made by another State.  Whatever 
light may be had from such opinions, they cannot give 
conclusive answers. 
Id. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) 
¶85  Despite these qualifications, Justice Frankfurter did 
not merely concur in the majority's result, but, rather, joined 
the majority opinion.14  Id. at 535.  His separate opinion 
elaborates on the special nature of parental rights claims as 
distinct from property claims, personal claims, and claims 
pertaining to marital status. 
¶86  Although May involved a collateral challenge to the 
personal jurisdictional underpinnings of a child custody decree 
                                                 
 
14   In any event, one justice did not participate, so the 
case was decided on a 5-3 vote, not a mere plurality.  May v. 
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953). 
  
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
7 
 
under full faith and credit, rather than a direct jurisdictional 
challenge as in this case, it is nevertheless the Supreme 
Court's most closely applicable statement of the law on the 
personal jurisdiction question presented here.15  And although it 
was a custody dispute rather than an action to terminate 
parental rights, May's reasoning applies with even greater force 
in the context of termination of parental rights, in which much 
more than just custody is at stake.  It is unusual, therefore, 
that the majority addresses May only summarily, in response to 
this dissent. 
¶87  The Supreme Court has not revisited May, but it has 
not overruled or circumscribed its holding either, nor has the 
Court taken up the question of whether child custody or 
termination of parental rights cases fall within the status 
exception to International Shoe that was held in reserve by the 
footnote in Shaffer.  The Court could have overruled or in some 
                                                 
15  The United States Supreme Court has also held that a 
state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction in an action 
for child support against a "nonresident, nondomiciliary parent 
of minor children domiciled within the State" violates due 
process if the non-resident parent has insufficient "minimum 
contacts" with the forum state under International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  Kulko v. Superior Court of 
California, 436 U.S. 84, 86 (1978).  The Court's holding in 
Kulko was based on the long-standing rule "that a valid judgment 
imposing a personal obligation in favor of the plaintiff may be 
entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of 
the defendant," and that "personal jurisdiction, in turn, 
depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant 
. . .  [and] a sufficient connection between the defendant and 
the forum State to make it fair to require defense of the action 
in the forum."  Id. at 91 (citations omitted).  See also, 
majority op., ¶25 n.5. 
 
  
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
8 
 
way addressed the continuing vitality of May in its reference to 
the status exception in the Shaffer footnote, but it did not.  
We cannot, therefore, simply ignore May's conclusion about the 
jurisdictional validity of a child custody decree entered 
without personal jurisdiction over a non-resident parent.16 
¶88   In its summary rejection of May, the majority implies 
that the case is no longer relevant in light of Shaffer.  
Majority op., ¶32.  May, however, has been cited with approval 
by the Supreme Court in a post-Shaffer termination of parental 
rights case, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham 
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)("Here the State has sought 
not simply to infringe upon [the parental] interest but to end 
it.  If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of 
deprivation.")(citing May, 345 U.S. at 533). 
¶89  Following Lassiter, the Court decided Santosky, which 
required the middle "clear and convincing evidence" burden of 
proof in termination of parental rights cases.  There, the Court 
held that "state intervention to terminate the relationship 
between [a parent] and [a] child must be accomplished by 
procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause" and 
that "persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental 
rights" have a "critical need" for the procedural protections of 
the due process guarantee.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.  The 
Court reiterated that termination of parental rights implicates 
a fundamental liberty interest, and noted that "[t]he fact that 
                                                 
 
16  May is cited but not discussed in Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97, 
a post-Shaffer case.     
  
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
9 
 
important liberty interests" of the child and the other parent 
may also 
be 
implicated 
"does not 
justify" 
a 
denial of 
constitutionally adequate procedures.  Id. at 754 n.7.  
¶90 Indeed, the majority recognizes that the Supreme Court 
"has made clear" that "subjects such as alimony and child 
support are not covered by the status exception."  Majority op.,  
¶25 n.5 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-92 
(1978)).  May held that the right to custody of children is "a 
personal right entitled to at least as much protection as [the] 
right to alimony."  May, 345 U.S. at 533-34.  Termination of 
parental rights actions, therefore, cannot be covered by the 
status exception.   
¶91  The majority asserts that "[m]ost courts that have 
considered the validity of jurisdiction under the UCCJA have 
determined that the status exception applies to child custody 
cases under the UCCJA, and that personal jurisdiction based on 
minimum contacts is not required."  Majority op., ¶30.  This 
appears to be true for child custody cases, which those courts 
that have addressed the matter have quite readily characterized 
as pure status determinations for purposes of the Shaffer 
footnote. 
¶92  The majority makes a similar assertion regarding 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
non-resident 
defendants 
in 
termination of parental rights cases, as distinct from child 
custody cases.  Majority op., ¶32.  In this area, however, the 
consensus, and proper analysis, are less clear.  Five states——
Alaska, Kansas, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah,——have applied the 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
10 
 
status exception to conclude that "minimum contacts" were not 
necessary in termination of parental rights cases.  S.B. v. 
State of Alaska, 61 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2002); In re M.L.K., 768 P.2d 
316 (Kan. App. 1989); In re Adoption of Copeland, 43 S.W.3d 483 
(Tenn. App. 2000); In re M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App. 
1980); D.A. v. State of Utah, 63 P.2d 607 (Utah 2002).  Two 
states——New Mexico and Hawaii——have declined to adopt the status 
exception 
and 
have 
required 
"minimum 
contacts" 
for 
the 
establishment 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
non-resident 
defendants in termination of parental rights cases.  Vernon R. 
v. Elizabeth V., 991 P.2d 986 (N.M. 1999)(leaving open the 
possibility of recognizing a UCCJA-based status exception in a 
custody or adoption-contemplation termination case); In the 
Interest of John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290 (Haw. 1996).  Two additional 
states——Arizona and Montana——have asserted personal jurisdiction 
in the absence of "minimum contacts" without discussing the 
status exception.  Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086 (Mont. 
1979); In the Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile 
Action, 543 P.2d 454 (Ariz. 1975). 
¶93  And although custody determinations might be more 
readily characterized as status determinations than parental 
rights terminations, at least two courts have cited May and 
concluded that child custody determinations require "minimum 
contacts" personal jurisdiction over a non-resident parent.  In 
re Dean, 447 So.2d 733, 735 (Ala. 1984); Pasqualone v. 
Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-1126 (Ohio 1980). 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
11 
 
¶94  I recognize that in the case of In the Interest of 
A.E.H., 161 Wis. 2d 277, 468 N.W.2d 190 (1991), this court 
stated that termination of parental rights cases constitute 
"custody determinations" within the meaning of the UCCJA.  But 
A.E.H. addressed the question of a Wisconsin court's competency 
over a termination determination under the UCCJA vis-à-vis the 
court 
of 
another 
state; 
the 
case 
did 
not 
address 
the 
requirements 
for 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
non-resident 
parents.  Id. at 298-301.  The court of appeals in Davidson v. 
Davidson, 169 Wis. 2d 546, 556, 485 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1992) 
held that in a child custody case under the UCCJA (not a 
parental rights termination case) due process is satisfied when 
"the out-of-state parent is given notice and an opportunity to 
be heard in the manner provided by the UCCJA."  This, however, 
was a one-sentence conclusory holding without any analysis 
whatsoever. 
¶95  In contrast, this court has concluded that in a 
paternity action, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a 
non-resident defendant without sufficient minimum contacts with 
the state violates due process.  State ex rel. N.R.Z. v. G.L.C., 
152 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 447 N.W.2d 533 (1989).  Similarly, the 
court of appeals has held that the UCCJA does not supply a 
constitutionally sufficient basis for the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a paternity action 
in the absence of "minimum contacts" with this state.  Paula 
M.S. v. Neal A.R., 226 Wis. 2d 79, 88, 593 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 
1999).  I do not see how due process——"traditional notions of 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
12 
 
fair play and substantial justice"——distinguishes between an 
action to establish paternity and an action to terminate 
paternity, except perhaps that the former may result in the 
imposition of financial obligations.  Actions to terminate 
parental rights, no less than paternity actions, require more 
than mere notice and an opportunity to be heard before extra-
territorial 
personal 
jurisdiction 
may 
be 
constitutionally 
asserted. 
¶96  Given the fundamental and constitutionally protected 
nature of parental rights and the permanency of a termination 
adjudication, and with May as the Supreme Court's most relevant 
pronouncement on the issue, I cannot agree that the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction in this termination of parental rights 
case over a non-resident parent who has had no contact with 
Wisconsin is constitutionally permissible.  While there may be 
instances of jurisdictional necessity in this context, such as 
an abandoned child whose biological parents cannot be located, 
this is not such a case, and we should leave such questions for 
a case that properly presents them.  Majority op., ¶38. 
¶97  Unlike a child custody determination, which can be 
modified, termination of parental rights is final, severs 
permanently 
all 
legal 
recognition 
of 
the 
parent-child 
relationship, and is therefore "among the most severe forms of 
state action."  Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 (quoting M.L.B. 
v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996)).  Accordingly, the 
rights and interests at stake for the non-resident parent are at 
least as significant as those in an action to determine 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
13 
 
paternity (State ex rel. N.R.Z.), alimony, or child support 
(Kulko).  I agree with the court of appeals that the personal 
jurisdictional 
requirement 
of 
"minimum 
contacts" 
under 
International Shoe is applicable here.  See In re Termination of 
Parental Rights to Thomas J.R., 2002 WI App 56, 251 Wis. 2d 483, 
640 N.W.2d 566. 
¶98 Termination of Robert T.R.'s parental rights may 
indeed be in Thomas J.R.'s best interests, in order to clear the 
way for his adoption by his step-father.  But before the merits 
of the question can be reached, there must be a constitutionally 
adequate basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
his non-resident father, and that is missing here.  I would 
affirm the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
 
No.  01-2787.dss 
 
 
 
1