Title: GUARDIANSHIP OF P J D
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14759
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 1979

No. 14759 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA IN RE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF P.J.D., a minor. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Richard Ganulin argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Dennis Conner argued, Great Falls, Montana Gary Zadick argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: September 14, 1979 Decided: SEP 2 5 1979 Filed: M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. O n ~ p r i l 24, 1969, P . J . D . was declared a dependent and neglected child. The Division of Child Welfare Services of t h e Department of Public Welfare was awarded permanent l e g a l custody with t h e r i g h t t o consent t o t h e adoption of t h e youth. O n May 7, 1969, P.J.D. was placed i n t h e f o s t e r c a r e of t h e a p p e l l a n t s herein. She has resided with them s i n c e t h a t t i m e . O n November 17, 1974, P.J.D. was permanently placed with the appellants. P.J.D. has been disabled with c e r e b r a l palsy s i n c e b i r t h . Appellants have been approved a s adoptive parents; however, they are f i n a n c i a l l y unable t o adopt P.J.D. O n June 27, 1978, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Cascade, requesting t h a t they be appointed guardians of P.J.D., t h e i r permanent f o s t e r c h i l d . The Department of S o c i a l and Re- h a b i l i t a t i o n Services (SRS) made a motion t o dismiss t h e p e t i t i o n on t h e grounds t h a t t h e c o u r t lacked s u b j e c t matter j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n f a i l e d t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f could be granted. O n January 2 2 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court granted SRS's motion t o dismiss and, on February 8, 1979, denied a p p e l l a n t s ' motion t o amend t h e conclusions of law by vacating t h e hearing on t h e motion. Appellants appeal from t h e s e o r d e r s of t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court. The s o l e i s s u e presented t o t h i s Court i s t h e i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 72-5-222(1), MCA, and s e c t i o n 72-5-225(2), MCA, t o determine (1) whether t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court has j u r i s - d i c t i o n t o appoint permanent f o s t e r p a r e n t s a s guardians of a c h i l d i n t h e l e g a l custody of SRS, and ( 2 ) whether SRS ever had p a r e n t a l r i g h t s over P . J . D . and, i f so, whether t h e s e r i g h t s have been suspended by circumstances, Appellants' p r i n c i p a l arguments can be summarized a s follows : (1) The t e r m " p a r e n t a l r i g h t s " a s used i n s e c t i o n 72-5- 222(1), MCA, r e f e r s t o t h e r i g h t s of t h e n a t u r a l parents, which i n t h i s case w e r e terminated on A p r i l 24, 1969. The f o s t e r parents have t h e r i g h t t o custody, companionship and s e r v i c e s of the c h i l d and c o n t r o l her r e l i g i o n , education and d i s c i p l i n e . ( 2 ) SRS's " p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody" were terminated by t h e permanent f o s t e r placement with appellants. Section 72-5-222 ( I ) , MCA, and ARM S46-2.6 ( 2 ) -S640 ( 3 ) (c) (i) . ( 3 ) Appellants request t h i s Court t o l i m i t i t s d e c i s i o n t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e and appoint them guardians. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s order dismissing t h e p e t i t i o n i s founded upon i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n s 72-5-222(1) and 72-5-225 ( 2 ) , MCA. Section 72-5-222 (1) s t a t e s : "The c o u r t may appoint a guardian f o r an unmar- r i e d minor -- i f p a l l - p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody have been terminated o r suspended circum- -- - stances o r p r i o r c o u r t order." (Emphasis sup- - . - . - p l i e d . ) Section 72-5-225(2) provides: "Upon hearing, i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t a q u a l i f i e d person seeks appointment, venue i s proper, t h e required n o t i c e s have been given, t h e requirements of 72-5-222 have been m e t , and t h e welfare and b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e minor w i l l be served by t h e requested appointment, it s h a l l make t h e appointment. &-other c a s e s t h e c o u r t may dismiss t h e - roceedings o r -- make any o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n of :he matter --- t h a t w i l l b e s t serve the i n t e r e z of t h e minor." (Emphasis supplied.) -- Resolution of t h i s case r e s t s on t h e construction placed on t h e above s t a t u t e s and more p a r t i c u l a r l y , on t h i s Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e phrase " a l l p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody . " Although t h e r e i s no Montana case law which f o r our purposes s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t s t h e above s t a t u t e s , appel- l a n t s c i t e and r e l y on a r e c e n t Montana case, I n r e Guardian- s h i p of Evans (1978), M o n t . , 587 P.2d 372, 35 St-Rep. 1768, a s being d i s p o s i t i v e here. A c l o s e look a t Evans r e v e a l s it i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t case. The problem of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was n o t reached i n Evans. Appellants cite various cases f o r t h e proposition t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court should appoint a guardian whenever neces- s a r y o r convenient f o r t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d : I n re Henwood's Guardianship (1958), 49 Cal.2d 639, 320 P.2d 1; San Diego County Dept. of Pub. Welf. v. Superior County (1972), 1 0 1 Cal.Rptr. 541, 496 P. 2d 453; I n re C.M.D. (Del. 1969), 256 A.2d 266. These cases, however, a r e e a s i l y d i s - tinguishable. They involve d i f f e r e n t s t a t u t o r y g u i d e l i n e s f o r guardianship than those w e a r e considering i n Montana. There a r e , however, two cases from Arizona construing t h a t s t a t e ' s guardianship s t a t u t e s which a r e i d e n t i c a l t o Montana's. The f i r s t i s Morales v. Glenn (1977), 1 1 4 Ariz. 327, 560 P.2d 1234. I n Morales t h e custody of t h e two minor c h i l d r e n involved w a s , pursuant t o a divorce decree, lodged i n t h e f a t h e r . I n 1976 t h e f a t h e r died, and t h e p a t e r n a l grandparents assumed custody of t h e two children. A request f o r custody by t h e mother w a s made t o t h e grandparents, which request was refused. Thereafter, t h e grandmother p e t i t i o n e d f o r guardianship of t h e c h i l d r e n a l l e g i n g t h a t a l l p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody had been terminated by c o u r t order. The mother regained custody of t h e c h i l d r e n through a habeas corpus proceeding and moved t o dismiss t h e guardian- s h i p proceedings. This motion w a s denied, and t h e mother appealed. The Arizona c o u r t found t h e mother's p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody had n o t been terminated by t h e divorce decree o r circumstances and held t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n n o t g r a n t i n g t h e mother's motion t o dismiss. The c o u r t went on t o s t a t e : "The Probate Court does n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o award custody when custody by o p e r a t i o n of t h e law . . . o r by c o u r t o r d e r . . . has a l r e a d y been determined." Morales, 560 P.2d a t 1237, 1238. I n M c N e a l v. Mahoney (1978), 117 A r i z . 543, 574 P.2d 31, t h e c o u r t , c i t i n g Morales , held t h a t where t h e f a t h e r ' s custody r i g h t s had n o t been terminated by circumstances o r by h i s c o n d i t i o n a l d e l i v e r y of t h e c h i l d t o grandparents, t h e appointment of t h e grandparents a s temporary guardians f o r t h e c h i l d was improper and " t h e t r i a l judge was without a u t h o r i t y t o appoint even a temporary guardian f o r Cindy." McNeal, 574 P.2d a t 35. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e custody of P.J.D. was estab- l i s h e d by c o u r t o r d e r on A p r i l 24, 1969, when permanent l e g a l custody with r i g h t t o consent t o adoption of P . J . D . was awarded t o SRS. Permanent custody of a c h i l d i s defined i n ARM S46-2.6 (2) -S650 (1) (b) as: ". . . t h e l e g a l s t a t u s c r e a t e d by an o r d e r of t h e youth c o u r t , t h a t g i v e s a person o r agency t h e r i g h t and duty t o t h e c a r e , custody and c o n t r o l of a youth with t h e a u t h o r i t y t o con- s e n t t o t h e adoption of s a i d youth. This s e v e r s t h e r i g h t s and d u t i e s of t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t ( s ) t o t h e c h i l d . " F u r t h e r , " [ t l r a n s f e r of l e g a l custody of a c h i l d s h a l l include guardianship of any a s s e t s o r e s t a t e of t h e c h i l d . . ." Section 41-3-406(4), MCA. I n e f f e c t , by making such an o r d e r , t h e c o u r t g r a n t s a l l t h e r i g h t s of t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t t o SRS. SRS, t h u s , becomes responsible f o r t h e c a r e , feeding, and c o n t r o l of the child. To provide for the best interests of and protect the welfare of a child, SRS attempts to place the child "in a stabilized setting such as an adoptive home or permanent foster care home which will promote the development of a psychological parent-child relationship." ARM S46-2.6(2)- S640 (3) (c) (i) . As unacceptable as it may sound, some of the children will never be adopted. Instead of having to institutionalize these children, SRS licenses foster parents, people who want to care for children but are either ineligible to adopt or cannot afford to adopt. When a child is placed in permanent foster home care, as P.J.D. was here, SRS provides certain services including: counseling services to child and foster parents; referral services when appropriate; arrange for continued education of the child as appropriate to his age and abilities; arrange for medical services for the child; and open foster home payments for board, room and personal necessities. ARM S46-2.6(2)-S6020. These services are in keeping with the duty placed upon SRS when it is granted legal custody of a child. The responsibilities and duties charged to SRS are similar to the ones charged to natural parents. The only difference is that to care for a child, SRS, in promoting a natural instead of institutional environ- ment for the child, must assign the everyday duties of care and feeding to foster parents like the appellants. By such assignment, however, SRS does not forego any of the duties it was charged by court order to carry out; it merely assigns the duties so they will be carried out in a more natural environment. SRS is still responsible for the youth's care and must keep a constant vigil to assure that the youth's best interests are being served. This duty is so strict because, i n e f f e c t , SRS i s charged with overcoming any ill- e f f e c t s t h e deprivation of t h e c h i l d ' s n a t u r a l p a r e n t s may have had on the c h i l d . While it i s t r u e t h a t t h e permanent f o s t e r parents, when placed i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , assume t h e r o l e of p a r e n t s and can i n f a c t become t h e psychological p a r e n t s of t h e c h i l d , t h i s does n o t change t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e c h i l d and SRS. "A c h i l d cannot be adversely possessed a s can a piece of r e a l property." I n t h e Matter of F i s h (1977) Mont. - , 569 P.2d 924, 928, 34 St.Rep. 1080, 1085. Appellants argue t h a t t h e phrase " a l l p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody" from s e c t i o n 72-5-222(1), MCA, w a s intended t o encompass only " p a r e n t a l r i g h t s " of n a t u r a l p a r e n t s and t h e r e f o r e , t h e r i g h t s granted t o SRS when it w a s awarded permanent custody of P.J.D. a r e incapable of t h e D i s t r i c t Court's j u r i s d i c t i o n t o appoint a guardian. This contention i s n o t supported by t h e f a c t s o r by t h e l a w . I n l i g h t of t h e d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s placed on SRS, t h e r e can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t it was awarded p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t o custody s i m i l a r t o t h a t of a n a t u r a l parent. There a l s o can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h e phrase " a l l p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody" includes the r i g h t s awarded t o SRS. This i s t h e l o g i c a l r e s u l t . To construe t h e above phrase t o include only n a t u r a l p a r e n t s would c r e a t e problems t h a t a p p e l l a n t s f a i l t o take i n t o account. I f only n a t u r a l p a r e n t s ' r i g h t s were protected, it would mean t h a t a guard- i a n could be appointed f o r a c h i l d with adoptive parents, s o l e l y because t h e n a t u r a l parents' r i g h t s had been ter- minated. One can hardly argue t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended such a r e s u l t . SRS, i n r e a l i t y , t a k e s t h e place of t h e adoptive p a r e n t by seeing t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s needs are taken c a r e o f , a l b e i t by f o s t e r parents. The phrase " p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of custody" t h e r e f o r e i n c l u d e s t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of both adoptive p a r e n t s and SRS when it i s awarded custody. The r i g h t s held by SRS here are permanent i n n a t u r e and have n o t been terminated. This being t h e c a s e , t h e c o u r t was without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o appoint a guardian under s e c t i o n 72-5-225(2), MCA. I t d i d n o t e r r i n dismissing a p p e l l a n t s ' p e t i t i o n . One o t h e r p o i n t needs t o be discussed. Because t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of P.J.D. were n o t terminated, t h e l a s t sentence of s e c t i o n 72-5-225 ( 2 ) may come i n t o play. This sentence reads: " I n o t h e r c a s e s t h e c o u r t m a y dismiss t h e proceedings o r -- make any o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n of -- t h e m a t t e r t h a t w i l l b e s t serve t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e minor." (Emphasis added.) The language of t h i s sentence i n d i c a t e s t h a t it i s w i t h i n t h e c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n i n such a s i t u a t i o n t o e i t h e r dismiss t h e proceeding o r make some o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n . H e r e , t h e c o u r t chose t o dismiss t h e proceeding. I n t h e absence of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , t h i s Court w i l l n o t a l t e r such a decision. I n re Gore (1977), Mont. , 570 P.2d 1110, 34 St-Rep. 1179. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, a n a t t o r n e y was appointed t o p r o t e c t P.J.D.'s i n t e r e s t s . I n h i s b r i e f t o t h i s Court, he states: " I t appears t o m e t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y between t h e f o s t e r p a r e n t s and t h e Department of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s i n t h e P . J . D . matter has been suf- f i c i e n t l y compatible s o t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d have been looked a f t e r . The department has provided a l l medical c a r e , f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e and so- cial s e r v i c e s support t o P.J.D. t h a t have appeared t o be necessary." W e have no f a c t record i n t h i s c a s e , s o we have no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t SRS w i l l remove t h e c h i l d from its f o s t e r p a r e n t s . Nor i s t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e c h i l d should be r e c e i v i n g a d d i t i o n a l care which SRS r e f u s e s t o provide. It a l s o appears t h a t SRS has agreed t o g r a n t a u t h o r i t y t o t h e f o s t e r p a r e n t s t o a u t h o r i z e emergency medical treatment. Apparently, t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d a r e being served here. This i s n o t t o say t h a t t h e r e a r e no long t e r m f o s t e r placements, such a s t h e c a s e here, i n which changes of s t a t u s may be d e s i r a b l e . But t o i n t e r p r e t t h e s t a t u t e as a b l a n k e t permission f o r such i s overlooking t h e p o s s i b l e mischief involved i n s h o r t t e r m c a s e s by t h e less s i n c e r e of t h o s e among us. Therefore, any change i n t h e r u l e s as w e have a p p l i e d them must come from t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a f t e r long and s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n and adequate safeguards a r e i n s t a l l e d f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e f o s t e r c h i l d r e n . The judgment of d i s m i s s a l of t h e District Court i s affirmed. 4- L/L/,A J u s t i c e 2 W e concur: 7~-efl, @&,4 Chief J u s t i c e -4- u s t i c e s