Title: Ex parte Edward Dwight Coleman. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Edward Dwight Coleman v. State of Alabama) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CC94-103; Criminal Appeals : CR-06-0026). Writ Denied. No Opinion.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060909
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2007

REL: 05/25/2007 - Ex parte Coleman
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1060909
____________________
Ex parte Edward Dwight Coleman
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Edward Dwight Coleman
v.
State of Alabama)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-94-103;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-0026)
PER CURIAM.
WRIT DENIED.  NO OPINION.
1060909
2
See, Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Stuart, J., dissents.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1060909
3
STUART, Justice (dissenting).
Consistent with my opinion expressed in Ex parte Butler,
[Ms. 1051636, March 16, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007), and
Ex parte Jenkins, [Ms. 1051778, March 16, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___
(Ala. 2007), I maintain that a presiding judge or a sentencing
judge does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for
sentence reconsideration filed pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.
Code 1975, by an inmate who has been convicted of an offense
that is statutorily defined as a violent offense.  Edward
Dwight Coleman was convicted of attempted murder, an offense
that is defined in § 12-25-32(13)a.2 and (13)c, Ala. Code
1975, as a violent offense; therefore, Coleman is not a
"nonviolent convicted offender" for purposes of § 13A-5-9.1,
and the circuit court never had jurisdiction to entertain
Coleman's  motion.  That court's judgment is void, and this
Court should dismiss this petition.  Therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
Additionally, if the merits of this case were properly
before us for review, I would disagree with the reasoning
applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in its unpublished
memorandum affirming the judgment of the circuit court.
1060909
4
Coleman v. State (No. CR-06-0026, Feb. 16, 2007), ___ So. 2d
___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)(table).  In its unpublished
memorandum, the Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on Wells v.
State, 941 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), held that
the circuit court properly denied Coleman's motion for
sentence reconsideration because the circuit court did not
have jurisdiction to consider Coleman's second or successive
motion for sentence reconsideration.  I disagree with the
reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Wells and now in
this case that a circuit court must summarily deny a second or
successive motion for sentence reconsideration in a particular
case because the circuit court loses its "jurisdiction."   
Alabama 
appellate 
courts 
have 
used 
the 
term
"jurisdiction" loosely throughout the years and thereby have
created confusion as to when a circuit court has jurisdiction
to decide a case.  In Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536 (Ala.
2006), this Court began to undo the confusion with regard to
the term "jurisdiction" and the meaning of that term by
unequivocally stating that a circuit court's jurisdiction  is
"derived from the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code"
and, therefore, that "a defect in an indictment could not
1060909
The court's jurisdiction to entertain motions for
1
sentence reconsideration rests in § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975.
See Ex parte Butler, ___ So. 2d at ___ ("'[T]he [trial court]
possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate [a motion
for sentence reconsideration] under Section 13A-5-9.1.'"
(quoting Kirby v. State, 899 So. 2d 968, 974 (Ala. 2004))).
5
divest a court of its power to hear the case."  Ex parte
Seymour, 946 So. 2d at 538. 
I maintain that just as a defect in an indictment does
not deprive a circuit court of jurisdiction to hear a case, a
circuit court is not deprived of jurisdiction to rule on a
motion for sentence reconsideration in a particular case
merely because the motion is a second or successive motion for
sentence reconsideration.  In other words, the fact that a
motion is a second or successive motion to reconsider a
particular sentence does not divest the circuit court of "its
power to hear the case."  The circuit court has the
jurisdiction 
to 
entertain 
a 
motion 
for 
sentence
reconsideration, pursuant to the Alabama Code,  and the
1
circuit court has jurisdiction to consider a second or
successive motion for reconsideration of a sentence that the
circuit court has already considered.  The reason that the
second or successive motion for sentence reconsideration must
be summarily denied is not that the circuit court loses
1060909
6
jurisdiction; rather, it is because the circuit court has
already considered a motion for reconsideration on the
particular sentence, has satisfied the defendant's right to
due process, and has found that the relief sought is not
warranted.  Cf. Duke v. State, 48 Ala. App. 188, 190, 263 So.
2d 167, 167 (1971)(explaining that res judicata "'applies to
repetitious suits involving the same cause of action.  It
rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and
public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal
relations.  The rule provides that when a court of competent
jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a
cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are
thereafter bound "not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose."'"(quoting Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948))).  Although the circuit court
retains jurisdiction, the circuit court is not required to
entertain a second or successive motion for a reconsideration
of that sentence; thus, such a motion warrants summary denial.