Title: In re Celine R.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S111138
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2003

1 
 
Filed 7/7/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re CELINE R. et al., Persons Coming 
) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                       ) 
 
 
) 
KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
) 
S111138 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 No. F040063 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
Kern County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. JD091445,  
MARY M. et al., 
) 
JD091446 
 
 
) 
 
Defendants and Respondents; ) 
 
) 
CRYSTAL M. et al., 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellants. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case, three young children have been declared dependants of the 
juvenile court, and efforts to reunify them with their parents have failed.  The time 
has come to establish and implement a permanent plan for them.  At this stage of 
the proceedings, if an appropriate adoptive family is or likely will be available, the 
Legislature has made adoption the preferred choice.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 366.26, subds. (b), (c).)1  If it is likely the child will be adopted, the court must 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
 
2 
 
choose that option—and as a result terminate the natural parents’ parental rights—
unless it “finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be 
detrimental to the child due to one or more” of specified circumstances.  
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) 
Effective January 1, 2002, the Legislature added “substantial interference 
with a child’s sibling relationship” to the circumstances that may permit the court 
to choose something other than adoption.  (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E), added by 
Stats. 2001, ch. 747, § 3.)  We must decide whether this new provision requires the 
court to consider the interests of all the siblings or only detriment to the specific 
child in question.  We must also decide under what circumstances the court must 
appoint separate counsel for each child. 
We conclude that the court may reject adoption under this sibling 
relationship provision only if it finds adoption would be detrimental to the child 
whose welfare is being considered.  It may not prevent a child from being adopted 
solely because of the effect the adoption may have on a sibling.  We also conclude 
that the court may appoint a single attorney to represent all of the siblings unless, 
at the time of appointment, an actual conflict of interest exists among them or it 
appears from circumstances specific to the case that it is reasonably likely an 
actual conflict will arise.  After the initial appointment, the court must relieve 
counsel from the joint representation when, but only when, an actual conflict of 
interest arises.  Finally, we conclude that any error here in not relieving counsel 
from representing all three children was harmless because it is not reasonably 
probable the result would have been different had the court done so.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal involves three children:  siblings Celine R., now five years old, 
and Angel R., now four years old, and their half sister, Crystal M., now 10 years 
 
 
 
3 
 
old.  The three have the same mother, but Crystal has a different father.  In August 
2000, the juvenile court adjudged them dependents of the court and removed them 
from parental custody after law enforcement agents discovered a 
methamphetamine laboratory in the family home.  By the beginning of September 
2000, Crystal was placed with a maternal aunt while Celine and Angel were 
placed with a paternal uncle and his long-term girlfriend. 
In April 2001, after efforts to reunify the family had failed, the court 
ordered Crystal into long-term foster care, and she continued to live with her 
maternal aunt.  The court set a hearing under section 366.26 to select and 
implement a permanent plan for Celine and Angel.  The hearing was originally 
scheduled for August 2001, but the Kern County Department of Human Services 
(Department) requested a continuance to search for a prospective adoptive home.  
The court continued the hearing until late February 2002. 
In its supplemental report prepared shortly before the hearing, the 
Department advised the court that the paternal uncle and his girlfriend had agreed 
to adopt Celine and Angel.  Angel did not understand the concept of adoption, but 
Celine said she wanted to be adopted.  She understood adoption to mean her uncle 
and his girlfriend would be her legal parents and she would live with them until 
she was 18.  The report concluded that adoption with them was the best permanent 
plan for Celine and Angel, and it recommended termination of parental rights. 
On February 25, 2002, the court held the hearing to choose a permanent 
plan for Celine and Angel.  Counsel for the parents indicated that the parents did 
not oppose termination of parental rights and the proposed adoption by the father’s 
brother and the girlfriend.  Counsel for the three children, however, expressed 
concerns, especially in light of the recent statutory change regarding the sibling 
relationship.  She stated that she had unsuccessfully tried to contact the paternal 
uncle and girlfriend regarding Celine and Angel.  She had learned from Crystal’s 
 
 
 
4 
 
aunt that visitation was no longer occurring between Crystal and the other two.  
She spoke with Crystal, “and Crystal would be very hurt and very saddened if her 
siblings were adopted by other people and she became separated from her sibling 
group totally.”  She asked the court to continue the matter again and order a 
bonding study, because she was concerned there might be “long-term emotional 
interests that could really be in jeopardy, especially with Crystal who is older than 
these kids. . . .  And her caregiver has concerns about how she would feel if her 
brother and sister were adopted.”  The attorney for the father noted that the 
children had been separated since September 2000, about a year and a half earlier.  
The court noted, and counsel for the children agreed, that even if the court did not 
terminate parental rights and permit the adoption, the children would still not be 
able to live together.  But counsel was concerned that the children should visit 
with each other. 
At this point, counsel for the children stated that “maybe the court should 
allow me to conflict out on Celine and Angel, then I could represent Crystal.  [¶]   
. . . [T]his presents a real problem when we are dividing up children and I attempt 
to represent all three because I know probably going to adoption, being secure, 
having permanency is really what’s necessary for all of the kids, and we have a 
very permanent plan for two of the kids. . . .  They are all young.  I don’t know if 
there is that kind of bonding that would scar these little kids never seeing their 
sister again.”  The court asked the social worker whether there had been sibling 
visits.  The social worker stated that he was informed the last visit had been in 
December 2001, but there had been visits before that time.  The court noted that 
the practical consequences of its decision were that it “could order sibling visits if 
they are in long-term foster or long-term guardianship.  Whereas, if these two are 
adopted, . . . [t]he court is out of it.”  The court interpreted the new code section as 
focusing on the two children being considered for adoption rather than the older 
 
 
 
5 
 
sibling.  It noted that those two had not “lived with the older sibling since they 
were infants and they would not remember her; they would not have any 
emotional attachment [any] more than they would with any other child or one of 
their little cousins or something.”  Accordingly, the court denied another 
continuance. 
The court then terminated parental rights and referred Celine and Angel to 
the county adoption agency for adoptive placement.  It set the matter for another 
hearing the following August and ordered visits among the three siblings in the 
meantime.  Counsel for the children, but not the parents, filed a notice of appeal. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the orders terminating parental rights.  It held 
that section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), and its exceptions pertained to Celine and 
Angel, not Crystal.  It also found the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying a continuance.  Finally, it held that any error in not relieving counsel from 
representing all three children was harmless. 
We granted the children’s petition for review to decide (1) whether the new 
sibling relationship exception obligates the court to consider the interests of all the 
siblings or only those being considered for adoption, and (2) under what 
circumstances the court must appoint separate counsel for separate siblings.2 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Sibling Relationship Exception 
California has a comprehensive statutory scheme establishing procedures 
for the juvenile court to follow when and after a child is removed from the home 
                                             
 
2  
The Department also argues that Crystal lacks standing to appeal the 
termination of parental rights as to her siblings.  The Court of Appeal declined to 
decide the question, and it is not within the scope of our grant of review.  
Accordingly, we do not decide it either.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.) 
 
 
 
6 
 
for the child’s welfare.  (§ 300 et seq.; see generally Cynthia D. v. Superior Court 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 247-250.)  “The objective of the dependency scheme is to 
protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to 
provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within 
a prescribed period of time.”  (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.)  When 
the child is removed from the home, the court first attempts, for a specified period 
of time, to reunify the family.  (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 248-
249.)  In this case, those efforts have failed.  When that occurs, “the court must 
terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 
366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan.  (§ 366.21, subd. 
(g).)”  (Id. at p. 249.)  This appeal concerns the section 366.26 hearing, also called 
a permanency planning hearing (In re Marilyn H., supra, at p. 298, fn. 2), that was 
held in February 2002. 
“Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the 
needs of the child for permanency and stability.”  (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 309.)  “A section 366.26 hearing . . . is a hearing specifically 
designed to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.”  (Id. at p. 304.)  
It is designed to protect children’s “compelling rights . . . to have a placement that 
is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional 
commitment to the child.”  (Id. at p. 306.)  “The Legislature has declared that 
California has an interest in providing stable, permanent homes for children who 
have been removed from parental custody and for whom reunification efforts with 
their parents have been unsuccessful.”  (Id. at p. 307.) 
The court has four choices at the permanency planning hearing.  In order of 
preference the choices are:  (1) terminate parental rights and order that the child be 
placed for adoption (the choice the court made here); (2) identify adoption as the 
permanent placement goal and require efforts to locate an appropriate adoptive 
 
 
 
7 
 
family; (3) appoint a legal guardian; or (4) order long-term foster care.  (§ 366.26, 
subd. (b).)  Whenever the court finds “that it is likely the child will be adopted, the 
court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.”  
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)  The circumstance that the court has terminated 
reunification services provides “a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights 
unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would 
be detrimental to the child due to one or more” of specified circumstances.  (Ibid.)  
The Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first 
choice.  “Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the 
best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.”  (In re 
Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.)  “Guardianship, while a more 
stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the 
secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.”  
(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344.) 
We thus see that if the child is adoptable—and no one disputes that Celine 
and Angel are—adoption is the norm.  Indeed, the court must order adoption and 
its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the 
specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination 
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.  The specified statutory 
circumstances—actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose 
adoption where possible—“must be considered in view of the legislative 
preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed.”  (In re Jasmine D., 
supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.)  At this stage of the dependency proceedings, 
“it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place 
the child in a permanent alternative home.”  (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, 
5 Cal.4th at p. 256.)  The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in 
 
 
 
8 
 
exceptional circumstances (In re Jasmine D., supra, at pp. 1348-1349), to choose 
an option other than the norm, which remains adoption. 
Until recently, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), contained four exceptions 
to the normal requirement of adoption.  Effective January 1, 2002, the Legislature 
added a fifth exception, the one at issue here:  “There would be substantial 
interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature 
and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was 
raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant 
common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and 
whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-
term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through 
adoption.”  (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E); Stats. 2001, ch. 747, § 3.)  This new 
exception now permits the court to consider the sibling relationship in deciding 
whether a compelling reason exists to choose something other than adoption. 
At the hearing in this case, counsel for the children expressed concern that 
Crystal might be hurt and saddened if Celine and Angel were adopted.  The issue 
before us is whether the sibling relationship exception permits the court to 
consider whether adoption would be detrimental, not to the children being 
considered for adoption, but to a sibling.  The trial court and Court of Appeal in 
this case held that the new exception permits the court to consider possible 
detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not detriment to a sibling.  
As the Court of Appeal explained, “Crystal was not the subject of the termination 
hearing . . . .  The court had previously selected for her a permanent plan of long-
term foster care.  Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) and its exceptions pertain to 
the child for whom the court is conducting the hearing to select and implement a 
permanent plan.  The purpose of the February 2002 hearing was to select and 
implement a permanent plan for Celine and Angel.  In order for the court to refrain 
 
 
 
9 
 
from selecting adoption as the permanent plan for Celine and Angel, given their 
adoptability, it would have to ‘find a compelling reason for determining that 
termination would be detrimental to the child,’ in this case them.  (§ 366.26, subd. 
(c)(1).)” 
We agree with the courts below that the sibling relationship exception 
permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered 
for adoption, but not a sibling of that child.  The plain language of the new 
exception compels this conclusion.  Although it concerns the sibling relationship 
in general, the statute continually refers to that relationship’s impact on the child 
being considered for adoption, not the impact on the sibling or anyone else.  
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).)  “[T]he language focuses exclusively on the benefits 
and burdens to the adoptive child, not the other siblings.  The court is specifically 
directed to consider the best interests of the adoptive child, not the siblings, and 
must ultimately determine whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive 
child, not the siblings.”  (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.)  
Nothing in the statute suggests the Legislature intended to permit a court to not 
choose an adoption that is in the adoptive child’s best interest because of the 
possible effect the adoption may have on a sibling. 
Counsel for the children argues that the “court must examine the 
relationship among all the siblings in considering” the sibling relationship 
exception and “may not restrict its inquiry to the children at issue in the hearing 
before the court.”  In a way, this is correct.  The sibling’s relationship with the 
child is not irrelevant.  Certainly, evidence of the sibling’s relationship with the 
child and, if the sibling is articulate, perhaps of the sibling’s views of that 
relationship, might be relevant as indirect evidence of the effect the adoption may 
have on the adoptive child.  A nonadoptive sibling’s emotional resistance towards 
the proposed adoption may also implicate the interests of the adoptive child.  In an 
 
 
 
10 
 
appropriate case, the court should carefully consider all evidence regarding the 
sibling relationship as it relates to possible detriment to the adoptive child.  But the 
ultimate question is whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, 
not someone else.  This conclusion does not mean that the court must totally 
disregard the interests of the sibling or the significance of the sibling relationship 
when it orders adoption.  When appropriate, the court can encourage the adoptive 
parents to agree to visits among the siblings although, as the court recognized in 
this case, it cannot require them to do so.  (§ 366.29; Fam. Code, § 8714.7; see In 
re Daniel H., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 812.) 
B.  Appointment of Separate Counsel for Separate Siblings 
The children argue that the trial court should have appointed a separate 
attorney for Crystal and another for Celine and Angel when their trial counsel 
expressed concern at the February 25, 2002, hearing about representing all three.  
“Where a child is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel for 
the child unless the court finds that the child would not benefit from the 
appointment of counsel.  The court shall state on the record its reasons for that 
finding.”  (§ 317, subd. (c).)  Here, the court did appoint counsel for the children, 
although just one for all three.  The law has been somewhat uncertain regarding 
whether and under what circumstances separate siblings must have separate 
counsel. 
The children do not argue that each child must always have his or her own 
attorney.  We agree that the court should not automatically appoint separate 
counsel for separate children.  In a dependency case, each parent generally has 
separate counsel.  Another attorney represents the social services agency.  Counsel 
for the children is the fourth attorney in the case.  Thus, four attorneys appeared at 
the February 25, 2002, hearing of this case.  If each child had separate counsel, 
 
 
 
11 
 
matters could become unwieldy, especially when there are several children; so 
many attorneys could interfere with the need to resolve dependency questions 
expeditiously as well as fairly.  For example, Carroll v. Superior Court (2002) 101 
Cal.App.4th 1423 (Carroll), discussed further below, involved seven children.  
Separate counsel for each would have resulted in a total of 10 attorneys, which 
would have made the matter resemble complex litigation.  In addition to the 
obvious inefficiencies of having so many attorneys—who might create scheduling 
difficulties and push the case in contradictory directions—and the serious draining 
of scarce public resources, separate counsel could also unnecessarily make 
siblings feel they are adversaries, which could harm their ability to provide mutual 
emotional support.  Having a single attorney would also permit the children to 
consult with their attorney together rather than separately, which can be quite 
beneficial in the often intimidating environment of judicial proceedings.  
Children’s interests are not always adversarial, and they should not always be 
treated as such. 
On the other hand, sometimes the interests of siblings are so conflicting that 
they should have separate counsel.  We must determine the exact standard for trial 
courts to apply when first appointing counsel and thereafter. 
Some courts have held that the court must appoint separate counsel for 
siblings only when an actual, not merely potential, conflict arises among them.  (In 
re Candida S. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1252; In re Richard H. (1991) 234 
Cal.App.3d 1351, 1367.)  Another said that there must be separate counsel 
whenever a “potential conflict of interest” exists.  (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 
Cal.App.3d 553, 565.)  The relevant statute seems to require separate counsel only 
when an actual conflict exists.  “Counsel for the child may be a district attorney, 
public defender, or other member of the bar, provided that the counsel does not 
represent another party or county agency whose interests conflict with the child’s.”  
 
 
 
12 
 
(§ 317, subd. (c), italics added.)  As pointed out in In re Richard H., supra, at page 
1367, the original bill that became the revised section 317 said, “provided that the 
counsel does not represent another party or county agency whose interest may 
conflict with the minor’s.”  (Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) § 22, p. 23, 
as introduced Jan. 26, 1987, italics added.)  A later amendment deleted the word 
“may,” and the language became “provided that the counsel does not represent 
another party or county agency whose interests conflict with the minor’s.”  (Sen. 
Bill No. 243, supra, § 21, p. 23, as amended in Assembly July 9, 1987.)  Thus, 
“may conflict,” which would seem to include a potential conflict, became 
“conflict,” which seems to require an actual conflict. 
The California Rules of Professional Conduct (rules) appear to differ 
slightly from section 317.  Rule 3-310(C) provides that, without each client’s 
written consent, an attorney shall not:  “(1) Accept representation of more than one 
client in a matter in which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or [¶] (2) 
Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a matter in which the 
interests of the clients actually conflict . . . .”  Thus, this provision states that at the 
outset, an attorney may not accept representation if there is a potential conflict; it 
does not require an actual conflict.  In Carroll, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 1423, the 
court sought to reconcile the apparent tension between section 317 and rule 3-
310(C). 
The Carroll court first held that an attorney must withdraw from an existing 
representation only when an actual conflict arises among multiple clients.  
(Carroll, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.)  Noting the language of rule 3-310, it 
then considered when an attorney must refuse to accept representation of multiple 
clients at the outset due to a potential conflict among them.  It noted that there may 
always be at least a “theoretical potential conflict among” siblings.  (Carroll, 
supra, at p. 1429.)  “This theoretical potential conflict exists from the 
 
 
 
13 
 
commencement of a multi-sibling dependency proceeding because of the 
possibility reunification will be unsuccessful and the siblings’ interests may differ 
at the permanent plan stage; therefore, in multiple sibling cases, it can be argued 
that separate counsel must be appointed for each at the commencement of the 
proceedings.  On the other hand, dependency proceedings often result in 
reunification and even if they do not, multi-sibling permanent plans do not 
necessarily involve an actual conflict.  Although a theoretical potential conflict of 
interest exists in each multiple sibling dependency proceeding, it appears this 
potential conflict is theoretical, not realistic.  Therefore, appointment of separate 
counsel for each sibling at the commencement of the dependency proceeding 
would in most cases result in an unnecessary duplication of effort and resources.”  
(Ibid.) 
“A degree of tension exists between Rule 3-310, which prohibits an 
attorney from accepting new representation of multiple clients when a potential 
conflict of interest exists among the clients, and section 317, subdivision (c), 
which prohibits representation of a minor in a dependency proceeding and another 
person or agency whose interests conflict with the minor’s.  Rule 3-310 refers to 
potential conflict and section 317, subdivision (c) seems to contemplate an actual 
conflict.  We believe, however, that in the dependency context the two concepts 
can be reconciled by a rule that an attorney may not represent multiple clients if an 
actual conflict of interest between clients exists and may not accept representation 
of multiple clients if there is a reasonable likelihood an actual conflict of interest 
between them may arise.  By interpreting the Rule 3-310 concept of potential 
conflict to mean, at least in the dependency context, a reasonable likelihood an 
actual conflict will arise, it is possible to reconcile the importance of independent 
representation with the practicality of not overwhelming the dependency system 
when unnecessary.”  (Carroll, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430.) 
 
 
 
14 
 
  Counsel for the children urges us “to adopt the formulation in Carroll as 
both consistent with existing law and workable in the dependency context.”  We 
agree that the Carroll court appropriately reconciled section 317 and rule 3-310, as 
well as the sometimes contradictory needs to assure that everyone is properly 
represented but not to overburden the dependency system or unnecessarily suggest 
that siblings are adversaries.  When first appointing counsel in a dependency 
matter, the court may generally appoint a single attorney to represent all the 
siblings.  It would have to appoint separate attorneys if, but only if, there is an 
actual conflict among the siblings or if circumstances specific to the case—not just 
the potential for conflict that inheres in all multisibling dependency cases—present 
a reasonable likelihood an actual conflict will arise.  If these specific 
circumstances exist, the court should appoint separate counsel at the outset rather 
than await an actual conflict and the possible disruption a later reappointment may 
cause.  After the initial appointment, the court will have to relieve counsel from 
multiple representation if, but only if, an actual conflict arises. 
Nothing in the record indicates there was a reasonable likelihood an actual 
conflict would arise among the siblings when the court first appointed counsel in 
this matter.  The children do not argue otherwise.  The children, however, argue 
that the court was required to appoint separate counsel at the February 25, 2002, 
hearing when counsel cited the new sibling relationship exception of section 
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), and expressed concern that the adoption of Celine 
and Angel would have a negative impact on Crystal.  In a similar situation, the 
Carroll court concluded that groups of siblings that would not be kept together 
may require separate counsel.  (Carroll, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1430-
1431.)  Now that we have clarified the meaning of the sibling relationship 
exception, it is not clear whether this precise situation will rearise or how our 
 
 
 
15 
 
interpretation of that exception would affect this question.  But we need not decide 
whether the court erred in not relieving counsel, for any error was harmless. 
Citing In re Patricia E. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1, 9, and criminal cases, the 
children argue that harmless error analysis is inappropriate in cases of improper 
joint representation.  We disagree.  It is true that error in having one attorney 
represent multiple defendants in a criminal case, once established, is generally not 
susceptible of harmless error analysis (see People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 
86), but the analogy to criminal cases is inapt.  In In re Richard E. (1978) 21 
Cal.3d 349, we held that error in not appointing counsel for the child as well as for 
the parents and the social agency was subject to harmless error analysis.  “Failure 
to appoint counsel in the context of a freedom from parental custody and control 
proceeding is dissimilar to denial of the fundamental right to counsel where one is 
charged with crime or juvenile misconduct.  [Citation.]  None of the personal 
deprivations flowing from denial of counsel in juvenile court proceedings are 
present here.  [Citations.]  Accordingly, failure to appoint counsel for a minor in a 
freedom from parental custody and control proceeding does not require reversal of 
the judgment in the absence of miscarriage of justice.”  (Id. at p. 355.) 
Other than In re Patricia E., supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 1, which followed 
People v. Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d 86, Court of Appeal decisions have generally 
applied this harmless error rule to error in not appointing separate counsel for 
separate siblings.  In In re Elizabeth M., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pages 566-567, 
the court noted that a defendant’s right to counsel in criminal cases is a 
fundamental constitutional right, but the child’s right to counsel in a dependency 
case is solely statutory.  Accordingly, it concluded “that the Richard E. standard 
[In re Richard E., supra, 21 Cal.3d 349] applies to evaluating error in failing to 
appoint independent counsel for children with varying interests.  We thus 
determine whether the record reflects a miscarriage of justice in the failure to 
 
 
 
16 
 
appoint separate counsel.”  (In re Elizabeth M., supra, at p. 568; accord, In re 
Candida S., supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252.) 
We conclude that the failure to appoint separate counsel for separate 
siblings is subject to the same harmless error standard as error in not appointing 
counsel for the children at all.  We add another reason criminal cases are inapt.  In 
a criminal case, reversal of a criminal judgment is virtually always in the 
defendant’s best interest.  The situation in a dependency case is often different.  
Reversal of an order of adoption, for example, might be contrary to the child’s 
best interest because it would delay and might even prevent the adoption.  After 
reunification efforts have failed, it is not only important to seek an appropriate 
permanent solution—usually adoption when possible—it is also important to 
implement that solution reasonably promptly to minimize the time during which 
the child is in legal limbo.  A child has a compelling right to a stable, permanent 
placement that allows a caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the 
child.  (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306.)  Courts should strive to give 
the child this stable, permanent placement, and this full emotional commitment, as 
promptly as reasonably possible consistent with protecting the parties’ rights and 
making a reasoned decision.  The delay an appellate reversal causes might be 
contrary to, rather than in, the child’s best interests.  Thus, a reviewing court 
should not mechanically set aside an adoption order because of error in not giving 
that child separate counsel; the error must be prejudicial under the proper standard 
before reversal is appropriate. 
Other than the general reference to a miscarriage of justice, the cases have 
not stated the exact harmless error test.  (See, e.g., In re Daniel H., supra, 99 
Cal.App.4th at p. 813 [finding both no “reasonable probability” and no 
“reasonable possibility” of prejudice].)  The California Constitution prohibits a 
court from setting aside a judgment unless the error has resulted in a “miscarriage 
 
 
 
17 
 
of justice.”  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)  We have interpreted that language as 
permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the 
result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.  
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  We believe it appropriate to apply 
the same test in dependency matters.  A court should set aside a judgment due to 
error in not appointing separate counsel for a child or relieving conflicted counsel 
only if it finds a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different but 
for the error.  We disapprove of anything in In re Patricia E., supra, 174 
Cal.App.3d 1, that is inconsistent with this conclusion. 
Attorneys who believe the trial court is erroneously compelling them to 
represent more than one child may, like the attorney in Carroll, supra, 101 
Cal.App.4th 1423, seek writ relief in the Court of Appeal rather than await any 
appellate remedy.  But attorneys should do so only if they believe it is in their 
clients’ best interest.  Sometimes the additional delay that seeking writ relief might 
cause could harm the children.  An attorney for a child is “charged in general with 
the representation of the child’s interests” (§ 317, subd. (e)) rather than always 
seeking a result that counsel thinks is legally correct regardless of whether that 
result is in the child’s best interest. 
As did the Court of Appeal, we find harmless any error in not relieving 
counsel.  The parents did not oppose the proposed adoption by the father’s brother.  
If the court had relieved counsel for the children because an actual conflict had 
arisen, it would not necessarily have had to appoint new counsel for Celine and 
Angel.  The court need not appoint counsel—or in this situation replacement 
counsel—if it finds the appointment would not benefit the child and states on the 
record its reasons for this finding.  (§ 317, subd. (c).)  At this late stage of the 
proceedings, after everything that had already been done, the court might have 
found that appointing new counsel, and continuing the permanency planning 
 
 
 
18 
 
hearing yet again, would, by delaying the adoption, have been detrimental rather 
than beneficial to Celine and Angel.  (See In re Jesse C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 
1481 [court may relieve counsel from further representation when such 
representation would no longer benefit the child].)3  If it had made this finding, 
and stated its reasons on the record, the court could have relieved counsel and 
simply ordered the adoption and termination of parental rights without appointing 
new counsel for Celine and Angel.  Doing so would not have affected the 
outcome. 
Even if Celine and Angel had had separate counsel, that counsel would 
either have argued in favor of the adoption, which obviously would not have 
affected the outcome, or against it, as counsel here did in effect.  We find it very 
unlikely that separate counsel would have convinced the court to make a different 
ruling when joint counsel failed.  This is especially true given our conclusion that 
the sibling relationship exception permits the court to consider only possible 
detriment to Celine and Angel.  Reflecting the Legislature’s preference for 
adoption when possible, the “sibling relationship exception contains strong 
language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption.  It only applies 
when the juvenile court determines that there is a ‘compelling reason’ for 
concluding that the termination of parental rights would be ‘detrimental’ to the 
child due to ‘substantial interference’ with a sibling relationship.”  (In re Daniel 
H., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 813, quoting § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)  Indeed, even 
                                             
 
3  
When In re Jesse C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1481, was decided, section 
317, subdivision (c), required the appointment of counsel when “it appears to the 
court that the minor would benefit from the appointment of counsel.”  (See In re 
Jesse C., supra, at p. 1486.)  Today, the court must appoint counsel unless it finds 
the child would not benefit from such appointment and states its reasons for the 
finding.  Thus, it is now presumed the child will benefit from having counsel.  
Courts should be very cautious in finding that counsel would not benefit the child. 
 
 
 
19 
 
if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court must 
nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship 
against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through 
adoption.  (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952-953.) 
The record discloses virtually no basis for the court to suspect the younger 
children felt such a bond with their older half sibling that they should not be 
adopted.  Celine and Angel had lived with Crystal only a very short time when 
they were very young.  When the children were placed in separate homes in 
September 2000, Celine was three years old and Angel less than two years old.  
They had been living separately from Crystal for a year and a half as of the 
February 2002 hearing.  Given their age when separated from Crystal and the 
length of time they had already lived separately from her, the conclusion was 
virtually compelled that they had not been “raised with [Crystal] in the same 
home” and had not “shared significant common experiences or [had] existing 
close and strong bonds with [her]” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)), or at least that such 
bonds should not prevent them from gaining a permanent home through adoption.  
Even counsel for the children did not suggest adoption would be detrimental to 
Celine and Angel.  Her concerns regarded Crystal.  Moreover, it was undisputed at 
the hearing that even if Celine and Angel were not adopted, there were no 
prospects of their living with Crystal.  Under the circumstances, the trial court 
reasonably discounted the importance of the sibling relationship to Celine and 
Angel, even if it was important to the older child, and, as does the Legislature 
generally, it valued more their “ability to belong to a family.”  (See In re L.Y.L., 
supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 953.)  We find no reasonable probability the court 
would have chosen a different permanent plan for Celine and Angel even if it had 
relieved counsel from representing all three children. 
 
 
 
20 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I agree with the reasoning and results of the majority opinion.  The majority 
holds that appointment of separate counsel for siblings is required only when there 
is “a reasonable likelihood an actual conflict will arise” in the multiple 
representation.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  The majority concludes that no such 
reasonable likelihood existed at the time counsel was appointed in the present 
case.  The majority further holds that after initial appointment, counsel should only 
be relieved of multiple representation if an actual conflict arises.  The majority 
declines to decide whether such actual conflict arose in this case, concluding that 
even if the trial court erred, its error was harmless. 
In my view, the trial court did err in failing at the February 25, 2002 
hearing to relieve the children’s counsel from her representation of all the siblings.  
As counsel recognized, there appeared to be a conflict between representing the 
interests of the older sibling, who had an emotional stake in preserving the sibling 
relationship and for whom there was no adoption plan, and the younger children, 
who were infants when they last had contact with the older sibling and for whom 
adoption was contemplated.  (See Carroll v. Superior Court (2002) 101 
Cal.App.4th 1423, 1430-1431.)  I agree that the error was harmless for the reasons 
articulated in the majority opinion. 
Had this conflict been foreseen at the time of counsel’s appointment, then 
there would have been grounds for initially appointing separate counsel.  One of 
 
2 
the reasons why it was not foreseen is that the sibling exception to the adoption 
statute, enacted in 2001 (Stats. 2001, ch. 747, § 3) and codified at Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), had not yet been 
legislated.  A case in which counsel is appointed under circumstances similar to 
the present case, but after section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E)’s enactment, may 
present “a reasonable likelihood an actual conflict will arise” and require 
appointment of separate counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
I CONCUR: 
 
  KENNARD, J. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Celine R. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 102 Cal.App.4th 717 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S111138 
Date Filed: July 7, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kern 
Judge: Michael G. Bush 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
B.C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel, and Susan M. Gill, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
John J. Sansone, County Counsel (San Diego), Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Gary C. 
Seiser, Deputy County Counsel; and Ruth Sorensen for California State Association of Counties as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
William Wesley Patton for Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John L. Dodd 
17621 Irvine Boulevard, Suite 200 
Tustin, CA  92780 
(714) 731-5572 
 
Susan M. Gill 
Deputy County Counsel 
1115 Truxtun Avenue, Fourth Floor 
Bakersfield, CA  93301 
(661) 868-3874 
 
William Wesley Patton 
Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic 
3333 Harbor Boulevard 
Costa Mesa, CA  92323 
(714) 444-4141 ext. 229