Title: Samuel L. Smithers v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-2258
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2009

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
______________ 
 
No. SC07-2258 
______________ 
 
SAMUEL L. SMITHERS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC08-868 
_____________ 
 
SAMUEL L. SMITHERS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
 
[July 9, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Samuel L. Smithers appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Smithers also petitions this Court for a 
 
- 2 - 
writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the postconviction court‘s order and 
deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Smithers was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the 1996 
killings of Cristy Cowan and Denise Roach.  He was sentenced to death on both 
counts.  This Court set out the facts of the case on direct appeal: 
In 1995, Sam Smithers agreed to mow the grass at a vacant Plant City 
house owned by Marion Whitehurst. . . . 
 
In 1996, Smithers and Whitehurst renewed their agreement. 
Smithers mowed the lawn the week of May 20 and Whitehurst paid 
Smithers on May 26.  At approximately 7 p.m. on May 28, Whitehurst 
decided to stop by the property.  The gate was locked when she 
arrived, but after opening the gate and driving to the house, 
Whitehurst found Smithers‘ truck parked just outside the carport. . . .  
Whitehurst noticed a pool of blood in the carport.  Smithers told her 
that someone must have come by and killed a small animal.  He 
assured her that he would clean up the mess. 
 
Although Whitehurst left the house, she was bothered by the 
pool of blood, and therefore she contacted the Sheriff‘s Department.  
Later that night, Deputy Skolnik met Whitehurst at the property.  The 
pool of blood had been cleaned up, but the deputy noticed what 
appeared to be drag marks in the grass leading towards one of the 
ponds.  The deputy followed the drag marks down to the pond and 
discovered a dead female body floating in the water.  The woman was 
later identified as Cristy Cowan.  A dive team subsequently 
discovered a second dead female body in another part of the pond.  
She was later identified as Denise Roach. 
 
. . . . 
 
Smithers told the detectives the following version of events 
regarding the Cowan murder.  Smithers was coming home from work 
when he spotted a car on the side of the road.  He stopped to assist the 
driver (Cowan) and drove her to a convenience store.  Once back in 
 
- 3 - 
his truck, Cowan demanded money and threatened to accuse him of 
rape if he did not give her money.  Smithers drove Cowan to the 
Whitehurst property.  Smithers gave Cowan all the money that he had 
but she still was not satisfied and she threw a drink at him.  In 
response, he picked up an axe and struck Cowan in the head.  She fell 
down unconscious and he dragged her to the pond.  He returned to the 
carport to rinse off the axe when Whitehurst arrived.  During the time 
that Whitehurst was there, he could hear Cowan making noises from 
the pond (Whitehurst testified that she never heard any sounds).  
When Whitehurst left, he went back to the pond and hit Cowan in the 
head ―to shut her up.‖  He also threw some tree limbs at her. 
 
Later in the interview, Smithers explained to the detectives his 
involvement with the Roach murder.  On May 7, Smithers was at the 
Whitehurst property mowing the lawn when Roach approached him.  
Roach told him that she had permission to be on the property.  When 
Smithers returned to the Whitehurst property on May 13, Roach was 
still there.  Smithers asked her to leave and she refused.  Roach then 
hit Smithers on the arm and Smithers punched Roach in the face. 
Smithers said that Roach picked up a planter in the carport and threw 
it at Smithers‘ truck, causing a dent.  Smithers shoved Roach against 
the wall, causing a piece of wood to fall down from a shelf and hit her 
on the head.  Roach fell to the ground unconscious.  Smithers left the 
property, but he returned the next day and dragged her body to the 
pond.  He cleaned up the blood with mop and a bucket of water. 
 
Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916, 918-20 (Fla. 2002).  Despite giving this 
statement to law enforcement officers, Smithers testified during the guilt phase of 
his trial that he did not kill Roach or Cowan.  He testified that another man killed 
the women and coerced Smithers into disposing of the bodies. 
The jury found Smithers guilty on both counts and, after a penalty phase, 
unanimously recommended the death sentence for each murder.  The sentencing 
court followed the jury‘s recommendation and imposed the death sentence for each 
murder.  The sentencing court found three aggravating factors in the Cowan 
 
- 4 - 
murder and two aggravating factors in the Roach murder.  It also found two 
statutory and seven nonstatutory mitigating factors applicable to each murder.  Id. 
at 922.  Smithers appealed his convictions and sentences.  This Court affirmed the 
convictions and sentences.  Id. at 931. 
On April 7, 2006, Smithers filed an amended motion to vacate judgment of 
conviction and sentence, raising seven claims.  The postconviction court held an 
evidentiary hearing on Smithers‘ claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  
After considering the evidence presented, the postconviction court denied the 
motion.  Smithers now appeals the postconviction court‘s denial.  He argues that 
the court erred in denying parts of two of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.1  In addition, Smithers filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising 
five claims. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Smithers does not appeal the denial of his claims that trial counsel was 
ineffective due to his failure to present evidence that would have corroborated 
Smithers‘ trial testimony; failure to present evidence that Smithers‘ confession was 
the product of psychological coercion; failure to object to the introduction of 
evidence of an uncharged crime and to prosecutorial comments about that 
uncharged crime; failure to argue that Smithers was not eligible for the death 
penalty because he was an ordained deacon; presentation of an expert witness that 
had not finished his evaluation of Smithers; and failure to request separate jury 
instructions on the aggravating factors that could apply to each victim.  Smithers 
also does not appeal his claims raised in the postconviction court that the rules 
prohibiting defense counsel from interviewing jurors are unconstitutional; the jury 
was not adequately instructed, and counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate the 
sufficiency of the instructions; Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme was 
unconstitutional as applied, and counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate this 
 
- 5 - 
II.  MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
On appeal, Smithers argues that the postconviction court should have found 
that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to (A) strike a 
prospective juror for cause; (B) seek exclusion of a portion of Smithers‘ statement 
to law enforcement; (C) adequately investigate mental health mitigation; and (D) 
call an independent medical examiner as a defense expert. 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show both that trial counsel‘s performance was deficient and that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair 
trial.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  As to the first prong, the 
defendant must establish that ―counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.‖  
Id. at 687; see also Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  For the 
second prong, the reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability that but for the deficiency the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  ―A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  This Court employs a 
mixed standard of review, deferring to the postconviction court‘s factual findings 
                                                                                                                                        
issue; he may be incompetent at the time of execution; and cumulative errors 
deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. 
 
- 6 - 
that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing legal 
conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004). 
A.  Failure to Strike Prospective Juror 
Smithers argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging juror Collins for cause based on 
statements made by Collins during voir dire concerning his views on the death 
penalty.  Because the full context of Collins‘ statements does not show that Collins 
was actually biased, we conclude that the postconviction court did not err in 
denying this claim. 
In Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 324 (Fla. 2007), this Court held that 
―where a postconviction motion alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise or preserve a cause challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that a juror 
was actually biased‖ to be entitled to relief.  Without a showing of such actual bias 
of the juror, the defendant cannot establish the prejudice required by Strickland.  
The Court explained in Carratelli that 
actual bias means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an 
impartial juror.  Under the actual bias standard, the defendant must 
demonstrate that the juror in question was not impartial––i.e., that the 
juror was biased against the defendant, and the evidence of bias must 
be plain on the face of the record. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 
- 7 - 
In Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2008), this Court applied the 
Carratelli standard to a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not exercising a 
cause or a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror.  The Court held that 
there was no evidence of bias in the record where a juror stated that she 
―[p]robably‖ would vote for the death penalty in the circumstance of multiple 
victims but ultimately stated that mitigating evidence such as testimony about the 
defendant‘s mental health could influence her to recommend a life sentence.  Id. at 
550. 
In this case, the defense argues that the following exchange gave counsel 
reason to challenge juror Collins for cause. 
MR. ROBBINS: Okay, I guess the same questions, can you 
conceive of circumstances that you think might be worth considering 
as far as mitigating circumstances, things involving either people‘s 
mental or physical circumstances, upbringing, those sorts of things? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR COLLINS: I guess it depends if the 
person is abused as a kid or something, I don‘t know.  But if they are 
guilty without a doubt they should get the death penalty. 
MR. ROBBINS: If someone is found guilty and you are totally 
convinced they are guilty of the offense whatever that particular 
murder case is about, do you feel that there could ever be any other 
sentence except the death penalty for first degree murder? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR COLLINS: Maybe life without parole. 
MR. ROBBINS: Those are the two choices by the way, life 
without parole or the death penalty.  But what I‘m asking is do you 
feel there could be circumstances where you vote for a 
recommendation for life? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR COLLINS: Yes, if I have to. 
 
 
 
- 8 - 
Juror Collins‘ statements did not show a biased unwillingness to consider 
potential sentences other than death.  Rather, similar to the comments considered 
in Owen, juror Collins expressed that he could consider life without parole as a 
possible sentence for first-degree murder and that if under Florida law the 
circumstances compelled a life recommendation, he would recommend life.  Thus, 
the record does not demonstrate actual bias that would prevent juror Collins from 
serving as an impartial juror.  Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err in 
denying this claim.2 
B.  Failure to Seek Exclusion of a Portion of Smithers’ Confession 
Smithers alleged that defense counsel Daniel Mario Hernandez was 
ineffective for not making a motion to exclude a portion of Smithers‘ confession.  
During the guilt phase, Detective Dorothy Flair, also known as Detective Martinez, 
testified that she interviewed Smithers on the night that the bodies were discovered 
and on the following day.  She testified to the substance of both interviews, 
including the following description of Smithers‘ statements about the murder of 
Denise Roach:  
                                          
 
 
2.  To the extent that Smithers argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to question juror Collins about potential mitigation, his argument is 
procedurally barred and without merit.  Smithers did not raise that argument before 
the postconviction court.  See Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1104 (Fla. 2008).  
Moreover, in Green, this Court held that an allegation that further questioning 
would have established a basis for a cause challenge was ―speculative‖ and not a 
basis for relief.  Id. at 1105. 
 
- 9 - 
Q. 
Okay.  What was his response to her hitting him on the 
shoulder or the arm? 
A. 
He told her that she wasn‘t going to hit him and he said 
he got upset about it. 
Q. 
Did he tell you whether or not he hit her in any part of 
her body? 
A. 
He said he hit her several times with a fist, with his first 
[sic]. 
Q. 
And did he tell you where on the body? 
A. 
In her face and head. 
Q. 
Did he tell you—Did he make any comments as to 
whether or not he had hit her again? 
A. 
After that, yes.  
Q. 
Yes.  Did anything kick in that make her—made him hit 
her again? 
A. 
He said that some prejudice may have set in so he hit her 
again.  
Q. 
And this is because she was black? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
After he hits her again does he tell her that he is going to 
call the police? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
And does he tell you how she reacts? 
A. 
She throws the planter against his truck. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  After this exchange, Detective Flair testified concerning 
Smithers‘ statements about the additional injuries he inflicted on Roach. 
 
During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel Hernandez 
testified that at the time of trial, he considered the fact that Smithers may have 
been prejudiced against the victim to be ―inextricably intertwined with the facts of 
the case.‖  He explained that it was only ―in retrospect‖ that he recognized that he 
could have filed a nonfrivolous motion to exclude the prejudice comment on the 
basis that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value.  Because 
 
- 10 - 
the postconviction court found that it was ―reasonable professional judgment of 
counsel to believe the racial bias was inextricably intertwined with the crime 
charged,‖ the court concluded that trial counsel was not deficient.  The 
postconviction court also concluded that Smithers did not establish that the 
admission of the statement ―was so prejudicial that confidence in the outcome was 
undermined.‖ 
Even if an objection to the admission of this portion of Smithers‘ statement 
would have been meritorious—which we do not decide—we conclude that 
Smithers has not established the requisite prejudice under the Strickland standard.  
Considering ―the totality of the evidence,‖ we conclude that Smithers has not ―met 
the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been 
different absent‖ the admission of Smithers‘ comment regarding his racial 
prejudice.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. 
Detective Flair‘s testimony about Smithers‘ statement to law enforcement 
officers spanned nearly thirty pages in the record.  Detective Flair testified that 
Smithers admitted to beating and killing Roach and Cowan and to attempting to 
dispose of their bodies in a pond.  The challenged comment was only a few lines of 
the testimony about Smithers‘ detailed admission.  In addition, other evidence 
connected Smithers to the murders.  Smithers and Cowan were seen together on a 
convenience store videotape filmed about an hour before Whitehurst discovered 
 
- 11 - 
the pool of blood in the carport.  Shoe prints by the pond matched the shoes found 
in Smithers‘ home.  Smithers‘ fingerprint was found in the kitchen of Whitehurst‘s 
house, and Smithers could not be excluded as the contributor of a semen stain that 
was found in the house.  Smithers, 826 So. 2d at 919.  Furthermore, the State did 
not mention the possible racial motivation for the murder during its guilt-phase 
closing argument, and thus the jury was not reminded of the challenged testimony 
before deliberating.  Given the persuasive evidence that Smithers committed the 
murders and the fact that the State did not emphasize the challenged testimony 
during closing, there is no reasonable probability that the jury improperly 
convicted Smithers of either murder due to his expression of racial bias, rather than 
properly convicted him based on the evidence of his guilt.  Trial counsel‘s alleged 
deficiency does not undermine confidence in the verdict. 
As for sentencing, the State alluded to the evidence of racial bias once in its 
penalty-phase closing argument.  The prosecutor used the phrase ―I guess prejudice 
set in‖ when paraphrasing Smithers‘ statement about the Roach murder.  Smithers 
asserts that the evidence influenced at least one juror‘s decision to recommend 
death. 
In Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1988), a direct appeal, we stated 
that ―the risk of racial prejudice infecting a criminal trial takes on greater 
significance in the context of a capital sentencing‖ where the jury is called upon to 
 
- 12 - 
make a ―highly subjective‖ evaluation.  The facts presented in Robinson were, 
however, very different from the facts presented here.  In Robinson, we concluded 
that ―the prosecutor‘s examination of [a] witness was a deliberate attempt to 
insinuate that [the defendant] had a habit of preying on white women and thus 
constituted an impermissible appeal to bias and prejudice.‖  Id. at 6.  We further 
concluded that the error could not be deemed harmless because we could not 
―presume that the prejudicial testimony did not remain imbedded in the minds of 
the jurors and influence their recommendation.‖  Id. at 8.  The passing reference to 
Smithers‘ statement concerning his prejudice is of a different character than the 
prosecutor‘s calculated attempt in Robinson to play on any racial prejudice held by 
the jurors. 
Our decision in State v. Davis, 872 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2004), is also readily 
distinguishable.  In Davis, defense counsel, during voir dire of a panel of 
prospective jurors, said: ―Sometimes I just don‘t like black people.  Sometimes 
black people make me mad just because they‘re black.‖  Id. (emphasis removed).  
We concluded that Davis was entitled to postconviction relief because ―the 
expressions of racial animus voiced by trial counsel during voir dire so seriously 
affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that our confidence in the 
jury‘s verdicts of guilt [wa]s undermined.‖  Id. at 253.  The improper and 
 
- 13 - 
inflammatory comments made by defense counsel in Davis are very different from 
the comment made by Smithers which is at issue here. 
Moreover, Smithers does not address how the comment could have affected 
the evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors by the jury or the 
sentencing court.  See Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 585 (Fla. 2008) (―‗Prejudice . 
. . is shown where, absent the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different or 
the deficiencies substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the 
proceedings.‘‖ (quoting Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 n.14 (Fla. 1999))).  
As discussed above, admission of the evidence of racial bias does not undermine 
confidence in either of the contemporaneous murder convictions that supported the 
prior violent felony aggravating factors, and the evidence has no bearing on 
whether the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) was 
applicable to the Cowan murder.  And while the comment may have supported the 
conclusion that Smithers acted from a particularly wicked or vile motive in the 
Roach murder, the comment was immaterial to whether the killing was 
―unnecessarily torturous to the victim.‖  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11 Penalty 
Proceedings—Capital Cases (defining heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating 
factor).  In short, there is no ―reasonable probability‖ that absent the admission of 
Smithers‘ comment concerning his racial prejudice, ―the balance of aggravating 
 
- 14 - 
and mitigating circumstances would have been different‖ in the eyes of either the 
jury—which unanimously recommended death for the murders—or the sentencing 
court.  Jones, 998 So. 2d at 585. 
In conclusion, the postconviction court did not err in concluding that 
Smithers was not entitled to relief on this claim. 
C.  Failure to Adequately Investigate Mental Health Mitigation 
 
In this claim, Smithers argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
investigating available mitigation evidence.  Smithers asserts that trial counsel 
unreasonably failed to provide the defense‘s mental health expert, Michael Scott 
Maher, M.D., with an investigative report documenting Smithers‘ claim that Dean 
Snyder, Smithers‘ neighbor, was present when a man in a Bentley approached 
Smithers.3  He further asserts that counsel unreasonably failed to interview Dean 
Snyder and to provide Dr. Maher with the results of the Snyder interview.  
                                          
 
 
3.  During the evidentiary hearing, the defense introduced a report dated 
September 17, 1998, from investigator Diane Fernandez to Smithers‘ trial 
attorneys.  The report stated that on September 11, 1998, Smithers informed his 
attorneys and Fernandez that he did not kill Roach and Cowan.  Smithers explained 
that he was approached at his home by a white male driving a Bentley.  Smithers 
explained that the man blackmailed Smithers into allowing him to use the 
Whitehurst property to ―conduct some business.‖  The report indicated that 
Smithers stated that he was speaking with Dean Snyder when the man arrived.  At 
the evidentiary hearing, Snyder testified that he never saw a man get out of a 
Bentley while he was talking to Smithers, that he believed he would remember 
such an event, that he was not asked by the defense to testify at trial, and that he 
would have been willing to testify. 
 
- 15 - 
Smithers explains that Snyder‘s statement that he never saw the man in the Bentley 
was evidence of a hallucination by Smithers. 
The postconviction court denied this claim, concluding that trial counsel‘s 
performance was adequate because he presented two expert witnesses about 
Smithers‘ possible psychosis and additional testimony to establish mitigating 
factors.  The postconviction court explained that ―changed opinions‖ do not 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.  After reviewing the postconviction 
record and the trial record, we conclude that Smithers has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice.  The postconviction court, therefore, did not err in denying relief on this 
claim. 
 
During the penalty phase, Dr. Maher diagnosed Smithers as suffering from a 
dissociative disorder not otherwise specified.  Dr. Maher explained that while 
Smithers was ―out of touch with reality in significant aspects of his beliefs and his 
ideas,‖ he found insufficient information to diagnose psychosis.  He stated, ―I can‘t 
say he was not psychotic during some of these dissociative episodes but I‘m not 
going to make the diagnosis simply out of uncertainty or in spite of some testing 
that shows he might be psychotic.‖  Later, Dr. Maher again clarified, ―I think he 
might have psychotic—I‘m not saying he doesn‘t but it is not part of my diagnosis 
that there are psychotic episodes.‖  He opined that both statutory mental health 
mitigating factors, extreme mental or emotional disturbance and substantially 
 
- 16 - 
impaired capacity, were applicable to the murders and described each murder as 
―an impulsive action taken by a man who was in the midst of a dissociative 
episode.‖  During cross-examination, Dr. Maher agreed that ―dissociative disorder 
with possible psychotic features‖ would be an accurate description of the 
diagnosis.  
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Maher testified that after 
reviewing the investigative report and learning that Snyder would testify that he 
never saw a man in a Bentley approach Smithers, Dr. Maher revised his diagnosis 
to ―[p]sychotic episode recurrent.‖  Dr. Maher testified that Smithers‘ insistence 
about the Bentley incident and Snyder‘s lack of corroboration was ―a pretty strong 
suggestion of psychosis or a drug-induced delirium or some other very substantial 
disturbance or perception and reality.‖  He explained that at the time of trial, he 
was close to diagnosing Smithers with psychosis and that an ―incident such as this 
which is clear and definite would in my judgment have led me to conclude that he 
was psychotic previously.‖ 
Dr. Maher‘s revised diagnosis is largely cumulative to the opinion offered 
by Dr. Robert Berland, who testified as an expert in forensic psychology during the 
penalty phase.  Dr. Berland diagnosed Smithers as having ―a chronic mental 
illness, a chronic psychotic condition, at least in part a by-product of brain injury.‖  
Dr. Berland testified that Smithers‘ ex-wife told him about Smithers ―doing things 
 
- 17 - 
which are associated with auditory and tactical hallucinations.‖  He opined that at 
the time of the murders, Smithers was ―suffering from an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance‖ as a result of ―a chronic psychotic disturbance effecting 
[sic] his judgment and behavior‖ and that while Smithers‘ ability to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct was not substantially impaired, his ability to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  Dr. Berland further 
opined that at the time of the murders, Smithers ―had an ongoing problem . . . 
involving a series of delusions and hallucinations and mood disturbance and a 
panoramic distortion in his judgment and perceptions.‖ 
In light of the evidence presented at trial and the sentencing court‘s findings, 
we conclude that Dr. Maher‘s revised opinion does not undermine confidence in 
the death sentences.  After considering the testimony of Dr. Maher, Dr. Berland, 
Dr. Wood (who testified about a PET scan and an MRI examination of Smithers), 
and the State‘s mental health experts, Dr. Donald Taylor and Dr. Barbara Stein, the 
sentencing court concluded that the mitigating factor of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance was proven and was entitled to moderate weight.  The 
sentencing court also concluded that the mitigating factor of substantially impaired 
capacity was proven and entitled to moderate weight.  Despite finding these 
mitigating factors, the sentencing court ―agree[d] with the unanimous jury that in 
 
- 18 - 
weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances, the 
scale tilts unquestionably to a sentence of death.‖ 
There is no reasonable probability that the sentencing court would have 
given significantly more weight to the statutory mental health mitigating factors 
had Dr. Maher diagnosed Smithers as suffering from psychotic episode recurrent, 
rather than dissociative disorder with possible psychotic features.  While the 
sentencing court was not aware of the possible hallucination about the man in the 
Bentley, the sentencing court was aware of Smithers‘ mental illness and considered 
how that illness impacted his actions at the time of the murders.  When considered 
in context, the change in Dr. Maher‘s diagnosis simply does not rise to the level of 
undiscovered mitigation previously found to require a new penalty phase.  See, 
e.g., Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. 1995) (holding defendant 
prejudiced where trial counsel presented only lay witnesses and failed to present 
evidence of defendant‘s psychiatric hospitalizations and suicide attempts); Phillips 
v. State, 608 So. 2d 778, 782-83 (Fla. 1992) (holding defendant prejudiced where 
trial counsel admitted doing ―virtually no preparation‖ for penalty phase and failed 
to present evidence of borderline mental retardation, schizoid personality, head 
injury, and lifelong deficits in adaptive functioning). 
D.  Failure to Call Independent Medical Examiner as Defense Expert 
 
- 19 - 
In his final postconviction claim, Smithers argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not retaining an independent medical examiner to refute testimony 
and argument about whether victim Cowan was alive and conscious when she was 
placed in the pond.  The postconviction court found that counsel was not 
ineffective.  We agree. 
At trial, Dr. Laura Hair, Associate Medical Examiner in District Six, 
testified that based on the foam cone found around Cowan‘s mouth, the body being 
recovered from water, and the possibility that someone heard the victim calling 
from the pond, drowning was a ―possibility.‖  Dr. Hair explained: 
At the time of the autopsy I did not consider the possibility of 
drowning.  I really believed her to have been dead from her injuries in 
the pond.  I got information later on that she may well have been 
making noise and that foam cone is probably indicative of drowning. 
When asked if the congestion found in Cowan‘s lungs was consistent with 
drowning, Dr. Hair answered: ―It‘s possible.  It‘s consistent with a lot of things 
actually.‖  Ultimately, Dr. Hair opined that the cause of death was ―the combined 
effects of the manual strangulation and chop wounds of the head.‖  She did not 
testify about whether the chop wounds were inflicted before or after Cowan was 
strangled, and she did not testify about at what point during the attack Cowan 
likely lost consciousness. 
On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between defense 
counsel and Dr. Hair: 
 
- 20 - 
Q.  
So you are testifying that foaming could be indicative of 
drowning.  That‘s simply a possibility? 
A.  
Yes. 
Q. 
You are not able to make any conclusion correct? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
In fact I believe you testified that you did not even think 
about drowning until you were told that somebody had said they heard 
voices, correct? 
A. 
That‘s correct, yes, sir. 
Q. 
And in fact you did not list it as a cause of death in 
preparing the Certificate of Death? 
A. 
That‘s correct. 
 
On re-cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Dr. Hair about whether the 
foam cone could have been caused by air escaping the body after death. 
Q.  
That [foam if caused by last breaths or trapped air] is not 
an indication of breathing, correct? 
A.  
No. 
Q. 
And the person could be for that matter be unconscious 
when this is occurring? 
A. 
You can breathe when you are unconscious, yes. 
Q. 
And the person could be dead and there could be you said 
air that was trapped in the lungs that was escaping, is that correct? 
A. 
That‘s correct. 
 
 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Ronald Keith Wright, M.D., 
testified as an expert in forensic pathology on behalf of Smithers.  Dr. Wright 
opined that Cowan‘s cause of death was manual strangulation and that it was 
―highly unlikely‖ that she died of drowning.  He testified about the specific 
physiological factors that caused him to believe she did not drown in freshwater, 
 
- 21 - 
including the relatively light weight of her lungs, the lack of hemorrhaging to the 
mastoid air sinuses, and the lack of right-heart fibrillation.4 
Trial counsel Scott Lyon Robbins testified that the defense strategy had been 
to argue that Cowan died of blunt trauma, not strangulation, before she was in the 
water.  Attorney Robbins explained that he made a strategic decision that Dr. 
Hair‘s testimony supported the defense‘s arguments.  Attorney Robbins stated: 
My decision at the time was that we had what we needed to 
make the arguments we were trying to make from Dr. Hair‘s 
testimony.  At that time that was what we proceeded with, that she 
wasn‘t given [sic] a definitive strangulation over the blunt trauma.  
She really wasn‘t saying which it was.  There wasn‘t any statement as 
to whether the witness was conscious at any point.  And to show that 
there was, you know, there was a particular painful or drawn out or 
cruel death was something that she really didn‘t nail down very well.  
And so that was the point we were trying to make was that that wasn‘t 
proven. 
Because Smithers did not demonstrate that this decision to rely on Dr. Hair‘s 
testimony was unreasonable, the postconviction court did not err in denying this 
claim.  In Belcher v. State, 961 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2007), this Court rejected a similar 
argument that defense counsel should have presented its own expert gynecologist, 
rather than relying on cross-examination of the State‘s expert.  In that case, trial 
counsel testified that the defense felt that the State expert could ―give them what 
they wanted.‖  Id. at 250.  This Court affirmed the denial of relief, finding that 
                                          
 
 
4.  During the hearing, Dr. Maher also testified briefly about Cowan‘s cause 
of death.  His testimony was cumulative to Dr. Hair‘s trial testimony. 
 
- 22 - 
counsel made a reasonable strategic decision.  The Court explained that it is not 
necessary for defense counsel to retain a defense expert ―where defense counsel 
cross-examined the State‘s experts to establish the facts necessary for the defense.‖  
Id.  In this case, Dr. Hair‘s testimony was silent as to whether Cowan was 
conscious during the strangulation and agreed that the evidence did not exclude the 
possibility that she was unconscious when placed in the pond.  Thus, Dr. Hair‘s 
testimony was consistent with the defense‘s argument that Cowan lost 
consciousness quickly due to blows to the head.  Accordingly, trial counsel was not 
deficient. 
Moreover, Smithers failed to prove deficiency because much of Dr. Wright‘s 
testimony would have been harmful to the defense.  Dr. Wright‘s testimony 
contradicted the argument that Cowan lost consciousness quickly due to blows to 
the head.  He testified that based on the lack of internal bleeding, Cowan‘s head 
injuries were inflicted postmortem or perimortem after she was strangled to 
unconsciousness.  See Rose v. State, 985 So. 2d 500, 505-06 (Fla. 2008) (finding 
counsel made reasonable tactical decision not to call expert to discuss photographs 
due to concern that evidence could have harmed defense); Provenzano v. State, 
616 So. 2d 428, 432 (Fla. 1993) (finding counsel not deficient for failing to 
introduce records that contradicted defense‘s theory). 
 
- 23 - 
We also conclude that Smithers did not establish that he was prejudiced by 
the alleged deficient performance.  While it is true that the State argued to the jury 
that Cowan may have drowned, Smithers has not shown a reasonable probability 
that the sentence imposed would have been different had the defense presented an 
expert witness. 
The evidence does not undermine confidence in the sentencing court‘s 
finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  In 
discussing HAC, the sentencing court stated that the evidence established that ―the 
death of Cristy Cowan was caused by or involved blunt impact to her face and 
head, manual strangulation, and possible drowning.‖  However, the focus of the 
sentencing court‘s analysis was that the ―strangulation death of a conscious victim 
is in and of itself a crime which is heinous, atrocious, or cruel.‖  The testimony 
presented at the postconviction hearing supported, rather than contradicted, the 
finding that Cowan was strangled to death while conscious. 
The evidence also does not undermine confidence in the sentencing court‘s 
finding that the CCP aggravating factor was applicable.  In analyzing CCP, the 
sentencing court relied on the evidence that Smithers deliberately sought out 
Cowan and took her to the secluded property after he had already killed Roach.  
On appeal, this Court likewise relied on the events leading up to Cowan‘s murder 
in finding CCP applicable.  The postconviction evidence did not refute the 
 
- 24 - 
evidence that Smithers picked up Cowan, took her to the property, and locked the 
gate behind them, after having recently killed Denise Roach. 
Because trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to call a 
defense expert and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing does not 
undermine confidence in the sentences, the postconviction court did not err in 
denying relief. 
III.  PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Smithers raises five claims in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  He 
claims that (A) the rules prohibiting counsel from interviewing jurors are 
unconstitutional; (B) the jury was not adequately instructed, and counsel was 
ineffective for failing to litigate the sufficiency of the instructions; (C) Florida‘s 
capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional as applied, and counsel was 
ineffective for failing to litigate this issue; (D) cumulative errors deprived him of a 
fundamentally fair trial; and (E) he may be incompetent at the time of execution. 
With the exception of his cumulative error argument, each claim is 
procedurally barred because Smithers raised an identical claim in his motion for 
postconviction relief.  See Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 976 (Fla. 2006) 
(holding habeas claims procedurally barred where same claims were raised in 
defendant‘s postconviction motion, summarily denied, and not appealed).  In 
 
- 25 - 
addition, as discussed below, each of Smithers‘ habeas claims is without merit.  
Thus, we deny the petition. 
A.  Juror Interviews 
Smithers argues that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 
is unconstitutional.  This Court has rejected similar challenges and has held rule 4-
3.5(d)(4) to be constitutional.  See, e.g., Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 957 (Fla. 
2004) (holding that rule 4-3.5(d)(4) does not conflict with defendant‘s 
constitutional rights to fair trial and effective assistance of counsel). 
B.  Jury Instructions 
Next, Smithers argues that his jury was given inadequate instructions and 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate the sufficiency of the 
instructions.  The challenged instructions are virtually identical to Florida Standard 
Criminal Jury Instruction 7.11.  This Court has repeatedly held that the standard 
instructions do not violate Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  See, e.g., 
Evans v. State, 975 So. 2d 1035, 1053 (Fla. 2007).  The Court also has held that 
Florida‘s standard penalty-phase instructions do not unconstitutionally shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant, see Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 
1982), and that the standard instructions defining HAC and CCP are not 
unconstitutionally vague.  See Donaldson v. State, 722 So. 2d 177, 186 n.10 (Fla. 
1998) (holding standard HAC instruction not unconstitutionally vague and 
 
- 26 - 
overbroad); Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (Fla. 2001) (holding standard 
CCP jury instruction not unconstitutionally vague).  Because each of Smithers‘ 
substantive arguments about the jury instructions is without merit, trial counsel 
was not ineffective for not raising those arguments.  See Evans, 975 So. 2d at 1043 
(holding counsel not ineffective for failing to make meritless argument).   
To the extent that Smithers may assert that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to litigate this issue, that claim is also procedurally barred and without 
merit.  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to 
camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal.  Rutherford v. 
Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  Moreover, appellate counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument.  Id. 
C.  Capital Sentencing Scheme 
Smithers argues that pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to him and that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not litigating this issue.  A defendant is not entitled 
to relief on the basis of Ring where, as in this case, the prior violent felony 
conviction aggravating factor is present, and ―counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument.‖  Evans, 975 So. 2d at 1043, 
1052-53.  To the extent that Smithers may assert that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to litigate this issue, his argument is without merit.  
 
- 27 - 
Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless 
argument.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643. 
D.  Cumulative Error 
 
Smithers argues that the cumulative effect of the substantive and procedural 
errors denied him a fair trial.  This Court found no reversible error on direct appeal, 
and Smithers has not demonstrated through his postconviction motion and appeal 
or this petition that any additional error occurred that was not considered on direct 
appeal.  Thus, he is not entitled to relief on the basis of cumulative error.  See, e.g., 
Owen, 986 So. 2d at 556-57 (denying cumulative error claim where defendant did 
not show that any harmful error occurred). 
E.  Competency at Time of Execution 
 
Finally, while acknowledging that a claim of incompetency at the time of 
execution is not ripe until a death warrant is issued, Smithers nevertheless argues 
that he may be incompetent at the time of his execution.  We agree that this claim 
is premature.  The claim is hereby denied without prejudice to raise the issue once 
a death warrant is signed.  See Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d 789, 805 (Fla. 2007). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court‘s denial of 
Smithers‘ motion for postconviction relief and deny his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
 
- 28 - 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and 
LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PERRY, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
William Fuente, Judge – Case No. 96-8093 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali A. Shakoor, Richard E. 
Kiley, and James Viggiano, Jr., Staff Attorneys, CCRC – Middle Region, Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Candance M. Sabella, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent