Title: Hazlet v. Gaunt
Citation: 126 Colo. 385, 250 P.2d 188
Docket Number: 16890
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 1952

250 P.2d 188 (1952) 126 Colo. 385 HAZLET et al. v. GAUNT et al. No. 16890. Supreme Court of Colorado, en Banc. October 14, 1952. *189 Maurice W. Konkel, Sterling, Isaac Mellman, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilbur Rocchio, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Commissioner of Education. Lyman P. Weld, Longmont, Emory L. O'Connell, Denver, for all defendants in error except State Commissioner of Education. MOORE, Justice. We will herein refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court, where plaintiffs in error were plaintiffs and defendants in error were defendants. Plaintiffs are citizens and taxpayers residing in Adams county, and their places of residence are within school districts which were added, in whole or in part, to School District No. 27 under procedures authorized by The School District Reorganization Act of 1949. Chapter 224, page 636, Session Laws of Colorado 1949. In their complaint, the legality of the reorganization of the new district was questioned upon constitutional, and other, grounds. They alleged that the defendant members of the school board for the new district were proceeding under the purported powers designated to them by said Act to issue bonds in the sum of $936,000 for school purposes, and that the contemplated bond issue would be illegal and without authority of law. The prayer of plaintiffs' complaint was for judgment that all acts of defendants performed in the capacity of the County Committee on school reorganization, together with all acts of defendants performed in the capacity of members of the newly created school district and as public officials in furtherance of said reorganization, be declared null and void, and that defendants be enjoined from further acts based upon the validity of said reorganization. Defendants in their answer placed all material questions of fact in issue. Trial was to the court and resulted in judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs seeking a reversal of this judgment bring the case here by writ of error. The School District Reorganization Act of 1949 establishes procedures for the reorganization of school districts and defines in detail the steps to be taken in the accomplishment of that objective. The selection of a County Committee is authorized and this body is empowered to set in motion a chain of events which ultimately leads to an election to determine whether the plan of reorganization, which the committee and State Commissioner of Education approve, shall become effective. These procedures were followed in the instant case. An election was held in conformity with the statute, whereby the proposed reorganization of school districts was approved by a majority of the voters casting ballots under the qualifications fixed by the Act. Section 14 of the Act provides, inter alia: Section 22 of the Act provides, inter alia: Section 25 of the Act provides, inter alia: The said Act further provides that, in determining the boundaries of a new district, "present district boundaries may be disregarded, and districts, or parts of districts may be included in a new district proposed to be organized, * * *." Section 15. In those instances where the new district embraces all the area of a former district, the school funds, except those for the retirement of bonded indebtedness, and assets of the old district become the property of the new district. Where only a portion of an old district is included within the area of the new district the moneys of the former are apportioned as provided by section 66, chapter 146, '35 C.S.A. Section 29. Section 30 of the Act provides, inter alia, that: The new district involved in this cause is described as District No. 27. It extends the old District No. 27 to include all of three former separate districts and portions of four others. Old District No. 27 included the city of Brighton and surrounding area, most of which is heavily populated, whereas the districts absorbed in whole or in part are for the most part rural areas with comparatively few inhabitants. By the reorganization, the area of District No. 27 was doubled and the assessed valuation of included properties was increased from $7,980,230 to $9,360,440. Plaintiffs contend that the provisions of the statute, fixing the qualifications of voters and authorizing formation of the new district upon majority vote of the qualified electors within the entire district, result in the sparsely inhabited rural districts being forced against the will of a majority of the inhabitants thereof to become part of the new district. It is argued by counsel for plaintiffs that this amounts to a violation of their constitutional right to due process of law. They further assert that the Act contravenes sections 2 and 15 of Article IX of the Constitution of Colorado, which read as follows: It further is argued that since the area included within the new district is nearly doubled, children are not provided a "thorough and uniform system of free public schools", and that the enlarged district is not designed to serve a particular community in that it is not compact and is not of "convenient size" as required by section 15 of Article IX above quoted. Finally, it *191 is contended that the Act in question amounts to unlawful delegation of legislative power to the County Committee. First: In authorizing procedures for the reorganization of school districts, does the legislature have the power to provide for the inclusion of existing districts, or portions thereof, in a new proposed district, and to direct transfer of assets of the existing districts to the new one, notwithstanding the fact that the existing districts and a majority of the electors residing therein may in fact oppose the reorganization and the resultant transfer of assets? This question is answered in the affirmative. We direct attention to the fact that plaintiffs in this action appear as individual citizens and taxpayers living in areas included within school districts affected by the reorganization plan in question. They allege that they have paid taxes in support of public school districts and that said districts have been abolished by the action of the defendants. No school district, through its authorized officers, appears in objection to the proposed reorganization. Before an individual taxpayer could successfully contend that he was denied property without due process of law, because of the inclusion or exclusion of the area occupied by him from a reorganization of school districts, it would be necessary to accept as a premise the proposition that an individual taxpayer has an interest in school property which is protected by the constitution against deprivation thereof without due process of law. We think it is well established that an individual taxpayer has no such property interest in assets devoted to school purposes. In Gorrell v. Bevans, 66 Colo. 67, 179 P. 337, we said: In Newt Olson Lumber Co. v. School District, 83 Colo. 272, 263 P. 723, 724, we quoted with approval from Florman v. School District, 6 Colo.App. 319, 322, 40 P. 469, 470, as follows: In People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167, 171, the 20th Amendment to the Constitution of Colorado was attacked upon the ground that it violated the provisions of the Constitution of the United States in that it took property from some existing towns and gave it to the City *192 and County of Denver, without due process of law. We there said: We believe the law to be well settled that consent of particular districts, or the inhabitants thereof, is not necessary as a constitutional prerequisite to the changing of boundaries, dissolution or division of school districts, or to the transfer of assets from an existing school district to the larger reorganized district of which it becomes a part. Whether such consent should be required before reorganization is effected is a question of legislative policy. There is nothing in our constitution which prohibits the legislature from authorizing the reorganization upon majority vote of all the electors in the proposed new district, even though it might not be desired by an included school district or by the electors in some particular district included within the reorganization plan. The questions raised involve expediency, propriety and efficiency of methods in providing education through the public schools, and as such are addressed to the legislative branch of government. In School District No. 68, Yamhill County v. Hoskins, Or., 240 P.2d 949, 954, the Supreme Court of Oregon said: To like effect are the opinions in the following cases: Prosper Independent School District v. County School Trustees, Tex. Com.App., 58 S.W.2d 5; State ex rel. Miller v. Common School District No. 87, 163 Kan. 650, 185 P.2d 677; and Wheeler School District No. 152 v. Hawley, 18 Wash. 2d 37, 137 P.2d 1010. The reason for the conclusion of these authorities is well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 40, 46, 52 L. Ed. 151, as follows: The above quotation is applicable to school districts as well as to municipal corporations. Kies, Attorney General v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 26 S. Ct. 27, 50 L. Ed. 167. Second: Does the School District Reorganization Act of 1949 violate the Constitution of the State of Colorado in that it provides for an illegal delegation of legislative power to administrative officers or to individuals? This question is answered in the negative. We think it a sufficient answer to the argument made by plaintiffs' counsel on this question to direct attention to the opinion of this court in Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568, 11 P.2d 555, 557. In that case we said: The contention urged before us in the instant case was argued before the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Wheeler School District No. 152 v. Hawley, supra [18 Wash. 2d 37, 137 P.2d 1015]. We quote from that opinion as follows : In 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 351, § 138a, we find the rule stated in part as follows: In 11 American Jurisprudence, section 240, page 957, we find the following statement: School districts are subdivisions of the state and are created only through legislative authority. Because few, if any, restrictions are placed upon the legislative power in school affairs, by the constitution, the legislature has almost unlimited power to abolish, divide or alter school districts. It has been generally recognized that this broad discretionary power to change the boundaries of school districts may be delegated by the legislature to administrative bodies to be exercised under certain conditions, and in agreement with certain standards. 135 A.L.R. 1098 (note). We have carefully considered the arguments made by counsel for plaintiffs in support of the proposition that the School Reorganization Act violates sections 2 and 15 of Article IX of the Constitution of Colorado, and we do not find sufficient merit in these arguments to warrant detailed analysis or discussion. The judgment accordingly is affirmed. ALTER and HOLLAND, JJ., dissent.