Title: PESSL v BRIDGER BOWL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12577
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 1974

No. 12577 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 F R E D PESSL, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, BRIDGER B O W L , a Montana corporation, and RIBLET T R A M W A Y C O M P A N Y , a corporation, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , R on or able W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellants : Poore, McKenzie and Roth, Butte, Montana Allen R. McKenzie argued, Butte, Montana Berg, OIConnell, Angel and Andriolo, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana - -- Submitted: May 20, 1974 Decided : JUL - 9 1974 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment against defendant and from an order denying motions f o r a new t r i a l and judgment not- withstanding the verdict. The case was t r i e d i n Gallatin County before a jury. P l a i n t i f f Fred Pessl brought action against Bridger Bowl, a Montana corporation, and Riblet Tramway Company alleging t h e i r negligence caused an accident and injury sustained by p l a i n t i f f on February 22, 1972. P l a i n t i f f a l s o asserted a claim based on the doctrine of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y and breach of implied warranty a s t o Riblet Tramway Company and a claim relying on the doctrine of r e s ipsa loquitur a s t o Bridger Bowl. Defendants answered generally denying a l l allegations. The d i s t r i c t court dismissed the action a s t o defendant Riblet Tramway Company and no appeal i s involved with Riblet. The jury returned a verdict against defendant Bridger Bowl i n the amount of $30,886.90. As p l a i n t i f f , who was skiing a t Bridger Bowl a s a season t i c k e t holder which e n t i t l e d him t o r i d e a l l l i f t s , was proceeding up the Bridger chair l i f t there was a sudden swirl of snow and increase i n the wind a t a point 40 t o 50 f e e t from Tower 3. The cable holding t h e c h a i r derailed from the sheave wheels on Tower 3 causing p l a i n t i f f ' s chair t o drop t o the ground, rebound and throw p l a i n t i f f t o the ground. P l a i n t i f f was 71 years old a t the time. He was severely injured. Defendant Bri-dger Bowl operates a recreational s k i area, including four l i f t s . The area i s operated under a special use permit from the United States Forest Service and i s subject t o i t s regulations and inspection. The area i s inspected each year and had been approved f o r the 1971-72 s k i season. O n February 22, 1972 p l a i n t i f f had been skiing i n the morn- ing. After I-unch the wind picked up so t h a t skiing was not too pleasant on the Alpine l i f t where he had been skiing. He decided t o go t o Deer Park l i f t which is a more protected area. To get t o t h a t area he used the Bridger l i f t . The wind was stronger and d r i f t i n g o r blowing snow was noticeable. The Deer Park l i f t had been shut down because of the high wind. O n t h a t day the Bridger l i f t was being operated i n s p i t e of p r i o r notice of a malfunction of a d e r a i l c i r c u i t switch. The f a i l u r e of t h i s switch t o operate would have e i t h e r an accelerative o r dampening force on the velocity with which the cable would rebound. Investigation of the accident was conducted on February 23, 1972 by Ross MacPherson and Leroy Schultz, United States Forest Service employees, and by E m i l Cochand, Wes Hayes and George Rule, employees of Bridger Bowl, A written report was submitted by Bridger Bowl t o the S t a t e Aerial Tramway Board. The Bridger em- ployees found no defect i n the l i f t and s p e c i f i c a l l y no defect i n o r misalignment of the sheave wheels located a t Tower 3 requiring r e p a i r o r replacement. MacPherson was the Forester i n charge of the area. Schultz was Regional Ski L i f t Engineer responsible f o r s k i areas. MacPherson was a t the s i t e of Tower 3 but remained on the ground a t the time of the investigation. Schultz went up the tower with Bridger Bowl employees and inspected alignment and condition of the sheave wheels. Schultz prepared an accident investigation report which was, i n p a r t , admitted i n t o evidence, More w i l l be said l a t e r concerning t h i s report, The issues on appeal are: 1. Admissibility of a f o r e s t service report. 2. The duty of care owed t o p l a i n t i f f . 3, Instructions given and refused. Bridger Bowl submitted a written report t o the S t a t e Aerial Tramway Board dated February 24, 1972. That report stated: "De- railment due t o wind (twister)." and "wind was only cause of derope- ment." Neither Forester PlacPherson nor Bridger Bowl employees Cochand, Hayes o r Rule discovered any defect i n the l i f t and speci- f i c a l l y no defect i n o r misalignment of the sheave wheels located a t , Tower 3, requiring repair or replacement. MacPherson, for the Forest Service, authorized resumption of operation of the lift the day following the inspection without change or restriction. A review of the testimony shows clearly that plaintiff endeavored to show negligence on the part of Bridger Bowl by a showing that deropement was caused by misalignment of the sheaves carrying the cable at Tower 3 . plaintiff's witness Sowder, an official of Riblet Tramway Company, testified to the effect that a misalignment of the sheaves of three inches would have an effect which would result in the cable coming out of the sheave easier. To establish that this misalignment condition existed at the time of lai in tiff's accident, plaintiff relied on an undated accident investigation report signed by Schultz, the Forest Service Regional Ski Lift Engineer. Plaintiff first attempted to introduce the evidence through witness Cochand, Bridger owl's manager. The court sustained an objection that the evidence was an interoffice memorandum and report between one department of the Forest Service and anoth.er and was hearsay and incompetent. plaintiff's next effort was to inquire about the reports from Sowder and again the court sustained Bridger owl's objection on the grounds that the report was hearsay; lack of opportunity to cross-examine and, tb.t the testimony sought would be prejudicial on a primary issue of the case. Plaintiff's third attempt was ultimately successful and the report was admitted on the basis of a foundation laid through MacPherson. At the first attempt by plaintiff to introduce the report, counsel for Bridger Bowl conceded that the copy of the report was a true and accurate copy, but that was all. Plaintiff sought to introduce it under the Uniform Business Recordsas Evidence Act, section 93-801-2, R.C.M. 1947. To give a word picture of the situation, we quote excerpts of testimony regarding the report: ' ' 1 ~ ~ . WELLCOME: We will offer in evidence, Your Honor, plaintiff's Exhibit 15, under the Uniform Business Records, as evidence, Act. "MR. IcKENZIE: May I voir d i r e ? "THE COURT : Yes, you may. l'1.1~. McICENZIE: M r . MacPherson, you have t e s t i f i e d t h a t you were present during the course of the investigation. You did not prepare t h i s report; did you? ''TIIE WITNESS : No. " 1 ~ 4 R . McKENZIE: And a s a matter of f a c t t h i s report was sent d i r e c t l y t o and was a p a r t of the f i l e s of the regional o f f i c e i n Missoula; i s t h a t t r u e , sir? "THE WITNESS: Yes. "PIZR. McMENZIE: You did not ever see t h i s report u n t i l about two days ago; i s t h a t c o r r e c t , sir; o r , three days ago ? "WITNESS: Yes; l a s t week sometime. "I.IR.I~CKENZIE: Yes. So t h i s report and the information contained therein can not be authenticated by you from your personal recollection o r knowledge gained i n the course of the investigation; i s n ' t t h a t t r u e ? "MR. W E L L C O M E : I object t o t h a t question, i f it i s on voir d i r e . That i s not an element of the Uniform Business, a s records evidence Act. "THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. "THE WITNESS: Would you t r y t h a t again. I I (Reporter read l a s t question.) "THE COURT: I a m l e t t i n g t h i s i n on the basis of source of information under t h e Uniform Business Records. All r i g h t . "THE WITNESS: I r e a l l y don't understand it, the d e t a i l s of the question. I stayed down on the ground and Schultz went up on the l i f t with Bridger owl's man and made the inspection. "HR. McKENZIE: So, any comments a s t o what were observed there t h a t a r e contained i n t h i s report are solely history, and you cannot t e s t i f y t o such information from your own personal knowledge or observation? "THE WITNESS: hat's r i g h t . "MR. T4cI(ETJZIE: And. a s a matter of f a c t as you have t e s t i f i e d , you a r e not the custodian of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r record, a r e you, sir? "THE TrJITNESS: No. "1.IR. McKENZIE: The custodian i s i n Missoula? "THE WITNESS: hat's r i g h t . J ; J c J c ''MR. McKEldZIE: W e w i l l object, i f the Court please, on the gound and f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e proposed exhibit i s based on hearsay, a s t o t h i s Defendant, The exhibit contains information pertinent to a primary issue in the case. And its admission into evidence would be prejudicial to the Defendant, Dridger Bowl, on the ground and for the reason that it would be pre- vented from cross-examining the author of the report. And the best evidence, is likewise, the testimony of the author of the report. " l . 1 R . ANGEL: May I have one question on voir dire? "THE COURT: Yes, you may. "lvfR, ANGEL: In view of the fact that this document did not reach your files until last week, in the month of March, 1973, are you really able to say when the report was prepared by LeRoy Schultz? "MR. ANGEL: I have no objections , Your Honor, but I just wanted to find that out. "THE C0UR.T: * J" Let the record show the jury is outside the presence of the Court. I will hear you Mr, Wellcome, on this. "MR. WELIACOPE: Well, Your Honor, my position, simply stated, is that it is admissible under the Uniform Business Records Act. We had an attorneys pre-trial conference the other day and there was never any indica- tion given to me that I would have to call somebody from Missoula, who was the actual custodian of this record, to lay a proper foundation for it. I t was my understanding that there was no problem as to the foundation, and there could be other objections but not as to the foundation, that this was a true report and record of the Forest Service. All of these other objections are being inter- jected, and I have no opportunity to meet this evidence because it is a regional thing from the Forest Service in Missoula. MacPherson did receive the report and is a custodian here of the report, and he made the investiga- tion with Mr. Schultz. As a matter of fact, may I ask Mr. MacPherson a couple of questions outside the presence of the jury? "THE COURT: Yes, you may. "Q. lsnlt it true that you had conversations with Hr. Schultz pertaining to what he found in his investigation? A. Yes, "Q. And didn't he relate to you. generally some of the things that are contained in this report? A. Some of the things were new to me when I saw it. "Q, Not the conclusion or anything, but 1 mean, the things that he checked and what he did? Not what hearsay he got, not to whom he talked, but the investigation generally, didn't he discuss that with you? A, We had different motives for making inspections. I asked him to tell me if the lift was safe to operate again to certify to me it was safe. That is what I was concerned with. At the end of the day, he told me the lift could be opened to the public the next day. "Q. In connection with whether this was prepared immediately or shortly thereafter, isn't it true that you had some knowledge of this report--even if you didn't have a copy--shortly after it was prepared and submitted? A. Yes. "?.IR. WELLCOME: Again, Your Honor, I am frankly sur- prised, and if this is going to be the condition, then I would like to close my testimony and request a con- tinuance to bring somebody from !.Iissoula. but, I didn't think I would have to do that. "MR. IfcKENZIE: I raise this point only because this man is not the custodian under he Uniform Business Records Act. The real gist of my objection is that that Act does not allow the introduction of hearsay testimony in the form of an official report based on the statement someone makes who is not available for cross-examination. And that is exactly the philosophy. "BY MR. McKEMZIE: "Q. Mr. MacPherson, this accident investigation report was made to and retained by the chief counsel of the regional office; is that true, sir? A. Correct. "Q. And this was kept by him, and not made available by reason of requirements concerning possible litigation; isn't that true? A. Yes. "Q. Now, this report prepared by Mr. Schultz, as you have said, relates to certain findings concerning sheave assemblies, etc., which were not observed by you isn't that true? A. That's right. "Q. There is a reference here to alignment, checking alignment. Did you personally observe any misalignment of the sheaves from where you were? A. No; I was too far away. ''Q. You were on the ground?" The edited report of Schultz, disputed Exhibit 15, provides the only basis upon which plaintiff rests his claim that there was a misalignment or defect in the sheave wheels which caused the de- ropement and supports the version of plaintiff's testimony that the cable merely rolled off the side of the sheave wheels rather than being blown off by the wind. Clearly the report had a prejudicial effect. Plaintiff argues the effect of the misalignment statements in the report was not prejudicial in any event because there was no proof the misalignment was the cause rather than the result of the deropement. As we have observed heretofore, plaintiff was clearly testifying that the cable merely rolled off the side of the sheave. P l a i n t i f f further argues t h a t i n view of the operation during extreme wind conditions, the absence of cable catchers and non- operation of the d e r a i l s a f e t y c i r c u i t , there was ample evidence of negligence apart from the evidence of misalignment. Perhaps so, but the introduction of the report under circumstances such a s here could not help but be prejudicial. A l l of the persons present a t the inspection said there was no misalignment while the report s t a t e d there was, and t h a t "The Area [personnel] corrected t h i s alignment i n m y presence. 1 1 As IYiacPherson's testimony indicates, the report was made f o r t h e purpose of possible l i t i g a t i o n and retained by the regional counsel f o r the Forest Service. P l a i n t i f f did not proceed under Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P., and request an admission a s t o the f a c t s and genuineness of the report by furnishing a copy. Neither a t r u e copy nor the o r i g i n a l has ever been made available. What has been expunged and what attachments were eliminated does not appear. Here p l a i n t i f f made no showing other than he was producing the a l t e r e d and expurgated copy of the report which the identifying witness l4acPherson had received from i t s custodian. It i s apparent the report was simply not a business record a s contemplated by section 93-801-2, R.C.M. 1947. Nor i s i t ad- missible under section 93-901-1, R.C.M. 1947, the Uniform O f f i c i a l Reports a s Evidence Act. Richardson v. Farmers Union O i l Co., 131 Mont. 535, 312 P.2d 134. Unsworn reports where there i s no r i g h t t o cross-examine come within the hearsay r u l e and a r e inadmissible. Shillingstad v. Nelson 141 Mont. 412, 378 P.2d 393. The admission of the report over objection was e r r o r and requires a new t r i a l . The second issue on appeal regards the duty of care; t h a t i s , whether the s t a t u s of a s k i l i f t i s a common c a r r i e r and the duty owed a passenger f o r h i r e applies, o r whether the duty owed i s reasonable care, The t r i a l court instructed: I I At the time of the accident in question, the defendant Bridger Bowl was a common carrier operating a ski lift on which the plaintiff was a passenger for hire. I I "YOU are instructed that the defendant Bridger Bowl is a common carrier of persons for reward. Such carriers are obligated to carry safely those people who they take onto their transportation facilities. To their passengers they owe both a duty of utmost care and the vigilance of a very cautious person. Such carriers are responsible for any, even the slightest, negligence and are required to do all that human care, vigilance and foresight reasonably can do under all the circumstances. 1 1 Eridger Bowl argues that the decision and ruling of the trial court on the question of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff was error in that it was in direct conflict first, with the decision in Brown v . Columbia Amusement Co., 91 Mont. 174, 6 P.2d 874, and second, the specific language of section 69-6615, R.C.M. 1947, which is part of the Passenger Tramway Act of 1971. Brown followed the law generally as to the duty of an owner of a place of anusement to his patrons, which was that of reasonable or ordinary care. An earlier case, Phillips v. Butte Jockey Club & Fair Assn., 46 Mont. 338, 127 P. 1011, specifically rejected the analogy between a passenger of a common carrier for hire and a patron of an amusement place. In 1971 the Passenger Tramway Act, sections 69-6601 through 69-6617, R,.C.M. 1947, was enacted. Section 69-6601 states the policy of the state: If+; - 1 . #8 * it shall be the policy of the state to protect its citizens and visitors from unnecessary mechanical hazards in the design construction and operation of passenger tramways, but not from the hazards inherent in the sports of mountaineering, skiing and hiking, or from the hazards of the area served by the skier or other sportsman * i k . l I Section 69-6615, R . C . M . 1947, provides: l t Passenger tramways shall not be construed to be common carrier or public utilities for the purposes of regulation within the meaning of the laws of the state of Montana. I t P l a i n t i f f argues simply t h a t section 69-6615, R.C.M. 1947, has t o do with r a t e structure and has no limitation upon the construction of a proper l e g a l standard of care which should be applicable t o a s k i l i f t , A s t o section 69-6601, R.C.M. 1947, p l a i n t i f f argues he was not injured because of a hazard inherent i n the sport of skiing; but r a t h e r , he was injured because of negligence i n design, construction and operation of the s k i l i f t . However, the words "unnecessary mechanical hazardsf' when coupled with these words a l s o appearing i n section 69-6601 he s t a t e , through t h e passenger tramway safety board, s h a l l r e g i s t e r a l l passenger tramways i n the s t a t e , e s t a b l i s h reasonable standards of design, construction and operational practices", establishes a standard of care. (Emphasis supplied.) The duty i s one of reasonable o r ordinary care and Instructions No.. 16 and 1 7 should not have been given. Bridger Bowl a l s o quarrels with Instruction No. 1 7 i n t h a t it goes f a r beyond the duty of care even f o r a common c a r r i e r . W e need not determine t h i s here, but r e f e r t o Risken v. Northern Pac. Ry., 137 Mont. 57, 350 P.2d 831, P l a i n t i f f c i t e s Summit County Development Corporation v. Bagnoli, 166 Cob 27, 441 P.2d 658, 664, where the Colorado Court said: "This i s the f i r s t occasion we have had t o consider the degree of care required of a s k i l i f t operator. W e have noted i n other jurisdictions where the sport of skiing has a l s o become highly popular, courts have imposed on s k i l i f t operators a common c a r r i e r s t a t u s , thus requiring t h a t a higher degree of care be exercised in the operation of t h i s type of f a c i l i t y . [Citing cases ] " ~ e c a u s e of the existence of the above described r u l e of Lewis, supra, and the nature and purpose of our s t a t u t e s pertaining t o common c a r r i e r s a t the t i m e of t h i s accident, there was no need t o designate t h e s k i l i f t operator a s a common c a r r i e r i n Instruction No. 15. However, t h i s i s of no consequence, since the paramount purpose of Instruction No. 15 was t o convey t o the jury the r u l e of law t h a t a chair s k i l i f t operator must exercise the highest degree of care com- mensurate with the practical operation of the s k i l i f t , It accomplished t h a t purpose. The defendant's contention t h a t the giving of t h i s instruction constituted prejudi- c i a l e r r o r i s rejected. I 1 This case, of course, does not construe ~ o n t a n a ' s Passenger Tramiay Act nor case law on recreational f a c i l i t i e s . The issues concerning instructions have been answered i n our discussions heretofore, so w e need not discuss them further. The judgment i s reversed and the cause i s remanded for new t r i a l . W e Concur: ' Justices. \ I i