Title: STATE v CARDWELL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14825
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 1980

No. 14825 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1979 T H E STATE O F MONTANA, V S . CURTIS C A R D W E L L , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: A. Michael Salvagni argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Michael J. L i l l y argued, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana '+,-LC,:, 3 , - . Filed: Submitted: October 31, 1979 ~ecided:APR 2 ? 1980 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. On December 8, 1978, the Honorable W. W. Lessley granted the Gallatin County attorney leave to file an information accusing appellant, Curtis Cardwell, of committing the offenses of aggravated assault, tampering with witnesses, and aggravated kidnapping. Cardwell pleaded not guilty to all three counts, and trial was set for January 26, 1979. On January 17, 1979, the State filed an amended informa- tion without leave of court pursuant to section 46-11- 403(1), MCA. The amended information changed the nature of the aggravated assault charge against Cardwell by adding the allegation that he committed the crime by threatening Jeff Sawyer with serious bodily injury by the use of a knife. The amendments to the original information further altered the information by charging Cardwell with aiding or abetting another in committing the offense of tampering with wit- nesses rather than actually committing the crime as charged in the original information. The amended information also eliminated the aggravated kidnapping charge. Cardwell moved to dismiss the amended information alleging that the filing of an amended information without leave of court was cnconstitutional, that Count I was dupli- citous, and that Count I1 had been filed without the showing of probable cause. The District Court denied the motion, and Cardwell was tried on the information on January 29 and 30, 1979. A jury found Cardwell guilty of both offenses charged in the amended information. This appeal followed. The thrust of appellant's argument on appeal centers around a challenge to section 46-11-403(1), MCA. That statute permits an information to be amended once as to substance p r i o r t o t r i a l without leave of c o u r t . Appellant contends t h a t allowing substantive changes i n an information without j u d i c i a l examination i s unconstitutional. Appellant r a i s e s h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge t o s e c t i o n 46-11-403(1), MCA, under A r t i c l e 11, Section 20, 1972 Montana Constitution. That c o n s t i t u t i o n provision s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "All criminal a c t i o n s i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t , except those on appeal, s h a l l be prosecuted e i t h e r by information, a f t e r examination and commitment by a magistrate o r a f t e r leave granted by t h e c o u r t , o r by indictment without such examination, commitment, o r leave." Reading t h i s s e c t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n broadly, a l l s t a g e s of t h e information f i l i n g process including amend- ments r e q u i r e j u d i c i a l examination. Under t h i s i n t e r p r e t a - t i o n of t h e provision, s e c t i o n 46-11-403(1) c o n f l i c t s with t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n by allowing an information t o be amended without leave of court. A s such, t h e s t a t u t e would be void. I f , however, A r t i c l e 11, Section 20, i s construed more narrowly t o apply only t o t h e i n i t i a t i o n of criminal a c t i o n s , l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t r o l of subsequent s t a g e s of t h e information process would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Construing t h e provision i n t h i s fashion would allow t h e amendment without leave of c o u r t s t a t u t e t o stand. To determine t h e meaning of A r t i c l e 11, Section 20, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , w e must employ t h e same r u l e s of construction employed t o construe s t a t u t e s . K e l l e r v. Smith (1976), 170 Mont. 399, 404, 553 P.2d 1002, 1006. The i n t e n t of t h e framers of a c o n s t i t u t i o n provision c o n t r o l s i t s meaning. K e l l e r , 170 Mont. a t 405, 553 P.2d a t 1006. The i n t e n t of t h e framers should be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used. I f t h a t i s possible, w e apply no o t h e r means of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Keller, 170 Mont. a t 405, 553 P. 2d a t 1006. The question now becomes whether t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n provision i s ambiguous. The S t a t e argues t h a t Section 20 of A r t i c l e I1 i s ambiguous. I t contends t h a t t h e key word i n t h e provision i s "prosecuted." The S t a t e asserts t h a t prosecuted can mean e i t h e r i n s t i t u t e o r i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y forward. The S t a t e argues t h a t interchanging these two meanings of t h e t e r m r e s u l t s i n d i f f e r e n t consequences i n t h i s case. I f prosecuted is taken t o mean i n s t i t u t e , A r t i - cle 11, Section 20, a p p l i e s only t o t h e commencing of crimi- n a l a c t i o n s . Section 46-11-403(1), MCA, which a p p l i e s t o amendments made a f t e r a n a c t i o n begins, would be c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l under t h i s a n a l y s i s . The second usage of t h e t e r m , i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y forward, would make t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n provision applicable t o a l l s t e p s i n t h e information f i l i n g process including t h e f i l i n g of amendments. Section 46-11- 403(1) would be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of prosecute a s it allows amendments without leave of c o u r t i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision. Given t h i s ambiguity, t h e S t a t e contends we must look t o o t h e r means of i n t e r p r e t i n g A r t i c l e 11, Section 20, t o determine i t s meaning. W e do not f i n d it necessary t o do s o because w e are n o t persuaded by t h e S t a t e ' s argument t h a t t h e t e r m "prosecuted" i s ambiguous. The t e r m s "prosecute" and "prosecution" have long been defined i n t h e j u d i c i a l s e t t i n g . A s long ago a s 1821, Chief J u s t i c e Marshall s a i d , "To commence a s u i t , i s t o demand something by t h e i n s t i t u - t i o n of process i n a c o u r t of j u s t i c e ; and t o prosecute t h e s u i t , is, according t o t h e common a c c e p t a t i o n of language, t o continue t h a t demand." Cohens v. ~ i r g i n i a (1821), 19 U.S. 264, 408, 5 L.Ed. 257, 292, 6 Wheat. 264. Since Cohens, numerous o t h e r c o u r t s have a l s o defined prosecute o r prose- c u t i o n t o mean i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y forward. For example, t h e V i r g i n i a Supreme Court s t a t e d : "In common and ordinary acceptation, according t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n given by lexicographers, and a u t h o r i t i e s generally, t h e word 'prosecution' means t h e i n s t i t u t i o n and carrying on of a s u i t o r proceeding t o o b t a i n o r e n f o r w some r i g h t o r t h e process of t r y i n g formal charges a g a i n s t an offender before a l e g a l t r i b u n a l . " I n criminal law, it i s the means adopted t o bring a supposed criminal t o j u s t i c e and punish- ment by due course of law, and c o n s i s t s of a series of proceedings from t h e t i m e formal ac- c u s a t i o n i s made by swearing o u t a warrant, t h e finding of an indictment o r information i n a criminal c o u r t , t h e t r i a l , and f i n a l judgment. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.]" Sigmon v. Commonwealth (1958), 200 Va. 258, 105 S.E.2d 171, 178. See a l s o : F l o r i d a ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp. ( 5 t h C i r . 1976), 526 F.2d 266, 270, footnote 16, cert. denied 429 U.S. 829; Commonwealth v. F a t t i z z o (1972), 223 Pa.Super. 378, 299 A.2d 22, 28, footnotes 15-16; S t a t e v. Harvey (1972), 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706, 717; Thacker v. Marshall (Okla. 1958), 331 P.2d 488, 492, footnote 4; S t a t e v. Shushan (1944), 206 La. 415, 19 So.2d 185, 192; S t a t e v. Bowles (1905) , 70 Kan. 821, 79 P. 726, 728. I n Montana w e have n o t y e t been so e x p l i c i t i n adopting a d e f i n i t i o n of "prosecution" o r "prosecute." However, w e d i d speak t o t h e i s s u e i n Rosebud County v. Flinn (1940) , 109 Mont. 537, 98 P.2d 330. There, w e held t h a t while t h e term prosecution was n o t broad enough t o encompass i n v e s t i - g a t i o n before f i l i n g a complaint o r information, t h e t e r m was broad enough t o take i n t h e t r i a l and o t h e r proceedings previous t o t r i a l . 109 Mont. a t 541-42, 98 P.2d a t 333-34. Although Rosebud County does n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y state which p a r t s of t h e prosecution of a criminal a c t i o n are included i n t h e "prosecution" of t h e a c t i o n , t h e broad language used t o d e f i n e prosecution i n d i c a t e s Montana intended t o adopt t h e general d e f i n i t i o n of prosecution t h a t would include amendments t o a criminal information. The above a n a l y s i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e c l e a r and unambigu- ous meaning of A r t i c l e 11, Section 20, 1972 Montana Consti- t u t i o n . A l l criminal a c t i o n s prosecuted--initiated and c a r r i e d forward--by information must be examined and com- mitted by a magistrate o r must be c a r r i e d forward a f t e r leave granted by t h e c o u r t . Thus, a l l s t a g e s of proceeding by information including amendments t o t h e information must be reviewed by t h e c o u r t . Any s t a t u t e t h a t allows f o r amendments without leave of c o u r t c o n f l i c t s with t h i s con- s t i t u t i o n provision and must f a l l . Section 46-11-403(1) allows f o r amendment of criminal informations without judi- c i a l supervision. The s t a t u t e , t h e r e f o r e , c o n f l i c t s with t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and must be declared i n v a l i d . W e now s o hold. I n d e c l a r i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i v e amendment without leave of c o u r t s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w e do n o t intend t o t o t a l l y preclude s u b s t a n t i v e amendments t o criminal informations. It has long been held t h a t an information can be amended both as t o form and substance. United S t a t e s v. Smith (D.C. Pa. 1952), 107 F.Supp. 839. On amendment of an information, however, c e r t a i n procedural safeguards must be imposed. The above discussion i n d i c a t e s amendments of substance can only be f i l e d with leave of c o u r t . This safeguard i s necessary n o t only t o comply with Montana' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l require- ments, b u t a l s o t o ensure a defendant r e c e i v e s a n e u t r a l determination of probable cause f o r d e t e n t i o n under t h e amended charges. See Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54. Another procedural safeguard involves n o t i c e t o t h e defendant. One function of a n i n f o r - mation is to notify a defendant of the offense charged, thereby giving the defendant an opportunity to defend. State v. ~ r o p f (1975), 166 Mont. 79, 88, 530 P.2d 1158, 1163; State v. Heiser (1965), 146 Mont. 413, 416, 407 P.2d 370, 371. This function of the information cannot be dis- pensed with when the information is amended as to substance. The defendant must be notified of the change and afforded a reasonable time after the amendment to prepare a defense. Further, when an amended information is filed substantively changing the charges against a defendant, the defendant should be arraigned under the new charges. State v. Butler (19691, 9 Ariz.App. 162, 450 P.2d 128, 131; Hanley v. Zenoff (19651, 81 Nev. 9, 398 P.2d 241, 242. See also, State v. DeWolfe (1904), 29 Mont. 415, 417-19, 74 P. 1084, 1085. We see no bar to substantively amending criminal informations if these procedures are followed. Having found the amendment without leave of court statute unconstitutional, we are constrained to dismiss the amended information filed here. Section 46-11-403(1) being uncon- stitutional, the amended information should have been dis- missed by the District Court on the original motion by Cardwell, and he should not have proceeded to trial on the charges in the amended information. Since the District Court failed to dismiss the amended information, we must do so now. However, in ordering the dismissal of the amended information, we do not mean to preclude the State from re- filing charges against Cardwell with proper judicial super- vision. We see no merit to Cardwell's argument that the State did not have probable cause to file any charges against him and are reversing this conviction based solely on the ~istrict Court's improper ruling on the constitutional claim. The cause is reversed and the amended information against defendant ordered dismissed. We concur: afid Chief 4 ~ustice &&t#q , ? e. w. Justices 0