Title: Gray v. Hawthorn Children's Psychiatric Hospital
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99995
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2023

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
MARYANN GRAY, 
) 
Opinion issued November 21, 2023 
 
) 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant, ) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
 
No. SC99995 
 
) 
HAWTHORN CHILDREN’S 
) 
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL/ 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent, ) 
 
) 
AND  
) 
 
) 
TREASURER OF THE STATE 
) 
OF MISSOURI, AS CUSTODIAN 
) 
OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND, 
)  
 
) 
Cross-Respondent. 
) 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 
 
 
Hawthorn Children’s Psychiatric Hospital (“Hawthorn”) appeals the Labor and 
Industrial Relations Commission’s (“Commission”) decision finding Maryann Gray’s 
applications for review were timely filed pursuant to section 287.4801 and overruling 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 except as otherwise indicated. 
 
2 
 
Hawthorn’s motion to strike.  On appeal, Hawthorn challenges the Commission’s finding.  
Because the Commission did not err in finding Gray’s applications were timely filed, the 
Commission’s decision is affirmed.   
Background 
 
Gray was a registered nurse at Hawthorn.  She filed three workers’ compensation 
claims for injuries sustained during her employment at Hawthorn in 2012, 2013, and 
2014.  An administrative law judge denied Gray benefits on September 12, 2019, 
concluding Gray had failed to meet her burden on all claims.  
Pursuant to section 287.480, Gray had 20 days from the date of the final awards—
until October 2, 2019—to file applications for review with the Commission.  Gray 
attempted to mail her applications for review through the United States Postal Service   
on September 30, 2019.  The postal service, however, returned the mailing to her due to 
insufficient postage.  On October 16, 2019, after the 20-day period had expired, Gray sent 
her applications via facsimile to the Commission.  She then attempted to mail her 
applications a second time through the postal service on October 29, 2019.  In the 
October 29 mailing, Gray included her original applications for review along with the 
original envelope that was sent on September 30.  The Commission received the October 
29 mailing on November 1.  
 
Hawthorn filed a motion to strike Gray’s applications, arguing the applications 
were untimely.  Gray responded, arguing the postal service incorrectly declared the 
September 30 mailing had insufficient postage.  The Commission remanded the case to 
the Division of Workers’ Compensation to take evidence regarding whether: (1) Gray’s 
3 
 
applications were mailed to the Commission; (2) the Commission or Division received 
the applications; and (3) the postal service endorsed the mailing of the applications before 
the end of the 20-day appeal period.   
At the remand hearing, Gray offered testimony and exhibits regarding the 
September 30 mailing.  Gray produced the envelope that allegedly included her original 
applications for review.  Six “Forever” stamps were affixed to the envelope, and the 
envelope was stamped with three postal service postmarks that read “USPS – Mail SEP 
30 2019.”  The envelope also read “REFUSED BY / ADDRESSEEE/ POSTAGE DUE 
$1.09.”  The Commission’s mailing address, though obstructed by stickers placed by the 
postal service, was visible through a strong light.  Gray also produced an internet postal 
service price calculator and a photograph of the scale her attorney’s office used to weigh 
mail.  Two witnesses testified at the hearing for Gray— the law firm’s paralegal and the 
office manager.  The paralegal testified she weighed the envelope containing Gray’s 
applications on the law office’s mail scale, the parcel was approximately 4.5 ounces, and 
she placed six Forever Stamps on the envelope—a value of $3.30.  The office manager 
testified she verified the postage needed to mail the applications on the postal service 
price calculator from USPS.com, and, according to the price calculator, $1.60 was the 
amount of postage necessary.  
After the hearing, the Commission found Gray timely filed her applications by 
mailing them to the Commission with sufficient postage on September 30, 2019, and the 
applications were returned due to a postal service error.  Although the October 29 mailing 
was untimely, it contained the original, returned September 30 mailing, bearing the 
4 
 
September 30, 2019, postal service postmark.  Because the September 30 mailing was 
returned due to postal service error, the Commission deemed Gray’s applications filed on 
September 30, 2019.  On February 10, 2022, the Commission issued final awards, 
affirming the denial of benefits as to the 2012 injury but ordering Hawthorn to pay Gray 
partial permanent disability benefits for the 2013 and 2014 injuries.  Hawthorn now 
appeals the Commission’s decision.2  
Standard of Review 
The Commission’s decision must be supported by competent and substantial 
evidence upon the entire record.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 18.  On appeal, the 
Commission’s factual findings “shall be conclusive and binding” in the absence of fraud, 
and “no additional evidence shall be heard.”  Section 287.495.1.  “This Court also defers 
to the Commission’s determinations as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight 
given to conflicting evidence.”  Annayeva v. SAB of TSD of St. Louis, 597 S.W.3d 196, 
198 (Mo. banc 2020).  On appeal, this Court: 
shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for 
rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no 
other: 
 
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers; 
 
(2) That the award was procured by fraud; 
 
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award; 
 
(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant 
the making of the award. 
                                                 
2 After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, 
sec. 10. 
5 
 
 
Section 287.495.1(1)-(4). 
Analysis 
The issue in this case is whether the Commission erred in determining Gray timely 
filed her applications for review pursuant to section 287.480.  Section 287.480.1 
provides, in relevant part:  
If an application for review is made to the commission within twenty days 
from the date of the award, the full commission, if the first hearing was not 
held before the full commission, shall review the evidence, or, if considered 
advisable, as soon as practicable hear the parties at issue, their representatives 
and witnesses and shall make an award and file it in like manner as specified 
in section 287.470.  Any notice of appeal, application or other paper required 
under this law to be filed with the division or the commission shall, when 
mailed to or transmitted by electronic facsimile meeting the requirements 
of the division and received by the division or the commission, be deemed 
to be filed as of the date endorsed by the United States post office on the 
envelope or container in which such paper is received, or the date received 
if filed by facsimile.  
 
(Emphasis added).  
 
Section 287.480 requires an application sent by mail be: (1) endorsed by the postal 
service; and (2) received by the Commission.  Commission decisions interpreting law are 
reviewed for correctness without deference to the Commission’s judgments.  Headrick v. 
Jackes-Evans Mfg. Co., 108 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo. App. 2003).   
I. 
Jurisdiction to Accept Gray’s Applications as Timely 
  
Hawthorn argues the Commission’s order accepting Gray’s applications as timely 
exceeded its powers, because, pursuant to section 287.480, none of Gray’s applications 
were timely filed.  Hawthorn alleges: (1) the postal service never endorsed the September 
30 mailing; and (2) the Commission never received the September 30 mailing.  Further, 
6 
 
Hawthorn argues the Commission’s finding that the September 30 mailing was returned 
based on postal service error is not supported by substantial and competent evidence 
because there was no evidence the postal service endorsed the mailing with sufficient 
postage. 
A. Endorsement Pursuant to Section 287.480 
Under section 287.480, if an application is mailed through the postal service and 
received by the Commission, “the postmark (the date endorsed by the United States 
Postal Service on the envelope or container in which the Application is received), will be 
deemed the filing date, notwithstanding its actual delivery at a later date.”  Cidlik v. 
Subsurface Contractors, 110 S.W.3d 856, 858 (Mo. App. 2003).3   
Hawthorn alleges the postal service concluded the September 30 mailing did not 
have sufficient postage and, consequently, the postal service never “endorsed” the 
mailing.  This Court discussed the meaning of “endorsed” as used in section 287.480 in 
Abrams v. Ohio Pacific Express, 819 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. banc. 1991).4  In Abrams, this 
Court held the date inscribed on an envelope by a licensed postage meter and delivered to 
an addressee by the postal service is the date “endorsed by the United States post office” 
                                                 
3 In Cidlik, the Commission dismissed the employer’s application for review because it 
was untimely.  110 S.W.3d at 857.  The date the postal service endorsed on the envelope 
containing the employer’s application was illegible, so the Commission utilized the date 
the application was received as the filing date.  Id.  The court of appeals reversed and 
remanded the case back to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing regarding the 
actual date of the postmark or the date the application was placed in the mail.  Id. at 857-
58.  
4 Although Abrams’s construction of section 287.480 predates the 2005 amendments 
requiring workers’ compensation laws to be strictly construed, Abrams’s reasoning 
remains instructive in determining the type of endorsement intended by section 287.480.  
7 
 
under section 287.480.  Id. at 343.  Although the issue was not squarely before the Court 
in Abrams, this Court suggested the meaning of “endorsed” as used in section 287.480 
could also mean “the date inscribed on the envelope by an employee of the post office.”  
Id. at 340.   
Here, the Commission determined there was a September 30, 2019, postal service 
endorsement on the envelope.  Photographs of the original envelope show the postal 
service stamped the envelope three times with a postmark dated “SEP 30 2019”—within 
the 20-day period Gray had to file her applications.  As this Court discussed in Abrams 
and the court of appeals acknowledged in Cidlik, the type of endorsement contemplated 
by section 287.480 would include a postmark—an official marking placed on an 
envelope by the postal service indicating the date of mailing.  As the Commission found, 
that type of endorsement was present here.   
Further, despite Hawthorn’s contention that the September 30, 2019, postmark 
could not be an endorsement because the postal service returned the mailing for 
insufficient postage, the Commission found the September 30 mailing did contain 
sufficient postage and was returned due to postal service error.  Hawthorn equates the 
present case to Marciante v. Treasurer of Missouri, in which a claimant attempted to mail 
notice of an appeal to the Commission but placed insufficient postage on the envelope.  
477 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Mo. App. 2015).  The Commission refused the mail, and the postal 
service returned it.  Id.  The claimant then remailed the notice of appeal outside the time 
limit for appeals.  Id.  Unlike the present case, no party in Marciante disputed that the 
claimant had placed inadequate postage on the first mailing.  Id.  There, the issue was 
8 
 
whether the notice of appeal was timely filed when the Commission did not receive it, 
and the claimant had remailed it after the statutory period to appeal had ended.  Id.  In 
Gray’s case, had the September 30 mailing contained insufficient postage, Marciante 
would apply.  The Commission, however, found, based on the testimony of Gray’s 
witnesses, that sufficient postage was placed on the September 30 mailing.   
Hawthorn asserts throughout its brief that the Commission erred in finding Gray’s 
witnesses credible because Gray’s witnesses, who were not postal service employees nor 
demonstrated knowledge of postal regulations, were not competent to testify to whether 
the September 30 mailing had sufficient postage.  This argument goes to the weight to be 
afforded Gray’s witnesses’ statements rather than the competence of such evidence, and 
this Court defers to the Commission’s decisions relating to the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight given to testimony.  Hornbeck v. Spectra Painting, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 624, 
632 (Mo. banc 2012).  
The office manager testified the September 30 mailing required $1.60 in postage 
based on its weight, and the September 30 mailing had $3.30 in forever stamps affixed to 
it.  The Commission expressly found, in part based on “the credible testimony of [Gray’s] 
witnesses,” that Gray timely filed her applications for review by mailing them to the 
Commission with sufficient postage on September 30.  The Commission’s decision to 
believe the testimony of Gray’s witnesses was within its authority.  This Court cannot 
reassess the credibility of the evidence presented in this case.  Id.  The Commission’s 
factual findings are binding on this Court.  Section 287.495.  
9 
 
Consequently, Hawthorn’s argument that the Commission’s determination that the 
September 30 mailing was “endorsed” by the postal service and had sufficient postage 
was not supported by substantial and competent evidence fails.   
B. Receipt Pursuant to Section 287.480 
For timely filing, section 287.480 requires the notice of appeal be mailed and 
received by the Commission.  Marciante, 477 S.W.3d at 706.  Hawthorn argues the 
Commission never “received” the September 30 mailing as required by section 287.480, 
and the Commission ignored the receipt requirement when it applied section 287.480 to 
the September 30 mailing.  Gray presented evidence at the remand hearing showing the 
Commission acknowledged receipt of the second mailing, which included Gray’s original 
applications and the September 30 envelope.  Specifically, one of Gray’s exhibits at the 
remand hearing was a November 1, 2019, letter from the Commission to Gray’s attorney 
stating, “Receipt is acknowledged of your October 29, 2019 correspondence along with 
the Applications for Review and original envelope.”  
The Commission acknowledged that it did not receive Gray’s applications for 
review until after the October 2, 2019, statutory deadline but found the evidence Gray 
produced at the remand hearing was sufficient to establish such applications’ timely 
filing.  Hawthorn’s argument that the Commission never received the September 30 
mailing fails.   
Hawthorn is correct that no part of section 287.480 permits the Commission to 
review an application filed after 20 days.  The facts found by the Commission, however, 
establish Gray’s applications were not untimely under the plain language of section 
10 
 
287.480.  The Commission found the September 30 mailing contained a postal service 
endorsement bearing the date September 30, 2019—within the 20-day statutory period—
and the Commission received Gray’s applications for review on November 1, 2019.  
Absent fraud, the Commission’s factual findings are conclusive and binding on this 
Court.  Section 287.495.  The purpose of the statute has been served.  Hawthorn’s 
argument that the Commission acted in excess of its powers fails.   
II. 
Jurisdiction to Enter the Final Awards 
Finally, Hawthorn argues the Commission lacked jurisdiction to review the 
matters appealed by Gray because the applications were untimely.  Hawthorn argues this 
Court should reverse the award of benefits and dismiss Gray’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction under section 287.480.  Because this Court affirms the Commission’s finding 
that Gray’s applications were timely filed, the Commission did have jurisdiction to enter 
the final awards on February 10, 2022.  Hawthorn’s argument fails.  
Conclusion 
The Commission did not err in finding Gray’s applications were timely filed under 
section 287.480.  Accordingly, the Commission’s decision is affirmed.  
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Chief Justice 
 
Russell, C.J., Powell, Fischer,  
Ransom and Wilson, JJ., concur.  
Broniec and Gooch, JJ., not participating.