Title: People v. Roe
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93370
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 2002

Docket No. 93370-Agenda 24-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. JAMES E. 
 								RYAN, Petitioner, v. JOHN B. ROE et al., Respondents.
Opinion filed October 3, 2002.
 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	On July 30, 1998, the defendant, Jeremiah Pasewaldt, was
arrested and charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child (see 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2000)) after he
attacked an 11-year-old girl in his garage. On June 8, 1999, the
defendant appeared in court to enter a guilty plea and receive a
recommended eight-year sentence pursuant to an agreement with
the State.
	The State offered, and the defendant acknowledged, a factual
basis for his guilty plea. In admonishing the defendant, the trial
judge told the defendant that the sentencing range for his offense,
a Class X felony, was 6 to 30 years. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(2);
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2000). The trial judge then asked
the State and the defense whether the truth-in-sentencing
provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (see 730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(2) (West 2000)) applied. The assistant State's Attorney
did not believe that truth-in-sentencing applied to a 1998 offense.
The judge stated that, though the provisions were in effect, "the
question is whether the offense is covered." The defendant's
attorney was uncertain, offering, "I need to check that." The judge
continued the defendant's sentencing hearing to research this
issue. On June 21, 1999, the parties again appeared in court. The
trial judge addressed the defendant:
			"I have determined that truth in sentencing does not
apply to this case, so you'll be entitled to your normal
good time credits, et cetera. I also have considered the fact
that both the [assistant] State's Attorney and your lawyer
told me that they didn't contemplate that it applies. That
means at the time that they entered into this agreement
relative to this sentence, they *** didn't consider the fact
that truth in sentencing might apply. And I have written
on your sentencing order that it doesn't apply."
At the bottom of the sentencing order, the trial judge noted, "NOT
SUBJECT TO TRUTH IN SENTENCING." The judge sentenced
the defendant to eight years' imprisonment and payment of costs.
	On March 1, 2002, nearly three years later, the State filed a
motion for leave to file a mandamus complaint (see 188 Ill. 2d R.
381; Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(a)) seeking an amended
sentencing order without any language to indicate that truth-in-sentencing should not apply. We granted this motion on March 14,
2002.

ANALYSIS
	Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally used to
compel a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty. See
Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999); Madden v.
Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). A writ of mandamus will be
awarded only if a plaintiff establishes a clear, affirmative right to
relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority
in the public official to comply with the writ. See People ex rel.
Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393, 398 (2001). The sentencing
provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections are mandatory, and
a mandamus complaint is a proper vehicle to force a trial judge to
apply them. See People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193,
196 (1992), quoting People ex rel. Daley v. Limperis, 86 Ill. 2d 459, 466 (1981); see also People v. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d 462,
464 (1997) (a mandamus complaint is the proper means for a
defendant to challenge the application of truth-in-sentencing
requirements). The sole issue before us is whether the trial judge's
sentencing order comported with statutory, truth-in-sentencing
requirements.
	"Truth-in-sentencing" is a label applied to a change in the
statutory method the Illinois Department of Corrections uses to
calculate good-conduct credit. Under the Unified Code of
Corrections, an inmate normally receives day-for-day good-conduct credit. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2000).
Section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) of the Unified Code, however,
unambiguously mandates that a defendant convicted of an
enumerated violent crime, including predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child, "shall receive no more than 4.5 days of good
conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence of
imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2000).(1) That is,
such a defendant must serve at least 85% of his or her sentence
and does not receive normal day-for-day good-conduct credit.
	Here, the defendant does not dispute this interpretation of the
statute, but he contends that the State is estopped from attempting
to modify a sentencing order which comports with the plea
agreement. We recognize the important role that plea-bargaining
plays in our criminal justice system. See generally Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978);
People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996); People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 416 (1985). This case, however, is not about a promise made
and broken by the State; it is about a sentence agreed to by the
parties, and imposed by the trial court, in violation of a statute.
	As the State correctly notes, a sentence which does not
conform to a statutory requirement is void and may be corrected
at any time. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). Here,
the trial court had no authority to order, and the State had no
authority to agree, that the defendant's eight-year sentence was not
subject to truth-in-sentencing. See People v. Brown, 296 Ill. App.
3d 1041, 1043 (1998) (mandatory supervised release requirements
may not be bargained-away by the State during plea negotiations).
Accordingly, we award the writ and order the Ogle County circuit
court to issue an amended sentencing order without language
exempting the defendant from section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii). Because the
trial judge who sentenced the defendant has retired, the writ is
issued to the court. See People ex rel. Barrett v. Sbarbaro, 386 Ill. 581, 593 (1944).
	Application of section 3-6-3(a)(ii) to an eight-year sentence
results in a prison term of at least 6.8 years. When the defendant
agreed to enter a guilty plea, however, he likely contemplated a
prison term of four years-eight years less day-for-day good-conduct credit. The defendant does not intimate that he may have
gone to trial if faced with an additional 2.8 years' imprisonment;
rather, he offers an alternative to minimize penal consequences of
granting mandamus relief. The defendant suggests that we use our
supervisory authority to reduce his sentence to the minimum for a
Class X felony, six years, with truth-in-sentencing requirements to
apply. Assuming he receives the maximum good-conduct credit
allowed under section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), the defendant would serve
5.1 years. The State has no objection to this alternative, and we
find it to be an equitable solution because neither party
contemplated truth-in-sentencing requirements when negotiating
toward a guilty plea. Accordingly, under Supreme Court Rule
615(b)(4) (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), we reduce the defendant's
sentence to six years' imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
	The Illinois truth-in-sentencing provisions of the Unified
Code of Corrections applied to the offense of which the defendant
was convicted, and the trial judge lacked the discretion to order
that the defendant was not subject to the provisions. A writ of
mandamus is awarded to the State, and the Ogle County circuit
court is ordered to issue an amended sentencing order. Further, in
the exercise of our supervisory authority pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 615(b)(4), we reduce the defendant's sentence to six
years' imprisonment.
Writ awarded.
1.      1The General Assembly originally enacted truth-in-sentencing
requirements in Public Act 89-404, eff. August 20, 1995, but did not
include predatory criminal sexual assault of a child as a triggering
offense. We invalidated this act under the single subject clause of the
Illinois Constitution. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). However,
before our decision in Reedy, the General Assembly revisited truth-in-sentencing. In both Public Act 90-592 and Public Act 90-593, both
effective June 19, 1998, the General Assembly reenacted truth-in-sentencing provisions and included predatory criminal sexual assault of
a child as a triggering offense. The defendant committed his offense on
June 30, 1998. He concedes that section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) applied to his
offense.