Title: Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Becker Property Services LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP002457
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2018

2018 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2457 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, State 
Auto Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Property 
and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford, Fay 
Walters and Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
          Plaintiffs, 
H.O.L.I.E. of Greenfield Avenue, Inc., Dennis 
Kleinhans, Dorothy Grabowski, Virginia Werner, 
Mernlyn Goodrich, Theodore Kolodzyk, Judith 
Gorski, Linda Sutton , as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Mary Sutton and  
Alice Carey, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Cintas Corporation No. 2, 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
     v. 
Becker Property Services LLC, 
          Third-Party  
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant- 
          Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 797, 899 N.W.2d 737 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
John J. DiMotto 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner, 
there were briefs filed by Patryk Silver, Esq., Aaron R. Berndt, 
Esq., Joshua B. Cronin, Esq., and Borgelt, Powell, Peterson, and 
Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Patryk 
Silver, Esq. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-third-Party 
plaintiff-appellant-cross 
respondent, there was a brief filed by Lars E. Gulbrandsen, 
Jeffrey O. Davis, Leila N. Sahar, and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Lars E. Gulbrandsen. 
 
 
 
 
2018 WI 81
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2457 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV3930) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, State 
Auto Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Property 
and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford, Fay 
Walters and Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
H.O.L.I.E. of Greenfield Avenue, Inc., Dennis 
Kleinhans, Dorothy Grabowski, Virginia Werner, 
Mernlyn Goodrich, Theodore Kolodzyk, Judith 
Gorski, Linda Sutton, as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Mary Sutton and 
Alice Carey, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Cintas Corporation No. 2, 
 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, 
 
          Defendant-Third-Party  
 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Becker Property Services LLC, 
 
          Third-Party  
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
2 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DANIEL 
KELLY, 
J.   Becker 
Property 
Services 
LLC 
("Becker") and Cintas Corporation No. 2 ("Cintas") executed a 
contract 
containing 
indemnification 
and 
choice-of-law 
provisions.  A dispute arose over whether the contract entitles 
Cintas to indemnification for damages caused by its own 
negligence.  To answer that question, we must also resolve a 
threshold dispute:  As between Wisconsin and Ohio, which law 
provides the rule of decision? 
¶2 
We hold that Ohio's law governs the parties' contract, 
and that Becker must defend and indemnify Cintas, even for 
damages caused by its own negligence.  Consequently, we affirm 
the court of appeals, but (as we discuss below) on other 
grounds.1 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
A 2013 fire at Valentino Square (a senior living 
facility) caused approximately $900,000 in property damage after 
the 
facility's 
fire-suppression 
sprinkler 
system 
allegedly 
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals, American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cintas Corp. 
No. 2, No. 2015AP2457, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 
11, 2017), reversing an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable John J. DiMotto presiding. 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
3 
 
failed.  Valentino Square's owner had contracted with Becker to 
manage the property.  In that capacity, Becker had contracted 
with Cintas2 in 2012 to perform certain services, including 
regular 
inspections 
of 
the 
fire-suppression 
system 
(the 
"Contract").  The fire-suppression system allegedly failed 
because water in the system accumulated, froze, and then burst 
the pipes. 
¶4 
Plaintiffs (the owner of Valentino Square, several 
tenants, and the property insurers) sued Cintas, claiming the 
fire-suppression system's pipes would not have burst but for 
Cintas's negligent performance of its duties, or its breach of 
the Contract's implied warranty that it would perform its duties 
in a workmanlike manner.  Cintas tendered the defense of the 
matter to Becker pursuant to the Contract's indemnity clause. 
¶5 
When Becker rejected the tender, Cintas impleaded it 
as a third-party defendant.  Cintas sought indemnification for 
any damages for which it may be held liable to the plaintiffs, 
the costs of defense (including attorney's fees), and the costs 
of enforcing the indemnification provision (including attorney's 
fees). 
¶6 
Cintas moved for summary judgment on its claim that 
Becker breached its obligation to defend and indemnify.  Cintas 
asserted that Ohio law should provide the rule of decision by 
virtue of the Contract's choice-of-law provision.  Becker filed 
                                                 
2 Cintas is incorporated in Ohio and has its principal place 
of business in Ohio. 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
4 
 
a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Contract 
does not require it to defend or indemnify Cintas for its own 
negligence.  Specifically, it argued that under Wisconsin law, 
contracts purporting to indemnify a party for its own negligence 
require a heightened level of clarity to be enforceable (the 
"strict construction" rule).3  According to Becker, the strict 
construction of indemnification provisions is a public policy 
important enough to defeat the Contract's choice-of-law clause. 
¶7 
The circuit court denied Cintas's motion and granted 
Becker's.  It agreed that the strict-construction rule embodied 
a public policy so important that the parties cannot be allowed 
to contract around it.  It then concluded that the Contract's 
indemnification clause did not satisfy that rule.  It said the 
Contract 
"does 
not 
have 
any 
specific 
and 
express 
statement . . . to the effect that Cintas gets coverage for its 
own negligent acts," and it does not convey that "the purpose 
and unmistakable intent of the parties in entering into the 
contract was for no other reason than to cover losses occasioned 
by the indemnitee's own negligence."  However, the court added 
that, if Ohio law had applied instead, the indemnification 
                                                 
3 Spivey v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 79 Wis. 2d 58, 63, 
255 N.W.2d 469 (1977) (stating that "[t]he general rule accepted 
in this state and elsewhere is that an indemnification agreement 
will not be construed to cover an indemnitee for his own 
negligent acts absent a specific and express statement in the 
agreement to that effect," and also establishing that "where the 
indemnitor, . . . is itself free of negligence, the obligation 
to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence must be 
clearly and unequivocally expressed in the agreement"). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
5 
 
provision would have been sufficient to require Becker to 
indemnify Cintas for its own negligence.  Consequently, the 
circuit court dismissed Cintas's third-party complaint against 
Becker. 
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed.  It held that, even 
under Wisconsin law, the Contract required Becker to defend and 
indemnify Cintas for its own negligence and for the breach of 
implied warranty claim.4  We granted Becker's timely petition for 
review, and now affirm. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
The circuit court decided this matter on cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  We review the disposition of such motions 
de novo, applying the same methodology the circuit courts apply.  
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 
N.W.2d 816 (1987); see also Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. 
Jackson Cty., 2010 WI 95, ¶11, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615 
("We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de 
novo, . . . .").  First, we "examine the pleadings to determine 
whether a claim for relief has been stated."  Green Spring 
Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.  Then, "[i]f a claim for relief has 
been stated, the inquiry . . . shifts to whether any factual 
issues exist."  Id.  Summary judgment is appropriate only "if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals did not address the choice-of-law 
question. 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
6 
 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2015-16); see also Columbia Propane, 
L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 
N.W.2d 776 (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02)). 
¶10 The 
only 
dispute 
before 
us 
is 
the 
proper 
interpretation of a contract.  This presents a question of law, 
which we review de novo.  Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics Mach., 
2003 
WI 15, 
¶15, 
259 
Wis. 2d 587, 
657 
N.W.2d 411 
("Interpretation of a contract is a question of law which this 
court reviews de novo."); see also Drinkwater v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2006 WI 56, ¶14, 290 Wis. 2d 642, 714 N.W.2d 568 
("This choice-of-law determination is a question of law subject 
to independent appellate review."); Beilfuss v. Huffy Corp., 
2004 
WI App 118, 
¶6, 
274 
Wis. 2d 500, 
685 
N.W.2d 373 
("Whether . . . the choice of forum clause and choice of law 
clause are enforceable requires interpretation of the employment 
agreement.  Interpretation of a contract is a question of law 
which this court reviews de novo."). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
7 
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶11 Before we can determine the enforceability of the 
Contract's indemnification provision, we must know which state's 
law to apply.  Therefore, we begin with whether we must honor 
the 
parties' 
agreement 
that 
Ohio's 
law 
controls 
the 
interpretation of their Contract.  We will then determine 
whether the Contract requires indemnification for Cintas's own 
negligence and the breach of implied warranty claim. 
A.  Choice of Law 
¶12 The parties agree that the Contract subjects itself to 
Ohio's law;5 they disagree over whether we should enforce that 
provision.  Becker says doing so would obviate and bring to 
naught one of Wisconsin's important public policies, viz., the 
strict construction of indemnification promises.6  Cintas says a 
rule of construction cannot embody a public policy so important 
that it could nullify the parties' choice of controlling law.  
For the following reasons, we agree with Cintas. 
¶13 There is no doubt that, generally speaking, parties 
are free to choose the law governing their contracts.  Jefferis 
                                                 
5 The Contract says, in part:  "The rights and obligations 
of the parties contained herein shall be governed by the laws of 
the State of Ohio, excluding any choice of law rules which may 
direct the application of the laws of another jurisdiction." 
6 "In cases where the damage results solely from the 
negligence of the indemnitee, and the indemnitee seeks recovery 
from the indemnitor, this court and the overwhelming majority of 
other state courts apply the rule that the indemnity contracts 
will be strictly construed."  Algrem v. Nowlan, 37 Wis. 2d 70, 
76, 154 N.W.2d 217 (1967). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
8 
 
v. Austin, 182 Wis. 203, 205, 196 N.W. 238 (1923) ("That parties 
to a contract may expressly or impliedly agree that the law of a 
jurisdiction . . . shall control is beyond question.").  But 
there is a caveat:  They may not use their freedom to escape 
"important public policies of a state whose law would be 
applicable if the parties['] choice of law provision were 
disregarded." 
 
Bush 
v. 
Nat'l 
Sch. 
Studios, 
Inc., 
139 
Wis. 2d 635, 642, 407 N.W.2d 883 (1987). 
¶14 Therefore, our task is to decide whether our practice 
of strictly construing indemnification provisions embodies a 
public policy so important that parties may not avoid it.  While 
we have previously said that "[a] precise delineation of those 
policies which are sufficiently important to warrant overriding 
a contractual choice of law stipulation is not possible,"7 we 
have at least described some of the characteristics by which we 
might recognize them.  They are policies that "make a particular 
type of contract enforceable," or that "make a particular 
contract provision unenforceable," or that "protect a weaker 
party against the unfair exercise of superior bargaining power 
by another party."  Id. at 643.  Courts (not necessarily ours) 
have seen those characteristics in, for example, usury laws, 
unconscionability doctrines, fair dealership laws, prohibitions 
                                                 
7 Bush v. Nat'l Sch. Studios, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 635, 643, 
407 N.W.2d 883 (1987). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
9 
 
on covenants not to compete, and statutes of frauds.  Id. at 643 
& n.1.8 
¶15 Our strict construction rule contains none of the 
characteristics indicative of a policy that should trump a 
choice-of-law provision.  The rule does not address the 
enforceability of a type of contract, or a type of contract 
provision.  And it applies without respect to the parties' 
relative bargaining power.  The rule's function is simply to 
ensure the parties actually intended for the indemnitee to be 
indemnified not just for the negligence of others for which it 
might be responsible, but for the indemnitee's own negligence as 
well. 
See, 
e.g., 
Hastreiter 
v. 
Karau 
Bldgs., 
Inc., 
57 
Wis. 2d 746, 748, 205 N.W.2d 162 (1973) ("The rule relied on by 
the 
tenant 
[i.e., 
strict 
construction 
of 
indemnification 
agreements 
that 
indemnify 
the 
indemnitees 
for 
their 
own 
negligence] is a rule of construction.  The purpose of the 
construction of an agreement is to ascertain the intent of the 
parties.").  As such, this is a rule of caution, not 
prohibition. 
¶16 If a cautionary rule of construction were enough to 
nullify a choice-of-law provision, we would unnecessarily impair 
                                                 
8 See also Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 137 (1851) 
("Contracts against public policy are divided, by MR. STORY, 
into seven classes, as follows:  1. Contracts in restraint of 
trade; 2. Contracts in restraint of marriage; 3. Marriage 
brokerage contracts; 4. Wagers and gaming; 5. Contracts to 
offend 
against 
the 
laws 
and 
public 
duty; 
6. Usury, 
and 
7. Trading with an enemy."). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
10 
 
"certainty and predictability in contractual relations."  See 
Bush, 139 Wis. 2d at 642; see also Thurner Heat Treating Co. v. 
Memco, Inc., 252 Wis. 16, 24, 30 N.W.2d 228 (1947) ("It is the 
policy of the law not only to encourage the embodiment of 
specific and material provisions in a contract, but in the 
interest of certainty and fair dealing, to require a plain and 
fair statement of terms.").  Every law, whether statutory or 
common, is——at some level——an embodiment of policy.  Because 
spotting the "important" public policies amongst all the rest is 
an inexact endeavor, we do well to keep that category narrowly 
focused.  If it were to expand beyond its essential kernel, 
certainty and predictability in contractual relations would 
erode in like measure because parties would find it increasingly 
difficult to know which provisions or contracts a court might 
preempt.  Expanding the "important" category far enough to reach 
our rule of strict construction would make virtually any 
contract provision potentially subject to the public policy 
caveat.  And that would leave parties perennially wondering 
whether we will honor their choice-of-law decisions.  We decline 
Becker's invitation to do so, and hold that our practice of 
strictly 
construing 
indemnification 
provisions 
is 
not 
so 
important that it will defeat a contract's choice-of-law 
provision. 
¶17 We should not honor the choice-of-law provision, 
Becker said, for the additional reason that doing so would allow 
Cintas to escape Wisconsin's public policy that indemnification 
provisions of this sort must be conspicuous.  Even if Becker is 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
11 
 
right about the conspicuousness requirement (a subject we do not 
address), it provided no argument capable of invoking the 
"important public policy" exception to the rule that choice-of-
law clauses are enforceable.  Because every state law embodies a 
public policy, it is in the very nature of choice-of-law clauses 
that they substitute one state's policies for another.  And 
still we enforce them.  Under this exception, it is only when 
such clauses obviate an "important public policy" that we set 
them aside.  Becker did not say why the conspicuousness 
requirement (if requirement it be) rises from the ranks of 
workaday public policies to join the elites that are so 
important we do not allow parties to contract around them.  It 
provided no argument, no examples, no analogies——it did not even 
call this policy "important," much less provide a basis upon 
which we could declare it to be so.  We will not develop an 
argument on Becker's behalf when Becker itself has chosen not to 
advance one.  See Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 
2005 WI 93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 ("We will 
not address undeveloped arguments."). 
¶18 Becker also argued that we should not enforce the 
choice-of-law provision because it is not conspicuous (that is, 
the provision is not set apart from the rest of the contract 
through a larger font, emphasis, or other mechanism designed to 
call a party's attention to it).  It cites no authority for the 
proposition, but asserts that if the choice-of-law provision 
obviates a law that requires part of the contract to be 
conspicuous, then the choice-of-law provision must itself be 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
12 
 
conspicuous. 
 
It 
says 
this 
must 
be 
so 
because 
"[t]he 
conspicuousness rule derives from the public policy requirement 
that the signer of a contract be unmistakably informed of the 
rights and duties at issue, in language that clearly and 
unequivocally 
communicates 
to 
the 
signer 
the 
nature 
and 
significance of the document being signed."  The conclusion, 
however, does not follow from the premise.  A conspicuous 
choice-of-law provision tells a contracting party nothing more 
about its indemnification obligations than an inconspicuous 
choice-of-law provision.  It could be far and away the most 
conspicuous part of the contract and still it would merely tell 
the parties which state's law will control the contract.  Its 
conspicuousness would hold no hint as to whether the selected 
state's laws are more or less favorable with respect to any 
given part of the contract. 
¶19 We have never held that a contract's choice-of-law 
provision must be conspicuous, and we see no reason to do so 
today.  Therefore, we will determine the enforceability and 
meaning of the Contract's indemnification provision using the 
law of the State of Ohio. 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
13 
 
B.  Indemnification 
¶20 Becker 
argues 
that, 
even 
under 
Ohio 
law, 
the 
indemnification 
provision 
is 
unenforceable 
because 
it 
is 
ambiguous.9   The Contract says, in relevant part: 
Purchaser [Becker], at its own expense, shall defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless Seller [Cintas] from any 
claim, charge, liability, or damage arising out of any 
goods or services provided by Seller hereunder, 
including any failure of the goods or services to 
function as intended.  Purchaser acknowledges that 
Seller shall have no liability or responsibility for 
any loss or damage to persons or property resulting 
from any fire or equipment malfunction. 
Becker says this language does not plainly state that Becker 
must indemnify Cintas for damages arising from Cintas's own 
negligence. 
¶21 Ohio says the purpose of scrutinizing a contract is to 
find and apply the parties' intent:  "The cardinal purpose for 
judicial examination of any written instrument is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of the parties."  Foster Wheeler 
Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Convention Facilities Auth., 
678 N.E.2d 519, 526 (Ohio 1997).  "The intent of the parties to 
a contract is presumed to reside in the language they chose to 
                                                 
9 "Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of 
two or more constructions."  McClorey v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 720 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).  "A 
contract 'does not become ambiguous by reason of the fact that 
in its operation it will work a hardship upon one of the parties 
thereto.'"  Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. 
Convention Facilities Auth., 678 N.E.2d 519, 526-27 (Ohio 1997) 
(quoting Ohio Crane Co. v. Hicks, 143 N.E. 388, 389 (Ohio 1924) 
(per curiam)). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
14 
 
employ in the agreement."  Id. (quoted source omitted); see also 
Worth v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 513 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ohio 1987) 
("The nature of an indemnity relationship is determined by the 
intent of the parties as expressed by the language used.").  In 
applying that language, "common words appearing in a written 
instrument are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning 
unless manifest absurdity results or unless some other meaning 
is clearly intended from the face or overall contents of the 
instrument." 
 
Alexander 
v. 
Buckeye 
Pipe 
Line 
Co., 
374 
N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ohio 1978). 
¶22 With respect to any alleged ambiguity in contractual 
language, the rule in Ohio is that "quoties in verbis nulla est 
ambiguitas ibi nulla expositia contra verba fienda est."  Lawler 
v. Burt, 7 Ohio St. 340, 349–50 (Ohio 1857) (quoted source 
omitted).  That is to say, "[i]n the absence of ambiguity, no 
exposition shall be made which is opposed to the express words 
of the instrument." Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, 
Classified and Illustrated 176 (1845); Alexander, 374 N.E.2d at 
150 ("[W]here the terms in an existing contract are clear and 
unambiguous, this court cannot in effect create a new contract 
by finding an intent not expressed in the clear language 
employed by the parties."). 
¶23 The 
Contract's 
indemnification 
provision 
is 
not 
ambiguous.  To the contrary, any greater explicitness regarding 
its coverage of Cintas's own negligence would come at the cost 
of the provision's broad scope.  The duty to defend and 
indemnify applies to "any claim, charge, liability, or damage 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
15 
 
arising out of any goods or services provided by Seller 
[Cintas]."  (Emphasis added.)  The term "any," of course, admits 
of no exceptions.  And that term describes both the nature of 
the attempt to hold Cintas liable (claims, charges, etc.), as 
well as the source of harm (goods or services).  With respect to 
the latter, the Contract even repeats itself for clarity, 
stating that the duty to defend and indemnify "include[es] any 
failure of the goods or services to function as intended."  The 
"goods and services" to which this phrase refers, of course, are 
those supplied by Cintas.  The indemnification provision left no 
possible misunderstanding about the effect of its language.  The 
same 
paragraph 
goes 
on 
to 
say 
that 
"Purchaser 
[Becker] 
acknowledges that Seller [Cintas] shall have no liability or 
responsibility for any loss or damage to persons or property 
resulting from any fire or equipment malfunction."  Cintas would 
have no such liability or responsibility because of the 
immediately preceding sentence, which made that loss or damage 
Becker's responsibility. 
¶24 We could not say this language does not cover Cintas's 
own 
negligence 
without 
doing 
considerable 
damage 
to 
the 
Contract.  First, we would need to remove the term "any" each 
time it appears in the indemnification provision to create the 
possibility that some claims or causes of damage might not be 
included.  But that would still leave Becker's acknowledgement 
that the effect of the indemnification language would leave 
Cintas free of any responsibility for damage or loss consequent 
upon a fire or equipment malfunction.  Therefore, Becker's 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
16 
 
preferred reading would require elimination of the entire 
sentence containing that acknowledgment.  In sum, we would need 
to eliminate over half of the Contract's indemnification 
provision just so it could plausibly be called ambiguous.  
Neither logic nor Ohio's law requires us to excise language for 
the purpose of creating an ambiguity that could then be 
exploited by one of the parties to the Contract. 
¶25 Nonetheless, Becker says other contractual provisions, 
read in conjunction with the indemnification language, make the 
duty to defend and indemnify ambiguous.10  Specifically, it calls 
our attention to the language on the first page of the Contract 
promising that "[a]ll work performed will be according to NFPA, 
State, and City Fire Department requirements and is guaranteed, 
insured and done by licensed personnel."  (Emphasis added.)  
Neither a guaranty nor a promise of insurance means anything, it 
reasons, if the indemnification provision shields Cintas from 
any and all responsibility for the goods and services it 
provides. 
¶26 This argument has some superficial attractiveness, but 
it ultimately cannot bear the weight Becker assigns it.  Becker 
                                                 
10 We understand Becker's argument as encouraging us to 
respect Ohio's recognition that "[a] fundamental principle of 
contract construction requires that the document be read as a 
whole."  Monsler v. Cincinnati Cas. Co., 598 N.E.2d 1203, 1209 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); see also McClorey, 720 N.E.2d at 956 ("In 
the construction of a written contract, it will be read as a 
whole, and the intent of each part will be gathered from a 
consideration of the whole.").  We agree that Ohio's law 
requires us to read the Contract as a whole. 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
17 
 
believes that, if the indemnification provision really does 
excuse Cintas from responsibility for its own negligence, then 
the promise of guaranteed work must be illusory.  However, 
neither provision negates or makes the other ambiguous because 
the Contract actually does contain a guaranty.  It provides that 
"[c]laims for defective goods or negligent services must be made 
within thirty (30) days after delivery and Purchaser's exclusive 
remedy shall be, at Seller's option, replacement of the 
defective goods or remedying of any negligence in services or 
credit or refund of the purchase price paid."  Becker offers no 
authority for the proposition that a limited guaranty is 
necessarily inconsistent with an indemnification provision that 
covers the indemnitee's own negligence.  Nor is there any 
readily-apparent 
reason 
that 
the 
two 
provisions 
cannot 
comfortably coincide in the same contract.  And if they can co-
exist, we must give effect to both terms.  German Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Roost, 45 N.E. 1097, 1099 (Ohio 1897) ("[N]o provision [of a 
contract] 
is 
to 
be 
wholly 
disregarded 
because 
[it 
is] 
inconsistent with other provisions, unless no other reasonable 
construction is possible, . . . .  If reasonable effect can be 
given to both, then both are to be retained."). 
¶27 The Contract's promise that all work would be insured 
is 
similarly 
incapable 
of 
calling 
the 
indemnification 
provision's meaning into question.  Buying an insurance policy 
does not create exposure to liability otherwise disclaimed.  Nor 
could Cintas's representation that it has such a policy create 
in Becker a contract-based expectation that Cintas would accept 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
18 
 
liability for the risks covered by the policy.  With respect to 
which party will shoulder the responsibility to defend and 
indemnify Cintas, the representation that Cintas carries an 
insurance policy is, at most, a nebulous suggestion that an 
insurance company is available to discharge that duty.  In 
contrast, the Contract's indemnification provision is a specific 
and explicit mandate that Becker must accept that responsibility 
to defend and indemnify Cintas.  So even if there were a 
conflict 
between 
the 
Contract's 
representation 
regarding 
insurance and its indemnification provision (and we do not 
believe there is), the specific provision would control.  See 
Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co., 991 N.E.2d 232, 235 (Ohio 2013) ("When 
faced with provisions that are arguably in conflict, we apply 
the more specific provision."); German Fire Ins. Co., 45 N.E. at 
1099 ("[A] special provision will be held to override a general 
provision only where the two cannot stand together.  If 
reasonable effect can be given to both, then both are to be 
retained."). 
¶28 The 
Contract's 
indemnification 
provision 
is 
not 
ambiguous.  Therefore, we hold that it plainly requires Becker 
to defend and indemnify Cintas in the underlying action, even 
with respect to Cintas's own negligence. 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
19 
 
* 
¶29 Ohio's 
law 
as 
it 
specifically 
relates 
to 
indemnification agreements confirms our conclusion.11  Ohio 
courts examine such agreements just like any other.  Portsmouth 
Ins. Agency v. Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 934 N.E.2d 940, 944 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2009) ("Indemnity agreements must be interpreted in the 
same manner as other contracts.").  And they are enforceable to 
the extent they do not contradict Ohio's public policy.  
Glaspell v. Ohio Edison Co., 505 N.E.2d 264, 266 (Ohio 1987) 
("[A]bsent specified public policy exceptions, the law of Ohio 
generally allows enforcement of indemnity agreements.").  But 
the public policy exceptions are to be narrowly applied: 
In a free and democratic society, freedom of 
contract is the general rule; public-policy limits are 
the exception.  The doctrine does not grant courts a 
roving commission to police the terms of agreements 
and must be cautiously applied lest the exception 
swallow the rule.  The Ohio Supreme Court has 
repeatedly admonished the courts against the loose 
application 
of 
"public 
policy" 
to 
invalidate 
agreements, even in the context of ordinary contracts 
between private parties . . . . 
                                                 
11 Becker argued that an indemnification provision that 
indemnifies an indemnitee for its own negligence must be 
conspicuous 
under 
Wisconsin's 
law, 
citing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 401.201(2)(f) (2015-16) and Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics 
Machinery, 
2003 
WI 15, 
259 
Wis. 2d 587, 
657 
N.W.2d 411.  
However, it offered no similar argument with respect to Ohio's 
law.  We generally do not address arguments the parties have not 
made, and we see no reason to depart from that tradition here.  
See Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2005 WI 93, 
¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 ("We will not address 
undeveloped arguments."). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
20 
 
Stickovich v. City of Cleveland, 757 N.E.2d 50, 59 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2001).  The parties have not identified, nor have we found, 
any public policy forbidding indemnification provisions in the 
type of contract between Cintas and Becker.12 
¶30 Indemnification agreements covering the indemnitee's 
own negligence are enforceable as well.  However, Ohio has a 
rule of strict construction similar to our own:  "Where it is 
alleged that the agreement protects an indemnitee from the 
financial consequences of his own negligence, the greater weight 
of authority, particularly in Ohio, would construe the words of 
such an agreement most narrowly."  Glaspell, 505 N.E.2d at 266.  
The rule applies when the contracting parties have such 
disparate bargaining power that one can impose inequitable 
conditions on the other.  See Coulter v. Dayton Power & Light 
Co., 731 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]he rule of 
narrowly construing this type of indemnification agreement had 
been developed to protect a contracting party in a disparately 
weaker bargaining position from the stronger party's attempt to 
impose wholly inequitable burdens upon the weaker party."). 
¶31 The strict construction rule does not apply, however, 
"when such burden of indemnification was assented to in a 
context of free and understanding negotiation."  Glaspell, 505 
                                                 
12 Ohio 
does 
not 
allow 
indemnification 
agreements 
in 
construction 
contracts, 
employment 
contracts, 
or 
illegal 
contracts.  See Worth v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 513 N.E.2d 253, 
257 (Ohio 1987); Glaspell v. Ohio Edison Co., 505 N.E.2d 264, 
266 (Ohio 1987) (citing cases). 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
21 
 
N.E.2d at 266.  That context typically is present when the 
contracting parties are capable business entities.  See id. at 
267 ("The parties in the case before us are commercial 
enterprises of sufficient size and quality as to presumably 
possess 
a 
high 
degree 
of 
sophistication 
in 
matters 
of 
contract."); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Corp. Circle, Ltd., 
658 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ("While clauses 
limiting the liability of the drafter are ordinarily strictly 
construed, such strict construction need not be applied in the 
interpretation of an exculpation or indemnification agreement 
entered into between business entities in a context of free and 
understanding negotiation." (emphasis omitted)). 
¶32 We think Becker is sufficiently sophisticated that it 
does not fall within the category of parties the strict 
construction rule is meant to protect.  Although the record does 
not disclose a great deal about Becker, the Contract discloses 
that it manages at least ten apartment complexes in southeastern 
Wisconsin.  Managing that number of properties requires at least 
some familiarity with matters of contract.  It also suggests 
that Becker is in a position to intelligently negotiate the 
economic terms of its contracts without being overborne by its 
counterparties. 
¶33 However, even if we were to conclude that Becker is 
entitled to the protection offered by the rule of strict 
construction, the Contract's indemnification provision more than 
adequately 
expresses 
the 
intention 
that 
Cintas 
would 
be 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
22 
 
indemnified for its own negligence.  Ohio's Supreme Court 
described this rule as follows: 
"Such an interpretation should not be given a contract 
that would make the appellant responsible for the 
consequence of a negligent act of the appellee unless 
no other meaning can be ascribed to it.  If a doubt 
existed as to its meaning, the court would resolve 
that doubt against the contention that the contract 
was intended to indemnify appellee against its own 
negligence. 
 
Every 
presumption 
is 
against 
such 
intention." 
George H. Dingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie R. Co., 131 N.E. 723, 725 
(Ohio 1921) (quoting Mitchell v. S. Ry. Co., 74 S.W. 216, 217 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1903)).  Ohio law does not, however, "require that 
contracts purporting to hold an indemnitee harmless for its own 
negligence contain express language to that effect."  Coulter, 
731 N.E.2d at 1174. 
¶34 In this case, the same characteristics that make the 
Contract's 
indemnification 
provision 
unambiguous 
also 
demonstrate 
it 
satisfies 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
strict 
construction rule.  Interpreting the Contract to not cover 
Cintas's own negligence would require a wholesale revision to so 
much language that we would be essentially reconstructing the 
agreement on behalf of Becker to avoid a conclusion favorable to 
Cintas. 
 
"[N]o 
other 
meaning 
can 
be 
ascribed 
to" 
the 
indemnification provision than the one we have described.  See 
George H. Dingledy Lumber Co., 131 N.E. at 725 (quoted source 
omitted).  Nor is there any "doubt . . . as to its meaning."  
See id. 
No. 
2015AP2457   
 
23 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶35 The parties agreed that Ohio law would control the 
Contract, and no public policy requires us to preempt their 
agreement. 
 
The 
Contract's 
indemnification 
agreement 
unambiguously requires Becker to defend and indemnify Cintas 
even for its own negligence, and this is true regardless of 
whether we apply Ohio's rule of strict construction.  Therefore, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
1 
 
¶36 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  "All work 
performed will be . . . insured."  This language is on the first 
page of the contract between Cintas and Becker, in bold type.  A 
reasonable person reading this contract language would think 
that it means what it says.  But not the majority.  In the 
majority's view, this unequivocal language is transformed to 
mean only that Cintas "carries an insurance policy."  Majority 
op., ¶27. 
¶37 Rather than giving effect to this language, the 
majority instead enforces a liability-shifting provision set 
forth in the finest of fine print.  The effect is that, yes, 
Cintas's work is "insured," but not by Cintas.  Instead, the 
liability-shifting indemnity provision foists liability for 
Cintas's own negligence onto Becker.  The indemnity provision 
appears in miniscule type as part of an identically-styled 
laundry list that cannot be easily read without a magnifying 
glass. 
¶38 The general rule of law in Wisconsin (as well as in 
Ohio) is that an indemnification provision will not be construed 
to cover an indemnitee for its own negligent acts unless there 
is a clearly expressed statement to that effect.  Spivey v. 
Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 79 Wis. 2d 58, 63, 255 N.W.2d 469 
(1977); see George Dingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie R. Co., 131 
N.E.  723, 725 (Ohio 1921).  Likewise, Wisconsin's strong public 
policy is that such agreements must be conspicuous lest they be 
deemed unconscionable.  See Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics 
Machinery, 2003 WI 15, ¶¶26-27, 259 Wis. 2d 587, 657 N.W.2d 411. 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
2 
 
¶39 Whether it be under Wisconsin or Ohio law, an 
ambiguous provision cannot be enforced.  Additionally, Ohio law 
cannot be invoked to circumvent important Wisconsin public 
policy considerations.  Because the indemnification provision 
here is both ambiguous and unconscionably inconspicuous, the 
majority's application of Ohio law must fail. 
¶40 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶41 Becker Property Services contracted with Cintas to 
perform regular inspections of the fire-suppression system in a 
property Becker managed.  Majority op., ¶3.  The fire-
suppression system allegedly failed and a fire in the property 
caused approximately $900,000 in damages.  Id. 
¶42 The property owner, several building tenants, and the 
property's insurers sued Cintas for negligence and breach of 
implied warranty.  Id., ¶4.  Pursuant to an indemnity provision 
in the contract, Cintas sought to have Becker indemnify Cintas 
for Cintas's own negligence.  Id. 
¶43 The majority first enforces a choice of law provision 
in the contract between Cintas and Becker that requires the use 
of Ohio law.  Id., ¶2.  Second, applying Ohio law, it ultimately 
concludes that the indemnity provision is enforceable.  Id.  
Consequently, it determines that Becker must indemnify Cintas 
for Cintas's own negligence. 
II 
¶44 At the outset, the majority missteps in framing what 
it refers to as the threshold question:  "As between Wisconsin 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
3 
 
and Ohio, which law provides the rule of the decision?"  
Majority op., ¶1.  The question, as framed, assumes that Ohio is 
qualified to be a contender.  It is not. 
¶45 In framing the "threshold" issue in this fashion, the 
majority is able to avoid addressing the real threshold issues 
that would prove fatal to its conclusion.  If the language of 
the contract is ambiguous, under either Wisconsin or Ohio law, 
the majority's conclusion cannot stand.  Next, even if the 
language of the liability-shifting indemnity provision is 
unambiguous, if it contravenes important Wisconsin public 
policy, Ohio law cannot be enforced.  An examination of these 
issues renders Ohio unqualified to even be in the ring. 
¶46 The majority errs in three significant ways.  First, 
it 
overlooks 
a 
substantial 
ambiguity 
in 
the 
contract, 
misconstruing a promise that Cintas's work is "insured."  
Second, it disregards the indemnity clause's inconspicuous 
nature, giving effect to a liability-shifting provision that 
appears in the middle of a block of text, that is so small as to 
be barely legible, and is not set off from the surrounding text 
or emphasized in any way.  Third, it ignores important Wisconsin 
public policy considerations and erroneously applies Ohio law to 
this dispute.  I address each in turn. 
A 
¶47 The 
majority 
errs 
first 
when 
it 
overlooks 
the 
ambiguity 
created 
by 
Cintas's 
promise 
that 
its 
work 
is 
"insured."  On the first page of the contract, in bold type is 
the statement:  "All work performed will be according to NFPA, 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
4 
 
State, and City Fire Department requirements and is guaranteed, 
insured and done by licensed personnel" (emphasis added).  From 
this language, it is reasonable to conclude that the work is 
insured by the drafter of the contract, Cintas. 
¶48 However, the contract also contains the indemnity 
provision, which states: 
Indemnity.  Purchaser, at its own expense, shall 
defend, indemnify and hold harmless Seller from any 
claim, charge, liability, or damage arising out of any 
goods or services provided by Seller hereunder, 
including any failure of the goods or services to 
function as intended[.]  Purchaser acknowledges that 
Seller shall have no liability or responsibility for 
any loss or damage to persons or property resulting 
from any fire or equipment malfunction. 
This provision shifts liability from Cintas to Becker, even in 
situations of Cintas's own negligence. 
¶49 In 
Wisconsin, 
the 
general 
rule 
is 
that 
"an 
indemnification agreement will not be construed to cover an 
indemnitee for his own negligent acts absent a specific and 
express statement in the agreement to that effect."  Spivey, 79 
Wis. 2d at 63.  Such indemnity agreements are subject to strict 
construction.  Id. 
¶50 The Spivey court explained the two ways in which an 
obligation to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence 
will be upheld:  (1) if the agreement clearly and unequivocally 
states that the indemnitee is to be covered for losses 
occasioned by his own negligent acts; and (2) "if it is clear 
that the purpose and unmistakable intent of the parties in 
entering into the contract was for no other reason than to cover 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
5 
 
losses occasioned by the indemnitee’s own negligence . . . ."  
Id. at 63-64. 
¶51 Similarly, as the majority provides, the rule in Ohio 
is that if the liability-shifting indemnity provision is 
ambiguous, then the provision cannot be enforced: 
Such an interpretation should not be given a contract 
that would make the appellant responsible for the 
consequence of a negligent act of the appellee unless 
no other meaning can be ascribed to it.  If a doubt 
existed as to its meaning, the court would resolve 
that doubt against the contention that the contract 
was intended to indemnify appellee against its own 
negligence. 
 
Every 
presumption 
is 
against 
such 
intention. 
Majority op., ¶33 (citing George H. Dingledy Lumber Co., 131 
N.E. at 725). 
¶52 Far from being clear and unequivocal, the contract in 
this case is contradictory and therefore ambiguous.  The bold 
type on the first page of the contract and the indemnity 
provision, 
when 
read 
together, 
are 
hopelessly 
ambiguous 
regarding whose responsibility it is to provide insurance for 
Cintas's work. 
¶53 To explain, the bold type on the first page says that 
Cintas's work is insured.  A reasonable reader would interpret 
this as meaning that Cintas would insure its own work.  A 
reasonable reader would not read this language as the majority 
does, to indicate merely that Cintas "carries an insurance 
policy."  See majority op., ¶27. 
¶54 However, the indemnity clause says the work is 
insured, but not by Cintas.  The indemnity clause thus shifts 
liability for the work to Becker.  This of course conflicts with 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
6 
 
the exhortation that the work is "insured," rendering the 
contract as a whole irreconcilably ambiguous. 
¶55 Under both Wisconsin and Ohio law, this ambiguity 
requires construing the contract against Cintas.  The contract 
does not "clearly and unequivocally" provide that Becker is to 
indemnify Cintas for its own negligence.  See Spivey, 79 
Wis. 2d at 63.  There is certainly another meaning that can be 
ascribed to it.  See George H. Dingledy Lumber Co., 131 N.E. at 
725.  Accordingly, I determine that the indemnity provision, is 
unenforceable because it is ambiguous. 
B 
¶56  In 
addition 
to 
being 
ambiguous, 
the 
indemnity 
provision is also inconspicuous pursuant to Wisconsin law.  This 
court in Deminsky announced the bright line requirement that 
"indemnity contracts in which parties agree to indemnify the 
indemnitee 
for 
the 
indemnitee's 
own 
negligence" 
must 
be 
conspicuous.  259 Wis. 2d 587, ¶28.  The issue in Deminsky arose 
in the context of the indemnitor's argument that the indemnity 
provision 
at 
issue 
was 
unconscionable 
because 
it 
was 
inconspicuous.  Id., ¶26. 
¶57 The 
standard 
for 
conspicuousness 
in 
indemnity 
contracts is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 401.201(2)(f).1  Id., ¶28.  
A term is "conspicuous" if any of the following apply: 
                                                 
1 At the time Deminsky was decided, this conspicuousness 
standard was set forth in Wis. Stat. § 401.201(10).  This 
statute has since been renumbered to § 401.201(2)(f).  See 2009 
Wis. Act 320. 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
7 
 
1. A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size 
than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, 
font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or 
lesser size. 
2. Language in the body of a record or display in 
larger 
type 
than 
the 
surrounding 
text, 
or 
in 
contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding 
text of the same size, or set off from surrounding 
text of the same size by symbols or other marks that 
call attention to the language. 
§ 401.201(2)(f). 
¶58 Applying the statute's conspicuousness standard to the 
facts of this case, the indemnity provision here is undoubtedly 
inconspicuous.  First, the font size is incredibly small.  
Counsel for Becker brought a magnifying glass with him to oral 
argument in this case to facilitate reading the provision, and 
with good reason.2 
¶59 Second, the entirety of the terms and conditions set 
forth in the contract look exactly the same.  The indemnity 
provision is only one of seventeen identical-looking, fine-print 
sections contained on the eighth and ninth pages of the nine-
page contract.  The indemnity provision has no heading, 
capitalization, bolding, italics, or underlining of any kind.  
Nothing about the provision grabs the reader's attention in any 
                                                 
2 The inconspicuous nature of the indemnity provision is 
demonstrated by a glance at the terms and conditions section of 
the contract, which is included as an appendix to this dissent.  
I direct the reader's attention to the indemnity provision, 
which is paragraph ten in the list of 17 items, all of which are 
set forth in what Becker maintains is 4.5 point font. 
 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
8 
 
way.3  Accordingly, I determine that the indemnity provision is 
inconspicuous and therefore unenforceable under Wisconsin law. 
C 
¶60 The preceding analysis of Deminsky's conspicuousness 
requirement informs my analysis of the choice of law provision.  
According to the choice of law provision, "The rights and 
obligations of the parties contained herein shall be governed by 
the laws of the State of Ohio, excluding any choice of law rules 
which may direct the application of the laws of another 
jurisdiction." 
¶61 Wisconsin courts have acknowledged that parties to a 
contract may expressly agree that the law of a particular 
jurisdiction shall control their contractual relations.  Bush v. 
National 
Sch. 
Studios, 
Inc., 
139 
Wis. 2d 635, 
642, 
407 
N.W.2d 883 
(1987) 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
However, 
this 
proposition is by no means unqualified.  Id.  Parties cannot 
agree to be bound by the law of a particular jurisdiction "at 
the expense of important public policies of a state whose law 
                                                 
3 In cases finding a contract provision to be conspicuous 
and enforceable there was some important characteristic to the 
provision that is lacking in this case.  See Deminsky v. 
Arlington Plastics Machinery, 2003 WI 15, ¶29, 259 Wis. 2d 587, 
657 N.W.2d 411 (highlighting the fact that the indemnity 
provision at issue had a heading in capital letters and bold 
print); Rainbow Country Rentals and Retail, Inc. v. Ameritech 
Publ'g, Inc., 2005 WI 153, ¶42, 286 Wis. 2d 170, 706 N.W.2d 95 
(emphasizing the fact that the liquidated damages provision at 
issue contained a specific reference in capital letters to a 
paragraph placing a limitation on available remedies). 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
9 
 
would be applicable if the parties choice of law provision were 
disregarded."  Id. 
¶62 In concluding that Ohio law applies, the majority 
addresses the choice of law provision without reference to the 
indemnity provision's conspicuity.  Yet, before determining 
whether the choice of law provision applies, one must determine 
first if there is an "important public policy" at stake.  See 
id. 
¶63 The majority refuses to address Becker's argument that 
the 
indemnification 
provision 
must 
be 
conspicuous 
under 
Wisconsin law because "it offered no similar argument with 
respect to Ohio's law."  Majority op., ¶29 n.11.  This analysis 
puts the cart before the horse.  Rather than diving into the 
application of Ohio law, the majority should instead have 
initially 
scrutinized 
Wisconsin's 
important 
public 
policy 
regarding the unconscionability of inconspicuous liability-
shifting provisions.  Such an analysis leads me to conclude that 
Ohio law does not apply to this dispute in the first instance. 
¶64 The Bush court declined to provide an exhaustive list 
of public policies that would render a choice of law provision 
null.  However, it specifically referenced laws "which make a 
particular 
contract 
provision 
unenforceable," 
such 
as 
"unconscionability doctrines," as sufficiently important to 
justify disregarding a contract's choice of law provision.  
Bush, 
139 
Wis. 2d at 
643, 
643 
n.1. 
 
The 
bright 
line 
conspicuousness requirement announced in Deminsky is rooted in 
the 
doctrine 
of 
unconscionability. 
 
See 
Deminsky, 
259 
No.  2015AP2457.awb 
 
10 
 
Wis. 2d 587, ¶¶26-27; see also Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 
206 Wis. 2d 76, 86-87, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996). 
¶65 An unconscionability doctrine is an "important public 
policy" identified by the Bush court.  This policy would be 
circumvented if we gave effect to the choice of law provision.4  
Therefore, the choice of law provision's selection of Ohio law 
is unenforceable.5  Accordingly, I determine that Wisconsin law 
applies.6  
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
4 My research has revealed no Ohio case establishing a 
similar conspicuousness rule to that announced in Deminsky, 259 
Wis. 2d 587. 
5 Further, 
it 
would 
render 
Deminsky's 
conspicuousness 
requirement entirely toothless if a party could avoid the 
requirement by way of a choice of law provision that is itself 
inconspicuous.  See Appendix, ¶15. 
6 I further observe that the majority's analysis results in 
an opinion of limited value in either Wisconsin or Ohio.  What 
is the precedential value of a Wisconsin court's interpretation 
of Ohio law?  Its application appears to be limited to this 
specific situation——where a choice of law provision results in a 
Wisconsin court applying Ohio law.