Title: Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Garth
Citation: 81 So. 2d 590
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1955

81 So. 2d 590 (1955)
BIRMINGHAM TRUST NAT'L BANK
v.
Ethel Mae GARTH et al.
8 Div. 789.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 30, 1955.
*591 Smyer, Smyer, White &amp; Hawkins, Birmingham, and Woodroof &amp; Woodroof, Athens, for appellant.
Maurice F. Bishop and Robt. S. Richard, Birmingham, and D. U. Patton, Athens, for appellees.
MERRILL, Justice.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Limestone County, in Equity, overruling demurrer to the bill of complaint as amended, to terminate a trust. The complainants (appellees) are Ethel Mae Garth, the daughter of the testator, and the six children of Ethel Mae Garth. The respondent-appellant bank is the trustee under the will of the testator.
To use the language in appellees' brief, "The bill seeks to terminate the trust created under the will, and a declaration of rights of the parties thereunder." The testator, L. C. Hightower, died on June 2, 1934, and the will was admitted for probate in Limestone County on June 28, 1934. The administration of the trust estate was transferred to and is pending in the circuit court, in equity.
The verified bill, with the will attached as an exhibit, shows that all the complainants are over 21 years of age except the youngest child of Ethel Mae Garth, who is over 18 and has had her disabilities of nonage removed and would become 21 on December 13, 1954; that the widow of L. C. Hightower, deceased, is dead; that a specific legacy to a sister of the testator was terminated by her death; that a specific legacy of $25 per month to a niece was terminated by her renunciation and release of same; that the only reason for the existence of the trust is a provision in the will providing for the payment of $500 per month to his daughter, Ethel Mae Garth, during her life; that Ethel Mae Garth is willing to renounce her interest in the estate; that complainants have requested respondent to terminate the trust and divide the corpus as provided in the will and respondent refuses so to do.
The respondent filed a demurrer consisting of 101 grounds which was overruled.
Item 3(f) of the will provided in pertinent part:
This case would present some close and interesting questions if we reached them, but under the allegations of the bill, which are construed more strongly against the pleader, we do not reach the real questions which are capably argued by counsel for the parties.
The theory of complainants' bill is that the renunciation by Ethel Mae Garth of all her life interests in a part of the income from the trust, accelerates the trust, so that it can be terminated immediately with the same result as if she had died. This theory was also followed by the trial court as his opinion states: "The purpose of the trust will have been fulfilled in December, 1954 with the renunciation of Ethel Mae Garth and her youngest child becoming twenty-one years of age."
Complainants have no existing justiciable controversy with respondent unless there has been a renunciation by Ethel Mae Garth. Appellees in brief make the categorical statement, "* * * and Ethel Mae Garth has renounced her interest in the trust and requested a termination of the trust estate." The statement quoted from the opinion of the trial court in the preceding paragraph shows that he, too, treated the cause as if there had been a renunciation by Ethel Mae Garth. The reply brief of appellant is just as emphatic when it states, "Mrs. Garth has not renounced her life estate." But has such a renunciation been alleged in the bill? It appears that there has been a deliberate and studied effort not to so allege. Paragraph 9 of the original bill stated in part:
One of the several grounds of demurrer to the original bill was: "It affirmatively appears from the Bill of Complaint that Ethel Mae Garth, a life tenant under the trust, has not relinquished her rights under the trust."
Subsequently, the bill was amended by amending paragraph 9 to read as follows:
The same grounds of demurrer were reassigned to the bill as amended together with many others, three of which again pointed out that a renunciation by Ethel Mae Garth had not been alleged.
We quote from several of our cases which deal generally with the requirements of equity pleading.
In Collins v. Thompson, 259 Ala. 82, 65 So. 2d 491, 493, we said:
We must agree with appellant that the bill as amended does not meet the requirements stated in these cases as to the direct and positive allegation of the renunciation of her interests by Ethel Mae Garth. Also "the bill must clearly show the title and interest of the complainant in the subject-matter of the suit and a present right to sue," Hicks v. Biddle, 218 Ala. 2, 117 So. 688, 690. A clear allegation of Mrs. Garth's renunciation is required to give complainants a "present right to sue" in this proceeding to terminate the trust.
In the case of Collins v. Thompson, supra, we said: "Here the allegations show complainants to be `ready, willing, able and eager' to pay their debt, but upon their own terms." The allegations of the bill in the instant case seem to say that Ethel Mae Garth is willing to renounce if we should hold that such action would permit the termination of the trust immediately, and if we should so hold, then her children will pay her $500 per month when the estate is distributed to them. The allegations of the bill as amended in respect to the present renunciation present only a moot case "`which seeks to determine an abstract *594 question, which does not rest upon existing facts or rights.'" Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Montgomery, 193 Ala. 234, 69 So. 428, 429.
A similar situation was considered in Bennett v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 122 N.J.Eq. 455, 194 A. 449, 451, where the court said:
See also In re Stone's Estate, 21 N.J.Super. 117, 91 A.2d 1.
We cite statements from a few of our cases dealing with the declaratory judgment feature of the instant case. "The courts will not render purely advisory opinions nor decide moot cases under the guise of declaratory judgments." Donoghue v. Bunkley, 247 Ala. 423, 25 So. 2d 61, 68. "Courts of equity have no authority to give such (advisory) opinions." Bates v. Baumhauer, 239 Ala. 255, 194 So. 520, 523. "The declaratory judgment statutes do not empower courts to decide moot questions, abstract propositions, or to give advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have the questions decided for the government of future cases." Shadix v. City of Birmingham, 251 Ala. 610, 38 So. 2d 851, 852.
It follows that there is no equity in the bill as amended, one of the grounds of demurrer, and the facts alleged show no bona fide existing justiciable controversy. Shadix v. City of Birmingham, supra; Werneth v. Hanly, Ala., 78 So. 2d 299.
We have considered the primary questions, that of the allegations affecting the termination of the trust and the declaratory judgment feature, but there remain certain other aspects of the bill as treated by the parties and the court below. These are that the trust is void as one for accumulation only; that the trust should be terminated because of changed circumstances and all the beneficiaries are in economic need; and that the trust violates the law against perpetuities.
Although the trial court overruled the demurrer "to the bill as a whole and to each and every aspect of the bill to which it is addressed," he makes the following statement in his opinion:
We are in accord with this statement, which is dispositive of those two aspects of the bill.
The aspect of the bill seeking to terminate the trust because it violates the law against perpetuities, Title 47, § 16, Code of 1940, evidently was not urged in the court below, and was expressly abandoned in oral argument here. However, since we are dealing with the allegations of the bill, we consider it proper to state that the will is an exhibit to the bill and it shows on its face that the trust provision does not violate the rule against perpetuities. Ramage v. First Farmers &amp; Merchants Nat. Bank, 249 Ala. 240, 30 So. 2d 706; Henderson v. Troy Bank &amp; Trust Co., 250 Ala. 456, 34 So. 2d 835.
It is not intended that anything said or any case cited in this opinion should indicate, directly or indirectly, our views as to the questions in this matter if and when there is an absolute and unconditional release and renunciation by Ethel Mae Garth.
*596 The decree of the lower court is reversed, one is here rendered sustaining the demurrer to the bill; the cause is remanded and complainants are allowed twenty days to amend, as they may deem proper.
Reversed, rendered and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur.