Title: Murphy v. Commissioner of Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13437
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 2023

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SJC-13437 
 
CONRAD MURPHY  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 2, 2023. - December 14, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Parole.  Sex Offender.  Commissioner of Correction.  
Constitutional Law, Parole, Sex offender.  Due Process of 
Law, Parole, Sex offender, Commitment.  Practice, Civil, 
Sex offender, Civil commitment, Action in nature of 
certiorari.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 15, 2022. 
 
 
The case was heard by Catherine H. Ham, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Mary P. Murray for the defendants. 
Matthew J. Koes for the plaintiff. 
Rebecca Rose, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 Superintendent, Massachusetts Treatment Center; and 
Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security. 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The issues before this court stem from a 
policy of the Department of Correction (DOC) declaring that 
civilly committed individuals categorically are ineligible for 
medical parole under G. L. c. 127, § 119A.  The plaintiff, a 
civilly committed sexually dangerous person, petitioned the DOC 
for medical parole.  The DOC denied his petition, writing:  "Per 
the DOC's Medical Parole Policy . . . persons awaiting trial and 
persons civilly committed pursuant to [G. L.] c. 123A shall not 
be deemed inmates for purpose of [determining eligibility for 
medical parole under] this regulation, therefore [the plaintiff] 
is not eligible for medical parole."  After the plaintiff sought 
review of this denial pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, a Superior 
Court judge allowed his motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
concluding that his due process rights had been violated.  The 
judge ordered the DOC to conduct a hearing on the plaintiff's 
medical parole petition.  We reverse the judge's order and hold 
that the medical parole statute applies only to committed 
offenders serving a criminal sentence, not civilly committed 
sexually dangerous persons.  Furthermore, sexually dangerous 
persons may seek release due to terminal illness or physical or 
mental incapacity under G. L. c. 123A, § 9 (§ 9); denying them 
3 
 
an additional avenue for relief by means of the medical parole 
statute does not offend substantive due process.2 
1.  Background.  a.  Criminal case.  The plaintiff was 
convicted of indecent assault and battery in September 1987.  
After two additional convictions for sexually violent conduct, 
the plaintiff pleaded guilty to charges of mayhem, indecent 
assault and battery, assault with intent to rape, armed assault 
with intent to murder, and assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon in December 1989.  The 1989 convictions arose from an 
incident in which the plaintiff induced a sixteen year old girl 
to enter his apartment, beat her with a hammer, threatened to 
kill her, and sexually assaulted her.  He was sentenced to 
concurrent prison terms of from fourteen to seventeen years on 
the convictions of mayhem, assault with intent to rape, and 
armed assault with intent to murder; a concurrent term of from 
three to five years on the conviction of indecent assault and 
battery; and a term of from eight to ten years, suspended with 
three years of probation, on the conviction of assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon. 
b.  Civil commitment.  Near the end of the plaintiff's 
sentence, the Commonwealth moved to commit him as a sexually 
dangerous person.  The plaintiff was adjudged to be a sexually 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services in support of the plaintiff. 
4 
 
dangerous person on August 6, 2010, and civilly committed to the 
Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for a period 
of from one day to life.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d).  He since 
has filed two petitions for examination and discharge under § 9, 
one in 2016 and the other in 2020.  Both times, a jury found 
that the plaintiff remained a sexually dangerous person. 
c.  Medical parole petition.  In January 2022, the 
plaintiff also filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 119A 
(medical parole statute).  Due to the plaintiff's health issues, 
including lymphedema (i.e., swelling caused by lymphatic system 
damage or blockage), venous insufficiency, and spinal stenosis, 
he alleged that his medical condition had deteriorated to the 
point of physical incapacity.  In support of his petition, the 
plaintiff submitted medical records, including his treatment 
plan, laboratory results, and medical status forms from October 
2021 to January 2022.  The DOC denied the plaintiff's medical 
parole petition the day after he submitted it, citing the DOC's 
policy that those awaiting trial or those civilly committed 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A are ineligible for medical parole.3 
 
3 The DOC policy provides that although "an inmate may be 
eligible for medical parole due to terminal illness or permanent 
incapacitation," 103 DOC § 603.02(A) (2022), persons who have 
been civilly committed (such as sexually dangerous persons) are 
not included within the definition of an "inmate."  See 103 DOC 
§ 603.01 (2022) ("Persons who are awaiting trial and persons 
civilly committed shall not be deemed inmates for the purposes 
of this policy").  Title 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.02 (2022), a 
5 
 
The plaintiff sought review of the DOC's denial in the 
Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, naming the 
Commissioner of Correction (commissioner), the superintendent of 
the treatment center, and the Secretary of the Executive Office 
of Public Safety and Security as defendants in his petition.  
After the parties filed cross motions for judgment on the 
pleadings, in November 2022 the judge granted the plaintiff's 
motion in part, denied the defendants' motion, and ordered that 
the DOC conduct a hearing to consider the merits of the 
plaintiff's medical parole petition. 
 
The defendants timely appealed from the judge's decision to 
the Appeals Court.  Thereafter, the judge granted a request by 
the defendants to stay her order, pending the defendants' 
appeal.  We transferred the appeal to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The plaintiff appeals from the denial of 
medical parole under G. L. c. 127, § 119A (g), which provides 
that a prisoner who is aggrieved by such a denial may petition 
for relief by filing an action in the nature of certiorari 
pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.  Certiorari is a "limited 
 
regulation promulgated by the Executive Office of Public Safety 
and Security pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 119A (h), similarly 
provides that "[p]ersons who are awaiting trial and persons 
civilly committed shall not be deemed prisoners," as that term 
is used under the medical parole statute. 
6 
 
procedure" reserved for correcting "substantial errors of law" 
(citation omitted).  Abner A. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass'n, 490 Mass. 538, 546 (2022).  While "[t]he proper 
standard of review under the certiorari statute is flexible and 
case specific, . . . ultimately [the review must] turn on 
whether the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious, 
unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise an error of 
law" (citation omitted).  Langan v. Board of Registration in 
Med., 477 Mass. 1023, 1025 (2017).  Here, whether the DOC's 
decision to deny the plaintiff's petition for medical parole was 
based on an error of law depends on a reading of the statutory 
schemes at issue -- G. L. c. 123A and G. L. c. 127, § 119A. 
 
a.  Applicable law.  General Laws c. 123A (SDP statute) is 
a civil statute that sets out the care, treatment, and 
rehabilitation of sexually dangerous persons.  See Dutil, 
petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 20 (2002) ("We have repeatedly held 
that the Legislature intended G. L. c. 123A as a civil 
statute").  This statute balances the dual concerns of 
protecting the public, on the one hand, and preserving 
individual liberty, on the other.  Chapman, petitioner, 482 
Mass. 293, 308 (2019).  See LeSage, petitioner, 488 Mass. 175, 
181-182 (2021) (government has legitimate and compelling 
interest in protecting public from those likely to be sexually 
dangerous). 
7 
 
Once an individual is found to be a sexually dangerous 
person, that individual may be released from civil commitment 
only after a finding that the individual no longer is sexually 
dangerous.  See Conlan v. Commonwealth, 383 Mass. 871, 872 
(1981).  See also G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d) (sexually dangerous 
person "shall be committed to the treatment center . . . until 
discharged pursuant to the provisions of [§] 9").  Under § 9, a 
sexually dangerous person may file an annual petition for 
examination and discharge.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  See also 
Trimmer, petitioner, 375 Mass. 588, 591 (1978) (purpose of § 9 
is to provide "periodic redeterminations" whether individual 
remains sexually dangerous).  Section 9 does not set out an 
explicit timeline under which this petition must be heard, 
although a petitioner has an express right to a "speedy 
hearing."  G. L. c. 123A, § 9 ("The petitioner shall have a 
right to a speedy hearing on a date set by the administrative 
justice of the superior court").  See LeSage, 488 Mass. at 180.  
See also Chapman, 482 Mass. at 302 (noting that it may take 
years to schedule § 9 petition for trial). 
Once a sexually dangerous person files a § 9 petition, the 
judge then orders examination of the petitioner by two qualified 
examiners.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  Qualified examiners are 
experts who, after evaluating the petitioner, opine whether the 
petitioner remains sexually dangerous.  See Johnstone, 
8 
 
petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 553 (2009).  See also Chapman, 482 
Mass. at 303.  Qualified examiners serve a uniquely "central" 
role in the commitment process, and the Legislature requires 
them to possess certain minimum qualifications.  See Johnstone, 
supra at 551-552 ("The statutory scheme therefore expressly sets 
the qualified examiners apart from other sources of expert 
evidence").  Qualified examiners consider a variety of factors 
in their assessments whether an individual remains sexually 
dangerous, including a sexually dangerous person's age and 
medical status.  See Chapman, supra at 297. 
If both qualified examiners opine that an individual is no 
longer sexually dangerous, that individual must be discharged; 
if at least one qualified examiner instead opines that an 
individual remains sexually dangerous, a trial is held on the 
§ 9 petition.  See LeSage, 488 Mass. at 180.  If the matter 
proceeds to trial, the qualified examiner reports are admissible 
at trial.  G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  The Commonwealth must then prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner remains sexually 
dangerous at the time of trial.  See LeSage, supra at 180-181.  
See also Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 585 n.13, cert. 
denied, 574 U.S. 858 (2014).  There is no provision for 
conditional release once a sexually dangerous person is found no 
longer sexually dangerous.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 502 (2000). 
9 
 
Petitioners may move the court to expedite the date of the 
§ 9 hearing, which the court then may allow pursuant to its 
inherent authority.  See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 491 Mass. 369, 
372-373 (2023) (courts have wide discretion on setting timeline 
for when case goes to trial); Bower v. Bournay-Bower, 469 Mass. 
690, 699 (2014) ("courts possess inherent power to 'manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases'" [citation omitted]).  See also Rule 
20(2)(c), (3) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018) (parties 
may request "[i]mmediate scheduling of a prompt and firm trial 
date"). 
Different factors motivated the Legislature in enacting the 
medical parole statute in 2018.  Specifically, the Legislature 
was concerned with several trends, notably, "the aging prison 
population, the rising cost of health care, and the fact that 
elderly infirm prisoners are 'considered among the least likely 
to re-offend when released'" (citation omitted).  Buckman v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14, 21 (2020).  See Harmon 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 472 (2021).  Under 
the medical parole statute, prisoners are eligible for medical 
parole if they are either terminally ill or permanently 
incapacitated.  See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (b).  A prisoner or 
authorized person may file a petition with either the 
superintendent of the correctional facility or the sheriff in 
10 
 
charge of the house of correction or jail where the prisoner is 
serving his sentence.  See Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 488 
Mass. 449, 452 (2021), citing G. L. c. 127, § 119A (c) (1), 
(d) (1).  After receiving a petition, the superintendent or 
sheriff has twenty-one days to consider the petition and make a 
recommendation to the commissioner.  Emma, supra.  The 
commissioner then has forty-five days to issue a written 
decision accompanied with a statement of reasons.  See id., 
citing G. L. c. 127, § 119A (e).  If the petition is granted, 
the prisoner is then released subject to any necessary 
conditions.  See Emma, supra at 453.  See also G. L. c. 127, 
§ 119A (f).  If the petition is denied, the prisoner may seek 
certiorari review.  See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (g). 
b.  Statutory interpretation.  The issue before this court 
is whether the medical parole statute applies to civilly 
committed sexually dangerous persons.  This is not the first 
time we have been called on to interpret the medical parole 
statute for purposes of determining its applicability to a 
particular class of persons.  In Harmon, 487 Mass. at 478, we 
addressed whether the medical parole statute applied to pretrial 
detainees.  We held it did not.  Id. at 481.  We began with 
examining the statute's plain language and found the term 
"prisoner" ambiguous.  Id. at 479.  After considering the 
Legislature's intent in enacting this statute, we held that the 
11 
 
"most important term" in the statute was not "prisoner" but, 
rather, "parole."  Id.  Based on the ordinary definition of 
parole, we held that the medical parole statute applied only to 
prisoners eligible for ordinary parole.  Id. at 480.4  We further 
reasoned that because pretrial detainees had an alternative 
avenue to seek relief, this interpretation was consistent with 
the purpose underlying the medical parole statute.  See id. 
(Legislature was concerned with aging prison population whose 
sole recourse for release was executive clemency). 
Our interpretation of the medical parole statute in Harmon 
controls the outcome here.  Simply put, sexually dangerous 
persons are ineligible for ordinary parole.  See Bruno, 432 
Mass. at 502 (G. L. c. 123A "does not provide less restrictive 
alternatives to commitment").  Thus, like pretrial detainees, 
sexually dangerous persons are not eligible for medical parole 
under G. L. c. 127, § 119A.  Furthermore, because sexually 
dangerous persons "who develop terminal or debilitating medical 
issues . . . have another avenue by which to seek relief" -- 
that is, § 9 -- excluding sexually dangerous persons from 
eligibility for medical parole does not frustrate the 
Legislature's purpose in enacting G. L. c. 127, § 119A.  Harmon, 
 
4 The plaintiff argues that the prisoner definition in G. L. 
c. 125, § 1 (m), should control our interpretation of the 
medical parole statute.  That argument was addressed and found 
unavailing in Harmon, 487 Mass. at 479. 
12 
 
487 Mass. at 480.  See Chapman, 482 Mass. at 297 (former 
sexually dangerous person released from civil commitment based 
on qualified examiners' findings that his age and medical 
condition rendered him no longer sexually dangerous).  
Accordingly, because civilly committed sexually dangerous 
persons are categorically ineligible for medical parole under 
G. L. c. 127, § 119A, the DOC's denial of the plaintiff's 
petition for medical parole was not an error of law. 
c.  Substantive due process.  The judge concluded in her 
order, and the plaintiff argues on appeal, that the plaintiff's 
substantive due process rights were violated when the DOC failed 
to consider the plaintiff's medical parole petition on its 
merits.  It bears noting at the outset that we have repeatedly 
held that the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons 
under the SDP statute does not violate substantive due process 
under the State or Federal constitution.  See Commonwealth v. 
Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 166 (2004) ("we conclude that the 
confinement of [a sexually dangerous person] is narrowly 
tailored to the Legislature's expressed interest in protecting 
the public from harm by persons convicted of sexual offenses who 
are likely to be sexually dangerous").  See also LeSage, 488 
Mass. at 181, 190; Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 192-193 
(2018); Bruno, 432 Mass. at 504.  Neither does the categorical 
ineligibility of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons to 
13 
 
petition for medical parole under G. L. c. 127, § 119A, violate 
their due process rights. 
"Substantive due process prohibits governmental conduct 
that 'shocks the conscience' or infringes on rights 'implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty'" (citation omitted).  G.F., 479 
Mass. at 191.  The nature of the right at stake determines the 
standard of review we apply.  See Vega v. Commonwealth, 490 
Mass. 226, 231 (2022).  Because the process outlined in § 9 
infringes on a fundamental right -- freedom from physical 
restraint -- we apply strict scrutiny.  Id.  See Kligler v. 
Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 55 (2022).  To withstand strict 
scrutiny, "government conduct that infringes on a fundamental 
right must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling and 
legitimate government interest."  LeSage, 488 Mass. at 181.  See 
Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 491 Mass. 390, 401-402 (2023).  The 
government interest animating the SDP statute is the protection 
of the public from harm by persons likely to be sexually 
dangerous.  See LeSage, supra at 181-182.  See also Bruno, 432 
Mass. at 504 (SDP statute reflects "Legislature's concern with 
protecting the public from harm by persons who are soon to be 
released and who are likely to be sexually dangerous"). 
The judge held that § 9 violates the plaintiff's 
substantive due process rights due to both the plaintiff's 
inability to petition for release solely based on his medical 
14 
 
condition and the length of time the plaintiff must wait to be 
heard on his § 9 petition.  We disagree.  If a sexually 
dangerous person can show that his medical condition is so 
compromised that he no longer is sexually dangerous, § 9 
provides that such an individual will be released.  For 
instance, in Chapman, 482 Mass. at 297, a sexually dangerous 
person was found no longer sexually dangerous due to "the 
combination of [his] age and his deteriorating physical 
condition resulting in him no longer being able to manage 
independently."  Moreover, the plaintiff may seek expedited 
review of a decision denying release based on terminal illness 
or physical or mental incapacity.5  See part 2.a, supra. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we conclude 
that civilly committed sexually dangerous persons categorically 
are ineligible for medical parole under G. L. c. 127, § 119A, 
and that this ineligibility does not violate sexually dangerous 
persons' due process rights.  Accordingly, the order granting 
the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
reversed, and judgment shall enter for the defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
5 Here, the plaintiff has not attempted to expedite his § 9 
petition.