Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Melinda Alfredson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP000520-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2019

2019 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP520-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Melinda Alfredson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Melinda Alfredson, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFREDSON 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 26, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2019 WI 17
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP520-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Melinda Alfredson, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Melinda Alfredson, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 26, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of the referee, 
Attorney John Nicholas Schweitzer, recommending that the court 
suspend the Wisconsin law license of Attorney Melinda Alfredson 
for 90 days and order her to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding.  The referee wrote the report after 
Attorney Alfredson and the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
entered into a stipulation concerning Attorney Alfredson's 
misconduct in two client matters and her failure to cooperate 
with the OLR's investigation into her misconduct.  Neither party 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
2 
 
has appealed from the referee's report and recommendation, and 
thus 
our 
review 
proceeds 
under 
Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
(SCR) 22.17(2).1   
¶2 
We 
agree 
that 
Attorney 
Alfredson's 
professional 
misconduct warrants a 90-day suspension.  We further agree that 
Attorney Alfredson should pay the full costs of this matter, 
which total $2,649.59 as of November 15, 2018.  No restitution 
was sought and none is ordered. 
¶3 
Attorney Alfredson obtained her Wisconsin law license 
in 2009.  In 2017, this court suspended her law license for 60 
days based on 16 counts of misconduct arising out of her 
representation of two clients, her various trust account 
violations, and her failure to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation into her misconduct.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Alfredson, 2017 WI 6, 373 Wis. 2d 79, 890 
N.W.2d 13 ("Alfredson I"). 
¶4 
In March 2018, the OLR filed the underlying complaint 
against Attorney Alfredson.  The OLR alleged that Attorney 
Alfredson had engaged in six counts of misconduct based on her 
work for clients R.R. and M.T., as well as her failure to 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides: 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
3 
 
cooperate with the OLR's investigation into her misconduct.  The 
OLR sought a four-month suspension of Attorney Alfredson's law 
license.   
¶5 
In mid-October 2018, following the filing of an answer 
and the appointment of the referee, the parties executed a 
stipulation in which Attorney Alfredson withdrew her answer and 
stipulated to the factual allegations and misconduct charges of 
the complaint, as amended in the stipulation.  Both the OLR and 
Attorney 
Alfredson 
agreed 
that 
a 
90–day 
suspension 
was 
appropriate.  The parties further agreed that the stipulation 
was not the result of plea bargaining; that Attorney Alfredson's 
entry into the stipulation was knowing and voluntary; and that 
she understood the misconduct allegations as amended by the 
stipulation, her right to contest those allegations, and the 
ramifications of her entry into the stipulation.   
¶6 
In late October 2018, the referee filed his report and 
recommendation.  The referee accepted the parties' stipulation 
and found, based on the stipulation, that the following facts 
were true. 
Representation of R.R. (Counts 1-4) 
¶7 
In February 2015, R.R. and his wife divorced.  R.R. 
was represented by counsel other than Attorney Alfredson at the 
time. 
¶8 
In approximately September 2015, R.R. hired Attorney 
Alfredson to represent him after he had fallen behind on certain 
post-divorce obligations.  R.R. owed his ex-wife past-due 
maintenance and attorney's fees.  In addition, R.R. had not yet 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
4 
 
attempted to sell a boat that he and his ex-wife had owned 
during their marriage, even though the divorce judgment required 
that the boat be placed on the market for sale.   
¶9 
In mid-October 2015, a family court commissioner found 
R.R. in contempt and imposed a $2,405.95 purge condition.   
¶10 On October 20, 2015, R.R. informed Attorney Alfredson 
that he had sold the boat for $7,500.   Attorney Alfredson and 
R.R. agreed that the proceeds from the sale would be deposited 
into Attorney Alfredson's trust account; that the proceeds would 
be used to pay the $2,405.95 purge amount; and that the 
remainder of the proceeds ($5,094.05) would be held in trust 
pending documentation of receipts for storage and the bank 
payoff for the boat, for which R.R.'s ex-wife was partially 
responsible. 
¶11 Attorney Alfredson never deposited the boat sale 
proceeds into a trust account.  Rather, on October 22, 2015, she 
deposited the check that R.R. had received for the boat in a 
non-trust account held by the law firm where she worked at the 
time.  Attorney Alfredson subsequently transferred a portion of 
the funds to a second non-trust account held by the firm, and 
transferred another portion of the funds to a third non-trust 
account held by the firm.   
¶12 In November 2015, Attorney Alfredson provided R.R.'s 
ex-wife's lawyer with a check, drawn from one of these non-trust 
accounts, for the $2,405.95 purge amount.  Attorney Alfredson 
also used some of R.R.'s funds for her own personal use.   
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
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¶13 In April 2016, R.R. terminated Attorney Alfredson and 
retained a new lawyer.  In a May 9, 2016 letter to R.R., 
Attorney Alfredson agreed to forward the remaining proceeds from 
the boat sale to R.R.'s new lawyer.  Later in May 2016, Attorney 
Alfredson provided the OLR with a carbon copy of a purported 
check that she allegedly wrote to R.R.'s new lawyer in the 
amount of the boat sale proceeds left after the $2,405.95 purge 
payment; i.e., $5,094.05. 
¶14 In early June 2016, the circuit court ordered that 
$5,000 of the proceeds from the boat sale were to be paid to 
R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer within ten business days.  In mid-June 
2016, R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer wrote R.R.'s new lawyer, inquiring 
about the status of the $5,000 payment and stating that 
"Attorney Alfredson advises that she sent the monies from her 
trust to you."  Attorney Alfredson was copied on this letter.  
In response, R.R.'s new lawyer wrote Attorney Alfredson to say 
that she had not received any trust funds from Attorney 
Alfredson.  Almost four months after receiving this letter, in 
October 2016, Attorney Alfredson delivered a $5,094.95 check 
made payable to R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer.  The check was drawn 
from a non-trust account. 
¶15 In April 2016, R.R. filed a grievance with the OLR 
against Attorney Alfredson.  In mid-July 2016, the OLR notified 
Attorney Alfredson of the investigation of R.R.'s grievance and 
requested certain information and records from her.  She did not 
respond.   
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
6 
 
¶16 In August 2016, the OLR sent Attorney Alfredson a 
second request for information and records via certified mail. 
Although Attorney Alfredson signed the return receipt for the 
letter, she did not respond.   
¶17 In early September 2016, the OLR personally served 
Attorney Alfredson with a letter in which it threatened to move 
for a temporary license suspension for failure to cooperate with 
its investigation.  In late September 2016, the OLR received a 
letter response from Attorney Alfredson to R.R.'s grievance.  
Attorney Alfredson failed to disclose in her letter that there 
was any issue with respect to the delivery of the remaining 
proceeds from the boat sale. 
¶18 In April 2017, Attorney Alfredson wrote a letter to 
the OLR stating that in May 2016, she had sent a $5,094.05 check 
to R.R.'s new lawyer, but she stopped payment on the check when 
that lawyer informed her that she had never received the check. 
¶19 In May 2017, the OLR sent a letter to Attorney 
Alfredson 
requesting 
additional 
information 
and 
documents.  
Attorney Alfredson did not respond.   
¶20 In June 2017, the OLR wrote Attorney Alfredson again, 
reminding her of her duty to cooperate.  In a July 2017 
telephone conversation with OLR staff, Attorney Alfredson stated 
that her response was in the mail and that she would fax a copy 
of the response to the OLR.  The OLR received nothing from 
Attorney Alfredson. 
¶21 In August 2017, the OLR personally served Attorney 
Alfredson with a letter in which it threatened to move for a 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
7 
 
temporary license suspension for failure to cooperate with its 
investigation.  In late August 2017, the OLR received Attorney 
Alfredson's faxed response to the OLR's May 2017 letter. 
Representation of M.T. (Counts 5-6) 
¶22 In October 2015, M.T. hired Attorney Alfredson to 
represent him in a divorce.  In a May 9, 2016 letter to Attorney 
Alfredson, M.T.'s wife's lawyer identified certain personal 
property items that her client wanted to retrieve from the 
marital residence but that M.T. had allegedly prevented her from 
retrieving.  Attorney Alfredson did not directly communicate 
with M.T. regarding this issue.  M.T.'s wife moved for contempt 
based on M.T.'s failure to return some of the items on the 
personal property list.   
¶23 In June 2016, M.T. retained a new lawyer.  That same 
month, M.T.'s new lawyer asked Attorney Alfredson to provide him 
with M.T.'s file as soon as possible.  His office followed-up 
that request with numerous written requests and phone calls 
asking for the file.  Attorney Alfredson did not provide M.T.'s 
file until September 2016, over three months after the new 
lawyer's initial request for the file. 
¶24 The referee reviewed the complaint and stipulation and 
concluded that, in connection with her work for R.R. and M.T., 
Attorney 
Alfredson 
had 
committed 
the 
following 
forms 
of 
misconduct: 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
8 
 
• Count One:  By failing to hold R.R.'s funds in trust, 
Attorney Alfredson violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).2  
• Count Two:  By failing to promptly deliver funds that 
she collected in connection with her representation of 
R.R. to R.R.'s ex-wife's lawyer, Attorney Alfredson 
violated 
former 
SCR 
20:1.15(d)(1), 
and 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(1).3  
• Count Three:  By converting R.R.'s funds that she 
received in connection with her representation of R.R. 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts.  
3 By S. Ct. Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, 
eff. July 1, 2016) former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) was renumbered as 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(1).  The text of the rule was not changed.  
Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) and current SCR 20:15(e)(1) provide:   
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.   
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
9 
 
for her own personal use, Attorney Alfredson violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c).4 
• Count Four:  By failing to timely provide the OLR with 
a written response to R.R.'s grievance, and by failing 
to timely provide the OLR with a response to the OLR's 
additional request for information, Attorney Alfredson 
violated SCR 22.03(2),5 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).6   
• Count Five:  By failing to address with M.T. the 
personal property issue set forth in his wife's 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation."  
5 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation.   
6 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
10 
 
lawyer's May 9, 2016 letter, Attorney Alfredson 
violated SCR 20:1.3.7  
• Count Six:  By failing to timely deliver M.T.'s case 
file to successor counsel, Attorney Alfredson violated 
SCR 20:1.16(d).8 
¶25 The referee then considered appropriate discipline.  
He 
adopted, 
without 
analysis, 
the 
OLR's 
reasoning 
and 
recommendation set forth in its sanction memorandum.  In that 
memorandum, the OLR discussed certain cases that, in its view, 
justified a 90-day suspension period.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Briggs, 2014 WI 119, 358 Wis. 2d 493, 861 
N.W.2d 528 
(90-day 
suspension 
for 
lawyer 
with 
no 
prior 
discipline who committed 12 counts of misconduct); see also In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woods, 2008 WI 79, 311 
Wis. 2d 213, 751 N.W.2d 840 (90-day suspension for lawyer with 
an extensive disciplinary history who committed four counts of 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
8 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:   
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law.  
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
11 
 
misconduct).  The OLR also discussed various aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  On the aggravating side of the scale, the 
OLR noted that Alfredson has a disciplinary history, converted 
client funds for personal use, and engaged in misconduct with a 
pattern of neglect, dishonesty, and failure to cooperate.  On 
the mitigating side of the scale, the OLR noted Attorney 
Alfredson's 
"lack 
of 
substantial 
legal 
experience," 
her 
acknowledgement 
of 
her 
misconduct, 
and 
her 
provision 
of 
"confidential information to OLR regarding family and medical 
issues which affected her ability to practice law during the 
time period in question." 
¶26 Ultimately, 
the 
referee 
accepted 
the 
parties' 
stipulated discipline and recommended a 90-day suspension.   He 
also recommended that Attorney Alfredson be held responsible for 
all the costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which total 
$2,649.59 as of November 15, 2018.   
¶27 No appeal was filed, so we review this matter pursuant 
to SCR 22.17(2).  We will affirm the referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  We review conclusions of law 
de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  We may impose 
whatever sanction we see fit, regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶28 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact, based on the parties' stipulation, are clearly 
erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We also agree with the 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
12 
 
referee's legal conclusions that Attorney Alfredson violated the 
supreme court rules noted above. 
¶29 The central issue for this court is whether a 
suspension greater than the 90-day recommended suspension is in 
order.  Our concern over the length of suspension is prompted by 
our February 2017 decision in Alfredson I, in which we noted 
that the 60-day suspension we imposed was "modest" given the 
facts at hand, and cautioned that a longer suspension would have 
been 
in 
order 
had 
Attorney 
Alfredson 
been 
previously 
disciplined.  Alfredson I, 373 Wis. 2d 79, ¶35.  We warned 
Attorney Alfredson "that the court may impose progressively 
severe 
sanctions 
when 
an 
attorney 
engages 
in 
repeated 
misconduct," and we imposed the stipulated 60-day suspension 
"with the expectation that Attorney Alfredson will not commit 
future misconduct subjecting her to additional discipline."  Id.  
Attorney Alfredson is now back before us——and, troublingly, the 
facts show that she failed to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation regarding her representation of R.R. even after 
the February 2017 issuance of Alfredson I.   
¶30 "This court has long adhered to the concept of 
progressive discipline in attorney regulatory cases."  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Netzer, 2014 WI 7, ¶49, 352 
Wis. 2d 310, 841 N.W.2d 820.  The question for us here is 
whether moving from a 60-day suspension to the recommended 90-
day suspension constitutes a sufficiently serious step in the 
progressive discipline process. 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
13 
 
¶31 On these facts, we conclude the answer is yes——though 
it is a close call.  The closeness of the call stems from the 
weakness of certain mitigating circumstances identified by the 
OLR in its sanction memorandum——which, again, the referee 
endorsed in its entirety without analysis.  The OLR stated that 
Attorney Alfredson's "lack of substantial legal experience" 
should count as a mitigating factor.  But Attorney Alfredson was 
admitted to the bar in 2009, and the misconduct in this case 
occurred years later, in 2015 through much of 2017.  By this 
time, Attorney Alfredson was not a brand-new lawyer.  Moreover, 
the ethical principles she violated are not elusive:  hold 
client funds in trust; do not spend them on personal matters; 
pay client funds owed to third parties promptly; communicate 
with clients diligently; cooperate with the OLR, etc.  Even the 
greenest lawyer is charged with knowledge of these basic rules.  
Surely Attorney Alfredson, with multiple years of experience 
under her belt, should have known better. 
¶32 We also cannot assign any weight to the OLR's 
statement in its sanction memorandum that Attorney Alfredson 
provided "confidential information" to the OLR regarding "family 
and medical issues which affected her ability to practice law 
during the time period in question."  Problematically, there is 
no evidence in the record regarding the nature of Attorney 
Alfredson's alleged family and medical issues, or their possible 
nexus to her misconduct.  The parties' stipulation provides no 
details, and the issues went unaddressed by the referee.  Thus, 
nothing stands behind the assertion that Attorney Alfredson's 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
14 
 
family and medical issues should partially excuse her misconduct 
except the parties' own say-so.  That is not enough.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Davig Huesmann, 2018 WI 114, 
¶40, 385 Wis. 2d 49, ___ N.W.2d ___ (declining to consider 
lawyer's personal and substance abuse problems as mitigating 
factors absent a "showing in [the] record that those problems 
were 
the 
cause 
of 
her 
professional 
misconduct"); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 
562 N.W.2d 137, (1997) ("Absent a causal connection between an 
attorney's medical condition and that attorney's professional 
misconduct, the medical condition may not be considered a factor 
mitigating either the seriousness of the misconduct or the 
severity of discipline to be imposed for it.") 
¶33 Nevertheless, we conclude that a 90-day suspension of 
Attorney Alfredson's law license is sufficient to impress upon 
her the seriousness of her professional duties and to deter her 
and others from engaging in similar misconduct.  We note the 
presence of certain mitigating factors.  Attorney Alfredson did, 
ultimately, 
endeavor 
to 
rectify 
the 
consequences 
of 
her 
misconduct.  She also entered into a stipulation that resolves 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding, 
wherein 
she 
explicitly 
acknowledged that her misconduct caused harm and that she was 
wrong for failing to cooperate with the OLR's investigation.  In 
addition to these mitigating factors, we note that a roughly 
analogous case, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood, 
2014 WI 116, 358 Wis. 2d 472, 854 N.W.2d 844, provides support 
for a 90-day suspension.  See id. (imposing a 90-day suspension 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
15 
 
on a respondent-lawyer who had been suspended the previous year 
in his first disciplinary matter, and who stipulated to seven 
misconduct counts, including failing to keep a client informed 
of the case status, failing to cooperate with the OLR, and 
various trust account violations).  We impose this 90-day 
suspension with the same caveat that we gave in Alfredson I:  we 
expect 
that 
Attorney 
Alfredson 
will 
not 
commit 
future 
misconduct, and should this expectation be disappointed, our 
progressive discipline system will await. 
¶34 As is our normal practice, we find it appropriate to 
impose the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding on 
Attorney Alfredson.  See SCR 22.24(1m). 
¶35 Finally, as to restitution, none was sought and none 
is ordered. 
¶36 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Melinda Alfredson is 
suspended for a period of 90 days, effective April 9, 2019. 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Melinda Alfredson shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$2,649.59 as of November 15, 2018. 
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Melinda Alfredson shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
No. 
2018AP520-D   
 
 
 
1