Title: State v. Austin
Citation: 246 So. 2d 12, 258 La. 273
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: March 29, 1971

246 So. 2d 12 (1971) 258 La. 273 STATE of Louisiana v. Billy Raymond AUSTIN. No. 50745. Supreme Court of Louisiana. March 29, 1971. *13 Dozier &amp; Thompson, James B. Thompson, III, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. DIXON, Justice. Billy Raymond Austin was charged with armed robbery. On October 16, 1967 James B. Thompson, III was appointed to represent the indigent defendant. Defendant pleaded not guilty, and on March 26, 1968 the case came on for trial in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. On the morning of the first day of trial, the attorney for defendant moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused on the ground that the defendant had indicated dissatisfaction with his appointed attorney. The motion was denied. The accused, through counsel, then moved for a continuance on the same ground, which likewise was denied. Defendant, through counsel, then filed a written motion to recuse the judge on the ground that he had taken part in a plea bargain discussion and knew that, under certain circumstances, defendant was willing to plead guilty. The motion was denied, and the trial began. The jurors were not sequestered for the night. On the morning of the second day of trial, a two-column newspaper article appeared in the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, reading in part as follows: Upon learning of this article, prior to the start of the second day of trial, defense counsel requested permission to poll the jury to determine if any of the jurors had seen the article. The request was denied. Defendant was convicted. On May 7, 1968, defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in the penitentiary. Because of the circumstances surrounding the imposition of sentence, the capable court-appointed counsel successfully prosecuted an appeal to this court, with the result that the invalidly imposed sentence was reversed. State v. Austin, 255 La. 108, 229 So. 2d 717 (1969). Upon remand, defendant was sentenced to twenty-four years in the penitentiary. Defendant now appeals from the conviction. Six Bills of Exception were reserved, which shall be treated in order. Bill of Exception No. 1 was reserved when the trial court denied counsel's motion to withdraw. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. Defendant is entitled to counsel. He may hire whom he chooses. Because he is indigent, he is privileged to have the State appoint an attorney without any cost to him. To permit the accused to discharge his court-appointed counsel on the day of trial, without any showing of incompetence and without having a privately retained attorney present to take his place, would be to permit defendant to choose which lawyer the court must appoint to defend him. We are not aware of any basis in law for such a claim upon the State or upon the members of the bar. In the instant case, the defendant stated: "Your Honor, I feel that my attorney is going into the case with a defeatist attitude, he feels that he can't win the case * * *." From the successful appeal already taken in this case, reported at 255 La. 108, 229 So. 2d 717 (1969), and from the excellent brief and eloquent oral argument of counsel in this appeal, we are inclined *14 to agree with the trial judge, who stated in his per curiam: The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has said, under facts strikingly similar to those in the instant case: Bill of Exception No. 2 was reserved when the trial court denied the motion for a continuance that counsel had urged on the same ground as the motion to withdraw. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. The defendant and his attorney both were present in court. The trial judge in his per curiam noted that "Mr. Thompson came to court prepared to try the case." Here, the denial of a continuance certainly did not work a hardship. Under the facts instant, an eleventh hour motion for a continuance simply will not lie. United States v. Follette, 425 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1970). Bill of Exception No. 3 was reserved when the trial court denied counsel's written motion to recuse the judge on the ground that he had taken part in a plea bargain and knew that, under certain circumstances, defendant was willing to plead guilty. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. In this case, all issues of fact pertaining to guilt or innocence were tried by a jury, not by the judge. Bill of Exception No. 4 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to the testimony of a State witness that defendant had robbed three men at the same time that he had robbed the witness. The asserted basis of the objection was that defendant was not accused of having robbed those three men. The trial judge in his per curiam noted that the evidence was part of the res gestae, and further that it would show system, motive, design and intent. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. This exception was neither briefed nor argued orally before this court. Bill of Exception No. 5 reads as follows: "Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 7th day of May, 1970. "s/ James B. Thompson III James B. Thompson, III Attorney for accused" The trial judge's per curiam to Bill of Exception No. 5 reads as follows: "Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 24th day of February, 1969. Under the circumstances of this case and the manner in which the question arose in the trial court, we cannot hold that it was reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to poll the jury to see if any jurors had read the newspaper article in violation of the instructions of the court. The court did admonish the jurors to disregard anything they might have read that was not in evidence in the case. The trial judge evidently was satisfied that such an admonition was sufficient to assure a fair trial. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 771. In view of the evidence referred to in the per curiam, there is no probability that a miscarriage of justice has resulted from the failure of the trial judge to poll the jury. We do not hold, however, that such an occurrence would not be reversible error in another case. Bill of Exception No. 6 was reserved when the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. The record shows that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. This exception was neither briefed nor argued orally before this court. The conviction and sentence are affirmed.