Title: Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S090420
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 5, 2002

1 
Filed 8/5/02  (Publishers:  This opinion should follow the companion case, Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
JOSEPH NAEGELE, as Trustee, etc., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S090420 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A084367 
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY et al.,) 
 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 992230 
 
 
) 
________________________________________) 
 
 
) 
RICHARD DONALDSON, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A084371 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY et al., ) 
Super. Ct. Nos.  
 
 
) 
992223/992217 
 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
________________________________________) 
 
Tobacco-related illnesses are a leading cause of death in this state and 
worldwide, and these debilitating illnesses have imposed enormous costs on 
tobacco users, their families, and society.  (See, e.g., Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 104350, subd. (a).)  Although the risk of illness and death from tobacco use has 
become increasingly well known in recent decades, tobacco consumption 
continues to be widespread, at least in part because tobacco contains nicotine, a  
 
 
2 
substance the Surgeon General of the United States has determined to be 
addictive.  (U.S. Surgeon Gen. Rep., The Health Consequences of Smoking:  
Nicotine Addiction (1988),  [as of Aug. 5, 
2002].)  In 1987, the California Legislature enacted former section 1714.45 of 
California’s Civil Code 1 (which we here sometimes refer to as the Immunity 
Statute) stating that in a product liability action a court could not require a 
manufacturer or seller to pay damages for injuries caused by certain products, 
including tobacco products, that are inherently unsafe and known to be unsafe by 
the ordinary consumer of that product.  (Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778 
(hereafter sometimes former section 1714.45).)  Ten years later, the Legislature 
repealed the Immunity Statute as it applied to manufacturers of tobacco products.  
(Stats. 1997, ch. 570, § 1.) 
In the companion case of Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (Aug. 5, 
2002, S095213) __ Cal.4th __ (Myers), we consider how the repeal of the statutory 
immunity affects the liability of tobacco manufacturers for injuries caused by 
tobacco use before, during, and after the 10-year period during which the 
Immunity Statute was in effect.  In Myers, we hold that, because the repeal was 
not retroactive, the Immunity Statute continues to provide an immunity for 
tobacco companies in product liability actions, but only for conduct they engaged 
in during the 10-year period when the Immunity Statute was in effect.2  The 
liability of tobacco companies based on their conduct outside the 10-year period is 
governed by general tort principles. 
                                                                 
1  
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code. 
2  
As in Myers, we use the term “immunity” rather loosely to describe the 
effect of a law that declares certain described conduct not to be a legal wrong or 
tort, and thus not a basis for liability. 
3 
Here, we are asked to decide what forms of conduct by tobacco companies 
during the 10-year immunity period come within the protection conferred by the 
Immunity Statute.  The Court of Appeal held that, as applied to liability for 
injuries caused by tobacco products, the Immunity Statute covers all conduct by 
tobacco companies acting as manufacturers or sellers of tobacco products except 
conduct resulting in manufacturing defects or breach of express warranty.  We, 
however, conclude that the Immunity Statute’s protection is not so broad and that 
it does not extend to allegations that tobacco companies, in the manufacture of 
cigarettes, used additives that exposed smokers to dangers beyond those 
commonly known to be associated with cigarette smoking. 
I 
Plaintiff Edwin Brigham smoked cigarettes from 1950 until 1996, when he 
was diagnosed with lung cancer.  He sued defendants R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation seeking personal injury 
damages on theories of negligence, product liability, and fraud.  Defendants 
demurred, citing the Immunity Statute as a bar to all of plaintiff’s causes of action.  
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer but granted plaintiff leave to amend 
the complaint. 
When defendants thereafter demurred to plaintiff’s first amended 
complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit 
against defendants.  On plaintiff’s appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed.3  We 
granted plaintiff’s petition for review. 
                                                                 
3  
Plaintiff died while the appeal was pending, and the Court of Appeal 
granted the application of Joseph Naegele and others as trustees to substitute for 
plaintiff.  For simplicity’s sake, we refer to both Brigham and the trustees as 
plaintiff.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fn. continued on next page) 
4 
II 
At issue here is what types or categories of conduct by tobacco companies 
fall within the immunity given to them by the Immunity Statute, which was in 
effect from January 1, 1988, until December 31, 1997.  The statute specifies that 
the immunity it gives to manufacturers and sellers of specified inherently unsafe 
products, including tobacco, applies in product liability actions.  (Former 
§ 1714.45, subd. (a), Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, pp. 5778-5779.)  The statute 
defines a product liability action as “any action for injury or death caused by a 
product, except that the term does not include an action based on a manufacturing 
defect or breach of an express warranty.”  (Id., subd. (b), Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, 
§ 3, p. 5779.)4  Therefore, the immunity conferred by the Immunity Statute does 
not cover liability for manufacturing defects in tobacco products or to a tobacco 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(Fn. continued from previous page) 
 
 
The Court of Appeal also consolidated plaintiff’s appeal for purposes of 
oral argument with that of Albert J. Pavolini, who had likewise claimed in his 
lawsuit that he suffered personal injury caused by smoking cigarettes.  When 
Pavolini died, the Court of Appeal substituted his successor in interest, Richard 
Donaldson, as plaintiff in that case.  Because Donaldson did not seek review here, 
we do not further discuss that consolidated matter.   
4 
Former section 1714.45 provided:  “(a)  In a product liability action, a 
manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:  [¶]  (1)  The product is inherently 
unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer who 
consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the community; 
and  [¶]  (2)  The product is a common consumer product intended for personal 
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as identified 
in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  [¶]  (b)  For 
purposes of this section, the term ‘product liability action’ means any action for 
injury or death caused by a product, except that the term does not include an action 
based on a manufacturing defect or breach of an express warranty.  [¶]  (c)  This 
section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or amend existing 
California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121, and 
shall apply to all product liability actions pending on, or commenced after, January 
1, 1988.”  (Italics added.) 
5 
company’s breach of an express warranty, but otherwise it appears in general to 
cover all liability for injury or death caused by tobacco products. 
Additional limitations on the scope of the immunity may be deduced from the 
history and purpose of the Immunity Statute, which we examined in detail in Richards 
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985 (Richards), a unanimous decision.  The 
statute’s express premise, we said, was “that suppliers of certain products which are 
‘inherently unsafe,’ but which the public wishes to have available despite awareness 
of their dangers, should not be responsible in tort for resulting harm to those who 
voluntarily consumed the products despite such knowledge.”  (Id. at p. 1002.)  We 
described the Immunity Statute as based on the principle that “if a product is pure and 
unadulterated, its inherent or unavoidable danger, commonly known to the 
community which consumes it anyway, does not expose the seller to liability for 
resulting harm to a voluntary user.”  (Id. at p. 999, italics omitted.)  Thus, as applied 
to tobacco products, the Immunity Statute was intended to protect tobacco companies 
from liability for their conduct as manufacturers and sellers of products containing 
tobacco that is pure and unadulterated, when the claim seeks damages for personal 
injuries or death resulting from dangers or risks that are commonly known to be 
inherent in tobacco products. 
We now apply this understanding of the purpose and scope of the Immunity 
Statute to the allegations of plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which seeks damages 
from defendant tobacco companies for plaintiff’s lung cancer, which was diagnosed in 
October 1996.  At that time, plaintiff had smoked cigarettes regularly since 1950.  His 
complaint alleged causes of action for negligence, product liability, and various 
theories of fraud, based, in part at least, on defendants’ conduct in manufacturing and 
distributing cigarettes during the statutory immunity period. 
Plaintiff argues that the Immunity Statute bars only product liability claims 
and not claims based on fraud.  According to plaintiff, a fraud claim is one that 
6 
challenges the propriety of defendants’ conduct, while a product liability claim is 
one that assails the safety of defendants’ products. 
The Court of Appeal rejected plaintiff’s proposed distinction between fraud 
and product liability claims as “of no consequence in interpreting [the Immunity 
Statute], because the Legislature supplied its own expansive definition of . . . 
‘product liability’ actions.”  As defined by the Legislature in the Immunity Statute, 
a product liability action is “any action for injury or death caused by a product, 
except that the term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect or 
breach of an express warranty.”  (Former § 1714.45, subd. (b).)  Relying on that 
language, the Court of Appeal stated:  “The Legislature’s plain language compels 
the conclusion that whether based on allegations or theories of fraud, negligence, 
or manufacture of an inherently unsafe product, an action in which a plaintiff 
seeks damages for personal injury or death caused by a tobacco product clearly is 
a ‘product liability’ action within the meaning of the statute.”  Thus, the Court of 
Appeal held, the Immunity Statute bars each of plaintiff’s various claims that 
defendant tobacco companies defrauded the public about the safety of their 
products and the risks of tobacco use. 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that under the Immunity Statute’s broad 
definition of product liability lawsuits, it makes no difference whether a claim 
seeking damages for “personal injury or death” caused by a tobacco product is 
labeled as one for negligence, manufacture of an inherently unsafe product, or 
fraud.  But we disagree with the Court of Appeal that the Immunity Statute 
precludes plaintiff’s recovery under all of his fraud allegations. 
As we explained in Richards, which we discuss at length in the companion 
case of Myers, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, the Immunity Statute drew “its express 
inspiration from product liability principles addressed by section 402A of the 
Restatement Second of Torts (Restatement), and particularly comment i thereto 
7 
(comment i).”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 999, citing former § 1714.45, 
subd. (a)(2).)  We observed:  “Section 402A of the Restatement proposes generally 
that when a manufacturer or distributor sells a product ‘in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer’ [citation], and the product 
reaches that person, as expected and intended, without substantial change in its 
condition, the seller is ‘subject to liability’ for physical harm ‘thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer.’ ” (Richards, supra, at p. 999, italics deleted.) 
We went on to say in Richards:  “However, comment i asserts an important 
qualification of the general rule . . . .  Comment i makes clear that, under the 
Restatement formulation, ‘[t]he rule [of liability] applies only where the defective 
condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer.’  (Restatement, p. 352, italics added.)  As comment i then explains, 
‘[m]any products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption,’ but 
if a product is pure and unadulterated, its inherent or unavoidable danger, 
commonly known to the community which consumes it anyway, does not expose 
the seller to liability for resulting harm to a voluntary user. 
“Thus, comment i observes, ‘[o]rdinary sugar is a deadly poison to 
diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture,’ 
but this is not what the Restatement means by ‘unreasonably dangerous.’  ‘Good 
whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people 
drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics . . . .  Good tobacco is not 
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful 
. . . .  Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the 
case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks . . . .’  
(Restatement, pp. 352-353, italics added.)”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 999, 
some italics added in first par.) 
8 
Richards added:  “The clear premise of comment i is that no ‘liability’ 
arises under the circumstances therein described because there is no sound basis 
for liability.  In other words, comment i posits, a manufacturer or seller breaches 
no legal duty to voluntary consumers by merely supplying, in an unadulterated 
form, a common commodity which cannot be made safer, but which the public 
desires to buy and ingest despite general understanding of its inherent dangers.”  
(Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1000.) 
Thus, as we explained in Richards, the Immunity Statute applied with 
respect to “pure and unadulterated” tobacco products (that is, products whose 
contents consumers “desire[] to buy and ingest”), notwithstanding that the 
“inherent or unavoidable danger[s]” of those products were “commonly known to 
the community.”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 999-1000, italics added.)  
Accordingly, the statutory immunity does not shield a tobacco company from 
product liability for injuries or deaths to consumers of its products caused by 
something not inherent in the product itself—that is, if some adulteration of the 
product made it unreasonably dangerous. 
In this case, the trial court relying on the Immunity Statute sustained 
defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which included four 
theories of recovery based on alleged fraud by tobacco companies.  For the limited 
purpose of reviewing that ruling with respect to those four theories of recovery, we 
treat the first amended complaint’s allegations as true.  (Kasky v. Nike (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 939, 946.) 
The trial court was wrong that the Immunity Statute required it to sustain 
defendant tobacco companies’ demurrer to two causes of action alleged in 
plaintiff’s first amended complaint.  In one of these, plaintiff alleges that 
defendants “manipulat[ed] the addictive properties of cigarettes via . . . additives,” 
and in the other he asserts that defendants “control[led] nicotine delivery to the 
9 
smoker, through adding ammonia.”  The essence of these allegations is that 
defendant tobacco companies adulterated the cigarettes plaintiff smoked with 
additives that exposed him to dangers not inherent in cigarette smoking.  Because, 
as we have explained, the statutory immunity does not shield a tobacco company 
from liability for injuries or deaths caused by something not inherent in the 
product itself, the Immunity Statute does not bar these claims. 
But the trial court was correct to sustain defendant tobacco companies’ 
demurrer to two other fraud claims alleged in plaintiff’s first amended complaint, 
to the extent those claims were based on conduct by tobacco companies during the 
immunity period.  (The concurring and dissenting opinion, however, would allow 
plaintiff to pursue these two claims.) 
The complaint alleges that defendants “control[led] the nicotine content of 
their cigarettes . . . by developing high-nicotine tobacco and blended tobacco.”  
Because nicotine is naturally present in tobacco, the risks associated with nicotine are 
inherent in tobacco products.  Therefore, an allegation that defendants increased the 
nicotine content of their cigarettes through blended or high-nicotine tobacco does not 
avoid the bar of the Immunity Statute because it does not allege that defendants 
exposed plaintiff to a risk other than those inherent in tobacco products. 
The state Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in American Tobacco 
Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 480 (American Tobacco), a decision 
authored by Presiding Justice J. Anthony Kline.  Although it observed that the 
Immunity Statute’s protection would not extend to risks caused by “unknown 
dangerous elements” in a tobacco product (id. at p. 490, fn. 5), the Court of Appeal 
rejected the plaintiffs’ contentions in that case that the word “tobacco,” as used in the 
Immunity Statute, applied only to unprocessed tobacco leaves rather than to 
cigarettes:  “The Legislature could not have intended to limit the statute to pure 
tobacco any more than it intended ‘alcohol’ [another product listed in the Immunity 
10 
Statute] to apply only to pure alcohol and not to beer, wine and other liquors, which 
are the forms in which alcohol commonly is consumed.”  (Ibid.) 
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint further alleges that defendants “lied about 
the addictive nature of smoking,” in “a campaign designed to deceive the public, 
plaintiff, the government, and others as to the health hazards of smoking.”  According 
to the complaint, this deception began before 1969, when the federal government first 
banned certain cigarette advertising, and it continued after 1969, when defendants 
“disseminate[d] deceptive, erroneous, misleading and false statements” about the 
“health hazards” and “addictive nature” of smoking cigarettes.  These allegations do 
not suggest that the cigarettes plaintiff smoked exposed him to dangers other than 
those inherent in cigarette smoking.  Thus, to the extent they pertain to conduct by 
tobacco companies during the immunity period, these allegations fall squarely within 
the reach of the Immunity Statute, which, during its effective dates from January 1, 
1988, until December 31, 1997, shielded tobacco companies against product liability 
“for injury or death” caused by pure and unadulterated tobacco products.  As this 
court explained in Richards, the Legislature enacted the Immunity Statute to protect 
manufacturers and sellers of certain inherently dangerous products, including 
cigarettes, from liability for injuries caused by those products precisely because the 
Legislature itself had concluded “the public desires to buy and ingest [those products] 
despite general understanding of [their] inherent dangers.”  (Richards, supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 1000.) 
According to the concurring and dissenting opinion, the Immunity Statute does 
not bar plaintiff’s fraud claim based on allegations that defendant tobacco companies 
deceived the public about the addictive nature of nicotine because smokers generally 
were not aware of the specific health risks of cigarette smoking.  But in American 
Tobacco, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 480, decided the year after the Surgeon General 
issued his report concluding that nicotine is addictive, the Court of Appeal soundly 
11 
rejected essentially the same argument.  It explained:  “[T]here is no requirement 
under [the Immunity Statute] that consumers fully appreciate all the risks involved in 
the use or consumption of [a particular] product[] . . . .  [I]t is sufficient if the ordinary 
consumer knows the product is ‘unsafe.’ ”  (Id. at p. 490, fn. 5.) 
III 
From January 1, 1988, and lasting through December 31, 1997, California’s 
Legislature, by its enactment of the Immunity Statute, protected tobacco 
companies from product liability lawsuits by smokers.  Here, plaintiff was a 
cigarette smoker for 46 years (from 1950 through 1996).  He argues that the 
immunity does not apply to defendants’ conduct during the 37 years he smoked 
before January 1, 1988, the effective date of the Immunity Statute.  We agree.   
As we hold in the companion case of Myers, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, the 
Immunity Statute governs conduct of tobacco companies during the immunity period, 
which began on January 1, 1988, and ended on December 31, 1997.  But when, on 
January 1, 1998, the California Legislature’s repeal of that immunity took effect, the 
Legislature restored the common law principles that had, until enactment of the 
Immunity Statute, governed tort liability against tobacco companies.  Thus, the 
Immunity Statute provides no protection to tobacco companies for conduct that 
occurred before the statute’s 10-year period of immunity. 
Regarding defendants’ conduct during the statutory immunity period, we 
conclude that the Immunity Statute bars plaintiff’s claims, however labeled, where 
they allege no more than personal injury caused by dangers or risks inherent in the 
consumption of tobacco products such as cigarettes.  But the Immunity Statute 
does not bar plaintiff’s claims that the defendants adulterated the cigarettes 
plaintiff smoked with additives that exposed him to dangers not inherent in 
cigarette smoking.  Nor does the Immunity Statute shield tobacco companies from 
liability for conduct outside the immunity period. 
12 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand to that court 
for reconsideration of plaintiff’s appeal in light of our conclusions here and in the 
companion case of Myers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that plaintiff’s (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 3, fn. 3) 
causes of action alleging defendants manipulated the addictive properties of 
cigarettes by adding ammonia should survive demurrer.  I write separately to 
express my concern that the majority has extended the immunity of Civil Code 
section 1714.45 (section 1714.45) only to products that are “pure and 
unadulterated” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5, 8-11), imposing a standard that is vague 
and misleading as well as potentially inconsistent with legislative intent.1 
 
Any product processed with one or more additives and thus no longer in its 
raw or natural state is arguably not “pure and unadulterated”; but that was not how 
we used the term in Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985 
(Richards).  In Richards, the court did not formulate a standard for determining 
the scope of section 1714.45 immunity but addressed the more fundamental 
question of the basis for statutory immunity.  We explained that “if a product is 
pure and unadulterated, its inherent or unavoidable danger, commonly known to 
the community which consumes it anyway, does not expose the seller to liability 
                                                                 
1 
Although this case arises under former section 1714.45, which included 
tobacco as one of the “common consumer product[s]” exempted from product 
liability actions under the conditions described (Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 
5778), the majority’s standard will apply equally to the current version of section 
1714.45, which continues to extend immunity to numerous other products.  (See 
§ 1714.45, subd. (a)(2).)  This breadth of application makes formulation of the 
proper standard particularly critical. 
 
 
2
for resulting harm to a voluntary user.”  (Richards, at p. 999, italics omitted.)  As 
the analysis in Richards makes clear, this reference to “pure and unadulterated” 
must be read with reference to comment i of section 402A of the Restatement 
Second of Torts (Restatement), from which section 1714.45 “draws its express 
inspiration . . . .”  (Richards, at p. 999; see § 1714.45, subd. (a)(2).) 
 
Comment i qualifies the general rule of liability for unreasonably dangerous 
products:  “Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all 
consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only 
from over-consumption.  Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor 
oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture.  That is not what is 
meant by ‘unreasonably dangerous’ in this Section.  The article sold must be 
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics.  Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous 
merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to 
alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is 
unreasonably dangerous.  Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely 
because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something 
like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.  Good butter is not unreasonably 
dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the 
arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous 
fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.”  (Rest., § 402A, com. i, pp. 252-253.) 
 
From this explanation, we can reasonably infer that the Legislature did not 
extend section 1714.45 immunity to products that are contaminated, perhaps 
through improper storage or transport, or contain some ingredient making them 
unfit for ordinary consumption.  Such contamination, however, is not the same as 
 
 
3
processing a “pure and unadulterated” product—as by incorporating additives—to 
make it more palatable or appealing to the consumer. 
 
In today’s high technology economy, such adulteration is common 
practice—even in common consumer products one might reasonably assume are 
“pure and unadulterated” (see, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 205.605 [listing several dozen 
nonsynthetic and synthetic substances that “may be used as ingredients in or on 
processed products labeled as ‘organic’ ”])—but it does not result in products that 
would fall outside the immunity of section 1714.45.  For example, most wines do 
not contain “pure and unadulterated” grapes but have sulfites added to discourage 
bacterial growth as the wine ferments.  Sulfur-based preservatives prevent 
discoloration in the drying of “pure and unadulterated” fruits such as apricots.  
Nitrites and nitrates preserve flavor and delay the development of toxins when 
used to cure “pure and unadulterated” meats for bacon and ham.  By the same 
reasoning, consumers generally do not buy unprocessed tobacco but cigarettes, 
which may contain nontobacco additives that make them more attractive to the 
consumer.  That processing does not necessarily make the tobacco adulterated, 
i.e., contaminated, even if the product is no longer “pure and unadulterated.”  
Thus, to the extent such cigarettes meet consumer expectations, they would not be 
unreasonably dangerous as contemplated by comment i and should come within 
the statutory immunity. 
 
This conclusion is fully consonant with our reasoning in Richards, 
irrespective of the passing reference to a product that is “pure and unadulterated.”  
As the court went on to explain, “Like comment i, section 1714.45 negates 
‘liab[ility]’ to voluntary users for the mere manufacture or sale of ‘common 
consumer product[s] intended for personal consumption,’ . . . which are 
‘inherently unsafe’ and are understood to be so by ‘ordinary knowledge common 
to the community,’ but which are nonetheless consumed with such ordinary 
 
 
4
knowledge.  Like the Restatement, the statute thus precludes ‘liab[ility]’ for the 
furnishing of such products on grounds that under the circumstances described in 
the statute, their ‘inherent’ dangers do not make them ‘defective’ when used as 
intended by voluntary consumers who are aware of the risks . . . .  In other words, 
under the conditions described by section 1714.45, a tobacco supplier simply 
commits no tort against knowing and voluntary smokers by making cigarettes 
available for their use.”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1000, italics added, 
original italics omitted.) 
 
Thus, in Richards, we hewed to the statutory language, as informed by 
comment i, in defining liability under former section 1714.45.  In my view, we 
should do the same in articulating the scope of the immunity and not engraft a 
“pure and unadulterated” standard.  This is not to say that some additives may not 
give rise to unique dangers that take a product outside the statutory definition; but 
we should not adopt a standard that will potentially sweep too many cases within 
its ambit.  I therefore agree with the majority that plaintiff’s action may proceed 
on the theory that the addition of ammonia or other additives to cigarettes posed 
some independent risk not within the “ordinary knowledge common to the 
community” about the dangers of tobacco.  (Former § 1714.45, subd. (a)(2).)  
Plaintiff, of course, will have to prove that case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I agree with the majority that the immunity conferred by Civil Code former 
section 1714.45 (Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778) (the Immunity Statute) bars 
plaintiff’s claims “where they allege no more than personal injury caused by 
dangers or risks inherent in the consumption of tobacco products such as 
cigarettes” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 11), insofar as that holding is limited, as the 
statute requires, to dangers or risks commonly known to the community and to 
conduct within the immunity period.1  I further agree that such immunity “does 
not extend to allegations that tobacco companies, in the manufacture of cigarettes, 
used additives that exposed smokers to dangers beyond those commonly known to 
be associated with cigarette smoking.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)   
I disagree with the majority that the Immunity Statute does not permit 
recovery based on plaintiff’s allegations that “defendants ‘control[led] the nicotine 
content of their cigarettes . . . by developing high-nicotine tobacco and blended 
                                                                 
1  
The Immunity Statute applied to certain conduct occurring from January 1, 
1988, to December 31, 1997 (the immunity period), so that no product liability 
cause of action may be based on that conduct, regardless of when the users of 
covered products may have sustained or discovered injuries caused thereby.  An 
amended version of Civil Code section 1714.45, enacted in 1997 (Stats. 1997, ch. 
570, § 1), eliminated any immunity for tobacco manufacturers.  (See Myers v. 
Phillip Morris Companies, Inc. (Aug. 5, 2002, S095213) __ Cal.4th __, __ [pp. 2-
3].) 
 
 
2
tobacco’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9) and “ ‘lied about the addictive nature of 
smoking’ ” (id. at p. 10, quoting the operative first amended complaint).  The 
majority rests here on the assertion that “[t]hese allegations do not suggest that the 
cigarettes plaintiff smoked exposed him to dangers other than those inherent in 
cigarette smoking” (id. at p. 10; see also id. at p. 9), but that is beside the point.  
The allegations do suggest that the cigarettes plaintiff smoked exposed him to 
dangers beyond those commonly known to be associated with cigarette smoking.  
They therefore fall outside the Immunity Statute which, as the majority 
acknowledges, does not extend to such allegations.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)2 
The Immunity Statute provided in pertinent part that, “(a) In a product 
liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:  [¶] (1) The product 
is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by the ordinary 
consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community; and [¶] (2) The product is a common consumer product intended for 
personal consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as 
identified in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”  
(Civ. Code, former § 1714.45, Stats. 1987, ch, 1498, § 3, pp. 5778-5779.) 
As the majority acknowledges, in Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 
14 Cal.4th 985 (Richards) we described the Immunity Statute as “based on the 
                                                                 
2  
I agree with the majority that on demurrer “an allegation that defendants 
increased the nicotine content of their cigarettes through blended or high-nicotine 
tobacco does not avoid the bar of the Immunity Statute [as part of a theory] that 
defendants exposed plaintiff to a risk other than those inherent in tobacco 
products.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  As I explain more fully below, however, 
such an allegation may avoid the bar of the Immunity Statute as part of a theory 
that defendants exposed plaintiff to a product not “known to be unsafe by the 
ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community.”  (Civ. Code, former § 1714.45, subd. (a)(1), Stats. 
1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778.) 
 
 
3
principle that ‘if a product is pure and unadulterated, its inherent or unavoidable 
danger, commonly known to the community which consumes it anyway, does not 
expose the seller to liability for resulting harm to a voluntary user.’ ”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 5, quoting Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 999.)  Here, the crux of 
plaintiff’s allegations respecting consumer knowledge at relevant times is that 
defendants’ products posed dangers other than those commonly known to be 
inherent in cigarette smoking.  Thus, plaintiff alleges in detail that defendants 
carried out a campaign designed to deceive the public, plaintiff, the government, 
and others as to the health hazards of smoking, including the addictive nature of 
smoking, to conceal the results of their own research, and to misrepresent their 
actual role in manipulating the addictive properties of cigarettes via nicotine and 
other additives. 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to deceive the government and 
the consuming public (including plaintiff himself) by a variety of means.  For 
example, according to plaintiff, defendants established, funded and publicized 
tobacco industry “research” bodies, which they touted as unbiased and 
trustworthy, and thereafter falsely represented to plaintiff and others that emerging 
questions about smoking and health would be truthfully answered by these 
bodies.3  Defendants also conspired to coordinate their responses to any 
statements by the Surgeon General or to other governmental action.  In furtherance 
of that conspiracy, plaintiff alleges, defendants “concealed their actual knowledge 
concerning their own negative health and addiction research results and their 
manipulation and control of the nicotine content of their products to create and 
                                                                 
3  
Plaintiff alleges activities by the Tobacco Institute, the Tobacco Industry 
Research Committee, the Tobacco Research Council, Tobacco Research—U.S.A., 
Inc., and the Council for Tobacco Research. 
 
 
4
perpetuate smokers’ addiction to cigarettes . . . .”  Before 1969 (when certain 
cigarette advertising was banned), defendants placed “deceptive, erroneous, 
misleading, and false advertisements” in all media “designed to conceal the true 
health hazards and addictive nature of cigarettes and to lure new, especially 
youthful, users to replace the older ones who died.”  After 1969, defendants 
“continued to disseminate deceptive, erroneous, misleading, and false statements 
concerning the state of the medical research concerning cigarettes and the diseases 
they cause, as well as the health hazards and addictive nature of cigarettes . . . .”  
At relevant times, plaintiff also alleges, defendants abused legal processes “to 
misdirect what purported to be objective scientific research to create favorable, 
and to suppress unfavorable, findings regarding the health consequences of 
smoking.” 
Throughout the immunity period, according to plaintiff, defendants thus 
aimed “to intentionally frustrate the flow of information from the medical and 
scientific community to the general public on the health risks and addictive nature 
of cigarettes.”  Defendants allegedly “controlled, and continue now to control 
nicotine content of their cigarettes . . . and engineer their cigarettes to control 
nicotine delivery to the smoker . . . .  They then concealed their knowledge of the 
addictive nature of nicotine and of their manipulation of nicotine levels and 
delivery.  Defendants have denied, and continue to deny publicly that nicotine is 
addictive, or that they attempt to or do achieve levels of nicotine in their products 
to create or sustain addiction.”  Defendants’ well-funded and deceptive public 
relations campaign, including “literally hundreds of misrepresentations to plaintiff 
and others over the course of the last 40 years,” plaintiff alleges, “resulted in 
plaintiff being unaware” of “the extent to which smoking presented a serious 
hazard to his health, [or] that the nicotine therein would addict him to smoking 
. . . .”  Indeed, as has been noted, “The tobacco industry has repeatedly told the 
 
 
5
public that nicotine is not addictive.  Most specifically and most dramatically, at a 
congressional hearing on April 14, 1994, seven tobacco company CEOs—each in 
turn—stated that nicotine is not addictive.”  (Glantz et al., The Cigarette Papers 
(1996) p. 100.)4 
In short, plaintiff alleges, “[t]he addictive effect of nicotine has long been 
known and concealed by the defendants.”  Despite their secret knowledge, 
defendants “intentionally conspired to mislead, deceive and confuse the 
government, and the public, including plaintiff, concerning the harmful and 
debilitating effects smoking has on the health of individuals, that nicotine in 
cigarettes is a powerfully addictive substance, and that defendants intentionally 
manipulate levels of nicotine delivery in cigarettes to ensure that smokers remain 
addicted.”  “One of the goals of the conspiracy,” plaintiff alleges, “was to create a 
false controversy regarding the health hazards of tobacco use and the addictive 
properties of nicotine in order to protect the market for cigarette sales and the 
profits of the tobacco industry” defendants.  Consequently, plaintiff alleges, 
despite the availability of some governmental information respecting smoking and 
addiction, “[a]t times material, the ordinary consumer, including the plaintiff, did 
not in the exercise of ordinary diligence know of the likelihood of, the severity of, 
or the risks from” cigarettes. 
                                                                 
4  
See generally Vladeck, Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors 
Fried and Rosenberg (2001) 31 Seton Hall L.Rev. 631, 635, wherein the author 
notes that in a recent book former federal Food and Drug Administration 
Commissioner David Kessler cites evidence obtained in litigation “to make his 
case that the tobacco industry deceived Congress, regulators, and the American 
people about the addictive nature of its products and its ability to manipulate the 
nicotine dose delivered by cigarettes to maintain addiction.”  (See also Kessler, A 
Question of Intent:  A Great American Battle With a Deadly Industry (2001).) 
 
 
6
Plaintiff thus plainly alleges more than “personal injury caused by dangers 
or risks inherent in the consumption of tobacco products such as cigarettes” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 11); he alleges that defendants secretly manipulated the nicotine 
content of cigarettes to enhance their addictive properties, thus subverting the 
“ordinary knowledge common to the community,” and materially misled the 
ordinary consumer about cigarettes’ addictiveness.  (Cf. Civ. Code, former 
§ 1714.45, subd. (a)(1), Stats. 1987, ch, 1498, § 3, p. 5778.)   
It is a “fundamental premise” of the Immunity Statute that it negates 
liability only to “knowing and voluntary consumers” of covered products and then 
only when the conditions described in the statute—including the condition that 
“the product is known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer”—obtain.  
(Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1000.)  The majority not only acknowledges the 
point (maj. opn., ante, at p. 5), but relies on it to conclude that plaintiff’s 
allegations concerning additives fall outside the Immunity Statute (see id. at p. 8).  
But there is no principled way to distinguish for these purposes between plaintiff’s 
allegations that defendants secretly used additives and his allegations that 
defendants secretly manipulated and lied about the addictiveness of their product.  
Both activities allegedly “exposed smokers to dangers beyond those commonly 
known to be associated with cigarette smoking” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 3); 
therefore, both fall outside the Immunity Statute. 
The majority apparently takes the view that the Legislature in the Immunity 
Statute declared the dangers of cigarettes to be commonly known as a matter of 
law.  (See, e.g., maj. opn., ante, at pp. 4-5.)  In support, the majority asserts that in 
Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at page 1000, we “explained” that the Legislature 
itself had concluded that tobacco products automatically qualify for immunity 
because there existed “ ‘general understanding of [their] inherent dangers.’ ”  
 
 
7
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10, italics added.)  But that is not what the Immunity Statute 
says, nor is it the import of what we said in Richards. 
On its face, the Immunity Statute mentions tobacco (along with sugar, 
castor oil, alcohol, and butter) only conditionally, as a consumer product that 
might qualify for immunity if certain other, separately specified, requirements are 
met.  Thus, tobacco appears in a list of examples of “common consumer 
product[s] intended for personal consumption” (Civ. Code, former § 1714.45, 
subd. (a)(2), Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778) that qualify for immunity if, but 
only if, they meet the requirements set out in subdivision (a)(1), a separate part of 
the statute.  Subdivision (a)(1) requires that any common consumer product 
proposed for immunity be “inherently unsafe and . . . known to be unsafe by the 
ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community.”  (Italics added.) 
When noting in Richards that tobacco was specifically included in the 
Immunity Statute’s list of inherently unsafe “common consumer product[s],” we 
also carefully noted, in fealty to the statute’s plain language, that the statute 
precludes liability only “under the circumstances described in the statute” 
(Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1000)—including, of course, the circumstance 
that “the product is known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer” (Civ. Code, 
former § 1714.45, subd. (a)(1), Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778). 
Even if, as the majority asserts, and contrary to the statute’s plain language, 
the Legislature in enacting the Immunity Statute intended to deem, as a matter of 
law, that the consuming public had a “ ‘general understanding’ ” of tobacco’s 
inherent dangers (maj. opn., ante, at p. 10), any such intent logically could have 
encompassed at the most only those dangers of tobacco that had been publicly 
reported by the time the Immunity Statute was enacted in 1987.  But in the period 
leading up to and at the outset of the immunity period, the predominant public 
 
 
8
document informing consumers about the addictiveness of tobacco was the 
Surgeon General’s 1964 Report on Smoking and Health (Surgeon Gen. Advisory 
Com. Rep., Smoking and Health (1964) (1964 Report)).  Significantly, that report 
concluded that tobacco use “should be characterized as an habituation rather than 
an addiction.”  (Id., ch. 4, p. 34, italics added.)  The 1964 Report actually 
minimized the health hazards of nicotine in cigarettes, arguing that “the chronic 
toxicity of nicotine in quantities absorbed from smoking and other methods of 
tobacco use is very low and probably does not represent an important health 
hazard.”  (Id., ch. 4, p. 32.) 
Not until 1988, one year after the Immunity Statute was enacted, did the 
Surgeon General state unequivocally that cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are 
addicting and that nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction.  (See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dept. Health & Human Services, The 
Health Consequences of Smoking:  Nicotine Addiction (1988); see also 
www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgrpage.htm [as of Aug. 5, 2002].)  Moreover, that the 
delivery to Congress in 1988 of a medical report on tobacco’s addictiveness 
conferred on either the California Legislature or California consumers a general 
understanding of tobacco’s addictive properties does not necessarily follow.  In 
any event, since neither the public nor the Legislature could possibly have known 
about dangers of tobacco use that were discovered or disclosed only after the 
Immunity Statute was enacted, the Legislature cannot have intended to bar suits 
based on such dangers. 
Contrary to the majority’s implication, the addictive property of a substance 
is qualitatively different from a mere “health risk” attendant upon its ingestion.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10-11, citing American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court 
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 480.)  As discussed, plaintiff alleges that, as a consequence 
of defendants’ misleading conduct, he and other ordinary consumers did not 
 
 
9
during the immunity period appreciate the relevant risks, specifically the risk of 
addiction, involved in the use or consumption of tobacco.  Moreover, once an 
individual is addicted to a substance, that individual arguably cannot reasonably be 
deemed a voluntary consumer.  Consequently, American Tobacco, a Court of 
Appeal decision issued only at the outset of the immunity period and five years 
before the bombshell disclosures about tobacco companies’ behavior on which 
plaintiff’s allegations largely are based (see Glantz et al., The Cigarette Papers, 
supra, p. xvii), is of no persuasive value. 
The majority improperly denies plaintiff an opportunity to attempt to 
demonstrate the truth of his allegations respecting the consuming public’s 
knowledge at relevant times.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9-10.)  Plaintiff’s allegations 
may or may not ultimately be provable, of course, but on review of a grant of 
demurrer their provability is not relevant since we assume them to be true.  
(Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 946; see also General Dynamics Corp. 
v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1177; maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  Since the 
Immunity Statute cannot apply if plaintiff’s allegations are true, the majority 
is mistaken in concluding as a matter of law that the Immunity Statute  
 
 
10
does not permit recovery based on these allegations.  From that conclusion I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
I CONCUR: 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 81 Cal.App.4th 503 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S090420 
Date Filed: August 5, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: David A. Garcia 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Wartnick, Chaber, Harowitz, Smith & Tigerman, Wartnick, Chaber, Harowitz & Tigerman, Harry F. 
Wartnick, Madelyn J. Chaber, Phillip Scott Chan; Law Offices of Daniel U. Smith, Daniel U. Smith and 
Ted W. Pelletier for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson and Andre J. Saltzman for Professor Stephen D. Sugarman as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dennis Eckhart, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Peter M. Williams, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin, H. Joseph Escher III, Ethan P. Schulman, Keith D. 
Kessler, Richard Shively and Anne-Marie Eileraas for Defendant and Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company. 
 
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold and Frederick D. Baker for Defendant and Respondent Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation. 
 
Fred Main for California Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
William L. Gausewitz for The Alliance of Am
erican Insurers, The American Insurance Association, The 
National Association of Independent Insurers, The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies 
and The Reinsurance Association of America as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Madelyn Chaber 
Wartnick, Chaber, Harowitz, Smith & Tigerman 
101 California Street, Suite 2200 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(415) 986-5566 
 
H. Joseph Escher III 
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin 
3 Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111 
(4150 434-1600