Title: Martin v. City of Tigard
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46329
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2003

Filed: June 12, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

GORDON R. MARTIN
and GORDON S. MARTIN, JR.,
	Appellants, 
	v.
CITY OF TIGARD,
	Respondent.
(OTC 4308; SC S46329)
	On review from the Oregon Tax Court.*
	Carl N. Byers, Judge.
	Argued and submitted September 11, 2000.
	Douglas V. Van Dyk, of Tarlow, Jordan &amp; Schrader, Portland,
argued the cause for appellants.  With him on the brief was
Edward H. Trompke.
	James M. Coleman, of Ramis, Crew, Corrigan &amp; Bachrach, LLP,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. 
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, and
Riggs, Justices.**
	CARSON, C.J.
	The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.
	*14 OTR 517 (1999).
	**Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  De Muniz and Balmer,
JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
		CARSON, C.J.				
		In this direct appeal from the Tax Court, we must
decide whether a charge by the City of Tigard (the city) against
taxpayers' property qualifies as an assessment for a local
improvement, which is exempt from the property tax limitations
set out in Article XI, section 11b, of the Oregon Constitution
or, instead, constitutes a "tax" subject to those limitations. (1) 
The Tax Court determined that the charge qualified as an
assessment for a local improvement under Article XI, section 11b,
and granted summary judgment in the city's favor.  Martin v. City
of Tigard, 14 OTR 517 (1999).
		On review, taxpayers contend that the charge at issue
does not qualify as an assessment for a local improvement, as
Article XI, section 11b, defines that term, for three reasons:
(1) the city requires taxpayers to waive all irregularities or
defects in the local improvement proceedings and cost
apportionment in order to exercise the option of paying the
charge over a ten-year period; (2) the city did not assess other
properties that taxpayers contend also received a special benefit
from the project; and (3) the city included attorney fees and
litigation costs related to the project in its costs.  We review
for errors of law.  ORS 305.445.  For the reasons set out below,
we conclude that the city's charge against taxpayers falls within
the meaning of an assessment for a local improvement under
Article XI, section 11b, and, therefore, is not a "tax" subject
to the dollar limits of that provision.  Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Tax Court.
		The following facts are taken from the Tax Court's
summary judgment order and the parties' affidavits and exhibits
in support of their respective motions for summary judgment.  In
1984, the city formed the Dartmouth Street Local Improvement
District No. 40 (the Dartmouth LID) to pay for the construction
of an extension of Dartmouth Street (the project).  Taxpayers own
approximately 25 acres of property located within the Dartmouth
LID boundary.  The city began construction on the project in
1992.  After completing condemnation proceedings necessary to
acquire property from another landowner in the LID boundary, the
city finished the project in 1994.
		In 1993, before completion of the project, but after
the city had drawn the Dartmouth LID boundary, the city granted
Waremart, Inc., and Costco, two merchant corporations, access to
Dartmouth Street. Both Waremart and Costco built sales facilities largely outside the LID boundary, but they
constructed parking lots within the LID boundary and placed the
entrances to their facilities on Dartmouth Street.  Once
finished, the sales facilities caused increased traffic on
Dartmouth Street.
		In 1998, the city enacted Ordinance 98-12, which
proposed final assessments against the properties located within
the Dartmouth LID for the cost of the project.  The city included
attorney fees and litigation costs associated with the project in
its total costs, including attorney fees and litigation costs
stemming from the condemnation proceeding.  The city proposed to
make a final assessment of $1,947,677 against taxpayers'
property.  However, because the entire Waremart structure and the
majority of the Costco structure were located outside the
Dartmouth LID boundary, the city did not assess those parts of
the Costco and Waremart parcels.  The city also did not assess
three residential parcels of land located within the LID boundary
-- including taxpayers' residence -- that had gained access to
Dartmouth Street as a result of the project.  Finally, as part of
the findings that it adopted in Ordinance 98-12, the city stated
that it would not accept taxpayers' application to extend payment
of the charge for the Dartmouth LID over a ten-year period unless
taxpayers agreed to waive all irregularities or defects in the
local improvement proceedings and cost apportionment, as required
by ORS 223.215(1)(a) and former Tigard Municipal Code (TMC)
13.04.070(b)(3)(A) (1996), renumbered as TMC 13.04.070(2)(c)(1)
(2002). (2) 
In June 1998, taxpayers brought this claim in the Tax
Court under ORS 305.583(1), (3) seeking a determination that the
charge for the Dartmouth LID was actually a "tax" under Article
XI, section 11b, rather than an assessment for a local
improvement.  In addition, taxpayers claimed that the waiver
requirements of ORS 223.215(1)(a) and former TMC
13.04.070(b)(3)(A) (1996) violated their right to petition the
government for redress of grievances under Article I, section 10,
of the Oregon Constitution and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
		On opposing motions for summary judgment, the Tax Court 
concluded that the charge for the Dartmouth LID was not a "tax"
under Article XI, section 11b, because the charge conformed to
the exemption under that section for an assessment for a local
improvement.  Martin, 14 OTR 517.  The Tax Court further
concluded that, because the charge did not constitute a tax, the
court lacked jurisdiction to hear taxpayers' constitutional
challenges to the waiver requirements of ORS 223.215(1)(a) and
former TMC 13.04.070(b)(3)(A) (1996).  Id. at 523.  The Tax Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the city.  Id. at 524. 
On appeal, taxpayers assign as error the Tax Court's
denial of their motion for summary judgment and its grant of the
city's opposing motion for summary judgment. (4)  We review the Tax
Court's ruling to determine whether either party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.  See TCR 47 C (summary judgment
appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists
and moving party entitled to judgment as matter of law).  We
begin with those issues that arise under Article XI, section 11b,
of the Oregon Constitution.
		As noted, Article XI, section 11b, is a constitutional
provision that the voters adopted by initiative petition that
sets dollar limits upon taxes that government imposes upon real
property.  Under Article XI, section 11b(2)(b), a "tax" is
	"any charge imposed by a governmental unit upon
property or upon a property owner as a direct
consequence of ownership of that property except
incurred charges and assessments for local
improvements."(Emphasis added.)  Article XI, section 11b(2)(d), defines a
"local improvement" as
	"a capital construction project undertaken by a
governmental unit
		"(i) which provides a special benefit only to
specific properties or rectifies a problem caused by
specific properties, and
		"(ii) the costs of which are assessed against
those properties in a single assessment upon the
completion of the project, and 
		"(iii) for which the payment of the assessment
plus appropriate interest may be spread over a period
of at least ten years.
		"The total of all assessments for a local
improvement shall not exceed the actual costs incurred
by the governmental unit in designing, constructing and
financing the project."
		Taxpayers do not dispute that the charge for the
Dartmouth LID resulted from a capital construction project that
provided a special benefit to specific properties, including
their property.  For the reasons detailed below, however,
taxpayers argue that the charge for the Dartmouth LID does not
satisfy other criteria set out in the foregoing definition of
"local improvement" and, thus, constitutes a "tax" subject to the
limits of Article XI, section 11b.  We address each of taxpayers'
arguments in turn.		
Citing Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), taxpayers
first contend that the charge for the Dartmouth LID does not
qualify under the exemption for an assessment for a local
improvement because the city will not permit taxpayers to pay
that charge over a ten-year period unless taxpayers waive all
irregularities or defects in the local improvement proceedings
and cost apportionment, as required under ORS 223.215(1)(a). (5) 
The city responds that, in Ester v. Monmouth, 322 Or 1, 903 P2d
344 (1995), this court specifically held that, in adopting
Article XI, section 11b, the voters did not intend to change the
law governing local improvements.  Thus, the city argues, under
Ester, because the waiver requirement of ORS 223.215(1)(a) long
has been a condition to the option to pay an assessment for a
local improvement in installments under statutory law, the voters
did not intend to preclude the application of that condition in
incorporating the option to pay an assessment in installments as
a constitutional requirement for a project to qualify as a "local
improvement" under Article XI, section 11b(2)(d).
Because the city asserts that Ester resolves taxpayers'
claim, we begin our discussion by examining the holding of Ester. 
In Ester, this court considered whether, by including the phrase
"which provides a special benefit only to specific properties" in
the definition of local improvement in Article XI, section
11b(2)(d)(i), the voters intended to exclude from that definition
any project that also provided a general benefit to the
community.  322 Or at 8.  Respecting that phrase, this court
concluded that the voters did not intend to alter the historical
understanding that local improvements ordinarily provide both a
special benefit to certain properties and a general benefit to
the community.  Id. at 13.  In Ester, however, the court did not
consider whether the other criteria set out in Article XI,
section 11b(2)(d), altered the meaning of the term "local
improvement."  Thus, in asserting that Ester stands for the
proposition that Article XI, section 11b, did not change the law
governing local improvements in any respect, the city overstates
this court's holding in that case. (6)
		Having explained that Ester does not dispose of
taxpayers' claim, we turn to the question whether the city's
imposition of the waiver requirement set out in ORS 223.215(1)(a)
prevents the charge for the Dartmouth LID from qualifying as an
assessment for a local improvement under Article XI, section 11b. 
Because Article XI, section 11b, is a voter-initiated
constitutional provision, our task in interpreting the meaning of
that provision is to discern the intent of the voters.  Roseburg
School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595
(1993).  The text of the provision itself provides the best
evidence of the voters' intent.  Id.  In addition, this court
also considers the context of the provision, including other
relevant constitutional provisions, case law from this court, and
any relevant statutory framework in effect at the time when the
voters adopted the provision.  See Flavorland Foods v. Washington
County Assessor, 334 Or 562, 569-75, 54 P3d 582 (2002)
(considering those as part of context of initiated constitutional
provision).  If the voters' intent is clear from the text and
context of the initiated constitutional provision, then the court
does not look further.  Roseburg School Dist., 316 Or at 378.
		Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), identifies one
criterion for a charge to qualify as an assessment for a local
improvement, namely that "the payment of the assessment plus
appropriate interest may be spread over a period of at least ten
years."  Or Const, Art XI, § 11b(2)(d)(iii).  Because that phrase
does not use words that carry any special legal meaning, we
assign those words their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. 
See Coultas v. City of Sutherlin, 318 Or 584, 588-89, 871 P2d 465
(1994) (court gives words of common usage their ordinary meaning
in interpreting voter-initiated constitutional provisions).  The
ordinary meaning of the word "may" is "have liberty to."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1396 (unabridged ed 1993).
		The parties agree, as do we, that, under the text of
Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), a charge qualifies as an
assessment for a local improvement only if the governing body has
provided the property owner with the option to pay the charge
over a period of at least ten years.  Taxpayers, however, contend
that the text of that provision does not allow the governing body
to impose any conditions upon that option, including the
condition set out in ORS 223.215(1)(a) that the property owner
waive all irregularities in the local improvement proceedings and
cost apportionment.  We disagree.
		As noted, the plain meaning of the phrase "may be
spread" in Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), suggests that the
property owner must have the "liberty" to spread the payment of
an assessment for a local improvement over a period of at least
ten years.  The "liberty" to spread payments over a ten-year
period, however, is not the same as an unconditional right to
that payment option.  Instead, the phrase "may be spread"
supports only the conclusion that the voters intended to require
the availability of a ten-year payment option, which ORS
223.215(1)(a) does not deny, before a charge may qualify as an
assessment for a local improvement within the meaning of Article
XI, section 11b.  We have not found, and taxpayers have not
suggested, anything else in the text of Article XI, section 11b,
that demonstrates that the voters intended to limit the authority
of a governing body to impose conditions that are consistent with
the ten-year payment option.
		The context of Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), also
does not support taxpayers' argument.  Long before the voters
adopted Article XI, section 11b, the statutory law governing
local improvements provided the option to pay an assessment for a
local improvement on an installment basis.  See ORS 223.210
(providing that property owner may apply to pay local improvement
assessment in installments); see also The Codes and Statutes of
Oregon, title XXVII, ch V, § 2727 (Bellinger &amp; Cotton 1902)
(same).  Thus, in requiring the availability of an installment
payment option, Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), incorporates
into the constitutional definition of "local improvement" a
provision that was well-established under statutory law.  Under
that statutory law, the waiver requirement set out in ORS
223.215(1)(a) always has been a condition to a property owner's
exercise of the installment payment option.  See The Codes and
Statutes of Oregon, title XXVII, ch V, § 2727 (Bellinger &amp; Cotton
1902) (application to pay assessment in installment must state
waiver of irregularities or defects in local improvement
proceedings and cost apportionment).
We presume that the voters were aware that the
installment payment option was so conditioned under statutory
law.  Cf. State v. Waterhouse, 209 Or 424, 436, 307 P2d 327
(1957) (court presumes legislature's awareness of existing law). 
Because nothing in the text of Article XI, section 11b,
demonstrates that the voters intended to change the nature of
that option, the text and context of Article XI, section 11b,
suggest that the voters did not intend to alter the authority of
a governing body to condition a property owner's installment
payment option upon the waiver requirement set out in ORS
223.215(1)(a). (7)  This court, however, previously has stressed
that it will not conclude lightly that the voters' intent is so
clear from text and context of a provision that further inquiry
is unnecessary.  See Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or 101,
117, 36 P3d 954 (2001), modified on recons on other grounds, 334
Or 11, 45 P3d 107 (2002) (so stating).  Therefore, because there
is some room for doubt, and because taxpayers argue that the
history of Article XI, section 11b, supports their reading of
Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), we also shall consider the
history of Article XI, section 11b, before ending our inquiry. 
See id. (describing that method of analysis).  
		The history of an initiated constitutional provision,
such as Article XI, section 11b, includes any information that
was available to the public at large at the time when the measure
was adopted that illuminates the voters' understanding of that
provision.  Id. at 129-30.  In this case, the only material that
we have found, or that taxpayers have suggested, that assists us
in ascertaining the voters' intent as to the meaning of Article
XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), is the explanatory statement of
Article XI, section 11b, from the voters' pamphlet.  That
statement described the relevant part of the provision as: 
		"The limits in this measure DO NOT APPLY to * * *
assessments for capital construction that provides
[sic] a special benefit to the property and that can be
paid off over at least ten years[.]" Official Voters' Pamphlet, Primary Election, November 6, 1990, 33
(capitalization in original; emphasis added).  
		The phrase "can be paid off" in the explanatory
statement suggested to the voters that a ten-year payment option
would be available to a property owner if a charge were to
qualify as an assessment for a local improvement.  That phrase,
however, again did not suggest to the voters that the proposed
measure would have any effect upon the authority of a governing
body to impose conditions that were consistent with that payment
option.  Thus, although the foregoing explanation confirms our
earlier conclusion that the voters intended to require the
availability of a ten-year payment option for a charge to qualify
as an assessment for a local improvement, that explanation does
not support taxpayers' contention that the voters intended that
the installment payment option be free of any conditions,
including the waiver requirement set out in ORS 223.215(1)(a). 
		In sum, after considering the text, context, and
relevant history of Article XI, section 11b, we find nothing that
supports taxpayers' argument that, to qualify under the exemption
for an assessment for a local improvement, the city may not
impose the waiver requirement set out in ORS 223.215(1)(a).  In
adopting Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), we determine that
the voters intended to require the availability of a ten-year
payment option for a charge to qualify under the exemption for an
assessment for a local improvement.  The city's imposition of the
waiver requirement set out in ORS 223.215(1)(a) does not deprive
taxpayers of that payment option.  We therefore conclude that the
Tax Court's decision as to that matter was not in error.
		Taxpayers next argue that the Dartmouth LID fails to
qualify as an assessment for a local improvement under Article
XI, section 11b(2)(d), because the city did not assess the entire
Waremart and Costco parcels, which taxpayers contend also
received a special benefit from Dartmouth Street.  The city
responds that the Tax Court correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider that argument on the merits because
taxpayers' claim presents a challenge to the LID under ORS
chapter 223, rather than a question involving Article XI, section
11b. 
		 The relevant part of Article XI, section 11b(2)(d),
provides:
		"[a] 'local improvement' is a capital construction
project undertaken by a governmental unit * * *
		"(i) which provides a special benefit only to specific properties or rectifies a problem caused by
specific properties, and
		"(ii) the costs of which are assessed against
those properties in a single assessment upon the
completion of the project[.]"
(Emphasis added.)  Taxpayers argue that the term "those
properties" in Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(ii), refers to the
specific properties that received a special benefit from the
project.  According to taxpayers, to conform to that definition,
the city must assess all specially benefitted properties to
qualify as an assessment for a local improvement. 
		We agree with taxpayers that the term "those
properties" in Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(ii), refers to the
properties defined in Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(i), that is,
those specific properties that received a special benefit from
the project.  As explained below, however, we do not agree that,
by including the requirement in Article XI, section
11b(2)(d)(ii), that the costs of a project be assessed against
"those properties" receiving a special benefit, the voters
intended to address the question of which properties received a
special benefit such that they should be included in the
assessment for the costs of that project.
		As discussed previously, in Ester, 322 Or 1, this court
considered the meaning of the phrase "special benefit only to
specific properties" in Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(i).  This
court held that the voters intended to adopt the established,
legal meaning of the term "special benefit" in including that
term in the definition of "local improvement" in Article XI,
section 11b(2)(d).  Id. at 13.  Therefore, the question whether
the project at issue in Ester had provided a special benefit to
the taxpayer's property was not a question involving the effect
of Article XI, section 11b, but, instead, constituted a challenge
to the local improvement district under ORS chapter 223.  Id. 
That holding applies equally in this context.  The
determination of which properties receive a "special benefit"
from a particular project controls a governing body's decision
about which properties it should include in an assessment for the
costs of a local improvement.  See ORS 223.389 (describing
procedure for making assessments for local improvements); see
also Stanley v. City of Salem, 247 Or 60, 64, 427 P2d 406 (1967)
("Special assessments can be levied upon property to the extent
that property is specially benefited by the improvement for which
the levy is assessed.").  Under Ester, a challenge to the
determination of "special benefit" is a challenge to the local
improvement under ORS chapter 223, rather than Article XI,
section 11b.  Thus, to determine whether a project conforms to
the requirement of Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(ii), that a
governing body assessed its costs only against "those properties"
that received a special benefit from the project, this court asks
only if the governing body has limited its assessment of costs to
the properties identified under Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(i),
that is, properties that received a special benefit.  Whether
other properties not included in the assessment also received a
special benefit, and, as a consequence, the governing body should
have included them in the assessment, is not a question involving
the effect of Article XI, section 11b; rather, that question
raises a challenge to the local improvement under ORS chapter
223.  We therefore conclude that the Tax Court's decision that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider taxpayers' challenge on the
merits was not in error. (8) 
		Taxpayers finally contend that the charge for the
Dartmouth LID does not qualify as an assessment for a local
improvement under Article XI, section 11b, because the city
included attorney fees and litigation costs associated with the
project in its total project costs, including attorney fees and
litigation costs stemming from the condemnation proceeding. 
According to taxpayers, under the text of Article XI, section
11b(2)(d), the city may not include such costs if the charge is
to qualify as an assessment for a local improvement.   
		The relevant part of Article XI, section 11b(2)(d),
provides:
		"The total of all assessments for a local
improvement shall not exceed the actual costs incurred
by the governmental unit in designing, constructing and
financing the project."
(Emphasis added.)
		As previously noted, when interpreting the text of an
initiated constitutional provision, this court gives words of
common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. 
Coultas, 318 Or at 588-89.  The plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning of "actual" in this instance is "existing in fact or
reality," as opposed to "ideal and hypothetical."  Webster's at
22.  In that regard, Article XI, section 11b(2)(d), requires that
a governing body limit an assessment for a local improvement to
those costs that the governing body in fact has incurred and are
not speculative.  The word "cost" ordinarily means "the amount or
equivalent paid or given or charged or engaged to be paid or
given for anything bought or taken in barter or for service
rendered."  Webster's at 515.  Under those definitions, we hold
that the attorney fees and litigation costs that the city
included in the assessment for the Dartmouth LID constitute
"actual costs." 
We next consider whether attorney fees and litigation
costs associated with the condemnation proceeding were "incurred
by the governmental unit in designing, constructing and financing
the project."  Or Const, Art XI, § 11b(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
The ordinary meaning of "constructing" is "to form, make, or
create by combining parts or elements."  Webster's at 489.  In
this case, the city's acquisition of the property upon which to
build the Dartmouth Street extension was a necessary part of the
creation of Dartmouth Street.  Thus, under the foregoing
definition of "constructing," the city's attorney fees and
litigation costs from the condemnation proceeding constituted
actual costs that the city incurred in "designing, constructing
and financing the project."  Because the text of Article XI,
section 11b(2)(d), is clear, and nothing in the context of
Article XI, section 11b, suggests a different reading of that
provision, we conclude that the Tax Court's decision as to that
matter also was not in error. (9)
		We now turn to taxpayers' other constitutional
challenges.  As noted, taxpayers claim that the city's imposition
of the waiver requirements of ORS 223.215(1)(a) and former TMC
13.04.070(b)(3)(A) (1996) violated their right to petition the
government for redress of grievances under Article I, section 10,
of the Oregon Constitution and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  On appeal,
taxpayers argue that the Tax Court erred when it dismissed those
challenges for lack of jurisdiction and ask this court to declare
that the waiver requirement is unconstitutional.
		Although the Tax Court is a court of "general
jurisdiction" and has the same powers as a circuit court, if the
question before the Tax Court is not a challenge to, or one
arising under, the tax laws of Oregon, it is not within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tax Court.  See ORS 305.410(1)
("[T]he tax court shall be the sole, exclusive and final judicial
authority for the hearing and determination of all questions of
law and fact arising under the tax laws of this state."); see
also Sanok v. Grimes, 294 Or 684, 690-97, 662 P2d 693 (1983)
(outlining scope of Tax Court's jurisdiction).  Here, taxpayers
raise facial state and federal constitutional challenges to the
statutory waiver requirements of ORS 223.215(1) and former TMC
13.04.070(b)(3)(A) (1996).  Those challenges do not "arise under
the tax laws" of this state.  Therefore, we conclude that the Tax
Court correctly dismissed those constitutional challenges for
lack of jurisdiction. 
		The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.


1.      	In 1990, Oregon voters adopted Ballot Measure 5, which
added Article XI, section 11b, to the Oregon Constitution and set
dollar limits upon certain charges that government imposes upon
real property.  In 1997, the voters approved Ballot Measure 50,
which modified Article XI, section 11b, in ways not relevant to
this dispute.

2.      	ORS 223.215(1)(a) provides:
		"The installment application shall state that the
applicant does thereby waive all irregularities or
defects, jurisdictional or otherwise, in the
proceedings to cause the local improvement for which
the final assessment is levied and in the apportionment
of the actual cost of the local improvement."
Former TMC 13.04.070(b)(3)(A) (1996) similarly provided, in part:
	"[t]he written application shall * * * [s]tate that the
applicant and property owner does waive all
irregularities or defects, jurisdictional or otherwise,
in the proceedings to cause the improvement to be
constructed or made for which the assessment is levied
and in the apportionment of the cost[.]"
Under ORS 223.210(2), a property owner generally must file an
application to make installment payments within 10 days after the
notice of the final assessment.  See ORS 223.210(2) (property
owner may file application to pay assessment in installments
within 10 days after notice of final assessment); see also ORS
223.210(3) (governing body has option to allow installment
application to be filed more than 10 days after final notice of
assessment).  In this case, however, the parties have stipulated
to toll the period within which taxpayers must apply for
installment payments until this challenge is resolved. 

3.      	ORS 305.583(1) provides:
		"An interested taxpayer may petition the regular
division of the Oregon Tax Court to determine the
effect of the limits of section 11 or 11b, Article XI
of the Oregon Constitution on any tax, fee, charge or
assessment imposed by a unit of government."	
(Emphasis added.)

4.      	Generally, an order denying a motion for summary
judgment is not appealable.  Carter v. U.S. National Bank, 304 Or
538, 545, 747 P2d 980 (1987).  However, under certain
circumstances, such as those arising in this case, this court may
review an order denying summary judgment on an appeal following
the entry of final judgment.  See To v. State Farm Mutual Ins.,
319 Or 93, 873 P2d 1072 (1994) (in appeal from final judgment
entered after grant of summary judgment, court reviewed and
reversed trial court's denial of cross-motion for summary
judgment); see also Payless Drug Stores v. Brown, 300 Or 243,
248, 708 P2d 1143 (1985) (court may not review denial of motion
for summary judgment in appeal from judgment after trial, unless
motion raised only issue of law about which facts found at trial
would have made no difference).

5.      	The city imposed that requirement pursuant to former
TMC 13.04.070(b)(3)(A) (1996), which, as noted previously, is
based upon ORS 223.215(1)(a).

6.      	This court's statements in Ester that "it is clear that
the voters intended to exclude all proper assessments for local
improvements from the property tax restrictions" and that "we now
hold that the term 'local improvement' refers to a local
improvement authorized under ORS chapter 223" are not to the
contrary.  322 Or at 13, 13 n 7 (emphasis added).  Those
statements set out only a summary of the court's earlier
conclusion -- that the voters did not intend to change the
historical understanding that local improvements ordinarily
provide both a special benefit to certain properties and a
general benefit to the community.

7.      	Taxpayers contend that the context of Article XI,
section 11b, as an initiative that severely limits the ability of
a governing body to impose taxes upon real property, supports
their reading of Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii).  See Ester,
322 Or at 12 n 6 (context of Article XI, section 11b, makes clear
that voters intended to limit property taxes severely).  However,
as this court explained in Ester, it does not follow from that
context that the voters intended to limit the authority of a
governing body respecting forms of revenue generation that
Article XI, section 11b, expressly excludes from its limitations. 
Id. 

8.      	Because taxpayers' claim is a challenge to the meaning
of "local improvement" in Article XI, section 11b, and is a
question of first impression, we note, as in Ester, that we do
not suggest that taxpayers improperly brought this claim in the
Tax Court.  Under ORS 305.580(1), the exclusive remedy for a
taxpayer who thinks that a charge exceeds the limits of Article
XI, section 11b, is a petition to the Tax Court.  See Ester, 322
Or at 13 n 7 (stating same). 

9.      	Taxpayers also point out that, in the legislation that
implemented Article XI, section 11b, the legislature did not
include attorney fees in its definition of "actual costs."  See
ORS 310.140(10) (omitting attorney fees from definition of
"actual cost").  However, as taxpayers acknowledge, ORS
310.140(10) provides that the list of costs included in that
provision is not exhaustive.  See ORS 310.140(10) ("actual costs"
not limited to enumerated costs).  In addition, this court
previously has stated that subsequently enacted, related
legislation is not evidence of the voters' intent in adopting an
initiated constitutional provision.  Ester, 322 Or at 10 n 5 (so
stating).