Title: P. v. Carrington
Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 145
Docket Number: S043628
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 2009

1 
Filed 7/27/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S043628 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
CELESTE SIMONE CARRINGTON, 
) 
 
) 
San Mateo County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SC29739 
 
____________________________________) 
 
After a jury trial, defendant Celeste Simone Carrington was convicted of 
the first degree murders of Victor Esparza and Carolyn Gleason, and the jury 
found true, as to each count of murder, allegations of burglary and robbery special 
circumstances.  (Penal Code §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a) (17)(I) & (VII), 
1203.06, subd. (a)(1), and 12022.5, subd. (a).)1  The jury also found true a 
multiple-murder special circumstance.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  Defendant was 
convicted of the second degree attempted murder of Dr. Allan Marks, and an 
allegation that she personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission 
of that crime was found true.  (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); 12022.7.)  She was 
convicted of the robbery of each of these three victims, as well as eight counts of 
commercial burglary.  (§§ 211, 460, subd. (b).)  Except as to five of the counts of 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
commercial burglary, allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in the 
commission of these offenses were found true.  (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1) and 
12022.5, subd. (a).)  After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict 
of death, and the trial court denied defendant‟s motion to modify the verdict to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)  This appeal 
is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
For the reasons discussed below, we reverse defendant‟s convictions for 
burglary in counts 9 and 10 and affirm defendant‟s remaining convictions and 
death sentence. 
I. FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
The offenses of which defendant Celeste Carrington was convicted arose 
out of four separate incidents.  Most of the facts underlying these offenses were 
admitted by defendant in her statements to the police, which she made shortly after 
her arrest.  The first incident involved the burglary of a Dodge dealership located 
at 640 Veterans Boulevard in Redwood City, on the night of January 17, 1992.  In 
her statement to the police, defendant admitted the following.  She previously had 
been employed as a janitor for several companies and, having worked in this 
building, defendant was aware that the back entrance was often left unlocked.    
She went to that location with gloves and a crowbar, which she used to force open 
several interior doors.  Among other items, she stole a .357 magnum revolver and 
five bullets.   
The second incident involved the burglary of a building located at 1123 
Industrial Road in San Carlos and the murder of Victor Esparza, on the night of 
January 26, 1992.  In her statement, defendant admitted the following.  She 
previously had worked on the premises as a janitor and had retained a key to the 
3 
building.  She borrowed a car from her neighbor and drove to the location, armed 
with the .357 magnum revolver she had stolen from the Dodge dealership.  She 
used her key to enter the building, accidentally setting off the alarm.  Victor 
Esparza, who was cleaning the facility, observed her in an office cubicle.  She told 
him that she worked in the building and must have accidentally set off the alarm.  
Esparza asked her to call the building manager to report the alarm, took out his 
wallet, and handed her a telephone number.  Defendant displayed the gun and took 
his wallet, which contained about $45 or $55 in cash.  She also demanded the 
personal identification number (PIN) for his automated teller machine (ATM) 
card, which he wrote down.  As defendant walked out of the cubicle, she turned 
around and shot Esparza.  She later attempted to use his ATM card, but the PIN he 
had given her was invalid.  Defendant admitted that she intended to kill Esparza, 
and that the experience was exciting and made her feel powerful.   
The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Esparza, Peter 
Benson, testified that Esparza died of a gunshot wound to the head, inflicted from 
a distance of approximately six inches.  Benson concluded that the angle of the 
gunshot wound was not inconsistent with the victim having been shot while 
kneeling and looking up at the shooter, nor was it inconsistent with the possibility 
that the victim was standing.  Celia Hartnett, a criminalist for the San Mateo 
County Sheriff‟s Laboratory who examined Esparza‟s body at the crime scene, 
testified that in her opinion — based upon the position of the body and the 
clothing, the pools of blood on the carpet, the blood on the clothing, and an 
abrasion on the forehead — he probably was on his knees when he was shot, with 
his arms raised in a defensive position; he likely fell forward and then rotated onto 
his back.  Hartnett believed that Esparza was shot from a distance of between six 
inches and one foot.     
4 
The third incident involved the burglary of an office building located at 777 
California Street in Palo Alto in Santa Clara County and the murder of Carolyn 
Gleason, on March 11, 1992.  In her statement to the police, defendant admitted 
the following.  She previously had worked as a janitor in the building and had 
retained a key.  A neighbor gave her a ride to the premises from her apartment in 
East Palo Alto.  Defendant brought a pair of gloves, a screwdriver, and the same 
.357 magnum revolver she had used  to kill Victor Esparza.  Her key would not 
open the door.  She observed two cars in the parking lot and two janitors working 
in the building.  She waited for these individuals to leave before using the 
screwdriver to open the door.  Defendant walked through the facility looking for 
money but found none.  She heard Caroline Gleason enter and go into an office.  
Defendant watched her and eventually encountered her in the copy room.  When 
defendant displayed the gun, Gleason begged her to put it away.  According to 
defendant, she did not want to hurt Gleason, but she became nervous and pulled 
the trigger. 
After shooting Gleason, defendant took Gleason‟s keys and about $400 
from her desk.  She went outside to the parking lot and entered Gleason‟s car, 
where she found Gleason‟s purse, which contained her ATM card and PIN.  
Defendant drove the car to a bank in Palo Alto, where she made two unsuccessful 
attempts to withdraw money from Gleason‟s account, but was able to withdraw 
$200 from  an ATM at a 7-Eleven store and another $100 from a second bank.  
She left the car in a hospital parking lot and took a taxi back to her apartment.   
An autopsy indicated that Gleason died as the result of a single gunshot to 
the head fired from a very close range.  The prosecution‟s forensic expert, 
criminalist Hartnett, opined — based upon the position of Gleason‟s body, the 
height of the blood spatters, the angle of the gunshot wound, and the presence of 
5 
gunshot residue on Gleason‟s sleeve — that the victim was kneeling and had tried 
to cover her face when shot.     
The fourth incident involved the burglary of a medical office building 
located at 80 Brewster Street in Redwood City and the attempted murder of Dr. 
Allan Marks, on the evening of March 16, 1992.  Defendant, in her statement to 
the police, admitted the following.  As in two of the earlier incidents, she brought 
with her a key she had retained from her prior employment at the building as a 
janitor, a pair of gloves, and the same .357 magnum revolver.  The doors to the 
building still were unlocked when she arrived at 5:30 p.m.  After discovering that 
she was unable to open any of the internal offices with her key, defendant hid in a 
closet for a few hours.  She emerged from the closet and spent some time in the 
building before observing Dr. Marks leaving his office after a late appointment.  
She decided to rob him and pulled out the gun.  When Marks observed her, he 
“went crazy” and the two struggled over the gun.  During the struggle she pulled 
the trigger three times, resulting in one misfire and two shots.  Marks managed to 
force her out of the office and locked the door.  Defendant fled the building, taking 
with her some access cards and prescription drugs. 
Dr. Marks testified to a somewhat different version of the shooting.  
According to his account, as he was about to leave his office defendant pushed the 
door open and came “barreling through,” causing the door to push him to the side.  
He recognized her as a former janitor in the building and began screaming and 
waiving his hands.  Defendant was standing about three feet from him, holding a 
gun in her right hand.  She pointed it at his upper body, and he heard gunshots.    
He was shot in the left shoulder, left thumb, and right forearm.  After being shot, 
Marks collapsed to his knees and defendant left the office.  He closed the door 
behind her and called 911.    
6 
Defendant was arrested a few days later.  Her apartment in East Palo Alto 
was searched  pursuant to three warrants obtained by the Los Altos, Palo Alto, and 
Redwood City Police Departments.  The police found evidence that connected 
defendant to all four incidents:  the keys to the Redwood City Dodge dealership; 
the gun that had been taken from the dealership, which was the weapon used to 
shoot Esparza, Gleason, and Marks; Gleason‟s pager and purse, and the key to the 
building in which she was shot; a box from Gleason‟s office that held petty cash; a 
piece of paper with Gleason‟s PIN on it; and a drug kit taken from a doctor‟s 
office in the medical building in which Marks was shot.  After the search was 
completed, police officers from each of the three police departments interviewed 
defendant, and she confessed to being the perpetrator in each of the four incidents.   
The defense presented no evidence at the guilt phase of the trial.  In closing 
argument, defense counsel conceded that the crimes occurred as defendant 
described them in her statements and argued that the murders were not executions.  
Defense counsel argued that with respect to the charge involving the robbery of 
Gleason, the jury should return a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense of theft and 
should find not true the allegation that the murder of Gleason took place during the 
commission of a robbery.  Defense counsel also urged that as to the charge 
involving the attempted murder of Marks, the jury should return a verdict of guilty 
on the lesser offense of assault with a firearm.     
B.  Penalty Phase 
At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution presented victim impact 
evidence.  Esparza‟s sister and aunt, with whom he was residing at the time of his 
death, testified about the type of person he was and their relationship with him.  
Other relatives who resided in Mexico at the time of Esparza‟s death — his 
parents, a sister, and a brother — also testified.  Gleason‟s two brothers-in-law 
7 
testified about the effect her death had on them and their families and, in 
particular, on their brother, Gleason‟s husband.  Gleason‟s mother had died, and 
her father was hospitalized at the time of defendant‟s trial. 
The prosecution also presented evidence establishing that defendant had 
attempted to escape from the county jail.  This evidence was contained in tape-
recorded statements made by Cindy Keshmiri, an inmate who worked on the food 
line at the county jail.  Keshmiri told a sheriff‟s deputy, and later an investigator 
from the district attorney‟s office, that defendant had asked her for a metal knife.  
Keshmiri told the authorities that she provided defendant with a hard plastic knife, 
which was a type used by jail staff but not available to inmates.  After Keshmiri 
gave her the knife, defendant asked for some aluminum foil.  Keshmiri assumed 
that defendant wanted the foil in order to make the plastic knife look like a metal 
one.  Keshmiri gave defendant the foil and asked whether she was planning to try 
to escape.  In response, defendant commented that the deputies do not carry guns.  
Defendant added, “[W]ell, I can always take one of the inmates up to the counter 
where the deputies are and ask for the scissors to cut their hair.”  Keshmiri 
interpreted this comment to mean that defendant intended to hold the scissors to 
somebody‟s throat in order to escape.  At that point, Keshmiri decided to report 
these events.  Based upon the information provided by Keshmiri, defendant‟s cell 
was searched, but no knife or foil was found.  At trial, Keshmiri denied having 
been acquainted with defendant and claimed not to recall these statements.  
Keshmiri‟s tape-recorded interviews with the deputy and the investigator were 
admitted into evidence as prior inconsistent statements.  In addition, testimony 
was presented demonstrating that hard plastic items, such as the knife Keshmiri 
provided to defendant, can be fashioned into a sharp weapon.   
In mitigation, the defense presented the testimony of a clinical 
psychologist, Dr. Myla Young, who testified that although defendant had an 
8 
average I.Q., Young‟s examination of defendant disclosed evidence of a brain 
abnormality and learning disorders.  Dr. Young could not identify the cause of the 
brain abnormality, which could have been caused by a genetic abnormality, 
trauma, or illness.  According to Dr. Young, the abnormality affected the left side 
of defendant‟s brain, which interfered with her ability to “see the bigger picture,” 
to think ahead and plan, and to be able to recognize and change behavior that is 
unsuccessful.  Dr. Young also diagnosed defendant as having a current and long-
standing depression and bipolar disorder.  
Friends and neighbors testified regarding defendant‟s family life while 
growing up in a low-income housing project in Philadelphia, and regarding 
defendant‟s life in the months leading up to her commission of the crimes.  
According to a next-door neighbor from Philadelphia, defendant as a girl 
frequently was left in charge of her younger brothers and sisters and on occasion 
she and her siblings were locked out of the house.  At times, the children had 
nothing to eat and defendant had to ask a neighbor for food.  Through a common 
wall, the neighbor could hear defendant‟s mother beating her.  As a child, 
defendant was anxious and withdrawn.  A cousin who resided with the family for 
two years recalled that defendant‟s mother seldom was present, and the cousin saw 
defendant‟s father only twice.  When defendant‟s mother was home, she beat 
defendant and sometimes beat the other children.   
At the time she committed the crimes, defendant was residing with her 
partner, Jackie, and Jackie‟s three children in an apartment in East Palo Alto.  
Defendant had been working as a janitor but became unemployed in the latter half 
of 1991.  At that time, according to her former employer, her behavior changed — 
she was less cheerful, began to gain weight, stayed home, and no longer engaged 
in activities in the neighborhood.  Defendant attempted to support Jackie and her 
9 
children and often took care of the children.  Jackie made frequent financial and 
emotional demands on defendant.   
A psychiatrist, Dr. George Woods, testified that defendant was genetically 
predisposed to depression and had “environmental difficulties,” and that both 
conditions contributed to her mental state at the time of the charged offenses.  
Defendant reported to Dr. Woods that between the ages of seven and 14 years, she 
regularly had been sexually abused by her father. When she was 14 years of age, 
she became pregnant with her father‟s child and had an abortion.  Defendant and 
her younger siblings suffered from parental abuse and neglect, and she took care 
of them.  In Dr. Woods‟ opinion, defendant at the time she committed the crimes 
suffered from profound depression.  She experienced increasing economic 
pressures and was unable to provide adequately for her family.  She felt worthless 
and hopeless, and had become withdrawn and isolated.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Search of Defendant’s Apartment  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress 
the evidence seized during three separate searches of her home and to suppress her 
confessions, which were obtained by exploiting officers‟ observations of items 
that had been viewed during the first assertedly unlawful search. 
Defendant‟s apartment initially was searched pursuant to a warrant obtained 
by the Los Altos Police Department, which was investigating two commercial 
burglaries unrelated to the present case.  In executing the search warrant, the Los 
Altos officers were accompanied by officers from the Palo Alto Police 
Department, who were investigating the homicide of Gleason.  While inside 
defendant‟s apartment, the Palo Alto officers observed (but did not seize) items in 
plain view that connected defendant to the Gleason offense.  The initial search was 
10 
suspended and, based upon their observations, the Palo Alto police obtained a 
second warrant to search the apartment for evidence connecting defendant to the 
homicide of Gleason.  During this second search, the police seized evidence 
connecting defendant to that killing.  In addition, during the interrogation of 
defendant, officers confronted her with some of the evidence related to the 
Gleason homicide observed in her apartment during the initial search.  Eventually, 
defendant confessed to killing Gleason and Esparza and to shooting Marks.  Based 
upon defendant‟s confession, the Redwood City police then obtained a warrant to 
search for evidence pertaining to the homicide of Esparza and the shooting of 
Marks.  During the third search, the Redwood City police seized additional 
evidence.   
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 
1538.5 to suppress evidence seized during the searches of her home, including 
items that belonged to the homicide victims, the gun used in all three shootings, 
and other incriminating physical evidence. Defendant also sought to suppress her 
confessions, on the ground that they were fruits of the assertedly illegal initial 
entry and search.  
The trial court denied defendant‟s motion, finding that the initial search 
warrant obtained by the Los Altos Police Department was supported by probable 
cause and that, even if it were not, the officers had proceeded in good faith.  The 
trial court further determined that the first search was part of a legitimate 
investigation and not merely a pretext to look for evidence of other crimes.  The 
court determined that the Palo Alto officers who accompanied the Los Altos 
officers were present because of their interest in the Gleason homicide, but they 
properly limited their activities to observing items in plain view.  Consequently, 
the trial court found, no illegality tainted the second and third searches or 
defendant‟s confessions.  Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the court‟s ruling 
11 
by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal and unsuccessfully 
renewed her motion to suppress the evidence at trial.  Evidence seized from 
defendant‟s home was admitted at the trial, as were her confessions. 
1.  Probable cause for issuance of the warrant 
Defendant contends the affidavit supporting the initial Los Altos Police 
Department search warrant was insufficient for two reasons:  (1) it did not 
establish a sufficient likelihood that contraband or evidence of the subject crimes 
would be found at defendant‟s home; and (2) the information in the affidavit was 
too stale to establish probable cause.  These arguments lack merit. 
In reviewing a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, an appellate court 
inquires “whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a fair 
probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing.”  (People v. Kraft 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040, citing Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238-
239.)  “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him [or her], including the „veracity‟ and „basis of knowledge‟ of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  (Illinois v. Gates, 
supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238.)  The magistrate‟s determination of probable cause is 
entitled to deferential review.  (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1041, citing 
Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 236.) 
Probable cause sufficient for issuance of a warrant requires a showing that 
makes it “ „substantially probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to 
seizure presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is sought.‟ ”  
(People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 744, quoting People v. Cook (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 67, 84, fn. 6.)  That showing must appear in the affidavit offered in support 
12 
of the warrant.  (People v. Frank, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 644.)  Defendant urges 
that the affidavit was deficient in failing to provide the necessary connection 
between each of the two crimes under investigation and the likelihood of finding 
evidence in defendant‟s home.  
The affidavit in support of the warrant obtained by the Los Altos Police 
Department stated the following.  Defendant previously had worked as a janitor at 
Blackard Designs, located at 289 South San Antonio Road, Los Altos, in Santa 
Clara County.  In December of 1991, defendant was fired from her job for stealing 
checks from offices in which she performed janitorial services.  On the night of 
January 7, 1992, Blackard Designs was burglarized and a single blank check was 
stolen.  On January 7 or 8, 1992, a nearby business, NDN Enterprises, located at 
283 South San Antonio Road, was burglarized and two blank checks were stolen.  
Entry into NDN Enterprises was accomplished by removal of the hinge pins on the 
exterior door.  On January 10, 1992, Christopher Mladineo attempted to cash the 
Blackard Designs check, which had been made out to him in the amount of 
$2,000.  On March 16, 1992, Mladineo was arrested and told authorities that 
defendant had given him the check and asked him to cash it for her because she 
lacked proper identification.  On March 16, 1992, officers had Mladineo make a 
pretextual telephone call to defendant, during which defendant admitted she had 
stolen the Blackard Designs check.2  On March 19, 1992, an officer spoke with 
                                              
2 
Defendant notes that the affidavit also states — incorrectly — that, during 
the telephone call with Mladineo, defendant admitted she still had a key to the 
building at 289 South San Antonio Road.  During the telephone call, she admitted 
stealing the check, but did not say she had a key or that she had burglarized the 
building.  She stated that she had performed janitorial work there, that the checks 
were “always accessible to me” and that she “just helped myself to [one.]” 
Defendant does not, however take the position that the inclusion of false 
information rendered the warrant invalid.  The transcript of the telephone call, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
13 
defendant‟s former employer who reported that, as part of her employment, 
defendant had a master key to 289 South San Antonio Road, and it was possible 
she had duplicated that key.  As of March 20, 1992, the checks stolen from NDN 
Enterprises still were outstanding and no attempt had been made to cash them.   
The affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to support the belief that 
defendant had burglarized Blackard Designs and NDN Enterprises and that 
evidence from those crimes — including a key to Blackard Designs and the checks 
stolen from NDN Enterprises — could be found at defendant‟s residence.  The 
affidavit explicitly sets forth strong and specific evidence linking defendant to the 
Blackard Designs burglary.  Based upon all the facts stated in the affidavit, a 
magistrate making a practical, commonsense decision, in light of all the facts set 
forth in the affidavit, could conclude with a fair probability that the person who 
burglarized Blackard Designs was the same person who burglarized NDN 
Enterprises:  the two businesses were located in close proximity to each other, 
both businesses were burglarized on or about the same date, and in both burglaries 
blank checks were stolen.  
The facts stated in the affidavit established a fair probability that the police 
would find evidence from the burglaries in defendant‟s residence.  This court 
noted in People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1206, that “ „[a] number of 
California cases have recognized that from the nature of the crimes and the items 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
containing the correct information, was referenced in and attached to the warrant 
application.  Consequently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the warrant, we shall 
disregard the assertion that defendant admitted she had a key to Blackard Designs.  
(See Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 155-156;  People v. Bradford 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297.) 
  
14 
sought, a magistrate can reasonably conclude that a suspect‟s residence is a logical 
place to look for specific incriminating items.  [Citations.]‟ (People v. Miller 
(1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 194, 204; see also People v. Superior Court (Brown) (1975) 
49 Cal.App.3d 160, 167-168.).”  When property has been stolen by a defendant 
and has not yet been recovered, a fair probability exists that the property will be 
found at the defendant‟s home.  (See People v. Stout (1967) 66 Cal.2d 184, 192-
193; United States v. Maestas (5th Cir. 1977) 546 F.2d 1177, 1180.)  Here, 
defendant at one time possessed a key to the Blackard Designs building.  
According to defendant‟s employer, defendant had the opportunity to make a copy 
of that key.  Additionally, the two checks stolen from NDN Enterprises still were 
outstanding at the time of the search.  As the affiant observed based upon his 
training and experience, “subjects who steal checks with the intent to commit 
forgeries will maintain possession of those stolen checks until they can be 
cashed.”  It was reasonable to conclude that defendant‟s residence was the most 
likely place to find these items.  
Defendant contends there was no substantial evidence indicating that she 
possessed a key to Blackard Designs at the time the warrant was obtained.  To the 
contrary, the affidavit contained circumstantial evidence indicating that such a key 
was in her possession:  at one time defendant possessed a master key to Blackard 
Designs and had the opportunity to duplicate it before her employment there was 
terminated.  The check was stolen during the month after defendant‟s termination; 
she had been in possession of the check and had attempted to have it cashed, and 
there was no indication of forced entry in the burglary of Blackard Designs.  A key 
is the type of item one reasonably could expect a defendant to keep at home.  The 
showing required in order to establish probable cause is less than a preponderance 
of the evidence or even a prima facie case.  (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 
p. 235.)  The facts stated in the affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause 
15 
that defendant duplicated the master key to 289 South San Antonio Road, used it 
to gain access to the building following her termination, and continued to keep it 
in her home.   
In the alternative, defendant contends that the information contained in the 
affidavit was too stale to provide probable cause for issuance of the search 
warrant, which occurred two months after the alleged burglaries.   No bright-line 
rule defines the point at which information is considered stale.  (People v. Brown 
(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1169.)  Rather, “the question of staleness depends 
on the facts of each case.”  (People v. Gibson (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 380.)  
“If circumstances would justify a person of ordinary prudence to conclude that an 
activity had continued to the present time, then the passage of time will not render 
the information stale.”  (People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1652.)    
Courts have upheld warrants despite delays between evidence of criminal 
activity and the issuance of a warrant, when there is reason to believe that criminal 
activity is ongoing or that evidence of criminality remains on the premises.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Superior Court (Bingham) (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 463 [affidavit of a 
fire marshal indicated that three items of property allegedly destroyed in a fire had 
been in the defendant‟s continuous control for many months after the fire, and 
there was no reason to conclude that the defendant had disposed of such property 
during the few days between execution of the affidavit and the last day on which 
the property had been seen in his possession]; People v. Superior Court (Brown), 
(1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 160, 167 [affidavit established probable cause to believe 
stolen items were in the defendant‟s residence one month after a burglary, where 
stolen items included credit cards and small antiques, “items which would require 
protection from the elements and fortuitous harm”]; United States v. Jacobs (9th 
Cir. 1983) 715 F.2d 1343 [affidavit was sufficient to support issuance of a search 
warrant for articles of clothing worn during a bank robbery, even though nearly 
16 
four months had passed between the earliest bank robbery in which the clothing 
had been worn and the issuance of the warrant].)  In the present case, the checks 
from NDN Enterprises still were outstanding two months after the burglary.  In 
view of the nature of the items sought — the outstanding checks still could be 
forged and cashed, and a key to Blackard Designs still could be useful to 
defendant — there existed a fair probability that these stolen items remained at 
defendant‟s residence despite the passage of time. 
2. Execution of the search warrant 
Defendant maintains that even if the search warrant obtained by the Los 
Altos police was valid, the initial search of her home was conducted in an 
unlawful manner because the Los Altos Police Department delegated execution of 
the warrant to members of the Palo Alto Police Department, who used the warrant 
merely as a pretext to gain access to her apartment in order to search for evidence 
pertaining to the homicides.  Defendant contends that the two subsequent searches 
as well as her confessions were tainted by the illegality of the first search.   
On March 20, 1992, detectives from the Palo Alto Police Department held 
an interagency meeting with law enforcement personnel from several jurisdictions, 
including Los Altos, Redwood City, and San Carlos.  The purpose of the meeting 
was to coordinate the investigations of several crimes the authorities believed 
defendant had committed.  Later that same day, Palo Alto officers accompanied 
the Los Altos officers when the latter officers executed the Los Altos warrant at 
defendant‟s residence.   
The warrant authorized the officers to search for keys, checks in the name 
of NDN Enterprises, and evidence of occupancy and control of the apartment.  Los 
Altos Police Detective Maculay and Palo Alto Police Sergeant Zook testified that 
the officers entered defendant‟s residence for the purpose of serving the Los Altos 
17 
warrant.  Sergeant Zook and Palo Alto Police Detective Hennessy accompanied 
the Los Altos officers on their search in order to ensure that the latter officers 
would not overlook, damage, or interfere with any evidence related to the Gleason 
homicide.  At Sergeant Zook‟s request, the officers conducted a plain view search 
of the residence.  During the search, Sergeant Zook and Detective Hennessy 
observed in plain view items of evidence related to the Gleason homicide.  Upon 
making these observations, Sergeant Zook requested that the Los Altos officers 
suspend their search so that the Palo Alto police could seek their own search 
warrant.  No items of evidence were seized from defendant‟s apartment at that 
time.   
In the meantime, Palo Alto and Redwood City police officers questioned 
defendant concerning the Gleason homicide.  Among other things, the officers 
confronted her with their observations in her apartment of the items of evidence 
related to the Gleason homicide.  Defendant eventually confessed to killing 
Gleason.  Hours later, she confessed to killing Esparza and to shooting Marks.   
At approximately 1:38 a.m. on March 21, 1992, Palo Alto police officers 
obtained a warrant authorizing them to search defendant‟s residence for evidence 
related to the Gleason homicide.  The affidavit supporting issuance of that warrant 
included the information that a pager belonging to Gleason and a key to the 
building in which she was killed had been observed during the earlier search.  
While conducting the second search, Palo Alto police officers seized the pager, the 
key, Gleason‟s purse, a metal petty cash box missing from Gleason‟s office, a 
hand gun, and four spent bullet casings.  Between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. on the 
same day, Los Altos police officers completed their search of defendant‟s 
residence pursuant to the warrant they had obtained, but did not seize any 
property.   
18 
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on that same day, Redwood City police officers 
executed their own warrant authorizing them to search defendant‟s residence for 
evidence related to the homicide of Esparza and the non-fatal shooting of Marks.  
The affidavit submitted in support of the issuance of that warrant did not contain 
any reference to the earlier searches conducted by the Los Altos or Palo Alto 
Police Departments, but did refer to defendant‟s confession.  Redwood City police 
officers seized several items of evidence related to the shooting of Marks, 
including keys and medical supplies.   
In ruling on a motion to suppress the fruits of an allegedly unlawful search, 
the trial court “sits as finder of fact with the power to judge credibility, resolve 
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences.”  (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 
Cal.3d 711, 718.)  When reviewing a trial court‟s denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant, “[w]e defer to the trial court‟s factual 
findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.  In 
determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.  
[Citations.]”  (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362; People v. Weaver 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924.)   
The federal Constitution controls in deciding issues pertaining to the 
exclusion of evidence under the Fourth Amendment.  (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 
Cal.3d 873, 890, 896.)  “The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment expressly 
provides that no warrant may issue except those „particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. 
Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1291.)   
Officers executing a warrant may seize items of evidence or contraband not 
listed in the warrant but observed in plain view.  “The plain-view doctrine permits, 
in the course of a search authorized by a search warrant, the seizure of an item not 
19 
listed in the warrant, if the police lawfully are in a position from which they view 
the item, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers 
have a lawful right of access to the object.”  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1293-1294.)  Thus, “[w]here an officer has a valid warrant to search for one 
item but merely a suspicion, not amounting to probable cause, concerning a 
second item, that second item is not immunized from seizure if found during a 
lawful search for the first item.”  (Id. at p. 1294.) 
In the present case, officers from the Los Altos and Palo Alto Police 
Departments lawfully entered defendant‟s residence to execute the warrant 
obtained by the Los Altos Police Department officers.  In the course of surveying 
the objects in plain view in the common areas of the apartment, the officers 
observed two items of evidence relating to the Gleason homicide:  a key clearly 
labeled with the address of the office building in which Gleason was killed, and a 
black pager with a sticker bearing the victim‟s pager number.  Without seizing any 
items of evidence, the officers suspended the search and sought a second warrant.  
Therefore, in their application for the second search warrant, the officers properly 
could recite what they had observed in plain view. 
The search initiated by the Los Altos police officers was not rendered 
invalid by the circumstance that Palo Alto officers accompanied them in 
anticipation of locating evidence related to the Gleason homicide.  Officers from 
another jurisdiction may accompany officers conducting a search pursuant to a 
warrant without tainting the evidence (pertaining to crimes that are the subject of 
their own investigation) uncovered in the process, even when the officers lack 
probable cause to support issuance of their own search warrant.  (United States v. 
Van Dreel (7th Cir. 1998) 155 F.3d 902, 903-905 [drug task force officers 
properly accompanied state officers on a search for evidence of hunting-law 
violations (conducted pursuant to a warrant)]; United States v. Ewain (9th Cir. 
20 
1996) 88 F.3d 689, 693 [postal inspector properly accompanied officers on a 
search conducted pursuant to a warrant]; United States v. Bonds (6th Cir. 1993) 12 
F.3d 540, 571 [federal agent accompanied state agents acting under a warrant].)  
Additionally, the discovery of evidence unrelated to the evidence sought in a 
warrant need not be inadvertent.  “If a police officer has a valid warrant for one 
item, and „fully expects‟ to find another, based upon a „suspicion . . . whether or 
not it amounts to probable cause,‟ the suspicion or expectation does not defeat the 
lawfulness of the seizure.”  (United States v. Ewain, supra, 88 F.3d at p. 693; 
quoting Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 138-139; accord, People v. 
Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1294 [discovery of evidence of a crime in plain 
view need not be inadvertent].)   
Defendant acknowledges these principles, but maintains the search violated 
her Fourth Amendment rights because the Los Altos police officers obtained a 
warrant to search for items relating to two burglaries when they actually intended 
to permit officers from another jurisdiction to conduct a general search for 
evidence of other crimes.  The trial court found that the Los Altos officers were, at 
the time, conducting a legitimate investigation into the two commercial burglaries 
committed within their jurisdiction and that they did not seek the warrant related 
to those burglaries merely as a pretext to facilitate a general search for evidence 
related to the homicides.  
We uphold a trial court‟s credibility determinations and factual findings on 
appeal if supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 
117, 123.)  Detective Ronald Barfield of the Los Altos Police Department, who 
testified at the hearing, described his investigation into the two burglaries, which 
included arranging the telephone call between Mladineo and defendant intended to 
obtain an admission of her involvement in one of the burglaries.  The telephone 
call took place on March 16, 1992, and the officers obtained the warrant on the 
21 
morning of March 20, 1992.  Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s 
findings that the Los Altos officers were conducting a legitimate investigation into 
the two commercial burglaries committed in their jurisdiction. 
Even assuming the officers who conducted the initial search hoped to find 
evidence of other offenses, their subjective state of mind would not render their 
conduct unlawful.  Courts must examine the lawfulness of a search under a 
standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or 
motivation of the officers involved.  (Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 
128, 137-138.)  The existence of an ulterior motivation does not invalidate an 
officer‟s legal justification to conduct a search.  (Whren v. United States (1996) 
517 U.S. 806; 813; People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 678-680.)  “That 
the . . . officer may have hoped to find evidence [not listed in the warrant] is 
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis under Whren, because once probable 
cause exists, and a valid warrant has been issued, the officer‟s subjective intent in 
conducting the search is irrelevant.”  (United States v. Van Dreel, supra, 155 F.3d 
at p. 905.)  The court simply asks “whether the police confined their search to 
what was permitted by the search warrant.”  (United States v. Ewain, supra, 88 
F.3d at p. 694.)  In the present case, the police did not exceed the scope of the 
search authorized by the warrant, and they observed Gleason‟s property in plain 
view in defendant‟s home.  These observations were lawful because the presence 
of the officers at the location where the observations were made was lawful, 
regardless of the officers‟ motivations. 
B.  Admissibility of Defendant’s Confessions   
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress 
her confessions to the murders of Caroline Gleason and Victor Esparza on the 
ground that her statements were involuntary.  At approximately 5:15 p.m. on 
22 
March 20, 1992, defendant was arrested at her home in San Mateo County and 
taken to the Redwood City Police Department.  Between approximately 7:55 p.m. 
and 3:50 a.m., defendant was separately interrogated by the Palo Alto, Redwood 
City, and San Carlos Police Departments.  During these three interviews, 
defendant confessed to the murder of Caroline Gleason, the burglary and 
attempted murder of Dr. Marks, and the murder of Victor Esparza.   
The trial court denied defendant‟s motion to exclude her statements to the 
police, concluding they were voluntarily made.  The trial court found that no 
implied promises were made to defendant and characterized the interviews as “a 
discussion about sleeping better, getting something off your chest or weight off 
your shoulders.”  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court 
did not err in denying defendant‟s motion to suppress her confessions.   
1.  The Murder of Caroline Gleason  
Defendant asserts that the police officers persuaded defendant that she 
would receive lenient treatment if she confessed to murdering Gleason.  An 
involuntary confession may not be introduced into evidence at trial.  (Lego v. 
Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 483.)  The prosecution has the burden of 
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant‟s confession was 
voluntarily made.  (Id. at p. 489; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659.)  
In determining whether a confession was voluntary, “ „[t]he question is whether 
defendant‟s choice to confess was not “essentially free” because his [or her] will 
was overborne.‟ ”  (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576.)  Whether the 
confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances.  
(Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 693-694; People v. Massie, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 576.)  “ „On appeal, the trial court‟s findings as to the circumstances 
surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the 
23 
trial court‟s finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to 
independent review.‟ ”  (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 114.) 
During the initial interview, Palo Alto Police Detective John Lindsay and 
Redwood City Police Sergeant Jon Sherman interrogated defendant for 
approximately two and one-half hours.  After Lindsay provided defendant with 
admonitions required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, defendant 
agreed to speak with the officers.  Lindsay began by informing defendant that she 
had been arrested pursuant to a warrant related to a Los Altos burglary, but that he 
also wanted to speak with her concerning her possible involvement in a homicide 
committed at 777 California Avenue in Palo Alto.  Later, Sergeant Sherman told 
defendant that if she cooperated during the interview, the officers “would try to 
explain this whole thing with, with Los Altos P.D. as [best] we can.”  He 
continued: “I have no control over that.  I‟m in Redwood City here.  Um, and, and 
I don‟t know what entailed um, in that case involving you in the burglary.  I wish I 
could so I could explain it to you more fully.  Uh, so that you know exactly where 
your [sic] stand is (unintelligible).  I would hope that you would try to push that 
away so that we could get through with what we‟re doing right now.  Can you do 
that for us?”  Defendant replied: “Yeah.  I guess so.”  Later during the interview, 
the officers strategically confronted defendant with items recovered from her 
residence such as the key to the building where Gleason‟s body was found, and 
Gleason‟s pager.  Sergeant Sherman also informed defendant that defendant‟s 
neighbor had called defendant on Gleason‟s pager number, and that a video 
surveillance camera revealed that she had been present at the 7-Eleven 
convenience store where the victim‟s ATM card was used.  Defendant denied 
involvement in the Gleason homicide.   
Detective Lindsay then told defendant that “what happened out there at 
777 California was probably an accident” and that there could be mitigating 
24 
circumstances:  “What if she scared you?  She confronted you.  Or maybe there 
was someone else with you.”  Lindsay continued:  “It‟s like a cancer. And what 
you‟ve gotta do is to go out and purge yourself of that.  You‟ve got to get that off 
your shoulders.  Not just for you but, for Jackie, for those three kids.  You‟ve got 
an incredible weight on your shoulders right now.  An incredible weight that 
you‟ve been carrying around for quite some time.  And it‟s time.”    Soon after, 
defendant confessed to the burglary of the premises at 777 California Avenue and 
to Gleason‟s murder.  
“ „Once a suspect has been properly advised of his [or her] rights, he [or 
she] may be questioned freely so long as the questioner does not threaten harm or 
falsely promise benefits.  Questioning may include exchanges of information, 
summaries of evidence, outline of theories of events, confrontation with 
contradictory facts, even debate between police and suspect. . . .  Yet in carrying 
out their interrogations the police must avoid threats of punishment for the 
suspect‟s failure to admit or confess particular facts and must avoid false promises 
of leniency as a reward for admission or confession. . . .‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115.) 
The foregoing statements by Sergeant Sherman demonstrate that 
defendant‟s confession to the murder of Gleason was not prompted by any express 
or implied promise of leniency.  First, the officer‟s statement that he would help 
defendant in explaining this “whole thing” to the Los Altos police did not 
constitute a promise of leniency when considered in the context both of 
defendant‟s prior questions as to why she was arrested and Sherman‟s subsequent 
disclaimer of any control over (or information concerning) the Los Altos burglary 
investigation.  In this context, Sergeant Sherman simply stated that he would 
attempt to obtain more information pertaining to the Los Altos burglary in order to 
assist defendant in determining her status with respect to that crime.   
25 
Second, we conclude that defendant‟s confession was not prompted by 
Sergeant Sherman‟s comments.  Defendant confessed approximately one hour 
after his comments were made.  During the interview, defendant was confronted 
with incriminating evidence that had been recovered at defendant‟s residence as 
well as other information linking her to the murder of Gleason, which apparently 
prompted her to confess to this crime.   
Defendant also contends that Detective Lindsay‟s assurances that the police 
merely were attempting to understand defendant‟s motivation in committing the 
crimes impermissibly coerced her to confess.  To the contrary, Detective 
Lindsay‟s suggestions that the Gleason homicide might have been an accident, a 
self-defensive reaction, or the product of fear, were not coercive; they merely 
suggested possible explanations of the events and offered defendant an 
opportunity to provide the details of the crime.  This tactic is permissible.  (People 
v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115.)  Moreover, any benefit to defendant that 
reasonably could be inferred from the substance of Detective Lindsay‟s remarks 
was “ „ “merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of 
conduct,” ‟ ” because  the particular circumstances of a homicide can reduce the 
degree of culpability, and thus minimize the gravity of the homicide or constitute 
mitigating factors in the ultimate decision as to the appropriate penalty.  (Ibid.) 
Defendant‟s confession to the Gleason homicide was not coerced by threats 
or false promises, but was given freely and voluntarily.   
2.  The Murder of Victor Esparza 
Defendant alleges that her confession to the murder of Victor Esparza 
should have been suppressed because it was not made freely and voluntarily, but 
instead was induced by (1) misleading statements concerning the extent of 
defendant‟s exposure to criminal liability, (2) improper promises of leniency, 
26 
(3) her unduly prolonged interrogation, and (4) improper appeals to her religious 
convictions.  Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, defendant‟s 
confession was the product of her free will.   
As an initial matter, defendant urges that deceptive comments made by the 
officers at the conclusion of the second interview relating to the nature of the 
charges and the potential punishment facing defendant coerced her into 
subsequently confessing to the murder of Esparza.  The second interview was 
conducted from 11:42 p.m. to 12:52 a.m. by Sergeant Sherman and Detective 
Steve Blanc of the Redwood City Police Department.  During this interview 
defendant promptly confessed to shooting Dr. Marks and to the burglary of the 
premises at 810 Brewster Avenue in Redwood City.  Defendant does not challenge 
the admissibility of this confession.  By the end of the interview, however, 
Sergeant Sherman shifted the questioning to the subject of the Esparza homicide, 
informing defendant that “a person was shot and killed . . . late at night” in San 
Carlos “[w]hen the building was unoccupied.”  Sherman urged defendant to 
confess to that crime and pointed out that “[a]t this point, to us you have nothing 
else to lose” and that her admission to this homicide “wouldn‟t make any 
difference.”    He continued: “I want you to pretty much purge yourself of all these 
bad things that you‟ve done, so at least you can start again.” 
Defendant claims that Sherman‟s statement that admitting she murdered 
Esparza “wouldn‟t make any difference” was deceptive, because a prosecutor 
more likely would seek — and a jury more likely would impose — a death 
sentence if a defendant admitted to committing two murders rather than a single 
murder.  The use of deceptive statements during an interrogation, however, does 
not invalidate a confession unless the deception is “ „ “of a type reasonably likely 
to procure an untrue statement.” ‟ ”  (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 299; 
People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167.)  Considered in this context, the 
27 
gist of Sergeant Sherman‟s comments was that, in view of the overwhelming 
evidence against defendant, her denial of participation in the Esparza homicide 
was unlikely to alter the outcome of the case against her.  Moreover, when law 
enforcement officers describe the moral or psychological advantages to the 
accused of telling the truth, no implication of leniency or favorable treatment at 
the hands of the authorities arises.  (People v. Nelson (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 238, 
251.)  Here, Sergeant Sherman focused on the benefit that defendant reasonably 
could expect from “purging [her]self” — namely, psychological and moral relief.   
Furthermore, we conclude that Sergeant Sherman‟s comments did not 
affect defendant‟s decision to confess to the murder of Esparza, because she 
maintained her innocence during the remainder of the second interview and, 
during the third interview, revealed that she already was aware that confessing to 
an additional murder would increase the severity of the punishment: “You know, 
yeah, I‟m quite sure that it might come down harder or what have you, especially 
this particular case here.”  The comments made by Sergeant Sherman during the 
second interview were not unduly coercive and did not amount to a promise 
affecting the reliability of the subsequent confession, and there is no indication 
that defendant relied upon those comments in deciding to confess. 
The third and final interview was conducted by Detective Steve Jackson of 
the San Carlos Police Department, Sergeant Sherman of the Redwood City Police 
Department, and Detective Lindsay of the Palo Alto Police Department.  The 
interview continued from 1:25 a.m. to 4:03 a.m., focusing upon the homicide of 
Esparza and the burglary committed at 1187 Industrial Avenue in San Carlos.  In 
initiating the interview, the officers confronted defendant with various similarities 
between the San Carlos homicide and the crimes to which she had confessed 
earlier.  The officers pointed out that the same gun was used in all three shootings, 
that defendant previously had worked as a janitor in the buildings in which the 
28 
killings occurred, and that the perpetrator had entered the building on Industrial 
Avenue through the same door defendant had used when she worked there as a 
janitor.  Defendant acknowledged that “everything points to me,” but refused to 
accept responsibility in the San Carlos case.  Detective Sherman then explained 
that he wanted to present a package to the district attorney in which he would be 
able to say “that in all cases that you have been charged with, all the cases you‟ve 
been involved with, that you helped and assisted the police in their investigation.”  
When asked whether she was not telling the truth because she sought to avoid a 
harsher penalty, defendant responded:  “Okay just depends on the judge and DA 
and how are they going to prosecute it.  You know, yeah, I‟m quite sure that it 
might come down harder or what have you, especially this particular case here. ”   
Sergeant Sherman then introduced the possibility that the crime had been 
an accident, and he urged without success that defendant confess.    Detective 
Jackson also suggested that perhaps defendant “bumped” into the victim, became 
frightened, and shot him as a result.  Detective Lindsay then intervened, telling 
defendant that she was “looking at special circumstances” and that refusing to 
discuss the San Carlos incident would work against her.  Defendant replied she 
was aware of that and would have to take her chances.  Lindsay proceeded:  “I 
think that you‟d be hard pressed to find a public defender or a defense attorney 
who could look at the similarity in style, the exact same gun, the exact same 
bullets, and not say Celeste, if I‟m going to represent you, I need to at least know 
if this really did happen, the one in San Carlos.”   
Lindsay then made the following statements, which ultimately prompted 
defendant‟s confession: “You shot that janitor in San Carlos, and we know you 
shot that janitor in San Carlos, and God Bless you, you can sit here and you can 
tell me that you didn‟t, there‟s someone up above, bigger than both of us looking 
down saying Celeste, you know that you shot that person in San Carlos and its 
29 
time to purge it all.  It is like a cancer that is eating away at you.  You felt good, I 
know you felt good when you told us what really happened in Palo Alto and what 
really happened in Redwood City, it was like a 50 [pound] weight off your 
shoulder.”  Lindsay continued: “Someone up above is looking at us, and I‟ll tell 
you what.  If that big guy up there or gal is looking at us and he said hey Lindsay, 
you better not be selling her a lot of Bullshit, cause you won‟t sleep well tonight.  
That‟s what the big guy is going to say to me.  He‟s telling me be honest with her, 
be straight up with her.  Look her in the eyes and be straight up because if you are 
not, then whoever that big person is up in the sky is looking at you going, how can 
you look at these two guys, and how can you tell them that that didn‟t happen in 
San Carlos.  You can‟t do it.”  A few moments later, defendant confessed to the 
murder of Victor Esparza and later explained that it had been difficult for her to 
confess, because the victim did not “stumble upon” her as Detective Jackson 
suggested, but rather defendant “just turned and shot him.”   
Defendant contends that during this interview the police improperly 
attempted to convince her that she would receive more lenient treatment if she 
confessed.   Defendant contends that promises of leniency were made initially, 
when Detective Sherman suggested it would be beneficial to defendant if the 
officers could deliver to the district attorney an “entire package” encompassing all 
the crimes and inform the prosecution that defendant fully cooperated with the 
police.  Defendant contends additional promises of leniency were made when the 
officers suggested that they merely were interested in understanding defendant‟s 
motivations in committing the crimes and that the Esparza homicide may have 
been an accident because she may have “snapped” or been frightened.   
The statements made by the officers did not imply that by cooperating and 
relating what actually happened, defendant might not be charged with, prosecuted 
for, or convicted of the murder of Esparza.  The interviewing officers did not 
30 
suggest they could influence the decisions of the district attorney, but simply 
informed defendant that full cooperation might be beneficial in an unspecified 
way.  Indeed, defendant understood that punishment decisions were not within the 
control of the police officers.  As noted above, she said it “just depends on the 
judge and DA and how are they going to prosecute it.”  Under these 
circumstances, Detective Sherman‟s statement that he would inform the district 
attorney that defendant fully cooperated with the police investigation did not 
constitute a promise of leniency and should not be viewed as a motivating factor in 
defendant‟s decision to confess.  (See People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 
p. 298.) 
We reject the contention that Detective Lindsay‟s comments relating to the 
prospect of special circumstances, and his suggestion that defendant‟s denial of 
responsibility for the Esparza homicide would worsen her position, represented an 
implied promise of leniency.  The possibility that special circumstances would be 
alleged was realistic, because defendant already had confessed to committing a 
murder during the commission of a burglary.  No constitutional principle forbids 
the suggestion by authorities that it is worse for a defendant to lie in light of 
overwhelming incriminating evidence.  “ „[M]ere advice or exhortation by the 
police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied 
by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession 
involuntary.‟ ”  (People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 398; People v. Higareda 
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1409.)  Here, the officers  did not make statements 
that were coercive; they did not threaten defendant and did not specify how her 
continued denial of criminal involvement could jeopardize her case.   
Defendant‟s contention that the police officers engaged in improper 
conjecture concerning the accidental nature of the killing also must be rejected.  
As noted in our review of the claims related to defendant‟s confession to the 
31 
murder of Gleason, the police properly may confront, and even debate with, a 
suspect regarding theories based on the circumstances of the crimes and even 
debate with the suspect the merits of those theories.  (People v. Holloway, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115.)   
Defendant‟s contention that Detective Lindsay improperly associated the 
function of the police with that of defense counsel, by telling defendant that the 
officers merely were attempting to obtain the same information that defense 
counsel would need, is not supported by the record.  In essence, Detective Lindsay 
remarked that eventually defendant would have to tell her lawyer the truth.  He did 
not suggest that defendant‟s lawyer and the district attorney would share 
information or use her testimony for the same purpose. 
Defendant further contends that the period over which the series of 
interrogations was conducted was so lengthy that her will was overborne.  A 
police interrogation that is prolonged may be coercive under some circumstances.  
(See Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398-399 [the defendant‟s statements 
to the police were not the product of a free and rational choice under the 
circumstances, where he was questioned for more than three hours, had been 
seriously wounded several hours earlier, was confused and unable to think clearly, 
and stated repeatedly that he did not wish to speak without having a lawyer 
present; Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 320-324 (confession made by 
young, emotionally unstable man after eight-hour interrogation, continued despite 
his requests to speak to his attorney and his repeated refusals to answer questions, 
was involuntary].) 
In the present case, although the questioning continued over the course of 
eight hours, it does not appear that defendant‟s will to resist was overborne.  The 
questioning was not aggressive or accusatory.  Instead, the interviewing officers 
chose to build rapport with defendant and gain her trust in order to persuade her to 
32 
tell the truth.  There is no indication that defendant was induced by fear to make a 
statement.  She appeared lucid and aware throughout the entire interrogation 
session and never asked the police officers to terminate the interview.  Defendant 
spoke with confidence, and her answers were coherent.  Moreover, the police 
repeatedly offered defendant food and beverages, provided her with four separate 
breaks, and allowed her to meet privately with her partner, Jackie.  We conclude 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the length of the interrogation did not 
render defendant‟s confessions involuntary. 
Finally, defendant asserts that her confession to the murder of  Victor 
Esparza was obtained through improper appeals to religious belief, because during 
the interrogation Detective Lindsay stated “there‟s someone up above, bigger than 
both of us looking down saying Celeste, you know that you shot that person in San 
Carlos and it‟s time to purge it all.”  “[T]he tactic of exploiting a suspect‟s 
religious anxieties has been justly condemned.”  (People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
931, 953; see People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 989 [confession 
suppressed when the interrogating officer, who attended the same church as the 
defendant, made repeated references to the defendant‟s sin, guilt, apostasy, and 
“ „reprobate mind‟ ”].)  When police comments are not “calculated to exploit a 
particular psychological vulnerability of [the] defendant,” however, and “no acute 
religious anxiety or sense of guilt was apparent from prior questioning,” appeals to 
religion are unlikely to be a motivating cause of a defendant‟s subsequent 
confession.  (People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 953.) 
Here, Detective Lindsay‟s remarks were not calculated to exploit anxieties 
or vulnerabilities that might have arisen had defendant held strong religious 
beliefs.  Religion was not discussed in prior questioning, and defendant stated no 
particular religious affiliation.  Moreover, although the interrogation was lengthy, 
defendant exhibited no sign of being in a particularly fragile mental state that 
33 
would render her vulnerable to manipulation by reference to religion.  The 
substance of Detective Lindsay‟s comments sought to evoke defendant‟s better 
nature by persuading her that “purg[ing] it all” was morally the right thing to do 
and would provide her with psychological relief.  Lindsay was effective in 
awakening defendant‟s sense of guilt; prior to confessing, she asked whether the 
detective was a counselor before joining the police force and apologized for not 
telling the truth earlier.  After confessing, defendant volunteered that she had 
maintained her silence because the murder of Esparza was not an accident, as the 
police officers suggested, but an intentional act.  “The compulsion to confess 
wrong has deep psychological roots, and while confession may bring legal 
disabilities it also brings great psychological relief.”  (People v. Andersen (1980) 
101 Cal.App.3d 563, 583-584, fn. omitted.)  Detective Lindsay did not coerce 
defendant into confessing through an impermissible appeal to her religious beliefs.  
Because the record does not reflect coercive tactics, the trial court did not err in 
denying defendant‟s motion to suppress that evidence. 
C.  Grand Jury Venire   
Defendant contends that the indictment must be quashed and her 
convictions reversed because she was indicted by a grand jury from which persons 
70 years of age and older were excluded systematically.  She contends the 
exclusion of such persons violated her right to a grand jury drawn from a 
representative cross-section of the community under the Sixth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.  She 
also contends the San Mateo County Jury Commissioner‟s Office failed to follow 
state law in selecting the grand jury and thus violated her right to due process of 
law under the federal Constitution.  (Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 
346.) 
34 
There is no exemption from jury service for elderly persons.  A prospective 
juror may be excused from such service based upon undue hardship resulting 
from, among other causes, “a physical or mental disability or impairment, not 
affecting that person‟s competence to act as a juror, that would expose the 
potential juror to undue risk of mental or physical harm.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 2.1008(d)(5).)  A court, however, may not require a person 70 years of age or 
older claiming such disability to furnish verification of his or her condition.  
(Ibid.)   
At a hearing held in the trial court, however, it was established that two of 
the deputy clerks in the San Mateo Superior Court consistently granted 
exemptions from jury service to all persons 70 years of age and older, whether or 
not they requested exemption.  Other deputies did the same on occasion or 
exercised greater leniency in granting exemptions to those 70 years of age or older 
as compared with other persons.  In a random sample taken of the jurors 
summoned during a six-week period in May and June of 1993, persons 70 years of 
age or older represented only 1.13 percent of the venire, although in the 1990 
census, persons over the age of 70 years represented 10.42 percent of the 
population.  At the hearing, defendant‟s experts testified that persons who were in 
this older age group at the time of defendant‟s trial shared distinctive outlooks and 
attitudes based not only upon their chronological age but also upon their common 
experience of having lived through World War II and the Great Depression. 
A violation of the requirement that a jury be drawn from a fair cross-section 
of the population is established by showing “(1) that the group alleged to be 
excluded is a „distinctive‟ group in the community; (2) that the representation of 
this group in the venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable 
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this 
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the selection 
35 
process.”  (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364.)  As defendant concedes. 
neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, 
applicable to a petit jury, also applies to a state grand jury convened for the 
purpose of considering issuance of an indictment.  (But see Peters v. Kiff (1972) 
407 U.S. 493, 503-504 [if a state chooses to use a grand jury, due process imposes 
limitations on the composition of that jury and prohibits systematic exclusion 
based upon race].)  In addition, defendant has failed to cite any California case 
holding that a category composed of older persons is a distinctive group for 
purposes of fair-cross-section analysis or that members of a particular age 
category constitute a distinctive group because they experienced certain historical 
events in common.3  We need not resolve these issues, however, because, even 
assuming the grand jury that indicted defendant was selected in violation of state 
law or constitutional fair-cross-section requirements, that circumstance would not 
require reversal of her conviction.  (See People v. Corona (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 
529 (Corona).)   
Generally, a conviction will not be reversed because of errors or 
irregularities that occurred at a preliminary hearing or grand jury proceeding, 
absent a showing that the asserted errors “deprived [the defendant] of a fair trial or 
otherwise resulted in actual prejudice relating to [the] conviction.”  (People v. 
Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 123 [purported irregularities in grand jury 
                                              
3  
In a case involving a challenge to San Mateo County jury selection 
practices based upon the same hearing underlying defendant‟s claim in the present 
case, the court in People v. McCoy (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 778, 783-786, upheld 
the trial court‟s determination that the defendant had not established that persons 
70 years of age and older were a distinctive group. 
 
36 
proceedings, including the admission of hearsay and improper comments by the 
prosecutor, did not require reversal]; see People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 
461-463 [asserted misconduct of the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing did not 
require reversal of conviction absent a showing that the trial was unfair]; People v. 
Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 522 [violation of a defendant‟s right to a 
public preliminary hearing did not compel reversal of his conviction absent a 
showing that the violation “in some way prejudiced defendant at his subsequent 
trial”]; Corona, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 535 [claim that the defendant‟s right 
to a grand jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community had been 
violated did not require reversal absent prejudice at trial]; see also Coleman v. 
Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 11 [denial of the defendant‟s right to counsel at the 
preliminary hearing was subject to harmless error review].)   
The United States Supreme Court, in creating an exception to the foregoing 
general rule, has held that purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of 
grand jurors, in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, 
requires reversal of the ensuing conviction without a showing of prejudice.  
(Vasquez v. Hillary (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 260-264; Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 
U.S. 545; 556; Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) 100 U.S. 303, 308.)  The high 
court has included among the rare forms of constitutional errors held not to be 
subject to harmless error analysis the “unlawful exclusion of members of the 
defendant‟s race from a grand jury.”  (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 
310.)  That court, however, has not extended the requirement of automatic reversal 
to other defects in the grand jury process.  (See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik 
(1986) 475 U.S. 66, 71-72 [violation of the rule prohibiting a grand jury witness 
from being present during other portions of the grand jury proceedings does not 
require automatic reversal]; Hobby v. United States (1984) 468 U.S. 339, 344-350 
37 
[discrimination in selection of federal grand jury foreman does not require 
automatic reversal of defendant‟s conviction].)   
The rationale for reversing a conviction without consideration of prejudice 
in instances of racial discrimination is that “intentional discrimination in the 
selection of grand jurors is a grave constitutional trespass, possible only under 
color of state authority, and wholly within the power of the State to prevent.  Thus, 
the remedy we have embraced for over a century — the only effective remedy for 
this violation — is not disproportionate to the evil it seeks to deter.”  (Vasquez v. 
Hillary, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 262.)  In contrast to the deliberate racial 
discrimination addressed in Vasquez v. Hillary, supra, 474 U.S. at page 262, the 
unwarranted exemption of some persons over the age of 70 years as a result of 
errors committed by court clerks is not the type of “evil” that requires or justifies 
the extreme remedy of automatic reversal of  a criminal conviction obtained as the 
result of a fair trial.  Indeed, in the present case the superior court‟s practices 
regarding excusal of jurors over 70 years of age were discontinued shortly before 
the hearing.4   
Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeal‟s decision in Corona that 
an asserted violation of the right to a grand jury drawn from a fair cross-section of 
the community does not require reversal of a conviction obtained after a fair trial, 
                                              
4  
Contrary to defendant‟s contention, our conclusion does not leave 
defendants without any remedy for improper or unconstitutional practices in the 
selection of grand juries.  They may pursue pretrial remedies, as defendant did in 
the present case.  She challenged the trial court‟s ruling in the state Court of 
Appeal, which denied her petition for writ of prohibition and mandate.  We denied 
review of that appellate ruling.  Defendant raised the same issue in a pretrial 
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the federal district court, which she 
subsequently withdrew.   
 
38 
absent a showing of prejudice.  (Corona, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 535.)  
Defendant does not attempt to demonstrate that the purported constitutional error 
in selecting the grand jury in her case was prejudicial, and no prejudice is apparent 
from the record.   
D.  Jurisdiction of Grand Jury   
Defendant contends that the grand jury lacked jurisdiction to indict her 
because, at the time it returned the indictment, proceedings on a previously filed 
complaint on the same charges had been stayed.  We disagree. 
The prosecution originally filed, in the municipal court in San Mateo 
County, a complaint against defendant alleging 10 counts, including the two 
murders and the attempted murder of which she was convicted in the present case.  
Defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts and filed a demurrer alleging San Mateo 
County was not the proper venue for trial of the offenses committed at the 
workplace of Caroline Gleason, located in Santa Clara County.  After the 
municipal court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, the prosecution filed 
an amended complaint alleging that acts preparatory to the commission of the 
Santa Clara County crimes occurred in San Mateo County.  (§ 781.)  Defendant 
again filed a demurrer challenging venue.  The municipal court overruled this 
demurrer and proceeded to set a preliminary hearing date.  Defendant then filed a 
petition for writ of prohibition in the superior court challenging venue for the 
offenses committed in Santa Clara County, and Presiding Judge Shelton issued an 
order to show cause and a stay of all proceedings in the municipal court.   
While the writ proceeding was still pending, the prosecutor initiated a grand 
jury proceeding, and that body subsequently returned an indictment against 
defendant that included the counts previously charged in the complaint as well as 
additional counts of burglary.  Similarly to the amended complaint, the indictment 
39 
alleged that “preparatory acts” to the Santa Clara County offenses occurred in San 
Mateo County, and that property taken during the commission of those offenses 
was brought to San Mateo County.  Over defendant‟s objection, the superior court 
vacated the stay of the municipal court proceedings.  The municipal court 
dismissed the amended complaint, and defendant was arraigned on the indictment.  
Defendant filed a demurrer to the indictment, challenging venue with regard to the 
offenses committed in Santa Clara County.  Defendant also moved to dismiss the 
indictment on the ground that the grand jury lacked authority to return an 
indictment because proceedings on the complaint were pending and had been 
stayed.  The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion to dismiss 
the indictment.     
Defendant contends the grand jury, as an “arm of the superior court,” 
lacked authority to act as long as the stay was in effect.  To the contrary, neither 
the pendency of the complaint nor the stay of proceedings on that complaint 
affected the jurisdiction of the grand jury.  In the prosecution of a felony, the 
People may proceed “either by indictment or . . . by information.”  (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 14; Pen. Code, §§ 682, 737.)  It is within the discretion of the prosecution 
to accept dismissal of a complaint and begin new proceedings by seeking an 
indictment.  (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 664, 669.)  After a 
complaint has been filed, the prosecution is not prohibited from seeking an 
indictment on the same charges, even prior to dismissal of the complaint.  
(Sherwood v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d. 183, 187 [grand jury did not lack 
jurisdiction to indict the defendant while a complaint was pending against him on 
the same charge].)   
The stay issued by the superior court did not affect the prosecution‟s right 
to seek an indictment.  That order stayed “all proceedings in the Municipal Court 
of this county on the case of The People v. Celeste Simone Carrington, 
40 
CRSf239675.”  An indictment and an information initiate “separate proceedings.”  
(People v. Combs (1961) 56 Cal.2d 135, 145 [error committed in connection with 
the complaint does not affect subsequent proceedings under an indictment for the 
same charges]; see People v. Grace (1928) 88 Cal.App. 222, 228 [“The mere fact 
that the same offense was charged in the indictment that previously had been 
charged in the information does not establish any legal relation or connection 
between the information and the indictment . . . and manifestly no error committed 
in connection with the one proceeding could affect the other”].)  The stay simply 
did not apply to any potential grand jury proceedings in the superior court. 
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor‟s action in convening a grand 
jury while a stay was in effect constituted unfair and unconstitutional forum 
shopping, violating her rights to due process and fundamental fairness.  By 
seeking an indictment, the prosecution may have avoided some delay in obtaining 
a probable cause determination while defendant‟s venue challenge to the 
complaint was being litigated.  The prosecution, however, did not obtain any 
unfair advantage in doing so.  It did not avoid a ruling on the venue issue.  
Defendant demurred to the indictment, alleging that San Mateo County was not a 
proper venue for trial of the Santa Clara County offenses, and the superior court 
overruled that demurrer.  (See §§ 917, 1004, par. 1.)  The prosecutor‟s decision to 
pursue an indictment was not unlawful and did not result in any unfair advantage 
over the defense.  Consequently, defendant‟s constitutional rights were not 
violated.   
E.  Venue in San Mateo County for the Gleason Homicide 
Defendant contends the indictment was facially deficient because it failed 
to allege facts establishing that San Mateo County was a proper county in which to 
try the Gleason homicide charges.  She claims that therefore the indictment must 
41 
be quashed, her conviction for Gleason‟s murder must be reversed, and the special 
circumstance findings and death sentence must be set aside.  Defendant further 
contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that San 
Mateo County had territorial jurisdiction over those charges, and that conducting 
her trial in that county violated her Sixth Amendment right to be tried in the 
district in which the crime was committed.  (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.)   
Gleason was killed in Santa Clara County.  The indictment alleged that  
“acts preparatory to the commission” of the burglary, robbery, and murder of 
Gleason occurred in San Mateo County and that “property taken in the 
commission” of those crimes was brought into San Mateo County.  In overruling 
defendant‟s demurrer, the trial court concluded that the indictment sufficiently 
alleged that venue was proper in San Mateo County.5 
Defendant contends the foregoing allegations in the indictment were 
insufficient because the charging document failed to allege specific facts, 
including the nature of the preparatory acts she engaged in and the fruits of the 
homicide that were brought into San Mateo County.  Defendant urges that the 
absence of more specific allegations violated the pleading requirements of 
California law.  (§ 959.)  She further contends the absence of specific allegations 
violated her federal constitutional right to be adequately informed of the nature of 
the accusation against her.  (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.)  
The trial court‟s ruling was correct.  An indictment may employ “ordinary 
and concise language without any technical averments or any allegations of matter 
not essential to be proved.”  (§ 952.)  The offense may be alleged “in the words of 
                                              
5  
Defendant filed a petition for writ of prohibition and mandate in the Court 
of Appeal challenging this ruling of the trial court.  The petition was denied on 
May 19, 1993.  We denied a petition for review on August 2, 1993.   
42 
the enactment describing the offense . . . or in any words sufficient to give the 
accused notice of the offense of which he [or she] is accused.”  (Ibid.)  An 
indictment is “sufficient if it contains[,] in substance, a statement that the accused 
has committed some public offense therein specified” (ibid.) and if it can be 
understood “[t]hat the offense charged therein is triable in the court in which it is 
filed” (§ 959, par. 5).   
Generally, an offense is triable in the county in which a crime was 
committed.  (§ 777.)  If a crime was committed in part in one county and in part in 
another county, venue is proper in either.  (§ 781.)  “Under section 781, a public 
offense may be tried in a jurisdiction in which the defendant made preparations for 
the crime, even though the preparatory acts did not constitute an essential element 
of the crime.”  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 385.)   
Section 952 specifically provides that  the crime itself may be alleged in the 
words of the statute that defines it.  There is no reason why allegations related to 
venue need be more specific.  In support of her assertion that the allegations of the 
indictment must include specific facts, rather than “blanket conclusions,” 
defendant relies upon cases that are inapposite.  In Ball v. United States (1891) 
140 U.S. 118, 136, the high court relied upon common law requirements that an 
accusatory pleading in a homicide prosecution specify the time and place of 
death — facts that were critical to the determination of the trial court‟s 
jurisdiction.  In People v. Wakao (1917) 33 Cal.App. 454, the defendant was 
charged with criminal libel, which at that time could be tried in the county in 
which the complaining witness resided when the defamatory statements were 
circulated.  The information alleged that defamatory statements were published in 
a newspaper circulated in Sacramento County, but did not allege that the 
complaining witness resided in that county.  Thus, the critical allegations were 
missing entirely from the accusatory pleading.  The Ball and Wakao cases clearly 
43 
are distinguishable from the present case and are not authority for the proposition 
that an indictment must allege specific facts demonstrating that venue is proper.   
A simple allegation that an offense was committed in a particular county 
ordinarily is sufficient.  (See, e.g., People v. Berg (1929) 96 Cal.App. 430, 432 
[statement that murder was committed “in the County of Los Angeles” sufficient 
to allege venue].)  Even when the crime is committed in part in one county and in 
part in another, the allegation is sufficient if it asserts the basis for venue in 
general terms, without alleging specific facts.  (See, e.g., People v. Dieguez (2001) 
89 Cal.App.4th 266, 281 [information alleged that crime was committed in part in 
Contra Costa County and in part in San Francisco County]; People v. Tolbert 
(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 685, 689 [information sufficiently alleged venue for sexual 
offenses even though it did not specify in which county they were committed, 
because sexual offenses were alleged to be connected to a kidnapping, which was 
alleged to have commenced in San Joaquin County].)  Thus the indictment in the 
present case was sufficient in alleging that “acts preparatory to the commission” of 
the crimes occurred in San Mateo County and that “property taken in the 
commission” of the crimes was brought into San Mateo County.   
Furthermore, to the extent defendant contends that the allegations in the 
indictment were insufficient to afford her a reasonable opportunity to prepare and 
present a defense, we note that notice is provided not only by the accusatory 
pleading but also by the transcript of the preliminary hearing or the grand jury 
proceedings.  (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317-318; accord, People v. 
Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 557; People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 399, fn. 
5.)  In addition, a “defendant may learn further critical details of the People‟s case 
through demurrer to the complaint or pretrial discovery procedures.”  (People v. 
Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 317.)  In the present case, defendant was entitled to 
and did receive a copy of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings.  (§ 938.1.)  
44 
Additionally, in its opposition to defendant‟s demurrer and motion to set aside the 
indictment, the People described in detail the specific facts upon which they relied 
to establish that venue was proper in San Mateo County.  Defendant does not 
contend that these materials were insufficient to afford her adequate notice of the 
factual basis for the allegation of proper venue in San Mateo County.   
Defendant alternatively contends that even if the indictment was sufficient, 
the evidence presented to the grand jury and at trial was insufficient to establish 
that venue was proper in San Mateo County.  Before trial, the court denied 
defendant‟s motion under section 995 to set aside the indictment, finding that the 
transcript of the grand jury proceedings established that sufficient preparatory acts 
were committed in San Mateo County because, while in that county, defendant 
made arrangements for the ride to Palo Alto, took a duffle bag from her San Mateo 
County home containing items to be used in the Palo Alto burglary — including a 
gun, a screwdriver, a pair of gloves, and keys — and brought the proceeds of the 
crime home to San Mateo County.  Evidence of these same preparatory acts was 
presented at trial.   
As a preliminary matter, the People urge that defendant, by declining to 
seek a jury instruction on this issue, forfeited any challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support venue.  (See People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 
1110, fn. 18 [the defendant, who did not propose a jury instruction on venue or 
provide authority to the trial court supporting the giving of such an instruction, 
could not complain on appeal of the absence of such an instruction].)  In the 
present case, after the jury returned its guilt phase verdicts, the trial court noticed 
that it had failed to instruct the jury on venue and proposed that jurors be called 
45 
back to decide that issue.6  The prosecution contended that defendant already had 
forfeited her right to a jury determination by failing to request an instruction on 
venue.  Defense counsel indicated that counsel did not wish to submit the issue to 
the jury at that time, and consequently it was not submitted to the jury.   
We need not decide whether defendant forfeited her right to challenge 
venue because, in any event, the evidence clearly was sufficient to establish venue 
in San Mateo County.  As noted above, when “the acts or effects thereof 
constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more 
jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court 
within either jurisdictional territory.”  (§ 781.)  Pursuant to section 781, an offense 
may be tried in a county “in which the defendant made preparations for the crime, 
even though the preparatory acts did not constitute an essential element of the 
crime.”  (People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 385 [Humboldt County had 
jurisdiction over a murder committed in Los Angeles County, because the 
defendant went to Humboldt County to obtain weapons for the purpose of killing 
the victim in Los Angeles County].) 
The evidence established, and the trial court found, that defendant 
committed preparatory acts in San Mateo County when she collected the items she 
planned to use to commit the crimes, including gloves, a screwdriver, a key, and a 
gun, from her home in San Mateo County, and made arrangements there to be 
                                              
6  
At the time of defendant‟s trial, case law provided that a defendant had a 
right to a jury trial on the facts supporting venue.  (See, e.g., People v. Megladdery 
(1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 766.)  Subsequently, we concluded that the matter of 
venue is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury.  (People 
v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 215.)  Nevertheless, because the rule that venue is 
a question of fact for the jury had been widespread and longstanding, we 
concluded that the new rule should be applied only prospectively.  (Ibid.)   
 
46 
transported to Palo Alto.  Defendant suggests these preparatory acts are 
insufficient because there is no evidence defendant was planning to commit a 
murder — as opposed to a burglary, theft, or robbery — at the time she made these 
preparations in San Mateo County.  Nevertheless, if preparatory acts occur in one 
county, those acts vest jurisdiction over the crime “even though the intent may 
have arisen in another county.”  (People v. Bismillah (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 80, 
86.)   
Furthermore, defendant does not assert that the burglary and the robbery 
were improperly charged in San Mateo County.  “When property taken in one 
jurisdictional territory by burglary . . . [or] robbery . . . has been brought into 
another, . . . the jurisdiction of the offense is in any competent court within either 
jurisdictional territory . . . .”  (§ 786, subd. (a).)  Defendant brought property taken 
during the Palo Alto (Santa Clara County) burglary and robbery back to her home 
in San Mateo County.  The murder was part of the same transaction as the robbery 
and burglary, and those offenses were “requisite to the consummation of” the 
murder.  (§ 781.)  Force was used against Gleason in furtherance of the robbery, 
and her murder served to eliminate her as a witness to the robbery and burglary.  
Consequently, the murder was properly tried in San Mateo County as well.   
In this respect, the present case is analogous to People v. Gutierrez (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 1083, 1116-1119, in which we held that San Bernardino County had 
jurisdiction to try the defendant for the attempted murder of a police officer that 
occurred in Riverside County.  The defendant in Gutierrez kidnapped a woman in 
San Bernardino County and, while driving through Riverside County, was stopped 
by a police officer for a traffic violation.  Defendant shot at the officer, and a gun 
battle ensued.  We concluded that San Bernardino County was a proper venue for 
trial of the attempted murder of the police officer, because the defendant had 
attempted to kill the officer in order to avoid detection or arrest for the kidnapping, 
47 
which began in San Bernardino County.  Because San Bernardino County had 
jurisdiction over the kidnapping, it had jurisdiction over the attempted murder as 
well.  (Id. at p. 1118.)  Similarly, in the present case, San Mateo County had 
jurisdiction over the robbery and burglary offenses and, because the killing 
occurred in connection with those crimes, it had jurisdiction to try the murder 
charge as well.7   
F.  Sufficiency of Evidence of Robbery   
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her 
conviction for the robbery of Gleason, because there was no evidence that she had 
formed the intent to steal from Gleason until after she had shot her.  “[W]hen a 
killer‟s only assaultive conduct occurs before forming the intent to steal, a robbery 
has not occurred, because there is no union of act and larcenous intent.”  (People 
v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 644.)  Defendant admitted in her confession, 
which was in evidence at trial, that she entered the office building with the intent 
to steal money and money orders from the company located there.  Defendant 
admitted that she was in the process of looking for money when she encountered 
Gleason, but stated she did not take anything until after the shooting.  Defendant 
stated she was surprised by Gleason in the copy room and shot her because 
                                              
7  
Defendant contends that her conviction and sentencing in a county lacking 
territorial jurisdiction violated her constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution to a jury trial, to 
fundamental fairness, to equal protection of the laws, and to reliable guilt and 
penalty phase determinations.  Defendant acknowledges that this court has held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to be tried in the “district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed” is not applicable to the states (see Price v. Superior Court 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1059-1069), but nevertheless raises the issue here in order 
to preserve her right to pursue it in federal court.  Because we have concluded that 
San Mateo County was a proper venue for trial of the Gleason murder charges, 
defendant‟s constitutional claims necessarily must fail.    
48 
defendant was frightened and nervous.  When asked whether she planned to shoot 
Gleason and then rob her, or vice versa, defendant stated that she had no particular 
intentions.  After the shooting, she took Gleason‟s keys and $400 that was in an 
envelope in a desk.  Defendant drove away in Gleason‟s car, which she later 
abandoned.  Gleason‟s keys, beeper, and purse later were found in defendant‟s 
apartment.   
On appeal, we uphold the jury‟s verdict if there was substantial evidence to 
support it.  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-578.)  Considering the 
entire record, we determine whether there is evidence that is “ „reasonable in 
nature, credible, and of solid value‟ ” from which a “ „reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 576.)  We have observed that 
“when one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is 
ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery.”  
(People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688; accord, People v. Bolden (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 515, 553; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 357; People v. Kipp 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128.)  “If a person commits a murder, and after doing so 
takes the victim‟s wallet, the jury may reasonably infer that the murder was 
committed for the purpose of obtaining the wallet, because murders are commonly 
committed to obtain money.”  (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  The 
jury was free to disbelieve defendant‟s statements to the police that she shot 
Gleason in a panic and that she did not possess any specific intent at that time, 
especially in view of the circumstance that the prosecution had presented 
evidence, through its forensic experts, that defendant‟s version of the 
circumstances of the shooting was not entirely truthful.  Defendant admitted that 
when she encountered Gleason, she was looking for money to steal and that she 
was armed with the gun in case she needed to frighten someone.  The evidence is 
49 
sufficient to support the jury‟s finding that defendant formed the intent to steal 
before she shot Gleason.   
G.  Sufficiency of Evidence of Burglary of ATM’s 
As charged in counts 9 and 10 of the indictment, defendant was found 
guilty of second degree burglary of a Bank of America ATM located at 700 
Jefferson Avenue in Redwood City.  These counts were based upon defendant‟s 
attempt to use Carolyn Gleason‟s ATM card at an ATM located on the outside of 
the bank building.  Defendant contends — and the Attorney General agrees — that 
her convictions on these two counts must be reversed.  Subsequent to defendant‟s 
trial, we held that inserting a stolen ATM card into an ATM on the outside of a 
building does not constitute an “entry” for purposes of the burglary statute.  
(People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 718-722.)  Because the evidence did not 
establish an entry, defendant‟s convictions on counts 9 and 10 must be reversed.   
H.  Instruction on Consciousness of Guilt   
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury, pursuant to 
CALJIC No. 2.03, that if “the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately 
misleading statement concerning the crime for which she is now being tried, you 
may consider such statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness 
of guilt.”  Over defense counsel‟s objection that such an instruction was not 
appropriate because defendant ultimately confessed, the trial court concluded that 
the instruction should be given because defendant initially made false statements 
to the police about her involvement in the homicides.   
Defendant contends that in People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826 we 
“implicitly acknowledged” that CALJIC No. 2.03 should not be given in a case, 
like the present one, in which the defendant initially denied involvement in the 
crimes but subsequently confessed.  In Mattson, we did not conclude the 
50 
instruction was given in error but commented that under such circumstances, “the 
probative value of, and inference of consciousness of, guilt from the initial denial 
was tenuous.”  (Id. at p. 872.)  We concluded that the giving of the instruction, 
even if error, was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, 
including the defendant‟s confession.   
We find no error in the giving of CALJIC 2.03 in the present case.  The fact 
that a defendant initially denies involvement and later makes admissions certainly 
supports a conclusion that the earlier statement was a lie made to avoid detection 
or culpability.  Even when a defendant confesses, his or her state of mind or other 
details of a crime may remain in dispute.  The fact that a defendant initially denied 
culpability and later made admissions are relevant facts, which must be weighed in 
light of all the evidence. Although defendant admitted her role in each of the 
crimes, her counsel continued to dispute her state of mind, urging that she had 
committed only a theft — not a robbery — of Gleason, and that she had not 
intended to kill Marks.  Additionally, the precise circumstances of the shootings 
— in particular, whether Esparza and Gleason were on their knees when shot — 
were in dispute.  
Defendant additionally contends that the consciousness-of-guilt instruction 
undermined the requirement that guilt be found beyond a reasonable doubt and 
violated her federal constitutional rights to a fair and reliable capital trial by 
permitting the jury to infer all of the elements of the charged offenses from the 
circumstance that she initially lied to the police.  An instruction that permits the 
jury to draw an inference of guilt from particular facts is valid only if there is a 
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact inferred.  (United States 
v. Gainey (1965) 380 U.S. 63, 66-67; Tot v. United States (1943) 319 U.S. 463, 
467-468.)  In the present case, as defendant admits, the jury reasonably could infer 
from her false statements that she was conscious of her responsibility for the 
51 
deaths of Gleason and Esparza, an issue that was not contested.  She asserts, 
however, that because the instruction did not limit the jury‟s use of the evidence to 
this appropriate inference, the instruction permitted the jury to draw other 
inferences that were not rationally related to the circumstance that defendant had 
lied, including that (1) defendant was conscious of having committed the crimes 
with a particular mental state (such as deliberation, premeditation, malice 
aforethought, or intent to kill), and (2) defendant was conscious of the truth of the 
factual allegations underlying the robbery and burglary special circumstances.  
Defendant did not request in the trial court that the consciousness-of-guilt 
instruction be modified or limited in any way, and consequently has forfeited any 
claim that the instruction should have been modified.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 
8 Cal.4th 1060, 1140.)  In any event, it was not misleading as given.  “A 
reasonable juror would understand „consciousness of guilt‟ to mean 
„consciousness of some wrongdoing‟ rather than „consciousness of having 
committed the specific offense charged.‟  The instructions advise the jury to 
determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of consciousness 
of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish guilt, thereby 
clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a confession and is to be 
evaluated with reason and common sense.  The instructions do not address the 
defendant‟s mental state at the time of the offense and do not direct or compel the 
drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto.”  (People v. Crandell 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871.) 
I.  Instruction on Firearm-use Enhancements 
Defendant contends that the trial court‟s instruction on the allegations that 
defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of certain offenses was 
erroneous because, in lieu of defining the term “firearm,” the court included an 
52 
instruction that “firearm includes a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum revolver.”  
The evidence showed that the weapon used in this case was a Smith and Wesson 
.357 magnum revolver.  Consequently, defendant contends, the instruction in 
effect directed a verdict on an issue of fact in violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to a jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt under the 
federal Constitution, and her right to due process of law under the state 
Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)   
We rejected an analogous argument in People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 
432, 443.  In Brown, the defendant was charged with murdering a peace officer 
engaged in the performance of his duties.  We held that the trial court did not err in 
instructing the jury that a Garden Grove Police Officer and a Garden Grove 
Reserve Police Officer are peace officers.  This instruction “took no element from 
the jury; it merely instructed the jury on a point of statutory law — a point not 
open to dispute — that a Garden Grove police officer is a peace officer.  
[Citations.]  The jury was left to make all essential factual determinations, 
including whether the victim was a Garden Grove police officer.”  (Brown, supra, 
46 Cal.3d at pp. 443-444; cf. People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504-507 [the 
trial court‟s instruction that certain named individuals are peace officers was 
harmless error].)  Similarly, in the present case, the jury merely was instructed on 
a point of law that was not open to dispute.  The jury was left to decide the factual 
question of whether defendant used a “Smith and Wesson .357 magnum revolver” 
in the commission of the crimes.  (See People v. Runnion (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 
852, 856-858 [trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the word “firearm” 
includes a handgun].)  We find no error.   
53 
J.  Issues Related to Aggravating Factor of Attempted Escape   
As noted above, the prosecution presented evidence, through the out-of-
court statements of Cindy Keshmiri, who had been incarcerated with defendant in 
the county jail and worked on the food line, that defendant had asked Keshmiri for 
a knife and, after Keshmiri provided her with a hard plastic knife, asked her for 
aluminum foil.  The prosecution theorized that defendant‟s acts constituted an 
attempted escape, and thus were admissible in aggravation as “criminal activity 
. . . which involved . . . the express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  
(§ 190.3, factor (b).)  Defendant raises a number of challenges to this evidence and 
to the court‟s related instructions regarding it, each of which is discussed below. 
1.  Absence of instruction that Keshmiri was an accomplice 
Defendant argues that, at the penalty phase, the trial court should have 
instructed the jury that Keshmiri was an accomplice to any attempted escape by 
defendant and that her out-of-court statements required corroboration.  The trial 
court denied the requested instruction on the ground that the question whether 
Keshmiri was an accomplice was an issue for the jury.  The trial court was correct.   
An “accomplice” is “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical 
offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony 
of the accomplice is given.”  (§ 1111.)  An accomplice‟s testimony is not 
sufficient to support a conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence 
connecting the defendant with the commission of the offense.  (Ibid.)  In this 
context, “testimony” includes an accomplice‟s out-of-court statements made under 
questioning by police or under other suspect circumstances.  (People v. Williams 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 245; People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 525-526.)  The 
requirement of accomplice corroboration applies to the penalty phase of a capital 
trial.  (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 244-245.)  “Whether a person is 
an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 presents a factual question for 
54 
the jury „unless the evidence presents only a single inference.‟  [Citation.]  Thus, a 
court can decide as a matter of law whether a witness is or is not an accomplice 
only when the facts regarding the witness‟s criminal culpability are „clear and 
undisputed.‟  [Citations.]”  (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 679.)   
To be an accomplice, Keshmiri would have had to act with knowledge of 
defendant‟s criminal purpose and with the intent to encourage or facilitate the 
commission of the offense.  (See People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90-
91.)  Providing assistance without sharing the perpetrator‟s purpose and intent is 
insufficient to establish that a person is an accomplice.  (People v. Sully (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 1195, 1227.)  In her out-of-court statements, Keshmiri admitted providing 
defendant with a plastic knife but denied any intent to facilitate a crime.  Keshmiri 
told the investigating officer that when she handed defendant the knife, “I didn‟t 
realize what I was doing I guess.”  Subsequently, when defendant commented that 
the guards did not carry guns, Keshmiri explained, “that‟s when I took it to seem 
she meant to escape.”  “That‟s why, that‟s why I freaked out.”  “I took it as a joke 
to begin with . . . and then I said . . . that was stupid.” That same day, Keshmiri 
voluntarily reported the incident to the authorities, explaining, “I don‟t want to see 
somebody else get hurt over it.”  If the jurors believed Keshmiri‟s out-of-court 
statements, they reasonably could conclude that she did not intend to assist 
defendant in escaping from custody and therefore was not an accomplice.  
Consequently, the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to decide whether or 
not Keshmiri was an accomplice.   
2.  Absence of instruction for jury to determine whether Keshmiri was 
an accomplice 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, in 
accordance with CALJIC No. 3.19, that it was required to determine whether the 
witness Keshmiri was an accomplice and that defendant had the burden of proving 
55 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Keshmiri was an accomplice.  (See People 
v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982 [trial court must inform the jury, on its own 
motion, of the jury‟s obligation to determine whether a witness is an accomplice].)  
Defendant contends the trial court‟s error in failing to direct the jury to determine 
explicitly whether Keshmiri was an accomplice was compounded by the court‟s 
instructions concerning the testimony of an “in-custody informant,” which, she 
asserts, erroneously informed the jury that Keshmiri was not an accomplice.   
The jury was instructed that an in-custody informant is “a person, other 
than a co-defendant, percipient witness, accomplice, or co-conspirator,”  who 
testifies concerning a statement made by the defendant while both were in 
custody.  (Italics added.)  The jury explicitly was instructed that Cindy Keshmiri 
was an in-custody informant.  Following these instructions, defendant contends, 
the jury assumed that because Keshmiri was an in-custody informant she was not 
an accomplice and that corroboration of her testimony was not required.   
We must consider whether it is reasonably likely that the trial court‟s 
instructions caused the jury to misapply the law.  (People v. Cain (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 1, 36; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-527.)  “[T]he correctness 
of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not 
from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”  
(People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538, disapproved on another ground in 
People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 
72 [alleged ambiguity in instructions must be viewed in light of the instructions as 
a whole and the entire record].)  
One could construe the instructions to mean that, because Keshmiri was an 
in-custody informant, and because an in-custody informant is someone “other than 
. . . an accomplice,” Keshmiri was not an accomplice.  We view it as unlikely, 
however, that the jury engaged in such an interpretation.  Although the trial court 
56 
did not explicitly tell the jury to decide whether Kesmiri was an accomplice, the 
instructions given implicitly required such a determination.  The jury was instructed 
that an accomplice‟s testimony must be corroborated, and the definition of an 
accomplice was provided.  The jury also was given instructions concerning how it 
was to determine whether an accomplice has been corroborated.  Defendant‟s 
interpretation would render the instructions on accomplice testimony entirely 
superfluous.   
We conclude it was more likely that the jurors correctly interpreted the 
instructions, in context, to mean that they were required to apply the instruction 
regarding in-custody informants only if they concluded that Keshmiri was not an 
accomplice.  Furthermore, both parties in their arguments correctly interpreted 
these instructions.  The prosecutor acknowledged in closing argument that the 
defense could argue that Keshmiri was an accomplice and that her statements 
required corroboration.  Defense counsel observed that the instructions concerning 
accomplice testimony and in-custody informant testimony were given to the jury in 
the alternative.  Defense counsel stated that the jurors could find that Keshmiri was 
an accomplice; however, “[i]f you were to find that she was not an accomplice but 
an in-custody informant,” the instructions would direct the jurors to be cautious in 
evaluating her testimony.  We find no reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted 
the instructions to require that it assume Keshmiri was not an accomplice.   
3.  Sufficiency of corroboration 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting Keshmiri‟s statements, 
because she was an accomplice and there was no corroborating evidence.  The trial 
court agreed that Keshmiri‟s prior tape-recorded statements were not corroborated.  
Even if we assume the trial court was correct, that circumstance did not render her 
statements inadmissible because, as discussed above, the jury reasonably could 
57 
have concluded that she was not an accomplice.  The jury was instructed that “[a] 
defendant cannot be found to have committed a criminal act based on the testimony 
of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence which 
tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense.”  If the jury 
determined that Keshmiri was an accomplice, we presume it followed the court‟s 
instructions and did not consider the allegation that defendant had committed an 
attempted escape.  On the other hand, if the jury determined — as it could have, 
under the evidence presented — that Keshmiri was not an accomplice, 
corroboration was not required.   
4.  Sufficiency of evidence of attempted escape 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the jury to hear the 
tape recordings of Keshmiri‟s out-of-court statements, because they did not 
establish “criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted 
use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  
(§ 190.3, factor (b).)  A jury cannot consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal 
activity as an aggravating factor unless it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the alleged conduct occurred and that it constituted a crime.  (People v. 
Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 539; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-
774.)  The prosecution argued that the conduct described by Keshmiri constituted 
an attempt to escape from county jail, in violation of section 4532, subdivision (b).  
Defendant contends that, even assuming Keshmiri‟s statements  were true, 
defendant‟s conduct amounted to no more than preparation to commit a crime, and 
not an attempt.   
We review the record for “substantial evidence from which a jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that violent criminal activity occurred.”  
(People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 587; see People v. Memro (1985) 38 
58 
Cal.3d 658, 698.)  To prove an attempt, “ „[s]omething more is required than mere 
menaces, preparation or planning.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Miller (1935) 2 Cal.2d 
527, 530.)  “ „[T]he attempt is the direct movement towards the commission after 
the preparations are made.‟ ”  (Ibid.)  In the present case, Keshmiri‟s statements 
were sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant was planning an escape 
attempt and prepared for that attempt by obtaining a hard plastic knife, but it is 
questionable whether they were sufficient to establish an actual attempt. 
Even if defendant is correct that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
an attempted escape, however, we conclude that any error in admitting Keshmiri‟s 
out-of-court statements was harmless.  The weakness of the evidence of an escape 
attempt, the numerous challenges to Keshmiri‟s credibility, her refusal to testify at 
trial, and the instruction requiring the jury to view her testimony with caution 
diminish the likelihood that the jurors gave significant weight to this evidence.  
Even if the jurors believed Keshmiri‟s statements, the incident she described was 
relatively trivial in comparison to the circumstances of the crimes of which 
defendant was convicted — defendant murdered two individuals and attempted to 
murder a third during the course of three separate incidents of burglary and 
robbery.  The prosecutor did argue to the jury that the evidence of an attempted 
escape demonstrated defendant‟s willingness to use violence, but did not focus on 
this evidence as a justification for the death penalty.  Indeed, the prosecutor 
admitted that  the evidence of defendant‟s escape attempt “pales, quite frankly, in 
comparison to the factors in aggravation under [section 190.3, factor] (a), but it 
happened.  We brought it to your attention and you can consider it and give it 
whatever weight you deem appropriate.”   Defendant contends that this evidence 
was harmful because it may have influenced the jury to conclude that defendant 
was an escape risk and that the public could not be protected from her if they 
sentenced her to life imprisonment.  The weakness of defendant‟s plan and the 
59 
absence of any evidence that defendant actually attempted to carry out that plan, 
however, render it unlikely that the jury considered her to be a serious escape risk.  
We find no reasonable possibility that this evidence influenced the jury‟s decision 
to impose the death penalty.   
5.  The trial court’s refusal to excise portions of Keshmiri’s statements 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to excise certain 
statements from the tape recording of Keshmiri‟s interview with law enforcement 
authorities, and that these statements were sufficiently inflammatory that they 
rendered defendant‟s trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of her rights to due 
process of law and to a reliable penalty determination.  (U.S. Const., 8th & 14th 
Amends.)  After the trial court ruled that Keshmiri‟s out-of-court statements could 
be admitted as prior inconsistent statements under Evidence Code sections 1235 
and 770, defense counsel objected to two portions of the statements:  Keshmiri‟s 
comments that (1) she regularly teased defendant about why defendant was in 
custody, (2) she would “bullshit” with defendant about her killing people and 
would “say duck when she goes by.”  Defense counsel argued that these 
statements were irrelevant and extremely prejudicial, because they suggested that 
defendant was willing to participate in humor about committing homicide.  The 
trial court overruled defendant‟s objections, concluding that the statements were 
relevant to show Keshmiri‟s relationship with defendant. 
Defendant argues that the prejudicial effect of these comments outweighed 
their probative value.  Although Keshmiri‟s comments about joking with 
defendant revealed something about Keshmiri‟s own character, defendant 
contends they also “implied that [defendant] shared some morbid sense of 
jocularity regarding the very serious charges she was facing.”  On the other hand, 
defendant argues, these comments were not necessary to establish defendant‟s 
60 
relationship with Keshmiri, because that relationship was fully established by 
other, less prejudicial portions of Keshmiri‟s interview with the officers.8   
We review the trial court‟s ruling for abuse of discretion, which is 
established by “a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.  [Citation].”  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)   
We find no abuse of discretion.  When called to testify, Keshmiri denied 
knowing defendant and claimed that the Celeste Carrington she knew was an 
entirely different person.  Keshmiri‟s out-of-court statement that she teased 
defendant regarding the killings helped to establish that the person she spoke about 
to the officers was indeed defendant, who had been charged with murder.  
Furthermore, Keshmiri‟s accepting attitude toward defendant and her crimes lent 
credibility to her statement that defendant approached her for assistance.  The trial 
court‟s ruling was reasonable and did not deny defendant a fair trial. 
K.  Admission of Victim-Impact Evidence   
Defendant filed a motion in the trial court to limit the scope of victim-
impact evidence that the prosecutor would be permitted to present at trial, and 
requested an offer of proof as to evidence that the prosecutor intended to 
introduce.  The trial court conducted a hearing, at which the prosecutor discussed 
                                              
8  
Keshmiri told Deputy McKague that “we got along real good.  I think she 
kind of liked me, as a matter of fact. . . .  [W]hen [my] niece was up in [the same 
dormitory unit as defendant] after I left I asked her to watch out for my niece.  So 
we got a fairly good rapport going.”  Keshmiri explained that defendant chose to 
approach her because “we had kind of a connection going.”  In her interview with 
the district attorney inspector, Bruce Sabin, Keshmiri stated that she and defendant 
had many friendly conversations, that Keshmiri was one of the few individuals 
with whom defendant spoke, that they had meals together, and that they had 
established a rapport.  
61 
the witnesses she planned to call to testify.  At that hearing, defendant argued that 
Evidence Code section 352 should apply, that the number of witnesses should be 
limited to avoid undue prejudice, and that generally those witnesses who had 
closer relationships and more recent contact with the victims were most relevant.  
The trial court declined to limit the number of victim-impact witnesses whom the 
prosecution could present.   
Defendant now argues that specific limitations should be placed on victim-
impact evidence.  First, she contends that, absent unusual circumstances, such 
evidence should be limited to the testimony of a single witness.  (See State v. 
Muhammad (N.J. 1996) 678 A.2d 164, 180 [imposing such a limitation, based 
upon the court‟s conclusion that “[t]he greater the number of survivors who are 
permitted to present victim impact evidence,  the greater the potential . . . to 
unduly prejudice the jury against the defendant”].)  Second, defendant contends 
that victim impact evidence is relevant and admissible as a “circumstance of the 
crime” (§ 190.3, factor (a)) only if it involves either (1) the effect of the murder on 
a family member who was present at the scene during or immediately after the 
crime, or (2) consequences of the crime that were known or reasonably apparent to 
the defendant at the time she committed the crime.  Under this standard, defendant 
contends that most of the victim-impact evidence admitted in this case should have 
been excluded because none of the witnesses who testified were present at the 
scene or immediately after the crime, and the testimony included information 
regarding the character of the victims — information that was unknown to 
defendant.  Additionally, defendant contends that an interpretation of 
“circumstances of the crime” so broad as to include the victim-impact evidence 
admitted in this case would render that aggravating factor unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague.  (U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 
15, & 17.)   
62 
We previously have rejected arguments that victim-impact evidence must 
be confined to what is provided by a single witness  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 327, 364), that victim-impact witnesses must have witnessed the crime 
(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 398), and that such evidence is limited to 
matters within the defendant‟s knowledge (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
1153, 1183).  We also have concluded that construing section 190.3, factor (a) to 
include victim-impact evidence does not render the statute unconstitutionally 
vague or overbroad.  (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1183.)  Defendant 
provides no compelling argument for this court to reconsider these decisions.   
Defendant additionally contends that the trial court erred in admitting 
testimony suggesting that Gleason‟s death caused her mother to die prematurely 
and her father to suffer a stroke.  Prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, 
the trial court agreed that evidence of the death of Gleason‟s mother and the illness 
of her father could be admitted in order to explain why they were not called to 
testify.  In response to defendant‟s concern that the jury might infer that the death 
and the illness resulted from the murder of Gleason, the prosecutor agreed that 
such an inference would not be appropriate and that she would not make this 
argument to the jury. 
During the penalty phase, Michael Gleason testified that Caroline 
Gleason‟s father recently had had a stroke, that her mother had died earlier in the 
year, and that her mother-in-law had died the previous year.  In reference to 
Gleason‟s mother‟s death, the witness added, “I think the loss of her daughter took 
its toll.”  The court promptly admonished the witness on its own motion, stating 
that “this is an area we can‟t speculate about.”   
We find no error in the court‟s admission of evidence regarding the status 
of Gleason‟s parents.  It is well established that a party may comment on the 
opposing party‟s failure to call anticipated witnesses.  (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 
63 
Cal.4th 182, 210, citing People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 403; People v. 
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 670; People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34; People 
v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 475; see People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 
552-553.)  The court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence intended to 
dispel any potential negative implication that might be drawn by the jury or by 
defense counsel based upon the prosecution‟s failure to call Gleason‟s parents as 
witnesses.   
When the witness went further and commented on the possible effect of the 
victim‟s death on her mother‟s health, the court properly informed him — in the 
presence of the jury — that such speculation was inappropriate.  To the extent 
defendant contends the trial court should have admonished the jury to ignore or 
limit its consideration of this evidence, her claim has been forfeited by her failure 
to request an admonition in the trial court.  (See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 353, 427-428.)    
L.  Absence of Limiting Instruction on Victim-Impact Evidence 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, 
on its own motion, concerning the proper use of victim-impact evidence.  
Although defendant did not request any such instruction in the trial court, she 
suggests that the following instruction (one proposed, although not mandated, by 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Means (Pa. 2001) 773 
A.2d 143, 159) would have been appropriate: “Victim impact evidence is simply 
another method of informing you about the nature and circumstances of the crime 
in question.  You may consider this evidence in determining an appropriate 
punishment.  However, the law does not deem the life of one victim more valuable 
than another; rather, victim impact evidence shows that the victim, like the 
defendant, is a unique individual.  Your consideration must be limited to a rational 
64 
inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the 
evidence.”  Defendant contends that in the absence of such an instruction, “there 
was nothing to stop raw emotion and other improper considerations from tainting 
the jury‟s decision,” in violation of her right to a decision by a rational and 
properly instructed jury, the due process right to a fair trial, and the right to a fair 
and reliable capital-penalty determination.  (U.S. Const. 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends.; 
Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16,  & 17.)  
We previously have rejected these same contentions.  In People v. 
Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pages 369-370, we found unpersuasive an argument 
that the trial court has a duty to give such an instruction on its own motion.  We 
concluded that (1) the first two sentences of defendant‟s proposed instruction were 
covered adequately by CALJIC No. 8.85, which also was read to the jury in the 
present case; (2) defendant‟s proposed instruction is incorrect to the extent it 
suggests that a juror‟s emotional response to the evidence may play no part in his 
or her decision; and (3) an instruction “informing the jury that the law does not 
deem the life of one victim more valuable than the other” is “not necessary to the 
jury‟s understanding of [the] case.”  (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 
370.) 
M.  Challenges to California’s Capital Sentencing Scheme 
Defendant advances a number of constitutional challenges to the California 
death penalty law and to instructions given to the jury based upon that law — 
challenges that, she concedes, we previously have rejected.  Defendant provides 
no convincing reason for us to reconsider our previous holdings on these issues.  
Consequently, we reject defendant‟s argument that her death sentence violates 
articles VI and VII of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
which prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and the arbitrary 
65 
deprivation of life.  “ International law does not compel the elimination of capital 
punishment in California. ”  (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 127.)  
We also have rejected the argument, presently made by defendant, that the 
assertedly regular imposition of the death penalty as punishment for a substantial 
number of homicides — as opposed to exceptional crimes such as treason — 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because such punishment has been 
abolished in the majority of nations, including all of Western Europe.  
“California‟s status as being in the minority of jurisdictions worldwide that impose 
capital punishment, especially in contrast with the nations of Western Europe, 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  (See, e.g., People v. Moon (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 1, 47-48.)”  (People v. Mungia (2008)  44 Cal.4th 1101, 1143.)  California 
does not impose capital punishment as a “ „regular punishment for substantial 
numbers of crimes.‟ ”  (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43, italics 
omitted.)  “The death penalty is available only for the crime of first degree murder, 
and only when a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of 
the penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions different from 
those applying to „regular punishment‟ for felonies.  (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 11; §§ 190.1-190.9, 1239, subd. (b).)”  (Id. at p. 44.) 
“This court‟s refusal to conduct intercase proportionality review of a death 
sentence does not violate the federal Constitution.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Wallace 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1098.)  Furthermore, because “capital defendants are not 
similarly situated to noncapital defendants, the death penalty law does not violate 
equal protection by denying capital defendants certain procedural rights given to 
noncapital defendants.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681.)   
We previously have rejected defendant‟s challenges to the penalty phase 
jury instruction given in this case, CALJIC No. 8.88.  The jury need not be told 
explicitly that it must return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility 
66 
of parole if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  
(People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978.)  The instruction that jurors may 
impose a death sentence only if the aggravating factors are “so substantial” in 
comparison to the mitigating circumstances that death is warranted does not create 
an unconstitutionally vague standard.  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 174; 
People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 190.)  There is no requirement in the 
federal or the state Constitution that the jury reach a unanimous agreement with 
respect to the factors in aggravation, that jurors find the factors in aggravation to 
be true beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the circumstances in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation before 
imposing the death penalty, or that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
death is the appropriate punishment.  (People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 
1097.)  “We have repeatedly held that the high court‟s recent decisions [in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2000) 536 U.S. 
584, and Blakeley v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296] do not compel a different 
answer.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 707; see also 
People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 60; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 
421.)  “It is settled . . . that California‟s death penalty law is not unconstitutional in 
failing to impose a burden of proof — whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence — as to the existence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, or the appropriateness of a sentence of death.  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1331.) 
“Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider „[t]he 
circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present 
proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true 
pursuant to Section 190.1,‟ does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution by allowing arbitrary imposition of 
67 
the death penalty.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976; People 
v. Stevens [(2007)] 41 Cal.4th [182,] 211.)”  (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
691, 755; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648; People v. 
Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1330.)  “As the United States Supreme Court noted 
in upholding factor (a) against an Eighth Amendment challenge, „our capital 
jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances 
of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.  [Citation.]‟ ”  
(People v. Page, supra,  44 Cal.4th at p. 60.)  Nor is section 190.3, factor (a) 
applied in an unconstitutionally arbitrary or capricious manner merely because 
prosecutors in different cases may argue that seemingly disparate circumstances, 
or circumstances present in almost any murder, are aggravating under factor (a).  
(People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 401.)  Rather, “each case is judged on its 
facts, each defendant on the particulars of his [or her] offense.”  (Ibid.)  
N.  Motion to Modify the Verdict  
The trial court considered and rejected defendant‟s motion, pursuant to 
section 190.4, subdivision (e), to modify the death verdict to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  Defendant urges that the trial court erred in two 
respects in denying the motion. 
First, defendant contends that the court failed to apply the proper legal 
standard.  In ruling upon a motion under section 190.4, subdivision (e), “the trial 
court must independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
factors presented at trial and determine whether, in its independent judgment, the 
evidence supports the death verdict.”  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 
1267.)   In support of her claim that the court applied an incorrect standard, 
defendant points to the circumstance that, in announcing its ruling, the court stated 
that it needed to “make a determination as to whether the jury‟s finding and 
68 
verdict that the aggravating circumstances are contrary to law or that the evidence 
was presented was not correct.”  Defendant notes that this statement is difficult to 
interpret, but she suggests the court believed — incorrectly — that the jury‟s 
verdict could be set aside only if based upon “incorrect evidence.”   
It appears the court misspoke, but we consider it reasonably likely that the 
court was observing that the question before it was whether the jury‟s verdict was 
“contrary to law or to the evidence presented,” the standard stated in section 190.4, 
subdivision (e).  The court‟s ruling, when considered in its entirety, indicates that 
it exercised its independent judgment and did not limit its determination to 
whether the jury‟s verdict was based upon “incorrect” evidence.  At the outset, the 
court stated that it must “make an independent determination” whether the 
imposition of the death penalty was proper, and that it must “weigh the evidence 
and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and determine the probative value of 
the evidence, which is what I have done.”  The court concluded that the jury‟s 
findings were supported by “the overwhelming weight of the evidence and [are] 
not contrary to law.”  The court thoroughly reviewed the evidence introduced at 
both the guilt and penalty phases, and set forth its “independent judgment as to the 
truth and the weight” of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors.  The court 
stated that it “agrees with the jury” after making its own “personal assessment of 
the evidence.”  The record demonstrates that “the court carefully and 
conscientiously performed its duty under section 190.4.”  (People v. Steele, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 1268.) 
Second, defendant contends the trial court also misconstrued section 190.3, 
factor (i), in stating that defendant‟s age constituted an aggravating factor.  
Defendant notes we have observed that chronological age itself is neither 
aggravating nor mitigating, but the word “age” as used in factor (i) is “a metonym 
for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or 
69 
morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty.”  (People v. Lucky 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302.)  Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the trial court‟s 
finding that age was an aggravating factor in the present case is consistent with our 
interpretation of section 190.3, factor (i).  The court explained: “The defendant 
was approximately 30 years of age and old enough to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of her conduct.”  The circumstance that defendant‟s age rendered her capable of 
appreciating the wrongfulness of her conduct “is a permissible age-related 
inference.”  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 190; see also People v. 
Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1224 [the jury properly could consider the 
prosecutor‟s argument that the defendant was “old enough to know better”].)   
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendant‟s convictions on counts 9 and 10 
are reversed and the judgment and sentence are otherwise affirmed. 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Carrington 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S043628 
Date Filed: July 27, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Mateo 
Judge: Margaret J. Kemp 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
Barry P. Helft, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, and Kathryn E. Collier, Deputy State Public Defender, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Bruce Ortega and Amy Haddix, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Barry P. Helft 
Chief Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Amy Haddix 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5893