Title: State v. Finchum
Citation: 364 N.W.2d 222
Docket Number: 84-468
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 1985

364 N.W.2d 222 (1985) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary Eugene FINCHUM, Appellant. No. 84-468. Supreme Court of Iowa. March 20, 1985. *223 Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Steven K. Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David E. Richter, Co. Atty., for appellee. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN, and LARSON, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. This appeal presents two issues: whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of defendant Gary Eugene Finchum's other crimes which was used to demonstrate that he was a bad person, and whether the trial court erred in mandatorily sentencing defendant to consecutive terms under section 901.8 of the Iowa Code of 1983. The trial information charged that Finchum broke into the home of Hope Thompson in Council Bluffs, Iowa, on the night of October 16, 1983. The prosecution showed at trial that Finchum had thrown a rock through a window in the back door of Thompson's home and in so doing had cut himself; that blood was found in the house; and that Finchum took a stereo and speakers from the house. The prosecution also showed that Finchum next went to Thompson's next-door neighbors, Rod and Becky Phares, seeking to use the telephone. The Phares noted that Finchum appeared to have been drinking, but stated that his speech was not noticeably slurred. They also observed that Finchum had blood on his shirt and hand. The Phares permitted Finchum to use the phone but, after attempting to call, Finchum told them that the party was not there. Finchum asked the Phares if they would take him home, and Rod Phares said he would. Finchum then asked Phares to wait a minute while he got his stereo equipment from the alley. When Finchum returned with the stereo Becky Phares became suspicious, believing that she recognized the equipment as belonging to Thompson. *224 Rod Phares took Finchum to the place that Finchum described as his residence behind a Schwinn shop. Meantime Becky Phares went to Thompson's house, saw that it had been broken into, and called the police. The police found blood inside the house, which became a trail of blood from Thompson's house to the Phares' residence. The trial information charged Finchum with second-degree burglary, and a jury found him guilty as charged. Following sentence, Finchum appealed. I. On direct examination Finchum testified he knew Thompson. He said he had not "thought about Hope Thompson for a long, long time." On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if Finchum had visited Thompson within the past two months. Finchum replied that he had not. The prosecutor then continued with this line of testimony which defendant claims is reversible error: After the defense rested the prosecutor recalled Thompson as a rebuttal witness. She testified defendant had visited her in the summer of 1983. Over Finchum's objection of irrelevancy, the prosecutor asked her about the circumstances of the visit and the following exchange took place: Finchum now objects that this line of testimony violated Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b) which prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts except to prove *225 motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. We agree that this evidence should not have been admitted. The general rule is that evidence to show the commission of crimes other than that for which the defendant is presently on trial is irrelevant and inadmissible. State v. Wright, 191 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa 1971). The record contains no evidence that the prosecution sought to use any of the exceptions in rule 404(b). In Wright we held that evidence of other thefts of soybeans by the defendant, who was presently being tried for theft of soybeans, was highly prejudicial to him. Id. at 642. There, as here, the other crimes did not fit into one of the exceptions set forth in rule 404(b). In that case we required a new trial. We have nearly the same case here. Finchum was on trial for burglary of Hope Thompson's domicile. The evidence that the prosecution sought to introduce was that the defendant apologized to Thompson for a previous burglary of her home. This evidence is highly prejudicial in that it appears to demonstrate previous similar conduct with regard to Thompson. It does not fit into any exception of rule 404(b), nor does the State contend that it does. This error necessitates a new trial. II. We also address the second issue in the appeal, as it may recur on retrial. The question is whether the trial court erred in holding that it was bound to sentence the defendant to consecutive sentences based on section 901.8 of the Iowa Code. We hold that the trial court erred. At the time that Finchum was arrested for the burglary, he was on parole for another offense. The trial court interpreted this to mean that Finchum was "committed" within the meaning of the statute. Section 901.8 of the Iowa Code reads as follows: The word "confined" in this section means "committed". State v. Jones, 298 N.W.2d 296, 298-99 (Iowa 1980). The first sentence of this statute does not concern us. It is merely a discretionary standard which was not used in this case. Both the State and the defense rely on the second sentence. They agree that a person on parole is not "committed" within the meaning of the statute. Cited for this proposition is the statutory definition of parole given in section 906.1 of the Iowa Code Supplement of 1983: The contention is that if the parolee is released from commitment, he is no longer committed and therefore does not fall within the purview of 901.8. We agree. Criminal statutes are strictly construed, and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of the accused. State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747 (Iowa 1978). Where the trial court has discretion it must exercise that discretion. State v. *226 Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62 (Iowa 1982). If Finchum is convicted on retrial, the sentencing court will have to exercise its discretion in the matter of a concurrent or consecutive sentence in light of the circumstances. We return the case to district court for retrial. REVERSED AND REMANDED.