Title: Alfred A. Zealy v. City of Waukesha
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1993AP002831
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 1996

No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-2831 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Alfred A. Zealy, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of Waukesha, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
JUN 4, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.  This is a review of a published decision 
of the court of appeals
1 affirming in part and reversing in part a 
judgment and order of the circuit court for Waukesha County, 
Willis J. Zick, Judge, and remanding the cause with directions.  
The issue before this court is whether the zoning of certain land 
owned by Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent Alfred A. Zealy ("Zealy") 
as a conservancy district in order to protect wetlands constitutes 
a constructive taking of property by the government for which a 
landowner should be compensated.  We conclude that the conservancy 
                     
     
1  Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 194 Wis. 2d 701, 534 N.W.2d 917 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
2 
zoning placed on Zealy's land did not effect a constructive 
taking.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals.   
 
The parcel of land here at issue consists of approximately 
10.4
2 contiguous acres.  The parcel was originally part of an 
approximately 250-acre parcel annexed from the Town of Waukesha to 
the City of Waukesha ("City") in 1967.  Prior to annexation, the 
property was zoned A-3 by the Town of Waukesha.  This zoning 
permitted agricultural use, and Zealy's parents used the property 
to grow crops in a truck farming operation.  After annexation, the 
City zoned the land R-1, a zoning permitting, among other uses, 
residential use.  Later, a small portion of the land was rezoned 
B-4, allowing business use.  The property continued to be used for 
farming until approximately 1981.  The other lands in the 250-acre 
parcel were sold off until only the 10.4-acre parcel at issue in 
this case remained in Zealy's possession.  As of the time he 
commenced this action, Zealy used the land for peat mining.   
                     
     
2  Throughout the proceedings in this case, the parties have 
provided varying figures for the acreage of Zealy's land.  At the 
trial court, the parties and the court stated that the entire 
parcel consisted of 11 or 11.2 acres.  In their briefs before this 
court, Zealy states that the parcel consists of 10.2 acres, while 
the City describes the parcel as being 10.3 acres.  The court of 
appeals decision states that the parcel is 10.1 acres.  The figure 
we here provide, 10.4 acres, is based on documents attached to the 
affidavit of the City's director, which are included in the 
record.  These documents show that the parcel currently consists 
of .57 acres zoned B-4, 1.57 acres zoned R-1, and 8.24 acres zoned 
C-1, for a total of 10.38 acres.  (All figures are rounded to the 
nearest hundredth of an acre.)  Rounding to the nearest tenth, we 
will henceforth describe the parcel as consisting of a total of 
10.4 acres. 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
3 
 
On March 16, 1982, Zealy, his mother, and his brother, all of 
whom at that time shared interests in the property, executed an 
easement granting the City the right to construct, maintain, and 
operate sanitary and storm sewers on Zealy's land.  Prior to the 
execution of the easement, Zealy had met with the City's Director 
of Public Works and City Engineer.  The Director of Public Works 
presented Zealy with a drawing showing proposed future development 
of the property as a residential area.  The easement provided that 
the City would not levy any special assessments for the storm or 
sewer mains installed on the property.  Zealy alleges that the 
representations made by the City's officials led him to grant the 
easement.  The City eventually constructed a sanitary and storm 
sewer on a portion of the property.   
 
On July 3, 1985, the City changed the zoning on approximately 
28.6 acres of land in the City from R-1 to C-1, creating a 
conservancy district.
3  Included in the conservancy district were 
8.2 acres of Zealy's parcel.  These 8.2 acres may not be used for 
residential use; the remaining land in the parcel, approximately 
2.1 acres, is zoned for residential (1.57 acres) and business (.57 
acres) use.  The C-1 zoning allows agricultural use of the 
property.  
                     
     
3  Zealy has filed a motion with this court asking that we 
take judicial notice of the minutes of the City's Plan Commission 
meeting of November 14, 1984, and the City's rezoning ordinance.  
We hereby grant Zealy's motion. 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
4 
 
Prior to the rezoning, the City's assessor had valued the 
entire 10.4-acre parcel at approximately $81,000.00; after the 
rezoning, the City assessed the value of the property at 
approximately $57,000.00.  Zealy claims that the fair market value 
of the 8.2 acres, if developed for residential use as allowed 
under R-1 zoning, would be approximately $200,000.00.  Zealy has 
never submitted an application for a building permit or plans to 
the City for residential construction on the land, nor has Zealy 
shown that he has made any expenditures toward such construction. 
 Zealy claims that the value of the 8.2-acre parcel under the 
present C-1 zoning is approximately $4,000.   
 
Zealy brought an inverse condemnation action
4 against the 
City, claiming that its rezoning of his land constituted a 
regulatory taking without compensation, and that the City should 
be equitably estopped from enforcing the rezoning because of 
Zealy's reliance on its representations.  The circuit court 
dismissed Zealy's claims on both issues.  With respect to the 
first issue, the circuit court concluded that Zealy's parcel 
should be considered as a whole in determining whether a taking 
occurred.  On appeal, the court of appeals held that the circuit 
court had erred when it considered the parcel as a whole, and 
reversed and remanded for a new trial.  See Zealy, 194 Wis. 2d at 
706, 718. 
                     
     
4  Zealy brought this action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.10 
(1993-94). 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
5 
 
The City, as well as several of the parties submitting briefs 
as amici curiae, argue to this court that this matter is not ripe 
for adjudication.  These parties note that a regulatory takings 
claim is not ripe "until the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at 
issue."  Streff v. Town of Delafield, 190 Wis. 2d 348, 354, 526 
N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Williamson County Regional 
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)).  In 
the present matter, Zealy has never sought to have his property 
rezoned.
5  We recognize that a lack of ripeness in a takings claim 
should normally result in dismissal.  See, e.g., Schlieper v. DNR, 
188 Wis. 2d 318, 322-23, 525 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1994).  However, 
we conclude that addressing the merits of the case at bar would 
best serve the interests of justice.  The resolution of this case 
will settle issues presently unclear in our law of regulatory 
takings.  We also address the merits in consideration of the 
extensive briefing by numerous interested persons and entities who 
filed amicus briefs, many of which exclusively discuss the takings 
issues raised in this case.  This court has previously recognized 
such considerations in reaching the merits of the takings issue in 
                     
     
5  At oral argument, Zealy's counsel contended that taking 
such actions would have been fruitless.  We also note that, in 
answers to interrogatories filed in this case, Zealy stated that 
his proposed use, presumably residential, would not be allowed 
even under a variance to the existing zoning.  
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
6 
M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Town of Somers, 141 Wis. 2d 271, 
286, 414 N.W.2d 824 (1987).  For the reasons above stated, we 
pursue a similar course of action here. 
 
The issue in this case is whether the City's ordinance 
constituted a taking of Zealy's property without compensation.  
This is a question of law, and thus we undertake our review 
without deference to the decisions of the courts below.  Ball v. 
Dist. No. 4, Area Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 537, 345 N.W.2d 389 (Ct. 
App. 
1984). 
 
The 
Fifth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides in part that private property shall not "be 
taken for public use, without just compensation."  Article I, § 13 
of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
 
Private property for public use.  Section 13.  The 
property of no person shall be taken for public use 
without just compensation therefor. 
 
 
Takings jurisprudence has developed from two competing 
principles: on one hand, respect for the property rights of 
individuals; on the other, recognition that the government retains 
the ability, in furtherance of the interests of all citizens, to 
regulate an owner's potential uses of land.  Thus, in Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the United States Supreme 
Court held municipal zoning to be a permissible exercise of the 
police power, while in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415 (1922), the Court held that "while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
7 
be recognized as a taking."  Such takings are described as 
"constructive" or "regulatory" takings. 
 
In cases decided since Mahon, the United States Supreme Court 
has established a rough framework for determining when a 
regulatory taking has occurred: "In 70-odd years of succeeding 
`regulatory takings' jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any 
`set formula' for determining how far is too far, preferring to 
`engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'"  Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) 
(quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978)).  This court has adopted a similar method of inquiry. 
 See Noranda Exploration, Inc., v. Ostrom, 113 Wis. 2d 612, 624, 
335 N.W.2d 596 (1983).  The United States Supreme Court has 
identified several factors particularly relevant to the inquiry in 
cases alleging a regulatory taking: "[T]he Fifth Amendment is 
violated when land-use regulation `does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land.'"  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City 
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).  When a landowner alleges 
that a regulation effects a taking as applied to a particular 
piece of property, the factors courts should examine are described 
as "the character of the governmental action," "the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant," and "the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
8 
backed expectations." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (quoted in 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8).  
 
Although phrased in slightly differing terms in the cases, 
the rule emerging from opinions of our state courts and the United 
States Supreme Court is that a regulation must deny the landowner 
all or substantially all practical uses of a property in order to 
be considered a taking for which compensation is required.  See 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (regulatory taking occurs when regulation 
"denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land"); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (regulatory 
taking occurs if it denies an owner "economically viable use of 
his land") (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260); Zinn v. State, 112 
Wis. 2d 417, 424, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983) (regulatory taking occurs 
"when 
the 
government 
restriction 
placed 
on 
the 
property 
`practically or substantially renders the property useless for all 
reasonable purposes'") (quoted sources omitted); Reel Enters. v. 
City of La Crosse, 146 Wis. 2d 662, 674, 431 N.W.2d 743 (Ct. App. 
1988), review denied, 147 Wis. 2d 887 (1988) (regulatory taking 
occurs if it "deprives the owner of all, or practically all, of 
the use").  Thus, for example, the United States Supreme Court in 
Lucas held that a landowner who purchased two residential lots at 
a combined price 
of nearly one 
million dollars and was 
subsequently barred from building residential structures by a 
state beachfront preservation law, rendering the lots without 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
9 
value, may be entitled to compensation for his loss.  See Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1006-07, 1019-32.   
 
However, before reaching this determination, a court must 
first determine what, precisely, is the property at issue:   
 
 
Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to 
compare the value that has been taken from the property 
with the value that remains in the property, one of the 
critical questions is determining how to define the unit 
of property "whose value is to furnish the denominator 
of the fraction." 
 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 
(1987) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: 
Comments 
on 
the 
Ethical 
Foundations 
of 
"Just 
Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192 (1967)).  The court 
of appeals in this case held that a landowner's anticipated 
investment opportunities should be examined in order to determine 
what the parcel at issue should be.  In this, the court of appeals 
was in error.  We conclude that the United States Supreme Court 
has never endorsed a test that "segments" a contiguous property to 
determine the relevant parcel; rather, the Court has consistently 
held that a landowner's property in such a case should be 
considered as a whole.   
 
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have been entirely 
abrogated. 
 
In 
deciding 
whether 
a 
particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court 
focuses rather both on the character of the action and 
on the nature and extent of the interference with rights 
in the parcel as a whole . . . . 
 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
10 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.   
Similarly, in Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498, the Court noted practical 
arguments against allowing the segmentation of the property at 
issue: 
 
Many zoning ordinances place limits on the property 
owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of 
his property.  A requirement that a building occupy no 
more than a specified percentage of the lot on which it 
is located could be characterized as a taking of the 
vacant area . . . .  [O]ne could always argue that a 
setback ordinance requiring that no structure be built 
within a certain distance from the property line 
constitutes a taking because the footage represents a 
distinct segment of property for takings law purposes.   
 
The court of appeals in this case cited Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 
n.7, for the proposition that courts should use a flexible 
approach in deciding when to segment the property at issue in 
takings cases.  See Zealy, 194 Wis. 2d at 716-17 & n.6.  However, 
we note that this issue was not before the Lucas Court.  The Court 
did not have to consider whether the property in that case might 
require segmentation because the trial court had found that the 
entirety of the property at issue was rendered valueless by the 
contested regulation.  See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7.  
Justice Scalia's comments on this point were therefore dicta.  
Furthermore, in Concrete Pipe and Prods. v. Construction Laborers 
Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993), Justice Souter, 
writing for the majority of the Court, replied in the following 
manner to an argument that the property at issue should be 
segmented: 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
11 
 
[W]e rejected this analysis years ago in Penn Central . 
. . where we held that a claimant's parcel of property 
could not first be divided into what was taken and what 
was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of 
the former to be complete and hence compensable.  To the 
extent that any portion of property is taken, that 
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant 
question, however, is whether the property taken is all, 
or only a portion of the parcel in question.   
 
We note that this opinion was written subsequent to Lucas, and 
that Justice Scalia joined the opinion.  We conclude, therefore, 
that the cases of the United States Supreme Court do not support 
the proposition that a contiguous property should be divided into 
discrete segments for purposes of evaluating a takings claim.  
 
We also note a possible difficulty in the application of the 
rule proposed by the court of appeals in the present case.  
Looking to a landowner's anticipated use of various parcels and 
sub-parcels of land in order to determine the extent of the parcel 
at issue would require ascertaining a landowner's subjective 
intent before being able to evaluate a possible takings claim.  
This would confuse both the agencies responsible for zoning and 
the courts called on to adjudicate such claims, and increase the 
difficulty of an already complex inquiry. 
 
The court of appeals also cited Ciampitti v. United States, 
22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991), and Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United 
States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), for its rule allowing 
segmentation of property.  These precedents, which in any event 
are merely persuasive, see Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 
115 Wis. 2d 289, 307, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983), do not alter our view 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
12 
of the rule we apply in this case.  First, we note that the court 
in Ciampitti had to determine what the extent of the property at 
issue was after a lengthy series of purchases, see Ciampitti, 22 
Cl. Ct. at 311-17, and ultimately decided against segmentation of 
the property, id. at 320.  The case thus bears little relation to 
the instant case, in which the property is part of a single 
purchase.  Second, in Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180, the court of 
appeals excluded from the parcel at issue lands that had already 
been developed and/or sold, as well as lands for which the 
development rights had been dedicated to the state in return for a 
building permit on the remaining lands.  No such concerns are 
present in the instant case, in which we consider only the 10.4 
undeveloped acres owned by Zealy at the time of its rezoning.   
 
We thus conclude that the property at issue in this case is 
Zealy's entire 10.4-acre parcel, and now examine the facts in the 
record to determine whether the City's C-1 zoning effected a 
taking.
6  First, we note that after the rezoning, Zealy still 
                     
     
6  The court of appeals stated in its opinion that Zealy 
conceded that "when all [10.4] acres are viewed together, the 
effect of the zoning change is not severe enough to support a 
constructive taking claim because of the value of his commercial 
property."  Zealy, 194 Wis. 2d at 706.  In both oral argument and 
in his briefs before this court, Zealy's counsel now claims that 
he made no such concession.  We note that the following exchange 
between Zealy's counsel (Mr. Hammes) and the circuit court, from 
the record of the hearing at which the circuit court granted 
summary judgment against Zealy on the regulatory taking issue, 
appears to represent just such a concession: 
 
 
THE COURT:  . . . .  I am open to proof if you can offer 
some proof that [the zoning] deprives of reasonable use 
of [sic] the entire [10.4] acres. 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
13 
retains approximately 2.1 acres zoned for business and/or 
residential use.  The City's assessor has valued the property at 
nearly three-fourths of its former value.  Zealy presented the 
circuit court with an assessment valuing the 8.2-acre parcel at 
approximately $200,000, presuming residential use was allowed, but 
as this court stated in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 
23, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972):
7 
 
[The landowners] argue their property has been severely 
depreciated in value.  But this depreciation of value is 
not based on the use of the land in its natural state 
but on what the land would be worth if it could be 
filled and used for the location of a dwelling.  While 
loss of value is to be considered in determining whether 
a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon 
changing the character of the land at the expense of 
(..continued) 
 
 
MR. HAMMES:  It can't, because he has a buildable 
business site before and after.   
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
THE COURT:  You concede it doesn't deprive reasonable 
use of [10.4] acres? 
 
 
MR. HAMMES:  Under the Court's analysis, that's correct.  
 
We further note that, at another point in his brief, Zealy's 
counsel states that the 2.1 acres that were not rezoned retain 
"substantial value."  In any event, whether or not Zealy concedes 
that the remaining 2.1 acres of his parcel contain sufficient 
value to defeat a regulatory taking claim, we can and do find 
facts in the record, as we describe in the text of this opinion, 
sufficient to support the summary judgment rendered against him by 
the circuit court. 
     
7  Zealy argues that this decision is limited to cases 
involving the public trust doctrine, under which the state has the 
duty to protect shoreland areas.  However, as this court stated in 
Somers, 141 Wis. 2d at 287, Just is not limited to cases involving 
that doctrine, and the case is thus equally applicable to wetland 
regulations. 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
14 
harm to public rights is not an essential factor or 
controlling.   
 
Finally, we note that under the City's current zoning ordinance, 
the 8.2 acres of land zoned C-1 may still be used for its 
historical use, farming.  Viewed as a whole, the parcel retains a 
combination of residential, commercial, and agricultural uses.   
 
It may be true that in some cases, as Justice Scalia stated 
in Lucas, that "the rhetorical force of [the] `deprivation of all 
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision," 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7, but this is not such a case.  The 
extent of the parcel at issue in this case is clearly identified, 
and just as clearly the parcel retains substantial uses.  Under 
these facts, we cannot conclude that the City's rezoning deprived 
Zealy of all or substantially all of the use of his land.  Without 
any such loss to the landowner, a taking cannot occur.  We 
therefore conclude that the circuit court correctly granted 
summary judgment against Zealy on this issue.   
 
Two further points are raised by the takings issue in this 
case.  First, our conclusion that the City's ordinance did not 
effect a taking was compelled by our holding that Zealy did not 
suffer the loss of substantially all of the beneficial uses of his 
land.  We therefore need not consider another factor we may look 
to in takings cases, whether the regulation did not advance a 
legitimate state interest.  Zealy only contested the interests 
served by the City's ordinance to the extent that he claimed the 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
15 
City's regulation served the improper purpose of allowing the City 
to "take" his land rather than purchase it outright, an argument 
we reject.  Second, we also do not reach the issue of the 
continuing validity of this court's analysis in Just in view of 
the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Lucas, which expressed 
disagreement with the South Carolina Supreme Court's conclusion 
that the regulation at issue could be justified as an exercise of 
the police power in order to prevent the harm to the public 
interest resulting from residential development of wetlands.  See 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-32.  Such an evaluation would be required 
only in a case in which, as in Lucas, the value of the land at 
issue is "wholly eliminated."  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.  For the 
same reason, we need not here consider the argument, raised by 
several amici curiae in this case, that Just is a "background 
principle[] of the State's law of property," see Lucas, 505 U.S at 
1029, that would justify even a total regulatory taking.  Nothing 
in this opinion limits our holding in Just and cases following its 
rule.   
 
Finally, Zealy also argues that he obtained a vested right to 
the former residential zoning on his land by virtue of the 
representations made to him by City officials during the 
negotiations for his granting of the City's easement.  Property 
owners obtain no vested rights in a particular type of zoning 
solely through reliance on the zoning.  Buhler v. Racine County, 
33 Wis. 2d 137, 148, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966).  Zealy has not shown 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
16 
that he made any expenditures in reliance on the zoning, nor has 
he ever submitted an application for a building permit proposing a 
residential use of the land.  Thus, he did not meet the 
requirement of submitting an application for a building permit 
"which conforms to the zoning or building code requirements in 
effect at the time of the application," see Lake Bluff Hous. 
Partners v. City of South Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 177, 540 
N.W.2d 189 (1995),
8 and his claim for vested rights must fail.  
 
Wisconsin has a long history of protecting its water 
resources, its lakes, rivers, and streams, which depend on 
wetlands for their proper survival.  As stated in Just, 56 Wis. 2d 
at 17:  
 
Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, 
undesirable, and not picturesque.  But as the people 
became more sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired 
that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, 
are part of the balance of nature and are essential to 
the purity of the water in our lakes and streams.  
Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part of the 
ecological creation and now, even to the uninitiated, 
possess their own beauty in nature.   
Our review of the relevant law of this court and the United States 
Supreme Court leads us to the conclusion that the circuit court 
correctly dismissed Zealy's claims.  We therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the circuit court's 
judgment and order. 
                     
     
8  Zealy submitted his brief in this case prior to our 
decision in Lake Bluff. 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
17 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-2831 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Alfred A. Zealy, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
City of Waukesha, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
 
Reported at:  194 Wis. 2d 701, 534 N.W.2d 917 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 4, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 29, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
WILLIS J. ZICK 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Curt R. Meitz, City Attorney and Karen A. Macherey, 
assistant city attorney and oral argument by Curt R. Meitz. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant James W. Hammes and Cramer, 
Multhauf & Hammes, Waukesha and oral argument by James W. Hammes. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by John S. Greene, assistant 
attorney general for the State of Wisconsin with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
No. 93-2831 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Brian W. Ohm, Madison for 
The Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Lawrence E. Classen, Madison 
for the Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Kristine A. Euclide, Meg 
Vergeront and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison for 
the National Wildlife Federation, Wisconsin Wildlife Federation, 
National Audubon Society and Wisconsin Audubon Council.  Of 
counsel was Glenn P. Sugameli, and National Wildlife Federation, 
Washington, D.C.; Cameron Davis and National Wildlife Federation, 
Ann Arbor, MI and John D. Echeverria and National Audubon Society, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Peter A. Peshek, Paul G. 
Kent, L. Stuart Rosenberg and DeWitt, Ross & Stevens, S.C., 
Madison; Curtis A. Witynski, Madison; Thomas W. Harnish, Madison; 
William P. O'Connor and Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, Madison 
for the City of Madison, League of Wisconsin Municipalities, 
Wisconsin Towns Association and the Wisconsin Association of 
Lakes, Inc and oral argument by Paul G. Kent.