Title: DENNIS BRIGHT V LT LITTLEFIELD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119111
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 2002

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 9, 2002  
DENNIS BRIGHT,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 119111  
LT. LITTLEFIELD, SGT. MEYERS, 
OFFICER JOHN DOE #1, OFFICER 
JOHN DOE #2, JOHN DOE #3 
also known as “ERIC,” and 
CHESTER F. WATERHOUSE,  
Defendants,  
DOROTHY AILSHIE, TIM MOORE 
and A-ABLE BAIL BONDS, 
a Missouri company,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
PER CURIAM  
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged defendants  
were liable to him under theories of assault and battery,  
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional  
distress, and negligence as a result of his being illegally  
 
 
arrested by a bounty hunter and taken to Missouri.  In  
Missouri it was confirmed that the actual person who should  
have been sought was plaintiff’s brother, who had been  
arrested on a drug charge there.  The trial court granted  
summary 
disposition 
for 
defendants 
pursuant 
to 
MCR  
2.116(C)(10).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal,  
holding the existence of the facially valid Missouri arrest  
warrant provided authority to arrest plaintiff.  We reverse  
the grant of summary disposition and remand for further  
proceedings.  
I  
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  We borrow the  
Court of Appeals statement of facts:  
Plaintiff’s 
brother 
Vincent 
Bright 
was  
arrested by Missouri police on a drug charge.  
Vincent identified himself as plaintiff Dennis 
Bright, using plaintiff’s address, date of birth 
and social security number.  Vincent entered into a  
bond agreement with defendant, A-Able Bail Bonds, 
which was issued in plaintiff’s name and which 
Vincent signed using plaintiff’s name. 
When  
Vincent subsequently absconded on the bond, an 
arrest warrant was issued in plaintiff’s name, 
again using plaintiff’s address, date of birth and 
social security number. 
Defendant Tim Moore  
apprehended plaintiff in Detroit and returned him 
to the Missouri court, where he was later released 
and the arrest warrant was amended to name Vincent.  
Plaintiff brought this action, alleging assault and 
battery, 
false 
imprisonment, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and negligence.  The trial  
court granted summary disposition to defendants, 
finding that the facially valid Missouri warrant  
2  
 
provided the authority to arrest plaintiff.[1]  
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Plaintiff has applied for  
leave to appeal.  
II  
The Court of Appeals held that, given probable cause, a  
private citizen may make an arrest for a felony committed in  
the person’s presence or otherwise.  MCL 764.16; People v  
Bashans, 80 Mich App 702, 713; 265 NW2d 170 (1978).  It  
further noted that a warrant provides probable cause for an  
arrest, and an arrest on a facially valid warrant is not a  
basis for a claim of false imprisonment. Gooch v Wachowiak,  
352 Mich 347, 351-354; 89 NW2d 496 (1958). It reasoned that  
the facially valid warrant provided the authority needed to  
execute it.  People v Rowe, 95 Mich App 204, 208-209; 289 NW2d  
915 (1980).  The Court concluded that because the Missouri  
warrant was facially valid and the erroneous identification  
was not caused by defendants, the trial court did not err in  
granting summary disposition.  
III  
This case concerns the interpretation of MCL 764.16.  In  
construing 
statutes, 
“[t]he 
primary 
goal 
of 
judicial  
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent  
of the Legislature.”  McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic Corp, 461  
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 10, 2001 
(Docket No. 219182), p 1.  
3  
Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d 57 (2000). To do that we examine the  
“language 
of 
the 
statute 
itself.” 
In 
re 
MCI  
Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  
If the language is unambiguous, the Court applies the statute  
as written.  
IV  
We deal with a plainly written statute in this matter.  
MCL 764.16 provides:  
A private person may make an arrest in the 
following situations:  
(a) For a felony committed in the private 
person’s presence.  
(b) If 
the 
person 
to 
be 
arrested 
has  
committed a felony although not in the private 
person’s presence.  
(c) If the private person is summoned by a 
peace officer to assist the officer in making an 
arrest.  
(d) If the private person is a merchant, an 
agent of a merchant, an employee of a merchant, or 
an independent contractor providing security for a 
merchant of a store and has reasonable cause to  
believe that the person to be arrested has violated 
section 356c or 356d of the Michigan penal code, 
Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, being 
sections 750.356c and 750.356d of the Michigan 
Compiled Laws, in that store, regardless of whether 
the violation was committed in the presence of the 
private person.  
The plain language of subsection (b) provides authority  
for a private person to arrest another, if the other has  
committed a felony. 
The statute does not grant arrest  
authority where the other has not committed a felony even if  
4  
the private person has probable cause to believe the other has  
committed a felony.2
 Notwithstanding the clarity of the  
Michigan statute, the Court of Appeals in Bashans incorrectly  
read a probable cause qualification into MCL 764.16.  This may  
not be done.  Although such authority may have existed at  
common law, that authority was abrogated by our Legislature in  
1927.  1927 PA 175. 
Thus, an arrest is only justified by  
subsection (b) if the person to be arrested has actually  
committed a felony.3  To proceed to arrest, no matter how  
2 While numerous states have similar statutes, several 
are more expansive and essentially grant authority to private 
parties to arrest on the basis of reasonable cause.  For  
example, Cal Penal Code 837 provides:  
A private person may arrest another:  
1. 
For 
a 
public 
offense 
committed 
or  
attempted in his presence.  
2. 
When the person arrested has committed a 
felony, although not in his presence.  
3. 
When a felony has in fact been committed,  
and he has reasonable cause for believing the 
person arrested to have committed it.  
3 It is noteworthy that the key phrase in subsection b is  
“committed a felony” (emphasis added). Of course, a felony is 
“committed” when a person engages in the conduct that  
constitutes a felony.  Thus, an arrest by a private person of 
another person who has actually committed a felony would be 
valid regardless of whether the arrested person is ever tried 
for or convicted of the felony.  In the present case, it is 
undisputed that plaintiff is innocent of the alleged Missouri 
felony underlying his purported arrest.  Accordingly, we need 
not consider the proper allocation of the burden of proof with 
regard to whether a person committed a felony in a case where 
that is a disputed issue. 
Likewise, we assume without 
deciding for purposes of our analysis that MCL 764.16(b)  
5  
 
manifest the likelihood the seized person is the felon, is  
outside the scope of subsection (b) if the seized person did  
not commit the felony.4  In such circumstances, subsection (b)  
does not shield the party making the “arrest” from liability.5  
provides authority for a private person to arrest for the 
commission of a felony under the laws of another state.  
4 While the plain language of subsection (b) is  
dispositive, it is noteworthy that subsection (d) of MCL 
764.16 authorizes a merchant (and certain affiliated parties) 
to make an arrest merely on the basis of “reasonable cause” to 
believe that a person has committed retail fraud in violation 
of MCL 750.356c or MCL 750.356d in the merchant’s store.  The  
absence of any such “reasonable cause” language in subsection 
(b) underscores that it means what it states in providing 
authority to arrest only if the person to be arrested has 
committed a felony.  
5 We note that this opinion is consistent with the result  
and basic analysis of our recent decision in People v  
Hamilton, 465 Mich 526; 638 NW2d 92 (2002). In Hamilton, a  
city 
police 
officer 
stopped a vehicle outside his jurisdiction 
and 
eventually 
arrested the driver, the defendant in Hamilton,  
for the misdemeanor of operating under the influence of liquor 
(OUIL).  It was later discovered that the defendant had two  
prior OUIL convictions, which led to him being charged with 
the felony of OUIL, third offense (OUIL-3d). 
However, 
importantly, the police officer was unaware of the prior OUIL 
convictions at the time of the arrest. This Court concluded  
that the police officer lacked authority under Michigan 
statutes, including the statute at issue in this case, MCL 
764.16, to make the arrest for the misdemeanor of simple OUIL. 
Id. at 530-532. However, we also concluded that the arrest 
did not involve a constitutional violation under the Fourth  
Amendment because the police officer had probable cause to 
suspect the defendant committed OUIL.  Id. at 533. 
The  
essential holding of Hamilton was that there is no  
exclusionary rule requiring suppression of evidence flowing 
from an arrest by a police officer that is only “statutorily 
illegal,” but does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at  
532-535.  Obviously, the present civil case does not implicate 
any concerns about suppression of evidence in a criminal 
prosecution on the basis of police misconduct. Accordingly, 
there is no conflict between the dispositive holding of  
6  
 
 
 
 
Further, the Court of Appeals opinion in Rowe, which was  
cited by the Court of Appeals as support in this case, does  
not support the lower courts’ conclusions.  In that case, two  
Hamilton and the present opinion.  
However, 
Hamilton 
did 
include 
the 
following 
language 
that 
may warrant further explanation:  
Under MCL 764.16, a private person has the 
authority to make a felony arrest, but lacks the 
authority to make a misdemeanor arrest except in 
nonapplicable circumstances.  “‘No one without a  
warrant has any right to make an arrest in the 
absence of actual belief, based on actual facts 
creating probable cause of guilt.’” 
People v  
Panknin, 4 Mich App 19, 27; 143 NW2d 806 (1966),  
quoting People v Bressler, 223 Mich 597, 600-601; 
194 NW 559 (1923), paraphrasing People v Burt, 51  
Mich 199, 202; 16 NW 378 (1883).  Here, the officer 
only had probable cause to make an arrest for a 
misdemeanor, i.e., OUIL.  The fact that defendant  
may have committed a felony, i.e., OUIL, third  
offense, was only discovered after the arrest.  
Accordingly, the officer lacked the statutory  
authority to make the arrest under MCL 764.16.  
[Id. at 531-532 (emphasis added).]  
The critical point was that the police officer in Hamilton did  
not realize that the defendant in that case may have committed 
the felony of OUIL-3d.  Accordingly, the officer in that case 
plainly did not even purport to arrest the defendant for a 
felony, but only for the misdemeanor of simple OUIL.  Thus, 
MCL 764.16 did not provide authority for the misdemeanor 
arrest made in Hamilton.  To the extent that the language from 
prior cases in the above quotation from Hamilton suggests that 
the existence of probable cause is relevant to determining 
whether a private person’s arrest of another person for a 
felony is permitted by subsection (b) of MCL 764.16, it is 
incorrect.  Rather, as explained in this opinion, the plain 
language of subsection (b) means that the question is whether 
the seized person actually committed a felony.  Of course, 
regardless of MCL 764.16, a police officer or other state 
actor acting as such is constitutionally precluded by the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
from making an arrest without probable cause. 
Hamilton, supra at 533.  
7  
 
city police officers arrested a defendant on a warrant outside  
their city, but inside the county where the city was located.  
It was claimed that they had no jurisdiction to effect the  
arrest outside the city.  The Court disagreed, holding that  
they had the statutory authority to execute the warrant  
anywhere in the state.  The Court further held that, “Pursuant  
to the statutes cited, when a warrant is directed to a law  
enforcement 
officer, 
the 
warrant 
itself 
provides 
the 
authority  
needed to execute it.” Id. at 208-209. The present case is  
distinguishable because it does not involve an arrest by a law  
enforcement officer.  Thus, while a warrant may give a law  
enforcement officer authority to execute it, it should not be  
construed as extending such authority to a private person.  
The authority for a private person to arrest in certain  
limited situations comes from MCL 764.16. 
Under its  
subsection (b), authority is given only when the person to be  
arrested has actually committed a felony.  
Therefore, because it is undisputed that plaintiff had  
not committed a felony, defendants did not have authority to  
arrest him.  The facially valid Missouri warrant did not,  
under these facts, provide the authority to arrest plaintiff.6  
6 Defendants argue that Moore’s status as a bounty hunter 
insulates him from liability because of alleged wide-ranging 
common-law powers based in part on the bail bond contract.  It  
is not necessary to determine the extent of those powers, if 
any, since plaintiff was not a party to the contract.  
8  
 
 
 
 
The trial court erred in granting summary disposition.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court and  
Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the circuit court  
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  MCR  
7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
9