Title: PAGET ET UX v. City of Pendleton
Citation: 219 Or. 253, 346 P.2d 1111
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 1959

Affirmed December 2, 1959.
*254 Arthur H. Lewis, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was William E. Hanzen, Pendleton.
Robert N. Funk and Gene B. Conklin, Pendleton, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and SLOAN, O'CONNELL, REDDING and KING, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
O'CONNELL, J.
The plaintiffs seek to enjoin the defendant city of Pendleton from foreclosing a water line extension lien arising out of an assessment made by the defendant against property in the Montee Addition to the city of Pendleton.
In 1955 Mr. William F. Brenner, a contractor and builder, was in the process of developing the Montee Addition which had just been platted, and which consisted of 127 lots. He requested the Pendleton city council to cooperate with him in working out an arrangement by which the Addition could be furnished with water through an extension of the defendant's water system. As a result of this request the following action was taken.
On February 5, 1955 the city council adopted *255 Resolution 192 in which it was resolved that it was expedient and necessary to create a water line extension district and to lay waterlines in such district at an estimated cost of $54,400; that an assessment district consisting of all of the lots in the Addition be created for the payment of such improvements; that the cost of making the improvements be made a lien upon all of the lots and parts of lots benefited by the improvements and that the assessment should be $466.20 against each of 71 lots designated in the resolution (these being the lots in the Addition upon which Brenner had begun the construction of dwelling houses). The resolution provided that in the event that the remaining 56 lots in the Addition were improved by erecting residence structures, the city would lay all water mains in that remaining area at its own expense and refund to Brenner $35.71 for each of the 56 lots improved to reimburse him for the outlay made on the 71 lots assessed. The following excerpt from the minutes of the city council meeting of January 26, 1955 explain this latter computation:
*256 Prior to the adoption of the resolution the defendant had obtained from all of the owners of the lots in the Montee Addition the written consent to the immediate entry of a lien against each of the lots for the amount to be assessed against such lot. The written agreement also contained the following waiver:
The Pendleton City Council enacted Ordinance No. 2089 and Ordinance No. 2090 which provided for the construction of the water main; the assessment of $466.20 against each of the 71 lots; and for the creation of a lien on the lots for the amount of the respective assessments. Ordinance No. 2089 provided in part as follows:
Eventually the defendant constructed the water line extension pursuant to the preceding arrangement. The defendant paid $21,299.80 of the $54,400 estimated cost, and the remainder, amounting to $33,100.20 was assessed to the 71 lots.
The plaintiffs are the owners in fee of one of the lots included in the 71 made subject to the assessment, having acquired title through mesne conveyances from one of the parties to the consent agreement referred to above. The action of the defendant city in creating the water line district and in levying the assessment against the 71 lots is attacked by the plaintiffs on the ground that it is "unreasonable, discriminatory, unlawful, ultra vires and void." More specifically, it is contended that the city did not have the authority under its charter to make such improvements or to levy the assessment; that even though defendant had such authority it exercised it improperly in that there was an attempt to impose a lien upon the 71 lots prior to the construction of the water main and before such lots would benefit by the improvement; that it exempted the property benefited by the improvement; that plaintiffs and the other owners of the 71 lots were charged for connections to other property; that the assessment overcharged each of the 71 lots the amount of $35.71; that the provision for rebate to Brenner was improper; that only a part of the property benefited was assessed for the entire improvement, and that the 71 lots were assessed in excess of benefits received.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the defendant city had the authority *258 under its charter to construct water line extensions and to assess the costs to the property benefited. In answer to plaintiffs' contention that the assessment was not levied in a lawful manner, the trial court held as follows:
We consider first the defendant's authority to create a water extension district and to make an assessment for the extension of water mains into the district. The general authority of the defendant city is found in Section 3 of its Charter, which reads as follows:
Section 5 of the Charter implemented this general grant of authority by the following provision:
The authority to make local improvements and assessments is contained in the following sections of the Charter:
Considering the broad grant of power to the city of Pendleton in sections 3 and 5 of the charter, together with the more specific power contained in sections 37 and 38 to provide for local improvements, we are of the opinion that the defendant city acted lawfully in enacting the ordinances creating the water extension district and providing for an assessment to finance the expenditures incurred.
1. The broad powers contained in sections 3 and 5 would in themselves be sufficient to authorize the defendant to enact the ordinances in question. City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal2d 595, 212 P2d 894 (1949); Liberis v. Harper, 89 Fla 477, 104 So 853 (1925); State v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 56 Fla 858, 47 So 358 (1908); Porter v. Vinzant, 49 Fla 213, 38 So 607 (1905); City Commission of Jackson v. Hirschman, 253 Mich 596, 235 NW 265 (1931); City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn 511, 16 NW2d 779 (1944); State v. Otis, 93 Ohio St 83, 120 NE 313 (1918); City of Denton v. Denton Home Ice Co., 119 Tex 193, 27 SW2d 119, 68 ALR 866 (1930). See City of Grants Pass v. Rogue River Public Service Corp., 87 Or 637, 171 P 400 (1918); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ed) § 10.25 (1949); 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 14.00, p 290. But we interpret sections 37 and 38 as a specific grant of the power to construct a water extension line and to assess the property benefited by the improvement.
The plaintiffs argue that the term "other public improvements" does not include the construction of a water line extension as was provided for by ordinance in the present case. This is a narrow construction of the charter and we refuse to adopt it. The extension *261 of a water main is as much a public improvement as the construction of streets, sidewalks and sewers expressly specified in the charter.
2. Although we have held that the furnishing of water by a city is a properitary and not a governmental function, it does not follow that such an activity is not a proper municipal function or that the construction of facilities to supply water is not a "public improvement." We think that the furnishing of water is the same class of public works as the construction of sewers specifically provided for in the charter. The importance of water to the health and convenience of the inhabitants of a city is equal to that of the disposal of sewage. Both are public improvements. See City of McMinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Or 451, 109 P 81 (1910).
Plaintiffs argue that the charter must be strictly construed and that the rule of ejusdem generis precludes us from regarding a water extension improvement as the same class of improvement as those specified in the charter. But this would call for a strict construction of the charter when the charter itself directs us to construe it liberally. Section 4 of the charter provides as follows:
With the aid of this constructional direction we find no difficulty in concluding that the improvement falls within the charter, and we hold therefore that the *262 defendant was acting within its jurisdiction in enacting the ordinances in question.
3. It is next argued that even though it be held that the defendant had the authority to make the improvement and assessment, the assessment was not properly made in that it constituted an overcharge on the owners of the 71 lots and exempted from the charge the other 56 lots benefited. Plaintiffs' title to the lots in question was originally held by one of the property owners who signed the written consent set out above expressly waiving objection to all irregularities in connection with the proceedings and waiving objection to the imposition of a lien upon the lot. Plaintiffs had notice of this agreement between the lot owners and the defendant.
4. Where a city has jurisdiction to make an assessment, an agreement by the property owners waiving their right to protest the assessment is binding upon them and their successors in interest with notice. Ingram's Estate v. Gilmore, 110 Ind App 298, 38 NE2d 860 (1942); Stodola v. City of Cedar Rapids, 192 Iowa 1025, 183 NW 607 (1921); Campbell Const. Co. v. Williamson, 263 Ky 336, 92 SW2d 332 (1936); Mock v. Boyle, 86 NE2d 475 (Ohio 1949); Patterson v. Ashland, 95 Or 233, 187 P 593 (1920); Wagoner v. City of La Grande, 89 Or 192, 173 P 305 (1918); Dunn v. City of Superior, 148 Wis 636, 135 NW 145 (1912); 13 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ed) § 37.265 (1950); 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 1415. Having held that the defendant had jurisdiction to make the improvement and the assessment in this case, the plaintiffs are bound by the consent agreement signed by their predecessor in title.
The decree of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint is affirmed.