Title: Commonwealth v. Eagles
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13215
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2023

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SJC-13215 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL J. EAGLES. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     November 2, 2022. - January 24, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief.  Evidence, Expert 
opinion, Statistics, Joint venturer.  Witness, Expert.  
Homicide.  Robbery.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Joint Enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 25, 1986, and May 27, 1987. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 419 Mass. 825 (1995), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 20, 2018, was heard 
by Gregg J. Pasquale, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Lowy, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Dennis Shedd for the defendant. 
 
Arne Hantson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
M. Chris Fabricant & Meghan Gilligan Palermo, of New York, 
Laura Carey, Daniel V. McCaughey, Abigail Kittredge, & 
Christopher J. Walsh, for The Innocence Project, Inc., & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  Following a jury trial, the defendant, 
Michael J. Eagles, was convicted of murder in the first degree 
by means of extreme atrocity or cruelty and on a theory of 
felony-murder, arising from the death of the victim, Lewis 
Jennings.1  During the course of the defendant's trial, the 
Commonwealth presented expert testimony comparing hair samples 
collected at the crime scene from the victim's hand with hair 
taken from the defendant.  The expert testimony included a 
statistical probability to support the expert's opinion that the 
hair collected at the crime scene belonged to the defendant.  
Since the defendant's convictions, however, such statistical 
probabilities to support hair comparisons have been found to be 
unreliable.  In light of this recent development, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the admission of 
the expert testimony improperly influenced the jury in their 
verdicts.  The motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing.  
The defendant filed both a notice of appeal and a gatekeeper 
petition for leave to appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  A 
single justice of this court allowed the defendant's gatekeeper 
petition and submitted this appeal to the full court. 
This case now presents the issue whether the admission of 
expert testimony on statistical support for hair comparison 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of armed robbery pursuant 
to G. L. c. 265, § 17. 
3 
 
evidence, which since has been proved to be unreliable, was a 
real factor in the jury's deliberations.  Where we conclude that 
it was not, we affirm the denial of the defendant's motion for a 
new trial.2 
Background.  The facts surrounding the murder are set forth 
in detail in Commonwealth v. Eagles, 419 Mass. 825, 826-830 
(1995).  "We summarize those facts here and supplement them with 
other relevant facts from the trial record and the facts found 
by the motion judge to be significant with respect to the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, all of which are supported 
by the record."  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 341 
(2014). 
On the evening of July 29, 1986, the defendant returned 
home from work, drank beer, and walked into town to purchase 
more liquor.  While returning from the liquor store, the 
defendant met with Jeffrey Roberio.  The defendant and Roberio 
returned to the defendant's residence, where they both drank 
more alcohol, and the defendant ingested cocaine and 
hallucinogenic "acid."  At approximately 8 P.M., Roberio's 
cousin, Paul DeMoranville, drove Roberio and the defendant to a 
local drive-in movie theater.  While at the theater, Roberio 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed in support of the 
defendant by the Innocence Project, Inc., and the New England 
Innocence Project. 
4 
 
told DeMoranville that he planned to break into a nearby trailer 
home and asked the defendant to be his lookout.  Roberio assured 
the defendant that nobody would be home at the time of the 
break-in.  Roberio then asked DeMoranville to return to the 
theater to pick them up in one and one-half hours.  DeMoranville 
left the theater, and both Roberio and the defendant walked from 
the theater to the victim's back yard. 
The victim was a seventy-nine year old man who lived alone 
in a trailer.  He stored cash in various hiding places 
throughout the trailer, kept change in a beer stein, and stored 
his insurance papers and old coins in a strong box in the 
kitchen.  The victim also kept a shotgun underneath his bed.  
See Eagles, 419 Mass. at 826. 
When Roberio and the defendant arrived at the victim's 
trailer, they noticed that a light was on and that a car was 
parked in the driveway.  The two men "proceeded to cut off any 
chance of help being called by severing the telephone line."3  
Eagles, 419 Mass. at 829.  According to the Commonwealth's 
theory of the case, the two men entered the trailer and 
confronted the victim, who resisted with force.  Id. at 829-830.  
Both Roberio and the defendant beat the victim mercilessly, tied 
 
3 According to the victim's daughter, the victim's telephone 
line had been working and there was no visible damage on the 
trailer door at 7:30 P.M earlier that day when she visited. 
5 
 
a pillowcase around the victim's neck, and brought him from room 
to room in an attempt to force the victim to tell the two men 
where the money was hidden.  Id. at 827, 830.  After robbing the 
victim, the two men left him either dead, or nearly dead, in his 
trailer.  Id. at 830. 
The defendant's version of the events, however, differed 
drastically.  Eagles, 419 Mass. at 828.  The defendant testified 
at trial in his own defense, and he entirely contradicted the 
recorded statement he previously had given to police shortly 
after the murder.  Id.  In his previous statement to police, the 
defendant had denied any involvement in the crime.  Id.  At 
trial, however, the defendant testified that he did not take 
part in the robbery and murder but did go to the victim's 
trailer for the sole purpose of acting as Roberio's lookout 
while Roberio entered the trailer, which he believed to be 
unoccupied at the time, and took the victim's money.  Id. 
The defendant was adamant that he served only as a lookout 
and remained outside when Roberio entered the trailer.  He 
testified that only when he heard noises coming from within the 
trailer did he enter.  According to the defendant, he saw the 
victim lying on the floor with a ligature around his neck and 
bleeding from his face.  The defendant also saw Roberio holding 
the victim's shotgun.  Although the victim was unconscious, he 
still was breathing.  Roberio instructed the defendant to look 
6 
 
for money, which he tried to do, but he claimed he was 
unsuccessful.  Roberio dumped change from the victim's beer 
stein into the defendant's hand and grabbed the strong box as 
the two men fled from the trailer.4 
Shortly after the murder, DeMoranville and DeMoranville's 
brother returned to the theater, where they picked up the two 
men, and dropped off the defendant at his residence.  The 
defendant had been living at this place of residence with a 
roommate and the roommate's wife for about one and one-half 
months, but never paid any rent.  See Eagles, 419 Mass. at 830, 
832.  Following the murder, the defendant was seen taking 
handfuls of change from his pocket and offering the change to 
his roommate as payment for food and rent.  See id. at 827, 832.  
The defendant also was seen with a roll of paper currency. 
The victim was found the next day on the floor of the 
living room of his trailer.  Eagles, 419 Mass. at 826-827.  
According to the medical examiner, the victim was alive when his 
 
4 After the murder, the two men went into the nearby woods, 
where they left the shotgun and the victim's strong box.  The 
day after the murder, DeMoranville drove Roberio back to the 
woods, where he retrieved the victim's shotgun and some 
ammunition.  They went to a nearby field to shoot the gun, where 
Roberio told DeMoranville that the shotgun was "hot."  Police 
eventually retrieved the victim's shotgun from that field with 
DeMoranville's help, who also showed police the wooded area 
where the shotgun initially was hidden.  In that other wooded 
area, the victim's strong box was found, along with the victim's 
papers strewn about the ground. 
7 
 
injuries were inflicted, but he ultimately died from a 
combination of the multiple blunt force injuries and the 
strangulation by ligature.5  See id. at 827. 
As police searched the victim's trailer, which was in 
disarray on their arrival, there were pools of blood and blood 
stains throughout it, but none of the victim's money could be 
found.  See Eagles, 419 Mass. at 827.  Much of the blood in the 
trailer was type O, the victim's blood type.  Id.  The police 
investigation also revealed Roberio's fingerprint on the empty 
beer stein, as well as a bloody footprint on a pillowcase on the 
floor of the living room.  Id.  Police eventually were able to 
obtain the defendant's sneakers and match the bloody footprint 
to the print from the defendant's left sneaker.  In addition to 
the bloody footprint, police found type O blood on the 
defendant's pants, occult blood on the defendant's hands, and 
blood on one shirt and the sneakers of the defendant.6  See id. 
Most importantly for the purpose of this appeal, hairs were 
found in the victim's left hand, which was found tucked 
 
5 "[T]he victim's spine had been fractured, an elbow had 
been dislocated, bones in his neck had been fractured and 
several ribs had been fractured on each side.  He had extensive 
injuries to his entire face, and he also had multiple 
lacerations on his right hand consistent with defensive wounds."  
Eagles, 419 Mass. at 827. 
 
6 The defendant has type A blood.  Eagles, 419 Mass. at 827 
n.5. 
8 
 
underneath his body at the crime scene.  See Eagles, 419 Mass. 
at 827.  At trial, Jay Godleski, a chemist at the State police 
crime laboratory, testified that he tested hair samples from the 
victim, Roberio, and the defendant.  He then compared those 
hairs to the ones found in the victim's hand.  Godleski 
testified that "two of [the five] hairs [that were recovered 
from the victim's hand] were consistent with [the defendant's] 
standard head hair."7  He further testified:  "[F]or one hair to 
be consistent with a head hair that's been submitted, there's a 
one in 4,500 chance that that hair came from that individual."8 
Following trial, the defendant was found guilty of murder 
in the first degree by means of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
on the theory of felony-murder, for which the defendant's 
conviction of armed robbery served as the predicate offense.  
Eagles, 419 Mass. at 826.  This court upheld the defendant's 
convictions on direct appellate review.  See id. at 840.9 
 
7 Two of the five hairs were consistent with the victim's 
head hair.  The last of the five hairs was "unclassified." 
 
8 Godleski also testified that the hairs had not been 
pulled. 
 
 
9 Roberio was tried separately and was also convicted of 
murder in the first degree and armed robbery.  Commonwealth v. 
Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 278, 279 n.1 (1998).  We overturned 
those convictions based on his trials counsel's failure to 
investigate an insanity defense.  Id. at 279-280.  Roberio was 
retried and again convicted; those convictions were affirmed.  
Commonwealth v. Roberio, 440 Mass. 245, 246 (2003). 
9 
 
In 2009, years after the defendant's convictions were 
affirmed on appeal, the National Academy of Sciences issued a 
report rejecting the ability of a forensic hair analyst to opine 
on the statistical significance of a person's hair being 
consistent with hair found at a crime scene.  See National 
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States:  A Path Forward (2009).  Specifically, the report stated 
that the very probability that Godleski testified about, i.e., 
that there was a one in 4,500 chance that the hair collected 
from a crime scene would be consistent with the hair sample 
submitted by the defendant, was a probability that was shown to 
be unreliable.  Id. at 158-161. 
In 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Innocence 
Project, and the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers came to an agreement on "what the science of microscopic 
hair examinations supports."  United States Department of 
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Microscopic Hair 
Comparison Analysis at 1 (Nov. 9, 2012).  The agreement allowed 
"a well-trained examiner to offer an opinion that a known 
individual can either be included or excluded as a possible 
source of a questioned hair collected at a crime scene."  Id.  
However, microscopic hair analysis necessarily is limited, 
because the size of the pool of people who can be included as a 
possible source of a specific hair is unknown.  Thus, an 
10 
 
expert's report or testimony "that applies probabilities to a 
particular inclusion of someone as a source of a hair of unknown 
origin cannot be scientifically supported."  Id.  In 2018, as a 
result of the newly discovered scientific unreliability of this 
hair evidence, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. 
Discussion.  "Rule 30 (b) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), 
authorizes a judge to 'grant a new trial at any time if it 
appears that justice may not have been done.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 803-804 (2021).  See 
Commonwealth v. Mazza, 484 Mass. 539, 551 (2020).  "A motion for 
a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge."  
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 498 (2020).  Generally, 
"[a]n appellate court will examine the motion judge's conclusion 
only to determine whether there has been a significant error of 
law or other abuse of discretion."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 664 (2011).  However, where the 
motion judge neither presided over the trial nor conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, we are in as good a position as the motion 
judge to assess the documentary evidence found within the 
record, thus allowing this court to review the judge's decision 
de novo.  See Mazza, supra at 547. 
Where the defendant's motion for a new trial is based on 
new evidence, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) "the 
11 
 
evidence is either 'newly discovered' or 'newly available,'" and 
(2) "it 'casts real doubt' on the justice of the defendant's 
conviction" (citation omitted).  Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 350.  
See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986).  "New 
evidence will cast real doubt on the justice of the conviction 
if there is a substantial risk that the jury would have reached 
a different conclusion had the evidence been admitted at trial."  
Sullivan, supra, citing Grace, supra at 306. 
At trial, Godleski testified that he tested hair samples 
from the victim, Roberio, and the defendant, comparing those 
hairs to the hairs found in the victim's hand at the crime 
scene.  Godleski's testimony, however, went beyond mere 
comparisons between the hair samples collected at the scene of 
the crime and those taken from the defendant.  He further opined 
that "for one hair to be consistent with a head hair that's been 
submitted, there's a one in 4,500 chance that that hair came 
from that individual."  Since the time of the defendant's trial, 
testimony that applies statistical probabilities to the 
inclusion of someone as a source of a hair of unknown origin no 
longer is scientifically supported. 
The defendant argues, and the Commonwealth concedes, that 
based on recent scientific developments, the statistical 
probability to which Godleski testified at trial in support of 
his hair comparison testimony ought to have been excluded.  The 
12 
 
Commonwealth concedes that the newly available analysis for the 
statistical probability used to support the inculpatory hair 
comparison evidence would have removed such statistical evidence 
from the jury's consideration at trial.  Where the new 
scientific analysis, which was unavailable to the defendant at 
trial, casts doubt on the reliability of the statistical 
probability that supported Godleski's hair comparison testimony, 
the defendant has satisfied his initial burden of demonstrating 
that the evidence to support his motion for a new trial is 
either newly discovered or newly available.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617-618 (2015) (defendant satisfies 
initial burden of demonstrating newly available evidence even 
where motions were "based less on newly discovered evidence that 
could have been admitted in evidence at the trial," and more "on 
newly available analysis that would remove from the jury's 
consideration evidence admitted at trial in the Commonwealth's 
case").  See also Grace, 397 Mass. at 306 (defendant must 
demonstrate that new evidence was "unknown to the defendant or 
his counsel and not reasonably discoverable by them at the time 
of trial"). 
Where the defendant correctly argues that newly available 
scientific developments likely would have rendered the 
statistical probability that supported the inculpatory hair 
evidence inadmissible at trial, our analysis hinges on whether 
13 
 
such statistical probability likely was a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations, such that its elimination would cast real 
doubt on the justice of the defendant's convictions.  See 
Cowels, 470 Mass. at 618. 
The defendant argues that where the hair comparison 
evidence was the only physical evidence that refutes the 
defendant's testimony that he acted solely as a lookout during 
the crime, it likely was a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations, as the elimination of the statistical evidence to 
support the hair comparison would have supported the defendant's 
argument that he did not have the requisite intent and knowledge 
to be found guilty of armed robbery and murder in the first 
degree.  We disagree. 
Where the Commonwealth's case strongly supports the 
defendant's guilt on a joint venture theory of felony-murder, 
the statistical probability to support Godleski's hair 
comparison testimony likely was not a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations.10  See Grace, 397 Mass. at 306, citing 
Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 33 (1923) (strength of 
case against criminal defendant may weaken effect of newly 
 
10 At trial, the Commonwealth also proceeded on the theory 
of murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty; however, where the evidence to support guilt under a 
theory of felony-murder is overwhelming, we do not focus our 
analysis on the Commonwealth's theory of murder in the first 
degree by reason of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
14 
 
discovered evidence).  "To warrant a conviction of felony-murder 
as a joint venturer with armed robbery as the predicate felony, 
the Commonwealth had to prove that [the defendant] was a joint 
venturer in an armed robbery and that the victim's death 
occurred in the commission or attempted commission of that armed 
robbery."  Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 673 (2019), 
citing Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 33 (2017).  "To find 
the defendant guilty of the underlying felony of armed robbery, 
proof was required that the defendant was part of a venture in 
which at least one of the coventurers was armed with a dangerous 
weapon, either applied violence to the victim['s] bod[y] or put 
[him] in fear and took the victim['s] property with the intent 
to steal it."  Rakes, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 
475 Mass. 705, 710 (2016). 
Here, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that 
both Roberio and the defendant planned to break into the 
victim's trailer and rob him of the money and other valuable 
items that the victim had hidden throughout the trailer.  On 
entering the trailer, the two men confronted the victim, who 
forcefully resisted their attempts to rob him.  Eagles, 419 
Mass. at 829-830.  Roberio and the defendant then beat the 
victim mercilessly, tied a pillowcase around his neck to 
strangle him, and brought him from room to room in the trailer 
in an attempt to force the victim to reveal where he had hidden 
15 
 
his money.  Id. at 827, 830.  Both men then stole the victim's 
money and left him for dead.  Id. at 830.  Where the defendant 
agreed to rob the victim, and aided Roberio in doing so by 
mercilessly killing the victim and taking the money that he had 
hidden throughout his trailer, such evidence is sufficient to 
support a conviction of armed robbery, as well as felony-murder.  
See Rakes, 478 Mass. at 33. 
The defendant insisted at trial, however, that he (1) 
served merely as a lookout for Roberio, (2) did not know that 
the trailer was occupied when Roberio initially entered, (3) did 
not aid in the killing of the victim, and (4) stole the victim's 
money only at the direction of Roberio.  See Eagles, 419 Mass. 
at 828.  Now, in arguing for a new trial, he again insists that 
he served as merely the lookout and further claims that without 
the statistical probability to support the hair comparison 
evidence, the record is devoid of any evidence demonstrating 
that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to support the 
armed robbery conviction, and his conviction of murder in the 
first degree.  At oral argument, the defendant also argued that 
the hair comparison evidence, and the statistical probability 
that supported such evidence, were likely a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations because of the Commonwealth's closing 
argument, where the prosecutor emphasized that the hair was 
found in the victim's hand, tucked underneath his body.  The 
16 
 
defendant argued that the emphasis on the hair being tucked 
underneath the victim's body served as the only piece of 
physical evidence to definitively support the Commonwealth's 
theory that the defendant possessed the requisite intent for 
armed robbery when he entered the victim's trailer with 
Roberio.11  We disagree. 
Even if the jury were to credit the defendant's version of 
events, which they certainly need not have done,12 and 
notwithstanding the Commonwealth's closing argument on the 
importance of the hair evidence, there undoubtedly existed ample 
evidence, outside of the hair comparison evidence, to 
demonstrate that the defendant possessed the requisite intent 
 
11 The defendant's argument rests on the assumption that the 
hair being tucked underneath the victim's body conclusively 
suggested that the defendant was involved in the brutal assault 
prior to the victim's death.  We note, however, that Godleski 
did not testify at trial that the hairs had been pulled out 
during an altercation, but instead that they simply may have 
fallen out. 
 
12 Much of the defendant's argument implicitly rests on the 
assumption that the jury did credit, or were required to credit, 
the defendant's self-serving testimony at trial.  The jury were 
permitted to discredit the defendant's entire trial testimony, 
particularly where such testimony contradicted his previous 
recorded statement to police given shortly after the murder.  
See Commonwealth v. Spinucci, 472 Mass. 872, 878 (2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Hawkesworth, 405 Mass. 664, 675 (1989) ("The 
jury, of course, [are] free to believe or disbelieve, in whole 
or in part, the testimony of each witness").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Forrester, 365 Mass. 37, 47 (1974) (jury were 
free to disbelieve defendant's contradictory trial testimony, 
where such testimony raised issue of credibility that only jury 
could resolve). 
17 
 
for his conviction of felony-murder under a joint venture 
theory. 
To find the defendant guilty of armed robbery, the 
predicate offense for the defendant's felony-murder charge, the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant knew that 
Roberio was armed, and that the defendant intentionally assisted 
Roberio in the commission of the armed robbery while sharing the 
mental state required for that crime.  See Commonwealth v. 
Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 11 (2010).  See also Commonwealth v. Buth, 
480 Mass. 113, 116, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018) ("Where, 
as here, an element of the offense is that the perpetrator is 
armed, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knew that 
[his] coventurer was armed").  Here, even if the jury believed 
that the defendant did not know Roberio was armed prior to 
entering the trailer, whether the defendant knew Roberio was 
armed either before or after entering the trailer ultimately has 
no bearing on the defendant's guilt in this case because the 
defendant's continued participation in the robbery after 
entering the trailer and learning of Roberio's use of a weapon, 
i.e., the ligature, demonstrates that the defendant necessarily 
possessed the requisite intent for the armed robbery joint 
venture.  See id. at 117 ("Where a defendant continues to act in 
furtherance of the joint venture even after learning of a 
coventurer's weapon, we have allowed an inference that the 
18 
 
coventurer had the requisite intent for the joint venture").  
The defendant's failure to render aid to the victim, telephone 
911, or disassociate himself from Roberio and the joint venture 
in some other way also supports the jury's rational inference 
that the defendant possessed the requisite intent for armed 
robbery and felony-murder.  See Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 
Mass. 462, 470-471 (2007).  Therefore, even under the 
defendant's version of the events, where he allegedly entered 
the trailer only after Roberio had used a weapon to assault the 
victim and saw that the victim had been beaten mercilessly and 
strangled, the defendant's continued participation in the 
robbery, i.e., taking the victim's money and other valuable 
goods, is sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant 
possessed the requisite intent for armed robbery.13  See id.  See 
also Rakes, 478 Mass. at 33 ("Even if the defendant had been 
unaware that [his coventurer] possessed a weapon in advance, it 
 
13 Much like his argument about possessing the requisite 
intent for armed robbery, the defendant's guilt on a joint 
venture theory of felony-murder does not depend on his actual 
participation in the beating and strangling that caused the 
defendant's death, as the Commonwealth did not have to prove 
that the defendant actively participated in the beating and 
strangling of the victim for a finding of guilt of murder in the 
first degree on a felony-murder theory.  See Commonwealth v. 
Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 708 (2011) (Commonwealth need not prove 
who actually shot victim, as defendant's knowing participation 
in attempted armed robbery, his intent to commit armed robbery, 
and victim's death during course of attempted armed robbery was 
sufficient to convict defendant of felony-murder). 
19 
 
would be reasonable to conclude that he became aware over the 
course of the robbery and continued to participate, implicating 
him in the joint venture"). 
Furthermore, the defendant's emphasis on the inculpatory 
effect of the hair comparison evidence presented at trial is 
misplaced, as the hair evidence merely was cumulative of the 
other significant physical evidence that demonstrated the 
defendant's involvement in the armed robbery and murder of the 
victim.  In Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 351-352, this court allowed a 
motion for a new trial on the defendant's convictions of murder 
in the first degree and armed robbery, based on the 
reexamination of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence.  On 
reexamining the purple jacket that the defendant allegedly wore 
at the scene of the crime, further testing revealed that the 
cuffs of the defendant's jacket tested negative for the presence 
of blood and that any DNA that was found on the cuffs 
definitively did not belong to the victim.  Id. at 351.  
Furthermore, additional testing also was inconclusive regarding 
whether hair found in the defendant's jacket belonged to the 
victim.  Id. 
In granting the defendant's motion for a new trial, we 
recognized that "the purported blood on the defendant's cuffs 
and the hair in [the] defendant's pocket were not merely 
cumulative of other physical evidence presented at trial."  
20 
 
Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 352.  Instead, these pieces of evidence 
"were different in kind because they served as the sole pieces 
of physical evidence indicating that the defendant had been in 
the presence of the victim during the killing."  Id., citing 
Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 518 (2001), overruled on 
another ground by Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 241 
(2009).  Thus, we held that their admission at trial likely was 
"a real factor in the jury's deliberations," such that the 
results of the reexamination "cast real doubt on the justice of 
the defendant's conviction."  Sullivan, supra at 353. 
In Cowels, 470 Mass. at 607-608, the Commonwealth 
introduced two bloody towels at trial to suggest that the two 
defendants had used the towels to clean themselves after 
stabbing and killing the victim.  Testing of the towels, 
however, neither identified nor excluded the defendants or the 
victim as the sources of the blood.  Id. at 608.  It was not 
until additional testing was done on one of the towels, years 
after the defendants' convictions had been affirmed, that it was 
revealed that the blood on the towel did not belong to either 
the defendants or the victim, but instead belonged to an 
unidentified male.  Id.  In ordering a new trial, this court 
emphasized that there was no forensic evidence at the crime 
scene linked to the defendants.  Id. at 619.  In a case with a 
"dearth of physical evidence," the towels served as the most 
21 
 
important piece of evidence to corroborate the testimony of the 
prosecution's key witness, who presented significant credibility 
issues.  See id.  Thus, the towels likely were a real factor in 
the jury's deliberations and ultimate convictions of the 
defendants.  Id. at 623-624. 
Here, unlike in Sullivan and Cowels, there existed other 
substantial physical evidence linking the defendant to the 
crime, including type O blood on the defendant's pants,14 occult 
blood on the defendant's hands, blood on the defendant's shirt 
and sneakers, and a bloody footprint on a pillowcase that 
matched the defendant's footprint.  Cf. Cowels, 470 Mass. at 
619; Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 352.  Thus, contrary to the 
defendant's argument, the hair found in the victim's hand at the 
scene of the crime was not the only piece of physical evidence 
linking the defendant to the crime.  Cf. Sullivan, supra. 
The hair also was not the sole piece of evidence that 
discredited the defendant's version of the events of the crime, 
as the defendant's significant credibility issues likely 
resulted from his own trial testimony, which almost entirely 
contradicted his previous recorded statement to the police 
shortly after the murder.  Cf. Cowels, 470 Mass. at 621-622 
(bloody towels served as crucial piece of evidence supporting 
 
14 The defendant has type A blood, and the victim had type O 
blood.  Eagles, 419 Mass. at 827 & n.5. 
22 
 
Commonwealth's argument to jury that they should credit key 
witness's testimony). 
In sum, the hair evidence "cumulatively . . . pointed to a 
strong, if not overwhelming showing that the defendant was in 
fact the perpetrator."  See Commonwealth v. Pandolfino, 33 Mass. 
App. Ct. 96, 102 (1992) (hair sample from defendant's mask not 
significant factor in jury's deliberations where other evidence, 
including defendant's clothes matching description of 
perpetrator's clothes, scratch marks on defendant's face, 
defendant's geographic and temporal proximity to crime scene, 
and multiple identifications of defendant as perpetrator of 
crime, overwhelmingly supported defendant's convictions).  It 
was neither the linchpin of the Commonwealth's case, cf. 
Commonwealth v. Cameron, 473 Mass. 100, 110 (2015) (DNA evidence 
from complainant's underwear tipped scale against defendant at 
trial, and newly discovered evidence eliminated defendant as 
source of semen on complainant's underwear, thus negating key 
piece of physical evidence that was real factor in corroborating 
complainant's testimony), nor was it the piece of evidence that 
was more credible than any other piece of evidence on the 
defendant's guilt as a joint venturer in the armed robbery and 
murder of the victim, cf. Cowels, 470 Mass. at 621-622. 
Therefore, where the hair evidence merely was cumulative of 
much of the physical evidence admitted to support the 
23 
 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, and where 
there was overwhelming evidence to support the defendant's 
conviction on a theory of felony-murder, we conclude that the 
statistical probability that supported Godleski's hair 
comparison testimony was not a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations, despite the Commonwealth's emphasis on the 
importance of the hair evidence in closing argument, as 
elimination of the evidence from the jury's calculation does not 
cast real doubt on the justice of the defendant's convictions.  
See Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 351-352.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.