Title: State v. Lott
Citation: 207 Kan. 602, 485 P.2d 1314
Docket Number: 46,135
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 1971

207 Kan. 602 (1971)
485 P.2d 1314
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL LOTT, SR., Appellant.
No. 46,135

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1971.
Ray Hodge, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Richard K. Hollingsworth, Deputy County Attorney, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Attorney General, Keith Sanborn, County Attorney, and Edward G. Collister, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
Samuel Lott, Sr. (defendant-appellant) appeals from a conviction by a jury of murder in the second degree.
The principal contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.
The defendant claims there is sufficient evidence that the shooting occurred in the heat of passion to justify an instruction on manslaughter. The state's theory is that defendant either committed *603 murder in the second degree or acted in self-defense and committed no crime.
The state's evidence consisted of the testimony of four witnesses  each of whom gave essentially the same description of the events leading up to the shooting.
On the afternoon of February 7, 1970, a group of people were drinking Scotch whiskey and listening to music in defendant's home at 1432 Wabash, Wichita. The assemblage consisted of neighbors and acquaintances of defendant. At the time of the shooting, in addition to defendant and his daughter, Lee Pearl Lott, those present were John Henry Straughter, the victim; his father, Isaah Straughter; Shirley Mae Curtis, a next door neighbor; Joy Ann Lee, a friend of Lee Pearl Lott; and George Edward Howard, apparently a friend of the deceased.
John Henry Straughter was one of the last to arrive. He soon fell asleep in a chair. When Lee Pearl Lott attempted to awaken John Henry she was told by her father (defendant) to get away from him and go back to her bedroom. The state's witnesses testified that John Henry Straughter was awakening and attempting to get out of his chair when he was shot once or twice by defendant. Defendant shot Straughter again after he had risen from the chair. Finally Straughter staggered out through the front door and collapsed on the front yard. He was taken to the hospital where he died the same day.
Two officers of the Wichita Police Department arrived at the Lott residence soon after the shooting. They took a pistol from defendant which was later determined to be the pistol from which the fatal shot was fired.
Defendant's evidence depicted a different version of the affair. Defendant and his daughter (Lee Pearl Lott) testified that defendant requested John Henry Straughter to leave or the police would be called, that Straughter then came toward defendant "as a prize fighter" with his "dukes" up. Defendant retreated to the bedroom to telephone the police; he was followed by Straughter, defendant got the pistol from a table near the bed. Defendant testified he first fired twice to scare Straughter but only made him angrier. The defendant then fired at Straughter but did not know how many times he hit him.
The trial court fully instructed the jury on murder in the second degree and self-defense. Defendant objected on the grounds the *604 jury was not instructed on first, third and fourth degree manslaughter.
Instructions in a criminal prosecution are to be confined to the issues in the case as determined by the charge in the information and the evidence adduced at the trial. Failure to instruct on some lesser degree of the crime charged is not ground for reversal if the evidence at the trial excludes a theory of guilt on the lesser offense. (State v. McDermott, 202 Kan. 399, 449 P.2d 545, cert. den. 396 U.S. 912, 24 L. Ed. 2d 187, 90 S. Ct. 226; State v. Hockett, 172 Kan. 1, 238 P.2d 539; and State v. Linville, 148 Kan. 142, 79 P.2d 869.)
The abstract clearly shows the case was tried by the state on the theory of homicide with malice, but not with premeditation while the theory of defendant was solely self-defense. The jury chose to believe the state's version. There was no evidence to support a theory of manslaughter in any degree. The defendant's testimony was that he was acting in self-defense rather than because of provocation to the degree necessary to constitute "heat of passion" as characterized by this court.
Defendant's description of the shooting is as follows:
"QUESTION: He was a younger man?
"ANSWER: (witness complies)
"THE COURT: Thank you.
The same issue was presented in State v. McDermott, supra, which we believe to be controlling here. In McDermott we said:
In the instant case, the defendant's own testimony refutes any suggestion that he acted in the heat of passion. When defendant testified he fired a shot directly into Straughter's body, after Straughter had fallen by the divan; and further that the firing of that shot was done purposely, then there can be no doubt defendant was in control of his actions and his reason at the time.
The issue whether defendant's actions constituted second degree murder or self-defense, as explicitly framed by the evidence, was properly submitted to the jury.
Although not argued on appeal defendant submits one further contention in his brief. Defendant claims a recorded statement of George Howard was erroneously admitted into evidence. At the trial defendant first objected but later agreed the statement was properly admitted under K.S.A. 60-460 (a) which reads:
The witness (George Howard) was present in the courtroom but *606 apparently he refused to testify for the state at the time of trial. He did testify for defendant and was examined and cross-examined. It appears that Howard had become a "turncoat" witness, a circumstance which 60-460 (a) is intended to meet.
In the 1970 Cumulative Supplement to his commentary, Judge Gard points out the important categories in which 60-460 (a) is intended to operate with major significance as an exception to the rule against hearsay. One category specifically enumerated is:
(Gard, Kansas Code of Civil Procedure Annotated, 1970 Cumulative Supplement, § 60-460 [a], p. 87.)
Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.