Title: People v. Britt-El
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89837
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2002

Docket No. 89837-Agenda 9-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								VINCENT D. BRITT-EL, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 29, 2002.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Vincent Britt-El, filed a second post-conviction petition along with a "Motion For Leave To File
Second Post-Conviction Petition" in the circuit court of Vermilion
County. The circuit court denied the motion as "untimely" and did
not consider the merits of defendant's petition. On appeal, the
appellate court treated the circuit court's ruling as a summary
dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition and affirmed.
The appellate court held that defendant's petition was an improper,
successive petition that was not permitted under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
2000). No. 4-99-0738 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of
the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced
on two counts of first degree murder and other felony offenses.
Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct
appeal. People v. Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d 129 (1994). Defendant
filed a petition for leave to appeal from this decision which was
denied at the September 1995 term of court. People v. Britt, 163 Ill. 2d 567 (1995).
	On August 29, 1996, defendant filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. In this petition, defendant alleged that he had
been denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.
Specifically, defendant asserted that his trial counsel had erred in
advising defendant not to testify at trial and during a hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant further alleged that trial
counsel had failed to have a "vital" witness testify during the
hearing on the motion to suppress, and that trial counsel had failed
to properly cross-examine several of the State's key witnesses at
trial. On the same day that defendant filed his first post-conviction
petition, the circuit court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction
to consider the petition because it was filed outside the time
limitations set forth in section 122-1 of the Act. See 725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West 1996). Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the
petition.
	On September 11, 1996, defendant filed a motion to
reconsider. In this motion, defendant conceded that his petition
was untimely filed. Defendant noted, however, that under section
122-1 of the Act, an untimely petition may be considered on the
merits if the "petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay in
filing was not due to his culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1
(West 2000). Defendant argued that the prison in which he was
incarcerated had been on "several severe lockdowns", that he had
been denied access to the prison law library, and that he had been
unable to prepare his post-conviction petition. Thus, according to
defendant, the delay in filing the petition was not due to his
culpable negligence, and his tardiness in filing the petition should
have been excused. The circuit court rejected these arguments and
denied defendant's motion to reconsider. Defendant appealed.
	On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's
dismissal of defendant's first post-conviction petition. People v.
Britt, No. 4-96-0730 (1997) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). Citing to People v. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d 392
(1995), which was the governing case law at that time, the
appellate court held that "the time frame of section 122-1 of the
Act within which a defendant must file his postconviction petition
is jurisdictional, so that the petition is barred if not timely filed."
The appellate court noted that defendant had conceded that his
petition was untimely. The appellate court then considered and
rejected defendant's argument that the delay in filing his petition
could be excused because it was not due to defendant's culpable
negligence. The appellate court concluded that, even accepting that
defendant's prison had been on lockdown, this excused only a
portion of the delay in filing. According to the appellate court,
defendant's petition was still an additional 11 months tardy
beyond that which could be excused by the lockdown and
defendant had offered no explanation for this further delay.
Accordingly, the appellate court held that the petition was
untimely filed and, therefore, that the court was "without
jurisdiction to entertain" defendant's post-conviction petition.
Defendant subsequently filed a petition for leave to appeal which
was denied at the January 1998 term of court. People v. Britt, 176 Ill. 2d 578 (1998).
	On August 9, 1999, defendant filed a second post-conviction
petition along with a "Motion For Leave To File A Second Post-Conviction Petition" in the circuit court. In this second petition,
which is the subject of the present appeal, defendant repeated the
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel that were presented
in his first petition. Defendant also raised numerous additional
allegations of constitutional violations. Defendant alleged, for
example, that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
because he failed to request certain limiting instructions, failed to
object to the introduction of autopsy photos, and failed to move to
suppress certain items of evidence. Defendant also contended that
several of the trial court's rulings and several comments made by
the prosecutor had denied him certain constitutional rights.
	In his "Motion For Leave To File A Second Post-Conviction
Petition," defendant repeated the same argument regarding
culpable negligence that he had made during his first post-conviction proceeding, even though this argument had previously
been rejected by the appellate court. In his motion, defendant
asserted that, during the time in which he was trying to prepare his
first post-conviction petition, the prison in which he was
incarcerated was on several "severe lockdowns" and that this
excused the tardy filing of the first petition. After making these
assertions, defendant concluded by stating that "the failure of the
court to consider these claims made herein [in his second post-conviction petition] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice." Defendant then requested that the circuit court "grant[]
him leave to file [a] second post-conviction petition."
	In a docket entry, the circuit court rejected defendant's
argument that the second petition was timely filed and denied
defendant's motion for leave to file a second post-conviction
petition. Defendant appealed.
	On appeal, the appellate court did not consider whether
defendant's second post-conviction petition was timely filed but,
instead, addressed whether the petition was procedurally barred as
an improper, successive petition. In so doing, the appellate court
treated the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion for leave to
file a second post-conviction petition as a summary dismissal of
the second post-conviction petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)
(West 2000).
	Before the appellate court, defendant acknowledged that the
filing of successive post-conviction petitions is generally
prohibited under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Defendant
maintained, however, that the circumstances of his case fell within
the exception which allows successive petitions when it can be
shown that "the proceedings on the initial petition were deficient
in some fundamental way." People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74 (1992). In support of this argument, defendant cited this court's
opinion in People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1 (1999), a decision which
was issued after the completion of defendant's first post-conviction proceedings. According to defendant, Wright overruled
Heirens and established that the time limitations in the Act are not
jurisdictional but are, instead, a statute of limitations which can
only be raised as an affirmative defense by the State in responsive
pleadings. Based on this reading of Wright, defendant maintained
that the circuit court lacked the authority, under section
122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act, to sua sponte consider the timeliness of
his first post-conviction petition during the initial stage of post-conviction review. Therefore, in defendant's view, the proceedings
on his initial petition were fundamentally deficient and his second
petition should have been considered by the circuit court on the
merits.
	The appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed the
dismissal of defendant's second post-conviction petition. We then
granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R.
315.

ANALYSIS
	At the outset, defendant offers an argument, unrelated to the
argument concerning Wright which was advanced in the appellate
court, for why his second post-conviction petition should be given
consideration on the merits. As he did before the appellate court,
defendant acknowledges that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
generally prohibits the filing of successive post-conviction
petitions. See People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273 (1992) ("The
Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplates the filing of only one
post-conviction petition"), citing People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367,
375 (1989). Defendant contends, however, that the disposition of
his first post-conviction petition, filed in 1996, did not constitute
a complete or valid initial post-conviction proceeding. Defendant
maintains that his first post-conviction proceeding did not afford
him the opportunity to have his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims heard on the merits because the first post-conviction
petition was dismissed on the basis that it was untimely filed.
Since he never received a merits-based ruling on his first petition,
defendant argues that his first post-conviction proceeding was, in
effect, a nullity. Therefore, according to defendant, his second
post-conviction petition, filed in 1999, was not a "successive"
petition as that term is used with respect to the Act and the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in that petition may
be considered on the merits. We disagree.
	Defendant received every procedural right, including the
opportunity to have his claims heard on the merits, that was
available to him at the time his first post-conviction petition was
filed. When defendant's first petition was filed in 1996, the
controlling case law interpreting the time limitations in the Act
was found in People v. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d 392 (1995).
Under that decision, the time limitations in the Act were
considered jurisdictional and it was incumbent upon a petitioner
who filed an untimely post-conviction petition to affirmatively
plead "facts showing that the delay [in filing] was not due to his or
her culpable negligence" (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000)) in
order to have his claims heard on the merits. Defendant took
advantage of this "safety valve" in an effort to have his claims
heard. Before the circuit court, defendant conceded that his first
post-conviction petition was untimely filed but argued that the
delay in filing the petition was not due to his culpable negligence
because the prison in which he was incarcerated had been on
lockdown. The circuit court rejected this argument. The appellate
court, after full consideration, affirmed. The appellate court held
that, even accepting all of defendant's arguments regarding
culpable negligence as true, there remained an unexcused delay in
the filing of the petition. This court denied the defendant's petition
for leave to appeal from the appellate court's decision. Thus, there
was a full and final resolution on whether defendant had
established a lack of culpable negligence. Defendant was accorded
all the procedural rights and protections any post-conviction
petitioner could have received under the Act as it was interpreted
at the time the first petition was filed. Under these circumstances,
it cannot be said that defendant's first post-conviction proceeding
was a nullity. Accordingly, defendant's second post-conviction
petition, the petition at issue in the case at bar, is a successive
petition for purposes of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
	Defendant argues, however, that even if his second post-conviction petition is a successive petition, it may nevertheless be
considered on the merits because the proceedings on his initial
post-conviction petition were fundamentally deficient pursuant to
Wright. Before addressing this argument, we clarify the scope of
the issue presented. Defendant's second post-conviction petition
presents numerous claims of constitutional violations, the majority
of which were not raised in defendant's first post-conviction
petition. Section 122-3 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
provides that "[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional
rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived."
725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2000). In his brief before this court,
defendant does not mention the additional claims raised in his
second post-conviction petition nor does he argue that these claims
are excused from the waiver provision of section 122-3. Further,
even under the principal argument advanced by defendant both
here and in the appellate court, i.e., that defendant's first post-conviction petition was erroneously dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds, we discern no reason why the additional claims could not
have been included in defendant's first petition. Accordingly,
those claims in defendant's second petition which were not
included in his first petition are waived. That being the case, the
scope of our review is limited to consideration of those claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel which were presented in both
defendant's first post-conviction petition and his second. See
People v. Pitsonbarger, No. 89368, slip op. at 12-13 (May 23,
2002) (each claim in a successive petition must be reviewed to
ascertain whether the claim is barred).
	We now turn to defendant's argument that his first post-conviction proceedings were fundamentally deficient under
Wright. A narrow exception to the rule prohibiting successive
post-conviction petitions holds that a claim presented in a
successive petition may be given consideration when the
proceedings on the initial petition were "deficient in some
fundamental way." People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74
(1992). To establish a fundamental deficiency which will permit
consideration of the successive petition, a defendant must
demonstrate both "cause and prejudice" with respect to each claim
raised. See generally People v. Pitsonbarger, No. 89368. "For
purposes of this test, 'cause' is further defined as some objective
factor external to the defense that impeded counsel's efforts to
raise the claim in an earlier proceeding, and 'prejudice' is defined
as an error which so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279." People
v. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d 194, 199 (2000).
	Defendant's explanation for why the claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel which are repeated in his second post-conviction petition should be considered on the merits-his
argument as to why he has satisfied the cause inquiry-is based on
the assertion that the circuit court improperly impeded his ability
to bring those claims in his first post-conviction petition because
the court sua sponte considered the timeliness of that petition. In
support of this argument, defendant relies upon this court's
decision in Wright. Wright, however, was decided in November
1999, almost two years after defendant's appeal from the denial of
his first post-conviction petition was completed. As noted, the
controlling case law at the time of defendant's first post-conviction proceedings was found in Heirens, an opinion which
held that the time limitations in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
were jurisdictional and could properly be raised sua sponte by the
circuit court. Thus, in arguing that his first post-conviction
proceedings were fundamentally deficient pursuant to Wright,
defendant is contending that our holding in Wright should be
applied retroactively to his first proceeding.
	The State, in response to defendant's arguments, first contests
defendant's reading of Wright. According to the State, even under
Wright, the circuit court retains the authority to sua sponte
consider the timeliness of a post-conviction petition during the
initial stage of review. Furthermore, in the State's view, even if
Wright does stand for the proposition that the circuit court may not
sua sponte consider the timeliness of a post-conviction petition,
that holding should not be applied to defendant's first post-conviction petition. The State maintains that "the People's interest
in the finality of criminal litigation and judgments" should
preclude application of Wright and prevent consideration of the
claims raised in defendant's second petition.
	Initially, we note that any confusion as to the meaning of
Wright, and any confusion as to whether a circuit court possesses
the authority to sua sponte raise the timeliness of a post-conviction
petition during the initial stage of post-conviction review, has been
resolved by our recent decision in People v. Boclair, Nos. 89388,
89471, 89534 cons. (August 29, 2002). In that case, we concluded
that the Act does not permit the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition during the first stage of post-conviction review
on the ground that the petition is untimely. Boclair, slip op. at 3-9.
Consequently, having concluded in Boclair that a circuit court may
not sua sponte dismiss a petition on the basis of timeliness, the
question in this case becomes whether the holding of Boclair
should be given retroactive application to defendant's first post-conviction proceeding. Under this court's case law, the answer to
this question is no.
	In People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19 (1998), the defendant filed
a second post-conviction petition in which he sought to take
advantage of a decision of this court, People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), that had been announced after the completion of
his first post-conviction proceedings. Johnson addressed the duties
of post-conviction counsel which arise under Supreme Court Rule
651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)). In substance, the defendant in Szabo
sought a reexamination of the holding in the appeal from his first
post-conviction appeal, arguing that the appeal was deficient based
upon Johnson. This court rejected this argument, stating:
		"Johnson was decided after the present defendant's appeal
from the denial of his first post-conviction petition. We
do not believe that Johnson controls the outcome of the
present case, any more than we believe that Johnson
governs other post-conviction matters that were
concluded long ago. The proceedings on defendant
Szabo's first post-conviction petition had been entirely
completed by the time Johnson was decided." Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d  at 25.
Applying the logic of Szabo to the instant appeal, this court's
holding in Boclair that a circuit court may not raise the issue of
timeliness sua sponte cannot be applied retroactively to
defendant's first post-conviction proceeding.
	Further, even under a general fundamental fairness inquiry, it
is clear that the holding adopted in Boclair should not be applied
retroactively to defendant's first post-conviction proceeding. Cf.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 353, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1073 (1989) (decisions establishing new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure may be applied
retroactively to cases pending on collateral review where the new
rule requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty). In the case at bar, after
defendant's first post-conviction petition was initially dismissed,
defendant filed a motion to reconsider in which he alleged that his
tardy filing was not due to his culpable negligence. See 725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West 2000). The circuit court denied that motion. On
appeal in 1997, the appellate court fully discussed the issue of
culpable negligence and held that defendant's petition was
untimely. Defendant's petition for leave to appeal from that
decision was denied. Thus, on the critical issues of whether
defendant's first petition was, in fact, untimely and whether he
lacked culpable negligence for the tardy filing, defendant has had
his day in court. These issues were fully and finally litigated in the
trial court, the appellate court, and this court when it denied
defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
	Significantly, neither the holding in Wright nor the holding in
the Boclair changed the length of the post-conviction time
limitations or the definition of culpable negligence. Indeed, from
defendant's perspective, and as a practical matter, the only
relevant change that has been made in post-conviction law since
the first post-conviction proceeding was completed is that now the
issue of timeliness must be affirmatively raised by the State, rather
than the circuit court. Thus, viewing the first post-conviction
proceeding from the perspective of the new law established in
Boclair, the only way it can be said that defendant has suffered any
prejudice is that, during the first post-conviction proceeding,
defendant was denied the possibility that the State might have
elected to waive the timeliness issue. However, in the course of
the present appeal, the State has continued to argue that defendant
was culpably negligent in filing the first petition and that the first
petition was therefore untimely filed. In other words, the State,
being fully aware of the nature of defendant's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, has made known that it would have pursued
the timeliness defense during the first post-conviction proceeding
and would not have waived it. Defendant has therefore not been
prejudiced in any way by the change in the law announced in
Boclair. Under these circumstances, denying retroactive
application would not be fundamentally unfair to defendant.
	Boclair may not be applied retroactively to defendant's first
post-conviction proceeding. Accordingly, defendant cannot
establish cause for proceeding on the claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel which are repeated in his second petition.
Thus, the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which are
repeated in defendant's second post-conviction petition are
procedurally barred from consideration on the merits.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court properly
affirmed the dismissal of defendant's second post-conviction
petition.
	Affirmed.
	Contrary to the majority's assertion, Britt-El was not accorded
all of the procedural protections to which he was entitled at the
time his first post-conviction petition was filed. Britt-El's first
petition was improperly dismissed by the circuit court, on the
court's own motion, on the grounds that it was untimely. As we
recently held in People v. Boclair, Nos. 89388, 89471, 89534
cons. (August 29, 2002) such sua sponte dismissals are not
permitted under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
	A significant feature of Boclair is that it did not limit its
interpretation of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to cases pending
on direct review or those arising in the future. We should not
impose such a limitation now. Decisions by our court are
presumed to apply retroactively as well as prospectively. Tosado
v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 196 (1999); Deichmueller Construction
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 Ill. 2d 413, 416 (1992). Although
that presumption may be overcome, prospective-only application
is the exception. Retroactivity is the norm.
	Unless our court has expressly stated in its ruling that the
decision will only be applied prospectively, overcoming the
presumption in favor of retroactivity requires consideration of
three factors: (1)whether the decision established a new principle
of law; (2) whether, given the purposes and history of the new
rule, its operation would be retarded or promoted by prospective
application; and (3) whether substantial inequitable results would
be produced if the decision were applied retroactively. Tosado,
188 Ill. 2d  at 197; Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 88 (1997).
	 The first of these three factors is a threshold requirement. If
it is not met, that is, if the decision does not establish a new
principle of law, there is no need for further inquiry. The
presumption cannot be overcome. The decision will not be limited
to prospective application. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d  at 197.
	Contrary to the majority's view, Boclair did not produce a
change in the law. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act did not mean
one thing prior to our decision in Boclair and something else
afterward. In construing the plain language of the Act as we did in
Boclair, our court established no new common law principles. We
recognized no new rules of constitutional procedure. We overruled
no prior decisions of this court. Our decision interpreting the Act
simply declared what the law had always meant from its effective
date forward. See Gates v. United States, 515 F.2d 73, 78 (7th Cir.
1975). That being so, there is no basis for overcoming the
presumption in favor of retroactive as well as prospective
application. The interpretation of the Act we followed in Boclair
is unquestionably applicable to the present case.
	People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19 (1998), and Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), the
decisions cited by my colleagues to reach a contrary result, are
inapposite. Unlike the post-conviction proceeding before us today,
neither of those cases involved the applicability of a decision
which merely interpreted and applied the plain language of an
existing statute. Where a judicial interpretation of a statue involves
a commonsense construction based on the clear wording of the law
as enacted by the General Assembly, the notion that the decision
should be applied only prospectively is untenable. See People v.
Turnbeaugh, 116 Ill. App. 3d 199, 205 (1983).
	The appellate court's opinion in People v. Heirens, 271 Ill.
App. 3d 392 (1995), cited by my colleagues, does not alter this
conclusion. The issue in Heirens was not whether the court could
summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition as untimely on its
own motion, but whether the State should be barred from
challenging the petition's timeliness. Unlike Boclair and the case
before us today, the timeliness of the petition in Heirens was
specifically challenged by the State in its motions to dismiss.
Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 399. The statutory authority of the trial
judge court to rule, sua sponte, that the petition had been filed too
late was neither raised nor decided.
	Even if Heirens could be construed as authorizing the circuit
court's action at the time Britt-El's first petition was dismissed,
that is not a sufficient basis for refusing to follow Boclair now. As
previously indicated, Boclair established no new criminal or
common law rules. It merely interpreted the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act in accordance with the Act's plain language. Giving
the clear language of a statute its effect as written cannot be said
to result in a change in the law, even where prior decisions of the
appellate court have reached contrary interpretations. See People
v. Crete, 113 Ill. 2d 156, 160-63 (1986). Accordingly, new judicial
decisions which do not enlarge the meaning of a statute but simply
interpret the statute's unambiguous language will be followed in
post-conviction proceedings notwithstanding the fact that the
appellate court may once have construed the law differently. See
People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 367-69 (1996); People v.
Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 430-37 (1997).
	Because the circuit court misapplied the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act and dismissed Britt-El's original petition when it had
no statutory authority to do so, the initial post-conviction
proceedings were fundamentally deficient. They served none of
the purposes for which the Post-Conviction Hearing Act was
enacted. In this regard, the situation is analogous to that presented
to our court in People v. Nichols, 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972), where
the circuit court erroneously dismissed the original post-conviction
petition without appointing counsel. Because of the circuit court's
fundamental error, our court viewed the original proceedings as a
virtual nullity. People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1988). I fail to
see how we can take a different view here.
	The majority's contention that Britt-El was not prejudiced by
the circuit court's failure to follow the plain language of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is misguided. It is easy for the State to
claim now that it would have challenged the timeliness of the
original post-conviction petition if the circuit court had not raised
the matter first, but the fact is that it did not. The State was not
obligated to move for dismissal of the original petition on the
grounds that it was untimely, and it filed no such motion. The
timeliness of the petition became an issue only when it was
improperly injected into the case by the circuit court.
	The State does not invariably raise all of the affirmative
defenses available to it, and we have no basis to assume that it
would have raised a limitations defense here. Although the State
did embrace that defense later, it is important to remember that the
subsequent litigation regarding the timeliness of the original
petition was necessary only because of the circuit court's initial
error in dismissing the petition. Had the circuit court not acted in
violation of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the petition's
timeliness may never have been contested and Britt-El would not
have been forced into a position of having to plead, after the fact,
that the delay should be excused.
	By allowing the circuit court's undeniable error in dismissing
Britt-El's original post-conviction petition on procedural grounds
to block Britt-El from litigating the merits of his post-conviction
claims in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding, the majority
has denied him the " 'one complete opportunity to show a
substantial denial of his constitutional rights' " to which he is
entitled. See Free, 122 Ill. 2d  at 376, quoting People v. Logan, 72 Ill. 2d 358, 370 (1978). That is not justice. It is the impersonation
of justice. Fundamental fairness and the law demand a contrary
result.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
affirming dismissal of Britt-El's second petition for post-conviction relief should be reversed, and the cause should be
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. I therefore
dissent.