Title: Miller Brewing Company v. Department of Industry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP001628
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
94-1628 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Miller Brewing Company, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Department of Industry, Labor and Human 
Relations, Equal Rights Division, 
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Becky Kozera, 
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  203 Wis. 2d 380, 553 N.W.2d 837 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 6, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 29, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Ely A. Leichtling, Carmella A. Huser and Quarles & 
Brady, Milwaukee and oral argument by Ely A. Leichtling. 
 
For the defendant-appellant the cause was argued 
by Richard Briles Moriarty, assistant attorney general with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-co-appellant there was a brief 
and oral argument by Michael J. Edmonds, Milwaukee. 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Marianne 
Goldstein Robbins, Leeann Gruwell Anderson and Previant, 
Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee for 
the Wisconsin State AFL-CIO. 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Patricia J. 
Meunier and Schneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks 
& Domer, Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Federation of Nurses and 
Health Professionals. 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert K. Sholl, 
Patrick D. Dolan and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & 
Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Manufacturers & 
Commerce. 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Ann M. Barry, 
Jennifer S. Walther and Buchanan & Barry, S.C., Milwaukee for the 
Wisconsin State Council of the Society for Human Resource 
Management.  
 
No. 94-1628 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-1628 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Miller Brewing Company, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Department of Industry, Labor and Human 
Relations, Equal Rights Division, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Becky Kozera, 
           
          Defendant-Co-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J. 
 Miller 
Brewing 
Company 
("Miller") seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals
1 which reversed and remanded a judgment of the Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee County, Michael Guolee, Judge.  The court of 
appeals held that Becky Kozera's ("Kozera") claim under the 
Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"),
2 is not pre-
                     
1  Miller Brewing Co. v. DILHR, 203 Wis. 2d 380, 553 N.W.2d 
837 (Ct. App. 1996). 
2  The Wisconsin FMLA is located at Wis. Stat. § 103.10 
(1987-88).  Section 103.10 provides in relevant part: 
No. 94-1628 
 
2 
empted by § 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act 
("LRMA").
3  We agree that Kozera's state law claim is not pre-
empted by federal law, and therefore affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.  
                                                                  
(3) FAMILY LEAVE. (a)1. In a 12-month period no 
employe may take more than 6 weeks of family leave 
under par.(b)1 and 2. 
. . . . 
3. 
In a 12-month period no employe may take 
more than 8 weeks of family leave for any combination 
of reasons specified under par.(b). 
(b) An employe may take family leave for any of 
the following reasons: 
1. 
The birth of the employe's natural child, if 
the leave begins within 16 weeks of the child's birth. 
. . . . 
(5) PAYMENT FOR AND RESTRICTIONS UPON LEAVE. (a) This 
section does not entitle an employe to receive wages 
or salary while taking family leave or medical leave. 
(b) An employe may substitute, for portions of 
family leave or medical leave, paid or unpaid leave of 
any other type provided by the employer.  
All future references are to the 1987-88 Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
3  Section 301 of the federal LMRA provides: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer 
and a labor organization representing employees in an 
industry 
affecting 
commerce 
as 
defined 
in 
this 
Act . . . may be brought in any district court of the 
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, 
without respect to the amount in controversy or 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).  All future references are to 
the 1988 Code unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 94-1628 
 
3 
I. 
¶2 
The relevant facts are undisputed.
4  Miller employs 
Kozera as a laboratory technician.  Kozera is a member of the 
laboratory technicians' bargaining unit at Miller, which is 
represented for purposes of collective bargaining by Brewery 
Workers Local 9, UAW (Amalgamated) AFL-CIO.  The terms and 
conditions of Kozera's employment are governed by a collective- 
bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the union and Miller. 
¶3 
On February 9, 1990, Miller approved disability leave 
for Kozera during her pregnancy.  Pursuant to the CBA, Kozera 
substituted her paid reserve sick leave for this disability 
leave.  Miller expected Kozera to return to work on April 16, 
1990, six weeks after the due date of her child.  However, on 
March 12, 1990, Kozera verbally requested a six-week parental 
family leave under the Wisconsin FMLA,
5 to begin on April 16, 
1990.  Kozera also requested that, pursuant to the FMLA, she be 
allowed to substitute six-weeks of paid reserve sick leave for 
unpaid family leave.  As of April 16, Kozera had 952 hours of 
paid reserve sick leave under the terms of the CBA.   
¶4 
Miller granted Kozera a six-week parental leave.  
However, the CBA provided that employees could substitute paid 
reserve sick leave only when they were in fact sick and had 
submitted a doctor's note acceptable to Miller.  Since Kozera 
was not sick, Miller denied her request for substitution.  
                     
4  Before the administrative law judge ("ALJ"), Kozera and 
Miller stipulated to the relevant underlying facts of this case. 
5  The federal Family Medical Leave Act was not in effect at 
the time Kozera's claim arose.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2611-19 (1994 & 
Supp. 1995). 
No. 94-1628 
 
4 
Miller had never allowed an employee to use paid reserve sick 
leave for any reason except personal injury or illness. 
¶5 
On April 13, 1990, Kozera filed a complaint with the 
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations ("DILHR"), 
Equal Rights Division ("ERD"), alleging that Miller had violated 
her rights under the FMLA, Wis. Stat. § 103.10(5)(b).  In order 
to successfully establish a violation of § 103.10(5)(b), Kozera 
was required to prove that: (1) she was covered by the FMLA at 
the time 
she 
requested 
the 
leave; 
(2) she 
requested a 
substitution for family leave; (3) Miller provided the type of 
leave requested;
6 (4) the substituted leave had accrued to her; 
and (5) Miller denied the substituted leave.  See Leher v. 
Consolidated Papers, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (W.D. Wis. 
1992) (relying on decisions of DILHR interpreting the FMLA).  
Kozera and Miller in effect stipulated to elements one, two, and 
five; therefore, only elements three and four were in dispute.   
¶6 
On 
May 
10, 
1990, 
the 
ERD 
issued 
an 
initial 
determination finding probable cause to believe that Miller had 
violated the FMLA.  Accordingly, on June 8, 1990, a hearing was 
held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on the merits of 
Kozera's claim.  The ALJ concluded that Miller had violated 
§ 103.10(5)(b) by refusing to allow Kozera to substitute paid 
reserve sick leave for unpaid family leave, even though Kozera 
was not sick when she requested the leave.  The ALJ ordered 
                     
6 An employer must provide leave that is definite and 
quantifiable in order for such leave to be available for 
substitution under the FMLA.  See Richland School Dist. v. 
DILHR, 174 Wis. 2d 878, 895-96, 498 N.W.2d 826 (1993). 
 
No. 94-1628 
 
5 
Miller to pay back pay, interest, and reasonable actual 
attorney's fees to Kozera.  The ALJ did not make an explicit 
determination as to whether Kozera's claim was federally pre-
empted by § 301 of the LRMA, despite the fact that Miller raised 
this issue.  
 ¶7 On December 12, 1990, Miller petitioned the circuit 
court for judicial review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.52.  The parties subsequently obtained a stay of the 
proceedings pending the outcome of Richland School Dist. v. 
DILHR, 174 Wis. 2d 878, 498 N.W.2d 826 (1993).  Richland 
resolved the issue of whether Kozera could substitute paid sick 
leave even though she was not sick, since the court held that 
"sec. 103.10(5)(b) does not require that the employe satisfy the 
conditions of leave eligibility set forth in the collective 
bargaining agreement before substitution is allowed."
7  Id. at 
898.  Consequently, federal pre-emption was the only issue 
remaining before the circuit court.   
¶8 
On April 20, 1994, the circuit court reversed the 
decision of the ALJ.  In its memorandum decision, the circuit 
court relied on Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 
U.S. 399 (1988), in which the United States Supreme Court 
stated:  "Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights 
created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims 
'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 
agreement.'"  Id. at 410 n.10.  The circuit court also explained 
                     
7  Federal pre-emption was not at issue in Richland because 
the Richland School District is a political subdivision of the 
state, and therefore is not an "employer" within the meaning of 
the LMRA.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 142(3) & 152(2). 
No. 94-1628 
 
6 
that in Richland, this court indicated that the FMLA cannot be 
the source of compensation for substitution.  Therefore, the 
circuit court concluded that because the CBA is the source of 
compensation 
for 
substitution, 
Kozera's 
claim 
is 
founded 
directly on rights created by the CBA, and is substantially 
dependent upon an analysis of the CBA.  Thus, the circuit court 
held that Kozera's claim was pre-empted under § 301.     
¶9 
Kozera and DILHR appealed pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.58.  On July 9, 1996, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's decision.  The court of appeals indicated that 
§ 301 pre-empts a state law claim only if adjudication of the 
claim would require interpretation of a collective-bargaining 
agreement.  Miller Brewing Co. v. DILHR, 203 Wis. 2d 380, 387-
88, 553 N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Leher, 786 F. Supp. 
at 1483-84).  The court determined that, in this case, it would 
not need to interpret the CBA to analyze Kozera's claim because 
the CBA unambiguously provided for the type of leave that may be 
substituted under the FMLA.  In addition, the court concluded 
that, under the unambiguous terms of the CBA, such leave had 
accrued to Kozera.  The court stated: "Lifting this fact from 
this 
agreement 
does 
not 
require 
interpretation 
of 
the 
agreement."  Id. at 390 (quoting Leher, 786 F. Supp. at 1485).  
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that Kozera's claim was 
not pre-empted under § 301.  Id. 
II. 
¶10 The pre-emptive effect of § 301 is a question of law. 
 International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, IAM 
Local 437 v. United States Can, 150 Wis. 2d 479, 487, 441 N.W.2d 
No. 94-1628 
 
7 
710 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).  Although this 
court generally is not bound by an agency's interpretation of a 
question 
of law, 
this court will 
defer 
to 
an agency's 
interpretation in certain situations.  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 
Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996); State ex rel. Parker v. 
Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994).  This 
court has identified three levels of deference or review which 
may be granted to an agency's conclusion of law:  great weight 
deference, due weight deference, and de novo review.  UFE, 201 
Wis. 2d at 284; Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290-91, 485 
N.W.2d 256 (1992).  De novo review applies if a legal question 
is presented and there is no real evidence of any special agency 
expertise or experience.  See Coutts v. Wisconsin Retirement 
Bd., Nos. 95-1905 & 95-2228, slip. op. (Wis. S. Ct. May 22, 
1997).  We conclude that DILHR has no special expertise or 
experience in determining questions of federal pre-emption, and 
therefore determine that de novo review is applicable here.
8   
                     
8  In addition, DILHR did not make an explicit determination 
as to the issue of federal pre-emption in this case. 
No. 94-1628 
 
8 
III. 
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION 
¶11 The pre-emption doctrine is rooted in article VI of 
the United States Constitution, which is commonly referred to as 
the Supremacy Clause.  See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 
U.S. 202, 208 (1985).  The question of whether federal law pre-
empts state law is one of congressional intent.  Brown v. Hotel 
& Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 
U.S. 491, 500 (1984).  Federal law pre-empts state law in three 
situations:  (1) where Congress explicitly mandates pre-emption 
of state law; (2) where Congress implicitly indicates an intent 
to occupy an entire field of regulation to the exclusion of 
state law; or, (3) where state law actually conflicts with 
federal law.  Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 
299-300 (1988); Brown, 468 U.S. at 501.  The defendant bears the 
burden of establishing pre-emption.  Derby v. Brenner Tank, 
Inc., 187 Wis. 2d 244, 248, 522 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1994); see 
also Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 779 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
¶12  The case before us involves a question as to the 
extent of § 301 pre-emption.  A court's interpretation of the 
scope of a statute's pre-emptive effect is guided by two 
principles.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that: 
 
[I]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those 
in which Congress has "legislated . . . in a field 
which the States have traditionally occupied," we 
"start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress."   
No. 94-1628 
 
9 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 
(1996) (internal citations omitted).  Accordingly, there is a 
presumption against pre-emption.  See id.
9  In particular, in the 
context of labor law, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
"pre-emption should not be lightly inferred in this area, since 
the 
establishment 
of 
labor 
standards 
falls 
within 
the 
traditional police power of the State."
10  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 
412 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 
(1987)).  Second, the Supreme Court has determined that "any 
understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest 
primarily on a 'fair understanding of congressional purpose.'"  
                     
9  In Medtronic, the Supreme Court used the words 
"assumption" 
and 
"presumption" 
interchangeably, 
as 
is 
demonstrated by the following quote: 
Although dissenting Justices have argued that this 
assumption should apply only to the question whether 
Congress intended any pre-emption at all, as opposed 
to questions concerning the scope of its intended 
invalidation of state law, we used a "presumption 
against 
the 
pre-emption 
of 
state 
police 
power 
regulations" to support a narrow interpretation of 
such an express command in Cipollone.  That approach 
is consistent with both federalism concerns and the 
historic primacy of state regulation of matters of 
health and safety. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 
(1996) (internal citations omitted). 
 
For a general discussion on the presumption against pre-
emption, see Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, 2 Treatise on 
Constitutional Law:  Substance & Procedure § 12.4 (2d ed. 1992 & 
Supp. 1997).  
10  We acknowledge, however, that when pre-emption is based 
on the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Board, there is a presumption in favor of federal pre-emption.  
See Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l 
Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1984). 
No. 94-1628 
 
10
Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 
n.27 (1992)).   
B.  SPECIFIC PRINCPLES OF § 301 PRE-EMPTION  
¶13 Congress did not expressly indicate whether, or to 
what extent, it intended § 301 to pre-empt state law.  Lueck, 
471 U.S. at 208.  However, when it first considered the question 
of § 301 pre-emption in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 
369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Supreme Court concluded that Congress 
intended "doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail 
over inconsistent local rules."
11  Id. at 104.  The Lucas Flour 
Court explained the purposes of § 301 pre-emption as follows: 
 
[T]he subject matter of s 301(a) "is peculiarly one 
that calls for uniform law."  The possibility that 
individual 
contract 
terms 
might 
have 
different 
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably 
exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation 
and administration of collective agreements.  Because 
neither party could be certain of the rights which it 
had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating 
an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult 
by the necessity of trying to formulate contract 
provisions in such a way as to contain the same 
meaning under two or more systems of law which might 
someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. . . .   
Id. at 103-04 (internal citations omitted).  In addition, the 
Court indicated that § 301 pre-emption preserves the central 
role of arbitration in labor disputes, by ensuring that 
employees  exhaust the grievance procedures set forth in a 
collective-bargaining agreement before bringing a claim in 
court.  See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219 (explaining that this "was 
one of the central reasons that underlay the Court's holding in 
                     
11  The Supreme Court has determined that state and federal 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction of § 301 claims; however, a 
court must apply federal law in adjudicating such claims.  See 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 403 n.2 
(1988). 
No. 94-1628 
 
11
Lucas Flour . . . .").  Accordingly, § 301 pre-emption ensures 
that common terms in collective-bargaining agreements are not 
given different interpretations in different jurisdictions, and 
promotes 
"the 
peaceable, 
consistent 
resolution 
of 
labor-
management disputes."  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 404. 
¶14 In a series of decisions made after Lucas Flour, the 
Supreme Court has determined that the pre-emptive scope of § 301 
is extensive.  See Livadas  v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 n.16 
(1994)  ("Within its proper scope, § 301 has been accorded 
unusual pre-emptive power.").  However, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that § 301 pre-emption applies only where the 
purposes of such pre-emption will be fulfilled.  As explained by 
the Livadas Court: 
 
[T[he pre-emption rule has been applied only to assure 
that the purposes animating § 301 will be frustrated 
neither 
by 
state 
laws 
purporting 
to 
determine 
'questions relating to what the parties to a labor 
agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were 
intended to flow from breaches of that agreement," nor 
by parties' efforts to renege on their arbitration 
promises by 'relabeling' as tort suits actions simply 
alleging breaches of duties assumed in collective-
bargaining agreements. 
Id. at 122-23 (internal citations omitted).  
¶15 Therefore, although the pre-emptive effect of § 301 is 
broad, "not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially 
involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is 
pre-empted by § 301 . . . ."  Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court has determined that "it would be 
inconsistent with congressional intent under [§ 301] to preempt 
state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and 
obligations, independent of a labor contract."  Id. at 212; see 
also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123 (Section 301 does not "pre-empt 
No. 94-1628 
 
12
nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a 
matter of state law . . . .").
12  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
has held that "an application of state law is pre-empted by 
§ 301 of the [LMRA] only if such application requires the 
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement."  Lingle, 
486 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Court has 
emphasized that "it is the legal character of a claim, as 
'independent' 
of 
rights 
under 
the 
collective-bargaining 
agreement, that decides whether a state cause of action may go 
forward."  Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123-24.  A state law claim is 
"independent" if it "does not require construing the collective- 
bargaining agreement."  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 (emphasis 
added).        
¶16 In addition, the Court has stressed that "when the 
meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the 
bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be 
consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not 
require the claim to be extinguished."  Livadas, 512 U.S. at 
124.  As the Seventh Circuit, applying the principles of Lingle 
and Livadas, has stated:  "Therefore, when the collective 
bargaining agreement is merely a tangential consideration in the 
resolution of an otherwise independent state law action or where 
resort to its provisions is merely pro forma, we can say with 
confidence that such consultation does not trigger § 301 
                     
12  Such a non-negotiable right, established independent of 
a collective-bargaining agreement, exists in this case.  See 
Richland School Dist. v. DILHR, 174 Wis. 2d 878, 906, 498 N.W.2d 
826 (1993) ("Even if there were a conflict between the 
collective bargaining agreement and FMLA, the latter would 
prevail."); see also infra p. 16-17. 
No. 94-1628 
 
13
preemption."  Loewen Group Int'l Inc. v. Habericheter, 65 F.3d 
1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1995).   
¶17 This court has similarly recognized such principles.  
In International Ass'n of Machinists, this court indicated that 
the 
test 
for 
§ 301 
pre-emption 
"is 
not 
esoteric, 
but 
practicaldoes the adjudication of the state-law claim depend on 
the interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement?"  150 
Wis. 2d at 492 (emphasis added).  The court also determined 
that, under § 301, "[i]f the claim does not require substantial 
interpretation 
of 
a 
collective-bargaining 
agreement, 
the 
application of federal law is not required."  Id. at 493 
(emphasis added). 
III. 
¶18 In the present case, Miller argues that Kozera's state 
law claim under the FMLA is pre-empted by § 301 because 
adjudication of the claim requires interpretation of the CBA.  
Specifically, Miller points to Richland, in which the court 
determined: 
 
[T]he phrase 'leave . . . provided by the employer' 
refers to any type of leave that has accrued to the 
employe.  Section Ind. 86.03, Wis. Adm. Code.  Only 
those types of leave which an employment contract 
allows 
an 
employe 
to 
accumulate 
over 
time 
are 
available for substitution.  Leave which is indefinite 
or which cannot be quantified at the time of the FMLA 
leave request is not 'leave provided by the employer' 
under FMLA. 
174 Wis. 2d at 895-96 (emphasis original).  Miller contends that 
we must interpret the CBA in order to determine whether, under 
the requirements set forth in Richland, Kozera's paid leave had 
accrued to her and was the type of leave available for 
substitution under the FMLA. 
No. 94-1628 
 
14
¶19 Additionally, Miller stresses that the Richland court 
determined:  "If the employe is to receive wages or salary while 
on FMLA leave, the authorization for such compensation must come 
from a source other FMLA."  Id. at 895.  Miller claims that, 
consequently, Kozera has no independent right to substitute paid 
sick leave under the FMLA, because the CBA provides the only 
possible 
authorization 
for 
compensation 
available 
for 
substitution.  Miller contends that Kozera's claim therefore is 
pre-empted under § 301, because it is "founded directly" on 
rights created by the CBA.
13   
¶20 We reject 
Miller's 
arguments.  Specifically, we 
conclude that interpretation of a disputed contract term or 
provision is not required in order to determine that Kozera had 
accrued paid leave that was definite and quantifiable, as 
required by Richland.  The parties agree that, at the time she 
requested substitution, Kozera had 952 hours of paid reserve 
sick leave under the terms of the CBA.  Therefore, the paid 
leave was clearly definite and quantifiable.  Moreover, such 
leave had accrued to Kozera.  Article VII, § 4(A) of the CBA 
provides in relevant part:  
 
Each employee shall be credited with a reserve of 
twenty (20) workdays' illness and injury leave with 
pay per contract year. . . . Any unused leave under 
this Section at the end of the contract year shall be 
accumulated and carried over into the succeeding 
contract 
year 
but 
the 
maximum 
leave 
to 
be 
so 
accumulated shall not exceed one-hundred-sixty (160) 
working days.   
                     
13  The United States Supreme Court has indicated that 
"[s]ection 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created 
by 
collective-bargaining 
agreements, 
and 
also 
claims 
'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 
agreement.'"  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410 n.10.  
No. 94-1628 
 
15
(R.8 at 44-45.)  Therefore, the CBA unambiguously indicates that 
employees covered by the agreement, such as Kozera, shall 
accumulate paid leave over time.  The mere need to refer to the 
plain language of the CBA to determine this fact does not 
require us to construe a disputed contract term.  See Livadas, 
512 U.S. at 124-25.  As the Livadas Court emphasized:  "[W]hen 
the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the 
bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be 
consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not 
require the claim to be extinguished."  Id. at 124.  Thus, since 
we need not interpret the CBA in order to determine that 
Kozera's paid leave had accrued to her and was the type of leave 
available for substitution under the FMLA, Kozera's claim is not 
pre-empted by § 301.  See id. at 124-25.  Further, because 
Kozera has established she accrued paid leave that was definite 
and quantifiable, she has established all the elements of her 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 103.10(5)(b).     
¶21 Our determination regarding pre-emption is directly 
supported by Leher v. Consolidated Papers, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 
1480 (W.D. Wis. 1992), in which the plaintiff filed a claim with 
DILHR against her employer, claiming that the employer had 
violated 
the 
Wisconsin 
FMLA 
by 
refusing 
her 
request 
to 
substitute paid sick leave for unpaid family leave.  The Leher 
court indicated that the plain language of the bargaining 
agreement between plaintiff's union and her employer provided 
that sick leave accrued to the plaintiff.  The court concluded: 
 "Lifting this fact from the agreement does not require 
interpretation of the agreement."  Id. at 1485.  Therefore, the 
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court held that § 301 of the LMRA did not pre-empt the 
plaintiff's claim under the FMLA.  Id.  
¶22 In addition, we conclude that simply because the CBA 
provides 
the 
authorization 
for compensation 
available for 
substitution does not mean that Kozera's claim is "founded 
directly" on rights created by the CBA.  Rather, Kozera's claim 
is directly founded on a right created by the FMLAthe right to 
substitute paid leave for unpaid family leave.  See Leher, 786 
F. Supp. at 1485 ("[P]laintiff's claim based on the [FMLA] is 
not a claim founded directly on rights created by the collective 
bargaining agreement. . . .").  In other words, Kozera does not 
assert that she has a right to substitution because of an 
understanding embodied in the CBA.  In fact, Kozera could not 
make such an assertion, because the CBA clearly provides that an 
employee must be sick in order to use paid reserve sick leave.  
It therefore follows that Kozera's right to substitute paid 
reserve sick leave is not directly founded on rights created by 
the CBA.  Instead, the Wisconsin legislature, by enacting the 
FMLA, has given workers such as Kozera the right to substitute 
accrued paid leave for unpaid family leave, even if the 
conditions of leave eligibility set forth in a collective- 
bargaining agreement are not met.  See Richland, 174 Wis. 2d at 
898.   
¶23 This right to substitution under the FMLA is a 
nonnegotiable right which the legislature has conferred upon 
individual employees.  See id. at 906 ("Even if there were a 
conflict between the collective bargaining agreement and FMLA, 
the latter would prevail.").  It would be inconsistent with 
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congressional intent under § 301 to pre-empt this state statute, 
which establishes rights independent of a labor contract.  See 
Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123; Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212.  Therefore, 
the mere fact that the CBA provides the authorization for 
compensation available for substitution under the FMLA does not 
mean that Kozera's claim is pre-empted by § 301.  
¶24 Moreover, our decision does not frustrate the two main 
purposes which § 301 servesensuring that terms and provisions 
of 
collective-bargaining 
agreements 
are 
given 
uniform 
interpretations and preserving the central role of arbitration 
in labor disputes.  In particular, since adjudication of 
Kozera's claim does not require us to interpret or construe the 
CBA, we do not risk giving a contract term or provision a 
different and possible conflicting interpretation from that 
which is applicable under federal law.  See Leher, 786 F. Supp. 
at 1485.  In addition, no one has suggested that Kozera is 
attempting to avoid arbitration by bringing a claim under the 
FMLA.  Thus, since pre-emption applies only to ensure that the 
purposes behind § 301 will not be frustrated, see Livadas, 512 
U.S. at 122-23, pre-emption does not apply here. 
¶25  In summary, we conclude that Miller has failed to meet 
its burden of establishing that § 301 of the LMRA pre-empts 
Kozera's 
claim under the 
FMLA.  
First, 
Miller has not 
established that adjudication of Kozera's claim will require us 
to interpret a disputed term or provision of the CBA.  Second, 
Miller has not proven that Kozera's claim is directly founded on 
rights created by the CBA.  Third, Miller has not demonstrated 
that pre-emption will serve the purposes of § 301.  Therefore, 
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Miller has not overcome the presumption against pre-emption.  We 
further conclude that Kozera has established the elements of her 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 103.10(5)(b).  Thus, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals, which remands this case to the 
circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.