Title: State v. Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51600
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2005

FILED:  August 18, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ZACHARY JAMES HARRIS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC No. C011903CR; CA A11718; SC S51600)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 12, 2005.
Andrew D. Coit, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
CARSON, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of conviction is affirmed, and the sentence is vacated.
The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Alan C. Bonebrake, Judge. 191 Or App 305, 82 P3d 653 (2004).
CARSON, C. J.
This case involves the use of prior juvenile
delinquency adjudications to increase sentences for adult felony
convictions under the Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines
(guidelines).  Under the guidelines, prior juvenile adjudications
for person felonies, (1) like prior adult criminal convictions,
increase a convicted defendant's criminal history score, which,
in turn, usually operates to increase the convicted defendant's
sentence.  Unlike adult criminal trials, however, juvenile
delinquency proceedings in Oregon are conducted without a jury.  
On review, defendant first argues generally that,
because juvenile adjudications in Oregon are accomplished without
jury trials, any subsequent reliance upon those adjudications to
increase a defendant's criminal sentence violates the jury trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (2)  Alternatively, defendant argues that, in any
event, the trial court unconstitutionally used the fact of his
past juvenile record to impose an increased criminal sentence in
his particular case.  Defendant's first argument is not well-taken.  As to his second argument, however, we hold that, under
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d
435 (2000), the manner in which the trial court used defendant's
juvenile adjudication to increase his sentence amounted to an
error that violated the Sixth Amendment.  As a result, we vacate
defendant's sentence and remand this case for resentencing.
The facts are undisputed.  In 2002, defendant was
indicted on 17 criminal counts in connection with a string of
Washington County burglaries that occurred in 2001.  In exchange
for the prosecution's agreement to drop most of the charges
against him, defendant agreed to plead guilty to three counts of
first-degree theft, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one
count of identify theft.  Defendant's plea petition expressly
called for open sentencing; no sentencing stipulations had been
made as part of defendant's agreement to plead guilty.  Among
other things, the plea petition also required defendant to list
his past criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications.
Defendant reported that, as a 12-year-old juvenile, he had been
adjudicated for first-degree rape.  He had no prior adult
convictions.
The trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea and
later held a sentencing hearing.  At that hearing, defendant
relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Apprendi, 530 US 466, to argue that using his prior juvenile
adjudication to enhance his adult criminal sentence would violate
the Sixth Amendment, as well as Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution. (3)  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court had
concluded that it was "unconstitutional for a legislature to
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed."  Id. at 490.  In so holding, however, the Court also
held that the existence of any prior convictions was a fact
exempt from that general rule.  Id.  Building from that
foundation, defendant in the present case argued that Apprendi's
prior conviction exception rested upon the fact that such
convictions were established through procedures satisfying the
constitutional guarantees of fair notice, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and trial by jury before being used as sentence
enhancements.  Defendant pointed out that, in contrast, case law
interpreting both the state and federal constitutions had made
clear that jury trials were not constitutionally required in
delinquency proceedings and, consequently, were not made
available to juvenile offenders tried in Oregon's juvenile
courts.  Because his prior juvenile adjudication had lacked a
jury trial, defendant argued that, unlike the fact of a prior
conviction, the fact of his adjudication could not be used to
increase his sentence and at the same time remain consonant with
Apprendi.  In arguing that point to the trial court, defendant's
lawyer added:
"I think the State could have avoided those
problems by pleading and proving prior conviction
possibly, but it's not my job to build my client's
criminal history or to put the State in a position
where they can enhance his sentence based upon a prior
criminal history."
Ultimately, the trial court rejected defendant's
arguments and relied upon defendant's prior juvenile adjudication
to increase his criminal history score and to impose an upward
departure sentence under the guidelines.  For the two first-degree burglary convictions, the trial court imposed respectively
a 24-month and a 34-month term of incarceration, which it ordered
to be served consecutively.  On the remaining counts, the trial
court imposed aggregated sentences totaling 36 months, all of
which were to be served concurrently with the burglary sentences. 
Apart from credit for time served and the good-time credit that
could accrue during his second burglary sentence, the trial court
deemed defendant ineligible for sentence reduction, work release,
alternative incarceration, and conditional or supervised release
programs.  The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's sentence
without written opinion.  State v. Harris, 192 Or App 602, 89 P3d
96 (2004).  This court subsequently allowed defendant's petition
for review to consider his constitutional arguments. 
On review, defendant challenges his upward departure
sentence solely based upon the United States Constitution.  His
primary assertion is that, because jury trial safeguards are not
available in Oregon juvenile proceedings, any use of a prior
juvenile adjudication to lengthen a subsequent criminal sentence
in Oregon violates the jury trial right set out in the Sixth
Amendment.  Defendant reasons that, after Apprendi, use of
juvenile adjudications to increase adult sentences without
essentially reproving the offenses underlying those adjudications
violates the Sixth Amendment because the resulting sentence is
based upon facts that were not offered or proved to a jury. 
Defendant's position appears to be that using a juvenile
adjudication as a factor to increase adult sentences is
unconstitutional whenever the juvenile proceedings that produce
those adjudications are conducted without jury trial protections. 
As a secondary argument, defendant contends that, in any event,
the trial court unconstitutionally applied defendant's prior
juvenile adjudication as a sentencing factor in this particular
case.
In response, the state argues that, presently, nothing
in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence interpreting
the Sixth Amendment can be read as expressly prohibiting the use
of juvenile adjudications at sentencing.  In any event, the state
continues, the facts of this case fall into either one of the two
expressed exceptions to Apprendi's general rule.  
First, the state argues that, by acknowledging the
existence of his prior juvenile adjudication in his plea
petition, defendant essentially admitted that fact and placed it
beyond the reach of the general rule recognized in Apprendi. 
Alternatively, the state contends that prior juvenile
adjudications easily fit within Apprendi's prior conviction
exception.  Pointing to the Supreme Court's decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US 224, 118 S Ct 1219,
140 L Ed 2d 350 (1998), the state contends that Apprendi's prior
conviction exception should be viewed as a broad "recidivism"
exception.  According to the state, the application of such an
exception does not depend upon the role that juries play in the
processes that eventually lead courts to label repeat offenders
"recidivists."  Instead, the state argues, application of the
"recidivism" exception depends upon whether the prior proceedings
in question were conducted with the "substantial procedural
safeguards" that the Sixth Amendment requires.  Because the Sixth
Amendment does not require jury trials in juvenile court
proceedings, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 US 528, 91 S Ct
1976, 29 L Ed 2d 647 (1971) (so stating), and because juvenile
adjudications are accompanied by a number of other important
constitutional safeguards, the state now asserts that using
defendant's prior juvenile adjudication as a sentencing factor
for his adult convictions does not offend the Sixth Amendment. 
Finally, the state argues that, under Apprendi, it should be
allowed to prove the existence of defendant's juvenile
adjudication to a jury on remand.
The state is correct in its initial observation that
the Supreme Court has yet to address this specific issue.  The
parties' arguments, however, implicate an element of criminal
sentencing that has received substantial scrutiny from the
Supreme Court over the last ten years, that is, sentence
enhancement and the factors that justify it.  Because an
understanding of that background is important to the resolution
of this case, we review the relevant history as a prelude to our
discussion.
In 1994, the Supreme Court placed prior convictions
squarely within what was, at the time, a largely unlimited pool
of information from which sentencing courts could draw in the
course of fashioning criminal punishments.  In Nichols v. United
States, 511 US 738, 747, 114 S Ct 1921, 128 L Ed 2d 745 (1994),
the Court stated:
"As a general proposition, a sentencing judge 'may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information
he may consider, or the source from which it may come.' 
United States v. Tucker, 404 US 443, 446, 30 L Ed 2d
592, 92 S Ct 589 (1972).  'Traditionally, sentencing
judges have considered a wide variety of factors in
addition to evidence bearing on guilt in determining
what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant.' 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 US 476, 485, 124 L Ed 2d
436, 113 S Ct 2194 (1993).  One such important factor,
as recognized by state recidivism statutes and the
criminal history component of the Sentencing
Guidelines, is a defendant's prior convictions."
(Emphasis added.)
Four years later, in Almendarez-Torres, 523 US 224, the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that  prior convictions were
among the substantive elements of a federal statute that
criminalized reentry of previously deported aliens into the
United States.  As a result, the Court also rejected the
defendant's contention that the Fifth Amendment (4) required
the government to charge the existence of the defendant's prior
convictions in his indictment.  
In Almendarez-Torres, the Court examined 8 USC section
1326, a federal statute that made it a crime for deported aliens
to return to the United States without special permission. 
Aliens convicted under the statute with no prior criminal history
could receive a maximum sentence of two years.  523 US at 226. 
By contrast, aliens who illegally returned to the United States
following conviction and deportation for an aggravated felony
could receive a 20-year maximum sentence.  Id.  The question
before the Court was whether such convictions were an element of
an aggravated crime under the federal statute and, therefore,
required charging by indictment, or whether Congress had intended
the references to prior convictions in the statute to be viewed
simply as sentencing factors.
Drawing on the text of the statute, as well as its
legislative history, a majority of the Court concluded that the
statute was not susceptible to any interpretation that could call
its constitutionality into question.  That conclusion flowed, in
part, from the Court's view that the defendant's prior
convictions fell within the broad category of "recidivism":
"At the outset, we note that the relevant
statutory subject matter is recidivism.  That subject
matter -- prior commission of a serious crime -- is as
typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine. 
Perhaps reflecting this fact, the lower courts have
almost uniformly interpreted statutes (that authorize
higher sentences for recidivists) as setting forth
sentencing factors, not as creating new crimes (at
least where the conduct, in the absence of the
recidivism, is independently unlawful).  And we have
found no statute that clearly makes recidivism an
offense element in such circumstances."
Id. at 230 (internal citations omitted).  Ultimately, the Court
rejected the notion that the defendant's prior convictions must
be treated as an element of his substantive criminal offense
under 8 USC section 1326.
Faced with a similar statute two years later, the
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in Jones v. United
States, 526 US 227, 119 S Ct 1215, 143 L Ed 2d 311 (1999).  In
Jones, the Court was called upon to analyze 18 USC section 2119,
a federal carjacking statute.  Under that statute, a person
taking a motor vehicle from another at gunpoint faced a maximum
sentence of 15 years.  If a carjacking victim suffered serious
bodily injury during commission of the crime, the maximum prison
sentence rose to 25 years; if the victim died, the maximum
sentence became life imprisonment.  The issue before the Court
was again whether the factors that lengthened prison terms under
the statute were indeed sentencing factors, or whether they were
elements of separate offenses that the state was required to
charge by indictment, prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and submit
to a jury for a verdict.  Id. at 229. 
In concluding that the statutory elements in question
should not be construed as sentencing factors, the Court's
analysis drew heavily upon the historical importance of the jury
trial in early English and American jurisprudence.  The Court's
core concern was that, if the elements at issue in Jones were
interpreted merely as sentencing factors, then those elements
arguably would be placed beyond a jury's purview, creating the
possibility of a direct clash with the jury trial guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment.   
Pointing to the historical antecedents of the Sixth
Amendment, the Court wrote that, under English common law, prior
to the American Revolution, 
"[t]he potential or inevitable severity of sentences
was indirectly checked by juries' assertions of a
mitigating power when the circumstances of a
prosecution pointed to political abuse of the criminal
process or endowed a criminal conviction with
particularly sanguinary consequences.  This power to
thwart Parliament and Crown took the form not only of
flat-out acquittals in the face of guilt but of what
today we would call verdicts of guilty to lesser
included offenses, manifestations of what Blackstone
described as 'pious perjury' on the jurors' part." 
Id. at 245.  The Court explained that, as competition between
juries and the judiciary grew, the government introduced
countervailing measures to diminish juries' power, including the
parliamentary practice of barring the right to a jury trial when
defining new, statutory offenses.  Id.  Among such laws that the
framers experienced firsthand were the Stamp Act and other
statutes regulating American trade with England.  Those
enactments eventually would lead to the protest set out in the
Declaration of Independence against England's deprivation of jury
trials in the colonies.  Id. at 245-46.  Having reviewed that
history, the Court explained its importance to the case at hand:
"In sum, there is reason to suppose that in the
present circumstances, however peculiar their details
to our time and place, the relative diminution of the
jury's significance would merit Sixth Amendment
concern.  It is not, of course, that anyone today would
claim that every fact with a bearing on sentencing must
be found by a jury; we have resolved that general issue
and have no intention of questioning its resolution. 
The point is simply that diminishment of the jury's
significance by removing control over facts determining
a statutory sentencing range would resonate with the
claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine
Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled."
Id. at 248 (emphasis added).  The Court went on to hold that
viewing the elements of the carjacking statute as sentencing
factors "would raise serious constitutional questions on which
precedent is not dispositive."  Id. at 251.  To avoid an
interpretation of the statute that arguably could be construed as
unconstitutional, the Court concluded that the federal carjacking
statute at issue must be viewed as establishing three separate
offenses, each marked by distinct elements that required charging
by indictment, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury
determination of guilt.
In reaching that conclusion in Jones, the Court
described, in a footnote, the motivating force behind its concern
over a contrary interpretation of the carjacking statute:
"[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Id. at 243 n 6.  The Court went on to concede that, "[b]ecause
our prior cases suggest rather than establish this principle, our
concern about the Government's reading of the statute rises only
to the level of doubt, not certainty."  Id.  The following year,
however, that "suggestion" would become an established tenet of
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in Apprendi. 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court examined a New Jersey
hate crime statute that allowed trial courts to impose extended
prison terms in criminal cases if a court found that the crimes
at issue had been committed "with a purpose to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race, color,
gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."  
530 US at 469.  The defendant in Apprendi had fired several shots
into the home of an African-American family that recently had
moved into an all-white New Jersey neighborhood.  After being
arrested and admitting that he was the shooter, the defendant
told police interrogators that he did not personally know his
intended victims, but objected to their presence in the
neighborhood because of their race.  Id. 
The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose in
connection with the shooting incident.  The offense carried a
penalty range of five to 10 years.  The trial court, however,
sentenced the defendant to 12 years' imprisonment after
concluding that, under New Jersey's "hate crime" statute, the
evidence supported a finding of racial bias on the defendant's
part.  Id. at 471.
In reversing the trial court's judgment, the Supreme
Court expressly confirmed what it only had suggested previously
in Jones: 
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  With that
exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set
forth in the concurring opinions in [Jones]: '[I]t is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the
jury the assessment of facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed.  It is equally clear that such
facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.'"
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).  Ultimately, the Court concluded
that the challenged sentencing scheme at issue before it
represented "an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition
that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." 
Id. at 497. 
Since issuing Apprendi, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its commitment to the principles set forth in that
case in several subsequent decisions, including Blakely v.
Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). 
In Blakely, the defendant had pleaded guilty to second-degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm.  124
S Ct at 2534-35.  In the State of Washington, crimes of that
nature were classified generally as Class B felonies, punishable
by no more than 10 years in prison.  Id.  For the specific crimes
at issue in Blakely, other provisions of state law further
limited the maximum available sentence to 53 months.  The trial
court nevertheless sentenced the defendant to a 90-month prison
term after finding that the defendant had acted with deliberate
cruelty, an expressed ground for upward sentencing departures
under Washington's domestic violence statutes.  Id. at 2535. 
In defending that enhanced sentence before the Supreme
Court, the State of Washington argued that its 10-year sentencing
ceiling for Class B felonies was the relevant "statutory maximum"
for the defendant's crimes.  Because the defendant's 90-month
sentence was well within that range, the state asserted that the
requirements of Apprendi had been satisfied.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the state's
argument, explaining:
"The State nevertheless contends that there was no
Apprendi violation because the relevant 'statutory
maximum' is not 53 months, but the 10-year maximum for
class B felonies [under Washington state law].  It
observes that no exceptional sentence may exceed that
limit.  Our precedents make clear, however, that the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis
of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.  In other words, the relevant
'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any additional findings." 
Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). 
The Court went on to reverse the judgment below and remand the
case for further proceedings consonant with Apprendi.  Id. at
2543. (5)  In doing so, the Court noted that its adherence to
Apprendi was motivated, in part, by its desire to give concrete
meaning to the jury trial right provided by the Sixth Amendment:
"Our commitment to Apprendi in this context
reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent,
but the need to give intelligible content to the right
of jury trial.  That right is no mere procedural
formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in
our constitutional structure.  Just as suffrage ensures
the people's ultimate control in the legislative and
executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their
control in the judiciary.  Apprendi carries out this
design by ensuring that the judge's authority to
sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict. 
Without that restriction, the jury would not exercise
the control that the Framers intended."
From the preceding examination of cases spanning
Nichols to Blakely, (6) several propositions emerge regarding
the current relationship between sentencing models and the Sixth
Amendment.  First, in a post-Apprendi/Blakely world, the broad,
largely unlimited inquiry that sentencing courts could undertake
at the time of Nichols is diminished when that inquiry is aimed
at lengthening sentences beyond their "statutory maximums" as the
Supreme Court defined that phrase in Apprendi and Blakely.  In
such cases, although a sentencing court still may consider all
the facts available to it under Nichols, that ability is now
circumscribed by the requirement that, aside from a defendant's
prior convictions or admissions, any fact that increases a
sentence first must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Second, prior convictions remain, at least for now, a
viable exception to the requirement noted above, due in large
part to the jury's function in establishing those
convictions. (7)  Finally, the jury's importance in
establishing the general validity of convictions under the Sixth
Amendment is founded upon more than the relatively narrow
function of the jury as a reliable factfinder.  From the framers'
perspective, the jury was also meant to serve as the people's
check on judicial power at the trial court level.  With those
ideas in mind, we now turn to the issue before us, that is,
whether the trial court properly considered defendant's prior
juvenile adjudication in increasing his sentence in this case.   
The essence of defendant's primary argument reduces to
this:  Because juvenile adjudications are conducted without
juries, they cannot be used to enhance adult criminal sentences
unless, and until, the facts giving rise to those adjudications
are presented to a jury and relitigated.  As explained below,
however, that proposition is not well-taken as a matter of Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.  
The Sixth Amendment has little to say, generally, about
what elements a legislature permissibly may use to define a crime
or lengthen a criminal sentence.  Although the legislature cannot
define a crime in a way that relieves the state of its
constitutional obligations to prove each element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, defining criminal conduct is still a
task generally left to the legislative branch.  Harris v. United
States, 536 US 545, 557, 122 S Ct 2406, 153 L Ed 2d 524 (2002). 
The Sixth Amendment, by comparison, is focused on procedures that
guarantee criminal defendants, among other things, "the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, * * * and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation[.]"  US
Const, Amend VI.  In that regard, it is of no moment -- at least
for Sixth Amendment purposes -- if the legislature chooses to
designate, inter alia, a prior nonjury juvenile adjudication as
an element that increases the seriousness of a crime or lengthens
a criminal sentence, so long as the existence of that prior
adjudication is proved to a jury, (8) or such a requirement is 
knowingly waived. (9) 
However, the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi and
Blakely lend defendant's secondary argument –- that is, that the
trial court erred in using defendant's juvenile adjudication to
enhance his sentence in this case -- considerably more traction
than his first.  Read together, Apprendi and Blakely stand for
the proposition that, outside of prior convictions or facts
admitted by a criminal defendant, any fact that increases a
criminal sentence beyond its statutory maximum must be proved to
a jury to be consonant with the Sixth Amendment.  In this case,
it is beyond dispute that defendant's prior juvenile adjudication
qualified as "any fact" and that the state did not present
evidence of that juvenile adjudication to a jury at defendant's
adult sentencing hearing.  It also is beyond dispute that the
trial court used defendant's juvenile adjudication specifically
to lengthen his prison sentence beyond the maximum that he
otherwise could have received.  The remaining question is whether
the use of defendant's juvenile adjudication in this case fits
within either of the two exceptions in Apprendi, discussed above. 
We turn to that inquiry now.  
As noted, the state seeks to mitigate the effect of
Apprendi and Blakely upon the facts here by attempting to square
defendant's sentence with the exceptions contained in those
cases.  First, the state essentially argues that, because
defendant noted his prior juvenile rape adjudication in filling
out his plea petition, its existence became a fact "admitted by
the defendant."  Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2537.  That argument,
however, fails to grasp fully the nature of judicial
admissions. (10)  This court has defined judicial admissions as
statements "made by a party or his [or her] attorney for the
purpose of dispensing with proof of a fact in issue."  Foxton v.
Woodmansee, 236 Or 271, 278, 386 P2d 659 (1963), reh'g den, 236
Or 271, 388 P2d 275 (1964) (emphasis added).  To purposely
dispense with the proof of such a fact, however, a party must at
least know that the fact is indeed one that is at issue and must
be proved.  As a result, this court has also categorized judicial
admissions as an intentional "act of waiver, relating to the
opponent's proof of the fact, and not merely a statement of
assertion or concession, made for some independent purpose." 
Erwin v. Thomas, 267 Or 311, 313, 516 P2d 1279 (1973) (quoting 9
Wigmore, Evidence, § 2594, 596 (3d ed)) (emphasis added).  A
guilty plea ordinarily constitutes such a waiver with regard to
the jury trial right.  Brady v. United States, 397 US 742, 748,
90 S Ct 1463, 25 L Ed 2d 747 (1970).  To be valid, however, such
a waiver must show "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege."  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458,
464, 58 S Ct 1019, 82 L Ed 1461 (1938). 
 In this case, defendant clearly waived his right to have a jury decide the charges as to which he ultimately was
convicted; defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced number of
charges in return for the prosecution's promise to dismiss the
remaining criminal counts.  That bargain, however, did not
encompass any aspect of defendant's prospective sentence. 
Defendant went on to participate in a proceeding clearly
identified in his plea petition as "open" sentencing, i.e., no
sentencing agreements had been reached between the parties prior
to the sentencing proceedings, and both defendant and the
prosecution were entitled to present evidence in support of their
respective positions regarding upward or downward departure
sentences.  Thus, although defendant's plea petition required him
to report any past juvenile adjudications, nothing in the record
demonstrates that the statements that defendant made in his
guilty plea also were made "for the purpose of dispensing with
proof of a fact in issue" at sentencing.  Foxton, 236 Or at 278. 
Indeed, defendant expressly objected to the use of his prior
juvenile adjudication at his sentencing hearing.  As a result, we
cannot say, based upon the record before us, that defendant's
acknowledgment of a prior juvenile adjudication in filling out
his guilty plea amounted to either an admission or a knowing
waiver of his jury trial right for sentencing purposes.
The state also argues that, in any event, prior
juvenile adjudications easily fit within Apprendi's prior
conviction exception.  According to the state, Apprendi's
exception for prior convictions should be read as a broad
"recidivism" exception intended to encompass repeat offenders
generally, without regard to how the determinations of the
recidivist's past offenses have been labeled or conducted.  When
viewed in that light, the state contends, application of the
prior conviction exception is not contingent upon whether the
right to a jury trial was strictly observed in a prior
proceeding.  Instead, the state argues that the exception turns
upon whether the prior proceeding afforded the criminal defendant
substantial procedural safeguards.  As a result, the state urges
us to adopt the rationale employed by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Smalley, 294 F3d 1030 (8th Cir 2002),
cert den, 537 US 1114.  
In Smalley, the Eighth Circuit opined that "whether
juvenile adjudications should be exempted from Apprendi's general
rule should not turn on the narrow parsing of words, but on an
examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult
convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not
offended by such an exemption."  Id. at 1033.  Ultimately, the
Eight Circuit concluded that, because juvenile proceedings are
safeguarded by the rights of notice, counsel, and confrontation,
the privilege against self-incrimination, and application of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the adjudications that result
are reliable enough to satisfy the exception in Apprendi.  Id.  
Under Oregon statutes, juvenile adjudications are not
considered criminal convictions.  See ORS 419C.400(4) (juvenile
court adjudication "is not a conviction of a crime or offense"). 
We agree with the state that how a legislative body chooses to
label or not label those determinations is not necessarily
dispositive here.  When the circumstances suit them, different
jurisdictions can, and frequently do, define juvenile
adjudications and criminal convictions as sharing the same
meaning.  See, e.g., 18 USCA § 521(a) (under federal statute
aimed at curbing criminal street gangs, "conviction" includes
finding that person has "committed an act of juvenile delinquency
involving a violent or controlled substances felony"). 
We also agree with the state that the procedural
protections accompanying juvenile adjudications imbue them with a
high degree of reliability.  The Supreme Court, however, has made
clear that reliability is not the sine qua non of the Sixth
Amendment; that constitutional provision also serves to divide
authority between judge and jury.  As the Court explained in
Blakely, the framer's paradigm for criminal justice was 
"Not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfections,
but the common-law ideal of limited state power
accomplished by strict division of authority between
judge and jury.  As Apprendi held, every defendant has
the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury
all facts legally essential to the punishment."
In sum, we hold that the use of prior juvenile
adjudications as sentencing factors in Oregon does not violate
the jury trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  At the
same time, we also hold that the Sixth Amendment requires that
when such an adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to
increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved
to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing
purposes following an informed and knowing waiver.  Here, neither
of those conditions was met.  It follows that the trial court's
use of defendant's juvenile adjudication as an enhancement factor
at sentencing violated the Sixth Amendment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of conviction is affirmed, and the sentence is vacated.
The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission maintains a list of statutory offenses
that it expressly has defined under its administrative rules as "person felonies."  The crimes
identified as such range from aggravated murder, ORS 163.095, to boating hit and run, ORS
830.475(2).  All appear to be offenses that, in some form, involve violent or dangerous acts
directed against the person of another.
2. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation[.]"
3. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in
the county in which the offense shall have been
committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof[.]"
4. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part:
"No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger[.]" 
5. This court has since come to apply the rationale used
by the Supreme Court in Blakely to sentencing matters in Oregon. 
See State v. Dilts, 337 Or 645, 103 P3d 95 (2004) (under Sixth
Amendment, defendant has right to have additional facts that may
increase his or her sentence beyond otherwise applicable maximum
sentence decided by jury, rather than by trial judge).
6. Since the time that the parties first briefed this case for argument, the Supreme
Court has decided other Apprendi-related matters in United States v. Booker, 543 US ___, 125 S
Ct 738, 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005).  Booker dealt with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and has
no application here.
7. Justice Thomas recently has called into question the
continuing validity of the prior conviction exception articulated
in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US 224, 118 S Ct 1219,
140 L Ed 2d 350 (1998).  In Shepard v. United States, 544 US ___,
125 S Ct 1254, 161 L Ed 2d 205 (2005), Justice Thomas wrote:
"Amendarez-Torres, like Taylor [v. United States, 495
US 575, 110 S Ct 2143, 109 L Ed 2d 607 (1990)], has
been eroded by this Court's subsequent Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now
recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided. 
The parties do not request it here, but in an
appropriate case, this Court should consider
Almendarez-Torres' continuing viability."
125 S Ct at 1264 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion on the matter, however,
is presently not binding authority on this court, and we will not
attempt to guess whether a majority of the Supreme Court may, at
some future date, ultimately adopt Justice Thomas's view.  Until
that time, we must assume that Almendarez-Torres, along with the
prior conviction exception, remains good law. 
8. Of course, as discussed earlier, the Sixth Amendment
would not require proof of the existence of such an adjudication
to a jury if that adjudication qualifies as a prior conviction. 
We address that question in the text below.
9. Using prior nonjury determinations in such a
fashion is not uncommon in our criminal justice system today. 
The crime of criminal driving while suspended, ORS 811.182, for
example, is a case study in how the legislature typically uses
prior nonjury, noncriminal convictions to form a substantive
element of a larger criminal charge.  The foundation of criminal
driving while suspended rests on repeated traffic violations,
charges expressly exempt from jury trials under ORS 152.076(1). 
If a driver is convicted of 20 traffic violations in a five-year
period, then the license of the driver is required to be revoked
as a habitual offender under ORS 809.600(2)(b).  The
administrative revocation proceedings that follow pursuant to ORS
809.640 are also juryless.  If the administrative process results
in a determination that the driver is indeed a habitual offender,
that finding will raise any subsequent conviction for driving
while suspended -- normally a Class A traffic violation -- to the
level of a criminal misdemeanor, ORS 811.182 (4)(f).  Under
defendant's theory in this case, if the state sought to prove
criminal driving while suspended because a driver was still on
the road after having lost his driver license as a habitual
offender, then the state would be forced to relitigate all the
prior juryless decisions that had led to the habitual offender
determination to establish a key element of the more serious
crime. 
10. The Oregon Evidence Code often uses the term "admissions" in a context that is
different from that framing the discussion above.  See, e.g., OEC 613 (inadmissability of
extrinsic evidence in some instances concerning prior inconsistent statements does not apply to
"admissions of a party-opponent" as defined in ORS 40.450).  Our discussion of judicial
admissions in this case does not effect the settled understanding of admissions in the evidentiary
context.