Title: MATTER OF S L R
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-391
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 28, 1982

No. 80-391 I N TI-IE SUPREME C O U R T O F T I E STATE OF ?lONTANA 1981 I N T H E M A T T E R O F THE ADOPTION OF S. L. R . , a minor c h i l d . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f R a v a l l i , The FIonorable John S. Henson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Smith, Connor & Van Valkenburg, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Terry S e h e s t e d t , Missoula, Nontana Submitted on B r i e f s : !day 13, 1981 Decided : JAB 2 8 rubL F i l e d : JAN 2 8 1982 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from an order issued by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, R a v a l l i County, denying a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r t h e adoption of SLR, a minor c h i l d . Appellant, t h e c h i l d ' s s t e p f a t h e r , r a i s e s two i s s u e s on appeal. He argues f i r s t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n finding t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r , by providing s e v e r a l s m a l l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g , and by paying debts unrelated t o t h e c h i l d , had "contributed t o t h e support" of t h e c h i l d . The s t e p f a t h e r ' s second argument is t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d in finding t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r was "unable" t o provide a d d i t i o n a l support f o r t h e c h i l d . SLR w a s born on June 7, 1976. The f a t h e r and mother of SLR w e r e divorced on March 31, 1978, and custody of t h e c h i l d was awarded t o t h e mother. The decree a l s o provided t h a t t h e f a t h e r have reasonable r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n and t h a t he pay t h e sum of $100 per month f o r t h e support, c a r e and maintenance of t h e c h i l d . The support payments were t o s t a r t on A p r i l 5 , 1978. The mother married t h e a p p e l l a n t on November 2 , 1979. Since t h i s marriage, t h e c h i l d has resided with t h e mother and s t e p f a t h e r a t t h e i r home i n S t e v e n s v i l l e , Montana. The f a t h e r has f a i l e d t o make any c h i l d support payments s i n c e February 9, 1979, although he does claim t o have given t h e c h i l d "a couple of blouses . . ." and o t h e r small i t e m s of clothing. During t h i s t i m e , t h e f a t h e r has only been s p o r a d i c a l l y employed, has earned only a very marginal income, has remarried, and has v o l u n t a r i l y incurred s u b s t a n t i a l a d d i t i o n a l debts. O n February 25, 1980, t h e s t e p f a t h e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r t h e adoption of t h e c h i l d i n R a v a l l i County D i s t r i c t Court. The mother consented t o t h i s p e t i t i o n , and t h e Montana Department of Social and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Services waived t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n required under s e c t i o n 40-8-122, MCA. The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t t h e consent of t h e f a t h e r was not necessary due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f a t h e r had w i l l - f u l l y abandoned t h e c h i l d and had not contributed t o her support while a b l e t o do s o f o r one year p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . See s e c t i o n 40-8-111(a) (iii) and ( v ) , MCA . During t h e hearing, t h e f a t h e r s t a t e d t h a t he had provided f o r t h e support of h i s new w i f e ' s c h i l d from a previous marriage f o r a l i m i t e d t i m e . The f a t h e r f u r t h e r admitted t h a t he had paid t h e entrance f e e f o r t h e b u l l - r i d i n g competition i n s e v e r a l rodeos during t h e summer of 1979. These f e e s may have amounted t o a s much as $100. The record a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of t h e f a t h e r ' s p r e s e n t indebtedness was incurred a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of h i s f i r s t marriage. The t r i a l c o u r t , a f t e r t h e hearing, denied t h e p e t i t i o n . I n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t found: (1) t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r "contributed t o t h e support of [SLR] by providing s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g f o r t h e c h i l d and by assuming r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , and making payments on debts incurred by t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s during t h e i r marriage"; and ( 2 ) t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s indebtedness, new family, and h i s f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n steady employment have rendered him unable (within t h e d e f i n i t i o n of s e c t i o n 40-8-111 ( a ) (v) , MCA) t o provide "additional" support f o r SLR. This appeal followed. Section 40-8-111, MCA, i s c o n t r o l l i n g on t h e s e i s s u e s . I t sets f o r t h a general r u l e and exceptions. The general r u l e i s t h a t consider a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption t h e c o u r t must f i r s t determine t h a t both n a t u r a l p a r e n t s ( i f l i v i n g ) consent t o t h e adoption. But t h e exceptions contained i n s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, a r e a l s o important on t h e question of p a r e n t a l consent. One such exception states t h a t t h e consent of a n a t u r a l parent is not required: ". . . i f it is proven t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e , has not contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d during a period of 1 year before t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption." Section 40-8-111(1) ( a ) (v) , MCA. From t h e express wording of t h i s s t a t u t e , a s w e l l a s t h e cases i n t e r p r e t i n g it, it is c l e a r t h a t s e c t i o n 40-8- 1 1 1 (1.) (a) (v) , MCA, sets f o r t h a two-part test: F i r s t , t h e c o u r t must determine whether t h e nonconsenting parent has contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d . Second, t h e c o u r t must determine whether t h e nonconsenting parent had t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c h i l d ' s support. Because s t r i c t compliance with s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, is required before t h e c o u r t can consider t h e adoption on its m e r i t s , t h e p e t i t i o n e r must be a b l e t o show t h a t t h e t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e have been met. I n R e Adoption of Biery (1974), 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377. ' The t r i a l c o u r t ' s determination t h a t t h e f a t h e r con- t r i b u t e d t o t h e support of SLR i s based upon two f a c t o r s : (1) t h e f a c t t h e f a t h e r had, during t h e preceding y e a r , given t h e c h i l d "a couple of blouses and a few t h i n g s l i k e t h i s , " and ( 2 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f a t h e r had made payments toward c e r t a h d e b t s , some of which w e r e incurred a f t e r t h e divorce. The n a t u r a l f a t h e r contends, and t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d , t h a t t h e nonconsenting f a t h e r contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d by providing s e v e r a l small a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g . W e do n o t agree. In Matter of Adoption of Smigaj (1975), 171 Mont. 537, 560 P.2d 1 4 1 , t h i s Court, construing "support" a s used i n s e c t i o n 40-8-111(1) ( a ) (v) , s t a t e d : ". . . we have no d i f f i c u l t y i n construing t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words i n t h e context of t h e consent s t a t u t e s a s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e ' f i n a n c i a l support t h a t a parent owes a child."' - - - (Emphasis added.) 560 P.2d a t 143. H e r e , t h e f a t h e r was under a duty, pursuant t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n decree, t o provide c h i l d support payments of $100 p e r month. I t is undisputed t h a t t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o pay any c h i l d support f o r over a year before t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption w a s f i l e d . The " p l a i n meaning" approach of Smigaj r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e f a t h e r c o n t r i b u t e f i n a n c i a l support t o t h e c h i l d . The f a i l u r e t o provide f i n a n c i a l support cannot be cured by giving t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l articles of clothing. S i m i l a r l y , t h e noncustodial parent cannot s a t i s f y h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o provide f i n a n c i a l support by i n c u r r i n g o r paying debts which a r e unrelated t o t h e c h i l d . The express t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e r e f e r t o "support t h a t a parent - - owes a c h i l d . " Smigaj, supra. H e r e , t h e debts paid by t h e f a t h e r w e r e n o t r e l a t e d t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d , and much of t h e debt had been incurred a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of h i s f i r s t marriage. The record c l e a r l y shows t h a t t h e f a t h e r made no f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d f o r over a year. This r e q u i r e s us t o vacate t h e f i n d i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e g i f t of c l o t h i n g and payment of debts by t h e f a t h e r c o n s t i t u t e d "support" a s t h a t t e r m i s used i n s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA. In t h e present case, t h e f a t h e r had no v a l i d reason f o r f a i l i n g t o make even one c h i l d support payment during t h e e n t i r e year preceding t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . H e s u f f e r e d no physical o r mental impairment during t h a t t i m e , and he was possessed of s k i l l s t h a t would have made him employable (carpentry, l a b o r e r , operating heavy equipment). The f a t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y chose a l i f e s t y l e i n c o n s i s t e n t with h i s p a r e n t a l support obligations. That he had a r i g h t t o chose such a lifestyle is conceded. That he had a legal right to prevent the adoption of his child, however, is not consistent with his voluntary failure to contribute to the child's support. In the words of the California court: "A statute should not be interpreted in favor of a father who seeks the benefit of parental rights but shuns the burden of parental obligations." In Re Burton's Adoption (1956), 147 Cal.App.2d 125, 305 P.2d 185, 191. It was the burden of the stepfather to show that the father was able to but failed to provide support for the child during the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. In Re Adoption of Challeen (1976), 172 Mont. 362, 563 P.2d 1120. In Challeen, the Court found that the petitioner had failed to meet this burden. In that case, the natural father had one of his eyes surgically removed, had been confined in the state prison, and had attended college during the time that he was alleged to have been "able" to contribute to the support of the child. Similarly, in the recent case of In Re Adoption of T.G.K. & J.P.K. (1981), - Mont. - , 630 P.2d 740, 38 St.Rep. 1030, it was shown that the father had been incarcerated in the state prison and therefore was thus not able to contribute to the child's support. In the present case, the father had no such excuse. Indeed, his own testimony reveals that, during the entire period, he was fully capable of obtaining fulltime employment but refused to do so. His voluntary assumption of the debts of his new wife and his support of her child for a limited period belie his claim of inability to support his own child. The record here shows that petitioner has met his burden of proof as to the father's "ability." The findings of the District Court as to the issues of the father's contribution to the support of the child and his a b i l i t y t o so contribute are vacated. The case i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings on t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption. , N 4 J u s t i c e d W e Concur: Chief ~ u s t i c e /us t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I d i s s e n t . Regardless of what name i s given t o t h e s t a t u t e involved ( s e c t i o n 40-8-111 (1) , MCA) , t h e undeniable f a c t i s t h a t w e are i n t e r p r e t i n g a s t a t u t e which has an i r r e v o c a b l e sanction: a n a t u r a l parent can forever l o s e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . Because, however, t h e s t a t u t e i s , i n essence, a penal s t a t u t e , it must be s t r i c t l y construed a g a i n s t t h e p e t i t i o n e r and i n favor of t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r . That is t r u e of a l l c i v i l s t a t u t e s penal i n nature. Missoula High School Legal Defense Assoc. v. Supt. of Public I n s t r u c t i o n (Deckniber 2 2 , 1981), Moot. - - 1 - P.2d r 38 St.Rep. 2164; and S t a t e v. S t a t e Highway P a t r o l (1958), 133 Mont. 162, 321 P.2d 612. Few c i v i l s t a t u t e s impose a more severe sanction than one forever terminating p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . The language "has n o t contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d during a period of one year before t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption," i s ambiguous, and t h a t i s p r e c i s e l y why t h i s Court has been c a l l e d upon t o i n t e r p r e t t h e phrase "has n o t contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d . . ." The l e g i s l a t u r e chose not t o specify o r deign what it considers t o be a "contribution t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d . . ." Because w e a r e d e a l i n g with a penal s t a t u t e , t h i s Court should n o t provide an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by a d e f i n i t i o n favoring t h e termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . Rather, t h i s Court should s t r i c t l y construe t h i s s t a t u t e t o mean t h a t any kind of support of t h e c h i l d within t h e one year period w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y prevent a determination of whether it would be i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t o be adopted. The case of I n R e Adoption of Smigaj (1975), 171 Mont. 537, 560 P. 2d 1 4 1 , d i d construe section 40-8-111 (1) ( a ) (v) , MCA, t o mean " f i n a n c i a l support t h a t a parent owes a c h i l d . " But t h e Court f a i l e d t o acknowledge t h a t it was i n t e r p r e t i n g a penal s t a t u t e t h a t must be s t r i c t l y construed a g a i n s t t h e penalty--the penalty of forever losing one's c h i l d . There- fore, Smigaj w a s i n c o r r e c t l y decided. H e r e t h e majority has ignored t h e f a c t t h a t section 40-8-111(1), i s , i n essence, a penalty s t a t u t e applied t o a person who has refused t o consent t o the adoption of h i s c h i l d . I f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has not e x p l i c i t l y set f o r t h t h e b a s i s on which t h e penalty i s t o be invoked, t h i s Court should f i l l i n t h e blanks f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Our duty i s t o s t r i c t l y construe the s t a t u t e a g a i n s t invocation of t h e penalty. To do t h a t w e must l i b e r a l l y construe t h e terms "contributed" and "support" i n favor of t h e n a t u r a l parent.