Title: McDowell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
Citation: 71 So. 2d 64
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1954

71 So. 2d 64 (1954)
McDOWELL et al.
v.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY &amp; GUARANTY CO. et al.
4 Div. 760.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 4, 1954.
*65 Jackson W. Stokes, C. L. Rowe, Elba, for appellants.
Rushton, Stakely &amp; Johnston, Montgomery, for appellees.
MERRILL, Justice.
This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer to an amended bill against the appellee and one Meek, who does not join in the appeal, to reach and apply the proceeds of a public liability insurance policy issued by the appellee to G. T. Key, an individual doing business as G. T. Key Construction Company.
The original bill alleged in effect that complainants are the widow and minor child of Robert McDowell, deceased; that Robert McDowell and respondent Meek had been employees of Key, who had a contract with Covington Electric Cooperative, Inc., for the construction of certain electric distribution lines and respondent insurer had issued a certain automobile insurance policy covering Key and any person while using a motor vehicle described in the policy, provided the actual use was by the named insured or with his permission. On June *66 30, 1949, Robert McDowell was killed as a result of the negligence of his fellow employee, respondent Meek, in the operation of an insured automobile of Key's while both McDowell and Meek were using the automobile in the line and scope of their employment. His death came within the provisions of the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Laws and on application of his widow and minor child, regular compensation payments have been and are being paid to them by appellee under the terms of its policy issued to Key.
Thereafter in January 1950 Mrs. McDowell and her minor son brought suit for damages in Coffee County against Meek, the fellow employee of Robert McDowell, deceased, pursuant to § 312, Title 26, Code of 1940 as amended. Meek did not appear to defend the suit; a judgment was rendered in the sum of $35,000 and the return on the execution was "nulla bona".
Complainants further alleged that they were entitled to the rights and remedies under §§ 11 and 12, Title 28, Code of 1940, to the end that the insurance money be reached and applied to the satisfaction of said judgment. They included interrogatories in their bill and prayed for discovery and for an application of the insurance money to their judgment.
The respondent Meek took no action. The appellee answered the interrogatories and filed a demurrer to the bill which was overruled. Appellee then filed an answer, setting out the requirements of the contract as to insurance, which included Workmen's Compensation and Public Liability, the certificate made by it to the Rural Electrification Administration, which contained a statement that the policies issued were standard policies, and pleaded Division III of the policy a part of which follows:
"III Definition of Insured
Respondent also pleaded Exclusion (c) of the policy which is in part:
"Exclusions
"This policy does not apply:
Thereupon appellants amended their bill incorporating the provisions of the construction contract, the requirement of a certificate that a public liability policy had been furnished and the requirement that a contractor's performance bond be furnished. The following is quoted from appellants' brief:
Appellee refiled demurrer interposed to the original bill. The trial court entered a decree sustaining the demurrer on grounds A, E, F, G and H and the appeal is from this decree. The grounds of demurrer held good were:
Counsel for appellants make this candid statement in their brief: "The instant case is based squarely on United States Fidelity &amp; Guaranty Company v. Doheny, [9 Cir.], 123 F.2d 746, 747. In the majority opinion, the Circuit Court of Appeals based its reasoning on estoppel; whereas, the concurring opinion was based on ambiguity arising out of construction of all *68 the related documents. In the instant case the bill of complaint as amended undertakes, by use of the alternative to lay the foundation for the claim on each of said principles and theories."
We think attention need be directed to only one feature of the Doheny case, which differentiates it from the case at bar. We quote the first paragraph of the opinion.
There the judgments were against the insured partnership. The United States Fidelity &amp; Guaranty Company had participated in the defense of the suit when its insured had been sued. But the bill in the instant case shows that Key, the named insured, has not been sued and no judgment of any kind recovered against him, and further alleges that complainants agreed with Key as to the Workmen's Compensation due them and that it has been and is being paid as agreed.
Section 12, Title 28, Code of 1940, is as follows:
In Employers Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Johnston, 238 Ala. 26, 189 So. 58, 61 we said:
This court said in Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co. v. Chapman, 240 Ala. 599, 200 So. 425, 426, that:
We have found a case which we think is decisive of the question before us. The opinion in General Accident Fire &amp; Life Assur. Corp. v. Kimberly, 61 Ga.App. 153, 6 S.E.2d 78, described a suit and judgment by the father of a deceased employee against a fellow employee after the father was being paid workmen's compensation by the employer and the defendant insurance company. We follow the "syllabus by the court", except that we insert the exact wording of the policy before us and use the names of the parties in the instant case instead of the respective parties in that case:
The provisions of the automobile owner's policy of liability insurance applicable in the instant case were: "III Definition of Insured". The unqualified word insured includes the named insured and also includes (2) under coverages A and B, any person while using an owned automobile or a hired automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission * * *. The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not apply under division (2) of this insuring agreement: (c) to any employee (Meek) with respect to injury to or sickness, disease or death of another employee (McDowell) of the same employer (Key) injured in the course of such employment in an accident arising out of the maintenance or use of an automobile in the business of such employer (Key). Clause "(c)", supra, excluded from the policy the liability for injury to McDowell, an employee of the named insured (Key), because of the negligence of his fellow employee (Meek) of the same insured.
Aside and apart from the "Exclusions" section which follows Section III defining the insured in the policy, we can only interpret (c) of Section III to mean that Howard Meek was not an "additional insured" as contended by appellant. Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67, 154 So. 279; Johnson v. Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 5 Cir., 104 F.2d 22; Birrenkott v. McManamay, 65 S.D. 581, 276 N.W. 725; Madison v. Steller, 226 Wis. 86, 275 N.W. 703.
As stated in appellants' reply brief, "the entire insurance policy is before the Court on this appeal," and we agree that the policy is to be construed most favorably for the insured against the insurer. However, we cannot by construction do violence to the language of the policy or read into it something that is not there. The language, "The insurance does not apply", can carry no other meaning.
In the instant case, the named assured was Key and not Meek, and there was no privity of contract between the insurer and Meek. Therefore the insurer had no obligation of any kind or nature to Meek nor has it any duty to indemnify or *70 hold harmless the said Meek by reason of any judgment which may have been obtained against Meek by the complainants. Meek did not meet the requirement of Title 28, § 12, Code of 1940, of an insured "defendant in such action."
We think the court properly sustained the demurrer on grounds A or E and it is therefore unnecessary to consider any of the remaining grounds assigned. Case v. Pfaffman, 253 Ala. 511, 45 So. 2d 453.
The decree of the lower court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur.