Title: STATE v CARDEN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13478
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 1977

No. 13478 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1977 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, JOHN J. CARDEN, a/k/a JAMES J. C A R D E N and GLORIA (EUSEK) CARDEN, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: ~ i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t ~ u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable M. James S o r t e , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Robert S. Keller, S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Smith, Emmons, B a i l l i e and Walsh, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Robert J. Emmons argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Knight, Dahood and Mackay, Anaconda, Montana Wade J. Dahood appeared, Anaconda, Montana - - - - - Submitted: February 1 6 , 1977 Decided : MAY 2 5 19n - . . ? F i l e d : -w 2 s 1977 Clerk Mr. Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendants James J. Carden and his wife Gloria Eusek Carden were charged with several crimes arising out of a $5,000 settle- ment of her Workmen's Compensation claim. The district court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissed the case on the ground that defendants had been denied their constitutional right to a speedy trial. The state appeals. We reverse. On December 20, 1974, the attorney general filed a direct Information against the defendants in the district court of Lewis and Clark County. Defendant James J. Carden is the former administrator of the Workmen's Compensation Division, Department of Labor and Industry, of the State of Montana. Defendant Gloria Eusek Carden is the wife of defendant James J. Carden. The Information contained 19 counts charging defendants with the following crimes in connection with a $5,000 settlement of Gloria Eusek Carden's claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act: Embezzlement by a public officer; grand larceny; obtaining money or property by false pretenses; presenting false proofs on a policy of insurance; officer illegally interested in a contract; offering false or forged document to be recorded; preparing false evidence; and offering false evidence. Defendants made their initial appearance on January 3, 1975, before District Judge Gordon R. Bennett. Defendants were granted additional time to brief the Information and were released on their own recognizance. On January 9, 1975, District Judge Nat Allen assumed, jurisdiction of the case upon request of Judge Bennett. O n January 17, 1975, Judge Allen granted defendants an _ extension of time t o February 10 i n which t o f i l e t h e i r motions and b r i e f s . O n February 10 defendants f i l e d 56 motions attacking the Information i n various particulars. Defendants received an extension of time t o February 26 t o f i l e t h e i r supporting b r i e f . O n March 18, Judge Allen revised the briefing schedule on defendants' motions so t h a t defendants' b r i e f was due on April 21, t h e s t a t e ' s answering b r i e f was due on May 21 and defendants' reply b r i e f was due on May 30. The s t a t e contends t h i s was done t o synchronize the briefing schedule i n t h i s case with the briefing schedule i n S t a t e v. James J. Carden, Cause /,3937 i n the d i s t r i c t court. Defendants deny t h i s . O n May 20,the s t a t e received an extension of time t o June 4 t o f i l e i t s answering b r i e f . Thereafter defendants received an extension of time t o July 3 i n which t o f i l e t h e i r reply b r i e f . O n August 4, the s t a t e moved t o disqualify Judge Allen resulting i n an appeal t o t h i s Court. W e ruled t h a t Judge Allen was disqualified. O n September 30, D i s t r i c t Judge Jack D. Shan- strom assumed jurisdiction. O n October 21, Judge Shanstrom s e t a l l pending motions f o r hearing on November 17. On November 3, defendants disqualified Judge Shanstrom. On December 9, D i s t r i c t Judge Paul G. Hatfield assumed jurisdiction. Judge Hatfield s e t all motions by t h e defendants f o r hearing on February 4 , 1976. A t the hearing, Judge Hatfield requested counsel t o submit proposed orders and requested the s t a t e t o review i t s Information f o r consolidation of counts. According t o the s t a t e , it subsequently wrote Judge Hatfield suggesting t h a t the Information could be reduced t o 6 counts and t h e judge concurred. - 3 - On April 14, 1976, Judge Hatfield entered an order ( 1 ) dismissing 13 counts of the Information, ( 2 ) granting the state leave to file an amended Information, ( 3 ) indicating that many of the defendants' original motions were rendered moot by the dismissal of the 13 counts, and ( 4 ) setting a further hearing for April 27. This was subsequently continued to May 4 due to incle- ment weather. In the meantime, on April 21, the state filed an amended Information containing 6 counts. In the amended Information the defendants were charged with 6 crimes generally corresponding to the remaining counts in the original Information. The crimes charged in the amended Information were: Embezzlement by a public officer; grand larceny; offering a forged or false document to be recorded; and preparing false evidence. Following the hearing on May 4, Judge Hatfield set May 1 4 as the date for arraignment of defendants on the amended Informa- tion; May 17 was set for hearing further motions to be filed by defendants; and June 17 was set as the tentative trial date. On May 11, defendants filed their motion to dismiss the case for denial of a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution. On May 17, defendants presented the state with 25 motions attacking the amended Information; a motion to dismiss all charges because of prejudicial pretrial publicity; a motion for change of place of trial; a demand for production of documents for trial; a motion for production of documents; and a motion to compel the state to furnish defendants with a copy of any oral or written confessions or admissions with a list of witnesses. O n May 27, defendant Gloria Eusek Carden moved f o r a severance of her t r i a l from t h a t of James J. Carden. O n June 8, Judge Hatfield, who was then engaged i n a s t a t e - wide campaign f o r election a s Chief J u s t i c e of t h i s Court, removed himself from jurisdiction i n the case, following a motion by defendants. D i s t r i c t Judge James Sorte then assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n and s e t a l l motions by defendants f o r hearing on June 17. Following hearing a l l motions by defendants were denied, except those r e l a t i n g t o discovery. T r i a l was s e t f o r August 16. O n July 16, defendants requested a rehearing on the issue of a speedy t r i a l . The rehearing was held on July 28, i n Kalispell during the annual convention of the State Bar of Montana. Judge Sorte ruled from the bench t h a t the case be dismissed f o r lack of a speedy t r i a l . The s t a t e f i l e d i t s notice of appeal the following day. O n August 1, Judge Sorte f i l e d a memorandum opinion s e t t i n g f o r t h the reasons f o r h i s ruling. The appeal was o r i g i n a l l y argued on October 22, 1976 and reargued on February 9, 1977. The sole issue on appeal i s whether the defendants have been denied t h e i r constitutional r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . W e note defendants have presented 16 additional issues f o r review re- l a t i n g t o other p r e t r i a l aspects of the case, which we w i l l not review a t t h i s time a s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s dismissal i s based exclusively on denial of a speedy t r i a l . Although the arguments of the respective p a r t i e s on the speedy t r i a l issue consist of hundreds of pages of b r i e f s f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court and i n t h i s Court on appeal, we w i l l endeavor - 5 - summarize the principal positions of the respective parties i n b r i e f , understandable form. In so doing, we w i l l confine our- selves t o the basic thrust of the arguments as w e view them, directing our attention t o the forest rather than the individual trees. The defendants principally contend that they have been denied t h e i r constitutional right t o a speedy t r i a l under the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court i n Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101, and our decisions i n State v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178, 32 St.Rep. 1185; State ex r e l . Sanford v. D i s t . C t . , Mont . 9 551 P.2d 1005, 33 St.Rep. 644; and state.:^. Keller, - Mont . , 553 P.2d 1013, 33 St.Rep. 795. These cases generally involve a sensitive balancing of four principal factors i n the individual case t o determine whether a given defendant has been denied a speedy t r i a l : (1) length of delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) assertion of the right by defendant, and (4) prejudice t o defendant. Defendants contend that when these four factors are properly evaluated and balanced under the circumstances of t h i s case, defendants have clearly been denied t h e i r right t o a speedy t r i a l , They emphasize the length of the delay here i s excessive and un- reasonable; that the principal reason for the delay i s the manner i n which the s t a t e chose t o prosecute the case by a 19 count Information covering an essentially simple factual transaction; that the duty is on the s t a t e ta afford defendants a speedy t r i a l , which defendants have neither waived nor consented to; and that defendants have suffered severe actual prejudice by the failure of the s t a t e to bring them t o t r i a l within a reasonable time. L n shuris, defendants clainl the state is responsible and charge- able with unreasonably delaying the trial of defendants without justification entitling defendants to dismissal of the charges against them. The basic position of the state, on the other hand, is that while the four factor balancing test of Barker and its Montana progeny Steward, Sanford and Keller is controlling, a proper evaluation and balancing of these factors demonstrates that de- fendants have not been denied a speedy trial within constitutional requirements. The state argues it has pursued the prosecution of this case with dispatch and cites several cases where delays substantially in excess of those here were held not to constitute violations of constitutional speedy trial guarantees: Barker, supra; United States v. Ewell, 383 U . S . 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L ed 2d 627; United States v. Lane, 465 F.2d 408; United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 322; United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050; United States v. Churchill, 483 F.2d 268; Ricon v. Garrison, 517 F.2d 628; United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185; United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844; Constabile v. State, (0kla.Cr.) 513 P.2d 588. The state emphatically denies that it is responsible or chargeable with the principal delays involved in this case, viz. the time necessarily consumed in researching, briefing, arguing, and securing a decision on the voluminous motions filed by the defendants and the time necessarily consumed incident to dis- qualification of judges by both the defendants and the state. The state further contends that the defendants have never sought a speedy trial and are not now prepared to go to trial. Finally, che s c a r e distinguishes Steward, Sanford and Keller but requests us to review our prior holdings in Steward and Sanford on assertion of the right to a speedy trial by defendants. As a further preface to our decision herein, we note the prior rulings of the district court on defendants' motion for Jismissal of this case for denial of a speedy trial. The district court initially denied defendants' motion. Subsequently a rehearing was granted and the district court granted defendants' motion. Briefly stated, the district court reasoned that the long delay in bringing the defendants to trial in this case established a prima facie case of denial of a speedy trial; that both presumptive and actual prejudice to defendants resulted from this delay; that three principal reasons accounted for the delay in this case (1) the Montana disqualification law and the procedural practicalities attendant on changing judges, (2) the filing of multiple counts (19) by the prosecution in a relatively simple factual situation, and (3) the state's disqualification of Judge Allen after he had considered the case for over 7 months; that none of these delays was chargeable to defendants; and therefore the defendants were entitled to dismissal for lack of a speedy trial. Implicit in the district court's reasoning although not specifically stated therein is the proposition that delays not chargeable to the defendants are the responsibility of the state. The starting point in our analysis of the speedy trial issue is Barker v. Wingo,407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101, which both the state and the defendants concede is controlling. Barker rejects the two arbitrary approaches to the issue of speedy trial in favor of a balancing test in this language : "We, therefore, reject both of the inflexible approaches-- the fixed-time period because it goes further than the Constitution requires; the demand-waiver rule because it is insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental. The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." 407 U . S . 529, d.530. The substance of the balancing test in Barker is described in these words: "A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an -- ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the de- fendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." 407 U . S . 530, 531. Montana has adopted and applied the four factor balancing test in Barker determining the speedy trial is sue under Art. 11, section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution, as well as under the United States Constitution in three principal cases: State v. Steward, supra; State ex rel. Sanford v . Dist. Ct., supra; State v. Keller, supra. The length of the delay between the filing of the Information and the date set for trial (544'days) triggers the inquiry here. Barker v. Wingo, supra. It establishes a prima facie case of denial of a speedy trial. State ex rel. Sanford v. Dist. Ct., supra. If this prima facie case remains unrebutted, the issue is settled. In this case, the state's rebuttal must be weighed and considered in the light of the four factor test of Barker. The first factor to be considered is the length of the delay. In this case the state concedes that the time lapse is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the other three elements of the balancing test. We agree. We note that speed alone is not the determining factor. Rather it is the manner in which the s t a t e has p~lmraued the pzosecutio~i in the l i g h t of the t o t a l i t y of the circumstances i n the case. The United States Supreme Court has placed t h i s consideration i n perspective i n the following passage from United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 11 However, i n large measure because of the many procedural safeguards provided an accused, the ordinary procedures f o r criminal prosecution a r e designed t o move a t a deliberate pace. A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious e f f e c t both upon the r i g h t s of the accused and upon the a b i l i t y of society t o protect i t s e l f . Therefore, t h i s Court has consistently been of the view t h a t 'The r i g h t of a speedy t r i a l i s necessarily r e l a t i v e . It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures r i g h t s t o a defendant. It does not preclude the r i g h t s of public justice. ' ik * ff 'Whether delay i n completing a prosecution * * amounts t o an unconstitutional depriva- rion of r i g h t s depends upon the circumstances +C * *. The delay must not be purposeful o r oppressive.' yc fi ffl[T]he e s s e n t i a l ingredient i s orderly expedition and not mere speed. 1 1 1 I n our view the s t a t e has pursued the prosecution with reasonable diligence. There i s l i t t l e "dead time'' i n which nothing was done which distinguishes t h i s case from Steward, Sanford and Keller. Although defendants argue the s t a t e could have proceeded more expeditiously had it chosen t o charge the defendants with a single crime o r no more than the 6 charges they eventually ended up with i n the amended Information, t h i s is largely speculative and unconvincing i n l i g h t of the 25 motions f i l e d by defendants attacking the amended Information and the additional discovery motions, venue motion, severance motion, and motion r e l a t i n g t o p r e t r i a l publicity. I n any event, we cannot s a y the law of Montana i s so clear t h a t the manner of charging defendants i n t h i s case rendered the i n i t i a l f i l i n g of a 19 count Information i n t h i s case unreasonable. I n our view the prosecution in t h i s case has proceeded i n orderly and reasonable progression ~cep-by-step towdrcl r r i a l ilrider the irirninal procedural s t a t u t e s of t h i s s t a t e . The second factor t o be weighed and considered under Barker involves the reasons for the delay. This has been par- t i a l l y touched upon i n the preceding discussion. To be more precise, t h e principal delays i n t h i s case were occasioned by the time necessarily consumed i n researching, briefing, and arguing defendants' 56 original motions, disqualification of judges by both the s t a t e and defendants with resulting procedural delays, requests f o r extensions of time by both the s t a t e and defendants, and the l a t e f i l i n g of b r i e f s . W e do not suggest f o r a moment t h a t defendants were not e n t i t l e d t o f i l e t h e i r 56 motions, disqualify 2 judges, o r request extensions of time. What we do say i s t h a t the resulting delays a r e not the responsi- b i l i t y of nor chargeable t o the s t a t e . This brings us t o one of the principal bones of contention between the s t a t e and defendants. The s t a t e contends it i s not chargeable with delays inherent i n the criminal j u s t i c e system i n the absence of f a u l t on i t s p a r t . Defendants contend t h a t such delays a r e chargeable t o the s t a t e because it i s the s t a t e ' s obligation t o afford the defendants a speedy t r i a l and the defendants have no control over the s t a t e ' s criminal procedure s t a t u t e s o r its criminal j u s t i c e system. W e r e j e c t the basic approach t o t h i s problem taken by defend- ants and impliedly by the d i s t r i c t court. This approach indi- cates t h a t i f defendant i s chargeable with a given number of days delay, the s t a t e is automatically chargeable with the re- mainder without regard t o other considerations. Such an a r b i t r a r y and mechanical approach is unreasonable and goes f a r beyond the speedy trial provisions of the federal and s t a t e constitu- rions. It leaves society naked of the means t o protect i t s e l f in the face of any protracted and s p i r i t e d defense. It i s d i r e c t l y contrary t o the four factor balancing t e s t i n Barker where the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed under the circumstances of the p a r t i c u l a r case under W e have previously held the time reasonably consumed by a defendant's good f a i t h motions requiring research, hearing and determination a r e not chargeable t o defendant. S t a t e v. Keller, supra. Logic and reason compel application of the same rule t o the s t a t e ' s good f a i t h e f f o r t s . I n our view the circumstances of t h i s case indicate no intentional or deliberate delay by the s t a t e , an insignificant amount of "dead time", no " i n s t i t u t i o n a l delays" i n the criminal j u s t i c e system beyond the statutory procedural r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s , and no substantial delays f o r which the s t a t e i s responsible o r chargeable. The t h i r d factor i n the balancing process, defendants' assertion of t h e i r r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , weighs most heavily against defendants under the circumstances of t h i s case. A l - though f a i l u r e t o a s s e r t t h i s r i g h t does not c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , it i s a factor t o be considered i n the balancing t e s t . I n Barker t h i s consideration was expressed thusly: "7k * * The defendant's assertion of h i s speedy t r i a l r i g h t , then, i s e n t i t l e d t o strong evidentiary weight i n determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.. W e emphasize t h a t f a i l u r e t o a s s e r t the r i g h t w i l l make it d i f f i c u l t f o r a defendant t o prove t h a t he was denied a speedy t r i a l . " 407 U.S. 531. In our view the record in this case amply demonstrates that the defendants did not really want a speedy trial. They first asserted this right after protracted proceedings resulting in dismissal of 13 of the 19 counts. For 507 days after they were charged, defendants failed to even hint they desired a faster pace in the proceedings. Defendants asked for and received extensions of time. They failed to object to extensions of time granted the state. They delayed for 40 days after the closing of filings for Chief Justice of this Court before seeking Judge Hatfield's removal because of his candidacy for a statewide elective judicial office. At the time defendants filed their motions for dismissal for lack of a speedy trial, they had not pursued any pretrial discovery and were in no sense ready for trial. Six days after filing their motions for dismissal for lack of a speedy trial, defendants filed, among other things, three pretrial discovery motions and a motion to change the place of trial. Fifteen days after filing their motion for dismissal for lack of a speedy trial, defendant Gloria Eusek Carden sought severance of her trial from that of her husband and codefendant. Under these circumstances defendants' claim of deprivation of a speedy trial loses its vitality. United States v. Churchill, 483 F.2d 268; United States v. Dornau, 356 F.Supp. 1091. The further circum- stance that defendants waited until the eve of trial to file their motions illustrates the transparent nature of their claim that they were deprived of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Churchill, supra; United States v. Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717; United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 322; United States v. Toy, 482 F.2d 741; Day v. State, 61 Wis.2d 236, 212 N.W.2d 489; United States v . Saglimbene, 471 F.2d 16. 'Che s t a t e requests us t o review our p r i o r holding i n Steward and Sanford on the t h i r d factor i n the Barker balancing process. The s t a t e reads these cases a s holding t h a t the f i l i n g of a motion t o dismiss f o r lack of a speedy t r i a l by defendant a t ? x i s arraignment i s a s u f f i c i e n t assertion of the right. Steward, unlike t h i s case, involved e s s e n t i a l l y "dead time" between the r i l i n g of charges and arraignment and motion on the eve of t r i a l so t o speak; Sanford involved the f a i l u r e of three d i f f e r e n t judges t o s e t defendant's motion f o r hearing over an eight month period despite h i s repeated requests. Although isolated s t a t e - ments i n the opinions may support the s t a t e ' s view of what t h i s Court held, these statements must be read and interpreted i n the context of the f a c t s of the case i n which they were made. As the United States Supreme Court recently stated: "While it i s possible t o excise various portions of the p l u r a l i t y opinion t o support the r e s u l t reached below, divorcing the language from the f a c t s of the case serves only t o d i s t o r t i t s holdings. 11 I l l i n o i s v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L ed 2d 425, 434. W e view t h i s a s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n speedy t r i a l cases where each case must be considered on an ad hoc basis under i t s p a r t i - cular f a c t s i n applying the balancing t e s t of Barker. W e in- tended no elimination of the t h i r d f a c t o r i n the Barker balancing t e s t , but simply held t h a t under the f a c t s and c i r - cumstances of those particular cases, defendants had properly asserted t h e i r right. The f i n a l factor i n the balancing process involves the question of whether defendants were prejudiced by the delay. W e need not belabor t h i s point. Both presumptive and actual prejudice are present t o some degree i n t h i s case. Barker describes the approach t o t h i s factor i n t h i s 'I* * Prejudice, of course, should be assessed i n the li$ht of the i n t e r e s t s of defendants which the speedy t r i a l r i g h t was designed t o protect. This Court has identified three such i n t e r e s t s : ( i ) t o prevent oppressive p r e t r i a l incarceration; ( i i ) t o minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and ( i i i ) t o l i m i t the p o s s i b i l i t y rhat the defense w i l l be impaired. Of these, the most serious i s the l a s t , because the i n a b i l i t y of a defendant adequately t o prepare h i s case skews the fairness of the e n t i r e system. I f witnesses d i e o r disappear during a delay, the prejudice i s obvious. There i s a l s o prejudice i f defense witnesses a r e unable t o r e c a l l accurately events of the d i s t a n t past. Loss of memory, however, i s not always reflected i n the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown." 407 U.S. 532. Here there is nothirg i n the record t o suggest t h a t the defense has been impaired by the delay. There a r e no l o s t o r missing witnesses. There i s no showing of l o s s of memory. There has been no p r e t r i a l incarceration, oppressive o r otherwise. There has been substantial anxiety and concern on the p a r t of defendants. This has manifested i t s e l f physically, mentally and emotionally. It is perhaps more severe i n t h i s case than i n the usual case. But t h i s i s an unusual case. W e do not see how thLs anxiety and concern can be eliminated o r minimized a s f a r a s these defendants a r e concerned u n t i l t h i s e n t i r e workmen's cornpensation investigation and prosecution i s completely finished. I n summary then, the circumstances of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case involve substantial delay resulting primarily from the exercise of statutory procedural r i g h t s inherent i n ~ o n t a n a ' s criminal j u s t i c e system f o r which neither the s t a t e nor the defendants a r e chargeable; t h a t defendants' assertion of lack of a speedy t r i a l has been belated and transparent, indicating t h a t defendants did not r e a l l y want a speedy t r i a l and were not yet ready f o r t r i a l whea they f i l e d t h e i r motion; and t h a t prejudice has resulted co defendants from the delay i n the form of anxiety and concern. O n the balance, we hold defendants have not been denied a speedy t r i a l i n the constitutional sense. The order and judgment of dismissal i s reversed. The case i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r t r i a l . J u s t i c e W e Concur: M r . Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: During o r a l argument the attorney general characterized t h i s as "a p o l i t i c a l case". It was not made clear what significance was intended. The majority here has scrupulously avoided any refer- ence t o the p o l i t i c a l background of t h i s o r related Workmen's Com- pensation cases but does s e t the case apart a t p. 15 of the opinion with "It is perhaps more severe i n t h i s case than i n the usual: case. But t h i s is an unusual case." (Emphasis supplied). - Appellate judges have said i n the past that it i s not necessary that a court pretend to be more ignorant than it actually is, nor more ignorant than the public generally. I believe t h i s t o be true. The p o l i t i c a l history and excessive media treatment has not escaped m y notice. Be t h i s a s it may, I cannot agree that cases should be viewed o r treated a s p o l i t i c a l or unusual or whatever. This case i s what it is, a single offense $5,000 fraud case, alleged by the s t a t e t o be a crime. The kind of case where the facts, not names, are important. The kind of case the average county attorney sees frequently and disposes of within several weeks o r a month with no problems. The majority opinion r e l i e s almost exclusively on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101 (1972), and I do not deny i t s authority. However, i n explaining the application of Barker t o the Montana cases of Steward, Sanhord and Keller, the majority s t a t e s a t p. 6 "These cases generally involve a sensitive balancing of four principal factors * * *." (Emphasis added.) Again the majority s t a t e s a t p. 9, that "Montana has adopted and applied the four factor balancing t e s t i n Barker * * *." (Emphasis added.) Further, _that l'FIn.;this case, the s t a t e ' s rebuttal must be weighed and considered in the light of the four factor test of Barker." (Emphasis added.) Thus it is obvious that the majority over-simplifies the principles of Barker. The case is not so narrow and restricted as the majority would lead us to believe. In it, the United States Supreme Court stated: "We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors which must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recogni- tion that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is speci- f ically affirmed in the Constitution." (Emphasis added. ) 407 U . S . 533. Many cases following Barker have recognized that the principles are not so constricted as the majority assumes. The foregoing quotation was set out and approved in its entirety in Moore v. Arizona, 4 1 4 U . S . 25, 94 S . C t . 188, 38 L ed 2d 183, 185, 186. As stated in United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 115: "* * * The Court emphasized that it did not intend the list to be exhaustive nor any one factor dispositive and that other relevant circumstances should also be considered." (Emphasis added. ) It is the "other relevant circumstances" set forth above in this opinion, which cannot be ignored for a proper application of Barker. The majority opinion purports to give full support to the rejection by Barker of the "demand-waiver doctrine". Af ter doing so, however, the majority goes all the way around the horns of their dilemma and gives actual effect to the "demand-waiver" rule. For this reason, we should look at the United States Supreme Court's statement in connection with the rule in Barker: "Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights. The Court has defined waiver a s 'an intentional r e l i n - quishment o r abandonment of a known r i g h t o r privilege. I * * * Courts should 'indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.' * * * and they should 'not presume acquiescence i n the loss of fundamental rights.' * * * I n Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 82 S.Ct. 884 (1962), we held: I I I Presuming waiver from a s i l e n t record is imper- missible * * * there must be an allegation and evidence * * *."I 407 U.S. 525,526. By, i n e f f e c t , applying the "demand-waiver rule" , the majority does further violence t o the law enunciated i n Barker: "The nature of the speedy t r i a l r i g h t does make it impossible t o pinpoint a precise time i n the process when the r i g h t must be asserted o r waived, but t h a t f a c t does not argue f o r placing the burden of protecting the r i g h t solely on defendants. A defendant has no duty t o bring himself t o t r i a l ; the S t a t e has t h a t duty a s well as the duty of insuring t h a t the t r i a l is consistent with due process. Moreover, f o r t h e reasons e a r l i e r ex- pressed, society has a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n bringing swift prosecutions, and society's representatives a r e the ones who should protect t h a t i n t e r e s t .I' (~mphasis added. ) 407 U.S. 527. The majority opinion a t page 7 attempts t o support its ultimate conclusion by c i t i n g t h e cases r e l i e d on by the s t a t e , wherein delays i n excess of t h a t Judge Sorte was confronted with were involved. It should be noted the only United States Supreme Court case c i t e d is United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S e c t . 773, i5 L ed 2d 627, decided February 23, 1966, over 6 years p r i o r t o Barker. Since Barker is universally accepted a s the Bible on speedy t r i a l issues, and since it has been a foundation f o r the new federal r u l e s and the decisions d r a s t i c a l l y reducing permissible delays i n bringing a case t o t r i a l , any authority of "Ewell" is diluted, and t o some extent superseded by Barker. Further, the f a c t s i n Ewell are not a t a l l similar t o those of the i n s t a n t case, nor a r e the f a c t s i n the other cases c i t e d by the s t a t e and the majority. It should be noted also that the delay i n Ewell was not "substantially i n excess" of that i n t h i s case, as stated by the majority. In t h i s case, the time between the f i l i n g of the Informa- tion and the order of Judge Sorte was 585 days, as compared t o 576 in Ewell. A t any rate, the quotation of the majority from Ewell a t page 10 of the majority opinion, is not consonant with the national trend since 1966. The substance of the quotation is that unless 11 prosecution is ,.purposeful or oppressive" i n delaying a prosecution, there i s no denial of a speedy t r i a l . This i s not the law under the 1972 Barker decision and the cases and rules applied since then. This has not been the law i n Montana, prior t o the majority decision i n t h i s case. The majority opinion makes t h i s charitable statement a t p. 13: "In our view the record i n t h i s case amply demonstrates that the defendants did not really want a speedy trial." (Emphasis added.) This is an exceedingly transparent e f f o r t t o bring t h i s case within the result of Barker,but t h i s case i s i n no manner o r way similar under the facts of Barker. There, Barker was anxiously awaiting the outcome of t r i a l s and appeals i n the related case of Manning, who was charged with the same crime. Barker was gambling that h i s case would be dismissed i f Manning were eventually acquitted. The s t a t e obtained 16 continuances of t r i a l dates, and Barker made no objection t o 13 of these continuances. H e thoroughly approved of the delays u n t i l he l o s t h i s bet. There are absolutely no similar facts in t h i s case. Moreover, a search of the record f a i l s t o disclose any evidence t o support t h i s gratuitous statement of the majority. Likewise, i f there was any issue of fact before Judge Sorte as t o whether or not the Cardens wanted t o go t o t r i a l , it i s not apparent from the record. Under the established rules of appellate procedure neither an issue of law nor an issue of fact can be raised for the first time on appeal. The majority completely by-passes this principle. The discretion vested in the trial court and the presumptions in the trial court's favor recognized in Steward seem to have no meaning in this case. This Court stated in Steward: "This Court has held many times that all presumptions are in favor of the trial court's decision. [Citing cases.] The district court had ample opportunity to view the record and determine the inferences to be drawn from the actions of the parties. We find no substantial evidence on the record rebutting the presumption the district court acted properly in holding the actions of defendant and his attorney did not waive the ripht to a speedy trial." (Emphasis added.) 543 P.2d 183. This Court further recognized the discretion vested in the trial court in connection with the question of dismissal with prejudice. In Steward, we said: "* * * The State may exercise discretion as to whether the accused will be reprosecuted. The trial court should possess similar discretion to disallow repmsecution if the prejudice caused the accused and his defense by the denial of a speedy trial would be compounded by a subsequent prosecution for the same offense." 543 P.2d 184. If we continue to recognize the presumption in favor of the < . ,-,. - . - ,- - . - , - A ; -\.- 4 r . 1 ruling of the trial court there is no basis for reversal on this record. If the majority bases its holding on manifest abuse or lack of substantial evidence, it should so state. The contention that the state has no responsibility for the time consumed in connection with defendants' 56 motions attacking the Information creates a bit of a "stench". There is no way or no case to support any angle the state can use to avoid responsi- bility for the time attendant to disposing 13 of the 1 9 counts. The majority opinion denies that "the initial filing of a 19 count Information in this case [was] unreasonable'! at page 10, but the - state admitted 13 counts were untenable. To say they were improvi- dently filed would be undeservedly apologetic and charitable. (See also in this connection: 5 3 . 9 ( c ) ( e ) of Std. for Criminal Justice of American Bar Association and Disciplinary Rules 7-103A and 1 - 1 0 2 ( A ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ; Montana Cannons of Professional Ethics 3 . 9 ( a ) ( c ) ( e ) . ) See also: United States v. Pauline Pipe, (Mont.) Havre-Glasgow Div., Federal District Court CR-77-10-HG, April 1977, for a discussion concerning repeated indictment as denial of due process which doctrine would not exclude application to untenable Information counts. The majority further condemns the defendants in relation to the number of counts at p . 10 of its opinion, saying "this is largely speculative and unconvincing in light of the 25 motions filed by the defendants attacking the amended Information and the addi- tional discovery motions, venue motion, severance motion, and motion relating to pretrial publicity." This charitable statement seems to assume that all motions should be filed at the outset of the proceedings. After a declaration of "unusual case", I fail to see any justification for the characterization "speculative and unconvincing" to describe motions relating to venue and pretrial publicity prior to the time the grounds had fully accrued, or not filing discovery motions prior to the time when it was determined whether or not the Information would be dismissed. The majority on p . 9, recognizes that 5 4 4 days between filing Information and trial date was sufficient to trigger an inquiry as to speedy trial in the following language: "It establishes a prima facie case of denial of a speedy trial. State ex rel. Sanford v . Dist.Ct., supra. If this prima facie case remains unrebutted, the issue is settled." (Emphasis added.) Having purported to recognize the rule, the majority emasculates it by ignoring that the burden is upon the state to rebut the the presumption of a denial of a speedy trial and it is the duty of the state to bring the case to trial. On p. 10 of its opinion, the majority blandly states: "In our view the state has pursued the prosecution with reasonable diligence .I1 This statement cannot be justified by the record and particularly the state's belated disqualification of Judge Allen after presiding for 264 days, but, more that that, it sidesteps the issues. The question is not limited to whether the prosecution proceeded with !'reasonable diligence" but whether or not the defendants were deprived of a constitutional right. If they were so deprived at the hands of the state, it matters not whether it was the executive, legislative or judicial branch at fault. (In this regard, see admissions by state in Petition for Supervisory Control v. Arnold Olsen (Goldman dismissal), April 26, 1977.) The majority states at p . 13: "* * * The further circumstance that defendants waited until the eve of trial to file their motions illustrates the transparent nature of their claim that they were deprived of their constitutional right to a speedy trial." (Emphasis added.) Let us take a good look at the above statement and then compare it with the unanimous expression of the Court in Steward. It was there said: "The 'appropriate motion' is a motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial. The proper time to assert the right to a speedy trial is prior to the actual commencement of-the trial, usually at the time the trial date is set, or the time the case is called to trial. Morse v . Munici- pal Court, et al., 1 3 Cal.3d 149, 118 Cal.Rptr. 14, 529 ~ . 2 d 46. -~efendant, in the instant case, made his motion to dismiss at the proper time." (Emphasis added.) 543 P.2d 182. We also stated in Steward: "The district court here was correct in holding: "' * * * the Defendant's attorney would not be representing the Defendant if he would raise the question of the fair speedy trial. This was incumbent upon the County Attorney to do so under the circumstances. 1 1 1 (Emphasis added.) 543 P.2d 182. Here, the "tentative trial date" was June 17, 1976 and on May 11, 1976 defendants filed their motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. How does this differ from the law announced in Steward? The majority attempts to circumvent Barker by constant reference to lack of "dead time", pp. 10, 12 and 1 4 of its opinion, apparently on the theory that if there is no extended interlude without some activity there can be no deprivation of a speedy trial. There is a very conspicuous lack of authority cited for this theory, and the only mention in Barker of "dead time" is in a totally different context. There Justice Powell observed: "* * * Most jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead time." (Emphasis added.) 407 U . S . 532,533. Any application of this statement to the instant case is difficult to see or understand. In passing I must comment that at p . 12 of its opinion the majority takes the position that the state or "society" is left "naked of the means to protect itself in the face of any protracted or spirited defense." In light of the facts of this case, the statement can only be viewed as an apology for incompetence. If nothing else it is a new concept that the state needs protection from individual defendants. Society does have an interest in speedy trials, but it is not adversary. It is in upholding and protecting the integrity of the judicial system against the deficiencies and abuses of its agencies which are in total control of the state government. The defendants and society, rather than arch adversaries, are in a position of parallel interests. It is ludicrous to make the assertion, particularly in what the state has termed an "unusual case" backed by state appropriation of approximately $1,933,737.00, against a handful of defendants. This imbalance is not a naked society but approaches tyranny. The thread of misunderstanding runs all through the majority opinon and finally in the summary, p . 15, asserts: 'I* * * the circumstances of this particular case involve substantial delay resulting primarily from the exercise of statutory procedural rights inherent in Montana's criminal justice system for which neither the state nor the defendants are chargeable * * * . I 1 ( % $ h a s i s added) This statement like the rest of the opinion misses the principal point, that this is not a 2 or single element matter, such as how the prosecution proceeded, that controls. Rather it is the total effect of the system. If the "Montana criminal justice system1' is so structured that a relatively simple, single transaction, alleged to be criminal, results in a 544 day delay of trial, then there has been a denial of a speedy trial, and it matters not whether it resulted in action or inaction by the courts, prosecution or legislature, or all in concert, the state is the system and totally responsible for "statutory procedures inherent in Montana's criminal justice system". Again, the majority persists in ignoring the basic rule of Barker: "* * * But the rule we announce today, which comports with constitutional principles places the primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial. * * *I1 407 U . S . 529. Again, on the matter of prejudice, I point out to-the majority that: ( 1 ) District Judge Sorte in the memorandum supporting his "order and judgment dismissing with prejudice" stated: "In t h i s S t a t e the law is t h a t long delay establishes a prima-facie case of denial of a speedy t r i a l . This case, a s of July 28, 1976, was 586 days from t h e date of the f i l i n g of the Information and i s presently s e t f o r t r i a l August 16th, 1976, which i s 605 days. Sanford (July 8th, 1976) held delay of ten months (299':days) between arraign- ment and t r i a l establishes a prima-facie case of denial of the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . That s i t u a t i o n , ,‘ { vr: A is present here a s is the presumption of prejudice (Sanford v. D i s t r i c t Court, 33 S t a t e Reporter 644, S t a t e v. Steward, 32 St. Reporter 1185 and cases cited. Uncontradicted t e s t i - mony given by defendants a t a hearing held May 17, 1976, i n Great F a l l s , Montana, c l e a r l y establishes prejudice beyond the presumption. (See Exhibits admitted June 17, 1976.)" (2) The s t a t e has offered no evidence t o contradict t h i s testimony. (3) The s t a t e has the burden t o not only produce proof of no prejudice but overcome the presumption of correctness of Judge Sorte' s judgment. (4) I n S t a t e .v. Keller, Mont . 9 553 P.2d 1013, 1017, 33 St-Rep. 795,798, t h i s Court again s t a t e d one of t h e major purposes of a speedy t r i a l is t o protect the accused i n the following language: "In h i s concurring opinion i n Barker, a t page 121, J u s t i c e White emphasizes one of the major purposes i n protecting the accused. Wholly aside from possible prejudice t o a defense on the merits, the accused w i l l be subject t o sub- s t a n t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on h i s l i b e r t y pending t r i a l , e i t h e r i n j a i l o r while f r e e on bond, ' I 1 * * * t h a t may disrupt h i s employment, drain h i s financial resources, c u r t a i l h i s associations, subject him t o public obloquy, and c r e a t e anxiety i n him, h i s family and h i s friends."' U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L ed 2d 468, (1971)." In United States v. Dreyer, 3 C.C.A. March 1976, 533 F.2d 112, 115, it was stated: "This reading of Barker, which conf ines ' prejudice' t o impairment t o the defense, was e x p l i c i t l y rejected by the United States Supreme Court i n ~ o o r e - v . Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27, 94 S.Ct. 188, 189-190, 38 L.Ed.2d 183, 185-186 (1973) (per curiam). There the Court quoted approvingly from J u s t i c e White's concurring opinion i n Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. a t 537, 92 S.Ct. a t 2195, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 121: "'Inordinate delay "wholly aside from possible pre- I judice t o a defense on the merits, may seriously i n t e r f e r e with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on b a i l or not, and * * * may disrupt h i s employment, drain h i s financial resources, c u r t a i l h i s associations, subject him t o public obloquy, and create anxiety i n him, h i s family and h i s friends. ' I ' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). These factors are more serious for some than for others, but they are inevitably present i n every case t o some extent, for every . defendant w i l l either be incarcerated pending t r i a l or on b a i l subject t o substantial restrictions on h i s liberty.' "The majority i n Barker also recognized that an accused is 'disadvantaged by restraints on h i s liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often h o s t i l i t y . ' Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. a t 533, 92 S.Ct. a t 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 118. A proper reading of Barker, therefore, must include within the meaning of 'prejudice' any threat t o what the Second Circuit recently has termed 'an accused's significant stakes--psychological, physical and financial--- i n the prompt termination of a proceeding which may u l t i - mately deprive him of l i f e , liberty or property.' United States v. Roberts, 515 F.2d 642, 645 (2d C i r . 1975).lt (Emphasis added.) (5) Our f i l e s do not reveal the defendants are proceeding forma pauperis, but are using their own assets. (6) Hence, the prejudice found and within the contemplation of Barker, Marion and Dreyer and adopted by Montana i n Keller, has not been recognized by the majority beyond "this is an unusual case". (7) There has been no burden established by the majority and no burden met by the state. (8) The s t a t e has disposed of the entire issue of prejudice summarily and t o t a l l y ignored the uncontroverted principle that the burden i s upon the s t a t e t o establish that there has been no prejudice. The majority i n stating "there i s nothing i n the record (Emphasis added.) t o suggestt'/any of these types of prejudice has unwittingly conceded that the prejudice element must be resolved 100% i n favor of de- fendants. Even i f the burden was on the defendants the conclusion of the majority would be untenable under the authority of Dreyer and cases cited therein, and Keller. I would ask the majority i n t h i s opinion, what is the s r a t e of the L a w a s it has been announced i n the many decisions s e t t i n g rorth the doctrine t h a t the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s presumed t o be correct and a l l doubt resolved i n favor of the prevailing party on appeal. H o w a r e we t o view the doctrine estab- lished by Steward, Sanford and Keller? Are they s t i l l the law, except i n "unusual" o r " p o l i t i c a l cases" ? I, f o r the reasons s t a t e d , f e e l Judge Sorte's judgment should be affirmed. J u s t ice. Hon. L.C. Gulbrandson, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e Paul G o Hatfield, agrees w i t h the dissent of M r . J u s t i c e Daly, t o the extent said dissent imposes responsibility upon the S t a t e of Montana for " i n s t i t u t i o n a l delays" i n the criminiil j u s t i c e system.