Title: STATE EX REL CITY OF HELENA v DIS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13021
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 1975

No. 13021 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1975 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , on the r e l a t i o n of the City of Helena, Montana, a municipal corporation, Relator, T H E DISTRICT C O U R T O F THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, I N AND F O R T H E COUNTY O F LEWIS AND CLARK, and the H O N O R A B L E PETER G. M E L O Y , Judge of said Court, ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record : For Rela t o r : P. Keith Keller argued, Helena, Montana C. W. Leaphart, Jr. , Helena, Montana For Respondents : Harris, Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana Robert Murdo argued, Helena, Montana Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Loble, Picotte and Pauly , Helena, Montana Submitted: M a y 14, 1975 Decided : J U N 1 0 1975 Filed : 4 1 L ) ! ? 2 C 1975 Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is a petition by the City of Helena for a writ of supervisory control alleging that the district court, Lewis and Clark County, erred in denying defendant petitioner's motion for summary judgment, in cause No. 36440, entitled Morland P. Branning, Plaintiff, versus Rick McCullough, the State of Montana, acting by and through its State Highway Commission, and the City of Helena, Montana, Defendants. Petitioner argues the denial of its motion necessitates a trial on the merits, even though peti- tioner cannot be held liable as a matter of law, and that super- visory control is the only effective remedy available. The lawsuit involves an intersection collision which occurred in the City of Helena on the evening of April 28, 1972. The following diagram approximates the appearance of that inter- section: "OLD" 11th. I 3 x B - Branning M - McCullough S - Stop Signs x - Point of collision Rickey P. McCullough was driving e a s t on "old" Eleventh Avenue when h i s vehicle collided with one being driven south on Fee S t r e e t by Morland P. Branning. McCullough and ~ r a n n i n g brought negligence a c t i o n s a g a i n s t each o t h e r , and both joined t h e City of Helena and t h e S t a t e of Montana a s defendants, a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was negligently designed, regu- l a t e d and maintained. The claims a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e were d i s - missed a s barred by t h e doctrine of sovereign immunity. his p e t i t i o n i s brought by t h e City of Helena, seeking review of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of summary judgment i n its favor. The p e t i t i o n r a i s e s two i s s u e s necessary t o t h e disposi- t i o n of t h i s case: 1. A r e t h e r e genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t which pre- clude summary judgment under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.? 2. Does t h e absence of j u r i s d i c t i o n o r c o n t r o l over t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n by t h e City, i f established here, preclude l i a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of the City? This Court held i n Roope v. Anaconda Co., 159 Mont. 28, 32, 494 P.2d 922: "The burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e absence of any i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t i s on t h e p a r t y seeking summary judgment. Byrne v. Plante, 154 Iqont. 6, 459 P.2d 266, and c i t a t i o n s herein. But where, a s here, t h e record d i s c l o s e s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e burden i s upon t h e party opposing t h e motion t o present evidence of a material and s u b s t a n t i a l nature r a i s i n g a genuine i s s u e of f a c t . Flansberg v. Montana Power Co., 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263, and a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d therein." The depositions i n t h e record here i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e i n t e r - s e c t i o n was, a t t h e time of t h e accident, a p a r t of t h e S t a t e Highway System and t h e Federal Aid Primary System. Respondent d i s t r i c t c o u r t acknowledges t h e unanimity among t h e deposed w i t - nesses, but argues t h a t no records have been produced which con- c l u s i v e l y confirm those statements. I t c i t e s Live Stock Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 303 I11.App. 445, 25 N.E.2d 613, as establishing the necessity for such documentary evidence in a case such as this. Without those records, it claims that a factual dispute remains which bars entry of summary judgment on the City's motion. That argument ignores the evidence contained in this record. Not only do the deposed witnesses all support the City's claim of no jurisdiction or control, but exhibits to those depo- sitions likewise support the claim. Employees of the State Highway Department who were deposed claimed that the intersectidn was within the department's jurisdiction. Among the exhibits is an agreement between the State and the City which refers to construc- tion known as "Federal Aid Project No. F. 9999(2)11, expressly in- cluding this portion of Eleventh Avenue. That agreement also pro- vides that the City will not erect any traffic control devices giving preference to "local routes" without the express written permission of the State. One exhibit is a pencil abstract indicating the entire intersection is owned by the State of Montana. Other exhibits, while less persuasive, also support the factual proposition that the intersection is owned by the State and remains a part of the State's jurisdiction. Given this evidence, we find the City has met the burden required before it can secure summary judgment, and respondent, to prevail, must demonstrate "evidence of a material and substan- tial nature, raising a genuine issue of fact." Roope, supra. The only evidence which might be viewed as controverting that produced by the City is contained in an amended answer to Branning's Interrogatory Number 9, wherein the City stated: "Inasmuch as the intersection is within the corporate limits of the city, i.ts use is policed by the city. Accordingly, the city performs re- moval of automobiles and obstructions and injured persons on an emergency b a s i s only. Routine maintenance was, and is, performed by t h e S t a t e of Montana. The City of Helena, however, performs sanding on t h e s t r e e t . " Brannings' deposition contains personal observations which tend t o confirm t h e sanding of t h e s t r e e t by t h e City. This evidence, i n our view, presents no genuine i s s u e of material f a c t . Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e has expressly declared its i n t e n t i o n t o "make t h e department of highways custodian of t h e federal-aid and s t a t e highways." Section 32-2202(2), R.C.M. 1947. Eleventh Avenue's s t a t u s a s a f e d e r a l a i d highway is evidenced by t h e depositions and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n contained i n the City-State agreement e a r l i e r r e f e r r e d t o . Its s t a t u s a s a s t a t e highway is c l e a r under the s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n a s ''[alny public highway planned, l a i d o u t , a l t e r e d , constructed, reconstructed, i m p r ~ v e d ~ r e p a i r e d , maintained, o r abandoned by t h e department.'' Section 32-2203(28), R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 . W e f i n d nothing i n t h e C i t y ' s sanding of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n which r a i s e s a genuine i s s u e a s t o t h e ultimate conclusion of S t a t e c o n t r o l and j u r i s d i c t i o n . That finding r a i s e s t h e question of whether o r not t h e City can be held l i a b l e f o r allegedly negligent design, regulation o r maintenance of t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n , even though it had no posses- sory o r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l powers over it. W e f i n d t h a t it cannot. I n reaching t h a t conclusion, w e a r e aided by t h e decision i n Harlan v. City of Tucson, 82 Ariz. ,11, 309 P.2d 244, 249. I n t h a t case, an accident occurred a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of a s t a t e highway with a c i t y s t r e e t i n Tucson. The S t a t e of Arizona had j u r i s d i c t i o n , c o n t r o l over, and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e maintenance of t h a t highway. The City of Tucson occupied a s i m i l a r s t a t u s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e frontage roads and connecting c i t y s t r e e t s . The complaint alleged t h e City was negligent i n constructing, o r allow- ing t o be constructed, a dangerous i n t e r s e c t i o n , and i n f a i l i n g t o give warning of t h e dangerous condition. The City moved f o r summary judgment on the ground that the intersection was within the jurisdiction of the State, and thereforethe City could not be found negligent, as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the granting of that motion: "There being no jurisdiction or control in the city over the intersection involved, it follows there could be no duty, and without a duty in the matter there can be no actionable negligence." The Court there reached that determination in spite of the per- formance of some traffic control and maintenance of the inter- section by the City. The Arizona statutes quoted in that opin- ion are, in many respects, similar to Montana's, and we find no reason for a different result in the instant case. For other pertinent authority, arriving at similar conclusions, see: Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 225 P.2d 522; McNulty v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 314 F.Supp. 1274; 19 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., B 54.25~. Petitioner here also raises an issue concerning alleged failure to satisfy the notice requirements of Section 11-1305, R.C.M. 1947. In finding that summary judgment should have been granted on the grounds already stated, we need not consider this additional issue. As in State ex rel. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. District Court, 159 Mont. 295, 496 P.2d 1152, a writ of supervisory control is proper here as the sole means by which petitioner can avoid the substantial prejudice of being forced to defend a suit where, as a matter of Law, liability cannot be established. Sunmary judgment should have been granted to petitioner, and it is so ordered. Justice / / Chief Justice