Title: Levisa Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 070580
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2008

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LEVISA COAL COMPANY 
 
 
       
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 070580        JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
  June 6, 2008 
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY 
Keary R. Williams, Judge 
This appeal arises from a dispute between the owner of a 
solid mineral estate subject to a long-term mining lease and a 
third party.  The dispute involves the storage of wastewater 
from the third party’s mining operations on other lands in a 
particular mine located within the subject leasehold but with 
the lessee’s permission.  The owner of the solid mineral estate 
sought an injunction and declaratory judgment to prevent the 
third party from using the mine, which had been idled by the 
lessee, as a wastewater storage pit.  We consider whether the 
circuit court erred in adjudicating that the third party “has a 
right to store excess water” from its mine in the mine in 
question and in denying the requested injunctive relief. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1937, Levisa Coal Corporation, the predecessor in 
interest to Levisa Coal Company, the plaintiff-appellant herein, 
acquired by severance deed the solid mineral estate and timber 
rights on various parcels of land in Buchanan County (“the 
Buchanan County parcels”).1  The severance deed conveyed to 
Levisa Coal ownership of “the coal, metals and timber, together 
with all the rights, privileges and easements incident thereto, 
in, on or under” the lands described in the deed.  However, the 
severance deed did not expressly convey to Levisa Coal the right 
to use any part of the estate conveyed or the attendant 
easements to support mining activities on other lands.  By a 
separate and subsequent severance deed, the rights to the oil 
and gaseous mineral estates of the Buchanan County parcels were 
conveyed to another party.  Levisa Coal later acquired an 
interest in these estates through an oil, gas and coalbed 
methane lease. 
In 1956, Levisa Coal entered into a lease with Island Creek 
Coal Company (Island Creek Coal) granting that company “the sole 
and exclusive right and privilege of mining and removing all of 
the coal from all the seams underlying the Tiller [V]ein or seam 
of coal or the horizon of such seam” in and upon the Buchanan 
County parcels conveyed by the 1937 deed.2  The 1956 lease 
                     
1 Because, for purposes of this appeal, there is no 
significant distinction between these two entities, we will 
refer to the owner of the solid mineral estate as “Levisa Coal” 
without distinction as to whether the reference is to the 
current owner or its predecessor in interest. 
2 The “Tiller Vein” refers to a particular deep-lying coal 
seam that has been identified by that name in geological surveys 
of western Virginia for at least the last ninety years.  See, 
 
2
further provided Island Creek Coal with the right “generally, to 
make any use of the leased premises which [Island Creek Coal] 
may deem needful or convenient in carrying on its mining or 
other operations.”  Among the specific uses permitted was the 
right to “dump water or refuse on said premises.”  These rights, 
however, were “limited to such rights as [Levisa Coal] owns and 
has the right to lease,” and the lease did not expressly purport 
to convey any right to use the leasehold for the support of 
mining operations on other lands. 
Under the 1956 lease, Levisa Coal retained certain rights 
to the ownership and continued use of its solid mineral estate 
below the Tiller Vein and to easements serving Island Creek 
Coal’s leasehold.  As relevant to this appeal, Levisa Coal 
retained “[t]he entire ownership and control of all the leased 
premises, and the coal . . . and other minerals and products 
therein and thereon, for all purposes (except those hereinbefore 
expressly set forth as leased to [Island Creek Coal]).”  
Additional express rights reserved to Levisa Coal included “the 
right and privilege of draining water . . . over, across, or 
through the leased premises,” as well as “the right and 
privilege of searching for oil, gas, or any other minerals or 
products and removing same when and wherever found.”  In 
                                                                  
e.g., H. Hinds, The Geology and Coal Resources of Buchanan 
 
3
furtherance of these rights, the lease provided that Levisa Coal 
could make excavations and bore “slopes, shafts, drifts, 
tunnels, and wells” so long as these operations did not 
interfere with Island Creek Coal’s right under the 1956 lease to 
remove coal from below the Tiller Vein.  Levisa Coal also 
retained a right of inspection within Island Creek Coal’s works 
and mines to assure compliance with an agreed upon mining plan 
and calculation of royalties due under the lease and “to use 
freely the means of access to the said works and mines without 
hindrance or molestation” consistent with its rights under the 
1937 deed. 
The initial term of the 1956 lease was for five years with 
the lease automatically renewing for successive terms of twenty 
years so long as Island Creek Coal fulfilled its obligation to 
mine coal on the property and pay royalties to Levisa Coal, or 
in lieu thereof to make minimum payments to Levisa Coal for the 
lost opportunity if coal was not being mined.  At issue in this 
appeal is a mine designated by Island Creek Coal as the “VP3 
Mine,” which was opened on land subject to the 1956 lease in 
1968.  Although Island Creek Coal suspended its mining 
operations at the VP3 Mine in 1998, Levisa Coal does not contend 
that Island Creek Coal has failed to pay royalties or fulfill 
                                                                  
County, Virginia, Bulletin XVIII (VA Geol. Survey 1918). 
 
4
its other obligations under the lease and, thus, under its terms 
the lease remains in force until at least 2021.  Moreover, 
Levisa Coal, through its managing general partner John C. Irvin, 
conceded during the proceedings of this case that it is not 
presently economically feasible to resume coal mining operations 
at the VP3 Mine. 
In 1993, CONSOL, Inc. (CONSOL), a subsidiary of CONSOL 
Energy, Inc., acquired Island Creek Coal and all of its assets, 
including the rights and obligations of the 1956 lease.  CONSOL 
has maintained Island Creek Coal as a separate corporate entity, 
although Island Creek Coal no longer has any active mining 
operations or employees and its corporate officers are also 
officers or employees of CONSOL or its subsidiaries.  CONSOL is 
also the parent company of Consolidation Coal Company 
(Consolidation Coal), the defendant-appellee herein.  
Consolidation Coal maintains a coal mining operation, designated 
as the “Buchanan Mine” or “Buchanan No. 1 Mine” in the vicinity 
of Island Creek Coal’s VP3 Mine as well as other idled mines 
once operated by Island Creek Coal. 
Excess ground water naturally flowing into any deep mine as 
a result of mining operations hampers extraction of coal.  Mine 
operators routinely remove such excess water or wastewater on a 
daily basis.  The removal of excess water in the Buchanan Mine, 
as well as the excess water in the VP3 Mine, was initially 
 
5
accomplished by pumping that water directly into the nearby 
Levisa River or one of its tributaries.  At some point after the 
acquisition of Island Creek Coal by CONSOL, it became necessary 
for Consolidation Coal to devise an alternate drainage system 
for the removal of excess water naturally flowing into its 
Buchanan Mine and the additional water released into that mine 
as a result of its continuing mining operations there.  In 
general terms, the drainage system devised by Consolidation Coal 
involved pumping the excess water from the Buchanan Mine into a 
series of nearby idled mines once operated by Island Creek Coal 
which functioned as storage pits for the water until the water 
could be pumped into the Levisa River.  Ultimately, this 
drainage system was designed to include the idled VP3 Mine.  The 
rate of discharge of the wastewater into the river was to be 
limited from time to time so that the Levisa River could 
accommodate the increased water flow resulting from this 
discharge. 
Ultimately, the chloride content of the anticipated 
discharged water into the Levisa River became an issue to be 
resolved in order for Consolidation Coal to comply with certain 
water standards established by the State Water Control Board and 
to obtain the necessary permits to allow it to continue to pump 
mine water into the Levisa River.  Consolidation Coal applied to 
the Virginia Department of Mines, Minerals, and Energy (DMME) 
 
6
for permits to discharge wastewater from the Buchanan Mine into 
idled mines under Island Creek Coal’s control, including the VP3 
Mine, and ultimately into the Levisa River in accord with its 
designed drainage system.3  Subsequently, Consolidation Coal 
began discharging wastewater into the “Beatrice” and “VP1” mines 
and, when these mines could not accommodate additional water, 
the discharge was diverted to the VP3 Mine.  The present rate of 
wastewater discharge from the Buchanan Mine into the VP3 Mine is 
nearly 2,500 gallons per minute.  The VP3 Mine has a capacity to 
hold approximately 6.4 billion gallons of wastewater. 
On July 10, 2006, Levisa Coal filed a complaint for 
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against Consolidation 
Coal in the Circuit Court of Buchanan County seeking to prohibit 
Consolidation Coal from continuing to divert wastewater from the 
Buchanan Mine to the VP3 Mine.  In seeking temporary and 
permanent injunctive relief, Levisa Coal maintained that “[t]he 
proposed pumping and storage of Buchanan Mine water in Levisa 
[Coal]’s properties will cause irreparable harm to Levisa 
[Coal]’s property and business interests.”  Specifically, Levisa 
Coal maintained that storing water in the VP3 Mine would result 
                     
3 According to statements in the record, Levisa Coal, by 
separate litigation, challenged the issuing of a permit by DMME 
to allow discharge of water into the VP3 Mine.  The record does 
not disclose the current status or result of that litigation. 
 
 
7
in absorption of coal bed methane gas and, with regard to the 
remaining coal in the property, would “vastly increase the costs 
that will be required in order to safely access and mine the 
coal in the future, effectively making it unminable.”  Levisa 
Coal further maintained that it had no adequate remedy at law to 
redress these alleged injuries. 
Levisa Coal premised its action for declaratory judgment on 
the assertion that Consolidation Coal “lacks the legal right to 
pump and store its Buchanan Mine water in the [VP3 Mine].”  It 
sought a declaration that Consolidation Coal “has no right to 
utilize Levisa [Coal]’s subject properties for temporary or 
permanent storage of Buchanan Mine water, and for judgment 
adjudicating all other issues expressly or inferentially 
raised.” 
On August 4, 2006, Consolidation Coal filed an omnibus 
response to the complaint, supported by an accompanying 
memorandum of law, asserting a demurrer, special plea in bar, 
answer and affirmative defenses.  As relevant to this appeal, 
Consolidation Coal maintained that it had a legal right to 
discharge wastewater into the VP3 Mine because Island Creek 
Coal, consistent with its purported rights under the 1956 lease, 
had agreed to permit Consolidation Coal to discharge the water 
into the VP3 mine.  Consolidation Coal further maintained that 
Levisa Coal was not entitled to seek an injunction as it was not 
 
8
suffering any harm from the discharge of water into Island Creek 
Coal’s leasehold, or, in the alternative, even if Levisa Coal 
were being injured by that action, it had an adequate remedy at 
law in the form of seeking monetary damages now or in the 
future. 
The parties engaged in a lengthy period of discovery before 
Levisa Coal sought a hearing to request entry of a preliminary 
injunction.  The circuit court conducted an ore tenus hearing on 
the request for a preliminary injunction on November 15 and 16, 
2006.  At that hearing, Levisa Coal took the position that, 
despite any agreement between Consolidation Coal and Island 
Creek Coal by which Island Creek Coal would purportedly accept 
responsibility for the dumping of water into the VP3 Mine, “it 
is Consolidation Coal Company that is doing it.”  Levisa Coal 
maintained that the 1956 Lease provided Island Creek Coal with 
the right to mine coal, but provided no right for Island Creek 
Coal to permit Consolidation Coal to put water into the mine. 
In response, Consolidation Coal took the position that it 
was Island Creek Coal, not Consolidation Coal, that was actually 
putting water into the VP3 Mine and that Island Creek Coal was 
doing so in a manner consistent with its rights under the 1956 
lease.  Consolidation Coal noted that even prior to the 
acquisition of Island Creek Coal by CONSOL, the two companies 
had cooperated in their respective mining efforts in the region.  
 
9
Consolidation Coal maintained that both companies had benefited 
from, and continued to benefit from, arrangements whereby mining 
operations on the lands and leaseholds of one were supported by 
activities on the lands and leaseholds of the other.  In this 
context, Consolidation Coal asserted that Island Creek Coal’s 
storage of the Buchanan Mine water in the VP3 Mine was a “use of 
the leased premises which [Island Creek Coal] may deem needful 
or convenient in carrying on its mining or other operations” as 
contemplated by the 1956 lease. 
Consolidation Coal further contended that even if it, and 
not Island Creek Coal, were deemed to be the party responsible 
for the inundation of the VP3 Mine, it was doing so only within 
the voids, tunnels and shafts created in Island Creek Coal’s 
leasehold below the Tiller Vein and, thus, in an area over which 
Levisa Coal had no current possessory interest.  Thus, 
Consolidation Coal contended that Levisa Coal did not have 
standing to seek any relief against Consolidation Coal.  
Moreover, assuming that Levisa Coal had such standing, to the 
extent that it might suffer some damage to its interest in the 
gaseous mineral estate, which Consolidation Coal did not 
concede, Consolidation Coal maintained that such damage was a 
quantifiable harm for which Levisa Coal could seek a monetary 
award at law.  As to any other damages Levisa Coal might suffer 
as a result of impairment of its retained rights under the 1956 
 
10
lease, Consolidation Coal maintained that these damages were 
“speculative” because the VP3 Mine was currently idle and there 
was no prospect of it being reopened for coal production or any 
other purpose.  Thus, Consolidation Coal maintained that Levisa 
Coal could not establish irreparable harm for which injunctive 
relief should be granted. 
Levisa Coal introduced evidence through testimony from 
Irvin, from Gerald Ramsey, a former employee of Island Creek 
Coal now employed by CONSOL Energy, from Andrew Cecil, a mining 
engineer, and from Charles Earl Ellis, a former employee of 
Island Creek Coal now working as an independent consultant who 
was qualified as an expert on business operations in the mining 
industry.  We need not recount the substance of this testimony 
in detail, it being sufficient to say that Irvin, Ramsey and 
Ellis confirmed the history of the VP3 Mine and the relationship 
between Island Creek Coal and Consolidation Coal as related 
above.  Additionally, Irvin testified concerning Levisa Coal’s 
interest in the production of coal bed methane gas on the 
Buchanan County parcels. 
Cecil’s testimony provided support for Levisa Coal’s 
contention that inundation of the voids, tunnels and shafts in 
the VP3 Mine would significantly impair the coal reserves of 
Levisa Coal in that portion of its estate and the adjoining 
strata.  Cecil opined, for example, that water in the VP3 Mine 
 
11
would be absorbed into the sandstone and shale layers above and 
below the coal seam, creating “issues” for the stability of the 
roof and floor of the mine, affecting the use of the mine 
tunnels and shafts for future access to the coal reserves in the 
strata below the Tiller Vein as well as increasing the cost of 
mining those reserves. 
Levisa Coal also sought to introduce evidence of the 
potential damage to the gaseous mineral estate of the Buchanan 
County parcels in the form of an affidavit prepared by Timothy 
L. Hower.  Levisa Coal contended that Hower was unavailable to 
testify in person because he was outside the United States on 
other business.  Levisa Coal averred that it had attempted to 
make Hower available for cross-examination by deposition or by 
having the hearing conducted on a date when he would have been 
available, but contended that Consolidation Coal had “refused” 
to take Hower’s deposition and implied that other difficulties 
with the discovery process had delayed the hearing until Hower 
was unavailable.  Consolidation Coal responded that its 
objection was not merely that Hower was unavailable for cross-
examination, but because the substance of his opinion as 
outlined in the affidavit was “speculative.”  The circuit court 
indicated that it would not “rul[e] on the substance of the 
affidavit,” but that it would nonetheless exclude it from 
evidence because “it is patently unfair to allow this witness to 
 
12
testify by affidavit without giving defendant’s counsel the 
opportunity to cross examine.” 
Following the circuit court’s ruling excluding Hower’s 
affidavit, Levisa Coal rested its case in chief.  Consolidation 
Coal then moved to strike Levisa Coal’s evidence, contending 
that Levisa Coal had failed to establish that it would suffer 
any irreparable harm if the temporary injunction were not 
granted.  This was so, Consolidation Coal maintained, both 
because the injury from the alleged trespass was merely 
speculative and, if actual, could be redressed by monetary 
damages awarded at law. 
In addressing the motion to strike Levisa Coal’s evidence, 
the circuit court stated that in its view the principal claim 
made by Levisa Coal with respect to the harm it would suffer 
from the inundation of the VP3 Mine was to “its coal and gas 
estate, although it is contested that it has a gas estate . . . 
there is some evidence here where the Court may conclude as 
much.”  The court concluded, however, that any damages to Levisa 
Coal’s interests were quantifiable and, thus, it “has an 
adequate remedy at law if it in any way lost its coal estate, 
. . . gas or coal bed methane estate.”  The court further 
concluded that granting the preliminary injunction could result 
in “astronomical” harm to Consolidation Coal in that it possibly 
would be required to suspend operations at the Buchanan Mine.  
 
13
Accordingly, the court ruled that Levisa Coal had not met its 
evidentiary burden for obtaining a preliminary injunction. 
The circuit court then ruled that the provision in the 1956 
lease that granted to Island Creek Coal “use of the leased 
premises which lessee may deem needful or convenient in carrying 
out its mining operations or other operations” was “about as 
broad and expansive as we might imagine.”  Applying that 
interpretation of the lease, the court ruled that with respect 
to the declaratory judgment Consolidation Coal “has the right to 
place any kind of storage water in the [VP3] [M]ine.”  
Accordingly, the court indicated that it did not need to hear 
evidence from Consolidation Coal’s witnesses and directed 
counsel for Consolidation Coal to draft an order reflecting the 
court’s rulings. 
On December 13, 2006, counsel for Consolidation Coal 
submitted a draft order adopting by reference the circuit 
court’s summation at the conclusion of the hearing and, in 
addressing the court’s ruling on the declaratory judgment issue, 
reflecting that Levisa Coal had “requested in this hearing that 
the Court construe the November 16, 1956 Lease, and the rights 
imparted therein.”  On December 20, 2006, counsel for Levisa 
Coal submitted a lengthy set of written objections to the 
court’s anticipated rulings as reflected in the court’s 
summation and the draft order. 
 
14
On December 22, 2006, the circuit court entered a separate 
order, which simplified the language of the draft order 
submitted by Consolidation Coal, but in substance reflected the 
court’s rulings on Levisa Coal’s requests for a preliminary 
injunction and declaratory relief.  On the latter issue, the 
court expressly ruled that Consolidation Coal “has the right to 
store excess water from the Buchanan No. 1 [Mine] in the VP3 
Mine.”  Although the draft order had not done so, the court’s 
order further provided that it was a final order “resolving all 
issues between the parties.”  Pursuant to Rule 1:13, the order 
was entered without endorsement of counsel “with the 
understanding that all objections the Parties have stated in the 
record are hereby preserved” including Levisa Coal’s written 
objections submitted on December 20, 2006.  We awarded Levisa 
Coal this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Levisa Coal has asserted 12 assignments of error to a 
number of aspects of the circuit court’s conduct of the hearing 
held in this case and its final judgment.  However, given the 
procedural posture of this case, we are of opinion that we need 
not address all of these assignments of error.  As we have 
previously noted, the hearing was noticed on Levisa Coal’s 
request for a temporary injunction.  The circuit court ruled on 
the merits of the request for a declaratory judgment and denied 
 
15
injunctive relief after sustaining Consolidation Coal’s motion 
to strike the evidence at the conclusion of Levisa Coal’s 
evidence in chief.  Accordingly, the resolution of Levisa Coal’s 
appeal rests principally upon two issues.4  First, we will 
consider whether the circuit court correctly construed the 1956 
lease as providing Island Creek Coal, and, by extension, 
Consolidation Coal through Island Creek Coal’s permission, with 
                     
4 While the petition for appeal in this case was under 
review, Consolidation Coal filed a motion to dismiss the 
petition for appeal and a renewed motion to dismiss.  In those 
motions, Consolidation Coal contends that because the ruling on 
the declaratory judgment had been made at Levisa Coal’s request, 
as recited in the circuit court’s order, and Levisa Coal had not 
then sought a reconsideration of that ruling, it is barred from 
seeking review of that ruling on appeal.  At oral argument of 
this appeal, counsel for Consolidation Coal again asserted that 
by requesting the inclusion of the court’s ruling in the order, 
Levisa Coal is barred from pursing an appeal on this point.  We 
disagree. 
It is entirely proper for a party to request that a court 
memorialize in an order a ruling made from the bench, even when 
that ruling is contrary to the party’s interest.  Levisa Coal 
noted its objection to the court’s interpretation of the 1956 
lease as permitting the storage of water from any source within 
the VP3 Mine in the written objections submitted to the court 
prior to the entry of the final order, and those objections were 
expressly preserved by reference in that order.  Thus, it was 
not necessary for Levisa Coal to renew its objection by a motion 
for reconsideration or any other means after entry of the final 
order.  See, e.g., Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 
621-23, 499 S.E.2d 829, 832-33 (1998)(error preserved by 
plaintiff’s written motion and supporting oral argument when 
objection noted on circuit court's final order).  Accordingly, 
to the extent we have not already disposed of the matter by 
granting the petition for appeal, Consolidation Coal’s motion to 
dismiss and renewed motion to dismiss are denied.  Similarly, we 
find no merit to Consolidation Coal’s contention made on brief 
 
16
“the right to store excess water from the Buchanan No. 1 [Mine] 
in the VP3 Mine.”  Second, if the 1956 lease does not provide 
Island Creek Coal with the right to permit Consolidation Coal to 
store excess water from the Buchanan Mine in the VP3 Mine, we 
will consider whether the record supports the circuit court’s 
denial of Levisa Coal’s request for injunctive relief. 
Interpretation of the 1956 Lease 
Like all leases, a mining lease is a contract and “when the 
terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, a court must give 
them their plain meaning.”  Pocahontas Mining L.L.C. v. Jewell 
Ridge Coal Corp., 263 Va. 169, 173, 556 S.E.2d 769, 771 (2002).  
On appeal, we review a trial court’s interpretation of a lease 
under a de novo standard.  See Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & 
Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002) (“on 
appeal we are not bound by the trial court’s interpretation of 
the contract provision at issue; rather, we have an equal 
opportunity to consider the words of the contract within the 
four corners of the instrument itself”); Wilson v. Holyfield, 
227 Va. 184, 187-88, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984). 
Levisa Coal contends that the circuit court misinterpreted 
the language of the lease allowing “any use of the leased 
premises which [Island Creek Coal] may deem needful or 
                                                                  
of this appeal that Levisa Coal’s written objections did not 
 
17
convenient in carrying on its mining or other operations” as 
permitting the support of mining operations on other lands.  
Levisa Coal initially notes that, under Clayborn v. Camilla Red 
Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 383, 105 S.E. 117 (1920), the 1937 deed 
conveying to it the solid mineral estate of the Buchanan County 
parcels permitted only a “necessary incidental easement” for 
purposes of removing the coal and other minerals.  Id. at 390, 
105 S.E. at 119.  Thus, Levisa Coal maintains that it did not 
obtain the right under the 1937 deed to support mining 
operations on other lands by permitting the inundation of the 
subsurface area with wastewater.  Accordingly, Island Creek Coal 
could not have obtained the right to do so within its leasehold 
because the 1956 lease expressly limited the easements Levisa 
Coal granted to Island Creek Coal “to such rights as [Levisa 
Coal] owns and has the right to lease.”  We agree with Levisa 
Coal. 
In Clayborn, we were required to determine, as a matter of 
first impression in Virginia, whether a trespass had occurred 
against the rights of the owner of the surface estate5 where the 
                                                                  
satisfy the contemporaneous objection requirement of Rule 5:25. 
5 “Surface estate” is a term intended generally to refer to 
the rights of the owner of that portion of the original tract of 
land that has not been severed by deeds granting rights in the 
mineral estate or other resources of the tract of land.  As 
Clayborn made clear, the rights of the surface owner are not 
limited to control of the surface area, but, depending on what 
 
18
owner of the severed coal estate was transporting coal from 
adjacent mining operations on other lands through the tunnels 
and shafts beneath the surface estate.  We recognized that under 
“[t]he prevailing if not wholly unbroken current of authority 
. . . a grantee of coal in place is the owner, not of an 
incorporeal right to mine and remove, but of a corporeal 
freehold estate in the coal, including the shell or containing 
chamber, and that as such owner he has the absolute right, until 
all of the coal has been exhausted, to use the passages opened 
for its removal for any and all purposes whatsoever, including 
in particular the transportation of coal from adjacent lands, so 
long as he operates and uses the passages with due regard to the 
rights of the surface owner.”  128 Va. at 388, 105 S.E. at 118. 
After extensively reviewing the law from other 
jurisdictions, we held that a deed or lease transferring a coal 
estate or portion thereof is “the grant of an estate 
determinable [and w]hen the coal is all removed the estate ends 
for the plain reason that the subject of it has been carried 
away.”  Id. at 393, 105 S.E. at 120.  Thus, “[t]he space [the 
coal] occupied reverts to the grantor by operation of law.”  Id.  
Accordingly, we concluded that the right to use the tunnels and 
                                                                  
rights are retained, may extend into the subsurface area.  
Clayborn, 128 Va. at 388, 105 S.E. at 118. 
 
 
19
shafts extended only to the mining operations within the 
determinable estate, and not to the support of mining operations 
on other lands.  We further held that “[i]f the coal owner 
expects more” than the right to mine and remove the coal within 
his estate “he ought to stipulate for it” in the deed or lease.  
Id. at 397, 105 S.E. at 122. 
Although our decision in Clayborn was not consistent with 
the majority view of other jurisdictions, see id. at 401-02, 105 
S.E. at 123 (Prentis, J., dissenting), with respect to the issue 
in this case that decision is in line with the long established 
view in American law that “[t]he owner of a mine . . . may allow 
the water therein to flow in natural channels and percolations 
into an adjoining mine, but he may not, in absence of an 
easement or license to do so, discharge [water] by means of 
artificial drains into such adjoining mine.”  Daniel M. 
Barringer and John S. Adams, The Law of Mines and Mining in the 
United States 631 (1900).  This principle applies both to mines 
at different levels within the same subsurface area of a single 
tract of land as well as to mines on different tracts of land. 
We can discern no practical distinction between supporting 
adjoining mining operations by using tunnels and shafts to 
transport coal, as in Clayborn, and the storing of wastewater 
from such operations in the voids, tunnels and shafts of an 
unrelated mine, as in this case.  Accordingly, we are of opinion 
 
20
that when the 1937 deed conveyed the solid mineral estate of the 
Buchanan County parcels to Levisa Coal, the parties to that deed 
contemplated only that the coal and other minerals would be 
mined from that estate, and that the deed conveyed only an 
incidental easement to use that portion of the parcels retained 
by the surface owner as was necessary to support such mining 
operations.  Nothing in the deed conveyed any right to use the 
voids, tunnels and shafts created below the surface for any 
purpose other than to support the mining operations on those 
parcels. 
Since the 1937 deed conveyed no right to use any portion of 
the mineral estate to support mining operations on other lands, 
the 1956 lease could not have granted such right to Island Creek 
Coal.  Accordingly, even if we were to accept Consolidation 
Coal’s argument that there was an incidental benefit to Island 
Creek Coal’s long-term operational plan for mining the Buchanan 
County parcels by permitting wastewater from the Buchanan Mine 
to be stored in the VP3 Mine, Island Creek Coal simply lacks the 
authority to permit Consolidation Coal to store wastewater from 
other mining operations in the VP3 Mine.  Clearly, Island Creek 
Coal did not stipulate for such a use of the leasehold in the 
1956 lease, nor could Levisa Coal have granted such rights even 
if they had been sought.  Thus, we hold that the circuit court 
 
21
erred in ruling that Consolidation Coal has a right to store 
wastewater from the Buchanan Mine in the VP3 Mine.  
Denial of Levisa Coal’s Request for Injunctive Relief 
Because the circuit court premised its judgment to deny 
Levisa Coal’s request for injunctive relief, at least in part, 
on its erroneous determination that Consolidation Coal had the 
right to store excess water from the Buchanan Mine in the VP3 
Mine, we will reverse that judgment.  Additionally, because the 
circuit court rendered that judgment in the procedural posture 
of the case which resulted in an insufficient record for this 
Court on appeal to resolve the issue of Levisa Coal’s 
entitlement to injunctive relief, we will also remand the case 
for further consideration of that issue by the circuit court. 
Upon appeal, Consolidation Coal has contended, as it did in 
the circuit court, that Levisa Coal lacks standing to seek 
injunctive relief in this case because the 1956 lease divested 
it of a present possessory interest in the leasehold given to 
Island Creek Coal.  While the circuit court did not expressly 
address this contention, implicitly the court rejected it by 
reaching the merits of Levisa Coal’s requested relief.  The 
record sufficiently reflects that Levisa Coal’s rights and 
interests are not limited to those of its retained ownership of 
the coal reserves below the Tiller Vein that Island Creek Coal 
presently has a right to mine.  In addition, Levisa Coal 
 
22
reserved the right to explore for and remove other minerals 
under the 1956 lease, and the circuit court found that there was 
sufficient evidence, even without Hower’s affidavit, that 
inundation of the VP3 Mine with excess water from the Buchanan 
Mine would potentially damage the coal bed methane and other gas 
deposits associated with the VP3 Mine and adjoining strata in 
which Levisa Coal owns an interest.  Accordingly, there is no 
merit to Consolidation Coal’s contention that Levisa Coal lacks 
standing to seek injunctive relief in this case, and that 
contention will not be an issue upon remand of this case to the 
circuit court. 
Levisa Coal’s standing to seek injunctive relief in the 
present case, however, is not sufficient alone to establish an 
entitlement to such relief.  Under well established principles, 
which will be applicable upon remand here, the granting of an 
injunction is an extraordinary remedy and rests on sound 
judicial discretion to be exercised upon consideration of the 
nature and circumstances of a particular case.  See, e.g., 
Fancher v. Fagella, 274 Va. 549, 556, 650 S.E.2d 519, 522 
(2007), Seventeen, Inc. v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 Va. 74, 78, 
205 S.E.2d 648, 653 (1974); Akers v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 151 
Va. 1, 8, 144 S.E. 492, 494 (1928). 
We also note that because of the absence of any right of 
Consolidation Coal to store excess water from its mine in the 
 
23
VP3 Mine and the evidence in the record that it is currently 
doing so, the issue before the circuit court will no longer 
involve the consideration of temporary injunctive relief but, 
rather, whether the circumstances warrant the issuance of a 
permanent injunction.6  In that regard, the circuit court may 
have the benefit of additional evidence on the issue of the 
damages that inundation of the VP3 Mine may cause to Levisa 
Coal’s interests in the gaseous mineral estate associated with 
the VP3 Mine and the adjoining strata.  Similarly, Consolidation 
Coal must be afforded the opportunity to present evidence to 
support its contention that Levisa Coal has an adequate remedy 
at law in the form of monetary damages resulting from the 
inundation of the VP3 Mine with wastewater from Consolidation 
Coal’s mine. 
The principles that a court must apply in properly 
exercising its discretion to grant or deny a permanent 
injunction have been identified in prior decisions of this 
Court.  “Under traditional equitable principles, a chancellor 
                     
6 In the circuit court Consolidation Coal urged the 
application of a four-factor approach for determining whether a 
preliminary injunction should issue, similar to that adopted by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., Inc., 550 
F.2d 189, 195-96 (4th Cir. 1977), for issues arising under 
F.R.Civ.P. 65.  In the posture of this appeal it is not 
necessary to address that issue, and we express no view upon the 
matter. 
 
24
may enjoin a continuing trespass.”  Fancher, 274 Va. at 556, 650 
S.E.2d at 522.  See also Nishanian v. Sirohi, 243 Va. 337, 339, 
414 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1992); Mobley v. Saponi Corporation, 215 
Va. 643, 645, 212 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1975).  However, even in a 
case involving a continuing trespass the guiding principle which 
remains constant is that the granting of an injunction is an 
extraordinary remedy and rests on the sound judicial discretion 
to be exercised upon consideration of the nature and 
circumstances of a particular case.  See, e.g., Fancher, 274 Va. 
at 556, 650 S.E.2d at 522; Seventeen, Inc., 215 Va. at 78, 205 
S.E.2d at 653; Akers, 151 Va. at 8, 144 S.E. at 494.  Thus, in a 
case of a continuing trespass, such as the present case, we have 
stated that if “the loss entailed upon [the trespasser] would be 
excessively out of proportion to the injury suffered by [the 
owner], or a serious detriment to the public, a court of equity 
might very properly . . . deny the injunction and leave the 
parties to settle their differences in a court of law.”  
Clayborn, 128 Va. at 399, 105 S.E. at 122. 
We have also observed that unless a party is entitled to an 
injunction pursuant to a statute, a party must establish the 
“traditional prerequisites, i.e., irreparable harm and lack of 
an adequate remedy at law” before a request for injunctive 
relief will be sustained.  Virginia Beach S.P.C.A., Inc. v. 
South Hampton Rds. Veterinary Assoc., 229 Va. 349, 354, 329 
 
25
S.E.2d 10, 13 (1985); see also Carbaugh v. Solem, 225 Va. 310, 
315, 302 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1983).  Clearly, if the plaintiff has no 
adequate remedy at law, equity will not countenance a continuing 
trespass merely because the trespasser, or even the public at 
large, will be benefited by allowing the trespass to continue.  
See Frank Shop, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 264 Va. 1, 
7, 564 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2002). 
When an injunction is sought to enforce a contract right 
concerning personal property, the plaintiff has a high burden of 
showing that the failure to enjoin the alleged improper action 
will result in irreparable harm for which the law will afford 
him no adequate remedy.  See, e.g., Griscom v. Childress, 183 
Va. 42, 47, 31 S.E.2d 309, 312 (1944); Langford v. Taylor, 99 
Va. 577, 580, 39 S.E. 223, 224 (1901).  Unless the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the property it seeks to protect has some 
personal value of sentiment or other intangible quality that 
cannot be restored to him at law, Langford, 99 Va. at 580, 39 
S.E. at 224, or that monetary damages would otherwise not make 
him whole, the court will deny the injunction because the legal 
remedy is sufficient.  Moore v. Steelman, 80 Va. 331, 339-40 
(1885).  Accordingly, in such cases, the court will give due 
weight to the adverse effect of the injunction being granted on 
the defendant. 
 
26
By contrast, when the injunction is sought to enforce a 
real property right a continuing trespass may be enjoined “even 
though each individual act of trespass is in itself trivial, or 
the damage is trifling, nominal or insubstantial, and despite 
the fact that no single trespass causes irreparable injury.  The 
injury is deemed irreparable and the owner protected in the 
enjoyment of his property whether such be sentimental or 
pecuniary.”  Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 172, 89 S.E.2d 
23, 25 (1955); accord Fancher, 274 Va. at 556, 650 S.E.2d at 
522-23; Clayborn, 128 Va. at 398-99, 105 S.E. at 122. 
Thus, in Clayborn we did not find that the alleged harm to 
the defendant constituted “the exceptional grounds” needed to 
require the owner of real property rights to forgo those rights 
for a purely legal remedy.  Id. at 399, 105 S.E. at 122.  Even 
though it was apparent from the record that the defendant could 
have negotiated the right to use the property “upon reasonable 
terms,” we held that the court could not impose such terms on 
the parties and, thus, the injunction ought to have been 
granted.  Id. at 400, 105 S.E. at 123. 
Similarly, in Blue Ridge Poultry & Egg Co. v. Clark, 211 
Va. 139, 176 S.E.2d 323 (1970), we rejected the claim that an 
injunction ought not to issue to protect a landowner from a 
noxious intrusion of effluent onto his land from a neighboring 
industrial farming operation.  Despite the fact that the 
 
27
chancellor had found that the damages to Clark’s property were 
quantifiable in terms of lost rent, we nonetheless held that 
“[t]he doctrine of ‘balancing of equities’ must be viewed in 
light of our long-standing pronouncement that a private 
landowner is to be protected for injuries he may sustain ‘even 
though inflicted by forces which constitute factors in our 
material development and growth.’ ”  Id. at 144, 176 S.E.2d at 
327 (quoting Townsend v. Norfolk Ry. & Light Co., 105 Va. 22, 
49, 52 S.E. 970, 978 (1906)). 
By contrast, in Akers we found that where the trespass had 
essentially stopped by the time the case had come to trial, 
granting an injunction “would be of little benefit to the 
complainant and would cost the defendant $1,000,000.00.”  Akers, 
151 Va. at 8, 144 S.E. at 494.  In such a case, the availability 
of a remedy at law was clearly appropriate, and thus an 
injunction was not appropriate.  Id.; see also Mobley, 215 Va. 
at 646, 212 S.E.2d at 290.  
Upon remand the circuit court will be guided by these 
principles after granting the parties the opportunity to present 
evidence regarding them. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. 
 
28
 
29
Reversed and remanded.