Title: Richard W. Ziervogel v. Washington County Board of Adjustment
Citation: 2004 WI 23
Docket Number: 2002AP001618
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2004

2004 WI 23 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1618 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Richard W. Ziervogel 
and Maureen A. McGinnity,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Washington County Board of Adjustment,  
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 82 
Reported at: 263 Wis. 2d 321, 661 N.W.2d 884 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
David C. Resheske   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., did not 
participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Maureen A. McGinnity and Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Maureen A. McGinnity. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Kimberly 
A. Nass, corporation counsel, Christine E. Ohlis, assistant 
corporation counsel, and oral argument by Christine E. Ohlis. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent the cause was argued by P. 
Philip Peterson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John A. Kassner and 
Murphy Desmond, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Builders Association, and oral argument by John A. Kassner. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson and 
Debra P. Conrad, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Realtors 
Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William P. O’Connor, 
Tracy K. Kuczenski, Mary Beth Peranteau and Wheeler, VanSickle & 
Anderson, S.C., Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Association of 
Lakes, and oral argument by William P. O’Connor. 
 
2004 WI 23 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1618  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 838) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Richard W.  
Ziervogel and Maureen A. McGinnity,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Washington County Board of Adjustment,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Intervenor-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  We are called upon in this case to 
reconsider the legal standard by which zoning boards of 
adjustment 
measure 
"unnecessary 
hardship" 
when 
determining 
whether to grant area zoning variances. 
¶2  The legislature has by statute vested local boards of 
adjustment with broad discretionary power to authorize variances 
where the strict enforcement of zoning regulations results in 
No. 
02-1618   
 
2 
 
unnecessary 
hardship 
to 
individual 
property 
owners.  
"Unnecessary hardship," however, is not defined in the statute.  
It has fallen to courts to give meaning to the term. 
¶3 The present need to revisit the meaning of "unnecessary 
hardship" is precipitated by our decisions in State v. Kenosha 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 
(1998), and State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 
78, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.  Kenosha County merged the 
previously distinct legal standards for unnecessary hardship in 
use and area variance cases that had existed since Snyder v. 
Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 247 
N.W.2d 98 (1976), establishing a single, "no reasonable use of 
the property" standard for unnecessary hardship in all variance 
applications.  We reconsidered Kenosha County's unitary "no 
reasonable use" standard in Outagamie County, but split on 
whether it should be overruled (three justices), maintained but 
not applied to defeat the area variance in the case (two 
justices in concurrence), or maintained and applied to defeat 
the variance (two justices in dissent).  Outagamie County, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, ¶5. 
¶4  We now conclude that the distinctions in purpose and 
effect of use and area zoning make the perpetuation of a single, 
highly-restrictive "no reasonable use of the property" standard 
for all variances unworkable and unfair.  Use zoning regulates 
fundamentally how property may be used, in order to promote 
uniformity of land use within neighborhoods or regions.  Area 
zoning regulates lot area, density, height, frontage, setbacks, 
No. 
02-1618   
 
3 
 
and so forth, in order to promote uniformity of development, 
lot, and building size. 
¶5 Restricting the availability of variances to those 
property owners who would have "no reasonable use" of their 
property without a variance may be justifiable in use variance 
cases, given the purpose of use zoning and the substantial 
effect of use variances on neighborhood character.  But applying 
the same strict "no reasonable use" standard to area variance 
applications is unjustifiable.  The "no reasonable use" standard 
is largely disconnected from the purpose of area zoning, fails 
to consider the lesser effect of area variances on neighborhood 
character, and operates to virtually eliminate the statutory 
discretion of local boards of adjustment to do justice in 
individual cases. 
¶6 
A forthright recognition of these differences in 
purpose and effect of use and area zoning and variances requires 
perceptibly different standards for the evaluation of use and 
area 
variance 
applications. 
 
Henceforward, 
area 
variance 
applicants need not meet the "no reasonable use of the property" 
standard that is applicable to use variance applications. 
¶7  We now reaffirm the Snyder standard for unnecessary 
hardship in area variance cases: "[w]hen considering an area 
variance, the question of whether unnecessary hardship . . . 
exists is best explained as '[w]hether compliance with the 
strict letter of the restrictions governing area, set backs, 
frontage, height, bulk or density would unreasonably prevent the 
owner from using the property for a permitted purpose or would 
No. 
02-1618   
 
4 
 
render 
conformity 
with 
such 
restrictions 
unnecessarily 
burdensome.'"  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 475 (quoting 2 Rathkopf, 
The Law of Zoning & Planning § 45-28 (3d ed. 1972)).  Whether 
this standard is met in individual cases depends upon a 
consideration of the purpose of the zoning restriction in 
question, its effect on the property, and the effect of a 
variance on the neighborhood and the larger public interest.  
The long-standing requirements that the hardship be unique to 
the property and not self-created are maintained.  Snyder, 74 
Wis. 2d at 476, 479.  The burden of proving unnecessary hardship 
remains on the property owner. 
¶8  The variance applicants in this case were denied an 
area variance from a shoreland zoning setback restriction 
because they failed to meet Kenosha County's restrictive "no 
reasonable use of the property" test.  The denial was upheld on 
certiorari review and appeal.  Because we now hold that Kenosha 
County's "no reasonable use" standard does not govern area 
variance applications, we reverse. 
   
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶9 
Richard 
Ziervogel 
and 
Maureen 
McGinnity 
("petitioners") own a 1.4 acre parcel of property on Big Cedar 
Lake in the Town of West Bend in Washington County.  The 
property has 200 feet of lake frontage and a 1600-square-foot 
house with a legal nonconforming setback of 26 feet from the 
ordinary high water mark of the lake.  A public roadway bisects 
the lot along the side of the house opposite the lake, and the 
No. 
02-1618   
 
5 
 
remainder of the lot on the other side of roadway is in a 
floodplain. 
¶10  The petitioners purchased the property in 1996 and 
have used it as a summer home.  They now wish to live in the 
house year-round, and would like to construct a ten-foot 
vertical addition to the structure consisting of two bedroom-
bathroom suites and an office.  In 1996, such an addition would 
have been permissible under the applicable shoreland zoning 
ordinance.  However, in 2001 Washington County amended its 
ordinance to prohibit any expansion of any portion of an 
existing structure within 50 feet of the ordinary high-water 
mark of the lake.  Washington Cty., Wis., Code § 23.13(3)(d).  
Accordingly, the petitioners need a variance to go ahead with 
their plans. 
 
¶11 The Washington County Board of Adjustment considered 
the petitioners' variance application at a public hearing on 
October 22, 2001.  The petitioners appeared and described their 
project in detail.  A letter from the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) objecting to the variance was read into 
the 
record. 
 
A 
representative 
of 
the 
Washington 
County 
Department of Planning and Parks was also heard; he, too, 
opposed the variance.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Board denied the variance because the petitioners failed to show 
that they would have no reasonable use of their property without 
the variance.     
 
¶12 The 
petitioners 
sought review via 
certiorari in 
Washington County Circuit Court.  The Honorable David C. 
No. 
02-1618   
 
6 
 
Resheske affirmed, concluding that under the "no reasonable use" 
standard of Kenosha County, the Board's denial of the variance 
must be upheld.  The court of appeals affirmed on the same 
ground.  State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2003 WI App 82, 263 Wis. 2d 321, 661 N.W.2d 884.  We 
reverse.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶13 A person aggrieved by the issuance or denial of a 
zoning variance may commence an action in circuit court seeking 
the remedy available by certiorari, as the petitioners did here.  
See Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).  A court on certiorari review must 
accord a presumption of correctness and validity to a board of 
adjustment's decision.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476.  A reviewing 
court may not substitute its discretion for that of the board, 
the entity to which the legislature has committed these 
decisions.  Id.   
¶14 When 
no 
additional 
evidence 
is taken, 
statutory 
certiorari review is limited to: (1) whether the board kept 
within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct 
theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, 
or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; 
and (4) whether the board might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question based on the evidence.  Arndorfer v. 
Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 162 Wis. 2d 246, 253, 469 
N.W.2d 831 (1991).  The second of these elements of certiorari 
review is implicated here: at issue is the appropriate legal 
standard 
for 
the 
determination 
of 
statutory 
"unnecessary 
No. 
02-1618   
 
7 
 
hardship."  This is a question of law that we review 
independently.  Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶22.   
 
 
 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶15 Counties are statutorily required to zone their 
shorelands by ordinance.  Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1m)(1999-2000).1  
Washington County adopted a revised Shoreland/Wetland/Floodplain 
ordinance that became effective June 1, 2001.  Washington Cty., 
Wis., Code ch. 23.       
 
¶16 The zoning enabling statutes also empower county 
boards of adjustment to authorize variances from the terms of 
zoning ordinances in harmony with their general purpose and 
intent. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(1). 
 
Washington 
County 
has 
established a board of adjustment pursuant to the variance 
enabling statute.  Washington County., Wis., Code § 23.15(e). 
 
¶17 Variance procedure in zoning law serves several 
essential purposes: to prevent otherwise inflexible zoning codes 
from precipitating regulatory takings; to provide a procedure by 
which the public interest in zoning compliance can be balanced 
against the private interests of property owners in individual 
cases; and, most broadly, to allow a means of obtaining relief 
from the strict enforcement of zoning restrictions where 
individual injustices might occasionally occur.  Outagamie 
County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶¶44-47.  Zoning variances "are 
designed to afford a protective device against individual 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
02-1618   
 
8 
 
hardships, to provide relief against unnecessary and unjust 
invasions of the right to private property, and to provide a 
flexibility 
of 
procedure 
necessary 
to 
the 
protection 
of 
constitutional 
rights." 
 
8 
Eugene 
McQuillin, 
Municipal 
Corporations § 25.160, at 590-91 (Rev. ed. 2000) (internal 
citations omitted).  Thus, 
[i]t has been said that to preserve the validity of 
the zoning ordinance in its application to the 
community in general, the variance provision of the 
enabling act functions as an "escape valve," so that 
when regulations that apply to all are unnecessarily 
burdensome 
to 
a 
few 
because 
of 
certain 
unique 
circumstances a means of relief from the mandates of 
the ordinance is provided. 
3 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice § 20-1 (2002 revision), at 
20-2. 
¶18 
Consistent 
with 
these 
principles, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
59.694(7) vests county boards of adjustment with the following 
authority to grant zoning variances: 
To authorize upon appeal in specific cases variances 
from the terms of the ordinance that will not be 
contrary to the public interest, where, owing to 
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the 
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary 
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance 
shall be observed and substantial justice done.   
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c). 
¶19 The legislature has by this enactment delegated to 
local boards of adjustment substantial discretion to grant 
variances where the literal application of zoning regulations 
would result in unnecessary hardship not justified by the 
underlying purposes of the ordinance in question.  The statute, 
No. 
02-1618   
 
9 
 
however, does not define "unnecessary hardship," which is a 
prerequisite to the issuance of a variance.  It has been left to 
courts to give content to the term. 
¶20 The following judicial rules of unnecessary hardship 
are well-established: The hardship must be based on conditions 
unique to the property rather than considerations personal to 
the property owner.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 479; see also 3 
Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning §§ 20.35-
20.40 (4th ed. 1996); 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's Law 
of Zoning and Planning § 58:18 (2003).  The hardship cannot be 
self-created.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476; see also Outagamie 
County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶24; 3 Ziegler, supra § 58:21; 3 Young, 
supra § 20.44-47.  The board of adjustment is to evaluate the 
hardship in light of the purpose of the zoning restriction at 
issue.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473; see also Outagamie County, 
244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶24; Id., ¶74, (Crooks, J., concurring).  A 
variance cannot be contrary to the public interest.  Arndorfer, 
162 Wis. 2d at 256; see also Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 
¶24.  The property owner bears the burden of proving unnecessary 
hardship.  Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 253; see also Outagamie 
County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶50.  While these general principles 
help guide the board's discretion, they do not establish the 
meaning of the term "unnecessary hardship" or provide a legal 
standard for determining whether it has been proved.     
 
¶21  By definition, all variances depart from the purpose 
of the zoning ordinance and implicate the public interest, 
because they permit something that is otherwise strictly 
No. 
02-1618   
 
10 
 
prohibited.  But they do so to varying degrees and levels of 
acceptability, depending on the type of variance requested and 
the nature of the zoning restriction in question.  As such, 
courts have long recognized a distinction between use variances, 
which permit a landowner to put property to an otherwise 
prohibited use, and area variances, which provide exceptions 
from such physical requirements as setbacks, lot area, and 
height limits.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 474-75; see also Outagamie 
County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶¶34-36.  The distinction has been 
described in this way: 
A use variance is one that permits a use other than 
that 
prescribed 
by 
the 
zoning 
ordinance 
in 
a 
particular 
district. 
 
An 
area 
variance 
has 
no 
relationship to a change of use.  It is primarily a 
grant to erect, alter, or use a structure for a 
permitted use in a manner other than that prescribed 
by the restrictions of a zoning ordinance. 
3 Yokley, supra § 20-3, at 20-8-9; see also 3 Ziegler, supra, 
58.4. 
 
¶22  The law treats use and area variances differently 
because use and area zoning serve distinct purposes and affect 
property rights in distinct ways; also, use and area variances 
affect public and private interests differently.  In the most 
general sense, the purpose of all zoning is to control land use 
and development in order to promote public health, safety, 
welfare, morals, and aesthetics.  Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).  Shoreland zoning, at 
issue 
here, 
carries 
the 
additional 
general 
purposes 
of 
protecting the public's interest in navigable waters, including 
No. 
02-1618   
 
11 
 
promoting safe and healthful water conditions, controlling 
pollution, and protecting fish and aquatic life and natural 
beauty.  Wis. Stat. § 281.31(1).  Within these general purposes, 
use zoning regulates fundamentally how property may be used, in 
order to promote uniformity of use within neighborhoods and 
regions.  Area zoning, on the other hand, regulates density, 
setbacks, frontage, height, and other dimensional attributes, in 
order to promote uniformity of development, lot size, and 
building configuration and size.    
¶23 Use and area variances thus threaten the integrity of 
zoning ordinances in qualitatively different ways, and generally 
to a different extent.  Use variances by their nature have the 
potential 
to 
bring 
about 
great 
changes 
in 
neighborhood 
character, but area variances usually do not have this effect.  
Synder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473; see also Outagamie County, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, ¶¶36-38.  While area variances provide an increment 
of 
relief 
(normally 
small) 
from 
a 
physical 
dimensional 
restriction such as building height, setback, and so forth, use 
variances permit wholesale deviation from the way in which land 
in the zone is used.  Accordingly, the measure of unnecessary 
hardship for use and area variances is different; "in most 
states, the courts will approve an area variance upon a lesser 
showing by the applicant than is required to sustain a use 
variance."2  3 Young, supra, § 20:48, at 580.  Until Kenosha 
                                                 
 
2  In some states, these differences are formalized in the 
variance statute itself.  "[S]tatutes governing use and area 
variances fall into three categories: (1) those which allow use 
and nonuse (area) variances and which allow nonuse (area) 
No. 
02-1618   
 
12 
 
County, Wisconsin followed this general rule, pursuant to this 
court's decision in Snyder. 
¶24 Snyder linked the definition of "unnecessary hardship" 
in use variance cases to the goal of preventing zoning from 
rendering property useless, holding that "unnecessary hardship" 
in use variance cases is established only when, in the absence 
of a variance, no reasonable or feasible use can be made of the 
property.  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 474.  However, because of the 
difference in purpose and effect of area zoning and area 
variances, 
Snyder 
established 
a 
different 
definition 
of 
"unnecessary hardship" for area variance cases: 
When considering an area variance, the question of 
whether unnecessary hardship or practical difficulty 
exists is best explained as "whether compliance with 
the strict letter of the restrictions governing area, 
set backs, frontage, height, bulk or density would 
unreasonably prevent the owner from using the property 
for a permitted purpose or would render conformity 
with such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome." 
Id. at 474-75.3 
                                                                                                                                                             
variances to be granted upon a showing of practical difficulty; 
(2) those which allow use and nonuse (area) variances and 
require a showing of unnecessary hardship for both; and (3) 
those which do not allow use variances and require unnecessary 
hardship for the granting of nonuse (area) variances. . . . 
[Wisconsin's] statute falls into the second category, allowing 
both use and area variances upon a showing of 'unnecessary 
hardship.'"  State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 
WI 78, ¶35, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 635, 628 N.W.2d 376; see also 3 
Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and 
Planning § 58.4 (2003). 
  
 
3  The term "practical difficulties" does not appear in our 
statute, which authorizes both use and area variances on a 
showing of "unnecessary hardship."  Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c).  
Snyder concluded that there was no real difference between the 
No. 
02-1618   
 
13 
 
¶25 Snyder's less-stringent and more flexible definition of 
unnecessary 
hardship 
for 
area 
variances 
allows 
variance 
procedure to function as more than just a protection against 
unconstitutional takings of private property.  It allows 
variance procedure to function as the regulatory "escape valve" 
it was meant to be: "The purpose of variances in the broadest 
sense is the rendering of justice in unique and individual cases 
of practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships arising from 
literal application of zoning ordinances."  8 Quillin, supra § 
25.172, at 648. 
¶26 Snyder's dual approach to use and area variances 
furthers the purpose of use and area zoning, allows for 
individualized balancing of public and private interests, and is 
consistent with the approach of most courts around the country: 
The prime justification for requiring less of an 
applicant for an area variance than is required in the 
case of a use variance is that the former does not 
affect the use of the land.  An area variance is 
thought not to threaten adjacent land with the 
establishment of an incompatible use, or to hazard the 
maintenance of a use which will change the essential 
character of a neighborhood.  Such a variance has some 
capacity to impose an adverse effect on adjacent land, 
and standards must be imposed to insure the protection 
of neighboring property, but in the case of area 
variances, it is assumed by most courts that adequate 
protection of the neighborhood can be effected without 
the imposition of the stringent limitations which have 
been developed in the use variance cases. 
                                                                                                                                                             
phrases "unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficulties" in 
the secondary authorities, but held that unnecessary hardship in 
use and area variance cases must be governed by distinct 
standards because use and area variances produce different 
effects.  Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 
Wis. 2d 468, 474-75, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976). 
No. 
02-1618   
 
14 
 
3 Young, supra § 20.48, at 581 (internal citations omitted).  
Snyder remained in place for more than two decades, until 
Kenosha County was decided in 1998. 
¶27 Kenosha County blurred the distinction between use and 
area variances, by adopting the "no reasonable use of the 
property" test from use variance analysis for area variance 
cases.  Kenosha County, 218 Wis. 2d at 398, 413-14.  This has 
had the effect of severely curtailing the discretion vested by 
the legislature in boards of adjustment.  See Outagamie County, 
244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶32; State ex rel. Spinner v. Kenosha County 
Bd. of Adjustment, 223 Wis. 2d 99, 110, 588 N.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 
1998)(Nettesheim, J., concurring).  It also had the effect of 
displacing Snyder sub silentio.  By operation of the now-uniform 
"no reasonable use" standard, local zoning boards cannot even 
begin to evaluate the individual circumstances of an area 
variance application when the property in question is capable of 
any reasonable use without the variance; a property owner with a 
"reasonable use" is disqualified from the start. 
¶28  Application of the "no reasonable use" standard to 
area variances overwhelms all other considerations in the 
analysis, rendering irrelevant any inquiry into the uniqueness 
of the property, the purpose of the ordinance, and the effect of 
a variance on the public interest.  As Justice Crooks has noted: 
Consideration of a variance request as it relates to 
the purpose of the zoning ordinance, along with review 
of the specific restriction at issue, must necessarily 
take into account the differences resulting from the 
granting of an area or use variance.  Indeed, "because 
area variances do not involve great changes in the 
No. 
02-1618   
 
15 
 
character of neighborhoods as do use variances," the 
purpose of the zoning ordinance may not be so likely 
undermined by an area variance as it might be by a use 
variance. 
Outagamie 
County, 
244 
Wis. 2d 613, 
¶74 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring)(quoting Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473.) 
¶29  For the statutory discretionary authority to be 
meaningful, boards of adjustment must have the opportunity to 
distinguish between hardships that are unnecessary in light of 
unique conditions of the property and the purpose of the 
ordinance, and hardships that do not warrant relief, either 
because they are inconsequential or not unique or because a 
variance would unduly undermine the purpose of the ordinance or 
the public interest.  Boards of adjustment must "have some very 
real flexibility in granting variances."  Id. (Crooks, J., 
concurring).  Under the "no reasonable use" standard, however, 
boards of adjustment are effectively prohibited from considering 
the graduated nature of intrusions upon the strict letter of 
area restrictions.  The "no reasonable use" standard, therefore, 
leaves boards of adjustment with almost no flexibility and 
empties the concept of "discretion" of any real meaning. 
¶30  Kenosha County's adoption of the "no reasonable use" 
standard for area variances generally precludes any property 
owner currently using his property from ever getting a variance, 
regardless of the merits of the application or the type, size, 
and nature of the variance requested.  This "unreasonably 
prevent[s] private property owners from making even highly 
beneficial, completely legal improvements to their property," if 
No. 
02-1618   
 
16 
 
doing so requires a variance to legalize even the slightest 
nonconformity.  Id., ¶¶42, 47.  Almost all variance applicants——
certainly all applicants who are putting their property to some 
use at the time of application——will flunk the "no reasonable 
use" test, divesting the board of any real discretion.4  
Universal application of the "no reasonable use" definition of 
unnecessary hardship to all variances has drained the variance 
statute of its meaning and effect.5 
                                                 
 
4  The court of appeals identified some of these anomalies 
almost immediately after the decision in State v. Kenosha County 
Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998), see 
State ex rel. Spinner v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 223 
Wis. 2d 99, 110, 588 N.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1998)(Nettesheim, J., 
concurring)("[t]he real effect of the [Kenosha County] decision 
is to significantly curtail a board of adjustment's discretion 
in such matters"), but has considered itself bound by the new 
"no reasonable use" standard for area variances.  See, State ex 
rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 2003 WI 
App 82, ¶¶21-25, 263 Wis. 2d 321, 661 N.W.2d 884.  See also, for 
illustrative 
purposes 
only, 
the 
following 
unpublished, 
nonprecedential opinions: State v. Waushara County Bd. of 
Adjustment, No. 02-2400, unpublished order (WI App May 7, 2003); 
Voss v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2003 WI App 111, 264 
Wis. 2d 893, 664 N.W.2d 126 (unpublished table decision); State 
v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 222 Wis. 2d 220, 587 
N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished table decision). 
  
 
5   "Unnecessary hardship" in zoning variance cases "is 
neither the same nor as demanding as a takings analysis."  3 
E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 20-6, at 20-25 (2002 
revision)(emphasis in original).  The United States Supreme 
Court has held that a categorical regulatory taking occurs when 
a zoning regulation deprives property of all economically 
beneficial or productive use.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  The "no reasonable use" test 
arguably 
accomplishes 
the 
bare 
constitutional 
minimum 
of 
preventing regulatory takings.  But requiring all variance 
applicants to show "no reasonable use" of the property without a 
variance frustrates rather than furthers the broader purposes of 
variance procedure. 
No. 
02-1618   
 
17 
 
¶31  In Outagamie County we reconsidered Kenosha County's 
adoption of the "no reasonable use" standard for measuring 
unnecessary hardship in area variance cases, but divided on 
whether it should be overruled (three justices), maintained but 
not applied to defeat the variance in the case (two justices in 
concurrence), or maintained and applied to defeat the variance 
(two justices in dissent).  Id., ¶5.  We now conclude that 
Kenosha County's "no reasonable use of the property" standard 
for unnecessary hardship no longer applies in area variance 
cases, and the Snyder definition of unnecessary hardship in area 
variance cases is reaffirmed. 
¶32  Applying the "no reasonable use" standard to area 
variances is inconsistent with the purpose of area zoning, fails 
to recognize the lesser effect of area variances on the public 
interest, and very nearly extinguishes the statutory discretion 
of local boards of adjustment.  Continuing to condition area 
variances upon a showing of "no reasonable use of the property" 
makes variance procedure unworkable and unfairly forecloses 
almost all property owners from the opportunity to demonstrate 
hardship. 
¶33 
We 
therefore 
reinstate 
Snyder's 
formulation 
of 
unnecessary hardship for 
area variance 
cases: 
"'[w]hether 
compliance with the strict letter of the restrictions governing 
area, set backs, frontage, height, bulk or density would 
unreasonably prevent the owner from using the property for a 
permitted 
purpose 
or 
would 
render 
conformity 
with 
such 
restrictions unnecessarily burdensome.'"  Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 
No. 
02-1618   
 
18 
 
475 (quoting 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 45-28 
(3d ed. 1972)).  Snyder also emphasized that variance requests 
are always evaluated in light of the purpose of the zoning 
ordinance and the public interests at stake.  Id. at 473.  
Accordingly, whether the Snyder standard is met in individual 
cases depends upon a consideration of the purpose of the zoning 
restriction in question, its effect on the property, and the 
effect of a variance on the neighborhood and larger public 
interest.  The established requirements that the hardship be 
unique to the property and not self-created are maintained, and 
the burden of proving unnecessary hardship remains on the 
property owner.  Id. at 476-79; see also Outagamie County, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, ¶¶24, 50. 
¶34  It is axiomatic that all zoning restrictions impose 
some burdensome effect on property and all variances run 
contrary to the purpose of the ordinance to some degree.  The 
inquiry should focus on how they do so, and to what extent, in 
light of the circumstances of each individual case.  The board 
must determine whether a hardship unique to the property has 
been demonstrated and whether the relief requested is consistent 
with the public interest such that the variance should be 
granted, or whether a variance would subvert the purpose of the 
zoning restriction to such an extent that it must be denied. 
¶35 We note in this case that the Washington County zoning 
ordinance incorporates Kenosha County's "no reasonable use of 
the property" definition of statutory unnecessary hardship, 
which 
we 
have 
now 
determined 
is 
no 
longer 
applicable.  
No. 
02-1618   
 
19 
 
Washington Cty., Wis., Code § 23.18(78).  A local ordinance 
defining "unnecessary hardship" as "no reasonable use" has the 
same effect as a judicial opinion adopting the same definition, 
that is, it virtually eliminates the statutory discretion of the 
board of adjustment. 
¶36 The zoning enabling statute authorizes the availability 
of variances upon a showing of unnecessary hardship, and 
explicitly commits to boards of adjustment the discretion to 
make variance decisions.  Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c).  The "no 
reasonable use" definition in the Washington County ordinance, 
to the extent it is applicable to area variance requests, 
conflicts with the statutory grant of authority and operates to 
eliminate what the statute allows.   
¶37  Counties have statutory home rule authority pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 59.03, but may not exercise that authority in a 
way that conflicts with legislative enactments of statewide 
concern that uniformly affect all counties.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.03(1); Mommsen v. Schueller, 228 Wis. 2d 627, 635-36, 599 
N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1999).  This is consistent with the general 
rule of limitation on the constitutionally-based home rule 
authority of other local units of government.  See Wis. Const. 
art. XI, § 3(1); De Rosso Landfill Company, Inc. v. City of Oak 
Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 657, 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996); Anchor 
Savings & Loan Association v. Madison Equal Opportunities 
Commission, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 395-97, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984).  
While local units of government may adopt "ordinances which, 
while addressed to local issues, concomitantly regulate matters 
No. 
02-1618   
 
20 
 
of statewide concern," this authority is limited to ordinances 
that complement rather than conflict with the state legislation.  
DeRosso, 200 Wis. 2d at 651-52. 
¶38  Accordingly, local home rule regulations in areas 
where the legislature has adopted uniformly applicable statutes 
on matters of statewide concern are subjected to the following 
analysis for validity: 1) has the legislature withdrawn the 
power of municipalities to act; 2) does the local ordinance 
logically conflict with the state legislation; 3) does the 
ordinance defeat the purpose of the state legislation; or 4) 
does 
the 
ordinance 
go against the 
spirit 
of 
the 
state 
legislation?  DeRosso, 200 Wis. 2d at 651-52 (citing Anchor, 120 
Wis. 2d at 397); Mommsen, 228 Wis. 2d at 636-37.  If "any one of 
these tests [is] met, the municipal ordinance is void."  
DeRosso, 200 Wis. 2d at 652. 
¶39  For the reasons we have noted, the Washington County 
ordinance adopting the "no reasonable use of the property" 
definition for unnecessary hardship in area variance cases 
logically conflicts with the statutory grant of discretion to 
local 
boards 
of 
adjustment 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.694(7)(c).  It also operates to defeat the purpose of the 
statute, for the reasons we have discussed, and contradicts the 
spirit of the statutory grant of discretion to local boards of 
adjustment. 
 ¶40  In Outagamie County we invalidated a DNR rule that 
prohibited a certain type of variance because it conflicted with 
the statutory grant of authority to boards of adjustment.  
No. 
02-1618   
 
21 
 
Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶¶59-60.  We also concluded 
that two county ordinance provisions——one which purported to 
permit certain variances and another that appeared to prohibit 
them——were irreconcilable and therefore unenforceable.  Id., 
¶66.  We reach a similar conclusion here.  The ordinance's "no 
reasonable use" requirement for unnecessary hardship in area 
variance cases, which mirrors Kenosha County's "no reasonable 
use" standard for area variances, conflicts with the statute and 
is therefore unenforceable as applied to area variances.       
¶41  The petitioners' variance application was denied, and 
the denial upheld on certiorari review and appeal, for the sole 
reason that Kenosha County's strict "no reasonable use of the 
property" standard for determining unnecessary hardship had not 
been met.  We have now concluded that the "no reasonable use" 
standard is no longer applicable in area variance cases and 
reaffirmed the Snyder definition of unnecessary hardship for 
area variance cases: whether compliance with area zoning 
restrictions "would unreasonably prevent the owner from using 
the property for a permitted purpose or would render conformity 
with such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome."  Snyder, 74 
Wis. 2d at 475. 
¶42  Whether this standard is met in this case will depend 
upon the board of adjustment's consideration of the purpose of 
the zoning restriction in question (including the important 
public purposes of shoreland zoning generally), the effect of 
the restriction on the property, and the effect of a variance on 
the neighborhood and the larger public interest.  In addition, 
No. 
02-1618   
 
22 
 
the petitioners must demonstrate that the hardship is based upon 
conditions unique to the property and is not self-created.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed 
and 
the 
cause 
remanded 
for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., did not participate.    
 
  
 
 
No. 
02-1618   
 
 
 
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