Title: Ray Mallo v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue
Citation: 2002 WI 70
Docket Number: 2000AP003252
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2002

2002 WI 70 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3252 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ray Mallo and Wanda Mallo,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, Farmers 
Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 
Wisconsin Division, National Farmers 
Organization, Wisconsin Agribusiness Council, 
Wisconsin Agri-Service Association, Inc., 
Wisconsin Cattlemen's Association Cooperative, 
Wisconsin Corn Growers Association, Inc., 
Wisconsin Federation of Cooperatives, Wisconsin 
Pork Producers Association Cooperative, 
Wisconsin Potato & Vegetable Growers 
Association, Inc., Wisconsin Soybean 
Association, Inc., Wisconsin State Cranberry 
Growers Association, and Howard D. Poulson,  
 
Intervening Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 11, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. LaRocque   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Michael 
P. May, James E. Bartzen, and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by James E. Bartzen. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by John R. 
Evans, chief counsel for the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
and Daniel W. Hildebrand, Jon P. Axelrod, Bradley W. Raaths, and 
DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Daniel 
W. Hildebrand. 
 
For the intervening defendants-respondents there was a 
brief by H. Dale Peterson, Sverre David Roang, and Stroud, 
Willink & Howard, LLC, Madison, and oral argument by Sverre 
David Roang. 
 
2002 WI 70 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3252  
(L.C. No. 
00-CV-0553) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ray Mallo and Wanda Mallo,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation Cooperative, 
Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of  
America, Wisconsin Division, National  
Farmers Organization, Wisconsin  
Agribusiness Council, Wisconsin  
Agri-Service Association, Inc., Wisconsin  
Cattlemen's Association Cooperative,  
Wisconsin Corn Growers Association, Inc.,  
Wisconsin Federation of Cooperatives,  
Wisconsin Pork Producers Association  
Cooperative, Wisconsin Potato & Vegetable  
Growers Association, Inc., Wisconsin  
Soybean Association, Inc., Wisconsin  
State Cranberry Growers Association, and  
Howard D. Poulson,  
 
          Intervening Defendants- 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Daniel L. LaRocque, Reserve Judge.  Affirmed.   
No. 
00-3252   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the Court of Appeals, District IV, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1999-2000).1  The issue we 
address is whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) exceeded its 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), when it promulgated Wis. 
Admin. Code § TAX 18.08 (current through Wis. Admin. Register 
No. 535, July 2000), providing for the valuation of agricultural 
land for taxation purposes based on its use-value, effective 
January 1, 2000.  After examining the plain language of the 
statute, we conclude that § 70.32 is unambiguous and gives the 
DOR authority to promulgate this rule.  We further conclude that 
the rule is consistent with the plain language of § 70.32.  We, 
therefore, affirm the decision of the circuit court granting 
summary judgment in favor of the DOR and dismissing this action. 
I.  FACTS 
A. 
Statutory and Administrative Background 
¶2 
We 
begin 
by 
examining 
the 
relevant 
statutes, 
administrative rules, and the history of the valuation of 
agricultural land.2  In 1974, the Wisconsin Constitution, Article 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 "'Agricultural land' means land, exclusive of buildings 
and improvements, that is devoted primarily to agricultural use, 
as defined by rule."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2).  
No. 
00-3252   
 
3 
 
VIII, Section 1,3 was amended to provide an exception from the 
uniform rule of taxation for agricultural land.  See 1971 J. 
Res. 39, 1973 J. Res. 29, (vote April 2, 1974).  The amendment 
added the following language:  "Taxation of agricultural land 
and undeveloped land, both as defined by law, need not be 
uniform with the taxation of each other nor with the taxation of 
other real property."  Wis. Const., art. VIII, § 1.  The 
subsequent legislation and administrative rules putting this 
constitutional amendment into effect present the central issue 
before us today. 
¶3 
Prior to January 1, 1996, agricultural land was 
assessed the same as all real property, at its fair market value 
based on its highest and best use.  Wis. Stat. § 70.32 (1993-
                                                 
3 SECTION 1.  The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the 
legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to collect and 
return taxes on real estate located therein by optional methods.  
Taxes 
shall 
be 
levied 
upon 
such 
property 
with 
such 
classifications as to forests and minerals including or separate 
or severed from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe.  
Taxation of agricultural land and undeveloped land, both as 
defined by law, need not be uniform with the taxation of each 
other nor with the taxation of other real property.  Taxation of 
merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials and finished 
products, and livestock need not be uniform with the taxation of 
real property and other personal property, but the taxation of 
all such merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials and 
finished products and livestock shall be uniform, except that 
the legislature may provide that the value thereof shall be 
determined on an average basis.  Taxes may also be imposed on 
incomes, 
privileges 
and 
occupations, 
which 
taxes 
may 
be 
graduated and progressive, and reasonable exemptions may be 
provided (emphasis added). 
No. 
00-3252   
 
4 
 
1994)4. 
 
In 
1995, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)5, to change the manner of value assessment 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 70.32(1) 
(1993-1994) 
provides 
in 
relevant part:  "Real property shall be valued by the assessor 
in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment 
manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or from the 
best information that the assessor can practicably obtain, at 
the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at 
private sale." 
5 (2r)(a)  For the assessments as of January 1, 1996, and 
January 1, 1997, or until the farmland advisory council under s. 
73.03(49) makes its recommendation, but not to extend beyond 
January 1, 2009, 
the 
assessed value 
of 
each 
parcel of 
agricultural land is the assessed value of that parcel as of 
January 1, 1995. 
(b) For each year beginning with 1998 or upon completion 
of 
the 
farmland 
advisory 
council's 
recommendation 
and 
promulgation of rules and ending no later than December 31, 
2008, the assessed value of the parcel shall be reduced as 
follows: 
1. 
Subtract the value of the parcel as determined 
according to the income that is or could be generated from its 
rental for agricultural use, as determined by rule, from its 
assessed value as of January 1, 1996. 
2. 
Multiply .1 by the number of years that the parcel has 
been assessed under this paragraph, including the current year. 
3. 
Multiply the amount under subd. 1. by the decimal 
under subd. 2. 
4. 
Subtract the amount under subd. 3. from the parcel's 
assessed value as of January 1, 1996. 
(c) For the assessment as of the January 1 after the 
valuation method under par. (b) no longer applies and for each 
assessment thereafter, agricultural land shall be assessed 
according to the income that could be generated from its rental 
for agricultural use. 
 
No. 
00-3252   
 
5 
 
of agricultural land for taxation purposes from market-value 
assessment to use-value assessment.  1995 Wis. Act 27 § 3362h.  
Under market-value assessment, land is valued "at the full value 
which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale."  
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) (1993-1994). Under use-value assessment, 
agricultural land is valued "according to the income that could 
be 
generated 
from 
its 
rental 
for 
agricultural 
use."  
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(c).   
¶4 
Section 70.32(2r) provides for the transition to use-
value assessment to occur in three stages, as indicated in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(a), (b), and (c).  During the first 
stage, 
otherwise 
known 
as 
the 
"freeze," 
1996 
and 
1997 
assessments were frozen at the 1995 assessed value.  See 
§ 70.32(2r)(a).  The second stage, otherwise referred to as the 
phase-in or mixed-use assessment, was legislated to begin in 
1998 "or upon completion of the farmland advisory council's 
recommendation and promulgation of rules and ending no later 
than December 31, 2008."  § 70.32(2r)(b).  The specific method 
of calculating assessments during the phase-in or mixed-use 
assessment is stated in § 70.32(2r)(b)1. through 4.  The final 
stage, as provided in § 70.32(2r)(c), began "as of the January 1 
after the valuation method under par. (b) no longer applies and 
for each assessment thereafter."  During the final stage, and 
for all assessments thereafter, agricultural land is wholly 
assessed based on its use-value. 
¶5 
At 
the 
same 
time 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), the legislature created the Farmland 
No. 
00-3252   
 
6 
 
Advisory 
Council 
(hereinafter 
the 
"Council") 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 73.03(49).6  1995 Wis. Act 27 § 3439m.  The 
                                                 
6 (49)  To appoint a farmland advisory council that shall do 
the following: 
(a) Advise the department of revenue on the supplement to 
the assessment manual's guidelines for assessing agricultural 
land, and on rules to implement use-value assessment of 
agricultural land and to reduce expansion of urban sprawl. 
(c) Annually report to the legislature on the usefulness 
of use-value assessment as a way to preserve farmland and to 
reduce the conversion of farmland to other users. 
(d) Recommend a method to adjust the shared revenue 
formula and other formulas one factor of which is equalized 
value 
to 
compensate 
counties, 
municipalities 
and 
school 
districts that are adversely affected by use-value assessment. 
(dg) Calculate the federal land bank's 5-year average 
capitalization rate and per-acre values based on estimated 
income generated from rental for agricultural use. 
(dm) Carry out its duties in cooperation with the strategic 
growth task force of the governor's land use council. 
(e) Including the following members: 
1. 
The 
secretary 
of 
revenue, 
who 
shall 
serve 
as 
chairperson. 
2. 
An agribusiness person. 
3. 
A person knowledgeable about agricultural lending 
practices. 
4. 
An agricultural economist employed by the University 
of Wisconsin System. 
5. 
A mayor of a city that has a population of more than 
40,000. 
6. 
An expert in the environment. 
7. 
A nonagricultural business person. 
No. 
00-3252   
 
7 
 
legislature charged the Council with the responsibility of 
informing and advising the DOR regarding the implementation of 
use-value assessment.  Specifically, § 73.03(49)(a) provided 
that the purpose of the Council was to advise the DOR "on rules 
to implement use-value assessment of agricultural land and to 
reduce expansion of urban sprawl." 
¶6 
On October 1, 1997, pursuant to its authority to 
promulgate rules, the DOR adopted Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.04 
through 18.08 (1997),7 to implement the use-value assessment 
system. 
 
Following 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), 1996 and 1997 assessments were frozen 
pursuant to § 70.32(2r)(a) and Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.08.  
Then, based on Wis. Admin. Code §§ Tax 18.07 and Tax 18.08, the 
phase-in, or mixed-use assessment, began and assessments of 
agricultural land in 1998 and 1999 reflected a ten and twenty 
percent shift, respectively, toward use-value assessments. 
¶7 
On October 18, 1999, the Council, in its role as 
advisor to the DOR regarding the implementation of use-value 
                                                                                                                                                             
8. 
A professor of urban studies. 
9. 
A farmer. 
7 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Tax 18.04 states the purpose of 
the subchapter as "to provide definitions and procedures for the 
department and municipal assessors to classify certain real 
property as agricultural or other, and to value such property 
for property tax purposes, beginning in 1998."  Administrative 
Code § Tax 18.05 states the relevant definitions, and § Tax 
18.06 states the categories of agricultural land.  Section Tax 
18.07 establishes the method for assessing agricultural land 
based on use-value, and § Tax 18.08 established the phase-in as 
stated in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(b). 
No. 
00-3252   
 
8 
 
assessments, recommended that the DOR implement rules to assess 
agricultural land at full use-value as of January 1, 2000.8  
Based on the Council's recommendation, the DOR used its 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)9 
to 
promulgate 
an 
                                                 
8 In their brief, the intervening defendants detail the 
difficult economic conditions facing Wisconsin farmers that 
triggered 
the 
recommendation 
to 
implement 
full 
use-value 
assessment as of January 1, 2000.  These facts are not essential 
to our statutory interpretation analysis, therefore, we find it 
unnecessary to repeat those facts here. 
9 227.24  Emergency rules; exemptions.  (1)  PROMULGATION.  
(a)  An agency may promulgate a rule as an emergency rule 
without complying with the notice, hearing and publication 
requirements under this chapter if preservation of the public 
peace, health, safety or welfare necessitates putting the rule 
into effect prior to the time it would take effect if the agency 
complied with the procedures. 
(b) An agency acting under s. 186.235(21), 215.02(18) or 
220.04 (8) may promulgate a rule without complying with the 
notice, hearing and publication procedures under this chapter. 
(c) A rule promulgated under par. (a) takes effect upon 
publication in the official state newspaper or on any later date 
specified in the rule and, except as provided under sub. (2), 
remains in effect only for 150 days. 
(d) A rule promulgated under par. (b) takes effect upon 
publication in the official state newspaper or on any later date 
specified in the rule and remains in effect for one year or 
until it is suspended or the proposed rule corresponding to it 
is 
objected 
to 
by 
the 
joint 
committee 
for 
review 
of 
administrative rules, whichever is sooner.  If a rule under par. 
(b) is suspended or a proposed rule under s. 186.235(21), 
215.02(18) or 220.04(8) is objected to by the joint committee 
for review of administrative rules, any person may complete any 
transaction entered into or committed to in reliance on that 
rule and shall have 45 days to discontinue other activity 
undertaken in reliance on that rule. 
(e) An 
agency 
that 
promulgates 
a 
rule 
under 
this 
subsection shall do all of the following: 
No. 
00-3252   
 
9 
 
emergency rule to implement the Council's recommendation.  The 
emergency rule amended Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.08 by creating 
§ Tax 18.08(4), providing for the immediate implementation of 
use-value assessments, as of January 2000.  Subsection (4) 
states in full:  "Notwithstanding subs. (1), (2) and (3), in 
2000 
and 
thereafter, 
the 
assessment 
of 
each 
parcel 
of 
agricultural land shall be its use value, as determined under s. 
TAX 18.07(3)(b)."  The emergency rule was published in the 
Wisconsin Administrative Register on December 14, 1999,10 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
1. 
Prepare a plain language analysis of the rule in the 
format prescribed under s. 227.14(2) and print the plain 
language analysis with the rule when it is published. 
2. 
Prepare a fiscal estimate of the rule in the format 
prescribed under s. 227.14(4) and mail the fiscal estimate to 
each member of the legislature not later than 10 days after the 
date on which the rule is published. 
10 Regarding the "Finding of Emergency," the Wisconsin 
Administrative Register stated, in part: 
On October 18, 1999, the Farmland Advisory Council 
recommended that agricultural land be assessed as of 
January 1, 2000 and thereafter according to value in 
agricultural use.  Major Wisconsin farm organizations, 
among others, have petitioned the Department under s. 
227.12, Stats., to promulgate an administrative rule 
implementing the Council's recommendation. 
Since 
the 
Department 
holds 
assessor 
schools 
in 
November and typically publishes the next years use-
value guidelines prior to January 1 of that year, an 
emergency rule requiring assessment of each parcel of 
agricultural 
land 
according 
to 
its 
value 
in 
agricultural use is necessary for the efficient and 
timely assessment of agricultural land as of January 
1, 2000. 
No. 
00-3252   
 
10 
 
took effect on the same date.  The emergency rule expired 150 
days after its effective date. 
¶8 
In the meantime, the DOR began the process of 
promulgating a permanent rule that would replace the emergency 
rule upon its expiration.  The proposed permanent rule repeals 
all of Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.08 and replaces it with a new 
§ Tax 18.08.  The new rule states:  "Beginning with the 
assessments as of January 1, 2000, the assessment of each parcel 
of agricultural land shall be its use-value, as determined under 
s. Tax 18.07(3)(b)."  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.19(2)11, which 
provides for legislative review of proposed rules, the rule was 
sent to the presiding officers of the legislature on May 8, 
2000.  The rule was then referred to the Senate Committee on 
Economic Development, Housing and Government Operations on May 
17, 2000, and to the Assembly Ways and Means Committee on May 
                                                 
11 (2)  NOTIFICATION OF LEGISLATURE.  An agency shall submit 
a notice to the presiding officer of each house of the 
legislature when a proposed rule is in final draft form.  The 
notice shall be submitted in triplicate and shall be accompanied 
by a report in the form specified under sub. (3).  A notice 
received under this subsection on or after November 1 of an 
even-numbered year shall be considered received on the first day 
of the next regular session of the legislature.  Each presiding 
officer shall, within 7 working days following the day on which 
the notice and report are received, refer them to one committee, 
which may be either a standing committee or a joint legislative 
committee created by law, except the joint committee for review 
of administrative rules.  The agency shall submit to the revisor 
for publication in the register a statement that a proposed rule 
has been submitted to the presiding officer of each house of the 
legislature.  Each presiding officer shall enter a similar 
statement in the journal of his or her house. 
 
No. 
00-3252   
 
11 
 
22, 2000.  Neither committee objected to the proposed rule.  
Wisconsin Admin. Code § Tax 18.08, was published in the 
Wisconsin Administrative Register on July 31, 2000, and it took 
effect on August 1, 2000. 
B. 
Procedural Background 
¶9 
On February 28, 2000, Ray and Wanda Mallo (hereinafter 
the Mallos) filed a lawsuit against the DOR in Dane County 
Circuit Court challenging the validity of the emergency rule 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1).12 
 
Several 
individuals 
and 
organizations 
with 
an 
interest 
and 
stake 
in 
the 
case13 
                                                 
12 227.40  Declaratory judgment proceedings.  (1)  Except as 
provided in sub. (2), the exclusive means of judicial review of 
the validity of a rule shall be an action for declaratory 
judgment as to the validity of such rule brought in the circuit 
court for Dane County.  The officer, board, commission or other 
agency whose rule is involved shall be the party defendant.  The 
summons in such action shall be served as provided in s. 
801.11(3) and by delivering a copy to such officer or to the 
secretary or clerk of the agency where composed of more than one 
person or to any member of such agency.  The court shall render 
a declaratory judgment in such action only when it appears from 
the complaint and the supporting evidence that the rule or its 
threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens 
to interfere with or impair, the legal rights and privileges of 
the plaintiff.  A declaratory judgment may be rendered whether 
or not the plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon 
the validity of the rule in question. 
13 Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation Cooperative, Farmers 
Educational 
and 
Cooperative 
Union 
of 
America, 
Wisconsin 
Division, National Farmers Organization, Wisconsin Agribusiness 
Council, Wisconsin Agri-Service Association, Inc., Wisconsin 
Cattlemen's Association Cooperative, Wisconsin Corn Growers 
Association, 
Inc., 
Wisconsin 
Federation 
of 
Cooperatives, 
Wisconsin Pork Producers Association Cooperative, Wisconsin 
Potato & Vegetable Growers Association, Inc., Wisconsin Soybean 
Association, 
Inc., 
Wisconsin 
State 
Cranberry 
Growers 
Association, and Howard D. Poulson. 
No. 
00-3252   
 
12 
 
(hereinafter 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"intervening 
defendants") were allowed to intervene as defendants.  The 
Mallos reside in Taylor County, where they own approximately 150 
acres of farmland.  In their complaint, the Mallos alleged that 
the DOR exceeded its authority in promulgating the emergency 
rule and eliminating eight years of the ten-year phase-in 
required by § 70.32(2r)(b).  They argued that the emergency rule 
would 
increase 
their 
real 
property 
taxes 
in 
2000 
by 
approximately $0.28 per acre.   
¶10 On March 21, 2000, the Mallos moved for a temporary 
injunction barring the DOR from enforcing the emergency rule.  
The circuit court, the Honorable Robert R. Pekowsky, denied the 
temporary injunction.  The court, finding § 70.32(2r) ambiguous, 
reasoned that the DOR's, and the Council's, interpretation of 
the 
statute 
would 
be 
entitled 
to 
due 
weight 
deference; 
therefore, 
the 
Mallos 
failed 
to 
establish 
a 
reasonable 
probability of success on the merits. 
¶11 While the Mallo's lawsuit challenging the emergency 
rule was pending, the DOR enacted the permanent rule.  The 
Mallos then amended their complaint to incorporate a challenge 
to the permanent rule, asking the court to declare as a matter 
of law that both the emergency rule and the permanent rule were 
invalid.  Both the Mallos and the DOR subsequently moved for 
summary judgment.  The circuit court, the Honorable Daniel L. 
LaRocque, Reserve Judge, denied the Mallos' motion and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the DOR.  The court, in dismissing 
the Mallos' action, stated: 
No. 
00-3252   
 
13 
 
The issue in this case is legislative intent.  This 
court agrees with the Department's contention that the 
promulgation of the permanent or final rule is 
evidence of the legislature's intent.  Pursuant to the 
process required by ch. 227, Stats., the legislature 
ratified the promulgation of the emergency rule by 
promulgating the permanent rule.  The latter was 
assigned 
to 
the 
Senate 
Committee 
on 
Economic 
Development, Housing and Government Operations on May 
17, 2000, and to the Assembly Ways and Means Committee 
on May 22, 2000.  Neither objected to the permanent 
rule. . . . The 
simultaneous 
progression 
of 
this 
lawsuit with the legislative actions adopting the 
permenent [sic] rule is a sufficient demonstration of 
legislative intent.  This court therefore concludes 
that any ambiguities in the statutory scheme have been 
resolved in favor of the Department's interpretation. 
(Footnote omitted). 
¶12 The Mallos appealed the circuit court's order, and the 
Court of Appeals, District IV, certified the appeal to this 
court. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 We review the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same methodology as the circuit 
court, 
although 
benefiting 
from 
its 
analysis. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 
Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  We do not find it 
necessary to repeat fully the oft-stated summary judgment 
methodology.  Rather, we simply note that summary judgment is 
appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Willow 
Creek Ranch v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶13, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 
611 N.W.2d 693. 
No. 
00-3252   
 
14 
 
¶14 The issue we address is whether Wis. Stat. § 70.32 
granted the DOR authority to promulgate the emergency rule, and 
then the permanent rule, Wis. Admin. Code § TAX 18.08.  If the 
DOR did not have authority to promulgate the rule, then it must 
be invalidated.  "Resolving an alleged conflict between a 
statute 
and 
an 
interpretive 
rule 
requires 
statutory 
interpretation," which is a question of law that we review de 
novo, but benefiting from the circuit court's analysis.  Seider 
v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶26, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.   
¶15 An administrative agency has only those powers given 
to it by statutory authority.  "No agency may promulgate a rule 
which conflicts with state law."  Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2); see 
also Plain v. Harder, 268 Wis. 507, 511, 68 N.W.2d 47 (1955) ("A 
rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity.").  
Accordingly, an administrative agency "may not issue a rule that 
is not expressly or impliedly authorized by the legislature."  
Oneida County v. Converse, 180 Wis. 2d 120, 125, 508 N.W.2d 416 
(1993).   
¶16 "If a statute is ambiguous, and if an administrative 
agency has been charged with enforcement of the statute, this 
court may look to the agency interpretation."  Knight v. LIRC, 
220 Wis. 2d 137, 155, 582 N.W.2d 448 (1998).  In doing so, we 
apply one of three levels of deference:  great weight, due 
weight, or de novo.  Id.  We note, however, that our first duty 
is to the legislature, not to the administrative agency.  
Seider, 2000 WI 76, ¶26.  Even if we accord the agency's 
interpretation great weight deference, therefore, we would not 
No. 
00-3252   
 
15 
 
uphold a rule that is contrary to the language of the statute.  
Id.   
¶17 Here, the parties dispute what level of deference we 
should 
accord 
the 
DOR's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(2r).  The DOR and the intervening defendants contend 
that 
we 
should 
accord 
the 
DOR's 
and 
the 
Council's 
interpretations due weight deference because both have been 
charged by the legislature with interpreting the statute.  In 
contrast, the Mallos argue that our review is de novo.  We 
conclude that § 70.32(2r) is unambiguous, and that the DOR's 
interpretation, and that of the Council, is correct under any 
level of deference.14  We, therefore, find it unnecessary to 
address our standard of review any further.  See Knight, 220 
Wis. 2d at 155 (concluding that Wisconsin Fair Employment Act is 
unambiguous, therefore no need to further address the level of 
deference to be accorded to LIRC's interpretation of the 
statute); United Airlines, Inc. v. DOR, 226 Wis. 2d 409, 416, 
595 
N.W.2d 49 
(Ct. 
App. 
1999) 
(concluding 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 76.04(4g)(b) is unambiguous, therefore no need to 
                                                 
14 We acknowledge that the circuit court apparently decided 
that the DOR's and the Council's interpretation would be 
entitled to due weight deference.  Judge Pekowsky, in his April 
14, 2000, order denying the Mallos' motion for a temporary 
injunction, based the decision partially on "the likelihood that 
the Department's interpretation of the statute and the Farmland 
Advisory Council's recommendation will be entitled to due weight 
deference."  Furthermore, in the circuit court's October 30, 
2000, opinion, Judge LaRocque concluded that "any ambiguities in 
the statutory scheme have been resolved in favor of the 
Department's interpretation." 
No. 
00-3252   
 
16 
 
further address the level of deference to be accorded to DOR's 
interpretation of the statute). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶18 We begin our review by examining the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) to determine whether the statute itself 
clearly expresses the legislative intent regarding the subject 
of the rule.  See Grafft v. DNR, 2000 WI App 187, ¶6, 238 
Wis. 2d 750, 618 N.W.2d 897.  "To determine whether an agency 
has exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating a rule, 
this court first examines the enabling statute."  Seider, 2000 
WI 76, ¶70.  The goal of statutory interpretation is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature.  Grafft, 2000 WI App 
187, ¶5.  We first look to the plain language of the statute and 
if it is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply the language to 
the facts at hand.  Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, 
¶14, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.  If the statute is 
ambiguous, however, we look to extrinsic factors, including 
legislative history, and the statute's scope, context and 
subject matter, to determine the intent of the legislature.  Id. 
at ¶15.  A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood by a reasonable person in either of two senses.  
Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 365, 597 N.W.2d 687 
(1999).  A statute is not rendered ambiguous, however, merely 
because two parties disagree as to its meaning.  Forest County 
v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 663, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998).   
¶19 By 
interpreting 
the 
enabling 
statute 
here, 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), we determine whether the legislature 
No. 
00-3252   
 
17 
 
expressly or implicitly authorized the DOR to promulgate Wis. 
Admin. Code § Tax 18.08.  See Seider, 2000 WI 76, ¶70.  We first 
identify the elements of the enabling statute, and then match 
the promulgated rule against those elements.  Grafft, 2000 WI 
App 187, ¶7 (citing Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Natural Resources 
Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 688, 706, 457 N.W.2d 879 (Ct. App. 1990).  "If 
the rule matches the statutory elements, then the statute 
expressly authorizes the rule."  Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n, 156 
Wis. 2d at 706.  We note, however, that it is not necessary for 
an enabling statute to "spell out every detail of a rule in 
order to expressly authorize it."  Grafft, 2000 WI App 187, ¶7.  
"Accordingly, whether the exact words used in an administrative 
rule appear in the statute is not the question."  Wisconsin 
Hosp. Ass'n, 156 Wis. 2d at 706. 
¶20 At 
issue 
here 
is 
the 
language 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), and whether it grants the DOR authority 
to promulgate the emergency rule and the permanent rule 
providing for assessment of agricultural land based on its use-
value, beginning January 1, 2000.  Section 70.32(2r) states in 
relevant part: 
(a) For the assessments as of January 1, 1996, and 
January 1, 1997, or until the farmland advisory 
council 
under 
s. 
73.03(49) 
makes 
its 
recommendation, but not to extend beyond January 
1, 2009, the assessed value of each parcel of 
agricultural land is the assessed value of that 
parcel as of January 1, 1995. 
(b) For each year beginning with 1998, or upon 
completion of the farmland advisory council's 
recommendation and promulgation of rules and 
No. 
00-3252   
 
18 
 
ending no later than December 31, 2008, the 
assessed value of the parcel shall be reduced as 
follows: 
 . . .  
(c) For the assessment as of the January 1 after the 
valuation method under par. (b) no longer applies 
and for each assessment thereafter, agricultural 
land shall be assessed according to the income 
that could be generated from its rental for 
agricultural use. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶21 The Mallos argue that Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.08 is 
invalid because it is contrary to the unambiguous language of 
the statute, and the DOR exceeded its authority in promulgating 
the rule.  First, the Mallos claim that § Tax 18.08 is invalid 
because the rule eliminates eight years of the ten-year 
mandatory phase-in under Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(b).  According 
to the Mallos, § 70.32(2r) is not ambiguous; it clearly provides 
for three defined steps for the transition from market-value 
assessment to use-value assessment.  The first step, referred to 
as the freeze under § 70.32(2r)(a), began on January 1, 1996, 
and lasted until December 31, 1997.  The second step, referred 
to as the phase-in under § 70.32(2r)(b), began in 1998, as 
required by the statute.  The Mallos contend that under the 
language of the statute, the phase-in lasts for ten years and 
ends on December 31, 2008.  The Mallos explain that the language 
"no later than December 31, 2008," was put in only to ensure 
that use-value would be the rule for assessments in 2009.  
Finally, the Mallos claim that the third step, referred to as 
full use-value assessment, begins January 1, 2009 and applies 
No. 
00-3252   
 
19 
 
for every year thereafter.  The Mallos argue that the statute 
clearly defines these three steps, and that under the facts and 
circumstances, there is no way to read § 70.32(2r) other than as 
mandating the phase-in for ten years. 
¶22 In 
making 
their 
argument, 
the 
Mallos 
focus 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(b), stating that during the phase-in the 
assessed value "shall be reduced as follows."  Using examples, 
the Mallos attempt to demonstrate that by eliminating the phase-
in after only two years, Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.08 directly 
contradicts 
the 
statute 
because 
the 
assessed 
values 
of 
agricultural land are no longer being "reduced as follows," 
according to § 70.32(2r)(b)1., 2., 3., and 4.  To state this 
another way, the Mallos claim that the DOR's rule is contrary to 
the unambiguous language of the statute because it reduces the 
assessed values differently than the "as follows" steps. 
¶23 The Mallos also argue that the DOR exceeded its 
authority because nothing in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) grants the 
DOR authority to truncate the phase-in.  According to the 
Mallos, the DOR is without authority to promulgate Wis. Admin. 
Rule § Tax 18.08 because nowhere in § 70.32 does the legislature 
state that once the phase-in begins, the DOR can end it sooner 
than provided in the statute.  The Mallos concede that 
§ 70.32(2r) is an enabling statute, but argue that it does not 
give the DOR any authority to truncate the phase-in from ten 
years to two years.  With regard to the Council, the Mallos 
argue that § 73.03(49) is not an enabling statute and does not 
No. 
00-3252   
 
20 
 
give the Council authority to recommend that the DOR shorten the 
phase-in. 
¶24 In contrast to the Mallos' arguments, the DOR and the 
intervening defendants argue that Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.08 
is valid.  Specifically, the DOR and the intervening defendants 
claim that the rule is consistent with the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), and is within the authority granted the 
DOR under the statute.  According to the DOR and the intervening 
defendants, there is no conflict between the rule and the 
statute because a mandatory ten-year phase-in is contrary to the 
purpose of transitioning to use-value assessments——preserving 
farmland and preventing urban sprawl.  Furthermore, the language 
in § 70.32(2r)(b) indicates that the statutory formula in (b)1. 
through 4. does not apply where the Council has completed its 
recommendation and the DOR promulgated rules in accordance with 
that recommendation. 
¶25 With regard to the DOR's authority to promulgate Wis. 
Admin. Code § Tax 18.08, the DOR and the intervening defendants 
claim that the unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) 
gives the DOR authority to promulgate the rule and to put the 
use-value assessment system into full effect.  For example, the 
following phrases in § 70.32(2r) state the phases, and then 
state the latest possible dates the phase can end: 
" . . . or 
until 
the 
farmland 
advisory 
council . . . makes its recommendation, but not to 
extend beyond January 1, 2009 . . . " 
No. 
00-3252   
 
21 
 
" . . . or upon completion of the farmland advisory 
council's recommendation and promulgation of rules and 
ending no later than December 31, 2008 . . . " 
" . . . as of the January 1 after the valuation method 
under par. (b) no longer applies . . . ." 
The DOR and the intervening defendants claim that based on the 
unambiguous language of the statute, the DOR has authority to 
promulgate 
§ Tax 
18.08 
upon 
completion 
of 
the 
Council's 
recommendation.  Specifically, the phrase, "no later than 
December 31, 2008," indicates that the legislature did not 
intend to delay full implementation of the use-value system if 
the Council's recommendation was made and if the DOR promulgated 
a rule.  Instead, the statutory language invites a pre-2009 
implementation of full use-value because the statute never 
indicates that full use-value assessment is not to occur sooner 
than 2009, or not to precede 2009.  According to the DOR and the 
intervening defendants, if the legislature intended for there to 
be a mandatory ten-year phase-in, a date certain on which full 
use-value 
assessment 
would 
occur, 
or 
a 
prohibition 
on 
implementation of full use-value assessment prior to 2009, the 
legislature would have indicated so in the statute.   
¶26 After 
examining 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
statute 
is 
unambiguous and grants the DOR authority to promulgate the 
emergency rule and the permanent rule, Wis Admin. Code § Tax 
18.08.  Specifically, we look to language in § 70.32(2r)(b), 
which provides that mixed-use assessment begins in 1998 "or upon 
completion of the farmland advisory council's recommendation and 
No. 
00-3252   
 
22 
 
promulgation of rules and ending no later than December 31, 
2008." 
 
This 
language 
expressly 
provides 
that 
mixed-use 
assessment is to end "no later than December 31, 2008."  It does 
not say, however, that it cannot end earlier.  When drafting 
statutes, the legislature usually chooses words very carefully.  
See Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 
N.W.2d 389 (1984) (expressing the reasonable presumption that 
the legislature chooses terms "carefully and precisely to 
express its meaning").  If the legislature intended or desired a 
mandatory ten-year phase-in, it could have easily chosen words 
to establish a fixed date in the statute.  It did not.  The only 
specific date mandated is the latest possible ending date of 
December 31, 2008.  Since it chose to specify the latest 
possible ending date, we conclude that likewise, if intended, 
the legislature would have specified the earliest possible 
ending date or a mandatory ending date for mixed-use assessment.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature intended to grant 
the DOR authority to implement full use-value assessment, upon 
advice from the Council, including the authority to implement 
full use-value assessment before January 1, 2009. 
¶27 We find further support for our conclusion in the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(c).  In determining when full 
use-value assessment would occur, the legislature again did not 
choose a specific date.  Rather, § 70.32(2r)(c) indicates that 
full use-value assessment will occur "as of the January 1 after 
the valuation method under par. (b) no longer applies . . . ."  
We find it significant that the legislature again chose not to 
No. 
00-3252   
 
23 
 
write in a date certain for when use-value assessment would be 
in full effect.  It could have easily done so by stating, for 
example, "beginning January 1, 2009, agricultural land shall be 
assessed according to the income that could be generated from 
its rental for agricultural use."  Instead, however, the 
legislature drafted the statute with flexibility, providing the 
DOR with authority to establish the full implementation of use-
value assessment for agricultural land.  We, therefore, conclude 
that the DOR had authority under § 70.32(2r) to promulgate Wis. 
Admin. Code § Tax 18.08, and that § Tax 18.08 is consistent with 
§ 70.32(2r). 
¶28 Although we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) is 
unambiguous and therefore, we do not need to look to extrinsic 
sources and legislative history, we find further support for our 
conclusion in the unique legislative history presented here.  
The Mallos, the DOR, and the intervening defendants all point to 
several different extrinsic sources in furtherance of their 
respective interpretations of § 70.32.15  We reject the Mallos' 
                                                 
15 The Mallos specifically turn to concurrent summaries of 
the legislation prepared by the Legislative Fiscal Bureau and 
the Assembly Republican Caucus, a prior interpretation of 
§ 70.32(2r) by the DOR, and the legislature's refusal to approve 
bills calling for immediate use-value assessment.  The Mallos 
also claim that their interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) 
is consistent with an Attorney General's opinion dated January 
14, 2000, and this court's decision in Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 
Wis. 2d 241, 564 N.W.2d 748 (1997).  The Mallos claim that all 
of these sources demonstrate that the legislature intended a 
mandatory ten-year phase-in from market-value to use-value 
assessments. 
No. 
00-3252   
 
24 
 
argument that our prior language discussing § 70.32(2r) in 
Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 564 N.W.2d 748 (1997) is 
controlling.  We find it significant, however, that the 
legislature took no action to change or modify the proposed Wis. 
Admin. Code § Tax 18.08, even though legislators knew of, and 
some of them actually funded, a challenge to the emergency rule.   
¶29 First, we reject the Mallos' argument that our 
discussion of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) in Norquist is controlling 
here.  The Mallos rely on Norquist where we describe the 
statutory scheme "transforming agricultural land assessments for 
                                                                                                                                                             
In response, the DOR and the intervening defendants also 
point to extrinsic sources.  First, they argue that we should 
give no substantive weight to the Attorney General's opinion or 
this 
court's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute 
in 
Norquist.  
Specifically, they claim that the Attorney General's opinion is 
inconsistent with the Attorney General's later position in 
defending the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) in 
Norquist.  Further, they argue that this court's discussion of 
the statute in Norquist was simply background and should not be 
followed because this court never examined nor considered the 
authority of the DOR with regard to the necessity or duration of 
the phase-in.  In contrast, however, the DOR and the intervening 
defendants argue that the unique circumstances surrounding the 
promulgation of the use-value rule makes the legislature's 
acquiescence an indictor of legislative intent.  The unusual 
circumstances here include the fact that there was extensive 
media coverage of the proposed rule and that Senator Charles J. 
Chvala, the Senate majority leader, and other senators approved 
funding from the Senate Organizing Committee for "consulting and 
legal services related to emergency rule-making authority of the 
Department of Revenue to accelerate the implementation of the 
use value property tax."  These facts, according to the DOR and 
the intervening defendants, demonstrate that the legislature was 
aware of the rule itself, understood the rule's impact, and knew 
of the pending challenge to the emergency rule, yet did not 
object to the rule and declined the opportunity to correct any 
perceived wrongs.   
No. 
00-3252   
 
25 
 
property taxes from a market value system to a use value 
system."  Norquist, 211 Wis. 2d at 246 (footnotes omitted).  
After discussing the first phase, otherwise referred to as the 
"freeze," this court described the second phase as follows:  
"Subsection (b) provides for a mixed assessment system that will 
last from the end of the initial freeze until 2009."  Id.  
Relying on this language, the Mallos argue that we previously 
interpreted § 70.32(2r) as mandating a ten-year phase-in or 
mixed assessment phase, therefore, the court should interpret 
the statute similarly here.  We reject this argument because the 
language used in Norquist does not control our decision 
regarding Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 18.08.  In Norquist, the focus 
was on a challenge to the constitutionality of § 70.32(2r) as a 
claimed violation of the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Id. at 247.  We refused to declare the statute 
either constitutional or unconstitutional because we concluded 
that the claim or cause of action itself was premature.  Id. at 
252.  The statement regarding the phase-in was simply meant as a 
summary of the statutory provisions, and was in no way related 
to the DOR's authority to promulgate § Tax 18.08.  Moreover, 
Norquist was decided on June 25, 1997, long before the Council 
made its recommendation on October 18, 1999; and the DOR 
promulgated the emergency rule on December 14, 1999; and § Tax 
18.08 was effective on August 1, 2000.  We, therefore, reject 
the Mallos' argument based on the language in Norquist, since it 
relies on language that is taken out of context.  That language 
No. 
00-3252   
 
26 
 
was not meant to foreclose the actions later taken by the 
Council and the DOR. 
¶30 In contrast to the Mallos' argument based on Norquist, 
we find that the unique legislative history is further support 
for 
our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
DOR 
had 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) to promulgate Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 
18.08 and that § Tax 18.08 is consistent with § 70.32(2r).  
Specifically, 
we 
find 
it 
significant 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature, acting through the assigned Senate and Assembly 
committees, did not object, either in whole or in part, to the 
proposed § Tax 18.08, even though legislators knew of, and some 
actually funded, a challenge to the emergency rule.  The DOR and 
the intervening defendants note that there was significant media 
coverage of the proposed permanent rule, which suggests that the 
legislators could not ignore the existence of the pending rule.  
Also persuasive, moreover, is that at the same time the rule was 
making its way through the Senate Committee on Economic 
Development, Housing and Government Operations and the Assembly 
Ways and Means Committee, this lawsuit challenging the emergency 
rule was already pending in Dane County Circuit Court.   
¶31 Furthermore, Senator Charles J. Chvala and other 
senators approved funding from the Senate Organizing Committee 
for "consulting and legal services related to emergency rule-
making authority of the Department of Revenue to accelerate the 
implementation of the use value property tax."  This means that 
even though Senator Chvala and others were funding a challenge 
to the emergency rule, the permanent rule——based on the same 
No. 
00-3252   
 
27 
 
statutory authority and with the same purpose, effect and impact 
of the emergency rule——was not objected to, either in part or in 
whole, 
by 
either 
legislative 
committee. 
 
We 
find 
these 
circumstances 
to 
be 
unique 
and 
persuasive16 
because 
the 
legislature knew of, and some members actually participated in, 
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
proposed 
rule's 
impact, 
yet 
neither 
legislative committee objected to § Tax 18.08.  See Estate of 
Cameron, 249 Wis. 531, 542, 25 N.W.2d 504 (1946) (under proper 
circumstances, a subsequent repudiation of a decision or 
inaction by the legislature may be evidence of legislative 
intent).  We, therefore, conclude that this legislative history 
is 
further 
evidence 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
that 
§ 70.32(2r) grant the DOR authority to promulgate § Tax 18.08, 
and that § Tax 18.08 is consistent with § 70.32(2r). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶32 In summary, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) 
unambiguously grants the DOR authority to promulgate Wis. Admin. 
Code § Tax 18.08, implementing full use-value assessment of 
agricultural land as of January 1, 2000.  Although we base our 
holding on the plain language of the statute itself, we find 
                                                 
16 The Mallos argue that the legislature's failure to object 
to the proposed rule is not indicative of legislative intent.  
By relying on the legislature's inaction as proof that the 
legislature approves of the rule, the Mallos contend that all 
administrative rules will now be insulated from review because 
all 
rules 
must 
follow 
the 
process 
established 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.19.  As we noted previously, we rely on the 
legislature's inaction in this instance, as further support for 
our conclusion, because the facts and circumstances are unique. 
No. 
00-3252   
 
28 
 
further support for our conclusion in the unique legislative 
history.  The legislature knew of the pending challenge to the 
proposed 
rule's impact, 
yet 
neither 
legislative 
committee 
objected to the rule.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the DOR 
and dismissing this action. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
¶33 JON P. WILCOX, J., and DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not 
participate. 
 
 
No.  00-3252.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I conclude that the DNR rules eliminating the eight years of the 
phase-in 
are 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
express 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r).  The January 14, 2000, Opinion of the 
Attorney General and the Mallos' brief got it right.   
¶35 I agree with the Opinion of the Attorney General, 
which reasons as follows: 
In sum, the common sense reading of Wis. Stat. 
70.32(2r) is that farmland is to be assessed at its 
1995 assessed value in 1996 and 1997, or until the 
Council has recommended, 
and the 
Department has 
adopted, rules for implementing use value assessments, 
whichever is later.  If necessary——that is, if the 
Council fails to make appropriate recommendations——the 
1995 assessments are to provide the assessed value of 
agricultural land until as late as 2008.  If the 
necessary recommendations are made before 2009, then 
beginning with the later of 1998 or the promulgation 
of use valuation rules, the assessed value of farmland 
will equal a weighted average of the land's 1995 
assessed value and its use value.  The use value 
weight will start at 10% and increase by 10% each 
year.  If the phase-in begins in 1998, then 100% use 
valuation will be achieved in 2007 and full use 
valuation 
will 
provide 
the 
basis 
of 
assessment 
thereafter. 
 
If 
the 
necessary 
rules 
and 
recommendations are delayed, so that the partial use 
value assessment of farmland does not begin until 
1999, then 100% use valuation will be achieved in 
2008, and full use valuation will provide the basis of 
assessment thereafter.  If the use valuation does not 
begin until 2000 or later, then the weighted average 
formula established in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(b) will 
provide the assessments for agricultural land until 
2009, at which time farmland will be assessed at 100% 
use value. 
Despite the difficulties presented by the statutory 
language, 
I 
am 
unable 
to 
find 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) 
or 
Wis. Stat. § 73.03(49) 
which 
would 
support 
the 
No.  00-3252.ssa 
 
2 
 
Department's ending the statutory phase-in period and 
implementing immediate use valuation. 
 . . . . 
There appear to be two bases to the Department's claim 
that it has the authority to immediately terminate the 
[phase-in] period.  The first is the absence of an 
express definition of the event or events that would 
result in "the valuation method under par. (b) no 
longer 
appl[ying]," 
as 
provided 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(c).  The other is the provision 
in Wis. Stat. § 73.03(49)(a) that the Council is to 
"[a]dvise the department of revenue . . . on rules to 
implement 
use-value 
assessment 
of 
agricultural 
land . . . ."  As I understand this argument, under 
Wis. Stat. § 73.03(49), one type of advice that the 
Council might give would be to forego [sic] any 
further transition to use valuation and to implement 
immediate, full use value assessments. 
The problem with this interpretation is that even if 
Wis. Stat. § 73.03(49)(a) were read as granting the 
Council the authority to recommend the immediate end 
of the use value phase-in, there is no other statutory 
provision for implementing such a recommendation.  
That 
is, 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) 
does 
not 
contain 
language that the method of assessment established in 
paragraph (b) is to be used "for each year beginning 
with 1998 and ending with the farmland advisory 
committee's recommendation and promulgation of rules, 
but no later than December 31, 2008."  I find it 
facially implausible that the Legislature would intend 
to grant to an advisory council an authority as 
important as the early termination of the use value 
phase-in, affecting the property taxes paid by all of 
the 
state's 
farmland 
and 
most 
of 
its 
non-farm 
property, but without any express language evincing 
such purpose.  In point of fact, the express language 
of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) points to the exact opposite 
interpretation.  Paragraph (b) provides that the 
issuance of the Council's recommendation causes the 
use value phase-in to start, not end.  
The 
opening 
language 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(b) 
reads "[f]or each year beginning with 1998 or upon 
completion 
of 
the 
farmland 
advisory 
council's 
recommendation and promulgation of rules and ending no 
later than December 31, 2008, the assessed value of 
No.  00-3252.ssa 
 
3 
 
the parcel shall be reduced . . . ."  When something 
is to begin either upon Event A (1998) or upon Event B 
(completion 
of 
the 
Council's 
recommendation 
and 
promulgation of rules) and is to end by Event C (no 
later than December 31, 2008), Event B is a possible 
beginning date, not ending date. There is no other way 
to read this language. 
Consideration of Extrinsic Interpretative Materials 
Even if Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) were ambiguous, I am 
not aware of any aspect of the statute's subject 
matter, object, context or history that would support 
the claimed authority to immediately end the use value 
phase-in.  The extrinsic aids to interpretation with 
which I am familiar indicate, to the contrary, that 
the statute was intended to create an initial period 
when 
agricultural 
assessments 
would 
be 
frozen, 
followed by a gradual phasing in of use valuation over 
a nine-year period, through a weighted average of 
frozen and use value assessments. 
In addition to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau analysis 
prepared at the time of the statute's enactment, it is 
significant that both the Senate and the Assembly 
defeated bills for immediate full use valuation of 
farmland. It is hard to reconcile a legislative 
purpose of authorizing the immediate implementation of 
full use valuation, with the rejection of bills 
authorizing immediate, full use valuation. 
It is also significant that the Department originally 
interpreted the statute consistent with this common 
sense reading.  
 . . . . 
In addition, the use value statute is commonly 
understood to have resulted from a compromise between 
urban and rural interests which, on the one hand, 
allowed farmland to be assessed based on its lower 
use, as opposed to market, value, but which, on the 
other hand, attempted to cushion the impact of this 
change to non-farm property owners and jurisdictions 
through a gradual phase-in.  A party wishing to 
challenge the Department's proposed use valuation 
rules 
would 
have 
little 
difficulty 
marshaling 
contemporaneous documents demonstrating this basic 
understanding.  
No.  00-3252.ssa 
 
4 
 
 . . . . 
Finally, 
simply 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
the 
statutory 
language, the interpretation provided by the Supreme 
Court 
in 
the 
first 
Norquist 
case 
is 
sensible, 
straight-forward and 
textual. 
 
In 
contrast, the 
Department's argument is striking for its lack of 
textual basis and for its assumption of a legislative 
purpose that would almost certainly find affirmative 
expression, had it really existed. 
¶36 I also agree with the Mallos' brief that explains how 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) works, as follows: 
Section 70.32(2r) shifts the method of assessing 
agricultural land from "market value" to "use value."  
The 
statute 
does 
not 
accomplish 
this 
shift 
immediately. Rather it provides for three steps, the 
freeze, the phase-in and the final rule, as laid out 
in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the statute. 
The first step is the freeze: 
 . . . . 
The freeze started January 1, 1996 and ended December 
31, 1997. 
Under the statutory scheme, once the freeze ends, the 
phase-in starts: 
(b) For each year beginning with 1998 or upon 
completion of the farmland advisory council's 
recommendation and  promulgation of rules and 
ending no later than December 31, 2008, the 
assessed value of the parcel shall be reduced as 
follows: 
 . . . . 
The 
statutorily mandated 
phase-in 
has 
a 
defined 
beginning and a defined end. The phase-in began in 
1998. 
The 
phase-in 
began 
after 
the 
Department 
promulgated the rules needed to begin the phase-in. 
 . . . . 
Under the statute, phase-in has an end.  It ends when 
the phase-in plays itself out, i.e., after ten years, 
No.  00-3252.ssa 
 
5 
 
but not later than December 31, 2008.  The "no later 
than December 31, 2008" provision exists to ensure 
that full use value assessment would be the rule in 
2009 and thereafter.  When the statute was enacted in 
1995, 
the 
legislature 
could 
not 
know 
when 
the 
Department would promulgate the rules needed to begin 
use value based assessment.  If, for example, §TAX 
18.07 was not promulgated until 2002, the phase-in 
would have started in year 2003.  In that case, but 
there would not have been a full ten years of phase-in 
because the statute mandates full use value assessment 
no later than 2009.  There would have been six, rather 
than ten, years of phase-in.  The legislature wanted 
to ensure that full use value assessment was the rule 
starting in 2009, no matter when the recommendation 
was made and the rules promulgated, so it added the 
"no later than" language to sub. (b)." 
The end date of the freeze and the start date of the 
phase-in are known facts.  TAX 18.07 was promulgated 
in time for the 1998 assessment.  Phase-in started in 
1998. As the Department recognized in 1997 when it 
promulgated §TAX 18.08(3) (1997), once started the 
phase-in would last 10 years, and full use value 
assessment would become operative January 1, 2008. 
Once the phase-in plays itself out, farmland is to be 
assessed 
on 
full 
use 
value 
basis: 
 . . . § 70.32(2r)(c). 
¶37 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the DNR 
rules are clearly inconsistent with the statute and therefore I 
dissent. 
¶38 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
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