Title: Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 2018

Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary From 2012 to 2015, Morris County, New Jersey awarded $4.6 million in taxpayer funds to repair twelve churches, as part of a historic preservation program. This appeal raised two questions for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration: whether the grant program violated the Religious Aid Clause of the New Jersey Constitution and, if so, whether the Religious Aid Clause conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the Religious Aid Clause has been a part of New Jersey’s history since the 1776 Constitution. The clause guaranteed that “[n]o person shall . . . be obliged to pay . . . taxes . . . for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry.” The clause reflected a historic and substantial state interest. The Court found the plain language of the Religious Aid Clause bars the use of taxpayer funds to repair and restore churches, and that Morris County’s program "ran afoul of that longstanding provision." Morris County and the grant recipients claimed that to withhold grants from eligible churches would violate their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The County and the churches relied heavily on Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), as grounds for their argument. The New Jersey Court determined that all of the defendant churches had active congregations, and all conducted regular worship services in one or more structures repaired with grant funds. Several churches specifically explained that they sought funds in order to be able to continue to host religious services. "We do not believe Trinity Lutheran would require that grants be considered and extended to religious institutions under those circumstances." Therefore the New Jersey Court reversed the trial court’s decision to uphold the grants. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders (A-71-16) (079277)Argued October 23, 2017 -- Decided April 18, 2018RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. From 2012 to 2015, Morris County awarded $4.6 million in taxpayer funds to repair twelve churches, as part of a historic preservation program. This appeal raises two questions: whether the grant program violated the Religious Aid Clause of the New Jersey Constitution and, if so, whether the Religious Aid Clause conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. In 2002, the voters of Morris County authorized the County Freeholder Board to permit historic preservation funding under a trust funded by a county property tax. Only four kinds of entities could apply for grants: municipal governments within Morris County; Morris County government; charitable conservancies whose purpose includes historic preservation; and religious institutions. A review board evaluated applications and made recommendations to the Freeholder Board, which approved final awards. Certain conditions applied to grant recipients. Successful applicants that received construction grants of more than $50,000 cumulatively had to execute a thirty-year easement agreement with the County. Grantees were also required to provide public access to properties that received grant funds. The County and the grant recipient were to “negotiate the days and hours that the property [would] be open to the public.” Applicants who received funding also had to list their property on the National and New Jersey Registers of Historic Places. From 2012 to 2015, the Freeholder Board approved a total of $11,112,370 in grants from the trust fund. The Board awarded 41.7 percent to twelve churches. The grants funded the preparation of construction documents and plans, and the restoration of church buildings, towers, parish houses, windows, and other items. All twelve churches “have active congregations” and all “have conducted regular worship services in one or more of the structures” for which grant funds have been or will be used. All twelve are Christian churches. Several successful applicants specifically stated that funds were needed to allow the church to offer religious services. On December 1, 2015, the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF) and David Steketee, a member of the group and a Morris County resident and taxpayer, (plaintiffs), filed a complaint in Superior Court that named the Freeholder Board, the review board, and the Morris County Treasurer, in his official capacity, (collectively, Morris County), as defendants. Defendants removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court later granted plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court. The court observed that plaintiffs “opted to allege a violation of their state rights, placing this case squarely within the state court.” After the remand, plaintiffs amended the complaint to include the twelve churches as defendants (Churches). All parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motion and denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion. The Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for direct certification. 230 N.J. 478 (2017).HELD: The plain language of the Religious Aid Clause bars the use of taxpayer funds to repair and restore churches, and Morris County’s program ran afoul of that longstanding provision. Based on its understanding of the current state of the law, including the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), the Court concludes that that the application of the Religious Aid Clause in this case does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.1. The Religious Aid Clause states that no person shall “be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3. That text has deep roots in New Jersey’s history. (pp. 12-24) 1 2. The Religious Aid Clause does not preclude the provision of services tied to general public safety. Instead, for more than 240 years, the Religious Aid Clause has banned the use of public funds to build or repair any place of worship. The clause does not ask about the governing body’s intent. In short, there is no exception for historic preservation. Nothing in the prior case law requires a departure from the plain language of the Religious Aid Clause. Nor do the other provisions about religion in the State Constitution. See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 4, 5. The Churches point to a debate at the Constitutional Convention of 1947 in response to the decisions by the Court of Errors and Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 133 N.J.L. 350 (E. & A. 1945), aff’d, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The debate did not relate to the Religious Aid Clause’s prohibition against the use of taxpayer funds to repair churches. Defendants and amici also suggest that Article VIII of the State Constitution affects the plain meaning of the Religious Aid Clause. Article VIII addresses funding for historic preservation and does not conflict with the clause. The County’s grants ran afoul of the State Constitution’s Religious Aid Clause. (pp. 29-34)3. The question before the Supreme Court in Trinity Lutheran was whether the policy of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources “of categorically disqualifying churches and other religious organizations from receiving grants under its playground resurfacing program . . . violated the rights of Trinity Lutheran [Church] under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.” 137 S. Ct. at 2017. The Court held that the Department’s policy violated the Free Exercise Clause by “expressly denying a qualified religious entity a public benefit solely because of its religious character.” Id. at 2024. The Court distinguished between Missouri’s policy and the scholarship restrictions in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). Id. at 2022-23. Of particular note in this case, in Locke, “Washington’s choice was in keeping with the State’s antiestablishment interest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training of clergy; in fact, the Court could 'think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment interests come more into play.’” Id. at 2023 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 722). The Court returned to the central problem raised by Missouri’s program: that Trinity Lutheran’s status as a church—not its intended use of the funds— prevented it from participating in the grant program. Id. at 2024. The Court, however, did not opine on whether that key principle—that “a qualified religious entity” cannot be denied “a public benefit solely because of its religious character,” ibid.—extends to religious uses of funding, id. at 2024 n.3. The Court concluded that “Missouri’s policy preference for skating as far as possible from religious establishment concerns” could not “qualify as compelling.” Id. at 2024. The state’s interest was “limited by the Free Exercise Clause.” Ibid. (pp. 35-42)4. The public funds awarded in this case actually went toward “religious uses.” The Churches are not being denied grant funds because they are religious institutions; they are being denied public funds because of what they plan to do—and in many cases have done: use public funds to repair church buildings so that religious worship services can be held there. Those grants constitute an impermissible religious use of public funds. New Jersey’s Religious Aid Clause and the grants awarded in this matter stand in stark contrast to the setting in Trinity Lutheran. As in Locke, New Jersey’s antiestablishment interest in not using public funds to build or repair churches or maintain any ministry “lay at the historic core of the Religion Clauses.” See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023. Also as in Locke, the antiestablishment interest New Jersey expressed in 1776 did not reflect animus toward any religion. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725. The holding of Trinity Lutheran does not encompass the direct use of taxpayer funds to repair churches and thereby sustain religious worship activities. See 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3. The application of the Religious Aid Clause in this case does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. (pp. 42-50)5. Had the Free Exercise Clause permitted the awards, it would be necessary to evaluate them under the Establishment Clause. The grant program poses questions under any articulation of the current standard. (pp. 50-51)6. The Court does not unwind the awards. The principles outlined above will apply prospectively. (p. 52) The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED. Summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs is GRANTED. JUSTICE SOLOMON, CONCURRING, writes separately to express that the Religious Aid Clause cannot categorically bar churches with active congregations from receiving funds that promote a substantial government purpose, such as historic preservation. Such a blanket exclusion violates the Free Exercise Clause and Trinity Lutheran. Had Morris County’s program been applied in a fundamentally neutral manner, the Religious Aid Clause could not bar funding to an otherwise qualified religious institution, in Justice Solomon’s view. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate, concurring opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 71 September Term 2016 079277FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION and DAVID STEKETEE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.MORRIS COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, THE MORRIS COUNTY PRESERVATION TRUST FUND REVIEW BOARD, JOSEPH A. KOVALCIK, JR., in his official capacity as Morris County Treasurer, THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN MORRISTOWN, FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF NEW VERNON, ST. PETER’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, FIRST REFORMED CHURCH OF POMPTON PLAINS, CHURCH OF THE REDEEMER, COMMUNITY OF ST. JOHN BAPTIST, STANHOPE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, CHURCH OF THE ASSUMPTION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY, FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF BOONTON, ST. PETER’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN MOUNTAIN LAKES, LEDGEWOOD BAPTIST CHURCH, and COMMUNITY CHURCH OF MOUNTAIN LAKES, Defendants-Respondents. Argued October 23, 2017 – Decided April 18, 2018 On appeal from the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Somerset County. Paul S. Grosswald argued the cause for appellants Freedom from Religion Foundation 1 and David Steketee (Paul S. Grosswald, on the brief, and Andrew L. Siedel and Ryan D. Jayne, of the Wisconsin bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs).John M. Bowens argued the cause for respondents Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Morris County Preservation Trust Fund Review Board, and Joseph A. Kovalcik, Jr., in his official capacity as Morris County Treasurer (Schenck, Price, Smith & King, attorneys; John M. Bowens, on the briefs).Kenneth J. Wilbur argued the cause for respondents The Presbyterian Church in Morristown, et al. (Drinker Biddle & Reath, attorneys; Kenneth J. Wilbur and Justin M. Ginter, on the briefs).Alex J. Luchenitser (Americans United for Separation of Church and State) a member of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey; Barry, Corrado & Grassi; Americans United for Separation of Church and State; and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, attorneys; Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero, Rebecca Livengood, Frank Corrado, Alex J. Luchenitser, Richard B. Katskee, a member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bars, admitted pro hac vice, and Daniel Mach, a member of the District of Columbia and New York bars, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).Cameryn J. Hinton, Deputy Attorney General, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Historic Trust (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, Cameryn J. Hinton and Susan M. 2 Scott, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Thomas A. Gentile submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty (Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker and The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, attorneys; Thomas A. Gentile, on the brief, and Hannah Clayson Smith, Luke William Goodrich, and Diana Marie Verm, members of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. From 2012 to 2015, Morris County awarded $4.6 million intaxpayer funds to repair twelve churches, as part of a historicpreservation program. This appeal raises two questions:whether the grant program violated the Religious Aid Clause ofthe New Jersey Constitution and, if so, whether the ReligiousAid Clause conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause of the UnitedStates Constitution. The Religious Aid Clause has been a part of New Jersey’shistory since the 1776 Constitution. The clause guarantees that“[n]o person shall . . . be obliged to pay . . . taxes . . . forbuilding or repairing any church or churches, place or places ofworship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry.”N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3. The clause reflects a historic andsubstantial state interest. We find that the plain language ofthe Religious Aid Clause bars the use of taxpayer funds to 3 repair and restore churches, and that Morris County’s programran afoul of that longstanding provision. Morris County and the grant recipients claim that towithhold grants from eligible churches would violate theirrights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.The County and the churches rely heavily on Trinity LutheranChurch of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012(2017), for support. In the case before us, all of the churches have activecongregations, and all have conducted regular worship servicesin one or more structures repaired with grant funds. Severalchurches specifically explained that they sought funds in orderto be able to continue to host religious services. We do notbelieve Trinity Lutheran would require that grants be consideredand extended to religious institutions under thosecircumstances. We therefore reverse the trial court’s decision to upholdthe grants. I. A. In 1992, the voters of Morris County approved a referendumto create a trust for open space and farmland preservation. Thetrust was funded by a county property tax. Ten years later, thevoters authorized the County Freeholder Board to permit historic 4 preservation funding under the trust. Today, the trust is knownas the Morris County Open Space, Farmland, Floodplain Protectionand Historic Preservation Trust Fund. At the time of the grants in question, the trust consideredapplications to stabilize, repair, rehabilitate, renovate,restore, improve, protect, or preserve historic properties. Tobe eligible for consideration, a property had to be located inMorris County and either be listed on the National or New JerseyRegister of Historic Places or be eligible for listing by theState historic preservation office. Only four kinds of entities could apply for grants:municipal governments within Morris County; Morris Countygovernment; charitable conservancies whose purpose includeshistoric preservation; and religious institutions. A review board evaluated applications and maderecommendations to the Freeholder Board. Among other things,the review board considered the significance of the property,its physical condition and proposed use, the applicant’s abilityto match the funds requested, and the project’s relationship toheritage education and tourism. The Freeholder Board approved final awards. For religiousinstitutions, grants could fund assessment reports, preparationof construction documents, construction projects for a 5 building’s exterior as well as its mechanical, electrical, andplumbing systems, and other items. Certain conditions applied to grant recipients. Successfulapplicants that received construction grants of more than$50,000 cumulatively, over any number of funding cycles, had toexecute a thirty-year easement agreement with the County. The“easement is a deed restriction that is used to assure long-termpreservation of a historic property through proper maintenanceand by limiting changes in use or appearance and preventingdemolition of the property.” Grantees were also required to provide public access toproperties that received grant funds. The County and the grantrecipient were to “negotiate the days and hours that theproperty [would] be open to the public.” All work on a project had to be completed within two yearsonce a grant was awarded; a one-year extension could be sought.Applicants who received funding also had to list their propertyon the National and New Jersey Registers of Historic Places. B. From 2012 to 2015, the Freeholder Board approved a total of$11,112,370 in grants from the trust fund. The Board awarded$4,634,394, or 41.7 percent, to twelve churches. The grantsfunded the preparation of construction documents and plans, and 6 the restoration of church buildings, towers, parish houses,windows, and other items. According to the parties’ joint statement of stipulatedfacts, all twelve churches “have active congregations” and all“have conducted regular worship services in one or more of thestructures” for which grant funds have been or will be used.All twelve houses of worship are Christian churches. In addition to the stipulation, the record also includesthe grant applications that the churches submitted, whichdetailed how the requested funds would be used and why they wereneeded. Several successful applicants specifically stated thatfunds were needed to allow the church to offer religiousservices. The Presbyterian Church in Morristown, for example,sought funds to restore the exterior of its chapel. The Churchexplained that a grant would “historically preserve the buildingallowing its continued use by our congregation for worshipservices as well as by the community and many other outsideorganizations that use it on a regular basis.” The Churchreceived a preservation grant to repair the chapel’s roof andthe air shaft in the church building; to pay for finishes,moisture protection, and other costs; and to finance interiorcarpentry, masonry, and concrete work. The Church of the Redeemer received grants for therestoration of the exterior of its church building and parish 7 house. As to the building, the Church wrote in its applicationthat “[t]he impact of restoring the large slate roof and toweris entirely positive. It will restore a key structural elementthat has failed and assist in assuring that the building cancontinue in its existing use as a church and as an importantbuilding in Morristown.” Saint Peter’s Episcopal Church of Morristown sought andreceived funds to repair the interior of its church tower. TheChurch observed that the funding would “ensure continued safepublic access to the church for worship, periods of solitude andmeditation during the week, and several concerts throughout theyear, as well as the treasures the church and tower contain.” The First Baptist Church of Ledgewood received funds tocreate preservation plans, in particular, for “the tower,heating system, and the original stained glass window.” Theapplication noted that “[p]reservation of the Ledgewood BaptistChurch will enable the congregation to continue to providereligious and community activities to the county’s diversepopulation.” At least one application reveals that grant funds financedthe restoration of religious imagery. The First PresbyterianChurch of Boonton received funds to restore its “Rose Window” 8 and “Walk to Emmaus” window.1 Interior photos of both windowsare in the record. The Rose Window is above the entrance to thechapel; the “long, arched” Emmaus Window is located directly infront of the altar and depicts Jesus and two disciples. TheChurch explained in its application that “[p]reservation andrepair of stained glass windows increase the beauty and theambiance of the structure, as viewed from inside and outside.”It is not clear from the record whether the stained glasswindows at the First Baptist Church of Ledgewood, noted above,depict religious images. C. On December 1, 2015, the Freedom from Religion Foundation(FFRF) and David Steketee, a member of the group and a MorrisCounty resident and taxpayer, (plaintiffs), filed a complaint inSuperior Court. The complaint named the Freeholder Board, thereview board, and the Morris County Treasurer, in his officialcapacity, (collectively, Morris County), as defendants.Plaintiffs asserted that the grants were unconstitutional andviolated Steketee’s substantive constitutional rights under theNew Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c).1 In Luke 24:13-53 (King James), Jesus appears after the Resurrection to two of his disciples as they walk from Jerusalem to Emmaus. 9 Defendants removed the matter to the United States DistrictCourt for the District of New Jersey. The District Court latergranted plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court.The court observed that plaintiffs “opted to allege a violationof their state rights, placing this case squarely within thestate court,” and explained that “[a]lthough Defendants’arguments center around potential federal defenses they mayraise, that does not bring Plaintiffs’ original cause of actionwithin [federal] jurisdiction.” After the remand, plaintiffsamended the complaint to include the grant recipients -- thetwelve churches -- as defendants (Churches). All parties moved for summary judgment. On January 9,2017, the trial court granted defendants’ motion and deniedplaintiffs’ cross-motion. In a statement of reasons, the trial court noted that thecase implicated several provisions of the New JerseyConstitution and centered on the Religious Aid Clause. Thecourt concluded “that the only thing that is clear about [theReligious Aid Clause’s] intended meaning is that it is not meantto be read literally” and that the grants were examples of“benevolent neutrality” on the part of the government,consistent with “the spirit of our state and federalConstitutions.” For support, the court relied on Resnick v.East Brunswick Township Board of Education, 77 N.J. 88 (1978), 10 Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 133 N.J.L. 350 (E. & A.1945), aff’d, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and American Atheists, Inc. v.City of Detroit Downtown Development Authority, 567 F.3d 278(6th Cir. 2009), which are addressed below. “[T]o correctly interpret the meaning of [the Religious AidClause] in this particular instance, given these particularfacts,” the trial court found that the provision must be read“in conjunction with the State’s longstanding tradition ofneutrality in church-state relations . . . and the adoption ofpro-neutrality provisions of the State Constitution, such asArt. I, Para. 4 and 5.” The court added that the Religious AidClause “must also be harmonized with” provisions in theConstitution that allow for eminent domain and the funding ofhistoric preservation. The court also noted that “[e]xcluding historical churchesfrom receipt of reimbursements available to all historicalbuildings would be tantamount to impermissibly withholding . . .general benefits to certain citizens on the basis of theirreligion,” contrary to federal law. We granted plaintiffs’ motion for direct certification.230 N.J. 478 (2017). We also granted the following motions forleave to appear as amicus curiae: a joint application by theAmerican Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil LibertiesUnion of New Jersey, and Americans United for Separation of 11 Church and State (collectively, ACLU); and individualapplications from the New Jersey Historic Trust (NJHT) and theBecket Fund for Religious Liberty (Becket). II. This appeal involves a pure question of law. We thereforereview the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendantsde novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). To help frame the issues, we begin with an overview ofparts of the State and Federal Constitutions that are relevantto this appeal. A. The modern Constitution of 1947 includes the Religious AidClause. N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3. The clause states that noperson shall “be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other ratesfor building or repairing any church or churches, place orplaces of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister orministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or hasdeliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform.” Ibid. The text of the Constitution has deep roots in our State’shistory. The CONCESSIONS and Agreement of the Lords Propriatorsof the Province of New Cesarea or New Jersey to and with all andevery the Adventurers and all such as shall settle or plantthere (Concessions), dated February 10, 1664, is considered the 12 first document for the governance of what was then a province.See Samuel Smith, The History of the Colony of Nova-Caesaria, orNew Jersey 61, 512-21 (1877). It expressly guaranteed religiousliberty by recognizing that all persons may “fully have andenjoy . . . their Judgments and Conciences in matters ofReligion throughout” the province. Concessions ¶ 7,https://www.njstatelib.org/wp-content/uploads/slic_files/imported/Research_Guides/Historical_Documents/nj/CONCESS1.html.At the same time, the document found that State-sponsoredreligion was compatible with liberty of conscience, so long aspeople could also support the religion of their choice. To thatend, the General Assembly of the province was granted the powerto “appoint such and soe many Ministers or Preachers as theyshall think fitt, and to establish their maintenance.” Id. ¶ 8. In the years that followed, charters were enacted for thegovernance of East and West New Jersey, and each contained aprovision in support of religious freedom. See Charter orFundamental Laws of West New Jersey ch. XVI (1676),http://www.njstatelib.org/wp-content/uploads/slic_files/imported/Research_Guides/Historical_Documents/nj/NJ05A.html;Fundamental Constitutions for the Province of East New Jersey inAmerica art. XVI (1683), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj10.asp. Despite the new charters, however, theConcessions appear to have retained vitality, at least in East 13 Jersey. See Edward Q. Keasbey, The Early Constitutions of NewJersey, 1 N.J. L. Rev. 20, 32-33 (1915). Also, the lifespan ofthe two charters was limited by the eventual surrender of bothJerseys to the Crown in 1702. See id. at 33; Carl H. Esbeck,Dissent & Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in theEarly American Republic, 2 004 BYU L. Rev. 1385, 1469 (2004). In that year, Edward Hyde, Lord Cornbury, was appointedGovernor of both New Jersey and New York. Keasbey, 1 N.J. L.Rev. at 34. The Crown provided Cornbury with detailedinstructions on how to govern; they included directions onreligious liberty: “You are to permit a liberty of conscienceto all person (except Papists) so they may be contented with aquiet and peaceable enjoyment of the same . . . .” Instructionsfor our Right Trusty and well beloved Edward Lord Cornbury ¶ 51(1702), http://iplaw.rutgers.edu/statutes/LS/LS8.pdf#page=32. Notwithstanding the intervening Instructions and charters,the Concessions remained an influential resource for thedrafters of the first Constitution in 1776. See Charles R.Erdman, Jr., The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 4 (1929). Itappears, though, that the establishment of religion provided forin the Concessions was successful on paper only. Esbeck, 2 004BYU L. Rev. at 1470-71. In reality, “a diverse array ofreligious traditions” took hold in New Jersey and “produced aspirit of toleration and liberty by the time independence was 14 declared.” Id. at 1468. And “in 1776, New Jersey settled anylingering uncertainty concerning church-state affairs byexpressly prohibiting in its constitution the establishment ofreligion.” Id. at 1472. New Jersey’s first Constitution, adopted on July 2, 1776,rejected the establishment of and compelled support for religionin two clauses. The first clause contains an express guaranteeof the right to freedom from compelled support. The ReligiousAid Clause in the 1776 Constitution provided as follows: That no Person shall ever within this Colony be deprived of the inestimable Privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a Manner agreeable to the Dictates of his own Conscience; nor under any Pretence whatsoever compelled to attend any Place of Worship, contrary to his own Faith and Judgment; nor shall any Person within this Colony ever be obliged to pay Tithes, Taxes, or any other Rates, for the Purpose of building or repairing any Church or Churches, Place or Places of Worship, or for the Maintenance of any Minister or Ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or has deliberately or voluntarily engaged himself to perform. [N.J. Const. of 1776 art. XVIII (emphasis added).] The second provision contains language similar to thefederal Establishment Clause: That there shall be no Establishment of any one religious Sect in this Province in Preference to another; and that no Protestant Inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied the Enjoyment of any civil Right merely on Account of his religious Principles; but that all 15 Persons, professing a Belief in the Faith of any Protestant Sect, who shall demean themselves peaceably under the Government as hereby established, shall be capable of being elected into any Office of Profit or Trust, or being a Member of either Branch of the Legislature, & shall fully & freely enjoy every Privilege & Immunity enjoyed by others their Fellow-Subjects. [N.J. Const. of 1776 art. XIX (second emphasis added).]The two clauses, in combination, reveal that (1) the freedomfrom being compelled to fund religious institutions throughtaxation -- including the repair of churches -- was a grant ofpersonal liberty, and (2) unlike other rights, that freedom wasnot limited to Protestants. The fact that New Jersey’s first Constitution included aReligious Aid Clause is highly significant. First, itunderscores the fundamental nature of the religious freedomclauses in our State’s history. The 1776 Constitution is abrief document that outlines the organization of government andthe powers of the executive, the legislative council, and thegeneral assembly. The document guarantees only a few distinctrights: the right to vote, id. art. IV; the right to religiousfreedom, id. arts. XVIII-XIX; the right of an accused to havecounsel and call witnesses, id. art. XVI; and the right to trialby jury, id. art. XXII. Viewed in that context, it is telling 16 that the founders devoted careful attention to religious libertyin the first Constitution. Second, of the twelve states that adopted constitutionsfrom 1776 to 1780, none included a compelled support clause asprecise and clear as the Religious Aid Clause. South Carolinaadopted a compelled support provision in its secondconstitution, which it framed exclusively in terms of worship:“No person shall, by law, be obliged to pay towards themaintenance and support of a religious worship that he does notfreely join in, or has not voluntarily engaged to support.”S.C. Const. of 1778 art. XXXVIII. Pennsylvania and Vermont adopted compelled support clausesthat are similar to each other; both are more expansive thanSouth Carolina’s but less detailed than New Jersey’s. See Pa.Const. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. II (“[N]o man ought or ofright can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erector support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry,contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent . . ..”); Vt. Const. of 1777 ch. I, ¶ 3 (“[N]o man ought, or of rightcan be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect, orsupport any place of worship, or maintain any minister, contraryto the dictates of his conscience . . . .”). 17 North Carolina’s first constitution, which took effectseveral months after New Jersey’s, contained a provision mostlike the Religious Aid Clause: [N]either shall any person, on any pre[t]ence whatsoever, be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his own faith or judgment, nor be obliged to pay, for the purchase of any glebe, or the building of any house of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes right, [or] has voluntarily and personally engaged to perform[.] [N.C. Const. of 1776 art. XXXIV.]Even that relatively detailed clause, though, does not mentionthe “repair” of houses of worship or ban payment of “taxes.”See N.J. Const. of 1776 art. XVIII. New Jersey’s Religious AidClause thus stands out as particularly specific for its time. It is also worth noting that among the first states toadopt a constitution, some did not prohibit compelled support.Maryland’s first constitution permitted the legislature tocollect tax dollars “for the support of the Christian religion.”Md. Const. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. XXXIII.Massachusetts, the last of the earliest states to disestablish,Esbeck, 2 004 BYU L. Rev. at 1458, permitted towns, “at their ownexpense,” to support “the institution of the public worship ofGod” and “Protestant teachers of . . . religion.” Mass. Const.of 1780 art. III. 18 The Religious Aid Clause in New Jersey’s first Constitutionalso stands out in the broader context of the process statesfollowed to ban the establishment of and compelled support forreligion. That process reflected the views of some “religioussects [that] opposed establishment on the ground that it injuredreligion and subjected it to the control of civilauthorities. Guaranteed state support was thought to stiflereligious enthusiasm and initiative.” Michael W. McConnell, TheOrigins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise ofReligion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1438 (1990). “Disestablishment was not an abrupt legal developmentbrought about at the national level as a consequence of theRevolution,” but rather a change that “unfolded . . . gradually,state by state, and somewhat differently in each state,depending on the state’s unique colonial background.” Esbeck,2 004 BYU L. Rev. at 1393. The process began in the MiddleColonies such as New Jersey and Delaware, which both adoptedconstitutions in 1776, and continued through 1833. Id. at 1393,1457-58. The States thus disestablished individually, inresponse to their own experiences, well before the religionclauses of the First Amendment were applied to the States.22 “[T]he Free Exercise Clause was expressly deemed incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in 1940 in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 ,” while “[t]he Establishment Clause was not incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment until 19 “Most States that sought to avoid an establishment ofreligion around the time of the founding placed in theirconstitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds tosupport the ministry.” Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 , 723(2004). Most also adopted “a prophylactic rule against the useof public funds for houses of worship.” Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2036 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Such prohibitionsare commonly known as “compelled support clauses” and wereinitially “enacted to address the colonists’ concern for churchand state separation.” Ellen M. Halstead, Note, After Zelman v.Simmons-Harris, School Voucher Programs Can Exclude ReligiousSchools, 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 147, 170 (2004). Today, twenty-nine constitutions, including New Jersey’s,have compelled support clauses.3 Ten other constitutions simplyEverson[,] 330 U.S. 1 , was decided in 1947.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664 , 702 (1970).3 The following states adopted compelled support clauses to their constitutions in the years listed in parentheses; the citations are to the current constitutions: Ala. Const. art. I, § 3 (1819); Ark. Const. art. II, § 24 (1836); Colo. Const. art. II, § 4 (1876); Conn. Const. art. VII (1818); Del. Const. art. I, § 1 (1792); Idaho Const. art. I, § 4 (1890); Ill. Const. art. I, § 3 (1818); Ind. Const. art. I, § 4 (1816); Iowa Const. art. I, § 3 (1846); Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, § 7 (1861); Ky. Const., Bill of Rights, § 5 (1792); Md. Const., Decl. of Rights, art. XXXVI (1776); Mich. Const. art. I, § 4 (1835); Minn. Const. art. I, § 16 (1857); Mo. Const. art. I, § 6 (1820); Neb. Const. art. I, § 4 (1866); N.M. Const. art. II, § 11 (1911); Ohio Const. art. I, § 7 (1803); Pa. Const. art. I, § 3 (1776); R.I. Const. art. I, § 3 (1843); S.D. Const. art. VI, § 3 (1889); 20 prohibit the use of public money in aid of religion.4 Thus, although the States eventually includeddisestablishment and compelled support provisions in theirconstitutions, see Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2036(Sotomayor, J., dissenting), New Jersey did so early on and inquite concrete terms. The Religious Aid Clause’s precisionstressed New Jersey’s departure from the Concessions, seeEsbeck, 2 004 BYU L. Rev. at 1457, and, perhaps, from authorityin other states at the time. The clause also highlighted thatNew Jersey was at the forefront of a historic and substantialchange, and signaled its longstanding and vigorous commitment toreligious liberty and freedom from compelled support. B. New Jersey adopted its Second Constitution in 1844. Thedocument began with a detailed list of individual rights and,among other things, moved the Religious Aid Clause to a newArticle I, Paragraph 3:Tenn. Const. art. I, § 3 (1796); Tex. Const. art. I, § 6 (1845); Vt. Const. ch. I, art. III (1777); Va. Const. art. I, § 16 (1830); W. Va. Const. art. III, § 15 (1863); Wis. Const. art. I, § 18 (1848); see also N.H. Const., Bill of Rights, art. 6 (1784).4 See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 12; Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 5; Fla. Const. art. I, § 3; Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, ¶ 7; Mass. Const., Amends., art. XVIII, § 2 (as amended by Amends., arts. XLVI, CIII); Okla. Const. art. II, § 5; Or. Const. art. I, § 5; Utah Const. art. I, § 4; Wash. Const. art. I, § 11; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 19. 21 No person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretence whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform.The words “other” and “the purpose of” do not appear in theReligious Aid Clause in the second Constitution, and no recordexplains those edits. A streamlined Establishment Clause, which removed allrestrictions to Protestants, can be found at Paragraph 4: There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust; and no person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right merely on account of his religious principles. [N.J. Const. of 1844 art. I, ¶ 4.] C. The Religious Aid Clause and the rest of Paragraph 3 wereleft virtually untouched in the modern Constitution of 1947. Arevised Establishment Clause, along with strong non-discrimination language inspired by a similar provision in theNew York Constitution, see 3 Proceedings of the ConstitutionalConvention of 1947 (Proceedings) 451, appears in Paragraphs 4 22 and 5. The text of those provisions remains unchanged since1947: 3. No person shall be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretense whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform. 4. There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to another; no religious or racial test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust. 5. No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin. [N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 3 to 5.] The above history makes clear that New Jersey’s ReligiousAid Clause can be traced to the establishment of an independentgovernment in the State in the 1700s. The provision was notinspired by the “Blaine Amendment”; nor was it a response toanti-immigrant or anti-Catholic bias. “[T]he Blaine Amendment is a remnant of nineteenth-centuryreligious bigotry promulgated by nativist political leaders who 23 were alarmed by the growth of immigrant populations and who hada particular disdain for Catholics.” Joseph P. Viteritti,Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and StateConstitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 657, 659 (1998).The label stems from a failed federal constitutional amendmentintroduced by Maine Congressman James G. Blaine in 1875. Id. at670. The proposed amendment nevertheless “propelled” a movementamong the states; fourteen “had enacted legislation prohibitingthe use of public funds for religious schools” by 1876, andtwenty-nine “had incorporated such provisions into theirconstitutions” by 1890. Id. at 670-73. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, BlaineAmendments have “a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate todisavow.” Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 , 828 (2000)(plurality opinion). New Jersey’s Religious Aid Clause longpre-dated the Blaine Amendments and reflected a concern forreligious freedom, not discrimination or hostility toward aparticular religion. D. The parties also reference two other clauses in the StateConstitution which provide for funding for historicpreservation. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶¶ 6, 7.Paragraph 6 of Article VIII was adopted in 1996 and amendedseveral times; paragraph 7 was adopted in 1998. Neither offers 24 any details about the meaning or scope of “historicpreservation” projects, and the provisions make no mention ofreligious institutions. Amicus NJHT also references two statutes meant to preservehistoric resources: the New Jersey Historic Trust, N.J.S.A.13:1B-15.111 to -15.127, and the Garden State Preservation TrustAct, N.J.S.A. 13:8C-1 to -57. Neither act, however, refers toreligious institutions. Cf. 54 U.S.C. § 302905(a) (sanctioningfederal grants for the preservation of religious propertieslisted on the National Register if the grant’s purpose “does notpromote religion”). E. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, ofcourse, also protects religious freedom. The Free ExerciseClause provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend.I. The Establishment Clause states that “Congress shall make nolaw respecting an establishment of religion.” Ibid. Both arediscussed below. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Federal Constitution is“the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.State “constitutional provisions that conflict with the FederalConstitution are 'without effect.’” Comm. to Recall RobertMenendez From the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 25 103 (2010) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 , 746(1981)). III. Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of the ReligiousAid Clause prohibits the use of tax revenues to repair churcheswith active congregations and that no other state constitutionalprovisions require a departure from that plain-language reading.According to plaintiffs, the challenged grants fall squarelywithin the Religious Aid Clause’s prohibition and areunconstitutional. In plaintiffs’ view, the Federal Constitution does notcompel a different result. Plaintiffs assert that the ReligiousAid Clause does not violate either the Free Exercise or theEqual Protection Clauses. “Trinity Lutheran’s free exerciseprotections do not apply to this case,” plaintiffs contend,because “[b]uilding or repairing houses of worship directlyadvances religion, even if that is not the government’s intent.”Plaintiffs distinguish between church buildings that are activehouses of worship and facilities that either never were or areno longer used for religious purposes. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the County’s programwould be unlikely to pass muster under the federal EstablishmentClause. 26 The ACLU agrees with plaintiffs’ interpretation of theReligious Aid Clause and adds that the history of the clausedoes not support an exception for “historical preservation.”The ACLU also submits that no other part of the StateConstitution overrides the Religious Aid Clause. Likeplaintiffs, the ACLU maintains that the Free Exercise Clausedoes not compel funding of historic-preservation grants thatsupport religious worship. In addition, the ACLU argues thatthe federal Establishment Clause would not permit the grants. The Churches dispute plaintiffs’ interpretation of theReligious Aid Clause. They assert that the clause, read incontext, permits religious institutions to participate inprograms that advance secular government interests and aregoverned by neutral criteria. According to the Churches, thelanguage of the Religious Aid Clause cannot properly be read inisolation. The Churches also argue that plaintiffs’ interpretation ofthe Religious Aid Clause violates the First Amendment underTrinity Lutheran. According to the Churches, the grantschallenged in this case cannot be distinguished from the programat issue in Trinity Lutheran. The Churches add that the federal Establishment Clause doesnot call for a different result. Finally, the Churches maintainthat there are no grounds to order them to refund the grants. 27 Like the Churches, the Morris County defendants focus onTrinity Lutheran and argue that “the First Amendmentjurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court requires” thatthe grants be upheld. Morris County adds that excludingchurches from the list of eligible grant applicants “would forcethe County to deny religious institutions equal protection underthe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”They join the Churches in asking the Court to uphold the grantprogram and affirm the trial court. Becket agrees with defendants that the grant program hereis governed by Trinity Lutheran because it “is a generallyavailable public benefit whose recipients are selected through acompetitive grant application process based on secular criteriaand . . . is open to 'all historic sites within the State’without reference to religious status.” Becket stresses that toexclude religious groups from the program “because of theirreligious status” would “violate[] the Free Exercise Clauseunder Trinity Lutheran.” According to Becket, “New Jersey’santi-establishment interest” in this matter “is nil,” and anysuch state interest “would be insufficient because the grantprogram does not even come close to violating the federalEstablishment Clause.” The NJHT represents that it has awarded “grant funds forhistoric preservation of eligible properties owned by religious 28 institutions for decades.” To exclude religious institutionsfrom public benefits “based solely on their religious status,”the NJHT asserts, would conflict with the State and FederalConstitutions and related case law. The NJHT contends that “thetrial court aptly analogized Morris County’s program toDetroit’s revitalization program considered in” AmericanAtheists. The NJHT also argues that because the programs have a“neutral public purpose and are administered in a way thatensures secular use of funds,” the programs pass muster underthe religion clauses. IV. The first step in our analysis is to determine whether thehistoric preservation grants awarded to repair twelve churchesviolated the Religious Aid Clause of the State Constitution. Inlight of the plain language of the clause, the question answersitself. To determine the meaning of a constitutional provision,courts look first to the language the drafters used. State v.Buckner, 223 N.J. 1, 15 (2015). If it is clear, the words “mustbe given their plain meaning.” State v. Trump Hotels & CasinoResorts, 160 N.J. 505, 527 (1999). With that in mind, we returnto the text of the Religious Aid Clause: No person shall . . . be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any church or churches, place or 29 places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged to perform. [N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3.]The clause does not prevent local or State authorities fromproviding taxpayer-funded police, fire, and emergency servicesto houses of worship. See Resnick, 77 N.J. at 103. Nor does itpreclude the provision of other services tied to general publicsafety. Instead, for more than 240 years, the Religious AidClause has banned the use of public funds to build or repair anyplace of worship. Here, the County awarded $4.6 million to twelve churches torepair active houses of worship -- from roofs to bell towers,from stained glass windows to ventilation systems. The use ofpublic funds to pay for those repairs violated the plainlanguage of the Religious Aid Clause. The clause does not ask about the governing body’s intent-- that is, whether the authorities meant to fund repairs tochurches, to preserve history and promote tourism, or both. Infact, the change from the 1776 Constitution to the 1844Constitution removed the bracketed phrase “no taxes . . . for[the purpose of] building or repairing any church.” CompareN.J. Const. of 1776 art. XVIII, with N.J. Const. of 1844 art. I,¶ 3. Thus, for most of its existence, the Religious Aid Clause 30 has banned public funding to repair a house of worship withoutregard to some other non-religious purpose.5 In short, there isno exception for historic preservation. Nor is there a basis to distinguish between “restoration”and “repair” under the Religious Aid Clause. The terms mean thesame thing. See Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009)(defining “repair” as “[t]o restore (a damaged, worn, or faultyobject or structure) to good or proper condition by replacing orfixing parts; to mend, fix”; and noting that definition was inplace before and after 1776). There is very little case law that construes the ReligiousAid Clause, and no case is directly on point. Some cases havefocused on the prohibition against “the maintenance of aminister or ministry,” not the “repair” of “any church.” SeeResnick, 77 N.J. at 102-04 (relating to a school board’spermitting a religious group to rent school property for5 The Massachusetts Constitution, by comparison, bars the “grant, appropriation or use of public money . . . for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any church, religious denomination or society.” Caplan v. Town of Acton, 92 N.E.3d 691, 693 (Mass. 2018) (ellipsis in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Mass. Const., Amends., art. XVIII, § 2 (as amended by Amends., arts. XLVI, CIII)). To assess whether a grant of public funds to renovate an active church is constitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted a three-factor test. Id. at 694. The test, in part, requires judges to consider the purpose and effect of the grant. Ibid. The plain language of the New Jersey Constitution does not call for that type of inquiry about the expenditure of public funds to repair a church. 31 religious instruction and services during non-school hours);Everson, 133 N.J.L. at 366-67 (Case, J., dissenting) (relatingto the use of public funds to reimburse parents for the cost ofbus transportation to private and parochial schools). Thus, nothing in the prior case law requires a departurefrom the plain language of the Religious Aid Clause. Nor do theother provisions about religion in the State Constitution. SeeN.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 4, 5. Neither Paragraph 4 nor Paragraph5 addresses the allocation of tax dollars for the repair ofactive houses of worship, a practice forbidden by the ReligiousAid Clause. The Churches point to a debate at the ConstitutionalConvention of 1947 in response to the decisions by the Court ofErrors and Appeals and the United States Supreme Court inEverson. In that case, the New Jersey high court upheld publicfunding for transporting students to Catholic parochial schools.133 N.J.L. at 356. The United States Supreme Court affirmedthat judgment. 330 U.S. at 18. Opponents of the decisions proposed a Blaine Amendment atthe Convention, see 5 Proceedings 789-806, and the proposal didnot succeed, 2 Proceedings 1247-49. We do not glean much fromthe discussion and believe that the debate has little impact onthe meaning of the Religious Aid Clause. 32 The proposal before the Committee on Taxation and Financecentered on school funding. No consideration was given to theinterplay between the proposal and other constitutionalprovisions, including the repair language of the Religious AidClause. In other words, the debate did not relate to theReligious Aid Clause’s prohibition against the use of taxpayerfunds to repair churches. Those in opposition instead alludedto the tension between the proposal and the Everson decisions.5 Proceedings 794-98, 804-06. To be sure, had the debate endeddifferently, no State constitutional amendment could haveoverruled the United States Supreme Court’s extension of publicwelfare legislation to religious schools. 330 U.S. at 16. The1947 Constitution, in fact, added a provision to “provide forthe transportation of children . . . to and from any school.”N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 3. Defendants and amici also suggest that Article VIII of theState Constitution affects the plain meaning of the ReligiousAid Clause. Article VIII addresses funding for historicpreservation and does not conflict with the clause. Therelevant provisions do not even mention historic preservation ofhouses of worship. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶¶ 6, 7.Because the two Articles do not compete and readily co-exist,there is no need to harmonize their provisions. See State v.Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 44 (1996) (“[C]ompeting clauses of a 33 constitution should be harmonized to give [them] effect . . ..”). Similarly, Article VIII neither expressly overrides theReligious Aid Clause nor repeals it by implication. See Mahwahv. Bergen Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 98 N.J. 268, 281 (1985) (“Everyreasonable construction should be applied to avoid a finding ofimplied repealer [of a statute].”); see also City & County ofSan Francisco v. County of San Mateo, 896 P.2d 181 , 186 (Cal.1995) (“Implied repeals are disfavored. So strong is thepresumption against implied repeals that we will conclude oneconstitutional provision impliedly repeals another only when themore recently enacted of two provisions constitutes a revisionof the entire subject addressed by the provisions.” (citationsand internal quotation marks omitted)). Just the same, thestatutes amici cite do not address houses of worship and, in anyevent, could not override a constitutional guarantee. SeeN.J.S.A. 13:1B-15.111 to -15.127; N.J.S.A. 13:8C-1 to -57. We therefore find that the County’s grants ran afoul of theState Constitution’s Religious Aid Clause. V. We turn now to a more challenging question: whether NewJersey’s Religious Aid Clause is at odds with the FederalConstitution. If so, the clause cannot stand, notwithstandingits history. Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez, 204 N.J. at 105 34 (“Bound as we are to adhere to the supreme law of the land, wecannot permit a provision of the State Constitution to remain inforce if it conflicts with the Federal Constitution.” (citingChamber of Commerce of U.S. v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 141 (1982)(citing, in turn, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2))). Based on ourunderstanding of the current state of the law, including theUnited States Supreme Court’s recent decision in TrinityLutheran, we conclude that the Religious Aid Clause does notconflict with the Free Exercise Clause. A. The question before the Supreme Court in Trinity Lutheranwas whether the policy of the Missouri Department of NaturalResources “of categorically disqualifying churches and otherreligious organizations from receiving grants under itsplayground resurfacing program . . . violated the rights ofTrinity Lutheran [Church] under the Free Exercise Clause of theFirst Amendment.” 137 S. Ct. at 2017. Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program offered “reimbursement grantsto qualifying nonprofit organizations that purchase playgroundsurfaces made from recycled tires.” Ibid. The Departmentawarded grants “on a competitive basis to those scoring highestbased on several criteria.” Ibid. In 2012, the Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center(Center), “a preschool and daycare center” that operated under 35 the auspices of Trinity Lutheran Church, applied for a grant.Ibid. The Department ranked the application fifth among 44applicants and awarded 14 grants that year, but it declared theCenter “categorically ineligible to receive a grant.” Id. at2018. The Department explained “that, under Article I, Section7 of the Missouri Constitution, the Department could not providefinancial assistance directly to a church.” Ibid. That sectionof the Missouri Constitution provides [t]hat no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship. [Mo. Const. art. I, § 7.] Trinity Lutheran filed a complaint against the Director ofthe Department in Federal District Court and asserted that theDepartment’s policy violated the Free Exercise Clause. TrinityLutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2018. The District Court found the caseindistinguishable from Locke, 540 U.S. 712 , in which the Court“upheld against a free exercise challenge the State ofWashington’s decision not to fund degrees in devotional theologyas part of a state scholarship program.” Ibid. The DistrictCourt therefore dismissed the action. Ibid. A majority of theEighth Circuit panel that heard the appeal affirmed. Ibid. 36 The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 2025. The Court’sopinion focused on the Free Exercise Clause because, unlike inthis case, the parties agreed that the Establishment Clause didnot prevent Missouri from awarding the challenged grant. Id. at2019. The Court held that the Department’s policy violated theFree Exercise Clause by “expressly denying a qualified religiousentity a public benefit solely because of its religiouscharacter.” Id. at 2024. The Court stressed that “laws that target the religious for'special disabilities’ based on their 'religious status’” mustbe subject “to the strictest scrutiny.” Id. at 2019 (quotingChurch of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , 533 (1993)). In that regard, the Court emphasized “thatdenying a generally available benefit solely on account ofreligious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise ofreligion that can be justified only by a state interest 'of thehighest order.’” Ibid. (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 ,628 (1978) (plurality opinion)). The Court found that “[t]he Department’s policy expresslydiscriminate[d] against otherwise eligible recipients bydisqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of theirreligious character.” Id. at 2021. By doing so, the Departmentforced an untenable choice: “participate in an otherwise 37 available benefit program or remain a religious institution.”Id. at 2021-22. The Court underscored that “[t]he expressdiscrimination against religious exercise here is not the denialof a grant, but rather the refusal to allow the Church -- solelybecause it is a church -- to compete with secular organizationsfor a grant.” Id. at 2022. The Court distinguished between Missouri’s policy ofexcluding religious organizations from the Scrap Tire Programand the scholarship restrictions in Locke v. Davey. Id. at2022-23. “Washington’s restriction on the use of itsscholarship funds was different,” the Court noted, because theclaimant in Locke “was not denied a scholarship because of whohe was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposedto do -- use the funds to prepare for the ministry.” Id. at2023. By contrast, the Court continued, “[h]ere there is noquestion that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply becauseof what it is -- a church.” Ibid. Of particular note in the case before us, the Court addedthat, in Locke, “Washington’s choice was in keeping with theState’s antiestablishment interest in not using taxpayer fundsto pay for the training of clergy; in fact, the Court could'think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishmentinterests come more into play.’” Ibid. (quoting Locke, 540 U.S.at 722). The Court observed that the funding sought in Locke 38 was “for an 'essentially religious endeavor . . . akin to areligious calling as well as an academic pursuit,’ andopposition to such funding 'to support church leaders’ lay atthe historic core of the Religion Clauses.” Ibid. (alterationin original) (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 721-22). The Court then returned to the central problem raised byMissouri’s program: that Trinity Lutheran’s status as a church-- not its intended use of the funds -- prevented it fromparticipating in the grant program. “[T]here is no dispute thatTrinity Lutheran is put to the choice between being a church andreceiving a government benefit. The rule is simple: Nochurches need apply.” Id. at 2024. The Court, however, did not opine on whether that keyprinciple -- that “a qualified religious entity” cannot bedenied “a public benefit solely because of its religiouscharacter,” ibid. -- extends to religious uses of funding.Footnote 3 of the majority opinion states that “[t]his caseinvolves express discrimination based on religious identity withrespect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religioususes of funding or other forms of discrimination.” Id. at 2024n.3. Four members of the Court joined footnote 3: ChiefJustice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan. Next, the Court concluded that “Missouri’s policypreference for skating as far as possible from religious 39 establishment concerns” could not “qualify as compelling.” Id.at 2024. The state’s interest, therefore, was “limited by theFree Exercise Clause.” Ibid. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 276 (1981)). There were three concurring opinions and one dissent.Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who joined the majority opinionaside from footnote 3, each filed a concurrence in which theother joined. Justice Thomas expressed doubts about the Court’sholding in Locke but noted that no party had asked the Court toreconsider it. Id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring). JusticeGorsuch questioned the majority’s distinction between “religiousstatus and religious use” to distinguish Locke. Ibid. (Gorsuch,J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch also expressed concern thatfootnote 3 might be “mistakenly read . . . to suggest that only'playground resurfacing’ cases, or only those with someassociation with children’s safety or health, or perhaps someother social good we find sufficiently worthy, are governed bythe legal rules recounted in and faithfully applied by theCourt’s opinion.” Id. at 2026. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment but wroteseparately to “emphasize[] the particular nature of the 'publicbenefit’ here at issue.” Ibid. (Breyer, J., concurring injudgment). He noted that in Everson, the Court made clear thata state could not exclude church schools from services like 40 police and fire protection. Id. at 2027. Justice Breyer saw“no significant difference” between that and Trinity Lutheran’s“participation in a general program designed to secure or toimprove the health and safety of children.” Ibid. “Publicbenefits come in many shapes and sizes,” Justice Breyer added,noting that he “would leave the application of the Free ExerciseClause to other kinds of public benefits for another day.”Ibid. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissentedfrom the opinion as a whole. The dissent first noted that“[t]he Establishment Clause [did] not allow Missouri to grantthe Church’s funding request because the Church uses theLearning Center, including its playground, in conjunction withits religious mission.” Id. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J.,dissenting). The dissent declined to accept the parties’agreement that the Establishment Clause posed no issue andremarked that “[c]onstitutional questions are decided by thisCourt, not the parties’ concessions.” Ibid. The dissent then turned to the Free Exercise Clause andfocused in particular on the state’s interest in denying thegrant in question. Justice Sotomayor “looked to history forguidance” and reviewed the “Nation’s early experience with, andeventual rejection of, established religion.” Id. at 2032. Thedissent canvassed efforts across the states “to end the public 41 funding of religion” and the “powerful” reasons for those steps-- “all stemming from the basic premise that the practice harmedboth civil government and religion.” Id. at 2033-35. Thedissent concluded that, “as in Locke, Missouri’s Article I, §7,is closely tied to the state interests it protects.” Id. at2038. The dissent found those interests “weighty.” Id. at2041. Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the Court’s decision touse strict scrutiny to evaluate Missouri’s program, as well asthe Court’s application of the test. Id. at 2038-41. Thedissent also questioned whether Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program,which Justice Sotomayor described as “a selective benefit for afew recipients each year,” was a “generally available benefit.”Id. at 2040. B. Trinity Lutheran’s scope is important because the facts ofthis case extend well beyond playground resurfacing. Indeed,the public funds awarded in this case actually went toward“religious uses.” It is clear from the stipulated facts in therecord that the Churches all “have active congregations thatregularly worship, or participate in other religiousactivities,” and all hold “regular worship services in one ormore of the structures that they have used, or will use,”taxpayer-funded grants to repair. 42 In addition to the stipulation, a number of theapplications expressly stated that churches sought funding forrepairs to continue to conduct worship services. As notedearlier, The Presbyterian Church in Morristown, for example,sought and received a grant to “historically preserve thebuilding allowing its continued use by our congregation forworship services as well as by the community and many otheroutside organizations that use it on a regular basis.”(emphasis added). The Church of the Redeemer sought andreceived funding to repair the slate roof -- “a key structuralelement that has failed” -- to “assist in assuring that thebuilding can continue in its existing use as a church and as animportant building in Morristown.” (emphasis added). SaintPeter’s Episcopal Church of Morristown similarly requested andreceived funds to repair the interior of the church tower to“ensure continued safe public access to the church for worship,periods of solitude and meditation during the week, and severalconcerts throughout the year, as well as the treasures thechurch and tower contain.” (emphasis added). In certain cases, public funds were used to repair stainedglass windows. The First Presbyterian Church of Boonton soughtand received grant monies to repair religious imagery above thechurch altar -- a stained glass window that depicts Jesus andtwo disciples on their walk from Jerusalem to Emmaus. The 43 Church also received funds to repair a second stained glasswindow above the entry door to the Church. The First Baptist Church of Ledgewood received funds todevelop a preservation plan for several areas of the churchbuilding -- both exterior and interior space -- including the“tower, heating system, and the original stained glass windows,”which “increase the beauty and the ambiance of the structure, asviewed from inside and outside.” The application noted that apreservation grant “will enable the congregation to continue toprovide religious and community activities.” As that grant reveals, restoration awards were not limitedto repairs to the exterior of church structures but also tofinance repairs to interior space where prayer services wereheld. Saint Peter’s Episcopal Church of Morristown, forexample, also received funds for interior work to itsventilation system. In light of the record in this case, Trinity Lutheran’sanalysis of Locke is particularly instructive. Once again, asthe Court noted, “Davey was not denied a scholarship because ofwho he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what heproposed to do -- use the funds to prepare for the ministry.”Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023. The same constructapplies here: the Churches are not being denied grant fundsbecause they are religious institutions; they are being denied 44 public funds because of what they plan to do -- and in manycases have done: use public funds to repair church buildings sothat religious worship services can be held there. This case does not involve the expenditure of taxpayermoney for non-religious uses, such as the playground resurfacingin Trinity Lutheran. The appeal instead relates to grants thatsustain the continued use of active houses of worship forreligious services and finance repairs to religious imagery. Inour judgment, those grants constitute an impermissible religioususe of public funds. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & ReligiousLiberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 , 774 (1973) (invalidating underthe Establishment Clause the “maintenance and repair” provisionof a New York law that allowed grants of state funds tononpublic schools -- “given largely without restriction onusage” -- on ground that funds could be used to pay “salaries ofemployees who maintain the school chapel, or the cost ofrenovating classrooms in which religion is taught, or the costof heating and lighting those same facilities,” which would have“a primary effect that advances religion in that it subsidizesdirectly the religious activities of sectarian . . . schools”);Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 , 683-84, 689 (1971)(recognizing that funding “chapel[s]” or buildings “otherwiseused to promote religious interests” would “have the effect ofadvancing religion,” and therefore striking down under the 45 Establishment Clause the twenty-year limit obligatinginstitutions not to use facilities built with federal grantmoney “for sectarian instruction or religious worship”).Nyquist and Tilton seem at odds with defendants’ claim that,even when active houses of worship need repairs to continuehosting religious services, “there is nothing inherentlyreligious about roofing.” Trinity Lutheran also read Locke to mean that Washington’s choice was in keeping with the State’s antiestablishment interest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training of clergy; in fact, the Court could “think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment interests come more into play.” Locke, 540 U.S. at 722. The claimant in Locke sought funding for an “essentially religious endeavor . . . akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit,” and opposition to such funding “to support church leaders” lay at the historic core of the Religion Clauses. Id. at 721-22. Here nothing of the sort can be said about a program to use recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. [ 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (alteration in original).]As a result, the Court in Trinity Lutheran did not find thestate interest in Article I, Section 7 of the MissouriConstitution sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny.137 S. Ct. at 2024; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276. New Jersey’s Religious Aid Clause and the grants awarded inthis matter stand in stark contrast to the setting in TrinityLutheran. As the history of the New Jersey Constitution 46 reveals, the interest the Clause seeks to advance “is scarcelynovel.” See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722. The Religious Aid Clausereflects a substantial concern of the State’s founders in 1776:to ensure that taxpayer funds would not be used to build orrepair houses of worship, or to maintain any ministry. Thatchoice reversed the approval of established religion in theearlier Concessions; it also diverged from the practice of otherstates that allowed established religion at the time. The Religious Aid Clause reflects the experience of many ofthe nation’s earliest settlers: A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches. . . . With the power of government supporting them, at various times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with the government of a particular time and place, men and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for which these punishments had been inflicted were such things as speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-established churches, non- attendance at those churches, expressions of non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support them. 47 These practices of the old world were transplanted to and began to thrive in the soil of the new America. The very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and companies designated to make the laws which would control the destinies of the colonials authorized these individuals and companies to erect religious establishments which all, whether believers or non-believers, would be required to support and attend. An exercise of this authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world practices and persecutions. . . . And all of [the] dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches . . . . . . . . The imposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build and maintain churches and church property aroused [the] indignation [of “the freedom-loving colonials”]. It was these feelings which found expression in the First Amendment. . . . [P]eople [throughout the Colonies] reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group. [Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-11 (emphases added).] As in Locke, New Jersey’s antiestablishment interest in notusing public funds to build or repair churches or maintain anyministry “lay at the historic core of the Religion Clauses.”See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023. New Jersey’s historicand substantial interest against the establishment of, and 48 compelled support for, religion is indeed “of the highestorder.” See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628. Also as in Locke, the antiestablishment interest New Jerseyexpressed in 1776 did not reflect animus toward any religion.See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725. The Religious Aid Clause wasenacted before the Federal Constitution; it is not a BlaineAmendment. No history of discrimination taints the provision.Cf. Am. Atheists, 567 F.3d at 301 (noting that Article I,Section 4 of the Michigan Constitution “grows out of the BlaineAmendments, the product of a mid-nineteenth century politicalmovement with no roots in the Religion Clauses of the UnitedStates Constitution”). At oral argument and in the briefs, the parties and amicicompared the grants in this appeal to Detroit’s revitalizationprogram in American Atheists. In that case, the Sixth Circuitupheld grants to several churches as part of a program to“refurbish[] the exteriors of downtown buildings and parkinglots . . . in a discrete section of downtown Detroit” inanticipation of the 2006 Super Bowl. Id. at 281. Projects atthree churches were among the ninety-one completed. Id. at 281-84. In total, “[t]he three churches received about $737,000from the agency,” or “6.4% of the $11.5 million inreimbursements.” Id. at 284. 49 The parties recognize that the Sixth Circuit upheld thegrants against a challenge under the Establishment Clause.There are other key differences as well. The revitalizationgrants did not enable religious worship services to continue orfund repairs to religious imagery. In short, the grants did notinvolve religious uses of funding. The holding of Trinity Lutheran does not encompass thedirect use of taxpayer funds to repair churches and therebysustain religious worship activities. See 137 S. Ct. at 2024n.3. We therefore find that the application of the ReligiousAid Clause in this case does not violate the Free ExerciseClause. C. Had the Free Exercise Clause permitted the awards, we wouldneed to evaluate the grants under the federal EstablishmentClause. In that regard, we believe that the grant program posesquestions under any articulation of the current standard. SeeTown of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818-20 (2014); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 , 648-49, 662-63 (2002); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 844-45 (O’Connor, J.,concurring); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 , 218, 234 (1997);Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 770-74; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 677-78; Lemonv. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 , 612-13 (1971); McKelvey v. Pierce,173 N.J. 26, 40-41 (2002). 50 Morris County’s preservation grants are not one-time awardsof the type the Sixth Circuit reviewed in American Atheists. Inthis case, recipients of grants that totaled more than $50,000embarked on a thirty-year relationship with the County marked byan easement agreement between each church and local authorities.Grantees were required to negotiate with the County as to whentheir property would be open to the public. They also had toregister their buildings on the National and New Jersey historicregisters. That said, because we need not reach the question in thisappeal, we refrain from conducting a detailed analysis of theEstablishment Clause. D. Finally, we note Morris County’s argument that denyinggrants to the Churches would violate the Equal Protection Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants do not offer persuasivelegal support for that theory. Courts, in general, approachreligious discrimination claims through the First Amendmentreligion clauses. See Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protectionof Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their History, 47 B.C. L.Rev. 275, 283-85 (2006); see also Eulitt v. Me. Dep’t of Educ.,386 F.3d 344, 353-54 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting effort to framea free exercise claim under “the rubric of equal protection” asa “crabbed approach [that] will not wash” because the Free 51 Exercise Clause “defines the scope of the fundamental right toreligion incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s equalprotection guarantee”). The Churches’ brief reliance on the Religious Land Use andInstitutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(b)(1), is also unavailing. The Churches’ conclusoryassertion that “[t]he County program is a landmarking law” thatsubjects it to RLUIPA does not persuade us that the statuteapplies here. VI. Today’s opinion clarifies and reaffirms the vitality of theReligious Aid Clause in light of more recent federal case law.The County awarded the grants in question from 2012 to 2015. Wedo not know the extent to which those funds have already beenspent in good faith reliance on the grant process and the trialcourt’s ruling. As a result, we do not attempt to unwind theawards at this late date. For all of those reasons, theprinciples outlined above will apply prospectively. VII. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and entersummary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate, concurring opinion. 52 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 71 SEPTEMBER TERM 2016 079277FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION and DAVID STEKETEE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.MORRIS COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, THE MORRIS COUNTY PRESERVATION TRUST FUND REVIEW BOARD, JOSEPH A. KOVALCIK, JR., in his official capacity as Morris County Treasurer, THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN MORRISTOWN, FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF NEW VERNON, ST. PETER’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, FIRST REFORMED CHURCH OF POMPTON PLAINS, CHURCH OF THE REDEEMER, COMMUNITY OF ST. JOHN BAPTIST, STANHOPE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, CHURCH OF THE ASSUMPTION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY, FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF BOONTON, ST. PETER’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN MOUNTAIN LAKES, LEDGEWOOD BAPTIST CHURCH, and COMMUNITY CHURCH OF MOUNTAIN LAKES, Defendants-Respondents. JUSTICE SOLOMON, concurring. I join with the majority in reversing the trial court’sdecision to uphold the monetary grants to defendant religious 1 institutions. I agree that under the facts of this case thedistribution of the grant money to the religious institutionswas contrary to the plain language of the Religious Aid Clause,N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3. I write separately to express myopinion that the Religious Aid Clause cannot categorically barchurches with active congregations from receiving funds thatpromote a substantial government purpose, such as historicpreservation. Such a blanket exclusion violates the FreeExercise Clause of the United States Constitution and the UnitedStates Supreme Court’s opinion in Trinity Lutheran Church ofColumbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United StatesConstitution, “a provision of [a] State Constitution [cannot]remain in force if it conflicts with the Federal Constitution.”Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez From the Office of U.S. Senatorv. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 105 (2010). Thus, a state constitutionalprovision that conflicts with the United States Constitution ispreempted. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitutionprovides in pertinent part that “Congress shall make no lawrespecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the freeexercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free ExerciseClause “'protect[s] religious observers [and religious entities]against unequal treatment’ and subjects to the strictest 2 scrutiny laws that target the religious for 'specialdisabilities’ based on their 'religious status.’” TrinityLutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (quoting Church of Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , 533, 542 (1993)(first alteration in original)). Therefore, while the majority, in discussing the plainlanguage of the Religious Aid Clause, correctly notes that,“[t]he clause does not ask about the governing body’s intent,”ante at ___ (slip op. at 30), and concludes that “there is noexception for historic preservation,” ante at ___ (slip op. at31), application of the limiting provisions of the Religious AidClause is restricted by the Free Exercise Clause of the UnitedStates Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. I. In Trinity Lutheran, the United States Supreme Courtdetermined that a categorical ban “disqualifying churches andother religious organizations from receiving grants under [astate/governmental] playground resurfacing program” violated theFree Exercise Clause. 137 S. Ct. at 2017. Accordingly, a“generally available benefit” cannot be denied to anorganization based solely on its religious identity. 1 Id. at 1 However, not all government action that intersects with a citizen’s religious beliefs is contrary to the Free Exercise Clause. Government action that does not “coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” does not run 3 2019; see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 , 629 (1978)(striking down statute which disqualified ministers from servingas state legislators). “At a minimum, the protections of theFree Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminatesagainst some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibitsconduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532. It is in this context that the UnitedStates Supreme Court examined the words and purpose of localordinances in Lukumi. See ibid.; see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 , 715-16 (2004). Lukumi, though not directly applicable to the case at hand,is instructive. That case concerned local ordinancesprohibiting animal sacrifices. 508 U.S. at 526. The Courtnoted that “if the object of a law is to infringe upon orrestrict practices because of their religious motivation, thelaw is not neutral and . . . is invalid unless it is justifiedby a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advanceafoul of the Free Exercise Clause. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 , 449 (1988) (finding that decision to harvest timber for construction on tract of land with religious significance to Native American tribe was not prohibited by Free Exercise Clause). Additionally, generally applicable laws passed without regard to religion do not offend the tenets of the Free Exercise Clause. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 872 (1990) (rejecting Free Exercise claim and finding that members of religious organization were not entitled to dispensation from criminal law which prohibited use of peyote). 4 that interest.” Id. at 533 (citation omitted). Application ofthat principle requires examining the purpose of the law, whichin turn requires scrutinizing its text to determine whether itis neutral on its face -- but the text is not determinative.Id. at 533-34. “Masked” “governmental hostility” is alsoinvalid, and examination of a statute’s underlying purpose isappropriate. Id. at 534. In examining the challenged law, theCourt found that the ordinances were “consistent with the claimof facial discrimination” and, more importantly, that they werepassed to “suppress[] . . . the central element of [areligion].” Ibid. Thus, the purpose underlying passage of theordinances was impermissible. Id. at 534-35. More recently, in Locke, 540 U.S. at 715, the Supreme Courtbalanced the limitations of the Free Exercise Clause againstWashington State’s “antiestablishment interest” as expressed inits state constitution. In that case, Joshua Davey, a studentpursuing a double major in pastoral ministries and businessmanagement/administration at a private, Christian collegereceived a scholarship from a state-run scholarship program thatprohibited the disbursement of funds to a qualified studentpursuing a degree in devotional theology. Id. at 716-17. TheCourt found that the program did not violate the Free ExerciseClause, noting that the state’s “antiestablishment interest” --its interest in not supporting the ministry or “funding the 5 pursuit of [a] devotional degree[]” -- “is scarcely novel.” 2 Id.at 722-23, 725. In distinguishing the ordinances at issue inLukumi from the program in Locke, the Court explained that theprogram “goes a long way toward including religion in itsbenefits” because scholarship recipients may “attend pervasivelyreligious schools” and “are still eligible to take devotionalcourses.” Id. at 724-25. The Court concluded that“neither . . . the history or text of Article I, § 11 of theWashington Constitution, nor . . . the operation of the[scholarship program] . . . suggests animus towards religion.”Id. at 725. Finally, the Court noted that the “historic andsubstantial state interest at issue” also weighed againstfinding that the program was unconstitutional. Ibid.3Importantly, the only state interest considered by the UnitedStates Supreme Court in Locke was Washington State’s“antiestablishment interest” which was balanced against theboundaries of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 720-22.2 In noting the commonality of this interest, the Court references other similar state constitutional provisions, including Article XVIII of the New Jersey Constitution of 1776. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723.3 I note that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Locke illustrates a discord in the test’s application, asserting that the program “facially discriminates against religion.” 540 U.S. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 6 Most recently, in Trinity Lutheran, the Court consideredthe Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center’s applicationfor a state grant administered by the Missouri Department ofNatural Resources (the Department) to reimburse qualifyingnonprofit organizations that install playground surfaces madefrom recycled tires. 137 S. Ct. at 2017. “[T]he Department hada strict and express policy of denying grants to any applicantowned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religiousentity.” Ibid. The State rejected the application citingArticle I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, which states:“[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury,directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect ordenomination of religion . . . .” Ibid. (quoting Mo. Const.art. I, § 7). In concluding that the Department’s denial of theapplication violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Court noted,“only a state interest 'of the highest order’ can justify theDepartment’s discriminatory policy.” 137 S. Ct. at 2024(quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628). The Court found that thepurported interest -- the “policy preference for skating as faras possible from establishment concerns” -- was unavailingbecause the doctrine of separation between Church and State “islimited by the Free Exercise Clause.” Ibid. (quoting Widmar v.Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 276 (1981)). Thus, the Court found thatthe State’s pursuit of its antiestablishment policy went “too 7 far” in “denying a qualified religious entity a public benefitsolely because of its religious character.” Ibid. II. Consistent with the precedent established in Lukumi andLocke and reaffirmed in Trinity Lutheran, a state’santiestablishment interest is not without its limits. Thus, Ibelieve that the Free Exercise Clause requires an examination ofthe enabling legislation and underlying motive or purpose ofstate action aimed at benefiting a house of worship.4 SeeTrinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024. New Jersey’s Constitution recognizes the preservation ofhistoric structures as an important government purpose by“providing funding, including loans or grants . . . for historicpreservation.” N.J. Const. art. VIII, § II, ¶ 7. Pursuant to4 In Caplan v. Town of Acton, 92 N.E.3d 691, 693–94 (Mass. 2018), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts analyzed the disbursement of grant funds to an active church, which was characterized as a “historic resource.” In assessing the constitutionality of the grant under the State’s anti-aid amendment, the court applied a three-factor test: (1) is “a motivating purpose of each grant . . . to aid the church”; (2) “whether the grant will have the effect of substantially aiding the church”; and (3) “whether the grant avoids the risks of the political and economic abuses that prompted the passage of the anti-aid amendment.” Id. at 694. Although the Massachusetts Court distinguished its case from Trinity Lutheran, as the anti- aid amendment did not impose a categorical ban on the grant of funds to a religious institution, and applied its own test to determine the validity of the grants, see id. at 704-05, I find its analysis informative. 8 that important government purpose and N.J.S.A. 40:12-15.2,5“[t]he Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders created theMorris County Historic Preservation Trust Fund . . . to helpsupport the preservation of the county’s exceptional abundanceof historic resources.” Morris County Office of Planning &Preservation, Historic Preservation (2018), https://planning.morriscountynj.gov/divisions/prestrust/historic/. The expressedpurpose of Morris County’s program is to advance New Jersey’ssubstantial interest in historic preservation. New Jersey’s substantial interest in historic preservationas expressed in our Constitution distinguishes this case fromLocke. In Locke, the Court found that the state’s decision notto fund devotional degrees was constitutional given the state’santiestablishment interest. 540 U.S. at 722-23, 725. However,the Court made clear in Trinity Lutheran that a state’s relianceon antiestablishment principles, even those grounded in thestate’s constitution, is not without limits. 137 S. Ct. at 2024. Thus, an antiestablishment interest cannot justify thecategorical ban of a religious institution from a public benefitbased solely on its religious character. Ibid. Here, NewJersey’s interest in historic preservation, N.J. Const. art.5 N.J.S.A. 40:12-15.2(a)(1)(e) allows the submission of a referendum to county voters to authorize the “imposition of an annual levy” for “historic preservation of historic properties, structures, facilities, sites, areas, or objects.” 9 VIII, § II, ¶ 7, counters its antiestablishment interestexpressed in the Religious Aid Clause. I believe, therefore,that New Jersey’s antiestablishment interest is less compellingthan was the state’s interest in Locke. The majority concludes that the present case exceeds thescope of Trinity Lutheran since Morris County’s taxpayer-fundedgrants “went toward 'religious uses.’” Ante at ___ (slip op. at42). In reaching this conclusion, the majority refers forsupport to Footnote 3 of the Trinity Lutheran decision, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3. However, that conclusion ignores New Jersey’sseparate and substantial government interest at stake in thiscase -- historical preservation. I believe that had MorrisCounty’s program been applied in a fundamentally neutral manner,the Religious Aid Clause could not bar funding to an otherwisequalified religious institution. Nevertheless, I am constrained to concur with the majoritybecause as the majority points out: there will be a protractedrelationship between Morris County and defendant religiousinstitutions; 41.7 percent of the grant money was awarded totwelve churches which, in some instances, sought funding tocontinue religious services; and the program’s Rules andRegulations explicitly name religious institutions as eligibleapplicants. Therefore, the grant program at issue here isneither facially neutral nor neutral in its application. 10