Title: Hughes v. Doe
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060684
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SIDNEY HUGHES 
 
v.  Record No. 060684     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 12, 2007 
JANE DOE, C/O PRATT MEDICAL 
CENTER, LTD., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 
John W. Scott, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the dismissal with 
prejudice of claims against an employee on procedural grounds 
precludes further proceedings against the employer on a theory 
of respondeat superior. 
 
On January 23, 2004, Sidney E. Hughes filed this personal 
injury action against "Jane Doe" and her employer, Pratt 
Medical Center, Ltd. (Pratt).  Hughes alleged that she was 
injured in 2002 as a result of Doe's negligence in performing 
a venipuncture procedure.  Hughes asserted that Pratt, as 
Doe's employer, was liable for Doe's negligence on the basis 
of respondeat superior.1 
 
In 2005, Hughes learned that Jane Doe was actually 
Melissa D. Lucas and filed a motion to amend her 
pleadings to substitute Lucas as the defendant.  Pratt 
filed a special plea in bar and opposition to the motion 
for leave to amend, arguing that Hughes' claim against 
                     
1 Hughes also claimed negligent training and hiring but 
that claim was dismissed and is not before us in this appeal. 
 
2
Lucas was barred by the statute of limitations.  The 
trial court granted Hughes' motion for amendment but 
sustained Pratt's plea in bar, holding that Hughes' 
substitution of Lucas for Jane Doe was not the correction 
of a misnomer but the addition of a different party and 
did not relate back to the date the action was initially 
filed.  The trial court concluded that the action against 
Lucas was untimely and entered an order dismissing Lucas 
with prejudice. 
 
Pratt then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 
that because Pratt's liability was wholly derivative of Lucas' 
negligence, the dismissal of Lucas with prejudice precluded 
further action against Pratt.  The trial court agreed and 
entered an order dismissing the case, stating that "when a 
master and servant are sued together and the master's 
liability, if any, is solely dependent on the servant's 
conduct, a dismissal with prejudice of the servant, even if 
the servant is dismissed on procedural grounds, necessarily 
exonerates the master and leaves the Court with no choice but 
to dismiss the case" against the master.  We awarded Hughes an 
appeal. 
 
On appeal, Hughes asserts that our jurisprudence does not 
require the dismissal of a claim against the employer when the 
employer's liability was based solely on a theory of 
 
3
respondeat superior and the claim against the employee was 
dismissed on procedural grounds.  Citing Roughton Pontiac 
Corp. v. Alston, 236 Va. 152, 156-57, 372 S.E.2d 147, 149-50 
(1988), Hughes argues that exoneration of the employer is 
justified only if the employee has been actually exonerated as 
a matter of fact. 
 
In response, Pratt begins with the principle that when 
the employer and employee are sued together and the employer's 
liability is solely derived from the employee's conduct, 
exoneration of the employee exonerates the employer.  From 
this principle, Pratt postulates that a final judgment 
dismissing an action against the employee with prejudice, 
regardless of the basis for that dismissal, should have the 
same preclusive effect on the employer's liability as a 
factual determination by a jury that the employee was not 
negligent.  Pratt bases its theory on language from our prior 
opinion stating that a dismissal with prejudice "is defined as 
'an adjudication on the merits, and final disposition, barring 
the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or 
cause,' " operates as res judicata, and is "as conclusive of 
the rights of the parties as if the suit had been prosecuted 
to a final disposition adverse to the plaintiff."  Reed v. 
Liverman, 250 Va. 97, 99-100, 458 S.E.2d 446, 447 (1995).  We 
reject Pratt’s position for the following reasons. 
 
4
 
First, the derivative liability principle recited by 
Pratt is applied when a verdict or other finding that the 
employee was not negligent is the basis for exoneration of the 
employer in the same case, see, e.g., Roughton, 236 Va. at 
156-57, 372 S.E.2d at 150; Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 
172 S.E.2d 751, 757 (1970); Whitfield v. Whittaker Mem’l 
Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 183, 169 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1969); Virginia 
State Fair Ass'n v. Burton, 182 Va. 365, 368, 28 S.E.2d 716, 
717-18 (1944), or in subsequent litigation through the 
application of the res judicata bar, see, e.g., Ward v. 
Charlton, 177 Va. 101, 115, 12 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1941).  We 
have never applied this principle to claims against an 
employer when the employee was dismissed with prejudice on a 
plea in bar or other procedural matter.  This limited 
application reflects the fact that the crux of respondeat 
superior liability is a finding that the employee was 
negligent. 
 
Second, under Virginia law a plaintiff pursuing relief 
against an employer on a theory of respondeat superior is not 
required to file an action against the employee alleging the 
employee was negligent.  See, e.g., Plummer v. Center 
Pyschiatrists, Ltd., 252 Va. 233, 234-35, 476 S.E.2d 172, 173 
(1996) (plaintiff filed suit only against employer seeking 
recovery for tort of employee on basis of respondeat 
 
5
superior); Sayles v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 242 Va. 328, 
329, 410 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1991) (same).  No judgment against 
the employee individually is necessary for recovery; only a 
finding that the employee was negligent. 
 
To adopt Pratt's position requires that we consider the 
dismissal of Hughes' claim with prejudice based on a plea in 
bar to be an affirmative finding that Lucas was not negligent.  
We have never embraced a theory that such a dismissal is in 
fact a decision on the merits.  While a dismissal with 
prejudice based on a plea in bar extinguishes the viability of 
the claim against the dismissed party, it does not do so based 
on the merits of the claim.  Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 
436, 440, 463 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1995) ("[A] dismissal with 
prejudice on the basis of a plea in bar, is conclusive as to 
the rights of those parties, even though the substantive claim 
of the plaintiff has not been litigated on the merits."); see 
also Lofton Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 268 Va. 377, 
380, 601 S.E.2d 648, 650 (2004) (noting that dismissal with 
prejudice based on a plea in bar "did not decide the case on 
the merits"). 
 
In this case, the dismissal with prejudice of Lucas was 
not an affirmative finding of non-negligence; it merely 
terminated Hughes' ability to hold Lucas liable for any 
alleged negligence.  To conclude that the dismissal with 
 
6
prejudice in this case terminates Hughes' ability to pursue a 
claim against Pratt, in the absence of any finding that Lucas 
was not negligent, goes well beyond our established 
jurisprudence.2 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the order dismissing 
the claims against Lucas with prejudice for failure to comply 
with the statute of limitations was not a holding on the 
merits of Lucas’ alleged negligence and therefore neither 
exonerated Pratt nor otherwise precluded Hughes from pursuing 
her claim against Pratt for Lucas' negligence on a theory of 
respondeat superior.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE AGEE joins, dissenting. 
 
I conclude the circuit court’s judgment dismissing with 
prejudice the claim against the servant, Melissa D. Lucas, was 
“as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had 
been prosecuted to a final disposition.”  Virginia Concrete 
Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Va. 821, 825, 91 S.E.2d 415, 
                     
2 In Shutler v. Augusta Health Care for Women, P.L.C., 272 
Va. 87, 630 S.E.2d 313 (2006), we did not need to address 
whether the dismissal of claims against an employee on 
procedural grounds exonerated the employer because the order 
in that case expressly authorized further proceedings against 
the employer. 
 
7
418 (1956).  That judgment thus exonerated Lucas’ employer, 
Pratt Medical Center, LTD., from liability.  See Roughton 
Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 236 Va. 152, 156, 372 S.E.2d 147, 149 
(1988).  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would 
affirm the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the claim 
against Pratt. 
Today, the majority declines to follow this Court’s well 
established principle that a dismissal of a defendant or claim 
“‘with prejudice’” constitutes “ ‘an adjudication on the 
merits, and final disposition, barring the right to bring or 
maintain an action on the same claim or cause.’ ”  Reed v. 
Liverman, 250 Va. 97, 99, 458 S.E.2d 446, 447 (1995) (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary 469 (6th ed. 1990)); accord Dalloul v. 
Agbey, 255 Va. 511, 512, 499 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1998); Virginia 
Concrete, 197 Va. at 825, 91 S.E.2d at 418.  Instead, the 
majority reasons that the circuit court’s dismissal with 
prejudice based on the running of the statute of limitations 
was not tantamount to an affirmative finding on the merits 
that the servant was not negligent.  Citing Gilbreath v. 
Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 463 S.E.2d 836 (1995), and Lofton 
Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 268 Va. 377, 601 
S.E.2d 648 (2004), the majority concludes that “[w]hile a 
dismissal with prejudice based on a plea in bar extinguishes 
 
8
the viability of the claim against the dismissed party, it 
does not do so based on the merits of the claim.” 
In my view, the flaw in the majority’s analysis lies in 
its focus on the nature of the plea in bar rather than on the 
dismissal with prejudice.  I agree that sustaining a plea in 
bar based on the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations is not, in fact, a finding that a servant is not 
negligent.  However, a dismissal with prejudice, regardless of 
the underlying reason for the dismissal, is nevertheless 
“generally as conclusive of the parties’ rights as if the 
action had been tried on the merits with a final disposition 
adverse to the plaintiff.”  Dalloul, 255 Va. at 514, 499 
S.E.2d at 281; see also Virginia Concrete, 197 Va. at 825, 91 
S.E.2d at 418 (“a judgment of dismissal which expressly 
provides that it is ‘with prejudice’ operates as res judicata 
and is as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the 
suit had been prosecuted to a final disposition adverse to the 
plaintiff”). 
That a dismissal with prejudice is treated as an 
adjudication of a claim on the merits is reflected in this 
Court’s decision in Virginia Concrete.  There, a county board 
of supervisors filed a suit to enjoin the defendant from 
operating its concrete plant.  197 Va. at 822, 91 S.E.2d at 
416.  The board alleged that the operation of the plant 
 
9
violated certain zoning ordinances of the county.  Id.  Acting 
without the board’s consent and in violation of the terms of 
his employment as the board’s legal counsel, the board’s 
attorney moved the trial court for a voluntary dismissal of 
the injunction suit and endorsed an order dismissing the suit 
“with prejudice to your complainant’s right to bring another 
suit on the same cause.”  Id.  The board subsequently filed 
another suit on the same claim and alleged, in part, that the 
dismissal with prejudice of the first suit was a nullity and 
should be set aside.  Id.  In its answer, the defendant 
asserted that the dismissal with prejudice of the first suit 
“was a complete adjudication of the matters and things 
involved . . . and was res judicata as to all matters and 
things alleged in that suit and in the [second] suit.”  Id. at 
823, 91 S.E.2d at 417. 
On appeal, we agreed with the defendant and explained the 
effect of the dismissal with prejudice of the first suit: 
“[I]t would decide that what the defendant was doing was not a 
violation of the zoning ordinance and that the county could 
not thereafter maintain a suit under the terms of that 
ordinance to stop the defendant or its successors from such 
operations.”1  Id. at 827, 91 S.E.2d at 419.  In other words, 
                     
1 We ultimately held that the county board of supervisors 
was not bound by the dismissal with prejudice of the first 
 
10
the dismissal with prejudice of the first suit was the same as 
an adjudication on the merits of the claim.  See also Reed, 
250 Va. at 99–100, 458 S.E.2d at 447 (holding that a dismissal 
with prejudice stemming from the settlement of an action 
rather than from an adjudication of the claim barred 
prosecution of the second action on the same claim). 
The court in North American Specialty Insurance Co. v. 
Boston Medical Group, 906 A.2d 1042 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), 
addressed arguments similar to those raised in the case before 
us.  There, the defendant asserted that the dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s first action on the basis of the statute of 
limitations precluded the plaintiff’s second action under the 
doctrine of res judicata.  Id. at 1045.  The plaintiff 
countered that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the 
                                                                
suit because, “[i]n the absence of express authority from the 
[county,] the consent of its attorneys did not bind it or 
deprive it of a right to have the ‘with prejudice’ feature of 
the decree set aside.”  Virginia Concrete, 197 Va. at 829, 91 
S.E.2d at 421. 
Similarly, in Shutler v. Augusta Health Care for Women, 
P.L.C., 272 Va. 87, 630 S.E.2d 313 (2006), this Court held 
that, because of certain language in the trial court’s order, 
the dismissal of a claim against a servant with prejudice did 
not “equate to an adjudication on the merits so as to preclude 
or limit [the plaintiff’s] ability to litigate the matters she 
alleged in her motion for judgment, including issues related 
to [the servant’s] allegedly negligent conduct, in pursuing 
her claims against [the master].”  Id. at 93, 630 S.E.2d at 
316.  Until today, these two cases are the only instances in 
which this Court has held that a dismissal with prejudice did 
not operate as an injunction on the merits. 
 
 
11
second action because a dismissal based on the statute of 
limitations was not an adjudication on the merits.  Id.  In 
affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the second action on 
the basis of res judicata, the appellate court distinguished 
between a dismissal on a procedural ground and a dismissal 
predicated on an affirmative defense: 
The principle underlying these cases is that a 
dismissal on a procedural ground is not a determination 
by the court that the plaintiff cannot maintain a cause 
of action; rather, it is a defect in practice, procedure, 
or form that may be corrected in the second lawsuit to 
allow the cause of action to proceed.  On the other hand, 
a dismissal of a claim because of an affirmative defense, 
like sovereign immunity . . . precludes a plaintiff from 
ever prosecuting that claim.  We believe that the 
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations falls 
in that latter category.  In dismissing a complaint that, 
on its face, is barred by the statute of limitations, the 
court is deciding that the plaintiff can never maintain 
that cause of action.  Consequently, when a circuit court 
. . . grants a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
complaint, on its face, is barred by the statute of 
limitations, such dismissal is an adjudication on the 
merits for res judicata purposes. 
 
Id. at 1050 (citations omitted); see also DeGraff v. Smith, 
157 P.2d 342, 343 (Ariz. 1945) (plaintiff’s voluntary 
dismissal of servant with prejudice meant the master could not 
be held liable). 
Nevertheless, the majority relies on language from this 
Court’s decisions in Gilbreath and Lofton Ridge to conclude 
that the dismissal with prejudice of the claim against Lucas 
did not have the same effect as an adjudication on the merits 
 
12
of the claim.  Upon examining the issues in those cases, I 
conclude those two decisions are not dispositive of the issue 
currently before the Court and that the language quoted by the 
majority, when viewed in context, does not support the 
majority’s conclusion. 
In Gilbreath, the issue on appeal was “whether the 
dismissal of an action pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3:3 for 
lack of timely service is with or without prejudice.”  250 Va. 
at 438, 463 S.E.2d at 836.  The two plaintiffs, who had 
effected service of process on the defendants more than one 
year after the commencement of their respective actions, 
argued that a dismissal under Rule 3:3 must be without 
prejudice for two reasons, because “the dismissal is not based 
on the merits of the claim [and because] a dismissal with 
prejudice would conflict . . . with Code § 8.01-229(E)(1).”2  
Id. at 439, 463 S.E.2d at 837.  In the context of rejecting 
the first argument, the Court pointed out that “not all 
dismissals terminating a cause of action without determining 
the merits are dismissals without prejudice.”  Id. at 440, 463 
S.E.2d at 837.  As an example, the Court noted that a 
dismissal based on a plea of sovereign immunity is a dismissal 
                     
2 Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) contains a tolling provision for 
an action that “for any cause abates or is dismissed without 
determining the merits.” 
 
 
13
with prejudice even though the merits of the underlying claim 
are not actually adjudicated.  Id.  Thus, the Court held that 
“a dismissal under Rule 3:3 is not precluded from being a 
dismissal with prejudice even though the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim were not determined.”  Id. 
In rejecting the second argument that a dismissal with 
prejudice would conflict with Code § 8.01-229(E)(1), the Court 
held that “for purposes of Code § 8.01-229(E)(1), a dismissal 
with prejudice is a determination on the merits.”  Id. at 440, 
463 S.E.2d at 837–38.  The Court reiterated: “A dismissal with 
prejudice generally is ‘as conclusive of the rights of the 
parties as if the suit had been prosecuted to a final 
disposition adverse to the plaintiff,’ and it not only 
terminates the particular action, ‘but also the right of 
action upon which it is based.’ ”  Id. at 440, 463 S.E.2d at 
837 (quoting Virginia Concrete, 197 Va. at 825, 91 S.E.2d at 
418). 
Thus, contrary to the majority’s view, Gilbreath does not 
stand for the proposition that a dismissal with prejudice 
based on a plea in bar is not treated as an adjudication on 
the merits.  Instead, the Court merely explained that a 
dismissal under Rule 3:3, like a dismissal based on a plea in 
bar, operates as a dismissal with prejudice even though the 
merits of the underlying claim are not in fact adjudicated.  
 
14
The Court has always recognized that, in many situations, 
there is not an actual adjudication on the merits of a claim 
when it is dismissed with prejudice.  But, as the Court has 
said repeatedly, a dismissal with prejudice “is as conclusive 
of the rights of the parties as if the suit had been 
prosecuted to a final disposition adverse to the plaintiff.”  
Virginia Concrete, 197 Va. at 825, 91 S.E.2d at 418 (emphasis 
added); accord Dalloul, 255 Va. at 514, 499 S.E.2d at 281; 
Reed, 250 Va. at 100, 458 S.E.2d at 447. 
The decision in Lofton Ridge is also inapposite.  That 
case involved the application of the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel, not the effect of a dismissal with prejudice.  268 
Va. at 379, 601 S.E.2d at 649.  In reciting the case’s 
procedural history, the Court noted that the defendant had 
filed a plea in bar alleging that the plaintiff’s claims were 
barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel and election of 
remedies.  Id. at 380, 601 S.E.2d at 650.  Continuing, the 
Court pointed out that the trial court, after a two-day trial, 
did not decide the merits of the case, but sustained the plea 
in bar.  Id.  In my view, the procedural history in Lofton 
Ridge, as set forth in the preceding sentence, does not stand 
for the proposition asserted by the majority, i.e., that a 
dismissal with prejudice on a plea in bar does not operate as 
an adjudication on the merits. 
 
15
The majority does not dispute the principle that “where 
master and servant are sued together in tort, and the master’s 
liability, if any, is solely dependent on the servant’s 
conduct, a verdict for the servant necessarily exonerates the 
master.”  Roughton Pontiac, 236 Va. at 156, 372 S.E.2d at 149; 
see also Santen v. Tuthill, 265 Va. 492, 499, 578 S.E.2d 788, 
792 (2003); Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 172 S.E.2d 
751, 757 (1970).  The majority, however, concludes that this 
longstanding precedent applies only when there is a verdict or 
other finding that a servant is not negligent.  According to 
the majority, “[w]e have never applied this principle . . . 
where the employee was dismissed with prejudice on a plea in 
bar or other procedural matter.”  But, this Court’s decisions 
have not limited the application of the foregoing legal 
principle to a verdict or affirmative finding that a servant 
is not negligent.  Moreover, until today, the Court has not 
had an occasion to decide whether a dismissal with prejudice 
based on a plea in bar constitutes an adjudication on the 
merits. 
Finally, the majority relies on the premise that “a 
plaintiff pursuing relief against an employer on a theory of 
respondent superior is not required to file an action against 
the employee alleging the employee was negligent.”  I do not 
disagree with that statement, but, in this case, Sidney E. 
 
16
Hughes chose to file the action against “Jane Doe” and her 
employer, Pratt, and alleged that Pratt was liable for Doe’s 
negligence on the basis of respondeat superior.  Hughes then 
amended her pleadings to substitute Lucas in the place of Doe.  
Thus, Hughes is bound by the consequences of her pleadings. 
For these reasons, I conclude that the circuit court’s 
sustaining the plea in bar based on the statute of limitations 
and dismissing with prejudice the claim against Lucas, the 
servant, operated as an adjudication on the merits of that 
claim.  See Reed, 250 Va. at 99, 458 S.E.2d at 447.  That 
adjudication necessarily exonerated the master, Pratt.  See 
Roughton Pontiac, 236 Va. at 156, 372 S.E.2d at 149.  Thus, I 
respectfully dissent and would affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment dismissing the claim against Pratt.