Title: State v. Carlos R. Delgado
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP002194-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2194-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Carlos R. Delgado,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  215 Wis. 2d 16, 572 N.W.2d 479 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 21, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Kremers 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Joseph E. Schubert and Brennan & Collins, Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Joseph E. Schubert. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Carlos R. Delgado, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 21, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Delgado, 215 Wis. 2d 16, 572 N.W.2d 479 (Ct. App. 1997), which 
affirmed an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 
Jeffrey A. Kremers, Judge.  The order of the circuit court 
denied defendant Carlos R. Delgado's motion for a new trial. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial.  The circuit court's denial of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial is based on the circuit 
court's finding that juror C.1 was not biased against the 
                     
1 We follow the practice of the court of appeals in using 
this designation for the juror.  
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
2 
defendant and that the defendant therefore was accorded a fair 
trial with an impartial jury.  
¶3 
The defendant was convicted by a jury of six counts of 
first degree sexual assault of two young girls.  Juror C. failed 
to disclose during voir dire that she had been a victim of a 
sexual assault when she was a child.  Juror C. revealed this 
fact during jury deliberations. 
¶4 
The circuit court found no actual or inferred juror 
bias.  We conclude that the circuit court's finding of no 
inferred juror bias is clearly erroneous because it is not 
supported by the record.  As a result, the circuit court's 
finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that it was 
more probable than not under the facts and circumstances 
surrounding this case that the juror was biased against the 
defendant was also clearly erroneous. 
¶5 
Because the circuit court denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial based on findings that were clearly 
erroneous, we conclude that the circuit court's denial of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Accordingly we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and the order of the circuit court denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.  We remand the cause to the 
circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.2 
                     
2 Because we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause, we need not, and do not, reach other 
issues raised. 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
3 
I 
¶6 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review. 
 On January 29, 1993, the defendant was convicted by a jury of 
six counts of first degree sexual assault on two girls who were 
ages 7 and 9 when the assaults occurred. 
¶7 
During 
voir 
dire 
the 
circuit 
court 
asked 
each 
prospective juror to answer eight questions of a biographical 
nature.  The sixth question was "whether you have ever been a 
victim or witness to a crime." 
¶8 
Juror C. did not disclose in response to this question 
that she had been a victim of sexual assault when she was a 
child.  Juror C. stated that she worked at an institution of 
higher learning, that she had never before served on a jury and 
that she had "not been a victim or witness of a crime."   
¶9 
The assistant district attorney asked juror C. the 
following question:  "In connection with your [employment], have 
you had occasion to deal with any sexual abuse issues involving 
children or adult survivors of sexual abuse?"  Juror C. 
answered, "No, I have not."  She did not take this opportunity 
to disclose that she had been sexually assaulted as a child or 
that she herself was an adult survivor of sexual assault. 
¶10 The assistant district attorney asked the entire jury 
panel whether there were "any members of the jury panel who have 
any experience working with children."  In response, several 
prospective jurors raised their hands, including juror C., who 
stated, "I coached 7 and 8 year olds in soccer and I also coach 
within the . . . school system forensics and I also taught in 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
4 
boy scouts and girl scouts."  The assistant district attorney 
then asked juror C. whether "in any of those context[s], have 
you ever become aware of or has it been reported to you anything 
about any of those kids being victims of sexual abuse?"  The 
juror responded with a simple "No," and again did not take the 
opportunity to disclose her own experience of childhood sexual 
assault. 
¶11 The assistant district attorney's next question to the 
entire jury panel was the following:  "Are there any members of 
the jury panel who either have a close friend or close relative 
or you yourself who have been the victim of a sexual assault, 
either as a child or as an adult?"  In response, several people 
on the panel raised their hands.  One woman stated that her 5-
year-old nephew was sexually assaulted by a distant relative, 
that the incident was reported to the police and that the matter 
was now going to trial.  One man said that his girlfriend's 
child was sexually abused at the age of 2 or 3 by a former 
boyfriend and that the abuse had been reported to child 
protective services.  A third juror stated that a good friend of 
hers was sexually abused from the age of 6 or 7 to the age of 
sixteen by her father, but that the incidents had not been 
reported to the police.  
¶12 After 
these 
three 
prospective 
jurors 
finished 
answering, the assistant district attorney then asked, "Is there 
anybody else who I missed?"  In response, a fourth panelist 
raised his hand.  He explained that his wife was abused by her 
older brother for a year when she was 8 and that when she was 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
5 
older she was the victim of a date rape.  He stated that neither 
incident had been reported to the police. 
¶13 After the fourth prospective juror finished answering, 
the assistant district attorney again asked the entire panel, 
"Is there anybody on the jury panel who I missed on this 
question?"  No additional panel members responded, and juror C. 
sat silent.   
¶14 Later in voir dire, defense counsel asked juror C. 
about her duties at work and the ages of the children with whom 
she worked.  In answering, juror C. again failed to raise the 
issue of her childhood sexual assault. 
¶15 Two of the four prospective jurors who reported 
incidents in which people close to them had been victims of 
sexual assault sat on the jury. 
¶16 After trial, on February 18, 1993, the circuit court 
received a letter from another juror.  The letter stated: 
"During deliberations, a juror revealed that she had been a 
victim of sexual assault or abuse but did not provide this 
information under questioning prior to the trial."  This juror 
later identified juror C. as the person who failed to disclose 
the sexual assault.  The circuit court transmitted the letter to 
counsel and discussed the matter with counsel a number of times 
over the next few months as the sentencing phase proceeded.  
After a judgment of conviction was entered on July 14, 1993, 
defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial based upon the 
substance of the juror's letter to the circuit court.   
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
6 
¶17 On September 9, 1993, the circuit court (Circuit Judge 
John J. DiMotto) held a hearing on the defendant's motion for a 
new trial, with juror C. as the only witness.  Defense counsel 
asked juror C.:  "During the course of voir dire, questions were 
asked of potential jurors as to whether or not they had ever 
been victims of a sexual assault.  Do you recall those questions 
being asked?"  In response, juror C. stated, "The way I 
understood it and heard it is were you ever a victim of a 
crime. . . .  I'm saying that I understood that it was not a 
crime because it was never reported."  Juror C., however, said 
she did recall other members of the panel describing on the 
record various incidents in which people close to them had been 
victims of sexual assaults that were never reported.  In 
response to questions posed by the assistant district attorney, 
juror C. testified that she answered all questions on voir dire 
honestly as she understood them at the time and that she did not 
harbor any bias or prejudice against the defendant because he 
was charged with a sexual assault. 
¶18 The circuit court (Circuit Judge John J. DiMotto) 
found juror C.'s testimony to be credible and concluded that the 
voir dire question whether the jurors themselves, their friends 
or relatives were victims of sexual assault was vague.  The 
circuit court explained that "based on the drafting of the 
question, the way the question was phrased, I do not find based 
on her testimony here today that she incorrectly or incompletely 
answered that question."  The circuit court therefore held that 
the first part of the test for juror bias set forth by this 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
7 
court in State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985),3 
was not satisfied and denied the motion for a new trial.  The 
first part of the Wyss test is that the defendant must 
demonstrate that the juror incorrectly or incompletely responded 
to a material question on voir dire.  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726. 
¶19 The defendant appealed.  On March 28, 1995, in an 
unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held that the 
defendant had satisfied the first part of the Wyss test.  The 
court of appeals held that the record clearly established that 
juror C. incorrectly or incompletely responded to the material 
questions of whether she had been "a victim to a crime," or "a 
victim of a sexual assault" by not answering these questions 
during voir dire.  The court of appeals further concluded that 
despite the juror's belief that she had answered the questions 
correctly and completely and despite the circuit court's 
assessment 
that 
her 
testimony 
was 
credible, 
the 
juror's 
responses were neither complete nor correct. 
¶20 The court of appeals remanded the cause to the circuit 
court to determine the second part of the Wyss test, that is, 
whether the defendant in this case demonstrated under the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the particular case it was more 
probable than not that juror C. was biased against the 
defendant.  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726. 
                     
3 State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), was 
overruled in part, on grounds not relevant to this case, by 
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 504-05, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990). 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
8 
¶21 On remand, the circuit court (Circuit Judge Jeffrey A. 
Kremers) held an evidentiary hearing.  Juror C. testified that 
when she was 6 or 7 years old she was sexually assaulted by a 
person whom she knew but who was not a relative.  She also 
stated that only one assault had occurred over 40 years before 
and that it had not been reported. 
¶22 In response to questions by the circuit court, juror 
C. further testified that during jury deliberations only one of 
the other jurors believed that the State had not proved its case 
against the defendant.  At one point during deliberations, juror 
C., in anger, said to the holdout juror, "You don't know what it 
feels like, but I happen to know what it feels like to be taken 
advantage of."  According to juror C., the holdout juror 
replied, "Why didn't you report it during voir dire?"  Juror C. 
also stated at this hearing that at no time during the trial did 
she hold any bias or prejudice against the defendant. 
¶23 In ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, 
the circuit court (Judge Jeffrey A. Kremers) concluded that the 
second part of the Wyss test was not satisfied and denied the 
motion for a new trial.  The second part of the Wyss test is 
that the defendant in this case must demonstrate that it is more 
probable than not that under the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the particular case, the juror was biased against 
the defendant.  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726.  The circuit court 
found that "the evidence is overwhelming that in this case 
[juror C.] was an impartial juror who based her verdict solely 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
9 
on the evidence without any influence or bias from her prior 
victimization."  
¶24 The defendant appealed this second circuit court order 
denying him a new trial.  A divided court of appeals affirmed 
the order and held that based upon "the juror's testimony that 
she was not biased against Delgado, which the trial court found 
to be credible, this finding is not 'clearly erroneous.'"  
Delgado, 215 Wis. 2d at 32.  The court of appeals concluded that 
there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that juror C. 
harbored an actual bias against the defendant.  The court of 
appeals further stated that no "facts and circumstances [were] 
demonstrated from which bias may be inferred."  Delgado, 215 
Wis. 2d at 33. 
II 
¶25 The defendant asserts that his federal4 and state5 
constitutional rights to be tried by an impartial jury have been 
violated.  The defendant bases his claim on juror C.'s having 
given incorrect or incomplete responses to material questions 
posed during voir dire and on juror C.'s close emotional 
connection with the charges in this case. 
¶26 The voir dire "serves to protect that right [to trial 
by an impartial jury] by exposing possible biases, both known 
and unknown, on the part of potential jurors."  McDonough Power 
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).  The 
                     
4 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
5 Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
10
effectiveness of voir dire depends upon the thorough and well-
reasoned questions posed by counsel and the circuit court, as 
well as the accuracy and completeness of the answers provided by 
prospective jurors.  Deficiencies in either the questions asked 
or answers given during voir dire may result in the seating of 
jurors who hold undiscovered or undisclosed biases against a 
defendant. 
¶27 We have repeatedly stated that this court is reluctant 
to grant new trials, State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 161, 549 
N.W.2d 435 (1996), and that jury verdicts should not be 
impeached easily.  After Hour Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 
108 Wis. 2d 734, 744, 324 N.W.2d 686 (1982).  Nevertheless, the 
value of finality and the sanctity of a jury verdict must yield 
when juror bias undermines confidence in the fairness and 
impartiality of the trial. 
¶28 The parties agree, and we conclude, that this case is 
governed by the Wyss decision. See Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 714-32. 
 The decision whether to deny a motion for a new trial on the 
basis of a juror's incorrect or incomplete response to a 
question during voir dire lies within the discretion of the 
circuit court.  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 717.  An appellate court 
will not reverse a circuit court's decision on a motion for a 
new trial when a juror fails to fully disclose information 
during voir dire, unless the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion.  A circuit court's erroneous view of the facts 
or the law constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 717-18; State v. Eison, 194 Wis. 2d 160, 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
11
171, 533 N.W.2d 738 (1995).  The term "discretion" contemplates 
a process of reasoning which depends on facts in the record or 
reasonably derived by inference from the record that yield a 
conclusion based on logic and founded on proper legal standards. 
 Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 177-78, 325 N.W.2d 321 
(1982).  The record on appeal must reflect the circuit court's 
reasoned application of the appropriate legal standard to the 
relevant facts of the case.  Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 
66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981). 
¶29 The circuit court's findings on actual and inferred 
bias are findings of fact and will not be reversed unless 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.17(2); 
Johnson 
v. 
Agoncillo, 183 Wis. 2d 143, 159, 515 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Olson, 179 Wis. 2d 715, 720, 508 N.W.2d 616 (Ct. App. 
1993); State v. Louis, 152 Wis. 2d 200, 208, 448 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
III 
¶30 The Wyss decision sets forth a two-part test to 
determine whether a new trial should be granted upon a claim 
that a juror gave an incorrect or incomplete response to a 
question during voir dire.  To be awarded a new trial upon such 
a claim, the defendant in this case must demonstrate:  "(1) that 
the juror incorrectly or incompletely responded to a material 
question on voir dire; and, if so, (2) that it is more probable 
than not that under the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
particular case, the juror was biased against the moving party." 
 Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726. 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
12
¶31 The court of appeals in its first decision held that 
the first part of the Wyss test was met.  Juror C. incorrectly 
or incompletely responded to material questions on voir dire 
asking whether she had been a victim of sexual assault.  This 
issue is not before us. 
¶32 The only issue presented to this court relates to the 
second part of the Wyss test, that is, whether under the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the present case, it is more 
probable than not that juror C. was biased against the 
defendant. See Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726. 
¶33 According to Wyss, the bias, that is, the partiality 
of a juror, may be actual, implied or inferred.6  Wyss, 124 
Wis. 2d at 730.  The failure of a juror in a sexual assault case 
to answer correctly or completely a question during voir dire 
about his or her experience of sexual assault does not 
constitute bias per se.  Olson, 179 Wis. 2d at 720-21.  Whether 
a juror answers a particular question on voir dire honestly or 
dishonestly, or whether an incorrect or incomplete answer was 
inadvertent or intentional, are factors to be considered in 
                     
6 The Wyss case uses the phrase "actual bias" as set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 805.08 (1989-90) to mean that "the prospective 
juror 'has expressed or formed any opinion, or is aware of any 
bias or prejudice in the case.'"  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 730.  The 
Wyss case uses the phrase "implied bias" to mean the type of 
bias set forth in § 805.08 based upon "specific grounds that 
will automatically disqualify prospective jurors without regard 
to whether that person is actually biased, i.e., if 'the juror 
is related by blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney 
appearing in this case, or has a financial interest in the 
case.'"  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 730.  Implied bias is not an issue 
in this case. 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
13
determining whether the juror was biased against the defendant. 
 Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 730.  In this case the circuit court found 
that Juror C. was honest, acted in good faith and did not 
purposely give an incorrect or incomplete answer.  The circuit 
court found that there was no actual juror bias.  We conclude 
that that finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. 
¶34 Wyss explains, however, that bias may be inferred from 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the prospective juror's 
answers during voir dire.  Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 730.  Inferred 
bias is a factual finding that turns on an evaluation of the 
facts 
and 
circumstances, 
including 
those 
surrounding 
the 
challenged juror's incorrect or incomplete response to questions 
during voir dire.  A finding that a juror was honest and 
truthful and had no actual bias does not foreclose a finding of 
inferred bias.   
¶35 In determining inferred bias, a circuit court should 
consider the following factors, among others: 
 
(1) did the question asked sufficiently inquire into 
the subject matter to be disclosed by the juror; 
 
(2) were the responses of other jurors to the same 
question sufficient to put a reasonable person on 
notice that an answer was required; 
 
(3) did the juror become aware of his or her false or 
misleading answers at anytime during the trial and 
fail to notify the trial court? 
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 731. 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
14
¶36 The circuit court did not consider these factors in 
determining inferred bias.  Yet these factors support a finding 
of inferred bias when applied to the facts of this record. 
¶37 As to the first factor, the circuit court (Judge John 
J. DiMotto) at the first hearing found the following question to 
be vague and insufficient to alert juror C. of what was being 
asked:  "Are there any members of the jury panel who either have 
a close friend or close relative or you yourself who have been 
the victim of a sexual assault, either as a child or as an 
adult?" 
¶38 The court of appeals ruled in its first decision that 
the question, on its face, constituted an inquiry into the 
subject matter of a juror's prior personal knowledge or 
experience of sexual assault.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that the question was sufficient to prompt juror C. to 
disclose her own childhood assault.  Nothing in the record 
supports a conclusion that the phraseology of the question 
justified juror C.'s silence.  
¶39 As to the second Wyss factor, only one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn from the record:  the responses of other 
jurors to the same question were sufficient to put juror C. on 
notice that she should divulge any sexual assault she may have 
suffered.  Four members of the voir dire panel described the 
sexual assault or abuse experienced by their close friends and 
relatives, including both reported and unreported incidents.  
The statements of these four jurors should have put juror C. on 
notice that she should reveal her unreported sexual assault. 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
15
¶40 As to the third Wyss factor, juror C.'s testimony 
demonstrates, without question, that juror C. became aware of 
her failure to answer the voir dire question correctly and 
completely during jury deliberations.  Juror C. testified that 
she was confronted during jury deliberations by the holdout 
juror, who asked, "Why didn't you report it during voir dire?"  
At that moment, if not before, juror C. became aware that she 
had incorrectly or incompletely responded to the voir dire 
question.  She did not, however, notify the circuit court at 
that time or at any other time until called to testify at the 
post-conviction hearing.  
¶41 The circuit court did not carefully examine these 
facts and circumstances to determine whether juror C.'s bias 
might be inferred.  In finding no inferred bias, the circuit 
court relied on its finding that juror C. was honest and 
credible and relied on its conclusion that simply being a victim 
of sexual assault does not make a person predisposed to decide a 
case in a particular way.   
¶42 We agree with the circuit court that a juror's honesty 
is an important factor in determining inferred bias and that 
being a victim of sexual assault does not per se predispose the 
person to a particular result in a sexual assault case.  The 
circuit court, however, did not examine juror C.'s responses 
during voir dire and her post-trial testimony to determine 
whether from an objective standard they revealed bias.  The 
circuit court failed to consider that although a juror might 
believe he or she is impartial and the circuit court may find no 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
16
actual juror bias, the juror's conduct might have revealed such 
a close connection between the juror and the case that bias may 
be inferred.  This is such a case for the following reasons. 
¶43 Juror C. was a victim of the same type of sexual 
assault as the crimes with which the defendant was charged.  The 
charge of sexual assault on young girls and juror C.'s 
experience of a sexual assault as a child are closely connected. 
 Although the assault on juror C. had occurred many years 
before, it understandably might have had a deep and lasting 
effect on her.  
¶44 Juror C. withheld material information about her 
sexual assault even though the information was expressly and 
repeatedly sought and other jurors responded appropriately.  
Juror C. disclosed the information in a moment of anger during 
jury deliberations.  Even when juror C. must have realized that 
she had not been totally forthright during voir dire, she failed 
to disclose the problem to the circuit court.  
¶45 The probability that juror C.'s substantial emotional 
involvement would adversely affect her impartiality was high.  
Her 
emotional 
involvement 
was 
demonstrated 
by 
the 
close 
similarity of her experience with the crimes charged, her 
incorrect and incomplete responses during voir dire, her 
revelation of her experience during jury deliberations, and her 
failure to report her omission to the court. 
¶46 Although juror C.'s responses during voir dire were 
honest and made in good faith, and although she stated that she 
had no actual bias against the defendant and the circuit court 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
17
so found, we conclude that the circuit court's finding of no 
inferred juror bias was clearly erroneous because it was not 
supported by the record. 
¶47 On the basis 
of 
our review of 
the 
facts and 
circumstances surrounding this case and use of the Wyss 
methodology, we conclude that juror bias may be inferred in this 
case and that it is therefore more probable than not that juror 
C. was biased against the defendant. 
¶48 The court of appeals did not assess the circuit 
court's failure to consider whether juror bias could be 
inferred.  Rather, the court of appeals in conclusory fashion, 
without reviewing the evidence, decided that no facts or 
circumstances existed from which bias might be inferred.  
Delgado, 215 Wis. 2d at 33. 
¶49 Because the circuit court exercised its discretion to 
deny the defendant's motion for a new trial on a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact of no inferred bias, we conclude that 
the circuit court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial was an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶50 When 
a 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercises 
its 
discretion we may remand the matter to the circuit court to 
exercise discretion or may decide the issue ourselves if the 
record permits.  We do not remand this matter for exercise of 
its discretion because the record leaves no doubt that bias is 
to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of this case 
under Wyss. 
No. 96-2194-CR 
 
18
¶51 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and the order of the circuit court denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.  We remand the cause to the 
circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.