Title: Michigan v. Lewis (Opinion on Application)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 156092
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 2018

PEOPLE v LEWIS
 
Docket No. 156092.  Decided December 27, 2018. 
 
 
Robert D. Lewis was convicted in the Macomb Circuit Court of one count of first-degree 
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b, and five counts of second-degree criminal sexual 
conduct, MCL 750.520c, for sexually assaulting his live-in girlfriend’s daughters.  The court, 
Richard L. Caretti, J., sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 
25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction and to 200 
to 360 months’ imprisonment for the second-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions.  The 
court also assessed $4,500 in costs and fees, representing $3,625 for attorney fees and $875 as a 
separate judgment.  Defendant appealed, challenging his convictions and the amount of attorney 
fees assessed against him.  The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences 
in an unpublished per curiam opinion, issued May 18, 2018 (Docket No. 331513), holding that 
the trial court properly awarded attorney fees without making findings of fact regarding the 
award of attorney fees because the language of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) and (iv) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq., was clear such that a separate calculation of costs was 
not required.  Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. 
 
 
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to 
appeal and without hearing oral argument, held: 
 
 
MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) provides, in pertinent part, that if a court determines after a 
hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty, the court may impose any costs reasonably related to 
the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in 
the particular case.  MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) provides, in pertinent part, that if a court determines 
after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty, the court may impose the expenses of 
providing legal assistance to the defendant.  The inclusion of the language “without separately 
calculating those costs involved in the particular case” under Subparagraph (iii) evidenced the 
Legislature’s intent that the provision apply only to that subparagraph.  Inclusion of average-
costs language in Subparagraph (iii)—rather than the Subdivision (b) umbrella—further 
suggested that the Legislature intended to create an exception to the default rule of 
Subdivision (b); if the exception permits costs without separate calculation, then logically the 
default rule must require that costs be separately calculated for the particular case.  Moreover, 
MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) does not include attorney fees in its list of the kinds of costs that do not 
have to be separately calculated for the particular defendant; although this list is nonexclusive, 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
the costs of providing legal assistance to a defendant are logically distinguishable from the costs 
enumerated in Subparagraph (iii), in part because to include legal-assistance costs among 
Subparagraph (iii) costs would be to render Subparagraph (iv) surplusage.  Moreover, the costs 
laid out under Subparagraph (iii) are all fairly standard expenses for a court’s operations, tend 
not to vary significantly by case, and are not affected by any particular case; in contrast, attorney 
fees can vary greatly among defendants depending on a variety of circumstances, such as the 
nature and number of criminal charges. 
 
 
Part V of the Court of Appeals’ opinion reversed; case remanded to the trial court for that 
court to support its findings regarding the cost of providing legal assistance to defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018 State of Michigan 
FILED  December 27, 2018 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 156092 
 
ROBERT DESHAWN LEWIS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
PER CURIAM. 
At issue is whether a sentencing court may impose attorney fees upon a defendant 
under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq., 
without first making findings of fact in support of that amount.  To answer that question, 
we must determine whether the language of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), which gives trial courts 
the authority to assess costs without “separately calculating those costs involved in the 
particular case,” applies to the attorney-fee provision in Subparagraph (iv), which 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
authorizes the imposition of expenses for legal assistance to a defendant.  We conclude that 
it does not.  Accordingly, we reverse Part V of the Court of Appeals’ opinion and remand 
to the trial court for that court to support its findings related to the cost of providing legal 
assistance to defendant.  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In December 2015, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b, and five counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, 
MCL 750.520c, for sexually assaulting his live-in girlfriend’s daughters.  The trial court 
sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 25 to 50 years’ 
imprisonment for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction and to 200 to 360 
months’ imprisonment for the second-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions.  The 
trial court also assessed $4,500 in costs and fees, representing $3,625 for attorney fees and 
$875 as a separate judgment.   
Defendant appealed, challenging his convictions on several grounds, but pertinent 
to this appeal, he challenged the amount of attorney fees assessed against him.  The Court 
of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences in an unpublished per curiam opinion, 
holding that the “trial court’s award of $4,500 in defense costs, without making findings 
of fact as to the award of attorney fees, was proper.”  People v Lewis, unpublished per 
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 18, 2017 (Docket No. 331513), p 6.  
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the language of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) and (iv) was 
clear such that a separate calculation of costs was not required—including the expense of 
providing defendant with legal assistance.  Id.   
 
 
 
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II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.  People v Gardner, 482 
Mich 41, 46; 753 NW2d 78 (2008).   
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION 
“When construing a statute, our primary goal is ‘to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the Legislature.’ ”  People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 395; 666 NW2d 657 (2003), 
quoting People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275 (2002).  “When a court 
interprets a statute, it first looks to its ‘plain language, which provides the most reliable 
evidence of intent.’ ”  People v McFall, 309 Mich App 377, 384; 873 NW2d 112 (2015), 
quoting People v McKinley, 496 Mich 410, 415; 852 NW2d 770 (2014).  If the statute’s 
language is clear and unambiguous, then judicial construction is inappropriate and the 
statute must be enforced as written.  McKinley, 496 Mich at 415.  A necessary corollary of 
this principle is that a “ ‘court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not 
within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute 
itself.’ ”  Phillips, 469 Mich at 395, quoting Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 
57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002).  Furthermore, when the Legislature includes language in 
one part of a statute that it omits in another, it is assumed that the omission was intentional.  
McFall, 309 Mich App at 385-386. 
MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) and (iv) provide, in pertinent part: 
(1) If a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or if the 
court determines after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty, both of 
the following apply at the time of the sentencing or at the time entry of 
judgment of guilt is deferred by statute or sentencing is delayed by statute: 
*   *   * 
 
 
 
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(b) The court may impose any or all of the following: 
*   *   * 
(iii) . . . any costs reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the 
trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the 
particular case . . .  
*   *   * 
(iv) The expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant. 
The instant issue previously appeared before the Court of Appeals in People v Duke, 
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 12, 2016 (Docket 
No. 325473).  That panel held that the trial court was required to establish the cost of legal 
representation for the specific defendant when assessing attorney fees pursuant to MCL 
769.1k(1)(b)(iv).  Id. at 2.  The panel explained:   
[W]hile language in MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) authorizes the trial court to assess 
costs without separately calculating the costs for the particular case, the 
attorney fee provision in MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) does not include that same 
language.  Compare MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) (“any cost reasonably related to 
the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating 
those costs involved in the particular case . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 
MCL 769.1k[(1)(b)](iv) (“[t]he expenses of providing legal assistance to the 
defendant.” (emphasis added)).  When the legislature includes language in 
one part of a statute that it omits in another, it is assumed that the omission 
was intentional.  People v McFall, 309 Mich App 377; 873 NW2d 112 
(2015), quoting People v Peltola, 489 Mich 174, 185; 803 NW2d 140 (2011).  
Thus, the trial court must establish the cost of providing legal services to the 
specific defendant at issue when assessing attorney fees under MCL 
769.1k(1)(b)(iv).  [Duke, unpub op at 2.] 
We agree that the inclusion of the language “without separately calculating those 
costs involved in the particular case” under Subparagraph (iii) evidences the Legislature’s 
intent that the provision apply only to that subparagraph.  Inclusion of average-costs 
language in Subparagraph (iii)—rather than the Subdivision (b) umbrella—further 
 
 
 
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suggests that the Legislature intended to create an exception to the default rule of 
Subdivision (b); if the exception permits costs without separate calculation, then logically 
the default rule must require that costs be separately calculated for the particular case.  
Moreover, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) does not include attorney fees in its list of the kinds of 
costs that do not have to be separately calculated for the particular defendant, namely: 
“[s]alaries and benefits for relevant court personnel,” “[g]oods and services necessary for 
the operation of the court,” and “[n]ecessary expenses for the operation and maintenance 
of court buildings and facilities.”  Although this list is nonexclusive, the costs of providing 
legal assistance to a defendant are logically distinguishable from the costs enumerated in 
Subparagraph (iii), in part because to include legal-assistance costs among Subparagraph 
(iii) costs would be to render Subparagraph (iv) surplusage.  See People v McGraw, 484 
Mich 120, 126; 771 NW2d 655 (2009) (“In interpreting a statute, we avoid a construction 
that would render part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”).  Moreover, the costs laid 
out under Subparagraph (iii) are all fairly standard expenses for a court’s operations, tend 
not to vary significantly by case, and are not affected by any particular case.  In contrast, 
attorney fees can vary greatly among defendants depending on a variety of circumstances, 
such as the nature and number of the criminal charges.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court was required to determine 
the cost of providing legal assistance to defendant pursuant to MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv).  The 
Court of Appeals erred by holding otherwise.  For this reason, we reverse Part V of the 
 
 
 
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Court of Appeals’ opinion and remand to the trial court for that court to support its findings 
regarding the cost of legal assistance provided to defendant.   
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement