Title: Donoghue v. American Nat. Ins. Co.
Citation: 838 So. 2d 1032
Docket Number: 1001926
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2002

838 So. 2d 1032 (2002)
George L. DONOGHUE III
v.
AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Harold Knotts, Jr.
1001926.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 14, 2002.
*1034 Sidney W. Jackson III and Mathew B. Richardson of Jackson &amp; Foster, L.L.C., Mobile, for appellant.
W. Michael Atchison, Rik S. Tozzi, and Benjamin J. Espy of Starnes &amp; Atchison, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellee American National Insurance Company (rehearing brief filed by W. Michael Atchison, Rik S. Tozzi, and Joshua A. Threadcraft).
Edward B. McDonough, Jr., and Kevin D. Graham of McDonough &amp; Graham, P.C., Mobile, for appellee Harold Knotts, Jr.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The opinion of February 22, 2002, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
George Donoghue III seeks review of the Mobile Circuit Court's dismissal of his claims against American National Insurance Company ("American National") and its agent, Harold Knotts, Jr., stemming from Donoghue's purchase of life insurance from American National. Donoghue contends that the dismissalbased upon the trial court's holding that Donoghue's claims were not ripe for adjudicationwas improper. We agree, and we reverse and remand.
In November 1993, Donoghue, through Knotts, purchased a universal life insurance policy from American National. On August 25, 2000, Donoghue filed this action in the Mobile Circuit Court against American National and Knotts, alleging fraud, breach of contract, negligence, conspiracy, and negligent and/or wanton failure to train, supervise, and monitor agents. The foundation of each of the claims in Donoghue's original complaint was the alleged misrepresentation by American National and Knotts that the "universal life insurance policy would meet his stated needs in that monies would be available at retirement."
American National filed a motion to dismiss (which Knotts adopted) pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that Donoghue's claims were not ripe for adjudication. American National later amended its motion to dismiss to assert that Donoghue's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Attached to the amended motion was a copy of Donoghue's policy.
Subsequently, Donoghue amended his complaint to allege (1) that before he purchased the policy Knotts had represented to him that the policy would provide a permanent life insurance plan, as well as a separate "retirement fund"; (2) that his understanding was that if he paid a premium of $73 per month, this separate "retirement fund" would have $125,000 in it when he reached the age of 65, the age at which he planned to retire; and (3) that he later learned that there was no such "retirement fund."
Following a hearing, the trial court granted American National's motion to dismiss, holding that Donoghue's claims were not ripe for adjudication. Donoghue appeals.
American National's motion to dismiss included, as an exhibit, a copy of Donoghue's policy. In general, exhibits provided in support of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are considered "matters outside the pleading" and effectively convert the motion into a motion for a summary judgment. Ala. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see F.A. Dobbs &amp; Sons, Inc. v. Northcutt, 819 So. 2d 607, 609 (Ala.2001) ("Dobbs's attaching exhibits to its motion to dismiss effectively converted it to a summary judgment motion."); Wesson v. McCleave, Roberts, Shields &amp; Green, P.C., 810 So. 2d 652, 656 (Ala.2001) (stating that conversion of a motion to a motion for a summary judgment under Rule 12(b) occurs "`regardless of what the motion has been called or how it was treated by the trial court'" (quoting Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So. 2d 932, 937-38 (Ala.1997))).
However, we are persuaded to embrace the well-founded rule adopted by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals precluding conversion when the exhibits in question are referred to in, and are central to, the plaintiff's complaint:
Wilson v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Georgia, 716 So. 2d 722, 726 (Ala.Civ.App.1998).
Guided by the above analysis, we conclude that we need not treat American National's motion to dismiss as a motion for a summary judgment. Donoghue's complaint specifically references the policy, and the purchase and substance of the policy serve as the foundation for each of Donoghue's claims. Therefore, our review is governed by the following standard:
C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So. 2d 98, 104 (Ala.1995) (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993) (citations omitted)).
In its order granting American National's motion to dismiss, the trial court held as follows:
"Circuit Judge"
Donoghue contends that the trial court erred in relying on Williamson v. Indianapolis Life Insurance Co., 741 So. 2d 1057 (Ala.1999), Stringfellow v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 743 So. 2d 439 (Ala.1999), and DeArman v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 786 So. 2d 1090 (Ala.2000), arguing that each of those cases involves "vanishing premiums" and, therefore, was decided based on a factual context wholly different from the one presented here. Donoghue concedes that in a "vanishing-premium" case (in which large premiums are paid over a short period with the anticipation that at some future date the premiums will "vanish," i.e., will no longer be required from the insured) a claim alleging that a plaintiff might have to pay premiums beyond the date on which the premiums were represented to "vanish" is not ripe for adjudication until a premium payment is made beyond the "vanish" date. See Williamson, 741 So. 2d  at 1060-61 ("Although there are projections suggesting that the agent's alleged representation [that premiums would `vanish' in 2002] was false, there is absolutely no way to know whether this representation was true or was false, until the end of the year 2002."); Stringfellow, 743 So. 2d  at 440-41 (claims filed in December 1997 were not ripe because they were based on an alleged misrepresentation that no premium payments would be required after July 11, 1998); DeArman, 786 So. 2d  at 1092 ("The DeArmans filed this action in January 1996, one year before the represented [`vanish'] date. Therefore, no cause of action had accrued when the DeArmans filed their complaint and no justiciable controversy existed.").
However, Donoghue argues that his circumstance is distinguishable from a vanishing-premium case in that he is alleging not that the policy might not perform as represented, but that it will not perform as represented, because no "retirement fund" exists. Donoghue contends that he suffered immediate injury when he purchased the American National policy because he "understood from Defendant's representations that his [premium] payments would immediately cause his [allegedly nonexistent] retirement plan to start growing and would progressively reach $125,000 at age 65." (Appellant's brief on rehearing pp. 1-2.) Because, as Donoghue alleges, there is no "retirement fund," Donoghue contends that he has been paying for something that does not exist and that his case is similar to Boswell v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 643 So. 2d 580 (Ala.1994), and his claims are ripe for adjudication.
*1038 In Williamson, we summarized Boswell and distinguished that case from the vanishing-premium scenario as follows:
Williamson, 741 So. 2d  at 1061.
We hold that, under the standard of review for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the dismissal of Donoghue's claims was erroneous. Viewing the allegations of Donoghue's complaint most strongly in his favor, we cannot conclude that Donoghue could not prove a set of facts similar to those in Boswellnamely, that due to the alleged tortious actions of the defendants, Donoghue was paying for something that "did not exist and never would exist" and that he consequently has suffered injury sufficient to ripen his claims. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Donoghue's claims.
American National attempts to present this Court with an alternative basis on which to decide this case against Donoghue. Specifically, American National contends that even if Donoghue's claims are ripe for adjudication, those claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.
Generally, we can affirm a trial court's judgment on any basis. See Ex parte City of Fairhope, 739 So. 2d 35, 39 (Ala.1999) ("A trial court's judgment, if correct, should be affirmed even if the court has given a wrong reason in support of its judgment."); see also Steiger v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 653 So. 2d 975, 977 (Ala.1995) ("A judgment properly entered will not be disturbed, even if it is not supported by the reasons stated by the trial court."). However, even if we found merit in American National's statute-of-limitations argument, the procedural posture of this case precludes the use of this "alternative" basis to affirm the trial court's judgment. The trial court held that Donoghue's claims were not ripe; that ruling would allow the claims to be asserted at a later date. Consequently, a decision against Donoghue based upon the statutes of limitations having expired would bar the claims from ever being *1039 brought againa result well beyond mere "affirmance" of the trial court's decision.
For the reasons given above, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Donoghue's claims and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF FEBRUARY 22, 2002, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
SEE and LYONS, JJ., concur in the result.