Title: INDPLS. POWER & LIGHT CO. v. Highland Realty, Inc.
Citation: 253 Ind. 637, 256 N.E.2d 394
Docket Number: 569S108
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 1970

253 Ind. 637 (1970)
256 N.E.2d 394
INDIANAPOLIS POWER &amp; LIGHT COMPANY
v.
HIGHLAND REALTY, INC., D/B/A TRAILER CITY ET AL.
No. 569S108.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 23, 1970.
Rehearing denied April 15, 1970.
Ralph W. Husted, Marcus E. Woods, Indianapolis, Jerry P. Belknap, Jon D. Noland, Indianapolis, and Barnes, Hickam, Pantzer &amp; Boyd, of counsel, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Arthur H. Gemmer, Indianapolis, for appellee, Highland Realty Inc., et al.
*638 Philip L. Bayt, Richard P. Stein, C. Patrick Clancy, as Constituent Members of and Constituting the Public Service Commission of Indiana; Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Alembert W. Brayton, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee, Public Service Commission of Indiana.
HUNTER, C.J.
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Marion Circuit Court, granting a temporary injunction to enjoin appellant, Indianapolis Power &amp; Light Company from enforcing or taking any action pursuant to the terms of an allegedly void administrative order entered by the Public Service Commission of Indiana on April 19, 1968. Appellees, owners and operators of certain duly licensed trailer parks in Indianapolis, brought suit to prevent the appellant Indianapolis Power and Light Company, acting pursuant to said order, from discontinuing electric service to appellees' trailer parks, alleging that such discontinuation of power would cause immediate and irreparable injury to appellees.
The order complained of was issued by the Public Service Commission in PSCI Cause No. 31230, and was based on a complaint filed by the Indianapolis Power &amp; Light Co. against appellees, in accordance with Ind. Ann. Stat. § 54-415 (1969 Supp.) which reads in part as follows:
The amended petition filed by appellant contains the following paragraphs which are pertinent to this appeal:
Said tariff provisions are required by the public policy of the State of Indiana to prevent any authorization or encouragement to the rendition of electric utility service by persons not authorized to act as a public utility under the laws of the state.
Hearing before the Public Service Commission was held on the merits of the petition on March 6, 1968. Appellees herein appeared specially at that hearing arguing by plea in abatement that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over both the subject matter and over appellees. Notwithstanding said objections the Public Service Commission entered an order on April 19, 1968, which determined that:
It is from this order that appellees filed suit for injunctive relief in the Marion Circuit Court. The only assigned error presented in this appeal by appellant is that the trial court *641 erred in entering a temporary injunction restraining and forbidding the enforcement of the PSC's order. We believe that the trial court was in error in assuming jurisdiction over this cause and that its order pursuant thereto should be dissolved.
We shall assume arguendo for the purposes of this appeal that appellees would suffer immediate and irreparable injury from the discontinuance of electric power by appellants. We shall further assume that no harm would result to appellant public utility by requiring it to continue to supply electric service to appellees, and that in any event the posted bond would be sufficient to reimburse it for any damages or costs occasioned by the granting of a temporary injunction. In short we shall assume that appellees were entitled to equitable relief to preserve the status quo until such time as a judicial review could be had on the merits.
Relief from the adverse effects of Public Service Commission orders is expressly provided for by statute at Ind. Ann. Stat. § 54-443 (1969 Supp.):
In a unaminous decision in the case of State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Marion Circuit Court (1961), 242 Ind. 145, 177 N.E.2d 397, this court held that the Appellate Court *642 and not the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for an injunction against the enforcement of an order of the Public Service Commission. In that case the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company filed a petition in the Marion Circuit Court to enjoin temporarily the enforcement of an order of the PSC which permanently suspended the petitioner's new rate schedule. Speaking for this court, Judge Achor recited the following language in his opinion:
The Court's conclusion that jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in such cases rests exclusively in the Appellate Court is fully supported by a comparison of § 54-443, supra, with its predecessor, Acts of 1929, ch. 169, § 1. The latter statute expressly provided that an action may be commenced in the *643 circuit or superior court by the same parties and under the same circumstances as set forth in our present statute. The Indiana General Assembly, in enacting § 54-443, supra, and thereby reposing appellate jurisdiction for judicial review in the Appellate Court instead of the circuit or superior courts, must be presumed to have intended to do just that. It must have intended that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, the only court that can pass on the merits of an order from the PSC, should be comprehensive and exclusive. Anticipating that, as here, injunctive relief may be required in certain instances to prevent irreparable injury to a party aggrieved by such an order, the legislature made the following provision in § 54-449 (1969 Supp.):
Thus it is clear that where a party is adversely affected by an order of the Public Service Commission, such party may challenge such order by applying for either legal or equitable relief or both. However it seems equally clear that any and all such relief must perforce be sought from the Appellate Court which under our statutes is deemed to have exclusive original appellate jurisdiction for judicial review in such matters.
Accordingly, this cause is hereby remanded to the Marion Circuit Court with orders to dissolve forthwith its order of April 10, 1969, granting a temporary injunction in this cause and to dismiss said cause for lack of jurisdiction. Appellees are hereby granted leave to file an appeal in accordance with § 54-443, supra, within thirty (30) days of the date of the filing of this opinion. Appellees' motion to affirm the interlocutory order of the Marion Circuit Court is hereby denied.
All of which is ordered this 23rd day of March, 1970.
*644 Arterburn, DeBruler and Jackson, JJ., concur; Givan, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 256 N.E.2d 394.