Title: Ex parte Yvonne Sumerlin. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Doris Williford, as the personal representative of the estate of Austin Taylor Terry, deceased v. Susan Toole et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080520
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2009

REL: 6/26/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1080520
____________________
Ex parte Yvonne Sumerlin
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Doris Williford, as the personal representative of
the estate of Austin Taylor Terry, deceased
v.
Susan Toole et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, CV-03-565)
On Application for Rehearing
STUART, Justice.
This Court's opinion of April 24, 2009, is withdrawn, and
the following is substituted therefor.
1080520
Terry's parents were divorced.  His mother had legal
1
custody; his father had supervised visitation rights.  
2
Yvonne Sumerlin petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a
summary judgment in her favor on the ground that she is
entitled to State-agent immunity in a wrongful-death action
pending against her and others.  We grant the petition and
issue the writ.
Facts
On Friday, September 6, 2002, the mother of Austin Taylor
Terry  admitted 12-month-old Terry, who had bruises on both
1
sides of his face, both ears, his neck, and his clavicle area,
to the Children's Hospital of Alabama.  Wanda Hawkins, a
medical social worker at Children's Hospital, notified the
Jefferson County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") of
Terry's injuries and reported to the intake worker that Terry
had suffered "suspicious non-accidental injuries"; as part of
the initial-intake information, the intake worker designated
the case as one requiring an "immediate" response.  Hawkins
also spoke with Sumerlin, a service supervisor at DHR.
According to Hawkins, she told Sumerlin that Terry should not
be allowed to go home with his mother until DHR could conduct
1080520
3
an investigation because she suspected child abuse and neglect
based on the nature of Terry's injuries and his mother's "flat
affect," i.e., her nonresponsive attitude. 
Sumerlin did not have an investigator available on
September 6, 2002, to immediately investigate the suspected
abuse.  Sumerlin, however, confirmed that Terry could remain
at Children's Hospital, a protective environment, until
Monday, September 9, when the situation could be investigated.
Sumerlin requested that the hospital contact DHR before
discharging Terry. 
That same day, Terry's father learned of Terry's
hospitalization and contacted DHR.  Because he telephoned the
DHR office after office hours, his call was forwarded to an
on-call DHR service worker, Tammie Godfrey.  After speaking
with Terry's father, Godfrey went to Children's Hospital.  At
the hospital, Godfrey met with Terry's father and helped
police officers take photographs of Terry.  Godfrey also
talked with Terry's mother.  Godfrey learned that Terry's
mother and Chris Wesson, her boyfriend, had been in the house
with Terry on the day Terry was injured.  According to Terry's
mother, Terry had fallen out of his crib.  Godfrey concluded
1080520
4
that Terry should not go home with his mother upon his
discharge from Children's Hospital, and she informed the
police of her conclusion.  She summarized her findings in a
report and submitted it to an administrative assistant at DHR.
On Monday, September 9, 2002,  Sumerlin assigned the
investigation of Terry's suspected abuse to Joann Hood.
During Sumerlin's deposition, she was asked why she did not
assign a caseworker to Terry's case immediately on Friday,
September 6.  She responded: 
"Because I had handled it over the phone that
Friday.  When I spoke with Ms. Hawkins she told me
that -- because it came in that Friday as an
emergency, and I talked with her, she said the baby
would be in the hospital and the baby would be there
through Monday and [it] was not a life-threatening
situation, I was told the baby was in a stable
situation, if the baby could stay there because my
emergency person for that day [Friday, September 6]
was currently working an emergency.  She agreed that
the baby would stay there until my worker saw him on
Monday."
That same day, Monday, September 9, Cindy Deerman, a
medical social worker at Children's Hospital, telephoned DHR
and spoke with Sumerlin to find out DHR's plan for Terry.
Sumerlin, who had not received Godfrey's report, informed
Deerman that Terry could go home with his mother at  discharge
and that Hood would meet Terry and Terry's mother at their
1080520
5
house.  The materials indicate that Terry was discharged from
Children's Hospital at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, September 9.
On September 10, 2002, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Hood
visited Terry and his mother at their house.  Wesson was in
the house at the time of Hood's visit.  Hood interviewed
Terry's mother and Wesson.  She also telephoned Martha Musso,
Terry's great-grandmother.  During the visit, Wesson and
Terry's mother showed Hood Terry's crib.  Wesson and Terry's
mother explained that something was wrong with the rail on the
crib because it would come off track and fall down.  They
stated that Terry had been injured when he fell out of the
crib.  Hood observed the bruise on the right side of Terry's
face and the blotches on his jaw area.  She concluded that
Terry's injuries were consistent with his having fallen out of
the crib.  Hood told Terry's mother to acquire another crib,
and she had Terry's mother and Wesson place the side of the
crib with the broken rail against the wall to prevent future
falls until they could acquire another crib.  Hood determined,
based on her initial investigation, that it was safe to leave
Terry in his mother's care.  
1080520
6
On November 3, 2002, Terry died from brain injuries
caused by punches to his head inflicted by Wesson.  Wesson is
currently serving a 20-year sentence for manslaughter as a
result of Terry's death.
The materials before us indicate that Sumerlin admitted
that intake information relevant to Terry's suspected abuse
"fell through the cracks."  She stated that Hood reported her
initial investigation findings to Sumerlin and that based on
the information she had she agreed with Hood's recommendation
that Terry stay in the home with his mother. 
Doris Williford, as personal representative of Terry's
estate, filed a wrongful-death action against  Sumerlin, in
her individual capacity, and others, including Susan Toole,
the child-welfare administrator for DHR.  In the complaint,
Williford alleged that Sumerlin negligently and wantonly
violated duties she owed  Terry, who, as a victim of child
abuse, was in need of the State's protection.  Specifically,
Williford alleged that Sumerlin negligently and/or wantonly
violated applicable standards of care in  child welfare:
"(a) by failing to comply with applicable rules,
standards, regulations policies and/or procedures
regarding 
the 
proper care, investigations and
1080520
In 1998, R.C., an eight-year-old boy who had been placed
2
in the custody of the Alabama DHR after he had been abused by
his mother and neglected by his father, filed a class-action
lawsuit against the commissioner of the Alabama DHR.  R.C. v.
Walley, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (M.D. Ala. 2005).  As the class
representative, R.C. challenged the conditions and practices
of Alabama's child-welfare system.  After two years of
litigation, the parties negotiated a consent decree that was
approved by the court, which provided, among other things,
mandates with regard to child-welfare-worker caseloads.
7
reporting of a suspected child abuse and/or neglect
case in Jefferson County, Alabama;
"(b) by failing to ensure that [Hood] complied
with mandatory rules and regulations pertaining to
child abuse investigations;
"(c) by failing to timely and adequately gather
and communicate to [Hood] all pertinent information
regarding Austin Taylor Terry;
"(d) by failing to dispatch [Hood] or another
child abuse and neglect investigator to Children's
Hospital within 12 hours after receipt of the report
of alleged abuse to Austin Taylor Terry;
"(e) by failing to implement safety measures for
the protection of Austin Taylor Terry prior to his
release from Children's Hospital;
"(f) by failing to implement a safety plan for
the protection of Austin Taylor Terry;
"(g) by failing to comply with the requirements
of the R.C. Consent Order
 by assigning the Austin
[2]
Taylor Terry investigation to a case worker, [Hood],
whose case load exceeded the R.C. case load mandate;
and,
1080520
8
"(h) by failing to require timely completion of
the 
investigation 
and 
reporting 
of 
said
investigation by [Hood]."
Sumerlin answered, denying the material allegations of
the complaint and asserting the defense of State-agent
immunity.  After some discovery was conducted, Sumerlin moved
for a summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to
State-agent immunity because, she said, her duties were
supervisory in nature and she had not acted beyond her
authority by violating any DHR policies.  She maintained that
Williford could not provide any evidence indicating that
Sumerlin had "failed to follow applicable law or departmental
rules, practices, or procedures or that [she] acted outside
her authority as an employee of [DHR]."  Additionally, she
asserted that Williford could not provide any evidence
indicating that Sumerlin had "acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond her authority, or under a
mistaken interpretation of law."  
Williford responded, arguing that Sumerlin was not
entitled to State-agent immunity because, she said, Sumerlin
had acted "beyond her authority" or "under a mistaken
interpretation of the law" by failing to follow established
1080520
9
policies in the Child Protective Services Policies and
Procedures Manual (hereinafter "the DHR manual") and to ensure
that Hood followed those requirements.  Specifically, she
alleged that  Sumerlin failed to follow the following two
policies regarding intake and initial assessment in cases of
suspected child abuse or neglect:
"CA/N [child abuse/neglect] Intake
"IV.  Analysis and Decision-Making
"....
"D.  DHR Response Times
"DHR's response time is the time frame within
which in-person initial contact shall be made with
(1) the children who are allegedly at risk of
serious harm and (2) all other children in the home.
"Designated response times are 'immediate' and
'within five (5) calendar days.'  'Immediate' is
defined as 'as soon as possible after a report is
received, but no later than twelve (12) hours from
receipt of the intake information.' 
"....
"CA/N [child abuse/neglect] Initial Assessment
"VI.  Review, Approval, and Assignment for On-going
Services
"1.  Supervisory Review
"Supervisors 
shall 
review 
all 
initial
assessments to determine that:
1080520
10
"-child welfare staff have complied with the general
requirements and information collection protocol;
"-any 
deviations 
have 
received 
supervisory
concurrence and been adequately documented;
"-documented information is pertinent and sufficient
to make the required initial assessment decisions."
According to Williford, Sumerlin failed to ensure that an
investigation of Terry's suspected abuse was conducted
"immediately" and that Hood had compiled her investigation
information and documented her initial-assessment decision.
Additionally, 
Williford 
maintained 
that 
Sumerlin 
deviated 
from
DHR policy by failing to evaluate Hood's assessment and
failing to concur with Hood's deviations from policy.  Lastly,
she argued that Sumerlin violated the R.C. consent decree by
assigning the case to Hood, whose caseload was over the
standard set in the R.C. consent decree.  
After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied
Sumerlin's summary-judgment motion, stating:
"Generally, State agents are afforded immunity
when the conduct made the basis of the claim is
based upon the exercise of judgment in discharging
governmental duties.  Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d
392 (Ala. 2000).  But a State agent is not immune
from civil liability in her personal capacity 'when
the 
State 
agent 
acts 
willfully, 
maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the
1080520
11
law.'  792 So. 2d at 405.  'A State agent acts
beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he
or she fails to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated
on a checklist.'  Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d
1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d
173, 178 (Ala. 2000).
"After consideration of the briefs, evidentiary
submissions and arguments of counsel, the Court
concludes that the motion for summary judgment filed
by ... Yvonne Sumerlin [is] due to be denied.
[Williford] has submitted substantial evidence that
... Sumerlin violated mandatory duties described in
the DHR's Child Protective Services Policies and
Procedures Manual.  'The mandates of the DHR Manual
... are precisely the sort of "detailed rules or
regulations" that State agents cannot ignore, except
at their peril.'  Gowens v. Tys., 948 So. 2d 513,
527 (Ala. 2006)."
On January 27, 2009, Sumerlin filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus with this Court, requesting an order directing the
trial court to enter a summary judgment for her based on
State-agent immunity.
Standard of Review
"'"'While the general rule is that
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, the exception is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment
grounded 
on 
a 
claim 
of 
immunity 
is
reviewable 
by 
petition 
for 
writ 
of
mandamus.'  Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911,
912 (Ala. 2000).  A writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy available only when
there is: '(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon
1080520
12
the respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex parte BOC
Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.
2001)."'
"Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452
(Ala. 2006) (quoting Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003))."
Ex parte Sawyer, 984 So. 2d 1100, 1105-06 (Ala. 2007).
Analysis
Sumerlin contends that the trial court erred when it
denied her summary-judgment motion because, she says, she is
entitled to State-agent immunity.  Williford contends that
Sumerlin is not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she
says, Sumerlin acted beyond her authority or under a mistaken
interpretation of law when she violated mandatory duties
described in the DHR manual and standards set out in the R.C.
consent decree.
"'State-agent 
immunity 
protects 
state 
employees,
as agents of the State, in the exercise of their
judgment in executing their work responsibilities.'
Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117, 122 (Ala. 2002).
In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), a
plurality of this Court articulated the following
test for State-agent immunity:
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
1080520
13
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'(1) formulating plans, policies, or
designs; or
"'(2) exercising his or her judgment
in the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"'(a) making administrative
adjudications;
"'(b) allocating resources;
"'(c) negotiating contracts;
"'(d) 
hiring, 
firing,
transferring, 
assigning, 
or
supervising personnel; or
"'(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"'(4) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement 
officers' 
arresting 
or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"'(5) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.
1080520
14
"'Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the
contrary in the foregoing statement of the
rule, a State agent shall not be immune
from civil liability in his or her personal
capacity
"'(1) when the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or the Constitution of
this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
of this State enacted or promulgated for
the purpose of regulating the activities of
a governmental agency require otherwise; or
"'(2) 
when 
the 
State 
agent 
acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law.'
"Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 ....  The Court adopted
the Cranman test for State-agent immunity in Ex
parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177-78 (Ala. 2000).
"....
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a 
"burden-shifting"
process 
when 
a 
party 
raises 
the 
defense 
of
State-agent immunity.'  Ex parte Estate of Reynolds,
946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to
immunity.'  946 So. 2d at 452.  Should the State
agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to
the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories
of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in
Cranman is applicable.  The exception being argued
here is that 'the State agent acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
his or her authority.'  946 So. 2d at 452.  One of
the ways in which a plaintiff can show that a State
agent acted beyond his or her authority is by
1080520
15
proffering evidence that the State agent failed '"to
discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."'
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178).
"....
"In Giambrone v. Douglas, supra, and Howard v.
City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2003), this
Court discussed the violation-of-rules basis for
denying a State agent immunity. We described those
cases in Gowens v. Tys. [S.], 948 So. 2d 513, 524-26
(Ala. 2006):
"'"The complaint in Giambrone [v. Douglas,
874 So. 2d 1046 (Ala. 2003),] sought
compensation for injuries suffered by
15-year-old Jake Giambrone, a member of the
wrestling team, in an impromptu wrestling
match with Michael Douglas, the head
wrestling coach for Auburn High School.
874 So. 2d at 1049. Douglas outweighed
Giambrone, 
who 
was 
a 
freshman, 
by
approximately 70 pounds. Id. The trial
court entered a summary judgment in favor
of Douglas on the ground of State-agent
immunity.
"'"In this Court, the appellant argued
that the summary judgment was improper,
because there was evidence indicating that
'[Douglas] 
violated 
the 
competition
guidelines as promulgated by the National
Federation of Wrestling ("NFW"); and ...
engaged in "inequitable competition" with
Jake in violation of the code of conduct
contained in the Alabama High School
Athletic Directors and Coaches Association
Directories ("the Athletic Directories").'
874 So. 2d at 1051 (emphasis added).  This
Court 
agreed 
with 
that 
argument 
and
1080520
16
reversed the summary judgment.  874 So. 2d
at 1057.
"'"In doing so, the Court noted that,
as a general principle, 'Douglas was
permitted to exercise broad judgment in the
education of his students.'  874 So. 2d at
1053. 
 
It 
explained, 
however, 
that
Douglas's 
supervisor, 
the 
athletic
director, had 'instructed the coaches ...
to follow the guidelines in the Athletic
Directories,' and that he had 'provided
Douglas with a book containing rules
promulgated by the NFW in order to make
sure that Douglas knew the rules for
conducting wrestling matches.'  874 So. 2d
at 1054.  The Court stated:
"'"'Although 
[the 
athletic
director] was not directed by the
[Auburn City Board of Education]
to impose on the coaches at
Auburn High School the guidelines
and rules of the ... NFW and the
Athletic 
Directories, 
it 
was
within 
the 
exercise 
of 
his
judgment to "insist" that the
coaches 
comply 
with 
those
guidelines and rules.
"'"'Therefore, 
Douglas's
"broad authority" to exercise
judgment in the safe conduct of
his wrestling team practices was
limited by the guidelines and
rules furnished and imposed by
[the athletic director].'
"'"874 So. 2d at 1054. The Court concluded:
"'"'The guidelines and rules
removed Douglas's judgment in
1080520
17
determining whether he should
participate in a "full speed"
challenge match with a student
who was less experienced, much
younger, 
and 
smaller 
than
Douglas. 
 
Moreover, 
the
guidelines and rules restricted
the 
type 
of 
moves 
that 
are
permissible 
in 
the 
sport 
of
wrestling.  Because a trier of
fact could determine that Douglas
performed an illegal move during
an "inequitable" challenge match,
thereby failing to discharge his
duties 
pursuant 
to 
"detailed
rules or regulations," we cannot
determine at this stage in the
proceedings 
that 
Douglas 
is
entitled to State-agent immunity.
Douglas did not meet his burden
of establishing that his actions
and decisions involved functions
that entitled him to immunity.'"
"'Howard [v. City of Atmore,] 887 So. 2d
[201,] 208 [(Ala. 2003)] (emphasis added in
Howard).'"
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1280-85 (Ala. 2008)(some
emphasis omitted).
Williford agrees that Sumerlin has made a sufficient
showing that the claims against Sumerlin arise from actions
taken by her while executing her work responsibilities as a
State employee.  Williford, however, contends that Sumerlin is
not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says,
1080520
18
Sumerlin "acted beyond her authority" or "under a mistaken
interpretation of law."  Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405
(Ala. 2000).  According to Williford, Sumerlin acted beyond
her authority by violating detailed and mandatory DHR policies
in the DHR manual and by violating detailed and mandatory
directives in the R.C. consent decree.  Williford argues that
Sumerlin acted beyond her authority in three ways.
First, Williford contends that she satisfied her burden
of establishing that Sumerlin acted beyond her authority by
violating the provisions of the DHR manual when she did not
immediately investigate or immediately assign someone to
investigate Terry's suspected abuse.  According to Williford,
when Sumerlin received the suspected-abuse report regarding
Terry on Friday afternoon, September 6, an immediate response
was required.  Williford maintains that Sumerlin acted beyond
her authority by not assigning a caseworker to investigate the
allegation until Monday, September 9.
The DHR manual provides that the DHR response times
within which an in-person initial contact must be made with
children who are allegedly at risk of serious harm are
"immediate" or "within five (5) calendar days."  "Immediate"
1080520
19
response time is defined as "as soon as possible after a
report is received, but no later than twelve (12) hours from
receipt of the intake information."  A supervisor is involved
in determining whether a response time is to be "immediate" or
"within five (5) calendar days."  An "immediate" response time
is 
required 
by 
the 
child-welfare 
staff 
"when 
intake
information indicates serious harm will likely occur within
twenty-four (24) hours to the children identified in the
report as allegedly abused or neglected."  The manual further
provides that factors that suggest a child may be at risk of
serious harm within 24 hours include, but are not limited to:
"-Child death report is received with alleged
abuse/neglect as the cause, and there are other
vulnerable children in the home; 
"-Child is under age six (6) years and the alleged
abuse/neglect is attributed to the parents' or
primary caregivers' substance abuse, mental illness,
mental retardation, or family violence;
"-Child is being hit, beaten, severely deprived now;
"-Child is unsupervised or alone now;
"-Child is in life threatening living arrangements
now;
"-Serious allegations have been reported and a child
is accessible to the person allegedly responsible
for abuse/neglect or accessibility to the person is
unknown;
1080520
20
"-Serious allegations have been reported and the
child/family situation may or will change quickly;
"-Allegations involve failure to thrive;
"-Allegations involve medical neglect of handicapped
infants;
"-Parents/primary caregivers are failing to seek
medical care for a health problem which, if left
untreated, could cause serious harm;
"-Parents/primary caregivers have been reported as
being under the influence of substances now;
"-Parents'/primary 
caregivers' 
whereabouts 
are
unknown; and
"-There is a history of CA/N [child abuse/neglect]
reports which suggest the children may be at risk of
serious harm now."
(Emphasis in original.)
Sumerlin stated in her deposition that on Friday,
September 6, when she received the initial-intake information
that designated the need for an "immediate" response in
Terry's case, she did not have an investigator available.
Therefore, recognizing the exigency of the circumstances, she
contacted Children's Hospital to further evaluate Terry's case
and to determine if Terry was at risk of serious harm at that
time and how best to address Terry's needs.  After talking
with Hawkins, the medical social worker at Children's
Hospital, she learned that Terry would remain in the hospital
1080520
21
until 
Monday, 
September 
9; 
therefore, 
Terry 
was 
not
unsupervised or alone, and he was not in a life-threatening
living arrangement.  Because Terry was in a safe environment,
Sumerlin exercised her judgment and determined that an
investigator could be assigned to Terry's case on Monday when
the threat of serious harm to Terry might return.  The
materials before us support a finding that Sumerlin did not
ignore her responsibility; rather, she exercised her judgment
in 
her 
supervisory 
capacity 
to 
deal 
with 
exigent
circumstances.  Indeed, nothing before us indicates that
Sumerlin exceeded the scope of her discretion in light of the
facts that she had no personnel to assign to Terry's case on
Friday afternoon and that Terry was not at that time in a
life-threatening situation.  Consequently, Williford has not
established that Sumerlin acted beyond her authority in this
regard. 
Next, Williford maintains that Sumerlin is not entitled
to State-agent immunity because, she says, Sumerlin acted
beyond her authority by failing to review and approve Hood's
initial assessment of Terry's case.  The DHR manual provides
under the initial-assessment section:
"CA/N [child abuse/neglect] Initial Assessment
1080520
22
"VI.  Review, Approval, and Assignment for On-going
Services
"1.  Supervisory Review
"Supervisors 
shall 
review 
all 
initial
assessments to determine that:
"-child welfare staff have complied with the general
requirements and information collection protocol;
"-any 
deviations 
have 
received 
supervisory
concurrence and been adequately documented;
"-documented information is pertinent and sufficient
to make the required initial assessment decisions."
The DHR manual also provides the following time frame for
completion of initial assessments:
"B.  Time Frame For Completion
"1.  Initial Assessments
"Initial assessments shall be completed within
ninety 
(90) 
days 
from 
the 
date 
the 
intake
information is received.  An initial assessment is
considered complete when:
"-The 
general 
requirements 
and 
information
collection protocol have been followed;
"-Analysis and decision-making have occurred;
"-Documentation has been completed and due process
rights have been initiated (including entry of the
preliminary CA/N [child abuse/neglect] disposition
into the Central Registry); and
"-Supervisory reviews and approval has occurred."
1080520
Williford urges that Terry's case was closed because, she
3
says, Hood had stopped investigating the case.  Investigation,
however, is only a portion of the initial assessment and
continues until the initial assessment is completed.  An
initial assessment, as provided in the DHR manual, is not
complete until the documentation has been completed and the
preliminary child-abuse/neglect disposition is entered into
the central registry.  Hood was still working on the initial
assessment, and Sumerlin could not review Hood's initial
assessment until Hood completed the documentation.  Therefore,
the materials before us support a finding that  Terry's case
was not closed. 
23
The initial-intake call of the suspected abuse of Terry
occurred on September 6, 2002; Terry died on November 3, 2002.
It appears undisputed that Hood did not daily document her
investigative findings in DHR's computer system.  Indeed, it
appears that she did not input the data regarding the Terry
investigation until November 4, 2002, the day after Terry
died. 
In her deposition, Sumerlin explained that she had daily
meetings with Hood about her initial findings with regard to
Terry and that Sumerlin agreed with Hood's determinations.
She stated that because Hood's assessment was ongoing, i.e.,
that Terry's initial assessment was not completed  and because
3
Hood had not documented her findings in the DHR computer
system, Sumerlin had not documented her official supervisory
approval of Hood's recommendation.  Because the DHR manual
1080520
Within this argument, Williford appears to maintain that
4
Sumerlin did not adequately supervise Hood.  On rehearing, she
states: "Sumerlin's and Hood's premature and incorrect
conclusion that additional investigation was not necessary is
in direct violation of the DHR manual."  An incorrect
conclusion, however, does not establish that Sumerlin exceeded
the scope of her authority in supervising Hood.  Additionally,
as we recognized in Gowens v. Tys. S., 948 So. 2d 513, 532
(Ala. 2006):
"The plaintiffs' theory of the case is that
[DHR] conducted a negligent investigation of the
[alleged abuse], and their theory against [the
supervisor], 
specifically, 
is 
that 
she 
acted
negligently 
in 
supervising 
[the 
caseworker's]
investigation.  On its face, their theory against
[the supervisor] is 'contrary to well-established
immunity principles.'  Vick v. Sawyer, 936 So. 2d
[517], 523 [(Ala. 2006)].  See also Love v. Davis,
14 F.Supp. 2d 1273, 1278 (M.D. Ala. 1998)('[B]ecause
supervisory and training functions require constant
decision-making, they are, for the most part,
discretionary.')." 
24
provides 90 days for completion of an initial assessment and
90 days had not passed from the initial intake in Terry's
case, Williford has not established that Sumerlin acted beyond
her authority by not having  completed and documented her
supervisory review of Hood's initial assessment.4
Last, Williford contends that Sumerlin is not entitled to
State-agent immunity because, she says, Sumerlin acted beyond
her authority or engaged in a mistaken interpretation of the
law 
when 
she 
assigned 
the 
Terry 
case 
to 
Hood 
for
1080520
25
investigation.  According to Williford, Hood's caseload
exceeded the caseload mandate set forth in the R.C. consent
decree.  The R.C. consent decree mandated one investigation
worker for every 13.5 child-abuse and neglect reports.
Although Hood stated in her deposition that during the fall of
2002 she was assigned between 35 to 50 open cases, the
materials before us indicate that for the month of September
2002 Hood had 19 open cases.  
In support of her contention that she did not violate the
mandates of the R.C. consent decree, Sumerlin provided an
affidavit from Mike Salter, director of DHR's Division of
Management & Fiscal Analysis.  He explained the requirements
of the R.C. consent decree with regard to caseload standards,
stating:
"Each county was to determine the monthly
average caseloads and document the caseload for each
worker.  Every three months the counties were to
report the caseload data to the DHR State Office.
If the county had more than ten percent of its
workers exceeding the caseload standards, the county
would file an exception report with the DHR State
Office identifying the reasons for the overages and
actions that would be taken to reduce them within
the next thirty days.  If a county reported an
excess of the caseload standards for two consecutive
quarters, the state and county offices would analyze
the problem together to determine the factors that
were causing the overage and take any needed
corrective action within thirty days.  Thus, the
1080520
26
county and state offices had seven months to
identify caseload problems and implement corrective
action to solve the issue rather than one month.
"....
"In April of 1999, an R.C. Child Welfare
Staffing 
Committee 
(hereinafter 
'staffing
committee') 
was 
established to monitor county
staffing on a monthly basis or more frequently if
necessary, to ensure that counties were meeting the
standards.  In addition, a computer reporting system
was developed whereby counties could enter data
concerning the number of cases their workers had and
send this data to the DHR State Office where it
would be compiled into a report.  When it appeared
to the committee that a county may have had
inadequate staff, an in-depth look at the county
staffing level is undertaken.
"The Office of Management and Fiscal Analysis
produced detailed information about the staffing
need in the county based on the caseload counts.
The data was calculated using a six-month average to
avoid having temporary spikes or dips in caseloads
changing a county staffing level from month to
month.  When it became apparent that a county was
experiencing staffing shortages based upon the
averages 
for 
the 
county, 
its 
allocation 
was
increased and the county would then be given
authority to hire additional staff.  However, a
county director or a county supervisor did not
determine the allocation for staffing.
"It was not possible to conclude that a county
was not in compliance with the Staffing Order
without a review of what a worker's caseloads were
for several consecutive months.  In this case, Joann
Hood, a child abuse and neglect worker, was over
caseload standards for September of 2002, but under
caseload standards for the immediate following month
of October of 2002. 
1080520
27
"While it is true that, at any given point in
time, the counties may have workers that have one or
more cases over the caseload standards, the same
counties may also have workers who are carrying
fewer cases than required under the standards.
Counties would be authorized to hire a sufficient
number of workers to meet or exceed the need shown
by the caseloads in that county.  However, in any
given month, an individual worker in that county may
be under or over the standards depending on the
number of cases the county received that month and
the number of cases the county closed that month.
The only way a county director could insure that
workers never exceeded the standards would be to
constantly move the cases from worker to worker
every month so that the caseloads were always equal.
However, optimal outcomes for children would not be
achieved by assigning them a new worker every few
months to meet a caseload standard.
"On 
January 
16, 
2007, 
the 
federal 
court
determined that DHR had complied substantially with
the R.C. Decree and granted [DHR's] motion to
terminate the R.C. Consent Decree ...."
In light of the fact that the R.C. consent decree
provided averages for caseloads over a period of time and in
light of the fact that the evidence indicates that Hood's
average caseload over the acceptable period did not exceed the
mandates of the R.C. consent decree, Williford has failed to
establish that Sumerlin acted beyond her authority or that she
acted under a mistaken interpretation of the law in this
regard.  
Conclusion
1080520
28
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Williford has
not established that Sumerlin is not entitled to State-agent
immunity.  Consequently, a summary judgment is proper for
Sumerlin on the ground of State-agent immunity.  We,
therefore, issue the writ and direct the Jefferson Circuit
Court to set aside its order denying Sumerlin's summary-
judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for Sumerlin.
APPLICATION 
GRANTED; 
OPINION 
OF 
APRIL 
24, 
2009,
WITHDRAWN; 
OPINION 
SUBSTITUTED; 
PETITION 
GRANTED; 
WRIT 
ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker,
Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.