Title: Synovus Bank v. Mitchell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1141046
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 2016

Rel: 04/29/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1141046
____________________
Synovus Bank
v.
Tom James Mitchell, d/b/a/ Mitchell Motors, et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-11-001801)
BRYAN, Justice.
Synovus Bank ("Synovus") appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") denying Synovus's
motion to set aside a joint stipulation of dismissal.  For the
1141046
reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment and remand
the case for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 22, 2010, Synovus filed in the Walker Circuit
Court a complaint against Tom James Mitchell d/b/a Mitchell
Motors ("Mitchell") seeking damages for Mitchell's alleged
default on a promissory note.  On May 16, 2011, Mitchell filed
a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer the
case to the Jefferson Circuit Court.  Mitchell argued that the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and that, should the case nevertheless be allowed to
proceed, venue was proper only in Jefferson County.  On
September 21, 2011, the Walker Circuit Court entered an order
denying Mitchell's motion to dismiss and transferring 
the 
case
to the Jefferson Circuit Court.
On May 22, 2012, Synovus filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  On June 26, 2012, Mitchell filed a response to that
motion in which he argued that an issue of material fact –-
how much debt on the promissory note remained outstanding –-
precluded a summary judgment.  Mitchell asked for a jury trial
to determine what, if anything, he owed Synovus.
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On or around July 22, 2014, Mitchell died.   On September
1
17, 2014, Mitchell's attorney, Joel E. Dillard, sent a letter
to Synovus's attorney, Griff O'Rear, informing O'Rear of
Mitchell's death.  That letter stated that "[Mitchell] had
nothing when he died" and asked O'Rear to confer with Synovus
to see if it would be willing to dismiss the action instead of
"'throw[ing] good money after bad.'"  On January 28, 2015,
Synovus filed a "joint stipulation [of] dismissal" that
stated, in full: "Please take notice that all parties in the
above-styled action hereby stipulate that the action 
is 
hereby
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs." 
It appears from the record that little progress in the
1
case occurred during the two years between the filing of
Mitchell's response to 
Synovus's motion for a summary judgment
in June 2012 and Mitchell's death in July 2014.  On October
11, 2012, Synovus filed an amendment to its summary-judgment
motion to correct a clerical error.  On November 21, 2012,
Synovus filed a supplement to its summary-judgment motion.  On
December 4, 2012, Mitchell filed a response to Synovus's
amended motion for a summary judgment.  That response,
however, was substantively identical to Mitchell's original
response to Synovus's summary-judgment motion.  On June 18,
2013, the trial court entered an order setting a status
conference for July 16, 2013.  It is unclear whether that
conference occurred.  Other than those filings and that single
court order, it does not appear that the parties or the trial
court took any other action concerning the case until after
Mitchell's death in July 2014.
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Both O'Rear and Dillard signed the stipulation of dismissal. 
The trial court did not enter an order dismissing the case.  
On February 20, 2015, Synovus filed a "motion to set
aside stipulation of dismissal."  In that motion, Synovus
claimed that it had received information that Mitchell was the
primary beneficiary of two life-insurance policies insuring
the life of his late wife and that it would not have entered
into the stipulation of dismissal had it been aware of
Mitchell's interest in the insurance policies.  On April 8,
2015, Dillard filed a response to Synovus's motion to set
aside the stipulation of dismissal in which he argued that
Synovus was bound by the stipulation of dismissal.  On May 1,
2015, Synovus filed a "motion to rule as a matter of law under
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] that this case is not
dismissed, or in the alternative, motion to set aside joint
stipulation of dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b)[, Ala. R. Civ.
P.]."  In that motion, Synovus argued that the stipulation of
dismissal failed to comply with Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), Ala. R.
Civ. P., and, thus, that it had not operated to dismiss the
action; however, the argument continued, if the trial court
determined that the stipulation of dismissal had 
dismissed the
4
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action, the dismissal should be set aside pursuant to Rule
60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  On May 5, 2015, Dillard filed a
response in which he argued that the stipulation of dismissal
had terminated the action and, consequently, had deprived the
trial court of jurisdiction to entertain Synovus's Rule 60(b)
motion.  
On May 14, 2015, the trial court entered an order in
which it found that the stipulation of dismissal had
terminated the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction.  In
accordance with that finding, the trial court 
denied 
Synovus's
motion to set aside the stipulation of dismissal.  Synovus
timely appealed.
Standard of Review
"Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is a question of law and,
therefore, is reviewable de novo."  Riverstone Dev. Co. v.
Nelson, 91 So. 3d 678, 681 (Ala. 2012).
Discussion
As it did in the trial court, Synovus argues that the
stipulation of dismissal did not comply with 
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii)
and, thus, did not operate to dismiss the action.  We need not
address that argument, however, because we hold that the
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stipulation of dismissal operated to dismiss Synovus's action
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Rule 41(a)(1),
Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part:
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule
66, and of any statute of this state, an action may
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court
(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first
occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
prejudice ...."
(Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that Synovus was operating under the
assumption that it needed Mitchell's consent to dismiss the
action.  However, Rule 41(a)(1)(i) expressly provides that a
plaintiff need only file with the court a notice of dismissal
to dismiss his or her action if the defendant has not served
the plaintiff with an answer or a motion for a summary
judgment.  Such notice of dismissal, once filed with the
court, 
automatically 
dismisses 
the 
action; 
no 
subsequent 
order
of the court is required.  Riverstone, 91 So. 3d at 681 ("If
the conditions of Rule 41(a)(1) are satisfied, dismissal is
automatic, that is, '[n]o order of the court is required ....
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[and] the notice [of dismissal] terminates the action ....'"
(quoting 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2363, at 439–41 (3d ed. 2008))).  In
this case, it is undisputed that Mitchell never filed an
answer or a motion for a summary judgment.   Thus, in order to
2
dismiss the action, Synovus needed only to file with the trial
court notice that it desired to dismiss the action; neither
Mitchell's consent nor a court order was required.
Although Rule 41(a)(1)(i) states that a plaintiff may
dismiss an action by filing a "notice of dismissal," the rule
does not prescribe specific, technical requirements for the
form of that notice.  In Reid v. Tingle, 716 So. 2d 1190 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1997), the Court of Civil Appeals held that a letter
written from the plaintiff to her attorney instructing the
attorney to "'dismiss this lawsuit immediately'" met the
requirements of Rule 41(a)(1)(i) "in that it [gave] notice of
the plaintiff's desire to dismiss the action, and it was filed
with the clerk's office."  716 So. 2d at 1192-93.  The United
Although Mitchell filed a motion to dismiss the action,
2
a motion to dismiss does not terminate a plaintiff's right to
voluntarily dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i)
unless the motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for a
summary judgment.  See Ex parte Yarbrough, 788 So. 2d 128, 130
n. 2 (Ala. 2000).
7
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States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that
a filing styled as a "motion to dismiss" that indicated that
the plaintiff would refile the action in state court
constituted a notice of dismissal for purposes of Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i), Fed. R. Civ. P., which is substantially
similar to our own Rule 41(a)(1)(i).  Matthews v. Gaither, 902
F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990).  Thus, it is the substance,
not the style, of a plaintiff's notice that triggers an
automatic dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(i).  
In this case, there can be no serious argument that
Synovus, in filing the stipulation of dismissal, 
was 
providing
notice to the trial court of its desire to dismiss the action
with prejudice; 
the stipulation of dismissal is 
unequivocal 
in
that regard.  That the notice is styled as a stipulation of
dismissal and contains the unnecessary signature of the
defendant's attorney are facts of no consequence in that they
do nothing to diminish the clarity of Synovus's desire to
dismiss the action.  Because Mitchell had yet to serve Synovus
with an answer or a motion for a summary judgment, the
stipulation of dismissal, once filed with the trial court,
immediately and automatically terminated the action pursuant
8
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to Rule 41(a)(1)(i).  Riverstone, supra.  
Furthermore, 
because
the stipulation of dismissal expressly indicates Synovus's
desire to dismiss the action with prejudice, the dismissal
operated to that effect.  See Rule 41(a)(1) (indicating that
a 
voluntary 
dismissal 
is 
without 
prejudice 
"[u]nless 
otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation" (emphasis
added)).
Synovus's voluntary dismissal "ipso facto deprived the
trial court of the power to proceed further with the action
and rendered all orders entered after its filing void."  Ex
parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1236 (Ala. 2004). 
Nevertheless, Synovus argues that, after dismissal of the
action, the trial court retained limited authority to
entertain Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the
dismissal.  We agree.  Although this Court has not previously
addressed whether a party may seek relief from a voluntary
dismissal by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), we note
that the Committee Comments to Rule 41 state: "A dismissal,
whether voluntary or involuntary, may be set aside by the
court, like any other judgment, on proper motion under Rule
60(b)."  In accord is the majority of federal circuits when
9
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considering whether a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P., can be set aside by a motion
filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., both of which
are substantially similar, respectively, to our own Rule
41(a)(1) and Rule 60(b).  See, e.g., White v. National
Football League, 756 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2014) (agreeing
with those circuits holding that a stipulated dismissal
constitutes a "'judgment' under Rule 60(b)"); Yesh Music v.
Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding
that 
"a 
Rule 
41(a)(1)(A) 
voluntary 
dismissal 
without 
prejudice
constitutes a 'final proceeding'" that is "subject to vacatur
under Rule 60(b)");  Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 589
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a voluntary, unilateral
dismissal does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction to
entertain a Rule 60(b) motion); Schmier v. McDonald's LLC, 569
F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that, "[l]ike other
final judgments, a dismissal with prejudice under Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i) can be set aside or modified under [Rule]
60(b)"); Olmstead v. Humana, Inc., 154 Fed. App'x 800 (11th
Cir. 2005) (not selected for publication in the Federal
Reporter) (affirming, without discussing the federal district
10
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court's authority, a judgment denying the plaintiff's Rule
60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., motion to set aside his voluntary
dismissal without prejudice); Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
377
F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Hinsdale v. Farmers
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1987),
and noting that Hinsdale held that a stipulation of dismissal
"'terminated the district court's jurisdiction except for the
limited purpose of reopening and setting aside the judgment of
dismissal within the scope allowed by Rule 60(b),'" Fed. R.
Civ. P.); and Warfield v. Allied Signal TBS Holdings, Inc.,
267 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming, without discussing
the federal district court's authority, a judgment 
denying 
the
plaintiff's Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., motion to set aside
her voluntary dismissal with prejudice).  Those decisions of
the federal circuits, though not binding, are persuasive. 
Sealy, 904 So. 2d at 1235 ("'[W]e normally consider federal
cases interpreting the federal rules of procedure as
persuasive authority.'" (quoting Hammond v. Brooks, 516 
So. 2d
614, 616 (Ala. 1987))).  Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to rule
on Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion.
11
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Ordinarily, this Court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion to determine whether, in denying the motion, the trial
court exceeded its discretion.   Kupfer v. SCI-Alabama Funeral
3
Servs., Inc., 893 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Ala. 2004).  However, in
this case, it is apparent that the trial court based its
denial of Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion not on the merits of the
motion but, rather, on the trial court's determination that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.  Because the trial
court did not consider the merits of Synovus's motion, we
cannot address Synovus's argument that the trial court
exceeded its discretion in denying the motion; indeed, there
was no exercise of discretion for this Court to review.  Thus,
we reverse the order denying Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion and
remand the case for the trial court to consider the merits of
Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion and to enter a judgment in
accordance with its consideration of the merits of that
motion.4
A judgment granting or denying a motion made pursuant to
3
Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., is not reviewed for an excess
of discretion.  Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 34
So. 3d 1238, 1242 (Ala. 2009).  Rule 60(b)(4), however, is not
applicable in this case.
This opinion should not be interpreted as validation of
4
the merits of Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion.  We merely hold
12
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REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, and Main,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
that the trial court retains the authority to consider the
motion and to grant or deny the motion based on the trial
court's consideration of the merits.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the reversal of the trial court's order in
this case denying the Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
filed by Synovus Bank on May 1, 2015, and the remand of this
case for the trial court to address the merits of that motion. 
In so doing, and particularly in concurring in the
instructions to the trial court to take up the merits of
Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion on remand, I find it important to
note that the appeal before us is in fact filed only with
respect to the trial court's order denying that particular
motion.  A denial of a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) is
an order separate from the underlying judgment and is
separately appealable as such.  E.g., Branson v. Moore Grp.,
Inc., 439 So. 2d 116, 118 (Ala. 1983).  Synovus does not
appeal from "the underlying judgment" effected by the
stipulation of dismissal filed by it and, concomitantly, does
not contest in this appeal the denial by operation of law of
what in effect was a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., postjudgment
motion filed by Synovus on February 20, 2015.
   
Under the particular facts of this case, I concur in
giving the filing made by Synovus in an attempt to satisfy the
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requirements 
for 
a 
joint 
"stipulation 
of 
dismissal" 
prescribed
in Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), Ala. R. Civ. P., effect as a unilateral
"notice of dismissal" under Rule 41(a)(1)(i), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
I do not foreclose the possibility, however, that, under
different circumstances, a party might justifiably be able to
rely upon the fact of a deficiency in an attempted
"stipulation" or object to the finality of a deficient
"stipulation," and I do not read the main opinion as reaching
that issue or necessarily foreclosing that possibility.
As alluded to above, I also note that a dismissal under
Rule 41 effects a "final judgment" of the case for purposes,
inter alia, of postjudgment motions (e.g., motions 
filed 
under
Rules 52 and 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.) challenging that dismissal. 
See, e.g., Schmier v. McDonald's LLC, 569 F.3d 1240, 1242
(10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a dismissal with prejudice
operates as a final judgment and citing Warfield v. Allied
Signal TBS Holdings, Inc., 267 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir.
2001));  Shong-Ching Tong v. First Interstate Servs. Co., 34
5
"The committee comments to Rule 41 state that this rule
5
is substantially the same as the federal rule, and we normally
consider federal cases interpreting the federal rules of
procedure as persuasive authority." Hammond v. Brooks, 
516 
So.
2d 614, 616 (Ala. 1987).
15
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F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (to same effect). See also Hicks v.
NLO, Inc., 825 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing 5 Moore's
Federal Practice ¶ 41.05[3] (2d ed. 1986), for the proposition
that a dismissal, even without prejudice, operates as a final
judgment as to the case in which it is filed).  Indeed, the
Committee Comments to Alabama's Rule 41 reveal the same
understanding, i.e., that a voluntary dismissal under Rule
41(a) effects a "judgment" from which "postjudgment" relief
can be sought. The comments expressly acknowledge, for
example, that a party may file a postjudgment motion under
Rules 52(b) and 59(a) and likewise refer to a dismissal as
being "like any other judgment" in acknowledging that
postjudgment relief under Rule 60(b) may be sought.  See Rule
41, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption.
The main opinion quotes language from Ex parte Sealy,
L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1236 (Ala. 2004), referring to the
lack of "jurisdiction" on the part of a circuit court once a
dismissal is filed. __ So. 3d at __.  I do not read the quoted
passage from Sealy, however, as indicating that the trial
court is deprived of the authority to revisit (pursuant to
appropriate procedures governing postjudgment matters) the
16
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efficacy of the purported dismissal itself as a judgment, but,
rather, that the trial court is prevented from taking any
other action, i.e., any action inconsistent with the fact that
the dismissal did effect such a judgment.   As is the case
6
following the entry of any other final judgment, such judgment
remains within the bosom of the court for 30 days as to any
issues affecting the efficacy of that dismissal.  
Ex parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230 (Ala. 2004), and
6
subsequent cases reiterating the proposition for which it is
cited in the main opinion involved situations in which,
following a voluntary dismissal, a party filed a pleading or
motion, or the trial court entered an order, that contemplated
some control by the trial court over the parties' dispute
other than for the purpose of addressing the efficacy of the
judgment of dismissal itself.  For example, in Sealy, the
defendant filed an answer to the complaint more than 30 days
after the voluntary dismissal filed by the plaintiff, after
which the trial court purported to enter a dismissal of the
action with prejudice.  It was in the context then of a
voluntary dismissal that had already taken effect as a final
judgment that this Court stated that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter some further order purporting to 
dispose of the case.  In Greene v. Town of Cedar Bluff, 965
So. 2d 773 (Ala. 2007), a motion to intervene was filed by a
third party after the trial court purported to refuse to
accept a duly filed stipulation of dismissal filed by the
parties to the action.  The third party argued to this Court
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to intervene,
but this Court stated that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to rule on the motion because the case already had been
dismissed.  
17