Title: Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.
Citation: 444 S.W.2d 246
Docket Number: 5-4946
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: September 2, 1969

444 S.W.2d 246 (1969) Walter BROOKS and Adrian L. Ferguson, Appellants, v. ARKANSAS-BEST FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., Employer (Self-Insured), Appellee. No. 5-4946. Supreme Court of Arkansas. September 2, 1969. *247 Shaw, Jones &amp; Shaw, Fort Smith, for appellants. Harper, Young &amp; Smith, Fort Smith, for appellee. JONES, Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case and the facts are not in issue. The appellants, Brooks and Ferguson, were claimant employees under the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Law. Both of them sustained compensable back injuries resulting in permanent total disability and they both filed petitions to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for lump sum settlements. Their petitions were granted by the Commission and the full amounts payable for permanent total disability were made to them. The petitions were filed and granted under authority of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1319 (k) (Repl.1960) which is as follows: *248 After receipt of the lump sum payments, Brooks and Ferguson required additional medication for the treatment of their injuries, and claims were filed for the medical expenses accruing both before and after the lump sum payments but not specifically included therein. The employer voluntarily paid the medical bills accruing prior to the lump sum payments, but the claims for additional medical benefits accruing subsequent to the lump sum awards were controverted on the theory that the employer had discharged its entire liability and fully settled all claims, both present and future, by the payment of the lump sums under the award. The Commission awarded the additional medical payments and on appeal to the Sebastian County Circuit Court the cases were consolidated and the awards of the Commission were reversed, the circuit court holding that the employer had discharged its total liability under the statute, by the payment of the lump sum awards. Brooks and Ferguson have appealed to this court on the single question of law as to whether the payment of compensation for permanent disability in one lump sum under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Arkansas discharges the employer or his compensation insurance carrier from additional liability for medical services and treatment occurring in the future. Under the "definitions" section of the Workmen's Compensation Law, Ark. Stat.Ann. § 81-1302, subsection (i) (Repl. 1960), is found the following: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1311 (Repl.1960), above referred to, reads in part as follows: Thus, it is seen that medical services and funeral expenses, as well as money allowance payable to the employee, are included in the broad general statutory definition of "compensation." In the context of benefits to the employee which are to be secured by the employer under the statute, Ark.Stat. Ann. § 81-1305 (Repl.1960), compensation payable to the employee for disability and the amounts payable in medical expenses are in the same category, but here the analogy ends. Except as set out in the definition, the term "compensation," as used throughout the statute, obviously refers to money benefits paid to the injured employee for disability. As examples, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1310 (Repl.1960): Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1312 (Repl.1960): *249 Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1313 (Repl.1960) provides: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1319 (Repl.1960) provides: Having in mind the three divisions, or categories, of "compensation" as money *250 allowance for disability, medical services and funeral expenses, we now return to the lump sum awards in these cases. There is no question that the amounts of the lump sum awards were calculated only on the money allowance for disability due the claimants for their 100% permanent disabilities. The award to Brooks concludes as follows: It is obvious to us from the wording of the statute, that there are two kinds of compensation benefits to which an injured employee may be entitled and which the employer is obligated to secure to the employee. (1) The money allowance payable to an injured employee for disability (§ 81-1313), and (2) medical and hospital services and supplies (§ 81-1311). Funeral expenses are also specifically included in the definition of compensation, but Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1315(a) and (b) provide: As appellee would have us interpret the statute, funeral expenses would not be available under the statute where death results from injury and when the deceased employee had been paid any of the compensation due him in one lump sum. We cannot believe that such results were the intent of the statute. The appellants contend that the appellee can only discharge and settle both its present and future liability for all compensation benefits under a joint petition as provided in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1319 (l) (Repl.1960), as follows: We agree with the appellants. As additional evidence of the correctness of their contention, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1326 (Repl. 1960) provides: No compensation is payable to the employee for the first week of his disability unless he is disabled for as long as four weeks under § 81-1310(a), supra, but he is entitled to prompt medical treatment under § 81-1311, supra. It is obvious to us, and we therefore hold, that the liability of the employer that may be discharged by a lump sum payment under § 81-1319(k), supra, can only relate to liability for such future payments of compensation as are capable of determination and reduction to present value, and that a lump sum settlement does only discharge the employer's liability for such compensation as is included in the lump sum award. We do not say that compensation in the form of accrued but unpaid medical expenses cannot be included in a lump sum settlement so as to discharge the employer from liability therefor, but we do say that was not done in the cases before us. We find no difficulty in concluding that the liability of an employer must first be determined before the value of future payments of compensation can be ascertained and reduced to present value for the purposes of a lump sum settlement, and we do not strain the liberal construction doctrine in holding that a lump sum settlement does not discharge the employer from liability for the payment of compensation not susceptible of determination and not contemplated nor included in the lump sum settlement. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.