Title: State v. Benters
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 5A14
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2014

NO. COA13-615 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 7 January 2014 
 
 
NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
No. 12 CVS 7710 
WADE H. PASCHAL, JR., Guardian Ad 
Litem for Harley Jessup; REGGIE 
JESSUP; RANDALL COLLINS JESSUP; 
and THURMAN JESSUP, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendants from orders entered 30 November 2012 and 
6 December 2012 by Judge G. Wayne Abernathy in Superior Court, 
Wake County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 October 2013. 
 
Haywood, Denny & Miller, L.L.P., by Robert E. Levin, for 
Plaintiff-Appellee. 
 
Moody, Williams, Roper & Lee, LLP, by C. Todd Roper, for 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
McGEE, Judge. 
 
 
Sixteen-year-old Harley Jessup (“Harley”) was injured on 15 
April 2009 when a truck driven by her cousin, Randall Collins 
Jessup (“Randall”), ran off the road and into a ditch, causing 
Harley to be ejected from the truck.  Harley, through her guardian 
ad litem Wade H. Paschal, Jr. (“Paschal”), and Harley’s father, 
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Reggie Jessup (“Reggie”), filed a complaint on 28 March 2012, 
alleging injury from the accident and medical expenses of 
$81,087.44.  Randall’s automobile insurance carrier tendered the 
$30,000.00 amount of its coverage.  The 28 March 2012 complaint 
also included an underinsured motorist claim against an automobile 
policy (“the policy”) of Harley’s paternal grandfather, Thurman 
Jessup (“Thurman”), which was issued by North Carolina Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. (“Plaintiff”).   
Plaintiff initiated the present action by filing a complaint 
for declaratory judgment on 25 May 2012.  Paschal, as guardian ad 
litem for Harley, along with Reggie, Randall, and Thurman were all 
named defendants.  In Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff asked the 
trial court to rule that Harley was not covered by the policy. 
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on 4 October 2012.  Harley, 
through Paschal, along with Reggie, Randall, and Thurman, moved on 
30 October 2012 to change venue from Wake County to either Chatham 
County or Randolph County.  The motion for change of venue was 
denied by order filed 30 November 2012.  In an order filed 6 
December 2012, the trial court concluded that Harley was “not a 
resident of [Thurman’s] household on April 15, 2009, and [was] 
therefore not entitled to coverage under the policy[.]”  Based 
upon this conclusion, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff.  Paschal, as guardian ad litem for Harley, and 
-3- 
Reggie and Thurman (“Defendants”) appeal from the 30 October 2012 
and the 6 December 2012 orders.  Defendant Randall Collins Jessup 
is not a party to this appeal. 
At the time of the accident, Thurman owned multiple houses 
and several hundred acres of farmland.  Thurman and Reggie had 
owned a house together until the house burned in 2005.  Harley 
lived with Reggie in that house for a short period after she was 
born.   Thurman purchased a house at 6846 Brush Creek Road. (“Brush 
Creek house”) in 1983, and lived there until sometime in the early 
2000s.  Thurman also purchased a house at 6615 Joe Branson Road 
(“Branson house”) in 1997.  The Branson house was approximately 
one mile from the Brush Creek house, and a person could walk from 
the Branson house to the Brush Creek house without leaving 
Thurman’s property.  Reggie and his children, including Harley, 
moved into the Branson house shortly after Thurman purchased it.  
In 2002, Thurman purchased a fifty percent interest in a house 
owned by his girlfriend, Donna Whitehead (“Ms. Whitehead”), 
located at 398 Browns Crossroads (“Browns Crossroads house”).  
After purchasing an interest in the Browns Crossroads house, 
Thurman spent most of his nights sleeping at either the Browns 
Crossroads house or the Brush Creek house.  On rare occasions, 
Thurman would sleep at the Branson house.   
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Most of Thurman’s mail, including bank statements, was sent 
to the Brush Creek house, and that is the address Thurman used for 
most official business, such as his tax returns and voter 
registration.  The Brush Creek house was also where Thurman kept 
most of his clothing.    
At his deposition, Thurman testified he owned over 100 head 
of cattle, approximately 4,000 hogs, and about 32,000 chickens, 
which were housed in different areas around his farm, including 
the Branson house, the Brush Creek house, and surrounding land.  
Thurman considered his farm to be a “family farm,” and several 
relatives lived and work on the farm.  Reggie lived in the Branson 
house with Harley and her brothers.  Harley had lived primarily at 
that address since she was a very young child.  Thurman paid all 
the bills associated with the Branson house.  Those bills were 
sent to Thurman’s Brush Creek house.  Reggie did not pay anything 
to live in the Branson house.  Thurman even paid for Reggie’s phone 
service.  
For many years, Thurman had taken continued responsibility 
for multiple family members, and some people not related to him by 
blood or marriage.  For example, at the time of his deposition, 
Thurman had two children, not related to either him or Ms. 
Whitehead, living with him.  Thurman had taken the two children in 
nine years earlier because the children’s father was often out of 
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the state for work.  When the children’s father was in town, 
Thurman allowed him to stay in one of Thurman’s houses free of 
charge.  Ms. Whitehead’s daughter and her two children also lived 
with Thurman and Ms. Whitehead.  Harley and her brothers also lived 
with Thurman at times.  Reggie had ongoing trouble with the law, 
and spent time in jail or prison on occasion.  When Harley could 
not stay with Reggie due to Reggie’s legal problems, she stayed 
with Thurman, at both the Browns Crossroads house and at the Brush 
Creek house.  Around 2005, Harley spent a year living with Thurman 
because of Reggie’s legal troubles.  Thurman was appointed as 
Harley’s guardian for that period of time.  Harley’s mother was 
not very involved in Harley’s life, and did not appear to provide 
Harley with material assistance or much guidance.  
Thurman testified he supported Harley through “every bit” of 
her life, providing food, clothes, housing, utilities, phone, and 
other expenses.  Reggie drove a truck that belonged to Thurman and 
if something was needed for the Branson house, such as a washing 
machine, Thurman bought it.  Thurman testified that when Harley 
was not living with him, he saw her two or three times a week.  
Harley testified she saw Thurman almost every day.  Thurman had 
keys to all his houses, and felt free to enter them at any time.  
If Harley needed to go to the doctor or dentist, Thurman took her.  
-6- 
When questioned at his deposition, Thurman agreed that Reggie, 
Harley, and her brothers were all a part of his household.  
Plaintiff filed its complaint for declaratory judgment on 25 
May 2012 and requested that the trial court “declare whether 
[Plaintiff’s] UIM policy issued to Defendant Thurman Jessup [was] 
applicable to the claim of Harley Jessup.”  Harley, through 
Paschal, and Reggie, answered Plaintiff’s complaint on 3 August 
2012, and counterclaimed, asking that the trial court “declare the 
UIM policy issued to defendant Thurman Jessup applicable to the 
claims of Harley and Reggie arising from the accident on or about 
April 15, 2009.”  Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on 
4 October 2012.  Defendants filed a motion on 30 October 2012 to 
change venue from Wake County to either Chatham County or Randolph 
County.  The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to change venue 
by order filed 30 November 2012.  In an order entered 6 December 
2012, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment, ruling that Harley “was not a resident of the Defendant 
Thurman Jessup’s household on April 15, 2009, and [was] therefore 
not entitled to coverage under the policy of UIM insurance issued 
by the Plaintiff to Defendant Thurman Jessup[.]”  Defendants 
appeal. 
I. 
-7- 
The issues in this appeal are whether (1) the trial court 
erred in denying Defendants’ motion to change venue and (2) the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff by ruling that Harley was not a resident of Thurman’s 
household.  We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. 
II. 
 
Defendants acknowledge that Wake County was a proper venue 
for this action.  However, Defendants argue the trial court abused 
its discretion by not changing venue to either Chatham County or 
Randolph County “for the convenience of witnesses and the promotion 
of justice.”  We disagree. 
 
The trial court is given broad discretion when ruling on a 
motion to change venue for the convenience of witnesses: 
“‘[T]he trial court may change the place of 
trial . . . [w]hen the convenience of 
witnesses and the ends of justice would be 
promoted by the change.’”  However, the 
court's refusal to do so will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that the court abused its 
discretion.  The trial court does not 
manifestly abuse its discretion in refusing to 
change the venue for trial of an action 
pursuant to subdivision (2) of [N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 1-83] unless it appears from the 
matters and things in evidence before the 
trial court that the ends of justice will not 
merely be promoted by, but in addition demand, 
the change of venue, or that failure to grant 
the change of venue will deny the movant a 
fair trial. 
 
. . . .  
 
-8- 
In resolving this issue here, we do not set 
forth a “bright line” rule or test for 
determination of whether a trial court has 
abused its discretion in denying a motion to 
change venue.  Rather, the determination of 
whether 
a 
trial 
court 
has 
abused 
its 
discretion is a case-by-case determination 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
facts 
and 
circumstances in each case. 
 
United Services Automobile Assn. v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 
399-400, 485 S.E.2d 337, 341 (1997) (citations omitted).  
Defendants 
fail 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
trial 
court’s 
discretionary ruling denying their motion to change venue denied 
them a fair trial, or that the ends of justice demanded a change 
of venue.  Defendants simply argue that “it [was] more convenient 
for [Defendants] to litigate this action in either Randolph or 
Chatham County rather than Wake County.”  According to Defendants’ 
motion to change venue, “Plaintiff’s principal office is in Wake 
County, North Carolina and it conducts business in said county.”  
Chatham County borders Wake County, and the courthouses in these 
two counties are not separated by great distances. 
 
Though Randolph or Chatham County may be a more convenient 
forum for Defendants, Wake County appears to be a more convenient 
forum for Plaintiff, and we find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to change venue 
from Wake County.  This argument is without merit. 
III. 
-9- 
Defendants argue the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff because Harley was covered under 
the policy.  We agree. 
Although this is an action for declaratory judgment, because 
it was decided by summary judgment, we apply the standard of review 
applicable to summary judgment.   
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact” 
and “any party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.”  In ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, “the court may consider the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
admissions, 
affidavits, answers to interrogatories, oral 
testimony and documentary materials.”  All 
such evidence must be considered in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party.  On 
appeal, an order allowing summary judgment is 
reviewed de novo.  
 
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 
693 (2004) (citations omitted). 
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, and 
should affirm the trial court’s action if our de novo review 
uncovers any basis to support the grant of summary judgment.  We 
agree with the trial court that the dispositive issue is whether 
the policy issued by Plaintiff covers Harley as a “family member” 
as that term is defined in the policy.1  “Part C1” of the policy: 
“Uninsured Motorists Coverage,” states in relevant part: 
                     
1 Plaintiff and Defendants argue about whether Thurman could be 
considered a resident of 6615 Joe Branson Road.  Determination of 
-10- 
We will pay compensatory damages which an 
insured is legally entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle because of: 
 
1. 
Bodily injury sustained by an insured and 
caused by an accident; and 
 
2. 
Property damage caused by an accident. 
 
The owner's or operator's liability for these 
damages must arise out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the uninsured motor 
vehicle. 
 
. . . .  
 
"Insured" as used in this Part means: 
 
1. You [the named insured] or any family 
member.  [(Emphasis in original)]. 
 
The policy includes the following definition of “family member:” 
"Family member" means a person related to [the 
named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption 
who is a resident of [the named insured’s] 
household.  This includes a ward or foster 
child.  [(Emphasis in original)]. 
 
Resolution of the matter before us depends on whether Harley 
was “a resident of [Thurman’s] household” under the policy.  The 
policy does not define the words “resident” or “household.”  It is 
undisputed that Harley is related to Thurman Jessup by blood, and 
that she lived at 6615 Joe Branson Road at the time of the accident.    
The determination of whether Harley was also a resident of 
                     
the place or places where Thurman resided, however, is only 
relevant to the extent, if any, that it can assist in determining 
what constituted Thurman’s “household.” 
-11- 
Thurman’s household, however, is more complicated.  The word 
“resident” 
is 
“flexible, 
elastic, 
slippery 
and 
somewhat 
ambiguous[,]” meaning anything from “a place of abode for more 
than a temporary period of time” to “a permanent and established 
home[.]”  Great American Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 N.C. 
App. 653, 656, 338 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1986) (citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  This Court has held that when a term, 
if not defined, is capable of more than one 
definition [it] is to be construed in favor of 
coverage.  . . . .  “When an insurance company, 
in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a 
‘slippery’ word to mark out and designate  
those who are insured by the policy, it is not 
the function of the court to sprinkle sand 
upon the ice by strict construction of the 
term.  All who may, by any reasonable 
construction of the word, be included within 
the coverage afforded by the policy should be 
given its protection.  If, in the application 
of this principle of construction, the limits 
of coverage slide across the slippery area and 
the company falls into a coverage somewhat 
more extensive than it contemplated, the fault 
lies in its own selection of the words by which 
it chose to be bound.” 
 
Fonvielle v. Insurance Co., 36 N.C. App. 495, 497-98, 244 S.E.2d 
736, 738 (1978) (citations omitted).    
Determinations of whether a particular person is a resident 
of the household of a named insured are individualized and fact-
specific: 
Cases interpreting the phrase, “residents of 
the same household,” as used in insurance 
policies, are legion.  These cases can be 
-12- 
divided into two categories: those involving 
clauses that exclude from coverage members of 
the insured's household, and those that extend 
coverage to such persons.  Applying the 
general rule that coverage should be provided 
wherever, by reasonable construction, it can 
be, 
courts 
have 
restrictively 
defined 
“household” in those cases where members of 
the insured's household are excluded from 
coverage.  On the other hand, where members of 
an insured's household are provided coverage 
under the policy, “household” has been broadly 
interpreted, and members of a family need not 
actually reside under a common roof to be 
deemed part of the same household.  As pointed 
out by this court in Fonvielle v. Insurance 
Co., . . . construction of such terms as 
“resident” 
and 
“household” 
in 
favor 
of 
coverage may lead to “the seemingly anomalous 
result” of a very narrow definition under one 
set of circumstances and a very broad 
definition under another. 
 
Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C. App. 102, 105, 331 S.E.2d 
744, 746 (1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Not only 
are relevant facts considered in making this determination, but 
intent, as well: 
As 
observed 
by 
our 
courts, 
the 
words 
“resident,” “residence” and “residing” have no 
precise, 
technical 
and 
fixed 
meaning 
applicable to all cases.  “Residence” has many 
shades 
of 
meaning, 
from 
mere 
temporary 
presence to the most permanent abode.  It is 
difficult 
to 
give 
an 
exact 
or 
even 
satisfactory 
definition 
of 
the 
term 
“resident,” as the term is flexible, elastic, 
slippery and somewhat ambiguous.  Definitions 
of “residence” include “a place of abode for 
more than a temporary period of time” and “a 
permanent and established home” and the 
definitions range between these two extremes.  
This being the case, our courts have held that 
-13- 
such terms should be given the broadest 
construction and that all who may be included, 
by any reasonable construction of such terms, 
within the coverage of an insurance policy 
using such terms, should be given its 
protection.   
 
Our courts have also found . . . that in 
determining whether a person in a particular 
case is a resident of a particular household, 
the intent of that person is material to the 
question. 
 
Great American, 78 N.C. App. at 656, 338 S.E.2d at 147 (citations 
omitted).  A minor may be a resident of more than one household 
for the purposes of insurance coverage.  Davis, 76 N.C. App. at 
106, 331 S.E.2d at 746 (citation omitted). 
 
We find the particular factual situations in Davis and Great 
American instructive for our analysis.  In Davis, this Court held: 
Applying these general principles to the case 
sub judice, we believe that the minor 
plaintiff was as much a resident of her 
insured father's household as that of her 
mother.  While the father maintained a 
separate residence from that of the mother, 
the evidence discloses that there existed 
between the father and the minor plaintiff a 
continuing 
and 
substantially 
integrated 
family relationship.  We therefore hold that 
the trial court correctly concluded that the 
minor plaintiff . . . was a resident of her 
insured father's household within the meaning 
of the insurance policy, and is entitled to 
coverage thereunder. 
 
Davis, 76 N.C. App. at 106, 331 S.E.2d at 747 (citations omitted).  
The following facts were considered by this Court in Great 
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American, where the issue was whether the defendant was a resident 
of his parents’ household for insurance purposes: 
The forecast of evidence before the trial 
court showed that at the time of the 
collision, Sean Wale [the defendant] was an 
emancipated person who was enlisted in the 
United States Navy and stationed at Norfolk, 
Virginia.  He enlisted in November of 1979.  
At the time he enlisted he gave his parents' 
home address in Salisbury as his home address.  
During his enlistment, he had no housing other 
than his military station.  Also, during his 
enlistment, he visited his parents from time 
to time and, just prior to the April 
collision, 
he 
had 
completed 
a 
14-day 
convalescent leave spent at his parents' home 
and was returning to his base in Norfolk.  At 
the time of the collision, Sean gave the 
investigating highway patrolman a home address 
the same as his parents' home address in 
Salisbury.  In June 1982, when asked by an 
insurance 
adjuster 
where 
he 
was, 
Sean 
answered, “At home,” giving his parents' 
address.  After he got out of the service in 
August of 1982, Sean stayed with his parents 
for several weeks while he looked for a place 
to live. 
 
When Sean left to join the Navy, he removed 
all of his personal belongings from his 
parents' home.  When he visited his parents on 
leave, he slept on a living room couch and had 
no bed or dresser of his own.  When he enlisted 
in the Navy, he never intended to return to 
his parents' home.  He did not consider 
himself to be a resident of his parents' 
household at the time of the collision.  
Sean's parents did not consider Sean to be a 
resident of their household at the time of the 
collision.   
 
. . . .  
 
The forecast of evidence before the trial 
-15- 
court raises a question as to Sean Wale's 
intent to remain a resident of his parents' 
household or to assume that status from time 
to time.  Sean's habit of returning to his 
parents' home for furloughs and leaves and his 
returning there after discharge from the Navy 
tends to show an intent to make his parents' 
home his own. On the other hand, the forecast 
is complicated by Sean's own statement that he 
did not intend to return to that residence 
after his enlistment; this statement tends to 
show an opposite intent from that shown by his 
habits and activities.  Thus, a material issue 
of fact has been raised which must be 
determined by the finder of fact. 
 
Great American, 78 N.C. App. at 655, 656-57, 338 S.E.2d at 146-47 
(citations omitted). 
 
In the present case, evidence before the trial court, 
considered in the light most favorable to Defendants, tends to 
show that Thurman was the most constant caregiver in Harley’s life.  
Thurman owned the Branson house where Harley was living at the 
time of the accident.  Thurman did not charge any rent for Reggie, 
Harley, or her brothers to live there.  Thurman had a key to the 
Branson house, and freely entered it whenever he desired.  Thurman 
paid the utility bills for the Branson house, and bought appliances 
for the house as needed.  The Branson house and the Brush Creek 
house were connected to each other by contiguous land owned by 
Thurman.  Thurman considered these two houses to be part of his 
farm, which he considered to be a family farm.  To this extent, 
Harley and Thurman could both be considered residents of Thurman’s 
-16- 
“family farm.”  Thurman spent much of his time at the Brush Creek 
house, and had most of his mail, including important documents, 
delivered to that address. 
 
Though Thurman apparently did not spend many nights at the 
Branson house, he did see Harley most every day of the week, and 
he was a regular participant in Harley’s life.  Thurman was often 
the one who took Harley to the dentist or doctor.  Thurman paid 
for the vast majority of Harley’s expenses, including necessaries 
such as food and clothing, as well as lifestyle items, such as 
Harley’s prom dress.  In addition, when Harley did not have a 
parent with whom to live because her father was either in prison 
or otherwise prohibited from living with Harley, and her mother 
either could not or would not provide housing and support, Harley 
lived with Thurman.  On these occasions, Thurman handled every 
responsibility, including helping Harley with her schoolwork and 
taking her to school.  For a period of time when Reggie was 
incarcerated, Thurman was appointed legal guardian of Harley.  A 
few years before the accident, Harley lived with Thurman for a 
year due to Reggie’s legal troubles.   
 
Finally, in the present case, unlike in Great American, both 
Harley and Thurman considered Harley to be a part of Thurman’s 
household.  When we consider all the relevant facts, we hold, in 
light of the very particular circumstances in this case, that 
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Harley was a resident of Thurman’s household as defined under the 
policy at the time of the accident.  We reverse the 6 December 
2012 order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 
remand for entry of an order declaring that, at the time of the 
accident, Harley was a “family member,” and thus an “insured,” 
pursuant to the UIM policy issued by Plaintiff to Thurman. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. 
Judges BRYANT and STROUD concur.