Title: Diana G. Sanders v. Estate of David R. Sanders
Citation: 2008 WI 63
Docket Number: 2006AP000424
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2008

2008 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP424 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the estate of David R. Sanders, deceased: 
 
Diana G. Sanders, 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Estate of David R. Sanders by Ivan Gruetzmacher, 
Personal Representative, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 18, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 4, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca   
 
JUDGE: 
Philip M. Kirk   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., did not 
participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Michael 
D. Lawrynk and Gabert, Williams, Konz & Lawrynk, LLP, Appleton, 
and oral argument by Michael D. Lawrynk. 
 
For the respondent there was a brief by Thomas W. Johnson, 
Eric D. Hendrickson, and Werner, Lindgren & Johnson, S.C., 
Waupaca; Thomas A. Maroney and Hansen, Shambeau, Maroney, 
Anderson & Parry, S.C., Waupaca, and oral argument by Eric D. 
Hendrickson. 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP424 
(L.C. No. 
1999PR143) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Estate of David R. Sanders, deceased: 
 
Diana G. Sanders, 
 
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Estate of David R. Sanders by Ivan 
Gruetzmacher, Personal Representative, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner, Diana G. Sanders 
(Sanders), seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision1 of 
the court of appeals, which dismissed Sanders' appeal as having 
been untimely filed.  The orders involved were granted in 
probate proceedings in the Circuit Court for Waupaca County with 
Judge Philip M. Kirk, presiding.  The Respondent is the Estate 
                                                 
1 Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, No. 2006AP424, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2007). 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
2 
 
of David R. Sanders (the Estate), and Ivan Gruetzmacher is the 
personal representative of the Estate. 
¶2 
The principal issue upon review is whether the 
February 10, 2006 order of the circuit court was a final order 
for the purposes of an appeal, or whether Sanders should have 
appealed from an earlier order. 
¶3 
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
hold that the February 10, 2006 order was a final order for the 
purposes of an appeal.  We are further satisfied that Sanders 
did not waive her right to an appeal by stipulating to the entry 
of the February 10, 2006 order. 
I 
¶4 
This is the second time that issues involving this 
Estate and the February 10, 2006 order have come before us.  In 
2006, we granted Sanders' first petition for review, which also 
related to the February 10, 2006 order.  The court of appeals 
had dismissed Sanders' appeal from that order in regard to the 
probate of her deceased husband's estate.  In 2003, the court of 
appeals dismissed Sanders' earlier appeal as premature, holding 
that it was from a nonfinal order.  In both 2006 and 2007, the 
court of appeals dismissed her second appeal, holding that it 
had been filed too late.  In doing so, the court of appeals held 
that the February 10, 2006 order was not a final order.  In 
2007, we summarily vacated the court of appeals' 2006 dismissal 
and 
remanded 
the 
case 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
reconsideration in light of our decisions in Wambolt v. West 
Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 2007 WI 35, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
3 
 
N.W.2d 670, and Tyler v. The Riverbank, 2007 WI 33, 299 Wis. 2d 
751, 728 N.W.2d 686.  On remand, the court of appeals once again 
concluded that Sanders' appeal was late and once again dismissed 
her appeal, holding that there was a final order that was issued 
between 2003 and 2005 from which she could have appealed.  
Sanders petitioned for review of the latest decision of the 
court of appeals, and we granted that petition for review. 
¶5 
This matter started with probate proceedings when, 
after a will contest, David Sanders' will was admitted to 
probate.  The will gave David Sanders' assets to his brothers 
and to his nephews while expressly excluding his wife, Sanders.  
Sanders and the Estate both disputed the characterization of the 
assets as being marital property and their valuation.  In April 
2001, based on the parties' agreement, the circuit court ordered 
that all of the Estate's assets other than real estate, interest 
on real estate, and other income attributable to any asset of 
the Estate were marital property that would be divided equally 
between Sanders and the Estate.  However, the parties disagreed 
on what assets should be included, their value, and the amount 
of the income to be split. 
¶6 
All of the parties eventually agreed that the farm was 
marital property and that Sanders could buy the Estate's one-
half interest in it at a price that would be determined by 
inviting offers.  On December 24, 2001, the circuit court 
approved that stipulation.  The Estate received two offers, one 
of which was for $375,000 and one of which was for $860,000, 
contingent on rezoning.  Sanders sought to buy the property for 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
4 
 
one-half of the $375,000 offer.  However, on July 12, 2002, the 
circuit court granted a motion by the guardian ad litem for 
Sanders' minor child asking for relief from the settlement 
agreement.  The circuit court ordered all parties to pursue the 
higher offer.  On October 18, 2002, the circuit court denied 
Sanders' motion for reconsideration of this decision to vacate 
the stipulated order, and Sanders then appealed. 
¶7 
On February 4, 2003, the court of appeals dismissed 
Sanders' appeal as being premature, because it was satisfied 
that the July 12, 2002, and October 18, 2002 orders were not 
final.  The court noted it would not consider the December 24, 
2001 order because it had been vacated.  The court of appeals 
also denied Sanders' request to interpret her notice of appeal 
as a petition for interlocutory review.  Sanders did not 
petition this court for review of that appellate decision. 
¶8 
Sanders asserts that, after her first appeal was 
dismissed, her only choice was to either match the higher offer 
that the circuit court validated or allow the property to be 
sold to the entity that made the higher offer.  Sanders chose to 
match the price and to buy the Estate's share of the farm.  
According to Sanders, her accepted offer to purchase the farm 
required the Estate both to restore the property and to pay for 
environmental clean-up costs.  On April 1, 2005, the farm's sale 
to Sanders was confirmed by an order of the circuit court.  The 
order did not state that any of Sanders' claims were dismissed, 
released, adjudicated, or satisfied.  Sanders claims that the 
environmental restoration was not finished until January 2006. 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
5 
 
¶9 
A few months after the April 1, 2005 order was 
entered, the parties agreed to mediate the claims that Sanders 
had with respect to all of the non-real estate assets and 
liabilities.  Sanders claimed that the Estate owed her $70,000.  
This amount was for issues that were still disputed, which 
included: (1) the amount the Estate owed to Sanders for marital 
property, which included farm income; (2) the amount the Estate 
owed to Sanders for its share of a loan; and (3) the amount 
Sanders owed to the Estate for the Estate's share of the farm's 
account through the closing date of the farm's sale. 
¶10 The parties, through mediation, reached an agreement 
with 
respect 
to all of the non-real estate assets and 
liabilities.  That agreement was dated June 29, 2005, and 
provided that the Estate would pay Sanders the amount of 
$37,500.  In July 2005, the circuit court entered an order, 
based on the agreement, which authorized the Estate to pay that 
amount to Sanders' attorney.  On January 27, 2006, the circuit 
court entered an order authorizing payments, which, among other 
things, covered services rendered to bring the real estate into 
compliance with environmental standards. 
¶11 On February 10, 2006, a stipulation and order of 
dismissal was filed with the circuit court providing that, upon 
the provision of the signed estate receipt from Sanders, all of 
the claims between Sanders and the Estate were dismissed.  The 
February 10, 2006 order specifically stated, "This Order does 
not however waive any appeal rights that Diana Sanders or the 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
6 
 
Estate of David R. Sanders may have which are expressly 
reserved." 
¶12 Sanders appealed the February 10, 2006 order.  On June 
7, 2006, the court of appeals dismissed Sanders' appeal as 
having been filed too late.  The court also concluded that the 
February 2006 order was not a final order.  The court of appeals 
was satisfied that one of the circuit court orders issued 
between 2003 and 2005 was the relevant final order and that an 
appeal from any of those orders would obviously be too late.  
Citing Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) (2005-06)2, the court of appeals 
noted that an appeal as a matter of right may only be taken from 
a final order or judgment in an action or a special proceeding.  
Also citing § 808.03(1), the court of appeals noted that an 
order or a judgment is only final if it disposes of the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties. 
¶13 In its June 7, 2006 decision, the court of appeals 
held that the February 2006 order was not final for the purposes 
of an appeal because that order did not dispose of any 
substantive matters that were then in litigation, at least not 
as to Sanders.  The court of appeals did not determine which 
order was the final order because it concluded that all of the 
previous potential final orders, which had been issued between 
2003 and 2005, were time barred for purposes of appeal.  The 
court of appeals stated that one potential final order was the 
                                                 
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
7 
 
order dated July 2003, which set Sanders' right of first refusal 
to purchase the farm.  The court of appeals also was satisfied 
that the April 1, 2005 order that confirmed the farm's sale was 
a potential final order.  It also stated that another potential 
final order was the order dated July 2005, which directed the 
Estate to make certain payments to Sanders' attorney.  The court 
of appeals rejected Sanders' argument that the environmental 
clean-up condition in the farm sales contract, which was still 
pending at the time of the issuance of all three orders, made 
all three previous orders nonfinal.  Sanders argued that the 
environmental clean-up work had not been finished until January 
2006, which is what allowed the claims to be dismissed in full 
using the February 2006 order. 
¶14 After the court of appeals' June 7, 2006 decision that 
dismissed her appeal as being untimely, Sanders filed a petition 
for review in this court.  We initially held Sanders' petition 
for review in abeyance until our Wambolt and Tyler decisions 
were released.  After the release of those two opinions, on May 
23, 2007, we granted Sanders' petition for review, summarily 
vacated the June 7, 2006 court of appeals order, and remanded 
the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of 
those two decisions. 
¶15 On September 20, 2007, the court of appeals summarily 
dismissed Sanders' appeal again as having been filed too late.  
The 2007 decision largely followed and expanded upon the 
reasoning of the court of appeals' 2006 decision. 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
8 
 
¶16 In its 2007 decision, the court of appeals stated that 
Sanders had sought review of the 2002 circuit court decision 
that related to the process by which Sanders could purchase the 
Estate's interest in the farm.  The court of appeals took the 
position that the appeal raised two issues, which were:  (1) 
whether the three probate orders that were issued between 2003 
and 2005 satisfied the finality requirements of Wambolt and 
Tyler as encompassing explicit language that dismissed or 
adjudged the claim; and (2) what the scope of the relevant 
matter in litigation was between Sanders and the Estate. 
¶17 The court of appeals first addressed the second issue 
and held that the real estate and the non-real estate matters 
were 
two 
separate 
proceedings, 
which 
were 
commenced 
and 
litigated at different times, and which were addressed in 
separate filings and orders.  As a result, the court of appeals 
held that Sanders' ability to appeal the final real estate order 
should not depend on whether any new non-real estate disputes 
were filed later, because such later disputes would not become a 
part of the matter that was in litigation already. 
¶18 Having decided the second issue that the real estate 
transactions were the sole matters in litigation for the purpose 
of identifying the final order, the court of appeals turned to 
the first issue of whether those orders satisfied the Wambolt 
and Tyler tests.  In its June 2006 dismissal order, the court of 
appeals believed that one of the three orders between 2003 and 
2005 was the final order, and not the February 2006 order.  As a 
result, the court of appeals felt that it was not necessary to 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
9 
 
determine which of those orders was actually the final order, 
because an appeal from any of those orders was time barred when 
the 2006 appeal was filed.  The court of appeals conceded that 
an appeal from the February 2006 order would have been timely if 
that court had determined that it was a final order. 
¶19 After reviewing the 2002, 2003, and 2005 orders, the 
court of appeals stated that the April 2005 order, which 
confirmed the real estate sale, satisfied the Wambolt test 
because its language explicitly approved and confirmed the sale 
of the farm.  The court of appeals cited Estate of Hillery: 
McCarville v. Hinkins, 46 Wis. 2d 689, 695, 176 N.W.2d 376 
(1970), for the proposition that an order that confirms the sale 
of real estate during a probate proceeding is a final order and, 
hence, appealable.  The court of appeals rejected Sanders' 
contention that the April 2005 order was not final because of 
its additional language that directed the proceeds from the sale 
to be placed in a trust account pending additional orders from 
the circuit court.  The court of appeals also decided that any 
environmental clean-up issues were not in litigation and that 
such potential future litigation would not render the April 2005 
order nonfinal.  The court of appeals held that the February 
2006 order, which Sanders appealed from, did not encompass the 
relevant April 2005 circuit court order.  The court of appeals 
also stated that Sanders' appeal of the February 2006 circuit 
court order did not permit Sanders a review of the nonfinal 2002 
circuit court order. 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
10 
 
¶20 Sanders filed a petition for review of the court of 
appeals' September 20, 2007 decision, and we granted review on 
December 19, 2007. 
II 
¶21 We begin by addressing the relevant standard of 
review.  Determining whether an order is final, and also 
determining whether an appeal is timely from a final judgment or 
order, both present questions of law that we review de novo.  
Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶14, citing Harder v. Pfitzinger, 2004 
WI 102, ¶8, 274 Wis. 2d 324, 682 N.W.2d 398. 
III 
¶22 The principal issue upon review is whether the 
February 10, 2006 order of the circuit court was a final order 
for the purposes of an appeal, or whether Sanders should have 
appealed from an earlier order. 
¶23 On review, Sanders first argues that, under Wambolt 
and Tyler, the February 2006 circuit court order was the final 
order because: (1) it met the specific language requirements of 
those two cases; (2) it disposed of the entire matter in 
litigation; and (3) a final order could not have been entered 
before the farm's sale was fully completed in January 2006.  
Sanders asserts that the court of appeals' decision conflicts 
with both cases, because none of the other circuit court orders 
contained explicit language that either adjudged or dismissed 
her claims.  Second, Sanders contends that the dispute over the 
real estate assets and the non-real estate assets was truly a 
single "matter in litigation."  She contends that all of her 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
11 
 
claims, after the initial will contest, have to be considered a 
single "matter in litigation[,]" because her marital property 
claims to both real estate assets and non-real estate assets 
were identical claims to different property items that were tied 
to the farm and its operations, and to transactions involving 
livestock, crops, and like matters.  Third, in her reply brief, 
Sanders argues that she did not waive her right to an appeal by 
stipulating to the entry of the circuit court's February 10, 
2006 order. 
¶24 On review, the Estate argues that the court of appeals 
was correct in its determination that the February 10, 2006 
circuit court order was not the final order.  The Estate argues 
that the dispute over the real estate was the sole "matter in 
litigation[,]" given that Sanders settled all of her non-real 
estate claims in mediation.  Furthermore, the Estate argues that 
the court of appeals was correct in concluding that the April 
2005 circuit court order satisfied the Wambolt and Tyler tests 
as being a final order because, while it did not use the term 
adjudged, it contained similarly explicit language that adjudged 
the matter.  Specifically, that order stated that "the sale of 
the real estate involved in the above entitled action is 
approved and confirmed."  The Estate claims that this order 
granted the ultimate relief that Sanders sought.  The Estate 
also argues that a potential for future litigation would not 
render an order nonfinal.  In the alternative, the Estate argues 
that Sanders waived her right to an appeal by stipulating to the 
entry of the circuit court's February 10, 2006 order. 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
12 
 
¶25 For the reasons discussed in detail below, we hold 
that the February 10, 2006 order of the circuit court was a 
final order for the purposes of an appeal.  We are further 
satisfied that Sanders did not waive her right to an appeal by 
stipulating to the entry of the February 10, 2006 order. 
¶26 A party may only appeal, as a matter of right, from a 
judgment or an order "that disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more of the parties . . ." in an action 
or a special proceeding.  Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  We have 
previously held that the probate of an estate is a series of 
special proceedings, which are terminated with a series of 
orders that are final orders for the purposes of an appeal.  See 
Estate of Goldstein v. Goldstein, 91 Wis. 2d 803, 810, 284 
N.W.2d 
88 
(1979). 
 
Special 
proceedings 
in 
probate 
"are 
terminated by orders rather than by judgments."  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
¶27 Because the probate of an estate may consist of a 
series of special proceedings, unlike other forms of litigation, 
probate can result in a series of potentially final orders.  
Estate of Olson v. Dunbar, 149 Wis. 2d 213, 216, 440 N.W.2d 792 
(Ct. App. 1989).  As this court stated, "'A final order in a 
special proceeding, . . . is one which determines and disposes 
finally of the proceeding——one which, so long as it stands, 
precludes any further steps therein.  It bears the same relation 
to the proceeding in which it is entered as the final judgment 
bears to an action.'"  Estate of Hillery: McCarville, 46 Wis. 2d 
at 695 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
13 
 
¶28 Furthermore, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 865.04(2) 
states: 
"The 
determination 
of 
each 
issue 
and 
the 
completion 
of 
each 
proceeding required for the administration of a decedent's 
estate is independent of any other issue or proceeding involving 
the same estate."  Additionally, in the context of probate, an 
appeal may be taken as a matter of right only from a judgment or 
an order that disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to 
one or more parties in an action or a special proceeding.  Wis. 
Stat. § 808.03(1).  Accordingly, because the probate of a 
decedent's estate is a series of special proceedings, we are 
satisfied that a party in such a proceeding may take an appeal 
as a matter of right at any time in the probate process when a 
special proceeding disposes of an entire matter in litigation as 
to one or more parties.  Obviously, this may occur more than 
once during the probate of a decedent's estate as special 
proceedings on various issues are concluded. 
¶29 We must first identify the scope of the relevant 
"matter in litigation" in regard to the real estate special 
proceeding in the present case.  Based on our review of the 
record, the real estate special proceeding contained many 
different matters such as the sales price determination, the 
confirmation of the purchase, the environmental clean-up on the 
property, and other aspects of the property's restoration.  We 
are satisfied that the real estate special proceeding was 
finally disposed of as an entire matter in litigation by the 
February 10, 2006 order because the Estate had not completed its 
required environmental clean-up and property restoration tasks, 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
14 
 
which made the real estate's sale complete and final, until 
January 2006.  As a result, we are persuaded that the circuit 
court could not have finally disposed of the real estate special 
proceeding before January 2006.  We are further satisfied that 
the February 10, 2006 order was the final order because it 
stated that "all claims have been resolved or adjudicated . . . 
."  It also specifically stated that the order did not waive any 
appeal rights that Sanders or the Estate "may have which are 
expressly reserved." 
¶30 We remanded this case to the court of appeals after 
our Wambolt and Tyler decisions were released, and we are 
satisfied that those cases support, and seem to be consistent 
with, our decision here because, as we noted previously, the 
February 10, 2006 order contained the language both that "all 
claims have been resolved or adjudicated . . ." and that all 
claims were "dismissed on the merits . . . ."  Such language is 
consistent with the requirement in both Wambolt and Tyler that 
final judgments or orders must contain a statement such as "'it 
is adjudged . . .'" or any other "similar[ly] explicit language 
adjudging the matter."  Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶34, n.12; see 
also Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, ¶3. 
¶31 While we are following the Wambolt and Tyler cases 
here, we are cognizant of the fact that those cases were not 
probate cases and that probate cases involve a series of special 
proceedings.  In addition, Wambolt and Tyler contain a new 
requirement with prospective application to circuit court final 
orders and final judgments. 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
15 
 
¶32 In 
Wambolt, 
and 
in 
Tyler, 
both 
of 
which 
had 
prospective application to the contents of circuit court final 
orders, the new requirement was that, from September 1, 2007, 
on, "final orders and final judgments [must] state that they are 
final for [the] purposes of [an] appeal."  Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 
723, ¶44 (citation omitted); see also Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, 
¶26.  Furthermore, in Wambolt, this court considered, but did 
not adopt, the federal requirement of a separate document.  
Wambolt, 299 Wis. 2d 723, ¶44, n.18.  We stated, "The federal 
system addresses the need for clarity with respect to finality 
by requiring that courts enter a separate document constituting 
[a] final judgment.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 (2006); Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(7), 4(b)(6) (2006)."  Id.  We continued by stating, "Unless 
and until our current rules are modified, the requirement of the 
statement on finality which we embrace above provides additional 
clarity within our existing appellate procedures."  Id. 
¶33 A general tenet of Wisconsin appellate procedure is 
applicable to the present case.  This court has held that, when 
final orders and judgments "arguably dispose of the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties, but which 
do not contain a clear statement that they are the documents 
from which [an] appeal of right may follow[,]" the appropriate 
course of action for an appellate court "is to liberally 
construe [the] documents in favor of timely appeals."  Id., ¶46 
(footnote omitted).  Accordingly, "absent explicit language that 
the document is intended to be the final order or final judgment 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
16 
 
for purposes of appeal, appellate courts should liberally 
construe ambiguities to preserve the right of appeal."  Id. 
¶34 In analyzing the present case, we turn first to the 
Estate's argument that Sanders waived her right to an appeal by 
stipulating to the entry of the circuit court's February 10, 
2006 order because, if true, that would end our inquiry.  Citing 
State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 124, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990), 
the Estate argues that the general rule is that a party lacks 
standing to appeal from a judgment or an order to which he or 
she consented. 
¶35 In contrast, Sanders argues that she did not waive her 
right to an appeal by stipulating to the entry of the February 
10, 2006 order.  Sanders also contends that she did not accept 
the circuit court's decisions regarding the farm's sale by doing 
so.  Sanders argues that all of the cases that the Estate relies 
on in support of its position on this issue involved conditional 
judgments, that allowed at least one party to revisit issues, 
either in the circuit court or upon appeal, depending on what 
the appellate courts did upon review.  Sanders notes that this 
was not the situation in the present case. 
¶36 We are satisfied that Sanders did not waive her right 
to an appeal in the present case, and our previous case law 
supports that decision.  For example, in Stone, the plaintiffs, 
the 
Stones, 
and 
their 
insurer, 
Acuity, 
entered 
into 
a 
stipulation.  Stone v. Acuity, 2008 WI 30, ¶16, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
747 N.W.2d 149.  The stipulation provided for a judgment to be 
entered in the Stones' favor "for $500,000 against Acuity and 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
17 
 
reserved Acuity's right to appeal the denial of its motion for 
summary judgment and motion for reconsideration of that denial."  
Id.  The parties agreed "'that the $500,000 figure would be the 
amount that ACUITY would pay for the injuries and damages 
sustained by G. Vaughn Stone and Christine Stone in the event 
[that] insurance coverage is found on appeal to exist from 
ACUITY . . . .'"  Id., ¶66.  Acuity had failed to provide the 
Stones with "adequate notice of the availability of UIM 
coverage," in violation of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(d), so this 
court read into the Stones' policy "the minimum level of UIM 
coverage required under § 632.32(4m)(d)——$50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident."  Id., ¶61.  However, we held that this 
particular determination did not end our inquiry because of the 
stipulation between the parties.  Id., ¶65.  We noted that the 
"'interpretation of a stipulation must, above all, give effect 
to the intention of the parties.'"  Id., ¶67 (citations 
omitted).  Because we found that UIM insurance coverage existed 
in favor of the Stones, we held that Acuity had to pay the 
Stones the full stipulated amount of $500,000 for their injuries 
and not the lesser amount of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per 
accident.  Id., ¶68. 
¶37 We are satisfied that Sanders did not waive her right 
to an appeal by stipulating to the entry of the circuit court's 
February 10, 2006 order.  As we noted in Stone, stipulations 
must "give effect to the intention of the parties."  Id., ¶67.  
Here, the stipulation expressly noted that it did "not . . . 
waive any appeal rights that . . . Sanders . . . may have which 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
18 
 
are expressly reserved."  Accordingly, giving effect to the 
parties' clear intention, we are satisfied that Sanders did not 
waive her right to an appeal because of the stipulation.3 
¶38 We now turn our analysis to the other primary legal 
issue before us upon review, which is the finality, or the lack 
thereof, of the February 10, 2006 order.  After doing so, we 
must determine whether Sanders' appeal was filed in a timely 
manner.  We are satisfied that the February 10, 2006 order was 
the relevant final order.4  Under Wis. Stat. § 809.10, a timely 
notice of appeal is necessary to confer jurisdiction on an 
appellate court.  Sanders' notice of appeal was stamped as filed 
on February 20, 2006. 
¶39 Based upon our review of the record, we are satisfied 
that the February 10, 2006 order of the circuit court met the 
requirements of a final order in a probate matter.  The February 
                                                 
3 We note, however, that the parties to an action or a 
proceeding may not bind the court on the issue of whether an 
order or a judgment is a final one regardless of the language 
set forth in a stipulation.  Accordingly, as we stated in 
Wambolt, "[c]ircuit courts should therefore be mindful of 
whether a document stating that it is final for purposes of 
appeal does in fact dispose of the entire matter in litigation 
as to one or more parties."  Wambolt v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 
2007 WI 35, ¶46 n.19, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 N.W.2d 670 
4 The relevant statute that sets forth the time limits for 
an appeal requires that any "appeal to the court of appeals must 
be initiated within 45 days of" the entry of the final judgment 
or order that is being "appealed from if written notice of the 
entry of a final judgment or order is given within 21 days of 
the final judgment or order as provided in [§ ]806.06(5), or 
within 90 days of entry if notice is not given . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 808.04(1).  Sanders' appeal was timely under either 
test. 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
19 
 
10, 2006 circuit court order specifically noted it dismissed all 
claims of Diane Sanders on the merits. 
¶40 Many issues remained unresolved after the issuance of 
the April 2005 order of the circuit court, which was the order 
that confirmed the farm's sale to Sanders.  Accordingly, we are 
convinced that the court of appeals focused too narrowly, and, 
therefore, erroneously on that circuit court order rather than 
looking at the scope of the entire "matter in litigation" 
between Sanders and the Estate related to the real estate.  In 
doing so, the court of appeals failed to place appropriate 
emphasis on many unresolved issues between Sanders and the 
Estate in the real estate special proceeding.  For example, the 
June 2005 mediation agreement, which the circuit court approved, 
required Sanders "to cooperate with any and all governmental 
agencies 
and 
their 
engineers 
or 
other 
employees 
or 
subcontractors with respect to environmental clean up and 
monitoring . . . ."  Furthermore, the Estate was to receive any 
future 
reimbursement 
from 
"P.E.C.F.A. 
funding 
. 
. 
. 
."  
Accordingly, the mediation agreement of June 2005 demonstrates 
that there were still matters pending in the real estate special 
proceeding.  The Estate was required to bring the farm property 
into compliance with environmental standards and to perform 
other, 
various 
clean-up 
activities 
on 
the 
farm. 
 
The 
environmental clean-up condition in the farm sales contract was 
still pending until just before the issuance of the February 10, 
2006 order.  It was not until late January of 2006 that the 
circuit 
court 
ordered 
payments 
for 
services 
related 
to 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
20 
 
environmental restoration and clean-up activities.  This January 
2006 circuit court order noted that "the real estate which is 
the principal asset in the Estate has now been brought into 
compliance with environmental standards . . . ."  Only after the 
Estate had performed all of its obligations in this regard could 
a final order be entered in the present case.  Accordingly, we 
are satisfied that the February 10, 2006 order was the relevant 
final order, because only it disposed of the entire matter in 
litigation between Sanders and the Estate in the real estate 
special proceeding. 
¶41 Specifically, the February 10, 2006 order disposed of 
the entire matter in litigation at the circuit court level as to 
at least one party, Sanders, by stating, "all claims brought and 
made by and between Diane Sanders and [the Estate] are hereby 
dismissed on the merits and without costs."  Furthermore, that 
order 
referenced 
the 
parties' 
"Stipulation 
and 
Order 
of 
Dismissal" and further stated that "all claims have been 
resolved or adjudicated at the trial court level."  While a 
finality determination is not always clear-cut, here we are 
satisfied that this circuit court order was the one that 
disposed of the entire matter in litigation, at least in regard 
to 
the 
relevant 
real 
estate 
special 
proceeding, 
and 
it 
specifically noted and preserved Sanders' right to appeal from 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
21 
 
the order.5  Just as we required in Wambolt and Tyler, final 
orders and final judgments in probate cases should also state 
that they are final for the purposes of an appeal, if that is 
the intention of the parties involved and of the circuit court. 
¶42 In summary, based on the foregoing, we hold that the 
February 10, 2006 order of the circuit court was a final order 
for the purposes of an appeal.  We are further satisfied that 
Sanders did not waive her right to an appeal by stipulating to 
the entry of the February 10, 2006 order. 
IV 
¶43 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
hold that the February 10, 2006 order was a final order for the 
purposes of an appeal.  We are further satisfied that Sanders 
did not waive her right to an appeal by stipulating to the entry 
of the February 10, 2006 order. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and this matter is remanded to the court of appeals 
for actions consistent with this opinion. 
¶44 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, 
J., did not participate. 
 
                                                 
5 Sanders' appeal of the February 10, 2006 order, because 
that order concluded the remaining real estate matters, had the 
effect of bringing before the court of appeals all of the real 
estate issues.  This is so because all prior nonfinal judgments, 
orders, or rulings that were adverse to Sanders in the real 
estate special proceeding, which were not previously appealed 
and ruled upon, were properly before the court of appeals.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 809.10(4). 
No. 
2006AP424 
 
 
 
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