Title: Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001634-CQ
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 6, 2020

2020 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Democratic National Committee, Democratic Party 
of Wisconsin, Sylvia Gear, Chrystal Edwards and 
Jill Swenson, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
     v. 
Marge Bostelmann, Julie M. Glancey, Dean 
Knudson, Mark L. Thomsen and Robert Spindell, 
Jr., 
          Defendants, 
Republican Party of Wisconsin, Republican 
National Committee and Wisconsin State 
Legislature, 
          Intervening Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 6, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
    
 
COUNTY: 
   
 
JUDGE: 
   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellees, there were briefs filed by 
Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Michelle M. Umberger, Sopen B. Shah and 
Perkins Coie LLP, Madison; Marc E. Elias (pro hac vice), Bruce V. 
Spiva (pro hac vice), John Devaney (pro hac vice), Amanda R. 
Callais (pro hac vice), Zachary J. Newkirk (pro hac vice) and 
 
 
2 
Perkins Coie LLP, Washington D.C.; Jeffrey A. Mandell, Douglas M. 
Poland and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison; Joseph S. Goode, Mark 
M. Leitner and Laffey, Leitner & Goode LLC, Milwaukee;  Jay A. 
Urban and Urban & Taylor, S.C., Milwaukee; Stacie H. Rosenzweig 
and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee and Rebecca L. Salawdeh and 
Salawdeh Law Office, LLC, Wauwatosa. 
 
For the intervening defendants-appellants Wisconsin State 
Legislature, there were briefs filed by Misha Tseytlin, Kevin M. 
LeRoy and Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Chicago. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Tony Evers, 
Governor of the State of Wisconsin and the Office of the Wisconsin 
Attorney General by Eric J. Wilson, deputy attorney general, Colin 
T. Roth, assistant attorney general and Thomas C. Bellavia, 
assistant attorney general, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1 and SEIU Healthcare 
Wisconsin by Kyle A. McCoy and Soldon McCoy, LLC, Middleton and 
Matthew Wessler (pro hac vice) and Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, 
D.C.
 
 
                                                                     2020 WI 80 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1634-CQ 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Democratic National Committee, Democratic Party 
of Wisconsin, Sylvia Gear, Chrystal Edwards and 
Jill Swenson,   
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellees,   
 
 
v. 
 
Marge Bostelmann, Julie M. Glancey, Dean 
Knudson, Mark L. Thomsen and Robert Spindell, 
Jr.,   
 
          Defendants, 
 
Republican Party of Wisconsin, Republican 
National Committee and Wisconsin State 
Legislature, 
 
          Intervening Defendants-Appellants. 
   
FILED 
 
OCT 6, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., 
joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of a question of law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Certified question 
answered and cause remanded.   
 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
2 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals has certified the following question to this court:  
"whether, under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), the Wisconsin Legislature 
has the authority to represent the State of Wisconsin's interest 
in the validity of state laws."  We answer the question in the 
affirmative.  The plain language of § 803.09(2m) (2017-18),1 along 
with its statutory context, grants the Legislature this power.  In 
Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v. Vos, we held 
that 
this 
provision 
survived 
a 
facial 
challenge 
to 
its 
compatibility with the separation of powers in the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  2020 WI 67, ¶73, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  
This court has not had occasion to consider, nor have we held, 
directly or by necessary implication, that any particular 
applications of this statute are unconstitutional as applied.  
Therefore, the current state of the law in Wisconsin is that the 
Legislature has the authority to represent the State of Wisconsin's 
interest in the validity of state laws under § 803.09(2m). 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
This question arises in the context of litigation over 
election-related laws challenged in federal court.  In that 
litigation, the Wisconsin Legislature was denied standing to 
appeal an adverse ruling below.  Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. 
Bostelmann, Nos. 20-2835 & 20-2844, 2020 WL 5796311, at *2 (7th 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
3 
 
Cir. Sept. 29, 2020) (per curiam).  The Seventh Circuit previously 
held that the Legislature had standing, but ruled that our decision 
in Vos constituted intervening authority justifying a departure 
from the law of the case.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit stated that 
under our decision in Vos, "the legislature may represent its own 
interest," but the Legislature may not "represent a general state 
interest in the validity of enacted legislation."  Id.  The 
Legislature sought reconsideration and then en banc review of this 
decision. 
¶3 
The Seventh Circuit's decision makes clear that key to 
its determination on standing is a question of state law, an issue 
on which this court has the final word.  Id.  Accordingly, under 
Wis. Stat. § 821.01 and 7th Circ. R. 52, the Seventh Circuit has 
requested that this court "decide whether, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(2m), the State Legislature has the authority to represent 
the State of Wisconsin's interest in the validity of state laws." 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶4 
The 
question 
certified 
is 
not 
a 
wide-ranging 
constitutional inquiry.2  Rather, the Seventh Circuit has focused 
our attention on the language of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), and 
whether that provision grants the Legislature the authority to 
defend a particular state interest in court——the "interest in the 
                                                 
2 Neither do the briefs raise comprehensive separation of 
powers arguments rooted in our constitutional text, a reality 
understandable in light of the abbreviated time frame the current 
circumstances require.   
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
4 
 
validity of state laws."  This court has weighed in on the 
constitutionality of this statute only once, in Vos.  The Seventh 
Circuit read Vos as limiting the reach of this statute, and on 
that basis determined the Legislature no longer had standing.  
Bostelmann, Nos. 20-2835 & 20-2844, at *2.  We therefore begin 
with Vos——discussing what this court held, and what it did not.  
Then we proceed to the statutory question squarely presented by 
the certified question. 
¶5 
The question before this court in Vos involved a facial 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), among other laws.  Vos, 393 
Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶10, 73, 86.  As we explained, a facial challenge 
under 
Wisconsin 
law 
cannot 
succeed 
unless 
the 
law 
is 
unconstitutional in "all applications."  Id., ¶¶38, 48.  In other 
words, if at least some applications of the law are constitutional, 
the facial challenge must fail.  Id., ¶72 ("Because this is a 
facial challenge, and there are constitutional applications of 
these laws, that challenge cannot succeed.").  In our analysis of 
the Legislature's power to intervene and represent the state, we 
concluded there are constitutional applications of § 803.09(2m).  
Id. ("In at least some cases, we see no constitutional violation 
in allowing the legislature to intervene in litigation concerning 
the validity of a statute, at least where its institutional 
interests are implicated.").  Because at least some applications 
of § 803.09(2m) were consistent with the Wisconsin Constitution, 
the facial challenge did not succeed.  Id., ¶73. 
¶6 
Our decision in Vos was limited.  This court did not 
hold or imply that the institutional interests discussed were the 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
5 
 
only circumstances in which these laws could be enforced consistent 
with the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id., ¶¶50-73.  Rather, we more 
narrowly concluded that certain institutional interests defeated 
the facial challenge.  Id., ¶73.  While the institutional interests 
discussed were sufficient for us to conclude the statute survived 
a facial challenge, we never concluded those or any other interests 
were necessary for the statute to be constitutionally applied.  To 
say it more plainly, this court has not held that any application 
of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) runs contrary to the Wisconsin 
Constitution; we have merely concluded some applications do not.  
Id. ("We express no opinion on whether individual applications or 
categories of applications may violate the separation of powers, 
or whether the legislature may have other valid institutional 
interests supporting application of these laws.  But the facial 
challenge . . . does not succeed."). 
¶7 
What remains, then, is the statutory question of whether 
Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) grants the Legislature the authority to 
represent the State of Wisconsin's interest in the validity of 
state laws.  Chapter 803 provides the rules of procedure for 
parties in civil cases, and the relevant provision here states: 
When a party to an action challenges in state or federal 
court the constitutionality of a statute, facially or as 
applied, challenges a statute as violating or preempted 
by federal law, or otherwise challenges the construction 
or validity of a statute, as part of a claim or 
affirmative defense, the assembly, the senate, and the 
legislature may intervene as set forth under [Wis. Stat. 
§] 13.365 at any time in the action as a matter of right 
by serving a motion upon the parties as provided in [Wis. 
Stat. §] 801.14. 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
6 
 
§ 803.09(2m).     
¶8 
This statute gives the Legislature the power to 
intervene in certain types of cases.  Intervention in Wisconsin is 
generally 
premised 
on 
protecting 
a 
party's 
interests 
in 
litigation.  Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  This begs the question, what 
interests does the Legislature have?  By enacting § 803.09(2m), 
Wisconsin has adopted a public policy that gives the Legislature 
a set of litigation interests, namely when a party "[1] challenges 
in state or federal court the constitutionality of a statute, 
facially or as applied, [2] challenges a statute as violating or 
preempted by federal law, or [3] otherwise challenges the 
construction or validity of a statute, as part of a claim or 
affirmative defense."  § 803.09(2m).  The Legislature is therefore 
empowered to defend not just its interests as a legislative body, 
but these specific interests itemized by statute.  Whatever 
constitutional interests the Legislature may have as a branch of 
government 
that 
could 
justify 
intervention 
apart 
from 
§ 803.09(2m), 
the 
statutory 
text 
unmistakably 
grants 
the 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
7 
 
Legislature an interest in defending the validity of state law 
when challenged in court.3 
¶9 
Moreover, under Wisconsin law, an intervenor is a full 
participant in the proceedings, having all the same rights as all 
other parties to the action.  Zellner v. Herrick, 2009 WI 80, ¶22, 
319 Wis. 2d 532, 770 N.W.2d 305; Kohler Co. v. Sogen Int'l Fund, 
Inc., 2000 WI App 60, ¶¶10-12, 233 Wis. 2d 592, 608 N.W.2d 746.  
This includes the power to raise "any legal claims and defenses," 
as well as the power to appeal an adverse decision just as any 
other party could.  Kohler Co., 233 Wis. 2d 592, ¶11; Prince Corp. 
v. Vandenberg, 2016 WI 49, ¶13, 369 Wis. 2d 387, 882 N.W.2d 371 
(noting that the intervenors there "separately appealed the 
circuit court's order"). 
¶10 The Plaintiffs-Appellees urge a different approach by 
making much of Wis. Stat. § 13.365.  This provision is found in a 
chapter of Wisconsin law addressing the Legislature and cross-
referenced in Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), parroting the language in 
that section.  It provides: 
                                                 
3 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals accurately recognized 
this is the plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) in Planned 
Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 
2019).  The majority said, "The State of Wisconsin has chosen to 
have an attorney general as its representative, but it also has 
recently provided a mechanism by which its legislature (or either 
of its constitutive houses) can intervene to defend the State's 
interest in the constitutionality of its statutes."  Id. at 795.  
And the concurrence likewise observed, "section 803.09(2m) 
reflects a sovereign policy judgment that the Attorney General is 
not the State's exclusive representative in court when state laws 
are challenged."  Id. at 806 (Sykes, J., concurring). 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
8 
 
Pursuant to [Wis. Stat. §] 803.09(2m), when a party to 
an action challenges in state or federal court the 
constitutionality of a statute, facially or as applied, 
challenges a statute as violating or preempted by 
federal law, or otherwise challenges the construction or 
validity of a statute, as part of a claim or affirmative 
defense: 
(1) The committee on assembly organization may intervene 
at any time in the action on behalf of the assembly.  
The committee on assembly organization may obtain legal 
counsel 
other 
than 
from 
the 
department 
of 
justice . . . to represent the assembly in any action in 
which the assembly intervenes. 
(2) The committee on senate organization may intervene 
at any time in the action on behalf of the senate.  The 
committee on senate organization may obtain legal 
counsel 
other 
than 
from 
the 
department 
of 
justice . . . to represent the senate in any action in 
which the senate intervenes. 
(3) The joint committee on legislative organization may 
intervene at any time in the action on behalf of the 
legislature.  The joint committee on legislative 
organization may obtain legal counsel other than from 
the 
department 
of 
justice . . . to 
represent 
the 
legislature in any action in which the joint committee 
on legislative organization intervenes. 
§ 13.365.  This statute explains the vehicle by which each 
legislative entity may exercise its authority to intervene under 
§ 803.09(2m).  Specifically, § 13.365 gives the committee on 
assembly organization, the committee on senate organization, and 
the joint committee on legislative organization authority to act 
"on behalf of" their corresponding legislative entity to defend 
the validity of state laws as intervenors. 
¶11 The statutory use of "on behalf of" has a simple and 
straightforward meaning:  it identifies which legislative entity 
the particular legislative committee is acting for, and how that 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
9 
 
entity effectuates intervention.4  Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 13.365 
limits the interests of the entities permitted to intervene or 
otherwise narrows the authority given to the Legislature to defend 
those interests under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m).  Nothing in § 13.365 
references the institutional interests of the Legislature as a 
body.  The only interests referenced in § 13.365 are the same ones 
repeated verbatim in § 803.09(2m).  Therefore, as a statutory 
matter, the Legislature's litigation interests under § 13.365 are 
identical to those in § 803.09(2m).  To read § 13.365 as limiting 
the Legislature's interests to its institutional interests both 
adds words to the statute (the Legislature's institutional 
                                                 
4 Our statutes commonly use the phrase "on behalf of" to 
indicate that an individual is acting or bringing a claim or 
challenge for another.  See, Wis. Stat. § 803.01(3)(a) (requiring 
an appointment of a guardian ad litem when "the guardian fails to 
appear and act on behalf of the ward or individual adjudicated 
incompetent") (emphasis added); Wis. Stat. § 803.08(1) ("One or 
more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties 
on 
behalf 
of 
all 
members") 
(emphasis 
added); 
§ 803.08(12)(d) ("The court may designate interim counsel to act 
on behalf of a putative class before determining whether to certify 
the action as a class action.") (emphasis added); Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.06(2) ("No witness on behalf of the state in any civil 
action, matter or proceeding, on behalf of either party in any 
criminal action or proceeding, on behalf of a municipality in a 
forfeiture action or on behalf of an indigent respondent in a 
paternity 
proceeding") 
(emphasis 
added); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 885.285(1)(a) ("A settlement with or any payment made to an 
injured person, or to another on behalf of any injured person") 
(emphasis added); Wis. Stat. § 885.37(3)(a)1. ("'Agency' includes 
any official, employee or person acting on behalf of an agency.") 
(emphasis added).   
The use of this same phrase suggests the Legislature intended 
the phrase to have the same meaning.  Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer 
Constr., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462.   
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
10 
 
interests are discussed in our cases, but not in the statute), and 
deletes the interests separately itemized.  Section 13.365, then, 
reinforces the plain language of § 803.09(2m). 
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.25, the statute granting the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) authority to represent the state in 
litigation, further supports the plain reading of § 803.09(2m).  
Alongside that section's grant of authority to the Attorney General 
and DOJ are multiple references to the power of the Legislature to 
intervene under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m).  See § 165.25(1) 
(representing the state in appeals and on remand); § 165.25(1m) 
(representing the state in other matters); § 165.25(6)(a)1. 
(requiring that legislative intervenors approve settlements 
entered by the Attorney General).  In each instance, the statutes 
now give the Legislature power to step in as a party and defend 
state law.  When it comes to the interests statutorily granted to 
the Legislature under § 803.09(2m), the authority given to the DOJ 
to defend those interests is not exclusive.   
¶13 Putting 
these 
principles 
together, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 803.09(2m) 
gives 
the 
Legislature 
a 
statutory 
right 
to 
participate as a party, with all the rights and privileges of any 
other party, in litigation defending the state's interest in the 
validity of its laws.  While defending state law is normally within 
the province and power of the Attorney General, § 803.09(2m) grants 
this same power to defend the validity of state law to the 
Legislature in certain circumstances.  Where the prerequisites in 
§ 803.09(2m) are met, Wisconsin law gives the Legislature, if it 
No. 
2020AP1634-CQ 
 
11 
 
chooses to intervene, the power to represent the State of 
Wisconsin's interest in the validity of its laws.   
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶14 As we have explained, in our only decision addressing 
the matter, this court has held that Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) is 
facially constitutional under a challenge based on the Wisconsin 
Constitution's separation of powers.  Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶73.  
Furthermore, the text of § 803.09(2m) permits the Legislature to 
intervene when the validity of a state statute is at issue and to 
defend that interest.  Therefore, in answer to the question 
certified by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, under 
§ 803.09(2m), the Legislature does have the authority to represent 
the State of Wisconsin's interest in the validity of state laws. 
 
By the Court.—Certified question answered and cause remanded. 
 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶15 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The certified 
question before us is whether, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), 
the Wisconsin Legislature has the authority to represent not only 
its own interest as the state's lawmaking institution, but the 
interests of the State of Wisconsin as a whole.  It does not.  The 
plain language of our statutes demarcates a clear line between the 
legislature's right to appear and be heard on behalf of its own 
interests, and the attorney general's mandatory duty to appear and 
make litigation decisions on behalf of the State of Wisconsin.  
Nothing about our decision last term in Service Employees 
International Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 
946 N.W.2d 35, disturbs this unambiguous distinction.  I dissent 
because the clear answer to the question certified by the Seventh 
Circuit is "no." 
¶16 Under Wisconsin law, it is the attorney general, or 
special counsel appointed by the governor,1 who must represent the 
state's interests in appellate litigation.  The attorney general, 
a constitutional officer and head of the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, has the powers and duties as "prescribed by law."  Wis. 
Const. art. VI, § 3; Wis. Stat. § 15.25.  One of those duties is 
                                                 
1 Pursuant Wis. Stat. § 14.11(2)(a), the governor may employ 
special counsel to either "assist" or "act instead of the attorney 
general in any action or proceeding."  The appointed special 
counsel assumes the duties of the attorney general to represent 
the state. 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
2 
 
a legislatively prescribed mandate directing the attorney general 
to appear for the state and defend its interests: 
The department of justice shall . . . appear for the 
state 
and 
prosecute 
or 
defend 
all 
actions 
and 
proceedings, civil or criminal, in the court of appeals 
and the supreme court, in which the state is interested 
or a party . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1) (emphasis added).  The attorney general, 
and only the attorney general, has the authority to represent the 
state on appeal.  To further clarify the attorney general's 
mandate, § 165.25(1) declares that "[n]othing in this subsection 
[which explicitly refers to § 803.09(2m)] deprives or relieves the 
attorney general" of this duty.  By contrast, the extent of the 
legislature's role in representing the state's interests is 
prescribed by § 165.25(1m):  "either house of the legislature" may 
"request[]" that the attorney general "appear for and represent 
the state." 
¶17 Here, special counsel fulfilled its duty under Wis. 
Stat. § 165.25(1).  After the district court granted plaintiffs 
their requested injunctive relief——for the second time——the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission's special counsel decided not to 
appeal.  Among the strategic litigation decisions the legislature 
may participate in, whether to pursue appeal on behalf of the state 
is not one.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 165.08(1) and 165.25(6)(a)(1) 
(authorizing legislative bodies to review and veto certain 
attorney 
general 
settlement, 
compromise, 
or 
discontinuance 
decisions).  The legislature has no statutory right to reverse the 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
3 
 
attorney general's——or, in this case, special counsel's——decision 
not to appeal. 
¶18 The majority, however, contends that the legislature's 
intervention right pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), and 
mentioned in Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1), deprives and relieves special 
counsel of the duty to appear for the state.  Majority op., ¶¶8–
13.  The majority claims that because our statutes allow the 
legislature to intervene on its own behalf, such intervenor status 
permits the legislature to appear for and litigate on behalf of 
the entire state.  Id.  This reading fails for three reasons:  
(1) the court must construe the distinct terms "appear for" and 
"intervene" 
as 
having 
distinct 
and 
different 
meanings; 
(2) § 803.09(2m), by its reference to Wis. Stat. § 13.365, 
confirms that the legislature may intervene only "on behalf of the 
legislature," not on behalf of the state; and (3) it conflates an 
intervenor's interest with an intervenor's legal rights. 
¶19 First, when two different words appear in the same 
statute, particularly in the same subsection, we presume the choice 
was intentional and that the words have distinct meanings.  See 
Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 
Wis. 2d 385, 856 N.W.2d 874 ("When the legislature chooses to use 
two different words, we generally consider each separately and 
presume that different words have different meanings." (quoted 
source omitted)).  Under Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1), the legislature 
chose to describe the attorney general's authority as "appear[ing] 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
4 
 
for the state," while in the same subsection, it described the 
legislature's authority as "interven[ing]."2  To avoid any overlap 
disfavored by our canons of construction, intervention cannot be 
the same as appearing for the state. 
¶20 Second, Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), by cross-reference to 
Wis. Stat. § 13.365, permits the legislature to appear only on its 
own behalf.  Section 803.09(2m) states that the legislature "may 
intervene as set forth pursuant to [§] 13.365," subsection (3) of 
which, in turn, limits the legislature's representative interests 
to its own: 
Pursuant to [§] 803.09(2m), . . . [t]he joint committee 
on legislative organization may intervene at any time in 
the action on behalf of the legislature. 
(Emphasis added.)  As this court has repeatedly stated, "[u]nder 
the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 'the express 
mention of one matter excludes other similar matters [that are] 
                                                 
2 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is 
the text of a state statute which identifies the state institution 
that can represent the state's interests.  In Virginia House of 
Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019), the Court held 
that Virginia's state legislature had no standing to appeal on the 
state's behalf because, similar to Wisconsin's law, Virginia's 
attorney general has the sole authority to represent the state in 
civil litigation. 
Under Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1), the duty to "defend all actions 
and proceedings" unambiguously appears in the sentence discussing 
what the attorney general shall do.  Again, the legislature chose 
to use the word "defend" with regard to the attorney general and 
"intervene" with regard to the legislature.  Those distinct terms 
should be given distinct meanings.  See Augsburger v. Homestead 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 385, 856 N.W.2d 874. 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
5 
 
not mentioned.'"  E.g., FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, 
¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 N.W.2d 287 (alteration in original) 
(quoted source omitted).  The legislature's inclusion of the phrase 
"on behalf of the legislature" precludes a reading of § 13.365, 
and by extension § 803.09(2m), that extends the legislature's 
representation right to additionally include "on behalf of the 
state."  The plain language of these statutes confers upon the 
legislature the right to intervene on behalf of its own interests; 
it lacks statutory authority to "appear for" or "defend" the state 
as a substitute attorney general.3 
¶21 Nothing this court said last term in Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 
compromises the attorney general's exclusive authority to 
represent the state's interests in litigation.  We noted only that 
there is "no constitutional violation" in the legislature's 
                                                 
3 Under the majority's reading of, Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), 
the joint committee on legislative organization, the committee on 
assembly organization and the committee on senate organization 
could all appear for the state, in addition to the attorney 
general. 
It is no stretch to imagine a scenario where the assembly and 
senate are controlled by different parties who may take 
diametrically opposed positions on appeal.  If the assembly 
concedes an argument but the senate wishes to contest it, which 
position should the court accept as the state's position?  What if 
the attorney general is still participating——how many competing 
voices can speak for the state?  These absurd results are yet 
another reason to reject the majority's misguided reading.  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
("[S]tatutory 
language 
is 
interpreted . . . reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."). 
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intervening in at least some circumstances in order to represent 
its own institutional interests.  Id., ¶72.  Vos does not stand 
for the proposition that Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) allows the 
legislature to become the de facto attorney general.  Indeed the 
legislature "is not the state's litigator-in-chief or even the 
representative of the people at large.  The legislature is a 
constitutional creation having a significant, but limited role in 
governance——the enactment of laws."  Wisconsin Legislature v. 
Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶235, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Hagedorn, 
J., dissenting); see also id., ¶243 ("[W]e certainly don't let the 
legislature bring any case it wants."). 
¶22 Finally, I address the majority's shocking assertion 
that "Wisconsin law gives the Legislature, if it chooses to 
intervene, the power to represent the State of Wisconsin's interest 
in the validity of its laws."  Majority op., ¶16 (emphasis added).  
The majority correctly points out that the legislature, when acting 
as an intervenor, has "all the same rights as all other parties to 
the action," including the "power to raise 'any legal claims and 
defenses.'"  Id., ¶9 (quoted source omitted).  But it immediately 
goes awry by insisting that a party's right to raise a legal claim 
or defense also allows it to assume the interest of other parties 
and raise a claim or defense on their behalf.  See Foley-
Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condo. Ass'n, 2011 WI 36, ¶62, 333 
Wis. 2d 402, 
797 
N.W.2d 789 
(explaining 
that 
a 
party 
is 
"prohibit[ed] . . . from raising another's legal rights" (quoted 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
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source omitted)).  An intervenor stands only on the interests upon 
which it entered the case.  See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78 
(1987) (holding that a party who intervened upon one interest 
cannot rely upon another party's interest to pursue an appeal). 
¶23 This distinction matters because the question certified 
to this court is not about whether an intervenor has the same 
rights as a named defendant to pursue a claim in federal court.  
Those rights are established by federal law.  See Planned 
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2019) 
("The right to intervene 'is a purely procedural right and even in 
a diversity suit it is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather 
than state law that dictate the procedures . . . to be followed.'" 
(quoted source omitted)).  The certified question is whether 
Wisconsin law allows the legislature to step into the role of the 
attorney general and represent the state's interests. 
¶24 The answer is no.  Wisconsin Stat. § 13.365 makes clear 
that the legislature can appear "on behalf of the legislature."  
It can represent the legislature's interest.  In Vos, this court 
enumerated a list of such legislative interests, both statutorily 
and constitutionally based:  (1) where the legislature requests 
the attorney general to represent the state; (2) where the 
legislature or one of its bodies are the subject of the lawsuit; 
or (3) where the public fisc is sufficiently implicated, such as 
a challenge involving an appropriations bill or involving a damages 
claim against a state entity.  Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶63–71.  These 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
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are not equivalent to the state's general interest in the validity 
of state law.4  See Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct at 1953 ("This Court 
has never held that a judicial decision invalidating a state law 
as unconstitutional inflicts a discrete, cognizable injury on each 
organ of government that participated in the law's passage.").  In 
short, the legislature can represent its institution's interest, 
but it cannot, by the plain terms of our statutes, appropriate the 
state's interests so as to veto the executive's decision not to 
appeal. 
¶25 The majority appears troubled by the notion that the 
attorney general or appointed special counsel could discharge its 
duty to represent the state's interests by declining to pursue an 
                                                 
4 Consider what is at issue in the federal case that brings 
us this question.  The plaintiffs are seeking an injunction against 
an executive branch agency to stop it from executing a law during 
a public health crisis.  Nothing about that injunction will 
"strike" the challenged laws from the statute books.  As the 
Seventh Circuit panel correctly observed regarding the challenged 
laws, "All of the legislators' votes were counted; all of the 
statutes they passed appear in the state's code."  Democratic Nat'l 
Comm. v. Bostelmann, Nos. 20-2835 & 20-2844, 2020 WL 5796311, at 
*1 (7th Cir. Sept. 29, 2020); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) ("[O]nce Congress makes its choice in 
enacting legislation, its participation ends.  Congress can 
thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly—
—by passing new legislation."). 
Nothing about this dispute concerns the legislature, so why 
should it determine the position of Wisconsin's executive branch 
when that branch has already spoken?  As this question 
demonstrates, the majority's atextual conclusion is plagued with 
unanswered constitutional dilemmas.  Instead, it leaves for 
another day the significant constitutional questions this court 
will no doubt face under the majority's holding. 
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9 
 
appeal.  Setting aside the fact that questions about the 
executive's duty are not before the court, the majority's solution 
to that unpresented problem is not to interpret the law but to 
rewrite it.  It asserts "intervene . . . on behalf of the 
legislature" means "appear for and defend the state."  This 
practice is just the latest in a growing number of instances 
whereby this court——ironically at the legislature's behest——
legislates from the bench.  For instance, in Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
this court excised the word "order" from a statute so that it could 
classify an executive's action as "rulemaking."  Today, it 
blatantly redefines "intervene" as "appear for" or "defend" 
because that is what the legislature now wishes it wrote.  Such a 
misuse of this court's authority is becoming a disturbing habit of 
the court, and one I would urge my fellow justices to break. 
¶26 The plain language of Wis. Stat. §§ 165.25(1)–(1m), 
803.09(2m), and 13.365 confirms that the legislature's role in 
state litigation is either to request that the attorney general 
represent the State or to intervene, standing only upon its own 
institutional interests in litigation.  Vos reinforced this clear 
textual demarcation.  The legislature lacks the statutory 
authority to usurp the executive's exclusive power to represent 
Wisconsin's interests; and therefore the answer to the Seventh 
Circuit's question is a resounding "no."  The majority's decision 
to the contrary creates out of whole cloth authority for the 
legislature to act as the attorney general, a holding that, in 
No.  2020AP1634-CQ.rfd 
 
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addition to the statutory issues discussed above, raises 
significant issues of constitutional separation of powers.  Those 
issues are not before us today but when they are, the errors 
underlying the majority's decision will be even more transparent. 
¶27 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶28 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
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