Title: Maghfour v. Waterbury
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20502
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: December 7, 2021

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ROCHDI MAGHFOUR v. CITY OF WATERBURY
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(SC 20502)
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Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
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Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
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Syllabus
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The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant city, sought to resolve a dispute
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concerning a lien the city placed on certain settlement proceeds that
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he had received as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred
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in 2016. At all relevant times, the city was self-insured and paid for the
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medical care that the plaintiff received in connection with the accident.
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In July, 2017, the legislature passed an amendment (P.A. 17-165, § 1) to
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a statute (§ 7-464) concerning group insurance benefits for municipal
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employees that allowed a self-insured city that provides health benefits
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for its employees to file a lien on the portion of any settlement proceeds
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that represents payment for medical expenses incurred by a city
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employee when such expenses result from the negligence or reckless-
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ness of a third party. Later in July, 2017, the plaintiff filed an action
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against the third-party tortfeasor who had caused the plaintiff to sustain
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injuries in the accident. Thereafter, on October 1, 2017, P.A. 17-165, § 1,
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became effective. In October, 2018, the city filed a notice of lien, claiming
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a right to reimbursement for amounts that it had paid for the plaintiff’s
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medical expenses from any judgment or settlement the plaintiff might
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receive arising from the accident. Approximately one week later, the
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plaintiff settled his civil action against the third-party tortfeasor. The
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plaintiff then brought the present action, claiming that P.A. 17-165, § 1,
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did not authorize the lien filed by the city because the plaintiff’s injuries
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occurred and his action against the third-party tortfeasor was com-
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menced before the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1. The trial court
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granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judg-
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ment thereon, concluding, inter alia, that the legislature did not expressly
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indicate that it intended for P.A. 17-165, § 1, to apply retroactively to
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pending actions and, therefore, that the statute (§ 55-3) precluding a
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new law that imposes any new obligation from being construed to have
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retroactive effect barred the city’s lien. On the city’s appeal from the
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trial court’s judgment, held that the trial court properly granted the
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plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, as that court correctly deter-
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mined that the city’s lien stemmed from an improper, retroactive applica-
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tion of P.A. 17-165, § 1: the legislature did not explicitly provide that
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P.A. 17-165, § 1, should apply retroactively, and, because that public act
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created a new right for a self-insured municipality to assert a lien to
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recover medical expenses that it has paid and eliminated the right of a
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municipal employee to retain sums that he or she recovers from a third-
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party tortfeasor if those sums represent medical expenses paid by the
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municipality, P.A. 17-165, § 1, was substantive, and, pursuant to § 55-3,
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could operate prospectively only; moreover, there was no merit to the
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city’s claim that allowing it to place a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement
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proceeds would not effect a retroactive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1,
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in view of the fact that the plaintiff settled his action against the third-
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party tortfeasor after the effective date of that public act, as the settle-
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ment was not independent of the motor vehicle accident that ultimately
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led to the settlement and that occurred prior to the public act’s effec-
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tive date.
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Argued December 8, 2020—officially released August 3, 2021*
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Procedural History
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Action for interpleader to resolve a dispute concern-
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ing a lien claimed by the defendant on certain settlement
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proceeds, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
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district of Waterbury, where the court, Roraback, J.,
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granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
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denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
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and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the
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defendant appealed. Affirmed.
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Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appel-
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lant (defendant).
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Jonathan H. Dodd, for the appellee (plaintiff).
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Opinion
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MULLINS, J. The defendant, the city of Waterbury
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(city), appeals from the judgment of the trial court ren-
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dered in favor of the plaintiff, Rochdi Maghfour. On
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appeal, the city contends that the trial court improperly
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granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
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because it erroneously concluded that General Statutes
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§ 7-464, as amended by § 1 of No. 17-165 of the 2017
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Public Acts (P.A. 17-165), did not authorize the city’s
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lien in this case. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
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the judgment of the trial court.
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The following undisputed facts, as found by the trial
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court and contained in the record, and procedural his-
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tory are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. On
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June 20, 2016, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle
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accident. He was an employee of the city, which is a
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self-insured municipality. Therefore, the city paid for
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medical care resulting from his injuries.
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On July 14, 2017, the plaintiff initiated an action
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against the third-party tortfeasor who had caused his
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injuries in the motor vehicle accident. Earlier that
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month, the legislature had enacted P.A. 17-165, § 1,
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which amended § 7-464 by adding subsections (c) and
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(d).1 See P.A. 17-165, § 1; 60 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 2017 Sess.,
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pp. 3076–77, 3101–3102; 60 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2017 Sess.,
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pp. 5329–35. The new subsections allow a self-insured
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city, town, or borough to file a lien on the portions of
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judgments or settlements that represent payment for
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medical expenses incurred by its employees when such
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expenses result from the negligence or recklessness of
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a third party. See P.A. 17-165, § 1. Public Act 17-165,
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§ 1, had an effective date of October 1, 2017.
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After the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1, the city
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filed a notice of lien dated October 15, 2018, with the
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plaintiff’s attorney. In that notice, the city claimed a
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right to reimbursement of medical expenses for which
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it had paid from any judgment or settlement the plaintiff
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might receive arising from his June 20, 2016 motor vehi-
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cle accident. Thereafter, on October 23, 2018, the plain-
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tiff settled his civil action against the third-party tortfea-
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sor.
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Following the settlement, the plaintiff and the city
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could not reach an agreement to resolve the issue of
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whether the city was entitled to a lien on the settlement
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for the amount of the medical expenses it had paid.
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Consequently, the plaintiff initiated the present action
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in the trial court contesting the validity of the city’s lien
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on the proceeds of his settlement.2 In his petition, the
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plaintiff claimed that § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-
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165, § 1, did not authorize the lien filed by the city
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because the plaintiff’s injury occurred and his action
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against the third-party tortfeasor was commenced
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before the effective date of the act.
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Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. The
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trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
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judgment and denied the city’s motion for summary
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judgment. In doing so, the trial court concluded that
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the legislature did not expressly indicate that it intended
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for P.A. 17-165, § 1, to apply retroactively to pending
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actions and, therefore, that General Statutes §§ 1-1 (u)3
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and 55-34 barred the lien from affecting pending litiga-
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tion and from applying retroactively. This appeal fol-
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lowed.5
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On appeal, the city asserts that the trial court improp-
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erly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judg-
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ment because the plain language and legislative intent
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of § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, indicate that
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the city’s lien would apply to the proceeds of the plain-
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tiff’s settlement reached after the act’s effective date.
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The city contends that, because the plaintiff reached
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his settlement after the effective date of P.A. 17-165,
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§ 1, and the plain language of the statute applies to
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settlements, its lien under the act would not operate
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retroactively in the present case. According to the city’s
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reasoning, P.A. 17-165, § 1, simply applies to any settle-
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ments reached after the effective date of the act. The
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plaintiff responds that the trial court correctly deter-
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mined that the city was not authorized to file a lien on
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the proceeds of his settlement in this matter because
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§ 55-3 bars P.A. 17-165, § 1, from applying retroactively
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and § 1-1 (u) prevents it from applying to existing litiga-
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tion.
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We begin by setting forth the standard of review
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governing this appeal. ‘‘The scope of our review of the
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trial court’s decision to grant the [plaintiff’s] motion
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for summary judgment is plenary.’’ Shoreline Shellfish,
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LLC v. Branford, 336 Conn. 403, 410, 246 A.3d 470
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(2020). ‘‘To the extent that the trial court’s decision
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. . . requires us to construe a [statute], our review is
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also plenary and is guided by our well established legal
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principles regarding statutory construction. . . . In
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construing statutes, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us
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first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
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relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such
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text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
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such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
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absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of
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the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’
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(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
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Id., 410–11.
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Both the plaintiff and the city agree that their compet-
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ing motions for summary judgment gave rise to no genu-
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ine issue as to any material fact. Thus, the issue of
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whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s
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motion for summary judgment turns solely on a point
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of statutory interpretation, namely, whether, as a matter
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of law, § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, autho-
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rizes the city to file a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement
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from his civil action against the third-party tortfeasor.
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As instructed by § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with
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the text of § 7-464 (c), which provides in relevant part
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that ‘‘[a] self-insured town, city or borough that provides
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group health benefits for its employees has a lien on
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that part of a judgment or settlement that represents
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payment for economic loss for medical, hospital and
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prescription expenses incurred by its employees and
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their covered dependents and family members when
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such expenses result from the negligence or reckless-
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ness of a third party. . . .’’ As we noted previously,
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P.A. 17-165, § 1, provided that the amendment to § 7-464
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became effective on October 1, 2017. The legislature,
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however, did not expressly indicate whether it intended
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the amendment to apply retroactively to events that
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occurred before its effective date, such as the plaintiff’s
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motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the plain language
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of the statute does not answer the question on appeal,
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and we must examine the relationship of § 7-464 (c)
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with our law governing the retroactivity of statutes.
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‘‘In considering the question of whether a statute may
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be applied retroactively, we are governed by certain
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well settled principles, [pursuant to] which our ultimate
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focus is the intent of the legislature in enacting the
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statute. . . . [O]ur point of departure is . . . § 55-3
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. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v.
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Volvo Excavators AB, 333 Conn. 283, 292, 215 A.3d
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149 (2019). Section 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the
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general statutes, not previously contained in the stat-
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utes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on
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any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a
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retrospective effect.’’ ‘‘[W]e have uniformly interpreted
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§ 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that stat-
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utes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospec-
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tively only. . . . In civil cases, however, unless consid-
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erations of good sense and justice dictate otherwise, it
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is presumed that procedural statutes will be applied
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retrospectively. . . . [Although] there is no precise def-
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inition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is
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generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines
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and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes
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the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining
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redress. . . . Procedural statutes . . . therefore leave
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the preexisting scheme intact.’’6 (Internal quotation
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marks omitted.) King v. Volvo Excavators AB, supra,
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292.
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Because the legislature did not expressly provide that
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P.A. 17-165, § 1, should apply retroactively, the pre-
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sumption stands that, if § 7-464, as amended by the act,
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affects substantive rights, then it shall apply prospec-
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tively only. See id. Here, then, we must determine whether
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§ 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, affects a sub-
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stantive or procedural right in order to answer the ques-
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tion of whether the city is entitled to the lien in this case.
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Prior to the passage of P.A. 17-165, § 1, a self-insured
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municipality did not have the express right to assert a
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lien to recover medical expenses paid as benefits from
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the proceeds of an employee’s litigation against third-
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party tortfeasors.7 See, e.g., P.A. 17-165, § 1; see also,
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e.g., Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Plan-
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ning and Development, Pt. 1, 2017 Sess., p. 247, remarks
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of Representative Stephanie E. Cummings (state repre-
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sentative who previously spoke with city’s leadership
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acknowledged during her testimony in support for pas-
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sage of house bill that became P.A. 17-165, § 1, that, as
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self-insured municipality, city lacked right under Con-
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necticut law to recover collateral source benefits). After
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P.A. 17-165, § 1, went into effect, however, a self-insured
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municipality had the right to assert a lien to recover
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medical expenses it had paid. See General Statutes § 7-
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464 (c) and (d).
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The statutory change thus confers a new right on a
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self-insured municipality, such as the city. Correspond-
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ingly, the statute, as amended, simultaneously elimi-
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nates the right of plaintiffs, held prior to the enactment
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of P.A. 17-165, § 1, to retain sums they recover from
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negligent or reckless third-party tortfeasors who have
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harmed them if those sums represent medical expenses
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paid by the municipality. Thus, because P.A. 17-165, § 1,
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created a new right for self-insured municipalities and
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limited the rights of their employees, we conclude that
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§ 7-464, as amended by the act, is substantive. See, e.g.,
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Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 Conn.
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451, 455–57, 446 A.2d 818 (1982) (holding that amend-
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ment affecting insurance company’s lien recovery
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amount was substantive rather than procedural); see
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also, e.g., Little v. Ives, 158 Conn. 452, 457, 262 A.2d 174
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(1969) (‘‘[l]egislation which limits or increases statutory
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liability has generally been held to be substantive in
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nature’’).8 The statute therefore must operate prospec-
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tively only.
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The city asserts that allowing it to file a lien on the
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plaintiff’s settlement proceeds in the present case
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would not present a retroactive application of the stat-
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ute. Specifically, the city asserts that, because the plain-
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tiff settled his action against the third-party tortfeasor
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on October 23, 2018, after the effective date of P.A. 17-
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165, § 1—which was October 1, 2017—upholding its
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lien does not require a retroactive application of the
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act. We disagree.
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As this court has previously concluded, ‘‘a statute
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does not operate retrospectively merely because it is
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applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the
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statute’s enactment . . . or upsets expectations based
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in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new
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provision attaches new legal consequences to events
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completed before its enactment.’’ (Emphasis in original;
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internal quotation marks omitted.) Shannon v. Com-
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missioner of Housing, 322 Conn. 191, 204, 140 A.3d
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903 (2016). In other words, ‘‘a law has retroactive effect
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when it would impair rights a party possessed when he
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acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or
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impose new duties with respect to transactions already
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completed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
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205–206. This court further cautioned that ‘‘[t]he conclu-
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sion that a particular rule operates retroactively comes
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at the end of a process of judgment concerning the
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nature and extent of the change in the law and the
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degree of connection between the operation of the new
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rule and a relevant past event.’’ (Internal quotation
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marks omitted.) Id., 204. Moreover, this court noted
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that ‘‘[a]ny test of retroactivity will leave room for dis-
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agreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the
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enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philo-
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sophical clarity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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Id.
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We conclude that allowing the city to pursue statutory
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lien rights in the present case would result in an
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improper, retroactive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1,
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because it would attach new legal consequences to
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events completed before the act’s effective date. Those
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events are the legal rights to which the plaintiff became
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entitled as a result of personal injuries sustained by
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him on June 20, 2016, the date of the motor vehicle
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accident. The act impaired the right of the plaintiff to
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obtain compensation for personal injuries caused by
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the tortfeasor’s negligence on certain conditions, one
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of those being that any such recovery would be free
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and clear of any claims by the city requiring repayment
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of sums expended for medical care relating to those
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injuries. Public Act 17-165, § 1, created a new liability
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or obligation on the part of the plaintiff to pay proceeds
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of his settlement to the city to reimburse the city for
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past payments made by it. It also created a correlative,
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new right entitling the city to obtain reimbursement for
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medical expenses from the proceeds of the plaintiff’s
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settlement.
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Indeed, neither the plaintiff’s obligation nor the city’s
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corresponding right existed at the time of the plaintiff’s
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motor vehicle accident or at the time the city paid most
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of the medical expenses, and, in this particular case,
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even the commencement of the plaintiff’s underlying
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civil action predated the effective date of P.A. 17-165,
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§ 1. Thus, applying P.A. 17-165, § 1, to a settlement
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related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred prior
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to the effective date of the act is a retroactive applica-
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tion of the act. Contrary to the city’s position, the settle-
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ment does not stand on its own. Rather, the settlement
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stems from the motor vehicle accident that occurred
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prior to the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1, and the
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respective substantive rights and obligations of the par-
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ties relating to that accident cannot be altered retroac-
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tively. Accordingly, we conclude that allowing the city
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to file a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement proceeds in the
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present case would constitute an improper, retroactive
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application of the act.
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In summary, because the legislature did not explicitly
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provide that § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1,
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should apply retroactively, and, because it is substan-
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tive in nature, § 55-3 requires that the statute operate
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prospectively. The postevent amendments to § 7-464
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cannot attach new legal consequences to the plaintiff’s
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motor vehicle accident, from which his settlement
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arose. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined
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that the city’s lien stemmed from an improper, retroac-
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tive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1, and properly granted
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the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
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The judgment is affirmed.
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In this opinion the other justices concurred.
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* August 3, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
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is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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1 General Statutes § 7-464 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) A self-insured
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town, city or borough that provides group health benefits for its employees
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has a lien on that part of a judgment or settlement that represents payment
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for economic loss for medical, hospital and prescription expenses incurred
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by its employees and their covered dependents and family members when
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such expenses result from the negligence or recklessness of a third
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party. . . .
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* * *
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‘‘(d) As used in subsection (c) of this section: (1) ‘Self-insured town, city
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or borough’ means a town, city or borough that provides group health
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benefits to its employees by paying submitted medical, hospital and prescrip-
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tion expense claims from its revenues . . . .’’
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2 The plaintiff initiated this action under § 7-464 (c) (4) (C), which provides
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in relevant part: ‘‘If agreement cannot be reached on the application of
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equitable defenses to the claimed lien amount, then either the employee,
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covered dependent, family member or the self-insured town, city or borough
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may petition the Superior Court for resolution on the application of equitable
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defenses. . . .’’
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The parties do not dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the
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plaintiff’s claim, so we do not address the issue of whether the plaintiff’s
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action was appropriately brought under § 7-464 (c) (4) (C).
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3 General Statutes § 1-1 (u) provides: ‘‘The passage or repeal of an act
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shall not affect any action then pending.’’
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4 General Statutes § 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the general statutes,
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not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any
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new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a
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retrospective effect.’’
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5 The city appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
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Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
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Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
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6 The city asserts on appeal that the trial court incorrectly determined
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that § 1-1 (u) applied to its lien because the lien was not at issue in the
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plaintiff’s civil action against the third-party tortfeasor and, therefore, would
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not affect that action. The plaintiff responds that the trial court correctly
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determined that § 1-1 (u) bars P.A. 17-165, § 1, from affecting his litigation,
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as it was pending at the time of the act’s effective date. We need not decide
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whether § 1-1 (u) is applicable to this case because we conclude that § 55-
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3 is dispositive of the matter.
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7 Any right to subrogation or a lien under the workers’ compensation
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scheme did not apply in the present case because there was no allegation
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that the plaintiff’s injuries occurred during the course of his employment
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with the city. Prior to the passage of P.A. 17-165, § 1, General Statutes § 52-
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225c prohibited the city from recovering the amount of benefits provided
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to the plaintiff as a collateral source.
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8 Public Act 17-165, § 1, also imposes a new obligation on the plaintiff
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that did not previously exist, namely, that he was being forced to pay money
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in the form of a lien from a sum he recovered as a result of his applicable
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settlement under § 7-464 (c). See, e.g., Little v. Ives, supra, 158 Conn. 453–57
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(holding that statute could not apply retroactively under § 55-3 when it
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imposed new obligation and liability on defendant highway commissioner,
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i.e., filing certificate of taking within reasonable amount of time after filing
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highway layout map and being subject to paying additional damages for not
425
doing so, respectively).
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