Title: Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company v. Adair et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1100872
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 2014

REL: 09/30/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2014
____________________
1100872
____________________
Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company
v.
Melissa Adair et al.
Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court
(CV-11-0002)
MURDOCK, Justice.1
This case was originally assigned to another Justice on
1
this Court.  It was reassigned to Justice Murdock on June 12,
2014.
1100872
Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company ("BMIC") appeals from an
order of the Calhoun Circuit Court modifying a previous order
granting BMIC injunctive relief.  We reverse and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On December 2, 2010, BMIC filed an "Application for
Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" ("the
complaint") in the Baldwin Circuit Court against 122
individuals who were insured under various insurance policies
issued by BMIC ("the insureds").   According to the complaint,
2
the insureds, through their legal counsel, had sent a letter
dated November 12, 2010, to BMIC.  The November 2010 letter
stated:
"On behalf of each of our clients listed on the
attached, please know that we invoke the appraisal
provision contained within the Baldwin Mutual
policies issued to these insureds for each loss or
claim suffered previously.  We hereby identify
Samantha Ronquille-Green as our appraiser, and
insist that you identify your appraiser within the
time specified in the policies [i.e., 20 days]. 
Obviously, we are only seeking appraisal of claims
for which there is prior coverage."
Additional 
defendants 
were 
subsequently 
added 
as
2
insureds.  In their briefs, the parties refer to there being
approximately 130 insureds.
2
1100872
The letter also requested that BMIC provide the insureds'
counsel with a copy of the policy file for each of the
insureds, and the letter accused BMIC of "bad faith" as to its
treatment of the insureds.
According to BMIC's complaint, the various insurance
policies at issue provided that BMIC or an insured could
invoke an appraisal process if BMIC and the insured could not
reach an agreement as to the amount of compensation due the
insured for a loss covered under the insured's policy.  The
appraisal process entailed BMIC and the insured each choosing
an appraiser to estimate the insured's loss, and the
appraisers in turn choosing an umpire who would resolve
differences in the loss estimates provided by the appraisers. 
BMIC alleged:
"11.  Under each of the appraisal provisions
..., a condition precedent to the demand of an
appraisal is that there be a disagreement as to the
amount of the loss.
"12.  The November 12, 2010 letter, by which the
[insureds] demand appraisal, fails to satisfy this
condition precedent, as the [insureds] fail to
establish that there is a disagreement as to the
amount of the loss.
"13.  Specifically, the purported appraisal
demand fails to set forth, among other things, the
date of the loss, the cause of the loss, the
3
1100872
location of the loss, any specifics concerning the
nature of the loss, or why the [insureds] assert
that there is a disagreement as to the amount of the
loss.
"14.  Upon information and belief, [BMIC] avers
that all claims and losses have been adjusted and
settled properly and without any disagreement or
complaint by said ... policyholders.
"15.  Under each of the appraisal provisions at
issue, appraisal is proper only as to the 'amount of
loss.'
"16.  Therefore appraisal is appropriate under
said policies only where (1) no coverage issue
exists, and (2) the policyholder and insurer agree
on the scope of the damage.
"17.  To the extent the November 12, 2010
letter, by which the [insureds] demand appraisal,
demands an appraisal as to issues concerning
coverage or the scope of the loss, the appraisal
demand is improper.
"18.  [The insureds], separately and severally,
therefore, have no right to invoke the appraisal
process.
"19.  [BMIC] further avers that the attorneys
that demanded appraisal by way of the November 12,
2010 letter presently have filed nine (9) separate
lawsuits against [BMIC], three of which set forth
class action allegations (McCain v. Baldwin Mutual
et al, CV-10-901266, Montgomery County ('McCain
Class'), 
Moyers 
v. 
Baldwin 
Mutual 
et 
al,
CV-10-900100, Escambia County ('Moyers Class'), and
Smith v. Baldwin Mutual et al, CV-07-900258, Calhoun
County ('Smith Class')).
"20.  The Complaint as last amended in Smith
defines the putative class as follows:
4
1100872
"'The class includes all of those past and
present ... policyholders, who, after
suffering an insured loss, were subjected
to Defendant [John] 
Bobo's
 nefarious ways
[3]
following his dispatch to adjust the loss
by [BMIC].'
"21.  Upon information and belief, most, if not
all, of the [insureds] were identified by their
current attorneys and contacted by way of the Smith
litigation.  Specifically, the attorneys that now
represent the [insureds] sent over two thousand
(2,000) letters to various policyholders of [BMIC],
including, most, if not all, of the [insureds].
"22. 
 
While 
simultaneously 
prosecuting 
the 
Smith
class, the attorneys for the [insureds] are also
seeking 
individual 
appraisals 
for 
the 
same
individuals that would fall within the Smith class.
"23.  The Complaint as last amended in Moyer[s]
defines the putative class as follows:
"'The class includes past and present BMIC
policyholders that suffered losses as a
result of the occurrence of Hurricane Ivan
for 
which 
they 
have 
not 
been 
duly
compensated, upon whose land Defendants
trespassed or who have otherwise been
aggrieved by Defendants' conduct in the
wake of Hurricane Ivan.
"'Members of the class or a class also
include those BMIC policy holders who
suffered losses as a result of Hurricane
Ivan and who were subjected to the
abnormally low pricing scheme perpetrated
by Defendants, as herein described above,
"Defendant 
Bobo" 
allegedly 
is 
a 
claims 
adjustor 
for 
BMIC.
3
5
1100872
and 
whose 
claims 
were 
consequently
underpaid.'
"24.  Count IX of the Second Amended Complaint
in Moyers sets forth a demand for Appraisal.
"25.  The Complaint as last amended filed in
McCain defines the putative class as follows:
"'All holders of policies, issued by
[BMIC], insuring properties within the
State of Alabama who have suffered a loss
within six (6) years of the filing of this
complaint for which [BMIC] reduced the
actual cash value of the same by reduction
for the loss of value of undepreciable loss
elements.'
"26.  The same Gloria McCain that serves as the
class representative in the McCain class is among
the Respondents on whose behalf appraisal has been
demanded.
"27.  Because [the insureds] have failed to
adequately identify the claims or losses for which
they seek an appraisal, [BMIC] is unable to
determine which of the [insureds] may fall within
the 
class 
definitions 
set 
forth 
in 
the
aforementioned class actions.
"28.  [BMIC] avers that proceeding with the
appraisal process prior to a determination whether
there exists a real dispute or disagreement and
whether each [of the insureds], separately and
severally, is entitled to invoke the appraisal
process, will result in immediate and irreparable
injury loss damage to [BMIC]."
(Emphasis added.)
6
1100872
In its complaint, BMIC sought a temporary restraining
order, "until such time as this court has the opportunity to
rule on [BMIC's] Motion for a Preliminary Injunction."  BMIC
asked that the restraining order "enjoin[] the 
[insureds] 
from
engaging in the appraisal process and stay[] the time in which
[BMIC] has to identify an appraiser or otherwise participate
in said process."  Also, BMIC asserted that "it will be caused
immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage should it be
required to engage in the appraisal process demanded prior to
determining whether [the insureds] separately and severally
are entitled to invoke the appraisal process."
In regard to BMIC's motion for a preliminary injunction,
the complaint requested that the court "conduct a hearing as
to the issues set forth above and issue a preliminary
injunction enjoining the [insureds] from proceeding with the
appraisal process as requested herein during the pendency and
until the final disposition of this cause."  (Emphasis added.)
As to the declaratory relief requested, BMIC's complaint
alleged as follows:
"40.  The insurance policies issued to the
[insureds] by [BMIC] serve as the basis for the
[insureds'] claims for appraisal. [BMIC] has not
been able to determine that all [the insureds] have
7
1100872
been insured with or suffered a covered loss while
insured with [BMIC].
"41.  Each policy issued by [BMIC] provides, as
a condition to the appraisal process, that there be
a failure to agree on the amount of the loss.
"42.  The appraisal demanded by the [insureds]
does not identify the claims or losses for which
appraisal is sought, but on information and belief,
[BMIC] avers that all claims and losses have been
adjusted and settled without any disagreement or
complaint by said ... policyholders.
"43. 
[The 
insureds] 
fall 
within 
[the] 
definition
of one or more of the three class actions that the
attorneys for the [insureds] have filed, and
therefore, may not pursue individual appraisals.
"44. [BMIC] seeks a determination from this
Court pursuant to Alabama Code [1975,] § 6-6-220
et seq., as to the following issues:
"(1)  Whether the [insureds] may properly
demand an appraisal, where, as is the case
here, the [insureds] (1) have failed to
identify the claims or losses for which
appraisal is sought; (2) have failed to set
forth any reason as to why the [insureds]
contend there is a disagreement as to the
amount of loss; and (3) have failed to
establish that any alleged disagreement is
over the amount of loss, as opposed to a
disagreement 
over 
coverage 
under 
the 
policy
or the scope of loss or some other matter
not subject to appraisal.
"(2) Whether the [insureds] may seek an
appraisal, given the pendency of the three
class actions filed by their attorneys.
8
1100872
"(3) Determine that those [insureds] who
have not suffered a loss insured by [BMIC]
are not entitled to appraisal."4
On December 21, 2010, the Baldwin Circuit Court held a
hearing on BMIC's request for a preliminary injunction. 
During the hearing, the court summarized its understanding of
the matter as follows:
"[I]f the essence of your injunction request is, we
don't want to proceed with an appraisal until we
know what the basis of their disagreement is, that's
a very reasonable claim.  That's a very reasonable
At the hearing on the temporary restraining order, the
4
Baldwin Circuit Court raised the issue of abatement as to
BMIC's action.  Thereafter, BMIC filed a brief on that issue. 
In the brief, BMIC stated that no class had been certified in
any of the class actions described in BMIC's complaint and
that the class representative in McCain v. Baldwin Mutual,
CV-10-901266, filed in Montgomery County, was the only one of
the insureds who was currently a party in an action in which
BMIC also was a party.  It is not clear from the materials
before us whether the claims at issue in McCain or the other
two class actions referred to in BMIC's complaint are also
claims that might be at issue in the present case.  Thus, it
is not clear whether BMIC's claims might be considered
compulsory counterclaims that are subject to abatement,
whether as to McCain or as to other insureds in the various
class actions.  See Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P.,
729 So. 2d 849, 851 (Ala. 1999).  Nor are we in a position to
consider the issue whether or how abatement might apply where
a class in a first-filed case has not been certified before a
second action is filed.  See Ex parte Water Works & Sewer Bd.
of Birmingham, 738 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1998)(discussing 
compulsory counterclaims in the context of a class action);
see also Ex parte State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 715 So. 2d 207
(Ala. 1997)(plurality opinion as to the issue of abatement in
class actions).
9
1100872
position for [BMIC] to take, and that is, I paid you
$5,000.  You accepted $5,000.  You're now saying
$5,000 isn't enough.  And they're simply saying,
'Well, why is it not enough?  What are you basing
that on?'  And you give that to them and say,
'Here's why, because I've got estimates that it's
going to cost another $2,500 to do the work or it
did cost me an extra $2,500 to do the work.'  Well,
they may say, 'Okay.  We agree with you.  Here's
another check for another $2,500,' and you don't
need the appraisal process.  It's not until you say
it's worth more -- the claim is worth more and they
say, 'No, it's not,' then you say, 'Well, then we're
invoking the appraisal process.'"
Counsel for the insureds responded, however, stating that
"that's not the law of the State of Alabama."  A later
colloquy is as follows:
"THE COURT: So if the insured goes back -– each
of these insureds goes back and files an amended
proof of loss -– 
"[BMIC'S COUNSEL]:  We'll have -- what we're
thinking is we should have a chance to investigate
it.  They could -- you're right.  They could be a
hundred percent right, Judge.  We don't --
"THE COURT: -- had a chance to investigate it.
"[BMIC'S COUNSEL]:  We have not.  We don't even
know -- there are people with five losses.  Judge. 
That letter says every claim ever made under every
policy for these people.  
"....
"I mean, they've got to show us something that
we can go back and investigate, and at that point,
if we don't agree with what their appraiser says,
10
1100872
that's the disagreement that's  triggered to invoke
the appraisal process. ... 
"....
"...  They can't just say we disagree when they
don't even know what our position is.
"[INSURED'S COUNSEL]:  We know what your
position is because you made a payment --
"[BMIC'S COUNSEL]:  We made a payment under a
claim that your person accepted.  You've not sent us
anything to let us know how it was deficient.
"[INSURED'S COUNSEL]:  We don't have to do that,
Your Honor.
"....
"THE COURT:  How do you know if you don't say,
you know, you underpaid us a thousand dollars, that
they're not going to say you're right?
"....
"I don't think the appraisal process has been
properly initiated yet because the insureds have not
responded to the basis of their disagreement for
[BMIC] to make a determination of whether they
disagree with the assessment by the insureds or not,
that until there is -- as [counsel for BMIC]
described it -— a mutual disagreement ... where the
insureds say, 'Our claim is for this amount of money
and you've only paid us this amount,' and Baldwin
Mutual says, 'No,' there's not a mutual disagreement
and so, therefore, the appraisal process, it's
preliminary to invoke the appraisal process and that
once that happens -- so, therefore, I think, the
insureds have to invoke some type of basis for why
they're disagreeing with whatever they have been
paid so far and then whatever the policy says as far
11
1100872
as a reasonable time ... to investigate and then
determine whether you accept what their proof of
loss is or whether you reject it and that if you
reject it, then the appraisal process can be
invoked.
"...  It is the reopening of a claim that has
been previously agreed to and the only way to
logically reopen it is [for the insureds to] tell
them what you disagree with what the amount of claim
is.  I mean, there ain't no other way to do it."
Immediately after the hearing, the Baldwin Circuit Court
issued an order ("the December 2010 order"), which states:
"This matter is before the Court on a
preliminary injunction filed by [BMIC] seeking a
stay from the appraisal process attempted to be
invoked by the [insureds], each being an insured of
[BMIC], 
to 
re-open 
certain 
claims 
previously
processed.  Based on the legal and factual arguments
presented, the Court finds that the appraisal
process on these named [insureds] has not been
adequately 
invoked 
because 
there 
is 
not 
a
determination yet of whether there is an actual
disagreement on the amount of loss.  The [insureds]
have notified [BMIC] that they now disagree with the
amount of money offered to settle their claims. 
However, no insured has provided any basis for the
current rejection of the offered amount or provided
any amended claim of loss. [BMIC] cannot respond as
to whether it can accept an insured's claim amount
or not until it is presented with the new claimed
amount.  Therefore, since the appraisal process has
not been triggered the time limit of 20 days for
[BMIC] to disclose an appraiser is STAYED, pending
each [insured] providing a basis for the rejection
of [BMIC's] claim settlement offer."
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)
12
1100872
In the December 2010 order, the Baldwin Circuit Court
also noted that the parties disagreed as to whether each of
the insureds was entitled to discovery of BMIC's claim file as
to that insured.  The court stated:  "Because there exist 3
pending class action suits in other courts within Alabama, all
awaiting class certification, this Court is not inclined to
undertake potential discovery issues that might better be
addressed by a court that might certify the class." 
Thereafter, the present action was transferred to the Calhoun
Circuit Court ("the circuit court"), where Smith v. Baldwin
Mutual, CV-07-900258, the first-filed of the class actions
against BMIC, was pending.   
5
On February 11, 2011, the insureds filed a motion in the
circuit court entitled "Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate." 
The insureds alleged that "it is not clear on the face of the
[December 2010] order whether the Circuit Court of Baldwin
County intended to grant [BMIC's] application for a
preliminary injunction," and they requested that the circuit
court vacate the December 2010 order "to the extent that the
Initially, 
the 
case 
was 
assigned 
to 
Calhoun 
Circuit 
Judge
5
John C. Thomason.  It was reassigned to Calhoun Circuit Judge
Brian P. Howell, before whom Smith was pending at the time of
these proceedings.   
13
1100872
same purports to grant injunctive relief."  According to the
insureds, the  December 2010 order did not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 65(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., because it
allegedly did not "describe in reasonable detail ... the act
or acts sought to be restrained."   The insureds also argued
that "the facts underlying the entry of the Court's order do
not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction."
BMIC filed a response to the insureds' "Motion to Alter,
Amend, or Vacate."  BMIC argued that the insureds' motion
should be denied because, BMIC argued, the insureds failed to
appeal from the December 2010 order pursuant to Rule
4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P. ("[T]he notice of appeal shall be
filed within 14 days (2 weeks) of the date of the entry of the
order or judgment appealed from: (A) any interlocutory order
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an
injunction ....").   BMIC also argued that, even if the
6
circuit court could reconsider the December 2010 order, the
BMIC also argued that the insureds' "Motion to Alter,
6
Amend, of Vacate" had not been timely filed pursuant to
Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.
14
1100872
insureds had failed to show that the Baldwin Circuit Court had
exceeded its discretion as to the entry of the order. 
On March 15, 2011, the insureds filed an answer to BMIC's
complaint and a counterclaim.  The counterclaim alleged:
"60.  Each [of the insureds] is either a present
or former BMIC policy holder or the successor in
interest of a BMIC policy holder.
"61.  BMIC issued policies of property and
casualty insurance to [the insureds] or their
successors covering losses to property.
"62. [The insureds] or their successors each
made claims on the corresponding policies issued to
them or to their successors.
"63. [The insureds] aver that these claims were
not paid in full.
"64. [The insureds] aver further that there was
widespread fraud associated with the manner in which
their claims were adjusted.
"65. 
[The insureds] aver that they each disagree
or have failed to agree with BMIC regarding amounts
of loss for each claim made by them or by their
successors."
Based on the foregoing allegations, the insureds asserted
claims of breach of contract in their counterclaim, and they
requested a judgment "declaring the various rights of the
parties under the terms of each policy issued to [an insured]
15
1100872
or his or her or its successor-in-interest," particularly as
to certain matters regarding the appraisal process.
On March 18, 2011, the circuit court entered an order
denying the insureds' "Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate" the
December 2010 order.  The March 2011 order further stated that
the insureds "must present the appropriate information to
properly trigger the appraisal process.  The Stay shall remain
in effect until such information is provided to [BMIC]."  
Thereafter, BMIC's counsel sent the insureds' counsel a
letter dated April 11, 2011.  The letter acknowledged that the
insureds' counsel had provided
"some information with respect to Hugh Bryan, Dora
Bryan, Mary Bulger, Mary Hicks, Hattie Jemison,
Gloria McCain, Robert Tubbs and LeAnna Williams.  I
need to have them submit to an Examination Under
Oath, as per the express terms of their policies.
"Also, it is imperative that your clients
provide me with all of the requested documentation
prior to the Examination Under Oath.  Again, this
information has been requested by way of the
consolidated discovery, and must also be provided
per the policies at issue.
"Many 
of 
the 
[insureds] 
are 
attempting 
to 
submit
multiple claims to appraisal.  Further, the claims
span over years and years.  As a practical matter,
it is very difficult to review the dwelling years
after the fact and make any sort of accurate
assessment.  Having documentation, as has been
requested, will certainly allow [BMIC] to determine
16
1100872
whether, in fact, it does disagree with any
contentions of your clients.  In addition, in the
event that there is disagreement between [BMIC] and
your clients, having this information readily
available should permit the appraisers to make a
more reasoned and accurate determination as to
whether any additional amounts are owed under the
claims in question."
On April 15, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing as to
various pending motions, and, at the conclusion of the
hearing, the court requested that the parties submit briefs as
to the issue of appraisal.  The parties submitted briefs. 
BMIC noted in its brief:
"To date, ... only 14 of the 130 [insureds] have
provided any information other than the date of
loss. Clearly, with respect to the 116 or so
[insureds] that have provided nothing to [BMIC]
since receiving payment from [BMIC] and thereby
reaching an 'agreement' with [BMIC], there has been
nothing presented that would tend to establish a
disagreement.
"Appraisal has been demanded again with respect
to 7 of the [insureds] -- (1) Banks; (2) Bulger;
(3) Hicks; (4) Key; (5) Kynard; (6) McNeal;
(7) Williams.  With respect to each and every one of
the seven [insureds], the only thing that has been
provided to [BMIC] following the 'agreement' wherein
the [insureds] were initially paid is the report of
Samantha Green, who has been retained by the
[insureds] as their expert."
On April 22, 2011, the circuit court entered an order
giving BMIC "ten (10) calendar days to name an appraiser in
17
1100872
this case as required by the provisions of the policy" ("the
April 2011 order").  Thereafter, BMIC sought clarification as
to whether the April 2011 order 
"applies with respect to all of the approximately
130  [insureds], or just the [insureds] that have
made the most recent demand for Appraisal.  Second,
[BMIC] seeks clarification as to whether this Order,
in addition to requiring that [BMIC] name its
appraiser, also holds that appraisal has been
properly invoked."
On April 29, 2011, the circuit court entered an order
granting BMIC's motion for clarification.  The order states:
"The Court clarifies its earlier Order to state that
the 
Court 
finds 
sufficient 
evidence 
of 
a
disagreement as it relates to the fourteen (14)
[insureds] that have made the most recent demand for
appraisal.  The Court finds that they have satisfied
the terms of the policy necessary.  Other [insureds]
may be added to this initial group of [insureds]
once they comply with the requirements of the policy
to invoke the appraisal provision."
BMIC appealed to this Court pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1)(A),
Ala. R. App. P., governing appeals from "any interlocutory
order 
granting, 
continuing, 
modifying, 
refusing, 
or 
dissolving
an injunction, or refusing to dissolve or modify an
injunction."  BMIC also filed a motion in the circuit court
requesting that that court stay the April 2011 order, pending
resolution of BMIC's appeal.  The circuit court denied the
18
1100872
motion for a stay.  BMIC then filed a motion with this Court
asking that we stay the April 2011 order; this Court granted
BMIC's motion. 
II. Standard of Review
In the present case, a preliminary injunction was issued
in December 2010.  Thereafter, the April 2011 order (as
clarified) modified the injunction as to 14 of the insureds
and, in effect, permanently denied BMIC's claims for
injunctive relief as those 14 insureds.   The "facts" before
7
the circuit court were undisputed, and no ore tenus evidence
was presented at the proceedings.  Thus, the ore tenus rule is
not applicable, and, as this Court has stated, "where the
trial court's ruling rests upon a construction of facts
indisputably established, this Court indulges no presumption
of correctness in favor of the lower court's ruling."  Alabama
Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 454 So. 2d 921, 923–24
As to those 14 insureds, the circuit court's order
7
disposes of the central dispute in this case:  the timing of
the appraisal process in relation to the 
insureds' fulfillment
of their post-loss duties.  It requires the parties to engage
in the appraisal process before the insureds meet their post-
loss duties.  Once this happens pursuant to the court's order,
it cannot "unhappen."  This is not an order that maintains the
status quo until relief can be entered or provides any sort of
"preliminary" relief; the relief it orders is irreversible.
19
1100872
(Ala. 1984).  "[W]hen the facts are undisputed and the
'"ruling [is] a reconsideration of a question of law, ... the
standard of review is de novo."'"  Kappa Sigma Fraternity v.
Price-Williams, 40 So. 3d 683, 694 (Ala. 
2009)(quoting 
Bradley
v. Town of Argo, 2 So. 3d 819, 824 (Ala. 2008), quoting, in
turn,  Pioneer Natural Res. USA, Inc. v. Paper, Allied Indus.,
Chem. & Energy Workers Int'l Union Local 4–487, 328 F.3d 818,
820 (5th Cir.2003)).   
Further, as this Court noted in Twin City Fire Insurance
Co. v. Alfa Mutual Insurance Co., 817 So. 2d 687, 691-92 (Ala.
2001):
"A contract of insurance, like other contacts,
is governed by the general rules of contracts. ... 
'Insurance contracts, like other contracts, are
construed so as to give effect to the intention of
the parties, and, to determine this intent, a court
must examine more than an isolated sentence or term;
it must read each phrase in the context of all other
provisions.'"  
(Quoting Attorneys Ins. Mut. of Alabama, Inc. v. Smith,
Blocker & Lowther, P.C., 703 So. 2d 866, 870 (Ala. 1996).)  
"'When analyzing an insurance policy,
a court gives words used in the policy
their 
common, 
everyday 
meaning 
and
interprets them as a reasonable person in
the 
insured's 
position 
would 
have
understood them.  Western World Ins. Co. v.
City of Tuscumbia, 612 So. 2d 1159 (Ala.
20
1100872
1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Edge Mem'l Hosp., 584 So. 2d 1316 (Ala.
1991). ...  Only in cases of genuine
ambiguity or inconsistency is it proper to
resort to rules of construction.  Canal
Ins. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 718 So.
2d 8 (Ala. 1998).  A policy is not made
ambiguous by the fact that the parties
interpret 
the 
policy 
differently 
or
disagree as to the meaning of a written
provision in a contract.  Watkins v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 656 So. 2d 337
(Ala. 1994). ...'
"B.D.B. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 814 So.
2d 877, 879–80 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)." 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 26 So. 3d 1167, 1169
(Ala. 2009).  "'If there is no ambiguity, courts must enforce
insurance contracts as written and cannot defeat express
provisions in a policy ... by making a new contract for the
parties.'"  Shrader v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 907 So. 2d
1026, 1034 (Ala. 2005) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v.
Chilton–Shelby Mental Health Ctr., 595 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Ala.
1992)).  "'[I]nsurance contracts are subject to the same
general rules of all written contracts, that is, in case of
doubt or uncertainty of the meaning thereof, they are to be
interpreted against the party drawing them.'"  Upton v.
Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 548, 555 (Ala.
1985) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hare, 47 Ala. App. 478,
21
1100872
486, 256 So. 2d 904, 911 (1972)).  In other words, "the rule
that ambiguous insurance contracts are to be construed in 
favor of insureds ... may [not] be permitted to frustrate the
parties' expressed intention if such intention can be
otherwise ascertained."  43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 299
(2013).  See also Tinker v. Continental Ins. Co., 410 A.2d
550, 553-54 (Me. 1980) (discussing, to like effect, the use of
the language of the contract as a whole as well as extrinsic
evidence in the construction of an insurance agreement). 
III. Analysis
BMIC argues that the April 2011 order requiring it to
participate at this time in the appraisal process as to some
of the insureds should be reversed:  (1) because the insureds
at issue have not complied with their post-loss obligations as
described in provisions of the insured's insurance policy and
(2) because the insureds have not established 
the 
precondition
to the appraisal process, namely BMIC's 'failure to agree' or
'disagreement' with the insureds as to the value of the loss
at issue.  As discussed below, the first reason feeds into the
second.
22
1100872
BMIC is correct in its position that the insureds must
comply with their post-loss obligations as described in
provisions 
of 
the 
respective 
insured's 
insurance 
policy 
before
that insured may invoke the appraisal process.  To conclude
otherwise would reflect an unreasonable reading of the
insurance policies at issue.  That is, as to the satisfaction
of the insured's post-loss obligations being 
a 
precondition 
to
the insured's assertion of the right to an appraisal, the
policy is not ambiguous.  See Slagle v. Ross, 125 So. 3d 117,
136 (Ala. 2012) (Shaw, J., concurring in the result in part
and dissenting in part) (recognizing that language is
ambiguous where it "is susceptible to at least two reasonable
interpretations"); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Scruggs, 24 Ala.
App. 130, 132, 131 So. 549, 551 (1930) ("[W]hile it is
practically everywhere the accepted rule that contracts of
insurance must be most strongly construed against 
the 
insurer,
this rule cannot be pressed to the extent of adopting a
construction that is unreasonable.  Its applicability is
limited to those cases where the language of the policy is
ambiguous 
and 
is 
susceptible 
of 
two 
reasonable
constructions.").   
23
1100872
Under the express terms of the insurance policies at
issue, an appraisal is a step that may be demanded only after
an insurance company and an insured come to a state of
disagreement over the amount the insurer is to pay.  Yet, the
insurer has no obligation to pay any amount -- a condition
necessary to put the parties in a state of disagreement over
that amount -- until the insured meets his or her post-loss
obligations.  For example, the loss-payment clause in policy
CP-00-99, one of the policies at issue here, states:
"f.  We will pay for covered loss or damages within
30 days after we receive the sworn statement of
loss, if:
"1.  You have complied with all of the
terms of this policy; and
"2.
a.  We have reached an agreement with
you on the amount of loss; or
"b.  An appraisal award has been
made."
Policy CP-00-99 further provides:
"3. DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE.
"You must see that the following are done
in the event of loss or damage to Covered
Property:
"a.
Notify the police if a law may have
been broken.
24
1100872
"b.
Give us prompt notice of the loss or
damage.  Include a description of the
property involved.
"c.
As soon as possible, give us a
description of how, when and where the
loss or damage occurred.
"d.
Take all reasonable steps to protect
the Covered Property from further
damage by a Covered Cause of Loss.  If
feasible, set the damaged property
aside and in the best possible order
for examination.  Also keep a record
of your expenses for emergency and
temporary repairs, for consideration
in the settlement of the claim.  This
will 
not 
increase 
the 
Limit 
of
Insurance.
"e.
At our request, give us complete
inventories 
of 
the 
damaged 
and
undamaged 
property. 
 
Include
quantities, costs, values and amount
of loss claimed.
"f.
Permit us to inspect the property and
records proving the loss or damage. 
Also permit us to take samples of
damaged 
property 
for 
inspection,
testing and analysis.
"g.
If requested, permit us to question
you under oath at such times as may be
reasonably required about any matter
relating to this insurance or your
claim, 
including 
your 
books 
and
records.  In such event, your answers
must be signed.
"h.
Send us a signed, sworn statement of
loss containing the information we
25
1100872
request to investigate the claim.  You
must do this within 60 days after our
request.  We will supply you with the
necessary forms.
"i.
Cooperate with us in the investigation
or settlement of the claim."
(Emphasis added.)  The other policies contain similar
provisions requiring an insured to submit proof of loss and
imposing other post-loss obligations, such as providing
notice, 
protecting 
the 
property 
from 
additional 
damages, 
etc.,
before payment of loss must be made.  In other words, the
insurance 
policies 
clearly 
condition 
BMIC's 
obligation 
to 
"pay
for covered loss" upon its receipt (1) of a proper statement
of loss from the insured, and (2) the insured's compliance
with the insured's post-loss obligations described in the
specific policy.
The foregoing conclusion is corroborated when one
considers the nature of the "duties after loss" at issue. 
Each of those is a duty that amounts to a precursor to the
establishment of a fair and final loss amount.  Yet, of the
approximately 130 insureds, only 14 have provided even some of
the documentation BMIC has requested in its investigation of
the claimed losses.
26
1100872
Even 
the 
14 
insureds 
who 
have 
provided 
some
documentation, however, have failed to submit to an
examination under oath as BMIC has requested.  In addition,
the most that any of them has submitted is a report prepared
by an appraiser chosen by the insured, or some confirmation of
expenses allegedly incurred, as to a loss that is several
years old.  Although perhaps helpful, the submitted
information does not provide BMIC with all the information to
which it is entitled under the terms of the insureds'
policies, and the insureds responses fall far short of
completion of the duties required to trigger BMIC's duty to
make an offer to settle the insured's claim for a particular
amount in addition to the amount to which the insured
apparently had previously agreed.  
We do not see how the
parties can engage one another in a dispute over the amount of
loss involved, and go even further to invoke an administrative
process for resolving that dispute, unless and until (1) the
insureds have provided the required notice of loss, including
the basis for each insured's claimed loss and its value, and
(2) the insureds have permitted BMIC to investigate and verify
the claimed losses, as allowed under the terms of the
27
1100872
respective policies.  See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v.
Nilsen, 745 So. 2d 264, 267 (Ala. 1998)("An insurance company
is entitled to require an insured to submit to an examination
under oath as part of its claims investigation process. ...
[A]n insurer's obligation to pay or to evaluate the validity
of an insured's claim does not arise until the insured has
complied with the terms of the contract with respect to
submitting claims.").  Moreover, the failure of the insureds
to have complied with their post-loss duties may be
particularly problematic in this case.  It appears that a
significant amount of time passed (two years or more) between
all, or most of, the claimed losses and the November 2010
letter from the insureds' counsel, by which BMIC was informed
that the insureds "disagreed" with the payments they had
received in settlement of the claims the insureds initially
had made -- in some cases, years earlier -- and that each of
the insureds now was demanding an appraisal.  
As BMIC correctly notes in its brief, an insured must
comply with his or her post-loss obligations when the insured
is making a claim upon the insurer, and meeting those
obligations is a precondition to any duty on the part of the
28
1100872
insurer to make a loss payment.  See Nilsen, supra; Akpan v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., Inc., 961 So. 2d 865, 872 (Ala. Civ. App.
2007).  "[T]he obligation to pay or to evaluate the validity
of the claim does not arise until the insured has complied
with the terms of the contract with respect to submitting
claims."  United Ins. Co. of America v. Cope, 630 So. 2d 407,
411 (Ala. 1993).  "[N]o case from this Court places on an
insurance company an obligation to either investigate or pay
a claim until the insured has complied with all of the terms
of the contract with respect to submitting claims for
payment."  630 So. 2d at 412; see also Reeves v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 539 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. 1989)("Our cases
have consistently held ... that the failure of an insured to
comply within a reasonable time with such conditions 
precedent
in an insurance policy requiring the insured to give notice of
an accident or occurrence releases the insurer from
obligations imposed by the insurance contract.").
We also agree with BMIC that, absent the establishment of
a duty to pay, there cannot be a genuine "disagreement"
between the parties as to the issue of the proper amount of a
payment.  We find helpful in this regard the decision in
29
1100872
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Romay, 744 So. 2d
467, 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), in which the court held
that the insured must comply with the policy's post-loss
obligations before the appraisal clause is triggered.  As the
Romay court explained, "the disagreement necessary to trigger
appraisal cannot be unilateral. ...  In other words, by the
terms of the contract, it was contemplated that the parties
would engage in some meaningful exchange of information
sufficient for each party to arrive at a conclusion before a
disagreement could exist." Romay, 744 So. 2d at 469-70; see
also  Hailey v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 181 N.C. App. 677, 687,
640 S.E.2d 849, 855 (2007) ("[T]he unsupported opinion of the
insured that the insurer's payment was insufficient does not
rise to the level of a disagreement necessary to invoke
appraisal. ... [T]o the extent Defendant requested that
Plaintiff comply with Plaintiff's post-loss duties prior to
invoking appraisal, such compliance was a necessary condition
precedent to the invocation of appraisal."). 
The Romay court also stated:
"[P]ermitting the insured to compel appraisal
without first complying with the policy's post-loss
obligations 
would 
place 
the 
insurer 
at 
a
considerable disadvantage entering the appraisal
30
1100872
process.  The nature of the post-loss obligations is
merely to provide the insurer with an independent
means by which to determine the amount of loss, as
opposed to relying solely on the representations of
the insured."
744 So. 2d at 471 n.4; see also Galindo v. ARI Mut. Ins. Co.,
203 F.3d 771, 777 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying Romay and
concluding that an "insurance company must be given an
opportunity to investigate a supplemental claim before there
can be a disagreement between the parties regarding the amount
of property loss or damage to effectuate appraisal"); Hailey,
supra.  In other words, the insured must satisfy his or her
post-loss obligations so that the insurer can know whether it
does or does not agree with the insured's claim as to the
amount of the loss at issue.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the circuit court erred by
ordering BMIC to engage in the appraisal process before the
insureds satisfied their respective post-loss obligations and
before BMIC had sufficient information on which it could
decide whether it disagreed with the respective claims of the
insureds.  Accordingly, we reverse the April 2011 order of the
31
1100872
circuit court and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
32
1100872
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. As the main opinion notes,
Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company ("BMIC") raises two 
issues 
on
appeal: (1) Whether the insureds may demand and invoke an
appraisal in light of the fact that "the insureds ... have not
complied with their post-loss obligations as described in
provisions of the insured's insurance policy"; and 
(2) 
whether
the insureds have "established the precondition to the
appraisal process, namely BMIC's 'failure to agree' or
'disagreement' with the insureds as to the value of the loss
at issue."  ___ So. 3d at ___. 
As to the first issue, BMIC argues that the insureds may
not demand or invoke an appraisal because, BMIC says, they
have failed to comply with the post-loss obligations in their
insurance policies. BMIC argues that, to properly invoke an
appraisal under the various policies, the insureds were
required to fulfill certain post-loss obligations. BMIC notes
that no Alabama appellate court has addressed the effect of an
insured's noncompliance with post-loss obligations on the
insured's ability to invoke an appraisal. BMIC relies on cases
from other jurisdictions for the proposition that an insured
33
1100872
may not demand an appraisal without first complying with the
post-loss obligations in the underlying policies. See, e.g.,
United States Fid. & Gaur. Co. v. Romay, 744 So. 2d 467, 471
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)("No reasonable and thoughtful
interpretation of the policy could support compelling
appraisal 
without 
first complying 
with 
the 
post-loss
obligations."); Galindo v. ARI Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 771,
777 (11th Cir. 2000)("[W]e hold that these insureds must
comply with the post-loss terms of their respective
homeowner's 
policies, 
which 
enables 
the 
insurance 
companies 
to
investigate the insureds' claims and to disagree with the loss
amount before the appraisal term becomes effective."); Hailey
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 181 N.C. App. 677, 687, 640 S.E.2d
849, 855 (2007)("[T]o the extent Defendant requested that
Plaintiff comply with Plaintiff's post-loss duties prior to
invoking appraisal, such compliance was a necessary condition
precedent to the invocation of appraisal."). According to
BMIC, these foreign cases align with Alabama cases holding
that an insurer is not obligated to pay an insured until the
insured has submitted claims to the insurer pursuant to the
terms of the policies. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Nilsen, 745 So.
34
1100872
2d 264, 267 (Ala. 1998)("[A]n insurer's obligation to pay or
to evaluate the validity of an insured's claim does not arise
until the insured has complied with the terms of the contract
with respect to submitting claims."). Therefore, BMIC asks
this Court to hold that the insureds must satisfy certain
post-loss obligations before demanding an appraisal according
to their policies. 
By their terms, however, the policies do not require the
insureds to first satisfy the post-loss obligations before
demanding an appraisal. The parties stipulate that the
appraisal provisions are roughly the same in each policy:
"Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the
values of the property or the amount of loss, either
may make written demand for an appraisal of the
loss. In this event, each party will select a
competent 
and 
impartial 
appraiser. 
The 
two
appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot
agree, either may request that selection be made by
a judge of a court having jurisdiction. The
appraisers will state separately the value of the
property and amount of loss. If they fail to agree,
they will submit their differences to an umpire. A
decision agreed to by any two will be binding. Each
party will: Pay its chosen appraiser and bear the
other expenses of the appraisal and umpire equally." 
The section of 
the 
policies regarding post-loss obligations is
entirely separate from the section of the policies regarding
an appraisal. Neither section makes reference to the other.
35
1100872
Nothing in the policies states that post-loss provisions must
be satisfied before the insureds may invoke the appraisal
provisions. Instead, the policies maintain that either 
BMIC or
the insureds may demand an appraisal if BMIC and the insureds
disagree on the value of the property or the amount of loss.
Such disagreement could arise at any time. The policies do not
specify that the insureds must bring their disagreement to the
attention of BMIC only after they have satisfied their post-
loss obligations. The plain and unambiguous terms of the
policies suggest that the insureds may demand an appraisal
whenever they disagree with BMIC regarding the value of the
property or the amount of loss. Although BMIC attempts to
portray the performance of post-loss obligations as a
condition precedent to appraisal, no language in the policies
supports 
that 
interpretation. 
Public 
Bldg. 
Auth. 
of 
Huntsville
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 80 So. 3d 171, 180 (Ala.
2010)("A court may not make a new contract for the parties or
rewrite their contract under the guise of construing it.").
BMIC 
would 
have 
us 
adopt 
holdings 
from 
other
jurisdictions to establish a bright-line rule for all Alabama
insurance cases, namely, that an insured must always satisfy
36
1100872
post-loss obligations before invoking appraisal provisions in
an insurance policy. Such a rule impairs the obligation of
existing contracts between insureds and insurers. "General
rules of contract law govern an insurance contract." Safeway
Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc. v. Herrera, 912 So. 2d 1140, 1143
(Ala. 2005). "The Court must enforce the insurance policy as
written if the terms are unambiguous." Id. 
Here, the policies are not ambiguous: They allow both
BMIC and the insureds to demand an appraisal if the parties
disagree about the value of the property or the amount of
loss. Although to compel an appraisal in Florida requires a
party first to comply with the post-loss provisions in an
insurance policy,  no such law exists in Alabama. Had the
8
parties wished to be bound by such a rule, they could have
included it in their policies. It is unreasonable to hold
that, when the insureds purchased their policies from BMIC,
they should have expected Florida law to govern their
policies. This Court should not read into a contract a
provision that is not there. Harbison v. Strickland, 900 So.
See, e.g., Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Mango 
Hill Condo.
8
Ass'n 12 Inc., 54 So. 3d 578, 581-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011). 
37
1100872
2d 385, 391 (Ala. 2004)("'"[A] court should ... presume that
the parties intended what the terms of the agreement clearly
state."'" (quoting other cases)). Nor should this Court add
provisions to an insurance policy according to what it
perceives to be industry-wide insurance standards and
practices as to which the policy is silent. Poole v.
Henderson, Black & Green, Inc., 584 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala.
1991)("'"The general rule of contract law is that, if a
written contract exists, the rights of the parties are
controlled by that contract, and parol evidence is not
admissible to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from its
terms."'"(quoting Rime-Shatten Dev. Co. v. Birmingham Cable
Commc'ns, Inc., 569 So. 2d 332, 334 (Ala. 1990), quoting in
turn Clark v. Albertville Nursing Home, Inc., 545 So. 2d 9, 11
(Ala. 1989))). Therefore, I would affirm the circuit court's
April 2011 order as to the first issue.
As to the second issue, BMIC argues that the insureds
have failed to establish a "failure to agree" or a
"disagreement" regarding the amount of loss and, therefore,
may not demand an appraisal. In particular, BMIC contends that
the insureds failed to provide sufficient evidence (e.g.,
38
1100872
estimates from contractors) that the parties disagreed about
the amount of loss either before or after BMIC compensated the
insureds for the loss. In response, the insureds allege that
they established a "disagreement" regarding the amount 
of 
loss
when, after receiving a check from BMIC to cover their loss,
they notified BMIC that the amount of the check was inadequate
and that their demand for an appraisal is in accordance with
their policies. The point of the appraisal, they contend, is
to determine not whether a disagreement between the parties
existed, but the amount on which the parties disagree. 
BMIC quotes from cases holding that there must be an
actual disagreement between the parties regarding the 
value 
of
the property or the amount of loss in order to effectuate an
appraisal.  These holdings are in keeping with the policies in
9
this case. BMIC does not argue that it disagrees with the
insureds' allegation that BMIC inadequately compensated them
for their loss. Rather, BMIC alleges that it does not have
enough information to determine whether it disagrees with the
insureds regarding the amount of the loss because the insureds
have not identified, with sufficient evidence, what they
E.g., Jersey Ins. Co. v. Roddam, 256 Ala. 634, 637-38,
9
56 So. 2d 631, 633-35 (1952); Romay, 744 So. 2d at 469-70.
39
1100872
consider the amount of loss to be. If the insureds had
complied with the post-loss obligations in the policies, BMIC
adds, there might have been sufficient evidence to allow BMIC
to determine whether its assessment of the amount of loss
differs from the insureds' assessment of the amount of loss. 
Accordingly, this Court must determine whether the
circuit court erred by denying BMIC's motion for injunctive
relief based on the circuit court's finding that 14 of the 130
insureds had proffered enough evidence of the amount of loss
to effectuate an appraisal under the policy. BMIC declares
that no such evidence exists or that the existing evidence
does not support the circuit court's finding that these
insureds 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
invoke the
appraisal. However, BMIC does not describe the evidence in the
record and before the circuit court or explain how the
specific contents of such evidence were inadequate to support
the circuit court's order granting the appraisal. This Court
has stated that the appellant "has a heavy burden when it
seeks a reversal of an order on the ground that the decision
is not supported by the evidence." Curtis White Constr. Co. v.
40
1100872
Butts & Billingsley Constr. Co., 473 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Ala.
1985). 
"It is the function of a trial judge sitting as
factfinder to decide facts where conflicts in the
evidence exist. Such was the case here. The
appellate courts do not sit in judgment of the
facts, and review the factfinder's determination of
facts only to the extent of determining whether it
is sufficiently supported by the evidence, that
question being one of law. No error of law exists in
this case, and where there is evidence to support
the decision reached by the factfinder, we must
affirm its judgment."
473 So. 2d at 1041. Because there is ample evidence in the
record to support the decision reached by the circuit court,
including 
detailed 
estimates, 
drawings, 
and 
photographs 
of 
the
damage at issue, and because BMIC makes no attempt to explain
in detail how this evidence does not support the circuit
court's findings that the 14 insureds had properly invoked the
appraisal provisions in the policies, I would affirm the
circuit court's order. 
Finally, BMIC claims that, "if an insured has not
retained a contractor or repairman, or obtained an estimate of
the amount of loss from some other source, it is difficult to
understand how an insured could, in fact, disagree with the
insurer's determination of the amount of loss." Nevertheless,
41
1100872
the policies by their terms did not require the insured to
retain a contractor or a repairperson or to obtain an estimate
of the amount of loss from some other source as a condition
precedent to invoking the appraisal provisions. "'Courts
cannot make contracts for parties, but must give such
contracts as are made a reasonable construction and enforce
them accordingly.'" Charles H. McCauley Assocs., Inc. v.
Snook, 339 So. 2d 1011, 1015 (Ala. 1976)(quoting R.P. Harris,
& Co. v. Thomas, 17 Ala. App. 634, 635, 88 So. 51, 52 
(1921)). "[W]e know of no canon of construction that warrants
an interpretation the only effect of which is to relieve a
party to the contract from consequences deemed by him hard or
unfair." Lilley v. Gonzales, 417 So. 2d 161, 163 (Ala. 1982).
"[I]t is the duty of the [C]ourt to enforce [the contract] as
written." Kinnon v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 418 So.
2d 887, 888 (Ala. 1982). To hold otherwise is to require
consumers purchasing insurance policies to know not only what
provisions appear in such policies, but also what judicially
created provisions exist for such policies outside the four
corners of the policies. Ordinary consumers of insurance
policies are not lawyers and should not be expected to search
42
1100872
"caselaw" for provisions applicable to their policies that do
not appear in such policies.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
43