Title: Shams v. Carney
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93-109
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1994

518 N.W.2d 366 (1994) Samir SHAMS and Laila Shams, Appellants, v. John Jerome CARNEY, Appellee. No. 93-109. Supreme Court of Iowa. June 22, 1994. Rehearing Denied July 25, 1994. *367 Frederick B. Anderson of Wiggins &amp; Anderson, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellants. Thomas J. Logan and Hugh J. Cain of Hopkins &amp; Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, NEUMAN, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ. LARSON, Justice. Samir Shams was struck while crossing a Des Moines street. A jury found no negligence on the part of the defendant, John Carney, and the plaintiffs appealed the resulting judgment. The court of appeals reversed, and we granted further review. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court. In Urbandale, Iowa, there is a frontage road running parallel to a main thoroughfare, Hickman Road. The frontage road is connected to Hickman by an access road at Ninetieth Street. There is a bus stop at that point, and it was there that Shams left a commuter bus to walk home. He waited for the bus to leave and started to walk across the frontage road. It was December 17, just after dusk, and the weather was misty. Shams was dressed in a dark suit, black shoes, black topcoat, and a blue cap. He successfully crossed the north (or westbound) half of the frontage road, but he was struck by Carney's car as he attempted to cross the south half. The frontage road traveled by Carney is a "protected" or "favored" street, one that provides for the right-of-way by the posting of yield or stop signs. See Wilson v. Jefferson Transp. Co., 163 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1968). The principal issues on appeal concern Carney's duty of care in approaching this intersection and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an instruction on "assured clear distance." It was on those issues that the court of appeals reversed the judgment for the defendant. The plaintiffs requested, but the court refused to give, the following proposed Instruction 9: We have held that this instruction, which incorporates Iowa Code section 321.288 (1991), is not required if the driver was approaching a protected intersection, as in this case. Wilson, 163 N.W.2d at 371. See also Pitz v. Cedar Valley Egg &amp; Poultry Co., 203 N.W.2d 548, 550-51 (Iowa 1973); Paulsen v. Haker, 250 Iowa 532, 537, 95 N.W.2d 47, 51-52 (1959). As we said in Wilson: Wilson, 163 N.W.2d at 372. As we said in Matuska v. Bryant, 260 Iowa 726, 150 N.W.2d 716 (1967): Id. at 733-34, 150 N.W.2d at 720-21 (citations omitted). A motorist traveling a protected roadway does not have a duty to decrease speed at an intersection unless it appears that another person has proceeded onto the protected roadway. In that case, Wilson, 163 N.W.2d at 371. In four separate instructions, the court stated the general law with respect to control, the duty to drive with due regard for all existing conditions, and the duty to drive at a speed reasonable and proper under the circumstances. It was not obliged to also give the plaintiffs' requested Instruction 9, which deals with unprotected intersections. Shams contends the trial court should have instructed the jury that This instruction is based on Iowa Code section 321.285. In Coppola v. Jameson, 200 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Iowa 1972), we set out a three-part test for determining when to give this instruction: Id. (quoting Cerny v. Domer, 13 Ohio St.2d 117, 123-24, 235 N.E.2d 132, 137 (1968)). Under section (2) of the Coppola test, there is a question whether Shams was reasonably discernible. The collision occurred one-half hour after sunset, Shams was wearing very dark clothing, and neither Shams nor Carney saw the other until Shams was a few feet in front of Carney's vehicle. Another witness confirmed that. Shams also fails section 3 of the Coppola test because he did not "[come] into [Carney's] lane of travel within the assured clear distance ahead at a point sufficiently distant ahead of him to have made it possible to bring his vehicle to a stop and avoid a collision." Coppola, 200 N.W.2d at 880. Vanderheiden v. Clearfield Truck Rentals, Inc., 210 N.W.2d 527, 531 (Iowa 1973) (quoting 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 293(2)(b), 208-09 (1969)); accord Nolte v. Case, 221 N.W.2d 741, 747 (Iowa 1974); see also Wright v. Welter, 288 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Iowa 1980) (plaintiff did not enter defendant's line of travel within the assured clear distance where plaintiff stood stationary at the centerline of the road approximately 300 feet in front of defendant, then proceeded to walk into defendant's lane of travel). Under the facts of this case, it was not error for the district court to deny the assured-clear-distance instruction. The plaintiff contends that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. Jury findings of fact are binding on appeal if they are supported by substantial *369 evidence. Nadler v. Mason City, 387 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Iowa 1986). Evidence is substantial if reasonable minds would find it adequate to reach the same conclusion, even if we might draw a contrary inference, Frontier Properties Corp. v. Swanberg, 488 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Iowa 1992). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered. Poulsen v. Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 294 (Iowa 1981). When we view the evidence with these principles in mind, we believe that the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore affirm. The defendant has raised an issue on cross-appeal regarding the court's instruction concerning a crosswalk. The court instructed that a driver is required to yield to a pedestrian crossing the road within a crosswalk. The defendant contends that this intersection was not a crosswalk within the meaning of the law; however, because we affirm the judgment favorable to the defendant, it is not necessary to address the cross-appeal issue. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.