Title: STATE v FISH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 79-007
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 1980

No. 79-7 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, DWAYNE FISH and JOHN ALDIN HUBBARD, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Morrison, Ettien and Barron, Havre, Montana Robert Morrison argued, Havre, Montana Lawrence A. Anderson argued, Public Defender, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mary B. Troland argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Tom McKittrick argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: November 11, 1980 Decided: EEC 3 0 19@ T E c 4 ":q$' Filed: . < M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his i s an appeal from a conviction and judgment a g a i n s t t h e defendant Dwayne Morris Fish of attempted bur- g l a r y and t h e defendant John Aldin Hubbard of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The convictions followed a jury t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Cascade. A t approximately 10:OO p.m. on t h e evening June 27, 1978, Dwayne F i s h and Mary Skelton went t o Wally's B a r i n Black Eagle, Montana, j u s t north and a c r o s s t h e Missouri River from Great F a l l s , Montana, where George M i l l e r w a s bartending. While i n t h e bar Fish t a l k e d with Miller con- cerning a past-due money d e b t M i l l e r owed him. A f t e r having a d r i n k , F i s h and Skelton began t o leave. A t t h a t time, some p r o f a n i t i e s were exchanged between M i l l e r and M s . Skelton. A s a r e s u l t of t h e exchange, a f i g h t ensued be- tween F i s h and Miller with M i l l e r seemingly g e t t i n g t h e b e t t e r of it. A f t e r a b r i e f t i m e , a patron of t h e bar grabbed F i s h and pulled him away from M i l l e r . The patron t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a s he separated t h e two men, Fish t o l d M i l l e r t h a t he was going t o k i l l him. F i s h l e f t t h e bar with Skelton. A f t e r leaving Wally's Bar F i s h took M s . Skelton home and mentioned t h a t he was going back t o t h e bar t o continue h i s f i g h t with M i l l e r . Skelton suggested t h a t she should c a l l her brother, John Hubbard, f o r help, b u t Fish r e j e c t e d t h e suggestion and t o l d her t o s t a y home. Skelton d i d c a l l her brother, John Hubbard, and r e l a t e d what had happened between Fish and M i l l e r . Hubbard agreed t o help and subsequently m e t h i s sister a t t h e ~ i v e r v i e w Lounge i n Great F a l l s . I n t h e meantime, F i s h returned t o Wally's B a r . F i s h parked h i s car nearby and was approaching t h e bar when t h e owner confronted him. F i s h requested t h a t t h e owner g e t ~ i l l e r t o come o u t , b u t M i l l e r d e c l i n e d and F i s h l e f t . Skelton and Hubbard, a f t e r meeting, l e f t f o r W a l l y f s Bar t o f i n d Fish. Upon a r r i v i n g a t Wally's, they were informed by t h e owner t h a t F i s h had come back b u t had l e f t again. Skelton and Hubbard then went t o t h e Grey Horse B a r and Saloon i n Black Eagle, where they found Fish. Hubbard advised F i s h t h a t it would n o t be w i s e t o r e t u r n t o Wally's Bar t o f i g h t Miller because t h e b a r w a s f u l l of Miller's f r i e n d s . F i s h s t a t e d t h a t t h e f i g h t w a s between him and Miller and f o r Hubbard t o s t a y o u t of it. A p a t r o n of t h e b a r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he heard F i s h and Hubbard say they w e r e going t o g e t Miller. Fearing t h a t F i s h would be i n f o r q u i t e a b e a t i n g i f he r e t u r n e d t o Wally's Bar Skelton and Hubbard l e f t t o f i n d some f r i e n d s t o even up t h e odds. Skelton and Hubbard went t o t h e L i t t l e Chicago Bar, i n Black Eagle, where they found D a l e Lodge, a c l o s e f r i e n d of John Hubbard. Skelton, Lodge and Hubbard went back t o t h e Grey Horse where they found F i s h s i t t i n g a t t h e bar. Skelton, Lodge and Hubbard began t o p l a y pool while F i s h continued t o s i t a t t h e bar. A t c l o s i n g t i m e , Skelton and F i s h l e f t t h e Grey Horse and headed towards Wally's Bar i n F i s h ' s automobile. understanding t h a t t h e r e would be a f i g h t between F i s h and M i l l e r a t Wally's, Hubbard and Lodge followed. Upon a r r i v a l a t Wally's Bar, Hubbard parked h i s t r u c k a c r o s s t h e street from t h e bar. While Hubbard w a s parked, O f f i c e r Dick Duncan of t h e Cascade County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , approached Hubbard's truck. Deputy Duncan asked ~ u b b a r d t o i d e n t i f y himself and advised Hubbard t h a t t h e r e was going t o be no trouble. A s Hubbard and Lodge w e r e leaving t h e a r e a of Wally's Bar, a s requested by Deputy Duncan, Skelton approached Hubbard's truck and asked Hubbard t o meet her and Fish a t F i s c h e r ' s T r a i l e r Park, where she expected Fish and M i l l e r t o f i g h t . M i l l e r was a r e s i d e n t of t h e trailer park. Skelton drove F i s h ' s automobile t o F i s c h e r ' s T r a i l e r Park b u t discovered t h a t M i l l e r had n o t y e t a r r i v e d . Skelton and F i s h parked t h e i r c a r a d j a c e n t t o F i s c h e r ' s T r a i l e r Park. Hubbard and Lodge a r r i v e d and parked next t o Skelton and Fish. A f t e r twenty t o f o r t y minutes of waiting a t t h e t r a i l e r park, Hubbard decided t o go home f o r t h e night. J u s t a s he was g e t t i n g ready t o leave, however, a car which was be- l i e v e d t o be M i l l e r ' s drove p a s t . F i s h and Skelton i n one c a r , and Hubbard and Lodge i n the o t h e r car, proceeded t o follow. The c a r spotted by t h e group a c t u a l l y contained S a l l y McCurdy, M i l l e r ' s fiancee. She w a s being followed t o Miller's t r a i l e r by a f r i e n d , Garth Lenci. Fish, Hubbard, Lodge and Skelton w e r e unaware t h a t Miller and a f r i e n d of h i s , Steven T r i p l e t t , were already i n s i d e t h e trailer when McCurdy a r r i v e d . Upon a r r i v i n g a t Miller's t r a i l e r , Skelton parked t h e c a r a s h o r t d i s t a n c e away. Fish g o t o u t of t h e car and walked t o where Lenci w a s parked. S a l l y McCurdy was a l r e a d y i n t h e t r a i l e r a t t h i s t i m e . Immediately a f t e r her a r r i v a l M i l l e r had come t o t h e t r a i l e r door and shouted t o her t o come i n s i d e . Lenci t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r Fish, Hubbard and Lodge walked up t o h i s c a r F i s h t o l d him "they w e r e going t o do it r i g h t and g e t i t done with." Lenci then t e s t i f i e d he l e f t a s a l l t h r e e men approached Miller's t r a i l e r with Fish i n t h e lead. Fish denies having made any such statement t o Lenci and t e s t i f i e d t h a t Hubbard and Lodge d i d not a r r i v e a t Lenci's c a r u n t i l a f t e r he had s t a r t e d up t h e porch s t e p s t o M i l l e r ' s t r a i l e r . When F i s h a r r i v e d a t M i l l e r ' s f r o n t door he began knocking. McCurdy, who was i n s i d e t h e trailer a t t h e time, t e s t i f i e d t o seeing Hubbard and Lodge a few f e e t behind Fish. T r i p l e t t , who was a l s o i n s i d e t h e t r a i l e r , s t a t e d he noticed an i n d i v i d u a l standing beside F i s h b u t was unable t o i d e n t i f y t h e person. Fish, Hubbard and Skelton t e s t i f i e d t h a t Lodge and Hubbard had stopped j u s t o f f a concrete landing i n f r o n t of Miller's t r a i l e r and were not on t h e porch with Fish. A s F i s h was knocking on t h e door, t h e l i g h t s i n t h e t r a i l e r went out. F i s h s a i d he continued t o knock and shouted t o Miller t o "come o u t and g e t it over with. " S a l l y McCurdy t e s t i f i e d t h a t Fish t o l d Miller t o come o u t o r he would come i n . F i s h knocked on t h e door f o r approximately two minutes b u t t e s t i f i e d he never attempted t o f o r c e open t h e door, nor d i d he ever grab o r handle t h e door knob i n a n attempt t o open t h e door. During t h i s period of time T r i p l e t t , M i l l e r and McCurdy were i n t h e t r a i l e r l i v i n g room. Without saying anything M i l l e r went t o h i s bedroom, obtained a r i f l e and returned t o t h e kitchen t o load it. T r i p l e t t t e s t i f i e d t h a t McCurdy then s t a r t e d y e l l i n g t h a t they were going t o have a shoot-out and t o l d h i m t o g e t i n t h e back bedroom. McCurdy however does n o t remember making any such statement. T r i p l e t t immedi- a t e l y l e f t the l i v i n g room and while on h i s way t o t h e back door, heard M i l l e r f i r e t h e r i f l e . A t t h e time t h e s h o t was f i r e d by M i l l e r , Fish testi- f i e d t h a t he had r e t r e a t e d and was standing about t e n f e e t from t h e porch. H e had heard the gun being cocked i n s i d e t h e trailer, which frightened him. A t about t h e same t i m e F i s h t e s t i f i e d t h a t Lodge r a n up on t h e porch and bumped a g a i n s t t h e door with h i s f o o t a s t h e s h o t w a s f i r e d by M i l l e r . The prosecution presented t h e testimony of Skelton which i n d i c a t e d t h a t Lodge was standing beside Fish when Lodge kicked t h e door two o r t h r e e t i m e s . The s h o t f i r e d by M i l l e r went through t h e f r o n t window a d j a c e n t t o the t r a i l e r door and s t r u c k Lodge i n t h e t h r o a t . Lodge's body was l a t e r found lying with h i s f e e t on t h e t r a i l e r door threshold. The door molding on t h e i n s i d e of t h e t r a i l e r and t h e door l a t c h were a l s o found ripped from t h e door casing. Shrapnel ( i . e . , t r a i l e r metal) from t h e s h o t by M i l l e r s t r u c k F i s h i n t h e stomach and Hubbard i n t h e l i p and eye. A s t h e s h o t was f i r e d , Fish and Hubbard ran from t h e v i c i n i t y of M i l l e r ' s t r a i l e r . Hubbard r e t r e a t e d t o t h e a r e a of a t i n shed a d j a c e n t t o t h e t r a i l e r while Fish f l e d around t h e back s i d e of t h e t r a i l e r and then headed towards h i s c a r . A t t h i s p o i n t , Miller ---- came o u t of t h e t r a i l e r and f i r e d -- two more s h o t s , aiming h i s r i f l e i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of -- - Hubbard. Hubbard then saw M i l l e r run around t h e opposite s i d e of t h e t r a i l e r . Hubbard then returned t o h i s truck and drove down t o t h e immediate v i c i n i t y of t h e trailer porch. A s he reached t h e t r a i l e r , Miller appeared and shoved a r i f l e through t h e window of t h e truck and threatened Hubbard's l i f e by y e l l i n g he w a s going t o "blow h i s f ----- g head o f f . " A s t r u g g l e f o r t h e r i f l e ensued, with Hubbard u l t i m a t e l y gaining possession. A f t e r taking t h e r i f l e away from M i l l e r , Hubbard went over t o Lodge's body and observed t h a t he had been s h o t i n t h e neck. Hubbard, then seeing M i l l e r moving away, aimed and f i r e d t h e r i f l e a t him. Hubbard s t a t e d t h a t when he f i r e d a t M i l l e r he was aiming a t h i s r i g h t l e g expecting t o wing him s o a s t o prevent him from leaving t o o b t a i n another weapon. Fish, having witnessed t h e s t r u g g l e over t h e r i f l e , t e s t i f i e d t h a t Hubbard missed Miller with t h e f i r s t s h o t and then f i r e d a t him again, Miller f a l l i n g f a c e down i n t h e gravel. Hubbard t e s t i f i e d t h a t he h i t M i l l e r with t h e f i r s t s h o t and f i r e d another i n t o t h e ground t o clear t h e chamber. A b u l l e t from t h e r i f l e s t r u c k M i l l e r i n t h e small of t h e back a t about b e l t l e v e l . McCurdy, who had f l e d through t h e back of t h e t r a i l e r t o g e t help, returned and went t o t h e s p o t where Miller l a y . While t h e r e , she t e s t i f i e d , she heard Hubbard say, "He k i l l e d m y f r i e n d s o I k i l l e d him." She a l s o t e s t i f i e d t o hearing F i s h say, "Yes, w e k i l l e d him." A deputy s h e r i f f who a r r i v e d on t h e scene s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t Hubbard t o l d him t h a t he s h o t M i l l e r because M i l l e r had s h o t Lodge. Both Lodge and M i l l e r died a s a r e s u l t of wounds re- ceived t h a t night. F i s h and Hubbard were charged j o i n t l y by amended i n - formation with d e l i b e r a t e homicide, attempted aggravated burglary and conspiracy t o commit aggravated a s s a u l t . he conspiracy charge was dropped p r i o r t o t r i a l and t h e defen- d a n t s pleaded n o t g u i l t y t o the remaining counts. Defendants f i l e d a motion t o dismiss t h e amended in- formation which was denied by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. F i s h then f i l e d a motion f o r s e p a r a t e t r i a l which was a l s o denied.  rial by jury commenced on A p r i l 4 , 1979. O n A p r i l 20, 1979, t h e jury returned a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y a g a i n s t defen- d a n t Fish f o r attempted burglary. He was a c q u i t t e d of attempted aggravated burglary and d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The codefendant, Hubbard, was convicted of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide and a c q u i t t e d of attempted aggravated burglary and attempted burglary. F i s h was sentenced t o confinement i n t h e Montana S t a t e Prison f o r a period of seven years and found t o be a nondan- gerous offender. Hubbard was sentenced t o prison f o r a period of twenty years and a l s o found t o be a nondangerous offender. F i s h and Hubbard both appeal. Numerous i s s u e s have been r a i s e d by defendants on appeal, b u t t h i s Court need only examine t h e following: 1. Whether defendant F i s h ' s conviction f o r attempted burglary i s supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence? 2. Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t properly excluded psychi- a t r i c testimony o f f e r e d by defendant Hubbard? To support an attemptedburglarycharge it i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e prosecution e s t a b l i s h , with s u b s t a n t i a l and c r e d i - b l e evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt, t h a t t h e defen- d a n t attempted t o e n t e r an occupied s t r u c t u r e with t h e purpose t o commit an o f f e n s e t h e r e i n . See s e c t i o n s 45-4-103 and 45-6-204, MCA. I t is a well-established p r i n c i p l e t h a t an attempt must c o n s i s t of more than m e r e preparation and t h a t t h e r e must be some o v e r t a c t committed i n furtherance of t h e offense charged. Section 45-4-103(1), MCA; see a l s o S t a t e v. Ribera (1979) Mont. , 597 P.2d , 36 St.Rep. 1292; S t a t e v. Rains (1917), 53 Mont. 424, 164 P. 540. The only evidence presented a t t r i a l i n d i c a t e s t h a t F i s h was on t h e f r o n t porch of M i l l e r ' s trailer knocking o r pounding on t h e door. F i s h t e s t i f i e d a s he was knocking he t o l d M i l l e r t o come o u t and g e t it over with. There was testimony of S a l l y McCurdy, who w a s i n s i d e t h e t r a i l e r a t t h e t i m e , t h a t F i s h t o l d Miller t o come o u t o r he would come i n ; however, no evidence was ever presented t h a t Fish a t - tempted t o f o r c e open t h e door o r t h a t he ever grabbed o r handled t h e door knob i n an attempt t o open t h e door. Based upon a review of a l l of t h e evidence, i n a l i g h t most favorable t o t h e S t a t e , w e a r e c l e a r l y unable t o f i n d t h a t F i s h ' s conduct a t any time c o n s t i t u t e d an o v e r t a c t t h a t could be construed a s an attempt t o e n t e r Miller's t r a i l e r . Mere knocking o r pounding on a door does n o t reach f a r enough towards t h e accomplishment of t h e a l l e g e d d e s i r e d r e s u l t t o gain e n t r y i n t o an occupied s t r u c t u r e necessary t o e s t a b l i s h t h e crime of attempted burglary. The S t a t e argues t h a t i f t h e a c t i o n s of Fish do n o t e s t a b l i s h attempted burglary, Fish i s s t i l l g u i l t y of t h a t crime on a theory of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e a c t i o n s of Dale Lodge. W e again must disagree. A person i s l e g a l l y accountable f o r t h e conduct of another when : I' (1) having a mental s t a t e described by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e offense, he causes an- o t h e r t o perform t h e conduct, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e l e g a l capacity o r mental s t a t e of an- o t h e r person; " ( 3 ) e i t h e r before o r during t h e commission of t h e offense with t h e purpose t o promote o r f a c i l i t a t e such commission, he s o l i c i t s , a i d s , a b e t s , agrees, o r attempts t o a i d such o t h e r person i n t h e planning o r commission of t h e offense." Section 45-2-302, MCA. The evidence presented a t t r i a l upon which t h e S t a t e b a s i s i t s theory of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s testimony t h a t a f t e r F i s h stopped knocking on t h e t r a i l e r door, Lodge r a n up n e x t t o F i s h and may have kicked t h e door between one and t h r e e times before a s h o t was f i r e d by Miller s t r i k i n g Lodge. F i s h t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had r e t r e a t e d from t h e porch a l t o - gether when Lodge r a n up t o t h e door, kicking it with h i s f o o t a s t h e s h o t w a s f i r e d . Additional evidence was pre- sented t h a t t h e molding around t h e t r a i l e r door and t h e door l a t c h w e r e found t o r n o f f t h e door casing and t h a t Lodge's body w a s found with h i s f e e t on t h e door threshold. How- ever, it should be noted t h a t no evidence w a s ever presented t h a t t h e door was damaged a s a r e s u l t of any a c t i o n by Lodge o r Fish; i n f a c t , no evidence t o support how the damage oc- curred was ever presented. Upon reviewing t h i s evidence, again i n a l i g h t most favorable t o t h e S t a t e , w e a r e unable t o f i n d t h a t t h e prosecution has e s t a b l i s h e d those elements required t o support a theory of l e g a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . There i s no s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t h a t F i s h had any i n t e n t t o e n t e r Miller's t r a i l e r o r t h a t he s o l i c i t e d o r aided Lodge when Lodge r a n up t o t h e door and a l l e g e d l y kicked it. I n f u r t h e r support of t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y theory, t h e S t a t e draws on t h e t i m e Fish, Hubbard and Lodge w e r e to- gether e a r l i e r i n t h e evening and on i s o l a t e d remarks overheard from them, a l l e g e d l y of anexceedingly v i o l e n t nature and t h a t a l l t h r e e w e r e again p r e s e n t a t Miller's t r a i l e r when Lodge approached the t r a i l e r door. Y e t , t h e record i s bare of any evidence of any preparation by any of t h e t h r e e t o c a r r y o u t t h e s e a l l e g e d t h r e a t s ; no one was armed, n o t even with a s t i c k o r a rock. The record is more compatible with an i n t e n t by Fish t o engage i n a f i s t fight-- t o which he admits. The S t a t e admits i n t h e record t h a t no weapons were found when t h e v e h i c l e s were searched. Miller was t h e only person armed. W e acknowledge t h a t t h e r e w a s an uncommon amount of a c t i v i t y t h a t evening t h a t made i t s way i n t o t h e record, b u t we are compelled t o r e j e c t t h e conclu- s i o n reached from t h i s by t h e S t a t e . The jury a l s o refused t o accept t h e theory of account- a b i l i t y , a s i s evidenced by t h e t h e i r i n c o n s i s t e n t v e r d i c t s . They refused t o f i n d Hubbard accountable f o r a c t i o n s of Fish o r Lodge by f a i l i n g t o f i n d him g u i l t y of attempted bur- g l a r y . And, they f a i l e d t o f i n d a c c o u n t a b i l i t y again by n o t f i n d i n g F i s h g u i l t y of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The d e f i n i t i o n of criminal a c c o u n t a b i l i t y contemplates an a c t i v e r o l e i n f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e commission of an offense. Consequently, more than mere presence a t t h e scene of a crime i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h criminal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . S t a t e ex rel. Murphy v. McKinnon (1976), 171 Mont. 120, 556 P.2d 906. The second i s s u e on appeal d e a l s with t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o allow a p s y c h i a t r i s t t o t e s t i f y a s t o defendant Hubbard's mental s t a t e a t t h e t i m e M i l l e r was shot. With r e s p e c t t o e i t h e r d e l i b e r a t e homicide o r mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e S t a t e must prove t h a t defendant "purposely o r knowingly" caused t h e death of another human being. Sections 45-5-102 and 45-5-103, MCA. " ~ u r p o s e l y o r knowingly" a r e s t a t u t o r y d e s c r i p t i o n s of various states of t h e human mind. See s e c t i o n s 45-2-lOl(52) and 45-2-101(27), MCA. They a r e p a r t i c u l a r elements i n - cluded i n the d e f i n i t i o n of t h e criminal offenses a t i s s u e . N o element of an offense can be presumed, and, thus, t h e r e q u i s i t e state of mind must be e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e prose- c u t i o n and believed by t h e jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See P a t t e r s o n v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281; I n re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. The prosecution must c a r r y t h e burden of proving t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e of t h e defendant i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r offense. Therefore, due process demands t h a t t h e defendant be allowed t o introduce evidence t o r e b u t s a i d evidence. Evidence should be admissible t o prove o r disprove t h e e x i s t e n c e o r nonexistence of a defendant's s t a t e of mind j u s t as any o t h e r evidence i s admissible t o prove o t h e r elements of t h e crime charged. The o f f e r e d p s y c h i a t r i c testimony i n t h i s i n s t a n c e i n - cluded a conclusion t h a t Hubbard, under t h e surrounding cir- cumstances, more than l i k e l y d i d n o t intend t o k i l l M i l l e r when he s h o t b u t only intended t o s t o p and apprehend him. This testimony goes d i r e c t l y t o t h e elements of "purposely o r knowingly" and, thus, should have been admitted. The S t a t e p o i n t s o u t t h a t defendant f a i l e d t o g i v e n o t i c e t o t h e prosecution t h a t he intended t o r e l y on t h e defense of lack of t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind forming an element of t h e crime charged, a s required by s e c t i o n 46-15- 301 ( 2 ) (a), MCA. W e acknowledge defendant's f a i l u r e b u t note t h a t sec- t i o n 46-15-301(2)(a), MCA, w a s amended i n 1979, with t h e amendment taking e f f e c t a f t e r defendant's t r i a l . Subsequent t o t h i s amendment, t h e s e c t i o n provided t h a t n o t i c e is only required i f the defendant intends t o r e l y on the defense of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . See s e c t i o n 95-1803(3) ( a ) , R.C.M. The testimony i n t h i s instance was n o t o f f e r e d t o support an a f f i r m a t i v e defense of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t b u t t o support a general r e b u t t a l t o an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t defendant purposely and knowingly caused t h e death of an- o t h e r . This being t h e case, n o t i c e i s n o t required. Respondent f u r t h e r argues t h a t even i f n o t i c e i s n o t required, t h e s u b j e c t matter of t h e testimony i s n o t proper f o r opinion testimony by an expert. Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid., s e t s f o r t h a two-prong t e s t i n determining t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e use of e x p e r t testimony: (1) Is t h e s u b j e c t matter such t h a t it r e q u i r e s e x p e r t testimony; and ( 2 ) Is t h e p a r t i c u l a r witness q u a l i f i e d as an e x p e r t t o give an opinion i n the p a r t i c u l a r a r e a of h i s testimony? See Commission Comment, Rule 702, M0nt.R.Evi.d. I n regard t o t h e s u b j e c t matter of t h e e x p e r t t e s t i - mony, general g u i d e l i n e s f o r admission w e r e set f o r t h i n Leybold v. Fox Butte Theater Corporation (1936), 103 Mont. ". . . When . . . it can be s a i d a s a matter of law t h a t t h e j u r o r s a r e equally capable of forming an opinion o r can draw, o r be r e a d i l y d i r e c t e d how t o draw, a reasonable inference, then t h e matter i s n o t t h e s u b j e c t of e x p e r t testimony. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. 1 I n o t h e r words, when t h e conclusions t o be drawn from t h e f a c t s s t a t e d a r e within t h e range of or- dinary t r a i n i n g , i n t e l l i g e n c e , and common observation, e x p e r t testimony i s n o t admis- s i b l e . . ." 62 P.2d a t 226. See also Lamb v. Page (1969), 153 Mont. 171, 455 P.2d 337; State v. Campbell (1965), 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978. We are unable to find that identification and descrip- tion of a particular defendant's mental state, at a certain point in time, as effected by surrounding circumstances, clearly lies within the comprehension of laymen as based on common knowledge and expertise. With this being the case as to the determination of a defendant's state of mind at the time of alleged criminal conduct, expert testimony is proper. The subject matter of the testimony being proper for expert testimony, and there being no dispute as to the qualifications of the psychiatrist, the offered testimony was improperly excluded from the jury. Furthermore, such a failure is prejudicial and, therefore, reversible error. To improperly exclude evidence and testimony offered by defen- dant as rebuttal to an essential element of the crime charged denies defendant a full evidentiary hearing and deprives him of his right to a fair trial. See Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297; Jenkins v . McKeithen (1969), 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404, reh. denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 35, 24 L.Ed.2d 123. The fact that we could reach a decision by treatment of a single issue in defendant Hubbard's appeal has no parti- cular significance as to the validity of the remainder of the issues presented to this Court for review by Hubbard. It is the feeling of this Court that, in the event of an- other trial, matters that could not or in all probability would not again occur are better left alone, which serves the best interests of all concerned. The conviction and judgment a g a i n s t defendant Fish i s reversed and the cause dismissed. The conviction and judgment a g a i n s t defendant Hubbard i s reversed and t h e cause remanded t o the D i s t r i c t Court f o r .I a new t r i a l . J u s t i c e d W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e