Title: Fletcher v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1862
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1862 
____________ 
 
THOMAS H. FLETCHER, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
July 7, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Thomas H. Fletcher appeals his judgment of conviction of first-
degree murder and his sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons below, we affirm 
Fletcher’s conviction and sentence of death. 
I. Background 
In September 2018, while serving a life sentence for the 1994 
first-degree murder of Milton Grossman, Fletcher strangled his 
cellmate Kenneth Davis to death in their cell at the Blackwater 
River Correctional Facility.  Fletcher, who confessed to killing Davis 
 
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to a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) special agent 
and in letters he wrote to the trial court, was indicted for first-
degree premeditated murder in March 2019.  As explained in the 
trial court’s sentencing order:  
On August 29, 2019, [Fletcher] pled guilty to first-degree 
murder in open court, which the Court accepted.  At the 
same time, [Fletcher] informed the Court of his decisions 
to waive a penalty phase jury, to not challenge the 
imposition of the death penalty, and to refuse to present 
mitigation, a position that he has consistently 
maintained throughout these proceedings.  The Court 
found that [Fletcher]’s waivers were knowingly and 
voluntarily made and directed the Department of 
Corrections to prepare a comprehensive presentence 
investigation report (PSI) in accordance with Muhammad 
v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363-64 (Fla. 2001).  After 
reviewing the PSI and other mitigating evidence 
submitted by the State and defense counsel, the Court 
appointed special counsel to represent the public interest 
in bringing forth all available mitigation for the Court’s 
benefit . . . . 
 
Following Fletcher’s guilty plea, the case proceeded to a 
penalty phase.  On June 18, 2020, the court confirmed Fletcher’s 
waiver of a penalty-phase jury and his wish for his appointed 
counsel not to present evidence in mitigation.  The State presented 
the testimony of several witnesses and introduced several exhibits 
in support of the following aggravators it sought to establish: (1) 
“capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a 
 
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felony and under a sentence of imprisonment”; (2) Fletcher “was 
previously convicted of another capital felony”; (3) “capital felony 
was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” (HAC); and (4) “capital 
felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification” (CCP). 
Among the State’s witnesses was the FDLE special agent who 
conducted the interview—published in court with no objection—
during which Fletcher confessed, “I did kill Kenny Davis.  I 
strangled him.”  The State also presented testimony from the 
pathologist, who performed Davis’s autopsy, identified possible 
defensive wounds on several parts of Davis’s body, and concluded 
that Davis’s cause of death was manual asphyxiation. 
The State’s exhibits included three letters written by Fletcher 
addressed to various individuals at the Santa Rosa County 
Courthouse confessing to Davis’s murder.  These letters were 
received and read into the record without objection. 
The special counsel, whom the trial court appointed, 
summarized the mitigation contained in the record regarding 
Davis’s murder, including from Department of Corrections (DOC) 
 
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records and an FDLE investigative report.  Special counsel also 
summarized relevant mitigation from Fletcher’s 1995 trial for the 
murder of Milton Grossman in 1994.  Among the evidence 
summarized, special counsel indicated that as a minor Fletcher 
experienced (1) physical and sexual abuse; (2) physical and 
emotional neglect; and (3) drug addiction.  Special counsel also 
noted that, as an inmate, Fletcher regularly tested positive for drugs 
and was suicidal. 
After the State rested, Fletcher elected not to present a closing 
argument and both the State and Fletcher agreed that a Spencer1 
hearing was unnecessary. 
As the trial court explained in the sentencing order, the 
penalty-phase evidence established that: 
[Fletcher] determined that he wanted to escape the hard 
life of prison.  Because he was unable to commit suicide, 
[Fletcher] decided that the easiest way to accomplish his 
“retirement plan” was to kill [Davis] a fellow inmate and 
have the death penalty imposed on him.  [Fletcher] 
accomplished this through careful planning, choking his 
cellmate to death despite his cellmate’s obvious attempts 
to escape death.  [Fletcher] does not lack intelligence or 
an ability to understand the nature of his actions. 
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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The trial court sentenced Fletcher to death for the first-degree 
murder of Davis on November 24, 2020.  In so doing, the trial court 
found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all four 
of its proposed aggravators—under sentence of imprisonment, prior 
violent felony, HAC, and CCP—and assigned great weight to each 
aggravator. 
As for mitigating factors, the trial court found no statutory 
mitigators; however, the trial court found and assigned the noted 
weight to the following ten nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 
proved by the greater weight of the evidence, namely that Fletcher 
was: (1) physically and sexually abused as a child (some weight); (2) 
raised by an alcoholic mother (slight weight); (3) raised in an 
unstable home life (slight weight); (4) protective of his sister who 
was being abused (some weight); (5) a provider for his sister (slight 
weight); (6) exposed to alcohol and illegal drugs at a young age and 
became an addict (some weight); (7) found to possess an artistic 
talent and has demonstrated a desire to develop this ability in the 
past (very slight weight); (8) found to have lost all hope (very slight 
weight); (9) cooperative with law enforcement (very slight weight); 
and (10) respectful and courteous in court (very slight weight). 
 
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As to the sufficiency and weighing findings, the trial court 
found that “sufficient aggravating factors exist to warrant the death 
penalty . . . that the aggravating factors far outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances and that a sentence of death, rather than life, is 
appropriate.” 
Fletcher now appeals. 
II. Analysis 
In this direct appeal, Fletcher argues that the trial court erred 
in sentencing him to death for two reasons: (1) the trial court failed 
to ensure that all available mitigation was developed and presented, 
and (2) the trial court failed to determine beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify death 
and outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  Though not raised 
as an issue, we also review Fletcher’s guilty plea to first-degree 
murder. 
1. Mitigation 
Although Fletcher instructed his appointed counsel not to 
present mitigation below, he now argues on appeal that even 
though the trial court followed the “formalities of a presentence 
investigation report and the appointment of special counsel,” it 
 
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erred in “ensur[ing] that all available mitigation was considered.”  
Because this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, we 
review the trial court’s rulings regarding mitigation for fundamental 
error.  See Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d 45, 56 n.6 (Fla. 2020) 
(explaining that unpreserved errors are reviewed for fundamental 
error). 
We have “repeatedly recognized the right of a competent 
defendant to waive presentation of mitigating evidence.”  Koon v. 
Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. 1993).  However, we have also 
held that a capital defendant’s mitigation waiver “does not eliminate 
the court’s responsibility to consider mitigating evidence in the 
record.”  Bell v. State, 336 So. 3d 211, 217 (Fla. 2022) (citing Sparre 
v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183, 1196 (Fla. 2015)).  And, in cases like 
Fletcher’s where a capital defendant entirely waives the 
presentation of mitigation, we require the trial court to order a 
“comprehensive” PSI that “include[s] information such as previous 
mental health problems (including hospitalizations), school records, 
and relevant family background.”  Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363; 
see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710(b) (adopting the Muhammad 
standard).  We have further left it within the trial court’s discretion 
 
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to appoint special counsel.  See Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 
491 (Fla. 2015) (holding that “[i]f the PSI and the accompanying 
records alert the trial court to the probability of significant 
mitigation, the trial court has the discretion . . . to appoint an 
independent, special counsel”); Robertson v. State, 187 So. 3d 1207, 
1214 (Fla. 2016) (“[A]ppoint[ing] special counsel [is] a matter within 
the court’s discretion.”) (citing Sparre, 164 So. 3d at 1198-99). 
Here, Fletcher argues that special counsel presented outdated 
mitigation from the proceedings related to Fletcher’s 1994 murder 
of Grossman and failed to explore Fletcher’s “drug use and suicidal 
ideation” as it relates to Davis’s murder.  Fletcher faults the trial 
court for failing to order further development of the mitigation 
concerning his adverse childhood experiences and his “drug use 
and suicidal ideation.”  We disagree that fundamental error 
occurred. 
The record shows that, faced with Fletcher’s election not to 
present mitigation, the trial court complied with our precedent.  The 
trial court ordered a comprehensive PSI, which contained required 
information like Fletcher’s “criminal, educational, work, and family 
history” and referenced Fletcher’s prior suicide attempt, 
 
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notwithstanding Fletcher’s refusal to participate in the PSI’s 
preparation.  See Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215 n.7 (finding that even 
though “the PSI was not particularly thorough, it included the type 
of information a comprehensive PSI requires”).  Further, as the 
sentencing order explicitly states, the trial court considered the 
mitigating evidence from the PSI.  See Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d 1204, 
1216-17 (Fla. 2009) (finding that the trial court “consider[ed] the 
PSI report as it was required to do” since the “sentencing order 
specifically states that a PSI was ordered”). 
Moreover, after exercising its discretion to appoint special 
counsel, see Marquardt, 156 So. 3d at 491, the record is also clear 
that the trial court considered the mitigation presented by special 
counsel.  Specifically, in the sentencing order, the trial court stated 
that “most of the mitigation [was] gleaned from special counsel’s 
summary.”  Indeed, over half of the mitigating circumstances found 
by the trial court relate to Fletcher’s traumatic childhood 
experiences, which were documented when Fletcher was an adult in 
connection with Fletcher’s 1994 murder of Grossman.  Additionally, 
special counsel discussed and the trial court explicitly considered 
Fletcher’s drug use in prison and “the fact that [Fletcher] had told 
 
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other inmates that he wanted to die.”  Although Fletcher faults the 
sufficiency of special counsel’s presentation and argues that the 
trial court erred by not requiring special counsel to do more to 
develop mitigation, he does not identify any mitigation that the trial 
court failed to consider.  See Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363 
(“emphasiz[ing] the duty of the trial court to consider all mitigating 
evidence ‘contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is 
believable and uncontroverted’ ”) (quoting Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d 
1368, 1369 (Fla. 1993)); see also Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 102 
(Fla. 2007) (finding that “the appointment of special counsel is 
solely at the discretion of the trial court” and “a defendant has no 
basis for claiming that special counsel’s presentation of mitigation 
evidence was ineffective”).  Furthermore, to the extent Fletcher 
claims fundamental error because the trial court did not appoint 
experts to assist special counsel with developing and presenting 
mitigation, Fletcher’s trial counsel stated that there was “no need 
for [special counsel] to seek to have experts appointed, because the 
defendant simply will not cooperate.” 
 
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Accordingly, because on these facts we find no fundamental 
error in the trial court’s rulings regarding mitigation, Fletcher is not 
entitled to relief. 
2. Sufficiency of Findings 
Fletcher also challenges his death sentence on the ground 
that, in sentencing him to death, the trial court failed to determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors were 
sufficient to justify death and outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances.  However, as Fletcher properly concedes in his 
initial brief, we have repeatedly rejected this argument.  See 
Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2019) (holding that 
sufficiency and weighing determinations “are not subject to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”); see also Craft, 312 
So. 3d at 57 (finding that this Court has “repeatedly” rejected 
arguments that “that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing 
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty”).  As in prior 
cases, we decline in Fletcher’s case to “revisit what has been settled: 
only the existence of a statutory aggravating factor must be found 
 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.”  McKenzie v. State, 333 So. 3d 1098, 
1105 (Fla. 2022). 
3. Guilty Plea 
Finally, we review Fletcher’s guilty plea to first-degree murder.  
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5); Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 121 
(Fla. 2007).  This review requires us “to scrutinize the plea to 
ensure that the defendant [1] was made aware of the consequences 
of his plea, [2] was apprised of the constitutional rights he was 
waiving, and [3] pled guilty voluntarily.”  Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 
956, 965 (Fla. 2002).  Additionally, we “review the relevant factual 
basis for the plea.”  Bell, 336 So. 3d at 218 (citing Doty v. State, 170 
So. 3d 731, 739 (Fla. 2015)). 
 
Here, the record shows that Fletcher knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entered his guilty plea.  First, Fletcher was made 
aware of the consequences of his plea and indicated he understood 
the consequences and the conditions of the plea agreement.  
Second, Fletcher was apprised of the constitutional rights he was 
waiving.  The trial court asked and Fletcher affirmed that he “read 
over the plea agreement” and “underst[ood] all the terms and 
conditions” which stated, among other things, that Fletcher was 
 
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waiving: (1) “the privilege against self-incrimination;” (2) “the right 
to a jury trial;” and (3) “the right to confront [his] accusers.”  
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 n.7 (1993) (explaining that 
three constitutional rights are waived when defendants plead 
guilty).  Third, the trial court asked, and Fletcher confirmed, that he 
pled guilty voluntarily.  Finally, the “factual basis for the plea,” 
which was agreed to by Fletcher, is sufficient to support the first-
degree murder conviction.  Doty, 170 So. 3d at 739. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Fletcher’s first-degree 
murder conviction and sentence of death. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, LAWSON, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from 
 
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proportionality review requirement in death penalty direct appeal 
cases), I can only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County, 
James Scott Duncan, Judge 
Case No. 572019CF000526CFAXMX 
 
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, 
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Jennifer A. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee