Title: State v. Onidas
Citation: 635 S.W.2d 516
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 1982

635 S.W.2d 516 (1982) STATE of Tennessee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John ONIDAS, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson. July 6, 1982. Walker Gwinn, Memphis, for defendant-appellant. Jennifer Small, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee; William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Nashville, of counsel. BROCK, Justice. The defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to serve a term in the penitentiary of not less than five years nor more than five years. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals and we granted review to consider the question whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the prosecutor, over objection of the defendant, to state to prospective jurors that a judge of the city court and the grand jury had already determined that there was probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and that the defendant had committed it. The following excerpt from the transcript presents the issue, to wit: It was stipulated by the State and by the defendant, as reflected in an order entered in this cause by the Court of Criminal Appeals, We have no hesitation in concluding that the quoted statement by the Assistant District Attorney General and the action of the trial court in approving the same by overruling the objection timely made by defendant's counsel was highly improper and constituted error. As Chief Justice Harbison, then serving as a Special Justice of this Court, said in Montesi v. State, 220 Tenn. 354, 417 S.W.2d 554, 560 (1967): In the case at bar, the prospective jurors were not told that grand jury proceedings are ex parte, that the defendant has no opportunity to testify or to present evidence to that body; neither were they told that preliminary examination hearings before a committee magistrate such as the city court judge are often cursory in nature at which the defendant, upon advice of counsel, for strategy reasons often does not participate or offer evidence. Defendant's counsel argues forcefully in this Court that the natural and probable effect of the misleading statements of the Assistant District Attorney were to effectively deprive the defendant of the benefit of the presumption of innocence to which he was entitled at the beginning of his trial and throughout the proceedings until the jury's verdict was reported. The prosecutor's statements to the prospective jurors were misleading and were calculated to create bias in the minds of the jurors against the defendant's cause. In Smith v. State, 205 Tenn. 502, 524-524, 327 S.W.2d 308, 318 (1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 930, 80 S. Ct. 372, 4 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1960), this Court made the following observation which we approve: It is a perversion of the voir dire examination for counsel for either party to attempt to create bias and prejudice in the minds of the jurors. The question remains whether or not the error is one which properly requires a reversal of the conviction. We conclude that it is. Rule 36(b), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: In a comment accompanying this rule, the Advisory Commission states, in part: Without determining whether or not the error in question "more probably than not affected the judgment" we are satisfied that it did result in prejudice to the judicial process, thereby requiring a reversal of the judgment. In our opinion, the error was calculated to prejudice the decision maker against the defendant. See, Sparks v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 563 S.W.2d 564 (1978). The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and that of the trial court are reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Costs are assessed against the State. HARBISON, C.J., and FONES, COOPER and DROWOTA, JJ., concur.