Title: Oliver v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 289, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DION OLIVER,
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No. 289, 2000
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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in and for New Castle County
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ID #9802012783
Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: July 10, 2001
Decided: August 21, 2001
Before WALSH, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 21st day of August, 2001, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
appears to the Court that:
1) Dion Oliver appeals from his convictions, following a jury trial, of
trafficking cocaine, possession with intent to deliver, maintaining a vehicle, resisting
arrest, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession with
intent to deliver marijuana, 2 counts of reckless endangering second degree, driving
without a valid license and driving without insurance.  He argues that: (i) the State
violated Oliver’s constitutional rights by striking two African-American prospective
jurors because of their race; (ii) the prosecutor’s improper comments during rebuttal
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summation were so prejudicial as to require a mistrial; (iii) the trial court erred in
admitting hearsay evidence concerning the reason for the police stop; and (iv) the
trial court erred in sentencing Oliver as an adult on all but one count of the
indictment.
2) In February 1998, Wilmington Police Detective Liam Sullivan and FBI
Special Agent Gordon Cobb were watching a home on Henderson Drive in
Wilmington, Delaware.  They had been tipped that Oliver, Abraham Farnum, and
Galen Collins were carrying a large quantity of drugs and that they would be found
at the Henderson Drive home.  The officers saw the three men leave the home and
get into a green Buick Riviera.  Oliver drove, Collins sat in the front passenger seat,
and Farnum sat in the back.
3) After following the car for a short distance,  Sullivan and Cobb coordinated
with other police units and conducted a “felony stop.”  An unmarked police car
pulled in front of the Riviera and two plainclothes detectives jumped out with guns
drawn. At the same time, Sullivan and Cobb pulled behind the Riviera in their
unmarked Ford Explorer.  Sullivan and Cobb were not in uniform, but they had used
their siren and flashing lights and they identified themselves as police officers as
soon as they got out of the Explorer.
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4) The two officers saw the Riviera’s tail lights go on and dove back into the
Explorer right before the Riviera backed into it.  Oliver continued driving in reverse
for a short distance until the Riviera hit a telephone pole.  Oliver and his co-
defendants jumped out of the car and started running in opposite directions. Oliver
and Farnum were apprehended quickly.  Collins was found later in Connecticut.
5) The officers searched the Riviera and found a brown paper bag containing
450 grams of crack cocaine and a loaded handgun on the rear floorboard behind the
driver’s seat.  When Oliver was taken into custody and searched, the police
discovered 16 bags of marijuana in his pants pocket.  In a subsequent search of
Oliver’s house, however, the police found no contraband or other evidence.
6) Oliver claims that he was denied equal protection under the State and
Federal Constitutions because the State challenged a juror on the basis of race.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Dixon v. State, Del. Supr., 673 A.2d 1220
(1996).  The three co-defendants in this case were African-American, and the State
used peremptory challenges to excuse two African-Americans, Cassandra Butler and
William Graves.  Oliver does not contest the State’s explanation for its challenge of
Butler –  she believed that the police had planted drugs on her brother many years
earlier.  As to Graves, the State said that it challenged him because he did not fill out
any information about himself on the Jury Services form. 
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7) Although the State did not accept Oliver’s suggestion that Graves be asked
to provide the missing personal information, we are satisfied that the State’s
explanation was race-neutral and credible in light of the fact that there were three
African-Americans on the jury, as eventually chosen.  Accordingly, we find no
constitutional violation.
8) Oliver next argues that the prosecutor’s egregious remarks during rebuttal
summation warrant a new trial.  The prosecutor told the jury that this case was about
the Constitution – the right to trial by jury; the right to remain silent; the right to be
presumed innocent; and the right to confront witnesses.  Then the prosecutor said,
“We would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that one of the requirements, one
of the privileges that you, anybody must do in order to enjoy these constitutional
rights is to respect the law.”  Oliver immediately objected and requested a mistrial,
but the Superior Court only instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s
comments.
9) Oliver is correct that the prosecutor’s comments were improper.  But the
jury was instructed to disregard them; the comments were not central to the issues
in the case; and the case was not particularly close.  As a result, we conclude that
it was not error to deny Oliver’s motion for a mistrial.  Hughes v. State, Del. Supr.,
437 A.2d 559 (1981).
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10) Next, Oliver argues that Sullivan should not have been permitted to testify
about the information that led him and Cobb to be watching the house on Henderson
Drive.  The informant did not testify and Oliver, therefore, was unable to cross-
examine on that subject.  In Caldwell v. State, Del. Supr., 770 A.2d 522 (2001), this
Court reversed a drug conviction in a case where  police officers testified about
information they received from another officer, who was not a witness, to the effect
that the defendant probably had been involved in drug dealing.  The prosecutor in
Caldwell also vouched for the absent police officer in his opening statement, and the
only “curative” instruction was a general admonition that an attorney’s statement is
not evidence.
11) This case is distinguishable.  First, the hearsay statement was not
particularly informative or prejudicial.  Sullivan merely explained that he was
watching the house because of information he had received.  Sullivan did not say that
Oliver or any of his co-defendants were suspected drug dealers.  Second, the
prosecutor did not compound the problem by including the hearsay in his opening
statement.  Finally, the Superior Court instructed the jury that it could not consider
Sullivan’s testimony as evidence that the three co-defendants were in the Henderson
Drive house.  We are satisfied that the testimony about Sullivan’s informant was
admissible for the purpose of explaining why Sullivan was watching the house, and
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that the jury was properly instructed on the limited purpose for which it was
introduced.
12) Finally, Oliver argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as an
adult on all of the counts except possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony.  Oliver was 17 years old when he committed the offenses.  He concedes
that, under 11 Del.C. § 1447A(e), it was appropriate to be tried and sentenced as an
adult for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  He also
acknowledges that, under 10 Del.C. § 921(16), it was appropriate to join the
companion charges in Superior Court.  Nonetheless, he argues that he should not
have been sentenced as an adult on the companion charges and he should not have
been subjected to the minimum mandatory sentence for trafficking cocaine.  The
Superior Court carefully considered these arguments and rejected them.  We affirm
on the basis of the Superior Court’s decision. State v. Oliver, Del. Super.,
ID#98020127783, Quillen, J. (May 2, 2000).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice