Title: Meehan v. Medical Information Technology, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13117
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2021

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SJC-13117 
TERENCE MEEHAN  vs.  MEDICAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.1 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 1, 2021. - December 17, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Employment, Termination, Records.  Public Policy.  Practice, 
Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 11, 2019. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Diane C. Freniere, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Robert S. Mantell (James A. Kobe also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Scott J. Brewerton for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Gavriela M. Bogin-Farber for Massachusetts Employment 
Lawyers Association & others. 
 
James P. McKenna for Pioneer Institute. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, David C. Kravitz, Deputy 
State Solicitor, & Alex Sugerman-Brozan, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the Attorney General. 
 
 
 
1 Doing business as Meditech.  
2 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The issue presented in this case is whether an 
employer can terminate an at-will employee simply for exercising 
the right to file a rebuttal to be included in his personnel 
file as provided by G. L. c. 149, § 52C.  We conclude that such 
a termination would violate the public policy exception to at-
will employment.  We therefore reverse the decision of the 
Superior Court allowing the motion, filed by the employer, 
Medical Information Technology, Inc. (Meditech), to dismiss the 
complaint brought by the plaintiff, Terence Meehan.2 
Background.  The facts are drawn from the complaint and, 
along with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
them, are assumed to be true for purposes of a motion to 
dismiss.  See Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 
676 (2011).  In November of 2010, Meehan began working for 
Meditech as a sales representative.  In 2017, Meditech undertook 
a revision of its then twelve-person regional sales department, 
keeping nine employees as sales representatives and moving 
three, including Meehan, to a newly created "sales specialist" 
position.  The sales specialist position greatly changed 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General; the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the Fair 
Employment Project, GLBTQ Advocates and Defenders, and the 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute; and by the Pioneer 
Institute. 
3 
 
Meehan's job responsibilities, and his ability to earn 
commissions was significantly diminished by this change.  
According to Meehan, the structure of the sales specialist role 
created little incentive for those leading sales efforts to 
utilize sales specialists, and even if they did so, the 
potential for sales specialists to earn commission income was 
quite limited. 
Early in July of 2018, Meehan and the other two sales 
specialists were placed on "performance improvement plans" 
(PIPs).  Approximately two weeks later, on July 17, 2018, Meehan 
sent his supervisor a lengthy rebuttal to having been placed on 
a PIP.  Members of Meditech's management team met that same day 
to discuss his rebuttal.3  The president and chief executive 
officer of Meditech decided that Meehan's employment should be 
terminated immediately.  On the day of the meeting, Meehan's 
employment was terminated.  In October of 2018, the PIP 
requirements for the other two sales specialists were 
discontinued with one or both of them being told that the PIP 
was "wrong" by a Meditech representative.   
 
3 Also raised at the meeting was a three week old 
confrontation between Meehan and another employee, where Meehan 
allegedly called the other employee a "maggot" in response to a 
political disagreement.  That employee, when asked by 
management, chose not to pursue the matter further.  For 
purposes of the motion to dismiss, we accept the defendant's 
contention that he was fired because of the rebuttal. 
4 
 
After obtaining an attorney, Meehan protested his 
termination to Meditech.  Meehan thereafter filed a one-count 
complaint in the Superior Court alleging wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy.  A Superior Court judge allowed 
Meditech's motion to dismiss.  The motion judge recognized that 
Meehan had a statutory right pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 52C, to 
submit a rebuttal; the judge nonetheless ruled that the right to 
submit a rebuttal was "not a sufficiently important public 
policy" to support Meehan's claim for wrongful discharge because 
it merely "involves matters internal to an employer's 
operation."  She also concluded that if any employee who 
submitted a written statement disagreeing with any information 
contained in a personnel record was protected from termination, 
this would convert the at-will employment rule into one for just 
cause. 
In a split decision, with an expanded panel, the Appeals 
Court affirmed the decision allowing the motion to dismiss.  
Meehan v. Medical Info. Tech., Inc., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 96, 
100 (2021).  We granted Meehan's application for further 
appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review the 
allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo" (citation omitted).  
Magliacane v. Gardner, 483 Mass. 842, 848 (2020).  For the 
purposes of Meditech's motion, "we accept as true the 
5 
 
allegations in the complaint and draw every reasonable inference 
in favor of the plaintiff."  Suburban Home Health Care, Inc. v. 
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., Office of Medicaid, 
488 Mass. 347, 351 (2021).   
2.  The public policy exception to employment at will.  In 
general, "employment at will can be terminated for any reason or 
for no reason."  Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 433 Mass. 465, 
478 (2001).  Massachusetts courts have, however, recognized 
limited exceptions to the general rule, when "employment is 
terminated contrary to a well-defined public policy."  Wright v. 
Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 472 (1992).  
In carving out these exceptions, the court has emphasized that 
the public policy exception should be narrowly construed to 
avoid converting the general at-will rule into "a rule that 
requires just cause to terminate an at-will employee."  King v. 
Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 582 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1 (1996), 
quoting Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald 
State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 150 (1989). 
More specifically, the public policy exception to at-will 
employment has been recognized "for asserting a legally 
guaranteed right (e.g., filing a worker's compensation claim), 
for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), or 
for refusing to do that which the law forbids (e.g., committing 
perjury)" (emphasis added).  Smith-Pfeffer, 404 Mass. at 149-
6 
 
150.  See DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 398 Mass. 205, 209-210 
(1986) (public policy protected employee from wrongful 
termination where employee refused to heed employer's 
instructions to give false testimony).  In addition to these 
three categories, this court subsequently created a fourth 
category to protect those "performing important public deeds, 
even though the law does not absolutely require the performance 
of such a deed."  Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 
Mass. 805, 810-811 (1991).  Such deeds include, for example, 
cooperating with an ongoing criminal investigation.  Id. 
The court has also stated that "the internal 
administration, policy, functioning, and other matters of an 
organization cannot be the basis for a public policy exception 
to the general rule that at-will employees are terminable at any 
time with or without cause."  King, 418 Mass. at 583 (employee 
not wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy where he 
participated in shareholder derivative action).  As a further 
illustration of this point, in Wright, 412 Mass. at 474, a 
plaintiff nurse reported internal problems to high-level 
hospital officials and thereafter was terminated.  This court 
determined that because the nurse's reports concerned the 
organization's internal matters, there was no basis for a public 
policy exception to the at-will termination rule.  Id. at 475.  
See Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758 (1997) (no 
7 
 
liability for discharge stemming from employer requiring 
employee to work overtime, even though such schedule interfered 
with employee's childcare responsibilities); Mello v. Stop & 
Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 558 n.3, 560-561 (1988) (no public 
policy violated where employee fired for reporting noncriminal 
wrongdoing by other employees). 
In determining whether to create a common-law public policy 
exception to employment at will, we must also consider whether 
the Legislature has prescribed a remedy for the public policy 
violation at issue, including a remedy for a discharge of the 
employee for exercising that right.  See Osborne-Trussell v. 
Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 265 (2021); Mello, 402 
Mass. at 557.  This is particularly true when the legally 
guaranteed right that has been exercised is defined by statute, 
as it is in the instant case. 
With these general principles in mind, we turn to the 
specific public policy at issue. 
3.  General Laws c. 149, § 52C.  The plaintiff alleges 
that, by filing the rebuttal, he was exercising a statutory 
right under G. L. c. 149, § 52C. The statute provides:  
"An employer shall notify an employee within [ten] days of 
the employer placing in the employee's personnel record any 
information . . . that . . . negatively affect[s] the 
employee's qualification for employment, promotion, 
transfer, additional compensation or the possibility that 
the employee will be subject to disciplinary action. . . . 
 
8 
 
"If there is a disagreement with any information contained 
in a personnel record, removal or correction of such 
information may be mutually agreed upon by the employer and 
the employee.  If an agreement is not reached, the employee 
may submit a written statement explaining the employee's 
position which shall thereupon be contained therein and 
shall become a part of such employee's personnel 
record. . . . 
 
". . . 
 
"Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than [$500] nor more than 
[$2,500].  This section shall be enforced by the attorney 
general." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 52C.  There is also a records retentions 
provision in the statute: 
"An employer of twenty or more employees shall retain the 
complete personnel record of an employee as required to be 
kept under this section without deletions or expungement of 
information from the date of employment of such employee to 
a date three years after the termination of employment by 
the employee with such employer.  In any cause of action 
brought by an employee against such employer of twenty or 
more employees in any administrative or judicial 
proceeding, including but not limited to, the Massachusetts 
Office of Affirmative Action, the Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination, Massachusetts Civil Service 
Commission, Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, 
attorney general, or a court of appropriate jurisdiction, 
such employer shall retain any personnel record required to 
be kept under this section which is relevant to such action 
until the final disposition thereof."  
  
Id.  Thus, G. L. c. 149, § 52C, is designed, in part, to create 
a complete and reliable record of an employee's tenure that is 
available for introduction as admissible evidence under the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule in any resulting 
9 
 
litigation that may arise.  See id.; Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A) 
(2021).  
4.  Whether termination of employment for a violation of 
G. L. c. 149, § 52C, constitutes a public policy exception to 
at-will employment.  We conclude that the statutory right of 
rebuttal provided in G. L. c. 149, § 52C, is a legally 
guaranteed right of employment, and therefore, termination from 
employment for the exercise of this legally guaranteed right 
fits within the first public policy exception to employment at 
will defined by our case law.  See Mello, 402 Mass. at 557 ("A 
basis for a common law rule of liability can easily be found 
when the Legislature has expressed a policy position concerning 
the rights of employees and an employer discharges an at-will 
employee in violation of that established policy, unless no 
common law rule is needed because the Legislature has also 
prescribed a statutory remedy").  See also Smith-Pfeffer, 404 
Mass. at 149 (providing public policy protection against 
discharge for assertion of "legally guaranteed right"). 
When addressing the discharge of an employee for the 
exercise of an employment right defined by statute, we do not, 
as the motion judge and Appeals Court did here, decide whether 
the right is important or relates only to internal matters.  See 
Meehan, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 98-100.  In enacting the statutory 
employment right, the Legislature has already made both 
10 
 
determinations, concluding that the right is a matter of public 
significance.4 
It is primarily in the fourth category, when we are seeking 
to identify a public policy that has not been already recognized 
in the law, that we consider how important the policy is, and 
whether it relates primarily to internal affairs.  Flesner, 410 
Mass. at 810-811 ("We think that the reasons for imposing 
liability in the [three] categories of cases set forth in Smith-
Pfeffer also justify legal redress in certain circumstances for 
employees terminated for performing important public deeds, even 
though the law does not absolutely require the performance of 
such a deed").  In this context, where there has been no 
legislative recognition of the right, an examination of the 
importance and public nature of the policy at issue in the 
discharge of the at-will employee is necessary to determine 
whether it merits protection.5 
 
4 As an employment right, it also obviously fully applies in 
the workplace. 
 
5 In extending this importance and internal affairs analysis 
to the instant case, the motion judge and the Appeals Court 
primarily relied on our decision in King, 418 Mass. 576.  See 
Meehan, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 96-99 & n.4.  In King, 418 Mass. at 
577-578, a vice-president of a closely held corporation was 
fired after bringing a shareholder derivative suit against his 
own employer regarding the corporation's stock buyback price.  
Although King did involve a statutory right, and we did discuss 
its importance, it was not a right of employment, nor one that 
had been expressly connected to employment.  Id. at 584-585.  
 
11 
 
Finally, even if we had to decide whether the right of 
rebuttal was important, we would so conclude here.  The right of 
rebuttal and accuracy of information in personnel files are 
important for employees, and not just in relation to their 
ability to earn a living with their current employer, but also 
to protect the ability of employees to seek other employment, 
and to enable other employers to make informed decisions about 
hiring them, thereby preventing terminated employees from 
becoming public charges.  See Meehan, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 103 
(Henry, J., dissenting) (General Laws c. 149, § 52C "serves an 
important public policy by ensuring that when employees choose 
or are to seek different employment, they can be fairly 
evaluated by potential new employers.  In essence, the statute 
makes labor markets work more fairly by making . . . more 
balanced[] information available to potential employers").  The 
right of rebuttal may also be important for evaluating 
 
Cf. Mello, 402 Mass. at 557 n.2 (listing statutes where 
Legislature has expressed policy position concerning rights of 
employees).  The court in King, supra at 584, also did explain, 
albeit confusingly, that "[f]or the exercise of a statutory 
right to be worthy of protection in this area we believe that 
the statutory right must relate to or arise from the employee's 
status as an employee, not as a shareholder."   The court then 
went on to conclude that "[t]he exercise of the right to file a 
derivative action arose from King's status as a shareholder."  
Id. at 584-585.  It is this point, not the importance or 
unimportance of the statutory right at issue, that should be 
understood as the basis of the King decision.  We emphasize that 
respect for the legislative branch makes any discussion of the 
unimportance of a statutory right highly problematic. 
12 
 
compliance with the laws of the Commonwealth, including those 
governing the terms and conditions of employment, such as 
workplace safety, the timely payment of wages, and the 
prevention of discrimination, and nonemployment-related 
activity, such as those governing the environment and the 
economy.  See note 7, infra.  The records retention provision of 
the statute confirms the additional purposes that documentation 
of personnel records, including rebuttal, may serve.  See G. L. 
c. 149, § 52C.     
Having concluded that there is a public policy employment 
right recognized by statute, we proceed to the question whether 
the remedy for discharge of the employee for exercising this 
statutory right of employment is already provided by statute or 
requires further common-law protection.   
"Of course, a statute itself may provide that an employer 
may not terminate an employee for exercising rights conferred by 
the statute, and in such a case, the common law public policy 
exception is not called into play."  King, 418 Mass. at 584 n.7.  
See Mello, 402 Mass. at 557 & n.2.  See also Osborne-Trussell, 
488 Mass. at 265.  Where the Legislature has provided a remedy 
for the statutory violation but not a remedy for discharge from 
employment for its exercise, the analysis is more difficult.  In 
these circumstances we must discern whether the statutory remedy 
is meant to be comprehensive, or whether there is a gap to be 
13 
 
filled by common-law protection.  Cf. Upton, 425 Mass. at 759 
("The Legislature has directed that unemployment compensation 
should be available to [a person unable to work extended hours 
due to childcare responsibilities], but it has not provided that 
such an employee has an action for wrongful discharge"); Melley 
v. Gillette Corp., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 513 (1985), S.C., 397 
Mass. 1004 (1986) (where employee sought to bring wrongful 
discharge claim for age discrimination, court stated "that 
where, as here, there is a comprehensive remedial statute 
[protecting against age discrimination in the workplace], the 
creation of a new common law action based on the public policy 
expressed in that statute would interfere with that remedial 
scheme"). 
In the instant case, the Legislature has provided a limited 
remedy for violations of the act:  a fine of not less than $500 
nor more than $2,500, to be enforced by the Attorney General.  
G. L. c. 149, § 52C.  The statute does not address termination 
or retaliation for exercise of the right itself.  Given the 
limited nature of the remedy, the absence of any discussion of 
termination, and the lack of a private enforcement mechanism, 
the Legislature does not appear to have considered the 
possibility of an employer simply terminating an employee for 
exercising the right of rebuttal.  Indeed, such a response would 
appear to be sticking a finger in the eye of the Legislature.  
14 
 
It would also empower any employer who so desired to essentially 
negate the important policies served by the right of rebuttal.  
We conclude that the Legislature would not have permitted such a 
flouting of its authority, had it contemplated the possibility.6  
Thus, we hold that recognizing a common-law wrongful discharge 
action for the termination of an at-will employee for exercising 
the statutory right of rebuttal would complement the remedial 
scheme.   
We also disagree with the motion judge and the Appeals 
Court that recognizing this right would provide just cause 
protection for at-will employees or transform the courts into 
"super personnel departments, assessing the merits -- or even 
the rationality -- of employers' . . . business decisions."  
Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 56 (2005), 
quoting Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992).  See Meehan, 99 
Mass App. Ct. at 98-99.  The employer remains free to terminate 
the employee for any reason or no reason so long as the employer 
does not terminate the employee for filing the rebuttal itself.  
The rebuttal merely memorializes the employee's position 
regarding the issue in dispute; it does not provide any 
 
6 A review of the legislative history reveals no draft bills 
or discussion addressing termination from employment for 
exercising the right of rebuttal.  
15 
 
additional rights.7  If the employer decides it prefers someone 
else in the job, the employer remains free to terminate the 
employee, regardless of the rebuttal.  For example, if an 
employee had an attendance problem, was disciplined for it, and 
filed a rebuttal, the rebuttal would not in any way shield the 
employee from being disciplined or fired for lack of attendance.  
If the absenteeism continued, the employee could be terminated 
from employment, regardless of the rebuttal.8 
Finally, we provide some precautionary guidance on the 
obvious issue left unresolved by the unusual factual posture of 
 
7 This record may of course be relevant when an employee 
claims that termination was the result of exercising a different 
protected right, including the right not to be discharged for a 
discriminatory reason, such as race, age, or sex, and the 
question whether the reasons provided by the employer were 
pretextual has been raised.  See, e.g., Bulwer v.  Mount Auburn 
Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 684-685 (2016) (jury could have concluded 
that negative evaluations were pretextual or biased based on 
other, contradictory evaluations in personnel file); Abramian v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 111 
(2000) ("the jury could have found that the incident reports 
were false and were entered into [the employee's] file without 
his knowledge").  That is an express purpose underlying the 
right of rebuttal and the records retention requirement in the 
statute.  See G. L. c. 149, § 52C (requiring employers to keep 
personnel records for period of three years after employee's 
termination, or until final disposition of administrative or 
judicial claim). 
 
8 If, however, the employer had given the employee a warning 
or a short suspension for being late, and then without further 
attendance problems, when the employer receives the rebuttal, 
the employer terminates the employee, the issue whether the 
filing of the rebuttal was the cause of termination is 
presented.  This is analogous to the facts of the instant case.   
16 
 
this case.  In filing his motion to dismiss, the plaintiff did 
not attach a copy of his rebuttal to his complaint or allege its 
contents.  For purposes of the motion to dismiss, we must 
therefore accept that he was fired for merely filing the 
rebuttal as opposed to what he wrote in the rebuttal.  As the 
issue of termination of an employee for what is written in the 
rebuttal may very well arise on remand, and will most certainly 
arise in subsequent cases, we briefly address this issue as 
well, leaving further line drawing in this area to future cases. 
As explained above, the express purpose of the rebuttal 
provision is to give employees an opportunity to respond to 
information in their personnel files that "has been used or may 
be used . . . to negatively affect" them.  G. L. c. 149, § 52C.  
The rebuttal provision itself only applies when there is 
"disagreement" on the content of the file that the parties 
cannot mutually resolve.  Id. 
As such, the rebuttal may be expected to involve disputed, 
contentious subjects and vehement disagreement.  In this 
context, where emotions inevitably run high, the exercise and 
expression of the right of rebuttal should not be grounds for 
termination when it is directed at "explaining the employee's 
position" regarding the "disagreement with . . . information 
contained in [the] personnel record," G. L. c. 149, § 52C, no 
matter how intemperate and contentious the expression in the 
17 
 
rebuttal.  Cf. Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 
170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 
1146 (2000) (antiretaliation clause for participation in 
employment discrimination administrative proceedings "ensure[s] 
not only that employers cannot intimidate their employees into 
foregoing the [federally prescribed] grievance process, but also 
that investigators will have access to the unchilled testimony 
of witnesses"); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 
695 (9th Cir. 1978) (narrow interpretation of right to bring 
informal, internal grievances "would not only chill the 
legitimate assertion of employee rights under [Federal law] but 
would tend to force employees to file formal charges rather than 
seek conciliation or informal adjustment of grievances").  Such 
protection from termination, of course, does not extend to 
threats of personal violence, abuse, or similarly egregious 
responses if they are included in the rebuttal.  Egei v. 
Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 81, 91 (D.D.C. 2016) (protection may 
not extend to employee who "threatens another participant during 
the course of" protected activity).  
Conclusion.  Termination of an at-will employee simply for 
filing a rebuttal expressly authorized by G. L. c. 149, § 52C, 
constitutes a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  
We therefore reverse the Superior Court's order allowing the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, and the matter is remanded to the 
18 
 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.