Title: Schneider v. Attorney General
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13609 &amp; 13610
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2024

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SJC-13609 
SJC-13610 
 
JOHN SCHNEIDER & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & another.2 
 
MAX PAGE & others3  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & another.4 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 22, 2024. - June 27, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, 
& Wolohojian, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition.  Attorney 
General.  Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System 
Examination. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2024. 
 
The case was reported by Wolohojian, J. 
 
 
 
 
1 Sixty-eight registered voters of the Commonwealth.  We 
refer to Schneider and the additional sixty-eight voters in case 
no. SJC-13609 collectively as the Schneider plaintiffs. 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth.  
 
3 Sixty-five registered voters of the Commonwealth.  We 
refer to Page and the additional sixty-five voters in case no. 
SJC-13610 collectively as the Page plaintiffs. 
 
4 Secretary of the Commonwealth.  
 
2 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 9, 2024. 
 
The case was reported by Wolohojian, J. 
 
 
 
The cases were submitted on briefs. 
 
Henry C. Dinger for John Scneider & others. 
 
Sarah K. Grossnickle, of Maine, & Thomas O. Bean for Max 
Page & others. 
 
Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, Anne Sterman & 
Phoebe Fischer-Groban, Assistant Attorneys General, for the 
defendants. 
 
Frank J. Bailey, John C. La Liberte, & Nicholas M. 
O'Donnell, for Pioneer Public Interest Law Center & others, 
amici curiae. 
 
 
WOLOHOJIAN, J.  The plaintiffs in these paired cases 
challenge, pursuant to G. L. c. 54, § 53, the title and one-
sentence "yes/no" statements prepared by the Attorney General 
and the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) with respect 
to Initiative Petition 23-36, "A Law Requiring that Districts 
Certify that Students Have Mastered the Skills, Competencies and 
Knowledge of the State Standards as a Replacement for the MCAS 
Graduation Requirement" (petition).  Although they give 
different reasons, both sets of plaintiffs argue that the title 
and the one-sentence statements are "false, misleading or 
inconsistent with the requirements of" § 53, and ask that we 
 
3 
amend them.  We conclude that the title and one-sentence 
statements satisfy § 53, and accordingly deny the relief sought.5   
Background.6  Under our existing law, students attending 
public schools and students educated with State funds must 
satisfy a "competency determination" as a condition for high 
school graduation.  See G. L. c. 69, § 1D (i); Student No. 9 v. 
Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 758 (2004).  Competency, in turn, 
is measured by a student's performance on what are known as the 
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) tests.  See 
G. L. c. 69, §§ 1D (i), 1I; 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.03 (2022).   
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Pioneer 
Interest Law Center, Michael Contompasis, and James A. 
Caradonio. 
 
 
6 The Page plaintiffs and Schneider plaintiffs filed their 
complaints in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County on 
May 9 and 16, 2024, respectively.  A single justice paired, 
reserved, and reported the two cases for consideration by the 
full court. 
 
 
Both complaints were timely filed within twenty days of 
publication of the title and one-sentence statements, which did 
not occur until April 26, 2024.  See G. L. c. 54, § 53.  
"[B]ecause we make every effort to resolve ballot cases before 
the voter information guide and ballots are sent for printing in 
early July," Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 671-672 
(2016), we find ourselves once again put in the undesirable 
position of deciding a § 53 challenge at the "proverbial 
eleventh hour."  See id.  We reiterate our request that the 
Attorney General and Secretary "consider preparing and 
publishing the title and one-sentence statements under § 53 no 
later than twenty days in advance of February 1 of the election 
year" so that "challenges brought under the statute [can] 
proceed in the normal course, at a more orderly pace, and not, 
as here, at the proverbial eleventh hour."  Id. 
 
4 
The one-paragraph petition proposes redefining competency 
by ending MCAS tests as the relevant measure and, instead, 
requiring a student to 
"satisfactorily complet[e] coursework that has been 
certified by the student's district as showing mastery of 
the skills, competencies, and knowledge contained in the 
state academic standards and curriculum frameworks in the 
areas measured by the MCAS high school tests . . . , and in 
any additional areas determined by the board." 
 
Pursuant to art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, the Attorney General certified the petition and 
prepared the following summary of its provisions: 
"This proposed law would eliminate the requirement that a 
student pass the [MCAS] tests (or other statewide or 
district-wide assessments) in mathematics, science and 
technology, and English in order to receive a high school 
diploma.  Instead, in order for a student to receive a high 
school diploma, the proposed law would require the student 
to complete coursework certified by the student's district 
as demonstrating mastery of the competencies contained in 
the state academic standards in mathematics, science and 
technology, and English, as well as any additional areas 
determined by the Board of Elementary and Secondary 
Education." 
 
No one (whether the plaintiffs here or any other set of voters) 
has challenged either the Attorney General's certification or 
her summary. 
Thereafter, the Attorney General and Secretary published in 
the Massachusetts Register the ballot question title and one-
sentence statements that are at issue in this case.  They state 
as follows:   
 
5 
Title:  "Elimination of MCAS as High School Graduation 
Requirement."   
 
 
"Yes" one-sentence statement:  "A YES VOTE would eliminate 
the requirement that students pass the [MCAS] in order to 
graduate high school but still require students to complete 
coursework that meets state standards." 
 
"No" one-sentence statement:  "A NO VOTE would make no 
change in the law relative to the requirement that a 
student pass the MCAS in order to graduate high school." 
 
The one-sentence statements are slated to appear on the November 
Statewide election ballot together with the petition and the 
Attorney General's summary.  See G. L. c. 54, § 42A.  They will 
also appear, together with the title, petition, summary, and 
other information, in the Information for Voters guide mailed to 
voters.  See G. L. c. 54, §§ 53, 54.   
Discussion.  General Laws c. 54, § 53, in relevant part, 
instructs the Attorney General and Secretary to prepare jointly 
"a ballot question title" and "fair and neutral [one]-sentence 
statements describing the effect of a yes or no vote."  Section 
53 allows any fifty voters to file a petition seeking to have 
the title or statements be amended.  G. L. c. 54, § 53.  
However, such relief will be granted "only if it is clear" that 
the title or one-sentence statements are "false," "misleading," 
or otherwise "inconsistent with the requirements of [§ 53]".  
Id.  "[W]e afford deference to 'the Attorney General's and the 
Secretary['s] reasonable judgments in deciding what to include 
in the [title and the] one-sentence statements."  Anderson v. 
 
6 
Attorney Gen., 490 Mass. 26, 34 (2022), quoting Dunn v. Attorney 
Gen., 474 Mass. 675, 688 n.12 (2016).  "Such deference is 
entirely appropriate, given the challenge of creating a title 
that fairly characterizes a sometimes complex petition and of 
drafting a single sentence that fairly and neutrally describes 
the consequence of a 'yes' or 'no' vote regarding such a 
petition."  Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 668 (2016).   
The crux of the arguments advanced by both sets of 
plaintiffs is that the title and one-sentence statements are 
misleading because they are incomplete.  The Page plaintiffs 
argue that the title and one-sentence "yes" statement are 
misleadingly incomplete because they mention only that the 
petition will eliminate MCAS as a graduation requirement, 
without also stating that MCAS would be replaced with something 
else.  They accordingly ask that we make the amendments set out 
in the margin.7  The Schneider plaintiffs assert that the title 
and one-sentence statements are misleadingly incomplete because, 
by referencing only the elimination of MCAS as a graduation 
 
 
7 The Page plaintiffs ask us to substitute the term 
"elimination" with the term "replacement" in the title and to 
amend the one-sentence "yes" statement to be as follows:  "A YES 
VOTE would require that for a student to graduate high school, 
the school district must determine that the student 
satisfactorily completed coursework certified by the district as 
demonstrating mastery of state curriculum standards instead of 
passing the MCAS." 
    
 
7 
requirement, they do not disclose that the petition would 
prohibit the use of any uniform Statewide assessment as a 
graduation requirement.  The Schneider plaintiffs' proposed 
amendments also appear in the margin.8 
We assess these arguments keeping in mind that the title 
and the one-sentence statements generally "'cannot, and should 
not, attempt to describe all the elements of a proposed measure' 
because 'that would undermine their usefulness as a shorthand 
reference for voters'" (alteration omitted).  Anderson, 490 
Mass. at 34, quoting Dunn, 474 Mass. at 688 n.12.  Instead, they 
are designed to be concise, and "conciseness and completeness 
are often incompatible."  Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
320 Mass. 230, 243 (1946).  In determining whether a title or 
one-sentence statement is misleadingly incomplete, we consider 
it "in the context of the other information that will be 
furnished to voters in the information guide prepared by the 
Secretary and on the ballot."  Hensley, 474 Mass. at 669.  An 
incomplete title or one-sentence statement is clearly misleading 
only where, in the context of other information provided to 
voters, its incompleteness results in a significant 
 
 
8 The Schneider plaintiffs ask us to substitute the term 
"MCAS" with "any uniform statewide assessment" in both the title 
and one-sentence statements.  
  
 
8 
mischaracterization of the petition's substance.  See, e.g., id. 
at 668-669.   
Here, the short petition addresses a single regulatory 
issue (high school graduation requirements), and the title and 
one-sentence statements accurately characterize what the 
petition proposes to do (eliminate MCAS tests as a graduation 
requirement).  It is true, as the plaintiffs point out, that the 
petition would also (i) replace the MCAS requirement with a new 
assessment scheme and (ii) prohibit any future Statewide 
assessment from being used as a graduation requirement.  But 
these are not distinct regulatory features of the petition.  The 
title and one-sentence statements do not need to describe every 
feature of the petition.  See Hensley, 474 Mass. at 669 n.28 
(even though petition would also legalize, regulate, and tax 
"hashish" and "food products with tetrahydrocannabinol [THC]," 
title did not need to reference these products).  Here, we defer 
to the Attorney General and Secretary's reasonable decision that 
the information did not need to be included.  See Anderson, 490 
Mass. at 34.  And we see no risk that the missing information 
would mislead voters given that the short, one-paragraph 
petition, and the Attorney General's equally short and concise 
one-paragraph summary, explicitly and clearly explain the 
details of the petition and provide context for the title and 
one-sentence statements.  
 
9 
The features of the petition omitted from the title and 
one-sentence statements here are not analogous to the 
information missing from the title that gave us concern in 
Hensley.  See Hensley, 474 Mass. at 668-669.  There, the 
petition contained a long and complicated scheme that had three 
distinct regulatory features:  the legalization of marijuana, 
its regulation, and its taxation.  Id. at 669.  The title, 
however, referred only to "Marijuana Legalization," and we 
accordingly concluded that it was clearly misleading because it 
did not include reference to the two other major features of the 
petition.  Id.  At the same time, Hensley teaches that not all 
omissions from a title or one-sentence statement are clearly 
misleading.  For example, we concluded that the title did not 
need to include the term "adult use," reasoning that an average 
voter would reasonably understand that the legalization of 
marijuana would not extend to people under the age of twenty-
one.9  See id. at 669 n.28.  Here, as we have already noted, what 
are omitted from the title and one-sentence statements are not 
distinct regulatory features of the petition. 
We now turn to two additional arguments forwarded by the 
Page plaintiffs.  First, the Page plaintiffs argue that the one-
 
 
9 We used "average voter" in Hensley as shorthand for the 
objective inquiry of whether voters would be clearly misled by 
an omission in the title.   
 
10 
sentence "yes" statement is misleading because it does not 
explicitly state that the new proposed assessments standard 
would be a graduation requirement.  Under the Page plaintiffs' 
reading, the "yes" statement categorizes the assessments 
standard as a general academic requirement rather than as a 
graduation requirement.  We are not persuaded.  The petition 
itself only addresses graduation requirements, and thus the one-
sentence "yes" statement is reasonably understood as referencing 
graduation requirements.   
Second, the Page plaintiffs argue that the word "still" in 
the one-sentence "yes" statement incorrectly implies that 
students are required under current law to complete coursework 
meeting State standards to graduate high school, and that the 
statement accordingly fails to explain that such coursework 
would be a replacement graduation requirement under the proposed 
law.  This argument depends on accepting the Page plaintiffs' 
contention that "still" is used to mean "continually."  But a 
natural reading of the one-sentence statement makes clear that 
the term "still" is used to mean "nevertheless."  Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/still [https://perma.cc/8T9P-83E9].  Thus, contrary 
to the Page plaintiffs' contention, the "yes" statement explains 
that the petition would replace the MCAS graduation requirement.   
 
11 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court for 
entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General and 
Secretary's title and one-sentence statements describing the 
effects of a "yes" vote and a "no" vote are in compliance with 
the requirements of G. L. c. 54, § 53.  
So ordered.