Title: People v. McKenzie
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S251333
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DOUGLAS EDWARD MCKENZIE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S251333 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F073942 
 
Madera County Superior Court 
MCR047554, MCR047692 and MCR047982 
 
 
February 27, 2020 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
S251333 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
We granted review in this case to decide whether a 
convicted defendant who is placed on probation after imposition 
of sentence is suspended, and who does not timely appeal from 
the order granting probation, may take advantage of 
ameliorative statutory amendments that take effect during a 
later appeal from a judgment revoking probation and imposing 
sentence.  The Court of Appeal answered this question in the 
affirmative and, in light of  a newly effective amendment to a 
sentence enhancement statute, ordered four of defendant  
Douglas McKenzie’s sentence enhancements stricken.  We 
affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 4, 2014, in three separate cases, defendant 
pleaded guilty to a number of drug-related offenses and, as here 
relevant, admitted having sustained four prior felony drug-
related convictions for purposes of sentence enhancement under 
Health and Safety Code, former section 11370.2.1  Under 
subdivision (c) of that statute, as it read at the time of 
defendant’s plea, each prior conviction rendered defendant 
subject to a consecutive three-year prison term enhancement.  
As to all three cases, the trial court suspended imposition of 
                                       
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the 
Health and Safety Code.  
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
sentence, granted defendant five years’ probation, and ordered 
him to attend drug court. 
In March 2016, the Madera County Probation Department 
sought revocation of defendant’s probation based on alleged 
probation violations.  Defendant admitted the violations and, on 
June 1, 2016, the trial court revoked probation, declined to 
reinstate it, and imposed a prison sentence that included four 
three-year prior drug conviction enhancements under former 
section 11370.2, subdivision (c). 
About two weeks later, defendant filed a notice of appeal.  
On September 13, 2017, the Court of Appeal filed an opinion 
modifying the judgment in certain respects and otherwise 
affirming. 
On October 11, 2017, the governor signed Senate Bill No. 
180 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which was to take effect January 1, 
2018.  Under section 11370.2, as revised by that bill, defendant’s 
prior drug-related convictions no longer qualified defendant for 
sentence enhancement.   
On October 20, 2017, defendant petitioned this court for 
review based on the enactment of Senate Bill No. 180 (2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.).  On December 20, 2017, we granted review and 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to 
vacate its decision and to reconsider the matter in light of the 
revised statute.  On January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 180 took 
effect.  On remand, the Court of Appeal held that defendant 
could take advantage of the revisions to section 11370.2 that 
rendered the statute’s sentence enhancements inapplicable to 
his prior drug-related convictions, and the court ordered those 
four enhancements stricken.   
We then granted the People’s petition for review.   
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
We begin with In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 
(Estrada), which first set forth the current rule regarding 
retroactive application of ameliorative statutory amendments 
and which is the foundation of the People’s argument.  In that 
case, between the defendant’s escape from a drug rehabilitation 
center and his guilty plea to the crime of escape, statutory 
amendments took effect that reduced “both the term of 
imprisonment [for his crime] and the time necessary to spend in 
prison to be eligible for parole.”  (Id. at p. 744.)  We held that the 
ameliorative changes applied to the defendant, explaining:  “The 
key date is the date of final judgment.  If the amendatory statute 
lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date the 
judgment of conviction becomes final then . . . . it, and not the 
old statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, 
applies.”  (Ibid.)   
 
This conclusion, we reasoned in Estrada, was warranted 
by factors indicating that, consistent with the common law rule, 
the Legislature must have intended the amendatory statute to 
apply in “all prosecutions not reduced to final judgment” at the 
time of its passage.   (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747.)  “[O]f 
paramount importance,” we explained, was the following 
consideration:  “When the Legislature amends a statute so as to 
lessen the punishment[,] it has obviously expressly determined 
that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter 
punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the 
prohibited act.  It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature 
must have intended that the new statute imposing the new 
lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to 
every case to which it constitutionally could apply.  The 
amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided 
the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.  
This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be 
to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for 
vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern 
theories of penology. . . . [¶] . . . ‘A legislative mitigation of the 
penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative judgment 
that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to 
meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.  Nothing is to be 
gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a 
pronouncement; the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, 
serve no purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance.’ ”  
(Id. at pp. 744-745.) 
 
Estrada involved statutory amendments that “merely 
reduced . . . penal sanctions” for a given act, but we 
subsequently applied it to amendments that “entirely 
eliminated” such sanctions.  (People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 
295, 301 (Rossi).)  “[T]he common law principles” underlying the 
Estrada rule, we reasoned, “apply a fortiorari when criminal 
sanctions have been completely repealed before a criminal 
conviction becomes final.”  (Ibid.)  As we explained, “it would be 
untenable to give defendants the benefit of a reduction in 
punishment while denying them the benefit of a complete 
remission of punishment.”  (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 
208, 213 (Collins).)  Such a rule “would clearly lead to absurd 
results.”  (Rossi, at p. 302, fn. 8.)  It would enable a defendant to 
benefit from a statutory change if the amendment “simply . . . 
reduce[s] the maximum punishment” for a given act — even  “to 
one day in jail” — but would “subject[]” a defendant “to the full 
punishment [formerly] prescribed” if the amendment instead 
“completely repeal[s] all criminal penalties for” the act.  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
“[S]uch a reading of legislative intent belies reality.”  (Ibid.)  
Thus, “ ‘when the [L]egislature repeals a criminal statute or 
otherwise removes the State’s condemnation from conduct that 
was formerly deemed criminal, this action requires the 
dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding charging such 
conduct.  The rule applies to any such proceeding which, at the 
time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final 
disposition in the highest court authorized to review it.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 304.) 
 
The record here shows that when the revisions to section 
11370.2 took effect, defendant’s “ ‘criminal proceeding . . . ha[d] 
not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized 
to review it.’ ”  (Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 304, quoting Bell v. 
Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230.)  On that date, “the time for 
petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court [had not] passed” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 
784, 789, fn. 5); as earlier set forth, the governor signed the bill 
containing the revisions before defendant even petitioned this 
court for review of the judgment imposing a prison sentence, and 
when the bill took effect on January 1, 2018, defendant’s appeal 
of his sentence was pending in the Court of Appeal pursuant to 
our December 2017 order granting review and remanding the 
case for reconsideration in light of the revisions.  Thus, the 
prosecution had not been “reduced to final judgment at the time” 
the revisions took effect.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.)   
 
In asserting that defendant is nevertheless precluded from 
obtaining relief, the People argue as follows:  The relevant cut-
off point under Estrada for applying ameliorative amendments 
is the date the “judgment of conviction becomes final.”  (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)  Penal Code section 1237, 
subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that a defendant may 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
appeal “from a final judgment of conviction” and that “an order 
granting probation . . . shall be deemed to be a final judgment 
within the meaning of this section.”  Under this section, the 
People assert, the original 2014 order granting defendant 
probation was “a final judgment for purposes of filing an 
appeal,” and that judgment — which included defendant’s 
“underlying conviction” and “the admissions to prior convictions 
that qualified [him] for enhanced sentencing” — became “final 
for Estrada purposes . . . when the time to appeal from the . . . 
order passed, well before the Legislature amended the 
enhancement statute.”  Defendant therefore is not entitled to 
“retroactive application” of the statutory revisions.   
 
The People’s arguments fail under our precedents.  
Initially, the People err by assuming that when we used the 
phrase “judgment of conviction” in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
page 744, we were referring only to “underlying” convictions and 
enhancement findings, exclusive of sentence.  In criminal 
actions, the terms “judgment” and “ ‘sentence’ ” are generally 
considered “synonymous” (People v. Spencer (1969) 71 Cal.2d 
933, 935, fn. 1), and there is no “judgment of conviction” without 
a sentence (In re Phillips (1941) 17 Cal.2d 55, 58).  Moreover, in 
Estrada, we also referred to the cut-off point for application of 
ameliorative amendments as the date when the “case[]” (id. at 
p. 746) or “prosecution[]” is “reduced to final judgment” (id. at p. 
747).  And in Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at page 304, we stated that 
an amendatory statute applies in “ ‘any [criminal] proceeding 
[that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet 
reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to 
review it.’ ”  (Italics added.)  It cannot be said that this criminal 
prosecution or proceeding concluded before the ameliorative 
legislation took effect.    
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
 
This conclusion is also consistent with our recent decision 
in People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771 (Chavez).  In that case, 
four years after successfully completing probation, the 
defendant asked the trial court to dismiss his action and 
expunge his record in furtherance of justice under Penal Code 
section 1385.  (Chavez, at p. 776.)  We concluded that the trial 
court could not dismiss the action under that statute because 
there was no longer an action to dismiss:  the criminal action 
had ended when the defendant’s probation had expired.  (Id. at 
p. 777.) 
 
In the course of so holding, we noted that “[u]nder well-
established case law, a court may exercise its dismissal power 
under [Penal Code] section 1385 at any time before judgment is 
pronounced — but not after judgment is final.”  (Chavez, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 777.)  At the same time, however, we expressly 
rejected the argument that in such cases, the “criminal action 
terminates” when “the court orders a grant of probation.”  (Id. 
at p. 785.)  We therefore concluded that Penal Code section 
1385’s dismissal “power may be exercised until judgment is 
pronounced or when the power to pronounce judgment runs 
out.”  (Chavez, at p. 777.)  As particularly relevant here, we 
explained that the “criminal action” — and thus the trial court’s 
jurisdiction to impose a final judgment — “continues into and 
throughout the period of probation” and expires only “when th[e] 
[probation] period ends.”  (Id. at p. 784.)  Chavez thus confirms 
that a criminal proceeding ends only once probation ends if no 
judgment has issued in the case. 
 
Notably, in reaching this conclusion, we also found it 
irrelevant that “under [Penal Code] section 1237, an order 
granting probation is deemed a ‘final judgment’ for the purpose 
of taking an appeal.”  (Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 786.)  Under 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
our precedents, we explained, “such an order” has only “limited 
finality” and “ ‘does not have the effect of a judgment for other 
purposes.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Based on these precedents, we declined to 
find that, by virtue of Penal Code section 1237, an order 
granting probation is a final judgment for purposes of 
construing a trial courts’ dismissal power under Penal Code 
section 1385.  (Chavez, at p. 786.) 
 
In this regard, Chavez is consistent with prior decisions in 
which we stated that under Penal Code section 1237, an order 
granting probation “is ‘deemed to be a final judgment’ for the 
limited purpose of taking an appeal therefrom” and “does not 
have the effect of a judgment for other purposes.”  (People v. 
Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 796; see People v. 
Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 94, fn. omitted [order granting 
probation “is not to be deemed a judgment except for purposes 
of appeal as provided in [Penal Code] section 1237”].)  By 
providing that an order granting probation is “deemed to be a 
final judgment within the meaning of this section,” Penal Code 
section 1237, subdivision (a), merely “mak[es]” the order 
“appealable” and “mak[es] the scope of review the same as 
though the appeal were taken from a final judgment of 
conviction.”  (In re Osslo (1958) 51 Cal.2d 371, 380, italics 
added.)  This clause was added to Penal Code section 1237 in 
1951 for the “limited” purpose of “exten[ding] . . . a defendant’s 
right to appeal from a theretofore nonappealable order.”  (People 
v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 143, 145.)  We long ago observed 
that the clause may “not preclude [a] court from recognizing that 
for purposes other than those of Penal Code section 1237 there 
is a substantial and . . . pertinent difference between an order 
granting probation and a final judgment as such.”  (In re Osslo, 
at p. 380.)  “To hold otherwise would give the 1951 amendment 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
greater scope than its language would reasonably support.”  
(Robinson, at p. 145.)   
 
Based on the preceding analysis, we reject the People’s 
argument that, by virtue of Penal Code section 1237, because 
defendant failed to appeal from the order granting probation he 
may not benefit from ameliorative amendments that took effect 
long after the time for taking an appeal from that order lapsed. 
 
  This reading of Estrada is consistent with the 
“consideration of paramount importance” we identified in that 
decision:  the “inevitable inference” that the Legislature, having 
“determined that its former penalty was too severe,” “must have 
intended” that the ameliorative statutory change “should apply 
to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.”  (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744-745.)  A contrary conclusion, we 
explained, would “ ‘serve no purpose other than to satisfy a 
desire for vengeance,’ ” and would have to rest on the 
impermissible view “that the Legislature was motivated by 
[such] a desire.”  (Id. at p. 745.)  Here, the People offer no basis 
for concluding that the revisions to section 11370.2 may not “be 
applied constitutionally” to defendant.  (Estrada, at p. 745)  
Thus, applying those revisions in this case is fully consistent 
with Estrada.   
 
The People instead offer several policy bases for their 
view.  They assert that precluding probationers like defendant 
from taking advantage of ameliorative statutory revisions that 
become effective after expiration of the time for direct appeal 
from an order granting probation would be “consistent with the 
public’s interest in finality, an interest that the Legislature 
would not intend to implicitly undercut by reducing a penalty.”  
Finality is important, the People argue, because it (1) “prevents 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
criminals from escaping prosecution” due to destruction of 
evidence and loss of witnesses over the years, (2) “conserves 
public resources” by eliminating potential retrials and the need 
“to preserve evidence during the period of probation,” and (3) 
“encourage[s]” probationers “to accept responsibility” for their 
actions and to “focus on rehabilitation.”  By contrast, the People 
contend, applying such revisions under these circumstances 
would produce “absurd results.”  It would “mean” that 
probationers “who do[] not initially challenge [their] underlying 
conviction” and “successfully complete[]” probation are worse off 
than probationers who violate their probation terms, have 
probation revoked, and appeal from that revocation, because 
only the latter may “benefit from a subsequent amendment to 
the pertinent statute.”  It would thus “ ‘encourag[e] defendants 
to violate the terms of their probation in the hopes of extending 
the probation term to take advantage of any beneficial changes 
in the law during the probationary period.’ ”  This, in turn, might 
make trial courts “reluctant to extend probation and give 
defendants additional opportunities to achieve rehabilitation.”  
 
We rejected similar arguments in Estrada when we 
adopted the existing rule and disapproved a previous decision 
holding that “the punishment in effect when the act was 
committed” applies notwithstanding a subsequently enacted 
ameliorative revision.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 742.)  The 
previous decision was based in part on the view that failing to 
apply a law “with certainty as it read on the date of the offense” 
would diminish the law’s “intended deterrent effect.”  (People v. 
Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9, 26.)  The dissent in Estrada echoed 
this view, arguing that allowing defendants to take advantage 
of ameliorative revisions as long as direct appeal is still 
available would “substantially reduce[]” the “deterrent[]” effect 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
that comes with “[t]he certainty of punishment.”  (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 753 (dis. opn. of Burke, J.).)  It would also, 
the Estrada dissent asserted, give “those contemplating and 
subsequently committing crime” incentive to “seek[] every 
avenue of delay through appeals and legal maneuvers of all 
kinds” in the hope that “the Legislature might in the meantime 
reduce the punishment.”  (Ibid.)  In other words, it would 
“encourag[e] appeals and delays not related to guilt or innocence 
but employed solely to keep open the possibility of subsequent 
windfalls” through application of “an ameliorating legislative 
act.”  (Ibid.)  Finally, it would create “a gross inequity” and 
“unequal treatment under the law” as to defendants who 
“plead[] guilty to an offense” and whose “conviction[s] promptly 
become[] final, thereby effectively shutting the door to [their] 
ever receiving any benefit” from the ameliorative revision.  
(Ibid.)  These policy arguments did not persuade us in Estrada 
not to apply ameliorative revisions to defendants who have 
already committed criminal acts if the revisions take effect 
before their “cases” are  “reduced to final judgment.”  (Id., at p. 
746.)  The People’s similar arguments are no more persuasive 
today, more than 50 years later, in the context of determining 
whether Estrada’s rule includes defendants who are, when 
ameliorative statutory revisions take effect, appealing from a 
judgment entered upon revocation of probation.  Indeed, we find 
it highly doubtful that a probationer would, as the People 
suggest, violate probation — and face probation revocation and 
imprisonment — simply in the hope that (1) the court would 
extend probation notwithstanding the violation, and (2) the 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
Legislature would enact some ameliorative statute during the 
extended probationary term.2 
 
Nor are we persuaded by the People’s argument that 
probationers who do not file a timely appeal from an order 
granting probation “cannot challenge the order or the 
underlying determination of guilt through a later appeal.”  The 
legal principle associated with this argument provides that 
when a court suspends imposition of sentence and grants 
probation, the defendant’s failure to appeal from the order 
granting probation generally “estops” the defendant “from 
claiming error with respect to matters occurring before that 
order,” but not as to “proceedings in connection with the 
revocation of probation and sentencing.”  (People v. Gonzales 
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 467, 470, italics added.)  In other words, it 
“merely forecloses action based on errors committed at the trial.”  
(People v. Wilkins (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 27, 34.)  Here, 
defendant does not claim that an “error[]” occurred “at the trial” 
(ibid.) “before” the court ordered probation (Gonzales, at p. 470).  
Instead, he raises an issue relating to the subsequent 
“revocation of probation and sentencing” (ibid.), based on an 
event — the amendment of section 11370.2 — that occurred long 
after the court ordered probation and the time for direct appeal 
lapsed.  Thus, defendant could not have raised this issue during 
a direct appeal from the probation order.  Under these 
                                       
2  
We also note that as a factual matter, applying the 
Estrada rule in this case does not implicate the People’s 
concerns about the costs and difficulties associated with retrials.  
Allowing defendant to take advantage of the revision to section 
11370.2 will not result in a new trial.  The trial court may simply 
strike the affected enhancements and modify defendant’s 
sentence accordingly. 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
circumstances, defendant’s failure to file such a direct appeal 
does not preclude him from taking advantage of ameliorative 
amendments that took effect while he was appealing from the 
subsequent revocation of his probation and imposition of 
sentence.  (Cf. In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 887 [“It has been 
said that the ‘requirement of exhaustion of the appellate or other 
remedy . . . is merely a discretionary policy governing the 
exercise of the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ’ ”].)   
 
The People’s contrary view rests on an asserted 
distinction — between amendments that merely reduce 
punishment and those that entirely eliminate punishment — 
that, as already explained, we long ago rejected for purposes of 
applying the Estrada rule.  The People argue that “because” the 
statutory amendment here “did not [merely] change the 
sentence or the superior court’s sentencing discretion as to the 
former enhancements, it did away with them altogether,” this 
case necessarily involves a prohibited “challenge to the [now 
final] adjudication of defendant’s guilt — specifically, the 
adjudication of the allegations of prior narcotics-related 
convictions” — rather than a question of “sentencing discretion.”  
In other words, in the People’s view, although defendant could 
have benefitted from the amendment had it merely reduced the 
punishment for the enhancement — even to a single day in 
jail — because the amendment completely eliminated the 
punishment, he cannot.  As we explained over 40 years ago, as 
a basis for determining the Estrada rule’s applicability, the 
distinction the People put forth is “untenable” (Collins, supra, 
21 Cal.3d at p. 213) and “would clearly lead to absurd results” 
(Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 302, fn. 8).  Therefore, we again 
decline to adopt it. 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
 
Finally, rejection of the People’s argument is consistent 
with our discussion in Estrada and subsequent decisions of 
“legislative intent,” i.e., whether “the Legislature intend[ed] the 
old or new statute to apply.”  (Estrada, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 
744.)  We find no basis to conclude that the Legislature intended 
the old statute imposing punishment to apply to those on 
probation simply because they may no longer appeal from orders 
granting probation as to which there was no ground for appeal.  
On the other hand, as we have explained, “an amendment 
eliminating criminal sanctions is [itself] a sufficient declaration 
of the Legislature’s intent to bar all punishment for the conduct 
so decriminalized.”  (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 213.)   
 
In addition to these generally applicable statements 
regarding legislative intent, the legislative history of section 
11370.2’s recent revision reveals additional “factors that 
indicate the Legislature must have intended that the 
amendatory statute should operate in” cases like this one.  
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.)  According to that 
legislative history, the “sentence enhancement for prior drug 
convictions” was an “extreme punishment” that had “failed to” 
achieve its goals — “protect[ing] communities [and] reduc[ing] 
the availability of drugs” — while having the following negative 
effects:  (1) producing “overcrowded jails and prisons”; (2) 
“ ‘funneling money away from community-based programs and 
services” ’ in order to “ ‘build[] new jails to imprison more people 
with long sentences,’ ” thus “crippl[ing] state and local budgets”; 
and (3) “ ‘devastat[ing] low-income communities of color’ ” and 
“ ‘target[ing] the poorest and most marginalized people in our 
communities.’ ”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 180 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) June 27, 2017, p. 4.)  Repeal 
of the enhancement was therefore “ ‘urgently needed’ ” in order 
PEOPLE v. MCKENZIE 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
“ ‘to undo the damage’ ” the enhancement had caused, to “free[]” 
up funds for “reinvest[ment] in community programs that 
actually improve the quality of life and reduce crime,” and to 
“ ‘reduce racial disparities in the criminal justice system.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  In view of these stated concerns and goals, we see no 
basis to conclude the Legislature intended to exclude those on 
probation simply because they can no longer appeal from the 
original order granting probation.  The legislative history 
reinforces the conclusion that the Legislature “must have 
intended” section 11370.2’s ameliorative changes to “operate in” 
cases like this one.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J.  
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J.  
KRUGER, J.  
GROBAN, J.  
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. McKenzie 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 25 Cal.App.5th 1207 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S251333 
Date Filed: February 27, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Madera 
Judge:  Ernest J. LiCalsi 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Alex Green, under appointment by the 
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.  
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, R. Todd Marshall, Raymond L. 
Brosterhous II, Eric L. Christoffersen, Janet Neeley, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Catherine Chatman, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Catherine Chatman 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-7699 
 
Elizabeth Campbell 
Attorney at Law 
3104 O Street 
Sacramento, CA 95816 
(530) 786-4108