Title: State of Florida v. Morris Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2172
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2004

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
Nos. SC02-2172 & SC02-2440
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
MORRIS HARRIS,
Respondent.
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner,
vs.
DONALD GENTES,
Respondent.
[May 13, 2004]
CANTERO, J.
In these consolidated cases we consider whether the State breaches a plea
2
agreement under which a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment
followed by probation, with no mention of civil commitment, when the State later
initiates civil commitment proceedings under the Jimmy Ryce Act.  The First
District Court of Appeal held that it did, but certified the following questions of
great public importance:
MAY THE STATE INITIATE DISCRETIONARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE RYCE ACT
(PART V OF CHAPTER 394, FLORIDA STATUTES) WHERE,
BY SEEKING CIVIL COMMITMENT, THE STATE WOULD
VIOLATE THE TERMS OF A PLEA AGREEMENT
PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO WITH THE DEFENDANT?
IS A PLEA AGREEMENT FOR PRISON TIME FOLLOWED BY
PROBATION VIOLATED WHEN THE STATE LATER
INITIATES DISCRETIONARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE JIMMY RYCE ACT (PART V OF
CHAPTER 394, FLORIDA STATUTES)?
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE DESCRIBED IN THE FIRST
QUESTION, IS THE STATE BARRED BY EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL FROM SEEKING CIVIL COMMITMENT?  
Harris v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D946, D948 (Fla. 1st DCA April 26, 2002), reh’g
denied, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2175, D2176 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 4, 2002).  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We decline to answer the first
question because it assumes what we need to decide:  whether the State breached
the plea agreement.  We answer only the latter two questions.  Based on our
3
decision in Murray v. Regier, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S1008 (Fla. Dec. 5, 2002), we
answer those questions in the negative and quash the decision below.
I.  FACTS
These consolidated cases involve similar facts, which we detail below.  In
both cases, the defendants executed plea agreements under which they were
sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by a period of probation.  Neither
agreement mentioned the possibility of involuntary civil commitment.  The plea
agreements were executed in 1995 (Harris) and 1993 (Gentes), before the Ryce Act
became law, and therefore neither party could have contemplated the possibility of
civil commitment.  The Ryce Act became effective as of January 1, 1999.  See Ch.
98-64, § 24, at 455, Laws of Fla.  Subsequently, before their terms of incarceration
expired, the State initiated civil commitment proceedings against them under the
Ryce Act.  The respondents claim that by doing so, the State has violated their plea
agreements.
A.  State v. Harris
In 1995, Morris Harris entered a plea of nolo contendere and was
adjudicated guilty of two counts of lewd and lascivious assault on a child under
sixteen years of age.  He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, with eight years
1.  In 1993, Harris entered a plea of nolo contendere and was adjudicated
guilty of one count of an attempted sexual act with a child under sixteen years of
age.  Harris was sentenced to a term of thirty months in prison on this charge.  
2.  The First District denied Harris’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review
the trial court’s ruling before trial.  See Harris v. State, 766 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla.
1st DCA 2000) (“We find that an appeal from a final order is the adequate and
appropriate remedy for denial of a motion to dismiss in this context, just as it is in
virtually every other setting.”).
4
of the sentence suspended for probation with sexual offender counseling.1  On May
27, 1999, four days before Harris’s tentative release date from prison, the State
filed a petition seeking civil commitment under the Ryce Act.  See §§ 394.910-.931,
Fla. Stat. (1999).  Harris then filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement and
sentence in the 1995 criminal case, arguing that the involuntary civil commitment
proceedings violated the plea agreement.  The trial court denied the motion, finding
that the State had not violated the plea agreement because (1) the Ryce Act had not
been enacted at the time of the plea, (2) the civil commitment was an unforeseen,
collateral consequence of the plea, and (3) Harris was serving probation while
awaiting trial in the civil proceeding.  Harris later filed a motion to dismiss the
commitment petition, arguing that as applied to him, the Ryce Act constituted an ex
post facto law and violated his right to due process.  The trial court denied this
motion as well. 2  After a non-jury trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing
5
evidence that Harris met the criteria for civil commitment.
Harris appealed the verdict and the denial of the motion to dismiss, and the
cases were consolidated.  The First District reversed and remanded on both
appeals, finding that “the state breached its plea agreement to allow Harris the
privilege of seeking treatment as a sexual offender during the probationary portion
of his sentence by seeking civil commitment shortly before he had completed the
incarcerative portion of his sentence.”  Harris, 27 Fla. L. Weekly at D948.  The
First District also certified the first question stated above.  Id.
In denying the State’s motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc, the First
District issued another opinion addressing Harris’s probationary status.  Evidently,
the State had represented at oral argument that Harris was not on probation while
civilly committed, and would not begin serving probation until he successfully
completed treatment and was released.  27 Fla. L. Weekly at D2175.  On motion
for rehearing, the State claimed that its concession “was ill-advised and in error.” 
The State argued that Harris was receiving sexual offender treatment during the
probationary period of his sentence, and thus, the State had honored the plea
agreement.  The First District disagreed that Harris was then currently on active
probation while confined under the Ryce Act.  Moreover, “[e]ven if it could be said
that [Harris] is currently on active probation while in the custody of DCFS, this
6
would raise a double jeopardy issue, because of the change in probationary
conditions his internment represents.”  Id.  The First District then certified the
second and third questions stated above.  Id. at D2176.  
B.  State v. Gentes
In 1993, Donald Gentes entered no contest pleas to five counts of lewd and
lascivious assault and was sentenced to ten years in prison on two of the counts,
the sentences to be served consecutively, to fifteen years' probation on two others
(consecutive), and fifteen years' probation (concurrent with the other probation
charges) on the final count.  On May 14, 1999, an order of probation was entered,
nunc pro tunc to October 22, 1993. 
Before Gentes’s release from prison, the State filed a petition for civil
commitment.  Gentes filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement and sentence,
alleging that the State’s petition for civil commitment breached the plea agreement
because it placed him in a “prison-like setting.”  The trial court denied the motion.  
Gentes appealed, and the First District reversed based on its prior decision in
Harris.  See Gentes v. State, 828 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).  The First
District also certified the same questions as certified in Harris, but noted that only
the two questions certified in the opinion on motions for rehearing need be
7
considered because the question in the original Harris opinion “jumps over the
central issue in the case by assuming the plea agreement was breached when the
State sought civil commitment.”  Gentes, 828 So. 2d at 1053.  Although obligated
to follow Harris, the panel in Gentes expressed its reservations about that decision. 
It noted that “the Harris holding may not be in concert with the apparent consensus
of other states finding civil commitment of sexually violent predators, under similar
state laws, does not violate the terms of a plea agreement.”  Gentes, at 1052 (citing
several cases from other states).  The court also noted that “our sister court has
previously held that subsequent designation as a sexual violent predator under
Florida law does not violate a plea agreement.”  Id. (citing Collie v. State, 710
So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)).
We now review this issue in these consolidated review proceedings.  
II.  DISCUSSION
The First District certified three questions to us, two of which we answer:
(A) whether the State violates a plea agreement that sentences a defendant to a term
of imprisonment followed by probation by initiating civil commitment proceedings
under the Jimmy Ryce Act; and (B) whether, under such circumstances, principles
of equitable estoppel prohibit the State from initiating civil commitment
8
proceedings.  We discuss each issue in turn.
A.  Do civil commitment proceedings violate a prior
plea agreement that did not mention such proceedings?
Respondents first allege that by later initiating civil commitment proceedings
in each case, the State breached the plea agreements.  The First District agreed. 
We do not.  Instead, we hold that our recent decision in Murray v. Regier, 27 Fla.
L. Weekly S1008 (Fla. Dec. 5, 2002), answers the question.  The First District did
not have the benefit of that decision because it was pending review in this Court at
the time.  See Murray v. Kearney, 770 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (on
rehearing), quashed sub nom. Murray v. Regier, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S1008 (Fla.
Dec. 5, 2002).
The Ryce Act provides for the involuntary civil commitment of persons who
are convicted of sexual offenses and found to be sexually violent predators.  See
generally Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2002).  To commit a person
under the Ryce Act, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
treatment.  See §§ 394.912(10), 394.917.  Therefore, although a prior criminal
9
conviction of a sexually violent offense is a necessary condition for commitment, it
is not sufficient in itself.  As we emphasized in Westerheide, “involuntary
commitment under the Ryce Act is based upon an individual’s current mental state
that makes it likely the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.”  831 So. 2d at
100 (plurality opinion).  We also emphasized that involuntary civil commitments are
civil in nature, not criminal:  “[T]he affirmative restraint of ‘a small but extremely
dangerous number of sexually violent predators’ who ‘pose [a risk] to society’
because they are ‘likely to engage in criminal, sexually violent behavior,’ § 394.910,
Fla. Stat. (2001), is a ‘classic example of nonpunitive detention.’”  Westerheide,
831 So. 2d at 100 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997)).
In Murray, we considered whether the State’s initiation of civil commitment
proceedings violated a prior plea agreement that did not mention the possibility of
such proceedings.  We held that “any bargain that a defendant may strike in a plea
agreement in a criminal case would have no bearing on a subsequent involuntary
civil commitment for control, care, and treatment.”  27 Fla. L. Weekly at S1010. 
As in these cases, the petitioner had executed a plea agreement under which he was
sentenced to a period of incarceration followed by probation.  Before he was
released, the State filed civil commitment proceedings under the Ryce Act.  27 Fla.
L. Weekly at S1008.  Murray then filed a motion for specific performance of his
10
plea agreement, arguing that he should be released to serve the agreed-upon
probation.  The case presented unique jurisdictional issues and bounced back and
forth between two district courts of appeal.  When the case reached this Court, we
resolved the jurisdictional issue.  We then addressed the merits of Murray’s
petition.  We held that the petitioner was not entitled to relief because
[t]he plea agreement was part of a criminal proceeding against Murray
whereas the commitment order was entered in a civil proceeding based
upon clinical evaluations of Murray’s present 
state. . . . Thus, Murray’s involuntary commitment cannot be
considered continued punishment for his criminal offense, but was
based upon clinical evaluations of his present state.  While Murray’s
previous conviction of a sexually violent offense satisfies one of the
statutory criteria of a sexually violent predator, the other requirement is
not related to his previous conviction.  
27 Fla. L. Weekly at S1009 (emphasis added).  Most importantly, we then
concluded
that any bargain that a defendant may strike in a plea agreement in a
criminal case would have no bearing on a subsequent involuntary civil
commitment for control, care, and treatment.  Consequently, Murray’s
constitutional claim is without merit and he was not entitled to release
from detention on that basis.  
27 Fla. L. Weekly at S1010 (emphasis added).
The respondents here argue that Murray does not apply to their cases
because it arose from a habeas petition and involved unique jurisdictional issues. 
Neither the procedural history of that case, however, nor the jurisdictional issues
3.  Several other courts have affirmed trial court orders without opinion,
citing Murray.  See Godboldt v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1928 (Fla. 1st DCA
Aug. 14, 2003); Ritchie v. State, 842 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Viruet v.
State, 847 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Meadows v. State, 839 So. 2d 747
(Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Crockett v. State, 834 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
11
involved affected our holding on the merits.  Since our decision in Murray, several
district courts of appeal, including the court that decided Harris and Gentes, have
recognized its holding and have applied it outside the context of habeas corpus. 
See State v. Riddle, 862 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); State v. McFarland, 28
Fla. L. Weekly D2298 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 3, 2003); State v. Klein, 851 So. 2d 274
(Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Marsh v. State, 849 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003);
Krischer v. Ford, 847 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Sublett v. State, 842
So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Sandillo v. State, 842 So. 2d 1018, 1019
(Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Satz v. Runion, 838 So. 2d 689, 689-90 (Fla. 4th DCA
2003); Krischer v. Faris, 838 So. 2d 600, 602-03 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Garcia v.
State, 847 So. 2d 980, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).3  No court has distinguished
Murray.  In fact, by applying Murray instead of Harris, the First District in
McFarland implicitly acknowledged that Murray has disapproved Harris.  See 28
Fla. L. Weekly at D2298.  We agree.
B.  Does the doctrine of equitable estoppel prohibit the State 
12
from initiating civil commitment proceedings?
The second question we answer is whether under these circumstances
equitable estoppel bars the State from seeking civil commitment.  The First District
found that “this is a classic case for the application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.”  Harris, 27 Fla. L. Weekly at D947.  
The elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a representation as to a material
fact that is contrary to a later-asserted position, (2) reliance on that representation,
and (3) a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by
the representation and reliance thereon.  See State Dep’t of Revenue v. Anderson,
403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981).  
The First District found that elements one and two “are easily satisfied in that
the state clearly represented to Harris the sentence he would receive in exchange for
his plea, and he relied on the representation.”  Harris, 27 Fla. L. Weekly at D947. 
As to the third element, the First District concluded that “the state subsequently
changed its position in a manner detrimental to Harris by filing the civil commitment
action against him.”  Id.  The court noted that the Legislature’s subsequent passage
of the Ryce Act did not render the State’s future compliance with the agreement
impossible, in part because the State is given discretion whether to file a civil
commitment action.  In other words, because the State “was clearly under no
4.  We accept the State’s representation that Harris is serving the
probationary portion of his sentence while civilly committed.  We therefore do not
address whether the State would violate his plea agreement if his probation did not
begin until after he was released from civil commitment.
13
compulsion to file a petition,” the State “violated its own solemn agreement that
appellant serve no more than a split sentence of incarceration and probation.”  Id.
The First District’s reasoning assumes that civil commitment under the Ryce
Act is punishment.  We already have held that it is not.  See Westerheide, 831 So.
2d at 98-104; see also § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2000).  Thus, the State, by initiating
civil commitment actions against respondents, did not “change [its] position
detrimental to the party claiming estoppel.”  The plea agreements are still
completely in effect, notwithstanding the civil commitment.4  Moreover, because
respondents Harris and Gentes executed their plea agreements before the Ryce Act
was enacted, neither party could have contemplated the possibility of involuntary
civil commitment.  Therefore, we agree with the dissent’s position below that “[t]he
plea agreement in the criminal proceeding is a separate event from the civil
commitment that was not contemplated by the parties.  Therefore, Appellant could
not have relied on any representations by the State to his detriment regarding civil
commitment, and the State has not changed its position from the plea agreement.” 
Harris, 27 Fla. L. Weekly at D951 (Polston, J., dissenting).  We also note that “[a]s
5.  We note, however, that during the plea colloquy we believe it appropriate
for the trial court to inform a defendant of the possible consequences of a guilty
plea, namely that the defendant may be subject to civil commitment pursuant to the
Ryce Act.  We hereby refer this matter to the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee
of the Florida Bar to formulate language addressing this requirement during the
colloquy.
14
a general rule, equitable estoppel will be applied against the state only in rare
instances and under exceptional circumstances.” Anderson, 403 So. 2d at 400. 
This is not one of them.
III.  CONCLUSION
We apply Murray v. Regier and hold that the State does not violate a plea
agreement for prison time followed by probation when it later initiates discretionary
civil commitment proceedings under the Jimmy Ryce Act.5  We answer the second
and third certified questions in the negative, quash the decisions in Harris and
Gentes, and remand these cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J.,
concurs.
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
6.  I do not, however, agree with the Court's broad statement in Murray, a
decision in which I did not participate, that "any bargain that a defendant may strike
in a plea agreement in a criminal case would have no bearing on a subsequent
involuntary civil commitment for control, care, and treatment."  Id. at S1010.
15
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring.
The defendants in these cases are not seeking to withdraw their pleas on
grounds that the pleas were involuntarily entered.  Rather, they seek relief upon the
theories of specific performance and equitable estoppel.  Because the enactment of
the Jimmy Ryce Act (otherwise known as the Sexually Violent Predators Act)
occurred subsequent to the plea agreements in these cases, I agree with the majority
that relief based on these theories should not be granted.  I also agree with the
majority that applying Murray v. Regier, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S1008 (Fla. Dec. 5,
2002), to the instant cases is appropriate because the defendant in Murray raised
the same claim for relief as Harris and Gentes—specific performance.6  
Further, I concur in the referral to the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee
in order to include as part of the standard plea colloquy a requirement that trial
courts inform defendants of the potential for indefinite civil commitment under the
Jimmy Ryce Act.  In the interim, I urge trial courts, if they do not already do so, to
immediately begin informing defendants who plead guilty to a sexually violent
7.  The Jimmy Ryce Act applies to "sexually violent predators," who are
those persons who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who
suffer from "a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined."  § 394.912(10), Fla.
Stat. (2003).  A "sexually violent offense" is defined as:
(a)
Murder of a human being while engaged in sexual battery
in violation of s. 782.04(1)(a)2.;
(b)
 Kidnapping of a child under the age of 13 and, in the
course of that offense, committing:
1.
 Sexual battery; or
2.
A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in
the presence of the child;
(c)
Committing the offense of false imprisonment upon a
child under the age of 13 and, in the course of that offense,
committing:
1.
Sexual battery; or
2.
A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in
the presence of the child;
(d)
Sexual battery in violation of s. 794.011;
(e)
Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in
presence of the child in violation of s. 800.04;
(f)
An attempt, criminal solicitation, or conspiracy, in
violation of s. 777.04, of a sexually violent offense;
(g)
Any conviction for a felony offense in effect at any time
before October 1, 1998, which is comparable to a sexually violent
offense under paragraphs (a)- (f) or any federal conviction or
conviction in another state for a felony offense that in this state would
be a sexually violent offense; or
(h)
Any criminal act that, either at the time of sentencing for
the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings
under this part, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to
have been sexually motivated.
§ 394.912(9), Fla. Stat. (2003).
16
offense7 of the State's right to seek civil commitment.8  Regardless of the fact that
8.  I would also urge that the plea agreement that the defendant signs be
revised to include a written acknowledgment of the potential for commitment under
the Jimmy Ryce Act. 
17
sexual predator acts are labelled by courts as civil commitment proceedings, the
actual effect of these acts is to confine defendants who have completed their
criminal sentences to an indefinite term of commitment. 
In this case, defendant Harris was to be released from prison in May of 1999
after serving a four-year sentence as the result of a plea of nolo contendere in 1995
to two counts of lewd and lascivious assault on a child under sixteen years of age. 
Five years later, Harris still remains committed pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act.  
The reality is that the confinement is against the defendant's will and the
confinement is in a prison-like environment.  As Justice Breyer observed in Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), discussing Kansas's Sexually Violent Predators
Act, which is substantially similar to Florida's Sexually Violent Predators Act:
Certain resemblances between the Act's "civil commitment" and
traditional criminal punishments are obvious.  Like criminal
imprisonment, the Act's civil commitment amounts to "secure"
confinement and "incarceration against one's will."  In addition, a basic
objective of the Act is incapacitation, which, as Blackstone said in
describing an objective of criminal law, is to "depriv[e] the party
injuring of the power to do future mischief." . . .  
Moreover, the Act, like criminal punishment, imposes its
confinement (or sanction) only upon an individual who has previously
committed a criminal offense.  And the Act imposes that confinement
through the use of persons (county prosecutors), procedural
18
guarantees (trial by jury, assistance of counsel, psychiatric
evaluations), and standards ("beyond a reasonable doubt")
traditionally associated with the criminal law.
521 U.S. at 379-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
In light of the consequences of civil commitment, defendants who enter pleas
of guilty or nolo contendere to sexually violent offenses subsequent to the passage
of the Jimmy Ryce Act should be advised of the possibility that the State may seek
their continued confinement after the term of imprisonment has ended. As the New
Jersey Supreme Court recently observed, "when the consequence of a plea may be
so severe that a defendant may be confined for the remainder of his or her life,
fundamental fairness demands that the trial court inform [the] defendant of that
possible consequence."  State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003).   
Finally, although I agree that Harris and Gentes are not entitled to specific
performance, I reach no conclusion as to whether the failure to advise a defendant
of the consequence of indefinite confinement under the Jimmy Ryce Act may
render a plea involuntary and thus subject to withdrawal under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.170(l).  However, once a trial court includes in the plea
colloquy the potential for indefinite civil commitment, any claim of involuntariness
on that basis will be eliminated.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
19
QUINCE, J., concurring in result only.
I concur in the result only in this case for the reasons outlined in my
concurring in result only opinion in Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla.
2002).  I do agree that defendants who enter pleas of guilty or nolo contendere to
sexually violent offenses should be informed that the State may seek further
confinement pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act.  
Two Cases Consolidated:
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance 
First District - Case Nos. 1D00-3775 & 1D00-4749; and 1D01-4090
(Gadsden & Leon Counties)
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Richard L. Polin, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Robert S. Friedman, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondents