Title: PAUL DRESSEL V AMERIBANK
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119959
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 2003

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 24, 2003  
PAUL DRESSEL and THERESA DRESSEL,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 119959  
AMERIBANK,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
With this case we determine whether a lender that charges  
a fee for the completion of standard mortgage documents  
engages in the unauthorized practice of law under MCL 450.681.  
The Court of Appeals held that the lender is so engaged and  
reversed 
a 
circuit 
court order granting summary disposition in  
favor of defendant.  We conclude that such conduct does not  
constitute the practice of law and, accordingly, reverse the  
 
Court of Appeals judgment and reinstate the circuit court  
order in favor of defendant.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
In 1997, plaintiffs obtained from defendant Ameribank a  
real estate loan secured by a mortgage on their home.  In  
connection with the loan, the bank prepared an adjustable rate  
note and a mortgage. 
On its settlement statement, it  
designated a $400 fee for "document preparation."  It provided  
written material to plaintiffs stating that the document  
preparation fee was "a separate fee that some lenders charge  
to cover their cost of preparation of final legal papers, such  
as a mortgage, deed of trust, note or deed."1  
Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the charging of a  
fee for completing the mortgage documents constituted the  
unauthorized practice of law and violated the Michigan  
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA),  MCL 445.901 et seq.  In March  
of 1999, the case was certified as a class action to provide  
potential relief for other borrowers who also had been charged  
a document preparation fee by lending institutions.  
The circuit court granted summary disposition to  
defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and denied reconsideration.  
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs again argued  
1United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 
Buying Your Home (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1997), p 19.  
2  
 
 
that defendant's assessment of a document preparation fee  
constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The Court of  
Appeals ruled for the plaintiffs, noting that the statutes  
governing the unauthorized "practice of law" do not  
specifically define that term and that this Court has never  
decided the issue.  It held that the charging of a separate  
fee for the preparation of legal documents by an interested  
party constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.  It held,  
also, that neither of the exceptions to the statutes  
proscribing the unauthorized practice of law2 applied to  
defendant's conduct.3  
The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had  
violated the MCPA and the Savings Bank Act (SBA), MCL 487.3101  
et seq. 
Because the trial court had erred in dismissing  
plaintiffs' claims of unauthorized practice of law, the Court  
reasoned, it erred also in dismissing the SBA and MCPA claims.  
Basic 
to 
these 
conclusions was the determination that, because  
defendant was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, its  
activities were proscribed by the Credit Reform Act's  
prohibition 
on 
excessive 
fees. 
MCL 
445.1857(3).  
Consequently, given that the fees were excessive under the  
2MCL 450.681 and MCL 600.916.  
3The Court of Appeals specifically held that the pro se 
and "as otherwise authorized by law" exceptions to the statute 
did not apply. 247 Mich App 133; 635 NW2d 328 (2001).  
3  
 
 
Credit Reform Act, they were not authorized by the SBA. MCL  
487.3430(1)(a).  
Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because  
defendant was in violation of the SBA, plaintiffs' claims  
under the MCPA were also valid. MCL 445.904(2)(d); see also  
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 467; 597 NW2d 28  
(1999).  Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the  
circuit court and remanded the case.  We granted leave to  
appeal.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Issues concerning the proper interpretation of statutes  
are questions of law that we review de novo. Hoste v Shanty  
Creek Mgt, Inc, 459 Mich 561, 569; 592 NW2d 360 (1999).  
Similarly, this Court applies a de novo standard when  
reviewing motions for summary disposition made under MCR  
2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual support for a claim.  
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d  
201 (1998).  We consider the facts in the light most favorable  
to the nonmoving party, in this case, the plaintiffs.  Smith,  
supra at 454.  
III. INTERPRETING THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTES  
In Michigan, the practice of law is regulated by statute.  
MCL 450.681 provides, in part:  
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or 
voluntary association to practice or appear as an 
attorney-at-law for any person other than itself in  
4  
 
any court in this state or before any judicial 
body, or to make it a business to practice as an 
attorney-at-law, for any person other than itself 
. . . .  
It is the cardinal principle of statutory construction  
that courts must give effect to legislative intent.  
Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 466 Mich 524, 528; 647 NW2d 493  
(2002). When reviewing a statute, courts must first examine  
the language of the statute.  If the intent of the Legislature  
is clearly expressed by the language, no further construction  
is warranted. Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309  
(2000).  
In the past, this Court concluded that it is impossible  
to formulate a specific and enduring definition of the  
practice of law "'for the reason that under our system of  
jurisprudence such practice must necessarily change with the  
everchanging business and social order.'"  State Bar of  
Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich 116, 133; 249 NW2d 1 (1976),  
quoting Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v Denkema, 290 Mich 56, 64; 287  
NW 377 (1939). We disagree with that conclusion.  
Although 
formidable, 
the 
task 
of 
formulating 
a 
definition  
of the practice of law is not impossible.  The full meaning of  
the language in MCL 450.681, and in its sister provisions,4  
prohibiting the unauthorized "practice of law" and engagement  
4MCL 600.916 prohibits individuals, as opposed to  
corporations, from engaging in the unauthorized practice of 
law or the law business.  
5  
 
 
 
in the "law business" may not be immediately apparent.  
However, the language is capable of being construed.  In order  
to accomplish that, we review the purposes of the unauthorized  
practice of law statutes.  
These purposes are discernable from the regulations  
governing the legal profession that preceded and coincided  
with the enactment of the statutes.  From them, it is possible  
to extrapolate a sufficiently accurate definition of the  
"practice of law" to guide parties in their dealings with each  
other.  
A. THE PURPOSE OF THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTES  
Regulation of the legal profession began early in the  
English legal tradition.  See, generally, 1 Pollock &  
Maitland, History of English Law (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co,  
2d ed, 1899), pp 211-217; Baker, An Introduction to English  
Legal History (London: Butterworths, 3d ed, 1990), pp 21, 179.  
In our nation, also, regulation of the practice of law has  
been an innate characteristic of the legal tradition. See  
Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times (St Paul:  
West, 1953), pp 130, 135-136; see, e.g., 2 Works of John Adams  
(Boston: Little & Brown, 1850), pp 45-50.  
In the period between the American Revolution and the  
Civil War, however, regulation of the profession receded.5  By  
5See, e.g., Ind Const 1851, art VII, § 21 ("Every person 
(continued...)  
6  
the turn of the last century, increasing concern had developed  
that the spread of unlicenced practitioners was harmful to the  
profession and dangerous to the public.  See Comment,  
Unauthorized practice of law—The full service bank that was:  
Bank cashier enjoined from preparing real estate mortgages to  
secure bank loans, 61 Ky L J 300, 303-304 (1972).  
Thus, at the time our unauthorized practice of law  
statutes were enacted, there was a trend toward restoring the  
organized bar as a means of regulating the practice of law.  
At the core of this movement and of all other attempts to  
regulate the practice was an interest in protecting the public  
from the danger of unskilled persons practicing law.  See  
Comment, supra at 301-302, 304. It became the basic purpose  
for our unauthorized practice statutes.  As we stated in  
Cramer, "'Laymen are excluded from law practice . . . solely  
to protect the public.' . . . It is this purpose of public  
protection which must dictate the construction we put on the  
term 'unauthorized practice of law'."  Id., at 134, quoting  
Oregon State Bar v Security Escrows, Inc, 233 Or 80, 87; 377  
P2d 334 (1962).  
Having discerned the purpose of the statutes, we now  
explore the extent of their reach.  In this regard, we find  
5(...continued) 
of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to 
admission to practice law in all courts of justice.")  
7  
  
 
persuasive the analysis of the trial judge in this case, Judge  
Dennis Kolenda.  
B. CONDUCT PROSCRIBED BY THE STATUTES  
Judge Kolenda noted:  
Some activities are plainly the practice of  
law.  "'It is too obvious for discussion'" that  
"'the conduct of cases in courts'" is the practice 
of law, as is "'the preparation of pleadings and 
other papers incident to actions . . . and the 
management of such actions and proceedings on 
behalf of clients before judges and courts . . . 
[.]" Detroit Bar Assn v Union Guardian Trust Co,  
282 Mich 216, 222[ 276 NW 365] (1937), quoting In  
re Duncan, 83 SC 186; 65 SE 210 (1909); and  
Denkema, [supra] at 63.  Doing those things, at 
least doing them well, demands the unique training 
and skills of an attorney. It is likewise obvious  
that, for the same reason, the practice of law 
includes "the giving of legal advice in any action 
taken for others in any matter connected with the 
law," [id.] at 63, even though unrelated to any 
action in court.  Much of what lawyers do is 
"'performed outside of any court and [has] no 
immediate relation to proceedings in court,'" [id.] 
at 64, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass 
607, 613; 194 NE 313 (1934), and giving competent 
legal advice requires a lawyer's training and 
skill.  
More problematic is the drafting of documents.  
In Denkema, supra [at 63], our Supreme Court said 
that the practice of law includes "the preparation 
of all legal instruments of all kinds whereby a 
legal right is secured," and in Detroit Bar Assn, 
[supra] at 221, that Court quoted holdings from 
other courts which included within the practice of 
law "'the drafting of legal documents of all kinds. 
[ . . .]'" Very significantly, however, the Court 
prefaced those quotations with the reservation, 
"[w]ithout giving full sanction thereto," Id., and 
a careful reading of those and subsequent cases 
discloses that such a broad definition has never  
actually been applied in this State.  Only some 
documents, e.g., wills, have actually been held to 
constitute the practice of law, [Denkema, supra] at  
8  
 
 
 
65.
 When composing a document requires "the 
determination of the legal effect of special facts 
and conditions," that activity is the practice of 
law, [Ingham Co Bar Ass'n v Walter Neller Co, 342 
Mich 214, 228; 69 NW2d 713 (1955)(citations 
omitted).]  "[P]rofound legal knowledge [is]  
necessary" to properly draft such documents.  
Detroit Bar Assn, [supra] at 223 (citations 
omitted).  
The practice of law does not, on the other 
hand, encompass drafting "the ordinary run of 
agreements [used] in the every day activities of 
the commercial and industrial world," Detroit Bar  
Assn, [supra] at 229. Legal training and knowledge 
are not necessary to properly compose them.  
Drafting simple documents, which drafting does not 
entail giving advice or counsel as to their legal 
effect and validity, is not the practice of law. 
Denkema, 
[supra] 
at 
66. 
Specifically, 
the  
preparation of ordinary leases, mortgages and deeds 
do not involve the practice of law, [Walter Neller  
Co, 342 Mich 226-227.]  They have become "'so 
standardized that to complete them for usual  
transactions requires only ordinary intelligence 
rather than legal training.'" Id. at 224, quoting 
Hulse v Criger, 363 Mo 26, 44; 247 [SW2d] 855  
(1952).
 To insist that only a lawyer can draft 
such documents would impede numerous commercial 
transactions without protecting the public, [id.] 
at 229, i.e., would not further the purpose of 
restricting the practice of law to trained and 
licensed attorneys. Cramer, [supra] at 133.  
Hence, our courts have consistently rejected the  
assertion 
that 
the 
Legislature thought that a person practiced  
law when simply drafting a document that affected legal rights  
and responsibilities.  Walter Neller, 342 Mich 228-229;  
Cramer, 399 Mich 133.  Instead, our courts have found a  
violation of the unauthorized practice of law statutes when a  
person counseled another in matters that required the use of  
legal knowledge and discretion. We agree and reiterate that  
9  
a person6 engages in the practice of law when he counsels or  
assists another in matters that require the use of legal  
discretion and profound legal knowledge.  
This definition is in accord with the purpose of the  
statutes, the protection of the public.  It maintains the  
integrity of the legal profession without overburdening our  
normal economic activities with unnecessary restrictions.  
Also, it provides parties with a common-sense approach to  
conforming their conduct so as to avoid committing the  
unauthorized practice of law.7  
IV. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES  
Plaintiffs 
contend 
that 
defendant's 
activities  
constituted the unauthorized practice of law because they  
affected plaintiffs' legal rights and responsibilities.  
Plaintiffs also contend that defendant's decision to charge a  
6As used in this opinion, "person" refers to any legal 
entity.  
7A report by the American Bar Association's Task Force on 
the Model Definition of the Practice of Law supports our 
conclusion that this definition comports with the general 
purpose for regulating the practice of law.  The Task Force  
reviewed the regulation of the practice of law among the 
several states and ultimately recommended "that every 
jurisdiction adopt a definition of the practice of law . . . 
[that] include[s] the basic premise that the practice of law 
is the application of legal principles and judgment to the 
circumstances or objectives of another person or entity."  See  
Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on the Model 
Definition of the Practice of Law to the House of Delegates, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_429.pdf. 
June 11,2003.  
10  
 
fee for its services compels a holding that it engaged in the  
practice of law and the "law business."  
As we noted previously, the preparation of ordinary  
mortgages is not the practice of law.  Plaintiffs do not  
assert that the bank's preparation of their mortgage document  
was in conjunction with anything other than an ordinary  
transaction in the normal course of the bank's  business.  
The bank's employees did not draft the mortgage document.  
They merely completed a standard form document that the  
federal government compiled and that is readily available to  
the public.  
In performing the act of completing the standard form  
mortgage, defendant was acting as an amanuensis, a kind of  
secretary for plaintiffs.  No legal knowledge or discretion  
was involved in the document's completion. The bank did not  
counsel plaintiffs with regard to the legal validity of the  
document or the prudence of entering into the transaction.  In  
general, the completion of standard legal forms that are  
available to the public does not constitute the practice of  
law. State Bar of Michigan v Kupris, 366 Mich 688, 694; 116  
NW2d 341 (1962); see also Denkema, 290 Mich 68; Walter Neller,  
324 Mich 222.  Accordingly, defendant was not practicing law  
when it completed the mortgage form at issue in this case.  
Moreover, because defendant was not practicing law when  
it completed the mortgage, it was not engaged in the "law  
11  
 
 
 
business."  It is immaterial that it charged a fee for its  
services.  Charging a fee for nonlegal services does not  
transmogrify those services into the practice of law.8  
CONCLUSION  
We hold that a person engages in the practice of law when  
he counsels or assists another in matters that require the use  
of legal discretion and profound legal knowledge. Defendant  
completed standard mortgage forms for plaintiffs and charged  
a fee for the service.  But it did not counsel or assist  
plaintiffs in matters requiring legal discretion or profound  
legal knowledge.  Therefore, it did not engage in the practice  
8Plaintiffs' reliance on Walter Neller and Kupris for the  
proposition that charging a fee for a law-related service 
constitutes the practice of law is misplaced.  
In Walter Neller, we remarked that a realtor who charged 
a separate fee for a real estate closing might be engaged in 
the practice of law.  However, the holding in the case was 
that the defendant was not practicing law by completing and 
executing 
form 
documents that were incidental to his business.  
In Kupris, the defendant real estate broker was enjoined 
from advising another broker and that broker's clients in the 
preparation of a chattel mortgage.  The fact that the  
defendant had charged a fee for the service does not bind that 
case to this.  Rather, what distinguishes Kupris from both  
Walter Neller and this case is that there the defendant took  
upon himself the role of advising others about the legal 
effect of a document.  Kupris, 366 Mich 692-693.  
Because the discussions about charging a fee were not 
necessary to the resolution of either case, they are obiter 
dicta.
 Thus, neither discussion constitutes a holding to 
which the binding principle of stare decisis is applied. 
People v Bouchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 286 n 4; 597 NW2d 1 
(1999), citing Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594,  
596; 374 NW2d 905 (1985).  
12  
of law and did not violate MCL 450.681. Accordingly, we  
reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the  
circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of  
defendant.  
Marilyn Kelly 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
13  
___________________________________ 
 
v 
 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PAUL DRESSEL and THERESA DRESSEL,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 119959  
AMERIBANK,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur with the majority that the filling out of  
standardized mortgage documents does not constitute the  
practice of law.  
I disagree, however, with the reasoning employed by the  
majority in reaching this conclusion.  Specifically, I  
seriously question the majority's attempt to formulate a  
comprehensive definition of the "practice of law." Such a  
definition runs contrary to prior precedent and appears to  
contribute little clarity or guidance to the unauthorized­
practice-of-law analysis.  
This Court has long held that the "practice of law"  
defies precise definition. "‘Even if possible, it is not  
practical or advisable to attempt specific definition of  
 
 
“practice of law.”’" Detroit Bar Ass'n v Union Guardian Trust  
Co, 282 Mich 216, 220; 276 NW 365 (1937) (citation omitted).  
This reluctance to adopt an inclusive definition of the  
"practice of law" derives from the fact that "under our system  
of jurisprudence such practice must necessarily change with  
the everchanging business and social order." Grand Rapids Bar  
Ass'n v Denkema, 290 Mich 56, 64; 287 NW 377 (1939); see also  
Ingham Co Bar Ass'n v Walter Neller Co, 342 Mich 214; 69 NW2d  
713 (1955); State Bar of Michigan v Kupris, 366 Mich 688; 116  
NW2d 341 (1962); State Bar of Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich 116;  
249 NW2d 1 (1976).  Constant new developments in society,  
technology, business, and the law preclude any chance of  
arriving at a lasting definition.1  
Today, the majority deviates from this longstanding  
restraint and defines the "practice of law" as "counsel[ing]  
or assist[ing] another in matters that require the use of  
legal discretion or profound legal knowledge." Ante at 12-13.  
1 The view that the "practice of law" does not admit of  
exact definition is shared by many other jurisdictions. 
Arkansas Bar Ass’n v Block, 230 Ark 430; 323 SW2d 912 (1959);  
State of Florida v Sperry, 140 So 2d 587 (Fla, 1962); Fought  
& Co, Inc v Steel Engineering and Erection, Inc, 87 Hawaii 37; 
951 P2d 487 (1998); Iowa Supreme Court Comm on Unauthorized  
Practice of Law v Sturgeon, 635 NW2d 679 (Iowa, 2001); Bd of  
Overseers of the Bar v Mangan, 2001 ME 7; 763 A2d 1189 (2001); 
Cardinal v Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc, 433 NW2d 864  
(Minn, 1988); State of Nebraska v Childe, 147 Neb 527; 23 NW2d 
720 (1946); Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayer’s Rights, 137 NH  
720; 634 A2d 1345 (1993); State of North Dakota v Niska, 380  
NW2d 646 (ND, 1986).  
2  
 
To reach this new standard, the majority analyzes the purpose  
of the statute—the protection of the public from untrained  
legal practitioners—and extrapolates a definition meant to  
effectuate that purpose. Ante at 6-7.2  
However, I do not believe that the majority's definition  
(or, for that matter, any definition) will better protect the  
public than the statute currently does.  Whether certain  
conduct requires the use of "legal discretion or profound  
legal knowledge" is as open-ended an inquiry as whether that  
same conduct constitutes the "practice of law."  "Legal  
discretion" and "profound legal knowledge" are amorphous  
concepts that, like the "practice of law," do not lend  
themselves to a single interpretation.  Thus, even with the  
majority's definition, a lack of consensus will persist among  
the courts.  Moreover, any attempt to conclusively define the  
term 
necessarily 
runs the risk of sweeping too broadly—thereby  
impeding 
public 
access to certain quasi-legal services at more  
competitive prices—or cutting too narrowly—thereby permitting  
nonlawyers to engage in legal activities to the detriment of  
the public.  See United States Department of Justice and  
Federal Trade Commission December 20, 2002, joint letter  
recommending that the "practice of law" not be defined.  
2 
 The majority does not explain what has changed that 
allows it to define today what it was incapable of defining in 
the past.  
3  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm.  
The prudent and restrained course therefore seems to be  
to remain committed to our prior holdings and continue  
deciding these issues on a case-by-case basis.  Since no  
definition of the "practice of law" can fully account for the  
infinite variety of fact situations that will inevitably  
arise, it is best to decide these cases in light of their  
specific 
circumstances.  This approach allows the lower courts  
to explore the concept's dimensions without confining their  
analyses to the parameters of an artificial formula.  
Judge 
Kolenda's 
exemplary 
opinion 
demonstrates 
the 
wisdom  
of this approach.  In his opinion, Judge Kolenda traced the  
relevant case law, examined it in light of the facts of the  
case, and properly concluded that filling out standardized  
mortgage documents does not constitute the practice of law.  
I support and adopt both his case-specific method of analysis  
and his conclusion.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
4