Title: State v. Ryan
Citation: 2012 WI 16
Docket Number: 2009AP003075
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2012

2012 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP3075 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Basil E. Ryan, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2011 WI App 21 
Reported at: 331 Wis. 2d 491, 796 N.W. 2d 23 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 28, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Cooper 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (Opinion filed).  
GABLEMAN, J. joins concurrence.     
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J. did not participate.  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Dan Biersdorf, E. Kelly Keady and Biersdorf & 
Associates, S.C. and oral argument by Dan Biersdorf. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Joanne 
F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
 
2012 WI 16
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP3075 
(L.C. No. 
2008CX4) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Basil E. Ryan, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 28, 2012 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Defendant Basil E. Ryan, Jr. 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
affirming orders of the circuit court.1  This is a forfeiture 
action in which the State alleged that Ryan unlawfully placed 
and maintained a sunken barge on the bed of the Menomonee River 
                                                 
1 See State v. Ryan, 2011 WI App 21, 331 Wis. 2d 491, 796 
N.W.2d 23 (affirming orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee 
County, Christopher R. Foley, Judge, and Thomas R. Cooper, 
Judge).  
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
2 
 
in violation of Wis. Stat. ch. 30 (2009-10).2  The circuit court 
concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Ryan 
from asserting that he did not own the barge, and it granted 
summary judgment in favor of the State. 
¶2 
The State contends that the elements of judicial 
estoppel are satisfied and the circuit court properly applied 
the doctrine to prevent Ryan from disclaiming ownership of the 
barge.  Additionally, it argues that under the circumstances of 
this forfeiture action, summary judgment was permitted because 
the State commenced the action with a complaint and summons and 
Ryan filed a written answer in lieu of appearing in court and 
entering a not guilty plea.    
¶3 
We conclude that two essential elements of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel are not satisfied.  The documents 
produced by the State do not demonstrate that Ryan took a 
position in the writ proceedings that is "clearly inconsistent" 
with Ryan's current position.  Further, they do not demonstrate 
that Ryan "convinced the first court" that he or his corporate 
entities owned the barge.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously invoked the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel.     
¶4 
We further conclude that summary judgment is not 
permitted in forfeiture actions for violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 
30.  The relevant procedural statutes cannot be reconciled with 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
3 
 
the summary judgment procedure.  Although the parties agreed to 
the filing of a written answer in lieu of an appearance, such an 
agreement cannot provide the basis to impose upon the statutory 
scheme a summary judgment procedure that does not otherwise 
exist.   
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  Even if summary judgment were available, it 
would not have been appropriate here because there are genuine 
issues of material fact.    
I 
¶6 
This forfeiture action began on February 4, 2008, when 
the State served Basil E. Ryan, Jr., with a summons and 
complaint alleging that he violated state statutes prohibiting 
the obstruction of navigable waters.  However, the facts 
necessary for a full understanding of this case began well 
before Ryan's alleged violation.   
¶7 
Ryan is associated with a number of related entities 
that conducted business at 260 North 12th Street in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.  The property, which abutted the Menomonee River, was 
owned by 260 North 12th Street, LLC.  Another of the entities, 
B.E. Ryan Enterprises, Inc. (Ryan Enterprises), received fees 
for storing upwards of 400 vehicles on the property.     
¶8 
In addition to storing vehicles, Ryan Enterprises also 
stored a barge, which floated on the Menomonee River and was 
moored to a concrete wall.  It is this barge that is the subject 
of the forfeiture action.   
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
4 
 
¶9 
In March of 2005, the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) exercised its eminent domain authority to take the 260 
North 
12th 
Street 
property. 
 
During 
the 
eminent 
domain 
proceedings, Ryan's then-attorney, Alan Marcuvitz, submitted a 
form to the DOT entitled "Relocation Business Questionnaire" 
(hereinafter, the relocation form).3  It appears that the purpose 
of the relocation form was to identify property eligible for 
relocation assistance under Wis. Admin. Code § COMM 202.52(1).  
The completed relocation form indicated that "Basil E. Ryan, Jr. 
d/b/a/ Ryan Marina"4 provided "storage of barge and boats" and 
that "currently, single barge is stored by owner (Ryan)."    
¶10 Ryan and his businesses were given 90 days to vacate 
the property, but they failed to do so by the specified date.  
Accordingly, the DOT filed a petition for a Writ of Assistance 
requesting that the circuit court assist it in obtaining 
possession of the property (hereinafter, the writ proceeding).  
The circuit court of Milwaukee County, Judge Foley presiding, 
conducted a two-day hearing.  It does not appear that the 
ownership of the barge was specifically litigated during that 
hearing.   
¶11 Ultimately, the circuit court issued an Order for Writ 
of Assistance, dated July 19, 2005.  It provided, in part: "IT 
                                                 
3 Ryan now claims that it was his former attorney who filled 
out the relocation form and that Ryan never saw it until the 
State introduced it as evidence in this forfeiture action.   
4 In an affidavit filed in this case, Ryan averred that 
"Ryan Marina" was a trade name used by Ryan Enterprises.  
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
5 
 
IS FURTHER ORDERED, that all Respondents will remove all of 
their personal property, including the barge, and will vacate 
the premises located at 260 North 12th Street, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin" on or before August 1, 2005.  
¶12 Ryan and his businesses vacated the property without 
removing the barge.  The barge remained secured to the concrete 
wall, and almost a year later, it partially sank and became 
stuck in the river bed.  
¶13 In 
October 
of 
2006, 
the 
Department 
of 
Natural 
Resources (DNR) sent a notice of violation to Ryan.  The notice 
informed Ryan that, due to the sunken barge in the Menomonee 
River, the DNR had reason to believe that he was in violation of 
various statutes governing navigable waters.   
¶14 In response to the notice of violation, Ryan's then-
attorney sent a letter to the DNR on October 16, 2006 (the 
October 2006 letter).5  The letter alleged that Ryan was not 
responsible and that the barge sank as a result of the DOT's 
negligence.  It continued: "With full reservation of the rights 
of the barge owner, we are nonetheless willing to address the 
matter by floating and removing the barge, thus eliminating the 
problem, while still leaving for resolution on another day, both 
cost placement and responsibility for damage experienced."    
¶15 Despite the assertions in the October 2006 letter, 
Ryan never removed the barge.  Accordingly, the State commenced 
                                                 
5 Ryan contends that he was never consulted about the 
contents of the October 2006 letter.  
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
6 
 
this forfeiture action alleging violations of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 30.10(2) and 30.12(1)(a).6   
¶16 The 
procedural 
statutes 
governing 
Chapter 
30 
forfeitures set forth two options for commencing an action: by a 
citation or by complaint and summons.  Wis. Stat. § 23.52.  In 
this case, the State opted to serve a complaint and summons.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 23.55(2)(b), the summons must contain a 
"direction summoning and requiring the defendant to appear in a 
specified court on a particular date . . . to answer the 
accompanying complaint."  During oral argument in this court, 
the State explained that the parties had deviated from the 
statutory procedures: "In this case, as in others that the 
Department of Justice has brought, other Chapter 30 actions, the 
parties agree that the defendant will waive his or her 
appearance and instead file an answer to the complaint, and 
that's what happened here."  Accordingly, Ryan filed a written 
answer asserting that he was not responsible for the barge 
sinking and that any violation was caused by the DOT.   
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.10(2) provides:  "Except as provided 
under sub. (4)(c) and (d), all streams, sloughs, bayous and 
marsh outlets, which are navigable in fact for any purpose 
whatsoever, are declared navigable to the extent that no dam, 
bridge or other obstruction shall be made in or over the same 
without the permission of the state." 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 30.12(1)(a) 
provides: 
"Unless 
an 
individual or a general permit has been issued under this 
section or authorization has been granted by the legislature, no 
person may do any of the following: (a) Deposit any material or 
place any structure upon the bed of any navigable water where no 
bulkhead line has been established."  
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
7 
 
¶17 Shortly thereafter, the State filed a motion for 
summary 
judgment. 
 
As 
grounds, 
it 
asserted 
that 
"[t]he 
undisputed facts establish that Ryan owns the barge and has 
maintained an obstruction and structure in the form of the barge 
on the bed of the Menomonee River without a permit."   
¶18 To show that Ryan undisputedly owned the barge, the 
State relied on three documents: the relocation form, which 
stated that "currently, single barge is stored by owner (Ryan)"; 
the Order for Writ of Assistance, which required "that all 
Respondents 
will 
remove 
all 
of 
their 
personal 
property, 
including the barge"; and the October 2006 letter, which stated 
that "[w]ith full reservation of the rights of the barge owner, 
we are nonetheless willing to address the matter by floating and 
removing the barge. . . ."   
¶19  Ryan filed a memorandum opposing the State's motion 
for summary judgment.  In the attached affidavit, Ryan asserted 
that the barge was actually owned by a man named Richard 
Schumacher.  He averred that years before, Ryan Enterprises 
permitted the barge to be docked at the property in exchange for 
a storage fee.  After a period of time, however, Schumacher 
stopped paying the storage fees, and Ryan Enterprises maintained 
possession of the barge and corresponding lien rights for the 
unpaid 
fees. 
 
Ryan 
contended 
that 
Ryan 
Enterprises 
has 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
8 
 
maintained control, but not ownership, of the barge for 
approximately fifteen years.7 
¶20 In its reply, the State argued that even if Ryan did 
not own the barge, he possessed and controlled it during the 
relevant time period and thus was responsible for the violation.  
The State contended that the true ownership of the barge was 
immaterial to Ryan's liability under the statutes: "Ryan errs 
when he states that a person must own the obstruction or 
material. . . . [No] 
language 
in 
the 
law 
imposes 
such 
a 
requirement.  Rather, the liability attaches to the person 
responsible for the obstruction or placement of the material."  
Additionally, the State argued that the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel prevented Ryan from claiming that he did not own the 
barge.  
¶21 The circuit court held a hearing on the State's motion 
for summary judgment.  In a letter decision, it determined that 
Ryan failed to present any evidence to support his assertion 
that the barge sank as a result of the DOT's negligence.  It 
further determined that "the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
precludes Ryan from denying that he or a Ryan corporate entity 
owned and controlled the barge at all pertinent times."   
¶22 In concluding that the elements of judicial estoppel 
were met, the circuit court relied on the three documents 
provided by the State:  
                                                 
7 Additionally, Ryan averred that the DOT caused the barge 
to sink by removing the cables that connected the barge to tow 
trucks.   
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
9 
 
Mr. Ryan and his corporate concerns affirmatively 
asserted ownership of the barge as personal property. 
They 
did 
so 
in 
the 
Relocation 
Business 
Questionnaire, . . .; they did so in Mr. Marcuvitz's 
letter on behalf of Mr. Ryan and his concerns dated 
October 16, 2006 . . . ; and, most importantly, they 
agreed to entry of an order which specifically 
determined that the barge was the "personal property" 
of Ryan or a Ryan concern.  
¶23 The circuit court granted partial summary judgment.8  
Shortly thereafter, the case was transferred to Judge Cooper, 
who entered an order consistent with Judge Foley's decision.    
¶24 Ryan filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the 
court's decision to invoke judicial estoppel.  Additionally, he 
asserted that summary judgment is not permitted in a forfeiture 
action for violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  He asked the court 
to set the matter for trial.   
¶25 The circuit court denied Ryan's motion.  It concluded: 
"Now, I'm not a big fan of summary judgments, but I am persuaded 
that the summary judgment motion can lie in this type of 
proceeding based upon the filing of a [summons and complaint]. 
                                                 
8 The circuit court reserved for another day questions about 
whether Ryan could be held personally liable for the forfeiture 
under Wis. Stat. § 30.292.  Ultimately, after conducting a 
hearing and reviewing the parties' affidavits, the circuit 
court, 
Judge 
Cooper 
presiding, 
concluded 
that 
Ryan 
was 
personally liable and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
State.  Ryan did not appeal the court's determination on 
personal liability, and it is therefore not on review in this 
court.   
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
10 
 
And one of the reasons I'm doing that is to keep this case going 
on the same track as the prior half of the case."9      
¶26 Having established that Ryan was liable under the 
statutes, the court moved on to determine the appropriate 
remedy.  To that end, it held a three-day trial.  Ultimately, 
the court imposed forfeitures on Ryan in the amount of 
$37,691.25 and required him to pay to remove the barge.  
¶27 Ryan appealed.  He argued that the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel was inapplicable and that summary judgment was 
not permitted to resolve the forfeiture action.       
¶28 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court.  It concluded that the elements of judicial 
estoppel had been satisfied.  State v. Ryan, 2011 WI App 21, 
¶27, 331 Wis. 2d 491, 796 N.W.2d 23.  In addition, it determined 
that the procedural aspects of Wis. Stat. ch. 30 forfeiture 
actions, set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 23.50-23.85, are consistent 
with summary judgment methodology, and therefore the circuit 
court did not err in permitting the State to move for summary 
judgment.  Id., ¶25.   
                                                 
9 Judge Cooper expressed some concern about the prior 
decisions made by the circuit court.  However, he concluded: "I 
don't see anything that raises to the level of requiring me to 
find that Judge Foley made error. . . . [A]rguably he did, maybe 
he didn't, but it's not such that I'm ready to step in and 
impose my judgment over his."   
Ryan filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal but later 
withdrew it.  Additionally, Ryan made a second, subsequent 
motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the circuit 
court.   
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
11 
 
II 
¶29 This case requires us to answer two questions.  We must 
determine whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents 
Ryan from disclaiming ownership of the barge.10  Additionally, we 
must determine whether summary judgment is permitted in a 
forfeiture action for violations of Chapter 30. 
¶30 Whether the elements of the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel are met is a question of law that we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State v. White, 2008 WI App 96, 
¶15, 312 Wis. 2d 799, 754 N.W.2d 214.  If the elements are met, 
however, the decision to invoke the doctrine is left to the 
discretion of the circuit court.  Salveson v. Douglas County, 
2001 WI 100, ¶38, 245 Wis. 2d 497, 630 N.W.2d 182.   
¶31 Whether summary judgment is permitted in a forfeiture 
action for violation of Chapter 30 is also a question of law, 
which we review independently of the determinations rendered by 
                                                 
10 Although the circuit court determined that Ryan was 
precluded from denying that "he or a Ryan corporate entity owned 
and controlled the barge at all pertinent times," the court's 
analysis focused on Ryan's alleged assertion of ownership: "Mr. 
Ryan and his corporate concerns affirmatively asserted ownership 
of the barge as personal property."  See supra, ¶¶21, 22 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, we focus our analysis on whether 
Ryan is judicially estopped from asserting that he owned the 
barge.    
We 
recognize 
that 
the 
parties' 
arguments 
on 
the 
significance of ownership and control have evolved during the 
course of this litigation.  See supra, ¶20.     
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
12 
 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  See State v. 
Hyndman, 170 Wis. 2d 198, 205, 488 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1992).   
III 
¶32 We begin by addressing the circuit court's application 
of the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel.  Judicial 
estoppel is intended "to protect against a litigant playing 
'fast and loose with the courts' by asserting inconsistent 
positions" in different legal proceedings.  State v. Petty, 201 
Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).  "The doctrine 
precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal 
proceeding and then subsequently asserting an inconsistent 
position."  Id.  "[J]udicial estoppel is not directed to the 
relationship between the parties, but is intended to protect the 
judiciary as an institution from the perversion of judicial 
machinery."  Id. at 346.   
¶33 For judicial estoppel to be available, three elements 
must be satisfied: (1) the later position must be clearly 
inconsistent with the earlier position; (2) the facts at issue 
should be the same in both cases; and (3) the party to be 
estopped must have convinced the first court to adopt its 
position.  Id. at 348.   
¶34 It is undisputed that the facts from the writ 
proceeding and the facts from this case are the same.  Thus, the 
focus of our inquiry is whether Ryan's current position——that he 
and his corporate entities do not own the barge——is "clearly 
inconsistent" with the position he took in the writ proceeding, 
and whether Ryan "convinced" the first court to adopt the 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
13 
 
position that he or one of his corporate entities owned the 
barge when it issued the Order for a Writ of Assistance. 
¶35 In concluding that Ryan was judicially estopped from 
asserting that he and his corporate entities did not own the 
barge, the circuit court relied on three documents: the 
relocation form; the circuit court's Order for a Writ of 
Assistance; and the October 2006 letter from Ryan's former 
attorney.   
¶36 We begin by observing that the October 2006 letter 
lends no support to the court's application of judicial 
estoppel.  That letter was sent to the DOT more than a year 
after the court issued the Order for a Writ of Assistance.  
Accordingly, it did not exist during the writ proceeding, and it 
could not have played a role in the court's decision to order 
Ryan to "remove all of [his] personal property, including the 
barge."  The State concedes as much by stating that "the letter 
alone cannot support a judicial estoppel determination."11   
                                                 
11 There are two additional reasons that the October 2006 
letter does not support the circuit court's judicial estoppel 
determination.  First, because it is ambiguous, it is not 
"clearly inconsistent" with Ryan's current position that he and 
his corporate entities do not own the barge.  Although Ryan's 
former attorney made reference to "the rights of the barge 
owner," he never named the barge owner as Basil E. Ryan, Jr., 
Ryan Enterprises, or 260 N. 12th St, LLC.  Second, the letter 
was a communication between Ryan and the DNR rather than a 
communication intended to "convince[] the first court" that Ryan 
owned the barge.  As we explain below, "judicial estoppel is not 
directed to the relationship between the parties," but rather 
"is intended to protect the judiciary as an institution[.]"  
State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 346, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).     
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
14 
 
¶37 We turn to the remaining documents, the relocation 
form and the Order for a Writ of Assistance issued by the court.  
The relocation form was allegedly completed by Ryan's former 
attorney and sent to the DOT during the eminent domain 
proceedings.  The form indicated that Ryan's business provided 
"storage of barge and boats" and that "currently, single barge 
is stored by owner (Ryan)."   
¶38 The position taken in the relocation form is not 
"clearly inconsistent" with Ryan's current position that he does 
not own the barge.  The statement that "currently, single barge 
is stored by owner (Ryan)" is ambiguous.  The word "owner" could 
refer to the owner of the barge.  Equally likely, however, is 
that the word "owner" refers to the owner of the business (Ryan 
Enterprises) or the owner of the real property (260 N. 12th 
Street).  The later meanings are especially likely because the 
relocation form was submitted during Ryan's negotiations with 
the DOT in an eminent domain proceeding, where the focus was on 
the rights of the property owners and businesses using the 
property.   
¶39 Because it is not clear whether Ryan was referring to 
the owner of the barge or the owner of the businesses and real 
property, his statements in the relocation form are not "clearly 
inconsistent" with his current position that he and his 
corporate entities do not own the barge.  As the court of 
appeals has explained, "Judicial estoppel, after all, is an 
equitable determination and should be used only when the 
positions taken are clearly inconsistent."  Harrison v. Labor 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
15 
 
Indust. Rev. Comm'n, 187 Wis. 2d 491, 497-98, 523 N.W.2d 138 
(Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis in original).   
¶40 In addition, even if we assume that the relocation 
form was an unambiguous attempt by Ryan to assert his ownership 
of the barge, the relocation form fails to satisfy the third 
element of judicial estoppel.  It does not demonstrate that Ryan 
"convinced the first court to adopt [his] position."   
¶41 "[J]udicial 
estoppel 
is 
not 
directed 
to 
the 
relationship between the parties," but rather "is intended to 
protect the judiciary as an institution[.]"  Petty, 201 
Wis. 2d at 346.  The relocation form was a communication between 
Ryan and the DOT which predated the writ proceedings.  By 
submitting the relocation form to the DOT, Ryan was not 
attempting to "convince[] the first court" that he owned the 
barge.  For that reason, we reject the State's argument that the 
relocation form was "akin to [a] judicial admission."12  
                                                 
12 In support of its argument that the relocation form is 
"akin to a judicial admission," the State cites to City of 
Wisconsin Dells v. Dells Fireworks, Inc., 197 Wis. 2d 1, 539 
N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1995).  In that case, a party made a 
"clear, deliberate and unequivocal statement of fact" while 
testifying during an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 17.  The court 
of appeals determined that the party's testimony was "a judicial 
admission."  Id.   
The testimony at issue in Dells Fireworks is not comparable 
to the statements made in the relocation form because the 
testimony in Dells Fireworks was made in court and to the court.  
By contrast, the statements in the relocation form were made 
prior to the writ proceeding and were directed to the opposing 
party. 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
16 
 
¶42 Once the relocation form is discounted, there is no 
evidence that Ryan took any position during the writ proceeding 
regarding the ownership of the barge.  To invoke the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel, the circuit court relied on the Order for 
Writ of Assistance, which required "that all Respondents will 
remove all of their personal property, including the barge."  
However, the Order for Writ of Assistance is a final document 
signed by the court, not a position taken by a litigant during 
the court proceedings.  Because it does not represent a position 
advanced by Ryan, it is not "clearly inconsistent" with his 
current position that he and his corporate entitles do not own 
the barge.   
¶43 Further, because the writ is not a position advanced 
by Ryan, it cannot be said that the Order for a Writ of 
Assistance evinces Ryan's attempt to "convince[] the first 
court" that he or his corporate entities owned the barge.  There 
is no evidence that the ownership of the barge was even at issue 
during the proceedings before the circuit court.  In response to 
Ryan's appeal in the writ proceeding, the DOT acknowledged that 
"the ownership of the barge was not an adjudicated fact 
deserving of any preclusive effect."   
¶44 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that two 
essential elements of the doctrine of judicial estoppel are not 
satisfied.  The October 2006 letter, the relocation form, and 
the Order for Writ of Assistance do not demonstrate that Ryan 
took a position in the writ proceedings that is "clearly 
inconsistent" with Ryan's current position.  Further, they do 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
17 
 
not demonstrate that Ryan "convinced the first court" that he or 
his corporate entities owned the barge.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously invoked the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel.     
IV 
¶45 We turn to the question of whether summary judgment is 
permitted in an action seeking forfeitures for violations of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  As discussed in greater detail below, the 
procedure for prosecuting Chapter 30 enforcement actions is set 
forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 23.     
¶46 We acknowledge that in prior opinions of this court, 
forfeiture actions have been resolved by summary judgment.  See, 
e.g., State v. Kelley, 2001 WI 84, 244 Wis. 2d 777, 629 
N.W.2d 601.  Like this case, Kelley involved a forfeiture action 
for an alleged violation of Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  Id., ¶21.  After 
the circuit court suggested and the parties agreed that "the 
legal 
issues 
might 
be 
resolved 
on 
summary 
judgment 
and 
stipulated facts," the circuit court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the State.13  Id., ¶¶17-18.   
¶47 On review, this court did not address any concerns 
about 
whether 
the 
summary 
judgment 
methodology 
was 
an 
                                                 
13 It does not appear that the circuit court in Kelley was 
strictly following the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 
23.  Although Chapter 23 does not permit discovery, see Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 23.73 
("Neither 
party 
is 
entitled 
to 
pretrial 
discovery . . . ."), the Kelleys' motion for summary judgment 
was supported in part by answers to interrogatories.  State v. 
Kelley, 2001 WI 84, ¶17, 244 Wis. 2d 777, 629 N.W.2d 601.  
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
18 
 
appropriate procedure.  However, our silence on this subject is 
unsurprising.   
¶48 The legal questions raised in Kelley were unrelated to 
the procedures that are permitted in forfeiture actions, and 
this court's opinion did not even cite to Wis. Stat. ch. 23, the 
relevant procedural statute.  Instead, the "complex question" 
before the court 
was purely substantive.14  Because the 
procedures used by the circuit court were not at issue in 
Kelley, 
the 
availability 
of 
summary 
judgment 
in 
such 
a 
proceeding was not decided by this court.  Likewise, other 
forfeiture cases resolved on summary judgment have not addressed 
the question of whether summary judgment is permitted in a Wis. 
Stat. ch. 30 forfeiture action.15 
¶49 We turn next to examining this question for the first 
time.  Summary judgment is a rule of civil procedure used to 
"avoid trials where there is nothing to try."  Hunter of 
Wisconsin, 
Inc. 
v. 
Hamilton, 
101 
Wis. 2d 460, 
470, 
304 
N.W.2d 752 
(1981). 
 
In 
cases 
where 
summary 
judgment 
is 
                                                 
14 Specifically, the legal question was whether one may be 
prosecuted under Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1)(a) for failure "to obtain 
a permit before depositing fill on land submerged below 
navigable water regardless of whether the land is above or below 
the ordinary high water mark."  Id., ¶43. 
15 See Oneida County v. Converse, 180 Wis. 2d 120, 508 
N.W.2d 416 (1993) (reversing a grant of summary judgment in a 
Chapter 30 forfeiture action without determining whether summary 
judgment was permitted); State v. Land Concepts, Ltd., 177 
Wis. 2d 24, 501 N.W.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1993) (affirming a grant of 
summary judgment in a Chapter 30 forfeiture action without 
determining whether summary judgment was permitted). 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
19 
 
permitted, it may be granted if the pleadings, together with any 
affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).     
¶50 Summary judgment is permitted "in circuit courts of 
this 
state 
in 
all 
civil 
actions 
and 
special 
proceedings . . . except where different procedure is prescribed 
by statute or rule."  Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2).  However, "mere 
silence 
regarding 
a 
rule 
of 
civil 
procedure 
does 
not 
automatically mean that the procedure is permitted."  State v. 
Schneck, 2002 WI App 239, ¶14, 257 Wis. 2d 704, 652 N.W.2d 434.  
"[T]he test for the application of the civil rules of procedure 
is 
not 
only 
whether 
the 
statutes 
governing 
the 
instant 
proceeding are silent on the matter or otherwise set out a 
different procedure, but also whether the instant proceeding can 
be reconciled with the rules of civil procedure."  Id., ¶7.      
¶51 The Schneck court evaluated whether summary judgment 
was permitted in a traffic forfeiture action under Wis. Stat. 
ch. 345.  Although Chapter 345 did not expressly provide that 
summary judgment was unavailable, the court concluded that "a 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 345 
forfeiture 
prosecution 
could 
not 
be 
reconciled with the summary judgment procedure set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08."  Id., ¶7. 
¶52 In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the 
summary judgment methodology with the pleading procedures set 
forth in Chapter 345.  Under the established summary judgment 
methodology, a circuit court begins by examining the complaint 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
20 
 
to determine whether it states a claim, and then turns to the 
answer to determine whether it joins a material issue of fact or 
law.  The Schneck court noted that the ordinary rules of civil 
procedure are well adapted to suit this methodology.  They 
require a summons and complaint, and the summons must "direct[] 
the defendant . . . to serve upon plaintiff's attorney . . . an 
answer" that asserts "every defense in law or fact."  Id., ¶9 
(citing Wis. Stat. §§ 801.09, 802.06).    
¶53 By contrast, the Schneck court determined that "there 
is nothing in ch. 345 that requires or contemplates the kind of 
responsive pleading" that would enable the circuit court to 
"perform even the rudimentary initial steps of summary judgment 
methodology."  Id., ¶10.  Rather, Chapter 345 requires the 
defendant to respond by pleading guilty, no contest, or not 
guilty.  Wis. Stat. § 345.40.  That sort of response is "not the 
equivalent of an answer in a conventional civil action" and does 
not "enable a trial court to determine if a material issue of 
fact or law has been joined."  Schneck, 257 Wis. 2d 704, ¶10.   
¶54 As Schneck illustrates, it is important to closely 
examine the relevant procedural statutes to see if they "can be 
reconciled with" the summary judgment procedure.  Wisconsin 
Stat. ch. 23 sets forth a series of unique and detailed 
procedures for prosecuting violations of the navigable waters 
statutes.16  
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 23.50(1) provides: "The procedure in 
ss. 23.50 to 23.85 applies to all action in circuit court to 
recover forfeitures . . . for violations of" Chapter 30.          
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
21 
 
¶55 Chapter 23 provides the State with two options for 
commencing an action: (1) an enforcing officer may commence the 
action by issuing a citation; or (2) a district attorney may 
commence the action by filing a complaint and summons.  Wis. 
Stat. § 23.52; Wis. Stat. § 23.62; Wis. Stat. § 23.65. 
¶56 If the action is commenced by citation, the citation 
must contain the requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. § 23.54.  
Among other requirements, the citation shall provide a "date, 
time and place for the court appearance, and a notice to 
appear."  Wis. Stat. § 23.54(3)(f).17        
¶57 If the State opts instead to commence the forfeiture 
action by complaint and summons, "[i]t must appear on the face 
of the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that a 
violation has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it."  Wis. Stat. § 23.55(1).  The summons must contain 
a "direction summoning and requiring the defendant to appear in 
a specified court on a particular date . . . to answer the 
accompanying complaint."  Wis. Stat. § 23.55(2)(b). 
¶58 Regardless of whether the action is commenced by 
citation or by complaint and summons, the citation or complaint 
                                                 
17 The defendant has the option of paying a deposit and 
stipulation in lieu of a court appearance, unless the court 
decides to summon the defendant rather than accept the payment.  
Wis. Stat. § 23.54(3)(g) and (j).  If the defendant makes a 
deposit and signs a stipulation, the defendant will be deemed to 
have tendered a plea of no contest and submitted to a 
forfeiture.  Wis. Stat. § 23.54(3)(j).  If the defendant does 
not make a deposit and fails to appear in court, the court may 
issue a summons or an arrest warrant.  Wis. Stat. § 23.54(3)(k).       
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
22 
 
may serve as the initial pleading.  Wis. Stat. § 23.68.  If the 
defendant appears, "the defendant shall be informed that he or 
she is entitled to a jury trial and then asked whether he or she 
wishes to plead."  Wis. Stat. § 23.70(1).  A defendant may plead 
guilty, not guilty, or no contest.  Wis. Stat. § 23.70(1). 
¶59 If the defendant pleads not guilty, "the court shall 
set a date for trial" unless both parties agree that the case 
may be tried "forthwith" and without a jury.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 23.72; Wis. Stat. § 23.71.  "Any motion which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue shall be 
made before trial."  Wis. Stat. § 23.69.  "Neither party is 
entitled to pretrial discovery[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 23.73.      
¶60 The phrase "summary judgment" does not appear anywhere 
in Chapter 23.  Nevertheless, the State argues that the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 23.69 expressly permits summary 
judgment.   
¶61 Wisconsin Stat. § 23.69 provides that "[a]ny motion 
which is capable of determination without the trial of the 
general issue shall be made before trial."  Although it is true 
that summary judgment is, by definition, a "motion which is 
capable of determination without the trial," it does not follow 
that Wis. Stat. § 23.69 expressly permits motions for summary 
judgment.   
¶62 In addition to summary judgment, there are many types 
of motions that could be "capable of determination without the 
trial of the general issue," such as motions dealing with issues 
of statutory interpretation, motions dealing with issues of 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
23 
 
constitutional interpretation, motions to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, and motions in limine to resolve evidentiary 
issues.  As we construe it, the import of Wis. Stat. § 23.69 is 
to dictate when certain motions "capable of determination 
without the trial" should be made.  However, Wis. Stat. § 23.69 
does not differentiate between the various types of pre-trial 
motions.  It makes no assessment regarding which of all 
conceivable pre-trial motions are permitted in the first 
instance.   
¶63 We conclude that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 23.69 
does 
not 
expressly 
permit 
summary 
judgment.  
Accordingly, as in Schneck, the question is whether "the instant 
proceeding 
can 
be 
reconciled 
with" 
the 
summary 
judgment 
procedure.  257 Wis. 2d 704, ¶7. 
  
¶64 The State appears to concede that summary judgment is 
inappropriate when the action is commenced with a citation and 
followed by the defendant's plea.  Like in Schneck, "a trial 
court cannot perform even the rudimentary initial steps of 
summary judgment methodology because the responses contemplated 
by these statutes are not the equivalent of an answer in a 
conventional civil action."  Id., ¶10.  Nevertheless, the State 
argues that the summary judgment procedure is "consistent with 
the complaint and answer form of action allowed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 23.55 and followed in this case."     
¶65 The procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 23.55 is not a 
"complaint and answer" procedure, but rather, a complaint and 
summons procedure.  Wisconsin Stat. § 23.55 provides that the 
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
24 
 
summons shall "requir[e] the defendant to appear in a specified 
court on a particular date . . . to answer the accompanying 
complaint."  Upon the appearance, the defendant is asked if he 
or she wishes to plead.  Wis. Stat. § 23.70(1).  According to 
Wis. Stat. § 23.72, "[i]f the defendant pleads not guilty the 
court shall set a date for trial or advise the defendant that he 
or she will be notified of the date set for trial."         
¶66 The State appears to acknowledge that this statute 
does not require a defendant to file a written answer asserting 
"every defense in law or fact," as Ryan did in this case.18  See 
Schneck, 257 Wis. 2d 704, ¶9 (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.06).  
However, the State contends that in cases like this, where the 
defendant in fact does file a written answer, the circuit court 
can determine whether issue is joined, whether there are 
material factual disputes, and whether one party is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
                                                 
18 The court of appeals erroneously concluded that a summons 
issued under Wis. Stat. § 23.55 "directs the defendant to answer 
the complaint."  State v. Ryan, 2011 WI App 21, ¶22, 331 
Wis. 2d 491, 796 N.W.2d 23.  It continued: "Thus, in an instance 
where a plaintiff initiates a claim via a complaint and summons 
pursuant to §§ 23.52 and 23.55, the trial court would be able 
not only to examine the complaint to determine whether it states 
a claim, but would also be able to evaluate the defendant's 
answer——written or otherwise——to determine whether it joins an 
issue of material fact."  Id. 
There is nothing in the statutes that prescribe the form 
and requirements of the defendant's "answer."  It appears that 
the only "answer" contemplated by Chapter 23 is a plea of 
guilty, not guilty, or no contest.  Wis. Stat. § 23.70.   
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
25 
 
¶67 Here, the parties agreed to the filing of a written 
answer in lieu of an appearance.  While such an agreement may be 
a reasonable practice under the circumstance, the agreement to 
file a written answer in lieu of an appearance cannot provide 
the basis to impose upon the statutory scheme a summary judgment 
procedure that does not otherwise exist.  It may be true that, 
due to the vagaries of how this case actually proceeded in the 
circuit court, the State's summons and complaint, combined with 
Ryan's written answer and the submitted affidavits, would be 
sufficient for the circuit court to conduct the established 
summary judgment methodology.  In many cases, however, summary 
judgment methodology could not be employed, either because the 
action was commenced with a citation, or because the defendant 
appeared in court and entered a plea without filing a written 
answer.         
¶68 Our conclusion that summary judgment is not permitted 
is buttressed by the desire for consistency and predictability.  
See Lord v. Hubbell, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 150, 169, 563 N.W.2d 913 
(Ct. App. 1997).19  The statutes contemplate that a defendant 
will respond to a citation or a complaint and summons by 
entering a plea.  It is undesirable to require courts to make ad 
hoc determinations regarding the permissibility of summary 
                                                 
19 See also Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 596, 151 
N.W.2d 664 (1967) (discussing the importance of predictability 
in the context of choice of law decisions); Johnson Controls, 
Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
665 N.W.2d 257 (discussing the importance of predictability and 
consistency as a basis for stare decisis).    
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
26 
 
judgment based on how the parties choose to proceed in a 
specific case.20   
¶69 We conclude that summary judgment is not permitted in 
forfeiture actions for violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  The 
relevant procedural statutes cannot be reconciled with the 
summary judgment procedure.  Although the parties agreed to the 
filing of a written answer in lieu of an appearance, such an 
agreement cannot provide the basis to impose upon the statutory 
scheme a summary judgment procedure that does not otherwise 
exist.21   
V 
 ¶70 In sum, we conclude that two essential elements of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel are not satisfied.  The documents 
produced by the State do not demonstrate that Ryan took a 
                                                 
20 Were we to conclude that the summary judgment procedure 
is permitted on a case-by-case basis, circuit courts would be 
called upon to make ad hoc determinations about the suitability 
of any written response.  For example, the court might be asked 
to decide whether a defendant's written not-guilty plea provided 
the court with sufficient information to perform the summary 
judgment methodology.  See concurrence, ¶82.  The resulting 
procedural uncertainty would be problematic because it would 
deprive 
parties 
in 
forfeiture 
actions 
of 
any 
settled 
expectations about how their cases could be disposed.     
If the legislature concludes that summary judgment is 
available under specific circumstances, it can amend the statute 
and provide specific guidance for litigants and courts.   
21 Our conclusion that summary judgment is not permitted 
alleviates the need to address Ryan's argument that the 
unavailability of discovery likewise precludes summary judgment.  
For the same reason, there is no occasion to address Ryan's 
arguments about the scope and meaning of Wis. Admin. Code § COMM 
202.52(1)(d).   
No. 
2009AP3075   
 
27 
 
position in the writ proceedings that is "clearly inconsistent" 
with Ryan's current position.  Further, they do not demonstrate 
that Ryan "convinced the first court" that he or his corporate 
entities owned the barge.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously invoked the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel.     
¶71 We further conclude that summary judgment is not 
permitted in forfeiture actions for violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 
30.  The relevant procedural statutes cannot be reconciled with 
the summary judgment procedure.  Although the parties agreed to 
the filing of a written answer in lieu of an appearance, such an 
agreement cannot provide the basis to impose upon the statutory 
scheme a summary judgment procedure that does not otherwise 
exist.   
¶72 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  Even if summary judgment were available, it 
would not have been appropriate here because there are genuine 
issues of material fact. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.  
¶73 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
1 
 
¶74 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur with the majority's mandate to reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for further proceedings.  I agree with the majority that the 
circuit court erred by concluding that Ryan was judicially 
estopped from disclaiming ownership of the barge.  See majority 
op., ¶3.  However, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion 
that summary judgment is never permitted in forfeiture actions 
for alleged violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  See id., ¶4.  Much 
like the court of appeals determined in this case, see State v. 
Ryan, 2011 WI App 21, ¶25, 331 Wis. 2d 491, 796 N.W.2d 23, I 
conclude that summary judgment is permitted in chapter 30 
forfeiture actions such as this one, in which the action is 
commenced by a complaint and summons and the defendant appears 
by filing an answer to the complaint.  At the same time, unlike 
the court of appeals, see id., ¶29, I conclude that, in this 
case, the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment to 
the State because Ryan set forth sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning ownership of the 
barge.  Accordingly, albeit on different grounds, I concur with 
the majority's mandate to reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
¶75 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), summary judgment 
"shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
2 
 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Our summary judgment methodology 
is often-stated and well-understood.  In State v. Schneck, 2002 
WI App 239, ¶8, 257 Wis. 2d 704, 652 N.W.2d 434, the court of 
appeals succinctly explained the methodology as follows:  
We first examine the complaint to determine whether it 
states a claim and then review the answer to determine 
whether it joins a material issue of fact or law.  If 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
complaint 
and 
answer 
are 
sufficient to join issue, we examine the moving 
party's affidavits to determine whether they establish 
a prima facie case for summary judgment.  If they do, 
we 
look 
to 
the 
opposing 
party's 
affidavits 
to 
determine whether there are any material facts in 
dispute that entitle the opposing party to a trial. 
See also Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 
(1980). 
¶76 As the majority acknowledges, see majority op., ¶50, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.01(2) 
directs 
that 
summary 
judgment 
is 
permitted, with limited exception, "in circuit courts of this 
state in all civil actions and special proceedings . . . ."  
(Emphasis added.)  The sole exception is when a "different 
procedure is prescribed by statute or rule."  Id.  Section 
801.01(2) further requires that we construe the statutes 
governing summary judgment in a manner that "secure[s] the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding." 
¶77 There is no question that a forfeiture action for an 
alleged violation of Wis. Stat. ch. 30 is a civil action.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 30.03(3).  Consequently, we must presume that 
summary 
judgment 
is 
permitted 
in 
such 
actions 
unless 
a 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
3 
 
"different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule."  Wis. 
Stat. § 801.01(2). 
¶78 In Schneck, 257 Wis. 2d 704, ¶7, the court of appeals 
articulated the test for determining whether a statute or rule 
prescribes a "different procedure" than the summary judgment 
procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08: "[T]he test for the 
application of the civil rules of procedure is not only whether 
the statutes governing the instant proceeding are silent on the 
matter or otherwise set out a different procedure, but also 
whether the instant proceeding can be reconciled with the rules 
of civil procedure."  Accordingly, in this case, we must look to 
the statutes governing forfeiture actions for alleged violations 
of Wis. Stat. ch. 30 to determine (a) whether they are silent on 
summary judgment procedure or otherwise prescribe a different 
procedure than that set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08 and (b) 
whether they can be reconciled with the procedure set forth in 
§ 802.08. 
¶79 The procedure to recover forfeitures imposed under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 30 is set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 23.50 to 23.85.  
See Wis. Stat. § 23.50(1).  At the outset, I note that §§ 23.50 
to 23.85 are not silent on summary judgment procedure.  To the 
contrary, Wis. Stat. § 23.69 expressly contemplates, without 
exception, the filing of "[a]ny motion which is capable of 
determination 
without 
the 
trial 
of 
the 
general 
issue."  
(Emphasis added.)  As the majority concedes, "summary judgment 
is, by definition, a 'motion which is capable of determination 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
4 
 
without 
the 
trial . . . .'" 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶61 
(quoting 
§ 23.69). 
¶80 The question then becomes whether we can reconcile the 
procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 23.50 to 23.85 with the 
summary judgment procedure set forth in § 802.08.  The majority 
is quick to say no.  Majority op., ¶69.  I disagree.   
¶81 A forfeiture action under Wis. Stat. ch. 23 may be 
commenced either by citation or by a complaint and summons.  
Wis. Stat. § 23.52.  I agree with the majority that summary 
judgment is not permitted when the action is commenced by 
citation.  Majority op., ¶64; see also Schneck, 257 Wis. 2d 704, 
¶10.  However, I am not persuaded that summary judgment is never 
permitted in cases such as this one, in which the action is 
commenced by a complaint and summons and the defendant appears 
by filing an answer to the complaint. 
¶82 The majority concludes that summary judgment is never 
permitted in forfeiture actions for alleged violations of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 30 because the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 23.50 to 23.85 do not require a defendant to file a written 
answer to the complaint.  See majority op., ¶65-67.  At the same 
time, the majority appears to acknowledge that §§ 23.50 to 23.85 
do not preclude a defendant from filing a written answer to the 
complaint.  Wisconsin Stat. § 23.55(2)(b) directs that the 
summons 
"shall 
contain . . . [a] 
direction 
summoning 
and 
requiring the defendant to appear in a specified court on a 
particular date not less than 10 days following service of the 
summons to answer the accompanying complaint."  To be sure, 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
5 
 
§ 23.55(2)(b) anticipates that the defendant will appear in 
person, in a specified court on a particular date, to answer the 
complaint.  However, Wis. Stat. §§ 23.70 and 23.75 inform us 
that the legislature at least contemplated that a defendant may 
not always appear in person to answer the complaint.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 23.70(1) provides, in relevant part, that the defendant 
must be informed that he or she is entitled to a jury trial and 
must be asked whether he or she wishes to plead "[i]f the 
defendant 
appears 
in 
response 
to 
a 
citation 
or 
a 
summons . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  More to the point, Wis. 
Stat. § 23.75(4) expressly states that a defendant may enter a 
not guilty plea by letter: "If a citation or summons is issued 
to a defendant and he or she is unable to appear in court on the 
day specified, the defendant may enter a plea of not guilty by 
mailing to the judge at the address indicated on the citation or 
summons a letter stating such plea."  Read together, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 23.55(2)(b), 23.70(1), and 23.75(4) certainly do not preclude 
a defendant from filing a written answer to the complaint and 
may even suggest it. 
¶83 This court's duty is not to comb through Wis. Stat. 
§§ 23.50 to 23.85 to search for a procedure that is inconsistent 
with the summary judgment procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08.  In fact, our duty is nearly the opposite: beginning 
with the rule that summary judgment is generally permitted "in 
circuit courts of this state in all civil actions," Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.01(2) (emphasis added), we must determine whether the 
procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 23.50 to 23.85 can be 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
6 
 
reconciled with the summary judgment procedure set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08.  Based upon the statutes' plain language, I 
conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 23.50 to 23.85 can be reconciled 
with the summary judgment procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08 in cases such as this one, in which the action is 
commenced by a complaint and summons and the defendant appears 
by filing an answer to the complaint.  Such a conclusion 
promotes efficiency in our circuit courts, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.01(2), and provides the State and defendants alike the 
means to "avoid trials where there is nothing to try," Rollins 
Burdick Hunter of Wis., Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 
304 N.W.2d 752 (1981). 
¶84 Ironically, it is "the desire for consistency and 
predictability" that drives the majority's conclusion that 
summary judgment is never permitted in forfeiture actions for 
alleged violations of Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  See majority op., ¶68.  
In the same breath, however, the majority cites to at least 
three published decisions in which this court and the court of 
appeals applied the summary judgment methodology to forfeiture 
actions under chapter 30.  See id., ¶48 & n.15 (citing State v. 
Kelley, 2001 WI 84, 244 Wis. 2d 777, 629 N.W.2d 601; Oneida 
Cnty. v. Converse, 180 Wis. 2d 120, 508 N.W.2d 416 (1993); State 
v. Land Concepts, Ltd., 177 Wis. 2d 24, 501 N.W.2d 817 (Ct. App. 
1993)).  One can only imagine how routinely the circuit courts 
in this state consider summary judgment motions in forfeiture 
actions under chapter 30, particularly when we have endorsed the 
practice ourselves.  Yet, from this day forward, in the name of 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
7 
 
consistency and predictability, circuit courts are no longer 
permitted to consider summary judgment motions in forfeiture 
actions under chapter 30——or any other chapter enumerated in 
Wis. Stat. § 23.50(1) and subject to the procedures in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 23.50 to 23.85.  The rationale of the majority's far-
reaching holding simply escapes me. 
¶85 Still, I concur with the majority's mandate to reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court for further proceedings.  While I conclude that 
summary judgment was permitted in this case, I disagree with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that the circuit court properly 
granted summary judgment to the State.  See Ryan, 331 
Wis. 2d 491, ¶29.  Rather, I conclude that Ryan's opposing 
affidavit, in which he averred that the barge was owned by 
Richard Schumacher, was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning ownership of the barge.  Accordingly, 
albeit on different grounds, I concur with the majority's 
mandate to reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
¶86 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2009AP3075.akz 
 
1