Title: Demers v. Peterson
Citation: 197 Or. 466, 254 P.2d 213
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1953

197 Or. 466 (1953)
254 P.2d 213
DEMERS
v.
PETERSON

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Submitted on Briefs December 17, 1952.
Modified March 4, 1953.
*467 Rhoten, Rhoten &amp; Speerstra, of Salem, for appellant.
George Neuner, of Salem, Attorney General, and *468 Cecil H. Quesseth and John D. Nichols, Assistant Attorneys General, both of Salem, for respondent and cross-appellant.
MODIFIED.
LATOURETTE, C.J.
Plaintiff, an operator of some 50 airplanes engaged in dusting and spraying agricultural crops, and forest lands under contract with the State of Oregon and the United States, instituted proceedings under the uniform declaratory judgments act directed against the director of the Oregon State Department of Agriculture to determine the constitutionality of ch 645, Oregon Laws 1951, the title of which act follows:
The trial court found certain portions of the act to be unconstitutional but refused to adjudicate on the remainder. Both parties appeal from the decree of the lower court.
Plaintiff has assailed the constitutionality of the act in several respects, one of which is that the act delegates the authority to promulgate regulations without providing for any definite standard in violation of Article III, § 1 of the constitution of Oregon. The trial court found the act unconstitutional in this respect.
The act in question is known as the "Oregon Agricultural Chemical Control Act." After defining the meaning of certain deleterious substances, such as insecticides, *469 and providing for the obtaining of an aircraft operator's license to engage in aerial spraying, the act further provides, among other things, as follows:
1. It is well established that the legislature cannot grant an administrative agency the power to regulate *470 unless some standard or yardstick is provided in the act as a guide to the administrative agency; in other words, the authority to regulate may not be left wholly to the whim and caprice of such agency. Multnomah County v. Luihn et al., 180 Or 528, 542, 178 P2d 159; City of Portland v. Welch, 154 Or 286, 303, 59 P2d 228, 106 ALR 1188; Van Winkle v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 151 Or 455, 466, 49 P2d 1140.
From a reading of the sections of the law hereinbefore quoted, the department, as well as the State Board of Aeronautics, has the unlimited power to make regulations to carry out the provisions of the act so long as they do not conflict with the laws of the state or the federal government. Beyond this, the sky is the limit. There is no suggestion in the title of the act or in the act itself of the nature, extent or character of the regulations. It would appear that the department has carte blanche authority, beyond the limitation above mentioned, to formulate any regulations which it sees fit. Under a blanket authority the rule-making bodies or their directors could conjure up from their fancies or imaginations any regulation which might come to mind. For a violation thereof, the licensee could be fined, imprisoned and have his license revoked.
2. We hold that the above sections of the act relating to the rule-making power are unconstitutional in that the act contains no rule or standard fixed for the guidance of the administrative bodies in that respect.
The trial court did not declare the act unconstitutional in its entirety, holding that the plaintiff could not question the validity of §§ 17 to 32, inclusive, of the act, stating as follows:
We believe that the court took too narrow a view of the matter in this respect because, as we will presently show, the State Department of Agriculture, represented by the defendant Peterson, its director, is delegated the authority to carry into effect the organization of the protected area provisions embraced within §§ 17 to 32, inclusive, and to approve regulations promulgated by the governing committee and is, therefore, an adverse party.
3. We further believe that there is a justiciable controversy between the parties involving the protected area.
It is contended by the defendant that no protected area district has as yet been organized; that, for this reason, plaintiff is not presently affected; and that, by virtue of Ore. Cry. Mfgs. Ass'n v. White, 159 Or 99, 78 P2d 572, and Amer. F. of L. v. Bain et al., 165 Or 183, 106 P2d 544, 130 ALR 1278, plaintiff is not in a position to raise the question of the constitutionality of the sections of the statute above referred to.
In the case of Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass'n v. White, supra, there was no actual controversy between the *472 parties. The plaintiffs pleaded that the act under consideration (p. 104),
At p. 111 we said that:
When taken alone some of the language employed in that opinion relating to the making of rules and regulations appears to support defendants' position; however, in construing the decision, we must consider the facts of the case, and in doing this we find that the plaintiff was on a fishing expedition to clear up uncertainty and doubt regarding the operation of the act, and, for this reason, there was no justiciable controversy between the parties.
In Amer. F. of L. et al. v. Bain et al., supra, we refused to consider the constitutionality of certain provisions of the act in question because no facts were presented by the pleadings or the record disclosing a justiciable controversy. In that case it was contended *473 that the labor unions were collecting fees, dues and fines for the purpose of caring for the sick and indigent members, etc., and that the defendant district attorney had threatened to prosecute them for such action because said unions were not authorized to exact such fees, etc., from its members. The defendants countered by answer as follows (p. 214):
From the foregoing it is obvious that there was no bone of contention between the parties.
In the present case plaintiff in his complaint asserts the invalidity of the statute being considered and, among other things, complains:
In his answer defendant denies the foregoing allegations of the complaint and admits that he will enforce the provisions of said statute; that,
and that,
As found by the lower court, the evidence reveals that:
4. We have repeatedly held that in determining the validity of a statute the decision of the court must be predicated on what it authorizes to be done and not by what has been done. M. &amp; M. Co. v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 176 Or 35, 155 P2d 933; Bell v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 157 Or 653, 663, 74 P2d 55; Eastern &amp; Western Lbr. Co. v. Patterson, 124 Or 112, 258 P 193, 264 P 441; Sterett &amp; Oberle Packing Co. v. Portland, 79 Or 260, 154 P 410, 415.
In Childs v. Marion County, 163 Or 411, 418, 97 P2d 955, a case brought under the uniform declaratory judgments act, we refused to construe the act piecemeal and said:
*475 Turning to Borchard, supra, we read:
Sections 17 to 32, inclusive, of the act provide in substance for the giving of notice of a hearing by the Department of Agriculture upon the application of certain landowners proposing to organize a protected area. At such hearing the department determines if there is need, in the interest of general welfare, for a protected area. If such need is determined by such department, it is then its duty to call an election in such area to determine whether or not the landowners within said district shall approve the organization of *476 such district. Provision is made that at such election the voters may elect a committee composed of three members as part of a governing body of such area. The department appoints two other members to act in conjunction with the three elected members, and such area is declared to be a governmental subdivision of the state and a public body corporate. After the protected area has been thus organized, the committee aforesaid may create a restricted area after giving notice of a proposed hearing on the creation of a restricted district. It is then provided that:
The law also provides that before any person may apply herbicides by aircraft within a protected or restricted district he must obtain a permit for such application from the committee of such area, and that he shall not make application of herbicides by aircraft within such area contrary to the conditions or terms of the permit issued to him.
It seems clear to us that the plaintiff in the operation *477 of his airplanes in such area might very well come in conflict with regulations approved by the department, of which the defendant Peterson is the director, and expose himself to a fine, jail sentence or revocation of his license.
5, 6. In any event, since we must liberally construe the uniform declaratory judgments act, we think that the entire controversy should be settled here.
7. The vice of the protected area provisions of the act lies in that portion permitting the committee, with the approval of the department, to formulate regulations pertaining to the application of herbicides. Here, too, as stated in the opinion of the lower court, we have no "guide or standard to which such regulations must conform" and "leaves the power attempted to be delegated unconfined and vagrant and is unconstitutional and void."
It is thus seen that not only the Department of Agriculture but also the State Board of Aeronautics, in addition to the area committee, subject to the approval of the department, have uncontrolled and unfettered power under the act to make rules and regulations governing airplane operators in the application of chemicals, which is a perfect exemplification of bureaucracy in full bloom with attendant confusion worse confounded.
It is our opinion that the act is not severable and, therefore, is unconstitutional in its entirety. Fullerton v. Lamm, 177 Or 655, 695, 163 P2d 941, 165 P2d 63. The decree of the lower court will be modified to that extent.