Title: Churchill v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 195, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KELLY CHURCHILL, 
 
 
§ 
§ 
Defendant Below,  
§ 
Appellant,  
 
§ No. 195, 2002 
§ 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ Court Below:   Superior Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ for Kent County 
§ Cr. ID No. 0107004333 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 22, 2002 
Decided: 
November 20, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
This 20th day of November 2002, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On October 31, 2001, the defendant-appellant, Kelly V. Churchill 
(“Churchill”), was convicted of one count of Delivery of Cocaine.  On March 13, 2002, 
Churchill was sentenced to life in prison under Delaware’s Habitual Offender statute.  
On appeal, Churchill argues that three purported trial errors warrant a reversal of his 
conviction.  We hold that Churchill’s claims lack merit, and accordingly we affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court. 
(2) 
In the summer of 2001, City of Dover police officers were conducting 
surveillance in the vicinity of South New Street, a “high crime area” believed to be an 
 
 
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open air drug market.  On July 8, 2001, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Officers Anthony 
DiGirolomo and Derek Lawson were located atop the roof of a shoe repair shop on 
West Division Street, between South New Street and South Governor’s Avenue.  Four 
additional officers were stationed in concealed locations on the perimeter of the scene, 
among them Officer Nicholas Berna who was parked in a firehouse parking lot on 
South Governor’s Avenue.  The two officers atop the shoe repair shop observed 
Churchill walk out into Division Street yelling “I got 30 bucks worth of dope.”  As 
Churchill proceeded eastward on Division Street he encountered William Lloyd.  After 
a brief conversation, Churchill handed something to Lloyd in exchange for cash.  Upon 
completion of the transaction, Churchill and Lloyd walked toward Governor’s Avenue. 
 Officer DiGirolomo radioed to Officer Berna and reported the apparent drug 
transaction.  Less than a minute later, Berna and the other officers stationed on the 
perimeter of the scene confronted Churchill and Lloyd.  During the search incident to 
arrest, the Officers retrieved a twenty dollar bill from Churchill, and a piece of what was 
believed to be crack cocaine from Lloyd’s front pocket.  Forensic chemical analysis later 
revealed that the item seized from Lloyd was indeed 0.1 grams of crack cocaine.   
(3) 
At trial, Officer DiGirolomo testified that he observed the transaction 
between Churchill and Lloyd.  DiGirolomo explained the circumstances surrounding 
 
 
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the transaction, and also testified that he radioed the information to Officer Berna, the 
arresting officer.  Officer Berna testified regarding the apprehension of Churchill and 
Lloyd, and in particular stated that “[Lloyd] bought an amount of cocaine and then Mr. 
Churchill had the money from it.”  The defense did not object to this statement, nor to 
the question that elicited Officer Berna’s response.  Nevertheless, the trial judge, sua 
sponte, issued a prompt curative instruction.  Later, during direct examination of Officer 
Lawson, Churchill moved for a mistrial on the basis of Officer Berna’s statement.  The 
court took the motion “under advisement,” but later denied it on the basis that the 
statement did not mislead the jury, and the curative instruction was sufficient to cure 
any potential prejudice.  Churchill never  testified at trial, and was convicted. 
(4) 
Churchill argues that Officer Berna’s testimony, and the trial court’s 
immediate instruction to disregard, prejudiced his right to a fair trial.  Thus, according 
to Churchill, the denial of the motion for a mistrial was an abuse of the trial court’s 
discretion.  There is no meaningful alternative to a mistrial where the prejudice to the 
defendant is egregious and “a curative instruction is deemed insufficient to cure 
prejudice to the defendant.”1  If, however, the trial court’s efforts to remedy the 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2002). 
 
 
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potential prejudice  are effective, a mistrial is unnecessary.2  Here, the court interrupted 
Officer Berna’s testimony, and sua sponte issued a curative instruction to the jury.  Even 
if Officer Berna’s testimony prejudiced the defendant, the court’s prompt curative 
instruction protected Churchill’s right to a fair trial. 
                                                 
2  Sawyer v. State, 634 A.2d 377, 380 (Del. 1993) (“Even when prejudicial evidence is admitted, 
its prompt excision followed by a cautionary instruction will usually preclude a finding of reversible 
error.”) (citing Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48, 52 (Del. 1991)).    
(5) 
Next, Churchill argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
his next motion for mistrial during the State’s rebuttal closing.  In response to defense 
speculation of the officers’ possible bias and prejudice toward Churchill, the prosecutor 
asked rhetorically whether “the officers [were] simply out there doing their job the best 
way they can[,] as honestly as they can?”  Defense counsel objected on the basis that the 
prosecutor was improperly vouching for the State’s witnesses, and the trial judge issued 
a curative instruction reminding the jury that  they alone were responsible for 
determining the credibility of witnesses.  Despite this instruction, Churchill again 
moved for a mistrial, but the motion was denied.  The jury was advised to disregard any 
expression of personal opinion regarding the credibility of a witness.  The trial judge’s 
instruction was sufficient.  The prosecutor’s statement was confined to how the officers 
 
 
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attempt to perform their duties, not how these particular officers testified during the 
trial.  Because the prosecutor was rebutting a claim of bias and prejudice rather than 
commenting on testimony, this statement was not improper vouching. 
(6) 
Finally, Churchill argues that the trial court erred by failing to intervene 
sua sponte to cure the effect of “improper” prosecutorial argument.  In particular, 
Churchill points to two statements made during rebuttal closing.  First, the prosecutor 
asked the jury to “consider the opportunity for the officers to coordinate their stories if 
they wanted to purposely mislead the jury in this case.”  The prosecutor then closed by 
suggesting that “[u]pon considering all of the evidence in this case, the State believes 
that there’s but one conclusion, that there’s no real possibility that the defendant did 
not deliver cocaine, and we’d ask you to return a verdict of guilty.”  Defense counsel did 
not object to either of these purportedly improper statements, and therefore the trial 
court’s failure to intervene sua sponte is reviewed for plain error.3  This review requires 
us to consider whether “(a) credibility is a central issue, (b) the case is close, and (c) the 
prosecutor’s comments are so clear and defense counsel’s failure to object is so 
inexcusable that a trial judge has no reasonable alternative other than to intervene sua 
                                                 
3  Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 652-653 (Del. 2001).   
 
 
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sponte and declare a mistrial or issue a curative instruction.”4  Under this precedent, and 
based on this record, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to intercede sua sponte 
does not constitute plain error. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, 
AFFIRMED.         
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
   s/Joseph T. Walsh 
           Justice 
                                                 
4  Cousins v. State, 2001 WL 1353571, *1 (Del. Nov. 2, 2001).