Title: The Florida Bar v. Richard Stuart Shankman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-1107
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1107 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
RICHARD STUART SHANKMAN,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 8, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review the referee’s report recommending that the respondent, 
Richard Stuart Shankman, be found guilty of professional misconduct and 
suspended for a period of ninety days.  Shankman seeks review of the referee’s 
recommendations as to both guilt and discipline, as well as an adverse evidentiary 
ruling.  The Florida Bar cross-petitioned, seeking review of the referee’s 
recommendation that Shankman be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) of 
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, the finding of no aggravating factors, as well 
as the recommended discipline.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
 
The Florida Bar filed a four-count complaint against Shankman on June 11, 
2008, alleging violations of a number of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar with 
respect to his representation of a seventeen-year-old female client.  Following 
appointment of a referee and holding a final hearing, the referee submitted a report 
recommending Shankman be found guilty of violating the following rules: under 
Count I, rule 4-1.5(a) (an attorney shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or 
collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee); under Count II, rules 4-1.1 
(a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client) and 4-1.4(b) (a lawyer 
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions regarding the representation); and under Count III, rules 
4-1.7(b) (conflict of interest) and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  With respect to Count IV, however, the referee 
recommends finding Shankman not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) (conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).  The referee also 
recommends that Shankman be suspended for ninety days, ordered to attend the 
Florida Bar’s Ethics School, and that costs be awarded to the Bar. 
Shankman petitioned for review, challenging the referee’s recommendations 
of guilt with respect to Counts I, II, and III, the recommended sanction of a ninety-
day suspension, and the referee’s ruling in which he took judicial notice of a 
 
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federal district court order and report and recommendation underlying that order, 
issued by the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa 
Division, Case No. 8:02-CV-2323-T-17EAJ.  The case, brought by Shankman in a 
petition for quantum meruit, involved the client with whom Shankman’s conduct 
gave rise to these proceedings.1  The Bar cross-petitioned, challenging the referee’s 
recommendation of not guilty as to Count IV, the finding of no aggravating factors, 
and the recommended discipline.  In an order dated March 9, 2010, the Court 
suspended Shankman for a period of six months, effective thirty days from the date 
of the order.  The opinion of the Court now follows. 
ANALYSIS 
1.  Judicial Notice 
 
Shankman challenges the referee’s ruling taking judicial notice of the federal 
district court judge’s order and the magistrate’s report and recommendation in 
Shankman’s civil action against the client, seeking quantum meruit relief.    
                                          
 
1.  On October 30, 2008, Shankman filed a Petition for Review of Non-Final 
Order in this Court, seeking review of the referee’s order granting judicial notice of 
the Report and Recommendation of U. S. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins, 
dated January 27, 2006, and the Order of U. S. District Judge Elizabeth 
Kovachevich, dated March 31, 2006, approving the Report and Recommendation.  
The Florida Bar filed a motion to dismiss Shankman’s petition.  On January 22, 
2009, the Court granted the Bar’s motion and dismissed the petition without 
prejudice. 
 
 
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Shankman argues that the referee misapplied section 90.202(2), Florida Statutes 
(2009).2  In addition, Shankman contends that the facts in those documents tainted 
the instant proceedings and compromised the referee’s impartiality. 
We reject Shankman’s claim.  Bar disciplinary proceedings are not civil or 
criminal in nature, but quasi-judicial; therefore, the rules of evidence are not 
binding upon the referee.  Fla. Bar. v. Tobkin, 944 So. 2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2006).  
―[T]his Court has reviewed referees’ actions regarding the admissibility of 
evidence in discipline cases using an abuse of discretion standard.‖  Fla. Bar v. 
Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 2002).  The case law unequivocally supports 
the referee’s taking judicial notice of the federal report and recommendation and 
order in this bar disciplinary case.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Head, 27 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 
2010); Tobkin, 944 So. 2d at 224; Fla. Bar v. Vining, 707 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. 
1998); Fla. Bar v. Calvo, 630 So. 2d 548, 549-50 (Fla. 1993); Fla. Bar v. Rood, 
620 So. 2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 1993).  Thus, the referee could properly consider the 
federal district court’s order and magistrate’s report, and, although not done here, 
the referee could have relied ―upon them as support for the disciplinary findings of 
fact.‖  Head, 27 So. 3d at 8. 
                                          
 
2.  Section 90.202 provides in pertinent part that ―[a] court may take judicial 
notice of the following matters, to the extent that they are not embraced within s. 
90.201:  . . .  (2) Decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of every other 
state, territory, and jurisdiction of the United States.‖ 
 
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2.  Recommendations of Guilt 
In reviewing a referee’s findings of fact and recommendations concerning 
guilt, the Court’s standard of review is well-established: ―This Court has 
repeatedly stated that with regard to facts, this Court’s review is limited, and if a 
referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the 
record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that 
of the referee.‖  Fla. Bar v. D’Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2009). 
Count I 
 
Under Count I, the Bar alleged Shankman sought an excessive fee, in 
violation of rule 4-1.5(a).  In July 2002, a seventeen-year-old woman (the client) 
hired Shankman to represent her in a civil matter.  The year before, during spring 
break in Daytona Beach, Florida, the client had participated in a ―wet t-shirt 
contest.‖   Unbeknownst to the client, the contest had been videotaped.  When the 
videotape was broadcast on cable television, the client contacted the law firm 
Shankman, Tancredo & Co. L.C. regarding potential claims arising out of the 
videotaping and distribution of the videotape. 
 
At that time, Shankman had been practicing law for less than three years and 
had no experience litigating in federal court.  Shankman associated with Trenam 
Kemker, a Tampa law firm with trial and federal court experience.  The client 
entered into a contingency fee agreement with Shankman and the Trenam Kemker 
 
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firm, providing that the attorneys would receive 40 percent of her gross recovery.  
Under this agreement, Shankman was to receive 9.6 percent of the gross recovery.  
Because Shankman was dissatisfied with Trenam Kemker’s advice to settle the 
case, Shankman convinced the client to fire the firm. 
 
Thereafter, Shankman advised the client to hire a second law firm, Gary, 
Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis, Watson & Sperando, P.L.  She entered into a 
contingency fee agreement with the firm and Shankman, which provided for a 45 
percent contingency fee to the attorneys.  Under this agreement, Shankman’s share 
of the fees increased to approximately 11.25 percent of the client’s gross recovery.  
After the Gary law firm attorneys arranged a settlement conference with one 
defendant, Shankman convinced the client to fire the Gary law firm. 
The client then signed a contingency fee agreement with Shankman’s newly 
formed law firm, Litigation Concepts, L.C.  Shankman advised the client to hire a 
third law firm, Arthur Tifford, P.A.  She signed a fee agreement addendum, 
providing for a 45 percent contingency fee to be split equally between the Tifford 
firm and Litigation Concepts.  Thus, under this agreement, Shankman’s fee share 
again increased.  For a third time, Shankman convinced the client to fire the 
associated law firm.  Following the hiring and firing of a fourth and fifth law firm, 
the client fired Shankman and retained new counsel. 
 
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Based upon these findings of fact, the referee recommends finding 
Shankman guilty of violating rule 4-1.5(a), which provides that ―[a]n attorney shall 
not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly 
excessive fee or cost.‖  Under rule 4-1.5(a)(1), 
[a] fee or cost is clearly excessive when: 
 
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence 
would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee or the 
cost exceeds a reasonable fee or cost for services provided to such a 
degree as to constitute clear overreaching or an unconscionable 
demand by the attorney . . . . 
 
Accordingly, a lawyer may properly charge his or her client for the time that 
reasonably should be devoted to accomplish a particular task.  Fla. Bar v. 
Richardson, 574 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. 1990).  Moreover, rule 4-1.5(b) identifies 
numerous factors that can be considered in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, including the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skills requisite to perform the legal 
services properly. 
 
In recommending that Shankman be found guilty of violating rule 4-1.5(a), 
the referee relied upon two facts—i.e., that the percentage of Shankman’s fee 
increased with each subsequent hiring of a new law firm and that Shankman sought 
45 percent of the client’s recovery in his action for quantum meruit in federal 
court.  While the record supports these findings of fact, they are an insufficient 
 
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basis upon which to conclude that Shankman’s fee was excessive.  Moreover, the 
Bar did not present expert testimony to establish that Shankman’s fee was 
unreasonable.  Therefore, we disapprove of this portion of the referee’s report.  Cf. 
Fla. Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412, 414-15 (Fla. 1992) (termination-of-services 
clause and withdrawal clause of contingency fee agreement violated rule 4-1.5(a) 
because ―[b]oth clauses provided that [the client] promptly pay for all services, 
fees, charges, and expenses incurred through the date of either the termination or 
withdrawal, . . . provided that Hollander’s law firm was entitled to a fee equal to 
the percentage amount stipulated in the contingency fee agreement until [the 
client], Hollander’s firm, and any new counsel worked out a mutually agreeable 
fee agreement, [and] allowed Hollander to collect twice for the same work, and 
thus, the agreement had the effect of intimidating a client from exercising the right 
to terminate representation‖). 
Count II 
 
Count II of the Bar’s complaint alleged that Shankman failed both to provide 
competent representation to the client in violation of rule 4-1.1 and to fully explain 
certain matters reasonably necessary for the client to make informed decisions 
concerning the representation in violation of rule 4-1.4(b). 
 
Shankman had been licensed to practice law for less than three years and had 
no federal court experience when he undertook the client’s representation.  
 
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Initially, he recognized that he was not competent to handle the case alone and 
acted in accordance with rule 4-1.1.  Under the rule, a newly admitted lawyer or 
one without the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular area may provide 
competent representation ―through the association of a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question.‖  In associating with the Trenam Kemker firm, 
the first firm Shankman recommended to the client, it appeared that Shankman was 
taking the proper steps to comply with rule 4-1.1.   
However, as found by the referee, Shankman’s problems began when he 
hired competent, more experienced law firms to help him and then decided not to 
take the advice of those firms.  Testimony supports the finding that the Trenam 
firm was competent to bring the case to conclusion according to the client’s wishes 
and in her best legal interests.  On the advice of Shankman, however, the client 
fired that firm and entered into cycles of hiring and firing other associated law 
firms.  Although there was a real possibility of obtaining a settlement, as testified 
to at the final hearing, Shankman continued to persuade his client to fire 
experienced co-counsel who had advised settlement of the case.  Thus, the referee 
found that Shankman’s motivation underlying his complete disregard of the advice 
of competent counsel was a desire to take the case to trial. 
Shankman challenges the referee’s findings and recommendation that he 
violated rule 4-1.1 on the basis that he was always working toward the client’s 
 
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primary goal of enjoining the production and distribution of the videotapes at issue.  
However, Shankman presented no evidence that settling the case and otherwise 
protecting the client’s legal interests were mutually exclusive.  Moreover, the 
referee found that the client wanted the case to be resolved as quickly as possible.  
Accordingly, we approve this portion of the referee’s report pertaining to 
Shankman’s violation of rule 4-1.1 as based on competent, substantial evidence in 
the record. 
Shankman’s incompetent representation of his client—by ignoring the 
advice of experienced counsel—is exacerbated by his failure to provide his client 
with sufficient information concerning the case in order for her to make informed 
decisions.  Specifically, the referee found that Shankman did not discuss with the 
client the value of her case and the potential risks in hiring multiple law firms and 
failed to provide her weekly updates as she had requested.  The lack of 
communication resulted in protracted litigation over attorney fees and delayed 
resolution of the case.  The fact that Shankman told the client’s stepfather about 
quantum meruit did not relieve him of the duty owed the client.  The Court, 
therefore, approves the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation as to guilt 
that Shankman violated rule 4-1.4(b) as supported by competent, substantial 
evidence in the record. 
 
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Count III 
 
Under Count III, the Bar alleged that Shankman violated rules 4-1.7(b)  
(conflict of interest) and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice).  The referee found that Shankman’s conduct in initiating the hiring and 
firing of a number of law firms, with the incremental increase in his percentage of 
the recovery with each new hiring, and the resultant delay contrary to the client’s 
goal of resolving the case constituted engaging in a conflict of interest under rule 
4-1.7(b).  The referee further found that the delay occasioned by Shankman’s 
inability to work with the other attorneys delayed the administration of justice and 
increased the cost to his client in violation of rule 4-8.4(d).  The referee, therefore, 
recommends Shankman be found guilty of violating the two rules.  We approve 
this portion of the referee’s report as supported by competent, substantial evidence 
in the record. 
Count IV 
 
The Bar alleged that Shankman violated rule 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) in Count IV.  The referee made the 
following findings:  Each time Shankman persuaded the client to fire co-counsel, 
he instructed her not to speak with the discharged attorneys or she would owe them 
legal fees.  Shankman provided that same instruction to the client after advising her 
 
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that the attorney with the third law firm had resigned from her case.  Shankman 
further promised the client that she would not owe former counsel any fees.   
 
The referee recommends Shankman be found not guilty of violating rule 
4-8.4(c).  In effect, the referee found that the Bar failed to present clear and 
convincing evidence establishing intent, a necessary element of the rule violation 
alleged—that the lawyer was dishonest or engaged in misrepresentation, deceit, or 
fraud. 
 
―A referee’s finding with regard to intent is a factual finding which must be 
upheld if there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support it.‖  Fla. 
Bar v. Nicnick, 963 So. 2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2007).  A referee’s legal conclusions, on 
the other hand, are subject to broader review by the Court.  Fla. Bar v. Beach, 675 
So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996).  In Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 
1999), the Court specifically stated that ―in order to satisfy the element of intent it 
must only be shown that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.‖  Id. at 1252.  
Thus, the issue is whether Shankman ―deliberately or knowingly engaged in the 
activity in question.‖  Fla. Bar v. Head, 27 So. 3d at 9.  Consequently, the referee 
erred as a matter of law when he required the Bar to establish dishonesty, 
misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit in order to prove intent.  We conclude that the 
Bar established the element of intent by clear and convincing evidence in the 
record, based upon Shankman’s deliberate conduct in telling his client not to speak 
 
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to the fired attorneys or she would owe them fees and that she would not have to 
pay the other lawyers.  Therefore, we disapprove the portion of the referee’s report 
finding that the Bar failed to establish intent and the recommendation that 
Shankman be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c). 
3.  Discipline 
The referee recommends Shankman receive a ninety-day suspension and be 
ordered to attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School.  Generally, the Court will not 
second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable 
basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions.  Fla. Bar v. De La Torre, 994 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2008).  Nonetheless, in 
reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, the Court’s scope of review is 
broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because ultimately it is 
our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So. 
3d 928, 939 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla.1989); see 
also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  With respect to a referee’s findings of aggravation 
and mitigation, however, as is the case with other factual findings, they carry a 
presumption of correctness and should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or 
without support in the record.  Fla. Bar v. Herman, 8 So. 3d 1100, 1106 (Fla. 
2009).  
 
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We turn first to the aggravating factors under the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  The referee’s application of standard 9.22 was 
clearly erroneous.  In his report, the referee explains that his consideration of 
aggravation was limited to only matters unrelated to the evidence underlying the 
recommendations of rule violations.  Pursuant to standard 9.21, however, 
aggravating factors ―are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase 
in the degree of discipline to be imposed.‖  Accordingly, aggravating factors may 
well be based upon the circumstances of the rule violations at issue, as well as 
taking into consideration the existence of a prior disciplinary history and whether 
there exists a pattern of similar misconduct. 
Here, the referee’s own findings of fact support the application of the 
following aggravating factors under standard 9.22:  dishonest or selfish motive, a 
pattern of misconduct, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, 
and the vulnerability of the victim.  As the referee found in his report, Shankman 
put his own interests before his client’s.  Shankman’s goal with respect to 
representation of the client was to take the case to trial, notwithstanding the advice 
of experienced attorneys, each of whom recommended that the case be settled.  In 
addition, Shankman engaged in a pattern of misconduct in repeatedly advising the 
client, over a period of years, not to speak with prior counsel following the firing 
of each firm, or she would have to pay their legal fees.  Shankman not only insists 
 
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that he did nothing wrong, but blames any harm caused on the conduct of others 
and the client herself.  Further, the client was a teenager at the time of the 
representation, unfamiliar with the legal system.  Also, under standard 12.1b, 
Shankman’s misconduct resulted in actual harm to the client and others.  His 
unrelenting opposition to even considering the possibility of settling the case 
unnecessarily consumed the time and resources of numerous law firms, delayed 
resolution of the client’s case, and increased the cost of litigation for the client.  
Shankman’s protracted fee litigation also constituted an unnecessary burden upon 
the federal district court. 
The referee found the following mitigating factors under standard 9.32:  
absence of a prior disciplinary record, inexperience in the practice of law, and 
remorse.  In addition, as a mitigating factor, the referee was of the opinion that 
Shankman was genuine in trying to get some type of resolution for his client that 
he thought was the best, but that he was misguided and caused delay in the 
administration of justice. 
―The fact that there is some evidence in the record to support a finding that a 
mitigating factor might apply does not mean that the referee should have 
necessarily found it applicable.‖  Herman, 8 So. 3d at 1106.   With respect to the 
mitigating factors that Shankman was inexperienced in the practice of law at the 
time and remorseful, the record evidence clearly contradicts the referee’s 
 
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conclusion.  Significantly, Shankman recognized his lack of experience in federal 
practice, but repeatedly ignored the advice of the practitioners he had engaged 
because of their greater legal experiences.  In addition, the evidence demonstrates 
that Shankman has maintained throughout these proceedings that he was acting as 
an advocate for his client’s ultimate wishes and disputes that he acted unethically 
at all.  Accordingly, we disapprove of the referee’s report pertaining to the 
mitigating factors as clearly erroneous, except for the lack of prior disciplinary 
history as mitigation. 
With regard to the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the 
referee only considered standard 9.0, pertaining to aggravating and mitigating 
factors, in making his recommendation.  Based upon the facts found by the referee 
and supported by the record, standards 4.32, 4.42a, 4.52, 4.62, and 7.2 also apply 
to the Court’s consideration of the appropriate discipline in light of the rule 
violations.3  Under the applicable standards, suspension is the presumptive 
                                          
 
3.  The relevant standards provide as follows: 
 
4.32  Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows of a 
conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible 
effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
 
4.42a  Suspension is appropriate when: a lawyer knowingly 
fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client. 
 
 
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discipline in this case.  However, because the standards do not address the 
appropriate length of a suspension, the Court examines caselaw to determine 
whether the referee’s recommendation of a ninety-day suspension has a reasonable 
basis. 
The sole case relied upon by the referee, Florida Bar v. Maurice, 955 So. 2d 
535 (Fla. 2007), does not apply to the circumstances found in this case.  In 
Maurice, the evidence supported the recommendation that the respondent had 
violated rules 4-1.1 and 4-1.7(b).  955 So. 2d at 540.  Those two rule violations, in 
conjunction with two aggravating factors—vulnerability of the victim and 
substantial experience in the practice of law—and one mitigating factor—absence 
of a prior disciplinary record—warranted a ninety-day suspension.  Id. at 542.  
Significantly, in Maurice, unlike the facts in this case, there was no violation of 
rules 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d).  Id. at 537-38. 
                                                                                                                                        
4.52  Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer engages in an 
area of practice in which the lawyer knowingly lacks competence, and 
causes injury or potential injury to the a client. 
 
4.62  Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client. 
 
7.2  Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal 
system. 
 
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Moreover, existing case law supports a sanction greater than a ninety-day 
suspension in this case.  See Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 
1999) (six-month suspension warranted upon attorney’s misrepresentations 
regarding status of a nonexistent lawsuit in violation of rules 4-1.3 (diligence), 
4-1.4 (informing client of status of representation), and 4-8.4(c) (misconduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation)); Fla. Bar v. Vining, 721 
So. 2d 1164, 1169 (Fla. 1998) (in light of extensive aggravating factors and 
minimal mitigation, six-month suspension imposed upon violations of rule 4-1.2(a) 
(a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objective of 
representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to 
be pursued); rule 4-1.7(b) (a lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer’s 
exercise of independent professional judgment in the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person or by the lawyer’s own interest); and rule 4-1.16 (a lawyer shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from 
the representation of a client if the lawyer is discharged)). 
Accordingly, having failed to engage in a considered review of the 
appropriate sanction under existing case law and the standards, we reject that 
portion of the referee’s recommendation on discipline with respect to the length of 
Shankman’s suspension.  Instead, we conclude that a six-month suspension is the 
 
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appropriate sanction.  All other conditions of discipline recommended by the 
referee are approved. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation 
of guilt as to violations of rules 4-1.1, 4-1.4(b), 4.1.7(b), and 4-8.4(d).  However, 
we disapprove the referee’s recommendation of guilt as to a violation of rule 
4-1.5(a), recommendation of not guilty as to a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), and 
finding of no aggravating factors.  We also disapprove the referee’s recommended 
discipline of ninety days.  Respondent Shankman is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of six months, effective, nunc pro tunc, April 8, 2010, 
the effective date of the discipline imposed by this Court on March 9, 2010.  Fla. 
Bar v. Shankman, No. SC08-1107 (Fla. Mar. 9, 2010) (unpublished order).  As 
Shankman is currently suspended, it is not necessary to provide him with thirty 
days to close out his practice to protect the interests of existing clients. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Richard Stuart 
Shankman in the amount of $11,496.45, for which sum let execution issue.4 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
                                          
 
4.  The Bar’s affidavit of costs incorrectly calculated the total amount as 
$12,746.45.  
 
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CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff Counsel, 
The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Karen Boroughs Lopez, Bar Counsel, 
and Cynthia Lois Miller, Assistant Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Steven C. Whalen, P.A., Palm Harbor, Florida, and John M. Klawikofsky, and 
David R. Ristoff of Williams, Ristoff and Proper, PLC, New Port Richey, Florida 
 
 
for Respondent