Title: Peck v. Safway Steel Products Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 002255
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2001

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
LISA C. PECK, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF  
 WILLIAM R. PECK, JR., DECEASED 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 002255 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
September 14, 2001 
SAFWAY STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Randall G. Johnson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the trial court erred 
in ruling that the plaintiff’s action is barred by Code § 65.2-
307, the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' 
Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-100 et seq. (the Act). 
I 
 
 
Lisa C. Peck, Administratrix of the Estate of William R. 
Peck, Jr., deceased (Plaintiff), filed a wrongful death action 
against Safway Steel Products, Inc. (Safway), alleging that her 
decedent’s death was proximately caused by Safway’s negligence 
and breach of warranties.  Safway filed a plea in bar, alleging 
that the Plaintiff’s action is precluded by the exclusive remedy 
under the Act.  The trial court sustained Safway’s plea and 
dismissed the Plaintiff’s action.  We awarded the Plaintiff this 
appeal. 
II 
 
The facts are undisputed.  On November 25, 1997, William R. 
Peck, Jr., while in the employ of White Construction Company 
(White), was killed when he fell from scaffolding on which he 
was working.  The Plaintiff and her two daughters applied for 
and received workers’ compensation benefits from White and its 
insurer. 
 
At the time of the accident, White was the general 
contractor on a project to repair and replace brick masonry on 
the exterior of Sanger Hall on the campus of the Medical College 
of Virginia.  Sanger Hall is a 12-story building owned by 
Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). 
 
Pursuant to its contract with VCU, White agreed to "provide 
and pay for all material, labor, tools, equipment . . . and 
other services or facilities of every nature whatsoever 
necessary to execute completely and deliver the Work within the 
specified time."  White had discretion regarding the means and 
method of completing the contracted work. 
 
White engaged Safway to supply and install scaffolding for 
the project.  The subcontract between White and Safway provided 
the following: 
 
THE WORK:  Subcontractor shall furnish all 
supervision, labor, materials, tools, equipment and 
services, permits, fees, and taxes required by the 
Contract Documents in the following 
division(s)/section(s) together with all work 
reasonably inferable therefrom: – Furnish, engineer 
and erect all scaffolding per contract document 
requirements including stair tower to roof and 
equipment hoist.  Erect first two decks for two 
months.  Erect remaining scaffolding to roof for an 
additional two months.  There shall be two working 
 
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deck levels available at all times and an additional 
non loaded deck for logistics purposes.  There are to 
be twelve additional deck moves as requested by 
contractor.  Rental time starts when scaffolding is 
complete and ready for use. 
 
The size and height of the scaffolding system required 
Safway to tie the scaffolding to the building.  This was 
accomplished by drilling into the brick walls and installing 
anchors.  The scaffolding system, however, could support only 
two working deck levels at one time.  Therefore, as work 
progressed, White called on Safway to remove the walk boards, 
brackets, and other equipment comprising the working decks and 
to reassemble them at different locations within the system.  
All deck moves were performed at White’s direction, and Safway 
provided all labor for the moves.  Although the subcontract 
originally called for Safway to provide on-site labor for twelve 
deck moves, problems discovered at the site required change 
orders to cover additional deck moves.  Including the extra work 
required by the change orders, Safway performed over 5,000 man-
hours of labor in erecting, modifying, and dismantling the 
scaffolding system. 
III 
 
Code § 65.2-307 provides that the rights and remedies 
granted under the Act "shall exclude all other rights and 
remedies" of an employee or his estate at common law or 
otherwise.  The only exception to this exclusivity provision is 
 
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set forth in Code § 65.2-309(A), which states, in pertinent 
part, that an employee or his personal representative can 
maintain an action at law against the person who caused the 
injury, provided such person is an "other party."  We have said 
that, to be an "other party," a defendant must have been a 
stranger to the trade, occupation, or business in which the 
employee was engaged when he was injured.  See, e.g., Pfeifer v. 
Krauss Construction Co., 262 Va. 262, 267, 546 S.E.2d 717, 719 
(2001); Fowler v. International Cleaning Service, 260 Va. 421, 
428, 537 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2000).  Thus, in the present case, we 
must determine whether the trial court correctly ruled that 
Safway was engaged in White’s trade, occupation, or business, 
thereby barring the Plaintiff’s action. 
 
The Plaintiff contends that Safway was a stranger to 
White's work and, therefore, an "other party" subject to suit.  
The Plaintiff asserts that, in leasing, delivering, and 
installing scaffolding, Safway's conduct was merely "an act of 
delivery by [a] subcontractor and is not tantamount to being 
engaged in the trade, business or occupation of the general 
contractor."  The Plaintiff relies on a number of cases in which 
we have held that a subcontractor that merely delivers materials 
or equipment to a job site is not engaged in the general 
contractor's work.  See, e.g., Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 
252 Va. 42, 471 S.E.2d 473 (1996); Hipp v. Sadler Materials 
 
4
Corp., 211 Va. 710, 180 S.E.2d 501 (1971); Burroughs v. Walmont, 
210 Va. 98, 168 S.E.2d 107 (1969). 
 
In Burroughs, the plaintiff, an employee of a trucking 
company that delivered plasterboard to a construction site, was 
injured while carrying the materials into one of the houses 
being constructed by the general contractor.  210 Va. at 99, 168 
S.E.2d at 108.  The trucking company had agreed to deliver and 
stack specified quantities of the plasterboard in the rooms in 
the various houses under construction.  Id. at 98, 168 S.E.2d at 
108.  The plaintiff sued the general contractor to recover for 
his injuries.  We held that "the stacking of [plasterboard] in 
the several rooms constituted the final act of delivery, not an 
act of construction."  Id. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 108.  
Consequently, the plaintiff was not engaged in the general 
contractor's trade, business, or occupation, and, therefore, the 
general contractor was an "other party" and subject to being 
sued.  Id., 168 S.E.2d at 109. 
 
In Hipp, the plaintiff was injured by an employee of Sadler 
Materials Corporation (Sadler), a subcontractor engaged to 
furnish and pour concrete at a job site.  The plaintiff was an 
employee of another subcontractor and was injured when struck by 
a concrete truck.  211 Va. at 710, 180 S.E.2d at 501.  We held 
that the plaintiff could maintain an action against Sadler.  In 
so holding, we explained that "Sadler was required only to 
 
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deliver concrete where directed, not to spread or finish the 
concrete," and that, in performing Sadler's obligation, its 
employee was performing "the final act of delivery, not an act 
of construction constituting the trade, business or occupation 
of the general contractor."  Id. at 711, 180 S.E.2d at 502. 
 
Finally, in Yancey, a general contractor was engaged by the 
Virginia Department of Transportation to design and install a 
sound barrier along an interstate highway.  The general 
contractor engaged a subcontractor to design, manufacture, and 
deliver concrete wall panels to the job site.  252 Va. at 43, 
471 S.E.2d at 474.  The subcontract also required the 
subcontractor to provide on-site patching for materials 
delivered in a damaged condition.  Id. at 44, 471 S.E.2d at 475.  
The plaintiff, an employee of the subcontractor, was injured 
while he was inspecting one of the panels for any damage.  Id. 
at 43, 471 S.E.2d at 474.  We held that the plaintiff was not 
engaged in the general contractor's trade, business, or 
occupation when he was injured.  In so holding, we concluded 
that the plaintiff's inspection and patching activities "were 
the final acts of delivery required by the contract."  Id. at 
45, 471 S.E.2d at 475. 
 
Safway contends, on the other hand, that, under the facts 
in the present case, it was not a stranger to White's trade, 
occupation, or business.  Thus, it was not an "other party" 
 
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subject to being sued.  Safway relies primarily upon our holding 
in Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d 92 (1957). 
 
In Rea, a general contractor was engaged to construct a 
high school building.  The general contractor rented from 
Woodrow W. Ford a crane, an operator, and a helper to hoist into 
place certain steel trusses necessary for the building's 
construction.  198 Va. at 713, 96 S.E.2d at 93.  The trusses 
were fastened to the structure by the general contractor's 
employees.  While the crane operator was using the crane to 
position a truss, the truss fell, killing Rea, an employee of 
the general contractor.  Id. at 714, 96 S.E.2d at 93-94.  Rea's 
widow and personal representative brought a wrongful death 
action against Ford. 
 
We held, in Rea, that Ford was not a stranger to the 
general contractor's business, and, therefore, Rea's personal 
representative was precluded from suing Ford.  We explained 
that, "in furnishing the equipment and crew for the purpose of 
erecting the steel structure[,] Ford was a subcontractor engaged 
in an essential part of the work which the principal contractor 
had to do."  Id. at 717, 96 S.E.2d at 96. 
 
In the present case, we reject the Plaintiff's contention 
that Safway was just a supplier of materials.  To the contrary, 
we think Safway's duties extended well beyond mere delivery.  
Safway's contract with White required it to design and erect a 
 
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massive, complex, 14-level scaffolding system, which included an 
equipment and materials hoist and a stair tower to the roof of 
the building.  Additionally, Safway was required to provide two 
working deck levels at all times.  Safway, in fulfilling its 
contractual obligations, including those imposed by change 
orders, performed 16 full deck moves and 13 half deck moves.  In 
erecting, modifying, and dismantling the scaffolding system, 
Safway provided over 5,000 man-hours of labor.  Clearly, Safway 
was engaged in an essential part of the work that White was 
required to perform under its contract with VCU. 
 
Thus, we hold that Safway is not an "other party" under the 
Act.  Therefore, the trial court properly ruled that the 
Plaintiff is precluded from maintaining a wrongful death action 
against Safway. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgment. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS joins, concurring. 
 
This case involves the application of § 65.2-307, the 
exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, 
Code §§ 65.2-100 et seq. (the Act).  Under that provision, an 
injured employee is limited to the remedies of the Act unless 
the injury sustained resulted from the actions of an "other 
party," that is, one who was not performing the trade, business, 
or occupation of the employee's employer.  Feitig v. Chalkley, 
 
8
185 Va. 96, 99, 38 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1946); Code § 65.2-309(A).  
The question which must be resolved then is whether the actions 
of Safway Steel Products, Inc. (Safway), the defendant in this 
personal injury action, constituted part of the trade, business, 
or occupation of White Construction Company (White), the injured 
party's employer.  If so, the injured employee's estate is 
limited to the remedies provided in the Act. 
 
The facts of this case, like those in most of the cases 
that come before us, do not fit neatly into a fact pattern 
addressed in a prior case.  I agree that Safway's activities in 
this case go beyond those of delivery.  In those cases in which 
we found the activity causing the injury to be delivery only, 
and thus not covered under the exclusivity provision of the Act, 
the activities were limited to delivery and were not the doing 
of construction.  See, e.g., Burroughs v. Walmont, Inc., 210 Va. 
98, 100, 168 S.E.2d 107, 108-09 (1969).  Here, although the 
scaffolding was not incorporated into the construction by the 
general contractor, and Safway's employees were not under the 
supervision and control of the general contractor, Safway's 
continuing presence on the project performing tasks necessary to 
allow the general contractor's employees to carry out their 
work, extends beyond the act of delivery and distinguishes 
Safway from other entities which we have concluded were engaged 
in delivery of material or tools.  However, the fact that 
 
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Safway's activities were not limited to acts of delivery is 
insufficient to support the affirmative conclusion that such 
activities constitute the trade, business, or occupation of 
White, the general contractor. 
 
The majority bases its conclusion that the work done by 
Safeway was "an essential part of the work of the general 
contractor" and, therefore, that Safway was not an "other 
party," on the following criteria:  (1) Safway's contract 
required it to design and erect a complex scaffolding system 
including two working decks at all times; (2) numerous deck 
moves were required; and (3) Safway performed over 5,000 man-
hours of work on the project.  This recitation of activities 
describes the work Safway did, but, it does not, in my opinion, 
provide any rationale or explain why or how this work was part 
of the trade, business, or occupation of the general contractor. 
 
The quantity or complexity of the work performed is not the 
salient factor in determining whether an entity is an "other 
party" for purposes of Code § 65.2-307.  Nor are activities 
which may be essential to the work of the general contractor 
necessarily activities which are part of the general 
contractor's work.  See, e.g., Stone v. Door-Man Manufacturing 
Co., 260 Va. 406, 413, 537 S.E.2d 305, 308 (2000) (stating that 
a manufacturer needs a plant, but that constructing a plant does 
not make construction the manufacturer's business); Burroughs, 
 
10
210 Va. at 99-100, 168 S.E.2d at 108 (gathering material 
essential for construction of building but does not make 
material delivery part of construction).  Rather the analysis 
must focus on the nature of the work in question as it relates 
to the trade, business, or occupation of the general contractor. 
This required analysis is based on the underlying rationale 
for the Act and the exclusivity provision.  An employee subject 
to the Act does not lose his common-law right of action against 
a stranger to the business, an "other party," "for the reason 
that, though the accident may arise out of and in the course of 
the employment, the dominant cause of the accident is not 
inherent in the business and is not a loss which the act 
contemplates that the industry should ultimately bear."  Feitig, 
185 Va. at 99, 38 S.E.2d at 74 (emphasis added). 
An example of the application of this rationale is seen in 
Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d 92 (1957).  In that case, a 
general contractor contracted to build a school building for the 
city of Norfolk.  In constructing the building, the general 
contractor was required to hoist certain steel trusses and 
attach them to the top of 30-foot high columns.  Raising the 
trusses was work required of the general contractor, and, since 
the contractor's "equipment on the job was not capable of 
lifting these trusses," the general contractor had to rent a 
crane and crew to perform this work.  198 Va. at 713, 96 S.E.2d 
 
11
at 93.  An employee of the general contractor was killed when a 
truss, dislodged by the crane, fell on him. 
The work of the general contractor was to construct the 
building and, to do so, it had to raise the trusses.  Thus, in 
performing this work, the subcontractor in Rea was "engaged in 
an essential part of the work which the principal contractor had 
to do."  Id. at 717, 96 S.E.2d at 96.  The risk of injury from 
this work was inherent in the work of the general contractor and 
one borne as a cost of doing business by the general contractor. 
In this case, the business of the general contractor White 
was to repair and replace brick masonry.  White's vice president 
and project manager, Johnny L. Powers, testified that White did 
not have the technical capacity to install multi-level 
scaffolding of the type provided by Safway.  However, when asked 
if White could have performed its work without the scaffolding 
provided by Safway, Powers testified that, in several instances 
during the project, Safway did not have scaffold decks in areas 
in which White's workers needed to work and White constructed 
its own system "like window washers use on [a] high-rise" to 
provide access to the brick wall above ground level.  Thus, 
while White did not erect the type of scaffolding provided by 
Safway, White considered access to its renovation activities in 
areas above ground level as a part of its work and, in fact, on 
occasion, provided a system for that purpose.  The risk of 
 
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injury from providing such access was inherent in the work of 
the general contractor and, accordingly, was a cost of doing 
business by White. 
Providing access to the brick masonry was part of White's 
work and, when Safway provided such access through a system of 
scaffolding, it was performing part of the trade, business, and 
occupation of White.  Therefore, Peck is limited to the remedies 
available under the Workers' Compensation Act for injuries 
suffered as a result of the negligence of Safway's employees.  
For these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the 
majority. 
 
 
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