Title: MATTER OF CONLEY v WALDEN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13242
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 1976

No. 13242 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 I N T H E M A T T E R O F THE ADOPTION O F CHRISTINA MAE CONLEY, EDGAR MELVIN C O N L E Y AND D A L E WAYNE CONLEY, Minor Children, P e t i t i o n e r and Appellant, LOIS INNIS W A L D E N , Respondent and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Harrison, Loendorf and Poston, Helena, Montana James T. Harrison Jr. argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Huppert and Swindlehurst, Livingston, Montana Joseph T. Swindlehurst argued, Livingston, Montana Submitted : September 2, 1976 Decided : M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the refusal of the d i s t r i c t court, Park County, to vacate an order granting a maternal grandmother's petition t o adopt three minor children. This matter commenced i n 1973 when petitioners Melvin Conley and Ruby Pershall, the natural parents of the children petitioned for a " W r i t of Habeas Corpusf' claiming the d i s t r i c t court did not have jurisdiction t o grant the adoption petition of the respondent. The d i s t r i c t court denied the petition for the w r i t and the holding was sustained by t h i s Court i n Application of Conley v. Walden, 166 Mont. 369, 375, 533 P.2d 955. That opinion s e t s out the facts pertinent t o t h i s appeal, therefore it is not necessary t o repeat i n d e t a i l the fact situation. I n June 1975, two months a f t e r the decision was rendered by t h i s Court, petitioner Ruby F, Pershall, natural mother of the three children, brought t h i s action t o void the adoption. Petitioner claimed, once again, the d i s t r i c t court lacked jurisdiction t o grant the adoption. A motion t o dismiss on the basis the prior decision in t h i s matter was res judicata was granted by the distr.ict court which again determined the adoption decree was valid and no notice of the adoption t o petitioner was required. The prior action i n t h i s matter, although denominated as an application for a w r i t , o f habeas corpus, resulted i n a determin- ation of the merits of a l l claims raised by petitioners i n t h e i r pleadings and raised once again i n the instant case. Petitioners' own brief i n Application of Conley stated: 'I* * * we submit that the Supreme Court should t r e a t the s u i t as one seeking t o void the adoption decree instead of merely an action i n habeas corpus. The substance of the s u i t i s certainly i n that vein, although the form may be denominated as habeas corpus." This Court, i n Application of Conley stated: "Whether the action is treated as habeas corpus or a petition t o s e t aside an adoption, the welfare of the child i s the paramount factor. * * * "Considering the record i n the instant case, there are numerous grounds upon which the adoption i t s e l f could have been sustained without the consent of the petitioners. * * *" Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, Ch. 1 7 , 517.3, p. 579, discusses the use of the w r i t of habeas corpus i n child custody matters : "* * * I n the f i r s t place, the w r i t i n custody cases is generally considered equitable rather than legal. Second, the court i s by no means limited t o an inquiry into the legal right by which the child is held, but must determine the broad question of what disposition w i l l best serve the child's interest. * * Third, usual rules of res judicata apply i n habeas corpus involving custody, a t l e a s t t o the extent that the judgment is f i n a l * * *. " (Emphasis added) . A t the request of petitioners, t h i s Court fully disposed of the issues raised here i n connection with the validity of the adoption i n the prior habeas corpus decision, and that decision is r e s judicata t o matters raised by the instant petition. Section 61-205(1), R.C.M. 1947, provides: I t * * * that consent [to adopt] s h a l l not be required from a father or mother, "(c) who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect toward the child; or "(d) who has, i n the s t a t e of Montana, or i n any other s t a t e of the United States, willfully abandoned such child; or " ( f ) if it is proven to the satisfaction of the court that said father or mother, if able, has not contributed to the support of such child during a period of one ( 1 ) year before the filing of a petition for adoption * * *." Section 61-211, 1947, provides in pertinent part: 11 Service of process * * * need not be made * * * on any parent whose consent to the adoption is not required under the provisions of section 61-205 * * *." Therefore, no service of process need be made on parents, such as petitioners, who have abandoned their children, failed to support them, or lost them to the custody of state agencies through neglect or cruelty. Here the custody of the children was removed from the parents by order of the Missouri district court and the children were placed in the care of respondent where they have remained for the past 9 years. For the last 4 years, respondent has had full legal custody of these children, based on an order from the same Missouri court. This Court, in the prior opinion, noted "A period of six years of absolute abandonment of the three children with no support, no contact, and no visits by either parent * * *." as being the primary reason the parents were not entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings, and were not required to give their consent to its execution. The proper party to give consent to this adoption was the Missouri court having custody of the children, which consent was given by that court in May 1972 upon petition of respondent. Although this consent was later voided by the Missouri court, under questionable circumstances, Montana law section 61-206, R . C . M . 1947, provides the "entry of the [adoption] decree renders any consent irrevocable .I1 The only exception i s upon a finding by the court that the best interests of the child would be served by allowing revo- cation of consent. Application of Hendrickson, 159 Mont. 217, 222, 496 P.2d 1115. W e find no evidence i n the record before us indicating any benefit would accrue from such a holding. Finally, the objects of the instant l i t i g a t i o n are the three small children whose well-being must be the primary con- sideration of the Court i n disposition of t h i s matter. Riley v. Byrne, 145 Mont. 138, 399 P.2d 980; I n r e Adoption of Graves, (Okla.1971), 481 P.2d 136; Application of Conley v. Walden, 166 Mont. 369, 533 P.2d 955. Recently, the Arizona Supreme Court i n In r e Adoption of Hammer, 15 Ariz.App. 196, 487 P.2d 417, 419, said: "* * * Moreover, from a s t r i c t l y humanitarian standpoint, there must be an end t o the emotional s t r e s s and s t r a i n that i s involved i n the natural parents' attempt t o gain custody of t h e i r child." Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 1 17.5, p. 593, i n an analysis of a situation similar to the instant case, states: "Many of the cases involving t h i s problem a r i s e when the parent leaves the child with a friend or relative who l a t e r refuses t o return him on request. The crucial issue here is whether the child w i l l be harmed by a s h i f t i n custody back t o the parent. This depends upon the length of h i s stay with the foster parents, the nature of h i s relationship t o them, and the degree of contact maintained with the parent." (Emphasis added) . A consideration of the findings of the t r i a l court, clearly supported by the record of the natural parents' lack of fitness t o have custody of these three children, i n d i c a e s t h i s Court should uphold the d i s t r i c t court's refusal to vacate the adoption order. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court is affirmed. W e Concur: Justice Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell dissenting: I dissent. In my view the adoption decree is void. The natural mother was not given notice of the adoption pro- ceeding and afforded an opportunity to be heard. Instead her parental rights were permanently and irrevocably terminated without an opportunity to resist. The issue on appeal is not res judicata. The prior case, Application of Conley v . Walden, 166 Mont. 369, 533 P.2d 955,958, was a custody case, not an adoption proceeding. The issue there was the right to custody of the minor children, not the right t o adopt them. The opinion of this Court in that prior case expressly points this out at page 958 of 533 P,2d: "Respondent argues that this is a habeas corpus proceeding and appellants are attempting to use habeas corpus to collaterally attack the adoption decree. We agree and will treat the matter as it was brought by appellants, as one of habeas corpus seeking the custody of the children. Lacking an identity of issues, the principle of res judicata is inapplicable. The issue on appeal in this case is one of jurisdiction, Here the Court granted the adoption and permanently terminated the parental rights of the natural mother without notice. This cannot be done. As stated by a prominent authority: "The clearest justification for setting an adoption asice at the instance of a natural parent is that the parent was not given notice of the adoption proceeding. -Ic * * . " Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 518.10, p . 668. In accord: Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U . S . 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1 4 L ed 2 d 62; Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541. Respondent claims that the consent 'of the natural mother is not required in this case under section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, and consequently notice of the adoption proceeding need not be given her under section 61-211, R.C.M. 1947. Inanyview there is a substantial question concerning whether the natural mother falls under one of the statute's exceptions. Here she was deprived of an opportunity to show that she did not fall within one of the statutory exceptions by failure to give her notice of the adoption proceeding. As we said in In re Adoption of Biery, 164 Mont. 353, 359, "While the best interests of the child are of utmost concern in both custody and adoption cases, we have required strict compliance with section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, because of the harshness of permanently terminating parental rights." I see no reason to abandon this salutary principle in this case. Whatever the ultimate merits of the case may be, they cannot satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Justice.