Title: In re R.D.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 268A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 268A19  
Filed 18 December 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: R.D. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 
6 March 2019 by Judge Elizabeth Trosch in District Court, Mecklenburg County. 
Heard in the Supreme Court on 2 September 2020. 
 
Thurman, Wilson, Boutwell & Galvin, P.A., by W. David Thurman and Thomas 
J. Thurman, for petitioner-appellant Bethany Christian Services. 
 
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Parent 
Defender, for respondent-appellee father. 
 
 
DAVIS, Justice. 
 
 
In this case, we address several issues relating to the manner in which 
dispositional hearings in termination of parental rights cases are conducted and the 
factors that a trial court may properly consider in making a determination as to 
whether termination is in the best interests of the juvenile. For the reasons set out 
below, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for the entry of a new 
dispositional order. 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
This case involves a private termination of parental rights proceeding initiated 
by petitioner Bethany Christian Services (BCS), a private adoption agency, against 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the father (respondent) of the juvenile. The minor child “Ryan”1 was born in October 
2017 to respondent and “Brittany.” Respondent and Brittany met at school in 2016 
when they were 15 and 14 years of age, respectively. The two were family friends and 
lived in the same neighborhood. In January 2017, respondent and Brittany began a 
sexual relationship that lasted until March 2017. 
Brittany discovered that she was pregnant in March 2017. Later that month, 
respondent blocked Brittany from contacting him on social media—the primary 
means that the two had used to communicate with each other. The two offered 
differing accounts in their testimony as to why this occurred. Brittany testified that 
respondent blocked her immediately after she informed him of the pregnancy, but 
respondent testified that he did so because “[s]he was becoming annoying.” 
Brittany changed schools while she was pregnant, and respondent’s family 
moved away from Brittany’s neighborhood. Respondent did not see Brittany over the 
summer of 2017, and, according to respondent, no discussion took place between them 
during that time as to whether she might be pregnant. 
Brittany gave birth to Ryan in October 2017 in Mecklenburg County. The day 
after Ryan’s birth, Brittany signed a document relinquishing her parental rights over 
Ryan to BCS and also signed an affidavit naming respondent as the father of Ryan. 
Brittany selected Jason and Demi Dowdy as the prospective adoptive parents for 
Ryan, and Ryan was placed with the Dowdys on 1 November 2017. Ryan has lived 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion in order to protect the identity of the 
minor child. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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exclusively with the Dowdys since that time. Following Ryan’s placement with the 
Dowdys, BCS attempted to contact respondent by sending letters to the address listed 
in Brittany’s affidavit. However, Brittany had mistakenly written down the wrong 
house number when listing respondent’s address, and respondent never received the 
letters. 
Respondent testified that he was not aware of Brittany’s pregnancy or the birth 
of Ryan until 2018. He stated that in January of 2018 he heard rumors at school that 
Brittany had given birth, and respondent’s sister testified that she had seen a photo 
of Brittany with Ryan on social media. Nevertheless, respondent did not take any 
steps to investigate whether he might be the father of Brittany’s child and did not 
make any attempt to contact Brittany until after he was served with BCS’s 
termination petition several months later. 
BCS filed its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights on 
21 November 2017, alleging that respondent had neglected Ryan under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1) and had failed to establish paternity under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5). 
After several unsuccessful efforts to locate respondent both by mail and via the 
internet, BCS finally served respondent at his new address on 6 March 2018. After 
receiving the petition, respondent’s mother paid for a paternity test. Upon confirming 
that respondent was, in fact, the father of Ryan, respondent’s mother began the 
process of challenging BCS’s custody of Ryan. 
At a pretrial hearing on 30 May 2018, the trial court appointed Rhonda 
Hitchens—a local attorney—to serve as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for Ryan in the 
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termination proceeding. The adjudication stage of the termination proceeding was 
held on 24 August 2018. During the adjudication stage, the trial court dismissed the 
ground of neglect but found the existence of a ground for termination under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(5) due to respondent’s failure to establish paternity. 
The dispositional stage of the termination proceeding was subsequently held 
over the course of two dates—31 October 2018 and 9 January 2019. During the 
dispositional hearing, the trial court directed Hitchens to take the witness stand in 
order to testify about the GAL’s report she had prepared. The GAL’s report contained 
summaries of interviews with twenty individuals connected with the case, an 
assessment of Ryan’s needs and interests, and Hitchens’ ultimate recommendation 
that respondent’s parental rights not be terminated. 
Respondent objected to Hitchens being called as a witness on the ground that 
allowing her to testify about her report would create a conflict of interest by requiring 
her to act as both a lawyer and witness in violation of Rule 3.7 of the North Carolina 
Rules of Professional Conduct.2 In response, BCS argued that it would not be 
improper for Hitchens to testify and that BCS should have the right to cross-examine 
Hitchens about the contents of her report. 
                                            
2 Rule 3.7(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested 
issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; 
or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.” N.C. Rev. 
R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(a). 
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The trial court ultimately presented Hitchens with two options—either to 
(1) testify as a witness and withdraw as Ryan’s attorney advocate; or (2) remain as 
his attorney advocate and submit her written report to the trial court without 
testifying. Hitchens chose the second option, and her report was admitted into 
evidence without her testimony. BCS objected to the admission of Hitchens’ report on 
the grounds that the report presented an improper expert opinion on the ultimate 
issue of whether termination would be in Ryan’s best interests and that it had been 
denied its right to cross-examine her. The trial court overruled this objection and also 
denied BCS’s request to present an offer of proof regarding the testimony Hitchens 
would have given had she testified. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that termination 
of respondent’s parental rights was not in Ryan’s best interests. The trial court 
entered a written order dismissing BCS’s petition to terminate parental rights on 
6 March 2019. BCS appealed to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1). 
Analysis 
Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for the termination of 
parental rights—an adjudication stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-
1109, -1110 (2019). At the adjudication stage, the petitioner bears the burden of 
proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for 
termination exist under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f). If the trial 
court finds the existence of one or more grounds to terminate the respondent’s 
parental rights, the matter proceeds to the dispositional stage where the trial court 
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must determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 
interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
“We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine 
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019) 
(quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). With regard to the trial court’s 
assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional stage, however, we 
review that decision “solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019). 
“[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by 
reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” 
Id. at 6–7 (alteration in original) (quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015)). 
BCS raises a number of arguments on appeal, which essentially raise two 
primary issues. First, BCS contends that the trial court’s admission of the GAL’s 
report during the dispositional stage of the termination proceeding without allowing 
Hitchens to be cross-examined about the report constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Second, BCS asserts that the trial court’s written order contained key findings of fact 
that lacked evidentiary support in the record. We address each argument in turn. 
I. 
Admission of the GAL’s Report Without the Opportunity for Cross-
Examination 
 
BCS initially argues that the trial court should not have admitted the GAL’s 
report into evidence during the dispositional stage without affording its counsel the 
opportunity to cross-examine Hitchens about the contents of the report. In order to 
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fully analyze this issue, it is necessary to review the legal framework governing the 
role of the GAL in termination of parental rights proceedings. Our Juvenile Code 
provides for the appointment of a GAL in a termination proceeding as follows: 
(b) If an answer or response denies any material 
allegation of the petition or motion, the court shall appoint 
a guardian ad litem for the juvenile to represent the best 
interests of the juvenile, unless the petition or motion was 
filed by the guardian ad litem pursuant to G.S. 7B-1103, or 
a guardian ad litem has already been appointed pursuant 
to G.S. 7B-601. A licensed attorney shall be appointed to 
assist those guardians ad litem who are not attorneys 
licensed to practice in North Carolina. . . . 
 
(c) In proceedings under this Article, the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem shall not be required except, as provided 
above, in cases in which an answer or response is filed 
denying material allegations, or as required under G.S. 7B-
1101; but the court may, in its discretion, appoint a 
guardian ad litem for a juvenile, either before or after 
determining the existence of grounds for termination of 
parental rights, in order to assist the court in determining 
the best interests of the juvenile. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1108(b)–(c) (2019). 
Our Juvenile Code also states the following with respect to the GAL’s duties: 
[t]he duties of the guardian ad litem program shall be to 
make an investigation to determine the facts, the needs of 
the juvenile, and the available resources within the family 
and community to meet those needs; to facilitate, when 
appropriate, the settlement of disputed issues; to offer 
evidence and examine witnesses at adjudication; to explore 
options with the court at the dispositional hearing; to 
conduct follow-up investigations to insure that the orders 
of the court are being properly executed; to report to the 
court when the needs of the juvenile are not being met; and 
to protect and promote the best interests of the juvenile 
until formally relieved of the responsibility by the court. 
 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-601(a) (2019). 
 
This Court has recognized that in termination cases where a respondent-
parent files an answer denying material allegations in a termination petition, “the 
trial court (1) must appoint a GAL for the juvenile, and (2) must appoint a licensed 
attorney . . . if the appointed GAL is not an attorney.” In re C.J.C., 374 N.C. 42, 
44 (2020). It is therefore clear that in some cases a GAL may be appointed to serve in 
a dual role as both the juvenile’s GAL and attorney advocate. See In re J.H.K., 
365 N.C. 171, 175–76 (2011) (“Thus, if the GAL is an attorney, that person can 
perform the duties of both the GAL and the attorney advocate. . . . [The Juvenile 
Code] recognizes that in TPR proceedings the [GAL] attorney advocate is to perform 
the traditional role of a lawyer . . . .”). Moreover, subsection (c) of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1108 
provides that even when the trial court is not expressly required to appoint a GAL, 
the trial court may still do so in its discretion “in order to assist the court in 
determining the best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1108(c). This language 
makes clear that one of the statutorily enumerated functions of a GAL is to assist the 
trial court in making its best interests determination during the dispositional stage. 
In light of the specific argument BCS asserts in this appeal, we must also 
address the evidentiary distinctions between the adjudication and dispositional 
stages of termination proceedings. The portion of the Juvenile Code governing the 
adjudication stage of termination proceedings provides, in pertinent part, that 
[t]he burden in such proceedings shall be upon the 
petitioner or movant and all findings of fact shall be based 
on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The rules of 
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evidence in civil cases shall apply. No husband-wife or 
physician-patient privilege shall be grounds for excluding 
any evidence regarding the existence or nonexistence of 
any circumstance authorizing the termination of parental 
rights.  
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (emphasis added). 
With regard to the dispositional stage, however, the General Assembly has 
stated the following: 
After an adjudication that one or more grounds for 
terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall 
determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the 
juvenile’s best interest. The court may consider any 
evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-
1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and 
necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (emphasis added). 
These statutes make clear that during the adjudication stage of a termination 
proceeding, the trial court must apply the provisions of the North Carolina Rules of 
Evidence that apply in all civil cases. During the dispositional stage, conversely, the 
trial court retains significantly more discretion in its receipt of evidence and may 
admit any evidence that it considers to be relevant, reliable, and necessary in its 
inquiry into the child’s best interests—even if such evidence would be inadmissible 
under the Rules of Evidence. 
*   *   * 
Applying these principles to the present case, we must first decide whether the 
GAL’s report was admissible—that is, whether the trial court erred in its implicit 
determination that the report was “relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the 
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best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). We agree with respondent that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the report provided by 
Hitchens met each of these criteria. The report contained summaries of interviews 
with twenty different persons having some connection with the case, an analysis of 
the needs of Ryan, and Hitchens’ ultimate recommendation that the trial court not 
terminate respondent’s parental rights. The report detailed the basis of Hitchens’ 
opinion and thoroughly set out both the pros and cons of terminating respondent’s 
parental rights. This report was therefore directly related to the trial court’s task 
during the dispositional stage. Thus, the trial court possessed the discretion to 
determine that the report was, in fact, “relevant, reliable, and necessary” to 
determine the best interests of Ryan. 
We also observe that the admission of a GAL’s report at the best interests stage 
of a termination proceeding is a commonplace occurrence and that such reports are 
frequently introduced in order to aid the trial court in determining the juvenile’s best 
interests. See, e.g., In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 905 (2020) (noting that the trial court 
admitted a “detailed [GAL] report” during the dispositional stage and that “[n]o 
objection was made and said report was received into evidence and considered by the 
[trial court] on the issue of best interest”); In re A.L.L., 254 N.C. App. 252, 261 (2017) 
(“In the dispositional phase, the trial court received the report of the guardian ad 
litem . . . .”); In re M.A.I.B.K., 184 N.C. App. 218, 221 (2007) (noting that during the 
best interests determination the trial court “considered a report on the child’s best 
interests submitted by her guardian ad litem”). 
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BCS argues, however, that the trial court was required to make explicit 
findings setting out why it found the GAL’s report to be “relevant, reliable, and 
necessary” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) before admitting it into evidence. This 
argument is unavailing. This Court has never interpreted N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) to 
impose such a requirement, and nothing in the statutory text indicates that the 
General Assembly intended that such express findings be required. By way of 
contrast, we note that other portions of the Juvenile Code do require explicit factual 
findings in certain contexts. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019) (“[T]he court shall 
find that it has jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination . . . .”) (emphasis 
added)). The absence of any analogous language in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) 
demonstrates that no explicit findings are necessary when a trial court deems it 
appropriate to consider evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the 
Rules of Evidence. 
Having determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the GAL’s report, we must next determine whether the trial court committed 
reversible error in declining to require that Hitchens be subject to cross-examination 
after her report was admitted into evidence. During the dispositional stage of the 
termination proceeding, the trial court initially asked Hitchens to take the witness 
stand to testify regarding her report. Respondent, however, objected to Hitchens 
being called as a witness, contending that her dual role as an attorney advocate and 
as a factual witness would create an impermissible ethical conflict under Rule 3.7 of 
the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. After hearing arguments on this 
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issue from both parties and consulting the North Carolina Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the trial court ultimately ruled that Hitchens “being compelled to testify or 
giving testimony as a witness would constitute a violation of Rule 3.7 and necessitate 
her withdrawal.” The trial court then gave Hitchens the option either to testify and 
withdraw as Ryan’s advocate or—alternatively—to introduce her written report 
without giving any testimony at all. Hitchens chose the latter option. 
BCS argues that it was improperly deprived of its right to cross-examine 
Hitchens by the trial court’s ruling. BCS asserts that a party has the absolute right 
to “an opportunity to fairly and fully cross-examine a witness who has testified for 
the adverse party.” Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Reid Motor Co., 216 N.C. 432, 
434 (1939). Because the GAL’s report in this case contained relevant evidence—
including interviews with persons who did not appear in court and a recommendation 
from Hitchens regarding Ryan’s best interests—BCS contends that it should have 
been allowed to question her regarding the basis for her opinion and the methods she 
used to conduct these interviews. Similarly, BCS challenges the trial court’s 
characterization of the ethical conflict that would exist under Rule 3.7 if Hitchens 
had been required to testify, contending that there is no legal authority in this state 
preventing a party from compelling a material witness to testify. Finally, BCS argues 
that the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying its offer of proof regarding 
Hitchens’ anticipated testimony. 
In response, respondent contends that BCS was not entitled to cross-examine 
Hitchens as a matter of right because the dispositional stage of a termination 
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proceeding is inherently non-adversarial in nature. Respondent further asserts that 
the relaxed evidentiary standards applicable to dispositional hearings under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) do not lend themselves to bright-line rules regarding the 
manner in which evidence may be admitted by a trial court during this stage of a 
termination proceeding. 
As a preliminary matter, we first address BCS’s contention that the trial 
court’s ruling amounted to a deprivation of its constitutional due process right to 
cross-examine an opposing witness. Because BCS made no constitutional argument 
before the trial court, this issue is not properly before us. See State v. Golphin, 352 
N.C. 364, 411 (2000) (“Constitutional questions not raised and passed on by the trial 
court will not ordinarily be considered on appeal.”). As a result, the only issue for our 
determination is whether the trial court acted within its discretion by refusing to 
allow cross-examination of Hitchens. On these facts, we cannot say that an abuse of 
discretion occurred. 
While it is axiomatic that cross-examination of an adverse witness is an 
essential right in adversarial proceedings, see, e.g., Brewer v. Garner, 264 N.C. 384, 
386 (1965), the dispositional stage of a termination proceeding is not adversarial. See 
Stephens v. Stephens, 213 N.C. App. 495, 503 (2011) (quoting Ramirez-Barker v. 
Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 78 (1992)) (“ ‘[T]he best interest’ question is thus more 
inquisitorial in nature than adversarial . . . .”). Instead, the focus during the 
dispositional stage is entirely on ascertaining the best interests of the child by 
utilizing whatever evidence the trial court believes is most “relevant, reliable, and 
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necessary.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). This statute gives the trial court broad discretion 
regarding the receipt of evidence in its quest to determine the best interests of the 
child under the particular circumstances of the case. Although this reservoir of 
discretion is not limitless, we are satisfied that here the trial court’s ruling on this 
issue was within its discretion.3 
Our conclusion is supported by the language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) itself, 
which—as noted above—expressly allows the trial court to consider hearsay evidence. 
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (“The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay 
evidence . . . .”). Hearsay, by definition, is an out-of-court statement that is not subject 
to cross-examination. See State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 759 (1994) (quoting 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c)). Accordingly, because the statute expressly allows the 
admission of evidence which inherently cannot be subject to cross-examination, our 
legislature has made clear that no absolute right to cross-examination exists during 
the dispositional stage.4 
We deem instructive this Court’s decision in In re J.H.K. In that case, the trial 
court appointed the juveniles a GAL and a separate attorney advocate shortly after 
DSS obtained custody of them. J.H.K., 365 N.C. at 172. At the subsequent 
                                            
3 For example, we are not confronted with a scenario in which the trial court allowed 
the GAL to testify on direct examination for respondent but then refused to allow cross-
examination by BCS. Instead, the trial court allowed the GAL’s report to speak for itself. 
4 Although BCS contends that cross-examination was particularly warranted because 
the GAL’s report contained Hitchens’ expert opinion regarding Ryan’s best interests, 
Hitchens made clear to the trial court that she was not holding herself out as an expert 
witness or purporting to offer an expert opinion. 
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termination proceeding, the attorney advocate was present, but the juveniles’ GAL 
was absent from the courtroom. Id. at 173. On appeal, the respondent-parent argued 
that the trial court erred by conducting the termination proceeding without the 
children’s GAL being physically present. Id. We disagreed, holding that a “nonlawyer 
GAL volunteer is not required to be physically present at the TPR hearing.” Id. at 
178. In explaining our ruling, we emphasized the “separate in-court and out-of-court 
responsibilities” of the nonlawyer GAL—such as investigation and observation of the 
needs of the children. Id. at 176. We noted that “[a]lthough the GAL’s presence at the 
TPR hearing may be preferable,” nothing in the Juvenile Code explicitly requires the 
GAL’s attendance. Id. 
We further held that it was clear that the GAL had fulfilled her statutory 
duties by “regularly fil[ing] reports describing the children’s needs . . . . and her 
recommendations concerning the best interests of the children in light of her ongoing 
investigation of their case.” Id. at 177. Meanwhile, the attorney advocate had, in turn, 
complied with her respective duties by “appear[ing] at every hearing documented in 
the record” and by examining witnesses and introducing the GAL’s report at the 
termination proceeding. Id. Thus, we concluded that “[t]hrough the work of its team 
members appointed to th[e] case, the GAL program satisfied its out-of-court 
investigatory duties as well as its in-court representational duties.” Id. at 178. 
Although In re J.H.K. did not involve the specific issue raised by BCS in the 
present case, it is nevertheless consistent with our ruling today. If the GAL is not 
even required to be present in the courtroom at the termination proceeding, then 
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logically there is no absolute right to cross-examine the GAL in cases where she is 
present but does not testify for the adverse party. In re J.H.K. further demonstrates 
that a GAL can fulfill her “out-of-court investigatory duties” simply by submitting her 
written report to the trial court—which is what ultimately happened here. Id. 
Moreover, the existence of the potential for an ethical conflict pursuant to Rule 
3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct makes the trial court’s refusal to require 
Hitchens to testify even more reasonable. After becoming aware of the possible ethical 
conflict, the trial court (1) heard arguments on this issue from both parties; (2) 
reviewed Rule 3.7, the relevant portions of the Juvenile Code, and case law regarding 
the duties of the GAL; and (3) made a phone call to the North Carolina State Bar 
seeking guidance on this ethical issue. The trial court then offered Hitchens the 
option to either testify as a witness and withdraw as Ryan’s advocate or submit her 
written report without testifying and continue to serve as Ryan’s advocate. In so 
doing, we are satisfied that the trial court acted within its authority in attempting to 
resolve this issue. Accordingly, BCS’s argument is overruled. 
II. 
Best Interests Determination 
BCS next makes several arguments regarding the trial court’s dispositional 
findings of fact in its written order. Specifically, BCS contends that the trial court 
(1) improperly placed a burden of proof upon BCS during the dispositional stage; 
(2) failed to properly consider the statutory factors relevant to the best interests 
determination; and (3) made several material findings of fact that were unsupported 
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by the evidence including, most notably, a finding about alleged harms associated 
with adoption generally. 
We first address BCS’s argument regarding the burden of proof during 
disposition. BCS argues that the trial court’s order incorrectly (1) conflated the 
applicable burden of proof with the statement of legislative purpose set out in the 
Juvenile Code; and (2) suggested that BCS bore the burden of proving that 
respondent was not a capable parent. 
In its written order, the trial court looked to the stated legislative purpose 
contained in the section of the Juvenile Code governing termination proceedings for 
guidance in making its dispositional findings. The trial court’s order noted that 
[t]he court, in making its [best interests] determination, 
has considered the general purpose of Article 11, which is 
to provide judicial procedures for terminating the legal 
relationship between a child and the child’s biological or 
legal parents when the parents have demonstrated that 
they will not provide the degree of care which promotes the 
healthy and orderly physical and emotional well-being of 
the child. 
 
The trial court also framed several of its dispositional findings in terms of 
whether or not respondent had “demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to 
provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy and orderly physical and 
emotional well-being of the child.” 
As noted by BCS, this language in the trial court’s order is drawn directly from 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100, which sets out the underlying legislative intent with regard to 
the statutory scheme governing termination of parental rights proceedings. See 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(1) (2019) (“The general purpose of this Article is to provide 
judicial procedures for terminating the legal relationship between a juvenile and the 
juvenile’s biological or legal parents when the parents have demonstrated that they 
will not provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy and orderly physical 
and emotional well-being of the juvenile.”). 
However, we do not believe that it is improper for a trial court to look to the 
General Assembly’s intent as set out in the Juvenile Code for guidance when making 
its dispositional findings of fact. In fact, this Court has similarly examined 
statements of legislative intent contained within the Juvenile Code in reviewing 
orders involving the termination of a party’s parental rights. See, e.g., In re F.S.T.Y., 
374 N.C. 532, 540 (2020). Moreover, although it is true that the trial court’s order 
does not recite all of the legislative policies contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100, we are 
unaware of any rule that required it to do so. 
BCS further contends that the trial court improperly suggested that BCS bore 
the burden of proof during the dispositional stage. BCS is correct that—unlike during 
the adjudication stage—no burden of proof should be imposed upon either party at 
the dispositional stage. Compare N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (“The burden in [adjudication] 
proceedings shall be upon the petitioner or movant . . . .”), with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 
(containing no burden of proof requirement). See also In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 
94, 96 (2002) (“There is no burden of proof on the parties at disposition.”). However, 
our reading of the trial court’s order does not reveal any indication that the trial court 
actually imposed a burden of proof upon BCS. 
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BCS also argues that the trial court erred by either minimizing or ignoring 
altogether the five statutory factors required to be considered in the best interests 
analysis under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Most notably, BCS contends that the trial 
court failed to sufficiently consider Ryan’s high likelihood of adoption, his lack of a 
bond with respondent, and whether termination would aid in accomplishing Ryan’s 
permanent plan of adoption. BCS also claims that the trial court placed too much 
weight on the statutory “catchall” provision under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6). Section 
7B-1110 states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria 
and make written findings regarding the following that are 
relevant: 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will 
aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for 
the juvenile. 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the 
juvenile 
and 
the 
proposed 
adoptive 
parent, 
guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement. 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
We have held that the five enumerated factors are not exclusive, as subsection 
(a)(6) expressly authorizes a trial court to rely on any other “relevant consideration” 
it deems pertinent to the best interests determination. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 
200 (2019) (“In addition to the statutory factors set out in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–
(5), the district court considered other relevant factors, as it was permitted to do 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) . . . .”). 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
We previously rejected an argument similar to that made by BCS in In re 
A.U.D. There, the respondent-parent contended that “the trial court did not make 
sufficient findings regarding the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)” and that 
the trial court improperly weighed these factors by relying too heavily on the 
“catchall” provision under (a)(6). A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 10. We disagreed, explaining 
that while “[i]t is clear that a trial court must consider all of the factors in section 7B-
1110(a),” a court need not make explicit “written findings as to each factor.” Id. 
Because the transcript indicated that the trial court considered each of the five 
statutory factors, we held that there was no violation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Id. 
We further determined that it was permissible for the trial court to “consider[ ] other 
relevant circumstances . . . under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6)” in making its best 
interests determination—such as the circumstances surrounding the children’s 
adoption and the respondent’s recent “strides in self-improvement.” Id. at 12. As for 
the respondent’s argument regarding the allegedly erroneous weighing of the 
statutory factors, we noted that while some “evidence existed that would have 
supported a contrary decision . . . . this Court lacks the authority to reweigh the 
evidence that was before the trial court.” Id. 
Here, as in In re A.U.D., we are satisfied that the trial court properly 
considered each of the statutory factors. Indeed, the trial court’s order stated that 
“[t]he court has considered each of the six criteria set out in subsection 1110, and 
makes written findings on those factors that are relevant, placing significant weight 
on the sixth criteria which addresses any relevant consideration.” Furthermore, to 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-21- 
the extent that BCS is contending that the trial court improperly weighed and 
balanced the six factors in reaching its conclusion, such balancing is uniquely 
reserved to the trial court and will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal. See In re 
A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 12 (“[T]his Court lacks the authority to reweigh the evidence that 
was before the trial court.”). 
Finally, we address BCS’s various challenges to the trial court’s factual 
findings in its written order. During the dispositional stage, we review the trial 
court’s factual findings to determine if they are supported by competent evidence. 
In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 57 (2020) (“The trial court’s dispositional findings of fact 
are reviewed under a ‘competent evidence’ standard.”). In making findings of fact, “it 
is the trial judge’s duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon the credibility of the 
witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony.” 
In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 411 (2019). Moreover, findings of fact are binding “where 
there is some evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might 
sustain findings to the contrary.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110–11. 
BCS first challenges Finding of Fact 14, which discusses Brittany’s attendance 
at a birthday party held by respondent’s sister. Finding of Fact 14 states as follows: 
14. [Brittany] attended a birthday party in May, 2017 for 
Respondent-Father’s sister. This was a pool party to which 
[Brittany] wore a bikini. [Brittany] initially denied 
attending the party, but acknowledged her participation 
when confronted with photographic evidence of her 
presence. [Brittany] was not obviously pregnant and she 
did not disclose her pregnancy to any member of the 
father’s family. Respondent-Father did not attend the 
birthday party. 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-22- 
 
BCS asserts that this finding is incorrect because the transcript demonstrates 
that Brittany never denied attending the party—rather, she simply stated that she 
did not recall whether she had attended the party. 
The transcript reveals that, when Brittany was asked whether she had “any 
contact or communication” with anyone in respondent’s family after becoming 
pregnant in March 2017, Brittany responded “[n]o.” When initially asked about her 
attendance at the May 2017 pool party, Brittany stated that she “[didn’t] recall” 
whether or not she had attended. After being asked about the pool party again on 
cross-examination and after being confronted with a photograph of her at the party, 
Brittany admitted that she was “the person wearing a pink bikini” in the photograph. 
To the extent that a portion of Finding of Fact 14 contained an inaccurate recitation 
of the evidence, we do not deem any such inaccuracy prejudicial. Indeed, the 
transcript reveals that Brittany initially denied having any contact with respondent’s 
family after becoming pregnant but later admitted attending the party for 
respondent’s sister while pregnant. 
Second, BCS challenges Findings of Fact 42, 52, and 53, which discuss the 
“barriers” that prevented respondent from visiting Ryan and forming a bond with him 
after becoming aware of his birth. These findings state, in relevant part, as follows: 
42. . . . . Additionally, in this case, the Respondent-Father 
was innocent in his ignorance of the pregnancy. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-23- 
52. That the only reason this child does not have a strong 
reciprocal bond with Respondent-Father is because of 
barriers that were erected after his birth which the Father 
could not, despite his efforts, overcome. 
 
53. Immediately after he became aware of the existence of 
this child, Respondent-Father expressed his desire to visit 
with and establish a bond with his son. He was prohibited 
from doing so, both by [BCS] and the Court. 
 
BCS asserts that no “barriers” were erected to deny respondent access to Ryan 
because it was respondent who (1) blocked Brittany on social media; (2) failed to ever 
inquire about whether Brittany was pregnant (despite knowing where she lived); and 
(3) heard rumors of her pregnancy in January 2018 but still did nothing to assert his 
parental rights until March 2018. For these same reasons, BCS argues that 
respondent was not “innocent in his ignorance of the pregnancy” and that he did not 
express a desire to visit Ryan “immediately” after becoming aware of Ryan’s birth. 
BCS asserts that respondent knew about the pregnancy two months before service of 
the termination petition yet still took no action. 
There was conflicting evidence in the record regarding respondent’s knowledge 
of Brittany’s pregnancy. Brittany testified that she informed respondent that she was 
pregnant in March 2017, but respondent denied this assertion and testified that he 
did not learn about the pregnancy until 2018—having first heard rumors about her 
pregnancy in January 2018 and receiving confirmation of her pregnancy when he was 
served with BCS’s termination petition in March 2018. The trial court found 
respondent’s account of these events to be credible and found Brittany’s testimony 
“not believable”—as was its province as the trier of fact. 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-24- 
Moreover, the evidence of record permitted the trial court to conclude that 
barriers were erected after Ryan’s birth that prevented respondent from bonding with 
Ryan. It is undisputed that Brittany relinquished her parental rights to Ryan one 
day after his birth and that Ryan was shortly thereafter placed with a prospective 
adoptive family without respondent’s knowledge. Thus, the circumstances 
surrounding Ryan’s adoption alone were enough to allow the trial court to infer that 
barriers existed that made it difficult—if not impossible—for him to bond with Ryan. 
BCS next challenges the portions of Findings of Fact 15, 30, and 38 that discuss 
Brittany’s “active efforts to conceal” her pregnancy from respondent. These findings 
provide as follows: 
15. [Brittany’s] guardians engaged in active efforts to 
conceal [her] pregnancy in that they withdrew her from the 
school she attended with Respondent-Father and sent her 
to a school outside of their community of residence. 
 
. . . . 
 
30. . . . . The Respondent-Father’s failure to provide an 
adequate standard of care for this minor child could not be 
willful 
because . . . 
[Brittany] 
and 
her 
guardians 
intentionally concealed her pregnancy from Respondent-
Father [and] engaged in a process of planning for the 
child’s future at the exclusion of the minor father . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
38. A fourteen year old child, with the counsel and 
assistance of her legal guardians, made a decision to 
conceal this pregnancy from a fifteen year old father, his 
family and the world . . . . All of these decisions were carried 
out by a minor child who intentionally excluded the father 
of her unborn child from the process. 
 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-25- 
BCS argues that none of the actions in which Brittany engaged were motivated 
by an intent to conceal her pregnancy from respondent. BCS asserts that (1) her 
family moved Brittany to a different school to prevent her from being bullied because 
of her pregnancy; (2) she informed respondent of her pregnancy; (3) she posted a 
picture of herself with Ryan on social media; and (4) she told BCS the correct name 
of the baby’s father. BCS asserts that the lack of communication between the two was 
respondent’s fault, as it was respondent who knew where Brittany lived at all times 
but chose not to contact her. 
We reject BCS’s argument as we believe that these findings were likewise 
supported by competent evidence. Given that the trial court disbelieved Brittany’s 
claim that she informed respondent of the pregnancy, the remaining evidence could 
have led a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Brittany and her family were 
intentionally concealing her pregnancy from respondent. First, Brittany changed 
schools while pregnant. She testified that she changed schools in order to avoid being 
bullied or harassed, but the trial court was free to reject her testimony and to infer 
that her true motivation for changing schools was to avoid contact with respondent. 
Second, Brittany listed the wrong address for respondent on her affidavit. While this 
could have been a simple mistake, it also would have been permissible for the trial 
court to infer that this inaccuracy was intentional given the trial court’s unchallenged 
finding that Brittany gave “inconsistent, self-serving and untruthful testimony . . . 
concerning a number of substantive matters.” Third, as noted above, there was 
evidence that Brittany and her family never attempted to contact respondent after 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-26- 
Ryan’s birth, and it is uncontested that respondent was not consulted regarding the 
decision to relinquish Ryan for adoption. 
Additionally, BCS challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 23 stating that 
BCS did not “engage in meaningful efforts to ascertain the proper address of the 
minor Respondent.” BCS asserts that it asked Brittany for respondent’s address and 
that BCS had no reason to believe that the address provided by Brittany would be 
inaccurate. BCS notes that it was unable to verify respondent’s address through 
county property records because his family did not own the residence. BCS argues 
that it never gave up the search for respondent, claiming that it was not until after 
several months of undelivered letters as well as searches conducted through the 
internet, social media, criminal records, and Division of Motor Vehicles records that 
BCS could finally locate a current address for respondent’s mother, who lived in a 
different county. Likewise, BCS also challenges the trial court’s refusal to admit into 
evidence BCS’s affidavit of service—a record that BCS contends documented its 
diligent efforts to search for respondent. 
Although it is true that BCS took a number of steps to attempt to locate 
respondent—such as sending letters to the address for respondent listed in Brittany’s 
affidavit and searching for respondent on social media and on the internet—the trial 
court noted that there were several other commonsense steps that BCS could have 
taken to find respondent but that it did not do so. For example, BCS did not seek 
additional information from Brittany or her family, who were known to be acquainted 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-27- 
with respondent’s family. Nor did BCS attempt to obtain an address for respondent 
from the high school that he was known to attend.5 
Finally, BCS challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 57 discussing the alleged 
“harm” associated with adoption generally. In the trial court’s oral findings at 
disposition, the trial court not only emphasized the “need to protect all children from 
the unnecessary severance of relationship[s] with biological parents” but also went 
on to discuss the “harm or the challenges that children who are adopted often face.” 
This concern was also reflected in Finding of Fact 57 of the written order, which states 
as follows: 
57. There is insufficient evidence that changing primary 
care givers and homes at fourteen months of age would be 
traumatic and should be considered a primary or 
compelling factor on best interests to terminate parental 
rights. A change in caregivers, routine and home must be 
balanced against the harm that children who are adopted 
often face as they try to understand who they are, where they 
came from, and why they were not raised by their biological 
parents. 
 
(Emphasis added). BCS argues that this finding is unsupported by the evidence and 
that if the finding is allowed to stand, it will signal that adoptive families are deemed 
                                            
5 We also reject BCS’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error by 
refusing to admit the affidavit of service, which described BCS’s various efforts to contact 
respondent via mail, the internet, and through public records searches. The trial court 
received extensive testimony from BCS’s representative Robyn Johnson regarding BCS’s 
efforts to contact respondent. Given the broad amount of discretion that trial courts possess 
in making evidentiary rulings during the dispositional stage coupled with the fact that the 
majority of this information was described in Johnson’s testimony, we do not believe that the 
trial court abused its discretion by declining to admit the affidavit of service. 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-28- 
by courts in this state to be inherently inferior to biological families for purposes of 
conducting a best interests determination. 
We agree with BCS that the italicized portion of Finding of Fact 57 and the 
above-quoted oral findings by the trial court not only lack support in the record but 
can also be read as reflecting an inappropriate bias against adoption. At oral 
argument, counsel for respondent conceded that the trial court heard no evidence 
from the GAL or any other witness regarding any “harm” associated with adoption as 
a general proposition. Additionally, although it is true that our Juvenile Code states 
a preference for avoiding the dissolution of the biological parent-child relationship 
except when absolutely necessary, see, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(2) (recognizing “the 
need to protect all juveniles from the unnecessary severance of a relationship with 
biological or legal parents”), this does not mean that adoption is contrary to the public 
policy of our state or that our law deems adoptive parental relationships to be any 
less valuable than biological parental relationships. 
As articulated elsewhere in our General Statutes, the legislature has stated 
that “it is in the public interest to establish a clear judicial process for adoptions, 
[and] to promote the integrity and finality of adoptions.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100(a) 
(2019). The General Assembly has further declared “as a matter of legislative policy” 
that it is desirable to “advance the welfare of minors by . . . facilitating the adoption 
of minors in need of adoptive placement by persons who can give them love, care, 
security, and support.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100(b). This Court recognized eighty years 
ago that 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-29- 
[t]he institution of adoption is a very worthy response of 
the law to social needs . . . . Instances of its beneficent effect 
may be found in the history of men and women who have 
been aided to become prominent in all lines of private and 
public service, and in the consolation it has given to 
hundreds of childless homes. 
 
Ward v. Howard, 217 N.C. 201, 208 (1940). 
In response, respondent argues that even if there was no evidence in the record 
about harm suffered generally by adopted children, it was nevertheless permissible 
for the trial court to make such an inference based on its own personal experience 
pursuant to the doctrine of judicial notice. We disagree. 
We have held that “[a] matter is the proper subject of judicial notice only if it 
is ‘known,’ well established and authoritatively settled.” Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C. 
500, 506 (1965). Conversely, “[a]ny subject . . . that is open to reasonable debate is 
not appropriate for judicial notice.” Greer v. Greer, 175 N.C. App. 464, 472 (2006). 
Here, it can hardly be said that it is “well established” or “authoritatively settled” 
that children who are adopted often face “harm” while growing up and attempting to 
understand their identity. Hughes, 264 N.C. at 506. 
Accordingly, because no evidence existed in the record to support the trial 
court’s finding on this issue and because the doctrine of judicial notice is inapplicable, 
we hold that the challenged portion of Finding of Fact 57 was erroneous. 
Furthermore, we deem this inappropriate finding to be prejudicial because of the 
possibility that it influenced the trial court’s ultimate best interests determination. 
Although there were factors in this case suggesting that Ryan’s interests were likely 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-30- 
to be best served by the termination of respondent’s parental rights—such as Ryan’s 
close bond with his prospective adoptive parents, the extremely high likelihood of 
adoption, his lack of any bond with respondent, and the very young age of respondent 
himself—the trial court ultimately found that these factors were outweighed not only 
by the importance of maintaining the biological parental bond between respondent 
and Ryan but also by the trial court’s perception of the “harm” that adopted children 
face simply by virtue of the fact that they are adopted. 
We are therefore unable to determine whether the trial court would have 
reached the same result in its best interests analysis but for the consideration of this 
improper finding. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a new 
dispositional order. We express no opinion as to the ultimate result of the best 
interests determination on remand, as that decision must be made by the trial court. 
The trial court shall have the discretion on remand to determine whether a new 
dispositional hearing is necessary.6 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set out above, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part 
for the entry of a new dispositional order. 
                                            
6 BCS also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the ground of neglect during 
the adjudication stage. Because the trial court found that a separate ground for termination 
existed—i.e., respondent’s failure to establish paternity—we need not address the trial 
court’s determination regarding the ground of neglect. See In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 340 
(2020) (“Because there is sufficient evidence to support one ground for termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights, the Court need not address the second ground for 
termination . . . .”); In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019) (“[A]n adjudication of any single 
ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights.”). 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-31- 
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I join the entirety of Part I of the majority opinion, which correctly resolves 
BCS’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of the GAL report. I also join Part II, 
except as to the majority’s disposition of this appeal. In contrast to the majority, I 
believe there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion 
that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was not in the juvenile’s best 
interests, even without the portion of the court’s finding that it must consider “the 
harm that children who are adopted often face as they try to understand who they 
are, where they came from, and why they were not raised by their biological parents.”1  
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to remand to the trial court for the 
entry of a new dispositional order and would instead affirm. 
 
The trial court made specific findings of fact relating to all six enumerated 
factors provided by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). First, regarding “[t]he age of the 
juvenile,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1), the trial court found that because Ryan “is only 
                                            
1 The majority is correct that there was no expert witness testimony in this case 
documenting the impact of adoption on the adoptee, but I do not agree that its factual finding 
reflects “an inappropriate bias against adoption” on behalf of the trial court as asserted by 
the majority. There is a large body of academic research addressing this question. See, e.g., 
David M. Brodzinsky et al., Being Adopted: The Lifelong Search for Self (1993) (describing 
seminal research on the unique stages of adoptee development); Psychological Issues in 
Adoption (David M. Brodzinsky & Jesús Palacios eds., 2005) (collecting works from 
psychologists engaged in adoption research, including issues of adoptive adjustments). While 
the existence of this body of research does not justify the trial court taking judicial notice of 
an adjudicative fact in this regard, it does demonstrate some basis for the trial court’s 
concern. 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
 
fourteen months old . . . the establishment of a new primary care giver would not 
cause such a significant disruption in social and emotional well-being and 
development[ ] that it should preclude preservation of the relationship between this 
child and his father.” Second, regarding “[t]he likelihood of adoption of the juvenile,” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2), and “[w]hether the termination of parental rights will aid 
in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(3), the trial court found that because “the likelihood of adoption of this 
Juvenile is extremely high and the Dowdy’s are absolutely committed to providing a 
permanent home through adoption, this is one of many counter-balancing 
considerations made by the Court.” Third, regarding the “bond between the juvenile 
and the parent,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(4), the trial court determined that this factor 
should be given “limited weight because the Mother’s act of placing the child in the 
custody of Petitioner twenty-eight (28) days after birth combined with no clear 
statutory right to visitation pending this action, resulted in a limited opportunity for 
Respondent-Father [to] nurture and parent his son.” The trial court further found 
that “the only reason this child does not have a strong reciprocal bond with 
Respondent-Father is because of barriers that were erected after his birth which the 
Father could not, despite his efforts, overcome.” Fourth, regarding “[t]he quality of 
the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent[s],” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110(a)(5), the trial court found that while “[t]his child has a very strong and 
reciprocal bond and attachment with the proposed adoptive parents and the extended 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
 
- 3 - 
 
family members, and their entire circle of friends[,] . . . [t]he quality of the 
relationship with the prospective adoptive parents should not be the prevailing factor 
resulting in the deprivation of a relationship with Respondent-Father.”  
 
If the findings recounted above reflected the sum total of the trial court’s 
dispositional findings, I might agree with the majority that a remand for further 
factfinding is appropriate. However, the trial court also expressly stated that, in 
reaching its ultimate conclusion at the dispositional stage, it was “placing significant 
weight on the sixth criteria which addresses any relevant consideration,” referring to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6). Regarding this factor, the trial court made numerous 
findings of fact relating to “[t]he circumstances surrounding the [mother’s] pregnancy 
and [Ryan’s] birth,” which tended to show that despite “fac[ing] extraordinary 
constraints to establishing his biological, legal[,] and personal relationship with his 
son,” the respondent-father had “on service of the petition and learning of the 
existence of his son, contacted petitioner to request custody and visitation,” and 
immediately “purchased and collected items to provide care for his son and 
unequivocally expressed his desire to exercise his parental rights and duties.” The 
trial court found that the evidence presented “do[es] not also demonstrate that 
Respondent-Father will not provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy 
and orderly physical and emotional well-being of his child.” Thus, in light of “the 
general purpose of Article 11, which is to provide judicial procedures for terminating 
the legal relationship between a child and the child’s biological or legal parents when 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
 
the parents have demonstrated that they will not provide the degree of care which 
promotes the healthy and orderly physical and emotional well-being of the child,” the 
trial court weighed the evidence against the statutorily enumerated factors and 
concluded that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights did not serve Ryan’s 
best interests. 
 
The trial court’s express statement that it was relying most heavily on findings 
related to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) suggests that its consideration of the potential 
harms of adoption was not a basis for its ultimate conclusion. Further, absent this 
finding, the trial court’s order bears substantial similarities to the order at issue in a 
recently decided case involving substantially similar facts, In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 
832 S.E.2d 698 (2019). In that case, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in concluding that termination of parental rights was not in the best 
interests of the juveniles, reasoning that it was appropriate for the trial court to 
emphasize the importance of preserving ties between the children and their biological 
father and to consider the circumstances of the mother’s relinquishment of the 
children which had deprived the respondent-father of an opportunity to develop a 
parental bond: 
Here, the trial court carefully weighed the competing goals 
of (1) preserving the ties between the children and their 
biological relatives; and (2) achieving permanence for the 
children as offered by their prospective adoptive family. In 
addition to the statutory factors set out in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(1)–(5), the trial court also considered other 
relevant circumstances—as it was permitted to do under 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
 
- 5 - 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6)—such as the fact that (1) [the 
juveniles] were relinquished to BCS solely at the behest of 
their mother; (2) respondent was never afforded the 
opportunity to parent [the juveniles] or provide for their 
care prior to their relinquishment; (3) upon learning of [the 
juveniles’] birth, respondent “proactively” attempted to 
establish paternity.  
 
Id. at 12, 832 S.E.2d at 703–04. For similar reasons, I believe that the trial court’s 
appropriate findings in this case are adequate to support its conclusion that 
termination of parental rights is unwarranted. 
Our decision in In re A.U.D. reflected a recognition that “[o]ne of the stated 
policies of the Juvenile Code is to prevent ‘the unnecessary or inappropriate 
separation of juveniles from their parents.’ ” Id. at 11, 832 S.E.2d at 703 (quoting 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(4) (2019)). Whatever the state of the evidence here regarding the 
potential impact on this child from being adopted, the trial court was entitled to 
conclude that because there was “substantial evidence that Respondent-Father is 
willing and capable of providing the degree of care that is necessary to promote the 
healthy and orderly physical and emotional well-being of his son,” terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights was “unnecessary” to achieving an outcome that 
served the juvenile’s best interests. An unwarranted skepticism of adoption is 
inconsistent with our Juvenile Code, but a belief that preserving the relationship 
between a child and a fit parent serves that child’s best interests is perfectly 
appropriate. Although the trial court had no specific evidence of the impact of 
adoption generally, the trial court was well within its discretionary authority to 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
 
- 6 - 
 
conclude that it served Ryan’s best interests to preserve his relationship with a 
respondent-father who was ready and able to provide appropriate care.  
Further, our decision in In re A.U.D. and other cases also reflect an appropriate 
respect for and deference to the judgment of trial courts tasked with weighing the 
often contradictory evidence presented during termination proceedings. As we 
indicated in that case, our sole task on appeal is to review the trial court’s order and 
the underlying record to determine whether the trial court’s conclusion that 
termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in the children’s best interests 
was either arbitrary or manifestly unsupported by reason. See id. at 12, 832 S.E.2d 
at 704; see also In re I.N.C., 374 N.C. 542, 550, 843 S.E.2d 214, 220 (2020) (“[T]he 
responsibility for weighing the relevant statutory criteria delineated in N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1110(a) lies with the trial court, which ‘is permitted to give greater weight to other 
factors,’ rather than with this Court.”) (quoting In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 
S.E.2d 62, 66 (2019)).  
In the present case, it does not appear that the trial court’s conclusion that 
termination of parental rights was not in Ryan’s best interests rested upon its 
unsupported factual finding regarding the impact of adoption, nor was its ultimate 
conclusion “arbitrary” or “manifestly unsupported by reason” given the trial court’s 
other findings at the dispositional stage of the proceeding. Upon close review of the 
trial court’s order and the record, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial 
court’s finding regarding the harms of adoption was so central to its determination 
IN RE R.D. 
 
Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
 
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that respondent-father’s parental rights should not be terminated as to permit us to 
disturb the trial court’s reasoned judgment.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand to the 
trial court for the entry of a new dispositional order. 
Chief Justice BEASLEY and Justice HUDSON join in this opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part.