Title: Cochran v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 50, 2007, 51, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 28, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONALD R. COCHRAN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  Nos. 50 and 51, 2007 
§  CONSOLIDATED 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0102010757 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 13, 2007 
Decided:  September 28, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of September 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Donald R. Cochran, filed appeals 
from the Superior Court’s January 22, 2007 corrected sentencing order and 
its January 22, 2007 decision and order granting in part and denying in part 
his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 35(a).1  Because Cochran was not present in the Superior Court with 
counsel when his burglary sentence was corrected, that sentence must be 
VACATED and this matter REMANDED to the Superior Court for further 
                                                 
1 Cochran also filed a separate motion for the appointment of counsel. 
 
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proceedings in accordance with this Order.  The remainder of the Superior 
Court’s rulings are AFFIRMED, albeit on grounds different from those 
relied upon by the Superior Court.2     
 
(2) 
In February 2003, Cochran entered a Robinson plea to Burglary 
in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, and Possession of a Deadly 
Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, crimes that he had committed 
in February 2001.  On the burglary conviction, he was sentenced to 20 years 
at Level V, to be suspended after 6 years for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  On the assault conviction, he was sentenced to 10 years at 
Level V.  On the weapon conviction, he was sentenced to 2 years at Level V. 
 
(3) 
In December 2006, Cochran filed a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  Cochran claimed 
that he should have been sentenced to no more than 10 years on his burglary 
conviction and that his sentence for the weapon offense should be reduced 
by good time.  The Superior Court agreed with Cochran’s first claim and 
issued a corrected sentencing order reducing his sentence for burglary to 10 
years at Level V, but denied Cochran’s second claim.   
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Cochran claims that a) the Superior Court 
improperly denied his claim that good time credit should be applied to his 
                                                 
2 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995).  
 
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sentence on the weapon conviction; b) the Superior Court improperly 
imposed a 20-year sentence on the burglary conviction; c) his illegal 
sentences were imposed due to the ineffective assistance of his counsel; d) 
his plea was involuntary because his counsel gave him incorrect information 
about the maximum sentence he could receive; and e) the Superior Court 
improperly corrected his sentence for burglary without his being present in 
court and accompanied by counsel. 
 
(5) 
  Cochran’s first claim, in essence, challenges the Department 
of Correction’s (“DOC’s”) failure to apply good time credits to his sentence 
on the weapon conviction.  The proper procedural vehicle for the remedy 
sought by Cochran is a petition for a writ of mandamus, not a Rule 35(a) 
motion.3  A writ of mandamus is a means for the Superior Court to compel a 
public agency such as the DOC to perform a duty where: the petitioner has a 
clear right to the performance of the duty; no other adequate remedy is 
available; and the public agency has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform 
                                                 
3 Ortiz v. State, Del. Supr., No. 645, 2006, Jacobs, J. (July 2, 2007) (citing Snyder v. 
Andrews, 708 A.2d 237 (Del. 1998); Meades v. Hosterman, Del. Supr., No. 239, 2006, 
Ridgely, J. (Aug. 23, 2006); and Clough v. State, 686 A.2d 158, 159 (Del. 1996)). 
 
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its duty.4  We, therefore, conclude that the Superior Court properly denied 
Cochran’s first claim.5                                                                                                                 
 
(6) 
Cochran next claims that the burglary sentence originally 
imposed by the Superior Court was illegal because it reflected the July 2001 
amendment to the first-degree burglary statute rather than the version of the 
statute in effect at the time he committed his crimes.6  Because the Superior 
Court agreed with this claim, and corrected Cochran’s sentence to reflect the 
correct version of the statute, this claim is now moot.   
 
(7) 
Cochran next claims that his illegal sentences were imposed as 
a result of the ineffective assistance of his counsel. Specifically, Cochran 
alleges that, because his counsel did not know the law relating to his case, he 
did not challenge the imposition of the illegal sentences.  An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is not cognizable under Rule 35(a).  The narrow 
function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-
examine alleged errors occurring prior to the imposition of sentence.7  The 
proper procedural vehicle for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that 
was not raised in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is a 
                                                 
4 Clough v. State, 686 A.2d at 159.    
5 We note that, in its decision, the Superior Court incorrectly referred to a version of Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447(b) that was not yet in effect at the time Cochran committed his 
crimes. 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 826, 4205(b) (3). 
7 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998) (citing Hill v. United States, 368 
U.S. 424, 430 (1962)). 
 
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postconviction motion under Rule 61.  We, therefore, conclude that the 
Superior Court properly denied this claim.     
 
(8) 
Cochran next claims that his Robinson plea was involuntary 
because his counsel did not properly advise him concerning his sentence.  
This claim was not presented to the Superior Court in the first instance.  For 
that reason, we decline to consider the claim in this appeal.8 
 
(9) 
Cochran’s final claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
corrected the sentence on his burglary conviction without his being present 
and represented by counsel.  The record reflects that, after the Superior 
Court corrected Cochran’s sentence for burglary, Cochran wrote a letter to 
the Superior Court complaining that he should have been present in court for 
the re-sentencing.   
 
(10) This Court has previously held that, when a defendant is being 
re-sentenced because of an error of law in the original sentence, regardless 
of whether the sentence is being increased or reduced, he has a right to be 
present in court, with counsel, for the re-sentencing.9  As such, we conclude 
that it was erroneous for the Superior Court to correct Cochran’s sentence 
without Cochran being present in court and represented by counsel.  On 
                                                 
8 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
9 Jones v. State, 672 A.2d 554, 555-56 (Del. 1996); Fullman v. State, 431 A.2d 1260, 
1264-65 (Del. 1981). 
 
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remand, Cochran must be re-sentenced in accordance with the requirements 
outlined above.10 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Cochran’s burglary 
sentence is VACATED and the matter is hereby REMANDED to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Order.  The 
remainder of the Superior Court’s rulings are AFFIRMED.  Jurisdiction is 
not retained.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
10 The State of Delaware laudably concedes this point. 
11 There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in postconviction 
proceedings.  Floyd v. State, Del. Supr., No. 194, 1992, Veasey, C.J. (July 13, 1992) 
(citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)).  We do not find good cause for the 
appointment of counsel in this case.  Therefore, Cochran’s motion for the appointment of 
counsel is denied.