Title: Commonwealth v. Delossantos
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13351
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 2023

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SJC-13351 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  OSCAR DELOSSANTOS.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 8, 2023. – June 13, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Waiver of constitutional rights, Voluntariness of 
statement, Search and seizure.  Waiver.  Evidence, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and 
confessions, Waiver, Voluntariness of statement, Affidavit.  
Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle. 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Newburyport 
Division of the District Court Department on January 20, 2017, 
and June 13, 2017. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter 
F. Doyle, J.; the cases were tried before Allen G. Swan, J.; and 
a motion for a new trial was heard by Doyle, J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Matthew Spurlock, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
1 As is our practice, we use the defendant's name as it 
appears on the complaint. 
2 
 
Kathryn L. Janssen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Oscar Delossantos, was charged 
with one count of carrying a firearm without a license pursuant 
to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), one count of carrying a loaded 
firearm without a license pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
and one count of disorderly conduct pursuant to G. L. c. 272, 
§ 53.  In a pretrial motion, the defendant sought to suppress 
"all evidence and statements seized" by police as a result of 
"the unlawful search and seizure[]" of the defendant.  Following 
an evidentiary hearing, the defendant's motion to suppress was 
denied, as the judge found that the defendant knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after, 
as the judge further found, the defendant was given "the full 
compl[e]ment of Miranda warnings (in English and in Spanish)." 
 
At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of carrying a 
firearm without a license, and he was sentenced to eighteen 
months in a house of correction.2  The defendant filed a motion 
to file a late notice of appeal, which was allowed by a single 
justice of the Appeals Court.  A stay of the appellate 
proceedings was subsequently entered as the defendant filed a 
 
2 The judge granted the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty as to the disorderly conduct charge, and 
the jury found the defendant not guilty of carrying a loaded 
firearm without a license. 
3 
 
postconviction motion for a new trial.  The motion was denied 
following a nonevidentiary hearing, and the defendant filed a 
timely appeal.  In a consolidated appeal, a panel of the Appeals 
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction and the denial of his 
motion for a new trial in an unpublished memorandum and order 
pursuant to its rule 23.0.3  Commonwealth v. Delossantos, 101 
Mass. App. Ct. 1115 (2022).  We granted the defendant's petition 
for further appellate review. 
 
This case presents the question whether the defendant 
waived a claim regarding the adequacy of the Miranda warnings 
provided to him in Spanish, where the Commonwealth argues that 
the defendant failed to set forth with particularity the grounds 
on which he sought to suppress his postarrest statements to 
police.  Where we conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights, and that the defendant did not waive the issue, the 
defendant's conviction must be vacated.4 
 
3 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the decision 
pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 27, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1656 
(2019), which the panel denied. 
 
4 Because we conclude that the defendant did not waive the 
Miranda warning issue and that the judge erred in denying the 
defendant's motion to suppress his postarrest statements, we 
need not reach the arguments raised in the motion for a new 
trial, i.e., whether trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly 
"failing to hold the Commonwealth to its burden to establish" 
4 
 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the motion 
judge, following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
motion to suppress, supplemented by undisputed facts from the 
hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 362 (2017). 
 
Shortly after 10 P.M. on January 19, 2017, Officer David 
Noyes of the Amesbury police department was on routine patrol in 
Amesbury when he observed a gray Honda motor vehicle "roll 
through" a stop sign and take a quick right turn without using a 
directional signal.  Noyes observed that the license plate on 
the vehicle was secured with only one screw, prompting him to 
turn around and follow the vehicle in his police cruiser.5  Noyes 
called dispatch with the license plate number for a registry 
query.  At that time, however, Noyes did not activate the lights 
of his cruiser. 
Another officer of the Amesbury police department, Officer 
Neil Moody, was parked at a local business when the gray Honda 
passed him.  Moody, having heard Noyes's request for a registry 
query on the gray Honda, used the computer in his cruiser to 
conduct a registration query of the vehicle, which revealed that 
it was registered to a male owner whose license had expired and 
 
that the defendant received accurate and complete Miranda 
warnings in Spanish. 
 
5 Noyes was in a "ghost cruiser," i.e., a police cruiser 
that did not appear to be marked fully until headlights "hit 
it." 
5 
 
was nonrenewable.  Moody saw that the driver of the vehicle was 
a male, prompting him to pursue the vehicle and activate the 
blue lights of his cruiser. 
 
As Moody was in pursuit, Noyes followed behind.6  The 
vehicle continued about one-tenth of a mile, passing numerous 
open parking spots without stopping.  The vehicle entered a 
parking area of a nearby convenience store and parked in two 
spaces, one of which was a handicap space.  Both front doors of 
the vehicle opened quickly.  The driver and the defendant, who 
was seated in the front passenger's seat, got out of the vehicle 
and continuously looked at the pursuing officers as they quickly 
walked in opposite directions away from the vehicle and the 
convenience store.  Moody then parked behind the vehicle, and 
Noyes soon thereafter pulled up next to him.7  Seeing both men 
quickly get out of the vehicle, the officers believed they were 
on the verge of fleeing the scene. 
 
6 Noyes still had not activated the lights of his cruiser.  
He testified on cross-examination that he was not in pursuit of 
the vehicle, but merely was trying to follow it, as he had been 
given a description by dispatch about the vehicle and was trying 
to confirm that information.  Noyes estimated that when he 
turned around to follow the vehicle, he was 900 feet behind 
Moody. 
 
7 Moody and Noyes were not in communication during the 
pursuit of the vehicle.  Moody did not know Noyes was following 
behind him.  Once Noyes pulled up next to Moody, who had already 
stopped the vehicle, Noyes saw that the vehicle matched the 
description provided by dispatch. 
6 
 
 
As a result, both officers got out of their vehicles; Moody 
"painted" the defendant with a Taser gun, and Noyes told the 
driver to stop.8  Noyes told the driver and the defendant 
multiple times to return to the vehicle, which they did after a 
lot of "back and forth."  On returning to the vehicle, both the 
driver and the defendant were ordered to put their hands on the 
dashboard.  Each, however, took his hands off the dashboard 
multiple times.  The defendant placed his hands near his waist, 
while the driver continued to reach with his right hand towards 
the center console and the floor area.  Fearing for their 
safety, the officers removed the two men from the vehicle.  The 
defendant was moved to the front of the vehicle and was pat 
frisked, but no weapons were found.  Officer Scott Peters of the 
Amesbury police department arrived on the scene and was told to 
check the area of the vehicle that the driver had "lung[ed] 
for."  Peters then found a loaded handgun within a bag that was 
located on the floor of the front passenger's area. 
 
Neither the defendant nor the driver had a license to carry 
the firearm.  Both men were arrested and were advised of the 
Miranda rights in English.  Once arrested, the defendant claimed 
that he could not speak English.  Because none of the officers 
 
8 The term "painted" was described as the officer drawing 
the Taser gun, pointing it at the defendant, and activating the 
Taser gun's red laser light. 
7 
 
at the scene spoke Spanish, an officer who was fluent in 
Spanish, Officer Guillermo of the Salisbury police department, 
was called to the scene and readvised the defendant of his 
Miranda rights in Spanish.  The defendant then was questioned by 
police about the firearm.  While the driver admitted that the 
firearm belonged to him, the defendant admitted to trying to 
conceal the firearm. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
"all evidence and statements seized" by police, including any 
postarrest statements made by the defendant during the motor 
vehicle stop.  During the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the 
Commonwealth presented testimony from Noyes, Moody, and Peters.  
Noyes testified that Guillermo advised the defendant of his 
rights in Spanish, and that the defendant appeared to understand 
those rights once given in Spanish.  Moody testified that he 
knew Miranda warnings were read to the defendant at the scene of 
his arrest.  Peters testified that he provided Miranda warnings 
to the defendant, but not in Spanish because he did not speak 
Spanish.  The Commonwealth did not call as a witness Guillermo, 
the officer who, according to the testimony, had given the 
defendant Miranda warnings in Spanish.  Nonetheless, the motion 
judge found that the defendant was given "the full compl[e]ment 
of Miranda warnings (in English and in Spanish)" and had 
8 
 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights.  
The defendant's motion then was denied. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Waiver of issue.  The Commonwealth argues 
that although the defendant "conceivably raised" the issue 
whether Miranda warnings were given at all, the issues whether 
Miranda warnings were required to be given in Spanish and 
whether they in fact were given in Spanish were not raised 
properly in the defendant's motion to suppress.  "Pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 
(2004) [(rule 13 [a] [2])], a motion to suppress 'shall state 
the grounds on which it is based and shall include in separately 
numbered paragraphs all reasons, defenses, or objections then 
available, which shall be set forth with particularity'" 
(emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304, 309 
(2017).  The Commonwealth argues that where the defendant has 
failed to do so, the issues whether Miranda warnings were 
required to be given in Spanish, and whether they in fact were 
given in Spanish, are waived.  We disagree. 
 
The defendant's motion to suppress, albeit in somewhat 
brief fashion, sought to suppress "any statements" made to 
police because the defendant "did not waive voluntarily any of 
[his] rights under the [United States] Constitution or the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  In his affidavit, the 
defendant more specifically stated that he "did not knowingly 
9 
 
and voluntarily waive any of [his] constitutional rights" 
following his arrest, and that "[a]ny statements attributed to 
[him] in the police report were not accurate and not truly 
voluntary" (emphases added).  In the memorandum of law filed in 
support of his motion, the defendant further argued that he did 
not receive Miranda warnings, as "[n]otably absent from the 
[a]rrest [r]eport [was] whether any 'Miranda' warnings were 
administered in Spanish to the [defendant] before questioning 
ensued." 
 
According to the findings of the motion judge, the 
defendant spoke English up until his arrest.  The motion judge 
found that once arrested, the defendant "claimed" that he could 
not speak English.  The Commonwealth was aware that the 
defendant had challenges with speaking English, as the 
prosecutor had elicited testimony from one of the officers, 
Noyes, on direct examination that Guillermo specifically was 
called to the scene to provide the defendant with Miranda 
warnings in Spanish.  In fact, on direct examination, the 
prosecutor specifically asked Noyes if the defendant appeared to 
understand the Miranda warnings once they were given to him in 
Spanish by Guillermo, to which Noyes responded, "Yes." 
A defendant's waiver of his or her Miranda rights must be 
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Commonwealth v. 
Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 153 (2011).  The Commonwealth is aware that 
10 
 
it bears "the 'particularly heavy burden' of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's Miranda waiver was [in 
fact] valid."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655 
(2018), quoting Hoyt, supra at 152.  In doing so, the 
Commonwealth always must demonstrate not only what warnings were 
provided to the defendant, but also that the defendant 
understood such warnings.  See Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran, 
471 Mass. 179, 186 n.6 (2015).  See also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 
379 Mass. 422, 429 (1980) ("A confession can be voluntary in the 
legal sense only if the suspect actually understands the import 
of each Miranda warning").  Where the Commonwealth bears a 
particularly heavy burden in demonstrating a valid waiver of 
Miranda protections, and where the Commonwealth was aware of the 
defendant's challenges with the English language, the 
Commonwealth was on full notice that the defendant's challenge 
to the over-all sufficiency of his Miranda warnings necessarily 
would include a challenge to the Commonwealth's proof that 
adequate Miranda warnings actually were provided in Spanish.  
See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 864 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 544, cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 942 (2002) (Miranda warnings must be provided in 
"language which [a defendant] can comprehend and on which [a 
defendant] can knowingly act"). 
11 
 
The Commonwealth knew that the defendant's ability to speak 
English was an issue, as evidenced by its direct examination of 
Noyes, and thus it had a full opportunity to present whatever 
facts it deemed relevant at the motion to suppress hearing.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santosuosso, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 310, 314 (1986).  
We conclude that the defendant placed the Commonwealth on 
sufficient notice of the issue whether proper Miranda warnings 
were provided in Spanish following the defendant's arrest. 
Despite our holding that the defendant satisfied the 
particularity requirement of rule 13 (a) (2), we take this 
opportunity to review this court's previous holding in 
Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 389-391 (2010).  In Mubdi, 
we held that if the Commonwealth seeks to challenge the 
particularity of a defendant's motion to suppress and fails to 
file either a motion for a more particularized affidavit or, 
alternatively, a motion to deny, without a hearing, the 
defendant's motion to suppress for failure to provide fair 
notice under rule 13 (a) (2), then the Commonwealth waives any 
objection to the particularity requirement of rule 13 (a) (2).  
Id. at 390-391. 
Rule 13 (a) (2) serves two practical purposes.  Mubdi, 456 
Mass. at 389-390.  It "alerts the judge and the Commonwealth to 
the suppression theories at issue, and allows the Commonwealth 
to limit its evidence to these theories."  Dew, 478 Mass. at 
12 
 
309, quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 781 (2004).  
Sufficient detail in the defendant's motion to suppress and 
accompanying affidavit allows the prosecution to receive fair 
notice "of the particular search or seizure that the defendant 
is challenging, so that the prosecution may determine which 
witnesses it should call and what evidence it should offer to 
meet its burden of proving" the constitutionality of the 
relevant search or seizure.  Mubdi, supra at 389.  The degree of 
detail that ultimately is required by rule 13 (a) (2), however, 
is evaluated with the rule's two practical purposes in mind.  
Id. at 390. 
The practice of placing the burden on the Commonwealth to 
challenge the defendant's failure to satisfy the particularity 
requirement of rule 13 (a) (2), in order to avoid waiver of the 
issue, aligns with neither the rule's two practical purposes, 
nor the rule's explicit language, which unambiguously places the 
burden for particularity in a motion to suppress on a defendant.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2) ("A pretrial motion shall state 
the grounds on which it is based . . . with particularity. . . .  
Grounds not stated which reasonably could have been known at the 
time a motion is filed shall be deemed to have been waived"). 
The purpose of the rule is to provide notice to the judge 
and the Commonwealth of what is at issue in the defendant's 
motion to suppress, so that the Commonwealth is not forced to 
13 
 
intuit and predict the multitude of challenges that a defendant 
could make to a search or seizure.  See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
444 Mass. 234, 250 n.3 (2005) (Greaney, J., dissenting) 
(defendant must state grounds for suppression with particularity 
so Commonwealth need not unnecessarily extend length of 
suppression hearing by presenting evidence on issues not raised 
by defendant).  Therefore, we overturn our previous decision in 
Mubdi, and no longer require that the Commonwealth file either a 
motion for a more particularized motion to suppress or 
affidavit, or alternatively a motion to deny the defendant's 
motion to suppress without a hearing, in order to preserve a 
challenge to the particularity of a defendant's motion to 
suppress.  We caution defense counsel across the Commonwealth 
that the burden of compliance with the particularity requirement 
of rule 13 (a) (2) falls on the defendant alone, as it had been 
prior to this court's decision in Mubdi.  Compare Commonwealth 
v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 473-474 & n.12 (2000) (where defendant 
did not raise in motion to suppress, or accompanying affidavit, 
issue whether search for weapon was outside curtilage of 
apartment, such issue was waived), with Commonwealth v. Douglas, 
472 Mass. 439, 444 n.5 (2015) (Commonwealth's contention that 
motions to suppress should have been dismissed for failure to 
comply with particularity requirement of rule 13 [a] [2] was 
waived because of Commonwealth's failure to file motion before 
14 
 
suppression hearing for denial of suppression motions or for 
more particularized motions from defendant).  Overbroad and bare 
assertions in a motion to suppress will not satisfy the 
particularity requirement of rule 13 (a) (2), and absent a 
showing of cause, grounds that reasonably could have been known 
at the time the motion to suppress was filed and are not stated 
with particularity by the defendant will be waived irrespective 
of the Commonwealth's failure to file a motion for a more 
particularized motion or affidavit.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
13 (a) (2). 
 
2.  Defendant's waiver of Miranda warnings.  Where the 
defendant did not waive the issue whether Miranda warnings were 
properly given in Spanish, we next assess whether the 
Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
waived his Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.  "In reviewing a judge's determination regarding a 
valid waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we 'accept[] 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, 
give[] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law, but independently review[] the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts found.'"  Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 435 
Mass. 743, 751 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 
375, 381 n.8 (1995). 
15 
 
"In Miranda[ v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], the United 
States Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates 
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Vasquez, 482 Mass. at 861-862.  "These procedural 
safeguards mandate that an accused must be warned that he or she 
'has a right to remain silent, that any statement he [or she] 
does make may be used as evidence against him [or her], and that 
he [or she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed.'"  Id. at 862, quoting Vuthy Seng, 436 
Mass. at 543. 
As discussed supra, the Commonwealth bears the particularly 
heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights.  See Tremblay, 480 Mass. at 655.  "In deciding 
whether a defendant's waiver of the rights described in the 
Miranda warning is valid, 'a court must examine the totality of 
the circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused 
and the details of the interrogation.'"  Hoyt, 461 Mass. at 153, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 388 Mass. 495, 501 (1983).  "The 
question [of waiver] is not one of form, but rather whether the 
defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights 
16 
 
delineated in the Miranda case."  Hoyt, supra, quoting North 
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
Here, the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda 
rights was valid because it failed to call Guillermo, the 
officer who actually provided Miranda warnings in Spanish to the 
defendant.  Unless Miranda warnings are provided in a language 
that the defendant actually can comprehend, the defendant cannot 
make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda 
rights.  See Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 544.  Because none of the 
officers initially present at the scene of the defendant's 
arrest could speak Spanish, the officers were forced to call 
Guillermo to the scene.  While the non-Spanish-speaking officers 
testified that they heard Guillermo provide the defendant with 
Miranda warnings in what appeared to be Spanish, and that the 
defendant appeared to understand Guillermo's warnings, none of 
this testimony resolved the question; because of their inability 
to speak Spanish, none of these witnesses properly could testify 
to the content of the Miranda warnings given.  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 256 (1991) (where officer who did not 
understand Spanish testified that Spanish-speaking officer had 
properly administered to defendant Miranda rights in Spanish, 
any argument against such practice was of "no consequence" where 
17 
 
ample additional evidence independently corroborated defendant's 
receipt and understanding of Miranda rights in Spanish). 
A translation of Miranda warnings need not be "word for 
word," Vasquez, 482 Mass. at 864, and a defendant has an 
opportunity to discredit the translation of Miranda warnings, or 
alternatively to discredit the interpreter who provided such 
warnings, in order to demonstrate the lack of a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights.  
See Commonwealth v. Ardon, 428 Mass. 496, 500 (1998).  The 
Commonwealth's shortcomings in deciding not to call Guillermo, 
and instead choosing to rely only on the testimony of other 
officers with no ability to speak Spanish, render the evidence 
insufficient for us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
complete and accurate Miranda warnings were provided to the 
defendant in Spanish, and that the defendant knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights.9  Cf. Perez, 
411 Mass. at 255-256 (Commonwealth demonstrated valid Miranda 
waiver beyond reasonable doubt where judge could verify complete 
and accurate Miranda warnings were provided in Spanish because 
 
9 Guillermo testified at trial that he had been speaking 
Spanish for thirty-five years and did not struggle with 
translating the Miranda warnings to Spanish.  This does not 
alter our conclusion, however, because when reviewing the denial 
of the defendant's motion to suppress, we review only the 
evidence presented to the motion judge, not evidence adduced at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 367 (2004). 
18 
 
defendant was given cards on which such warnings were printed, 
defendant indicated understanding of what he read on cards, and 
judge independently could verify that warnings on cards were 
complete and accurate Miranda warnings in Spanish).  Therefore, 
the admission of the defendant's incriminating postarrest 
statements was erroneous. 
Where the Commonwealth introduced the defendant's 
statements at trial, in violation of his constitutional rights, 
we must examine whether the erroneous admission was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 
Mass. 546, 552 (2006).  Such review "requires us to consider, 
among other factors: 
'[1] the importance of the evidence in the prosecution's 
case; [2] the relationship between the evidence and the 
premise of the defense; [3] who introduced the issue at 
trial; [4] the frequency of the reference; [5] whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of 
properly admitted evidence; [6] the availability or effect 
of curative instructions; and [7] the weight or quantum of 
evidence of guilt.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 467-468 (2018), quoting 
Dagraca, supra at 553. 
 
"In short, we analyze the case to see whether the error 
might have had an effect on the jury or contributed to the 
verdicts, and whether the Commonwealth's evidence was '"merely 
cumulative" of evidence properly before the jury,' Commonwealth 
v. Sinnott, [399 Mass. 863, 872 n.8 (1987),] or was overwhelming 
19 
 
without the erroneously admitted evidence."  Dagraca, 447 Mass. 
at 553, citing Perez, 411 Mass. at 260. 
 
Among the elements required to sustain a conviction under 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the Commonwealth was required to prove 
that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.  See 
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 489 Mass. 292, 298 (2022).  See also 
Commonwealth v. White, 452 Mass. 133, 136 (2008).  According to 
the trial testimony, the defendant, following his arrest at the 
scene, admitted to officers that he did not possess a license to 
carry the firearm and, more importantly, that he was trying to 
hide the firearm.  In its closing, the Commonwealth emphasized 
the importance of the defendant's incriminating statements 
because of the defendant's "interesting turn of phrase," i.e., 
that he was trying to "hide" the firearm.  The Commonwealth 
argued in closing that the defendant's intent to hide the 
firearm was important evidence of his knowledge and possession 
of the firearm.  Where the defendant's statements were not 
cumulative of other evidence presented, and the evidence of the 
defendant's knowing possession of the firearm was not 
overwhelming without the admission of the defendant's 
incriminating statements, the erroneous admission of the 
defendant's statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 473-474 
(2015) (admission of defendant's involuntary statements not 
20 
 
harmless beyond reasonable doubt where defendant's admission to 
possessing knife limited defense counsel's strategy, boosted 
victims' credibility, and served as prominent part of 
Commonwealth's case that defendant assaulted three teenage 
victims at knifepoint). 
 
Conclusion.  Accordingly, because the admission of the 
defendant's postarrest statements was error, the judgment is 
vacated and the verdict is set aside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.