Title: LaMar Williams v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S02-0512-CR-643
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2005

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Mark Small 
Steve Carter 
Marion County Public Defender Agency 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Jodi Kathryn Stein 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0512-CR-643 
 
LAMAR WILLIAMS, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G20-0310-FA-176400 
The Honorable Steve Rubick, Commissioner 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0402-CR-114 
_________________________________ 
 
December 13, 2005 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
 
 
Appellant LaMar Williams struggled with Indianapolis Police Department officers during 
an investigatory stop and then fled in his vehicle.  A jury found Williams guilty on four of the 
State’s five charges.  The trial court found four aggravating factors and two mitigating factors 
and enhanced Williams’ sentence on one of the counts.  Williams appealed on Sixth Amendment 
grounds, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  We affirm. 
 
 
1
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
On October 11, 2003, at around 2:30 a.m., Officer Jose Torres of the Indianapolis Police 
Department investigated a vehicle at a vacant building.  Officer Torres encountered Williams, 
the driver, and did a pat-down search.  There followed a struggle in which Williams was able to 
flee in his vehicle.  During the flight, Williams dropped a white box that was later recovered and 
found to contain cocaine.  Police apprehended Williams at Wishard Hospital, despite further 
attempts to resist. 
 
A jury acquitted Williams on a count of dealing in cocaine, but found him guilty of 
possession of cocaine, a class C felony; resisting law enforcement, a class D felony;1 battery, a 
class A misdemeanor; and resisting law enforcement, a class A misdemeanor.   
 
The trial court sentenced Williams to six years for class C felony possession (the 
presumptive is four), and suspended two to probation.  It ordered a consecutive three-year term 
for class D felony resisting (the presumptive being one and a half years).  It imposed one-year 
concurrent terms for the misdemeanors.  The result is a sentence of nine years, two suspended to 
probation.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Williams v. State, 818 N.E.2d 970, 977 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004) vacated.  We grant transfer to consider Williams’ claims under Blakely, and 
otherwise affirm the Court of Appeals.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
  
 
Blakely and Aggravating Factors 
 
The trial court judge found four aggravating factors: (1) Williams’ criminal history; (2) 
Williams’ likelihood to commit another offense; (3) Williams’ need for rehabilitation that could 
best be provided by a penalty facility; and (4) Williams’ behavior once caught with the drugs.  
                     
1 Resisting law enforcement is a class A misdemeanor, but the use of a vehicle increases the offense level 
to a class D felony.  IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) (West 2004).   
 
 
2
On this basis it ordered the felony sentences to be served consecutively and enhanced the felony 
counts above the presumptive.  We examine these aggravating circumstances in turn. 
 
A.  Criminal History 
 
A sentence may be enhanced on the basis of prior convictions, consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 
(Ind. 2005). 
 
While a single aggravating circumstance may justify enhancing a sentence, the existence 
of any one aggravator does not automatically justify a maximum sentence; judges must consider 
the weight warranted by each aggravator.  Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind. 2005).  “The 
significance of a criminal history ‘varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior 
offenses as they relate to the current offense.’”  Id. (quoting Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 
929 n.4 (Ind. 1999)).  In Morgan, to illustrate this point, we hypothesized that a conviction for 
theft, six years prior to a conviction for class B burglary, probably would not warrant the 
maximum burglary sentence, but a maximum sentence for theft might be supported by a prior 
conviction for class B burglary.  829 N.E.2d at 15-16.   
 
The criminal history on which the trial court’s action rested consisted of one juvenile 
adjudication and one adult felony.  Under Indiana’s criminal code, juvenile adjudications 
reflecting a history of criminal behavior may be considered an aggravating circumstance.  Jordan 
v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 410 (Ind. 1987).  We have recently concluded that the existence of 
such an aggravator may be noted by a sentencing court without the intervention of a jury.  Ryle 
v. State, __ N.E.2d __, __, No. 49S02-0505-CR-207, slip op. at 3 (Ind. Dec. 13, 2005).  Thus, 
Williams’ 1994 juvenile adjudication for burglary, a class C felony if committed by an adult, 
was properly considered.  It was likewise proper to give aggravating weight to Williams’ 1997 
adult conviction for possession of cocaine as a class D felony. 
 
B.  “Derivative Statements” Cannot Be Separate Aggravators 
 
 
3
The trial court’s second and third aggravating factors (likelihood to re-offend and need 
for rehabilitation) spring from a single source: the fact of the prior convictions.  This single fact 
cannot be used as three separate aggravators.  While there has been some tendency to sanction 
these aggravators on grounds that they derive from a defendant’s prior criminal history,2 we 
have held that such statements are more properly characterized as “legitimate observations about 
the weight to be given to facts . . . .”  Morgan, 829 N.E.2d at 17.  They do not serve as separate 
aggravators, at least absent a jury determination.  Id. at 17-18. 
 
C.  Williams’ Behavior Once Drugs Were Found 
 
A trial court may only enhance a sentence based on those facts that “are established in 
one of several ways:  1) as a fact of prior conviction; 2) by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; 3) 
when admitted by a defendant; and 4) in the course of a guilty plea where the defendant has 
waived Apprendi rights and stipulated to certain facts or consented to judicial factfinding.”  
Trusley v. State, 829 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind. 2005).  In the instant case, Officer Torres testified 
that Williams led officers on a chase where speeds reached “45 to 50 miles per hour,” several 
traffic signals were ignored, and Williams “almost caused a couple of accidents.”  (Tr. at 58.)    
Citing this testimony, the trial court found that “[Williams’] blatant disregard for the safety of 
the citizens of this county must be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”  (Tr. at 257-58.)  
Since a finding of “blatant disregard” is a judicial statement, to be a proper aggravator, it must 
rest on some permissible fact. 
 
None of the facts cited are permissible under Trusley.3  
 
 
Conclusion 
                     
2 Caron v. State, 824 N.E.2d 745, 755-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)(trial court’s finding that Caron was in need 
of extended incarceration was “derivative” of criminal history), trans. denied; Bledsoe v. State, 815 
N.E.2d 507, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)(trial court’s determination that defendant’s rehabilitation could only 
occur in a penal institution and was likely to continue to engage in criminal activities was merely 
“derivative” of defendant’s criminal history), trans. denied. 
3 The defendant did say “[t]hey said I almost got into a couple of accidents, I was driving, and mad.”  (Tr. 
at 219-20.)  But, he was merely referring to the officers’ previous testimony and not admitting any facts. 
 
4
 
Williams’ prior adult conviction and juvenile adjudication were adequate to support the 
relatively modest enhancements imposed.  We therefore affirm. 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
 
5