Title: Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89075, 89084
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 29, 2001

Docket Nos. 89075, 89084 cons.-Agenda 14-January 2001.
PRIMECO PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, L.P., et al., 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE
COMMISSION et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
Opinion filed March 29, 2001

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this case, we are asked to decide whether the "municipal
infrastructure maintenance fee" (the municipal IMF) (see 35 ILCS
635/20 (West 1998)), part of the Telecommunications Municipal
Infrastructure Maintenance Fee Act (35 ILCS 635/1 et seq. (West
1998)), violates the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §2). The municipal IMF is a fee which
municipalities are allowed to impose on telecommunications
retailers as a percentage of the retailers' gross charges to their
customers. The plaintiffs in this case are all wireless
telecommunications retailers. They brought this action to declare
the municipal IMF unconstitutional and to enjoin the state from
enforcing its provisions. The plaintiffs argued that the municipal
IMF was intended as a means of compensating municipalities for
the physical occupation of the public rights-of-way by certain
telecommunications providers. Since the plaintiffs are not among
those telecommunications providers who physically occupy the
public rights-of-way with their infrastructure, they argued that it
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional to include them
within the class of telecommunications retailers subject to the
municipal IMF. The intervening plaintiffs are all consumers who
have paid the municipal IMF, who agree with the plaintiffs'
assertion that the municipal IMF is unconstitutional, and who are
seeking reimbursement in the circuit court.
	The defendant is the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC),
the state agency with the responsibility of regulating certain
aspects of the telecommunications industry in Illinois. The
intervening defendant is the City of Chicago, one of the
municipalities that has passed an ordinance imposing a municipal
IMF. The defendant and the intervening defendant (the
defendants) argued that the municipal IMF was merely a means of
raising municipal revenue and that the General Assembly did not
overstep its constitutional bounds in extending the municipal IMF
to wireless providers.
	The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that the municipal
IMF was unconstitutional and struck it down on its face. Because
the circuit court invalidated an Illinois statute, the defendants took
their appeal directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1).
While we agree that the municipal IMF is unconstitutional as
applied to the plaintiffs in this case, we do not find it to be invalid
on its face. A recitation of the pertinent facts in this case is
necessary in order to frame the legal issue presented to us.
BACKGROUND
	For decades, the public rights-of-way have been available for
use by the telecommunications industry. Historically, landline
providers (i.e., telecommunications providers who transmit
messages by means of cable wire) have built, owned, and
maintained a wire-based (or fiber-optic-cable-based) infrastructure
by placing telecommunications cables, poles, switching
equipment, terminal boxes, manhole covers, concentrators,
splicing cases, and other equipment in and under the public streets
and roadways. The landline providers use this infrastructure to
transmit telephone calls or other data for their customers.
However, the landline system is no longer the only means of
sending and receiving telecommunications. For many years, it has
been possible to send and receive telecommunications without the
use of wires or cables-in other words, by wireless means. In order
to facilitate the transmission of wireless telecommunications,
however, an alternate infrastructure had to be established.
	Wireless telecommunications providers transmit messages
through the air by means of microwave transmissions rather than
cable wire. The wireless infrastructure consists of base stations
and radio cell towers located at various locations within the
wireless provider's service area. These individual base stations and
cell towers send and receive microwave transmissions within a
"cell" site. That is, they send and receive electromagnetic signals
to or from cellular devices which are passing within a certain
radius of the base station or cell tower (usually two or three miles,
but sometimes as little as one-quarter of a mile). A wireless
provider's service area is composed of a mosaic of cells that are
positioned in such a manner as to reach any customer located
within the service area. When an electromagnetic signal is
received at one of these stations or towers, it is then transmitted to
the wireless provider's switching station, which directs the signal
to its ultimate destination.
	At the present time, it is impossible for the wireless providers
to rely entirely on their own wireless infrastructure to send and
receive most telecommunications. For instance, if a cellular
customer wishes to call a land-based telephone, the signal must
pass through the landline system (at least for the last portion of the
call) in order for it to reach the landline customer. Conversely,
when a landline customer wishes to call a wireless customer, the
landline provider must use the wireless provider's infrastructure
to complete the call. In order to facilitate the completion of such
calls, the wireless and landline providers have negotiated
"interconnection agreements" by which they pay each other
specified amounts based on a standard charge for each minute that
a landline provider uses the wireless infrastructure and vice versa.
	Wireless and landline usage intersect in other situations as
well. For instance, when a cellular customer wishes to call another
cellular customer (even if both customers use the same wireless
provider), the wireless customer places the call, which is then
received at a cell tower servicing the cell site in which he is
located. Once the signal is received, it must be sent to a switching
center. In order for the signal to be sent from the cell site to the
switching center, it must pass through the landline system. After
it is received at the switching center, it is sent through the landline
system again to the cell site where the other cellular customer is
located. Once the signal reaches the cell site, it is transmitted
electromagnetically to the other wireless customer's cellular
device.
	In order for a wireless provider to obtain the right to transmit
its electromagnetic signals through the landline system, it must
lease the capacity from a landline provider. When a wireless
provider enters into lease agreements with the landline provider
for the purpose of allowing it to send messages between its cell
sites and switching center, it is called "backhaul services."
	In order to provide telecommunications services to all of their
customers, the landline providers install and maintain an extensive
system of wires and cables within the public rights-of-way.
Wireless providers, on the other hand, do not own, operate or
maintain any equipment in the public rights-of-way. The wireless
providers operate and maintain all of their equipment on private
property pursuant to privately negotiated commercial leases.
	Historically, landline providers have obtained access to the
public rights-of-way by negotiating with individual municipalities.
In order to establish and maintain telephone service, a landline
provider would often have to tear up the public roads, dig holes,
and erect telephone poles along the streets. Until 1998, the
landline providers obtained the right to do this in exchange for the
payment of what was called a "franchise fee." The franchise fee
operated as a means of compensating the municipality for the
providers' use of the streets, sidewalks and other public areas. See
City of Springfield v. Inter-State Independent Telephone &amp;
Telegraph Co., 279 Ill. 324, 325-26 (1917).
	Of course, wireless providers never entered into municipal
franchise fee agreements. Because the wireless providers have
never installed any equipment in the public rights-of-way, they
would never have any need to negotiate with municipalities for the
right to do so. However, under the franchise fee system, when a
landline provider leased capacity to wireless providers, it would
pass a share of the franchise fee on to the wireless providers in
proportion to the volume of capacity used by them. These costs
were embedded within the lease payments made to the landline
provider.
	Franchise fees were not the only fees or taxes paid by
telecommunications retailers to the various organs of government.
Until 1998, the state levied a tax on telecommunications retailers
called the "invested capital tax." See 35 ILCS 610/2 A. 1 (West
1996). The invested capital tax was paid to the state, not
municipalities, in an amount equal to 0.8% of the
telecommunication retailer's invested capital for the taxable
period. 35 ILCS 610/2 A. 1 (West 1996).
	Five years ago, Congress amended the Communications Act
of 1934 in the form of the federal Telecommunications Act of
1996. One of these amendments provides that "[n]o State or local
statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity
to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."
47 U.S.C. §253(a) (Supp. 1996). It goes on to say that "[n]othing
in this section affects the authority of a State or local government
to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on
a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of
public rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory basis ***." 47 U.S.C.
§253(c) (Supp. 1996).
	Following the passage of the amendments to the
Telecommunications Act, the Illinois General Assembly passed
the Telecommunications Municipal Infrastructure Maintenance
Fee Act (the Act), which became effective on January 1, 1998. 35
ILCS 635/1 et seq. (West 1998). The Act repealed the invested
capital tax (35 ILCS 635/905 (West 1998)), and abolished
franchise fees (35 ILCS 635/30(a) (West 1998)). In their place, the
General Assembly enacted three new taxes: the state infrastructure
maintenance fee (state IMF) (35 ILCS 635/15(a), (b) (West 1998)),
the optional infrastructure maintenance fee (optional IMF) (35
ILCS 635/15(c), (d) (West 1998)), and the municipal IMF (35
ILCS 635/20 (West 1998)). The state IMF is paid to the state in an
amount equal to 0.5% of a telecommunication retailer's "gross
charges" to its customers. 35 ILCS 635/15(b) (West 1998). The
optional IMF is also paid to the state, but only in the event that a
certain municipality has not yet adopted a municipal IMF and
there is no preexisting franchise fee agreement between the retailer
and the municipality. 35 ILCS 635/15(c), 30 (West 1998).
Payment of the optional IMF gives the retailer the right to "use"
the public rights-of-way in the municipality to which the fee
relates without having to negotiate the payment of a franchise fee.
35 ILCS 635/30 (West 1998).
	The municipal IMF is a fee paid to a certain municipality that
has passed an ordinance imposing one. 35 ILCS 635/20(a) (West
1998). The maximum amount that a municipality can charge in the
form of a municipal IMF is dependent upon the size of the
municipality. 35 ILCS 635/20(b) (West 1998). If the municipality
has a population greater than 500,000 (i.e., Chicago), it may
charge a municipal IMF no greater than 2% of the "gross charges
charged by the telecommunications retailer to service addresses in
the municipality for telecommunications originating or received in
the municipality." 35 ILCS 635/20(b)(i) (West 1998). For all other
municipalities in Illinois, the maximum amount is 1%. 35 ILCS
635/20(b)(ii) (West 1998). The General Assembly determined that
the municipal IMF:
			"shall be the only fee or compensation for recovering
the reasonable costs of regulating the use of the public
rights-of-way and for the use of public rights-of-way that
may be levied by or otherwise required by ordinance,
resolution, or contract to be paid to a municipality for the
use of its public way by telecommunications retailers." 35
ILCS 635/30 (West 1998).
See also 35 ILCS 635/35 (West 1998).
	Soon after the passage of the Act, the City of Chicago passed
its own municipal IMF at the maximum allowable rate, 2%. See
Municipal Code of Chicago §3-75-030(A) (eff. January 1, 1998).
The ordinance, like the Act itself, provided that the municipal IMF
would be imposed on "all gross charges charged by
telecommunications retailers to a service address in the city for
telecommunications originating or received in the city." Compare
Municipal Code of Chicago §3-75-030(A) (eff. January 1, 1998)
with 35 ILCS 635/20(b)(i) (West 1998).
	On April 27, 1998, a number of wireless providers filed this
action for injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the
constitutionality of the Act insofar as it authorizes municipalities
to impose a municipal IMF. The plaintiffs, Primeco Personal
Communications, L.P., Illinois RSA #3, Inc., USCOC of Illinois
RSA #4, Inc., Davenport Cellular Telephone Co., USCOC of
Illinois RSA #1, Inc., and National Cellular Communications, Inc.,
are all wireless telecommunications retailers providing wireless
telephone service to customers in Illinois. The defendant, the ICC,
is the Illinois agency responsible for regulating the rates of
landline telecommunications providers. The complaint contained
three counts, all seeking to invalidate the municipal IMF as
unconstitutional on its face. After the complaint was filed, the City
of Chicago intervened as a defendant to defend the
constitutionality of the Act as well as the City's own municipal
IMF ordinance.
	In count I, the plaintiffs argued that the municipal IMF
violates the uniformity clause because it allows municipalities to
assess a percentage fee on the "gross charges" of
telecommunications retailers, whether landline or wireless.
Because the purpose of the municipal IMF is to compensate
municipalities for the use of the public rights-of-way, it was
argued, the extension of the municipal IMF to wireless providers,
who do not own or operate any equipment in the public rights-of-way, was "entirely unreasonable and inconsistent with the express
purpose of the [IMF] Act." According to the complaint, the Act,
by classifying all telecommunications providers as equally subject
to the municipal IMF, violated the portion of the uniformity clause
which requires the General Assembly to classify the subjects or
objects of nonproperty taxes in a reasonable manner.
	In count II of the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the
municipal IMF violated the uniformity clause because of those
entities which the Act excluded from its coverage. Precisely, the
plaintiffs argued that certain entities that use "PBX" (private
branch exchange) and "Centrex" systems are not subject to
payment of a municipal IMF, but should be. Centrex customers are
those entities which lease switching capacity from landline
providers for private use. These entities tend to be large
corporations or commercial landlords that need an internal means
of communication, but do not wish to establish their own network
of wires and equipment. Instead, the Centrex customers sign a
lease with a landline provider for the limited use of some of the
landline provider's infrastructure. PBX customers, on the other
hand, buy or lease a switching computer which performs the same
function as a Centrex system. Instead of signing a lease with a
landline provider, the PBX customer buys or leases its own
switching computer which is located on the customer's premises.
When a PBX or Centrex system has been established, it allows its
users to dial an extension which then routes the call to another user
within the system. If the user wishes to make a call to someone
outside of the system, the user must dial "9" in order to access an
outside line.
	According to the plaintiffs, the exclusion of PBX and Centrex
customers from coverage under the municipal IMF creates an
unreasonable classification. Because the PBX or Centrex
customers simply lease capacity from the landline providers, the
wireless plaintiffs argued that their own use (or, rather, nonuse) of
the public rights-of-way is equivalent to that of PBX and Centrex
customers. For this reason, it was argued that there is no
justification for making wireless providers subject to the municipal
IMF while excluding PBX and Centrex entities.
	Finally, in count III, the plaintiffs argued that section 13-511
of the Public Utilities Act, which became effective on the same
date as the municipal IMF, is unconstitutionally vague because it
contains language that is so imprecise that it fails to offer
meaningful guidance to the ICC as the agency charged with
enforcing the directives contained in the statute. See 220 ILCS
5/13-511 (West 1998). Section 13-511 of the Public Utilities Act
provides the following:
			"With respect to any telecommunications retailer that is
regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission, the
Commision shall order such rate adjustments as shall be
necessary to assure that the implementation of the
Telecommunications Municipal Infrastructure Fee Act
*** shall have no significant impact on the net income of
each such telecommunications retailer." 220 ILCS
5/13-511 (West 1998).
The plaintiffs argued that when the statute authorizes the ICC to
adjust the rates of landline providers to assure that the Act "shall
have no significant impact on the net income of each ***
telecommunications retailer," the language used by the General
Assembly is so vague and ambiguous that it fails to provide
reasonable standards for restricting the ICC's discretion.
	The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all
three counts. In their cross-motions, the parties agreed that there
were no disputed issues of material fact and that summary
judgment was therefore appropriate. On January 11, 2000, the
circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
on count I, but entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on counts II and III. The circuit court found that the
Act created an unreasonable class of subject entities by broadly
imposing the municipal IMF on all telecommunications retailers,
both landline and wireless, whether they used the public rights-of-way or not. Because the circuit court found that the object of the
municipal IMF was to compensate municipalities for the use of the
public rights-of-way, the court then determined that it was
unreasonable to include wireless providers, who never "use" the
public rights-of-way, within the class of individuals subject to the
municipal IMF.
	The parties filed cross-appeals, which we consolidated.
Because the circuit court invalidated an Illinois statute, the appeals
were taken directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1). The
circuit court stayed the enforcement of its judgment pending
appeal, subject to certain conditions. After the notices of appeal
had been filed, Dr. William Spillman, Tiffany Insurance Agency,
and 13 other persons were given leave to intervene as plaintiffs in
the circuit court and as cross-appellees in this court. The
intervening cross-appellees are all consumers who have paid the
municipal IMF and are now seeking restitution in the circuit court.
	Although there are cross-appeals filed in this case, the
plaintiffs' cross-appeal relates only to counts II and III. It is the
defendants' appeal that asks us to reverse the circuit court's
judgment on count I. Because we partially affirm the circuit
court's judgment on count I and invalidate the municipal IMF as
it applies to the plaintiffs in this case, we do not address the
plaintiffs' cross-appeal on counts II and III.(1)

ANALYSIS
	The defendants' appeal is taken from an order entering
summary judgment in the plaintiffs' favor on count I. Summary
judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735
ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). The parties in this case agree that
there were no contested issues of material fact to be resolved by a
fact finder. Therefore, summary judgment in this case was
unquestionably appropriate. The only issue we need to resolve is
a legal one: does the municipal IMF, as imposed on a class of
telecommunications providers regardless of their use of the public
rights-of-way, create a reasonable class of subject entities under
article IX, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution? Our review of the
circuit court's resolution of this legal question is de novo.
McNamee v. State, 173 Ill. 2d 433, 438 (1996).


I. The Uniformity Clause


	Article IX, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution states the
following:
			"In any law classifying the subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and
the subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed
uniformly. Exemptions, deductions, credits, refunds and
other allowances shall be reasonable." Ill. Const. 1970,
art. IX, §2.
A fair reading of the text of this provision shows that there are two
separate requirements contained in the first sentence. The first
requires the General Assembly to classify the subjects or objects
of nonproperty taxes reasonably. Once a reasonable classification
has been established, the second requirement is that the members
of that class must be taxed uniformly. In this case, we are only
concerned with the first requirement, which we will refer to as the
"reasonable classification" requirement.
	In order for a classification to be considered reasonable, it
must be (1) based on a real and substantial difference between
those who are taxed and those who are not taxed, and it must (2)
bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation
or to public policy. Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance Co. v. Selcke,
179 Ill. 2d 94, 98 (1997); Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan
Pier &amp; Exposition Authority, 172 Ill. 2d 243, 250 (1996); Searle
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 117 Ill. 2d 454,
468 (1987). The foregoing test has also been applied in cases
construing article IX, section 1, of the 1870 Constitution. See
Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 Ill. 2d at 468-69; Ill. Const.
1870, art. IX, §1. For purpose of this appeal, however, we are only
concerned with the second prong of the "reasonable classification"
test, namely, whether the classification of entities subjected to
taxation under the municipal IMF bears some reasonable
relationship to the object of the municipal IMF itself or to public
policy.(2)
	The initial burden of proof in these cases is not with the party
attacking the classification as unreasonable. Milwaukee Safeguard
Insurance Co., 179 Ill. 2d  at 98. Rather, when a good-faith
challenge to the reasonableness of a tax classification has been
presented, it is the taxing body that must first justify the tax
classification. Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier &amp; Exposition
Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 248 (1992). Once the taxing body
comes forward with a justification, the challenging party must
persuade the court that the taxing body's justification is
unsupported by the facts or insufficient as a matter of law. Geja's
Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d  at 248-49. With that in mind, we address the
parties' contentions.
II. The Object of the Municipal IMF
	A uniformity clause challenge such as this one requires us to
first determine the object (or purpose) of the taxing provision at
issue. Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance Co., 179 Ill. 2d  at 98. Once
we have determined the object, it is incumbent upon us to
determine whether that object is reasonably related to the class of
entities taxed. Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance Co., 179 Ill. 2d  at
98. The plaintiffs argue that the purpose behind the municipal IMF
was to replace the franchise fee system. According to their theory,
instead of having a complex array of franchise fees charged on a
municipality-by-municipality basis, the municipal IMF would
establish a uniform charge that telecommunications providers
would pay to have access to the public rights-of-way. Because the
wireless providers do not own or operate any equipment in the
public rights-of-way or have any desire or need to do so, they
argue that it is unreasonable to place them in a class of entities
who must pay the municipal IMF. Rather, it is the landline
providers who alone make use of the public rights-of-way for
telecommunications activity.
	Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the purpose of the
municipal IMF is to provide a means of raising municipal revenue
and that nothing in the Act purports to limit the purpose of the
municipal IMF to that of a "user fee." The defendants's argument
rests on a dichotomy drawn between user fees and taxes.
According to the defendants, a user fee is strictly limited to cost-recovery for a specific purpose while a tax, on the other hand, may
be imposed simply to raise revenue for any number of reasons.
They argue that the text and structure of the Act indicate an intent
to create a municipal tax on telecommunications activity generally,
not a user fee. Building on this assertion, they argue that the
classification created by the municipal IMF, which includes both
wireless and landline telecommunications providers, is reasonably
related to the purpose of the municipal IMF, which was simply to
raise municipal revenue without regard to a telecommunication
provider's use or nonuse of the public rights-of-way.
	Unlike many other taxing schemes, the Act is not at all cryptic
as to the purpose behind the municipal IMF. In fact, the first
section in the Act, after the short title, is entitled "Legislative
intent." See 35 ILCS 635/5 (West 1998). In pertinent part, it states
the following:
		"This Act is intended to abolish the invested capital tax
on telecommunications retailers ***[,] abolish municipal
franchise fees with respect to telecommunications
retailers, create a uniform system for the collection and
distribution of fees associated with the privilege of use of
the public right of way for telecommunications activity,
and provide municipalities with a comprehensive method
of compensation for telecommunications activity
including the recovery of reasonable costs of regulating
the use of the public rights-of-way for
telecommunications activity." 35 ILCS 635/5 (West
1998).
The defendants argue that we should disregard this section because
it consists of nothing more than "prefatory language." According
to the defendants' theory, courts should only look to these types of
sections, sometimes referred to as preambles, when the operative
parts of the act are ambiguous. Because the operative parts of the
Act are not ambiguous, it is argued, we need not look to the Act's
legislative intent section to discern its purpose.
	Defendants misunderstand our precedents on this matter.
While it is true that a "declaration of policy or a preamble is not a
part of the act itself" (Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 227 (1989); see also Brown v. Kirk, 64 Ill. 2d 144, 152-53
(1976)), that is not the end of the matter. In Atkins v. Deere &amp; Co.,
we held that a "preamble has long been recognized as one of the
quintessential sources of legislative intent." Atkins v. Deere &amp; Co.,
177 Ill. 2d 222, 232 (1997). "The fact that the preamble often
accompanies a bill throughout the legislative process, is voted
upon by the members of the General Assembly, and is included in
the text which is presented to the Governor for signature highlights
the unique character of the preamble in terms of legislative intent."
Atkins, 177 Ill. 2d  at 232; accord Edwards v. Pope, 4 Ill. 465, 470
(1842) (holding that the "preamble to a statute is no part of the act;
still it may assist in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the
legislature"). Moreover, "a preamble constitutes a stronger
expression of intent than does a passing comment made by a single
legislator during legislative debates." Atkins, 177 Ill. 2d  at 232-33.
	Defendants urge us, instead of relying on section 5 to discern
the object of the municipal IMF, to look to sections 20 and 25(a)
and (c) of the Act (35 ILCS 635/20, 25(a), (c) (West 1998)),
which, they argue, establish that the municipal IMF is not intended
as a tool for compensating municipalities for the use of the public
rights-of-way, but simply as a means of raising municipal revenue.
Sections 20 and 25, however, are certainly not the only sections in
the Act that discuss the municipal IMF. A fundamental principle
of statutory interpretation is that we must give effect to the entire
statutory scheme rather than looking at words and phrases in
isolation from other relevant portions of the statute. Michigan
Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504
(2000). In other words, statutes should be construed as a whole,
with each provision evaluated in connection with every other
section. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000).
	Section 5 of the Act strongly implies that the municipal IMF
was intended as a replacement for the revenue generated by
franchise fees. According to this section, the Act was intended to
"abolish municipal franchise fees with respect to
telecommunications retailers, [and] create a uniform system for the
collection and distribution of fees associated with the privilege of
use of the public right of way for telecommunications activity." 35
ILCS 635/5 (West 1998). The defendants argue, however, that this
language does not necessarily imply that the purpose of the
municipal IMF was to compensate municipalities for the use of the
public rights-of-way. Because the municipal IMF is not in direct
proportion to the costs incurred by municipalities in allowing
telecommunications providers to have access to the public rights-of-way, the defendants argue that the municipal IMF was
obviously not intended solely as a means of compensation, but
also as a means of raising revenue in excess of a municipality's
actual costs involved in allowing such access. However, the same
could be said of franchise fees, the sole purpose of which was to
compensate municipalities for the privilege of accessing the public
rights-of-way.
	The franchise fee was often treated as a sort of rent payment
"which the [telecommunications provider] was required to pay as
a reasonable compensation for the use of the parts of the streets
and alleys occupied by its poles" or other equipment. City of
Springfield, 279 Ill.  at 327. Normally, a municipality would pass
an ordinance in which it would offer a telecommunications
provider the right of access to the public rights-of-way in return
for a certain sum of money or other consideration. City of
Springfield, 279 Ill.  at 327. In other words, the franchise fee was
contractual in nature. City of Springfield, 279 Ill. at 327-29;
Village of West City v. Illinois Commercial Telephone Co., 372 Ill. 493, 495-97 (1939).
	Historically, municipalities would often bargain with
telecommunications providers in order to extract the maximum
amount of consideration that a provider would be willing to pay
for using the public rights-of-way. In the years leading up to the
passage of the Act, however, we began to reign in the power of
municipalities in this respect. In 1993, we held that a
municipality's only interest in the public streets was regulatory in
nature, not proprietary. American Telephone &amp; Telegraph Co. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 156 Ill. 2d 399, 413 (1993). As such,
franchise fees could "only cover actual costs, including inspection,
regulatory, administrative and repair costs associated with the
tunneling under public streets." American Telephone &amp; Telegraph
Co., 156 Ill. 2d  at 413-14. Municipalities, we held, did "not have
the authority to hold the public streets hostage as a means of
raising revenue." American Telephone &amp; Telegraph Co., 156 Ill. 2d  at 408.
	Obviously, our holding in American Telephone &amp; Telegraph
Co. could only reach as far as those cases in which a
telecommunications provider actually challenged the imposition
of a franchise fee in court. It would therefore be reasonable to
assume that there were still a number of franchise agreements in
existence at the time the Act was passed that imposed fees which
were wholly unrelated to a municipality's regulatory costs. But
regardless of whether the franchise fee was proportional to a
municipality's regulatory costs, its purpose was always the
same-as a quid pro quo for granting telecommunications providers
access to the public rights-of-way.
	Prior to the enactment of the Act, a telecommunications
provider never would have entered into a franchise fee agreement
with a municipality unless it needed to access the public rights-of-way in that particular municipality. Once a telecommunications
provider gained access to the public rights-of-way by paying a
franchise fee, it would use that access to lay cable or erect
telephone poles or other equipment on public property. If the
municipal IMF was intended as a statewide replacement for
franchise fees, it makes sense to conclude that this same bargain
has now been codified in the form of the municipal IMF.
	For this reason, it makes no difference whether the municipal
IMF raises revenue in direct proportion to a municipality's
regulatory costs. In cases brought under the second prong of the
"reasonable classification" test, we are merely asking whether the
tax classification created by a piece of legislation is reasonably
related to its object (see Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance Co., 179
Ill. 2d at 98), not whether the means of taxation are crafted in a
way to raise revenue in direct proportion to the costs related to the
object of the legislation.
	In addition to abolishing and replacing franchise fees, the
municipal IMF was also intended to "create a uniform system for
the collection and distribution of fees associated with the privilege
of use of the public right of way for telecommunications activity."
35 ILCS 635/5 (West 1998). The defendants argue that this clause
proves their point concerning the revenue-raising purpose of the
municipal IMF. Because the municipal IMF is a fee which is
merely "associated with" the use of the public rights-of-way, it is
argued, this means that the fee is intended to compensate
municipalities for more than just their regulatory costs. However,
as we just discussed, franchise fees themselves were not
necessarily directly proportional to a municipality's regulatory
costs. What is important is that the franchise fees were paid to a
municipality in exchange for the privilege of accessing the public
rights-of-way. Whether the fees were directly proportional to a
municipality's regulatory costs is irrelevant in discerning their
ultimate purpose.
	The remaining language in section 5 states that the municipal
IMF was intended as a means of providing "municipalities with a
comprehensive method of compensation for telecommunications
activity including the recovery of reasonable costs of regulating
the use of the public rights-of-way for telecommunications
activity." (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 635/5 (West 1998). The
defendants argue that the legislature's use of the term "including"
in the language quoted above means that it intended all sorts of
various purposes for the municipal IMF besides those that are
related to the use of the public rights-of-way. Such an
interpretation, however, obliterates the otherwise apparent
meaning of section 5 and subsumes those purposes that are
actually expressed in the provision. This is not how we interpret
statutes. When construing a statute, this court evaluates it as a
whole and interprets it, where possible, so that no term is rendered
superfluous or meaningless. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v.
McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998).
	We believe that the best interpretation of the remaining
language in section 5 is that it merely reflects the purpose that had
been served by franchise fees. When the General Assembly
abolished franchise fees and fashioned the municipal IMF in its
place, the legislature must have been cognizant of the function that
had been served by franchise fees, i.e., that they were not
necessarily in direct proportion to a municipality's regulatory
costs. By using the term "including," the legislature apparently
crafted the municipal IMF in such a way that it reflected the
function of franchise fees. That is, the municipal IMF, like
franchise fees, would be related to the recovery of regulatory costs
involved with telecommunications activity on public property,
whether or not the revenue generated by the municipal IMF was
directly proportional to those costs.
	Even though one could argue that the municipal IMF
encompasses a broader purpose than the mere reimbursement of
a municipality's regulatory costs, it was not intended to encompass
a broader purpose than that of franchise fees. In addition to section
5, there are several other indicators which make it clear that the
legislature had no broader purpose in mind than replacing
franchise fees with a more uniform system. That is, the municipal
IMF would do nothing more than create a statewide means of
providing access to the public rights-of-way though the imposition
of a uniform fee.
	First of all, the title given to the municipal IMF illustrates its
purpose. The legislature described the municipal IMF as a
"[m]unicipal telecommunications infrastructure maintenance fee."
See 35 ILCS 635/20 (West 1998). It is reasonable to assume that
the legislature meant what it said: the municipal IMF is a fee
imposed on those telecommunications providers that need to
access the public rights-of-way in order to maintain their existing
infrastructure. Obviously, the "maintenance" to the
telecommunications infrastructure is being done by the
telecommunications provider that owns the infrastructure, not the
municipality. If the municipality is exacting a fee from the
provider so that it can perform such maintenance, the question
arises why the municipality would expect such a fee. Of course,
the obvious conclusion is that the municipality is exacting the fee
in exchange for allowing the provider to access the public rights-of-way, where much of the provider's infrastructure is located.
	There is yet another factor which leads us to believe that the
municipal IMF was intended as a charge for obtaining access to
the public rights-of-way. As we mentioned earlier, the Act
contains three separate fees: the state IMF, the municipal IMF and
the optional IMF. See 35 ILCS 635/15, 20 (West 1998). If a
municipality has not enacted a municipal IMF, a
telecommunications provider may pay the optional IMF to the
state as a percentage of the gross charges "charged *** to service
addresses in [that] particular municipality for telecommunications,
originating or received in the municipality." 35 ILCS 635/15(c)
(West 1998). By paying the optional IMF, the telecommunications
provider gains access to the public rights-of-way in the
municipality to which the fee relates. 35 ILCS 635/30 (West
1998). Because the optional IMF is "optional," a
telecommunications provider only pays it if the provider needs to
gain access to the public rights-of-way in a particular municipality.
	Section 30 of the Act demonstrates that the municipal IMF
serves the same function as the optional IMF. Section 30 provides
that the payment of the municipal IMF (in a municipality that has
enacted one) or the payment of the optional IMF (in a municipality
that has not yet enacted a municipal IMF) gives the
telecommunications provider the right to obtain access to the
public rights-of-way in the municipality to which the fee pertains.
35 ILCS 635/30 (West 1998). A telecommunications provider may
only elect to pay an optional IMF if there is no existing franchise
fee agreement to which the provider is a party and the municipality
has not imposed a municipal IMF. 35 ILCS 635/15(c) (West
1998).
	If a municipality wishes to impose a municipal IMF, the Act
prohibits the municipality from collecting the fee "during any
period of time when a municipality receives any compensation
other than the municipal [IMF] *** for a telecommunications
retailer's use of the public right-of-way ***." 35 ILCS 635/25(d)
(West 1998); see also 35 ILCS 635/25(e) (West 1998). In other
words, the municipality may not collect both a franchise fee and
the municipal IMF because the fees are duplicative. That is, they
perform the same function-allowing a telecommunications
provider access to the public rights-of-way in exchange for the
payment of a fee.
	The Act provides yet another clue indicating the purpose of
the municipal IMF. In section 35 of the Act, entitled "home rule,"
the Act states that a "home rule municipality may not impose
franchise or other fees upon or require other compensation from
telecommunications retailers for use of the public way, other than
the municipal [IMF] authorized by this Act." 35 ILCS 635/35
(West 1998). The obvious implication contained in this provision
is that the municipal IMF creates a quid pro quo: payment of the
fee in exchange for access to the public rights-of-way.
	All of these examples provide overwhelming textual evidence
of the legislative purpose behind the municipal IMF. Based on
these provisions, we find that it is unquestionable that the
municipal IMF was intended as a uniform means of allowing
telecommunications providers to have access to the public rights-of-way while giving municipalities compensation that they
otherwise would have received in the form of a franchise fee.(3)
	The circuit court, in its decision, discussed at great length the
meaning of the phrase "use of the public right of way," as that
phrase is employed in the Act. The circuit court first analyzed the
"narrow" definition of the term "use," i.e., the physical occupation
of the public rights-of-way by the wires, poles, and other pieces of
equipment owned by a telecommunications retailer. The "broad"
definition, however, would include the act of leasing capacity from
a landline provider for the purpose of completing wireless calls
(since these calls often pass through the landline system, which is
located in the public rights-of-way). Ultimately, the circuit court
concluded that "under either definition of the term 'use[,]' the
Municipal IMF offends the Uniformity Clause."
	It is not necessary to analyze whether the "broad" definition
of the term "use" would justify the classification created by the
municipal IMF. It is clear from the text of the Act that the phrase
"use of the public right of way" refers to the physical occupation
of those rights-of-way by a telecommunication provider's
infrastructure. For instance, section 25(e) of the Act describes a
situation in which a municipality is still receiving "compensation
from a telecommunications retailer [in the form of a franchise fee]
for the use of the public right of way." 35 ILCS 635/25(e) (West
1998). In other words, the municipality is collecting the franchise
fee in exchange for granting the telecommunications retailer the
"use of the public right of way." As we just established, the only
reason a telecommunications retailer would pay a franchise fee
was to access the public rights-of-way for the purpose of installing
or maintaining certain parts of its infrastructure. Thus, when
section 25(e) explains the franchise fee agreement as the payment
of a fee in exchange for "the use of the public right of way," we
know exactly what the term "use of the public right of way"
meant: the physical occupation of the public rights-of-way.
III. Reasonable Classification
	Now that we have established the object of the municipal
IMF, we must determine whether that object is reasonably related
to the class of entities to which the municipal IMF applies. See
Milwaukee Safeguard Insurance Co., 179 Ill. 2d  at 98. If, as we
have already established, the object of the municipal IMF is to
replace franchise fees and establish a uniform system for allowing
telecommunications providers to access the public rights-of-way
in exchange for the payment of a fee, it would be absurd to impose
such a fee on wireless providers who do not own, operate, or
maintain any equipment within the public rights-of-way. Wireless
providers do not need to access the public rights-of-way in order
to maintain their infrastructure, nor do they desire to establish an
infrastructure where such access would be necessary in the future.
	The defendants argue this very point, but for a different
purpose. Rather than using this observation to establish that the
classification created by the municipal IMF is unreasonable, the
defendants attempt to establish thereby that by including wireless
providers among those entities subject to the municipal IMF, the
legislature demonstrated its desire to make wireless providers
subject to the fee (in other words, the tax classification itself
demonstrates the legislature's purpose in creating the fee). Under
this theory, the classification created by the municipal IMF is
reasonable because it fits the overall purpose of the legislation (to
provide municipalities with a general source of revenue from both
landline and wireless telecommunications activity). This argument
is obviously circular. If the tax classification itself informs the
inquiry regarding the purpose of the legislation (even in clear
contravention of all other textual indications), any classification
would inevitably survive a uniformity clause challenge. Such a
rationale, however, renders the limitations contained in the
uniformity clause utterly meaningless. Our precedents do not
establish that the uniformity clause of our constitution is devoid of
substance.
	We find that the defendants in this case have failed to offer a
sufficient legal justification for imposing the municipal IMF on a
class of entities which includes wireless providers. As we
established, the purpose of the municipal IMF is to create a fee
whereby telecommunications providers are granted access to the
public rights-of-way. Because wireless providers do not own,
operate, or maintain any portion of their infrastructure within the
public rights-of-way and do not need or desire to have access to
the public rights-of-way for the purpose of installing any such
infrastructure, it is unreasonable to include them within the class
of entities subjected to the municipal IMF.
IV. Facial Invalidation
	We do not believe, however, that our conclusion on this
matter suffices to render the municipal IMF facially invalid. "A
facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987), quoted with
approval in In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994). The fact
that the municipal IMF operates unconstitutionally as it applies to
wireless providers is insufficient to render it wholly invalid. See
Salerno, 481 U.S.  at 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 707, 107 S. Ct.  at 2100;
In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d  at 210-11.
	In spite of this, the circuit court invalidated the municipal IMF
on its face. We do not believe, however, that this case presented
the circuit court with an all-or-nothing constitutional dilemma. By
examining the trial judge's reasoning, we can understand the error
that led him to believe that it did.
	As previously discussed, in the portion of its opinion
addressing the "narrow" and "broad" definitions of the phrase "use
of the public right of way," the circuit court held that the
municipal IMF would be invalid even under the "broad" definition
of that phrase (which includes the mere leasing of landline
capacity by a wireless provider) because the wireless provider's
practice of leasing landline capacity is a much less intense "use of
the public right of way" than that of the landline providers. As we
have already demonstrated, the meaning of the phrase "use of the
public right of way" is not so broad that it would include the mere
leasing of landline capacity. Nonetheless, the circuit court held
that even under the "broad" definition of that phrase, "it is wholly
arbitrary to impose [the municipal IMF] on the gross charges of
the Plaintiffs since they are plainly in a different category as to
[their] use [of the public rights-of-way] than landline service
providers who own, manage, control and maintain the lines
located on the public rights-of-way." In other words, the circuit
court invalidated the municipal IMF, at least in part, because the
fee generated an amount of revenue which was in no way directly
related to the intensity to which each type of provider "used" the
public rights-of-way (under the "broad" definition of that term). Of
course, a fee measured against the gross receipts of a
telecommunications retailer would be invalid per se under such a
rationale. It is difficult to conceive of a direct relationship that
could be shown between a telecommunications provider's gross
receipts and its use of the public rights-of-way.
	In its holding on this matter, the circuit court relied heavily on
the reasoning of this court in City of Chicago Heights v. Public
Service Co., 408 Ill. 310 (1951). In fact, much of the discussion in
the parties' briefs is centered around that case. However, City of
Chicago Heights is inapposite to our holding in this case. City of
Chicago Heights involved the constitutionality of two franchise
fees imposed by the City of Chicago Heights on the gross receipts
of any telecommunications company that occupied the public
rights-of-way within the city limits. See City of Chicago Heights,
408 Ill.  at 316. In that case, we held that the franchise fees
imposed by Chicago Heights violated the uniformity clause
because a fee assessed as a percentage of gross receipts "has no
relation to the amount of space in a street used by wires or poles
of a given company." City of Chicago Heights, 408 Ill.  at 318. We
struck down the fee, noting that it was "wholly lacking in
uniformity, and *** purely arbitrary and discriminatory in its
nature." City of Chicago Heights, 408 Ill.  at 318.
	In the present case, however, we determined that the
municipal IMF is invalid in its application to the plaintiffs because
the classification created by the fee is not reasonably related to the
fee's purpose. The franchise fee in City of Chicago Heights was
not challenged under this theory. As the above-quoted language
demonstrates, the franchise fee in City of Chicago Heights was
struck down because it taxed the members of the subject class in
a nonuniform manner. City of Chicago Heights, 408 Ill.  at 318. As
the text of the uniformity clause indicates, however, a piece of
legislation must first create a reasonable tax classification before
a court can even reach the question of whether the members of that
class are being taxed uniformly. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §2.
As we have just demonstrated, the municipal IMF fails to do so.
To the extent the municipal IMF creates a classification that
includes telecommunications providers who do not own or operate
any of their infrastructure in the public rights-of-way, it is invalid.
Of course, this description fits all of the plaintiffs in this case. It is
not necessary for us, then, to address whether the municipal IMF
operates uniformly upon the remaining members of the class who
do own and operate part of their infrastructure within the public
rights-of-way.
	Not only is it unnecessary, it is improper. Our jurisdiction is
restricted to cases which present an actual controversy, and we
decline to issue advisory opinions on moot or abstract questions of
law. People ex rel. Partee v. Murphy, 133 Ill. 2d 402, 408 (1990);
People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d 273, 276 (1983); In re
Marriage of Wright, 89 Ill. 2d 498, 500 (1982). If the resolution of
a certain question of law cannot affect the result as to the parties
or controversy before it, the court should not resolve the question
merely to set a precedent or to guide future litigation. Segers v.
Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (2000); In re Barbara H.,
183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998); Murphy, 133 Ill. 2d  at 408.
CONCLUSION
	Accordingly, for the reasons given, we affirm the circuit
court's order of summary judgment under count I of the complaint
that found the municipal IMF to be in violation of article IX,
section 2, of the Illinois Constitution. However, we do not find the
municipal IMF to be invalid on its face. Rather, we find that the
municipal IMF violates the uniformity clause only to the extent
that it applies to telecommunications retailers who do not own,
operate, or maintain any part of their infrastructure within the
public rights-of-way.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	The City of Chicago and the Illinois Commerce Commission
(defendants) have filed a petition for rehearing in this cause.
Because I believe that this court's opinion may have been in error,
I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing.
	The legislature enacted the Telecommunications Municipal
Infrastructure Maintenance Fee Act (Act) (35 ILCS 635/1 et seq.
(West 1998)), effective January 1, 1998. Section 5 of the Act
provides in part:
		"This Act is intended to abolish the invested capital tax
on telecommunications retailers ***. This Act is also
intended to abolish municipal franchise fees with respect
to telecommunications retailers, create a uniform system
for the collection and distribution of fees associated with
the privilege of use of the public right of way for
telecommunications activity, and provide municipalities
with a comprehensive method of compensation for
telecommunications activity including the recovery of
reasonable costs of regulating the use of the public rights-of-way for telecommunications activity." 35 ILCS 635/5
(West 1998).
	The invested capital tax (35 ILCS 610/2 A. 1 (West 1996)) had
been imposed on invested capital of utilities. Municipal franchise
fees were imposed by municipalities upon landline
telecommunications retailers to compensate the municipalities for
the use of the public rights-of-way by these retailers for
telecommunications activity and the maintenance and repair of
equipment in the public rights-of-way. The franchise fees included
a percentage of all lease revenues that wireless
telecommunications retailers paid to landline telecommunications
retailers for their use of the equipment maintained by the landline
telecommunications retailers in the public rights-of-way.
	The Act replaced the invested capital tax and the franchise
fees with a state infrastructure maintenance fee imposed upon
landline telecommunications retailers (35 ILCS 635/15(a), (b)
(West 1998)); an optional infrastructure maintenance fee imposed
upon landline telecommunications retailers (35 ILCS 635/15(c),
(d) (West 1998)); and a municipal telecommunications
infrastructure maintenance fee imposed upon all
telecommunications retailers, including wireless
telecommunications retailers (Municipal IMF) (35 ILCS 635/20
(West 1998)).
	Pursuant to section 20 of the Act, a municipality could impose
a Municipal IMF upon telecommunications retailers by adopting
an ordinance to that effect. If the municipality had a population of
more than 500,000, it could impose a Municipal IMF of "2.0% of
all gross charges charged by the telecommunications retailer to
service addresses in the municipality for telecommunications
originating or received in the municipality." 35 ILCS 635/20(b)
(West 1998). In a municipality with a population of 500,000 or
fewer, the Municipal IMF was limited to "1.0% of all gross
charges charged by the telecommunications retailer to service
addresses in the municipality for telecommunications originating
or received in the municipality." 35 ILCS 635/20(b) (West 1998).
	The City of Chicago passed an ordinance imposing a
Municipal IMF of 2% on "all gross charges charged by
telecommunications retailers to a service address in the city for
telecommunications originating or received in the city." Chicago
Municipal Code §3-75-030(A) (added October 1, 1997). Primeco
Personal Communications, L.P., a wireless telecommunications
retailer, and several other wireless telecommunications retailers
(plaintiffs) filed an action for injunctive and declaratory relief.
	Plaintiffs noted that wireless telecommunications retailers do
not own or operate equipment in the public rights-of-way.
Plaintiffs claimed that the purpose of the Municipal IMF was to
compensate municipalities for the use of the public rights-of-way.
Plaintiffs argued that the Municipal IMF violated the uniformity
clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §2) to
the extent that the Municipal IMF applied to telecommunications
retailers who do not own or operate any equipment in the public
rights-of-way.
	Defendants responded that the Municipal IMF was not a fee
for the use of the public rights-of-way. Instead, the Municipal IMF
was a tax imposed uniformly on telecommunications retailers.
Defendants maintained that the Municipal IMF did not violate the
uniformity clause.
	This court held section 20 of the Act (35 ILCS 635/20 (West
1998)) invalid as applied to telecommunications retailers who do
not own, operate, or maintain any equipment in the public rights-of-way. Initially, this court noted that in a case involving a
uniformity clause challenge it must ascertain the object or purpose
of the taxing provision at issue. This court looked particularly to
section 5 of the Act (35 ILCS 635/5 (West 1998)), entitled
"Legislative intent," to ascertain that purpose. This court reasoned
that the Municipal IMF was intended as a tool to compensate
municipalities for the use of the public rights-of-way. As such, the
Municipal IMF violated the uniformity clause because the
Municipal IMF was imposed on both landline telecommunications
retailers, that is, retailers who own, operate and maintain
equipment in the public rights-of-way, and wireless
telecommunications retailers, that is, retailers who do not own,
operate or maintain equipment in the public rights-of-way.
	In their petition for rehearing, defendants question this court's
conclusion that the Municipal IMF was intended as a uniform
means of compensating municipalities for allowing
telecommunications retailers to have access to the public rights-of-way. Defendants maintain that the Municipal IMF was intended as
a means of raising revenue from telecommunication activities, and
not just a way to compensate municipalities for the costs they
incur in allowing telecommunications retailers to have access to
the public rights-of-way. Defendants note that, pursuant to
sections 20 and 25 of the Act (35 ILCS 635/20, 25 (West 1998)),
municipalities may collect the Municipal IMF from wireless
telecommunications retailers. See also 35 ILCS 635/10(b), (d), (f)
(West 1998). Given the clarity of these provisions, and assuming
the legislature knew that wireless telecommunications retailers do
not own, operate or maintain equipment in the public rights-of-way, defendants assert this court gave undue precedence to the
Act's statement of legislative intent while ignoring the Act's
substantive provisions.
	Next, defendants assert that the Municipal IMF is a fair way
of raising revenue from telecommunication activities. Defendants
explain:
		"[W]hile wireless retailers do not themselves need to
install or repair equipment in public rights-of-way, they
are critically dependent upon such equipment. Rather than
place their own equipment in the public way, wireless
retailers have chosen to rely on landline carriers to do this
for them. Thus, it is reasonable to spread to wireless
carriers a portion of the compensation that municipalities
receive for granting landlines access to public rights-of-way, since wireless providers are critically dependent on
the ability of landline carriers to obtain access to public
rights-of-way in order to install and maintain equipment.
For that reason, the General Assembly reasonably
included wireless retailers within the class of
telecommunications retailers that must compensate
municipalities for granting landline carriers access to
public rights-of-way. Indeed, as we explain above,
wireless retailers previously contributed to the payment of
franchise fees for landlines. For that reason, they could
also be expected to contribute to the IMF, which replaced
franchise revenues."
	Finally, defendants maintain this court's opinion will have an
adverse impact on "every municipal budget in Illinois" and will
require "painful cuts in municipal services or borrowing at
considerable cost to the taxpayers in order to plug budgetary
shortfalls" resulting from the invalidation of the Act.
	I believe that defendants have advanced considerations that
merit rehearing by this court. I also find an additional reason for
allowing the petition for rehearing in this court's failure to either
follow or overrule our decision in City of Chicago Heights v.
Public Service Co., 408 Ill. 310 (1951). This court's attempt to
distinguish City of Chicago Heights is unpersuasive.
	The decision in this cause is of momentous import to the
litigants and to the people of this state. The City of Chicago and
numerous municipalities in the state stand to lose a great deal of
revenue because this court has invalidated the Municipal IMF. The
municipalities will surely attempt to enact other taxing provisions
to counter the loss of revenues from the Municipal IMF.
Moreover, if the Municipal IMF is truly intended as a means to
compensate municipalities for the use of the public rights-of-way,
the legislature may well increase the fee that municipalities are
allowed to collect from the landline telecommunications retailers
to make up for the loss of revenues from the wireless
telecommunications retailers. Any increase in those fees would be
passed on to users of landline telephones in this state. Given these
circumstances and the arguments for rehearing outlined above, I
believe this court errs in denying the petition for rehearing. I
respectfully dissent.
 



 



1.      1We intimate no view on the validity of the municipal IMF as it
relates to those not similarly situated to the plaintiffs. 

2.      2The first prong of the "reasonable classification" test compares and
contrasts the class of taxed entities with those that are not taxed. The
allegation in count I, on the other hand, is focused exclusively on the
similarities or differences within the class of entities subject to taxation. 

3.      3Although the circuit court discussed the federal
Telecommunications Act at length in its memorandum opinion, we do
not believe it is necessary in this case to speculate as to the effects that
federal law might have had in forming the legislative intent behind the
municipal IMF.