Title: Pinellas County v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96-332
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC96332
____________
PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, etc.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.,
Appellees.
[January 11, 2001]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review an appeal from the circuit court's order denying
validation of Pinellas County's proposed revenue bonds to be used in funding the
development of reclaimed water service for selected portions of the County's water
service area ("Service Area").  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section
3(b)(2) of the Florida Constitution, and reverse the decision below.
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellant, Pinellas County, Florida (the "County") is a home rule charter
1The County’s home rule charter was established by chapter 80-590, section 1, Laws of
Florida, and made effective by an approving referendum held on October 7, 1980. 
2Madeira Beach and Indian Rocks Beach are referred to collectively herein as the "Beach
Cities."  They are joined by appellees James Palamara, Robert Johnson, Fred Vowinkel, Marsha
Loper and John DeMont  The Beach Cities are two of a string of municipalities that form the barrier
islands of Pinellas County.  The water service territory included by the Special Acts included "that
certain chain of islands bordering on the Gulf of Mexico from Pass-A-Grille to Indian Rocks."  Of the
eight beach municipalities that the County is proposing to serve with reclaimed water, only the two
Beach Cities--Madeira Beach and Indian Rocks Beach--object to validation of the bonds.   
3The Special Acts are incorporated into the Pinellas County Code at sec.126-121. 
-2-
county.1  Pursuant to certain special laws, the County has provided water service to
the municipalities of the Pinellas County beaches (including the Beach Cities2), for
more than sixty years.  See generally ch. 29442, Laws of Fla. (1953) (the "1953
Special Act"); ch. 20066, Laws of Fla. (1939) (the "1939 Special Act"); ch. 17644,
Laws of Fla. (1935) (the "1935 Special Act") (collectively referred to as the
"Special Acts").3  Under the Special Acts, the County was designated as the
provider of water to the Beach Cities and other Pinellas Beaches, which had
suffered many failures of small wells.  See also Madeira Beach, Fla., Code of
Ordinances  art. II, ch. 70, §§ 15-201-15-202 (reflecting that the Special Acts gave
Pinellas County the authority to construct and operate a nonprofit water system;
that such system provides retail water to the Beach Cities; that responsibility for
operation "including the right to fix charges or rates for water consumed" has been
delegated to the Director of the Water System; and that the Pinellas County Board
4The record reflects that the County also serves five municipalities with water on a wholesale
basis, where the contracting municipalities bill the customers according to fee schedules set by the
municipalities.
-3-
of County Commissioners is authorized to be the sole and exclusive supplier of
potable water to the City of Madeira Beach). 
The County's water system currently serves thirteen municipalities within
Pinellas County, as well as servicing unincorporated areas, on a retail or direct
billing basis4.  Retail customers in the Service Area (such as the Beach Cities) are
directly billed by the County for the water utilized.  The record reflects that rates
for water service are established by resolution of the Pinellas County Board of
County Commissioners (the "Board") pursuant to the Special Acts, and there is no
record evidence of any interlocal agreements between the County and the
municipalities served.
This controversy began when the County proposed to incorporate into its
existing water and sewer facilities a reclaimed water service component (the
"RWS").  The RWS would dispose of the system’s wastewater in an
environmentally acceptable manner, an indispensable element of any water service
system.  The treated, non-potable water would be made available to those portions
of the Service Area which had been selected, after study, as being best suited for
5The reclaimed water supply is designed to be used for items such as lawn and garden
irrigation, vehicle washing and other non-potable uses.  This also provides a corresponding reduction in
the demand for potable water, a water conservation measure.   
-4-
utilization of reclaimed water for irrigation and other non-potable uses.5  The scope
and coverage of any reclaimed water program is necessarily limited because the
methodology requires the combination of waste water from approximately four
households to produce sufficient reclaimed water for the estimated needs of a
single household.  The County's enabling ordinance for the program (Ordinance
No. 97-103) reflects that it was proposed as a means to minimize the use of existing
potable water supplies, to provide a less expensive (and unrestricted) source of
water for irrigation, and to recycle wastewater generated from the Service Area. 
See also Pinellas County Resolution 98-251.
The County proposed to fund the RWS with sewer revenue bonds, and to
pledge, as partial security for the bonds, the proceeds to be obtained from a
proposed availability charge (or "readiness to serve" charge) (the “Availability
Charge”).  This charge would apply only to those properties in the Service Area to
which the County's new facilities would extend, allowing them to have access to the
reclaimed water service.  Although highly treated, reclaimed water is not potable
and must be delivered through specific water lines.  “Transmission lines” carry the
reclaimed water from the treatment facilities to the general areas of service.  Smaller
-5-
“distribution lines” then carry the reclaimed water from the transmission lines to
individual property owners.  From these smaller distribution lines, the County then
installs a service stub at individual properties to connect customers to reclaimed
water.  The proposed Availability Charge--to be amortized over thirty years--was
calculated to cover only a part of the cost of the water distribution lines and the
hose bib connections at each property receiving service (and not the cost of
transmission lines or of the waste water treatment facility itself, the cost of which
would be apportioned to all system users).  Once the cost of these lines was
recovered, the Availability Charge would no longer be assessed.  Those properties
having pre-existing wells were to be exempted from reclaimed water service fees,
including the Availability Charge.  Properties electing to use the reclaimed water
would be subject to a connection charge, and fees based upon usage. 
Based upon these proposals, the County filed a complaint in circuit court,
seeking to validate the Sewer Revenue Bonds.  Some of the affected municipalities,
asserting that many of their citizens would have no use for the water, opposed
validation of the bonds. 
The trial court denied the County’s request to validate the bonds, on two
grounds.  First, citing Hodges v. Jacksonville Transportation Authority, 353 So. 2d
1211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), it found that, pursuant to chapter 153, Florida Statutes,
6The authority, under the Special Acts, for the County to assess charges for the County’s
Water System includes the power to assess fees for water services and facilities, and for mandatory
hook-ups to such facilities.  Section 4 of the 1953 Special Act ("Powers of the County") provides, in
pertinent part, that the County shall have the power:
(4)  To prescribe, fix, establish and collect fees, rentals or other charges for the
facilities and services furnished by such water system, or any part thereof, either
heretofore or hereafter constructed or acquired on an equitable basis; provided,
however, that such fees, rentals or other charges, or any revision thereof, shall be fixed
and established by Resolution of the Board of County Commissioners in said County.
. . . .
(8)  To require all lands, buildings and premises to use the facilities and services
of such undertakings, except as herein otherwise noted, in all cases deemed necessary
or desirable by the county.
(Emphasis supplied.) 
-6-
the County was required to obtain the additional consent of the municipalities within
the Service Area before adding this reclaimed water system to the existing water
services (which it had not done).  Second, citing State v. City of Port Orange, 650
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1994), it held that the proposed $7 monthly Availability Charge was
neither a connection charge nor a user fee; rather, it was an impermissible tax.   
We reverse the final judgment entered by the trial court denying the County’s
complaint for bond validation for two reasons.  First, we hold that the County,
which was authorized by its home rule charter powers and the Special Acts6 to add
reclaimed water improvements to its existing water and sewer system, was not
required to comply with additional requirements of chapter 153, Florida Statutes,
where it neither relied, nor was required to rely, upon such supplemental authority. 
-7-
Second, we conclude that the Availability Charge is not an impermissible tax, but a
valid fee.    
ANALYSIS
This Court's scope of review in bond validation cases is limited.  The only
issues for our consideration are: (1) whether the public body has the authority to issue
the bonds; (2) whether the purpose of the obligation is legal; and (3) whether the bond
issuance complies with the requirements of the law.  See Poe v. Hillsborough County,
695 So. 2d 672, 675 (Fla. 1997). 
Requirement to Comply with Chapter 153
The record and evidence fail to support the trial court’s conclusions, and the
applicable law compels reversal.  In our view, chapter 153 is clear and unequivocal
in providing that its authority and application are supplemental to, and do not
invalidate, other sources of authority for undertaking the activities authorized by the
statutory provisions.  See §153.20, Fla. Stat. (1997).  Review of the applicable
resolutions and ordinance in this case reflects that the County did not invoke, nor
did it need to invoke, chapter 153 in attempting to extend its reclaimed water
service into the Beach Cities.  Hodges is distinguishable, and we believe Mountain
v. Pinellas County, 152 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), is on point.  
-8-
In Hodges, the Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA), exercising its
power of eminent domain, filed a complaint for condemnation seeking to obtain a
right-of-way needed to construct a limited access highway.  Property owners
located in the City of Jacksonville opposed the complaint on the ground, inter alia,
that there had been no compliance with section 338.01, Florida Statutes, requiring
municipal consent for the construction of certain limited access highways.  The
JTA did not contend that it was not proceeding pursuant to, or bound by the
requirements of, section 338.01.  Rather, it successfully urged before the trial court
that other instruments executed by the City of Jacksonville containing references to
construction of the proposed highway on the subject property sufficiently evinced
municipal consent and, therefore, compliance with the statute had been established. 
The appellate court disagreed, stating that its examination of those documents
revealed that they did not meet the test to establish consent.  The appellate court
further observed, however, that the record reflected that a resolution had been
introduced in the City Council of the municipality which, if adopted, would comply
with the statute.  On that basis, the appellate court stated that it did not "hold that
the proceeding must be dismissed for failure to obtain timely consent but only that
it must be abated until that event has occurred."  353 So. 2d at 1212-1213.
7The County's second argument--that the Beach Cities, by consenting to the County's provision
of water to them, have thereby consented to construction, operation and maintenance of all lawful
components of that system--need not be reached, but is (as a matter of public policy) also compelling. 
Environmentally sound programs are often the most costly components of essential local  governmental
service systems, whether those systems involve electric utilities, water and sewer facilities, or garbage
disposal services.  Absent a valid interlocal compact providing otherwise, where special laws require a
county to provide water service to a municipality, that municipality should not be permitted to "cherry-
pick" one system component and reject another component, especially where, as here, the Legislature
has encouraged such component as part of an integrated water system.  See generally § 373.250, Fla.
Stat. (1997) (providing that the "encouragement and promotion of water conservation and reuse of
reclaimed water . . . are state objectives considered to be in the public interest"); § 403.064(8), Fla.
Stat. (1997) (providing that local governments "may and are encouraged to implement programs for the
reuse of reclaimed water"); § 403.064(9), Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that a "local government that
implements a reuse program under this section shall be allowed to allocate the costs in a reasonable
-9-
Mountain, on the other hand, involved an issue virtually identical to that
presented here: whether the County could rely on sources of authority other than
chapter 153 in constructing its water system, rather than proceeding under chapter
153 and complying with all provisions contained therein.  In holding that the County
was not limited by or compelled to follow the requirements of chapter 153, the
Mountain court recognized that chapter’s expressly supplemental character.  Where
not invoked, its provisions and restrictions need not be followed.  Cf. City of Boca
Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25, 29 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the city was not bound
to follow the requirements of chapter 170, Florida Statutes, which reflected that it
provided a "supplemental, additional and alternative method of procedure" for
levying special assessments, in constructing certain downtown infrastructure
improvements and funding them through bonds financed by special assessments).7 
manner").  
-10-
Because the County was not required to and did not invoke chapter 153 as
authority to extend reclaimed water service into the Beach Cities, the trial court
reversibly erred in finding that the County was bound by, and violated, the
requirements of chapter 153.  
Character of Availability Charge
Recently, this Court had the occasion to address, at length, the character of a
valid user fee as compared with a tax in fee's clothing.  See Collier County v. State,
733 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1999).  Collier County involved a rather transparent attempt
by a local government to collect ad valorem taxes on those properties which,
because of improvements not substantially complete on January 1 of a given tax
year, have historically escaped tax liability for up to twenty-seven months after
completion of the improvements.  See §192.042(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Because the
County was, nonetheless, required to provide essential governmental services to
these properties, Collier County--endeavoring to recoup this alleged "windfall"
from the affected property owners--passed an ordinance establishing an  "interim
governmental services fee" applicable to these properties.  As stated in this
Court's Collier opinion:
-11-
The purpose of the fee is to provide the equivalent
of a partial year assessment of ad valorem taxes on
improvements to property substantially completed after
January 1 that would not otherwise be subject to ad
valorem taxation at its new increased value.  However, the
County stresses that the assessment is not based on the
value of the property, but rather on the increased cost of
providing certain "growth-sensitive" services as a result
of the improvement.  
. . . .
The government growth-sensitive services funded
by the fee are: (1) the Office of the Sheriff; (2) elections; 
(3) code enforcement; (4) courts and related agencies; 
(5) animal control; (6) libraries; (7) parks and recreation; 
(8) public health; (9) medical examiner; (10) public
works; and (11) support services.  The County admits
that these are the exact services funded through the
general revenue fund from ad valorem taxes that all
property tax payers are required to support.
Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1015-16 (footnote omitted).
Not surprisingly, even though Collier County presented expert testimony to
the effect that the "fee" had been calculated based upon an elaborate formula which
excluded "fixed" governmental costs not impacted by improvements to property,
this Court rejected the county's characterization of the charge as anything other than
a tax.  In Collier County, the services supported by the fee were admittedly the
same services otherwise paid for through ad valorem tax funds.  In analyzing why
the “interim governmental services fee” was not a valid user fee, we reasoned:
-12-
The County's ordinance includes a "savings
clause" providing for the collection of the same amount
of money as a fee upon the issuance of the certificate of
occupancy, if the uniform method of collection is
declared invalid.  However, a change in the method of
collection will not convert a prohibited tax into a valid
fee.  As we stated in City of Port Orange, [650 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1994),] the power "to tax should not be broadened
by semantics which would be the effect of labeling what
the City is here [attempting to collect] a fee rather than a
tax."  650 So. 2d at 3.
In City of Port Orange, this Court found an alleged
"transportation utility fee" to actually be an impermissible
tax.  In that case, the City sought to levy a fee on
property owners to support the operation, maintenance
and improvement of the local road system.  See id. at 2. 
We explained that user fees are "charged in exchange for
a particular governmental service which benefits the party
paying the fee in a manner not shared by other members
of society."  Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied).  In that aspect,
user fees are similar to special assessments, in that the fee
must result in a benefit not shared by persons not
required to pay the fee.
. . . .
As explained above, the services to be funded by
the "Interim Government Services Fee" provide no direct
benefit to the property.  Those paying the fee are not
benefitted by the services provided in a manner not
shared by those not paying the fee.  Instead, the services
to be funded by the fee are the same general police-power
services provided to all County residents.  Moreover, the
fee would not provide the source for any capital
improvements to the County's existing facilities, but
instead would defray the operating costs for the County
to exercise its sovereign functions.  Just as the fee fails to
meet the requirements of a special assessment, so does it
fail to qualify as a valid fee.
-13-
Collier County, 733 So. 2d at 1018-19.
Applying this same Port Orange analysis here, in contrast, even though the
respondent cries "tax," the Availability Charge has all of the earmarks of a valid
utility facilities user fee.  In Port Orange, we noted that user fees “are charged in
exchange for a particular governmental service which benefits the party paying the
fee in a manner not shared by other members of society.”  Port Orange, 650 So. 2d
at 3.  Here, there is no question that the Availability Charge provides a special
benefit to those paying the fee: unlimited access to reclaimed water for non-potable,
outdoor uses, such as irrigation and washing activities.  Rather than going into the
general fund, the money which is recouped through the Availability Charge is tied
directly to payment for reclaimed water distribution line improvements extending to
the individual properties (not transmission lines to other parts of the county), and
collection of the charge ceases when those costs have been recovered.  Further,
those paying the fee receive unlimited access to reclaimed water, a benefit which is
not shared by persons not required to pay the fee.  See Collier County v. State, 733
So. 2d 1012, 1018 (Fla. 1999).  These are not the indicia of a tax.    
Nonetheless, the trial court erroneously concluded that a “voluntary user fee
would permit those who choose to use the reclaimed water to pay for the service
and would not indiscriminately burden those property owners who have no need or
8While the reclaimed water project in its entirety may be indispensable to continued  provision
of potable water to all customers in the system (because it provides an environmentally acceptable
disposition of system waste water), only that portion of project improvements attributable to distribution
lines going to individual properties having access to the limited supply of available reclaimed water will
be included in the Availability Charge.  Indeed, because of the additional benefit which those properties
will receive, had the County adopted the allocation which the State and Beach Cities urge (charging the
entire cost of the reclaimed water service, including individual distribution lines, to all water system
customers), it would have been suspect.  Cf. Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667
So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1995) (observing--in the context of a similar challenge levied against certain
stormwater management special assessments (rather than user fees)--that, where the County's
assessments against certain properties were reasonably related to the treatment of polluted stormwater
contributed by those properties, "[t]o require that the stormwater utility services be funded through a
general ad valorem tax, as requested by the religious organizations who filed this action, would shift part
of the cost of managing the stormwater drainage problems, which are created by developed real
property, to undeveloped property owners who neither significantly contributed to nor caused the
stormwater drainage problems"). 
-14-
desire to use reclaimed water.”  This focus was too narrow.  There is no question
that the Beach Cities voluntarily receive water service from the County, and nothing
in the record evidences their desire to stop receiving such service.  While it is true
that only certain customers may have access to the necessarily limited quantities of
reclaimed water, and that these customers, therefore, pay a portion of the
distribution line costs attributable to this special benefit, that is not dispositive of
the question.  It is clear that the reclaimed water system is an integrated part of the
whole water service system, and the remainder of the system costs, not attributable
to provision of this special benefit, are borne by all users of the system.8  Absent a
valid interlocal agreement which would allow the Beach Cities to pick and choose
between integral components of the water system through which they are provided
9However, the Reclaimed Water Ordinance does permit residents to opt out of the Availability
Charge if they have an irrigation well on their property. 
10The nexus between water systems and sewer systems makes them equivalent for purposes of
construing applicable fees.  Cf. State v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 726, 736-37, 27 So. 2d 118, 124
(1946) (observing, in the context of affirming the validation of sewer revenue bonds, that "[a] sewer
system is complementary to a water system . . . so the principles of law which would apply to one
system must likewise apply to the other" ).
11There is ample authority under Florida’s statutory law for local governments to recoup the
costs of providing water service in general, and reclaimed water service in particular.  See § 153.12,
Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that counties may, upon construction of a sewage disposal system and the
financing of such a system by the issuance of sewer revenue bonds, require that each lot or parcel of
land within the county which abuts upon a street or other public way containing sanitary sewer connect
to such sewer); § 180.02(3), Fla. Stat. (1997)
(providing that municipalities have the power to create a zone or area by ordinance and to require all
persons or corporations living in or doing business within that area to connect, when available, to any
sewerage system or alternative water supply system, including, but not limited to, reclaimed water); §
373.309, Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing requirements for mandatory connection to available potable
water systems in areas of known contamination); § 381.0065, Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that
connections to on-site sewage and disposal systems are only allowed when service is not available from
a publicly-owned or private sewage system); § 381.00655, Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that property
owners must connect to available sewer systems within a specified time); § 403.031(17), Fla. Stat.
(1997) (providing that storm water management programs are to be operated “as a typical utility which
bills services regularly, similar to water and wastewater services”); §§ 403.064(8)-(9), Fla. Stat.
-15-
this essential water service,  the “voluntary choice” was made by all customers
within the served municipalities when they opted either to receive the integrated
water service or not.9  See supra note 6.  
Further, where a governmental entity provides access to traditional utility
services,10 this Court has not hesitated to uphold local ordinances imposing
mandatory fees, regardless of whether an individual customer actually uses or
desires the service.11  See Stone v. Town of Mexico Beach, 348 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
(1997) (encouraging local governments to implement programs for the reuse of reclaimed water, and
providing that governments implementing such programs “shall be allowed to allocate the costs in a
reasonable manner”). 
12Similar cases from other states likewise support the conclusion that the Availability Charge is
an appropriate fee.  See Lepre v. D'Iberville Water & Sewer Dist., 376 So. 2d 191, 194 (Miss. 1979)
(upholding mandatory "readiness to serve" charge regardless of property's connection to water and
sewer system, and specifically finding that the charge was not a tax); Airwick Indus., Inc. v. Carlstadt
Sewerage Auth., 270 A.2d 18 (N.J. 1970) (approving sewer fees to improved and unimproved
properties); McMillan v. Texas Natural Resources Conservation Comm'n, 983 S.W. 2d 359, 365
(Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that annual "standby fees" imposed  for availability of potable water,
sanitary sewer or drainage facilities and services to undeveloped property were not taxes, because they
were "not equally distributed, but instead [were] imposed only on property that can take advantage of
available benefits").  
-16-
1977) (finding that a mandatory flat rate for garbage service, regardless of use, was
not contrary to constitutional standards); State v. City of Miami Springs, 245 So.
2d 80 (Fla. 1971) (ruling that a flat rate for sewer charges for all single family
residences, unrelated to actual use, was not unreasonable, arbitrary or in conflict
with state or federal constitutions or law); see also Riviera Beach v. Martinique 2
Owners Ass’n, 596 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (holding that the subject
solid waste removal ordinance applied to unoccupied condominiums without
regard to actual use); Town of Redington Shores v. Redington Towers, Inc., 354
So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (holding that mandatory sewer charges against
unoccupied property applied from the date the sewer main was available to be
used, and that sewage charges were reasonably related to the value of service
rendered either as actually consumed or as readily available).12  Because the
-17-
Availability Charge has the characteristics of a valid fee, the trial court erred in
determining it to be an invalid tax.  Based upon the foregoing, we vacate the order
denying the complaint for bond validation, and remand this case to the trial court
with directions to enter a judgment validating the bonds.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and QUINCE,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County - Bond Validation
Charles W. Cope, Judge - Case No. 99-1961-CI-20
Joseph A. Morrissey, Assistant County Attorney, Clearwater, Florida; and Grace E.
Dunlap, Kenneth A. Guckenberger and Randall W. Hanna of Bryant, Miller and Olive,
P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Bernie McCabe, State Attorney and C. Marie King, Assistant State Attorney, Sixth
Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, Florida; and Lee Wm. Atkinson of Tew, Zinober, Barnes,
Zimmet & Unice, Clearwater, Florida,
for Appellees
Robert P. Banks and Leonard Berger, Assistant County Attorneys, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for The Florida Association of County Attorneys, Amicus Curiae