Title: Poston, et al. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 579, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EYERCE POSTON a/k/a EYERCE 
ARMSTRONG and AVEE 
POSTON, JR.,  
 
Defendants Below, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST 
COMPANY AMERICAS as Trustee 
for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., 
Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass 
Through Certificates Series, 2006-
QS5, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 579, 2018 
§   
§  Court Below—Superior Court of 
§  the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. N16L-07-149 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
     Submitted:  November 21, 2018 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  December 18, 2018 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
 
Having considered the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order under 
Supreme Court Rule 42, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
This interlocutory appeal arises from a Superior Court order, dated 
October 22, 2018, granting a motion to strike a jury demand.  On November 1, 2018, 
the defendants below-appellants, Eyerce Poston and Avee Poston, Jr., filed an 
application for certification to take an interlocutory appeal.  They argued, among 
2 
 
other things, that the order determined a substantial issue—their right to a jury a jury 
trial under the Delaware Constitution—and that there were conflicting Superior 
Court decisions regarding whether a defendant in a scire facias sur mortgage action 
has a right to a jury trial.  The plaintiff below-appellee, Deutsche Bank Trust 
Company Americas, opposed the application.   
(2) 
The Superior Court denied the application, holding that the order was 
consistent with other Superior Court decisions on the issue of whether there is a 
constitutional right to a jury trial in foreclosure actions, that recent Superior Court 
decisions were not conflicting, and that, with trial scheduled for January 2019, an 
interlocutory appeal would further delay resolution of the matter.  
(3) 
We agree that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.  
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of the 
Court.1  In the exercise of our discretion, we have concluded that the application for 
interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards for certification under Rule 
42(b) and should be refused.  This case is not exceptional,2 and the potential benefits 
of interlocutory review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable 
costs caused by an interlocutory appeal.3   
                                               
 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v). 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii). 
3 Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii). 
3 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the interlocutory 
appeal is REFUSED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Justice