Title: Crawford v. OSU Medical Trust
Citation: 2022 OK 25
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: March 22, 2022

Crawford v. OSU Medical Trust Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order dismissing Defendant-respondent OSU Medical Trust, doing business as OSU Medical Center (OSUMC), from a medical malpractice lawsuit. The issue was whether Plaintiffs-appellants Miranda and Colby Crawford, Natural Parents and on Behalf of C.C.C., a Minor, and Miranda and Colby Crawford, Individually (collectively, the Crawfords) complied with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Supreme Court held that the Crawfords failed to present notice of their tort claim within one year of the date the loss occurred and, pursuant to 51 O.S.Supp.2012 section 156(B), their claims against OSUMC were forever barred. The Court thus affirmed the trial court's order dismissing OSUMC with prejudice. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . CRAWFORD v. OSU MEDICAL TRUST 2022 OK 25 Case Number: 117870 Decided: 03/22/2022 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. MIRANDA and COLBY CRAWFORD, Natural Parents and on Behalf of C.C.C., a Minor, and MIRANDA and COLBY CRAWFORD, Individually, Plaintiffs/Petitioners, v. OSU MEDICAL TRUST, a Public Trust d/b/a OSU Medical Center, Defendant/Respondent, and SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL, INC., an Oklahoma Corporation, d/b/a St. Francis Children's Hospital, PEDIATRIC OPHTHALMOLOGY, P.C., an Oklahoma Professional Corporation, d/b/a Pediatric Eye Associates and Family Eye Care, and SCOTT S. SADEGHI, D.O., Defendants APPEAL FROM A CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE REBECCA NIGHTINGALE, DISTRICT JUDGE ¶0 Dr. Sawyer Hall treated C.C.C. in the emergency room at Saint Francis Hospital on June 16, 2017. C.C.C.'s eye was removed on June 21, 2017. Plaintiffs/Appellants Miranda and Colby Crawford, Natural Parents and on Behalf of C.C.C., a Minor, and Miranda and Colby Crawford, Individually (collectively, the Crawfords) initially filed this medical malpractice lawsuit against Defendant Saint Francis Hospital, Inc. on February 2, 2018. The Crawfords sought to hold Saint Francis liable for damages resulting from Dr. Hall's alleged misdiagnosis. In February 2018, the Crawfords learned that Dr. Hall was actually an intern or resident physician and employee of Defendant/Respondent OSU Medical Trust, doing business as OSU Medical Center (OSUMC), and not an employee of Saint Francis. The parties agree OSUMC is a public trust and subject to the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), 51 O.S. §§ 151-172. The Crawfords gave notice of their tort claim to OSUMC on August 22, 2018. The trial court granted OSUMC's motion to dismiss for failure to present notice of the claim within one year of the date the loss occurred, pursuant to 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(B). The Crawfords appealed from a certified interlocutory order, and this Court previously granted certiorari. The Crawfords argue that the discovery rule applies and tolls the one-year notice period until they learned Dr. Hall was an employee of OSUMC. We hold: (1) the discovery rule applies to the commencement of the one-year notice period when a medical negligence claim is subject to the GTCA; (2) the discovery rule does not, however, operate to toll the one-year notice period until the Crawfords discovered Dr. Hall was an employee of OSUMC; (3) the tolling provision in 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(E) does not apply to incapacitation due to minority; and (4) when the GTCA controls, the limitations in 12 O.S.2011 § 96 do not apply to the time limits for presenting notice of the claim. Notice was untimely and, as a result, the Crawfords' claims against OSUMC are forever barred. We affirm the trial court's order dismissing OSUMC for lack of jurisdiction. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Paul T. Boudreaux, Richardson Richardson Boudreaux, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Petitioners. Leslie C. Weeks, Brandon C. Whitworth, Rodolf & Todd, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Respondent OSU Medical Trust, a Public Trust. KANE, V.C.J.: ¶1 We granted certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order dismissing Defendant/Respondent OSU Medical Trust, doing business as OSU Medical Center (OSUMC), from this medical malpractice lawsuit. The issue is whether Plaintiffs/Appellants Miranda and Colby Crawford, Natural Parents and on Behalf of C.C.C., a Minor, and Miranda and Colby Crawford, Individually (collectively, the Crawfords) complied with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), 51 O.S. §§ 151-172. We hold that the Crawfords failed to present notice of their tort claim within one year of the date the loss occurred and, pursuant to 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(B), their claims against OSUMC are forever barred. We affirm the trial court's order dismissing OSUMC with prejudice. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 On June 16, 2017, C.C.C., a minor child, was taken to Defendant Saint Francis Hospital, Inc.'s emergency room due to problems with his eye. There, C.C.C. was seen by Dr. Sawyer Hall. The Crawfords allege that Dr. Hall's misdiagnosis resulted in C.C.C.'s eye being removed on June 21, 2017. ¶3 The Crawfords initially filed this lawsuit against Saint Francis on February 2, 2018. At the time of filing, the Crawfords believed Dr. Hall was an employee of Saint Francis and alleged that Saint Francis was liable for the negligence of its agents and representatives, which resulted in the enucleation of C.C.C.'s eye. Sometime later in February 2018, the Crawfords learned or discovered that Dr. Hall was actually an intern or resident physician and an employee of OSUMC and not an employee of Saint Francis. The parties agree OSUMC is a public trust and subject to the GTCA. The Crawfords gave notice of their tort claim to OSUMC on August 22, 2018. On December 12, 2018, OSUMC denied the claim based on failure to give notice of the claim within one year of the date of loss, as required by the GTCA. The Crawfords amended their petition to add OSUMC as a defendant. In their Third Amended Petition, the Crawfords claimed that the acts and omissions of OSUMC's agents, employees, representatives, interns and residents caused damages, including the enucleation of C.C.C.'s eye. The Crawfords also explained that they had "accumulated their child's medical records and secured the services of an expert to advise them concerning any breaches of the National Standards of Care. Thereafter, Plaintiffs learned in approximately February of 2018, that the Defendants breached the National Standards of Care." ¶4 OSUMC entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on failure to comply with the notice provisions of the GTCA and for failure to state a claim. OSUMC argued that the Crawfords did not present their notice of tort claim within one year after the date of loss, as required by 51 O.S. § 156(B). Notice was given on August 22, 2018, which was one year and two months after Dr. Hall treated C.C.C. and the eye was removed. The Crawfords responded that the discovery rule tolled the one-year notice period. The Crawfords asserted that they did not learn of OSUMC's malpractice until all the medical records were collected and reviewed. The earliest they knew or could have known of OSUMC's breach of the national standards of care, which resulted in C.C.C.'s injury, was approximately February of 2018 "when their counsel conferred with and secured the opinion of an expert" and, therefore, they had until February 2019 to give notice of the tort claim to OSUMC. The trial court granted OSUMC's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the one-year notice requirement in the GTCA. The trial court certified the order for interlocutory review pursuant to 12 O.S.2011 § 952(b)(3). We previously granted certiorari. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5 A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Tulsa Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corr., 2019 OK 84, ¶ 2, 455 P.3d 918, 919. The notice required by 51 O.S. § 156(B) is considered a mandatory prerequisite and jurisdictional requirement to filing a tort claim in district court. See Hall v. GEO Grp., Inc., 2014 OK 22, ¶¶ 1, 19, 324 P.3d 399, 400, 406. The Crawfords contend the trial court erred by not applying the discovery rule1 to toll the one-year notice period in 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(B) of the GTCA. This proposition of error presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Grisham v. City of Oklahoma City, 2017 OK 69, ¶ 4, 404 P.3d 843, 846. Whether 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(E) tolls the notice period due to minority and whether 12 O.S.2011 § 96 applies to a GTCA claim both present issues of statutory interpretation. Issues of statutory interpretation also present questions of law and are reviewed de novo. See Fanning v. Brown, 2004 OK 7, ¶ 8, 85 P.3d 841 , 845. Appellate courts have plenary, independent and nondeferential authority to determine whether the trial court erred in its legal rulings. Id. III. ANALYSIS A. If the Discovery Rule Applies to the Underlying Tort, It Applies to the Commencement of the One-Year Notice Period in the GTCA ¶6 The parties agree OSUMC is a public trust and that the Crawfords' claims are subject to the requirements of the GTCA.2 "The GTCA is the exclusive remedy by which an injured plaintiff may recover against a governmental entity for its negligence." Smith v. City of Stillwater, 2014 OK 42, ¶ 14, 328 P.3d 1192, 1198. The GTCA narrowly structures the method and timeframe for bringing a tort claim against the State or a political subdivision. See Watkins v. Cent. State Griffin Mem'l Hosp., 2016 OK 71, ¶ 21, 377 P.3d 124, 130 (citing 51 O.S.2011 § 156). Section 156(B) of the GTCA provides, in pertinent part: [C]laims against the state or a political subdivision are to be presented within one (1) year of the date the loss occurs. A claim against the state or a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is presented within one (1) year after the loss occurs. 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(B). "The [GTCA] requires, without exception, that the plaintiff give notice and commence an action [in the district court] within the prescribed statutory time limits." Jarvis v. City of Stillwater, 1987 OK 5, ¶ 5, 732 P.2d 470 , 473. ¶7 Generally, a cause of action accrues, and the applicable statute of limitations begins to run, when the injury occurs. See Calvert v. Swinford, 2016 OK 100, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d 1028, 1033. The common law discovery rule tolls the limitations period until the injured party knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the injury. See id.; Woods v. Prestwick House, Inc., 2011 OK 9, ¶¶ 24-25, 247 P.3d 1183 , 1189-90. Whether the discovery rule applies to the statutory time limits in the GTCA depends on the underlying tort. The discovery rule only applies in certain tort cases. See Calvert, 2016 OK 100, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d at 1033. If the discovery rule applies to the underlying tort in a non-GTCA case, it applies to the commencement of the one-year notice period when that tort claim is subject to the GTCA. ¶8 The discovery rule applies to medical negligence claims that are not subject to the requirements of the GTCA. See 76 O.S.2011 § 18; Wing v. Lorton, 2011 OK 42, 261 P.3d 1122 (applying 76 O.S. § 18); Seitz v. Jones, 1961 OK 283, 370 P.2d 300 (applying the common law discovery rule). Thus, we hold the discovery rule applies to the commencement of the one-year notice period when a medical negligence claim is subject to the GTCA.3 B. The Discovery Rule Does Not Toll Commencement of the One-Year Notice Period Until the Crawfords Learned the Tortfeasor was an Employee of the State or a Political Subdivision ¶9 The Crawfords argue the discovery rule should apply because they did not learn Dr. Hall was an employee of an entity subject to the GTCA until February 2018. The Crawfords explain: Plaintiffs, through counsel, did not discover the malpractice by Defendant, OSU, until all the medical records of C.C.C. were collected and reviewed. C.C.C.'s misdiagnosis occurred at Saint Francis Children's Hospital, and Plaintiffs did not have reason to know and did not know that a physician who was involved in malpractice worked for OSU rather than Saint Francis Hospital, Inc., where the malpractice occurred. The earliest that Plaintiffs knew or could have known through reasonable diligence that the individual involved in the malpractice that resulted in C.C.C.'s damages was employed by Defendant, OSU, and not Saint Francis, was approximately February 2018, when counsel conferred with and secured the opinion of an expert after providing the expert with all pertinent medical records. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief, p. 7. The Crawfords argue that because the discovery rule tolled the one-year notice period, they had until February 2019 to give OSUMC notice of their claim and, therefore, the notice provided on August 22, 2018 was timely. They rely on two Court of Civil Appeals cases, Bentley v. Kirk, 2015 OK CIV APP 43, 348 P.3d 1112, and Lavender v. Craig General Hospital, 2013 OK CIV APP 80, 308 P.3d 1071, to support their argument. Bentley and Lavender do not support the extension of the discovery rule that the Crawfords desire. While both cases involved medical malpractice claims and GTCA-entities given notice outside the one-year limitation, neither opinion addresses the issue presented in this case: whether the discovery rule tolls the one-year notice period until the plaintiffs discover the physician was employed by an entity subject to the GTCA. ¶10 The Crawfords assert they did not know nor should they have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that Dr. Hall was an OSUMC intern or resident, and not an employee of Saint Francis, until their counsel conferred with an expert. Even assuming their assertions are true, as we must, that is not the type of discoverable information contemplated by the rule. The discovery rule pertains to the plaintiff discovering "sufficient information to be aware of the claims," Watkins, 2016 OK 71, ¶ 30, 377 P.3d at 132, and "sufficient facts to state a cause of action." Woods, 2011 OK 9, ¶ 3, 247 P.3d at 1186. Medical negligence, like all negligence claims, contains three elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) a failure to properly exercise or perform that duty; and (3) plaintiff's injuries proximately caused by the defendant's failure to exercise his duty of care. See Robinson v. Okla. Nephrology Assocs., Inc., 2007 OK 2, ¶ 9, 154 P.3d 1250 , 1253-54. The discovery rule applies to the statutory time limit for giving notice under the GTCA much like it applies to the statute of limitations for a non-GTCA medical negligence claim.4 For general medical malpractice cases, this Court has said the pertinent inquiries in a discovery rule analysis are when the plaintiff acquired sufficient information that she knew or should have known of (1) the injury itself; and (2) the wrongfulness and cause of the injury. See Wing, 2011 OK 42, ¶¶ 14, 19, 261 P.3d at 1126-28. ¶11 The Crawfords are not claiming they did not discover the injury itself until February 2018. The injury alleged is the loss of the eye. It is undisputed the Crawfords knew about the injury itself when C.C.C.'s eye was removed on June 21, 2017. This Court has said the discovery rule applies when the injury manifests after the wrongful act or omission responsible for the medical negligence action. See id. ¶ 13, at 1126. That is not the situation in this case. The injury manifested just five days after Dr. Hall's alleged wrongful act or omission. The purpose of the discovery rule "is to exclude the period of time during which the injured party is reasonably unaware that an injury has been sustained so that people in that class have the same rights as those who suffer an immediately ascertainable injury." Woods, 2011 OK 9, ¶ 24, 247 P.3d at 1190. In this case, the injury itself was ascertainable when C.C.C.'s eye was removed. ¶12 The Crawfords are not claiming they did not discover the wrongfulness and cause of the injury until February 2018. The Crawfords allege the wrongfulness and cause of the injury was the misdiagnosis provided by Dr. Hall on June 16, 2017. The Crawfords are not claiming they did not discover that Dr. Hall's misdiagnosis caused C.C.C.'s injuries until February 2018. In fact, on February 2, 2018, the Crawfords filed a lawsuit against Saint Francis based on Dr. Hall's alleged misdiagnosis--the same medical negligence upon which their claims against OSUMC are based. ¶13 Rather, the Crawfords claim they did not know the identity of Dr. Hall's employer until February 2018. The discovery rule does not apply in this case as a matter of law. The one-year notice period began when C.C.C. lost his eye on June 21, 2017. At that point in time, the Crawfords had sufficient information to state a cause of action for medical negligence based on Dr. Hall's alleged misdiagnosis. The Crawfords did not need to know the identity of the tortfeasor's employer to state a cause of action.5 When a plaintiff is injured and their medical negligence claim accrues, they may not know whether the individual, who allegedly committed malpractice, is an employee of the state or a political subdivision. After the Crawfords had sufficient information to be aware of their claims, it became their duty to investigate the claims and explore theories of liability, including vicarious liability, respondeat superior, individual liability, and whether their claims were subject to the GTCA.6 The Crawfords had one year from the date C.C.C.'s eye was removed to determine if Dr. Hall was an employee of the state or a political subdivision and, if so, present notice of their claim. The Crawfords, admittedly, assumed Dr. Hall was an employee of Saint Francis because he treated C.C.C. at a Saint Francis facility. It was not until after the suit was initially filed and the Crawfords' counsel, as part of their litigation strategy, consulted an expert in February 2018 that they learned Dr. Hall was an employee of OSUMC.7 The GTCA's one-year notice period expired on June 21, 2018. The Crawfords did not present notice of their claim until August 22, 2018. C. Title 51, § 156(E) Does Not Toll the Notice Period When the Injured Person is Incapacitated Due to Minority ¶14 On appeal, the Crawfords assert that 51 O.S. § 156(E) also tolls the one-year notice period.8 Section 156(E) of the GTCA tolls the notice period while the injured person is incapacitated: "The time for giving written notice of claim pursuant to the provisions of this section does not include the time during which the person injured is unable due to incapacitation from the injury to give such notice, not exceeding ninety (90) days of incapacity." 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(E). The Crawfords argue that § 156(E) applies to C.C.C.'s inability, due to incapacitation as a minor, to give notice. ¶15 We disagree. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute provides that the one-year notice period is tolled 90 days only if "the person injured is unable due to incapacitation from the injury to give such notice . . . ." 51 O.S. § 156(E) (emphasis added); see also Johns v. Wynnewood Sch. Bd. of Ed., 1982 OK 101, ¶ 6, 656 P.2d 248 , 250 ("The time for giving notice excludes up to 90 days of time during which the party is incapacitated as a result of the injury."). In Johns v. Wynnewood School Board of Education, 1982 OK 101, 656 P.2d 248 , we noted that § 156 "specifically deals with incapacity arising from physical results of the injury and does not speak to incapacity resulting from minority." Id. ¶ 6, at 250. Section 156 of the GTCA does not toll the notice period due to incapacity resulting from minority. The Crawfords do not allege that C.C.C. was incapacitated as a result of the injury; they allege incapacity due to his status as a minor. The injury to C.C.C.'s eye did not create a legal incapacity which prevented him from giving notice of his claim. The 90-day extension in 51 O.S. § 156(E) does not apply.9 D. When the GTCA Controls, 12 O.S. § 96 Does Not Apply ¶16 Title 12, § 96 is the general statute of limitations for a tort action brought by a person under a legal disability. This section provides: If a person entitled to bring an action other than for the recovery of real property, except for a penalty or forfeiture, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, under any legal disability, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one (1) year after such disability shall be removed, except that, after the effective date of this section, an action for personal injury to a minor under the age of twelve (12) arising from medical malpractice must be brought by the minor's parent or guardian within seven (7) years of infliction of the injury, provided a minor twelve (12) years of age and older must bring such action within one (1) year after attaining majority, but in no event less than two (2) years from the date of infliction of the injury, and an action for personal injury arising from medical malpractice to a person adjudged incompetent must be brought by the incompetent person's guardian within seven (7) years of infliction of the injury, provided an incompetent who has been adjudged competent must bring such action within one (1) year after the adjudication of such competency, but in no event less than two (2) years from the date of infliction of the injury. 12 O.S.2011 § 96 (emphasis added). C.C.C. was four years old at the time of the injury. The Crawfords note that if this was a malpractice action against a non-governmental entity and the GTCA did not apply, the limitations period for their claims would be seven years. Without citing any authority, the Crawfords argue the seven-year statute of limitations that applies to a non-GTCA action for personal injuries to a minor arising from medical malpractice should apply to a GTCA action for the same, thereby extending the one-year notice period to seven years.10 ¶17 In Johns, this Court determined that 12 O.S. § 96 does not apply to governmental tort claims for injuries to minors. In Johns, a minor was injured at school on September 18, 1979. See Johns, 1982 OK 101, ¶ 2, 656 P.2d at 248. The parents of the minor gave notice of the claim to the school board on September 10, 1981 and then filed suit. Id. ¶ 2, at 249. At that time, the Oklahoma Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act--the predecessor to the GTCA--applied, and the time limit for presenting notice of the claim was only 120 days.11 The school board sought to dismiss the action based on the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the 120-day notice period in 51 O.S. § 156. Id. The plaintiffs responded that, as a minor, plaintiff was under a legal disability to institute an action on her own behalf and, therefore, she could do so at any time within one year after she attained majority,12 pursuant to 12 O.S.1971 § 96. Id. This Court was presented the following federal certified question: Are the time limitations contained in the Oklahoma Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 51 Okla.Stat. (1978 Supp.) § 156, controlling as to a cause of action accrued to a minor, notwithstanding the provisions of 12 Okla.Stat.1971 § 96? Id. ¶ 1, at 248. We answered "yes" and determined that "[t]he time limitations contained in the Oklahoma Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 51 Okla.Stat. (1978 Supp.) (now 1981) § 156, control as to a cause of action accrued to a minor, notwithstanding the provisions of 12 O.S.1981 § 96." Id. ¶ 7, at 250. We held "that the minority of the plaintiff when injured did not toll the time limits as prescribed in 51 Okla.Stat. § 156 as against the defendant School Board." Id. ¶ 2, at 248-49. In reaching our answer in Johns, we examined the tolling provision in § 156: "The time for giving written notice of claim pursuant to the provisions of this section does not include the time during which the person injured is unable due to incapacitation from the injury to give such notice, not exceeding ninety (90) days of incapacity." 51 O.S.Supp.1978 § 156(C) (renumbered 51 O.S. § 156(E) by Laws 1984, c. 226, § 8, eff. Oct. 1, 1985). This is the same provision at issue today. See 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(E). In Johns, we determined: In view of the fact the Act specifically deals with incapacity arising from physical results of the injury and does not speak to incapacity resulting from minority, it is proper to apply the language of the statute to all incapacities not specifically excepted in view of the clear language of the statute's (§ 156) unqualified statement that no action may be maintained unless notice is filed within 120 days, and action commenced within six months. Johns, 1982 OK 101, ¶ 6, 656 P.2d at 250 (applying 51 O.S.Supp.1978 § 156(B)) (footnotes omitted). ¶18 The same question is posed today. Does 12 O.S.2011 § 96 apply to a governmental tort claim for injuries to a minor? More specifically, does the seven-year limitations period in 12 O.S.2011 § 96 supplant the one-year notice period in 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(B) when the governmental tort claim is for injuries to a minor under the age of twelve (12) arising from medical malpractice? Continuing to follow Johns, we hold the GTCA, 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156, controls as to a cause of action accrued to a minor notwithstanding the provisions of 12 O.S.2011 § 96. Section 96 does not apply. The one-year notice period in 51 O.S. § 156 applies to a governmental tort claim for injuries to a minor arising from medical malpractice. Minority does not toll the time limits as prescribed in 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156. ¶19 Our holding in Johns remains instructive even after subsequent amendments to 12 O.S. § 96. In 1987, 12 O.S. § 96 was amended to add exceptions to the statute of limitations for injuries to a minor arising out of medical malpractice. However, the amendments to § 96 do not change this Court's determination in Johns that when the GTCA controls, § 96 does not apply. In order to toll or extend the notice period for injuries to minors in a GTCA action, the Legislature would need to amend the GTCA. In Johns, we explained: The exception granted infants from the running of the statute of limitations rests on legislative determination and does not emanate from a fundamental precept of the law. It is within the power of the legislature to place infants in the same category as adults in the respect of limitations and unless excepted by statute, the limitations statutes apply to that class of persons. . . . [E]xception of infants from limitations statutes is a matter of legislative cognizance. The exception from the limitation provisions for persons under incapacities is spoken to in § 156 and no mention is made of exceptions for minors. Johns, 1982 OK 101, ¶¶ 4, 6, 656 P.2d at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). To this day, the Legislature has not amended 51 O.S. § 156 to add a specific exception for minors with tort claims against the government. ¶20 This Court has cited Johns for its precedential value multiple times since it was decided in 1982.13 In Hamilton v. Vaden, 1986 OK 36, 721 P.2d 412 , this Court concluded the Legislature intended for 12 O.S.1981 § 96 to toll the two-year statute of limitations provided by 12 O.S.1981 § 95(3) and, therefore, a minor could bring an action for personal injuries any time before they reached majority plus one year. See id. ¶ 20, at 419. We noted: The only diversion from the course we have plotted here is found within the provisions of the Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act, 51 O.S. 1981 § 156. In Johns v. Wynnewood School Bd. of Educ., 656 P.2d 248 (Okla.1982), a minor was injured while on the school yard playing during recess. In Ross v. City of Shawnee, 683 P.2d 535 (Okla.1984), the minor received injuries at the municipal swimming pool. The minors were held to the same statute of limitations as adults under 51 O.S. 1981 § 156. These cases are distinguishable because the notice provision of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act furthers legitimate state interests by fostering a prompt investigation while the evidence is fresh; the opportunity to repair any dangerous condition, quick and amicable settlement of meritorious claims; and preparation of fiscal planning to meet any possible liability. Reirdon v. Wilburton Bd. of Ed., 611 P.2d 239 -40 (Okla.1980). Further, by its terms 51 O.S. 1981 § 170 supersedes all other statutory provisions. Hamilton, 1986 OK 36, n. 31, 721 P.2d at 419. More recently, in Hall v. GEO Group, Inc., 2014 OK 22, 324 P.3d 399, we reiterated that when the GTCA controls, 12 O.S. § 96 does not apply. In Hall, an inmate alleged he was injured on September 7, 2010 while being transported in a van. See id. ¶ 3, at 402. On June 18, 2012, he filed a negligence action in the district court. Id. ¶ 5, at 402. In response to the prison's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, the inmate responded that, pursuant to 12 O.S. § 96, the limitations period in 12 O.S.2011 § 95(11) should be tolled until one year after his legal disability was removed. Id. ¶ 6, at 402. First, we determined compliance with the notice provisions of the GTCA was required for a prisoner, or former prisoner, to bring a tort action against a private correctional facility. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10-13, at 400, 403-04. Then, the Court looked at whether 12 O.S. § 96 tolled the GTCA's one-year notice period. Id. ¶¶ 14-16, at 404-05. Citing Johns, we explained: "As for Hall's claims of tolling because he was under a legal disability we have previously held that where the GTCA includes specific provisions, the general statute of limitations does not apply." Id. ¶ 15, at 405 (footnotes omitted). We held that because the GTCA was controlling, 12 O.S. § 96 did not apply. See id. ¶ 14, at 404. Because the GTCA only tolls the notice period due to incapacity from the injury for 90 days, the case was dismissed as untimely. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10, 19, at 400-01, 404, 406. ¶21 Like the plaintiffs in Johns and Hall, the Crawfords argue that 12 O.S. § 96 applies to their tort claim against the government. In Johns, we said that when the GTCA controls, tolling the notice period is limited to § 156--which does not include incapacity due to minority--and § 96 does not apply. In Hall, we said when the GTCA controls, tolling of the notice period due to incapacity as a result of the injury is limited to 90 days, and § 96 does not apply. In this case, the GTCA also controls. We cannot square applying 12 O.S. § 96 to the Crawfords' claim against the government when we did not apply § 96 to the plaintiffs' claims against the government in Johns and Hall. ¶22 Without explanation, the Crawfords assert that 12 O.S. § 96 applies pursuant to 51 O.S. § 164. Section 164 provides: The laws and statutes of the State of Oklahoma and the Rules of Civil Procedure, as promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma insofar as applicable and to the extent that such rules are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, shall apply to and govern all actions brought under the provisions of this act. 51 O.S.2011 § 164. There are some situations where Title 12 applies to a governmental tort claim. We have found the general laws and rules of civil procedure apply when the GTCA does not speak specifically to a matter. See Cruse v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Atoka Cty., 1995 OK 143, ¶ 17, 910 P.2d 998 , 1005 (holding 12 O.S.1991 § 100 applies to a GTCA claim when the action was timely-filed in district court); Rout v. Crescent Pub. Works Auth., 1994 OK 85, ¶¶ 8-10, 878 P.2d 1045 , 1049-50 (holding 12 O.S.1991 § 940 applies to a GTCA claim, because the GTCA does not contain a specific provision for attorney fees and costs). This Court will only apply the general laws of the State to governmental tort claims where there has been timely compliance with the GTCA. The notice required by 51 O.S. § 156 is considered a mandatory prerequisite and jurisdictional requirement to filing a tort claim in district court. See Hall, 2014 OK 22, ¶¶ 1, 19, 324 P.3d at 400, 406. Only "where valid notice has been given and the governmental tort claims action has been timely filed under § 157, the court's power is invoked and, at that point, pursuant to the broad terms of 51 O.S.1991, § 164, the governmental tort claims action is controlled by the laws of this state . . . ." Cruse, 1995 OK 143, ¶ 17, 910 P.2d at 1005 (emphasis added). ¶23 The GTCA is not silent as to when the notice period can be tolled. The GTCA's notice provisions, including the time limits for giving notice and when the notice period may be tolled are specific, detailed, and comprehensive. In Johns, we said: Title 51 O.S. § 156 contains detailed provisions for limitations of actions against political subdivisions. There are no express exceptions saving the rights of infants found within this section or any other portion of the Act. This is true despite the detailed limitation provisions of 51 O.S. §§ 156 and 157. On the face of the statute, the limitations provided by § 156 are detailed and also appear absolute in that Subdivision B states, "A claim . . . shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within one hundred twenty days after the loss occurs." The comprehensive nature of the limitations provisions is evident. . . . The time for giving notice excludes up to 90 days of time during which the party is incapacitated as a result of the injury. . . . In view of the fact the Act specifically deals with incapacity arising from physical results of the injury and does not speak to incapacity resulting from minority, it is proper to apply the language of the statute to all incapacities not specifically excepted in view of the clear language of the statute's (§ 156) unqualified statement that no action may be maintained unless notice is filed within 120 days, and action commenced within six months. Johns, 1982 OK 101, ¶ 6, 656 P.2d at 249-50 (footnotes omitted) (applying 51 O.S.Supp.1978 § 156(B)-(C)). Section 156(E) of the GTCA clearly and unambiguously provides that the notice period may be tolled only due to incapacitation from the injury. The GTCA does not provide for tolling due to minority. Furthermore, tolling authorized by § 156(E) is limited to 90 days. Applying the seven-year limitation in 12 O.S. § 96 to the notice period in 51 O.S. § 156 would be inconsistent with the provisions of the GTCA and is, therefore, not permitted by 51 O.S. § 164. Until the GTCA contains exceptions for minors or specific tolling provisions for minors, the one-year notice period applies equally to minors. ¶24 This conclusion is consistent with the Legislature's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. See 51 O.S.2011 § 152.1(B); 51 O.S.Supp.2015 § 153(A); Cruse, 1995 OK 143, ¶ 10, 910 P.2d at 1001-02. We have said: "The manner in which a party may overcome sovereign immunity and maintain an action against the government is narrowly structured by the procedural prerequisites in §§ 156 and 157." Cruse, 1995 OK 143, ¶ 11, 910 P.2d at 1002 (footnote omitted). "Upon compliance with the time-limited procedural steps in §§ 156 and 157, the state's consent to be sued is manifest, the sovereign immunity bar is removed, and a judicial remedy for enforcement of the tort claim against the state or political subdivision may be maintained." Id. ¶ 12, 1002-03. ¶25 The Crawfords did not give OSUMC timely notice of their tort claim in compliance with § 156. As a result, they have not brought themselves within the limited waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the GTCA. The Crawfords cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. IV. CONCLUSION ¶26 If the discovery rule applies to the underlying tort, it applies to the commencement of the one-year notice period in the GTCA. Thus, the discovery rule applies to medical negligence claims subject to the GTCA. The notice period provided in 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(B) does not commence until the plaintiff has sufficient information that they know or should have known of the injury itself and the wrongfulness and cause of the injury. The discovery rule does not operate to toll commencement of the one-year notice period until the plaintiff learns the tortfeasor is an employee of the state or a political subdivision. Furthermore, 51 O.S.Supp.2012 § 156(E) does not toll the notice period due to the injured person's status as a minor. When the GTCA controls, the limitations for personal injuries to minors arising out of medical malpractice in 12 O.S.2011 § 96 do not apply. ¶27 The discovery rule does not toll commencement of the one-year notice period until the Crawfords learned Dr. Hall was an employee of OSUMC. The one-year notice period commenced when C.C.C.'s eye was removed on June 21, 2017. The Crawfords did not give OSUMC notice of their tort claims within one year of the date the loss occurred. As a result, their claims against OSUMC are barred. The district court properly dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT IS AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. CONCUR: Darby, C.J., Kane, V.C.J., Winchester, Rowe, and Kuehn, JJ. CONCUR IN RESULT: Combs (by separate writing) and Gurich, JJ. DISSENT: Kauger (by separate writing) and Edmondson, JJ. FOOT