Title: DEBRA ANN SIMMONS V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2001-SC-000572-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2003

IMPORTANTNOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANYCOURT OF THIS STATE. DEBRA ANN SIMMONS V APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE 00-CR-114 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : JANUARY 23, 2003 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Appellant Debra Ann Simmons was convicted by a Hart Circuit Court jury of two counts of trafficking in cocaine and one count of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree, and sentenced to a total of twenty years in prison . She appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky . Const. § 110(2)(b), contending that the trial court erred by (1) failing to grant a directed verdict as to one of the cocaine trafficking counts due to a problem in the labeling of the cocaine evidence ; and (2) allowing the Commonwealth to peremptorily strike the only remaining African-American member of the jury panel . We affirm . I. FACTS . The Commonwealth's confidential informant, Robert Warren, testified that he purchased crack cocaine from Appellant on two occasions, April 11, 2000, and May 3, 2000, in cooperation with the Kentucky State Police . On each occasion, Detective Scottie Ward searched Warren and his vehicle to ensure that Warren was free of drugs. Ward then gave Warren $50 for the buy and a tape recorder to record the transaction . Under Ward's surveillance, Warren proceeded to Appellant's home and gave the $50 to Appellant in exchange for crack cocaine . Afterwards, Warren immediately turned the crack cocaine over to Detective Ward, informing Ward that he purchased the crack cocaine from Appellant . Detective Ward testified that on each occasion, he placed the crack cocaine in a plastic bag that was marked with (1) Appellant's name ; (2) the time and date of the drug buy, and (3) a case number . He then deposited the plastic bag in an envelope with the tape recording, and placed the envelope in a locked evidence locker. The envelopes were touched only by a sergeant who did so only in order to lodge the evidence in the evidence room . Ward, himself, removed the envelopes from the evidence room and drove them to the Madisonville state police laboratory . There, the substance in each plastic bag was tested and found to be, in fact, cocaine . After testing was completed, the plastic bags and envelopes were returned to the evidence locker until Detective Ward retrieved them for use at trial . During cross-examination, defense counsel pointed out a discrepancy related to the April 11, 2000, transaction . A form entitled "Forensic Laboratory: Request for Examination" indicated that the case number for the April 11 th transaction was "03-00 498 ." However, while Appellant's name and the date of the buy were correctly written on one of the plastic bags, the case number on that plastic bag was transcribed as "03- 00-453" rather than "03-00-498 ." After a recess, Detective Ward testified that he had inadvertently written the wrong case number on the plastic bag . According to Detective Ward, "03-00-498" was the correct case number, and he was now certain that he had simply made a transcription mistake . Indeed, Ward stated that fear of such a transcription error was precisely why he also wrote Appellant's name and date of the drug buy on each plastic bag in addition to the case number . Because the plastic bag was dated April 11, 2000, and marked "Debbie Woodward" (Appellant's maiden name), Ward was certain that the crack cocaine inside was in fact purchased from Appellant . The only narcotics transaction Ward participated in on April 11, 2000, involved Appellant . Moreover, the forensic chemist who tested the crack cocaine confirmed that the plastic bag was labeled with Appellant's name and the date "April 11, 2000" when it arrived . Appellant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to Count 1 only (which related to the April 11, 2000, offense), contending that the case number error created a chain of custody problem and, therefore, there was insufficient evidence that Appellant had trafficked in a "controlled substance," an element of KRS 218A.1412 . The trial court disagreed, finding Detective Ward's explanation sufficient to create a jury issue . II. DIRECTED VERDICT. We note initially that Appellant is not appealing the admission of the crack cocaine in the plastic bag marked "Debbie Woodward, April 11, 2000, case number 03- 00-453," nor is she appealing the admission of the forensic chemist's testimony that the plastic bag marked "Debbie Woodward, April 11, 2000, case number 03-00-453" contained cocaine . Thus, the question presented is not a typical "chain of custody" question, i .e . , whether the trial court properly admitted the plastic bag and the forensic chemist's testimony pursuant to KRE 901(a) . Instead, the question presented is whether the trial court properly denied her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal . On this score, Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence that the substance tested by the forensic chemist was the same substance that Warren purchased from Appellant on April 11, 2000 . We disagree . transcription . The plastic bag in question was labeled with Appellant's name and the date of the drug buy, "April 11, 2000." Ward made no other drug buy on April 11, 2000 . Although the incorrect case number raised the specter of misidentification, the jury was entitled to accept Ward's explanation that he had simply committed an error in Even with respect to substances which are not clearly identifiable or distinguishable, it is unnecessary to establish a perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as there is persuasive evidence that the reasonable probability is that the evidence has not been altered in any material respect . Rabovsky v . Commonwealth , Ky., 973 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998) (quotation omitted) . In the instant case, the "reasonable probability" was that the bag labeled with Appellant's name contained the substance sold by her . See McKinney v . Commonwealth , Ky., 60 S .W .3d 499, 511 (2001) ("Gaps in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.") (quotation omitted) . The motion for a directed verdict was properly denied . III . BATSON ISSUE . Appellant also alleges that the Commonwealth unlawfully struck the only remaining African-American member of the jury panel in violation of Batson v . Kentucky , 476 U .S . 79, 106 S.Ct . 1712, 90 L .Ed .2d 69 (1986) . Two members of the jury pool were African-American . The first was excused for cause when he volunteered that he knew Appellant, and could not be impartial . The second, Juror No . 56, was excused as a result of the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge . Appellant objected, and the trial court inquired as to the Commonwealth's reason. Court : Do you have a race-neutral reason for striking [Juror No . 56]? Com : Your honor, I inquired and he knew the defendant and he was friends with her brothers . And he stated out in the court that he was friends with her brothers . Counsel : I'd also like to put on the record for purposes of appeal he also said he had a relative who was a policeman, and so we are objecting [inaudible] and that's a Batson objection for the record . Court : The court finds that the Commonwealth's reason is a race neutral reason . It is sufficient . It did not violate Batson . Juror No . 56 also stated that his relationship with Appellant and her family would not affect his ability to be impartial . In Batson, supra, the United States Supreme Court developed a three-part test for determining when a prosecutor has violated the Equal Protection clause in exercising his peremptory challenges . First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of racial bias for the peremptory challenge . Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to articulate 'clear and reasonably specific' race-neutral reasons for its use of a peremptory challenge . While the reasons need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause, 'self-serving explanations based on intuition or disclaimer of discriminatory motive' are insufficient . Finally, the trial court has the duty to evaluate the credibility of the proffered reasons and determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination . Gamble v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 68 S.W.3d 367, 371 (2002), quoting Stanford v . Commonwealth , Ky., 793 S .W.2d 112,114 (1990), and Washington v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 34 S .W.3d 376, 379 (2000) . Where, as here, the prosecutor has offered a reason for his peremptory challenge, the first step in the analysis is moot . Hernandez v . New York , 500 U .S . 352, 359, 111 S .Ct . 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) . The fact that Juror No . 56 knew the defendant and was a friend of her brother was a prototypically race-neutral reason under Batson . E_g_, Commonwealth v. Snodgrass , Ky., 831 S .W .2d 176, 179-80 (1992) (juror failed to respond to question concerning whether he knew the defendant when prosecutor had information that he did know the defendant) ; United States v . Novaton , 271 F.3d 968, 1003 (11th Cir. 2001) (juror was friends with defense attorney) ; United States v . Jones , 195 F.3d 379, 381 (8th Cir . 1999) (juror nodded to defendant's brother in hallway outside courtroom). Indeed, we have long recognized that a close relationship with the defendant or the defendant's family constitutes "implied bias ." Smith v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 734 S .W .2d 437, 444 (1987) (juror's wife was defendant's second cousin) ; Stone v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 418 S.W.2d 646, 652 (1967) (juror was close friend of defendant for thirty-five years) . And, while the fact that a juror "knew" the defendant does not necessarily create sufficient grounds for excusal for cause, Key v . Commonwealth , Ky . App., 840 S.W .2d 827, 830 (1992), the reason need not rise to that level so long as it is race-neutral and not pretextual . Hernandez , supra , at 362-63, 111 S .Ct . at 1868 . "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Id. at 360, 111 S .Ct . at 1866 . The trial court found the Commonwealth's reason to be both race neutral and credible . Trial courts are given "great discretion" on this inquiry and may accept the prosecutor's reason at face value in proper circumstances . Gamble , supra, at 372 . Here, the juror's relationship with the defendant and her family were undisputed . Neither the fact that Juror No . 56 claimed that he could be impartial, nor that he had a relative who was a police officer, require the conclusion that the trial court's credibility determination was "clearly erroneous." Stanford , supra , at 114 . Accordingly, the judgment entered and the sentence imposed by the Hart Circuit Court in this case are affirmed . All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Karen Maurer Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Suite 302 100 Fair Oaks Lane Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : A. B . Chandler, III Attorney General State Capitol Frankfort, KY 40601 Dennis W. Shepherd Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601