Title: Burns v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090863
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 2010

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
WILLIAM JOSEPH BURNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 090863 
 
 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
          
 
January 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHENANDOAH COUNTY 
Dennis L. Hupp, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in granting summary judgment to the Commonwealth in a proceeding 
remanded to the circuit court, pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.2, 
for determination of a claim of mental retardation by a person 
sentenced to death for a capital offense. 
Background and Material Proceedings Below 
The Circuit Court of Shenandoah County convicted Burns of 
capital murder, among other crimes, and sentenced him to death.  
This Court upheld Burns’ capital conviction and sentence on 
direct appeal.  Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 541 S.E.2d 
872 (2001). 
Burns raised a claim of mental retardation in habeas corpus 
proceedings in this Court.  While his petition was pending, the 
Supreme Court of the United States decided Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), which prohibits execution of persons 
who are mentally retarded.  In response thereto, the General 
Assembly enacted legislation implementing procedures governing 
the determination of the mental retardation of individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
facing a capital sentence.  Code §§ 8.01-654.2; 19.2-264.3:1; 
19.2-264.3:1.1; 19.2-264.3:1.2; 19.2-264.3:3; and 19.2-264.4; 
see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 73, 79, 581 S.E.2d 514, 
517 (2003) (describing these statutes as emergency legislation 
enacted in response to the holding of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Atkins v. Virginia).  Thereafter, this Court 
determined that Burns’ claim of mental retardation was not 
frivolous and, after two rehearings, remanded his case to the 
Circuit Court of Shenandoah County, pursuant to Code § 8.01-
654.2, for a jury determination of his mental retardation claim.  
Burns v. Warden, 269 Va. 351, 354, 609 S.E.2d 608, 610-11 
(2005). 
Mental Retardation Proceeding 
In the instant remanded proceeding concerning Burns’ claim 
of mental retardation, Burns’ counsel began to notice that Burns 
was exhibiting odd behavior and questioned Burns’ competence.*  
Dr. J. Gregory Olley, the psychologist appointed by the circuit 
court pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.3:1.2 to assist Burns, 
                     
* During his original criminal trial, Burns was evaluated 
and found to be incompetent and unable to aid in his own 
defense.  Burns received medication and treatment that restored 
his competency.  After Burns was restored to competency, his 
trial proceeded and he was convicted of capital murder.  Burns 
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. at 313, 541 S.E.2d at 877.  After 
Burns’ conviction, the forensic psychological unit evaluated 
him.  The evaluator, Dr. Mario J.P. Dennis, found that Burns 
experienced a psychotic disorder that included personality 
 
 
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concluded that Burns’ mental health had to be addressed before 
he could complete a mental retardation evaluation on Burns in 
conformity with the requirements mandated by Code § 19.2-
264.3:1.1.  Additionally, a neuropsychiatrist appointed by the 
circuit court determined that Burns suffered from “psychosis, 
impairment of autobiographical memory, derailment of language 
and thought, and significant social deterioration,” which 
rendered Burns incompetent to rationally assist counsel in his 
own defense.  Burns’ counsel filed a motion to declare Burns 
incompetent and to secure treatment, pursuant to Code § 19.2-
169.2, to restore Burns to competence. 
The Commonwealth filed a motion opposing the motion to 
declare Burns incompetent and a motion to change the style of 
the case.  The Commonwealth argued that the instant matter was 
not a criminal proceeding, nor a post-conviction habeas 
proceeding, but instead a “specific proceeding” created by the 
General Assembly.  According to the Commonwealth, the 
proceeding, authorized by Code § 8.01-654.2, was a “collateral, 
post conviction proceeding,” and because Burns was not a 
defendant in a criminal matter, he did not have a Sixth 
Amendment right to be competent in the proceeding.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth argued, Code §§ 19.2-169.1 and 19.2-176, which 
                                                                  
decompensation, social withdrawal and disordered affect, and 
erratic, possibly assaultive behavior. 
 
 
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guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a competency 
evaluation before and after sentencing, were inapplicable.  The 
Commonwealth requested the style of the case be changed to In 
re:  William Joseph Burns or Burns v. Warden to reflect the 
unique nature of the proceeding. 
Burns filed a motion in opposition to the Commonwealth’s 
motions, arguing that the statutory scheme for mental 
retardation determinations allows Burns to retain his criminal 
trial rights.  Burns also argued that this Court had already 
rejected the Commonwealth’s arguments when it stated in Burns v. 
Warden that all defendants in capital cases who allege mental 
retardation, regardless of the procedural posture of their cases 
on the date that Atkins v. Virginia was decided, are afforded 
the same procedures by statute.  Burns v. Warden, 268 Va. 1, 3, 
597 S.E.2d 195, 196 (2004), aff’d on reh’g, 269 Va. 351, 352-54, 
609 S.E.2d 608, 609-11 (2005). 
The circuit court heard argument on the motions and ruled 
that the proceeding was a specific proceeding that was neither 
wholly civil nor wholly criminal.  The circuit court changed the 
caption of the case to In re: William Joseph Burns.  Noting that 
Burns was the moving party, the circuit court ruled that, as in 
a civil case, Burns’ competence was irrelevant because he was 
represented by counsel, and declined to determine Burns’ 
competence.  A trial date was set for the special proceeding, 
 
 
4
along with the dates for expert reports to be exchanged 
beforehand. 
At the time designated for the filing of expert 
disclosures, Burns filed a notice stating that he did not intend 
to present expert testimony in support of his claim.  Attached 
to the notice was a declaration from Dr. Olley.  In his 
declaration, Dr. Olley stated that Burns was not competent to 
stand trial because of his psychosis.  Dr. Olley further stated 
that Burns’ psychosis interfered with his attempts to assess 
Burns’ intellectual functioning in conformity with accepted 
professional practice and that professional practice obliged him 
to address Burns’ mental illness before administering a 
standardized intelligence test.  
Responding to this filing, the Commonwealth filed a “Motion 
for a Final Order.”  In this motion, the Commonwealth argued 
that expert testimony was necessary to prove whether Burns was, 
in fact, mentally retarded because the relevant statute requires 
proof of significant limitations in intellectual functioning and 
adaptive behavior that must be assessed in conformity with 
specific professional standards.  See Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A).  
The Commonwealth stated that Burns’ notice that he did not 
intend to present expert testimony was an admission of a failure 
of proof and an implied withdrawal or waiver, which entitled the 
Commonwealth to judgment.  
 
 
5
At the hearing on the Motion for Final Order, the circuit 
court reiterated that Burns’ competence was not at issue because 
the proceeding was not a criminal proceeding.  The circuit court 
opined that the presence of competent counsel was enough for 
Burns to go forward with the proceeding.  Because Burns admitted 
that he lacked an expert witness on the issue of whether he is 
mentally retarded, the circuit court ruled that Burns could not 
satisfy his burden of proof on the mental retardation issue.  
The circuit court granted the Commonwealth’s Motion for a Final 
Order, treating it as a motion for summary judgment.  We granted 
Burns’ petition for appeal. 
Analysis 
Burns argues that because the remanded proceeding was not a 
civil proceeding, but rather a criminal or quasi-criminal 
proceeding, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment 
in favor of the Commonwealth and in ruling the issue of Burns’ 
mental competence was not relevant. The Commonwealth responds 
that the proceeding in the circuit court was not a criminal 
trial or a criminal sentencing, but rather a “specific” 
proceeding created to determine a claim raised in a habeas 
petition; Burns was not entitled to the rights of a criminal 
defendant because the proceeding was civil in nature.  Also, the 
Commonwealth argues, because the proceeding on remand was civil 
in nature, the circuit court did not err in ruling that the 
 
 
6
issue of Burns’ mental competence was irrelevant and in granting 
summary judgment based on Burns’ lack of an expert witness. 
In order to decide the issues presented in this case, we 
must first determine whether the adjudicatory procedure mandated 
by Code § 8.01-654.2 is criminal or civil in nature.  Whether a 
statutory scheme is civil or criminal is an issue of statutory 
construction.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  Courts, 
when conducting a statutory construction analysis, “consider the 
statute’s text and its structure to determine the legislative 
objective.”  Id.  This Court reviews issues of statutory 
construction de novo.  Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 
180, 639 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2007). 
Burns’ mental retardation determination was remanded to the 
Circuit Court of Shenandoah County pursuant to Code § 8.01-
654.2.  This statute is one of several promulgated by the 
General Assembly in direct response to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. at 321.  See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. at 79, 581 
S.E.2d at 517. 
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that it was unconstitutional to execute a mentally 
retarded individual.  536 U.S. at 321.  The analysis in Atkins 
v. Virginia focused on the Eighth Amendment, which protects 
citizens and residents from cruel and unusual punishment.  Id.  
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “excessive” sanctions and as a 
 
 
7
precept of justice “punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to the offense.”  Id.  Atkins v. Virginia left it 
to the states to determine which individuals are so impaired as 
“to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about 
whom there is a national consensus.”  Id. at 317.   
In 2003, the General Assembly enacted Code §§ 19.2-
264.3:1.1 and 19.2-264.3:1.2 establishing the procedure for 
determining defendants’ future claims of mental retardation 
arising in capital murder cases.  Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1 defines 
mental retardation and states the requirements for assessing 
mental retardation for purposes of a capital sentencing.  The 
statute states that “the issue of mental retardation, if raised 
by the defendant in accordance with the notice provisions” in 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1.2, shall be determined as part of the 
sentencing proceeding required in capital cases pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-264.4.  Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C).  Code § 19.2-264.3:1.2 
provides for a defendant to have expert assistance when the 
issue of the defendant’s mental retardation is relevant to a 
capital sentencing.   
The General Assembly also enacted Code § 8.01-654.2 in 
2003.  It provides redress for certain individuals who had been 
sentenced to death before April 29, 2003. Code § 8.01-654.2 
states:   
 
 
8
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
person under sentence of death whose sentence became 
final in the circuit court before April 29, 2003, and 
who desires to have a claim of his mental retardation 
presented to the Supreme Court, shall do so by one of 
the following methods:  (i) if the person has not 
commenced a direct appeal, he shall present his claim 
of mental retardation by assignment of error and in his 
brief in that appeal, or if his direct appeal is 
pending in the Supreme Court, he shall file a 
supplemental assignment of error and brief containing 
his claim of mental retardation, or (ii) if the person 
has not filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under subsection C of § 8.01-654, he shall present his 
claim of mental retardation in a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus under such subsection, or if such a 
petition is pending in the Supreme Court, he shall file 
an amended petition containing his claim of mental 
retardation.  A person proceeding under this section 
shall allege the factual basis for his claim of mental 
retardation.  The Supreme Court shall consider a claim 
raised under this section and if it determines that the 
claim is not frivolous, it shall remand the claim to 
the circuit court for a determination of mental 
retardation; otherwise the Supreme Court shall dismiss 
the petition.  The provisions of §§ 19.2-264.3:1.1 and 
19.2-264.3:1.2 shall govern a determination of mental 
retardation made pursuant to this section.  If the 
claim is before the Supreme Court on direct appeal and 
is remanded to the circuit court and the case wherein 
the sentence of death was imposed was tried by a jury, 
the circuit court shall empanel a new jury for the sole 
purpose of making a determination of mental 
retardation. 
 
If the person has completed both a direct appeal 
and a habeas corpus proceeding under subsection C of  
§ 8.01-654, he shall not be entitled to file any 
further habeas petitions in the Supreme Court and his 
sole remedy shall lie in federal court.  
 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.2, once this Court decides, as 
a threshold issue, that the claim of mental retardation is not 
frivolous, the claim is remanded to the circuit court to 
 
 
9
determine the issue of mental retardation.  The requirement that 
a nonfrivolous claim be remanded applies whether the claim is 
raised in the context of a direct appeal or a petition for 
habeas corpus.  Burns v. Warden, 269 Va. at 353, 609 S.E.2d at 
610.  Code § 8.01-654.2 provides a single, specific procedure to 
determine the issue of mental retardation, regardless of the 
context in which the issue arises.  Id.  Adjudication of the 
issue of mental retardation does not occur as part of a direct 
appeal or habeas corpus proceeding in this Court, but in the 
specific proceeding, established through Code § 8.01-654.2, to 
be conducted on remand.  Id. 
 
Code § 8.01-654.2 directs that the provisions of Code 
§§ 19.2-264.3:1.1 and 19.2-264.3:1.2 govern the determination of 
mental retardation on remand.  Those same criminal procedure 
statutes govern the determination of the mental retardation 
claims of individuals charged with or convicted of capital 
murder after April 29, 2003.  Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) 
specifically refers to the mental retardation determination 
taking place “as part of the sentencing proceeding required by 
§ 19.2-264.4.”  Code § 19.2-264.4 is the general sentencing 
proceeding statute applicable upon a finding that a defendant is 
guilty of an offense that may be punishable by death.  Such a 
proceeding is limited to determining whether the defendant shall 
be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.  See Code § 19.2-
 
 
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264.4.  It is a criminal proceeding. 
 
The procedures set forth in Code §§ 19.2-264.3:1.1 and 
19.2-264.3:1.2 apply to all determinations of a defendant’s 
mental retardation relevant to a capital sentencing.  Under the 
statutory scheme approved by the General Assembly, the same 
procedure applies for determining a defendant’s claim of mental 
retardation arising in a capital murder case, whether the claim 
is raised by a defendant charged with or convicted of capital 
murder after April 29, 2003 or by a person sentenced to death 
before April 29, 2003. 
 
This unitary procedure imposed by the statutory scheme 
appears to have been designed to provide those individuals, 
whose claims of mental retardation are remanded to the circuit 
court pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.2, the same procedural 
protections and rights as are given to defendants charged with 
or convicted of a capital offense after the Atkins v. Virginia 
decision.  The Commonwealth argues that the specific proceeding, 
on remand, to determine the mental retardation of individuals, 
such as Burns, whose claims of mental retardation were brought 
before this Court by way of a writ of habeas corpus should be 
treated as civil proceedings, while those specific proceedings 
ordered after consideration of a direct appeal should be treated 
as criminal proceedings, providing different constitutional 
rights on remand based upon the context in which the issue was 
 
 
11
raised.  The Commonwealth is correct that, pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-654.2, the remanded claim of mental retardation is 
adjudicated in a special proceeding in circuit court.  However, 
the nature of the proceeding conducted on remand is not governed 
by the context in which the issue was raised before this Court, 
but rather by consideration of the legislative objective of the 
statute which created it.  See Burns v. Warden, 269 Va. at 353, 
609 S.E.2d at 610; Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-93.  
 
The mandated use of a unitary criminal procedure for 
determining mental retardation, along with consideration of the 
constitutional protection such determinations are designed to 
afford, indicate that the General Assembly intended that all 
claims remanded, pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.2, be treated as 
criminal proceedings.  Therefore, we hold that the proceedings 
to determine the mental retardation of a person sentenced to 
death, undertaken upon remand of a case to the circuit court 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.2, are criminal in nature.  Any 
person whose claim is so remanded shall be afforded, in such 
proceeding, the same rights as those afforded to a defendant in 
a criminal sentencing proceeding. 
 
The statutory scheme indicates that a mental retardation 
determination conducted upon remand to the circuit court is a 
part of a capital murder case, and that proceeding is criminal 
in nature.  The purpose of determining the mental retardation of 
 
 
12
a person charged with or convicted of capital murder is the same 
in all capital murder cases in which the issue arises — whether 
the defendant’s mental retardation should prohibit the 
defendant’s execution.  This case, which was remanded to the 
circuit court pursuant to Code § 8.01-264.2, is no different.  
Our directions to the circuit court stated: 
[U]pon a finding that Burns is not mentally retarded, 
the sentence of death entered on May 12, 2000 remains 
in full force and effect.  Upon a finding that Burns is 
mentally retarded, the trial court shall enter an order 
vacating the sentence of death and re-sentencing Burns 
in accordance with Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(D).  
 
Burns v. Warden, 269 Va. at 354, 609 S.E.2d at 611. 
 
Code § 8.01-654.2 is a transitional statute that the 
General Assembly enacted to address the rights of a limited 
number of capital murder defendants.  Id.  The General Assembly 
promulgated Code § 8.01-654.2 to allow certain defendants 
sentenced to death before April 29, 2003 the opportunity to 
present their claims of mental retardation.  When those mental 
retardation claims are found by this Court to be “not 
frivolous,” Code § 8.01-654.2 creates a dispositional vehicle, 
which allows those defendants the same protections and 
procedures concerning the presentation of their mental 
retardation claims given to individuals charged or convicted of 
capital murder after April 29, 2003.  All the proceedings on 
remand pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.2 must be criminal in nature 
 
 
13
in order to carry out the intent of the General Assembly. 
 
Rule 3:20 allows summary judgment to be entered in civil 
actions.  However, Part 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia only applies to civil actions.  Rule 3:1.  Because the 
proceeding remanded pursuant to Code § 8.01-654.2 was criminal 
in nature, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment 
to the Commonwealth. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that trying 
an incompetent criminal defendant violates the right to due 
process.  Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996); Medina 
v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992).  A defendant is 
considered incompetent if he does not have the present ability 
to consult with his lawyer “with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding [and] a rational as well as factual understanding 
of the proceedings against him.”  Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 
(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).  
Because the remanded proceeding was criminal in nature, the 
circuit court erred in ruling that Burns’ competence was 
irrelevant and in refusing to adjudicate Burns’ competence. 
Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the 
arguments presented, we find reversible error in the judgment of 
the circuit court.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will 
reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand the case to the 
 
 
14
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion and this Court’s order entered on March 11, 2005. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
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