Title: Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Labor and Industry Review Commission
Citation: 2007 WI 105
Docket Number: 2004AP001550
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 17, 2007

2007 WI 105 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1550 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Douglas 
Scott Geen, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 157 
Reported at: 295 Wis. 2d 750, 721 N.W.2d 102 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 7, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Amy O. Bruchs, Scott C. Baumbach, and Michael Best & 
Friedrich LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Amy O. Bruchs. 
 
For the respondents-respondents Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, there were briefs by David C. Rice, assistant 
attorney general, with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager, and oral argument by David C. Rice. 
 
For the respondents-respondents Douglas Scott Geen, there 
were briefs by Victor M. Arellano, John C. Carlson, Jr., Matthew 
P. White, and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, and oral argument 
by John C. Carlson, Jr. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Monica Murphy, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Disability Rights of Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Laura A. Linder, C. Ann 
Martin, and Lindner & Marsack, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Inc., there was oral 
argument by Laura Lindner. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Melissa A. Cherney, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Education Association 
Council. 
 
 
2007 WI 105
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1550  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV3050) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and 
Douglas Scott Geen, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Stoughton Trailers, Inc. 
("Stoughton") seeks review of a published decision of the court 
of appeals1 affirming a decision of the Labor and Industry Review 
Commission ("LIRC"), which concluded that Stoughton refused to 
reasonably accommodate Douglas Scott Geen's ("Geen") disability, 
migraine 
headaches, 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) (2005-06),2 and terminated Geen because 
                                                 
1 Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. LIRC, 2006 WI App 157, 295 
Wis. 2d 750, 721 N.W.2d 102. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
2 
 
of his disability within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 111.322 
and 111.34.  
¶2 
This case involves interpretation of the Wisconsin 
Fair 
Employment 
Act 
("WFEA") 
and 
review 
of 
an 
agency 
determination.  Thus, our authority in this case is governed by:  
(1) the will of the legislature as expressed in the language of 
the WFEA, and (2) the appropriate level of deference accorded to 
a determination of the agency charged by the legislature with 
administrating the WFEA.   
¶3 
Stoughton 
terminated 
Geen's 
employment 
after 
it 
determined that he accumulated 6.5 absences or "occurrences" 
under Stoughton's no-fault attendance policy, exceeding the 
policy's limit of six "occurrences" in a prescribed time period.  
Two of these "occurrences" were caused by Geen's migraine 
headaches, while the remaining "occurrences" were unrelated to 
Geen's disability.   
¶4 
LIRC concluded that Stoughton terminated Geen because 
of his disability within the meaning of the WFEA, holding that 
the 
two 
"occurrences" 
caused 
by 
Geen's 
disability 
were 
sufficient to conclude that the termination was because of 
disability.  LIRC further concluded that Stoughton did not 
reasonably accommodate Geen, in that it failed to give him 
sufficient time to submit documentation to avoid being assessed 
an "occurrence" under its attendance policy, and it failed to 
exercise 
"clemency 
and 
forbearance" 
when 
it 
refused 
to 
temporarily tolerate the absences that were caused by his 
disability to allow medical intervention to take its course and 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
3 
 
potentially resolve the problem of Geen's absences.  The circuit 
court and court of appeals affirmed LIRC on both issues. 
¶5 
We conclude a more reasonable basis for LIRC's 
decision exists than the one adopted by LIRC.  To wit, we note 
that Stoughton did not follow its own no-fault attendance policy 
in terminating Geen when it failed to provide him with 15 days 
as allowed under the policy to submit documentation to avoid 
being assessed an "occurrence."  Because Stoughton did not 
follow its own no-fault attendance policy, it may not claim 
whatever protection that policy may provide in its termination 
of Geen.  Thus, LIRC's conclusion that Geen was terminated 
because of his disability is more reasonably based on the unique 
circumstances surrounding that termination.  Based on these 
circumstances, 
we 
conclude that LIRC's determination that 
Stoughton 
terminated 
Geen 
because 
of 
his 
disability 
was 
reasonable.  We therefore do not address the issue of whether a 
termination for exceeding the maximum number of absences 
permitted under a no-fault attendance policy is because of 
disability under the WFEA when some of the absences were caused 
by disability and others were not.3 
                                                 
3 The dissent chides this court for "abdicat[ing] its role 
as the state's ultimate policy making court," and later for 
"adding insult to injury" by deciding this case on the grounds 
that are presented by the facts. Dissent, ¶¶76, 78.  In essence, 
the dissent faults this court for exercising judicial restraint. 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
4 
 
¶6 
We further conclude that LIRC reasonably interpreted 
and applied the WFEA in determining that Stoughton failed to 
reasonably accommodate Geen.  Additionally, we conclude that its 
ordered remedy was reasonable.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
I 
¶7 
The facts relevant to the issues presented on review 
are taken from LIRC's decision of September 12, 2003, and are 
undisputed.  Stoughton, a manufacturer of semi-trailers, has a 
no-fault attendance policy for its employees.  The policy 
includes a point-based system under which employees are assigned 
"occurrences" for tardiness and absences, subject to limited 
exceptions, including "[a]bsences meeting State and Federal 
Family and Medical Leave [FMLA] laws."  An employee is 
terminated under the policy if he or she accumulates six 
"occurrences."   
¶8 
Under 
Stoughton's 
no-fault 
attendance 
policy, 
an 
employee who is absent from work due to a medical condition is 
provided a standard letter with a Family and Medical Leave Act 
("FMLA") form to complete and return to the human resources 
                                                                                                                                                             
In general, this court decides cases on the narrowest 
grounds presented.  See Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 
2d 560, 566 n.2, 575 N.W.2d 671 (1998).  We do not reach out to 
decide issues not presented by the facts just because we can.  
We settle disputes.  Here, the facts present a narrower ground 
for decision than the broad ground upon which the dissent so 
eagerly wishes us to base our decision.  
We fail to see how this well accepted approach "add[s] 
insult to injury."  Dissent, ¶78.  Insult to whom?  Injury to 
whom?  We have merely resolved this dispute between Geen and 
Stoughton.   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
5 
 
department.  If the employee returns the completed form, he or 
she will not be assessed an "occurrence."  However, if the 
employee does not return the certification form within 15 days 
(but does submit other proof that their absence was for a 
medical condition), the employee is assessed one "occurrence," 
regardless of the duration of the leave.  In this case, Geen 
submitted a medical excuse for a mid-December 1996 to early 
January 1997 extended absence but not the FMLA form and thus was 
assessed one "occurrence."   
¶9 
Geen worked for Stoughton for approximately eight 
years, until January 31, 1997, when he was fired for exceeding 
the number of "occurrences" allowed under the attendance policy. 
¶10 As of December 11, 1996, Geen had accumulated 4.5 
"occurrences" under the policy, none of which were due to 
disability.  From December 12, 1996, through January 7, 1997, 
Geen was absent from work because of severe headaches.  Geen 
sought medical attention at least three times during this period 
and was diagnosed as suffering from migraine headaches and 
depression.  Geen was prescribed the drug Paxil for his 
depression and Midrin for his migraines.  This leave of absence 
constituted Geen's first disability-related "occurrence" under 
the attendance policy, bringing his total to 5.5 "occurrences."   
¶11 Geen returned to work on January 8, 1997.  On Friday, 
January 24, 1997, Geen called in before his shift and said that 
he could not work because he had a migraine.  Geen called in 
sick again with migraines on the following Monday and Tuesday 
mornings, January 27 and 28.  When Geen returned to work on 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
6 
 
January 29, 1997, Stoughton's human resource administrator, 
Tammy Droessler ("Droessler"), provided Geen with a copy of a 
standard letter noting that Geen had been absent from work since 
the previous Friday.  The letter explained the need to submit a 
completed FMLA form within 15 days of the date of the letter if 
Geen was to avoid having the absence counted as an "occurrence" 
under Stoughton's no-fault attendance policy.4  Droessler also 
reminded Geen orally that he would need to submit the FMLA form 
to avoid being assessed an "occurrence."  
¶12 On January 30, 1997, Geen was examined by his 
physician, Dr. M.A. Hansen, who concluded that Geen showed 
"textbook examples of migraine headaches, which has increased in 
frequency and intensity since beginning a prescription of 
Paxil."  Dr. Hansen took Geen off Paxil and again prescribed 
Midrin for his headaches.  Dr. Hansen scheduled a follow-up exam 
for Geen in one week.  Dr. Hansen provided Geen with a note 
stating that he was being evaluated for migraines.  Later that 
day, Geen gave the note to Droessler, who told Geen that he 
needed to bring in a doctor's note stating he could return to 
work without restrictions.   
¶13 The next day, January 31, 1997, Geen gave Droessler a 
second note from Dr. Hansen indicating he had been unable to 
work on January 27 and 28 because of migraines but was now 
                                                 
4 Fifteen days is the minimum time the FMLA requires 
employers to give employees to submit medical certification.  
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b).  Stoughton incorporated this 
requirement of the FMLA in its no-fault attendance policy.  The 
FMLA itself is not at issue in this case.  See infra, ¶58 n.12.   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
7 
 
cleared to work without restrictions.  The note did not address 
Geen’s absence on January 24.  After reviewing the note, 
Droessler informed Geen he was being discharged because the 
doctor's note did not excuse him for January 24, causing him to 
accrue an "occurrence" for that date, which brought his total 
number of "occurrences" to 6.5.  Geen was given two days from 
the date he received the standard letter (January 29) to the 
date of his termination (January 31) and not 15 days as provided 
under Stoughton's no-fault termination policy to submit the FMLA 
form to avoid being assessed an "occurrence." 
¶14 Geen indicated that his doctor needed more time to 
evaluate him, and that his doctor would be unavailable to 
provide additional medical documentation for at least a week.  
Droessler told Geen that he had three working days from Friday, 
January 31 to write a letter to the company's Attendance Review 
Board ("Board") in order to try to reverse the assessment of the 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
8 
 
"occurrence."  She said that he could submit additional medical 
documentation to the Board.5   
 
¶15 By letter dated February 4, 1997, Geen timely appealed 
his termination to the Board.  Geen indicated his doctor was 
currently evaluating his headaches and had indicated that he 
would perform additional tests and change Geen's medication if 
the headaches persisted.  Geen did not submit any additional 
medical documentation with his letter.  On February 21, 1997, 
the Board rejected Geen's appeal.  
¶16 On 
February 
24, 
1997, 
Geen 
filed 
a 
disability 
discrimination complaint with the Equal Rights Division of the 
Department of Workforce Development ("DWD") alleging Stoughton 
                                                 
5 The hearing examiner's decision in this case contains 
additional findings of fact that are not included in LIRC's 
decision but are not inconsistent with LIRC's decision.  See 
Geen v. Stoughton Trailers, ERD No. 199700618 (ERD, September 
29, 1999).  These included that Droessler knew of two ways that 
Geen could have avoided the assessment of an "occurrence" and 
kept his job.  Id., p. 4.  First, Geen could have demonstrated 
that his January 24, 27 and 28 absences qualified for family and 
medical leave by submitting a completed FMLA form, the option 
discussed at length in LIRC's decision and in this opinion.  Id.  
Second, Stoughton could have compared the reasons for Geen's 
previous medical leave of absence from December 1996 to early 
January 1997 to the reasons for his January 24, 27 and 28 
absences and assessed him only one "occurrence" for these two 
periods of absence.  Id.  According to the hearing examiner's 
decision, Droessler did not consider combining the periods of 
absence into a single "occurrence," and rather chose to 
terminate Geen's employment only two days into the 15-day period 
for submission of the FMLA documentation.  Id.  
The hearing examiner's decision also indicates that Geen 
did not submit any additional medical documentation to the 
Attendance Review Board, although Geen had a follow-up exam with 
his doctor on February 7, 1997.  Id., p. 5. 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
9 
 
terminated his employment because of his disability in violation 
of the WFEA.  A hearing examiner6 ruled that (1) Geen had a 
disability as defined by the WFEA; (2) his employment was 
terminated in part because of his disability; and (3) Stoughton 
had failed to reasonably accommodate Geen's disability.   
¶17 Stoughton appealed to LIRC.  LIRC reversed, concluding 
that Stoughton had not refused to reasonably accommodate Geen's 
disability.  Geen v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., ERD Case No. 
199700618 (LIRC, August 31, 2000).  LIRC dismissed Geen's 
complaint. 
¶18 Geen appealed to the Dane County Circuit Court, 
Honorable 
John 
C. 
Albert, 
which 
set 
aside 
LIRC's 
order 
dismissing the complaint and ordered the matter remanded to 
LIRC.  Stoughton sought review of the circuit court decision 
with the court of appeals.   
¶19 The court of appeals concluded that while LIRC had 
determined that Stoughton did not discriminate against Geen 
because of disability, it expressly left open the more narrow 
question 
of 
whether 
Geen 
was 
terminated 
because 
of 
his 
disability.  See Geen v. LIRC, 2002 WI App 269, ¶34 n.8, 258 
Wis. 2d 498, 654 N.W.2d 1.  The court of appeals noted that 
LIRC's decision discussed whether a termination could be because 
of disability when two of the 6.5 "occurrences" were due to 
                                                 
6 The WFEA refers to persons who hear and decide WFEA 
complaints as "examiners" and not "administrative law judges."  
See Wis. Stat. § 111.39(4).  This opinion therefore uses the 
term "examiner." 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
10 
 
disability, but concluded only "'there is no bright-line rule' 
regarding 
when 
a 
'no-fault' 
attendance 
policy 
becomes 
discriminatory 
on 
account 
of 
disability-related 
absences."  
Geen, 258 Wis. 2d 498, ¶34 n.8 (quoting Geen, ERD Case No. 
199700618 (LIRC, August 31, 2000)).  The court of appeals also 
concluded LIRC should have considered the applicability of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") to Geen's case.  The court 
of appeals remanded the matter to LIRC to  
consider, to the extent it is necessary to do so, 
either or both of the following issues: (1) whether on 
the 
present 
facts 
Stoughton 
terminated 
Geen's 
employment because of his disability; and (2) whether 
the FMLA or regulations enacted thereunder affect 
Stoughton's claim that it reasonably accommodated 
Geen's disability, and if so, how.  
Geen, 258 Wis. 2d 498, ¶36.  Stoughton filed a petition for 
review, which the Supreme Court denied on January 21, 2003. 
¶20 On remand, LIRC concluded Stoughton terminated Geen 
because of his disability and failed to reasonably accommodate 
his disability.  Geen v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., ERD Case No. 
199700618 (LIRC, September 12, 2003).  LIRC's decision included 
a cease and desist order, reinstatement of Geen, and an award of 
back pay and attorneys fees and costs.   
¶21 Stoughton appealed to the Dane County Circuit Court, 
Honorable Michael N. Nowakowski, which affirmed the LIRC 
decision.  Stoughton sought review in the court of appeals, 
which affirmed the circuit court's order.  The court of appeals 
concluded LIRC's determination that Stoughton terminated Geen's 
employment because of his disability was based on a reasonable 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
11 
 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the WFEA and that 
Stoughton's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute 
was 
not 
more 
reasonable.  Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. LIRC, 2006 WI App 157, 
¶24, 295 Wis. 2d 750, 721 N.W.2d 102.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that LIRC reasonably interpreted and applied the WFEA 
in determining that Stoughton failed to reasonably accommodate 
Geen's disability.  Id., ¶47.  Further, the court of appeals 
concluded that LIRC properly exercised its discretion in 
applying the "in-part" test adopted in Hoell v. LIRC, 186 Wis. 
2d 603, 609-11, 522 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1994), to establish 
Geen's remedy.  Stoughton Trailers, 295 Wis. 2d 750, ¶35.  
Stoughton filed a petition for review, which we granted. 
II 
¶22 The 
Wisconsin 
Fair 
Employment 
Act 
("WFEA"), 
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395, 
prohibits 
discrimination 
in 
employment on the basis of age, race, creed, color, disability, 
marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record, 
conviction record, membership in the national guard, state 
defense force or military reserves, or the use or nonuse of 
lawful products off the employer's premises on the employee's 
personal time.  Wis. Stat. § 111.321.  The WFEA states that its 
purpose is "to encourage and foster to the fullest extent 
practicable 
the 
employment 
of 
all 
properly 
qualified 
individuals" regardless of their status as a member of a class 
protected by the statute, and that its provisions "shall be 
liberally construed for the accomplishment of this purpose."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.31(3).   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
12 
 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) 
provides 
that 
"[e]mployment discrimination because of disability includes, but 
is not limited to . . . [r]efusing to reasonably accommodate an 
employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a 
hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business."7  As 
the court of appeals noted, to prevail on his disability 
discrimination claim under the WFEA, Geen must first    
establish that he has a disability within the meaning 
of Wisconsin's fair employment law.  Second, Geen must 
prove that Stoughton terminated him because of his 
disability.  Third, if Geen proves these two elements, 
the burden then shifts to Stoughton to justify the 
termination.  Stoughton may do so by proving that 
Geen's disability is "reasonably related" to his 
ability to do his job and that either:  (1) Stoughton 
reasonably accommodated Geen's disability prior to his 
termination; or (2) any accommodation would have posed 
a hardship on its business.  
Stoughton Trailers, 295 Wis. 2d 750, ¶13 (quoting Geen, 258 
Wis.2d 498, ¶15 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).   
 
¶24 Stoughton does not dispute that migraine headaches are 
a disability within the meaning of the WFEA.  Geen has not 
                                                 
7 The dissent asserts that because the court concludes that 
Stoughton violated its no-fault policy by not giving Geen 15 
days to submit medical documentation before it assessed an 
occurrence against him, it "leaps to the determination . . . 
that . . . Stoughton intentionally discriminated against Geen 
when it terminated him."  Dissent, ¶93.  The dissent ignores the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
employment 
discrimination, 
which 
includes "[r]efusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or 
prospective employee's disability unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the 
employer's 
program, 
enterprise 
or 
business." 
 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.34(1)(b).   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
13 
 
argued that his migraine headaches are not "reasonably related" 
to his ability to do his job.  Moreover, Stoughton does not 
assert that a reasonable accommodation of Geen's disability 
would pose a hardship on its business.  The two primary disputed 
issues in this case are whether Stoughton terminated Geen 
because of his disability, and whether Stoughton took adequate 
steps to reasonably accommodate Geen's disability prior to 
terminating him.  We address each of these issues in turn.  
A 
 
¶25 Stoughton 
contends that, prior to LIRC's second 
decision in this case, the settled rule in Wisconsin was that it 
is not discrimination because of disability for an employer to 
terminate 
an 
employee 
by 
even-handed 
application 
of 
the 
employer's no-fault attendance policy when a majority of the 
employee's absences causing termination were not related to the 
employee's disability.  Stoughton further maintains LIRC erred 
in applying the "in-part" test used in Hoell, 186 Wis. 2d at 
608, because the "in-part" test is appropriate only in cases in 
which discriminatory intent is a motivating factor in the 
decision to terminate, and intent (discriminatory or otherwise) 
is not a factor in a termination that is based on a violation of 
a no-fault attendance policy.  Alternately, Stoughton asserts 
that if the "in-part" test does apply here, LIRC nonetheless 
ordered the wrong remedy.  Before addressing these arguments, we 
consider the appropriate standard of review to apply to LIRC's 
determination 
that 
Geen 
was 
terminated 
because 
of 
his 
disability. 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
14 
 
1 
¶26 When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, 
this court reviews the agency's decision, not the decision of 
the court of appeals or the circuit court.  Racine Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings and Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶8 
n.4, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  A reviewing court accords 
an interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency one 
of three levels of deference——great weight, due weight or no 
deference——based on the agency's expertise in the area of law at 
issue.  See DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶15, _ _ Wis. 
2d __ , 727 N.W.2d 311.   
¶27 An agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to 
great weight deference when:  (1) the agency was charged by the 
legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2) the 
interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; (3) the 
agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in 
forming the interpretation; and (4) the agency's interpretation 
will provide uniformity in the application of the statute.  
DaimlerChrysler, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶16.  
¶28 We grant an intermediate level of deference, due 
weight, "where an agency has some experience in the area, but 
has not developed any particular expertise in interpreting and 
applying the statute at hand" that would put the agency in a 
better position to interpret the statute than a reviewing court.  
Responsible Use of Rural and Agric. Land (RURAL) v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of Wis., 2000 WI 129, ¶24, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 
888.   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
15 
 
The deference allowed an administrative agency under 
due weight is not so much based upon its knowledge or 
skill as it is on the fact that the legislature has 
charged the agency with the enforcement of the statute 
in question.  [Under the due weight standard] . . . , 
a court will not overturn a reasonable agency decision 
that comports with the purpose of the statute unless 
the court determines that there is a more reasonable 
interpretation available. 
Id.  (quoting UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 286-87, 548 
N.W.2d 57 (1996)).  
¶29 We apply de novo review when "there is no evidence 
that the agency has any special expertise or experience 
interpreting the statute[,] . . .  the issue before the agency 
is clearly one of first impression, or . . . the agency's 
position on an issue has been so inconsistent so as to provide 
no real guidance."  Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶18, 236 Wis. 
2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635 (citations omitted). 
¶30 Stoughton contends that we should apply de novo review 
because LIRC's decision was based on an interpretation of the 
disability provisions of the WFEA that was inconsistent with its 
first decision in this case and with prior cases that addressed 
the application of no-fault attendance policies to disabled 
employees.  Geen contends that LIRC's decision is entitled to 
great weight deference, given the agency's experience and 
knowledge in application of the WFEA.   
¶31 The court of appeals and the circuit court both 
concluded that LIRC's "because of" disability decision was 
entitled to due weight deference.  The court of appeals reasoned 
that "because the question presented here involves policy 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
16 
 
implications, and because LIRC offers expertise and experience 
in the interpretation of the WFEA's 'because of disability' 
language," some deference was owed LIRC's decision.  Stoughton 
Trailers, 295 Wis. 2d 750, ¶21.  However, due to the "somewhat 
different 
approach" 
LIRC 
had 
taken 
than 
in 
prior 
cases 
addressing somewhat similar issues, the court of appeals 
determined that LIRC's decision was entitled to due weight 
rather than great weight deference.  Id. 
¶32 We agree with the court of appeals that LIRC's 
"because of" disability decision is entitled to due weight 
deference.  LIRC has not squarely addressed in any prior 
decision the question of whether a termination for exceeding the 
maximum number of permitted absences under a no-fault attendance 
policy was a termination because of disability within the 
meaning of the WFEA when some of the employee's absences were 
caused by disability and others were not.  Because LIRC has 
acquired much experience interpreting "because of" disability 
language in the WFEA, see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LIRC, 
2000 WI App 272, 240 Wis. 2d 209, 621 N.W.2d 633, is well 
acquainted with the policies that underlie the disability 
protections of the WFEA, but has not previously addressed the 
particular issue presented in this case, we grant LIRC's 
decision on the termination "because of" disability question due 
weight deference.  Accordingly, we will affirm LIRC's decision 
if it is reasonable, and no other interpretation is more 
reasonable.  See RURAL, 239 Wis. 2d 660, ¶24. 
2 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
17 
 
 
¶33 We begin our consideration of the "because of" 
disability issue by briefly setting forth LIRC's analysis.  On 
remand before LIRC, Stoughton argued that LIRC's first decision 
had concluded that Geen was not terminated because of his 
disability, contrary to the court of appeals' reading of LIRC's 
first decision as explained in Geen, 258 Wis. 2d 498.  Stoughton 
also maintained that LIRC's prior decisions in Gordon v. Good 
Samaritan Med. Ctr., ERD Case No. 8551631 (LIRC, April 26, 
1988), and Gee v. ASAA Tech., ERD Case No. 8901783 (LIRC, 
January 15, 1993), established that a termination for exceeding 
the maximum number of permitted absences under a no-fault 
attendance policy was not because of disability under the WFEA 
when only some of the absences were caused by a disability.   
¶34 LIRC rejected Stoughton's argument that its first 
decision 
had 
held 
that 
the 
termination 
was 
because 
of 
disability, noting that its first decision was based on the 
conclusion that Stoughton had reasonably accommodated Geen, and 
had expressly reserved judgment on the question of whether 
Geen's termination was because of his disability.  LIRC noted 
that the question of whether Geen was terminated because of 
disability was narrower than the ultimate question of whether 
Geen was discriminated against because of his disability.  LIRC 
further noted that, regardless, it was bound by the court of 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
18 
 
appeals' 
conclusion 
in 
Geen 
regarding 
the 
"because 
of" 
disability question under the law of the case doctrine.8   
¶35 LIRC concluded that its prior decisions in Gordon and 
Gee did not compel the result sought by Stoughton because 
neither squarely addressed the issue presented in this case.  
LIRC noted that while Gordon and Gee contained discussion of the 
relationship between no-fault attendance policies and disability 
discrimination claims under the WFEA, the discussion in both 
cases was unrelated to the holding, and therefore dicta.  LIRC 
added that, to the extent that these two decisions suggested a 
different analysis, "the current commission simply takes a 
different view of this matter than did the commission which 
decided Gordon and Gee a decade and more ago."  Geen v. 
Stoughton Trailers, Inc., ERD Case No. 199700618 at p. 12 (LIRC, 
September 12, 2003). 
¶36 LIRC then concluded that because two of Geen's 6.5 
"occurrences" under the Stoughton's no-fault attendance policy 
were caused by his disability, the termination was because of 
his disability.  LIRC concluded that the "in-part" test (or 
"mixed-motive" test) for discrimination endorsed by the court of 
appeals in Hoell, 186 Wis. 2d at 609-11, was applicable in the 
                                                 
8 "The law of the case doctrine is a 'longstanding rule that 
a decision on a legal issue by an appellate court establishes 
the law of the case, which must be followed in all subsequent 
proceedings in the trial court or on later appeal.'"  State v. 
Stuart, 2003 WI 73, ¶23, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82 
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, the tribunal to which a case 
is remanded must follow the decisions of the court of appeals or 
supreme court in that case.  Id.    
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
19 
 
present case.  Quoting Hoell, 186 Wis. 2d at 609-10, LIRC set 
forth the "in-part" test and the remedies available under it as 
follows:     
[I]f an employe[e] is terminated solely because of an 
impermissible 
motivating 
factor, 
the 
employe[e] 
normally should be awarded a cease and desist order, 
reinstatement, back pay, interest, and attorney's  
fees under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.  If an 
employe[e] is terminated in part because of an 
impermissible motivating factor and in part because of 
other motivating factors, but the termination would 
not have occurred in the absence of the impermissible 
motivating factor, the Commission has the discretion 
to award some or all of the remedies ordinarily 
awarded.  Finally, if an employe[e] is terminated in 
part because of an impermissible factor and in part 
because 
of 
other 
motivating 
factors, 
and 
the 
termination would have taken place in the absence of 
the impermissible motivating factor, the employe[e] 
should be awarded only a cease and desist order and 
attorney's fees. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
¶37 Here, 
Stoughton 
renews 
its 
contention 
that 
the 
decision of LIRC that is on review conflicts with LIRC's first 
decision in this case, as well as its decisions in Gordon and 
Gee.  In essence, Stoughton argues that these prior decisions 
compel the conclusion that an employer does not terminate an 
employee because of disability within the meaning of the WFEA if 
the termination is for violating a no-fault attendance policy 
when only some of the employee's absences were caused by the 
employee's disability. 
 
¶38 Stoughton also contends LIRC erred in applying the 
"in-part" test of discrimination set forth in Hoell, 186 Wis. 2d 
at 609-11, to this case.  It asserts that the "in-part" test 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
20 
 
applies only to cases involving discriminatory intent, and that 
a termination by application of a no-fault attendance policy is 
by definition non-discriminatory.  Stoughton maintains that the 
proper test of discrimination in this case is the "determining 
factor" test, an alternate methodology for cases involving a 
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate reasons.  Under this 
test, 
the 
analysis 
focuses 
on 
whether 
the 
complainant's 
disability was merely a "factor" in the termination and 
therefore not because of disability, or whether it was a 
"determining factor" and therefore because of disability.  See 
Puetz Motor Sales v. LIRC, 126 Wis. 2d 168, 172-73, 376 N.W.2d 
372 (Ct. App. 1985).   
 
¶39 LIRC contends that it properly concluded that Geen was 
terminated because of disability where Stoughton counted two 
disability-related absences as "occurrences" under its no-fault 
attendance policy.  LIRC acknowledges that there may be 
circumstances in which the number of absences under a no-fault 
attendance policy may be so insignificant that the termination 
may not be because of disability.  It argues that this is not 
such a case, however, because nearly one-third of Geen's 
"occurrences" under Stoughton's policy were caused by his 
disability.  LIRC and Geen both contend that LIRC correctly 
applied the "in-part" test of discrimination in Hoell to the 
present case.   
 
¶40 As noted, due weight deference requires that we affirm 
an agency's determination when no other interpretation is more 
reasonable.  Our interpretation set forth below is more 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
21 
 
reasonable, but because it comports with LIRC's determination, 
we affirm.  We conclude that our interpretation is more 
reasonable because it is appropriate to the unique facts of this 
case and disposes of the case on more narrow grounds, and we 
further 
conclude 
that 
Stoughton's 
position 
is 
not 
more 
reasonable.  See Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 560, 
566 n.2, 575 N.W.2d 671 (1998) ("[W]e typically decide cases on 
the narrowest possible grounds.").   
¶41 The relevant events relating to Geen's termination are 
as follows:  Geen was absent from work on Friday, January 24, 
Monday, January 27, and Tuesday, January 28.  When Geen returned 
to work on Wednesday, January 29, Droessler, Stoughton's human 
resources administrator, informed Geen that he would need a 
release from his doctor to return to work.  She also provided 
Geen with the form letter indicating that he would need to 
submit a completed FMLA form to ensure that his absences were 
not counted as an "occurrence."  On January 30, Geen provided 
Droessler with a doctor's note indicating that Geen was being 
evaluated for migraines.  The next day, January 31, Geen 
provided Droessler another doctor's note clearing him to return 
to work, and indicating that his absences on January 27 and 28 
were due to migraine headaches.   
¶42 That same day, Droessler assessed Geen an "occurrence" 
under Stoughton's attendance policy for not providing a medical 
excuse for his January 24 absence, bringing Geen's total 
"occurrences" to 6.5, and terminated Geen for exceeding the six 
allowed "occurrences" under the no-fault attendance policy.  
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
22 
 
Droessler informed Geen that he could seek review of the 
termination with Stoughton's Attendance Review Board within 
three working days, and that Geen could present additional 
medical documentation to the Board.  Geen informed Droessler 
that he would be unable to obtain additional documentation from 
his doctor for at least one week because a follow-up exam had 
been scheduled in one week to evaluate the progress of his 
treatment for migraines. 
¶43 Based on these facts, we must conclude that Stoughton 
violated its own no-fault attendance policy in terminating Geen.  
Stoughton's policy allowed its employees 15 days from the date 
of receipt of the form letter to submit FMLA documentation to 
ensure that a medically-related absence would not be counted as 
an "occurrence" under its no-fault attendance policy.  However, 
Stoughton gave Geen only two days from the date it provided Geen 
with the form letter to submit the FMLA form to ensure that the 
absence was not counted as an "occurrence" before terminating 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
23 
 
him.9  Under Stoughton's policy, Stoughton should have provided 
Geen until February 13 to submit FMLA documentation to avoid 
having his final absence count as an "occurrence" under the no-
fault attendance policy.  By not waiting the full 15 days, 
Stoughton 
terminated 
Geen 
when 
he 
had 
accrued 
only 
5.5 
"occurrences" under Stoughton's attendance policy, and the 
termination was therefore invalid under the policy.10  
                                                 
9 We contrast Stoughton's treatment of the January 24 
absence with its treatment of Geen's extended absence from 
December 1996 to early January 1997.  After the extended 
absence, Stoughton provided Geen the required time to submit the 
completed FMLA form to avoid his absence being counted as an 
"occurrence," and Droessler personally encouraged Geen to submit 
the form.  Geen failed to submit the FMLA form and the absence 
was counted as an "occurrence," bringing his total "occurrences" 
to 5.5.  We note that Geen has not disputed the counting of this 
absence as an "occurrence," although it was undisputedly caused 
by his disability.  At oral argument, counsel for LIRC plausibly 
suggested that Geen's decision not to challenge this earlier 
assessment of an "occurrence" may be related to the fact that 
Stoughton gave Geen ample time to submit the FMLA form, unlike 
in the case of the final absence. 
10 The dissent faults the court for making factual findings 
that were not made by the agency.  The dissent is mistaken.  Our 
decision differs from LIRC's because LIRC chose not to decide 
the case on the narrow grounds presented.  Nevertheless, the 
facts on which the court relies were found by LIRC and the 
hearing examiner.  The hearing examiner found that Droessler 
"chose to terminate Mr. Geen's employment only two days into the 
15-day period for submission of the family/medical leave 
documentation."  Geen v. Stoughton Trailers, ERD No. 199700618 
at p. 4 (ERD, September 29, 1999).  LIRC found that Stoughton 
had a 15-day period for employees to submit documentation to 
avoid being assessed an "occurrence," that Geen received a 
"standard letter" on January 29, 1997, informing him he had 15 
days from the receipt of the letter to submit FMLA documentation 
to avoid being assessed an occurrence under Stoughton's policy, 
and that Geen was terminated on January 31, 1997.  Geen v. 
Stoughton Trailers, ERD No. 199700618 at pp. 4-6 (LIRC, 
September 12, 2003). 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
24 
 
¶44 Because Stoughton did not follow the requirements of 
its no-fault attendance policy in terminating Geen, we conclude 
it may not claim the protection that may be available to it 
under the policy.  Geen had not accrued the requisite number of 
"occurrences" 
necessary 
for 
termination. 
 
Thus, 
LIRC's 
conclusion that Geen was terminated because of his disability is 
more reasonably based on the unique circumstances surrounding 
the termination of Geen than on LIRC's analysis of the 
relationship between Stoughton's no-fault attendance policy and 
the "because of" element of a disability discrimination claim 
under the WFEA.   
                                                                                                                                                             
However, the dissent does not accept LIRC's finding that 
the date of Geen's termination was January 31, 1997.  LIRC found 
that on January 31, 1997, "Droessler told Geen that he was being 
discharged because his medical documentation did not excuse him 
for Friday, January 24, 1997."  Geen, ERD No. 199700618 at p. 6 
(LIRC, September 12, 2003).  Later, LIRC refers to the moment on 
January 31, 1997, that Droessler informed Geen he was being 
terminated as "the time [Droessler] discharged Geen."  Id.  
Despite LIRC's explicit finding that Geen was terminated on 
January 
31, 
1997, 
the 
dissent 
faults 
the 
majority 
for 
"treat[ing] January 31 as the official discharge date" and 
asserts, without support, that "Stoughton's discharge of Geen 
became final on February 21, 1997," the date the Attendance 
Review Board rejected Geen's appeal of his termination, "more 
than 15 days after Stoughton advised Geen to submit medical 
documentation."  Dissent, ¶96.  The dissent suggests that this 
court 
"implies, without providing any justification, that 
Stoughton did not comply with the FMLA."  Id.  As we have taken 
pains to note, the FMLA itself is not at issue in this case.  
See supra, ¶11 n.4 and infra, ¶58 n.12.  The FMLA's 15-day grace 
period to submit documentation is relevant to this case only to 
the extent that it was incorporated into Stoughton's no-fault 
attendance policy. 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
25 
 
¶45 We note that LIRC's findings of fact indicate that 
Stoughton knew Geen was receiving medical treatment for migraine 
headaches when it terminated him.  LIRC's findings also show 
that Geen had recently been absent from work because of 
migraines, and that Geen had been absent for several weeks from 
December 1996 to January 1997 with migraines.  Additionally, 
LIRC's findings show that Stoughton provided Geen only three 
days to obtain a medical excuse for his final absence, when Geen 
indicated his doctor would not be able to provide an excuse 
until the following week.  
¶46 Based 
on 
these 
facts, 
we 
conclude 
that 
LIRC's 
conclusion that Stoughton terminated Geen "because of" his 
disability was reasonable.  
¶47 Because we conclude that Stoughton violated its no-
fault attendance policy in terminating Geen and therefore is not 
entitled to whatever protection the policy may provide, and that 
Geen had not accrued the requisite number of "occurrences" 
necessary for termination under that policy, we need not address 
whether a termination for exceeding the maximum number of 
absences allowed under a no-fault attendance policy is a 
termination because of disability when some of the absences were 
caused by a disability and others were not.   
¶48 Stoughton argues that the application of the "in-part" 
test is inappropriate where an employer has a no-fault policy 
that is uniformly applied.  Because Stoughton did not terminate 
Geen by proper application of its no-fault attendance policy, 
its argument for precluding the application of the "in-part" 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
26 
 
test must fail.  We therefore determine that LIRC's application 
of the "in-part" test is reasonable under the facts of this 
case.  
¶49 In sum, we conclude LIRC reasonably determined that 
Stoughton terminated Geen because of his disability.  Based on 
LIRC's findings, we conclude Stoughton's termination of Geen 
violated its own no-fault attendance policy because Geen was not 
provided 15 days to submit documentation to avoid being assessed 
an "occurrence" under the policy.  As a result, Geen had not 
accrued the requisite number of "occurrences" necessary for 
termination.  Accordingly, we conclude that Stoughton is not 
entitled to whatever protection its no-fault policy may provide.  
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
Geen's 
termination demonstrate that LIRC's conclusion that Stoughton 
was terminated because of his disability was reasonable.11   
B 
 
¶50 Having 
affirmed 
LIRC's 
conclusion 
that 
Stoughton 
terminated Geen because of his disability, we turn to the issue 
of reasonable accommodation.  Because Stoughton does not assert 
                                                 
11 Stoughton and amicus Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce 
argued that an interpretation of the WFEA that determined that a 
termination for violating a no-fault attendance policy was 
because of disability when only some of an employee's absences 
were caused by disability would threaten the very existence of 
no-fault attendance policies.  We express no opinion on this 
position of Stoughton and amicus.  We merely reiterate that this 
opinion does not address the question of whether a termination 
is because of disability when an employee is terminated for 
violating a no-fault attendance policy when some of the 
employee's absences are disability-related and others are not.   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
27 
 
that accommodation of Geen's disability would pose a hardship on 
it, the only issue remaining for review is whether Stoughton 
reasonably accommodated Geen's disability.   
1 
 
¶51 We consider first the proper standard of review to 
apply to LIRC's interpretation and application of the WFEA's 
reasonable accommodation requirement.  Stoughton contends that 
our review of this issue should be de novo because LIRC's 
decision regarding reasonable accommodation is contrary to its 
first decision in this case, and to its long-standing rule that 
employees do not have a right to the accommodation of their 
choosing.  We conclude that LIRC's treatment of the reasonable 
accommodation issue is entitled to great weight deference.    
¶52 This court addressed the standard of review generally 
applicable to reasonable accommodation determinations in Crystal 
Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 
N.W.2d 651, and Hutchinson Technology, Inc. v. LIRC, 2004 WI 90, 
273 Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343.  In Crystal Lake, this court, 
relying in part on the court of appeals' decision in Target 
Stores v. LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 13-14, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 
1998), concluded that LIRC's interpretation and application of 
reasonable accommodation was entitled to great weight deference.  
Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶29-30.  The Crystal Lake court 
reasoned that great weight deference was appropriate because of 
the expertise LIRC had developed after having "had many 
opportunities 
to 
address 
th[e] 
issue" 
of 
reasonable 
accommodation under the WFEA.  Id.   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
28 
 
¶53 In the following term, this court applied great weight 
deference in another reasonable accommodation decision of LIRC, 
stating "[o]ur decision in Crystal Lake makes it clear that 
great weight deference is the appropriate standard of review for 
LIRC decisions regarding reasonable accommodation . . . under 
the WFEA."  Hutchinson, 273 Wis. 2d 394, ¶24 n.9.  Following 
Crystal Lake and Hutchinson, we conclude LIRC's reasonable 
accommodation determination in this case is entitled to great 
weight deference.  To the rationale explained in Crystal Lake 
and Hutchinson, we add only that the reasonableness of an 
accommodation necessarily depends upon the facts of a given 
case, and is the sort of determination for which LIRC, by virtue 
of its experience in applying the relevant legal principles to a 
range of different sets of facts, has developed expertise 
meriting great weight deference.  
 
¶54 Stoughton cites no published case in which a Wisconsin 
court has applied de novo review to a reasonable accommodation 
decision of LIRC.  Moreover, we disagree with Stoughton's 
arguments for applying de novo review in this case.  Regarding 
the fact that LIRC reached a different conclusion here than in 
its first decision, we note that LIRC's second decision was 
influenced by the court of appeals' decision and order of 
remand.  More importantly, and unlike LIRC's treatment of the 
"because of" question, LIRC applied the same legal standard for 
reasonable accommodation that it has applied in prior cases.  
Finally, 
for 
reasons 
discussed 
later, 
we 
disagree 
with 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
29 
 
Stoughton's argument that LIRC's decision violates the rule that 
an employee has no right to pick his or her own accommodation.   
¶55 We therefore conclude that great weight deference is 
the proper standard of review here.  Accordingly, "[w]e will 
uphold LIRC's interpretation of [the] statute, if it is 
reasonable and compatible with the plain meaning of the statute 
even 
if 
another 
interpretation 
may 
be 
more 
reasonable."  
Hutchinson, 273 Wis. 2d 394, ¶24.  
2 
¶56 In 
addressing 
the 
requirement 
of 
reasonable 
accommodation, this court has recognized "the important role 
that management prerogatives play in the success of a business."  
Hutchinson, 273 Wis. 2d 394, ¶29.  As this court has explained, 
"a business must have the right to set its own employment rules 
to encourage maximum productivity," but "such rules do not exist 
in a vacuum, [and] must bend to the requirements of the WFEA."  
Id.  To reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability 
under Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b), an employer need only provide 
an accommodation that is reasonable under the circumstances, 
though it may not be the accommodation preferred by the 
employee.  However, this court has also described "the WFEA [as] 
'a remedial statute [that] should be broadly interpreted to 
resolve the problem it was designed to address,'" and has 
specifically applied this principle when interpreting the 
reasonable accommodation requirement of § 111.34(1(b).  See 
Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶46 (citation omitted).   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
30 
 
¶57 LIRC concluded on two separate bases that Stoughton 
failed to reasonably accommodate Geen's disability.  First, LIRC 
concluded that Stoughton refused to reasonably accommodate Geen 
by failing to provide Geen with the 15 days required under its 
attendance policy to submit a completed FMLA form to excuse his 
final disability-related absence.  Second, LIRC concluded that 
Stoughton refused to reasonably accommodate Geen by failing to 
extend 
to 
him 
"clemency 
and 
forbearance" 
by 
temporarily 
tolerating his disability-related absences while the medical 
intervention that had already begun was allowed to take its 
course and eventually resolve the problem of his absences.  We 
examine LIRC's analysis of both these grounds in turn.    
¶58 LIRC's analysis begins by addressing the reasonable 
accommodation question in the terms set forth in the remand 
order of the court of appeals, "whether the FMLA or regulations 
enacted thereunder affect Stoughton's claim that it reasonably 
accommodated Geen's disability, and if so, how."  Geen, 258 Wis. 
2d 498, ¶36.  In Geen, the court of appeals focused on 
Stoughton's failure to provide Geen with 15 days to submit a 
completed FMLA form to excuse his January 24 absence, which it 
concluded "suggests that Stoughton may not have fully complied 
with the FMLA."  Id., ¶25.  LIRC read the court of appeals' 
opinion in Geen to effectively reject all of Stoughton's 
arguments regarding its failure to provide Geen with 15 days to 
submit the FMLA form and its duty to reasonably accommodate.  
See Geen, 258 Wis. 2d 498, ¶¶26-30.  Based on the law of the 
case doctrine, and on LIRC's independent conclusion that the 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
31 
 
court of appeals' analysis was more persuasive than Stoughton's, 
LIRC concluded that Stoughton refused to reasonably accommodate 
Geen by failing to provide Geen with 15 days to submit the FMLA 
form.12   
¶59 Stoughton contends that LIRC's decision improperly 
substitutes Geen's preferred reasonable accommodation for that 
offered by Stoughton.  Stoughton maintains that it reasonably 
accommodated Geen by permitting him to remove the "occurrences" 
assessed for his extended absence from December 1996 to early 
January 1997 and for January 24 by providing him with an FMLA 
form which he could complete and submit to avoid being assessed 
an 
"occurrence." 
 
We 
disagree 
and 
conclude 
that 
LIRC's 
determination that Stoughton refused to reasonably accommodate 
Geen by failing to allow him sufficient time to submit 
                                                 
12 Based upon the court of appeals' analysis of the FMLA in 
Geen, LIRC also concluded that Stoughton's failure to provide 
Geen with 15 days to submit the FMLA form was a violation of the 
FMLA.  We do not address here whether this action violated the 
FMLA.  The 15-day requirement of the FMLA is relevant to our 
analysis only to the extent that it was incorporated into 
Stoughton's no-fault attendance policy.  As such, Stoughton's 
failure to adhere to this requirement of its policy supports the 
reasonableness of LIRC's conclusions that Stoughton terminated 
Geen because of his disability and that Stoughton refused to 
reasonably 
accommodate 
Geen. 
 
Regarding 
the 
reasonable 
accommodation analysis, we note that there is nothing magical 
about a 15-day requirement that makes this time period more 
reasonable than another.  However, we conclude under the facts 
of this case that LIRC's conclusion that 15 days to submit the 
documentation was necessary to reasonably accommodate Geen was 
reasonable.  We conclude that the substantive provisions of the 
FMLA are not relevant to our review of LIRC's decision. 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
32 
 
documentation to avoid being assessed an "occurrence" was 
reasonable.  
¶60 Stoughton attempts to conflate its treatment of Geen's 
December 1996 to January 1997 extended absence with its 
treatment of his final absence that put him over the number 
allowed by Stoughton's attendance policy.  We note that Geen has 
not challenged Stoughton's assessment of an "occurrence" for his 
extended absence from December 1996 to early January 1997.  And 
it would appear that Stoughton provided Geen with ample 
opportunity to avoid this first "occurrence" by submitting a 
completed FMLA form, but Geen failed to do so.   
¶61 Stoughton 
treated 
this 
first 
disability-related 
"occurrence" very differently than the second disability-related 
"occurrence."  Contrary to Stoughton's claims, it did not 
provide Geen with sufficient time to submit a completed FMLA 
form to avoid being assessed an "occurrence."  Stoughton 
terminated Geen two days after providing him with its standard 
letter informing him that he had 15 days to submit the FMLA 
form.  Droessler informed Geen that he had three days to submit 
adequate documentation to excuse the absence, even though Geen 
informed her that he would be unable to get such documentation 
from his doctor for at least a week.  On these undisputed facts, 
we affirm LIRC's determination that Stoughton refused to 
reasonably accommodate Geen by failing to give him sufficient 
time to submit documentation to avoid being assessed an 
"occurrence."   
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
33 
 
¶62 LIRC 
also 
concluded 
that 
Stoughton 
refused 
to 
reasonably accommodate Geen by failing to extend to him 
"clemency and forbearance" in the form of temporarily tolerating 
his absences while the medical intervention that was already 
underway had a chance to resolve the problem of his disability-
related absences.  LIRC highlighted the court of appeals' 
decision in Target Stores.  There, the employee, Crivello, had 
sleep apnea, which caused her to doze off at work, a violation 
of a company "loafing" rule.  After several somnolent incidents, 
and shortly after beginning a new treatment for her sleep apnea, 
Crivello was terminated.  Applying a great weight standard of 
review, the court of appeals upheld LIRC's conclusion that 
Target Stores had failed to reasonably accommodate Crivello by 
not 
exercising 
"clemency 
and 
forbearance" 
in 
immediately 
discharging Crivello and not allowing sufficient time to permit 
the medical treatment to address the problem.  Target Stores, 
217 Wis. 2d at 17-18.  The Target Stores court explained:   
LIRC's interpretation of "reasonable accommodation" to 
include forbearing from enforcing the loafing rule 
while Crivello is undergoing treatment is reasonable. 
Like a leave of absence, forbearance from enforcing 
the loafing rule is a temporary accommodation to 
permit medical treatment which, if successful, will 
remove the difficulty in performing the job-related 
responsibility. Whether either [a leave of absence or 
forbearance from enforcing an employment rule] is a 
reasonable accommodation in a given case will depend 
on the facts and circumstances of that case.  
Id. at 19.  The court of appeals rejected Target Stores' 
position that "an accommodation is reasonable only if it will 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
34 
 
immediately remove the difficulty in performing job-related 
responsibilities caused by the handicap."  Id. at 18. 
¶63 LIRC observed that Target Stores "was similar in many 
respects to [Geen's] case."  Geen, ERD No. 199700618 (LIRC, 
September 12, 2003).   
In this case, Geen's migraine condition was 
sometimes causing him to miss work.  However, as was 
the case in Target Stores, Geen's problem had only 
recently been diagnosed, and he was still at a fairly 
early stage of treating his disorder.  As Crivello had 
been, Geen was still working with physicians to 
determine effective medications and to adjust them.  
It was entirely possible, that development of an 
appropriate 
treatment 
regimen 
would 
significantly 
reduce or even eliminate the problem of periodic 
absences due to migraine attacks.      
Id. at pp. 18-19.  LIRC noted that this court in Crystal Lake 
accepted LIRC's interpretation that a reasonable accommodation 
did not necessarily require that an employee be able to perform 
all job-related duties, only some or most, and that as long as 
the employee could perform some of the job duties, modification 
of the duties could be a reasonable accommodation required of 
the employer.  See Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶52. 
¶64 Applying great weight deference to the second part of 
LIRC's reasonable accommodation determination, we conclude that 
LIRC's determination that Stoughton refused to reasonably 
accommodate by failing to extend "clemency and forbearance" was 
also reasonable.  
¶65 LIRC reasonably concluded that an employer should 
exercise 
"clemency 
and 
forbearance" 
by 
not 
immediately 
terminating an employee where, as here, the employer knows a 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
35 
 
medical intervention is already underway that has not had the 
chance to take effect to potentially resolve the problem of the 
employee's absences. 
¶66 LIRC's 
conclusion 
is 
consistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.34(1)(b), and is in harmony with both the express purpose 
of the WFEA "to encourage and foster to the fullest extent 
practicable 
the 
employment 
of 
all 
properly 
qualified 
individuals" regardless of disability or other protected status, 
and its directive that its provisions "be liberally construed 
for 
the 
accomplishment 
of 
this 
purpose." 
 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.31(3).   
 
¶67 As set forth in LIRC's decision, "clemency and 
forbearance" is not an open-ended requirement mandating that an 
employer indefinitely suspend its attendance requirements for 
the disabled employee.13  Such a mandate would not be a 
reasonable accommodation within the meaning of the WFEA.  
Rather, "clemency and forbearance" requires that an employer 
"forbear" by temporarily tolerating an employee's disability-
related absences under circumstances similar to those presented 
                                                 
13 In a decision post-dating the decision in this case, LIRC 
made precisely this point, noting that "an employer is generally 
not required to indefinitely suspend the application of a 
reasonable attendance policy to accommodate a disability."  Seil 
v. Dairy Farmers of Am., ERD Case No. 200204104 (LIRC, August 
26, 2005).  Amicus Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce asserts 
that Seil demonstrates that LIRC's decision in this case is 
contrary to established precedent.  Amicus is incorrect.  Seil 
is not inconsistent with LIRC's holding in this case, which does 
not require "indefinite" suspension of employer rules, only 
temporary "forbearance" to allow medical intervention that is 
already underway to have its intended effect.  
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
36 
 
in this case.  It requires "a temporary accommodation to permit 
medical 
treatment 
which, 
if 
successful, 
will 
remove 
the 
difficulty 
in 
performing 
the 
job-related 
responsibility."  
Target Stores, 217 Wis. 2d at 19.  Here, where Stoughton 
immediately discharged Geen, LIRC's determination that Stoughton 
did not exercise "clemency and forbearance" is reasonable.   
C 
 
¶68 Finally, Stoughton challenges the remedy ordered by 
LIRC.  Stoughton contends that if the "in-part" test set forth 
in Hoell applies, as we concluded it does under the unique facts 
of 
this 
case, supra, ¶48, the remedy ordered by LIRC, 
reinstatement and back pay, was not authorized by Hoell.  We 
disagree, 
and 
conclude 
that 
LIRC 
properly 
exercised 
its 
discretion in determining the award based upon the correct 
interpretation of the WFEA and the "in-part" test as described 
in Hoell.   
 
¶69 Under Wis. Stat. § 111.39(4)(c), LIRC (or DWD) may 
award reinstatement and back pay.  In general, LIRC (or DWD) has 
the discretion to award to a prevailing complainant some or all 
of the remedies available under subchapter II of Chapter 111.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.39(4)(c).   
 
¶70 In Hoell, 186 Wis. 2d at 608-11, the court of appeals 
endorsed LIRC's statement of the remedies specific to a "mixed-
motive" case.  As noted above, when the court determines in a 
"mixed-motive" case that the termination would not have occurred 
in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, LIRC has 
the discretion to award some or all of the following remedies:  
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
37 
 
a cease and desist order, reinstatement, attorney's fees, back 
pay and interest.  Id. at 609-610.  Only when LIRC determines 
that the termination would have occurred even in the absence of 
the impermissible factor is the remedy limited to a cease and 
desist order and attorney's fees.  Id. 
¶71 In this case, LIRC expressly concluded that Geen would 
not 
have 
been 
terminated 
but 
for 
his 
disability-related 
absences.  LIRC apparently determined that the full scope of 
remedies was appropriate here.  We conclude that LIRC properly 
exercised its discretion in making this determination based upon 
a correct application of the legal standard provided in Hoell 
and the WFEA.14 
                                                 
14 The dissent labels LIRC's award to Geen of back pay on 
his $9.52/hour position "breathtaking" while failing to mention 
that the award is offset by Geen's interim earnings.  Dissent, 
¶106.  Under LIRC's order, Geen's award is calculated by 
subtracting his earnings from other employment since his 
termination and from any other statutory offsets.  The amount 
payable to Geen (if any) after this calculation is subject to 
interest at the rate of 12 percent simple. 
Additionally, the dissent calls it "astonishing" that this 
court affirms LIRC's award to Geen of the maximum remedies 
allowed under the WFEA, which it claims are allowed only in 
"cases of pure invidious discrimination."  Dissent, ¶107.  This 
case involves discriminatory intent given Stoughton's refusal to 
reasonably 
accommodate 
Geen's 
disability, 
and 
the 
full 
circumstances of Geen's termination, which need not be recounted 
here.  As noted earlier, Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) provides that 
it is discrimination based on disability to "[r]efus[e] to 
reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's 
disability," unless the employer can demonstrate that the 
reasonable accommodation would pose an undue hardship on its 
business. 
No. 
2004AP1550   
 
38 
 
III 
¶72 In sum, we conclude a more reasonable basis for LIRC's 
decision is that Stoughton did not follow its own no-fault 
attendance policy in terminating Geen when it failed to provide 
him with 15 days, as allowed under the policy, to submit 
documentation to avoid being assessed an "occurrence."  Because 
Stoughton did not follow its own no-fault attendance policy, it 
may not claim whatever protection that policy may provide in its 
termination of Geen.  Thus, LIRC's conclusion that Geen was 
terminated because of his disability is more reasonably grounded 
on the circumstances surrounding that termination.  Based on 
these circumstances as set forth earlier in this opinion, we 
conclude that LIRC's conclusion that Stoughton terminated Geen 
because of his disability was reasonable.  We therefore do not 
address the issue of whether a termination for exceeding the 
maximum number of absences permitted under a no-fault attendance 
policy is because of disability under the WFEA when some of the 
absences were caused by disability and others were not. 
¶73 We further conclude that LIRC reasonably interpreted 
and applied the WFEA in determining that Stoughton failed to 
reasonably accommodate Geen.  Additionally, we conclude that its 
ordered remedy was reasonable.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶74 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶75 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This case has 
been litigated for years, at great expense to all parties, 
because it presents a vital question for Wisconsin employers.  
The question is whether an employer may apply a facially neutral 
no-fault attendance policy to terminate an employee, without 
risk of employment discrimination liability, when some of the 
employee's absences are caused by disability but most are not.  
More specifically, does an employer discriminate "because of" 
disability within the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act when the 
employer terminates an employee under these circumstances?  Does 
an employer refuse to reasonably accommodate an employee's 
disability within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1) when the 
employer promises to disregard disability related absences if an 
employee submits appropriate family/medical leave certification 
forms but the employee fails to do so?   
¶76 The 
majority 
avoids 
answering 
these 
important 
questions——directly——and thus abdicates its role as the state's 
ultimate policy making court.  But it does pick a winner. 
¶77 To rule in favor of Douglas Geen (Geen), however, 
without answering any tough questions, the majority is forced to 
make a disputed factual determination that Stoughton Trailers 
(Stoughton) violated its own no-fault attendance policy and then 
to infuse discriminatory intent into Stoughton's unremarkable 
decision to terminate Geen.  The result of all this is to permit 
an employee to miss work, claim that a key absence was based on 
disability, and escape any consequence even though he has never 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
2 
 
produced a single piece of medical documentation supporting the 
reason for the critical absence. 
¶78 Because the court's handling of this decision is a 
classic example of adding insult to injury, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶79 This case involves a claim under the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act (WFEA).  The WFEA prohibits an employer from 
terminating 
an 
employee 
"because 
of" 
"disability."  
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.321 and 111.322(1).  Employment discrimination 
"because 
of" 
disability 
includes 
refusing 
to 
"reasonably 
accommodate" an employee's disability unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the 
employer's 
program, 
enterprise, 
or 
business.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b). 
¶80 As the Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce (WMC) 
points out in its amicus brief, the present case raises WFEA 
issues in a context not previously addressed by this court——
absenteeism.  WMC notes, "Employee absenteeism directly affects 
the 
economic 
viability 
and 
competitiveness 
of 
Wisconsin 
employers. . . .  According to the 2005 CCH Unscheduled Absence 
Survey . . . , the average yearly cost of absenteeism in the 
United 
States 
in 
2005 
was 
$660 
per 
employee 
in 
paid, 
unproductive time, which amounted to a financial cost of over $1 
million per year for some larger employers."  See 2005 CCH 
Unscheduled Absence Survey.  In addition, WMC explained that 
many Wisconsin employers utilize no-fault attendance policies, 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
3 
 
citing 
a 
survey 
that 
reported 
that 
in 
the 
production, 
maintenance, and service areas, 60 percent of employers with 
more than 500 unionized employees, and 46.8 percent of employers 
with more than 500 non-unionized employees, utilized no-fault 
attendance policies.  See 2005/2006 Wisconsin & Northern 
Illinois Policies & Benefits Survey. 
¶81 This case presents an opportunity to resolve several 
legal questions regarding absenteeism and employers' ability to 
use no-fault attendance policies under the WFEA.  Wisconsin 
employers expect and need guidance on these questions.  Instead, 
the majority leaves the questions for another day.   
¶82 By leaving these questions for another day, the 
majority does not disturb the decisions of the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC) and the court of appeals.  It 
does not reverse their decisions or withdraw language from them.  
It simply moves on.  By deciding this case on a narrower ground, 
the majority has insidiously retained LIRC's decision and the 
court of appeals' decision as precedent for those future cases 
that must be decided on grounds broader than the artificially 
narrow ground used in this case.  When a future case arrives, 
the court of appeals will have no choice but to apply its 
precedent.  See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 
N.W.2d 246 (1997) (stating that "the court of appeals may not 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
4 
 
overrule, 
modify 
or 
withdraw 
language 
from 
a 
previously 
established decision of the court of appeals").1   
¶83 Thus, employers should be wary of applying their 
facially neutral no-fault attendance policies to treat all 
absences alike regardless of the reason for the absence.  
Ironically, treating all employees alike does not protect 
employers from liability under the WFEA.  Rather, equal 
treatment of employees leads to a finding of discriminatory 
intent by employers in adverse employment decisions.   
¶84 With each new case, Wisconsin seems determined to 
vindicate the commentator who wrote: 
For years, the employment law purportedly aimed 
at requiring employers to treat workers neutrally and 
impartially 
on 
their 
merits, 
all 
alike; 
even 
affirmative action was shaped in accord with this sort 
of officially declared goal.  But now discrimination 
is quietly being redefined as the failure to treat 
each employee differently.  Nondiscrimination really 
requires the most subtle and pervasive discrimination, 
or so the theory goes; treat all employees alike, and 
you've broken the law.   
Walter Olson, The Excuse Factory 118 (1997).   
II 
¶85 The majority defends its decision-making process by 
invoking the principle that this court "typically decide[s] 
cases on the narrowest possible grounds."  See majority op., ¶40 
(quoting Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 560, 566 n.2, 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals' decision and LIRC's second decision 
are cited in Rose Ann Wasserman, Wisconsin Employment Law 
§§ 14.58, 14.63 (2004 & Supp. 2007); Rose Ann Wasserman, A Guide 
to Wisconsin Employment Discrimination Law § 3.31 (Supp. 2007); 
30 
Mental 
& 
Physical 
Disability 
Law 
Reporter 
678, 
800 
(Sept./Oct. 2006). 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
5 
 
575 N.W.2d 671 (1998)).  However, the majority then makes its 
own factual determinations to craft a narrower ground upon which 
to decide the case.  The majority finds that Stoughton violated 
its no-fault attendance policy when it failed to provide Geen 
with 15 days to submit medical documentation before it assessed 
an occurrence against him.  Majority op., ¶5.  Then it finds 
that, because Stoughton violated its no-fault attendance policy, 
it intentionally discriminated against Geen when it terminated 
him.  See majority op., ¶49.   
¶86 This court is not a fact-finding or error correcting 
court, see Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 188-89; Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 
Wis. 2d 100, 107 n.3, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980); nevertheless, in 
this case, the majority determines facts sua sponte.  Because 
this case now turns on specific facts, I am compelled to comment 
on them. 
III 
 
¶87 LIRC made the following findings of fact in its second 
decision in this case.  Geen v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., ERD 
Case No. 199700618 (LIRC, Sept. 12, 2003).  As of Geen's return 
to work on January 8, 1997, Geen had accumulated a balance of 
5.5 occurrences.  Four-and-a-half of those occurrences were not 
disability related; the other occurrence was disability related.  
Geen was assessed one occurrence for a disability-related 
absence (migraines) from December 12, 1996, to January 7, 1997, 
because he never returned the Department of Labor certification 
form required to establish that his absence could qualify for 
FMLA leave.  Stoughton, however, did qualify Geen's absence as a 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
6 
 
medical leave and therefore assessed him only one occurrence for 
the entire period.   
¶88 On Thursday, January 23, 1997, Geen took an excused 
vacation day.  On Friday, January 24, 1997, the day after his 
vacation day, Geen called Stoughton before the start of his 
shift to report that he could not work because he had a migraine 
headache.  Geen also called Stoughton on Monday, January 27, 
1997, to report that he could not work because of headaches.  On 
the following day, January 28, 2007, Geen called Stoughton to 
report that he was seeing a physician that day.  Geen returned 
to work on January 29, 1997, and met with Tammy Droessler 
(Droessler) in the human resources office.  She handed Geen a 
standard letter emphasizing the need to provide Stoughton with 
medical documentation within 15 days of the letter.  The next 
day, January 30, 1997, Geen saw another physician who gave Geen 
a note stating that Geen was being evaluated for migraines.  
Geen gave the note to Droessler on the same day, but Droessler 
told Geen that he needed a physician's note stating that he 
could return to work without restrictions.  Geen obtained a note 
from his physician the following day, indicating that he was 
released for work without restrictions and that he had been 
unable to work on January 27 and 28.  The note did not indicate 
that he had been unable to work on January 24, 1997.  After Geen 
gave Droessler this note on January 31, 1997, Droessler told 
Geen 
that 
he 
was 
being 
discharged 
because 
his 
medical 
documentation did not excuse him for Friday, January 24, 1997.  
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
7 
 
This unexcused absence caused Geen to accrue an occurrence for 
that date, putting him at 6.5 occurrences.   
¶89 At the time he was discharged, Geen stated that his 
doctor needed additional time to evaluate him before he could 
bring in more medical documentation.  Droessler told Geen about 
his option to appeal to Stoughton's Attendance Review Board 
(ARB).  She told Geen that he had three days from that date 
(January 31) to write a letter to the company's ARB in order to 
try to reverse the assessment of the occurrence.  She told him 
he could submit medical documentation to the ARB.   
¶90 On Wednesday, February 5, 1997, the ARB received 
Geen's appeal in which he stated that he had been having trouble 
with migraine headaches, was on medicine for depression, had 
been seen by several doctors, and was having his primary 
physician evaluate his headaches.  Geen did not submit any 
medical documentation to the ARB with his letter of appeal.  On 
February 7, 1997, Geen had a follow up exam with his primary 
physician.  Geen did not submit any documentation to the ARB 
about his February 7 visit with his primary physician, nor did 
he ask his primary physician at that time to complete the form 
necessary to establish that his absences qualified for FMLA 
leave.  Geen did not submit any such information to the ARB or 
anyone else at Stoughton, at any time thereafter.   
¶91 On February 21, 1997 (more than 15 days after 
Droessler 
informed 
Geen 
of 
the 
need 
to 
submit 
medical 
documentation), the ARB rejected Geen's appeal.  The ARB 
rejected Geen's appeal because Stoughton had mistakenly believed 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
8 
 
that Geen had been absent without notice or excuse on January 
23, 1997, the day that Geen took for vacation.   
¶92 In his findings of fact, the Administrative Law Judge 
quoted from the ARB's memo to Geen, "The Attendance Review Board 
reviewed your inquiry regarding the occurrence you received for 
your absences beginning on January 23, 1997.  On January 23, 
1997, you didn't call in or bring in medical documentation 
excusing you on that day.  Your absence on Thursday puts you at 
6[.5] occurrences."   
IV 
¶93 Based 
on 
these 
facts, 
the 
majority 
finds 
that 
Stoughton violated its no-fault attendance policy by not giving 
Geen 15 days to submit medical documentation before it assessed 
an occurrence against him.  From that finding, the majority 
leaps to the determination——although not explicitly stating so——
that, because Stoughton violated its no-fault attendance policy, 
Stoughton intentionally discriminated against Geen when it 
terminated him.  See majority op., ¶48 (stating, "Because 
Stoughton did not terminate Geen by proper application of its 
no-fault attendance policy, its argument for precluding the 
application of the in-part test must fail.").2  Both of these 
determinations are without merit. 
¶94 First, LIRC never found and the facts do not show that 
Stoughton violated its no-fault attendance policy.  Droessler's 
note to Geen indicated that he had 15 days to submit medical 
                                                 
2 Stoughton argued that the in-part test did not apply in 
this case because the in-part test requires a finding of 
discriminatory intent.  
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
9 
 
documentation in order to continue on medical leave.  When Geen 
submitted such medical documentation on January 31——justifying 
his absences on January 27 and 28——he failed to justify his 
absence on January 24.  From that point on, Stoughton was not 
required to believe that Geen's absence on January 24 was 
disability 
related. 
 
Unlike 
some 
disabilities, 
migraine 
headaches are not visibly evident.  In addition, migraine 
headaches are not always permanent——they come and go.  Without 
medical documentation justifying his absence on January 24 (the 
day after a vacation day), Stoughton could have believed that it 
was assessing an occurrence against Geen for a non-disability 
related unexcused absence.  When an employee is absent for a 
non-disability related reason, Stoughton's policy does not 
require waiting 15 days before it assesses an occurrence against 
an employee.  Perhaps Stoughton was simply following its policy 
of assessing one occurrence for a non-disability related, 
unexcused absence.3 
                                                 
3 In its findings of fact, LIRC trivializes Geen's failure 
to turn in medical documentation justifying his absence on 
January 24.  Instead of acknowledging that Geen's failure to 
turn in medical documentation for January 24 justified the 
assessment 
of 
an 
occurrence 
under 
Stoughton's 
no-fault 
attendance policy, LIRC simply surmises that, even if Geen had 
turned in medical documentation for January 24, Stoughton would 
still have assessed an occurrence against Geen for the period of 
January 24, 27, and 28.  That finding is purely speculative.  If 
Geen had turned in proper medical documentation for January 24 
justifying his absence as disability related, perhaps Stoughton 
would have continued to wait for Geen to submit the FMLA form 
and perhaps Stoughton would have considered combining this later 
period of absence with his previous period of absence from 
December 1996 to early January 1997.   
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶95 Second, although Droessler's note informed Geen that 
he had 15 days to submit medical documentation, it did not 
pinpoint when Stoughton ultimately assesses occurrences against 
employees.  Droessler testified that on many occasions Stoughton 
would assess an occurrence against an employee, but once the 
employee turned in the proper medical form, Stoughton would 
remove the occurrence from the employee's record.   
¶96 Third, the majority treats January 31 as the official 
discharge date without acknowledging that Geen's discharge on 
January 31, 1997, was reversible upon Geen's submittal of the 
proper FMLA form.  Stoughton's discharge of Geen became final on 
February 21, 1997, more than 15 days after Stoughton advised 
Geen to submit medical documentation.  The majority does not 
acknowledge that, if Geen had turned in the FMLA form during his 
appeal to the ARB, both the FMLA and Stoughton's attendance 
policy would have required Stoughton to reverse the occurrence 
against Geen.  By refusing to acknowledge that Geen's discharge 
on January 31, 1997, was not final but was contingent upon 
Geen's submittal of FMLA documentation, the majority implies, 
without providing any justification, that Stoughton did not 
comply with the FMLA.   
¶97 More 
disturbing 
than 
the 
majority's 
factual 
determination that Stoughton violated its no-fault attendance 
policy is the majority's determination that, because Stoughton 
violated 
its 
no-fault attendance policy, it intentionally 
discriminated against Geen when it terminated him.  See majority 
op., 
¶49. 
 
Once 
again, 
the 
majority 
makes 
a 
factual 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
11 
 
determination——this time in direct contradiction of some of 
LIRC's previous findings.   
¶98 In its first decision, LIRC explicitly stated that 
this 
case 
did 
not 
"involve[] 
bad 
intent 
and 
invidious 
discrimination because of hostility towards [Geen] because of 
his disability."  Geen v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., ERD Case No. 
199700618 
(LIRC, Aug. 31, 2000).  LIRC noted that the 
Administrative Law Judge "did not make any findings of fact 
consistent with [Geen's] theory of invidious discrimination."  
Id.  LIRC added that it did "not believe that there is 
substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that Stoughton was 
motivated by bias against Geen because of his disability."  Id. 
¶99 Notably, there has never been a factual finding of 
discriminatory intent on the part of Stoughton——until the 
majority said so.  Although LIRC eventually reversed its prior 
decision, it never commented on or invalidated its conclusion 
that Stoughton lacked discriminatory intent.  On appeal, Geen 
did not argue that Stoughton had discriminatory intent.  Rather, 
Geen argued, and the court of appeals found, that the Hoell4 in-
part 
(mixed motive) test did not require a finding of 
discriminatory intent.  See Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. LIRC, 
2006 WI App 157, ¶33, 295 Wis. 2d 750, 721 N.W.2d 102.   
                                                 
4 Hoell v. LIRC, 186 Wis. 2d 603, 522 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
12 
 
¶100 This court was supposed to clarify whether the in-part 
test requires discriminatory intent5 and to determine whether the 
in-part test would be appropriate in cases where an employer 
utilizes its no-fault attendance policy to terminate an employee 
when some of the employee's absences are disability related and 
others are not.  The majority chooses not to address this issue, 
thus leaving as precedent the court of appeals' decision that 
discriminatory intent is not required under the in-part test and 
that the in-part test is appropriate to apply in cases involving 
termination under a no-fault attendance policy.   
¶101 By 
avoiding 
this 
issue 
and 
simply 
infusing 
discriminatory intent into Stoughton's termination decision, the 
majority is able to avoid Geen's argument that this case is 
really a disparate impact case.6  At oral argument, while 
continuing with his position that discriminatory intent is not 
required under the in-part test, Geen argued that this case was 
                                                 
5 See State Dep't of Employment Relations v. WERC, 122 
Wis. 2d 132, 142, 361 N.W.2d 660 (1985) (stating, "A violation 
of SERLA is not established by merely proving the presence of 
protected concerted activity.  The employee must show that the 
employer was motivated, at least in part, by anti-union 
hostility."); Hoell, 186 Wis. 2d at 614 (stating, "The question 
of an employer's motivation presents a question of ultimate 
fact."); Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. LIRC, 164 Wis. 2d 567, 
597, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the in-part 
test does not apply to disparate impact claims, where a finding 
of discriminatory intent is not required). 
6 "Wisconsin law recognizes two theories of employment 
discrimination——the disparate impact theory and the disparate 
treatment theory."  Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 164 Wis. 2d at 
594. 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
13 
 
a disparate impact case.7  Geen is correct that under a disparate 
impact theory, discriminatory intent is not required.  See 
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. LIRC, 164 Wis. 2d 567, 595, 476 
N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, the in-part test does not 
apply to disparate impact claims.  Id. at 597.  Furthermore, 
although a plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent under 
a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must provide "statistics 
showing, or allowing a reliable deduction," of an adverse 
disparate impact on a protected group.  See Racine Unified Sch. 
Dist., 164 Wis. 2d at 598; Kaczmarek v. City of Stevens Point, 
ERD Case No. 200200370 (LIRC, Aug. 12. 2003).  Geen did not 
provide such statistics; therefore, he had the burden of proving 
discriminatory intent.  Up until the majority said so, Geen had 
not met this burden.   
¶102 The majority is in no position to make this factual 
determination, especially when reasonable inferences favor a 
finding that Stoughton lacked discriminatory intent.  First, 
LIRC found no bad intent or invidious discrimination on the part 
of Stoughton.  Second, Stoughton terminated Geen without ever 
being provided one piece of medical documentation justifying 
Geen's absence on January 24.  Stoughton could have thought it 
was terminating Geen because of an unexcused, non-disability 
                                                 
7 Geen's argument is insightful because the facts of this 
case do more logically apply to a disparate impact theory.  "The 
disparate impact theory is invoked to attack facially neutral 
policies which, although applied evenly, impact more heavily on 
a protected group."  Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. LIRC, 164 
Wis. 2d 567, 595, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991).  A no-fault 
attendance policy is a facially neutral policy.   
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
14 
 
related absence.  Third, the ARB rejected Geen's appeal not 
because of any alleged disability related absence but because of 
its mistaken belief that Geen had taken an unexcused absence, 
rather than an excused vacation day, on January 23.  These facts 
support 
a 
reasonable 
inference 
that 
Stoughton 
did 
not 
intentionally discriminate against Geen when it terminated him.   
V 
¶103 After making these factual determinations and holding 
that Stoughton terminated Geen because of disability, the 
majority 
determines 
that 
Stoughton 
did 
not 
reasonably 
accommodate Geen.  The majority reaches two contradictory 
conclusions.  First, the majority concludes that Stoughton did 
not reasonably accommodate Geen because it failed to give him 
sufficient time to submit documentation to avoid being assessed 
an occurrence.  Majority op., ¶59.  The majority continues, 
however, and concludes that Stoughton did not reasonably 
accommodate Geen because it failed to extend "clemency and 
forbearance" 
by 
temporarily 
suspending 
its 
attendance 
requirements for Geen.  Majority op., ¶64.  Thus, under the 
majority’s second conclusion, even if the majority had found 
that Stoughton had given Geen 15 days to submit the medical 
documentation before it terminated him, Stoughton would still 
have failed to reasonably accommodate Geen.  The majority 
therefore requires an employer to suspend its attendance 
requirements even if an employee fails to submit medical 
documentation 
confirming 
that 
his 
absence 
was 
disability 
related.   
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶104 The majority’s first conclusion——that Stoughton did 
not reasonably accommodate Geen because it failed to give him 15 
days to submit medical documentation——is without merit.  Geen 
had opportunities to turn in the FMLA form while the ARB was 
considering his appeal.8  Even after Geen visited his primary 
physician during the appeal to the ARB, Geen neither asked the 
physician to fill out the FMLA form nor asked the physician for 
medical documentation concerning his January 24 absence.  To 
this day, Stoughton has never received any medical documentation 
justifying his absence on Friday, January 24 (the day after his 
vacation day).  Stoughton gave Geen ample opportunity to have 
his occurrence reversed, but Geen did not take advantage of it.  
Thus, Stoughton should not be penalized for its employee’s 
failure to provide FMLA documentation.   
¶105 The majority’s second conclusion——that Stoughton did 
not reasonably accommodate Geen because it failed to exercise 
"clemency 
and 
forbearance"——is 
also 
without 
merit. 
 
The 
majority’s conclusion conflicts with the settled principle that 
                                                 
8 The majority mischaracterizes LIRC's finding when it 
states that "Droessler informed Geen that he had three days to 
submit adequate documentation to excuse the absence."  Majority 
op., ¶61.  Rather, LIRC stated that "Droessler told [Geen] that 
he had three working days from that date (January 31) to write a 
letter to the company's Attendance Review Board in order to try 
to reverse the assessment of the occurrence.  She told him he 
could submit medical documentation to the Board."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
LIRC never found that Droessler told Geen that he had only 
three days to submit medical documentation.  In fact, the 
parties disputed whether Droessler told Geen at that time that 
he could turn in the FMLA form within 15 days to remove the 
occurrence and make the "whole thing go[] away."   
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
16 
 
where "an employer offers an accommodation which effectively 
eliminates 
the 
conflict between the [disabled] employee’s 
abilities and the job requirements, and which reasonably 
preserves 
the 
affected 
employee’s 
employment 
status, 
the 
accommodation requirement is satisfied."  Norton v. City of 
Kenosha, ERD Case No. 9052433 (LIRC, May 21, 1993); Owen v. Am. 
Packaging Co., ERD Case No. 8920686 (LIRC, Aug. 31, 1990).  In 
this case, Stoughton offered an accommodation to eliminate any 
conflict 
by 
giving 
Geen 
the 
opportunity 
to 
submit 
FMLA 
documentation 
to 
avoid 
an 
occurrence 
under 
the 
no-fault 
attendance policy.  In essence, Stoughton would have exercised 
clemency and forbearance by not assessing Geen a disability 
related occurrence if Geen had only provided it with proper FMLA 
documentation.  The majority concludes, however, that Stoughton 
should have exercised clemency and forbearance without the 
employee ever having to provide the employer with any medical 
documentation justifying his absence.  Employers must now take 
employees at their word regarding disability related absences.  
That is unreasonable accommodation.   
VI 
¶106 In finding that Stoughton terminated Geen because of 
disability and failed to reasonably accommodate him, the 
majority affirms LIRC’s conclusion that all of the following 
remedies 
are 
appropriate: 
a 
cease 
and 
desist 
order, 
reinstatement, attorney's fees, back pay and interest.  Majority 
op., ¶70.  As a result, Stoughton must pay Geen the sum he would 
have earned as an employee from the date of his discharge until 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
17 
 
Geen 
resumes 
employment 
with 
Stoughton 
or 
would 
resume 
employment with Stoughton but for Geen's refusal of a valid 
offer of a substantially equivalent position.  The amount 
payable to Geen is also increased by interest at the rate of 12 
percent simple.  Geen was terminated in early 1997, over 10 
years ago.  At that time, he was making $9.52 an hour.  This is 
a breathtaking penalty. 
¶107 The 
majority upholds LIRC’s award after finding 
discriminatory intent and thus crafting a way to apply Hoell’s 
in-part test.  What is astonishing is that the majority awards 
Geen the maximum remedies allowed under the WFEA for cases of 
pure invidious discrimination.   
VII 
¶108 Because the majority avoids deciding the real issue 
presented in this case and does so by crafting a narrower ground 
upon which to decide the case, I respectfully dissent.   
¶109 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2004AP1550.dtp 
 
 
 
1