Title: KAREN L COX V UNIVERSITY OF MI BD OF REGENTS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116711
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 2001

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 24, 2001  
CONNIE FANE and CHARLES FANE,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v  
No. 116708  
DETROIT LIBRARY COMMISSION,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KAREN L. COX and NORMAN W. COX,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v  
No. 116711  
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
 
 
These 
consolidated cases question the scope of the public  
building exception to governmental immunity1 in light of this  
Court's ruling in Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744; 575  
NW2d 762 (1998). 
The parties in Fane dispute whether the  
elevated terrace where plaintiff fell is part of Detroit's  
main public library building.  In Cox, this Court must  
determine whether a portable ramp placed at a doorstep is part  
of the Fairlane Estate building in Dearborn.  
We conclude that the public building exception can apply  
to parts of a building that extend beyond the walls.  We hold  
the public building exception applicable under the undisputed  
facts in Fane v Detroit Library Commission, because the  
terrace is part of the building.  Hence, we reverse the  
decision of the Court of Appeals.  
In Cox v Board of Regents of the University of Michigan,  
applying the undisputed facts, we find that the ramp is not  
part of the building. Because the public building exception  
does not apply, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  
A. FANE v DETROIT LIBRARY COMMISSION  
On October 21, 1995, Connie Fane was walking toward the  
main entrance of the Detroit Public Library.  She climbed  
several stairs to a broad stone terrace that gives access to  
1MCL 691.1406.  
2  
 
 
 
 
the doors of the library. After she had taken several steps  
on the terrace, the heel of her shoe caught on a raised  
portion of the stonework.  She fell as a result and was  
injured.
 She and her husband, Charles, filed a complaint  
against the Detroit Library Commission.  They alleged that,  
under the public building exception to governmental immunity,  
the commission violated its statutory duty to repair and  
maintain the terrace in a safe condition.  
The commission sought summary disposition under MCR  
2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing that governmental immunity  
bars plaintiffs' claim.  The parties disputed whether the  
terrace was part of the building for the purpose of the public  
building exception. They agreed that the fall did not occur  
in the building itself but on the terrace approximately  
thirty-five yards from the entrance.  Plaintiffs contended  
that the terrace is part of the permanent structure of the  
library building; it is physically attached to the building,  
and it provides the sole access to the main entrance.  
When the trial court denied the commission's motion, the  
commission filed an appeal.  In lieu of granting leave, the  
Court of Appeals, citing Horace, remanded for entry of an  
order granting summary disposition for the commission.2  This  
2Unpublished order, entered May 8, 1998 (Docket No. 
211232).  
3  
 
Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the  
case for consideration with Cox. 459 Mich 944 (1999).3  
On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower  
court's denial of summary disposition, again relying on this  
Court's decision in Horace.4  The Court concluded that the  
trial court had erred as a matter of law in finding that the  
terrace was part of the building. It noted that Connie Fane  
was not alleged to have fallen in the building, and it  
determined that the elevated terrace was "merely contiguous"  
and not part of the building itself.  
The appeals court remanded the case to the trial court  
with instructions to enter an order of summary disposition in  
favor of the commission.  This Court granted leave to appeal,  
ordering the case to be argued and submitted with Cox. 463  
Mich 911 (2000).  
B. COX v BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
On August 21, 1994, Karen Cox was visiting the Henry Ford  
estate to attend her niece's wedding. As she walked from the  
building to an outdoor porch, she stepped on a ramp that had  
been positioned at the doorstep.  The heel of her shoe caught  
3The order also consolidated Maskery v Univ of Mich Bd of  
Regents (Docket No. 109065). 
Maskery is not part of this 
appeal.  
4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 24, 2000 
(Docket No. 211232).  
4  
in a space between the door and the ramp, and the ramp  
slipped, causing her to fall.  
In 
a 
multicount 
complaint, Karen and her husband, Norman,  
sued the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, the  
owners of the property.  They alleged that the ramp was a  
dangerous or defective condition and that the board breached  
its duty under the public building exception to governmental  
immunity by failing to secure it in a proper fashion.  
The 
board 
moved 
for summary disposition, arguing that the  
public building exception did not apply. The board contended  
that, because it was not affixed to the building, the ramp was  
not part of the building itself.  Plaintiffs responded that a  
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the ramp was part  
of the building, notwithstanding that it was portable and  
unattached.  
The trial court granted the board's motion for summary  
disposition, citing MCR 2.116(C)(7).  The Court of Appeals  
denied plaintiffs' delayed application for leave to appeal.5  
This Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration  
as on leave granted. 459 Mich 883 (1998).  
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of  
5Unpublished order, entered July 2, 1998 (Docket No. 
208644).  
5  
 
summary disposition in favor of the board.6  Relying on this  
Court's decision in Horace and a fixtures analysis, the court  
determined that the ramp was not a fixture or an integral part  
of the building.  
The Court concluded that the trial court had properly  
found that the public building exception was not applicable.7  
This Court granted leave to appeal, ordering the case to be  
argued and submitted with Fane. 463 Mich 911 (2000).  
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES  
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW  
In both cases, the Court of Appeals upheld summary  
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).  We review decisions on  
summary disposition motions de novo. Sewell v Southfield Pub  
Schs, 456 Mich 670, 674; 576 NW2d 153 (1998).  Under MCR  
2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is proper when a claim is  
barred by immunity granted by law.  To survive such a motion,  
the plaintiff must allege facts justifying the application of  
an exception to governmental immunity.  Wade v Dep't of  
Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 164; 483 NW2d 26 (1992). 
We  
consider all documentary evidence submitted by the parties,  
6Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 24, 2000 
(Docket No. 215337).  
7The decision also addressed the issue of proprietary 
function, which is not presented in this appeal pursuant to 
this Court's order granting leave to appeal.  
6  
 
accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless  
affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically  
contradict them. Sewell, supra at 674; MCR 2.116(G)(5).  
B. THE PUBLIC BUILDING EXCEPTION  
Under MCL 691.1407(1), a government agency is generally  
immune from suit for actions undertaken in the performance of  
its governmental functions. However, this broad immunity is  
limited by some narrowly drawn exceptions. Jackson v Detroit,  
449 Mich 420, 427; 537 NW2d 151 (1995).  The present appeal  
involves the public building exception to governmental  
immunity, which provides in pertinent part:  
Governmental agencies have the obligation to 
repair and maintain public buildings under their 
control when open for use by members of the public. 
Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury 
and property damage resulting from a dangerous or 
defective condition of a public building if the 
governmental agency had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time 
after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the 
condition or to take action reasonably necessary to 
protect the public against the condition. 
[MCL 
691.1406.]  
To determine whether the public building exception is  
applicable, this Court has set forth a five-pronged test.  
Under the test, a plaintiff is required to prove that  
(1) a governmental agency is involved, (2) the 
public building in question is open for use by 
members of the public, (3) a dangerous or defective 
condition of the public building itself exists, (4) 
the governmental agency had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the alleged defect, and (5) the  
governmental agency failed to remedy the alleged  
7  
 
  
  
defective condition after a reasonable period of 
time or failed to take action reasonably necessary 
to protect the public against the condition after a 
reasonable period.  [Kerbersky v Northern Mich  
Univ, 458 Mich 525, 529; 582 NW2d 828 (1998), 
citing Jackson, supra at 428.]  
It is the third element of this test that is at issue in the  
present appeal, whether a dangerous or defective condition of  
the public building itself exists.  
III. HORACE V CITY OF PONTIAC  
The Court of Appeals determined that neither the terrace  
nor the ramp is part of the buildings in question, relying on  
this Court's decision in Horace. Horace was a consolidated  
appeal involving two different sets of facts, both of which  
involved injuries from defects in walkways.8
 The first  
concerned a hole or crack eighteen to twenty-eight feet from  
the entrance doors of the Silverdome in Pontiac. The second  
involved a hole in a walkway leading to the entrance of a  
building at a rest area on I-75.  
The issue in Horace was whether the public building  
exception applies to dangerous or defective conditions of  
areas outside and adjacent to entrances or exits of public  
buildings. Horace, supra at 746. The Court concluded that  
"the ground adjacent to a public building is [not] a public  
'building,' statutorily speaking . . . ."  Id. at 757. Thus,  
8The decision in Horace also resolved its companion case, 
Adams v Dep't of State Highways & Transportation.  
8  
the core holding of Horace is that mere sidewalks and walkways  
are clearly outside the scope of the public building  
exception.  
However, the Court added in a footnote that the decision  
is not an absolute bar to injuries occurring from defective or  
dangerous conditions located outside the four walls of a  
building. The footnote states:  
The dissent suggests that our opinion may cut 
off liability for injuries resulting from the 
collapse of an outside overhang on a public 
building, stairs leading up to or down from an 
elevated building entrance, an underground tunnel 
leading into a building, an attached external ramp 
or railing.  While it is not necessary for us to 
resolve these hypothetical situations in the case 
at bar, we note that an outside overhang is a 
danger presented by a physical condition of a 
building itself and that some stairs may also fit 
the test we adopt today if they are truly part of 
the building itself. [Id. at 756-757, n 9.]  
We are now asked to further clarify the extent to which  
something outside a building falls within the exception.  
IV. ANALYSIS  
As an initial matter, we conclude that the Court of  
Appeals reading of Horace was overly broad. The appeals court  
decision mistakenly portrays Horace as stating a bright-line  
rule precluding liability for injuries occurring from  
dangerous 
or 
defective conditions of building parts outside an  
entrance or exit. By imposing an absolute bar on liability  
for injuries arising from something outside the four walls of  
9  
 
a building, the opinion precludes the possibility that an  
external part might be "truly part of the building itself."  
While such an interpretation would be warranted by the  
words "in a public building," the Legislature did not choose  
that phrase. Rather, it referred to injuries resulting from  
dangerous or defective conditions "of a public building,"  
which implies that the conditions could pertain to parts of a  
building outside its walls.  We presume that "of" rather than  
"in" was carefully chosen to reflect legislative intent.  See  
Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410; 424 NW2d  
248 (1988).  
It is consistent with Horace and its treatment of the  
word "of" to consider the characteristics of the building and  
the item in question.9  If it must be determined whether the  
building 
possesses 
the 
item, 
surely 
the 
relative  
characteristics of both must be evaluated.  
In some cases, a fixtures analysis will be helpful in  
determining whether an item outside the four walls of a  
building is "of a public building." As recognized in Velmer  
v Baraga Area Schs,10 a dangerous or defective fixture can  
support a claim of liability under the public building  
9Horace indicated that "of" is "used to indicate  
possession." 456 Mich 756.  
10430 Mich 385, 394; 424 NW2d 770 (1988).  
10  
  
 
exception.  
However, the fixtures analysis is limited to items of  
personal property that have a possible existence apart from  
realty. Wayne Co v Britton Trust observes that "[t]he term  
'fixture' necessarily implies something having a possible  
existence apart from realty, but which may, by annexation, be  
assimilated into realty."  Wayne Co v Britton Trust, 454 Mich  
608, 614-615; 563 NW2d 674 (1997) (citation omitted). Where  
the facts do not lend themselves to a fixtures analysis  
because the item causing the injury has no existence apart  
from realty, the courts must look beyond the fixtures analysis  
to determine whether an item or area outside the four walls of  
a building is "of a public building."  
Under the fixtures analysis, an item is considered part  
of the building if it is found to be a fixture. An item is a  
fixture if (1) it is annexed to realty, (2) its adaptation or  
application to the realty is appropriate, and (3) it was  
intended as a permanent accession to the realty.  Id. at 615.  
When a fixtures analysis does not apply, in determining  
whether an item or area outside the four walls of a building  
is "of a public building," the courts should consider whether  
the item or area where the injury occurred is physically  
connected to and not intended to be removed from the  
11  
building.11  
A. FANE v DETROIT LIBRARY COMMISSION  
A fixtures analysis is not applicable to the elevated  
library terrace in Fane because the terrace does not have an  
existence apart from the library.  Therefore, we must  
determine whether it is physically connected to and not  
intended to be removed from the building, making the terrace  
part "of a public building."  
The terrace is a large stone area that is physically  
abutting and built into the library building.  It is not  
intended to be removed from the rest of the building in the  
foreseeable future.  Normally, to reach the main entrance, one  
walks along a sidewalk, up stairs to the elevated terrace,  
across the terrace, and up additional stairs.  If the terrace  
were removed, the doors to the library would be located  
approximately four feet off the ground.  
We conclude that the elevated terrace is physically  
connected to and not intended to be removed from the library.  
Accordingly, we are persuaded that the terrace is part of the  
building within the meaning of the public building exception.  
11A temporary object or structure is normally not part of 
a building.  Consider, for example, scaffolding attached to a  
building 
only 
for 
the 
period 
necessary 
to 
complete 
construction.  Because it is clearly intended to be removed 
from the building, the scaffolding could not be considered 
part of the building.  
12  
  
  
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Fanes' claim  
was precluded by the holding in Horace.  
B. COX v BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
The 
characteristics of the portable ramp indicate that it  
is personal property with a possible existence apart from the  
doorstep of the Fairlane Estate building.  As such, the  
fixtures analysis is applicable.  
There is no dispute that the portable ramp was not  
physically attached to the building and could readily be  
removed. 
Wayne Co states that annexation can be actual or  
constructive.  Constructive annexation occurs where the item  
cannot be removed from the building without impairing the  
value of both the item and the building. Wayne Co, supra at  
615-616. However, there is no evidence that removal of the  
ramp would impair the value of either the ramp or the  
building.
 Therefore, the ramp was not actually or  
constructively annexed to the building.  
Although the ramp was adapted appropriately to the  
entrance, there is no evidence that it was intended as a  
permanent accession to the building. 
We conclude that the  
ramp is not a fixture and, therefore, not part of the  
building.  Because it does not fall within the public building  
exception, 
the 
appeals 
court 
correctly 
determined 
that 
summary  
disposition was proper in Cox.  
13  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
Horace 
acknowledges 
that 
injuries 
occurring 
from  
dangerous or defective conditions of building parts outside  
the walls of a building can fall within the public building  
exception.  In determining whether an item or area outside the  
walls of a building is "of a public building," the courts must  
consider the characteristics of the building and of the item  
in question.  A fixtures analysis should be used where the  
item is personal property that could possibly have an  
existence apart from the realty.  However, where the facts  
indicate that the fixtures analysis does not apply, the courts  
should consider whether the item or area where the injury  
occurred is physically connected to and not intended to be  
removed from the building.  
Applying this analysis to the undisputed facts in Fane,  
we conclude that the elevated terrace is part of the library  
building 
itself 
because the terrace is physically connected to  
and not intended to be removed from the library. Hence, the  
Fanes are not precluded from pursuing their claim.  The Court  
of Appeals order instructing the trial court to enter summary  
disposition in favor of the commission is reversed.  
However, we affirm in Cox.  Applying the undisputed  
facts, the ramp is personal property that could possibly have  
an existence apart from the building.  Therefore, the fixtures  
14  
 
 
 
analysis is applicable.  However, the ramp is not a fixture  
because it is not annexed to the building and was not intended  
as a permanent accession to the building.  Therefore, the ramp  
is not part of the building.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of  
Appeals in Cox and reverse in Fane.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with KELLY, J.  
15