Title: State v. Saiz
Citation: 106 Ariz. 352, 476 P.2d 515
Docket Number: 2093
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 1970

106 Ariz. 352 (1970) 476 P.2d 515 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Terry SAIZ, Appellant. No. 2093. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. November 10, 1970. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Public Defender, by Anne Kappes, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice. Terry Saiz, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was tried along with Benjamin B. Verrue and others upon a charge of possession of a narcotic. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to not less than two nor more than three years in the Arizona State Penitentiary. In State v. Verrue, 106 Ariz. 325, 475 P.2d 939, we considered the separate appeal of Benjamin B. Verrue which presented some questions identical to those presented herein. The first five deal with the validity of the seach warrant and the misjoinder of the defendants. Our holding in Verrue, supra, disposed of these questions. The defendant in addition to the questions relating to the validity of the search warrant and misjoinder of the defendants, further states there was not probable cause to make an arrest without a warrant and that the evidence was insufficient to connect the defendant with the narcotics. The defendant was at the home of Benjamin B. Verrue along with three others when on August 23, 1968, officers of the Arizona State Narcotic Division who had a search warrant went to the home of Benjamin B. Verrue, knocked at the door and yelled that it was the police; that they had a search warrant. *353 The screen door was closed and the other door was open. They announced their identity and purpose for being there. At this time they were unable to see anyone coming toward the door. They entered the house going directly to the living room where they heard a movement. Upon entering the kitchen they found people, including the defendant around the kitchen table. Officer Moody testified some of them were standing and some were in the process of getting up when they entered. Defendant ran out the back door and was stopped by an officer who was at the rear of the house. He was returned to the kitchen and there along with his four co-defendants placed under arrest. Officer Moody testified that he observed puncture wounds in the inner area of the defendant's arm. He testified "it was fresh; that it had blood which appeared to be uncoagulated." At the trial Verrue and defendant were represented by separate attorneys, evidence was admitted that officers observed a hypodermic needle, spoon which contained a piece of cotton and an eye dropper which contained some brown liquid. Over defendant's objection the state introduced into evidence twenty-six packets removed from Verrue's pocket during the arrest. Three were chosen at random for examination and were found to contain narcotics. The other twenty-three were later removed from the evidence. A.R.S. § 13-1403, subsection 4, authorizes a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant: Officer Procunier testified that he "observed a subject", the defendant, "running from the back door of the house * * * and pursued him some 20 to 30 yards, * * * I told him to stop, I was a police officer * * * I grabbed ahold of him and took him back through the rear door of the residence into the kitchen area." The defendant was later placed under arrest by the officer in charge. Officer Procunier, together with the other officers, was on the premises making an investigation in connection with a search warrant issued on probable cause that a felony was being committed thereon. At the time of the arrest all of the evidence had been observed by the officers. The defendant had attempted flight, which could be considered by the officer "as conduct evidencing a consciousness of guilt". Udall, Law of Evidence, Sec. 178, p. 383; State v. Vaughn, 104 Ariz. 240, 450 P.2d 698. The main contention of counsel for defendant in the instant case was that Officer Procunier did not have actual knowledge of the commission of the felony as observed by the other officers and therefore not having that knowledge he did not have the right to stop the defendant. In the execution of a search warrant the officers have a right to do everything that is reasonably necessary to make a search and to prevent the destruction of evidence for which the search warrant was issued. If they could not stop an individual from fleeing, he could put evidence in his pocket and thereafter destroy it and a search warrant would thereby become useless in narcotic cases. Furthermore, an officer seeing a person fleeing from a house that is being searched would have probable cause to believe that the reason the individual was fleeing from the house was for the purpose of escaping with the article sought, thereby preventing it from being found. In State v. Vaughn, supra, we said: In the Vaughn case, supra, the officer had probable cause to stop the suspect in connection with the investigation of a felony which had taken place in the area; the actions of the suspect gave rise to this suspicion. There was probable cause to apprehend and search the suspect. The result of the investigation reenforced the officer's belief that the suspect was guilty and arrest followed. Also see State v. Musgrove, 2 Ariz. App. 505, 410 P.2d 127, cert. den. 385 U.S. 979, 87 S. Ct. 524, 17 L. Ed. 2d 441, which cites State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130. In State v. Quintana, this court held that reasonableness of the officer's conduct would be determined by the circumstances of the case and we quoted from People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437, as follows: In reversing a conviction for lack of evidence demonstrating probable cause the United States Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 148 stated: We accordingly hold that the arrest of the defendant was lawful and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. Our holding in the Verrue case is equally applicable to this defendant as regards the questions of dominion, control and testimony thereto of the narcotic in Verrue's pocket. Possession may be jointly by two or more persons. Exclusive possession is not required. State v. Verrue, supra. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of the jury of possession of narcotics. Judgment affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., concur.