Title: Ex parte Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. v. Drucilla D. Johnson) (Talladega Circuit Court: CV 02-518; Civil Appeals : 2030409). Affirmed. No Opinion.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1041405
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2007

Rel. 06/08/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1041405
____________________
Ex parte Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc.
v.
Drucilla D. Johnson)
(Talladega Circuit Court, CV-02-518;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2030409)
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A), Ala. R. App. P.
1041405
2
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin,
JJ., concur. 
See and Parker, JJ., concur specially.
Murdock, J., recuses himself.
1041405
3
PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the per curiam no-opinion affirmance, but I
write separately to emphasize that this Court should not
depart from the compensation schedule enacted by the
legislature in cases in which the plaintiff/worker complains
of debilitating pain, unless the plaintiff/worker presents
objective evidence that the pain he or she experiences is
truly disabling.
I. Case History
Drucilla Johnson began working for Masterbrand Cabinets,
Inc., in February 2000.  Her tasks included inspecting and
repairing cabinet doors during the finishing process.  The job
required light sanding, puttying cracks, and flipping the
cabinet doors and involved repetitive motions of her hands,
arms, and wrists.  She handled 380-500 cabinet doors of
varying sizes and weights each day.
After several months of employment, Johnson experienced
pain and swelling in her wrists, hands, and arms.  She was
eventually diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome, and she had
surgery on both hands in January and February 2001.  She then
returned to work on light duty, but the pain and the swelling
1041405
4
continued, even though she received physical therapy and took
prescribed muscle relaxants.  She declined to have pronator
surgery suggested by her doctor, Dr. Sharon L. Colgin, a
surgeon who specializes in hand surgery, because the earlier
surgeries had not given her much relief and because Dr. Colgin
could not guarantee that the surgery would be successful.
After consulting with a vocational expert who had examined and
tested Johnson, Dr. Colgin returned Johnson to work but
limited her to work that did not require repetitive motions of
her hands, wrists, and arms.  When Johnson continued to suffer
pain and swelling in her arms, Dr. Colgin told her that,
because it appeared that the only jobs Masterbrand had for
Johnson involved repetitive arm motions, Johnson should not
work at Masterbrand at all.  Johnson stopped working there in
May 2002.
After she stopped working at Masterbrand, her condition
appears to have deteriorated significantly.  At the time of
the trial in August 2003, she was complaining of swelling and
constant throbbing pain in her hands and arms that often
1041405
Commenting on the subjectivity of this kind of testimony,
1
the Alabama Self-Insurers Association observes in its amicus
curiae brief at 14:
"It is apparent that the primary distinction
between the holdings [of the Court of Civil Appeals]
in Masterbrand [Cabinets, Inc. v. Johnson, [Ms.
2030409, June 3, 2005] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005),] and [Kohler Co. v.] Miller [, 921 So.
2d 
436 
(Ala. 
Civ. 
App. 
2005),] 
is 
that 
in
Masterbrand the employee testified to having 8 out
of 10 pain, where in Miller the employee testified
to having 6 out of 10 pain.  Any rule of law based
upon 
this 
principle 
will 
only 
lead 
to
inconsistencies in judgments...."
See Armstrong v. Lewis & Assocs. Constr. Co., 469 So. 2d 605,
607 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), in which the Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed a trial court's determination that the worker's
disability was only 5% because the evidence of permanent and
total disability was "entirely subjective."
5
reached a level of 8 to 10 on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10
being the worst.  
1
Although the testimony concerning the extent of Johnson's
disability varied, the trial court agreed with the opinion of
Johnson's vocational expert that Johnson suffers a 100%
vocational disability and loss of earning capacity.  The trial
court held:
"[T]he injuries ... and the resulting pain and
disability therefrom, extends to other parts of her
body ... and the court finds that [Johnson] suffers
a 100% permanent and total disability to the body as
a whole with a consequent 100% loss of earning
capacity." 
1041405
6
Masterbrand appealed.  The Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the
evidence indicated that Johnson was at maximum medical
improvement at the time of the trial and that there was
sufficient evidence, albeit conflicting, to support the trial
court's conclusion that Johnson's disability is complete and
permanent. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. v. Johnson, [Ms.
2030409, June 3, 2005] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
Concerning the treatment of the injury as an unscheduled
injury to the body as a whole, rather than as a scheduled
injury to Johnson's arms under § 25-5-57(a)(3), Ala. Code
1975, the Court of Civil Appeals said:
"We do not read Ex parte Drummond [Co., 837 So.
2d 831 (Ala. 2002),] as foreclosing compensation
outside the schedule when an injury, although to a
scheduled member, entails 'an abnormal and unusual
incapacity with respect to the member' -– in
particular, a debilitating pain -– that impairs the
body as a whole in a manner not contemplated by the
schedule. The Supreme Court specifically explained
in Ex parte Drummond that its original intention in
adopting in Bell [v. Driskill, 282 Ala. 640, 213 So.
2d 806 (1968),] an exception to the workers'
compensation schedule had been to 'address those
instances where the injury to a scheduled member
caused such impairment to the body as a whole that
the benefits reflected on the schedule were not
appropriate.' ...
1041405
7
"Although it then restated the applicable test
as whether '"the effects of the loss of the member
extend to other parts of the body and interfere with
their efficiency,"' the Drummond Court did not have
before it a case that required it to address an
abnormal or unusual pain that, although isolated to
a 
scheduled 
member, 
caused 
a 
more 
general
debilitating effect on the body as a whole."
___ So. 2d at ___.  The Court of Civil Appeals then quoted the
following from Ex parte Drummond:
"'This case does not present a situation in which
the pain, although isolated to the scheduled member,
causes a disability to the body as a whole.  We
recognize that pain can be totally, or virtually
totally, debilitating, but this case does not
present such a situation; therefore, we decline to
address that situation here.'"
___ So. 2d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So. 2d
831, 836-37 n. 11 (Ala. 2002)).  Masterbrand petitioned for a
writ of certiorari.  This Court granted the writ.  Georgia
Pacific Corporation and the Alabama Self-Insurers Association
filed amici curiae briefs in support of Masterbrand.
II. Analysis
Before the advent of workers' compensation statutes,
common-law principles governed compensation for work-related
injuries.  An unfortunate consequence was expensive and time-
consuming litigation, and injured employees frequently were
unsuccessful in obtaining compensation because they could not
1041405
1 Terry Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 1:4-5
2
(1998).
8
afford to pay an attorney or because their employers could
successfully raise common-law defenses such as the fellow-
servant rule, contributory negligence, or assumption of risk.2
A major goal of the legislature in adopting the Alabama
Workers' Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et
seq.("the Act"), was to remove these common-law defenses in
most workers' compensation cases and also to minimize the cost
of litigating a worker's compensation claim.  The legislature
included in the Act a fixed schedule that sets the
compensation on various types of injuries.  See § 25-5-57.
Although with the enactment of workers' compensation statutes
the worker lost the right to a jury trial in most cases, he or
she gained the right to a speedier and less expensive
determination without having to establish that the employer
was negligent and that the employee was not contributorily
negligent. 
As the amicus curiae brief filed by Georgia Pacific
observes, the legislature's primary purpose in enacting the
workers' compensation schedule as part of the Act was to
minimize costly and time-consuming litigation over work-
1041405
9
related injuries.  The legislature did not totally eliminate
litigation, but the occasions on which injuries could be
compensated outside the schedule were carefully limited.  
The schedule for the applicable members in Johnson's
case, § 25-5-57(a)(3)a.24, sets forth specifically the
compensation to be awarded for the "loss of two arms, other
than at the shoulder," and § 25-5-57(a)(3)d provides that the
permanent and total loss of the use of a member shall be
considered as equivalent to the loss of that member.  Although
the evidence was disputed, the trial court found that Johnson
had suffered the permanent and total loss of the use of both
arms, other than at the shoulder, so by the terms of the Act
the compensation for Johnson's loss is fixed by § 25-5-
57(a)(3)a.24.
However, in Bell v. Driskill, 282 Ala. 640, 213 So. 2d
806 (1968), the Court began a departure from the strict
application of the compensation schedule in the Act.  The
Court stated:
"[A]lthough the injury itself is to only one part or
member of the body, if the effect of such injury
extends to other parts of the body, and produces a
greater or more prolonged incapacity than that which
naturally results from the specific injury, or the
injury causes an abnormal and unusual incapacity
1041405
10
with respect to the member, then the employee is not
limited in his recovery under the [Workers']
Compensation Law to the amount allowed under the
schedule for injury to the one member."
282 Ala. at 646, 213 So. 2d at 811. 
The Court in Bell
cited 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 58.20 at 44-45
and 156 A.L.R. 1344 for the proposition that when an injury to
one part of the body extends to other parts and produces an
incapacity the employee is not limited to the compensation
provided for by the schedule.  The Court quoted Warrior Stone
& Contracting Co. v. De Foor, 241 Ala. 227, 229,  2 So. 2d
430, 431 (1941), for the proposition that certain injuries
"'can not be truthfully and fairly expressed in any percentage
of disability of any designated member or members of the
petitioner's body.'"
However, the Court in Bell made no attempt to reconcile
its decision with the plain language of § 25-5-57.
A series of cases followed in Bell's wake in which the
Court of Civil Appeals considered employees' injuries outside
the compensation schedule in § 25-5-57: Dale Motels, Inc. v.
Crittendon, 50 Ala. App. 251, 278 So. 2d 370 (1973);
Richardson Homes Corp. v. Shelton, 336 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1976); Republic Steel Corp. v. Kimbrell, 370 So. 2d 294
1041405
11
(Ala. Civ. App. 1979);   Smith v. Capps, 414 So. 2d 102 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1982); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So. 2d 1129
(Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Checker's Drive-In Rest. v. Brock, 603
So. 2d 1066 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); U.S. Steel v. Nelson, 634
So. 2d 134 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); American Cast Iron Pipe Co.
v. Uptain, 680 So. 2d 387 (Ala Civ. App. 1996); and A.M.R.
Servs. v. Butler, 697 So. 2d 472 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
In all these cases, the intent of the Court of Civil
Appeals was to provide justice and fair compensation to
injured employees; the result, however, was to effectively
rewrite § 25-5-57 by placing certain types of injuries outside
the schedule.  As a further result, by removing certain types
of injuries from the schedule and subjecting the injured
employee to costly and time-consuming litigation, one of the
basic purposes of the Act was undermined.
In 2002, this Court decided Ex parte Drummond Co., 837
So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2002).  The Court quoted 4 Lex K. Larson,
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 87.02 (2001):
"'The great majority of modern decisions agree
that, if the effects of the loss of the member
extend to other parts of the body and interfere with
1041405
Although this Court quoted from Larson in Ex parte
3
Drummond and other Alabama courts have frequently quoted
Larson, Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 2:8, observes
that "[i]n adopting the workers' compensation laws, the
Alabama legislation created a system of compensation different
from any other type of compensation system.  The Workers
Compensation Act is 
sui 
generis." 
(Footnote 
omitted.)
However, in § 3:10 Moore does note that the Act was  modeled
after the Workers' Compensation Law of Minnesota, though its
resemblance to Minnesota's law has diminished with time.  For
that reason, citations from other jurisdictions and from
treatises about workers' compensation generally are of limited
value in interpreting Alabama's Workers' Compensation Act.
12
their efficiency, the schedule allowance for the
lost member is not exclusive.'"3
837 So. 2d at 834.  This Court then stated that "[b]ecause of
the confusion that has developed surrounding the Bell test, we
today adopt the language recited above from Larson, Workers'
Compensation Law § 87.02, as the test for determining whether
an injury to a scheduled member should be treated as
unscheduled ...."  This Court then held, "[T]herefore, we
overrule Bell insofar as it established a different test, and
we further overrule those cases listed in notes 5 through 8
[A.M.R. Services, Gold Kist, Republic Steel Corp., Richardson
Homes Corp., Checker's Drive-In Restaurant, American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., U.S. Steel, Smith, and Dale Motels] insofar as they
expanded the Bell test."  837 So. 2d at 835.
1041405
13
The Ex parte Drummond decision effectively upheld that
portion of Bell that allowed injuries to be compensated
outside the schedule "'if the effect of such injury extends to
other parts of the body, and produces a greater or more
prolonged incapacity than that which naturally results from
the specific injury ....'" 282 Ala. at 646, 213 So. 2d at 811.
But Ex parte Drummond effectively overruled that portion of
Bell that allowed compensation outside the schedule "if the
injury causes an abnormal and unusual incapacity with respect
to the member ...." 282 Ala. at 646, 213 So. 2d at 811.  In
effect, Ex parte Drummond held that an injury that extends
beyond the injured member and affects the efficiency of other
members may be compensated outside the schedule, but an injury
that affects the efficiency of only the injured member, albeit
in an abnormal and unusual way, may be compensated only within
the schedule.  But as previously noted, Ex parte Drummond, in
footnote 11, left open the possibility that in a given
situation pain in one member could be so disabling as to
prevent a person from working.
However, 
proving 
that 
disabling 
pain 
exists 
is
problematic.  Other courts, wary of the reliability of
1041405
14
testimony concerning pain, have encouraged examination of
medical evidence in addition to lay testimony to determine
whether the effect of the pain is truly disabling.  See Morris
v. Lansdell's Frame Co., 547 So. 2d 782, 785-86 (Miss. 1989)
("[W]e are seriously concerned that there is a great potential
for abuse in claims which are based predominantly upon pain
reported by the patient, particularly in circumstances where
the patient's testimony or statement to the physician is the
sole evidence of its continued presence.  In these cases it
would be prudent to obtain additional medical evidence to
either support or dispute the claim."); Crisp v. Southern Silk
Screen, Inc., 451 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. Ct. App. 1984) ("A
compensation 
claimant 
who 
alleges 
disability 
due 
to
substantial or appreciable pain must establish that condition
to a reasonable certainty and by a fair preponderance of the
evidence. ...  A claimant is not disabled solely because of
some residual pain or discomfort.  Pain is disabling only if
it is substantial. ...  Whether a claimant has met this burden
is a question of fact based on the totality of the lay and
medical 
evidence.").  Alabama decisions have reflected similar
1041405
Although Alabama courts have recognized that the injured
4
person's subjective testimony concerning his or her pain is a
relevant factor to be considered in light of the totality of
evidence, a trial court may properly determine that it is
insufficient in itself to constitute the basis for an award
outside the compensation schedule in § 25-5-57.  Lofton v.
Brown & Root, 591 So. 2d 88 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), involved a
worker who sought permanent-total-disability benefits after
suffering a fall at work.  The Court of Civil Appeals noted
that "the only evidence concerning Lofton's pain is his own
subjective testimony.  It is apparent that the trial court did
not find this evidence persuasive in light of the other
testimony that was presented.  A reasonable view of this
evidence supports the court's judgment[;] thus it cannot be
disturbed on appeal."  591 So. 2d at 89-90.  Other Alabama
cases have held that the injured person's subjective testimony
about his or her pain is entitled to be considered, but in
each of these cases the person's testimony was considered
along with other, more objective evidence.  Dolgencorp, Inc.
v. Hudson, 924 So. 2d 727 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Lemons v.
Alabama Dep't of Fin., 856 So. 2d 847 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003);
and Checker's Drive-In Rest. v. Brock, supra.
15
concerns over stand-alone subjective testimony by the claimant
as to the degree of pain the claimant suffers.4
The Act, and particularly the schedule at § 25-5-
57(a)(3)a, does not provide for an exception to the scheduled
payments.  Instead, through Bell and Ex parte Drummond, this
Court has created an exception, allowing unscheduled awards
for injuries to members of such severity that they impact the
claimant's entire body.  Because this court-created exception
supplements the statutory compensation schedule in § 25-5-
1041405
16
57(a), we must apply it narrowly.  Therefore, a claimant
seeking compensation outside the schedule should provide
objective evidence that disabling pain exists.
 We should require a claimant who seeks compensation
beyond the schedule in the Act because of disabling pain to
prove either (1) that his or her pain extends to other parts
of the body and so interferes with the use of those parts as
to have a disabling effect on the entire body or (2) that the
pain 
"is 
sufficiently 
abnormal 
in 
its 
frequency 
or 
continuity
and in its severity," Masterbrand, ___ So. 2d at ___, and is
present even when the scheduled member is not used, such that
it has a disabling effect on the body as a whole.  The
resolution of this question of fact depends on the "totality
of the lay and medical evidence" before the fact-finder.
Crisp, 451 So. 2d at 1262.  The pain claimed, thus, must be
consistent with the medical evaluation of the injury.
This case raises the issue of disabling pain, which the
Court in footnote 11 in Ex parte Drummond said was not present
there:
"This case does not present a situation in which
the pain, although isolated to a scheduled member,
causes a disability to the body as a whole.  We
recognize that pain can be totally, or virtually
1041405
17
totally, debilitating, but this case does not
present such a situation; therefore, we decline to
address that situation here."
837 So. 2d at 836-37 n. 11.  The Ex parte Drummond Court did
not decide that debilitating pain was a basis for taking an
injury out of the schedule for the purpose of determining
compensation; the Court simply noted that this issue was not
presented in that case.  The Court recognized that a situation
involving debilitating pain could arise, but the Court did not
say what should be done in such a situation.  Significantly,
several of the Court of Civil Appeals cases overruled by this
Court  in Ex parte Drummond involved debilitating pain similar
to that claimed here:  Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, supra
(involving carpal tunnel syndrome that caused the loss of the
use of the employee's right hand resulting in an inability to
concentrate); A.M.R. Servs. v. Butler, supra (involving three
fractured fingers that caused residual pain); Richardson Homes
Corp. v. Shelton, supra (involving five fractured metatarsal
bones that caused pain extending up to the knee, swelling
after standing for three hours, and difficulty sleeping at
night).  In all those cases the trial court awarded
nonscheduled benefits.  In all those cases the Court of Civil
1041405
18
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.  This Court
overruled all those decisions in Ex parte Drummond; however,
the Court did not completely rule out the possibility that a
worker could be compensated outside the schedule in some
exceptional circumstances, and the Court did not eliminate the
possibility that in some circumstances pain could be so
debilitating as to entirely prevent a person from holding
gainful employment.  That case is now before us.
Johnson does not claim that her actual injury extends
beyond her hands and arms.  Rather, she claims that the pain
in her hands and arms is so debilitating that it effectively
interferes with the rest of her body.  She rates the pain in
her hands and arms as 8 to 10 on a scale of 0 to 10, but I
would be reluctant to affirm an unscheduled award based upon
that subjective testimony alone. 
Dr. Colgin acknowledged
that when a patient is asked to rate her pain on a scale of 0
to 10, the patient's answer is going to be somewhat
subjective.  However, Dr. Colgin testified that she tries to
minimize the subjective nature of that question by explaining
to the patient that 0 means no pain at all and 8 to 10 means
"I have to go to the emergency room."  This helps the patient
1041405
19
be more objective, although Dr. Colgin acknowledged that one
person's emergency-room point may not be another person's
emergency-room point.
In this case, the record presents objective evidence that
disabling pain does exist.  Dr. Colgin, a surgeon who
specializes in hand surgery, testified that she has practiced
hand surgery since 1991 and that she has seen and treated
Johnson on numerous occasions from November 2001 until July
2002.  She testified that the pain Johnson described was
consistent with the pain generally associated with pronator
syndrome.  She testified that she conducted provocative
testing of Johnson's median nerves and determined that the
test produced substantial pain.  In physical-therapy sessions
she determined that Johnson's pronator muscles were extremely
tender; when she tapped the nerve, a response of tingling was
produced that, Dr. Colgin testified, is "hard for somebody to
fake."  She said Johnson also displayed objective criteria
that indicate pain, such as elevated blood pressure and
accelerated heart rate and breathing rate.  She also said
Johnson's forearms were "as hard as any female I'd ever seen"
and that this is an objective indicator of subjective pain.
1041405
20
I therefore conclude that the evidence of disabling pain,
although not conclusive, is sufficient that the trial court's
finding that Johnson suffered disabling pain is not clearly
erroneous.  I therefore concur to affirm the judgment of the
Court of Civil Appeals.
See, J., concurs.