Title: Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC21-175
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 5, 2023

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC21-175 
____________ 
 
BRINDA COATES, etc., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
 
January 5, 2023 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
 
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Coates, 308 So. 3d 1068 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2020), the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed as 
excessive a punitive damages award that exceeds the net 
compensatory damages award by a ratio of 106.7 to 1.  In so ruling, 
the district court certified a question of great public importance.1  
308 So. 3d at 1076. 
In passing upon the certified question, the Fifth District 
addressed the Florida and federal standards for evaluating whether 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
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a punitive damages award is excessive, and ultimately certified this 
question: 
When other factors support the amount of punitive 
damages awarded, but the award is excessive compared 
to the compensatory award, does the amount of punitive 
damages that may legally be imposed for causing the 
death of a human being depend on the actual amount of 
compensatory damages awarded to the decedent’s estate, 
even when that compensatory award is modest and the 
punitive award would be sustainable compared to awards 
in other cases for comparable injuries caused by 
comparable misconduct? 
 
Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1076. 
Under Florida law, although the trial court has broad 
discretion in ruling on a motion for remittitur of a damages award, 
that discretion is constrained by statutory criteria that must be 
considered in determining whether the award is excessive.  See 
Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 308 (Fla. 
2017).  Because the Florida Statutes require us to conclude that a 
punitive damages award in a wrongful death action must bear a 
reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury 
suffered by the statutory beneficiaries, we decline to further analyze 
the issue as a matter of Florida or federal constitutional law.  See In 
re Holder, 945 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2006) (“[W]e have long 
 
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subscribed to a principle of judicial restraint by which we avoid 
considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided 
on nonconstitutional grounds.”).  Accordingly, we rephrase the 
certified question as follows: 
Does the trial court in a wrongful death action abuse its 
discretion by denying remittitur of a punitive damages 
award that does not bear a reasonable relation to the 
amount of damages proved and the injury suffered by the 
statutory beneficiaries? 
 
As explained below, our answer to the rephrased question is 
yes, and because no reasonable trial court could have concluded 
that the necessary relation exists in this case, we hold that the trial 
court abused its discretion by denying remittitur of the excessive 
award.  Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District’s decision 
reversing the punitive damages award and remanding for further 
proceedings to the extent the district court’s decision is consistent 
with this opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
This case involves a non-Engle2 wrongful death action that is 
governed by the 1997 version of the Florida Statutes based on the 
 
 
2.  Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). 
 
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date of the decedent’s death.  Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1070 n.1, 1071.  
In the operative complaint filed in the trial court, the plaintiff 
Brinda Coates, individually and as the personal representative of 
the estate of her sister, Lois Stucky, alleged that Ms. Stucky died as 
a result of lung cancer caused by smoking cigarettes and sought 
relief from the defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) 
based on four theories: (1) negligence, (2) strict-liability design 
defect, (3) fraud, and (4) conspiracy. 
The jury found for Ms. Coates on the strict liability theory but 
rejected RJR’s liability under the other three theories.  The jury 
further found that each of Ms. Stucky’s three adult children 
sustained $100,000 in damages, for a total of $300,000.  Id. at 
1070.  The jury’s verdict specified that these were “the total 
amount” of damages sustained by Ms. Stucky’s children “for the 
loss of parental companionship, instruction[,] and guidance, and 
from their mental pain and suffering as a result of Lois Stucky’s 
lung cancer and death.”  However, the jury also found that Ms. 
Stucky’s negligence caused 50% of the damages, which reduced the 
total compensatory damages to $150,000.  Coates, 308 So. 3d at 
 
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1070.  Finally, the jury found that punitive damages were 
warranted and ultimately awarded $16 million.  Id. 
RJR filed a motion for new trial or remittitur, arguing that the 
punitive damages award was excessive.  Id.  In an unelaborated 
order, the trial court denied RJR’s motion, id. at 1071 n.3, and then 
entered a final judgment against RJR.  
RJR appealed to the Fifth District, “challeng[ing] the punitive 
damages award as excessive, particularly when considered in 
relation to the $150,000 net compensatory damages award, and 
argu[ing] that the trial court erred in denying its motion for new 
trial or remittitur.”  Id. at 1071.  After concluding that the punitive 
damages award is excessive under both Florida and federal law, the 
Fifth District reversed the award and remanded “for entry of an 
order of remittitur or, if remittitur is rejected by either party, a new 
trial solely on the amount of punitive damages.”  Id. at 1076.  In so 
holding, the Fifth District certified to this Court the question of 
great public importance that we have rephrased and limited to 
Florida law as set forth above. 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
 
The rephrased question presents a pure question of law that 
we review de novo.  See Townsend v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 192 
So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 2016).  To explain why we answer it in the 
affirmative, we first address Florida law requiring a reasonable 
relationship between punitive damages and the amount of damages 
proved and the injury suffered.  Then, we explain why the rule is no 
different in a wrongful death action.  Finally, we apply Florida law 
to the undisputed facts of this case to conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying remittitur of the excessive punitive 
damages award. 
A. Florida law requires a reasonable relationship between 
punitive damages and the amount of damages proved and the 
injury suffered. 
 
 
The rephased question implicates two statutes, sections 
768.73 and 768.74, Florida Statutes (1997), that govern review of 
the punitive damages award at issue.3  Therefore, we begin with 
 
 
3.  Since 1997, the first statute, section 768.73, has been 
substantially amended.  See § 768.73, Fla. Stat. (2021).  The second 
statute, section 768.74, remains the same.  See § 768.74, Fla. Stat. 
(2021). 
 
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their text.  See Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 308 So. 3d 942, 
946 (Fla. 2020) (explaining that in interpreting a statute this Court 
“follow[s] the ‘supremacy-of-text principle’—namely, the principle 
that ‘[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and 
what they convey, in their context, is what the text means’ ”) 
(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). 
 
First, section 768.73, Florida Statutes (1997), addresses 
Florida’s limitation on punitive damages, and subject to one 
exception, caps a punitive damages award in relation to the 
compensatory damages award at a 3:1 ratio: 
(1) (a) In any civil action based on negligence, strict 
liability, products liability, misconduct in commercial 
transactions, professional liability, or breach of warranty, 
and involving willful, wanton, or gross misconduct, the 
judgment for the total amount of punitive damages 
awarded to a claimant may not exceed three times the 
amount of compensatory damages awarded to each 
person entitled thereto by the trier of fact, except as 
provided in paragraph (b).  However, this subsection does 
not apply to any class action. 
 
(b) If any award for punitive damages exceeds the 
limitation specified in paragraph (a), the award is 
presumed to be excessive and the defendant is entitled to 
remittitur of the amount in excess of the limitation 
unless the claimant demonstrates to the court by clear 
and convincing evidence that the award is not excessive 
 
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in light of the facts and circumstances which were 
presented to the trier of fact. 
 
(c) This subsection is not intended to prohibit an 
appropriate court from exercising its jurisdiction under s. 
768.74 in determining the reasonableness of an award of 
punitive damages that is less than three times the 
amount of compensatory damages. 
 
§ 768.73(1)(a)-(c). 
 
Second, section 768.74, Florida Statutes (1997), which is 
Florida’s remittitur and additur statute, requires the trial court, 
upon a proper motion, to review an award of money damages “to 
determine if [the] amount is excessive . . . in light of the facts and 
circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact,” § 
768.74(1), and to “order a remittitur” if it “finds that the amount 
awarded is excessive,” § 768.74(2).  The statute establishes five 
“criteria” that the trial court “shall consider” “[i]n determining 
whether an award is excessive . . . in light of the facts and 
circumstances presented to the trier of fact and in determining the 
amount, if any that such award exceeds a reasonable range.”  § 
768.74(5).  The rephrased certified question implicates the fourth of 
these five criteria, which requires the trial court to consider 
 
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“[w]hether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the 
amount of damages proved and the injury suffered.”  § 768.74(5)(d). 
 
Reading these statutes together, unless the “facts and 
circumstances” exception of section 768.73(1)(b) applies, section 
768.73(1)(a) caps an award of punitive damages in comparison to 
the compensatory damages award at a ratio of 3:1, and section 
768.74 provides for further review of an award that is challenged as 
excessive, regardless of whether the award falls inside or outside of 
the 3:1 cap.  Therefore, even when (as the Fifth District held here) 
the “facts and circumstances” allow a punitive damages award to 
exceed the 3:1 presumptive cap of section 768.73(1)(a), that is not 
the end of the analysis.  See Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1073.  Rather, 
the trial court must review the challenged award for excessiveness 
under section 768.74.  See id.; see also § 768.74(3), Fla. Stat. (“It is 
the intention of the Legislature that awards of damages be subject 
to close scrutiny by the courts and that all such awards be 
adequate and not excessive.”) (emphasis added); Guarino v. 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 88-1087-CIV-MARCUS, 1989 WL 
265218, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 1989) (describing section 
768.73(1)(a) as imposing a cap on punitive damages and section 
 
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768.74(2) as providing “a further check upon the imposition of 
excessive punitive damages”). 
 
When a trial court reviews an award of punitive damages 
under section 768.74, the statute plainly requires that the amount 
awarded must “bear[] a reasonable relation to the amount of 
damages proved and the injury suffered.”  § 768.74(5)(d).  This 
requirement is one of the five “criteria” that the trial court “shall 
consider” in determining whether a damages award is excessive, § 
768.74(5)(d), and is therefore a condition that must be met for the 
award to stand.  See Owens v. State, 303 So. 3d 993, 997 n.5 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2020) (“The word criteria used by the Legislature is the 
plural of criterion.  Using the plural shows that the Legislature 
intended all [the] conditions to be met . . . .”) (citation omitted); see 
also Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Thornton, 241 So. 3d 867, 868 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2018) (remanding for remittitur where the amount of damages 
awarded bore no reasonable relationship to the damages proved). 
Consistent with the statutory text, our precedent recognizes 
that a punitive damage award must bear a reasonable relationship 
to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered.  
Specifically, in Schoeff, 232 So. 3d at 308, we applied section 
 
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768.74(5) to “evaluate a denial of remittitur for abuse of discretion,” 
and identified the compensatory damages award as relevant to the 
statutory inquiry, explaining that “[p]unitive damages must also be 
reviewed alongside compensatory damages ‘to ensure a reasonable 
relationship between the two.’ ”  Id. (quoting Engle v. Liggett Grp., 
Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1264 (Fla. 2006)). 
B. The rule is no different in a wrongful death action. 
 
 
Given the clarity of both the statutory text and our precedent, 
it is not surprising that Ms. Coates acknowledges that sections 
768.73 and 768.74 make relevant a comparison between punitive 
and compensatory damages.  She also acknowledges that the dollar 
amount of the $16 million punitive damages award in this case 
compared to the dollar amount of the $150,000 net compensatory 
damages award “might call the punitive award into some initial 
question.”  However, despite the 106.7 to 1 ratio of the awards, she 
argues that the necessary reasonable relationship exists because, 
unlike other actions where the compensatory damages reflect the 
actual injury suffered, the compensatory damages in a wrongful 
death action do not because the statutory beneficiaries do not 
recover damages for the decedent’s death.  Insisting that the 
 
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uncompensated-for death is really the injury suffered in a wrongful 
death action, Ms. Coates urges us to answer the rephrased question 
in the negative and uphold the $16 million punitive damages award 
as bearing a reasonable relation to Ms. Stucky’s death. 
We cannot.  The text of Florida’s Wrongful Death Act controls 
and precludes us from concluding that death is “the injury suffered” 
in a wrongful death action.  See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 
149 So. 631, 632 (Fla. 1933) (“The common law afforded no remedy 
for death by wrongful act.  Hence the right and remedy are purely 
statutory.”).  The Wrongful Death Act creates a statutory right of 
action, see § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (1997), and provides that the injury 
suffered in such an action is to the decedent’s statutory 
beneficiaries, not the decedent, see §§ 768.18, 768.21, Fla. Stat. 
(1997). 
As explained above, the statutory beneficiaries in this case are 
Ms. Stucky’s three adult children.  § 768.18(1) (defining 
“[s]urvivors” to include the decedent’s children).  The Wrongful 
Death Act specifies the damages that “may be awarded” to the 
statutory beneficiaries, and where the decedent’s survivors are 
concerned provides that “[e]ach survivor may recover the value of 
 
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lost support and services from the date of the decedent’s injury to 
her or his death, with interest, and future loss of support and 
services from the date of death and reduced to present value.”  § 
768.21(1).  Accordingly, because the Wrongful Death Act remedies 
injuries suffered “for the living and not for the dead,” Martin v. 
United Sec. Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 1975), we cannot 
conclude, for purposes of evaluating a punitive damages award in a 
wrongful death action under section 768.74(5)(d), that the 
decedent’s death is “the injury suffered.”  See § 768.20, Fla. Stat. 
(1997) (“When a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no 
action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action 
pending at the time of death shall abate.”) (emphasis added). 
Citing decisions from other states, Ms. Coates cautions that 
failing to recognize death as the real injury suffered in a wrongful 
death action disregards the sanctity of life by allowing a tortfeasor 
to be punished to a lesser extent in a case where the injured person 
dies as a result of the tortious conduct than in a case where the 
injured person survives.  See Schwartz v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 
355 P.3d 931, 942-43 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming a punitive to 
compensatory damage award ratio of 148:1 in a wrongful death 
 
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action based in part on the court’s conclusions that the $170,000 
compensatory award did not, as a matter of Oregon law, “account 
for the loss [of the decedent’s] life itself” and “would not serve an 
appropriate admonitory function in the circumstances of this case”). 
In Florida, however, the Legislature made a policy choice to 
exclude death as a cognizable injury in a wrongful death action and 
to recognize instead the injury suffered by the statutory 
beneficiaries.  It is not for us to treat injury differently for punitive 
damages in wrongful death actions where the Legislature has not.  
Rather, our job is to faithfully apply the law as written.  See State v. 
Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001) (“[I]t is not this Court’s 
function to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to 
the wisdom or policy of a particular statute.”). 
Although the dissent properly observes that the statutes 
provide for the estate as a beneficiary, our analysis on punitive 
damages is not affected because death is not a cognizable injury for 
the estate in a wrongful death action.  Section 768.21(6) specifies 
the damages that “[t]he decedent’s personal representative may 
recover for the decedent’s estate.”  Although not part of the 
damages awarded in this case, the statute authorizes, subject to 
 
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certain limitations, recovery for injuries to the estate in the form of 
lost earnings of the deceased from the date of injury to the date of 
death, lost prospective net accumulations of the estate, and medical 
or funeral expenses.  See id.  Nowhere does the statute authorize 
recovery on behalf of the estate for the decedent’s death.  
Significantly, that is because the Legislature’s choice to exclude 
death as a cognizable injury in a wrongful death action equally 
applies to all of the statutory beneficiaries, including the estate.  
See § 768.20 (limiting the personal representative’s recovery “for the 
benefit of the decedent’s survivors and estate” to the damages 
“specified in this act” and expressly extinguishing any action for a 
personal injury to the decedent that results in death). 
Under Florida law, which excludes the decedent’s death as a 
cognizable injury under the Wrongful Death Act, we hold that the 
trial court in a wrongful death action abuses its discretion by 
denying remittitur of a punitive damages award that does not bear a 
reasonable relation to the damages proved and the injury suffered 
 
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by the statutory beneficiaries.  Therefore, we answer the rephrased 
question in the affirmative.4 
C. The trial court abused its discretion by denying remittitur. 
 
 
In this case, we agree with the Fifth District that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying remittitur of the $16 million 
punitive damages award.  See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1263 (“Under 
Florida law, a trial court’s determination of whether a damage 
award is excessive, requiring a remittitur or a new trial, is reviewed 
by an appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard.”); see 
also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (“If 
reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken 
by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there 
can be no finding of an abuse of discretion.”). 
 
 
4.  In so holding, we reiterate that the rephrased question is 
limited to the facts of this case where the compensatory damages 
award reflects the damages proved and the legally cognizable injury 
suffered by the statutory beneficiaries.  Therefore, we need not 
reach RJR’s argument that section 768.74(5)(d), on its face and as 
interpreted by this Court in Schoeff, should be read to require 
remittitur of a punitive damages award based solely on the ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages, without regard to the injury 
suffered.  Nor do we express any opinion as to whether the damages 
proved will always be coextensive with the injury suffered in every 
case to which the remittitur statute applies. 
 
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Although we cannot say it was unreasonable to conclude that 
the facts and circumstances support departing from the 3:1 cap of 
section 768.73(1), see Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1073, as we have 
explained above, that is not the end of the inquiry.  Rather, section 
768.74(5)(d) imposes a further check against an excessive punitive 
damages award that turns on “[w]hether the amount awarded bears 
a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the 
injury suffered.”  Looking to the undisputed facts in this record, no 
reasonable trial court could have concluded that the $16 million 
punitive damages award survives that check.  See Canakaris, 382 
So. 2d at 1203. 
Here, the damages proved were $300,000, reduced by Ms. 
Stucky’s 50% comparative fault to a net of $150,000.  Although the 
Fifth District described these damages as “modest,” Coates, 308 So. 
3d at 1076, they are not merely nominal damages awarded in a 
case where compensatory damages were not proven.  See Land & 
Sea Petroleum Holdings, Inc. v. Leavitt, 321 So. 3d 810, 816 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2021) (“[N]ominal damages are in effect zero damages and 
are defined as those damages flowing from the establishment of an 
invasion of a legal right where actual or compensatory damages 
 
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have not been proven.”) (quoting Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 
(Fla. 1989)).  Rather, the injury suffered by the survivors in this 
wrongful death case is the injury reflected in the compensatory 
damages award that the jury found to represent “the total amount” 
of the damages that Ms. Stucky’s survivors sustained “for the loss 
of parental companionship, instruction[,] and guidance, and from 
their mental pain and suffering as a result of Lois Stucky’s lung 
cancer and death.” 
Finally, Ms. Coates correctly notes that higher dollar awards of 
punitive damages have been approved in other tobacco cases.  See 
Coates, 308 So. 3d at 1076 (collecting tobacco cases with punitive 
damages awards of $20 million or more).  However, the statutory 
analysis of whether a punitive damages award bears a reasonable 
relation to the amount of damages proven and the injury suffered is 
necessarily case-specific.  See § 768.74(5)(d).  The damages findings 
in this case sit in stark contrast to other wrongful death cases 
where the proof of more significant injury to the statutory 
beneficiaries resulted in much larger compensatory damages 
awards that, in turn, supported higher punitive damages awards.  
See, e.g., Schoeff, 232 So. 3d at 299, 308-09 (holding the trial court 
 
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did not abuse its discretion by denying remittitur of a $30 million 
punitive damages award where the jury found the tobacco company 
liable for the decedent’s wrongful death on multiple claims, 
including fraudulent concealment, and awarded $10.5 million in 
compensatory damages). 
In this case, because no reasonable trial court could have 
found that the $16 million punitive damages award bears a 
reasonable relation to the $150,000 net compensatory damages 
award and the injury suffered by Ms. Stucky’s survivors, the Fifth 
District correctly reversed the excessive punitive damages award 
and remanded for further proceedings. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we hold that a trial court in a wrongful 
death action abuses its discretion by denying remittitur of a 
punitive damages award that does not bear a reasonable relation to 
the damages proved and the injuries suffered by the statutory 
beneficiaries.  Accordingly, we answer the rephrased certified 
question in the affirmative.  Further, because the trial court abused 
its discretion by not ordering remittitur of the punitive damages 
award in this case, we approve the Fifth District’s decision reversing 
 
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the excessive award and remanding for further proceedings to the 
extent the district court’s decision is consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., 
concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
FRANCIS, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
 
As a result of today’s decision, a Florida jury’s verdict—that 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (R.J. Reynolds) is liable for 
$16 million in punitive damages for the wrongful death of 
Lois Stucky—will be drastically reduced to a fraction of what the 
jury determined that the circumstances of the case warrant.  This 
drastic reduction is attributable to the majority’s analysis of the 
rephrased certified question, an analysis that unreasonably 
concludes that the decedent’s death is not a cognizable injury for 
purposes of punitive damages claims. 
 
Although Florida’s Wrongful Death Act does not recognize the 
death of the decedent, Ms. Stucky, as a cognizable injury in 
awarding compensatory damages, I disagree with the majority’s 
 
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conclusion that under the Act, her death is not a cognizable injury 
for the purpose of awarding punitive damages.  I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
In March 2019, the jury rendered a verdict which read in part: 
“Please state whether cigarettes manufactured by R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Company and smoked by Lois Stucky were defective by 
reasons of their design and, if so, whether the defect was the legal 
cause of Lois Stucky’s lung cancer and death.”  To this question, 
the jury answered: “Yes.”  The jury further found “by clear and 
convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted against 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company under the circumstances of this 
case.” 
 
When evaluating a plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the 
jury “focuses on ensuring the correct remedy for the underlying 
violation—one that punishes the defendant and deters others from 
engaging in similar conduct.”  Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
187 So. 3d 1219, 1230 (Fla. 2016).  Naturally, this means that in a 
wrongful death case, the jury must consider the correct remedy for 
the tortious conduct that caused the decedent’s death. 
 
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However, today’s decision guts the impact of punitive damages 
in wrongful death cases because the majority concludes that the 
most important part, indeed, the basis of a wrongful death claim—
the decedent’s death—may not be considered an injury suffered.  
This decision invades the province of the jury in wrongful death 
cases because it increases the likelihood that remittitur will be 
ordered whenever the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages exceeds the ratio of 3:1. 
 
To arrive at its conclusion that the jury’s punitive damages 
award was excessive in this case, the majority relies on a strained 
interpretation of one of five factors set forth in section 768.74(5), 
Florida Statutes (1997), and it concludes that no reasonable court 
could have found that the punitive damages award bears a 
reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury 
suffered.  See majority op. at 18.  The majority also narrowly 
focuses on Ms. Stuckey’s three adult children as the “statutory 
beneficiaries,” although the decedent’s estate is also an enumerated 
beneficiary under Florida’s Wrongful Death Act.  The majority’s 
interpretation raises the question: when evaluating punitive 
 
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damages in a wrongful death case, how can a decedent’s death not 
be a cognizable injury? 
 
The Wrongful Death Act, with its focus on compensatory 
damages, should not be read to limit the type of injury cognizable in 
determining punitive damages.  Nor does considering death as an 
injury for punitive damages purposes constitute maintaining an 
“action for the personal injury,” which is prohibited under the Act.  
See § 768.20, Fla. Stat. (1997). 
 
Because R.J. Reynolds’s tortious conduct caused Ms. Stucky’s 
death, treating her death as a cognizable injury for the purpose of 
awarding punitive damages is necessary to hold R.J. Reynolds fully 
accountable for the harm it caused.  This rationale was cogently 
explained in Schwarz v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 355 P.3d 931, 943 
(Or. Ct. App. 2015), where similar to Florida, compensatory 
“damages [in Oregon] did not account for the loss of [the decedent’s] 
life itself, as ‘Oregon law does not provide for compensatory 
damages for loss of life to the person who has died or to her estate 
in this type of case.’ ”  Id. (quoting jury instruction).  As a result, the 
court explained, “the compensatory damages did not account for all 
of the harm directly suffered as a result of the actions of defendant.  
 
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Rather, defendant’s conduct caused harm for which defendant was 
not required to pay.”  Id. 
 
Acknowledging the inadequacy of this result, the court 
concluded that the “less than $170,000” awarded to the plaintiffs 
was “a relatively small amount for the death of a human being and 
would not serve an appropriate admonitory function in the 
circumstances of this case.”  Id.  The court observed that the 
“defendant engaged in particularly egregious acts in this case, but 
that conduct resulted in a relatively small amount of compensatory 
damages in light of the harm that resulted.”  Id. 
 
In the present case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal also 
identified egregious wrongdoing by the defendant, R.J. Reynolds, 
explaining in detail: 
 
The evidence at trial demonstrated significant 
reprehensibility by Reynolds in designing its cigarettes.  
It used a tobacco curing process designed to make the 
smoke “smoother” and manipulated the levels of nicotine 
and other additives to make its product easily inhalable, 
and thus, addictive.  Too, its advertising efforts, 
particularly those advertisements produced in the early 
years of Ms. Stucky’s addiction, were intended to entice 
young people to begin smoking and to suggest, if not 
convince, consumers that smoking was safe, or 
reasonably so.  But it was well established that the 
inhalation of cigarette smoke is not safe.  Stucky paid the 
 
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price for her addiction.  The jury determined that 
Reynolds must also pay its price. 
 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Coates, 308 So. 3d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2020).  As a result of the jury’s findings, the jury awarded 
$16 million in punitive damages for the entirety of the harm caused 
by R.J. Reynolds.  Id. at 1071. 
 
The exclusion of Ms. Stucky’s death as a cognizable injury for 
punitive damages purposes is revealed to be especially unfair when 
considering that if she had not died as a result of R.J. Reynolds’s 
wrongdoing, but instead was left alive but severely injured, that 
injury would be able to be considered in determining punitive 
damages.  Under today’s holding, however, because Ms. Stucky did 
not survive, her death is not a basis for awarding punitive damages. 
 
While the majority emphasizes that a cognizable wrongful 
death injury must attach to the statutory beneficiaries, I hasten to 
note that a decedent’s estate is also a named beneficiary under the 
Wrongful Death Act; indeed, Ms. Coates was successful on her 
strict liability claim in her capacity as the personal representative of 
Ms. Stucky’s estate.  Although a personal injury cause of action 
cannot survive the death of the decedent, Ms. Stucky’s death itself 
 
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is a separate injury, and naturally, only cognizable upon her death.  
Accordingly, death is the injury suffered to the decedent’s estate as 
a statutory beneficiary, and it can be considered for punitive 
damages purposes. 
 
It is not hard to imagine a situation under the majority’s 
interpretation where the punitive damages awarded to a living 
victim will far exceed the punitive damages awarded if a victim dies.  
Recognizing death as a cognizable injury for punitive damage 
purposes would maintain the Wrongful Death Act’s function of 
defining available compensatory damages without robbing punitive 
damage awards of their purpose.  Because of the untenable results 
that will flow from the majority’s interpretation, I respectfully 
dissent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Direct Conflict of Decisions/Certified Great Public Importance 
 
 
Fifth District – Case No. 5D19-2549 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
John S. Mills of Bishop & Mills, PLLC, Jacksonville, Florida, 
Courtney Brewer, Jonathan Martin, and Bailey Howard of Bishop & 
Mills, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
- 27 - 
Troy A. Fuhrman and Marie A. Borland of Hill Ward Henderson, 
Tampa, Florida; Jason T. Burnette and Brian Charles Lea of Jones 
Day, Atlanta, Georgia, Charles R.A. Morse of Jones Day, New York, 
New York, and Andrew J. Bentz of Jones Day, Washington, District 
of Columbia, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Geoffrey J. Michael, John P. Elwood, and Samuel F. Callahan of 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, District of 
Columbia, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Philip Morris USA Inc. 
 
Kansas R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Miami, Florida; and 
Cyrus S. Vaziri of Cyrus S. Vaziri, P.A., Fort Myers, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Defense Lawyers Association 
 
William W. Large of Florida Justice Reform Institute, Tallahassee, 
Florida; and Joseph H. Lang, Jr. of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America, the American Tort Reform Association, and 
the Florida Justice Reform Institute 
 
Wendy F. Lumish of Bowman and Brooke LLP, Coral Gables, 
Florida; and Thomas H. Dupree, Jr. of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 
 
Cory L. Andrews of Washington Legal Foundation, Washington, 
District of Columbia, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation