Title: Authority
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92473
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 19, 2002

Docket No. 92473–Agenda 12–May 2002.
JOHN H. STROGER, JR., et al., Appellees, v. THE REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed September 19, 2002.
 
      JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
 
      In February 2000, plaintiffs, John H. Stroger, Jr., and Bernard 
Scavella, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, the Regional 
Transportation Authority (RTA), the commuter rail division of the 
RTA (METRA), and the suburban bus division of the RTA 
(PACE). The complaint alleged that the statutory procedures 
contained in the Regional Transportation Authority Act (Act) (70 
ILCS 3615/1.01 et seq. (West 1998)) for appointment of the board 
of directors of RTA, METRA, and PACE violate the Illinois 
Constitution of 1970. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary 
injunction prohibiting defendants from making any further 
appointments to the boards of directors under the provisions of the 
Act. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant 
to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 
5/2–615 (West 1998)), alleging failure to state a claim as a matter 
of law. The Attorney General was granted leave by the circuit 
court to intervene for the purpose of defending the 
constitutionality of the Act. The Attorney General filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2–619.1 of the Code 
(735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 1998)), incorporating the allegations 
of defendants’ section 2–615 motion and, in addition, alleging that 
plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by laches because the Act had 
never been challenged on the grounds raised in the complaint. 
After briefing and argument on the motions, the circuit court 
denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed 
their complaint on the basis that they had failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief could be granted. The appellate court 
reversed the dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further 
proceedings. 324 Ill. App. 3d 970. We granted defendants’ petition 
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
 
 
BACKGROUND
      In 1973, the General Assembly enacted the Act, creating the 
RTA for the counties of Cook, Du Page, Kane, Lake, McHenry, 
and Will. The Act’s purpose was to “provide for, aid and assist 
public transportation in the northeastern area of the State *** by 
providing for the creation of a single authority responsive to the 
people and elected officials of the area and with the power and 
competence to provide and facilitate public transportation ***.” 
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 111⅔, par. 701.02(b). The Act 
provided for a board of directors for the RTA (RTA board), 
comprised of nine directors. Four directors were to be appointed 
by the mayor of Chicago, two directors were to be appointed by 
members of the Cook County board elected from that part of Cook 
County outside of Chicago, and two directors were to be appointed 
by the chairmen of the county boards of the counties in the 
metropolitan region outside Cook County. The chairman of the 
RTA board was to be chosen by the other eight directors. Ill. Rev. 
Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 111⅔, pars. 703.01(a) through (d). The Act 
required that the voters in the metropolitan region to be served by 
the RTA approve its establishment in a special referendum 
election. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 111⅔, par. 701.05. In 
Hoogasian v. Regional Transportation Authority, 58 Ill. 2d 117 
(1974), this court upheld the validity of the referendum that was 
conducted in March 1974 and upheld the constitutionality of the 
Act against certain challenges.
      In 1983, the General Assembly amended the Act in response 
to “[s]ubstantial, recurring deficits in the operations of public 
transportation services subject to the jurisdiction of the Regional 
Transportation Authority and periodic cash shortages” that had 
occurred and which could bring about a loss of public 
transportation services throughout the metropolitan region. 70 
ILCS 3615/1.02(b)(i) (West 1998). The amendment provided for 
additional state financial assistance and created METRA (70 ILCS 
3615/3B.01 (West 1998)) and PACE (70 ILCS 3615/3 A. 01 (West 
1998)) and established boards of directors for these new entities. 
The amendment also changed the composition of and selection 
process for the RTA board. Currently, there are 13 directors of the 
RTA board, chosen as follows:
“(a) Four Directors appointed by the Mayor of the City
of Chicago, with the advice and consent of the City
Council of the City of Chicago, and a fifth director who
shall be the Chairman of the Chicago Transit Authority.
Each such Director shall reside in the City of Chicago
except the Chairman of the Chicago Transit Authority
may live outside the City of Chicago.
(b) Four Directors appointed by the members of the
Cook County Board elected from that part of Cook
County outside of Chicago, or, in the event such Board of
Commissioners becomes elected from single member
districts, by those Commissioners elected from districts,
a majority of the electors of which reside outside Chicago.
In either case, such appointment shall be with the
concurrence of four such Commissioners. Each such
Director shall reside in that part of Cook County outside
Chicago.
(c) Two Directors appointed by the Chairmen of the
county boards of Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will
Counties, with the concurrence of not less than a majority
of the Chairmen from such counties, from nominees by
the Chairmen. Each such Chairman may nominate not
more than 2 persons for each position. Each such Director
shall reside in a county in the metropolitan region other
than Cook or DuPage Counties.
(d) One Director shall be appointed by the Chairman of
the Board of DuPage County with the advice and consent
of the County Board of DuPage County and shall reside
in DuPage County.” 70 ILCS 3615/3.01(a) through (d)
(West 1998).
      Section 3.01(h) (70 ILCS 3615/3.01(h) (West 1998)) of the 
Act provides in relevant part:
“(h) The Board of Directors shall be so appointed as to
represent the City of Chicago, that part of Cook County
outside the City of Chicago, and that part of the
metropolitan region outside Cook County on the one man
one vote basis. After each Federal decennial census the
General Assembly shall review the composition of the
Board and, if a change is needed to comply with this
requirement, shall provide for the necessary revision by
July 1 of the third year after such census.”
      The METRA board has seven directors. The appointments are 
made by the mayor of Chicago (one appointment), suburban Cook 
County commissioners from suburban-majority districts (three 
appointments), Du Page County chairman (one appointment), and 
chairmen of the other collar county boards (two appointments). 70 
ILCS 3615/3B.02 (West 1998). The PACE board has 12 directors. 
Appointment authority is allocated to the suburban Cook County 
commissioners from suburban-majority districts (six 
appointments) and to each of the chairmen of the collar county 
boards (five appointments). Each PACE board member must be a 
chief executive officer of a municipality within one of six regions 
specified by the statute. The chairman of the PACE board is 
chosen by a majority of the chairmen of the collar county boards 
and members of the Cook County board elected from suburban-majority districts. 70 ILCS 3615/3 A. 02 (West 1998).
      Plaintiff Stroger is president of the Cook County board of 
commissioners and represents the fourth district of Cook County. 
Plaintiff Scavella is a registered voter residing in Calumet City in 
the fourth district. In count I of their complaint, plaintiffs alleged 
that, because the Act removes the power to appoint directors from 
the Cook County board’s chief executive officer and places it in 
the legislative members of that board, the appointment provisions 
of the Act relating to Cook County violate the separation of 
powers doctrine contained in article II, section 1, of the 
constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). In count II of the 
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the transfer of appointment 
power from the Cook County board president to certain legislative 
members of that board constituted an unconstitutional change in 
the form of Cook County government without a referendum, in 
violation of article VII, section 6(f), of the constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. VII, §6(f)). Count III of the complaint alleged that the 
appointment provisions of the Act violate the “one person, one 
vote” guarantee of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2; art. 
III, §3), because commissioners elected from Cook County 
districts where the majority of residents reside inside Chicago 
(which is the case in the fourth district) are precluded from voting 
to appoint directors to the RTA board. Thus, according to 
plaintiffs, only Cook County board members from districts 5, 6, 
13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 may vote for directors of the RTA board. 
Plaintiffs alleged that this effectively disenfranchised Scavella and 
approximately 226,000 other voters, giving them no voice in the 
appointment of directors to the RTA board.
       The circuit court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The 
appellate court did not address plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments, 
instead finding that the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint 
was premature. The court noted that section 3.01(h) of the Act 
specifically requires that appointments be made on the one person, 
one vote basis and that plaintiffs had alleged in their complaint 
that the directors are not in fact so appointed. The court found it 
unclear whether plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. The 
court noted that, at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel had argued 
that the appointment scheme had become “inequitable” since 1994 
when Cook County board members began to be elected from 
single-member districts. The court noted that this issue was not 
addressed in the circuit court and “perhaps merits discussion.” 
Therefore, the appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit 
court for a hearing on the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint. 324 
Ill. App. 3d at 979.
 
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
      When the legal sufficiency of a complaint is challenged by a 
section 2–615 motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the 
complaint are taken as true and a reviewing court must determine 
whether the allegations of the complaint, construed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of 
action upon which relief may be granted. Connick v. Suzuki Motor 
Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1996). The question to be determined is 
whether sufficient facts are contained in the pleadings which, if 
established, may entitle the plaintiff to relief. Urbaitis v. 
Commonwealth Edison, 143 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (1991). The 
appropriate standard of review is de novo. Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 439 (2000).
 
II. Constitutional Principle of “One Person, One Vote”
      Despite the appellate court’s failure to address their 
constitutional arguments, the parties argue, and we agree, that the 
record is sufficient to permit this court to determine the 
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Act.
“Legislation challenged in this court benefits from a
presumption of constitutionality. [Citation.] Courts
examining the constitutional validity of a statute will
ordinarily apply the rational basis test. [Citation.] Under
this test, a statute will be upheld if it bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. [Citation.]
Where challenged legislation implicates a fundamental
constitutional right, however, such as the right to vote, the
presumption of constitutionality is lessened and a far
more demanding scrutiny is required. [Citation.] When
the means used by a legislature to achieve a legislative
goal impinge upon a fundamental right, the court will
examine the statute under the strict scrutiny standard.
[Citation.] Under a standard of strict scrutiny, the court
must conclude that the means employed by the legislature
to achieve a stated goal were necessary to advance a
compelling state interest. [Citation.] In addition, the
statute must be narrowly tailored, that is, the legislature
must use the least restrictive means consistent with the
attainment of the legislative goal. [Citations.]” Tully v.
Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304-05 (1996).
      We review de novo a circuit court’s decision regarding the 
constitutionality of a statute. People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 4 
(2000).
      The constitutional principle of “one person, one vote” derives 
from two articles of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Article I, 
section 2, provides that “[n]o person shall be *** denied the equal 
protection of the laws.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2. Article III, 
section 3, states that “[a]ll elections shall be free and equal.” Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. III, §3. As this court has stated:
“The principle of the one-man, one-vote doctrine, as
exemplified by Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 84 S. Ct. 1362, and the decisions stemming
from it, is that when a public office must be filled by
election, whether because of a constitutional mandate or
a legislative enactment, the method used shall be
reasonably designed to achieve the objective that the 'vote
of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of
any other citizen in the State.’ (377 U.S. 533, 579, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 537, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390.) From this it
follows that when the determinative vote is to be cast by
electoral districts these must be 'as nearly of equal
population as is practicable.’ 377 U.S. 533, 577, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 536, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390.” Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 577-78 (1979).
      Defendants argue that the one person, one vote principle 
applies only to elected officials. They rely on Eastern, in which 
this court rejected an argument that the one person, one vote 
principle applied to a sanitary district board whose directors were 
appointed, noting that the United States Supreme Court had never 
held that appointed offices must be selected on the one person, one 
vote principle. Rather, the Supreme Court had recognized the 
constitutionality of filling offices by appointment, rather than 
election, in such decisions as Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 18 L. Ed. 2d 650, 87 S. Ct. 1549 (1967), and Fortson v. 
Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 17 L. Ed. 2d 330, 87 S. Ct. 446 (1966). 
Eastern, 75 Ill. 2d  at 578. Accordingly, this court concluded that 
no constitutional requirement exists that an appointed governing 
body of a district be so constituted that a majority of its members 
represent the more populous regions comprising the district. 
Eastern, 75 Ill. 2d  at 585.
      In Sailors, Michigan electors challenged the method of 
selecting members of the county school board. Voters elected 
members of the local school boards, but the county school board 
was chosen by delegates from the local school boards. Each local 
board received one vote in the selection of the county board, 
regardless of population or wealth. Plaintiffs argued that this 
method of selection violated the principle of one person, one vote. 
Sailors, 387 U.S.  at 106-07, 18 L. Ed. 2d  at 652, 87 S. Ct.  at 1551. 
The Supreme Court concluded that no constitutional reason 
existed why state or local officers of a nonlegislative character 
may not be chosen by appointment, rather than through election. 
The court noted that while the Michigan county school boards 
performed important functions, they were primarily administrative 
in nature and, therefore, were not legislative in the “classical 
sense.” Sailors, 387 U.S.  at 108-10, 18 L. Ed. 2d  at 653-54, 87 S. Ct.  at 1552-53.
       In Fortson, the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection 
challenge to a provision of the Georgia constitution providing that 
if no gubernatorial candidate received a majority of votes at a 
general election, the Georgia legislature was to select the governor 
by majority vote from the two candidates receiving the highest 
number of popular votes. The court noted that the method chosen 
by Georgia had been employed both before and since the 
Revolutionary War. Fortson, 385 U.S.  at 233-34, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at 
332-33, 87 S. Ct.  at 448.
      Plaintiffs argue that this court applied the one person, one 
vote principle to an appointed body in Fumarolo v. Chicago Board 
of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990). In that case, the plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of the Chicago School Reform 
Act, which decentralized the Chicago school system by creating 
local school councils that were responsible for each grammar 
school and high school. Each council was comprised of the 
principal of the school and 10 elected members. The elected 
members were to consist of: (1) six parents of children currently 
enrolled at the school; (2) two community residents residing 
within the school’s attendance center; and (3) two teachers 
employed at the school served by the council. Each local school 
council elected one member to sit on a subdistrict council. The 
statute set forth voter eligibility requirements for participation in 
local school council elections. Only parents of students enrolled at 
the school served by the local school council could vote for the 
parent members of the council; only school staff could vote for the 
teacher members; and only community residents residing within 
the school’s attendance center could vote for the community 
members of the local school council. However, with respect to 
community residents to be elected to the local school council of a 
multiarea school, the statute provided that only the parents of 
students enrolled at that multiarea school, the principal and the 
school staff could vote for the community residents to be elected 
to the local school council for that multiarea school. Accordingly, 
community residents who lived in a multiarea attendance center 
and who did not have children enrolled at the school could not 
vote for any local school council members. In addition, 
community residents in single district attendance centers could 
vote for only two members of the local school council, while 
parents with children enrolled in the school could vote for six 
members. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d  at 71-72.
      The plaintiffs in Fumarolo advanced an equal protection 
argument, asserting that the statute’s voter eligibility requirements 
violated the one person, one vote principle. We concluded that the 
local school councils were essential units of educational 
governance, making important decisions regarding the Chicago 
school system. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d  at 81. Thus, the statute’s 
voter eligibility provisions must satisfy the strict scrutiny test, i.e., 
they must be necessary to advance a compelling state interest and 
must be narrowly tailored to achieve that end. We determined that 
the restrictions on voting for local school council members were 
not necessary to effect its purpose and were not the least restrictive 
means of attaining the state’s goal. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d  at 90-94.
      The plaintiffs further argued in Fumarolo that because the 
local school council voting scheme violated the equal protection 
clause, the method of selecting the board of education was also 
unconstitutional. Under the statute, the mayor of Chicago 
appointed members of the board of education, after receiving 
recommendations from a nominating commission. The nominating 
commission was comprised of five mayoral appointees and one 
member from each of the 11 subdistrict councils. Among the 
defendants’ arguments was that the nominating commission need 
not be selected on the basis of one person, one vote because it was 
an appointed body and not an elected body. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d  
at 94-95. This court distinguished its Eastern decision and the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Sailors, noting that, in both those 
cases, there was no question that the members of the bodies 
responsible for making the appointments were constitutionally 
selected. However, the subdistrict councils and the nominating 
commission were comprised of and selected by the local school 
councils, which were unconstitutionally elected bodies. Thus, the 
members of the nominating commission who were selected by 
members of the subdistrict councils were not properly selected. 
Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d  at 99.
      Plaintiffs attempt to apply Fumarolo to the instant case by 
arguing that the commissioners who make appointments to the 
RTA board constitute a distinct appointing body and, like the local 
school councils in Fumarolo, those commissioners must be elected 
on the one person, one vote basis. While plaintiffs do not dispute 
that each member of the Cook County board of commissioners is 
constitutionally elected by the voters of his or her district, they 
argue that it is not the Cook County board of commissioners that 
appoints the RTA directors but, rather, a subgroup of seven 
commissioners who have the authority to make appointments on 
behalf of all suburban Cook County voters, including plaintiff 
Scavella. Plaintiffs argue that the RTA board exercises broad and 
general governmental powers throughout its jurisdiction, making 
important budgetary and administrative decisions that affect the 
entire region served by the RTA. Thus, they reason, it must be 
appointed by a body that is itself constitutionally elected.
      We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the Act creates an 
additional unit of government in the seven commissioners 
empowered to make appointments to the RTA board. Fumarolo 
does not support this argument. In that case, the statute specifically 
created three separate entities–local school councils, subdistrict 
councils, and the nominating commission. Only members of the 
local school councils were to be elected by voters. In contrast, the 
Act does not create a separate body within the Cook County board 
of commissioners. It provides for appointment of RTA board of 
directors based upon the proportional population of the region to 
be served by the RTA. It is true that not all commissioners 
participate in the appointment of directors to the RTA board. 
However, they do not, simply due to that fact, constitute a 
separate, recognizable entity under the Act that must be elected on 
the one person, one vote basis. Plaintiffs have cited no persuasive 
authority in support of their argument. Each of the members of the 
Cook County board of commissioners is, as plaintiffs have 
conceded, constitutionally elected. Thus, the appointment 
provisions of the Act do not abridge plaintiffs’ fundamental 
constitutional right to vote.
      Because the appointment provisions here neither affect a 
fundamental right nor involve a suspect classification, the 
appropriate standard for our review of plaintiffs’ constitutional 
challenge is the rational basis test. Under this test,“[a] legislative 
classification must be upheld if any set of facts can reasonably be 
conceived which justify distinguishing the class to which the 
statute applies from the class to which the law is inapplicable.” 
Miller, 196 Ill. 2d  at 59. Whether the course chosen by the 
legislature to achieve a desired result is wise or is the best means 
available is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry. Garcia v. 
Tully, 72 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1978).
      Prior to enactment of the Act, public transportation in 
northeastern Illinois was in a shambles. Receipts from fares were 
inadequate to sustain services. The Chicago Transit Authority 
announced that it would have to either raise fares or cut services. 
The suburban bus companies were about to cease business because 
of inadequate funds to meet payrolls and pay for fuel. The 
commuter railroads had requested substantial fare increases from 
the Illinois Commerce Commission. There was a consensus that 
something had to be done. While agreement existed that the 
agency to be responsible for transportation should cover the six-county area of northeastern Illinois, other issues remained. As one 
commentator phrased it:
“Besides financing, other differences of opinion
centered on the structure, powers and control of the
proposed agency. Would it be an operations type of
agency or would it be an 'arm’s length’ unit of
government which would provide funding but not the
operations staff to be involved in day-to-day operations?
Would it represent truly regional interests and do so from
a consumer-oriented perspective? What kind of powers
would be delegated by the legislature? Would it be a
strong agency or a weak agency? How would the City of
Chicago, suburban Cook and the five outlying counties be
represented on the Board of Directors? What types of
checks and balances could be utilized to maintain control
of the Board in a balance reflecting the diverse political,
ethnic, social and economic interests found in the six-county region?” J. Tecson, The RTA in Northeastern
Illinois, Part I, Chi. B. Rec. 318, 334 (May-June 1975). 
      The composition of and selection process for the RTA board 
was the General Assembly’s response to the need to balance the 
varying interests of the diverse region to be served by the RTA. 
We cannot say that the appointment provisions of the Act are not 
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of providing safe, 
efficient, and affordable public transportation in the northeastern 
region of Illinois. While it is true that the Cook County board of 
commissioner elected by Scavella does not have the power to 
appoint any directors to the RTA board, the interests of Scavella 
and the 226,000 others identified by him are nonetheless served by 
those directors on the RTA board who are appointed by other 
commissioners, a majority of whose constituents reside in 
suburban Cook County. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
appointment provisions of the Act satisfy the rational basis test 
and we reject plaintiffs’ constitutional argument.
 
III. Statutory “One Person, One Vote” Provision
      Plaintiffs argue that, even if the constitutional principle of one 
person, one vote does not apply to appointments to the RTA 
board, the statute itself requires that those appointments be made 
on a one person, one vote basis. Plaintiffs refer us to section 
3.01(h) of the Act, quoted above.
      The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 
(1997). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used 
in the statute itself and that language must be given its plain and 
ordinary meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at 177. The statute should be 
construed as a whole and, if possible, in a manner such that no 
term is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Texaco-Cities 
Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). 
Where the meaning of a statute is unclear from a reading of its 
language, courts may look beyond the language of the statute and 
consider the purpose of the law, the evils it was intended to 
remedy, and the legislative history behind it. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542-43 (1997).
      Plaintiffs argue that the plain meaning of this statutory 
provision is that the appointments to the RTA board are to be 
made on the one person, one vote basis. Otherwise, according to 
plaintiffs, the provision would have no meaning. Defendants 
contend that the plain meaning of this provision requires the 
General Assembly to determine after each federal decennial census 
whether the board appointment process needs to be adjusted to 
account for population shifts within the region to be served by the 
RTA.
      The one person, one vote provision of the Act has existed 
since the Act’s inception in 1973 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 
111⅔, par. 703.01(g)). In addition, the Act has always 
contemplated that Cook County may adopt single member 
districts, stating that, in the event this occurs, the directors of the 
RTA board allocated to that part of Cook County outside of 
Chicago shall be appointed by those commissioners elected from 
districts, a majority of the electors of which reside outside 
Chicago. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 111⅔, par. 703.01(b). We 
disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that, unless the one person, one 
vote provision is applied as they urge, it would have no meaning. 
The area served by the RTA consists of three core constituencies: 
Chicago, the Cook County suburbs, and the collar counties. The 
appointment scheme for the RTA board reflects the proportional 
population of those regions. Thus, Chicago has five appointments, 
the Cook County suburbs have four, and the collar counties have 
three. Section 3.01(h) simply directs the General Assembly to 
review the appointment provisions after each federal decennial 
census to ensure that the representation on the RTA board for each 
of the RTA’s three regions remains proportional to the population 
of those regions. The statute does not require that the RTA board 
itself be appointed on the one person, one vote basis.
 
IV. Separation of Powers
      Plaintiffs contended in their complaint that the appointment 
provisions of the Act violate the separation of powers doctrine 
found in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution. That 
section provides that the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of government are separate and that no branch shall 
exercise powers properly belonging to another. Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. II, §1. The basis for plaintiffs’ argument is that the Act 
deprives the president of the Cook County board of his “inherent 
appointment authority.”
      Article VII, section 4(a), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(a)) provides for the election by each 
county of a chief executive officer, who shall have the duties and 
powers provided by law and by county ordinance. Pursuant to 
article VII, section 4(b), the president of the Cook County board 
shall be elected from the county at large and shall be the chief 
executive officer of the county. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(b).
      Plaintiffs argue that the office of Cook County board 
president is similar to the office of Governor and that, therefore, 
the powers of the two offices are equivalent. However, plaintiffs 
overlook the fact that article V, section 9, of the Illinois 
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, §9(a)) specifically grants to 
the Governor the power to “nominate and *** appoint all officers 
whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for.” The 
constitution contains no provision setting forth the powers of the 
president of the Cook County board. Plaintiffs also argue that the 
president of the Cook County board has inherent, executive 
authority to appoint members of the RTA board. They contend that 
this authority derives from the fact that the president is a 
constitutional officer. However, the precedent they cite does not 
support their argument. At issue in Dunne v. County of Cook, 164 
Ill. App. 3d 929, 936 (1987), were ordinances in which Cook 
County commissioners gave themselves the right to hire and fire 
members of their personal staffs. A statute gave the board 
president power to appoint all officers and employees of Cook 
County except those whose election or appointment was otherwise 
provided for by law. The circuit court held these ordinances an 
unconstitutional attempt to change the form of county government 
without a referendum in violation of the home rule provision of 
the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court affirmed, noting that 
appointment of the employees in question was not governed by 
any law and, thus, the appointment power belonged to the 
president of the board.
      People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 54 Ill. 2d 561 (1973), 
involved a challenge to the authority of the Cook County board to 
transfer certain functions from the county clerk to the newly 
created office of county comptroller. The plaintiff argued that the 
county clerk was a constitutionally created office and, as such, was 
protected from elimination. This court held the transfer lawful, 
noting that the duties sought to be transferred were not derived 
from common law or constitutionally delegated to the office of 
county clerk. Beck, 54 Ill. 2d  at 566-67. People ex rel. Hansen v. 
Phelan, 255 Ill. App. 3d 113 (1993), also cited by plaintiffs, is not 
precedential because this court vacated the circuit and appellate 
court judgments in that case (People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan, 158 Ill. 2d 445 (1994)).
      It is well settled that the method of appointment, other than of 
constitutional officers, is a matter solely within the discretion of 
the legislative branch. Betts v. Village of Calumet Park, 20 Ill. 2d 524, 526 (1960). “[T]he power to appoint to office is not inherent 
in the executive department unless conferred by the constitution or 
the legislature[.] *** [T]he creation of officers, the delegation and 
regulation of the powers and duties of officers and the prescribing 
of the manner of their appointment or election are legislative 
functions, which are restrained only by the Constitution.” People 
ex rel. Gullett v. McCullough, 254 Ill. 9, 16 (1912). Thus, this 
court has upheld statutes providing for appointment authority in 
persons other than a chief executive. See, e.g., Betts, 20 Ill. 2d 524 
(statute providing for appointment of village officers by village 
board of trustees upheld against separation of powers challenge); 
People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77 (1945) (statute 
requiring approval by mayor of Chicago of gubernatorial 
appointments to legislatively created transit authority upheld 
against separation of powers challenge); People ex rel. Dunham v. 
Morgan, 90 Ill. 558 (1878) (separation of powers challenge 
rejected where statute provided for appointments to board of park 
commissioners by circuit judge).
      As stated, our constitution does not confer on the president of 
the Cook County board any specific powers. Thus, the Act does 
not deprive the president of any inherent appointment powers to 
the RTA board. We hold that the appointment provisions of the 
Act do not violate the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers.
 
V. Change of Cook County Government Without Referendum
      Plaintiffs argue that the Act’s appointment provisions violate 
the provisions of article VII, section 6(f), of the Illinois 
Constitution. Article VII sets forth the powers of home rule units. 
Section 6(f) states that a home rule unit may, subject to approval 
by referendum, adopt, alter, or repeal a form of government 
provided by law. Plaintiffs contend that the Act “effectively 
removes the power to appoint RTA board members from the chief 
executive and transfers that power to a subgroup of the legislative 
arm of the Board of Commissioners.” However, as we have 
already held, the president of the Cook County board has no 
inherent power to appoint directors of the RTA board. The 
legislature was within its authority to establish the RTA and 
provide for its governance.
      We further note that article VII, section 6(f), provides that a 
home rule unit has the power to adopt, alter, or repeal a form of 
government. This language, which is clear on its face, applies only 
to actions taken by home rule units, not to acts of the General 
Assembly. Plaintiffs point to no authority holding to the contrary. 
We therefore conclude that the appointment provisions of the Act 
do not contravene article VII, section 6(f), of the constitution.
 
CONCLUSION
      For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the 
appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
 
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 
      JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case.