Title: Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13138
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13138 
 
TAMARA LANIER  vs.  PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
& others.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 1, 2021. - June 23, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Emotional Distress.  Negligence, Emotional distress, Duty to 
prevent harm.  Wanton or Reckless Conduct.  Constitutional 
Law, Freedom of speech and press.  Conversion.  Intentional 
Conduct.  Restitution.  Personal Property, Ownership.  
Limitations, Statute of.  Common Law.  Massachusetts Civil 
Rights Act.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 20, 2019. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., 
J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Joshua D. Koskoff, of Connecticut, & Ben Crump, of Florida 
(Carey B. Reilly & Preston Tisdale, of Connecticut, & Talley L. 
Kaleko & Jennifer L.W. Seymore, of Florida, also present) for 
the plaintiff. 
 
 
1 Harvard Board of Overseers, Harvard University, and 
Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology. 
2 
 
 
 
Anton Metlitsky, of New York (Victoria L. Steinberg also 
present) for the defendants. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
John Roddy & Elizabeth Ryan for Eamon Moore Whalen & 
others, Jarrett Martin Drake, Ariella Aïsha Azoulay, Cornelia 
Bewersdorf, Dan Hicks & another, and Meredith McKinney & 
another. 
Robert J. Ambrogi & Peter J. Caruso for Massachusetts 
Newspaper Publishers Association & another. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 1850, the Harvard professor Louis Agassiz 
arranged to have daguerreotypes made of Renty Taylor and Delia 
Taylor, who were enslaved on a plantation in South Carolina.2  
Renty was ordered to disrobe.  His daughter, Delia, was stripped 
naked to the waist.  Their images were then captured in four 
daguerreotypes.  These daguerreotypes were later used by Agassiz 
in an academic publication to support polygenism, a 
pseudoscientific racist theory for which Agassiz, a prominent 
scientist, was a vocal proponent. 
Identifying herself as a descendant of Renty and Delia 
Taylor, the plaintiff, Tamara Lanier, contacted Harvard 
University seeking recognition of her ancestral connection to 
Renty and Delia and requesting information regarding Harvard's 
past and intended use of the daguerreotypes.  When the 
university dismissed Lanier's claim of descent from Renty and 
Delia and ignored her requests, continuing to use and display 
 
2 Daguerreotypes were an early precursor to the modern 
photograph. 
3 
 
 
 
images of Renty without informing her, she brought this action 
against the defendants, the President and Fellows of Harvard 
College, the Harvard Board of Overseers, Harvard University, and 
the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology (collectively, 
Harvard),3 seeking relief for emotional distress and other 
injuries, as well as restitution of the daguerreotypes to her.  
A judge of the Superior Court granted Harvard's motion to 
dismiss, determining that each of the claims Lanier raised 
failed as a matter of law and that the facts as alleged in her 
second amended complaint  did not plausibly suggest an 
entitlement to relief. 
Because we conclude that the alleged facts, taken as true, 
plausibly support claims for negligent and indeed reckless 
infliction of emotional distress, we vacate the dismissal of the 
plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
and remand the case to the Superior Court to allow the plaintiff 
to amend her complaint to incorporate allegations of reckless 
infliction of emotional distress.  The dismissal of Lanier's 
other claims, however, we affirm.4 
 
3 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the 
Harvard Board of Overseers govern Harvard University.  The 
Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology is owned and 
controlled by Harvard University. 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
descendants of Louis Agassiz; Jarrett Martin Drake; Ariella 
 
4 
 
 
 
Background.  We summarize the factual allegations in the 
plaintiff's complaint, supplemented by information drawn from 
the undisputed documents referenced in that complaint.  For the 
purposes of reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept all factual 
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff's favor.  Shaw's Supermkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 
Mass. 338, 339 (2021). 
1.  Louis Agassiz, polygenism, and the daguerreotypes of 
Renty and Delia Taylor.  Harvard is a private educational 
institution founded in Cambridge in 1636.  Louis Agassiz was a 
Swiss natural scientist whose primary area of study was 
comparative zoology.  Employed by Harvard from 1847 until his 
death in 1873, Agassiz was also a proponent of polygenism, the 
pseudoscientific theory that racial groups lack a common 
biological origin and thus are fundamentally and categorically 
distinct.  Consistent with his belief in polygenism, Agassiz 
delivered lectures in Boston and South Carolina asserting that 
Black and white people have separate origins.  As a leader in 
the scientific community, with a reputation buttressed by his 
affiliation with Harvard, Aggasiz's views purported to give 
 
Aïsha Azoulay; Cornelia Bewersdorf; Dan Hicks and Nicholas David 
Mirzoeff; Meredith McKinney and the Harvard Student Coalition to 
Free Renty; and the Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers 
Association and New England First Amendment Coalition. 
5 
 
 
 
scientific legitimacy to the myth of white racial superiority 
and the perpetuation of American slavery. 
 
In 1850, three years after joining the Harvard faculty, 
Agassiz embarked on a tour of South Carolina plantations in 
search of people he believed were racially "pure" Africans whom 
he could study as evidence to support polygenism.  At the B.F. 
Taylor plantation in Columbia, Agassiz selected several 
individuals from among the enslaved population, including Renty 
and Delia Taylor, to be photographed using the daguerreotype 
process.  Renty and Delia were taken to the studio of 
photographer J.T. Zealy, where Renty was ordered to disrobe and 
Delia was stripped naked to the waist, following which Zealy 
photographed them in various poses and from different angles, 
according to Agassiz's instructions. 
The daguerreotypes were sent to Agassiz, who used them to 
support the polygenist conclusions he proposed in an academic 
article entitled "The Diversity of Origin of the Human Races."  
It appears that in 1936, the daguerreotypes were transferred to 
the holdings of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology 
(Peabody Museum), where they remained in obscurity.  In 1976, 
the daguerreotypes were discovered in a wooden cabinet in a 
corner of the Peabody Museum's attic by a museum researcher.  
Although the researcher who made the discovery expressed concern 
for the families of the men and women depicted in the 
6 
 
 
 
daguerreotypes, Harvard did not act on the researcher's 
concerns.  Rather, it simply claimed the daguerreotypes as its 
property.  The discovery itself attracted national media 
attention, as the daguerreotypes were believed to be the 
"earliest known photographs of American slaves."5 
2.  The plaintiff's family history, her contacts with 
Harvard, and Harvard's use of the daguerreotypes.  The 
plaintiff's mother, Mattye Thompson, often told the story of 
their family, which began with a man named Renty Taylor, also 
known as Papa Renty or "the Black African."  Papa Renty was an 
indomitable man who defied slavery's tyranny by teaching himself 
and others to read and by conducting secret Bible readings and 
study on the plantation where he was enslaved.  As a reminder to 
never forget the family history that began with Renty Taylor, 
Mattye Thompson repeatedly told her children and grandchildren, 
"Always remember we're Taylors, not Thompsons." 
In 2010, as Thompson was nearing the end of her life, she 
implored her children to document their family history.  After 
Thompson's death, the plaintiff set out to fulfill her wish, 
searching online resources and libraries and archives in South 
Carolina and speaking to anyone who might have information about 
 
5 Rensberger, Earliest Pictures of Slaves Found in Harvard 
Attic, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1977, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/05 
/31/archives/earliest-pictures-of-slaves-found-in-harvard-attic 
.html [https://perma.cc/RU6V-JLAZ]. 
7 
 
 
 
their ancestors.  Based on this research, Lanier concluded that 
she is the direct lineal descendant of Renty Taylor. 
During her research, Lanier learned about the 
daguerreotypes of Renty and Delia Taylor at Harvard.  In March 
2011,6 she wrote to Drew Gilpin Faust, the president of Harvard 
University at the time,7 and stated that she had "historical and 
[United States] Census information" that "confirm[ed]" that two 
of the individuals depicted in the daguerreotypes were her 
ancestors.  Lanier asked "to learn more about the slave 
daguerreotypes and how they have [been] or will be used," and 
for "a formal review of [her] documentation" to verify that 
Renty and Delia Taylor were indeed her ancestors. 
In her response, Faust thanked the plaintiff for sharing 
her story.  She noted that the plaintiff had been in touch with 
staff members at the Peabody Museum and had been given the 
opportunity to view the daguerreotypes.  Faust also stated that 
the museum was "involved in an ongoing project regarding those 
daguerreotypes" and that the same staff members had "agreed to 
be in touch with you directly if they discover any new relevant 
 
6 The plaintiff's complaint identifies the date of her 
initial correspondence with Faust as May 2011, but her 
subsequent affidavit filed with the Superior Court, and the 
attached correspondence to Faust, both list the date of that 
communication as March 17, 2011. 
 
7 Faust, we note, is a distinguished historian of the 
antebellum South and the Confederacy. 
8 
 
 
 
information."  But Harvard never contacted Lanier about any 
ongoing or future projects involving the daguerreotypes, nor did 
it contact her regarding the verification of her lineage and 
connection to the daguerreotypes. 
In March 2014, Lanier's hometown newspaper, the Norwich 
Bulletin, published an article about the daguerreotypes and the 
plaintiff's research into her family connection with Renty and 
Delia.  Both Lanier and a Peabody Museum staff member were 
interviewed about the plaintiff's connection to the 
daguerreotypes.  In the Norwich Bulletin article, the director 
of external relations for the Peabody Museum was quoted as 
saying of Lanier:  "She's given us nothing that directly 
connects her ancestor to the person in our photograph." 
In 2017, Renty Taylor's image from one of the 
daguerreotypes at issue was used on the cover of the thirtieth 
anniversary edition of "From Site to Sight," a volume on 
anthropology and photography published and marketed by Harvard 
University Press.  Harvard also used the image at a national 
academic conference it hosted on universities' historical 
connections with slavery in March of that year.  At the 
conference, which the plaintiff attended with her own daughters, 
Renty's image was projected on a large screen onstage and was 
also featured on the front cover of the conference program, 
where it was accompanied by the following caption: 
9 
 
 
 
"The man you see on the program's front cover, Renty, lived 
and worked as a slave in South Carolina in 1850, when his 
photograph was taken for the Harvard professor Louis 
Agassiz as a part of Agassiz's scientific research.  While 
Agassiz earned acclaim, Renty returned to invisibility." 
 
According to the plaintiff's complaint, this description "took 
[her] breath away," not only because it omitted the "racist and 
dehumanizing" nature of Agassiz's work, but also because it 
"relegate[d] Renty to 'invisibility,'" in "flagrant disregard 
for [her] repeated attempts to share Renty's story and restore a 
measure of the humanity that Agassiz [had] stripped from him." 
Prompted by these events, Lanier sent another letter to 
Faust on October 27, 2017, in which she demanded that the 
daguerreotypes of Renty and Delia be "immediately relinquished" 
to her.  Harvard responded to her letter on November 13, 2017, 
without acknowledging her demand. 
The plaintiff then commenced this action in the Superior 
Court on March 20, 2019.  She ultimately alleged seven counts 
against Harvard:  replevin, conversion, unauthorized use of a 
portrait or picture, violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights 
Act, intentional harm to a property interest, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and equitable restitution.8  
 
8 With respect to the count for unauthorized use of a 
portrait or picture, Lanier asserted a claim against Harvard for 
using the daguerreotypes of Renty and Delia Taylor for 
advertising and commercial purposes without consent, in 
violation of G. L. c. 214, § 3A.  The motion judge dismissed 
 
10 
 
 
 
When the motion judge granted Harvard's motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's second amended complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), this appeal followed.  We 
subsequently granted the plaintiff's application for direct 
appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the grant 
of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-
pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, drawing all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determining 
whether the allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is 
entitled to relief.  See Sacks v. Dissinger, 488 Mass. 780, 783 
(2021); Shaw's Supermkts., Inc., 488 Mass. at 339. 
In undertaking this review, we also may consider 
uncontested documents that the plaintiff has referenced in her 
complaint, especially given that Lanier has attached such 
documents to her affidavit in opposition to Harvard's motion to 
dismiss and both parties have discussed them in their briefing.  
See Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 614 
 
this claim on the ground that the statute does not provide that 
the right to sue survives the death of the person whose picture 
or portrait has been used.  We need not discuss this claim 
further because the plaintiff's briefs fail to present any 
argument challenging the motion judge's ruling.  See, e.g., 
Campatelli v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 468 Mass. 455, 
477 (2014); Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 
Mass. 1628 (2019) ("The appellate court need not pass upon 
questions or issues not argued in the brief"). 
11 
 
 
 
n.5 (2019); Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 224 
(2011), S.C., 466 Mass. 156 (2013); Marram v. Kobrick Offshore 
Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 n.4 (2004). 
In addressing Lanier's various claims here, we separate 
claims for emotional distress from the property-related claims, 
namely replevin, conversion, intentional harm to a property 
interest, and equitable restitution, as we conclude that the 
former survive the motion to dismiss but that the latter do not. 
2.  Negligent infliction of emotional distress.  To recover 
for negligently inflicted emotional distress, a plaintiff must 
prove "(1) negligence; (2) emotional distress; (3) causation; 
(4) physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology; and 
(5) that a reasonable person would have suffered emotional 
distress under the circumstances of the case."  Payton v. Abbott 
Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 557 (1982).  The requirement of physical 
harm is interpreted to include a broad range of symptoms; what 
is required is only enough "objective evidence" to "corroborate 
[plaintiffs'] mental distress claims."  Sullivan v. Boston Gas 
Co., 414 Mass. 129, 137-138 (1993).  Qualifying symptoms include 
those that "could be classified as more 'mental' than 
'physical,'" provided that they go beyond "mere upset, dismay, 
humiliation, grief and anger."  Gutierrez v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 412 (2002), S.C., 442 Mass. 1041 
(2004), quoting Sullivan, supra at 135-139. 
12 
 
 
 
To establish the first element of negligence, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and 
that the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care 
resulted in a breach of that duty.  See Helfman v. Northeastern 
Univ., 485 Mass. 308, 315, 327 (2020); Conley v. Romeri, 60 
Mass. App. Ct. 799, 801 (2004) ("It is fundamental that there 
must be a showing of a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, 
because [t]here can be no negligence where there is no duty" 
[quotation and citation omitted]).  Unless Harvard owed a duty 
of care to Lanier, then, she has no claim to relief for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
"Whether a defendant has a duty of care to the plaintiff in 
the circumstances is a question of law . . . , to be determined 
by reference to existing social values and customs and 
appropriate social policy."  O'Sullivan v. Shaw, 431 Mass. 201, 
203 (2000), citing Davis v. Westwood Group, 420 Mass. 739, 743 
(1995).  We conclude that Harvard's present obligations cannot 
be divorced from its past abuses.  In light of Harvard's 
complicity in the horrific actions surrounding the creation of 
the daguerreotypes, once Lanier communicated her understanding 
that the daguerreotypes depicted her ancestors and provided 
supporting documentation, we discern in both existing social 
values and customs and appropriate social policy a duty on 
Harvard's part to take reasonable care in responding to her. 
13 
 
 
 
Indeed, Harvard itself voluntarily undertook to apprise 
Lanier of any new information regarding the daguerreotypes, 
which would include information about her lineage from the 
individuals depicted in the daguerreotypes, and about how, going 
forward, the daguerreotypes would be used and displayed.  We 
emphasize, however, that Harvard's duty did not arise simply out 
of its voluntary representation to Lanier that it would keep her 
informed.  Cf. Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316, 323 (2002) 
("A . . . person or entity . . . may voluntarily assume a duty 
that would not otherwise be imposed on it . . .").  Its duty of 
care arose rather from what Lanier communicated to the 
university and from its involvement in the horrific conduct by 
which the daguerreotypes were created.  To reiterate:  given the 
university's horrific, historic role in the coerced creation of 
the degrading daguerreotypes, once Lanier approached Harvard as 
a descendant of the individuals depicted in these 
daguerreotypes, provided documentation to that effect, and 
requested further information, a duty to respond to her requests 
with due care was triggered. 
Based on this duty, we conclude that the facts as alleged 
regarding Harvard's ongoing treatment of Lanier since her 2011 
letter do not preclude a finding that Harvard has committed a 
breach of its duty of care to her.  Without any prior notice to 
Lanier, Harvard publicly dismissed her claim of an ancestral 
14 
 
 
 
connection to Renty and Delia in her local newspaper.  The 
university also failed to contact her when it subsequently used 
Renty's image on the cover of a book it published, and 
prominently featured that same image in materials connected with 
a conference that it hosted.  Harvard also rebuffed her attempts 
to tell "Renty's story," in the words of the complaint.  In sum, 
despite its duty of care to her, Harvard cavalierly dismissed 
her ancestral claims and disregarded her requests, despite its 
own representations that it would keep her informed of further 
developments. 
Moreover, Lanier has alleged that as a result of Harvard's 
mistreatment of her, she suffered emotional distress that 
produced physical symptoms of insomnia and nausea.  A fact 
finder could determine both that this distress was the actual 
and foreseeable consequence of Harvard's conduct toward the 
plaintiff and that her distress was a reasonable reaction to 
that conduct. 
Taken together, then, Lanier's various factual allegations 
are sufficient to "raise a right to relief" on her claim of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress "above the 
speculative level."  Dunn v. Genzyme Corp., 486 Mass. 713, 721 
(2021), quoting Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 
636 (2008). 
15 
 
 
 
Moreover, a cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is not, on the alleged facts, untimely.  As a 
tort action, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress must be brought "within three years next after the 
cause of action accrues."  G. L. c. 260, § 2A.  "Under our 
discovery rule, a cause of action for negligence accrues when 'a 
plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that [he or she] has 
sustained appreciable harm as a result of a defendant's 
negligence.'"  Khatchatourian v. Encompass Ins. Co. of Mass., 78 
Mass. App. Ct. 53, 57 (2010), quoting Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. 
Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C., 394 Mass. 265, 268 (1985).  
Although Lanier's complaint alleges that she suffered emotional 
distress because of Harvard's treatment of her, she does not 
indicate when she sustained this harm. 
Nevertheless, even if she began to suffer emotional 
distress from Harvard's conduct more than three years before she 
commenced this action in March 2019, Lanier's claim is not time 
barred given the continuing nature of Harvard's negligent 
response to her requests.  We have explained that where the tort 
complained of "has perdured for a period longer than the 
allowable period for bringing an action," then although "the 
plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for the time 
antedating the allowable period," nonetheless the "action is not 
barred" because the "continuing nature of the wrong keeps alive 
16 
 
 
 
the right to bring the action."  Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co., 
464 Mass. 1, 10 (2012), quoting J.R. Nolan & B. Henry, Civil 
Practice § 15.6, at 358 (3d ed. 2004). 
3.  Reckless infliction of emotional distress.  Although a 
closer question, we also conclude that the plaintiff has 
adequately alleged facts to plausibly support a claim of 
reckless infliction of emotional distress.  In the course of 
setting out allegations in support of her claim of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, Lanier alleged that Harvard's 
conduct toward her was "undertaken in . . . reckless disregard 
for how it would affect [her]."  Although she expressly sought 
relief only for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
specifically, we discern plausible support for a claim of 
reckless infliction of emotional distress in this and other 
allegations that Lanier has made. 
In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the 
understanding that this court's task in reviewing the allowance 
of a motion to dismiss is to determine "whether the factual 
allegations in the complaint are sufficient, as a matter of law, 
to state a recognized cause of action or claim, and whether such 
allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief."  Dunn, 
486 Mass. at 717.  For a claim to survive a motion to dismiss, 
the complaint need not recite that specific cause of action so 
long as the factual allegations are sufficient to support such a 
17 
 
 
 
claim.  See Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 479 Mass. 141, 161 (2018) 
(vacating dismissal of suit by generic drug consumer against 
brand-name drug manufacturer and directing Superior Court to 
grant leave to plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege claim 
of reckless rather than negligent failure to warn); Cheney v. 
Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 377 Mass. 141, 150 (1979) 
(giving plaintiff opportunity to amend complaint where court 
"indicat[ed] for the first time . . . the relevant 
considerations concerning" his claim).  Allowing a claim to go 
forward for further factual development is particularly 
appropriate when the claim for relief rests on a "fact-intensive 
and novel theory of recovery."  Baker v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering 
Hale & Dorr LLP, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 850 (2017), citing 
Ritchie v. Department of State Police, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 
663 n.14 (2004). 
a.  Elements of a reckless infliction of emotional distress 
claim.  To recover on a claim of reckless infliction of 
emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish four elements.  
First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant "knew or 
should have known that emotional distress was the likely result 
of his conduct."  Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 
144-145 (1976), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 
comment i (1965).  See Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 
Mass. 707, 717 (2012), quoting Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 
18 
 
 
 
250, 264 (1994) ("a plaintiff must show . . . that the defendant 
. . . should have known that his conduct would cause . . . 
emotional distress").  Second, the plaintiff must establish that 
the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous."  Agis, 
supra at 145, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46.  
Third, the defendant's conduct must have caused the plaintiff's 
distress.  Agis, supra.  Finally, the plaintiff must have 
suffered "severe" emotional distress, "of a nature 'that no 
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.'"  Id., quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment j. 
We conclude that Lanier has alleged sufficient facts 
relating to each of these elements to "raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level."  Dunn, 486 Mass. at 721, quoting 
Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.  As explained above in connection 
with Lanier's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, 
her allegations, if proved, are sufficient to establish that 
Harvard should have known that its conduct toward the plaintiff 
would likely result in emotional distress and that its conduct 
was the factual and legal cause of her distress.  The fact that 
this distress has, as alleged, been manifested in symptoms such 
as nausea and insomnia is enough to plausibly suggest that 
Lanier has suffered severe distress. 
19 
 
 
 
The remaining issue, requiring further analysis, is whether 
Harvard's treatment of Lanier may qualify as extreme and 
outrageous conduct. 
b.  Extreme and outrageous conduct.  The bar is high for a 
defendant's conduct to count as "extreme and outrageous" for 
purposes of an intentional or reckless infliction of emotional 
distress claim.  "Conduct qualifies as extreme and outrageous 
only if it 'go[es] beyond all possible bounds of decency, and 
[is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community.'"  Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 386 
(2014), quoting Roman, 461 Mass. at 718.  To qualify as extreme 
and outrageous, then, a defendant's actions must flout the most 
basic community standards of decency and propriety. 
We have no doubt that Agassiz's actions in 1850 -- having 
Renty and Delia taken, stripped, and forced to pose for the 
daguerreotypes -- would have met these requirements.  What is 
directly at issue here is, however, the separate question 
whether Harvard's conduct toward a descendant of Renty and Delia 
nearly 170 years later satisfies these stringent requirements.  
Nevertheless, as emphasized in connection with Lanier's 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, Harvard's 
present actions cannot be divorced from its past misconduct.  
Because Harvard's historic complicity in the objectionable 
20 
 
 
 
origins of the daguerreotypes informs the legal significance of 
its contemporary treatment of Lanier, we analyze them together. 
In 1850, slavery had long been abolished in Massachusetts.  
See Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193, 209 (1836) (holding that 
slavery had been abolished in Massachusetts no later than 1780, 
when Massachusetts Declaration of Rights became effective).  If 
Agassiz had arranged for two persons to be taken against their 
will to a photography studio in Massachusetts, where they were 
then forced to disrobe and pose for daguerreotypes to be made of 
them, he should have faced criminal liability for an illegal 
conspiracy, whether to batter or to kidnap.9 
In South Carolina, where the daguerreotypes were created, 
slavery was still recognized as a lawful institution.  Under 
this institution, "founded in force, not in right," Aves, 18 
Pick. at 215, persons who were enslaved had no legal right to 
control their own bodies and labor, being instead reduced to 
 
9 "[A] combination of two or more persons, by some concerted 
action, to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose" was 
recognized as itself "an offence punishable by the laws of this 
Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111, 122, 123 
(1842).  Physically taking another and confining him or her 
without consent was just such a criminal or unlawful purpose.  
See Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 12 Met. 56, 79 (1846) (by statute, 
it was punishable criminal offense to, "without lawful 
authority," "forcibly seize and confine, or . . . inveigle or 
kidnap any other person"); Commonwealth v. Clark, 2 Met. 23, 24 
(1840) ("touching of another's person, wilfully or in anger, 
without his consent," was, "unless justifiable," unlawful 
"battery"). 
21 
 
 
 
"mere chattel[s] personal" with no legal protections against 
battery or kidnap.  State v. Maner, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 453, 454 
(1834).  Taking advantage of the continued existence of slavery 
in South Carolina, Agassiz therefore apparently faced no legal 
impediments in procuring Black people who were enslaved there to 
be stripped and photographed to further his pseudoscientific 
theories that Black and white people do not share a common 
origin and that the former are biologically inferior to the 
latter. 
Seized and made to pose for the camera under conditions in 
which no valid consent could have been given, Renty and his 
daughter suffered not only a gross interference with their 
bodily autonomy but also an invasion of their personal privacy 
and an affront to their dignity.  Any subsequent display and 
dissemination by Agassiz and his associates of the 
daguerreotypes resulting from this sordid episode, by exposing 
to public gaze degrading and dehumanizing images of Renty and 
Delia, would have compounded these harms. 
In sum, Agassiz's actions in 1850 were extreme and 
outrageous.  Harvard has not suggested otherwise.  Indeed, there 
are few acts more extreme and outrageous than forcing another 
held in a condition that precludes giving valid consent to pose 
half-naked for a photograph, and subsequently displaying and 
exploiting the resulting images for one's own ends.  Moreover, 
22 
 
 
 
Agassiz's extreme and outrageous conduct was undertaken while he 
served as a Harvard professor and in his role as an academic 
researcher. 
Even long after the deaths of Renty and Delia Taylor, the 
degrading and dehumanizing daguerreotypes that Agassiz arranged 
to have made of them retained their capacity to wound.  The 
Peabody Museum researcher who discovered the daguerreotypes in 
1976 seemed to recognize this, expressing concern for the 
descendants of the individuals depicted in the daguerreotypes, 
apparently aware that such descendants would be intensely 
interested in and concerned about the past mistreatment, and the 
ongoing degrading display, of their half-naked ancestors.  But 
despite being notified of Lanier's belief in her lineage from 
Renty and Delia, as well as receiving documentation supporting 
this belief, at no point did Harvard engage meaningfully with 
her to verify her potential family connection to the individuals 
portrayed in the daguerreotypes.  Instead of engaging personally 
with Lanier, Harvard ignored her and -- without informing her -- 
expressed its skepticism about her assertion of descent through 
a public statement given by the director of external relations 
for the Peabody Museum to Lanier's local newspaper that, from 
Harvard's perspective, she had given the museum "nothing that 
directly connect[ed] her ancestor to the person in [the 
museum's] photograph."  Harvard also went on to repeatedly use 
23 
 
 
 
the degrading daguerreotype of Renty in ways that exposed his 
image to public gaze, without at any time consulting with or 
even informing Lanier before doing so, or allowing her an 
opportunity to tell Renty's story.10 
As we have already observed, Harvard's past complicity in 
the repugnant actions by which the daguerreotypes were produced 
informs its present responsibilities to the descendants of the 
individuals coerced into having their half-naked images captured 
in the daguerreotypes.  Whether Harvard's response to Lanier's 
inquiries about the daguerreotypes resulted in a breach of basic 
community standards of decency cannot be evaluated without 
taking into account its historic responsibility for Agassiz's 
role in the horrific circumstances by which those very 
daguerreotypes were created. 
 
10 As thoughtfully explained in the concurrence by the Chief 
Justice and in the amicus brief submitted by Jarret Martin 
Drake, Harvard's actions in this regard starkly depart from 
standards of archival practice widely recognized today.  In its 
Code of Ethics for Archivists, the Society of American 
Archivists (SAA), which is North America's largest organization 
of archivists, affirms the importance of respecting privacy in 
archival practice.  The SAA's Code of Ethics recognizes the 
importance of "ensur[ing] that privacy and confidentiality are 
maintained, particularly for individuals and groups who have had 
no voice or role in collections' creation, retention, or public 
use."  The Code also insists on "the respectful use of 
culturally sensitive materials" in archival collections, 
including by appropriate "consult[ation]" with stakeholders.  
Society of American Archivists, Core Values Statement and Code 
of Ethics, https://www2.archivists.org/statements/saa-core-
values-statement-and-code-of-ethics#code_of_ethics 
[https://perma.cc/KY75-LLJ2]. 
24 
 
 
 
When the plaintiff informed Harvard that the daguerreotypes 
of Renty and Delia Taylor that it had in its possession, and 
that it used according to its own purposes, were in fact 
photographic images of her ancestors, Harvard was put on notice 
that she would reasonably be greatly concerned about how the 
images -- created through coercion and depicting her ancestors 
in a degrading, dehumanizing light -- would be used, displayed, 
and disseminated.  What was at stake for her was the continued 
exposure and exploitation of images of her ancestors, by the 
very institution complicit in the coerced and invasive creation 
of those images.  In these circumstances, basic community 
standards of decency dictate that the institution complicit in 
the extreme and outrageous actions by which the degrading 
daguerreotypes of Lanier's ancestors were produced should, in 
the words of her complaint, "willingly make amends" for its past 
actions or at least "stop perpetuating the wrenching pain of its 
past" by engaging in good faith with her, both about her 
ancestral connection to the individuals depicted in the 
daguerreotypes, and about how these degrading and dehumanizing 
images would be used going forward, particularly in public 
displays.  Because, as alleged, Harvard did just the opposite, 
25 
 
 
 
its actions plausibly rose to the level of extreme and 
outrageous conduct.11 
4.  First Amendment limitations on tort liability.  
Although we are persuaded that the plaintiff's allegations have 
plausibly suggested an entitlement to relief for infliction of 
emotional distress, any right, as well as any remedy that might 
ultimately be awarded, must be carefully delineated to respect 
the protections for freedom of speech under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  This may limit what activity 
by Harvard may be taken into account in determining the 
university's liability for negligently or recklessly inflicting 
emotional distress on Lanier.  In particular, even if shameful, 
Harvard's commentary on the daguerreotypes and Agassiz's role in 
their creation, presented in the context of an academic 
conference, would appear to be protected speech under the First 
Amendment; this includes Harvard's own characterization in the 
conference program of Agassiz's work as scientific research and 
of Renty as being rendered invisible. 
We emphasize that the First Amendment "looks beyond written 
or spoken words as mediums of expression."  Hurley v. Irish-
 
11 For the reasons discussed in connection with the 
plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
a claim of reckless infliction of emotional distress would also 
not be barred by the three-year statute of limitations for tort 
actions. 
26 
 
 
 
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995).12  Imposing tort liability for how photographs -
- including daguerreotypes -- are used to express and 
communicate ideas therefore raises First Amendment concerns.  
See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 
2003) ("The protection of the First Amendment . . . includes 
. . . photographs . . ."). 
Whether and to what extent Harvard's expressive use of or 
commentary on the daguerreotypes can form the basis of liability 
for infliction of emotional distress depends on whether the 
speech activities at issue deal with matters of public concern 
or with private matters.  A matter of public concern is a 
"matter of political, social, or other concern to the community" 
or "a subject of general interest and of value and concern to 
the public."  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011), first 
quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983), then quoting 
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004).  By contrast, "purely 
private" matters are those that "concern[] no public issue."  
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
759, 762 (1985). 
 
12 Photography is a medium that attracts First Amendment 
protection because it is a "significant medium for the 
communication of ideas" and an "organ of public opinion."  
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
27 
 
 
 
Speech on a public matter "occupies the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special 
protection."  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452.  Specifically, such 
speech may not be the basis of liability for infliction of 
emotional distress, even if that speech is extreme and 
outrageous, as "'[o]utrageousness' in the area of political and 
social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which 
would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the 
jurors' . . . views."  Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 55 (1988).  Where, however, "matters of purely private 
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often 
less rigorous."  Snyder, supra.  With respect to speech of only 
private concern, then, there is no First Amendment impediment to 
holding defendants liable in tort for causing emotional 
distress. 
Distinguishing which aspects of Harvard's interactions with 
the plaintiff qualify as speech of public rather than private 
concern is a fact-intensive question that cannot be fully 
resolved at this early stage of proceedings.  See Snyder, 562 
U.S. at 453, quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761 
("Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern 
requires us to examine the 'content, form, and context' of that 
speech, 'as revealed by the whole record'"). 
28 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the broad strokes of the distinction between 
the public and private aspects of Harvard's expressive 
activities are already apparent at this early stage.  We note, 
first, that the daguerreotypes at issue here are significant in 
understanding the history of American slavery.  At the time of 
their discovery in 1976, the daguerreotypes attracted public 
attention as the earliest known photographic images of 
individuals enslaved in the United States.  Today, they continue 
to serve as damning proof of the evils of American slavery 
itself, and of Harvard's own complicity in this evil history, 
especially when the daguerreotypes are contextualized with the 
full facts surrounding their creation.  The history and legacy 
of slavery in this country is, without doubt, a matter of public 
concern.  Indeed, confronting the history of slavery and its 
ongoing impacts and lingering harms is a matter of utmost 
importance in the public life of our nation.  For this reason, 
Harvard's expressive use of the daguerreotypes to characterize 
the history of American slavery and comment on its past and 
present significance is speech on a matter of public concern 
that is insulated from tort liability by stringent First 
Amendment protections.  This is true even if Harvard was 
complicit in this evil history, and not describing and accepting 
responsibility for its own misconduct. 
29 
 
 
 
On the other hand, Harvard's dismissive and disrespectful 
response to Lanier's inquiries about her ancestral connection to 
Renty and Delia, and about how the images of her ancestors would 
be used, touches on matters solely of interest to the specific 
litigants in this case, not to the public at large.  These 
personal interactions between Harvard and Lanier "did not 
address a public concern" and hence may constitutionally incur 
tort liability.  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453, quoting Roe, 543 U.S. 
at 84. 
5.  Property claims.  Although we discern claims for 
infliction of emotional distress that survive dismissal, we 
conclude that Lanier's property claims were properly dismissed.  
She has argued that because the daguerreotypes at issue were 
created in the context of "multiple tortious and criminal 
violations" of Renty and Delia's rights, it was Renty and Delia, 
not Agassiz or Harvard, who held possessory rights over the 
daguerreotypes from the time they were made.  She further argues 
that as a descendant of Renty and Delia, she is entitled to 
possession of the daguerreotypes.  We determine that Lanier's 
property claims do not survive dismissal for two reasons.  To 
begin with, the claims were not timely brought.  On the more 
complicated question whether, on the merits, Lanier has alleged 
sufficient facts to plausibly make out her property claims, we 
30 
 
 
 
determine that she has no cognizable property interest in the 
daguerreotypes. 
Lanier's claims of replevin, conversion, and intentional 
harm to a property interest are subject to the three-year 
statute of limitations for tort and replevin actions.  See G. L. 
c. 260, § 2A ("actions of tort . . . and actions of replevin, 
shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause 
of action accrues").13  Lanier's equitable restitution claim is 
likewise subject to the three-year limitations period in G. L. 
c. 260, § 2A.  Where an equitable claim such as restitution is 
not explicitly covered in the statutes of limitations, we look 
to the analogous claim at law to determine the applicable 
statute of limitations.  See Sacks, 488 Mass. at 791 n.14 (claim 
for unjust enrichment predicated on tortious conduct presumed to 
be governed by statute of limitations for torts).  Here, 
Lanier's equitable restitution claim is premised on the 
allegation that although she is the "rightful owner" of the 
daguerreotypes of Renty and Delia, Harvard has unlawfully 
 
13 The text of G. L. c. 260, § 2A, explicitly includes 
"actions of replevin."  The statute also applies to claims for 
conversion, which is a tort action.  See Patsos v. First Albany 
Corp., 433 Mass. 323, 327 n.6 (2001).  The plaintiff's claim for 
intentional harm to a property interest, which has not to date 
been recognized as a cause of action in Massachusetts, is 
premised on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 871 (1979).  
Assuming but not deciding that such a cause of action is 
available in Massachusetts, it would be a tort action subject to 
G. L. c. 260, § 2A. 
31 
 
 
 
retained possession of them.  Her equitable restitution claim is 
thus analogous to her replevin claim, for which the limitations 
period is three years. 
Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff's cause of action 
accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, "when the 
plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have 
discovered that (1) he has suffered harm; (2) his harm was 
caused by the conduct of another; and (3) the defendant is the 
person who caused that harm."  Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 
720, 727 (2014). 
With respect to her property claims, the alleged harm 
suffered by Lanier is Harvard's wrongful possession of and 
control over the daguerreotypes.  Her March 2011 letter to Faust 
indicated her awareness by that time of the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the daguerreotypes and that Harvard 
was in possession of them; it also demonstrated that she already 
believed then that she descends from Renty and Delia.  The March 
2014 article in the Norwich Bulletin again revealed Lanier's 
knowledge at the time that Harvard was in possession of 
daguerreotypes depicting individuals she believed to be her 
ancestors.  In addition, the statement by the Peabody Museum's 
director of external relations reported in the article 
reasonably put her on notice that Harvard rejected her assertion 
32 
 
 
 
of descent and hence any property rights she might have in the 
daguerreotypes. 
Consequently, the plaintiff's factual allegations and 
exhibits indicate that, at the latest by March 2014, she had 
discovered or reasonably should have discovered that Harvard 
wrongfully took and retained possession of the daguerreotypes of 
Renty and Delia, which, she believed, were rightfully hers.  As 
such, under the discovery rule, her property-based causes of 
action accrued no later than March 2014.  Her property claims 
filed in March 2019 were therefore barred by the relevant 
statutes of limitations. 
As for the merits of her property claims, absent the 
extraordinary circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
daguerreotypes, Lanier would have no property rights in them.  
In general, the photographer and not the subject owns "the 
negative [and] the photographs printed from it."  Thayer v. 
Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 163-164 (1933).  Accord Ault 
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 1988), 
overruled on other grounds by Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 
1049 (9th Cir. 1990) (photograph is "the property of the 
photographer").  Likewise, those whose likenesses are reproduced 
in a photograph do not, simply for that reason, have a property 
interest in it.  See Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. 
App. 643, 652 (1949) ("the subject of a photograph does not own 
33 
 
 
 
the negative or have any property rights therein").  In the 
ordinary course then, the daguerreotypes would be the property 
of the person who made them or who contracted for them to be 
made, who could then freely transfer ownership over them to 
others.  A descendant of someone whose likeness is reproduced in 
a daguerreotype would not therefore inherit any property right 
to that daguerreotype. 
Even in egregious circumstances like those described here, 
property transfers to private parties have not been ordered.  
Consider G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b), which provides that whoever 
"willfully photographs, videotapes or electronically surveils 
another person who is nude or partially nude" when that person 
is in a "place and circumstance" where he or she "would have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in not being so photographed," 
and "without that person's knowledge and consent," is criminally 
liable.  General Laws c. 272, § 105 (c), further prohibits 
willfully and knowingly "disseminat[ing]" a "visual image" of 
another person taken in violation of § 105 (b), when done 
"without consent" of the person depicted.  This statute 
recognizes, and seeks to protect by the imposition of criminal 
penalties, individuals' privacy interests in avoiding the 
nonconsensual photographic reproduction by another of their nude 
or partially nude likeness and the subsequent public 
distribution of any such invasive images.  See Commonwealth v. 
34 
 
 
 
Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 570 (2019) (purpose of § 105 [b] is to 
"protect the victim's privacy and to penalize the invasion of 
that privacy").  Nevertheless, it notably does not provide for 
the conferral of ownership rights in the offending photographs 
or video footage on the persons depicted in them or their 
descendants. 
Although there are also statutory provisions for forfeiture 
of property because of that property's connection to criminal 
activity, these provisions are mostly offense-specific and 
likewise do not order property transfers to private parties.  
They instead require forfeiture of the property implicated in 
the criminal activity to the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 90, § 24W (providing for forfeiture to Commonwealth of motor 
vehicles owned by persons convicted of drunk driving offenses); 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (e) (providing for confiscation of firearm by 
Commonwealth upon conviction of illegal possession of firearm); 
G. L. c. 94C, § 47 (providing for forfeiture to Commonwealth of 
property used or intended for use in illegal manufacture, 
delivery, and distribution of controlled substances); G. L. 
c. 265, § 56 (providing for forfeiture to Commonwealth of 
property used or intended for use in human trafficking).14 
 
14 We note that G. L. c. 276, §§ 1 and 3, provide for 
property seized as evidence during a search to be returned to 
the rightful owners if the property was stolen, embezzled, 
 
35 
 
 
 
Here, we have neither a criminal conviction nor a specific 
statute providing for forfeiture or transfer of property under 
the factual circumstances alleged.  The most closely analogous 
statutes, as explained above, would require forfeiture of the 
property associated with the criminal activity to the 
Commonwealth, not the transfer of such property to a private 
party.  Lanier has also not identified any judicial decisions 
providing for compelled forfeiture or transfer to a private 
party in these circumstances,15 nor are we aware of any such 
decisions. 
 
obtained by false pretenses, or "otherwise obtained in the 
commission of a crime," and for the seized property to be 
forfeited "as the public interest requires."  However, these 
provisions only apply to property seized in the course of a 
search conducted "in the execution of a search warrant."  There 
was no criminal investigation of Agassiz, and no search warrant 
that issued targeting him or his property.  General Laws c. 276, 
§§ 1 and 3, therefore do not provide any authority for 
transferring the daguerreotypes to Lanier. 
 
15 In Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 258-259 
(1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970), S.C., 360 Mass. 857 
(1971), this court acted in very exceptional circumstances to 
limit the full possessory rights of a filmmaker to use and 
distribute film footage he had made, for the sake of the privacy 
interests of those depicted in the film.  The Wiseman court 
determined that because the film displayed mentally ill inmates 
of a correctional facility "in situations which would be 
degrading to a person of normal mentality and sensitivity," such 
as being portrayed nude or while undergoing distressing symptoms 
of mental illness, distribution of the film to the general 
public would work an "indecent intrusion into the most private 
aspects of the lives of [the inmates depicted]."  Id. at 258.  
For that reason, the court enjoined showing the film to the 
general public, while allowing viewings by specialized 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
6.  The creation of a new common-law right.  We can also 
identify no support in the common law of this Commonwealth or 
any other State for the new cause of action that Justice 
Cypher's concurrence would create to allow descendants of 
persons who were enslaved to obtain possession of artifacts that 
resulted from the enslavement of their ancestors. 
As more thoroughly explained in the concurrence by the 
Chief Justice, the new right proposed in Justice Cypher's 
concurrence does not derive from common-law reasoning, which is 
a precedent-based, evolutionary decision-making process 
providing both for continuity and change.16  Rather, a right and 
remedy, without precedent, would be created anew.17 
 
audiences.  It did not, however, require the filmmaker to 
transfer possession of the film to those portrayed in it or 
confer ownership rights on them.  Indeed, it allowed the 
filmmaker to charge for viewings of the film by specialized 
audiences as permitted under the injunction.  Id. at 262-263. 
 
16 See B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 67 
(1921) (common law develops through judges "extend[ing] or 
restrict[ing]" "existing rules," giving due weight to "certainty 
and uniformity and order and coherence" of system of legal 
rules); F. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer 119 (2009) ("common-
law rules" are "developed incrementally and by accretion over 
time"); D.A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 37, 38 (2010) 
(common law develops "over time, not at a single moment" by 
"emerg[ing] from [an] evolutionary process through the 
development of a body of precedents"). 
 
17 Cf. Strauss, supra at 38 ("Present-day interpreters" of 
common law may contribute to its evolution, "but only by 
continuing the evolution, not by ignoring what exists and 
starting anew"). 
37 
 
 
 
Although arising out of a case, the proposed new cause of 
action is in certain ways more comparable to remedial schemes 
providing for the repatriation of cultural items or for 
reparations that have hitherto been accomplished only by 
legislative action.  See, e.g., Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 
(legislation providing for repatriation of Native American human 
remains and cultural items held by Federal agencies and 
institutions receiving Federal funds to lineal descendants and 
culturally affiliated tribes).  Notably, perhaps the most 
serious attempt to date to achieve a program of reparations with 
the force of law for the historic enslavement of Black Americans 
has taken the form of a bill introduced in the United States 
Congress.  See Commission to Study and Develop Reparation 
Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. Rep. 40, 117th Cong., 
1st Sess. (2021).18  Such open-ended power to create and assign 
new legal rights and duties properly belongs to the Legislature, 
not the judiciary.  See 1 L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law 982 (3d ed. 2000) ("The open-ended discretion to choose ends 
is the essence of legislative power").  For this reason, and for 
 
18 For an overview of the history of the struggle for 
reparations for Black Americans, including the contrast between 
the strategy of achieving reparations through litigation and 
strategies seeking legislative solutions, see J.C. Torpey, 
Making Whole What Has Been Smashed:  On Reparations Politics 
107-132 (2006). 
38 
 
 
 
the reasons explained in our earlier discussion of Harvard's 
liability for causing Lanier emotional distress, we look to 
existing tort law to provide the appropriate remedy here. 
7.  Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim.  In her 
complaint, Lanier alleged that Harvard, acting through 
administrators appointed pursuant to the State Constitution, 
buttressed the racist ideology underlying slavery and otherwise 
advocated for a slave-based economy in the period "between 
approximately 1846 and 1861."  Because by then this court had 
held that slavery was unlawful under the Massachusetts 
Constitution, Lanier contends that Harvard's advocacy for 
slavery, particularly those of its efforts that relied on the 
use of Renty Taylor's image, amounted to a violation of his 
State constitutional rights, which entitles her to relief under 
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I. 
The motion judge properly granted Harvard's motion to 
dismiss this claim.  The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act creates 
a private right of action for "[a]ny person whose exercise or 
enjoyment . . . of rights secured by the constitution or laws of 
the commonwealth, has been interfered with, or attempted to be 
interfered with."  G. L. c. 12, § 11I.   However, a plaintiff 
may only bring such an action "in his own name and on his own 
behalf."  Id.  The allegations in Lanier's complaint that 
Agassiz used Renty's image to support pseudoscientific theories 
39 
 
 
 
of racial hierarchy pertain to an alleged interference with 
Renty's constitutional rights, not to any interference with her 
own rights.  Because there is no provision in the Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Act that allows Lanier to bring a claim for a 
violation of the State constitutional rights of her ancestor 
that took place more than one and one-half centuries ago, her 
State civil rights claim cannot succeed on the alleged facts. 
Conclusion.  We vacate the motion judge's allowance of 
Harvard's motion to dismiss Lanier's claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and remand the case to the 
Superior Court with directions to allow the plaintiff to amend 
her complaint to incorporate a claim of reckless infliction of 
emotional distress.  We affirm, however, the motion judge's 
dismissal of the property claims and the Massachusetts Civil 
Rights Act claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
 
 
BUDD, C.J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that 
Tamara Lanier has stated a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (NIED), and that she should be permitted to 
amend her complaint to add a claim for reckless infliction of 
emotional distress (RIED).  I further agree that her remaining 
claims properly were dismissed.  I write separately to emphasize 
that the alleged conduct of the defendants (collectively, 
Harvard) here clearly transgressed moral standards broadly 
adopted by archival institutions.  It thus ran afoul of 
Harvard's duty of care to Lanier and could be found to be 
extreme and outrageous.  Finally, although I am not persuaded 
that Justice Cypher's proposed cause of action is the proper 
course, I remain open to the possibility that a legal theory 
could be developed by which plaintiffs similarly situated to 
Lanier could be afforded fuller relief than that which the court 
affords Lanier today. 
1.  I agree with the court's holding that Harvard's 
exploitation of the enslavement of Lanier's ancestors forges a 
special relationship between Harvard and Lanier that obligates 
Harvard to exercise reasonable care in responding to Lanier's 
claim that the daguerreotypes in its possession depict her 
ancestors.  Ante at    .  As the court explains, because Lanier 
plausibly alleges facts that would support a finding that 
Harvard woefully failed to satisfy this duty of care, thereby 
2 
 
 
 
causing Lanier emotional distress -- an undoubtedly reasonable 
reaction in these circumstances, with physical manifestations -- 
Lanier has stated a claim for NIED against Harvard.  Id. at    .  
See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 557 (1982). 
I further agree that Lanier has stated a claim for RIED 
against Harvard because the facts that she alleges additionally 
would support a finding that Harvard "knew or should have known 
that emotional distress was the likely result of [its] conduct," 
this conduct was "extreme and outrageous," and the distress that 
it caused Lanier was "severe."  Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 
Mass. 140, 144-145 (1976), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 46 & comment j (1965).1  Ante at    . 
The court's conclusion that each of these claims legally is 
viable rests on its evaluation of the ethical standards of our 
modern community.  These standards are the guidepost for 
determining that Harvard owes a special duty of care to Lanier, 
see Correa v. Schoeck, 479 Mass. 686, 693 (2018), quoting Jupin 
v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 143 (2006) ("duty of care is derived 
from 'existing social values and customs and appropriate social 
policy'"), as well as for determining that its conduct could be 
found "extreme and outrageous," see Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 
 
1 I also agree with the court that neither an NIED nor an 
RIED claim is time barred because of the continuing nature of 
Harvard's tortious response to Lanier's outreach.  Ante at note 
11. 
3 
 
 
 
379, 386 (2014), quoting Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461 
Mass. 707, 718 (2012) ("Conduct qualifies as extreme and 
outrageous" if "regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable 
in a civilized community").  I write separately to emphasize 
that Harvard's alleged conduct here indeed transgresses 
contemporary standards and values adopted by museums and 
research institutions nationally and internationally, including 
by Harvard itself. 
As the court notes, ante at note 10, the Society of 
American Archivists (SAA), North America's largest organization 
of archivists, has published a code of ethics that urges 
archivists to "establish procedures and policies to protect the 
interests of the . . . individuals . . . whose public and 
private lives and activities are documented in archival 
holdings."  Society of American Archivists, Core Values 
Statement and Code of Ethics, "Privacy" (rev. Aug. 2020), 
https://www2.archivists.org/statements/saa-core-values-statement 
-and-code-of-ethics#code_of_ethics [https://perma.cc/KY75-LLJ2].  
The SAA code of ethics additionally encourages archivists to 
"consult with those represented by records" in order to "promote 
the respectful use of culturally sensitive materials in their 
care."  Id. 
4 
 
 
 
The American Alliance of Museums (AAM), of which Harvard's 
Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology is a member,2 
similarly has published an ethical code that provides that 
"competing claims of ownership that may be asserted in 
connection with objects in [a museum's] custody should be 
handled openly, seriously, responsively and with respect for the 
dignity of all parties involved."  See American Alliance of 
Museums, AAM Code of Ethics for Museums, "Collections" (amended 
2000), https://www.aam-us.org/programs/ ethics-standards-and-
professional-practices/code-of-ethics-for-museums [https://perma 
.cc/BK9D-QUAD]. 
The International Council of Museums (ICOM) likewise has a 
code of ethics, which "reflects principles generally accepted by 
the international museum community" and is presented as a 
"minimum standard for museums."  See International Council of 
Museums, ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums (2017) (preamble), 
https://icom.museum/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICOM-code-En-
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TLR-J3Y3].  The code observes: 
"Museum collections reflect the cultural and natural 
heritage of the communities from which they have been 
derived.  As such, they have a character beyond that of 
ordinary property, which may include strong affinities with 
national, regional, local, ethnic, religious or political 
identity.  It is important therefore that museum policy is 
responsive to this situation." 
 
2 See American Alliance of Museums, Find a Member Museum, 
https://ww2.aam-us.org/about-museums/find-a-museum [https: 
//perma.cc/HJV8-Y7WC]. 
5 
 
 
 
 
Id. at 33.  In line with this guiding principle, the ICOM 
ethical code directs that "[w]here museum activities involve a 
contemporary community or its heritage, . . . [r]espect for the 
wishes of the community involved should be paramount."  Id. at 
34. 
These various ethical codes show that museums and research 
institutions across the United States and the world realize 
their special ethical obligations to the communities from whom 
their collections have too frequently been wrongfully extracted.  
They demonstrate a uniform commitment to proactive examination 
of the provenance of held artifacts and to respectful and 
transparent consideration of competing ownership claims to these 
artifacts. 
 
This is so even where these institutions hold valid legal 
title to the artifacts at issue.  For example, the Smithsonian 
Institution (Smithsonian) has created an ethical returns working 
group that is in the process of developing an institution-wide 
policy for scrutinizing its collection practices and addressing 
any wrongs.  See McGlone, Why the Smithsonian Is Changing Its 
Approach to Collecting, Starting with the Removal of Looted 
Benin Treasures, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 2022 (McGlone); Stevens, 
Smithsonian to Return Most of Its Benin Bronze Collection to 
Nigeria, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2022 (Stevens).  The working 
6 
 
 
 
group's focus is not on technical questions of legal title, but 
"on ethics."  McGlone, supra.  According to Kevin Gover, the 
undersecretary for museums and culture at the Smithsonian, the 
institution is "going beyond legal title and asking, should we 
own this, knowing the circumstances under which it came into our 
ownership?"  Stevens, supra.  Similarly, Christine Mullen 
Kreamer, the deputy director of the African Art Museum and a 
member of the Smithsonian's ethical returns working group, 
stated that the institution is scrutinizing "past collecting 
practices in light of current ethical concerns," prioritizing 
"[e]ngagement with communities," and "giving voice to 
individuals, communities and institutions that have not always 
had a voice."  McGlone, supra.  In connection with this effort, 
the Smithsonian recently removed eighteen Benin Kingdom Court 
Style works from its cases -- which had been looted by British 
soldiers during a raid of Benin City (in modern Nigeria) -- and 
is working to repatriate the pieces to Nigeria, although it is 
not legally obligated to do so.  See id.; Stevens, supra. 
As another example, in 2010 the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 
(MFA), realized that four Seventeenth Century tapestries in its 
possession once had been owned by an art dealership in Berlin, 
Germany, managed by Jakob and Rosa Oppenheimer, who were Jewish.  
See Museum of Fine Arts Boston, Ownership Resolutions, 
https://www.mfa.org/collections/provenance/ownership-resolutions 
7 
 
 
 
[https://perma.cc/4699-VMD4].  The Oppenheimers had fled Germany 
to escape Nazi persecution, and the art from their dealership 
subsequently had been sold at an auction.  Id.  On learning this 
history, the MFA contacted the Oppenheimers' heirs, who allowed 
the MFA to retain the tapestries as part of a settlement 
agreement.  Id. 
Particularly illuminating here, a case study published by 
the SAA describes how an archival institution dealt with the 
discovery that it possessed photographs of a Sun Dance, "a 
sacred, week-long ceremony that was distinctive of the Great 
Plains tribes during the [E]ighteenth and [N]ineteenth 
centuries."  E.M. Ryan, Society of American Archivists, Case 
Studies in Archival Ethics, Case #3:  Identifying Culturally 
Sensitive American Indian Material in a Non-tribal Institution, 
at 3 (Sept. 2014), https://www2.archivists.org/sites/all/files 
/AmericanIndianMaterial_CEPC-CaseStudy3.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/2QWX-M4PR].  The institution surmised that "the images were 
most likely taken without the knowledge or consent of the tribal 
members," and therefore contacted the director of the Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes' language and cultural preservation department to 
arrange a meeting to discuss "proper handling of the images 
given their sensitive content."  Id. at 4.  In the meantime, the 
institution removed the sensitive photographs from its online 
digital collection.  Id.  After discussion with tribal leaders, 
8 
 
 
 
the institution agreed to restrict public access to the 
sensitive photographs, which remained in the institution's files 
only to be viewed by "[f]amilies of those depicted in the 
images."  Id. at 5. 
These three examples show how archival institutions deal 
respectfully with individuals who are connected to pieces in 
their collections and prioritize those individuals' wishes for 
how the pieces should be used or displayed, particularly where 
the pieces were created or acquired under conditions of duress, 
violence, or nonconsent.  Such practices reflect a shared 
recognition on the part of these institutions that to disregard 
such individuals' concerns would be to signal that the 
inequitable power structures that enabled the archival 
institution to possess the contested pieces live on.  To send 
this signal is itself a form of violence.3 
Harvard's alleged conduct here inflicted just this sort of 
violence on Lanier.  It brushed her off, publicly dismissed her 
ancestral claim, and continued to display and profit from the 
daguerreotypes without Lanier's input or involvement.  This 
departs from every ethical code quoted supra.  By failing to 
 
3 Indeed, when the Smithsonian removed the looted Benin 
pieces from its shelves, it replaced them with photographs and a 
sign that states in part:  "We recognize the trauma, violence 
and loss such displays of stolen artistic and cultural heritage 
can inflict on the victims of those crimes, their descendants, 
and broader communities."  McGlone, supra.  See Stevens, supra. 
9 
 
 
 
engage respectfully and transparently with Lanier when she 
approached the university to explain her connection to the 
daguerreotypes, Harvard transgressed archival institutions' 
values, selfishly putting itself and its agenda before any 
effort to reckon with its past or make amends in the present. 
Indeed, Harvard transgressed what it now upholds as its own 
values.  Harvard recently released a report detailing the 
university's historic ties to slavery and recommending 
reparative action.  See Presidential Committee on Harvard & the 
Legacy of Slavery, Harvard & the Legacy of Slavery (Apr. 25, 
2022), https:// 
radcliffe-harvard-edu-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/b2c5a41d-8bfd-4d04-
933c-858670839e50/HLS-whole-report_FINAL_2022-04-25FINAL-ua.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/52W5-X8YA].  The report proclaims:  "Today, 
Harvard University . . . embraces reckoning with its past," and 
is "seeking to make amends for these wrongs."  Id. at 5, 56.  It 
specifically describes Louis Agassiz's racist work, id. at 33-
38, including his procurement of the Zealy daguerreotypes, id. 
at 35-36, and acknowledges that Agassiz's research "produce[d] 
devastating consequences in the [Nineteenth] and [Twentieth] 
[C]enturies," id. at 11, among them, "intellectual justification 
for continued subjugation" of Black people in the United States.  
Id. at 29.  The report declares that "[t]he damage caused by 
Harvard's entanglements with slavery and its legacies warrant 
10 
 
 
 
action," even in "the absence of a legal requirement" to act.  
Id. at 57.  The report presents recommendations "that seek to 
remedy harms to descendants," id. at 58, in ways that are 
"visible, lasting, grounded in a sustained process of 
engagement, and linked to the nature of the damage done," id. at 
57.  One such recommendation is to "support direct descendants" 
of enslaved individuals who labored on Harvard's campus or were 
enslaved by Harvard staff through "dialogue" and "relationship 
building," with an aim of enabling these descendants to "recover 
their histories" and "tell their stories."  Id. at 60. 
Lanier's ancestors did not labor on Harvard's campus or 
suffer from enslavement directly by Harvard staff, but it is 
without question -- as detailed in the Harvard report, id. at 
29, 33-38, and described by the court, ante at     -- that 
Harvard, through its agent Agassiz, exploited Renty and Delia's 
(and others') enslaved condition to extract from them value then 
used in furtherance of a white supremacist agenda.  Thus, the 
spirit of the report would appear to encompass dialogue and 
relationship building with the descendants of those pictured in 
the Zealy daguerreotypes, as well as pursuit of a visible and 
lasting remedy to the harm worked by Agassiz and Harvard against 
them.  Lanier suggests such a remedy.  Harvard's refusal even to 
discuss respectfully with Lanier her request to possess the 
daguerreotypes of Renty and Delia flies in the face of its 
11 
 
 
 
aspirational report.  Harvard's conduct thus belies its 
purported commitment to enable descendants to "recover their 
histories," to "tell their stories," or to repair meaningfully 
the harm it has done to them. 
For the reasons stated by the court, Harvard's alleged 
treatment of Lanier is inconsistent with its special duty of 
care to her -- a duty derived from values espoused by museums 
and other archival institutions across the country and world, 
and to which Harvard itself pays lip service -- and a jury 
soundly could find that it was "extreme and outrageous." 
2.  Lanier alleges that the Zealy daguerreotypes depict her 
enslaved ancestors and are possessed by Harvard -- the very 
institution whose exploitation of her ancestors enabled the 
daguerreotypes' creation.  Harvard's continued retention of the 
daguerreotypes despite Lanier's competing claim to them is 
patently unjust.  However, this court cannot remedy a perceived 
wrong based solely on a strongly held moral belief.  Cf. Holland 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010), quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 
517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) ("courts of equity 'must be governed by 
rules and precedents no less than the courts of law'"); State v. 
Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008), quoting 
B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, at 141 (1921) 
(judges "exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized 
12 
 
 
 
by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the 
primordial necessity of order in the social life'"). 
Courts are constrained to evaluate the matters that are 
brought before them, and the arguments raised by either side 
must be grounded in our constitutional, statutory, or common 
law.  Although we do not abandon our moral instincts and sense 
of justice when we attempt to resolve them, we are obligated to 
work within the bounds of precedent together with principles 
that are adapted incrementally to new circumstances that come 
before us.  See, e.g., Mohr v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 147, 159 
(1995), quoting Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of 
Springfield, 225 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524 (1992) ("common law 
traditionally grows" by extending established common-law 
doctrines, not through "dramatic, radical departure[s] from the 
well-established common law"); PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western 
Growers Assur. Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1992) ("the 
common law decisionmaking process is inherently incremental in 
nature;" it "calls for devising a rule that does not stray too 
far from the existing regime"); Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland County, 
505 Mich. 429, 472–473 (2020) ("The common law is . . . 
incremental in adapting to society's changing circumstances, 
developing gradually to reflect our policies, customs, norms, 
and values"); R.J. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers 8 (3d ed. 1997) 
(Aldisert) ("The genius of the common law is that it proceeds 
13 
 
 
 
empirically and gradually, testing the ground at every step 
. . ."). 
As explained by the court, none of the arguments that 
Lanier sets forth for possession of the daguerreotypes fits 
within our common-law precedent or any incremental adaptation 
thereto, nor do they have a statutory or constitutional basis.  
These arguments, therefore, provide no ground for the specific 
relief that the plaintiff seeks by way of claims under property 
law. 
Further, although I fully support Justice Cypher's effort 
to create a new common-law cause of action, I am not persuaded 
that the one she proposes is anchored sufficiently in legal 
precedent -– either our own or that of other jurisdictions.4  I 
agree that courts are charged with, among other things, 
remedying injustices.  And to be sure, Justice Cypher's 
 
4 Contrast, e.g., Mohr, 421 Mass. at 156-161 (recognizing 
cause of action for wrongful adoption after analyzing cases from 
other jurisdictions that had done same and analogizing to 
existing cause of action under our common law); Viccaro v. 
Milunsky, 406 Mass. 777, 780-782 (1990) (recognizing cause of 
action for wrongful birth after surveying cases demonstrating 
that "almost all courts have allowed" such claims); Alberts v. 
Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 66-69, cert. denied sub nom. Carroll v. 
Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985) (recognizing cause of action for 
violation of physician-patient duty of confidentiality after 
determining that most courts to have considered question had 
provided for similar cause of action); Agis, 371 Mass. at 142-
144 (recognizing cause of action for intentional or reckless 
infliction of severe emotional distress after analyzing "history 
of actions for emotional distress"). 
14 
 
 
 
suggested course of action comports with an intuitive sense of 
what is just and fair.  However, an appeal to the abstract 
notion of justice by itself cannot justify the judicial creation 
of new rights and remedies.  Courts are required to reason from 
analogy to existing, concrete applications of the law.  See 
Aldisert, supra at 8.  This is not to say that the common law is 
stagnant or change unwelcome.  Indeed, "[t]he genius of the 
common law . . . is its capacity for orderly growth," see 
Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Haw. 374, 376 
(1968), quoting Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Haw. 500, 502 (1958), and 
"[n]o litigant is automatically denied relief solely because 
[s]he presents a question on which there is no Massachusetts 
judicial precedent."  Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 68 
(1985), cert. denied sub nom. Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 
(1985).  See Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628 (1976).  But 
common-law growth must have some order to it if we are to avoid 
rule by bare judicial instinct.5 
 
5 The development of the common-law right to privacy 
exemplifies how the common law properly evolves in an orderly 
fashion, expanding upon recognized legal rights after discerning 
an underlying principle that they reflect.  See Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 193 (1905) (leading case by 
State court of last resort recognizing common-law right of 
privacy; "[t]he entire absence . . . of a precedent for an 
asserted right should have the effect to cause the courts to 
proceed with caution before recognizing the right, . . . but 
such absence . . . is not conclusive of the question as to the 
existence of the right"); Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 299 Md. 
697, 699-702 (1984) (overview of this historical development). 
15 
 
 
 
My concern with Justice Cypher's cause of action is not 
that it is unprecedented per se, but that she does not explain 
how she gets from the very abstract legal principles that she 
invokes to the very specific cause of action that she proposes, 
other than by looking to the facts of the instant case.  
Although this case indeed presents novel facts, the legal issues 
presented lie at the intersection of bedrock areas of common 
law:  tort, property, and equity.  Our existing case law has 
much to say on these issues.  Comparisons to recognized legal 
claims could be made, and deviations justified.6  Although this 
is how common-law development normally works, Justice Cypher's 
concurrence is not reasoned this way.  Contrast Agis, 371 Mass. 
at 142-144; Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 193.  Because I am not 
persuaded that Justice Cypher's proposed cause of action has a 
proper foundation in our common law, I cannot join her 
concurrence.7 
 
6 I sketch out a rough outline, infra, of one potential 
approach, using an unjust enrichment claim as a comparator.  As 
Justice Cypher's cause of action is unlike any recognized 
common-law claim, it eludes such comparison altogether. 
 
7 However, I disagree with the court that Justice Cypher's 
proposed cause of action violates separation of powers 
principles.  Ante at    .  The adjudication of common-law claims 
for equitable transfers of property to remedy discrete 
injustices on a case-by-case basis falls squarely within the 
ambit of the judicial branch.  Although Justice Cypher's 
proposed cause of action is analogous to certain provisions of 
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 
 
16 
 
 
 
By declining to join Justice Cypher's opinion today, I do 
not mean to discourage future litigants similarly situated to 
Lanier from advancing novel theories for recovery.  To the 
contrary, I am open to the possibility that a viable legal 
theory could be advanced that would permit this court to provide 
a plaintiff similarly situated to Lanier with an adequate remedy 
for a harm such as that which Lanier here alleges.  Cf., e.g., 
Alberts, 395 Mass. at 68-69 (newly recognizing cause of action 
for violation of physician-patient duty of confidentiality). 
Essentially, Lanier seeks an equitable transfer of property 
from Harvard to her, based on Harvard's having obtained the 
property through wrongdoing to her ancestors.  This sounds in 
unjust enrichment.  See Salamon v. Terra, 394 Mass. 857, 859 
(1985), quoting Restatement (First) of Restitution § 1 (1937) 
 
1990, see 25 U.S.C. § 3005(c), this does not imply that it is 
beyond the reach of our common-law powers.  Compare Alberts, 395 
Mass. at 67–68 ("G. L. c. 233, § 20B, creates an evidentiary 
privilege as to confidential communications between a 
psychotherapist and a patient.  The fact that no such statutory 
privilege obtains with respect to physicians generally and their 
patients does not dissuade us from declaring that in this 
Commonwealth all physicians owe their patients a duty [of 
confidentiality], for violation of which the law provides a 
remedy . . ." [citation omitted]).  Cf. J.A. Pojanowski, Private 
Law in the Gaps, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1689, 1743 (2014) ("When, as 
in most federal cases today, courts are understood to lack 
general common law powers, the inapplicability of any statute 
entails that a plaintiff fails to state a claim.  In state 
courts . . . that conclusion does not follow.  Rather, the court 
could treat the question as one governed by private law norms 
operating within the court's common law residuary"). 
17 
 
 
 
("A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is required to make restitution to the other"); 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 44 
(2011) ("A person who obtains a benefit by conscious 
interference with a claimant's legally protected interests [or 
in consequence of such interference by another] is liable in 
restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment . . .").  
In the Commonwealth, we have typically used unjust enrichment 
for quasi contractual matters or to undo property transfers 
tainted by fraud, bad faith, or violation of a duty, see, e.g., 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 464 Mass. 623, 644 (2013); 
Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 449 Mass. 235, 
246 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1099 (2008), neither of which 
fits the circumstances before us.  However, there may also be 
"cases in which the remedy for unjust enrichment gives the 
plaintiff something -- typically, the defendant's wrongful gain 
-- that the plaintiff did not previously possess."  Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 comment a.  
Here, although Renty and Delia never possessed the 
daguerreotypes, Harvard acquired them through wrongdoing against 
Renty and Delia, and unjust enrichment principles dictate that 
this wrongful gain be disgorged. 
The problem is, to whom?  Unjust enrichment supports 
transferring to the wronged party the defendant's wrongfully 
18 
 
 
 
acquired gain.  But here we have before us not Renty and Delia, 
but their descendant, Lanier.  Under traditional conceptions, 
Lanier would appear to lack standing to bring an unjust 
enrichment claim against Harvard based on harms inflicted by 
Harvard against her ancestors.  See In re African-American Slave 
Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759-761 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 941 (2007).  Cf. Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 144 
N.Y.S.2d 27, 29 (1955) ("the few cases which have permitted 
recovery for the publication of the name or picture of a 
deceased person . . . contain no suggestion that . . . 
descendants of a person whose name or portrait is published 
without authorization . . . would possess a good cause of action 
for violation of a right of privacy" [quotation omitted]). 
Our Commonwealth courts are not limited by the 
justiciability restrictions of art. III of the Federal 
Constitution.  Contrast In re African-American Slave Descendants 
Litig., 471 F.3d at 759-761.  Still, we generally adhere to 
traditional standing principles, and there are sound reasons 
undergirding that adherence.  See Slama v. Attorney Gen., 384 
Mass. 620, 624 (1981) ("To have standing in any capacity, a 
litigant must show that the challenged action has caused the 
litigant injury").  For an unjust enrichment claim to be viable 
in these circumstances, we would need reasoned argumentation for 
why an ancestor of an enslaved person should be permitted to sue 
19 
 
 
 
on behalf of and recover in the place of her enslaved ancestor.  
Compare Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of 
the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 447, S.C., 484 Mass. 
1029 (2020) (discussing representative standing); Planned 
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Bell, 424 Mass. 573, 578, 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 819 (1997) (same).  There may be further 
challenges to the type of unjust enrichment claim I have 
gestured at here, or other arguments undergirding a different 
remedy altogether.  I note simply that we have yet to be 
presented with such a nuanced theory,8 and that, if we were, it 
would receive careful and rigorous consideration, as we consider 
all arguments that come before us. 
 
8 Ideally, such a theory would be advanced by a litigant; 
courts properly are wary of developing the law without "a clash 
of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted 
situation embracing conflict and demanding interests."  Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968), quoting United States v. 
Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961). 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  1.  Introduction.  The plaintiff, 
Tamara Lanier, brought this action against the defendants, 
President and Fellows of Harvard College, the Harvard Board of 
Overseers, Harvard University, and the Peabody Museum of 
Archaeology and Ethnology (collectively, Harvard), seeking 
possession of daguerreotypes1 of her ancestors, Renty and Delia,2 
who were enslaved in South Carolina in the 1800s.  The plaintiff 
also sought monetary damages, but the primary form of relief 
requested in her complaint and in the case before this court was 
Harvard's surrender of the daguerreotypes to her.  Although I 
agree with the court that Harvard may be liable for negligent or 
reckless infliction of emotional distress, I disagree that the 
plaintiff has no interest in the daguerreotypes that this court 
may recognize.  Thus, I write separately to discuss the legal 
 
1 A daguerreotype was a precursor to the modern photograph.  
The daguerreotype process was the first publicly available and 
commercially successful photographic-like process.  The 
daguerreotype process created "a highly detailed image on a 
sheet of copper plated with a thin coat of silver without the 
use of a negative."  Library of Congress, The Daguerreotype 
Medium, https://www.loc.gov/collections/daguerreotypes/articles-
and-essays/the-daguerreotype-medium [https://perma.cc/DB76-
SQLN].  Exposure times initially ranged from three to fifteen 
minutes, but improvements in the process "soon reduced the 
exposure time to less than a minute."  Id.  Due to the lack of 
negative, each daguerreotype contains a unique image.  Id. 
 
2 Renty and Delia were enslaved on the plantation of B.F. 
Taylor and thus share the last name "Taylor."  I therefore refer 
to them by their first names. 
2 
 
 
 
avenue by which I believe the plaintiff could be permitted to 
pursue possession of the daguerreotypes. 
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), the factual allegations in the 
complaint must "'plausibly suggest[]' . . . an entitlement to 
relief."  Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 
(2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 557 
(2007).  The "factual allegations 'must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level.'"  Dunn v. Genzyme 
Corp., 486 Mass. 713, 721 (2021), quoting Iannacchino, supra.  
Massachusetts is a notice pleading jurisdiction.  Dunn, supra at 
719.  "Under the Massachusetts practice of notice pleading, 
'there is no requirement that a complaint state the correct 
substantive theory of the case.'"  Berish v. Bornstein, 437 
Mass. 252, 269 (2002), quoting Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 
707, 709 (1981).  All that is required under Mass. R. Civ. P. 
8 (a) (1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974), is "a short and plain statement 
of the claim . . . which affords fair notice to the defendant of 
the basis and nature of the action against him" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Berish, supra.  Taking the plaintiff's 
allegations as true and drawing "every reasonable inference in 
favor of the plaintiff" for the purposes of deciding a motion to 
dismiss, Heath-Latson v. Styller, 487 Mass. 581, 582 n.3, 584 
n.8 (2021), I think that the factual allegations in the 
3 
 
 
 
plaintiff's complaint plausibly suggest that she is entitled to 
possession of the daguerreotypes under a common-law cause of 
action that I understand to be within the authority of this 
court to recognize. 
2.  The need for a remedy.  The making of the 
daguerreotypes was a horrific harm to Renty and Delia, inflicted 
by their enslavers and by Louis Agassiz, a Harvard professor who 
ordered that the daguerreotypes be created.  I agree with the 
court that the judge properly dismissed the specific property 
causes of action pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint based on 
our existing jurisprudence.  However, if the plaintiff 
ultimately prevails on the surviving tort causes of action 
articulated by the court, the trial court will not be able to 
award the plaintiff with possession of the daguerreotypes, which 
was the plaintiff's primary reason for bringing suit. 
Further, the plaintiff's claim is no ordinary claim that 
can be rooted in our traditional jurisprudence.  As the court 
concludes, our current law does not provide the plaintiff with 
an identifiable cause of action whereby she may seek possession 
of the daguerreotypes.  However, this court should not ignore 
that this fact derives from the legal fiction, inflicted on 
Renty and Delia, "that turn[ed] humans to chattel property."  
Washington, Critical Race Feminist Bioethics:  Telling Stories 
4 
 
 
 
in Law School and Medical School in Pursuit of "Cultural 
Competency," 72 Alb. L. Rev. 961, 962 (2009). 
Although it is easy to point to American chattel slavery as 
the direct instrument of Renty's and Delia's disenfranchisement, 
repressive legislation such as Black Codes and Jim Crow laws, 
and the indifference of many white Americans to the plight of 
Black Americans, systemically perpetuated the deprivation of 
rights of formerly enslaved individuals and their descendants, 
and led to their continued exclusion from many legal 
protections, even after slavery was legally abolished.  See D.A. 
Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name:  The Re-Enslavement of Black 
Americans from the Civil War to World War II 111 (2008) ("In the 
eyes of the vast majority of white Americans, the refusal of the 
southern states [after the Civil War] to fully free or 
enfranchise former slaves and their descendants was not an issue 
worthy of any further disruption to the civil stability of the 
United States"); C. Galland, Love Cemetery:  Unburying the 
Secret History of Slaves 81 (2007) ("the 'store system' [and] 
debt peonage" were "very much a part of the Jim Crow era" and 
were "often as restrictive and cruel as the institution of 
slavery itself"); N.I. Painter, Creating Black Americans:  
African-American History and Its Meanings, 1619 to the Present 
154 (2007) (Painter) ("In three court cases decided between 1895 
and 1903, the [United States] Supreme Court ruled against 
5 
 
 
 
[B]lack men who had sued their states for racist 
disenfranchisement . . . .  Taken together, these decisions of 
the . . . Supreme Court signaled the end of the larger 
reconstruction by supplying the legal basis for the segregation, 
disenfranchisement, and racial degradation that characterized 
the South -- and much of the North -- during the first half of 
the [T]wentieth [C]entury").  As a result, the plaintiff now 
faces a legal system several generations later devoid of a 
sufficient remedy for the injuries and injustices she has faced 
as a descendant of enslaved Africans and African-Americans. 
3.  The common law.  "The courts of this Commonwealth enjoy 
common law powers."  Loffredo v. Center for Addictive Behaviors, 
426 Mass. 541, 545-546 (1998).  Where the common law is "founded 
. . . upon 'justice, fitness and expediency,'" and is "designed 
to meet and be susceptible of being adapted 'to new institutions 
and conditions of society'" and "new usages and practices, as 
the progress of society in the advancement of civilization may 
require,'" Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 333 (1931), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Temple, 14 Gray 69, 74 (1859), it can 
and should provide a remedy where none currently exists. 
According to former Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
"The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, 
and always with an apology, are the secret root from which 
the law draws all the juices of life.  I mean, of course, 
6 
 
 
 
considerations of what is expedient for the community 
concerned.  Every important principle which is developed by 
litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or 
less definitely understood views of public policy; most 
generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, 
the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and 
inarticulate convictions, but nonetheless traceable to 
views of public policy in the last analysis." 
 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466 (1991), quoting O. 
Holmes, The Common Law 35–36 (1881). 
More recently, former Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants 
remarked: 
"We are responsible [for] and the sole arbiter of the 
common law of Massachusetts.  The common law of 
Massachusetts is ours.  We are responsible for it.  If it 
turns out that it does not work, it is our fault.  That is 
part of our obligations.  And ultimately within the rubric 
of all those three things that we do [interpreting the 
Massachusetts Constitution, interpreting Massachusetts 
statutes and regulations, and developing the common law], 
probably the single most important thing . . . is that it 
is our obligation to correct miscarriages of justice.  Our 
job here is ultimately to do justice.  If [we] are writing 
a decision and [we] are finding it to be unjust, that 
should cause [us] to think harder as to whether or not that 
decision is compelled, perhaps by controlling authority by 
the United States Supreme Court.  Not by controlling 
authority from us, because if we did something which turns 
out now in retrospect to be unjust, it is our obligation to 
change it.  So we don't walk away from miscarriages of 
justice.  We don't generally say, 'well, we rely upon the 
importance of continuity, so if it was an injustice that 
occurred a while ago, we're just going to leave it be.'  
Our obligation is to correct a miscarriage of justice 
whenever it happens, and that is part of what is bred in 
our bone." 
 
R.D. Gants, C.J., Welcome Remarks (Aug. 31, 2020). 
As the Supreme Court has stated, "the common law is 
susceptible of growth and adaptation to new circumstances and 
7 
 
 
 
situations, and . . . the courts have power to declare and 
effectuate what is the present rule in respect of a given 
subject . . . .  The common law is not immutable, but flexible, 
and upon its own principles adapts itself to varying 
conditions."  Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935), 
citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).  "The common 
law, unlike a constitution or statute, provides no definitive 
text; it is to be derived from the interstices of prior opinions 
and a well-considered judgment of what is best for the 
community."  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 466.  The common law "draw[s] 
'its inspiration from every fountain of justice'" and has "a 
'flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation' which [is] 
'the peculiar boast and excellence' of the system" (citation 
omitted).  Funk, supra at 383. 
This court also finds its authority to prevent and correct 
injustices through its equitable powers.  This court "has full 
equity jurisdiction," Gargano v. Pope, 184 Mass. 571, 574 
(1904), "of all cases and matters cognizable under the general 
principles of equity jurisprudence," Parkway, Inc. v. United 
States Fire Ins. Co., 314 Mass. 647, 651 (1943), and has "broad 
and flexible powers to fashion remedies,"3 Recinos v. Escobar, 
 
3 "Equitable remedies are flexible tools to be applied with 
the focus on fairness and justice."  Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 
Mass. 555, 580 (1998). 
8 
 
 
 
473 Mass. 734, 740 (2016), quoting Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., 
Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation (No. 1), 
424 Mass. 430, 463 (1997).  See G. L. c. 214, § 1.  "These 
powers . . . extend to actions necessary to afford any relief in 
the best interests of a person under their jurisdiction."  
Recinos, supra at 741, quoting Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 561 
(1982).  "A fundamental maxim of general equity jurisprudence is 
that equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy."  
Recinos, supra. 
 
Although once separate, today, common law and equity have 
merged throughout the history of American law such that the 
common law now is in many ways based on equitable principles.  
See Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute:  Conceptions of 
Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal 
Rules, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1989) (discussing merger of law 
and equity); Chapter One:  The Intellectual History of Unjust 
Enrichment, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 2077, 2090 (2020), quoting C.L. 
Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 
Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1027, 1032 (2011) ("The law is . . . 
littered with 'remnants of equitable tests that continue to 
operate as prerequisites for access to certain remedies'").  
Compare Recinos, 473 Mass. at 741 ("equity will not suffer a 
wrong to be without a remedy"), with Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 
219, 223 (1995) ("the common law . . . provides a remedy for 
9 
 
 
 
every wrong").  Therefore, we may develop the common law by 
recognizing new causes of action when warranted.4  Compare 
Labonte v. Giordano, 426 Mass. 319, 322 (1997) (new cause of 
action may be warranted where insufficient remedies available 
under current law and plaintiff presents sufficient reasons for 
expanding those remedies by creating new cause of action), with 
Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 544, 547, 550 
 
4 Other courts have similarly expanded the common law in 
their jurisdictions to appropriately include new causes of 
action where existing remedies were lacking.  For a thorough 
overview of decisions in other jurisdictions that have 
recognized the inherent authority of courts to recognize new 
causes of action, whether constitutionally rooted or arising at 
common law, see Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 33, 39-41 (1998).  
See also, e.g., Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 
Haw. 374, 375-376 (1968) (recognizing cause of action for 
invasion of privacy, despite lack of recognition at "ancient 
common law," and noting that "[t]he common law system would have 
withered centuries ago had it lacked the ability to expand and 
adapt to the social, economic, and political changes inherent in 
a vibrant human society"); Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 60 
Ill. App. 3d 616, 617-620 (1978) (recognizing cause of action 
for "money damages . . . based on a violation of the rights 
provided for by Article I, Section 17," of the Illinois 
Constitution, which states that "[a]ll persons shall have the 
right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the hiring and 
promotion practices of any employer or in the sale or rental of 
property," where factual allegations pleaded in complaint and 
reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to state such 
claim); Mouret v. Godeaux, 886 So. 2d 1217, 1221 (La. Ct. App. 
2004) (discussing judicial creation of "avowal action" by which 
biological father may "establish [his] paternity to children 
born during the mother's marriage to another man despite the 
statutory presumption of the husband's paternity," creating 
"'dual paternity,' where the mother's husband is the child's 
legal father, but the biological father may also assert some 
parental rights"). 
10 
 
 
 
(2002) (declining to recognize cause of action for spoliation of 
evidence where remedy already exists "within the context of the 
underlying civil action").  See also, e.g., Mohr v. 
Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 147, 159 (1995) (recognizing cause of 
action for wrongful adoption); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 406 Mass. 
777, 779-782 (1990) (recognizing cause of action for wrongful 
birth); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 60-61, 70-71, cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985) (recognizing cause of action for 
inducing violation of physician's duty of confidentiality); Agis 
v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-145 (1976) 
(recognizing cause of action for intentional or reckless 
infliction of severe emotional distress without resulting bodily 
injury). 
This flexibility permits development of the law to follow 
evolving societal norms surrounding what is reasonable and 
tolerable, and conversely what is unreasonable and intolerable.  
"The maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria 
[no advantage may be gained from one's own wrong] has long been 
applied by courts of law and equity."  Shrader v. Equitable Life 
Assur. Soc'y of the U.S., 20 Ohio St. 3d 41, 44 (1985).  
However, where the plaintiff alleges that Harvard employed 
Agassiz and facilitated -- and is thus culpable for -- the harms 
caused to Renty and Delia in the creation of the daguerreotypes, 
the Commonwealth's existing causes of action, which appear to 
11 
 
 
 
allow Harvard's continued retention of the daguerreotypes and 
leave the plaintiff without redress, lead to a violation of this 
well-established maxim.  Thus, as the plaintiff has observed, 
current law impermissibly "rewards wrongdoers -- even criminals 
-- and their sponsors with the spoils of their wrongdoing."  
Rather than perpetuate the common law in a manner violative of 
one of the common law's most established maxims, I would permit 
it to evolve to ensure that the maxim that one should not be 
allowed to profit from one's own wrongful conduct is not 
rendered meaningless.5 
Here, the plaintiff has asserted among other things that 
(1) the daguerreotypes, currently in Harvard's possession, "are 
all that is left to connect [her] to her ancestors," Renty and 
Delia;6 and (2) Harvard's continued possession of the 
 
5 "There is not a rule of the common law in force today that 
has not evolved from some earlier rule of common law, gradually 
in some instances, more suddenly in others, leaving the common 
law of today when compared with the common law of centuries ago 
as different as day is from night."  Lembke v. Unke, 171 N.W.2d 
837, 844 (N.D. 1969), quoting State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957).  Contrary to the court's 
assertion, ante at    , I do not understand our authority to 
recognize new common-law rights to be unlimited.  The cause of 
action I would recognize today is -- as the evolution of the 
common law must be -- based on the adaptation of existing legal 
maxims and principles to conform to modern society's 
understanding of what constitutes intolerable conduct. 
 
6 The plaintiff asserts that, "[g]iven that these four 
[daguerreotypes] are all that is left to connect Lanier to her 
ancestors, it cannot be gainsaid there is anything more dear to 
this family." 
12 
 
 
 
daguerreotypes amounts to rewarding wrongdoers with the spoils 
of their wrongdoing, and concepts of fairness and justice demand 
the recognition of a cause of action to remedy that harm.  If 
the plaintiff's allegations are proved, Harvard's continued 
retention of the daguerreotypes allows it to profit from its own 
wrongful conduct -- including the participation in the 
enslavement of Renty and Delia decades after slavery was 
abolished in the Commonwealth -- in a manner violative of a 
well-established common-law maxim.  Where it is within our power 
to develop the common law to ensure that there is no miscarriage 
of justice in this case, I think we should not allow the law to 
continue to leave the plaintiff without any avenue for redress 
for the harms she has suffered and continues to suffer as a 
result of Harvard's wrongful conduct.  Accordingly, in light of 
the unique facts and circumstances of this case, I would 
13 
 
 
 
recognize a cause of action that would provide a limited remedy 
for the harm the plaintiff alleges.7,8 
 
7 The situation presented to us is rare in that (1) the 
daguerreotypes, artifacts from the 1800s, are likely still in 
existence today due to being in archival protection for most of 
their existence; (2) given Agassiz's historical notoriety and 
Harvard's prominence in the Commonwealth, there was meticulous 
documentation surrounding the creation and use of the 
daguerreotypes; and (3) Harvard as a purportedly wrongdoing 
entity today existed in largely the same form as a wrongdoing 
entity in 1850.  Thus, contrary to the court's concern that 
legislation is the only way to repatriate such an artifact, this 
case presents a very specific claim that this court is well 
equipped to resolve. 
 
8 The court and the Chief Justice's concurrence conclude 
that the cause of action I propose has no foundation in our 
common law where it does not resemble an established cause of 
action and cannot be analogized to the facts of another case.  
See ante at    ,    .  The Chief Justice's concurrence further 
asserts that I could have made comparisons to "recognized legal 
claims" and then justified any deviations therefrom.  Id. 
at    .  However, no examples are provided of any such legal 
claims that I might have used, nor has my research revealed any, 
suggesting that there are as yet no recognized legal claims that 
could serve as a useful comparator here. 
 
Given that Black Americans have long been deprived of the 
rights and the access to the legal system that others have 
enjoyed, see supra, and thus to my knowledge no court in this 
country has yet seen a descendant of enslaved persons prevail on 
a claim remotely resembling the plaintiff's, it is hardly 
surprising that other cases have not been resolved as I propose 
this case could be.  To rely on the premise that because we have 
no precedent there can be no new claims or rights does not 
acknowledge that the people who now assert such a claim or right 
previously were not recognized by the legal system.  And 
although the facts are unique, as discussed supra and infra, the 
legal principles underlying the cause of action I would apply 
them to are well established under the common law and this 
court's equitable powers.  As discussed infra, we have in the 
past rendered decisions with significant implications for issues 
of slavery and race, most notably when, in response to a series 
 
14 
 
 
 
The wrong the plaintiff alleges, and that I would address, 
is Harvard's continued wrongful retention of the daguerreotypes, 
which were created specifically as a consequence of the 
enslavement of the plaintiff's ancestors and concomitant 
wrongdoing by Agassiz and Harvard, are a vital component of the 
plaintiff's family lineage, and are a source of a meaningful 
familial connection, physically and emotionally, between the 
plaintiff and her ancestors.9  So long as the daguerreotypes 
 
of freedom suits brought by enslaved African-Americans, this 
court judicially abolished slavery in Commonwealth vs. Jennison 
(1783) (unreported).  See A. Zilversmit, The First Emancipation:  
The Abolition of Slavery in the North 113 (1967) ("In a new 
series of freedom cases, the abolitionists succeeded in 
persuading the courts to interpret the constitution in a way 
that was probably never intended by its framers").  Thus, I 
understand this court's historical decisions in this area to 
provide precedent for the cause of action I propose today. 
 
9 It is significant to me, as it is to the court and the 
Chief Justice's concurrence, that Harvard's posture in this case 
is questionable.  Harvard is not an ignorant third party who 
happens to possess the daguerreotypes.  Agassiz, and by 
extension Harvard, directly benefited from the enslavement of 
Renty and Delia by using them to create the daguerreotypes, by 
Agassiz using the daguerreotypes in turn to promote racist, 
pseudoscientific theories, and by Harvard continuing to control 
and benefit from them in the manner it has.  Since the 
rediscovery of the daguerreotypes in 1976, Harvard has continued 
to profit from this exploitation by allowing use of the images 
only with Harvard's permission and upon the payment of a 
substantial licensing fee.  Harvard also has used the 
daguerreotypes to publish works it has sold for profit.  See, 
e.g., To Make Their Own Way in the World:  The Enduring Legacy 
of the Zealy Daguerreotypes (I. Barbash, M. Rogers, & D. Willis, 
eds., 2020). 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
remain under the defendants' control, Renty and Delia remain 
cherished members of the plaintiff's family who are relegated to 
an existence as "enslaved subjects trapped inside the frame -- 
subjects who, from the very first exposure, were intended to 
exist more as objects and symbols of American slavery than as 
fully realized human beings with the ability either to represent 
themselves through -- or withhold themselves from -- the 
camera."  H.L. Gates, Jr., Foreword, To Make Their Own Way in 
the World:  The Enduring Legacy of the Zealy Daguerreotypes 9 
(I. Barbash, M. Rogers, & D. Willis, eds., 2020) (Barbash).  See 
D.R. Berry, The Price for Their Pound of Flesh:  The Value of 
 
 
The defendants seem alone in failing to acknowledge the 
legacy of their own complicity in this case.  Agassiz's 
descendants expressed in their amicus brief that creating a 
remedy by which the plaintiff legally can pursue possession of 
the daguerreotypes is a necessary step to "acknowledge and move 
towards repair" of the incalculable harm to the plaintiff's 
lineage, wrought by Agassiz and Harvard in the pursuit of false 
arguments of scientific racism.  As the Chief Justice's 
concurrence notes, Harvard recently released a report discussing 
the university's "entanglements with slavery and its legacies" 
and making seven specific recommendations for reparative action.  
Presidential Committee on Harvard & the Legacy of Slavery, 
Harvard & the Legacy of Slavery 10, 57-60 (Apr. 25, 2022), 
https://radcliffe-harvard-edu-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/b2c5a41d 
-8bfd-4d04-933c-858670839e50/HLS-whole-report_FINAL_2022-04 
-25FINAL-ua.pdf [https://perma.cc/52W5-X8YA].  I wholly agree 
with her analysis that Harvard's conduct in this case -- 
including its refusal to acknowledge that its past and current 
conduct related to the daguerreotypes harms Lanier as a 
descendant of Renty and Delia -- undermines its professed 
commitment to reckon with its ties to slavery and make amends to 
descendants of enslaved individuals who were exploited by 
Harvard. 
16 
 
 
 
the Enslaved, from Womb to Grave, in the Building of a Nation 
195 (2017) ("death did not end the[] commodification [of the 
enslaved]").  Agassiz, and by extension Harvard, exercised 
control over Renty and Delia and their images during their 
lives.  Concepts of fairness and equity demand that Harvard be 
prohibited from continuing to control Renty's and Delia's legacy 
in perpetuity.10 
 
4.  The abolition of slavery in Massachusetts.  To 
understand why I think that we have the ability to remedy this 
 
10 The plaintiff asserts that "[t]he daguerreotypes are all 
that remain of her ancestors[,] Renty and Delia," and that 
"Harvard's refusal to return Renty['s] and Delia's images to 
[the plaintiff] is a continuation of Renty['s] and Delia's 
enslavement and a perpetuation of Harvard's legacy of white 
supremacy."  Moreover, Harvard University and Harvard's Peabody 
Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology have adopted policies to 
research the provenance of artifacts in the institution's 
possession to determine rightful ownership where such artifacts 
were obtained after theft or other illegal transactions and to 
then return such artifacts to their rightful owners.  See 
Harvard University, Steering Committee on Human Remains in 
Harvard Museum Collections, https://www.harvard.edu 
/president/news/2021/steering-committee-on-human-remains-in-
harvard-museum-collections [https://perma.cc/LK4T-ZUMR]; Harvard 
University, Message from the Peabody Museum Director, 
https://peabody.harvard.edu/news/message-peabody-museum-director 
[https://perma.cc/6PZZ-WT7E].  I think the daguerreotypes 
constitute such artifacts.  It is widely recognized that human 
remains and related objects have inherent cultural and communal 
significance to the kin of the individuals those remains and 
objects represent.  See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act); Steering 
Committee on Human Remains in Harvard Museum Collections, supra.  
Where, as the plaintiff asserts, the daguerreotypes are Renty's 
and Delia's final tangible impression on this Earth, they 
likewise have inherent cultural and communal significance to the 
plaintiff as their lineal descendant. 
17 
 
 
 
particular wrong, it is necessary to examine the history of 
slavery and its abolition in Massachusetts, as our ability to 
right this wrong derives from this history.  Throughout much of 
the Eighteenth Century, individuals -- including enslaved 
individuals -- repeatedly lobbied the General Court to abolish 
slavery legislatively.  A. Zilversmit, The First Emancipation:  
The Abolition of Slavery in the North 100-103 (1967).  In 1703 
the General Court enacted a statute to make manumission, the 
release of an individual from slavery, more onerous by imposing 
a fee on enslavers who freed those they had enslaved.  Id. at 
18.  In later years, the General Court changed course and "made 
several attempts to end slavery and the slave trade."  Id. at 
100. 
At the same time that enslaved Africans and African-
Americans were lobbying the General Court to abolish slavery, 
they were also seeking the judicial abolition of slavery through 
a series of cases that have become known as "freedom suits" -- 
cases in which enslaved persons sued for their freedom.  Id. at 
101-103.  "John Adams recalled that the arguments in the freedom 
cases . . . '[arose] from the rights of mankind.'"11  Id. at 104.  
After ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution in 1780, 
 
11 We acknowledge that, earlier, John Adams had argued on 
behalf of an enslaver in one such freedom suit.  Zilversmit, 
supra at 103. 
18 
 
 
 
which declared that "[a]ll men are born free and equal,"12 these 
freedom suits ultimately succeeded in bringing about the 
abolition of slavery through judicial interpretation of that 
provision of the Constitution.  Id. at 112-113.  See 
Massachusetts Constitution and the Abolition of Slavery, 
https://www.mass.gov/guides/massachusetts-constitution-and-the-
abolition-of-slavery [https://perma.cc/74QQ-FB2X]. 
Thus, for the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, we owe 
a great debt to the brave men and women who, while enslaved, 
went to courts that had so far permitted their enslavement to 
challenge the existence of slavery in Massachusetts and to argue 
for their freedom, among them, Adam, Priscilla, Juno, Timon,13 
 
 
12 Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights has 
since been amended to provide that "[a]ll people are born free 
and equal" (emphasis added).  Art. 106 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution. 
 
13 As the Senate recognized in 2009, one of the indignities 
suffered by those enslaved was the stripping of their given 
names.  Sen. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009).  
Although some, like Renty and Delia, were made to use the 
surname of their enslaver, others were allowed no surname at 
all.  Thus, the case names created when these individuals sued 
for their freedom often listed only a first name for the 
plaintiff.  See Blanck, Seventeen Eighty-Three:  The Turning 
Point in the Law of Slavery and Freedom in Massachusetts, 75 New 
Eng. Q. 24, 27 n.8 (2002). 
19 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Freeman,14 and Quock Walker.15  They led this court to 
recognize, in 1783, that under the Massachusetts Constitution, 
slavery was "as effectively abolished as it [could] be by the 
granting of rights and privileges wholly incompatible and 
repugnant to [slavery's] existence," and that "perpetual 
servitude [could] no longer be tolerated."16  J.D. Cushing, The 
Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts:  
More Notes on the "Quock Walker Case," 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118, 
 
 
14 When enslaved, Elizabeth Freeman was known as "Mum Bett," 
the name she used in her freedom suit.  Massachusetts 
Constitution and the Abolition of Slavery, https://www.mass.gov 
/guides/massachusetts-constitution-and-the-abolition-of-slavery 
[https://perma.cc/74QQ-FB2X].  After winning her freedom, she 
changed her name to Elizabeth Freeman.  National Women's History 
Museum, Elizabeth Freeman, https://www.womenshistory.org 
/education-resources/biographies/Elizabeth-freeman [https: 
//perma.cc/Q7GC-F2C9].  I therefore use the name she chose for 
herself as a free woman. 
 
15 Blanck, 75 New Eng. Q. at 27 n.8.  Massachusetts 
Constitution and the Abolition of Slavery, https://www.mass.gov 
/guides/massachusetts-constitution-and-the-abolition-of-slavery 
[https://perma.cc/74QQ-FB2X]. 
 
16 Chief Justice William Cushing included these remarks in 
his instructions to the jury in the case of Commonwealth vs. 
Jennison (1783) (unreported), in which Nathaniel Jennison was 
charged with assault and battery related to his enslavement of 
Quock Walker.  J.D. Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition 
of Slavery in Massachusetts:  More Notes on the "Quock Walker 
Case," 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118, 130-132 (1961).  Similar 
instructions were adopted in a unanimous opinion of the court in 
Inhabitants of Littleton vs. Tuttle (1796) (unreported).  Later 
cases recognized these two rulings as having abolished slavery 
judicially.  See, e.g., Inhabitants of Winchendon v. Inhabitants 
of Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 128-129 (1808) (recounting jury 
instructions in Jennison and Tuttle cases). 
20 
 
 
 
133 (1961).  See Massachusetts Constitution and the Abolition of 
Slavery, https://www.mass.gov/guides/massachusetts-constitution-
and-the-abolition-of-slavery [https://perma.cc/74QQ-FB2X]. 
This court played a critical role in the abolition of 
slavery in Massachusetts, but we should not ignore that the 
court's history with slavery and some of the important race-
related issues since then has not always been a paradigm of 
freedom and equality.  For example, although this court held in 
Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193, 217 (1836), superseded by 
the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that 
an enslaved person who was brought into the Commonwealth by her 
enslaver became free on entering Massachusetts and thus could 
not be removed forcibly from the Commonwealth by her enslaver, 
the court declined to extend that holding to "fugitives," 
meaning those enslaved individuals who had fled their captivity 
to assert their right to be free. 
This court also has the unfortunate distinction of being 
one of the first courts to develop the "separate but equal" 
doctrine,17 later relied on and endorsed by the Supreme Court in 
the infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540-
 
17 See Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198, 206, 209 (1849), 
superseded by St. 1855, c. 256, §§ 1-5 (separate schools for 
Black and white children did not violate their right to be 
"equal before the law"). 
21 
 
 
 
541, 548-550 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ. of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494-495 (1954). 
In light of this checkered history, I understand this court 
to have a continuing responsibility to ensure, to the fullest 
extent that our role as Justices may permit, that the common law 
provides a remedy for every substantial wrong.  See, e.g., 
Recinos, 473 Mass. at 741; Shields, 163 Vt. at 223.  To fulfill 
that responsibility, I think we may do what common-law courts 
always have been empowered to do and recognize a judicial remedy 
to ensure that where, as here, an aggrieved litigant has pleaded 
a violation of her rights, she has access to an appropriate 
judicial remedy tailored to the facts of her case. 
5.  An appropriate remedy.18  I conclude that the factual 
allegations in the plaintiff's second amended complaint 
 
18 I do not attempt, nor purport to possess the authority to 
recognize, a sweeping remedy akin to reparations.  See art. 30 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  All that I do 
today, and all that it is within our authority to do, is provide 
a potential remedy to a plaintiff who is properly before us, and 
who has pleaded a specific harm suffered due to allegedly 
wrongful conduct of the defendants.  Contrary to the court's 
assertion, see ante at    , this narrow cause of action is 
entirely dissimilar to a comprehensive statutory and regulatory 
scheme such as that created by the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 3001-3013, and is entirely dissimilar to the type of sweeping 
reparations to which the court compares it.  Although the 
differences between my proposed cause of action and legislation 
such as NAGPRA are vast, a primary one is that, with a cause of 
action such as the one I propose, a plaintiff may only recover 
if she affirmatively brings suit in the first instance, and it 
 
22 
 
 
 
plausibly raise an entitlement to relief under a cause of action 
I would recognize as follows:  a plaintiff must show that (1) 
she is a direct lineal descendant of a specific individual or 
individuals enslaved in the United States or in a colony that 
later became a part of the United States;19 (2) the defendant has 
possession of an artifact,20 which was created or obtained as a 
consequence of the enslavement of the plaintiff's ancestors; (3) 
the defendant participated, either directly or indirectly, in 
the wrongful creation or attainment of such artifact; (4) the 
artifact provides a meaningful connection between the plaintiff 
and her ancestors; and (5) the plaintiff has made a request or 
 
would be the plaintiff's burden to prove that she, as a specific 
individual, has fulfilled all the elements of the cause of 
action such that she is entitled to possession of the specific 
artifact to which she claims such entitlement.  Conversely, 
pursuant to the framework created by NAGPRA, Federal agencies 
and museums have affirmative duties, in consultation with tribal 
governments, to inventory their holdings to identify any 
artifacts subject to NAGPRA.  25 U.S.C. § 3003.  The cause of 
action I propose would place no similar affirmative duty on any 
potential defendants. 
 
19 I define "enslaved individual" in this case to encompass 
only those who were subjected to the institution of American 
chattel slavery.  Although other people came to this land in 
positions that were less than free, such as those who indentured 
themselves to another in payment for their voyage, such forms of 
servitude are beyond the scope of this particular remedy. 
 
20 I use the term "artifact" to mean "an object[, such as a 
tool or instrument,] remaining from a particular period," 
namely, the period of American chattel slavery.  See Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, Artifact, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/artifact [https://perma.cc/E588-A7QK]. 
23 
 
 
 
demand to the defendant to relinquish the artifact to the 
plaintiff, which the defendant has refused or ignored.  On 
establishment of the foregoing elements, as the sole remedy for 
this cause of action, the plaintiff would be entitled to the 
specific performance of transfer of possession of the artifact 
from the defendant to the plaintiff.21 
 
21 The court asserts, ante at    , that the transfer of the 
daguerreotypes to the plaintiff would be inappropriate where 
Harvard has not been convicted of any crime in relation to the 
daguerreotypes and there is no statute "providing for forfeiture 
or transfer of property under the factual circumstances 
alleged."  First, this ignores that, as noted supra, the 
plaintiff's circumstances are rare, if not unique, in several 
respects.  A claimant pleading the cause of action I would 
recognize would need to identify an artifact from the era of 
chattel slavery that exists today and show that his or her 
ancestor had a connection to it, both of which become more 
difficult with the passage of time.  The daguerreotypes have 
survived this long because they have been in archival protection 
for most of their existence.  Many other artifacts of that time 
period have likely been degraded or destroyed altogether by this 
point.  Further, Agassiz's status as a historical celebrity is 
also unique, meaning the level of meticulous documentation 
surrounding his creation and use of the artifacts may also well 
be unique or rare.  As a result, this plaintiff's ability to 
establish a connection to the daguerreotypes is extremely rare 
in how strong it is and suggests that the potential class of 
litigants who may seek such a remedy is quite small.  It is 
therefore unsurprising that no judicial decisions addressing a 
similar factual scenario have been identified.  It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that this plaintiff must be 
resigned to go without a full remedy for the harm she has 
suffered. 
 
Second, the successful prosecution of nearly every civil 
case results in the judicially ordered forfeiture of property by 
the defendant to the plaintiff, either via an award of monetary 
damages or the imposition of injunctive relief.  Courts of the 
Commonwealth have long been empowered to impose injunctive 
 
24 
 
 
 
I now turn to the question whether, considering the factual 
allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff has plausibly 
suggested an entitlement to relief under this cause of action.  
I think she did.  The plaintiff has alleged that (1) she is a 
 
relief that requires the transfer of property from one party to 
another.  See, e.g., Tucker v. Connors, 342 Mass. 376, 378, 381-
382 (1961) (affirming order requiring transfer of property to 
option holder as "a usual equity power"); Limpus v. Armstrong, 3 
Mass. App. Ct. 19, 20-22, 24 (1975) (ordering specific 
performance of agreement to sell property to plaintiff despite 
plaintiff's failure to perform on date specified for closing 
where time was not of the essence).  Additionally, money is 
property.  See Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 
Mass. 612, 628 n.17 (2019), citing G. L. c. 93, § 76 (a); 
Commonwealth v. Alleged Gaming Apparatus & Implements & Money, 
335 Mass. 223, 224 (1957); Commonwealth v. Hays, 14 Gray 62, 64 
(1859); Sheldon v. Root, 16 Pick. 567, 569 (1835).  As such, an 
award of monetary damages for a plaintiff also requires the 
forfeiture of property by the unsuccessful party and transfer of 
the same to the prevailing party.  This also means that, every 
time this -- or any -- court has recognized a new cause of 
action, it has allowed for the transfer of property between 
parties in novel circumstances. 
 
Thus, if the plaintiff prevails on remand on her claims of 
negligent and reckless infliction of emotional distress claims, 
it will result in the transfer of property from Harvard to the 
plaintiff in the form of monetary damages.  However, although 
the court considers a claim for reckless infliction of emotional 
distress to be part of established tort law, I note that this 
court did not recognize such a claim until 1976, and it is thus 
relatively new in the context of the long history of the common 
law.  Compare Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144 
(1976) (recognizing for first time cause of action for 
intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress 
in absence of resulting bodily injury), with George v. Jordan 
Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 255 (1971) (recognizing cause of 
action for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress 
with resulting bodily injury and declining to rule on 
availability of claim for reckless infliction of severe 
emotional distress). 
25 
 
 
 
direct lineal descendant of Renty and Delia, who were enslaved 
in the United States in the 1850s; (2) Harvard possesses the 
daguerreotypes, which were both created according to Agassiz's 
orders and obtained by Harvard as a consequence of Renty's and 
Delia's enslavement; (3) the daguerreotypes were created by 
Agassiz's exploitation of enslaved labor at a time when slavery 
was unlawful in the Commonwealth, with Agassiz acting as an 
agent and employee of Harvard; (4) the daguerreotypes represent 
the plaintiff's only remnant of any tangible connection to Renty 
and Delia; and (5) the plaintiff has demanded that Harvard 
relinquish the daguerreotypes to her, and Harvard has refused to 
do so.  Thus, taking the factual allegations in the plaintiff's 
complaint as true, the plaintiff has stated a claim under the 
cause of action I would recognize today, and thus, she should be 
entitled to the opportunity to prove that claim at trial.  See 
Alberts, 395 Mass. at 75 (recognizing new cause of action and 
reversing grant of summary judgment for defendants).22  See also 
Labonte, 426 Mass. at 322-323 (declining to recognize new cause 
of action for tortious interference with expectancy under will 
 
22 Other examples of cases where a court has simultaneously 
recognized a new cause of action and reversed dismissal of the 
case or judgment for the defendant in order to allow for trial 
on the merits include Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & 
Gynecology, P.C., 327 Conn. 540, 572 (2018); Theama v. Kenosha, 
117 Wis. 2d 508, 528 (1984); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 
404-405 (1975). 
26 
 
 
 
while donor is alive, but remanding case to allow plaintiff to 
amend complaint where donor died during pendency of appeal). 
6.  Statute of limitations.  A statute of limitations 
generally applies equally at equity as in law.  Baldassari v. 
Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 43 (1975), superseded on other 
grounds by G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), as appearing in St. 1979, 
c. 406, § 1.  International Paper Co. v. Commonwealth, 232 Mass. 
7, 13 (1919).  Because the cause of action I would recognize is 
not based on breach of contract, I think it is most analogous to 
a tort,23 and thus the three-year statute of limitations set 
forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2A, would apply.  A statute of 
limitations period generally begins to run when "the cause of 
action accrues."  See, e.g., G. L. c. 260, § 2A. 
Pursuant to the discovery rule, "a cause of action accrues 
when the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should 
have discovered that (1) he has suffered harm; (2) his harm was 
caused by the conduct of another; and (3) the defendant is the 
person who caused that harm."  Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 
720, 727 (2014).  The "harm" referred to in the discovery 
doctrine is limited to legally cognizable harm.  See Sudbury v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 485 Mass. 774, 781 (2020) 
 
23 Black's Law Dictionary defines "tort" as "[a] civil 
wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be 
obtained, usu[ally] in the form of damages."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1792 (11th ed. 2019). 
27 
 
 
 
(asserted harm not legally cognizable).  The cause of action I 
would recognize has, as one of its elements, that a defendant in 
possession of an artifact has rejected the plaintiff's demand to 
relinquish the artifact.  Because a cause of action cannot 
accrue until, at a minimum, all of the elements of the claim 
have occurred, the cause of action I would recognize would 
accrue no earlier than when the plaintiff knows or should know 
that the defendant has refused the plaintiff's demand to 
relinquish such artifact.24 
Here, the plaintiff alleges that she completed sufficient 
research to reasonably know that she is a descendant of Renty 
and Delia in 2017.  She demanded Harvard relinquish the 
daguerreotypes to her on October 27, 2017, less than one year 
later.  Harvard's response to the letter ignored the demand.  
Thus, the date of such reply, November 13, 2017, would be the 
 
24 Of course, as a predicate to such a demand, the plaintiff 
should know or reasonably be able to know that she is a direct 
lineal descendant of a person enslaved during the period of 
American chattel slavery described supra, and that the defendant 
possesses an object created or obtained through the specific 
enslavement of that ancestor.  Where a demand is a required 
element of a claim, the demand must be made within a reasonable 
time, which generally means "the time limited for bringing an 
action at law" as set forth in the relevant statute of 
limitations.  Kelley v. Thomas G. Plant Corp., 274 Mass. 102, 
106 (1931).  However, under the cause of action I would 
recognize, the time to make such a demand would depend on when 
the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that she is a 
descendant of an enslaved person and that the defendant 
possesses an object created or obtained through the enslavement 
of that ancestor. 
28 
 
 
 
earliest point at which the plaintiff's cause of action accrued.  
The plaintiff commenced this action on March 20, 2019.  Taking 
the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, as we must, if the 
court were to recognize the cause of action I have articulated, 
it would appear that the plaintiff's case was timely brought. 
7.  First Amendment considerations.  It has been suggested 
by Harvard and certain amici that where the plaintiff's claim to 
the daguerreotypes derives from Renty's and Delia's status as 
subjects depicted therein, concerns under the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution are implicated, specifically as 
related to freedom of the press and freedom of (the defendants') 
speech.  I defer to the court's reasoning on freedom of speech 
as it relates to the negligent and reckless infliction of 
emotional distress claims, to the extent that those concerns, 
should they arise on remand, must be factually developed and 
litigated by the parties in the trial court. 
I doubt, however, that the freedom of the press or freedom 
of speech are implicated by the remedy I propose, which would 
potentially transfer ownership and control of the daguerreotypes 
from one private entity to another.  It is well established that 
the First Amendment rights to both freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press are limited by a private individual's 
rights related to his or her private property, and thus the 
29 
 
 
 
First Amendment would not be implicated by the cause of action I 
would recognize. 
Here, we have daguerreotypes that are and would continue to 
be privately possessed -- by either Harvard or the plaintiff.  
Thus, I fail to see how this dispute between purely private 
parties, none of whom has an obligation to provide access to the 
daguerreotypes to the press or the public, implicates the rights 
of freedom of the press or freedom of expression secured by the 
First Amendment.  As to the right to freedom of expression, 
although the case law addressing the interaction between the 
First Amendment and tangible property has dealt only with the 
interaction between a speaker's First Amendment rights and an 
individual's right to exclude others from their real property,25 
I conclude that the analysis is applicable to personal property 
as well, where the range of a person's rights in either type of 
property includes the right to exclude others.  "[A] speaker 
must seek access to public property or to private property 
dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment concerns."  
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
 
25 See, e.g., Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Bd., 424 
U.S. 507, 509, 513, 521 (1976) (shopping center did not violate 
picketers' First Amendment rights by prohibiting picketing on 
its property because "the constitutional guarantee of free 
expression is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, 
[F]ederal or [S]tate"). 
30 
 
 
 
788, 801 (1985).  See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825, 831 (1987). 
As a practical matter, where Harvard's current exercise of 
control over the daguerreotypes involves a prohibition on 
viewing the daguerreotypes or using the related images without 
Harvard's consent and a substantial licensing fee, the press 
would be no more legally restricted in its access to the 
daguerreotypes -- and thus its First Amendment rights would be 
no more burdened -- if the daguerreotypes were owned and 
controlled by the plaintiff than if they remained in Harvard's 
possession and control.  Thus, the First Amendment does not 
prevent recognition of a cause of action whereby ownership of 
the daguerreotypes may be transferred from one private party to 
another. 
Additionally, the photography-related cases relied on by 
Harvard and the motion judge in dismissing the plaintiff's 
property-related claims are inapplicable where, as here, the 
cause of action does not concern a photograph, but a unique 
artifact.  A daguerreotype fundamentally is distinct from a 
photograph:  photography results in an image designed to be 
easily reproduced ad infinitum.  Where an individual takes a 
photograph, such photograph is generally the property of the 
photographer, and the use of such photograph is generally 
31 
 
 
 
protected under Federal copyright law.26  Even a photographer 
hired by a private party may expect to retain ownership over the 
photographic negative, depending on the terms of any contract 
between the parties.  But because the daguerreotype process 
results in a unique image on a single sheet of copper, 
dageurreotypists in 1850 would not have had a similar 
expectation of retention of the product of their work.  Instead, 
a resulting daguerreotype is simultaneously the original, 
 
26 I note that the question of property rights in a tangible 
photograph is distinct from the question of copyright in a 
photograph.  I also observe that "[p]hotographs did not receive 
federal copyright protection until the Act of March 3, 1865, 
38th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198."  SHL Imaging, Inc. v. 
Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
Thus, the daguerreotypes, created in 1850, would not have been 
subject to Federal copyright protections. 
 
It is also worth noting that the rule that a photographer 
owns the photograph taken is not absolute; exceptions exist.  
For example, where a person commits sexual abuse of a child or 
adult and photographs such abuse, the resulting imagery is 
forfeited to the State as the fruit of the crime and may, in the 
case of child sexual abuse, itself constitute a crime.  See 
G. L. c. 276, §§ 1, 3 (evidence not "stolen, embezzled or 
obtained by false pretenses" and seized pursuant to search 
warrant "may be forfeited and either sold or destroyed, as the 
public interest requires"; stolen property to be returned to 
rightful owner); G. L. c. 272, § 29C (criminalizing possession 
of child sexual abuse material); Beldotti v. Commonwealth, 41 
Mass. App. Ct. 185, 188-190 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173 
(1997) (declining to return to defendant photographs depicting 
rape of victim where there was "connection between the property 
that [the defendant sought] to have returned to him and the 
crime he committed").  It rightly never has been suggested, 
however, that a journalist's First Amendment rights are 
threatened by this exception to the general rule that 
photographers own their photographs. 
32 
 
 
 
negative, and final viewable product, and is more akin to a 
painted portrait or a sculpture than to a photograph.  Once 
created and delivered to a customer, there would be no 
alternative source of the image in which the daguerreotypist 
could have a property right.  Thus, a daguerreotype is a unique 
item of personal property in which the creating daguerreotypist 
would generally retain no ownership rights after a sale.  See 
Barbash, supra at 171. 
Further, the photography cases relied on by Harvard and the 
judge largely concern photographs taken by, or provided to, 
journalists for the purpose of publishing the news, or with 
photographs taken by law enforcement in the course of a criminal 
investigation of the plaintiff; they do not address a situation 
analogous to that here, where the dispute is between two private 
parties, neither of whom is a member of the press or law 
enforcement and neither of whom appears to have freely offered 
images of the daguerreotypes to the press.27,28  See, e.g., Thayer 
 
27 As discussed supra, the plaintiff's complaint alleges 
that Harvard prohibits use of images of the daguerreotypes 
unless such use is with Harvard's permission and upon payment to 
Harvard of a substantial licensing fee. 
 
28 I also note that neither Harvard nor Agassiz was the 
daguerreotypist, so to the extent that a photographer owns the 
photographs he or she takes and, by extension, a daguerreotypist 
owns the daguerreotypes he or she makes, on its face such rule 
does not appear to support Harvard's possession of the 
daguerreotypes. 
33 
 
 
 
v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 163-164 (1933) (photograph 
provided to newspaper taken of group in public place with 
plaintiff's consent); United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 195 
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982) (photograph 
from plaintiff's juvenile record used during subsequent criminal 
investigation).  Thus, because the cause of action I would 
recognize does not implicate the right of the press to publish 
photographs taken by or provided to members of the press, and 
because such right is protected by the First Amendment, nothing 
I would decide would alter the right of the press to publish 
photographs consistent with the case law relied on by the motion 
judge. 
8.  Conclusion.  The result reached by the court 
underscores the need for the cause of action I have articulated 
in order to provide a full remedy for the harms alleged by the 
plaintiff.  Failing to recognize that the plaintiff, as a 
descendant of Renty and Delia, may have a claim to the 
daguerreotypes superior to Harvard's is precisely the sort of 
miscarriage of justice that the late Chief Justice Gants warned 
us against perpetuating.  We are faced with an aggrieved 
plaintiff who has pleaded facts that, if proved, demand a full 
remedy and nothing less.  It is within this court's authority to 
provide such remedy by recognizing the cause of action I have 
articulated today.