Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL WALTER KACZMAREK
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 114580
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2001

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 3, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 114580  
MICHAEL WALTER KACZMAREK,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
Michael Kaczmarek was convicted of delivering marijuana1  
in August, 1994. In September, 1998, he pleaded guilty to a  
second probation violation.  During the interim, Michigan  
voters approved Proposal B, which amended the state  
1MCL 333.7401(2)(c).  
constitution to remove the right of appeal from criminal  
defendants who plead guilty.2 The change applies to crimes  
committed on or after December 27, 1994.  See § 3 of both 1994  
PA 374 and 1994 PA 375.  
The question here is whether defendant retains an appeal  
as a matter of right from the prison sentence imposed in the  
wake of his probation violation. We hold in the affirmative.  
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals dismissal of  
defendant's claim and remand for consideration of his appeal  
as of right.  
Background of the Case  
As a consequence of his August, 1994 sale of marijuana,  
defendant was arrested and charged with having committed a  
felony punishable by up to four years in prison.3 A jury  
convicted him in March 1995, and a judge pronounced a two-year  
sentence of probation.  
Defendant violated conditions of his probation in 1996.  
The violation led to an order that extended the term to five  
years and imposed additional conditions. Two years later, he  
again violated his probation. As a result, in early 1999, the  
2Proposal B was effective December 27, 1994.  It amended  
Const 1963, art 1, § 20, to state that a criminal defendant 
has "an appeal as a matter of right, except as provided by law 
an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere 
shall be by leave of the court . . . ."  
3He was charged under the former language of MCL  
333.7401(2)(c).  Later amendments and the current language 
appear at 1994 PA 221, 1996 PA 249, and 1998 PA 319.  
2  
 
judge sentenced him to a prison term of thirty-two to forty­
eight months.  
Defendant filed a claim of appeal with the Court of  
Appeals.  The Court dismissed the claim on the ground that it  
lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of right in this matter.  
The Court ordered:  
The claim of appeal is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because the January 29, 1999, judgment 
of sentence, which was based upon a plea of guilty 
to a probation violation that occurred after  
December 27, 1994, is not appealable as a matter of 
right.
 The Court finds that MCR 6.445(H) is 
applicable to this case because the amendment of 
that court rule was simply a codification of 
existing law.  That court rule does not determine  
the appellate rights of a defendant by what rights 
existed at the time the defendant was originally 
sentenced.  [Unpublished order, entered March 24, 
1999 (Docket No. 217835).]  
We granted leave to appeal. 463 Mich 892. While his  
appeal 
was 
pending 
with this Court, defendant attained parolee  
status, rendering his appeal arguably moot.
 We sometimes  
consider mooted questions that involve issues of public  
significance and are likely to recur, yet evade judicial  
review. Lawrence v Toys R Us, 453 Mich 112, 119-120; 551 NW2d  
155 (1996), citing In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 Mich  
148, 151-152, n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984).  
The question in this case is significant because it  
involves appellate rights provided by the state constitution  
and statutes.  Yet, it will evade review because others who  
may raise it, like defendant, also are likely to be on parole  
3  
  
by the time their cases reach this Court. See, e.g., Franciosi  
v Parole Bd, 461 Mich 347, 348, n 1; 604 NW2d 675 (2000).  
Thus, we will address this appeal on its merits.  
Proposal B  
Before 1994, Michigan's Constitution provided:  
In every criminal prosecution, the accused 
shall have . . . an appeal as a matter of right 
. . . . [Const 1963, art 1, § 20.]  
If a defendant was convicted after pleading guilty, he had the  
right to be heard on appeal.  People v Smith, 402 Mich 72; 259  
NW2d 558 (1977). Likewise, he had a second appeal as of right  
in the event he was later found to have violated the terms of  
his probation. People v Pickett, 391 Mich 305; 215 NW2d 695  
(1974).  
However, those rules changed when, on November 8, 1994,  
voters approved Proposal B.  The removal of the right to be  
heard on appeal for a person who had pleaded guilty took  
effect December 27, 1994, the effective date of the  
implementing legislation.4 Specifically, the change "applies  
to criminal prosecutions for crimes committed on or after  
[that date]." The effective date is drawn from language that  
appears at the end of both 1994 PA 374 and 1994 PA 375.  This  
Court also has stated that the modified procedures described  
in certain amendments to the court rules apply to crimes  
4See 1994 PA 374, amending MCL 770.3 and 1994 PA 375, 
amending MCL 600.308(2)(d).  
4  
 
committed on or after December 27, 1994.  448 Mich cxiv  
(1995).  
Probation Violation  
For Proposal B to apply to this case, there would have to  
have been a "criminal prosecution" for a "crime" that took  
place on or after December 27, 1994. Defendant's August 1994  
marijuana delivery is the only "crime" involved of which  
defendant has been convicted or for which he has been  
sentenced. Though he violated his probation, "probation  
violation" does not constitute a separate felony in the Penal  
Code5 or elsewhere.  
As our Court of Appeals has explained, violation of  
probation is not a crime, and a ruling that probation has been  
violated is not a new conviction. See People v Johnson, 191  
Mich App 222, 226-227; 477 NW2d 426 (1991); People v Burks,  
220 Mich App 253, 256; 559 NW2d 357 (1996). "If a judge finds  
that a probationer violated his probation by committing an  
offense, the probationer is neither burdened with a new  
conviction nor exposed to punishment other than that to which  
he was already exposed . . . ." Johnson, supra at 226.  
Instead, revocation of probation simply clears the way  
for a resentencing on the original offense.  MCL 771.4.6  
5MCL 750.1 et seq.  
6At the time this matter arose, the language of MCL 771.4 
was drawn from 1988 PA 78.  The current language is taken from 
(continued...)  
5  
 
Thus, when the judge sentenced defendant to prison in March  
1999, he was sentencing him for the crime of delivering  
marijuana, committed in August 1994.7  
6(...continued) 
1998 PA 520, which made only stylistic changes. It states:  
It is the intent of the legislature that the 
granting of probation is a matter of grace 
conferring no vested right to its continuance. If  
during the probation period the sentencing court 
determines that the probationer is likely again to 
engage in an offensive or criminal course of  
conduct or that the public good requires revocation 
of probation, the court may revoke probation. All  
probation orders are revocable in any manner the 
court that imposed probation considers applicable 
either for a violation or attempted violation of a 
probation condition or for any other type of 
antisocial conduct or action on the probationer's 
part for which the court determines that revocation 
is proper in the public interest. . . . 
If a  
probation order is revoked, the court may sentence 
the probationer in the same manner and to the same 
penalty as the court might have done if the 
probation order had never been made. . . .  
7The dissent questions our view that a sentence for 
probation 
violation 
is merely a "resentencing" on the original 
criminal conviction. Post at 2. It asserts without authority, 
that "appellate remedies following probation revocation have 
always been governed by our court rules in the absence of 
explicit legislation on the subject." Id. Therefore, she 
concludes, MCR 6.445(H) should govern and limit defendant's 
appeal of right.  
We reject this rationale. It overlooks MCL 771.4 which 
provides:  
If a probation order is revoked, the court may 
sentence the probationer in the same manner and to 
the same penalty as the court might have done if 
the probation order had never been made.  
Moreover, as explained in this opinion, the Legislature 
(continued...)  
6  
Because this case arises from a criminal prosecution for  
a crime committed before December 27, 1994,Proposal B does not  
apply to this defendant. Accordingly, he retains the appeal of  
right that was available before it took effect.  
Michigan Court Rule 6.445(H)  
In its order dismissing defendant's claim of appeal, the  
Court 
of 
Appeals 
cited MCR 6.445(H), which currently provides:  
(1)  In a case involving a sentence of  
incarceration under subrule (G), the court must 
advise the probationer on the record, immediately 
after imposing sentence, that  
(a)  the probationer has a right to appeal, if 
the conviction occurred at a contested hearing, or  
(b)  the probationer is entitled to file an 
application for leave to appeal, if the conviction 
was the result of a plea of guilty.  
(2) In a case that involves a sentence other  
than incarceration under subrule (G), the court 
must 
advise 
the 
probationer 
on 
the 
record, 
immediately after imposing sentence, that the  
probationer is entitled to file an application for 
leave to appeal.  
Defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
word 
"conviction" 
in 
paragraphs  
(1)(a) and (1)(b) refers to the underlying conviction, not the  
probation violation, and thus subrule (H) actually supports  
his position.  
He is incorrect.  Rule 6.445 is entitled "Probation  
7(...continued) 
expressly described Proposal B as applying to "crimes  
committed on or after December 27, 1994." 1994 PA 374-375, § 
3 (emphasis added). The only "crime" committed in this case 
occurred before December 1994. Thus, Proposal B does not 
apply.  
7  
  
 
 
Revocation." 
It refers throughout to procedure concerning  
probation revocations.  Hence, it follows that the word  
"conviction" in paragraphs (H)(1)(a) and (1)(b) means  
conviction for "probation revocation."  
Notwithstanding that interpretation, the defendant is  
correct that the language of MCR 6.445(H) does not support the  
dismissal of his appeal.  As was indicated at the time it was  
added, the court rule's new language merely implemented the  
1994 amendment of article 1, § 20 of the Michigan Constitution  
of 1963. 459 Mich cxcviii, cxcix (1998). It cannot be used  
to dismiss a claim of appeal properly filed under the  
constitution and the implementing legislation.  
Issues Available on Appeal  
We caution that defendant's appeal of right is limited in  
scope. It encompasses only those issues that he could not have  
raised in an appeal from his 1995 marijuana conviction. See  
Pickett, supra at 316-318. 
Moreover, defendant's plea of  
guilty on the allegation that he violated his probation  
subsumes any factual question whether the probation was  
violated. People v New, 427 Mich 482, 488-491; 398 NW2d 358  
(1986).  
Therefore, unless defendant can identify a fundamental  
flaw in the revocation proceedings,8 his present appeal as of  
8New explains that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
waives nearly all issues arising before the plea.  With regard 
(continued...)  
8  
 
 
 
right is limited to issues arising from the resentencing.  
Conclusion  
Defendant's marijuana delivery, the only crime involved  
and for which he was placed on probation, occurred before  
December 27, 1994.  Therefore, although defendant later  
pleaded guilty to a probation violation, Proposal B does not  
apply, and defendant is entitled to challenge the revocation  
of his probation by way of an appeal as of right.  
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the  
order of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that  
court for reinstatement of defendant's appeal.  
CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred  
with KELLY, J.  
8(...continued) 
to the plea itself, the record of the present case suggests no 
failure to comply with the terms of MCR 6.445(F).  
9  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 114580  
MICHAEL WALTER KACZMAREK,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CORRIGAN, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  The majority concludes that  
defendant has an appeal of right following his plea of guilty  
to probation violation because the underlying crime occurred  
before December 27, 1994, the effective date of Proposal B and  
the implementing statutes.  I would hold that any defendant  
who pleads guilty to probation violation is limited to an  
appeal by leave.  The date of a probation violator’s  
underlying crime was rendered irrelevant by virtue of our 1998  
amendments of MCR 6.445(H).  
By allowing an appeal of right in these circumstances,  
the majority misconstrues the court rule that governs this  
case. 
 The linchpin of the majority opinion is its view that  
1  
the sentence for probation violation is a “resentencing” for  
the original criminal conviction.  MCL 771.4. The majority  
apparently views the appellate remedies as flowing from that  
word.  However, the appellate remedies following probation  
revocation have always been governed by our court rules in the  
absence of explicit legislation on the subject.  MCR 6.445(H)  
specifically 
addresses 
this 
situation 
and 
authorizes 
an 
appeal  
by leave only, irrespective of the date of the underlying  
crime.  
I  
In 1994, the electorate ratified Proposal B, which  
amended Const 1963, art 1, § 20 to allow a defendant to appeal  
only by leave following a guilty plea. Const 1963, art 1, §  
20 now provides:  
In every criminal prosecution, the accused 
shall have the right . . . to have an appeal as a 
matter of right, except as provided by law an 
appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo 
contendere shall be by leave of the court . . . .  
The Legislature, in turn, implemented Proposal B by  
amending MCL 600.308 in 1994 PA 375.  Thereafter, the Court of  
Appeals 
jurisdiction 
over 
plea-based 
final 
orders 
or 
judgments  
was limited to appeals by leave only.  The Code of Criminal  
Procedure was also amended to reflect this procedural change.  
MCL 770.3(1)(e), as amended by 1994 PA 374.  The change  
“applies to criminal prosecutions for crimes committed on or  
after [December 27, 1994].”  1994 PA 375, § 3. 
This Court  
2  
confirmed the same view when it first amended the relevant  
court rules. 448 Mich cxiv (1995).  
I concur with my colleagues’ views that probation  
violations are not separate crimes. They are nowhere listed  
in the Penal Code.  Moreover, I agree with them that one  
rational way to view probation revocation is as a resentencing  
on the original offense. 
MCL 771.4; MCR 6.445(G). 
My  
disagreement with the majority relates to the course change  
this opinion represents.  In treating the instant probation  
revocation as a resentencing, the Court rejects, at least in  
part, the approach it took to the problem of probation  
revocation in the 1998 court rule amendment.  
In the absence of explicit legislative direction  
regarding appellate review of probation violations, our court  
rule amendment, effective January 1, 1999, specifically  
regulated 
appellate 
procedure 
governing 
probation 
revocations.  
In my view, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed  
defendant’s claim of appeal in its succinct order:  
The claim of appeal is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because the January 29, 1999, judgment 
of sentence, which was based upon a plea of guilty 
to a probation violation that occurred after  
December 27, 1994, is not appealable as a matter of 
right.
 The Court finds that MCR 6.445(H) is 
applicable to this case because the amendment of 
that court rule was simply a codification of 
existing law.  That court rule does not determine  
the appellate rights of a defendant by what rights 
existed at the time the defendant was originally 
sentenced.  [Unpublished order, entered March 24, 
1999 (Docket No. 217835).]  
3  
 
 
I would affirm that order because nothing in the language  
of the governing court rule makes the date of the underlying  
crime the triggering event in determining appellate rights  
following probation revocations.  
The probation-revocation court rule expressly provides  
that a defendant who pleads guilty to a probation violation  
may only appeal by leave:  
(1) In a case involving a sentence of  
incarceration under subrule (G), the court must 
advise the probationer on the record, immediately 
after imposing sentence, that  
(a) the probationer has a right to appeal, if 
the conviction occurred at a contested hearing, or  
(b) the probationer is entitled to file an  
application for leave to appeal, if the conviction  
was the result of a plea of guilty.  
(2) In a case that involves a sentence other 
than incarceration under subrule (G), the court 
must 
advise 
the 
probationer 
on 
the 
record, 
immediately after imposing sentence, that the  
probationer is entitled to file an application for 
leave to appeal. [MCR 6.445(H) (emphasis added).]  
This rule nowhere directs the trial or appellate court to  
discriminate in granting appellate rights on the basis of the  
date of the underlying offense. 
For purposes of appellate  
review, this Court has consistently treated probation  
violation as distinct from the underlying crime and sentence.  
In People v Pickett, 391 Mich 305, 316-318; 215 NW2d 695  
(1974), we held that an appeal following revocation of  
probation is limited to matters relating to the probation  
4  
 
violation.  We also held that a judgment of sentence resulting  
from a probation violation is a “final judgment” for purposes  
of appeal rights. Pickett, supra at 313, 316.  Further, in  
People v Rial, 399 Mich 431, 435; 249 NW2d 114 (1976), this  
Court, following Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 782; 93 S Ct  
1756; 36 L Ed 2d 656 (1973), properly recognized that  
probation revocation is neither part of, nor a mere  
continuation of, the criminal prosecution for the underlying  
offense.  
The former MCR 6.445(H) accorded probationers a right to  
appeal from a sentence of incarceration.  In late 1997, the  
Michigan Judges Association proposed an amendment because of  
its concern that the rule then in effect still granted  
probation violators a right to appeal although they no longer  
had a right to appeal when they pleaded guilty to the  
underlying offense. This anomaly persisted despite Proposal  
B and the amendment of MCR 6.425.  This Court thereafter  
published the proposed rule for comment.  
The only public comment on file with this Court opposed  
the amendment.  It asserted that a defendant’s appeal rights,  
including appeal rights from a probation revocation, are  
vested or fixed at the time of the original sentencing on the  
underlying substantive crime.  The majority’s view today  
essentially adopts the lone commenter’s view.  The Court  
rejected this argument.  An obvious contrary reason is that  
5  
 
probation 
violations 
are 
treated 
like 
substantive 
offenses 
for  
purposes of appellate rights.  
Thus, while a defendant is  
returned to the position of resentencing as far as sentencing  
options were concerned, the factors involved in imposing  
sentence are not static, and a defendant is limited on appeal  
to asserting matters that were raised during the probation  
violation hearing.  The Court apparently adopted the proposed  
rule after considering and rejecting the views expressed by  
the commenter and various rebuttal arguments.  
I believe that hundreds of cases have been decided in  
reliance on the amended rule.  I would not repudiate that  
court rule.  In this case, the final judgment entered January  
29, 1999, did not qualify defendant for an appeal of right.  
I would therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals  
dismissing defendant’s claim of appeal.  
6