Title: Riverstone Development Co., Inc. v. Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1140555
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 23, 2015

REL: 10/23/2105
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1140555
____________________
Riverstone Development Co., Inc.
v.
Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc.
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-12-901008)
STUART, Justice.
Riverstone 
Development 
Co., 
Inc. 
("Riverstone
Development"), sued Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc.
("G&A Appraisals"), in the Madison Circuit Court, asserting
negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy claims stemming from a
1140555
July 2010 appraisal G&A Appraisals conducted on waterfront
property Riverstone Development owned on Lake Guntersville. 
During the course of the eventual trial on those claims, the
trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of
G&A Appraisals on the negligence claim, and, at the conclusion
of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of G&A
Appraisals 
on 
the 
wantonness 
and 
conspiracy 
claims. 
Riverstone Development appeals, arguing that the judgment as
a matter of law was improperly entered on the negligence claim
and that it is entitled to a new trial based on juror
misconduct.  We affirm.
I.
In 2005, Southern Heritage, LLC, a company owned by Frank
McRight and Michael Lastovic, completed a series of land
transactions resulting in its owning approximately 170 acres
of property abutting Lake Guntersville.  As part of those
transactions, Southern Heritage also obtained a right-of-way
easement from a neighboring landowner providing access to the
property from County Road 88 via an existing roadway.
Sometime in the summer of 2006, Southern Heritage began
borrowing money from First American Bank in Huntsville to
2
1140555
start developing the property, with the ultimate goal of
creating a subdivision to be known as Pinnacle Cove.  Southern
Heritage used the borrowed funds to begin initial development
work, such as building exploratory roads, drafting plats, and
obtaining permits from the Army Corps of Engineers and the
Tennessee Valley Authority that would allow it to build
boathouses along the shore of Lake Guntersville.  By February
2007, Southern Heritage had borrowed approximately $1.5
million from First American, which loan was secured by a
mortgage on the Pinnacle Cove property, and McRight
subsequently testified at trial that First American had
indicated that it would also provide the additional financing
necessary to complete the project, which McRight estimated
would have cost approximately $4 million.
Southern Heritage originally hoped to have initial
development work completed by approximately September 2007 so
that it could begin selling lots.  However, in March 2007,
First American notified Southern Heritage that it would not
continue to fund the development until 50 percent of the lots
were "pre sold."  McRight subsequently testified that this
condition was tantamount to pulling all future 
funding 
because
3
1140555
Southern Heritage did not anticipate selling 50 percent of the
lots in Pinnacle Cove until approximately two years after it
began selling lots. 
 
Southern Heritage thereafter 
attempted to
obtain financing from other sources but was unable to do so. 
It subsequently ran out of money in May 2007, and no
substantive work was done on the Pinnacle Cove property after
June 2007.
Shortly after First American indicated that it would no
longer provide financing, McRight and Lastovic created a new
company, Riverstone Development, to take over ownership of 
the
Pinnacle Cove property, because Southern Heritage owned other
property in addition to that tract.  For approximately the
next two years, McRight, Lastovic, Southern Heritage, and/or
Riverstone Development (hereinafter referred to collectively
as "the developing parties") continued to pay interest on the
loan held by First American.  Sometime in the summer of 2009,
RBC Bank, which had purchased First American and taken over
Southern 
Heritage's 
loan, 
informed 
the 
developing 
parties 
that
it would not renew the loan unless the payment terms were
modified and additional collateral and guarantees were
provided.  The developing parties ultimately concluded that
4
1140555
they could not agree to those changes, and the loan
accordingly went into default status when the developing
parties stopped making payments.
In March 2010, RBC Bank contracted Phil Fowler, a state-
certified appraiser, to prepare an appraisal of the Pinnacle
Cove property.  Fowler had previously appraised the property
on multiple occasions, assigning it an appraised value of
$2.115 million in 2007 and an appraised value of $1.765
million in February 2009.  The March 2010 appraisal Fowler
submitted to RBC Bank estimated the value of the property to
be $1.7 million.  That same month, Riverstone Development,
which now owed approximately $1.6 million on the loan,
approached RBC Bank and offered to provide a deed in lieu of
foreclosure –– essentially selling the Pinnacle Cove property
to RBC Bank for the amount owed –– but that offer was
rejected.
In June 2010, RBC Bank contracted G&A Appraisals to
conduct a new appraisal of the Pinnacle Cove property.  This
appraisal was conducted by Thomas Garrett and Leigh Stephens,
both 
state-certified 
appraisers, 
and 
their 
July 
2010 
appraisal
report placed the value of the Pinnacle Cove property at
5
1140555
$340,000.  Several months later, RBC Bank foreclosed on the
Pinnacle Cove property, eventually purchasing it at the
foreclosure sale for $300,000, leaving a deficiency 
balance 
of
approximately $1.3 million.   RBC Bank thereafter sued the
1
developing parties to recover that deficiency balance, and,
sometime in 2012, they reached a settlement agreement in which
McRight agreed to provide $250,000 to Southern Heritage and
Riverstone Development that they could use to settle the
claims against them. 
Riverstone Development and Southern Heritage initiated
the instant action on July 30, 2012, when they sued G&A
Appraisals, Garrett, and Stephens, asserting negligence,
wantonness, and conspiracy claims.  The gravamen of their
claims was that Garrett and Stephens had either performed
their appraisal of the Pinnacle Cove property so unskillfully
as to constitute negligence and/or wantonness or, in the
alternative, that they had conspired with RBC Bank to
intentionally appraise the property at lower than market
value.  In either case, Riverstone Development and Southern
RBC Bank thereafter publicly listed the Pinnacle Cove
1
property for sale at $300,000, and it eventually sold for
$185,000.
6
1140555
Heritage argued, they were injured when RBC Bank used the
$340,000 appraisal as the basis of its $300,000 bid at the
foreclosure sale, thus leaving them with no property and owing
a deficiency balance of $1.3 million.
Eventually, 
Southern 
Heritage, 
Garrett, 
and 
Stephens 
were
voluntarily dismissed from the case, leaving only Riverstone
Development as the plaintiff and G&A Appraisals as the
defendant.   The case proceeded to a jury trial in October
2
2014, and, following the close of Riverstone Development's
case, G&A Appraisals' motion for a judgment as a matter of law
on the negligence claim was granted.  The wantonness and
conspiracy claims were thereafter submitted to the jury at the
close of all testimony, and the jury ultimately returned a
verdict in favor of G&A Appraisals on both claims.  The trial
court subsequently entered a judgment on the jury's verdict,
after which Riverstone Development moved for a new trial on
multiple grounds.  On January 18, 2015, the trial court denied
that motion for a new trial, and, on February 27, 2015,
Riverstone Development filed its notice of appeal to this
Court.
Garrett in fact died while the case was pending.
2
7
1140555
II.
On appeal, Riverstone Development argues that the trial
court erred (1) by entering the judgment as a matter of law in
favor of G&A Appraisals on the negligence claim and (2) by
denying Riverstone Development's motion for a new trial on
juror-misconduct grounds.  We first review the judgment as a
matter of law entered on Riverstone Development's negligence
claim.  
In Blue Circle Cement Inc. v. Phillips, 989 So. 2d 1025,
1029 (Ala. 2007), we explained the standard of review
applicable to a trial court's ruling on a motion for a
judgment as a matter of law:
"'This 
Court 
applies 
the 
same standard 
of 
review
to a ruling on a motion for a [judgment as a matter
of law] as the trial court used in initially
deciding the motion.  This standard is "materially
indistinguishable from the standard by which we
review a summary judgment."  Hathcock v. Wood, 815
So. 2d 502, 506 (Ala. 2001).  We must decide whether
substantial evidence was presented to the jury,
which, when viewed in the light most favorable to
[the nonmovant], would warrant a jury verdict in
[its] favor.  City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834
So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2002).  "Substantial evidence is
evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to
be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'"
8
1140555
(Quoting Webb Wheel Prods., Inc. v. Hanvey, 922 So. 2d 865,
870 (Ala. 2005).)  Thus, in order for its negligence claim to 
proceed to the jury in this case, Riverstone Development was
required to present substantial evidence indicating (1) that
G&A Appraisals owed it a duty; (2) that G&A Appraisals
breached that duty; (3) that Riverstone Development suffered
a loss; and (4) that G&A Appraisals' breach was the actual and
proximate cause of that loss.  QORE, Inc. v. Bradford Bldg.
Co., 25 So. 3d 1116, 1123 (Ala. 2009).  When it orally entered
the judgment as a matter of law on Riverstone Development's
negligence claim at the close of Riverstone Development's
case, the trial court explained that, "based on the
presentation of evidence, I don't find that [Riverstone
Development] established that the standard of care was
breached in this case or that any alleged breach of the
standard of care proximately caused the damages complained of
in this case."  For the reasons that follow, we agree that
Riverstone Development failed to present substantial evidence
indicating that G&A Appraisals breached any duty it owed
Riverstone 
Development; 
accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
judgment 
as
9
1140555
a matter of law entered by the trial court on Riverstone
Development's negligence claim.3
As an initial matter, we note that the individuals
accused of negligence and whose negligence is attributed to
G&A Appraisals has also argued that it performed the July
3
2010 appraisal for the sole benefit of RBC Bank and that it
accordingly owed no duty to Riverstone Development in
connection with that appraisal.  See Zanaty Realty, Inc. v.
Williams, 935 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Ala. 2005) (holding that an
appraisal company was entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law on a negligence claim because the appraisal company was
employed by a mortgage company to conduct an appraisal for
only mortgage-insurance purposes, and the appraisal company
accordingly owed no duty to the buyer of the appraised
property who had chosen to rely on that appraisal).  However,
Riverstone Development argues that both Zanaty and Fisher v.
Comer Plantation, Inc., 772 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 2000), upon which
Zanaty relied, are distinguishable inasmuch as those cases
involved negligence claims brought by parties that had relied
upon 
appraisals 
performed 
for 
other 
parties, 
unlike 
Riverstone
Development, which claims that its injury resulted from RBC
Bank's use of an appraisal that G&A Appraisals had performed
specifically for RBC Bank.  Unlike the appraisals in Zanaty
and Fisher, Riverstone Development argues, the appraisal in
this case was used by the intended party for its intended
purpose and the injury ultimately suffered was foreseeable. 
See Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of City of
Mobile, 294 Ala. 606, 613, 320 So. 2d 624, 630 (1975)
("[W]here one party to a contract assumes a duty to another
party to that contract, and it is foreseeable that injury to
a third party –– not a party to the contract ––  may occur
upon a breach of that duty, the promissor owes that duty to
all those within the foreseeable area of risk.").  Ultimately,
however, we need not decide whether G&A Appraisals owed a duty
to Riverstone Development, because Riverstone Development's
failure to establish a breach of the claimed duty provides a
sufficient basis for our judgment.
10
1140555
G&A Appraisals –– Garrett and Stephens –– are licensed
professional real-estate appraisers.  The general rule in
Alabama is that, when negligence is asserted against a
professional, a witness also qualified in that profession 
must
present expert testimony establishing both a breach of the
standard of care and causation.  See, e.g., Collins Co. v.
City of Decatur, 533 So. 2d 1127, 1134 (Ala. 1988) (applying
professional-negligence rule to architects and engineers). 
Alabama courts have not yet considered whether this rule
applies to real-estate appraisers as well; however, other
courts that have considered the issue have decided that it
does.  For example, in Hice v. Lott, 223 P.3d 139, 143-44
(Colo. App. 2009), the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded
that real-estate appraisers practice a profession involving
knowledge or skill and that, accordingly, claims against them
asserting professional negligence must generally be supported
by expert testimony.  In making that determination, the
Hice court noted that real-estate appraisers are licensed and
regulated by Colorado law, are subject to rules and
regulations set forth by a state board, and are subject to
discipline for misconduct or violation of those rules and
11
1140555
regulations.  Id.  Real-estate appraisers in Alabama operate
in a similar environment –– they are licensed and regulated by
the Alabama Real Estate Appraisers Board, which maintains
rules and regulations governing the profession and which has
the ability to discipline license holders who do not operate
in accordance with those rules and regulations.  See Rule 780-
X-1-.01 et seq., Ala. Admin. Code (Real Estate Appraisers
Bd.).  We accordingly similarly conclude that real-estate
appraisers are engaged in a profession requiring specialized
knowledge and skill and that the professional-negligence rule
therefore requires expert testimony to establish a licensed
real-estate appraiser's breach of the standard of care.
In this case, no expert witness definitively declared in
testimony that Garrett and/or Stephens –– and thus, by
extension G&A Appraisals –– breached the standard of care;
however, Riverstone Development argues that Stephens's own
testimony constituted expert testimony demonstrating her
breach of the standard of care in one respect and that her
breach of the standard of care in another respect is so
obvious that no expert testimony is necessary.  Riverstone
Development 
first 
argues 
that 
Stephens 
effectively
12
1140555
acknowledged that she breached the standard of care when she
testified that she was "protecting the bank" when she
performed the July 2010 appraisal of the Pinnacle Cove
property, even though, Riverstone Development argues, the
undisputed 
evidence 
indicated 
that 
real-estate 
appraisers 
must
always perform their work with impartiality, objectivity, and
independence. 
At trial, both Stephens and Fowler, a real-estate
appraiser testifying as an expert witness on behalf of
Riverstone Development, gave expert testimony indicating that
licensed real-estate appraisers in Alabama are required to
abide by the Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal
Practice ("USPAP").  They both further agreed that one of
those standards mandated that a real-estate appraiser must
always be "impartial, objective, and independent."  At trial,
counsel for Riverstone Development questioned Stephens
regarding this standard and a statement she had made in her
deposition regarding her view that it was her duty to "protect
the bank":
"Q.
Ms. Stephens, you did this appraisal knowing
there was potential for foreclosure, correct?
"A.
Correct.
13
1140555
"Q.
You did this appraisal so you could –– you
deflated this value on this appraisal so you
could protect the bank, didn't you?
"A.
No.
"Q.
Did you tell me on your deposition that you did
it to protect the bank?
"A.
I told you in my deposition that it was my job,
as an appraiser, to protect the bank.
"Q.
So you did say on deposition that you were
protecting the bank?
"A.
I did.
"Q.
Isn't 
that 
a 
violation 
of 
USPAP, 
your
obligation to be independent, objective, and
impartial?
"A.
Independent, objective, and impartial is what I
was.
"Q.
I'm asking you, is protecting a party to the
transaction a violation of USPAP?  Simple
question.  We have read the rules.  I am asking
you.
"A.
As I said in my deposition, I was protecting
the bank from making a loan based upon the
premise that the highest and best use was for a
subdivision, when, in my professional opinion,
the highest and best use was as vacant land,
not as a subdivision.
"Q.
So you were protecting –– 
"A.
Protecting the bank –– 
"Q.
The bank –– 
14
1140555
"A.
–– to not recommend they loan more money on a
subdivision.
"Q.
Well, that's not your job as an appraiser, is
it?
"A.
It is.
"Q.
I 
thought 
you 
weren't 
supposed 
to 
take
anybody's sides.  You weren't supposed to
advocate anybody's position; isn't that [what]
USPAP says?
"A.
I don't care which side gets mad when I come up
with a value, it's my own opinion.  One side is
likely to be unhappy.
"Q.
I'm not asking who is angry or mad.
"A.
Right.
"Q.
I'm asking you about you.  You told us, in this
transaction, you were protecting the bank?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
Simple question.  Doesn't USPAP say you can't
do that?
"A.
They say to be independent, impartial, and
objective, which I was.
"Q.
Yes, ma'am.  And it says you cannot advocate
the position of a client, right?
"A.
That's correct.
"Q.
And in this case, your client was the bank,
correct?
"A.
That's right.
15
1140555
"Q.
Again, ma'am, is that protecting the bank a
violation of your standards as an appraiser?
"A.
No."
We 
are 
not 
convinced 
that 
Stephens's 
testimony
constitutes substantial evidence of a breach of the standard
of care.  Riverstone Development views Stephens's statement
that she was "protecting the bank" as tantamount to a
statement that she was "favoring the bank"; however, we do not
believe that a fair-minded person in the exercise of impartial
judgment could 
make that conclusion when considering the whole
of Stephens's testimony.  In Giles v. Brookwood Health
Services, Inc., 5 So. 3d 533, 550 (Ala. 2008), this Court
cautioned against the 
practice 
of relying on isolated excerpts
of deposition testimony to argue in favor of a proposition the
testimony as a whole does not support, explaining:
"[T]he testimony of [the plaintiff's] medical expert
is not sufficient to satisfy [the plaintiff's]
burden 
of 
producing 
substantial 
evidence
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact as to her medical-malpractice claims
....  Even if portions of her expert's testimony
could be said to be sufficient to defeat a
summary-judgment motion when viewed 'abstractly,
independently, and separately from the balance of
his testimony,' 'we are not to view testimony so
abstractly.'  Hines v. Armbrester, 477 So. 2d 302,
304 (Ala. 1985).  See also Malone v. Daugherty, 453
16
1140555
So. 2d 721, 723–24 (Ala. 1984).  Rather, as this
Court stated in Hines:
"'We are to view the [expert] testimony as
a whole, and, so viewing it, determine if
the testimony is sufficient to create a
reasonable inference of the fact the
plaintiff seeks to prove.  In other words,
can 
we 
say, 
considering 
the 
entire
testimony of the plaintiff's expert, that
an inference that the defendant doctor had
acted contrary to recognized standards of
professional care was created?'
"477 So. 2d at 304–05; see also Pruitt v. Zeiger,
590 So. 2d 236, 239 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Hines, 477
So. 2d at 304–05).
"Similarly, in Malone v. Daugherty, supra,
another medical-malpractice case, we noted that a
portion 
of 
the 
plaintiff's 
medical 
expert's
testimony in that case,
"'when viewed abstractly, independently,
and separately from the balance of his
sworn 
statement, 
would 
appear 
sufficient 
to
defeat 
the 
[defendant's] 
motion 
for 
summary
judgment.  But our review of the evidence
cannot be so limited.  The test is whether
[the 
plaintiff's 
medical 
expert's]
testimony, when viewed as a whole, was
sufficient 
to 
create 
a 
reasonable 
inference
of the fact Plaintiff sought to prove. 
That is to say, could a jury, as the finder
of fact, reasonably infer from this medical
expert's testimony, or any part thereof
when viewed against the whole, that the
defendant doctor had acted contrary to the
recognized standards of professional care
in the instant case.
17
1140555
"'Thus, in applying this test, we must
examine the expert witness's testimony as
a whole.'
"453 So. 2d at 723; see also Downey v. Mobile
Infirmary Med. Ctr., 662 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Ala.
1995) (noting that portions of a medical expert's
testimony must be viewed in the context of the
expert's testimony as a whole); Pendarvis v.
Pennington, 521 So. 2d 969, 970 (Ala. 1988) ('[W]e
are bound to consider the expert testimony as a
whole.')."
It is clear, when examining Stephens's testimony as a
whole, that she was not stating that she "favored" the bank
when she stated that she was "protecting" it; rather, she was
merely articulating the fact that lenders pay to have
appraisals performed in order to protect themselves from
making undersecured loans.  See, e.g., Graham v. Bank of
America, N.A., 226 Cal. App. 4th 594, 607, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d
218, 229 (2014) ("An appraisal is performed in the usual
course and scope of the loan process to protect the lender's
interest to determine if the property provides adequate
security for the loan." (emphasis omitted and emphasis
added)), and Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 676 F.3d 655,
661 (8th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he primary purpose of an appraisal is
to protect the lender's interests by ensuring the value of the
collateral is sufficient to secure the loan." (emphasis
18
1140555
added)).  No fair-minded person in the exercise of impartial
judgment could consider the whole of Stephens's testimony and
conclude that Stephens's statement that she was "protecting
the bank" indicates that she was not "impartial, objective,
and independent" as required by USPAP.
Riverstone Development next argues that Stephens –– and
by extension G&A Appraisals –– was negligent inasmuch as she
overlooked the fact that Riverstone Development owned a
permanent easement providing access to the Pinnacle Cove
property when she was preparing the appraisal report for G&A
Appraisals and that no expert testimony was necessary to
establish a breach of the standard of care in that respect
because her want of skill and/or lack of care is so apparent
that it can be understood by any layperson.  See, e.g.,
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Jones, Morrison & Womack, P.C., 42 So.
3d 667, 680-81 (Ala. 2009) (explaining exception to
professional-negligence rule when the professional's error is
so obvious that neglect would be clear to average layperson). 
However, although Stephens did acknowledge that she was
unaware of the easement held by Riverstone Development, we do
19
1140555
not agree that that evidence alone is sufficient to merit the
submission of the negligence claim to the jury.  
With regard to the possibility of real-estate appraisers
making mistakes in the performance of their 
duties, 
Riverstone
Development's expert Fowler testified that "a simple mistake
may not constitute gross negligence [but] a series of mistakes
may."  Furthermore, Fowler agreed with G&A Appraisals'
attorney that, under USPAP, "you can't have an error of
omission or commission that significantly affects the
appraisal."   In this case, Stephens acknowledged that she
4
overlooked 
the 
easement 
when 
preparing 
the 
appraisal; 
however,
she also testified that her error in that regard had no impact
on her valuation of the property.  When questioned by G&A
Appraisals' attorney, she stated:
"Q.
The real question [counsel for Riverstone
Development] wanted to ask about was the fact
whether that missing [easement] affected the
value of this property.  Did you missing the
easement affect the value of the property in
your appraisal?
"A.
It did not.
Stephens 
also 
testified 
than 
an 
error 
of 
commission 
could
4
be a violation of USPAP "if it affected the value of the
estimate of the appraiser's value."
20
1140555
"Q.
And the reason why has to do with comparables,
doesn't it?
"A.
That's right.
"....
"Q.
Did you make any –– let me ask you this
question first –– the properties that you used
as comparables all had access?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
Did you make any deductions on the value of
those comparables to make up for the fact that
you listed this property, the 170 acres, as not
having access?
"A.
No, I did not.
"[Questions about other adjustments made for size,
location, and proximity to flood plain.]
"Q.
No adjustments for access?
"A.
Correct.
"Q.
What does that tell us about your value that
you placed on the property?
"A.
It tells us that I basically assumed if you get
access, that access did not play a role in the
value that I put on the property."
Thus, the expert testimony heard at trial –– from both Fowler
and Stephens –– indicated that an appraiser's error could be
a breach of the standard of care if it affected the
appraisal's final value; however, there was no expert
21
1140555
testimony indicating that in this case Stephens's failure to
identify the specified easement had an effect on the final
estimated value arrived at in the July 2010 appraisal.  In
fact, Stephens specifically refuted that idea, and, when
questioned by G&A Appraisals' attorney at trial, Fowler
emphasized that he was not making any judgment regarding the
effect on the July 2010 appraisal of not taking the easement
into account:
"Q.
You told me, during the course of your
deposition, did you not, that you were not
there to testify about the Garrett and Stephens
appraisal?
"A.
I don't have any basis to testify about that. 
I have never seen their appraisal.
"Q.
And you are not here to testify about it today,
are you?
"A.
No.
"Q.
And you are not here to offer any opinion with
regard to the Garrett-Stephens appraisal?
"A.
That would be a review, and I would have to
meet all the requirements if I did that.
"Q.
Well ... I think, during the course of your
deposition, you told me, because you had
appraised this property, you would not and
could not do a review.
"A.
No, it wouldn't be appropriate for me to do a
review on a property that I had appraised.
22
1140555
"Q.
Because it would affect your impartiality,
because you've already got a pre-fixed opinion,
right?
"A.
That's exactly the reason.
"Q.
And you just acknowledged that you have not
reviewed 
or 
read 
the 
Garrett[-Stephens]
appraisal, have you?
"A.
I have not reviewed it, no.
"Q.
And you told me also that you weren't going to
comment on their appraisal because you didn't
know what [their] appraisal premise was; does
that sound right?
"A.
Yes."
Thus, there was no expert testimony presented at trial
indicating that the error Stephens made by overlooking the
easement had an effect on the final value for the Pinnacle
Cove property listed 
in 
the appraisal. 
 Riverstone Development
argues that no expert testimony is needed because the error is
obvious to any layperson; however, although it might be true
that 
a 
layperson 
can 
understand 
the 
concept 
of 
a
professional's overlooking a relevant fact, we disagree that
a layperson has the expertise in this situation to understand
whether and how a real-estate appraiser's overlooking an
easement might impact that appraiser's conclusions as to the
valuation of a property.  As the trial court stated when
23
1140555
granting G&A Appraisals' motion for a judgment as a matter of
law:
"[Riverstone Development] also argued yesterday
that the nature of the alleged breach in this case
is so obvious that a layperson is capable of finding
that a breach occurred and does not require expert
testimony.  That just doesn't fly with me.  I think
if anything has become clear, it's that appraisals
are tricky business and it's not simple, by any
stretch, and the simple analysis of that is looking
at the binder of Mr. Fowler's first analysis that is
about two inches thick."
Moreover, we note that this is not a case where there was
no expert testimony given regarding an alleged breach of the
standard of care and the plaintiff on appeal is arguing that
no expert testimony was needed because the negligence is
obvious to any layperson.  Rather, in this case there was
expert 
testimony 
establishing 
an 
industry 
standard 
with 
regard
to real-estate appraisal errors –– that an appraisal error
might be considered a breach of the standard of care only if
that error affects the appraised value of the property –– but
the plaintiff now argues that a jury should nevertheless have
been allowed to find that the appraisal error was a "common-
sense" error constituting 
negligence 
without any regard to the
standard set forth by the experts and without any regard to
whether there was evidence indicating that the error affected
24
1140555
the appraised value of the property.  Accepting this argument
would undermine the purpose of the rule requiring expert
testimony in professional-negligence cases, and we decline to
do so.  The judgment as a matter of law entered on Riverstone
Development's negligence claim is due to be affirmed.
III.
We 
next turn 
to 
Riverstone 
Development's 
juror-misconduct
argument.  Specifically, Riverstone Development alleges that
it is entitled to a new trial because one of the jurors, A.L.,
failed to acknowledge during voir dire that he had previously
been a defendant in a civil lawsuit.
"In Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d [763,] 772
[(Ala. 2001)], this Court stated:
"'[T]he proper standard to apply in
determining whether a party is entitled to
a new trial in this circumstance [where a
juror fails to respond correctly to a
question on voir dire] is "whether the
defendant might have been prejudiced by a
veniremember's failure to make a proper
response."  Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d
[122,] 124 [(Ala. 1993)].  Further, the
determination of whether a party 
might have
been prejudiced, i.e., whether there was
probable prejudice, is a matter within the
trial court's discretion.'
"Id.  See also Reynolds v. City of Birmingham, 723
So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) ('"[T]he
ruling of the trial judge denying a motion for new
25
1140555
trial will not be disturbed in the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion, and this Court will
indulge 
every 
presumption 
in 
favor 
of 
the
correctness of his ruling."'  (quoting Hall v.
State, 348 So. 2d 870, 875 (Ala. Crim. App.
1977)))."
Ex parte Dixon, 55 So. 3d 1257, 1259 (Ala. 2010).  Thus,
Riverstone 
Development 
bore 
the 
burden 
of 
proof 
in
establishing 
that 
probable 
prejudice 
arose 
from 
A.L.'s 
failure
to truthfully respond to a question on voir dire, and the
trial 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
Riverstone 
Development 
failed 
to
meet that burden is subject to great deference under the
exceeds-its-discretion standard. 
Riverstone Development argues that it was prejudiced in
this case because juror A.L. failed to respond to the
following question posed by Riverstone Development's attorney
during voir dire:
"Now, let's make sure –– on the terminology
here, we are the plaintiff.  We go first in the
evidence, and we have an obligation of showing our
burden of proof.  These are the defendants.  Anybody
been a defendant, in other words, in the same
position as these folks in a civil lawsuit?  And
please don't –– I don't want to invade –– I'm not
talking about domestic issues and I'm not talking
about criminal cases where [the district attorney's
office] is prosecuting you, something of a criminal
nature.  I'm talking about civil-damage[s] lawsuits,
money-damage[s] lawsuits, civil claims."
26
1140555
Three prospective jurors in the pool responded affirmatively
and were subjected to further questioning; A.L., 
however, 
made
no response.  Riverstone Development thereafter learned ––
presumably at some time after judgment had been entered on the
jury's verdict –– that A.L. had in fact been a defendant in
three collection actions apparently stemming from A.L.'s
status as a guarantor on three student loans that had gone
unpaid.  In conjunction with its motion for a new trial,
Riverstone Development submitted to the trial court copies of
three consent judgments that had been entered against A.L. in
December 2013, totaling $18,789, $27,525, and $41,132,
respectively.  Riverstone Development now argues that "[a]
person saddled with judgments in that amount would likely be
biased against plaintiffs, or sympathetic to defendants, or
both" and that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
failing to recognize what Riverstone Development says was
probable prejudice and to grant its motion for a new trial. 
(Riverstone Development's brief, at p. 44.)
G&A Appraisals, however, emphasizes that "not every
failure to respond properly to questions propounded during
voir dire 'automatically entitles [the complaining party] to
27
1140555
a new trial or reversal of the cause on appeal.'"  Ex parte
Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 763, 771-72 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Freeman v.
Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 166, 238 So. 2d 330, 335 (1970)).  G&A
Appraisals further argues that Riverstone Development failed
to establish the existence of probable prejudice inasmuch as
Riverstone 
Development's 
attorneys 
failed 
to 
testify 
that 
they
would have struck A.L. had they known of the judgments entered
against him.  In Ex parte Dobyne, this Court explained:
"The form of prejudice that would entitle a
party to relief for a juror's nondisclosure or
falsification in voir dire would be its effect, if
any, to cause the party to forgo challenging the
juror for cause or exercising a peremptory challenge
to strike the juror.  Ex parte Ledbetter, 404 So. 2d
731 (Ala. 1981); Warrick v. State, 460 So. 2d 320
(Ala. Crim. App. 1984); and Leach v. State, 31 Ala.
App. 390, 18 So. 2d 285 (1944).  If the party
establishes that the juror's disclosure of the truth
would have caused the party either to (successfully)
challenge the juror for cause or to exercise a
peremptory challenge to strike the juror, then the
party has made a prima facie showing of prejudice. 
Id.  Such prejudice can be established by the
obvious tendency of the true facts to bias the
juror, as in Ledbetter, supra, or by direct
testimony of trial counsel that the true facts would
have prompted a challenge against the juror, as in
State v. Freeman, 605 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992)."
805 So. 2d at 772-73 (emphasis added).  It is undisputed that
counsel for Riverstone Development did not submit sworn
28
1140555
testimony indicating that A.L. would have been challenged had
the true facts been known; thus, G&A Appraisals is correct
that probable prejudice was not established in that manner. 
However, Riverstone Development correctly notes that probable
prejudice may also be established "by the obvious tendency of
the true facts to bias the juror," id., and it accordingly
argues that it is obvious in this case that A.L. would be
biased against Riverstone Development and in favor of G&A
Appraisals because A.L. had recently stood in the same
defendant role that G&A Appraisals was in when he was sued by
a company seeking a judgment against him.  It is apparent,
however, that the trial court did not accept this argument,
and, when considering the relevant facts at the heart of both
A.L.'s dispute and the instant dispute –– and not just the
singular fact that A.L. and G&A Appraisals were both
defendants in civil actions –– we cannot say that the trial
court exceeded its discretion in concluding that there was no
probable prejudice.
The parties both state that the judgments entered against
A.L. were the result of loan guarantees he had made,
presumably on student loans, inasmuch as the plaintiff
29
1140555
bringing the claims against him was the National Collegiate
Student Loan Trust.  In the instant case, Riverstone
Development sought a judgment against G&A Appraisals based on
negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy claims.  Riverstone
Development's corporate representative at trial was McRight,
who, like A.L., had been sued in a separate case as a result
of guarantees he had made on a loan, specifically the $1.5
million loan made by First American to Southern Heritage. 
Thus, the trial court might have fairly concluded that it was
equally likely that A.L. would be prejudiced in favor of
McRight, and by extension Riverstone Development, inasmuch as
both had been defendants in lawsuits seeking to collect on
loan guarantees they had made.  
We further note that even if the trial court could infer,
in 
the 
absence 
of 
direct 
testimony 
from 
Riverstone
Development's attorneys, that those attorneys would have
viewed A.L. in a negative light had they had knowledge of the
judgments entered against him, it would still require another
inference –– that the negative effect of the judgments would
outweigh 
the 
attorneys' 
otherwise 
favorable 
impression 
of 
A.L.
–– in order for the trial court to conclude that probable
30
1140555
prejudice existed.   See Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d at 773
5
(explaining in a similar case involving a juror who failed to
disclose information that the trial court could not find the
existence of probable prejudice based upon on "[a]n inference
on an inference").  In conclusion, the trial court did not
exceed its discretion in denying Riverstone Development's
motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct
because there was a basis from which the trial court could
have concluded that Riverstone Development was not probably
prejudiced by A.L.'s failure to disclose during voir dire the
existence of the judgments entered against him.
IV.
Following the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in
favor of G&S Appraisals and a jury trial resulting in a
judgment entered in G&A Appraisals' favor, Riverstone
Development appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by
That counsel for Riverstone Development had a favorable
5
impression of A.L. before learning of the judgments entered
against him is evidenced not only by the fact that counsel did
not strike him, but also by the fact that counsel successfully
challenged G&A Appraisals' attempt to strike him, citing
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  Ironically, the
reason given by G&A Appraisals' counsel for striking A.L. was
that he did not respond to any questions or disclose any
information during voir dire "other than when he stood up to
tell us who he was."
31
1140555
entering a judgment as a matter of law on its negligence
claim, 
thereby 
removing 
that 
claim 
from 
the 
jury's
consideration, and that the trial court also erred by denying
a postjudgment motion for a new trial on the ground of juror
misconduct.  As explained above, however, the trial court's
decision to enter a judgment as a matter of law on the
negligence claim is supported by the law in light of the
evidence adduced by Riverstone Development during the
presentation of its case, and the trial court also acted
within its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial
inasmuch as there was a basis for it to conclude that
Riverstone Development was not probably prejudiced by A.L.'s
lack of disclosure during voir dire.  Accordingly, the
judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., concurs in the result.
32