Title: New Brunswick Cellular v. South Plainfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-21-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). POLLOCK, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue in this appeal is whether the Borough of South Plainfield Board of Adjustment (the Board) arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably denied the request of New Brunswick Cellular Telephone Co., d/b/a Comcast Cellular Communications (Comcast), for use and bulk variances to construct a monopole for cellular communications. The governing statute, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d, requires an applicant for a use variance to satisfy both the "positive criteria" and the "negative criteria." Generally speaking, to satisfy the positive criteria, an applicant must prove that the use promotes the general welfare because the proposed site is particularly suitable for the proposed use. To satisfy the negative criteria, an applicant must prove that the variance can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and also demonstrate, through an enhanced quality of proof, that the variance is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance. An inherently beneficial use presumptively satisfies the positive criteria, and eliminates the need to satisfy the negative criteria by an enhanced quality of proof. In Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Fair Lawn Board of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309 (1998), this Court refrained from declaring towers and monopoles to be inherently beneficial uses. Until that opinion, the Law Division and the Appellate Division had considered towers and monopoles to be inherently beneficial uses. Here, Comcast and the Board proceeded on the assumption that the monopole was such a use. Nonetheless, the Board denied the requested use variance. The Board concluded that Comcast had failed to meet its burden of proving that the monopole would not pose a substantial detriment to the public good, the zone plan, and the zoning ordinance. Also, the Board found that the site was inappropriate for a monopole. The Board concluded that the minimal benefit from the proposed monopole did not outweigh the public detriment it imposed. Both the Law Division and the Appellate Division also assumed that the monopole was an inherently beneficial use. The Law Division, however, reversed the Board's decision, concluding that the record did not establish that the monopole would be detrimental to the public good. The Appellate Division reversed the Law Division, finding that substantial evidence in the record supported the Board's conclusions that Comcast should have used an existing tower; that increased use of digital service would eliminate the need for the monopole; and that the grant of the variance would substantially impair the development of the zone. Judge D'Annunzio dissented. He concluded that the monopole was inherently useful, that its negative effect was minimal, and that the pole's usefulness outweighed its minimal negative effect. For the dissent, the proposed location of the monopole in the Borough's most permissive industrial zone was the most important fact in this case. The dissent also rejected the testimony of the objector's planner as a "net opinion." Comcast appealed as of right. We remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of Smart. On remand, the Appellate Division reaffirmed its original decision reversing the judgment of the Law Division. Again Judge D'Annunzio dissented, reasoning that the facts in the present case are similar to those in Smart. Once again, Comcast appealed as of right. HELD: Comcast has satisfied the positive and negative criteria of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70d; and the public benefit outweighs the slight impact on the industrial zone. The record establishes that Comcast is entitled both to the use variance and the bulk variance. 1. The positive criteria test whether a proposed use promotes the general welfare and is particularly suited for the site. With telecommunications towers, an FCC license generally establishes that the use promotes the general welfare. Comcast's license satisfies that requirement. Consequently, this appeal centers on the suitability of the site and the satisfaction of the negative criteria. Comcast has demonstrated that the tower is particularly suited for the site by proving a need for the facility at that location. Additionally, because the site is located between I-287 and a railroad, and is in an industrial zone that permits heavy and light manufacturing, it seems to be a particularly appropriate site. (pp. 16-18) 2. To satisfy the negative criteria, an applicant must show that the use will not substantially impair the purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance, or constitute a substantial detriment to the public good. Uncontradicted evidence at the hearing demonstrated that the monopole will not generate noise or traffic and will not impose any burden on city services. The aesthetic impact of a 90-foot monopole in an industrial zone will be minimal. The testimony by the objectors' planner that the monopole would "derail" development in the M-3 zone was not supported by any studies or data, and contradicts the Borough's Master Plan. It was tantamount to a net opinion that could not reasonably support the Board's finding that the monopole would substantially impair the zone plan and zoning ordinance. (pp. 18-20) 3. Given the escalating demand for telecommunications services, the Board erred in characterizing the public benefit from the monopole as "minimal." The benefit from those services, moreover, outweighs the slight impact on the industrial zone. It follows that the denial of the variance will not withstand judicial review. The Board's reluctance to weigh properly the evidence concerning the positive and negative criteria leads us to conclude, as in Smart, that the appropriate resolution is to reinstate the Law Division's order directing the approval of the variances. (pp. 20-21) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. JUSTICE O'HERN, dissenting, is of the view that because the Board is the best equipped agency to judge the variance application initially, the matter should be remanded to the Board. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK'S opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI did not participate in the decision. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 21 September Term 1998 NEW BRUNSWICK CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY, d/b/a COMCAST CELLULAR ONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOROUGH OF SOUTH PLAINFIELD BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendant-Respondent, and TED DABROWSKI, KAZ DABROWSKI, KARL KOLAR, SALLY KOLAR, VINCENT J. DOTOLI and LOUISA DOTOLI, Intervenors-Respondents. Argued May 3, 1999 -- Decided June 30, 1999 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinions are reported at 305 N.J. Super. 151 (1997) and 314 N.J. Super. 102 (1998). Gregory J. Czura argued the cause for appellant. James F. Clarkin, III, argued the cause for respondent (Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman, Stahl &amp; Clarkin, attorneys; Mr. Clarkin and Rosalind Westlake, on the brief). David J. Frizell argued the cause for intervenors respondents (Vincent J. Dotoli, attorney; Mr. Dotoli, on the briefs). Richard D. Stanzione submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. (Hiering, Dupignac &amp; Stanzione, attorneys; Mr. Stanzione and Eli L. Eytan, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by POLLOCK, J. The issue in this appeal is whether respondent, Borough of South Plainfield Board of Adjustment (the Board) arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably denied the request of appellant, New Brunswick Cellular Telephone Co., d/b/a Comcast Cellular Communications (Comcast), for use and bulk variances to construct a monopole for cellular communications. More specifically, the issue is whether the Board erroneously concluded that Comcast had not satisfied the "positive" and "negative" criteria entitling it to a use variance under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d). Finding that the Board had erred, the Law Division directed approval of both variances. The Appellate Division reversed. 314 N.J. Super. 102, 104 (1998). Because of a dissent in the Appellate Division, Comcast appealed as of right. We reverse and reinstate the judgment of the Law Division. No variance or other relief may be granted under the terms of this section unless such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. On June 30, 1997 the legislature amended the second paragraph of subsection d to read: No variance or other relief may be granted under the terms of this section, including a variance or other relief involving an inherently beneficial use, without a showing that such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance. The first paragraph in subsection d refers to the "positive criteria" and the second paragraph "the negative criteria" necessary for the grant of a use variance. Generally speaking, "to satisfy the positive criteria, an applicant must prove that 'the use promotes the general welfare because the proposed site is particularly suitable for the proposed use.'" Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Fair Lawn Board of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 323 (1998) (quoting Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 4 (1987)); see also William M. Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration 7-5.2 (1999). Further, "[t]o satisfy the negative criteria, in addition to proving that the variance can be granted 'without substantial detriment to the public good,' an applicant must demonstrate through an 'enhanced quality of proof . . . that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance.'" Smart, supra, 152 N.J. at 323 (quoting Medici, supra, 107 N.J. at 21-22); see also Cox, supra, at 8-2. An inherently beneficial use presumptively satisfies the positive criteria, and eliminates the need to satisfy the negative criteria by an enhanced quality of proof. Smart, supra, 152 N.J. at 323. Grant of a use variance for an inherently beneficial use "depends on balancing the positive and negative criteria." Id. at 324. In Smart, we refrained from declaring towers and monopoles to be inherently beneficial uses. Id. at 329. Instead, we recognized that they serve the general welfare "and thereby satisf[y] the positive criteria if the use is particularly suited for the proposed site." Id. at 332. That qualified recognition left telecommunications carriers with the obligation to satisfy the negative criteria. The carriers also must prove that, when balancing the proof on the positive and negative criteria, the grant of the variance would not cause substantial detriment to the public good. Ibid. Until the issuance of our opinion in Smart, the Law Division and the Appellate Division had considered towers and monopoles to be inherently beneficial uses. Id. at 328 (listing cases). Here, Comcast proceeded before the Board on the assumption that its monopole was such a use. Although the Board also assumed that the monopole was an inherently beneficial use, it denied the requested use variance. The Board concluded that Comcast had failed to meet its burden of proving that the monopole would not pose a substantial detriment to the public good, the zone plan, and the zoning ordinance. Additionally, the Board found that the site was inappropriate for a monopole and that the monopole did not provide a public benefit. The Board concluded that the minimal benefit from the proposed monopole did not outweigh the public detriment it imposed.See footnote 1 Both the Law Division and the Appellate Division also assumed that the monopole was an inherently beneficial use. The Law Division, however, reversed the Board's decision, concluding that the record did not establish that the monopole would be detrimental to the public good. Finding that substantial evidence in the record supported the Board's conclusions, the Appellate Division reversed the judgment of the Law Division. 305 N.J. Super. 151, 170-71 (1997). The court accepted the Board's conclusions that Comcast should have used an existing tower, that increased use of digital service would eliminate the need for the monopole, and that the grant of the variance would substantially impair the development of the zone. Ibid. Judge D'Annunzio dissented. Id. at 171. He concluded that the monopole was inherently useful, that its negative effect was minimal, and that the pole's usefulness outweighed its minimal negative effect. Id. at 174-75. For the dissent, the "proposed location of the monopole in the Borough's most permissive industrial zone [was] the most important fact in this case." Id. at 175. Also, the dissent rejected the testimony of the objector's planner as a "net opinion." Ibid. Comcast appealed as of right. We remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of Smart. On remand, the Appellate Division reaffirmed its original decision reversing the judgment of the Law Division. 314 N.J. Super., supra at 104. Again, Judge D'Annunzio dissented. Ibid. The dissent reasoned that the facts in the present case are similar to those in Smart and that the grant of a variance similarly would not impose a substantial adverse impact on the zone plan. Id. at 104-05. Finally, the dissent concluded that the monopole's contribution to the general welfare outweighed its minimal adverse effect. Ibid. Once again, Comcast appealed as of right. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 21 September Term 1998 NEW BRUNSWICK CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY, d/b/a COMCAST CELLULAR ONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOROUGH OF SOUTH PLAINFIELD BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendant-Respondent, and TED DABROWSKI, KAZ DABROWSKI, KARL KOLAR, SALLY KOLAR, VINCENT J. DOTOLI and LOUISA DOTOLI, Intervenors-Respondents. O'HERN J., dissenting. The telecommunications industry is among the fastest growing industries today. "Industry analysts predict that between 122,000 and 250,000 new cell sites will be needed to meet the growing demand of cellular phone subscribers in the United States alone." Ben Campanelli, Planning for Cellular Towers (visited May 18, 1999) . This need for "expansion of cellular communications systems, in both capacity and geographical coverage, has resulted in the inevitable conflict with local land-use planning and zoning laws. In many instances, the development of this new technology has outpaced the ability of communities to enact zoning ordinances which accommodate cellular telephone services." Nancy M. Palermo, Progress Before Pleasure: Balancing the Competing Interests of Telecommunications Companies and Landowners in Cell Site Construction, 16 Temp. Envtl. L. &amp; Tech. J. 245, 246 (1998) (footnotes omitted). This conflict is heightened by the concerns of local citizens that the construction of cellular towers "will have [an] adverse impact[] on aesthetics, property values, or health and safety." Gregory Tan, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Uncertainty of Local Zoning Authority over Wireless Telecommunications Tower, 22 Vt. L. Rev. 461, 462 (1997). When Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, deregulating the industry with certain substantive and procedural limitations,See footnote 3 it explicitly retained the authority of local government to adopt zoning regulations for the industry. Ibid. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has been described as "expansive legislation designed primarily to increase competition in the telecommunications industry." It was passed "in order to provide a 'pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services . . . .'" [Carol R. Goforth, "Not in My Backyard!" Restrictive Covenants as a Basis for Opposing the Construction of Cellular Towers, 46 Buff. L. Rev. 705, 726-27 (1998) (footnotes omitted).] Notwithstanding the deregulation of the industry, wireless service facilities sought to present themselves as public utilities, entitled to a favored status as a public utility or as an inherently beneficial use, see Sica v. Board of Adjustment Tp. of Wall, 127 N.J. 152 (1992). In Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Board of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309 (1997), we made it clear that wireless services facilities are neither regulated public utilities nor inherently beneficial uses. The fact that "America's fast-paced and convenience-driven society demands immediate gratification" does not warrant a finding that wireless service facilities are inherently beneficial. Timothy L. Gustin, The Perpetual Growth and Controversy of the Cellular Superhighway: Cellular Tower Siting and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1001, 1002 (1997). If a dairy processing facility is not an inherently beneficial use, Kohl v. Mayor and Council of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 279 (1967), instant personal communication is not. Rather, in Smart, supra, we held that any use variance for cellular tower sites must be "particularly suited for the proposed site". 152 N.J. at 332 (citing Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 4 (1987)). This case is much like a dog chasing its tail; it can never catch up because it started out on the wrong premise. The zoning board and the Law Division proceeded on the assumption that wireless services facilities are inherently beneficial uses. Ante at ____ (slip. op. at 5). The zoning board denied the variance finding that the "minimal benefit from the monopole did not outweigh the public detriment . . . ." Ante at ____ (slip. op. at 6). The Law Division reversed the zoning board on the basis that the proposed cell tower was an inherently beneficial use. The Court now reinstates the judgment of the Law Division that was based on a flawed premise. (In fairness to the excellent judge of the Law Division, it is necessary to note that the Law Division was bound by existing Appellate Division decisions that cellular towers were inherently beneficial uses.) It makes good sense and is only fair that we permit the body "best equipped to pass initially on such applications." Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 23 (1954). This application should be properly presented to the zoning board of adjustment. A special-reasons variance that is not inherently beneficial must be rooted in the land itself, not the use. In order that the variance be granted, there must be evidence that the site is particularly appropriate for a ninety-foot tower. A mobile communications facility, which requires construction of a tower or monopole, is not suitable for every site. Although such facilities may promote the general welfare, towers and monopoles can pose special land use problems. A structure that exceeds permitted bulk requirements, particularly those pertaining to height, may be more appropriate in one zone than in another. It is not that towers or monopoles universally are aesthetically displeasing. . . . The point is that some sites are better suited than others for towers or monopoles. NO. A-21 NEW BRUNSWICK CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY, d/b/a COMCAST CELLULAR ONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOROUGH OF SOUTH PLAINFIELD BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendant-Respondent, and TED DABROWSKI, KAZ DABROWSKI, KARL KOLAR, SALLY KOLAR, VINCENT J. DOTOLI and LOUISA DOTOLI, Intervenors-Respondents. DECIDED A. All uses permitted in the M-1 Zone. B. The manufacture, fusing and production of quartz and of silica and quartz products; the manufacture of electrical instruments and electrical components; the manufacture and production of all types of precious and base metals and alloys in ingot form, refining, melting, casting and working of precious and base metals and alloys; manufacture and production of precious base and alloy metal products, including processing, milling, machine fabrication and assembling; manufacture and production of non-hydrocarbon chemical and catalyst products, plating compounds and solutions, diamonds and other precious stone products, brazing fluxes, light metal parts, liquid gold and other precious and base metal organic based paints, casting compounds and cements, gas measuring equipment and gas generating and storage equipment. C. Warehouse and distribution center, including sales at retail of a "clearance" nature, provided however that such sales activities occur not more frequently than one every quarter for a period, in each case, of not more than seven (7) consecutive days duration. D. Lumber Yards. The zoning ordinance provides that the M-1 zone permits: A. Office buildings for executive, administrative, business, educational or professional purposes. B. Scientific or research laboratories devoted to research, design and/or experimentation; process and fabricating incidental thereto may be permitted. C. Uses of a light manufacturing nature as follows: (1) Manufacturing of light machinery comprising any of the following carburetors, and small machine parts; cash registers; sewing machines; and typewriters, calculators and other office machines. (2) Fabrication of metal products comprising any of the following: baby carriages, bicycles and other non-motorized vehicles; metal furniture; musical instruments; sheet metal products; and toys. (3) Fabrication of paper products comprising any of the following: bags, bookbinding; boxes and packaging materials; office supplies; and toys. (4) Fabrication of wood products comprising any of the following: boats; boxes, cabinets and wood workings; furniture and toys. (5) Food and associated industries comprising any of the following: bakeries; bottling of food and beverages; food and cereal mixing and milling; food processing; food sundry manufacturing; and ice cream manufacturing. (6) Other permissible industry comprising any of the following: concrete and plastic products; electronic products; glass and glass products manufacturing; jewelry manufacturing, including polishing; leather goods manufacturing, except, curing, tanning and finishing of hides; motion picture exchange; pharmaceutical products manufacturing. The substantive limitations on local authority decree that zoning regulations "shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers" and "shall not prohibit . . . the provision of personal wireless services. 332(c)(7)(B)(I)(I) &amp; (II). The statute also outlaws governmental consideration of the environmental effect of radio frequency emissions," so long as the emissions comply with FCC regulations. 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). Procedurally, the Act requires local governments to act expeditiously on requests for zoning variances, 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), and requires zoning denials to be in writing and based on substantial evidence, 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Finally, subsection (c)(7)(B)(v) provides jurisdiction to federal courts over controversies arising under 332. [Primeco Personal Communic., L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1058-59 (N.D. Ill. 1998), recons. denied, 35 F. Supp. 2d 643 (N.D. Ill. 1999).]