Title: Wallace W. v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12669
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 2019

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SJC-12669 
 
WALLACE W., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 4, 2019. - August 9, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent child, 
Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Delinquent child, Juvenile 
Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Practice, 
Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding.  Statute, 
Construction.  Words, "First offense." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 26, 2018. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
Peter A. Hahn (Lauren E. Russell, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, also present) for the juvenile. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney 
(Heidi Sylvanowicz, Assistant District Attorney, also present) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
K. Hayne Barnwell, for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The recent amendment to G. L. c. 119, § 52, 
excludes from the definition of "[d]elinquent child," and thus 
2 
 
 
from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, children who commit 
"a first offense of a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a 
fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more 
than [six] months or both such fine and imprisonment."  The 
meaning of the term "first offense" under the statute is the 
central issue of this case. 
 
A delinquency complaint issued against the juvenile that 
charged him with a misdemeanor that carried a maximum penalty of 
imprisonment of less than six months.  He moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that because he had not previously been 
adjudicated delinquent for any offense, the charge was a "first 
offense" under § 52 and must be dismissed.  A Juvenile Court 
judge denied the motion, concluding that because the juvenile 
had previously been charged with a separate offense for which 
probable cause had been found, the new charge was not the 
juvenile's "first offense" under the amended statute.  The 
juvenile filed a petition for relief in the county court, and 
the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full 
court. 
 
For the reasons set forth infra, we conclude that the 
amendment to § 52 was plainly designed to give juveniles a 
"second chance" with regard to a "first offense of a 
misdemeanor" that carries a maximum punishment of six months' 
imprisonment or a fine (six months or less misdemeanor).  In 
3 
 
 
other words, the Legislature intended to excuse a juvenile's 
first isolated instance of such misconduct.  This means that the 
Juvenile Court may not exercise jurisdiction where the 
juvenile's first offense is one such misdemeanor.  Once a 
juvenile has committed his or her "first offense," however, the 
Juvenile Court may exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses 
not otherwise excluded under § 52, including subsequent six 
months or less misdemeanors.  We further conclude that, 
consistent with the purpose of the statute and the rule of 
lenity, the term "first offense" under § 52 means a first 
adjudication of delinquency. 
 
We recognize, however, that, as a practical matter, this 
interpretation presents certain challenges.  Because the statute 
excludes a "first offense" of a six months or less misdemeanor 
from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, it is difficult to 
establish that a first offense has ever occurred.  Indeed, where 
a juvenile's commission of a six months or less misdemeanor 
constitutes his or her "first offense," it would be dismissed 
under § 52 before ever reaching the adjudicatory stage of the 
proceeding.  Because there would be no record of an adjudication 
of delinquency, every subsequent commission of a six months or 
less misdemeanor would seemingly have to be dismissed as a 
"first offense" under § 52.  As we conclude that the Legislature 
did not intend to create this type of "Catch-22" situation, but 
4 
 
 
rather intended to excuse only a first offense while providing 
the Juvenile Court with jurisdiction over repeat juvenile 
offenders, we define here the means by which a first offense, 
even one that did not result in a prior delinquency 
adjudication, may be proved and recorded such that the Juvenile 
Court may exercise jurisdiction over subsequent offenses. 
 
Accordingly, the case is remanded to the county court for 
entry of a judgment vacating the order denying the juvenile's 
motion to dismiss the delinquency complaint and remanding the 
matter to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.1,2 
 
Background.  For the purposes of this appeal, the parties 
agreed to the following facts.  In late August 2018, the 
juvenile was arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a 
license in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 10.  Following the 
juvenile's arrest, the arresting officer filed an application 
for a delinquency complaint.  The court activity record 
information (CARI) database revealed that the juvenile had a 
court history that included several dismissed drug charges, 
                                                 
 
1 We recognize the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2 Because we remand this case, the juvenile's argument on 
appeal that we must expunge the entry of the charge of 
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle from his juvenile record 
is premature. 
5 
 
 
a dismissed charge of operating a motor vehicle without 
authority, and an open case for breaking and entering in the 
nighttime with the intent to commit a felony.  Probable cause 
had been found on one or more of these previous charges.  A 
delinquency complaint on the new charge subsequently issued, and 
the juvenile was scheduled for arraignment. 
 
Prior to arraignment, the juvenile moved to dismiss the 
complaint under G. L. c. 119, § 52, arguing that because he did 
not have any prior delinquency adjudications, and because the 
maximum punishment for unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle 
is a fine, see G. L. c. 90, § 20, the charge was a "first 
offense of a misdemeanor" under § 52.  Accordingly, he argued, 
the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter.  
The motion judge disagreed, concluding that the new charge was 
not the juvenile's "first offense" under the statute because a 
clerk-magistrate had made a prior finding of probable cause on 
at least one of the juvenile's prior offenses.  The judge denied 
the motion to dismiss the complaint and proceeded with the 
arraignment. 
 
The juvenile thereafter filed a petition for relief in the 
county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3; the single justice 
reserved and reported the case to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Statutory background.  The Juvenile Court 
"is a court of limited jurisdiction, which has no . . . 
6 
 
 
authority in the absence of a specific statutory authorization" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 
473 Mass. 164, 167 (2015).  The Juvenile Court's statutory 
authorization to govern delinquency proceedings is found in 
G. L. c. 119, §§ 52 et seq.  See G. L. c. 218, § 60.  The court 
may only exercise jurisdiction, however, over delinquency 
complaints charging juveniles with offenses identified under 
§ 52's definition of the term "[d]elinquent child."  G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 52-58.  See Commonwealth v. Santos, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 
639, 642–643 (1999) ("a child can be adjudicated a delinquent 
only after proceedings upon a complaint alleging the child to be 
a delinquent child within the meaning of § 52"). 
 
The scope of the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over 
delinquency proceedings underwent a substantial change in July 
2018, after the Legislature enacted St. 2018, c. 69, entitled 
"An Act relative to criminal justice reform" (criminal justice 
reform act or act).  For over one-half century prior to the 
enactment of the criminal justice reform act, the term 
"[d]elinquent child" was broadly defined as "a child between 
seven and seventeen who violates any city ordinance or town by-
law or who commits any offence against a law of the 
commonwealth."  G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended through St. 1960, 
c. 353, § 1.  The criminal justice reform act considerably 
narrowed this definition by excluding children below the age of 
7 
 
 
twelve and children who commit any civil infractions, or violate 
any municipal ordinances or town bylaws.  Most relevant to this 
appeal, the amendment also excluded children who commit "a first 
offense of a misdemeanor" meeting the statutory definition.  
St. 2018, c. 69, § 72.  The act did not define the term "first 
offense" or explain how such a first offense may be proved. 
2.  Meaning of "first offense of a misdemeanor" language.  
The parties offer competing interpretations of what this "first 
offense of a misdemeanor" language means.  As an initial matter, 
the parties dispute whether the exclusion of "a first offense of 
a misdemeanor" applies only, as the Commonwealth contends, to 
the commission of a single six months or less misdemeanor, or, 
as the juvenile argues, to the juvenile's first offense of every 
six months or less misdemeanor.  More specifically, the 
Commonwealth argues that the exclusion under § 52 is a one-time 
exclusion from jurisdiction over the first time a juvenile 
commits a six months or less misdemeanor.  The juvenile, on the 
other hand, argues that the exclusion applies to the first time 
a juvenile commits each individual six months or less 
misdemeanor.  Under the juvenile's interpretation, a juvenile 
could conceivably commit every individual six months or less 
misdemeanor once without the Juvenile Court ever having 
jurisdiction.  We conclude the Commonwealth's interpretation of 
this aspect of the statute to be correct. 
8 
 
 
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  
Millis Pub. Sch. v. M.P., 478 Mass. 767, 775 (2018).  When 
interpreting a statute, our primary duty is to "effectuate the 
intent of the Legislature in enacting it."  Matter of E.C., 479 
Mass. 113, 118 (2018), quoting Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 
737 (2014).  To that end, we begin with the statutory language.  
See International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 
(1983) ("the primary source of insight into the intent of the 
Legislature is the language of the statute").  We also consider 
the "cause of [the statute's] enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76–77 (2011), 
quoting DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490 
(2009).  In so doing, however, we are careful to "avoid any 
construction of statutory language which leads to an absurd 
result, or that otherwise would frustrate the Legislature's 
intent" (quotation and citation omitted).  Bellalta v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 378 (2019).  Indeed, 
"our respect for the Legislature's considered judgment dictates 
that we interpret the statute to be sensible, rejecting 
unreasonable interpretations unless the clear meaning of the 
language requires such an interpretation."  DiFiore, supra at 
490–491.  Finally, we consider the legislative history where it 
9 
 
 
is informative.  Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 797 
(2018) ("A statute's meaning must be reasonable and supported by 
the . . . history of the statute" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
 
All these tools of statutory construction support the 
Commonwealth's argument that "a first offense of a misdemeanor" 
applies only to the commission of a single six months or less 
misdemeanor.  The plain language of § 52 refers to "a first 
offense of a misdemeanor" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 119, § 52.  
It does not, as the juvenile's interpretation would suggest, 
refer to a "first offense" of "every" different type of six 
months or less misdemeanor.  See Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 
Mass. 286, 294 (2002) ("We will not add words to a statute that 
the Legislature did not put there, either by inadvertent 
omission or by design"). 
 
Moreover, when considered in the context of the entire 
definition, the meaning of this aspect of the statutory language 
is clear.  See Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810 
(2013) ("we look to the language of the entire statute, not just 
a single sentence, and attempt to interpret all of its terms 
harmoniously to effectuate the intent of the Legislature" 
[quotation and citation omitted]).  In the same definition, the 
Legislature eliminated all civil infractions and violations of 
municipal ordinances or town bylaws as predicates for 
10 
 
 
delinquency adjudications.  These categorical exclusions stand 
out in stark contrast from the single exclusion applicable to 
misdemeanors, which applies only to "a first offense of a 
misdemeanor" for which the punishment is a fine or imprisonment 
for six months or less (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 119, § 52.  
If the Legislature intended, as the juvenile argues, to 
categorically exclude the first offense of every misdemeanor 
meeting the statutory definition, it would have done so 
explicitly.  See Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 
324 (1988) (noting that Legislature intended different meanings 
where it used different language in different portions of same 
statute). 
 
The Commonwealth's interpretation is also supported by the 
purpose of the statute.  As the Legislature has directed, 
statutes governing delinquency proceedings, including § 52, are 
to be "liberally construed so . . . the children brought before 
the court . . . shall be treated . . . as children in need of 
aid, encouragement and guidance."  G. L. c. 119, § 53.  Thus, we 
have repeatedly recognized that the juvenile justice system "is 
primarily rehabilitative, cognizant of the inherent differences 
between juvenile and adult offenders, and geared toward the 
correction and redemption to society of delinquent children" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 
466 Mass. 562, 576 (2013).  See Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 
11 
 
 
Mass. 459, 466 (2012) ("goal of the juvenile system of justice 
to act in the best interests of children by encouraging and 
helping them to become law-abiding and productive members of 
society, and not to label and treat them as criminals" 
[quotation and citation omitted]).  The rehabilitative purposes 
of the act recognize the difference between an isolated act of 
misbehavior, for which a second chance can and should be 
granted, and a pattern of such misbehavior, which cannot be 
ignored.  Allowing a juvenile to commit a first offense of every 
individual six months or less misdemeanor would contravene these 
purposes.  See Bellalta, 481 Mass. at 378 (courts "avoid any 
construction of statutory language which . . . would frustrate 
the Legislature's intent" [quotation and citation omitted]).  
Indeed, the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile justice 
system would be ill served by an interpretation of § 52 that 
would allow juveniles to repeatedly commit delinquent acts 
without any mechanism by which their delinquent behavior could 
be "correct[ed] and rede[emed]," including through the placement 
of the juvenile into a pretrial diversion program or some other 
alternative disposition suited to the juvenile's rehabilitative 
needs (citation omitted).  Humberto H., supra.  See G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 53, 54.  See also Commonwealth v. Orbin O., 478 Mass. 
759, 765 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 
747, 758 n.6 (2018) (describing district attorneys' efforts to 
12 
 
 
provide rehabilitative pretrial diversion programs to juvenile 
defendants). 
 
This interpretation is also supported by the legislative 
history of the criminal justice reform act, which refers to 
giving juveniles who make the mistake of committing criminal 
offenses early in life a "second chance."  See State House News 
Service (House Sess.), Apr. 4, 2018 (statement of Rep. Kay Khan) 
(statutory amendment "will give young people a second chance").  
See also Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 325, 333-334 (2019) 
(describing legislative history of criminal justice reform act).  
The legislative history does not contemplate an unlimited number 
of such chances before the exercise of Juvenile Court 
jurisdiction and intervention.  As the Legislature undoubtedly 
understood, juveniles engaging in repeated delinquent behavior 
should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, as 
their rehabilitation and reform are critical to ensuring that 
they "become law-abiding and productive members of society."  
Magnus M., 461 Mass. at 466.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
§ 52's exclusion of "a first offense of a misdemeanor" applies 
only to a juvenile's first offense of a single six months or 
less misdemeanor meeting the statutory definition, not his or 
her first offense of every six months or less misdemeanor. 
 
For the same reason, we reject the juvenile's contention 
that the Juvenile Court may not exercise jurisdiction over a 
13 
 
 
first offense of a six months or less misdemeanor that follows a 
delinquency adjudication of a felony or a more serious 
misdemeanor.  The exclusion from jurisdiction under § 52 applies 
only to six months or less misdemeanors that constitute the 
juvenile's "first offense."  It does not, as the juvenile 
contends, apply to the first time a juvenile commits a six 
months or less misdemeanor without regard to the juvenile's 
prior record.  The Legislature intended to excuse an isolated 
instance of more minor misdemeanor-level misconduct, not 
multiple misdemeanors, or a minor misdemeanor that follows more 
serious misconduct.  It would make little sense, and indeed 
contravene the Legislature's intent, for a juvenile who had 
previously been adjudicated delinquent on one or more felonies, 
or one or more serious misdemeanors, to have a six months or 
less misdemeanor dismissed as a "first offense."  Meyer v. 
Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 212 (2019), quoting Ciani 
v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019) ("we will not adopt a 
literal construction of a statute if the consequences of doing 
so are absurd or unreasonable, such that it could not be what 
the Legislature intended"). 
 
The more difficult question concerns what burden of proof 
or type of procedure is necessary to establish a "first offense" 
under § 52.  The juvenile contends that a "first offense" of a 
six months or less misdemeanor has not occurred unless there is 
14 
 
 
a prior adjudication of delinquency for the same misdemeanor 
offense.  The Commonwealth argues that a first offense has 
occurred if there is a probable cause finding in any of the 
juvenile's prior criminal matters. 
 
This aspect of the meaning of "first offense" under § 52 is 
not self-explanatory.  Where, as here, the statutory language is 
not defined, we ordinarily give the words their usual and 
accepted meanings, which we derive "from sources presumably 
known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other 
legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  See Scione v. 
Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 225, 235 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 415 Mass. 697, 700 (1993).  The word "offense," 
however, has different meanings in different contexts.  For 
example, sentencing statutes tend to treat the word "offense" as 
synonymous with "conviction" or "adjudication."  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 266, § 30A (shoplifters punished "for a first offense 
by a fine not to exceed [$250], for a second offense by a fine 
of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than [$500] and 
for a third or subsequent offense by a fine of not more than 
[$500] or imprisonment . . . or by both such fine and 
imprisonment"); G. L. c. 270, § 6A ("A person who sells tobacco 
rolling papers to a person under the age of [twenty-one] shall 
be punished by a fine of [twenty-five dollars] for the first 
15 
 
 
offense, fifty dollars for the second offense and [one hundred 
dollars] for a third or subsequent offense"). 
 
Other statutes, however, distinguish offenses from 
adjudications or convictions.  Some expressly provide that one 
must be convicted of an offense to be punished, thereby implying 
that a criminal act may constitute an offense regardless of 
whether it results in a conviction or adjudication.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 6, § 178C (defining "[s]ex offender" as person "who has 
been convicted of a sex offense or who has been adjudicated as a 
youthful offender or as a delinquent juvenile by reason of a sex 
offense").  In the criminal justice reform act itself, there is 
still another definition of "offense," albeit in the context of 
expungement, where an offense is defined as a "violation of a 
criminal law for which a person has been charged and has made a 
criminal court appearance or a juvenile court appearance for 
which there is a disposition and a record."  St. 2018, c. 69, 
§ 195.  Finally, dictionary definitions of the word do not 
clearly elucidate its meaning under § 52.  See, e.g., Black's 
Law Dictionary 1250 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "offense" as "[a] 
violation of the law; a crime, often a minor one"); Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 1566 (1993) (defining 
"offense" as "an infraction of law"). 
 
Where the meaning of a statute "is not plain from its 
language," we look "to the intent of the Legislature ascertained 
16 
 
 
from all its words . . . considered in connection with the cause 
of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied 
and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the 
purpose of its framers may be effectuated" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 490.  The Commonwealth 
reads § 52 to mean that a "first offense" has occurred if the 
juvenile has a probable cause finding for a prior offense.  In 
other words, the commission of a six months or less misdemeanor 
will only constitute a juvenile's first offense under the 
statute if no prior findings of probable cause have been made 
against the juvenile in any of his or her prior delinquency 
matters.  By contrast, the juvenile argues that a "first 
offense" of a six months or less misdemeanor under § 52 has not 
occurred unless there is a prior adjudication of delinquency.  
Under this interpretation, without a prior adjudication of 
delinquency, a juvenile's commission of a six months or less 
misdemeanor must be dismissed as a "first offense" under § 52. 
Neither interpretation, however, is without its faults.  
The Commonwealth's interpretation is not supported by either the 
words of the statute or its legislative history.  Indeed, no 
reference to probable cause is found anywhere in § 52, and the 
Commonwealth has not directed us to any legislative history, and 
we have located none, that would suggest this to be the 
Legislature's intent.  Interpreting § 52 as the Commonwealth 
17 
 
 
would have us do would therefore require us to effectively 
rewrite the statute to include some form of a probable cause 
requirement.  This we decline to do.  Retirement Bd. of 
Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 672 (2014) ("We will not 
add words to a statute that the Legislature did not put there, 
either by inadvertent omission or by design").  See Commonwealth 
v. Biagiotti, 451 Mass. 599, 602–603 (2008) ("It is not our 
function to rewrite a statute"). 
The juvenile's interpretation, on the other hand, suggests 
that the Legislature drafted a classic "Catch-22."  As explained 
supra, § 52 creates an exclusion from the jurisdiction of the 
Juvenile Court.  As there is intended to be no jurisdiction over 
a "first offense" of a six months or less misdemeanor for a 
juvenile who has not previously been adjudicated delinquent for 
any offense, it follows that there cannot be a final 
adjudication of delinquency for the first charged six months or 
less misdemeanor in any conventional sense, as the charge would 
be dismissed under § 52 before ever reaching the adjudicatory 
stage of the proceeding.  Consequently, if, as the juvenile 
argues, a "first offense" under § 52 cannot occur unless there 
is a prior adjudication of delinquency, and there can never be a 
final adjudication over the first offense because there is no 
jurisdiction, the statute would, in effect, create a "Catch-22" 
and effectively eliminate these misdemeanors as predicates for 
18 
 
 
delinquency adjudications altogether.  As explained supra, this 
is inconsistent with both the statutory language and the 
legislative intent to allow the Juvenile Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over repeat offenders. 
 
What we are left with, then, is a statute the ambiguity of 
which creates "a vexing choice."  Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 
Mass. 497, 506 (2017).  Where, as here, a statute can "plausibly 
be found to be ambiguous," however, the rule of lenity requires 
that the juvenile be given "the benefit of the ambiguity" 
(citation omitted).  Hanson H., 464 Mass. at 813.  Accordingly, 
we read the term "first offense" to mean a first adjudication of 
delinquency, although, as we explain infra, not one that 
necessarily creates the "Catch-22" the juvenile seeks to 
enforce.  This reading gives the juvenile the benefit of the 
ambiguity, as it requires a higher showing from the Commonwealth 
before the Juvenile Court may exercise jurisdiction over a 
juvenile who has committed a six months or less misdemeanor.3 
                                                 
 
3 This reading also satisfies another well-established 
principle:  that, in addition to the rule of lenity, this court 
does not interpret an ambiguous statute against a juvenile 
because doing so "would conflict with the statutory command of 
G. L. c. 119, § 53," which provides that statutes governing 
delinquency proceedings, including § 52, are "liberally 
construed" so the children brought before the court "shall be 
treated . . . as children in need of aid, encouragement and 
guidance" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 
Mass. 497, 506, 509 (2017). 
19 
 
 
 
Although we cannot read "first offense" in this ambiguous 
provision to mean anything other than a first adjudication of 
delinquency, we must still resolve the apparent "Catch-22" 
problem, identified supra, that would seemingly eliminate all 
six months or less misdemeanors as predicates for delinquency 
adjudications.  As this result was clearly not what the 
Legislature intended in amending § 52, we consider next how to 
carry out the Legislature's apparent intention of allowing a 
mechanism by which a juvenile who demonstrates recurrent 
delinquent behavior can have his or her "first offense" of a six 
months or less misdemeanor established, even if it did not 
result in a prior adjudication of delinquency.  To that end, we 
examine the various circumstances in which the Juvenile Court 
may or may not exercise jurisdiction over an application for a 
delinquency complaint charging a juvenile with a six months or 
less misdemeanor under § 52. 
 
For juveniles who have no prior record and a single new 
charge, the question of the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction is 
clear.  In those cases, a delinquency complaint application 
charging the juvenile with a single six months or less 
misdemeanor must be dismissed as a "first offense" under § 52.  
This is exactly the second chance for a first offense the 
Legislature envisioned. 
20 
 
 
 
Similarly, the question of jurisdiction over a juvenile who 
has previously been adjudicated delinquent for any offense is 
rather straightforward.  Such adjudications could have occurred, 
for example, for a felony, for misdemeanors with a maximum 
punishment of more than six months, or for a six months or less 
misdemeanor that occurred prior to the amendment to § 52.  There 
could also be a prior delinquency adjudication of a six months 
or less misdemeanor out of State.  In those cases, the Juvenile 
Court may properly exercise jurisdiction pursuant to § 52 over a 
delinquency complaint application charging the juvenile with a 
six months or less misdemeanor, because such a charge would not 
be the juvenile's "first offense" under the statute, and the 
exclusion would not apply. 
 
More difficult to analyze, however, are cases involving 
juveniles who have not previously been adjudicated delinquent 
for any offense, but who may nonetheless have engaged in 
multiple offenses.  The obvious examples are (1) a juvenile who 
has previously had a delinquency complaint application charging 
the juvenile with a six months or less misdemeanor dismissed as 
a "first offense" under § 52;4 (2) a juvenile accused of 
committing two or more six months or less misdemeanors, or a six 
                                                 
 
4 Dismissal on the ground that a charge is a "first offense" 
under § 52 is different from dismissal of a charge on the 
merits.  A prior dismissal on the merits cannot provide the 
basis for a prior adjudication of delinquency. 
21 
 
 
months or less misdemeanor and a greater offense or offenses; 
(3) a juvenile who has previously had a charge of a six months 
or less misdemeanor or a greater offense continued without a 
finding; and (4) a juvenile with an open case for another six 
months or less misdemeanor or a greater offense. 
 
In these circumstances, a delinquency complaint application 
charging the juvenile with a six months or less misdemeanor may 
issue upon a finding of probable cause on the charge, provided 
that the Commonwealth notifies the clerk-magistrate prior to the 
issuance of the complaint that it intends to prove multiple 
offenses during any subsequent proceedings.5  If a delinquency 
complaint issues on the subsequent six months or less 
misdemeanor, the juvenile may move to dismiss the complaint 
prior to arraignment on the ground that the charged conduct is a 
first offense under § 52.  See Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 576.  A 
prearraignment evidentiary hearing shall then be ordered, at 
which time the Commonwealth must prove that the charge upon 
which the complaint has issued is not the juvenile's first 
offense under § 52.  The Commonwealth must do this by proving, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile has committed a 
                                                 
 
5 We note that this may often require the clerk-magistrate, 
upon receipt of the complaint application in these 
circumstances, to notify the Commonwealth that an issue of first 
offense under § 52 is presented unless the Commonwealth intends 
to prove multiple offenses. 
22 
 
 
prior offense.  Upon the motion judge's finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the juvenile has committed a prior 
offense, the Commonwealth may proceed to arraignment on the 
charge upon which the delinquency complaint is based, as such a 
charge would not be the juvenile's first offense under § 52 and 
the Juvenile Court would therefore have jurisdiction to proceed.  
If, however, the motion judge concludes that the prior offense 
has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the complaint 
shall be dismissed as a "first offense" under § 52.6 
 
This procedure avoids the "Catch-22" problem that there can 
never be a second or subsequent offense because every offense is 
dismissed as a first offense.  It also targets repeat juvenile 
offenders who engage in a pattern of misconduct, not a single 
isolated instance, in accordance with the Legislature's intent.  
It also protects the juvenile by ensuring that no complaint 
charging a juvenile with a six months or less misdemeanor will 
proceed to arraignment, and the negative consequences 
accompanying an arraignment will not attach, unless and until 
                                                 
 
6 Should the juvenile subsequently be charged with another 
six months or less misdemeanor, the earlier dismissal as a 
"first offense" pursuant to § 52 does not itself establish that 
a "first offense" has occurred.  The occurrence of a first 
offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
23 
 
 
the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it is not the juvenile's 
"first offense" under § 52.7 
 
In the instant case, the juvenile has not been previously 
adjudicated delinquent for any offense.  Although probable cause 
had apparently been found in several prior cases, a number of 
those cases have been dismissed.  Where the cases have been 
dismissed on the merits without an adjudication of delinquency, 
such cases cannot form the basis of a first offense.  The record 
before us appears to indicate, however, that there is at least 
                                                 
 
7 As we explained in Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 
747, 755 (2018), we are also "[m]indful of the importance of 
protecting a child from the stigma of being perceived to be a 
criminal and from the collateral consequences of a delinquency 
charge" (quotation, alteration, and citation omitted).  
Accordingly, we held that "the authority to rule on a motion to 
dismiss before arraignment to spare a child from a CARI record 
where the complaint was without probable cause was within the 
discretion of a Juvenile Court judge to 'protect the best 
interests of children consistent with the interest of justice.'"  
See id., quoting Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 576 
(2013).  We conclude that the Legislature has made a similar 
determination in regard to a first offense of a six months or 
less misdemeanor.  When such a charge is dismissed as a "first 
offense" under § 52, record-keeping regarding the juvenile shall 
therefore be limited to MassCourts, the court's internal record-
keeping database.  The creation of this internal record in 
MassCourts is important for determining whether jurisdiction can 
be properly exercised over subsequent offenses, but it shall be 
maintained for this purpose alone.  This record would not be a 
CARI record.  Nor would this record in MassCourts be publicly 
accessible.  See G. L. c. 119, § 60A ("records of the court in 
cases of delinquency arising under [§§ 52 to 59], inclusive, 
shall be withheld from public inspection except with the consent 
of a justice of such court"); Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-84 
(1984) ("All juvenile court case records and reports are 
confidential and are the property of the court"). 
24 
 
 
one pending case in which the juvenile has been charged with 
breaking and entering in the nighttime with the intent to commit 
a felony.  The existence of this open case requires that the 
instant case be remanded.  The Commonwealth may choose to 
proceed with the felony case first, and so notify the court.  An 
adjudication of delinquency for such a felony charge would 
provide a basis to exercise jurisdiction over the misdemeanor 
charge in the instant case.  Alternatively, the Commonwealth 
could notify the court that it intends to prove multiple 
offenses -- i.e., both the open felony charge and the 
misdemeanor -- in subsequent proceedings.  If the open charge is 
found to have occurred beyond a reasonable doubt in a subsequent 
proceeding,8 then the instant charge of unlicensed operation of a 
motor vehicle would not be considered a "first offense" under 
§ 52.  The Legislature, as previously explained, intended to 
excuse an isolated instance of more minor misdemeanor-level 
misconduct, not multiple misdemeanors or a misdemeanor combined 
                                                 
 
8 Of course, as explained supra, a motion judge's finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior felony offense occurred 
has no legal effect other than to establish that a first offense 
has occurred, thereby allowing the Juvenile Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the subsequent charge of a six months or less 
misdemeanor.  If the Commonwealth seeks an adjudication of 
delinquency on the felony charge, the juvenile is entitled to a 
jury trial.  See G. L. c. 119, § 55A ("Trial of a child 
complained of as a delinquent child or indicted as a youthful 
offender in a division of the juvenile court department shall be 
by a jury . . ."). 
25 
 
 
with more serious misconduct.  If, however, the Commonwealth 
fails to prove that the juvenile has committed a prior offense, 
the instant charge must be considered a first offense under 
§ 52, and the case must be dismissed accordingly. 
 
Finally, we recognize that the ambiguity of § 52, and the 
interpretation we adopt today consistent with that ambiguity and 
the rule of lenity, may pose challenges to the administration of 
juvenile proceedings in the Commonwealth going forward.  We 
recognize in particular that, as drafted, § 52 requires multiple 
procedures to identify and prove first offenses that have no 
legal effect other than to establish that a first offense has 
occurred.9  Absent clarifying legislation, however, we are unable 
to adopt an interpretation of the meaning of "first offense" 
that avoids these complications.  The Legislature, of course, 
may remedy these difficulties by enacting clarifying 
                                                 
 
9 In addition to the additional procedures that we have 
described in this decision, we note there may be other possible 
unforeseen burdens and difficulties imposed on the parties and 
the public.  For example, a proceeding involving a juvenile in 
one county may require the Commonwealth to prove that the 
juvenile committed his or her first offense in a separate county 
months, or even years, prior.  This would require a district 
attorney in one county to prove an offense that occurred in 
another, which would require the Commonwealth to track down 
evidence and witnesses from other counties in the Commonwealth. 
Regardless of location, witnesses would also be required to 
participate in a proceeding that has the sole purpose of 
establishing that a comparatively minor misdemeanor occurred 
some months or years earlier, with no other legal effect than to 
establish that a first offense has occurred. 
26 
 
 
legislation.10  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 784–
785 (2017). 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the Juvenile Court judge 
erred in deciding that a probable cause finding in a prior case 
was sufficient to establish that the instant complaint is not 
the juvenile's "first offense" of a six months or less 
misdemeanor under G. L. c. 119, § 52.  A "first offense" must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have occurred.  However, 
because there is at least one open case involving the juvenile 
in addition to the instant one, the Commonwealth may still be 
able to prove that the current delinquency complaint related to 
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle is not the juvenile's 
"first offense" under the statute.  Accordingly, the case is 
remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment vacating 
the order denying the juvenile's motion to dismiss the 
delinquency complaint and remanding the matter to the Juvenile 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                 
 
10 The Legislature could, for example, amend § 52 once more 
to include an explicit definition of "first offense" and how 
such a first offense may otherwise be proved.