Title: Evans v. Valley Diesel
Citation: 111 N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740
Docket Number: 19645
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 1991

807 P.2d 740 (1991) 111 N.M. 556 Robert EVANS, Petitioner, v. VALLEY DIESEL and Mountain States Casualty Company, Respondents. No. 19645. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 13, 1991. *741 Hanratty Law Firm, Kevin J. Hanratty, Fisk &amp; Vandiver, John Fisk, Artesia, for petitioner. Atwood, Malone, Mann &amp; Turner, Freddie J. Romero, Roswell, for respondents. SOSA, Chief Justice. Petitioner, Robert Evans, pursuant to our grant of his petition for writ of certiorari, seeks reversal of the court of appeals' decision reversing the workers' compensation judge's (WCJ's) disposition awarding benefits to Evans. We agree with Evans and thus reverse the court of appeals. See Valley Diesel and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans, No. 11,558 (Ct. App., Dec. 18, 1990) (Chavez, J., dissenting). We cite pertinent portions of the court of appeals' majority opinion, followed by pertinent portions of Judge Chavez' dissenting opinion. Valley Diesel and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans, No. 11,558 (Ct. App., December 18, 1990) at 1-2, (Chavez, J., dissenting) at 1-2. Our disagreement with the court of appeals' majority opinion lies in how it applies the whole record review standard set out in Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988). In applying that standard of review, the court of appeals' opinion conflicts with our holding on whole record review as set forth in National Council on Compensation Insurance v. New Mexico State Corp. *743 Comm'n., 107 N.M. 278, 282, 756 P.2d 558, (1988). As stated in Tallman, "National Council . . . makes clear the supreme court did intend a favorable light view of the agency's decision." 108 N.M. at 129, 767 P.2d at 368. The court of appeals in Tallman continued: Id., 108 N.M. at 129-30, 767 P.2d at 368-69. Here, we can conscientiously say that the evidence supporting the WCJ's disposition is substantial, when viewed in the light that the whole record furnishes. Further, there are no "limited circumstances" here that called for the court of appeals, in effect, to make findings independent from those entered by the WCJ. For example, as noted above at page one of the majority opinion, the WCJ found that "`worker was injured as he was moving his vehicle so that employer's premises could be secured for the evening...." The majority of the court of appeals disagreed, but in doing so, we hold, the majority erroneously applied the applicable standard of review. The majority, in our judgment, went beyond the admittedly sometimes fine line between reviewing the WCJ's disposition and rewriting that disposition. While it is a close call, we conclude that the majority went too far, by making its whole record review a refinding of the facts; it reconsidered the evidence without giving the particular deference to the WCJ's findings that is called for by our opinion in National Council. We further disagree with the court of appeals' construction of the whole record to mean that Evans was not injured during the course of his employment. The court of appeals construed the record to mean that Evans was on his employer's premises "for the sole purpose of working on his personal vehicle." Valley Diesel and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans at 2. That is one construction to be given to the evidence, but the WCJ gave the evidence another construction namely that Evans was supposed to lock up for the night. While Evans could have attended to this chore without having pushed or driven his mudbogger into the shop, nonetheless he didn't leave it outside, but, as usual, tried to move it inside the shop. The employer was sufficiently apprised of Evan's custom of pushing or driving the vehicle inside before locking up to understand that the two actions went together, and thus there was substantial evidence to sustain the WCJ's conclusion that the two actions ordinarily took place together, that is, "in the course of employment." The facts in Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987) (worker tripping over sprinkler head in parking lot on her way home for the day) are parallel to the facts before us. Thus we conclude, as we did in that case, that Evans was "in a place where the employee [was] reasonably expected to be, and that he [was] engaged in a necessary incident of employment." Id. at 506, 734 P.2d at 746. Further, applying the holding of Kloer v. Municipality of Las Vegas, 106 N.M. 594, 596, 746 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct.App.1987), the employer here, as the WCJ found and as Judge Chavez noted, derived sufficient "intangible value[s]" from having Evans work on his mudbogger at the locale of his employment to justify the WCJ's finding that the injury "arose out of" Evan's employment. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-28 (Repl. Pamp.1987). *744 Accordingly, the court of appeals is reversed and the WCJ's disposition is reinstated in its entirety. RANSOM and FRANCHINI, JJ., concur.