Title: In re Marquez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S102729
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 2003

1
Filed 3/27/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
S102729 
 
 
) 
In re VINCENT MARQUEZ 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H022214 
 
 
) 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
Monterey County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR 16624 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case, petitioner Vincent Marquez was convicted in Monterey County 
of first degree burglary and several prior serious felony conviction enhancements.  
The court sentenced him to a term of 30 years in prison (later reduced to 25 years), 
with credit for certain pretrial custody.  Thereafter, petitioner’s conviction on an 
earlier unrelated Santa Cruz County case was reversed and the charges dismissed.  
On petitioner’s subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Monterey 
County Superior Court declined to credit him with time spent in custody after he 
was sentenced in the Santa Cruz County case and before he was sentenced in this 
case.  The question presented is whether the time petitioner spent in local jails 
awaiting trial and sentencing in this case, after his sentencing in the Santa Cruz 
County case, can be applied to reduce his sentence.  We conclude the answer is 
yes. 
FACTS 
Police arrested petitioner in Monterey County on July 8, 1991, on suspicion 
of first degree burglary.  (Pen. Code, § 459; all further statutory references are to 
the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.)  He posted bail and was released from 
 
2
custody on July 11, 1991.  Following a preliminary examination, a magistrate held 
him to answer on the burglary charge.  He remained out of custody.  
A few days later, on July 23, 1991, police arrested petitioner (then 
apparently using the name Vincent Ernest Soto) in neighboring Santa Cruz 
County, again on suspicion of burglary.  He has remained in continuous custody 
from that day.  A criminal complaint in Santa Cruz County was filed the next day.  
Monterey County placed a hold on him on August 21, 1991.1 
Petitioner was thereafter convicted in Santa Cruz County of burglary 
(§ 459) and assorted enhancement allegations.  He was sentenced on 
December 11, 1991, to 10 years in prison and given credit for 142 days in local 
custody, representing the time he had spent in Santa Cruz County jail from his 
July 23 arrest until and including his December 11 sentencing.  For reasons that 
are irrelevant for purposes of the present proceeding, he was subsequently 
resentenced in Santa Cruz County to 11 years in prison, with two years stayed 
pending imposition of sentence in Monterey County.  The court again granted him 
142 days of custody credit. 
                                             
 
1  
Petitioner alleges the hold was placed on him on August 8, 1991; his only 
evidence for that fact is his own representation to the sentencing court.  Although 
the People allege that Monterey County placed a hold on petitioner on August 21, 
1991, no document appears in the record verifying that fact.  The People’s return 
filed in Monterey County Superior Court on November 16, 1999, states Monterey 
County placed a hold on petitioner on August 21, 1991.  The People’s January 9, 
2001, letter brief filed in the Sixth District Court of Appeal, which the appellate 
court treated as a return, also alleges Monterey County placed a hold on August 
21, 1991.  Petitioner does not expressly dispute that date in his traverse in the 
appellate court, but seems to assume the hold was placed on August 8.  Finally, the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion in this case uses August 21 as the date of the hold, and 
petitioner did not petition for rehearing.  (See rule 29(b)(2), Cal. Rules of Court.)  
Accordingly, we will use August 21, 1991, as the true date Monterey County 
officials placed a hold on petitioner. 
 
3
Petitioner was then rebooked into the Monterey County jail and, in due 
time, convicted in that county of burglary (§ 459) with multiple prior serious 
felony allegations (§ 667, subd. (a)).  The Monterey County Superior Court 
sentenced him on April 2, 1992, to 30 years in prison with 229 days of credit, 
representing 153 days of credit for “actual local time” (that is, time spent in 
custody in county jail) and 76 days of “local conduct credit” (that is, credit for 
work and good behavior for that same period of custody, pursuant to section 
4019).  
Petitioner appealed both convictions.  His Monterey County case—the case 
at hand—was decided first.  The Court of Appeal directed the Monterey County 
Superior Court to modify petitioner’s sentence from 30 to 25 years, but otherwise 
affirmed the judgment.  (People v. Marquez (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 115 
[H009663], disapproved on another ground in People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 
252, 275, fn. 5.)  The Monterey County Superior Court did as directed.  About two 
months later, the same appellate court filed an unpublished opinion reversing his 
Santa Cruz County conviction.  (People v. Soto (July 21, 1993, H009326).)2  
Following receipt of the remittitur, the Santa Cruz County Superior Court vacated 
petitioner’s sentence and dismissed the charges in the interests of justice.  Since 
that time, petitioner has sought unsuccessfully to be awarded credit against his 
Monterey County sentence for time he spent in custody between the day he was 
sentenced in the Santa Cruz County case and the day he was sentenced in the 
Monterey County case. 
                                             
 
2  
Petitioner separately requests that we take judicial notice of the court 
records in both appeals.  Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) permits this 
court to notice the “[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state.”  Accordingly, we grant 
the request for judicial notice of the court records in People v. Marquez, H009663, 
and People v. Soto, supra, H009326. 
 
4
DISCUSSION 
I.  Section 2900.5 Authorizes Credit  
Petitioner claims that once his Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed 
and the case dismissed, the time he spent in custody from the date of the Santa 
Cruz County sentence to the date he was sentenced in Monterey County became 
attributable to his Monterey County case.  Such credit previously was unavailable 
because his custody during that period followed his sentencing in the Santa Cruz 
County case and was thus deemed attributable solely to that case.  (In re Rojas 
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 152 (Rojas).)  But once the Court of Appeal reversed his Santa 
Cruz County conviction and the trial court dismissed the case, petitioner argues, 
the legal barrier to awarding him credit for such custody to reduce the length of his 
Monterey County sentence disappeared.   
Section 2900.5 is the applicable law.  In general, credit is authorized in 
subdivision (a), which provides in pertinent part:  “In all felony and misdemeanor 
convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, 
including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail . . . , all days of custody of the 
defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a 
court order, and including days credited to the period of confinement pursuant to 
Section 4019, shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment . . . .”   
The outcome of the instant case depends on our interpretation of section 
2900.5, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 2900.5(b)).  It provides in full:  “For the 
purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited 
is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant 
has been convicted.  Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody 
attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.”  
(Ibid., italics added.) 
 
5
As with many determinations of credit, a seemingly simple question can 
reveal hidden complexities.  Although the statutory language in section 2900.5 
“may appear to have meaning which is self-evident, the appellate courts have had 
considerable difficulty in applying the words to novel facts.”  (People v. Adrian 
(1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 868, 874.)  “Probably the only sure consensus among the 
appellate courts is a recognition that section 2900.5, subdivision (b), is ‘difficult to 
interpret and apply.’  [Citation.]  As we have noted, in what is surely an 
understatement, ‘[c]redit determination is not a simple matter.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 874-
875.) 
We reach the proper resolution of this case by way of familiar principles:  
We assign the statutory language its plain and commonsense meaning, attempting 
to effectuate the Legislature’s intent.  (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. 
of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632-633.)  If the statutory 
language is not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and we 
apply the plain meaning of the statute without resort to extrinsic sources.  (People 
v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192.)  “In construing a statute, 
we must also consider ‘ “the object to be achieved and the evil to be prevented by 
the legislation.” ’  [Citation.]  And, wherever possible, ‘we will interpret a statute 
as consistent with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to harmonize 
Constitution and statute.’ ”  (Id. at p. 193.) 
We turn, then, to whether the “custody to be credited” (§ 2900.5(b)) in this 
case—the period between the day petitioner was sentenced in Santa Cruz County 
(December 11, 1991) and the day he was sentenced in Monterey County (April 2, 
1992)—can be deemed “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct 
for which [petitioner] has been convicted” (ibid.), i.e., to the Monterey County 
proceedings. 
 
6
Although petitioner had been in custody since July 23, 1991, when he was 
arrested for his Santa Cruz County crimes, as of August 21, 1991, when Monterey 
County placed a hold on him, his custody became attributable to the pending 
criminal charges in two counties:  Monterey and Santa Cruz.  Had Santa Cruz 
County dropped its charges at that time, petitioner’s subsequent custody would 
have been attributable solely to the Monterey County hold.  But Santa Cruz 
County dropped its charges only later, after petitioner’s conviction was reversed.  
Nevertheless, after Monterey County placed a hold on petitioner, his custody was 
attributable to the charges in both counties.  Thus, once Santa Cruz County 
dismissed its charges, all custody following Monterey County’s hold, including 
the period between petitioner’s sentencing in Santa Cruz County and his Monterey 
County sentencing, is properly characterized as “attributable to [the Monterey 
County] proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been 
convicted.”  (§ 2900.5(b).)  The plain meaning of section 2900.5(b) thus supports 
petitioner’s claim. 
To deny petitioner credit for his time spent in custody between 
December 11, 1991, and April 2, 1992, would render this period “dead time,” that 
is, time spent in custody for which he receives no benefit.  Sometimes this result is 
unavoidable.  For example, had petitioner’s Santa Cruz County presentence 
custody been attributable solely to the Santa Cruz County charges (that is, had 
Monterey County never placed a hold), dismissal of the Santa Cruz County 
charges would have left petitioner with no sentence against which credit for that 
period could be applied.  But because his custody after placement of the Monterey 
County hold was attributable to both his Santa Cruz and Monterey County cases, 
dismissal of the Santa Cruz County charges still left him with the Monterey 
County sentence against which credit for all of his custody from placement of the 
Monterey County hold until imposition of sentence could be applied.   
 
7
Our conclusion is consistent with Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152.  In Rojas, a 
defendant who was already serving a term for manslaughter was charged with an 
unrelated murder.  He was removed from state prison and placed in local custody 
to await trial.  After his conviction for the murder, he claimed he was entitled to 
credit against his murder sentence for the time he had spent in county jail awaiting 
trial.  We disagreed, explaining:  “There is no reason in law or logic to extend the 
protection intended to be afforded one merely charged with a crime to one already 
incarcerated and serving his sentence for a first offense who is then charged with a 
second crime.  As to the latter individual the deprivation of liberty for which he 
seeks credit cannot be attributed to the second offense.  Section 2900.5 does not 
authorize credit where the pending proceeding has no effect whatever upon a 
defendant’s liberty.”  (Id. at p. 156.)  We further held that, although section 2900.5 
does not expressly limit credit to situations where the custody is “exclusively” 
attributable to a charge of which a defendant is later convicted, “it is clearly 
provided that credit is to be given ‘only where’ custody is related to the ‘same 
conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.’  The sensible inference is 
that a defendant is not to be given credit for time spent in custody if during the 
same period he is already serving a term of incarceration.”  (Rojas, supra, at pp. 
155-156.) 
If an offender is in pretrial detention awaiting trial for two unrelated crimes, 
he ordinarily may receive credit for such custody against only one eventual 
sentence.  Once the pretrial custody is credited against the sentence for one of the 
crimes, it, in effect, becomes part of the sentence, bringing the case within the 
embrace of the rule in Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152.  In such circumstances, the 
pretrial custody ceases to be “attributable” to the second crime, thus prohibiting its 
being credited against the sentence for that crime.  (People v. Bruner (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 1178, 1189 (Bruner).) 
 
8
In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487 (Joyner) is illustrative.  In that case, the 
defendant was sought in connection with felonies committed in California.  He 
was thereafter arrested in Florida and charged with unrelated felonies there.  
California authorities then placed a hold on him.  Joyner was eventually convicted 
and sentenced in Florida, which credited him for time spent in pretrial custody.  
Following his extradition to California, Joyner pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
to prison.  The trial court denied his request for credit against his California 
sentence for the time spent in pretrial detention in Florida.  We affirmed:  “In 
determining the proceedings to which [his pretrial custody in Florida] may 
properly be attributed, it is significant that the period has been credited against 
petitioner’s Florida sentences, making it also a period during which petitioner in 
effect was serving a sentence on another conviction.”  (Id. at p. 492.)  Hence, 
Joyner’s pretrial custody came within the rule of Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152, 
which prohibited its application to his California sentence.  
Applying Rojas to this case, we find that, as an initial matter, the Santa 
Cruz County Superior Court correctly awarded petitioner credit against his Santa 
Cruz County sentence for his time spent in pretrial custody up until December 11, 
1991, the date he was sentenced on the Santa Cruz County charges.  Because 
petitioner’s Santa Cruz conviction occurred first, that was the sentence against 
which the credit should have been applied.  And once the credit was awarded, it in 
effect became part of the sentence for those crimes.  In other words, at that point, 
before the Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed, Rojas would apply to 
prohibit credit for any of petitioner’s custody (both before his trial for the Santa 
Cruz County charges as well as after he was sentenced for those crimes) to reduce 
 
9
his Monterey County sentence (with the exception of the four days he spent in 
Monterey County jail before his Santa Cruz County arrest).3 
But once the appellate court reversed petitioner’s Santa Cruz County 
conviction, he was returned to a situation indistinguishable from that of a 
defendant who had been charged in that county, but never tried.  When Santa Cruz 
County dismissed its charges, the “custody to be credited” (i.e., the time petitioner 
had spent in local custody pursuant to the Monterey County hold, both before and 
after the date of the Santa Cruz County sentencing) became “attributable [solely] 
to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been 
convicted” (§ 2900.5(b)), i.e., the proceedings in this case.  The Monterey County 
Superior Court thus properly awarded petitioner credit for his custody from the 
time of the hold until the date of his sentencing in Santa Cruz County.  It erred, 
however, in failing to award him credit for his custody following his sentencing in 
Santa Cruz County, up to and including the date of his sentencing in Monterey 
County. 
Although the plain language of section 2900.5 supports a decision to grant 
petitioner credit for the latter period and nothing in Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152, 
precludes it, respondent argues we should nonetheless deny petitioner additional 
credit because we have, in the past, applied a rule of “strict causation” to credit 
                                             
 
3  
The record shows that the Monterey County Superior Court awarded 
petitioner credit from the time of the hold until he was sentenced in Santa Cruz 
County.  This was error under Rojas, as that time in custody had already been 
credited to his sentence in Santa Cruz County and was thus solely attributable to 
his conviction in that county.  The issue is moot, however, because after 
petitioner’s Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed on appeal and the charges 
dismissed, the time in custody from the hold until his Santa Cruz County 
conviction became attributable to the Monterey County charges, and the time is 
now properly credited against his sentence in Monterey County. 
 
10
cases involving multiple restraints.  Thus, for example, we held in Bruner, supra, 
9 Cal.4th 1178, that “where a period of presentence custody stems from multiple, 
unrelated incidents of misconduct, such custody may not be credited against a 
subsequent formal term of incarceration if the prisoner has not shown that the 
conduct which underlies the term to be credited was also a ‘but for’ cause of the 
earlier restraint.”  (Id. at pp. 1193-1194.)  Relying on this holding, respondent 
contends that “it is apparent that petitioner’s Monterey County case had absolutely 
nothing to do with his confinement in Santa Cruz County” and that “[p]etitioner 
has failed to show any evidence that he posted bail in the Santa Cruz case or that 
he could have obtained release but for the Monterey County hold.” 
This argument is misplaced.  The requirement of “strict causation,” on 
which this court relied in Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th 1178, and Joyner, supra, 48 
Cal.3d 487, is applicable in cases involving the possibility of duplicate credit that 
might create a windfall for the defendant.  Here, because the Santa Cruz County 
charges have been dismissed, no possibility of a windfall (in the form of double 
credit) to petitioner exists.  Unlike in Bruner and Joyner, the choice is not between 
awarding credit once or awarding it twice.  The choice is instead between granting 
petitioner credit once for his time in custody between December 11, 1991, and 
April 2, 1992, or granting him no credit at all for this period of local custody.   
Respondent also argues that giving petitioner credit in this situation 
requires that we “transmute” his Santa Cruz County postsentence custody time 
into presentence custody time attributable to his Monterey County charges.  We 
disagree.  As we explained, ante, petitioner’s custody after Monterey County’s 
August 21st hold originally was attributable to charges in both counties.  Once the 
Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed and the charges dismissed, 
petitioner’s situation was no different than if the Santa Cruz County charges had 
 
11
been dismissed before trial.  His custody—attributable originally to both sets of 
charges—would still be attributable to the remaining charges in Monterey County. 
Finally, respondent, like the Court of Appeal, relies on People v. Huff 
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1100.  In Huff, the defendant was on probation for 
possession of PCP when he was arrested on a new and unrelated charge of auto 
theft.  After spending more than two months in pretrial custody for the auto theft 
charge, the defendant’s probation for possession of PCP was summarily revoked 
due to the pending theft charge, and he was remanded into custody for the 
revocation pending sentencing.  The auto theft case was then dismissed for failure 
to prosecute and, about one month later, the defendant was sentenced to prison for 
his possession of PCP.  The defendant sought custody credits against his drug 
offense sentence for the period commencing with his arrest on the auto theft.  The 
Huff court found he was not entitled to such credits because he had not been in 
custody on the probation violation for the entire period that commenced with his 
arrest, i.e., his incarceration was not solely attributable to the probation revocation.  
“While it is true that the new [auto theft] charges were eventually dismissed due to 
a failure to prosecute, so that there was no resulting sentence against which to 
credit appellant’s time in custody on those charges, that fact does not transmute 
the custody to time attributable to the old [drug] charges.”  (Id. at p. 1105.) 
Because Huff is distinguishable on its facts, it is unhelpful here.  Petitioner 
here seeks credit only for the time he spent in custody from the day he was 
sentenced in Santa Cruz County until the day he was sentenced in Monterey 
County.  As we explain, once the Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed on 
appeal and the charges dismissed, the time in question became attributable to 
petitioner’s Monterey County conviction.  Huff would be relevant only if 
petitioner had sought credit for the time spent in custody from the time he was 
arrested in Santa Cruz County, before Monterey County placed a hold on him, 
 
12
because that period would be analogous to the period in Huff commencing with 
that defendant’s arrest for auto theft.   
We thus conclude petitioner is entitled to additional credit.  All that remains 
is calculation of the correct amount.   
II.  Calculation of Credits 
The Monterey County Superior Court awarded petitioner a total of 229 
days of credit, comprised of 153 days of local time and 76 days of conduct credit.  
Included in the amount of custody credit was credit for the four days he spent in 
Monterey County jail from the time he was arrested on the Monterey County 
charges (July 8, 1991) until he was released on bail (July 11, 1991).  As 
respondent acknowledges, the trial court properly awarded credit for these four 
days.  
The same court also properly awarded petitioner credit for the time between 
the Monterey County hold and his sentencing in Santa Cruz County, a purported 
total of 149 days of custody credit.  Unfortunately, both dates the court used in its 
calculations were wrong:  the hold was placed on August 21, 1991 (not August 8, 
1991), and defendant was first sentenced in Santa Cruz County on December 11, 
1991 (not January 3, 1992).4  Petitioner should have received credit for 113 days 
of custody. 
Contrary to the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts in this case, 
we find petitioner is entitled to credit for time spent in local custody between the 
day he originally was sentenced in Santa Cruz County (December 11, 1991) and 
the day he was sentenced in Monterey County (April 2, 1992).  Having already 
                                             
 
4  
Petitioner perpetuates these errors in his briefing before this court, and this 
error accounts for the discrepancy between the number of custody credits to which 
we find he is entitled, and the number of credits he claims in his briefing. 
 
13
counted December 11 in the previous calculation, we find petitioner is entitled to 
an additional 113 days of credit (which includes the leap day of February 29, 
1992).  The total number of custody credit days to which petitioner is entitled is 
thus 230 days (4 + 113 + 113).   
There being nothing in the record suggesting petitioner is disallowed the 
full amount of conduct credit pursuant to section 4019,5 we must also calculate his 
conduct credit.  People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 explained the 
applicable method of calculation:  “ ‘Penal Code section 4019, specifies how 
prisoners may obtain certain credits.  Subdivisions (b) and (c) of that section 
provide:  “for each six-day period in which a prisoner is confined in or committed 
to a specified facility” one day shall be deducted from his period of confinement 
for performing labors, and one day shall be deducted for compliance with the rules 
and regulations of the facility.  Subdivision (f) of that section provides “if all days 
are earned under this section, a term of six days will be deemed to have been 
served for every four days spent in actual custody.”  (Italics added.)’  [Citation.]  
                                             
 
5  
Section 4019, subdivision (b) states:  “[F]or each six-day period in which a 
prisoner is confined in [county jail], one day shall be deducted from his or her 
period of confinement unless it appears by the record that the prisoner has refused 
to satisfactorily perform labor as assigned by the sheriff, chief of police, or 
superintendent of an industrial farm or road camp.”   
 
Subdivision (c) of the same section provides:  “For each six-day period in 
which a prisoner is confined in [county jail], one day shall be deducted from his or 
her period of confinement unless it appears by the record that the prisoner has not 
satisfactorily complied with the reasonable rules and regulations established by the 
sheriff, chief of police, or superintendent of an industrial farm or road camp.” 
 
Subdivision (e) provides:  “No deduction may be made under this section 
unless the person is committed for a period of six days or longer.” 
 
Subdivision (f) provides:  “It is the intent of the Legislature that if all days 
are earned under this section, a term of six days will be deemed to have been 
served for every four days spent in actual custody.” 
 
14
[¶] Credits are given in increments of four days.  No credit is awarded for anything 
less. . . .  Under the statutory scheme, ‘rounding up’ is not permitted.” 
“Other courts have adopted the Smith approach to the calculation of 
credits.”  (People v. Fabela (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1664 [citing several 
cases].)  We do as well. 
Employing this approach, we take the number of actual custody days (4 + 
113 + 113 = 230) and divide by 4 (discarding any remainder), which leaves 57 
(230 ÷ 4 = 57).  We then multiply the result by two (57 x 2 = 114), resulting in a 
total of 114 days of conduct credit.  To arrive at the total amount of credit to which 
petitioner is entitled (custody plus conduct), we add the custody credit (230 days) 
to the conduct credit (114 days), giving us a total of 344 days (230 + 114).  
Because the trial court had previously awarded petitioner a combined 229 days of 
credit (custody and conduct), we conclude he is entitled to an additional 115 days 
of credit (344 – 229 = 115). 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  The trial court is directed 
to correct the judgment to reflect that petitioner is entitled to an additional 115 
days of credit (custody and conduct). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
I agree with the result and reasoning of the majority opinion.  I write 
separately to express my views regarding the majority’s discussion of People v. 
Huff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1100 (Huff).  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12.)  After 
reciting the facts of Huff, the majority states that, “[b]ecause Huff is 
distinguishable on its facts, it is unhelpful here.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  
While I agree that Huff is “distinguishable on its facts,” I am inclined to go further 
in order to point out that, in People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178 (Bruner), we 
endorsed a method of computing presentence custody credits contrary to that 
utilized in Huff. 
 
In 1988, the defendant in Huff was placed on three years’ probation for 
possession of phencyclidine.  On January 17, 1989, he was arrested for grand theft 
automobile.  He did not post the $15,000 bail and remained in custody.  Yet his 
probation was not revoked until March 27, 1989, more than two months after the 
date of his arrest.  Most importantly, the probation revocation was based solely on 
the grand theft automobile charge.  On April 24, 1989, the underlying grand theft 
automobile charge was dismissed, but, after a probation violation hearing in which 
the court heard evidence regarding the automobile theft, the defendant was found 
in violation of probation and his probation remained revoked.  (Huff, supra, 223 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1103.)  In sentencing the defendant, the Court of Appeal declined 
to award him presentence custody credit for the period of January 17, 1989 
 
2
through March 26, 1989, for the reason that he was not  “in custody” on the 
probation violation until March 27, 1989, and thus his custody was not attributable 
to the probation violation until that date.  (Id. at pp. 1105-1106.)   
 
But in Bruner, we stated that “post-[People v. Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487, 
489] decisions apply a general rule that a prisoner is not entitled to credit for 
presentence confinement unless he shows that the conduct which led to his 
conviction was the sole reason for his loss of liberty during the presentence period.  
Thus, these cases reason, his criminal sentence may not be credited with jail or 
prison time attributable to a parole or probation revocation that was based only in 
part on the criminal episode.  [Citations.] . . . [W]e conclude that these authorities 
construe the statute correctly.”  (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1191.)  We then 
cited, with approval, People v. Williams (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 827, 832-834, a 
case in which the Court of Appeal held that the defendant “was entitled to credit 
against his sentence for the time spent in custody on the probation revocation 
because this custody arose from the identical conduct that led to the criminal 
sentence.”  (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1194, fn. 10, italics added.) 
 
In Huff, the Court of Appeal failed to award presentence custody credit 
where the probation revocation was based on the identical conduct that led to the 
criminal offense.  Therefore, the method used to calculate presentence custody 
credits in Huff is contrary to the method we endorsed in Bruner.1   
 
The majority also states that “Huff would be relevant only if petitioner had 
sought credit for the time spent in custody from the time he was arrested in Santa 
Cruz County, before Monterey County placed a hold on him, because that period 
                                             
 
1  
In the Huff-type of situation, moreover, whether the probation hold 
precedes or is subsequent to the filing of criminal charges is of no moment 
because custody credit accrues from the date of arrest. 
 
3
would be analogous to the period in Huff commencing with that defendant’s arrest 
for auto theft.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12.)  While I agree that Huff might be 
factually relevant, it should be noted that, even if petitioner had sought 
presentence custody credit from the time spent in custody from the day he was 
arrested in Santa Cruz County, Huff is not analogous to the present case because 
the custody credit rules governing the interplay between an underlying crime and 
probation violation (i.e., a Huff situation) are different from the custody credit 
rules that govern a Marquez situation, i.e., where a defendant commits two distinct 
crimes in two different counties.  As noted, in a Huff situation, the defendant is 
entitled to custody credit from the date of arrest.  In a Marquez situation, a 
defendant is not entitled to credit from the date of arrest by the first county in the 
event that charge is dismissed.  Instead, he receives credit only from the date the 
hold was placed by the second county, which makes his custody attributable to 
both distinct cases. 
 
For the reasons stated above, I would go further than the majority and 
recognize that the Huff situation is not analogous to the facts of the present case 
and, where a probation revocation is based on the identical conduct that led to 
criminal charges, the Huff court’s method of computing presentence custody 
credits is contrary to the method we endorsed in Bruner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
I CONCUR:  
 
 BROWN, J. 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Marquez 
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Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
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Opinion No. S102729 
Date Filed: March 27, 2003 
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Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
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Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Arthur Dudley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Vincent Marquez. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, 
Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Christina V. Vom Saal and James Panetta, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Respondent State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Arthur Dudley 
Page, Salisbury & Dudley 
605 Center Street 
Santa Cruz, CA  95060-3804 
(831) 429-9966 
 
Christina V. Vom Saal 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-1360