Title: Gelfond v. DISTRICT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DIST.
Citation: 504 P.2d 673
Docket Number: 25627
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 1972

504 P.2d 673 (1972) Lawrence P. GELFOND, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT of the State of Colorado et al., Respondents. No. 25627. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. October 30, 1972. Robert Bugdanowitz, Denver, for petitioner. Litvak, Schwartz &amp; Karsh, Lawrence Litvak, Epstein, Lozow &amp; Preblud, Frederick Epstein, Denver, for respondents. KELLEY, Justice. This is an original proceeding in the nature of prohibition. C.A.R. 21. The respondent, Hon. Gerald E. McAuliffe, one of the judges of the Second Judicial District, appointed a Master in a pending divorce proceeding in which Joyce M. Gelfond, respondent, is the plaintiff and Lawrence P. Gelfond, the petitioner, is the defendant (Civil Action No. D-23464). The petitioner objected to the appointment of the Master and moved to vacate the appointment on the ground that the appointment was in violation of the terms and purpose of C.R.C.P. 53(b) rather than pursuant thereto. The trial judge denied the motion and instructed the Master to proceed to "schedule an appropriate date or dates for hearing all matters relative to permanent orders," and to file, as soon as practicable, The trial judge prefaced his order of appointment thus: We disagree with the trial court's interpretation of Rule 53(b) and conclude that it exceeded its jurisdiction and that the order to show cause should be made absolute. Rule 53(b) provides: The respondents contend that, Continuing, they argue that, Petitioner, in response, suggests that La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 249, 77 S. Ct. 309, 1 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1957) is a complete answer to all of the arguments advanced by the respondents. We agree. In La Buy, the trial judge, on his own motion, entered orders of reference in two consolidated antitrust cases under Rule *675 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Our rule is identical. All parties objected to the references. Upon the judge's refusal to vacate the references, the parties filed mandamus actions in the Court of Appeals seeking the issuance of writs ordering the judge to vacate the 53(b) orders. In his answer to the show cause orders, the judge, similar to Judge McAuliffe's position here, contended that the cases were very complicated and complex, that they would take considerable time to try and that his calendar was congested. Mr. Justice Tom Clark in the La Buy opinion noted that the Court of Appeals had declared that the references amounted to a refusal by the judge to try the cases in due course and concluded, (The power of this court under Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution of Colorado is comparable to that of the federal courts under the All Writs Act.) The issuance of a writ to mandate the vacation of the reference order is necessary to protect the rights of the petitioner where the court is proceeding in excess of its power. To await the final judgment, based on the Master's report, would be too late and any appeal at that point a futile act. The expenditure of both time and money would already have occurred and there would then be no way to undo what had already been erroneously done. See Sutterfield v. District Court, 165 Colo. 225, 438 P.2d 236 (1968). The trial court's order appointing the Master in effect delegated the decision making, as well as the fact finding, function to the Master. In so doing, the judge abdicated his constitutional responsibilities and duties. That this is so is evidenced by Rule 53(e)(2), which provides that, In a scholarly and comprehensive article in 58 Columbia Law Review 452 (1958), Judge Irving R. Kaufman discusses the appointment of masters in the federal courts under Rule 53. Some of the statements are particularly pertinent to the present situation. Judge Kaufman then points out that it is difficult to formulate a general rule for determining the priority of a reference under the exceptional condition criterion in each and every case. He notes that where reference is limited to specific issues rather than to the case itself, the reference is more likely to be sustained. We agree with his further point that: The same would be true where the basis for the reference to the master is the difficulty and complexity of the matter. It does not appear from the pleadings, the affidavits, and the court's order that any of the referred matters are beyond the competence of the court to determine without the assistance of a master. On this point the article notes that difficulty and complexity is not sufficient in itself to warrant a reference and then observes: He finds justification for the foregoing statement in the exception, "save in matters of account," in that portion of the rule relating to non-jury cases. However, we do not hold that the mere fact that accounting may be necessary is sufficient in itself to justify a reference if it appears that the matter is simple and would not consume an undue amount of the court's time. Helfer v. Corona Products, Inc., 127 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1942). Even where an accounting possesses the requisite complexity and difficulty there is no license in the rule to refer all the issues presented in a case to a master. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., supra. In the instant case it appears from the record before us that the home of the parties has been sold and the equity has been liquidated and is available and subject to the court's order. It also appears that the common stock involved is listed on either the New York *677 Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange so that there is no difficulty in establishing the value at the critical date. There is also an indication that some of the property came to the wife through inheritance prior to the marriage. Before value becomes important, the court should determine whether or not the property is subject to division. The court should determine these issues and if they are resolved in a manner that indicates that an accounting is necessary and that they are of substantial proportions, a reference may be justified. Then and only then should the court refer the matter to a special master. In concluding the article on non-jury cases, Judge Kaufman states: The rule is made absolute. The matter is remanded with directions to vacate the order appointing a master and for further proceedings before a judge of the domestic relations division not inconsistent with the views above expressed.