Title: Eddie Junior Bigham v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-245
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-245 
____________ 
 
EDDIE JUNIOR BIGHAM,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[July 10, 2008] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a conviction of first-degree 
murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we reverse the first-degree murder 
conviction and vacate the death sentence because we conclude the evidence is 
insufficient to prove premeditation.  However, we find that the record supports a 
conviction of second-degree murder, and we remand to the trial court to enter a 
judgment of conviction on second-degree murder and to conduct a sentencing 
proceeding on that conviction.  
FACTS 
The record reflects that Eddie Junior Bigham was indicted for first-degree 
murder, kidnapping, and sexual battery on July 28, 2003.  Bigham’s motion to 
suppress his statement given to police was denied by the trial court on April 15, 
2004.  The trial began with jury selection on November 1, 2004.  At the end of the 
State’s case-in-chief, Bigham moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts, and 
the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal on the charges alleging kidnapping, 
sexual battery, and felony murder; but the trial court denied the motion as to first-
degree premeditated murder and allowed that charge to be submitted to the jury.  
The jury returned a guilty verdict for first-degree premeditated murder, and 
subsequently returned an advisory recommendation for death as an appropriate 
penalty.  On January 11, 2005, the trial court sentenced Bigham to death. 
Evidence presented at trial indicated that very late on the night of May 23, 
2003, Lourdes Cavazos-Blandin, a/k/a Lulu, left the apartment she shared with her 
husband Jose Guillermo, a/k/a Oscar, after asking her mother, Olivia Cavazos, for 
money for a taxi.  Prior to leaving, she had eaten dinner and split a twelve-pack of 
 
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beer with her husband.  She also had intercourse with her husband before falling 
asleep.  After leaving, she did not return home or call the next morning, May 24, 
2003. 
On the morning of May 24, 2003, Dennis Lewis discovered Lulu’s body on 
the way to work while walking past a wooded lot.  He called the police, who 
responded to the scene and cordoned it off to avoid contamination.  Officer 
Hurtado testified that he noticed that the vegetation was disturbed along a path 
from the street to the body.  Lulu’s body was mostly nude, and her clothes were 
folded and placed over her face, chest, and genitals. 
On July 1, 2003, Bigham voluntarily went with Sergeant Bill Hall and 
Investigator Jeffrey Hammrick to the Ft. Pierce Police Department for questioning.  
The interview was videotaped.  At the beginning of the tape, Hall appears to be in 
the middle of informing Bigham of his Miranda1 rights and asks him to sign a 
written waiver, which Bigham refuses.  Bigham, however, did agree to continue 
the interview.  Bigham stated that he had met Lulu at a store in Ft. Pierce in the 
early hours of May 24 and that he had sex with her at the home of his friend, 
“Lightning.”  Initially he stated that he had intercourse with Lulu without a 
condom on the floor of the bathroom of the home, and that he gave her ten dollars 
and she left.  Shortly thereafter he left and went home without seeing her again.  
                                          
 
 
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
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He denied having anal intercourse with her.  However, later in the interview he 
stated that he saw her again and had sex with her in a wooded lot nearby.  He 
described her as high on alcohol or drugs.  He stated that he used a black condom 
given to him by his friend.  He said the friend gave him two condoms.  Bigham 
also stated that it was possible that he “slipped” and entered Lulu’s anus during the 
sex in the woods.  He stated that when they finished having sex in the woods he 
asked if she was alright and she said yes.  He further stated that Lulu was standing, 
conscious, speaking, and getting dressed when he left her.  Bigham denied choking 
Lulu despite persistent suggestions from his interrogators that he may have 
accidentally choked her during sex. 
Tommy Garrason, a crime scene investigator, photographed the scene and 
collected the physical evidence.  He described a disturbed area in the lot with 
branches broken and pushed apart.  He also observed drag marks in the pine 
needles that covered the lot.  He discovered a flip-flop type shoe on the street next 
to the lot and another in the middle of the street.  He also found a black condom 
wrapper in the street near the lot.  Garrason photographed and examined Lulu’s 
body before moving her.  Near the shorts lying on her chest, he noticed a strand of 
hair.  In total, he collected five strands of hair from under the clothing laid on her 
body.  When he rolled the body over, he found a black condom still lodged in her 
 
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anus.  He was not able to retrieve fingerprints from any of the objects located or 
from the body itself. 
Expert witness Earl Ritzline testified that he performed the DNA analysis on 
the samples collected.  He identified two of the hairs found on Lulu’s body as 
Bigham’s.  Additionally, he testified that the semen found in Lulu’s vagina 
belonged to Bigham and that the seminal fluid found on and in the condom and the 
fluid wiped on the T-shirt found on Lulu’s body belonged to both Bigham and 
Oscar, although Oscar’s contribution to the stains was smaller and only on the 
outside of the condom.  Further, he testified that the panties were stained with 
Lulu’s urine and had traces of Oscar’s semen.  There was fecal matter, mixed with 
semen, on the T-shirt.  There were small blood stains on the shirt and shorts that 
matched both Lulu and Bigham, and clippings from her nails had traces of DNA 
from both Bigham and Oscar.  Ritzline testified that his findings were consistent 
with Lulu having had sex with Oscar first, then having got dressed, then having 
had sex with Bigham without dressing again and at some point having urinated 
while still standing upright and dressed, staining her shorts.  Ritzline opined that 
the sex with Bigham would have naturally pushed Oscar’s semen out of the vaginal 
cavity, thereby explaining the lack of any trace of his semen in her vagina. 
Medical Examiner Charles Diggs testified that he determined Lulu’s cause 
of death to be strangulation and that she died between the hours of 1 and 2 a.m. on 
 
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May 24, 2003.  He stated that death by strangulation takes minutes, but that a 
victim could be rendered unconscious in as little as fifteen seconds.  He noted a 
very minor superficial wound on her face near her left eye.  He collected a sexual 
assault kit from the body and testified that there was evidence of sexual activity, 
but not of physical trauma associated with the sex.  Diggs also testified that he 
found no injuries on the body or any other physical signs of a struggle.  He noted 
that the urine found on her shorts could have been caused by terror or fright. 
The trial court ruled that this evidence was insufficient to submit to the jury 
on the charges of kidnapping, sexual battery, and felony murder; but the court 
allowed the premeditated murder charge to go to the jury.  The jury convicted 
Bigham of premeditated murder and, after a penalty phase proceeding, 
recommended a sentence of death, which the trial court subsequently imposed. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In this appeal, Bigham raises seventeen guilt-phase claims and fourteen 
penalty-phase claims.  Upon reviewing the record, we find that while the evidence 
is sufficient to support a finding that Bigham was responsible for the victim’s 
death, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the necessary element of 
premeditation to sustain a conviction of premeditated first-degree murder.  We find 
the evidence sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree murder and 
 
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remand for resentencing for that crime.  Our resolution of this issue renders 
Bigham’s penalty-phase claims moot.   
Sufficiency of Evidence 
In his first two issues, Bigham first asserts that the proof was insufficient to 
prove he was responsible for Lulu’s death, and next asserts that he could not be 
found guilty of first-degree murder because the proof of premeditation was 
insufficient.   
 
At trial, Bigham’s theory of innocence was that someone else killed Lulu, 
perhaps her husband, Oscar, because of his disapproval of her drug use and 
promiscuity.  Bigham maintained in his statement that she was alive when he left 
her.  However, the State offered proof that Oscar stayed home the night of Lulu’s 
death and did not leave until she had already been killed.  More importantly, the 
State’s evidence, including that of the medical examiner, indicated that Lulu was 
not likely to have moved after Bigham had intercourse with her in the woods, 
because she did not remove the condom from her anus, his hairs were on her body, 
and a mixture of his semen and her fecal matter was on the shirt that lay on top of 
her when she was found.  From this evidence, the jury could infer that Lulu died 
during or immediately after her sexual activity with Bigham in the woods.  
Bigham’s conflicting accounts of his encounters with Lulu also provided the jury 
with a basis for concluding that, coupled with the DNA evidence, Bigham was not 
 
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being truthful in asserting that she was up, alive and getting dressed when he left 
her.  The presence of the condom used by Bigham still in her body is hardly 
consistent with his account.  Further, where the physical evidence is considered 
together with the numerous conflicts and contradictions in Bigham’s account of his 
encounter with the victim, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that he 
was responsible for her death.  Hence, we conclude the proof was sufficient to 
demonstrate Bigham’s involvement in her death.   
 
However, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, we 
conclude the State’s evidence was not sufficient to prove that Lulu’s death was 
caused by premeditated murder.  In Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 943-44 (Fla. 
1998) (quoting Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 741 (1997)), we explained: 
 
Premeditation is the essential element that distinguishes first-
degree murder from second-degree murder.  Coolen v. State, 696 So. 
2d 738, 741 (Fla. 1997).  Premeditation is defined as  
more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully formed 
conscious purpose to kill.  This purpose to kill may be 
formed a moment before the act but must also exist for a 
sufficient length of time to permit reflection as to the 
nature of the act to be committed and the probable result 
of that act.   
“Where the State’s proof fails to exclude a reasonable hypothesis that the homicide 
occurred other than by premeditated design, a verdict of first-degree murder cannot 
be sustained.”  Id. at 944.    
 
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While we find that the evidence was sufficient to rule out any hypothesis but 
that Bigham caused Lulu’s death, we do not find that the evidence was sufficient to 
prove that Bigham had the conscious purpose to kill Lulu that we held in Green 
was required.  The record is devoid of evidence from which it can be inferred that 
Bigham intended to kill Lulu or desired for her to die. 
 
In Green we reduced a first-degree murder conviction involving a death by 
manual strangulation under circumstances somewhat similar to those involved 
herein.  We concluded in Green that the proof of the defendant’s guilt of 
premeditated murder by circumstantial evidence was insufficient.  We described 
the facts in Green in a light most favorable to the State: 
Kulick’s body was found on Masterpiece Gardens Road in Polk 
County, Florida, at approximately 3:30 a.m. on May 22.  The only 
apparel worn by Kulick was a pair of shoes.  Here body had been 
dragged from the side of the road and displayed in the middle of the 
intersection with her legs spread apart.  Her body exhibited evidence 
of stab wounds and blunt trauma, but the cause of death was manual 
strangulation.  At the time of her death, Kulick’s blood alcohol level 
was .106. 
 
. . . . 
 
We find that the record in this case supports the reasonable 
hypothesis that Kulick’s murder was committed without any 
premeditated design.  On the night of the murder, Kulick was 
intoxicated and had a heated argument with Gulledge, her former 
boyfriend and employer.  Kulick was arrested and charged with 
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.  She was angry and intoxicated 
upon her release from custody, as indicated by her blood alcohol level 
at the time of her death.  Gay testified that Green confessed that he 
and a friend picked Kulick up in front of the jail and “did things” to 
her.  Green related to Gay that “the bitch got crazy” and he and his 
friend killed her.  There were no witnesses to the events immediately 
 
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preceding the homicide.  Although Kulick had been stabbed three 
times, no weapon was recovered and there was no testimony 
regarding Green’s possession of a knife.   
715 So. 2d at 941-44.  While the facts in Green were arguably stronger than those 
presented here, we nevertheless concluded: “[T]here was little, if any, evidence 
that Green committed the homicide according to a preconceived plan.”  Green, 715 
So. 2d at 944.   
 
Prior to Green, and in a case that also involved a death by strangulation, we 
concluded that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient despite evidence that 
the strangled victim was found partially nude and the defendant had a history of 
strangling women while raping them.  Hoefert v. State, 617 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 
1993).  Subsequently, we found insufficient evidence of premeditation in two 
strangulation murders in Randall v. State, 760 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2000).  In Randall, 
we relied upon our earlier decision in Kirkland v. State, 684 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 
1996), also holding that evidence of premeditation was lacking in a strangulation 
case.  Randall, 760 So. 2d at 902.  Hence, we have concluded in a number of cases 
that evidence of premeditation was insufficient even though the defendant had 
killed the victim by strangulation.   
 
We conclude the same result is required here where, arguably, the proof of 
premeditation is even less than the proof in these previous cases, and where here 
the trial court has directed a judgment of acquittal on the charges of sexual battery 
 
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and kidnapping.  Nevertheless, as in Hoefert and the other strangulation cases 
discussed above, we find the evidence of strangulation sufficient to sustain a 
conviction for second-degree murder, which requires the finding of an “act 
imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of 
human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any 
particular individual.”  Hoefert, 617 So. 2d at 1050 (quoting § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. 
(1987)). 
State’s Alleged Improper Argument 
 
Next, Bigham argues that it was improper for the prosecution to argue in 
closing that Bigham had sexually violated the victim.  Bigham points out that the 
trial court had granted a judgment of acquittal for that crime.     
 
The prosecution asserted during its closing that Bigham had killed Lulu at 
the same time that he was having sex with her in the woods:   
Ms. Park:  . . . He pulled off the shorts inside out and the 
panties, [Lulu] is no longer fighting.  He puts on the black condom.  
He then sexually assaulted her vaginally, anally, she’s no longer 
fighting.  She’s dead. 
Mr. Unruh:  Objection, Judge. . . . 
. . . . 
 
. . .We have the State arguing a sexual assault occurred, there 
are only felony murder. (sic)  They brought it up during my closing, 
the Court previously ruled on these things. . . . 
 
. . . . 
Ms. Park:  At the point where he is wearing a black condom 
and having sex with her, she’s no longer fighting, she’s dead.  There 
are no signs of trauma, no signs of tearing, she’s not struggling any 
longer.  You wouldn’t expect to see that. . . . 
 
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Mr. Unruh:  Object, Your Honor, facts not in evidence. . . .   
. . . . 
. . .The State has commented on things that were not in 
evidence.  No expert testified that she was dead at the time of the 
sexual act.  There was no direct evidence by any expert witness of 
that.  They are commenting on things that are not in evidence. 
The Court:  That’s their theory.  Overrule the objection.  
 
Because the trial court overruled the objection, our first task is to determine 
whether the argument was improper.  If the argument was improper, we must then 
determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Muhammad v. 
State, 782 So. 2d 343, 360 (Fla. 2001) (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 
(Fla. 1986)).  
 
In determining whether an error is harmless, the court must determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the comment did not contribute to the guilty 
verdict.  Further, in making this determination, the burden is on the State, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to demonstrate that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict.  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1135. 
 
We have long held that argument on matters outside the evidence is 
improper.  See Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1986).  Even though 
the trial court had granted a judgment of acquittal on the charge of sexual battery, 
the trial court overruled the objection on the basis that it was the State’s theory that 
Lulu was probably dead at the time the sex act occurred.  We agree that the State’s 
theory could be inferred from evidence that suggested that the death by 
 
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strangulation could have occurred at virtually the same time that the sexual 
relations took place.  Therefore, the prosecutor’s argument does not appear to have 
been improper.  In other words, we agree with the trial court that the State was 
doing little more than stating its theory of the case that the choking of the victim by 
Bigham took place at virtually the same time as the sex.    
 
Even if the comments were improper, and the trial court should have 
sustained the objection, we find that there is no reasonable possibility the 
comments complained of could have contributed to the verdict.  DiGuilio, 491 So. 
2d at 1135; cf. Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 360 (holding the prosecutor went beyond 
simply commenting on the evidence and the record as a whole showed there was 
no reasonable possibility that the improper argument contributed to the jury’s 
guilty verdict).  Accordingly, Bigham is not entitled to a new trial based upon this 
claim.    
Denial of Bigham’s Arguments 
 
Bigham next alleges the court abused its discretion by forbidding him to 
argue the State failed to prove the two counts of sexual battery and kidnapping it 
had already dismissed via the judgment of acquittal.  Here, the trial court instructed 
the jury that the only charge remaining for the jury to decide was the charge of 
first-degree premeditated murder and that the jury should only concern itself with 
that charge.  
 
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It is within the trial judge's discretion to determine when an attorney’s 
argument is improper, and such determination will not be upset absent abuse of 
discretion by lower court judge. Watson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. 
1994).  We agree that after the trial court’s dismissal of those charges, the counts 
of sexual battery and kidnapping were no longer germane to the jury’s 
consideration and were properly restricted from closing argument by the trial 
judge. 
Juror Challenge 
 
Bigham next alleges that the trial court improperly allowed a juror to remain 
on the panel after the juror informed the court he recognized one of the State’s 
witnesses once testimony began.  Bigham claims he is entitled to a new trial 
because this juror concealed material information.   
 
The trial court conducted a full inquiry of the juror’s contact with the 
witness.  On the record it appears that the juror’s failure to disclose his knowledge 
of a State witness was not material.  See De La Rosa v. Zequira, 659 So. 2d 239 
(Fla. 1995).  Rather, the record reflects that his familiarity with the State’s witness 
was casual and distant.  On his own initiative, the juror stated that he did not know 
a police detective’s last name, but recognized him as someone who had been a past 
acquaintance.  He explained that he worked security at a bar that the detective 
frequented five to seven years prior to the trial.  He further explained that any 
 
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conversation between the two had been brief and did not reflect the detective’s 
work.  Secondly, the juror did not attempt to conceal the information and came 
forward as soon as it was apparent that he did, in fact, recognize the officer.  
Finally, the juror answered the question posed during voir dire correctly, because 
he was actually asked if he was related to or close friends with any law 
enforcement officers, and even given his passing acquaintance with Hall, there was 
no evidence that he was related to or close friends with him.  We find no error in 
the trial court’s resolution of this issue. 
Expert Testimony 
 
Bigham next argues that the trial court improperly admitted expert 
testimony.  We find there was no error. 
 
In the present case, Earl Ritzline was called as a State expert witness for 
DNA analysis.  He was properly qualified as an expert before the court and jury in 
questioning by the State.  During his testimony regarding biological fluids found 
on the T-shirt laid on top of the victim’s body, Ritzline stated that the stains were a 
combination of Bigham’s fluids and Oscar’s fluids.  To clarify, he was asked if he 
was talking about the same wipe on the shirt.  Later, he was asked to explain how 
one stain could include contributions from both men.  Experts are allowed to give 
opinion testimony based on facts that the expert personally observed, even if those 
facts are not admissible themselves.  § 90.704, Fla. Stat. (2005).  Here, an expert 
 
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on DNA analysis provided the jury with his explanation of the presence of 
biological fluids.  The opinions given were subject to cross-examination, and their 
credibility could be weighed by the jury.  Bigham has not demonstrated that the 
opinions given by the expert were outside the scope of his expertise or factual 
observations.  Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in allowing this 
testimony.  
Voir Dire 
 
Bigham next argues that the trial court improperly allowed the State, over 
objection, to assert during voir dire that the State did not seek the death penalty in 
all cases.  We have examined the record and the context in which the statement 
was made, and we find there was no error.  We note that, in essence, the statement 
was made as a predicate for the State to ascertain a potential juror’s ability to apply 
the law in a case where the State was seeking the death penalty.  The statement was 
not made in the context of any assertion that the penalty was appropriate in this 
case because the prosecutor was selective.  Furthermore, the juror questioned did 
not serve on the jury.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. 
Absence From Conferences 
Bigham next argues that his absence from certain pretrial conferences 
violated his right to a fair trial.  However, he makes no attempt to demonstrate 
 
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prejudice or to otherwise demonstrate that anything substantive took place at the 
hearings.  The State notes the incidents were hearings for the defense’s motions to 
continue and a status conference where defense counsel spoke to Bigham, who 
waived his right to appear, just prior to appearing.  No objections by the defense to 
the proceedings were ever lodged in the trial court.  This Court has held that 
although adherence to the rule requiring a waiver of defendant’s appearance has 
not always been followed, a defendant may nonetheless waive his right to appear 
either through trial counsel or by later acquiescence to the outcome of the missed 
portion.  Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001); see also Wike v. State, 
813 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2002).  While the State admits that these waivers were not in 
writing, it argues that the conferences were not critical and that Bigham did not 
preserve the issue because he appeared before the same judge shortly thereafter 
without raising an objection to his absence from previous conferences.  We agree 
and find that any possible error was harmless under these circumstances. 
Improper Testimony 
 
Bigham argues that the State improperly solicited speculation from its 
witness, Mrs. Cavazos, as to when Lulu’s husband Oscar left his apartment.  The 
State argues that Mrs. Cavazos’ testimony was lay opinion testimony and, as such, 
was properly admitted under section 90.701, Florida Statutes.  Section 90.701 
requires a two-prong test of lay opinion testimony: 
 
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(1)  The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and 
adequacy, communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of 
fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the 
witness’s use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of 
fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and 
(2)  The opinions and inferences do not require a special 
knowledge, skill, experience, or training. 
§ 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2005).  We agree with the State that Mrs. Cavazos’ testimony 
was admissible under this rule.  We also agree that her opinion was subject to 
being challenged on cross-examination with its ultimate credibility left to the jury.    
We have also considered but also reject Bigham’s contention that the trial 
court improperly admitted other hearsay testimony through Mrs. Cavazos, Oscar, 
and Officer Hammrick.  We agree with the State that this evidence was either 
invited by questioning by the defense or that the admission of any such testimony 
was harmless. 
Juror Excused 
Bigham next argues that the trial court improperly allowed the State to 
excuse a potential juror for cause.  A potential juror may be excused “for cause” on 
a number of grounds, including that the juror has a state of mind regarding the case 
“that will prevent the juror from acting with impartiality.”  § 913.03(10), Fla. Stat. 
(2005).  Excusal for cause is justified if reasonable doubt exists whether the juror 
can be impartial.  Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 683 (Fla. 2003).  An individual 
may not serve as a juror in a capital case if his or her views on the death penalty 
 
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“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in 
accordance with the juror’s instructions or oath.”  Fernandez v. State, 730 So. 2d 
277, 281 (Fla. 1999).   
In this case the juror in question declared during voir dire that as a Christian 
she could not sit in judgment of anyone.  She also answered affirmatively the 
question of whether her experience would prevent her from being fair and 
impartial.  She further stated that she would prefer to recommend life and only that 
she would try to follow the law.  Although the juror later seemed to qualify her 
prior statements and suggested she could be impartial and follow the law, we 
conclude there was enough hesitation and equivocation for the trial court to 
exercise its discretion and allow the State to challenge her for cause.   
Suppression of Bigham’s Statement 
Bigham argues that his statement to the police should have been suppressed 
because he was never notified of his right to an attorney before he was questioned.  
He relied substantially on a record of the statement which contains only a partial 
account of the Miranda warnings.  However, the trial court held a full evidentiary 
hearing on the motion where both police officers present during the videotaped 
statement testified that Detective Hall fully and properly read Bigham his Miranda 
rights, including his right to counsel.  The trial court was entitled to rely on this 
 
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testimony to resolve any confusion in the transcript.  Accordingly, we find no error 
in the trial court’s denial of Bigham’s motion to suppress. 
Jury Dispersed 
Bigham argues that the trial court erred in not sequestering the jury and 
allowing the jurors to go home for the night during deliberations.  However, the 
record shows that the trial court asked both defense counsel and the prosecution 
how they wanted to proceed with the jury during deliberations and that the defense 
agreed the jurors could go home:  
THE COURT:  It’s a little after five o’clock and I understand that we 
have agreed that––I’ll ask the Jury if they are about to reach a verdict, 
in which case we’ll wait. Otherwise, I understand everybody has 
agreed we can send them home for the night. 
MR. AKINS:  That’s fine 
THE COURT:  Okay with the State?             
MS. PARK:  Yes, sir 
THE COURT:  Okay with the defendant? 
MR. AKINS:  Yes, sir. 
 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  . . .Okay.  The defendant is present.  What do you 
want  to do? 
MR. HARLLEE:  I kind of like the approach you did yesterday, see if 
they are close or way apart and take it from there. 
THE COURT:  Send a note in or bring them out? 
 
MR. HARLLEE:  Note, please.  You want to do the honors? 
 
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MS. PARK:  What's this one going to say? 
MR. HARLLEE:  What did you say yesterday? 
MS. PARK:  He didn't, he called them out. 
THE COURT:  If you're close to reaching a verdict, we'll stay and 
wait for you; if not, we'll break until Friday morning. 
MR. HARLLEE:  Okay. Sounds good. 
MS. PARK:  You're close to reaching a verdict, we'll wait for you, 
otherwise -- 
MR. HARLLEE:  We'll break at five. 
THE COURT:  Break at five and come back Friday morning. 
MR. UNRUH:  That's fine.   
Because the record clearly demonstrates that Bigham agreed that the jurors could 
be released, we find no reversible error.   
Jury Instructions 
Finally, Bigham’s contention that the jury instructions given on first-degree 
murder were inadequate is now a moot issue in view of our reduction of the 
conviction to second-degree murder.   
CONCLUSION 
 
When the State has presented sufficient evidence to establish 
the guilt of one accused of a serious crime, it is the responsibility of 
the courts to acknowledge that evidence.  However, it is equally the 
duty of the courts to ensure that the State is held to its burden of proof 
when someone is charged with a serious crime and liberty and life are 
at risk.  
 
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Ballard v. State, 923 So. 2d 475, 485 (Fla. 2006).  As noted above, our discussion 
of the evidence compels us to conclude that while the State has submitted 
sufficient evidence of Bigham’s guilt of second-degree murder, there was 
insufficient evidence of premeditation.  Accordingly, we reverse Bigham’s 
conviction for first-degree murder and vacate his death sentence and remand this 
case to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment for second-degree 
murder and to sentence Bigham accordingly. 
 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and CANTERO, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
BELL, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
QUINCE, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
While I agree with the majority that the evidence in this case does not 
support the first-degree murder conviction under the theory of premeditation, I 
dissent because I believe that under these facts the first-degree murder conviction 
cannot be reduced to second-degree murder.  In addition to being charged with 
first-degree premeditated murder, Bigham was also charged with kidnapping, 
sexual battery, and felony murder.  The trial judge found the evidence insufficient 
to submit the kidnapping, sexual battery, and felony murder charges to the jury.  
Thus, Bigham was effectively acquitted on these three charges. 
 
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In order to find a defendant guilty of second-degree murder, the murder must 
have been committed while the defendant was a participant in one of the felonies 
enumerated in section 782.04(3), Florida Statutes, and the actual killing was done 
by someone other than the person engaged in committing the felony or, as defined 
in section 782.04(2), the murder was committed during the course of an act that 
was imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind.  Since the 
defendant was acquitted on the felony charges and we have no evidence that the 
death occurred by the act of another, Bigham cannot be convicted of second- 
degree murder under 782.04(3). 
 
I also conclude that the facts do not support the taking of a life by an act that 
is imminently dangerous and evincing a depraved mind.  While the majority 
reduces this case to second-degree murder because the victim was strangled, I 
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bigham was the person who 
strangled the victim.  The evidence in this case indicates that Bigham had sex with 
the victim on the night of the murder.  The medical examiner testified that while 
there was sexual activity there was no trauma.  There were no injuries to the body 
or signs of a struggle.  In addition, Bigham made inconsistent statements to law 
enforcement concerning his involvement with the victim.  This evidence does not 
support a finding that Bigham strangled the victim.   
 
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Therefore, I do not agree that the evidence supports a conviction for second-
degree murder. 
 
BELL, J., dissenting. 
 
Unlike the majority, I would uphold Bigham’s conviction for first-degree 
premeditated murder.  The circumstantial evidence in this case, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, is sufficient to support premeditation.  
Moreover, the State’s case excluded every identifiable, reasonable hypothesis other 
than premeditation. 
 
As this Court has explained, premeditation is  
more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully formed conscious purpose 
to kill.  This purpose may be formed a moment before the act but must 
exist for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection as the nature of 
the act to be committed and the probable result of that act.   
Carpenter v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182, 1196 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Norton v. State, 709 
So. 2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1997)).  “Evidence from which premeditation may be inferred 
includes such matters as the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of 
adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in 
which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds 
inflicted.”  Id.  (quoting Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990)).   
 
Where the State seeks to establish premeditation by circumstantial evidence, 
“the evidence relied upon by the State must be inconsistent with every other 
 
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reasonable inference.”  Hoefert v. State, 617 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 1993)  
(quoting Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d at 930).  And where the State’s proof fails to 
exclude a reasonable hypothesis that the homicide occurred without premeditation, 
a verdict of first-degree premeditated murder cannot be sustained.   Id. (citing Hall 
v. State, 403 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1981)); see also Randall v. State, 760 So. 2d 892, 
902 (Fla. 2000) (reversing the defendant’s conviction for first-degree premeditated 
murder where there was a reasonable hypothesis that “Randall intended for his 
choking behavior to lead only to sexual gratification, not to the deaths of his sexual 
partners,” which was supported by evidence of the defendant’s history of choking 
women to heighten sexual arousal); Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 944 (Fla. 1998) 
(reversing the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction because there was 
“strong evidence militating against a finding of premeditation,” including that the 
defendant had a heated argument with the victim which resulted in the victim’s 
arrest, that the victim had a high blood alcohol level at the time the defendant and 
his friend picked up the victim from the jail, that the defendant’s friend “did 
things” to the victim that made her “crazy,” and that the defendant’s intelligence 
was exceedingly low). 
However, “ ‘[t]he question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all 
reasonable hypotheses is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, 
competent evidence to support the jury verdict,’ reversal is not required.”  Delgado 
 
- 25 -
v. State, 948 So. 2d 681, 690 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 
155 (Fla. 2002)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3016 (2007).  “In addition, the State is not 
required to ‘rebut every possible variation of events,’ but only to present evidence 
that is inconsistent with the defendant’s reasonable hypothesis.”  Id. (quoting 
Darling, 948 So. 2d at 156).  Importantly, the State “is entitled to a view of any 
conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.”  Cochran v. 
State, 547 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1989); see also Hoefert, 617 So. 2d at 1049.       
The circumstantial evidence in this case, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury’s verdict, is sufficient to support premeditation.  Specifically, 
the victim was found lying on her back with her genitalia and upper torso covered.  
Her clothes, which were found folded on top of her naked body, contained traces 
of the defendant’s semen, the victim’s urine (perhaps caused by terror or fright), 
and fecal matter.  A condom—containing the defendant’s semen—was still lodged 
in the victim’s anus.  Nearby, there was a disturbed area in a vacant lot covered by 
pine needles where drag marks led toward the body.  About twenty yards from the 
victim’s body, on the shoulder of North 26th Street, was a condom wrapper.  
Additionally, the police found one flip-flop shoe in the middle of North 26th Street 
and the other flip-flop shoe next to the lot.  There was a minor abrasion close to the 
victim’s left temple, which could have been caused by striking or banging of the 
victim’s head against something hard, that was inflicted around the time of the 
 
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victim’s death.  However, there was no evidence of physical trauma associated 
with the sexual activity.  And it is undisputed that the cause of death was manual 
strangulation, a process that generally takes several minutes.     
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, this evidence clearly 
supports the State’s hypothesis that Bigham assaulted the victim on the road, 
dragged her into the woods, strangled her, had vaginal and anal sex with her, wiped 
himself with the victim’s clothes, laid her clothes on top of her body, and fled the 
scene.  
  Unlike Green, Hoefert, and Randall, there is no alternative, reasonable 
hypothesis that the victim in this case was killed without premeditation.  Death 
during a struggle was not a reasonable hypothesis because the evidence shows 
little, if any, resistance.  Further, while death during masochistic sex might have 
been a viable hypothesis, Bigham firmly denied that he had ever strangled the 
victim for sexual pleasure or excitement.  In essence, the majority does not identify 
and Bigham has not offered any hypothesis that is reasonably inconsistent with the 
jury’s verdict of premeditated murder.   
In light of the above, I would uphold Bigham’s conviction for first-degree 
premeditated murder.  There is competent, substantial evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that Bigham had a fully formed conscious purpose to kill.  The 
 
- 27 -
 
- 28 -
evidence excludes any other reasonable hypothesis.  Thus, we should respect the 
jury’s verdict.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St. Lucie County,  
C. Pfeiffer Trowbridge, Senior Judge – Case No. 562003CF002566A 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant Public 
Defender, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa-Marie Lerner, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee