Title: People v. Kliner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81314
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 1998

People v. Kliner, No. 81314 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 81314-Agenda 27-May 1998.
Opinion filed December 3, 1998.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Ronald Kliner, was charged in Cook County with two 
counts of first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1), 
(a)(2)) and one count of conspiracy to commit murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 
38, par. 8-2). These charges related to the February 18, 1988, murder of Dana 
Rinaldi in Palatine, Illinois. The jury returned verdicts of guilty against 
defendant on all counts and the trial court entered judgment on the murder 
verdict. Defendant waived a jury for the death sentencing hearing. The trial 
court found defendant eligible for the death penalty on the basis that he 
committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which 
he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder 
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(5)). After considering evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation, the trial court found no mitigating factors 
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty and sentenced defendant 
to death for the murder of Dana Rinaldi. Defendant's death sentence has been 
stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 
134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's 
conviction and death sentence.
FACTS
The evidence adduced at trial showed that at around 12:30 a.m. 
on February 18, 1988, two neighbors, John and Deborah Fostin, discovered the 
body of Dana Rinaldi in her car located in the parking lot of the Wyndham Court 
apartment complex in Palatine, Illinois. Dana had lived in that apartment 
complex with her husband, Joseph Rinaldi. Dana was found seated on the driver's 
side of her blue Mustang, slumped over to the passenger side. Her left leg was 
hanging out of the driver's side door. An assistant medical examiner, who 
performed an autopsy on Dana, testified that Dana, while seated in her car, had 
been shot five times in the face and head from a distance of 18 to 24 inches. 
Three gunshot wounds to her hands also suggested that Dana had raised her hands 
in front of her face in an attempt to protect herself. The cause of death was 
determined to be multiple gunshot wounds.
After arriving on the scene shortly after discovery of Dana's 
body, police officers found six .22-caliber spent shell casings and one 
.22-caliber live round on the ground close to Dana's car. The live round had an 
indentation indicating the firing pin had struck the bullet but did not 
discharge it. A firearms tool mark examiner later concluded that the six shell 
casings and the live round were all .22 Long Rifle caliber and had been fired 
from the same weapon. In addition to the casings and the bullet, police officers 
found Dana's gloves, which she was wearing, and her purse in the car, both of 
which displayed bullet holes. No fingerprints were found in the car.
Police officers interviewed a number of Dana's neighbors, 
including Paul Skorupa, shortly after the discovery of the body. When Skorupa 
returned home around 11:45 p.m. on February 17, 1988, he nearly rear-ended a 
1987 or 1988 red Nissan Pulsar in the apartment complex's parking lot. Under 
lighting conditions which he described as "pretty good," Skorupa could see the 
passenger in the car. Skorupa viewed a group of photographs three days later, 
picked out defendant's photograph, and said that defendant "looked like" the 
passenger in the Nissan Pulsar. Skorupa, however, was unable to identify anyone 
at a lineup conducted five years later. When Skorupa last saw the red car, it 
was parked toward a cul-de-sac at the end of the driveway. Skorupa did not see 
the victim's car at this time. On cross-examination, Skorupa acknowledged that 
he had seen another red Nissan Pulsar parked in the apartment complex parking 
lot a few days after the murder. On redirect, however, he testified that it did 
not resemble the car he had seen on the night of the murder.
Neighbor Tyrone Miller testified that he heard his dog barking 
sometime between midnight and 12:30 a.m. on the night of the murder. When he 
looked out his upstairs bedroom window, Miller saw a man jogging or walking fast 
down the street. The man stopped below Miller's window, looked at Miller, and 
ran away. Miller got a good look at his face and identified codefendant Michael 
Permanian in open court. Miller also identified Permanian as the man he had seen 
the night of the murder, during a photograph array conducted a few days after 
the murder, as well as at a lineup held five years after the murder. The last 
thing that Miller observed on the night of the murder were headlights leaving 
the area. On re-cross-examination, Miller acknowledged that if asked by the 
police to make an identification, he would falsely identify someone about 10% of 
the time based upon his mood.
During the early morning hours of February 18, 1988, police 
officers also interviewed the victim's husband, Joseph Rinaldi, who cried upon 
learning of Dana's death. When officers asked Rinaldi if he knew anyone who 
owned a small red sports car, Rinaldi offered the name of his friend Michael 
Permanian. Permanian was later photographed getting out of a red Nissan Pulsar 
at Dana's wake. It was later confirmed that Permanian was the owner of a red 
1988 Nissan Pulsar.
No arrests were made in this case until June 10, 1993 following 
grand jury testimony by Tammy Behenna, defendant's former girlfriend, and John 
Apel, Sr., defendant's uncle. These witnesses along with Joseph Rinaldi 
testified for the State. Rinaldi testified in exchange for, among other things, 
the prosecutor's promise to recommend a 40-year sentence, although he later 
received a sentence of 60 years' imprisonment after pleading guilty to murder, 
conspiracy, and solicitation. Rinaldi testified that he had married Dana in 
1980, and they began having marital problems in the fall of 1987 when the couple 
was deeply in debt. About this time, Rinaldi began meeting with Michael 
Permanian, a close friend since childhood who had served as best man at his 
wedding. Rinaldi indicated to Permanian that he was having marital problems and 
wanted to have his wife killed because divorce was not an option given their 
debts. Permanian suggested that Rinaldi meet with defendant because defendant 
might be able to help Rinaldi with his problem. Rinaldi also had been acquainted 
with defendant since his childhood.
Prior to the murder, Rinaldi met with both Permanian and 
defendant, both of whom agreed to kill Dana. Defendant even pointed to a gun 
tucked in his waistband when Rinaldi asked how he would do it. Rinaldi informed 
them that he wanted it to look like a botched robbery attempt and defendant and 
Permanian agreed. Rinaldi provided defendant and Permanian with background 
information regarding Dana's employment and their apartment complex, the Wyndham 
Court Apartments. Rinaldi drew a map of the complex indicating the exact 
location where Dana usually parked her car. Rinaldi also informed defendant and 
Permanian about a $50,000 life insurance policy he had obtained on Dana's life 
and agreed to give them half of those proceeds. After investigating the matter, 
defendant and Permanian reported to Rinaldi that the apartment complex was the 
best place to kill Dana. Defendant and Permanian announced that they planned to 
commit the murder on February 17, 1988, and Permanian indicated that they would 
steal a car. Permanian suggested that Rinaldi go out on the night of the murder 
and page him as soon as he was finished talking to the police.
Rinaldi further testified that he called his friend Jim Groszka 
and persuaded him to go drinking with him in downtown Chicago on the night of 
February 17, 1988. Groszka later corroborated this in his own trial testimony, 
adding that he was surprised by Rinaldi's call and agreed to go out because 
Rinaldi was insistent. Groszka testified that he and Rinaldi were together at 
several bars in Chicago from 9 p.m. on February 17, 1988, until about 4 a.m. on 
February 18, 1988.
On February 17, 1988, Rinaldi visited his wife at work, which 
was 10 miles from their home, and took her out to dinner. Jennifer Sparesus, one 
of Dana's coworkers, corroborated Rinaldi's testimony regarding his visit at the 
office, and his announcement that he was going downtown later that night. Dana 
returned to the office after dinner. Sparesus testified that she last saw Dana 
around midnight when Dana indicated that she was going home.
Rinaldi testified that he returned home sometime after 4 a.m. 
Upon arriving home, Rinaldi knew the murder had been carried out because he saw 
Dana's car being towed away.
Following the murder, Rinaldi testified that he received more 
insurance proceeds than he originally anticipated. Rinaldi received 
approximately $137,000. Rinaldi had originally agreed to pay defendant and 
Permanian $25,000, and he did not immediately inform them of the additional 
funds. Rinaldi began making weekly payments to defendant and Permanian shortly 
after the murder. Permanian later contacted Rinaldi and informed him that he and 
defendant had learned about the additional insurance proceeds. Rinaldi agreed to 
pay defendant and Permanian $55,000. Rinaldi had meetings with defendant and 
Permanian regarding the insurance proceeds. Rinaldi testified that he was 
threatened by defendant and Permanian with respect to making payments to them 
and speaking to the police.
Rinaldi testified that, on September 28, 1993, while he, 
defendant and Permanian were in a holding cell awaiting transportation for a 
court appearance, Permanian talked about how he and defendant had driven to 
Indiana at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour after the murder, where they 
disposed of the clothes and gun used to commit the murder. Both defendant and 
Permanian were laughing as they recalled how officers had dragged Lake Michigan 
looking for the gun.
Rinaldi further recounted how, in late October, while all three 
men were in a lockup, Rinaldi saw defendant and Permanian re-enact the murder. 
Permanian sat on a bench while defendant stood over him, defendant's hand 
pointed at Permanian's head, and defendant's index finger stuck out as if he 
were holding a gun. After Permanian put his hand up by his face, defendant 
indicated that was how he shot Dana. Defendant also indicated that the gun had 
jammed during the shooting.
Rinaldi testified that, in January 1995, he had a conversation 
with defendant and Permanian before he testified at a suppression hearing on a 
defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police. Both defendant and 
Permanian coached him in an effort to get his statements suppressed. They 
advised him to testify that officers had threatened him, offered leniency to 
him, and denied his requests for counsel. When Rinaldi testified at the 
suppression hearing, he claimed coercion. At trial, however, Rinaldi admitted 
that he had perjured himself in that testimony.
Tammy Behenna, defendant's former girlfriend, testified for the 
State at trial. Behenna met defendant in 1987. Defendant and Behenna 
occasionally spent the night at her apartment prior to moving in together in 
October, 1988. They lived together until July 1, 1991. Defendant and Behenna had 
a child together, a son. Behenna recounted the events of February 17, 1988, in 
her testimony. According to Behenna, defendant got up around 11 p.m. and put on 
a suit. Defendant then left the apartment and did not return that night. 
Defendant called Behenna the next morning, February 18, 1988, and informed her 
he was okay and was going out to eat. Defendant returned to the apartment later 
that morning and went back to bed. When he heard a radio news report, however, 
he jumped out of bed and screamed, "That can't be right. They can't have a 
suspect." Behenna overheard defendant then make a phone call, during which he 
mentioned the name "Mike." Later that day, defendant called Behenna at her 
office and informed her that he had to meet "Mike" and that "they were going to 
make a deposit in Lake Michigan." On the evening of February 18 or 19, 1988, 
defendant asked Behenna to listen to a tape recording of a conversation between 
Permanian and Rinaldi. Defendant asked her if Rinaldi sounded like a man who had 
spent two months practicing his crying. Behenna recalled that defendant made a 
lot of phone calls on February 18 and 19, and that he clipped a lot of newspaper 
articles about the Rinaldi murder.
Behenna testified that, when she was subpoenaed to appear 
before the grand jury in April of 1988, she claimed the fifth amendment 
privilege, as defendant had advised her, and refused to testify. Behenna 
testified that when she was served with the subpoena to appear before the grand 
jury, defendant informed her that people can die in a number of ways, including 
being struck by a car while crossing the street. Defendant then had Behenna 
cross the street to mail a letter.
Behenna stated that defendant had a conversation with her about 
the Rinaldi murder in August of 1988, when they visited Great America amusement 
park. Defendant stated to Behenna that "I want you to picture this. It's cold 
outside. It's late. It's dark ... somebody is just coming home from work.... And 
I walk up to her car and point a gun at her. And she says `what are you doing?' 
And then she put her hand up, and then I shot her five times." Behenna stated 
that defendant was smiling when he relayed this information to her. Behenna also 
recounted that, in July of 1990, defendant walked up to her, put his finger to 
her head, and impersonated a woman's voice as he said: "What are you doing?" 
Defendant then said "bang" five times.
Behenna further testified that, sometime in February of 1988, 
or the fall of 1989, defendant mentioned Joe Rinaldi and that he was angry with 
Rinaldi and that he wanted Rinaldi to pay him for a job he had done. In the fall 
of 1989, Behenna saw defendant kneeling on the floor of their bedroom, counting 
what appeared to be a large amount of cash. Defendant looked at the money and 
asked, "Is this worth a life?"
On cross-examination, Behenna admitted that she had engaged in 
a sexual relationship with Permanian in 1991, just before she and defendant 
stopped living together. Behenna stated that she stopped living with defendant 
after July 1, 1991, and moved in with her parents. Behenna began cooperating 
with the police in September of 1991, and testified before the grand jury in May 
of 1993. Behenna acknowledged that she was involved in ongoing litigation with 
defendant and his parents regarding visitation with her son.
John Apel, Sr., defendant's uncle and a Chicago police officer, 
also testified for the State. Apel testified about a number of incriminating 
statements defendant made to him. On February 18, 1988, around 6 p.m., defendant 
called him at home and told him to watch the news that night. Apel did so and 
heard an account of the Rinaldi murder. Defendant called him again that night to 
confirm Apel had watched the news, and defendant specifically referred to the 
murdered girl in Palatine, at which time defendant began laughing.
Sometime in May of 1988, defendant unexpectedly arrived at 
Apel's home. Defendant honked the horn repeatedly and drove partially onto 
Apel's driveway and his neighbor's lawn. Defendant admitted to Apel that he had 
killed Dana Rinaldi and provided details, including how he had stuck a gun to 
her head and pulled the trigger, and how she had thrown up her arms with a 
terrified look on her face. Defendant relayed that he laughed when he shot her 
in the head. Defendant also told Apel that the gun had jammed at one point. 
After relaying this information, defendant threatened that he would kill the 
members of the Apel family if his uncle said anything.
On cross-examination, Apel admitted that he did not inform 
anyone at the police department or make a written report about these admissions 
by defendant. Apel also admitted that he had claimed the fifth amendment 
privilege when he appeared before the grand jury in May of 1988. Apel explained 
that he did so because he was afraid of defendant. Apel stated that he did 
discuss defendant's statements when subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury a 
second time, in May of 1993, after defendant was in jail. Apel also admitted 
that he continued to engage in a business relationship with defendant even after 
the driveway conversation described above because defendant is a "pushy kind of 
person" and because "[i]t is either you are his enemy or you are his 
friend."
Apel's son, John Floyd Apel, also testified at defendant's 
trial. John corroborated his father's testimony about the conversation in the 
driveway of the Apel home in May of 1988. He also testified that he was present 
for another conversation with defendant in which defendant stated that "he could 
kill anyone just like he had killed the Rinaldi girl." John believed that this 
conversation had taken place in the fall of 1992, although he stated he could 
not recall the date with certainty, only that it was before defendant was 
incarcerated. The parties later stipulated that defendant had been continuously 
incarcerated in the Cook County jail from April 8, 1992, on another charge to 
the time of this trial.
Defendant called two witnesses, Todd Pugh, a law student 
working for the defense, and John Eierman, an investigator for the defense, to 
rebut the testimony of the State's witness Tyrone Miller. Pugh, Eierman and 
counsel for Permanian visited the Rinaldi's apartment complex, Wyndham Court, on 
February 18, 1996, to test the accuracy of Miller's observations. Each took a 
turn looking out the lower-level window of Miller's former apartment, and out 
the second-story window of a neighboring apartment, while another walked or 
jogged past the apartment. Both Pugh and Eierman testified they could not make 
an identification from that vantage point. On cross-examination, Pugh and 
Eierman acknowledged they did not know the lighting conditions on the actual day 
of the murder, nor did they know to what extent trees and bushes might have 
grown since then to obscure their vision. Moreover, both witnesses admitted they 
did not look out the bedroom window at which Miller was standing when he saw 
Permanian. Eierman also testified that the others could not see the headlights 
in the manner suggested by Miller when Eierman drove his car behind the 
clubhouse. Eierman, however, admitted that they did not attempt the experiment 
with a 1988 Nissan Pulsar.
Defendant called a final defense witness, Cook County sheriff's 
police officer Ronald Russell, to impeach the testimony of State's witness Paul 
Skorupa. Russell acknowledged that he had prepared a police report in which he 
reported that Skorupa saw the victim's blue Mustang parked on the street when he 
returned home around 11:45 p.m. On cross-examination, however, Russell testified 
he had erred when he drafted the report because Skorupa indicated that, although 
he saw the victim's car parked on the street in the past, he did not see the 
victim's car on the night of the murder.
In the State's rebuttal case, Palatine police officer John 
Saurmann testified he was sent to the Wyndham Court apartments on February 18, 
1996, after someone reported suspicious people on the premises. Saurmann saw 
Pugh, Eierman and Permanian's attorney at the apartment complex. Although he 
stayed for some time, Saurmann did not see any of the men walk up and down the 
street and then look up at the apartment window. Saurmann stated that no one 
asked him if he could identify anyone from where he stood by the 
apartment.
In surrebuttal, defendant presented codefendant Permanian's 
attorney to contradict the evidence given by Saurmann. He testified that, when 
he asked Saurmann, who was standing by the apartment, if he could identify Pugh 
or Eierman, who were by the street, Saurmann replied that he could 
not.
After considering the aforementioned evidence, the jury 
returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder. The sentencing hearing was conducted before the trial judge because 
defendant had previously waived a jury for sentencing. After the State provided 
evidence that defendant was over 18 years of age, and the trial judge took 
judicial notice of the verdicts and the trial testimony, the trial judge found 
defendant eligible for the death penalty because the murder had been committed 
pursuant to a contract. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(5).
The State then presented extensive evidence in aggravation. 
Assistant Cook County State's Attorney Patrick Quinn testified that inmate 
Charles Russell called him on June 3, 1993, and that he and Detective John Duffy 
later visited Russell in the Kendall County jail. Russell stated that, sometime 
before April of 1993, when he was in Cook County jail, defendant asked him to 
find someone to kill a woman named Tammy. Defendant said the woman planned to 
testify against him in his aggravated battery and murder cases. Russell agreed 
to do so for $25,000, with half to be paid up front. When he talked to Quinn, 
Russell stated that he had already received $11,000 through intermediaries. When 
Quinn sought to verify Russell's story, he learned that Russell had been on the 
same jail tier as defendant. Quinn met with Russell again on June 11 in the 
company of Officers Dornbos and Duffy. Russell repeated the same story and said 
he had already received $11,000 from defendant. Russell gave Quinn a note with 
Behenna's name on it, which Quinn submitted for analysis. After comparing the 
note with the known handwriting of defendant, forensic document examiner Maureen 
Casey-Owens concluded that defendant had written the note. Russell later offered 
to wear a transmitting device and requested that Quinn help him with his 
existing prison sentence. Quinn refused and his contacts with Russell then 
ended.
The State also presented evidence of defendant's solicitation 
to murder John Apel, Sr. Quinn testified that he was contacted in January of 
1994 by Detective Mike Fleming, who reported that he had a note that had been 
seized during a routine search of inmate Maurice Coleman's cell at Cook County 
jail. The note refers to John Apel, Sr., describes where he lived and worked, 
contains maps, and contains other personal information about Apel. When Quinn 
talked to Coleman in January of 1994, Coleman told him that defendant had given 
him the note and asked him "to see to it" that the police officer named therein 
(John Apel, Sr.) was murdered. Coleman added that defendant had deposited $900 
in his commissary account, and Quinn verified that Coleman had indeed received 
$900 in his account at the time he said he had talked to defendant. Coleman 
wanted Quinn to help him with a pending murder charge, which Quinn could not do. 
Document examiner Casey-Owens concluded that defendant had written this note as 
well as the Behenna note. Officer Duffy corroborated Quinn's testimony about the 
Apel contract.
The State also presented evidence of defendant's criminal 
record. The State presented a police "rap sheet" showing defendant's numerous 
prior arrests. The State also showed that, before his sentencing hearing in this 
case, defendant had been convicted of aggravated battery, aggravated unlawful 
restraint and two counts of unlawful use of weapons. The State also produced 
newspaper clippings which described crimes that defendant had been charged with 
committing. Apel, defendant's uncle, testified that, shortly after each crime, 
defendant gave him a newspaper clipping about defendant's involvement in a 
crime. The State then presented testimony about defendant's alleged involvement 
in the burglaries of several department stores, "road rage" incidents in which 
defendant displayed a gun, defendant's fire bombings of fellow students' homes 
and threats to them while in college, defendant's threats to Tammy Behenna and 
her family, and defendant's threats to an attorney who had previously 
represented defendant.
The State also presented evidence of defendant's gun purchases 
and possession of weapons. Cook County sheriff's police detective Thomas Mayton 
was assigned to investigate the Rinaldi murder, and he checked the records of 
various gun shops. Detective Mayton found that defendant, prior to the murder, 
had purchased various types of handguns and rifles. Defendant was also found in 
possession of two different guns when he was arrested on two occasions in 1990. 
Moreover, on three different occasions in 1991 and 1992, when defendant was 
arrested on unrelated charges, police officers discovered a considerable amount 
of ammunition of different types and caliber and various weapons in defendant's 
possession. In addition, when Cook County corrections officer Thomas McInerney 
conducted a random search of defendant's cell on July 6, 1993, he found two 
razors under defendant's bunk and a pair of scissors inside the mattress. 
Defendant admitted possession of the razors in a disciplinary 
hearing.
Following the State's case in aggravation, the defense 
presented the following evidence in mitigation. Pat Marz testified that 
defendant had dated her daughter, and that he was a "gentleman" and "very 
respectable."
Anthony Goldstein, defendant's stepbrother, testified that he 
has known defendant all his life. Defendant is a "good man" who took in homeless 
people and who allowed them to live in buildings that he owned. Defendant, 
however, did not live with Goldstein when he lived in Indiana between the ages 
of 9 and 18.
Alvin Goldstein, defendant's stepfather for 27 years, provided 
a more comprehensive account of defendant's life. Goldstein described defendant 
as an intelligent child who learned things quickly. For example, defendant 
managed to pass exams after cramming at the last minute. After graduating from 
college, defendant became a paralegal and opened a real estate business. 
Goldstein testified that, "as an adult, he was just superb." Defendant showed 
respect for older relatives, protected his siblings, supported Tammy Behenna, 
and took in homeless persons. On cross-examination, Goldstein acknowledged that 
defendant had not lived with him for the last 14 years.
Several professional acquaintances testified on behalf of 
defendant. Patti Werner knew defendant in the real estate business and briefly 
dated him. According to her, defendant acted like a gentleman and treated her 
"great." John Manglardi also knew defendant from the real estate business. He 
knew defendant to be helpful and trustworthy. Deborah Fiorito, an attorney, 
represented defendant in an unrelated matter. Fiorito recalled that defendant's 
father had abandoned his family. She, however, was not aware of defendant's 
criminal background.
Nicholas Wayne grew up in defendant's neighborhood and stated 
that he has known defendant for 20 years. According to Wayne, defendant treated 
him well and was never violent.
Cleatus Coleman, a business associate of defendant's parents, 
described defendant as smart, energetic and "above board." He saw defendant once 
or twice a month, but defendant stopped visiting him at his store seven to nine 
years before the trial.
Andy Gonzalez, a volunteer chaplain at Cook County jail, 
testified that defendant was "wild and crazy" when he first came to him for 
counseling in the county jail. In his opinion, however, defendant is now calm 
and well behaved and a positive influence on other inmates.
After considering the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, 
the trial judge concluded that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to 
preclude the death penalty and sentenced defendant to death for the murder of 
Dana Rinaldi.
Codefendants Joseph Rinaldi and Michael Permanian were jointly 
indicted on charges of murder and conspiracy, with Rinaldi additionally indicted 
on a charge of solicitation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 8-1(a)). Rinaldi 
ultimately pled guilty in a separate proceeding and was sentenced to 60 years' 
imprisonment. With respect to Permanian, the trial court severed his case from 
defendant's case but conducted their trials jointly before separate juries. A 
jury found Permanian guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count 
of conspiracy. Permanian received a sentence of 75 years' 
imprisonment.
Additional relevant facts are set forth in the analysis portion 
of the opinion where necessary for a thorough discussion of the 
issues.
ANALYSIS
I. Pretrial Issue
A. Speedy Trial
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motions to dismiss the indictment because the delay between his 
arrest on June 10, 1993, and the commencement of his trial on January 25, 1996, 
violated his statutory right to a speedy trial. Defendant therefore requests 
that we reverse his conviction.
Initially, we note that an accused has a constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8. 
An accused also has a statutory right to a speedy trial under section 103-5 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (speedy trial statute), which specifies 
the periods of time within which an accused must be brought to trial. 725 ILCS 
5/103-5 (West 1994). The constitutional and statutory provisions address similar 
concerns; however, the rights established by each of them are not necessarily 
coextensive. See People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 525-26 (1992); 
People v. Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d 318, 323 (1990). In the present case, 
defendant asserts only a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial and 
does not raise a constitutional issue.
Section 103-5(a) provides that an accused in custody must be 
brought to trial within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody, unless 
delay is occasioned by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1994). Defendant 
was in custody from his arrest until trial and section 103-5(a) therefore 
applies. A delay is occasioned by the defendant and charged to the defendant 
when the defendant's acts caused or contributed to a delay resulting in the 
postponement of trial. See People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 438 
(1995); People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 550 (1989); People v. 
Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1982). A defense counsel's express agreement 
to a continuance may be considered an affirmative act contributing to a delay 
which is attributable to the defendant. See Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d  at 
106. The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a speedy-trial 
violation, and in making his proof, the defendant must show that the delay was 
not attributable to his own conduct. See People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 280 (1984). Any period of delay occasioned by the defendant temporarily 
suspends the running of the speedy-trial period until the expiration of the 
delay, at which point the statute shall recommence to run. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(f) 
(West 1994); see McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 438-39; People v. 
Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 149 (1990). An accused not tried within the 
mandate of section 103-5(a) must be discharged from custody, and the charges 
must be dismissed. See Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 137. The trial court's 
determination as to who is responsible for a delay of the trial is entitled to 
much deference, and should be sustained absent a clear showing that the trial 
court abused its discretion. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 438; 
People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 137 (1990); Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d  at 107. With these principles in mind, we now examine the periods of 
alleged delay in the instant case.
The first period at issue is the 47 days between June 10, 1993, 
and July 27, 1993. As noted, defendant was arrested on June 10, 1993, for the 
murder of Dana Rinaldi, and the 120-day period commenced on that date. According 
to the common law record, which contains the trial court's memorandum of orders, 
commonly referred to as "half-sheets," and the transcript of proceedings, the 
parties first appeared in court on June 11, 1993, when the trial court conducted 
a probable cause hearing and denied bail. At the conclusion of this hearing, the 
trial court continued the case until June 22, 1993. The State on appeal concedes 
that these 12 days are not delays attributable to defendant. The record reveals 
that the parties next appeared before the court on June 22, 1993, at which time 
the trial court entered a continuance by agreement of the parties to July 27, 
1993. Although there is no transcript available for the proceedings dated June 
22, 1993, the record is not silent concerning the reason for the delay because 
the record includes the half-sheets contained in the common law record. See 
People v. Sojak, 273 Ill. App. 3d 579, 582-83 (1995). According to both 
the half-sheet and an order entered by the trial court on June 22, 1993, 
defendant filed a motion to set bail, which was entered and continued by 
agreement of the parties to July 27, 1993. In general, an agreed continuance 
constitutes an affirmative act of delay attributable to the defendant which 
tolls the speedy-trial term. See Turner, 128 Ill. 2d  at 553; People 
v. Plair, 292 Ill. App. 3d 396, 398 (1997). Given that the continuance was 
by agreement, this period of time is attributable to defendant.
Defendant argues, however, that the State, during a hearing on 
a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds on June 5, 1995, 
conceded, and the trial court accepted, that the 34-day delay between June 10, 
1993, and July 14, 1993, was not attributable to defendant. At that same 
hearing, prior to the State's concession, the trial court indicated that the 
record showed a continuance by agreement between June 11, 1993, and July 27, 
1993. The trial court nevertheless accepted the State's concession. We find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in attributing this delay to the State. 
See Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 139 (in a criminal case, a factual 
determination by a trier of fact is entitled to great weight, but where the 
record does not support the finding, this court must reverse). As noted above, 
the record clearly establishes a continuance by agreement of the parties during 
this period. Consequently, only 12 of the 47 days between June 10, 1993, and 
July 27, 1993, should not be attributed to defendant and thereby computed within 
the 120-day period.
The next period at issue is the 130-day delay between March 14, 
1994, and July 22, 1994. Prior to March 14, 1994, defendant filed a series of 
motions, including a motion for discovery, a motion for substitution of judges, 
a motion to dismiss indictment, a motion for severance, a motion to suppress 
statements, and a motion to suppress "message unit detail records" and telephone 
records. Defendant on appeal concedes, and the record reflects, that he agreed 
to a series of continuances from July 27, 1993, until March 14, 1994. Defendant 
contends, however, that the period between March 14, 1994, and July 22, 1994, is 
not attributable to him because he had to wait for the court to assign another 
judge to hear his pending motions. We reject defendant's claim because this 
delay resulted from his filing of the aforementioned motions. A delay occasioned 
by the processing of the defendant's motions, including the time required for 
the State to respond and the time necessary for the court to hear and decide the 
issues, is attributable to the defendant. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 
440; Jones, 104 Ill. 2d  at 280.
A detailed review of the events occurring between March 14, 
1994, and July 22, 1994, reveals that this delay is attributable to defendant. 
On March 14, 1994, Judge Kavitt, who recused himself from defendant's case on 
February 10, 1994, granted Permanian's lawyer leave to file a severance motion. 
Defendant's attorney did not attend this March 14 proceeding. Judge Kavitt 
continued the case until April 15. This period of delay is chargeable to 
defendant. When a defendant's attorney fails to appear in court at the appointed 
time, his absence causes a delay attributable to the defendant. See 
Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 141; People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 354 (1970); see Sojak, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 584.
On April 15, 1994, when the parties appeared, Judge Kavitt 
reminded the parties that he could not proceed on defendant's motions, and that 
defendant's case would be assigned to a different judge after he had decided 
Permanian's severance motion, at which time he would know how many judges would 
be needed to hear the cases. Defendant's attorney agreed that defendant had no 
reason to pursue his own severance motion at this time because defendant would 
receive a separate trial as long as the judge granted his codefendant's motion 
for severance. Judge Kavitt continued the case for a hearing on the severance 
motion by agreement to May 6, 1994. We note that a defendant has the primary 
duty to call his motions for hearing and disposition. See People v. 
Donalson, 64 Ill. 2d 536, 542 (1976). Moreover, when defense counsel 
replied "that would be just fine" to the continuance, he expressly agreed to the 
continuance. See People v. Arsberry, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039 
(1993). A defendant is bound by the acts or omissions of his counsel. See 
Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at 141. Consequently, defense counsel's failure to 
call defendant's motion for severance for hearing and disposition, and counsel's 
agreement to the continuances during this period, resulted in a delay 
attributable to defendant.
The parties next appeared on May 6, 1994, when Judge Kavitt 
considered Permanian's motion for severance. The State agreed to the severance 
and the trial judge granted the severance of all three cases. Judge Kavitt 
thereafter transferred the cases to Judge Hoffenberg. On that same day, Judge 
Hoffenberg noted that defendant had previously removed him via a 
substitution-of-judges motion, precluding him from hearing matters relating to 
defendant. Judge Hoffenberg continued the case by agreement of codefendants' 
attorneys to June 17, 1994, for a hearing on the motions. Once again, defense 
counsel did not attempt to call his motions for hearing at this time. Rather, 
defense counsel stated that he wanted to be there on June 17, 1994, to hear the 
codefendant's motions. In response, Judge Hoffenberg continued defendant's case 
by agreement to June 17, 1994, for status. On June 17, 1994, defense counsel 
moved the court to assign a judge to hear his motions. Defendant's motion was 
allowed and all three cases were transferred to Judge Bierman. Defendant's and 
codefendants' attorneys agreed to a continuance to July 22, 1994, for status so 
that Judge Bierman could hear all pending matters. The period between May 6, 
1994, and July 22, 1994, is a delay occasioned by defendant because it arises 
from defense counsel's failure to call his motions for hearing and from 
defendant's prior motion for substitution of judge, which results in a delay 
that includes the actual reassignment to a new judge. See People v. 
Spicuzza, 57 Ill. 2d 152, 155 (1974); People v. Turley, 235 Ill. 
App. 3d 917, 920 (1992); People v. Helton, 153 Ill. App. 3d 726, 730 
(1987). We therefore conclude that the speedy-trial period was tolled from March 
14, 1994, to July 22, 1994, because of defense counsel's actions and defendant's 
motions.
The next period at issue is the 21-day period from August 24, 
1994, to September 14, 1994. On July 22, 1994, defense counsel agreed to 
continue the case with respect to the pending motions until August 24, 1994, for 
a hearing on pending motions. On August 24, 1994, the trial court continued the 
case on the State's motion to September 14, 1994. The State now concedes and the 
record reflects that this 21-day delay is not attributable to defendant. This 
21-day delay is therefore charged to the State and computed towards the 
speedy-trial period.
Defendant next contests the periods of delay between January 
12, 1995, and January 31, 1995, and between March 3, 1995, and June 5, 1995. 
From September 14, 1994, to January 12, 1995, and from January 31, 1995, to 
March 3, 1995, hearings were held on various defense motions. Defendant now 
acknowledges that defense counsel agreed to those continuances. When the parties 
appeared on January 12, 1995, defendant's case could not be heard because the 
judge was in the middle of a jury trial in another case. Defense counsel was not 
present; however, the trial judge addressed defendant personally and informed 
him that "all the attorneys [had] reached a date of agreement" when the court 
had contacted them earlier. The 19-day delay from January 12 to January 31 
cannot be charged to defendant because another trial was the cause of the delay. 
Defense counsel was given no choice in regard to this delay. As such, defense 
counsel was essentially forced to accept another date. The delay occasioned by 
the court's schedule cannot be attributable to defendant because the continuance 
was solely due to the trial judge's unavailability on January 12, 1995. See 
People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 423, 428 (1977).
On March 3, 1995, after concluding the hearing on the defense 
motions, defense counsel demanded trial. The trial court, however, refused to 
recognize the demand because defense counsel indicated to the trial court that 
he intended to file death penalty motions. The trial court found that, since the 
defense was planning to file such motions, it was not ready to proceed to trial 
and that the delay caused by those motions was attributable to the defense. The 
trial court continued the case until March 21, 1995, to give defendant's 
attorney time to file sentencing motions, as well as motions challenging the 
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute, and to allow the State 
time to respond. This delay was attributable to defendant even if, as defendant 
now claims, the motions did not require evidentiary hearings, because the State 
was entitled to time in which to prepare responses to defendant's numerous 
motions. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 440-41.
On March 21, 1995, the case was continued to March 23, 1995, on 
the court's motion. Because the case was continued on the court's motion, the 
two-day delay cannot be attributable to defendant.
On March 23, 1995, the trial judge heard and denied the 
sentencing motions filed by defendant. The trial court announced that June 5, 
1995, would be an agreed trial date. Defense counsel agreed. The trial court 
also stated that there was an agreed continuance for status to May 4, 1995. 
Defense counsel responded: "Very good, your Honor." On May 4, 1995, defense 
counsel requested to argue on June 5, 1995, a motion to dismiss the indictment 
on speedy-trial grounds for running of its term. The trial court allowed defense 
counsel's request. The trial court also stated that there was an agreed 
continuance of the case to June 5, 1995, for trial. This period of delay between 
March 23, 1995, and June 5, 1995, is chargeable to defendant because there was 
agreement by defense counsel to continue the date for trial to June 5, 1995. See 
Plair, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 400 (when defense counsel expressly consents 
to a particular trial setting, the delay up to that date is attributable to the 
defendant). We therefore conclude that defendant has not established that the 
delays between March 3, 1995, to March 21, 1995, and March 23, 1995, to June 5, 
1995, were delays caused by the prosecution. As such, these periods of time may 
not be counted in computing the 120-day period.
The State concedes that the 43-day delay between June 5, 1995, 
and July 18, 1995, is not attributable to defendant. On June 5, 1995, the trial 
court denied the defense motion to dismiss the indictment. The State sought a 
continuance because the prosecutor, a member of the United States Army Reserves, 
had been called for one week of active duty. Moreover, the prosecutor needed 
additional time to interview codefendant Joseph Rinaldi, who had decided to 
testify for the State against defendant and codefendant Permanian after 
accepting the State's plea bargain offer on May 22, 1995, and to reduce any of 
his statements to writing. The trial court continued the case on the State's 
motion to June 27, 1995, for status, and determined that this delay was 
attributable to the State. On June 27, 1995, the prosecutor, having completed 
his interviews of Rinaldi, sought more time in order to reduce his statements to 
writing and provide copies to defense counsel. The court continued the case 
until July 19, 1995, on the State's motion, and therefore the delay is 
chargeable to the State.
The final period of delay concerns the period between July 19, 
1995, and January 25, 1996. In addressing this period of delay, it is necessary 
to note that defendant had charges of armed violence, aggravated battery and 
aggravated unlawful restraint arising out of a July 1, 1991, incident with Tammy 
Behenna pending against him at the time officers arrested him and charged him 
with the Rinaldi murder. Initially, the State elected to proceed to trial first 
on the Rinaldi murder case. The State, however, sought to change that election. 
On June 5, 1995, the State not only sought a continuance in the Rinaldi murder 
case but also sought to change its election and proceed first with the other 
pending armed violence charges for the reasons stated in the preceding 
paragraph. Defense counsel objected to the change of election on the basis that 
it was a subterfuge on the part of the State to avoid the running of the 
speedy-trial term in the murder case. The trial court rejected defendant's 
argument and found that the State was entitled to change its election. The trial 
court determined that the fact that Joseph Rinaldi had recently become a witness 
for the State was a valid reason to change the election. The trial court 
therefore allowed the change of election and continued the case to June 27, 
1995. On June 27, 1995, in granting the State's motion to continue to July 19, 
1995, the trial court reaffirmed its prior ruling that the State had a right to 
change its election and proceed to trial first with the armed violence charges. 
On July 19, 1995, defense counsel informed the court that, although it was ready 
to proceed in the Rinaldi murder trial, it was not ready to try the armed 
violence charges. The trial court therefore ruled that the running of the 
speedy-trial statute was tolled in the murder case until the other pending 
charges were tried, and the trial court continued the case to August 17, 1995, 
for status. The murder case was continued several times thereafter so as to 
determine the status of the other pending charges, which ultimately proceeded to 
trial on October 18, 1995. Defendant was found guilty for aggravated battery and 
aggravated unlawful restraint on March 21, 1996, and was sentenced on May 9, 
1996. Meanwhile, defendant's trial for the Rinaldi murder commenced on January 
25, 1996. 
Defendant contends that the delay between July 19, 1995, and 
January 25, 1996, is attributable to the State and that the trial court 
erroneously tolled the speedy-trial statute during this period. Defendant claims 
that, because the State elected to proceed on the murder case, the State was 
required to try him for murder within 120 days of his arrest on June 10, 1993. 
Defendant further claims that the State was not entitled to change its election 
and proceed first on the armed violence case because the State's change of 
election represented a subterfuge to allow it to delay trial of the murder 
charge. We disagree.
Where a defendant is simultaneously in custody for more than 
one charge, the State must bring him to trial on one of those charges within 120 
days of his arrest and must try him on the remaining charge within 160 days from 
the rendering of judgment on the first charge. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(e) (West 1994). 
Section 103-5(e) thereby preserves a defendant's right to a speedy trial and 
also mitigates the State's burden of preparing more than one charge for trial 
against a single incarcerated defendant. Under section 103-5(e), the 
speedy-trial period on the second charge is tolled until a judgment is rendered 
in the first charge. The 160-day period from the entry of judgment on the first 
charge, however, is only tolled if the requisite circumstances occur with 
respect to the second charge, including a delay occasioned by the defendant or 
an interlocutory appeal. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(e) (West 1994); see People v. 
Brown, 92 Ill. 2d 248, 256-57 (1982) (interlocutory appeal in one case does 
not toll the 160-day statutory period in another case pending against the 
defendant). Because the State here announced on June 5, 1995, its decision to 
proceed to trial first in the armed violence charges, the State was required to 
bring defendant to trial on those charges within 120 days given that defendant 
was in custody on those charges. The speedy-trial period with respect to the 
murder case was therefore tolled from June 5, 1995, until judgment was rendered 
on the armed violence charges. Once judgment was rendered, however, the State 
was required to bring defendant to trial for murder within 160 days. The State 
brought defendant to trial in the murder case before judgment was rendered in 
the armed violence case. Consequently, defendant was tried within the 160 days 
provided for in section 103-5(e).
As a final matter, we reject defendant's contention that the 
prosecutors engaged in an act of subterfuge calculated to occasion delay in 
going to trial on the murder case. We first point out that the State is not 
precluded from changing its election. See People v. Beard, 271 Ill. 
App. 3d 320, 327-28 (1995) (allowing the State to change its election three 
times where the defendant was brought to trial within 160 days from judgment 
rendered on the first case); People v. Holmes, 234 Ill. App. 3d 931, 
939-40 (1992) (rejecting the defendant's claim that the State changed its 
election merely to give its expert time to revamp his findings in response to a 
defense challenge). If the law were to the contrary, a defendant could decide 
which charge should be tried first by challenging a prosecutor's legitimate 
reason for changing his election. In this case, the prosecutor changed his 
election primarily because he needed additional time in the murder case to 
interview codefendant Rinaldi, who had recently decided to testify for the 
State, and to prepare his statements. The trial court properly decided that this 
event constituted good cause for a change of election. The record does not show 
that the State changed its election as an act of subterfuge to delay proceeding 
to trial on the murder charge.
In sum, we find that only 97 days from defendant's arrest to 
commencement of his trial for murder are not attributable to defendant. We 
therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motions to dismiss. Accordingly, we hold that defendant was brought 
to trial within the statutory periods proscribed by the speedy-trial 
statute.
II. Trial Issues
A. Opening Statements
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial because the 
prosecutor, in his opening statements, promised that various witnesses would 
testify as to defendant's ownership of .22-caliber handguns and then failed to 
produce such evidence at trial. Specifically, defendant points to the following 
statements by the prosecutor:
The record reveals that, several days after the prosecutor's opening 
statements, defendant filed a motion to exclude testimony relating to the 
possession or purchase of handguns by defendant. The motion claimed that such 
testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial because the alleged guns had not been 
recovered, had been reported stolen before the murder, and had not been 
identified as the weapon used in the murder. Moreover, the motion noted that the 
only .22-caliber handgun found at defendant's residence had been tested and 
determined not to have been the murder weapon. The motion therefore concluded 
that the guns had not been shown to be connected to either defendant or the 
crime. At the hearings on this motion, the prosecutor explained that he was 
seeking to introduce into evidence records and testimony which showed that 
defendant had purchased two .22-caliber handguns, one in 1985 and one in 1987, 
to show that one of those guns possessed by defendant could have been the murder 
weapon given that the victim in this case was shot by a .22-caliber gun. The 
trial court ruled that there was an insufficient connection between these prior 
gun purchases and the crime and that evidence of defendant's ownership of these 
guns was prejudicial. The trial court therefore allowed defendant's motion to 
exclude this evidence.
Defendant now claims that the prosecutor's promises in opening statements of 
witnesses who would testify about defendant's purchase and possession of guns 
was reversible error because there was deliberate misconduct on the part of the 
prosecutor. According to defendant, the prosecutor had no good-faith basis to 
assume that testimony about purchases of unidentified handguns, which had been 
reported stolen by defendant before this offense, and had no hint of connection 
to this case, could be admissible, particularly where the only gun which had 
been recovered from defendant had been proven not to be the murder weapon. 
Defendant further argues that the intentional nature of the prosecutor's 
misconduct is apparent in regard to the promises of Apel's and Behenna's 
testimony about defendant's possession of handguns. Defendant points out that 
the prosecutor did not attempt to inquire of Apel or Behenna about this subject 
matter. Defendant therefore concludes that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's 
remarks because the prosecutor promised witnesses who would place the potential 
murder weapon in defendant's hand.
The State responds that defendant has waived this issue for review because he 
failed to object at trial. We need not address the State's waiver argument 
because waiver limits the parties' ability to raise an argument and not this 
court's right to entertain an argument. See People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998). For this reason, we address the merits of this issue.
The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what each party 
expects the evidence to prove. See People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355, 
392 (1992). An opening statement may include a discussion of the expected 
evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Leger, 149 Ill. 2d  at 392; People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 63 (1990). No 
statement may be made in opening which counsel does not intend to prove or 
cannot prove. See Smith, 141 Ill. 2d  at 63. As such, it is improper for 
counsel to make opening statements about testimony to be introduced at trial and 
then fail to produce that evidence. See People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 422 (1988). Nevertheless, it is not always grounds for reversal when an 
opening statement refers to evidence which later turns out to be inadmissible. 
Reversible error occurs only where the prosecutor's opening comments are 
attributable to deliberate misconduct of the prosecutor and result in 
substantial prejudice to the defendant. See Smith, 141 Ill. 2d  at 
64.
In the present case, the prosecutor's remarks regarding testimony relating to 
defendant's prior possession or purchase of .22-caliber handguns were improper 
because such matters were not later proven given the trial court's granting of 
defendant's motion to exclude such evidence at trial. We also agree with 
defendant that the prosecutor did not have a good-faith basis to believe that 
the evidence regarding the guns would be admitted. The prosecutor should have 
known that he could not demonstrate that the .22-caliber handguns allegedly 
purchased by defendant were sufficiently connected with the murder and defendant 
so as to permit testimony about them into evidence. See People v. Free, 
94 Ill. 2d 378, 415-18 (1983); People v. Yelliott, 156 Ill. App. 3d 
601, 602-03 (1987). As noted, Dana Rinaldi was murdered by a .22-caliber weapon; 
however, the two .22-caliber handguns allegedly owned by defendant, and about 
which the State sought to introduce evidence, had not been recovered, had been 
purchased years prior to the offense, and had been reported stolen before the 
murder. Consequently, the prosecution could not have shown that defendant had 
access to such weapons around the time of the murder. The prosecutor's 
statements, however, did not amount to reversible error. The prosecutor's 
remarks regarding these handguns did not result in substantial prejudice to 
defendant. The trial court instructed the jury both before opening statements 
and at the conclusion of the evidence that opening statements are not evidence 
and that the jury should disregard any statements not supported by the evidence. 
Moreover, the prosecutor presented no evidence concerning defendant's alleged 
prior possession and purchases of .22-caliber handguns to the jury. The 
prosecutor properly did not question Apel and Behenna about defendant's prior 
gun ownership in compliance with the court's order excluding such evidence. We 
therefore conclude that the prosecutor's opening statements did not deny 
defendant a fair trial.
B. Cross-Examination
Defendant challenges the trial court's limitation of defense counsel's 
cross-examination of two of the State's witnesses and argues that such 
limitation amounted to reversible error because of the witnesses' importance to 
the State's case.
Defendant first argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to 
confront and cross-examine State witness Joseph Rinaldi by the trial court's 
refusal to allow him to elicit additional information from Rinaldi regarding his 
alleged use of tranquilizers during his testimony at trial.
The record discloses that, several days following Rinaldi's testimony, 
defense counsel informed the trial court at a side bar conference that one of 
the prosecutors had been overheard telling police officers that Rinaldi had been 
tranquillized. The prosecutor emphatically denied such an allegation. At a 
hearing held outside of the jury's presence, Mary Permanian, codefendant's 
mother, testified that, during a break in the trial, she had overheard 
detectives ask the prosecutor in the hallway outside the courtroom how the 
prosecutor had gotten Rinaldi to remain calm, to which the prosecutor replied 
"we had him tranquilized." According to Mrs. Permanian, the prosecutor and the 
officers thought it was a big joke, and had smiles on their faces during this 
conversation. On cross-examination, Mrs. Permanian admitted that she could not 
remember the date when the conversation allegedly took place, and that she had 
waited several days before informing defense counsel about the conversation. 
Mrs. Permanian also could not name or describe the officers in any detail. The 
prosecutor testified that he did not make this statement, did not have any 
knowledge that Rinaldi was taking tranquilizers during his testimony, and did 
not discuss Rinaldi's testimony with the officers. Defense counsel moved to have 
Rinaldi returned to court for further examination, and for production of the 
jail's medication records for Rinaldi. The trial court denied each of these 
requests. The trial judge explained that she did not believe an accusation made 
by a codefendant's mother, who could not remember when the statement was 
allegedly made, and who admitted that she did not report this incident for 
several days. Moreover, the trial judge found that the State had refuted the 
testimony of Mrs. Permanian.
Defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to allow him to recall Rinaldi 
as an improper restriction of cross-examination. Defendant claims that he should 
have been allowed to cross-examine Rinaldi as to this issue because Rinaldi's 
use of tranquilizers was relevant to his credibility.
A criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to confront the 
witnesses against him, which includes the right to cross-examination. See 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974); People v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 474 (1985). Any 
permissible matter which affects the witness's credibility may be developed on 
cross-examination. See People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1994). 
This court has held that drug addiction of a witness at the time of testifying 
or at the time that an event occurred is a proper subject of cross-examination 
and may be used in an attempt to diminish a witness' credibility. See People 
v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 270 (1985); People v. Strother, 53 Ill. 2d 95, 99 (1972). Nevertheless, the latitude permitted on cross-examination 
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing 
court should not interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion 
resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. See Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d  at 37; People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 295 (1990).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding cross-examination 
of Rinaldi regarding his alleged use of tranquilizers. Defendant did not provide 
an adequate foundation to support his claim that Rinaldi had been on 
tranquilizers at the time of his testimony. In light of the testimony of both 
Mrs. Permanian and the prosecutor, we agree with the trial court that the State 
refuted the defendant's allegations. Therefore, additional inquiry into 
Rinaldi's alleged use of tranquilizers was not warranted. See People v. 
Crisp, 242 Ill. App. 3d 652, 660 (1992) (finding defense counsel was 
properly precluded from cross-examining the witness regarding the witness's 
alleged drug use because he failed to lay a proper foundation). Parenthetically, 
we note that defense counsel was able to cross-examine Rinaldi extensively about 
any motivation for lying and display to the jury whether or not Rinaldi was 
worthy of belief.
Defendant also claims that he was deprived of his constitutional right to 
confront and cross-examine State witness Tammy Behenna by the trial court's 
refusal to allow him to question Behenna about her current name, address, place 
of employment, and social security number.
The record discloses that, prior to Behenna's taking the stand, the State 
filed a motion in limine to bar defendant from questioning Behenna 
about her new name, new home address, new place of employment, and new social 
security number. In support of its motion, the State asserted that such matters 
were neither relevant nor material, and that disclosure might compromise the 
safety of Behenna, who had been placed in the witness protection program. 
Defense counsel countered that such information was relevant for 
cross-examination, and that such information was necessary to continue 
investigative efforts regarding Behenna's background. Defense counsel further 
argued that disclosure was necessary to show Behenna's interest and bias given 
the ongoing visitation battle between Behenna and defendant's family regarding 
defendant and Behenna's young son. The trial court granted the State's motion on 
the basis that such information was not relevant to establishing Behenna's 
interest and bias. The trial court, however, ruled that defense counsel could 
ask Behenna if she had changed her name and address, and whether she had entered 
the witness protection program.
Defendant now asserts that he was entitled to the disclosure of this 
information regarding Behenna so as to properly investigate her. In support of 
his argument, defendant relies on the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956, 88 S. Ct. 748 
(1968). In Smith, the trial court refused to allow the defense to 
inquire about the real name and address of the State's witness, who was both an 
informant and participant in the illegal sale of narcotics. The Supreme Court 
found this to be reversible error because the defendant was denied his right to 
confront a witness against him. The Court reasoned that when the credibility of 
a witness is at issue, the very starting point in exposing falsehood and 
bringing out the truth through cross-examination is to ask the witness who he is 
and where he lives because the witness' name and address open avenues of 
in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. Smith, 390 U.S.  at 
131, 19 L. Ed. 2d  at 959, 88 S. Ct.  at 750.
Initially, we note that the circumstances of this case are distinguishable 
from those in Smith. Unlike in Smith, Behenna is neither an 
informant nor a participant in the murder. Instead, the record reveals that 
Behenna is a witness whom defendant knew quite well. Moreover, there was 
evidence that Behenna's safety was a concern. The State informed the trial court 
that Behenna was in the witness protection program, which itself implies an 
issue of safety. It is evident that cross-examining Behenna about her current 
name, address, place of employment or social security number might have 
endangered her personal safety. See People v. Lewis, 57 Ill. 2d 232, 
237 (1974) (an informer should not be forced to disclose his name and address at 
trial on cross-examination if his life or safety is in jeopardy). We therefore 
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense 
counsel from making the aforementioned inquiries of Behenna because sufficient 
evidence was presented at trial that Behenna's safety was an issue. 
Parenthetically, we note that testimony at defendant's sentencing hearing 
supported the State's concern for Behenna's safety even after defendant's 
incarceration in Cook County jail in April of 1992. The record at sentencing 
reveals that defendant hired inmate Charles Russell sometime in 1993 to find 
someone to kill Behenna because she was prepared to testify against him in this 
case and another case pending against defendant.
In a related argument, defendant contends that the trial court improperly 
deprived him of his right to cross-examine Behenna about the terms of the 
visitation order regarding defendant and Behenna's son. During cross-examination 
of Behenna, defense counsel questioned her about the ongoing litigation between 
Behenna and defendant's family, namely that defendant's mother was seeking 
visitation rights with Behenna's son. After Behenna denied that defendant's 
mother had been granted visitation, defense counsel sought to question Behenna 
about the specific terms of a visitation order. The trial court refused to allow 
defense counsel to ask Behenna additional questions regarding the order. More 
specifically, the court refused to allow defense counsel to inquire: (1) whether 
Behenna had disobeyed a visitation order; (2) whether Behenna had brought the 
child to visit defendant's mother pursuant to the order; (3) whether defendant's 
mother had ever seen the child; and (4) whether Behenna had told numerous 
persons that members of defendant's family would never see the child. 
Nevertheless, the trial court allowed defense counsel to prove that defendant's 
mother had filed a petition seeking visitation, which was pending at the time of 
defendant's trial.
Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling prevented him from adequately 
informing the jury of the extent of Behenna's bias against him and motivation to 
offer false testimony. According to defendant, cross-examination as to the terms 
of the visitation order would show that Behenna had a motive to testify falsely, 
namely, to defeat defendant's family's attempts to gain visitation rights with 
her son.
A defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness concerning bias, 
interest or motive to testify falsely. See Davis, 415 U.S.  at 316, 39 L. Ed. 2d  at 354, 94 S. Ct.  at 1110; Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d  at 37; 
People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 144 (1988). The confrontation 
clause, however, does not prevent the trial judge from imposing limits on 
defense counsel's inquiry into potential bias of a witness. We have held that a 
trial judge retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such 
cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or of 
little relevance. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 683, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986); Harris, 123 Ill. 2d  at 
144. The United States Supreme Court observed in Delaware v. Fensterer, 
474 U.S. 15, 20, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 19, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1985), that "the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and 
to whatever extent, the defense might wish." (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, 
the improper denial of a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine a 
witness regarding bias does not always mandate reversal, but may be found to be 
harmless error. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 684, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 686, 
106 S. Ct.  at 1438.
Here, the trial court permitted defense counsel to question Behenna about 
defendant's family's attempts to obtain visitation rights with Behenna's son. 
The trial court merely limited defense counsel's inquiry into the terms of a 
visitation order. Despite this restriction, defense counsel was able to elicit 
from Behenna that there was ongoing litigation between herself and defendant's 
family regarding visitation rights with her son. This evidence was more than 
sufficient to point out to the jury Behenna's potential bias against defendant. 
We note, furthermore, that defendant was permitted a full cross-examination of 
Behenna in other respects. The jury was advised of information with which to 
make an informed decision about Behenna's motivation for offering false 
testimony. The jurors were informed that Behenna and defendant had ended their 
relationship. The jurors were also informed that Behenna had a sexual 
relationship with codefendant Permanian in 1991. In the context of this case, 
the restriction placed on defendant's cross-examination of Behenna by the trial 
court was minor. Therefore, we find that, even if the trial court erred in 
limiting Behenna's cross-examination regarding the terms of the visitation 
order, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Conspiracy Conviction
Defendant claims that his conspiracy conviction must be vacated because the 
statute of limitations for conspiracy had expired prior to the filing of the 
indictment, and the conspiracy allegation was insufficiently pled in the 
indictment. We need not consider these claims because no judgment on the 
conspiracy count was entered against defendant. Conviction is defined as a 
"judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a 
verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted 
jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without 
a jury." 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-1-5 (West 1996). Judgment 
means "an adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or not guilty, 
and if the adjudication is that the defendant is guilty, it includes the 
sentence pronounced by the court." 730 ILCS 5/5-1-12 (West 1996). Thus, a jury 
verdict is not a judgment of conviction because only the trial judge renders a 
judgment in a case. Here, the jury returned guilty verdicts for the conspiracy 
and murder counts; however, the trial judge did not enter a judgment of 
conviction or a sentence with regard to the conspiracy verdict. Instead, the 
trial judged entered an adjudication that defendant is guilty of first degree 
murder and sentenced him to death for that offense. We note that the trial 
judge's decision is consistent with the well-established principle that a 
defendant cannot be convicted of both the inchoate offense (i.e., 
conspiracy) and the principal offense (i.e., murder). 720 ILCS Ann. 
5/8-5, Committee Comments-1961, at 519-20 (Smith-Hurd 1993); see People v. 
St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 519 (1992). Given that there is no conspiracy 
conviction to vacate, there is also no reason to remand for resentencing, as 
advocated by defendant.
D. Conspiracy Evidence
Defendant also challenges the admission, through the testimony of Joseph 
Rinaldi, of several statements by defendant and Permanian regarding the 
conspiracy. Defendant claims that Joseph Rinaldi's testimony about preoffense 
and post-offense statements by defendant and codefendant Permanian was 
inadmissible because the State's evidence did not conform to the time 
limitations placed upon it by the bill of particulars. Prior to Rinaldi's 
testimony at trial, defendant filed a motion to exclude portions of Rinaldi's 
testimony which related to statements made by defendant and Permanian before and 
after February 18, 1988, which was the date on which the offenses of murder and 
conspiracy allegedly occurred pursuant to the bill of particulars. Defendant 
argued that he was surprised by that evidence because it was beyond the scope of 
the bill of particulars on which defendant relied in preparing his case. The 
trial court denied defendant's motion on the basis that the defense was not 
taken by surprise because the State tendered such statements to the defense 
prior to trial.
Rinaldi thereafter testified about meetings and conversations with defendant 
and Permanian before and after February 18, 1988. Rinaldi testified that, 
beginning in November of 1987, there were a series of meetings between him and 
Permanian. During these meetings, Permanian made statements that suggested the 
development of a plan by Permanian, Rinaldi and defendant to murder Dana 
Rinaldi. Rinaldi also testified about meetings with Permanian and defendant at 
which defendant agreed to murder Rinaldi's wife in exchange for a portion of the 
insurance proceeds. According to Rinaldi, defendant requested background 
information about Dana Rinaldi regarding her place of employment, work hours, 
and the location of their home, including the layout of their apartment complex, 
which defendant and Permanian indicated would be the best place to commit the 
murder. Rinaldi also testified about statements made by Permanian following the 
murder. These statements related to defendant's and Permanian's threats to 
Rinaldi, their efforts to collect the insurance proceeds from Rinaldi, including 
a payment schedule, and a plan to convert traveler's checks into cash in Las 
Vegas.
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by allowing Rinaldi's 
testimony about defendant's and Permanian's statements because these statements 
varied from the date of the murder and conspiracy set forth in the bill of 
particulars.
Section 111-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/111-6 (West 
1996)) provides that the trial court has discretion to require the State to 
furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars containing such particulars of 
the offense as may be necessary for the preparation of the defense. That section 
further states that "[a]t the trial of the cause the State's evidence shall be 
confined to the particulars of the bill." The purpose of the bill of particulars 
in criminal prosecutions is to give the defendant notice of the charge against 
him and to inform him of the particular transactions brought in question so as 
to enable the defendant to prepare his defense. See People v. Westrup, 
372 Ill. 517, 518 (1939); 21A Ill. L. &amp; Prac. Indictments and 
Informations §59 (1977). In general, the State is confined in its proof to 
the matters set forth in the bill of particulars; however, a bill of particulars 
limits the evidence only as to the matters that it purports to particularize and 
does not limit the introduction of evidence tending to prove such matters. See 
30 Ill. L. &amp; Prac. Pleading §243 (1993). Although the bill of 
particulars limits the State's evidence to transactions set out in the bill, the 
State is not required to disclose in the bill all of the evidence that will be 
offered in support of the charge. See Westrup, 372 Ill.  at 519; 
People v. Seawright, 228 Ill. App. 3d 939, 969 (1992). In fact, any 
evidence tending to establish the transactions set forth in the bill of 
particulars is admissible. See People v. Depew, 237 Ill. 574, 578 
(1908). Moreover, a variance between the bill of particulars and the evidence at 
trial does not result in reversible error where the defendant has not been 
misled or prejudiced in the preparation of his defense. See People v. 
Suter, 292 Ill. App. 3d 358, 364 (1997); People v. Paik, 257 Ill. 
App. 3d 620, 625-26 (1993); 21A Ill. L. &amp; Prac. Indictments and 
Informations §83 (1977), 30 Ill. L. &amp; Prac. Pleading §245 
(1993).
In this case, it is clear from the information relayed in the statements at 
issue that the State introduced those statements to support its charge of 
conspiracy to commit murder on the part of defendant. The offense of conspiracy 
arises where a person with intent that an offense be committed agrees with 
another to the commission of that offense and an act in furtherance of such 
agreement is alleged and proved to have been committed by that person or by a 
coconspirator. 720 ILCS 5/8-2 (West 1996). Consequently, conspiracy involves a 
criminal agreement to commit a separate criminal act or acts. The bill of 
particulars provided that the date of the conspiracy was on or about February 
18, 1988. Given that Rinaldi's testimony referred to events and statements which 
were made before and after that date, there was indeed a variance between the 
evidence presented by Rinaldi and the date of the conspiracy specified in the 
bill of particulars. However, we find that the trial court's ruling allowing 
Rinaldi's testimony despite that variance was not error. The preoffense 
statements laid a foundation for the conspiracy, and the post-offense statements 
indicated the ongoing nature of the conspiracy, which included obtaining 
insurance proceeds. Moreover, the trial court indicated that the State tendered 
Rinaldi's statements to the defense during pretrial discovery. The State's 
answer to discovery also provided that written or recorded statements and 
summaries of oral statements of codefendants, which included Rinaldi, were given 
to the defense. In view of these circumstances, we are not persuaded that 
defendant was misled or prejudiced in the preparation of his defense due to any 
variance between the date set forth in the bill of particulars and the evidence 
presented by the State. We therefore conclude that any variance did not amount 
to reversible error.
In a related claim, defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling 
that the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule permitted Rinaldi to 
testify about hearsay statements of Permanian occurring after Dana Rinaldi's 
murder. The following testimony by Rinaldi is at issue.
On February 18, 1988, several hours after the murder, Rinaldi called 
Permanian in accordance with their prior agreement. Rinaldi told Permanian that 
his wife, Dana, had been murdered and Permanian indicated that he knew because 
he had been listening to the news. Permanian asked Rinaldi how he had fared with 
the police, and Rinaldi admitted that he had told the police that Permanian 
owned a red sports car. When Permanian became upset, Rinaldi reminded him that 
he had originally planned to use a stolen car to commit the murder. Permanian 
responded that "he and Ron [defendant] had used his [Permanian's] car, and it 
was all over the news."
During a second conversation between Rinaldi and Permanian, which occurred 
sometime in March of 1988, Permanian angrily reported that officers had 
contacted him about Dana's murder. Permanian blamed Rinaldi for the police 
involvement because Rinaldi had told them about Permanian's red sports car. 
Rinaldi responded by telling Permanian that he was supposed to steal a car and 
make the murder look like a robbery. Permanian in turn responded that "Ron 
couldn't get the purse out of her hand, and it looked like one of the shots may 
have hit it." During this conversation, Permanian demanded payments for the 
murder. Shortly after this conversation, Rinaldi began making payments to 
Permanian and defendant.
Defendant also challenges additional statements in which Rinaldi and 
Permanian discussed Permanian's and defendant's demands for money, payment 
schedules, distribution of the insurance proceeds, and threats to kill Rinaldi. 
One such conversation occurred in August of 1989, when Permanian told Rinaldi 
that defendant wanted the remainder of the money owed to him. Permanian stated 
to Rinaldi that "Kliner [defendant] wanted his money by the end of the month, 
the end of August, or that he [defendant] was going to kill me [Rinaldi]." This 
conversation led to another conversation involving a gambling scheme to convert 
traveler's checks to cash in Las Vegas.
It is defendant's contention that the preceding statements were not 
admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule because they 
were made beyond the pendency of the conspiracy and did not further the 
conspiracy. Instead, these statements merely served to incriminate defendant. 
Defendant therefore concludes that the admission of these statements through 
Rinaldi's testimony violated his constitutional rights under the confrontation 
clause of the sixth amendment.
We find that Permanian's statements were admissible under the coconspirator 
exception to the hearsay rule. Pursuant to this hearsay exception, any 
declaration by one coconspirator is admissible against all conspirators where 
the declaration was made during the pendency of and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. See People v. Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d 278, 283 (1980). The 
coconspirator hearsay exception does not extend to a statement which is merely a 
narrative of past occurrences and which does not further any objective of the 
conspiracy. See People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 290 (1995). 
Statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy include those that have the 
effect of advising, encouraging, aiding or abetting its perpetration. See M. 
Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §802.10 (6th ed. 
1994). Statements relating to attempts at concealment further the objective of 
the conspiracy, which implicitly includes escaping punishment. Moreover, 
subsequent efforts at concealment of the crime, where sufficiently proximate in 
time to the offense, are considered as occurring during the course of the 
conspiracy. See People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 238 (1997).
Here, Permanian's statement to Rinaldi regarding the use of Permanian's car 
during the murder occurred the same day as the murder and, as such, was 
proximate in time to the commission of the underlying offense of murder. 
Permanian's statement went beyond a mere narrative of a past event. Rather, it 
was directed toward persuading Rinaldi to remain silent by explaining the 
alteration of the original plan with respect to using a stolen car. 
Consequently, Permanian's statement expressed his desire to conceal the 
conspiracy by encouraging Rinaldi not to reveal further information to the 
police. Because Permanian's statement was made in furtherance of an effort at 
concealment, the statement was also made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Cf. People v. Parmly, 117 Ill. 2d 386, 394-95 (1987) 
(codefendant's hearsay statement that the defendant fired the fatal shot was not 
admissible under the coconspirator exception because the statement was not made 
in furtherance of any effort at concealment, and it was a mere attempt by the 
declarant to place the principal blame for the murder on the defendant). We 
therefore determine that this statement was properly admitted pursuant to the 
coconspirator hearsay exception.
The remainder of Permanian's statements concern the collection of the payment 
for the murder. This court has found that statements made in an effort to obtain 
payment for the murder are admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception. 
See People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279 (1995). In Byron, this 
court was presented with a murder-for-hire scheme in which a codefendant 
testified about hearsay statements made by another codefendant after the murder. 
These statements revealed details of the murder, demands for payment and 
threats. We held that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony 
concerning these statements, which were made during the course of and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d  at 290-91. We 
reasoned that the conspiracy did not end with the victim's murder because the 
ultimate goal of the conspiracy was for the defendant and codefendants to obtain 
money as payment for the murder. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d  at 291. The 
conversations between the codefendants following the murder were calculated to 
further such financial interests, and the recitations about the murder were 
inextricably intertwined with the requests for money. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d  at 291.
Defendant contends that the holding in Byron cannot be applied to 
this case. We reject this contention. Although the statements in Byron 
were made within one week of the offense, the holding in that case is not 
premised on that fact. The statements in Byron were admissible not 
because they were made shortly after the murder, but because they were made 
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
In the case before us, as in Byron, a conspirator (Permanian) 
discussed certain details about the commission of the murder in his attempts to 
obtain payment for the murder. Permanian's statements were not merely a 
narrative of past details of the crime. Rather, Permanian's statements were made 
during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The conspiracy did 
not end with Dana Rinaldi's murder on February 18, 1988, because the conspiracy 
encompassed obtaining the insurance proceeds. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 
528 (the conspiracy included invading the victim's house, taking the electronic 
equipment, and selling it). The real objective of the conspiracy included 
Permanian's and defendant's obtaining the insurance proceeds from Rinaldi as 
payment for the murder. At the time of Permanian's statements, this goal of the 
conspiracy had not been accomplished. Permanian's statements served to further 
an objective of the conspiracy, namely, to obtain payment for the murder. Even 
Permanian's statement regarding Dana Rinaldi's purse was attributable to his 
attempts to obtain payment because it sought to encourage Rinaldi to pay 
Permanian and defendant for the murder despite the fact that the attempt to make 
it look like a robbery had failed. Under these circumstances, Permanian's 
statements were made in the course of the conspiracy and to advance the ultimate 
goal of the conspiracy. As we determined in Byron, Permanian's 
statements were inextricably intertwined with the continued requests for 
compensation from Rinaldi. Accordingly, we conclude that Permanian's statements 
made in the context of receiving payment from Rinaldi were admissible under the 
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
As a final matter on this issue, we reject defendant's claim that the 
admission of Permanian's statements violated the holding in Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In 
Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of his 
rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment when his 
codefendant's post-arrest confession, which incriminated the defendant, was 
admitted at their joint trial. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged 
that there was no recognized exception to the hearsay rule before it. 
Bruton, 391 U.S.  at 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct.  at 1623 
n.3. The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in 
Bruton. Here, unlike Bruton, the statements at issue do not 
involve a custodial confession by Permanian, and the statements were admissible 
under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Permanian's statements were also 
generally made under circumstances that indicate their reliability including 
that Permanian had personal knowledge of the incident, it was unlikely that 
Permanian's statements were founded upon a faulty recollection, the statements 
were against Permanian's penal interest given their context, and the statements 
did not contain any express factual assertion of defendant's guilt but only an 
inference of guilt. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 226-27, 91 S. Ct. 210, 219-20 (1970) (holding that the sixth amendment 
confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements 
under a Georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators 
where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the 
statements); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d  at 284-85 (finding hearsay statements 
admissible because there was sufficient indicia of reliability). Moreover, 
defendant was able to confront and cross-examine Rinaldi, who testified about 
the statements. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d  at 528 (holding that the 
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of 
hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, where 
the defendant was able to confront and cross-examine the witness who claimed 
that the statements at issue were made); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d  at 284 
(same). We therefore conclude that the use of Permanian's statements at 
defendant's trial did not deny defendant his constitutional rights under the 
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.
E. Evidence of Another Crime
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing 
the State to elicit from its witness evidence that defendant committed another 
crime.
On direct examination, Tammy Behenna, defendant's former girlfriend, 
testified about inculpatory statements made to her by defendant regarding the 
Rinaldi murder. Behenna indicated that she moved out of defendant's apartment on 
July 1, 1991, and began cooperating with law enforcement officials on September 
13, 1991, with regard to the Rinaldi murder. On cross-examination, defense 
counsel elicited from Behenna that on July 1, 1991, there was an "occurrence" 
between her and defendant that led to her filing of a complaint and defendant's 
arrest in September of 1991. Defense counsel further elicited that, although 
Behenna had been in court on several occasions seeking orders of protection 
against defendant, she had not included her alleged knowledge about defendant's 
role in the Rinaldi murder in the orders of protection and had not informed any 
of the judges before whom she appeared about that matter. On redirect 
examination, the prosecutor asked Behenna why she had sought the orders of 
protection against defendant. Defense counsel's objection was overruled. Behenna 
responded that "there was an incident in July when he pistol whipped me." 
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion for 
mistrial and ruled that defense counsel on cross-examination opened the door 
regarding the orders of protection and that the jury had a right to know the 
allegations surrounding those orders.
Defendant claims that it was impermissible for the trial court to permit the 
jury to hear that defendant had allegedly pistol-whipped Behenna because such 
evidence was not relevant to establish any material question.
In general, evidence of other crimes is not admissible if it is relevant 
merely to establish the defendant's propensity to commit crime. See People 
v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452 (1991); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). Evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes 
is admissible, however, where relevant to prove any material question other than 
the defendant's propensity to commit crime, including modus operandi, 
intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. See Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d  at 452; Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d  at 364-65. In considering the 
admissibility of other-crimes evidence, the trial judge must weigh its probative 
value against its prejudicial effect on the defendant, and may exclude the 
evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. 
See Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d  at 365. The trial court's ruling as to the 
admissibility of other-crimes evidence will not be reversed absent a clear 
showing of abuse of discretion. See Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d  at 364.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we conclude that the trial 
judge abused her discretion in admitting evidence that defendant had 
pistol-whipped Behenna. Although defense counsel referred to the orders of 
protection on cross-examination, he did not introduce the details surrounding 
those orders. Rather, he referred generally to the orders to show that Behenna 
did not discuss defendant's involvement in the Rinaldi murder in the context of 
those orders. In essence, defense counsel attempted to discount Behenna's 
testimony by showing that she did not make a prompt revelation to authorities 
even when she had the opportunity. On redirect, the prosecutor indicated that 
the purpose of discussing the basis of the orders of protection was to show that 
Behenna maintained her silence because of her fear of defendant. The prosecutor 
attempted to rehabilitate Behenna by showing that she was afraid of defendant; 
however, there was no reason to introduce to the jury that defendant had 
allegedly pistol-whipped Behenna. Such details of the other crime were not 
relevant to establish any material question because the prosecutor could have 
accomplished his purpose without referring to those details. Moreover, we find 
that the prosecutor introduced the pistol-whipping incident to enhance the 
credibility of Behenna by showing that defendant is a bad person who has a 
propensity to commit crime. Evidence of other crimes cannot be admitted to 
enhance the credibility of a witness. See People v. Romero, 66 Ill. 2d 325, 330-31 (1977). For these reasons, it was improper for the trial judge to 
admit the details of the pistol-whipping incident. See People v. 
Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 285 (1998).
Despite the erroneous admission of this evidence, we find this error to be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence regarding defendant's alleged 
pistol-whipping of Behenna was not so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair 
trial. See Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d  at 285-86 (finding the erroneous 
admission of certain details of other-crimes evidence to be harmless error). We 
find that the error is unlikely to have influenced the jury's verdicts such that 
its admission does not warrant reversal. As noted above, Behenna admitted on 
cross-examination that there is ongoing litigation between her and defendant's 
family regarding visitation rights with the child she had with defendant. On 
re-cross-examination, defense counsel admitted and published to the jury a 
number of photographs taken at family parties in July of 1991, in which Behenna 
bears no visible signs of injury. Defense counsel also elicited from Behenna 
that she was merely given Tylenol and did not receive X-rays following the 
alleged pistol-whipping incident. Defense counsel also showed that Behenna sent 
affectionate letters and a Christmas present to defendant after the alleged 
incident. Additional re-cross-examination elicited information that all orders 
of protection against defendant were eventually terminated. Consequently, 
defense counsel was able to again challenge Behenna's credibility with respect 
to the pistol-whipping incident such that any reference to that incident was not 
likely to have materially influenced the jury's decision. We therefore find that 
defendant was not prejudiced and was not denied a fair trial because of the 
admission of the alleged pistol-whipping incident.
In a related claim, defendant contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion in precluding him from eliciting from Behenna that defendant had been 
acquitted of armed violence for the pistol-whipping incident. At the time of 
Behenna's testimony, the case against defendant regarding the pistol-whipping 
incident was pending. Although the armed violence charge had been dismissed, the 
trial proceeded against defendant on the remaining two charges of aggravated 
battery and aggravated unlawful restraint. Defendant was found guilty of those 
charges after the jury returned a verdict of guilty against defendant in the 
instant case. We find that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's 
ruling because the jury was also not informed that a trial was proceeding 
against defendant on the remaining counts. Moreover, the jury heard defendant's 
outburst in court that he had been found not guilty of pistol-whipping 
Behenna.
F. Hearsay Statements
Defendant contends that this court should order a new trial because 
prejudicial hearsay testimony was erroneously admitted at trial.
On direct examination, John Apel, Sr., a witness for the State, testified 
that defendant had confessed to him in May of 1988 about the Rinaldi murder. 
During cross-examination, Apel recalled two occasions in March of 1993, when 
investigating officers interviewed him. On both occasions, he told the 
investigating officers that he had no "first hand" knowledge of the Rinaldi 
murder. He also told them that he had received all of his information about the 
case from Joe Splindorio, his father-in-law and defendant's grandfather. Apel 
then admitted on cross-examination that those statements to the investigating 
officers were false. Apel claimed to be afraid of defendant. Apel also admitted 
on cross-examination that in May of 1993, he finally told law enforcement 
officials about defendant's confession to him, following defendant's 
incarceration in Cook County jail.
On redirect examination, the prosecution attempted to elicit Apel's testimony 
about a conversation he had with Splindorio. The trial judge found that defense 
counsel's cross-examination of Apel had "opened the door with regard to him 
[Apel] garnering his information from Splindorio." The trial judge therefore 
ruled, over defense objection, that the prosecutor could ask Apel if he had a 
conversation with Splindorio and if he gave out information that he gleaned from 
that conversation. The trial judge, however, precluded the prosecutor from going 
into the actual contents of the conversation. The following exchange thereafter 
occurred between the prosecutor and Apel on redirect examination:
Defendant now claims that Apel's testimony regarding this 
conversation was hearsay because the jury could deduce that defendant had made 
inculpatory statements to Splindorio, and Splindorio was not called as a 
witness. According to defendant, such hearsay testimony was erroneously admitted 
since no exception to the hearsay rule applied. Defendant further claims that he 
was prejudiced by the admission of such hearsay because the testimony not only 
suggested to the jury that defendant made inculpatory statements to a close 
confidant, but also corroborated Apel's testimony. The State argues that 
defendant has waived this issue for review because he failed to raise it in his 
post-trial motions. Because we choose to address the merits of defendant's 
argument, we need not decide whether this issue has been waived.
Hearsay testimony is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. See People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 
161 (1991). Where an out-of-court statement is offered for some purpose other 
than to establish the truth of the matter asserted, the statement is not hearsay 
and is admissible. See People Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 70 (1984); M. 
Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §801.5 (6th ed. 
1994). We agree with the State that Apel's testimony did not improperly 
introduce statements by Splindorio, but established simply that a conversation 
had occurred between Apel and Splindorio. Defense counsel opened the door on 
cross-examination to the conversation with Splindorio by suggesting that Apel 
never had the conversation with him. Consequently, the statement itself had 
legal significance on redirect since the State sought to rehabilitate Apel's 
credibility by proving that Apel had a conversation with Splindorio. Apel's 
testimony about the conversation, however, was not offered to establish the 
truth of the matters asserted in the conversation. It was offered only to show 
that Apel and Splindorio had a conversation. We therefore reject defendant's 
claim that he was denied a fair trial by the erroneous admission of hearsay 
testimony.
G. Closing Arguments
Defendant claims that the prosecutor made a number of improper and 
prejudicial remarks during closing and rebuttal arguments. Defendant insists 
that the prosecutor's remarks deprived him of a fair trial and therefore warrant 
a new trial.
We initially note that the State claims that defendant has waived his 
challenge to most of the comments about which he now complains by failing to 
object to the comments at trial. We, however, choose to address the merits of 
defendant's argument, and therefore need not decide whether this issue has been 
waived.
It is well established that the prosecutor is afforded wide latitude in 
closing argument and may argue to the jury facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
from the evidence. See People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 407 (1994); 
Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d  at 38; People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 219 (1993); Smith, 141 Ill. 2d  at 60. It is, however, improper for 
the prosecutor to argue assumptions or facts not based upon the evidence in the 
record. See Smith, 141 Ill. 2d  at 60. The trial court has discretion to 
determine the proper character, scope and prejudicial effect of closing 
arguments. See People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507 (1993); 
People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 483 (1993). Improper remarks 
warrant reversal only where they result in substantial prejudice to the 
defendant, considering the content and context of the language, its relationship 
to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial 
trial. See Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d  at 483; Smith, 141 Ill. 2d  at 
60.
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on 
defendant's failure to produce certain evidence and witnesses. In closing 
argument, the prosecutor made the following remarks regarding the production of 
evidence:
Defense counsel objected, and the trial court instructed the jury to 
disregard anything that was not evidence, and that counsel's arguments were not 
evidence.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed reversible 
error when he repeatedly told the jury that the defense also had subpoena power 
and could have subpoenaed Rinaldi's bank records, Dornbos and Shriner. Defendant 
claims that the prosecutor's remarks improperly sent a message to the jury that 
they should place blame upon the defense for having failed to meet their burden 
of presenting this evidence and these witnesses. According to defendant, the 
prosecutor's comments resulted in shifting the burden of proof to defendant.
After examining the prosecutor's comments in the context of the proceedings, 
we find that such comments were not improper because they were based on 
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence or invited by the closing 
arguments of defense counsel. Moreover, we note that the trial court instructed 
the jury that the State has the burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that defendant is not required to prove his innocence. This 
instruction made it clear to the jury that the prosecutor could not shift the 
burden of proof to defendant.
During trial, Rinaldi testified that he initially paid defendant and 
Permanian several cash installment payments to avoid detection by the police. On 
cross-examination, Rinaldi indicated that he made these payments either out of 
his employment check or his bank account but that the bank records would not 
reflect a set amount. Defense counsel cross-examined Rinaldi about his inability 
to show bank records of withdrawals to corroborate his testimony regarding the 
installments payments. Defense counsel, on cross-examination, further elicited 
from Rinaldi that the State never inquired about the bank records. The 
implication by defense counsel was that the bank records would belie Rinaldi's 
claims regarding the installment payments and therefore represented the reason 
that the State did not produce those records. During closing arguments, the 
prosecutor merely responded to the inference set forth by defense counsel during 
trial. By referring to defendant's ability to subpoena those records, the 
prosecutor merely commented on the value of such records, which is a reasonable 
inference drawn from the evidence given Rinaldi's testimony that the records did 
not reflect the actual payments. As noted, an attorney's statements that are 
based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are within the scope of 
proper argument. See Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 219; Peeples, 
155 Ill. 2d  at 485-86.
The prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal regarding defendant's ability to call 
Dornbos and Shriner can be construed as a response to statements made by defense 
counsel in closing argument. We have held that the prosecutor may respond to 
comments by defense counsel which clearly invite a response (see 
Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 39), and that comments made in closing argument 
must be considered in the proper context by examining the entire closing 
arguments of both the State and the defendant (see Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d  at 507; Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 38). In closing argument, defense 
counsel reminded the jury that Dornbos was the lead investigator in this case, 
and that Dornbos had interrogated Rinaldi. Defense counsel then suggested that 
the jury consider why, if Dornbos had not made promises or threats to Rinaldi 
upon Rinaldi's arrest, as Rinaldi had originally testified at the suppression 
hearing, the prosecution had not called Dornbos to testify to that fact. In 
response to defense counsel's argument, the prosecutor pointed out on rebuttal 
that defendant could have called Dornbos as a witness. In so responding, the 
prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to defendant. See People v. 
Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 31 (1996) (holding that the burden of proof was not 
shifted when the prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to the defendant's 
right to " `subpoena each and every witness he may want to and put anybody 
at all on the witness stand' "); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 
42 (1996) (holding that the jury would not interpret the prosecutor's comment as 
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant where the prosecutor argued that 
" `[i]f there was anybody in the world that could describe the relationship 
***, you can be sure the defense would have had the people up on the 
stand' "). In fact, the prosecutor acknowledged that the burden of proof 
was on the State. Moreover, we find that the prosecutor's comments during 
rebuttal argument regarding defense counsel's ability to subpoena Dornbos were 
invited by defense counsel's argument that the State failed to call him as a 
witness. See People v. Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d 388, 423-25 (1989).
We likewise find that the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to 
defendant with respect to the comments about Shriner. In closing argument, 
defense counsel argued that, although police claimed that evidence was not 
released to the media, newsman Shriner knew about evidence in the case regarding 
a bullet and shell casings found on the ground on the night of the murder. 
Defense counsel suggested that the jury consider the State's failure to present 
testimony about alleged facts reported to the news media. Defense counsel sought 
to imply that the State's witnesses gleaned information about the case from 
media reports and not firsthand knowledge. In rebuttal, the prosecutor remarked 
about Shriner's lack of testimony at trial in response to defense counsel's 
arguments regarding the State's failure to call Shriner as a witness. This court 
has held that where the challenged remarks were invited, a defendant cannot 
assign them as error on appeal. See Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 43.
Defendant next claims that the prosecutor, in rebuttal argument, improperly 
commented on defendant's failure to testify at trial. In rebuttal argument, the 
prosecutor informed the jury:
Defendant contends that the prosecutor's reference to the "only witness" 
called by the defense and Rinaldi's testimony being "unrebutted" reminded the 
jury that defendant had not testified. A criminal defendant has a constitutional 
right not to testify as a witness in his own behalf. See People v. 
Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 146 (1991); People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 210 (1990). As a result, the prosecutor is prohibited from directly or 
indirectly commenting on the defendant's failure to take the stand in his own 
defense. See Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 146; Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d  
at 210-11. This court, however, has held that the prosecutor can describe the 
State's evidence as uncontradicted provided that the comments are not intended 
or calculated to direct the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to 
testify. See Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 147; Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d  
at 211. In determining whether the challenged remarks were improper comments on 
the defendant's failure to testify, a reviewing court must examine the remarks 
in the context of the entire proceedings. See Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 
147; Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d  at 211. Moreover, an error resulting from a 
comment on the defendant's failure to testify does not require reversal where 
the reviewing court is able to conclude upon an examination of the entire record 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 147-48.
We find that the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal were not intended or 
calculated to direct the jury's attention to defendant's failure to testify. The 
prosecutor responded to defense counsel's closing argument, which challenged the 
State's evidence against defendant, by summarizing the evidence presented by the 
defense. The prosecutor noted that the defense witnesses consisted of those who 
contradicted Tyrone Miller regarding Miller's ability to see someone in the 
parking lot on the night of the murder, and Ronald Russell, who attempted to 
impeach the testimony of Paul Skorupa regarding whether he saw the victim's car 
on the night of the murder. In particular, the comments referring to the "only" 
witnesses and Rinaldi's testimony being "unrebutted" were merely designed to 
characterize the evidence against defendant. These comments did not necessarily 
direct the jury's attention to defendant's failure to testify, and therefore 
were not improper. See Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d  at 211 (finding that the 
prosecutor's comments referred to omissions in testimony that could have been 
supplied by witnesses other than the defendant); cf. Howard, 
147 Ill. 2d  at 147 (determining impermissible comment on the defendant's failure 
to testify where the prosecutor referred to the absence of any testimony to 
contradict the statements appearing in the defendant's confessions and the only 
witness who would have presented such evidence was the defendant). Nevertheless, 
even if error occurred, the challenged comments did not deprive defendant of a 
fair trial. Defendant's rights were sufficiently safeguarded when the trial 
judge, at the close of the evidence, instructed the jurors that defendant's 
decision not to testify should not be considered by them in rendering a verdict. 
In light of the context of the proceeding, we conclude that the prosecutor's 
comments were not improper or did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. See 
People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 105-07 (1996).
Defendant claims that the testimony about Permanian's frisking Behenna for a 
wire had been heard only by the Permanian jury. According to defendant, this 
argument was improper because it was not based upon any evidence in defendant's 
case. Defendant also contends that such comments were prejudicial to him because 
they suggested defendant's guilt through testimony that primarily implicated 
Permanian.
We agree with defendant that is was improper for the prosecutor to refer to 
Permanian's frisking of Behenna. Most of the evidence concerning the listening 
device worn by Behenna was introduced by defense counsel, who, during Behenna's 
cross-examination, elicited the information that the police had provided her 
with a recording device on two separate occasions when she met with Permanian. 
Behenna indicated that she only wore the recording device with Permanian and not 
with defendant. This evidence was apparently brought out on Behenna's 
cross-examination to implicate Permanian. Consequently, any comments about 
Behenna wearing a listening device were fair comments on the evidence and 
defendant cannot now complain about prosecutorial comments relating to evidence 
which defense counsel elicited. Nevertheless, prosecutorial comments about 
Permanian's pat down of Behenna in search of a wire were not based on evidence 
from defendant's case and therefore were improper. Despite the improper comments 
by the prosecutor, no substantial prejudice accrued to defendant. See People 
v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 323-26 (1990) (finding prosecutorial 
comments improper where there was no evidence at trial to support the comments 
but not reversible error given the objection and the instruction to the jury). 
The trial judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's 
comments, and later instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence 
and to disregard any arguments not based on the evidence. Such instructions can 
serve to alleviate any possible prejudice from an erroneous closing comment by 
the State. See People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (1995); cf. 
People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d 36, 43-44 (1978) (the defendant was 
deprived of a fair trial where the prosecutor urged the jury to gauge the 
defendant's guilt by referring to his alleged accomplices' guilty pleas to the 
same offense and the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard it). 
Therefore, the prosecutor's improper reference to evidence introduced at 
Permanian's trial was not so substantial that it prejudiced defendant and 
deprived him of a fair trial.
In light of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the challenged prosecutorial 
comments during closing and rebuttal arguments did not operate to deny defendant 
a fair trial or due process of law. See Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431, 438, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 (1974) (prosecutor's 
remark has not made the defendant's trial "so fundamentally unfair as to deny 
him due process").
H.. Ex Parte Communications
Defendant argues that the trial judge engaged in improper ex parte 
communications with the jury when it responded to the jury's inquiries 
without notifying or consulting with defense counsel or defendant about the 
jury's requests and the appropriate responses. Defendant insists that he was 
prejudiced by the ex parte communications such that the trial court's 
actions amounted to reversible error.
The record reveals that the jury deliberated from February 26, 1996, to 
February 28, 1996. During the course of those deliberations, the jury sent six 
written notes to the judge. The jury's first written request to the court 
stated: "We need transcript of trial. Opening statements. Ranialdi 
[sic] testimony." In response, the court wrote "no" on the bottom of 
the note. A second note from the jury asked: "When were these pictures taken. 
What were dates taken of People's exhibit 56, 57, 58, 60."(1) 
In response, the court wrote "Feb. 1988" on the note. Below that response was 
written, "We disagree," with lines drawn through those words. In its next note, 
the jury announced, "We are done for today!" The judge did not respond to the 
communication. In its fourth note, the jury informed the court that: "Someone 
wishes to walk around block escorted is this okay? One person needs to get fresh 
air and clear their head. Thanks." In response, the court wrote, "No, sorry." In 
the fifth note, the jury wrote, "We are done for today!" The judge wrote, 
"Transportation is coming at 6:00 p.m. Continue to deliberate." In their final 
note, the jury complained about poor hotel and food accommodations and asked, 
"Can any of this be fixed should we need to stay longer?" Seven of the jurors 
signed their names. No response from the judge was indicated on this note.
The State initially responds that defendant's argument regarding the jury 
notes is waived. The State points out that defense counsel neither made an 
objection at the time of the alleged error nor stated this reason as grounds for 
error in his post-trial motions. It is well settled that both an objection at 
trial and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are necessary to 
preserve an alleged error for review. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Nonetheless, we have determined that application of the waiver 
rule is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the trial judge's 
conduct. See People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996). We 
therefore address defendant's claim of alleged judicial impropriety.
In examining communications between a jury and a trial court, this court has 
established certain principles. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right 
to appear and participate in person and by counsel at all proceedings involving 
his substantial rights. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 459; People v. 
Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 227 (1994). A communication between the judge and 
the jury following the jury's retiring to deliberate, except one held in open 
court and in the defendant's presence, deprives the defendant of his 
constitutional rights. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 459; 
Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  at 227. A jury verdict, however, will not be set 
aside where it is apparent that no harm or prejudice resulted from an ex 
parte communication. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 460; 
Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  at 227-28. The State has the burden of proving that 
any error in the ex parte response is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 460; Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  
at 228.
In this case, an ex parte communication did in fact occur between 
the trial judge and the jury. There is no indication in the record that the 
trial judge notified either defense counsel or defendant of the jury's six 
written inquiries. There is also no indication in the record that the trial 
judge conferred with defense counsel or defendant before answering the jury's 
inquiries or choosing not to reply. Instead, the trial judge communicated with 
the jury outside of defendant's presence during jury deliberations, which are a 
critical stage of trial affecting defendant's substantial rights. Consequently, 
the trial judge conducted an ex parte communication with the jury. See 
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 459-60.
Having determined that improper ex parte communications occurred, we 
next examine whether defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Defendant 
contends that he was harmed by the trial court's ex parte 
communications because he was denied an opportunity to suggest to the trial 
judge appropriate responses to the jury's notes. We disagree.
The general rule is that the trial court has a duty to provide instruction to 
the jury where it has posed an explicit question or requested clarification on a 
point of law arising from facts about which there is doubt or confusion. See 
Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  at 228-29. A trial court, however, may exercise its 
discretion and properly decline to answer a jury's inquiries where the 
instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently explain the relevant 
law; where further instructions would serve no useful purpose or would 
potentially mislead the jury; where the jury's inquiry involves a question of 
fact; or if providing an answer would cause the court to express an opinion 
which would likely direct a verdict one way or another. See Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  at 228. This court has found there to be prejudicial error where the 
trial court engaged in an ex parte communication and failed to answer a 
question of law. See Childs, 159 Ill. 2d  at 233-35 (where the trial 
court engaged in an ex parte communication that resulted in prejudice 
to the defendant when the jury expressed confusion on a question of law 
regarding the jury instructions and the trial judge referred the jury back to 
the original instruction).
As to the jury's first written inquiry, which requested transcripts of the 
opening statements and Rinaldi's testimony, the trial court had discretion to 
determine whether it would make the transcripts available. The decision whether 
to grant or deny a jury's request for transcripts of testimony rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and, unless there is an abuse of that 
discretion, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on review. See 
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 87. Initially, we note that the trial judge's 
response of "no" does not indicate that the denial of the transcripts was based 
upon the trial judge's mistaken belief that she had no discretion to provide the 
transcripts. Cf. People v. Queen, 56 Ill. 2d 560, 565 (1974) 
(trial judge stated that he could not have testimony of witnesses read to the 
jury and his reply was found to indicate that he erroneously believed he had no 
discretion to give the jury the transcript). In fact, there is no indication in 
the record that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the jury's 
request. See Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 86-88. Because the jury's request 
with respect to the transcripts did not involve a legal issue, the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion and declined to provide the transcripts. 
Moreover, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to provide 
the requested transcripts because the jury could not have considered the opening 
statements as evidence and the jury already had heard sworn testimony by 
Rinaldi, who had implicated defendant in the murder.
Defendant was also not prejudiced by the trial court's response to the jury's 
second note concerning the date of certain photographs. The trial court's 
response of February 1988 was factually consistent with the evidence presented 
at trial. This response did not "stamp" the State's position with the trial 
judge's approval, as advanced by defendant. We also reject defendant's 
additional claim that he was prejudiced by the trial court's response because 
some jurors disagreed with that response as indicated by the statement "we 
disagree" at the bottom of the note. This allegation is speculative and is not 
supported because the phrase "we disagree" has lines drawn through it.
Defendant's challenges to the court's responses or failure to respond to the 
remaining four notes are also without merit. Defendant argues that he was 
prejudiced because the trial judge may have acted in such a manner as to coerce 
a verdict. We find that these remaining notes did not provide information that 
was relevant to the issue of the jury's willingness to continue deliberating. In 
the third and sixth notes in which the jury announced respectively "we are done 
for today" and complained about their hotel and food accommodations, the court 
properly declined to respond to these notes because further instruction would 
serve no useful purpose. When informing the court that it was done for the day, 
the jury did not ask a question but merely informed the court of the status of 
its deliberations. Moreover, there is no indication that the jury's verdicts 
were hastened by the trial court's failure to respond to the complaints of poor 
accommodations. The note regarding the poor accommodations was written on 
February 27; however, the verdict was not reached until the following day. The 
length of time following the complaints and the rendering of the verdicts belies 
defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the trial judge's failure to 
respond. We likewise find no prejudice to defendant in the trial court's refusal 
to grant a juror's request to take a walk around the block. This request was 
also made on February 27, and the verdicts were not reached until the next day. 
Finally, we find that the trial judge's statement to the jury to continue 
deliberating until transportation arrived at 6 p.m. was an appropriate response 
to the jury's announcement that it was done for the day. This response conveyed 
neutral information and did not imply any pressure to reach a verdict, which as 
noted was not rendered until the next day. Defendant therefore suffered no 
prejudice from the trial court's providing the jury with this information. See 
People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 230-32 (1991) (where defendant was 
not prejudiced because the trial court told the jurors about the time and 
arrangements for their sequestration, including transportation). After 
considering all of the aforementioned notes, we find that the manner in which 
the trial court dealt with the jury's inquiries was not a factor in the jury's 
rendering of the verdicts of guilty against defendant.
Accordingly, we hold that the ex parte communications did not 
prejudice defendant, and as a result, such improper communications were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant therefore is not entitled to a new 
trial.
I. Jury Polling
Defendant challenges the manner in which the trial judge polled the jury. On 
February 28, 1996, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of first 
degree murder and conspiracy. Following the reading of the verdict, the jury was 
polled at the request of defendant. Each juror was asked, "Was this and is this 
now your verdict?" Each of the jurors responded "yes" to the question. Defendant 
now alleges that the trial judge failed to poll juror Reed Larson and mistakenly 
polled venireperson Bruce Kamp, who had been removed by a peremptory challenge 
prior to trial, juror William Peterson, who had been removed and replaced by 
alternate juror Lawrence Melvin before opening statements, and alternate juror 
Philip Buettner, who was discharged by the court at the end of the trial on 
February 26, 1996. Defendant claims that the trial court's polling of the jury 
indicated that nonjurors were improperly part of the deliberative process such 
that a question arises about the unanimity of the guilty verdicts entered 
against defendant.
The State points out that this issue is waived because defendant failed to 
object at the time the jury was polled and failed to raise this issue in his 
post-trial motions. As noted above, application of the waiver rule is less rigid 
where the basis for the objection is the trial judge's conduct. For this reason, 
we address defendant's claim regarding the polling of the jury.
The purpose of polling a jury is to determine that the verdict accurately 
reflects each juror's vote and that the vote was not the result of coercion. See 
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 462; People v. Kellogg, 77 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1979). When polling a jury, if a juror indicates some hesitancy or 
ambivalence in his or her answer, then the trial judge must determine the 
juror's present intent by affording the juror the opportunity to make an 
unambiguous reply as to the juror's present state of mind. See 
McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 463. A trial court's determination as to the 
voluntariness of the juror's assent to the verdict will not be set aside unless 
that determination is clearly unreasonable. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  
at 463.
Defendant's argument in this case is not based on the jurors' answers during 
polling. Rather, defendant questions the accuracy of the polling itself. We find 
that defendant's argument is based on typographical errors made by the court 
reporter when she transcribed the proceedings dated February 28, 1996, which 
included the polling of the jury. According to the original transcript of 
proceedings, Kamp, Peterson and Buettner orally assented to the verdict, and 
there was no questioning of Larson. This court, however, allowed the State's 
motion to supplement the record on appeal with a corrected transcript of the 
February 28, 1996, proceedings, which was prepared after the court reporter 
consulted her stenographic notes. The corrected transcript of the proceedings 
reveals that juror Larson was properly polled and assented to the verdict, 
whereas Kamp, Peterson and Buettner did not in fact participate in the poll. 
Consequently, the corrected transcript shows that all 12 jurors who actually 
served on the jury and signed the verdict forms confirmed their agreement with 
the verdicts.
We further note that other portions of the record corroborate the corrected 
transcript. The juror daily attendance sheet dated February 28, 1996, the date 
on which the poll was conducted, provides the names of the jurors who reported 
for service that day. This sheet shows that Larson was present, as indicated by 
his signature next to his name, and that Kamp, Peterson and Buettner were not 
present for that day. Kamp's name is not even listed and there is no signature 
next to the names of Peterson and Buettner. Instead, lines were drawn through 
the names of Peterson and Buettner because the court had earlier excused them 
from the jury. Even more revealing than the juror attendance sheet are the 
actual verdict forms signed by the jurors. Both guilty verdicts were signed by 
the 12 jurors, including Larson. Moreover, they do not contain any signatures by 
Kamp, Peterson or Buettner. Under these circumstances, defendant cannot 
demonstrate that Larson did not participate in the deliberations or that Kamp, 
Peterson or Buettner did participate. Cf. People v. 
Babbington, 286 Ill. App. 3d 724, 735 (1997) (reversing convictions and 
remanding the cause for a new trial because an alternate juror dismissed at the 
end of the trial indisputably signed the verdict forms, deliberated with the 
jury, and responded when polled). It is therefore evident that defendant's claim 
is contradicted by the record.
As a final matter, we reject defendant's alternative argument that we remand 
to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 329 
(134 Ill. 2d R. 329) so as to address the conflict between the two versions of 
the transcript. This court already granted the State's motion to supplement the 
record on appeal with the corrected transcript. In granting this motion, this 
court considered the arguments of the parties and the affidavit of the court 
reporter attesting to the errors in the original transcript of the proceedings 
and the accuracy of the corrected transcript. There is no evidence presented to 
question the accuracy of the corrected transcript, particularly in light of the 
fact that defense counsel did not object at the time the jury was polled.
Thus, defendant's claim is insufficient to warrant granting a new trial or 
remanding for an evidentiary hearing.
III. Sentencing Issues
A. Recusal of Sentencing Judge
Prior to the commencement of the eligibility phase of the death penalty 
hearing, defendant filed a motion for an in camera hearing. The motion 
sought to obtain information regarding whether ex parte communications 
from the sheriff's department had been made to the trial judge regarding threats 
to the trial judge by defendant and whether such information had prompted the 
trial judge to order additional security for herself, including having someone 
start her car. The motion further stated defendant's concern that such ex 
parte contacts reflected adversely on defendant at the sentencing hearing. 
The motion concluded that the trial court erred in not timely notifying 
defendant about the additional security arrangements and therefore requested an 
in camera hearing to address this matter. After hearing arguments by 
defense counsel regarding this motion, the trial court denied any improper 
ex parte contacts, and refused defendant's request for an in 
camera hearing. Defendant now argues that, under these circumstances, the 
trial judge erred in failing to recuse herself from the sentencing hearing or, 
at a minimum, from the hearing on defendant's motion.
Initially, we note that the trial judge is in the best position to determine 
whether he or she is prejudiced against the defendant. See People v. 
Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 80 (1988). The trial judge's decision will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See People v. Wilson, 37 Ill. 2d 617, 621 (1967). After considering the record, we find that the trial judge 
did not abuse her discretion in not recusing herself from either considering the 
motion or presiding over the sentencing hearing. A judge should disqualify 
himself or herself where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including instances where the judge has personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 
63(C)(1)(a). In this case, there is no basis for questioning the trial judge's 
impartiality and no indication of prejudice against defendant. The record 
contains no evidence of any ex parte communications concerning the 
merits of this case. The trial judge denied any improper contacts with anyone 
from the sheriff's department regarding threats by defendant and the need for 
additional security. Rather, the trial judge indicated that additional security 
was routinely ordered in capital cases. Moreover, when sentencing defendant, the 
trial judge neither referred to any alleged threats made by defendant against 
the court nor gave any indication that such threats influenced her sentencing 
decision or impeded her ability to give defendant a fair trial.
Parenthetically, we note that a trial judge has the duty to protect the 
safety of individuals in the courtroom by ordering additional security measures 
when necessary. In People v. Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494 (1995), the 
defendant argued that the sentencing judge had improperly considered an ex 
parte memorandum from the sheriff's department. The memorandum recommended 
additional security procedures at the sentencing hearing because defendant was 
prone to violent outbursts and planned to disrupt the courtroom following 
sentencing. This court held that there was no evidence that the sentencing judge 
improperly considered the memorandum for sentencing purposes, after noting that 
the sentencing judge did not refer to the memorandum or indicate that it 
influenced his sentencing decision. See Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d  at 508. We 
likewise find that the trial judge here merely instituted additional security 
measures, and did not engage in conduct that might result in questioning the 
judge's impartiality. We therefore reject defendant's claim as unsupported by 
the record.
B. Evidence in Aggravation and Closing Arguments
Defendant raises several challenges to evidence introduced or excluded at the 
second phase of the capital sentencing hearing. Defendant also challenges the 
trial court's rulings regarding closing arguments.
Defendant first challenges the admission of certain evidence presented by the 
State in aggravation. More specifically, defendant refers to testimony by 
Officer Richard Stuebe regarding information he received from university 
officials and students concerning prior criminal conduct by defendant while 
attending Northeastern Illinois University, including charges of assault and 
complaints involving defendant's threats to others; testimony by Officer Frank 
Bresnahan regarding a threatening phone call allegedly made by defendant from 
Cook County jail to Steven Smith in Ontario, Canada, on January 28, 1995; and 
the admission of defendant's Chicago police department "rap sheet," which 
indicated defendant's prior arrests. Defendant argues that such evidence was 
unreliable because the testimony by Officers Stuebe and Bresnahan amounted to 
uncorroborated hearsay and the prior arrests noted in the "rap sheet" did not 
result in convictions. Defendant maintains that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting this evidence. Defendant therefore requests a new 
sentencing hearing.
At the second phase of the death penalty hearing, evidentiary rules are 
relaxed because it is important that the sentencing authority have before it the 
fullest information possible regarding the defendant's life, character, criminal 
record and the circumstances of the particular offense. See People v. 
Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 283-84 (1989). It is well settled that the 
standard for admissibility of evidence proffered during the aggravation and 
mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing is that the evidence be 
relevant and reliable, the determination of which lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge. See People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 96 
(1987); People v. Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d 44, 65 (1984). Hearsay evidence 
of crimes that did not result in prosecution or conviction is admissible at the 
second phase of the death sentencing hearing provided it meets the requirements 
of relevancy and reliability. See People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 
331 (1998); People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 111 (1996); People v. 
Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 450 (1993). Moreover, evidence relating to a 
defendant's past criminal conduct, including a "rap sheet," is relevant to the 
sentencing phase because it provides an insight into the defendant's character. 
See People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 361-62 (1988); People v. 
Lego, 116 Ill. 2d 323, 346-47 (1987).
In this case, defendant argues that the aforementioned evidence is unreliable 
because it was not corroborated at his death penalty proceeding. In addressing 
defendant's claim, we note that, where the trial court alone conducts the 
sentencing hearing, the trial court is presumed to have considered only properly 
admitted evidence in determining the sentence. See People v. Cortes, 
181 Ill. 2d 249, 291 (1998); People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 149 
(1987); Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d  at 65-66. There is nothing in this record 
to rebut that presumption. We observe that the trial court, in stating its 
findings, made it clear that it was not relying on all of the evidence offered 
by the State in aggravation. In fact, the trial judge specifically announced 
that she had rejected any evidence she did not find to be sufficiently reliable. 
The trial judge stated: "I would like to state that I have had to sort through 
some of this evidence. Some of the State's evidence was not necessarily reliable 
or reliable enough, and the Court has not considered that evidence in sentencing 
here today." Additionally, the record indicates that the trial judge did not 
cite to any of the evidence here challenged by defendant in announcing the 
factors she considered in aggravation. Consequently, defendant was not 
prejudiced by the admission of such evidence. See Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d  
at 291; People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 300 (1987); 
Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d  at 66. Therefore, the trial court's admission of 
the preceding evidence, even if erroneous, did not deprive defendant of a fair 
sentencing hearing.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the 
defense to impeach a State witness who gave evidence in aggravation at the 
sentencing hearing. The defense attempted to attack the credibility of John 
Apel, Sr., by inquiring of Alvin Goldstein, who was defendant's step-father and 
Apel's brother-in-law, about Apel's reputation for truthfulness. The trial court 
sustained the State's objection. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in 
its ruling because Goldstein would have testified about Apel's poor reputation 
for truth and veracity. Defendant therefore seeks a new sentencing hearing.
It is well established that a witness in a criminal case may be impeached by 
proof of reputation for untruthfulness. See M. Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's 
Handbook of Illinois Evidence §608.2 (6th ed. 1994). The proper procedure to 
introduce evidence of truthfulness is to ask the impeaching witness whether he 
knows the general reputation of the principal witness' truthfulness in the 
neighborhood in which he lives or amongst those with whom he works or 
socializes. See M. Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence 
§608.3 (6th ed. 1994). The testimony must relate to the witness' reputation at 
the time of trial. See M. Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois 
Evidence §608.3 (6th ed. 1994). As noted above, evidentiary determinations at a 
capital sentencing hearing are examined under an abuse of discretion standard. 
See Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d  at 65.
With these principles in mind, we examine defense counsel's attempted 
impeachment of Apel. The record shows that defense counsel did not ask Goldstein 
for Apel's reputation in the neighborhood in which he now lived or among those 
with whom he worked or socialized. Moreover, Goldstein could not report Apel's 
reputation at the time of trial because Goldstein indicated that he had not seen 
much of Apel after 1990, which is six years prior to the trial. Accordingly, 
under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing this evidence.
In addition to evidentiary errors, defendant claims that he is entitled to a 
new sentencing hearing because of the trial court's rulings regarding closing 
arguments. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
Defendant claims that this argument was improper because it suggested 
defendant's future dangerousness should a death sentence not be imposed, and 
thereby improperly influenced the decision to impose the death penalty in this 
case. We note that the possibility of committing future crimes is irrelevant to 
the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. See Edgeston, 
157 Ill. 2d  at 241. Nevertheless, when the trial judge is the sentencer, it is 
presumed that the trial judge based his decision upon competent and reliable 
evidence, which does not include arguments of counsel. See People v. 
Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 154 (1992); Evans, 125 Ill. 2d  at 95. It 
is also presumed that the trial judge ignored irrelevant, inflammatory or 
emotional factors in determining the sentence. See Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d  
at 154. There is no evidence in this record that shows the trial judge here made 
a decision on the basis of these remarks by the prosecutor. See 
Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d  at 154-56. Consequently, there is no reasonable 
possibility that the prosecutor's remarks improperly influenced the sentencing 
decision of the judge. Therefore, we find that defendant was not denied a fair 
sentencing hearing.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to overrule 
the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's reference in closing argument to 
residual doubt as a mitigating factor. We disagree. This court has previously 
held that residual doubt is not relevant to the imposition of the death penalty 
because it is not relevant to the circumstances of the offense or the 
defendant's character. See McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 456; 
Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 244-45. We find no reason to depart from this 
court's prior decisions.
We therefore reject defendant's claims of error during the second stage of 
the death penalty hearing and find no basis warranting the granting of a new 
sentencing hearing.
C. Disparate Sentences
Defendant contends that his death sentence is unreasonably disparate from the 
60-year term of imprisonment imposed on Joseph Rinaldi. In support, defendant 
claims that he and Rinaldi are equally culpable because Rinaldi planned the 
murder of his wife and hired others to commit it. Defendant further claims that 
his character and background do not support the disparity between the sentences. 
Defendant requests that because there is no basis for the disparate sentences, 
his sentence of death be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.
In reviewing a death sentence disparity claim, we have compared a defendant's 
death sentence to the sentence imposed upon a codefendant. See People v. 
Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 479 (1996); People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 80 (1995); People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 134 (1990); People 
v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 82-90 (1988). This court's decisions have 
focused on such factors as the nature of the offense, each defendant's relative 
involvement or culpability, his character and background, including any criminal 
record, and his potential for rehabilitation. See People v. Griffin, 
178 Ill. 2d 65, 89 (1997); Towns, 174 Ill. 2d  at 479; Burt, 
168 Ill. 2d  at 80; Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 134. This court has held that 
similarly situated codefendants should not be given arbitrarily or unreasonably 
disparate sentences. See Burt, 168 Ill. 2d  at 80; People v. 
Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 119 (1991).
With these principles in mind, we find that defendant's death sentence is not 
unreasonably disparate to Rinaldi's 60-year sentence. Defendant's claims do not 
support a conclusion that he and Rinaldi were equally culpable in the commission 
of Dana Rinaldi's murder. The evidence shows that defendant and Rinaldi did not 
have equal roles in the actual murder of Dana. Rather, defendant was the one who 
repeatedly shot Dana in cold-blood. Defendant had the final opportunity to 
preserve Dana's life when his gun jammed. Nevertheless, defendant chose to fire 
the fatal shot. Although we do not minimize the role Rinaldi played in hiring 
defendant, we find that under the circumstances, defendant's conduct is more 
culpable. See Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 90; People v. St. 
Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 513-14 (1992); Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 135; 
Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d  at 88-89.
We further find that the evidence shows that defendant and Rinaldi are not 
similarly situated with respect to their character and background. To aid our 
review in this matter, the record has been supplemented with transcripts of the 
sentencing hearing following Rinaldi's plea of guilty. Members of Rinaldi's 
family testified about his good character. There was no evidence presented that 
Rinaldi had a prior criminal record. There was also testimony that Rinaldi's 
behavior in jail was exemplary and that he was considered an outstanding inmate. 
Moreover, Rinaldi expressed his sorrow and remorse at the sentencing hearing. 
After considering the evidence, the trial judge found Rinaldi to be remorseful 
and capable of being rehabilitated.
Defendant's character and background differ significantly from that of 
Rinaldi. The evidence presented at defendant's trial and sentencing hearing 
showed that defendant had been involved in a number of burglaries, fire-bombings 
of homes of people with whom he had minor disagreements, and traffic 
altercations in which he displayed a gun. There was also evidence that defendant 
had hired someone to murder his uncle and girlfriend while he was incarcerated. 
Moreover, defendant exhibited no remorse for his role in Dana's murder, as 
evidenced by his bragging and laughing about that murder. Finally, defendant 
adjusted poorly to incarceration, as indicated by his possession of weapons and 
threats to others while in prison. The aforementioned evidence shows that 
defendant's criminal history is more extensive and his prospects for 
rehabilitation significantly poorer than Rinaldi. Comparing the character and 
background of defendant and Rinaldi provides an additional basis for the 
sentence disparity between them.
We therefore conclude that a more severe sentence for defendant was justified 
and proper given the circumstances of this murder and defendant's character and 
background.
IV. Constitutionality of the Illinois Death Penalty Statute
As a final matter, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the Illinois 
death penalty statute. Defendant contends that the statute is unconstitutional 
because it places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful 
consideration of mitigating evidence, allows the sentencer to weigh a vague 
aggravating factor, and fails to minimize sufficiently the risk of arbitrarily 
or capriciously imposed death sentences. This court has previously considered 
and rejected these claims. See, e.g., People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 522-23 (1996); People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439-40 
(1995); Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d  at 247. Defendant offers no compelling 
reason why this court should reconsider its prior decisions. We therefore adhere 
to those decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty 
statute and reject defendant's claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County 
is affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting 
Thursday, March 18, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death, entered by 
the circuit court of Cook County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be 
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk 
of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the 
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden 
of the institution where defendant is confined.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Ronald Kliner's conviction should be upheld. For the reasons set 
forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, No. 81578 (November 10, 1998), 
however, this state's present death penalty law does not meet the requirements 
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. 
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) or article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution 
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Accordingly, we should vacate Kliner's death 
sentence and remand the cause to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence 
other than death.
1. The State's Exhibits numbered 56 through 58 and 60 are 
photographs depicting Tyrone Miller's apartment and the view of the street from 
his apartment's second-floor window out of which he testified that he saw 
codefendant Permanian jogging at the time of the 
murder.