Title: Commonwealth v. Vaughn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-08400
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2015

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SJC-08400 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEFFREY VAUGHN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2015. - May 12, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Duffly, JJ. 
 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Affidavit, Disclosure of 
evidence, Conduct of prosecutor, Assistance of counsel, 
Failure to object, Jury and jurors, Capital case.  
Evidence, Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence, Testimony 
before grand jury, Police report, Impeachment of 
credibility, Hearsay.  Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 19, 1998.   
 
 
The cases were tried before James D. McDaniel, Jr., J., and 
a supplemental motion for a new trial, filed on December 17, 
2009, was heard by Thomas E. Connolly, J. 
 
 
 
 
Eileen D. Agnes for the defendant. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In June of 1999, a Superior Court jury convicted 
the defendant, Jeffrey Vaughn, of murder in the first degree for 
the shooting of Robert Mason in a schoolyard in the Dorchester 
2 
 
section of Boston on the night of November 29, 1997.1  The 
defendant now brings this direct appeal as well as an appeal of 
the denial of his motion for a new trial.  Represented by new 
counsel on appeal, he claims the judge considering his motion 
for a new trial improperly denied it without an evidentiary 
hearing, that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence timely, that the prosecutor knowingly solicited false 
testimony, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.  The 
defendant also requests that we exercise our power pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or direct the entry of 
a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt.  We affirm the conviction 
and the order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, 
and decline to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   
 
1.  Facts and background.  We recite the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving further details for discussion of 
the specific issues raised.  On the morning of November 30, 
1997, police responded to a report of a dead body in a 
schoolyard in the Dorchester section of Boston.  There, they 
found the victim, later identified as Robert Mason.  The victim 
had been shot five times, twice in the head and once in the 
chest and each arm, by a .40 caliber firearm.  Later that day, 
John Hyppolite, the victim's close friend, was arrested pursuant 
                     
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of possession of a 
firearm.  No argument is made regarding this conviction, and we 
do not consider it.   
3 
 
to a warrant issued in an unrelated matter.  As a result of a 
conversation with Hyppolite, the following day, December 1, 
1997, police sought a warrant to arrest the defendant, charging 
him with the murder of the victim.   
 
The defendant was arrested later that night.  During his 
arrest, the defendant refused to answer the door of the 
apartment where police found him attempting to escape out the 
back.  On December 30, 1997, while awaiting indictment in 
custody, the defendant saw Troy Meade, a friend and the brother 
of a woman with whom the defendant had a child, in the holding 
area of the booking room in the Suffolk County jail.  Meade 
engaged the defendant in a conversation about the murder.  The 
defendant admitted killing the victim because the victim had 
once held a brother of the defendant, Walter "Wally" Vaughn, 
upside down over a second-story balcony at a party.  That 
brother had since been murdered.  The defendant also stated that 
it had been his intention to kill Hyppolite because he had 
witnessed the murder but the defendant's other brother, Jamal, 
was in the way.  The weapon the defendant said he used was a .40 
caliber firearm.  Meade had seen the defendant with a .40 
caliber pistol several weeks before the murder.   
 
The defendant's statement to Meade referenced a series of 
escalating events in a conflict between, on one hand, the 
defendant and his brothers and, on the other, two brothers by 
4 
 
the name of Tim and Eric Mathis.  The defendant suspected Tim 
Mathis of killing the defendant's brother, Wally Vaughn, while 
the defendant was incarcerated.   
 
In addition to the balcony incident with Wally Vaughn, the 
defendant further knew that, while the defendant had been in 
prison on an unrelated matter, the victim had been the driver in 
a drive-by shooting targeting Meade, on April 30, 1997.  The 
Mathis brothers were passengers in that vehicle as was 
Hyppolite.  In a telephone conversation made from his place of 
incarceration, the defendant promised Meade that he would "take 
care" of the perpetrators, including the victim.  This 
conversation took place while Meade was at the house of Jeff 
Pruitt, another friend of the defendant.   
 
The defendant was released from prison in early November, 
1997.  Shortly after his release, the defendant attended a 
party; watched a movie, rewinding and replaying certain portions 
of the videotape constantly; and stated that he would seek 
revenge on unnamed parties.  After his release, he also 
reiterated to Hyppolite this desire for revenge, specifically 
naming Tim Mathis.   
 
On the night of November 29, 1997, Jamal Vaughn and 
Hyppolite met the victim at his house to go socializing.  Later 
in the evening, they were joined by the defendant.  Eventually 
the four of them arrived at a nearby schoolyard where it was 
5 
 
common to drink alcohol.  The usual practice was to loiter on 
the stairs to keep watch for police surveillance.  On this 
night, however, the defendant suggested the group move to the 
side of the school.  The group moved.   
 
There the conversation between the defendant and the victim 
quickly turned to the defendant's deceased brother Wally and 
encompassed the occasion on which the victim had held Wally 
upside down over a second-story balcony.  The defendant grew 
emotional during this discussion and displayed a handgun.  At 
the sight of the weapon, the victim became visibly nervous and 
asked the defendant to be careful.  Hyppolite intervened and 
attempted to defuse the situation.  Seemingly mollified, the 
defendant put the gun away.  Hyppolite turned away from the pair 
to relieve himself and heard a gunshot.  He turned around in 
reaction and saw the victim falling to the ground with the 
defendant standing over him with the gun in his hand.  He saw 
the defendant shoot the victim several more times after he had 
fallen to the ground, including twice in the head.   
 
The group fled.  Jamal Vaughn ran to a local bar and then 
to meet his older brother Dwayne Vaughn at their sister's house.  
Hyppolite went in another direction, and the defendant soon 
joined him.  The defendant warned him not to tell others of the 
events of the evening.  Hyppolite insisted that the defendant 
had taken his retribution against the wrong person.  They 
6 
 
continued on to Hyppolite's house, where the defendant 
persistently asked to use the telephone over Hyppolite's initial 
refusal.  Fearing the defendant, who still had the gun, 
Hyppolite relented.  The defendant called his older brother 
Dwayne.   
 
Wishing to vacate the area, Hyppolite called for a ride 
from a friend.  The defendant, meanwhile, stated that more 
retribution was to come.  Hyppolite's friend arrived to give him 
the requested ride.  The defendant asked if they could bring him 
to his brother Dwayne's house.  The driver agreed.  As they 
drove, the defendant saw two sisters with whom he was familiar:  
Sherelle and Jeanine Jackson.  Jeanine was a former girl friend 
of the defendant.   
 
The defendant requested the driver pull over.  The 
defendant took Jeanine Jackson out to the back of a house for 
several minutes.  Sherelle Jackson overheard part of the 
conversation between her sister and the defendant in which the 
defendant told Sherelle that something would be found in the 
schoolyard.  After waiting a while, Hyppolite went to retrieve 
the defendant at the request of the driver.   
 
The defendant returned to the car, this time with the 
Jackson sisters.  The group, now five in number, drove to the 
residence of the defendant's sister where they met Dwayne 
Vaughn.  There, the defendant and Jeanine Jackson got out of the 
7 
 
car.  Hyppolite, the driver, and Sherelle Jackson waited in the 
car.  Jeanine returned to the car a short while later, soon 
followed by the defendant.  After one more stop, the driver and 
Hyppolite left the defendant and the Jackson sisters at a 
residence.  Before parting, the defendant repeatedly insisted 
that Hyppolite speak to Jamal the next day.   
 
At this location, the defendant and the Jackson sisters 
entered an apartment belonging to one of Sherelle's friends.  
There, Sherelle was privy to a further conversation between the 
defendant and Jeanine in the kitchen.  The defendant said he had 
"eight more to go."  Sherelle's memory of this conversation 
consisted of portions she had overheard mixed with details her 
sister had later supplied.   
 
The next day, the defendant called Hyppolite.  The 
defendant warned Hyppolite to speak to "nobody" about the events 
of the previous night and, if asked, to say that the group had 
actually been at Pruitt's house the night before.  Jamal Vaughn 
went to Hyppolite's house after this conversation.  Hyppolite 
confronted Jamal about the killing.  Jamal responded only that 
the victim had gotten what he deserved.  Later that evening, 
Boston police officers arrested Hyppolite.   
 
At trial, the defendant relied upon a misidentification 
defense.  Hyppolite testified that the defendant was the 
shooter.  After initially stating an unidentified third party 
8 
 
was present (contradicting his testimony before the grand jury 
in this case), Jamal Vaughn eventually testified that Hyppolite 
in fact had pulled the trigger.   
 
The defendant called as a witness Keith Pomare, a friend.  
Pomare testified that on the night in question he had approached 
the schoolyard looking for friends and saw the victim, 
Hyppolite, the defendant, and Jamal there.  The group was 
"bebopping and rapping" and "messing around with beats."  Unseen 
by the group, Pomare testified that he heard and saw John 
Hyppolite shoot the victim.  Still unseen in the aftermath of 
the shooting, Pomare testified that he stayed at the scene as 
the group fled and then walked over to the body.  He then fled 
himself.  Pomare admitted he had not testified to these facts 
before the grand jury and that he had deliberately lied on that 
occasion.   
 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
first degree based on a theory of deliberate premeditation with 
malice aforethought.  Following the trial, the defendant moved 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  In support 
of this motion, the defendant proffered two virtually identical 
affidavits from one Carl Jones, dated September 5, 2000, and 
December 9, 2008.  The affidavits give no home address nor other 
identifying information of the affiant.   
9 
 
 
In these affidavits, Jones swore that, on the night in 
question, he saw four black males in the schoolyard from his 
residence across the street.  From his unknown vantage point, he 
saw that three of the males were six or more feet tall and that 
one of the males was five feet, four inches tall.2  Jones swore 
that he saw one of the taller males shoot one of the other tall 
males, matching the description of the victim.  The affidavits 
go on to state that after the group fled, a previously unnoticed 
male walked over to the body, looked upon it, and then fled.  
The affidavits conclude that several days later Jones saw 
television reports relating to the murder and that the shorter 
male, presumably the defendant, was identified as the murderer.  
Jones asserts that police had arrested the wrong individual.   
 
The motion judge, who was not the trial judge, rejected 
these affidavits as not credible and denied the motion for a new 
trial.  The defendant appealed claiming several errors.  We 
address each claim of error in turn.   
 
2.  Motion for a new trial.  The defendant claims as error 
the denial of his motion for a new trial without an evidentiary 
hearing.  "The trial judge upon motion in writing may grant a 
new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have 
been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
                     
 
2 The victim was approximately six feet, two inches tall.  
The defendant is approximately five feet, six inches tall.  
Hyppolite was more similar in height to the victim than the 
defendant.  All were black males.   
10 
 
1501 (2001).  The defendant bears the burden of proving the 
facts on which he relies in his motion for a new trial.  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 378 Mass. 165, 171 (1979), S.C., 470 
Mass. 595 (2015).  Where the appeal from the denial of a motion 
for a new trial is considered with the direct appeal from the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, we review 
the denial of that motion to determine whether an abuse of 
discretion or other error of law occurred.  Commonwealth v. 
Savann Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 781 (2012).  If such abuse or error 
is found, we look to see if it created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  Id.  "Where, as here, the motion 
judge was not the trial judge and the motion judge did not make 
credibility determinations arising from an evidentiary hearing, 
we consider ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge 
to review the trial record. . . .  Nevertheless, we review a 
judge's decision on a defendant's motion for a new trial based 
on the common-law claim of newly discovered evidence for a 
significant error of law or other abuse of discretion."  
(Citations and quotations omitted.)  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 
469 Mass. 340, 351 (2014).   
 
The defendant must support his motion for a new trial with 
affidavits.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  The primary purpose of Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (c) (3) is to encourage the disposition of motions for 
11 
 
postconviction relief on the basis of affidavits alone.  See 
Reporter's Notes to Rule 30 (c) (3), Massachusetts Rules of 
Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 222-223 (Thomson Reuters 
2014).  See also Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 260 
(1981).  The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion 
for a new trial is "left largely to the sound discretion of the 
judge."  Id. at 257.  Only when the motion and affidavits raise 
a "substantial issue" is an evidentiary hearing required.  
Commonwealth v. Chatman, 466 Mass. 327, 334 (2013).   
 
"In determining whether a 'substantial issue' meriting an 
evidentiary hearing . . . has been raised, we look not only at 
the seriousness of the issue asserted, but also to the adequacy 
of the defendant's showing on the issue raised."  Stewart, 383 
Mass. at 257-258.  "[N]ewly discovered evidence that is 
cumulative of evidence admitted at trial tends to carry less 
weight than new evidence that is different in kind."  
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305-306 (1986).  In 
determining the adequacy of the defendant's showing, the motion 
judge may consider whether the motion and affidavits contain 
credible information of sufficient quality to raise a serious 
question.  See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 792 n.14 
(2004) (motion judge may assess credibility of defendant's 
claims).   
12 
 
 
"When weighing the adequacy of the materials submitted in 
support of a motion for a new trial, the judge may take into 
account the suspicious failure to provide pertinent information 
from an expected and available source."  Commonwealth v. 
Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 354 (2004).  Such a failure "speaks 
volumes."  Id.  "A judge is not required to accept as true the 
allegations in a defendant's affidavits even if nothing in the 
record directly disputes them,"  Commonwealth v. Rzepphiewski, 
431 Mass. 48, 55 (2000), or if the affidavit is uncontroverted.  
See Commonwealth v. Thurston, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 551 (2002).  
Even where, as here, the motion judge did not preside at the 
trial, the credibility, weight, and impact of the affidavits are 
entirely within the motion judge's discretion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 634 (2000).  In such cases it is 
important that the judge provide some reasons for accepting or 
rejecting a particular affidavit or group of affidavits, to 
assist the appellate court in understanding whether the judge 
acted within his or her discretion.  Id.   
 
The Jones affidavits essentially identify Hyppolite as the 
shooter and corroborate Pomare's testimony.  The motion judge, 
however, did not credit the Jones affidavits.  The judge found 
that the absence of identifying information, such as Jones's 
address and birth date, was troubling given the passage of time 
since the trial.  The judge similarly gave weight to the fact 
13 
 
that, in the ten years since the verdict, Jones never had 
contacted the police to give a statement regarding his knowledge 
that the police had arrested and prosecuted an innocent man.  
The judge also acknowledged the Commonwealth's presentation of a 
letter addressed to Jamal Vaughn from the defendant and an 
unsigned affidavit accompanying the letter.  In the letter, the 
defendant strongly asks Jamal to sign the affidavit which the 
defendant had prepared in Jamal's name.  On these bases, the 
judge simply refused to believe anything contained within the 
affidavits.  On these facts, we cannot say that the judge's 
decision not to give weight to the affidavits was the product of 
an error of law or an abuse of the judge's discretion.   
 
Similarly, the judge was within his discretion in denying 
the motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.  The 
assertion that a person matching Hyppolite's description was the 
shooter and that a fourth person approached the body of the 
victim after others present in the schoolyard had fled was 
merely cumulative of the evidence offered by the defendant at 
trial.   
 
The defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Trung Chi Truong, 
34 Mass. App. Ct. 668 (1993), for support.  Nothing in that case 
leads us to a different conclusion.  In Truong, the defendant 
was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery after two 
men and a woman robbed a jewelry store.  Id. at 668-669.  The 
14 
 
defendant's wife was charged for the robbery as well.  Id. at 
669.  At his trial, the defendant and his wife both testified 
that the defendant had picked up his wife and daughter for a 
doctor's appointment at the time of the robbery.  Id. at 669-
670.  The Commonwealth later filed a nolle prosequi in the case 
of the wife after the fingerprints at the crime scene were 
matched to a different person.  Id. at 673.  The defendant 
relied on this fact in his motion for a new trial, arguing that, 
as this new match pointed to a different female robber, his 
alibi defense that he was with his wife and daughter at the 
doctor's appointment was bolstered.  Id. at 674.  The 
Commonwealth argued that the evidence was cumulative and not 
material.  Id. at 673.  The motion judge denied the motion 
without an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 670.  The Appeals Court 
determined that the motion judge had abused his discretion 
because "the prosecution relied upon evidence that the 
defendant's wife participated in the robbery as evidence from 
which the jury could infer the defendant conspired with her to 
commit the robbery and which refuted the defendant's alibi that 
he was taking her and their daughter to the doctor."  Id. at 
674.  This reliance, taken in conjunction with the relative 
weakness of the remainder of the Commonwealth's evidence, meant 
that the Commonwealth's later decision to file a nolle prosequi 
15 
 
in the case of the wife raised a substantial issue in the 
defendant's case.  Id. at 674-675.   
 
In the instant case, the Jones affidavits do not remove an 
essential pillar of the Commonwealth's evidence comparable to 
the decision to nolle prosse the wife in Truong, which called 
into question an important inference upon which the Commonwealth 
had relied in seeking a conviction of the defendant.  The 
affidavit proffered by the defendant only parrots some of the 
evidence at trial.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of the 
discretion of the motion judge in denying the defendant's motion 
for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.   
 
3.  Failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.  Troy Meade 
testified under oath about the April 30, 1997, shooting in which 
Meade was the victim in two separate grand jury investigations.3  
The first investigation occurred on June 3, 1997, and named John 
Doe as the subject.  The second occurred on April 22, 1998, and 
named Tim Mathis as the subject.  On the eve of trial the 
prosecutor learned of Meade's testimony about the April 30, 
1997, shooting and disclosed it to the defendant pursuant to a 
general request for discovery of exculpatory evidence.  As we 
will explain, some uncertainty exists as to what information 
exactly the defendant received, but at a minimum, it was the 
                     
 
3 The grand jury testimony in this case remains impounded.  
We refer only to that grand jury testimony cited by the parties 
in their briefs before this court. 
   
16 
 
minutes of Meade's grand jury testimony on June 3, 1997.  The 
defendant now claims that he never received the minutes of 
Meade's grand jury testimony from April 22, 1998.  The defendant 
also argues that the Commonwealth's failure to disclose the 
police reports relating to the April 30, 1997, shooting was a 
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.  The late disclosure 
and failures to disclose, taken together or singly, the 
defendant urges, denied him a fair trial.4   
 
The defendant asserts specifically that the alleged failure 
to disclose the April 22, 1998, grand jury minutes cast Meade's 
disclosed testimony before the grand jury on June 3, 1997, in a 
misleading light and thus deprived him of an opportunity to 
demonstrate Meade's bias and motivation to lie.  The police 
reports, the defendant continues, demonstrate Hyppolite's motive 
to commit the murder.  We address each in turn.   
 
a.  Grand jury minutes.  The Commonwealth asserts that the 
defendant received the April 22, 1998, grand jury minutes at the 
same time he received the June 3, 1997, grand jury minutes.  At 
trial, the judge addressed the handling of both the grand jury 
investigation for this case as well as those "that relate to 
                     
 
4 The defendant now argues that these nondisclosures were 
intentional but offers no evidence in support of this argument.  
Trial counsel never alluded to any such suspicion.  We discern 
no basis in the record to support the contention that the 
Commonwealth intentionally withheld evidence.  We therefore 
analyze this issue under the assumption that the Commonwealth 
acted in good faith.   
17 
 
Troy Meade" and ordered both marked for identification.  The 
exhibit list shows two entries for identification of grand jury 
minutes but does not describe them further.  We conclude that it 
is safe to say that one entry accounts for the minutes of the 
grand jury investigating the defendant and the other for Meade's 
testimony in the grand jury investigations in which Meade was 
the alleged victim.  The question we must resolve is whether the 
second entry includes Meade's testimony of April 22, 1998.   
 
The Commonwealth attempts to resolve this uncertainty by 
pointing to questions asked by defense counsel containing 
information contained in the April 22, 1998, grand jury 
transcript but not the June 3, 1998, grand jury transcript.  
Specifically the Commonwealth highlights a question by defense 
counsel to Meade referencing the fact that Meade had identified 
the victim to the police as one of four individuals in the car 
on April 30, 1997.5  Although the fact that four people were in 
the car on that date had come out during the trial already, no 
mention had been made at any point of the fact that it was Meade 
who had told police four people were in the car and identified 
them.  The police reports, supplied in the record, demonstrate 
that Meade did make such an identification to the police, but 
                     
5 Q.:  "You knew of [the victim] enough that you could 
identify him to the police as one of the four people 
in that vehicle where someone was trying to kill you, 
is that so?  You have to say yes or no."   
 
A.:  "Yes, sir."   
18 
 
the defendant already had stated he never received them.  Thus 
the only basis for the statement Meade had identified four 
people came from the April 22, 1998, grand jury minutes, 
contradicting the defendant's claim that his counsel never 
received them.   
 
Even if we were to err on the side of caution and assume 
without deciding that the prosecution did not deliver the 
April 22, 1998, minutes to the defendant and that those minutes 
were exculpatory, the defendant fares no better.  "Where the 
prosecution denies the defendant exculpatory evidence but the 
defendant . . . has made only a general request, this court will 
order a new trial or reduction of the verdict whenever the court 
concludes that there is a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Simmons, 417 Mass. 60, 
73 (1994).  We easily conclude that when the Commonwealth fails 
to provide grand jury testimony by a nonpercipient witness on an 
unrelated incident that the defendant would use only to impeach 
that witness and the defendant has already successfully called 
into question the witness's truthfulness, no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice exists.  The issue at 
trial here was the identity of the person who shot Robert Mason.  
Meade did not witness that shooting.  His bias and prior 
contradictory testimony already had been considered by the jury 
in weighing his testimony as to the defendant's jailhouse 
19 
 
confession and likely would not have affected the trial's 
outcome.   
 
b.  Police reports.  For substantially the same reasons, we 
find no error in the nondisclosure of the police reports of the 
April 30, 1997, shooting.  The defendant argues that it is only 
in these reports that Hyppolite's motive to murder the victim 
emerges.  The police reports in question do not mention 
Hyppolite.  The defendant sees this lack of mention as support 
for his defense that Hyppolite was motivated to kill the victim 
to extinguish any evidence of his involvement in the shooting.  
The defendant's reading of the reports is not reasonable.   
 
The police reports regarding the April 30, 1997, shooting 
of Meade simply describe police efforts to ascertain the 
identity of the perpetrators of that crime.  The reports do not 
mention Hyppolite as a suspect.  From this fact, the defendant 
asserts that Hyppolite killed his friend more than six months 
later in an effort to remain unsuspected.  The defendant's 
theory is speculative, convoluted, and confusing.  We cannot 
interpret the failure of the police reports to mention Hyppolite 
as evidence that an affirmative desire to remain unsuspected 
prompted Hyppolite to kill Mason.  Their nondisclosure was not 
error.  But again, even were we to assume without deciding that 
the reports may be exculpatory, we would still conclude that 
their nondisclosure after a general request did not result in a 
20 
 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because they 
do not address the issue of the identity of Robert Mason's 
killer.  See Simmons, 417 Mass. at 73.   
 
4.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant claims that 
the prosecutor knowingly elicited false testimony from Meade and 
failed to correct it, in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264 (1959).  At issue is the prosecutor's attempt to 
establish the nature of any promises made by the district 
attorney's office in connection with Meade's testimony at trial.  
During the course of that effort, the prosecutor elicited from 
Meade that the first time he and Meade had contact in this case 
was when Meade was called to testify in front of the grand jury.6  
The defendant cries foul.   
 
According to the defendant, the first time Meade was 
brought before a grand jury in this case was January 30, 1998.  
                     
6 Q.:  "It's fair to say, sir, that when you came to the 
Suffolk County Grand Jury to testify in this case you 
did not even know that you were being brought in to 
testify?"   
 
A.:  "Exactly." 
 
Q.:  "Did you call the Suffolk County D.A.'s office to say 
that you had information?"   
 
A.:  "No, I didn't."   
 
Q.:  "Is it fair to say the first time you came into 
contact with the Suffolk County District Attorney's 
office was when they brought you into court?"   
 
A.:  "Yes, sir."   
21 
 
Visitors' logs from the jail obtained by the defendant show the 
prosecutor visiting Meade on January 15, 1998, fifteen days 
prior.  Therefore, the defendant concludes, the prosecutor 
knowingly elicited false testimony and failed to correct the 
record.   
 
This argument is part of the effort to project Meade's 
testimony as the product of collusion between Meade and the 
prosecutor.  The defendant, however, is mistaken in his factual 
understanding that the first time Meade met with the prosecutor 
was on January 30, 1998, when Meade testified before the grand 
jury.  The docket shows an oral motion for a writ of habeas 
corpus by the prosecutor on December 29, 1997, for a witness to 
appear the next day.  The Commonwealth has produced that writ 
commanding that the sheriff of Suffolk County produce Meade on 
December 30, 1997, to Suffolk Superior Court.  The prosecutor 
first met with Meade on December 30, 1997, when he was brought 
to "court," as he had testified.   
 
Similarly, the defendant claims he was denied a fair trial 
when Meade testified at trial that he could not identify the 
shooter in the April 30, 1997, incident, which was inconsistent 
with his April 22, 1998, grand jury testimony.  The defendant 
argues that the prosecutor had access to the April 22, 1998, 
grand jury minutes, failed to correct this point, and that 
failure amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.  "That a 
22 
 
prosecution witness contradicted [himself] is insufficient to 
show that the Commonwealth knowingly used perjured testimony."  
Commonwealth v. Zuluaga, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 629, 646 (1997).  The 
defendant has failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct.   
 
5.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant makes 
multiple claims that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  To succeed on these claims, the defendant must 
demonstrate that (1) that there was "serious incompetency, 
inefficiency, or inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel 
falling measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer," and (2) that this substandard 
performance "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise 
available, substantial ground of defence."  Commonwealth v. 
Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 601 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  Because this is a review 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, our degree of scrutiny is heightened, 
and we search for any unpreserved error that might have created 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Britto, 
supra at 601-602, citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 
682 (1992).  We turn to the defendant's claims.   
 
a.  Access to grand jury minutes.  At trial, the defendant 
was restricted personally from viewing the grand jury minutes 
relating to the April 30, 1997, drive-by shooting.  The 
defendant now argues that his counsel gave ineffective 
23 
 
assistance in failing to object to this restriction.  The 
defendant asserts he would have had greater knowledge than his 
attorney relative to the context of the testimony presented.  
This restriction, he argues, deprived him of the opportunity to 
present a full defense.   
 
Even accepting the defendant's proposition as true that he 
had greater knowledge than his attorney of the facts of an 
unrelated shooting that occurred while the defendant was 
incarcerated, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object 
to the protective order because such an objection would have 
been futile.  Rule 14 (a) (6) specifically allows discovery to 
be restricted to defense counsel alone for cause shown.  Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (6), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004).  
The decision to enter such an order is within the trial judge's 
discretion.  Commonwealth v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 803, cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 947 (2008).  Here, the judge was well within 
his discretion in granting the restricting order given the 
defendant's expressed threats against witnesses.  Defense 
counsel's failure to make a clearly futile objection to the 
protective order was not behavior falling measurably below that 
of an ordinary fallible lawyer.   
 
b.  Sleeping juror.  The defendant argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to 
pursue the possibility of a sleeping juror.  The defendant 
24 
 
alleges that his counsel should have submitted affidavits to 
bolster his claim that a juror was inattentive during the 
presentation of the evidence.  Defense counsel twice brought to 
the judge's attention the issue of a juror appearing to be 
asleep during trial.7  The defendant urges that his right to an 
impartial attentive juror was compromised when the judge and 
defense counsel took no further action.   
 
The defendant has failed to meet his burden.  Although it 
is true that a judge must take action when confronted with 
evidence of a sleeping juror, the nature of that action is 
within the judge's discretion.  Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 
Mass. 61, 78 (2010).  The defendant must show that the judge 
abused his discretion by making an arbitrary or unreasonable 
decision.  Id.  Here, the defendant has not made such a showing.   
 
Defense counsel first reported during a bench conference 
that he had observed a juror sleeping, including sleeping during 
the judge's instructions.  He also offered that the prosecutor 
had seen it as well.  Nothing in the record indicates the 
prosecutor's observations of the juror or his agreement or 
disagreement with defense counsel's observations.  Defense 
counsel offered no further description of why he thought the 
                     
 
7 The second time defense counsel also requested that a 
second juror be removed from the panel because defense counsel 
had observed the second juror for ten minutes during the lunch 
break the previous day "standing [in public], staring off into 
space with his hands folded, talking to himself on the street 
corner."   
25 
 
juror was sleeping beyond the excuse that he had not brought up 
the issue earlier in light of the possibility he may have 
observed a "nervous reaction."  Defense counsel did not request 
any further action at the time of the initial report.  In 
response to defense counsel's reports, the judge made his own 
observations of the juror.  The judge did not observe the juror 
sleeping.  He promised to continue his observations and to act 
should defense counsel's concerns prove founded.  The next day, 
defense counsel revisited the issue, offering no further 
description of the asserted fact that the juror was sleeping and 
offering no new evidence that the juror had fallen asleep since 
the initial report.  He asked that the juror be removed.  The 
judge declined to do so.  In his affidavit in support of the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, defense counsel did not 
elaborate any further on his report at trial.   
 
It is clear that the trial judge did not find defense 
counsel's assertions reliable enough to warrant further action, 
particularly where counsel said that the juror slept during the 
judge's instructions to the jury and the judge would necessarily 
have been looking at the jury.  Yet the judge noticed nothing 
unusual.  Contrast Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 645 
(2015) (report from adjacent juror of snoring enough to prompt 
further action).  Defense counsel's report gave no description 
of the characteristics of the juror's alleged slumber beyond 
26 
 
likening it to a "nervous reaction," an empty illustration 
explained by myriad possibilities.  More importantly, defense 
counsel did not ask for a voir dire.  In fact, he initially 
requested the judge do nothing at that time.  The judge was 
entitled to rely on his own observations to reach the conclusion 
that the report of a sleeping juror was not sufficiently 
reliable to warrant further action when made only by defense 
counsel without a request for a voir dire.  McGhee, supra at 645 
(trial judge should first assess reliability of report before 
taking further action).  We defer to the findings of the trial 
judge on a claim alleging a sleeping juror.  Commonwealth v. 
Morales, 453 Mass. 40, 47 (2009).  The trial judge did not abuse 
his discretion in his response to defense counsel's claim that 
the juror was sleeping.   
 
Nor would the submission of affidavits by trial counsel 
have affected this outcome.  Counsel twice brought the issue 
before the trial judge.  The second time the judge assured 
defense counsel that he was monitoring the juror.  We cannot 
accept as true that a juror was in fact sleeping and therefore 
cannot speculate upon any possible effect of further affidavits 
not proffered in this regard.  Simply put, without more, 
counsel's failure to submit affidavits at that juncture was not 
behavior falling measurably below that which might be expected 
from an ordinary fallible lawyer.   
27 
 
 
c.  Failure to call or examine witnesses.  The defendant 
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective with respect to 
several decisions regarding witnesses.  "Trial tactics which may 
appear questionable from the vantage point of hindsight . . . do 
not amount to ineffective assistance unless 'manifestly 
unreasonable' when undertaken."  Commonwealth v. Haley, 413 
Mass. 770, 777-778 (1992), citing Commonwealth v. Sielicki, 391 
Mass. 377, 379 (1984).  Failure to call a witness will not be 
considered ineffective assistance of counsel absent a showing of 
prejudice.  Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 275 (1991).  
We address the defendant's arguments.   
 
i.  Jeanine Jackson.  The defendant argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to 
call Jeanine Jackson to impeach the testimony of Sherelle 
Jackson, her sister.  The defendant contends that Jeanine would 
have testified that the defendant had never told her he had shot 
the victim, contradicting Sherelle Jackson's testimony.  The 
Commonwealth answers that defense counsel had already impeached 
Sherelle Jackson by other means including noting her outstanding 
warrants and criminal charges and inconsistencies between her 
trial and grand jury testimony.  Furthermore, in her own 
testimony, Sherelle freely admitted that her memory was affected 
by hearsay reported to her the same day.  In any event, the only 
effect of calling Jeanine Jackson would have been for the 
28 
 
further impeachment of Sherelle.  This failure to provide 
cumulative impeachment testimony was not ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 105 
(2001); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 357 (2001).   
 
ii.  Troy Meade.  The defendant argues that defense counsel 
was ineffective by reason of his failure to object to Meade's 
testimony on the basis of hearsay or lack of foundation 
regarding the July, 1997, telephone call in which the defendant 
told Meade the defendant would take care of the persons who 
committed the April 30, 1997, drive-by shooting.  The 
defendant's argument is without merit.  It is uncontroverted 
that statements of the defendant in a criminal case are not 
hearsay.  Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. 358, 365-366 
(2001).  Similarly, there is no merit to the defendant's 
argument that defense counsel should have objected to Meade's 
testimony for lack of foundation.  The evidence was substantial 
that Meade and the defendant had been familiar with each other 
for years.  In fact, Meade's sister and the defendant had a 
child together.  "Identification of telephone voices by 
witnesses familiar with the voice of the identified person has 
long been permitted by the law of the Commonwealth."  
Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 262 (1991) (citations 
omitted).  Any objections on these bases would have been futile.  
Defense counsel was not ineffective in this regard.   
29 
 
 
iii.  Jeffrey Pruitt.  Defense counsel vigorously cross-
examined Meade about the details of the July, 1997, telephone 
call in order to cast doubt on the veracity of Meade's 
testimony.  The defendant now alleges that his counsel's failure 
to examine Jeffrey Pruitt on the issue for the same purpose 
constitutes ineffective assistance.  We disagree.  The defendant 
points to an affidavit submitted after the trial to indicate 
that, had Pruitt been examined on this issue, he would have 
denied Meade's presence in his house during the telephone call 
in question.  Defense counsel had focused his direct examination 
of Pruitt on the events surrounding the murder and an incident 
in which Pruitt claimed Meade told him he had lied about the 
defendant's jailhouse confession.  The Commonwealth offered 
evidence of the July, 1997, telephone call to demonstrate 
motive, an element the Commonwealth was not under an obligation 
to prove.  The central issue in the case was the resolution of 
the identity of the shooter in the schoolyard on the night of 
November 29, 1997.  Even were we to take Pruitt's affidavit at 
face value, the failure to offer evidence casting further doubt 
on the already-impeached testimony of a witness who did not 
observe the shooting and thus could not identify the shooter was 
not behavior falling measurably below that of an ordinary 
fallible lawyer nor did it deprive the defendant of a 
substantial ground of defense.   
30 
 
 
iv.  Marcel Morale.  The defendant argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to 
investigate, interview, and present as a witness Marcel Morale, 
a person interviewed by the police after the shooting who 
resided within sight of the school.  In the police interview, 
Morale indicated she saw four men run from the schoolyard after 
the shooting.  The defendant claims that this testimony 
corroborates that of Keith Pomare by placing four people at the 
scene and making it more likely that Hyppolite was the shooter.  
Morale's general observations of four people running away cannot 
be considered exculpatory evidence.  Morale told police that one 
male ran through a hole in a fence and then joined the three 
other males in fleeing the scene.  Even were we to take Morale's 
police interview as true that there were four people present in 
the school yard after the shooting on November 29, 1997, her 
report would still not corroborate Keith Pomare's testimony.  
Pomare stated under oath that he stayed hidden until the others 
had fled and walked around the body.  Pomare testified that he 
then fled to his grandmother's house and did not meet up with 
the group that had just fled the school yard.  Pomare's 
testimony and Morale's police report are not consistent with one 
another and thus the police report cannot be said to corroborate 
Pomare's testimony.  Defense counsel's failure to call Morale 
did not prejudice the defendant's case by depriving him of a 
31 
 
substantial ground of defense.  Defense counsel was not 
ineffective in this regard.   
 
6.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E, review.  The defendant requests 
that we reduce his conviction of murder or order a new trial 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in the interests of justice after a 
consideration of the evidence.  We have reviewed the entire 
record and conclude that there is no reason to exercise our 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.