Title: KUIPER v EIGHTH JUD DIST COURT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-147
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 1981

No. 81-147 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 DENNIS KUIPER, Relator and Appellant, VS. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA et al., Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: For Appellant: Conner, Baiz and Olson, Great Falls, Montana Dennis Conner argued, Great Falls, Montana Niewald, Risjord and Waldeck, Kansas City, Missouri For Respondent: Church, Harris, Johnson and Williams, Great Falls, Montana Cresap McCracken argued, Great Falls, Montana Dzivi, Conklin & Nybo, Great Falls, Montana William Conklin argued, Great Falls, Montana Stinson, Mag and Frizzell, Kansas City, Missouri Submitted: June 10, 1981 Decided: August 12, 1981 Filed: August 12, 1981 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f , ~ e n n i s Kuiper ( r e l a t o r ) , served r e q u e s t s f o r admission asking Goodyear t o admit t h e genuineness of documents i n t h e possession of both defendant and r e l a t o r and sought by deposition t o o r a l l y examine the defendant's executives. Defendant, Goodyear T i r e and Rubber Company (Goodyear), f i l e d a motion seeking a p r o t e c t i v e order. The D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e p r o t e c t i v e order, thereby preventing t h e r e l a t o r from discovering t h e documents and compelling t h e answers. The r e l a t o r p e t i t i o n e d f o r a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l . On April 16, 1981, t h i s Court entered an order accepting t h e a p p l i c a t i o n . This case r e s u l t s from i n j u r i e s received by t h e r e l a t o r , on August 13, 1979. The r e l a t o r was handling a truck t i r e i n f l a t e d on a Goodyear K-type multi-piece truck r i m . The complaint a l l e g e s t h a t a side-ring explosively separated from t h e r i m base, f r a c t u r i n g r e l a t o r ' s s k u l l . The complaint sets f o r t h a claim i.n s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y r e q u i r i n g proof t h a t : (1) The product was i n a d e f e c t i v e condition and unreasonably dangerous t o the user. ( 2 ) The d e f e c t caused the a c c i d e n t and i n j u r i e s complained of herein. ( 3 ) The d e f e c t i s trace- a b l e t o t h e defendant. On November 7 , 1980, t h e r e l a t o r f i l e d a request f o r admission of genuineness of documents. The contested docu- ments came i n t o t h e possession of r e l a t o r ' s a t t o r n e y a s t h e r e s u l t of the documents o r i g i n a l l y being ordered produced i n a s i m i l a r b u t unrelated case. Messick v. Goodyear T i r e & Rubber Co. (No. 74CV756-W-2 D. Mo. ) . I n t h a t case, t h e p l a i n t i f f had f i l e d a r e q u e s t for production of documents, and a f t e r viewing t h e documents - i n camera, t h e f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t judge h e l d t h a t t h e documents w e r e t o be produced. A f t e r production, t h a t c a s e was s e t t l e d and dismissed. T h e r e a f t e r , t h e documents w e r e widely disseminated. The r e l a t o r , and many o t h e r s , have seen t h e documents s i n c e t h a t t i m e . The r e l a t o r , i n t h i s c a s e , has sought t o depose c e r t a i n of d e f e n d a n t ' s executives. The q u e s t i o n s t o which t h e defendant ob j ec ted, p e r t a i n e d t o t h e s u b j e c t documents and t o a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e defendant by t h e National Highway T r a f f i c S a f e t y Administration (NHTSA). That i n v e s t i g a t i o n was commenced i n 1970 f o r t h e purpose of determining why K- type truck r i m s seemed t o cause numerous a c c i d e n t s . The r e l a t o r seeks t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Goodyear attempted, through government i n f l u e n c e , t o terminate t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The r e l a t o r a l l e g e s t h a t Goodyear "covered up" t h e d e f e c t i n a product, which Goodyear knew t o be unsafe, and t h a t t h e r e l a t o r i s e n t i t l e d t o prove such f a c t s t o e s t a b l i s h a b a s i s f o r p u n i t i v e damages. The r e l a t o r f i l e d a motion under Rule 3 7 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., seeking t o compel answers t o d e p o s i t i o n q u e s t i o n s by r e q u i r i n g attendance of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s employees a t t r i a l t o t e s t i f y about t h e disputed m a t t e r s . The r e l a t o r ' s motion was denied, and t h e D i s t r i c t Court has r u l e d t h a t t h e r e l a t o r cannot i n q u i r e e i t h e r about t h e documents o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The following i s s u e s a r e now before t h i s Court: (1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n determining t h e c o n t e s t e d documents f e l l w i t h i n t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e work product r u l e , thereby f o r e - c l o s i n g t h e use of those documents i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . ( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n precluding re- l a t o r from using m a t e r i a l , a l r e a d y i n h i s possession, f o r any purpose. (3) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n refusing t o allow t h e r e l a t o r t o question Goodyear executives regarding t h e documents and f a c t s surrounding t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . With r e s p e c t t o t h e disputed documents, i t i s important t o d i s t i n g u i s h between two separate i s s u e s . R e l a t o r ' s re- q u e s t f o r admission of genuineness of documents was f i l e d pursuant t o Rule 3 6 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., allowing a p a r t y t o make r e q u e s t s f o r admission of genuineness of documents covering t h e t r u t h of any matters within t h e scope of Rule 2 6 ( b ) , M.R. Civ.P. Therefore, pursuant t o Rule 2 6 ( b ) , a p a r t y must only admit the genuineness of documents which a r e not p r i v i l e g e d and are discoverable under t h a t r u l e . A r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e involves i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a s defined i n s e c t i o n 26-1-803, MCA, and t h e work product r u l e governed by Rule 26 (b) ( 3 ) , M.R.Civ.P. A s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t i s s u e r e l a t e s t o the D i s t r i c t Court order forbidding use of the documents. The c o u r t order prevents t h e use of t h i s information, i n possession of r e l a t o r , f o r any purpose whatsoever. Resolution of t h i s i s s u e involves discussion and a p p l i c a t i o n of r i g h t s of f r e e speech, under a r t i c l e 11, S7, of t h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n , and t h e F i r s t Amendment of the United S t a t e s Constitution. With regard t o deposition questions propounded by r e l a t o r t o Goodyear executives, r e l a t o r seeks t o compel t h e attendance of those witnesses a t t r i a l . Though t h e r e l i e f sought i s inappropriate, we w i l l t r e a t r e l a t o r ' s motion a s one t o compel answers under Rule 37 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., and decide whether r e l a t o r i s e n t i t l e d t o have Goodyear's w i t - nesses answer t h e questions. W e resolve t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e f i r s t . The order of t h e t r i a l c o u r t prevents r e l a t o r from using the documents i n r e l a t o r ' s possession, f o r e x t r a j u d i c i a l purposes, a s w e l l a s i n the case a t bar. Such an order has a c h i l l i n g e f f e c t upon F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s and must be subjected t o c l o s e s c r u t i n y . I n r e Halkin, (D.C. C i r . 1979), 598 F.2d 176. I n Halkin, t h e p l a i n t i f f s alleged t h a t c e r t a i n government agencies conducted unlawful s u r v e i l l a n c e of c i t i z e n s who opposed t h e war i n V i e t Nam. P l a i n t i f f s sought damages and e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f f o r v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . During t h e pendency of t h e case, p l a i n t i f f s , through discovery, obtained c e r t a i n documents which t h e government contended would impair United S t a t e s diplomatic and f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s , r e v e a l C I A i n t e l l i g e n c e sources, and implicate t h e privacy i n t e r e s t s of t h i r d persons. P l a i n t i f f s they advised t h e government t h a t / intended t o r e l e a s e t h e i n f ormation t o t h e news media and, t h e r e a f t e r , defendant moved f o r a p r o t e c t i v e order pursuant t o Rule 2 6 ( c ) . Defendant argued t h a t public d i s c l o s u r e of the documents would be " p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e defendants ' r i g h t t o adjudication of t h e i s s u e s " i n an unbiased climate and would deny the defendant a f a i r t r i a l . Pla i n t i £ f s responded by contending t h a t the p r o t e c t i v e order would v i o l a t e the p l a i n t i f f s ' F i r s t Amendment r i g h t . The United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court signed t h e defendant's proposed r e s t r a i n i n g order and t h e p l a i n t i f f s p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t of appeals f o r a w r i t of mandamus, seeking t o vacate t h e D i s t r i c t Court order. Judge Bazelon, w r i t i n g f o r the c o u r t acknowledged t h a t a t t o r n e y s have h i s t o r i c a l l y been o f f i c e r s of the c o u r t s and t h a t they have a l e g a l and e t h i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o safe- guard t h e r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . However, Judge Bazelon said: ". . . But lawyers' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e j u d i c i a l process does n o t mean t h a t lawyers and l i t i g a n t s surrender t h e i r F i r s t Amend- ment r i g h t s a t the courthouse door. Even public o f f i c i a l s who have s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o t h e c o u r t do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have a 'more s e v e r e l y cur- t a i l e d ' r i g h t t o freedom of e x p r e s s i o n than ' t h e average c i ti zen ' . " I n Halkin, Judge Bazelon c i t e d w i t h approval, Chase v . Robson ( 7 t h C i r . 1970), 435 F.2d 1059, wherein t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t an o r d e r b a r r i n g counsel and p a r t i e s from making p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s about t h e merits of t h e case, was unconsti- t u t i o n a l . The Robson c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e o r d e r cons ti t u t e d ". . . a p r i o r r e s t r a i n t on p r o t e c t e d F i r s t Amendment conduct". The c o u r t i n Halkin acknowledged t h a t a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r may n o t c o n s t i t u t e a p r i o r r e s t r a i n t , b u t determined t h a t t h e i s s u e of " p r i o r r e s t r a i n t " was n o t d e t e r m i n a t i v e . The c o u r t s a i d : "We do n o t b e l i e v e , however, t h a t t h e proper r e s o l u - t i o n of t h i s case i n t h e end t u r n s on whether t h i s o r d e r can be termed a p r i o r r e s t r a i n t . W e observe t h e admonition of J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r t h a t t h e t e r m ' p r i o r r e s t r a i n t ' should n o t be used a s ' a t a l i s m a n i c t e s t , ' Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 4 4 1 , 77 S.Ct. 1325 (1957), and do n o t begin our ex- amination w i t h an almost insurmountable presumption a g a i n s t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h i s o r d e r . However, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e o r d e r poses many of t h e dangers of a p r i o r r e s t r a i n t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o r e q u i r e c l o s e s c r u t i n y of i t s impact on p r o t e c t e d F i r s t Amendment expression." 598 F.2d a t 1 8 6 . Noting t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court had s t r e s s e d t h a t l i t i g a t i o n may be "a v e h i c l e f o r e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l expression and a s s o c i a t i o n , a s w e l l a s a means of communicating u s e f u l information t o t h e p u b l i c " , I n r e Primus (1978), 436 U.S. 412, 431, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 1904, 56 L.Ed.2d 417, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t ". . . [ l l i t i g a t i o n i t s e l f is a form of e x p r e s s i o n p r o t e c t e d by t h e F i r s t Amendment". 598 F.2d a t 187. The c o u r t i n Halkin, concluded t h a t a F i r s t Amendment r i g h t extends t o use of discovery m a t e r i a l s . 598 F. 2d a t 187. Before a t r i a l c o u r t can e n t e r a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r r e s t r a i n i n g f r e e e x p r e s s i o n , t h e c o u r t must f i n d t h a t t h r e e c r i t e r i a e x i s t : (1) The harm posed by dissemination must b e s u b s t a n t i a l and serious. (2) The r e s t r a i n i n g order must be narrowly drawn and be p r e c i s e . (3) There must be no a l t e r n a - t i v e means of p r o t e c t i n g t h e public i n t e r e s t which i n t r u d e s less d i r e c t l y on expression. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. S t u a r t (1976), 427 U . S . 539, 96 S . C t . 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683; I n re Halkin, supra. I n assessing t h e p r o p r i e t y of a p r o t e c t i v e order i n each case, t h e t r i a l c o u r t must consider and make necessary f i n d i n g s on each element of the standard. I n t h i s case no findings have been made which j u s t i f y t h e c o u r t order t h a t "counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f a r e hereby prohibited from making any f u r t h e r use whatsoever of such p r i v i l e g e d documents and e x h i b i t s i n t h i s action." This p o r t i o n of t h e c o u r t ' s order u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y proscribes p l a i n t i f f ' s freedom of expression and must be reversed. The D i s t r i c t Court held t h a t t h e contested documents, e x h i b i t s A-E, and G-M were e n t i t l e d t o p r o t e c t i o n under a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and work product. The e f f e c t of t h i s r u l i n g i s t o f o r e c l o s e use of t h e documents when t h i s matter comes t o t r i a l . Section 26-1-803, MCA, provides: "An a t t o r n e y cannot, without t h e consent of h i s c l i e n t , be examined a s t o any communication made by t h e c l i e n t t o him o r h i s advice given thereon i n t h e course of professional employment." Work product i s governed by Rule 26 (b) (3) , M.R.Civ.P., which provides: "Subject t o t h e provisions of subdivision ( b ) ( 4 ) of t h i s r u l e , a p a r t y may o b t a i n discovery of documents and t a n g i b l e things otherwise discover- a b l e under subdivision (b) (1) of t h i s r u l e and pre- pared i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n o r f o r t r i a l by o r f o r another p a r t y o r by o r f o r t h a t o t h e r p a r t y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e (including h i s attorney, consultant, s u r e t y , indemnitor, in- s u r e r o r agent) only upon a showing t h a t the p a r t y seeking discovery has s u b s t a n t i a l need of t h e m a t e r i a l s i n t h e preparation of h i s case and t h a t he i s unable without undue hardship t o o b t a i n t h e s u b s t a n t i a l equivalent of the mater- i a l s by o t h e r means. I n ordering discovery of such m a t e r i a l s when t h e required showing has been made, t h e c o u r t s h a l l p r o t e c t a g a i n s t d i s c l o s u r e of t h e mental impressions, conclu- s i o n s , opinions, o r l e g a l t h e o r i e s of an a t t o r n e y o r o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p a r t y concerning t h e l i t i g a t i o n . " Before discussing a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e , w e must r e s o l v e t h e question of waiver. Relator contends t h a t t h e documents here i n question have been widely disseminated without o b j e c t i o n from Goodyear. On the o t h e r hand, Goodyear contends t h a t t h e documents were i n v o l u n t a r i l y produced pursuant t o c o u r t order and t h a t under these circumstances a waiver d i d n o t occur. Waiver i s t h e voluntary relinquishment of a known r i g h t . Massett v. Anaconda (1981), - Mont. - 1 - P. 2d -, 38 St.Rep. 961. Goodyear's response t o c o u r t process does n o t c o n s t i t u t e such a waiver. S t a t e ex rel. Union O i l Co. of Cal. v. D i s t r i c t Court (1972), 160 Mont. 229, 503 P.2d 1008. However, t h e waiver could subsequently be found should t h e evidence show t h a t , t h e r e a f t e r , Goodyear v o l u n t a r i l y disseminated t h e documents i n question. A waiver could a l s o be found i f dissemination was made by persons not connected with Goodyear. If a s u f f i c i e n t l y wide dissemination of t h e m a t e r i a l s was found t o have occurred, and Goodyear, knowing of t h i s , took no l e g a l a c t i o n t o p r o t e c t a g a i n s t dissemination, then t h e voluntary relinquishment of a r i g h t could be found. The record before us i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o make t h i s determination. Upon remand of t h i s matter, the D i s t r i c t Court i s d i r e c t e d t o hold a hearing with r e s p e c t t o evidence bearing upon t h e waiver question and t o make findings accordingly. The balance of our discussion concerning t h e attorney- c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e work product r u l e , w i l l apply should the t r i a l c o u r t f i n d t h a t a waiver has not occurred. I f a waiver i s found, then the e x i s t e n c e of p r i v i l e g e i s rendered moot. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s order dated March 13, 1981, g r a n t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e order t o Goodyear, c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e s e x h i b i t A a s c o n s i s t i n g of r e p o r t s concerning closed product l i a b i l i t y l i t i g a t i o n prepared by Goodyear's in-house counsel. However, t h e o r d e r ' s reference t o e x h i b i t B a s being a communication between house counsel Rigrish and o t h e r Goodyear personnel i s inaccurate. Exhibit B i s a b r i e f note from a Goodyear employee denominated "Gerb" forwarding excerpts from a deposition taken i n another "rim" case. Exhibits D and E a r e c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d as communications between house counsel Rigrish and o t h e r Goodyear personnel. The order mistakenly i d e n t i f i e s e x h i b i t J a s being a communication between in-house lawyer Rigrish and Goodyear's l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e r ; e x h i b i t J i s a memorandum from one employee of a l i a b i l i t y insurance company t o another employee within t h e same company. Exhibit M i s mistakenly i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e order a s a communication between lawyer Rigrish and Goodyear's l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e r ; e x h i b i t M i s a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by a represent- a t i v e of t h e Aetna Insurance Company addressed t o Rigrish of Goodyear. Exhibits C, H I I, K and L a r e c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e order a s being communications from Rigrish t o l i a b i l i t y insurance c a r r i e r s . Exhibit G i s c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d a s a communication from Rigrish t o r e t a i n e d counsel representing Goodyear i n s i m i l a r b u t unrelated l i t i g a t i o n . The s u b j e c t m a t t e r and author of each e x h i b i t i s c r i t i c a l t o determining whether a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e i s applicable. That p r i v i l e g e only a p p l i e s s t a t u t o r i l y i n Montana t o communi- c a t i o n s made by a c l i e n t t o h i s a t t o r n e y and l e g a l advice given i n response t h e r e t o , during the course of professional employment. Section 26-1-803, MCA. ~ x h i b i t A i s a compilation of case h i s t o r i e s prepared by ~ i g r i s h f o r h i s superior a t Goodyear. Attorney-client p r i v i l e g e does r e l a t e t o l e g a l advice given by house counsel t o t h e corporate employer. S t a t e ex r e l . Union O i l Co. of Cal. v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra. A c a r e f u l study of each of the case h i s t o r i e s contained i n e x h i b i t A shows t h a t the contents of the document cannot be a c c u r a t e l y characterized a s " l e g a l advice". Rigrish ana- lyzed closed product l i a b i l i t y f i l e s and reported t o h i s superior t h e r e s u l t s obtained i n each of those f i l e s . The f i l e s w e r e closed a t t h e time the document was prepared. The r e p o r t was apparently made by Rigrish f o r t h e purpose of allowing h i s superior t o evaluate h i s work and f o r t h e purpose of keeping corporate management advised about t h e h i s t o r y of product l i a b i l i t y l i t i g a t i o n . I t i s important t o note t h a t no l e g a l advice i s being given by Rigrish t o h i s superior o r corporate management with r e s p e c t t o pending l i t i g a t i o n f i l e s . Under these circumstances t h e attorney- c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a s s t a t u t o r i l y defined i n Montana, does n o t apply t o e x h i b i t A. Exhibit B i s correspondence from Goodyear personnel t o Rigrish and, though t h e contents of the note a r e r a t h e r ambiguous, it would seem t o be covered by a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e . However, t h e enclosure appears t o be deposition excerpts which would be p a r t of the p u b l i c record. Exhibits D and E a r e l e t t e r s from Rigrish t o o t h e r Good- year personnel. They appear t o cover matters contemplated by t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e . Exhibits C , HI I, K and L a r e communications between Rigrish and personnel employed by Goodyear's l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e r s . Rigrish i s n o t a lawyer f o r those l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e r s . There i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the r e c i p i e n t s of the communications a r e a t t o r n e y s f o r Rigrish. Therefore, the a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e does n o t apply t o these documents. Exhibit G i s a communication from Goodyear t o r e t a i n e d counsel. Exhibit G i s c l e a r l y protected by t h e p r i v i l e g e . Exhibit J i s a document prepared by an employee of t h e l i a b i l i t y insurance company and forwarded t o o t h e r personnel w i t h i n the same insurance company. I f any p r i v i l e g e e x i s t s , it e x i s t s f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h a t l i a b i l i t y insurance company and would have t o be claimed by t h a t company. Exhibit M i s a communication from Aetna Insurance Company t o Rigrish. Rigrish i s n o t an a t t o r n e y f o r Aetna Insurance Company and a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e i s , t h e r e f o r e , inapplicable. Exhibits A, C, H, I, J, K , L and M a r e n o t covered by a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e . Exhibits B, D, E and G may be protected . The work product r u l e i s broader i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n than t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e , b u t it i s n o t an a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e . By i t s t e r m s t h e r u l e governs not only t h e a t t o r n e y and h i s c l i e n t , b u t a l s o a p a r t y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , including h i s consultant, s u r e t y , indemnitor, i n s u r e r o r agent. The r u l e p r o t e c t s m a t e r i a l s prepared during liti- g a t i o n o r i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n and provides f o r t h e d i s c l o s u r e of such m a t e r i a l only upon a showing t h a t t h e p a r t y seeking discovery has a s u b s t a n t i a l need f o r t h e m a t e r i a l i n preparation of the case and i s unable, without undue hardship, t o o b t a i n t h e m a t e r i a l s through o t h e r means. The r u l e f u r t h e r d i r e c t s t h a t the c o u r t p r o t e c t a g a i n s t t h e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, o r l e g a l t h e o r i e s of an a t t o r n e y o r o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p a r t y concerning the l i t i g a t i o n . Rule 26 (b) (3) , M . R . c ~ v . P . , may a f f o r d p r o t e c t i o n t o much of the documentary evidence here i n dispute. I n applying the work product r u l e , w e must make t h e following determinations : (1) Does the r u l e apply where m a t e r i a l has been discovered and i s i n t h e possession of opposing counsel? ( 2 ) Does t h e r u l e apply t o terminated l i t i g a t i o n ? ( 3 ) Does t h e r u l e apply where t h e r e i s a claim b u t the r e a l i t y of l i t i g a t i o n may be very speculative? A l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rule 26(b) ( 3 1 , M.R.Civ.P., would confine a p p l i c a t i o n of the r u l e t o those i n s t a n c e s where discovery i s sought. Relator does n o t here seek discovery. Relator has possession of t h e s u b j e c t documents and seeks only t o l a y foundation f o r those documents. W e f e e l t h a t t h e work product r u l e must be given a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n order t o e f f e c t u a t e i t s purpose. The r i g h t granted under the r u l e can be waived and such a waiver w i l l be t h e s u b j e c t of the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing hereinbefore ordered. However, w e here hold t h a t the work product r u l e l e g i t i m a t e l y can form the b a s i s of a p r o t e c t i v e order even though the "work product" i s i n t h e possession of t h e adverse p a r t y . The question of whether "terminated l i t i g a t i o n " i s con- templated by the work product r u l e , was determined i n I n re Murphy ( 8 t h C i r . 1977), 560 F. 2d 326. I n t h a t case Chief Judge Gibson, w r i t i n g f o r t h e c o u r t , said: " I n view of t h e Hickman r a t i o n a l e and t h e p o l i c i e s of Rule 26 (b) ( 3 ) , w e conclude t h a t the work product p r i v i l e g e a p p l i e s t o documents prepared i n a n t i c i - p a t i o n of terminated l i t i g a t i o n . The primary pur- pose of t h e work product p r i v i l e g e i s t o a s s u r e t h a t an a t t o r n e y i s n o t i n h i b i t e d i n h i s represent- a t i o n of h i s c l i e n t by the f e a r t h a t h i s f i l e s w i l l be open t o s c r u t i n y upon demand of an opposing party. Counsel should be allowed t o amass d a t a and commit h i s opinions and thought processes t o w r i t i n g f r e e of t h e concern t h a t , a t some later d a t e , a n opposing p a r t y may be e n t i t l e d t o secure any r e l e v a n t work product documents merely on r e q u e s t and use them a g a i n s t h i s c l i e n t . The work product p r i v i l e g e would be attenuated i f it were limited t o documents t h a t were prepared i n the case f o r which discovery i s sought. What i s needed, i f w e a r e t o remain f a i t h f u l t o the a r t i c u l a t e d p o l i c i e s of Hickman, i s a perpet- u a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r work product, one t h a t extends beyond the termination of the l i t i g a t i o n f o r which the documents were prepared. Any less p r o t e c t i o n would generate t h e very e v i l s t h a t t h e Court i n Hickman attempted t o avoid." 560 F.2d a t 326. There i s a d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y on t h i s question. Cases supporting t h e opposite view a r e United S t a t e s v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Business Machines Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1974), 66 F.R.D. 154, 178, and Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper A i r c r a f t Corp., (M.D. Pa. 1970), 50 F.R.D. 117, 119. W e f e e l t h a t t h e b e t t e r reasoned r u l e supports a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e work product r u l e t o terminated l i t i g a t i o n . Rule 26 (b) provides t h a t m a t e r i a l s prepared - i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n can only be produced upon a showing of s u b s t a n t i a l need and i n a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n the m a t e r i a l s elsewhere. However, t h a t p o r t i o n of the r u l e which p r o t e c t s t h e mental impressions and l e g a l t h e o r i e s of an a t t o r n e y only r e f e r s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o " t h e l i t i g a t i o n " . Subsection 3 of Rule 26 (b) , i n i t s l a s t sentence, s t a t e s : " I n ordering discovery of such m a t e r i a l s when the required showing has been made, t h e c o u r t s h a l l p r o t e c t a g a i n s t d i s c l o s u r e of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, o r l e g a l t h e o r i e s of an a t t o r n e y o r o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p a r t y concerning t h e l i t i g a t i o n . " W e must determine whether t o apply t h e p r o t e c t i o n afforded mental impressions of an a t t o r n e y t o those impres- s i o n s rendered during the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a claim where no l i t i g a t i o n i s i n progress. I n I n r e Murphy, supra, the government f i l e d motions seeking t o discover l e g a l documents and i n t e r n a l memoranda t h a t were prepared by law firms representing s e v e r a l l a r g e corporate c l i e n t s . The law firms' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of these c l i e n t s had e x i s t e d f o r many years. The documents consisted of i n t e r n a l memoranda, notes, summaries, o u t l i n e s and chrono- l o g i e s prepared f o r use i n then c u r r e n t and a n t i c i p a t e d l i t i g a t i o n . The documents were characterized by counsel a s p r i v a t e working papers of trial lawyers t h a t included a type of " d e v i l ' s advocacy" made i n an e f f o r t t o o u t l i n e t h e inferences t h a t might be drawn by a " s k i l l e d and imaginative" adversary. These documents w e r e n o t s e n t t o o r shown t o the c l i e n t s . The 8 t h C i r c u i t Court of Appeals held t h a t such documents were protected by the "mental impressions" provision of t h e work product r u l e even though some documents r e l a t e d t o a n t i c i p a t e d l i t i g a t i o n . W e agree t h a t such p r o t e c t i o n should be afforded even though l i t i g a t i o n i s not i n progress. When a claim f i l e i s opened, t h e r e i s always some prospect of l i t i g a t i o n and an i n v e s t i g a t i o n must be conducted geared t o t h e ultimate e v e n t u a l i t y of l i t i g a t i o n . Theref o r e , we f e e l t h a t work product p r o t e c t i o n must be afforded from t h e time the claim f i l e i s opened. Exhibit A was n o t prepared i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n and only r e l a t e s t o an a n a l y s i s of closed f i l e s . I t c l e a r l y i s n o t covered by t h e work product r u l e . The balance of the e x h i b i t s i n question a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n s of Rule 26 (b) ( 3 ) , M.R.Civ.P., b u t such p r o t e c t i o n i s n o t absolute. The m a t e r i a l s may not be t h e proper s u b j e c t of a p r o t e c t i v e order i f r e l a t o r i s a b l e t o make a showing t h a t he "has s u b s t a n t i a l need of t h e m a t e r i a l s i n the preparation of h i s case and t h a t he i s unable without undue hardship t o o b t a i n t h e s u b s t a n t i a l equivalent of t h e m a t e r i a l s by o t h e r means." However, those p o r t i o n s of t h e documents which r e l a t e t o t h e mental impressions of the author of the document, receive a g r e a t e r protection. W e agree with the following r a t i o n a l e from I n r e Murphy, supra, wherein t h e c o u r t said: " I t i s c l e a r t h a t opinion work product i s e n t i t l e d t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n than ordinary work product. Therefore, unlike ordinary work product, opinion work product cannot be discovered upon a showing of s u b s t a n t i a l need and an i n a b i l i t y t o secure t h e s u b s t a n t i a l equivalent of the mater- ials by a l t e r n a t e means without undue hardship. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 ) . I n our view, opinion work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only i n very r a r e and extraordinary circum- stances. See Hickman v. Taylor, supra. Our unwill- ingness t o recognize an absolute immunity f o r opinion work product s t e m s from the concern t h a t t h e r e may be r a r e s i t u a t i o n s , y e t unencountered by t h i s c o u r t , where weighty considerations of public policy and a proper administration of j u s t i c e would m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t the nondiscovery of an a t t o r n e y ' s mental impression. Absent such compelling showing, t h e a t t o r n e y ' s opinion work product should remain i m - mune from discovery. I' (Footnotes omitted. ) 560 F. 2d a t 337. Upon remand, t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i l l have t h e burden of applying t h i s law t o each of the documents involved i n t h e case. I f t h e t r i a l c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e was a waiver, then the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s r u l e becomes moot. I n i t s order, t h e D i s t r i c t Court foreclosed r e l a t o r from deposing Goodyear executives regarding f a c t s contained i n t h e disputed documents and a l s o from i n t e r r o g a t i n g those witnesses about t h e National Highway T r a f f i c Safety Administra- t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The c o u r t based i t s p r o t e c t i v e order upon "relevancy" and "public policy". The b a s i s f o r a w i t n e s s ' s r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y i s set f o r t h i n Rule 2 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., which provides: "Upon motion by a p a r t y o r by t h e person from whom discovery i s sought, and f o r good cause shown, t h e c o u r t i n which t h e a c t i o n i s pending o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y , on matters r e l a t i n g t o a deposition, t h e c o u r t i n t h e d i s t r i c t where t h e deposition i s t o be taken may make any order which j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s t o pro- t e c t a p a r t y o r person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, o r undue burden o r expense . . ." The r u l e does not provide f o r r e f u s a l on "public policy" grounds. Were t h i s Court t o expand t h e r u l e and allow f o r a "public policy" b a s i s f o r r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y , then, given t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, such a b a s i s would n o t f o r e c l o s e inquiry. This Court has previously found strong public p o l i c y reasons f o r imposing s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t . I n Branden- burger v. Toyota Motor S a l e s (1973), 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268, we said: "The e s s e n t i a l r a t i o n a l e f o r imposing t h e d o c t r i n e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t i s t h a t such imposition a f f o r d s t h e consuming public t h e maximum p r o t e c t i o n from dangerous d e f e c t s i n manufactured products by r e q u i r i n g t h e manufacturer t o bear t h e burden of i n j u r i e s and l o s s e s enhanced by such d e f e c t s i n i t s products. . ." The D i s t r i c t Court order states t h a t " d i s c l o s u r e i n t h i s a c t i o n of t h e m a t e r i a l and information Goodyear was compelled t o submit t o t h e National Highway T r a f f i c Safety Administration i n v e s t i g a t i o n would c l e a r l y discourage frank and open communications with the government contrary t o t h e strong public policy i n t e r e s t s i n such ,an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . " I t should here be noted t h a t Goodyear does n o t have t h e option of d i s c l o s i n g t o t h e f e d e r a l government. Such d i s c l o s u r e i s mandated by l a w . I n Barry v. Manglass (1976), 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877, t h e c o u r t said: "As an a d d i t i o n a l answer t o General Motors' p u b l i c p o l i c y argument ( t h a t the admission of such r e c a l l l e t t e r s would discourage manufacturers from an- nouncing a p o s s i b l e d e f e c t ) , it i s merely necessary t o p o i n t o u t t h a t such announcement was not a vol- untary a c t , b u t one mandated by Federal s t a t u t e (see Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, supra) ." This Court has recognized a strong p u b l i c p o l i c y i n p r o t e c t i n g members of t h e public from i n j u r y by d e f e c t i v e products. I n Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co. (1977), 176 Mont. 98, 516 P.2d 711, J u s t i c e Harrison, writing f o r t h e majority, said: "We r e j e c t any r u l e which would operate t o encourage misdesign." W e hold t h a t p u b l i c policy m i l i t a t e s i n favor of permitt- i n g discovery of f a c t s surrounding the " r e c a l l campaign" and t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e National Highway T r a f f i c Safety Administration. A complete public awareness of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s concerning d e f e c t i v e products i s i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and should be f a c i l i t a t e d . W e f i n d t h i s l i t i g a t i o n t o be a proper forum f o r such disclosure. The D i s t r i c t Court order granting p r o t e c t i o n t o Goodyear's witnesses, f u r t h e r j u s t i f i e d i t s holding on the b a s i s of "relevancy". Relator here seeks p u n i t i v e damages and by way of discovery seeks t o develop evidence f o r t h e purpose of proving malice. R e l a t o r ' s deposition questions a r e designed t o prove Goodyear knew it had a d e f e c t i v e product and attempted t o prevent public knowledge of t h a t d e f e c t . Such f a c t s would tend t o prove malice and a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e s pleaded. The D i s t r i c t Court order precluding r e l a t o r from deposing Goodyear witnesses with r e s p e c t t o the National Highway T r a f f i c Safety Administration i n v e s t i g a t i o n and t h e " r e c a l l campaign" i s reversed. That p o r t i o n of t h e order which prevents r e l a t o r from inquiring about t h e disputed documents i s governed by t h e law enunciated i n t h i s opinion with r e s p e c t t o those documents. I f a p a r t i c u l a r document i s not protected by e i t h e r the a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e o r t h e work product r u l e , then inquiry may be made about t h a t docu- ment during t h e taking of depositions from Goodyear executives. I f a document i s p r i v i l e g e d , such i n q u i r y may n o t be made. Accordingly, t h i s matter i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r proceedings i n conformity with t h i s opinion. / 1 I W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e A 1 ,,<' N' Justices