Title: People v. Sanchez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S087569
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JUAN SANCHEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S087569 
 
Tulare County Superior Court 
40863 
 
 
April 29, 2019 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
S087569 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
After two juries were unable to reach a verdict, a third jury 
convicted defendant, Juan Sanchez, of the first degree murders 
of Ermanda Reyes and Lorena Martinez under the special 
circumstances of multiple murder and, as to Lorena Martinez, 
rape by instrument.  It also found true that defendant 
personally used a firearm during the commission of both 
murders.  After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of 
death.  The court denied the automatic motion to modify the 
verdict and imposed a judgment of death.  This appeal is 
automatic.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  THE FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Overview 
The evidence supported a jury finding that early in the 
morning of August 4, 1997, defendant entered the Porterville 
home of Ermanda Reyes (Ermanda) and her 17-year-old 
daughter, Lorena Martinez (Lorena), sexually assaulted Lorena, 
then shot and killed both mother and daughter.  (All future 
dates in this factual recitation are to the year 1997 unless 
otherwise indicated.) 
Defendant presented evidence trying to raise a reasonable 
doubt that he committed the crimes. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
2.  Prosecution Evidence 
In early August, Ermanda lived on North Wellington 
Street in Porterville with her daughter, Lorena, her 13-year-old 
son, Victor M. (Victor), and her five-year-old son, Oscar H. 
(Oscar).  Rosa Chandi, the sister of Ermanda’s former husband, 
Efrain M. (Lorena’s and Victor’s father), lived with several 
family members nearby on North Wellington.  Victor spent the 
night of Sunday to Monday, August 3-4, at his father’s house, 
but Ermanda, Lorena, and Oscar were home that night. 
Chandi woke early on the morning of Monday, August 4.  
A short time later, she observed Oscar approach her house 
alone.  Oscar told her that his mother and Lorena were 
“sleeping,” were “bleeding” and “cut,” and he could not wake 
them.  Chandi went with Oscar to the Reyes home.  The front 
door was open, and Chandi entered with Oscar.  Inside, she saw 
Ermanda’s and Lorena’s bodies in their respective bedrooms.  
She returned to her home and dialed 911.  Officer Larry 
Rodriguez was the first to respond, arriving around 5:48 a.m.  
He entered the house and observed the bodies.  Other 
responders soon arrived. 
Lorena’s body was in her bedroom lying partially on the 
bed and partially on the floor.  She was wearing a bloody T-shirt 
that had been pulled up over her stomach area and a bra that 
had been pulled up enough to expose one breast.  The bra had a 
one-inch cut that a knife might have made.  Bloodstained 
underpants were around Lorena’s knees.  A separate piece torn 
from the underpants was on the floor nearby.  A black-handled, 
silver-bladed steak knife was found on the bed under Lorena’s 
body. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
Blood was found in various places in the house, including 
a trail leading from outside Lorena’s bedroom into the master 
bedroom, where Ermanda’s body was located.  Ermanda’s body 
was lying on the floor next to the bed.  A telephone was on a 
nightstand near the bed, but the handset to the telephone was 
on the floor.  The physical evidence indicated that Lorena had 
been shot in her bedroom, and Ermanda had been shot outside 
Lorena’s bedroom, then managed to return to her bedroom, 
where she died. 
Lorena died of wounds to the chest from two gunshots.  
Fresh bruising and scratching in her genital and anal areas 
indicated she had been sexually assaulted by an instrument of 
some kind.  Ermanda bled to death from a gunshot wound 
through the chest.  She could have engaged in physical activity 
briefly before she died. 
Investigators found three bullets, one in Lorena’s 
mattress, one in her clothes, and one in the family room that had 
passed through her bedroom wall.  They also found two 
unexpended cartridges in her bedroom.  All came from the same 
gun, 
“[m]ore 
than 
likely” 
a 
nine-millimeter 
Luger 
semiautomatic handgun. 
Detective Ty Lewis was dispatched to the crime scene at 
5:45 a.m. that morning.  When he arrived, he entered the Reyes 
home briefly, then went to the Chandi residence, where he spoke 
individually with Chandi and others.  Chandi told him about a 
“boyfriend” she had seen recently at the Reyes house who might 
have committed the crime.  She did not know his name, but she 
described him and said he drove a yellow truck.  Detective Lewis 
spoke briefly with Oscar, who seemed “very calm.”  Oscar told 
him that “he had been sleeping in his mother’s bedroom on the 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
floor and that he awoke to a man’s loud voice, and there was a 
man standing in the bedroom.”  At that point, Oscar became 
nonresponsive, and Detective Lewis ended the interview. 
Sergeant Chris Dempsie spoke with Oscar alone around 
7:00 a.m. that morning at the Chandi house.  During the 
interview, Oscar was emotional.  “Periodically, he would stop 
crying and answer questions, but he was crying when he first 
came to me, and I believe he was crying towards the end of the 
interview also.”  Oscar told Sergeant Dempsie that he had been 
sleeping in his mother’s bed and was “awakened by 
firecrackers.”  He “saw his mother coming towards the telephone 
that was next to his bed, and he also saw a man in the room with 
her.”  His mother was bleeding.  She grabbed the telephone, then 
fell backwards.  Oscar said that the man had a “wisp on his 
chin”; when he said that, Oscar brushed his chin with his hand.  
Oscar also said he was the man who “had brought him ice 
cream.”  Oscar said he tried to wake his mother but could not.  
He also saw blood on the walls and saw his sister and heard her 
screaming.  She was bleeding.  Then he ran outside to his aunt’s 
house. 
After speaking with Oscar, Sergeant Dempsie spoke with 
Victor, who had come to the Chandi house when he heard what 
had happened.  He asked if Victor knew of someone who had 
brought Oscar ice cream.  Victor testified that until that point, 
he was unaware defendant might have been involved in the 
crime.  But he remembered that the previous Saturday, August 
2, Oscar was eating ice cream at home.  Defendant was present.  
Victor testified that Oscar told him at the time that “Juan” had 
gotten him the ice cream.  Later in his testimony, Victor clarified 
that he had remembered the name “Juan” from seeing 
defendant at the Reyes house that weekend.  Oscar did not use 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
the name at the time.  Thus, Victor told the police that “Juan” 
had given Oscar the ice cream.  Victor was also able to tell the 
police where defendant lived because Victor’s family had once 
lived near him. 
Later that morning, Sergeant Eric Kroutil obtained a 
photograph of defendant and showed it to Oscar.  In the 
photograph, defendant had a mustache but no goatee.  Oscar 
said the photograph was of “Juan,” and he was the man he had 
seen in the house earlier that morning.  At the time, Sergeant 
Kroutil was aware that Victor, not Oscar, had first used the 
name “Juan.” 
Defendant was arrested in his home in Porterville around 
11:00 to 11:20 a.m. the same morning.  After defendant’s arrest, 
Sergeant Dempsie showed Oscar a photographic lineup 
containing a photograph of defendant taken that day.  In this 
photograph, defendant had both a mustache and a goatee.  
Oscar identified defendant’s photograph as that of Juan, the 
man who had given him ice cream and was in the house the 
morning of the murders.  The interview was videotaped, and the 
videotape was played to the jury.  During the interview, in 
addition to identifying defendant’s photograph, Oscar added 
new details about what had occurred in the house that morning.  
He said that he hit Juan in the stomach; that Juan had a knife 
and a gun in his hand; that two men were in the room, one 
named Juan and one named Michael; and that Juan left the 
house in his yellow truck. 
The same morning, Detective Steve Ward obtained a 
warrant to search defendant’s home.  He seized a steak knife 
with a black handle that he observed on a kitchen counter.  He 
looked for, but could not find, a similar knife.  Mary Lucio, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
defendant’s wife, testified that she had bought that knife and a 
similar but smaller knife at a “99-cent store” the previous 
February.  She could not remember what happened to the 
second knife.  She said she told police it probably got lost or was 
thrown away in the trash.  After his arrest, defendant wrote a 
letter to Mary in Spanish telling her “to remember the knife that 
you had lost cutting cantaloupe.”  After receiving the letter, she 
told police that she lost the knife cutting cantaloupe.  But at 
trial, she testified that she did not know what had happened to 
it. 
A forensic metallurgist testified that he compared the 
knife found in Lorena’s bedroom with the knife seized from 
defendant’s house.  He said that certain “design characteristics 
of the items suggest [a] common manufacturer,” but he could not 
be certain. 
Sergeant Kroutil interviewed defendant in English for 
about 30 to 40 minutes the afternoon of his arrest.  Defendant 
“appeared concerned for his friends, cooperative . . . like he was 
wanting to help.”  After defendant was given and waived his 
Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), he 
said he had known Ermanda but had not seen her for about two 
years until the previous Saturday, August 2.  On that Saturday, 
he went to her home and drank beer with her for about three 
hours.  He also bought ice cream for Oscar.  The evening of 
Sunday, August 3, he spent some time at the home of Hector 
Hernandez, then returned to his home, where he spent the 
night.  Lucio woke him that morning around 8:00 a.m., and he 
stayed in bed until 8:45 a.m. 
When Sergeant Kroutil showed defendant a picture of the 
knife found in his home, he strongly denied it was his, saying, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
“I’ve never seen a knife that looks like this.”  Then, when he 
realized the picture had been taken in his own home, he said, 
“[Y]eah, . . . my wife bought that at the 99-cent store.”  When 
asked whether she had bought another knife at the same time, 
he said, as Sergeant Kroutil testified, “[N]o, absolutely not, that 
was the only knife she bought.” 
Later the same day, Sergeant Kroutil spoke with 
defendant again briefly, mainly to obtain his consent to an 
interview the next day in Visalia.  Other than standard booking 
procedures, no one else interviewed defendant that day.  The 
next day, August 5, Sergeant Kroutil transported defendant to 
Visalia, where Visalia Police Detective Steve Shear interviewed 
him.  The interview was tape recorded. 
Detective Shear’s interview with defendant began in 
English, then defendant requested and obtained a Spanish 
interpreter.  Detective Shear testified, however, that he could 
understand defendant’s English and defendant appeared to 
understand his English.  Detective Shear told defendant about 
his Miranda rights, including that he had a right to an attorney.  
Defendant did not request an attorney.  Defendant again denied 
committing the crime.  When Detective Shear showed him a 
photograph of the knife found in his home, he said that his wife 
had purchased it at a 99-cent store.  When Detective Shear 
showed him a photograph of the smaller knife found at the crime 
scene, defendant said he was not sure it was his.  Later he said 
he remembered that the smaller “knife had been inadvertently 
left in the back yard when he and his wife had been cutting 
watermelon . . . about a week earlier.”  Defendant also reiterated 
that he had bought Oscar ice cream the previous Saturday. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
After the interview with Detective Shear on August 5, 
defendant told Sergeant Kroutil that a “smaller version” of the 
knife found in his house had been “lost in his back yard and [he] 
was wanting somebody to go check or something like that.” 
Defendant spoke with police for a total of less than one 
hour on August 4 and less than two hours on August 5. 
The next day, August 6, Detective Ward spoke with 
defendant for about 30 minutes.  After that interview, Sergeant 
Ernie Garay, who speaks Spanish, interviewed defendant.  
Defendant had just eaten lunch.  The interview between Garay 
and defendant was mostly in Spanish but some of it was in 
English, which defendant understood.  An interview that was 
not recorded began at 12:30 p.m. and continued until they took 
a break at 1:55 p.m.  Defendant was given and waived his 
Miranda rights.  At first, defendant again denied committing 
the crime.  But about 20 to 30 minutes into the interview, he 
said, “I’m screwed,” and, as Sergeant Garay described it, 
“admitted going over to the house and shooting both of the 
victims.”  After telling Sergeant Garay in the unrecorded 
interview what he had done, defendant agreed to give a 
videotaped statement, which began at 2:20 p.m., in which he 
reiterated his confession.  The videotape was played to the jury. 
In the videotaped statement, after again receiving and 
waiving his Miranda rights, defendant said the following:  He 
entered the Reyes house through an unlocked door.  (One 
witness testified that the Reyes house was often unlocked.)  He 
had a gun, but no knife.  He was looking for Ermanda, who owed 
him money and had insulted him.  When he saw Ermanda, he 
“just shot” two or three times.  He also shot the other woman 
about two times.  He did not know if he hit them.  He did not 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
know why he shot, saying, “I was blacked out.”  But he also said 
he saw a knife in Lorena’s hand and thought “she was going to 
kill me.”  He did not see anyone else in the house and did not 
follow anyone into the other room.  He denied sexually 
assaulting Lorena, stating, “I didn’t touch her.”  He was inside 
for only about five minutes.  He then left the house and drove 
away in his truck.  While driving, he threw the gun into a field.  
He thought the gun was a “.22” but added, “I don’t know guns.”  
(The police looked for the gun where defendant said he had 
thrown it but could not find it.) 
By the time of the third trial, more than two years after 
the crime, Oscar testified that he remembered little about the 
events of August 4.  He did remember that defendant had 
brought him ice cream, although he could not remember when.  
He also remembered talking to the police on August 4, when 
everything was fresh in his mind; he testified that he told them 
the truth.  At one point on redirect examination, Oscar did 
identify defendant as a man he saw the day his mother was 
killed.  But then he promptly reiterated that he did not 
remember.  On recross-examination by defense counsel, he also 
identified a photograph of a different person as someone else he 
saw at his mother’s house the night she died. 
Hector Hernandez testified that defendant came to his 
house twice during the evening of Sunday, August 3, using his 
yellow truck.  Hernandez asked defendant to give him a ride to 
work the next morning, as he often did.  Defendant agreed to 
give him a ride, and Hernandez gave him ten dollars to pay for 
it.  The next morning, August 4, Hernandez woke at 5:00 a.m., 
as he had to be at work by 6:30 a.m.  Defendant was supposed 
to come to his home around 6:00 a.m.  Hernandez called his 
brother for a ride just after 5:30 a.m. because he feared 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
defendant would not come.  His brother then gave him a ride to 
work.  Hernandez testified that defendant did not come to his 
house that morning, or at least that he did not see him. 
Margarita Ruiz testified that soon after the murders, 
Hernandez told her that defendant had been at his house 
around 5:00 a.m. on August 4.  Hernandez denied telling her 
this.  Hernandez’s brother testified that Hernandez called him 
to give him a ride to work around 5:00 to 5:10 a.m. that morning.  
Hernandez had not called him the night before. 
Hernandez later testified that he had had a sexual 
relationship with defendant for about five years, and he loved 
him.  He said, however, that he would not lie for defendant and 
insisted that defendant did not come to his house early on 
August 4. 
Lucio testified that on August 4, she went to bed for the 
last time around 4:30 a.m.  Defendant was in her bed at the 
time.  She awoke around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m.  Defendant was in her 
bed at that time also.  However, Lucio told police that defendant 
“might have been acting like he was asleep” when she went to 
bed at 4:30 a.m., that she was sleeping “very soundly” that 
morning, that it was “absolutely” possible for defendant to leave 
her bed and return without disturbing her, and that he had done 
so “hundreds of times” or “a thousand times” in the past.  At 
trial, Lucio denied that defendant could have left without her 
knowing it.  After the killings, Lucio told a friend that the 
morning of August 4, defendant was withdrawn and acting 
strange.  He wanted to put his truck in the backyard. 
Several witnesses, including Chandi, testified that they 
saw defendant or his distinctive yellow truck, or both, at or 
around the Reyes residence on multiple occasions the weekend 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
before the crimes.  One witness testified that she observed 
defendant drive the truck by the residence “real slow” more than 
once.  Around 1:30 a.m. on the morning of August 4, when she 
went outside to smoke, the same witness saw defendant talking 
with Ermanda in her garage.  Ermanda appeared agitated.  
Another witness testified she saw defendant there three times 
within a short period of time.  Once she saw defendant and 
Ermanda speaking loudly in front of her house.  Defendant was 
gesturing with his hands.  Another witness testified that she 
saw defendant with Ermanda the Saturday before the killings.  
Defendant left in his truck appearing upset. 
Michael 
Stephens, 
Lucio’s 
nephew, 
who 
was 
at 
defendant’s home early on the morning of August 4, testified 
that he might have heard what he believed was defendant’s 
noisy truck early that morning, but he was not sure.  Previously, 
Stephens had told police unequivocally that he did hear the 
truck start up early that morning. 
Lucio testified that defendant once told her that he wanted 
to bring a firearm home, although she did not see any guns at 
home.  Alonzo Perez, Hernandez’s cousin, testified that he drove 
to a dump with defendant in defendant’s yellow truck the day 
before the murders.  Defendant told him that “he had a gun at 
home.”  Camarino Reyes, Ermanda’s brother, testified that 
before Ermanda’s funeral, Raul Madrid, Ermanda’s brother-in-
law, told him that the week before Ermanda was killed, Madrid 
gave defendant a ride home.  On his way back, Madrid realized 
that defendant had left a nine-millimeter gun in his pickup.  
Madrid said he returned the gun the next day.  After Madrid 
said this, he said no more and reacted as if “he had blown it.”  At 
trial, Madrid denied the conversation.  Catherine Barrera 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
testified that defendant stayed with her for a while during the 
summer of 1997.  He told her he had a gun. 
The distance by car from the Reyes house to Hernandez’s 
home was 1.4 miles, and it took about two minutes 40 seconds 
to drive it.  The distance from defendant’s home to the Reyes 
house was 1.5 miles, and it took about three minutes ten seconds 
to drive it.  The distance from defendant’s house to Hernandez’s 
home was 1.6 miles, and it took about two minutes 35 seconds 
to drive it. 
The prosecution also presented evidence that was 
exculpatory.  Defendant’s DNA was not found anywhere in the 
Reyes house.  His fingerprints were found on some beer cans but 
not elsewhere in the house.  A bloody shoeprint was found in the 
house.  The boots defendant wore when he was arrested did not 
match the shoeprint, nor did police find any matching shoes in 
defendant’s house.  None of defendant’s clothes were 
bloodstained.  Neither semen nor sperm were found in or around 
Lorena’s body. 
When police arrived at the crime scene, the window of 
Victor’s bedroom was open.  The window screen was removed 
and leaning against the wall outside.  But the window ledge on 
the inside was dusty and showed no signs of a recent 
disturbance.  The knife found at the crime scene had one partial 
and two full fingerprints that were unidentified but were not 
defendant’s or Lucio’s.  The sliding portion of the open window 
of Victor’s bedroom contained unidentified fingerprints that 
were not defendant’s.  Because of similarities between the prints 
on the window and the prints on the knife, there was a “strong 
possibility” they came from the same person.  But because of the 
nature and condition of the prints, the fingerprint examiner 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
could not say for sure.  The examiner could not say how long the 
prints had been there. 
3.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant presented evidence relevant to Oscar’s 
credibility at trial and the credibility of Oscar’s statements and 
identifications the day of the crimes.  This evidence included 
events that might have influenced him, primarily conversations 
inside the Chandi house the morning of the crimes; Oscar’s 
inconsistent statements, including some of his prior testimony; 
testimony from Wanda Newton, a professional counselor who 
provided therapy to Oscar; and testimony from Dr. Susan 
Streeter, a psychologist and expert on the reliability of child 
witnesses.  He also presented evidence of his actions the day 
before the crimes, evidence inconsistent with some of the 
prosecution evidence, and evidence from persons who knew 
Ermanda and Lorena well that they never saw defendant at 
Ermanda’s home. 
Defendant testified.  He denied committing the crimes.  He 
said he visited Ermanda the Saturday before the crimes and 
again the next day.  He had never been to the house previously, 
although he had known Ermanda from a time in the past when 
she lived near him.  On that Saturday, he brought a six-pack of 
beer and, for Oscar, ice cream.  On Sunday evening, August 3, 
he went to Hernandez’s home for a while, then returned home, 
where he eventually went to bed.  He awoke the next morning, 
August 4, around 9:30-9:45 a.m.  He was surprised to be arrested 
later that morning. 
Defendant said he had not agreed to give Hernandez a ride 
to work the morning of August 4.  He also denied telling Alonzo 
Perez and Catherine Barrera that he had a gun. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
Defendant testified about his interviews with police on 
August 4, 5, and 6, leading to what he said was a false 
confession.  He denied that Sergeant Kroutil gave him his 
Miranda rights.  He said he asked Sergeant Kroutil, Detective 
Shear, and Sergeant Garay for an attorney on multiple 
occasions, although never when the interview was being 
recorded.  He said the officers ignored his requests, except that 
Detective Shear told him he did not need an attorney. 
Defendant testified that Detective Ward threatened to put 
him in a cell with a “crazy man . . . so he can kill you.”  The 
detective also said, “I better tell him, and if not, then he, himself, 
would inject me so that he could see me die, suffering, dying, 
little by little for what I had done.”  Sergeant Garay threatened 
to take his family away “if I didn’t tell him.”  Defendant 
confessed “after they had me all scared and pressured.  I told 
them so they could leave me at peace.”  He also confessed 
“because of Ward’s threat, because Garay had already said to 
me that he was going to take my family away, because I was 
tired and so that I could satisfy them.  I said it so they would 
leave me at peace, alone.  This was three days with the chains.  
I was three days with the chains and all I wanted was to be left 
alone or at peace.”  (Both Sergeant Garay and Detective Ward 
denied making these, or any, threats.) 
Defendant also presented the testimony of Dr. Richard 
Ofshe, a social psychologist, regarding, as defendant states it on 
appeal, “how the misuse of police interrogation tactics, including 
threats and coercion, can result in false confessions.”1 
                                        
1  
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented the expert 
testimony of Joseph Buckley regarding police interrogations and 
confessions. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
B.  Penalty Phase 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s crimes 
of violence against his wife, Mary Lucio, and his stepdaughter, 
Tammy Lucio.  It also presented the testimony of Rosa Chandi, 
Michelle Chandi (Lorena’s cousin), and Victor about the impact 
the murders had on them. 
Defendant presented a substantial case in mitigation.  
Thirteen friends and relatives who knew him well, including his 
wife, son and stepchildren, testified about his difficult 
upbringing, his good qualities, and their continuing love for him. 
Dr. Jose La Calle, a clinical psychologist, testified that his 
testing showed that defendant had an intelligence quotient (IQ) 
of 84, “the lowest end of the dull normal intelligent level.”  
Defendant’s “Spanish vocabulary was probably around third or 
fourth elementary grade level.”  He attended elementary school 
sporadically for about three years.  Someone with defendant’s 
IQ could “do some problem solving in mechanics,” but 
defendant’s abstract problem solving was “very poor.”  He had 
poor short-term attention span.  He also had a “short fuse,” 
meaning a “low tolerance threshold to a stress.”  But “short fuse” 
does not mean “violent reaction” or “blowing your top.” 
Mike Harvey, a Tulare County deputy sheriff, testified 
that defendant had had no “write-ups or disciplinary actions” 
while in jail. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Issues Regarding Guilt 
1.  Contentions Regarding Oscar’s Testimony and 
Statements the Day of the Crimes 
Defendant makes several arguments regarding Oscar’s 
testimony and the evidence of his statements and photographic 
identifications the day of the crimes. 
To place the arguments into context, it is important to 
keep in mind the following:  By the time Oscar testified, more 
than two years after the events, he had little memory of what 
happened the morning of August 4, 1997.  His trial testimony, 
as distinguished from his statements on August 4, included little 
that implicated defendant in the crimes.  In his argument to the 
jury, the prosecutor did not rely on Oscar’s testimony at all, but 
only on the evidence of his statement to police that the man he 
saw in the bedroom that morning was the one who had brought 
him ice cream, and his two photographic identifications of 
defendant as that man.  What the jury had to decide was the 
credibility of that statement and those identifications. 
a.  Oscar’s Competence To Testify 
Defendant contends the court erred in finding Oscar 
competent to testify. 
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, every person, 
irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is 
disqualified to testify to any matter.”  (Evid. Code, § 700, italics 
added.)  “A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is:  
[¶]  (1)  Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the 
matter so as to be understood, either directly or through 
interpretation by one who can understand him; or  [¶]  (2)  
Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
truth.”  (Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a).)  The grounds stated in 
Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a)(1) and (2), are the 
“only” grounds for disqualifying a witness from testifying.  
(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 572.) 
Defendant does not contend that Oscar was incapable of 
expressing himself so as to be understood.  A quick review of the 
transcript of his testimony shows he was quite capable of 
expressing himself.  But defendant contends the court should 
have declared him disqualified because he was incapable of 
understanding his duty to tell the truth. 
“Capacity to communicate, or to understand the duty of 
truthful testimony, is a preliminary fact to be determined 
exclusively by the court, the burden of proof is on the party who 
objects to the proffered witness, and a trial court’s 
determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion.”  (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 573.)  
“[T]he credibility of a witness is an issue for the jury, and not a 
relevant factor in determining competence to testify.”  (People v. 
Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1264, fn. 16; see People v. Avila 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 589-590.) 
The trial court acted well within its discretion in 
permitting Oscar to testify.  Defendant moved to disqualify 
Oscar before the first trial.  The court presided over a lengthy 
evidentiary hearing, during which Oscar, as well as others, 
including Dr. Streeter and Wanda Newton, testified.  After the 
hearing, the court found him competent to testify in a written 
ruling:  “The court observed the minor testify on the issue and 
has considered his demeanor and responses as well as the other 
evidence presented.  The court finds the minor witness is 
capable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
understood and the minor understands his duty to tell the truth.  
As to defense contentions of inconsistencies and concerns 
relating to the minor’s therapy, these are matters for the trier of 
fact to consider on the issue of credibility and are not a basis to 
disqualify a witness from testifying.  (See People v. Dennis 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 468.)” 
At the original hearing, Oscar testified that he was seven 
years old and in the first grade.  At first, he said he did not know 
the difference between the truth and a lie.  But when questioned 
carefully, he made clear he did understand the difference.  The 
prosecutor held what Oscar knew was a pen.  When the 
prosecutor said, “If I told you this is a car,” Oscar responded, 
“That would be a lie.”  When asked whether he would lie or tell 
the truth while sitting in the witness chair, he responded, “The 
truth.”  He said he understood it was important for him to tell 
the truth, and he would always tell the truth while sitting in the 
chair.  Defense counsel’s cross-examination and the redirect 
examination reinforced that Oscar was able to understand his 
duty to tell the truth. 
Similarly, at the trial under review, Oscar made clear he 
understood his duty to tell the truth.  At the beginning of his 
testimony, he said he would tell the truth.  The prosecutor 
asked, “If I said I was wearing a blue shirt, would that be the 
truth or would that be a lie?”  Oscar responded, “A lie.”  The 
prosecutor then asked, “If I said I was wearing a tie with 
elephants on it, would that be the truth or would that be a lie?”  
Oscar responded, “The truth.”  The record before us does not 
reveal the appearance of the prosecutor’s shirt or tie, but 
presumably Oscar responded appropriately.  No one suggested 
otherwise.  After this testimony, the court again found Oscar 
competent to testify. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
Oscar’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding.  
(People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 525 [voir dire 
testimony of a child four years old at the time of the crimes and 
eight years old when testifying established that she “understood 
the difference between truth and falsehood and appreciated that 
she had to tell the truth”].)  Defendant argues that Oscar had 
made many inconsistent statements between the time of the 
crimes and his testimony; that his memory had been corrupted 
by, among other things, the fact he had undergone therapy; and 
that he was incredible.  Some of these arguments are factually 
supported; all are irrelevant to Oscar’s competence to testify but 
instead were matters for the jury to consider. 
Oscar was seven or eight years old when he testified at the 
third trial.  Children much younger have been found competent 
to testify.  (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 351 [two child 
witnesses, one six and a half years old, and the other not quite 
five years old at the time of trial]; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 408, 443 [five years old at the time of trial]; People v. 
Giron-Chamul (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 932, 941 [five years two 
months old at the time of trial]; see People v. Roberto V. (2001) 
93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1368-1369 [collecting cases in which four- 
and five-year-old children were found competent to testify].) 
Regarding a five-year-old witness, we explained that 
“[i]nconsistencies in testimony and a failure to remember 
aspects of the subject of the testimony, however, do not 
disqualify a witness.  [Citation.]  They present questions of 
credibility for resolution by the trier of fact.”  (People v. Mincey, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 444.)  Similarly, we can easily adapt to 
this case our discussion in a case involving an eight-year-old 
witness:  “The facts that [Oscar] received therapy to help [him] 
cope with [his] mother’s [and, here, sister’s] death, that [he] 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
discussed the events with the prosecutor and others, and that 
[he] had gaps in [his] memories of the [morning] the crimes 
occurred, do not disqualify [him] as a witness.”  (People v. 
Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 526.) 
In the Giron-Chamul case, the defendant argued the five-
year-old child was disqualified because her testimony was 
“ ‘fantastical.’ ” 
 
(People 
v. 
Giron-Chamul, 
supra, 
245 
Cal.App.4th at p. 958.)  The court disagreed for reasons that 
apply here.  It explained that the witness was “a child, and 
children have imaginations.  ‘[T]he fact that a very young 
witness makes inconsistent or exaggerated statements does not 
indicate an inability to perceive, recollect, and communicate or 
an inability to understand the duty to tell the truth,’ even if 
some parts of the child’s testimony may be ‘inherently 
incredible.’ ”  (Id. at p. 960.) 
In short, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
finding Oscar competent to testify and letting the jury 
determine his credibility. 
b.  Asserted Error in Admitting Oscar’s 
“Unreliable” Statements and Testimony 
In a similar vein, defendant argues that Oscar’s testimony 
and earlier statements were too unreliable to be admitted.  But, 
as explained in part II.A.1.a, ante, these are arguments for the 
jury to consider, not grounds to exclude the evidence.  Defendant 
also argues Oscar did not have “personal knowledge of the 
matter” about which he testified.  (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).)  
The comments of the Law Revision Commission to Evidence 
Code section 701 explain, “Because a witness, qualified under 
Section 701, must have personal knowledge of the facts to which 
he testifies (Section 702), he must, of course, have the capacity 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
to perceive and to recollect those facts.  But the court may 
exclude the testimony of a witness for lack of personal 
knowledge only if no jury could reasonably find that he has such 
knowledge.  [Citation.]  Thus, the Evidence Code has made a 
person’s capacity to perceive and to recollect a condition for the 
admission of his testimony concerning a particular matter 
instead of a condition for his competency to be a witness.  And, 
under the Evidence Code, if there is evidence that the witness 
has those capacities, the determination whether he in fact 
perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact.”  (Cal. Law 
Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 2 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) 
foll. § 701, p. 284; see People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 
525-526 [quoting the same comment], People v. Lopez, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 351.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the evidence.  (People v. Lopez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 352.)  Oscar 
was present at the events about which he testified.  At trial, he 
could not remember much, but the jury was entitled to consider 
and evaluate what he did remember.  (People v. Dennis, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at pp. 491-492 [trial court properly admitted the 
testimony of a child who “did not remember much about the 
traumatic attack on her mother”].)  Oscar’s testimony “showed 
that [he] could perceive and recollect, and [he] understood [he] 
should not invent or lie about anything [he] said in court.  [He] 
was an eyewitness to the events.  Consequently, once the trial 
court properly determined [he] was competent to testify under 
Evidence Code section 701, it had no basis for excluding [his] 
testimony for lack of personal knowledge.”  (Id. at p. 526.) 
In fact, Oscar’s trial testimony was, by and large, quite 
credible.  He said he remembered little about the events of 
August 4, 1997.  The trial court specifically credited this part of 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
his testimony.  Oscar’s lack of current memory was, indeed, 
consistent with defendant’s own evidence suggesting that later 
events, such as therapy, might have corrupted his memory.  
From the prosecutor’s perspective, probably his most important 
testimony was that he told the police the truth the morning of 
the crimes.  The jury could readily find this testimony credible.  
The jury could also find it credible that, although Oscar could 
not remember what he told police, he did remember that, 
whatever it was, it was the truth.  Oscar also testified that 
defendant had brought him ice cream, although he could not 
remember when.  This testimony was highly credible.  That a 
person brought him ice cream is something a five-year-old child 
would likely remember.  Moreover, defendant himself said that 
he brought Oscar ice cream in his first interview with Sergeant 
Kroutil and again at trial. 
The trial court properly permitted the jury to consider 
Oscar’s testimony and the evidence of his statements the 
morning of the crimes and to judge for itself their reliability.  
Contrary to defendant’s argument, doing so did not violate his 
due process rights.  (People v. Lopez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 353-
354.) 
c.  Admissibility of Oscar’s Photographic 
Identifications 
Defendant contends the procedures by which Oscar made 
the two photographic identifications was impermissibly 
suggestive and, to the extent Oscar identified defendant at trial, 
that identification was tainted by the earlier improper 
identifications. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
23 
i.  Factual Background 
Sergeants Dempsie and Kroutil testified about the 
identifications at an evidentiary hearing held before the first 
trial.  Sergeant Dempsie spoke with Oscar at Rosa Chandi’s 
home early the morning of August 4, 1997.  Oscar told him the 
man he saw in the bedroom had brought him ice cream and had 
a “wisp on his chin.”  When Oscar said that he gestured by 
rubbing his chin.  Oscar gave no name.  After speaking with 
Oscar, Sergeant Dempsie spoke with Victor and obtained 
information regarding defendant that he provided to Sergeant 
Kroutil. 
Using information that Sergeant Dempsie provided, 
Sergeant Kroutil obtained a past booking photograph of 
defendant.  In the photograph, defendant had a mustache but 
no goatee.  Around 9:00 a.m. that morning, he showed the 
photograph to Oscar while they were alone in a bedroom in the 
Chandi residence.  Sergeant Kroutil told Oscar something along 
the lines of “I wanted to show him a photograph and see if he 
knew the person in it.”  Oscar said it was “Juan,” the man he 
had seen “that morning while his mom was bleeding.”  From 
information that Sergeant Dempsie had provided, Sergeant 
Kroutil understood that Oscar had originally not provided a 
name, but in the interim he had gotten the name from Victor.  
Oscar “was very strong in his belief that it was Juan.” 
Later that morning, Sergeant Dempsie showed Oscar a 
photographic lineup containing six photographs, one of which 
was of defendant taken that morning.  In that photograph, 
defendant had both a mustache and a goatee, as did the others 
in the lineup.  Oscar identified defendant’s photograph. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
24 
Originally, the court ruled evidence of the single-
photograph showup admissible but not evidence of the 
photographic lineup.  At the trial under review, however, the 
court ruled the evidence of the photographic lineup was also 
admissible.  Accordingly, the jury heard evidence of both of 
Oscar’s photographic identifications.2 
ii.  Analysis 
Defendant contends the identification procedure was 
impermissibly suggestive in violation of his due process rights. 
“A due process violation occurs only if the identification 
procedure is ‘so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ”  (People 
v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1355, quoting Simmons v. 
United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384.)  “In order to determine 
whether the admission of identification evidence violates a 
defendant’s right to due process of law, we consider (1) whether 
the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and 
unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was 
nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances, 
taking into account such factors as the opportunity of the 
witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the 
witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense, the 
accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level 
of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and 
the lapse of time between the offense and the identification.”  
                                        
2  
Two days after the photographic identifications, Oscar 
also identified defendant from a live lineup.  But the trial court 
found that lineup impermissibly suggestive because defendant 
was the only person wearing striped jail pants.  Accordingly, 
evidence of that lineup was not admitted at any of the trials. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
25 
(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989; see People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 556-558.)  “Against these factors is 
to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive 
identification itself.”  (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 
114.) 
Because there is no dispute regarding the historical facts, 
we independently review the trial court’s ruling that the 
identification was admissible.  (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 595, 609.) 
Defendant first contends that Sergeant Kroutil’s showing 
Oscar a single photograph was both unnecessary and 
impermissibly suggestive.  We have said that such showups are 
not necessarily unfair.  (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 
136.)  “Rather, all the circumstances must be considered.”  
(Ibid.)  Nevertheless, a single-photograph showup is inherently 
suggestive, at least to some extent.  (Manson v. Brathwaite, 
supra, 432 U.S. at p. 109.)  It is unclear whether the showup was 
necessary in this case.  At the time Oscar viewed the single 
photograph, defendant was a suspect but was still at large.  To 
take the time to prepare a photographic spread may have 
increased the risk that he might flee.  On the other hand, Oscar 
had already identified the killer as the man who brought him ice 
cream, and Victor had already identified defendant as the man 
who brought Oscar ice cream.  That may have been reason 
enough to arrest (or at least monitor) defendant without 
conducting a photo identification beforehand.  The police also 
put together a photo array mere hours after the showup — and 
perhaps could have done so much faster given that they arrested 
(and processed) Sanchez in the meantime.  Plus, unlike the 
witness in Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, Oscar was not 
himself on the brink of death.  The issue is therefore close.  
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
26 
But we need not decide whether the procedure was 
necessary.  Although the reliability of Oscar’s showup 
identification itself presents a difficult issue, we ultimately find 
that it was reliable under the totality of the circumstances.  The 
inherent suggestiveness of the procedure was outweighed by 
other factors confirming the reliability of the identification.  (See 
Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 116.)  Sergeant 
Kroutil merely showed Oscar a photograph and asked if he knew 
the person.  That did not explicitly suggest the answer.  
Moreover, although Oscar had indicated (correctly) that the man 
who gave him ice cream had a goatee, the photograph was from 
a time in the past when defendant did not have a goatee.  Thus, 
defendant’s appearance in the photograph was different than 
his appearance the day of the shooting and different than 
Oscar’s description of the man he observed.  If anything, the 
difference in facial hair suggested the photograph was not of the 
man Oscar had observed.  So although Oscar — unlike the 
witness in Braithwaite — was not an adult “trained police 
officer” viewing a showup “at his leisure,” and “[a]lthough 
identifications arising from single-photograph displays may be 
viewed in general with suspicion,” we still see relatively “little 
pressure on [Oscar] to acquiesce in the suggestion that such a 
display entails.”  (Id. at pp. 115-116)   
Against this possible corrupting effect, we weigh the 
factors indicating the identification was reliable. For a start, the 
showup occurred mere hours after the murders.  And although 
Oscar probably had only a fleeting opportunity to observe the 
man in the dimly lit bedroom at the time of the offense, he had 
ample opportunity to observe and get to know defendant the 
weekend before the Monday morning murders.  It likely would 
not take Oscar long in the bedroom that morning to recognize 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
27 
the man he saw as the man he had seen much of over the 
weekend and who had brought him ice cream.  His description 
of defendant, including the goatee, was accurate.  Moreover, 
Oscar identified defendant even though the photograph he was 
shown did not contain that goatee, thus suggesting the 
identification was based on his observation rather than the 
photograph matching his description. 
Other circumstances support a finding of reliability.  Part 
of the identification was independently corroborated by none 
other than defendant himself.  Oscar identified defendant in two 
respects:  (1) as the man who brought him ice cream, and (2) as 
the man he saw in the bedroom.  The first of these was later 
shown to be completely reliable.  Defendant said the same thing 
in his initial interview with police and later at trial.  Moreover, 
the physical evidence corroborated part of what Oscar told the 
police that morning.  He said that his mother grabbed the 
telephone, then fell.  Ermanda’s body was lying on the floor, and 
the telephone handset was on the floor.  The only disputed point 
was Oscar’s statement that the man who brought him ice cream 
was also the man in the bedroom.  But Oscar said that before he 
was shown the photograph.  Thus, the showup could not have 
influenced that statement. 
In short, although the suggestive nature of the 
identification does raise concerns, we find Oscar’s identification 
of the single photograph as the man he saw in the bedroom 
sufficiently reliable to be admissible.  Defendant did not carry 
his “burden of demonstrating the existence of an unreliable 
identification procedure.”  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 989.)  We note, however, that because single-
photograph showups are inherently suggestive, they should be 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
28 
used very cautiously, and only when truly necessary.  It is 
generally better to use a multiple-photograph lineup. 
Defendant also challenges the photographic lineup.  We 
have viewed it, and it was fair.  Defendant’s photograph in the 
lineup was different than the one Oscar had previously seen, so 
Oscar did not simply reidentify the same photograph.  All of the 
photographs were of persons with both a goatee and a mustache.  
“The question is whether anything caused defendant to ‘stand 
out’ from the others in a way that would suggest the witness 
should select him.”  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
367.)  Nothing did in this lineup.  Defendant argues that the 
conversation between Sergeant Dempsie and Oscar before the 
viewing impermissibly suggested Oscar’s identification.  “Our 
review of the transcripts reveals no such suggestiveness in 
[Dempsie’s] inquiries.”  (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 
699.)  Sergeant Dempsie asked Oscar questions about what he 
had seen and then asked him whether the man he had seen was 
among the pictures.  He did not say that the man was in the 
lineup and did not suggest which, if any, of the six photographs 
Oscar should select. 
Finally, defendant contends Oscar’s trial testimony was 
tainted by the earlier identification procedures.  At trial, Oscar 
identified defendant in only two respects.  First, he said 
defendant had brought him ice cream, testimony that, as noted, 
was entirely reliable, having been corroborated by defendant 
himself.  Second, although Oscar generally testified that he did 
not remember the events that morning, on redirect examination 
he did briefly identify defendant as the man he saw in the house.  
But then Oscar reiterated that he did not remember.  To the 
extent this testimony can be considered a trial identification of 
defendant as the perpetrator, the jury could readily consider it, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
29 
by itself, to be unreliable.  Similarly, the jury could readily 
consider as equally unreliable Oscar’s additional testimony on 
recross-examination that the photograph of a different person 
was also of someone he had seen at the house when his mother 
died. 
As was apparent to the jury, Oscar’s memory was largely 
corrupted by the time he testified at the third trial.  But the 
identification procedures the morning of the crimes did not 
cause this corruption.  Instead, other factors that defendant 
himself identified at trial, including the passage of time, and 
external events such as Oscar’s therapy, caused the corruption.  
The jury was entitled to consider Oscar’s trial testimony for 
what it was worth. 
d.  Admission of Oscar’s Hearsay Statements Made 
on the Day of the Murders 
Over defendant’s hearsay objections, the court admitted 
evidence of Oscar’s statements the morning of the shooting to 
Sergeant Dempsie (the man he saw in the bedroom had a “wisp 
on his chin” and had brought him ice cream) and Sergeant 
Kroutil (identifying a photograph of defendant as that man).  In 
a written ruling before the first trial, reiterated at the trial 
under review, the court admitted the statement to Sergeant 
Dempsie as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code 
section 1240.  The court found that, “given the totality of the 
circumstances, Oscar provided the information about the man 
with a ‘wisp’ who gave him ice cream while Oscar was under the 
stress of excitement and while his reflective powers were still in 
abeyance.” 
The court admitted the statement to Sergeant Kroutil on 
three grounds:  (1) as a spontaneous statement, (2) as a prior 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
30 
consistent statement under Evidence Code sections 791 and 
1236, and (3) as a past recollection recorded under Evidence 
Code section 1237.  It noted that “the interview between Oscar 
and Kroutil occurred within three hours of probably the most 
stressful, shocking event I think any of us could perceive, 
anyone could experience, that is, the death of a five year old’s 
mother and sister.” 
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting both 
statements.  We disagree.  We review the court’s evidentiary 
rulings for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 401, 462.)  The court acted within its discretion in 
finding the statement to Sergeant Dempsie admissible as a 
spontaneous statement and in finding the statement to 
Sergeant Kroutil admissible as a past recollection recorded.  
Because one ground for admissibility is sufficient, we need not 
consider whether the statement to Sergeant Kroutil was also 
admissible on the other grounds the court cited.  (See Cowan, at 
p.  465.) 
“Evidence Code section 1240 provides that ‘[e]vidence of a 
statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the 
statement’ ‘[p]urports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, 
condition, or event perceived by the declarant’ and ‘[w]as made 
spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by such perception.’  ‘[T]he basis for the 
circumstantial trustworthiness of spontaneous utterances is 
that in the stress of nervous excitement, the reflexive faculties 
may be stilled and the utterance may become the instinctive and 
uninhibited expression of the speaker’s actual impressions and 
belief.’  [Citation.]  [¶]  ‘To be admissible, “(1) there must be some 
occurrence startling enough to produce . . . nervous excitement 
and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
31 
utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive 
and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be 
supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in 
abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the 
circumstances of the occurrence preceding it.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 751-752.) 
The first and third of these requirements are clearly met.  
What occurred, the deaths of his mother and sister, was 
certainly startling, and Oscar’s statements related to the 
circumstances of that occurrence.  Defendant contends the 
second requirement is not met because Oscar had time to 
contrive and misrepresent.  “Because the second admissibility 
requirement, i.e., that the statement was made before there was 
‘ “time to contrive and misrepresent,” ’ ‘relates to the peculiar 
facts of the individual case more than the first or third does 
[citations], the discretion of the trial court is at its broadest 
when it determines whether this requirement is met.’ ”  (People 
v. Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 752.) 
“A number of factors may inform the court’s inquiry as to 
whether the statement in question was made while the 
declarant was still under the stress and excitement of the 
startling event and before there was ‘time to contrive and 
misrepresent.’  [Citation.]  Such factors include the passage of 
time between the startling event and the statement, whether 
the declarant blurted out the statement or made it in response 
to questioning, the declarant’s emotional state and physical 
condition at the time of making the statement, and whether the 
content of the statement suggested an opportunity for reflection 
and fabrication.  [Citations.]  This court has observed, however, 
that these factors ‘may be important, but solely as an indicator 
of the mental state of the declarant.’  [Citation.]  For this reason, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
32 
no one factor or combination of factors is dispositive.”  (People v. 
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 64.) 
We see no abuse of discretion.  When the court made its 
final ruling, it had presided over a detailed evidentiary ruling 
and two previous trials.  It knew the facts thoroughly.  The most 
important factor here was that, as the court noted, the 
underlying event was truly startling, especially for a five year 
old.  The court could reasonably conclude it would take a long 
time for the child to regain his reflective powers after what he 
saw and experienced.  Sergeant Dempsie spoke with Oscar 
within about an hour and a half of that event.  He testified that 
during the interview, Oscar was emotional and was crying part 
of the time.  Given the circumstances, Sergeant Dempsie’s 
testimony was credible.  The trial court could readily conclude 
that Oscar had not by then had time to contrive or misrepresent, 
or to reflect or fabricate. 
As defendant notes, Detective Lewis testified that when 
he spoke with Oscar earlier that morning, Oscar seemed calm.  
However, Oscar also soon became nonresponsive in that 
interview.  He could well have been in shock, then later reacted 
emotionally.  The trial court could reasonably find that Oscar 
was under the stress of the earlier events on both occasions.  
Defendant also argues that Oscar might have heard discussion 
from others in the Chandi house suggesting defendant was the 
perpetrator.  But there was no evidence that anyone suggested 
that the man who brought Oscar ice cream was the perpetrator.  
Oscar said that himself.  In any event, whether or not there 
might have been discussion in the Chandi house, the court acted 
within its discretion when it found Oscar was still under the 
stress of the earlier events when he made the statement. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
33 
The court also acted within its discretion when it found 
the statement to Sergeant Kroutil admissible as a past 
recollection recorded.  “Evidence Code section 1237 permits 
evidence of a witness’s past statement ‘if the statement would 
have been admissible if made by him while testifying, the 
statement concerns a matter as to which the witness has 
insufficient present recollection to enable him to testify fully and 
accurately, and the statement is contained in a writing which:  
[¶] (1) [w]as made at a time when the fact recorded in the writing 
actually occurred or was fresh in the witness’[s] memory;  [¶] (2) 
[w]as made . . . (ii) by some other person for the purpose of 
recording the witness’[s] statement at the time it was made;  [¶] 
(3) [i]s offered after the witness testifies that the statement he 
made was a true statement of such fact; and  [¶] (4) [i]s offered 
after the writing is authenticated as an accurate record of the 
statement.’  (Evid. Code, § 1237, subd. (a).)”  (People v. Cowan, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 465.) 
At trial, Oscar certainly had “insufficient present 
recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately” about 
the matter.  (Evid. Code, § 1237, subd. (a).)  Defendant contends 
instead that he had too little recollection at trial.  Citing People 
v. Simmons (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 677, he argues that the third 
requirement — that the witness testifies the statement was 
true — is lacking.  In Simmons, after the witness had made the 
statement in question, he suffered a head injury causing 
amnesia.  At trial, he could not remember making the statement 
or whether it was true.  All he could say was that he had no 
reason not to tell the truth.  The Court of Appeal held that was 
insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements.  As it noted, 
“the witness did not, and was unable to, attest to the accuracy 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
34 
of the matters contained in his previous statement.”  (Id. at p. 
682.) 
This case is different than People v. Simmons, supra, 123 
Cal.App.3d 677.  Like the witness in Simmons, Oscar did not 
remember the statements.  But, unlike the witness in Simmons, 
he testified that he remembered talking with the police and, 
critically, he remembered that he told them the truth. 
In People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th 401, the witness 
testified that he had told the truth regarding the statement in 
question “to the best of his ability,” although he admitted that 
his memory had been “ ‘jumbled’ and ‘scrambled’ because of” 
drug use.  (Id. at p. 466.)  We found this testimony sufficient to 
admit the prior statement.  We explained that “ ‘whether an 
adequate foundation for admission’ of a statement under 
Evidence Code section 1237 has been established turns on 
whether the declarant’s ‘testimony that [the] statement was 
true was reliable,’ and the trial court who hears the declarant’s 
testimony has ‘the best opportunity’ to assess its credibility.”  
(Id. at p. 467.)   We concluded that, “[u]nder the circumstances, 
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining the statement was sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted under [Evidence Code] section 1237.”  (Ibid.) 
Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in finding Oscar’s 
testimony that he told the truth sufficiently reliable to admit the 
evidence.  That Oscar remembered telling the truth was quite 
credible even though he could not remember what he said.  The 
court or jury could reasonably find that a child would normally 
tell the truth in that situation and could remember that he did 
so even though he remembered little else. 
Defendant also argues that, because Oscar remembered 
little about the events when he testified, admitting the prior 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
35 
statements violated his constitutional rights to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses.  However, as the United States 
Supreme Court has stated, “when the declarant appears for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”  
(Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59-60, fn. 9.)  This 
is true even if the witness cannot recall the statement.  
“Defendant contends there can be no constitutionally effective 
cross-examination when the witness cannot recall the facts 
related in the hearsay statement.  [Citations.]  But the high 
court has squarely rejected that contention, concluding that 
‘when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to 
unrestricted cross-examination,’ ‘the traditional protections of 
the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury to 
observe the witness’[s] demeanor satisfy the constitutional 
requirements,’ notwithstanding the witness’s claimed memory 
loss about the facts related in the hearsay statement.  (United 
States v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 554, 559-560.)  Nothing in 
Crawford casts doubt on the continuing vitality of Owens.”  
(People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 468; see People v. 
Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 632-633 [similar].) 
Defendant was permitted to cross-examine Oscar, and the 
jury could observe his demeanor.  Importantly, defendant was 
also able to cross-examine other witnesses, present evidence 
about the circumstances under which Oscar made the 
statements, and present any other evidence relevant to the 
credibility of those statements.  This was sufficient to satisfy 
defendant’s confrontation rights. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
36 
e.  Restrictions on Defendant’s Presentation of 
Evidence To Impeach Oscar’s Credibility 
Defendant sought to challenge Oscar’s credibility by 
presenting evidence of his prior statements and some of his 
testimony at previous trials.  The court admitted some of the 
statements and testimony but not all.  Given Oscar’s testimony 
that he could remember little of the events of August 4, 1997, 
which the court found not to be evasive, the court generally 
found that the statements it excluded were not inconsistent with 
his trial testimony and, additionally, were not admissible as 
past recollections recorded.  Defendant contends the court erred 
by excluding those statements. 
We need not review in detail the court’s many rulings, 
because even if we assume the court erred under California law 
in excluding any or all of the proffered statements, the error was 
harmless and was not so severe as to violate defendant’s federal 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. 
The court permitted defendant to admit the following 
statements over the prosecutor’s hearsay objections.  On cross-
examination of Oscar, defense counsel elicited that in an earlier 
trial, he said, “[N]o” when asked whether the “person in the 
courtroom today [is] the person who came in,” and he shook his 
head when asked if he saw the person “here today.” 
Defense counsel elicited testimony from prosecution 
witness Camarino Reyes that around August 10, 1997, Oscar 
told him “that he saw a big man.” 
Oscar’s biological father, Jose H., testified that after 
August 20, 1997, he took Oscar to his home in Idaho.  Oscar told 
Jose H. that his mother would come back for him and that she 
would talk to him.  About two or three weeks after August 20, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
37 
1997, Oscar also told Jose H. that three men were in the house 
the night his mother died.  Oscar gave his father three names of 
the men, only two of which the father remembered.  Oscar gave 
the names of “Juan” and either “Marcos” or “Michael.” 
Lola Ortiz testified that a few days after the shooting, 
Oscar gave her the names of the persons he saw in the house the 
night his mother died.  He said “Juan” was there, as well as a 
man who was Ermanda’s mechanic and a friend of Lorena’s 
called “Big Man.”  At one point, Oscar told Ortiz that “Domingo” 
had been there. 
Additionally, the jury viewed the videotape of Sergeant 
Dempsie’s second interview with Oscar the day of the shooting, 
in which Oscar identified defendant’s photograph from a lineup 
but also said he saw two men named Juan and Michael in the 
room. 
The trial court also admitted testimony from Oscar’s 
therapist making clear that Oscar had long been mired in a 
“fantasy-reality tug of war.”  For example, she described a 
session where Oscar said that his mom was under the couch and 
talking to him — and another session where Oscar said that his 
mom had not been murdered but instead cut herself with a 
knife.  
Defendant argues that the court erroneously excluded 
other items of evidence that had been admitted at previous 
trials.  He also argues that because the previous trials had 
resulted in the jury being unable to reach a verdict, the different 
rulings at the third trial were prejudicial. 
In addition to Oscar’s statements that his father testified 
about at this trial, Jose H. had also testified at an earlier trial 
that a few weeks after the crimes, Oscar also told him the 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
38 
following:  Three men had entered the house the night of the 
crimes, cut the telephone cord, and manhandled Lorena and 
Ermanda.  The men gave them beer, and soon Lorena was “face 
up” with two men while the third was with Ermanda.  They 
heard firecrackers, and his mother hid him under the bed.  
Oscar ran to where the blood was and started to move his 
mother.  His sister was in a room, and his mother was running 
all over.  Jose H. also testified that Oscar no longer told him that 
any of these men had brought him ice cream. 
The trial court also excluded at the instant trial 
statements that Oscar made to two investigators in Idaho three 
months after the shooting in which he went into lurid details 
about what he saw the morning of the shooting that were, as 
defendant puts it in his brief, not corroborated and “contradicted 
by the evidence and common sense.”  Specifically, Oscar said 
that a person he had seen with a gun got a hammer and hit him 
in the stomach and back and pulled his shirt.  The man ran 
around and broke everything including a clock and toys.  Oscar 
said he hid under the bed.  He also said he was tied up with a 
rope, and the man gave him medicine to drink, but Oscar did not 
drink it.  Oscar said the man broke a window, hit a door with 
the hammer, hit his sister on the head and stomach, and there 
was blood on the man’s hat and hands. 
Defendant 
also 
sought 
unsuccessfully 
to 
present 
additional statements from Oscar’s prior testimony. 
In light of the evidence of Oscar’s statements that the 
court did admit at the third trial, as well as his actual trial 
testimony — in which he remembered little and identified a 
photograph of a man other than defendant as having been in the 
house that morning — and the other evidence defendant 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
39 
presented challenging Oscar’s credibility, the jury knew that, by 
the time he testified, more than two years after the shooting, 
Oscar’s memory had been largely corrupted.  The jury knew that 
Oscar’s trial identification of defendant, which he quickly 
changed to say he did not remember, and his identification at 
trial of the photograph of a different man, were, by themselves, 
not reliable.  Admission of the additional statements and more 
of his prior testimony would not have significantly added to the 
picture the jury already had concerning Oscar’s testimony. 
The real credibility issue for the jury to resolve was the 
reliability of Oscar’s statements and identifications on the 
morning of August 4, 1997.  Indeed, the credibility question was 
even narrower than that.  It was undisputed, and corroborated 
by defendant himself, that Oscar correctly identified defendant 
as the man who had brought him ice cream.  The only disputed 
question was the accuracy of Oscar’s statement to Sergeant 
Dempsie that the man who brought him ice cream (i.e., 
defendant) was also the man he saw in the bedroom.  Defendant 
was permitted to present all the evidence he wished concerning 
the statements of August 4, 1997, and the surrounding 
circumstances, including what occurred in the Chandi house 
that morning. 
The jury knew from the evidence actually presented that, 
very soon after his initial statement, Oscar began adding new 
details that were inconsistent and incredible.  Defendant 
presented much evidence, including expert testimony, that 
accounted for this.  Some of Oscar’s statements that were 
admitted at earlier trials but excluded from this one were 
perhaps more lurid and incredible than the admitted 
statements.  But under all of the circumstances, excluding those 
statements was not prejudicial.  What was important, and what 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
40 
became obvious to the jury, was that Oscar’s memory was 
quickly corrupted by the many factors defendant identified at 
trial.  Further evidence on that score would have done little to 
undermine the credibility of Oscar’s initial statement 
implicating defendant, which he made very soon after the 
incident and which was largely corroborated by defendant 
himself and the positioning of the bodies.  Because Oscar had 
learned in the interim that defendant was named Juan, we also 
see little significance in the fact that, in later statements to his 
father, Oscar simply used defendant’s name and no longer 
referred to him as the man who brought him ice cream. 
For these reasons, to the extent any error was of state law, 
we would find it harmless because it is not reasonably probable 
the result would have been more favorable to defendant had the 
excluded evidence been admitted.  (People v. Merriman, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 69.)  Defendant also contends the rulings 
violated his federal constitutional rights, including the right to 
confront witnesses.  To establish a violation of his right of 
confrontation, defendant must show that the excluded evidence 
“would have produced ‘a significantly different impression of 
[the witness’s] credibility.’ ”  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
894, 946, quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 
680.)  On this record, we cannot say that he has made that 
showing.  Nor can defendant show that the rulings made the 
trial fundamentally unfair.  (Merriman, at p. 70.) 
f.  Restricting the Testimony of a Defense Expert 
Witness 
As part of his effort to challenge Oscar’s credibility, 
defendant called Dr. Susan Streeter to provide expert testimony 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
41 
on the reliability of child witnesses.  Defendant contends the 
court erroneously restricted the scope of her testimony. 
Before Dr. Streeter testified, the prosecutor objected to 
any testimony expressing her opinion of Oscar himself.  Citing 
People v. Page (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 161, the court ruled that Dr. 
Streeter could testify about factors that could affect a child’s 
credibility, but she could not give an opinion regarding Oscar’s 
own credibility.  Specifically, the court ruled that “Doctor 
Streeter is certainly qualified and may testify about Oscar’s 
developmental stage and the general principles that apply to a 
child of that age insofar as reliability is concerned. . . .  If she 
has an opinion generally as to children of that developmental 
age as to reliability, she may discuss those principles. . . .  She 
may state the general principles involved as to a child of that 
developmental age, but beyond that, there’s ample evidence 
before the jury to make that determination, and the proffered 
expert testimony would not be admissible.”  The court also 
prohibited Dr. Streeter from citing hearsay evidence that would 
have supported her opinion regarding Oscar’s credibility. 
Defendant contends the court erred in restricting Dr. 
Streeter’s testimony in this way.  It did not.  “When expert 
opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial court’s 
discretion.”  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 403.)  
We see no abuse of discretion.  In People v. Page, supra, 2 
Cal.App.4th 161, the case the trial court cited, an expert 
testified about factors that could cause a false confession.  The 
Court of Appeal held that the trial court acted properly in not 
additionally permitting the expert “to discuss the particular 
evidence in this case or to give his opinion regarding the overall 
reliability of the confession.”  (Id. at p. 188.)  It was for the jury, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
42 
not an expert, to determine the reliability of the actual 
confession.  (Id. at pp. 187-189.) 
Similarly, the trial court properly permitted Dr. Streeter 
to testify about factors the jury should consider in judging 
Oscar’s credibility and the reliability of his statements of August 
4, 1997, and then leaving it to the jury to apply that testimony 
to the actual facts.  “The general rule is that an expert may not 
give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth, for the 
determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond 
common experience that the expert’s opinion would assist the 
trier of fact; in other words, the jury generally is as well 
equipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being 
truthful.”  (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 
82; see People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 628 [similar]; 
People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 39 [abuse of 
discretion to admit expert opinion that a witness was credible].)  
The jury heard Dr. Streeter’s testimony, it heard Oscar’s 
testimony and could observe his demeanor, and it heard the 
remaining testimony relevant to his credibility.  It was fully 
qualified to judge for itself, without additional expert help, the 
credibility and reliability of Oscar’s testimony and his 
statements of August 4, 1997. 
Contrary to defendant’s additional argument, because the 
trial court properly prohibited Dr. Streeter from giving an 
opinion regarding Oscar’s actual credibility, it also properly 
prohibited her from citing hearsay evidence to support that 
prohibited opinion.  We see no error. 
2.  Admission of Defendant’s Confession 
Defendant argues that the court should have excluded his 
confession on two grounds:  (1) it was tainted by a violation of 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
43 
the rules of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, during the 
August 5, 1997, interview between Detective Shear and 
defendant; and (2) it was involuntary. 
a.  Factual Background 
Before the first trial, defendant moved to exclude his 
confession, and the court presided over an evidentiary hearing 
concerning the interviews between defendant and police 
culminating in his confession.  The testimony at the hearing was 
generally consistent with the evidence later presented at trial, 
except that it contained some testimony relevant to the 
suppression motion not presented at trial.  We will focus on the 
testimony relevant to defendant’s arguments. 
The August 5, 1997, interview between Detective Shear 
and defendant was recorded; the court listened to critical 
portions of the recording.  The purpose of the interview was for 
the detective to give defendant a “voice stress analyzer” test.  
Defendant had agreed to submit to questioning to prepare for 
the test and then to take the test itself.  Detective Shear testified 
that the first part of the interview was “a preinterview for the 
purpose of preparing the questions for the examination.”  At the 
outset of the interview, he reminded defendant of the Miranda 
rights that he had previously waived.  He said, “All those rights 
still apply to you, Juan.  You have the right to remain silent, you 
don’t have to talk to us, you don’t have to submit to this test, you 
have the right to talk to an attorney and everything.”  He added, 
“You know that you don’t have to talk to me?  You don’t have to.  
You can say I don’t want to talk to you.  I don’t want to take this 
test.  I don’t want to talk to you.  Do you want to talk to me?  
Will you answer questions for me?”  Defendant responded, “Yes, 
why not?” 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
44 
Later in the interview came an exchange during which 
defendant contends he invoked his right to remain silent.  After 
listening to the tape, the court found the following occurred.  
Defendant said, “I want you to put the machine, sir.”  Detective 
Shear said, “Beg your pardon?”  Defendant said, “I want you to 
put the machine on me.”  Detective Shear responded, “Yeah, I 
know.”  Defendant said, “I’m not going to say nothing more.  I 
told you the truth.  That’s the truth.”  Detective Shear asked, 
“Now you just want to take the test?”  Defendant responded, 
“Yes.”  Detective Shear continued asking defendant questions 
about the case and eventually administered the test.3  
Defendant still denied involvement in the murders. 
As at trial, defendant testified that the police repeatedly 
threatened him and ignored his requests to have an attorney, 
testimony the officers denied. 
The court denied defendant’s suppression motion in a 
written ruling.  It found not credible defendant’s testimony that 
he had been threatened and had repeatedly requested counsel; 
it found credible the officers’ contrary testimony.  It also found 
that defendant had not been coerced.  After quoting the colloquy 
that defendant contended constituted an invocation of the right 
to silence, the court stated, “Considering the content of the 
exchange and the surrounding circumstances, the court does not 
find Mr. Sanchez invoked his right to terminate questioning.”  
In a separate ruling, the court also found that the investigators 
never advised defendant of his consular rights under the Vienna 
                                        
3  
At defendant’s request, the court ordered that the test 
itself not be mentioned at trial. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
45 
Convention on Consular Relations, but that the failure to do so 
did not require suppression of the confession. 
b.  Analysis 
When reviewing a ruling admitting a confession, we accept 
the trial court’s resolution of any factual dispute to the extent 
the 
record 
supports 
it, 
but 
otherwise 
we 
determine 
independently whether the confession was taken in violation of 
the rules of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, or was 
involuntary.  (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551.)  On 
both questions, the People bear the burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  (Ibid.)  Here, defendant and the 
officers provided sharply differing testimony of what occurred.  
The court resolved this factual dispute by finding the officers 
credible and defendant not credible.  The record, including the 
taped statements themselves, supports the court’s credibility 
determination, and we accept it.  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 731, 751.)  Accordingly, we will consider the taped 
statements and the officers’ testimony, but not defendant’s 
contrary testimony, to determine independently whether the 
confession was admissible. 
Defendant contends he invoked his right to remain silent 
when he told Detective Shear during the August 5, 1997, 
interview, “I’m not going to say nothing more.  I told you the 
truth.  That’s the truth.”  If a defendant invokes his Miranda 
rights, questioning must cease.  (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 
Cal.4th 1111, 1122.)  However, when, as in this case, a 
defendant has waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk 
with police, any subsequent invocation of the right to counsel or 
the right to remain silent must be unequivocal and 
unambiguous.  (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
46 
381-382 [right to remain silent]; Davis v. United States (1994) 
512 U.S. 452, 461-462 [right to an attorney].)  “The question 
whether a suspect has waived the right to counsel with 
sufficient clarity prior to the commencement of interrogation is 
a separate inquiry from the question whether, subsequent to a 
valid waiver, he or she effectively has invoked the right to 
counsel.  [Citations.]  It is settled that in the latter circumstance, 
after a knowing and voluntary waiver, interrogation may 
proceed ‘until and unless the suspect clearly requests an 
attorney.’  (Davis v. United States [, supra,] 512 U.S. [at p.] 461, 
italics added.)  Indeed, officers may, but are not required to, seek 
clarification 
of 
ambiguous 
responses 
before 
continuing 
substantive interrogation.  (Id. at p. 459.)”  (People v. Williams 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 427.)  The same rules apply to an 
invocation of the right to silence as apply to the invocation of the 
right to counsel.  (Berghuis v. Thompkins, at p. 381; Williams, 
at pp. 433-434.) 
“[T]he question of ambiguity in an asserted invocation 
must include a consideration of the communicative aspect of the 
invocation — what would a listener understand to be the 
defendant’s meaning.  The high court has explained — in the 
context of a postwaiver invocation — that this is an objective 
inquiry, identifying as ambiguous or equivocal those responses 
that ‘a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would 
have understood [to signify] only that the suspect might be 
invoking the right to counsel.’ . . .  [¶]  In certain situations, 
words that would be plain if taken literally actually may be 
equivocal under an objective standard, in the sense that in 
context it would not be clear to the reasonable listener what the 
defendant intends.”  (People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 
428-429.)  “A defendant has not invoked his or her right to 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
47 
silence when the defendant’s statements were merely 
expressions of passing frustration or animosity toward the 
officers, or amounted only to a refusal to discuss a particular 
subject covered by the questioning.”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 76, 115.) 
In context, defendant’s statement, “I’m not going to say 
nothing more,” was not an unambiguous invocation of his right 
to remain silent.  Instead, the statement showed impatience to 
take the voice stress analyzer test.  Other than the one 
statement, defendant was cooperative during that interview and 
always willing to talk.  We agree with the trial court’s analysis:  
“In context, Mr. Sanchez was not seeking to terminate the 
interview.  Shear had explained to Mr. Sanchez the voice stress 
test was like a lie detector and would determine whether Mr. 
Sanchez was telling the truth when he denied involvement in 
the deaths of his friends.  At the point of dispute, Mr. Sanchez 
did not state he wanted to be silent.  He did not indicate a refusal 
to talk about the case.  By implication, he indicated impatience 
with Shear’s pretest interrogation and clearly stated he wanted 
to proceed to the test portion of the interview.  Mr. Sanchez’s 
insistence that Shear proceed with testing him by the ‘machine’ 
does not equate to an invocation of his right of silence.” 
Contrary to defendant’s additional arguments, nothing 
else in the interview between Detective Shear and defendant 
supports the conclusion that he invoked his right to silence.  
Because we find that defendant did not unequivocally invoke his 
right to silence, we need not consider the Attorney General’s 
further argument that any Miranda violation on August 5 
(when defendant continued to deny guilt) did not taint his 
confession the next day, which was preceded by another waiver 
of his rights. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
48 
Defendant also contends his confession was involuntary.  
He “is of course correct that ‘[a]n involuntary confession may not 
be introduced into evidence at trial.’ ”  (People v. Spencer (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 642, 672.)  “ ‘A statement is involuntary if it is not the 
product of “ ‘a rational intellect and free will.’ ”  (Mincey v. 
Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398.)  The test for determining 
whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s 
“will was overborne at the time he confessed.” ’ ”  (People v. 
McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346-347.)  “In assessing 
whether statements were the product of free will or coercion, we 
consider the totality of the circumstances, including ‘ “ ‘the 
crucial element of police coercion,’ ” ’ the length, location, and 
continuity of the interrogation, and the defendant’s maturity, 
education, and physical and mental health.”  (People v. Duff, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 555-556.)  Police coercion is, indeed, 
crucial.   To be considered involuntary, a confession must result 
from coercive state activity.  (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 
U.S. 157, 165; People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 483, 502.) 
Defendant’s testimony would have supported a finding 
that his confession was coerced.  But, as noted, the trial court 
discredited that testimony in favor of the officers’ testimony that 
they did not threaten or coerce him.  We accept that credibility 
finding.  Except for defendant’s testimony, there was no 
evidence of police coercion.  Although there were multiple 
interrogations, none was particularly lengthy, and they were 
spread out over three days.  He ultimately confessed about 20 to 
30 minutes into an interview that began after he had eaten 
lunch.  Because there was no police coercion, defendant 
confession was not involuntary. 
As defendant notes, the police did not notify him of his 
consular rights under article 36 of the Vienna Convention on 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
49 
Consular Relations.  Defendant is a Mexican national, although 
it appears that at the time of his arrest, he had lived in this 
country longer than he lived in Mexico.  However, “the United 
States Supreme Court made it clear that an officer’s failure to 
notify a suspect of his or her consular rights does not, in itself, 
render a confession inadmissible.”  (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 735, 756, citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006) 548 
U.S. 331.)  Instead, “[a] defendant can raise an Article 36 claim 
as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his 
statements to police.”  (Sanchez-Llamas, at p. 350.)  Defendant 
has done so.  But nothing about the failure to notify defendant 
of this right coerced him into confessing.  “As the Sanchez-
Llamas court noted, article 36 ‘secures only a right of foreign 
nationals to have their consulate informed of their arrest or 
detention — not to have . . . law enforcement authorities cease 
their investigation pending any such notice or intervention.’  
(Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 349.)”  (Enraca, at p. 
758.)  We have no basis on which to find the confession 
involuntary. 
For these reasons, we uphold the trial court’s ruling 
admitting the confession. 
3.  Admission of Evidence of Defendant’s Sexual 
Relationship with a Witness 
Over objection, the trial court admitted evidence that 
defendant and prosecution witness Hernandez had had a sexual 
relationship.  Defendant contends the court erred. 
a.  Factual Background 
During Detective Shear’s testimony, the prosecutor sought 
to admit evidence of Hernandez’s sexual relationship with 
defendant.  He argued it was relevant:  (1) to defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
50 
veracity in his interview with Detective Shear, when he said 
differing things regarding his relationship with Hernandez; and 
(2) to Hernandez’s credibility, particularly his credibility when 
he denied seeing defendant the morning of the murders.  The 
court deferred a ruling pending further evidence, and the 
proffered testimony was not presented at that time.  Later, the 
prosecutor again sought to present the evidence.  Defendant 
objected to the evidence as unduly prejudicial. 
The court ruled the evidence admissible:  “There is 
certainly a legitimate concern about potential undue prejudice, 
and I recognize that.  However, I agree that . . . the veracity of 
Mr. Hernandez is a critical issue in this case.  It certainly makes 
a great deal of difference whether or not Mr. Sanchez’s wife, who 
has provided an alibi that he was asleep at the time the murders 
occurred, whether or not that is true, or whether or not he was 
active and about in the community of Porterville at or about the 
time of the homicide.  There are also other reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn depending upon what the fact finder finds to 
be the situation.  There is a material difference between a 
friendship, even a close friendship, and an intimate 
relationship, particularly an intimate relationship wherein the 
person whose veracity is at issue has expressed love for the 
principal at issue.”  The court found the probative value of the 
evidence outweighed any potential for prejudice. 
Thus, the court permitted testimony from Hernandez 
regarding his sexual relationship with defendant (see pt. I.A.2, 
ante), and cross-examination of defendant regarding that 
relationship and statements he made about it to Detective Shear 
and Sergeant Garay.  (See also pt. II.A.5, post [concerning a 
related contention].)  Defendant admitted in court that he had 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
51 
had a sexual relationship with Hernandez but denied that it 
lasted five years, as Hernandez had testified. 
At defendant’s request, the court agreed to give the jury a 
limiting instruction, and it did so on three occasions.  The first 
occurred at the beginning of Hernandez’s testimony regarding 
the relationship.  The court admonished:  “This evidence is being 
introduced for the purpose of showing, if it does, that Mr. 
Sanchez and Mr. Hernandez were engaged in a consensual 
sexual relationship and on more than one occasion.  This 
evidence . . . is admitted for a limited purpose.  It may be used 
to judge the credibility and believability of Mr. Hernandez when 
he denied seeing Juan Sanchez on August the 4th, 1977 [sic], at 
about five o’clock in the morning.  It may be used to evaluate the 
truthfulness of Mr. Sanchez’s statements to Detective Shear 
relating to his relationship with Mr. Hernandez, and it may be 
used in considering the credibility and believability of Mr. 
Sanchez’s testimony at trial.  It absolutely is not being 
introduced for any other purpose unless I direct you otherwise.” 
The court added, “Obviously, consensual adult sexual 
relationships are not illegal in our society.  As a matter of fact, 
there are constitutional protections in place that recognize 
that.”  It instructed that if any juror could not accept the limiting 
instruction, the juror should so inform the bailiff.  No juror did 
so. 
During a break in the testimony, outside the jury’s 
presence, defense counsel requested the court also to tell the 
jury that the evidence could not be considered to show a 
propensity to commit the charged crimes.  The court stated that 
it had “intentionally left it out because sexual relationships 
between two adults is not bad character.  That’s why instead of 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
52 
saying bad character and . . . giving it a negative connotation, I 
gave it a positive connotation by reminding the jurors that it’s 
constitutionally protected.”  The court added that the evidence 
did have some probative value because it “suggests that Mr. 
Sanchez is not averse to sodomy.”  But the court offered to give 
a more complete admonition during jury instructions.  The 
prosecutor also noted that the court had erroneously stated the 
year 1977 instead of 1997.  But everyone agreed the mistake 
could not have confused the jury. 
The second admonition came during cross-examination of 
defendant.  The court again explained that “there was evidence 
introduced 
yesterday 
again 
on 
the 
consensual 
sexual 
relationship between Mr. Sanchez and Hector Hernandez.  I just 
want to remind you I’ve already given you a limited instruction 
on the use of that evidence, and I just want to remind you at this 
point again that it is being offered for a limited purpose of, 
among other — excuse me, the limited purpose of judging the 
credibility of Mr. Hector Hernandez.  It may be used in 
considering the truthfulness of Mr. Sanchez’s testimony in 
court.  It may be used to consider the truthfulness of Mr. 
Sanchez’s testimony relating to his whereabouts on the morning 
in question, and as I believe I already mentioned, it may be used 
in judging Mr. Sanchez’s credibility.  It is admitted for those 
limited purposes.”  A short time later, the court added, “And I 
think this goes without saying, that you’re not permitted to 
consider that evidence for any other purpose than one that the 
court has instructed you may consider, and you will get a formal 
jury instruction on this at the time of jury instructions.” 
The third admonition came as part of the jury instructions 
after the evidence had been presented.  The court stated:  
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing, if it 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
53 
does, that the defendant and Hector Hernandez were engaged 
in a consensual sexual relationship.  Such evidence, if believed, 
may not be considered by you to prove that Mr. Sanchez is a 
person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit 
crimes, including the crimes for which he is now charged.  Such 
evidence, if believed, may be considered by you only for the 
limited purpose of determining if it tends to show the 
following:  . . . The credibility/believability of Mr. Hector 
Hernandez when he denied seeing Juan Sanchez on August the 
4th, 1997, at or about five o’clock in the morning; the 
credibility/believability of Juan Sanchez’s statements to police 
officers and his testimony at trial.  For the limited purpose for 
which you may consider this evidence, you must weigh it in the 
same manner as you do all other evidence in the case.  You are 
not permitted to consider this evidence for any other purpose.” 
b.  Analysis 
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the 
evidence because it was irrelevant and, even if relevant, it 
should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under Evidence 
Code section 352.  “The trial court enjoys broad discretion in 
determining the relevance of evidence and in assessing whether 
concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time 
substantially outweigh the probative value of particular 
evidence.”  (People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 572.)  We see 
no abuse of discretion.  The court carefully exercised its 
discretion.  Its ruling was not arbitrary, capricious, or absurd.  
(Ibid.) 
“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence 
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, 
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
54 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”  
(Evid. Code, § 210, italics added.)  If relevant, a court has 
discretion to admit evidence of a sexual relationship.  (People v. 
Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 132-134 [evidence admitted at 
the defendant’s request over the prosecution’s objection with a 
limiting instruction].) 
Here, as indicated in the trial court’s ruling, although the 
evidence was somewhat relevant to judging the credibility of 
defendant’s denial of guilt in the interview with Detective Shear 
and his trial testimony, it was primarily admitted on the 
question of Hernandez’s credibility.  Defendant presented an 
alibi that he was asleep in his bed between around 4:30 and 6:30 
to 7:00 a.m. the morning of the murders.  Hernandez testified 
that, the night before, he had asked defendant to give him a ride 
to work that morning.  Defendant was supposed to come to 
Hernandez’s home around 6:00 a.m.  Evidence, including 
testimony from Hernandez’s brother, showed that Hernandez 
called his brother for a ride just after 5:30 a.m. because he feared 
defendant would not come.  Calling him that early would be odd 
if Hernandez had no reason at 5:30 a.m. to believe defendant 
would not arrive by 6:00 a.m.  Margarita Ruiz testified that 
Hernandez told her that defendant had been at his house at 5:00 
a.m. that morning.  If so, that would disprove defendant’s alibi, 
something obviously of consequence to determining his guilt.  It 
would also place defendant within about a three-minute drive of 
the crime scene shortly before the murders, and it would show 
that defendant did not give Hernandez the promised ride to 
work but instead was doing something else during the time the 
crime was committed.  Hernandez denied seeing defendant that 
morning.  As the trial court explained in exercising its 
discretion, whether this denial was credible was an important 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
55 
question at trial.  That Hernandez had a sexual relationship 
with and loved defendant showed possible bias and was 
probative of his credibility. 
Moreover, the court gave pointed and emphatic limiting 
instructions not once, but three times during the trial.  “We 
presume the jury understood and followed the instruction.”  
(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 873.)  Defendant 
contends the limiting instructions were inadequate, and the 
court should instead have given a slightly different instruction 
that his attorney suggested.  We disagree.  The instructions 
were precise and carefully limited the jury’s consideration of the 
evidence to its proper sphere.  We see no error. 
4.  Admission of Evidence That Defendant Possessed a 
Firearm 
Over defendant’s objection, the court admitted evidence 
that he possessed a firearm around the time of the murders.  
Defendant contends the court erred.  Preliminarily, the Attorney 
General argues defendant forfeited any argument as to 
Catherine Barrera’s testimony because he did not object to it at 
the third trial.  However, defendant did object to the testimony 
at the first two trials.  Before the third trial, the court stated 
that it was reiterating its rulings made during the first two 
trials.  Under the circumstances, defendant’s previous two 
objections were sufficient to preserve the contention. 
Turning to the merits, we see no error.  Defendant invokes 
the rule, established in People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 577, 
and reiterated in People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 
1056, that it is generally error to admit evidence that the 
defendant possessed a weapon that could not have been the one 
used in the charged crime.  That rule does not apply here.  Here, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
56 
the murder weapon was never found, but the evidence showed 
it was likely a nine-millimeter firearm.  The firearm the 
witnesses testified about could easily have been the one used in 
the murders.  “Although the witnesses did not establish the gun 
necessarily was the murder weapon, it might have been.  Unlike 
People v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at page 577, this evidence did 
not merely show that defendant was a person who possesses 
guns, but showed he possessed a gun that might have been the 
murder weapon . . . .  The evidence was thus relevant and 
admissible as circumstantial evidence that he committed the 
charged offenses.”  (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 
1052; see People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 956 [similar].) 
Evidence that shortly before the murders defendant 
possessed a firearm that could have been the murder weapon 
was similarly relevant and admissible as circumstantial 
evidence that he committed the murders.  Contrary to 
defendant’s additional argument, we see no abuse of discretion 
in not excluding the evidence as unduly prejudicial under 
Evidence Code section 352. 
5.  Cross-examination of Defendant 
Defendant contends the court erred in permitting certain 
cross-examination when he testified. 
a.  Factual Background 
At one point in the interview between defendant and 
Sergeant Garay, after confessing to shooting the victims, 
defendant said, “I don’t want to talk anymore, Garay.  No more.  
But I can help you.”  At a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled 
that this statement was an invocation of defendant’s right to 
silence, and it ordered the prosecution not to present in its case-
in-chief evidence of any later statements. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
57 
During his cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor 
informed the court outside the jury’s presence that, to impeach 
defendant’s credibility, he wanted to question defendant about 
statements he made to Sergeant Garay after he invoked his 
right to silence regarding his relationship with Hernandez.  The 
prosecutor argued that defendant “lied to Garay, and he did so 
after, the date after admitting, and he goes back to lying.  Lying 
seems to be the most comfortable communication for him and 
that’s what I’m seeking to demonstrate for the jury.”  The court 
asked how the statements were inconsistent with defendant’s 
trial testimony.  The prosecutor responded:  “It’s not a 
consistency.  It goes merely to show he has lied in this case in 
the past when asked direct questions.”  The court deferred a 
ruling and asked the prosecutor to provide authority supporting 
the request. 
Later, citing Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, the 
court ruled that statements made after defendant invoked his 
right to silence could be used for impeachment.  The court stated 
that it would give the jury a limiting instruction.  Defendant 
objected under Evidence Code section 352.  The prosecutor 
reiterated why the testimony would be impeaching:  “I think it’s 
very relevant that [defendant] is denying yet again on the day 
that he’s making his confession because . . . [defense] counsel 
seeks to argue that his confession is tainted because he 
obviously cannot come up with true factors related to the 
murders, and that’s because he doesn’t know about the murders, 
and that’s why he is unable to come up with these and that 
shows that he’s an innocent person who’s falsely confessing.  
However, at the same time that he’s being asked about that and 
not coming up with what is factually accurate with the murder 
scene, he’s also being asked about his relationship — or he has 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
58 
been asked about his relationship with Hector, certainly a 
subject that he would have intimate knowledge about, and he’s 
not coming up with the truth, either, until pressed.  And so it’s 
very relevant.” 
The court permitted the requested impeachment, finding 
it “very probative for the very reasons that [the prosecutor] 
stated.  It certainly is the type of evidence that can if 
improperly —unless there are appropriate cautions to the jury, 
it is the type of evidence that can certainly cause prejudice and 
on occasion undue prejudice.  However, in this case, given the 
nature of the issues in this case, particularly the issue relating 
to the confession, Mr. Sanchez’s — the testimony of Hector 
Hernandez and his veracity and the other limited purposes for 
which it . . . has been offered previously, it is probative and its 
probative value certainly outweighs . . . any undue prejudicial 
effect.  So I have weighed those factors and will allow it and deny 
the objection under [Evidence Code section] 352.” 
The prosecutor questioned defendant about statements he 
made to Sergeant Garay regarding his relationship with 
Hernandez that occurred after the point at which the court had 
ruled defendant invoked his right to silence.  Defendant testified 
that he originally denied having a sexual relationship, then 
gradually admitted it when asked further questions. 
In addition to the limiting instructions described in part 
II.A.3.a, ante, the court gave the following instruction at the end 
of the evidence portion of trial:  “At one point in the videotaped 
statement to Sergeant Garay, Mr. Sanchez stated, quote, ‘I don’t 
want to talk anymore,’ unquote, and I believe that’s found on 
page 44 of the transcript that is in evidence.  In any event, as to 
any statements made by Mr. Sanchez to Sergeant Garay after 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
59 
this point in time, you are to consider only such statements, if 
any, that are inconsistent with his trial testimony.  Any such 
statements may be considered by you only for the purpose of 
testing the defendant’s credibility.  You are not to consider such 
statements as evidence of guilt.  This limiting instruction does 
not apply to statements which you find were made prior to Mr. 
Sanchez’s statement, ‘I don’t want to talk anymore.’ ”  The court 
then repeated the instruction. 
b.  Analysis 
Defendant contends the court should have prohibited the 
cross-examination into his sexual relationship with Hernandez 
both because it was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code 
section 352 and because the cross-examination about his 
statements to Sergeant Garay violated his Miranda rights. 
The first argument largely reprises his similar argument 
challenging the evidence previously admitted about the 
relationship between defendant and Hernandez.  (See pt. II.A.3, 
ante.)  Although not strongly probative, the cross-examination 
was somewhat relevant to impeach defendant for the reasons 
the prosecutor and the court identified.  One defense theory of 
the case, suggested in the defense’s opening statement to the 
jury, was that defendant withheld information that the actual 
killer would have known, which showed that he was ignorant of 
that information; that, in turn, showed that his confession was 
false.  Evidence that, even after he confessed, defendant 
continued lying and withholding information was probative on 
this point and was thus probative of the credibility of 
defendant’s testimony that he confessed falsely.  Because 
evidence of the sexual relationship had already been admitted, 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
60 
any additional prejudicial effect was slight.  We see no abuse of 
discretion under Evidence Code section 352. 
A statement that is otherwise voluntary, but taken in 
violation of the Miranda rules, may be admitted to impeach a 
defendant who testifies.  (Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. 
222; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 32.)  Defendant 
contends this rule does not apply because his testimony on direct 
examination 
was 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
admitted 
statements, and the cross-examination concerned only collateral 
matters.  We need not resolve this point, because any error was 
harmless in light of the evidence that was properly admitted.  
The jury had already heard of the sexual relationship through 
Hernandez’s own testimony, and defendant was also cross-
examined about his evasive statements to Detective Shear.  The 
brief cross-examination regarding defendant’s statements to 
Sergeant Garay after he invoked his right to silence added little 
to what the jury otherwise knew. 
Moreover, the court gave repeated instructions limiting 
the use the jury could make of this testimony, instructions we 
presume the jury understood and followed.  Any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
6.  Admitting Testimony That Was Later Stricken 
The prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney David Alavezos, 
asked defendant on cross-examination questions about some 
testimony he anticipated he would present later.  When he tried 
to present the testimony, it had to be stricken and the jury 
admonished to disregard it, because it turned out to be 
inadmissible hearsay.  Defendant contends that, in the process, 
the court committed error, and the prosecutor committed 
misconduct. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
61 
a.  Factual Background 
During presentation of the defense case, Alavezos stated 
outside the jury’s presence that defense counsel had just 
informed him that the defense intended to call Lola Ortiz as a 
defense witness.  He said that the defense “just gave me what 
looked like about a little over a hundred pages this morning on 
Lola Ortiz . . . .”  He wanted to know for what purpose the 
defense intended to call her.  He also said that Ortiz is “not a 
percipient witness to anything, so everything she testifies to is 
hearsay that she’s heard from somebody else.”  Defense counsel 
clarified that she intended for Ortiz to testify that Ortiz had not 
seen defendant at the victim’s home. 
After this, Alavezos also stated that if defendant called 
Ortiz as a witness, he intended to present evidence that Ortiz 
had told two persons about a conversation between Ermanda 
and defendant shortly before the murders in which defendant 
threatened Ermanda’s daughter.  Alavezos acknowledged he 
understood that Ortiz herself was “denying this now,” but the 
two people she told had in turn “independently told officers” that 
Ortiz told them she was present.  Defense counsel asserted that 
Ortiz “always says like she was there,” but “[w]hen you really 
ask her, it turns out it’s hearsay from Ermanda, it’s not 
admissible.”  Defendant objected on hearsay grounds, and the 
court made no ruling at the time. 
The question arose outside the jury’s presence again the 
next day.  Defense counsel again objected to the evidence, 
stating that Ortiz had denied hearing the conversation between 
defendant and Ermanda.  Counsel suggested that if Ortiz had 
heard of the conversation at all, she might have heard about it 
from Ermanda and did not personally overhear it.  Alavezos 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
62 
represented that two witnesses, Margaretta Zepeda and Maria 
Alicia Palomares, had told investigators in separate interviews 
that Ortiz told them that she was present during the 
conversation.  He described what the witnesses had said.  They 
said that Ortiz told them that “she was present when Juan had 
gone over to the victim’s residence in the evening to be paid for 
some mechanical work he had done on Ermanda’s car; that 
Ermanda told the defendant her car was running worse than 
before he had worked on it and told defendant Sanchez that if 
he would fix her car she would pay him.  Defendant Sanchez 
then told Ermanda that if she didn’t pay him, her daughter 
would pay him, and that [Ortiz] understood this to mean that he 
would harm Lorena.”  The prosecutor again acknowledged that 
Ortiz herself did not confirm this. 
Based on these representations, the court found “sufficient 
foundation” for the evidence to be admitted.  Defense counsel 
requested that it be stricken “if it turns out to be hearsay.”  
Alavezos agreed not to “elicit the source” of the hearsay for the 
time being. 
Later Alavezos sought to question defendant on cross-
examination about this purported conversation between him 
and Ermanda.  When defendant objected, the court ruled outside 
the jury’s presence that the prosecutor could ask the question, 
and, if defendant denied the conversation occurred, it would 
admonish the jury that questions are not evidence.  When the 
defense expressed doubt that an admonition would be effective, 
the court responded, “I have a lot of faith in jurors following the 
law.  We went through extensive voir dire in this case with the 
questionnaire and everything else.  These people appreciate 
their duties.” 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
63 
When cross-examination resumed, the prosecutor asked 
defendant about the conversation.  Defendant denied that it 
occurred.  At that point, the court admonished the jury:  “Ladies 
and gentlemen, I think it’s appropriate to remind you, once 
again, that questions of counsel are not evidence.  Counsel has 
just asked two questions, Mr. Sanchez has denied it, and unless 
there is some other evidence relating to it, that’s it.  It didn’t 
happen.  You’re not to speculate otherwise.” 
After these events, Ortiz testified as a defense witness 
that she had not seen defendant at the Reyes house and 
regarding some statements by Oscar.  She was asked no 
questions about the conversation between Ermanda and 
defendant.  Later, defense counsel objected under Evidence 
Code section 352 to the prosecutor’s calling Ortiz to question her 
about the conversation.  The court found the evidence probative 
and not unduly prejudicial. 
Alavezos then called Ortiz as his own witness on rebuttal.  
She denied overhearing the conversation between Ermanda and 
defendant and further denied telling Zepeda or Palomares about 
it.  At this point, the court admonished the jury:  “Remember, 
ladies and gentlemen, the questions of counsel are not evidence.  
It’s the testimony of the witness that is.” 
The prosecutor then called Zepeda as a witness.  At a 
hearing outside the jury’s presence, the court permitted 
Alavezos to ask leading questions to minimize the risk of the 
witness saying something prejudicial.  On the stand and in the 
presence of the jury, Zepeda then denied that Ortiz told her 
about something defendant had said in Ortiz’s presence.  The 
prosecutor questioned her about what she had told the 
investigators.  He asked, “Did you talk to them about what 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
64 
[Ortiz] had told you that she heard Juan say?”  Zepeda 
responded, “No, she did not hear.  She was told by Ermanda.” 
At that point, at defense counsel’s request, another 
hearing was held outside the jury’s presence.  Defendant asked 
that the testimony be stricken and moved for a mistrial.  The 
court did not rule on the mistrial motion at the time, but it 
stated the belief than an admonition would be effective.  The 
court then admonished the jury:  “Ladies and gentlemen, there’s 
been reference in the testimony about something that Ermanda 
purportedly said to somebody else was reported to somebody 
else, that’s hearsay.  That’s totally unreliable.  So that part of 
this witness’s testimony is stricken.  You shall disregard it.  Do 
you all understand that?  Do you all understand how important 
that is?  This case is not going to be decided in any way by 
inadmissible hearsay.  Some hearsay is admissible under the 
law, but some is so unreliable it does not come in, and this is 
exactly that type of unreliable hearsay.  It’s stricken.  You shall 
disregard it in its entirety.” 
The prosecutor asked no further questions of Zepeda but 
called Palomares as a witness.  She also denied that Ortiz told 
her that Ortiz was present when defendant made the 
statements.  At that point, the jury was dismissed, and the 
witness was questioned further in its absence.  Palomares said 
she did not know whether Ortiz actually heard the conversation 
between defendant and Ermanda or was merely relating what 
Ermanda had told Ortiz.  The prosecutor then stated the intent 
not to question the witness further.  The court said it would 
admonish the jury to disregard all of this testimony. 
Defense counsel again moved for a mistrial.  She claimed 
the prosecutor committed misconduct because he presented the 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
65 
evidence knowing it was unreliable for the sole purpose of 
prejudicing the jury.  The court asked Alavezos about his good 
faith belief.  The prosecutor said he believed from a report by 
Investigator Florencio Camarillo that the witnesses had said 
Ortiz was present during the conversation between defendant 
and Ermanda. 
Investigator Camarillo testified outside the jury’s 
presence.  He said he spoke with both Zepeda and Palomares.  
He read the relevant portion of his report, dated September 7, 
1999:  “Lola [Ortiz] told them the defendant Juan Sanchez had 
gone over to victim’s residence in the evening to be paid for some 
mechanical work he’d done on her car.  She told him [sic] that 
Ermanda told . . . defendant that her car was running worse 
than before he worked on it.  Ermanda supposedly told 
defendant Sanchez that if he would fix her car, then she would 
pay him.  Defendant Sanchez  . . . then told Ermanda that if she 
didn’t pay him, her daughter would pay him.” 
Investigator Camarillo testified he “assumed” and 
“received” the women’s statements as meaning that Ortiz was 
present for the threat.  But his report did not specifically address 
the point.  Asked whether he told Alavezos about his 
conversations with Zepeda and Palomares, he said he had.  
Asked further whether what he told Alavezos included that 
Ortiz was present during the conversation, Camarillo answered, 
“That’s how I understood it, yes.” 
The court denied defendant’s mistrial motion.  It found, 
“based upon what has been presented to me, that Mr. Alavezos 
had a good faith, although apparently mistaken, belief that . . . 
the last two witnesses would impeach Lola Ortiz if she’s denied 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
66 
the conversation.”  It expressed confidence that, given an 
admonition, the jury would disregard the testimony. 
The court admonished the jury:  “Ladies and gentlemen, 
all of the rebuttal evidence is stricken.  You are to entirely 
disregard it.  Now, by rebuttal evidence, I’m talking about the 
evidence today of Lola Ortiz, and thank you for crossing those 
out of your notes, if you made any notes.”  The court also struck 
the testimony of Zepeda and Palomares, adding:  “You are to 
entirely and totally disregard it.  It is unreliable and shall not 
be considered by you in any way whatsoever.  You’re to strike it 
from your mind right now, totally.  And I’m not only talking 
about the testimony, obviously.  By striking testimony, that 
means that the questions of counsel are out, as well, because 
questions of counsel, as you well know, as I’ve previously 
admonished you many times, are not evidence.  So there’s 
absolutely nothing to consider relating to the testimony of those 
three witnesses.”  The court then asked each juror in turn 
whether that juror understood the admonition and would follow 
it.  All responded affirmatively. 
The court readmonished the jury as part of its overall 
instructions after the presentation of evidence:  “The entire 
testimony of the witnesses Lola Ortiz, Margaretta Zepeda, and 
Marie Palomares, given on Friday, October 9th, 1999, was 
stricken by the court.  You are instructed to entirely disregard 
that evidence and not consider it in any way.  You are reminded 
of that instruction.”  It clarified that the jury could consider 
Ortiz’s earlier testimony when she testified as a defense witness. 
b.  Analysis 
Defendant contends the court erred in not holding a 
hearing to determine whether Ortiz had personal knowledge 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
67 
about the purported conversation between him and Ermanda.  
It did not err. 
“Subject to Section 801 [concerning expert witnesses], the 
testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is 
inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter.  
Against the objection of a party, such personal knowledge must 
be shown before the witnesses may testify concerning the 
matter.”  (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a); see People v. Anderson, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 573.)  In this case, the court’s discussion 
with counsel of Ortiz’s potential testimony made clear that the 
threat would be admissible only if Ortiz testified she heard 
defendant threaten Ermanda, which neither attorney expected, 
or if Zepeda and Palomares testified Ortiz told them she had 
overheard the threat.  Given the parties’ uncertainty about what 
the witnesses would say, the potentially prejudicial nature of 
the information, and the inherent difficulty of stopping a jury 
from considering information once it has been received, it would 
have been prudent for the court to avoid potential prejudice by 
examining the witnesses beforehand outside the jury’s presence.  
(Evid. Code, §§ 402, 702.)  
Although the court did not examine the witnesses 
beforehand, it did hold a hearing.  The prosecutor represented 
that he had witnesses who would testify that Ortiz did have 
personal knowledge of the conversation even if Ortiz denied it.  
The court then permitted the prosecutor to call Ortiz herself as 
a witness.  When she denied the conversation, it permitted the 
prosecutor to call the two witnesses (Zepeda and Palomares) 
who, the prosecutor represented, would supply the missing 
evidence.  The two witnesses testified from personal knowledge, 
although not in the way the prosecutor anticipated.  If, as 
anticipated, the two witnesses had testified that Ortiz told them 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
68 
she heard the conversation, the evidence would have been 
admissible.  The statements from defendant to Ermanda would 
have come within the exception to the hearsay rule for 
statements of a party.  Ortiz’s statements to Zepeda and 
Palomares would have come within the exception to the hearsay 
rule for prior inconsistent statements.  (Evid. Code, §§ 1201, 
1220, 1235; see People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 403.)  
When it turned out that the witnesses did not establish that 
Ortiz spoke from personal knowledge, the court struck the 
testimony and admonished the jury.  (See Evid. Code, § 403, 
subd. (c)(2) [the court “[s]hall instruct the jury to disregard the 
proffered evidence if the court subsequently determines that a 
jury could not reasonably find that the preliminary fact [Ortiz’s 
personal knowledge] exists”].) 
Defendant relies primarily on People v. Valencia (2006) 
146 Cal.App.4th 92.  In Valencia, a conviction of sexual crimes 
was based partly on hearsay statements of a person who had 
“consistently and repeated stated” that she “lacked personal 
knowledge” of the charged crimes.  (Id. at p. 104.)  It appears 
that no effort was made to show that the declarant did, indeed, 
have personal knowledge, and the evidence was admitted 
without objection.  The Court of Appeal found defense counsel 
ineffective for not objecting to the hearsay testimony.  “In the 
absence of personal knowledge, a witness’s testimony or a 
declarant’s statement is no better than rank hearsay or, even 
worse, pure speculation.”  (Id. at pp. 103-104.)  This case is 
entirely 
different. 
 
Here, 
based 
on 
the 
prosecutor’s 
representation, the court did not clearly err in permitting the 
prosecutor to try to establish the requisite personal knowledge.  
When the testimony differed from what was expected, the court 
struck the testimony.  In contrast to Valencia, where the jury 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
69 
was permitted to consider the inadmissible hearsay, here the 
court instructed the jury not to consider it. 
In any event, no prejudice actually resulted.  “[T]he court 
firmly instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, and we 
presume the jury did so.”  (People v. Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 
1, 33.)  Defendant contends the admonitions were inadequate.  
We disagree.  The admonitions were squarely on point and 
clearly instructed the jury on its duty.  Indeed, the court took 
the extraordinary step of polling the jurors individually to 
ensure that each understood and would follow the admonition. 
To the extent defendant contends the court erred in not 
granting the mistrial motion after Zepeda stated that Ortiz had 
been “told by Ermanda,” we disagree.  We review the denial of a 
mistrial motion for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 
Cal.5th 49, 92.)  “A court should grant a mistrial motion based 
on a witness’s statement if it judges the defendant has been 
prejudiced in a way that an admonition or instruction cannot 
cure.  Because this is inherently a speculative matter, the trial 
court has considerable discretion in ruling on a mistrial motion.”  
(Ibid.)  Here, the trial court participated in selecting this 
particular jury, and it knew the jury well.  It was confident that 
an admonition would cure any harm.  We have no reason to 
disagree or find the court abused its discretion. 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in two respects.  First, he contends the prosecutor 
committed misconduct in cross-examining him about the 
conversation.  “ ‘It is improper for a prosecutor to ask questions 
of a witness that suggest facts harmful to a defendant, absent a 
good faith belief that such facts exist.’ ”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 515, 562.)  However, “as long as he had a good faith 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
70 
belief in the existence of the preliminary fact [citation], the 
prosecutor was entitled to ask defendant” these questions.  
(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 467.)  Defendant 
contends the prosecutor did not act in good faith.  However, after 
holding a hearing, the court found otherwise, and it also found 
that an admonition would cure any harm.  “The record supports 
these determinations and we adopt them as our own.”  (People 
v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 482.) 
The prosecutor stated the source of his belief that Ortiz 
had personal knowledge:  a report from Investigator Camarillo.  
Although the report did not say so, Camarillo testified that he 
assumed or understood that Ortiz had personal knowledge of 
the threat, and in conveying the report to the prosecutor he also 
conveyed that understanding.  This testimony, along with the 
prosecutor’s representation he expected Zepeda and Palomares 
to testify that Ortiz told them she witnessed the threat, supplied 
substantial support for the trial court’s finding of good faith. 
While we do not overturn the trial court’s finding, we note 
that the prosecutor knew that Ortiz would likely deny 
knowledge of the threat.  Indeed, when she testified, Ortiz 
denied overhearing the threat and even denied telling Zepeda 
and Palomares about it.  Thus, the prosecutor knew he would 
have to rely on Zepeda and Palomares to make the testimony 
admissible.  But the report of those witnesses’ statements did 
not specifically state that Ortiz had overheard the threat.  In 
this circumstance, it would have been prudent for the 
prosecutor, no less than for the court, to verify the threat’s 
admissibility before questioning witnesses about it in front of 
the jury.   
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
71 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by not admonishing the witnesses before calling 
them.  Defendant appears to focus on Zepeda’s statement that 
Ortiz “was told by Ermanda.”  “A prosecutor has the duty to 
guard against statements by his witnesses containing 
inadmissible evidence.  [Citations.]  If the prosecutor believes a 
witness may give an inadmissible answer during his 
examination, he must warn the witness to refrain from making 
such a statement.”  (People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 
481-482.)  Defendant did not object on this basis at trial, thus 
forfeiting the contention.  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1370, 1406.)  Because defendant did not object, the record does 
not indicate whether the prosecutor had reason to believe any 
witness would state something inadmissible, or whether he did 
or did not admonish the witnesses.  (Ibid.)  The record does 
reflect that the prosecutor requested and was given permission 
to ask leading questions to minimize the risk of eliciting 
inadmissible evidence.  The prosecutor also stated his intention 
not to elicit the source of the statements for the time being.  He 
asked Zepeda a yes or no question designed not to elicit the 
inadmissible statement that the witness, nonetheless, blurted 
out.  In any event, as we have explained, the court’s admonitions 
sufficed to prevent prejudice. 
Something similar occurred in People v. Melendez, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at pages 31-33.  There, the prosecution presented 
evidence that a witness had been injured in a criminal assault.  
The circumstances in which the evidence was presented implied 
that the defendant had committed the crime.  But anticipated 
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime never 
materialized, and the trial court had to admonish the jury to 
disregard the testimony.  We found no error and, given the 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
72 
admonition, no prejudice.  We further explained that “[w]hat 
occurred here was unfortunate, but it is the sort of event that 
sometimes happens in a trial. . . . Witnesses sometimes blurt 
things out or . . . testify in unanticipated ways.  We have to trust 
the trial court to take corrective measures when necessary, as 
the court here did, and the jury to follow the court’s instructions.  
It would be easy for the jury to understand that no evidence was 
ever introduced to show that defendant was responsible for the 
witness’s injury, and therefore it had to disregard her testimony.  
We have no basis even to speculate that the jury based its 
verdict on the stricken testimony rather than the evidence it 
properly heard.”  (Id. at p. 33.) 
The same is true here.  The jury could easily understand 
that the stricken testimony was, as the court repeatedly stated, 
“unreliable,” and the jury had to disregard it.  As in People v. 
Melendez, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1, we find neither error nor prejudice 
in Zepeda’s unexpected testimony.   
7.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct During the 
Closing Argument 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during his guilt phase closing argument to the jury. 
The prosecutor argued:  “[T]hat’s where Ermanda got 
killed, outside her daughter’s door, watching, most likely, her 
daughter dying.  She has one other child in the house, and she 
gets to her bedroom where that child is and she gets on the 
phone.  The defendant goes in there and she’s not even able to 
call the police.  She died not knowing if her youngest was going 
to make it, but knowing her oldest hadn’t.” 
Defendant objected to the argument outside the jury’s 
presence on the ground that the prosecutor was “prejudicing and 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
73 
trying to inflame the jury.”  The court found no misconduct but 
stated that “if there is a pattern that is established, then the 
court will deal with it appropriately.  Prosecutor is on notice of 
the defense’s objection.  There is a . . . line between what is 
argument and inflaming.  I’m not ruling the prosecutor has 
reached the point of inflammatory argument.  Defense [counsel] 
has put her concern on record, and the court will continue to 
listen to the argument and, if there’s a further objection, I’ll 
consider it.”  The prosecutor then turned to other matters in his 
jury argument and did not return to this theme. 
Defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
committed 
misconduct by “by inviting the jury to imagine [Ermanda’s] last 
thoughts.”  We have repeatedly stated that it is “ ‘improper to 
make arguments to the jury that give it the impression that 
“emotion may reign over reason,” and to present “irrelevant 
information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s 
attention from its proper role, or invites an irrational, purely 
subjective response.” ’ ”  (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 
742.)  More specifically, we have said that “[i]n the guilt phase 
of a trial, it is misconduct to appeal to the jury to view the crime 
through the eyes of the victim.”  (People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 
Cal.4th 686, 704; see People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 
1057 [similar].) 
Here, the prosecutor only indirectly suggested that the 
jury should view the crime through Ermanda’s eyes.  
Nevertheless, the comment was irrelevant to defendant’s guilt 
and, for that reason, should not have been made.  However, as 
in both Mendoza and Stansbury, any impropriety was not 
prejudicial.  The comment was brief and made during a long and 
otherwise unobjectionable jury argument.  (See People v. 
Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1057.)  When admonished by 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
74 
the court, the prosecutor “did not return to the point.”  (People 
v. Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 704.)  We find no reasonable 
probability the jury would have reached a different verdict 
absent the comment.  (Stansbury, at p. 1057.) 
Defendant also argues that “the prosecutor improperly 
argued matters outside the record and became an unsworn 
witness.”  He did not object “on this basis, and therefore has 
forfeited this claim.”  (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 
743.)  The contention also lacks merit.  The comment was clearly 
based on the evidence presented at trial.  As the evidence 
strongly supported the comment, no reason existed for the jury 
to believe otherwise. 
B.  Issue Regarding Penalty 
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting evidence 
in aggravation under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), that 
defendant committed a crime involving force or violence against 
his stepdaughter, Tammy Lucio (Tammy).  He contends the 
evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find he committed 
such a crime. 
At a hearing outside the jury’s presence, defense counsel 
requested an offer of proof regarding any crime committed 
against Tammy.  The prosecutor responded that Tammy “had 
stated that [defendant] has hit her on the head previously.”  
When defense counsel said, “Tapped her on the head,” the 
prosecutor reiterated that Tammy had said defendant hit her on 
the head, although “she minimized it later on after saying that.”  
Defense counsel stated her belief that Tammy would not 
corroborate anything about assaultive conduct.  The court 
responded, “Then the District Attorney loses and anytime a 
party puts on evidence and it falls way short of what you contend 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
75 
it is, it doesn’t really help their position.”  The court ruled it was 
for the jury to determine whether it was just a tap in the head 
or a battery. 
Thereafter, Tammy testified.  She generally said 
defendant never assaulted her.  She said he merely gave her a 
“gentle tap on the top of my head.”  She added that it was “never 
a striking blow.  He’s never hit me in my life.”  Additionally, she 
testified that defendant “treated me very good.  He’s always 
treated me with respect and he’s showed me how to be a lady.”  
She said that she responded, “hm-hmm” when an investigator 
asked her if it was more than “a striking blow,” but she was not 
trying to tell the investigator that defendant hit her hard. 
After the presentation of evidence, defendant asked the 
court to rule that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding of assaultive conduct.  The court denied the request.  It 
instructed the jury that the evidence of other crimes it could 
consider included “striking Tammy Lucio in the head, a 
violation of Penal Code section 242, a battery,” and it defined 
the crime of battery.  It also instructed that a juror could not 
consider the crime unless that juror first found defendant 
committed it beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant 
argues 
Tammy’s 
testimony 
presented 
insufficient evidence for a juror to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant committed a criminal battery against her.  
“Because the question concerns the admissibility of evidence, it 
also comes within the trial court’s discretion.”  (People v. 
Rodriguez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 636.)  Tammy’s trial 
description of what defendant had done did not support a finding 
that he committed a battery.  But her earlier apparent 
affirmative response to the investigator’s question whether 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
76 
defendant had hit her more than a striking blow, which was 
admissible for its truth as a prior inconsistent statement (Evid. 
Code, § 1235), did support such a finding, albeit just barely.  
Victims of domestic violence sometimes try to minimize the 
events later.  The jury could reasonably believe this was one 
such occasion and give more credence to Tammy’s earlier 
statement than to her trial testimony.  This evidence of a crime 
was tenuous, but we believe admitting it and letting the jury 
decide came within the trial court’s discretion. 
Moreover, we would find any error harmless.  As the trial 
court noted, when the evidence falls short of what the party 
presenting it expects, it is not good for that party.  Tammy’s 
testimony was generally favorable to defendant.  If, as 
defendant contends, her testimony did not warrant a finding 
that he committed a crime against her, it is unlikely the jury 
would have given it much, if any, consideration in aggravation.  
It is far more likely that her testimony helped defendant, 
especially given that she was called as a prosecution witness.  
We find no reasonable possibility the verdict would have been 
different had the court not permitted the jury to consider 
Tammy’s testimony as possible aggravating evidence.  (People v. 
Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960-961.) 
C.  Cumulative Effect of the Asserted Errors 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the asserted 
errors was prejudicial.  We disagree.  Any errors were minimal 
and had no cumulative effect. 
D.  Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law 
Defendant reiterates numerous challenges to California’s 
death penalty law that we have repeatedly rejected.  We adhere 
to our previous decisions. 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
77 
Penal Code sections 190.2 and 190.3 are not impermissibly 
broad, and Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), does not make 
imposition of the death penalty arbitrary and capricious.  
(People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 997.)  “Except for 
evidence of other crimes and prior convictions, jurors need not 
find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt; no 
instruction on burden of proof is needed; the jury need not 
achieve unanimity except for the verdict itself; and written 
findings are not required.”  (Ibid.)  “CALJIC No. 8.88’s use of the 
words ‘so substantial,’ its use of the word ‘warrants’ instead of 
‘appropriate,’ its failure to instruct the jury that a sentence of 
life is mandatory if mitigation outweighs aggravation, and its 
failure to instruct the jury on a ‘presumption of life’ does not 
render the instruction invalid.”  (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 823, 862-863.)  Penal Code “[s]ection 190.3’s use of 
adjectives such as ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in describing 
mitigating circumstances does not impermissibly limit the jury’s 
consideration of mitigating factors.”  (Id. at p. 863.)  “The court 
need not delete inapplicable sentencing factors . . . .”  (Ibid.)  
“Intercase proportionality review is not required.”  (People v. 
Livingston, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)  “The California death 
penalty scheme does not violate equal protection by treating 
capital and noncapital defendants differently.”  (Ibid.)  “Use of 
the death penalty does not violate international law and is not 
unconstitutional.”  (Ibid.) 
“Defendant also argues that the recent high court decision 
of Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. __ [193 L.Ed.2d 504, 136 
S.Ct. 616], which invalidated Florida’s sentencing scheme, also 
invalidates California’s.  It does not.  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 
Cal.4th 1192, 1235 & fn. 16.)  ‘The California sentencing scheme 
PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
78 
is materially different from that in Florida.’  (Id. at p. 1235, fn. 
16.)”  (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1038.) 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Sanchez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S087569 
Date Filed: April 29, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Tulare 
Judge: Gerald F. Sevier 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Nina Wilder, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, 
Kenneth N. Sokoler, Rebecca Whitfield and Angelo S. Edralin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Nina Wilder 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Angelo S. Edralin 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 445-9555