Title: State Ex Rel. Bethke v. Bain
Citation: 193 Or. 688, 240 P.2d 958
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1952

193 Or. 688 (1952)
240 P.2d 958
STATE EX REL. BETHKE
v.
BAIN, AS CIRCUIT JUDGE

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Submitted on petitioner's demurrer, on briefs, January 24, 1952.
Peremptory writ ordered February 6, 1952.
*690 Donald H. Joyce, of Portland, for petitioner.
William B. Murray and Maurice V. Engelgau, of Portland, for respondent.
PEREMPTORY WRIT ORDERED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus, instituted by the state of Oregon, ex rel. Carl H. Bethke, as plaintiff, against James R. Bain, as judge of the circuit court of the state of Oregon, for the county of Multnomah, as defendant, to require the defendant to quash an order discharging an attachment.
Carl H. Bethke, as plaintiff, brought an action in the circuit court of Multnomah county, Oregon, against Hollywood Liquidating Corporation, formerly Hollywood Ford Motors, Incorporated, an Oregon corporation, as defendants, to recover money. A writ of attachment was issued in that action, and the sum of $800, *691 belonging to defendant, was attached and garnisheed and taken into possession by the sheriff of Multnomah county, as shown by the return of said sheriff to the original writ of attachment. Defendant moved to discharge the attachment on the ground:
The defendant in this proceeding sustained the motion, made an order discharging the attachment, and, at the same time, made a further order staying all proceedings until this court rules on plaintiff's petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus.
The plaintiff filed in this court his duly verified petition for an alternative writ of mandamus directed to defendant. In this petition he alleged the several facts upon which he relied and attached to the petition as an exhibit a true copy of the complaint in the action commenced by him in the trial court. This court ordered that an alternative writ issue directed to defendant commanding him to rescind, revoke, and set aside the order discharging the attachment or, in lieu thereof, show cause why he has not done so. The alternative writ was issued and duly served upon defendant.
The writ, omitting formal parts, is as follows:
It is noted that no copy of the complaint in the original action is attached to the original writ of mandamus, nor is it pleaded in haec verba in said writ. The only place it may be found is as an exhibit attached to plaintiff's second amended petition for writ of mandamus, and based upon which the order for the writ was entered by this court. Upon the issuance of the writ, the petition therefor became functus officio. It serves no further purpose in this proceeding, nor could it serve any further purpose, unless it had become necessary to issue an amended writ.
1, 2. It is well established in this state that a petition for mandamus is no part of the pleadings. It is the writ that serves the same purpose as the complaint in other actions, and in the writ itself must be stated all the material facts; it must show on its face a clear right to the relief demanded. If any exhibit, such as a copy of *695 the complaint in the original action, is material, it must be attached to and made a part of the writ or, in lieu thereof, pleaded therein. Otherwise, it is not before the court. Crawley v. Munson, 131 Or 428, 283 P 29; State ex rel. Bell v. Pierce et al., 118 Or 533, 247 P 812; Elliott v. Oliver, 22 Or 44, 29 P 1.
The defective writ in this proceeding could have been reached by demurrer. Instead of demurring, however, the defendant filed an answer to the writ. Omitting formal parts, the answer alleges:
To this answer, plaintiff has filed a demurrer "on the grounds and for the reason that the facts set forth in said answer herein are not sufficient to constitute a defense to said Alternative Writ of Mandamus."
3. It will be observed that, in the first paragraph of defendant's answer, reference is made to the true copy of the complaint in the original action that is attached to and made a part of plaintiff's second amended petition for writ of mandamus, and the entire answer is based upon the assumption that this complaint is before the court. We think this reference to the complaint in defendant's answer has the effect of incorporating it therein and making it a part of the answer by reference, and that we are entitled to refer to the exhibit mentioned in determining the issues. The petition, though functus officio, is, nevertheless, actually on file in this court and proceeding and, therefore, available for our inspection by virtue of defendant's invitation. It is our opinion that this reference to the complaint in the answer of defendant cures the defect in the original writ to which attention has heretofore been directed.
The complaint in the original action, omitting formal parts, is as follows:
The sole question for determination here is whether the defendant abused his discretion in sustaining the motion to discharge the attachment and entering an order of discharge.
*700 Insofar as applicable to this case, § 7-201, OCLA, as amended by ch. 183, Oregon Laws 1941, provides:
No question was raised in the original action by the defendant therein as to the sufficiency of either the affidavit or the undertaking for the writ of attachment. §§ 7-202 and 7-203, OCLA. No attempt was made by affidavit or otherwise to directly attack the facts alleged in the affidavit for attachment. The sole attack made by defendant in the original action respecting the writ of attachment rested upon the proposition that on the face of the complaint it appeared that the cause of action alleged was not one in which plaintiff was entitled to the writ pursuant to the above quoted provisions of § 7-201, OCLA.
It clearly appears from the complaint in the original action that plaintiff is proceeding upon the theory of a rescission of the contract of sale and purchase. Manifestly, the complaint does not attempt to state a cause of action for damages for breach of contract. The complaint may be defective in alleging plaintiff's cause of action  defendant, in the action, has demurred to it , but, if so, it may be amended. Suksdorff v. Bigham, 13 Or 369, 12 P 818. Such necessary amendment, if *701 made, would not affect plaintiff's rights as to attachment. Note, 74 ALR 912.
4-6. Upon proper and justified rescission of a contract of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a return of the money paid on the purchase price. Weiss v. Gumbert, 191 Or 119, 227 P2d 812. If the seller refuses to return the money, then the purchaser may sue in assumpsit to recover it. Weiss v. Gumbert, supra. The law implies an agreement upon the part of the seller to make such repayment; it is an implied contract within the meaning of § 7-201, OCLA, as amended by ch. 183, Oregon Laws 1941. Hanley v. Combs, 48 Or 409, 412, 87 P 143.
In the instant case no uncertainty exists as to the amount of money plaintiff paid on the purchase price and which he is entitled to recover upon rescission. He delivered his Buick automobile to the seller at the agreed price of $451.48 and paid $249.35 in cash. This totals $700.83, for which sum he demanded judgment. True, the automobile was not money, but its value was fixed between the parties, and when defendant refused to return the car to plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled to recover its agreed value in lieu thereof.
The complaint states a cause of action in which plaintiff was entitled to have a writ of attachment issue; a cause of action based upon an implied contract for the direct payment of money.
The defendant judge erred in discharging the attachment on the grounds set forth in his answer to the writ.
But defendant argues that his ruling and order were within his discretion, and that there was no abuse of discretion in making them. He contends that he had jurisdiction to pass upon the motion; that this jurisdiction vested him with the power to decide erroneously *702 as well as correctly; and that, for a mistake in judgment, it cannot be said that he abused his discretion.
7. Section 11-302, OCLA, respecting the issuance of a writ of mandamus, provides:
"Judicial discretion", as used in the statute, means the option which a judge may exercise either to do or not to do that which is proposed to him that he shall do; it is the right to choose between the doing and not doing of a thing, the doing of which cannot be demanded as an absolute right of the party asking it to be done; it is the exercise of the right legally to determine between two or more courses of action.
In 27 CJS, Discretion, 135, it is stated:
*703 In State v. Lewis, 113 Or 359, 364, 230 P 543, 232 P 1013, this court, speaking through the late Justice RAND, said:
8, 9. "Judicial discretion" never authorizes arbitrary, capricious action that tends to defeat the ends of substantial justice. Where the facts are in dispute, or where there is no strict rule of law applicable, the exercise of a sound discretion by the trial judge in such circumstances cannot be disturbed or controlled in a proceeding by mandamus, no matter how erroneous his ruling may be. He has the power to decide erroneously as well as correctly, and the only remedy for the correction of error is by appeal.
10. However, where the facts are not in dispute, and there exists a strict rule of law that is applicable, no question of "judicial discretion" arises. The trial judge is under the positive duty of correctly applying the applicable rule of law. In Riesland v. Bailey, 146 Or 574, 580, 31 P2d 183, 92 ALR 1207, this court stated the rule as follows:
*704 See also State ex rel. Scott v. Dobson, 171 Or 492, 135 P2d 794, 137 P2d 825.
11. In the instant case there is no dispute as to the facts, and there is a strict rule of law that is applicable. In an action based upon an implied contract for the direct payment of money, the plaintiff, by force of the statute, has an absolute right to attach property of the defendant; provided he make and file the necessary affidavit and undertaking for attachment. This the plaintiff did in the action he commenced. The facts being undisputed, and the statutory rule of law vesting in plaintiff an absolute right as it does, the trial judge had no discretion to do other than apply that law. In truth, he had no discretion, and, hence, his action does not come within the rule that judicial discretion will not be reviewed, no matter how erroneous.
It is obvious that plaintiff had no remedy by appeal from the order of the court discharging the attachment. To present the error of the court with respect to that on appeal, plaintiff would be compelled to await the entry of final judgment in the case. Under the facts appearing in the writ, such a review would be an idle thing and would in no way protect plaintiff's statutory rights, because, as appears from the writ, defendant in the original action is insolvent. The defendant in this proceeding, in his answer to the writ, does not deny that allegation of insolvency, and, for the purposes of this case, it stands admitted. Unless relief is given by mandamus, the security plaintiff obtained on attachment for the satisfaction of any judgment recovered will be completely lost and destroyed, and such judgment as he may obtain will be valueless.
12, 13. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is not a writ of right; it will never issue unless the duty sought to be enforced is one legally defined. *705 Neither will it issue where there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, to bar mandamus, the law remedy must afford all relief to which the relator is entitled. State ex rel. Hupp etc. Corp. v. Kanzler, 129 Or 85, 97, 276 P 273.
14, 15. The primary purpose or function of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right, and to enforce a corresponding imperative duty created or imposed by law. It is designed to promote justice. It may issue even where other remedies exist, if they are not sufficiently speedy to prevent material injury. Propriety of the issuance of the writ is determined by the inadequacy, and not the mere absence of other legal remedies, and the danger of a failure of justice without it. State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 117 Or 498, 501, 244 P 540; CJS, Mandamus, 85, § 51.
In the instant case a miscarriage of justice would result, should the order discharging the attachment be permitted to stand. Plaintiff shows a clear legal right to have the thing done which is requested, and it also is the clear legal duty of the defendant to do the thing he is called on to do. His answer to the alternative writ of mandamus presents no defense. The demurrer thereto is sustained, and it is ordered that a peremptory writ issue.