Title: Phillips v. Chicago Housing Authority
Citation: 431 N.E.2d 1038, 89 Ill. 2d 122
Docket Number: 54481
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 2, 1982

89 Ill. 2d 122 (1982)
431 N.E.2d 1038
ELIZA PHILLIPS, Adm'r, Appellee,
v.
THE CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant.
No. 54481.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed February 2, 1982.
*123 Orner, Wasserman &amp; Moore, Ltd., of Chicago (Norton Wasserman and H. Elisabeth Huber, of counsel), for appellant.
Epton, Mullin, Segal &amp; Druth, Ltd., of Chicago (Edward *124 J. McCambridge and Mary F. Stafford, of counsel), for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE WARD delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal is from a negligence action brought in the circuit court of Cook County for the wrongful death and personal injuries of plaintiff's decedent, a resident of a housing project operated by the defendant, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). The circuit court struck the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and also three successive amended complaints. Upon striking the third amended complaint, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The appellate court concluded that a cause of action was stated and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. (91 Ill. App.3d 544.) We granted the CHA's petition for leave to appeal.
The plaintiff's third amended complaint alleged:
The appellate court held that the plaintiff's third amended complaint did state a cause of action. We agree. It will not be necessary to consider the correctness of all of the grounds given by the appellate court for its holding.
Our conclusion that the complaint did state a cause of action rests upon the holding in Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 204.
In Pippin, this court held that the CHA owed no duty, either by statute or under the common law, to protect its tenants from criminal acts. The court recognized, however, that as a general principle liability is imposed upon a landlord who voluntarily undertakes to provide security measures, but performs the undertaking negligently, if the negligence is the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. (78 Ill. 2d 204, 209, citing Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 69, 74 (insurer held responsible in tort for personal injuries suffered as a result of the insurer's negligent performance of a voluntary inspection of the premises where the injuries occurred).)
The duty of care imposed upon the landlord under that *127 analysis was held to be limited to the extent of the landlord's undertaking. Because the CHA's undertaking in Pippin was to hire a security firm to provide guard services for its building, this court concluded that the CHA could be held liable only for negligence in hiring. The Civil Practice Act states that pleadings should be liberally construed (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 33(3)), and that no pleading is bad in substance if it contains sufficient information reasonably to inform the opposing party of the nature of the claim that the party is called upon to meet (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 42(2)). Although the complaint is something short of a model, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that it can be read to allege that the CHA voluntarily undertook to close off and secure certain floors to prevent the commission of crimes thereon and to safeguard tenants and that the CHA performed that undertaking negligently.
The complaint alleges that the CHA's negligent acts were the proximate cause of the abduction, rape, and death of the decedent. The CHA contends, citing Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 313, that it cannot be held liable merely for a negligent performance that proximately causes injury; but that, rather, it can be held liable only if the plaintiff alleges that the CHA's conduct actually increased the risks and dangers to the plaintiff's decedent. In other words, the CHA says that the landlord is not to be judged liable because it undertook a security measure that failed through its negligence, but is to be held liable only if the landlord's actions left the tenants in a worse position than they were in before the landlord undertook the security measure. The complaint contains no allegation of an increase in danger, and no inference of an increase in danger can reasonably be drawn from it. Under the Pippin holding, however, no such allegation is necessary.
The decision in Pippin rests upon the principle in tort expressed in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 69. There an insurance company was held liable for *128 injuries to employees of the company's insured when a construction hoist fell. The insurer had voluntarily undertaken to inspect the premises, and the plaintiff alleged that the insurer had negligently conducted those inspections, proximately causing the injuries. This court in Nelson dismissed a contention similar to the one advanced by the CHA, stating:
The situation in Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 313, is distinguishable from the one here. This court held in Cross that the duty of care imposed upon a landlord in a voluntary undertaking to provide guard service includes a duty not to create a condition of increased danger to tenants. Cross, however, was simply an application of the reasoning of Pippin to a complaint in which the plaintiff alleged that the landlord's conduct had created increased dangers to him. Nowhere in Cross is it said that the duty of care recognized in Nelson and Pippin was simply a duty not to create a condition of increased danger.
The appellate court was correct in holding that the plaintiff's allegation that the CHA was negligent in failing to provide guard services in the building did not state a cause of action. The duty of care considered in Pippin extends only to the landlord's undertaking. Here, the landlord undertook only to secure certain floors. The duty of care arising was not a general duty to police. We have explained the inapplicability of our decision in Cross.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the appellate court reversing the circuit court and remanding the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.