Title: State v. Bruce Duncan MacArthur
Citation: 2008 WI 72
Docket Number: 2006AP001379-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2008

2008 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1379-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
     v. 
Bruce Duncan MacArthur, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 4, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel W. Klossner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs by Alex Flynn and Alex Flynn & Associates, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alex Flynn. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross-appellant the cause was 
argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Father Donald J. 
McGuire. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1379-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2006CF19) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Bruce Duncan MacArthur, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dodge County, 
Daniel W. Klossner, Judge.  Affirmed, and the cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This case is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).  The State alleges that 
Bruce MacArthur sexually abused three children between 1965 and 
1972.  Accordingly, he was charged with multiple counts of 
having sexual intercourse with a child and indecent behavior 
with a child pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 944.10(1), 944.10(3), 
944.11(1), and 944.11(2) (1966-67).1  He moved to dismiss those 
                                                 
1 References to the applicable year of the Wisconsin 
Statutes vary throughout this opinion and will be identified 
accordingly.   
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
2 
 
charges based upon the statute of limitations.  The circuit 
court denied MacArthur's motion to dismiss. 
¶2 
This case presents the following issues: First, should 
the statute of limitations that governs the charges against 
MacArthur be the version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 that was in 
effect between 1965 and 1972 or the version of that statute that 
was in effect in 2006?2  MacArthur is alleged to have committed 
several sexual assault offenses between 1965 and 1972, but he 
was not charged until January of 2006.  Depending on which 
statute applies, the charges may be barred.  We conclude that 
the applicable version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 is the version 
that existed between 1965 and 1972.  Second, what is the proper 
procedure for determining public resident tolling under Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(3)?  Whether the statute of limitations is tolled 
because MacArthur was not a public resident of the state affects 
the viability of the charges against MacArthur.  We adopt an 
approach consistent with the federal court's approach to the 
tolling provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3290.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the circuit court judge decides the tolling issue in a 
pretrial 
proceeding 
wherein 
the 
State 
must 
prove 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant was not a public 
resident. 
                                                 
2 The relevant statutory texts can be found in section III 
of this opinion.  
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
3 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
MacArthur allegedly sexually abused three children at 
the former St. Joseph's Hospital in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin.  The 
State asserts that the incidents occurred between March 1965 and 
June 1972 when MacArthur was a chaplain at the hospital.  On 
January 18, 2006, MacArthur was charged with a number of crimes 
for those alleged incidents.  Count one: Sexual intercourse with 
a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 944.10(3) (1966-67).3  Count 
two: Indecent behavior with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.11(2) (1966-67).  Count three: Sexual intercourse with a 
child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 944.10(1) (1966-67).  Count four: 
Indecent 
behavior 
with 
a 
child 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 944.11(1) (1966-67).  Count five: Indecent behavior with a 
child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 944.11(2) (1966-67).  Count six: 
Attempted indecent behavior with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 944.11(2) and 939.32 (1966-67).  Count seven: Indecent 
behavior with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 944.11(1) (1966-
67).4   
¶4 
On February 24, 2006, MacArthur moved the circuit 
court to dismiss all counts.  In short, MacArthur argued that 
                                                 
3 The criminal complaint cites the 1966-67 statutes for each 
count regardless of when between 1965 and 1972 the alleged 
crimes occurred.  However, the relevant chapter 944 offenses 
were not altered during this time between 1965 and 1972. 
4 The probable cause portion of the criminal complaint was 
amended on March 28, 2006, and March 31, 2006.  However, the 
underlying charges remained the same.  
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
4 
 
the six-year statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1965-
72), had expired, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction.  
Moreover, MacArthur argued that the complaint failed to offer 
any proof that MacArthur left the state, which would be required 
to give rise to the tolling provision in Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) 
(1965-72).5  In the alternative, MacArthur argued that even if 
the State could prove MacArthur was not a resident of Wisconsin 
after 1970, the prosecution was barred because Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(2)(c) (2005-06) prohibits prosecution after a victim 
reaches the age of 45 years old, and in this case, the victims 
were older than 45 years old when the complaint was filed. 
¶5 
On May 25, 2006, the circuit court denied MacArthur's 
motion to dismiss.  It concluded that the age limitations of 
subsection (2)(c) of Wis. Stat. § 939.74, which became effective 
on July 1, 1989, did not apply to chapter 944 offenses from 
1965-72.  Subsection (2)(c) refers to crimes pursuant to chapter 
948, which was created by the same Act and does not refer to 
chapter 944.  As a result, the circuit court stated, "[t]he 
plain text of the statute, of course, does not refer to any 
predecessor statute of sec. 948.02."  Accordingly, the circuit 
court determined that the age limitations in subsection (2)(c) 
did not apply and that Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1965-72) governed 
the statute of limitations issues in this case. 
                                                 
5 The State subsequently amended its complaint, as detailed 
in footnote three, to address this defect.   
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The circuit court scheduled a pretrial hearing on the 
statute of limitations defense.  The court reasoned that the 
State would need to satisfy the court, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that MacArthur was not a resident of the state of 
Wisconsin during the relevant time.  However, the circuit court 
stated that if the defense were to raise the issue at trial, it 
"believes" the State's burden would elevate to beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶7 
On June 8, 2006, MacArthur petitioned the court of 
appeals for leave to appeal the circuit court's non-final order.6  
The State cross-appealed the circuit court's order that required 
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the 
public resident tolling provision was satisfied.7  The court of 
appeals granted that petition on July 12, 2006, and subsequently 
certified the case to this court.  Specifically, three issues 
were certified: First, "whether the statute of limitations for 
child sexual assault in effect when this crime was charged, Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74 (2005-06), applies to crimes committed before the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. ch. 948."  Second, "whether the judge or 
                                                 
6 On June 6, 2006, MacArthur motioned the circuit court to 
stay the trial proceedings, but the result of that motion does 
not appear in the record before us.  
7 The State cross-appealed what it believed was the circuit 
court's "order" regarding the tolling issue if raised at trial.  
We question whether a trial court "order" existed with regard to 
tolling if raised at trial.  Nonetheless, we provide guidance on 
this issue because the circuit court did render a decision on 
how the tolling provision would be addressed pretrial and at 
trial. 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
6 
 
the jury decides if the statute of limitations bars prosecution 
where the State argues that the statute of limitations has been 
tolled because the defendant left the State of Wisconsin."  
Third, "what burden of proof applies to resolving whether the 
statute of limitations has been tolled." 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
This case involves a determination of the appropriate 
statute of limitations as well as the interpretation and 
application of Wisconsin Statutes.  Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 
WI 50, ¶14, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.  While these 
matters present questions of law that we review de novo, we 
benefit from the analyses of the lower courts.  Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶9 
"[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  This court begins statutory interpretation with 
the language of a statute.  Id., ¶45.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the 
language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except 
that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given 
their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  Context 
and structure of a statute are important to the meaning of the 
statute. 
 
Id., 
¶46. 
 
"Therefore, 
statutory 
language 
is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
7 
 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id. 
¶10 Between 1965 and 1972, Wis. Stat. § 939.74, "Time 
limitations on prosecutions," read: 
(1) Except as provided . . . , prosecution for a 
felony must be commenced within 6 years . . . after 
the commission thereof. . . .   
(2) Notwithstanding 
that 
the 
time 
limitation 
under sub. (1) has expired: 
(a) A prosecution for murder may be commenced at 
any time; 
(b) A prosecution for theft against one who 
obtained possession of the property lawfully and 
subsequently 
misappropriated 
it 
may 
be 
commenced 
within one year after discovery of the loss by the 
aggrieved party, but in no case shall this provision 
extend the time limitation in sub. (1) by more than 5 
years. 
(3) In 
computing 
the 
time 
limited 
by 
this 
section, the time during which the actor was not 
publicly a resident within this state . . . shall not 
be included. . . .  
Simply stated, under the 1965 through 1972 statutes, charges 
need to be filed within six years of the alleged felony unless 
the actor was not a public resident within this state.  If the 
actor 
was 
not a 
public resident within the state, the 
limitations period is tolled for that time period. 
¶11 In 1987, subsection (2)(c) was added to Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74.  1987 Wis. Act 332, § 27.  Subsection (2)(c) provided 
the following:  
A prosecution for violation of s. 948.02, 948.03, 
948.04, 948.05, 948.06 or 948.08 may be commenced 
within the time period specified in sub. (1) or by the 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
8 
 
time the victim reaches the age of 21 years, whichever 
is later. 
1987 Wis. Act 332, § 65 states: "Initial applicability.  This 
act applies to offenses occurring on or after the effective date 
of this SECTION, but does not preclude the counting of other 
violations as prior violations for sentencing a person."  The 
effective date was July 1, 1989.  1987 Wis. Act 332, § 66a. 
¶12 In 1993, subsection (2)(c) was amended in order to 
increase the age a victim might attain before a prosecution 
would be barred.  1993 Wis. Act 219, § 6.  Subsection (2)(c) 
then provided: 
A prosecution for violation of s. 948.02, 948.03, 
948.04, 948.05, 948.06, 948.07 or 948.08 shall be 
commenced before the victim reaches age 26 years, or 
be barred. 
1993 Wis. Act 219, § 7 states: "Initial applicability. (1) The 
treatment of section 939.74(2)(c) of the statutes first applies 
to offenses not barred from prosecution on the effective date of 
this 
subsection." 
 
This 
particular 
language 
of 
"initial 
applicability" also appears in the 1997 and 2003 amendments. 
¶13 In 1997, subsection (2)(c) was again amended to 
increase the victim's age.  1997 Wis. Act 237, § 722c.  It read: 
A 
prosecution 
for 
violation 
of 
s. 
948.02, 
948.025, 948.03(2)(a), 948.05, 948.06, 948.07(1), (2), 
(3) or (4), 948.08 or 948.095 shall be commenced 
before the victim reaches the age of 31 years or be 
barred. 
In 2003, subsection (2)(c) was again amended to increase the 
victim's age.  2003 Wis. Act 279, § 9.  It read: 
A 
prosecution 
for 
violation 
of 
s. 
948.02, 
948.025, 948.03(2)(a), 948.05, 948.06, 948.07(1), (2), 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
9 
 
(3), or (4), 948.08, or 948.095 shall be commenced 
before the victim reaches the age of 45 years or be 
barred, except as provided in sub. (2d)(c). 
¶14 Finally, in 2005, any restriction on a victim's age 
was removed if the defendant was charged with Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1) or 948.025(1)(a), but the 45 year age limit 
remained for some chapter 948 offenses.  See 2005 Wis. Act 276, 
§§ 1, 2.  However, the 2005 change does not apply to the case at 
hand because the statute's effective date was April 6, 2006, 
which is after the date MacArthur was charged.  The parties do 
not argue whether this 2005 amendment applies to the case at 
hand.   
A. Applicable version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74   
¶15 MacArthur argues that the 2005-06 version of Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) applies in this case as a bar to the 
charges against him.  He asserts that, assuming the State proves 
that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(3),8 the charges do not survive because they are 
barred under the 2006 version of the § 939.74(2)(c).  Relying on 
State v. Haines,9 MacArthur argues that because he was not a 
public resident in the state between 1970 and 2004, the 
applicable statute of limitations becomes the amended version of 
§ 939.74(2)(c), which became effective on May 1, 2004.  He 
asserts that the amended statute applies as a bar to the 
                                                 
8 Subsection (3) of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 was not altered 
between 1965 and 2006 except to become gender neutral. 
9 State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39, 261 Wis. 2d 139, 661 
N.W.2d 72. 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
10 
 
prosecution because he was charged in January of 2006, after the 
May 
2004 
effective 
date, 
and 
the 
2004 
amendment 
barred 
prosecutions for charges where the victim had attained 45 years 
of age.  MacArthur argues that since the victims here were over 
age 45, the prosecutions under the 2006 statute are barred. 
¶16 The State, on the other hand, citing to State v. 
Hamilton,10 argues that when a statute of limitations is replaced 
or amended, a cause of action that has accrued11 prior to the 
effective date of the new statute or amendment is governed by 
the prior statute unless the legislature specifically states 
otherwise.  Specifically, it asserts that in enacting subsection 
(2)(c), the legislature specified that the section only applied 
to offenses that occurred on or after the effective date.  It 
further asserts that the legislature specifically included 
chapter 948, but it did not so reference and include chapter 
944.  Thus, it argues that subsection (2)(c) does not apply.  
¶17 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
1965-1972 
version 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74 governs the case at issue because (1) here, 
the offenses allegedly occurred prior to the effective date of 
§ 939.74(2)(c), which was July 1, 1989; and (2) the legislature 
did not include chapter 944 crimes in subsection (2)(c) of 
§ 939.74 even though it specifically included chapter 948 
                                                 
10 State v. Hamilton, 2002 WI App 89, ¶11, 253 Wis. 2d 805, 
644 N.W.2d 243, aff'd, 2003 WI 50, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 
N.W.2d 832. 
11 In a criminal case, a cause of action accrues and the 
statute of limitations begins when the crime is complete.   
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
11 
 
crimes.  Accordingly, neither the 1987 amendment to § 939.74, 
which created subsection (2)(c), nor any subsequent amendment to 
subsection (2)(c) applies to the case at hand. 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
12 
 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.0712 instruct that 
when a limitation period has been repealed and the repealing act 
provides for a new limitation period, "such latter limitation or 
period shall apply only to such rights or remedies as shall 
                                                 
12 Neither Wis. Stat. § 990.06 nor § 991.07 was altered 
between 1965 and 2006.  Wisconsin Stat. § 990.06, "Repeal or 
change of law limiting time for bringing actions," provides: 
In any case when a limitation or period of time 
prescribed in any act which shall be repealed for the 
acquiring of any right, or barring of any remedy, or 
for any other purpose shall have begun to run before 
such repeal and the repealing act shall provide any 
limitation or period of time for such purpose, such 
latter limitation or period shall apply only to such 
rights or remedies as shall accrue subsequently to the 
time when the repealing act shall take effect, and the 
act repealed shall be held to continue in force and be 
operative 
to 
determine all such limitations and 
periods of time which shall have previously begun to 
run 
unless 
such 
repealing 
act 
shall 
otherwise 
expressly provide. 
(Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Stat. § 991.07, "Statutes of 
limitation," provides: 
In any case when a limitation or period of time 
prescribed in any act which is hereby repealed for the 
acquiring of any right or the barring of any remedy or 
for any other purpose shall have begun to run and a 
limitation or period of time for such purpose shall be 
prescribed in these revised statutes, the limitation 
or period prescribed by these statutes shall be held 
to apply only to such rights or remedies as shall 
accrue subsequently to the time when the same shall 
take effect; and the act repealed shall be held to 
continue in force and operative to determine all such 
limitations and periods of time, which shall have 
previously begun to run, unless in special cases in 
these revised statutes a different rule shall be 
prescribed. 
(Emphasis added.)  
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
13 
 
accrue subsequently to the time when the repealing act shall 
take effect" and the repealed act shall continue in force and be 
operative 
unless 
the 
repealing 
act 
specifically 
provides 
otherwise.  
¶19 Applying Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07 to the case 
at hand, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (1987-88) 
(effective July 1, 1989), does not apply to MacArthur.  The 
causes of action here accrued between 1965 and 1972.  The 
legislature did not specifically state that subsection (2)(c) 
should apply to causes of action that accrued prior to the July 
1, 1989, effective date.  In fact, the legislature specifically 
stated otherwise in 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 65, which provided that 
provisions created by Act 332——e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c)——
only applied to causes of action that accrued on or after the 
July 1, 1989, effective date.  The legislature did, however, 
indicate that for the purposes of sentencing, other violations 
committed prior to the subsection (2)(c) effective date could be 
considered.  1987 Wis. Act 332, § 65.13  Therefore, the 
legislature has shown that it is quite capable of designating 
when it intends prior offenses to be included in this context.  
Here, the legislature specifically considered the application of 
subsection (2)(c) in 1987, and it concluded that it should only 
                                                 
13 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 65 provides in relevant part, 
"[t]his act applies to offenses occurring on or after the 
effective date of this SECTION, but does not preclude the counting 
of other violations as prior violations for sentencing a 
person." 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
14 
 
apply prospectively.  Quite obviously, the years between 1965 
and 1972 are not within that prospective application. 
¶20 MacArthur argues that subsection (2)(c) of the 2005-06 
statutes applies to his case because the prosecution against him 
was not yet barred in 2006 due to the tolling provision in Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(3) (1965-present).  MacArthur reasons that post-
1987 amendments14 to subsection (2)(c) apply to causes of action 
not yet barred rather than applying subsection (2)(c) only to 
those causes of action that accrued on or after July 1, 1989, as 
directed by the legislature when it created subsection (2)(c) in 
1987.15  However, MacArthur's argument that subsection (2)(c) 
should apply due to the post-1987 amendments to subsection 
(2)(c) is not persuasive.   
¶21 First, absent clear direction that the legislature in 
effect "changed its mind" from 1987 to 1993 with regard to the 
applicability of subsection (2)(c), we will not construe such a 
change.  In 1987, the legislature specifically stated that 
                                                 
14 The 1993 amendment increased the age to 26, the 1997 
amendment increased the age to 31, the 2003 amendment increased 
the age to 45, and the 2005 amendment removed any age limit.  
Each time, subsection (2)(c) was amended, it stated that it 
applied to prosecutions not yet barred.  See 1993 Wis. Act 219, 
§ 7; 1997 Wis. Act 237, § 9356(2d); 2003 Wis. Act 279, § 10(2).    
15 MacArthur relies on 1993 Wis. Act 219, § 7 for his 
argument.  Section 7 states that the initial applicability of 
the amended Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c), which extended the age 
from 21 to 26, "applies to offenses not barred from prosecution 
on the effective date of this subsection."  Similar language 
appears in the session "Laws of Wisconsin" for each of the 
subsequent amendments.  See 1993 Wis. Act 219, § 7; 1997 Wis. 
Act 237, § 9356(2d); 2003 Wis. Act 279, § 10(2).    
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
15 
 
subsection (2)(c) only applied to those offenses occurring on or 
after July 1, 1989.  The language in the subsequent amendments, 
which stated these amendments apply to offenses not yet barred, 
was meant to apply to offenses that subsection (2)(c) had not 
already barred.   
¶22 We find nothing that indicates the legislature meant 
to change the initial applicability of subsection (2)(c) as it 
was articulated in 1987.  Neither the text of the amended 
statutes, nor the text in the Laws of Wisconsin, nor the 
drafting 
records 
supports 
such 
a 
conclusion. 
 
In 
1987, 
subsection (2)(c) was to apply prospectively, and this court 
will 
not 
presume 
that 
the 
1993 
amendment 
or 
subsequent 
amendments were intended to trump the legislature's 1987 
directive without the legislature so specifically stating.  We 
interpret 
the 
legislature's post-1987 directives to apply 
subsection (2)(c) to claims not yet barred to mean that Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(2)(c), as amended in 1993, 1997, and 2003, 
applies to those offenses not yet barred by the previous version 
of subsection (2)(c).  The statutory text simply does not 
support an alternative interpretation.   
¶23 Second, MacArthur relies on State v. Haines, 2003 WI 
39, 261 Wis. 2d 139, 661 N.W.2d 72, to support his argument, but 
Haines lends support to our conclusion rather than supporting 
MacArthur's argument.  Additionally, it provides an example of 
how Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (1987-present) should be utilized.  
In Haines, the alleged incident took place in 1992.  Haines, 261 
Wis. 2d 139, ¶3.  The applicable statute of limitations at the 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
16 
 
time of the offense barred prosecution once the victim reached 
age 21.  Id., ¶4.  However, between 1992 and July 24, 2000, when 
the defendant was charged, the statute of limitations was 
amended to bar prosecution once the victim was 26 years old, and 
it was amended again to age 31 years old.  When charges were 
brought in 2000, the victim was 22 years old.  Id.  The court 
concluded that the amended statute of limitations applied 
because the prosecution was not yet barred when the amendment 
became effective.  Id., ¶8.  In other words, a previous version 
of subsection (2)(c) did not bar the claim.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals applied the age 26 limitation rather than the 
age 21 limitation.  Id. 
¶24 Haines is not analogous to MacArthur's situation.  In 
fact, it highlights critical factors that must be considered 
when determining how to apply Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (1987-
88) (effective July 1, 1989) and its subsequently amended 
versions.  In Haines, unlike this case, the defendant was 
charged pursuant Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1989-90), an included 
offense in § 939.74(2)(c), rather than the chapter 944 offenses 
charged here.  In Haines, unlike this case, the alleged incident 
took place after the effective date of § 939.74(2)(c)——July 1, 
1989——not prior to the effective date.  Haines provides an 
example of how § 939.74(2)(c) (1987-present) should be applied.  
It, however, does not support MacArthur's argument.   
¶25 Third, Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (1987-present) does 
not apply to the case at hand because MacArthur is charged with 
Wis. Stat. §§ 944.10(1), 944.10(3), 944.11(1), and 944.11(2) 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
17 
 
(1966-67) rather than Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02, 948.03, 948.04, 
948.05, 948.06 or 948.08.  When subsection (2)(c) was created in 
1987, it provided:  
 
A prosecution for violation of s. 948.02, 948.03, 
948.04, 948.05, 948.06 or 948.08 may be commenced 
within the time period specified in sub. (1) or by the 
time the victim reaches the age of 21 years, whichever 
is later. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) 
(1987-88) 
(effective 
July 
1, 
1989).  
¶26 In summary, by its plain language, no version of 
subsection (2)(c) applies to the chapter 944 charges from 1965-
1972.  The 1987 version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 does not apply 
because it specifically stated that subsection (2)(c) was to 
apply only prospectively from July 1, 1989, and subsection 
(2)(c) listed only chapter 948 offenses, thus leaving out any 
mention of "predecessor statutes" to chapter 948.  The 1993, 
1997, and 2003 versions do not apply to the case at hand for two 
reasons.  First, the legislature has not specifically withdrawn 
the 
1987 
directive 
to 
apply 
subsection 
(2)(c) 
only 
prospectively.  Second, the post-1987 amendments apply only to 
claims not yet barred by a previous version of subsection 
(2)(c).  The 2005 version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 does not apply 
because it became effective after MacArthur was charged with 
these offenses. 
¶27 MacArthur, however, argues that even though Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(2)(c) does not expressly include chapter 944 crimes, 
the 
sexual 
assault 
crimes 
of 
chapter 
948 
listed 
in 
§ 939.74(2)(c) (1987-present) constructively includes chapter 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
18 
 
944 offenses.  MacArthur asserts that subsection (2)(c), which 
specifically references chapter 948 offenses, applies in this 
case because subsection (2)(c) also applies to chapter 944 
offenses that are not time barred.  We disagree because (1) the 
relevant chapter 944 crimes were repealed in 1975——well before 
chapter 948 was enacted——and (2) the relevant chapter 944 crimes 
have different elements than the chapter 948 crimes.  As a 
result and because the legislature has not indicated otherwise, 
we conclude that § 939.74(2)(c) (1987-present), which lists 
chapter 948 offenses, does not constructively include the 
relevant chapter 944 offenses.  
¶28 In 
1975, 
the 
legislature 
"repealed" 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 944.10 and 944.11.  Section 8, ch. 184, Laws of 1975.  The 
statutes were repealed; they were not "amended" or "renumbered 
and amended."  See, e.g., ch. 155, Laws of 1975 (stating an "An 
Act to renumber and amend . . . ; to amend . . . ; and to create 
 . . .").  We find this persuasive evidence that chapter 948 
does not constructively include the relevant chapter 944 
offenses.  Chapter 944 had been repealed for over two decades by 
the time chapter 948 was enacted. 
¶29 Nonetheless, MacArthur argues that the term "repeal" 
is ambiguous and therefore we should look to the legislative 
history.  We reject the argument that the word "repeal" is 
ambiguous.  See Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, 38 Wis. 2d 131, 
136-37, 156 N.W.2d 493 (1968) (stating "[o]f course [the 
legislature] intended the repeal.  It expressly said it was 
repealing" and "a clear and plain declaration in the enacting 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
19 
 
clause that a statute is repealed must be given effect according 
to its terms").   
¶30 Furthermore, legislative history does not advance 
MacArthur's argument.  For example, MacArthur argues that the 
legislative history shows that a private attorney drafted the 
legislation that repealed Wis. Stat. §§ 944.10 and 944.11 and 
created Wis. Stat. § 940.225 (1975-76).16  He further argues that 
"[w]hile the Legislative Reference Bureau obviously reviewed 
this first draft and the legislature put its stamp of approval 
on the final wording of the legislation, the drafting records 
show that explicit attention was given to the substance of the 
new legislation, not to words like 'repeal.'"  This too, is not 
persuasive.  We must assume that the legislature has reviewed 
the legislation and that it intends the words used be given 
their meaning.  See Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd. of 
Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 
N.W.2d 389 
(1984) 
(stating 
that 
"[t]he 
more 
reasonable 
presumption is that the legislature chose its terms carefully 
and precisely to express its meaning"); see also 2A Norman J. 
Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 46.3 (7th ed. 2007).    
¶31 Statutory interpretation would be chaotic if we cast 
aside a word such as "repeal" and assumed the legislature did 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.225 was created in 1975.  It 
created first degree, second degree, third degree and fourth 
degree sexual assault of minors.  Section 5, ch. 184, Laws of 
1975. 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
20 
 
not intend to use that word because it did not change that word 
from the original draft.  We cannot assume that the legislature 
did not carefully consider its wording.  MacArthur's argument is 
contrary 
to 
well 
respected 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.   
¶32 Certainly, if the legislature intended chapter 948 to 
include offenses under the repealed chapter 944, it could 
specifically state such a directive.  It did not.  Compare Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(6)(am) (2005-06) (providing an example of when 
the 
legislature 
intends 
to 
include 
previous, 
comparable 
offenses).17  
¶33 MacArthur argues that if the chapter 944 (1965-72) 
offenses that he allegedly committed "were so thoroughly 
repealed by the 1975 legislature that they do not constructively 
survive 
in 
the 
present 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.02," 
then 
this 
constitutes 
"specially 
and 
expressly" 
the 
intent 
by 
the 
legislature to "repeal" the statutes so that prosecution of him 
can no longer take place under these statutes.  MacArthur relies 
on Wis. Stat. § 990.04 to support his argument.  Section 990.04 
provides in relevant part: 
Actions pending not defeated by repeal of statute. 
The repeal of a statute . . . . And criminal 
prosecutions and actions at law or in equity founded 
                                                 
17 Subsection (6)(am) of Wis. Stat. § 980.01 provides, 
"'Sexually violent offense' means any of the following: . . . 
[a]n offense that, prior to June 2, 1994, was a crime under the 
law of this state and that is comparable to any crime specified 
in par. (a)." 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
21 
 
upon such repealed statute, whether instituted before 
or after the repeal thereof, shall not be defeated or 
impaired by such repeal but shall, notwithstanding 
such repeal, proceed to judgment in the same manner 
and to the like purpose and effect as if the repealed 
statute continued in full force to the time of final 
judgment thereon, unless the offenses, penalties, 
forfeitures 
or 
rights 
of 
action 
on 
which 
such 
prosecutions or actions shall be founded shall be 
specially and expressly remitted, abrogated or done 
away with by such repealing statute.  
¶34 MacArthur's argument, however, eviscerates Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.04.  See Niesen v. State, 30 Wis. 2d 490, 494, 141 
N.W.2d 194 (1966) (stating that this statute is meant to prevent 
the mere repeal of a statute from defeating existing rights).  
The purpose of the statute is to ensure that repealed statutes 
survive unless those provisions are remitted, abrogated, or done 
away with.  Id. at 493-94.  If repeal were included within this 
group of exceptions——remitted, abrogated, or done away with——
there would be no need for such a statute.  While the 
legislature repealed chapter 944 offenses, it did not remit, 
abrogate, or do away with those offenses under the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 990.04.  In this case, the underlying conduct——
sexually abusing children——is still criminalized even though 
specific 
conduct 
is 
criminalized 
under 
different 
crimes.  
Accordingly, the legislature did not remit, abrogate, or do away 
with those offenses and MacArthur's argument fails. 
¶35 Further 
support 
that 
chapter 
948 
does 
not 
constructively include the relevant chapter 944 crimes arises 
when we consider that the elements of Wis. Stat. §§ 944.10 and 
944.11 differ from the elements in chapter 948 offenses.   
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
22 
 
¶36 For example, Wis. Stat. § 944.10(1) (1965-72), "Sexual 
intercourse with a child," under the age of 18, has two elements 
that differ from chapter 948 offenses.  Namely, § 944.10(1) 
requires that the victim be a female who the defendant is not 
married to, and it requires that the victim be under the age of 
18.  See Wis. Stat. § 944.10(1) (1965-72); Wis JI——Criminal 1520 
(1966).  Wisconsin Stat. § 944.10(3), "Sexual assault of child," 
under the age of 12, contains three elements not present in 
chapter 948 offenses.  Namely, the victim must be a female who 
the defendant is not married to, the defendant must be at least 
18 years old, and the victim was under the age of 12.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 944.10(3) (1965-72); Wis JI——Criminal 1522 (1966).  
In Wis. Stat. § 944.11(1), "Indecent behavior with a child," 
under the age of 16, one element included in the 1965-72 
statutes is not found in the chapter 948 offenses.  Namely, the 
defendant took indecent liberties with a victim.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.11(1) (1965-72); Wis JI——Criminal 1525 (1966).  Indecent 
liberties means, "such liberties as the common sense of society 
would regard as indecent and improper."  Wis JI——Criminal 1525 
(1966).  Finally, Wis. Stat. § 944.11(2) (1965-72), "Indecent 
behavior with a child," under the age of 18, contains two 
elements not found in the chapter 948 offenses.  Namely, the 
defendant took indecent liberties with a victim and the victim 
was under the age of 18 years old.  See Wis. Stat. § 944.11(2) 
(1965-72); Wis JI——Criminal 1527 (1966).   
¶37 Chapter 948 offenses simply do not contain the same 
elements listed in the previous paragraph.  In 1987 when chapter 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
23 
 
948 was created, the elements for sexual assault of a child were 
as follows: (1) sexual intercourse or sexual contact; (2) with a 
victim who had not attained the age of 13 to constitute first 
degree sexual assault or a victim who had not attained the age 
of 16 to constitute second degree sexual assault; and (3) if the 
offense constitutes sexual contact, the defendant had the 
purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant or 
degrading or humiliating the victim. 
¶38 Sexual assault of a child pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02, neither in 1987 nor today, includes elements involving 
16- or 17-year-old victims.  The phrase "indecent liberties" is 
removed from the criminal code.  The requirements that the 
victim be female and not the wife of the defendant are now 
removed from the criminal code.  While the punishable underlying 
conduct is similar——sexually abusing children——nothing indicates 
that the legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c), which 
listed chapter 948, to "constructively" include chapter 944 
offenses.  Absent any evidence to support MacArthur's argument, 
we will not interpret § 939.74(2)(c) (1987-present) so that it 
constructively includes chapter 944 offenses. 
¶39 MacArthur asserts that In re Detention of Pharm, 2000 
WI App 167, 238 Wis. 2d 97, 617 N.W.2d 163, supports his 
argument that chapter 944 offenses are constructively included 
in Wis. Stat. 939.74(2)(c).  MacArthur argues that because the 
court of appeals, in Pharm, concluded that a person convicted 
under Wis. Stat. § 944.11(3) (1973-74) can be committed as a 
"sexually 
violent 
person" 
under 
chapter 
980 
(1997-98), 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
24 
 
subsection (2)(c) of § 939.74 constructively includes chapter 
944 (1965-72) offenses.  Section 980.01(6) did not specifically 
identify chapter 944 offenses; rather it defined a "sexually 
violent offense" as: 
(a) Any crime specified in s. 940.225(1) or (2), 
948.02(1) or (2), 948.025, 948.06 or 948.07. 
(b) Any crime specified in s. 940.01, 940.02, 
940.05, 940.06, 940.19(4) or (5), 940.195(4) or (5), 
940.30, 940.305, 940.31 or 943.10 that is determined, 
in a proceeding under s. 980.05(3)(b), to have been 
sexually motivated. 
(c) Any solicitation, conspiracy or attempt to 
commit a crime under par. (a) or (b). 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6) (1997-98). 
¶40 MacArthur's 
argument 
that 
chapter 
944 
is 
"constructively 
included" 
fails 
to 
acknowledge 
Pharm's 
discussion of Wis. Stat. § 980.13 (1997-98).  Section 980.13 
provided the following inclusive language: "Applicability.  This 
chapter applies to a sexually violent person regardless of 
whether the person engaged in acts of sexual violence before, on 
or after June 2, 1994."  As a result, the legislature 
specifically stated that in the context of chapter 980, sexually 
violent acts may be considered even if not specifically charged 
under chapter 948.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.74 contains no such 
directive. 
¶41 In addition, the definition of a "sexually violent 
offense" provided in § 980.01(6) was subsequently amended to 
state: "[a]n offense that, prior to June 2, 1994, was a crime 
under the law of this state and that is comparable to any crime 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
25 
 
specified in par. (a)."  See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6)(am) (2005-
06).  Therefore, the legislature has specifically stated that 
child sexual abuse charged under non-chapter 948 offenses may be 
considered in the chapter 980 context.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.74 
contains no such directive. 
¶42 Even if we concluded that Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) 
(1987-present) constructively included the relevant chapter 944 
offenses from 1965-72, that still would not satisfy the 
directives of Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07.  When a statute 
of limitations is replaced or amended, the prior statute governs 
any cause of action that has accrued prior to the effective date 
of the new statute or amendment unless the legislature, by 
virtue of the repealing act, expressly provides otherwise.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07.  How is this directive to be 
satisfied if the amended statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) 
(1987-present), does not state something to the effect that 
"predecessor" statutes to chapter 948 are included or conduct 
prior to the effective date of the new statute is included.  
Nothing indicates that when the legislature created subsection 
(2)(c) in 1987, it meant to include Wis. Stat. §§ 944.10 and 
944.11 (1965-72) when it plainly stated that "[a] prosecution 
for violation of s. 948.02, 948.03, 948.04, 948.05, 948.06 or 
948.08 may be commenced" until the victim reaches the age of 21 
years.   
¶43 To satisfy the directives of Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 
991.07, the legislature would need to indicate specifically that 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) applies to more than just chapter 948 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
26 
 
offenses or that subsection (2)(c) applies to conduct that 
occurred prior to the effective date of July 1, 1989.  In this 
case, 
the 
legislature 
did 
the 
opposite; 
it 
stated 
that 
§ 939.74(2)(c) (1987-88) applied only to offenses committed on 
or after July 1, 1989.    
¶44 Although MacArthur failed to argue the following to 
the courts below, he now asserts that the prosecution against 
him is barred because all victims were greater than 26 years of 
age on April 22, 1994, which was the effective date of the 
amended subsection (2)(c) that changed the maximum age from 21 
years to 26 years.  However, MacArthur's argument fails for the 
same reasons it fails with respect to the 2006 provision.  This 
is a statute of limitations not a statute of repose.  The 
tolling provision halted the running of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1).  
The prosecutions for the 1965-72 chapter 944 crimes were not 
barred in 1994.  These crimes did not somehow convert into 
chapter 948 offenses so as to fall under that statute of 
limitations.  MacArthur's argument defeats the purpose of the 
tolling provision and the language of the statutes.  He would 
not be making this argument if the six-year limitation period 
applied because MacArthur was a public resident of the state.  
The application that MacArthur urges us to adopt removes any 
deterrent effect that subsection (3) could have on fleeing 
felons.  Furthermore, it rewards a defendant who does flee.  
Section 939.74(1) did not expire in 1994.   
¶45 Lastly, MacArthur argues that even if subsection 
(2)(c) does not prohibit the prosecution, the due process clause 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
27 
 
bars MacArthur's prosecution.  We reject this argument because 
to constitute a due process violation, MacArthur must make two 
showings: (1) actual prejudice as a result of delay; and (2) the 
delay arose out of an improper purpose, which would give the 
State a tactical advantage over the defendant.  State v. Dabney, 
2003 
WI 
App 
108, 
¶30, 
264 
Wis. 2d 843, 
663 
N.W.2d 366.  
MacArthur acknowledges that he cannot satisfy his burden and 
show that the State delayed the prosecution for improper 
reasons.  Thus, his argument fails. 
¶46 No version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) applies to the 
case at hand.  When subsection (2)(c) was created in 1987, it 
only 
applied 
prospectively. 
 
As 
stated 
previously, 
the 
subsequent amendments do not change this conclusion because they 
do not change the initial applicability of subsection (2)(c).  
Rather, the language in the subsequent amendments, which stated 
these amendments apply to offenses not yet barred, was clearly 
meant to apply to offenses that subsection (2)(c) had not 
already barred.   
B. Tolling provision 
¶47 This court must now address whether the judge or the 
jury decides questions under the tolling provision in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(3).  In addition, we must determine the requisite 
burden of proof that applies to such an issue: preponderance of 
the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.   
¶48 MacArthur argues that at a pretrial proceeding, the 
circuit court should decide whether the State's evidence on 
tolling is strong enough to convince a jury beyond a reasonable 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
28 
 
doubt that the defendant was no longer a public resident in 
Wisconsin while the statute of limitations was still running.  
MacArthur further argues that if the circuit court concludes 
that the State has met its burden prior to trial, the case may 
proceed to trial where the jury should be given a special 
verdict question on the public resident tolling provision.  The 
State, on the other hand, encourages this court to adopt the 
procedure applied by federal courts to the analogous tolling 
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3290, "Fugitives from justice."18  We 
reject MacArthur's arguments and adopt an approach consistent 
with the federal courts. 
¶49 "While the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's crime was committed within 
the applicable statute of limitations, it is for the [circuit] 
court to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether 
certain facts (e.g., the defendant's [status as a public 
resident within this state]) have affected what the time limit 
is."  5 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin 
S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 18.5(a), 189 (3d ed. 2007) (citing 
United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Greever, 134 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Marshall, 856 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Gonsalves, 675 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1982). 
                                                 
18 18 U.S.C. § 3290, "Fugitives from justice," provides, "No 
statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from 
justice." 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
29 
 
¶50 Our approach to tolling is guided by United States v. 
Florez, 
a 
Second 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
opinion 
that 
articulated the requisite burden of proof and standard of review 
for the federal tolling provision.  Florez, 447 F.3d at 149-50.  
In Florez, the following protocol was set forth: After the 
defendant makes a statute of limitations challenge, the State 
bears the burden of showing, at a pretrial proceeding, that Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(3) has been satisfied by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  However, at trial, the jury must determine the date 
or date range of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This can be accomplished by the general verdict's language or 
when appropriate with a special verdict.  If the date found by 
the jury creates a bar against prosecution because of the 
statute of limitations and the court's pretrial findings 
regarding tolling, the court must then rule accordingly on the 
issue. 
¶51 This approach is supported for a number of reasons.  
Under this approach, the issue is then decided prior to trial, 
which prevents an untimely prosecution.  Moreover, it allows the 
State the opportunity to appeal the court's decision on this 
jurisdictional issue.  As a practical matter, this is an issue 
which is typically known and addressed early on in litigation. 
Furthermore, the fact that a defendant was not a public resident 
for some period of time is not determinative of guilt and not an 
element of the crime charged.  Rather, it is a fact that 
determines whether the law tolls a statute of limitations.  
Therefore, the State need not prove a defendant's status as a 
No. 
2006AP1379-CR   
 
30 
 
public resident beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, compliance 
with a statute of limitation is required for the court to have 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and jurisdiction is 
typically a question of law for the trial court to decide. 
¶52 On 
appellate 
review, 
a 
circuit 
court's 
tolling 
decision under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) should be subject to the 
following standard: Appellate courts should review the circuit 
court's findings of fact relevant to the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(3) only for an erroneous exercise of discretion, 
and this court reviews de novo the circuit court's legal 
conclusion that these facts establish tolling as specified by 
the statute.  See Florez, 447 F.3d at 150.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶53 Accordingly, we affirm, and the cause is remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We conclude, as did 
the circuit court, that the applicable version of Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74 is the version that existed between 1965 and 1972.  
With regard to the public resident tolling provision in 
§ 939.74(3), we adopt an approach consistent with the federal 
court's approach to the tolling provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3290.  
Therefore, we conclude that the circuit judge decides the 
tolling issue in a pretrial proceeding wherein the State must 
prove 
that 
MacArthur 
was 
not 
a 
public 
resident 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed, 
and the cause remanded. 
¶54 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
No.  2006AP1379-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶55 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority because the text of the statutes upon which it relies 
support its conclusion. I write separately, however, for two 
reasons:  (1) I am concerned about the ramifications of the 
majority's interpretation, and (2) I remain uncertain if its 
interpretation correctly reflects the intent of the legislature. 
¶56 The majority adopts the position advanced by the 
State.  At oral argument the State acknowledged that the 
ramifications of its position extend well beyond cases involving 
the prosecution of child sexual assaults. They extend to all 
criminal cases involving statute of limitations questions. 
Although I am unsure how the majority's decision will play out 
in the context of other criminal cases, I will confine my 
discussion to how it may affect other child sexual assault 
cases. 
¶57 I am concerned that in an effort to save this 
prosecution, the State (and thus the majority) is actually 
undermining the prosecution of other child sexual assault cases.  
Let me explain. 
¶58 The legislature recognized the need to expand the time 
period of the statute of limitations because often child sexual 
assaults are not reported until many years after the offense. 
Even though the legislature has consistently expanded the time, 
the majority's interpretation is going to leave many child 
sexual assaults with a very limited time for prosecution.   
¶59 The State advocates, and the majority adopts, a 
bright-line rule. For all prosecutions of child sexual assaults 
No.  2006AP1379-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
that occur prior to July 1, 1989, a six-year statute of 
limitations begins to run from the date of the commission of the 
charged offense.1 At the end of the six-year period, the 
prosecutions are barred forever. Simple enough. But what are the 
ramifications of this statutory interpretation?  
¶60 Consider the case of a four-year-old who is sexually 
assaulted on June 30, 1989, but who does not report it until 
2005, 
when 
he 
is 
20 
years 
old. 
Under 
the 
majority's 
interpretation the statute of limitations would expire on June 
30, 1995, when the victim is ten years old. Period. The same 
six-year bar for prosecutions would apply to probably countless 
child sexual assaults that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s that 
were not reported at the time of the offense. 
¶61 Was it the intent of the legislature to bar the 
prosecution of the above described June 1989 offense (and all of 
those other prosecutions) while at the same time consistently 
extending the statute of limitations? In 1987, effective July 1, 
1989, the legislature recognized that the period of limitations 
for child sexual assault cases should extend at least to the 
time the victim turns 21.  
¶62 Subsequent amendments to § 939.74(2)(c) extended the 
period of limitations even further. In 1993, for example, the 
legislature determined that the violations could be commenced 
                                                 
1 The majority concludes that the applicable statute of 
limitations is set forth in the version of § 939.74 in effect in 
December 1988. See majority op., ¶¶10-11.  That statute provides 
"prosecution 
for 
a 
felony 
must 
be 
commenced 
within 
6 
years . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1)(1985-86). 
No.  2006AP1379-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
until the victim turned 26.2 The age was raised again in 1997, 
2003, and 2005.3 The most recent version of § 939.74 provides 
that prosecutions under § 948.02(1), first degree sexual assault 
of a child, "may be commenced at any time." Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(2)(a)(2005-06). It also provides that prosecutions 
under § 948.02(2), second degree sexual assault of a child, 
"shall be commenced before the victim reaches the age of 45 
years or be barred." Id. 
¶63 According to the majority, a sexual assault of a child 
committed June 30, 1989, must be prosecuted by 1995 or be 
barred. In contrast, a sexual assault of a child committed just 
one year later in 1990 may be prosecuted until the victim turns 
45, or without time limitation, depending on the crime charged. 
It seems unlikely that the legislature intended such wildly 
different outcomes based on small differences as to when sexual 
assaults of children take place.  
¶64 The legislature has paid a great deal of attention to 
the period of limitations for child sexual assault prosecutions. 
It has consistently expanded that period, accounting for the 
fact that such assaults are often reported years after they 
occur. The majority's interpretation, however, indicates that 
the legislature intended to expand the period for assaults that 
took place after July 1, 1989, while at the same time strictly 
limiting the periods for assaults that took place before that 
                                                 
2 1993 Wis. Act 219, § 6; see majority op., ¶12.  
3 1997 Wis. Act 237; 2003 Wis. Act 279, § 9; 2005 Wis. Act 
276, §§ 1, 2; see majority op., ¶¶13-14.  
No.  2006AP1379-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
date. 
It 
also 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
dramatically different outcomes based on small differences in 
when an assault was committed.  I am uncertain whether such 
results were actually intended by the legislature.  
¶65 Nonetheless, I join the majority because the text of 
the statutes upon which it relies support its interpretation. As 
the majority explains, under Wis. Stat. §§ 990.06 and 991.07, 
when 
the 
legislature 
replaces 
or 
amends 
a 
statute 
of 
limitations, the prior statute applies to any cause of action 
that accrues before the effective date of the new statute or 
amendment, unless the legislature provides otherwise. Majority 
op., ¶42. There is no express provision in any of the 
legislation amending § 939.74 indicating that the amendments 
apply to the chapter 944 offenses with which MacArthur has been 
charged. Thus, the majority concludes that the applicable 
statute of limitations is the one in effect on the date of the 
charged crime: six years. 
¶66 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP1379-CR.awb 
 
1