Title: Ex parte Sylvester James Abrams. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Sylvester James Abrams, alias v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070385
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2008

REL: 05/02/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070385
_________________________
Ex parte Sylvester James Abrams
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Sylvester James Abrams
v.
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-06-1473;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1288)
LYONS, Justice.
1070385
2
Sylvester James Abrams petitioned this Court for a writ
of certiorari to review whether the Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in affirming the Montgomery Circuit Court's revocation
of his probation on the basis that Abrams's sufficiency-of-
the-evidence argument had not been preserved for appellate
review.  We granted certiorari review to consider whether
Abrams's argument that the evidence on which his probation was
revoked was insufficient to support the revocation is
precluded from appellate review.  For the reasons discussed
below, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Sylvester James Abrams pleaded guilty to first-degree
sexual abuse.  On March 7, 2007, the Montgomery Circuit Court
sentenced him, as an habitual offender, to 15 years'
imprisonment.  The trial court split Abrams's sentence and
ordered him to serve three years in prison, with the balance
suspended upon the completion of five years' probation and
when all other conditions were met.  The trial court further
stated that the sentence would be a "reverse split," i.e.,
that the probationary period would be served first.  
1070385
3
At the time of the sentencing hearing on the sexual-abuse
conviction Abrams was already serving a probationary period
for at least one other charge.  Two days after the hearing,
Abrams's probation officer filed a report declaring Abrams
delinquent for: (1) failing to pay court-ordered moneys, (2)
failing to avoid injurious habits, and (3) failing to comply
with court orders to complete the CAP (Chemical Addiction
Program) for drug and alcohol abuse.  According to the State,
this delinquency report was "filed on two other cases on which
Abrams was on probation."  State's brief at p. 3 (emphasis
added).
As a result of the delinquency report, the trial court
held a hearing on March 15, 2007, to determine whether
Abrams's probation should be revoked.  The record reflects the
following exchange occurred at the hearing: 
"THE COURT: ...  They charged you with a new
violation.  They allege you were read and explained
the 
conditions 
of 
your 
probation, 
that 
you
acknowledged by signing the conditions of probation,
that you reported to the probation officer and
[were] ordered to report for the month of March
2007.  And you began paperwork on the probation.
They had a drug test or some sort of test.  Is that
what it was?  You came back positive on the drug
test.  Is that what it was?
"[ABRAMS]: Yes, sir.
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4
"THE COURT: ... [F]ailure to pay all fines, costs,
restitution ordered by the Court.  Then ... failure
to pay court costs, failure to avoid injurious
habits, failure to comply with court orders.  How
does he plead to those charges?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Judge, there are some issues on
the court costs.  I think he didn't pay after
November 2006, however --
"[ABRAMS]: I think my balance is zero.
"THE COURT: Go ahead.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He lost his job.  He does have
the ability to pay at this point.  I think the
primary thing we would ask the Court is to consider
the fact that these are violations of the possession
of marijuana in the second degree. [Abrams] was not
placed on probation at the time that he admitted to
using the marijuana and cocaine.  That happened the
day before he was sentenced [on the sexual-abuse
conviction] in this court.  So these are actually
violations of the possession of marijuana in the
second degree.  He was enrolled in CAP.  I think he
provided paperwork to the probation officer the day
he was locked up to prove that he had enrolled in
CAP.  So we would just ask the Court to take all of
that into consideration and reinstate him, allow him
to continue with his progress in the CAP program."
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial court then asked the probation officer for his
position on Abrams's conduct.  The probation officer testified
that Abrams came to him on March 6, 2007, the day before the
trial court sentenced Abrams on the sexual-abuse conviction,
and  said that he wanted to sign up for the program for
1070385
5
alcohol abuse but not for drug abuse, because, he said, he did
not have a drug problem.  The probation officer then asked
Abrams to take a drug test.  The probation officer testified
that Abrams told him that he had "partied" with friends
because of his looming sentencing hearing on the sexual-abuse
conviction and that he would likely test positive for drug use
if he submitted to a drug test.
After the hearing, the trial court revoked Abrams's
probation, not only on the cases in which Abrams was already
serving probation when he was sentenced on the sexual-abuse
conviction, but also on the sexual-abuse case in which he had
been given probation eight days earlier.  Specifically, the
trial court stated:
"So I am going to revoke your probation, and I
am going to revoke it in all these cases, including
sexual abuse in the first degree, and sentence you
to 15 years in the penitentiary on that case." 
 
The trial court thus placed the original 15-year sentence on
the sexual-abuse conviction into effect with instructions that
Abrams receive the "maximum" treatment for drug and alcohol
abuse while he was incarcerated.  The trial court's March 15,
2007, revocation order stated that Abrams
"was advised of charged violations of probation of:
1070385
6
"1. Failure to pay court-ordered monies.
"2. Admitted use of marijuana and cocaine
in lieu of drug test.
"3. 
Failure 
to 
complete 
drug/alcohol
treatment program.
"...  Based on his admission of charged violations,
the Court finds he has violated conditions of
probation by failing to refrain from illegal
activity." 
Abrams then appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing
that the trial court had erred in revoking his probation on
the sexual-abuse conviction because, he said, it erroneously
based that revocation on evidence indicating that Abrams had
used illegal drugs before he was placed on probation for the
sexual-abuse conviction. 
The Court Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court without an opinion.  Abrams v. State (No. CR-06-
1288, Oct. 26, 2007), __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)
(table).  In an unpublished memorandum that court held:
"Where a probationer does not object to the
sufficiency of the State's evidence before, during,
or after the revocation hearing, this issue is not
preserved for review on appeal.  Holden v. State,
820 So. 2d 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).  In order to
preserve the sufficiency of the evidence as an
appellate issue, the question must first be raised
and ruled upon in the trial court.  Reed v. State,
717 So. 2d 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).  The record
1070385
7
reflects that after the defense counsel made her
argument, the trial court completed the revocation
proceeding without responding to or ruling on the
counsel's argument.  Without a ruling by the trial
court, nothing was preserved for appellate review."
We granted certiorari review to consider whether Abrams's
argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence is precluded
from appellate review.
II. Standard of Review 
"'This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo.'"  Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala.
2004) (quoting Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.
2003)).
III. Analysis
During the probation-revocation hearing, defense counsel
argued that the trial court, in determining whether Abrams had
violated 
his 
probation, 
should 
not 
consider 
evidence
indicating that Abrams had used illegal drugs before he was
placed on probation for the sexual-abuse conviction.  Abrams
refers to this argument as an "objection," although defense
counsel did not use the phrase "I object" or the word
"objection" in his argument to the trial court.  Defense
counsel stated "we would ask the Court ... to consider" that
1070385
8
Abrams "was not placed on probation at the time that he
admitted to using the marijuana and cocaine."  Defense counsel
then asked the trial court to "reinstate him."  To this Court
Abrams argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
holding that his argument as to the insufficiency of the
evidence to support the revocation of his probation on the
sexual-abuse conviction was not properly preserved for
appellate review.     
Abrams contends that the holding of the Court of Criminal
Appeals conflicts with that court's holding in Ryans v. State,
629 So. 2d 799 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).  In Ryans, the
appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of vehicular homicide.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding:
"This issue has not been preserved for appellate
review because the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence was never presented to the trial court.
There was no motion for a judgment of acquittal and
there was no other motion, objection, or request
seeking similar relief."
629 So. 2d at 799 (emphasis added).  Abrams argues that under
Ryans he properly preserved his argument as to the sufficiency
of the evidence because defense counsel presented the issue to
the trial court.  Abrams further argues that the trial court
1070385
9
implicitly overruled his "objection" by subsequently revoking
his probation solely because he admitted, one day before he
was placed on probation on the sexual-abuse conviction, that
he had used illegal drugs and that the results of any drug
test would be positive.
The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
finding that Abrams's argument as to the sufficiency of the
evidence was precluded from appellate review was correct
because Abrams failed to make a specific objection on this
ground.  The State asserts that the Court of Criminal Appeals
properly noted in its unpublished memorandum its holding in
Holden v. State, 820 So. 2d 158, 160 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001),
that a probationer's argument as to the sufficiency of the
evidence was not preserved for review because the probationer
"did not object to the sufficiency of the State's evidence
before, during, or after the revocation hearing."  (Emphasis
added.)  Accordingly, the State argues that defense counsel's
general argument did not preserve the issue of the sufficiency
of the evidence in a probation-revocation proceeding as
required by Alabama law.  The State notes that in McIntosh v.
State, 762 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), the Court
1070385
10
of Criminal Appeals held that "the general rules of
preservation apply to revocation hearings." 
The 
State 
further 
argues 
that 
the 
trial 
court's
revocation of Abrams's probation does not constitute an
adequate 
ruling 
on 
his 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
argument 
to
support appellate review.  The State asserts that the trial
court's revocation of Abrams's probation evidences only that
the trial court was reasonably satisfied from the evidence
presented that Abrams had violated the terms of his probation.
The State does not cite any caselaw to support this argument;
rather, it cites Rule 27.6(d)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P., which
provides that in order to revoke probation "[t]he judge must
be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that a violation of
the conditions or regulations of probation or the instructions
occurred."
"This Court has always looked to substance over form,"
Southern Sash Sales & Supply Co. v. Wiley, 631 So. 2d 968, 971
(Ala. 1994).  To hold that Abrams's argument as to the
sufficiency of evidence was not preserved for appellate review
because it was not raised as a specific "objection" or because
the trial court did not expressly rule on it would be to
1070385
The entire hearing is set forth in just over 10 pages of
1
transcript. 
11
elevate of form over substance.  In Ryans, the Court of
Criminal Appeals countenanced a "request seeking similar
relief" as an alternative to a motion for a judgment of
acquittal, another motion, or an objection.  629 So. 2d at 799
("[T]he evidence was never presented to the trial court.
There was no motion for a judgment of acquittal and there was
no other motion, objection, or request seeking similar
relief.").  
At the outset of the brief probation-revocation hearing1
in the instant case, defense counsel pointed out that the
charges related to violations of a previous probation order
and that Abrams had not been placed on probation in the
sexual-abuse case at the time he admitted using illegal drugs,
and he requested that the trial court not consider evidence
indicating Abrams's prior drug use so that Abrams's probation
in the sexual-abuse case could be reinstated.  This argument
was clearly made to apprise the trial court of the
insufficiency of the evidence to revoke Abrams's probation in
the sexual-abuse case and constitutes a request seeking relief
similar to that sought by an objection.  See Ryans, 629 So. 2d
1070385
12
at 799.  This Court has stated: "The purpose of requiring a
specific objection to preserve an issue for appellate review
is to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error,
giving an opportunity to correct it before the case is
submitted to the jury."  Ex parte Parks, 923 So. 2d 330, 333
(Ala. 2005).  We are not dealing with a jury case in which a
trial court is being asked to take the case from the jury.  A
probation-revocation hearing is a bench trial and the trial
court is the sole fact-finder.  Nor, in the instant case, are
we dealing with a question concerning the admissibility of a
specific item of evidence in a scenario where the judge is
left to speculate as to the position of a party and the
party's grounds for concern. 
We further conclude that Abrams's argument as to the
sufficiency of the evidence received an adverse ruling from
the trial court.  The probation officer's delinquency report
charged Abrams with: (1) failure to pay court-ordered moneys,
(2) failure to avoid injurious habits, and (3) failure to
comply with court orders to complete the drug- and alcohol-
treatment program.  The trial court's order revoked Abrams's
probation because "[Abrams] has violated the conditions of
1070385
13
probation by failing to refrain from illegal activity."
Because failure to pay court-ordered moneys and failure to
comply with a court directive to complete a substance-abuse
program do not equate with "failing to refrain from illegal
activities," we must conclude that the trial court revoked
Abrams's probation solely because it found that Abrams had
engaged in the use of illegal drugs.  Yet there was no
evidence presented to the trial court indicating that Abrams
had tested positive for drug use after he was placed on
probation for the sexual-abuse conviction.  The trial court's
revocation 
of 
Abrams's 
probation 
on 
the 
sexual-abuse
conviction embraced exclusively the precise evidence that
Abrams asked the court not to consider.  Although "'it is
familiar law that an adverse ruling below is a prerequisite to
appellate review,'" Ex parte Borden, [Ms. 1050042, August 17,
2007] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. 2007) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc.
v. Day, 613 So. 2d 883, 884 (Ala. 1993)), the trial court's
revocation of Abrams's probation constitutes an adverse
ruling, coming as it did on the heels of Abrams's statement as
to the insufficiency of the evidence just a few minutes
earlier in the revocation proceeding. 
1070385
14
It is obvious that the trial court and the State knew
precisely of what Abrams complained and the relief he wanted;
it is equally obvious that the trial court, in revoking
Abrams's probation on the sexual-abuse conviction, refused
Abrams's request that it disregard evidence of conduct that
predated his probation in the sexual-abuse case.  As
previously noted, the State acknowledges that the delinquency
report was "filed on two other cases on which Abrams was on
probation" and not on the conviction for sexual abuse.  This
Court in Ex parte Works, 640 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Ala. 1994),
quoted with approval a dissenting opinion in Works v. State,
640 So. 2d 1056, 1056 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (Taylor, J.,
dissenting), that is also applicable to this proceeding:
"Defense counsel should not have to direct his opponent's mind
to the correct law the way one would thrust a beagle's nose on
a rabbit trail."  See also Ex parte Purser, 607 So. 2d 301,
302 (Ala. 1992) ("'Specific objection or motions are generally
necessary before the ruling of the trial judge is subject to
review, unless the ground is so obvious that the trial court's
failure to act constitutes prejudicial error.'" (quoting
1070385
The record indicates that the use of illegal drugs that
2
resulted in the revocation of Abrams's probation occurred
either on the night of March 5, i.e., two nights before he
appeared in court, or as early as March 4.
Although a copy of the results of a drug test is not in
3
the record, according to the probation officer Abrams admitted
to drug use when he was asked to take a drug test.  Also, at
the beginning of the hearing the trial court stated, "You came
back positive on a drug test," and Abrams replied, "Yes sir."
15
Lawrence v. State, 409 So. 2d 987, 989 (Ala. Crim. App.
1982))).
  
The State, while acknowledging that "Abrams's criminal
acts occurred the night before he appeared before the court
and was placed on probation in this case,"  contends, without
2
citation to authority, that the trial court's revocation of
Abrams's probation as to the conviction for sexual abuse can
be upheld.  State's brief at p. 20.  The State reasons that
"[Abrams's] inability to comply with the initial requirement
of probation -- that he successfully pass a drug screen -- was
noncompliance that occurred after the court imposed the
probationary split sentence" in the sexual-abuse case.
State's brief at p. 20.   We decline to view the subsequent
3
generation of a laboratory report by a third party dealing
with activity that clearly predated Abrams's sentence of
probation 
on 
the 
sexual-abuse 
conviction 
as 
an 
act
1070385
16
attributable to Abrams occurring after the sentencing that
constitutes a violation of his probation as to that
conviction.  Nothing before us suggests that the trial court's
granting of probation on the sexual-abuse conviction was
conditioned upon a negative drug test.  Indeed, the record
reflects that the State knew at the time of sentencing that a
drug test, if administered, could come back positive.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Abrams's
contention that the trial court erred in revoking his
probation 
on 
the 
sexual-abuse 
conviction 
based 
on 
a
delinquency report related to his probation on another
conviction because, he  argues, the trial court erroneously
considered evidence indicating that Abrams used illegal drugs
before he was placed on probation on the sexual-abuse
conviction is not precluded from appellate review. 
IV. Conclusion 
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further
proceedings.
1070385
17
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.