Title: People v. Gherna
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92554
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2003

Docket No. 92554-Agenda 9-May 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								LYNETTE S. GHERNA, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 24, 2003.
	 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	On August 26, 1999, officers approached a vehicle driven by
defendant, Lynette Gherna, observed certain items in the vehicle,
asked defendant to exit the vehicle in order to conduct a search,
and later arrested and charged defendant with one count of
possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West
2000)). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence. After conducting a hearing, the circuit court of
Vermilion County granted defendant's suppression motion,
rejecting the State's contention that the officers' encounter with
defendant was entirely consensual. The State filed a certificate of
substantial impairment and appealed the circuit court's ruling
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)).
With one justice dissenting, a panel of the appellate court reversed
the judgment of the circuit court and remanded this cause for
further proceedings. 325 Ill. App. 3d 157. We allowed defendant's
petition for leave to appeal pursuant to our Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of
the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant was arrested by Danville police officers on August
26, 1999, and charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2000)). Approximately one
month after defendant's arrest, on September 23, 1999, the circuit
court held a preliminary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence seized by the police officers when defendant was
arrested. Danville police officer Troy Wasson, who was the only
witness to testify during the hearing, stated that at 9 p.m. on
August 26, he and his partner, Officer Doug Smalley, were on
bicycle patrol. At that time the officers observed two females
sitting in a pickup truck parked in an apartment complex parking
lot. Officer Wasson testified that as he and his partner were riding
by the truck, he "observed a bottle of beer in the-sitting in a cup
holder console-or in the center console between the two girls."
Officer Wasson stated that because the passenger in the truck
"appeared to me to be pretty young," he and his partner suspected
possible underage drinking and therefore "stopped to identify both
the people inside the vehicle." The officers determined that
defendant, the driver of the truck, was over the age of 21, and that
the passenger in the vehicle was defendant's 13-year-old daughter.
The officers also examined the bottle of beer and determined that
the bottle was unopened and in its original container.
	Officer Wasson further testified that after ascertaining that no
underage drinking had occurred, he began "casually talking" with
defendant. Officer Wasson stated that defendant became "very
nervous" as they conversed. Officer Wasson testified that it was
during this conversation that he observed an item resembling a
credit card located underneath defendant's left thigh as she was
sitting inside the truck. Wasson stated that he asked defendant
about the card, that defendant showed the card to him, and that
Wasson saw that it was an Illinois Link card in the name of Lowell
Briggs. Officer Wasson then asked defendant where she had
obtained the card. Defendant replied that she did not know how
the card got into her vehicle and that possibly someone had
dropped it there when the police arrived. Officer Wasson testified
that "[a]t that point I asked [defendant] to exit the car so I could
speak with her in private, not around her 13-year-old daughter."
According to Officer Wasson, he and defendant "then stepped next
to the vehicle," and he asked defendant if there were any other
items in the car that could belong to Lowell Briggs and of which
defendant was unaware. According to Wasson, defendant stated
that the officers were "free to look." Officer Wasson testified that
he and his partner did not search the vehicle at that time because
Wasson "was still talking with [defendant]." Wasson then asked
defendant if she "had anything on her that belonged to Lowell
Briggs," including any illegal drugs or narcotics, to which
defendant replied in the negative. Officer Wasson testified that
"[a]t that point I paused," and defendant then began emptying her
front pockets. As defendant was removing various items from her
pockets, a clear plastic baggie fell to the ground that contained
several yellowish-white rocks, which subsequently field-tested
positive for cocaine. Officer Wasson stated that defendant was
then placed under arrest.
	Prior to trial, defendant filed with the circuit court a motion
to suppress evidence, alleging that she was searched without a
warrant and without probable cause in violation of the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
IV) and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §6). Specifically, defendant asserted that the
officers' approach to her vehicle amounted to a Terry stop to
investigate whether minors were unlawfully consuming alcohol.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968). Defendant argued that after the officers determined that no
underage drinking or open alcohol violation had taken place, the
officers' investigation should have ceased. Relying upon this
court's decision in People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999),
defendant concluded that her continued detention by the officers
after the basis for the Terry stop was dispelled constituted an
unlawful seizure.
	On September 7, 2000, approximately one year after
defendant's arrest, the circuit court conducted a hearing on
defendant's suppression motion. Again, Officer Wasson was the
only witness to testify during the proceedings. Although Officer
Wasson's general recounting of the events leading up to
defendant's arrest was similar to the testimony he gave during the
preliminary hearing, Officer Wasson provided additional details
not mentioned during his earlier testimony. Officer Wasson stated
that on the evening of defendant's arrest, both he and his partner
were on bicycle patrol and were outfitted in Danville police
bicycle uniforms, which consisted of a shirt with a badge and short
trousers, and were carrying weapons and other police gear, such as
radios, flashlights, and handcuffs. Although Officer Wasson
stated, as he had during the preliminary hearing, that his encounter
with defendant began when he and his partner observed two
individuals sitting inside a truck parked in an apartment complex
parking lot, Officer Wasson added that he and his partner were
patrolling the area of the parking lot "due to the high levels of drug
activity" there. Officer Wasson described the parking lot as "what
the city refers to as a stop area *** a high drug and crime area[ ]
*** [where officers are assigned] to help stop the drug flow or any
other criminal activity that's going on in the area." Officer Wasson
repeated his preliminary hearing testimony that he observed a
bottle of beer in the console between the driver and the passenger,
and it was the presence of the beer bottle that caused the officers
to "pay[ ] notice to the age of the occupants." Officer Wasson
stated that during his encounter with defendant, he was positioned
with his bicycle at the driver's side of defendant's "full size"
truck, while Officer Smalley was positioned with his bicycle at the
vehicle's passenger side. According to Wasson, although he
recognized defendant, her passenger appeared to be very young,
"under 21." Officer Wasson testified that he wanted to examine
the bottle of beer because he suspected that underage drinking may
have taken place. Defendant gave the bottle to Officer Wasson,
and, upon his examination, it appeared unopened and in its
original container. Officer Wasson handed the bottle back to
defendant after determining that underage drinking had not
occurred. Although Officer Wasson testified, as he did at the
preliminary hearing, that he then "engag[ed] in conversation with
[defendant]," he added that he questioned defendant with respect
to her presence in the area, and that while he was conversing with
her, he was "peering into the car" with his flashlight and observed
the card under defendant's left thigh. Officer Wasson asked
defendant what it was and she stated that she did not know and
reached down and handed it to him. He then asked defendant if
there was anything else in the truck that she was not aware of, such
as illegal drugs or weapons, and she stated that they were "free to
look." Officer Wasson testified that he "asked [defendant] to go
ahead and exit the pickup truck," and defendant complied. Officer
Wasson stated that he "request[ed]" defendant to exit the vehicle
because she had told them that they were free to look. On cross-examination, Officer Wasson acknowledged that during the
preliminary hearing he had testified that the reason he asked
defendant to exit the vehicle was so that he could speak to her
more privately away from her daughter. Wasson then stated that he
asked defendant to exit the vehicle for both purposes, and that he
had intended to ask defendant "questions about drug use, drug
sales, the use of illegal drugs and narcotics" and that such
questions would be inappropriate for a 13-year-old to hear.
According to Officer Wasson, he and defendant walked towards
the front of the truck and he continued to engage her in
conversation, asking defendant if she had any illegal drugs in her
possession. When defendant replied in the negative, Officer
Wasson testified, "I paused for a few moments; and while I was
pausing [defendant] began to empty her pockets." Officer Wasson
referred to the police report and stated that the pause was of
approximately 10 seconds in duration. As defendant was emptying
her pockets, a small baggie containing what later was determined
to be crack cocaine fell to the ground. Defendant was arrested. A
subsequent search of defendant's vehicle yielded no contraband.
	On September 26, 2000, the circuit court entered a written order granting defendant's motion to suppress. In the order, the
circuit court judge rejected the State's contention that the officers'
encounter with defendant was completely consensual and,
therefore, did not implicate the fourth amendment. The circuit
court found that in the case at bar, "the officers approached
specifically as a result of their observation of the youth of the
passenger and the suspicion that underage drinking was taking
place. This does not appear to be in the nature of a community
caretaking function; clearly the officers intended to investigate and
determine whether underage drinking was occurring. Therefore,
the court finds this circumstance to be more akin to a 'Terry stop,'
in which the police have a reasonably articulable suspicion of
criminal activity." The circuit court then relied upon the reasoning
in this court's decision in People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501
(1999), and held that the officers' actions and the inquiry that
followed amounted to an unlawful detention. Specifically, the
circuit court determined that "[o]nce the officers found the beer to
be unopened, the reason for their inquiry ended. Upon asking the
defendant to leave the car so as to conduct a conversation outside
the presence of her daughter, the defendant was unlawfully
detained. The court rejects the State's position that this was a mere
request because a person in the defendant's position could
reasonably believe that upon being asked to step away from the
car, she was not free to leave. Accepting the testimony that the
defendant thereafter gave her consent to search, the court finds
such consent was tainted as a product of that unlawful detention."
	In its written opinion, the circuit court also "took notice of the
transcript of the preliminary hearing, which did not refer in any
way to the area being targeted for drug activity or otherwise
indicating the officer's original suspicion to be anything other than
underage drinking."
	A majority of the appellate court reversed the judgment of the
circuit court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 325
Ill. App. 3d 157. The appellate court majority determined that the
encounter between defendant and the officers was entirely
consensual and, accordingly, defendant's rights under the fourth
amendment were not implicated. In finding that defendant had not
been seized at any time, the appellate majority relied upon the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980), where the Court listed several examples of
circumstances that could suggest that a seizure had occurred,
including the presence of more than one officer, the display of a
weapon by an officer, an officer's physical touching of a citizen,
or the officer's use of language or tone of voice indicating that the
citizen's compliance with the request was compelled. The
appellate majority found that, in the matter at bar, none of the
circumstances described in Mendenhall were present to establish
that a show of authority was made by the officers against
defendant. Thus, based upon the totality of circumstances
surrounding the encounter at bar, the majority held that defendant
was not seized by the officers because a reasonable person would
have believed that she was free to leave at any time. In addition,
the appellate majority rejected defendant's contention that this
encounter began as a Terry stop, and held that "an officer's
approach of a vehicle for the purposes of an investigation does not
per se create a Terry stop." 325 Ill. App. 3d at 162. The appellate
majority therefore concluded that because the contact between
defendant and the police officers was completely consensual, and
because defendant, therefore, had not been seized, the entire
encounter required neither probable cause nor reasonable
suspicion.
 	 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Cook stated that although he
agreed with the majority's proposition that merely approaching a
parked vehicle and asking questions of the occupants does not
constitute a seizure, he emphasized that "where the officer
approaches the vehicle because he has concerns about criminal
activity, the officer is not 'merely approaching the vehicle.' " 325
Ill. App. 3d at 163 (Cook, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice
noted that the trial court made a specific finding of fact that the
officers approached defendant's vehicle as a result of their
observation of the apparent youth of the passenger and the
suspicion that underage drinking was taking place. The dissenting
justice observed that because the community caretaking function
is " ' "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute" ' " (325 Ill. App. 3d at 163 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting
People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 388 (1990), quoting Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 715, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973)), community caretaking "is not a fall-back
position when the evidence is insufficient to sustain a Terry stop."
325 Ill. App. 3d at 163-64 (Cook, J., dissenting).
	We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal under our
Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).



ANALYSIS
	Defendant contends that the appellate court erred in reversing
the circuit court's ruling granting her motion to suppress.
Specifically, defendant argues that the circuit court correctly found
that the police initiated the encounter with her in order to
investigate their suspicions that underage drinking was occurring
in defendant's truck. Defendant further asserts that the circuit
court correctly determined that the officers' actions constituted an
investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and that once the officers
concluded that no criminal violation had occurred, the reason for
the stop had come to an end and that her continued detention by
the officers constituted an unreasonable seizure that violated her
constitutional rights and tainted her subsequent consent to search.
In sum, defendant argues, the appellate court erred in holding that
her entire encounter with Officers Wasson and Smalley was
consensual and that defendant had at no time been seized. We
agree.
	In reviewing a circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress,
mixed questions of law and fact are presented. Factual findings
made by the circuit court will be upheld on review unless such
findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v.
Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51 (2001). This deferential standard of
review is premised upon the reality that the circuit court is in "a
superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve conflicts
in the witnesses' testimony." People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402,
412 (1998). If we accept the findings of fact made by the circuit
court, we then review de novo whether suppression is warranted
under those facts. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d  at 412. A court of review
"remains free to engage in its own assessment of the facts in
relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions
when deciding what relief should be granted." Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 
at 51.
	The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV; accord Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
sec. 6; see People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 201 (2001) (" 'This
court has construed the search and seizure language found in
section 6 in a manner that is consistent with the Supreme Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence' "), quoting Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 (1996). Because "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places" (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967)), "wherever an
individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy'
[citation], he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government
intrusion" (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 899, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873, (1968)). Accordingly, the parameters of this
right are shaped by the context in which it is asserted, for "what
the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1680, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1446
(1960).
	This court has previously observed that "[t]here are,
theoretically, three tiers of police-citizen encounters" (People v.
Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1990)) that do not constitute an
unreasonable seizure. The first tier involves the arrest of a citizen,
which must be supported by probable cause. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 
at 387. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
known by the arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a
reasonable person's belief that the arrested individual has
committed an offense. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226 (1984). The
next tier of encounters between police and citizens involves a
temporary investigative seizure conducted under the standards set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Murray, 137 Ill. 2d  at 387. In Terry, the Supreme Court held that an officer may,
within the parameters of the fourth amendment, conduct a brief,
investigatory stop of a citizen when the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and such suspicion
amounts to more than a mere "hunch." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 909, 88 S. Ct.  at 1883. The final tier of police-citizen
encounters involves those encounters which are consensual. The
encounters in this tier "involve[ ] no coercion or detention and
therefore do[ ] not involve a seizure." Murray, 137 Ill. 2d  at 387.
Accordingly, consensual encounters do not implicate the fourth
amendment.
	In the matter at bar, the appellate majority below determined
that the entire encounter between the officers and defendant was
completely consensual. In the view of the appellate court, the
protections of the fourth amendment are not implicated in the
matter at bar because "the officers never showed authority and
thus never seized defendant." 325 Ill. App. 3d at 163. In its brief
to this court, the State mirrors the reasoning of the appellate
majority, and contends that the officers did not seize defendant,
that the contact was entirely consensual, and that a reasonable
person in defendant's position would have felt free to leave the
scene at any time. The State concludes, therefore, that the contact
between defendant and the officers does not implicate the fourth
amendment. We disagree.
	For purposes of the fourth amendment, an individual is
"seized" when an officer " 'by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.' "
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991), quoting Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19 n.16, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905 n.16, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879 n.16. It is well settled that
a seizure does not occur simply because a law enforcement officer
approaches an individual and puts questions to that person if he or
she is willing to listen. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. ___,
___, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 251, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983) (plurality op.). "So long as a reasonable
person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his
business,' [citation], the encounter is consensual and no reasonable
suspicion is required." Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at
398, 111 S. Ct.  at 2386, quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991);
see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 569, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1977 (1988). However, when, taking
into account " 'all the circumstances surrounding the incident' "
(Immigration &amp; Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
215, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984), quoting
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 3d 497,
509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)), the conduct of the police
would lead a reasonable innocent person under identical
circumstances to believe that he or she was not "free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter" (Bostick,
501 U.S.  at 436, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 400, 111 S. Ct. at 2387), that
person is seized. Accordingly, this analysis hinges on an objective
evaluation of the police conduct and not upon the subjective
perception of the individual approached. Hodari D., 499 U.S.  at
628, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 111 S. Ct.  at 1551.
	Applying the above principles to the facts before us, we
conclude that the appellate court erred in holding that defendant's
liberty was not restrained during her encounter with the Danville
officers. As stated, an individual is not seized for fourth
amendment purposes when police ask questions of that individual,
including a request for identification, so long as the officers do not
convey by their words or actions to the person being questioned
that compliance with their requests is required. See Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 434-35, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 398, 111 S. Ct.  at 2386. However,
a consensual encounter will lose its consensual nature if law
enforcement officers convey a message, by means of physical
force or show of authority, that induces the individual to
cooperate. Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 434-35, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 398, 111 S. Ct.  at 2386; Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554-56, 64 L. Ed. 2d  at
509-10, 100 S. Ct.  at 1877-78.
	In the matter at bar, the record reveals that, during the initial
encounter between the Danville officers and defendant, more than
mere consensual questioning took place. Defendant, while seated
in her vehicle with her 13-year-old daughter, was confronted by
two uniformed officers riding bicycles clearly marked "police."
We reject the State's assertion that the presence of the officers in
the instant matter was "less threatening" because the officers
approached defendant on bicycles and were outfitted in short-sleeved shirts and short trousers. The testimony of Officer Wasson
established that the officers displayed police badges on their shirts,
and that they were equipped with a full complement of police gear,
including weapons, radios, handcuffs and flashlights. The fact that
the officers were assigned to bicycle patrol did not diminish their
apparent authority as law enforcement personnel. Officer Wasson
positioned himself and his bicycle at the driver's door, while
Officer Smalley positioned himself and his bicycle at the
passenger's door. Upon taking these positions, the officers
proceeded to identify the passengers. Although the officers
determined that defendant was over the age of 21, Officer Wasson
testified that defendant's passenger "appeared to be young ***
under 21." According to his testimony, Officer Wasson then asked
defendant to hand him the bottle of beer because he wanted to
ascertain if any underage drinking had taken place. Defendant gave
the bottle to Officer Wasson, who determined that it was unopened
and in its original container. Officer Wasson then handed the
bottle back to defendant.
	Under the totality of the circumstances at bar, we conclude
that the presence and positioning of the officers with their bicycles
on either side of defendant's vehicle, combined with Officer
Wasson's request to defendant to produce the bottle of beer for
examination after questioning defendant and her daughter about
their identities, constituted an official show of authority to which
a reasonable innocent person would feel compelled to submit. At
the time Officer Wasson asked defendant to hand him the bottle of
beer, a reasonable innocent person in defendant's position would
not have felt "free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter." Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 436, 115 L. Ed. 2d 
at 400, 111 S. Ct.  at 2387. At that instant, defendant's movement
was restricted: the positioning of the officers and their bicycles
prevented defendant from either exiting the vehicle or driving the
vehicle away from the scene. This blocked movement, combined
with the request to examine the bottle of beer on the heels of other
questioning, would " 'have communicated to a reasonable person
that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go
about his business.' " Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 437, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at
400, 111 S. Ct.  at 2387, quoting Chesternut, 486 U.S.  at 569, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 569, 108 S. Ct.  at 1977; see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
at 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 111 S. Ct.  at 1552; cf, People v.
Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 520 (1999) ("officers restrained the
movements of [a] car's occupants by their show of authority").
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was seized.
	Our inquiry, therefore, turns to whether this seizure was
reasonable under the circumstances presented, as only those
seizures which are "unreasonable" violate the fourth amendment.
U.S. Const., amend. IV, accord Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. We hold
that the seizure of defendant during her initial encounter with the
Danville police was reasonable under the standards set forth in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court recognized that effective
crime prevention and detection requires that an officer be allowed
to briefly detain and question individuals in order to investigate
possible criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause
to support an arrest. To justify such a brief investigative seizure,
the officer's decision must be based on "specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 906, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880. An officer's decision to engage
in a brief Terry investigative detention cannot be justified,
however, on the basis of "unparticularized suspicion" or on a
"hunch." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 909, 88 S. Ct.  at
1883.
	The Terry Court established a dual inquiry for determining
whether an officer's investigative detention is reasonable: (1)
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception" and (2)
"whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879. In Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983), the
Supreme Court elaborated on the principles applicable to the
second part of the Terry reasonableness inquiry. In Royer, the
Court emphasized that, under Terry, "an investigative detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Royer, 460 U.S.  at 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 1325 (plurality op.). In addition, the
Royer Court held that the State bears the burden of showing that
a seizure based on "reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited
in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative
seizure." Royer, 460 U.S.  at 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at 238, 103 S. Ct. 
at 1326 (plurality op.). Finally, Royer held that the where an
officer's confinement of a person goes beyond the limited restraint
of a Terry investigative stop, a subsequent consent to search may
be found to be tainted by the illegality. Royer, 460 U.S.  at 501, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at 238-39, 103 S. Ct.  at 1326 (plurality op.).
	In the matter at bar, the circuit court held, based upon its
factual finding that the officers had a "reasonably
articulable"suspicion of underage drinking, that their initial
encounter with defendant constituted a valid Terry investigative
detention. We agree. The record demonstrates that the conduct of
the officers during their initial encounter with defendant
comported with the precepts of the fourth amendment. As found
by the circuit court, the officers possessed a reasonable and
articulable suspicion, based upon their observation of the bottle of
beer and of a passenger who appeared to be younger than 21, that
underage drinking may have been taking place. Accordingly, the
officers had a justifiable basis to briefly detain and question
defendant about the bottle of beer and to ascertain the ages of the
occupants of the vehicle. See Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 
at 906, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880. Indeed, in her brief to this court,
defendant concedes that her initial encounter with the officers was
proper under Terry.
	Defendant contends, however, that the officers exceeded the
scope of their Terry authority and therefore violated her rights
under the fourth amendment by unreasonably detaining her after
the officers had satisfied themselves that the criminal activity
which originally justified the investigative detention-the possible
underage consumption of alcohol-had not occurred. The State, in
its submissions to this court, does not attempt to justify any
portion of the encounter between the Danville officers and
defendant as a Terry investigative detention. Rather, as noted, the
State advances the argument, which we have rejected above, that
defendant was not seized by the officers at any time prior to her
arrest.
	In the case at bar, the circuit court agreed with defendant's
position. The circuit court held that "[o]nce the officers found the
beer to be unopened, the reason for their [Terry] inquiry ended."
The circuit court relied upon our decision in Brownlee and held
that "[u]pon asking the defendant to leave the car so as to conduct
a conversation outside the presence of her daughter, the defendant
was unlawfully detained." In the course of its ruling, the circuit
court also rejected the State's position that the officers merely
requested that defendant exit the vehicle, and made the explicit
factual finding that "a person in defendant's position could
reasonably believe that upon being asked to step away from the
car, she was not free to leave." The circuit court further stated that,
"[a]ccepting the testimony that the defendant thereafter gave her
consent to search, the court finds such consent was tainted as a
product of that unlawful detention." We agree with the circuit
court.
	We find that the result in the matter at bar is controlled by our
decision in People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999), a case
which is factually analogous and in which we upheld the circuit
court's suppression of evidence which was obtained after a
passenger was detained without a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. In Brownlee, two officers conducted a traffic stop of a
vehicle that contained four occupants. The defendant was seated
in the backseat. The officers obtained identification from each
occupant and checked for outstanding warrants. After determining
that none of the occupants had an outstanding warrant, the officers
decided not to issue any traffic citations and reapproached the car.
However, upon returning to the driver his license and insurance
card, the officers paused for a time and then requested that the
driver consent to a search of the vehicle. When the driver inquired
whether he had a choice, one of the officers replied in the
affirmative and stated that he was "asking" that the driver allow
the search. The driver then exited the vehicle and said, " 'Okay
you can search.' " Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 506. After the
passengers were ordered out of the car, a search revealed the
presence of marijuana in the vehicle. All four individuals were
arrested and, as a result of a search incident to her arrest, cocaine
was discovered on the defendant's person. The trial court granted
the defendant's suppression motion and the State appealed. We
affirmed the trial court's suppression of the evidence.
	In arriving at this conclusion, we reasoned that although the
original traffic stop was valid under Terry, the continued detention
of the defendant was unlawful because the officers did not have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at
521. We held that, in view of all the facts surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, as "the
officers restrained the movements of the car's occupants by their
show of authority." Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 520. We explained:
		"There was no dispute in this appeal that the driver had no
choice but to submit to the officers' lawful authority while
they conducted the traffic stop and related investigation.
This traffic stop concluded when, with [one officer]
standing on the driver's side of the car, and [the other
officer] standing on the passenger side of the car, [the
officers] returned to the driver his license and insurance
card, and explained that no citations would be issued.
According to [one of the officer's] own testimony, he then
'paused' for 'a couple [of] minutes.' The officers
apparently did not move from their stations at the car's
doors during this two-minute time period, but rather stood
there, saying nothing. Given these circumstances, we can
find no fault with the circuit court's conclusion that the
officers' actions constituted a show of authority such that
a reasonable person would conclude that he or she was
not free to leave." Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 520.
	Just as in Brownlee, the initial encounter between the Danville
officers and defendant was reasonable under Terry. However, once
the officers' reasonable suspicions regarding underage drinking
had been allayed, the specific reason for the Terry investigative
detention had concluded. The record reflects, however, that the
officers continued to detain defendant. Once the officers
concluded their initial encounter with defendant by returning the
bottle of beer, the officers did not indicate in word or manner that
defendant was free to leave, even though the officers harbored no
reasonable suspicion of any other criminal conduct on defendant's
part. To the contrary, the officers remained stationed on both sides
of defendant's truck, with their bicycles positioned next to the
vehicle's doors, and proceeded to question defendant about her
reasons for being in the area. In addition, while questioning
defendant, Officer Wasson testified that he was "peering into"
defendant's truck and using a flashlight to illuminate the interior
of the passenger compartment. It was during this time that Officer
Wasson observed an object resembling a credit card located under
defendant's left thigh. Defendant was then asked by Officer
Wasson to exit the vehicle, all in the absence of any reasonable,
articulable suspicion that would warrant the continued detention.
	We agree with the circuit court's finding that, under the
totality of circumstances surrounding this incident, defendant
remained seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment, as
a reasonable innocent person in defendant's position would
believe that she neither was free to " 'disregard the police and go
about [her] business' " (Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at
398, 111 S. Ct.  at 2386, quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S.  at 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 111 S. Ct. at 1552) nor was "free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter" (Bostick,
501 U.S.  at 436, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 400, 111 S. Ct. at 2387). Under
the facts before us, we conclude that the show of authority by the
officers in the case at bar is analogous to the show of authority by
the officers in Brownlee, and that the continued detention of
defendant was not supported by any reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity. In turn, the officers' unreasonable
detention of defendant culminated in defendant's arrest. We
conclude, as we did in Brownlee, that the continued detention of
defendant constituted an unreasonable seizure that violated her
fourth amendment rights. The appellate court majority erred in
arriving at a contrary result.
	An individual cannot be seized absent reasonable, objective
grounds for doing so. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 556, 64 L. Ed. 2d 
at 510-11, 100 S. Ct.  at 1878. It is the State's burden to establish
that an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion was
sufficiently limited in duration and scope to satisfy the conditions
of a Terry investigative seizure. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 521. Just
as in Brownlee, the State has not attempted to "show that the
officers' continued detention of the car was in any way reasonable
or objectively justified." Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 521. Also, just as
in Brownlee, the State at bar does not "attempt to show that the
officers' detention was sufficiently limited in scope or duration to
satisfy the conditions of a Terry investigative seizure." Brownlee,
186 Ill. 2d  at 521. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in
holding that the officers' continued detention of defendant was
unconstitutional because it was not reasonable. See Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 521.
	Finally, as stated, where an illegal detention occurs, "a
subsequent consent to search may be found to have been tainted by
the illegality." Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 521. We hold that the
circuit court did not err in determining that the evidence against
defendant must be suppressed because her consent to search was
tainted as the product of the officers' illegal detention. See
Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 521.


CONCLUSION
	For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the appellate
court is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.



Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICES GARMAN and RARICK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.