Title: Commonwealth v. Ortiz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12273
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 12, 2018

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SJC-12273 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY C. ORTIZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     October 3, 2017. - February 12, 2018. 
 
Present (Sitting at Greenfield):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure.  Search and Seizure, 
Motor vehicle, Consent, Fruits of illegal search.  Consent.  
Evidence, Result of illegal search. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 25, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Edward 
J. McDonough, Jr., J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Hines, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney (Bethany 
Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In this case we must decide whether a driver's 
consent to allow the police to search for narcotics or firearms 
"in the vehicle" authorizes a police officer to search under the 
hood of the vehicle and, as part of that search, to remove the 
vehicle's air filter.  We hold that it does not.  A typical 
reasonable person would understand the scope of such consent to 
be limited to a search of the interior of the vehicle, including 
the trunk.  Because the police here exceeded this scope by 
searching under the hood and removing the air filter, and 
because the search was not otherwise supported by probable cause 
and was not a lawful inventory search, the Superior Court 
judge's order granting the defendant's motion to suppress is 
affirmed. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the motion 
judge, supplemented by uncontroverted evidence that the judge 
explicitly or implicitly credited.  See Commonwealth v. Isaiah 
I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).  On 
January 23, 2015, Officer Jared Hamel and Detective Boyle1 of the 
Holyoke police department were on patrol in an unmarked police 
cruiser when they heard loud music coming from a vehicle.  The 
officers determined that the loud music posed a public safety 
hazard under a local ordinance that prohibits excessively loud 
                                                          
 
 
1 The record does not reflect Detective Boyle's first name. 
 
 
3 
music in a motor vehicle.  Officer Hamel activated the cruiser 
lights and initiated a stop of the vehicle. 
 
As the officers approached the vehicle, Hamel recognized 
the driver (the defendant) as someone he had earlier pursued in 
a foot chase during an incident where the defendant was arrested 
for breaking into an apartment.  Hamel also recalled that the 
defendant had been charged in two separate incidents with 
attempted murder and with narcotics and firearms offenses.  
Hamel also recognized one of the two passengers, George Ortiz, 
because he recalled an incident where Ortiz had been arrested 
for trafficking in cocaine after the execution of a search 
warrant. 
 
As a safety precaution, Hamel requested a backup unit to 
provide assistance over the police radio.  Hamel then asked the 
defendant for his license and registration.  The defendant 
looked at Hamel, and turned for assistance to Ortiz, who spoke 
in Spanish to the defendant.  Hamel recalled from his prior 
encounters with the defendant that the defendant "only spoke a 
little English," and understood that Ortiz was translating 
Hamel's request for the defendant's benefit.  The defendant 
presented to Hamel a Massachusetts identification card that was 
not a driver's license, which confirmed that the driver was the 
defendant.  Hamel asked the other passengers if either had a 
driver's license, and neither did. 
 
 
4 
 
Hamel asked the defendant in English if there was anything 
in the vehicle that the police should know about, including 
narcotics or firearms.  The defendant responded, without 
hesitation and without any translation from Ortiz, "No, you can 
check."  Hamel asked the defendant and the two passengers to 
leave the vehicle, and placed all three in handcuffs.  All were 
frisked for weapons; none were found, but the two passengers 
were each found in possession of marijuana. 
 
Shortly thereafter, other police officers arrived on the 
scene, including an officer in the K-9 unit; the officer's dog 
walked around the vehicle but did not alert to anything.  The 
officers searched the front and back seat areas of the vehicle, 
but found no contraband.  Hamel then instructed one of the 
officers to check under the hood of the vehicle.  The officers 
raised the hood, and a few minutes later, after removing the air 
filter, Boyle found a black bag that contained two firearms.  
During the course of this search, the defendant was standing to 
the side of the road; at no point did he voice any objection to 
the search. 
 
A few minutes later, the registered owner of the vehicle 
arrived and was allowed to drive the vehicle away.  The search 
was conducted based solely on the defendant's consent; the 
police did not consider it to be an inventory search and did not 
 
 
5 
believe that they had grounds to search the vehicle without a 
warrant. 
 
The defendant and the two passengers were arrested and 
transported to a police station, where a Spanish-speaking police 
officer assisted in taking the defendant's statement.  According 
to that officer, the defendant understood English but was more 
comfortable with Spanish.  In his statement, the defendant 
admitted, among other things, that the firearms found in the 
vehicle belonged to him and that he gave consent to the officers 
to look in his vehicle. 
 
Indictments were returned by a grand jury, charging the 
defendant, as a habitual offender, with two counts of illegal 
possession of a firearm, two counts of unlawful possession of 
ammunition without an identification card, and one count of 
receiving stolen property.  The defendant moved to suppress the 
firearms and the statements he made at the police station, 
claiming that the search was unconstitutional and that the 
statements must be suppressed as fruits of the unconstitutional 
search. 
After an evidentiary hearing, a judge of the Superior Court 
allowed the defendant's motion.  The judge found that the 
defendant had given his free and voluntary consent to the search 
but that, because Hamel had asked the defendant whether he had 
any narcotics or firearms "in the vehicle," the scope of the 
 
 
6 
consent was limited to a search for narcotics or firearms in the 
interior of the vehicle and did not include a search "under the 
hood beneath the air filter."  The judge found that a typical 
reasonable person interpreting the verbal exchange between Hamel 
and the defendant "would believe that [the] defendant was 
limiting the scope of the search to the cabin of the vehicle." 
 
The judge also found that the defendant's silence when 
Hamel expanded the scope of the search by directing the other 
officers to search "under the hood" was nothing more than the 
defendant's "mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority," 
and therefore did not expand the scope of his initial consent. 
Having found that the search of the air filter under the 
vehicle's hood was unconstitutional because it exceeded the 
scope of the defendant's consent, the judge found that the 
defendant's statements to police were "directly caused by the 
illegal search of [the] defendant's vehicle," and therefore were 
"fruits of the poisonous tree" that also must be suppressed. 
The Commonwealth applied for interlocutory review, and a 
single justice of this court allowed the application.  The 
defendant then filed an application for direct appellate review, 
which we allowed. 
Discussion.  "In reviewing the allowance of a motion to 
suppress, we accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear 
error."  Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 256 (2010).  
 
 
7 
Where, as here, we find no clear error in the judge's findings, 
"[w]e then determine 'the correctness of the judge's application 
of constitutional principles to the facts as found.'"  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). 
The Commonwealth concedes that the warrantless search of 
the air filter under the hood of the vehicle is constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights only if the 
defendant consented to such a search.  When the police rely on 
consent to justify a warrantless search, "the prosecution 'has 
the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and 
voluntarily given.'"  Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 237 
(2005), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 
(1968).  The Commonwealth must show "consent unfettered by 
coercion, express or implied, and also something more than mere 
'acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 555, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976), 
quoting Bumper, supra at 549.  Here, we accept the judge's 
findings that the defendant, despite his limited understanding 
of English, consented to a search of his vehicle.  The issue is 
the scope of that consent. 
A search that is based on consent may not exceed the scope 
of that consent.  See Commonwealth v. Cantalupo, 380 Mass. 173, 
178 (1980) ("Because consent can legitimize what would otherwise 
 
 
8 
be an unreasonable and illegal search, a search with consent is 
reasonable and legal only to the extent that the individual has 
consented").  "The standard for measuring the scope of a 
suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 
'objective' reasonableness -- what would the typical reasonable 
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and 
the suspect?"  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 255 (2005). 
 
It bears emphasis that the standard is that of a typical 
reasonable person, not a typical reasonable police officer.  
Therefore, the focus is solely on what a typical reasonable 
person would understand the scope of the consent to be, based on 
the words spoken and the context in which they are spoken, not 
on what a police officer may understand as the places in a 
vehicle where narcotics or firearms may be hidden.  
Consequently, the fact that a police officer, such as Hamel 
here, knows from investigative experience that persons sometimes 
hide firearms and narcotics inside the air filter of a vehicle 
is irrelevant to a reasonable person's understanding of the 
scope of the driver's consent. 
 
In State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2002), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court confronted similar facts.  There, the 
police officer asked the driver whether he had "any weapons in 
the vehicle" (emphasis in original).  Id. at 872.  The driver 
 
 
9 
responded, "[N]o, nothing."  Id.  The officer asked, "Okay if we 
take a look?" and the driver answered, "Yeah, go ahead."  Id. at 
869.  As the court noted, "The verbal exchange therefore 
expressly indicated that the officer intended to search only for 
'weapons' that were 'in the vehicle,' and there was nothing to 
indicate that the search would encompass more than just the 
vehicle's interior."  Id. at 872.  The court, "applying a common 
sense interpretation to [that] . . . exchange," found that "it 
was objectively reasonable to conclude that the consent to 
search included only the interior of the vehicle and any 
containers that may have contained weapons."  Id. 
 
Here, similarly, the exchange between Hamel and the 
defendant indicated that the defendant's consent was limited to 
a search of the interior of the vehicle.  Hamel asked the 
defendant if there was anything in the vehicle that the police 
should know about, including narcotics and firearms, to which 
the defendant responded, "No, you can check."  These words 
limited the scope of the defendant's consent to a search for 
narcotics and firearms inside the vehicle, that is, the 
passenger compartment and trunk, and containers within those 
areas where narcotics and firearms could reasonably be found.  
See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.2 
                                                          
 
 
2 The dissent points to several Federal and State court 
decisions where police were authorized, based on the defendant's 
 
 
10 
 
The most generous understanding of the defendant's consent 
in this case is that it was ambiguous whether it included the 
engine area under the hood and whether it authorized the police 
to remove the air filter.  But the police are not allowed to 
take advantage of such ambiguity when they have the ability to 
resolve it with clarifying questions. 
 
We have held that the voluntariness of consent to a search 
must be unambiguous; "[t]he Commonwealth must provide us with 
more than an ambiguous set of facts that leaves us guessing 
about the meaning of [the] interaction and, ultimately, the 
[consenting person's] words or actions."  Commonwealth v. Carr, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
consent, to search under the hood of the vehicle.  Post at note 
1.  But the words, context, and circumstances of the consent in 
this case distinguish it from those cases.  For instance, in all 
but one of those cases, consent was given in response to a 
general request to search; unlike in this case, there were no 
words indicating that the scope of the search would be limited 
to items "in the vehicle."  In United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 
684, 685 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 874 (1995), the 
police officer asked if the defendant had "any objection to his 
searching the vehicle," to which the defendant replied that he 
did not.  And in State v. Lopez, 219 N.C. App. 139, 142 (2012), 
the police officer asked, "[D]o you mind if I search the 
vehicle?"  See also Pincherli v. State, 295 Ga. App. 408, 409, 
413 (2008) (police officers' "request for consent was a general 
one" to search vehicle); Hoskins vs. State, Tex. Ct. App., Nos. 
07-03-0053-CR & 07-03-0054-CR (Dec. 23, 2003) ("[N]either 
[officer's] request nor [defendant's] consent limited the scope 
of the search," where police officer asked for consent to search 
vehicle).  In the one cited case where the United States Border 
Patrol agent asked, "May I look inside the truck?," the court 
noted that, "[b]efore the hood was opened the [defendant] gave 
permission for an agent to look in the back of the truck and 
even went so far as to aid in the search."  United States v. 
Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 936 (1978). 
 
 
11 
458 Mass. 295, 299 (2010), quoting Rogers, 444 Mass. at 238.  
"If either the officer's request or the [person's] response is 
so ambiguous that we are unable to discern whether the [person] 
voluntarily consented to [the search], our inquiry will be over 
and the [search] must be deemed unlawful."  Carr, supra, quoting 
Rogers, supra at 238-239.  It makes little sense to insist on 
clarity when determining the voluntariness of consent, but not 
when determining the scope of that consent.  As a matter of 
logic and constitutional fairness, the requirement of reasonable 
clarity must also apply to the scope of consent. 
 
Our constitutional jurisprudence with respect to consent 
searches is already quite protective of law enforcement.  To 
establish that the consent to a search is valid, the 
Commonwealth need not prove that the consenting person knew that 
he or she had a right to refuse consent, or that the person was 
informed of that right.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 226-227 (1973); Walker, 370 Mass. at 555.  See also Rogers, 
444 Mass. at 246.  It suffices that the consent was given 
voluntarily and was "unfettered by coercion"; knowledge or 
ignorance of the right to refuse is simply one factor to be 
considered under the totality of the circumstances.  Walker, 
supra.  We need not consider here whether it is fair that 
consent to the search of a vehicle can be valid even where it is 
not knowing.  But it is fair to conclude that the scope of that 
 
 
12 
search should not extend into the realm of the ambiguous, 
especially when the police can easily resolve that ambiguity 
with a clarifying question.  See, e.g., United States v. Coburn, 
876 F.2d 372, 373-374 (5th Cir. 1989) (after obtaining consent 
to search truck, United States Border Patrol agent specifically 
asked for consent to search gasoline tank). 
  
In Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 351-352 (2012), 
where we considered whether a defendant had invoked his right to 
silence after being advised of his Miranda rights, we declared, 
"When law enforcement officials reasonably do not know whether a 
suspect wants to invoke the right to remain silent, there can be 
no dispute that it is a 'good police practice' for them to stop 
questioning on any other subject and ask the suspect to make his 
choice clear."  We noted that this "'intuitively sensible 
course' . . . has the benefit both of ensuring protection of the 
right if invoked and of minimizing the chance of suppression of 
subsequent statements at trial if not."  Id. at 352, quoting 
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 473 (1994) (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  "Far from creating any 'wholly 
irrational obstacles' to police investigation, . . . the process 
of asking, in a brief and even-handed fashion, simple clarifying 
questions does not burden the police."  Clarke, supra, quoting 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975). 
 
 
13 
 
We apply this same reasoning to a consent search like this 
one, where the defendant gave consent to the police to search in 
his vehicle, but did not with reasonable clarity give the police 
consent to search beneath the hood or to dismantle the air 
filter as part of that search.  Under the Fourth Amendment and 
art. 14, unless it is reasonably clear that the consent to 
search extends beyond the interior of the vehicle, the police 
must obtain explicit consent before a vehicular search may 
extend beneath the hood. 
 
Moreover, where such consent is not reasonably clear at the 
outset, the defendant's silence when the police open the hood 
cannot be an adequate substitute for consent.  The motion judge 
correctly found that the defendant's silence, while he was in 
handcuffs and had been removed to the side of the street, was 
nothing more than "mere 'acquiescence to a claim of lawful 
authority.'"  Walker, 370 Mass. at 555, quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. 
at 549.  Nor, for that same reason, can his failure to revoke 
his consent be construed as consent to expand the scope of the 
search beyond the scope to which he had initially consented.  
See 4 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), at 23 (5th ed. 
2012) ("[A] defendant's failure to object should not be treated 
as expanding a more limited consent, especially when the 
circumstances suggest some other possible reason for [the] 
defendant's silence").  See also United States v. Neely, 564 
 
 
14 
F.3d 346, 350-351 (4th Cir. 2009) (where defendant consented to 
search of trunk, failure to object did not expand scope to 
include passenger compartment); United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 
1222, 1228-1229 (10th Cir. 2000) (where defendant consented to 
search of passenger compartment, failure to object did not 
expand scope to include trunk). 
 
Conclusion.  To the extent that it exceeded the scope of 
the defendant's consent, the search here of the air filter under 
the hood was unconstitutional.  We therefore affirm the motion 
judge's order allowing the defendant's motion to suppress the 
weapons found in the air filter and the defendant's subsequent 
statements at the police station related to his possession of 
those weapons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (dissenting, with whom Gaziano and Kafker, JJ., 
join).  I respectfully dissent.  Under our constitutional 
framework for evaluating the scope of an individual's consent to 
a search, we ask, "[W]hat would the typical reasonable person 
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?"  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).  This 
requires that we consider the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding the exchange, including the "expressed object" of 
the search, id., and whether the individual exercised his or her 
right to limit the scope of the search to particular areas.  
Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 256 (2005).  Applying 
these principles to the facts of this case, I disagree with the 
court that the defendant's consent was limited to the interior 
and trunk of the vehicle.  In my view, the defendant's 
unqualified and unambiguous general consent to search for "any 
narcotics or firearms in the vehicle," coupled with the 
defendant's failure to object as the search moved from the 
interior of the vehicle to beneath its hood, would indicate to 
"the typical reasonable person" that the defendant had 
authorized the entire search at issue, including the officers' 
limited search beneath the hood and under the air filter of the 
engine.1 
                                                          
 
 
1 Numerous Federal and State courts have reached the same or 
similar conclusions on this issue.  See United States v. 
2 
 
 
 
I find the principal case relied on by the court, State v. 
Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2002), distinguishable on both the 
law and the facts.  As the court points out, the precise 
language used during the verbal exchange between the defendant 
and officer in each case was the same:  there, as here, the 
defendant granted the police permission to search for contraband 
"in the vehicle."  Id. at 869.  Applying "a common sense 
interpretation to the verbal exchange," the Troxell court 
concluded that "in the vehicle" referred "only [to] the interior 
of the vehicle," id. at 872, that is, the passenger compartment.  
(The defendant in that case argued that his consent "was limited 
in scope to the interior compartment of the pickup truck."  Id.)  
The court in this case goes one step further than Troxell, 
interpreting the very same language to refer not only to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 688-689 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
874 (1995) (suspect's general consent to search vehicle, coupled 
with his failure to object to breadth of search, authorized 
police to search under vehicle's hood); United States v. Sierra-
Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
936 (1978) (search beneath hood within scope of suspect's 
general consent); Pincherli v. State, 295 Ga. App. 408, 412-413 
(2008) (same); State v. Lopez, 219 N.C. App. 139, 142, 148-149 
(2012) (general consent to "search the vehicle" for weapons or 
drugs "included under the hood and in the air filter 
compartment"); Hoskins vs. State, Nos. 07-03-0053-CR & 07-03-
0054-CR (Tex. App. Dec. 23, 2003) (search beneath hood within 
scope of suspect's general consent).  Cf. People v. Kats, 2012 
IL App (3d) 100683, ¶¶ 28-30 (consent to search "vehicle and its 
contents for contraband" authorized search behind vehicle's door 
panel); State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557, 562-563 (1996) 
(general consent to search authorized removal of side panel of 
vehicle's door). 
3 
 
 
passenger compartment but also the trunk of the vehicle.  I do 
not see a meaningful difference in this context between a 
vehicle's trunk and its engine:  both are beyond the passenger 
compartment and must be opened separately. 
 
I also believe the Troxell court's narrow focus on the 
colloquial use of the term "in" ignores the important fact that 
these were not casual exchanges between two civilians, but 
inquiries about the possible possession of illegal contraband 
between one civilian and a police officer, which an objective 
bystander would doubtless take into account when interpreting 
the exchange.  See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 ("[W]hat would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect?" [emphasis added]). 
 
Moreover, the court in Troxell, 78 S.W.3d at 872, noted 
that it was "worth emphasizing" additional facts about the 
encounter beyond the particular language used:  the officer 
requested the defendant's consent only after he had completed 
his investigation into the traffic offense that prompted the 
stop to begin with; more significantly, even, the court pointed 
out that the officers relied on the defendant's general consent 
to conduct "an extensive, nearly [twenty-]minute search of the 
interior of the vehicle and its contents and conducted a sweep 
of the vehicle by using a drug detection dog.  Despite finding 
no evidence of weapons or drugs, [the officer] . . . continued 
4 
 
 
the detention of the defendant by then crawling under an 
examining the underside and gas tank of the vehicle."  Id. at 
872-873.  As the facts of the case reveal, the officer then 
"instructed the defendant to drive to a service station so the 
gas tank could be removed."  Id. at 869.  Only then did the 
officers discover drugs in the vehicle. 
 
Cases in this area indicate that, apart from the specific 
language used by a defendant when authorizing a search, the 
command of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution that a search be "reasonable" also mandates that 
police may not rely on generalized consent to conduct a 
forcible, destructive, or unnecessarily prolonged search.  See, 
e.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-252 ("It is very likely 
unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the 
search of his trunk [of a vehicle], has agreed to the breaking 
open of a locked briefcase within the trunk"); United States v. 
Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941-942 (11th Cir. 1990) (consent to 
search of vehicle's trunk for contraband did not include 
slashing open of spare tire).  When a consented-to search of a 
vehicle turns into a protracted, fruitless search for drugs, 
followed by a request from the police that the driver bring the 
vehicle to a body shop for the physical dismantling of its 
parts, that search runs counter to this principle, and it is 
therefore "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth 
5 
 
 
Amendment.  Those are not the facts of this case, however.  
Here, the stop of the defendant lasted approximately twenty to 
twenty-five minutes from start to finish, only "a few minutes" 
were spent beneath the hood of the vehicle, and there is no 
indication that the police used tools or damaged the vehicle in 
any way. 
 
I further disagree with the court that the scope of the 
defendant's consent was in any way ambiguous.  The exchange 
between the police and the defendant left no doubt as to the 
areas and objects of the intended search:  an officer asked the 
defendant if there were "any narcotics or firearms in the 
vehicle."  The defendant replied, immediately and without 
hesitation, "No, you can check."  His "words placed no 
limitations on the scope of the search to which he was 
consenting."  Commonwealth v. Cantalupo, 380 Mass. 173, 179 
(1980).  Accordingly, the officers were authorized to search the 
vehicle for "narcotics [and] firearms" wherever they might 
reasonably be found "in the vehicle."  Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.  
This included the limited search beneath the hood and under the 
air filter -- a space that this court has acknowledged may 
conceal contraband.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Bakoian, 412 Mass. 295, 
305 (1992) (search beneath hood and under air filter valid 
component of probable cause-based search of vehicle for 
6 
 
 
narcotics, during which police are authorized to search any part 
of vehicle that "may conceal" drugs [citation omitted]). 
 
Finally, to the extent the defendant's general consent left 
any ambiguity over its proper scope (although I find none), the 
defendant's failure to object as the officers moved from the 
interior of the vehicle to beneath its hood is only further 
evidence that he similarly authorized that portion of the 
search.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 534 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 952 (2004) ("a suspect's 
failure to object [or withdraw his consent] when an officer 
exceeds limits allegedly set by the suspect is a strong 
indicator that the search was within the proper bounds of the 
consent search").  To be clear, I do not interpret the 
defendant's silence "as expanding a more limited consent," 4 
W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c) (5th ed. 2012).  
Rather, I view the original scope of his generalized, 
unqualified response to have included beneath the hood, and I 
interpret his silence as the police searched that area of the 
vehicle as but additional evidence that it fell within the 
defendant's permission.  The motion judge, and now the court, 
discount this important point, that "[a]lthough it is a 
suspect's right to limit the scope of a search to which he 
consents, . . . the defendant did not avail himself of that 
right."  Gaynor, 443 Mass. at 256.  I am not convinced that the 
7 
 
 
fact that the defendant was in handcuffs during the search 
automatically converts his silence into "mere acquiescence to a 
claim of lawful authority," as the motion judge and the court 
characterize it.  Just as a defendant may freely and voluntarily 
consent to a search despite being under arrest, Commonwealth v. 
Franco, 419 Mass. 635, 642 (1995), so too may a defendant's 
other actions (or inaction) while in handcuffs factor into our 
analysis of the scope of a consent-based search.