Title: STATE v SWAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-268
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 19, 1982

No. 81-268 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. GARY JOSEPH SWAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hsn. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps 111, County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: June 22, 1982 Decided: August 19, 1982 Filed: ,A$d6 13 1 9 8 2 T k j = "Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. O n a w r i t of habeas corpus from t h e United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court, Missoula Division, defendant appeals h i s 1972 c o n v i c t i o n s of second degree a s s a u l t ( s e c t i o n 94-602, R.C.M. 1947, now repealed) and rape ( s e c t i o n 94-4101, R.C.M. 1947, now r e p e a l e d ) . On May 11, 1972, defendant was sentenced t o s i x y e a r s f o r t h e a s s a u l t and ninety-nine y e a r s f o r t h e rape convic- t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, Missoula County. According t o defendant, h i s counsel t o l d him t h a t a n o t i c e of appeal had been f i l e d . After t h e time l i m i t f o r appeal had expired, defendant discovered, however, t h a t a n o t i c e had never been f i l e d . Defendant wrote Chief J u s t i c e Harrison i n November 1972 seeking a t r a n s c r i p t and a i d i n appealing h i s convic- t i o n . Chief J u s t i c e Harrison wrote back t o defendant s t a t i n g : "You s t a t e d t h a t you requested your a t t o r n e y t o appeal but he d i d not do so; I a m informed t h a t you did d i s c u s s an appeal with your counsel b u t you were advised t h e r e was no i s s u e t o appeal on. "I a m a l s o advised by t h e d i s t r i c t judge t h a t he d i d n o t f e e l t h e r e were any problems upon t h e t r i a l , nor were any r u l i n g s made t h a t could be an i s s u e on appeal. Also t h a t t h e evidence was c l e a r and your counsel did a good job on your t r i a l . "You do not need a t r a n s c r i p t f o r an applica- t i o n f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus, j u s t make t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and s e t f o r t h i n it wherein you f e e l your r i g h t s were prejudiced. I f t h i s c o u r t r e q u i r e s some of t h e testimony t o a s c e r t a i n i f what you say is t r u e , we w i l l s e c u r e it." Over the next few y e a r s , defendant made s e v e r a l pro s e attempts t o g e t a t r a n s c r i p t which he believed was neces- - s a r y i n o r d e r t o p e r f e c t an a p p e a l . I n 1973, he f i l e d f o r a w r i t of mandamus i n F e d e r a l District Court, which was de- n i e d . I n September 1978, he f i l e d a n o t h e r w r i t of mandamus w i t h t h i s Court, s e e k i n g c o u r t r e c o r d s and t r a n s c r i p t , which was a l s o denied. Also, i n 1978, d e f e n d a n t began an a c t i o n i n Powell County s e e k i n g a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t h a t Mon- t a n a ' s former r a p e s t a t u t e ( s e c t i o n 94-4101, R.C.M. 1947) u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t males. A p p a r e n t l y no a c t i o n was t a k e n on t h i s p e t i t i o n . On December 20, 1 9 7 8 , d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a p r o se p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of habeas c o r p u s i n t h e United S t a t e s District Court, Missoula D i v i s i o n , c l a i m i n g , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t he was d e n i e d a r i g h t of a p p e a l . The writ was d e n i e d f o r want o f e x h a u s t i o n of s t a t e remedies. See, 36 St.Rep. 746, I n J u l y 1979, t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e i n Missoula County d e s t r o y e d t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e of t h i s c a s e . On May 20, 1980, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of habeas c o r p u s w i t h t h i s Court, which was d e n i e d . (Docket No, 80-184.) F i n a l l y , on S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a n o t h e r p r o s e p e t i t i o n f o r a writ of habeas c o r p u s i n F e d e r a l District Court, Missoula D i v i s i o n . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a f t e r a t e l e p h o n e c o n f e r e n c e i n which t h e S t a t e conceded c e r t a i n f a c t s , i s s u e d an o r d e r on May 1 3 , 1981, h o l d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s d e p r i v e d of h i s r i g h t t o a p p e a l because h e d i d n o t have e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . The District Court o r d e r e d t h e S t a t e of Montana t o f u r n i s h d e f e n d a n t w i t h a review of h i s c o n v i c t i o n w i t h t h e assis- t a n c e of c o u n s e l . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h e S t a t e t o proceed with d i l i g e n c e i n procuring a t r a n s c r i p t and appointment of counsel, and t o r e p o r t back t o t h e c o u r t a s t o what has been done w i t h i n 120 days. This appeal followed. I n Missoula, Montana, on t h e evening of December 13, 1971, Sharon Briggs, a seventeen-year-old g i r l , went o u t d r i n k i n g with defendant, d e f e n d a n t ' s wife and a f r i e n d of defendant, Rodger Smalley. Defendant and h i s wife were s t a y i n g a t t h e "93 Motel." A l l four people drank beer a t t h e motel room from about 6:30 t o 9:00 p.m. They then l e f t t h e motel and went t o a l o c a l b a r , d r i n k i n g and dancing f o r about two more hours. About 11:30 p.m., a l l four r e t u r n e d t o t h e motel and Briggs asked t o be taken home. The following account was t o l d by Briggs a t t h e t r i a l : After Briggs asked t o be taken home, defendant stayed i n t h e c a r , apparently w i l l i n g t o d r i v e her home. Defen- d a n t ' s wife and Rodger Smalley went back t o t h e motel room. Briggs s a t i n t h e f r o n t s e a t of t h e c a r with defendant. When they drove p a s t t h e s t r e e t t o her house, Briggs again t o l d defendant she wanted t o go home. Defendant t o l d her t h a t he wanted t o buy some beer f i r s t . After buying t h e beer, defendant continued t o d r i v e south, o u t of Missoula. When Briggs asked where they were going, defendant s a i d t h a t he was t a k i n g her t h e "long way home." Briggs r e p e a t e d l y asked defendant t o t a k e her home. A f t e r a few m i l e s defendant turned onto t h e Blue Mountain Road, which was snow-packed and s l i p p e r y . Defendant's car became stuck a couple of times, but they were a b l e t o f r e e it each time u n t i l t h e c a r s l i d p a r t i a l l y o f f t h e road. The defendant t o l d Briggs they would have t o walk home, and he o f f e r e d her some beer. When s h e r e f u s e d , t h e defendant h i t her on t h e s i d e of her f a c e with h i s f i s t . The defendant ordered t h e v i c t i m o u t of t h e c a r and h i t her a g a i n , breaking her g l a s s e s . When she threw her g l a s s e s down, t h e defendant h i t her again and pushed her over a snow bank toward t h e r i v e r . After they had reached t h e r i v e r bank, he h i t her again and kicked her. A t t h i s p o i n t , according t o Briggs, t h e defendant threatened t o make her s w i m t h e r i v e r and a l s o attempted t o remove her pants. He took her p a n t s and p a n t i e s down and t o l d her he was going t o have sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with h e r . She did not r e s i s t because she was a f r a i d . Apparently because of t h e cold, he chose n o t t o have sex with her. He ordered her t o g e t dressed and follow him o r he would b e a t and/or k i l l her. After walking some d i s t a n c e , they stopped a t a house and asked f o r a r i d e back t o Missoula. The occupant of t h e house agreed t o g i v e them a r i d e and l a t e r t e s t i f i e d he n o t i c e d how b a d l y B r i g g s was b e a t e n b u t a c c e p t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t o r y about a bar brawl. H e o f f e r e d t o take Briggs t o t h e h o s p i t a l , b u t defendant s a i d s h e was h i s wife and he would take c a r e of her. When Briggs a r r i v e d back a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motel, she again requested t o be taken home. The d e f e n d a n t ' s wife was awake when they returned and t o l d Briggs t h a t she could not go home because she was too cold. The defendant and h i s wife removed the v i c t i m ' s c l o t h i n g and ordered her i n t o bed between them. When t h e defendant's wife l e f t t o go t o t h e bathroom, Briggs t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant forced her t o have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h him. D e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e l a t e r returned from t h e bathroom. When Briggs was s u r e they were both a s l e e p , she g o t o u t of bed and began looking f o r her c l o t h e s . She then, f o r t h e f i r s t time, r e a l i z e d t h a t Rodger Smalley was s l e e p i n g on t h e couch i n t h e room. When Smalley awoke, a t about 5:00 a.m., Briggs was looking f o r her c l o t h e s and asked Smalley t o take her home. H e refused because he d i d n ' t have a c a r . Briggs then waited f o r l i g h t enough t o f i n d her shoes. Once she found her shoes, she went t o a nearby shopping mall and c a l l e d her mother. Her brother picked her up. Upon seeing her c o n d i t i o n , he stopped on t h e way home and c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e . The p o l i c e m e t Briggs a t home and e s c o r t e d her t o t h e h o s p i t a l where she was examined by her physician. A t t r i a l her physician t e s t i f i e d t h a t Briggs was " i n a p r e t t y s o r r y s t a t e ' ' when he saw h e r . She was b a t t e r e d and bruised with hemorrhages on t h e s u r f a c e and white of t h e eye. She had d r i e d blood i n her nose, a c u t l i p and s c r a t c h e s on her neck. There were b r u i s e s l o c a t e d on her lower r i g h t r i b cage and on t h e i n s i d e of her r i g h t thigh. The X-rays showed t h a t t h e r e was a f r a c t u r e of t h e jaw on t h e r i g h t s i d e and t h e s i n u s i n her l e f t cheek had been o b l i t e r a t e d by blood and swelling. A p e l v i c examination was conducted. N o sperm was found i n t h e vaginal c a v i t y , but t h e r e were s i g n s of a narrow g e n i t a l i n j u r y . Before t h e t r i a l , t h e S t a t e moved f o r a p r o t e c t i v e order p r o h i b i t i n g r e f e r e n c e t o Br i g g s ' morals o r c h a s t i t y . The record shows only t h a t a d i s c u s s i o n was held i n chambers and t h a t t h e motion was taken under advisement. The record does not r e f l e c t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on t h e motion. Defense counsel gave n o t i c e t h a t defendant would use t h e defense of i n s a n i t y and made a motion f o r an order allowing defendant t o be examined by a p s y c h i a t r i s t of h i s own choice, paid by t h e S t a t e . Defendant had a l r e a d y been examined by one p s y c h i a t r i s t a t Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital. The motion was denied. A t t r i a l t h e main evidence presented by t h e S t a t e was t h e testimony of Briggs, t h e policeman who accompanied her t o t h e h o s p i t a l and her physician. The defense c a l l e d only two witnesses: d e f e n d a n t ' s previous a t t o r n e y t o r e b u t hearsay testimony concerning a conversation between defendant and t h e a t t o r n e y , and t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t who examined defendant a t Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital. The p s y c h i a t r i s t t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant had a below normal I .Q. of approximately 78 and t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct could be impaired because of h i s low m e n t a l i t y . Neither defendant nor h i s wife t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l . Defendant's counsel did n o t p r e s e n t any proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 8, a Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c - t i o n , was given t o t h e jury: " I n every crime or p u b l i c o f f e n s e t h e r e must e x i s t a union or j o i n t o p e r a t i o n of a c t and i n t e n t , or c r i m i n a l negligence. The i n t e n t o r i n t e n t i o n is manifested by t h e circum- s t a n c e s connected with t h e o f f e n s e and t h e sound mind and d i s c r e t i o n of t h e accused. " I n order t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e o f f e n s e charged i n t h i s case t h e i n t e n t a l l e g e d i n t h e Infor- mation is necessary t o be proved, but d i r e c t and p o s i t i v e testimony is not necessary t o prove t h e i n t e n t . I t may be i n f e r r e d from t h e evidence i f t h e r e a r e any f a c t s proved which s a t i s f y t h e jury, beyond a reasonable d o u b t , of its e x i s t e n c e . "The l a w a l s o presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a n y v o l u n t a r y act committed by him. The l a t t e r presumption, however, is termed a d i s p u t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n a n d may b e c o n t r o v e r t e d by o t h e r evidence." (Emphasis added.) Defendant was charged w i t h second d e g r e e a s s a u l t , r a p e and kidnapping. The j u r y r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on o n l y t h e a s s a u l t and r a p e c h a r g e s . Defense c o u n s e l made a motion f o r a new t r i a l which was d e n i e d . The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l a r e : 1. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l , d u e p r o c e s s and e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n were v i o l a t e d by t h e f a i l u r e t o a p p o i n t c o u n s e l and p r o p e r l y h e a r h i s a p p e a l ? 2. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l ? Because both i s s u e s must be answered a f f i r m a t i v e l y , w e r e v e r s e t h e judgment of t h e District C o u r t and remand f o r a new t r i a l , i f enough e v i d e n c e still e x i s t s . The i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t is whether o r n o t t o a p p l y c u r r e n t law. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t i f w e a p p l y c u r r e n t law we must do s o r e t r o a c t i v e l y . W e do n o t a g r e e . The q u e s t i o n of whether o r n o t a r u l e of l a w is t o b e a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y a r i s e s o n l y when c a s e s have been " f i n a l i z e d . " Cases a r e g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d " f i n a l i z e d " o n l y when t h e r e h a s been " a judgment of c o n v i c t i o n , s e n t e n c e and e x h a u s t i o n of r i g h t s of appeal." S t a t e v. Rogers ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 93 N.M. 519, 602 P.2d 616, 618. The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t is whether t h e S t a t e v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t s t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l , e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , and due p r o c e s s by summarily p r e v e n t i n g h i s i n i t i a l a t t e m p t t o a p p e a l . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Montana c o u r t system t o a p p o i n t counsel f o r him, when it was apparent he was i n d i g e n t and h i s t r i a l c o u r t counsel was not pursuing h i s case, was a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s . The S t a t e contends t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s " t r i a l s and t r i b u l a t i o n s " i n o b t a i n i n g an appeal a r e i r r e l e v a n t and t h a t t h e only i s s u e s before t h i s Court a r e i s s u e s t h a t would have been presented i n an immediate appeal of t h i s case. I f t h i s Court were t o follow t h e S t a t e ' s reasoning, we would be blinding o u r s e l v e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t during t h e t e n y e a r s defendant s a t i n p r i s o n h i s r i g h t s were being v i o l a t e d . To say t h a t those t e n y e a r s a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e case before us is t o ignore a long l i n e of United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c a s e s and F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a s e s acknowledging t h a t n e i t h e r an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t nor t r i a l counsel may "sabotage" an appeal by i n a c t i o n , even i f t h e appeal is thought t o be without m e r i t . See, M i l l e r v. McCarthy ( 9 t h Cir. 1979), 607 F.2d 854, 857, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . I n t h e landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U . S . 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, t h e Supreme Court c o n c l u d e d t h a t a p p o i n t m e n t of c o u n s e l f o r an i n d i g e n t criminal defendant was a "fundamental r i g h t , e s s e n t i a l t o a f a i r t r i a l , " and t h a t t h e Fourteenth Amendment r e q u i r e s appointment of counsel i n a s t a t e c o u r t , j u s t a s t h e S i x t h Amendment r e q u i r e s it i n a f e d e r a l c o u r t . 372 U.S. a t 340. In a s i s t e r case, Douglas v. C a l i f o r n i a (1963), 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, t h e Court applied t h e Gideon h o l d i n g t o t h e a p p e l l a t e p r o c e s s , s t a t i n g t h a t " f e d e r a l c o u r t s must honor h i s [ t h e i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t ' s ] request f o r counsel r e g a r d l e s s of what they think t h e m e r i t s of the case may be; and 'representation in the role of an advocate is required.' Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675." 372 U . S . at 357. The Court went on to apply this rule to the California Supreme Court, which had denied appellants' petitions for appeal without a hearing, stating: ". . . The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal, shows that the discrimination is not between ' possibly good and obviously bad cases,' but between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, re- search of the law, and marshalling of argu- ments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determina- tion that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal." 372 U.S. at 357. Under such case law, defendant, as an indigent, clearly had the right to have counsel on appeal. Nevertheless, an even more important question before this Court is whether the court system undermined his right to counsel by informally and summarily denying his appeal. Clearly, it has. In Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a case very similar to the one now before us. In Anders the court-appointed counsel for an indigent defendant thought there was no merit to the indigent's appeal. The appointed counsel wrote a letter to California's District Court of Appeals, expressing his opinion that the indigent's appeal was without merit. The California court affirmed the conviction after examining the record. The Supreme Court of t h e United S t a t e s s t a t e d t h a t such a procedure 'I. . .smacks of t h e treatment t h a t Eskridge received, which t h i s Court condemned, t h a t permitted a t r i a l judge t o withhold a tran- s c r i p t i f he found t h a t a defendant 'has been accorded a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l , and i n t h e C o u r t ' s opinion no grave o r p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r s occurred ,therein. ' Eskridge v. Wash- ington S t a t e Board, 357 U.S. 214, 215 (1958). Such a procedure, t h i s Court s a i d , 'cannot be an adequate s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e r i g h t t o f u l l , a p p e l l a t e review a v a i l a b l e t o a l l defendants who may not be a b l e t o a f f o r d such an expense . . ." 386 U.S. a t 742-743. The Court then went on t o o u t l i n e what procedures would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n such a case: "The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirement of substan- t i a l e q u a l i t y and f a i r process can only be a t t a i n e d where counsel a c t s i n t h e r o l e of an a c t i v e advocate i n behalf of h i s c l i e n t , a s opposed t o t h a t of amicus c u r i a e . The no- m e r i t l e t t e r and t h e procedure it t r i g g e r s do not reach t h a t d i g n i t y . Counsel should, and can w i t h honor and without c o n f l i c t , be of more a s s i s t a n c e t o h i s c l i e n t and t o t h e c o u r t . H i s r o l e a s advocate r e q u i r e s t h a t he support h i s c l i e n t ' s appeal t o t h e b e s t of h i s a b i l i t y . Of course, i f counsel f i n d s h i s c a s e t o be wholly f r i v o l o u s , a f t e r a con- s c i e n t i o u s examination of it, he should s o advise t h e c o u r t and request permission t o withdraw. That r e q u e s t must, however, be accompanied by a b r i e f r e f e r r i n g t o anything i n t h e record t h a t might arguably support t h e appeal. A copy of c o u n s e l ' s b r i e f should be furnished t h e i n d i g e n t and t i m e allowed him t o r a i s e any p o i n t s t h a t he chooses; t h e court--not counsel--then proceeds, a f t e r a f u l l examination of a l l t h e proceedings, t o decide whether t h e c a s e is wholly f r i v o l o u s . I f it s o f i n d s it may g r a n t c o u n s e l ' s r e q u e s t t o withdraw and dismiss t h e appeal i n s o f a r a s f e d e r a l requirements a r e concerned, or pro- ceed t o a d e c i s i o n on t h e m e r i t s , i f s t a t e law s o r e q u i r e s . O n t h e other hand, i f it f i n d s any of t h e l e g a l p o i n t s arguable on t h e i r m e r i t s (and t h e r e f o r e not f r i v o l o u s ) it must, p r i o r t o d e c i s i o n , a f f o r d t h e i n d i g e n t t h e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l t o a r g u e t h e appeal." 386 U.S. a t 744. Here, d e f e n d a n t ' s counsel n o t only believed defendant had no grounds f o r appeal, but a l s o t o l d defendant he had filed a notice of appeal when, in fact, he had not. More- over , defendantls appeal was prevented by this Court by an informal process condemned by the Anders Court. The State claims that all these errors have been cured because we now grant defendant his right to appeal. We cannot agree in light of the other errors arising out of defendant's trial; errors that include, most blatantly, the issuance of an improper Sandstrom-type instruction, and that cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial of the defendant. In Parker v . Crist (1980), - Mont. - , 621 P.2d 484, 37 St.Rep. 2048, this Court upheld a Sandstrom-type instruction identical to the one in this case. Our reason- ing was based on three grounds: (1) the instruction itself was a permissive inference and not a conclusive presumption; (2) the instructions as a whole made it clear that the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crimes charged; and (3) the error, if any, was harmless because the evidence of the requisite intent was overwhelming. 621 P.2d at 486-487. In State v . Lundblade (1981), Mont . , 625 P.2d 545, 38 St.Rep. 441, we limited our reasoning in Parker, stating ". . . we cannot say that the circumstances making the instruction permissible in Parker occurred in the instant case, nor do we know for certain that the United States Supreme Court would find this instruction to be constitutional in this case in light of Sandstrom v . Montana (1979), 442 U . S . 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 239." 625 P.2d at 549. Here, two of the alleviating factors listed in Parker do not exist. The instructions, as a whole, fail to place t h e f u l l burden of proof on t h e S t a t e , and t h e e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t is h a r d l y " o ~ e r w h e l m i n g . ~ ~ See a l s o , S t a t e v. Hamilton (1980)f - Mont. , 605 P.2d 1121, 37 St.Rep. 70, and S t a t e v. Dolan ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 620 P.2d 355, 37 St.Hep. 1860. Here, as i n S t a t e v. Kyle ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. I 628 P.2d 263, 38 St.Rep. 578Q, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d h a r m l e s s because t h e j u r y c o u l d have e a s i l y viewed t h e i n s t r u c t i o n as mandatory, and because m e n t a l s t a t e was a c r u c i a l f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was c l a i m i n g t h e i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e . Such an e r r o r , i n i t s e l f , is c a u s e f o r r e v e r s a l and remand. W e a l s o n o t e , however, t h a t t h e t r i a l i t s e l f d i d n o t meet t h e f a i r n e s s and due p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s p r o v i d e d f o r i n A r t . 11, S e c t i o n s 17 and 24, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s case is s i m i l a r t o S t a t e v. Mickelson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 489, 565 P.2d 308, where w e s t a t e d : ". . . The s e a r c h f o r t r u t h was less t h a n v i g o r o u s by c o u n s e l i n t h i s m a t t e r and t h i s w r i t e r f e e l s t h a t , p a r t i c u l a r l y on a bench t r i a l , t h e judge h a s t h e i n h e r e n t power, r i g h t and y e s , d u t y , t o s u a s p o n t e demand t h a t a s e a r c h f o r t h e t r u t h be e x h a u s t e d b e f o r e t h e matter be a c c e p t e d f o r d e c i s i o n . Otherwise, t h e d e f e n d a n t , as h e r e , h a s been d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l and due p r o c e s s under A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 24, 1 9 7 2 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . " 565 P.2d a t 311. W e t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e t h e judgment of t h e District Court. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t a new t r i a l would be i m p o s s i b l e because t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e was d e s t r o y e d i n 1979. Never- t h e l e s s , n o t knowing what e v i d e n c e still e x i s t s , w e remand t o g i v e t h e S t a t e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e t r y t h e r a p e case if s u f f i c i e n t evidence is a v a i l a b l e . T h i s is n o t t r u e of t h e assault case, as the six-year sentence i n that cause has long since been s a t i s f i e d . W e concur: ?&T?ji%&d *a Chief Justice ..