Title: Manis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 148, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 16, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GORDON L. MANIS
)
)  No.  148, 2000
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for New Castle County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  I.D. No. 9812000028
)
Plaintiff Below
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  August 7, 2001
Decided:  August 16, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 16th day of August, 2001, on consideration of the briefs of the
parties, it appears to the Court that:
1.
Gordon L. Manis pleaded guilty to Manslaughter and Driving
Under the Influence and the Superior Court sentenced him on January 7,
2000 to 30 months at Level V, 6 months at Level IV (Work Release) and 1
year at Level IV (Home Confinement). Manis then filed and the Superior
Court denied his Motion for Sentence Correction.1  On this appeal Manis
argues that because the Superior Court accepted a plea agreement he entered
                                          
1 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).
2
on June 7, 1999,2 which specified a sentence of “10 years at Level V
suspended after 30 months for probation,” the Superior Court erred when it
later imposed a sentence exceeding 30 months at Level V.  Manis contends
that the Superior Court must impose a sentence no greater than that provided
in the plea agreement.
2.
On March 13, 2001, after briefings and supplemental
memoranda, we remanded this case to the Superior Court asking whether it
sentenced Manis in excess of the Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement and if so
whether it should not impose a sentence no greater than that provided for in
the agreement.  The Superior Court issued a Report after Remand on May
21, 2001 explaining that it did not sentence Manis to a punishment greater
than that specified in the plea agreement.  Because we find that the Superior
Court’s report on remand accurately and persuasively explains that the Court
did sentence Manis within the terms of the plea agreement and its statutory
authority, we affirm.
3.
The facts in this case are simple but tragic.  On December 1,
1998, Manis caused a fatality in a motor vehicle collision at the intersection
of Routes 13 and 273.  Police arrested Manis at the scene.  On January 19,
1999, a Superior Court Grand Jury indicted Manis and charged him with:
                                          
2 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(1)(C).
3
Murder in the Second Degree; Driving a Vehicle While Under the Influence
of Alcohol and/or Drugs; Failure to have Required Insurance; and Driving
While License is Suspended.
4.
On June 7, 1999, Manis entered into a plea agreement pursuant
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(C).  This rule permits the parties to
“agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case,”
subject to approval by the Superior Court.  The parties’ plea agreement
provided that Manis would plead guilty to Manslaughter and Driving Under
the Influence and that a nolle prosequi would be entered as to all the
remaining charges.  The plea agreement further provided for a sentence of
“10 years Level V, suspended after 30 months for probation.”
5.
On October 7, 1999, the parties appeared for a plea in Superior
Court.  Manis pleaded guilty to manslaughter and driving under the
influence of alcohol.  The Superior Court did not impose a sentence at that
time; instead, the Superior Court ordered a presentence report.
6.
On January 7, 2000, Manis appeared for sentencing before a
Superior Court judge different from the one who presided at the October 7,
1999 hearing.  According to Manis, the second judge sentenced him to a
punishment in excess of what the parties had agreed to in the plea agreement
that the Superior Court had accepted during the October 7, 1999 hearing.
4
During this sentencing hearing, the Superior Court stated: “So the Court will
exercise its discretion and defer to the parties’ agreement with respect to
sentence.  That will mean two and a half years in prison.”  The Superior
Court then sentenced Manis to 30 months at Level V to be followed by 6
months at Level IV (Work Release), to be followed by 1 year at Level IV
(Home Confinement).  The Superior Court also revoked Manis’ driving
privileges for 15 years.
7.
On March 10, 2000, Manis filed a Motion for Sentence
Correction in an attempt to have his sentence reflect the verbatim sentence
contained in the plea agreement.  On March 28, 2000, The Superior Court
denied Manis’ motion and stated that “assuming without deciding that
[Manis’] sentence exceeds the Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, the Superior
Court is not bound by Rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreements.”3  Manis contends that
“given the parties’ Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, the Superior Court was
bound to impose a sentence no greater than that provided for in the plea
agreement once the Superior Court had accepted [it].”4
                                          
3 In this appeal, the State acknowledges that “any statements by the sentencing judge in
the post-sentencing proceedings that the trial court is not bound by the provisions of
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(C) are legally incorrect.”
4 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(3).  Rule 11(e)(3) states:
If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the parties
either after taking the plea where immediate sentencing is contemplated or
immediately prior to sentencing in cases where a presentence report has
5
8.
The issue in this case is whether the Superior Court accepted
the plea agreement on October 7, 1999 and then violated the terms of that
agreement when it sentenced Manis on January 7, 2000 to a punishment
greater than that provided in the plea agreement.  Manis contends that when
the parties presented the plea agreement to the Superior Court on October 7,
1999, the presiding Superior Court judge accepted the guilty plea and the
terms of the plea, which specified 10 years at Level V suspended after 30
months and probation.  According to Manis, the Superior Court judge
announced that he accepted the Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, entered
judgments of guilt, and ordered a presentence investigation.  Manis argues
that because he was then precluded from withdrawing his guilty plea, the
plea agreement became binding.
9.
The State refutes Manis’ argument that the Superior Court
accepted the plea agreement on October 7, 1999.  Rather, the State argues,
the Superior Court accepted only Manis’ guilty plea at that hearing.  Because
the Superior Court did not accept the plea agreement on October 7, 1999, it
did not violate the terms of the plea agreement when it later sentenced Manis
on January 7, 2000.  Moreover, the State refutes Manis’ argument that once
                                                                                                                             
been ordered that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the
disposition provided for in the plea agreement.  Nothing stated herein
6
he entered a guilty plea, he was legally unable to withdraw, arguing that
until the Superior Court expressly accepted the agreement, Manis was free to
withdraw.5
10.
In its Report after Remand, the Superior Court explained that
the Superior Court judge who presided over the October 7, 1999 hearing
neither “defer[ed] to the parties’ agreement with respect to sentencing” nor
“announce[ed] his acceptance of the Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement.”6
Instead, in its report, the Superior Court explained that the “presiding judge
entered findings of guilt but deferred accepting or rejecting the plea
agreement until there was an opportunity to consider the presentence report.”
In fact, the “presiding judge did not intend, much less promise, to defer to
the plea agreement.  Furthermore, the presiding judge specifically left open
the possibility that [Manis] would serve the mandatory prison sentence ‘and
whatever else the Court may impose.’”
11.
In its report, the Superior Court explained that during the
January 7, 2000 sentencing hearing the presiding judge “incorrectly
attributed to the judge who presided over the plea colloquy” the language
                                                                                                                             
precludes the court from thereafter reducing the sentence imposed
pursuant to Rule 35(b) of these rules or 11 Del. C. § 4217.
5 In its Supplemental Memorandum, the State argues Manis acquiesced by failing to
timely withdraw his guilty plea.
6 Report on Remand page 2-3.
7
that the court would defer to the parties’ agreement.  The Superior Court
clarified the remark, explaining that the phrase was meant to be literal, that it
applied only to the amount of time the court would impose at Level V.  The
phrase was not meant to apply to Manis’ entire sentence.  The Superior
Court explained that the plea agreement does not mention Level IV
supervision.  The agreement could have accounted for descending levels of
supervision and/or specifically excluded Level IV supervision.
12.
The Superior Court noted in its report that during an office
conference held on February 14, 2000, Manis’ primary concern was that his
imprisonment might exceed 30 months while he awaited placement at Level
IV supervision for work release.  At that point the Superior Court modified
Manis’ sentence so that all Level IV time would be spent at home
confinement.  Manis did not object to this modification on the theory that it
violated the plea agreement nor did he attempt to withdraw from the plea
agreement – an option which the Superior Court then offered Manis.7  Manis
also did not request reargument.  He then filed this appeal.
13.
The Superior Court concluded that Level IV supervision is not
Level V imprisonment and that the sentence imposing home confinement
did not exceed the Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement.  The Superior Court
                                          
7 See report pat 6-7.
8
concluded that although the sentencing order might necessitate Manis
holding at Level V for more than 30 months while he waited for the
necessary equipment for home confinement, Manis could seek a sentence
modification when and if the situation arises.
14.
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for correction of
sentence pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a) for an abuse of discretion.8
Errors of law are reviewed de novo.  Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(2)
provides, in part: “If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision
(e)(1)(C), the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its
decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity
to consider the presentence report.”  Absent fraud on the court, a plea
agreement under the rule is binding on the Superior Court once it is accepted
by the Superior Court.9
15.
In this case, the Superior Court explained that language, which
left the impression that that the Superior court accepted the plea agreement,
was mistakenly attributed to the Superior Court judge presiding at the
                                          
8 See Hamilton v. State, Del. Supr., 285 A.2d 807, 808 (1971); Shy v. State, Del. Supr.,
246 A.2d 926, 927 (1968).
9 Conversely, this Court has held that the Superior Court is not bound by plea agreements
it has not accepted. Sommerville v. State, Del. Supr., 703 A.2d 629, 633 (1997).  Superior
Court Rule 11(e)(1)(C) is based upon a corresponding provision in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Federal rule was recently amended to clarify that while the court
retains absolute discretion whether to accept a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) Plea Agreement, “such a
9
October 7, 1999 hearing.  In addition, because the agreement neither
included Level IV supervision nor explicitly excluded it, the Superior Court
did not violate the terms of the plea agreement.
16.
The Superior Court’s order is consistent with the plea
agreement and current sentencing practice.  Level IV is not imprisonment
but a less intense level of supervision than Level V and a more intense level
of supervision than Level III.  Sentencing now places people at appropriate
“levels of supervision” and generic references to “probation” have only
historic meaning.  A sentencing order is now crafted to reflect the intensity
of supervision necessary and the resources available to devote to the
appropriate level of supervision.  Therefore, the Superior Court, on remand,
correctly concluded that “when the Court sentenced defendant to home
confinement, it did not exceed the Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea agreement.”
17.
The plea agreement provided for 10 years at Level V suspended
after 30 months.  It appears that Manis’ original concern was that it is not
unusual for defendants to be held at Level V until “space becomes available”
at Level IV, halfway house or home confinement for supervision or
treatment (work release, a  specific drug alcohol treatment center or
program, etc.).  Here, the concern apparently was the probability that he
                                                                                                                             
plea agreement is binding on the court once it is accepted by the court.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
10
could be held at Level V beyond the 30 months called for in the plea
agreement while he waited for work release to become available (usually
through a Level IV halfway house facility).  The court modified the sentence
to Level IV home confinement instead of Level IV halfway house.  While
Manis would still be held at Level V pending the availability of the home
confinement equipment and supervision, the sentencing judge noted that the
current wait was “about two week[s].”  Manis also was on notice that “the
hold order” could result in Level V supervision beyond the agreement if he
had to wait for space at the halfway house or equipment availability for
home confinement.  The plea agreement could have specifically covered
those considerations, but did not.
18.
Finally, Manis overlooks the statutory requirements of 11 Del.
C. § 4204(l), which states that
“[w]henever a court imposes a period of incarceration at Level
V custody for 1 or more offenses that totals 1 year or more,
then that court must include as part of its sentence a period of
custodial supervision at either Level IV, III or II for a period of
not less than 6 months to facilitate the transition of the
individual back into society.  The 6-month transition period
required by this subsection may, at the discretion of the court,
be in addition to the maximum sentence of imprisonment
established by the statute.”
                                                                                                                             
11(e)(1)(C); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note.
11
In this case, after reviewing the presentence report, the Superior Court
determined that it was an unacceptable risk to take Manis directly
from Level V to Level III.  The Superior Court imposed Level IV
supervision for follow-up treatment and supervision during the hours
Manis was not at work.  This determination is well within an
acceptable rational range of the court’s discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of
the Superior Court be, and the same here by is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele_________
Justice