Title: Hales v. Scott
Citation: 473 So. 2d 1028
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 1985

473 So. 2d 1028 (1985)
Philip HALES and Dorothy Hales
v.
H. K. SCOTT.
83-1165.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 21, 1985.
*1029 Charles A. McGee, Fort Payne, for appellants.
Robert W. Hanson, Albertville, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This case concerns a suit seeking sale of real property for division of the proceeds. At issue is whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict for appellants Dorothy and Philip Hales on the ground that the appellee, H.K. Scott, allegedly failed to prove an ownership interest in the property.
Scott filed suit seeking a sale of certain real property for division of proceeds, alleging that he was the owner of an undivided 9/10 interest in property and that the Haleses were the owners of an undivided 1/10 interest in the property. Scott claimed his ownership interest by having purchased the subject property at a mortgage foreclosure sale.
As proof of ownership, Scott testified, on direct examination, that he was the owner of a 9/10 interest in the property. Scott offered into evidence proceedings in the case of Truman Hicks, et al. v. Philip Hales and Dorothy Hales, et al., CV-77-500044, which, it appears, involved the same property and was tried in the same court as that in which this proceeding was held. The Haleses contend that the record of the former proceeding was not admitted into evidence. The present record shows the following with regard to the former proceeding:
The trial court, in its final decree in this case, found as follows:
The Haleses appeal here contending that the court erroneously took judicial notice of the prior proceeding. The record of the prior proceeding is not a part of the record before us.
We note first that the Haleses' motion for a directed verdict was not the proper motion. Because this was a non-jury case, the proper motion should have been for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. Feaster v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 399, 401 (Ala.1982); Chaney v. General Motors Corporation, 348 So. 2d 799 (Ala.Civ.App. 1977). Rule 41(b), in pertinent part, provides as follows:
We will treat the demand and trial court order as a Rule 41(b) motion and ruling, even though a Rule 41(b) motion is not the same as a Rule 50 motion. In comparing a Rule 41(b) motion to a motion for a directed verdict, the Chaney court stated, "A Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss is not the equivalent to a Rule 50 motion for a directed verdict, nor is the role of the trial *1031 court the same." Chaney, supra, at 801. The committee comments to Rule 41 elaborate on this distinction, as follows:
Ala.R.Civ.P. 41(b), committee comments, citing O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 293 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.1961).
This rule must be read in conjunction with the ore tenus rule. Thus, the trial court's ruling in a non-jury case need only be supported by credible evidence and will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous or palpably wrong or unjust. Peterson v. Jefferson County, 372 So. 2d 839 (Ala.1979).
Because the trial judge, in this decree, stated that he was taking judicial notice of the prior proceeding, we will address that question.
The law regarding when a circuit court may take judicial notice of judicial proceedings has been summarized in McElroy's Alabama Evidence, as follows:
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 484.02(2) (3d ed. 1977) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
In the case at hand, the former proceeding was not referred to in the pleadings, but we find that not to be fatal.
Here, the plaintiff's lawyer offered in evidence the court file that contained the only evidence of plaintiff's ownership of the subject property. When the defendants' lawyer asked to see the file, he was told that "[the clerk] can't seem to be able to find that file right now." Defendants' lawyer replied, "Judge, we can get it later. We'll go ahead and proceed." With this offer from the defendants' lawyer to get the file later, plaintiff's lawyer then rested his case; and, immediately, the defendants' lawyer moved for a "directed verdict" based on the lack of evidencethe very evidence not yet before the court, but which counsel had just agreed could be supplied later. In this posture, appellants cannot now be heard to complain that the trial court erred in denying their motion for dismissal. In spite of the trial judge's error in "taking judicial knowledge" of the proffered record of the prior proceeding, the judgment appealed from is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.