Title: Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. New Mexico St. Corp. Com'n
Citation: 516 P.2d 689, 85 N.M. 718
Docket Number: 9637
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 1973

516 P.2d 689 (1973) 85 N.M. 718 GROENDYKE TRANSPORT, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, Columbus Ferguson, Chairman, Floyd Cross and John Abraham, Commissioners, Defendants-Appellees, v. E.B. Law &amp; Son, Inc., Defendant-in-Intervention-Appellee. No. 9637. Supreme Court of New Mexico. November 9, 1973. Rehearing Denied December 13, 1973. *690 Girand &amp; Richards, W.D. Girand, Hobbs, for plaintiff-appellant. David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Thomas Patrick Whelan, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for State Corp. Comm. Jones, Gallegos, Snead &amp; Wertheim, J.E. Gallegos, Santa Fe, for E.B. Law &amp; Son. MONTOYA, Justice. Appellant Groendyke Transport, Inc. (Groendyke) in 1965 filed a petition with appellee New Mexico State Corporation Commission (Commission) attacking the validity and issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity No. 895-1 held by intervenor-appellee E.B. Law &amp; Son, Inc. (Law), which was issued after a hearing held by the Commission on December 14, 1950. Groendyke's complaint, that there was insufficient notice for the granting of such authority, was dismissed on a motion filed in behalf of Law by the Commission, which action was, upon appeal, affirmed by the District Court of Santa Fe County on March 29, 1966. Upon appeal to this court, we reversed and remanded the case back to the district court with direction to remand back to the Commission, overruling the motion to dismiss. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. New Mexico St. Corp. Com'n, 80 N.M. 509, 458 P.2d 584 (1969). Thereafter, the Commission held hearings and, on September 10, 1970, again dismissed Groendyke's complaint and, again upon appeal, the District Court of Santa Fe County affirmed the Commission's dismissal. This appeal followed. Groendyke contends on appeal: (1) The order of the Commission dated March 29, 1966, is unlawful, unreasonable arbitrary and capricious, and the certificate in the form which it is now held by Law is void for the reason that it was issued without notice or hearing. (2) Law is legally bound by the stipulation which it entered into on December 5, 1950, that crude oil would be excluded from its application. (3) The September 10, 1970, order dismissing Groendyke's complaint was erroneous in holding that the doctrine of laches was applicable and that Groendyke lacked standing to litigate this cause. On November 2, 1950, Law filed an application with the Commission seeking authority to act as a common carrier as follows: Subsequently, the Commission issued public notice for a hearing to be held November 17, 1950, on the Law application, which reads as follows: At the time of the Law application, there was no other motor common carrier authorized to transport, on a statewide basis, the commodities produced from petroleum. Law and his main competitor, Ferguson-Steere Motor Co., joined in applying for statewide authority. However, Ferguson-Steere's existing certificate used the commodity description "petroleum and petroleum products" and its application used that wording. After Law and Ferguson-Steere filed, two other tank truck operators also applied. They both used wording similar to the Ferguson-Steere application. Thus, there developed the situation of four-tank-truck carriers asking for the same geographical authority and all applications being set for hearing at the same time and place. Notice was then given for the hearing to be held November 17, 1950, which setting was actually postponed to December 5, 1950, at the same time and place set for the November 17th hearing. Notification was sent to all interested parties. Thereafter, on December 14, 1950, the Commission authorized the issuance of a new certificate of public convenience and necessity to Law, authorizing the following: In his first point Groendyke relies upon the language of Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. New Mexico St. Corp. Com'n, supra, where we stated (80 N.M. at 511, 458 P.2d at 586): Groendyke, in its brief in chief, states: *692 In the Groendyke case, supra, we were concerned with the affirming by the district court of the order by the Commission granting a motion to dismiss on the pleadings before the Commission. The order of March 29, 1966, stated that "The Complaint fails to state grounds upon which relief may be granted * * *." That order was based only on the alleged facts contained in Groendyke's complaint. The applicable rule and, therefore, the rule presumably followed by the Commission and the reviewing courts, is to accept for purposes of the motion to dismiss as true all facts well pleaded and question only whether Groendyke might prevail under any state of facts provable under the claim. Jones v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 72 N.M. 322, 383 P.2d 571 (1963), and Jernigan v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 69 N.M. 336, 367 P.2d 519 (1961), cited with approval in Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966). On that basis we held that a claim for relief was stated and said (80 N.M. at 511, 458 P.2d at 586), In other words, the effect of our order was to reverse and remand to the Commission for a hearing on the merits. The question with which we were concerned on the first appeal in Groendyke (80 N.M. 509, 458 P.2d 584), was that of the inadequacy of the content of the notice to support the order finally entered by the Commission. That question was resolved by this court on the basis of the pleadings only before the Commission. We do not feel that it was necessary or proper under the narrow issue presented on that first appeal to discuss the distinction between the transportation of gas and oil and the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products. All we were concerned with was whether the allegations made by Groendyke before the Commission relating to notice, which had been attacked by a motion to dismiss submitted by Law, stated a provable claim under the facts admitted by the motion to dismiss. Thus, the following language in that opinion (80 N.M. at 511, 458 P.2d at 586), being dicta, is not controlling in a resolution of the issues now present in this case after a hearing of the cause on the merits before the Commission. It is to be further noted that, in support of the above quoted language, we referred to an order of the Commission dated May 11, 1959, and the application, notice and hearing which is the subject of this appeal occurred in 1950. On appeal from the Commission's order, the trial court was limited to a determination of the single issue of whether the *693 Commission's order was lawful and reasonable, i.e., whether the Commission's order was supported by substantial evidence. Western Oil Transportation Co. v. State Corp. Com'n, 67 N.M. 380, 355 P.2d 923 (1960); Transcontinental Bus System v. State Corp. Com'n, 67 N.M. 56, 352 P.2d 245 (1959). The issue on appeal here is the same as in the trial court, viz., whether the evidence before the Commission, and upon which its order was based, is substantial in character. Id. Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Company, 78 N.M. 86, 89, 428 P.2d 625, 628 (1967). Rinker v. State Corporation Commission, 84 N.M. 626, 627, 506 P.2d 783, 784 (1973), citing with approval from Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Company, supra. The record in the instant case discloses that interested parties who had an objection to the application did appear and participated in all the cases, except that Law and Ferguson-Steere, by agreement, did not protest each other. The same parties who were alerted to and cared to protest the application, using the words "petroleum and petroleum products," protested the Law application, using the words "gas, oil and water." There was also testimony to support the following findings of the Commission dated September 10, 1970: Judged by the foregoing standards, we hold that the findings of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence. See also Tome Land &amp; Improvement Co. v. Silva, 83 N.M. 549, 494 P.2d 962 (1972); McCauley v. Ray, 80 N.M. 171, 453 P.2d 192 (1968). The second point alleged by Groendyke is that Law is bound by the stipulation entered into on December 5, 1950, whereby Law specifically agreed that *694 crude oil would be excluded from its application. This issue was not raised in the district court. It is fundamental that matters not brought into issue by the pleadings and upon which no decision of the trial court was sought, or fairly invoked, cannot be raised on appeal. McNabb v. Warren, 83 N.M. 247, 490 P.2d 964 (1971); Supreme Court Rule 20(1), (2), (§ 21-2-1(20)(1), (2), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., Repl. Vol. 4, 1970). In view of the foregoing, it is deemed unnecessary to rule on Groendyke's third point. The decision of the district court, affirming the Commission's September 10, 1970, dismissal of Groendyke's complaint, is affirmed. It is so ordered. OMAN and MARTINEZ, JJ., concur.