Title: Ex Parte King
Citation: 564 So. 2d 928
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1990

564 So. 2d 928 (1990)
Ex parte John Wesley KING and Joey Thomas King.
Re John Wesley King and Joey Thomas King
v.
State.
89-257.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 22, 1990.
*929 W. Gregory Hughes, Mobile, for petitioners.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and P. David Bjurberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
JONES, Justice.
We granted the writ of certiorari to take a closer look at the petitioners' argument that the "trial court erred in consolidating the defendants' cases for trial in the absence of the defendant, Joey King." In support of their argument, the petitioners seize upon the last sentence found in Rule 15.4(b), Temporary Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule provides as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
The record tends to show the following: In May 1986, the defendants were separately indicted for first degree robbery. Code 1975, § 13A-5-9. Following a guilty verdict and a judgment thereon, an appeal was filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals. On December 4, 1987, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that a jury charge was defective. On April 1, 1988, this Court denied the State's petition for writ of certiorari.
On May 26, 1988, the State filed a motion to consolidate the defendants' cases on retrial. On July 1, 1988, a hearing was held on the State's motion. At that hearing, the defendants' lawyer made the following objection:
Subsequently thereto, the trial court granted the State's motion to consolidate. Both defendants were later convicted of first degree robbery and were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under the Habitual Felony Offender Act. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, without an opinion. 553 So. 2d 140 (1989).
*930 The dispositive issue is whether temporary Rule 15.4(b) requires that a defendant has the right to be present at a consolidation hearing, even in cases where that defendant is represented by counsel.
The petitioners insist that the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of this case is contrary to this Court's opinion in Ex parte Jones, 473 So. 2d 545 (Ala.1985), and its own opinion in Blackmon v. State, 487 So. 2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). We disagree. Jones's lawyer was not given notice of the State's motion to consolidate until after the hearing on the motion had taken place and the trial judge had ordered the consolidation.[2]
On the day of the trial, Jones's lawyer filed with the trial court a motion for severance based on the fact that neither he nor his client had received notice of the hearing on the motion to consolidate. At that time, the trial judge belatedly allowed Jones's lawyer the "opportunity to be heard." Subsequently thereto, the motion for severance was denied. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Jones v. State, 473 So. 2d 541 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). This Court granted the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari and subsequently reversed their convictions. See Ex parte Jones, 473 So. 2d 545 (Ala.1985). In Ex parte Jones, Justice Embry, speaking for a unanomous Court, explained the reasoning behind the reversal:
Id. at 546.
Subsequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in Blackmon v. State, 487 So. 2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), dealt with an alleged noncompliance with Rule 15.4(b) thusly:
(Emphasis added.)
This Court's opinion in Ex parte Jones and the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion in Blackmon v. State, while sound, provide, at best, only a modicum of support for the petitioners' position. Admittedly, both cases stress strict compliance with Rule 15.4(b), A.R.Cr.P.Temp.; however, we believe that the facts and circumstances underlying the present controversy are readily distinguishable from the facts and circumstances found in Ex parte Jones and Blackmon v. State and, thus, do not control this case.
*931 In Ex parte Stout, 547 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1989), this Court answered, in the affirmative, the question whether a defendant has the constitutional right to be present at a pretrial suppression hearing at which sworn testimony of a prosecution witness is taken. In so holding, this Court distinguished two cases relied upon by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Stout v. State, 547 So. 2d 894 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), as follows:
547 So. 2d  at 902-03. (Emphasis added.)
The linchpin of the Ex parte Stout decision is the principle that a defendant's right to be present and to confront adverse witnesses at an evidentiary hearing is constitutionally protected. Here, however, as was the case in Maund and Johnson, supra, the consolidation hearing necessitated only arguments of law. Hence, this Court's opinion in Ex parte Stout, supra, is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
In the instant case, both defendants were represented by the same lawyer at the consolidation hearing. A review of the record reveals that the lawyer fully appreciated the ramifications of consolidation and, in fact, did an admirable job in arguing the applicable law and asserting viable reasons why consolidation would not be in either of his clients' best interests. Hence, we are clear to the conclusion that the defendants, speaking through their lawyer, were afforded an "opportunity to be heard." In essence, if a defendant is represented by his lawyer at a consolidation hearing, the "opportunity to be heard" requirement set out in Rule 15.4(b) is satisfied. If, on the other hand, a defendant is proceeding pro se, Rule 15.4(b) would demand that defendant's presence at the consolidation hearing.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  No objection was made on behalf of John Wesley King, because he was out on bond and apparently had voluntarily chosen not to attend the hearing.
[2]  The attorney for co-defendant Bryant was present for the hearing only because he happened to be in the courthouse at that time on another case.