Title: STATE v LAHR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13134
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 24, 1977

No. 13131a IN THE SUPREI.tE CGURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- H A R O L D CHESTER LABR, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Bradley B. P a r r i s h argued, Lewistown, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Michael Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Mayo Ashley, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana W i l l i a m Spoja, Jr., County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana Robert L. Knopp, Deputy County A t t o r n e y , appeared, Lewistown, Montana Submitted: January 2 1 , 1977 , - - - r Decided: -E& 24 1 9 n Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns probable cause for an arrest for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The district court,Fergus County, after hearing on a motion to suppress held sufficient probable cause existed for the arrest. Thereafter defendant Harold Lahr was tried and convicted of the charge. On the evening of September 7, 1974, defendant Harold C. Lahr and Richard Biehl drove from Moore, Montana to Denton, Montana in Lahr's automobile. Sheriff's Lleputy David Sirucek was on duty in Denton that evening and noticed Lahr and Biehl as they entered town. Sirucek, who had positioned himself nearby, observed Lahr and Biehl conversing with one John Linse. Deputy Sirucek was aware of Linse's previous drug related arrests, Using binoculars, Deputy Sirucek observed what he believed to be a transaction take place between the parties. Sirucek testified that a package appeared to change hands, however, he had no idea what kind of package, only that the circumstances were somewhat suspicious. Lahr and Biehl left Denton soon after their conversation with Linse and proceeded toward Lewistown, Montana. Deputy Sirucek then radioed Deputy Randle Cordle in Lewistown and informed him of the suspicious transaction. He asked Cordle to "pick them up when they came into Lewistown to see what they were up to." Deputy Cordle positioned his unmarked patrol car approx- imately four to five miles outside Lewistown and waited for the Lahr vehicle. As the Lahr vehicle approached Lewistown, Deputy Cordle followed the car for approximately three miles at a dis- tance of one to four car lengths. Lahr testified he considered the vehicle following him so closely a dangerous s i t u a t i o n and attempted t o have t h a t vehicle pass him. He further t e s t i f i e d he slowed and waved f o r t h e following vehicle t o pass. Deputy Cordle t e s t i f i e d t h a t while following the Lahr vehicle he observed it swerve over t h e center l i n e of the highway twice and go onto t h e shoulder three times. Cordle s t a t e d he con- sidered Lahr's manner of driving reckless i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h e c a r s were only traveling from 35 t o 40 miles per hour, so he dis- played h i s flashing red l i g h t and Lahr pulled t o the side of the road. Both Deputy Cordle and Lahr alighted from t h e i r vehicles and Deputy Cordle asked t o see Lahr's d r i v e r ' s license. Lahr returned t o h i s car t o g e t h i s license. As he was r e t r i e v i n g it from h i s coat pocket, Deputy Cordle observed a quantity of what he believed t o be marijuana i n the console between the f r o n t s e a t s of Lahr's car. A t t h a t time Cordle placed Lahr and Biehl under a r r e s t f o r i l l e g a l possession of dangerous drugs. A t no time was Lahr charged with any driving violation. Lahr was found g u i l t y of i l l e g a l possession of dangerous drugs; Biehl was found not g u i l t y of t h a t charge. Whether there was probable cause f o r t h e a r r e s t i s t h e issue before t h i s Court on appeal. Section 95-608(d), R.C.M. 1947, provides the circumstances under which peace o f f i c e r s may make a warrantless a r r e s t , it s t a t e s : "A peace o f f i c e r may a r r e s t a person when: "* * * "(d) He believes. on reasonable grounds, t h a t t h e person i s committing an offense, o r t h a t the person has committed an offense and the existing circumstances require h i s immediate a r r e s t . I I See: State ex r e l . Glantz v. District Court, 154 Mont. 132, 461 P.2d 193; State v. Fetters and Lean, 165 Mont. 117, 123, 526 P.2d 122; State v. Bennett, 158 Mont. 496, 493 P.2d 1077. However, the validity of an a r r e s t under section 95-608(d), is determined by the presence of probable cause. In Fetters and Lean the Court stated the well-established rule i n Montana: "Whether the arrests a r e valid depends, i n turn, upon whether a t the moment the arrests were made the officers had probable cause- i . e . whether a t that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information were sufficient t o warrant a prudent man i n believing defendants had committed o r were committing an offense and the circum- stances required their immediate arrests. Section 95- 608(d), R,C.M. 1947; State v. Bennett, supra; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 ." It i s clear that neither Deputy Sirucek nor Deputy Cordle had probable cause t o a r r e s t Lahr. Deputy Sirucek had a suspicion that an i l l e g a l transaction had taken place i n Denton, but nothing more. O n cross-examination a t a hearing on a motion t o suppress he t e s t i f i e d : "Q. You saw what you thought was a suspicious trans- action and you--why didn't you a r r e s t them i f you thought something was going on? A. I had no grounds for an arrest. "Q. You had no grounds for an a r r e s t ? A. N o sir. "Q. And yet you called Officer Cordle and said there was something suspicious? A. Yes, s i r . I t Deputy Cordle t e s t i f i e d he i n i t i a l l y stopped Lahr for a driving violation, however a t r a f f i c c i t a t i o n was never issued. Clearly, the t r a f f i c stop was merely a pretext used by Deputy Cordle t o follow up on the c a l l received from Deputy Sirucek. Eence, Deputy Cordle was also acting on a mere suspicion. The evidence required t o establish g u i l t i s not necessary to prove probable cause for an a r r e s t , however good f a i t h o r mere suspicion on the part of arresting officers is not enough. State v. Fetters and Lean, supra; State ex r e l . Wong You v. District Court, 106 Mont. 347, 78 P.2d 353. Furthermore, an a r r e s t i s not justified by what the subsequent search discloses. State v. Fetters and Lean, supra; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L A ed 2d 134; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L ed 543. W e reverse on the grounds of lack of probable cause for the arrest. Justices. J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d i s s e n t i n g : I n m y view t h e conviction should be affirmed. The a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e dangerous drugs and smoking paraphernalia depends on whose version of t h e f a c t s i s accepted, Deputy Cordle's o r defendant's. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t must have accepted Deputy Cordle's version o r t h e c o u r t would not have denied t h e defend- a n t ' s motion t o suppress. This Court should not r e v e r s e t h i s implied f a c t u a l finding based on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , though c o n f l i c t - ing,evidence. I f t h e r e is no c l e a r preponderance of evidence a g a i n s t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f a c t u a l determination, it should not be disturbed on appeal. Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corporation, Mont. , 541 P.2d 56, 32 St.Rep. 963, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . A s I see it, t h e events i n Denton a r e i r r e l e v a n t and f u r n i s h no b a s i s f o r stopping defendant's c a r . But according t o Deputy Cordle t h e defendant's v e h i c l e t w i c e swerved over t h e c e n t e r l i n e and t h r e e times went onto t h e shoulder of t h e road i n Deputy Cordle's presence. This gave Deputy Cordle a r i g h t t o s t o p t h e v e h i c l e and ask t o see t h e defendant's d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . I n t h i s process Deputy Cordle observed i n p l a i n view t h e two roaches of marijuana c i g a r e t t e s , a f i l m c a n n i s t e r used t o contain marijuana, and a hash pipe. Thereafter he placed t h e defendant under a r r e s t . The majority c i t e s e c t i o n 95-605(d), R.C.M. 1947, a s amended, a s d e t a i l i n g t h e circumstances under which an o f f i c e r may make a warrantless a r r e s t . One of t h e s e circumstances is where, a s here, an o f f e n s e i s committed i n t h e o f f i c e r ' s presence. Normal p o l i c e procedure i n c i d e n t t o a t r a f f i c s t o p i s a r e q u e s t t o see t h e person's driver's l i c e n s e . During t h i s process Deputy Cordle observed t h e dangerous drugs i n p l a i n view. A t t h i s p o i n t he had probable cause t o a r r e s t t h e defendant. This i s i n accord with our holding i n S t a t e v. F e t t e r s and Lean and - 6 - the other cases cited by the majority. The majority point out that the defendant was never arrested on the traffic charge and therefore conclude that the traffic offense either did not occur or that it was a mere subterfuge to get a look in defendant's car. This is pure supposition, in my view, as common experience demonstrates that in many cases where a second more serious crime is discovered while investigating a lesser offense, the person is frequently not charged with the lesser offense. What the majority have done here is accept the version of defendant that his erratic driving was the result of tail- gating by Deputy Cordle in preference to Deputy Cordle's version to the contrary. In so doing they have made an independent factual determination contrary to that made by the district court in denying defendant's motion to suppress. For these reasons I respectively dissent. Justice