Title: State v. Loomis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP000157-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2016

2016 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP157-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Eric L. Loomis, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 5, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Scott L. Horne 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by Michael 
D. Rosenberg and Community Justice, Inc., Madison, and oral 
argument by Michael D. Rosenberg. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2015AP157-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2012CF75 & 2013CF98)            
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric L. Loomis, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   In 2007, the Conference of 
Chief Justices adopted a resolution entitled "In Support of 
Sentencing Practices that Promote Public Safety and Reduce 
Recidivism."1  It emphasized that the judiciary "has a vital role 
to 
play 
in 
ensuring 
that 
criminal 
justice 
systems 
work 
                                                 
1 Conference of Chief Justices, Conference of State Court 
Administrators, National Center for State Courts, Resolution 12: 
In Support of Sentencing Practices that Promote Public Safety 
and 
Reduce 
Recidivism 
(August 
1, 
2007), 
http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctcomm/id/139. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
2 
 
effectively and efficiently to protect the public by reducing 
recidivism and holding offenders accountable."2  The conference 
committed to "support state efforts to adopt sentencing and 
corrections policies and programs based on the best research 
evidence of practices shown to be effective in reducing 
recidivism."3 
¶2 
Likewise, the American Bar Association has urged 
states to adopt risk assessment tools in an effort to reduce 
recidivism and increase public safety.4  It emphasized concerns 
relating 
to 
the 
incarceration 
of 
low-risk 
individuals, 
cautioning that the placement of low-risk offenders with medium 
and high-risk offenders may increase rather than decrease the 
risk of recidivism.5  Such exposure can lead to negative 
influences 
from 
higher 
risk 
offenders 
and 
actually 
be 
detrimental to the individual's efforts at rehabilitation.6 
¶3 
Initially risk assessment tools were used only by 
probation and parole departments to help determine the best 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, State 
Policy 
Implementation 
Project, 
18, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/crimin
al_justice/spip_handouts.authcheckdam.pdf. 
5 Id. at 19. 
6 Id. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
3 
 
supervision and treatment strategies for offenders.7  With 
nationwide focus on the need to reduce recidivism and the 
importance of evidence-based practices, the use of such tools 
has now expanded to sentencing.8  Yet, the use of these tools at 
sentencing is more complex because the sentencing decision has 
multiple purposes, only some of which are related to recidivism 
reduction.9 
¶4 
When 
analyzing 
the 
use 
of 
evidence-based 
risk 
assessment tools at sentencing, it is important to consider that 
tools such as COMPAS continue to change and evolve.10  The 
concerns we address today may very well be alleviated in the 
future.  It is incumbent upon the criminal justice system to 
recognize that in the coming months and years, additional 
research data will become available.  Different and better tools 
                                                 
7 Pamela M. Casey et al., National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC), Using Offender Risk and Needs Assessment Information at 
Sentencing:  Guidance for Courts from a National Working Group, 
at 1 (2011), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/ 
RNA%20Guide%20Final.ashx. 
 
8 See, e.g., National Center for State Courts (NCSC), 
Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court 
Administrators, Resolution 7:  In Support of the Guiding 
Principles on Using Risk and Needs Assessment Information in the 
Sentencing 
Process 
(2011), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Resolution-
7.ashx. 
9 Casey, 
Using 
Offender 
Risk 
and 
Needs 
Assessment 
Information at Sentencing, supra note 7, at 1. 
10 "COMPAS" stands for "Correctional Offender Management 
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions." 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
4 
 
may be developed.  As data changes, our use of evidence-based 
tools will have to change as well.  The justice system must keep 
up with the research and continuously assess the use of these 
tools. 
¶5 
Use of a particular evidence-based risk assessment 
tool at sentencing is the heart of the issue we address today.  
This case is before the court on certification from the court of 
appeals.11  Petitioner, Eric L. Loomis, appeals the circuit 
court's denial of his post-conviction motion requesting a 
resentencing hearing. 
¶6 
The court of appeals certified the specific question 
of whether the use of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing 
"violates a defendant's right to due process, either because the 
proprietary 
nature 
of 
COMPAS 
prevents 
defendants 
from 
challenging the COMPAS assessment's scientific validity, or 
because COMPAS assessments take gender into account."12 
¶7 
Loomis asserts that the circuit court's consideration 
of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing violates a defendant's 
right to due process.  Additionally he contends that the circuit 
                                                 
11 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2013-14), the 
court of appeals certified an appeal of an order of the Circuit 
Court for La Crosse County, Scott Horne J., presiding. 
12 We are also asked to review whether the court of appeals' 
decision in State v. Samsa, 2015 WI App 6, 359 Wis. 2d 580, 859 
N.W.2d 149, must be modified or overruled if this court 
determines that the right to due process prohibits consideration 
of  COMPAS risk assessments at sentencing.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we have not so determined and thus need not address 
this issue. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
5 
 
court erroneously exercised its discretion by assuming that the 
factual bases for the read-in charges were true. 
¶8 
Ultimately, 
we 
conclude 
that 
if 
used 
properly, 
observing the limitations and cautions set forth herein, a 
circuit court's consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at 
sentencing does not violate a defendant's right to due process. 
¶9 
We determine that because the circuit court explained 
that its consideration of the COMPAS risk scores was supported 
by other independent factors, its use was not determinative in 
deciding 
whether 
Loomis 
could 
be 
supervised 
safely 
and 
effectively in the community.  Therefore, the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion.  We further conclude 
that the circuit court's consideration of the read-in charges 
was not an erroneous exercise of discretion because it employed 
recognized legal standards. 
¶10 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court 
denying Loomis's motion for post-conviction relief requesting a 
resentencing hearing. 
I 
¶11 The facts of this case are not in dispute.  The State 
contends that Loomis was the driver in a drive-by shooting.  It 
charged him with five counts, all as a repeater:  (1) First-
degree recklessly endangering safety (PTAC); (2) Attempting to 
flee or elude a traffic officer (PTAC); (3) Operating a motor 
vehicle without the owner's consent; (4) Possession of a firearm 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
6 
 
by a felon (PTAC); (5) Possession of a short-barreled shotgun or 
rifle (PTAC).13 
¶12 Loomis denies involvement in the drive-by shooting.  
He waived his right to trial and entered a guilty plea to only 
two of the less severe charges, attempting to flee a traffic 
officer and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's 
consent.  The plea agreement stated that the other counts would 
be dismissed but read in: 
The other counts will be dismissed and read in for 
sentencing, although the defendant denies he had any 
role in the shooting, and only drove the car after the 
shooting occurred.  The State believes he was the 
driver of the car when the shooting happened. 
 
The State will leave any appropriate sentence to the 
Court's discretion, but will argue aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 
After accepting Loomis's plea, the circuit court ordered a 
presentence investigation.  The Presentence Investigation Report 
("PSI") included an attached COMPAS risk assessment. 
¶13 COMPAS is a risk-need assessment tool designed by 
Northpointe, 
Inc. 
to 
provide 
decisional 
support 
for 
the 
Department of Corrections when making placement decisions, 
managing offenders, and planning treatment.14  The COMPAS risk 
                                                 
13 "PTAC" refers to party to a crime. 
14 Northpointe, Inc., Practitioner's Guide to COMPAS Core, 
at 
1 
(Mar. 
19, 
2015), 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_ 
documents/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
7 
 
assessment 
is 
based 
upon 
information 
gathered 
from 
the 
defendant's criminal file and an interview with the defendant. 
¶14 A COMPAS report consists of a risk assessment designed 
to predict recidivism and a separate needs assessment for 
identifying program needs in areas such as employment, housing 
and substance abuse.15  The risk assessment portion of COMPAS 
generates risk scores displayed in the form of a bar chart, with 
three bars that represent pretrial recidivism risk, general 
recidivism risk, and violent recidivism risk.16  Each bar 
indicates a defendant's level of risk on a scale of one to ten.17 
¶15 As the PSI explains, risk scores are intended to 
predict the general likelihood that those with a similar history 
of offending are either less likely or more likely to commit 
another crime following release from custody.  However, the 
COMPAS risk assessment does not predict the specific likelihood 
that an individual offender will reoffend.  Instead, it provides 
a prediction based on a comparison of information about the 
individual to a similar data group. 
¶16 Loomis's 
COMPAS 
risk 
scores 
indicated 
that 
he 
presented a high risk of recidivism on all three bar charts.  
His PSI included a description of how the COMPAS risk assessment 
should be used and cautioned against its misuse, instructing 
                                                 
15 Id. at 12, 16. 
16 Id. at 3, 26. 
17 Id. at 8. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
8 
 
that it is to be used to identify offenders who could benefit 
from interventions and to target risk factors that should be 
addressed during supervision. 
¶17 The PSI also cautions that a COMPAS risk assessment 
should not be used to determine the severity of a sentence or 
whether an offender is incarcerated: 
For purposes of Evidence Based Sentencing, actuarial 
assessment tools are especially relevant to:  1. 
Identify 
offenders 
who 
should 
be 
targeted 
for 
interventions.  2. Identify dynamic risk factors to 
target with conditions of supervision.  3. It is very 
important to remember that risk scores are not 
intended to determine the severity of the sentence or 
whether an offender is incarcerated. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶18 At sentencing, the State argued that the circuit court 
should use the COMPAS report when determining an appropriate 
sentence: 
In addition, the COMPAS report that was completed in 
this case does show the high risk and the high needs 
of the defendant.  There's a high risk of violence, 
high risk of recidivism, high pre-trial risk; and so 
all 
of 
these 
are 
factors 
in 
determining 
the 
appropriate sentence. 
¶19 Ultimately, the circuit court referenced the COMPAS 
risk score along with other sentencing factors in ruling out 
probation: 
You're identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as 
an individual who is at high risk to the community. 
 
In terms of weighing the various factors, I'm ruling 
out probation because of the seriousness of the crime 
and because your history, your history on supervision, 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
9 
 
and the risk assessment tools that have been utilized, 
suggest that you're extremely high risk to re-offend. 
¶20 In addition to the COMPAS assessment, the circuit 
court considered the read-in charges at sentencing.  For 
sentencing purposes, it assumed that the factual bases for the 
read-in charges were true and that Loomis was at least involved 
in conduct underlying the read-in charges.  The circuit court 
explained further that Loomis "needs to understand that if these 
shooting related charges are being read in that I'm going to 
view that as a serious, aggravating factor at sentencing."  
Defense counsel protested the circuit court's assumption that 
the read-in charges were true and explained that Loomis did not 
concede that he was involved in the drive-by shooting. 
¶21 Although a review of the transcript of the plea 
hearing reveals miscommunications and uncertainty about the 
consequences of a dismissed but read-in offense, the circuit 
court ultimately quoted directly from a then-recent decision of 
this court explaining the nature of such a read-in offense.  It 
explained to Loomis that a circuit court can consider the read-
in offense at sentencing and that such consideration could 
increase a defendant’s sentence: 
 
The Court: Mr. Loomis, I just——there is a recent 
Supreme Court decision in State v. Frey that describes 
what a read-in offense is.  And I just want to quote 
from that decision so that you fully understand 
it. . . .  
 
"[T]he defendant exposes himself to the likelihood of 
a higher sentence within the sentencing range and the 
additional possibility of restitution for the offenses 
that are 'read in.'" 
 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
10 
 
So you're limited in this agreement to a sentencing 
range within——up to the maximums for the charges that 
you're pleading guilty.  You're agreeing, as the 
Supreme Court decision indicates, that the charges can 
be read in and considered, and that has the effect of 
increasing the likelihood, the likelihood of a higher 
sentence within the sentencing range.  You understand 
that? 
 
Loomis: Yes. 
¶22 The plea questionnaire/waiver of rights form stated 
that the maximum penalty Loomis faced for both charges was 
seventeen years and six months imprisonment.  The court 
sentenced him within the maximum on the two charges for which he 
entered a plea.18 
¶23 Loomis filed a motion for post-conviction relief 
requesting a new sentencing hearing.  He argued that the circuit 
court's 
consideration 
of 
the 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment 
at 
sentencing violated his due process rights.  Loomis further 
asserted that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by improperly assuming that the factual bases for the 
read-in charges were true. 
¶24 The circuit court held two hearings on the post-
conviction motion.  At the first hearing, the circuit court 
addressed Loomis's claim that it had erroneously exercised its 
                                                 
18 On the attempting to flee an officer charge, the circuit 
court sentenced Loomis to four years, with initial confinement 
of two years and extended supervision of two years.  For 
operating a vehicle without the owner's consent, the circuit 
court sentenced Loomis to seven years, with four years of 
initial confinement and three years of extended supervision, to 
be served consecutively with the prior sentence. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
11 
 
discretion 
in 
how 
it 
considered 
the 
read-in 
charges.  
Considering the relevant case law and legal standards, the 
circuit court concluded that it had applied the proper standard 
and denied Loomis's motion on that issue. 
¶25 During the first post-conviction motion hearing, the 
circuit court reviewed the plea hearing transcript and the 
sentencing transcript and explained that it did not believe 
Loomis's explanation: 
I felt Mr. Loomis's explanation was inconsistent with 
the facts.  The State's version was more consistent 
with the facts and gave greater weight to the State's 
version at sentencing. 
¶26 At the second hearing, the circuit court addressed the 
due process issues.  The defendant offered the testimony of an 
expert witness, Dr. David Thompson, regarding the use at 
sentencing of a COMPAS risk assessment.  Dr. Thompson opined 
that a COMPAS risk assessment should not be used for decisions 
regarding incarceration because a COMPAS risk assessment was not 
designed for such use.  According to Dr. Thompson, a circuit 
court's consideration at sentencing of the risk assessment 
portions of COMPAS runs a "tremendous risk of over estimating an 
individual's risk and . . . mistakenly sentencing them or basing 
their sentence on factors that may not apply . . . ." 
¶27 Dr. Thompson further testified that sentencing courts 
have very little information about how a COMPAS assessment 
analyzes the risk: 
The Court does not know how the COMPAS compares that 
individual's history with the population that it's 
comparing them with.  The Court doesn't even know 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
12 
 
whether that population is a Wisconsin population, a 
New 
York 
population, 
a 
California 
population. . . . There's all kinds of information 
that the court doesn't have, and what we're doing is 
we're mis-informing the court when we put these graphs 
in front of them and let them use it for sentence. 
¶28 In denying the post-conviction motion, the circuit 
court explained that it used the COMPAS risk assessment to 
corroborate its findings and that it would have imposed the same 
sentence regardless of whether it considered the COMPAS risk 
scores.  Loomis appealed and the court of appeals certified the 
appeal to this court. 
II 
¶29 Whether the circuit court's consideration of a COMPAS 
risk assessment violated Loomis's constitutional right to due 
process presents a question of law, which this court reviews 
independently of the determinations of a circuit court or a 
court of appeals.  See Jackson v. Buchler, 2010 WI 135, ¶39, 330 
Wis. 2d 279, 793 N.W.2d 826. 
¶30 "This court reviews sentencing decisions under the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard."  State v. Frey, 2012 
WI 99, ¶37, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436.  An erroneous 
exercise of discretion occurs when a circuit court imposes a 
sentence "without the underpinnings of an explained judicial 
reasoning process."  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971); see also State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶3, 
270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
¶31 Additionally, a sentencing court erroneously exercises 
its discretion when its sentencing decision is not based on the 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
13 
 
facts in the record or it misapplies the applicable law.  State 
v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶16, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491.  It 
misapplies the law when it relies on clearly irrelevant or 
improper factors.  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 278.  The defendant 
bears the burden of proving such reliance by clear and 
convincing evidence.  State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶3, 326 
Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409. 
 ¶32 In a similar manner we review the issue of whether a 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion when it 
relies on the factual basis of the read-in charge when 
fashioning the defendant's sentence.  Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 
¶¶37-39.  "A discretionary sentencing decision will be sustained 
if it is based upon the facts in the record and relies on the 
appropriate and applicable law."  Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶16. 
III 
¶33 At the outset we observe that the defendant is not 
challenging the use of a COMPAS risk assessment for decisions 
other than sentencing, and he is not challenging the use of the 
needs portion of the COMPAS report at sentencing.  Instead, 
Loomis challenges only the use of the risk assessment portion of 
the COMPAS report at sentencing.  
¶34 Specifically, Loomis asserts that the circuit court's 
use of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing violates a 
defendant's right to due process for three reasons:  (1) it 
violates a defendant's right to be sentenced based upon accurate 
information, in part because the proprietary nature of COMPAS 
prevents him from assessing its accuracy; (2) it violates a 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
14 
 
defendant's right to an individualized sentence; and (3) it 
improperly uses gendered assessments in sentencing. 
¶35 Although we ultimately conclude that a COMPAS risk 
assessment can be used at sentencing, we do so by circumscribing 
its use.  Importantly, we address how it can be used and what 
limitations and cautions a circuit court must observe in order 
to avoid potential due process violations. 
¶36 It is helpful to consider Loomis's due process 
arguments in the broader context of the evolution of evidence-
based sentencing.  Wisconsin has been at the forefront of 
advancing evidence-based practices.  In 2004, this court’s 
Planning 
and 
Policy 
Advisory 
Committee 
(PPAC) 
created 
a 
subcommittee "to explore and assess the effectiveness of 
policies and programs . . . designed to improve public safety 
and reduce incarceration."19 
¶37 From that initial charge, Wisconsin’s commitment to 
evidence-based practices and its leadership role have been well 
                                                 
19 Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Planning and Policy Advisory 
Committee (PPAC), Effective Justice Strategies Subcommittee, 
Phase I: June 2004——June 2007 Insights and Recommendations, at 
3-4, https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/programs/docs/phase1final 
report.pdf.  
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
15 
 
documented.20  Initially, a variety of risk and needs assessment 
tools were used by various jurisdictions within the state.  In 
2012, however, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections selected 
COMPAS as the statewide assessment tool for its correctional 
officers, providing assessment of risk probability for pretrial 
release misconduct and general recidivism.21 
¶38 The question of whether COMPAS can be used at 
sentencing has previously been addressed.  In State v. Samsa, 
2015 WI App 6, 359 Wis. 2d 580, 859 N.W.2d 149, the court of 
appeals approved of a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS 
assessment at sentencing.  However, it was not presented with 
the due process implications that we face here.  Citing to a 
principle for sentencing courts set forth in State v. Gallion, 
2002 WI App 265, ¶26, 258 Wis. 2d 473, 654 N.W.2d 446, aff'd, 
2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, the Samsa court 
                                                 
20 See generally Suzanne Tallarico et. al., National Center 
for State Courts (NCSC), Court Services Division, Effective 
Justice Strategies in Wisconsin: A Report of Findings and 
Recommendations 
(2012), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/programs/docs/ejsreport.pdf; 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Planning and Policy Advisory 
Committee (PPAC), Effective Justice Strategies Subcommittee, 
Phase 
II: 
Progress 
and 
Accomplishments 
(Nov. 
13, 
2013), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/programs/docs/finalreport.pdf; 
Casey, Using Offender Risk and Needs Assessment Information at 
Sentencing, supra note 7, at 41.  
21 Pamela M. Casey et al., National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC), Center for Sentencing Initiatives, Research Division, 
Use of Risk and Needs Assessment Information at Sentencing:  La 
Crosse 
County, 
Wisconsin 
at 
3 
(Jan. 
2014), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%20Brief%20-
%20La%20Crosse%20County%20WI%20csi.ashx. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
16 
 
emphasized that "COMPAS is merely one tool available to a court 
at the time of sentencing."  359 Wis. 2d 580, ¶13. 
¶39 In Gallion we warned of ad hoc decision making at 
sentencing:  "Experience has taught us to be cautious when 
reaching high consequence conclusions about human nature that 
seem to be intuitively correct at the moment.  Better instead is 
a conclusion that is based on more complete and accurate 
information . . . ."  270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶36.  We encouraged 
circuit courts to seek "more complete information upfront, at 
the time of sentencing.  Judges would be assisted in knowing 
about a defendant's propensity for causing harm [and] the 
circumstances likely to precipitate the harm . . . ."  Id., ¶34. 
¶40 Concern about ad hoc decision making is justified.  A 
myriad of determinations are made throughout the criminal 
justice system without consideration of tested facts of any 
kind.  Questions such as whether to require treatment, if so 
what kind, and how long supervision should last often have been 
left to a judge's intuition or a correctional officer's standard 
practice. 
¶41 The need to have additional sound information is 
apparent for those working in corrections, but that need is 
even 
more 
pronounced 
for 
sentencing 
courts. 
 
Sentencing 
decisions are guided by due process protections that may not 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
17 
 
apply to many run of the mill correctional decisions.22  This 
distinction is of import given that the risk and needs 
assessment tools were designed for use by those within the 
Department of Corrections and that design is being transitioned 
to a sentencing venue governed by different guiding principles. 
¶42 In response to a call to reduce recidivism by 
employing evidence-based practices, several states have passed 
legislation 
requiring 
that 
judges 
be 
provided 
with 
risk 
assessments and recidivism data at sentencing.23  Other states 
                                                 
22 The process that is due under the Constitution differs 
with the types of decisions and proceedings involved.  "Due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands."  Schweiker v. McClure, 456 
U.S. 188, 200 (1982); see also Londoner v. City and Cty. of 
Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) ("Many requirements essential 
in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with [in the 
administrative forum]"). 
23 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.007(3)(a) (2016) 
(sentencing judges in Kentucky shall consider the results of a 
defendant's 
risk 
and 
needs 
assessment 
included 
in 
the 
presentence 
investigation); 
Ohio 
Rev. 
Code 
Ann. 
§ 5120.114(A)(1)-(3) 
(2015-16) 
(the 
Ohio 
department 
of 
rehabilitation and correction "shall select a single validated 
risk assessment tool for adult offenders" that shall be used for 
purposes including sentencing); 42 PA. Cons. Stat. § 2154.7(a) 
(2016) (in Pennsylvania, a risk assessment instrument shall be 
adopted to help determine appropriate sentences).  See also 
Ariz. Code of Judicial Admin. § 6-201.01(J)(3) (2016) ("For all 
probation eligible cases, presentence reports shall [] contain 
case information related to criminogenic risk and needs as 
documented by the standardized risk assessment and other file 
and collateral information"); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 988.18(B) 
(2016) (an assessment and evaluation instrument designed to 
predict risk to recidivate is required to determine eligibility 
for any community punishment). 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
18 
 
permit, but do not mandate, the use of risk assessment tools at 
sentencing.24 
¶43 But other voices are challenging the efficacy of 
evidence-based sentencing and raise concern about overselling 
the results.  They urge that judges be made aware of the 
limitations of risk assessment tools, lest they be misused: 
In the main, [supporters] have been reticent to 
acknowledge the paucity of reliable evidence that now 
exists, and the limits of the interventions about 
which we do possess evidence.  Unless criminal justice 
system actors are made fully aware of the limits of 
the tools they are being asked to implement, they are 
likely to misuse them. 
Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based 
Corrections, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 537, 576 (2015). 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Idaho Code § 19-2517 (2016) (if an Idaho court 
orders a presentence investigation, the investigation report for 
all offenders sentenced directly to a term of imprisonment and 
for certain offenders placed on probation must include current 
recidivism rates differentiated based on offender risk levels of 
low, moderate, and high); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 
566, 571-73, 575 (Ind. 2010) (encouraging the use of evidence 
based offender assessment instruments at sentencing); La. Stat. 
Ann. § 15:326(A) (2016) (some Louisiana courts may use a single 
presentence investigation validated risk and needs assessment 
tool prior to sentencing an adult offender eligible for 
assessment); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.500(1) (2016) (requiring a 
court to consider risk assessment reports at sentencing if 
available); State v. Rogers, No. 14-0373, 2015 WL 869323, at *4 
(W. Va. Jan. 9, 2015) (Loughry, J., concurring) (in an 
unpublished Memorandum Decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia explained that although probation officers are 
required to conduct standardized risk and needs assessments 
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 62-12-6(a)(2) (2016), the use of these 
tools at sentencing to inform sentencing decisions is left to 
the discretion of the circuit court). 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
19 
 
¶44 We heed this admonition.  The DOC already recognizes 
limitations on the PSI, instructing that "[i]t is very important 
to remember that risk scores are not intended to determine the 
severity 
of 
the 
sentence 
or 
whether 
an 
offender 
is 
incarcerated."  We are in accord with these limitations.  
Further, we set forth the corollary limitation that risk scores 
may not be considered as the determinative factor in deciding 
whether the offender can be supervised safely and effectively in 
the community.25 
¶45 In addressing Loomis's due process arguments below, we 
additionally raise cautions that a sentencing court must observe 
in order to avoid potential due process violations. 
IV 
¶46 We turn to address Loomis's first argument that a 
circuit court's consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment 
violates a defendant's due process right to be sentenced based 
on accurate information.  Loomis advances initially that the 
proprietary 
nature 
of 
COMPAS 
prevents 
a 
defendant 
from 
challenging the scientific validity of the risk assessment.  
Accordingly, 
Loomis 
contends 
that 
because 
a 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment is attached to the PSI, a defendant is denied full 
access to information in the PSI and therefore cannot ensure 
that he is being sentenced based on accurate information. 
                                                 
25 See Casey, Using Offender Risk and Needs Assessment 
Information at Sentencing, supra note 7, at 14. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
20 
 
¶47 It is well-established that "[a] defendant has a 
constitutionally protected due process right to be sentenced 
upon accurate information."  Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶17.  
Additionally, the right to be sentenced based upon accurate 
information includes the right to review and verify information 
contained in the PSI upon which the circuit court bases its 
sentencing decision.  State v. Skaff, 152 Wis. 2d 48, 53, 447 
N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1989). 
¶48 In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977) 
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion), the circuit court imposed the 
death sentence, relying in part on information in a presentence 
investigation report that was not disclosed to counsel for the 
parties.  The plurality opinion concluded that the defendant 
"was denied due process of law when the death sentence was 
imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he 
had no opportunity to deny or explain."  Id. at 362. 
¶49 Following Gardner, the Wisconsin court of appeals 
determined that it was an erroneous exercise of discretion for 
the circuit court to categorically deny disclosure of the PSI to 
a defendant.26  Skaff, 152 Wis. 2d at 58.  The Skaff court 
explained that if the PSI was incorrect or incomplete, no person 
was in a better position than the defendant to refute, explain, 
                                                 
26 Although Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) was a 
death penalty case, State v. Skaff, 152 Wis. 2d 48, 55 447 
N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1989), determined that "we perceive no 
reason why its rationale should not be applied to penalties of 
lesser severity." 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
21 
 
or supplement the PSI.  Id. at 57.  Accordingly, until the 
defendant reviews his PSI, its accuracy cannot be verified.  Id. 
at 58. 
¶50 Skaff reasoned that given the discretion accorded the 
circuit 
court 
in 
sentencing 
decisions, 
any 
significant 
inaccuracies would likely affect the defendant's sentence.  Id.  
Therefore, denial of access to the PSI denied the defendant "an 
essential factor of due process, i.e., a procedure conducive to 
sentencing based on correct information."  Id. at 57 (citing 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
¶51 Loomis analogizes the COMPAS risk assessment to the 
PSI in Gardner and Skaff.  Northpointe, Inc., the developer of 
COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade 
secret.  Accordingly, it does not disclose how the risk scores 
are determined or how the factors are weighed.  Loomis asserts 
that because COMPAS does not disclose this information, he has 
been denied information which the circuit court considered at 
sentencing. 
¶52 He argues that he is in the best position to refute or 
explain the COMPAS risk assessment, but cannot do so based 
solely on a review of the scores as reflected in the bar charts.  
Additionally, Loomis contends that unless he can review how the 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
22 
 
factors are weighed and how risk scores are determined, the 
accuracy of the COMPAS assessment cannot be verified.27 
¶53 Loomis's analogy to Gardner and Skaff is imperfect.  
Although Loomis cannot review and challenge how the COMPAS 
algorithm calculates risk, he can at least review and challenge 
the resulting risk scores set forth in the report attached to 
the PSI.  At the heart of Gardner and Skaff is the fact that the 
court relied on information the defendant did not have any 
opportunity to refute, supplement or explain.  Gardner, 430 U.S. 
at 362.  That is not the case here. 
¶54 Loomis is correct that the risk scores do not explain 
how the COMPAS program uses  information to calculate the risk 
scores.  However, Northpointe's 2015 Practitioner's Guide to 
COMPAS explains that the risk scores are based largely on static 
information (criminal history), with limited use of some dynamic 
variables (i.e. criminal associates, substance abuse).28 
¶55 The COMPAS report attached to Loomis's PSI contains a 
list of 21 questions and answers regarding these static factors 
such as: 
                                                 
27 In a similar vein, Loomis asserts that the COMPAS 
assessment would not pass the Daubert test and therefore would 
be inadmissible at trial.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Given that the rules of evidence do 
not apply at sentencing, we need not address that argument here. 
State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶52, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 
N.W.2d 835. 
28 Northpointe, Inc., supra note 14, at 12, 27. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
23 
 
 How many times has this person been returned to 
custody while on parole? 5+ 
 How many times has this person had a new 
charge/arrest while on probation? 4 
 How many times has this person been arrested 
before as an adult or juvenile (criminal arrest 
only)? 12 
Thus, to the extent that Loomis's risk assessment is based upon 
his answers to questions and publicly available data about his 
criminal history, Loomis had the opportunity to verify that the 
questions and answers listed on the COMPAS report were accurate. 
¶56 Additionally, this is not a situation in which 
portions of a PSI are considered by the circuit court, but not 
released to the defendant.  The circuit court and Loomis had 
access to the same copy of the risk assessment.  Loomis had an 
opportunity to challenge his risk scores by arguing that other 
factors or information demonstrate their inaccuracy. 
¶57 Yet, regardless of whether Gardner and Skaff are 
analogous to this case, Loomis correctly asserts that defendants 
have the right to be sentenced based on accurate information.  
Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶17. 
¶58 Some states that use COMPAS have conducted validation 
studies of COMPAS concluding that it is a sufficiently accurate 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
24 
 
risk assessment tool.29  New York State's Division of Criminal 
Justice 
Services 
conducted 
a 
study 
examining 
a 
COMPAS 
assessment's recidivism scale's effectiveness and predictive 
accuracy and concluded that "the Recidivism Scale worked 
effectively and achieved satisfactory predictive accuracy."30  
Unlike New York and other states, Wisconsin has not yet 
completed a statistical validation study of COMPAS for a 
Wisconsin population.31 
¶59 However, Loomis relies on other studies of risk 
assessment 
tools 
that 
have 
raised 
questions 
about 
their 
                                                 
29 This analysis references current research studies in 
order to caution sentencing courts regarding concerns that have 
been raised about evidence-based risk assessment tools such as 
COMPAS.  However, we are not in a position to evaluate or opine 
on the scientific reliability of this data.  Accordingly, this 
opinion should not be read as an endorsement of any particular 
research study or article, regardless of whether its conclusion 
is critical or supportive of the COMPAS risk assessment tool. 
30 Sharon Lansing, New York State Division of Criminal 
Justice Services, Office of Justice Research and Performance, 
New York State COMPAS-Probation Risk and Need Assessment Study:  
Examining the Recidivism Scale's Effectiveness and Predictive 
Accuracy, 
at 
i, 
18 
(September 
2012), 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/downloads/research/DCJS_OPCA_ 
COMPAS_Probation_Validity.pdf. 
 
31 See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., ProPublica, Machine Bias 
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-
risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. 
 
See 
also 
Lansing, 
supra note 30; Thomas Blomberg, et at., Broward Sheriff's 
Office, Department of Community Control, Validation of the 
COMPAS Risk Assessment Classification Instrument (Sept. 2010), 
http://criminology.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/Validation-of-the-
COMPAS-Risk-Assessment-Classification-Instrument.pdf. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
25 
 
accuracy.32  For example, he cites to a 2007 California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") study 
which concludes that although COMPAS appears to be assessing 
criminogenic needs and recidivism risk, "there is little 
evidence that this is what [] COMPAS actually assesses."33 
¶60 The California Study reached the further conclusion 
that there "is no sound evidence that the COMPAS can be rated 
consistently by different evaluators, that it assesses the 
criminogenic needs it purports to assess, and (most importantly) 
that it predicts inmates' recidivism for CDCR offenders."34  
Ultimately, the authors of the study could not recommend that 
CDCR use COMPAS for individuals.35 
                                                 
32 The State acknowledges that no method of risk assessment 
is without error.  For example, the State cites to a primer on 
COMPAS which summarizes multiple studies that have assessed 
COMPAS's predictive validity as moderate, with scores ranging 
from .50-.73.  Pamela M. Casey, et al., National Center for 
State 
Courts 
(NCSC), 
Offender 
Risk 
& 
Needs 
Assessment 
Instruments: 
 
A 
Primer 
for 
Courts 
at 
A-23 
(2014), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/BJA%20RNA%20Fin
al%20Report_Combined%20Files%208-22-14.ashx.  However, it also 
summarizes other studies that assign COMPAS higher scores of .70 
for internal consistency and .70-1.0 for re-test reliability.  
Id.  
33 Jennifer L. Skeem and Jennifer Eno Loudon, Report 
Prepared for the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR), Assessment of Evidence on the Quality of 
the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions 
(COMPAS) 
at 
5 
(2007), 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_Documents/ 
COMPAS_Skeem_EnoLouden_Dec_2007.pdf. 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
26 
 
¶61 Subsequently, however, the CDCR published its 2010 
final report on California's COMPAS validation study.36  The 2010 
study concluded that although not perfect, "COMPAS is a reliable 
instrument. . . ."37  Specifically, it explained that the general 
recidivism risk scale achieved the value of .70, which is the 
conventional standard, though the violence risk scale did not.38 
¶62 In addition to these problems, there is concern that 
risk assessment tools may disproportionately classify minority 
offenders as higher risk, often due to factors that may be 
outside 
their 
control, 
such 
as 
familial 
background 
and 
education.39  Other state studies indicate that COMPAS is more 
predictive of recidivism among white offenders than black 
offenders.40 
¶63 A recent analysis of COMPAS's recidivism scores based 
upon data from 10,000 criminal defendants in Broward County, 
Florida, concluded that black defendants "were far more likely 
                                                 
36 David 
Farabee 
et 
al., 
California 
Department 
of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, COMPAS Validation Study:  Final 
Report 
(Aug. 
15, 
2010), 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_Documents/
COMPAS_Final_report_08-11-10.pdf. 
37 Id. at 29. 
38 Id. 
39 Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-
Based Corrections, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 537, 577 (2015). 
40 See e.g., Angwin, supra note 31; Tracy L. Fass, et al., 
The LSI-R and the Compas:  Validation Data on Two Risk-Needs 
Tools, 35 Crim. Justice & Behavior 1095, 1100-01 (2008). 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
27 
 
than white defendants to be incorrectly judged to be at a higher 
risk of recidivism."41  Likewise, white defendants were more 
likely than black defendants to be incorrectly flagged as low 
risk.42  Although Northpointe disputes this analysis, this study 
and others raise concerns regarding how a COMPAS assessment's 
risk factors correlate with race.43 
¶64 Additional concerns are raised about the need to 
closely monitor risk assessment tools for accuracy.  At least 
one commentator has explained that in order to remain accurate, 
risk assessment tools "must be constantly re-normed for changing 
populations and subpopulations."  Klingele, The Promises and 
Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 
576.  Accordingly, jurisdictions that utilize risk assessment 
tools must ensure they have the capacity for maintaining those 
tools and monitoring their continued accuracy.  Id. at 577. 
¶65 Focusing exclusively on its use at sentencing and 
considering the expressed due process arguments regarding 
accuracy, we determine that use of a COMPAS risk assessment must 
be subject to certain cautions in addition to the limitations 
set forth herein. 
                                                 
41 Jeff Larson et al., ProPublica, How We Analyzed the 
COMPAS 
Recidivism 
Algorithm 
(May 
23, 
2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-
recidivism-algorithm. 
42 Id. 
43 Northpointe, Inc., supra note 14, at 14. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
28 
 
¶66 Specifically, 
any 
PSI 
containing 
a 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment must inform the sentencing court about the following 
cautions regarding a COMPAS risk assessment's accuracy:  (1) the 
proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to prevent 
disclosure of information relating to how factors are weighed or 
how risk scores are to be determined; (2) risk assessment 
compares defendants to a national sample, but no cross-
validation study for a Wisconsin population has yet been 
completed; (3) some studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores 
have raised questions about whether they disproportionately 
classify 
minority 
offenders 
as 
having 
a 
higher 
risk 
of 
recidivism; and (4) risk assessment tools must be constantly 
monitored and re-normed for accuracy due to changing populations 
and subpopulations.  Providing information to sentencing courts 
on the limitations and cautions attendant with the use of COMPAS 
risk assessments will enable courts to better assess the 
accuracy of the assessment and the appropriate weight to be 
given to the risk score. 
V 
¶67 We address next Loomis's argument that a circuit 
court's consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment amounts to 
sentencing based on group data, rather than an individualized 
sentence based on the charges and the unique character of the 
defendant.  As this court explained in Gallion, individualized 
sentencing "has long been a cornerstone to Wisconsin's criminal 
justice jurisprudence."  270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
29 
 
¶68 If a COMPAS risk assessment were the determinative 
factor considered at sentencing this would raise due process 
challenges 
regarding 
whether 
a 
defendant 
received 
an 
individualized sentence.  As the defense expert testified at the 
post-conviction motion hearing, COMPAS is designed to assess 
group data.  He explained that COMPAS can be analogized to 
insurance actuarial risk assessments, which identify risk among 
groups of drivers and allocate resources accordingly. 
¶69 Similarly, the 2015 Practitioner's Guide to COMPAS 
explains that "[r]isk assessment is about predicting group 
behavior . . . it is not about prediction at the individual 
level."44  Risk scales are able to identify groups of high-risk 
offenders——not a particular high-risk individual.45  A pointed 
example of potential misunderstanding arising from the use of 
group data is that an individual who has never committed a 
violent offense may nevertheless be labeled as a high risk for 
recidivism on the violent risk scale.  As the DOC explains: 
"[a]n offender who is young, unemployed, has an early age-at-
first-arrest and a history of supervision failure, will score 
medium or high on the Violence Risk Scale even though the 
offender never had a violent offense."46 
                                                 
44 Northpointe, Inc., supra note 14, at 31. 
45 Id. 
46 State of Wisconsin, Department of Corrections, Electronic 
Case Reference Manual, 
COMPAS Assessment Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://doc.helpdocsonline.com/dcc-business-process. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
30 
 
¶70 To ameliorate this problem, the DOC explains that 
"staff are predicted to disagree with an actuarial risk 
assessment (e.g. COMPAS) in about 10% of the cases due to 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances to which the assessment 
is not sensitive."47  Thus, "staff should be encouraged to use 
their professional judgment and override the computed risk as 
appropriate . . . ."48 
¶71 Just as corrections staff should disregard risk scores 
that are inconsistent with other factors, we expect that circuit 
courts will exercise discretion when assessing a COMPAS risk 
score with respect to each individual defendant. 
¶72 Ultimately, 
we 
disagree 
with 
Loomis 
because 
consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing along 
with other supporting factors is helpful in providing the 
sentencing court with as much information as possible in order 
to arrive at an individualized sentence.  In Gallion, this court 
explained that circuit courts "have an enhanced need for more 
complete information upfront, at the time of sentencing."  270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶34. 
¶73 COMPAS has the potential to provide sentencing courts 
with more complete information to address this enhanced need.  
The Indiana Supreme Court examined similar risk assessment tools 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Northpointe, Inc., supra note 14, at 31. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
31 
 
and explained that these tools assist courts in weighing all the 
sentencing factors: 
Such assessment instruments enable a sentencing judge 
to more effectively evaluate and weigh several express 
statutory sentencing considerations such as criminal 
history, the likelihood of affirmative response to 
probation 
or 
short 
term 
imprisonment, 
and 
the 
character and attitudes indicating that a defendant is 
unlikely to commit another crime. 
Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 574 (Ind. 2010) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
¶74 However the due process implications compel us to 
caution circuit courts that because COMPAS risk assessment 
scores are based on group data, they are able to identify groups 
of high-risk offenders——not a particular high-risk individual.  
Accordingly, a circuit court is expected to consider this 
caution as it weighs all of the factors that are relevant to 
sentencing an individual defendant. 
VI 
¶75 We turn now to address Loomis's argument that a COMPAS 
risk assessment's use of gender violates a defendant's due 
process rights.  Relying on Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶33, Loomis 
asserts that because COMPAS risk scores take gender into 
account, a circuit court's consideration of a COMPAS risk 
assessment violates a defendant's due process right not to be 
sentenced on the basis of gender. 
¶76 Due to the proprietary nature of COMPAS, the parties 
dispute the specific method by which COMPAS considers gender.  
Loomis asserts that it is unknown exactly how COMPAS uses 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
32 
 
gender, 
but 
contends 
that 
COMPAS 
considers 
gender 
as 
a 
criminogenic factor.  The State disagrees, contending that the 
DOC uses the same COMPAS risk assessment on both men and women, 
but then compares each offender to a "norming" group of his or 
her own gender. 
¶77 Regardless of whether gender is used as a criminogenic 
factor or solely for statistical norming, Loomis objects to any 
use of gender in calculating COMPAS's risk scores.  In response, 
the State contends that considering gender in a COMPAS risk 
assessment is necessary to achieve statistical accuracy.  The 
State argues that because men and women have different rates of 
recidivism and different rehabilitation potential, a gender 
neutral risk assessment would provide inaccurate results for 
both men and women. 
¶78 Both parties appear to agree that there is statistical 
evidence that men, on average, have higher recidivism and 
violent crime rates compared to women.  Commentators also have 
noted and discussed statistical evidence differentiating men and 
women in this context.  See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-
Based 
Sentencing 
and 
the 
Scientific 
Rationalization 
of 
Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803, 813 (2014) ("if the 
instrument includes gender, men will always receive higher risk 
scores than otherwise-identical women (because, averaged across 
all cases, men have higher recidivism rates . . . "); John 
Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment:  Forecasting Harm 
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 Va. L. Rev. 391, 
416 (2006) ("That women commit violent acts at a much lower rate 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
33 
 
than men is a staple in criminology and has been known for as 
long as official records have been kept."). 
¶79 However, Loomis asserts that even if statistical 
generalizations based on gender are accurate, they are not 
necessarily constitutional.  He cites to Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 208-210 (1976), a case where the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that an Oklahoma law that prohibited the sale of 
3.2% beer to men under the age 21 and to women under the age of 
18 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Court explained that although state officials 
offered sociological or empirical justifications for the gender-
based difference in the law, "the principles embodied in the 
Equal Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by 
statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning 
the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups."  Id. at 208-09. 
¶80 Notably, however, Loomis does not bring an equal 
protection challenge in this case.  Thus, we address whether 
Loomis's constitutional due process right not to be sentenced on 
the basis of gender is violated if a circuit court considers a 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment 
at 
sentencing. 
 
See 
Harris, 
326 
Wis. 2d 685, ¶33. 
¶81 Loomis 
misinterprets 
Harris 
in 
arguing 
that 
a 
sentencing court cannot consider a COMPAS risk assessment 
because it takes gender into account in calculating risk scores.  
In Harris, the defendant asserted that the circuit court imposed 
its sentence on the basis of gender when it criticized him for 
being unemployed while his child's mother worked.  Id., ¶61.  
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
34 
 
Harris argued that he should not be penalized for being a stay-
at-home father and that the circuit court used this fact as an 
aggravating factor when fashioning his sentence.  Id. 
¶82 In determining whether the circuit court improperly 
considered gender in sentencing Harris, this court concluded 
that there was a factual basis underlying the circuit court's 
statements that was not related to Harris's gender.  Id., ¶¶62-
63.  The record revealed that Harris was not his daughter's 
stay-at-home 
primary 
caregiver 
and 
that 
other 
factors 
demonstrated that he was not a responsible father.  Id., ¶63. 
¶83 Likewise, there is a factual basis underlying COMPAS's 
use of gender in calculating risk scores.  Instead, it appears 
that any risk assessment tool which fails to differentiate 
between men and woman will misclassify both genders.  As one 
commenter noted, "the failure to take gender into consideration, 
at least when predicting recidivism risk, itself is unjust."  
Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and 
Ethical Challenges, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 231, 255 (Spring 2015).  
Thus, if the inclusion of gender promotes accuracy, it serves 
the interests of institutions and defendants, rather than a 
discriminatory purpose.  Id. 
¶84 Additionally, Harris concluded that the defendant had 
not met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that the circuit court actually relied on gender as a factor in 
imposing its sentence.  326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶64.  It explained that 
the "circuit court considered the proper factors——it evaluated 
the gravity of the offense, Harris's character, and the public's 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
35 
 
need for protection."  Id., ¶¶65, 67.  "The circuit court 
thoroughly explained its reasons for the sentence it imposed, 
and all of the potentially offensive comments flagged by both 
Harris and the court of appeals bear a reasonable nexus to 
proper sentencing factors."  Id., ¶67. 
¶85 Here, as in Harris, Loomis has not met his burden of 
showing that the circuit court actually relied on gender as a 
factor in imposing its sentence.  The circuit court explained 
that it considered multiple factors that supported the sentence 
it imposed: 
In terms of weighing the various factors, I'm ruling 
out probation because of the seriousness of the crime 
and because your history, your history on supervision, 
and the risk assessment tools that have been utilized, 
suggest that you're extremely high risk to re-offend. 
In addition to the COMPAS risk assessment, the seriousness of 
the crime and Loomis's criminal history both bear a nexus to the 
sentence imposed.  See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶46 ("we 
require that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and 
factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the 
sentencing objectives.").  See also Harris v. State, 75 
Wis. 2d 513, 519, 250 N.W.2d 7 (1977) (relevant sentencing 
factors include past record of criminal offenses, history of 
undesirable behavior patterns, and results of presentence 
investigation). 
¶86 We determine that COMPAS's use of gender promotes 
accuracy that ultimately inures to the benefit of the justice 
system including defendants.  Additionally, we determine that 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
36 
 
the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that the 
sentencing court actually relied on gender as a factor in 
sentencing.  Thus, we conclude that the use of the COMPAS risk 
assessment at sentencing did not violate Loomis's right to due 
process. 
VII 
¶87 Next, we address the permissible uses for a COMPAS 
risk assessment at sentencing.  Then we set forth the 
limitations and cautions that a sentencing court must observe 
when using COMPAS. 
¶88 Although it cannot be determinative, a sentencing 
court may use a COMPAS risk assessment as a relevant factor for 
such matters as:  (1) diverting low-risk prison-bound offenders 
to a non-prison alternative; (2) assessing whether an offender 
can be supervised safely and effectively in the community; and 
(3) imposing terms and conditions of probation, supervision, and 
responses to violations.49 
¶89 First, COMPAS may be useful in identifying prison-
bound offenders who are at low risk to reoffend for purposes of 
diverting them to non-prison alternatives and aids in the 
decision of whether to suspend all or part of an offender's 
sentence.50  
                                                 
49 Tallarico, supra note 20, at 20-21. 
50 Casey, Using 
Offender 
Risk 
and 
Needs 
Assessment 
Information at Sentencing, supra note 7, at 8, 9, 13. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
37 
 
¶90 Second, risk assessment tools such as COMPAS can be 
helpful to assess an offender's risk to public safety and can 
inform the decision of whether the risk of re-offense presented 
by the offender can be safely managed and effectively reduced 
through community supervision and services.51 
¶91 Third, COMPAS may be used to inform decisions about 
the terms and conditions of probation and supervision.52  Risk 
assessments can be useful in identifying low-risk offenders who 
do not require intensive supervision and treatment programs.53  
Together with a need assessment, a risk assessment may inform 
public 
safety 
considerations 
related 
to 
offender 
risk 
management, and therefore may be used to provide guidance about 
the level of supervision and control needed for an offender 
placed on probation or released to extended supervision.54  
Specifically, 
it 
may 
inform 
decisions 
such 
as 
reporting 
requirements, drug testing, electronic monitoring, community 
service, and the most appropriate treatment strategies.55 
¶92 Thus, a COMPAS risk assessment may be used to "enhance 
a judge's evaluation, weighing, and application of the other 
                                                 
51 Id. at 9, 13-14. 
52 Id. at 16. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 11; Casey, Offender Risk & Needs Assessment 
Instruments:  A Primer for Courts, supra note 32, at 2. 
55 Casey, 
Using 
Offender 
Risk 
and 
Needs 
Assessment 
Information at Sentencing, supra note 7, at 14, 16. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
38 
 
sentencing evidence in the formulation of an individualized 
sentencing program appropriate for each defendant."  See 
Malenchick, 928 N.E.2d at 573.  As the court of appeals 
explained in Samsa, "COMPAS is merely one tool available to a 
court at the time of sentencing and a court is free to rely on 
portions of the assessment while rejecting other portions."  359 
Wis. 2d 580, ¶13. 
¶93 However, the use of a COMPAS risk assessment at 
sentencing must be subject to certain limitations.  As noted 
above, the DOC already recognizes these limitations on the PSI, 
instructing that "[i]t is very important to remember that risk 
scores are not intended to determine the severity of the 
sentence or whether an offender is incarcerated."  This is also 
the first "Guiding Principle" of the National Center for State 
Courts ("NCSC") report on using offender risk and needs 
assessment at sentencing, which instructs that: 
Risk and need assessment information should be used in 
the sentencing decision to inform public safety 
considerations related to offender risk reduction and 
management.  It should not be used as an aggravating 
or mitigating factor in determining the severity of an 
offender's sanction.56 
¶94 Additionally, we set forth the corollary limitation 
that risk scores may not be used as the determinative factor in 
deciding whether the offender can be supervised safely and 
                                                 
56 Id. at 11. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
39 
 
effectively in the community.  This is consistent with the second 
"Guiding Principle" of the National Center for State Courts.57 
¶95 The 
decision 
of 
the 
Indiana 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 575, provides additional guidance here.  
It limited the use of risk assessments, explaining that they 
"are not intended to serve as aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances nor to determine the gross length of sentence, but 
a trial court may employ such results in formulating the manner 
in which a sentence is to be served." 
¶96 Additionally, 
a 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment 
was 
not 
designed to address all of the goals of a sentence.  Its aim is 
addressing the treatment needs of an individual and identifying 
the risk of recidivism.  Sentencing, on the other hand, is meant 
to address additional purposes.  See State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, 
¶97, 
338 
Wis. 2d 565, 
808 
N.W.2d 691 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) ("It is commonly understood that there are four main 
purposes of sentencing: (1) deterrence; (2) rehabilitation; (3) 
retribution; and (4) segregation."). 
¶97 Because of these disparate goals, using a risk 
assessment tool to determine the length and severity of a 
sentence is a poor fit.  As scholars have observed, "[a]ssessing 
the risk of future crime plays no role in sentencing decisions 
based solely on backward-looking perceptions of blameworthiness, 
 . . . is not relevant to deterrence, . . . and should not be 
                                                 
57 Id. at 14. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
40 
 
used to sentence offenders to more time than they morally 
deserve."58 
¶98 Thus, a sentencing court may consider a COMPAS risk 
assessment at sentencing subject to the following limitations.  
As recognized by the Department of Corrections, the PSI 
instructs that risk scores may not be used:  (1) to determine 
whether an offender is incarcerated; or (2) to determine the 
severity of the sentence.  Additionally, risk scores may not be 
used as the determinative factor in deciding whether an offender 
can be supervised safely and effectively in the community.59 
¶99 Importantly, a circuit court must explain the factors 
in addition to a COMPAS risk assessment that independently 
support the sentence imposed.  A COMPAS risk assessment is only 
one of many factors that may be considered and weighed at 
sentencing. 
¶100 Any 
Presentence 
Investigation 
Report 
("PSI") 
containing a COMPAS risk assessment filed with the court must 
                                                 
58 John Monahan and Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in 
Criminal Sentencing, 12 Annual Rev. Clinical Psychol. 489, 492-
93. 
 
See 
also 
Melissa 
Hamilton, 
Risk-Needs 
Assessment:  
Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 231, 
277 (2015) ("Retributive and deterrence orientations are less 
amenable to evidence-based practices"). 
59 Casey, 
Using 
Offender 
Risk 
and 
Needs 
Assessment 
Information at Sentencing, supra note 7, at 14. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
41 
 
contain 
a 
written 
advisement 
listing 
the 
limitations.60  
Additionally, this written advisement should inform sentencing 
courts of the following cautions as discussed throughout this 
opinion: 
 The proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to 
prevent disclosure of information relating to how 
factors are weighed or how risk scores are determined. 
 Because COMPAS risk assessment scores are based on 
group data, they are able to identify groups of high-
risk offenders——not a particular high-risk individual. 
 Some studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores have 
raised questions about whether they disproportionately 
classify minority offenders as having a higher risk of 
recidivism. 
 A COMPAS risk assessment compares defendants to a 
national sample, but no cross-validation study for a 
Wisconsin population has yet been completed.  Risk 
assessment tools must be constantly monitored and re-
normed for accuracy due to changing populations and 
subpopulations. 
                                                 
60 A circuit court may order a presentence investigation 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 972.15(1).  When filed with the court, 
any 
presentence 
investigative 
report 
that 
attaches 
or 
incorporates a COMPAS risk assessment must contain, consistent 
with due process, a written advisement regarding the cautions 
and limitations. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
42 
 
 COMPAS was not developed for use at sentencing, but 
was intended for use by the Department of Corrections 
in 
making 
determinations 
regarding 
treatment, 
supervision, and parole. 
¶101 It is important to note that these are the cautions 
that have been identified in the present moment.  For example, 
if a cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population is 
conducted, then flexibility is needed to remove this caution or 
explain the results of the cross-validation study.  Similarly, 
this advisement should be regularly updated as other cautions 
become more or less relevant as additional data becomes 
available. 
VIII 
¶102 We 
apply 
next 
the 
relevant 
permissible 
uses, 
limitations and cautions to an examination of the record in this 
case.  Loomis argues that he is entitled to a resentencing 
hearing 
because 
the 
circuit 
considered 
the 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment in imposing his sentence.  According to Loomis, this 
is a violation of his due process rights because he argues that 
a 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment 
should 
never 
be 
considered 
at 
sentencing. 
¶103 Notably, Loomis does not argue that the other factors 
the court considered at sentencing were insufficient to support 
the sentence he received.  In fact, at oral argument Loomis's 
counsel acknowledged that he would not be challenging the 
sentence imposed if it were devoid of any reference to the 
COMPAS risk assessment.  He argues instead that even if there 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
43 
 
are other bases for the circuit court's sentence, this does not 
overcome the error of considering the COMPAS risk assessment. 
¶104 As discussed above, if used properly with an awareness  
of 
the 
limitations 
and 
cautions, 
a 
circuits 
court’s 
consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not 
violate a defendant’s right to due process.  The circuit court 
here was aware of the limitations.  Two limitations were set 
forth by the DOC in the PSI containing the COMPAS report.  Thus, 
when Loomis was sentenced, the circuit court was aware that 
"risk scores are not intended to determine the severity of the 
sentence or whether an offender is incarcerated."  The third 
limitation, 
that 
a 
COMPAS 
risk 
assessment 
may 
not 
be 
determinative in deciding whether a defendant may be supervised 
safely 
and 
effectively 
in 
the 
community 
is 
a 
corollary 
limitation to those already set forth in the PSI. 
¶105 With respect to the cautions this opinion requires, we 
intend that they be used to inform courts of due process 
implications.  These cautions will enable sentencing courts to 
better assess the weight to be given to the COMPAS risk scores, 
circumventing potential due process violations.  Here, however, 
the record reflects that although the circuit court referenced 
the risk assessment at sentencing, the court essentially gave it 
little or no weight. 
¶106 At the post-conviction motion hearing, the circuit 
court explained that it used the COMPAS risk assessment to 
corroborate its findings and that it would have imposed the same 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
44 
 
sentence regardless of whether it considered the COMPAS risk 
scores: 
I think its accurate and safe for this court to say 
that had there been absolutely no mention of the risk 
assessment tool in the Presentence Report, had the 
COMPAS not been attached to the presentence report, 
that the sentence would have been exactly the same 
because of the court's evaluation of the sentencing 
factors that are required under the [] law. 
¶107 The circuit court explained that it considered the 
COMPAS risk assessment as "an observation" to reinforce its 
assessment of the other factors it considered: 
In other words, the factors that were cited by the 
court 
suggested 
low 
probability 
of 
success 
on 
supervision 
and 
serious 
crime. 
 
And 
that 
was 
reinforced by the fact that the risk assessment tool 
shows high risk in all areas . . .  
The court identified factors that were apparent to Mr. 
Loomis's history and the nature of the offenses.  And 
then went to the COMPAS as an instrument, basically, 
that supported that evaluation. 
¶108 This is consistent with the sentencing transcript, in 
which the circuit court explained that it was also considering 
the seriousness of the crime and Loomis's criminal history and 
history on supervision in ruling out probation.  A review of the 
sentencing transcript reveals that the circuit court also 
addressed and discussed the gravity of the offense, the 
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the 
need to protect the public.  See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶13. 
¶109 Thus, the record reflects that the sentencing court 
considered the appropriate factors and was aware of the 
limitations 
associated 
with 
the 
use 
of 
the 
COMPAS 
risk 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
45 
 
assessment.  Ultimately, although the circuit court mentioned 
the COMPAS risk assessment, it was not determinative in deciding 
whether Loomis should be incarcerated, the severity of the 
sentence 
or 
whether 
he 
could 
be 
supervised 
safely 
and 
effectively in the community. 
¶110 Additionally, although the circuit court was unaware 
of the cautions set forth above, those cautions are required in 
part to ensure that undue weight is not given to the COMPAS risk 
scores.  As the circuit court explained at the post conviction 
hearing, it would have imposed the exact same sentence without 
it.  Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court's 
consideration of COMPAS in this case did not violate Loomis's 
due process rights. 
IX 
¶111 As a final matter, Loomis argues that the circuit 
court improperly gave undue weight to read-in charges at 
sentencing.  He asserts that not only did the circuit court 
appear to misunderstand the difference between dismissed and 
read-in charges, but it improperly assumed that the factual 
basis for the read-in charges was true. 
¶112 In Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶61, this court clarified 
how the read-in procedure and dismissed charges fit into the 
plea bargaining process.  The circuit court can consider 
uncharged or unproven offenses regardless of whether the 
defendant consented to having the charges read in or dismissed 
outright.  Id., ¶47. 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
46 
 
¶113 Frey explained that it is preferable for the circuit 
court to "acknowledge and discuss dismissed charges, if they are 
considered by the court, giving them appropriate weight and 
describing their relationship to a defendant's character and 
behavioral pattern or to the incident that serves as the basis 
for a plea."  Id., ¶54.  Open discussion of dismissed charges is 
consistent with the sentencing methodology set forth in Gallion 
and allows the defendant the opportunity to explain or dispute 
the charges.  Id. 
¶114 Additionally, read-in charges are expected to be 
considered at sentencing "with the understanding that the read-
in charges could increase the sentence up to the maximum that 
the defendant could receive for the conviction in exchange for 
the promise not to prosecute those additional offenses."  Id., 
¶68. 
¶115 Loomis asserts that the circuit court appeared to 
misunderstand the difference between dismissed charges and those 
that are dismissed but read in.  At sentencing, the circuit 
court initially erred in its statement regarding dismissed and 
read-in charges when it stated that it could not consider the 
dismissed charges at all, but would consider the read-in charges 
as true.  However, the circuit court took a break from the 
hearing to review Frey and continued the hearing under the 
proper framework. 
¶116 Although 
the 
circuit 
court 
may 
have 
initially 
misstated that under Frey there is no distinction between read-
in 
charges 
and 
dismissed 
charges, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
47 
 
consideration of the read-in charges was not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  It subsequently clarified the proper 
use. 
¶117 During the plea hearing, quoting directly from Frey, 
the circuit court advised Loomis of the proper legal standard 
regarding how it would consider the read-in offenses at 
sentencing.  It allowed both sides to debate the merits of the 
charges and ultimately believed the State's version of events 
was more credible. 
¶118 At the post-conviction motion hearing, the circuit 
court reviewed the plea hearing transcript and the sentencing 
transcript and explained how it weighed the facts in addressing 
the read-in charges: 
The Court had to give weight, greater weight or lesser 
weight to the facts that's relating [sic] to the 
shooting.  I felt Mr. Loomis's explanation was 
inconsistent with the facts.  The State's version was 
more consistent with the facts and gave greater weight 
to the State's version at sentencing. 
¶119 Thus, the circuit court weighed the facts, assessed 
the credibility and the recognized legal standards for read-in 
offenses.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court's 
consideration of the read-in charges was not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion. 
X 
¶120 Ultimately, we conclude that if used properly as set 
forth herein, a circuit court's consideration of a COMPAS risk 
assessment at sentencing does not violate a defendant's right to 
No. 2015AP157-CR 
   
 
48 
 
due process and that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion here. 
¶121 We 
further 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
consideration of the read-in charges was not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion. 
¶122 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 
 
By the Court.–The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶123 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  I 
agree with much of the majority opinion's discussion and I 
concur in its result; however, I write to clarify that while our 
holding today permits a sentencing court to consider COMPAS, we 
do not conclude that a sentencing court may rely on COMPAS for 
the sentence it imposes.  Because at times the majority opinion 
interchangeably employs consider and rely when discussing a 
sentencing court's obligations and the COMPAS risk assessment 
tool, our decision could mistakenly be read as permitting 
reliance on COMPAS.1  Therefore, I write to clarify for the 
reader.2 
¶124 At sentencing, the circuit court is to consider three 
primary factors:  gravity of the offense, character of the 
offender and the need to protect the public.  State v. 
Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶22, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662.  A 
circuit 
court's 
proper 
exercise 
of 
sentencing 
discretion 
includes an individualized sentence based on the facts of the 
case and may include explaining how the sentence imposed 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶8, 31, 48, 82, 85, 98-99.      
2 Contrary to the manner in which the majority opinion 
sometimes 
employs 
"consider" 
and 
"rely," 
they 
are 
not 
interchangeable.  "Rely" is defined as "to be dependent" or "to 
place full confidence."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 977 
(1974).  Therefore, to permit circuit courts to rely on COMPAS 
is to permit circuit courts to depend on COMPAS in imposing 
sentence.  On the other hand, "consider" is defined as "to 
observe" or to "contemplate" or to "weigh."  Id. at 241-42.  
Therefore, to permit circuit courts to consider COMPAS is to 
permit circuit courts to observe a COMPAS risk assessment and 
weigh it along with other relevant factors in imposing sentence.    
No.  2015AP157-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
furthers the circuit court's objectives.  Id. (citing State v. 
Harris (Landray M.), 2010 WI 79, ¶29, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 
N.W.2d 409).3   
¶125 A sentencing court must articulate the factors that it 
considered at sentencing and how they affected the sentence it 
imposed.  State v. Harris (Denia), 119 Wis. 2d 612, 623, 350 
N.W.2d 633 (1984).  It is through this articulation that we 
determine whether the circuit court properly exercised its 
sentencing discretion.  Id.  Defendants have a due process right 
not to be sentenced in reliance on improper factors such as on 
race or gender.  Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶33.   
¶126 The 
circuit 
court's 
consideration 
of 
various 
sentencing 
factors 
is 
afforded 
a 
"strong 
presumption 
of 
reasonability because the circuit court is best suited to 
consider the relevant factors and demeanor of the convicted 
defendant."  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶18, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
678 N.W.2d 197 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, a 
circuit court's sentencing decision is upheld unless it exhibits 
an erroneous exercise of discretion by sentencing based on 
irrelevant or improper factors.  Id., ¶17; Harris (Landray M.), 
326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶30.  In addition, any reference to a 
potentially improper sentencing factor is reviewed in the 
                                                 
3 See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶43 n.11, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 
678 
N.W.2d 197 
which 
identifies 
numerous, 
supplemental sentencing factors that circuit courts may consider 
under the appropriate circumstances of each case. 
No.  2015AP157-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
context of the circuit court's sentencing record as a whole.  
Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶45.   
¶127 As the majority opinion aptly explains, the circuit 
court here appropriately considered numerous sentencing factors 
when imposing sentence and merely mentioned the defendant's 
COMPAS risk assessment in passing.4  The circuit court detailed 
the three primary sentencing factors and explained how the facts 
of the case warranted the sentence imposed.5  Therefore, I agree 
with the majority opinion that circuit courts may consider a 
COMPAS risk assessment along with a multitude of other relevant 
factors at sentencing, as was done in this case.6 
¶128 However, one of my concerns is that the certified 
question frames the issue presented as "whether the right to due 
process 
prohibits 
circuit 
courts 
from 
relying 
on 
COMPAS 
assessments when imposing sentence."7  The majority opinion 
concludes that "if used properly with an awareness of the 
limitations and cautions, a circuit court's consideration of a 
COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate a 
defendant's right to due process."8  I agree that "consideration" 
of COMPAS does not contravene defendant's right to due process.   
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶¶85, 107-09. 
5 Id., ¶¶85, 104-10. 
6 Id., ¶¶105, 109-10.   
7 State v. Loomis, No. 2015AP157-CR, 2015 WL 5446731, 1 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2015) (emphasis added). 
8 Majority op., ¶104 (emphasis added).   
No.  2015AP157-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶129 However, the question presented on certification is 
whether due process prohibits circuit courts from relying on 
COMPAS, and then the majority opinion's answering that question 
in 
the 
negative, 
even 
though 
it 
employs 
the 
word 
"consideration," may cause the majority opinion to be read as 
permitting circuit court reliance on COMPAS.  Stated otherwise, 
rather than merely considering COMPAS as one of many factors 
relevant to sentencing, the majority opinion, due to its 
interchangeable use of "rely" and "consider," together with the 
certified question, may be read to permit a circuit court to 
rely on COMPAS to determine the appropriate sentence.  Reliance 
would violate due process protections.  Accordingly, I write to 
clarify our holding in the majority opinion:  consideration of 
COMPAS is permissible; reliance on COMPAS for the sentence 
imposed is not permissible. 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶130 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion.  It describes the salient issues raised by 
considering COMPAS at sentencing, and informs the bench and the 
bar of the limitations and cautions that should be observed in 
considering COMPAS in sentencing.  It underscores that we are 
addressing the use of a research-based tool and that it is 
incumbent upon actors in the criminal justice system to 
recognize that additional research data may become available in 
the future and different, better tools may be developed.       
¶131 I write separately to make two points: 
¶132 First, I conclude that in considering COMPAS (or other 
risk assessment tools) in sentencing, a circuit court must set 
forth on the record a meaningful process of reasoning addressing 
the relevance, strengths, and weaknesses of the risk assessment 
tool.   
¶133 Second, this court's lack of understanding of COMPAS 
was a significant problem in the instant case.  At oral 
argument, the court repeatedly questioned both the State's and 
defendant's counsel about how COMPAS works.  Few answers were 
available.  
¶134 Northpointe, the company that created COMPAS, sought 
to file an amicus brief in the instant case to discuss the 
history, accuracy, and efficacy of COMPAS, as well as the use of 
risk assessment tools like COMPAS throughout the criminal 
justice system.       
¶135 The court denied (over my dissent and without comment) 
Northpointe's motion to file an amicus brief.  The denial was a 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
mistake.  The court needed all the help it could get.  The 
majority opinion considers publications by Northpointe.  Why 
could it not consider an amicus brief by Northpointe? 
¶136 For these reasons, I write separately. 
I 
¶137 I would hold that a circuit court, in considering 
COMPAS (or another risk assessment tool) in sentencing, must 
evaluate on the record the strengths, weaknesses, and relevance 
to the individualized sentence being rendered of the evidence-
based tool (or, more precisely, the research-based or data-based 
tool).   
¶138 Such an explanation is needed, I think, because the 
use of risk assessment tools like COMPAS has garnered mixed 
reviews in the scholarly literature and in popular commentary 
and analysis.   
¶139 For 
example, 
although 
then-Attorney 
General 
Eric 
Holder endorsed the use of risk assessment tools in preparing 
and planning for the reentry of offenders into society, he 
cautioned against using risk assessment tools in sentencing.  
Attorney General Holder warned that using "static factors and 
immutable characteristics, like the defendant's education level, 
socioeconomic background or neighborhood" in sentencing could 
have unintended consequences, including undermining our goal of 
"individualized 
justice, 
with 
charges, 
convictions, 
and 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
sentences befitting the conduct of each defendant and the 
particular crime he or she commits."1     
¶140 Attorney General Holder's concerns have been echoed in 
other studies.2 Additionally, studies differ regarding the 
accuracy 
of 
COMPAS's 
recidivism 
(and 
especially 
violent 
                                                 
1 See Ryan J. Reilly, Eric Holder Warns of Risks in 
'Moneyballing' Criminal Justice, Huffington Post (11:28 AM Aug. 
1, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/01/eric-holder-
moneyball-criminal-justice_n_5641420.html.  
Wisconsin law also recognizes the need for individualized 
sentences.  See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶48, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (recognizing that individualized 
sentencing "has long been a cornerstone to Wisconsin's criminal 
justice jurisprudence."). 
University of Wisconsin Law Professor Cecelia Klingele 
summarized the challenges inherent in using these tools in The 
Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 537, 576-78 (2015). 
2 See Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS 
Recidivism 
Algorithm, 
Pro 
Publica 
(May 
23, 
2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-
recidivism-algorithm; see also Julia Angwin et al., Machine 
Bias, 
Pro 
Publica 
(May 
23, 
2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (reviewing the findings of 
Pro Publica's study and discussing numerous anecdotal examples 
of individuals whose risks of recidivism were incorrectly 
assessed).    
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
recidivism) scores.3  The circuit court has to show its awareness 
of and consideration of these issues. 
¶141 I recognize that the demands on circuit courts are 
many and their resources relatively few, but making a record, 
including a record explaining consideration of the evidence-
based tools and the limitations and strengths thereof, is part 
of the long-standing, basic requirement that a circuit court 
explain its exercise of discretion at sentencing.   
¶142 Such a process increases the likelihood that circuit 
courts will remain abreast of new developments in evidence-based 
decision making and cognizant of the qualities of the tools 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Sheldon X. Zhang et al, An Analysis of Prisoner 
Reentry and Parole Risk Using COMPAS and Traditional Criminal 
History Measures, 60 Crime & Delinquency 167, 187 (2014) 
(finding that a model assessing just four static variables——
gender, age, age of first arrest, and number of prior arrests——
performed just as well as COMPAS in predicting prior arrests); 
Jennifer L. Skeem & Jennifer Eno Louden, Assessment of Evidence 
on the Quality of Correctional Offender Management Profiling for 
Alternative 
Sanctions 
(COMPAS) 
28 
(2007), 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_Documents/
COMPAS_Skeem_EnoLouden_Dec_2007.pdf (last visited July 1, 2016) 
(stating that "there is little evidence that the COMPAS predicts 
recidivism," and "there is no evidence that the COMPAS assesses 
risk state, or change over time in criminogenic needs."); but 
see Sharon Lansing, New York State COMPAS-Probation Risk and 
Need 
Assessment 
Study: 
Examining 
the 
Recidivism 
Scale's 
Effectiveness and Predictive Accuracy, N.Y. Div. Crim. Justice 
Servs., Office of Justice Research & Performance, at i (Sept. 
2012) 
(concluding 
that 
COMPAS's 
"Recidivism 
Scale 
worked 
effectively and achieved satisfactory predictive accuracy," 
namely 71% accuracy); Tim Brennan et al., Evaluating the 
Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment 
System, 36 Crim. Just. & Behavior 21, 30 (2009) (determining, in 
a study by three individuals for Northpointe, the company that 
markets COMPAS, that COMPAS's risk models are "satisfactor[il]y 
predictive . . . .").   
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
utilized.  Such a process also provides appellate courts with a 
meaningful record to review and provides the State, the 
defendant, and the public with a transparent and comprehensible 
explanation for the sentencing court's decision.   
II 
¶143 With evidence-based decision making on the rise, 
amicus briefs evaluating the research and data will, in all 
likelihood, become more important.  As Judge Richard Posner has 
written, "[m]ost judges are generalists, and increasingly we are 
confronted by complexities that most of us have difficulty 
understanding."4   One way of addressing these complexities is 
taking a more expansive view toward accepting amicus briefs.   
¶144 The court denied Northpointe's motion to file an 
amicus brief over my dissent.  See Attachment A.  COMPAS is 
proprietary, and Northpointe considers COMPAS's algorithms trade 
secrets.  As a result, Northpointe does not disclose how COMPAS 
determines individual risk scores or it how weighs various 
factors in arriving at a risk score.   
¶145 Northpointe has an obvious financial and proprietary 
interest in the continued use of COMPAS.  The court could have 
taken 
Northpointe's 
interests 
into 
account 
in 
weighing 
Northpointe's amicus brief. 
¶146 This court's orders accepting and rejecting amicus 
briefs have generally not explained the court's decision, and 
the orders have not been consistent.  Perhaps Northpointe's 
                                                 
4 Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 55 (2013).   
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
brief was rejected because Northpointe had an interest in the 
use of its tool.   
¶147 In contrast, in another order denying a motion to file 
an amicus brief (Attachment B), the amicus had no legally 
cognizable interest in the case.   
¶148 Yet in Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996), the court accepted an amicus brief filed by 
then-Assembly 
Speaker 
David 
T. 
Prosser 
arguing 
that 
the 
legislative enactment at issue in that case was constitutional.  
¶149 In a recent case addressing similar issues to those 
raised in Thompson, the court permitted an amicus to file a 
brief and raise issues that the parties did not address.  See 
Coyne v. Walker, No. 2013AP416, unpublished orders dated Sept. 
22, 2015 and October 1, 2015.    
¶150 Without providing an explanation for the court's 
acceptance or denial of amicus briefs, we provide no guidance to 
lawyers and other interested persons wishing to file amicus 
briefs in future cases.  The court should, in my opinion, take a 
more expansive view toward granting motions to file amicus 
briefs.   
¶151 For the reasons set forth, I concur and write 
separately. 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
ATTACHMENT A 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
 
ATTACHMENT B 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
 
No.  2015AP157-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1