Title: ADVISORY OPINION 2005 PA 71
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130589
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 2007

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 18, 2007 
In re REQUEST FOR ADVISORY 
OPINION REGARDING 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 2005 PA 71 
 
No. 130589 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J. 
Article 3, § 8 of the Michigan Constitution allows the Governor or either 
house of the Legislature to request the opinion of this Court “on important 
questions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of 
legislation . . . .” We granted the House of Representatives’ request to opine on 
the constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, MCL 168.523.  Of concern to the House is the 
constitutionality of the requirement that voters either present photo identification 
or sign an affidavit averring that the voter lacks photo identification before voting.    
We hold that the photo identification requirement contained in the statute is 
facially constitutional under the balancing test articulated by the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Supreme Court in Burdick v Takushi.1  The identification requirement is a 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction designed to preserve the purity of 
elections and to prevent abuses of the electoral franchise, as demanded by art 2, § 
4 of the Michigan Constitution, thereby preventing lawful voters from having their 
votes diluted by those cast by fraudulent voters.  Moreover, as no voter is required 
to incur the costs of obtaining a photo identification card as a condition of voting, 
the identification obligation imposed by MCL 168.523(1) cannot properly be 
characterized as an unconstitutional poll tax under the Twenty-fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. 
I. UNDERLYING BACKGROUND FACTS 
In 1996, our Legislature amended the Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 
et seq., to include § 523, which required a voter to present photo identification 
before voting. 
The 1996 amendment was nearly identical to the statutory 
provision at issue in this case.2  However, before the amendment became effective, 
an opinion of the Attorney General issued, concluding that the photo identification 
requirement in § 523 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 Specifically, the Attorney General 
1 504 US 428; 112 S Ct 2059; 119 L Ed 2d 245 (1992).  
2 See 1996 PA 583. 
3 See OAG, 1997-1998, No 6930, p 1 (January 29, 1997). We note in 
passing that OAG, No 6930 appears not to have been initiated in accordance with 
MCL 14.32, which requires the Attorney General to issue opinions only in 
(continued…) 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
opinion indicated that the photo identification requirement was “not necessary to 
further a compelling state interest” in the absence of evidence of “substantial voter 
fraud in Michigan” and that the requirement imposed “economic and logistical 
burdens” on those without photo identification.4  Therefore, although the law was 
passed by both houses and signed by the Governor, the Secretary of State has 
never complied with or enforced this validly enacted law.5 
Subsequent events brought renewed interest in election reform.  The 2000 
presidential election revealed highly publicized alleged deficiencies in the 
electoral system in several states.6  In an effort to address these deficiencies, 
Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, which imposed 
(…continued)  
response to “questions of law submitted to him by the legislature, or by either  
branch thereof . . . .”  
4 OAG No 6930, pp 3, 5. 
5 Relying on obiter dictum found in Traverse City School Dist v Attorney 
General, 384 Mich 390, 407 n 2; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), both the supporting and the 
opposing Attorney General maintain that opinions issued by the Attorney General 
are “binding upon state agencies.” Because the effect of an Attorney General 
opinion is beyond the scope of the advisory opinion, we decline to address the 
statutory or constitutional basis for the claim that opinions of the Attorney General 
are binding in the present opinion. Cf. East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent Co 
Tax Allocation Bd, 415 Mich 381; 330 NW2d 7 (1982). 
6 See the report of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform 
(Ford-Carter Commission), To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral 
Process (August 2001). The commission was “formed in the wake of the 2000 
election crisis” to “offer a bipartisan analysis” of election reform. 
 (accessed December 19, 2006).  
3  
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
minimum administration standards on state elections.7  HAVA requires that first­
time voters who register by mail present proof of identity in the form of photo 
identification or other alternative documentation.8  In addition, HAVA specifically 
indicates that its provisions establish minimum requirements, explicitly authorizing 
states to institute consistent “administration requirements that are more strict” than 
the federal requirements.9 
After the enactment of HAVA, the Commission on Federal Election 
Reform was formed to “assess HAVA’s implementation” and to “offer 
recommendations for further improvement.”10  The findings and recommendations 
of the commission were released in September 2005.  One recommendation 
proposed that voters provide photo identification in order to deter fraud and 
enhance ballot integrity.11  The commission noted that “[t]he electoral system 
7 42 USC 15301 through 15545. 
8 See 42 USC 15483(b)(2).  The statute permits a voter to present “current 
and valid photo identification” or “a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, 
government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name 
and address of the voter.” 
9 42 USC 15484 (emphasis added). 
10 See Commission on Federal Election Reform (hereinafter Carter-Baker 
Commission), Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, p 1 (September 19, 2005). 
This 21-member bipartisan commission was cochaired by former President Jimmy 
Carter and former United States Secretary of State James A. Baker, III. 
 (accessed December 19, 2006). 
11 Carter-Baker Commission, supra at 21. The Carter-Baker Commission 
recommended that states require voters to use the “REAL ID card” to vote.  The 
(continued…) 
4  
 
   
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or 
to confirm the identity of voters.  Photo IDs currently are needed to board a plane, 
enter federal buildings, and cash a check.  Voting is equally important.”12 
MCL 168.523, with its photo identification requirement, was amended by 
2005 PA 71. Concerned by the adverse Attorney General opinion regarding the 
previous enactment of § 523, the Michigan House of Representatives adopted a 
resolution requesting that this Court issue an advisory opinion regarding whether 
the photo identification requirements contained in 2005 PA 71 violate either the 
Michigan Constitution or the United States Constitution.13  We granted the 
request, asking the Attorney General to submit briefs and argue as both opponent 
and proponent of the issue.14 
II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
The question presented in this original proceeding, whether MCL 168.523 
is facially violative of either the Michigan Constitution or the United States 
(…continued)  
Real ID Act of 2005, PL 109-13, 2005 HR 1268, was enacted on May 11, 2005.  
The act requires that federal agencies accept only state-issued driver’s licenses and  
identification cards that meet stringent information requirements.   
12 Carter-Baker Commission, supra at 18. 
13 See 2006 House Journal 17 (Resolution No. 199, February 21, 2006). 
14 474 Mich 1230 (2006). To prevent confusion, the terms “supporting 
Attorney General” and “opposing Attorney General” will be used throughout this 
opinion to identify the briefs and argument submitted by the Attorney General as 
the proponent and opponent, respectively, of the constitutionality of 2005 PA 71. 
5  
 
   
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Constitution, is purely a question of law.  To the degree the provisions are 
congruous, this Court has previously construed Michigan’s equal protection 
provision15 to be coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause of the federal 
constitution.16 
A statute challenged on a constitutional basis is “clothed in a presumption 
of constitutionality,”17 and the burden of proving that a statute is unconstitutional 
rests with the party challenging it.18  A party challenging the facial 
constitutionality of a statute “faces an extremely rigorous standard,”19 and must 
show that “‘“no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be 
valid.”’”20 
15 Const 1963, art 1, § 2. 
16 US Const, Am XIV. Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 258; 615 NW2d 
218 (2000), citing Frame v Nehls, 452 Mich 171, 183; 550 NW2d 739 (1996), and 
Doe v Dep’t of Social Services, 439 Mich 650, 670-671; 487 NW2d 166 (1992). 
However, in Lind v Battle Creek, 470 Mich 230, 235; 681 NW2d 334 (2004) 
(Young, J., concurring), it was noted that Const 1963, art 1, § 2 contained specific 
antidiscrimination provisions not found in its federal counterpart.   
17 Cruz v Chevrolet Grey Iron Div of Gen Motors Corp, 398 Mich 117, 127; 
247 NW2d 764 (1976). 
18 DeRose v DeRose, 469 Mich 320; 666 NW2d 636 (2003); Tolksdorf v 
Griffith, 464 Mich 1; 626 NW2d 163 (2001); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341; 
612 NW2d 407 (2000). 
19 Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v Michigan, 459 Mich 291, 310; 586 NW2d 894 
(1998) (Taylor, J., dissenting).  
20 Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 543; 592 NW2d 53 (1999), quoting 
United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) 
(continued…) 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
As a preliminary matter, the opposing Attorney General claims that this 
Court lacks the constitutional authority to issue an advisory opinion in this case 
because the request for the advisory opinion was untimely.  Const 1963, art 3, § 8 
provides that either house of the Legislature or the Governor may request an 
advisory opinion regarding the constitutionality of legislation “after [the 
legislation] has been enacted into law but before its effective date.”   
The opposing Attorney General maintains that, because 2005 PA 71 was an 
amendment of 1996 PA 583, MCL 8.3u dictates that the effective date of 2005 PA 
71 was March 31, 1997, the effective date of 1996 PA 583.21  Essentially, the 
opposing Attorney General claims that Const 1963, art 3, § 8 cannot be satisfied 
because the effective date of the public act occurred eight years before 2005 PA 71 
(…continued)  
(citation omitted.). A facial challenge is a claim that the law is “invalid in toto ­
and therefore incapable of any valid application . . . .”  Steffel v Thompson, 415 US  
452, 474; 94 S Ct 1209; 39 L Ed 2d 505 (1974).  
The other type of constitutional challenge is an “as applied” challenge. An 
“as applied” challenge considers the specific application of a facially valid law to 
individual facts. Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248; 615 NW2d 218 (2000); Boddie 
v Connecticut, 401 US 371; 91 S Ct 780; 28 L Ed 2d 113 (1971).  An “as applied” 
challenge is not possible at this juncture, as the statute has yet to be enforced. 
21 MCL 8.3u provides: 
The provisions of any law or statute which is re-enacted, 
amended or revised, so far as they are the same as those of prior 
laws, shall be construed as a continuation of such laws and not as 
new enactments.  If any provision of a law is repealed and in 
substance re-enacted, a reference in any other law to the repealed 
provision shall be deemed a reference to the re-enacted provision. 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
existed. 
This misconstrues MCL 8.3u, which merely requires that once a 
reenacted, amended, or revised law becomes operational, it is treated as a 
continuation of the prior law. It is axiomatic that a statute becomes operational 
only upon its effective date.22  Moreover, MCL 8.3 indicates that MCL 8.3u is to 
be observed “unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the legislature.” The manifest intent of the Legislature indicates that the 
effective date of 2005 PA 71 was January 1, 2007. Because the House of 
Representatives requested an advisory opinion well before that date, this Court 
indisputably has jurisdiction under art 3, § 8 to render an advisory opinion in this 
matter. 
III. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statute at issue, MCL 168.523, provides in relevant part: 
(1) At each election, before being given a ballot, each 
registered elector offering to vote shall identify himself or herself by 
presenting an official state identification card . . . , an operator’s or 
chauffeur’s license . . . , or other generally recognized picture 
identification card and by executing an application showing his or 
her signature or mark and address of residence in the presence of an 
election official. . . . If the elector does not have an official state 
identification card, operator’s or chauffeur’s license as required in 
this subsection, or other generally recognized picture identification 
card, the individual shall sign an affidavit to that effect before an 
election inspector and be allowed to vote as otherwise provided in 
this act. However, an elector being allowed to vote without the 
22 Const 1963, art 4, § 27 (“No act shall take effect until the expiration of 
90 days from the end of the session at which it was passed, but the legislature may 
give immediate effect to acts by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and 
serving in each house.”). 
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identification required under this subsection is subject to challenge 
as provided in section 727. 
The statutory provision requires that a registered elector perform two 
distinct acts before being given a ballot. First, the elector must present photo 
identification in the form of a driver’s license, state identification card, or “other 
generally recognized picture identification card.”23  Second, the elector must 
execute, in the presence of an election official, an application bearing the elector’s 
signature and address. The statute specifically provides that in the event that an 
elector does not have the necessary photo identification, an elector need only “sign 
an affidavit to that effect” before the elector shall “be allowed to vote.”  The 
statute indicates, however, that an elector voting without identification is “subject 
to challenge” under the challenge procedures outlined in MCL 168.727.24 
23 Because, in reliance on OAG No 6930, the Secretary of State has never 
enforced the statute or promulgated rules and regulations, there is no basis for this 
Court to speculate regarding what type of identification might eventually 
constitute “generally recognized picture identification . . . .”  The duty to 
promulgate rules and regulations concerning acceptable alternate photo 
identification lies exclusively with the Secretary of State under MCL 168.31(1).   
24 Any voter, including those voters presenting photo identification, may be 
challenged pursuant to MCL 168.727.  The statute imposes differing requirements 
on different challengers. An election inspector is required to challenge a ballot 
applicant “if the inspector knows or has good reason to suspect that the applicant 
is not a qualified and registered elector of the precinct, or if a challenge appears in 
connection with the applicant’s name in the registration book.”  A registered 
elector may challenge an applicant “if the elector knows or has good reason to 
suspect that individual is not a registered elector in that precinct.” MCL 
168.727(1).  Those who challenge voters may not “challenge indiscriminately” or 
“without good cause,” and face criminal sanctions if qualified voters are 
challenged for the purpose of annoyance or delay. MCL 168.727(3). 
(continued…) 
9  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The opposing Attorney General maintains that voters without photo 
identification are impermissibly burdened because the phrase “subject to” 
indicates that the challenge procedure is not discretionary, but is compulsory 
whenever a voter seeks to vote without photo identification.  However, this claim 
is not supported by the language of the statute.  The plain meaning of the phrase 
“subject to” connotes possibility, and in this context is appropriately defined as 
meaning “open or exposed to.”25  Moreover, another provision of § 523(1), a mere 
three sentences from the provision at issue, describes a situation in which the 
application of the challenge procedure is clearly mandatory, as indicated by use of 
the phrase “shall be challenged.”26  Here, the Legislature chose to use the 
particular phrase “subject to challenge” rather than the mandatory phrase “shall be 
(…continued) 
Once challenged, a voter is required to swear to answer truthfully and 
answer questions “concerning his qualifications as an elector . . . .”  MCL 168.729. 
If the challenged voter answers qualification questions satisfactorily, the 
challenged voter “shall be entitled to receive a ballot and vote.”  The ballot cast by 
a challenged voter is marked (and the mark subsequently concealed) with a 
number corresponding to the voter’s poll list number, and is counted as a regular 
ballot. MCL 168.745; MCL 168.746. The marked ballot becomes relevant only 
in the event of litigation surrounding a contested election, where the challenged 
voter’s qualifications to vote are disputed. MCL 168.747; MCL 168.748. 
25 Webster’s New Universal Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1996), p 
1893. 
26 “If the signature or an item of information [from the voter registration 
list] does not correspond, the vote of the person shall be challenged, and the same 
procedure shall be followed as provided in this act for the challenging of an 
elector.” MCL 168.523(1) (emphasis added). 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
challenged.” The fact that the Legislature used both the mandatory and permissive 
language concerning challenges of electors within the same statutory provision 
suggests that there is no basis for concluding that it intended “subject to” to be the 
equivalent to “shall.” We presume that the Legislature intended the meaning of 
the words used in the statute, and we may not substitute alternative language for 
that used by the Legislature.27  Therefore, we interpret the last sentence of § 
523(1) to indicate that an elector voting without photo identification faces the 
possibility of challenge under § 727, but that the challenge procedure is not 
compulsory. Rather, utilizing the plain language of § 727, any voter, including 
those without photo identification, may be challenged, but only if the person 
challenging the voter “knows or has good reason to suspect” that the voter is not a 
registered elector of that precinct.28 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
A. NATURE OF THE COMPETING INTERESTS  
The “right to vote” is not expressly enumerated in either our state or the 
federal constitution.29  Rather, it has been held that the right to vote is an implicit 
27 People v Crucible Steel Co of America, 150 Mich 563; 114 NW 350 
(1907); Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92; 611 NW2d 309 (2000); Robertson v 
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732; 641 NW2d 567 (2002). 
28 There is no basis to conclude that a voter who merely executes an 
affidavit, without more, presents a challenger with “good reason to suspect” that 
the voter is not a registered elector of a precinct. 
29 See San Antonio Independent School Dist v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 35 n 
78; 93 S Ct 1278; 36 L Ed 2d 16 (1973) (“[T]he right to vote, per se, is not a 
constitutionally protected right . . . .”). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“‘fundamental political right’” that is “‘preservative of all rights.’”30  As the 
United States Supreme Court noted, “a citizen has a constitutionally protected 
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the 
jurisdiction.”31  However, “[t]his ‘equal right to vote’ is not absolute . . . .”32 
Balanced against a citizen’s “right to vote” are the constitutional commands 
given by the people of Michigan to the Legislature in Const 1963, art 2, § 4, which 
states in relevant part: 
The legislature shall enact laws to regulate the time, place and 
manner of all nominations and elections, except as otherwise 
provided in this constitution or in the constitution and laws of the 
United States. The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity 
of elections, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against 
abuses of the elective franchise, and to provide for a system of voter 
registration and absentee voting. [Emphasis added.] 
Under art 2, § 4, in addition to the legislative responsibility of regulating 
the “time, place and manner” of elections, the Legislature has been specifically 
commanded by the people of Michigan to “preserve the purity of elections” and 
30 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 562; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964) 
(citation omitted). 
31 Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 336; 92 S Ct 995; 31 L Ed 2d 274 
(1972). 
32 Id. (States may “impose voter qualifications,” and “regulate access to the 
franchise in other ways.”)  See also Carrington v Rash, 380 US 89, 91; 85 S Ct 
775; 13 L Ed 2d 675 (1965) (noting that states have historically possessed “‘broad 
powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be 
exercised,’” quoting Lassiter v Northampton Co Bd of Elections, 360 US 45, 50; 
79 S Ct 985; 3 L Ed 2d 1072 [1959]).  
12  
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“to guard against abuses of the elective franchise.”  These provisions have been a 
part of our constitution for almost as long as Michigan has been a state.33 
As this Court noted in the nineteenth century, the purpose of a law enacted 
pursuant to these constitutional directives “is not to prevent any qualified elector 
from voting, or unnecessarily to hinder or impair his privilege. It is for the purpose 
of preventing fraudulent voting.” 34  Under the Legislature’s authority to “preserve 
the purity of elections” and “to guard against abuses of the elective franchise,” the 
Legislature may “regulate, but cannot destroy, the enjoyment of the elective 
franchise.”35 
In addition to the specific legislative mandate to prevent fraudulent voting 
contained in the Michigan Constitution, federal jurisprudence has long recognized 
33 The constitutional authority to prevent fraudulent voting was first given 
to the Legislature in the 1850 Michigan Constitution. See Const 1850, art 7, § 6 
(“Laws may be passed to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses 
of the elective franchise.”). The 1908 Constitution altered the language of the 
provision to make clear that the duty was obligatory, explicitly providing that 
“[l]aws shall be passed to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses 
of the elective franchise . . . .”  Const 1908 art 3, § 8.  When the 1963 Constitution 
was ratified by the people, the responsibility to pass laws preventing fraudulent 
voting was explicitly vested in the Legislature, and the Address to the People 
pointedly stated that “[t]he legislature is specifically directed to enact corrupt 
practices legislation.” 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3366 
(emphasis added). 
34 Attorney General ex rel Conely v Detroit Common Council, 78 Mich 545, 
559; 44 NW 388 (1889) (emphasis added). 
35 Brown v Kent Co Bd of Election Comm’rs, 174 Mich 477, 479; 140 NW 
642 (1913) (emphasis added).  
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
that a state has the authority to regulate elections under the federal constitution as 
well as a “compelling interest in preventing voter fraud.”36  Article I, § 4 of the 
federal constitution provides that states may prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives . . . .”37  In Smiley v 
Holm,38 the United States Supreme Court discussed the scope of state authority to 
regulate federal elections under art 1, § 4: 
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace 
authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not 
only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, 
supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and 
corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and 
canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, 
to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards 
which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the 
fundamental right involved. 
Federal jurisprudence has likewise recognized that states retain the power to 
regulate state and local elections, subject to federal constitutional and statutory 
limitations.39 
36 Purcell v Gonzalez, 549 US ___, ___; 127 S Ct 5, 7; 166 L Ed 2d 1, 4 
(2006). See also Burson v Freeman, 504 US 191, 199; 112 S Ct 1846; 119 L Ed 2d 
5 (1992); Rosario v Rockefeller, 410 US 752; 93 S Ct 1245; 36 L Ed 2d 1 (1973). 
37 US Const, art I, § 4, cl 1. 
38 285 US 355, 366; 52 S Ct 397; 76 L Ed 795 (1932) (emphasis added). 
39 Burdick, supra at 433; Tashjian v Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 
US 208, 217; 107 S Ct 544; 93 L Ed 2d 514 (1986); Sugarman v Dougall, 413 US 
634; 93 S Ct 2842; 37 L Ed 2d 853 (1973); Boyd v Nebraska ex rel Thayer, 143 
US 135, 161; 12 S Ct 375; 36 L Ed 103 (1892) (“Each State has the power to 
(continued…) 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to possessing the constitutional authority to regulate elections, 
the United States Supreme Court has also recognized that states have a compelling 
interest in preserving the integrity of their election processes, including an interest 
in “ensuring that an individual’s right to vote is not undermined by fraud in the 
election process.”40  As the Supreme Court observed in Purcell:41 
Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is 
essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.  Voter 
fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds 
distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes 
will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. 
“The right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of 
the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly 
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”  
Thus, fraudulent voting effectively dilutes the votes of lawful voters.  By 
instituting requirements to guard against abuse of the elective franchise, a state 
protects the right of lawful voters to exercise their full share of this franchise.  
(…continued)  
prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be  
chosen . . . .”).  
40 Burson, supra at 199. 
41 Purcell, supra, 549 US at ___; 127 S Ct at 7; 166 L Ed 2d at 4, quoting 
Reynolds v Sims, supra at 555. Voter disenfranchisement through vote dilution is 
a problem that is also addressed by the Voting Rights Act, 42 USC 1973. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to protect that compelling interest, a state may enact “generally 
applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of 
the electoral process,”42 because 
[c]ommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the 
conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring 
elections; “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial 
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some 
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.”[43] 
In sum, while a citizen’s right to vote is fundamental, this right is not 
unfettered. It competes with the state’s compelling interest in preserving the 
integrity of its elections and the Legislature’s constitutional obligation to preserve 
the purity of elections and to guard against abuses of the elective franchise, 
including ensuring that lawful voters not have their votes diluted.    
B. STANDARD OF SCRUTINY 
i. FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Generally, where a law classifies by a suspect category, or “where a law 
classifies in such a way as to infringe constitutionally protected fundamental 
42 Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 788 n 9; 103 S Ct 1564; 75 L Ed 2d 
547 (1983). 
43 Burdick, supra at 433 (citation omitted). See also Timmons v Twin Cities 
Area New Party, 520 US 351, 358; 117 S Ct 1364; 137 L Ed 2d 589 (1997) 
(holding “that States may, and inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of 
parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election and campaign-related disorder”). 
16  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rights, heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is required.”44 
However, in the context of assessing a challenge to the constitutionality of an 
election law, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that every 
election law must be evaluated under strict scrutiny analysis.45  The Court  
recognized that “to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require 
that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . 
would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated 
equitably and efficiently.”46  Rather, the Court has held that a “flexible standard” 
is applicable: 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must 
weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward 
by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” 
taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”   
Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the 
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a 
challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment 
44 Attorney General of New York v Soto-Lopez, 476 US 898, 906 n 6; 106 S 
Ct 2317; 90 L Ed 2d 899 (1986). Suspect categories include race, alienage, or 
national origin. 
45 Under a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review, “[t]he State 
must show that the ‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’” Burson, supra at 198 (quoting 
Perry Ed Ass’n v Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 US 37, 45; 103 S Ct 948; 74 
L Ed 2d 794 [1983]). 
46 Burdick, supra at 433. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected 
to “severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to 
advance a state interest of compelling importance.”  But when a state 
election law provision imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of 
voters, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally 
sufficient to justify” the restrictions. [47] 
Thus, the first step in determining whether an election law contravenes the 
constitution is to determine the nature and magnitude of the claimed restriction 
inflicted by the election law on the right to vote, weighed against the precise 
interest identified by the state.  If the burden on the right to vote is severe, then the 
regulation must be “narrowly drawn” to further a compelling state interest. 
However, if the restriction imposed is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, then the 
law is upheld as warranted by the important regulatory interest identified by the 
state. The United States Supreme Court has stressed that each inquiry is fact and 
circumstance specific, because “[n]o bright line separates permissible election­
related regulation from unconstitutional infringements . . . .”48 
Like every election regulation, MCL 168.523(1) imposes to some degree a 
burden on an elector.49  However, the photo identification requirement contained 
47 Id. at 434 (internal citation omitted). 
48 Timmons, supra at 359. See also Storer v Brown, 415 US 724, 730; 94 S 
Ct 1274; 39 L Ed 2d 714 (1974) (noting that there is “no litmus-paper test for 
separating those [election] restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious 
under the Equal Protection Clause”). 
49 As the Supreme Court has observed, all election laws “invariably impose 
some burden upon individual voters.” Burdick, supra at 433. In Michigan, a voter 
(continued…) 
18  
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
in the statute does not impose a severe burden upon an elector’s right to vote. For 
the overwhelming majority of registered voters in Michigan, the statute merely 
requires the presentation of photo identification that the voter already possesses.50 
The opposing Attorney General does not claim that requiring an elector to identify 
himself imposes a severe burden on the right to vote, nor claims that the act of 
(…continued) 
is required to meet minimum age and residency qualifications to register as an 
elector and must register to vote by executing a registration affidavit in accordance 
with MCL 168.495. The voter is required to vote at the correct polling place 
during the hours the polls are open (unless they qualify for an absentee ballot), 
wait in line, execute an application with the voter’s signature and residence, and 
utilize whatever voting machine is available at the polling place.  Moreover, the 
voter may not have his write-in vote counted unless the candidate has filed a 
declaration of intent under MCL 168.737a.  Michigan’s various election 
requirements invariably impose some burden on the voter.  However, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Marston v Lewis, 410 US 679, 680; 93 S Ct 1211; 35 L 
Ed 2d 627 (1973), “a person does not have a [state or] federal constitutional right 
to walk up to a voting place on election day and demand a ballot.”  Rather, 
Michigan has a compelling interest in ensuring that its election processes are 
honest, orderly, and efficient. 
50 According to an affidavit submitted by the Director of the Bureau of 
Driver and Vehicle Records for the Michigan Department of State, approximately 
95 percent of registered voters in the state of Michigan already possess either a 
driver’s license or a state identification card.  Of the remaining five percent of 
registered voters, it is unknown how many possess “other generally recognized 
picture identification . . . .” As previously indicated, see n 23, the Secretary of 
State has not promulgated rules regarding what kind of “alternative” photo 
identification will satisfy this requirement. 
19  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
reaching into one’s purse or wallet and presenting photo identification before 
being issued a ballot imposes a severe burden on the right to vote.51 
Rather, the opposing Attorney General maintains that the statute is facially 
unconstitutional because an impermissibly severe burden falls on those registered 
voters who, for whatever reason, do not possess the necessary photo identification. 
According to this argument, those without photo identification, particularly the 
“poor, racial and ethnic minorities, elderly, and the disabled,” are unable to “gain 
free and unfettered access to the ballot box.”52  However, the statute explicitly 
provides that an elector without photo identification need only sign an affidavit in 
the presence of an election inspector before being “allowed to vote.”  The 
opposing Attorney General fails to explain why the act of signing an affidavit in 
lieu of presenting photo identification imposes a severe burden on the right to 
vote.53  Surely, affixing a signature to such an affidavit is no greater a burden than 
affixing a signature to the required election application under MCL 168.523. 
Moreover, the affidavit alternative to the photo identification requirement imposes 
51 Historically, some mechanism of voter identification has been an integral 
part of the voting process. Harris, Election Administration in the United States 
(Brookings Institution Press, 1934), ch 6, pp 221-222.  
52 Opposing Attorney General brief, p 12. 
53 We have already considered and rejected the opposing Attorney 
General’s argument that the challenge procedure delineated in MCL 168.727 is 
required to be applied to every voter who utilizes the affidavit alternative.  All 
voters, without regard to whether they possess photo identification, face the 
possibility of challenge pursuant to the statute.  See n 24 of this opinion. 
20  
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
less of a burden than is imposed on those voters who are required to execute a 
sworn statement before casting a provisional ballot.54  While both voters are 
required to execute sworn statements, a provisional ballot “is not tabulated on 
election day”;55 instead, the ballot is not tabulated until the provisional voter’s 
eligibility is verified within six days after the election.56  There is simply no basis 
to conclude that requiring an elector to sign an affidavit as an alternative to 
presenting photo identification imposes a severe burden on the right to vote. 
Furthermore, the application of a “strict standard would be especially 
inappropriate in a case such as this, in which the right to vote is on both sides of 
the ledger.”57 This is so because fraudulent voting dilutes the vote of legitimate 
voters.58 
The photo identification provision contained in MCL 168.523 imposes only 
a “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction” on the right to vote that is warranted 
by the precise interest identified by the state—Michigan’s compelling regulatory 
54 A provisional ballot is cast when “an individual who is not listed on the 
voter registration list” seeks to cast a ballot. MCL 168.523a(2). HAVA requires 
that a voter sign a sworn statement as a condition of casting a provisional ballot. 
42 USC 15482(a)(2); 42 USC 15483(b)(2)(B).  
55 MCL 168.523a(5). 
56 MCL 168.813(1). By contrast, a vote cast pursuant to the affidavit 
provision of MCL 168.523 is tabulated on the day of the election like every other 
vote. 
57 Crawford v Marion Co Election Bd, 472 F3d 949, 952 (CA 7, 2007). 
58 Purcell, supra 549 US at ___; 127 S Ct at 7; 166 L Ed 2d at 4-5. 
21  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
interest in preventing voter fraud as well as enforcement of the constitutional 
directive contained in art 2, § 4 to “preserve the purity of elections” and “to guard 
against abuses of the elective franchise.”  The identification requirement applies 
evenhandedly to every registered voter in the state of Michigan without making 
distinctions with regard to any class or characteristic. In every circumstance, a 
registered voter need only take one of two actions in order to cast an in-person 
ballot–either present photo identification or sign an affidavit.  The affidavit 
alternative is equally available to a voter who chooses not to obtain identification, 
a voter whose faith precludes him from obtaining photo identification, a voter who 
cannot obtain identification, or a voter who simply lost his identification.    
Moreover, the statute is a reasonable means to prevent the occurrence of in­
person voter fraud. As our Secretary of State has indicated, “without a personal 
identification requirement it is nearly impossible to detect in-person voter fraud.”59 
In-person voter fraud is, by its very nature, covert.60  In order to prevent in-person 
voter fraud, it is reasonable to require the person seeking to cast a ballot to provide 
59 Letter from Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land to Attorney General 
Michael A. Cox, dated April 20, 2006.  See also Crawford, supra at 953, 
describing in detail the “extreme difficulty of apprehending a voter impersonator.” 
60 See Burson, supra at 208. “Voter intimidation and election fraud are 
successful precisely because they are difficult to detect.”  
22  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reliable identification that he is, in fact, the individual registered to vote.61  The 
prevention of fraud in the first instance is critical, because it is impossible to 
remedy the harm inflicted by the fraudulently cast ballot by correcting the vote 
count, as our constitution requires that ballots remain secret.62  Conducting the 
election anew is the only remedy available to purge the taint of a fraudulently cast 
ballot, a solution described as “imperfect” and having a “negative impact on voter 
turnout.”63 
The opposing Attorney General argues that MCL 168.523(1) fails even 
under a lower standard of scrutiny because in-person voter fraud “is very rare”; 
thus, the state’s interest in preventing fraud is “illusory” because there is no 
significant evidence of in-person voter fraud.64  Moreover, the opposing Attorney 
61 In-person voter fraud could include impersonation of a registered voter, 
casting a vote in the name of a deceased voter, or casting a vote in the name of a 
fictional registered voter. 
62 See Const 1963, art 2, § 4. In fact, a voter’s ballot is required to be 
rejected if any part of the ballot is exposed to any person. MCL 168.738(2).  If the 
voter’s ballot is rejected for exposure, the “elector shall not be allowed to vote at 
the election.” Id. 
63 Burson, supra at 209. 
64 Opposing Attorney General brief, pp 20, 21.  See also Overton, Voter 
identification, 105 Mich L R 631 (2007) (urging on policy grounds that lawmakers 
await better empirical studies before imposing potentially antidemocratic measures 
and that the judiciary should demand statistical data.).  Given that voter fraud is 
both covert and criminal, it is hard to imagine how an “empirical study” of the 
kind demanded by the opponents of voter identification requirements could be 
designed or executed. 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General argues that the statute does nothing to address or prevent fraudulent 
absentee voting, “where fraud is known to exist.”  However, there is no 
requirement that the Legislature “prove” that significant in-person voter fraud 
exists before it may permissibly act to prevent it.  The United States Supreme 
Court has explicitly stated that “elaborate, empirical verification of the 
weightiness of the State’s asserted justifications” is not required.65  Rather, a state 
is permitted to take prophylactic action to respond to potential electoral problems: 
To require States to prove actual [harm] as a predicate to the 
imposition of reasonable . . . restrictions would invariably lead to 
endless court battles over the sufficiency of the “evidence” 
marshaled by a State to prove the predicate.  Such a requirement 
would necessitate that a State’s political system sustain some level 
of damage before the legislature could take corrective action. 
Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential 
deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than 
reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not 
significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.[66] 
Therefore, the state is not required to provide any proof, much less “significant 
proof,” of in-person voter fraud before it may permissibly take steps to prevent it.   
Furthermore, the Legislature is not obligated under the Equal Protection 
Clause to address at once every point at which fraud might occur.67  Even in the 
65 Timmons, supra, 520 US at 364. 
66 Munro v Socialist Workers Party, 479 US 189, 195-196; 107 S Ct 533; 
93 L Ed 2d 499 (1986). 
67 The Equal Protection Clause “does not compel . . . legislatures to prohibit 
all like evils, or none.” United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 151; 
58 S Ct 778; 82 L Ed 1234 (1938).  
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
context of voting regulations, the Legislature is “allowed to take reform ‘one step 
at a time,’” and is not required “to cover every evil that might conceivably have 
been attacked.”68  Rather, the Legislature is given the discretion to weigh the 
perceived harm and determine ameliorative priorities without running afoul of 
equal protection guarantees:69 
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and 
proportions, requiring different remedies.  Or so the legislature may 
think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to 
the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative 
mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a 
remedy there, neglecting the others.  The prohibition of the Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
goes 
no 
further 
than 
the 
invidious 
discrimination.[70] 
Because we conclude that the obligation imposed by the statute of either 
presenting photo identification or signing an affidavit is not a severe burden on the 
68 McDonald v Chicago Bd of Election Comm’rs, 394 US 802, 809; 89 S Ct 
1404; 22 L Ed 2d 739 (1969) (citation omitted). 
69 The opposing Attorney General also argues that MCL 168.523(1) is not 
justified because “an effective framework for detecting and deterring voter fraud is 
already in place in Michigan.”  Opposing Attorney General brief, p 21.  In support 
of this argument, counsel cites MCL 168.932a.  This statute, which was enacted 
by 1996 PA 583, imposes criminal penalties for those who assume a fictitious 
name or impersonate another for the purposes of voting.  However, that Michigan 
criminalizes in-person voter fraud does not address Michigan’s undisputed interest 
in preventing fraud in the first instance, nor do criminal sanctions provide a means 
of detecting fraud. 
Moreover, it is unclear how the imposition of criminal 
penalties could remedy the harm inflicted on our electoral system by a 
fraudulently cast ballot. 
70 Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc, 348 US 483, 489; 75 S Ct 
461; 99 L Ed 563 (1955) (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).  
25  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
right to vote, and that the statute imposes only a reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restriction on the election process in furtherance of Michigan’s compelling 
regulatory interest in preventing voter fraud and enforcing art 2, § 4 to “preserve 
the purity of elections” and “to guard against abuses of the elective franchise” by 
ensuring that lawful voters not have their votes diluted, we conclude that the 
statute is facially constitutional under the flexible standard articulated in Burdick, 
supra. 
ii. MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION 
The opposing Attorney General argues that the Michigan Constitution 
grants a higher level of protection and that the “flexible test” articulated in Burdick 
is not consistent with Const 1963, art 1, § 2. First, the opposing Attorney General 
notes that, in contrast to its federal counterpart, the Michigan equal protection 
provision contains an express recognition of “political rights.”  Thus, counsel 
maintains that any regulation affecting “political rights” necessitates strict scrutiny 
analysis. Second, citing Wilkins v Ann Arbor City Clerk71 and Michigan State 
UAW Community Action Program Council v Secretary of State,72 the opposing 
Attorney General maintains that the Michigan Constitution requires that every law 
that applies even a de minimis burden on the right to vote must be analyzed under 
strict scrutiny. 
71 385 Mich 670; 189 NW2d 423 (1971).    
72 387 Mich 506; 198 NW2d 385 (1972).   
26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
While Const 1963, art 1, § 2 does contain the term “political rights,” that 
term does not stand in isolation.73  We have discovered no authority, and counsel 
has revealed none, holding that the term “political rights” has ever been 
interpreted as providing an unfettered right to vote divorced from any type of time, 
place, or manner restriction. 
Rather, reading the constitutional provision in 
context, it provides that no person shall be denied “the enjoyment of his civil or 
political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of 
religion, race, color or national origin.” (Emphasis added.) However, as the 
opposing Attorney General acknowledges in its brief, the distinction made in MCL 
168.523(1) is between “those who possess photo identification and those who do 
not.”74  Nothing in the statute denies an elector the right to vote, and certainly does 
not do so because of religion, race, color, or national origin.  Accordingly, Const 
1963, art 1, § 2 provides no support for the claim that strict scrutiny must be 
applied to every election regulation. 
73 The term “political rights” is found in the nondiscrimination clause of art 
1, § 2 rather than the Equal Protection Clause. Const 1963, art 1, § 2 states in full: 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; 
nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of 
religion, race, color or national origin.  The legislature shall 
implement this section by appropriate legislation. 
74 Opposing Attorney General brief, p 8. 
27  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Likewise, the cases cited by the opposing Attorney General do not support 
the claim that the Michigan Constitution requires that every election law be 
subject to strict scrutiny review.  In Wilkins, supra, this Court considered the 
constitutionality of MCL 168.11(b), a statute that precluded students from 
establishing residency for the purposes of voter registration.  Previous caselaw 
construing the statute held that a student could register to vote by overcoming a 
rebuttable presumption that the student was not a resident in the locale of the 
institution of learning.75  Relying exclusively on federal authority, Wilkins held that 
the statute violated both federal and state due process and equal protection 
provisions. The Court held that the statute violated due process because there 
were no consistently applied standards by which a student could overcome the 
presumption of nonresidency.  
In its equal protection analysis, Wilkins held that strict scrutiny was the 
applicable review standard, noting that the “compelling interest test has been 
applied with one exception to all of the recent [federal] voting cases . . . .”76 
Rejecting the argument that an absolute denial of the right to vote was required to 
invoke strict scrutiny, the Wilkins Court held that strict scrutiny was appropriate 
because it was sufficient that the students could show “a burden” on their right to 
75 Wolcott v Holcomb, 97 Mich 361; 56 NW 837(1893); People v Osborn, 
170 Mich 143; 135 NW 921 (1912); Attorney General ex rel Miller v Miller, 266 
Mich 127; 253 NW 241 (1934).   
76 Wilkins, supra at 681. 
28  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vote.77  Applying the heightened standard, the Wilkins Court declared the statutory 
provision unconstitutional because it was not necessary to advance the state’s 
interest in “promoting a concerned and interested electorate” and in “insuring that 
students will not vote twice.”78 
In Michigan State UAW, supra, this Court considered the constitutionality 
of MCL 168.509. The statute required that electors who had not voted or taken 
other specified action within the previous two years have their voter registration 
suspended, unless the elector completed an “application for continuation,” bearing 
the elector’s signature, address, and mother’s maiden name.79  In resolving the 
case, the Court dealt “with only one issue”–whether the statute violated Const 
1963, art 2, § 1 by imposing an additional voter qualification.80  Inexplicably, the 
77 Id. at 684. 
78 Id. at 687, 685. 
79 Michigan State UAW, supra at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  A notice of 
suspension, along with the application for continuation, was mailed to the elector’s 
address 30 days before the elector’s registration was suspended.  
80 Michigan State UAW, supra at 513. Const 1963, art 2,  § 1, provides: 
Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 
21 years, who had resided in this state six months, and who meets 
the requirements of local residence provided by law, shall be an 
elector and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise 
provided in this constitution.  The legislature shall define residence 
for voting purposes. 
29  
 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan State UAW Court utilized the strict scrutiny standard applicable in the 
equal protection context, art 1, § 2, in analyzing the art 2, § 1 question.81 
In Michigan State UAW, the Attorney General argued that the statutory 
provision was permissible under art 2, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution, discussed 
supra. However, in analyzing this constitutional provision, the Court addressed 
only the Legislature’s authority to provide for voter registration, and did not 
address the explicit directive to preserve the purity of elections and guard against 
abuses of the elective franchise.  The Attorney General also argued that the act of 
returning the application for continuation was a “small price to pay.”  In response, 
the Court cited Wilkins and two United States Supreme Court cases in support of 
the conclusion that “[a]ny burden, however small, will not be permitted unless 
there is demonstrated a compelling state interest.”82  The Court concluded by 
holding that, because the Legislature had other statutes in place that served to 
prevent fraudulent voting, the state “failed to demonstrate a compelling state 
interest” and the statute was “unconstitutional under Const 1963, art 2, § 1,” as 
adding an additional elector qualification.83 
81 In support of the application of strict scrutiny to art 2, § 1, a provision 
setting forth voter qualifications, the Michigan State UAW Court exclusively cited 
equal protection cases, including Wilkins, supra. 
82 Michigan State UAW, supra at 516. 
83 Id. at 520. 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
Properly read, neither Wilkins nor Michigan State UAW stands for the 
proposition that Michigan’s Equal Protection Clause, in contrast to the federal 
Equal Protection Clause, requires the application of strict scrutiny review to every 
election law. 
Wilkins relied exclusively on United State Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in construing the Michigan equal protection provision as requiring 
the application of a strict scrutiny standard whenever “a burden” was placed on the 
right to vote.  Notably, nothing in the Wilkins decision purported to differentiate 
between the state and federal equal protection provisions; rather, the provisions 
were read as coterminous for the purposes of the Wilkins analysis. However, as 
Burdick subsequently clarified, blanket application of strict scrutiny review to 
every election law was not constitutionally required under the federal Equal 
Protection Clause; rather, strict scrutiny review was constitutionally required only 
where an election law imposed a severe burden on the right to vote.  Because 
Wilkins relied on a construction of the federal Equal Protection Clause that was 
subsequently repudiated by Burdick, its analytical underpinning has been 
destroyed and is of no utility in construing the Michigan Constitution.  
Similarly, Michigan State UAW does not support the opposing Attorney 
General’s claim that the Michigan Constitution requires strict scrutiny review of 
all election regulations. The Michigan State UAW opinion did not purport to 
examine or rely on the Michigan Equal Protection Clause in its analysis at all. At 
issue in Michigan State UAW was the constitutionality of a voter registration 
regulation. It is unclear why the Court analyzed the voter registration regulation as 
31  
 
    
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
an elector qualification issue under art 2, § 1, because the Legislature 
unquestionably possesses explicit constitutional authority over voter registration 
pursuant to art 2, § 4.84  Regardless, the Court borrowed the strict scrutiny 
standard, a doctrine rooted in equal protection principles, and applied it to the 
issue of whether a voter registration provision imposed an additional elector 
qualification under art 2, § 1.85 
Of significance, neither Wilkins nor Michigan State UAW considered or 
examined the effect of the constitutional directive found in art 2, § 4, requiring the 
84 Const 1963, art 2, § 1 sets forth the minimum characteristics that electors 
must possess before they become qualified to vote “except as otherwise 
provided”—citizenship, age, and residency.  Const 1963, art 2, § 4 vests in the 
Legislature the exclusive authority to regulate the time, place, and manner of 
elections, as well as the authority to provide for a system of voter registration. 
Thus, contrary to Justice Kelly’s assertions, both constitutional provisions play a 
vital and necessary role in a citizen’s right to cast a ballot on election day.  
85 Justice Kelly also relies on Socialist Workers Party v Secretary of State, 
412 Mich 571; 317 NW2d 1 (1982), to argue that Const 1963, art 1, § 2 requires 
strict scrutiny. 
However, Socialist Workers Party never concludes that the 
Michigan Constitution independently requires strict scrutiny.  Instead, this Court 
determined that strict scrutiny would apply under the First and Fourteenth 
amendments of the federal constitution, citing federal caselaw.  See id. at 587-590. 
After concluding that the law at issue violated the First and Fourteenth 
amendments, this Court summarily held that art 1, § 2 had been violated as well, 
relying on the “‘frequent past expressions of this Court that the Michigan 
Constitution “secures the same right of equal protection” as is secured by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”  Id. at 600 n 21, quoting 
Governor v State Treasurer, 390 Mich 389, 395; 212 NW2d 711 (1973) (T.G. 
Kavanagh, J., concurring), quoting Fox v Employment Security Comm, 379 Mich 
579, 588; 153 NW2d 644 (1967).  Because Socialist Workers Party expressly 
stated that it did not rely on the independent force of the Michigan Constitution, 
Socialist Workers Party does not indicate that art 1, § 2 requires strict scrutiny. 
32  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legislature to “enact laws to preserve the purity of elections” and to “guard 
against abuses of the elective franchise.” This oversight is of critical importance, 
because “every [constitutional] provision must be interpreted in the light of the 
document as a whole . . . .”86  Because our constitutional provisions “‘are of equal 
dignity,’”87 having been adopted simultaneously, “‘neither can logically trump the 
other.’”88  Therefore, every effort should be made to construe constitutional 
provisions harmoniously, and no provision “should be construed to nullify or 
impair another.”89 
Thus, as noted above, the Michigan Constitution does not compel that 
every election regulation be reviewed under strict scrutiny.  Given that the 
appropriate standard by which to evaluate election laws must be compatible with 
our entire constitution, and must not nullify or impair any other constitutional 
provision, we adopt the “flexible test” articulated in Burdick when resolving an 
equal protection challenge to an election law under the Michigan Constitution. 
86 Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Court, 469 Mich 146, 156; 665 NW 2d 
452 (2003).  See also Sault Ste Marie City Comm v  Sault Ste Marie City Attorney, 
313 Mich 644; 21 NW2d 906 (1946); City of Lansing v Ingham Co Clerk, 308 
Mich 560; 14 NW2d 426 (1944). 
87 In re Probert, 411 Mich 210, 232-233 n 17; 308 NW2d 773 (1981) 
(citation omitted). 
88 Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 533; 592 NW2d 53 (1999) (citation 
omitted). 
89 Lapeer Co Clerk, supra at 156. 
33  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
The Burdick test strikes the appropriate balance between protecting a citizen’s 
right to vote under art 1, § 2 and protecting against fraudulent voting under art 2, § 
4.90  Therefore, where an election law subjects the right to vote to “severe 
restrictions,” strict scrutiny review is applicable, and the regulation must be 
narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest.91  However, when an 
election law imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” on the right 
to vote, the law is upheld as advancing the important regulatory interest identified 
by the state.  As we have previously concluded, MCL 168.523(1) does not impose 
a severe burden on the right to vote; rather, it imposes only a reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restriction that furthers Michigan’s compelling regulatory 
interest in preventing voter fraud as well as enforcing the constitutional directive 
contained in art 2, § 4 to “preserve the purity of elections” and “to guard against 
abuses of the elective franchise” by ensuring that lawful voters not have their 
votes diluted.  Therefore, the statute is valid under the Michigan Constitution.  
V. MCL 168.523(1) IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLL TAX 
The opposing Attorney General argues that by requiring voters to purchase 
a state-issued identification card, MCL 168.523(1) is “tantamount to a poll tax,” 
90 Contrary to Justice Kelly’s assertions, we are not “simply follow[ing] 
federal precedent in lockstep.”  Post at 34. 
As the preceding analysis 
demonstrates, we have carefully considered the requirements of art 1, § 2 in light 
of art 2, § 4, and determined that the test enunciated in Burdick gives proper 
meaning and effect to both constitutional provisions.  Justice Kelly, on the other 
hand, fails to adequately address the impact of art 2, § 4. 
91 Burdick, supra at 434. 
34  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
and violates the Twenty-fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. US 
Const, Am XXIV provides: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any 
primary or other election . . . shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or 
other tax. 
The opposing Attorney General argues that the fee charged by the Secretary 
of State to obtain a state identification card ($10) or a driver’s license ($25) 
constitutes an impermissible poll tax. Moreover, counsel argues that the “real 
costs” incurred in obtaining photo identification are “much higher,” and are 
properly considered when determining whether the statute imposes an 
unconstitutional poll tax. Such “real costs” include the cost of transportation to 
reach the local Secretary of State office, the cost of taking time off work to go to 
the Secretary of State office, and the cost of procuring supporting documentation 
necessary to obtain state-issued photo identification, such as a copy of a birth 
certificate. 
The seminal case concerning poll taxes is Harper v Virginia Bd of 
Elections.92  There, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Virginia law 
that imposed an annual poll tax of $1.50 on every resident over the age of 21 as “a 
precondition for voting.”93  Virginia argued that if it could “demand from all an 
92 383 US 663; 86 S Ct 1079; 16 L Ed 2d 169 (1966).   
93 Id. at 665 n 1.  
35  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
equal fee for a driver’s license,” then it could “demand from all an equal poll tax 
for voting.”94  The Court held that the Virginia law was unconstitutional because 
the law made “the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral 
standard.”95  Regarding any “familiar form of taxation,” the Harper Court stated 
the opinion did nothing to “impair its validity so long as” payment of fees is not 
“made a condition to the exercise of the franchise.”96
 
In Harman v Forssenius,97 the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
Virginia law that required, as a condition of voting, an elector to either pay a poll 
tax or file an annual certificate of residence no later than six months before the 
election. 
Holding that the Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibited “‘onerous 
procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise,’”98 
the Court struck down the certificate of residence requirement because it imposed 
“a real obstacle to voting” for those “who assert their constitutional exemption 
94 Id. at 668. 
95 Id. at 666. 
96 Id. at 669 (emphasis added). The Harper opinion overruled Breedlove v 
Suttles, 302 US 277; 58 S Ct 205; 82 L Ed 252 (1937), where the Court had 
previously held that it was constitutionally permissible “[t]o make payment of poll 
taxes a prerequisite of voting . . . .” Id. at 283. 
97 380 US 528; 85 S Ct 1177; 14 L Ed 2d 50 (1965). 
98 Id. at 541 (citation omitted). 
36  
 
 
    
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
from the poll tax.”99  The Court noted that the certificate of residence had to be 
filed every election year, at least six months before the election, and had to be 
witnessed or notarized. Unlike poll tax bills, which were sent directly to a voter’s 
residence, a certificate of residence had to be obtained from local officials or 
prepared by the voter, and filed “in person, or otherwise” with the city or county 
treasurer. The Court noted that the statute imposed “a cumbersome procedure,” 
and that it seemed “far preferable to mail in the poll tax payment upon receipt of 
the bill.”100 
In this case, MCL 168.523(1) is not an unconstitutional poll tax under 
Harper because the statute does not condition the right to vote on the payment of 
any fee. A voter who does not otherwise possess adequate photo identification is 
not required to incur the costs of obtaining photo identification as a condition of 
voting. Instead, a voter may simply sign an affidavit in the presence of an election 
inspector. Nothing in the statute contemplates that a voter is required to incur any 
costs in the execution of an affidavit.  
Moreover, the statute is not unconstitutional under Harman because signing 
an affidavit in the presence of an election inspector, as an alternative to presenting 
photo identification, is simply not an onerous procedural requirement that 
handicaps the exercise of the franchise.  The procedure in MCL 168.523 bears no 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 541, 542. 
37  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
resemblance to the “cumbersome procedure” depicted in Harman. Fulfilling the 
requirement of MCL 168.523(1) requires only as much penmanship as is 
necessary to execute the affidavit, which is readily available at the election 
precinct. In Harman, the fact that the residency certificate was required to be 
“filed six months before the election” was significant, because such a requirement 
“perpetuat[es] one of the disenfranchising characteristics of the poll tax which the 
Twenty-fourth Amendment was designed to eliminate.”101  Here, there is no 
requirement that an affidavit be executed in advance of the election; rather, an 
affidavit is executed on the day of the election.  Because MCL 168.523(1) does 
not “erect[] a real obstacle to voting,”102 there is no constitutional infirmity under 
Harman. 
Although no voter is ever compelled to procure photo identification as a 
condition for exercising his right to vote under the statute, we observe that our law 
provides a mechanism for some voters to receive a state identification card at no 
cost. Our law requires that the Secretary of State waive the customary fee for a 
state identification card if an applicant meets any of the conditions listed in MCL 
28.292(14).103  Thus, any voter who elects to obtain photo identification for use at 
101 Harman, supra at 542. 
102 Id. at 541. 
103 MCL 28.292 (14) provides: 
(continued…) 
38  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the polls is entitled to have the $10 fee waived entirely if he is elderly, disabled, or 
presents good cause to have the fee waived.  Therefore, many of the categories of 
voters that the opposing Attorney General claims are disproportionately affected 
by the cost of procuring the entirely optional photo identification can in fact obtain 
it for free.104 
Regarding the secondary costs cited by the opposing Attorney General— 
time, transportation, and the expense of procuring supporting documentation—we 
(…continued) 
The secretary of state shall waive the fee under this section if 
the applicant is any of the following: 
(a) A person 65 years of age or older. 
(b) A person who has had his or her operator’s or chauffeur’s 
license suspended, revoked, or denied under the Michigan vehicle 
code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.1 to 257.923, because of a mental or 
physical infirmity or disability. 
(c) A person who presents evidence of statutory blindness as 
provided in 1978 PA 260, MCL 393.351 to 393.368. 
(d) A person who presents other good cause for a fee waiver. 
(e) Beginning January 1, 2007, a person who wishes to add or 
remove a heart insignia described in subsection (1)(f). 
104 Additionally, the elderly and the disabled are entitled to cast absentee 
ballots pursuant to MCL 168.758(1), alleviating the need to vote at an election 
precinct and either present photo identification or execute an affidavit.  
39  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
agree with the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana in rejecting a similar poll tax claim: 105 
This argument represents a dramatic overstatement of what 
fairly constitutes a “poll tax.” It is axiomatic that “(e)lection laws 
will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters.”  Thus, 
the imposition of tangential burdens does not transform a regulation 
into a poll tax. Moreover, the cost of time and transportation cannot 
plausibly qualify as a prohibited poll tax because these same “costs” 
also result from voter registration and in-person voting requirements, 
which one would not reasonably construe as a poll tax.  Plaintiffs 
provide no principled argument in support of this poll tax theory.[106] 
Noting that the “only incidental cost which might plausibly approach being a poll 
tax is the fee assessed to obtain a birth certificate,” the Rokita Court ultimately 
rejected the claim because the birth certificate fees were not “sufficiently tied to 
105 Indiana Democratic Party v Rokita, 458 F Supp 2d 775, 827 (SD Ind, 
2006) (internal citation omitted), aff’d sub nom Crawford v Marion Co Election 
Bd, 472 F3d 949 (CA 7, 2007).  
In Rokita, the Indiana statute at issue required a voter to present valid photo 
identification issued either by the federal government or the state of Indiana.  In 
the event a voter did not possess the requisite identification, the voter was required 
to be challenged, and could only cast a provisional ballot after executing an 
affidavit. In order to have the provisional ballot counted, the voter was required to 
provide proof of identity by noon on the second Monday following the election. 
106 We acknowledge that in Common Cause/Georgia v Billups, 406 F Supp 
2d 1326, 1370 (ND Ga, 2005), the court held that a statute requiring voter photo 
identification constituted a poll tax because a voter had to “arrange for 
transportation,” wait in line, and sign a fee waiver affidavit that “may require the 
voter to swear or affirm to facts that simply are not true” in order to obtain photo 
identification at no cost. However, less than one year later, the same federal judge 
adopted the poll tax analysis of Rokita, thereby undercutting the prior holding sub 
silentio. See Common Cause/Georgia v Billups, 439 F Supp 2d 1294, 1354-1355 
(ND Ga, 2006). 
40  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
the requirements of voting as to constitute a ‘poll tax.’”107  Where, as here, even 
less of a burden is imposed on voters, since no voter need ever incur any 
secondary costs because of the affidavit alternative contained in MCL 168.523. 
Therefore, any incidental costs incurred by a voter who elects to obtain the 
optional identification card cannot be held to constitute a “poll tax.” 
VI. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENTS 
We are content to rest on the strength of the constitutional analysis we have 
made, but pause here briefly to address some of the more inflammatory and 
emotional arguments made in Justice Cavanagh’s dissent.108  It is clear that he 
passionately dislikes the enacted voter photo identification requirement and 
believes it to be “ill-advised” and founded on no empirical data showing that 
Michigan has a voter fraud problem. Whether the statute is an “ill-advised” policy 
choice is not a judgment open to the judiciary, this Court, or any member of it. 
For the reasons we have stated, whatever its policy merits, this enacted legislative 
policy choice is not one that is facially unconstitutional as the dissenters maintain. 
We turn now to some of the specific emotional arguments advanced by the dissent. 
107 Rokita, supra at 827, 828.  The Rokita court noted that the plaintiff had 
“provided no evidence” that anyone would actually have to incur the costs of 
obtaining a birth certificate in order to obtain identification.  Moreover, other 
forms of documentation that could be used to obtain photo identification were 
issued by the federal government, whose requirements and incidental fees were 
outside the control of the state. 
108 Because the arguments made in Justice Kelly’s dissenting opinion 
overlap with the arguments made in Justice Cavanagh’s opinion, there is no need 
to address her arguments separately unless otherwise indicated. 
41  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
A. MICHIGAN HAS NO VOTER FRAUD PROBLEM 
The interest in this case is more accurately presented as 
preventing in-person voter fraud when there is no evidence that in­
person fraud actually exists.109 
The sting of the dissent’s contention here is that the photo identification 
statute serves no purpose and therefore surely cannot serve a constitutionally 
significant one that could justify even the slightest burden that it might impose on 
a Michigan voter. Not even the opposing Attorney General argues that “no 
evidence” of such voter fraud exists; the opposing Attorney General suggests only 
that in-person voter fraud is “rare.”110  However, whether the incidence of in­
person voter fraud is believed to be rare or frequent, the fact of the matter is that 
no voter identification was required before the enactment of MCL 168.523 and no 
one knows—or could possibly know—the frequency with which in-person voter 
fraud occurs at the polls.111 More relevant to our constitutional inquiry is the fact 
that a legislature—particularly one given a constitutional mandate to “preserve the 
109 Post at 13 (emphasis in original). See also Justice Kelly’s dissent, post at 
16. (“[T]hose arguing in favor of the photo identification requirements have not 
come forward with any documented instances of in-person voter fraud.”). 
110 Interestingly, amicus curiae supporting the constitutionality of the 
statute have presented certified death certificates of 46 persons who “voted” in the 
November 2004 election, despite the ordinarily indisposing condition of being 
dead at the time. All these persons died well in advance of the election, with dates 
of death ranging from 16 months to more than 12 years prior to the November 
2004 election. A surprising number of these deceased “voters” apparently voted at 
their precinct. 
111 See n 59 of this opinion. 
42  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
purity of elections”—is not required to wait for an electoral calamity before it may 
act to fulfill its obligation to preserve.112  And while the dissent purports to focus 
on the right to vote, it does so by considering only one side of that right without 
reckoning with the obvious object of art 2, § 4—that the right to vote includes the 
assurance that one’s vote will not be diluted by the votes of fraudulent voters.  The 
statute at issue is clearly designed to promote this state constitutional value by 
requiring those who desire to cast in-person ballots to present identification 
establishing that they are the registered voters who they claim to be. 
B. THE STATUTE IMPOSES A SEVERE BURDEN 
The reality is that not all of our citizens live a life in which 
they have photo identification and obtaining photo identification 
solely to vote causes a severe burden.113 
In a statutory regime that compels the state to issue free Michigan photo 
identification to its disabled, its senior, and its most impecunious citizens,114 the 
dissent’s argument that the photo identification statute imposes a severe burden on 
anyone is simply facetious. But the argument is even more wrongheaded on 
another ground:  Under this statute, no one need have or present photo 
112 McDonald v Chicago Bd of Election Comm’rs, supra n 68. 
113 Post at 20. 
114 See n 100 of this opinion. 
43  
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
identification at the poll; a voter need only sign an affidavit to vote and have that 
vote counted like those of every other voter appearing at the polls.115 
Justice Cavanagh contends that the ability of voters without photo 
identification to sign an affidavit in order to vote does not lessen the burden 
imposed by MCL 168.523 because a “likely scenario is that the challenge process 
will be used in some situations to harass and intimidate citizens” who sign an 
affidavit.116 Although he conjures up images of voters being denied their right to 
vote at the whim of election officials, he ignores the clear statutory prohibition 
against such harassment in MCL 168.727(3), which provides that “[a] challenger 
shall not make a challenge indiscriminately and without good cause.”  Moreover, a 
person who challenges a voter for the purpose of annoyance or delay is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.  Thus, contrary to the assertions of Justice Cavanagh, the use of the 
challenge process to harass voters is deterred by subjecting the challenger to 
115 While Justice Kelly maintains that the “affidavit option itself” 
“interferes” with the right to vote, post at 13, she does not explain how the “minor 
obstacle” of signing one’s signature is any different that affixing a signature to the 
required election application under MCL 168.523. Justice Kelly also suggests that 
“signature matching” would be a “less restrictive alternative” than either showing 
photo identification or signing an affidavit. Post at 17. However, it should be 
noted that signature matching necessarily requires a signature, and does not 
obviate the necessity of confirming that the person at the poll is the person he 
claims to be. Thus, it would appear that Justice Kelly objects to the legislative 
choice in determining the identity of a potential voter. 
116 Post at 31. 
44  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
criminal penalties. For these reasons, the dissent errs by concluding that MCL 
168.523 imposes a severe burden on the right to vote. 
C. THE STATUTE WILL HAVE A DISPARATE IMPACT  
ON MINORITIES  
The photo identification requirement will have a disparate 
impact on racial and ethnic populations, as well as poor voters, 
elderly voters, and disabled voters . . . [T]he statute at issue will 
diminish the opportunity for thousands of citizens to participate in 
the political process.117 
When all other arguments are unavailing, resorting to a claim of racial 
discrimination is a frequent substitute.  Unfortunately, the Justice Cavanagh has 
chosen this tack.118 
Since the act of signing one’s name to an affidavit is too trivial an act to 
sustain the weight of Justice Cavanagh’s overwrought burden argument, he has 
been forced to ignore the fact that this case involves a facial challenge to the 
statute and argues that the statute, as it will be applied in the future, will be subject 
to abuses that will be discriminatorily visited upon some Michigan citizens.119  We 
simply note that, whatever may happen once the statute is enforced, our task in 
this case is to determine only whether the statute is capable of any valid 
117 Id. at 21. 
118 Indeed, Justice Cavanagh appears to have come perilously close to 
suggesting that the Legislature was motivated in enacting this statute by the desire 
to suppress minority voters. Post at 13-15. 
119 Post at 19-23. 
45  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
application.120  We conclude that it passes constitutional muster under a facial 
challenge because the voter photo identification statute imposes no significant, 
much less “severe,” burden on Michigan’s voters.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this advisory opinion, we have carefully considered the arguments 
advanced by the Attorney General both challenging and defending the 
constitutionality of 2005 PA 71. For the reasons previously articulated, the photo 
identification requirement in MCL 168.523(1) is facially constitutional and 
withstands scrutiny under both the Michigan Constitution and the United States 
Constitution. Under the balancing test articulated by Burdick, supra, the photo 
identification requirement is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction designed 
to preserve the purity of elections and to prevent abuses of the electoral franchise, 
as demanded by art 2, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution, thereby ensuring that 
lawful voters not have their votes diluted.  Moreover, because no voter is required 
to incur the costs of obtaining a photo identification card as a condition of voting, 
the statute does not impose the payment of a fee as “a condition to the exercise of  
120 See Steffel cited in n 20 of this opinion. Should it occur that the statute is 
discriminatorily applied when it is enforced, the constitutionality of its 
enforcement will then be at issue and can be challenged at that time. 
46  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the franchise”121 and therefore is not an unconstitutional poll tax under the 
Twenty-fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Stephen J. Markman 
121 Harper, supra at 669. 
47  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
In re REQUEST FOR ADVISORY 
OPINION REGARDING 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 2005 PA 71 
No. 130589 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
This case is not about preventing voter fraud, it is not about thwarting 
abuses of the electoral franchise, and it is certainly not about preserving the purity 
of elections. This case is simply about protecting the right to vote for all Michigan 
citizens. As our Michigan Constitution provides: “All political power is inherent 
in the people. Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and 
protection.” Const 1963, art 1, § 1. Today’s decision ignores this constitutional 
principle and endorses misguided legislation that significantly impairs the 
fundamental right of thousands of our citizens to vote.  The statute at issue and the 
majority’s approval of this statute ignore the fact that the government does not 
bestow the right to vote on our citizens.  The right to vote is inherent, and the 
government’s role is simply to protect this right. Today, our government has 
failed its citizens. Because I believe this ill-advised legislation is unconstitutional, 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
I. THE RIGHT TO VOTE IS FUNDAMENTAL  
“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in 
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must 
live. 
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined.” Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1, 17; 84 S Ct 526; 11 L Ed 2d 481 
(1964). “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the 
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the 
heart of representative government.” Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 555; 84 S Ct 
1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964); see also Kramer v Union Free School Dist No 15, 
395 US 621, 626; 89 S Ct 1886; 23 L Ed 2d 583 (1969). The fundamental right to 
vote encompasses the right to actually have those votes counted.  Reynolds, supra 
at 554. In Michigan, our citizens’ right to vote is protected by the Michigan 
Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution.1 
1 Our Michigan Constitution provides: 
Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 
21 years, who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the 
requirements of local residence provided by law, shall be an elector 
and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise provided in 
this constitution. The legislature shall define residence for voting 
purposes. [Const 1963, art 2, § 1.] 
Under the United States Constitution, the voting age requirement has been 
changed to 18 years.  US Const, Am XXVI. 
(continued…) 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
This Court has long recognized that the “right to vote has always received a 
preferred place in our constitutional system.  The importance of this right cannot 
be overemphasized. It is the basic protection that we have in insuring that our 
government will truly be representative of all of its citizens.”  Michigan State 
UAW Community Action Program Council v Secretary of State, 387 Mich 506, 
514; 198 NW2d 385 (1972).  “[T]he right to vote is accorded extraordinary 
treatment because, it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen 
cannot hope to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if 
granted an inferior right of participation in the political process.”  Plyler v Doe, 
457 US 202, 233; 102 S Ct 2382; 72 L Ed 2d 786 (1982) (Marshall, J. concurring). 
While the state has the authority to regulate elections pursuant to Const 1963, art 
(…continued) 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution provides, in 
relevant part, the following: 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; 
nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of 
religion, race, color or national origin.  [Const 1963, art 1, § 2.] 
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  [US Const, Am XIV, § 
1.] 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2, § 4, the state cannot pass a law that violates the Equal Protection Clause.  See 
Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23, 29; 89 S Ct 5; 21 L Ed 2d 24 (1968).   
This Court has been asked to issue an advisory opinion pursuant to Const 
1963, art 3, § 8, addressing the constitutionality of § 523 of 2005 PA 71, which 
requires voters to provide an official state identification card, a driver’s license, or 
other generally recognized picture identification card to vote.  The statute also 
provides that a voter who does not have one of these forms of identification must 
sign an affidavit to that effect before being allowed to vote.  The statute provides, 
in relevant part, the following: 
(1) At each election, before being given a ballot, each 
registered elector offering to vote shall identify himself or herself by 
presenting an official state identification card issued to that 
individual . . . , an operator’s or chauffeur’s license issued to that 
individual . . . , or other generally recognized picture identification 
card and by executing an application showing his or her signature or 
mark and address of residence in the presence of an election official. 
If an elector’s signature contained in the qualified voter file is 
available in the polling place, the election official shall compare the 
signature upon the application with the digitized signature provided 
by the qualified voter file. If an elector’s signature is not contained 
in the qualified voter file, the election official shall process the 
application in the same manner as applications are processed when a 
voter registration list is used in the polling place.  If voter 
registration lists are used in the precinct, the election inspector shall 
determine if the name on the application to vote appears on the voter 
registration list. If the name appears on the voter registration list, the 
elector shall provide further identification by giving his or her date 
of birth or other information stated upon the voter registration list. 
In precincts using voter registration lists, the date of birth may be 
required to be placed on the application to vote.  If the signature or 
an item of information does not correspond, the vote of the person 
shall be challenged, and the same procedure shall be followed as 
provided in this act for the challenging of an elector.  If the person 
offering to vote has signed the registration card or application by 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
making a mark, the person shall identify himself or herself by giving 
his or her date of birth, which shall be compared with the date of 
birth stated upon the registration card or voter registration list, or 
shall give other identification as may be referred to upon the 
registration card or voter registration list.  If the elector does not 
have an official state identification card, operator’s or chauffeur’s 
license as required in this subsection, or other generally recognized 
picture identification card, the individual shall sign an affidavit to 
that effect before an election inspector and be allowed to vote as 
otherwise provided in this act. However, an elector being allowed to 
vote without the identification required under this subsection is 
subject to challenge as provided in section 727.  [MCL 168.523.] 
A photo identification requirement was previously passed by the 
Legislature in 1996, but the Attorney General issued an opinion that the photo 
identification requirement in 1996 PA 583 violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. OAG, 1997-1998, No 6930, p 1 (January 29, 1997). 
The legislation passed in 1996 was identical in every relevant respect to the 
legislation at issue in this case, and the photo identification requirement has not 
been enforced since that time.   
The Attorney General stated: “For the poor, those who do not drive, 
especially the elderly, the handicapped and those who, for whatever reason, do not 
possess a picture identification card, this requirement imposes economic and 
logistical burdens.”  Id. at 3. 
The Attorney General acknowledged that the 
prevention of voter fraud is, of course, a valid governmental interest, but the 
prevention of nonexistent voter fraud did not survive the required strict 
constitutional scrutiny. 
The Attorney General stated that “as the chief law 
enforcement official of the State of Michigan, I am not aware of any substantial 
5  
 
 
 
 
voter fraud in Michigan’s elections. I have not received complaints regarding 
voter fraud.” Id. The Attorney General also relied on confirmation from the 
state’s chief elections official, then-Secretary of State Candice Miller, for further 
evidence of the fact that Michigan does not have a voter fraud problem.  Id. The 
Attorney General concluded that because the state of Michigan does not have an 
issue with voter fraud, the photo identification requirement “is simply not 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.”  Id. Thus, because the 
photo identification requirement was not necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest and it denied the right to vote to our state’s citizens, the 
earlier statute that required photo identification to vote was never implemented. 
II. THE PHOTO IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT IMPOSES A  
SEVERE BURDEN ON MICHIGAN’S CITIZENS 
The photo identification requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause 
because it unduly burdens our citizens’ right to vote.  As this Court has stated, any 
law that affects elections places a burden on the right to vote.  Michigan State 
UAW, supra at 516. The United States Supreme Court has also held that when a 
statute places a condition on the exercise of the right to vote, an exacting test is 
required. Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 337; 92 S Ct 995; 31 L Ed 2d 274 
(1972). If a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies 
the right to vote to other citizens, the court must determine whether the exclusions 
are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Id. “Any burden, however 
small, will not be permitted unless there is demonstrated a compelling state 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
interest.” Michigan State UAW, supra at 516, citing Lane v Wilson, 307 US 268, 
275-277; 59 S Ct 872; 83 L Ed 1281 (1939).  When restrictions are enacted on the 
basis of race or wealth, the restriction is highly suspect and demands exacting 
judicial scrutiny. McDonald v Bd of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 US 802, 
807; 89 S Ct 1404; 22 L Ed 2d 739 (1969).  Notably, the Equal Protection Clause 
“guards against subtle restraints on the right to vote, as well as outright denial.” 
Wilkins v Ann Arbor City Clerk, 385 Mich 670, 684; 189 NW2d 423 (1971).   
To determine whether a restriction indeed compels strict scrutiny, the 
extent to which a requirement burdens a citizen’s rights must be examined. 
Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428, 434; 112 S Ct 2059; 119 L Ed 2d 245 (1992). 
When a restriction is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, the state’s important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restriction.  Id. But when 
a restriction is severe, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to advance only a 
compelling governmental interest.  Id.; see also Illinois Bd of Elections v Socialist 
Workers Party, 440 US 173, 184; 99 S Ct 983; 59 L Ed 2d 230 (1979).  When a 
statute will deny some citizens the right to vote, the general presumption of 
constitutionality is not applicable. Kramer, supra at 628. “The presumption of 
constitutionality and the approval given ‘rational’ classifications in other types of 
enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of state government 
are structured so as to represent fairly all the people.”  Id. But “when the 
challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the 
assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality.”  Id. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
While Kramer dealt with legislation that explicitly denied certain citizens 
the right to vote in school district elections, this fundamental premise is equally as 
sound in the case before us.  The challenge to the photo identification requirement 
is that it will disproportionately deny the right to vote to racial and ethnic 
populations, as well as to the elderly, the poor, and citizens who are disabled.  The 
government—which should be the voice of fairness in providing protection to all 
citizens—is the very entity that has enacted the legislation that is allegedly 
discriminatory. The government cannot now shield itself from strict scrutiny 
because it provides only a purported rational basis for the requirement while 
simultaneously failing to provide any evidence to support its purported rationale. 
Our Legislature—even one that has been fairly elected—“can exclude a minority 
of voters from any voice in the decisions just as effectively as if the decisions were 
made by legislators the minority had no voice in selecting.”  Id. 
“[T]he State is itself controlled by the political party or parties in power, 
which presumably have an incentive to shape the rules of the electoral game to 
their own benefit.” Clingman v Beaver, 544 US 581, 603; 125 S Ct 2029; 161 L 
Ed 2d 920 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Tashjian v Republican 
Party of Connecticut, 479 US 208, 225; 107 S Ct 544; 93 L Ed 2d 514 (1986) (The 
Court recognized that the interests of the state represented, to some extent, the 
views of the one political party enjoying majority power.).  Recognizing the basic 
fact that the government is not always wholly independent and unbiased does not 
mean that reasonable and genuinely neutral and necessary requirements cannot be 
8  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
imposed. 
But it does mean that an intellectually honest examination of a 
requirement must begin with recognizing this basic political fact and examining 
what role this has played in the enactment of the requirement at issue. See, e.g., 
Crawford v Marion Co Election Bd, 472 F3d 949, 954 (CA 7, 2007) (Crawford I) 
(Evans, J., dissenting). As requirements “become more severe, however, and 
particularly where they have discriminatory effects, there is increasing cause for 
concern that those in power may be using electoral rules to erect barriers to 
electoral competition.” Clingman, supra at 603 (O’Connor, J., concurring).2 
“[W]here fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be 
closely scrutinized and carefully confined.” Harper v Virginia Bd of Elections, 
2 The majority claims that I “come perilously close to suggesting that the 
Legislature was motivated in enacting this statute by the desire to suppress 
minority voters.” Ante at 45 n 118. Yet I advocate no such position.  The majority 
distorts my view because it believes that this will have the most shock value and 
because it has no response for the realistic position that I do espouse.  When a 
political party—any political party—is in power and enacts legislation that will 
affect our citizens’ fundamental right to vote, it is the job of the courts to 
realistically examine the legislation, if it is challenged, to determine the effect it 
will have on our citizens. If those who are likely to be negatively affected are 
viewed as often not voting for the party in power, that is certainly one factor that 
must be considered. This is not a shocking principle; it is a rational one.  The 
majority chooses to pretend that it is a scandalous concept that political 
motivations may actually affect the legislative votes of politicians. Yet this is a 
basic concept that I think few reasonable people, including our elected officials, 
would even try to counter.  This does not mean that the Legislature acted with any 
untoward motivations when enacting this statute, but it does mean that a 
reasonable person should not be blind to considering the possibility that politics 
may have played a role. One need only look at the continued inquiries being made 
on the national level to see the disingenuous nature of the position being taken by 
the majority. 
9  
 
 
 
  
 
383 US 663, 670; 86 S Ct 1079; 16 L Ed 2d 169 (1966).  Thus, to determine if a 
law violates the Equal Protection Clause, the court must weigh the character and 
magnitude of the burden caused against the interests that justify the burden.  See 
Timmons v Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 US 351, 358; 117 S Ct 1364; 137 L 
Ed 2d 589 (1997). Specifically, the court looks at three areas:  “[T]he character of 
the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; 
and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.”  Dunn, 
supra at 335. In examining the character of the classification, the court must 
consider the facts and circumstances behind the law.  Williams, supra at 30. 
While there is no bright-line test to separate permissible election-related 
regulations from unconstitutional infringements on our citizens’ right to vote, the 
court must consider the extent to which the state’s concerns make the burden 
necessary. Timmons, supra at 358. But “[t]he power to regulate the time, place, 
and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgement of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote . . . .”  Tashjian, supra at 217. 
Because voting involves the assertion of a fundamental constitutional right and 
this case deals with the actual right to vote, and not merely a minor regulation 
regarding the time, place, or manner of elections, the compelling state interest test 
must be applied.  See Wilkins, supra at 681. Thus, if the state is unable to 
demonstrate a compelling interest for the significant impairment it seeks to 
implement, then the statute must be deemed unconstitutional.  Id. at 682. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority purports that “the state is not required to provide any proof, 
much less ‘significant proof,’ of in-person voter fraud before it may permissibly 
take steps to prevent it.” Ante at 24. But the majority ignores a critical aspect of 
the caselaw it cites. A state can respond to a potential deficiency only if “the 
response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally 
protected rights.” Munro v Socialist Workers Party, 479 US 189, 196; 107 S Ct 
533; 93 L Ed 2d 499 (1986).  In Dunn, supra at 346, the United States Supreme 
Court specifically noted that the record was “totally devoid of any evidence” to 
support a durational residency requirement. The restriction, in this case a photo 
identification requirement, must be reasonable given the interest the restriction 
allegedly serves. 
See Burdick, supra at 434; Timmons, supra at 358-359. 
Deciding if a restriction is constitutional depends very much on “the facts and 
circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, 
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.”  Williams, 
supra at 30; see also Storer v Brown, 415 US 724, 731; 94 S Ct 1274; 39 L Ed 2d 
714 (1974). Thus, I disagree with the majority that the state is not obligated to 
provide any evidence to support its asserted interest. 
I also disagree with the majority’s characterization of the asserted interest. 
The majority alleges that the interest to be served is preventing voter fraud, but I 
disagree that the interest in this case can be presented so broadly.  “States certainly 
have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of their ballots 
and election processes as means for electing public officials.”  Timmons, supra at 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
364. But that does not mean that by merely making the broad claim of addressing 
voter fraud, a state has no limits on its actions. See Dunn, supra at 345-346.  It is 
the circumstances of the case that determine the weight that must be afforded a 
stated interest. California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 US 567, 584; 120 S Ct 
2402; 147 L Ed 2d 502 (2000).  A court must determine the legitimacy and 
strength of the “precise interest” asserted by the state as its justification for the 
enacted restriction. Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 789; 103 S Ct 1564; 75 L 
Ed 2d 547 (1983).  And the restriction must precisely and specifically address the 
state’s interest. Kusper v Pontikes, 414 US 51, 59; 94 S Ct 303; 38 L Ed 2d 260 
(1973). “If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate 
interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of 
fundamental personal liberties.” Id. 
Of course preventing voter fraud is an important interest in the abstract, but 
the relevant inquiry is whether, and to what degree, in-person voter fraud would 
be addressed by the photo identification requirement.  See California Democratic 
Party, supra at 584; see also American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v 
Santillanes, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 17087 *98-*99 (D NM, February 12, 2007). 
Using a broad interest such as preventing voter fraud would allow almost any 
restriction to be deemed constitutional, and this would effectively nullify any true 
test for constitutionality, thus allowing the government to enact almost any 
constraint on voting that it chooses, all in the name of preventing “voter fraud.” 
See Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Elections (September 2005) (Comments by Tom Daschle, Spencer Overton, and 
Raul Yzaguirre) (“The mere fear of voter fraud should never be used to justify 
denying eligible citizens their fundamental right to vote”).3  But the interest in this 
case cannot be so simplistically deemed.  The interest in this case is more 
accurately presented as preventing in-person voter fraud when there is no evidence 
that in-person voter fraud actually exists.     
Not only is there no evidence or history of any problem with in-person 
voter fraud in Michigan, but Kelly Chesney, a spokesperson for Secretary of State 
Terri Lynn Land, has stated: “‘We have a number of checks and balances inherent 
in the process to prevent “fake people” from voting . . . .  We do believe the 
safeguards in place will protect the integrity of the election.’”  Chad Selweski, 
Flood of voter registrations raises specter of election fraud, Macomb Daily, 
September 30, 20044; see also Bay Co Democratic Party v Land, 347 F Supp 2d 
404, 437 (ED Mich, 2004). Former Attorney General Frank J. Kelley has also 
stated that Director of Michigan Elections Christopher Thomas recently informed 
him “that he had never observed or heard of a single case of a voter using fake 
identification at the time of voting.”  Amicus brief at 3.  The reality is that the 
issue of access to the voting polls can unfortunately be turned into a political issue.  
3  (accessed May 14, 
2007). 
4  (accessed 
May 30, 2007). 
13  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
As reported earlier this year, a federal panel—the Election Assistance 
Commission—downplayed the findings of experts who conducted election 
research and found there was little voter fraud around the nation.  Ian Urbina, U.S. 
Panel is Said to Alter Finding on Voter Fraud, N.Y. Times, April 11, 2007.5 
Instead, the panel “issued a report that said the pervasiveness of fraud was open to 
debate.” Id. The panel also changed the original report’s findings that evidence of 
continued outright intimidation and suppression existed and that registration forms 
had not been used in polling place fraud.  Id. Just weeks earlier, the panel had also 
refused to release another report that it had commissioned that found that voter 
identification laws reduce turnout, particularly among minority group members. 
Id. Thus, I believe it is clear that the prevalence—or lack thereof—of voter fraud 
is critical to whether photo identification laws are necessary.   
Moreover, when viewed objectively, the claim of “voter fraud” has 
repeatedly been exposed as a tactic used to suppress the votes of minorities and the 
poor. See Editorial, Phony Fraud Charges, N.Y. Times, March 16, 2007.6  In  
partisan political circles, “the pursuit of voter fraud is code for suppressing the 
votes of minorities and poor people.” 
Id. 
Congress is also investigating 
5 Available through purchase at 
<http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0713FF395B0C728DDDAD0 
894DF404482> (accessed May 30, 2007). 
6 Available through purchase at 
<http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10C15FE34550C758DDDAA0 
894DF404482> (accessed May 30, 2007).  
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
allegations that over a dozen officials in the Justice Department used their 
positions for partisan purposes by enacting policies and actively supporting 
legislation that would impose a photo identification requirement for the purpose of 
suppressing the votes of minority voters.  See Greg Gordon, Congress eyes alleged 
suppression of minority votes, Lansing State Journal, May 21, 2007, p 3A.  There 
is mounting evidence that Justice Department officials used their positions to clear 
“the way for laws designed to disenfranchise minority voters . . . .” Editorial, Why 
This Scandal Matters, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2007.7 
But as The New York Times reported, “There is no evidence of rampant 
voter fraud in this country.” Id. Instead, these allegations have been used as an 
excuse to pass legislation that will suppress the votes of the poor, the elderly, and 
minorities. Id. “The claims of vote fraud used to promote these measures usually 
fall apart on close inspection.” 
Id. 
For example, allegations that African-
American voters in St. Louis listed addresses that were vacant lots have been 
determined to be unfounded.  Id. When a local newspaper looked into these 
allegations, “it found that thousands of people lived in buildings on lots that the 
city had erroneously classified as vacant.” Id. (emphasis added).   
The majority seeks to buttress its position by arguing that the requirement is 
constitutional because there is evidence that 46 “dead” people voted in the 
7 Available through purchase at 
<http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F7081FF635550C728EDDAC08 
94DF404482> (accessed May 30, 2007). 
15  
 
 
                                                 
November 2004 election. See ante at 42 n 110. This makes a snappy sound bite, 
but a more thoughtful examination of this allegation results in the finding that 
administrative problems and clerical errors are likely at the root of these “dead” 
people voting. For example, one newspaper article stated that it appeared that 
approximately 40 people who are dead cast votes in the primary election in August 
2006 out of 134,629 votes cast in Detroit.  Many Names on City’s Voter Lists may 
not Belong, Detroit Free Press, November 3, 2006, 1B.  But of these 40 people, 25 
died within six weeks before the election, so those votes may have been validly 
cast by absentee ballot before the citizen died.   
But, even more importantly, another article indicated that the city of 
Detroit’s election records are “plagued with mistakes and inconsistencies.”  In 
Mich., Even Dead Vote, Detroit News, February 26, 2006.8  Many voting “errors” 
were the result of clerical errors—incorrect birthdates and addresses being 
recorded, as well as election workers recording votes under a similar name or 
confusing voters with a relative. Id. The article further stated that there was no 
evidence of voter fraud, although allegations of fraud had been made particularly 
related to absentee ballots. Id. And in articles cited by the Attorney General who 
filed a brief in support of the requirement, the problem with voting errors is again 
identified as being because of administrative problems with the voter rolls.  See, 
8 Available through purchase at 
<http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060226/METRO/602260 
301&temp1> (accessed July 5, 2007). 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
e.g., Kathleen Gray, John Bebow, and Ben Schmitt, Detroit’s Flawed Registry: 
Many Erroneous Names Found on City’s Voter Rolls, Detroit Free Press, 
November 3, 2005; In Mich., Even Dead Vote, supra.9  An analysis of voting by 
The Detroit News found, “Clerical errors so pervasive that it is difficult to 
determine in many instances who actually voted.  Incorrect addresses, wrong 
birthdates and expired residencies; typographical errors in names and addresses; 
and garbled spellings are regularly recorded and kept on the city’s active voter 
list.” In Mich., Even Dead Vote, supra. “Among the most common mistakes 
occur when election workers record a vote under a similar name, or confuse voters 
with their parents or other relatives.” Id.; see also Spencer Overton, Article: Voter 
identification, 105 Mich L R 631, 645-647 (2007).  Current statutory provisions 
already deal with these administrative issues, including MCL 168.510, which 
requires that the county clerk forward monthly a list of those who have died to the 
clerk of each city or township within the county.  “The city or township clerk shall 
compare this list with the registration records and cancel the registration of all 
deceased electors.” Id. If the concern truly is about “dead” people voting, the 
simple solution is an administrative one—do what the law requires and properly 
purge the voting rolls. 
9Available at 
<http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:WoHvRHJJ6i0J:www.freep.com/news/loc 
way/voters> (accessed July 5, 2007). 
17  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The photo identification requirement at issue is not narrowly tailored to 
meet a compelling state interest because there is no evidence of in-person voter 
fraud. Thus, there is no evidence of any documented need to impose a photo 
identification requirement. But an examination of whether the photo identification 
requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause does not just stop with 
identifying the state’s interest—in this case, nonexistent in-person voter fraud. 
The Court must also consider the character and magnitude of the burden, as well 
as the interests affected by the burden.  Dunn, supra at 335. This Court has 
declared: “It can be stated without exaggeration that the right to vote is one of the 
most precious, if not the most precious, of all our constitutional rights.”  Wilkins, 
supra at 680. “The right to vote has been considered to be the most vital of our 
constitutional rights.” Id. at 694. Voting is a fundamental right because it is 
preservative of all other rights. Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 370; 6 S Ct 1064; 
30 L Ed 220 (1886). And this basic fundamental right cannot be infringed merely 
because the government seeks to assert its power over supervising elections. 
Kusper, supra at, 414 US at 57. 
In this case, the requirement deals with actual access to the ballot box.  In 
cases dealing with direct ballot access, such as cases that deal with a residency 
requirement or a property ownership requirement, the most exacting level of 
scrutiny is required. Dunn, supra at 335; Kramer, supra at 626-627. Likewise, 
the requirement at issue in this case goes to the very heart of a citizen’s ability to 
vote at all. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, not all cases 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
dealing with election regulations are reviewed the same and cases that deal with 
actual voting rights are quite different than those that deal with other regulations. 
See California Democratic Party, supra at 573. Because the photo identification 
requirement will significantly affect the voting rights of thousands of Michigan 
citizens and have discriminatory effects, “applying heightened scrutiny helps to 
ensure that such limitations are truly justified and that the State’s asserted interests 
are not merely a pretext for exclusionary or anticompetitive restrictions.” 
Clingman, supra at 603 (O’Connor, J., concurring).   
Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the photo identification 
requirement “applies evenhandedly to every registered voter,” ante at 22, this 
legislation does not affect all Michigan citizens equally, and it is disingenuous—at 
best—to claim that it does. 
As the United States Supreme Court stated in 
Anderson, supra at 786 (citation omitted), it is important to examine a restriction 
“‘in a realistic light’” to determine the extent and nature of the restriction’s impact 
on voters. In Bullock v Carter, 405 US 134, 144; 92 S Ct 849; 31 L Ed 2d 92 
(1972), the United States Supreme Court determined that a filing fee requirement 
for primary elections was unconstitutional because of “the obvious likelihood that 
[the] limitation would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the 
community . . . .” The Court stated that “we would ignore reality were we not to 
recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as 
candidates, according to their economic status.”  Id. The “practical difficulties” of 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a restriction on those who will be affected must be considered in any constitutional 
analysis. See, e.g, Lane, supra at 277. 
Examining the photo identification requirement “in a realistic light” clearly 
indicates that distinct populations in Michigan will be uniquely and substantially 
burdened by the photo identification requirement.  The reality is that not all our 
citizens live a life in which they have photo identification and obtaining photo 
identification solely to vote causes a severe burden.  To many, it may seem 
unimaginable to live a life in which a person has no photo identification, but to 
thousands of Michigan citizens, it is indeed a reality.   
Proponents of the photo identification requirement argue that photo 
identification is a standard practice in today’s world and that photo identification 
is needed to board an airplane, rent a hotel room, or open an account at a bank. 
But these arguments ignore that there are segments of our population that do not 
have the means to board an airplane or rent a hotel room.  There are numerous 
Michigan citizens who do not live a life in which photo identification is a 
necessity, yet this does not mean that they should be subjected to obstacles when 
exercising their fundamental right to vote.  See, e.g., Crawford I, supra at 955­
956. The failure to recognize that many Michigan citizens live a life in which 
photo identification is not needed is the reason that proponents fail to recognize 
that the photo identification requirement will create a substantial obstacle to voting 
for thousands of Michigan citizens.  This classification does not truly apply 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“evenhandedly” to every citizen because those without photo identification will 
more likely be the poor and the disenfranchised.   
The photo identification requirement will have a disparate impact on racial 
and ethnic populations, as well as poor voters, elderly voters, and disabled voters; 
thus, the photo identification requirement does not affect all citizens equally.  Just 
as the registration scheme in Lane, supra at 271, inherently operated 
discriminatorily, the statute at issue will diminish the opportunity for thousands of 
citizens to participate in the political process.  The fact that the photo identification 
requirement contains no overt statement of discrimination does mean that the 
requirement will not succeed in disproportionately keeping away members of 
Michigan’s most disenfranchised groups.  See, e.g., Carrington v Rash, 380 US 
89, 92-93; 85 S Ct 775; 13 L Ed 2d 675 (1965).  The discrimination that exists in 
the photo identification requirement is dangerous because of its façade as a 
“reasonable” requirement to combat voter fraud, but the “Equal Protection Clause 
likewise guards against subtle restraints on the right to vote, as well as outright 
denial.” Wilkins, supra at 684. Our citizens’ fundamental right to vote cannot be 
denied or abridged, whether the restriction seeks to directly or indirectly infringe 
on this right. Harman v Forssenius, 380 US 528, 540-542; 85 S Ct 1177; 14 L Ed 
2d 50 (1965). 
The majority’s dismissive attempt to trivialize the effect that this legislation 
will have on Michigan’s citizens is unconvincing because of the majority’s choice 
to ignore the realities associated with the photo identification requirement.  The 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
majority belittles any argument that this legislation will negatively affect racial 
and ethnic populations by claiming that “[w]hen all other arguments are 
unavailing, resorting to a claim of racial discrimination is a frequent substitute.” 
Ante at 45.  Notably, the majority ignores that the poor, the elderly, and disabled 
voters will also be negatively affected by this legislation.  Members of Congress, 
as well as numerous nonprofit organizations, have expressed the same concerns 
expressed in this dissent.  See 148 Cong Rec S10488 (2002). 
Even the 
Commission on Federal Election Reform recognizes that concerns about the photo 
identification requirement, including that the requirement could disenfranchise 
voters and have an adverse effect on minorities, are “serious and legitimate.” 
Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, supra. And it is certainly relevant to 
consider the effect that photo identification requirements have had in states that 
have enacted identification requirements.  See, e.g., Crawford v Marion Co 
Election Bd, 2007 US App LEXIS 7804 at *7 (CA 7,  2007) (Wood, J., dissenting) 
(“The New York Times recently reported that overall voter turnout in these states 
decreases by about three percent, and by two to three times that much for 
minorities.”) (citing Christopher Drew, Low Voter Turnout is Seen in States That 
Require ID, NY Times, February 21, 2007). 
Yet the majority chooses to ignore this information simply because it could 
then not flippantly respond that the dissent is raising a hollow claim of racism. 
But no matter how much the majority engages in figurative eye-rolling, the 
majority cannot revise history and it cannot change the realities of the society in 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
which we live. Unfortunately, the historical and current reality is that racism 
exists and voting regulations have been used for discriminatory reasons.  The 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 were 
enacted to protect against racial discrimination in voting.  See 42 USC 1971 and 
42 USC 1973 et seq. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that certain 
groups of people have historically been relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness. Plyler, supra at 218; South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 
308-313; 86 S Ct 803; 15 L Ed 2d 769 (1966).  “The experience of our Nation has 
shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups.”  Id.; 
see also Bone Shirt v Hazeltine, 336 F Supp 2d 976, 1018-1023, 1026-1027, 1028­
1034 (D SD, 2004) (“[T]here is substantial evidence that South Dakota officially 
excluded Indians from voting and holding office.”); Bone Shirt v Hazeltine, 200 F 
Supp 2d 1150, 1152 (D SD, 2002).  The majority’s steadfast refusal to recognize 
this fact and consider even the possibility that it may affect the real-world 
implications of the photo identification requirement results in a condescending 
response to the concerns raised by numerous amici that the constitutional rights of 
hundreds of thousands of Michigan citizens may be negatively affected by this 
legislation. 
The photo identification requirement may not be as obviously 
discriminatory as a poll tax, but its effect will be the same.10  The photo 
10 The United States Constitution provides: 
(continued…) 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
identification requirement is merely a more sophisticated device that will 
disenfranchise our citizens by denying and abridging their fundamental right to 
vote, and a restriction that places even a minimal price on a citizen’s exercising his 
right to vote constitutes invidious discrimination.  See Bullock, supra at 142; see, 
e.g., Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, supra (Comments by Tom Daschle, 
Spencer Overton, and Raul Yzaguirre) (The photo identification requirement 
suggested by the Commission on Federal Election Reform is “nothing short of a 
modern day poll tax.”). “[A] state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment 
of any fee an electoral standard.” Harper, supra at 666. A proper examination of 
the photo identification requirement demands that this Court look at the true and 
cumulative effect of the statute’s requirement and the state’s overall regulations 
governing photo identification.  See, e.g., Clingman, supra at 599 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). This Court must not simply accept the cursory allegation that the 
photo identification requirement affects everyone equally.  It does not.  According 
to the Secretary of State, approximately 370,000 registered Michigan voters do not 
(…continued) 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any 
primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors 
for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in 
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any 
state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.  [US Const, 
Am XXIV, § 1.] 
24  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
have photo identification. Dawson Bell, Court Jumps into Dispute over Voter ID 
Checks, Detroit Free Press, April 27, 2006.11  While some argue that this number 
is actually much higher, the fact that hundreds of thousands of Michigan citizens 
will be affected by this legislation indicates that the requirement is a serious 
impediment on the fundamental right to vote for these citizens.  See, e.g., 
Michigan State UAW, supra at 516-517.12 
As numerous amici curiae have attested, the impact that this law will have 
on numerous citizens will be substantial.  Governor Jennifer M. Granholm; Frank 
J. Kelley, Attorney General Emeritus; the city of Detroit; the National Association 
11 Available through purchase at 
<http://nl.newsbank.com/ml_search/we/Archives?s_site=freep&f_sitename=Detro 
it+Free+P> (accessed May 30, 2007). 
12 A study by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee of the driver’s 
license status of those of voting age in Wisconsin found “[m]any adults do not 
have either a drivers license or photo ID.”  John Pawasarat, The Driver License 
Status of the Voting Age Population in Wisconsin, Employment and Training 
Institute, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, June 2005, at 1, available at 
 (accessed May 30, 
2007). Twenty-three percent of people aged 65 or older did not have a driver’s 
license or state photo identification card.  Id. “Minorities and poor populations are 
the most likely to have drivers license problems.”  Id. In one county, only 47 
percent of African-American adults and 43 percent of Hispanic adults had a valid 
driver’s license, compared to 85 percent of Caucasian adults in the rest of the state.  
Id. at 1-2. When examining young adults aged 18-24 in the same county, only 26 
percent of African-American young adults and 34 percent of Hispanic young 
adults had a valid driver’s license, compared to 71 percent of Caucasian young 
adults in the rest of the state. Id. at 2. 
Further, a report by the Commission on Federal Election Reform indicates 
that 12 percent of the voting age population lack a driver’s license.  Building 
Confidence in U.S. Elections, supra (Comments by Tom Daschle, Spencer 
Overton, and Raul Yzaguirre). 
25  
 
 
 
 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)-Detroit Branch; the Michigan 
State Conference NAACP; the National Bar Association; the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Michigan; the League of Women Voters Detroit; the American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee; Project Vote; the Association of 
Communities for Reform Now; the Latin Americans for Social and Economic 
Development, Inc.; the Detroit Urban League; the National Conference 
Community and Justice-Michigan; the Michigan Civil Rights Commission; the 
Michigan Department of Civil Rights; Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, 
Inc.; the Michigan Democratic Party; the Michigan House Democratic Caucus; the 
Michigan Senate Democratic Caucus; the Michigan Legislative Black Caucus; the 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; and the American Association 
for Retired Persons (AARP) all provided compelling arguments and information 
about how the photo identification requirement will truly affect our citizens, and 
this information should not be ignored.  Notably, the amici brief submitted by 
Michigan county clerks, who are responsible for election administration 
throughout the state, recognizes, “Voters who do not have these common forms of 
photo identification [a driver’s license, state photo identification card, or possibly 
a passport] are most likely to be those who do not drive and these, in turn, are 
most likely to be older, and/or lower income voters, or immigrants.”  Amici brief 
at 7. Even the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
26  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
recognized that “[n]o doubt most people who don’t have photo ID are low on the 
economic ladder . . . .” Crawford I, supra at 951.13 
The photo identification requirement will present a monetary and logistical 
burden for thousands of our citizens.  There is a cost associated with obtaining a 
driver’s license or state identification card.  While the state identification card fee 
can be waived for some people, there are many people who will be required to pay 
the fee. But this is not the only cost associated with the photo identification 
requirement. See, e.g., Weinschenk v State, 203 SW3d 201, 213-214 (Mo, 2006) 
(After examining the costs associated with obtaining photo identification required 
for voting, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that “all fees that impose financial 
burdens on eligible citizens’ right to vote, not merely poll taxes, are impermissible 
under federal law.”). Procuring the documents required to obtain a driver’s license 
or other acceptable state-issued identification also costs money. 
Multiple 
documents must be obtained, at a monetary cost, as well as a logistical cost, to 
then acquire acceptable photo identification.  For example, to use a birth certificate 
as one of the three documents necessary to obtain a state identification card, only a 
certified birth certificate with a raised seal or a true copy of the birth certificate are 
13 The concerns of the amici are further supported by various studies that 
indicate that a photo identification requirement has a statistically significant effect 
on voting. Timothy Vercelotti and David Anderson, Protecting the franchise, or 
restricting it? The effects of voter identification requirements on turnout, Rutgers 
University, 2006, at 1, available at <http://www.eagleton.rutgers.edu/News­
Research/VoterID_Turnout.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2007). 
27  
 
 
  
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
acceptable; hospital birth certificates are not acceptable.14  This, of course, costs 
even more money than just that required outright for a driver’s license or state 
identification card. But an interesting and important fact to note is that photo 
identification is required to request a copy of one’s birth certificate. So a person 
who needs a birth certificate to obtain photo identification must present photo 
identification to receive the birth certificate.  Further, any documents issued by 
another country that are not written in English must be translated before they can 
be used. Translations are only acceptable from a limited number of organizations, 
such as a college, government agency, or translation-related business, and the 
translation must provide detailed information about the translator.  Not only must 
a person spend money to get the necessary documents to then travel to a Secretary 
of State office to get the necessary photo identification, but a person must navigate 
the government system and spend time doing so.15 
14 Older African-American citizens may experience particular difficulties as 
many were never issued birth certificates because they were born at home. 
Leighton Ku, Donna C. Ross, and Matt Broaddus, Survey Indicates Deficit 
Reduction Act Jeopardizes Medicaid Coverage for 3 to 5 Million Citizens, Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised February 17, 2006, available at 
 (last accessed June 26, 2007).  One 
study found that 1/5 of African-Americans adults born in 1939 and 1940 lacked 
birth certificates. Id. 
15 Traveling the required distance to a Secretary of State office  may 
indeed be too burdensome for  many citizens, including  those in rural areas. 
For example, Chippewa County  has only one  Secretary of State office. 
Secretary 
of 
State 
office 
locations, 
available 
at 
 (accessed 
July 2, 2007). Yet Chippewa County occupies 1,561.06 square miles, which 
(continued…) 
28  
 
 
 
                                                 
The Michigan county clerks—again the very government officials who 
administer elections—recognize, “It is clear from examining these requirements 
for obtaining a personal identification card that it will be a very time consuming 
matter.” Amici brief at 8-9.  As the Michigan county clerks further note, “It must 
be recognized that the very fact that these voters do not drive may make it more 
difficult for them to travel to the locations where the identification cards are 
obtained.”  Id. at 7. And to obtain a driver’s license or state photo identification 
card a person must travel to an office of the Secretary of State.  See, e.g., MCL 
28.291.  For many citizens, taking the time to do so, which may also mean taking 
time off work without pay, will create a substantial burden to exercising the 
citizens’ right to vote. 
What appears lost on the proponents of the photo identification requirement 
is that encouraging citizens to vote is an essential state objective, and our 
government should be trying to promote voting, not passing legislation that will 
actually discourage participation by throwing up unnecessary roadblocks.  “[T]he 
constitutional order must be preserved by a strong, participatory democratic 
process.” California Democratic Party, supra at 587 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see also Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, supra (Comments by Tom 
Daschle, Spencer Overton, and Raul Yzaguirre) (“Election reform must be about 
(…continued)  
means that a person may have to travel a significant distance merely to get the  
identification needed to vote. 
United States Census Bureau, available at  
 (accessed July 2, 2007).  
29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
empowerment, not disenfranchisement.  Raising needless impediments to voting 
or creating artificial requirements to have one’s vote counted are steps 
backward.”). But the photo identification requirement is yet another obstacle that 
a citizen must overcome as he proceeds along the path to exercise his fundamental 
right to vote. Now that citizen is less likely to exercise his fundamental right to 
vote because of the photo identification requirement.  And the affidavit 
exception—if a citizen even knows of its existence—is not helpful because of the 
harassment and intimidation that a voter may face through the challenge process. 
Merely being allowed into a polling place does not mean that a citizen’s 
right to vote has been protected. See, e.g., United States v Saylor, 322 US 385, 
387-388; 64 S Ct 1101; 88 L Ed 1341 (1944).  A citizen’s right to vote must also 
be protected throughout the challenge process.  The burden of the photo 
identification requirement must be realistically viewed in light of what this means 
to the citizen who does not have photo identification but still wants to vote.  The 
burden for a citizen without photo identification is not “simply” a matter of 
signing an affidavit and then voting.  Contrary to the majority’s belief, the 
Michigan county clerks, who will actually administer the election, admit, “It is not 
yet clear whether an affidavit is a sufficient means for a voter without photo 
identification to attest that he is who he purports to be but lacks the requisite 
identification.” Amici brief at 10. While the majority presents the affidavit 
process as an insignificant inconvenience, it is actually much more burdensome to 
the actual voters. 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The lack of photo identification makes it much more likely that a voter will 
be challenged because the statute explicitly references the challenge process in 
relation to those signing the affidavit.  MCL 168.523.  During the challenge 
process, there is the distinct possibility that a citizen may be denied the right to 
vote if an election inspector believes that the citizen’s answers indicate that he is 
not a qualified elector or if the citizen chooses not to sign the affidavit.  For some 
citizens with disabilities, the affidavit may be too difficult to sign or understand. 
However, unfortunately, another likely scenario is that the challenge process will 
be used in some situations to harass and intimidate citizens who seek to exercise 
their right to vote. The statute explicitly invites a challenge to a citizen who is 
voting without photo identification by stating that a citizen “being allowed to vote 
without the identification required under this subsection is subject to 
challenge . . . .” Id. The challenge process subjects those who are voting without 
photo identification to delay, intimidation, and harassment to a greater degree than 
those who have photo identification.16  Notably, a citizen being challenged must 
“stand to one side until after unchallenged voters have had an opportunity to vote, 
when his case shall [then] be taken up and disposed of.”  MCL 168.728.  Waiting 
16 The majority argues that the use of the challenge process to harass voters 
will be deterred because it is a misdemeanor to do so.  See ante at 44. But it is a 
felony to impersonate another person to vote, yet the majority apparently does not 
give credence to the fact that this criminal penalty already serves to deter in­
person voter fraud. Notably, I again point out that there is no evidence of in­
person voter fraud, while there is evidence of voters having been harassed at the 
polls. See amici brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People et al, at 16-17, 24-25; exhibits 3-6. 
31  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
for long periods at the polls is not uncommon, and now voters who are challenged 
because they do not have photo identification must wait indefinitely longer to 
resolve the challenge. This practical, real-world effect can be used to substantially 
penalize and harass those without photo identification.17 
But a penalty cannot be imposed on a citizen who chooses to exercise his 
right to vote merely because he does not have photo identification.  See Dunn, 
supra at 341, citing Harman, supra at 540. “To the extent that a citizen’s right to 
vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen.” Reynolds, supra at 567.  As this 
Court has recognized, the fundamental right to vote cannot be left to the whim or 
impulse of an election official. Wilkins, supra at 677. It certainly is beyond 
dispute that certain voters in our country—and even our state—have been 
intimidated and harassed to keep those citizens from voting.  See, e.g., Note: 
Eradicating racial discrimination in voter registration: Rights and remedies under 
the voting rights act amendments of 1982, 52 Fordham L R 93 (1983).  The 
Commission on Federal Election Reform reports that during the 2004 elections, 
there were “improper requests for voter ID” and there were reports “of voter 
intimidation and suppression tactics.” See Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, 
supra. Of 55,000 calls made to a MYVOTE1 hotline on election day in 2004, 4.9 
17 See, e.g., Berry, Comment: Take the money and run: Lame-ducks 
“quack” and pass voter identification, 74 U Det Mercy L R 291, 297 (1997) 
(citing Jeff Gerritt, Long Waits Prove Vote System Dated, Detroit Free Press, 
November 7, 1996) (The wait was so long at some polls that some voters walked 
in, turned around, and walked out.).  
32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
percent of the calls were about coercion and intimidation and 43.9 percent of the 
calls were about registration issues and poll access.  Notably, election challengers 
in Michigan can be appointed by political parties, which may provide an added 
incentive for challenges to be made.  If a challenge is successful and a citizen is 
deemed unqualified, there is no appeal from this decision, so a citizen’s denial of 
his fundamental right is absolute.  See MCL 168.729. The photo identification 
requirement and the challenge process now again leave those who do not have 
photo identification at the whim of election officials as our challenged citizens are 
required to wait an indefinite length of time merely to exercise their fundamental 
right to vote.   
Notably, there are already numerous statutes that criminalize voter fraud. 
To name just a few, it is a felony to falsely impersonate another person to vote or 
attempt to vote, and it is also a felony to try to induce a person to impersonate 
another person to vote or attempt to vote.  MCL 168.932a(a).  It is a felony to 
assume a false or fictitious name to vote.  MCL 168.932a(b). It is a misdemeanor 
for an elector to make a material statement that is false in answering a question 
asked by a clerk or assistant clerk or in a registration affidavit.  MCL 168.499(1). 
And it is perjury to give an untrue answer concerning a material matter when 
challenged.  MCL 168.729.  
Given these statutes that criminalize voter fraud, as well as the state’s 
comprehensive statutory scheme that manages all aspects of voting, the state’s 
actions in mandating photo identification are certainly not narrowly tailored or 
33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
even reasonable. See Dunn, supra at 345-346; Bay Co Democratic Party, supra at 
437. Any concerns about preventing voter fraud must examine the current system 
to determine its completeness. Wilkins, supra at 687. In Dunn, a durational 
residency requirement, even assuming it had once been necessary, was no longer 
required because of the state’s comprehensive statutory scheme.  Similarly, 
Michigan’s statutory scheme is comprehensive when dealing with voter 
regulations. For example, when a citizen appears at the polls to vote, the citizen 
must complete an application that includes his signature and address.  MCL 
168.523(1). If voter registration lists are used, then the citizen must provide his 
date of birth or other information that appears on the voter registration list.  Id. 
Also, if the qualified voter file is available at the polling place, the election official 
must compare the signature on the voter’s application that was completed at the 
polling place with the signature in the qualified voter file.  Id. 
There are also numerous laws that address the qualifications of voters, 
MCL 168.492; the contents of registration affidavits, MCL 168.495; ascertaining 
whether a voter is already registered, MCL 168.505; changes of a voter’s 
residence, MCL 168.506, MCL 168.507, MCL 168.507a, and MCL 168.507b; 
verifying the correctness of registration records by conducting a house-to-house 
canvas, MCL 168.515; and even registering voters confined in jail, MCL 
168.492a, to name just a few. Thus, there are “a variety of criminal laws that are 
more than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared.”  Dunn, 
supra at 353. When there is such a comprehensive statutory design to prevent, 
34  
 
 
 
 
address, and punish in-person voter fraud, imposing a photo identification 
requirement that will restrict our citizens’ fundamental right to vote is unnecessary 
and certainly not the least restrictive means to prevent voter fraud.  See id. at 353­
354. 
Further, the photo identification requirement will do nothing to actually 
prevent in-person voter fraud, even if an incident were to occur in the future.  The 
majority makes much of the exception to the photo identification requirement that 
allows a citizen to sign an affidavit attesting that he is who he says he is.  This 
affidavit allows a person to vote without showing photo identification.  But if a 
person is willing to break the law and commit in-person voter fraud, then signing 
this affidavit will do nothing to deter the fraud from occurring.  A person willing 
to risk committing a felony and being sent to prison to commit in-person voter 
fraud is not going to be affected by having to sign a piece of paper.  “[F]alse 
swearing is no obstacle to one intent on fraud . . . .”  Dunn, supra at 346. As the 
United States Supreme Court recognized when striking down a durational 
residency requirement: “The nonresident intent on committing election fraud will 
as quickly and effectively swear that he has been a resident for the requisite period 
of time as he would swear that he was simply a resident.”  Id. The oath swearing 
“becomes an effective voting obstacle only to residents who tell the truth and have 
no fraudulent purposes.” Id. at 346-347. Likewise, the only citizens in Michigan 
who will be affected will be legitimate voters who stay away from the polls 
because they do not know there is an exception to the photo identification 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
requirement or those voters who fear they will suffer harassment and intimidation 
through the affidavit challenge process. 
III. THE PHOTO IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT IS NOT EVEN 
JUSTIFIED BY A REASONABLE RATIONALE 
Even if the photo identification requirement is examined under a lesser 
standard, the photo identification requirement is an unconstitutional burden 
nonetheless, because it is not a reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction 
justified by an important state interest. 
See Burdick, supra at 434. 
The 
government’s interest in mandating the photo identification requirement must be 
sufficiently weighty to justify the restriction.  See Timmons, supra at 365. But 
here the government’s interest has no weight because there is absolutely no 
evidence that a problem with in-person voter fraud even exists.   
I join my colleagues in their desire to prevent voter fraud, but I am 
unwilling to do so at any cost. No matter how many times the majority argues that 
the photo identification requirement is necessary to prevent vote dilution, it does 
not change the fact that there is no evidence of in-person voter fraud. Merely 
making the claim does not make it so. When there is no evidence of in-person 
voter fraud that will be corrected by the photo identification requirement and no 
credible evidence of this problem existing nationwide, I cannot join the majority in 
finding that this requirement is constitutional.  See 148 Cong Rec S10488 (2002); 
see also Common Cause/League of Women Voters of Georgia, Inc v Billups, 439 F 
Supp 2d 1294, 1350 (ND Ga, 2006). “There is nothing in the Constitution which 
36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
permits the Legislature, under the desire to purify elections, to impose any 
conditions which will destroy or seriously impede the enjoyment of the elective 
franchise.” Attorney General v Bd of Councilmen of the City of Detroit, 58 Mich 
213, 216; 24 NW 887 (1885).  “For even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a 
State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected 
liberty. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely 
touching our most precious freedoms.” Anderson, supra at 806 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
It is not reasonable to impose a photo identification requirement when the 
alleged interest is nonexistent in-person voter fraud, especially when the 
requirement will significantly impinge on the rights of thousands of Michigan’s 
citizens. The majority cannot dismiss the argument that there is no evidence of in­
person voter fraud by stating that it just does not matter.  It certainly matters when 
our citizens will have their fundamental voting rights restricted.  To ascertain 
whether the restriction is warranted, it is indeed essential to factor into the analysis 
the fact that no in-person voter fraud has been shown to exist.  A bald assertion is 
insufficient—a state’s asserted interest in a restriction must bear some sort of 
plausible relationship to the burden the restriction will place on its citizens.  See 
Timmons, supra at 374-375 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And “[i]f the State has open 
to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interest, it may not choose a 
legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal 
liberties.” Anderson, supra at 806 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
37  
 
 
 
 
The photo identification requirement that is being touted as a solution to a 
nonexistent problem is indeed unconstitutional because it addresses an imaginary 
problem while significantly undermining and burdening our citizens’ 
constitutional rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The constitution demands that the government vigorously protect our 
citizens’ fundamental right to vote. Our citizens must be able to exercise their 
right to vote without encumbrances that are unconstitutional and have the practical 
effect of limiting this right.  Today’s decision is alarming because it ignores the 
reality of the photo identification requirement and validates the Legislature’s 
shortsighted attempt to restrict the rights of our citizens.  It trivializes the effect 
that this ill-advised legislation will have on our poorest and, in many cases, most 
disenfranchised citizens.  It appears to stem from a belief that the government 
gives rights to its citizens and can take these rights away on a whim and with the 
flimsiest of excuses.  But a significant impairment of our citizens’ fundamental 
right to vote requires justification. 
While this Court has abdicated its 
responsibility to require this justification, I believe that our citizens must demand 
more. Thus, I respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
38  
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re REQUEST FOR ADVISORY 
OPINION REGARDING  
No. 130589 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 2005 PA 71 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
This case involves the constitutionality of mandating that registered voters 
show photographic identification before being allowed access to the voting booth. 
Under 2005 PA 71, if a voter is unable to show the required identification, he or 
she must sign an affidavit swearing to that fact in order to vote.   
This new law impinges on the fundamental right to vote.  Before today, this 
Court consistently applied a strict scrutiny analysis to any law or regulation that 
impinged on that right. But, in upholding the constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, the 
majority announces that strict scrutiny is now the wrong test.  Relying on the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Burdick v Takushi,1 it concludes that a 
number of this Court’s past voters’ rights decisions no longer are good law. 
Because I disagree, I respectfully dissent.   
First, Burdick did not signal a change in the law. It was simply a clear 
articulation of the rule that emerges from synthesizing earlier United States 
Supreme Court decisions in this area. Burdick also did not overrule past decisions 
1 504 US 428; 112 S Ct 2059; 119 L Ed 2d 245 (1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
of either the United States Supreme Court or of this Court.  A proper application 
of the law declared in these decisions convinces me that 2005 PA 71 is 
unconstitutional. It is a serious error for the Michigan Supreme Court to ignore 
this long-revered caselaw. 
Second, the majority of this Court has uncritically adopted what it believes 
is a rule mandated by the federal constitution.  In so doing, it essentially confers 
on the United States Supreme Court the functional ability to amend our state 
constitution. The majority’s decision to adopt in lockstep what it mistakenly 
believes is the federal standard renders our state constitutional provisions 
nugatory. And it represents a failure of this Court to fulfill its constitutional duty.   
In reliance on the Michigan Constitution and the caselaw interpreting it, I 
would hold that infringements on the right to vote that cannot withstand the most 
exacting scrutiny are unconstitutional. Because 2005 PA 71 infringes on the right 
to vote and is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest, 
it is unconstitutional under both the federal and the state constitutions.   
I. THE FACTS 
The legal question that we are considering here has its genesis in MCL 
168.523, § 523 of the Michigan Election Law,2 which was enacted by the 
Legislature in 1996 PA 583. Section 523(1) requires that each voter identify 
himself or herself by 
2 MCL 168.1 et seq. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
presenting an official state identification card issued to that 
individual pursuant to Act No. 222 of the Public Acts of 1972, being 
sections 28.291 to 28.295 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, an 
operator’s or chauffeur’s license issued to that individual pursuant to 
the Michigan Vehicle Code, Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, 
being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or 
other generally recognized picture identification card  . . . . 
Section 523(1) also provides: 
If the elector does not have an official state identification 
card, operator’s or chauffeur’s license as required in this subsection, 
or other generally recognized picture identification card, the 
individual shall sign an affidavit to that effect before an election 
inspector and be allowed to vote as otherwise provided in this act. 
However, an elector being allowed to vote without the identification 
required under this subsection is subject to challenge as provided in 
section 727. 
Pursuant to these requirements, before being given a ballot, each registered 
voter would have to identify himself or herself by presenting (1) an official state 
identification card, (2) an operator’s or chauffeur’s license, or (3) another 
generally recognized picture identification card.  If the voter did not have the 
required photo identification, the voter would have to sign an affidavit swearing to 
his or her identity. If the voter complied, he or she would be allowed to vote, but 
would be subject to challenge under MCL 168.727, in which case, the right to vote 
might be denied. It is not clear what would happen if a registered voter had photo 
identification but was not in possession of it at the polling place.   
Before the requirements of § 523 became effective, then-Attorney General 
Frank J. Kelley evaluated it pursuant to MCL 14.32 and found that the photo 
identification requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
States Constitution, US Const, Am XIV.  OAG, 1997-1998, No 6930, p 1 (January 
29, 1997). As a result, § 523 was never implemented or enforced.   
Nine years later, the Legislature enacted 2005 PA 71.  The new act 
essentially repeated the same requirements that were in the version of § 523 
enacted in 1996 PA 583.  In February of the next year, the Michigan House of 
Representatives, by resolution, asked this Court to issue an opinion on the 
constitutionality of 2005 PA 71. See 2006 House Journal 17 (Resolution No. 199, 
February 21, 2006). We granted the request.  474 Mich 1230 (2006). 
As a consequence, the question before us is the constitutionality of 2005 
PA 71. It is beyond argument that the photographic identification requirements of 
the act infringe on the paramount and fundamental right to vote.  Nonetheless, a 
majority of this Court has decided that these requirements will pass constitutional 
muster if they can withstand only a minimal level of scrutiny.  I do not agree. For 
the reasons that follow, I would hold that the requirements of the act violate both 
the federal and state constitutions. 
II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The United States Supreme Court has stated on many occasions that the 
right to vote is fundamental.  E.g., Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780; 103 S Ct 
1564; 75 L Ed 2d 547 (1983); Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L 
Ed 2d 506 (1964); Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356; 6 S Ct 1064; 30 L Ed 220 
(1886). “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in 
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
live. 
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined.” Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1, 17; 84 S Ct 526; 11 L Ed 2d 481 
(1964). Because this right is so precious, federal courts have consistently applied 
the most demanding level of scrutiny to governmental action that interferes with 
access to the voting booth.  See, e.g., Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330; 92 S Ct 995; 
31 L Ed 2d 274 (1972); Kramer v Union Free School Dist No 15, 395 US 621; 89 
S Ct 1886; 23 L Ed 2d 583 (1969). 
The majority acknowledges that the right to vote is of fundamental 
importance. But it has decided that, because of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Burdick, a more relaxed standard now applies to governmental 
measures that limit the right to cast a ballot.  The majority is badly mistaken.   
A. BURDICK V TAKUSHI 
At issue in Burdick was Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting. Burdick, 
504 US at 430. Under Hawaii election law, write-in votes were simply ignored. 
Id. at 436. The plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the prohibition violated his rights 
under the First and Fourteenth amendments. Id. at 430. 
The Court stated the standard to be applied in analyzing whether a voting 
regulation unconstitutionally infringes on these rights: 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must 
weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward 
by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” 
taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”  [Id. at 434 (citations 
omitted).] 
The Court explained that the rigorousness of the Court’s scrutiny depends 
on the degree to which voting restrictions burden the right to vote.  If that right is 
severely restricted, the restrictions, to be constitutional, must be drawn narrowly 
so as to advance a state interest of compelling importance.  Id. But, when the 
restrictions impose only “‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory 
interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).   The Court found that Hawaii’s prohibition did not violate the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights because it created a minor burden while promoting the state’s 
legitimate interest.  Id. at 430. 
A majority of this Court has concluded that the decision in Burdick worked 
a dramatic shift in the law.  In fact, it asserts that Burdick repudiated a previous 
construction of the federal Equal Protection Clause that was erroneous.   
The majority has misread Burdick.  The case broke no new ground.  Rather 
than create a new rule or signal a shift in the law, Burdick simply announced a rule 
that synthesized past decisions of the United States Supreme Court and articulated, 
in one test, already established legal principles.3 
3 Burdick was not the first case to articulate the standard that emerges from 
blending United States Supreme Court decisions in the area of voting rights.  The 
balancing test set forth in Burdick seems to have originated in Storer v Brown, 415 
US 724; 94 S Ct 1274; 39 L Ed 2d (1974), and American Party of Texas v White, 
(continued…) 
6  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contrary to the majority’s claim, the federal constitution has never required 
that every law regulating elections must withstand strict scrutiny.  E.g., Jenness v 
Fortson, 403 US 431, 440-442; 91 S Ct 1970; 29 L Ed 2d 554 (1971);4 Storer, 415 
US at 730;5 Anderson, 460 US at 788.6  Rather, the federal constitution has 
(…continued) 
415 US 767; 94 S Ct 1296; 39 L Ed 2d 744 (1974).  In these two cases, the Court 
applied a type of intermediate scrutiny to the regulations under consideration. 
Zywicki, Federal judicial review of state ballot access regulations: Escape from 
the political thicket, 20 T Marshall L R 87, 113-114 (1994).  It appears that it is 
this intermediate level of scrutiny that led to the balancing test that the United 
States Supreme Court first clearly expressed in Anderson, 460 US at 789, and the 
majority attributes to Burdick. See Zywicki, supra, pp 114-116. See also Note: 
Better late than never: The John Anderson cases and the constitutionality of filing 
deadlines, 11 Hofstra L R 691, 703-704 (1983).   
4 In Jenness, in a perfunctory fashion that is inconsistent with strict scrutiny 
review, the Court upheld a petition nominating requirement because it was not 
unduly burdensome.  Id. at 440-442. 
5 In Storer, the Court stated that “the rule fashioned by the Court to pass on 
constitutional challenges to specific provisions of election laws provides no 
litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are 
invidious under the Equal Protection Clause.  The rule is not self-executing and is 
no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made. Decision in this context, 
as in others, is very much a ‘matter of degree . . . .’” 415 US at 730.   
6 In Anderson, the Court set forth the test that the majority attributes to 
Burdick. 
Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s 
election laws therefore cannot be resolved by any “litmuspaper test” 
that will separate valid from invalid restrictions. Instead, a court 
must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels 
its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It 
then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by 
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In 
(continued…) 
7  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
consistently been interpreted to require application of a strict scrutiny analysis 
only if the right to vote has been subjected to a severe restriction.  Cases both 
predating and postdating Burdick illustrate that statutes that impair an individual’s 
right to cast a ballot, as 2005 PA 71 does, are severe restrictions.7 
B. HARPER V VIRGINIA BD OF ELECTIONS8 
In Harper, the Supreme Court found that Virginia’s poll tax requirement 
for state elections violated the Equal Protection Clause.  383 US at 666.  It made 
clear that it greatly disfavors requirements not related to one’s ability to participate 
intelligently in the electoral process and that threaten to deprive one of the right to 
vote. Id. at 668. When such requirements are at issue, the Court declared, the 
degree to which the right to vote is impaired is irrelevant. Id.  If the regulation is 
(…continued) 
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy 
and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the 
reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged 
provision is unconstitutional. [460 US at 789 (citation omitted).]  
7 A closer look at the Burdick opinion reveals the error of the majority’s 
analysis. The right at issue in the instant case is the right to cast a ballot.  It is a 
fundamental right. Dunn, 405 US at 336. Burdick did not involve an individual’s 
right to cast a ballot. It involved a candidate’s right to appear on the ballot.  The 
right of candidacy has never been recognized as a fundamental right.  Clements v 
Fashing, 457 US 957, 963; 102 S Ct 2836; 73 L Ed 2d 508 (1982).  Thus, Burdick 
is virtually of no assistance in determining whether the requirements at issue work 
a severe burden on the fundamental right to vote. 
8 383 US 663; 86 S Ct 1079; 16 L Ed 2d 169 (1966).   
8  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest, even a small 
impairment will violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. 
C. KRAMER V UNION FREE SCHOOL DIST NO 15 
Similarly, in Kramer, a bachelor living with his parents challenged a New 
York law. It limited the individuals eligible to vote in school district elections to 
owners of property within the district and parents of children enrolled in the local 
public school. Kramer, 395 US at 622. The Court considered whether the 
limitations violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 626. The Court concluded 
that “if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide 
residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the 
Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest.”  Id. at 627.   
D. DUNN V BLUMSTEIN 
And in Dunn, the United States Supreme Court struck down a durational 
residency requirement.  405 US at 333. It found that any one citizen in the 
jurisdiction has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an 
equal basis with any other citizen in the jurisdiction.  Id. at 336. And before that 
right may be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the overriding interests 
served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny. Id.  The Court found that 
strict scrutiny “is required for any statute that ‘place[s] a condition on the exercise 
of the right to vote.’”  Id. at 337, quoting Bullock v Carter, 405 US 134, 143; 92 S 
Ct 849; 31 L Ed 2d 92 (1972).   
9  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The majority ignores each of these pre-Burdick cases because it believes 
that Burdick signaled a shift in the law. But Burdick did no more than clearly 
articulate the law as it existed at the time it was written.  It did nothing to overrule 
prior decisions.9  And, the United States Supreme Court’s post-Burdick decision in 
Bush v Gore10 confirms that a restriction works a severe burden and is subject to 
strict scrutiny if it interferes with an individual’s right to cast an equal ballot.   
E. BUSH V GORE 
In Bush, the Court considered whether Florida’s manual recount of ballots 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The standard for what qualified as a legal 
vote differed from county to county. Bush, 531 US at 103. In deciding the case, 
the Court noted that one source of the fundamental nature of the right to vote “lies 
in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each 
voter.” Id. at 104. Because “[t]he right to vote is protected in more than the initial 
allocation of the franchise[, e]qual protection applies as well to the manner of its 
exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, 
by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of 
another.” 
Id.
 Ultimately, the Court held that the recount of votes was 
9 Yet, the members of the majority find that Burdick repudiated an 
erroneous construction of the Equal Protection Clause.  I am baffled by how they 
arrive at this conclusion. It seems to me highly unlikely that our most revered 
legal institution would announce a dramatic shift in the law without at least 
suggesting it and limiting existing precedent.    
10 531 US 98; 121 S Ct 525; 148 L Ed 2d 388 (2000).    
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unconstitutional because the lack of a clear standard permitted an unequal 
evaluation of the ballots. Id. at 110. 
Though factually distinguishable from the instant case, Bush is relevant 
because it is the only post-Burdick United States Supreme Court decision 
involving an individual’s right to cast an equal ballot.11  The  Bush Court 
peremptorily dismissed the state interests that were asserted and struck down the 
recount. In so doing, it had to have used a strict scrutiny standard.12  Hence, the 
Bush decision stands as reassurance that the pre-Burdick decisions that applied a 
strict scrutiny analysis to infringements of a voter’s right to cast a ballot are still 
good law.13 
11 Bush does not even mention Burdick. The fact that Bush does not discuss 
Burdick is further substantiation that Burdick is not the landmark decision that the 
majority would have us believe.   
12 In Bush, the Supreme Court never explicitly stated what level of scrutiny 
it used in reviewing the constitutionality of the recount.  However, the fact that the 
Court found the recount unconstitutional after summarily dismissing the interests 
prompting the recount indicates that the Court was utilizing strict scrutiny review. 
See Stewart v Blackwell, 444 F3d 843, 862 (CA 6, 2006); Hasen, Symposium: The 
law of presidential elections: Issues in the wake of Florida, 2000:  Bush v Gore 
and the future of equal protection law in elections, 29 Fla St U L R 377, 395-396 
(2001). 
13 For additional post-Burdick federal decisions finding that strict scrutiny 
applies to regulations that directly burden the right to cast a ballot, see, e.g., 
Greidinger v Davis, 988 F2d 1344, 1354 (CA 4, 1993) (finding that strict scrutiny 
applies to a voter registration scheme that conditions a voter’s right to vote on the 
public disclosure of the voter’s social security number); Republican Party of 
Arkansas v Faulkner Co, 49 F3d 1289, 1298-1299 (CA 8, 1995) (Finding that the 
requirement that political parties conduct and pay for primary elections was 
subject to strict scrutiny.  This is because it had the effect of forcing many voters, 
(continued…) 
11  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F. THE PHOTO IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS  
At this time, the Secretary of State estimates that 370,000 Michigan 
registered voters do not have photo identification.14  The photographic 
identification requirements of 2005 PA 71 mandate that these individuals obtain 
photographic identification or sign an affidavit before they can vote.  The teaching 
of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Harper, Kramer, Dunn, Bush, 
and their progeny15 is that these requirements work a severe burden on the right to 
vote.16 
(…continued)  
who wished to vote in the Republican primary, to vote either in the Democratic  
primary or not at all.).  
14 D. Bell, Court Jumps Into Dispute Over Voter ID Checks, Detroit Free 
Press (April 27, 2006) (quoting Secretary of State spokeswoman Kelly Chesney).   
15 E.g., Kusper v Pontikes, 414 US 51; 94 S Ct 303; 38 L Ed 2d 260 (1973) 
(Striking down a party affiliation statute that impaired the right to vote by 
preventing individuals who had voted in a primary from voting in another party’s 
primary for nearly two years. Less drastic alternatives existed that satisfied the 
state’s interest involved.); Hill v Stone, 421 US 289, 298; 95 S Ct 1637; 44 L Ed 
2d 172 (1975) (Striking down a “dual box” voting technique because “in an 
election of general interest, restrictions on the franchise of any character must 
meet a stringent test of justification.”). 
16 None of the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that a lower 
standard of review applies concerned the regulation of an individual’s right to cast 
a ballot. The United States Supreme Court decisions cited by the majority are (1) 
Burdick, 504 US 428, (2) Timmons v Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 US 351; 
117 S Ct 1364; 137 L Ed 2d 589 (1997), and (3) Storer, 415 US 724.  Each of 
these cases dealt with a candidate’s right to get on the ballot, not an individual’s 
right to cast a ballot. The right of candidacy has never been recognized as a 
fundamental right. Clements, 457 US at 963. But, as the cases I cite demonstrate, 
(continued…) 
12  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Because “equal dignity [is] owed to each voter,”17 the most “exacting test is 
required for any statute that ‘place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right to 
vote.’” Dunn, 405 US at 337 (quoting Bullock, 405 US at 143) (emphasis added). 
Where access to the ballot box is impeded because of qualifications or 
requirements, such as (1) the poll tax in Harper, (2) the property ownership 
requirement in Kramer, (3) the durational residency requirement in Dunn, or (4) 
the photo identification and affidavit requirements in this case, the most exacting 
level of scrutiny must be applied.   
G. THE AFFIDAVIT OPTION OF 2005 PA 71 
The majority concludes that it is because 2005 PA 71 includes the affidavit 
option that a minimal level of review of the photo identification requirement is 
appropriate. 
However, the affidavit option itself interferes with the right of 
individuals lacking photo identification to cast a ballot.  The assistant attorney 
general who argued in support of the constitutionality of the act concedes this 
point. Even if, as the majority asserts, signing an affidavit were a minor obstacle, 
it is an obstacle that is imposed on only a select group of otherwise qualified 
voters. 
(…continued)  
when an individual’s right to cast a ballot is impaired, the United States Supreme  
Court has uniformly held that strict scrutiny applies.    
17 Bush, 531 US at 104. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
“[W]here a law classifies in such a way as to infringe constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights, heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause is required.” New York Attorney General v Soto-Lopez, 476 US 898, 906 n 
6; 106 S Ct 2317; 90 L Ed 2d 899 (1986).  And a restriction that burdens the right 
of only a select group of citizens to access the ballot is sufficient to trigger strict 
scrutiny review under the federal constitution. See, e.g., Harper, 383 US at 670;18 
Wesberry, 376 US at 17-18;19 Nowak & Keeton, Constitutional Law (5th ed), § 
14.31, p 866.20  As the Burdick Court itself stated, a lower standard of review will 
apply only to “‘nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”  Burdick, 504 US at 434 (citation 
omitted). Because only individuals without photo identification will be subject to 
the affidavit process, these requirements clearly discriminate between individuals 
with photo identification and individuals without such identification.21  Therefore, 
18 “[W]here fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be 
closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”   
19 “Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way 
that unnecessarily abridges this right.” 
20 “Because the right to vote is a fundamental right, any classification 
defining the ability to exercise the right must meet, under a strict scrutiny review, 
the dictates of the equal protection guarantee before the Court can sustain the 
measure as constitutional.” 
21 “Discriminate” is defined as “to make a distinction in favor of or against 
a person on the basis of the group or class to which the person belongs, rather than 
according to merit.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
14  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contrary to the position of the majority, the affidavit option does nothing to reduce 
the level of scrutiny that applies to 2005 PA 71.   
H. THE RELEVANT COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST 
When strict scrutiny applies, “a heavy burden of justification is on the 
State, and . . . the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted 
purposes.” Dunn, 405 US at 343. The state must demonstrate that 2005 PA 71 is 
“‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’”  Id. at 342, quoting 
Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 634; 89 S Ct 1322; 22 L Ed 2d 600 (1969) 
(emphasis omitted); Kramer, 395 US at 627. And even if a compelling interest 
can be shown, the state must use the least restrictive means to advance that 
interest. 
[T]he State cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes affecting 
constitutional rights must be drawn with “precision,” and must be 
“tailored” to serve their legitimate objectives. And if there are other, 
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of 
greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose “less drastic 
means.” [Dunn, 405 US at 343 (citations omitted).] 
The interest that has been put forth for the photo identification requirements 
is that they will prevent voter fraud.  The prevention of voter fraud is clearly a 
legitimate governmental objective. But, there is no evidence at present that voter 
fraud is a significant problem in Michigan. In fact “Michigan enjoys an election 
history that is relatively fraud-free.” Bay Co Democratic Party v Land, 347 F 
15  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
    
                                                 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Supp 2d 404, 437 (ED Mich, 2004) (citing Attorney General Opinion No 6930). 
And voter fraud appears to be very low nationally, as well.22 
More fundamentally, there are many types of voter fraud.  2005 PA 71 
addresses only one: in-person polling place fraud that involves the impersonation 
of a registered voter. Yet, those arguing in favor of the photo identification 
requirements have not come forward with any documented instances of in-person 
voter fraud.23 
22 See Minnite & Callahan, Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election 
Fraud 
(Demos, 
A 
Network 
for 
Ideas 
and 
Action, 
2003), 
at: 
 (accessed July 11, 
2007). After a review of news and legal databases and after interviews with state 
election officials, the authors found that, between 1992 and 2002, election fraud 
was “very rare” and a “minor problem” that “rarely affects election outcomes.” 
Id. at 4, 17. 
See also E. Lipton & I. Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter 
Fraud, 
NY 
Times 
(April 
12, 
2007) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/washington/12fraud.html?pagewanted=1&e 
i=5088&en=277feccfa099c7d0&ex=1334030400> (accessed July 16, 2007).  In 
the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, the Department of Justice began an 
aggressive probe of voter fraud. 
That investigation revealed “virtually no 
evidence of any organized effort to skew federal elections.”  Some have argued 
that the accusations of voter fraud have been advanced to mask efforts to suppress 
the rights of some to vote.  There is evidence that supports this argument.  See G. 
Gordon, 2006 Missouri Election was Ground Zero for GOP, McClatchy 
Newspapers 
(May 
2, 
2007) 
<http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/ 
news/nation/17168096.htm> (accessed July 11, 2007).  And, it has been advanced 
by the opponents of 2005 PA 71.  In his dissent, Justice Cavanagh makes a 
persuasive argument regarding the requirements’ potential negative effects on 
certain groups of voters. 
23 And it is not a lack of diligence that has prevented the production of such 
evidence. Rather, it is because there has not been a single documented instance of 
in-person voter fraud in the state of Michigan.  In fact, it appears that only one 
(continued…) 
16  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Accordingly, the photo identification requirements are a solution in search 
of a problem. This is a particularly serious matter given that they affect and hinder 
the exercise of the fundamental constitutional right to vote.  In order for the 
restrictions to withstand challenge, a constitutionally sufficient compelling 
governmental interest would have to be shown.  But such an interest is 
conspicuously absent in this case.   
I. THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS 
Even assuming a constitutionally sufficient justification could be shown, 
the government must employ the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 
The photo identification and affidavit requirements are not the least restrictive 
means.  The goals of 2005 PA 71 may be achieved by more limited means that do 
not discriminate against and threaten to disenfranchise a large number of qualified 
Michigan voters. First, Chapter XXIII of the Election Law, MCL 168.491 to 
168.524, already establishes comprehensive safeguards aimed at preventing 
fraudulent voting. The fact that there are no documented cases of in-person voter 
fraud suggests that these less drastic, nondiscriminatory means have adequately 
advanced the state’s interest. 
Another safeguard is the matching of signatures.  In states that utilize voter 
signature matching, each voter is required to sign the poll sheet. The signature is 
(…continued)  
allegation of in-person fraud has ever been made to the Secretary of State, and that  
allegation was never substantiated.  
17  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
then matched against the signature acquired at registration.  Michigan utilizes this 
method in precincts where digital signatures are available.  MCL 168.523.  A less 
restrictive alternative to the photo identification requirements would be to ensure 
that all precincts have digital signatures available.24 
Another safeguard is to permit voters the use of nonphoto identification. 
Seventeen states utilize this method.25  If Michigan were to allow flexible 
nonphoto identification, it would avoid the prejudice to eligible voters who lack 
state-issued photo identification. 
Unlike the above safeguards, the photo identification requirements of 2005 
PA 71 pose an extreme remedy to an unsubstantiated problem.  When the remedy 
causes a greater harm than the problem, it cannot survive strict scrutiny.  All the 
aforementioned options represent less drastic means to accomplish the state’s 
interest in preventing voter fraud.  Hence, the photo identification requirements 
are not the least restrictive means to advance the asserted state interest.  For the 
reasons I have detailed, 2005 PA 71 violates the federal constitution. 
24 The majority claims that signature matching is not a less restrictive 
option because it would still require a signature.  What the majority overlooks is 
that signature matching would require a signature from everyone, not just those 
who lack photo identification.  It is this difference that makes signature matching a 
less restrictive, less discriminatory alternative.   
25 Study by National Conference of State Legislatures, available at 
 
(accessed 
July 11, 2007). 
18  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
III. THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION  
A complete analysis of 2005 PA 71 must also include consideration of the 
Michigan Constitution. “State courts cannot rest when they have afforded their 
citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution.  State constitutions, too, 
are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those 
required by the [United States] Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”26 
That the state constitution requires an independent interpretation is not a 
novel concept. For much of the nation’s history, state constitutions have been 
invoked to protect individual rights and often have been found to provide greater 
protection than the federal constitution.27  The idea that state courts are not only 
free to interpret their constitutions independently, but have a duty to do so, is 
derived from federalism itself.28 
James Madison acknowledged this principle when he stated, “In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first 
divided between two distinct governments, and then the position allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double security 
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each 
26 Brennan, State constitutions and the protection of individual rights, 90 
Harv L R 489, 491 (1977). 
27 Note: Neither Icarus nor ostrich: State constitutions as an independent 
source of individual rights, 79 NYU L R 1833, 1835 (2004). 
28 Id. at 1842. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”29  The Federalist No. 
51. 
In Sitz v Dep’t of State Police,30 this Court thoughtfully explained the role 
that the federal constitution plays in interpreting our state constitution.   
Where a right is given to a citizen under federal law, it does 
not follow that the organic instrument of state government must be 
interpreted as conferring the identical right. Nor does it follow that 
where a right given by the federal constitution is not given by a state 
constitution, the state constitution offends the federal constitution. It 
is only where the organic instrument of government purports to 
deprive a citizen of a right granted by the federal constitution that 
the instrument can be said to violate the constitution. 
* * * 
. . . As a matter of simple logic, because the texts were written 
at different times by different people, the protections afforded [by 
the two constitutions] may be greater, lesser, or the same.  [Sitz, 443 
Mich at 760-762.] 
When interpreting our constitution, therefore, “[t]he right question is not 
whether [the] state’s guarantee is the same as or broader than its federal 
counterpart as interpreted by the [United States] Supreme Court. The right 
question is what the state’s guarantee means and how it applies to the case at 
29 Similarly, Justice Brandeis recognized the benefits of our federal system 
when he stated in New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311; 52 S Ct 371; 76 
L Ed 747 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), “It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.” 
30 443 Mich 744; 506 NW2d 209 (1993). 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
hand.”31  And though the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
federal constitution may be a polestar to help us navigate to the correct 
interpretation of our constitution, it is no more than that.  Ultimately, it is our 
constitutional duty to independently interpret the Michigan Constitution.   
The Michigan Supreme Court has long recognized the duty by engaging in 
a “searching examination to discover what ‘law the people [of Michigan] have 
made.’” Sitz, 443 Mich at 759 (citation omitted).  As Chief Justice Cooley 
correctly stated well over 100 years ago, the state Supreme Court’s “duty is to 
enforce the law which the people have made, and not some other law which the 
words of the constitution may possibly be made to express.”  People v Harding, 53 
Mich 481, 485; 19 NW 155 (1884).   
Hence we must determine what level of protection the people of Michigan 
have provided against infringements on the right to vote.  The surest way to 
answer this question is to examine the specific provisions of the Michigan 
Constitution dealing with that right. 
A. ARTICLE 2, SECTION 1 
Article 2, § 1 of the Michigan Constitution states that “[e]very citizen of the 
United States who has attained the age of 21 years, who has resided in this state 
six months, and who meets the requirements of local residence provided by law, 
shall be an elector and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise 
31 Linde, E pluribus—Constitutional theory and state courts, 18 Ga L R 
165, 179 (1984). 
21  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
provided in this constitution.” By its terms, this clause provides that individuals 
who have met certain requirements are “qualified to vote.”   
In giving meaning to the phrase “qualified to vote,” this Court “discerns the 
common understanding of constitutional text by applying [the] term’s plain 
meaning . . . .” Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 468-469; 684 NW2d 765 
(2004). The word “qualified” is defined as “having met the conditions required by 
law or custom for exercising a right, holding an office, etc.”  Random House 
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).   Article 2, § 1, therefore, expressly confers 
the right to vote on any United States citizen, age 21 or older, who has been a 
Michigan resident for six months, and who meets local residency requirements.32 
The question then becomes whether the photo identification and affidavit 
requirements unconstitutionally infringe on this right. 
32 The Twenty-sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution has 
lowered the voting age to 18.  And, as the majority points out, other constitutional 
provisions may specifically take away an otherwise qualified individual’s right to 
vote. See, for example, Const 1963, art 2, § 2, which permits the exclusion of 
citizens from voting because of mental incompetence or commitment to a jail or 
penal institution. However, unless another constitutional provision specifically 
provides otherwise, anyone who meets the requirements of art 2, § 1 is qualified to 
vote. The majority claims that the Purity of Elections Clause is one of the 
constitutional provisions that provides otherwise.  So, the majority asserts, the 
framers of our constitution thought it important enough to set forth the 
qualifications to vote but then added the Purity of Elections Clause.  The majority 
believes that the framers inserted that clause so that the Legislature could later add 
any other qualification it felt like adding.  This argument cannot withstand 
scrutiny. To read the Purity of Elections Clause as broadly as the majority wishes 
would essentially render art 2, § 1 meaningless.  I cannot accept that our framers 
would adopt a meaningless constitutional provision.    
22  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
When the constitutionality of legislation is examined, a showing of 
“[d]ifferent degrees of state interest [is] required by the courts, depending upon the 
type of private interest which is being curtailed.”  Kropf v Sterling Hts, 391 Mich 
139, 157-158; 215 NW2d 179 (1974). The strict scrutiny standard of review 
applies to “legislation [that] impinge[s] on a fundamental right explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the constitution.”  In re Kasuba Estate, 401 Mich 560, 
570; 258 NW2d 731 (1977); Kropf, 391 Mich at 157-158.  Because our 
constitution expressly confers the right to vote on individuals who have satisfied 
the requirements of art 2, § 1, any infringement on that right, beyond these 
requirements, is subject to strict scrutiny review.33 
B. WILKINS V ANN ARBOR CITY CLERK34 
It is consistent with the decisions of this Court that infringements on the 
right to vote not in art 2, § 1 are invalid under the Michigan Constitution, unless 
they withstand the most exacting review.  For example, in Wilkins, this Court 
considered whether a statute that precluded certain students from registering to 
33 Article 2, § 1 is not the only constitutional provision that gives rise to the 
requirement that strict scrutiny apply to regulations that impair the right to vote. 
The Michigan Constitution begins with the declaration that “[a]ll political power is 
inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security 
and protection.”  Const 1963, art 1, § 1.  Additionally, the Michigan Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits any person from being denied the enjoyment of his or 
her “political rights.” Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  These constitutional provisions 
indicate that the people of Michigan attach the utmost importance to the 
fundamental right to vote. 
34 385 Mich 670; 189 NW2d 423 (1971).   
23  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vote in the state violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution.35 
Wilkins, 385 Mich at 675-676.  We held that the constitution “guards against 
subtle restraints on the right to vote, as well as outright denial”36 and actual denial 
of the right need not be shown in order for strict scrutiny review to be required. 
Id. at 685. The statute at issue in Wilkins placed a burden on the students’ right to 
vote. There were less restrictive ways of accomplishing the state interests of 
preventing voter fraud and providing for an educated electorate.  Hence the Court 
found that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state 
constitution.37 Id. at 694. 
35 The Equal Protection Clause is at art 1, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution.   
36 Id. at 684. 
37 The majority disregards Wilkins because Wilkins relied on federal law. 
But Wilkins’s reliance on federal law is irrelevant. Sitz, 443 Mich at 762 n 12 
(“‘state courts are not required to incorporate federally-created principles into their 
state constitutional analysis’”) (citation omitted). The Wilkins Court held that any 
infringement on the right to vote triggers strict scrutiny review under the Michigan 
Equal Protection Clause. That the United States Supreme Court may have altered 
its interpretation of the federal constitution is not adequate reason to abandon a 
prior decision of this Court interpreting the Michigan Constitution.  This Court 
should “not disregard the guarantees that our constitution confers on Michigan 
citizens merely because the United States Supreme Court has withdrawn or not 
extended such protection.” Id. at 759. 
The majority also claims that Wilkins did not consider art 2, § 4 of the 
Michigan Constitution. The majority’s reading of Wilkins is incorrect. In Wilkins, 
the Court noted that the Court of Appeals had upheld the statute because it was a 
valid exercise of legislative authority under art 2, § 4.  Wilkins, 385 Mich at 685. 
See also Wilkins v Ann Arbor City Clerk, 24 Mich App 422, 427; 180 NW2d 395 
(1970). The Court rejected this argument because regulations enacted under this 
(continued…) 
24  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. MICHIGAN STATE UAW COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM COUNCIL 
V SECRETARY OF STATE38 
Similarly, in Michigan State UAW, this Court considered whether a statute 
automatically disqualifying inactive voters violated art 2, § 1 of the Michigan 
Constitution. Michigan State UAW, 387 Mich at 513. After emphasizing the 
fundamental importance of the right to vote, we found that the law was 
unconstitutional, unless it was supported by a compelling state interest.  Id. at 514. 
Indeed, the Court held that “[a]ny burden, however small, will not be permitted 
unless there is demonstrated a compelling state interest.”39 Id. at 516. 
The government had argued that it was within the Legislature’s powers 
under art 2, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution to disqualify inactive voters.  Article 
2, § 4 authorizes the enactment of “laws to preserve the purity of elections, to 
preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against abuses of the elective franchise, 
(…continued)  
constitutional provision still must be supported by a compelling state interest.  
Wilkins, 385 Mich at 685-687.  
38 387 Mich 506; 198 NW2d 385 (1972).   
39 The majority claims that, when properly read, Michigan State UAW does 
not stand for the proposition that the Michigan Constitution requires the 
application of strict scrutiny to all voters-rights cases.  I am baffled by this 
statement. In Michigan State UAW, the Court was very explicit in stating that it 
was considering only whether the statute at issue violated the Michigan 
Constitution, specifically art 2, § 1.  The Court held that “[a]ny burden [on the 
right to vote], however small, will not be permitted unless there is demonstrated a 
compelling state interest.” Michigan State UAW, 387 Mich at 516. The only 
possible way this decision can be read is that art 2, § 1 of the Michigan 
Constitution requires the application of strict scrutiny to regulations that burden 
the right to vote. 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
and to provide for a system of voter registration and absentee voting.”  Michigan 
State UAW, 387 Mich at 515. This Court rejected that argument, finding that “the 
state still must demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify a law passed 
pursuant to this section.”   Id. at 516.  And, because a comprehensive set of 
safeguards were already in place to accomplish the purported governmental 
interest of preventing voter fraud, this Court struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional.40 Id. at 517-520. 
D. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY V SECRETARY OF STATE41 
In Socialist Workers Party, at issue was a statute requiring new political 
parties to meet both a petition requirement and a minimum-primary-vote 
requirement to appear on the general election ballot.  Socialist Workers Party, 412 
Mich at 580. Again, the plaintiffs argued that the requirements violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the state constitution.  Id. at 582. 
This Court agreed, 
determining the requirements unconstitutional because they were not narrowly 
40 The majority also claims that Michigan State UAW failed to consider the 
effect of art 2, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution.  The majority’s reading of this 
opinion is incorrect.  In Michigan State UAW, 387 Mich at 516, this Court 
explicitly recognized that the government had argued that the statute was 
authorized by this constitutional provision.  This Court rejected the argument, 
determining that “the state still must demonstrate a compelling state interest to 
justify a law passed pursuant to [art 2, § 4].” 
41 412 Mich 571; 317 NW2d 1 (1982). 
26  
 
 
 
  
 
    
                                                 
 
 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.42 Id. at 594. The Court held, also, 
that the law violated art 2, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution, the “‘purity of 
elections’” clause. Socialist Workers Party, 412 at 599. 
In deciding that the statute violated the Purity of Elections Clause, the 
Court recognized that the clause embodies “two separate concepts: first, that the 
constitutional authority to enact laws to preserve the purity of elections resides in 
the Legislature; and second, ‘that any law enacted by the Legislature which 
adversely affects the purity of elections is constitutionally infirm.’”  Id. at 596 
(citation omitted). The Court found that a law that undermined the fairness and 
evenhandedness of an election would be invalid.  Id. at 598-599. And, because the 
statute at issue gave parties already established an advantage over new parties, the 
Court held that the statute violated the clause.  Id. 
This Court’s decisions in Wilkins, Michigan State UAW, and Socialist 
Workers Party stand for the proposition that any infringement on the right to vote, 
42 The majority finds that Socialist Workers Party can be discarded because 
it relied on federal precedent in interpreting the Michigan Constitution.  In 
Socialist Workers Party, this Court found that strict scrutiny applied under the 
Michigan Constitution. 
It relied on the federal constitution in making that 
decision. 
Regardless, the case is relevant to show that, under the state 
constitution, strict scrutiny applies to the requirements at issue.  As I stated earlier, 
this Court should “not disregard the guarantees that our constitution confers on 
Michigan citizens merely because the United States Supreme Court has withdrawn 
or not extended such protection.” Sitz, 443 Mich at 759. 
27  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
   
however minor, is subject to strict scrutiny under the Michigan Constitution.43 
These decisions also illustrate the proper role of the Purity of Elections Clause. 
The Legislature is free to enact new laws under this clause, but any legislation that 
threatens to disenfranchise voters or that undermines the fairness of an election 
will be invalid. 
The requirements at issue in the instant case infringe on the right to vote by 
creating an obstacle that burdens the right of qualified voters to cast a ballot. 
Hence, the teaching of Wilkins, Michigan State UAW, and Socialist Workers Party 
is that these requirements are unconstitutional, unless they are narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest.   
E. FACTORS TO BE WEIGHED 
We are required by the language of our state constitution and the decisions 
of this Court interpreting that language to find that infringements on the right to 
43 The majority claims that these decisions can be ignored because they 
were decided at a time when all voting regulations were subject to strict scrutiny. 
This simply is not true. At the same time this Court decided Michigan State UAW 
and Wilkins, and over ten years before this Court decided Socialist Workers Party, 
the United States Supreme Court explicitly maintained that “not every limitation 
or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent 
standard of review.” Bullock, 405 US at 143. Accordingly, to claim that this 
Court decided these cases assuming that strict scrutiny applies to all voting 
regulations assumes that past members of the Court misunderstood the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court. This is an insulting assumption.  Out of 
deference to and respect for my predecessors, I assume that they were well aware 
that the federal constitution did not require application of strict scrutiny in all 
instances. Rather, they made a conscious decision that the Michigan Constitution, 
unlike the federal constitution, requires any infringement on the right to vote to 
withstand strict scrutiny review. 
28  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
vote are subject to strict scrutiny. But an additional reason supports that finding. 
On past occasions, this Court has cited factors that are helpful in determining 
when it is appropriate to find that the state constitution affords more protection 
than its federal counterpart.  When these factors are weighed, it is apparent that 
our state constitution affords greater protection against infringements on the right 
to vote than does the federal constitution.44 
The factors are (1) the textual language of the state constitution, (2) 
significant textual differences between parallel provisions of the two constitutions, 
(3) structural differences between the state and federal constitutions, (4) state 
constitutional and common-law history, (5) state law preexisting adoption of the 
relevant constitutional provision, and (6) matters of peculiar state or local interest. 
Sitz, 443 Mich at 763 n 14.   
Article 2, § 1 of the Michigan Constitution expressly confers the right to 
vote on individuals who satisfy the requirements set forth in that section.  This is a 
difference between the Michigan Constitution and the federal constitution.  The 
federal constitutional provisions regarding the right to vote prohibit denial of the 
right on the basis of certain protected characteristics.  But the federal constitution 
44 Numerous state courts have found that their state constitution affords 
greater protection against infringements on the right to vote than the federal 
constitution. E.g., Weinschenk v State, 203 SW3d 201, 212 (Mo, 2006); Maryland 
Green Party v Maryland Bd of Elections, 377 Md 127, 150; 832 A2d 214 (2003).  
29  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
does not expressly give anyone the right to vote.45 San Antonio Independent 
School Dist v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 34 n 74; 93 S Ct 1278; 36 L Ed 2d 16 (1973). 
The fact that the Michigan Constitution confers the right to vote on qualified 
electors while the federal constitution does not, supports the conclusion that the 
Michigan Constitution affords greater protection than its federal counterpart.  
The language of the Michigan Constitution also differs from the federal 
constitution in that the Michigan Equal Protection Clause46 protects “political 
45 The Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
The Nineteenth Amendment provides: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of sex. 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
The Twenty-sixth Amendment provides: 
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen 
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of age.  
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
46 Const 1963, art 1, § 2. This provision provides: 
(continued…) 
30  
 
 
 
  
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
rights,” whereas the federal Equal Protection Clause47 does not. Additionally, art 
1, § 1 of the Michigan Constitution declares that “[a]ll political power is inherent 
in the people.” The federal constitution contains no analogous constitutional 
provision. 
There are also structural differences between our constitution and the 
federal constitution that indicate that the state constitution provides greater 
protection against infringements on the right to vote.  Unlike the federal 
constitution, the Michigan Constitution dedicates an entire article to elections.48 
This signifies the importance that the Michigan people attach to the right to vote. 
The federal constitution contains no parallel article regarding elections.   
Another difference is that, unlike federal caselaw, the decisions of this 
Court have uniformly held that infringements on the right to vote are subject to 
(…continued) 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; 
nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of 
religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall 
implement this section by appropriate legislation. 
47 US Const, Am XIV, § 1.  This provision provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
48 All of art II is dedicated to elections. 
31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strict scrutiny. 
Before today, in every case decided under the current state 
constitution, this Court applied strict scrutiny to statutes that impaired the right to 
vote. See Wilkins, Michigan State UAW, and Socialist Workers Party. On the 
other hand, the federal courts have long recognized that different levels of scrutiny 
will apply depending on how significant the burden is.  See, e.g., Storer, 415 US at 
730; Anderson, 460 US at 788. 
And even long before the ratification of our current constitution, this Court 
recognized the fundamental and paramount nature of the right to vote, explaining 
that “[n]o elector can lose his right to vote, the highest exercise of the freeman’s 
will, except by his own fault or negligence.”  Attorney General, ex rel Conely v 
Detroit Common Council, 78 Mich 545, 563; 44 NW 388 (1889).  This Court’s 
decision in the Detroit case suggested, also, that the appropriate recourse for those 
seeking to prevent fraud by imposing an identification requirement is a 
constitutional amendment, not legislation. 
If the exigencies of the times are such, which I do not believe, 
that a fair and honest election cannot be held in Detroit, or in any 
other place in our State, without other qualifications and restrictions 
upon both native-born and naturalized citizens than those now found 
in or authorized by the Constitution, then the remedy is with the 
people to alter such Constitution by the lawful methods pointed out 
and permitted by that instrument.  [Id. at 564.] 
Accordingly, for well over 100 years, this Court has held that restrictions 
that threaten to disenfranchise otherwise eligible voters are invalid, absent a 
constitutional amendment or a compelling government interest.  This fact weighs 
heavily in favor of finding greater protection under the state constitution.   
32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, voting is fundamentally a matter of local concern.  The federal 
constitution leaves the regulation of elections largely to the states.  The Elections 
Clause of the federal constitution provides that the state legislatures shall prescribe 
the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives . . . .” US Const, art I, § 4, cl 1.  The individual states have 
complete control, also, over the election process for state offices.  Tashjian v 
Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 US 208, 217; 107 S Ct 544; 93 L Ed 2d 514 
(1986). 
The fact that the states are granted such broad regulatory power indicates 
that this is an area where state constitutions likely include greater protection 
against potential abuses. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the Michigan 
Constitution expressly sets forth the qualifications for voting, whereas under the 
federal system, qualifications are left to legislative determination.  Compare US 
Const, art I, § 2, which provides that federal electors must be equivalent to those 
for state positions, with Const 1963, art 2, § 1, which provides that an individual 
who meets certain requirements is qualified to vote.  Because the federal 
constitution leaves the regulation of elections largely to the states, it makes sense 
that the state constitutions would provide greater protection against potential 
election abuses. 
For all of the above reasons, I would hold that any infringement on the right 
to vote is unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution, unless it can withstand 
the most exacting scrutiny. The photo requirements of 2005 PA 71 infringe on the 
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fundamental right to vote and, as demonstrated in the preceding section, are not 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Hence, I would declare 
these requirements unconstitutional.49 
The majority disagrees with my conclusion and finds that the Michigan 
Constitution affords no greater protection against regulations that burden the right 
to vote than does the federal constitution.  But, in deciding that 2005 PA 71 does 
not violate the Michigan Constitution, the majority simply follows federal 
precedent in lockstep.  I strongly disagree with this approach.  It is the functional 
equivalent of giving the United States Supreme Court the ability to amend the 
Michigan Constitution. To quote Justice Dennis of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
“my colleagues have sunk this court to the lowest pitch of abject followership. 
They no longer believe in our state constitution as an act of fundamental self­
government by the people . . . .  They no longer perceive this court to be the final 
arbiter of the meaning of that constitution, bound by the intent of the drafters and 
ratifiers as reflected by the text, the drafting history, and this court’s constitutional 
precedents. Instead, for them, our state constitution is a blank parchment fit only 
as a copybook in which to record the [decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court.]” State v Tucker, 626 So 2d 707, 719 (La, 1993).   
49 2005 PA 71 cannot withstand strict scrutiny review because (1) there is 
no evidence that in-person voter fraud is a significant problem in Michigan, and 
(2) even if it were, there are other methods to combat fraud that are less 
burdensome than the requirements at issue.   
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IV. CONCLUSION  
A review of the United States Supreme Court decision in Burdick shows 
that strict scrutiny continues to be the standard of review applicable here.  Harper, 
Kramer, and Dunn are still good law.   
But even if the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution did not 
require it, the Michigan Constitution demands that 2005 PA 71 pass the strict 
scrutiny test in order to be pronounced constitutional.  Detroit Common Council, 
Wilkins, Michigan State UAW, and Socialist Workers Party all speak to that fact. 
The right to vote is fundamental, and the strict scrutiny test must be applied 
to any statute that infringes on it. It is beyond question that the requirements of 
2005 PA 71 infringe on the right to vote by adding conditions to a voter’s access 
to the polling place.  These conditions fail the strict scrutiny test because no 
compelling state interest in them has been demonstrated.  Significant in-person 
voter fraud has not been shown to exist in Michigan.  But, even if it had, less 
burdensome methods exist to combat whatever voter fraud may threaten to erupt. 
2005 PA 71 should be held unconstitutional. 
Those most severely prejudiced by today’s decision are the impoverished 
and the disadvantaged.  Yet, Michigan has always enjoyed a strong reputation for 
the protection of our civil rights.  This tragic decision has the potential to wipe out 
many of this state’s achievements in this area.  I believe that history will judge us 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
harshly for joining those states that have limited the precious constitutional right to 
vote. Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
36