Title: Bertozzi v. Hanover County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 001072
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2001

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
 
A. G. BERTOZZI 
       OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 001072 
April 20, 2001 
 
HANOVER COUNTY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 
John R. Alderman, Judge 
 
 
In this land use dispute, we consider whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that a local planning commission's 
disapproval of applications and plats for a subdivision properly 
was based on the applicable ordinance and was not arbitrary or 
capricious. 
 
Before the close of business on October 9, 1996, A. G. 
Bertozzi, a subdivider, filed with the Hanover County Planning 
Office applications for final approval of five sections, "A" 
through "E," of a subdivision known as "Sugar Maple."  The 
sections comprised approximately 125 acres of real property 
located in an A1 agricultural district in the western part of 
the County. 
 
During the evening of October 9, the County Board of 
Supervisors adopted zoning and subdivision ordinances 
significantly changing rural subdivision development 
requirements.  The new ordinances include a so-called 
"grandfather clause," the interpretation of which is at the core 
of this controversy.  As pertinent, the grandfather clause 
provides: 
"Complete applications for final subdivision approval 
which have been filed before the close of business on 
October 9, 1996, which were in compliance with all 
substantive zoning and subdivision ordinance 
requirements in effect on that date shall be reviewed 
in accordance with those requirements." 
 
 
By letter dated October 29, 1996 from the County's Deputy 
Director of Planning, the subdivider was notified that the 
applications and plats for Sugar Maple had been disapproved by 
the planning staff.  The subdivider appealed this ruling to the 
circuit court pursuant to former Code § 15.1-475(B)(3) (now Code 
§ 15.2-2259(C)).  As pertinent, the statute provided: 
"If a local commission or other agent disapproves a 
plat and the subdivider contends that such disapproval 
was not properly based on the ordinance applicable 
thereto, or was arbitrary or capricious, he may appeal 
to the circuit court having jurisdiction of such land 
and the court shall hear and determine the 
case. . . ." 
 
 
In his petition to the circuit court, the subdivider 
contended that disapproval of the applications and plats was 
erroneous, improper, and "arbitrary and/or capricious."  He 
asserted that the filings should have been approved because he 
fully complied with all applicable requirements. 
 
Following a June 1997 hearing, at which the trial court 
considered only the subdivider's petition, the County's 
response, memoranda of the parties, and argument of counsel, but 
 
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no evidence, the court ruled in favor of the subdivider.  In a 
July 1997 final decree, the court ordered that the plats for the 
subdivision "shall be accepted" following review by the County 
"pursuant to the requirements of ordinances in effect prior to 
October 9, 1996."  The County appealed that ruling to this 
Court. 
 
In Hanover County v. Bertozzi, 256 Va. 350, 504 S.E.2d 618 
(1998), we reversed the judgment of the circuit court because we 
were presented with "a record devoid of any evidence and factual 
findings" on the question whether the County properly had 
disapproved the filings for Sections A through E.  We remanded 
the case "for an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the 
County's disapproval . . . was 'not properly based on the 
ordinance applicable thereto, or was arbitrary or capricious.' "  
Id. at 356, 504 S.E.2d at 621. 
 
Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing to consider the foregoing issues.  The subdivider 
presented the testimony of two persons who were familiar with 
the practices and procedures for subdivision development 
followed by the County planners in districts zoned A1.  Also 
testifying for the subdivider was a civil engineer who had 
prepared the filings for the Sugar Maple subdivision, as well as 
for another proposed County subdivision, Pin Oak Place, which 
the subdivider previously developed. 
 
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This evidence established that for years prior to October 
9, 1996 the County planners routinely had employed a "25-acre 
Rule," an unwritten administrative interpretation of the zoning 
and subdivision ordinances.  Under the "Rule," developers were 
permitted to subdivide land into more lots than would have been 
permitted under a strict interpretation of the ordinances. 
 
According to the testimony, the "Rule" allowed a developer 
to divide a large parcel into tracts of approximately 25 acres, 
"and then go through the subdivision process on each of those 
tracts," yielding "four lots per every 25 acres or 16 lots per 
hundred, as opposed to . . . 10 lots per hundred."  The four-lot 
arrangement was accomplished by dividing the 25-acre tract into 
a two-acre "first division," two ten-acre lots, and a three-acre 
residual lot.  The "first division" lot was not considered a 
part of the subdivision subject to review for subdivision 
approval; that lot was not to be included on the subdivision 
plat. 
 
This procedure, described as "convoluted" by the County's 
Director of Planning, affected the application process.  Under 
the procedure, a developer would file an "Application for Final 
Approval" with the County Planning Office together with a 
subdivision plat, accompanied by the required fees.  The 
subdivider was not required to have recorded a "first division" 
deed at that time. 
 
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The application would then be reviewed by the planners, who 
would notify the applicant of any revisions to the plat they 
required for final approval.  Typically, a required revision 
specified removal of "the first divisions from these plats by 
removing the bold lines from their perimeter, adding their 
proper deed book and page number, and half-toning this 
information."  When the suggested revisions were made, including 
recordation of the "first division" deeds, the applications and 
the plats received the County's final approval. 
 
The evidence established that this practice and procedure 
generally had been followed by the County since 1978; it 
specifically had been followed when this subdivider developed 
the Pin Oak Place subdivision in 1995. 
 
When the subdivider filed the applications and plats for 
Sugar Maple on October 9, 1996, he employed the foregoing 
application procedure that existed under the ordinances in 
effect immediately prior to that date.  Specifically, he did not 
include a deed book and page number for the "first division" 
lots related to development of Sections A through E, although 
such lots were shown on the plats. 
 
In disapproving these applications in the letter of 
October 29, the County stated that the "new ordinance eliminated 
. . . both 'first divisions' and 'the 25 acre rule' as 
interpretations of the zoning and subdivision ordinances." 
 
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Continuing, the County wrote that the "staff has completed 
its review of your application and is notifying you that your 
subdivision plat and application, filed on October 9, 1996, 
titled 'Sugar Maple', . . . is DISAPPROVED because of failure to 
record first division lots (Title I. Art 5. Sec. 2.7-1)."  
Section 2.7-1 of the County Code related to lot size 
requirements for single family dwellings and provided:  "2 
acres, after the first conveyance all lots must be 10 acres or 
greater." 
 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court ruled in favor of the County.  The court rejected the 
subdivider's argument that, according to the provisions of the 
grandfather clause of the new ordinances, his applications and 
plats should have been considered according to the County's 
practices and procedures employed under the old ordinances. 
 
The court responded that, after October 9, the "first 
division" lots were required to be recorded at the time the 
application was filed.  Continuing, the court said:  "My reading 
of the grandfather clause means that everything has to have been 
done because of the artificial barrier that was placed on 
October 9.  After October 9, the Planning Commission, the 
County, couldn't do what had been done before, which was a 
process of application amendment and, ultimately, approval.  The 
 
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County was not empowered to do it after that so the process 
became, in effect, a one-day process." 
 
In a February 2000 final decree, the trial court dismissed 
the subdivider's petition, finding that the County's 
"disapproval was properly based on the applicable ordinances and 
was not arbitrary or capricious."  The subdivider appeals. 
 
The County, urging affirmance of the trial court's order, 
contends in a circular argument that in "applying [the 
grandfather clause], the County staff gave applicants the 
benefit of the Rule in determining whether applications were 
filed 'in compliance with all substantive zoning and subdivision 
requirements. . . .'  In the case of Sugar Maple, Sections A 
through E, the staff determined that there was not compliance 
with the requirements of the Rule.  The Subdivision did not 
comply with substantive provisions of either old or new 
ordinances, in that lot sizes were less than the old or new (ten 
acre) minimums, and the divisions were not made correctly."  We 
do not agree that the County's disapproval properly was based on 
the applicable ordinances, and the trial court erred in so 
ruling. 
 
As demonstrated by the foregoing portion of its argument, 
the County in one breath says that, in applying the grandfather 
clause, the "staff gave applicants the benefit of the Rule."  
But in the next breath, the County says that the Sugar Maple 
 
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filings were "not in compliance with the requirements of the 
Rule."  This argument disregards the evidence. 
 
There is no conflict in the evidence about the provisions 
and administration of the "25-acre Rule."  Indeed, the testimony 
of John Howard Hodges, the County's Director of Planning in 
October 1996, corroborates the testimony of the subdivider's 
witnesses about the practice and procedure the County routinely 
followed under the old ordinances in allowing "first division" 
lots to be recorded under the "Rule" subsequent to filing of the 
application.  As a matter of fact, reasonably to be inferred 
from the evidence is the conclusion that the County Board of 
Supervisors recognized and tacitly approved the planning staff's 
employment of the "Rule" under the old ordinances.  When the 
trial court, referring to the "Rule," asked Hodges, "Whose 
bright idea was that?", Hodges responded, "The Board of 
Supervisors always does the right thing." 
 
The grandfather clause mandates that if "complete" 
applications for final subdivision approval have been filed 
before the close of business on October 9, 1996, and if such 
applications were "in compliance with all substantive zoning and 
subdivision ordinance requirements" then effective, those 
applications shall be reviewed in accordance with those 
requirements.  The County does not dispute that the applications 
 
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the subdivider filed for the sections of Sugar Maple at issue 
here were "complete." 
 
Rather, the County maintains the applications failed to 
comply with old or new substantive ordinance requirements.  But 
the evidence is clear that, under the County's administrative 
interpretation of the substantive requirements of the old 
ordinances, "first divisions" were permitted under the "25-acre 
Rule," and the first division deed did not have to be recorded 
when the applications were filed initially, as long as they were 
recorded prior to final approval.  For purposes of this 
discussion, it is irrelevant that the applications did not 
comply with the new substantive ordinance requirements. 
 
Incidentally, the County does not contend that employment 
by its planners of the "25-acre Rule" was an impermissible 
administrative interpretation or that it was prohibited 
legislative action taken by an administrator, as discussed in 
cases like Board of Zoning Appeals for the County of York v. 852 
L.L.C., 257 Va. 485, 489, 514 S.E.2d 767, 769-70 (1999).  
Indeed, the County's October 29 letter of disapproval refers to 
the "first divisions" and the "Rule" as its "interpretations" of 
the ordinances. 
 
Therefore, we hold that, under the grandfather clause, this 
subdivider is entitled to have his "complete" Sugar Maple 
(Sections A through E) applications reviewed in accordance with 
 
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the pre-existing substantive ordinance requirements, as 
interpreted employing the pre-existing "Rule."  Cognizant of the 
"Rule," the County Board of Supervisors, in enacting the 
grandfather clause, manifestly intended such a result. 
 
This means that the County is prohibited from requiring the 
deed book and page number of "first division" lots to be 
included in the applications and plats initially, as long as 
such information is provided prior to final County approval of 
the applications and plats.  In other words, the former 
standards must be applied to applications and plats filed, as 
here, before the close of business on October 9, 1996. 
 
Consequently, the judgment below will be reversed, and the 
case will be remanded with direction that the circuit court 
order the County to accept the applications and plats in issue 
and that they be reviewed by the County in accordance with the 
standards existing when they were filed on October 9, 1996. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting. 
 
 
As the majority correctly notes, the interpretation of the 
so-called “grandfather clause” is the central controversy in 
this case.  Because I believe that the majority fails to 
interpret that clause according to its plain, unambiguous terms, 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
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The “grandfather clause” at issue in this appeal provides 
that “[c]omplete applications for final subdivision approval 
which have been filed before the close of business on October 9, 
1996, which were in compliance with all substantive zoning and 
subdivision ordinance requirements in effect on that date shall 
be reviewed in accordance with those requirements.”  Hanover 
County, Va.,  Subdivision Ordinance No. 96-17, § 8(4)(a)(Oct. 9, 
1996).  I find the terms of that clause to be plain and 
unambiguous.  Thus, “there is no need for construction by the 
court; the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be 
given it.”  Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 
87 (1985) (citing School Bd. v. School Bd., 219 Va. 244, 250, 
247 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1978)); accord Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Sylva, 
242 Va. 191, 194, 409 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1991).  Thus, to trigger 
the right of A.G. Bertozzi to have his application for final 
approval of the subdivision known as “Sugar Maple” reviewed 
under Hanover County’s prior subdivision ordinances, his 
application must have been “in compliance with all substantive 
zoning and subdivision ordinance requirements in effect” before 
October 9, 1996. 
 
For purposes of this appeal, the relevant substantive 
requirement in effect before the October 9th deadline was former 
§ 2.7-1 in Title I, Article 5 of the Hanover County Code.  That 
 
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section, along with the definition of the term “subdivision,”* 
formed the basis for the administrative interpretation known as 
the “25-acre Rule.”  Section 2.7-1 stated that the minimum lot 
size for a single family dwelling was “2 acres, after the first 
conveyance all lots must be 10 acres or greater.”  The term 
“conveyance” means the “transfer of title to land from one 
person, or a class of persons, to another by deed.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 333 (6th ed. 1990). 
In my view, the provisions of § 2.7-1 required an actual 
conveyance of the two-acre “first division” lot before a 
subdivider, such as Bertozzi, could submit an application for 
final approval of a subdivision utilizing the “25-acre Rule.”  
Under the “grandfather clause,” compliance with that substantive 
requirement had to occur before the close of business on October 
9, 1996.  While I recognize that the County had developed a 
practice that allowed a subdivider to file an application for 
final approval before recording the deed evidencing conveyance 
of the “first division” lot, that practice was not part of the 
substantive zoning and subdivision ordinance requirements in 
effect before October 9, 1996.  The “grandfather clause” 
requires compliance with substantive subdivision requirements, 
not compliance with the County’s prior practice or procedure.  
                     
* A subdivision for tracts of this size was a “division of a tract or 
parcel of land into three (3) or more parts, any of which contain an area of 
 
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Yet, the majority allows Bertozzi’s application for final 
approval of the subdivision to be reviewed in accordance with 
that practice. 
Notably, Bertozzi’s application was not the only one denied 
after October 9th because the subdivider failed to record a deed 
evidencing a “first division” conveyance before submitting an 
application for final approval.  John Howard Hodges, Deputy 
County Administrator for Hanover County, testified that no one 
was allowed to record a two-acre “first division” after October 
9th.  During cross-examination, he reiterated that any 
applications received before the deadline that did not have the 
“first division” were not approved.  The County’s consistent 
construction of the “grandfather clause” is entitled to great 
weight.  See Cook v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 244 Va. 107, 111, 
418 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992) (citing Masterson v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1987)). 
Thus, I believe that the circuit court correctly determined 
that the County’s disapproval of Bertozzi’s application was 
based on the applicable ordinances and was not arbitrary or 
capricious.  Bertozzi did not convey a “first division” lot 
prior to the close of business on October 9th.  Thus, he did not 
comply with the substantive subdivision ordinances in effect 
                                                                  
ten(10) or more acres, but less than twenty-five (25) acres . . . .”  Hanover 
County, Va., Zoning Ordinance Title III, Article 5, § 2-6 (Sep. 27, 1972). 
 
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prior to the October 9th deadline.  Additionally, there is no 
evidence that the County did not consistently interpret and 
apply the provisions of the “grandfather clause.”  For these 
reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
 
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