Title: Norfolk Southern Rwy. Co. v. Rogers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050160
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2005

Present:  All the Justices 
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, 
SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO NORFOLK AND 
WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 050160  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 4, 2005 
DALE ROGERS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
James A. Cales, Jr., Judge 
 
This appeal involves an action brought by Dale Rogers 
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 
U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2000), against Norfolk Southern Railway 
Company.1  Rogers alleged that, during his employment at 
Norfolk Southern, he was exposed to both asbestos and 
silica, Norfolk Southern knew or should have known about 
such exposure, and despite such knowledge, Norfolk Southern 
failed to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work.  
A jury returned a verdict in favor of Rogers with regard to 
his silicosis claim.2 
On appeal, Norfolk Southern challenges the admission 
of certain testimony by Richard A. Vogel, Jr., an 
                                                 
1 In 1982, Southern Railway and Norfolk and Western 
Railway merged.  They are currently known as Norfolk 
Southern Railway Company.  See Mason Y. Cooper, Norfolk 
Western Historical Society, An Introduction to the Norfolk 
& Western Railway, http://www.nwhs.org/about_nw.html (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2005). 
 
2 At trial, the circuit court granted Norfolk 
Southern’s motion to strike the evidence regarding Rogers’ 
asbestosis claim. 
 
2
industrial hygienist who testified as an expert on behalf 
of Rogers, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the jury verdict.  We find that Vogel’s 
challenged testimony lacks an adequate factual foundation 
and that, without his testimony, the evidence is 
insufficient as a matter of law on the issue of Norfolk 
Southern’s negligence.  Thus, we will reverse the circuit 
court’s judgment in favor of Rogers. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Rogers was employed as a “maintenance of way” laborer 
for Norfolk Southern between 1981 and 1998.3  Maintenance of 
way crews are responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of 
the railroad track structures to ensure the safe passage of 
trains.  Rogers worked in the maintenance of way department 
during his entire career with the railroad.  He spent about 
eight years of that time working outside the Tidewater area 
of Virginia in locations such as West Virginia and Ohio. 
Rogers’ work on the railroad tracks sometimes involved 
rock known as “ballast,” which provides a foundation and 
drainage for railroad tracks.  Different railroads use 
                                                 
3 Rogers’ employment with Norfolk Southern was not 
continuous.  From 1983 until 1984, Rogers worked for Diesel 
Injection as a sandblaster; during 1984, he worked at 
Jamestown Sheet Metal as a helper; and from 1984 until 
1986, he worked for Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock 
Company as a laborer.  Rogers returned to the railroad in 
1986. 
 
3
different types of rock as ballast, and the silica content 
of the rock varies depending on its type.  Rogers stated 
that, during the course of his employment with Norfolk 
Southern, the composition of the ballast used remained 
consistent and “[y]ou [could] see sparkles on most of it.” 
 
Rogers’ crew dumped ballast on the railroad tracks in 
different ways depending on the type of railroad car 
containing the ballast.  Some cars required workers to 
shovel the ballast from inside the car through an opening 
to other workers waiting outside the railroad car who then 
controlled the flow of ballast with ropes.  Other cars 
dumped the ballast directly onto the tracks.  Rogers 
testified that his job was dusty, and that dumping ballast 
on the tracks was the dustiest aspect of his duties.  
According to Rogers, the second dustiest job was operating 
a piece of equipment called a “double broom,” which swept 
the tracks forwards and backwards after the ballast had 
been dumped.  Other tasks performed by Rogers included 
repairing the tracks, welding damaged track sections, 
removing railroad ties, and installing switch panels.  From 
time to time, he also operated a “ballast regulator,” which 
was used to get a sufficient amount of ballast back in the 
track after a repair, and an “undercutter,” a machine used 
 
4
to remove old ballast from a track before new ballast was 
dumped. 
Rogers explained that the dust associated with his 
various jobs on the maintenance of way crew came from under 
the tracks, from the dirt surrounding the tracks, and from 
the ballast.  He related that his clothes were covered with 
dust and dirt after a typical shift of working on the 
tracks.  Because Rogers worked on a “section gang,” his 
exposure to ballast was not continuous; he might be exposed 
one day and not the next.  By the 1990’s, Rogers was not 
dumping ballast on a regular basis. 
 
In 2003, Rogers began experiencing some shortness of 
breath.  He saw Dr. Richard C. Bernstein, a pulmonologist, 
in July 2003.  Dr. Bernstein diagnosed Rogers as having 
“early silicosis” – “destruction of the lung[s] from 
silica.”4  Dr. Bernstein based his opinion on Rogers’ 
description of his occupational history and exposure to 
dust, chest x-rays, and breathing tests.  He opined that 
Rogers’ silicosis was caused by exposure to silica while 
working on the railroad track. 
                                                 
4 The diagnosis of silicosis was disputed at trial.  
Norfolk Southern introduced testimony from four medical 
experts who each opined that Rogers does not have 
silicosis.  The sufficiency of the evidence regarding the 
diagnosis of silicosis is not an issue on appeal. 
 
 
5
 
On the issue of Norfolk Southern’s negligence, Rogers 
called Richard A. Vogel, Jr. as an expert in the field of 
industrial hygiene.  In developing his opinions, Vogel 
reviewed “[a] number of depositions, answers and questions 
related to interrogatories, medical histories, work 
histories taken by a physician,” and excerpts from 
historical documents recording various proceedings of the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR).5  Vogel also spoke 
with Rogers about his work history and watched a video 
depicting a maintenance of way crew dumping ballast.6 
Vogel began by discussing portions of the AAR 
historical documents.  The documents demonstrated that, as 
                                                 
5 The AAR is a professional organization of freight 
railroads, Amtrak, and other rail-related companies.  
Association of American Railroads, 
http://www.aar.org/About_AAR/about_aar.asp (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2005).  The historical documents are the product of 
meetings held beginning in the 1930’s for railroad surgeons 
and medical personnel to discuss medical problems known to 
the railroads. 
 
6 Rogers introduced the video into evidence.  The video 
depicted ballast being dumped at an undisclosed location on 
an unidentified railroad line and did not involve Rogers’ 
maintenance of way crew.  In the video, there was a 
noticeable difference between the visible dust surrounding 
those employees working alongside the equipment that was 
dumping the ballast and those working in front of it; the 
employees in front were working in less visible dust.  
Notably, Vogel testified, based on his discussions with 
Rogers, that the majority of the work performed by Rogers 
“appeared to be working at the ground level with a shovel 
in hand in front of the equipment.” 
 
 
6
early as 1932, the AAR was concerned about the hazards of 
exposure to silica dust.  Reading from the documents, Vogel 
testified that “[p]neumoconiosis, derived from pneumo, 
[meaning] lung, and konis, [meaning] dust, is a condition 
that may be caused by any kind of dust entering the lung, 
but we as railroad surgeons are undoubtedly more interested 
in silicosis and asbestosis than any other types.”  He 
continued, “[s]ilicosis is caused by breathing free silica 
into the lungs.”  The documents also stated that silicosis 
is a dust disease and a person can contract it only by 
breathing silica dust. 
Based on the information found in the AAR historical 
documents, Vogel opined that the railroad industry, as of 
1935, had recommended standards for industrial hygiene with 
regard to silica exposure.  Those standards included 
educating workers about the hazard, using methods to limit 
exposure to dust, providing respirators to workers, using 
ventilation to control dust levels, using certain handling 
methods to reduce the emission of dust, and taking 
measurements to determine the concentration of hazardous 
material in the air. 
 
Continuing, Vogel testified that the applicable 
industrial hygiene standards in place during Rogers’ 
employment period were the Occupational Safety & Health 
 
7
Administration (OSHA) standards.7  29 C.F.R. 1910.1000 
(2000).  OSHA regulates worker exposure to silica-
                                                 
7 Silica exposure is not as heavily regulated as 
exposure to asbestos.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (2000).  
In 1978, OSHA released a program directive to provide 
guidelines for inspecting and, where necessary, for issuing 
citations with regard to exposure to silica in the 
workplace.  Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 
CPL 02-02-007, Program Directive #300-3, Crystalline Silica 
(1978), available at  
http://www.osha.gov/sltc/silicacrystalline/standards.html 
(follow “Crystalline Silica” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 
6, 2005) (hereinafter Directive #300-3).  Pursuant to 
Directive #300-3, “employee exposure to airborne 
crystalline silica shall not exceed an 8-hour time-weighted 
average limit (variable) as stated in 29 CFR 1910.1000, 
Table Z-3 or a limit set by a state agency whenever a 
state-administered Occupational Safety and Health Plan is 
in effect.”  Id.  Thus, an employer is not in violation 
unless employees are exposed to silica in excess of the 
permissible exposure limits. 
Directive #300-3 also provides indicators as to when 
an employer should test for possible excessive exposure to 
silica: 
(i) Any information or observations which would 
indicate employee exposure to silica or other 
substances; 
(ii) Any measurement of airborne silica; 
(iii) Any employee complaints of symptoms which 
may be attributable to exposure to silica or 
other substances; 
(iv) Any production, process, or control change 
which may result in an increase in the airborne 
concentration of silica, or whenever the employer 
has any other reason to suspect an increase in 
the airborne concentrations of silica. 
Id.  If testing is undertaken and exposure is found to be 
above the permissible limits, Directive #300-3 outlines the 
steps an employer should take to minimize exposure: 
The first mandatory requirement is that employee 
exposure be eliminated through the implementation 
of feasible engineering controls.  After all such 
controls are implemented and they do not control 
to the permissible exposure limit, each employer 
 
8
containing materials, and the allowable silica level has 
been constant since 1972.  Vogel explained that the level 
of allowable silica is “based on the percentage of silica 
in a compound.  Ten milligrams per cubic meter divided by 
the percentage of silica plus two, so it’s a moving target.  
The higher the silica content in the material, the lower 
the level.” 
 
To perform this calculation, the silica content of the 
material being tested must be known.  On direct 
examination, Vogel was asked: 
Q:  Is it essential to the calculation to know 
what the silica content is of the material you’re 
testing? 
 
A:  You have to know, otherwise all you’re 
evaluating is exposure to airborne dust. 
 
Q:  And that could be from any source? 
 
A:  True. 
 
During both his direct testimony and cross-examination, 
Vogel admitted that he did not know the type of rock that 
Rogers was exposed to during his employment with Norfolk 
                                                                                                                                                 
must rotate its employees to the extent possible 
in order to reduce exposure.  Only when all 
engineering or administrative controls have been 
implemented, and the level of respirable silica 
still exceeds permissible exposure limits, may an 
employer rely on a respirator program . . . . 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  Engineering controls include 
suppressing dust by wetting down the offending substance 
(in this case the ballast) and proper ventilation.  Id. 
 
9
Southern, nor did he know its silica content.8  He agreed 
that “[i]n order . . . to state whether somebody’s at risk, 
you need to know the volume of the substance they were 
exposed to” and that determination is made by taking an air 
sample and measuring that sample against the applicable 
“threshold limit value.”  Vogel stated that he had not 
conducted testing with regard to either Rogers’ work or 
similar work performed by other maintenance of way crews.  
Nevertheless, Vogel testified that “[v]isible dust is an 
indication that there are no controls or limited control 
measures in effect . . . [and i]f you can see visible dust, 
there’s likely to be a much larger percentage of dust that 
is not visible to the naked eye.”  According to Vogel, “[a] 
visible dust cloud is an indicator of conditions that could 
generate a respiratory hazard and it’s something that 
should trigger sampling.”  (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
8 During direct examination, Vogel was asked whether 
“Mr. Rogers worked with or around silica-containing 
products?”  Vogel replied, “I believe he did.  I’ve seen 
material safety data sheets from a number of companies 
supplying ballasts for railroad operations that indicated 
silica in their materials at varying percentages.”  Vogel 
testified that he had no “specific firsthand knowledge of 
the materials that Norfolk Southern purchased that Mr. 
Rogers would have been using during his employment.”  
Sustaining Norfolk Southern’s motion to strike this 
testimony, the circuit court instructed the jury to 
disregard it.  Contrary to Rogers’ argument, Vogel did not 
indicate that he relied on material safety data sheets in 
formulating his opinions in this case. 
 
10
 
Even though he did not know the type of ballast Rogers 
worked with or its silica content, Vogel opined that 
Norfolk Southern failed to comply with industrial hygiene 
standards relating to exposure to silica dust because 
Norfolk Southern never warned Rogers about the hazards of 
working with ballast.  Furthermore, according to Vogel, 
Norfolk Southern did not train Rogers in the proper 
handling of the silica-containing materials, provide 
workers with respiratory protection, or conduct air 
samples.  Finally, Rogers asked Vogel: 
Q:  [B]ased on your education, training and 
certification as an industrial hygienist, based 
on your review of the existing relevant 
literature, based on your knowledge of railroad 
industry practices, based on your viewing of the 
videotape depicting ballast dumping that is 
admitted as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, based on your 
discussions with Mr. Rogers concerning his work 
history from 1981 to 1997, based on the then 
existing OSHA permissible exposure limits, based 
on the applicable railroad industry standards in 
effect during the period of his employment, do 
you have an opinion as to a reasonable degree of 
industrial hygiene certainty as to whether or not 
Mr. Rogers was exposed to silica dust during the 
years of his employment with Norfolk Southern in 
an amount that exceeded a reasonably safe level? 
 
A:  Based on all those factors, yes, I believe he 
did. 
 
Norfolk Southern objected to this question on the 
basis that an adequate foundation had not been 
established for Vogel’s opinion.  The circuit court 
 
11
overruled the objection and allowed that question 
along with the following one: 
Q:  And, Mr. Vogel, based on all those same 
things . . . do you have an opinion to a 
reasonable degree of certainty in the field of 
industrial hygiene as to whether Norfolk Southern 
provided reasonable and sufficient safeguards to 
Mr. Rogers so he would have a reasonably safe 
place to work with regard to his exposure to 
silica dust? 
 
A:  No, I do not believe that they did. 
 
At the conclusion of Rogers’ case-in-chief, Norfolk 
Southern moved to strike Rogers’ evidence.  The circuit 
court overruled the motion.  Norfolk Southern then 
presented testimony from its witnesses. 
 
As part of Norfolk Southern’s evidence, David M. 
Tucker testified as an expert in the field of industrial 
hygiene.  Tucker was employed for Norfolk Southern as an 
industrial hygienist from 1989 through 2001.  During his 
tenure with Norfolk Southern, he was not aware of any 
railroad worker who had a confirmed diagnosis of silicosis. 
 
Tucker testified that in order for silica dust to be 
harmful, it must be respirable dust.  This means that it 
must be microscopic; any dust particle larger than that is 
harmless.  Therefore, Tucker opined that not every exposure 
to silica represents a health hazard. 
 
12
 
Tucker further explained that Norfolk Southern uses 
various types of rock as ballast, including granite and 
limestone.  He stated that Rogers mainly worked on Norfolk 
Southern’s railroad tracks where limestone ballast was 
used.  Limestone rock has a lower silica content than 
granite.  Tucker also considered significant the fact that 
Rogers worked in what was called a “section gang.”  Unlike 
a “system gang” that was exposed to silica dust on a daily 
basis, a section gang did not have exposure to silica dust 
everyday. 
 
In 1990, Norfolk Southern learned that a former track 
maintenance worker had possibly been diagnosed with 
silicosis.  After some initial testing, Norfolk Southern 
decided, in 1992, to conduct extensive air monitoring and 
medical work-ups on employees.  The testing revealed that a 
few workers were exposed to levels of silica dust that 
exceeded the threshold limit values (TLV) while working on 
railroad tracks where granite ballast was used.9  According 
                                                 
9 Tucker explained: 
 
The TLV is designed as an established safe 
limit.  Nobody exposed at or below the TLV for 
eight hours a day, 40 hours a week over a 35 year 
working lifetime and that’s constant at that 
level should ever get sick except for somebody 
predisposed genetically [who is] very sensitive 
to this disease. 
 
 
13
to Tucker, the air monitoring and medical testing showed 
that the “track maintenance workers [were] at no increased 
risk of contracting silicosis over any other occupation.” 
At the close of all the evidence, Norfolk Southern 
again renewed its motion to strike.  Similarly, after the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Rogers, Norfolk 
Southern moved to set aside the jury verdict.  The circuit 
court denied both motions and entered judgment for Rogers. 
On appeal, Norfolk Southern challenges, among other 
things, the admission of Vogel’s testimony that Rogers was 
exposed to excessive levels of silica dust during his 
employment with Norfolk Southern and the sufficiency of the 
evidence regarding the issue of negligence.10  We will 
address the issues in that order. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Armed with a jury verdict in his favor, Rogers is 
entitled to have the evidence, and all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from it, viewed in the light most 
favorable to him.  Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Keeling, 265 Va. 
                                                 
10 On brief, Rogers claims that Norfolk Southern failed 
to file the August 9, 2004 trial transcript and therefore 
is barred from relying on it in this appeal.  That 
transcript was, however, filed when Norfolk Southern 
attached it to its motion to set aside the verdict.  
Therefore, the transcript is part of the record and may be 
considered on appeal. 
 
14
228, 232, 576 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2003); Evaluation Research 
Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 147, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 
(1994).  The judgment of the trial court will not be set 
aside unless it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.”  Code § 8.01-680.  This standard of review is 
applicable to Norfolk Southern’s assignments of error 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.  Keeling, 265 
Va. at 282, 576 S.E.2d at 456.  The question whether 
Vogel’s expert opinion was supported by an adequate factual 
foundation concerns the admissibility of evidence.  CSX 
Transp., Inc. v. Casale, 250 Va. 359, 367, 463 S.E.2d 445, 
450 (1995).  On appeal, we will reverse a trial court’s 
decision to admit expert testimony if the court abused its 
discretion in doing so.  Tarmac Mid-Atl., Inc. v. Smiley 
Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995). 
B. Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
In FELA cases, Virginia law governs the admissibility 
of expert testimony.  Keeling, 265 Va. at 235, 576 S.E.2d 
at 457.  Expert testimony is allowed where it “will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue.”  Code § 8.01-401.3.  An 
expert’s opinion may be based on “facts, circumstances or 
data made known to or perceived by such witness.”  Code 
§ 8.01-401.1. 
 
15
An expert opinion, however, must have an adequate 
factual foundation, and an expert’s testimony will be found 
to be inadmissible if it is speculative in nature.  John v. 
Im, 263 Va. 315, 319–20, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002); Tarmac 
Mid-Atl., 250 Va. at 166, 458 S.E.2d at 465–66.  It is the 
trial court’s responsibility “ ‘to ensure that only 
properly admitted evidence is considered by the jury.’ ”  
Casale, 250 Va. at 367, 463 S.E.2d at 450 (quoting Tyger 
Constr. Co. v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 143 (4th 
Cir. 1994)).  “Expert testimony founded upon assumptions 
that have no basis in fact is not merely subject to 
refutation by cross-examination or by counter-experts; it 
is inadmissible.  Failure of the trial court to strike such 
testimony upon a motion timely made is error subject to 
reversal on appeal.”  Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 160, 
606 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2005) (citations omitted). 
In the present case, Vogel’s challenged testimony was 
not based on an adequate factual foundation and was 
therefore inadmissible.  See Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 
Va. 151, 155, 475 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1996) (excluding expert 
testimony because it “is speculative, is founded upon 
assumptions lacking a sufficient factual basis, relies upon 
dissimilar tests, and contains too many disregarded 
variables”); Stover v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 249 Va. 192, 
 
16
197, 201, 455 S.E.2d 238, 241, 243 (1995) (expert witness, 
who relied solely on depositions and color photographs, 
drew an impermissible inference because the opinion was not 
based on facts in the case or within the expert’s 
knowledge).  Vogel acknowledged that, in order to determine 
the allowable silica level, it is necessary to know the 
silica content of the material being tested.  Otherwise, 
the test is merely evaluating exposure to airborne dust 
that could come from any source.  Vogel did not know the 
kind of ballast used by Rogers during his employment with 
Norfolk Southern nor did he know its silica content.  
Furthermore, Vogel admitted that, in order to know if a 
worker is at risk, it is necessary to know the volume of 
substance to which the worker was exposed. 
Despite the admitted lack of necessary underlying 
data, Vogel opined that Rogers had been exposed to 
excessive levels of silica while working for Norfolk 
Southern.  He reached that conclusion by relying primarily 
on AAR historical documents, his discussions with Rogers 
concerning his work environment, and the video depicting 
ballast dumping.  Not one of those sources of information, 
however, contained any evidence about the kind of ballast 
used in Rogers’ work or its silica content.  Consequently, 
Vogel’s opinion that Rogers was exposed to silica dust in 
 
17
an amount that exceeded a reasonably safe level was 
“founded upon assumptions that [had] no basis in fact.”  
Vasquez, 269 Va. at 160, 606 S.E.2d at 811.  The testimony 
was therefore inadmissible. 
C. Sufficiency of Evidence 
Under the provisions of FELA, railroads are liable for 
“injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the 
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of 
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, 
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, 
machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other 
equipment.”  45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).  “[A] railroad has a 
nondelegable duty, which is continuing, to exercise 
reasonable care in furnishing its employees a safe place to 
work.”  Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 251 Va. 37, 44, 
465 S.E.2d 800, 805 (1996).  FELA does not, however, hold 
employers to be the insurers of their employees.  Inman v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138, 140 (1959); Brown 
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1994); 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Trimiew, 253 Va. 22, 27, 480 S.E.2d 
104, 108 (1997). 
The question whether an employer was negligent under 
FELA is a question of federal law.  Trimiew, 253 Va. at 24, 
480 S.E.2d at 106.  “Drawing on federal law, we have noted 
 
18
that a plaintiff’s proof must justify with reason the 
conclusion that an employer’s negligence played any part, 
even the slightest, in producing the injury for which 
damages are sought.”  Id.; accord Rogers v. Missouri Pac. 
R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).  “Reasonable foreseeability 
of harm is an essential ingredient of FELA negligence.”  
Stover, 249 Va. at 201, 455 S.E.2d at 244. 
The standard of proof in a FELA action “is more 
lenient than in a common law action[; however,] the 
plaintiff nevertheless is still required to establish some 
act of negligence in order to prevail.”  Norfolk & W. Ry. 
Co. v. Hughes, 247 Va. 113, 116, 439 S.E.2d 411, 413 
(1994).  The weight of the evidence must be more than a 
scintilla before a case may be properly left to the 
discretion of a jury.  Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 
476, 479 (1943); Stover, 249 Va. at 200, 455 S.E.2d 243; 
see also Keeling, 265 Va. at 232, 576 S.E.2d at 456 
(“[B]oth foreseeability and negligence must be shown by 
more than a scintilla of evidence”).  “[I]n rare cases 
‘where fair-minded persons cannot differ on whether the 
employer was at fault and whether that fault played any 
part in the employee’s injury or death, the question 
becomes one for the court.’ ”  Stover, 249 Va. at 199, 455 
 
19
S.E.2d at 242 (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hodges, 248 Va. 
254, 260, 448 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1994)). 
At the close of Rogers’ evidence, at the close of all 
of the evidence, and after the jury returned its verdict, 
Norfolk Southern challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
with regards to the issues of negligence and 
foreseeability.  On appeal, Norfolk Southern asserts that 
the circuit court erred in each instance.  Because Norfolk 
Southern introduced evidence on its behalf after the 
circuit court denied its motion to strike Rogers’ evidence, 
it has waived the right to rely on the first motion.  
Taylor v. Flair Prop. Assocs., 248 Va. 410, 414, 448 S.E.2d 
413, 416 (1994).  Thus, in deciding whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, we 
consider all the evidence and not just the evidence 
presented in Rogers’ case-in-chief.  Id.  We do not, 
however, consider the portion of Vogel’s expert testimony 
that we have determined was inadmissible.  See Grasty v. 
Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 727-28, 146 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1966). 
The principal contention between the parties on the 
sufficiency of the evidence regarding Norfolk Southern’s 
negligence is whether Rogers was required to introduce 
“specific dose evidence” of his exposure to silica dust.  
Norfolk Southern argues that Rogers “failed to present any 
 
20
evidence of the amount of silica to which he was exposed, 
that this amount exceeded permissible threshold levels, 
that Norfolk Southern knew or should have known this was 
occurring, or that his injury was reasonably foreseeable.”  
Rogers claims that specific dose evidence is not required 
to establish a railroad’s liability.11  To resolve whether 
there was sufficient evidence in this case, we turn to some 
of the cases cited by the parties. 
In Young v. Clinchfield Railroad Co., 288 F.2d 499 
(4th Cir. 1961), the court concluded that the plaintiff 
presented sufficient evidence to create a jury issue as to 
whether the railroad had failed to provide the plaintiff 
with a safe workplace.  Id. at 501.  The plaintiff worked 
“behind a cribbing machine which removed ballast from 
between the ties and an adzing machine which smoothed the 
ties.”  Id.  The plaintiff presented evidence that he was 
exposed to heavy dust while performing this work on the 
defendant’s railroad tracks and that the ballast used 
contained rock with silica content ranging from 34 percent 
to 100 percent.  Id.  A physician testified that this type 
                                                 
11 On this point, Rogers draws a distinction between 
the issue of liability and the issue of medical causation.  
He correctly points out that Norfolk Southern has not 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on the latter 
issue. 
 
21
of exposure, to this amount of silica, could have caused 
the plaintiff’s silicosis.  Id. 
 
In a decision citing Young, the court in Wooden v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 862 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 
1989), found sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
infer that the railroad knew, or should have known, of the 
risk to its employee of exposure to silica dust in the 
workplace.  Id. at 562.  The plaintiff alleged that his 
work on the railroad caused him to contract silicosis.  Id. 
at 560.  The plaintiff introduced evidence showing that he 
operated a tamping machine for the railroad, id. at 561, 
and that the machine produced enough dust that “[y]ou 
barely could see what you was [sic] doing.”  Id. at 562.  
An industrial hygienist testified that the rocks on the 
trackbed with which the plaintiff worked contained 100 
percent silica.  Id. 
In both Young and Wooden, there was evidence as to the 
amount of silica present in the substance causing the dust.  
While neither case contained evidence of actual exposure 
levels, i.e., dose evidence, both cases did include expert 
witness testimony that the rocks in question contained 
significant levels of silica.  Therefore, the jury in each 
case could reasonably infer that the dust to which the 
 
22
plaintiff was exposed contained a large amount of silica.  
No such evidence was presented in the case before us. 
In contrast to Young and Wooden, the court in Mitchell 
v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1999), affirmed 
the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the 
defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove the level 
of chemicals to which he was exposed.  Id. at 781.  The 
plaintiff was a warehouseman and truck driver, whose 
position “required him to stock, organize and fill orders 
from the company’s ‘flammable room.’ ”  Id. at 779.  The 
flammable room was a small room without ventilation and 
housed various products manufactured by the defendant that 
contained certain chemicals.  Id.  Evidence suggested that 
some barrels in the room had leaked.  Id.  The plaintiff 
was diagnosed with chronic myelogenous leukemia and alleged 
that his exposure to the chemicals in the flammable room 
caused his illness.  Id. 
In Mitchell, an industrial hygienist was offered to 
testify that the plaintiff’s exposure to these chemicals 
caused his leukemia.  Id.  The expert, however, studied 
only photographs of the flammable room showing some 
chemical spillage and material safety data sheets listing 
various chemicals contained in the defendant’s products.  
Id.  The expert never visited the room, nor did he conduct 
 
23
any tests to determine the plaintiff’s level of exposure to 
the chemicals.  Id.  The plaintiff relied on the proffered 
expert testimony, along with his own testimony as to the 
number and length of his visits to the flammable room, to 
prove exposure.  Id. at 781. 
In excluding the expert’s testimony for lack of an 
adequate foundation and finding the remaining evidence 
insufficient, the court stated: 
[W]hile [the plaintiff’s] testimony could be 
relevant to proving that the “flammable room” 
contained chemicals, it does not clarify the 
level of chemicals to which [the plaintiff] was 
exposed.  Similarly, the materials relied upon by 
[the expert] are not relevant in determining 
[the] level of exposure.  It makes little sense 
to argue that a scientist can look at pictures 
and a list of chemicals contained in a room and 
arrive at a level of exposure. 
 
Id.; see also Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 
278 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[b]ecause he had no accurate 
information on the level of [the plaintiff’s] exposure to 
the fumes, [the expert] necessarily had no support for the 
theory that the level of chemicals to which [the plaintiff] 
was exposed caused [his illness]”);  Savage v. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co., 67 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1031 (E.D.Ark. 1999) 
(“plaintiff must demonstrate ‘the levels of exposure that 
are hazardous to human beings generally as well as the 
plaintiff’s actual level of exposure’ ” (quoting Wright v. 
 
24
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 
1996)).  But cf. Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 
257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (“although [the expert] did not 
point to [the plaintiff’s] exposure to a specific level of 
airborne talc, there was evidence of a substantial 
exposure”). 
 
Rogers correctly points out that the evidence in Young 
and Wooden did not include specific dose evidence and 
relies on Harbin v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 
F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1990), in support of his position.  In 
Harbin, the plaintiff was employed as a boilerman, and once 
a year he was required to clean out three boilers located 
in an enclosed building.  Id. at 129.  This cleaning forced 
large amounts of soot and debris into the air.  Id. at 130.  
While the soot and debris were being released into the air, 
locomotives in the building were running and emitting 
exhaust fumes.  Id.  The plaintiff was provided a breathing 
cup, but it only covered his mouth and had to be changed 
three or four times a day because the soot was so dense.  
Id.  The railroad was aware of the problem but did nothing 
to improve the ventilation system.  Id.  It did, however, 
allow other employees (those not cleaning the boilers) to 
leave during the cleaning process.  Id.  On the third day 
of cleaning, the plaintiff experienced left arm and chest 
 
25
pain, shortness of breath, and heavy perspiration.  Id.  He 
was later diagnosed as having suffered a heart attack.  Id. 
The plaintiff subsequently brought a FELA action 
against the railroad.  The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the railroad on the issue of negligence, 
holding that “[w]ithout knowledge of the precise quantity 
or composition of soot present in the air, . . . a jury 
would be unable to assess the reasonableness of the 
Railroad’s conduct.”  Id. 
 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s judgment.  The 
appellate court was persuaded by the evidence showing that 
the cleaning process took place in a room without adequate 
ventilation, while locomotives were running and emitting 
exhaust fumes, and that cleaning the boilers produced so 
much soot and debris the breathing cups had to be changed 
multiple times each day.  Id. at 131.  Based on this 
evidence, the court held that “a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the Railroad’s failure to employ a different 
boiler cleaning method or take additional precautions to 
ensure the safety of its employees was negligent.”  Id. at 
132.  While the court concluded that the plaintiff did not 
need to “identify the specific composition and density of 
soot present,” id., it compared the “general risk of harm 
 
26
to employees forced to labor without ventilation in a sooty 
environment” to the risk of injury “from a rusty wire left 
lying about or a stagnant pool of water, or the lifting of 
a heavy weight.”  Id. 
 
Rogers also relies on Fulmore v. CSX Transportation, 
Inc., 557 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), an asbestos case, 
to support his argument that specific dose evidence is not 
needed.  There, the court stated: 
First, a plaintiff must offer proof of general 
causation: whether exposure to a substance is 
capable of causing a particular injury or 
disease.  In addition, a plaintiff must also 
produce evidence of specific causation: whether 
exposure to a substance under the circumstances 
of the case caused a particular plaintiff’s 
illness or disease.  While both analyses involve 
a question of the concentration levels of the 
toxin to which plaintiffs were exposed, it does 
not necessarily follow that plaintiffs must show 
specific air measurement readings, or that they 
have not otherwise established causation. 
 
Id. at 72.  The court in Fulmore acknowledged the need to 
know the level of exposure to the offending substance.  It 
held, however, that because the plaintiffs had contracted 
asbestosis, “which by definition, results only from an 
overexposure to asbestos, the proof of asbestosis 
conclusively establishe[d] such overexposure.”  Id. at 72. 
 
As in Young and Wooden, the offending substance in 
Harbin and Fulmore was known and there was evidence from 
which a jury could infer that the respective plaintiff had 
 
27
been exposed to a hazardous level of the substance.  In 
Harbin, the plaintiff proved that he was exposed to such 
amounts of soot and debris as to require breathing cups to 
be changed frequently during a workday.  Harbin, 921 F.2d 
at 130.  The plaintiff also showed that the ventilation 
system was poor and that the railroad was aware of it – in 
fact, the railroad allowed those employees not involved in 
cleaning the boilers to leave.  Id. at 130.  In Fulmore, 
the offending substance was asbestos, and excessive 
exposure was proven by the fact that the plaintiff had 
asbestosis.  557 S.E.2d at 72. 
In contrast, the evidence in the case before us, 
viewed in the light most favorable to Rogers, established 
that beginning in 1932 railroads were aware of silica dust.  
Testing in the 1990’s, however, did not show exposure to 
unsafe levels of silica dust except for some railroad 
employees who worked in areas where granite ballast was 
used.  Rogers did not prove that he worked with granite 
ballast.  The only evidence on this subject showed that he 
predominantly worked on railroad tracks in areas where 
limestone ballast was used.12 
                                                 
12 On brief, Rogers argues that testimony from one of 
Norfolk Southern’s witnesses that he observed Rogers 
wearing a respirator at times, establishes that Rogers was 
exposed to unsafe levels of silica dust.  We do not agree.  
 
28
Even knowing that Rogers worked with limestone 
ballast, which is information Vogel did not have, the 
record is void of evidence as to the silica content of such 
rock.  See Young, 288 F.2d at 501 (silica content of 
ballast rock ranged from 34 percent to 100 percent); 
Wooden, 862 F.2d at 562 (rocks on railroad trackbed 
contained 100 percent silica).  At best, the evidence 
showed that Rogers, while working with limestone ballast, 
was exposed to a visible dust cloud.  But, Rogers’ own 
expert, Vogel, admitted that, unless the silica content of 
the material is known, any testing just measures exposure 
to airborne dust that could come from any source.  Vogel 
further admitted that, to determine the allowable silica 
level, it is essential to know the silica content of the 
tested substance.  Furthermore, Rogers testified that dust 
to which he was exposed came not only from ballast but also 
from under the railroad tracks and from dirt surrounding 
the tracks. 
Thus, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient, 
as a matter of law on the issue of Norfolk Southern’s 
negligence, to sustain the jury verdict.  In reaching this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Moreover, Rogers testified that he never wore a respirator.  
See Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 462, 114 S.E. 652, 
656 (1922) (“No litigant can successfully ask a court or 
jury to believe that he has not told the truth.”). 
 
29
conclusion, we agree with Rogers that “specific dose 
evidence” is not required.  Nevertheless, a plaintiff with 
silicosis seeking damages under FELA must present some type 
of evidence, such as silica content of the offending 
substance, from which a jury can reasonably infer that the 
plaintiff was exposed to levels of silica dust that 
exceeded reasonably safe levels, i.e., that exceeded the 
TLV.  See supra note 9. 
III. Conclusion 
Vogel’s challenged testimony was inadmissible under 
the rules for admission of expert testimony in Virginia.  
His testimony that Rogers was exposed to amounts of silica 
dust that exceeded reasonably safe levels lacked an 
adequate factual foundation.  The remainder of the evidence 
presented was insufficient as a matter of law on the issue 
of Norfolk Southern’s negligence.  Norfolk Southern cannot 
be held liable on a theory of exposure to excessive amounts 
of silica dust when there was no evidence of exposure to 
silica dust beyond exposure to a dust cloud of unknown 
content.  Rogers failed to prove “some act of negligence” 
by Norfolk Southern.  Hughes, 247 Va. at 116, 439 S.E.2d at 
413.  Therefore, we will reverse the judgment of the 
 
30
circuit court and enter final judgment for Norfolk 
Southern.13 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                                                 
13 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address Norfolk Southern’s remaining assignments of error.