Title: Plymouth Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12711
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 2019

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SJC-12711 
 
PLYMOUTH RETIREMENT BOARD  vs.  CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEALS 
BOARD & another1 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     September 5, 2019. - December 3, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Retirement.  Police, Retirement.  Municipal Corporations, 
Police, Retirement board.  Public Employment, Police, 
Retirement.  Statute, Construction.  Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Board. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 12, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Michael D. Ricciuti, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Andrew M. Batchelor, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
 
Michael Sacco for the plaintiff. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission. 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In this case, the parties ask that we determine 
whether a police officer who is a member of a municipal 
retirement system must remit payments under G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2), to obtain creditable service for prior work conducted 
as a permanent-intermittent police officer (PIPO).  A Superior 
Court judge held that the Plymouth Retirement Board (Plymouth 
board) did not have to collect remittance payments from such 
members because G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), which expressly 
discusses PIPO creditable service does not mention a payment 
requirement.  The Contributory Retirement Appeals Board (CRAB) 
appeals, arguing that the provision, considered in the context 
of the whole statute, mandates remittance payments by member 
police officers for past intermittent work.  We agree with CRAB 
and therefore reverse. 
 
Statutory scheme.  The Legislature created a "contributory 
retirement system" through which municipalities establish their 
own employee retirement systems, and form "municipal retirement 
boards to manage [those] systems."  Retirement Bd. of Stoneham 
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 130, 132 
(2016), citing G. L. c. 32, § 20 (4) (b), (5) (b).  Members 
contribute to the system by payroll deductions.  See G. L. c. 
32, § 22.  Retirement system members must be "regularly 
employed."  Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, supra, citing G. L. c. 
32, § 3 (2) (a) (x).  A member's retirement benefits depend on 
3 
 
 
the individual's years and months of "creditable service," among 
other factors.  See G. L. c. 32, §§ 5, 10.  Creditable service 
is governed by G. L. c. 32, § 4, and includes "all service 
rendered" while an employee is a member of a retirement system.  
See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (a). 
Some service rendered prior to an employee becoming a 
member of the retirement system is creditable.  G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (a).  Local retirement boards have "full jurisdiction" 
to determine whether a new member may receive creditable service 
for "part-time, provisional, . . . or intermittent employment."2  
G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (d).  A retiree's benefits depend upon the 
individual's years and months of "creditable service" among 
other factors.  See G. L. c. 32, §§ 5, 10.  Once an intermittent 
employee becomes a member of the retirement system, the member 
may petition the relevant local retirement board to acquire 
creditable service for past intermittent work.  See G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (a). 
 
The statute permits local retirement boards to determine 
how much "service in any calendar year is equivalent to a year 
                     
 
2 The Legislature defines an employee as someone who is 
"regularly employed" and "whose regular compensation . . . is 
paid by any political subdivision of the [C]ommonwealth," 
including police officers, G. L. c. 32, § 1, and part-time 
workers.  See Essex County Retirement Bd. v. North Andover, 349 
Mass. 233, 235 (1965).  The Legislature has left "regularly 
employed" undefined.  Id. 
4 
 
 
of [creditable] service" and how much creditable service is 
available for previous intermittent work.  G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (b).  However, for certain discrete employment 
categories, such as permanent-intermittent police positions, the 
statute limits the power of such boards to determine creditable 
service by mandating specific calculations.  Id.  For example, 
police officers must receive one year of creditable service, 
with a maximum of five years, for any time spent during the 
calendar year as "reserve or permanent-intermittent police 
officer[s] . . . on [their] respective list[s] and eligible for 
assignment to duty."  Id. 
To acquire creditable service for previous intermittent 
work, members must remit payments "with buyback interest" in "an 
amount equal to that which would have been withheld as regular 
deductions" had they "been a member . . . during [that] previous 
period."  G.L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c).  Section 4 (2) (c) has no 
express exemptions from the purchase formula. 
 
Background and procedural history.  Plymouth police officer 
Antonio Gomes is a member of Plymouth's contributory retirement 
system.  Before becoming a permanent police officer, Gomes 
served as a PIPO -- someone who worked "only on such days as [he 
or she] might be called, and compensated accordingly."  Costa v. 
Selectmen of Billerica, 377 Mass. 853, 854 (1979).  Gomes 
5 
 
 
actively engaged in police work and earned money for his 
intermittent work. 
 
In 1998, Gomes purchased full-time retirement credit for 
his prior intermittent service, with interest.  In 2003, the 
Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) 
informed the Plymouth board that under G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), 
the board incorrectly had charged Gomes for the creditable 
service he earned as a PIPO.  Despite the policy of the Plymouth 
board that member police officers must remit payments to obtain 
full-time credit for previous uncredited PIPO work, the board 
refunded Gomes's remitted payment, including the buyback 
interest. 
Ten years later, CRAB decided MacAloney vs. Worcester 
Regional Retirement Sys., No. CR-11-19 (amended June 21, 2013), 
ruling that member firefighters must remit payments to purchase 
retirement credit for past intermittent work under G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (c).  See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b) (addressing credit to 
intermittent work of firefighters).  As a result of the 
MacAloney decision, the Plymouth board advised Gomes that he 
must "remit those funds previously refunded, together with 
buyback interest," in part because "it had always been the 
policy of the [Plymouth board] to require members . . . who 
rendered prior service as a reserve police officer to remit 
contributions and interest . . . in order to receive credit 
6 
 
 
rendered as a reserve police officer pursuant to [G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (b)]." 
Gomes appealed from the Plymouth board's determination to 
the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA).  Siding with 
Gomes, the Plymouth board shifted course and claimed that it 
"disagree[d] with PERAC's interpretation of § 4 (2) (b) post-
MacAloney," and asked that DALA join PERAC as a necessary party-
defendant.  DALA rejected the argument of Gomes and the Plymouth 
board that the MacAloney decision did not apply to Gomes.  Gomes 
and the Plymouth board appealed to CRAB, which upheld DALA's 
ruling and affirmed the MacAloney decision. 
CRAB rejected the argument that, because G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (b), does not explicitly state that a member is required 
to buy creditable service earned as a PIPO, the member is 
entitled to receive the creditable service at no cost.  CRAB 
stated that that provision had to be considered in context, and 
that G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c), set forth the requisite terms of 
payment for creditable service.  The latter section, CRAB 
pointed out, did not contain an exemption for creditable service 
as a PIPO.  CRAB also stated that § 4 (2) (c) listed general 
types of employment or service subject to the buyback 
calculation, and therefore, the absence of the specific phrase 
"permanent-intermittent police officer" in that provision did 
not matter.  Finally, CRAB pointed out that to consider G. L. 
7 
 
 
c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), in isolation would produce an anomalous 
result:  a disincentive to become a member of the retirement 
system and to be subject to regular payments via payroll 
deductions.  The Plymouth board sought review in the Superior 
Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 14.3 
 
On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, the 
Superior Court judge accepted the Plymouth board's view that the 
plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), does not require 
remittance payments by member police officers for past PIPO 
service because the statute states that local retirement boards 
"shall credit" police officers for up to five years of prior 
PIPO work.  CRAB timely appealed to the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the case on our own motion.  We now reverse. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Statutory 
interpretation is "a pure question of law," and we therefore 
"exercise de novo review" of CRAB's analysis (citation omitted).  
Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, 476 Mass. at 134.  This court 
"typically defer[s] to CRAB's expertise and accord[s] great 
weight to its interpretation and application of the statutory 
provisions" it administers, such as G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), and 
will reverse only if the "decision was based on an erroneous 
                     
 
3 Gomes did not appeal from the decision by CRAB.  Although 
CRAB disputed the standing of the Plymouth board in the Superior 
Court, CRAB did not raise the issue on appeal.  Thus, the issue 
is waived, and we assume that the Plymouth board has standing. 
8 
 
 
interpretation of law" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, supra.  See G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7) (c), (e). 
 
2.  Statutory interpretation.  Both parties urge that the 
plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), supports their argument.  
We agree with CRAB's interpretation that § 4 (2) only makes 
sense when read as a coherent whole, because this interpretation 
is consistent with the statute's plain language, correctly 
interprets § 4 (2) within the entire statute without creating 
surplusage, and accords with the apparent legislative purpose 
behind G. L. c. 32 generally and § 4 (2) specifically. 
 
a.  Plain language.  When conducting statutory 
interpretation, this court strives "to effectuate" the 
Legislature's intent by looking first to the statute's plain 
language (citation omitted).  Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 
(2018).  The express language of § 4 (2) (b) and (c) 
demonstrates that the Legislature constructed the latter 
provision to work together with the former.  First, § 4 (2) (c) 
lays out a formula for "any employee of any governmental unit" 
to purchase creditable service for past intermittent employment 
rendered "prior to becoming eligible for membership in a 
retirement system", see Gallagher v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 11 (1976).  Section 4 (2) (c) 
neither announces the necessary qualifications to measure 
9 
 
 
creditable service nor determines the amount of creditable 
service for which a member may be eligible; rather, it states 
that "the board may allow [such] credit" and merely requires 
payment.  G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c). 
Additionally, the purchase formula for past intermittent 
work in G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c), does not exempt police 
officers or any other employees from its general applicability.  
Where the Legislature did not include an exception in a statute, 
this court will not create one.  See Joslyn v. Chang, 445 Mass. 
344, 352 (2005) ("[T]he duty of the court [is] to adhere to the 
very terms of the statute, and not, upon imaginary equitable 
considerations, to escape from the positive declarations of the 
text" [citation omitted]). 
 
The plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c), 
demonstrates the Legislature's intent to apply the payment 
formula without exemption to police officers for "creditable 
prior service" as defined by G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b).  See 
Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 118 ("Ordinarily, where the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to legislative intent").  Where § 4 (2) (c) describes how to 
purchase creditable service for previous PIPO work, § 4 (2) (b) 
explains how boards can or must measure the amount of that 
"creditable prior service" for intermittent work, subject to 
specific criteria for categories of members, like PIPOs, to whom 
10 
 
 
local retirement boards "shall credit" up to five years.  Colo 
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 185, 
186–187 (1994).  In limiting retirement boards' discretion to 
measure creditable service regarding prior PIPO service, the 
Legislature nonetheless did not amend the instructions for how 
to obtain that creditable service found in the purchase 
provisions of § 4 (2) (c).  We conclude that § 4 (2) (b) 
therefore is silent on payment for creditable service not 
because the Legislature intended for member police officers to 
receive credit for past permanent-intermittent service without 
payment, but because the Legislature intended § 4 (2) (b) only 
as a measurement scheme.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Nascimento, 479 
Mass. 681, 684 (2018) ("The Legislature's silence on a subject 
cannot be ignored," especially where it had opportunity to add 
language at issue [citation omitted]). 
 
b.  Statute construed as a whole.  Beyond plain language, 
"[c]ourts must look to the statutory scheme as a whole," 
Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, 476 Mass. at 135, so as "to produce 
an internal consistency" within the statute (citation omitted). 
Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 118.  Even clear statutory language 
is not read in isolation.  See Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 
Mass. 786, 795 (2018). 
Considering the provisions of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), as an 
interrelated whole within the larger context of G. L. c. 32 
11 
 
 
supports CRAB's conclusion that member police officers must 
remit payments for creditable service for previous intermittent 
work.  Indeed, G. L. c. 32 "create[d] and describe[d] a 
contributory retirement system, i.e. a system maintained" by 
payments of members.  Rockett v. State Bd. of Retirement, 77 
Mass. App. Ct. 434, 439-440 (2010).  This court thus adheres to 
the legislative intent to mandate payment by interpreting the 
subsections of § 4 (2) as codependent cogs within a contributory 
retirement mechanism. 
 
Each subsection of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) has a clear, 
connected role.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 178–
179 (2014) (reading statute's sections together to construe 
harmonious whole).  Subsection (a) demands that new members 
seeking to "claim credit as provided for in" subsection (c) file 
"a detailed statement of any other [past temporary or permanent] 
service," and subsection (d) directs a local retirement board to 
"verify [the statement] as soon as practicable" after filing.  
Given the express interconnected language of § 4 (2) (a), (c), 
and (d), we conclude that the Legislature did not intend for § 4 
(b) to stand on its own statutory island.  Subsection (b) 
functions with the other provisions by providing a measurement 
criteria to local retirement boards.  The whole scheme, then, 
operates so that subsection (d) requires such boards to verify 
and certify the statement of service filed in subsection (a) as 
12 
 
 
soon as possible so that members who have been granted 
creditable service, as determined by those boards in subsection 
(b), may receive and begin paying for that service according to 
the buyback formula found in subsection (c).  Moreover, our 
reading of § 4 (2) follows the Plymouth board's long-standing 
interpretation of this section  and conforms to the backbone of a 
contributory retirement system:  employees investing a portion 
of their earnings towards a future pension.4 
 
Not only does reading all subsections within § 4 (2) 
clarify its meaning, comparing the structure and language of 
§ 4 (2) against the other sections of G. L. c. 32, § 4, such as 
§ 4 (1), it also elucidates legislative intent.  See Scione v. 
Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 225, 235 (2019), citing Ginther v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 324 (1998) (one well-
established rule of statutory construction compares use of 
                     
 
4 The CRAB decision in Grimes vs. Malden Retirement Bd., No. 
CR-15-5 (Nov. 18, 2016), is not inconsistent with our holding.  
In that decision, CRAB found that former PIPOs who were 
available to be called into service, yet never were, could 
obtain creditable service under G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), 
without any remittance payments, because their purchase price 
under the formula set forth in G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c), was 
zero, given that they never earned any money as PIPOs.  Although 
contributory retirement systems inevitably result in some 
inequities, we will not remedy possible unfairness in the face 
of clear legislative intent.  See Housman v. LBM Fin., LLC, 80 
Mass. App. Ct. 213, 218 (2011).  Further, to the extent that 
this appears unfair, in 2009, the Legislature addressed such 
outcomes in the new G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (o), discussed infra.  
See St. 2009, c. 21, § 5. 
13 
 
 
language employed within different subsections of same statute).  
Section 4 (1) has dozens of separate paragraphs, each of which 
describes a discrete and mutually exclusive employment 
circumstance, the method by which local retirement boards 
measure creditable service, and the process by which employees 
can obtain that creditable service.  Most sections require 
payment expressly, see, e.g., G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (q), which 
permits an inference that other subsections of § 4 (1) provide 
exemptions for payment for past work.5  Unlike the structure of 
§ 4 (1), specifically its independent subsections, each 
subsection of § 4 (2) must be read together for the statute to 
make sense.  The absence of an explicit payment provision in 
§ 4 (2) (b) does not then operate as it would in § 4 (1), 
because the payment provision of § 4 (2) (c) works alongside the 
measurement criteria of § 4 (2) (b). 
 
By reading § 4 (2) (b) in isolation, as the Plymouth board 
requests, § 4 (2) (c) would be devoid of any purpose.  "The 
                     
 
5 The Plymouth board cites to a memorandum and order by a 
panel of the Appeals Court that was issued pursuant to that 
court's rule 1:28, Lawrence Retirement Bd. v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeals Bd., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1124 (2015), to argue 
that G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), exempts police officers from 
remitting payment.  Such memoranda and orders, however, have no 
precedential value.  In any event, the case concerned G. L. 
c. 32, § 4 (1) (b), covering service in a governmental unit 
before the unit became part of the retirement system, not the 
provisions at issue in this case. 
14 
 
 
canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation 
would render superfluous another part of the same statutory 
scheme" (citation omitted).  City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. 
Co., 481 Mass. 784, 790 (2019).  Section 4 (2) (b) is the sole 
place in G. L. c. 32 where the Legislature instructs local 
retirement boards about how to quantify the amount of credited 
service available for previous intermittent work.6  If the amount 
of credit to provide to a member does not derive from § 4 (2) 
(b), then the purchase formula of § 4 (2) (c) would become 
obsolete. 
 
On the Plymouth board's contrary reading of § 4 (2), 
subsection (c) would retain a purpose without acting as the 
purchase formula for PIPO service because it would continue as 
the formula for other categories of employment cited in 
                     
 
6 Ten sections of G. L. c. 32 mention "intermittent" 
employment.  General Laws c. 32, § 3 (2) (a) (iv), discusses 
whether teachers can become members.  General Laws c. 32, 
§ 3 (2) (d), outlines the jurisdiction of retirement boards to 
determine whether temporary or intermittent employees can become 
members.  General Laws c. 32, § 5 (3) (c), discusses 
"intermittent" in the context of how an actuary can "determin[e] 
the normal yearly amount of any retirement allowance in 
accordance" with the rest of G. L. c. 32.  General Laws c. 32, 
§§ 85H and 85H1/2, provide for disability retirement 
compensation for intermittent employees.  General Laws c. 32, 
§§ 89, 89A, 89B, and 89E, provide annuities to dependents of 
intermittent employees killed in the performance of duties.  
General Laws c. 32, § 100A, provides benefits for intermittent 
employees killed in the line of duty.  Only G. L. c. 32, § 4, 
titled "creditable service," explains how boards can measure 
creditable time for intermittent employees.  See G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (b). 
15 
 
 
subsection (b):  "part-time, provisional, temporary, temporary 
provisional, seasonal or intermittent."  Although we have found 
the statutory language to be clear, that does not mean that the 
Legislature drafted it perfectly.  Sometimes, it is challenging 
to "harmoniz[e] the provisions" of an imperfectly crafted 
statute so as to prevent surplusage.  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
482 Mass. 366, 370–371 (2019).  The drafting of § 4 (2) (b) 
undoubtedly leaves room for improvement, but that imperfection 
does not convince us that the Plymouth board was correct. 
 
As the Plymouth board notes, although seasonal employees 
must complete "actual full-time service" of not less than seven 
months to receive a year of creditable time, local retirement 
boards "shall credit" members for past PIPO service even if 
members were solely on an eligibility list7 and have never 
performed work while PIPOs.  G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b).  Because 
PIPOs who did not work would still receive creditable service 
without any remittance, the Plymouth board infers that the 
Legislature intended the same for all PIPOs.  This court will 
not rewrite statutory language to find a meaning contrary to 
legislative intent.  See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 
                     
 
7 According to G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b), local retirement 
boards "shall credit" as full-time service, not to exceed a 
maximum of five years, the period of time that PIPOs are on an 
eligibility list and are "eligible for assignment to duty 
subsequent to [their] appointment." 
16 
 
 
(2015) ("inartful drafting" does not permit court to interpret 
statute against clear legislative intent).  Therefore, we 
decline to read § 4 (2) (b) as providing up to five years of 
creditable service without remittance payments to member police 
officers even if they were being paid and not making 
contributions to the retirement system. 
 
The Plymouth board also contends that the provisions of 
G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b) and (c), do not speak to one another 
regarding PIPOs because subsection (b) uses the phrase 
"permanent-intermittent" employment and subsection (c) only 
talks of "intermittent employment."  We do not agree.  First, 
the introductory clauses of both subsections (b) and (c) cover 
the same universe of "part-time, provisional, temporary, 
temporary provisional, seasonal or intermittent employment."  
"Where words in a statute are used in one part of a statute in a 
definite sense, they should be given the same meaning in another 
part of the statute."  Hallett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal 
Bd., 431 Mass. 66, 69 (2000).  Second, the parties have not 
identified, and we have not found, a definition of "intermittent 
employment" in G. L. c. 32 or elsewhere.8  Although § 4 (2) (b) 
                     
 
8 The Legislature seems not to have defined intermittent 
employment, even when related to permanent-intermittent police 
officers, see G. L. c. 31, §§ 60, 60A, but the category is often 
lumped with part-time employment.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 30, § 46 
(administration of classification and pay plans); G. L. c. 32B, 
17 
 
 
is the only place in G. L. c. 32 in which the phrase "permanent-
intermittent" appears, we agree with CRAB that permanent-
intermittent employment reasonably may be considered a 
subcategory of "intermittent employment," a category identical 
to those captured by the payment provisions of § 4 (2) (c).  
Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. at 118 (where "words used are not 
otherwise defined in the statute, we afford them their plain and 
ordinary meaning").  Through consideration of "the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language," Matter of E.C., supra, we 
conclude that the category of intermittent employment, occurring 
at irregular, noncontinuous intervals, includes a permanent-
intermittent police officer, who works as needed by the police 
department.  See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 598 (1980) 
(defining intermittent as "not continuous" and "coming and going 
at intervals").  See also Selectmen of Oxford v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 588 (1994). 
 
c.  Legislative history.  This court interprets a statute's 
plain language "in connection with the cause of its enactment" 
(citation omitted).  Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 
Mass. 529, 532 (2019).   Although "legislative history is not 
ordinarily a proper source of construction," we use it to 
augment our interpretation of the language of a statute 
                     
§ 9C1/2 (discussing insurance benefits for spouse and dependents 
of deceased intermittent firefighters).  See also note 6, supra. 
18 
 
 
(citation omitted).  AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. 
Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296, 301 (2017).  The legislative history 
of G. L. c. 32 generally and § 4 (2) specifically buttress our 
conclusion about the meaning of § 4 (2) (b). 
 
First, the Legislature established a special commission to 
look into all retirement systems of the Commonwealth.  1945 
House Doc. No. 1950.  According to its 1945 report, issued a few 
months before the enactment of G. L. c. 32, see St. 1945, 
c. 658, the original intent of that chapter was to establish a 
system where "every government employee should contribute to his 
own retirement allowance" because "[n]on-contributory retirement 
allowances are unsound and at variance with the generally 
prevailing concept that both the employee and the employer 
should furnish funds to sustain employee pension plans."  1945 
House Doc. No. 1950 at 5.  In addition, subsequent amendments to 
the statute also reinforce legislative intent to require members 
to purchase creditable service.  In 1947, the Legislature 
amended G. L. c. 32 to prevent certain unpaid intermittent 
workers from receiving creditable time towards their retirement.  
The amendment eliminated "person[s] holding a position" with 
"annual compensation" at "two hundred dollars or less" from 
membership eligibility.  G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (d), as amended by 
St. 1947, c. 667, § 2.  The Legislature limited membership in 
this way, in part, "because retirement boards will always have a 
19 
 
 
legitimate interest in denying membership to individuals" who 
provided little service or who would pay marginal amounts into 
the contribution system.  Rotondi v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 650 (2012).  In 2009, the Legislature 
reiterated its preference that members, including PIPOs on 
eligibility lists who were never called into service, remit 
payments to obtain creditable service by inserting G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (1) (o), which asserted that no "state, county, or municipal 
employee" who earns less than $5,000 starting on July 1, 2009, 
can accrue creditable time for that service.  See St. 2009, 
c. 21. 
 
Finally, amendments to § 4 (2) (b) that added special 
creditable provisions for police officers discuss "credit[ing]  
. . . as full-time service" periods of permanent-intermittent 
work, see St. 1964, c. 125; St. 1964, c. 738; St. 1965, c. 73, 
or "count[ing] as full-time service," see St. 1966, c. 509.  
None of these amendments relative to PIPOs mentions payment or 
waives payment in a manner that suggests diverging from the 
generally applicable language of § 4 (2) (c).  We conclude that 
the Legislature intended these amendments to provide former 
PIPOs with creditable years of service in recognition of their 
service as police officers; any PIPO who worked even the minimal 
amount of qualifying work within one calendar year could receive 
one year of creditable service, and local retirement boards are 
20 
 
 
denied any discretion to interfere.9  See G. L. c. 32, 
§ 4 (2) (b).  Nowhere do the amendments suggest that former 
PIPOs would receive the credited time without repayment into the 
retirement system for the years that they were PIPOs once they 
become member police officers.  The legislative history 
demonstrates the legislative purpose to create a contributory 
retirement system worthy of its name into which all but those 
explicitly exempted must pay. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated supra, we reverse the 
decision of the Superior Court and vacate the judgment.  A 
judgment affirming CRAB's decision shall enter.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
9 Until 2009, the minimal amount of qualifying work for 
PIPOs was zero.  So long as they were on call, they could 
receive credit even if they were never called into duty.  See 
note 4, supra. 
 
 
10 The Plymouth board has the power to waive the interest 
payment on its own initiative, see G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (c) 
(2), or on the petition of Gomes.  See G. L. c. 32, 
§ 20 (5) (c) (3).  We thus assume that the Plymouth board will 
consider whether "fairness [may] dictate" that Gomes should not 
have to pay interest on his second purchase of creditable 
service.  Cf. Doe v. Harbor Schools, Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 254 
(2006) (noting that where legislation is silent regarding 
statute of limitations, "basic fairness dictates a more flexible 
approach").