Title: Clover Bottom Hospital and School v. Townsend
Citation: 513 S.W.2d 505
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 1974

513 S.W.2d 505 (1974) CLOVER BOTTOM HOSPITAL AND SCHOOL et al., Appellants, v. Arrol TOWNSEND et al., Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. July 29, 1974. David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., C. Hayes Cooney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellants. Larry D. Woods and Woods, Woods &amp; Sisk, Nashville, for appellees. CHATTIN, Justice. This suit was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, but was dismissed because of a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Immediately after the dismissal, appellees filed the suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The suit is an action by appellees, Arrol Townsend and several former residents of appellant, Clover Bottom, seeking to recover unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act for their labor while residents of the hospital and school. They allege they worked at maintenance jobs and were paid an average rate of $2.50 per month in violation of the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground the Chancellor *506 lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit; and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because appellants are immuned from suit in a state court for a money judgment under the Fair Labor Standards Act in view of the provisions of Article 1, Section 17, of our Constitution, and T.C.A. Section 20-1702. 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) provides in pertinent part: Appellants insist the courts of this State are not "courts of competent jurisdiction" as provided in 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) because of the provisions of Article 1, Section 17, of our Constitution and T.C.A. Section 20-1702. Article 1, Section 17, of our Constitution provides in pertinent part: And T.C.A. Section 20-1702 provides: The Chancellor found the sovereign immunity defense inapplicable and overruled the motion to dismiss. However, the appellants were granted, pursuant to the terms of T.C.A. Section 27-305, a discretionary appeal to this Court. Appellants assign as error the action of the Chancellor in overruling their motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity. Appellees insist congress clearly intended to subject the states to suit by their citizens for violations of the Act; therefore, any defense of sovereign immunity which might exist in the absence of federal legislation is not applicable. Further, appellees argue the state impliedly consented to or waived any claim of immunity. Prior to 1966, a suit of this nature could not have arisen because Section 3(d) of the Act defined "employer" to exclude the United States or any state or political subdivision thereof. However, in 1966, congress adopted an amendment to Section 3(d) which added an "except" clause which reads: Section 3(r) was also amended to include: The validity of the foregoing amendments was upheld by the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 88 S. Ct. 2017, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968). However, the question of the availability of a sovereign immunity defense was expressly reserved. In the recent case of Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1973), the Supreme Court decided the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution barred suit by employees of the State of Missouri against the State in federal court for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, the court refused to decide if such actions could be brought in state courts saying: "The argument is that if we deny this direct federal court remedy, we in effect are recognizing that there is a right without any remedy. Section 16(b), however, authorizes employee suits in `any court of competent jurisdiction.' Arguably, that permits suit in the Missouri courts but that is a question we need not reach." Although concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, disagreed with the majority's conclusion the question of whether the suit could be brought in a state court may not be decided. Mr. Justice Marshall said: Mr. Justice Marshall offered an affirmative answer to the issue saying: Because of the logic of Mr. Justice Marshall's conclusion, we think the majority of the Supreme Court will, in all probability, reach a similar conclusion when the question is considered again by that court, we adopt the reasoning of Mr. Justice Marshall. *508 Having so decided it is unnecessary to consider the question of waiver. Likewise, we think it unnecessary to consider appellees' motion to dismiss this discretionary appeal. However, we note that the appellants also argue that if the trial court awards money damages it will be in violation of Article 2, Section 24, of our Constitution which provides in part as follows: The logic of Mr. Justice Marshall's conclusion applies with equal force to counter this argument as well as appellants' first argument. The decree of the Chancellor is affirmed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. DYER, C.J., McCANLESS and FONES, JJ., and LEECH, Special Justice, concur. CHATTIN, Justice. Petitioners have filed an earnest and forcible petition to rehear. They insist we were in error in holding this suit could be brought against appellees, a State institution and its officials, without State legislative authority. However, we clearly pointed out that the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act authorizing suits by employees of the State against such State institutions were valid; that the States had granted to Congress the power to regulate commerce; and that, therefore, the State cannot defeat the suit by pleading its common law shield of sovereign immunity. Petitioners further insist our holding that Congress by enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act had conferred subject matter jurisdiction of the suit upon the courts of this State is unconstitutional in violation of Article 1, Section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution. Again, we pointed out that Congress had the power to enact the Act and authorize suits in State courts under the commerce clause. The office of a petition to rehear is to call the attention of the Court to matters overlooked, not those things which Counsel supposes were improperly decided after full consideration. West v. Carr, 212 Tenn. 367, 370 S.W.2d 469 (1963). The petition to rehear is denied. DYER, C.J., McCANLESS and FONES, JJ., and LEECH, Special Justice, concur.