Title: Judy Hartman v. Winnebago County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP000596
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0596 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Judy Hartman and Ronald Delap, individually and 
on behalf of all others similarly situated,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Winnebago County, a municipal corporation, 
Winnebago County Board of Supervisors, Winnebago 
County Social Services Board, and the Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  208 Wis. 2d 552, 561 N.W.2d 768 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 26, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 2, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
William E. Crane 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by John E. Thiel, Rebecca L. Kent and Godfrey & Kahn, 
S.C., Appleton and oral argument by John E. Thiel. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief 
and oral argument by Jeff Scott Olson, Madison. 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Jeffrey A. Kingsley 
and Abbott & Kingsley, Shorewood for the Wisconsin Employment 
Lawyers Association. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by James A. Walrath and 
Peter M. Koneazny, Milwaukee for the Legal Aid Society of 
Milwaukee, Inc. and American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin, 
Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Charles H. Bohl, 
Tamara Hayes O'Brien and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C., Milwaukee 
for the Wisconsin Towns Association and League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities.  
 
No. 96-0596 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0596  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                 :      
          
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Judy Hartman and Ronald Delap,  
individually and on behalf of all others  
similarly situated,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Winnebago County, a municipal  
corporation,  
 
Winnebago County Board of Supervisors,  
 
Winnebago County Social Services Board,  
and the Winnebago County Department of  
Social Services,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
FEB 26, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioners seek review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of 
the Winnebago County Circuit Court, the Honorable William E. 
Crane presiding, denying Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).2  Winnebago County, 
Winnebago County Board of Supervisors, Winnebago County Social 
                     
1Hartman v. Winnebago County, 208 Wis. 2d 552, 561 N.W.2d  
768 (Ct. App. 1997). 
2 All future references to the United States Code will be to 
the 1994 volume unless otherwise noted. 
No. 96-0596 
 
2 
Services Board, and Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services (collectively "County") contend that Judy Hartman and 
Ronald Delap, individually and on behalf of others similarly 
situated 
(collectively 
"Hartman"), 
are 
not 
entitled 
to 
reasonable attorneys' fees because Hartman's request for fees 
was untimely, and because Hartman is not a prevailing party to 
whom fees may be awarded.   
¶2 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4)3 sets forth the 
appropriate time limitation for an attorneys' fees award 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Under Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4), as 
a party seeking costs, Hartman was required to  perfect the 
judgment (i.e., tax and insert costs) within 30 days of the date 
of notice of entry of judgment or forfeit the right to recover 
those costs.  Because Hartman did not perfect the circuit 
court's November 18, 1993, judgment within 30 days of Hartman's 
receipt of the November 19, 1993, notice of entry, or obtain a 
stay of the attorneys' fee issue pending appeal, the request was 
untimely.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.4 
I. 
 
¶3 
The underlying claim from which Hartman's request for 
attorneys' fees arises involves the County's action to reduce 
                     
3 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1993-94 volume unless otherwise noted. 
4 We point out that our holding is based on the timeliness 
of the motion at issue.  Hartman's claim for attorneys' fees may 
have merit, the catalyst theory may be applicable, and Hartman 
may be a "prevailing party" in the action, but we do not reach 
those substantive issues.   
No. 96-0596 
 
3 
the amount of general relief5 provided to recipients in Winnebago 
County.  On September 10, 1990, the Winnebago County Board of 
Social Services voted to adopt a policy to reduce the amount of 
general 
relief 
provided 
to 
Winnebago 
County 
recipients, 
effective October 1, 1990.  
 
¶4 
On October 4, 1990, Hartman, a recipient of general 
relief in Winnebago County, commenced an action in Winnebago 
County Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Hartman asserted that the County had failed to establish written 
standards of need to determine the amount of relief reasonable 
and necessary to meet recipients' basic subsistence needs in 
violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 49.01(5m) and 49.02(1m) (1987-88).  
Hartman also asserted that the amount of general relief provided 
pursuant to the new policies was below the statutory minimum 
required under Wis. Stat. § 49.032 (1987-88).  Hartman further 
alleged that the County did not provide adequate notice to 
recipients or appropriate administrative appeal procedures in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 49.037 (1987-88).  In addition to 
the state statutory violations, Hartman alleged that the 
County's failure to provide reasonable and necessary benefits, 
sufficient notice, and administrative appeal procedures violated 
recipients' 
rights 
under 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
of 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 49.01(5m) defines general relief as: 
such services, commodities or money as are reasonable 
and necessary under the circumstances to provide food, 
housing, 
clothing, 
fuel, 
light, 
water, 
medicine, 
medical, dental, and surgical treatment (including 
hospital 
care), 
optometrical 
services, 
nursing, 
transportation, and funeral expenses, and include 
wages for work relief. 
No. 96-0596 
 
4 
I, sections 1 and 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 
 
¶5 
On the same date the action was commenced, Hartman 
filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Temporary Relief to 
prevent the County from reducing the amount of general relief.  
In an Order for Temporary Injunction and Relief dated November 
20, 1990, Nunc Pro Tunc October 25, 1990, the circuit court 
enjoined the County from implementing the new general relief 
administrative policies during the pendency of the action and 
ordered the County to restore general relief benefits as they 
existed prior to October 1, 1990.  The circuit court further 
enjoined the County from reducing benefits without first 
establishing written standards of need to determine the amount 
of benefits reasonable and necessary for recipients of relief. 
 
¶6 
On June 24, 1991, the County filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment arguing that the action should be dismissed as 
moot.  The County contended that on May 6, 1991, it had taken 
legislative action to fully restore the level of general relief 
benefits to the status quo prior to October 1, 1990.  On June 
25, 1991, Hartman also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.   
 
¶7 
A hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment 
was held on July 18, 1991.  On August 26, 1991, the circuit 
court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed the action, concluding Hartman's claims were moot.  
The Notice of Entry of Order was filed August 28, 1991, and 
Hartman appealed. 
 
¶8 
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals 
determined 
that 
there 
were 
issues 
ripe 
for 
review, 
No. 96-0596 
 
5 
notwithstanding the County's rescission of its policy to reduce 
benefits.  The court of appeals concluded that there was still a 
question of whether the County adopted standards of need as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 49.02(1m) and if so, whether those 
standards 
conformed 
with 
the 
applicable 
common 
law.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case.  See 
Hartman v. Winnebago County, No. 91-2414, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. April 22, 1992).   
¶9 
On remand, the circuit court concluded that the County 
had enacted proper standards of need in compliance with the 
applicable law.  In an order dated November 18, 1993, the 
circuit court dismissed Hartman's complaint.  A Notice of Entry 
of Order was filed November 22, 1993.  Hartman appealed. 
 
¶10 While Hartman's second appeal was pending, this court 
rendered its decision in Clark v. Milwaukee County, 188 Wis. 2d 
171, 524 N.W.2d 382 (1994), which set forth the appropriate 
method of establishing proper standards of need for benefits 
recipients.  The County filed a motion requesting that the court 
of appeals reopen the record or remand the case to the circuit 
court for a determination of whether the County's written 
standards of need were in compliance with Clark.  Thereafter, 
the County filed an amended motion advising the court of appeals 
that the County's written standards of need had been revised to 
comply with the directives of Clark, thereby making Hartman's 
appeal moot.  The County requested that the court of appeals 
either remand the case to the circuit court for a determination 
on the standards of need or dismiss the appeal as moot. 
No. 96-0596 
 
6 
¶11 Hartman filed a motion requesting that the court of 
appeals address the adequacy of the County's written standards 
of need pursuant to the holding of Clark.  The court of appeals 
denied Hartman's request, concluding that the appeal involved 
the application of new law and facts which had not been 
addressed by the circuit court.  In a decision dated April 19, 
1995, the court of appeals dismissed Hartman's second appeal as 
moot.  See Hartman v. Winnebago County, No. 94-0022, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 19, 1995). 
¶12 On November 16, 1995, Hartman filed a Notice of Motion 
and Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the Civil Rights Attorneys' 
Fees Awards Act.6  In its brief in opposition to Hartman's motion 
for attorneys' fees, the County argued, in part, that Hartman's 
request for fees was untimely and that Hartman was not a 
"prevailing party" entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b).   
¶13 In an order dated January 26, 1996, the circuit court 
denied Hartman's motion.  The circuit court first concluded that 
Hartman's request for fees was untimely because it was not filed 
within 30 days of the date of the judgment as required under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4).  Alternatively, the court determined 
                     
6 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) states: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 
sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, 
title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb 
et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title[] the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 
No. 96-0596 
 
7 
that if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were applicable, 
Hartman had failed to file a motion for fees within 14 days of 
entry of judgment in accordance with Rule 54(d).  Finally, the 
court determined that even if the common law rule set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in White v. New Hampshire Dep't 
of 
Employment, 
455 
U.S. 
445 
(1982), 
governs 
the 
time 
requirement, Hartman did not request attorneys' fees within a 
reasonable time period because the motion was filed more than 
six months after the court of appeals' entry of judgment on 
April 19, 1995. 
¶14 The circuit court also concluded that Hartman was not 
a prevailing party in the litigation entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees.  The court determined there was no proof that 
the County's action of revising its written standards of need 
was a result of any determination on the merits of Hartman's 
claims.  The circuit court found that Hartman did not prevail on 
any claims, and that Hartman's "Motion for an Award of 
Attorneys' 
Fees, Costs and 
Expenses 
did not 
rise 
to a 
constitutional violation."  Hartman appealed. 
¶15 The court of appeals concluded that there were no 
procedural rules or Wisconsin cases addressing the timeliness 
issue of a motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b).  Consequently, the court concluded that the rule set 
forth in White, 455 U.S. at 454, was applicable and that 
Hartman's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees was timely 
filed because it did not unduly surprise or prejudice the 
County.  The court of appeals further concluded that Hartman was 
a prevailing party in the action and therefore entitled to 
No. 96-0596 
 
8 
attorneys' fees.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's decision and remanded the case for a determination of an 
award of reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1988(b). 
II. 
¶16 We first address whether Hartman's Motion for an Award 
of Attorneys' Fees was timely filed.  To that end we must 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
statutory 
or 
commmon-law 
rule 
governing the time requirement for filing a request for 
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).   
¶17 An award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) 
is within the discretion of the circuit court, and the circuit 
court's determination will ordinarily be reversed only where 
there has been an erroneous exercise of that discretion.  See 
Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 305, 340 
N.W.2d 704 (1983).  Such deference is given a state circuit 
court or federal district court in a § 1988 action "because that 
court is particularly well-qualified to make the partially 
subjective findings necessary for an award of fees and to 
perform the balancing of equities that is an integral part of 
the proceeding for an award of fees."  Libby v. Illinois High 
School Ass'n, 921 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted).  However, an appellate court can independently reverse 
a circuit court's otherwise discretionary grant or denial of § 
1988 attorneys' fees if the decision was based upon an error of 
law.  See Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d at 305 (quoting Chrapliwy 
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 1982)).  
No. 96-0596 
 
9 
 
¶18 There are three rules that could govern the time 
requirement for requesting attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b):  (1)  Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4), which requires that a 
judgment be perfected (i.e., costs taxed and inserted in the 
judgment) within 30 days of the entry of judgment (or notice of 
entry of judgment, depending upon which party causes the 
judgment to be entered) or recovery of costs is forfeited; (2) 
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
requires that a motion for attorneys' fees be brought within 14 
days of the entry of judgment; or (3) the common law rule set 
forth in White, 455 U.S. at 454, which holds that a motion for 
attorneys' fees is timely unless it "unfairly surprises or 
prejudices the affected party."  We conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.06(4) sets forth the appropriate time requirement for a 
request for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) in 
an action venued in a Wisconsin circuit court. 
 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06 provides, in relevant part: 
 
Rendition, perfection and entry of judgment. (1)(a) A 
judgment is rendered by the court when it is signed by 
the judge or by the clerk at the judge's written 
direction. 
(b) A judgment is entered when it is filed in the 
office of the clerk of court. 
(c) A judgment is perfected by the taxation of costs 
and the insertion of the amount thereof in the 
judgment. 
 
 . . .  
 
(4)  A judgment may be rendered and entered at the 
instance 
of 
any 
party 
either 
before 
or 
after 
perfection.  If the party in whose favor the judgment 
is rendered causes it to be entered, the party shall 
perfect the judgment within 30 days of entry or 
forfeit the right to recover costs.  If the party 
against whom the judgment is rendered causes it to be 
entered, the party in whose favor the judgment is 
No. 96-0596 
 
10
rendered shall perfect it within 30 days of service of 
notice of entry of judgment or forfeit the right to 
recover costs.  If proceedings are stayed under s. 
806.08, judgment may be perfected at any time within 
30 days after the expiration of the stay. 
 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(4) bases the time limitation 
for perfecting the judgment (i.e., taxing and inserting costs) 
upon the date on which the party seeking costs has notice that 
the judgment is entered.  If the party seeking costs causes the 
judgment to be entered, the 30-day time limitation begins on the 
date of entry of the judgment.  If the party seeking costs is 
not the party who causes the judgment to be entered, the 30-day 
time limitation begins on the date of notice of entry of 
judgment.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4).   
¶21 The statutory language of  Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) sets 
forth a time limitation with regard to recovery of "costs."  
Therefore, we must consider whether an award of attorneys' fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is a "cost" in accordance with Wis. 
Stat. § 806.06(4).  
¶22 The relevant language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) expressly 
provides that in an action to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, a court may award the prevailing party "a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of costs."  (Emphasis supplied).  Thus, 
the plain language of the statute specifically provides that 
§ 1988 
attorneys' 
fees 
are 
costs. 
 
This 
plain 
language 
interpretation was recognized and followed by this court in 
School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 170 Wis. 2d 347, 
488 N.W.2d 82 (1992).   
¶23 In Shorewood we addressed the issue whether attorneys' 
fees 
under 
§ 
1988(b) 
are 
considered 
damages 
within 
the 
No. 96-0596 
 
11
provisions of an insurance contract, thereby placing a duty on 
the insurer to defend or indemnify the insured based upon a 
request for attorneys' fees.  In holding that an award of 
attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1988(b) is not damages, we 
recognized that there are various statutory provisions that 
allow for an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party, 
some of which define attorneys' fees as costs and some of which 
separate attorneys' fees from other taxable costs.  See id. at 
378.  We concluded that "[u]nder 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988, attorney 
fees constitute part of the [taxable] costs."  Id. 
¶24 Arguably, 
because 
an 
action 
for 
attorneys' 
fees 
pursuant to § 1988 is based upon federal substantive law, we 
need only look to the federal statutory language and this 
court's interpretation of it to determine that § 1988 attorneys' 
fees are costs.  We recognize, however, that "[t]he fact that a 
statute incorporates within its text the word 'cost' is not 
conclusive evidence that the statute in question authorizes the 
taxation of costs" in accordance with Wisconsin statutes.  State 
v. Foster, 100 Wis. 2d 103, 106, 301 N.W.2d 192 (1981). 
 
Under Wisconsin law costs are only recoverable if there is a 
specific Wisconsin statutory provision stating that the cost is 
recoverable.  See Kleinke v. Farmers Coop. Supply & Shipping, 
202 Wis. 2d 138, 147, 549 N.W.2d 714 (1996). 
 
'The terms 'allowable costs' or 'taxable costs' have a 
special meaning in the context of litigation.  The 
right to recover costs is not synonymous with the 
right to recover the expense of litigation.  This 
right is statutory in nature, and to the extent that a 
statute does not authorize the recovery of specific 
costs, they are not recoverable . . . . Many expenses 
of litigation are not allowable or taxable costs even 
though they are costs of litigation.' 
No. 96-0596 
 
12
Id. (quoting Foster, 100 Wis. 2d at 106).  See also State v. 
Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d 233, 237, 549 N.W.2d 718 (1996); State v. 
Amato, 126 Wis. 2d 212, 217, 376 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1985).    
¶25 Accordingly, we must also determine if any Wisconsin 
statute authorizes an award of attorneys' fees under § 1988 as a 
taxable cost.  "Interpretation of a statute is a matter of law 
which we review de novo, benefitting from the analyses of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals."  Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d 
at 237.  The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  See Hughes v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 
(1996).  To determine the legislature's intent, we first look to 
the language of the relevant statutes.  See UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 
201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-82, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996). 
¶26 The language of Wis. Stat. § 814.04 supports our 
interpretation of the federal statute that attorneys' fees 
awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) are costs.  Section 
814.04 sets forth the specific items of costs that are 
recoverable as taxable costs in civil proceedings.  Section 
814.04(2) states that statutorily approved costs include "[a]ll 
the necessary . . . fees allowed by law."  Although this court 
has not heretofore considered the specific issue whether 
No. 96-0596 
 
13
§ 1988(b) attorneys' fees are "necessary fees allowed by law," 
we conclude that they are.7 
¶27 Attorneys' fees are allowed by law under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b) and are a "necessary" cost of litigation to which a 
prevailing party is entitled.  Section 1988 was enacted by 
Congress as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976. 
 It was drafted in response to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), wherein the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
disapproved 
of 
lower 
federal 
court 
decisions that awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the private 
attorney general doctrine.  See Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d at 
305 (citing S. Rep. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5908, 5909). 
 
In authorizing the fee shifting, Congress determined 
that '[i]f private citizens are to be able to assert 
their civil rights and if those who violate the 
Nation's fundamental law are not to proceed with 
impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to 
recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights 
in court.' 
Id.8   
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04(1) discusses attorneys' fees as 
items of costs, setting forth standard minimum and maximum 
amounts recoverable.  This section is inapplicable in this 
instance because "[t]he determination of what is a reasonable 
fee under sec. 1988 is left to the discretion of the trial 
court."  Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 
305, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424 (1983)).  See also Bialk v. Milwaukee County, 180 
Wis. 2d 374, 379, 509 N.W.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1993).  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 814.10(4) 
provides 
for 
circuit 
court 
review 
of 
attorneys' fees as taxable costs. 
No. 96-0596 
 
14
 
¶28 Despite Hartman's 
argument 
to 
the 
contrary, our 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.06(4) 
governs 
the 
time 
requirement is consistent with the court of appeals' holding in 
ACLU v. Thompson, 155 Wis. 2d 442, 455 N.W.2d 268 (Ct. App. 
1990).  In Thompson the plaintiffs did not receive notice that 
the judgment had been entered in time to file an appeal.  
Consequently, they brought a motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 to 
vacate the judgment and reenter it so that a timely appeal could 
be filed.  See id. at 445.  In affirming the circuit court's 
order denying the plaintiffs' motion, the court of appeals 
determined that "[a] trial court cannot extend the time to 
appeal 
a 
final 
judgment 
by 
vacating 
and 
reentering 
the 
judgment."9  Id. (citation omitted).  Where a judgment resolves 
the merits of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, it is a final judgment 
from which a party may appeal even though a request for 
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) has not been resolved 
because an award of fees "'is uniquely separable from the cause 
                                                                  
8 Wisconsin courts have also recognized that where a party 
is acting as a private attorney general, the costs incurred in 
retaining counsel are "necessary" costs. Where an individual is 
acting to enforce the public's rights, an award of attorneys' 
fees to a prevailing party may be recoverable because to fully 
enforce those guaranteed rights "assistance of counsel is 
fundamental." Richland School Dist. v. DILHR, 166 Wis. 2d 262, 
283, 479 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Watkins v. LIRC, 117 
Wis. 2d 753, 345 N.W.2d 482 (1984)), aff'd 174 Wis. 2d 878, 498 
N.W.2d 826 (1993). 
9 Though not dispositive in this case, we note that the 
court of appeals' holding in Thompson was distinguished in a 
recent opinion of this court, wherein we determined that a 
circuit court may extend the statutory time to appeal by 
vacating and reentering a judgment where "compelling equitable 
considerations under § 806.07(1)(a)" outweigh "the goal of 
finality." Edlund v. Wisconsin Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp., 210 
Wis. 2d 639, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997). 
No. 96-0596 
 
15
of action to be proved at trial.'"  Id. at 447 (quoting White, 
455 U.S. at 452).   
¶29 The court of appeals' decision in Thompson did not 
address the timeliness of the request for attorneys' fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).  The plaintiffs in Thompson brought a 
motion for costs and attorneys' fees after the court released 
its memorandum decision but prior to the entry of judgment.  See 
id. at 444.  Thereafter, the parties agreed to postpone the 
resolution of the fees issue until after appeal.  See id.  There 
was no argument made that the request for fees was untimely and 
it was, in fact, brought within the time limitation set forth 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4). 
¶30 Our holding today does not negate the recognition that 
an award of attorneys' fees based upon the status of a 
prevailing party is a consideration separate from the underlying 
merits of the cause of action.  In addition, our decision does 
not prohibit the parties from stipulating to postpone the issue 
of attorneys' fees or seeking to stay the proceedings pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 806.08.  Hence, we do not restrict a circuit 
court's ability to economize its time and postpone fee issues 
pending the resolution of the underlying merits of a claim on 
appeal consistent with Thompson.  We simply conclude that, 
absent either of these circumstances (e.g., postponement or stay 
pending appeal), the attorneys' fees must be taxed and inserted 
in the judgment within 30 days of the entry of judgment or 
notice of entry of judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4). 
 
¶31 At oral argument, Hartman's counsel asserted that our 
 decision in Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 194 Wis. 2d 203, 
No. 96-0596 
 
16
533 N.W.2d 746 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996), and 
the court of appeals' decision in Richland School Dist. v. 
DILHR, 166 Wis. 2d 262, 479 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd 
174 Wis. 2d 878, 498 N.W.2d 826 (1993), support Hartman's 
argument that the proper time limitation is set forth in White, 
455 U.S. at 454.  We disagree. 
¶32 Our holding is consistent with our decision in Gorton. 
 In Gorton we did not consider the timeliness of an attorneys' 
fees request under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).  Rather we held that 
Wis. Stat. § 805.16, which governs time limitations for motions 
after verdict, was inapplicable to a request for attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2.  The request for fees 
in Gorton was filed within 30 days of the date of the entry of 
judgment.10 
¶33 Furthermore, our holding in the present case is 
distinguishable from Richland School Dist..  In Richland School 
Dist. the court of appeals stated that the appropriate time 
limitation for a motion for attorneys' fees in a Wis. Stat. ch. 
227 review was "a reasonable time after the court enters a final 
order or judgment . . . "  Id. at 285.  This determination was 
made, however, only after the court of appeals recognized that 
the individual's "right to an award of attorney's fees for 
representation in this ch. 227 review is a court-created right. 
 Having created the right and in the absence of legislation, the 
court may establish time limits for requesting an award . . . " 
                     
10 In Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 194 Wis. 2d 203, 211, 
533 N.W.2d 746 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996), the 
judgment on the verdict was entered in February 4, 1993, and the 
plaintiff filed a motion requesting attorneys' fees on March 4, 
1993.   
No. 96-0596 
 
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 Id. (citation omitted).  Richland School Dist. involved issues 
of administrative review, and the court did not consider the 
timeliness of § 1988 attorneys' fees.  Moreover, neither party 
in that case argued that Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) governed the 
time limitation for attorneys' fees under those circumstances. 
¶34 It is generally appropriate for Wisconsin circuit 
courts to apply Wisconsin's procedural rules in a federal civil 
rights action provided those rules do not "place conditions on 
the vindication of a federal right."  Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 
131, 139 (1988).  "Federal law takes state courts as it finds 
them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not 
'impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized 
by federal laws.'"  Id. at 150 (quoting Brown v. Western R. Co. 
of Alabama, 388 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949)).  Application of state 
procedural requirements is therefore appropriate to the extent 
that the rights of the parties are protected in accordance with 
controlling federal law.  See Felder, 487 U.S. at 151. 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(4) adequately protects the 
rights of a federal civil rights plaintiff because it is even 
more generous than the rule that is applicable in federal 
courts.  Under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure a party has 14 days from the date of the entry of 
judgment to bring a motion for an award of attorneys' fees.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.06(4), on the other hand, allows a party 
30 days from the date of the entry of judgment or notice of the 
entry of judgment to tax and insert costs into the judgment.  
Thus, the application of Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) places no 
"unnecessary burdens" or "conditions" on the right of a party 
No. 96-0596 
 
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seeking attorneys' fees under § 1988 and is in accordance with 
controlling federal law.  Id. at 150-51.  Since there is an 
applicable Wisconsin statute governing the time limitation, 
there is no need to address either the application of Rule 54(d) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the federal common-
law rule set forth in White, 455 U.S. at 454. 
¶36 Having concluded that Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) sets 
forth the time limitation for a request for attorneys' fees in 
an action under § 1988, we further conclude that Hartman failed 
to comply with Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4).  Hartman asserts 
entitlement to attorneys' fees based in large part upon the 
County's rescission of its administrative policies on May 6, 
1991, resulting in the return of the benefits levels to the 
status quo prior to October 1, 1990.  This action by the County 
occurred many months prior to the circuit court's entry of 
judgment in November of 1993.  The County caused entry of the 
circuit court's order, and thereafter forwarded a Notice of 
Entry of Order dated November 19, 1993, to Hartman.  Because 
Hartman is claiming "prevailing party" status based in part upon 
the County's 1991 rescission of its reduction of benefits, 
Hartman should have taxed and inserted costs in the November 18, 
1993, judgment based upon a catalyst theory11 within 30 days of 
receipt of the November 19, 1993, Notice of Entry of Order.   
                     
11 Where a plaintiff does not obtain a favorable ruling on 
the merits of any claim, that plaintiff may still receive an 
award of attorneys' fees if "the lawsuit served in part as a 
catalyst which prompted the defendant to take action [favorable 
to the plaintiff]."  United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 622 
F.2d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 1980). See also, Hendrickson v. 
Branstad, 934 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir. 1991); Dawson v. Pastrick, 
600 F.2d 70, 79 (7th Cir. 1979). 
No. 96-0596 
 
19
¶37 The 
fact 
that 
Hartman subsequently 
appealed the 
circuit court's November 18, 1993, order does not alter our 
analysis.  Hartman could have made an attempt to reach an 
agreement with the County to postpone the attorneys' fees issue, 
or Hartman could have brought a motion before the circuit court 
requesting stay of the attorneys' fees issue pending appeal.  
Absent either of these attempts to postpone the issue, however, 
Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) required that Hartman tax and insert 
costs in the judgment within 30 days of receipt of Notice of the 
Entry of Order.  Hartman did not file the Motion for an Award of 
Attorneys' Fees until November 16, 1995, and the request for 
attorneys' fees was therefore untimely.12 
¶38 Because we conclude that Hartman's motion for an award 
of attorneys' fees was untimely, it is unnecessary for us to 
consider whether Hartman was a "prevailing party" as the term is 
used in 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) entitling Hartman to an award of 
reasonable attorneys' fees.13 
                     
12 Even if we were to assume that the date of entry of 
judgment is the April 19, 1995, decision of the court of appeals 
or even the June 9, 1995, date of remittitur of the record to 
the circuit court, Hartman's request for fees was untimely under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.06(4) because it was not filed until November 
16, 1995. 
13 We deny the Motion of Plaintiffs-Appellants to Strike 
Section III of the Reply Brief of Defendants-Respondents-
Petitioners received by the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
on August 22, 1997.  This court ordered that the motion be held 
in abeyance pending our consideration of the merits of this case 
upon review.  Because we are reversing the court of appeals and 
holding that Hartman's request for an award of attorneys' fees 
was untimely, we find it unnecessary to address the County's 
argument that this litigation is pending in violation of 45 
C.F.R. Part 1617, as well as Hartman's argument that this issue 
was raised by the County for the first time in its reply brief. 
No. 96-0596 
 
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By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.