Title: Land v. IU Credit Union
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 23S-CP-00115
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 24, 2023

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CP-115 
Tonia Land, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, 
Appellant (Plaintiff below) 
–v– 
IU Credit Union, 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
Argued: June 29, 2023 | Decided: October 24, 2023 
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court, 
No. 53C06-2103-PL-562 
The Honorable Holly M. Harvey, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 22A-CP-382 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter and Molter concur. 
Justice Massa dissents with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 24 2023, 11:59 am
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Goff, Justice. 
A basic tenet of American contract law holds that “an offeror is master 
of his offer.”1 However, the offeror’s control over the form of acceptance 
may be limited to protect the offeree’s contractual freedom.2 One such 
limitation arises when the offeror purports to dictate acceptance by the 
offeree’s silence or inaction. While silence or inaction may, in exceptional 
circumstances, constitute acceptance, we find no such circumstances here. 
We thus reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
Facts and Procedural History 
The IU Credit Union (or IUCU) is a not-for-profit, member-owned 
financial cooperative that provides a variety of banking services. Tonia 
Land is a member of, and maintains at least two checking accounts with, 
IUCU. When she first became a member, Land received an “Account 
Agreement,” the terms of which are “subject to change at any time” as 
permitted by law. App. Vol. II, p. 43. IUCU agreed to notify its members 
of any changes in the Agreement’s terms, either by U.S. mail or (for those 
who agreed to receive notices electronically) by email.  
When Land later registered for online banking for one of her checking 
accounts, she received by email a second agreement (referred to here as 
the Disclosure), which permitted IUCU to “modify the terms and 
conditions applicable to the Services from time to time” and to “send any 
notice to [Land] via email.” Id. at 118. Under the terms of the Disclosure, 
Land is deemed to have received any such notice “three days after it is 
sent.” Id. Land’s agreement to these terms required her to click “Accept.” 
Id. at 119. 
 
1 K. N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 Yale L.J. 1, 33 (1938) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract 
Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 250 (1990). 
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In 2019, IUCU sent to its customers a proposed modification to the 
Agreement (referred to here as the Addendum). The terms of this 
Addendum (1) permitted either party to require arbitration to resolve 
disputes without the other party’s consent and (2) prohibited members 
from initiating or joining a class-action lawsuit. Id. at 127. The Addendum 
also specified, under a heading in bold and in all-capital letters, the 
member’s “right to opt out” of the arbitration Addendum if he or she so 
informed IUCU within 30 days of receiving notice. Id. To “opt out” 
required the member to send IUCU “written notice” at a specific address. 
Id. Otherwise, according to its terms, the Addendum became binding on 
the member. 
Because Land maintains only one of her checking accounts online, 
IUCU sends her monthly statements and change-of-terms notices by 
regular U.S. mail and by email. IUCU adhered to this arrangement when 
sending her the Addendum. In the email it sent, the subject line used the 
same language used for monthly accounts statements, indicating only that 
a “New eStatement” was available “in Online Banking.” Id. at 178. The 
body of the email itself mentioned nothing about the Addendum. But a 
link in the email would have directed Land to her five-page monthly 
account statement, the first page of which referenced the Addendum in 
bold, all-capital letters and directed her to review the updated terms “at 
the end of [the] statement.” Id. at 123. The document Land received by 
regular U.S. mail consisted of a two-page monthly account statement, the 
first page of which likewise noted the Addendum in bold, all-capital 
letters and directed her to review the updated terms “included in this 
mailing.” Id. at 212. Land claims to have seen neither version of the 
Addendum. And she never notified IUCU of her preference to opt out.  
Land later filed a class-action complaint against IUCU, alleging 
wrongful assessment of overdraft fees, breach of contract, breach of duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and a violation of 
Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. Citing the Addendum, IUCU 
moved to compel individual (rather than class) arbitration. After a 
hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of IUCU, having found “an 
enforceable agreement to arbitrate” between the parties. Id. at 10. 
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On discretionary interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that IUCU failed to provide reasonable notice to Land by either 
email or regular mail. Land v. IU Credit Union, 201 N.E.3d 246, 251 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2022). As persuasive support, the panel relied in part on its then-
vacated-but-not-yet-supplanted decision in Decker v. Star Financial Group, 
Inc. Id. at 249–50 (citing 187 N.E.3d 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), vacated, 204 
N.E.3d 918 (Ind. 2023)). As an alternative ground for invalidating the 
Addendum, the panel held that Land’s silence and inaction did not 
constitute acceptance under section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. Id. at 253. 
IUCU petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thus vacating the 
Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews questions of contract interpretation de novo. Lake 
Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan All., Inc., 182 N.E.3d 203, 206 (Ind. 2022). A de 
novo standard likewise applies to a trial court’s decision on a motion to 
compel arbitration. Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 521 (Ind. 
2021). 
Discussion and Decision 
Indiana recognizes a strong policy interest in favor of enforcing 
arbitration agreements. Decker v. Star Fin. Grp., Inc., 204 N.E.3d 918, 920 
(Ind. 2023). But a presumption in favor of arbitration without first 
determining whether the parties agreed to such a method of dispute 
resolution threatens to “frustrate the parties’ intent and their freedom to 
contract.” MPACT Const. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 
802 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ind. 2004). The party seeking to compel arbitration 
carries the burden of showing the existence of an enforceable arbitration 
agreement. Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 88 
N.E.3d 188, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In deciding whether this burden has 
been met, courts apply ordinary principles of contract law. MPACT Const., 
802 N.E.2d at 906. So, an arbitration agreement, as with a typical contract, 
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requires “offer, acceptance of the offer and consideration.” Reitenour v. M/I 
Homes of Indiana, L.P., 176 N.E.3d 505, 510–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). And while the parties may modify 
their contract, such modification, which amounts to a contract itself, 
requires all the elements of a contract. Stelko Elec., Inc. v. Taylor Cmty. Sch. 
Bldg. Corp., 826 N.E.2d 152, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
The parties here dispute the binding effect of the Addendum. Land 
argues that IUCU’s failure to give reasonable notice, along with her 
silence in response to IUCU’s offer, renders the Addendum invalid.3 
IUCU, on the other hand, contends that it fulfilled its notice obligations by 
sending the Addendum to Land according to the terms of the Agreement 
and that Land’s silence and inaction amounted to acceptance of the 
Addendum.  
I. IUCU provided Land with reasonable notice of its 
offer to amend the Agreement. 
On the issue of notice, IUCU’s argument is twofold: First, IUCU 
challenges the applicable standard. And second, IUCU contends that its 
notice to Land sufficed as an offer to amend the Agreement. We address 
these arguments in turn.  
A. A reasonableness standard applies to the interpretation 
of the parties’ agreed terms of notice.  
IUCU first argues that, by relying on the vacated opinion in Decker, the 
Court of Appeals unjustifiably adopted a heightened standard for what 
constitutes sufficient notice under a contract. Pet. to Trans. at 13. While the 
contract itself in Decker spoke of “reasonable notice,” IUCU contends, 
nothing in the court’s opinion there suggests that such a standard is “now 
 
3 Land also argues that the terms of the original account Agreement did not permit the 
unilateral addition of the Addendum. Appellant’s Br. at 34–41. Because we resolve this case in 
her favor on other grounds, we need not address this argument. 
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required as a matter of judicially created law” regardless of the terms of a 
contract. Id. at 14. Instead, IUCU submits, the Agreement and Disclosure 
set forth the agreed-upon terms for notice and it fulfilled those notice 
obligations. Id. at 13.  
We disagree with IUCU’s characterization of the issue.   
The question is not whether a pure reasonableness standard always 
governs notice. This Court will “defend the freedom of contract by 
enforcing parties’ agreed terms,” whether those terms call for notice by 
email, regular U.S. mail, or other means. See Care Grp. Heart Hosp., LLC v. 
Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745, 758 (Ind. 2018). Thus, insofar as the contracting 
parties agree on what constitutes effective notice, their agreement 
controls. But to the extent an agreement fails to define notice, this Court 
will apply a reasonableness standard as an exercise in contract 
interpretation. 
Here, for example, the original Agreement’s notice-of-amendment 
clause specified that members would receive an email informing them 
“that a new notice is available” for review. App. Vol. II, p. 43 (emphasis 
added). The Agreement thus defined what would constitute notice by 
email. The Agreement does not, however, define what constitutes “written 
notice,” other than saying it is effective once properly mailed. Id. In 
analyzing whether IUCU complied with the Agreement’s terms of notice 
by mail, we apply an “objective theory” of contract interpretation. See Akin 
v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). In other words, it 
becomes a question of reasonableness for the courts to decide as a matter 
of law. See Indiana Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 965 N.E.2d 
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62, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that “what constitutes reasonable notice 
is a question of law for the court to decide”) (citation omitted).4 
Land received two notices of the Addendum in the account statements 
sent to her from IUCU—one by email and one by regular U.S. mail. The 
email notice contained an inconspicuous subject line (making no 
indication of a change in terms), and the body of the email itself said 
nothing of the Addendum. Instead, it informed Land that she “ha[d] a 
new eStatement to retrieve,” not that she had a “new notice” to review, as 
the Agreement required. Compare App. Vol. II, p. 178, with id. at 43. But 
even if the email notice did not qualify as effective notice as defined in the 
Agreement, the notice sent to her by regular U.S. mail, as discussed below, 
did constitute reasonable notice. 
B. IUCU’s mailing efforts met the reasonable-notice 
standard. 
In arguing that its mailing efforts were sufficient to notify Land of the 
Addendum, IUCU relies on Neal v. Purdue Federal Credit Union, 201 N.E.3d 
253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Pet. to Trans. at 10–13. Land distinguishes Neal 
on grounds that the notice issue in that case was waived and that (waiver 
 
4 Commensurate with this objective standard, Indiana courts have recognized the need for 
“reasonable notice” in a variety of contractual arrangements, including for a contracting party 
to properly assent to an offer. See, e.g., Adsit Co. v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2007) (“To determine whether a clickwrap agreement is enforceable, courts presented with the 
issue apply traditional principles of contract law and focus on whether the plaintiffs had 
reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the clickwrap agreement.”) (quotation and 
citation omitted); T-3 Martinsville, LLC v. US Holding, LLC, 911 N.E.2d 100, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2009) (holding that a landlord, before terminating a lease, was “required to give reasonable 
notice” to a tenant, with an opportunity to cure its default); Consumers’ Gas Tr. Co. v. Littler, 
162 Ind. 320, 328, 70 N.E. 363, 366 (1904) (holding that a contracting party must give the other 
contracting party “reasonable notice of his intention” to claim a forfeiture) (all emphases 
added). 
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aside) the notice there was “demonstrably better” than the one here.5 
Resp. to Trans. at 8, 13–14. 
Land is correct that the notice issue in Neal was waived. See 201 N.E.3d 
at 262 n.5. But, waiver notwithstanding, we disagree with Land that the 
notice there was “demonstrably better” than the one here. The opinion in 
Neal provides an incomplete picture of the bank’s noticing efforts. All we 
know is that the bank there sent the customer hard copies of her monthly 
and quarterly account statements, which included an arbitration 
addendum similar to the one here. Id. at 257–59.6 The panel gave no 
indication of how many pages those account statements consisted of, 
whether they referenced the enclosed addendum, or whether any such 
reference was conspicuously placed in those statements. See id.  
Turning to the reasonableness of IUCU’s notice efforts here, we begin 
by noting that this is not a case in which a bank sent an account statement 
to its customer “along with copious piles of junk mail.” See Kortum-
Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693, 699 (Mont. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Rather, the monthly statement itself contained 
the Addendum. A monthly bank statement, much like a credit-card billing 
statement, “contains information at the heart of the service relationship,” 
making it “well-suited” to communicate change-of-terms notices and 
other important information. See Hart v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. SA CV 
17–556–DOC (RAOx), 2017 WL 6942425, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017), 
aff’d, 814 Fed. Appx. 211 (9th Cir. 2020). In addition to providing Land 
with a detailed list of account transactions (both debits and credits), the 
monthly account statement provides important contact information for 
member service, the account’s beginning and ending balance, the total 
number of withdrawals, the amount of fees she incurred (including 
 
5 Land also dedicates several pages in her briefings to analogizing the notice efforts here to 
those in Decker. Appellant’s Br. at 26–28, 32; Resp. to Trans. at 14–15. But because we vacated 
the Court of Appeals’ opinion in that case, and because we didn’t decide the issue of 
reasonableness of notice on transfer, we decline a comparative analysis.  
6 In a separate section of its opinion, the court notes that the arbitration addendum was sent as 
a “standalone hard copy.” 201 N.E.3d at 262 n.5. 
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overdraft fees and returned-item fees), the total dividends paid to her (if 
any), her balance due on any outstanding loans, the annual percentage 
rate for those loans, and the payments she’s made toward those loans. A 
monthly account statement also offers insight into spending habits. See 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Assess Your Spending, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/owning-a-home/prepare/assess-your-
spending [https://perma.cc/CV5G-F9FA] (last visited Oct. 23, 2023). And it 
may help a customer discover unauthorized transactions that require 
further action. It makes sense, then, for IUCU to have included its 
proposed modification to the Agreement among this information.  
Second, Land’s argument that the Addendum was “buried” at the 
“back of [the account] statement” carries little persuasive weight. See 
Resp. to Trans. at 14. That statement was a mere two pages, the first of 
which clearly referenced the Addendum (in bold, all-capital letters) and 
the second of which was the Addendum itself. App. Vol. II, pp. 212–13. 
Had Land simply glanced at the account statement, she would have easily 
seen the reference to the Addendum and the language directing her to 
“review the added language.” Id. at 212.  
In short, IUCU provided Land with reasonable written notice of its 
offer to amend the Agreement. This conclusion, however, does not end 
our inquiry. As noted above, a binding arbitration agreement, as with any 
contract, requires not only an offer but also an acceptance of that offer. 
Reitenour, 176 N.E.3d at 511. Whether Land accepted IUCU’s offer is the 
question we turn to next.  
II. Land’s silence and inaction did not amount to 
assent. 
IUCU argues that the terms of the Addendum gave Land “‘reason to 
understand that [her] assent may be manifested by silence or inaction.’” 
Appellee’s Br. at 36–37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
69(1)(b) (Am. L. Inst. 1981)). And the “course of dealing” between them, 
IUCU submits (referring to the existing Agreement and Disclosure), also 
“gave Land reason to know that her continued use of her accounts 
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without opting out would constitute acceptance of a change in the 
Agreement.” Id. at 37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
69(1)(c)). For her part, Land acknowledges that “silence can, in limited 
circumstances, be used to show a party accepted and assented to an offer.” 
Appellant’s Br. at 23. But acceptance by silence, she insists, is the 
exception rather than the rule, and the circumstances here present no such 
exception. Id.  
We agree with Land.  
Section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (on which Land 
and IUCU both rely) recognizes a party’s silence or inaction as acceptance 
in only three exceptional circumstances: 
(a) Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with 
reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that 
they were offered with the expectation of compensation.  
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to 
understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, 
and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept 
the offer. 
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is 
reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does 
not intend to accept.  
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1).7 
Here, IUCU explicitly notified Land that the failure to opt out of the 
arbitration Addendum within 30 days of receiving notice would bind her 
to the Addendum. But the “mere fact that an offeror states that silence will 
constitute acceptance does not deprive the offeree of his privilege to 
remain silent without accepting.” Id. § 69 cmt. c. Instead, IUCU must show 
that Land “in remaining silent and inactive intend[ed] to accept the offer.” 
See id. § 69(1)(b). Under the Restatement, the “case for acceptance is 
strongest” when the offeree’s “reliance is definite and substantial” or 
when the offeree’s “intent to accept is objectively manifested though not 
communicated to the offeror.” Id. § 69 cmt. c. Even assuming Land was 
aware of the offer to arbitrate (which she disputes), there’s no evidence of 
her “definite and substantial” reliance on the proposed arbitration 
Addendum. See id. In fact, by filing a class-action complaint with the trial 
court, Land’s actions point in the opposite direction.  
We likewise find no objective manifestation of intent to accept through 
Land’s continued use of her checking accounts. To begin with, nothing in 
the Agreement or the Disclosure suggested that silence and continued use 
of the accounts would result in acceptance of any future modification to 
those original contracts. Cf. Heiges v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 521 F. 
Supp. 2d 641, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a customer’s use of the 
credit card bound him to the original agreement’s arbitration clause); 
 
7 While this Court has never applied section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, our 
Court of Appeals has relied on it when analyzing issues of contractual assent by silence or 
inaction. See, e.g., Neal, 201 N.E.3d at 262–63; Mueller v. Karns, 873 N.E.2d 652, 657–58 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007). By joining the Court of Appeals, we aim to “promote consistency in contracting 
practices among businesses and instill a greater sense of fairness among consumers in 
carrying out their contractual obligations, ultimately reducing the need for judicial 
intervention.” Decker, 204 N.E.3d at 924 (Goff, J., concurring in the judgment). Adopting 
section 69 also aligns with this Court’s frequent reliance on other sections of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts. See, e.g., Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 309–10 
(Ind. 2012) (citing section 33 for the proposition that the terms of a contract must be 
“reasonably certain”); USA Life One Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Ind. 
1997) (citing section 202 for the proposition that words used in a contract may be construed to 
avoid absurdity); Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind. 
1994) (citing the doctrine of promissory estoppel under section 90). 
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Meyer v. Nat. City Bank, 903 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding 
that a customer assented to a credit card agreement where the agreement 
expressly stated that use of the card constituted acceptance and the 
customer in fact used the credit card); Weldon v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 896 
N.E.2d 1181, 1182, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding implied assent to 
arbitrate a dispute where customer repeatedly used his credit card and the 
original agreement contained an arbitration clause). Moreover, nothing in 
IUCU’s offer to amend those original contracts (in the form of the 
proposed arbitration Addendum) conditioned continued use of the 
accounts on acceptance of the Addendum. To the contrary, a member 
could “opt out” of the proposed agreement to arbitrate and continue to 
use the accounts without being bound by the Addendum. See App. Vol. 2, 
p. 127. 
Finally, we find nothing in the record to indicate a “course of dealing” 
to give IUCU or Land any reason to understand that Land’s silence would 
constitute acceptance.8 IUCU points to the Disclosure that Land entered 
into when she first registered for online banking. Because the Disclosure 
informed Land that continued use of her accounts was an 
“acknowledgment” of her “inten[t] to be bound” by all agreements she 
had entered into, IUCU contends, Land knew that continued use of those 
accounts without opting out of the Addendum would result in acceptance 
of the agreement to arbitrate. Appellee’s Br. at 37. We disagree. When 
Land registered for online banking, IUCU required her to agree to the 
terms of the Disclosure by clicking “Accept.” App. Vol. II, p. 119. Rather 
than suggesting that Land’s silence would amount to acceptance, the 
parties’ previous dealings point in the opposite direction: the need for 
affirmative assent.9  
 
8 Because the Court of Appeals’ decision in Neal reached the opposite conclusion under a 
strikingly similar set of circumstances, see 201 N.E.3d at 263, we expressly disapprove that 
case to the extent that it conflicts with our holding today. 
9 This fact also undermines IUCU’s argument that “to get an affirmative response from all of 
its members to a proposed amendment would require it to hire an army to track them down 
and force them to sign in wet ink or click a button.” See Pet. to Trans. at 10. 
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Conclusion 
For the reasons above, we hold that, while IUCU provided Land with 
reasonable notice of its offer to amend the Agreement, Land’s subsequent 
silence and inaction did not amount to acceptance of the Addendum. 
Thus, with no enforceable agreement to arbitrate, we reverse the trial 
court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur. 
Massa, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Tyler B. Ewigleben 
Lisa M. LaFornara 
Vess A. Miller 
Lynn A. Toops 
Cohen & Malad, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Matthew R. Gutwein 
DeLaney & DeLaney LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
John Steinkamp 
John Steinkamp & Associates, P.C. 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
James R. Branit 
Phillip G. Litchfield 
Litchfield Cavo LLP 
Chicago, Illinois 
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Massa, J., dissenting. 
On the same day the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this case, a 
different panel of that Court decided an almost identical case between 
Purdue Federal Credit Union and one if its members, coming out the other 
way. Neal v. Purdue Fed. Credit Union, 201 N.E.3d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), 
trans. not sought. Because I concur in the reasoning of that panel, and 
because I am concerned that today’s decision could upend long-accepted 
business practices of companies with large customer bases in Indiana — 
from Netflix to Citibank and thousands of smaller institutions in between 
— I respectfully dissent. The IU Credit Union provided Land an 
opportunity to opt out, without losing her banking privileges;1 all she had 
to do was send written notice within thirty days. Ante, at 3. The option 
was neither burdensome nor unreasonable, but the consequences of our 
decision today may turn out to be both. 
 
 
 
1 While we did not reach this issue in Decker v. Star Financial Group, Inc., 204 N.E.3d 918 (Ind. 
2023), I find it helpful to compare the facts of this case with Decker to show how Land was 
unburdened by IU Credit Union’s directions on how to opt out of the arbitration Addendum.  
In Decker, the bank sent its members an arbitration addendum that noted its terms would be 
effective within ten days if members retained their accounts with Star Financial. Decker, 204 
N.E.3d at 920. This meant that if members wanted to opt out of arbitration, they would have 
the burden of closing their accounts with the bank within ten days of the letter. See id. 
Whereas here, IU Credit Union’s Addendum informed its members that they could “opt out” 
by sending written notice to IU Credit Union within 30 days but did not specify that a 
member assented to the Addendum by the continued use of their account. Ante, at 3. Simply 
put, IU Credit Union’s members could continue to keep their accounts with IU Credit Union 
even if they opted out of the Addendum. Ante, at 12.