Title: McCown v. Gottlieb
Citation: 465 So. 2d 1120
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 1985

465 So. 2d 1120 (1985)
John D. McCOWN
v.
Carl Robert GOTTLIEB, et al.
Carl Robert GOTTLIEB, et al.
v.
John (Jack) D. McCOWN, et al.
83-1054, 83-1090.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 22, 1985.
*1121 Samuel M. McMillan of Inge, McMillan &amp; Inge, Mobile, for appellant/cross-appellee.
William W. Watts of Reams, Vollmer, Philips, Killion, Brooks &amp; Schell, Mobile, for appellees/cross-appellants.
William M. Cunningham, Jr. of Sintz, Pike, Campbell &amp; Duke, Mobile, for appellee William B. Crane.
SHORES, Justice.
The plaintiffs are, individually, owners of five contiguous lots located along Oakway Drive in Mobile, Alabama. They brought this action to enjoin John D. McCown, also the owner of a lot on Oakway Drive, from subdividing his lot in violation of a deed restriction.
In late 1954 and early 1955, William B. Crane and Phyllis C. Crane sold the six lots now owned by plaintiffs and McCown; five of the lots were sold within a thirteen-day period, and the sixth was sold approximately two months later. The deeds to each of the six lots contained the following restrictive covenants:
On December 26, 1980, some twenty-five years after the conveyance of these lots, *1122 the Cranes and McCown executed an instrument entitled "Amendment to Restrictive Covenants," which purported to release the covenant prohibiting subdivision. This instrument was recorded in the office of the Judge of Probate of Mobile County.
On July 6, 1982, McCown sold a portion of his lot to Wladimir and Susan Jean Paquette Wertelecki, and began preparations for construction of a residence on the portion he retained.[1] The plaintiffs then brought this suit against McCown to enjoin construction of the residence and named William B. Crane and Phyllis C. Crane as defendants; plaintiffs also sought to recover the expenses of the litigation, including attorney's fees. McCown, in turn, filed a counterclaim, seeking damages for slander of title and malicious interference and seeking a declaratory judgment to establish that the release of the covenant was valid.
The court then issued a permanent injunction forbidding McCown from "any and all efforts to resubdivide or to perpetuate any previous resubdivision of this property made in violation of the restrictive covenants in effect" and from building a residence on the retained portion of the land "so long as there is in existence a principal residential dwelling on the portion of the property conveyed ... to Wladimir Wertelecki and Susan Jean Paquette Wertelecki."
Summary judgment was granted in favor of plaintiffs on McCown's counterclaim for slander of title and malicious interference and in favor of the Cranes on plaintiffs' claim for expenses and attorney's fees.
We affirm the disposition of all claims by the trial court.
The trial court determined that the six lots owned by the plaintiffs and McCown constitute a "subdivision developed pursuant to a common development plan or scheme," thus enabling plaintiffs to enforce the restrictive covenants in McCown's deed.
The characteristics of a development created pursuant to a common scheme or plan were considered in Hall v. Gulledge, 274 Ala. 105, 109, 145 So. 2d 794, 798 (1962), wherein the Court wrote:
If, therefore, the six lots in question constitute a subdivision created pursuant to a common scheme of development, the trial court was correct in concluding that the attempted release of the covenant was ineffective to subvert the equitable easements created in the plaintiffs.
McCown argues, however, that the restrictions were imposed for the personal benefit of the Cranes and were not intended to create any rights in the plaintiffs.
Whether the grantor intended to create an easement in favor of the purchaser is a question of fact which "may be proven as is any other fact in the light of legal presumption or precedent." Virgin v. Garrett, 233 Ala. 34, 169 So. 711 (1936). In McMahon v. Williams, 79 Ala. 288, 291 (1885), the Court, considering the indicia of the grantor's intent, wrote as follows:
Moreover, a declaration in the conveying instrument "that restrictive covenants are to run with the land has been cited as a significant factor in determining that a grantor intended a general scheme or plan of development." Wright v. Cypress Shores Development Co., 413 So. 2d 1115, 1124 (Ala.1982), citing Golian v. Polhironakis, 390 So. 2d 187 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980).
The trial court based its decision on evidence presented in response to motions for summary judgment made by the plaintiffs and by McCown; and though the order appealed from is denominated "summary judgment," it is evident that each party was allowed to fully develop evidence on the issue of the grantor's intent. From this, it is undisputed that the six lots in question were sold within a short period of time; with uniform restrictive covenants; without a reservation of the power by the grantor to alter or amend the restrictive covenants; and with a declaration in the deed that the restrictive covenants "shall run with the land and shall bind said land as well as the present and future owners thereof."
Applying the above stated principles of law to the undisputed material facts, we find that the trial court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that the six lots were conveyed according to a common scheme of development and that the revocation of the restriction forbidding subdivision was void.
Based upon our review of the record and briefs of counsel, we hold that the trial court also properly granted summary judgment on the remaining issues.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  The portion of the lot reserved by McCown measured 60 feet by 130 feet, or 7,800 square feet. Prior to this division, the smallest of the six lots measured approximately 90 feet by 221 feet, or 19,890 square feet.