Title: In re Humphrey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S247278
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re KENNETH HUMPHREY 
 on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S247278 
 
First Appellate District, Division Two 
A152056 
 
San Francisco City and County Superior Court 
17007715 
 
 
March 25, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban and Jenkins concurred. 
 
 
1 
In re HUMPHREY           
S247278 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
An arrestee’s release pending trial is often conditioned on 
whether the arrestee can make bail.  To do so, an arrestee posts 
security — in the form of cash, property, or (more often) a 
commercial bail bond — which is forfeited if the arrestee later 
fails to appear in court.  Those who can’t afford to satisfy the bail 
condition remain in jail until the end of the criminal 
proceedings.   
Underlying this arrangement is a major premise:  that the 
state has a compelling interest in assuring the arrestee’s 
appearance at trial and protecting the safety of the victim as 
well as the public.  Yet those incarcerated pending trial — who 
have not yet been convicted of a charged crime — 
unquestionably suffer a “direct ‘grievous loss’ ” of freedom in 
addition to other potential injuries.  (Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 
Cal.3d 424, 435 (Van Atta).)  In principle, then, pretrial 
detention should be reserved for those who otherwise cannot be 
relied upon to make court appearances or who pose a risk to 
public or victim safety.  (Cf. Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 
660, 661–662 (Bearden) [limiting the circumstances in which an 
indigent probationer may be incarcerated for failure to pay a 
fine or restitution]; In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100, 113–116 
(Antazo) [same].)  But it’s a different story in practice:  Whether 
an accused person is detained pending trial often does not 
depend on a careful, individualized determination of the need to 
protect public safety, but merely — as one judge observes — on 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
the accused’s ability to post the sum provided in a county’s 
uniform bail schedule.  (See Karnow, Setting Bail for Public 
Safety (2008) 13 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 16–17.)   
  Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey, joined by the Attorney 
General, challenges this system with a claim as simple as it is 
urgent:  No person should lose the right to liberty simply 
because that person can’t afford to post bail.  His claim joins a 
“clear and growing movement” that is reexamining the use of 
money bail as a means of pretrial detention.  (ODonnell v. Harris 
County (S.D.Tex. 2017) 251 F.Supp.3d 1052, 1084.)  
We find merit in Humphrey’s claim.  The common practice 
of conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford 
bail is unconstitutional.  Other conditions of release — such as 
electronic monitoring, regular check-ins with a pretrial case 
manager, community housing or shelter, and drug and alcohol 
treatment — can in many cases protect public and victim safety 
as well as assure the arrestee’s appearance at trial.  What we 
hold is that where a financial condition is nonetheless 
necessary, the court must consider the arrestee’s ability to pay 
the stated amount of bail — and may not effectively detain the 
arrestee “solely because” the arrestee “lacked the resources” to 
post bail.  (Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at pp. 667, 668.)   
In unusual circumstances, the need to protect community 
safety may conflict with the arrestee’s fundamental right to 
pretrial liberty — a right that also generally protects an arrestee 
from being subject to a monetary condition of release the 
arrestee can’t satisfy — to such an extent that no option other 
than refusing pretrial release can reasonably vindicate the 
state’s compelling interests.  In order to detain an arrestee 
under those circumstances, a court must first find by clear and 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
convincing evidence that no condition short of detention could 
suffice and then ensure the detention otherwise complies with 
statutory and constitutional requirements.  (See post, pp. 21–
23.)   
Detention in these narrow circumstances doesn’t depend 
on the arrestee’s financial condition.  Rather, it depends on the 
insufficiency of less restrictive conditions to vindicate 
compelling government interests:  the safety of the victim and 
the public more generally or the integrity of the criminal 
proceedings.   Allowing the government to detain an arrestee 
without such procedural protections would violate state and 
federal principles of equal protection and due process that must 
be honored in practice, not just in principle.  
Because the trial court here failed to consider Humphrey’s 
ability to afford $350,000 bail (and, if he could not, whether less 
restrictive alternatives could have protected public and victim 
safety or assured his appearance in court), we agree with the 
Court of Appeal:  Humphrey was entitled to a new bail hearing.     
I. 
What brought Humphrey, 66 years old, to this point was 
his arrest on May 23, 2017, for first degree residential robbery 
and burglary against an elderly victim, inflicting injury on an 
elder adult, and misdemeanor theft from an elder adult.  (Pen. 
Code, §§ 211, 368, subds. (c) & (d), 459, 667.9, subd. (a).)  The 
criminal complaint also charged that Humphrey had suffered 
four prior strike convictions (see id., §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and four prior serious felony convictions 
(id., § 667, subd. (a)(1)), all for robbery or attempted robbery.1   
The complaining witness, 79-year-old Elmer J., told police 
that Humphrey had followed him into his Fillmore District 
apartment in San Francisco, threatened to put a pillowcase over 
his head, and demanded money.  When Elmer said he had no 
money, Humphrey took Elmer’s cell phone and threw it to the 
floor.  After Elmer handed over $2, Humphrey stole an 
additional $5 as well as a bottle of cologne.  Before leaving, 
Humphrey moved the victim’s walker into the next room, out of 
reach.     
At arraignment on May 31, 2017, Humphrey sought 
release on his own recognizance (OR) without any condition of 
money bail.  He cited his advanced age, his community ties as a 
lifelong resident of San Francisco, and his unemployment and 
financial condition.  He also noted the minimal value of the 
property he was alleged to have stolen, the remoteness of his 
prior strike convictions (the most recent of which was in 1992), 
the lack of any arrests over the preceding 14 years, and his 
history 
of 
complying 
with 
court-ordered 
appearances.  
Humphrey invited the court to impose an appropriate stay-away 
order regarding the victim, who lived on a different floor of the 
senior home in which they both resided.  The prosecutor 
requested bail in the amount of $600,000, as recommended by 
the bail schedule, as well as a criminal protective order directing 
Humphrey to stay away from the victim.   
 
1  
We rely largely on the Court of Appeal’s statement of facts.  
(In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1016–1022 
(Humphrey); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
The trial court denied Humphrey’s request for OR release 
and, acceding to the People’s request, set bail at $600,000.  After 
acknowledging Humphrey’s ties to San Francisco and the age of 
his prior convictions, the court buttressed its decision by citing 
“the seriousness of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, as 
well as the recommendation from pretrial services.”  The court 
also ordered Humphrey to stay away from the alleged victim, 
including the victim’s floor in the senior home.   
Humphrey challenged this ruling.  He did so by filing a 
motion for a formal bail hearing (Pen. Code, § 1270.2) and an 
accompanying request for OR release.  As an exhibit to his 
motion, Humphrey, who is African American, attached a 2013 
study of San Francisco’s criminal justice system, which found 
that “Black adults in San Francisco are 11 times as likely as 
White adults to be booked into County Jail” prior to trial.  (W. 
Haywood Burns Inst., San Francisco Justice Reinvestment 
Initiative:  Racial and Ethnic Disparities Analysis for the 
Reentry Council, Summary of Key Findings (2013) pp. 4–5.)  The 
motion also offered additional information about Humphrey’s 
background, including the fact that he had successfully 
completed the Roads to Recovery drug rehabilitation program 
and earned a high school diploma while in custody at the San 
Francisco County Jail from 2005 to 2008; that upon his release 
he enrolled for nearly two years at City College of San Francisco 
and served as a mentor for young adults in the community, 
which ended when he suffered a relapse; and that he 
successfully completed a residential substance abuse program 
in May 2016.  Finally, Humphrey announced that he had been 
accepted into another residential substance abuse and mental 
health treatment program, beginning the day after the date set 
for the bail hearing.   
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
At the hearing, the prosecutor pointed out the trial court 
would need to find unusual circumstances to justify a deviation 
from the bail schedule because Humphrey was charged with 
robbery, a serious and violent felony (see Pen. Code, § 1275, 
subd. (c)), and asserted there were no such circumstances here.  
He also argued that Humphrey’s substance abuse and inability 
to address it constituted “a great public safety risk” and that 
Humphrey was a flight risk because he faced a lengthy prison 
sentence based on his prior strike convictions.   
The trial court once again denied OR and supervised 
release, but did find unusual circumstances warranting a 
reduction of bail to $350,000.  The court characterized the 
current charges as “serious” and similar to those Humphrey had 
committed in the past, “so that continuity is troubling to the 
court.”  Although “little was taken,” “that’s because the person 
whose home was invaded was poor [and] I’m not [going to] 
provide less protection to the poor than to the rich.”  The court 
elected to deviate from the bail schedule because of Humphrey’s 
“willingness to participate in treatment, and I do commend that” 
— but only to a limited extent, citing “public safety and flight 
risk concerns.”  The court included an additional condition of 
bail:  that Humphrey participate in the residential treatment 
program he had identified.   
The public defender cautioned that Humphrey was too 
poor “to make even $350,000 bail” and would therefore be unable 
to participate in the required residential treatment program.  
The court did not comment on Humphrey’s inability to afford 
bail.  Nor did the court consider whether nonfinancial conditions 
of release could meaningfully address public safety concerns or 
flight risk.   
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
Humphrey filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
Court of Appeal.  Requiring money bail as a condition of release 
at an amount the accused cannot pay, he claimed, is nothing less 
than the functional equivalent of a pretrial detention order — 
which can be justified only if the state establishes a compelling 
interest in detaining the accused and demonstrates that 
detention is necessary to further that purpose.  (Humphrey, 
supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.)  He requested immediate OR 
release or, in the alternative, a remand to the superior court for 
a new hearing consistent with what the California Constitution 
requires and with the substantive and procedural protections 
discussed in United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739.  
During such a hearing, the court could either (1) set the least 
restrictive, nonmonetary conditions of release necessary to 
protect public safety; or (2) if necessary to assure his appearance 
at future court hearings, impose a financial condition of release 
only upon making inquiry into and findings concerning 
Humphrey’s ability to pay.  (Humphrey, at pp. 1015–1016.)  
After initially opposing the petition, the Attorney General filed 
a return and agreed that Humphrey was entitled to a new bail 
hearing.  The Attorney General added that he would no longer 
defend “ ‘any application of the bail law that does not take into 
consideration a person’s ability to pay, or alternative methods of 
ensuring a person’s appearance at trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1016.)        
The Court of Appeal granted habeas corpus relief, 
reversed the bail determination, and directed the trial court to 
conduct a new bail hearing.  (Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1016.)  In its opinion, the court declared that principles of 
due process and equal protection “dictate that a court may not 
order pretrial detention unless it finds either that the defendant 
has the financial ability but failed to pay the amount of bail the 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
court finds reasonably necessary to ensure his or her 
appearance at future court proceedings; or that the defendant is 
unable to pay that amount and no less restrictive conditions of 
release would be sufficient to reasonably assure such 
appearance; or that no less restrictive nonfinancial conditions of 
release would be sufficient to protect the victim and the 
community.”  (Id. at p. 1026; see also id. at pp. 1041, 1045.)  
Because the trial court had not made any such findings, the 
Court of Appeal remanded to allow “a new bail hearing at which 
the court inquires into and determines his ability to pay, 
considers nonmonetary alternatives to money bail, and, if it 
determines petitioner is unable to afford the amount of bail the 
court finds necessary, follows the procedures and makes the 
findings necessary for a valid order of detention.”  (Id. at p. 
1014.)   
No party petitioned for review.  On remand, the superior 
court conducted a new bail hearing and ordered Humphrey 
released on various nonfinancial conditions, including electronic 
monitoring, an order to stay away from the victim and his 
residence, and participation in a residential substance abuse 
treatment program for seniors.  A few weeks later, upon request 
by several entities (including the District Attorney of the City 
and County of San Francisco, which had not been designated a 
party in the Court of Appeal), we granted review on our own 
motion to address the constitutionality of money bail as 
currently used in California as well as the proper role of public 
and victim safety in making bail determinations.2       
 
2  
Although Humphrey himself was no longer detained or 
subject to money bail, we granted review to address “important 
 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
II. 
It is one thing to decide that a person should be charged 
with a crime, but quite another to determine, under our 
constitutional system, that the person merits detention pending 
trial on that charge.  Even when charged with a felony, 
noncapital defendants are eligible for pretrial release — on their 
own recognizance, on OR supervised release, or by posting 
money bail.  When people can obtain their release, they almost 
always do so:  The disadvantages to remaining incarcerated 
pending resolution of criminal charges are immense and 
profound.   
If not released, courts have observed, the accused may be 
impaired to some extent in preparing a defense.  (See Van Atta, 
supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 435–436; accord, Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 
420 U.S. 103, 123.)  Empirical evidence reveals additional 
disadvantages.  Studies suggest that pretrial detention 
heightens the risk of losing a job, a home, and custody of a child.  
(See Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532–533; Van Atta, at 
p. 436.)  And while correlation doesn’t itself establish causation, 
time in jail awaiting trial may be associated with a higher 
likelihood of reoffending, beginning anew a vicious cycle.  (See 
Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor 
Pretrial Detention (2017) 69 Stan. L.Rev 711, 759–769; Pepin, 
2012–2013 Policy Paper:  Evidence-Based Pretrial Release 
(2013) p. 5; Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial 
Detention (2013) p. 4.) 
 
issues that are capable of repetition yet may evade review” and 
“ ‘to provide guidance for future cases.’ ”  (In re White (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 455, 458, fn. 1.)  
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
Pretrial detention also forces the state to bear the cost of 
housing and feeding those arrestees who could properly be 
released.  (See Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 436–437.)  On 
any given day, nearly half a million people — none of whom has 
yet been convicted of a charged offense — sit in America’s jails 
awaiting trial.  (Crim. Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law 
School, Bail Reform:  A Guide for State and Local Policymakers 
(Feb. 2019) p. 1 [“increases in pretrial detention rates are 
‘responsible for all of the net jail growth in the last twenty 
years’ ”].)  This represents nearly 20 percent of the world’s 
pretrial jail population.  (Id. at p. 7.)  Just six California counties 
(Alameda, Fresno, Orange, Sacramento, San Bernardino, and 
San Francisco), for example, spent $37.5 million over a two-year 
period jailing people who were never charged or who had 
charges dropped or dismissed.  (See Human Rights Watch, “Not 
in it for Justice”:  How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail 
System Unfairly Punishes Poor People (Apr. 11, 2017) p. 3; see 
generally Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail:  A Resource Guide 
for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American 
Pretrial Reform (Sept. 2014) p. 15 [“the United States 
Department of Justice estimates that keeping the pretrial 
population behind bars costs American taxpayers roughly 9 
billion dollars per year”].)   
Although California courts deny bail outright to felony 
defendants at roughly the same rate as courts in the rest of the 
country (Tafoya, Pretrial Detention and Jail Capacity in 
California (July 2015)),3 arrestees in large urban counties in 
 
3  
<https://www.ppic.org/publication/pretrial-detention-and-
jail-capacity-in-california/> [as of Mar. 25, 2021]; all Internet 
 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
California reportedly end up in pretrial detention at much 
higher rates than arrestees in large urban counties elsewhere.  
(Ibid.)  Part of the disparity may arise from the fact that even 
when bail is technically allowed, the amount that must be 
posted is considerably higher in California, on average, than 
elsewhere.  And not in a way that can plausibly be justified by 
the state’s higher cost of living:  “The median bail amount in 
California ($50,000) is more than five times the median amount 
in the rest of the nation (less than $10,000).”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  
The indiscriminate imposition of money bail has 
consequences.  “[S]ome people currently in California jails who 
are safe to be released are held in custody solely because they 
lack the financial resources for a commercial bail bond, and 
other people who may pose a threat to public safety have been 
able to secure their release from jail simply because they could 
afford to post a commercial bond.”  (Pretrial Detention Reform 
Workgroup, Pretrial Detention Reform:  Recommendations to 
the Chief Justice (Oct. 2017) p. 25.) 
That disparity lies at the heart of this case.   
III. 
Twice, the superior court granted Humphrey bail — and 
on both occasions, the trial court set bail at sums Humphrey 
couldn’t afford.  Initially set at $600,000, bail was then reduced, 
after a formal bail hearing, to the still substantial sum of 
$350,000.  At no point did the court inquire into Humphrey’s 
ability to pay such an amount.  As it turned out, Humphrey 
 
citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number, 
and case name at . 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
could not post bail so he remained in custody, even though a 
person facing similar charges, but with greater means, would’ve 
been able to post bail and be released.       
The United States Supreme Court “has long been sensitive 
to the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system.”  
(Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 664.)  So have we.  (See Antazo, 
supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 116–117.)  Humphrey asks whether it is 
constitutional to incarcerate a defendant solely because he lacks 
financial resources.  We conclude it is not.       
Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court 
has yet held that a judge must consider what an arrestee can 
pay when fixing the amount of money bail.  But from cases 
resolving analogous questions, we can perceive a theme.  
Consider Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. 660, which examined the 
permissibility of imprisoning a probationer for failing to satisfy 
the balance due on a court-ordered fine and restitution.  (Id. at 
pp. 661–662.)  Bearden argued that it violated the federal 
Constitution to imprison him “solely because” he lacked the 
ability to make these payments — a proposition that garnered 
agreement from the Supreme Court.  (Id. at p. 661.)  Bearden’s 
analysis proves illuminating in our assessment of whether it 
likewise violates the state and federal Constitutions to hold an 
arrestee in custody solely because the arrestee cannot afford 
bail.  
In Bearden, the court understood itself to be resolving 
“whether a sentencing court can revoke a defendant’s probation 
for failure to pay the imposed fine and restitution, absent 
evidence and findings that the defendant was somehow 
responsible for the failure or that alternative forms of 
punishment were inadequate.”  (Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
665.)  The parties had examined this question “primarily in 
terms of equal protection,” which inquired “whether, and under 
what circumstances, a defendant’s indigent status may be 
considered in the decision whether to revoke probation.”  (Id. at 
pp. 665, 666.)  Yet the court didn’t quite buy the parties’ 
argument that equal protection sufficiently captured the 
problem Bearden identified.  Because “indigency in this context 
is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting ‘the 
problem of this case into an equal protection framework is a task 
too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished.’ ”  (Id. at p. 666, 
fn. 8.)  The court found the “more appropriate question” (ibid.) 
instead to be “whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or 
arbitrary for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is 
unable to pay the fine” (id. at p. 666).   
Since the latter question turned out to be “substantially 
similar” to the equal protection inquiry (Bearden, supra, 461 
U.S. at p. 666), the court treated this case as one where “[d]ue 
process and equal protection principles converge” (id. at p. 665).  
This led the court to conclude that “[w]hether analyzed in terms 
of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved 
by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather 
requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the 
individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, 
the rationality of the connection between legislative means and 
purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for 
effectuating the purpose’ ” in the case at hand.  (Id. at pp. 666–
667, fn. omitted.)   
At stake in Bearden was the probationer’s conditional 
freedom after pleading guilty to burglary and theft.  (Bearden, 
supra, 461 U.S. at pp. 662, 672.)  By granting Bearden 
probation, Georgia had already determined that its “penological 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
interests” did not require imprisonment (id. at p. 670) and that 
a fine and restitution could be the appropriate penalty for his 
crime.  (Id. at p. 667.)  To be sure:  His failure to pay those debts 
may have indicated “that this original determination need[ed] 
reevaluation, and imprisonment may now be required to satisfy 
the State’s interests.”  (Id. at p. 670.)  But that would be so only 
under limited conditions:  if the court determined (1) that he had 
the means to pay and willfully refused to do so or (2) that 
alternative measures would not be adequate “to meet the State’s 
interests in punishment and deterrence.”  (Id. at p. 672.)  In 
other words, “[o]nly if the sentencing court determines that 
alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular 
situation to meet the State’s interest in punishment and 
deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who has made 
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”  (Ibid.)   
The Supreme Court then remanded the matter to allow 
the Georgia courts to determine either that Bearden had not 
made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his fine or that 
alternative punishment could not satisfy the state’s interest in 
punishment and deterrence.  (Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 
674.)  In the absence of such findings, though, “fundamental 
fairness” required that Bearden remain on probation.  (Ibid.)   
Principles of equal protection and substantive due process 
likewise converge in the money bail context.  The accused 
retains a fundamental constitutional right to liberty.  (See 
United States v. Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 750 (Salerno); 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)  Further, the state’s interest in the bail 
context is not to punish — it is to ensure the defendant appears 
at court proceedings and to protect the victim, as well as the 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
public, from further harm.  (See Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 12, 28, 
subd. (f)(3); Pen. Code, § 1275, subd. (a)(1).)4 
 
4  
Appearing as amici curiae, the District Attorneys of San 
Bernardino and San Diego Counties question whether the 
concepts of substantive due process and equal protection even 
have a role to play in setting or reviewing bail.  According to this 
view, Humphrey’s entitlement to relief, if any, can derive only 
from the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and its specific prohibition on excessive bail.  (Cf. Graham v. 
Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 394–395.)  We disagree.  Equal 
protection and due process apply in a wide variety of contexts 
where the government imposes benefits or burdens on people.  
It’s true “that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific 
constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth 
Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard 
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of 
substantive due process.”  (United States v. Lanier (1997) 520 
U.S. 259, 272, fn. 7.)  But the claim that bail is excessive under 
the Eighth Amendment is not one Humphrey makes in this case 
— and this opinion does not purport to address or resolve any 
such claim.  His objection instead targets the method by which 
his bail was determined.  What he claims is that because the 
trial court failed to consider his ability to pay or the efficacy of 
less restrictive conditions of release, he was detained without 
adequate justification.  Because that sort of claim is not 
“ ‘covered by’ ” the Eighth Amendment (County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis (1998) 523 U.S. 833, 843), neither Graham nor Lanier 
precludes his hybrid argument based on the convergence of the 
due process and equal protection clauses.  (See Walker v. City of 
Calhoun (11th Cir. 2018) 901 F.3d 1245, 1259; ODonnell v. 
Harris County (5th Cir. 2018) 892 F.3d 147, 157; U.S. v. 
Giangrosso (7th Cir. 1985) 763 F.2d 849, 851; see generally 
Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 749 [recognizing an arrestee’s 
general substantive due process right to liberty prior to a 
judgment of guilt].)  Those latter clauses protect the “specific 
constitutional right[s] allegedly infringed” here.  (Graham, at p. 
394.) 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
Yet if a court does not consider an arrestee’s ability to pay, 
it cannot know whether requiring money bail in a particular 
amount is likely to operate as the functional equivalent of a 
pretrial detention order.  Detaining an arrestee in such 
circumstances accords insufficient respect to the arrestee’s 
crucial state and federal equal protection rights against wealth-
based detention as well as the arrestee’s state and federal 
substantive due process rights to pretrial liberty.   
Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that 
detaining arrestees solely because of their indigency is 
fundamentally unfair and irreconcilable with constitutional 
imperatives.  (See Walker v. City of Calhoun, supra, 901 F.3d 
1245, 1258; ODonnell v. Harris County, supra, 892 F.3d at pp. 
162–163; Hernandez v. Sessions (9th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3d 976, 
992 [“By maintaining a process for establishing the amount of a 
bond that likewise fails to consider the individual’s financial 
ability to obtain a bond in the amount assessed or to consider 
alternative conditions of release, the government risks 
detention that accomplishes ‘little more than punishing a person 
for his poverty’ ”]; Pugh v. Rainwater (5th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 
1053, 1057 [“The incarceration of those who cannot [afford bail], 
without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives, 
infringes 
on 
both 
due 
process 
and 
equal 
protection 
requirements”]; Brangan v. Com. (Mass. 2017) 80 N.E.3d 949, 
954; Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada 
(Nev. 2020) 460 P.3d 976, 984 [“bail must not be in an amount 
greater than necessary to serve the State’s interests”]; State v. 
Huckins (Wn.App. 2018) 426 P.3d 797, 804 [“the court abused 
its discretion by requiring monetary bail without considering 
less restrictive conditions as required by the law”].) 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
What we must therefore conclude is that pretrial 
detention is subject to state and federal constitutional 
constraints.  Consistent with the aforementioned principles, we 
hold that such detention is impermissible unless no less 
restrictive conditions of release can adequately vindicate the 
state’s compelling interests.  (Cf. Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 
672 [“Only if the sentencing court determines that alternatives 
to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to 
meet the State’s interest in punishment and deterrence may the 
State imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide 
efforts to pay”]; accord, Antazo, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 114 
[“Because the state has available to it these alternative methods 
of collecting fines, we cannot conclude that imprisonment of 
indigents is necessary to promote this state interest”].)5    
 
5  
In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 did not consider — and 
thus did not reject — the hybrid due process/equal protection 
challenge Humphrey has asserted here.  York claimed a 
violation of equal protection when the court required him to 
submit to drug testing and warrantless searches as conditions 
for his OR release.  He complained that such conditions “could 
not be imposed upon a defendant who is able to, and does, post 
reasonable bail.”  (York, at p. 1152.)  We indulged, “without 
deciding,” York’s predicate assumption that those on bail could 
not be subjected to conditions other than those related to 
assuring the arrestee’s appearance in court (ibid.) — but we 
have since rejected this assumption as mistaken.  (See In re 
Webb (2019) 7 Cal.5th 270, 278 [“trial courts have authority to 
impose reasonable conditions related to public safety on persons 
released on bail”]; see generally Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. 
(b)(3).)  York never considered whether or to what extent a court 
must consider a defendant’s financial resources in setting bail.   
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
IV. 
In light of our conclusion that courts must consider an 
arrestee’s ability to pay alongside the efficacy of less restrictive 
alternatives when setting bail, it may prove useful for us to 
sketch the general framework governing bail determinations.   
When making any bail determination, a superior court 
must undertake an individualized consideration of the relevant 
factors.  These factors include the protection of the public as well 
as the victim, the seriousness of the charged offense, the 
arrestee’s previous criminal record and history of compliance 
with court orders, and the likelihood that the arrestee will 
appear at future court proceedings.  (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 12, 
28, subds. (b)(3), (f)(3); Pen. Code, § 1275, subd. (a)(1).)   
The voters amended the Constitution to grant the people 
of this state the right to have the safety of the victim and the 
victim’s family considered in the bail determination process.  
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) text of Prop. 
9, p. 129.)  To that end, they added “the safety of the victim” to 
the list of factors that a court shall consider in “setting, reducing 
or denying bail” ensuring that it, along with public safety, will 
be “the primary considerations” in those determinations.  (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(3); see Pen. Code, § 1275, subd. 
(a)(1).)  Along with those primary considerations of victim and 
public safety, the court must assume the truth of the criminal 
charges.  (See Ex parte Duncan (1879) 53 Cal. 410, 411; Ex parte 
Ruef (1908) 7 Cal.App. 750, 752.)  These are constitutionally 
permissible considerations, within certain parameters.  (See 
Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 750–751 [“When the Government 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee 
presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
the community we believe that, consistent with the Due Process 
Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that 
threat”]; U.S. v. Fidler (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 1026, 1028 [“the 
detention is not based solely on the defendant’s inability to meet 
the financial condition, but rather on the district court’s 
determination that the amount of the bond is necessary to 
reasonably assure the defendant’s attendance at trial or the 
safety of the community”].)    
In determining what kind of threat to victim or public 
safety is required, we look to the standard of proof set forth in 
article I, section 12 of the California Constitution.  Because that 
provision requires a court to find the specified risk of harm by 
“clear and convincing evidence” before detaining an arrestee by 
denying bail (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12, subds. (b), (c)), we similarly 
interpret our Constitution to bar a court from causing an 
arrestee to be detained pretrial based on concerns regarding the 
safety of the public or the victim, unless the court has first found 
clear and convincing evidence that no other conditions of release 
could reasonably protect those interests.    
 
Our state Constitution does not explicitly state what 
standard of proof is required to justify pretrial detention when 
an arrestee poses a flight risk.  On reflection, we agree with 
Humphrey that the standard of proof should likewise be clear 
and convincing evidence.  There is no compelling reason why the 
quantum of evidence needed to establish that a given arrestee 
poses a risk of flight should differ from the quantum of evidence 
needed to establish that a given arrestee poses a risk to public 
or victim safety.  (See Kleinbart v. United States (D.C. 1992) 604 
A.2d 861, 870 [“A defendant’s liberty interest is no less — and 
thus requires no less protection — when the risk of his or her 
flight, rather than danger, is the basis for justifying detention 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
without right to bail”]; cf. Pen. Code, § 1272.1, subds. (a), (b) 
[applying the clear and convincing standard of proof to both the 
risk of flight and the risk to public safety when analyzing bail 
on appeal].)  Accordingly, we conclude that our Constitution 
prohibits pretrial detention to combat an arrestee’s risk of flight 
unless the court first finds, based upon clear and convincing 
evidence, that no condition or conditions of release can 
reasonably assure the arrestee’s appearance in court.  (See 
Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1037.) 6     
In those cases where the arrestee poses little or no risk of 
flight or harm to others, the court may offer OR release with 
appropriate conditions.  (See Pen. Code, § 1270.)  Where the 
record reflects the risk of flight or a risk to public or victim 
safety, the court should consider whether nonfinancial 
conditions of release may reasonably protect the public and the 
victim or reasonably assure the arrestee’s presence at trial.  If 
the court concludes that money bail is reasonably necessary, 
then the court must consider the individual arrestee’s ability to 
pay, along with the seriousness of the charged offense and the 
arrestee’s criminal record, and — unless there is a valid basis 
for detention — set bail at a level the arrestee can reasonably 
afford.  And if a court concludes that public or victim safety, or 
the arrestee’s appearance in court, cannot be reasonably 
assured if the arrestee is released, it may detain the arrestee 
only if it first finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that no 
 
6  
We have not been asked to decide and do not determine 
here whether the California Constitution permits pretrial 
detention based on risk of nonappearance or flight alone, 
divorced from public and victim safety concerns. 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
nonfinancial condition of release can reasonably protect those 
interests. 
The experiences of those jurisdictions that have reduced 
or eliminated financial conditions of release suggest that 
releasing arrestees under appropriate nonfinancial conditions 
— such as electronic monitoring, supervision by pretrial 
services, community housing or shelter, stay-away orders, and 
drug and alcohol testing and treatment (see, e.g., Pen. Code, 
§ 646.93, subd. (c); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-17) — may often 
prove sufficient to protect the community.  (See Pretrial 
Detention Reform Workgroup, Pretrial Detention Reform:  
Recommendations to the Chief Justice, supra, at pp. 51–53; 
Crim. Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law School, Bail 
Reform:  A Guide for State and Local Policymakers, supra, at 
pp. 26, 38, 44, 49, 59, 62–63.)  Yet just as neither money bail (nor 
any other condition of release) can guarantee that an arrestee 
will show up in court, no condition of release can entirely 
eliminate the risk that an arrestee may harm some member of 
the public.  (See In re Nordin (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 538, 546 
[“ ‘Prediction of the likelihood of certain conduct necessarily 
involves a margin of error, but is an established component of 
our pretrial release system’ ”].)  In choosing between pretrial 
release and detention, we recognize that absolute certainty 
— particularly at the pretrial stage, when the trial meant to 
adjudicate guilt or innocence is yet to occur — will prove all but 
impossible.  A court making these determinations should focus 
instead on risks to public or victim safety or to the integrity of 
the judicial process that are reasonably likely to occur.  (See 
Stack v. Boyle (1951) 342 U.S. 1, 8 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.) 
[“Admission to bail always involves a risk that the accused will 
take flight.  That is a calculated risk which the law takes as the 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
price of our system of justice”]; cf. Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 
751 [discussing an arrestee’s “identified and articulable threat 
to an individual or the community”].)    
Even when a bail determination complies with the above 
prerequisites, the court must still consider whether the 
deprivation of liberty caused by an order of pretrial detention is 
consistent with state statutory and constitutional law 
specifically addressing bail — a question not resolved here7 — 
and with due process.  While due process does not categorically 
prohibit the government from ordering pretrial detention, it 
remains true that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception.”  (Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 755.) 
Marking the boundary between the general rule and the 
limited exception requires a careful balancing of the 
government’s interest in preventing crime against the 
individual’s fundamental right to pretrial liberty.  (Salerno, 
supra, 481 U.S.  at pp. 749–750.)  This territory has not yet been 
fully mapped, but we can nonetheless discern that an order of 
detention requires an interest that “is sufficiently weighty” in 
the given case — and courts should likewise bear in mind that 
Salerno upheld a scheme whose scope was “narrowly focuse[d] 
on a particularly acute problem.”  (Id. at p. 750.)  Indeed, the 
 
7  
Because this case does not involve an order denying bail, 
we leave for another day the question of how two constitutional 
provisions addressing the denial of bail — article I, sections 12 
and 28, subdivision (f)(3) — can or should be reconciled, 
including whether these provisions authorize or prohibit 
pretrial 
detention 
of 
noncapital 
arrestees 
outside 
the 
circumstances specified in section 12, subdivisions (b) and (c).  
(See In re White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 470–471.)    
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
law under review there authorized pretrial detention “only on 
individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of 
extremely serious offenses.”  (Ibid.; accord, Com. v. Vieira (Mass. 
2019) 133 N.E.3d 296, 301 [“The practice of pretrial detention 
on the basis of dangerousness has been upheld as constitutional 
in part because the Legislature ‘carefully limit[ed] the 
circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most 
serious of crimes’ ”].)8      
A court’s procedures for entering an order resulting in 
pretrial detention must also comport with other traditional 
notions of due process to ensure that when necessary, the 
arrestee is detained “in a fair manner.”  (Salerno, supra, 481 
U.S. at p. 746; see Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 
335.)  Among those fair procedures is the court’s obligation to 
set forth the reasons for its decision on the record and to include 
them in the court’s minutes.  (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. 
(f)(3).)  Such findings facilitate review of the detention order, 
guard against careless or rote decision-making, and promote 
public confidence in the judicial process.  (Humphrey, supra, 19 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1038; see In re John H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 18, 
23.)   
Accordingly, striking the proper balance between the 
government’s interests and an individual’s pretrial right to 
liberty requires a reasoned inquiry, careful consideration of the 
individual arrestee’s circumstances, and fair procedures.  But — 
 
8  
Even when eligible for detention under constitutional and 
statutory provisions, an arrestee who ends up detained “for 
want of bail” may ask the court to reconsider the bail amount.  
(Pen. Code, § 1270.2; see In re Avignone (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 
195, 200; see generally In re Weiner (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 441, 
444.)      
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
as both parties emphasize — this is not a case that requires us 
to lay out comprehensive descriptions of every procedure by 
which bail determinations must be made.  We leave such details 
to future cases.  (See In re Nordin, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at pp. 
544–545, fn. 4.)  
V. 
 In a crucially important respect, California law is in line 
with the federal Constitution:  “liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception.”  (Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 755.)  An arrestee 
may not be held in custody pending trial unless the court has 
made an individualized determination that (1) the arrestee has 
the financial ability to pay, but nonetheless failed to pay, the 
amount of bail the court finds reasonably necessary to protect 
compelling government interests; or (2) detention is necessary 
to protect victim or public safety, or ensure the defendant’s 
appearance, and there is clear and convincing evidence that no 
less restrictive alternative will reasonably vindicate those 
interests.  (See Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026.)  
Pretrial detention on victim and public safety grounds, subject 
to specific and reliable constitutional constraints, is a key 
element of our criminal justice system.  Conditioning such 
detention on the arrestee’s financial resources, without ever 
assessing whether a defendant can meet those conditions or 
whether the state’s interests could be met by less restrictive 
alternatives, is not. 
Because the trial court failed to determine whether 
Humphrey had the financial wherewithal to post bail — and, if 
not, whether less restrictive alternatives could reasonably have 
satisfied the government’s compelling interest in seeking his 
In re HUMPHREY           
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
detention — the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s bail 
order and remanded for the court to conduct a new hearing.  
Before we granted review, the trial court held that hearing and 
released Humphrey under various nonfinancial conditions, 
including his participation in a residential substance abuse 
treatment program for seniors, electronic monitoring, and an 
order to stay away from the victim and the victim’s residence.  
In December 2018, Humphrey was released from his court-
ordered 
residential 
treatment 
program, 
but 
his 
other 
nonfinancial conditions remained in place, along with a 
requirement to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and 
outpatient treatment.  No party sought relief from the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, and no party is seeking relief from the trial 
court’s most recent ruling.  We therefore affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Humphrey  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX  19 Cal.App.5th 1006 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S247278  
Date Filed:  March 25, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:   Superior 
County:  San Francisco  
Judge:  Joseph M. Quinn  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Civil Rights Corps, Alec Karakatsanis, Katherine C. Hubbard; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Seth P. 
Waxman, Daniel S. Volchok, Thomas G. Sprankling; Jeff Adachi, Public Defender, Matt Gonzalez, Chief Deputy 
Public Defender, Paul Myslin, Christopher F. Gauge, Anita Nabha and Chesa Boudin, Deputy Public Defenders, for 
Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Bartell, Hensel & Gressley, Donald J. Bartell, Lara J. Gressley and Michael W. Donaldson for California DUI 
Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, Krista Carter, Edmond Ahadome, Michael Isaacs and Oscar Ramallo for Human 
Rights Watch as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, Thomas V. Loran III; Goodin, MacBride, Squeri & Day and Francine T. Radford 
for the 22 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Keker, Van Nest & Peters, Daniel Purcell, Maya Karwande, Divya Musinipally; and W. David Ball for Crime 
Survivors for Safety and Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Micaela Davis; Peter Eliasberg; David Loy; Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Robin B. Johansen and James C. Harrison 
for ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties and 
California law professors as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
University of San Francisco School of Law, Lara Bazelon; Columbia School of Law, Kellen R. Funk;  University of 
Georgia School of Law and Sandra G. Mayson for National Law Professors of Criminal, Procedural, and 
Constitutional Law as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
McDermott Will & Emery, A. Marisa Chun and Sarah P. Hogarth for the Bar Association of San Francisco, The Los 
Angeles County Bar Association and The Santa Clara County Bar Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
 
 
Todd W. Howeth and Michael C. McMahon for California Public Defenders Association and Public Defender of 
Ventura County as Amici Curiae on behalf of Peitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, J. Bradley Robertson, Candice L. Rucker, Rachel A. Conry and Kimberly M. 
Ingram for California Association of Pretrial Services, National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Pretrial 
Justice Institute and National Association for Public Defense as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kennth 
Humphrey. 
 
Emily Ludmir Aviad; Michael L. Pomeranz; Jonathan L. Marcus, Paul M. Kerlin and Ryan J. Travers for Faith 
Leaders and Organizations as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Venable, Alex M. Weingarten, Belinda M. Vega, Eric J. Blakewell, Matthew M. Gurvitz; and Robert M. Carlson for 
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, Mary B. McCord, Douglas N. Letter, Joshua A. Geltzer and 
Seth Wayne for current and former prosecutors and law enforcement officials as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey. 
 
George Gascón, District Attorney, Sharon L. Woo, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Wade K. Chow, Assistant 
Chief District Attorney, Allison G. Macbeth, Assistant District Attorney;  Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald 
A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit and 
Katie L. Stowe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent The People. 
 
Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Mark A. Amador, Linh Lam and Marissa A. Bejarano, Deputy District 
Attorneys for San Diego County District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent The People. 
 
Law Offices of Donald Kilmer, Donald Kilmer and Jessica Danielski for Crime Victims United Charitable 
Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent The People. 
 
Michael A. Ramos, District Attorney, and Brent J. Schultze, Deputy District Attorney, for District Attorney of San 
Bernardino County as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent The People. 
 
Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent The People. 
 
Albert W. Ramirez and Dale Christopher Miller for Golden State Bail Agents Association as Amicus Curiae. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Edward DuMont, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua Klein, Deputy State  Solicitor General, 
as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Daniel S. Volchok 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 
1875 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 
Washington, DC 20006 
(202) 663-6103 
 
Alec Karakatsanis 
Civil Rights Corps 
1601 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 800 
Washington, DC 20009 
(202) 844-4975 
 
Joshua A. Klein 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
1515 Clay Street, Suite 2000 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 879-0756