Title: Thompson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
Citation: 201 Kan. 296, 440 P.2d 548
Docket Number: 45,023
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 1968

201 Kan. 296 (1968)
440 P.2d 548
NAOMI F. THOMPSON, Appellant,
v.
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 45,023

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 11, 1968.
Lee R. Meador, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Jerry G. Elliott, of Wichita, argued the cause, and George B. Powers, John F. Eberhardt, Stuart R. Carter, Robert C. Foulston, Malcolm Miller, Robert N. Partridge, Robert M. Siefkin, Richard C. Harris, Gerald Sawatzky, Donald L. Cordes, Robert L. Howard, Charles J. Woodin, Mikel L. Stout, Benjamin C. Langel, Phillip S. Frick, John E. Foulston, and Stanley G. Andeel, all of Wichita, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, C.J.:
This is an action by a widow-beneficiary to recover the "double indemnity for accidental death" benefits under a life insurance policy.
Judgment was rendered for defendant insurance company, and plaintiff has appealed.
The insured was an employee of the Boeing Company in Wichita, and was insured under a group life insurance policy which provided for payment of double the amount of the policy in the event the insured met accidental death resulting 
An exclusionary clause of the policy provided there was no coverage for accidental death 
Following the death of insured the basic death benefits of the policy were paid to plaintiff. Payment of the double indemnity benefits was refused  hence this action.
On the evening in question the insured, upon returning to his home from work, ate a rather hurried meal  for he was to show a movie film at his church. About 7:15, while carrying his moving picture equipment through a side door of the church, he "bumped" his head on the door. He mentioned the matter to his son, who was with him. He went ahead and showed the film. About 8:30 he packed up his equipment and carried it back down stairs and across the street to his car. He remarked to his wife that he had bumped his head and that it ached terribly. While in the process of driving away from the church he collapsed at the wheel. His wife drove him to a hospital where he died about two hours later.
The pertinent portion of the death certificate stated 
The depositions of three physicians were taken, and their medical opinions as to the cause of death were 
One physician, who had treated the insured for an arteriosclerosis condition for several years was of the opinion the bump on the head was in no way connected with the cause of death  cerebral hemorrhage.
Another physician, after reviewing all of the evidence, stated there was no objective evidence that insured had sustained a trauma of any kind and that in his opinion insured died of a spontaneous hemorrhage not associated with trauma.
The other physician was of the opinion it was possible for there to have been a causal relationship between the bump on the head and the massive hemorrhage.
A pretrial conference was held on December 21, 1965, at which time defendant orally moved for summary judgment on the ground that notwithstanding the evidence of the one physician to the effect the bump on the head possibly precipitated the cerebral hemorrhage and ultimate death, recovery was precluded by reason of the exclusionary clause in the policy.
Following some discussion and argument of the matter the court did not rule on the motion but decided that additional medical evidence should be submitted. The matter was continued until *298 February 28, 1966, but no further action was taken until May 3, 1966. In the meantime, additional medical evidence  as above related  was obtained and the parties submitted briefs on the questions involved. The brief of defendant stated the question to be whether defendant was entitled to summary judgment in view of the fact the most favorable evidence to plaintiff  that of her own doctor  showed that the alleged blow on the head could not have caused death without the presence of an abnormal blood vessel and that the diseased blood vessel played the major part in the whole process. Plaintiff's brief agreed that the question as stated by defendant was the only question and concluded that the matter was a question of law to be determined by the court.
At the second pretrial conference on May 3, 1966, considerable discussion was had. Counsel for defendant stated that all of the evidence was before the court and that the court could weigh it and reach a decision. Counsel for plaintiff replied that the court could determine from the briefs the issues involved. The court inquired if the issue was whether the insured died as a result of accident or as the result of other causes  and both counsel answered in the affirmative. After further discussion the record then shows that counsel for defendant stated 
Counsel for plaintiff replied 
"Correct."
Counsel for defendant 
The court 
Counsel for defendant 
"That is right."
*299 Counsel for plaintiff 
The court 
Counsel for plaintiff 
"That is the whole question."
The court made the following order 
Judgment was rendered on May 27, 1966, and the journal entry thereof, after listing the evidence before the court, recited that counsel had announced and agreed that all of the evidence that would be produced by either the plaintiff or defendant, or both, was before the court, and that counsel had requested the court to study and decide the matter without the necessity of further proceedings  and concluded 
In her appeal plaintiff contends the court erred 
In other words, it is argued that under the pretrial order it was necessarily assumed that the insured suffered a blow on his head which precipitated the cerebral hemorrhage from which he died but that it would not have done so except for the pre-existing arteriosclerosis condition, leaving only the legal question whether *300 the exclusionary clause prevented recovery  whereas the court went ahead and decided the factual question on the merits. It is further contended that under the rule of Williams v. General A.F. &amp; L. Assurance Corp., 144 Kan. 755, 62 P.2d 856, and Williams v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 200 Kan. 51, 434 P.2d 765, the exclusionary clause would not bar recovery, and this court is urged to reverse the judgment with directions to enter judgment for the amount of accidental death benefits under the policy.
We construe the court's ruling "that the bump on the head did not cause death" as a finding that insured did not meet death through accidental means. As a practical matter, therefore, the question whether the exclusionary clause bars recovery is not reached, and becomes immaterial. That is  even though the case were returned to the trial court with directions to decide the question of the application of the exclusionary clause  which plaintiff contends was the only issue under the pretrial order  and assuming the court did hold the clause did not bar recovery  plaintiff would still be faced with the finding that insured did not meet death through accidental means.
We think, however, there is an additional reason why plaintiff's contentions may not be upheld. Conceding, for the sake of argument  that the pretrial order limited the question before the court to that of the exclusionary clause, and that in a strict technical sense the ultimate ruling of the court went beyond the literal scope of the order  the record in this case discloses clearly that both parties had introduced all of their evidence and in fact had submitted the entire matter for decision. Trial by jury had not been requested. As previously mentioned  when the court inquired if the issue was whether the insured died as a result of accident or as the result of other causes  counsel for plaintiff answered in the affirmative. He also agreed that the first question for determination was whether "the blow that everybody reports the plaintiff received at the side of his head had anything to do with his death."
Under K.S.A. 60-216 the pretrial order here, in effect, may be said to have superseded and replaced the pleadings. In Forster v. Fink, 195 Kan. 488, Syl. 2, 407 P.2d 523  following K.S.A. 60-215 (b), it was held that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. From the record it is clear that this entire case was submitted to the court for decision with the consent of both parties. The finding *301 by the trial court was fully supported by the medical evidence  and it is not contended otherwise. All parties appear to have had their day in court and we find nothing to require a reversal.
The judgment is affirmed.