Title: Spence v. Board of Zoning Appeals
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 970351
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 1998

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
GORDON SPENCE 
 
v.  Record No. 970351 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                       January 9, 1998 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS FOR 
THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in 
upholding a decision of a board of zoning appeals that authorized 
a variance from certain residential setback and parking space 
requirements. 
 
In 1989, Wayne Beagle purchased two lots in the Chesapeake 
Beach area of the City of Virginia Beach.  The lots, which were 
platted in 1928, are zoned for R-7.5 use under the zoning 
ordinance enacted by the City in 1988.  This residential use 
classification requires a minimum lot size of 7,500 square feet. 
 
The two lots contain a total of 4,011 square feet and 
constitute a triangular-shaped corner property that is subject to 
a 30-foot zoning setback requirement on two of its three sides.  
The parties agree that, due to the size and shape of the 
property, a residential structure cannot be built on the property 
unless a variance is obtained. 
 
Beagle, a real estate developer, purchased the lots knowing 
that their previous owner had been denied a variance to construct 
a single residence on the lots.  Beagle later applied to the 
Board of Zoning Appeals for the City of Virginia Beach (the 
Board) for a variance, submitting a site plan for a residential 
structure that conformed to the applicable lot coverage 
restrictions.  To build the structure, Beagle needed a front yard 
setback variance of 17 feet, a side yard setback variance of 17 
feet, and a reduction of parking space size.  The Board granted 
Beagle's variance application. 
 
Gordon Spence, alleging the status of an aggrieved property 
owner, petitioned the trial court for a writ of certiorari to 
review the Board's decision.  The trial court did not hear 
evidence, but based its decision solely on the record before the 
Board.  Affirming the Board's decision, the trial court ruled, 
among other things, that the evidence supported the Board's 
findings made under Code § 15.1-495.  Spence appeals from this 
decision. 
 
Spence argues that Beagle did not meet his burden of proving 
that he purchased the property in good faith because he acquired 
the property at a low price, knowing that it could not be 
developed without a variance.  Spence also contends that any 
hardship suffered by Beagle was self-inflicted, because he knew 
the property was nonconforming when he purchased it.  We disagree 
with Spence's arguments. 
 
A board of zoning appeals may grant a variance if such grant 
is not contrary to the public interest and if a literal 
enforcement of the zoning ordinance will result in unnecessary 
hardship to the property owner.  Code § 15.1-495(2).  The factors 
governing this process are further detailed in Code § 15.1-
495(2), which permits the granting of a variance 
 
 
[w]hen a property owner can show that his property 
was acquired in good faith and where by reason of the 
exceptional narrowness, shallowness, size or shape of a 
specific piece of property at the time of the effective 
date of the ordinance, . . . the strict application of 
the terms of the ordinance would effectively prohibit 
or unreasonably restrict the utilization of the 
property or where the board is satisfied, upon the 
evidence heard by it, that the granting of such 
variance will alleviate a clearly demonstrable hardship 
approaching confiscation, as distinguished from a 
special privilege or convenience sought by the 
applicant, provided that all variances shall be in 
harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of the 
ordinance. 
 
 
In addition, Code § 15.1-495(2) limits the authority of a 
board of zoning appeals to grant a variance by requiring that 
three specific findings be made before a variance is granted.  
The board must find that: (1) a strict application of the 
ordinance would result in an undue hardship to the property 
owner, (2) this hardship is not shared generally by properties in 
the same zoning district and the same vicinity, and (3) the 
variance will not result in substantial detriment to adjacent 
property and will not change the character of the zoning 
district.  Code § 15.1-495(2). 
 
On review before the trial court, the decision of a board of 
zoning appeals is presumed to be correct.  Steele v. Fluvanna 
County Board of Zoning Appeals, 246 Va. 502, 506, 436 S.E.2d 453, 
456 (1993); Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44, 
353 S.E.2d 727, 732-33 (1987).  The trial court's review is 
limited to a determination whether a board has applied erroneous 
principles of law or, when a board's discretion is involved, 
whether the decision is plainly wrong and in violation of the 
purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance.  Id.; Packer v. 
Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 120, 267 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1980); Alleghany 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 217 Va. 64, 67, 225 
S.E.2d 383, 385 (1976). 
 
We first hold that Beagle's purchase of the property at a 
low price with the intent to seek a variance does not constitute 
an absence of "good faith," as that term is used in Code § 15.1-
495(2).  The very purpose of the statute is to afford any 
property owner an opportunity to seek a variance when a strict 
application of the zoning ordinance would effectively prohibit or 
unreasonably restrict the owner's use of the property, or would 
cause a demonstrable hardship approaching confiscation of the 
property.  See Code § 15.1-495(2).  The purchase price of the 
property is irrelevant to this consideration. 
 
Likewise, Beagle's knowledge that the previous owner of the 
property had been denied a variance does not affect his "good 
faith" status under the statute.  A board of zoning appeals' 
decision whether to grant a variance must be exercised with 
regard to the particular facts of an application, including the 
precise extent of the relief sought.  See Board of Zoning Appeals 
v. Fowler, 201 Va. 942, 947-48, 114 S.E.2d 753, 757-58 (1960); 
Azalea Corp. v. City of Richmond, 201 Va. 636, 640, 112 S.E.2d 
862, 865 (1960); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Combs, 200 Va. 471, 
475, 106 S.E.2d 755, 758 (1959).  While the denial of a prior 
application may be a relevant consideration regarding the extent 
of relief that is appropriate, nothing in the language of Code 
§ 15.1-495(2) precludes a property owner from seeking a variance 
when a prior application has been denied. 
 
Spence next argues that since Beagle purchased the property 
knowing that he needed a variance to build a house, the mere fact 
of his purchase constitutes a self-inflicted hardship that bars 
him from obtaining a variance.  We reject this argument because, 
under Spence's analysis, nonconforming property could never be 
developed by obtaining a variance after the property is sold and, 
therefore, Code § 15.1-495(2) would be rendered meaningless with 
regard to such property.  No language in Code § 15.1-495(2) 
supports this result. 
 
Nevertheless, Spence argues that three of our decisions 
compel a conclusion that Beagle's hardship is self-inflicted.  
His reliance on these decisions is misplaced because each of 
those cases involved property owners who had acted in violation 
of applicable zoning ordinances.  In Steele v. Fluvanna County 
Board of Supervisors, 246 Va. 502, 436 S.E.2d 453, we held that 
the construction of a house in violation of side yard setback 
requirements, although done inadvertently, was a self-inflicted 
hardship.  We stated that "a self-inflicted hardship, whether 
deliberately or ignorantly incurred, provides no basis for the 
granting of a variance."  246 Va. at 507, 436 S.E.2d at 457. 
 
In Alleghany Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 
217 Va. 64, 225 S.E.2d 383, a property owner sought a variance to 
allow use of his property as an automobile sales lot.  The 
property was zoned for residential use but was located adjacent 
to the owner's motor vehicle business.  We held that any hardship 
the property owner suffered was self-inflicted because, after 
purchasing property zoned for residential use, he violated the 
zoning ordinance by using the property for purposes not allowed 
in that land use classification.  217 Va. at 68-69, 225 S.E.2d at 
386. 
 
In Board of Zoning Appeals v. Combs, 200 Va. 471, 106 S.E.2d 
755, we reinstated a board of zoning appeals' decision denying an 
occupancy permit to a property owner who had constructed an 
apartment over an existing garage in violation of a zoning 
ordinance.  We held that any hardship the owner suffered was 
self-inflicted.  200 Va. at 477, 106 S.E.2d at 759. 
 
Unlike the property owners in Steele, Alleghany, and Combs, 
Beagle did not violate a zoning ordinance provision and then seek 
relief from the consequences of that unlawful act.  Instead, 
Beagle followed the procedures prescribed by Code § 15.1-495(2) 
and the City's zoning ordinance to obtain a variance before 
attempting to use the property.  Beagle did not create his own 
hardship but only sought relief allowed by Code § 15.1-495(2) 
based on the configuration and the physical characteristics of 
his property.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err 
in upholding the Board's decision. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
 
Affirmed.