Title: State v. Sua
Citation: 987 P.2d 959
Docket Number: 21480
State: Hawaii
Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 1999

987 P.2d 959 (1999) 92 Hawai`i 61 STATE of Hawai`i, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Alomalietoa SUA, Respondent-Appellant. No. 21480. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. October 28, 1999. As Amended November 8, 1999. *961 Bryan K. Sano, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for the petitioner-appellee State of Hawai`i on the writ. MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and RAMIL, JJ. Opinion of the Court by LEVINSON, J. The petitioner-appellee State of Hawai`i applies to this court for a writ of certiorari to review the opinion by the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Sua, 92 Hawai`i 78, 987 P.2d 976 (Haw.Ct.App.1999) [hereinafter, the "ICA's opinion"], vacating the first circuit court's judgment, guilty conviction, and sentence, filed on March 9, 1998, and remanding the case for a new trial. The prosecution argues that the ICA should not have held that the respondent-appellant Alomalietoa Sua's right to confrontation was violated at trial. Specifically, the prosecution suggests that the ICA erred in holding that "receipt of a witness's grand jury testimony under the past recollection recorded exception to the rule against hearsay at the criminal trial of [Sua] violated the right of confrontation guaranteed him by the Hawai`i Constitution." ICA at 78, 987 P.2d at 976. We agree with the prosecution that the ICA's holding was erroneous. In contrast to the ICA's opinion, we hold that, under certain circumstances, receipt of grand jury testimony pursuant to a firmly rooted exception to the general rule against hearsay may adequately preserve a defendant's right of cross-examination. We leave undisturbed the ICA's holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's guilty verdict. Furthermore, we hold that the Sua's remaining points of error on appeal are without merit. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA's opinion and affirm the trial court's judgment, guilty conviction, and sentence, filed on March 9, 1998. Jonah Gooman's grandmother owned two rental units in a building in Waipahu, located in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai`i. Sometime during the week prior to June 18, 1996, Sua contacted Gooman and asked him for a refund of deposit money relating to a rental unit that Sua's brother had recently vacated. Gooman explained to Sua that he knew nothing about the deposit money. *962 On June 18, 1996, Gooman was driving an automobile in which Sua, Cory Kaowili, and Trent Puahi were the passengers. All four had known each other since elementary school. While Gooman was driving, Sua again demanded the deposit money. When Gooman stopped the car and looked back, he noticed that Sua was "fiddling with a gun." Sua continued to demand money and then struck Gooman in the head with the butt of the gun. Kaowili gave Sua approximately $120.00 in the hopes that Sua would "back off." Sua then exited the car. On July 23, 1997, the grand jury returned an indictment against Sua, charging him with robbery in the first degree, pursuant to Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-840(1)(b) (1993),[2] in connection with the foregoing events. On December 24, 1997, during Sua's trial, Kaowili testified in relevant part as follows: When Puahi took the witness stand, he testified in relevant part as follows: Gooman testified in relevant part as follows: At this point, the prosecution offered Gooman's grand jury transcript into evidence. Sua objected on the ground that he had not *964 been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine Gooman regarding the substance of Gooman's grand jury testimony. On December 26, 1997, the circuit court allowed Gooman's grand jury testimony to be read to the jury, pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 802.1(4) (1993).[3] Following the reading of his grand jury testimony, Gooman testified further in relevant part as follows: Gooman proceeded to testify that he had gone to the hospital emergency room on June 18, 1996 and that he remembered a lot of police officers coming to his house on that date. Gooman testified that he was unable to remember anything else about the alleged incident. The prosecution's final witness, Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Detective Derek Shimatsu, testified as follows regarding telephone conversations in which he had engaged with Puahi and Kaowili: Sua objected to Shimatsu's testimony on the ground that he had been unable to cross-examine Kaowili and Puahi regarding this subject matter. The trial court admitted Shimatsu's testimony over Sua's objection. Shimatsu also testified as follows regarding a meeting he had had with Gooman: Sua did not object to this testimony. During jury deliberations, the trial court received the following question from the jury: "Is it robbery if one person wants another person to get owed money from another?" Sua requested that the following response be given: "If one person wants another person to get owed money from another, this shows a lack of intent to commit robbery." The trial court instead responded, "Please refer to jury instructions previously given to you." On December 30, 1997, the jury found Sua guilty as charged. On March 9, 1998, the trial court filed its judgment, guilty conviction, and sentence. Sua filed a timely notice of appeal on April 7, 1998. In his opening brief, Sua argued: (1) that the trial court admitted various prior statements of Gooman, Kaowili, and Puahi, in violation of the Hawai`i Rules of Evidence; (2) that the trial court committed plain error in not providing the jury with an instruction regarding ignorance or mistake of fact; and (3) that the jury's guilty verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. On August 30, 1999, the ICA vacated the trial court's judgment, guilty conviction, and *966 sentence. ICA at 98, 987 P.2d at 996. The ICA's pivotal holding declared Id. at 98, 987 P.2d at 996. The ICA noted that, inasmuch as "the grand jury procedure is primarily intended to facilitate the government's interest in obtaining an indictment[,]... a hearsay exception for grand jury testimony cannot be said to substantively preserve [Sua's] right of cross-examination." Id. at 89, 987 P.2d at 987. The ICA also held that Sua's "assertions that the [trial] court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and that the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence must be rejected." Id. at 97, 987 P.2d at 995. The ICA noted that Gooman's testimony regarding the photographic lineup alone "would have enabled a person of reasonable caution to conclude [that Sua] was guilty." Id. at 98, 987 P.2d at 996. On September 23, 1999, the prosecution filed the present timely application for a writ of certiorari. State v. Lee, 83 Hawai`i 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996). Whether the prosecution has made a showing that a statement bears "adequate indicia of reliability"for the purposes of satisfying the confrontation clauses of the United States and Hawai`i Constitutionsis, under one of two available modes of analysis, a question of law, involving a determination whether the statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." See Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 275, 925 P.2d at 1099 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980)). We review a question of law under the right/wrong standard. State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai`i 351, 355, 884 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (citing In re Estate of Holt, 75 Haw. 224, 857 P.2d 1355 (1993)). Pursuing the second mode of analysis, we ask whether the prosecution has made a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 275, 925 P.2d at 1099 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). The evaluation of a statement's trustworthiness is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Christian, 88 Hawai`i 407, 418, 967 *967 P.2d 239, 250 (1998) (applying abuse of discretion standard to assessment of whether "corroborating circumstances" rose to level of clearly indicating a statement's trustworthiness); State v. Swier, 66 Haw. 448, 450, 666 P.2d 169, 170 (1983) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court's evaluation of trustworthiness of witness' statement); State v. Osborne, 982 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Mont. 1999) (noting that admissibility of evidence examined for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" falls within the discretion of trial judge). State v. Staley, 91 Hawai`i 275, 281-82, 982 P.2d 904, 910-11 (1999) (quoting State v. Mattiello, 90 Hawai`i 255, 259, 978 P.2d 693, 697 (1999) (quoting State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai`i 85, 90, 976 P.2d 399, 404 (1999) (quoting State v. Lee, 90 Hawai`i 130, 134, 976 P.2d 444, 448, reconsideration denied (1999) (quoting State v. Bautista, 86 Hawai`i 207, 210, 948 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1997))))) (brackets in original). Staley, at 282, 982 P.2d at 911 (quoting State v. Maumalanga, 90 Hawai`i 58, 63, 976 P.2d 372, 377 (1998), reconsideration denied (1999) (quoting State v. Davia, 87 Hawai`i 249, 253, 953 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1998))). State v. Cabrera, 90 Hawai`i 359, 364-65, 978 P.2d 797, 802-03 (1999) (quoting Maumalanga, 90 Hawai`i at 62-63, 976 P.2d at 376-77 (quoting State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997))) (brackets and ellipsis points in original). The prosecution argues that "there was no violation of [Sua's] confrontation rights as Gooman's grand jury testimony was properly admitted into evidence after the [prosecution] had established the requisite foundation for the past recollection recorded hearsay exception." While we disagree with the bright line rule implied by the prosecution's argument, we agree with the prosecution's conclusion that Sua's constitutional right of confrontation was not violated. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution (1978)[4] guarantee an accused the right to confront adverse witnesses. "The right of confrontation affords the accused both the opportunity to challenge the credibility and veracity of the prosecution's witnesses and an occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of those witnesses." State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 360, 845 P.2d 547, 555 (1993) (citing State v. Rodrigues, 7 Haw.App. 80, 84, 742 P.2d 986, 989 (1987)). "Thus, chief among the interests secured by the confrontation clause is the right to cross-examine one's accuser." State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai`i 148, 155, 871 P.2d 782, 789 (1994) (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531). There is no right, however, to "cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559, 108 S. Ct. 838, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1987) (citations and internal quotation signals omitted)). We have noted that "[t]he inherent unreliability of hearsay statements raises special problems within the context of a criminal case[,] since the out-of-court declaration also involves a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine and confront the witnesses against him." State v. Hoffman, 73 Haw. 41, 47, 828 P.2d 805, 809 (1992) (quoting Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 644 (Alaska 1977)). State v. Apilando, 79 Hawai`i 128, 131-32, 900 P.2d 135, 138-39 (1995) (brackets in original). We have noted that, "[w]hile a literal interpretation of the confrontation clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected that view as `unintended and too extreme.'" State v. Moore, 82 Hawai`i 202, 223, 921 P.2d 122, 143 (1996) (quoting McGriff, 76 Hawai`i at 156, 871 P.2d at 790 (citation omitted)). Accordingly, while we have repeatedly recognized the importance of the right of confrontation, we have nonetheless held that a declarant's hearsay may be admitted at trial even though the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. See, e.g., Moore, 82 Hawai`i at 225, 921 P.2d at 145 (holding that admission of former testimony given at a supervised release hearing did not violate defendant's right of confrontation). This court has repeatedly followed the test established in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S. Ct. 2531, recognizing that Moore, 82 Hawai`i at 223, 921 P.2d at 143. As regards the first part of the Roberts test, we have "remained resolute that[,] under the confrontation clause of the Hawai`i Constitution, a showing of the declarant's unavailability is necessary to promote the integrity of the fact finding process and to ensure fairness to defendants." Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 276, 925 P.2d at 1100 (quoting Apilando, 79 Hawai`i at 133, 900 P.2d at 140 (quoting McGriff, 76 Hawai`i at 156, 871 P.2d at 790)) (brackets in original). "Unavailability may be demonstrated by a showing of ... loss of memory[.]" Apilando, 79 Hawai`i at 137, 900 P.2d at 144 (citing Tsuruda v. Farm, 18 Haw. 434, 438 (1907)) (emphasis in original). Upon demonstrating that a witness is unavailable, under the second half of the Roberts test, only statements that bear "adequate indicia of reliability" may be admitted into evidence. "Reliability" may be shown in two ways. First, reliability may be inferred without more if it "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception[.]" Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 556 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). The hearsay exception for past recorded recollections "is clearly a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Hatch v. State, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 (10th Cir.1995); see also In re Subpoena of Drake, 786 F. Supp. 229, 234 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (noting that exception for past recollection recorded is "one of the `firmly rooted' hearsay exceptions"); accord United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 42-43 (1st Cir.1986) (noting that courts accept hearsay exception for recorded recollection despite confrontation clause challenges). Application of the exception for past recollection recorded, therefore, "does not involve any deprivation of the right of confrontation as the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted and construed." United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir. 1965). Alternatively, reliability may be demonstrated "upon a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 556 (quoting Roberts, *970 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). The United States Supreme Court has declined "to endorse a mechanical test for determining `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' under the [Confrontation] Clause." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1990). Instead, the Court has determined that "`particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' must be shown from the totality of the circumstances" and that "the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." Id. at 819, 110 S. Ct. 3139. We note that other jurisdictions have developed loose guidelines for determining whether grand jury testimony is supported by guarantees of trustworthiness, including, inter alia: whether the testimony was given under oath, see United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S. Ct. 851, 139 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1998); whether the declarant recanted his or her inculpatory declaration or expressed belated views as to its accuracy, see id.; the relationship between the declarant and the defendant, see id.; whether the declarant testified before the grand jury voluntarily, see United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1038 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281, 117 S. Ct. 2468, 138 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1997); whether the declarant testified from person knowledge, see id.; and the relationship of the declarant to the government, see id. Cf. Geraci v. Senkowski, 23 F. Supp. 2d 246, 263 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (concluding that a witness' grand jury testimony exhibited particularized guarantees of trustworthiness where the witness gave testimony under oath, had personal knowledge of the facts, was a witness to the incident, and had a long-term acquaintance with both the victim and the defendant); State v. Lincoln, 71 Haw. 274, 279-80, 789 P.2d 497, 500 (1990) (citing United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir.1982), for the following test for determining whether grand jury testimony possesses "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness": "the trial court should consider the declarant's relationship with both the defendant and the government, the declarant's motivation to testify before the grand jury, the extent to which the testimony reflects the declarant's personal knowledge, whether the declarant has ever recanted the testimony, and the existence of corroborating evidence available for cross-examination"[5] (emphases omitted)). In the instant matter, the ICA noted, and the prosecution does not contest in its application, that Gooman's grand jury testimony constituted hearsay, pursuant to HRE Rule 801 (1993).[6] ICA at 84, 987 P.2d at 982. The ICA also properly observed that Gooman's grand jury transcript satisfied the foundational requirements of HRE Rule 802.1(4),[7]see supra note 3, and thereby qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule. ICA at 84, 987 P.2d at 982. *971 The first prong of the Roberts test was satisfied in the present case. Although he was present at trial, Gooman was unable to recollect any substantive elements of his grand jury testimony and, therefore, was "unavailable" by virtue of his loss of memory. See Apilando, 79 Hawai`i at 137, 900 P.2d at 144. The second prong of the Roberts analysis, once unavailability has been demonstrated, focuses upon the reliability of the witness' statement. Inasmuch as Gooman's grand jury testimony falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," as "past recollection recorded," and therefore bears an adequate indicia of reliability, see Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 556, the testimony should satisfy the confrontation clause. Accordingly, the traditional inquiry as to whether the testimony bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" need not necessarily be undertaken. See, e.g., McGriff, 76 Hawai`i at 156-58, 871 P.2d at 790-92 (holding that a hearsay statement did not violate the confrontation clause because it fell within the "firmly rooted" co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Jenkins, 168 Wis.2d 175, 483 N.W.2d 262, 272 (Ct.App. 1992) (holding that, where a defendant's out-of-court declaration satisfied the requirements of the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule, the confrontation clause was not violated because the hearsay exception was firmly rooted). We have held, however, "that the mechanistic application of the hearsay exceptions is inappropriate." Lincoln, 71 Haw. at 280, 789 P.2d at 500 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973)). Accordingly, to ensure the highest standard of protection of Sua's constitutional right of confrontation,[8] we analyze whether Gooman's grand jury testimony bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." In so doing, we depart from the analysis set forth in the ICA's opinion, in which, inter alia, the ICA held that, inasmuch as "the grand jury procedure is primarily intended to facilitate the government's interest in obtaining an indictment," a hearsay exception for grand jury testimony cannot preserve a defendant's right to confrontation. ICA at 89, 987 P.2d at 987. We regard the ICA's holding as overstating the proposition. We agree that "grand jury proceedings differ markedly from the typical preliminary hearing or trial," particularly inasmuch as grand jury proceedings are ex parte investigations, in the course of which (1) the prosecution may elicit hearsay and adduce scripted testimony and (2) the defense attorney may not appear or engage in cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses. ICA at 88-89, 987 P.2d at 986-87; see also State v. Chong, 86 Hawai`i 282, 289-90, 949 P.2d 122, 129-30 (1997). We do not believe, however, that the character of the grand jury is such that all testimony presented therein is necessarily suspect. This court has long recognized the important role that the grand jury plays in our criminal justice system: "[t]he grand jury functions as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges and serves as a `shield against arbitrary or oppressive action, by insuring that serious criminal accusations will be brought only upon the considered judgment of a representative body of citizens acting under oath and under judicial instruction and guidance.'" State v. Kahlbaun, 64 Haw. 197, 203, 638 P.2d 309, 315 (1981) (quoting United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 48 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1976)). We agree with the observation made by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: McHan, 101 F.3d at 1038 (some brackets added and some in original). Accordingly, we review Gooman's grand jury testimony to ascertain whether it bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." While there is no "mechanical test" for determining whether a statement possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," see Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 110 S. Ct. 3139, we believe, in this case, that Gooman's grand jury testimony was supported by numerous guarantees, which, taken together, satisfy the second prong of the Roberts test. First, we note that Gooman's grand jury testimony was given under oath. Second, as the victim, Gooman had direct personal knowledge of the relevant facts. Third, Gooman exhibited no reluctance in the grand jury proceeding to implicate Sua. Fourth, Gooman bore no relationship to the government that would have benefitted him to testify against Sua. Finally, Gooman never recanted his inculpatory testimony or expressed belated views regarding its accuracy; in fact, at Sua's trial, Gooman testified that he was able to testify at the grand jury "fully and accurately." Given these indicia of trustworthiness, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Gooman's grand jury testimony into evidence. The circumstances of Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56 (D.C.1994), are analogous to those of the instant matter.[9] In Carey, a witness testified before the grand jury that she had made a statement to the police on the night of a murder. Id. at 57. The witness' statement to the police was then read to the grand jury, and the witness affirmed that it was true. Id. at 57. At the defendant's trial, however, the witness testified that she was unable to remember either what had happened on the night of the murder or whether she had given a statement to the police or had testified before the grand jury. Id. at 57-58. The trial court permitted the prosecution to read to the jury, as past recollection recorded, that portion of the witness' grand jury testimony which had incorporated her statement to the police. Id. at 58. Reviewing the defendant's argument that his right of confrontation right was violated *973 by the admission of the witness' police statement through her grand jury testimony, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals observed: Id. at 59; cf. People v. Chavies, 234 Mich. App. 274, 593 N.W.2d 655, 659 (1999) (concluding that, although witnesses claimed to remember nothing at trial, inasmuch as their grand jury testimony constituted prior inconsistent statement, the grand jury testimony did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation). Similarly, in the present matter, Gooman made assertions before the grand jury and later claimed a loss of memory at trial. Sua was provided with the opportunity to cross-examine Gooman regarding his loss of memory. Inasmuch as Gooman's grand jury testimony met both requirements of the Roberts test, and Sua was able to cross-examine Gooman regarding his failure to remember the alleged incident, we cannot say that the admission of Gooman's grand jury testimony violated Sua's right to confrontation. We agree with the ICA's determination that evidence regarding Gooman's prior identification of Sua was properly admitted into evidence. ICA at 93, 987 P.2d at 991. We likewise agree with the ICA's conclusion that Gooman's handwritten statement on the bottom of the identification form, which read "Alo Sua demanded money from me and hit me with a gun," did not meet the foundational requirements of HRE Rule 802.1(3), see supra note 3. See ICA at 93, 987 P.2d at 991. Nonetheless, we hold that the Gooman's right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of testimony regarding Gooman's handwritten statement on the identification form. Gooman's statement on the identification form satisfies the requirements of HRE Rule 802.1(4), see supra note 3, i.e., the hearsay exception for past recollection recorded. Gooman wrote the statement himself, indicating that he "once had knowledge" of the information contained therein. Gooman signed the statement, thereby adopting it as his own. Inasmuch as the statement was made less than a month after the incident, we may fairly infer that it was given when the events were still "fresh in his memory." Finally, Gooman testified at trial that he was unable to remember writing the statement. Under these circumstances, the foundational requirements of HRE Rule 802.1(4) were met. As above, we apply the Roberts test to determine whether the admission of Gooman's statement on the identification form violated Sua's constitutional right of confrontation. We note that Gooman's loss of memory rendered him "unavailable" for purposes of the first prong of the Roberts test. See Apilando, 79 Hawai`i at 137, 900 P.2d at 144. We further note that the statement bears an adequate indicia of reliability, inasmuch as it "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception[.]" Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 556. Again, to ensure the highest standard of protection of Sua's rights under the confrontation clause, we engage in an analysis of whether Gooman's statement on the identification form exhibits "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 275, 925 P.2d at 1099 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). We believe that the statement is supported by *974 sufficient guarantees to satisfy the second prong of the Roberts test. First, Gooman signed the identification form, thereby adopting the statements contained therein as his own. Second, he possessed had direct personal knowledge of the relevant facts. Third, he drafted the inculpatory statement in his own words and handwriting. Fourth, he stood in no relationship to the government that would have benefitted him falsely to implicate Sua. Finally, he never recanted his inculpatory statement or expressed belated views regarding its accuracy. Given these indicia of trustworthiness, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Gooman's statement was imbued with particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Accordingly, we hold that Sua's right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of testimony regarding Gooman's statement on the identification form. Sua argues that he was denied his right to effective cross-examination because allegedly prior inconsistent statements of Kaowili and Puahi were introduced into evidence via the testimony of Detective Shimatsu. We disagree. HRE Rule 802.1(1)(C), see supra note 3, delineates the prerequisites for admitting the prior inconsistent statements of witnesses into evidence. Kaowili testified at trial (1) that he never spoke with a police detective regarding the alleged incident, (2) that he never told a detective that he was riding in a car with Puahi, Gooman, and Sua on the night of the alleged incident, and (3) that he never told a police detective that he gave Sua money after Sua hit Gooman with a gun. Puahi testified at trial that he could not remember whether he had spoken with a police detective, but that he never told a police detective (1) that he was traveling in Waipahu with Kaowili on the night of the alleged incident, (2) that they met up with Sua, and (3) that, when he returned from going to the bathroom, Gooman had been hit on the head by Sua. We agree with the ICA's determination that these statements by Kaowili and Puahi were inconsistent with their prior statements to Shimatsu. See ICA at 96, 987 P.2d at 994. The ICA noted, however, that Id. at 96-97, 987 P.2d at 994-95 (ellipsis points in original) (some brackets added and some in original). As the ICA recognized, however, Sua did not raise any objection, based on foundational grounds, to Shimatsu's testimony regarding Kaowili's and Puahi's recorded statements. Moreover, Sua's counsel himself conceded the existence of a "telephone recorded statement" given by Kaowili and a "transcribed statement" taken of Puahi. It appears that Sua has waived the issue of whether Kaowili's and Puahi's prior inconsistent statements were properly recorded, pursuant to the requirement of HRE Rule 802.1(1)(C), thereby rendering them admissible at trial. "[T]he rule is well settled that evidence[,] even though incompetent, if admitted without objection or motion to strike, is to be given the same probative force as that to which it would be entitled if it were competent." State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 410, 910 P.2d 695, 723 (1996) (citation and internal quotation signals omitted). Inasmuch as Sua failed to object at trial to the admission of Kaowili's and Puahi's prior inconsistent statements on the ground that they were not recorded in a substantially verbatim fashion and inasmuch as Sua's counsel appeared to concede the fact that the statements had been recorded we hold *975 that the statements were properly admitted pursuant to HRE Rule 802.1(1)(C). We therefore proceed to Sua's claim that his right of confrontation was violated by the admission of Kaowili's and Puahi's prior inconsistent statements. Regarding HRE Rule 802.1, this court has stated: State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 294, 926 P.2d 194, 199 (1996) (quoting State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 136, 913 P.2d 57, 62 (1996) (citing commentary to HRE Rule 802.1)) (brackets and ellipsis points in original). Both Kaowili and Puahi were cross-examined with respect to their prior inconsistent statements to Shimatsu. It therefore follows that the substantive use of these statements did not infringe upon Sua's right of confrontation. Sua relies on State v. Canady, 80 Hawai`i 469, 911 P.2d 104 (App.1996), for the assertion that "a witness that is unable to recall the events allegedly described in the prior statement does not satisfy the requirements of HRE Rule 802.1[,] and therefore the prior statement would not be admissible." In Canady, the complaining witness "testified that she could not recall the events that she allegedly described in the statement." 80 Hawai`i at 481, 911 P.2d at 116. In the present matter, Kaowili and Puahi denied ever having made the relevant statements to the detective. Therefore, unlike the witness in Canady, who was rendered "unavailable" by virtue of her memory loss, Kaowili and Puahi were both "available" for cross-examination. Accordingly, while we agree with Sua's reading of Canady, it is inapposite to the present matter. Sua urges that the trial court committed plain error in not instructing the jury regarding the defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. Specifically, Sua contends that he "believed that he was entitled to a sum of money from the complaining witnesses or the complaining witnesses['] help in obtaining the sum of money." The proposed defense appears to be, therefore, that Sua did not intend to compel Gooman's acquiescence to the taking of money, but simply intended to elicit help from Gooman in collecting deposit money from Gooman's mother. The ICA declined to address this contention. ICA at 97, 987 P.2d at 995. Inasmuch as the record contained no evidence supporting Sua's proposed defense, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury regarding the defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. State v. Cabrera, 90 Hawai`i 359, 370, 978 P.2d 797, 808 (1999) (some brackets added and some in original). Sua fails to point to any evidence in the record regarding facts about which Sua might have been mistaken or ignorant.[10] There is no evidence suggesting that Sua merely intended to elicit Gooman's assistance in obtaining money from a third party. Indeed, the evidence adduced at trial reflects that Sua demanded money of Gooman, compelling the inference that Sua intended to obtain control over the property of another. Sua's suggestion that he believed himself to be the rightful owner of Gooman's money did not entitle him to a jury instruction regarding such a belief, inasmuch as the "claim of right" defense does not apply in a prosecution for robbery. See State v. McMillen, 83 Hawai`i 264, 266-67, 925 P.2d 1088, 1090-91 (1996) (noting that "[t]he proposition that a claim of right negates the felonious intent in robbery `not only is lacking in sound reason and logic, but it is utterly incompatible with and has no place in an ordered and orderly society such as ours, which eschews self-help through violence'" (quoting People v. Hodges, 113 A.D.2d 514, 496 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74 (1985) (citation omitted))). Accordingly, we hold that Sua was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. The ICA held, and the prosecution understandably does not contest in its application, that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. ICA at 98, 987 P.2d at 996. In this regard, inasmuch as the ICA's holding is uncontested, we leave it undisturbed. Based on the foregoing reasoning, we reverse the ICA's opinion and affirm the trial court's judgment, guilty conviction, and sentence, filed on March 9, 1998. [1] This summary is compiled from the grand jury testimony of Jonah Gooman, taken on July 23, 1997. [2] HRS § 708-840 provides in relevant part: Robbery in the first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree if, in the course of committing theft: .... (b) The person is armed with a dangerous instrument and: (i) The person uses force against the person of anyone present with intent to overcome that person's physical resistance or physical power of resistance; or (ii) The person threatens the imminent use of force against the person of anyone who is present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property. [3] HRE Rule 802.1 provides in relevant part: Hearsay exception; prior statements by witnesses. The following statements previously made by witnesses who testify at the trial or hearing are not excluded by the hearsay rule: (1) Inconsistent statement. The declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the declarant's statement, the statement is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, the statement is offered in compliance with rule 613(b), and the statement was: ... (C) Recorded in a substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other means contemporaneously with the making of the statement; ... (3) Prior identification. The declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement, and the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving that person; or (4) Past recollection recorded. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which the witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. [4] Article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution provides in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against the accused[.]" The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution is virtually identical. [5] We note that, since this court's decision in Lincoln, the United States Supreme Court has held that corroborating evidence may not be used to support a hearsay statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Wright, 497 U.S. at 822-24, 110 S. Ct. 3139. In Wright, the Court noted that the use of corroborating evidence for such a purpose "would permit the admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility." 497 U.S. at 823, 110 S. Ct. 3139. [6] As we have indicated above, HRE 801 defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." HRE 801 defines "statement" in relevant part as "an oral or written assertion." [7] Other jurisdictions have held that grand jury testimony may be admitted as "past recollection recorded." See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 678 F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir.1982) (noting that "admission into evidence of portions of grand jury testimony as past recollection is proper use of such testimony"); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 67 (3d Cir.1965) (observing that, where grand jury testimony fails to refresh the memory of a witness, it is received as evidence of past recollection recorded); but see Commonwealth v. Fryar, 414 Mass. 732, 610 N.E.2d 903, 912 (1993) (ruling that grand jury testimony not admissible as past recollection recorded where witness did not adopt the grand jury testimony as being accurate at or about the time of the events). [8] Although Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, suggests that the existence of a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" alone is sufficient to satisfy the "adequate indicia of reliability" test, this court will not hesitate to extend the protections of the Hawai`i Constitution beyond federal standards. See, e.g., State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 42, 960 P.2d 1227, 1250 (1998); Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 130 n. 3, 938 P.2d at 561 n. 3 (1997); Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 28, 928 P.2d at 870; State v. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 453-54, 865 P.2d 150, 154 (1994); State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 67 n. 2, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 n. 2 (1992). [9] In our view, the ICA's reliance on State v. Woods, 48 Ohio App.3d 1, 548 N.E.2d 954 (1988), is misplaced. In Woods, the prosecution sought to introduce the out-of-court statement of a witness who "declined to respond to questions posed with respect to his grand jury testimony on direct examination and declared that he would not answer questions on cross-examination." Id. at 959. In fact, on cross-examination, the witness "refused to verify the truth of his grand jury testimony or to respond to questions regarding the substance of the testimony, and ultimately declined to respond further." Id. at 958. On appeal, the Woods court held that the admission of the witness' grand jury testimony violated the defendant's right to confrontation. The scenario presented in Woodsin which the defendant refused to answer any questions regarding his grand jury testimonyis inapposite to the present case. First, the hearsay statements of the witness in Woods did not qualify as past recollection recorded and did not fall into any other "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Second, inasmuch as the witness in Woods refused to confirm the truth of his grand jury testimony, or even to admit that he testified before the grand jury at all, his grand jury testimony lacked the "particularized guarantees of truthfulness" that are present in the instant matter and that we have enumerated above. [10] We note that Sua does not claim mistake of law and that, in any case, a "mistaken belief by the defendant that the defendant's conduct is not legally prohibited by the penal law ... must, in most instances, be held ... [to] afford no excuse[.]" Commentary to HRS § 702-220 (1993).