Title: McGUIRE v NELSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12216
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 1973

No, 12216 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1973 DOUGLAS R . McGUIRE, Plaintiff and Respondent, HOWARD NELSON, d / b / a HARMONY HOUSE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W . W. Lessley , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Bennett and Bennett, Bozemn, Montana Lyman H, Bennett 111 argued, and Lyman Bennett, Jr. appeared, Bozeman, Montana Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana Page Wellcome appeared, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, Montana Richard Anderson argued, Billings, Montana - - - Submitted: January 24, 1973 M r , J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from judgment entered on a jury verdict i n the d i s t r i c t court of the eighteenth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Gallatin. The jury returned a verdict i n the amount of $45,000 i n favor of p l a i n t i f f . After denial of defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l , defendant appealed the f i n a l judgment and order denying a new t r i a l , P l a i n t i f f brought the action t o recover damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s sustained i n a motorcycle accident which occurred on July 5, 1970. Defendant Howard Nelson, d/b/a Harmony House, i s an authorized Honda dealer. P l a i n t i f f purchased a used 1966 Honda T r a i l 90 motorcycle from a friend i n April 1970. The front t i r e of the Honda was badly worn so p l a i n t i f f desired t o replace it. Since p l a i n t i f f was working f u l l time during the day and a s a musician a t night, he sent h i s g i r l friend, now h i s wife, Sherrie Johnson McGuire, t o Harmony House t o purchase the new t i r e . He instructed her t o ask f o r a t i r e f o r a "1966 Honda T r a i l Bike go'', Sherrie con- tended she went t o Harmony House and purchased a tire, although defendant and h i s employees denied s e l l i n g her any t i r e , Plain- t i f f ' s witnesses placed her near the s t o r e with a t i r e a t the time of the alleged purchase. She t e s t i f i e d she specified a t i r e "for a 1966 T r a i l Bike Honda 90". Allegedly, an employee of Harmony then checked some catalogs, conversed with other employees, and then brought out a t i r e from the back room and sold it t o her. She took the t i r e t o the s t o r e where p l a i n t i f f worked and placed the t i r e i n h i s car. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t a day or two l a t e r he took the t i r e and motorcycle t o a service s t a t i o n t o have the t i r e mounted. However, the owner of the service s t a t i o n contended p l a i n t i f f could n o t have had the t i r e mounted a t h i s s t a t i o n because he had a s e t policy not t o mount motorcycle t i r e s . Further, he did n o t have proper equipment t o mount motorcycle t i r e s . I n any event, the t i r e was mounted on the Honda T r a i l Bike 90. P l a i n t i f f maintains the crux of the case l i e s i n the difference between the proper front t i r e s i z e l i s t e d i n the manufacturer's specifications and the s i z e of the t i r e a c t u a l l y mounted on the motorcycle. The s i z e of the t i r e purchased by Sherrie McGuire and mounted on the motorcycle was a 2,75 x 17, The proper f r o n t t i r e , according t o manufacturer's specifications, was a 2.50 x 17 s i z e . The t i r e Sherrie purchased was the proper s i z e f o r the r e a r wheel but a t t h e time of the purchase she did not specify whether she wanted a front o r r e a r tire. The day of the accident, p l a i n t i f f and Sherrie went t o an area c a l l e d "the p i t s " near Bozeman. The motorcycle was designed a s a t r a i l bike and p l a i n t i f f intended t o use it there f o r t h a t purpose. Sherrie was h e s i t a n t about r i d i n g down a p a r t i c u l a r i n c l i n e and p l a i n t i f f teased her by edging the bike over the h i l l . A s the bike began t o r o l l , it encounted a r i s e o r bump i n the t e r r a i n about 2 112 f e e t from the top of the h i l l . The motorcycle suddenly pitched forward throwing Sherrie t o the side, P l a i n t i f f plummeted down the h i l l with the bike landing on top of him. H e sustained a fractured pelvis and dislocated hip. Sherrie received no serious injury and makes no claim f o r any. That p l a i n t i f f requires further surgery and perhaps even t o t a l h i p replacement was not contested by defendant, The exact cause of the accident was unknown t o p l a i n t i f f a t t h a t time. He speculated t o an ambulance driver t h a t he may have applied the front brake. Some nine months a f t e r t h e accident, p l a i n t i f f was r i d i n g t h e same cycle, with the same equipment, over a bumpy t e r r a i n of f i s t - s i z e rocks. A s he drove over the rocks, he f e l t a momentary seizing of the f r o n t wheel. He observed t h a t when he h i t a rock the wheel would move up i n the f r o n t fender housing and freeze a s it h i t the upper l i m i t of travel. H e t o l d friends with him t h a t he had j u s t discovered the cause of the accident. One friend t r i e d the same thing and observed t h e same r e s u l t s , Later, p l a i n t i f f compared h i s cycle with one nearly i d e n t i c a l t o h i s and noticed t h a t h i s f r o n t t i r e was a 2-75 x 1 7 , while the other c y c l e ' s f r o n t t i r e was a 2.50 x 17, H e then took h i s bike t o a cycle shop operator, Ron Abelin, f o r further checking. the Abelin placed a f u r n i t u r e clamp on/handlebars and the f r o n t wheel ax.le t o compress the f r o n t shock absorber t o the l i m i t of travel. Upon doing so, the f r o n t t i r e would not turn, This same demonstration was conducted a t t r i a l . When the clamp was placed on the l e f t side the t i r e would turn s l i g h t l y ; when placed on the r i g h t side the t i r e would not turn a t a l l . When the 2.75 x 17 t i r e was replaced with the 2,50 x 17 t i r e , the t i r e rotated f r e e l y with the clamp placed on e i t h e r side. Defendant objected t o the demonstration on the grounds t h a t s i m i l a r i t y of conditions could not be shown; t h a t i s , there was no showing the normal operation of the cycle would place the same pressure on the f r o n t fork a s did the furniture clamp. The demonstration was performed; defendant was allowed a continuing objection. J u s t prior t o t r i a l on December 10, 1971, p l a i n t i f f moved t o amend h i s complaint t o encompass a theory of implied warranty of f i t n e s s , a s provided i n section 87A-2-315, R.C.M. 1947. Hearing on the motion t o amend was held the day of t r i a l , December 14, 1971. Defendant maintained the motion was not timely i n t h a t it changed the theory of the law on the case f o r which defendant had no time t o prepare. P l a i n t i f f contended the amendment merely explained and c l a r i f i e d the complaint. The court granted the motion t o amend, denied defendant's motion f o r continuance, and ordered the t r i a l t o begin, Defendant presents seven issues f o r review on appeal, but we w i l l discuss only those issues determinative of t h i s case, While warranties of f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose, a s expressed i n section 87A-2-315, R.C.M. 1947, a r e not novel before t h i s Court, t h i s case presents the f i r s t instance i n which we need consider the substantive problems raised under the s t a t u t e . W e w i l l f i r s t consider whether the motion t o amend should have been granted, W e cannot agree t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s amendment merely c l a r i f i e d the o r i g i n a l complaint, The o r i g i n a l complaint was c l e a r l y based on the alleged negligence of defendant. The p r e t r i a l order was no d i f f e r e n t . This remained the theory of the case u n t i l very shortly before the t r i a l . In f a c t , a s heretofore noted, the motion t o amend was not granted u n t i l the very day of t r i a l . I f the complaint and p r e t r i a l order so c l e a r l y s t a t e d a theory of implied warranty of f i t n e s s , a s p l a i n t L f f contends, why was i t not expressly s t a t e d ? Obviously, it was not contemplated u n t i l shortly before the motion t o amend was f i l e d . It w a s e r r o r f o r the t r i a l court t o grant p l a i n t i f f ' s motion t o amend the complaint t o include the theory of implied warranty of f i t n e s s , Although Rule 15 (a), M.R,Civ. P, , estab- l i s h e s t h a t leave t o amend s h a l l be f r e e l y granted, amendments should not be allowed where the theory presented by the amend- ment is t o t a l l y inapplicable to the case, a s is the s i t u a t i o n here. Negligence, e i t h e r on the p a r t of defendant o r p l a i n t i f f , has no place i n an action f o r an alleged breach of warranty. Similarly, warranty theories a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o a negligence case. I n Picker X-Ray Corp, v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919,922, the Municipal Court of Appeals f o r the D i s t r i c t of Columbia, said: 11 There seems t o be some confusion i n understanding the nature of implied warranty l i a b i l i t y . I n the f i r s t place, concepts of negligence and f a u l t , a s defined by negligence standards, have no place i n warranty recovery cases, Proof of negligence i s un- necessary t o l i a b i l i t y f o r breach of implied warranty and the lack of i t is immaterial t o defense thereof, Since the warranty i s implied, e i t h e r i n f a c t o r i n law, no express representations o r agreements by the manufacturer [or r e t a i l e r , a s the case may be] a r e needed. Implied warranty recovery is based on two factors: (a) The product o r a r t i c l e i n question has been transferred from the manufacturer ' s [ r e t a i l e r ' s ] possession while i n a 'defective' s t a t e , more s p e c i f i c a l l y , the product f a i l s e i t h e r t o be I reasonably f i t f o r the p a r t i c u l a r purpose intended' o r of 'merchantable q u a l i t y , ' a s these two terms, separate but often overlapping, a r e defined by the law; and (b) a s a r e s u l t of being 'defective: the product causes personal injury o r property damage, I I .[Paraphrased material added]. See a l s o : 2 Frurnrner & Friedman, Products L i a b i l i t y , $ 16.01 [ I ] ; 3 ~ e n d e r ' s U.C.C. Service, Duesenberg & King, Sales and Bulk Transfers 5 7.01 141. A s a r e s u l t of the amendment, defendant had t o be prepared f o r an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t defense theory, The p r e j u d i c i a l nature of the amendment becomes more apparent when viewed i n l i g h t of the instructions given, The issues became so confused t h a t both theories were combined i n t o a single instruction. The question should not have been whether there was a breach of an implied warranty o r f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose, but r a t h e r , whether the defendant was negligent. The c o u r t ' s Instruction No. 6, r e l a t i n g t o the two theories upon which p l a i n t i f f predicated h i s case, f a i l e d t o properly dis- tinguish the theories. The instruction s t a t e d only t h a t contri- butory negligence was no defense t o a breach of warranty, It did not indicate t o the jury t h a t any negligence on the defendant's p a r t was t o t a l l y inapposite t o recovery under the warranty theory. This, when coupled with c o u r t ' s Instruction No. 8 , must necessarily have l e f t the jury completely i n doubt a s t o any d i s t i n c t i o n s between the theories. Instruction No. 8 speaks i n terms of reliance on the s e l l e r ' s s k i l l i n selecting the merchandise, a warranty element, but concludes t h a t the r e s u l t a n t improper selec- t i o n of merchandise by f a i l u r e t o exercise reasonable care i s negligence. This Court i n Brothers v, Surplus Tractor Parts Corp., M o n t . 9 -- P.2d , 30 St.Rep. 265,268, ruled t h a t confusing instructions concerning the theories of negligence and implied warranty were grounds f o r reversal. P l a i n t i f f is not r e s t r i c t e d from pleading i n the a l t e r - native. But where, a s here, i t becomes readily apparant t h a t any warranty theory is foreign t o the proper pleading of the case, any combination of the two theories cannot be tolerated. The inapplicability of the warranty theory becomes especially obvious when i n a r t f u l l y drawn instructions a r e merely a conglomeration of the two theories. What p l a i n t i f f a c t u a l l y suggests i s not t h a t the tire i t s e l f was defective, but the s a l e of the t i r e t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s agent was defective. But, such suggestion only further confuses t h e issue. To say the s a l e was defective necessarily implies the s a l e was negligent. W e find l i t t l e support f o r the theory t h a t an allegedly negligent a c t i s a defect. A l l cases facing the issues properly indicate t h a t the defect must be i n the product i t s e l f , A quick sampling of recent cases i s helpful: Van Winkle v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 117 Ill,App,2d 324, 253 N.E.2d 588, an allegedly defective t i r e ; Peters v. Lyons, (Mich. 1969), 168 N.W.2d 759, an allegedly defective dog chain; Kirk v. Stine- way Drug Store Com., 38 111,Appe2d 327, 187 N.E.2d 307, an allegedly defective stepladder; Utley v. Standard Magnesium & Chemical Co, , (Okl. 1970), 478 P, 2d 953, an allegedly defective metal ladder; Continental Cas. Co. of Ill. v, Westinghouse Elec, Corp., (D.C.Mich. 1970), 327 F.Supp. 720, an allegedly defective spot weld on a heating-air conditioning u n i t ; Paullus v. Liedkie, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P,2d 733, allegedly defective breeder hogs because of disease; DeLamaw Motor Co. v, White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S,W,2d 802, an allegedly defective truck; Waddell v , American Breeders Service, Inc., M o n t . , 505 P,2d 417, 30 St.Rep, 91, allegedly defective b u l l semen. P l a i n t i f f c i t e s Lewis v. Mobil O i l Corp., (8th C i r , 1971), 438 F.2d 500, in support of h i s theory. It i s d i f f i c u l t t o re- concile -- Lewis with the cases noted above. Although the case i s somewhat distinguishable, the d i s t i n c t i o n between negligence and warranty was overlooked. The court i n Lewis held, i n e f f e c t , t h a t the improper selection of hydraulic system o i l breached an implied warranty of f i t n e s s . However, i n t h a t case, the plain- t i f f i n i t i a l l y requested t h a t he be supplied with t h e proper o i l f o r h i s system, and continually r e i t e r a t e d h i s concern t h a t the o i l be the proper one. Mobil O i l consistently supplied an i m - proper o i l u n t i l nearly two years a f t e r the o i l was f i r s t fur- nished. Here, on the other hand, defendant did supply p l a i n t i f f with a proper t i r e "for a 1966 T r a i l Bike Honda go", the t i r e was, i n f a c t , a correct t i r e s i z e f o r the r e a r wheel of the cycle; p l a i n t i f f ' s agent had not specified which wheel. In Van Winkle v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 117 Ill, App.2d 324, 253 N.E.2d 588, 590, the Appellate Court of I l l i n o i s had t h i s t o say concerning the p l a i n t i f f ' s burden: he p l a i n t i f f must * * , k show affirmatively t h a t there was some defect i n the a r t i c l e sold which rendered it u n f i t f o r t h a t purpose and t h a t damage resulted from such defect." I n support of t h i s r u l e , the I l l i n o i s court c i t e d Kirk v. Stineway Drug Store Com,which case r e l a t e d t o a defective stepladder f o r f a i l u r e t o i n s t a l l a safety c l e a t ; and Knab v. Alden's Irving Park, Inc., 49 111,App.Zd 371, 199 N.E.2d 815, r e l a t i n g t o a p a i r of trousers defective because of the highly inflammable nature of the material. W e a r e i n accord with the I l l i n o i s court, Here, defendant warranted t h a t the t i r e he allegedly sold p l a i n t i f f ' s agent was f r e e of defects affecting the p a r t i c u l a r purpose f o r i t s intended use. The t i r e was without question a perfectly good 2.75 x.17 t i r e t h a t did not f a i l , a s the term i s ordinarily used, i n i t s normal operation. P l a i n t i f f i s not precluded from alleging t h a t the selection of the t i r e was i m - proper. Such a l l e g a t i o n , however, could only be presented t o the jury on a negligence theory, Since we find a warranty of f i t n e s s inapplicable, defendant's contention concerning f a i l u r e t o receive timely notice of the defect need not be considered. While other i s s e s raised by defendant a r e not pertinent t o the grounds f o r reversal, they would, no doubt, be raised again on r e t r i a l ; therefore we s h a l l determine them. Defendant objected a t t r i a l t o the introduction of the f u r n i t u r e clamp demonstration. H e claims e r r o r on the b a s i s t h a t no s i m i l a r i t y of conditions was shown between the amount of force applied by the clamp and the pressure actually exerted by two persons riding the cycle. W e agree, The t r i a l court erred i n allowing the demonstration without proper foundation. This Court has consistently held t h a t substantial s i m i l a r i t y of conditions must be shown before experiments o r demonstrations can be introduced. Bernhard v. Lincoln County, 150 Mont, 557, 561, 437 P.2d 377; Hurly v. Star Transfer Company, 141 Mont. 176, 181, 376 P,2d 504; Richardson v. Farmers Union O i l Co., 131 Mont. 535, 548, 312 P,2d 134. The persuasive e f f e c t of t h i s courtroom demonstration cannot be denied, Without a showing t h a t the clamp pressure was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than the pressure of two r i d e r s , the demonstration should not have been admitted, Other- w i s e , the jury i s strongly influenced t o speculate t h a t the re- s u l t shown i n the demonstration was, i n f a c t , the cause of the accident. P l a i n t i f f ' s witness Abelin admitted he did not know whether the pressure applied was similar. The cause i s reversed and remanded f a r a new t r i a l . Associat ustices, Q