Title: State v. Pokini
Citation: 548 P.2d 1397
Docket Number: 5673
State: Hawaii
Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 1976

548 P.2d 1397 (1976) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James POKINI, also known as James K. Pokini, Defendant-Appellant. No. 5673. Supreme Court of Hawaii. April 7, 1976. *1398 Donald K. Tsukiyama, Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant. Maurice Sapienza, Pros. Atty., Honolulu (Herbert T. Woolley, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and KOBAYASHI, OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and SHINTAKU, Circuit Judge, assigned by reason of vacancy. MENOR, Justice. The defendant, James Pokini, was indicted jointly with Franklin Melandre and Jonah Iaea on two counts, one for conspiracy to murder Harold "Biggie" Chan and the other for his murder in the first degree. Franklin Melandre was tried separately in August, 1973. The defendant and Jonah Iaea were tried together in April, 1974, after their motions for severance were denied. The defendant was acquitted of murder in the first degree but was found guilty by a jury of the offense of conspiracy to murder. The defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence of the trial court. We reverse the conviction and set aside the judgment and sentence of the circuit court. At the earlier separate trial of Franklin Melandre, a material witness for the prosecution was one Robert Low, an admitted accomplice. He was also a principal State witness against the defendant and Iaea in this case. Low testified that he and Pokini planned the murder of "Biggie" Chan. The evidence shows that neither of them participated in the actual killing of Chan. During the cross-examination of Low by Jonah Iaea's counsel, the latter read from several pages of a transcript of Low's entire testimony in the Melandre trial, either to refresh the witness' recollection or to show that he had made prior inconsistent statements. On redirect examination, the *1399 prosecution offered the entire transcript consisting of 206 pages into evidence, and it was admitted over the objection of Pokini's counsel. The transcript contained the following, which had not been referred to by Iaea's counsel: The transcript also contained other detailed references to these other crimes. They were completely irrelevant to the issues upon which the guilt of the defendant in this case was determined. They were improperly admitted and were so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant *1400 of his constitutional right to a fair trial. In State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 549, 498 P.2d 635, 643 (1972), we said that "the deliberate and unresponsive injection by prosecution witnesses of irrelevant references to prior arrests, convictions, or imprisonment may generate insurmountable prejudice to the cause of an accused." The case before us falls squarely within the principles we laid down in Kahinu. Moreover, evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the accused, which are collateral to the issues to be tried, are ordinarily inadmissible. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 12 S. Ct. 292, 35 L. Ed. 1077 (1892); State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 361 P.2d 45 (1961); United States v. Dressler, 112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir.1940). It appears from the record that defense counsel failed to direct the trial court's attention to these particular passages when interposing his objection to the transcript's admission into evidence. Nevertheless, the trial court should have insisted upon it, and should have been alert to the inherent danger of admitting into evidence, without even a cursory examination, the entire testimony of an admitted accomplice given at an earlier trial in which the defendant was not even a participant in those prior proceedings. Moreover, the transcript was originally used by Jonah Iaea's counsel for Iaea's presumed benefit and not for the benefit of the defendant. The trial court gave no limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of the transcript, but even if it had the highly prejudicial effects of the evidence could not have been dissipated thereby. The State itself was not entirely blameless in the matter. The prosecutor was fully aware of the contents of the transcript. His deliberate injection of incompetent matter into the proceedings was prosecutorial misconduct of the most prejudicial nature. State v. Kahinu, supra; White v. State, 257 Ind. 64, 272 N.E.2d 312 (1971). The defendant, Pokini, took the witness stand to testify in his own defense. He denied his involvement in the conspiracy to murder Harold "Biggie" Chan, and the record shows that he did not participate in the actual killing. During the cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecution was permitted over objection to ask him repeated questions relative to his employment and sources of income. The defendant did not testify on those matters on direct examination. The prosecution's admitted purpose in pursuing this line of examination was to impeach the defendant's credibility. The defendant assigns this as additional ground for reversal. A defendant who elects to testify in his own defense is subject to cross-examination as to any matter pertinent to, or having a logical connection with the specific offense for which he is being tried. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S. Ct. 549, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943); Territory v. Bell, 43 Haw. 23 (1958); Territory v. Hart, 24 Haw. 349 (1918). And once having taken the witness stand in his behalf, the defendant may be cross-examined on collateral matters bearing upon his credibility, the same as any other witness. The scope and extent of examination in these areas must necessarily be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The defendant may be asked questions regarding his occupation or employment. Bolin v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1966); see Territory v. Tamashiro, 37 Haw. 552 (1947). But there are obvious limitations beyond which the court may not allow the examiner to venture. The subject matter of the inquiry must have some rational bearing upon the defendant's capacity for truth and veracity. Asato v. Furtado, 52 Haw. 284, 474 P.2d 288 (1970). And where the testimony sought to be elicited is of minimal value on the issue of credibility and comes into direct conflict with the defendant's right to a fair trial, the right of *1401 cross-examination into those areas must yield to the overriding requirements of due process. See State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971), Bolin v. Commonwealth, supra. While we find that the trial court was somewhat overly permissive in the cross-examination of the defendant relative to his employment, we are satisfied that this, in and of itself, did not prejudice his cause. Of more serious concern to this court, however, was the trial judge's conduct in ruling upon the objections interposed by the defendant's counsel to the questions asked the defendant on cross-examination. There was no necessity for the following exchange to have taken place in the presence of the jury: *1402 Following the resumption of cross-examination on matters totally unrelated to the foregoing exchange, the trial judge, almost as an afterthought, interrupted and further commented: It was improper for the trial judge to make these remarks in the presence of the jury, especially coming as it did on the heels of an extended exchange that could have had no other effect than to demean defense counsel in the eyes of the jury.[1]State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 640, 526 P.2d 94 (1974). Moreover, there was no apparent legal basis for the trial court's prejudicial comment relative to disciplinary proceedings against defendant's counsel. In Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 468, 95 S. Ct. 584, 596, 42 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1975), the Court stated: We do not doubt the personal integrity and inherent fairness and impartiality of the trial judge. But it is equally essential to a fair trial that the presiding judge endeavor at all times to maintain an attitude of fairness and impartiality. State v. Pokini, supra. There was absolutely no justification for the conduct of the trial judge in these and other instances reflected by the record. In view of the erroneous admission of prejudicial matter into evidence, we reverse and remand for new trial. [1] The following is but one other example of the court's propensity for injecting unnecessary remarks into the proceedings: THE COURT: Mr. Conklin, is there anything that the Court should know regarding this refusal to answer, aside from what the court knows from the proceeding in court? MR. CONKLIN: Your Honor, I'm embarrassed to say I did not hear the question. THE COURT: You should be embarrassed because you people are not paying attention to the trial. MR. CONKLIN: I am paying attention to the trial, your Honor. I was not paying attention to that question.