Title: The Florida Bar v. Noah Daniel Liberman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-1874
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC06-1874 
_____________ 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
NOAH DANIEL LIBERMAN, 
Respondent. 
 
 
[August 26, 2010] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that the Court accept 
respondent’s unconditional guilty plea and consent judgment for discipline, 
suspending respondent from The Florida Bar for three years.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  As more fully explained below, after consideration of 
the referee’s report, the guilty plea and consent judgment, and the parties’ joint 
response to the Court’s order to show cause why respondent should not be 
disbarred, we disapprove the proposed sanction of a three-year suspension and 
disbar respondent effective, nunc pro tunc, July 3, 2006. 
 
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On March 30, 2006, respondent Noah Daniel Liberman pleaded guilty and 
was adjudicated guilty of one first-degree felony count of trafficking in the drug 
known as ―Ecstasy‖ (ten grams or more but less than 200 grams).  Due to this 
felony conviction, he was, on July 3, 2006, automatically suspended from The 
Florida Bar pursuant to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-7.2(e), in case number 
SC06-977.  He has remained suspended since that time. 
 
After the automatic felony suspension was imposed, The Florida Bar filed a 
complaint against respondent, alleging that based on his felony conviction he 
violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.3, providing that the ―commission by 
a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the 
act is committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or 
otherwise, whether committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether 
or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline,‖ 
and 4-8.4(b), providing that a lawyer shall not ―commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects.‖  As noted, the respondent and the Bar have submitted and the referee has 
recommended that the Court accept an unconditional guilty plea and consent 
judgment for discipline suspending respondent for three years effective, nunc pro 
tunc, July 3, 2006.  The referee’s report recites the following facts stipulated in the 
guilty plea and consent judgment: 
 
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Respondent, Noah Daniel Liberman, was a young attorney who 
was primarily, if not exclusively, involved in civil litigation.  He also 
had an illness; he was a drug addict and was severely addicted to the 
drugs methamphetamine and M.D.M.A. (ecstasy).  For years prior to 
his arrest, drugs controlled his life. 
 
The use of the drugs led to he and his friends pooling their 
funds to purchase the drugs in greater quantity for a volume discount 
and then the drugs being distributed among his friends.  During this 
time period one of his friends, a fellow addict, was arrested for a drug 
offense and began working undercover for Coral Gables Police 
Department in conjunction with the Miami Beach Police [D]epartment 
and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) unbeknownst to 
Respondent.  
For a period of approximately six weeks in 2004, this 
―confidential source‖ purchased small quantities of either 
methamphetamine or M.D.M.A. from Respondent on four (4) 
occasions as follows: 
 
 
(1) 
On February 16, 2004, 1 gram of methamphetamine. 
(2)  
On February 24, 2004, 2 grams of methamphetamine 
 
and 2 M.D.M.A. Ecstasy pills. 
 
(3) 
On March 9, 2004, 1 gram of Methamphetamine  
 
(4) 
On April 5, 2004, 2 grams of Methamphetamine. 
  
 
The ―confidential source‖ then requested that Respondent 
obtain an amount of the drug M.D.M.A. that far exceeded that which 
was usual or customary for Respondent to have in his possession. 
Once the ―confidential source‖ was confident that Respondent had the 
requested drugs in his possession, the police were notified and raided 
Respondent’s home finding a trafficking amount of the drug 
M.D.M.A. 
 
Subsequently, Respondent entered into a plea agreement with 
the Office of the State Attorney and pled guilty.  On or about March 
30, 2006, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of one felony count of 
Phenethylamine/Ecstasy/Trafficking of 10 Grams or more but less 
than 200 Grams. . . .  Since that time he has cooperated with 
authorities, served a short sentence in county jail over weekends only, 
served six months on community control, and successfully completed 
his probation.  
 
 
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The referee also found and considered the following mitigating factors: (1) 
respondent did not have a prior disciplinary record; (2) he lacked a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) he made a timely good-faith effort to rectify the consequences 
of his misconduct; (4) he made a full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board 
and had a cooperative attitude toward the proceeding; (5) he was inexperienced in 
the practice of law; (6) he otherwise had a good reputation and character; (7) he 
had a physical or mental disability or impairment; (8) he participated in an interim 
rehabilitation program; (9) other penalties or sanctions were imposed on him; (10) 
he showed remorse for his actions; and (11) he was involved in ongoing supervised 
rehabilitation under Florida Lawyer’s Assistance, Inc.  The referee considered one 
aggravating factor—respondent’s pattern of misconduct. 
 
On January 8, 2010, after considering the referee’s report, we directed the 
parties to show cause why the recommended sanction should not be disapproved 
and why harsher sanctions, including disbarment, should not be imposed.  The Bar 
and respondent filed a joint response to the order to show cause, contending that in 
light of the mitigating circumstances in this case, a three-year suspension is 
appropriate.  We disagree. 
As acknowledged by the parties, under Standard for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions 5.11, the presumptive discipline for an attorney convicted of a felony is 
disbarment.  The burden is on the attorney to overcome this presumption.  Fla. Bar 
 
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v. McKeever, 766 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 2000).  Here, despite the presence of 
substantial mitigation, we conclude that a lesser sanction is not justified. 
The Bar and respondent point to multiple cases where we have imposed 
lengthy suspensions in cases involving felony convictions where substantial 
mitigation, including drug and alcohol addiction, was shown.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. 
Del Pino, 955 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2007) (recognizing cases where a respondent’s drug 
addiction caused or contributed to the felonious conduct and resulted in suspension 
instead of disbarment); Fla. Bar v. Hochman, 815 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 2002) 
(suspending attorney for three years where attorney pled no contest to felony grand 
theft and mitigating evidence included drug and alcohol addiction); Fla. Bar v. 
Marcus, 616 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1993) (suspending attorney for three years after 
conviction of felony for misappropriating client funds where cocaine addiction was 
directly and causally linked to misconduct); Fla. Bar v. Corbin, 540 So. 2d 105 
(Fla. 1989) (suspending attorney for three years after conviction of attempted 
sexual battery on a child where substantial mitigation included voluntarily entering 
and completing residential alcohol treatment program); Fla. Bar v. Jahn, 509 So. 
2d 285 (Fla. 1987) (suspending attorney for three years after conviction for 
delivery of cocaine to a minor and possession of cocaine where drug addiction was 
one of several mitigating factors); Fla. Bar v. Rosen, 495 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 
1986) (suspending attorney for three years after conviction for possession of 
 
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cocaine with intent to distribute, where addiction was found to be the ―prime force 
behind his felony conviction‖). 
Of these cases, only Rosen involved drug trafficking.  In Rosen, the attorney 
had become increasingly addicted to free-base cocaine, so much so that he 
voluntarily closed his law practice because he could no longer serve his clients.  
Rosen, 495 So. 2d at 181.  Subsequently, he ―continued to withdraw into the 
nightmarish netherworld of cocaine addiction until he finally became involved in 
drug trafficking.‖  Id.  In contrast, here there was no showing that respondent was 
essentially incapacitated by his addiction.  We have not hesitated in the past to 
disbar Florida attorneys with felony convictions involving drug trafficking.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Hecker, 475 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1985) (disbarring attorney who pled 
guilty to criminal conspiracy to traffic in 1000 pounds of cannabis); Fla. Bar v. 
Wilson, 425 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1983) (disbarring attorney convicted of solicitation to 
traffic in cocaine and attempted trafficking in cocaine). 
Given the gravity of respondent’s offense, we conclude that disbarment 
effective, nunc pro tunc, July 3, 2006, is the appropriate sanction in light of the 
criteria previously enunciated by this Court in Florida Bar v. Pahules, 233 So. 2d 
130, 132 (Fla. 1970): the sanction must be (1) fair to the disciplined attorney, being 
sufficient to punish while at the same time encouraging rehabilitation; (2) fair to 
society, both in terms of protecting the public from unethical conduct and at the 
 
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same time not denying the public the service of a qualified lawyer as a result of 
undue harshness; and (3) severe enough to deter others who might be tempted to 
engage in like violations.  See also Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108, 124 (Fla. 
2007) (discussing Pahules criteria).  Disbarment of an attorney convicted of a 
serious felony offense cannot be interpreted as unfair to him.  Illegal behavior 
involving moral turpitude demonstrates intentional disregard for the very laws an 
attorney is bound to uphold.  Disbarment under these circumstances also serves 
best to encourage rehabilitation and to protect the public in that it ensures 
respondent may be readmitted only upon full compliance with the rules and 
regulations governing admissions to the Bar.  Finally, we conclude that only 
disbarment can measure up to the gravity of a conviction for illegal drug 
trafficking and serve as a sufficient deterrent for others who might be tempted to 
engage in similar illegal activity.  Although we do not find that the mitigating 
circumstances present in this case are sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
disbarment for a felony conviction, we do find that such mitigation is sufficient to 
justify making the order of disbarment effective, nunc pro tunc, to the date 
respondent was automatically suspended due to the felony conviction. 
Accordingly, Noah Daniel Liberman is hereby disbarred effective, nunc pro 
tunc, July 3, 2006.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
 
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Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Noah Daniel 
Liberman in the amount of $1,858.22, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I would approve the referee’s recommendation of a three-year suspension, as 
urged by The Florida Bar and agreed to by the respondent.  Since respondent’s 
drug crimes, which occurred over six years ago, he has led a drug-free and 
exemplary existence.  Although respondent pled guilty to the serious offense of 
drug trafficking, the overwhelming evidence in this case demonstrates that his 
misconduct stemmed from a severe addiction to drugs, did not arise from the 
practice of law, and resulted in no client harm.   
 
There are other strong mitigating factors in this case that, when coupled with 
respondent’s addiction, weigh heavily in favor of a three-year suspension rather 
than disbarment.  For example, when charged with this crime, respondent 
immediately assumed responsibility for his actions.  This factor was critical to the 
determination by the State Attorney’s Office during plea negotiations that a 
 
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sentence of six months of house arrest and six months of jail on the weekends was 
appropriate—far below the mandatory minimum requirement for the first-degree 
felony drug trafficking charge.  The assistant state attorney testified that the 
mandatory minimum requirement was reduced in respondent’s case because ―it 
didn’t seem . . . like he was a street trafficker.  He accepted responsibility.  He 
went into rehab immediately.  He was drug tested routinely and was always 
negative.‖     
Further, since the time of his own arrest and plea agreement, respondent has 
lived an exemplary existence as found by the referee:  
While his acceptance of responsibility and cooperation with the 
investigation and legal process is commendable, his resolve to turn his 
life around is impressive.  Since the time of his arrest, nearly five and 
1/2 years ago, Mr. Liberman has remained drug free (clean date is 
April 7, 2004).  Over the past 3 1/2 years he has been a productive 
member of society working, continuing to contribute to the legal 
industry as a paralegal.  He has also been a benefit to the community, 
initially volunteering as a tutor at Camillus House and now 
supervising the tutoring program and volunteering as a member of the 
Board of the Camillus House Young Leaders.  
When determining the appropriate sanction, this Court should also consider 
the mitigating fact that respondent’s crime, while serious, did not arise from the 
practice of law and resulted in no client harm.  For example, this case stands in 
marked contrast to cases in which we have disbarred attorneys whose substance 
abuse and addiction contributed to misappropriation of funds or abandonment of 
clients.  See Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d 333, 338 (Fla. 2008) (―This 
 
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Court has disbarred attorneys who misappropriated funds or abandoned their 
clients, despite the referees findings of substance abuse and rehabilitation, 
concluding that the mitigation was insufficient to overcome the seriousness of the 
misconduct.‖) (citing Fla. Bar v. Prevatt, 609 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1992); Fla. Bar v. 
Shuminer, 567 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1990); Fla. Bar v. Golub, 550 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 
1989); Fla. Bar v. Rodriguez, 489 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1986); Fla. Bar v. Setien, 530 
So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1988)).  In this case, there is no evidence of any client harm or any 
indication that respondent’s addiction or crime impacted his performance as an 
attorney.   
The majority distinguishes this case from Florida Bar v. Rosen, 495 So. 2d 
180 (Fla. 1986), but in fact the circumstances are very similar.  Like the attorney in 
Rosen, at the time of his arrest, respondent was heavily addicted to and impaired 
by drugs, specifically crystal methamphetamine.  In Rosen, we explained: 
The referee’s findings of fact, we believe, well support the 
recommendation of suspension rather than disbarment.  First, the 
referee found that ―[t]he respondent’s involvement in the crime for 
which he pleaded guilty was a result of his own addiction to cocaine 
at the time,‖ and that ―respondent’s addiction was the prime force 
behind his felony conviction.‖ 
 
495 So. 2d at 181.  Similarly, in this case, respondent’s addiction directly 
contributed to his conduct.  As found by the referee when comparing the instant 
case to Rosen, ―[r]espondent also slid into deep and mind altering addiction and it 
was the addiction that caused the actions that led to his arrest.‖   
 
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I understand that respondent pled guilty to a drug trafficking crime.  
However, when looking at the actual substance of the charges for this crime, which 
occurred over six years ago, it is not comparable to the trafficking crimes at issue 
in Hecker and Wilson, which are relied on by the majority.  In Hecker, the attorney 
pled guilty to criminal conspiracy to traffic in 1000 pounds of cannabis.  475 So. 
2d at 1241.  Here, respondent’s crime involved 270 Ecstasy pills, totaling 37.7 
grams.  In Wilson, the attorney pressured one of his clients who was incarcerated 
in jail to make arrangements to have one and a half pounds of cocaine delivered to 
the attorney.  425 So. 2d at 2.  In this case, respondent’s drug trafficking crime 
resulted from the request of a fellow addict and friend, who was working 
undercover after having been arrested.   
 
I also emphasize that, even if we were to accept the recommendation of a 
three-year suspension, this would not be a guarantee of reinstatement.  
Demonstrating rehabilitation is a very heavy burden to meet, especially in cases 
with the added concern of addiction.   
Finally, to the extent the majority attempts to lessen the severity of the 
sanction of disbarment by finding that the mitigation is sufficient to justify making 
the order of disbarment effective, nunc pro tunc, to the date respondent was 
automatically suspended, I note that when this Court suspends an attorney, the 
suspension is usually effective, nunc pro tunc, to the date of original suspension.   
 
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In light of the foregoing, and because it has been over six years since the 
offense and respondent has lived an exemplary and drug-free existence for those 
six years, I would accept the referee’s strong recommendation, joined by The 
Florida Bar, that we approve the three-year suspension.    
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
 
Original Proceedings – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and William Mulligan, Bar 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Richard Baron of Richard Baron and Associates, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent