Title: Easthampton Savings Bank v. City of Springfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11612
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2014

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SJC-11612 
 
EASTHAMPTON SAVINGS BANK & others1  vs.  CITY OF SPRINGFIELD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 4, 2014. - December 19, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
Constitutional Law, Home rule, Home Rule Amendment.  Municipal 
Corporations, Home rule, By-laws and ordinances, Fees. 
Mortgage, Foreclosure.  Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous 
Material Release Prevention Act.  State Sanitary Code. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit.  
 
 
 
Tani E. Sapirstein for the plaintiffs.  
 
Thomas D. Moore, Associate City Solicitor (Lisa C. deSousa, 
Associate City Solicitor, with him) for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Lee D. Goldstein for Harvard Legal Aid Bureau & others. 
 
Robert G. Rowe, III, of the District of Columbia, for 
American Bankers Association, Inc. 
 
Francis J. Nolan & Nathalie K. Salomon for Real Estate Bar 
Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another. 
 
Michael McDonagh for Massachusetts Association of Realtors. 
                     
 
1 Chicopee Savings Bank, Hampden Bank, United Bank, Monson 
Savings Bank, and Country Bank for Savings. 
 
2 
 
 
Henry C. Luthin, First Assistant Corporation Counsel, & 
Brandon H. Moss for Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers Association, 
Inc. 
 
William F. Sheehan, of the District of Columbia, & Brenda 
R. Sharton & Thomas M. Hefferon for Massachusetts Bankers 
Association, Inc. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  We consider in the present case challenges 
brought against two ordinances adopted by the city of 
Springfield (city) in response to a wave of foreclosures 
triggered by the economic downturn of 2008.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has certified the 
following questions to this court, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, 
as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981):2   
 
"1.  Are Springfield's municipal ordinances Chapter 
285, Article II, 'Vacant or Foreclosing Residential 
Property' (the [f]oreclosure [o]rdinance) or Chapter 182, 
Article I, 'Mediation of Foreclosures of Owner-Occupied 
Residential Properties' (the [m]ediation [o]rdinance) 
preempted, in part or in whole, by those state laws and 
regulations identified by the plaintiffs? 
 
 
"2.  Does the [f]oreclosure [o]rdinance impose an 
unlawful tax in violation of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts?" 
 
Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 
2013).   
                     
 
2 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 
Mass. 700 (1981), provides:  "This court may answer questions of 
law certified to it by . . . a Court of Appeals of the United 
States . . . when requested by the certifying court if there are 
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this 
State which may be determinative of the cause then pending in 
the certifying court and as to which it appears to the 
certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the 
decisions of this court."   
 
3 
 
 
We answer the first question that the mediation ordinance 
is preempted by G. L. c. 244 and that the foreclosure ordinance 
is preempted by G. L. c. 21E and G. L. c. 111 but not by G. L. 
c. 244.  We answer the second question in the negative.3   
 
1.  Procedural background.  We summarize certain undisputed 
facts in the order of certification and in the record before us.  
In 2011, in response to an increased number of foreclosures due 
to the housing market collapse of 2008 and its effect on public 
safety, the city enacted two ordinances addressing properties 
left vacant during or after the foreclosure process.  The 
plaintiffs, six banks holding mortgage notes on properties in 
Springfield, filed suit in State court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief from the enforcement of the ordinances.  The 
defendant city removed the case to Federal court.  The Federal 
District Court allowed the city's motion for summary judgment.  
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit.  That court determined that the outcome 
of the case centered on unresolved questions of Massachusetts 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed by the 
Massachusetts Bankers Association, Inc.; the American Bankers 
Association, Inc.; the Massachusetts Association of Realtors; 
and the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and 
the Abstract Club in support of the plaintiffs, and the Harvard 
Legal Aid Bureau, National Consumer Law Center, National 
Community Reinvestment Coalition, Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute, and Massachusetts Alliance Against Predatory Lending; 
and the Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers Association, Inc., in 
support of the defendants.   
4 
 
law better suited for this Court.  We now consider the questions 
presented to this court.   
 
2.  Springfield ordinances.  The two ordinances deal 
specifically with the foreclosure process.  The mediation 
ordinance is entitled "Facilitating Mediation of Mortgage 
Foreclosures of Owner Occupied Residential Properties" and is 
codified in Chapter 7.60 of Title 7 of the Revised Ordinances of 
the city of Springfield, 1986, as amended (city ordinances).  
The foreclosure ordinance is entitled "Regulating the 
Maintenance of Vacant and/or Foreclosing Residential Properties 
and Foreclosures of Owner Occupied Residential Properties," and 
is codified in Chapter 7.50 of Title 7 of the city ordinances.   
 
a.  Mediation ordinance.  The mediation ordinance 
establishes a program requiring mandatory mediation between 
mortgagors and mortgagees.  The ordinance requires that, upon 
giving notice of a default and the statutory right of redemption 
to the mortgagor, mediation must begin within forty-five days.  
The mediation consists of a conference between the mortgagor and 
mortgagee in which the parties must make a good faith effort to 
renegotiate the terms of the mortgage that was the subject of 
the notice or otherwise to resolve the pending foreclosure.  If, 
after a mediation conference, the city-provided mediation 
program manager determines that the mortgagee has made a good 
faith effort to mediate but that the parties were unable to come 
5 
 
to an agreement to avoid foreclosure, the manager will issue a 
certificate stating that the mortgagee has satisfied the 
requirements of the mediation ordinance and authorizing the 
mortgagee to proceed with its rights pursuant to G. L. c. 244.  
Failure of a mortgagee to comply with the mediation ordinance 
results in a $300 fine with each day of noncompliance 
constituting a separate violation.   
 
b.  Foreclosure ordinance.  The foreclosure ordinance 
requires owners of buildings that are vacant or undergoing 
foreclosure to register with the city.  The definition of 
"owner" includes "a mortgagee of any such property who has 
initiated the foreclosure process."  Under the ordinance, the 
mortgage foreclosure process is initiated by "taking possession 
of a residential property pursuant to [G. L. c. 244, § 1]; [or 
by] commencing a foreclosure action on a property in any court 
of competent jurisdiction, including without limitation, filing 
a complaint in Land court under the Servicemembers Civil Relief 
Act -- Public Law 108-189 (50 U.S.C.S. App. § 501-536)."  In 
addition, "where the mortgage authorizes [the] mortgagee entry 
to make repairs upon the mortgagor's failure to do so," the 
mortgagee has "initiated" the foreclosure process.  Read 
together, a mortgagee whose mortgage expressly authorizes entry 
to make repairs upon the mortgagor's failure to do so is an 
6 
 
owner under the ordinance without any consideration as to 
whether the mortgagor has vacated the property.  
 
Under the foreclosure ordinance, an "owner" as defined in 
the ordinance is responsible for the maintenance of the 
property.  The ordinance specifies the minimum requirements of 
maintenance, including the filing of a space utilization plan 
with the fire commissioner; the removal of hazardous material 
from the property; the securing of windows and doorways or the 
provision of twenty-four hour on-site security; the removal of 
trash, debris, and stagnant water; the draining of water from 
plumbing if the property is vacant; the procurement of liability 
insurance for the property; and the provision of a $10,000 cash 
bond against the possibility of noncompliance.  Upon the 
satisfaction of these conditions, the city will issue a 
certificate of compliance to the owner.   
 
If an owner fails to register a vacant or foreclosing 
property with the city and to obtain a certificate of 
compliance, the building commissioner, once notified, is 
empowered to give notice and order the owner to bring the 
property into compliance with the foreclosure ordinance.  
Failure to comply with an order to register and its attendant 
conditions authorizes the building commissioner and his agents 
to enter the property to inspect it and bring it into compliance 
with the ordinance.  An owner must pay any expenses incurred by 
7 
 
the commissioner in securing an unregistered property within 
seven days of receipt of notice, or the city may file a notice 
of claim against the property and obtain a lien.  The 
ordinance's requirement of a $10,000 bond ensures that, should 
the owner of a property subject to the ordinance fail to 
maintain the property according to the strictures of the 
ordinance, the city will be able to recoup the costs of entering 
the property and satisfying the maintenance requirements.  If 
the property is registered and the owner fails to pay the 
expenses incurred by the city, the city may draw down the posted 
bond.  Furthermore, the city will retain an unspecified portion 
of the bond as "an administrative fee to fund an account for 
expenses incurred in inspecting, securing, and marking said 
building and other such buildings that are not in compliance 
with [the foreclosure ordinance]."4  Finally, failure to comply 
with the foreclosure ordinance results in a $300 per day fine 
with each day constituting a separate violation.   
 
3.  Preemption.  The Home Rule Amendment authorizes a 
municipality by ordinance or bylaw to "exercise any power or 
function which the general court has power to confer upon it, 
which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted 
by the general court in conformity with powers reserved to the 
                     
 
4 The city has represented that this fee would likely be 
between $500 and $1000.  Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 
736 F.3d 46, 49 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013).   
8 
 
general court by section eight" of the Home Rule Amendment.  See 
art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  See also G. L. c. 43B, § 13 (Home Rules 
Procedures Act).  Municipal bylaws are presumed to be valid.  
Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 
440 (1983).  The plaintiffs argue that the ordinances are 
inconsistent with several laws enacted by the General Court and 
thus are unconstitutional.  The city argues that no conflict 
exists with the specified laws and that, should this court 
conclude otherwise, the foreclosure ordinance by its own 
language avoids any conflict.   
 
In determining whether a local ordinance or bylaw is 
inconsistent with a State statute, the "question is not whether 
the Legislature intended to grant authority to municipalities to 
act . . . , but rather whether the Legislature intended to deny 
[a municipality] the right to legislate on the subject [in 
question]."  Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 394 Mass. 518, 524 
(1985).  Municipalities enjoy "considerable latitude" in this 
regard.  Bloom v.  Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 154 (1973).  There 
must be a "sharp conflict" between the ordinance or bylaw and 
the statute before a local law is invalidated.  Id.  Such a 
conflict "appears when either the legislative intent to preclude 
local action is clear, or, absent plain expression of such 
intent, the purpose of the statute cannot be achieved in the 
9 
 
face of the local by-law."  Grace v. Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 54 
(1979).   
 
Legislative intent to preclude local action can be express 
or inferred.  St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral of W. Mass., 
Inc. v. Fire Dep't of Springfield, 462 Mass. 120, 126 (2012).  
When express, the task of determining the inconsistency between 
a local enactment and a State law is relatively easy.  See 
Wendell, 394 Mass. at 524.  More difficult are the instances 
when the Legislature is silent on the issue of local regulation 
and a party challenging a local enactment asserts that "a 
legislative intent to bar such local action should be inferred 
in all the circumstances."  Id.  When "legislation on a subject 
is so comprehensive that an inference would be justified that 
the Legislature intended to preempt the field," a municipal law 
cannot stand.  Id.  See Anderson v. Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 186 
(1978) (construing campaign finance laws as "preempting any 
right which a municipality might otherwise have to appropriate 
funds for the purpose of influencing the result on a referendum 
question").  "In a close case, the considerations influencing 
the decision depend on the particular circumstances and a 
perception of the extent to which the Legislature has or has not 
made a preemptive intent clear.  In such an analysis, it is not 
inappropriate to take note of what has or has not been 
10 
 
traditionally a matter of local regulation."  Wendell, 394 Mass. 
at 525.   
 
The plaintiffs have identified three statutes that they 
argue are in conflict with the ordinances:  G. L. c. 244, the 
Massachusetts foreclosure statute; G. L. c. 21E, the 
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act 
(OHMRPA); and G. L. c. 111, §§ 127A-127L, the State sanitary 
code.  We address each in turn.   
 
a.  Massachusetts foreclosure statute.  The plaintiffs 
argue that the foreclosure statute preempts the foreclosure 
ordinance.  The First Circuit has asked us also to consider 
whether the foreclosure statute preempts the mediation 
ordinance.  As we explain, we conclude that the foreclosure 
statute preempts the mediation ordinance in whole but find no 
preemption of the foreclosure ordinance.   
 
i.  Mediation ordinance.  General Laws c. 244 establishes 
three means by which the equity of redemption of a mortgage may 
be foreclosed.  They are foreclosure (1) by action, G. L. 
c. 244, §§ 3-10; (2) by entry and possession, G. L. c. 244, 
§§ 1, 2; or (3) by sale under the power of sale in a mortgage, 
G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C.  General Laws c. 244, § 35A, as amended 
by St. 2010, c. 258, § 7, gives a mortgagor of residential real 
property in the Commonwealth 150 days to cure a payment default 
before foreclosure proceedings may be commenced.  A foreclosing 
11 
 
mortgagee may reduce the 150-day period to ninety days by 
certifying that it has engaged "in a good faith effort to 
negotiate a commercially reasonable alternative to foreclosure 
. . . involv[ing] at least 1 meeting, either in person or by 
telephone, between [the parties or their representatives,]" and 
that the meeting was not successful.  G. L. c. 244, § 35A (b).  
A good faith effort requires the mortgagee to consider the 
mortgagor's current circumstances, an analysis of the net 
present value of a modified mortgage loan compared to the 
"anticipated net recovery following foreclosure[,] and . . . the 
interests of the creditor."  G. L. c. 244, § 35A (c).  Should 
the good faith effort fail, the mortgagee must provide the 
mortgagor with an affidavit setting forth "the time and place of 
the meeting, parties participating, relief offered to the 
borrower, a summary of the creditor's net present value analysis 
and applicable inputs of the analysis and certification that any 
modification or option offered complies with current [F]ederal 
law or policy."  G. L. c. 244, § 35A (f).  
 
A comparison of the foreclosure statute and the mediation 
ordinance reveals similar attempts to give mortgagees an 
incentive to negotiate with the mortgagors before proceeding to 
foreclose.  The city contends that the mediation ordinance 
complements and does not conflict with the foreclosure statute 
because a mortgagee could comply with both laws.  We disagree.  
12 
 
The Legislature's decision to utilize the proverbial "carrot" of 
a shorter right-to-cure period trumps the city's choice of the 
"stick" of a daily fine.  Furthermore, the ordinance by its own 
terms does not allow a mortgagee to proceed with foreclosure 
before obtaining a certificate of good faith mediation, a direct 
impingement on the process of foreclosure.  
 
Mortgage foreclosure regulation traditionally has been a 
matter of State, and not local, concern.  See Walsh, The Finger 
in the Dike:  State and Local Laws Combat the Foreclosure Tide, 
44 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 139, 180-187 (2011) (reviewing legal 
challenges to efforts by municipalities to regulate mortgage 
foreclosure process).  See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 
U.S. 531, 541-542 (1994) (noting traditional State-level 
management of foreclosure).  The mediation ordinance alters what 
the Legislature determined, as a matter of policy, to be the 
just medium between the parties involved in the contemplation of 
a mortgage foreclosure.  By so doing, the ordinance necessarily 
"frustrate[s] the purpose" of the foreclosure statute.  Wendell, 
394 Mass. at 529.  
 
The Legislature's amendment of the foreclosure statute in 
2012 provides further support for our conclusion that the 
foreclosure process is wholly a matter of State regulation 
absent an expression of a clear intent to allow local 
regulation.  General Laws c. 244, § 35B, inserted by St. 2012, 
13 
 
c. 194, § 2, prohibits a mortgagee from proceeding with 
foreclosure by sale if the mortgage loan at issue in the 
foreclosure qualifies as a "certain mortgage loan," as defined 
by G. L. c. 244, § 35B (a).  If the loan qualifies, the 
mortgagee must conduct an analysis of whether the mortgagor is 
capable of paying a modified mortgage loan, and it must offer 
the mortgagee any such identified loan.  See G. L. c. 244, 
§ 35B (b).  This analysis and offer, if any is forthcoming, 
constitute objective evidence of a good faith effort to prevent 
foreclosure.  Id.  We think the differing treatment of lenders 
based on the particular circumstances of the mortgage loan in 
question indicates that the Legislature considered and rejected 
other possible means of regulation.  Accordingly, we discern a 
legislative intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of other 
options -- including further regulation at the local level. 
 
ii.  Foreclosure ordinance.  The foreclosure statute does 
not preempt the foreclosure ordinance.  As we stated above, 
G. L. c. 244 establishes procedures by which the equity of 
redemption in a mortgage may be foreclosed.  The foreclosure 
ordinance does not impact that process.  Although a mortgagee's 
duty to maintain and repair arises under the ordinance and other 
liabilities may arise from actions required under the ordinance, 
nothing in the ordinance affects the procedures for foreclosing 
the equity of redemption.  It is immaterial for purposes of 
14 
 
liability under the ordinance that the ordinance considers the 
foreclosure process initiated at a different moment than the 
statute because the ordinance does not purport to have any legal 
effect on the statutory foreclosure process.5  We therefore 
conclude that the foreclosure ordinance does not conflict with 
the foreclosure statute.6  
 
b.  Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release 
Prevention Act.  As we explain, we determine that the 
foreclosure ordinance is inconsistent with G. L. c. 21E, the 
OHMRPA.  The foreclosure ordinance requires an "owner of a 
vacant and/or foreclosing property" to "[r]emove from the 
property, to the satisfaction of the fire commissioner, 
hazardous material as that term is defined in Massachusetts 
General Laws, chapter 21K, as that statute may be amended from 
time to time . . . ."  The plaintiffs argue that the foreclosure 
ordinance's definition of "owner" is broader than the definition 
                     
 
5 As discussed infra, where the mortgage authorizes the 
mortgagee to make repairs upon the mortgagor's failure to do so, 
the mortgagee is deemed to have initiated the foreclosure 
process.  
 
 
6 The foreclosure ordinance also is not inconsistent with 
G. L. c. 266, § 120, the criminal trespass statute.  The 
criminal trespass statute applies to those who enter "without 
right."  G. L. c. 266, § 120.  A mortgagee may have a right to 
enter property either under the terms of the mortgage or under 
G. L. c. 244, § 9. 
 
15 
 
included in the OHMRPA.7  In the plaintiff's view, this 
overbreadth directly places the foreclosure ordinance squarely 
in conflict with a clearly stated legislative policy.  We agree.   
 
The OHMRPA is a statute "drafted in a comprehensive fashion 
to compel the prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous material 
and to ensure that costs and damages are borne by the 
appropriate responsible parties.  To that end, the [Department 
of Environmental Quality Engineering] has promulgated extensive 
regulations . . . for purposes of implementing, administering, 
and enforcing [the OHMRPA]."  Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assocs., 
436 Mass. 217, 223 (2002).  Under the OHMRPA, a secured lender 
will "not be deemed an owner or operator with respect to the 
site securing the loan" if certain conditions are met.  G. L. 
c. 21E, § 2 (c).  However, this exemption from liability under 
OHMRPA applies only to "releases and threats of release that 
first begin to occur before such secured lender acquires 
ownership or possession of the site . . . ."  G. L. c. 21E, 
§ 2 (c) (1).  "Nothing in this definition shall relieve a 
secured lender of any liability for a release or threat of 
release that first begins to occur at or from a site . . . 
during the time that such secured lender has ownership or 
                     
 
7 The definition of "owner" in G. L. c. 21K references the 
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act 
(OHMRPA).  Both c. 21K, which addresses the mitigation of 
hazardous materials, and the OHMRPA utilize the same definition 
of "hazardous material."   
16 
 
possession of such site . . . for any purpose."  Id.  
Furthermore, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this 
definition, a secured lender shall be deemed an owner or 
operator of an abandoned site . . . if such secured lender . . . 
held ownership or possession of such site . . . immediately 
prior to such abandonment."  G. L. c. 21E, § 2 (c) (2).   
 
The plaintiffs argue that the foreclosure ordinance 
forcibly exposes them to liability under the OHMRPA if, in 
complying with the mandate of the ordinance, they enter a 
property and become mortgagees in possession during or after 
which a release or threat of release of hazardous material 
occurs.  The imposition of liability in such circumstances would 
defeat the safe harbor for secured lenders provided by the 
Legislature.  We agree.   
 
The OHMRPA is a "comprehensive" statute.  Taygeta Corp., 
436 Mass. at 223.  "Legislation which deals with a subject 
comprehensively . . . may reasonably be inferred as intended to 
preclude the exercise of any local power or function on the same 
subject because otherwise the legislative purpose of that 
statute would be frustrated."  Bloom, 363 Mass. at 155.  Here, 
we can infer that the Legislature has decided that secured 
lenders not in possession (nor previously in possession) of a 
site should not be liable for any hazardous material releases at 
that site.  The foreclosure ordinance alters that calculus by 
17 
 
requiring mortgagees not yet in possession to enter the property 
and assume possession.  In so doing, a secured lender may become 
liable under the OHMRPA through compliance with the foreclosure 
ordinance.  As such, the foreclosure ordinance is inconsistent 
with the OHMRPA.   
 
The city argues that the very language of the ordinance 
eliminates any inconsistency between it and the OHMRPA because 
the ordinance does not apply to owners "exempt from such actions 
by Massachusetts General Laws."  We are unpersuaded by this 
argument.  "The existence of legislation on a subject . . . is 
not necessarily a bar to the enactment of local ordinances and 
by-laws exercising powers or functions with respect to the same 
subject[,]" but can be a bar when "the Legislature has . . . 
[impliedly] . . . forbidden the adoption of local ordinances and 
by-laws on that subject."  Del Duca v. Town Adm'r of Methuen, 
368 Mass. 1, 11 (1975), quoting Bloom, 363 Mass. at 156.  Simply 
put, a municipality has no regulatory power in a field already 
wholly occupied by the State unless explicitly granted such 
power to regulate by the statute itself.  The city cannot exempt 
a secured lender from the foreclosure ordinance if it has no 
power to include the lender.  See N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:11, at 326-327 
(7th ed. rev. 2014) ("A true statutory exception exists only to 
exempt something which would otherwise be covered by an act").  
18 
 
 
c.  State sanitary code.  The plaintiffs challenge the 
foreclosure ordinance by claiming it is inconsistent with the 
Sanitary code and the regulations promulgated under it, 105 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 400 (1993), together known as the State sanitary 
code (code).  "General Laws c. 111, §§ 127A-127N, reflect a 
comprehensive legislative attempt to effectuate compliance with 
minimum health and safety standards for residential premises."  
Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 199, 202 (1977).  A local board of 
health is permitted "to adopt such rules and regulations as, in 
its opinion, may be necessary for the particular locality under 
its jurisdiction; provided, such rules and regulations do not 
conflict with the laws of the commonwealth or the provisions of 
the code."  G. L. c. 111, § 127A.  Enforcement of the code and 
any local regulations falls to the local board of health or the 
Department of Public Health by service of an order on the owner 
of a property.  Id.  105 Code Mass. Regs. § 400.200-400.300 
(1993).  The local board of health and the Department of Public 
Health, as well as a tenant, also may petition a court to 
enforce the requirements of the code.  G. L. c. 111, §§ 127A, 
127C.  Among the available remedies are criminal or civil 
injunctive relief, correction of the violation by the board 
itself at the expense of the owner, appointment of a receiver, 
or condemnation and demolition of the building.  G. L. c. 111, 
19 
 
§§ 127A, 127B, 127I.  105 Code Mass. Regs. § 400.700(B) (1993).  
105 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 410.910, 410.950-410.960 (2007).   
 
The appointment of a receiver, while a familiar instrument 
of equity, is an extraordinary remedy.  Perez v. Boston Hous. 
Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 735-736 (1980).  General Laws c. 111, 
§ 127I, "set[s] forth circumstances that permit a court to 
appoint a receiver (i.e., when it 'may' do so) as well as those 
circumstances when appointment of a receiver is mandated (i.e., 
when it 'shall' do so)."  Boston v. Rochalska, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 
236, 243 (2008).  Section 127I "require[s] the appointment of a 
receiver to undertake remedial action when there are ongoing 
sanitary code violations in an occupied building 'and the court 
determines that such appointment is in the best interest of the 
occupants residing in the property,' but mak[es] the appointment 
discretionary when the building is unoccupied or, if occupied, 
when the best interests of occupants do not require 
appointment."  Id. at 244.   
 
The foreclosure ordinance amalgamates two separate 
enforcement procedures envisioned in the State sanitary code 
into a single regulatory mechanism:  the use of the surety bond 
and direct entry by an enforcement authority.  Under the State 
sanitary code, an enforcement authority initially can only issue 
an order to the owner (as defined by 105 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 410.020 [2007]) or petition a court for enforcement.  Only 
20 
 
after "a failure to comply with an order . . . results in a 
condition which endangers or materially impairs the health or 
well-being of the occupant or the public" may an enforcement 
authority cause "such proper cleaning or repair and charge the 
responsible person or persons as hereinbefore provided with any 
and all expenses incurred."  105 Code Mass. Regs. § 410.960(A) 
(2007).  The code requires only receivers to post a bond, not 
owners subject to the code.  G. L. c. 111, § 127I.  Even then, 
receivers are required to post a bond only after appointment by 
a court of competent jurisdiction.  Id.   
 
The foreclosure ordinance requires an owner, subject only 
to an administrative order and fine followed by charged expenses 
under the code, to post a bond to ensure compliance with the 
ordinance.  The building commissioner may draw on the bond after 
failure of an owner to pay within seven days the expenses of a 
direct entry by the building commissioner or his agents.  The 
code envisions that expenses for such a direct entry can be 
recouped by an action at law or by placing a lien on the 
property.  105 Code Mass. Regs. § 410.950(D) (2007).  The 
foreclosure ordinance places a heavier burden on an owner than 
does the code to ensure enforcement of essentially the same 
mandates by requiring an owner to post a bond where the code 
would require none.  "Given the comprehensiveness of the [code] 
and the remedies provided therein," it is inconsistent with the 
21 
 
code for a municipality to require a surety bond of an owner in 
situations where the code would require none.  See Boston Gas 
Co. v. Newton, 425 Mass. 697, 704-705 (1997).  In addition, the 
code's provision for the use of a surety bond limits the city's 
power to require such a bond in any other context of code 
enforcement.  See 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 400.015 (1993) ("Nor 
should the existence of the State Sanitary Code limit or 
otherwise affect the power of any health authority with respect 
to any matter for which the State Sanitary Code makes no 
provision").  The city, by the terms of the code, may require 
only a surety bond in the manner the code allows.  The 
foreclosure ordinance requires a surety bond in circumstances 
different from those of the code.  Thus the foreclosure 
ordinance conflicts with the code.8   
 
4.  Lawful fee.  The plaintiffs challenge the foreclosure 
ordinance by characterizing it as an unlawful tax instead of a 
lawful fee.  The city imposes a charge on foreclosing mortgagees 
                     
 
8 Although we determine that State law preempts the 
foreclosure ordinance, the effect of this preemption vis-à-vis a 
general severability clause is not before us.  "Neither a trial 
judge nor this court can consider such alleged ordinances unless 
they are put in evidence."  Fournier v. Central Taxi Cab, Inc., 
331 Mass. 248, 249 (1954), and cases cited.  Nor are local 
ordinances "an appropriate subject of judicial notice."  
Lawrence v. Falzarano, 380 Mass. 18, 25 n.10 (1980).  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 202(c) (2013).  We note that the foreclosure 
ordinance, unlike the mediation ordinance, does not have a 
severability provision specific to itself. 
 
22 
 
to register the property with the city.9  "A municipality does 
not have the power to levy, assess, or collect a tax unless the 
power to do so in a particular instance is granted by the 
Legislature."  Silva v. Attleboro, 454 Mass. 165, 168 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 91, 92 
(1987).  The plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the 
invalidity of the exaction.  Id.  The operation of the exaction, 
rather than the specific language used to describe it, 
ultimately demonstrates its nature.  Id.  Fees share certain 
common characteristics that distinguish them from taxes and 
establish the lens through which to determine their nature.  
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 610 (2011) (Doe No. 10800).  
Utilizing these characteristics, we arrive at the conclusion 
that the monetary exaction at issue here is a lawful fee, and 
not a tax.   
 
a.  Particularized benefit.  Fees "are charged in exchange 
for a particular governmental service which benefits the party 
paying the fee in a manner 'not shared by other members of 
society.'"  Emerson College v. Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 424 
(1984), quoting National Cable Television Ass'n v. United 
States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974).  In Doe No. 10800, we examined 
                     
 
9 Because we determine that the city's requirement that a 
registrant post a bond is preempted by State law, we analyze 
this question as if the city charged a fee directly instead of 
retaining part of the bond.   
23 
 
whether an exaction that the Legislature authorized from sex 
offenders who were required to register with a supervisory board 
constituted a regulatory fee or tax.  459 Mass. at 605, 610-615.  
There, we further affirmed our reasoning in Silva, 454 Mass. at 
170, that "the particularized benefit provided in exchange for 
the [regulatory fee] is the existence of the regulatory scheme 
whose costs the fee serves to defray."  Such fees "serve 
regulatory purposes either 'directly by, for example, 
deliberately discouraging particular conduct by making it more 
expensive,' or indirectly by defraying an agency's regulation-
related expenses."  Id. at 171, quoting Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. 
Low-Level Waste Mgt. Bd., 421 Mass. 196, 201-202 (1995).   
 
"In the context of regulatory fees, we construe the term 
'benefit' broadly to encompass the provision of particular 
governmental services to a group of individuals whose actions 
have necessitated the regulatory scheme in the first instance 
and who should shoulder the burden of paying for such services.  
That this may not be viewed as a 'benefit' to [one subject to 
the scheme] in the traditional sense of the word does not 
detract from the fact that a governmental entity has provided a 
particularized 'service' to individuals who require it."  Doe 
No. 10800, 459 Mass. at 611.  The city has stated its belief 
that properties in foreclosure are more likely to become 
nuisances than other properties and that a downward spiral of 
24 
 
urban blight can occur as nuisance properties in foreclosure 
affect the values of other properties around it, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of foreclosure.  The foreclosure 
ordinance attempts to regulate this phenomenon by addressing the 
period of time between when a mortgagor has stopped tending to 
the property (due either to the futility of the exercise in the 
face of foreclosure and unavoidable eviction or to the fact that 
the property is already vacant with no party responsible for its 
care) and when the mortgagee or new occupant comes into 
possession.  While the act of foreclosing by mortgagees should 
not be equated with the acts of those subject to the regulatory 
scheme in Doe No. 10800, foreclosure is nevertheless the 
operation that triggers the conditions giving rise to the 
perceived necessity for the regulatory scheme.  That this 
regulatory scheme is not viewed as a benefit by the plaintiffs 
does not detract from the fact that the city provides a 
particularized service to the plaintiffs in the form of 
maintaining property values of their loan collateral through 
enforcement of the foreclosure ordinance after foreclosure has 
commenced.  See Nuclear Metals, Inc., 421 Mass. at 205 ("It is 
appropriate that the entities which generate low-level 
radioactive waste (and not the taxpayers of the Commonwealth) 
should shoulder costs associated with protecting the general 
public from the hazards posed by the waste").   
25 
 
 
b.  Costs.  Fees, unlike taxes, "are collected not to raise 
revenues but to compensate the governmental entity providing the 
services for its expenses."  Emerson College, 391 Mass. at 425.  
Here, the fee is paid into "an account for expenses incurred in 
inspecting, securing, and marking said building and other such 
buildings that are not in compliance with this Section."  See 
id. at 427 (stating deposit of exaction into general fund 
nondecisively weighs in favor of tax, not fee).  "The critical 
question is whether the fees are reasonably designed to 
compensate an entity for its anticipated regulatory expenses."  
Doe No. 10800, 459 Mass. at 612.  In reviewing this question, 
"reasonable latitude must be given to the agency in fixing 
charges to cover its anticipated expenses in connection with the 
services to be rendered."  Southview Coop. Hous. Corp. v. Rent 
Control Bd. of Cambridge, 396 Mass. 395, 403 (1985).  Such 
charges should "not be scrutinized too curiously even if some 
incidental revenue were obtained."  Id., quoting Opinion of the 
Justices, 250 Mass. 591, 602 (1924).  "Relevant expenses include 
both the direct and the indirect or incidental costs associated 
with the particular government service."  Doe No. 10800, 459 
Mass. at 613.  
 
The plaintiffs argue that the funds that do not apply 
directly to the registered compliant properties are utilized to 
secure other, noncompliant properties and are never recovered by 
26 
 
the original payor.  These excess monies, therefore, indicate 
that the exaction is excessive to the costs of the benefit.10  
This argument passes over the fact that the foreclosure 
ordinance envisions that the expenditures of the city in 
entering and securing a noncompliant property will indeed be 
initially financed by a portion of the administrative fee from 
the compliant properties paid into an account to fund the city's 
actions in securing the noncompliant properties but that 
ultimately the penalties that other properties will incur 
through noncompliance will cover those expenditures of the city.  
This initial financing of a portion of the regulatory scheme 
beyond the simple processing and registration of a compliant 
property is "an indirect or incidental cost[] associated" with 
the foreclosure ordinance.  Doe No. 10800, 459 Mass. at 613.   
 
c.  Voluntariness.  The parties agree that the exaction at 
issue in the foreclosure ordinance is involuntarily paid.  We 
have "consistently given less weight to the voluntariness 
factor" in the context of regulatory fees.  Silva, 454 Mass. at 
172.  The purpose of the foreclosure ordinance is "to promote 
                     
 
10 The foreclosure ordinance does not specify the amount of 
the administrative fee.  Therefore, although we discuss the role 
of the exaction relative to costs and ultimately determine that 
the exaction is a fee, we can make no further determination 
whether the exaction unlawfully raises revenue or, 
alternatively, compensates the city on the record before us.  We 
note that the mere fact that a fee creates some revenue does not 
transform the fee into a tax.  See Opinion of the Justices, 250 
Mass. 591, 602 (1924).   
27 
 
the health, safety and welfare of the public, to protect and 
preserve the quiet enjoyment of occupants, abutters and 
neighborhoods, and to minimize hazards to public safety 
personnel inspecting or entering such properties."  Exactions 
founded upon the police power to regulate particular activities 
are regulatory fees.  See id. at 168.  Accordingly, in this 
context, the issue of voluntariness "is of no relevance in 
determining whether that charge is a fee or a tax."  Id. at 172.  
 
In conclusion, for the aforementioned reasons, we determine 
that the city's exaction from those subject to the foreclosure 
ordinance would be a lawful fee, rather than a tax.11  
Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the 
negative.   
 
We recognize that the city of Springfield has attempted to 
address the serious problem of urban blight within its borders 
through these ordinances.  Although we conclude that the city 
may not achieve its goal by ordinance as it has here attempted, 
a solution may be provided through the Legislature.  
 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of this court, to the clerk of 
                     
 
11 The plaintiffs also argue that the city lacks the 
statutory authorization to impose this exaction.  The plaintiffs 
point to nothing in the record to support this contention.  We 
assume, without deciding, that the city does have this authority 
pursuant to G. L. c. 40, § 22F, and that the city has duly 
adopted this provision.   
28 
 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, as the 
answers to the questions certified, and will also transmit a 
copy to each party.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.