Title: Helton v. Phillip A. Glick Plumbing
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 081240
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2009

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL L. HELTON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No.  081240  
   JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
   FEBRUARY 27, 2009 
PHILLIP A. GLICK PLUMBING, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this case, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in failing to find an accord and satisfaction by use of an 
instrument. 
 
Phillip A. Glick Plumbing, Inc. (“Glick Plumbing”) filed a 
warrant in debt in the General District Court of Rockingham 
County claiming payment due for plumbing work that had been 
completed on a house owned by Michael L. Helton (“Helton”).  The 
case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Rockingham County.  In 
the circuit court, Helton filed a plea in bar claiming an accord 
and satisfaction pursuant to Code § 8.3A-311.  The plea in bar 
was denied after argument, and the case proceeded to trial.  
After the trial, the circuit court awarded Glick Plumbing a 
judgment of $1,686.51 plus interest.  Helton objected to the 
judgment, claiming that he had proven an accord and satisfaction 
by use of an instrument.  Helton appeals. 
FACTS 
 
In 2005, Helton met with Andy Glick (“Glick”), owner of 
Glick Plumbing, and they orally contracted for Glick Plumbing to 
 
 
complete plumbing work on a house under construction in Penn 
Laird, Virginia.  The plumbing services were to be charged at 
the rate of $35 per hour plus the cost of materials.  After the 
initial work was done, Helton noted that the workers were taking 
extended breaks and generally working slowly.  He informed Glick 
about these problems.  Glick acknowledged the complaint but did 
not agree that the workers were wasting time.  
After Helton received the initial invoice, he requested an 
itemized statement and paid a portion of the invoice.  Glick 
complained to Helton about the partial payment, and Helton told 
him that the issue of wasted time and materials would have to be 
addressed before he would make a full payment.  Glick again 
denied that any time or materials were being wasted. 
Helton later contracted with Glick Plumbing to install a 
hot water heater in the Penn Laird home.  Glick agreed to 
install the hot water heater if payment would be made.  Helton 
agreed to pay for the hot water heater and the hours worked to 
make the installation. 
Helton kept track of the hours related to the installation 
of the hot water heater.  After receiving the invoice, Helton 
told Glick that the amount billed was “considerably high based 
on the hours worked, multiplied by the rate per hour.”  Helton 
then paid for the hot water heater installation but did not pay 
for all of the hours billed for the work. 
 
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Helton, thereafter, sent two letters to Glick’s business 
address advising him of perceived problems with overbilling on 
the original job as well as on the installation of the water 
heater.  These letters contained detailed allegations of workers 
“goofing off” and wasted materials.  After sending these 
letters, Helton mailed a cashier’s check to Glick’s business 
address in the amount of $1,300, which was $1,686.51 less than 
the amount billed.  The cashier’s check included the words “Paid 
in Full” on the memo line on the front of the check.  
Accompanying the check, Helton sent a letter stating that the 
amount was reduced from the total amount billed, due to the 
previously reported issues with overbilling of hours and wasted 
materials.  Both the letter and the check indicated that no more 
payments would be made.  
Later, Glick Plumbing mailed Helton another invoice asking 
for the remainder of the amount billed.  This invoice included a 
copy of Helton’s cashier’s check, which had been deposited into 
Glick Plumbing’s bank account. The words “Paid in Full” had been 
crossed out on the check, and the words “No” and “Balance Due 
$1,686.51” had been added. 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Helton assigns error to the circuit court’s 
denial of his plea in bar and defense of an accord and 
satisfaction.  Helton claims he satisfied all the requirements 
 
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set forth in Code § 8.3A-311 for an accord and satisfaction by 
use of an instrument.  Glick Plumbing argues that even if the 
statute applies, Helton does not meet the criteria for an accord 
and satisfaction by use of an instrument because “he did not act 
in good faith with an honest belief that a bona fide dispute 
existed.”  
 
Code § 8.3A-311 was adopted by the General Assembly in 1992 
as an amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), and it 
is applicable to the situation presented in this appeal.  Code 
§ 8.3A-311; see Johnston v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 271 Va. 239, 
244, 624 S.E.2d 10, 12 (2006).  In order to prove an accord and 
satisfaction by use of an instrument, the person against whom 
the claim is asserted, the debtor, must prove that: (1) he in 
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full 
satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was 
unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute and (3) the 
claimant obtained payment of the instrument.  Code § 8.3A-
311(a).  Unless subsection (c) of the statute applies, the claim 
is discharged if the debtor proves that the instrument or an 
accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous 
statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full 
satisfaction of the claim.∗  Code § 8.3A-311(b).  
                     
∗ Code § 8.3A-311(c) is inapplicable in this case. 
Subsection (c) of the Code states that the debt is not 
 
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It is undisputed that Glick Plumbing received and deposited 
the check from Helton.  Glick conceded that Helton complained to 
him more than once concerning allegations of overbilling and 
wasted materials.  Helton told Glick that the issue of wasted 
time and materials would need to be addressed before full 
payment would be made.  Further, Helton wrote two letters to 
Glick about his allegations that workers were “goofing off” and 
wasting time.  Thus, the amount of Glick Plumbing’s claim was 
the subject of a bona fide dispute. 
 
The Code defines “in good faith” as honesty in fact and in 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing. Code § 8.3A-103. In the present case, the circuit 
court’s approved statement of facts indicates that Helton 
submitted the cashier’s check to Glick Plumbing’s business 
address.  Further, the check submitted was clearly marked “Paid 
in Full,” and a letter accompanying the check indicated that 
Helton was submitting the check in full satisfaction of the 
                                                                  
discharged if the claimant, if an organization, proves that it 
sent a statement to the person against whom the claim is 
asserted that communications concerning disputed debts, 
including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, 
are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and the 
instrument or accompanying communication was not received by 
that designated person, or if a claimant, whether or not an 
organization, proves that within ninety days after payment of 
the instrument, the claimant tendered repayment of the amount of 
the instrument to the person against whom the claim is asserted.  
Code § 8.3A-311(c).  Glick Plumbing has not alleged any facts 
 
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claim.  There have been no claims that the check was submitted 
fraudulently.  The evidence before the circuit court showed that 
the check was tendered in good faith in order to settle the 
disputed claim. 
 
Because subsection (c) does not apply, the claim is 
discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted 
proves that the “instrument or an accompanying written 
communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect 
that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the 
claim.”  Code § 8.3A-311(b).  The circuit court’s approved 
statement of facts states that Helton’s cashier’s check was 
mailed to Glick’s business address with an accompanying 
explanatory letter.  Helton wrote, “Paid in Full” on the 
cashier’s check.  The letter made it clear that no more payments 
would be made.  Before depositing Helton’s check, Glick Plumbing 
placed a line through the notation “Paid in Full” and wrote “No” 
and “Balance Due $1,686.51” on the check, verifying Glick 
Plumbing’s knowledge of the language on the check.  Thus, we 
hold that Glick Plumbing received a conspicuous statement to the 
effect that Helton’s check was being tendered as full 
satisfaction of the claim. 
                                                                  
that would support the application of this subsection in this 
case.   
 
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The remaining issue is whether Glick Plumbing’s alteration 
of the “Paid in Full” language on Helton’s check allows Glick 
Plumbing to avoid a finding of an accord and satisfaction by 
showing that Glick Plumbing’s acceptance of the check was for a 
partial payment only.  We hold that it does not. 
At common law, if the instrument is sent to the creditor 
with a statement that the amount is in full satisfaction of the 
claim and the creditor accepts it with knowledge of such 
condition, then an accord and satisfaction results.  See 
Virginia-Carolina Elec. Works v. Cooper, 192 Va. 78, 81, 63 
S.E.2d 717, 719 (1951).  While some jurisdictions have held that 
the UCC allows a creditor to avoid an accord and satisfaction by 
altering the “Paid in Full” notation, in keeping with the 
majority view, we hold that the UCC does not change the common 
law, and that the common law does not allow acceptance with 
alteration of an instrument tendered in good faith as a full 
payment of the disputed debt.   Sarah H. Jenkins, 13 Corbin on 
Contracts § 70.2, at 318-27 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed., rev. ed. 
2003).  See also Nizan v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn. N.A., 274 Va. 
481, 491, 650 S.E.2d 497, 502 (2007) (under Code § 8.1A-103, 
unless displaced by the particular provisions of the UCC, common 
law doctrines are continued). 
 
For these reasons, we hold that Helton proved an accord and 
satisfaction by use of an instrument.  Accordingly, we will 
 
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reverse the judgment of the circuit court and enter final 
judgment in favor of Helton.  
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
 
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