Title: Bouche Et Ux v. Wagner Et Ux
Citation: 206 Or. 621, 293 P.2d 203
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 1956

Reversed and remanded with instructions February 8, 1956.
Petition for rehearing denied March 7, 1956.
*622 Bruce Williams, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs was John H. Carson, Salem.
W.C. Winslow, Salem, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
PERRY, J.
This is a suit commenced by the plaintiffs to quiet their title in and to certain real property described in their complaint as follows:
The defendants by answer allege ownership of a strip of land carved out of and running through the above-described real property in a generally easterly and westerly direction, which is more particularly described in the deeds hereinafter set out.
For clarity a drawing is here set forth.
On November 7, 1921, the owners of the land in section 7 conveyed to the Silverton Lumber Company (from whom the defendants deraign title) a portion of land in that section as follows:
On October 12, 1918, Lizzie M. Burdick and S.J. Burdick, being the then owners of Lot 2 in section 12, conveyed a strip of land to the Lumbermens Engineering Company. This deed of conveyance was not introduced in evidence and is not before us.
On September 9, 1919, the Lumbermens Engineering Company, in accordance with their agreement as trustees of the land for the benefit of the Silverton Lumber Company (from whom these defendants deraign title), conveyed to that company the strip of land in dispute in Lot 2, section 12, together with other lands, by deed as follows:
*627 The Silverton Lumber Company constructed a railroad running through the strip of land in dispute, and sometime in 1931 or 1932 abandoned further use of the road, and removed the rails and a portion of the ties therefrom.
The Silverton Lumber Company was granted a certificate of dissolution by the state corporation commissioner on June 30, 1936. On December 20, 1939, the Silverton Lumber Company, by its board of directors, executed two quitclaim deeds to Earl and Jessie Chapel, the then owners of land adjoining plaintiffs' property on the east; the deeds being in part as follows:
The deed quitclaiming the land in section 7 is identical to the above-deed, except for the description of the property which reads as follows:
Each deed was signed by the president and secretary, and acknowledged by them as having been done by authority of the board of directors, and the corporate seal was affixed.
The Chapels conveyed their land adjoining the plaintiffs' land and the strips of land set forth in the above conveyances from the Silverton Lumber Company to the defendants herein on May 24, 1945.
The plaintiffs base their claim of ownership in fee simple upon two propositions: (1) The Silverton Lumber Company operating a railroad obtained only an easement in the property, and, since the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest were the owners of the lands surrounding the strip, upon abandonment of the *629 railroad the lands reverted to them; (2) they obtained title by adverse possession.
The defendants base their claim of ownership to the strip of land upon the assertion of a fee title in the Silverton Lumber Company, and also claim by adverse possession.
A decree for the plaintiffs was entered in the trial court, and the defendants have appealed.
1. We are satisfied from a search of the record that the claim to ownership by adverse possession was not proven by either the plaintiffs or the defendants.
It is, therefore, necessary to consider the nature of the estate in the real property acquired by the Silverton Lumber Company. If an easement, then the plaintiffs should prevail; if a fee simple title, then the defendants should prevail.
The plaintiffs rely upon the following words, found in the conveyance of November 7, 1921, as restricting the conveyance to an easement only:
2. "Whether an instrument conveys ownership of the land or only an easement depends upon the intention of the parties." 28 CJS 681, Easements § 27.
ORS 93.120 provides:
3. The intention to convey less than the full fee must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied from *630 the words used in the conveyance. Weniger v. Ripley, 134 Or 265, 293 P 425. The courts and text-books writers have suggested many tests as aids in determining the intention of the parties. See 2 Thompson, Real Property (perm ed) §§ 459 and 462; Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky 105, 132 SW2d 768, 132 ALR 137, and annotation following; Brightwell et al v. I. &amp; G.N. Ry. Co. et al., 121 Tex 338, 49 SW2d 437, 84 ALR 265, and annotation following. Some of these tests are set forth and applied by this court in Bernards et ux v. Link and Haynes, 199 Or 579, 248 P2d 341, 263 P2d 794.
A study of the cited cases suggests that the courts have little difficulty, where a railroad company is grantee, in declaring that the instrument creates only an easement whenever the grant is a use to be made of the property, usually, but not invariably, described as for use as a right of way in the grant.
On the other hand, the general rule concerning the grant of land to a railroad as distinguished from the grant of a right or use thereof is stated by the author of the annotation of 132 ALR 145 as follows:
The courts, however, seem to express a divergence of opinion when the conveyance merely has a reference to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put, and which is contained in either the granting or habendum clause, and, except for the reference, would uniformily *631 be construed as passing title in fee. This confusion, we think, arises for the most part in the failure to distinguish the twofold meaning of the words "right of way."
In New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 US 171, 183, 19 S Ct 128, it is stated:
See also Johnson v. Valdosta, M. &amp; W.R. Co., 169 Ga 559, 150 SE 845.
Let us now consider the conveyance of the strip in Section 7, conveyed to the Silverton Lumber Company. The conveyance is not entitled (1) a "right of way deed"; (2) the granting clause conveys land, not a right; (3) the consideration was substantial ($650); (4) there is no reverter provided for; (5) the words *632 "over and across the lands of the grantors" do not appear; and (6) the land conveyed is described with precision. The only indication that the parties may have intended an easement should pass is the incidental reference to a "right of way" in the covenant following the granting and habendum clause. Thus the term "right of way" as used in the deed could have referred to either the right of passage or to the land itself. There is nothing therein which in anywise limits the company in the use it might make of the land, and in every other particular the conveyance clearly states the conveyance of the fee.
4. We must, therefore, conclude that it was the intention of the parties that the fee in the land should pass.
The deed of the strip of land across Lot 2, Section 12, from Lizzie M. and S.J. Burdick to the Lumbermans Engineering Company was not introduced as evidence in the trial court. All we have is the deed from the Lumbermans Engineering Company to the Silverton Lumber Company, which includes eleven parcels of land.
Paragraph (8) of the deed described the strip in Lot 2, section 12, and, while there was no mention of the phrase "right of way" in paragraph (8), it is urged by the plaintiff that we should look to the conveyance of the strip across Lot 7, section 13, conveyed to the Lumbermans Engineering Company by Henry and Alice Lyons and described in paragraph (3), and to the conveyance of the strip across a portion of section 8 conveyed by Frank, Caroline and Chester Kubin and described in paragraph (10). Both of these descriptions incidently refer to the strip conveyed as a "right of way." It is doubtful whether these references carry any more weight than the reference *633 in the Burdick-Silverton Lumber Company deed, but we do not feel it necessary to consider that issue.
5, 6. This situation does not come within the rule first set out in this state in Kruse v. Prindle, 8 Or 158, which provided that two conveyances executed at the same time between the same parties and relating to the same subject matter may be construed together. The three deeds described in paragraphs 3, 8 and 10 refer to three separate instruments by three separate grantors, dealing with three separate parcels of land. The rule is well-stated in Rogers v. Powers, 204 Mass 257, 264, 90 NE 514:
See, also, Blagen v. Thompson, 23 Or 239, 31 P 647, 18 LRA 315.
7. Thus, we see that the deed to the strip across Lot 2, section 12 contained no mention of a right of way; it described the subject of the grant as "a strip of land," not as a "right," and there was no statement of the purposes for which it was granted; it described the land conveyed with a relatively high degree of precision; and the habendum clause is of the type usually employed to convey a fee simple title. This deed conveyed the fee simple title to the land involved.
*634 The plaintiffs make a further attack upon the defendants' record title. They state in their brief:
In answer to this contention, we quote from 19 CJS 659, Corporations § 1099b:
In 19 CJS, Corporations § 1100b, we find:
8. A certificate of dissolution was filed by the Silverton Lumber Company on June 30, 1936. The deeds *635 to the Chapels were executed by the Silverton Lumber Company in 1939  within the five year period during which a dissolved corporation was then authorized to continue its existence as a body corporate for winding up its affairs. § 25-221, Oregon Code 1930. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to show that the deeds from the Silverton Lumber Company were executed without proper authority. Atlantic &amp; Pacific R.R. Co., v. City of St. Louis, 66 Mo 228.
In view of our conclusions as to the deeds in question, it is unnecessary to consider the validity or invalidity of defendants' tax foreclosure deed from Marion County.
The decree of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with instructions to enter a decree not inconsistent with our opinion.
Neither party shall recover costs in this court.
TOOZE, J., not participating.