Title: State v. Sellers
Citation: 161 S.E.2d 15, 273 N.C. 641
Docket Number: 254
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 1968

161 S.E.2d 15 (1968) 273 N.C. 641 STATE of North Carolina v. Jack SELLERS. No. 254. Supreme Court of North Carolina. May 8, 1968. *18 Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Asst. Atty. Gen. Bernard A. Harrell, for the State. Charles V. Bell, Charlotte, for defendant appellant. PARKER, Chief Justice. Defendant did not make a motion in the trial court for arrest of judgment on the ground the indictment was defective. For the first time in this Court he moved "for arrest of judgment on the ground that the identity of the building alleged to have been broken and entered into by the defendant is not alleged with reasonable particularity to enable the defendant to plead his plea of `nolo contendere' as a bar to further prosecution for the same offense." A motion in arrest of judgment predicated upon some fatal error or defect appearing on the face of the record proper may be made at any time in any court having jurisdiction of the matter. This is true even though the motion is made for the first time in the Supreme Court at the hearing of the appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court. State v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 266, 37 S.E.2d 678; State v. Bradley, 210 N.C. 290, 186 S.E. 240; State v. Baxter, 208 N.C. 90, 179 S.E. 450; State v. McKnight, 196 N.C. 259, 145 S.E. 281; State v. Marsh, 132 N.C. 1000, 43 S.E. 828. The indictment is based upon the following language of G.S. § 14-54: The indictment in the instant case charges a felonious breaking and entry into "a certain storehouse, shop, warehouse, dwelling house and building occupied by one Leesona Corporation, a corporation * * *." This is said in 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 166: See also State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 47, 164 S.E. 732, cert. den. 287 U.S. 645, 53 S. Ct. 91, 77 L. Ed. 558; 27 Am.Jur. Indictments and Informations § 104. This is said in State v. Williams, 210 N. C. 159, 185 S.E. 661: State v. Knight, 261 N.C. 17, 134 S.E.2d 101, was a criminal prosecution on a three-count indictment charging the defendants with (1) non-burglariously breaking and entry, (2) larceny of a metal safe, of $75,000 in U. S. currency, and of stock and securities of the value of $100,000, and (3) receiving. The defendants pleaded not guilty. From a verdict of guilty and a sentence of imprisonment, they appealed to the Supreme Court. Defendants assigned as error the denial of their motion to quash the indictment, made in apt time before pleading to the indictment. They contended that the indictment should be quashed for this reason, inter alia, that the first count charges them with a non-burglariously breaking and entry into "a certain storehouse, shop, warehouse, dwelling house and building occupied by one Dr. D. W. McAnally," etc., which does not give them any specific information as to the type of structure they are charged with breaking into. The Court held that this assignment of error was without merit. In its language the Court said: The exact point presented on this appeal was presented in State v. Burgess, 1 N.C. App. 142, 160 S.E.2d 105, in an opinion filed 27 March 1968. In that case the defendant was charged in a bill of indictment with the felony of breaking and entering a certain storehouse, shop, warehouse, dwellinghouse, bankinghouse, countinghouse and building occupied by one Dreame A. Glover wherein merchandise, et cetera, were being kept, and in a second count with the felony of larceny. Defendant, through his counsel, tendered a plea of guilty to the felonies of housebreaking and larceny as set forth in the bill of indictment. From a sentence of imprisonment, defendant appealed. In its opinion the Court said: We approve of the language of the Court of Appeals emphasized in the above quotation in respect to the particular identification of the building alleged to have been broken into and entered. The facts in Wright v. Commonwealth, 155 Ky. 750, 160 S.W. 476, are not on all-fours, but are apposite. At the November term, 1912, an indictment was returned by the grand jury of Graves County, Kentucky, accusing B. W. Wright, L. A. Perkins, and Wood Gordon of the crime of banding themselves together for the felonious purpose of burning a warehouse and tobacco house, in pursuance of which conspiracy they did set fire to and burn and destroy a "warehouse and tobacco house," which was the property of G. R. Allen and W. A. Usher, and which was in the possession of B. W. Wright, who was doing business for himself and V. E. Allen, and upon which warehouse and tobacco house there was at the time insurance. The Court in its opinion said: In Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368, reh. den. 11 September 1961, defendant was charged with the burglary of the Fred Harsch Lumber Co. of Longmont, Colorado. Following a jury verdict of guilty and a sentence of imprisonment, *21 defendant appealed. The opinion of the Court states: In an indictment under G.S. § 14-54 punishing the breaking and entering of buildings, a building must be described as to show that it is within the language of the statute and so as to identify it with reasonable particularity so as to enable the defendant to prepare his defense and plead his conviction or acquittal as a bar to further prosecution for the same offense. State v. Banks, 247 N.C. 745, 102 S.E.2d 245; 12 C.J.S. Burglary § 35e. The indictment here charges all the essential elements of the offense created by G.S. § 14-54 in substantially the language of part of the statute and is good. State v. Wilson, 270 N.C. 299, 154 S.E.2d 102; State v. Brown, 266 N.C. 55, 145 S.E.2d 297; State v. Vines, 262 N.C. 747, 138 S.E.2d 630; State v. Knight, supra; State v. Mumford, 227 N.C. 132, 41 S.E.2d 201; State v. Goffney, 157 N.C. 624, 73 S.E. 162; State v. Burgess, supra. Defendant could not have been misled by the words "a certain storehouse, shop, warehouse, dwelling house and building," for the same were qualified by the further specific description "occupied by one Leesona Corporation, a corporation." Undoubtedly, a storehouse, a shop, a warehouse, and a dwelling describe a building. Reading the indictment it does not charge the defendant with feloniously breaking into several separate buildings because the one building broken into is specifically described as "occupied by one Leesona Corporation, a corporation." Defendant apparently knew without a doubt what building he was charged with breaking *22 and entering, because he was present with his counsel, who was a lawyer of large experience in criminal cases, and pleaded nolo contendere. If the defendant or his counsel had been in doubt as to the identity of the building he was charged with having feloniously broken into and entered, he could have called for a bill of particulars. Defendant relies solely upon the case of State v. Banks, supra, which was an arson case. In the Banks case the bill of indictment was clearly defective in that there was no allegation of ownership or of possession, or any other descriptive language tending to give the building a fixed location. In the Banks case the Court said this: "From the foregoing decisions it appears that an allegation of ownership or of possession suffices to meet the requirements of identity." Nothing we have said in this opinion is at variance with what is held in the Banks case. In our opinion the indictment with its language "occupied by one Leesona Corporation, a corporation" suffices to give the defendant sufficient notice to have prepared his defense if he had pleaded not guilty instead of nolo contendere and to enable him to plead former conviction or former acquittal to a second indictment for the same offense, and the indictment supports the sentence of imprisonment. Defendant's motion in arrest of judgment is overruled. According to the record before us the indictment is not signed by the prosecuting officer or by anyone, but this is not mentioned in defendant's brief. According to the record before us made up by the defendant, it is stated, "This bill was returned: A `True Bill.'" There is no statute in North Carolina requiring the signature of the solicitor to an indictment. It is not essential in this jurisdiction to the validity of the indictment that it should be signed by the prosecuting officer. State v. Doughtie, 238 N.C. 228, 77 S.E.2d 642; State v. Shemwell, 180 N.C. 718, 104 S.E. 885; State v. Arnold, 107 N.C. 861, 11 S.E. 990; State v. Mace, 86 N.C. 668; State v. Vincent, 4 N.C. 105. This is said in 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 56: The burden is on the defendant to prepare the statement of the case on appeal and to show, if he can, error. G.S. § 1-282. The defendant has not seen fit to place in the record any of the evidence in the case, if evidence was introduced. Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere. A plea of nolo contendere will support the same punishment as a plea of guilty. State v. Payne, 263 N.C. 77, 138 S.E.2d 765; State v. Cooper, 238 N.C. 241, 77 S.E.2d 695; State v. Burnett, 174 N.C. 796, 93 S.E. 473. Even if no evidence was offered by the State, it was not incumbent upon the State to offer proof of defendant's guilt. This is so because his plea of nolo contendere admits for the purpose of the particular case all the elements of the offense charged against the defendant and gives the court complete power to sentence the defendant for such offense. State v. Cooper, supra; State v. Beasley, 226 N.C. 580, 39 S.E.2d 607; State v. Ayers, 226 N. C. 579, 39 S.E.2d 607; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 425(4). Incidentally, a plea of guilty also relieves the prosecution of the duty to prove the facts. State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 611, 157 S.E.2d 211; State v. Wilson, 251 N.C. 174, 110 S.E.2d 813; 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 495; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 424(4). The judgment of the lower court is Affirmed.