Title: Todd Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP000885
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0885 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Todd Jandrt, a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, 
Larry B. Brueggeman, Kristine K. Kinsley 
Stoeklen, as Special Administrator of the Estate 
of Mitchell J. Kinsley, deceased, Tierney 
Liazuk, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Larry 
B. Brueggeman,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Jerome Foods, Inc.  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Monica Jandrt, Jodi Liazuk and Kristen K. 
Kinsley Stoeklen,  
 
Third-Party Defendants, 
Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & 
Brueggeman, S.C.,  
 
Judgment Debtor-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 6, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Barron 
 
JUDGE: 
Edward R. Brunner 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the judgment debtor-appellant there were 
briefs by Thomas W. St. John, Matthew W. O’Neill and Friebert, 
Finerty & St. John, S.C., Milwaukee and of counsel, Joe Thrasher 
and Thrasher, Doyle, Pelish & Franti, Ltd., Rice Lake and oral 
argument by Thomas W. St. John. 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by 
James R. Troupis, Steven P. Means and Michael Best & Friedrich, 
LLP, Madison and David F. Girard-diCarlo, James T. Smith, 
Laurence S. Shtasel, Lisa A. Rosenblatt-Kaplan and Blank, Rome, 
Comisky & McCauley, LLP, Philadelphia, PA and oral argument by 
James R. Troupis and James T. Smith. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert A. 
Slattery and Slattery & Hausman, Ltd. And James D. Ryberg and 
Kelly & Ryberg, S.C.¸ Eau Claire for the American Board of Trial 
Advocates. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark L. Thomsen 
and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield and William C. Gleisner, 
III and Hausmann-McNally, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
No. 
98-0885 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0885 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Todd Jandrt, a minor, by his Guardian ad  
Litem, Larry B. Brueggeman, Kristine K.  
Kinsley Stoeklen, as Special  
Administrator of the Estate of Mitchell  
J. Kinsley, deceased, Tierney Liazuk, a  
minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Larry B.  
Brueggeman,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Jerome Foods, Inc.  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Monica Jandrt, Jodi Liazuk and Kristen K.  
Kinsley Stoeklen,  
 
          Third-Party Defendants, 
 
Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller  
& Brueggeman, S.C.,  
 
          Judgment Debtor-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a judgment of the Circuit Court for Barron 
County, the Honorable Edward R. Brunner.    Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part and the cause is remanded.  
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.    This case is before us on 
certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (1997-98).  Debtor-appellant appeals a judgment 
No. 
98-0885 
 
2 
of the Circuit Court for Barron County, the Honorable Edward R. 
Brunner. 
¶2 
On May 9, 1995, Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, 
Miller & Brueggeman, S.C. (Previant firm) filed this lawsuit on 
behalf of three children born with birth defects.  The lawsuit 
alleged upon information and belief that the plaintiffs' birth 
defects were caused by the exposure of their mothers during 
pregnancy to certain chemicals present and used at Jerome Foods, 
Inc. (JFI), a turkey processing plant located in Barron County, 
where the mothers worked.  The causation allegation was made 
"upon information and belief" because, among other things, the 
Previant firm was advised by a medical consultant that it would 
need discovery from JFI concerning the specific chemicals used 
and 
levels 
of 
exposure 
before 
conclusively 
determining 
causation.  The Previant firm filed the action within one week 
of a change in the law of joint and several liability that 
potentially would have a significant impact upon the plaintiffs' 
recovery should their lawsuit be successful. 
¶3 
Nine months after the action was filed, the Previant 
firm offered to voluntarily dismiss the action.  The Previant 
firm and its clients had concluded that the causal connection 
between chemicals at JFI and the plaintiffs' birth defects could 
only be demonstrated through epidemiological studies, and chose 
not to commence such an undertaking.  JFI then filed a motion 
seeking sanctions against the Previant firm for allegedly 
commencing and continuing a frivolous action.  After a two-day 
hearing on the motion, the circuit court filed its memorandum 
No. 
98-0885 
 
3 
decision which included 118 findings of fact and 74 conclusions 
of law.  The court held that the commencement and continuation 
of the action was frivolous because the Previant firm failed to 
make a reasonable inquiry into the facts underlying the 
allegation of causation prior to and following filing.  The 
circuit court awarded JFI a total of $716,081 in attorneys fees 
and costs.   
¶4 
Accordingly, the issues presented for review are:  
¶5 
(1) Whether the circuit court applied a proper 
standard of law and used a demonstrated rationale process in 
concluding that the filing of this action without proof of 
causation was frivolous under Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 or 814.025.  
We hold that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in concluding that the commencement of the action was 
frivolous. 
¶6 
(2) Whether under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 the Previant 
firm's continuation of the action for nine months was frivolous. 
 We hold that the circuit court did not err as a matter of law 
in concluding that the action was frivolously maintained. 
¶7 
(3) Whether an award of $716,081 in attorneys fees and 
costs was reasonable as a matter of law.  As we hold that the 
filing of the action was not frivolous, we remand to the circuit 
court to determine the amount of reasonable attorneys fees and 
costs JFI is entitled to as a result of the Previant firm's 
continuation of a frivolous action. 
I 
 
No. 
98-0885 
 
4 
¶8 
In November 1994, Larry Brueggeman (Brueggeman), a 
shareholder with the Previant firm, was contacted by Jonathan 
Sherman (Sherman), a Wisconsin attorney with whom he had worked 
in the past.  Sherman told Brueggeman that he represented a 
potential class of children who had suffered birth defects as a 
result of their mothers' exposure to chemicals at JFI during 
their pregnancies.  Sherman inquired whether Brueggeman would be 
interested in handling the case on behalf of the plaintiffs. 
¶9 
Brueggeman 
understood 
from 
Sherman's 
preliminary 
investigation that between 12 and 15 women had indicated that 
they had "problem pregnancies" while working at JFI.  Sherman 
had obtained information from some of the mothers who worked at 
JFI that there had been ammonia leaks and that on occasion the 
facility had been evacuated.  He also had some evidence that the 
level of carbon dioxide (CO2) was such that there was CO2 build-
up on the floor and that a number of women had complained of 
breathing problems, headaches, and dizziness. 
¶10 Brueggeman also understood that Sherman had run a 
medical literature search to determine whether there was a 
relationship 
between 
birth 
defects 
and 
chemicals 
in 
the 
environment.  Sherman indicated that his office had not located 
any scientific literature specifically addressing the possible 
relationship between CO2 or ammonia, two chemicals known to be 
present at JFI, and birth defects. 
¶11 Finally, Sherman also provided Brueggeman with a 
transcript statement made by Jodi Liazuk (Liazuk), the mother of 
one of the plaintiffs, taken approximately a year after the 
No. 
98-0885 
 
5 
birth of her daughter in a conversation with Sherman.  Liazuk 
explained that her daughter's neurologist, Dr. Harris, told her 
that the cause of her daughter's spina bifida could have been 
chemicals at JFI:  
 
[Dr. Harris] had asked us where we worked and well, my 
husband asked him how does this happened [sic] and he 
said there's there's several different reasons that it 
can be hereditary it can be caused by chemical 
pollution, by chemicals you work with and he asked us 
where did you work because we didn't you know have any 
idea of anything in the family and we told him where 
we worked and, what I worked around and he said 
there's a good cause right there he said that's he 
says that I could be almost certain almost certain 
that the chemicals that you worked around and with 
could have cause [sic] the spina bifida.   
 
¶12 In February 1995, Jodi Liazuk and the mothers of the 
two other plaintiffs' in this suit retained the Previant firm to 
represent them in this matter.  The plaintiffs Tierney Liazuk 
and Todd E. Jandrt were born with spina bifida.  Kristine K. 
Kinsley 
Stoeklen 
was 
the 
third 
plaintiff, 
the 
special 
administrator of the Estate of Mitchell J. Kinsley, who was 
deceased.  Mitchell Kinsley was born with hypoplastic heart 
malformation. 
¶13 After its retention, the Previant firm made additional 
investigation to determine whether a complaint should be filed. 
Previant firm associate Lisa Bangert (Bangert) and a Previant 
firm librarian conducted a search of medical and scientific 
literature 
regarding the 
relationship 
between 
exposure to 
ammonia or CO2 and birth defects.  They found literature 
indicating that birth defects can be a result of chemicals in 
No. 
98-0885 
 
6 
the environment, but were unable to find any literature 
addressing 
whether 
ammonia 
or 
CO2, 
individually 
or 
in 
combination, caused birth defects.   
¶14 Bangert then examined whether any of the other known 
causes of spina bifida were present.  She interviewed the 
plaintiffs' mothers, and two of the fathers.  Based upon these 
interviews, she concluded that none of those causes were 
present, and further concluded that therefore there was a 
"strong probability" that exposure to chemicals caused the 
defects.  
¶15 Brueggeman then consulted with George Dahir, M.D. 
(Dahir), regarding causation.  Brueggeman had in the past relied 
on Dahir, who serves as a consultant to lawyers in "toxic tort" 
actions, for help to determine whether or not a causal 
relationship existed between the exposure to a chemical and the 
problem of which the plaintiff is complaining.  Although not an 
expert on causation, Dahir had apparently advised Brueggeman on 
technical 
issues 
in 
similar 
cases 
and 
advises 
attorneys 
generally on how best to proceed in such cases.  Brueggeman 
testified at the sanctions hearing that after he explained the 
facts known to him, Dahir advised that due to the evolving 
nature of the science in the area of causation, in order to 
obtain an expert opinion on causation it would be necessary to 
commence an action and obtain discovery concerning the nature 
and extent of the exposure of the plaintiffs to the chemicals at 
JFI.  The Previant firm relied on Dahir's advice and did not 
contact an expert on causation before it filed the action. 
No. 
98-0885 
 
7 
¶16 On March 1, 1995, shortly after the Previant firm was 
retained, the Wisconsin Senate approved Senate Bill 11, which by 
all accounts made significant changes to the law of comparative 
negligence.  The law was scheduled to take effect on May 17, 
1995 (which it did).  The Previant firm received a number of 
"warnings" concerning the potential liability the firm could 
face if it did not file negligence actions prior to the 
effective date of the law.  For instance, it received an April 
10, 1995, practice alert from the State Bar and the Wisconsin 
Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company ("WILMIC").  The "Good Practice 
Alert" issued by the State Bar stated: 
 
Both defense and plaintiff's counsel need to advise 
their respective clients of this important deadline 
which 
can 
dramatically 
affect 
their 
client's 
interests.  Whether you are representing carriers or 
claimants, be alert.  The information you provide (or 
fail to provide your clients) could be a costly 
omission.   
Two weeks later, in an article in the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, a personal injury attorney, who the Previant firm 
characterizes as well-known, was quoted as stating that "[a]ny 
lawyer who has a case where the remedy might be better under the 
old law who doesn't file is guilty of malpractice, in my 
opinion."   
¶17 The Previant firm based its decision to file on these 
warnings and one week before the new law was to take effect, it 
filed this action on behalf of the named plaintiffs.  Brueggeman 
testified at the sanctions hearing that although he believed 
that he did have sufficient information to commence the action, 
No. 
98-0885 
 
8 
he would not have filed the action on that date but for the 
impending change in the law. 
¶18 The complaint named the plaintiffs as representatives 
of a class who were injured by chemicals at JFI and alleged that 
JFI was negligent in a number of respects, including failure to 
properly 
design, 
construct, 
maintain 
and 
repair 
the 
JFI 
facility, failure to properly ventilate the facility, and 
failure to utilize proper equipment.  The complaint also alleged 
that JFI violated Wis. Stat. § 101.11(2), the Safe Place Act, by 
failing to furnish employment that was safe for JFI's employees.  
¶19 With respect to causation, paragraph 28 of the 
complaint alleged:   
 
On April 23, 1992, plaintiff Todd E. Jandrt was born 
with physical defects.  On April 10, 1993, Mitchell J. 
Kinsley, deceased, was born with physical defects.  On 
April 7, 1992, Tierney Liazuk was born with physical 
defects.  Upon information and belief, said physical 
defects were caused in utero by the exposure of their 
mothers to poisonous chemicals emitted from one of the 
aforesaid food processing machines while they were 
employed at defendant Jerome Foods . . . . 
¶20 The Previant firm subsequently made two requests for 
documents, the first in May and the second on June 21, 1995. The 
June request asked for a broad array of documents, including 
those relating to any analysis by JFI of the potential health 
risks to employees and unborn children "as a result of exposure 
to chemicals," and documents relating to birth defects suffered 
by children of JFI employees.  JFI declined to produce the 
documents 
without 
a 
confidentiality 
agreement. 
 
The 
confidentiality order was signed by the court on December 7, 
No. 
98-0885 
 
9 
1995 and the requested documents became available to the 
Previant firm thereafter. 
¶21 JFI responded to the lawsuit by retaining two law 
firms, one as its national counsel and the other as local 
counsel.  JFI instructed that experts be engaged to analyze the 
allegations of negligence and causation.  JFI also retained a 
public relations company, an expert in environmental and 
infrastructure consulting, and a private investigation firm.  
¶22 JFI served interrogatories on the Previant firm in 
June and again in August 1995.  Among the information it sought, 
JFI requested every fact that supported plaintiffs' claim that 
exposure to "poisonous chemicals" at JFI caused the plaintiffs' 
birth defects.  Plaintiffs responded on September 28, 1995, 
refusing to provide any information concerning their theory of 
causation, writing that JFI's inquiry into the core allegation 
of causation prematurely implicated expert testimony. 
¶23 In July 1995, JFI's counsel interviewed Dr. Robert 
Brent, a teratology expert who opined that there was no causal 
nexus between any chemical at JFI and birth defects.  He told 
JFI that no medical or scientific literature established such a 
connection.  From July 1995, JFI believed, as Brent explained, 
that causation could not be proven.  JFI continued, and indeed 
stepped up, its defense efforts following its acquisition of 
this opinion.  It also continued to request from the Previant 
firm the factual basis for the element of causation, to which 
the Previant firm refused to comment. 
No. 
98-0885 
 
10
¶24 Aside from serving the large document request on JFI 
in June 1995, it appears from the record that the Previant firm 
made no further and independent steps to support its allegation 
of causation as it awaited the confidentiality order JFI 
requested.  Once signed, JFI produced over 200,000 documents 
which the Previant firm inspected at JFI's facility on January 
31 and February 1, 1996. 
¶25 Following 
review 
of 
the 
documents, 
Brueggeman 
consulted with Dr. Dahir and with an in-state expert on 
causation.  Dr. Dahir in turn consulted with an out-of-state 
expert.  The out-of-state expert indicated that there were no 
studies regarding the relationship between ammonia or CO2 and 
human birth defects and that he would be vulnerable on cross 
examination if he testified about causation.  The in-state 
expert agreed that there were no scientific studies on the 
subject, and suggested that a better approach to causation would 
be to engage an epidemiologist to conduct a study to confirm 
what 
appeared 
to 
be 
a 
causal 
connection 
between 
JFI's 
environment and its employees' problem pregnancies.  In securing 
these opinions, the Previant firm did not provide its experts 
with any of JFI's documents obtained through discovery; that is, 
none of the information obtained from JFI identifying either the 
types of chemicals used at JFI or the exposure level of those 
chemicals was provided to the experts. 
¶26 With the expert opinions in hand, the Previant firm 
decided that engaging an epidemiologist to commence a study 
would be too expensive.  On February 28, 1996, the Previant firm 
No. 
98-0885 
 
11
advised JFI's counsel that the plaintiffs wished to voluntarily 
dismiss the complaint, a motion was filed and subsequently 
granted. 
¶27 JFI thereafter moved for sanctions on grounds that the 
plaintiffs 
commenced 
and 
continued 
a 
frivolous 
action.  
Following a two-day hearing, the circuit court issued a 
memorandum decision holding that the lawsuit was filed "without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law," focusing particularly upon 
the 
Previant 
firm's 
failure 
"to 
complete 
a 
thorough 
investigation of scientific and medical experts in the field of 
teratology" prior to filing the complaint.  The circuit court 
based its conclusion in large measure upon the testimony of 
JFI's witnesses, most particularly teratologist Dr. Brent, who 
testified that causation could not be proved.  From his 
testimony the circuit court concluded that there was no 
scientific or medical support for the causal nexus alleged by 
the 
plaintiffs: 
"there 
was 
no 
dispute, 
no 
cause, 
no 
uncertainty."  The circuit court then awarded JFI $716,081 in 
attorneys fees and costs. 
II 
 
¶28 The Previant firm appeals the circuit court's decision 
that under Wis. Stat. §§ 802.051 and 814.0252, it commenced and 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 802.05 provides in relevant part: 
(1)(a) Every pleading, motion or other paper of a 
party represented by an attorney shall contain the 
name . . . of the attorney . . . and shall be 
subscribed with the handwritten signature of at least 
one attorney of record in the individual's name. . . . 
No. 
98-0885 
 
12
                                                                  
 The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a  
certificate that the attorney or party has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of 
the attorney's or party's knowledge, information and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading, 
motion or other paper is well-grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law; and that the pleading, motion or other paper is 
not used for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation. . . . If the court determines 
that an attorney or party failed to read or make the 
determinations required under this subsection before 
signing any petition, motion or other paper, the court 
may, upon motion or upon its own initiative, impose an 
appropriate sanction on the person who signed the 
pleading, motion or other paper, or on a represented 
party, or on both. The sanction may include an order 
to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable 
expenses incurred by that party because of the filing 
of the pleading, motion or other paper, including 
reasonable attorney fees. 
 
2  Wis. Stat. § 814.025 provides in relevant part: 
 
Costs upon frivolous claims and counterclaims. (1) If 
an action or special proceeding commenced or continued 
by a plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense or cross 
complaint commenced, used or continued by a defendant 
is found, at any time during the proceedings or upon 
judgment, to be frivolous by the court, the court 
shall award to the successful party costs determined 
under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney fees. 
 
. . . .  
 
(3) In order to find an action  . . . to be 
frivolous under sub. (1), the court must find one or 
more of the following: 
 
. . . .  
 
(b) The party or the party's attorney knew, or 
should have known, that the action . . . was without 
any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be 
No. 
98-0885 
 
13
continued a frivolous action.  Both §§ 802.05 and 814.025 
authorize a circuit court to sanction a party for commencing a 
frivolous 
action, 
while 
§ 
814.025 
alone 
authorizes 
the 
imposition of sanctions upon a party maintaining a frivolous 
action.  Where, as here, the circuit court awards sanctions for 
commencing a frivolous action pursuant to both §§ 802.05 and 
814.025, 
we 
review 
the 
decision 
as 
one 
made 
pursuant 
to § 802.05.  See Wis. Stat. § 814.025(4) ("To the extent s. 
802.05 is applicable and differs from this section, s. 802.05 
applies."). 
 
¶29 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.05, a person who signs a 
pleading makes three warranties: 
 
First, the person who signs a pleading, motion or 
other 
paper 
certifies 
that 
the 
paper 
was 
not 
interposed for any improper purpose.  Second, the 
signer warrants that to his or her best 'knowledge, 
information 
and 
belief 
formed 
after 
reasonable 
inquiry' the paper is 'well grounded in fact.'  Third, 
the signer also certifies that he or she has conducted 
a reasonable inquiry and that the paper is warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argument for a change 
in it. 
Riley v. Isaacson, 156 Wis. 2d 249, 256, 456 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. 
App. 1990)(citing Beeman v. Fiester, 852 F.2d 206, 208-09 (7th 
Cir. 1988)).  If the circuit court finds that any one of the 
three requirements set forth under the statute has been 
disregarded, it may impose an appropriate sanction on the person 
signing the pleading or on a represented party or both.  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.05(1)(a); but see Riley, 156 Wis. 2d at 256 ("If any 
                                                                  
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. 
No. 
98-0885 
 
14
one of these three prongs has been violated, sanctions must be 
imposed."). 
 
¶30 When made pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.05, our review 
of a circuit court's decision that an action was commenced 
frivolously is deferential.  Riley, 156 Wis. 2d at 256 (citing 
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 
(7th Cir. 1989)).  Determining what and how much prefiling 
investigation was done are questions of fact that will be upheld 
unless 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Id. 
 
"Determining 
how 
much 
investigation should have been done, however, is a matter within 
the trial court's discretion because the amount of research 
necessary to constitute 'reasonable inquiry' may vary, depending 
on such things as the particular issue involved and the stakes 
of the case."  Id.  A circuit court's discretionary decision 
will be sustained if it examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational 
process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
reach.  Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 
175 (1982). 
¶31 Because Wis. Stat. § 802.05 is patterned after Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 11, Riley, 156 Wis. 2d at 255, we may 
turn to federal case law interpreting Rule 11 for persuasive 
authority in our interpretation of the section and in the method 
by which it should be applied by circuit courts.  Id. (citing 
Gygi v. Guest, 117 Wis. 2d 464, 467, 344 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 
1984)).  Federal cases have established a number of guidelines 
in view of which district courts are to make their discretionary 
No. 
98-0885 
 
15
determinations 
of 
frivolousness. 
 
We 
believe 
that 
these 
guidelines serve equally well as the framework within which a 
circuit court should make its discretionary determination of 
frivolousness under § 802.05; further, in many respects, these 
are 
the 
same 
guidelines 
a 
circuit 
court 
uses 
in 
its 
determination of frivolousness under Wis. Stat. § 814.025.   
¶32 First, in determining whether an action has been 
commenced frivolously, the circuit court is to apply an 
objective standard of conduct for litigants and attorneys.  See 
National Wrecking Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 1993) (in determining 
whether to award sanctions under Rule 11, a court "need only 
'undertake an objective inquiry into whether the party or his 
counsel "should have known that his position is groundless."'" 
(citations omitted));  see also Stern v. Thompson & Coates, 
Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 241, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (under Wis. 
Stat. § 814.025, "whether the attorney knew or should have known 
that the position taken was frivolous [is] determined by what a 
reasonable attorney would have known or should have known under 
the same or similar circumstances," and is an objective 
standard).  Section 802.05 requires that the claim be well 
grounded in both facts and law.  Applying the objective standard 
when determining whether an attorney made a reasonable inquiry 
into the facts of a case, the circuit court should consider:   
 
whether the signer of the documents had sufficient 
time for investigation; the extent to which the 
attorney had to rely on his or her client for the 
factual foundation underlying the pleading, motion, or 
No. 
98-0885 
 
16
other paper; whether the case was accepted from 
another attorney; the complexity of the facts and the 
attorney's ability to do a sufficient pre-filing 
investigation; and whether discovery would have been 
beneficial to the development of the underlying facts. 
Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards of U.S., 830 F.2d 
1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted), abrogated on 
other grounds, Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d 928; Belich v. 
Szymaszek, 224 Wis. 2d 419, 430-31, 592 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 
1999).  And in determining whether the attorney made a 
reasonable inquiry into the law, consideration should include 
 
the amount of time the attorney had to prepare the 
document and research the relevant law; whether the 
document contained a plausible view of the law; the 
complexity 
of 
the legal 
questions 
involved; and 
whether the document was a good faith effort to extend 
or modify the law. 
Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435.  
¶33 Second, the circuit court's proper analysis must be 
made from the perspective of the attorney and with a view of the 
circumstances that existed at the time counsel filed the 
challenged paper.  Schering Corp. v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3rd Cir. 1989).  "The court is expected 
to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the 
signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at 
the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted."  
Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 199 (1983).  A claim is 
not frivolous merely because there was a failure of proof or 
because a claim was later shown to be incorrect.  Stern, 185 
Wis. 2d at 243 (citations omitted).  Nor are sanctions 
appropriate merely because the allegations were disproved at 
No. 
98-0885 
 
17
some point during the course of litigation.  See Colan v. 
Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 360 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(plaintiff's failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment was not a 
violation of Rule 11 where the court found that some evidence 
supported the plaintiff's claim).  
¶34 With these guidelines before us, we turn to a review 
of the circuit court's decision.  The single allegation upon 
which JFI has asserted that the Previant firm had no basis in 
fact was paragraph 28 of the complaint, the plaintiffs' 
allegations that their physical defects were caused in utero by 
the exposure of their mothers to poisonous chemicals emitted 
from one of a number of food processing machines used at JFI 
while the mothers were employed by JFI.  We are therefore 
directed in our review to the question of whether when the 
complaint was filed on May 9, 1995, the Previant firm had a 
sufficient basis in fact to allege that a chemical at JFI caused 
the plaintiffs' physical defects. 
A 
 
¶35 At the outset, we address the Previant firm's argument 
that it needed no evidence of causation prior to filing the 
action because its complaint also stated a claim for violation 
of the Wisconsin Safe Place Act, Wis. Stat. § 101.11.  As 
authority, the Previant firm points to those decisions involving 
the safe place statute where we stated the rule of law that 
where a plaintiff establishes negligence in violation of the 
safe place statute, "the plaintiff need not prove causation, and 
No. 
98-0885 
 
18
the burden of proof is on the owner to rebut the presumption of 
causation."  Frederick v. Hotel Investment, Inc., 48 Wis. 2d 
429, 434, 180 N.W.2d 562 (1970).  Without deciding whether the 
presumption applies to the safe place violation asserted here, 
we conclude that it is a presumption not applicable to the claim 
of common law negligence.   
¶36 Plaintiffs alleged two claims each against JFI, one 
common law negligence, the other a violation of the safe place 
statute.  Without regard to the adequacy of the allegation of a 
violation of the safe place statute, each element of the 
plaintiffs' common law negligence claims needed to be well-
grounded in fact, for the inclusion of one sufficient and 
adequately investigated claim does not permit counsel to file 
unsubstantiated 
claims 
as 
riders. 
 
See 
Frantz 
v. 
U.S. 
Powerlifting Federation, 836 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1987).  
"Each claim takes up the time of the legal system and the 
opposing side. . . .  Rule 11 applies to all statements in 
papers it covers.  Each claim must have sufficient support; each 
must be investigated and researched before filing."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  "[T]he prevailing notion is the sensible 
one that time needlessly forced to be spent on the elimination 
of frivolous claims or in dispelling frivolous arguments should 
be compensable even though other claims or arguments have been 
reasonably advanced."  Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie v. Life Assur. 
Co., 128 F.R.D. 233, 237 n.6 (N.D.Ill 1989).  The significant 
amount of 
time and money 
JFI spent 
on 
researching and 
investigating causation as alleged in the complaint is a good 
No. 
98-0885 
 
19
case in point, and we conclude that the element of causation 
within the plaintiffs' common law negligence claims required 
factual support. 
B 
¶37 The Previant firm contends that independent of its 
claim under the safe place statute, on May 9, 1995, when the 
plaintiffs' action was filed, it possessed the following facts 
which, together, satisfied the requirement that the allegation 
of causation was well grounded in fact: 
 
(1) Between April 1992 and April 1993, three women 
employed by JFI gave birth to children with birth 
defects 
 
(2) A total of approximately twelve to fifteen women 
employed at JFI had reported problem pregnancies 
 
(3) The 
plaintiffs' 
mothers 
reported 
excessive 
amounts of ammonia and CO2 in the work environment at 
JFI 
 
(4)  The 
plaintiffs' 
mothers 
believed 
that 
their 
exposure to chemicals while at JFI caused the birth 
defects of their children 
 
(5) Literature indicated that birth defects could be 
caused by chemicals in the environment 
 
(6) An analysis by a Previant associate, using a 
process of elimination, ruled out other known causes 
of the spina bifida suffered by two of the plaintiffs 
 
(7) One plaintiffs' mother's doctor told the mother 
that chemicals at JFI could have caused her child's 
spina bifida 
 
(8) A non-expert physician, Dr. Dahir, advised that 
the 
plaintiffs 
needed 
discovery 
concerning 
the 
specific chemicals in the environment at JFI as well 
No. 
98-0885 
 
20
as the levels of exposure to the chemicals before they 
could secure an expert opinion on causation 
 
(9) Information suggested that JFI management may 
have 
been 
covering 
up 
the 
relationship 
between 
chemicals 
and 
birth 
defects 
by 
disciplining 
a 
supervisor who told one mother to seek legal counsel 
¶38 The circuit court's decision that the action was 
commenced frivolously was based on its findings that the element 
of causation was not well-grounded by these facts and that the 
Previant firm should have made a more thorough investigation of 
the causal nexus prior to filing.  We review the circuit court's 
findings regarding the investigation the Previant firm should 
have made for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Riley, 156 
Wis. 2d at 256. 
¶39 The circuit court made numerous findings regarding the 
Previant firm's unreasonable inquiry that reflect upon the facts 
the Previant firm knew.  For ease of analysis, we combine these 
findings into two groups.  First, the circuit court found that 
the 
Previant 
firm 
should 
not 
have 
relied 
on 
Sherman's 
investigation nor on any of the mothers' statements for the 
factual basis of causation; second, and central to its decision 
that the action was commenced frivolously, the Previant firm 
should have consulted with an expert on causation prior to 
filing.  We address these findings in turn. 
¶40 Attorneys do not have an unfettered right to rely on 
either the investigation of a referring attorney or on client 
statements for the factual basis of a claim.  While there is 
authority in support of the Previant firm's argument that an 
attorney receiving a case from another attorney is entitled to 
No. 
98-0885 
 
21
place some reliance upon the other attorney's investigation, see 
Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 446 
(5th Cir. 1992), this rule is not without limitation.  An 
attorney may not so rely when to do so would be unreasonable: 
 
In relying on another lawyer, however, counsel must 
'acquire[] knowledge of facts sufficient to enable him 
to certify that the paper is well-grounded in fact.'  
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11A 
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 187 (1985).  An attorney 
who signs the pleading cannot simply delegate to 
forwarding co-counsel his duty of reasonable inquiry. 
 Id. 
Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 548, 558 (9th 
Cir. 1986).  The circuit court found that the information that 
Sherman possessed and passed on to Brueggeman was "skeletal," a 
finding that we do not believe is clearly erroneous.  The facts 
uncovered by Sherman would have been insufficient to establish 
the causal nexus had Sherman filed this action.  These same 
facts could not become sufficient by virtue of their transfer to 
the Previant firm.   
¶41 It is also true, as the Previant firm contends, that 
an attorney may rely upon his or her client for the factual 
basis of a claim when the client's statements are objectively 
reasonable.  See Miller v. Bittner, 985 F.2d 935, 939 (8th Cir. 
1993).  However, as is true of reliance on information provided 
by a referring attorney, reliance on a client is not without 
limitation.  In deciding whether he or she may rely solely on a 
client for the facts that are at the foundation of a claim, "the 
attorney should determine if the client's knowledge is direct or 
No. 
98-0885 
 
22
hearsay and check closely the plausibility of the client's 
accountparticularly if the information is secondhand."  Harris 
v. Marsh, 679 F.Supp. 1204, 1386 (E.D.N.C. 1987)(citing Nassau-
Suffolk Ice Cream v. Integrated Resources, 114 F.R.D. 684, 689 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)).  When an attorney must rely on his client, as 
Previant here stated that it needed to, the attorney should 
question his client closely and not accept the client's version 
on faith alone.  Id. (citing Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream; Fleming 
Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F.Supp. 507, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1985)). 
¶42 The statement offered by Liazuk that her daughter's 
neurosurgeon told her that "chemicals that you worked around and 
with could have caused the spina bifida" was relied upon, in 
part, as evidence that ammonia caused Liazuk's spina bifida, and 
the birth defects of the other two plaintiffs.  While Liazuk's 
statement may have been objectively reasonable, the circuit 
court found that Previant should have contacted the neurologist 
prior to filing to determine whether he in fact did opine as to 
the causation of this plaintiff's birth defect and whether the 
doctor was qualified to so opine.   
¶43 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in making this finding.  The authority that an 
attorney may rely on a client for information rests in notes to 
Rule 11 which instruct that whether an attorney's inquiry is 
reasonable may depend upon "whether he had to rely on a client 
for information as to the facts underlying the pleading . . . ." 
 Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. at 199.  The fact at issue 
here was whether ammonia or CO2 could cause the plaintiffs' birth 
No. 
98-0885 
 
23
defects.  The Previant firm did not need to rely upon Liazuk for 
the physician's statement as a basis for causation.  Unlike the 
situations in which a client's statement could not be verified 
without discovery, Liazuk's could have been.  The Previant firm 
could have contacted Dr. Harris to determine whether he did have 
an opinion as to causation and it chose not to, citing strategic 
reasons for not doing so.  The circuit court believed that this 
was an unreasonable action, and its finding is not clearly 
erroneous given the Previant firm's lack of any other evidence 
of causation.  As the circuit court noted, it was even less 
reasonable for the Previant firm to extrapolate from this one 
statement that the birth defects of the other plaintiffs were 
likewise caused by ammonia.  The circuit court's decision with 
respect to these findings must be upheld. 
The Need for Expert Opinion 
¶44 The circuit court also believed that the Previant 
firm's 
failure 
to 
complete 
a 
thorough 
investigation 
of 
scientific and medical experts in the field of teratology was 
unreasonable.  The Previant firm argues that by so finding, the 
circuit court erred as a matter of law because there is no per 
se requirement that an expert be retained prior to filing.  We 
agree that an expert need not be retained prior to filing an 
action as a matter of law.  However, we disagree that the 
circuit court's finding should be read so broadly. 
¶45 We have discovered no federal or state decision which 
directly addresses whether as a matter of law, Rule 11 or a 
comparable state rule governing frivolous actions requires a 
No. 
98-0885 
 
24
party to have in place an expert opinion prior to commencing an 
action.  In those few cases in which the question has been 
addressed even tangentially, the answers vary.  For instance, in 
Simpson v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company, Inc., 522 
A.2d 880, 884-85 (D.C. 1987), the court found that under 
circumstances in which the plaintiff had almost three years from 
the time of an alleged incident to the time she filed suit in 
which to investigate the causes of an alleged accident, her 
failure to identify an expert who would testify on her behalf 
regarding the defendants' duty of care in interrogatories 
suggested that she had failed to ascertain a basis for her claim 
prior to filing.  Id. at 884-85.  The court believed that the 
plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the defendants 
had breached an applicable standard of care without expert 
advice to that effect prior to filing.  Id. at 885. 
¶46 In Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509 (Wyoming 1995), the 
Wyoming court explained that an expert would not be needed prior 
to filing an action alleging legal malpractice where the 
attorney who files is himself an "expert" in the legal area.  
Id. at 518.  However, it believed that before "an attorney files 
a legal malpractice action where the underlying case of alleged 
malpractice involves a complex or specialized area of the law, 
with which [an attorney is] unfamiliar, that attorney should 
first consult with an expert in the complex or specialized legal 
arena about the standard of care."  Id.  The court did not 
discuss, however, whether the failure to contact an expert 
witness prior to filing would be a violation of its frivolous 
No. 
98-0885 
 
25
lawsuit statute, modeled after Rule 11, as a matter of law and 
without regard to the additional circumstances facing the 
attorney prior to filing. 
¶47 Federal 
decisions 
further 
suggest 
that 
expert 
witnesses are not required prior to commencing an action.  For 
instance, in Teck General Partnership v. Crown Central Petroleum 
Corp., 28 F.Supp.2d 989, 992 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1998), the court 
wrote that "[i]t is arguable whether, in some instances, Rule 
11, Fed.R.Civ.P., may require retention or consultation with an 
expert 
before 
certain 
allegations 
may 
be 
included 
in 
a 
complaint."   And in RTC Mortgage Trust v. Fidelity National 
Title Insurance Co., 981 F.Supp. 334, 345 (D.N.J. 1997), the 
court explained that "Rule 11 neither demands nor regulates 
consultation with an expert. . . ." 
¶48 As a body, these cases are inconclusive.  While good 
practice may dictate that an expert be consulted prior to filing 
a claim upon which expert testimony will necessarily be required 
at trial, a per se rule that an expert opinion is always 
required cannot be squared with the objective standard by which 
an attorney's investigation is to be judged.  The test for 
frivolousness 
should 
take 
into 
consideration 
all 
of 
the 
circumstances facing the party commencing an action at the time 
the party files, and at times those circumstances may be such 
that an expert witness is not needed prior to filing. 
¶49 Here, though, the circuit court did not rule that the 
Previant firm needed an expert witness as a matter of law and 
without regard to the circumstances it faced.  Instead, the 
No. 
98-0885 
 
26
circuit court quite thoroughly explained its decision as one 
requiring expert opinion precisely because in its view the 
Previant firm had no other objective evidence of causation.  As 
the claim had no basis in fact, the court believed that the firm 
should have consulted an expert to establish that basis. 
¶50 While 
it 
did 
give 
some 
consideration 
to 
the 
circumstances, we nonetheless conclude that the circuit court 
drew its conclusion that an expert needed to be contacted prior 
to filing by improperly relying upon hindsight and for failing 
to give appropriate consideration to the amount of time within 
which the Previant firm had to conduct an investigation prior to 
a substantial change in the law. 
¶51 As we explained, the amount of time an attorney has to 
investigate a claim is one consideration that shapes the 
objective standard for determining whether an attorney's inquiry 
was reasonable.  The amount of time reasonably necessary to 
investigate a claim is itself variable, dependent upon the 
complexity of the claim.  Here, the attorneys could not be 
expected to have conducted as thorough an investigation as they 
would have had they had longer than six weeks in which to file 
prior to the change in the law of joint and several liability.  
See Smith, 960 F.2d at 447 (because the lawyers had only two 
months in which to investigate a civil Racketeer Influenced & 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit prior to the running of 
the statute of limitation, they "could not be expected to 
conduct as complete an inquiry as they could have had [the 
plaintiff] consulted them earlier").  "[A]s the Supreme Court 
No. 
98-0885 
 
27
noted [in Cooter & Gell], if a lawyer discovers that his client 
has a potential cause of action only a short time before the 
statute of limitations will expire, a more cursory inquiry will 
be tolerated than when he has ample time to investigate."  
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th 
Cir. 1990)(citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 
2447, 2459 (1990)). 
¶52 While the plaintiffs' claims were not jeopardized by 
an impending statute of limitations, the change in the law of 
joint and several liability was a real concern for the Previant 
firm and one which reasonably contributed to its decision to 
file earlier than it would have otherwise done.  The circuit 
court summarily and in error rejected the firm's concern and 
found that the change in the law of liability did not excuse the 
firm's failure to make an appropriate investigation. 
¶53 The circuit court noted that from the time the 
Previant firm admitted it knew that the law was going to change 
to the time it took effect, it had more than six weeks to make a 
meaningful investigation.  The court then concluded that six 
weeks was plenty of time to investigate because, relying upon 
the testimony of JFI's expert Dr. Brent, "a consultation with a 
qualified teratologist lasting more than four or five hours 
would have revealed that the causation theory was meritless." 
¶54 The court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
reaching this conclusion.  First, the Previant firm did not fail 
to make any investigation into causation.  It did conduct a 
literature search and one of its associates engaged in an 
No. 
98-0885 
 
28
elimination theory of causation which included interviews with 
the plaintiffs' mothers and two fathers.  While the court found 
this investigation to be inadequate as support for causation, 
the investigation itself was not found to be an unreasonable 
attempt to establish causation.  Certainly, as the Previant firm 
considered the time within which it had to file prior to the 
change in the law, it could not know that its investigation 
would be as fruitless as it turned out to be.  Further, the 
circuit court's finding that had the Previant firm contacted a 
teratologist, a five-hour conversation would have established 
that causation could not be proven is a conclusion made 
manifestly with the benefit of hindsight.  It presumes that 
causation is impossible to prove (a decision which appears to be 
made on the merits of the action even though made through Dr. 
Brent's testimony at the sanctions hearing), that a reasonable 
attorney would know that under the circumstances then facing it 
that a teratologist needed to be contacted, and it ignores the 
evidence offered by the Previant firm at the sanctions hearing 
that 
an 
epidemiological 
study 
could 
possibly 
establish 
causation. 
 
¶55 Although a close case, upon considering the facts and 
circumstances facing the Previant firm when it commenced the 
action, and resolving all doubts about frivolousness in favor of 
the Previant firm, see Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, 
221 Wis. 2d 630, 640, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998), we conclude that 
the Previant firm did not frivolously file this lawsuit.  Given 
the information that it knew, coupled with the short amount of 
No. 
98-0885 
 
29
time in which it reasonably believed it needed to file the 
lawsuit, the Previant firm did not commence this action 
frivolously. 
III 
 
¶56 We must next consider whether the Previant firm's 
continuation of the action was frivolous under Wis. Stat. § 
814.025(3)(b), as found by the circuit court.  We recently 
explained the standard we use in reviewing a circuit court's 
finding under § 814.025 that an action is frivolously continued: 
 
Inquiries about frivolousness involve a mixed question 
of law and fact.  Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 241 (citing 
State v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 582, 
601-02, 302 N.W.2d 827 (1981)).  The determination of 
what a party or attorney "knew or should have been 
known" [under Wis. Stat. § 814.025] is a factual 
question, and the circuit court's findings of fact 
will not be reversed by an appellate court unless the 
findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 805.17(2). 
 
The ultimate conclusion of whether the circuit court's 
factual determinations support the legal determination 
of frivolousness is, however, a question of law, which 
this court determines independent of the circuit court 
or court of appeals, benefiting from the analysis of 
both courts.  Id. (citing State Farm, 100 Wis. 2d at 
602). 
Juneau County, 221 Wis. 2d at 638-39. 
¶57 Costs and reasonable attorney fees must be awarded to 
JFI if the court is satisfied that the Previant firm knew or 
should have known that its allegation of causation was "without 
any reasonable basis in law or equity."  Wis. Stat. § 814.025(1) 
and (3)(b).  We explained in Part II of this opinion that 
although the case was close, under the circumstances the 
No. 
98-0885 
 
30
Previant firm faced when it commenced the action, it made a 
reasonable inquiry into the underlying facts of causation prior 
to filing.  We reached this conclusion based with a view to the 
relatively short time period between the Previant firm's 
retention and the change in the law of joint and several 
liability.  However, under § 814.025, a party is not relieved of 
its responsibility to ensure that an action is well-grounded in 
fact and law once an action is commenced.  A party's 
responsibility for the factual basis of a claim is on-going.  
Once a party knows or should have known that a claim is not 
supported by fact or law, it must dismiss or risk sanctions.   
¶58 The circuit court found that the Previant firm did not 
meet it responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 814.025.  The circuit 
court made numerous findings which together demonstrate, as the 
circuit court ultimately concluded, that the Previant firm never 
had a reasonable basis in fact supporting the element of 
causation during the entire nine months it continued the action 
against JFI.   
¶59 We have no doubt that, as the circuit court found, the 
Previant firm "recognized that the causal component of the 
claimthat is, that in utero exposure to carbon dioxide, 
ammonia, and/or other chemicals used at JFI caused the specific 
birth defects suffered by plaintiffswas an essential element of 
the contemplated allegations."  This finding is well supported 
by the record and is not disputed by the parties.  However, it 
is the facts the Previant firm knew and what it should have done 
No. 
98-0885 
 
31
in light of its recognition that the causal element was 
essential to its claim that lies at the heart of this appeal. 
¶60 The circuit court's findings on this question are 
quite detailed.  First, the circuit court found that at no time 
prior to the dismissal of the complaint did the Previant firm: 
 
a. 
Obtain 
an 
expert 
witness 
who 
supported 
the 
causation 
theory 
upon 
which 
the 
claims 
in 
the 
complaint rested. 
 
b. Consult with an identified scientific or medical 
professional 
with 
expertise 
in 
the 
areas 
of 
teratology, 
toxicology, 
epidemiology, 
genetics, 
pediatrics or the causes of birth defects. 
 
c. Interview any treating physician of any of the 
mothers or the children in question. 
 
d. Pursue the purported "cover up" identified as one 
of the bases for the filing of the complaint. 
Each of these facts is well-supported by the record: Brueggeman 
testified during the sanctions hearing that the Previant firm 
made none of these inquiries.  These circuit court findings are 
not clearly erroneous and this court must accept each as true. 
¶61 The circuit court also found that the Previant firm 
never engaged in any of the following activities: 
 
a. A comprehensive review of the medical records of 
the mothers and children in question. 
 
b. An identification of the risk factors present in 
the mothers of the three plaintiffs indicative of 
causation of the birth defects in question. 
 
c. 
An 
evaluation, 
through 
consultation 
with 
appropriate medical and scientific authorities, of the 
scientific 
invalidity 
of 
Attorney 
Bangert's 
"elimination analysis," as well as the irrelevance of 
No. 
98-0885 
 
32
the presence of multiple "pregnancy problems" among 
female employees of JFI. 
None of these facts are clearly erroneous and we must accept 
each as true. 
¶62 Further, the circuit court found that: 
 
The Previant Firm unreasonably followed Dr. Dahir's 
suggestion to commence a lawsuit in order to "take 
discovery" 
regarding 
the 
nature 
and 
extent 
of 
plaintiffs' mothers exposure.  First, as Mr. Gleichert 
testified, the Previant Firm was entitled as a matter 
of law to obtain from JFI the names of all chemicals 
used at JFI, as well as the results of all tests 
measuring the amount of chemicals in the workplace 
atmosphere. 
 
It 
was 
unnecessary, 
and 
therefore 
unjustified, for the Previant Firm to sue JFI to 
obtain this information.  Second, the "discovery" 
sought by the Previant Firm could not correct the 
absence of any scientific support for the underlying 
theory of causation.  Even if plaintiffs' counsel 
would have unearthed documents at JFI indicating that 
the mothers were exposed to unacceptable levels of 
chemicals (and there was no such evidence), that 
information would not have provided the fundamental 
and necessary causal link to the birth defects.  Only 
an expert could have provided the critical link.  
Rather, 
any 
such 
documents 
merely 
would 
have 
corroborated statements by the mothers about alleged 
exposure to chemicals. 
 
It was unreasonable for the Previant Firm to rely on 
the 
"elimination 
analysis" 
performed 
by 
Attorney 
Bangert.  Not only did Attorney Bangert have no 
qualifications 
to 
perform 
such an 
analysis, her 
conclusions were entirely unfounded.  As Dr. Brent 
testified, Attorney Bangert failed to consider risk 
factors, as such were contained in the mothers' 
medical records, for the specific birth defects in 
question; moreover, her conclusion that "eliminating" 
certain potential causes "left" exposure to carbon 
dioxide and ammonia as the actual cause of the birth 
defects in question is simply wrong as a matter of 
science and logic. 
 
No. 
98-0885 
 
33
It was unreasonable for the Previant Firm to rely on 
the 
purported 
existence 
of 
multiple 
"pregnancy 
problems" among female employees of JFI.  As Dr. Brent 
indicated, the presumed instances of miscarriages, 
premature births, still births, low birth weights, and 
other complications counsels against the presence of a 
single teratogenic agent and provides no support for 
plaintiffs' claims. 
 
At no time prior to its review of the documents 
[inspected on January 31 and February 1, 1997] did the 
Previant Firm make any effort to obtain a qualified 
expert to support the causation theory advanced in the 
complaint, nor did it obtain any other scientific 
support for the proposition that exposure to carbon 
dioxide, ammonia or any other chemical used at JFI 
causes birth defects. 
 
The Previant Firm failed to offer any testimony 
indicating that either the "in state" or "out of 
state" consultant was ever shown any of the documents 
produced by JFI. 
Together, these are the essential findings of fact upon which 
the circuit court drew the conclusion that the Previant firm 
frivolously continued this action.  Each of these findings is 
supported by the record, and we must accept each as true. 
¶63 Despite these findings, the Previant firm defends its 
continuation of this action, arguing that it is entitled to 
"safe harbor" to investigate the facts underlying causation and 
that it satisfied its obligation to do so with its June 21, 1995 
request for documents.  This argument finds its genesis in 
Stern, 185 Wis. 2d at 235, where we explained that because an 
attorney has an obligation to zealously represent his or her 
client's 
interests, 
he 
or 
she 
may 
in 
the 
appropriate 
circumstance make "some claims which are not entirely clear in 
the law or on the facts, at least when commenced."  This 
No. 
98-0885 
 
34
statement has since been interpreted as providing "parties and 
attorneys a 'safe harbor' in that they may file a pleading 
without fear of sanctions as long as they make a reasonable 
inquiry as to uncertain or unclear facts within a reasonable 
time after the pleading is filed."  Kelly v. Clark, 192 Wis. 2d 
633, 651, 531 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶64 However, just as an attorney's right to rely on a 
referring attorney or on the statements of clients is not 
without limitation, use of "safe harbor" is not unfettered.  The 
"safe harbor" identified in Kelly is a result of the adoption of 
our rules of civil procedure in 1976 which brought to an end a 
party's ability to conduct discovery for the purposes of 
pleading.  See id. at 650. "Now, a party and his or her attorney 
must commence an action before conducting discovery."  Id.  
"Safe harbor" is responsive to the problem created by the rule 
change and allows attorneys to bring an action even though some 
facts are uncertain or unclear.  Thereafter, discovery may be 
made to bring certainty and clarity to the facts.  However, 
"safe harbor" does not relieve an attorney from establishing a 
factual basis for a claim when that basis could be established 
by means other than discovery.  That is, “safe harbor” is not a 
loophole through which attorneys may escape the requirement of 
Wis. Stat. § 814.025 that an action have a reasonable basis in 
law or equity. 
¶65 Yet such a loophole is precisely what the Previant 
firm's argument would create, and is a position with which the 
dissent agrees.  We do not hold, as is stated by the dissent, 
No. 
98-0885 
 
35
that as a matter of course a plaintiff must exhaust outside 
sources of information before embarking on formal discovery.  
See dissenting op. at 6-8.  However, we do believe that a 
plaintiff may not rely on formal discovery to establish the 
factual basis of its cause of action, thereby escaping the 
mandates of both Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025, when the 
required factual basis could be established without discovery.  
The dissent ignores the requirement of these two statutes that a 
party must have a reasonable basis in fact for each claim and 
that when, and only when, that factual basis cannot be 
established but for discovery, "safe harbor" may be provided to 
help the party establish the factual basis.  See, e.g., Kelly, 
192 Wis. 2d at 651 (attorney was permitted to rely on a client's 
statements because he had no way to verify the facts related 
without discovery).  "Safe harbor" simply cannot be a mechanism 
by which a party is permitted to file and continue an action to 
conduct discovery for information which is available short of 
discovery.  If the law were otherwise, §§ 802.05 and 814.025 
would be of little worth and no factual basis for a claim would 
ever need be required.  Under the dissent's view, a "file first 
and ask questions later" approach to litigation would carry the 
day. 
¶66 Nonetheless, the Previant firm contends that its June 
1995 discovery request was intended to uncover documents which 
would help it establish causation.  The Previant firm explains 
that under Stern and Kelly, it had a right to file the action 
and "a duty thereafter to make a reasonable inquiry as to the 
No. 
98-0885 
 
36
unclear facts surrounding the issue of causation (e.g., the 
chemicals used at JFI and the exposures to which the mothers 
were subjected)."  On the record before us, the Previant firm 
apparently believes that its duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" 
required no activity beside its request for documents. 
¶67 The circuit court rejected the Previant firm's view of 
its right to "safe harbor" for two reasons.  First, it found 
that the Previant firm should not have relied upon the two-
minute conversation with Dr. Dahir in which he advised that an 
expert in causation could not be contacted until the Previant 
firm had discovered the exposure levels of chemicals at JFI.  
The court found that Dahir had no experience in teratology, 
epidemiology, or the causes of spina bifida, heart malformation 
or any other birth defects, was not board certified in any 
specialty, did not have training that would qualify him to 
render a competent opinion regarding relationships between 
specific chemical exposures and specific birth defects, and that 
he had never read any of the medical records of the plaintiffs 
or their mothers.  In essence, the circuit court found that 
Dahir did not have sufficient expertise to opine on whether 
discovery needed to be made prior to contacting an expert 
witness on causation.  The Previant firm did not offer any 
evidence that Dahir was qualified to make such a recommendation, 
and the circuit court's finding that Dahir should not have been 
relied upon is not clearly erroneous. 
¶68 Second, and more importantly, the circuit court found, 
as we have quoted above, that the information the Previant firm 
No. 
98-0885 
 
37
claims it needed prior to acquiring an expert opinion (i.e., the 
chemicals used at JFI and the exposures to which the mothers 
were subjected) could have been acquired without discovery.  The 
circuit court based its finding on the testimony of Gregg 
Gleichert, JFI executive vice-president, who explained at the 
sanctions hearing that under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA), JFI is required to maintain records of all chemicals 
used in the workplace as well as the results of tests monitoring 
the chemical exposure.  Under OSHA, this information is 
available 
to 
employees, 
former 
employees 
and 
their 
representatives by simply asking for that information.  The 
Previant firm does not dispute this finding; it is a finding 
supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous. 
¶69 The Previant firm may have believed that JFI had more 
detailed information on the levels of exposure than that which 
is required by OSHA.  However, that belief does not excuse the 
Previant firm for failing to avail itself of information that 
was available without discovery.  While discovery may frequently 
provide the details essential to proving a claim, as we have 
noted, for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 814.025, an attorney may 
not ignore information that is available that would help to 
establish the claim's factual basis.  The Previant firm has made 
quite clear that the reason it had to engage in discovery was 
its need to know the types of chemicals used at JFI and 
employees' level of exposure to those chemicals.  It is 
undisputed that this information was available to the Previant 
firm short of discovery.  The circuit court drew the further 
No. 
98-0885 
 
38
inference that discovery was not really necessary to obtain the 
expert opinions since the Previant firm did not provide the 
experts with any information it obtained from JFI in securing 
their opinions.3 
¶70 It matters little that the Previant firm describes its 
discovery as one which uncovered "remarkably fruitful" evidence 
supporting its allegations of negligence.  While this may indeed 
be true, causation is the element for which the Previant firm 
needed evidence, and those documents which helped to support the 
element of negligence is irrelevant to that information which it 
repeatedly states it needed to acquire before it could contact 
an expert witness. 
¶71 We 
turn 
now 
to 
consider 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination that this claim was frivolously continued.  None 
of the circuit court's findings of fact pertaining to the 
Previant firm's continuation of this claim is clearly erroneous. 
                     
3 The dissent states that the Previant firm was merely 
engaging in "cautious lawyering" by choosing not to show any 
document it acquired from JFI to its experts.  Dissenting op. at 
9.  However, in noting the Previant firm's strategy, the dissent 
loses sight of the reason the firm stated that it needed to file 
and then maintain this action without any factual basis for 
causation: namely, it believed that it could only establish 
causation by conducting discovery to identify the types of 
chemicals used at JFI and the levels to which employees were 
exposed to those chemicals.  That information, it has explained, 
had to be discovered before an expert would opine on causation. 
 Aside from the fact that the circuit court found that this 
information was available short of discovery, there is some 
inconsistency in needing to engage in discovery for information 
that will be shown to an expert, and then receiving an opinion 
from an expert without providing the expert with any of 
discovered information. 
No. 
98-0885 
 
39
 Each has ample support in the record, and we must accept each 
as true.  However, whether these factual determinations support 
a finding of frivolousness is a matter of law which we review 
independent of the circuit court, benefiting from its analysis. 
 Juneau County, 221 Wis. 2d at 638-39. 
¶72 We are mindful of the delicate balance involved in the 
 application of Wis. Stat. § 814.025.  A significant purpose of 
the statute is to help maintain the integrity of the judicial 
system and the legal profession.  Juneau County, 221 Wis. 2d at 
639 (citing Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 799, 299 N.W.2d 856 
(1981)).  As we have explained, courts and litigants should not 
be subjected to actions without substance.  Id.  At the same 
time, we must also recognize that courts must be cautious in 
declaring an action frivolous, for to do so may stifle "the 
ingenuity, foresightedness and competency of the bar."  Id. 
(citing Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 
605, 613, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984)).  In making the appropriate 
balance between these competing interests, we will declare the 
continuation of an action frivolous only when there is no 
reasonable basis for a claim.  Id.  Any doubts about the 
reasonableness of claim will be resolved in favor of the 
litigant or attorney subject to the sanctions motion.  Id. 
 
¶73 Here, with a view to the findings made by the circuit 
court, we have no doubts that the Previant firm frivolously 
continued this action.  The essential element of the plaintiffs' 
allegation requiring a factual basis was causation.  The circuit 
court found that discovery was not required to obtain the 
No. 
98-0885 
 
40
information the Previant firm would rely upon in securing an 
expert opinion, that the Previant firm made no efforts aside 
from the discovery request to establish the necessary causal 
nexus, and that once it did contact experts, it did not provide 
those experts any of the information it obtained as a result of 
discovery.  The circuit court also found that what information 
that the Previant firm did have from its clients and the 
referring attorney should not have been relied upon.  Although 
we do not come to this decision lightly, we conclude that these 
facts as found by the circuit court do support a finding that 
the action was continued frivolously as a matter of law.4 
¶74 The Previant firm remains firm in its belief that 
causation could still be established through an epidemiological 
study, and that the most that one might surmise from its 
investigation into causation is that "to date there is no 
                     
4  In contrast, the dissent summarily asserts that “an 
independent review of [the] facts demonstrates that the suit was 
not frivolous.”   Dissenting op. at 3.  In so concluding, the 
dissent lists six "facts" that the Previant firm knew prior to 
filing this action and four documents that the Previant firm 
uncovered during discovery as evidence that the action was not 
continued frivolously.  The dissent's error in relying on these 
pieces of information is two-fold.  First, the circuit court 
found that none of the six facts could be relied upon and that 
the Previant firm should have made additional inquiries.  As we 
have discussed, these findings are not clearly erroneous.  
Further, the dissent's analysis is notable for its failure to 
address the circuit court's findings of factfindings which 
unless clearly erroneous must serve as the basis for its review 
of whether the action was frivolously continued.  Second, the 
determination of what an attorney knew or should have known is 
the question to consider in evaluating whether an action was 
frivolously continued.  The dissent inappropriately looks to 
documents discovered nine months after the action was filed. 
No. 
98-0885 
 
41
scientific literature conclusively demonstrating a causal link 
between these chemicals and birth defects."  We believe that 
these statements underscore the dearth of evidence supporting 
causation, in view of which it was unreasonable to continue this 
action. 
 
¶75 In sum, the cornerstone of this conclusion rests in 
this: 1) causationthe causal connection between any amount of a 
chemical used at JFI and the plaintiffs’ birth defectswas the 
critical element of the plaintiffs’ claims; 2) following the 
filing of the complaint, for nine months the Previant firm did 
nothing to try to establish this causation.  Certainly the 
Previant firm sought discovery, but this discovery did not go to 
establishing the basic nexus between chemicals and the birth 
defects.  This is what the circuit court found, and there is 
ample evidence in the record to support the finding.  The law 
gives a lawyer great power in starting a lawsuit.  The filing of 
a complaint can set in gear, as it did here, a great deal of 
activitycostly activitywith respect to the defendant.  With 
the power to institute a lawsuit must come responsibility.  With 
the problems this case presented to the plaintiffs, the 
plaintiffs had a responsibility to do more than sit and wait.  
¶76 Finally, the amount of attorney fees and costs to be 
awarded will depend upon the time at which this court determines 
that the action was continued frivolously.  We deem it 
appropriate to award fees and costs beginning on June 21, 1995. 
 It was upon that date that the Previant firm served on JFI its 
second request for documents, following which it made no further 
No. 
98-0885 
 
42
investigation into causation, and in response to which JFI began 
to accumulate substantial fees and costs defending itself 
against the action. 
IV 
 
¶77 The Previant firm also appeals the amount awarded JFI 
in reasonable attorney fees and costs.  We will sustain a 
circuit court's award of attorney fees unless its determination 
is clearly erroneous.  See Standard Theatres v. Transportation 
Dept., 118 Wis. 2d 730, 747, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984).  This 
deference is extended to the circuit court on both the 
prevailing rate as well as the facts concerning the magnitude of 
the effort required to meet the challenges of litigation.  See 
id. at 747-52 (while we explicitly stated that we review the 
value of fees for an erroneous exercise of discretion, we in 
practice also reviewed the reasonableness of the preparations an 
attorney 
made 
under 
this 
deferential 
standard). 
 
This 
deferential standard of review acknowledges the circuit court's 
advantageous position in determining the reasonableness of a 
firm's rate and preparations.  See id. at 747.  
 
'[The trial judge] has observed the quality of the 
services rendered and has access to the file in the 
case to see all of the work which has gone into the 
action from its inception.  He has the expertise to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the fees with regard to 
the services rendered.' 
Id. (citing Tesch v. Tesch, 63 Wis. 2d 320, 335, 217 N.W.2d 647 
(1974).  In reviewing an award of attorney fees, we recognize 
that although reasonableness is a question of law, due to the 
circuit court's superior position, we give weight to the circuit 
No. 
98-0885 
 
43
court's determination.  Nelson v. Machut, 138 Wis. 2d 301, 305, 
405 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1987).   
¶78 Because the circuit court properly found that the 
Previant firm frivolously continued the underlying action, and 
we affirm, sanctions in this case are mandatory.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025(1) (if an action continued by a plaintiff is found 
frivolous, the "court shall award to the successful party costs 
determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney fees.").  The 
Previant firm argues that while the sanction is mandatory, the 
amount awarded is not reasonable and is contrary to the purpose 
of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 which it believes is to deter litigants 
and attorneys from commencing or continuing frivolous actions 
and to punish those who do so. 
 
¶79 While we agree with the Previant firm that deterrence 
and punishment are the underlying purposes of § 814.025, see 
Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 511, 362 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. 
App. 1984), we are less convinced that compensation is not an 
appropriate consideration.  Certainly, deterrence and punishment 
of an attorney or party who maintains a frivolous action is not 
inconsistent with fully compensating an opposing party for the 
costs and attorneys fees required to defend a frivolous action. 
 In Johnson v. Calado, 159 Wis. 2d 446, 464 N.W.2d 647 (1991), 
in what is admittedly dicta, we wrote that Wis. Stat. § 814.025 
may "in a proper case, provide full compensation for reasonable 
attorney fees necessary to defend against a frivolous claim."  
Id. at 462.  We embrace this view today. 
No. 
98-0885 
 
44
¶80 While not the primary purpose of rules governing 
frivolous claims, compensating those forced to defend frivolous 
litigation may be appropriate.  See Retired Chicago Police Ass'n 
v. Firemen's Annuity, 145 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 1998)(citing 
Brandt v. Schal Assocs., Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 645-46 (7th Cir. 
1992).5  Logic dictates that "reasonable" sanctions would make a 
party whole by including in sanctions all the costs and fees 
associated with defending against a frivolous action.  While a 
court may not be obligated to do so, use of a "but-for" standard 
for sanctions may be sensible.  Such a standard shifts to the 
violator the economic burden of all fees and expenses reasonably 
generated in response to the frivolous argument or pleading.  
See Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237.  Under such a 
"but-for" approach, the circuit court should make findings as to 
what fees and expenses were reasonably generated.   
 ¶81 Further, in determining the appropriate amount of fees 
and 
expenses, 
a 
court 
should 
"reflect 
upon 
equitable 
considerations in determining the amount of the sanction."  
Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards of U.S., 830 F.2d 
1429, 1438-39 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 
Although equitable considerations are not relevant to 
the initial decision to impose sanctions [], once a 
court 
determines 
that 
sanctions 
are 
appropriate, 
                     
5 While Wis. Stat. § 814.025 does not mirror Rule 11 as does 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05, both statutes provide for reasonable 
attorney fees and costs upon a finding that an action is 
frivolous, and case law interpreting the federal rule may be 
persuasive authority on the question of reasonable attorney fees 
and costs under § 814.025.    
No. 
98-0885 
 
45
equitable factors may be an ingredient in . . . 
fashioning an award. 
Id. at 1439.  Relevant considerations may include the sanctioned 
attorney's assets or whether the party seeking fees caused the 
litigation to be longer than necessary.  Id. (citations 
omitted). In some circumstances, "[a] duty of mitigation exists, 
and a district court should ensure that the party requesting 
fees has not needlessly protracted the litigation."  Id. (citing 
Schwarzer, 104 F.R.D. at 203 ("A party having vigorously 
resisted a baseless claim may therefore find that the court, in 
making an award, will consider its expenditures to have been 
excessive." (footnote omitted))). 
 
¶82 Turning to the award made by the circuit court, we 
observe that it made very thorough findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect to the reasonableness of JFI's 
response to the claim.  It viewed the claim as one which would 
be devastating to JFI, and expressed the view that  
 
[JFI] would have to be comatose not to see [the claim] 
as a significant threat to the corporation.  It was 
reasonable for a national corporation such as Jeromes 
. . . to seek the best legal resources they felt were 
available to them and to prepare for and to fully 
defend the suit to protect their corporate assets. 
The record amply supports the court's findings in most respects. 
  
¶83 However, the circuit court's conclusion that the fees 
were reasonable was based upon its view that JFI, facing the 
complaint, would reasonably have undertaken all the costs of the 
defense that it did here.  However, the circuit court did not 
No. 
98-0885 
 
46
explicitly consider whether JFI's defense remained reasonable 
upon receiving Dr. Brent's opinion in July of 1995.  It is 
difficult to square JFI's varying views that causation was 
impossible to prove as a matter of law and the need to expend 
the hundreds of thousands of dollars that JFI expended in 
defending this suit.  See Kirk Capitol Corp. v. Bailey, 16 F.3d 
1485, 
1491 
(8th 
Cir. 
1994)("[T]here 
is 
something 
very 
inconsistent with the assertion that the plaintiffs filed a 
patently frivolous complaint meriting sanctions under rule 11 
and contending that it took 279.10 or even 179.10 hours of legal 
work to reveal what the defendants contend is obvious."). 
 
¶84 Because the award of attorneys fees and costs was 
based on both the commencement and continuation of a frivolous 
complaint, we remand to the circuit court for a determination of 
the appropriate costs and attorneys' fees due only to the 
plaintiffs' maintenance of a frivolous claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025. Although the record contains a fairly detailed 
description of JFI's costs and attorneys fees, this court cannot 
determine precisely those costs and fees to be attributed to 
JFI's defense as part of the continuation of the action.  
Further, the circuit court adopted the recommendations that a 
certain amount of the attorneys fees should be excluded based on 
duplication of effort and imperfect efficiencies.  The record 
does not disclose the manner in which this discount was applied 
by the circuit court and therefore we do not have the necessary 
information with which to make this calculation here. 
No. 
98-0885 
 
47
¶85 In making its determination, we direct the circuit 
court to compute the costs and attorneys fees from June 21, 
1995, and in doing so take into its consideration the equitable 
factors we have identified above.  In particular, the circuit 
court should give whatever weight it believes appropriate as a 
mitigating factor the opinion JFI obtained from Dr. Brent in 
July 1995 that the Previant firm could not establish causation. 
By the Court.The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded. 
 
98-0885.awb 
 
1 
¶86 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).   What happened on 
June 21, 1995, that transformed the Previant firm’s action from 
a meritorious case into a frivolous claim?  The majority fails 
to clearly answer the question.  It nevertheless concludes that 
on that date, only six weeks after the case was commenced, the 
Previant firm’s suit was so completely lacking merit that “no 
reasonable basis exist[ed] for a claim."  
¶87 Could it be, as the majority seemingly suggests, that 
the filing of a request for the production of documents in this 
case renders it devoid of merit?  Is the majority really 
contending that it is frivolous for a party to pursue formal 
discovery without first “avail[ing] itself of information that 
was available without discovery?”  Majority op. at 37.  The 
majority’s answers to both questions appear to be “yes.” 
¶88 At the outset, it is important to remember that the 
entire life of this action spanned nine months:  the Previant 
firm filed the action on May 9, 1995, and indicated that it 
wished to dismiss the action on February 28, 1996.  Prior to 
filing the action, the Previant firm knew that several female 
employees of JFI had given birth to children with birth defects, 
that the JFI plant had frequent ammonia leaks, and that 
excessive amounts of carbon dioxide often existed in the work 
environment.  It knew that the physician of one of the pregnant 
employees had indicated that the chemicals at JFI could well 
have caused the birth defects of that employee’s child.  The 
Previant firm was informed that a management employee of JFI had 
indicated that the company knew of the dangers at the plant and 
98-0885.awb 
 
2 
attempted a cover up.  A consultant advised the Previant firm 
that in order to prove that the toxic chemicals caused the birth 
defects 
it 
needed 
to 
obtain 
information 
concerning 
the 
employees' level of exposure to the chemicals. 
¶89 The Previant firm filed suit and six weeks later 
requested documents.  JFI would not release the requested 
documents without a confidentiality agreement.  After months of 
wrangling with JFI over the confidentiality agreement, on 
December 8, 1995, the court signed the order and the Previant 
firm had access to those documents numbering well over 200,000.6 
 On January 31 and February 1, 1996, the Previant firm inspected 
those documents.   
¶90 Through that discovery, the 
Previant 
firm 
found 
documents suggesting that JFI suspected that its chemicals might 
adversely affect pregnancy.  It discovered that almost two years 
prior to the commencement of the suit, JFI had hired a 
researcher at the University of Minnesota to run a computerized 
“Med-line” search of articles related to “Spina Bifida and 
Carbon Dioxide Exposure or Teratogenic Effects of Carbon 
Dioxide.”  The documents revealed that JFI produced a “Safety 
Facts Sheet” 
indicating 
that “[c]oncentrations 
[of 
carbon 
dioxide] over 50,000 [parts per million] can deplete oxygen 
levels which could impact the health of unborn children.”  It 
                     
6 This is not to say that the case sat idle until that time. 
 From the middle of June until early November, both the Previant 
firm and JFI debated, weekly at times, issues related to venue, 
substitution of judges, 
third-party 
complaints, 
and 
other 
various items common to complex litigation. 
98-0885.awb 
 
3 
discovered that after an ammonia leak, a JFI supervisor kept any 
pregnant employees “out of the area for the rest of the evening 
as a precautionary measure.”  Significantly it found that a 
doctor of another pregnant employee had written to JFI informing 
it that the pregnant employee should discontinue working because 
ammonia is “harmful to adults” and “is similarly harmful to 
fetuses whose mothers breathe excessive amounts of the gas.”   
¶91 The Previant firm also learned, after talking with two 
consultants, that in order to establish causation it would need 
to obtain very expensive epidemiological studies.  The clients 
did not have the desire to pursue this massive undertaking.  
Recognizing that without the epidemiological studies, the chance 
of ultimate success was slim, they instead chose to voluntarily 
dismiss their suit. 
¶92 I conclude that an independent review of these facts 
demonstrates that the suit was not frivolous.7  JFI, by its 
actions, apparently agrees with me.   
¶93 JFI expended nearly $1 million to defend against the 
Previant firm’s action.  Quite simply, it is incongruous for JFI 
to assert that it is reasonable to spend that amount of money 
defending the action while at the same time claiming that the 
                     
7 As we reiterated earlier this term, frivolousness is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  Juneau County v. Courthouse 
Employees, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 639, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998).  While a 
circuit court’s findings of fact are not upset unless they are 
clearly erroneous, whether those facts constitute frivolousness 
is a question of law that we review independently of the 
determinations of the circuit court.  Id. 
98-0885.awb 
 
4 
claim has no merit.  As the Eighth Circuit stated, “On the face 
of it, there is something very inconsistent with the assertion 
that the plaintiffs filed a patently frivolous complaint 
meriting sanctions . . . and contending that it took 279.10 or 
even 179.10 hours of legal work in order to reveal what 
defendants contend is obvious.”  Kirk Capitol Corp. v. Bailey, 
16 F.3d 1485, 1491 (8th Cir. 1994) (cited by majority op. at 
36).  Hours of 179 to 279 constitute only pocket change in 
comparison to the total number of hours billed by JFI's 
attorneys 
in 
this 
caseover 
2,500. 
 
The 
“inconsistency” 
increases exponentially as the hours increase arithmetically.   
¶94 JFI now contends that as of July 1995, two months 
after the action was filed, it was of the opinion this action 
was frivolous.  Yet, it never raised that issue in its answer or 
any responsive pleadings.  Instead, it waited until the 
plaintiffs announced their intent to voluntarily dismiss this 
action before it raised the specter of seeking sanctions.  All 
the while, it continued to spend seemingly unlimited resources 
to defend an action that it deemed frivolous.  
¶95 JFI cannot spend unlimited resources to defend a 
frivolous action without those expenditures becoming frivolous 
as well.  Just how does one rack up over $750,000 in bills in 
nine months?  The attorneys fees claimed by JFI exceeded $45,000 
for the pleadings alone.  It claimed $43,000 in LEXIS and 
Westlaw research expenses, over and above the $107,000 in 
attorneys fees for research.  
98-0885.awb 
 
5 
¶96 As further detailed below, I agree with the majority 
that the fees and expenses submitted by JFI are excessive.  
Majority op. at 46-47.  However, the fees and expenses reveal 
that JFI took this claim seriously because the claim was 
serious.  JFI attacked this case as if it had merit because the 
case was meritorious.  This case was not commenced frivolously; 
it was not continued frivolously.   
¶97 The majority agrees with part of that statement.  On 
the one hand it determines that the suit was not frivolous when 
filed on May 9, 1995.  On the other hand it determines that it 
was frivolous on June 21, 199543 days, or a little over six 
weeks, from filing.  
¶98 Six weeks disappear with the blink of an eye in 
ordinary civil litigation.  Complex toxic tort cases with 
multiple defendants only elongate this process.  See 1 A Guide 
to Toxic Torts, § 2.01 (Matthew Bender 1999).  Such cases are 
expensive to litigate and, as a necessary corollary, typically 
of long duration.  See, e.g., In re Joint E.& S. Dists. Asbestos 
Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (six years); In re Agent 
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 
aff’d 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (six years); Ayers v. Township 
of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 292 (N.J. 1987) (nine years).  Yet, on 
June 21, 1995, six weeks after filing the complaint and 22 days 
before JFI even answered the complaint (July 13, 1995), the 
majority declares, as a matter of law, that the lawsuit became 
utterly meritless. 
98-0885.awb 
 
6 
¶99 Not only is six weeks a blink of the eye in the life 
of a toxic tort case, six weeks is a wholly inadequate period of 
time for plaintiffs’ counsel to gather and build what is needed 
to prove causation in a toxic tort case.  Causation is the core 
of a toxic tort case and, by its nature, is riddled with special 
and complex problems of proof.  2 A Guide to Toxic Torts, ch. 15 
(Matthew Bender 1999) ("Special Issues of Cause and Effect in 
the Defense of a Toxic Tort Case").  Proving causation in a 
toxic tort case normally requires evidence of the level, date, 
and circumstances of the chemical exposure, as well as the 
observed 
effects 
of 
exposure 
on 
each 
of 
the 
individual 
plaintiffs.  2 A Guide to Toxic Torts, § 15.01[6].  All of this 
proof of causal relationship must be shown in addition to some 
form of scientific evidence.  Yet, according to the majority, 
plaintiffs’ counsel must assemble all of this proof in a six-
week period of time.   
¶100 Setting aside the folly of finding this suit frivolous 
after only six weeks and before issue was even joined, the 
majority’s 
rationale 
underlying 
its 
conclusion 
does 
not 
withstand scrutiny.  The majority’s holding, as I understand it, 
is that the Previant firm’s suit became frivolous on June 21, 
1995, because on that date the Previant firm served its second 
request for the production of documents on JFI.8  Majority op. at 
41.  This ordinary act of formal discovery became egregious, the 
                     
8 Also on that date, the Previant firm served JFI notice of 
a deposition of one of its officials and JFI requested a 
confidentiality order. 
98-0885.awb 
 
7 
majority maintains, for two reasons:  (1) the Previant firm 
should not have relied upon the advice of Dr. Dahir who 
suggested that the Previant firm needed to know the levels of 
toxic exposure before it could secure an expert opinion on 
causation; and (2) the Previant firm could have obtained the 
same information from OSHA without discovery.  Majority op. at 
35-37.  
¶101 It is not entirely clear why Dr. Dahir’s suggestion is 
relevant to the majority’s conclusions.  The Previant firm 
consulted Dr. Dahir prior to filing the suit.  This explains why 
the circuit court’s findings regarding Dr. Dahir were in regard 
to the frivolous filing of the suit (a conclusion, of course, 
with which the majority disagrees), but it does not explain why 
the majority extrapolates them to the frivolous continuance of 
the suit.   
¶102 In any event, it is elementary that in order to 
determine whether exposure to a toxic chemical is harmful, it is 
necessary to know the level or amount of exposure.  As this 
court has previously stated, even normally “benign” chemicals 
can become harmful if released in excessive amounts.  See 
Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 233, 
564 N.W.2d 728 (1997); Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. 
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 The majority’s attack on Dr. Dahir’s opinion, his experience, 
and his training creates confusion not illumination.  It really 
provides no support for the majority’s argument. 
98-0885.awb 
 
8 
¶103 Next, the majority suggests that the continuation of 
the action is frivolous because the Previant firm could have 
obtained the requested information from OSHA without formal 
discovery.  Majority op. at 36-37.  I am bewildered both by the 
factual 
and 
by 
the 
legal 
assumptions 
that 
underlie 
the 
majority’s assertion.  Factually it is not, as the majority 
repeatedly contends, “undisputed that this information was 
available to the Previant firm short of discovery.”  Majority 
op. at 37.  To the contrary, at oral argument the Previant firm 
maintained that it did check the OSHA records related to JFI.  
Additionally, the Previant firm argued that such information was 
of only marginal assistance because the information is limited 
to what OSHA requires a company to report.  These records did 
not provide all the information the Previant firm needed. 
¶104 More importantly, legally I am aware of no rule of 
civil procedure in this state that imposes a duty on a plaintiff 
to exhaust outside sources of information before seeking that 
information from an opposing party through formal discovery.  
Certainly there is no such rule imposed by Wis. Stat. ch. 804.  
Actually such a rule is in conflict with § 804.01(2)(a) which 
states that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged . . . .”  The majority does not even make 
a serious attempt to justify its bald assertion that formal 
discovery on a subject is sanctionable until every alternative 
source has been exhausted, as its discussion on the matter is 
98-0885.awb 
 
9 
bereft of any cited authority on that principle.9  See majority 
op. at 36-37. 
¶105 Instead, the majority hangs its hat on what it terms 
the circuit court’s conclusion that “the information the 
Previant firm claims it needed prior to acquiring an expert 
opinion . . . could 
have 
been 
obtained 
without 
discovery.”  
Majority op. at 36.  That is not what the circuit court said.  
Rather the circuit court found that “[i]t was unnecessary, and 
therefore unjustified, for the Previant Firm to sue JFI to 
obtain this information” because the documents existed at OSHA. 
 Quoted by majority op. at 32 (emphasis added).  But the 
majority has already concluded (contrary to the circuit court) 
that the Previant firm acted permissibly in filing its suit.  
Majority op. at 28.  Having permissibly filed suit, the Previant 
                     
9 The majority castigates the Previant firm’s actions as 
“fil[ing] first and ask[ing] questions later.”  Majority op. at 
34.  It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the 
majority’s earlier conclusion that the Previant firm had a 
reasonable basis in fact and law to file the action.  Majority 
op. at 28.   
The majority suggests that it does not hold “that as a 
matter of course a plaintiff must exhaust outside sources of 
information before embarking on formal discovery.”  Majority op. 
at 34.  Yet that assertion is contradicted by the majority’s 
next words:  “we do believe that a plaintiff may not rely on 
formal discovery to establish the factual basis of its cause of 
action.”  Majority op. at 34.   
The majority’s problem, of course, is that it has already 
held that the plaintiff did establish the “factual basis of its 
cause of action” at the time of filing.  Under the rules of 
civil procedure, unlocking that door permits a plaintiff to 
enter the world of formal discovery.   
98-0885.awb 
 
10
firm did not need to access the documents from OSHA; it was 
permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure to get them directly 
from JFI.   
¶106 Similarly, the majority takes a rather parochial 
approach to discovery.  As the Previant firm’s lead attorney 
indicated at the hearing, the Previant firm suspected that JFI, 
as a multi-million dollar corporation, might have conducted 
research on its chemicals and their health effects on employees. 
 This type of information would never have appeared in an OSHA 
file.   
¶107 The Previant firm was seeking discovery for more 
diffuse reasons than just causation.  The Previant firm needed 
access to JFI’s records in order to have a more complete picture 
of what JFI knew, when it knew it, and what it had done with 
that knowledge.   
¶108 Having found little success with its “Dr. Dahir” and 
“OSHA" arguments, the majority resorts to contending that the 
Previant firm presented disingenuous arguments to the court.  
The majority rejects the Previant firm’s claim that it needed 
the discovery to obtain expert opinions because “once [the 
Previant firm] did contact experts, it did not provide those 
experts any of the information it obtained as a result of 
discovery.”  Majority op. at 40.  
¶109 While the majority may be technically correct, it 
fails to recognize the effect that the confidentiality agreement 
had 
on 
the 
Previant 
firm’s 
actions. 
 
As 
part 
of 
the 
confidentiality agreement governing the disclosure of JFI’s 
98-0885.awb 
 
11
records, the Previant firm had to “advise [JFI] of the identity 
of 
the 
expert 
and/or 
advisor 
to 
whom 
disclosure 
is 
contemplated.”  The anonymity provided to consultants by the 
rules of civil procedure was eviscerated by the confidentiality 
agreement.  See Fredrickson v. Louisville Ladder Co., 52 Wis. 2d 
776, 782, 191 N.W.2d 193 (1971); Wisconsin Discovery Law & 
Practice, § 8.11; Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Chapter 804, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 463, 474-75 
(1976).   
¶110 Had the Previant firm done what the majority would 
seem to require“provide those experts . . . the information it 
obtained as a result of discovery”the identity of its 
consultants would have been revealed to JFI.  Following the 
requirement of the majority would unfairly force the Previant 
firm’s hand.   
¶111 Tellingly, the majority has nothing to say about the 
effect that the confidentiality agreement had on the Previant 
firm’s decision not to show its consultants documents obtained 
from JFI.  There was no duplicity on the part of Previant, only 
cautious lawyering.10  By suggesting otherwise, the majority 
further exhibits that its conclusion is inconsistent with the 
facts and law guiding this case. 
                     
10 To the extent that the majority implies that the Previant 
firm had no discussions with its consultants about what it found 
in JFI’s records, that assertion is not supported by the record. 
 The circuit court’s findings of fact on this issue stated only 
that the Previant firm’s consultants were not “shown any of the 
documents produced by JFI.”   
98-0885.awb 
 
12
¶112 Finally, I note that in remanding this case to the 
circuit court for a determination of the reasonable amount of 
fees and expenses, the majority correctly questions whether the 
defendants have fulfilled their duty to mitigate those fees and 
expenses.  Majority op. at 45-46.  As discussed above and as 
noted in the majority opinion, it is difficult to “square JFI’s 
varying views that causation was impossible to prove as a matter 
of law and the need to expend the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars that JFI expended in defending this suit.”  Majority op. 
at 46 (citing Kirk Capitol Corp., 16 F.3d at 1491).  It is 
inconsistent for JFI to contend that continuing the lawsuit is 
patently frivolous while at the same time giving credence to the 
suit’s merit by spending excessive sums in JFI’s defense. 
¶113 The majority also correctly notes in its opinion that 
the plaintiffs allege two claims each against JFI, one in common 
law negligence and the other under the safe place statute. 
Majority op. at 7-8.  The majority, however, declines to 
determine whether the safe place claims were frivolously 
continued and makes a conclusion only with regard to the common 
law negligence claims.  Majority op. at 40.   
¶114 As a result, upon remand JFI will have the burden of 
proving what amounts of its claimed fees and expenses are 
attributable only to the “frivolous” common law negligence 
claims.  No fees and expenses may be assessed for the defense of 
the safe place claims.  Any doubt as to whether an amount is 
attributable only to the common law negligence claims should be 
98-0885.awb 
 
13
resolved in favor of the Previant firm.  See Juneau County, 221 
Wis. 2d at 640. 
¶115 Upon remand and consistent with the majority opinion, 
the circuit court should deduct from the requested amount all 
fees and expenses incurred prior to June 21, l995.  Next, it 
should allow fees and expenses that are attributable only to the 
“frivolous” continuation of the common law claims.  Finally, in 
fashioning the award, the circuit court should consider JFI’s 
duty of mitigation.  As the majority quoted, “A party having 
vigorously resisted a baseless claim may therefore find that the 
court, in making an award, will consider its expenditures to 
have been excessive.”  Majority op. at 45 (citing Brown v. 
Federation of State Medical Boards of U.S., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 
(7th Cir. 1987)). 
¶116 In sum, the majority is correct to conclude that the 
Previant firm’s action was not frivolous when it was commenced. 
 However, its conclusion that the Previant firm continued a 
frivolous action as of June 21, 1995, six short weeks into the 
litigation, is meritless.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
¶117 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.