Title: State v. Richard Dodson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP001306-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1306-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Richard Dodson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  211 Wis. 2d 886, 568 N.W.2d 651 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-UNPUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 19, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 20, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
S. Michael Wilk 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Crooks, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Steinmetz & Wilcox, J.J., join 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Michael J. Backes, and Law Offices of Michael J. 
Backes, Milwaukee and oral argument by Michael J. Backes. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1306-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard Dodson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part and remanded. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  Defendant Richard Dodson 
(Dodson) seeks review of a court of appeals’ decision reversing 
one conviction and affirming two convictions for first-degree 
sexual assault of a child.  The reversed count was based on 
sexual intercourse with a child; the two affirmed counts were 
based on sexual contact with a child.  Dodson argues that 
evidence of a prior sexual assault of the victim, which the 
court of appeals held was erroneously excluded as to the 
reversed count, was likewise erroneously excluded on the other 
two affirmed counts.  Thus, Dodson asserts, the two convictions 
affirmed by the court of appeals should be reversed.  We agree. 
 Because we conclude that the exclusion of this evidence 
violated Dodson’s right to a fair trial and that the State of 
Wisconsin’s (State’s) interest in excluding the evidence under 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
2 
the rape shield law does not overcome his right, we reverse that 
part of the court of appeals’ opinion which affirmed the two 
convictions and remand for a new trial.  We further conclude 
that the modified jury instruction given to the jury was 
misleading.   
¶2 
The defendant, Richard Dodson, was charged with three 
counts of intentionally sexually assaulting a child who has not 
yet attained the age of 13 years, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1) (reprinted below).1  Counts one and two were based on 
allegations of sexual contact (defined below)2 with the child, 
B.W.S.  Count three was based on an allegation of sexual 
intercourse (defined below)3 with the child, B.W.S.  The jury 
                     
1 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1991-92 
version unless otherwise noted. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) provides: “FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT.  
Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B 
felony.”  
2 Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5) defines “sexual contact” as 
any 
intentional 
touching 
by 
the 
complainant 
or 
defendant, either directly or through clothing by the 
use of any body part or object, of the complainant’s 
or defendant’s intimate parts if that intentional 
touching is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or 
sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.  
 
3  Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6) defines “sexual intercourse” as 
vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or 
anal 
intercourse 
between 
persons 
or 
any 
other 
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s 
body or of any object into the genital or anal opening 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
3 
convicted the defendant of all three counts.  Dodson was also 
charged with one count of intentionally exposing a child to 
harmful materials, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a).  The 
jury acquitted him of this charge.  The Kenosha County Circuit 
Court, S. Michael Wilk, Judge, entered judgment on the three 
convictions for first-degree sexual assault. 
¶3 
Dodson appealed his convictions, arguing that the 
circuit court erred in excluding evidence, presented by an offer 
of proof, that the victim had been previously sexually assaulted 
by a third party, Bobby M.  Defense counsel offered this 
evidence to provide an alternative source for the child’s sexual 
knowledge and to rebut the State’s evidence of physical injury 
to the child.  In an unpublished decision, State v. Dodson, No. 
96-1306-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 21, 1997), 
the court of appeals applied the test laid out by this court in 
State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 647-48, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990), to determine whether application of the rape shield law, 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2), violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
constitutional right to present a defense.  The court of appeals 
reversed count three, first-degree sexual assault based on 
sexual intercourse, because the court determined that evidence 
of the prior sexual assault should have been admitted.  
¶4 
However, the court of appeals declined to reverse 
counts one and two, both for first-degree sexual assault based 
                                                                  
either by the defendant or upon the defendant’s 
instruction.  The emission of semen is not required. 
 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
4 
on sexual contact.  The court determined that those convictions 
were based on “other discrete incidents” which do not closely 
resemble the proffered evidence of alleged sexual intercourse by 
Bobby M.  See Dodson, No. 96-1306-CR, unpublished slip op. at 
13.  Therefore, the court remanded for a new trial only on count 
three. 
¶5 
Dodson also argues that the circuit court erred by 
submitting a modified version of Wis JICriminal 255 to the jury 
regarding the State’s obligation to prove when the alleged 
events took place.  The court of appeals determined that the 
circuit court did not err.  The court reasoned that Dodson 
neither claimed an alibi for the time period alleged in the 
information nor did the instruction confuse the jury.  This 
court accepted Dodson’s petition for review of the court of 
appeals’ decision on these two issues.   
¶6 
The first question presented in this case, whether the 
circuit court erred in excluding evidence of a prior sexual 
assault committed on the victim by a third party, is a question 
of constitutional proportion.  Whether the circuit court’s 
determination denied Dodson his Sixth Amendment right to present 
a defense is a question of constitutional fact which this court 
reviews de novo.  See In Interest of Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d 
713, 720, 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993) (citing Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 
at 648).   
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
5 
¶7 
Wisconsin’s rape shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) 
(reprinted below),4 generally prohibits the introduction of 
evidence regarding the complainant’s prior sexual conduct.  See 
§ 972.11(2)(b).  “[G]enerally evidence of a complainant’s prior 
sexual conduct is irrelevant or, if relevant, substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”  Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 
at 644.  The statute does, however, provide three exceptions 
which represent “those limited circumstances in which evidence 
of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct is generally viewed as 
probative of a material issue without being overly prejudicial.” 
 Id.  The exceptions include evidence of the victim’s past 
                     
4 Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) In this subsection, “sexual conduct” means any 
conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of 
the complaining witness, including but not limited 
to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement 
and life-style. 
(b) If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 
940.225, 948.02, 948.05 or 948.06, any evidence 
concerning the complaining witness’s prior sexual 
conduct or opinions of the witness’s prior sexual 
conduct and reputation as to prior sexual conduct 
shall not be admitted into evidence during the 
course of the hearing or trial, nor shall any 
reference to such conduct be made in the presence of 
the jury, except the following, subject to s. 
971.31(11): 
1. Evidence of the complaining witness’s past 
conduct with the defendant. 
2. Evidence 
of 
specific 
instances 
of 
sexual 
conduct showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered. 
3. Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault made by the complaining witness.  
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
6 
sexual 
conduct 
with 
the 
defendant; 
evidence 
of 
specific 
instances of sexual contact showing an alternative source of 
semen, pregnancy or disease; or evidence that the victim made 
prior 
untruthful 
allegations 
of 
sexual 
assault. 
 
See 
§ 972.11(2)(b)1, 2, 3.  In the present case, we agree with the 
court of appeals that evidence regarding prior sexual assault 
perpetrated on the child by a third party does not fall within 
one of these statutory exceptions.   
¶8 
This 
does 
not, 
however, 
end 
our 
inquiry. 
 
In 
Pulizzano, this court determined that Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) is 
constitutional 
on 
its 
face, 
but 
as 
applied 
it 
may 
unconstitutionally deprive a defendant of his or her rights to a 
fair 
trial, 
confrontation, 
and 
compulsory 
process. 
 
See 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 647.  “[I]n the circumstances of a 
particular case evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct 
may be so relevant and probative that the defendant’s right to 
present it is constitutionally protected.”  Id.  
¶9 
The 
concern 
pervasive 
throughout 
the 
Pulizzano 
analysis is the defendant's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
7 
Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution5 and the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.6   
 
The rights guaranteed by the confrontation and 
compulsory 
process 
clauses 
are 
fundamental 
and 
essential to achieving the constitutional objective of 
a fair trial.  The two rights have been appropriately 
described as opposite sides of the same coin and 
together, they grant defendants a constitutional right 
to present evidence.  The former grants defendants the 
right to 'effective' cross-examination of witnesses 
whose testimony is adverse, while the latter grants 
defendants the right to admit favorable testimony.  
The right to present evidence is not absolute, 
however.  Confrontation and compulsory process only 
grant defendants the constitutional right to present 
relevant evidence not substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 645-46 (internal citations omitted). 
¶10 To determine whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2), as 
applied, deprives a defendant of his or her constitutional 
rights and therefore, to admit evidence normally barred by the 
rape shield statute, the Pulizzano court established a two-part 
process.  First, the defendant must establish his or her 
constitutional rights to present the proposed evidence through a 
sufficient offer of proof.  See id. at 648-49.  A sufficient 
offer of proof must meet five tests: “(1) that the prior acts 
                     
5 Wis. Const. Art. I, § 7 provides in part: "Rights of 
accused.  In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face; [and] to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf . . . ."  
6 U.S. Const. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . ."  
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
8 
clearly occurred; (2) that the acts closely resembled those of 
the present case; (3) that the prior act is clearly relevant to 
a material issue; (4) that the evidence is necessary to the 
defendant’s case; and (5) that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.”  Id. at 656.   
¶11 Second, if the defendant meets the five-part showing 
in his or her offer of proof to establish a constitutional right 
to present evidence, the court must determine whether the 
defendant’s rights to present the proffered evidence are 
nonetheless outweighed by the State’s compelling interest to 
exclude the evidence.  See id. at 653.  The court must closely 
examine and weigh the State’s interests against the defendant’s 
constitutional rights to present the evidence, as measured by 
the five factors listed above.  See id. at 654-55.   
¶12 The Pulizzano court concluded that, based on the above 
analysis, Wis. Stat. § 972.11 was unconstitutional as applied in 
Pulizzano’s 
case. 
 
However, 
“[w]hether 
the 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional as applied in other instances is to be resolved 
on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. at 655.   
¶13 Before turning to the five-part Pulizzano test, we 
must discuss the offer of proof itself.  “The offer of proof 
need not be stated with complete precision or in unnecessary 
detail but it should state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned 
by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the conclusion or 
inference that the trier of fact is urged to adopt.”  Milenkovic 
v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 284, 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978).   
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
9 
¶14 Two purposes are served by an offer of proof: first, 
provide the circuit court a more adequate basis for an 
evidentiary ruling and second, establish a meaningful record for 
appellate review.  See State ex rel. Schlehlein v. Duris, 54 
Wis. 2d 34, 39, 194 N.W.2d 613 (1972).  An offer of proof may be 
made in question and answer form or by statement of counsel, but 
out of the presence of the jury.  See id.  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 901.03(1)(b) (reprinted below).7  Although the form of the 
offer of proof is at the circuit court’s discretion, this court 
has specifically urged judges to use the question and answer 
form whenever practicable.  See Milenkovic, 86 Wis. 2d at 285 
n.10.   
 
We conclude that offers of proof made in this manner 
will significantly reduce the possibility that trial 
counsel will inadvertently fail to offer to prove a 
crucial fact upon which the conclusion or inference 
which he seeks to establish necessarily depends.  We 
also believe such a procedure will assist the trial 
court and any reviewing court in determining whether 
the evidentiary hypothesis can actually be sustained 
or the offer is overstated.  Although the question and 
answer method of making an offer of proof may take a 
little more time, it enable (sic) the trial court and 
reviewing court to approach the evidentiary problem 
                     
7 Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(b) provides:  
(1) EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS RULING.  Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected; 
and 
. . .  
(b) Offer of proof.  In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the judge by offer or was apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked.  
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
10
with some confidence that the evidentiary problem 
really exists. 
Id.  See also Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 724-25 n.5.   
¶15 The court in Milenkovich did not say, and we do not 
say now, that every offer of proof should be accompanied by a 
question and answer format.  There are cases in which the 
evidentiary problem posed is easily resolved by statements of 
counsel.  Other considerations, such as concerns of or for the 
alleged victim, may well encourage the court to resolve the 
matter without the question and answer format.  Nevertheless, in 
a close case we encourage the circuit courts to engage in the 
question and answer format. 
¶16 In the present case, at the close of the first day of 
trial and out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel 
indicated that he hoped to ask the victim, B.W.S., by way of an 
offer of proof, whether he ever told the defendant’s mother, 
Delores, that he had been sexually assaulted by a different 
person.  Defense counsel also planned to call Delores to testify 
regarding her conversation with B.W.S. in 1990 in which B.W.S. 
allegedly told her that Bobby M. had sexually assaulted him in 
June or July, 1990.  Defense counsel asserted that such 
information was probative to the defense theory that the third 
party, Bobby M., actually committed the assault on the child.  
The evidence, he argued, would provide an alternative source for 
the child’s sexual knowledge and would rebut the State’s 
evidence of the child’s physical injury.  The court denied 
defense counsel’s motion, stating that the rape shield statute 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
11
bars any inquiry of the victim concerning any prior sexual 
activity.  Accordingly, the circuit court would not allow 
defense counsel to question B.W.S. regarding his statements to 
the 
defendant’s 
mother; 
nor 
would 
the 
court 
allow 
the 
defendant’s mother to testify regarding B.W.S.’s statements. 
¶17 Following the court’s determination, defense counsel 
completed his offer of proof by stating what the defendant’s 
mother would testify to if allowed to do so.  Defense counsel 
stated that the defendant’s mother would testify that B.W.S. 
told her that around June or July, 1990, Bobby M. “told him to 
take off his clothes, and that [Bobby M.] laid on top of him, 
and that his weiner got real big, and that he put his weiner in 
his butt.  [B.W.S.] said he told [Bobby M.] to stop it, it was 
hurting him, and [Bobby M.] said it doesn’t hurt, and if (sic) 
feels good, and he likes it.”  Defense counsel asserted that the 
information was important because “the scenario is identical to 
that which [the victim] described and attributes to this 
defendant.”  He also asserted that the terminology, “it feels 
good,” was also used by the victim in this case.   
¶18 Later in the trial and out of the presence of the 
jury, defense counsel proposed asking Bobby M., who had been 
called as one of the State’s witnesses, whether he had ever 
sexually assaulted B.W.S.  The circuit court denied defense 
counsel’s request, concluding that the rape shield statute bars 
any line of questioning regarding the victim’s prior sexual 
conduct.  Defense counsel then made an offer of proof regarding 
what questions he had hoped to ask Bobby M.  “The offer of proof 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
12
would be that I intend on asking [Bobby M.] whether or not he 
had any sexual contact with [B.W.S.] at any time during his 
life.  Specifically, did you ever have any rectal intercourse 
with [B.W.S.].”   
¶19 Again, the two purposes of an offer of proof are to 
provide the circuit court a more adequate basis for an 
evidentiary ruling and to establish a meaningful record for 
appellate review.  The circuit court has discretion to obtain an 
offer of proof either by a statement from counsel or by question 
and answer.  However, as we encouraged in Milenkovic, question 
and answer offers of proof will assist counsel in proving all 
crucial facts necessary to the case and will assist circuit and 
appellate courts to determine whether there is a sustainable 
evidentiary hypothesis.  We believe that in a close case, the 
circuit court should favor the question and answer form to 
achieve the purposes of an offer of proof.   
¶20 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not have an adequate basis to make an evidentiary ruling on the 
offers of proof received through statements from defense 
counsel.  Defense counsel was only able to relay in his 
statement what Delores probably told him about her conversation 
with B.W.S.  Had defense counsel been able to question Delores, 
he may have elicited further information about the assault.  
Defense counsel was also not allowed to make a question and 
answer offer of proof with either B.W.S. or Bobby M.  Had he 
been allowed to question them, defense counsel may have 
established 
“an 
evidentiary 
hypothesis 
underpinned 
by 
a 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
13
sufficient 
state 
of 
facts 
to 
warrant 
the 
conclusion 
or 
inference” that B.W.S.’s sexual knowledge and physical injury 
were the result of an assault by Bobby M. rather than by the 
defendant.  The circuit court, the court of appeals, and this 
court would have been better served had the circuit court 
allowed defense counsel to question B.W.S., Bobby M. and the 
defendant’s mother.  Such offers of proof should, however, be 
conducted outside the presence of the jury.  See, e.g., State v. 
Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 430-31, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 
1982).   
¶21 We now turn to the five-part Pulizzano test, applying 
the test to the facts in the record to determine whether the 
proffered evidence of alleged prior sexual intercourse committed 
on the victim should have been admitted in regard to all the 
charges against this defendant including those based on sexual 
contact.  In cases involving more than one count of sexual 
assault, the circuit court should analyze each count under the 
Pulizzano test.  The State asserts that the defendant’s offers 
of proof did not meet the second, third, fourth or fifth 
Pulizzano tests.  We will address the State’s arguments within 
our analysis of each test. 
¶22 The first test is whether the proffered evidence shows 
that the prior acts clearly occurred.  The defendant offered 
that the defendant’s mother would testify that the victim told 
her about a prior sexual assault by a third party.  The State 
does not challenge this and accordingly, this first test is met.  
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
14
¶23 The second Pulizzano test is that the prior act 
closely resembles those of the present case.  The court of 
appeals, in upholding the two convictions based on sexual 
contact, determined that those convictions were based on “other 
discrete incidents.”  The court of appeals relied on the 
statement this court made in Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 736, 
that sexual touching does not “so closely resemble[] sexual 
intercourse as to satisfy the Pulizzano test.”   
¶24 In Michael R.B., the defendant was charged with first-
degree sexual assault based on sexual intercourse.  See id. at 
721.  To refute the State’s evidence, the defendant sought to 
introduce testimony from a neighbor who allegedly saw the victim 
and victim’s brother “playing together in a tire swing in the 
early summer of 1990; the children were facing each other in the 
swing, [the brother’s] pants were undone, and the children spent 
two or three minutes ‘touching each other’s private parts.’”  
Id. at 726.  This court stated: “[W]e find it an insupportable 
leap of reasoning to conclude that two or three minutes of 
undefined sexual touching while sitting in a tire swing so 
closely resembles sexual intercourse as to satisfy the Pulizzano 
test.”  Id. at 736.   
¶25 In the present case, the defendant, charged with 
first-degree sexual assault, sought to admit evidence of prior 
sexual intercourse to suggest an alternative source for the 
State’s evidence of physical injury to the child and to provide 
an alternative source of sexual knowledge.  The State argues 
that Dodson failed to link the evidence of the prior sexual 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
15
intercourse with the sexual contact charges.  The State asserts 
that prior sexual intercourse does not sufficiently resemble 
sexual contact to be admissible under Pulizzano.  We disagree.   
¶26 Although evidence of prior sexual touching does not 
sufficiently 
“resemble 
sexual 
intercourse,” 
it 
does 
not 
automatically follow that evidence of prior sexual intercourse 
does not resemble or involve sexual touching.  In fact, it is 
impossible to conceive of sexual intercourse which does not 
involve “intentional touching . . . directly . . . by the use of 
any body part or object, of the complainant’s or defendant’s 
intimate parts if that intentional touching is either for the 
purpose of sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the 
complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.”  
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5) (defining sexual contact).  “Intimate 
parts” is defined as “breast, buttock, anus, groin, scrotum, 
penis, vagina, or pubic mound of a human being.”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.22(19).  Although sexual touching does not closely 
resemble or involve sexual intercourse (as in Michael R.B.), 
sexual intercourse most certainly involves sexual contact.   
¶27 The third test of Pulizzano is that the prior act is 
clearly relevant to a material issue.  “Evidence of the prior 
sexual assault is probative of a material issue, to show an 
alternative source for sexual knowledge . . . .”  Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d at 652.  A defendant’s constitutional rights to 
confrontation and compulsory process only allow a defendant to 
present relevant evidence not substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.  The test for relevancy is whether the 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
16
evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.   
¶28 In this case, evidence of a prior sexual assault is 
relevant to show an alternative source not only for the child’s 
physical injury, but also for the child’s sexual knowledge.  The 
State argues that alleged prior sexual intercourse is dissimilar 
and therefore, irrelevant to a current charge of sexual contact. 
 As stated above, this is an incorrect hypothesis.  Accordingly, 
the third Pulizzano test is met. 
¶29 The fourth Pulizzano test is that the evidence is 
necessary to the defendant’s case.  “Evidence of the prior 
sexual assault is . . . necessary to rebut the logical and 
weighty inference that [the victim] could not have gained the 
sexual knowledge he possessed unless the sexual assaults [the 
defendant] is alleged to have committed occurred.”  Pulizzano, 
155 Wis. 2d at 652. 
¶30 As in Pulizzano, the evidence of prior sexual assaults 
is necessary to the defendant’s case to rebut the logical and 
weighty inference that the victim gained sexual knowledge 
because the defendant committed the acts charged.  In most 
sexual assault cases, the only witnesses to the crime are the 
victim and the perpetrator.  The jury’s verdict is often a 
matter of which person the jury finds to be more credible.  See, 
e.g., State v. Johnson, 149 Wis. 2d 418, 427, 439 N.W.2d 122 
(1989).  One indication of credibility is whether there is 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
17
corroborating evidence to support the complainant’s testimony.  
See, e.g., State v. Wachsmuth, 166 Wis. 2d 1014, 1022, 480 
N.W.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1992).  In Wachsmuth, the defendant was 
charged with sexually assaulting a child.  The defendant’s 
father had previously been convicted of sexual assault for 
assaulting the same child on the same occasion for which the 
defendant was charged.  During the trial against the defendant, 
some of the jurors read a newspaper article about the father’s 
conviction. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
Wachsmuth’s 
conviction and remanded for a new trial because the extraneous 
information, 
improperly 
brought 
to 
the 
jury’s 
attention, 
contributed to the conviction.  The court reasoned:  
 
[B]ecause the information regarding [the father’s] 
conviction corroborated [the victim’s] testimony that 
he was sexually assaulted, it also enhanced the 
credibility of [the victim’s] testimony that Wachsmuth 
committed the assault.  This information, therefore, 
constituted improper corroboration of [the victim’s] 
testimony that a sexual assault occurred and that 
Wachsmuth committed it.  Because the state’s case had 
little 
other 
corroboration 
of 
[the 
victim’s] 
assertions, this information significantly bolstered 
the state’s case. 
Id. at 1022.  
¶31 In this case, the jury heard evidence that the 
defendant sexually touched and had intercourse with B.W.S.  The 
State relied on the child’s sexual knowledge and evidence of the 
child’s physical injury to corroborate the victim’s allegation 
that 
he 
was 
sexually 
assaulted. 
 
In 
other 
words, 
the 
corroborating evidence of physical injury bolstered the victim’s 
credibility, especially as to the sexual intercourse charge.  
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
18
The court of appeals correctly reversed the conviction for 
sexual assault based on sexual intercourse because the jury 
heard the victim’s testimony and corroborating evidence that the 
sexual intercourse occurred, but did not hear the impeaching 
evidence.   
¶32 However, it is difficult to conclude that the evidence 
of sexual intercourse, corroborated by the physical injury, did 
not also bolster B.W.S.’s credibility in the eyes of the jury 
with regard to the two sexual contact charges.  The State 
asserts that without the underlying assumption that the jury 
would believe that a nine-year old child could not describe the 
sexual contact unless it occurred, evidence of the prior sexual 
assault is not necessary to the defendant’s case.  However, the 
jury could have and probably did use the victim’s version of the 
assaults, 
vis-a-vis 
the 
sexual 
intercourse 
charge 
and 
corroborating evidence, to convict on the sexual contact charges 
as well.  Had the jury learned of the defendant's evidence 
regarding prior sexual assaults committed on B.W.S. by a third 
party, it may have questioned the victim’s credibility in the 
entire matter.  Accordingly, we conclude as to the fourth prong 
of the Pulizzano test, that the rebutting evidence is necessary 
to the defendant’s case because it may have created enough of a 
reasonable doubt that the jury would have acquitted not only on 
first-degree sexual assault based on sexual intercourse but also 
on the remaining charges based on sexual contact.   
¶33 The fifth test in Pulizzano is that the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  See 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
19
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 656.  The potential for prejudice can 
be negated by giving a limiting instruction to the jury.  See 
id. at 652-53.  In this case, evidence of prior sexual assaults 
on the child is highly probative, even to the charges of sexual 
assault 
based 
on 
sexual 
contact 
because 
it 
suggests 
an 
alternative source of the child complainant’s sexual knowledge. 
 The State asserts that whether the prior assault occurred, it 
sheds little if any light on the sexual contact charges against 
Dodson.  We disagree.  As discussed above, although prior sexual 
contact 
may 
not 
infer 
sexual 
intercourse, 
it 
does 
not 
automatically follow that evidence of prior sexual intercourse 
cannot infer prior sexual touching.  In this case, evidence of 
prior sexual intercourse is probative, not only to show an 
alternative source of sexual knowledge but also with respect to 
the victim’s credibility. 
¶34 The State asserts that evidence of prior sexual 
conduct between B.W.S. and Bobby M. is prejudicial because it 
would divert the jury’s attention to that interaction rather 
than determining the credibility of Dodson and B.W.S.  Although 
that may occur to some degree, this risk does not outweigh the 
probative value that the evidence has regarding the credibility 
of Dodson and B.W.S.the very thing about which the State is 
concerned.  As in Pulizzano, “we cannot conclude in this case 
that the possible prejudice the evidence presents outweighs its 
probative value . . . .”  Id. at 653.  
¶35 Having concluded that the defendant has met the five-
part test to establish his constitutional right to present 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
20
evidence of the prior sexual assaults committed on the victim, 
we must now determine if the State’s interests in prohibiting 
the evidence nevertheless require that the evidence be excluded. 
 See Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 653.  According to Pulizzano, we 
must apply a strict scrutiny analysis“there must be compelling 
state interests to overcome the defendant’s constitutional 
rights.”  Id. at 654.  In Pulizzano, the court concluded: 
 
As meritorious as the state’s interests underlying 
sec. 972.11, Stats., are, and to the extent that they 
promote effective law enforcement . . . we cannot 
conclude 
that 
they 
overcome 
Ms. 
Pulizzano’s 
constitutional right to present evidence of the prior 
sexual assault.  The inference that [the victim] could 
not possess the sexual knowledge he does unless Ms. 
Pulizzano sexually assaulted the children greatly 
bolsters [the victim’s] allegations.  In order to 
rebut that inference, Ms. Pulizzano must establish an 
alternative 
source 
for 
[the 
victim’s] 
sexual 
knowledge.  Evidence of the prior sexual assault is 
therefore a necessary and critical element of Ms. 
Pulizzano’s defense.  Given the circumstances of this 
case, we find Ms. Pulizzano’s right to present the 
evidence paramount. 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 655.  As discussed above, had the 
defense counsel been allowed to present an offer of proof in the 
form of questions and answers, it is likely that he would have 
elicited testimony regarding prior sexual touching as well as 
sexual intercourse.  As in Pulizzano, and for the same reasons 
here, we conclude that the State’s interest in excluding 
evidence under the rape shield law does not overcome the 
defendant’s constitutional rights to present a defense. 
¶36 In sum, we conclude that the exclusion of this 
evidence violated Dodson’s right to a fair trial and that the 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
21
State’s interest in excluding the evidence under the rape shield 
law does not overcome his right.  We hold that in this case the 
exclusion of evidence of prior sexual assaults on the victim 
based on sexual intercourse by a third party which warrants 
reversal of the first-degree sexual assault charge based on 
sexual intercourse also warrants reversal of the two sexual 
assault charges based on sexual contact. 
¶37 We now turn to the second issue presented by this 
case: whether Wis JICriminal 255 or some version of the 
instruction should have been given to the jury at all and if so, 
whether the modified version given to the jury was appropriate. 
 In this case the circuit court submitted a modified version of 
Wis JICriminal 255 (“State Need Not Prove Exact Time of 
Commission”) to the jury.  (Wis JI-Criminal 255 and the 
instruction as modified by the circuit court are reprinted 
below.)8  
                     
8 The actual text of Wis JICriminal 255 provides:  
If you find that the offense charged was committed 
by the defendant, it is not necessary that the State 
shall have proved that the offense was committed on 
the 
precise 
date 
alleged 
in 
the 
(information) 
(complaint). 
 
If 
the 
evidence 
shows 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on a 
date near the date alleged, that is sufficient. 
 
The text of the modified version of Wis JICriminal 255 
given to the jury in this case is as follows (underlined 
portions are modified): 
If you find that the offense charged was committed 
by the defendant, it is not necessary that the State 
shall have proved that the offenses were committed 
between the precise dates alleged in the Information. 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
22
¶38 Dodson argues that Wis JICriminal 255 should not have 
been given to the jury at all because he was charged with three 
offenses that allegedly occurred within a range of time (between 
February 29, 1992 and August 31, 1992) rather than on precise 
dates.  He argues that the circuit court erred in giving the 
instruction because it is designed for situations where only one 
offense is charged or, if there are multiple charges, there is 
no confusion regarding their separateness in time.  See Jensen 
v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 598, 153 N.W.2d 566 (1967).  Dodson further 
argues that even if it was not error to submit some version of 
Wis JICriminal 255 to the jury, the instruction in this case 
was erroneous because it was internally inconsistent, falsely 
stated the law and misled the jury.  We address each argument in 
turn. 
¶39 A circuit court has wide discretion to give jury 
instructions based on the facts of a case.  See State v. McCoy, 
143 Wis. 2d 274, 289, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988).  The court may 
exercise this discretion regarding both the language and 
emphasis of the instruction.  See id. (citing State v. Vick, 104 
Wis. 2d 678, 690, 321 N.W.2d 489 (1981)).  “The court’s 
discretion should be exercised to ‘fully and fairly inform the 
jury of the rules of law applicable to the case and to assist 
the jury in making a reasonable analysis of the evidence.’”  
McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d at 289 (quoting State v. Dix, 86 Wis. 2d 474, 
                                                                  
 If the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the offenses were committed on a date during the time 
period alleged in the Information, that is sufficient. 
  
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
23
486, 273 N.W.2d 250 (1979)).  A jury instruction is tainted and 
in 
error 
if 
“a 
reasonable 
juror 
could 
misinterpret 
the 
instructions to the detriment of a defendant’s due process 
rights.”  McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d at 289 (citing State v. Schulz, 102 
Wis. 2d 423, 426-27, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981)). 
¶40 Wisconsin JICriminal 255 provides that the State need 
not prove that the defendant committed the charged offense on 
the precise date alleged if the evidence shows that the offense 
was committed on a date near the date alleged.  The Jensen court 
determined that giving Wis JICriminal 255 was error because the 
defendant offered an alibi defense.  Where “there were two [or 
more] offenses in question which occurred very close to each 
other in time and [there is] . . . general testimony to the 
effect that these acts . . . occurred several times, . . .” the 
practical effect of giving Wis JICriminal 255 is to render the 
alibi defense ineffectual from the beginning.  See Jensen, 36 
Wis. 2d at 604.  However, the error in the instruction only 
affects the charges for which the defendant presents an alibi 
defense.  See id. at 606.   
¶41 At oral argument in the present case, counsel for 
Dodson admitted that Dodson had no real alibi defense at trial. 
 Although he attempted to narrow the window of opportunity to 
commit the alleged acts, he did not notify the State of an alibi 
defense, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.23(8); nor did he offer an 
actual alibi defense at trial.  Therefore, we conclude that it 
would not be error to submit Wis JICriminal 255 to the jury 
because Dodson did not offer an alibi defense and there was no 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
24
confusion about the separateness of the charges, each involving 
different conduct, occurring within the time frame alleged.9 
¶42 The next question is whether the circuit court erred 
in this case by submitting Wis JICriminal 255 to the jury as 
modified.  The validity of the jury’s verdict depends on the 
correctness of the jury instructions which the jury is charged 
to follow.  See Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d at 426-27.   
 
Misleading instructions and verdict questions which 
may cause jury confusion are a sufficient basis for a 
new trial. . . .   
Where 
jury 
instructions 
appear 
on 
their 
face 
inconsistent and confusing, we are required to examine 
the 
context 
in 
which 
the 
jury 
received 
the 
contradicting instructions to determine whether the 
verdict itself inspires no confidence. 
Runjo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 594, 603, 
541 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1995) (internal citation omitted).   
¶43 The text of the modified version of Wis JICriminal 
255 given to the jury in this case is as follows: 
 
If you find that the offense charged was committed 
by the defendant, it is not necessary that the State 
shall have proved that the offenses were committed 
between the precise dates alleged in the Information. 
 If the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the offenses were committed on a date during the time 
period alleged in the Information, that is sufficient. 
   
                     
9 Although we determine it would not be error to submit Wis 
JICriminal 255 to the jury, we note that at the new trial in 
this case delivery of jury instructions remains a matter 
committed to the circuit court’s discretion.  See State v. 
McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 289, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988). 
No.  96-1306-CR 
 
25
On its face, this instruction is internally inconsistent and 
contradictory.   
¶44 The State argues that Wis JICriminal 255 as modified 
was not in error because it did not affect any of the material 
rights of the defendant.  We disagree.  “[O]nce the jury has 
been properly instructed on the principles it must apply to find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a court must 
assume 
on 
appeal 
that 
the 
jury 
has 
abided 
by 
those 
instructions.”  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 
N.W.2d 752 (1990).  It is impossible for the jury to abide by 
the modified version of Wis JICriminal 255 as given in this 
case.  The internal inconsistency of the instruction undermines 
any confidence in the jury’s verdict.  Therefore, we conclude 
that giving the jury instruction as modified so misled and 
confused the jury as to taint its verdict.  We understand how in 
the heat of trial no one, the State, the defendant, nor the 
court, could see the internal inconsistency in the instruction 
given.  But, we trust, it is now apparent to all that the 
modified instruction, given its internal inconsistency, was 
erroneous.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court for a new trial. 
 
No. 96-1306-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (Concurring).   I 
agree 
with 
the 
court's 
mandate. 
 
The 
instruction 
given 
constitutes prejudicial error.  
¶46 I agree with the State and the court of appeals that 
the evidence of the sexual assault of the child victim that the 
defendant sought to introduce is not relevant to the sexual 
contact counts.   
¶47 As State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990), makes clear, the precise evidence offered and the theory 
for which it is offered must be carefully articulated and 
examined.  Unless the circuit court closely scrutinizes and 
analyzes the evidence and its relevance to a material issue, the 
court will wind up annulling the rape shield statute.  
¶48 I agree with the State's position, which it sets forth 
as follows:   
 
At trial, the defendant did not offer the evidence to 
show an alternative source of sexual knowledge.  It is 
clear 
from 
his 
trial 
counsel's 
statements 
that 
defendant sought to suggest that Bobby Moore, not the 
defendant, assaulted the victim.  He characterized the 
evidence as 'probative of who actually committed these 
offenses 
against 
this 
young 
man, 
if 
anybody 
did." . . .   His belated claim that he offered the 
evidence to show sexual knowledge is not supported by 
the record. . . .  
 
Nothing in the victim's testimony in describing the 
fondling in this case indicates any need to prove an 
alternative 
source 
of 
sexual 
knowledge. 
 
The 
description did not contain any detailed anatomy that 
a nine-year-old would not be expected to know.  None 
of the testimony describes activities which a nine-
year-old would know only if the defendant committed 
these acts.  
 
No. 96-1306-CR.ssa 
 
2 
Without the underlying assumption that the jury would 
believe a nine-year-old could not describe fondling 
unless it had occurred, the evidence of the prior 
sexual assault is not necessary to the defendant's 
case.  
 
Brief for State at 11-13. 
 
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the mandate and 
write separately. 
 
96-1306-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶50 ANN WALSH BRADLEY (Concurring).  While I agree with 
the mandate of the court, I write separately because I do not 
believe that the court should reach the constitutional question 
presented by State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990).  As indicated by the majority opinion, the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in presenting the modified 
form of the Wis. JI-Criminal 255 instruction to the jury.  On 
that basis alone the defendant's convictions must be reversed 
and remanded for new trial. 
¶51 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
defendant's 
conviction for sexual intercourse with a minor and allowed the 
defendant to offer evidence of the victim's prior sexual assault 
and resulting alternate source of sexual knowledge.  It took 
this action to ensure the defendant a fair trial.  This court 
affirms that portion of the court of appeals decision.  Pursuant 
to the court of appeals determination, upon remand the defendant 
will be allowed to offer evidence that Bobby M. previously 
sexually assaulted B.W.S. 
¶52 However, the majority also reverses the defendant's 
convictions for sexual contact with a minor.  The court takes 
this action on two grounds:  (1) violation of the defendant's 
constitutional right to present the evidence of the victim's 
prior sexual assault for purposes of the sexual contact charges, 
and (2) the circuit court's erroneous offer of a modified jury 
instruction which "so misled and confused the jury as to taint 
its verdict."  Majority op. at 25.  Absent more, either error 
96-1306-CR.awb 
 
2 
would require reversal of the defendant's convictions and remand 
for a new trial.  The defendant seeks reversal of his remaining 
two convictions on either or both of these grounds. 
¶53 This court has repeatedly recognized that it will not 
decide constitutional questions if a case can be resolved on 
other grounds.  See State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 
N.W.2d 44 (1997); Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 
2d 593, 612, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987); Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 
Wis. 2d 397, 415, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987) (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring); Labor and Farm Party v. Elections Board, 117 Wis. 
2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984); Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 
Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981); see also Smith v. 
Journal Co., 271 Wis. 384, 390, 73 N.W.2d 429 (1955).  Because 
the majority's resolution of the jury instruction issue requires 
reversal of the defendant's convictions for sexual contact with 
a minor, it should not reach the constitutional issue.   
¶54 Additionally, the majority's reach to address the 
constitutional issue is unnecessary because the evidence deemed 
admissible as a result of its constitutional analysis has 
already been held admissible by the court of appeals decision.  
In reversing the sexual intercourse count, the court of appeals 
determined, pursuant to Pulizzano, that evidence of B.W.S.'s 
prior sexual assault by Bobby M. should be admitted upon 
retrial.  The majority's conclusion merely duplicates upon 
retrial the admission of that same evidence—that B.W.S. was 
previously sexually assaulted by Bobby M.  Thus, the majority 
need not and should not reach the constitutional Pulizzano issue 
96-1306-CR.awb 
 
3 
presented by the sexual contact charges.  Accordingly, while I 
concur in the mandate, I join only in the majority's jury 
instruction discussion. 
 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 ¶55 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Concurring).    I join the 
mandate in this case, since I agree with the majority that the 
exclusion of the evidence of a prior sexual assault of the 
victim violated Dodson's right to a fair trial.  Accordingly, I 
agree that Dodson's convictions for first-degree sexual assault 
based on sexual intercourse and sexual contact with a child 
should be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court 
for a new trial.  I concur because I do not agree that the 
modified version of Wis JICriminal 255 "so misled and confused 
the jury as to taint its verdict."  Majority op. at 25.  Rather, 
I conclude that any error committed by the circuit court judge 
in giving the modified jury instruction was harmless. 
¶56 Dodson challenges the jury instruction on two grounds: 
 (1) that Wis JICriminal 255 should not have been given under 
the facts presented in this case; and (2) that the modified 
version of Wis JICriminal 255 falsely stated the law, was 
internally inconsistent, and misled the jury.  Where a defendant 
challenges a jury instruction, claiming that it constitutes an 
erroneous statement of the law, an appellate court must apply a 
"harmless error analysis to determine whether reversal is 
required."  State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 556 N.W.2d 
90 (1996)(citing State v. Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 387 N.W.2d 55 
(1986); State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985); 
State v Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 315 N.W.2d 350 (1982)).   
¶57 In Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 540, this court concluded 
that when a jury instruction is given in error, a reviewing 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
2 
court must "consider whether the error was harmless."  The 
harmless error test as defined by this court in Dyess is 
"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the conviction."  Id. at 543.10  If the record 
                     
10 In State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985), this court relied upon the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to 
set forth the harmless error test.  In Strickland, the U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that a conviction must be reversed if: 
" . . . there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for  . . .  [the] errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome. 
" . . . [T]he 
question 
is 
whether 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
factfinder 
would 
have 
had 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
respecting 
guilt . . . . 
 
Taking 
the 
[findings 
unaffected by error] as a given, and taking due 
account of the effect of the errors on the remaining 
findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must 
ask if . . . the decision reached would reasonably 
likely have been different absent the errors." 
 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695-96).   
 
The 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
used 
the 
term 
"reasonable 
probability" in Strickland; however, this court in Dyess 
stated that the "reasonable possibility" test for harmless 
error under Wisconsin law "is substantively the same."  
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544.  Although this court concluded 
in Dyess that the appropriate standard for a harmless error 
analysis 
is one of "reasonable possibility," 
several 
Wisconsin courts have applied the harmless error test using 
a "reasonable probability" standard.  See, e.g., State v. 
A.H., 211 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 566 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Joseph P., 200 Wis. 2d 227, 237,  546 N.W.2d 494 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
 
In reviewing erroneous jury instructions in the civil 
context, this court has stated that "a new trial is not 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
3 
does not support a reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed 
to 
the 
defendant's 
conviction, 
the 
error 
is 
harmless, and the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.  
Id. 
¶58 Where a judgment of conviction is challenged based 
upon 
an 
allegedly 
erroneous 
jury 
instruction, 
the 
jury 
instruction and its effect on the jury should not be viewed in 
isolation, but within the context of the trial as a whole: 
 
[A] judgment of conviction is commonly the culmination 
of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses, 
argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence, 
and instruction of the jury by the judge.  Thus not 
only is the challenged instruction but one of many 
such instructions, but the process of instruction 
itself is but one of several components of the trial 
which may result in the judgment of conviction. 
Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d at 49 (citations omitted).  
¶59 The Information in this case stated that each of the  
charged offenses allegedly occurred at some time between 
February 29, 1992, and August 31, 1992.  The modifications to 
the standard jury instruction, Wis JICriminal 255, and the 
record from the instructions conference suggest that the circuit 
court was attempting to tailor the instruction to fit the 
evidence presented by the State:  that there were four separate 
                                                                  
warranted unless the error is prejudicial."  Nowatske v. 
Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 429, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996) 
(emphasis supplied).  I note that the majority relies upon 
a civil case for its review of the allegedly erroneous jury 
instruction in this criminal case.  See Majority op. at 24 
(quoting Runjo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 197 
Wis. 2d 594, 603, 541 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
 
 
 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
4 
charged offenses, each of which allegedly occurred between 
February 29, 1992, and August 31, 1992.   
¶60 At the instructions conference, Dodson objected to the 
giving of Wis JICriminal 255, citing his previous motion to 
make the time of the alleged acts in the Information more 
certain.  See Record on appeal 23:99.  However, he did not 
object to the jury instruction, as modified, because it would 
potentially confuse the jury regarding the specific dates upon 
which the alleged acts occurred, or because of the apparent 
inconsistency in the instruction.  Further, Dodson's counsel 
stated that he was "not concerned about the Jensen v. State 
case . . . " 
 
Record 
on 
appeal 
23:101. 
 
In 
fact, 
the 
modifications to the jury instruction occurred at the suggestion 
of Dodson's attorney.11  
                     
11 With regard to the first sentence of the instruction, the 
following colloquy occurred between the circuit court judge and 
Dodson's counsel:   
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And what I would suggest here, Judge, is 
between the dates alleged in the Information – 
THE COURT:  [Asst. District Attorney], I guess what he's 
[defense counsel's] asking is the first sentence, if you find 
the offense committed by the defendant, it is not necessary that 
the State shall have proved that the offenses were committed 
between the dates –- as between the precise dates. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Yes. 
Record on appeal 23:96. 
With regard to the second sentence of the instruction, the 
following colloquy occurred: 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
5 
                                                                  
THE COURT:  All right.  Just so that –- So the State is 
conceding that the language on the second sentence as the 
evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the offenses were 
committed on a date during the time period alleged, that is 
sufficient. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  The only thing –- I'm satisfied as the 
modification you don't have to use mine.  If you simply add 
during the time period alleged in the Information. 
THE COURT:  That is for the first sentence. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  No. Down there at the bottom where we do 
have the same thing, don't we? 
ASST. D.A.:  Yes, we did. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  On the last sentence where he has 
stricken out near it says during. 
THE COURT:  The time period alleged. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  During the time period alleged in the 
Information? 
THE COURT:  Do you have an objection? 
ASST. D.A.:  No. 
Record on appeal 23:100.  Although I do not decide the issue, 
this colloquy may support an argument that Dodson has waived his 
right to object to the modified jury instruction, at least to 
the extent he argues that the modified instruction confused and 
misled the jury.  Cf.  State v. Ambuehl, 145 Wis. 2d 343, 361, 
425 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1988)("A defendant waives the right to 
claim error when the trial court instructs the jury in the 
manner defendant requested."). 
 
 
 
 
 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
6 
¶61 At the trial, the victim's testimony was uncertain 
regarding the specific dates upon which the alleged acts 
occurred, and Dodson did not present an alibi defense for any 
particular dates.  In the circuit court judge's charge to the 
jury, the jurors were informed that they were to consider the 
instructions as a whole.  See Record on appeal 23:127; see also 
Wis JICriminal 200.  In all, the jury was given approximately 
27 instructions, both on procedural and substantive aspects of 
the law applicable to this case.  As part of its charge, the 
circuit court recited each of the four counts set forth in the 
Information, stating that 
each offense 
allegedly occurred 
between February 29, 1992, and August 31, 1992.  No member of 
the jury expressed confusion or requested further instruction 
after hearing the modified version of Wis JICriminal 255. 
¶62 The circuit court submitted, in writing, several of 
the instructions for the jury to consider during deliberations. 
 However, in accord with Wis. Stat. § 972.10, the instructions 
submitted in writing were only those relating to the burden of 
proof/presumption of innocence and applicable substantive law.12 
 The modified version of Wis JICriminal 255 was not submitted 
to the jury in writing.  See Record on appeal 29:1-12.  Thus, 
there was no written instruction that could have arguably led to 
                     
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.10(5) states, in part: 
The court shall provide the jury with one complete set of 
written instructions providing the burden of proof and the 
substantive law to be applied to the case to be decided. 
 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
7 
confusion.  In addition, during deliberation, the jury did not 
ask for further clarification of the modified jury instruction 
as given orally by the circuit court judge.   
¶63 The record does not reflect a reasonable possibility 
that the modified jury instruction, considered within the 
context of the trial as a whole, contributed to Dodson's 
convictions 
for 
first-degree 
sexual 
assault. 
 
Therefore, 
assuming the circuit court erred in giving the modified jury 
instruction, any error by the circuit court was harmless. 
¶64 In 
summary, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
modified 
jury 
instruction must be viewed within the context of the trial as a 
whole.  As such, this court should consider the testimony 
received at the circuit court trial, the recitation by the 
circuit court judge regarding the dates upon which the offenses 
allegedly occurred, the lack of any expression of confusion or 
request for further instruction by the jury, and the fact that 
the modified jury instruction was not submitted to the jury in 
writing.  Based upon these facts, I conclude that there is no 
reasonable possibility, see Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544, i.e. 
probability, see Strickland, 487 U.S. at 695, that the modified 
jury instruction confused or mislead the jury.  Any error 
committed by the circuit court judge in giving the modified 
version of Wis JICriminal 255 was, therefore, harmless. 
¶65 For these reasons, I concur. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. 
STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this concurrence. 
 
96-1306-CR.npc 
 
8