Title: Fitts v. HANKS ET UX
Citation: 209 Or. 1, 303 P.2d 220
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 1956

209 Or. 1 (1956)
303 P.2d 220
FITTS
v.
HANKS ET UX

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Submitted on briefs September 18, 1956.
Affirmed November 2, 1956.
Petition for rehearing denied November 28, 1956.
*2 Cecil H. Quesseth and John A. Heltzel, Salem, for appellant.
Williams &amp; Skopil, Salem, for respondent.
AFFIRMED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an action to recover rent pursuant to the terms of a written lease, brought by Robert J. Fitts, as plaintiff, against James Hanks and Helen L. Hanks, as defendants. A verdict was returned and judgment entered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
On October 25, 1950, defendants, as lessees, entered into a lease agreement with Herman Moritz and Myrtle Moritz, as lessors. The lease provides that lessees would rent for a term of four years certain real property which was a part of the Golden Gate Hop Ranch, located near Independence, in Polk county, Oregon, together with certain personal property. The real and personal property were leased primarily for the purpose of growing hops, the first hop crop to be harvested under the lease being that of 1951. Lessees were to pay to the lessors $13,832 per year in advance, $10,000 of which was payable on or before January 2 of each year, and $3,832 of which was payable on or before February 2 of each year. The lease provides, *3 among other things, that the lessors were to supply defendants with a "complete hop picking machine in good working order and ready for operation," and that "lessees shall have the use of sufficient irrigation equipment at the proper time for the irrigation of his [sic] hop crop." This equipment was vitally important to the successful operation of the leased hop ranch, and in particular, the irrigation equipment.
Defendants grew and harvested hops on the ranch during 1951 and paid the rental for that year. On December 30, 1951, the lessors sold the property to the plaintiff. Defendants abandoned and moved all their machinery and equipment off the leased property some time in late August and September, 1951. They did not pay the 1952 rental due on January 2, 1952, and on February 2, 1952, which rental was for the 1952 operation. It is to recover this 1952 rental that plaintiff brings this action. The lease provides that 30 days after the rent is due and unpaid, the lessors may re-enter upon the property. On February 7, 1952, the plaintiff leased the property to another tenant for a short period of time, and then later leased it to one Lewis P. Doney, who had formerly been the foreman of defendants' operations on the premises.
If plaintiff or the original lessors surrendered the lease, or if defendants were constructively evicted prior to the dates on which the rent would have become due, plaintiff is not entitled to recover the 1952 rental. The pivotal questions raised by this appeal are: (1) whether the answer alleges facts sufficient to raise the defense of constructive eviction and (2) whether there is sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find a constructive eviction.
1. Plaintiff's first assignment of error is that the *4 court erred in overruling plaintiff's demurrer to defendants' first, further and separate defense. This defense, as set forth in the answer, reads in part:
In Hotel Marion Co. v. Waters, 77 Or 426, 433, 150 P 865, with respect to the subject matter of constructive eviction we said:
A breach of covenant to supply irrigation equipment might well deprive the tenants of a hop ranch such as that leased to defendants of their free right *5 to enjoyment of the premises and make it impossible for them to continue as lessees. The allegations of defendants' first, further and separate defense are, therefore, sufficient to raise the defense of constructive eviction. Title &amp; Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Co., 155 Or 427, 450, 63 P2d 209, 64 P2d 834.
2. The second assignment is that the court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict either on the theory of surrender or on the theory of constructive eviction.
We will examine some of the evidence in the record.
Plaintiff's exhibit "7" was a letter of June 29, 1951, sent to the lessors by the defendants' attorney. It read in part as follows:
*6 Lewis Doney, defendants' former foreman and the present lessee of the property under plaintiff, as a witness for plaintiff, testified on cross-examination as follows:
James Hanks, one of the defendants, testified on direct examination:
N. Sanden, as a witness for the defendants, testified as follows:
The testimony of Herman Moritz, a witness for plaintiff, would indicate that defendants had treated the breach of covenant respecting the irrigation equipment as a constructive eviction, because they commenced moving their own machinery and equipment off the leased premises long before Moritz and his wife sold to the plaintiff. According to the defendant James Hanks, defendants had moved a large portion of their machinery and equipment by the end of hoppicking operations in early September, 1951, and all of it by the end of September, 1951. Defendants did not move out of the house in which they were living until early in January, 1952, but their use of this house was under a separate oral rental agreement, and was not a part of their original leasing contract. As to the removal of defendants' own machinery and equipment from the leased hop ranch, Herman Moritz, on direct examination, testified as follows:
It is our opinion that if credence is given the above testimony, it was permissible for the jury to conclude that defendants had reasonable grounds to expect that this very serious difficulty as to the irrigation equipment would continue to exist throughout the term of the lease, and that they were thereby deprived of the free enjoyment of the premises in accordance with the specific terms of the lease. It is, therefore, our opinion, whether or not there was any evidence to show a surrender, that there was sufficient substantial evidence to support a verdict upon the theory of constructive eviction, and that a verdict in favor of defendants was compatible with the testimony.
In Banfield et al. v. Crispen et al., 111 Or 388, 391, 226 P 235, we said:
In the instant case plaintiff has not met this burden.
*13 3, 4. Plaintiff's third assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to give the following requested instruction:
It is our opinion that the court's instructions adequately covered the theory of surrender. Instructions given must be considered as a whole. Furthermore, the proposed instruction is misleading in this case because a lessee can relieve himself by "mere abandonment" without express or implied consent of the lessor if the lessor has done an act which amounts to the constructive eviction of the lessee. The proposed instruction contained no such qualification. That this is the generally accepted law is shown by 32 Am Jur 231, Landlord and Tenant § 246, wherein it is stated:
Plaintiff's fourth assignment of error is that the court erred in instructing the jury on the law of constructive *14 eviction. As shown above, there were sufficient allegations in the answer and substantial evidence in the record to support a verdict for the defendants upon the theory of constructive eviction; therefore, the court did not err in giving this instruction. We find no reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.