Title: State v. Abshire
Citation: 363 N.C. 322
Docket Number: 459A08
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2009

Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
1  Certain amendments to the registration program found at
Article 27A, Chapter 14 of our General Statutes became effective
1 December 2006, 1 June 2007, and 30 August 2007.  We must
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 459A08
FILED: 18 JUNE 2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
v.
PATRICIA DAWN ABSHIRE
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C.
App. ___, 666 S.E.2d 657 (2008), vacating a judgment entered 28
February 2007 by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Superior Court,
Caldwell County, following a jury verdict finding defendant
guilty of failing to comply with the sex offender registration
law.  On 11 December 2008, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s
petition for discretionary review of additional issues.  Heard in
the Supreme Court 31 March 2009.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by J. Joy Strickland,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
James N. Freeman, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
BRADY, Justice.
The sole issue before the Court is whether the State
presented sufficient evidence that convicted sex offender
Patricia Dawn Abshire (defendant) changed her address so as to
trigger the reporting requirements of North Carolina’s Sex
Offender and Public Protection Registration Program (registration
program).  See N.C.G.S. §§ 14-208.7, -208.9, -208.11 (2005).1  In
-2-
analyze the case sub judice under the 2005 version of the
statutes since defendant’s offense occurred before these
amendments became effective.
response to the threat to public safety posed by the recidivist
tendencies of convicted sex offenders, “North Carolina, like
every other state in the nation, enacted a sex offender
registration program to protect the public.”  State v. Bryant,
359 N.C. 554, 555, 614 S.E.2d 479, 480 (2005) (citations
omitted); see also Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 362 N.C. 328,
333, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008) (discussing recidivism rates
among sex offenders).  The registration program contained in Part
2 of Article 27A, Chapter 14 of our General Statutes requires
certain sex offenders with “reportable conviction[s]” to submit a
registration form listing personal information, including the sex
offender’s “home address,” to the sheriff of the county in which
the “person resides” and to notify the sheriff of any subsequent
change of address.  N.C.G.S. §§ 14-208.7(a),(b), -208.9(a).  In
the case sub judice, we conclude that the State presented
sufficient evidence that defendant changed her address and failed
to comply with the requirements of the registration program.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant’s Status as a Convicted Sex Offender Prior to the Case
Sub Judice
On 19 January 1999, the Caldwell County Grand Jury
returned true bills of indictment charging defendant with four
counts of rape of a child at least six years younger than
defendant under N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7A(a) and four counts of taking
indecent liberties with a child under N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1.  The
-3-
2  Information regarding convicted sex offenders is
available via the Internet.  North Carolina Offender Registry,
http://sexoffender.ncdoj.gov/ (last visited May 21, 2009).
indictments describe four acts of vaginal intercourse occurring
in June 1998 between defendant, who was twenty years of age at
the time, and a thirteen year old boy.  Pursuant to a plea
agreement, on 27 March 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to four
counts of taking indecent liberties with a child and the four
counts of rape were dismissed.
As a result of her guilty pleas and corresponding
convictions, defendant was obligated to register as a sex
offender.  According to the North Carolina Sex Offender and
Public Protection Registry website, defendant first reported her
home address to the sheriff of her county on 30 October 2001.2 
After her initial registration but before being indicted for the
present charge, defendant reported thirteen changes of address
under subsections 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11(a)(2) of the
registration program.  Those subsections require under the threat
of criminal liability that “[i]f a person required to register
changes address, the person shall provide written notice of the
new address not later than the tenth day after the change to the
sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.” 
Id. § 14-208.9(a).
Defendant’s Actions Leading to the Case Sub Judice
At defendant’s trial for failing to comply with the sex
offender registration program, the State presented evidence that
tended to show the following:  On 19 July 2006, defendant
notified the Caldwell County Sheriff’s Office of a change of
-4-
address.  She listed her new address as 3410 Gragg Price Lane,
Hudson, North Carolina, in Caldwell County, and showed her old
address as 2155 White Pine Drive, number 9, Granite Falls, North
Carolina, also in Caldwell County.  In September 2006 officials
at the school attended by defendant’s two children became
concerned about the number of times the children arrived late or
missed the entire day.  Consequently, in early September 2006,
Gwen Laws, a social worker employed by the Caldwell County
Schools, attempted to locate defendant at her Granite Falls
address to discuss the children’s tardiness.  After failing to
find defendant at that address, Laws searched the State-
maintained website that informs the public of the addresses of
convicted sex offenders.  After learning that the address listed
for defendant was 3410 Gragg Price Lane, Laws visited that
address on 11 September 2006 and spoke with Ross Lee Price, who
owned and resided at the property.  Laws testified that when she
inquired whether defendant lived there, Price said, “Hell no,”
and explained that although defendant was “in and out” of the
residence and received United States Postal Service mail there,
she had not “lived there in three weeks.”  Price told Laws that
he was unsure where defendant was living at the time.  After this
futile attempt to locate defendant, Laws inquired of the Caldwell
County Sheriff’s Office to determine whether law enforcement knew
of a different address for defendant.
Detective Aaron Barlowe of the Caldwell County
Sheriff’s Office learned of Laws’s unsuccessful attempts to
locate defendant in September 2006, and he began an
-5-
investigation.  At trial, Detective Barlowe testified that on 18
September 2006, he visited 3410 Gragg Price Lane and spoke with
Price.  Price told Detective Barlowe that defendant was in a
dating relationship with his son at the time.  Price informed
Detective Barlowe that defendant “got mad a couple of weeks ago
and went to go stay with her father.”  Price believed that
defendant was planning on moving back to the residence, though he
did not know when, and he indicated that defendant had been gone
for two or three weeks, “but might have stayed a night” during
that time.  After speaking with Price, Detective Barlowe went to
the residence of Robert and Ruth Abshire at 5739 Poovey Drive,
Granite Falls, North Carolina.  Mr. Abshire, defendant’s father,
indicated that defendant had been staying at his home for about
two weeks.  Based on his conversations with Price and defendant’s
father, Detective Barlowe obtained a warrant for defendant’s
arrest for violating the reporting requirements of the sex
offender registration program.
Additionally on 18 September 2006, defendant filed a
“Criminal Complaint and Request for Process” in Caldwell County
against her brother.  She alleged that on 13 September 2006, her
brother began “punching” her “in the face” and elsewhere after
she attempted to stop her brother from beating his ex-girlfriend. 
Defendant listed 5739 Poovey Drive, Granite Falls, North
Carolina, as her address on the complaint.  The State presented a
copy of the complaint at trial as evidence that defendant had
changed her address.
-6-
Pursuant to a warrant, defendant was arrested on 19
September 2006 for failure to register as a sex offender under
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.11.  After arrest, defendant submitted the
following statement to law enforcement:
About 10 days after I filed the breaking
and entering report when my house was broken
into and my daughter’s computer was stolen I
went to stay with my father at 5739 Poovey
Drive.  I decided that if I went to stay with
my dad for a week or two, I could get my
emotions together.  I told Ross that I was
going to stay with my dad so I could get my
self emotionally stable and I would come back
home.  I was planning on going back home this
past weekend but I was attacked by my brother
and I decided to stay with my dad for a
little bit longer.  I am moving back into the
house on Friday after her [sic] girls are out
of school.  I still received my mail at 3410
Gragg Price Lane[.]  I would pick the mail up
or Ross would bring me my mail about twice a
week.  I went back and stayed the night on
the 9th and 14th of September.  I was not
planning n [sic] moving from the house but
only staying for a week or two with my
father.
At the time of her arrest defendant also gave Detective Barlowe a
note from her father that stated:  “To Whom it may Concern,
Patricia has staye [sic] at my home for the past 5-6 weeks. 
During that time she would go to Ross’s Houses [sic] and stay
once every 7-10 day’s [sic] [.]”  The reference to Ross indicated
the Price residence at 3410 Gragg Price Lane.
On 23 October 2006, a Caldwell County Grand Jury
returned a true bill of indictment charging defendant with
failing to comply with sex offender registration in violation of
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.11.  The indictment alleged defendant changed
her address on or about 30 August to 4 September 2006, and the
date of the offense was recorded as on or about 14 to 18
-7-
September 2006.  Defendant was tried by a jury in Superior Court,
Caldwell County, on 27 and 28 February 2007.  At the close of the
State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charge on
grounds that the State failed to present sufficient evidence. 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion, and the trial
proceeded to defendant’s evidence.  
According to defendant’s testimony, someone broke into
the residence at 3410 Gragg Price Lane and stole her daughters’
computer on 19 August 2006.  Approximately ten days later she
began staying at her father’s residence on Poovey Drive “[o]ff
and on over about a three week period.”  She testified that
“almost everyday” she still visited Gragg Price Lane to care for
her pets, wash clothes, or “hang out.”  Defendant testified that
Price was “grouchy,” so she tried to avoid him by visiting Gragg
Price Lane during the day, although she stayed the night there on
9 September and 14 September 2006.  Defendant stated that she
maintained a private telephone line at Gragg Price Lane, never
moved her belongings, and considered it her “home” during the
time she stayed at her father’s residence.
At the close of all the evidence, defendant again moved
to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence.  The trial court
denied the motion and instructed the jury on the charge.  After
deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.  Defendant
was sentenced to a minimum term of thirteen months to a maximum
term of sixteen months.  Defendant’s sentence was then suspended,
and she was placed on supervised probation for eighteen months. 
Defendant appealed.
-8-
3  Because we reverse the Court of Appeals based on the
issue presented as the basis for the dissenting opinion, it is
unnecessary for us to consider the additional issue presented by
the State of whether the Court of Appeals majority used an
improper standard for ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss.
On 16 September 2008, a divided panel at the Court of
Appeals vacated defendant’s conviction and held that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had changed
her address.  State v. Abshire, __ N.C. App. __, __, 666 S.E.2d
657, 664-65 (2008).  The dissenting judge concluded that there
was sufficient evidence, id. at __, 666 S.E.2d at 665 (Hunter,
Robert C., J., dissenting), and the State appealed to this Court
based on the dissent.  On 6 October 2008, we allowed the State’s
motion for a temporary stay, and on 11 December 2008, we allowed
the State’s petitions for Writ of Supersedeas and for
discretionary review as to additional issues.3
ANALYSIS
When reviewing a defendant’s motion to dismiss a charge
on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court
determines “whether the State presented ‘substantial evidence’ in
support of each element of the charged offense.”  State v.
Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 374, 611 S.E.2d 794, 827 (2005); see also
State v. McNeil, 359 N.C. 800, 803-04, 617 S.E.2d 271, 273-74
(2005) (citations omitted); State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 412,
597 S.E.2d 724, 746 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156 (2005). 
“‘“Substantial evidence” is relevant evidence that a reasonable
person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to
support a particular conclusion.’”  McNeil, 359 N.C. at 804, 617
S.E.2d at 274 (quoting Garcia, 358 N.C. at 412, 597 S.E.2d at 746
-9-
(citations omitted)).  In this determination, all evidence is
considered “‘in the light most favorable to the State, and the
State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference
supported by that evidence.’”  Id. (quoting Garcia, 358 N.C. at
412-13, 597 S.E.2d at 746 (citation omitted)).  “The defendant’s
evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into
consideration,” State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 60, 66, 184 S.E.2d 862,
866 (1971), except “when it is consistent with the State’s
evidence, the defendant’s evidence ‘may be used to explain or
clarify that offered by the State,’” State v. Denny, 361 N.C.
662, 665, 652 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2007) (quoting Jones, 280 N.C. at
66, 184 S.E.2d at 866 (citation omitted)).  Additionally, a
“‘“substantial evidence” inquiry examines the sufficiency of the
evidence presented but not its weight,’” which is a matter for
the jury.  McNeil, 359 N.C. at 804, 617 S.E.2d at 274 (emphasis
added) (quoting Garcia, 358 N.C. at 412, 597 S.E.2d at 746
(citation omitted)); State v. Blake, 319 N.C. 599, 604, 356
S.E.2d 352, 355 (1987) (citation omitted).  Thus, “if there is
substantial evidence--whether direct, circumstantial, or both--to
support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and
that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the
motion to dismiss should be denied.”  McNeil, 359 N.C. at 804,
617 S.E.2d at 274 (brackets, citations, and quotation marks
omitted).
The crime of failing to notify the appropriate sheriff
of a sex offender’s change of address under N.C.G.S. §
14-208.11(a) is a strict liability offense.  See Bryant, 359 N.C.
-10-
at 562, 614 S.E.2d at 484.  The crime contains three essential
elements:  (1) the defendant is a “person required . . . to
register,” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.11(a); (2) the defendant “change[s]”
his or her “address,” id. § 14-208.11(a)(2); and (3) the
defendant “[f]ails to notify the last registering sheriff of
[the] change of address,” id., “not later than the tenth day
after the change,” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.9(a).  Here, defendant only
challenges the second element and argues that she did not change
her address.
The Definition of “Address” under the Registration Program
Before determining whether the State presented
substantial evidence to show that defendant changed her address,
we must ascertain the definition of “address” as used in
subsections 14-208.9(a) and 14-208.11(a)(2) of the registration
program.  At the outset, we note that the statute describes a
change of address as a discrete event and not as a nebulous
process.  The statute indicates that once “a person required to
register changes address,” the person must notify the appropriate
sheriff of the change within ten days.  Id. § 14-208.9(a).  With
this in mind, we turn to the definition of address.
The word “address” is not explicitly defined by
statute.  Section 14-208.6 contains numerous definitions of terms
utilized in Article 27A, but there is no definition for the words
“address” or “change of address.”  Id. § 14-208.6 (2005). 
“‘Nothing else appearing, the Legislature is presumed to have
used the words of a statute to convey their natural and ordinary
meaning.’  In the absence of a contextual definition, courts may
-11-
look to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of words
within a statute.”  Perkins v. Ark. Trucking Servs., Inc., 351
N.C. 634, 638, 528 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2000) (citations omitted)). 
The noun “address” has the following ordinary meaning:  “A
description of the location of a person . . . .  The location at
which a particular organization or person may be found or reached
. . . .”  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 20 (4th ed. 2000).  Another dictionary defines the noun
“address” as “the particulars of the place where someone lives.” 
The New Oxford American Dictionary 18 (2d ed. 2005).
Before applying this definition, we are mindful that
the word is set within the context of the registration program
and this context may further clarify any ambiguity surrounding
the word.  During deliberations at trial, jurors sent a note
asking the judge whether they could “see [a] copy of [the] law
stating what constitutes a residence in regards to sex
offenders.”  In response, the trial judge noted to counsel that
the phrase “change of address” in subsection 14-208.11(a)(2) is
“definitely ambiguous” on its face.  The trial judge chose to
instruct the jurors that they were to “use the ordinary meanings
that these words have as commonly used in the English language.”  
Our method of statutory construction dictates that:
When the language of a statute is clear
and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this
Court to give effect to the plain meaning of
the statute, and judicial construction of
legislative intent is not required.  However,
when the language of a statute is ambiguous,
this Court will determine the purpose of the
statute and the intent of the legislature in
its enactment.
-12-
Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3
(2006) (citations omitted).  To whatever degree the meaning of
“address” may be ambiguous, we refer to the purpose of the
statute and the intent of the legislature in order to derive an
appropriate interpretation.
“The best indicia of [the legislature’s] intent are the
language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act and
what the act seeks to accomplish.”  Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete
Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Town of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 620, 629,
265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1980) (citations omitted), quoted in Diaz,
360 N.C. at 387, 628 S.E.2d at 3.  Moreover, “[i]n discerning the
intent of the General Assembly, statutes in pari materia should
be construed together and harmonized whenever possible.”  State
v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 836, 616 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2005) (citation
omitted). 
The registration program was designed to assist law
enforcement agencies and the public in knowing the whereabouts of
sex offenders and in locating them when necessary.  The
legislature “recognize[d] that sex offenders often pose a high
risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from
incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public
from sex offenders is of paramount governmental interest.” 
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5 (2005).  Furthermore, this Court has
recognized “the twin aims” of the registration program to be
“public safety and protection.”  Bryant, 359 N.C. at 560, 614
S.E.2d at 483.
-13-
The Court of Appeals opined that a sex offender’s “home
address” is “a place where a registrant resides and where that
registrant receives mail or other communication.”  Abshire, __
N.C. App. at __, 666 S.E.2d at 663 (majority).  This
interpretation, however, would thwart the intent of the
legislature if a sex offender were allowed to actually live at a
location other than where he or she was registered and not be
required to notify the sheriff of that new address as long as he
or she continued to receive United States Postal Service mail at
the registered address.  Such a result would enable sex offenders
to elude accountability from law enforcement and would expose the
public to an unacceptable level of risk.
We conclude that the legislature intended the
definition of address under the registration program to carry an
ordinary meaning of describing or indicating the location where
someone lives.  As such, the word indicates what this Court has
considered to be a person’s residence.  For instance, this Court
noted in Hall v. Wake County Board of Elections that “[r]esidence
simply indicates a person’s actual place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary.”  280 N.C. 600, 605, 187 S.E.2d 52, 55
(1972); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1335 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining “residence” as:  “1.  The act or fact of living in a
given place for some time . . . .  2.  The place where one
actually lives . . . .  Residence usu. just means bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place . . . .”).  Thus, a sex
offender’s address indicates his or her residence, meaning the
actual place of abode where he or she lives, whether permanent or
-14-
temporary.  Notably, a person’s residence is distinguishable from
a person’s domicile.  See Hall, 280 N.C. at 605, 187 S.E.2d at
55.  Domicile is a legal term of art that “denotes one’s
permanent, established home,” whereas a person’s residence may be
only a “temporary, although actual,” “place of abode.”  Id.  
Defining “address” in terms of indicating a person’s
residence is consistent with other provisions of the registration
program.  For instance, section 14-208.7 specifies the
information collected on registration forms submitted by sex
offenders.  Among other details, the form requires a “home
address.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-208.7(b)(1).  The addition of the
adjective “home” indicates that the address is a physical
location, precluding the possibility of listing a postal box. 
Furthermore, section 14-208.7 pertains to sex offenders who come
to North Carolina from out of state to study or work.  Id. § 14-
208.7(a1).  These students and workers are required to register
and provide a “home address” within North Carolina, as well as
provide an address in the state from which they came.  Id. § 14-
208.7(a1), (b)(1).  These provisions demonstrate the
legislature’s clear intent that even a temporary “home address”
must be registered so that law enforcement authorities and the
general public know the whereabouts of sex offenders in our
state.  
Additionally, the statutory provision requiring that a
sex offender’s registered information be verified annually, id. §
14-208.9A(1) (2005), simply requires that a sex offender’s
address be at a location where he or she can receive a
-15-
“nonforwardable verification form” via the United States Postal
Service.  This form can be sent to even a temporary residence
that is registered.  Subsection 14-208.9A(1) uses the word
“address” to refer to a mailing address, but considering the
overarching purpose of the registration program and the inclusion
of the adjective “home” with “address” in subsection 14-
208.7(b)(1) demonstrates that understanding “address” to mean a
mailing address alone is insufficient for the registration
program.
Finally, defining “address” as indicating a sex
offender’s residence is consistent with the distinction the
legislature recognized between mere presence at a location and
establishing a residence.  Subsection 14-208.7(a) requires
registration for sex offenders moving to North Carolina “within
10 days of establishing residence,” while sex offenders who
simply visit our State must register “whenever [they have] been
present in the State for 15 days.”  Id. § 14-208.7(a) (emphasis
added).  Thus, reading the statutes in pari materia leads to the
conclusion that mere physical presence at a location is not the
same as establishing a residence.  Determining that a place is a
person’s residence suggests that certain activities of life occur
at the particular location.  Beyond mere physical presence,
activities possibly indicative of a person’s place of residence
are numerous and diverse, and there are a multitude of facts a
jury might look to when answering whether a sex offender has
changed his or her address.  Adding any further nuance to the
definition is unnecessary at this time.
-16-
Before applying these principles to the facts of this
case, we note that defendant argues the rule of lenity compels us
to rule in her favor.  We disagree.  The rule of lenity requires
that we strictly construe ambiguous criminal statutes.  State v.
Hinton, 361 N.C. 207, 211, 639 S.E.2d 437, 440 (2007) (citations
omitted).  However, construing the word “address” in terms of
indicating defendant’s residence is not a liberal reading in
favor of the State; rather, it is the only plausible reading that
comports with the legislative purpose in enacting the
registration program.
Sufficient Evidence Defendant Changed Her Address
Having interpreted the statutes to determine the
meaning of the term “address,” we now examine whether the State
presented sufficient evidence that defendant changed her address
to trigger the reporting requirement.  In her statement to
Detective Barlowe on 19 September 2006, defendant indicated that
around the end of August 2006 she “went to stay with [her] father
at 5739 Poovey Drive” and “decided that if [she] went to stay
with [her] dad for a week or two, [she] could get [her] emotions
together.”  From this statement, the jury could reasonably infer
that defendant was indicating a change in her actual place of
abode, even for just a temporary period, from Gragg Price Lane to
Poovey Drive.  Although defendant’s statement also mentioned that
she “stayed the night on the 9th and 14th of September” at Gragg
Price Lane and still received mail there, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that those details were ancillary to
defendant’s actual place of abode on Poovey Drive.  The note
-17-
Detective Barlowe received from defendant’s father upon
defendant’s arrest on 19 September 2006 stated defendant had
stayed at her father’s “home for the past 5-6 weeks,” and this
included spending the night there according to her father’s
testimony at trial.  The jury could have reasonably inferred that
spending the night at her father’s house for this amount of time,
or for even a shorter duration, indicated that defendant carried
out the core necessities of daily living at Gragg Price Lane and
that she had made her father’s residence her own for that period
of time.
Additionally, Gwen Laws, the social worker from the
Caldwell County Schools, testified that on 11 September 2006,
Price told her that, “Hell no,” defendant did not live at Gragg
Price Lane and had not “lived there in three weeks.”  Price told
Laws that he did not know where defendant was living at the time. 
The jury could reasonably infer that had Gragg Price Lane been
defendant’s residence at the time, then Price, who owned and
occupied the house, would have known defendant was residing
there.  Price also informed Detective Barlowe on 18 September
2006 that defendant had been away from Gragg Price Lane for a
span of two to three weeks, except for possibly spending one
night during that time.  Finally, defendant held out her address
to be 5739 Poovey Drive on 18 September 2006, when she filed a
“Criminal Complaint and Request for Process” against her brother. 
Thus, defendant’s own representation may have supported the
inference jurors made that defendant’s address changed to the
Poovey Drive residence beginning around the end of August and
-18-
continued, at least, through the filing of the complaint against
her brother.
When this evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, and when the State is afforded the
benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence,
we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that
defendant changed her address to withstand defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial
court properly denied defendant’s motions to dismiss, and we
reverse the Court of Appeals.
REVERSED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.