Title: Von Der Heide v Dept. of Transportation (Concurring Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98 M.D. APPEAL DOCKET 97
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: October 1, 1998

[J-24-98] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT ALICE C. VON DER HEIDE, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM VON DER HEIDE, Appellee v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 98 M.D. Appeal Docket 1997 Appeal from the Order of Commonwealth Court dated September 23, 1996, at No. 1406 C.D. 1995, reversing the April 20, 1995 Order of the Court of Common Pleas, Lycoming Co., Civil Division, at No. 93-01419. ARGUED : February 3, 1998 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: OCTOBER 1, 1998 While the majority rests its disposition upon its conclusion that the doctrine of superseding cause can be applied only to third-party conduct, I note that some comparative negligence jurisdictions have continued to apply superseding cause to a narrow category of cases in which an injured plaintiff’s conduct is wholly unforeseeable, amounts to more than mere negligence, and creates a risk distinct from that created by the defendant’s conduct.1 Thus, while I acknowledge the soundness of the general preference for 1 See, e.g., Caraballo v. United States, 830 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1987)(construing New York law); Faris v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 753 F. Supp. 388, 390 (D.D.C. 1991); Sumpter v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427, 432 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)(stating that “we are not prepared to hold that the conduct of a plaintiff could never constitute a superceding cause”); see generally 57A AM.JUR.2D NEGLIGENCE §650 (1989). But see Beirne v. Security (continued…) [J-24-98] - 2 addressing the relevance of a plaintiff’s own conduct within the calculus of comparative fault, I would not foreclose the possibility that a plaintiff’s conduct might be deemed a superseding cause in an appropriate case. Particularly, application of the doctrine of superseding cause would seem appropriate in a case in which a plaintiff’s own intentional, unforeseeable conduct severs the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injuries. Here, however, Mr. Von der Heide’s conduct was neither intentional nor unforeseeable; therefore, I join the majority’s holding that an instruction to the jury concerning superseding cause was unwarranted. Mr. Chief Justice Flaherty joins this Concurring Opinion. (…continued) Heating-Clearwater Pools Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (M.D. Pa. 1991)(finding that the doctrines of intervening and superseding cause are not appropriately applied to a plaintiff’s conduct).