Title: Mack v. District Attorney for the Bristol District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13468
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 2024

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13468 
 
ERIC MACK  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE BRISTOL DISTRICT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 6, 2023. - April 26, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Public Records.  District Attorney.  Privacy.  Police Officer.  
Statute, Construction.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, 
Burden of proof.  Attorney at Law, Work product.  Words, 
"Misconduct." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 2, 2022. 
 
 
The case was heard by James Budreau, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Mary Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the defendant. 
 
Howard Friedman for the plaintiff. 
 
Graham D. Welch for Lawyers for Civil Rights Boston & 
others. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Rebecca Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Mason A. Kortz, Jessica J. Lewis, & Daniel L. McFadden for 
Andrew Quemere & others. 
 
Nick J. Erickson, of Colorado, Brian S. Fraser, of New 
York, & David Milton for National Police Accountability Project. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Randall E. Ravitz, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission. 
 
David E. Sullivan, District Attorney, & Cynthia M. Von 
Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for 
the northwestern district. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this action, the plaintiff, Eric Mack, has 
requested, pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (public records law), 
certain records that relate to the fatal shooting of his 
brother, Anthony Harden (decedent).  A judge in the Superior 
Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, 
mandating disclosure of the requested documents, absent a few 
minor exceptions.  Seeking to prevent the disclosure of these 
records, the district attorney for the Bristol district 
(district attorney's office) appealed from the judge's order and 
asserts that each of the requested records is exempt from the 
definition of "public records" under at least one of three 
enumerated exemptions:  the privacy exemption, the policy 
deliberation exemption, and the investigatory exemption.  See 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c), (d), (f).  The district 
attorney's office further argues that, pursuant to G. L. c. 6E, 
§§ 1 et seq., the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and 
Training Commission (POST commission) has exclusive authority to 
release officers' names.  For the following reasons, we affirm 
in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court 
3 
 
 
 
for a determination whether the investigatory exemption applies 
to certain material.1 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that are undisputed, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
summary judgment was entered -- here, the district attorney's 
office.  See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 326-
327 (2022). 
1.  The shooting.  The following facts are taken primarily 
from the final report of the district attorney's office on its 
findings and conclusions regarding the officer-involved shooting 
of the decedent (final DAO report), as well as from other 
documents in the record. 
On November 22, 2021, Officers Michael Sullivan and Chelsea 
Campellone of the Fall River police department traveled to the 
residence of a woman who had reported a domestic violence 
incident.2  The woman reported to the officers that a man she was 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district 
attorney for the northwestern district; National Police 
Accountability Project; Lawyers for Civil Rights Boston, 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice, National Lawyers Guild, New 
England First Amendment Coalition, and Strategies for Youth, 
Inc.; and Andrew Quemere, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
and American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc.  We 
also acknowledge the amicus letter submitted by the POST 
commission. 
 
2 The officers were identified as "the male officer" and 
"the female officer" in the final DAO report, pursuant to a 
policy of the district attorney's office to refrain from 
 
4 
 
 
 
dating had choked her and struck her in the face with a stick 
two days prior.  After documenting her facial injuries, the 
officers determined that there was probable cause to arrest the 
man. 
 
That man was the decedent.  Having previously been charged 
with domestic violence offenses and reckless endangerment of a 
child, the decedent was confined to his residence by court order 
at the time the woman reported the domestic violence incident.  
The decedent resided with the plaintiff (his twin brother) and 
his landlord. 
 
A surveillance camera outside the decedent's residence 
recorded Sullivan and Campellone arriving on the evening of 
November 22.  The officers spoke first with the decedent's 
landlord, who permitted the officers to enter the residence and 
directed them to the decedent's bedroom.  Sullivan then went to 
the decedent's bedroom and announced his presence to the 
decedent from the doorway.  After a brief exchange, the decedent 
refused to step outside and speak with the officers.  Sullivan 
explained to the decedent that he was being placed under arrest. 
 
The decedent reached for an item on his desk.  Although 
Sullivan was unable to see what the decedent grabbed, Campellone 
 
publicly identifying officers involved in fatal shootings when 
no criminal charges are issued.  The officers were named, 
however, in a search warrant affidavit and in the plaintiff's 
complaint.   
5 
 
 
 
believed the metallic and pointed item in his possession was a 
knife.  The decedent quickly approached Sullivan, holding the 
item in his right hand, and tried repeatedly to stab Sullivan in 
the neck and head with the item.  As Sullivan and the decedent 
struggled, Campellone fired two shots from her service weapon, 
and the decedent fell over. 
Sullivan promptly requested emergency medical personnel, 
who arrived at the decedent's residence minutes later, along 
with several additional Fall River police officers.  A police 
sergeant who arrived on the scene following the shooting found 
Sullivan and Campellone with their weapons drawn, pointing 
toward the decedent's bedroom.  Sullivan told the sergeant, 
"That guy just tried to kill me with a knife!"  
On entering the decedent's bedroom, the sergeant observed 
the decedent laying on his stomach just inside the doorway, 
groaning and moving his hands.  The sergeant requested that the 
decedent stop moving his hands and attempted to place handcuffs 
on him.  The decedent resisted at first, but ultimately, 
officers were able to handcuff him and began administering 
medical aid. 
 
As officers worked to clear the scene for emergency 
personnel, one officer found a knife on the floor near the 
decedent.  That same officer then moved the knife onto a table 
6 
 
 
 
in the bedroom to ensure the safety of incoming emergency 
personnel. 
The decedent was treated for his gunshot wounds and 
transported to a hospital.  Within thirty minutes from the time 
Sullivan and Campellone first approached him in his bedroom, the 
decedent was pronounced dead. 
The plaintiff raises several questions regarding the final 
DAO report.  Chief among them is whether the decedent did in 
fact possess a knife when he allegedly attacked Sullivan.  
Various officers alternatively reported not seeing a knife at 
all, observing a black-handled steak knife on the decedent's 
desk, finding a black-handled steak knife on the floor near the 
decedent's feet, or discovering a knife underneath the decedent 
after the decedent was rolled over to administer medical aid.3 
2.  Investigation of the shooting.  In coordination with 
the State police, the district attorney's office conducted a 
five-month long investigation into the decedent's death pursuant 
to G. L. c. 38, § 4, which mandates that, in "cases of unnatural 
or suspicious death . . . [t]he district attorney or his law 
enforcement representative shall direct and control the 
 
3 After conducting a search of the residence, officers 
reported finding a total of three steak knives at various 
locations in the decedent's bedroom. 
 
7 
 
 
 
investigation of the death."4  The purpose of this investigation 
was to determine whether the two responding officers were 
criminally responsible for the decedent's death.  Investigators 
interviewed four percipient witnesses and approximately twenty 
additional civilian and law enforcement witnesses. 
The district attorney's office either acquired or created 
the following records while investigating the decedent's death:  
videotaped interviews of Fall River police officers and fire 
department paramedics who were involved in the incident 
(videotaped public employee interviews); Sullivan's personnel 
records; the decedent's autopsy and medical records; crime scene 
reports listing items recovered from the apartment and detailing 
subsequent forensic testing; video footage from surveillance 
cameras on a neighboring property that was recorded between 
November 20 and November 22, 2021 (home security videos); 
twenty-six crime scene photographs depicting the decedent's 
residence, including his bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, and shared 
living spaces (crime scene photographs); a brief typewritten 
document titled "Room Summary," which was authored by an 
assistant district attorney and consists of several bullet 
points that recount the factual events leading to the decedent's 
death (room summary); and a homicide report prepared by the 
 
4 No independent internal affairs investigation of the Fall 
River police department was performed. 
8 
 
 
 
State police, which includes a nine-paragraph summary of the 
events surrounding the decedent's shooting and appends summaries 
of the videotaped public employee interviews (MSP homicide 
report).5 
While the investigation remained ongoing, the district 
attorney's office prepared a preliminary report in December 2021 
summarizing its findings and conclusions regarding the shooting 
(preliminary DAO report).6  The preliminary DAO report includes 
details on the decedent's background, a summary of the domestic 
violence incident that prompted the officers' arrival at the 
decedent's residence, a description of the events surrounding 
 
5 The names of the officers being interviewed, among other 
information, are redacted from the interview summaries appended 
to the MSP homicide report.  A draft of the MSP homicide report, 
discussed infra, was completed in November 2021.  The district 
attorney's office released the final MSP homicide report online 
to the public in April 2022.  The most significant difference 
between the final MSP homicide report and the draft MSP homicide 
report is the "approved" status indicated at the top of the 
document. 
 
6 The preliminary DAO report mistakenly was referred to as 
the final report in an initial e-mail message to the plaintiff.  
On December 22, 2021, a staff member at the district attorney's 
office sent an e-mail message to the plaintiff indicating that a 
"final report" on the shooting was attached.  However, this same 
staff member later submitted an affidavit in which he explained 
that he had incorrectly assumed that the report was final.  In 
addition to the preliminary DAO report that was sent to the 
plaintiff and the final DAO report that was released to the 
public, the district attorney's office prepared an earlier draft 
preliminary DAO report, discussed infra, that was circulated 
within the district attorney's office and "subject to attorney 
review." 
9 
 
 
 
the shooting, an explanation of the Fall River police 
department's policy on the use of force, and a conclusion that 
there was "no basis" to find that Sullivan or Campellone had 
committed a crime. 
On completing its investigation, the district attorney's 
office released the final DAO report to the public in April 
2022.  In addition to the information from the preliminary DAO 
report detailed supra, the final DAO report includes 
supplemental details on the decedent's domestic violence 
offenses and child endangerment charges, as well as a summary of 
the decedent's medical examination and autopsy report.  The 
final DAO report again concludes that there was "no basis" to 
charge either of the two responding officers with a crime.  The 
district attorney's office also describes the Fall River police 
department's use of force policy, which states that a "law 
enforcement officer shall not use deadly force upon a person 
unless de-escalation tactics have been attempted and failed or 
are not feasible based on the totality of the circumstances."  
The policy permits an officer to use deadly force if there is no 
other reasonable alternative and the officer has an objectively 
reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary to protect 
herself or another.  The district attorney's office found in its 
report that Sullivan and Campellone did not violate the use of 
force policy, reasoning that the officers had probable cause to 
10 
 
 
 
arrest the decedent and that it was reasonable to believe that 
the decedent was attempting to use deadly force. 
 
3.  The public records request and responses.  After 
receiving a copy of the preliminary DAO report, the plaintiff 
wrote to the district attorney's office on January 10, 2022, 
requesting public records pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b).  In 
his letter, the plaintiff requested (1) all documents relating 
to any incidents that occurred between November 20 and November 
22, 2021, involving Fall River police officers and the decedent; 
(2) all audio recordings concerning the decedent between 
November 20 and November 22, 2021; (3) all video recordings and 
photographs that show the decedent or officers who interacted 
with the decedent on November 22, 2021; and (4) all documents 
relating to any investigations of incidents involving the 
decedent that occurred between November 20 and November 22, 
2021. 
 
The district attorney's office responded in a letter dated 
January 25, 2022, denying the plaintiff's request for public 
records primarily because the investigation was ongoing.  The 
district attorney's office further explained its belief that 
many of the records the plaintiff requested were exempt from the 
definition of "public records" under the public records law and 
thus would not be disclosed, even after the completion of the 
investigation. 
11 
 
 
 
On April 1, 2022, the district attorney's office sent 
another letter and the final DAO report to the plaintiff.  This 
letter included the website address of the district attorney's 
office, where anyone could view the public records that the 
district attorney's office identified as responsive to the 
plaintiff's request.  The district attorney's office explained 
in its letter that certain records would not be disclosed to the 
plaintiff.  Relevant here, the district attorney's office 
stated, "[a]ll recorded witness interviews and certain audio and 
video recordings," some photographs, and the names of police 
officers were being withheld under the privacy exemption.  The 
district attorney's office also indicated certain records were 
being withheld under the investigatory exemption because their 
production "would disclose investigatory techniques and 
potentially hinder the effectiveness of future investigations."  
Last, the district attorney's office claimed that records 
constituting work product were being withheld under the policy 
deliberation exemption. 
4.  The lawsuit.  On February 2, 2022, the plaintiff 
commenced an action in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 66, § 10A, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to 
compel the disclosure of public records held by the district 
attorney's office.  In his complaint, the plaintiff sought the 
12 
 
 
 
same four types of records he had identified in his initial 
public records request to the district attorney's office. 
 
In September 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment in which he requested an order from the Superior Court 
compelling the district attorney's office to produce the 
documents and information he had requested.  The district 
attorney's office filed both an opposition to the plaintiff's 
motion and a cross motion for summary judgment, asserting that 
it properly had withheld certain records and redacted certain 
information that was not subject to disclosure under the public 
records law.  Specifically, the district attorney's office 
maintained that the additional records the plaintiff sought were 
exempt from disclosure under at least one -- and in some 
instances, multiple -- of the following statutory exemptions 
from the definition of "public records":  (1) G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (c) (privacy exemption); (2) G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (d) (policy deliberation exemption); and (3) G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f) (investigatory exemption). 
The motion judge held a hearing in February 2023 at which 
he reviewed several contested documents in camera.  On March 10, 
2023, the judge issued an order granting the plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment with minor exceptions and entered judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff. 
13 
 
 
 
In April 2023, the district attorney's office appealed from 
the judge's decision and the resulting judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff.  We then allowed an application for direct appellate 
review submitted by the district attorney's office. 
Discussion.  On appeal, the district attorney's office 
claims that the motion judge erred in granting the plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment because the requested records are 
exempted from disclosure.  The district attorney's office 
asserts, as it did below, that the privacy exemption applies to 
(1) the crime scene photographs; (2) the home security videos 
(and still images taken from those video recordings); (3) the 
names of police officers and other public employees, which were 
redacted from the preliminary and final DAO reports; and (4) the 
videotaped public employee interviews.  Next, the district 
attorney's office claims that the investigatory exemption 
applies to (1) the videotaped public employee interviews; (2) 
the home security videos; and (3) a list of interview questions 
that a State police investigator asked the two responding 
officers (investigator's interview questions).  Finally, the 
district attorney's office argues that the policy deliberation 
exemption applies to (1) a draft of the MSP homicide report; (2) 
a draft of the preliminary DAO report; and (3) the room summary.  
We address each asserted exemption below. 
14 
 
 
 
1.  Standard of review.  We review a judge's decision on a 
motion for summary judgment de novo.  Matter of the Estate of 
Jablonski, 492 Mass. 687, 690 (2023).  "Summary judgment is 
appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in dispute 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" 
(citation omitted).  Adams v. Schneider Elec. USA, 492 Mass. 
271, 280 (2023).  As summary judgment was entered against the 
district attorney's office, we review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to it.  See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 490 Mass. at 
326-327. 
2.  Public records law.  Two statutes govern public records 
requests:  G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a), which requires agencies, like 
the district attorney's office, to provide access to public 
records on request; and G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, which 
defines the scope of public records.  See Rahim v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 486 Mass. 544, 547 (2020).  The 
primary purpose of these statutes is to provide the public 
"broad access to government records" and information on "whether 
public servants are carrying out their duties in an efficient 
and law-abiding manner" (citations omitted).  Attorney Gen. v. 
District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 484 Mass. 260, 262-263 
(2020). 
15 
 
 
 
The Legislature broadly defined the term "public records."  
See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.7  See also Boston Globe Media 
Partners, LLC, v. Department of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 432 
(2019).  Paired with this broad definition is a statutory 
presumption in favor of disclosure, with the burden placed on 
the government agency to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a record may be withheld.  See G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10A (d) (1) (iv).  See also Rahim, 486 Mass. at 549.  The 
Legislature has carved out various enumerated exemptions from 
the definition of "public records," including the privacy 
exemption, the policy deliberation exemption, and the 
investigatory exemption.  See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c), 
(d), (f).  See also Attorney Gen., 484 Mass. at 263.  These 
 
7 Specifically, the term "public records" is defined, 
subject to certain exemptions, as: 
 
"all books, papers, maps, photographs, recorded tapes, 
financial statements, statistical tabulations, or other 
documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form 
or characteristics, made or received by any officer or 
employee of any agency, executive office, department, 
board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the 
commonwealth, or of any political subdivision thereof, or 
of any authority established by the general court to serve 
a public purpose, or any person, corporation, association, 
partnership or other legal entity which receives or expends 
public funds for the payment or administration of pensions 
for any current or former employees of the commonwealth or 
any political subdivision as defined in [G. L. c. 32, 
§ 1]." 
 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. 
16 
 
 
 
exemptions are "strictly and narrowly construed" (citation 
omitted).  Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, supra.  Whether an 
exemption applies requires a case-by-case analysis.  See Rahim, 
supra. 
a.  Privacy exemption.  The privacy exemption applies to 
"personnel and medical files or information and any other 
materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, 
the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c).  In 
2020, the Legislature passed "An Act relative to justice, equity 
and accountability in law enforcement in the Commonwealth."  
St. 2020, c. 253.  Among other provisions, this act amended the 
privacy exemption of the public records law and established the 
POST commission to increase transparency in law enforcement 
investigations.  See St. 2020, c. 253, §§ 2, 30.  See also 
Letter from the Governor to the Senate and House (Dec. 10, 
2020), 2020 Senate Doc. No. 2975 ("This bill makes law 
enforcement more accountable for their conduct and provides the 
public with direct insight into officers' performance history[,] 
which not only creates greater transparency in law enforcement 
but also gives departments greater ability to hire or promote 
only qualified applicants").  Specifically, the act created a 
new carve-out within the privacy exemption for "records related 
to a law enforcement misconduct investigation."  G. L. c. 4, 
17 
 
 
 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (c), as amended through St. 2020, c. 253, § 3.  
That is, records that would otherwise fall within the privacy 
exemption but are "related to a law enforcement misconduct 
investigation" may not be withheld from disclosure under this 
exemption. 
On appeal, the district attorney's office argues it 
properly withheld the crime scene photographs, the home security 
videos, the still images, the names of officers and public 
officials, and the videotaped public employee interviews under 
the privacy exemption.  The district attorney's office claims 
that disclosing the crime scene photographs would violate the 
decedent's privacy rights because they reveal the decedent's 
"unclean bathroom" and "unkempt home" with "trash bags piled up" 
as well as "a disturbing notation on the [decedent's] calendar."  
The district attorney's office also contends that releasing the 
home security videos and still images would create an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy for private individuals who 
voluntarily provided the video recordings to the district 
attorney's office as part of its investigation.8  Moreover, the 
district attorney's office asserts that the names of officers 
and public officials should be withheld to protect their 
 
8 The plaintiff's request for video footage is limited to 
video recordings that show either the decedent or the Fall River 
police department officers. 
18 
 
 
 
privacy.  Last, the district attorney's office argues that 
withholding the videotaped public employee interviews and 
instead releasing reports summarizing their substance properly 
balanced the public interest "in knowing about the conduct of 
the public employees" with "the privacy interests and safety of 
the individuals involved." 
The motion judge balanced the decedent's privacy interest 
in the requested records against the public interest in 
disclosure and found that the "equities substantially favor[ed]" 
disclosure.  See Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass. 86, 96 
(2015) ("The inquiry under the privacy exemption requires that 
the seriousness of any invasion of privacy be balanced against 
the public right to know" [quotation and citation omitted]).  We 
need not review the judge's application of the balancing test 
because all records identified by the district attorney's office 
fall under the "law enforcement misconduct investigation" carve-
out to the privacy exemption.  Thus, the privacy exemption 
cannot be used to withhold these records from disclosure. 
The district attorney's office argues that "[w]here the 
shooting was deemed to be justified in this death investigation 
under [G. L. c. 38, § 4], and no criminal prosecution ensued, 
the records are not 'law enforcement misconduct' records at 
all."  Essentially, the district attorney's office asserts that 
unless an investigation ends in a finding that a law enforcement 
19 
 
 
 
officer engaged in misconduct, the carve-out to the privacy 
exemption does not apply. 
This contention of the district attorney's office finds no 
support in the language of the statute.  General Laws c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (c), provides, in relevant part, that the privacy 
exemption "shall not apply to records related to a law 
enforcement misconduct investigation."9  In questions of 
statutory interpretation, we begin with the plain language of 
the statute.  See Commonwealth v. Escobar, 490 Mass. 488, 493 
(2022).  The ordinary meaning of "misconduct" is "[a] 
dereliction of duty; unlawful, dishonest, or improper behavior, 
esp[ecially] by someone in a position of authority or trust."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1195 (11th ed. 2019).  As the district 
attorney's office has acknowledged, the purpose of the 
investigation in this case was to determine whether the two 
responding officers committed any crimes or violated the Fall 
River police department's use of force policy in relation to the 
decedent's death.  A police officer's commission of a crime in 
the performance of his or her official duty is both "unlawful" 
 
9 The phrase "related to" is construed broadly.  See, e.g., 
Marsh v. Massachusetts Coastal R.R., 492 Mass. 641, 651 n.21 
(2023), petition for cert. filed, U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 23-669 
(Dec. 21, 2023); Machado v. System4 LLC, 471 Mass. 204, 206 
(2015). 
 
20 
 
 
 
and a "dereliction of duty."  An officer's use of excessive 
force is likewise a dereliction of that officer's duty. 
General Laws c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c), clearly and 
unambiguously states that the privacy exemption does not apply 
to an "investigation" of law enforcement misconduct.  To require 
the investigation to end with a finding of police misconduct 
places the cart before the horse and runs counter to the goals 
of police accountability and transparency.  Thus, the 
investigation into the shooting of the decedent in this case was 
a "law enforcement misconduct investigation."  Accordingly, the 
crime scene photographs, the home security videos, the still 
images, the names of officers and public officials, and the 
videotaped public employee interviews each "relate[] to a law 
enforcement misconduct investigation" and may not be withheld 
under the privacy exemption.10 
b.  Investigatory exemption.  Under G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (f), any "investigatory materials necessarily 
compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other 
investigatory officials" are exempt from the definition of 
"public records" if disclosing such materials "would probably so 
 
10 That the privacy exemption does not apply to the 
videotaped public employee interviews does not necessarily mean 
that the interviews must be disclosed.  As discussed infra, this 
matter will be remanded for a determination whether the 
investigatory exemption applies to the videotaped public 
employee interviews. 
21 
 
 
 
prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such 
disclosure would not be in the public interest."  This exemption 
is "aimed at 'the avoidance of premature disclosure of the 
Commonwealth's case prior to trial, the prevention of the 
disclosure of confidential investigative techniques, procedures, 
or sources of information, the encouragement of individual 
citizens to come forward and speak freely with police concerning 
matters under investigation, and the creation of initiative that 
police officers might be completely candid in recording their 
observations, hypotheses and interim conclusion.'"  Reinstein v. 
Police Comm'r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 289 (1979), quoting 
Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62 (1976). 
This is not a blanket exemption that applies to any record 
kept by a police department for an investigation.  See Bougas, 
371 Mass. at 65.  Instead, we analyze whether this exemption 
applies on a case-by-case basis.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Police Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 859 (1995).  In doing 
so, we ask whether a requested disclosure "would be so 
prejudicial to effective law enforcement that it is in the 
public interest to maintain secrecy."  Id.  Where an 
investigation is closed, this fact alone "does not automatically 
terminate the applicability" of the investigatory exemption.  
Rahim, 486 Mass. at 552. 
22 
 
 
 
The district attorney's office argues that the 
investigatory exemption applies to the videotaped public 
employee interviews.  It reasons that disclosing these video-
recorded interviews would chill prospective witnesses, both 
private and public, from agreeing to video-recorded interviews 
in the future.11  The district attorney's office also claims that 
release of these interviews may reduce the likelihood that 
officers are "completely candid" when questioned. 
We previously have examined the application of the 
investigatory exemption to the statements of law enforcement 
officials.  For example, in Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 
864-865, we held that statements of police officers compiled 
during internal affairs and criminal investigations were not 
subject to the investigatory exemption.  Given the available 
summaries of the internal affairs investigation, the evident 
public purpose behind the investigation, and prior publicity of 
these summaries, any harmful effect that disclosure might have 
had was diminished.  See id.  Because of the previous publicity, 
disclosing the officers' statements was unlikely to decrease the 
likelihood that officers would be completely candid in recording 
 
11 In addition to potentially chilling future witnesses, the 
district attorney's office had claimed that the release of these 
videotapes "might also indirectly reveal" the identities of the 
two officers who were present at the shooting.  However, as 
discussed supra, the names of these two officers were revealed 
in a trooper's affidavit and thus already known to the public. 
23 
 
 
 
their observations, especially where the possibility of public 
disclosure was "surely apparent" to the officers at the time 
they made these statements.  See id. 
In Rahim, 486 Mass. at 554-555, we held that the 
investigatory exemption applied to certain records that a 
district attorney acquired during an investigation into a fatal 
shooting by law enforcement officials.  The district attorney 
identified one withheld document as a five-page statement signed 
by a Federal agent "concerning actions taken and observations 
made regarding the shooting," and which "include[d] a one page 
annotated aerial photograph."  Id. at 554.  While "succinct," 
this description successfully demonstrated that the records 
sought identified at least one law enforcement official, 
described the official's "observations, hypotheses, and interim 
conclusion," and included a photograph related to these 
observations.  Id., quoting Bougas, 371 Mass. at 62.  We 
remanded to the Superior Court for a determination whether the 
investigatory exemption applied to other material that was 
inadequately described and instructed the district attorney to 
either provide a revised description with "enough details about 
the nature and scope of the materials" or, where "fuller 
descriptions" were not possible, to seek in camera review of the 
material at issue.  Rahim, supra at 555-556. 
24 
 
 
 
Here, the district attorney's office contends that 
disclosure of the videotaped public employee interviews would 
hamper investigation by discouraging witnesses -- both private 
and public -- from agreeing to video-recorded interviews in the 
future.  However, the video recordings at issue do not depict 
interviews of private citizens but rather the interviews of 
seven Fall River police officers and two paramedics.  Where we 
previously have stated that the investigatory exemption is aimed 
at "the encouragement of individual citizens to come forward and 
speak freely with police" (emphasis added), Bougas, 371 Mass. at 
62, we only have considered this factor for private individuals 
-- not public officials performing duties in their official 
capacity.  See Rahim, 486 Mass. at 551; Globe Newspaper Co., 419 
Mass. at 859; District Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. 
Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 512 (1995); WBZ-TV4 v. District Attorney 
for the Suffolk Dist., 408 Mass. 595, 603 (1990); Reinstein, 378 
Mass. at 289. 
Although the district attorney's office asserted this 
exemption before the motion judge, the judge did not address 
whether the investigatory exemption applied to these interviews.  
Therefore, we remand to the Superior Court to address whether 
the district attorney's office has met its burden to show that 
25 
 
 
 
the investigatory exemption applies.12  If the judge finds that 
the investigatory exemption applies to any record on remand, 
then the district attorney's office may withhold that record 
even if another exemption does not apply.  See Globe Newspaper 
Co., 419 Mass. at 857. 
c.  Policy deliberation exemption.  Under the policy 
deliberation exemption, "inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda 
or letters relating to policy positions being developed by [an] 
agency" are exempt from the definition of "public records"; 
however, "reasonably completed factual studies or reports on 
which the development of such policy positions has been or may 
 
12 The district attorney's office has also asserted that the 
investigatory exemption applies to the investigator's interview 
questions and to the home security videos.  The motion judge did 
not address whether this exemption applies to the interview 
questions.  Therefore, we also remand so that the judge may 
determine whether the district attorney's office met its burden 
to show the investigatory exemption applies to the 
investigator's interview questions.  The judge did, however, 
consider whether the release of the home security videos would 
"interfere with future investigations."  The district attorney's 
office claims that releasing the home security videos will 
discourage citizens from coming forward and volunteering 
information, harming future investigations.  We are not 
convinced.  As discussed supra, the home security videos depict 
public employees, not private citizens, performing their duties 
in public areas.  We hold that the district attorney's office 
has failed to demonstrate how the disclosure of these video 
recordings "would probably so prejudice the possibility of 
effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in 
the public interest."  See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f).  
Therefore, the district attorney's office has not met its burden 
of showing that the investigatory exemption applies to the home 
security videos.  
26 
 
 
 
be based" are not exempt.  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d).  
See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 
Mass. 444, 457 (2007) (policy deliberation exemption applies to 
"advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations 
compromising part of a process by which governmental decisions 
and policies are formulated" [citation omitted]).  This 
exemption protects "open, frank intra-agency and intra-agency 
deliberations regarding government decisions."  DaRosa v. New 
Bedford, 471 Mass. 446, 457 (2015).  See General Elec. Co. v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 807 (1999), 
overruled in part by DaRosa, supra at 453 (purpose of policy 
deliberation exemption "is to foster independent discussions 
between those responsible for a governmental decision in order 
to secure the quality of the decision"). 
In applying this exemption, the court utilizes the work 
product doctrine and looks to Mass. R. Civ. P. 26, as amended, 
474 Mass. 1401 (2016), for guidance.  See DaRosa, 471 Mass. at 
458.  There are two forms of work product:  opinion and fact.  
Id.  Opinion work product is material that contains "the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation."  Id. at 459, quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3).  
All other work product is considered fact work product.  See 
Attorney Gen. v. Facebook, Inc., 487 Mass. 109, 128 (2021) 
27 
 
 
 
(Facebook).  Absent a "highly persuasive showing" otherwise, 
opinion work product is exempt from disclosure (citation 
omitted).  DaRosa, supra.  Conversely, fact work product must be 
disclosed "if it is a 'reasonably completed factual stud[y] or 
report[] on which the development of [an agency's] policy 
positions has been or may be based.'"  Id., quoting G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (d).13  Where a reasonably completed factual 
study or report is intermingled with opinion, "a purely factual 
section of the report might fall outside [the policy 
deliberation exemption] but a discussion or analysis section 
interwoven with facts would be protected from disclosure."  
DaRosa, supra at 460. 
Here, the district attorney's office identifies three 
documents that it claims are work product to which the policy 
deliberation exemption applies:  (1) a draft of the MSP homicide 
report, (2) a draft of the preliminary DAO report, and (3) the 
room summary.  The motion judge found that these three records 
were fact-based documents to which the policy deliberation 
exemption did not apply.  We agree that the district attorney's 
office has not proven that the policy deliberation exemption 
 
13 The policy deliberation exemption is a "time-limited 
protection" (citation omitted).  DaRosa, 471 Mass. at 455.  It 
"protects documents from disclosure only while policy is 'being 
developed,' that is, while the deliberative process is ongoing 
and incomplete" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id. at 459 
n.16. 
28 
 
 
 
applies to either the draft of the MSP homicide report or the 
room summary.  The draft of the MSP homicide report includes 
only factual details of the decedent's death.  Similarly, the 
room summary, written by an assistant district attorney, 
contains only facts relating to the layout of the decedent's 
residence, a brief summary of the conversation between the 
decedent and the officers prior to the shooting, and a 
description of the altercation between the decedent and the 
officers.  As neither document contains any "mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories," these records are not 
opinion work product.  See DaRosa, 471 Mass. at 459.  Further, 
the district attorney's office has not met its burden of showing 
that these documents are not reasonably completed factual 
studies or reports. 
The draft of the preliminary DAO report stands on somewhat 
different footing.  Like the other two records at issue, the 
motion judge correctly noted that this draft report primarily is 
comprised of factual detail.  For example, the draft report 
includes -- much like the preliminary DAO report and the final 
DAO report, both of which were released to the public -- 
sections that detail the decedent's criminal background, the 
initial domestic violence report to officers by the decedent's 
girlfriend, and the shooting.  Where sections of the draft 
report are identical to the corresponding sections in either of 
29 
 
 
 
the publicly available reports, the district attorney's office 
has effectively waived the work product privilege with respect 
to these sections.  See Facebook, 487 Mass. at 135 (party cannot 
claim protection for opinion work product for information it has 
released publicly).   
However, the draft report is not completely identical.  
Comparing the different iterations of the DAO report reveals 
that certain sections of the draft report, labeled "Applicable 
Laws" and "Conclusion," are different from the corresponding 
sections in the publicly available reports.  These sections also 
contain discussions of the law and legal analysis addressing 
whether the responding officers had committed any crime and 
whether the shooting was justified.  Because these sections 
differ from their publicly available counterparts, they may 
convey the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories" as to the criminal responsibility of the officers.  
See Facebook, 487 Mass. at 127.  Moreover, that the final DAO 
report was voluntarily released to the public does not mean that 
these sections of an earlier draft report are not protected work 
product.  See Gilhuly v. Johns-Manville Corp., 100 F.R.D. 752, 
755 n.4 (D. Conn. 1983) ("Disclosure of a final draft does not 
automatically waive the work product privilege of prior 
drafts"). 
30 
 
 
 
Therefore, it was error for the judge to order disclosure 
of the entire draft preliminary DAO report.  While the district 
attorney's office has not met its burden of showing that the 
entire draft report is not a reasonably completed factual study 
or report, see DaRosa, 471 Mass. at 460, the district attorney's 
office has met its burden of showing that the policy 
deliberation exemption applies to the "Applicable Laws" and 
"Conclusion" sections of the draft report.  These two sections 
are severable from the purely factual sections of the draft 
report.  Therefore, the "Applicable Laws" and "Conclusion" 
sections of the draft report may be redacted, and the remaining 
factual sections of the report must be disclosed.   
3.  General Laws c. 6E.  The district attorney's office 
separately claims that the POST commission has exclusive 
authority under G. L. c. 6E, §§ 1 et seq., to release publicly 
the names of police officers in connection with any 
investigations, thereby taking such information out of the 
purview of the public records law.14  In support, the district 
attorney's office points to the level of detail within G. L. 
c. 6E, §§ 1 et seq., which it argues creates a clear implication 
that the Legislature intended the POST commission to be the 
 
14 The POST commission was created through the same act that 
added the carve-out for law enforcement misconduct 
investigations to the privacy exemption.  See St. 2020, c. 253, 
§ 30 (effective July 1, 2021). 
31 
 
 
 
exclusive avenue for members of the public to access law 
enforcement officers' names. 
We turn to the plain language of the statutory scheme at 
issue, which established the creation of the POST commission.  
See G. L. c. 6E, § 2.  Among other provisions, the statutory 
scheme grants the POST commission the authority to "establish 
uniform policies and standards for the certification of all law 
enforcement officers," G. L. c. 6E, § 4; "to investigate officer 
misconduct," G. L. c. 6E, § 8; and to "promulgate rules and 
regulations for the use of force by law enforcement officers," 
G. L. c. 6E, § 15.  Notably absent from this statutory scheme is 
any provision granting the POST commission exclusive authority 
to determine whether to release the names of officers involved 
in law enforcement misconduct investigations.  "We do not read 
into the statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there, nor add words that the Legislature had the 
option to, but chose not to include" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Dones, 492 Mass. 291, 297 (2023).  Based on the 
plain language of the statute, the statutory construction 
argument of the district attorney's office fails, and we need 
not proceed any further.  See Commonwealth v. Narvaez, 490 Mass. 
807, 809 (2022) ("we follow the plain language when it is 
unambiguous and when its application would not lead to an absurd 
32 
 
 
 
result, or contravene the Legislature's clear intent" [citation 
omitted]).15 
Conclusion.  Because the "Applicable Laws" and "Conclusion" 
sections of the draft preliminary DAO report are exempt from 
disclosure, we reverse the motion judge's order with respect to 
the mandated disclosure of these sections.  We also reverse 
insofar as the order requires disclosure of the videotaped 
public employee interviews and the investigator's interview 
questions, and we remand this case to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings to determine whether the investigatory 
exemption applies to the interviews or the investigator's 
interview questions.  In all other respects, the order and 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff are affirmed.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
15 Insofar as the district attorney's office claims that, 
because of the comprehensive nature of G. L. c. 6E, §§ 1 et 
seq., the public records law impliedly was repealed to the 
extent that it allows for the disclosure of officers' names, 
this argument also fails because we do not see an 
"irreconcilable conflict" between the two statutory schemes 
(citation omitted).  See Concord v. Water Dep't of Littleton, 
487 Mass. 56, 61 (2021). 
 
16 In his brief, the plaintiff has requested that we award 
him appellate attorney's fees and costs.  We decline to do so. 
BUDD, C.J. (concurring).  I agree that this matter should 
be remanded to allow the judge to address whether the 
investigatory exemption to the public records law applies to the 
videotaped interviews of public employees, an issue the judge 
did not address.  See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv); 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f).1  I write separately to note 
that although the district attorney for the Bristol district 
(district attorney's office) argues that records of police 
interviews fall under the exemption because disclosure could 
disincentivize officers from being candid, attending to this 
concern is not in keeping with the letter or spirit of the 
public records law.  
 
The district attorney's office's argument stems from this 
court's discussion of the investigatory exemption's possible 
aims in Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59 
(1976).  In that case, the court concluded that the records the 
plaintiffs sought were exempt from disclosure under the language 
 
1 General Laws c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f), exempts from 
disclosure  
 
"investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the 
public view by law enforcement or other investigatory 
officials the disclosure of which materials would probably 
so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement 
that such disclosure would not be in the public interest." 
2 
 
 
 
of G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f).  Id. at 62.2  In discussing 
the statute generally, the court also listed possible reasons 
that the Legislature provided for an investigatory exemption: 
"Included among the purposes in providing this exemption 
would be the avoidance of premature disclosure of the 
Commonwealth's case prior to trial, the prevention of the 
disclosure of confidential investigative techniques, 
procedures, or sources of information, the encouragement of 
individual citizens to come forward and speak freely with 
police concerning matters under investigation, and the 
creation of initiative that police officers might be 
completely candid in recording their observations, 
hypotheses and interim conclusions" (emphasis added). 
 
Id.   
This court since has repeated the Bougas language when 
discussing the investigatory exemption, including its reference 
to officer candor, on several occasions.  See, e.g., Rahim v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 486 Mass. 544, 551, 
554-555 (2020); Reinstein v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 378 Mass. 
281, 289 (1979).  However, in only two subsequent cases has this 
court specifically addressed the argument.  In Rahim, supra, 
this court concluded, without elaboration, that a district 
 
2 The plaintiffs in that case sought police reports of an 
incident that allegedly involved police misconduct.  Bougas, 371 
Mass. at 60-61.  Noting that the records contained "complete 
accounts of police investigatory efforts including the police 
officer's own observations of the incident in question, 
statements taken from witnesses, additional information obtained 
from other sources, some confidential, and leads and tips to be 
pursued," the court concluded that the requested reports fell 
under the investigatory exemption because they were "prepared by 
police officers in connection with their investigation of an 
incident which led to criminal proceedings."  Id. at 62.   
3 
 
 
 
attorney's office's justification as to why one record could be 
shielded under the investigatory exemption was "sufficient," 
where the record both displayed "the identity" of a Federal 
Bureau of Investigation agent and contained that agent's 
"observations, hypotheses, and interim conclusions" about the 
incident.  Id. at 554-555, citing Bougas, 371 Mass. at 62.  In 
the other case, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 
419 Mass. 852, 864 (1995), the court directly considered the 
effect that the disclosure of the police statements at issue 
might have on officer candor, concluding that disclosure would 
not "seriously threaten" it.  Moreover, in Globe Newspaper Co., 
the court appeared to question the premise of the Bougas court's 
concern by noting that other courts have concluded "with some 
persuasiveness" that, rather than deter officer candor, "limited 
disclosure of investigatory materials might promote candor."  
Id. at 865 n.13.3   
Presuming that disclosure would be detrimental to officer 
candor provides police departments (and other agencies) with a 
ready excuse to oppose the disclosure of information, which 
 
3 In Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 865 n.13, the court 
cited three Federal cases that emphatically rejected the 
argument that police records may be withheld due to the same 
concern regarding officer candor.  See id., citing Kelly v. San 
Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 664-666 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Wong v. New 
York, 123 F.R.D. 481, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); and King v. Conde, 
121 F.R.D. 180, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
4 
 
 
 
otherwise would be available to the public, based on a 
speculative, intangible, and largely unverifiable concern.  Cf. 
Kelly v. San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 664 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("the 
premise that . . . investigating officers will be less 
forthright in expressing their opinions if there is a risk of 
disclosure[] is empirically unsupported and very debatable").  
As other decisions favorably cited by this court have 
acknowledged, see Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 865 n.13, if 
anything, "the stronger working hypothesis is that fear of 
disclosure is more likely to increase candor than to chill it," 
King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).4    
An approach that allows concerns for the effect that 
disclosure might have on officer candor to drive disclosure 
determinations cannot be squared with the public records 
statute's "presumption" of disclosure, against which exemptions 
must be "strictly and narrowly construed" (citations omitted).  
Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Pub. Health, 
482 Mass. 427, 432 (2019).  It also conflicts with one of the 
primary purposes of the public records law, i.e., empowering the 
 
4 Notably, we are not aware of any case since Bougas was 
decided in which the Commonwealth demonstrated that concern for 
police candor was a viable reason to shield police testimony, 
including in the instant case.  See G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10A (d) (1) (iv) ("the burden shall be on the defendant agency 
or municipality to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that such record or portion of the record may be withheld in 
accordance with [S]tate or [F]ederal law").   
5 
 
 
 
public to ensure that "public servants are carrying out their 
duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner."  Attorney Gen. 
v. District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 484 Mass. 260, 262-
263 (2020), citing Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 
151, 158 (1979).  Transparency is especially critical in the 
context of community members' interactions with law enforcement.  
See District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., supra at 263 
(transparency is "an essential ingredient of public confidence 
in government" [citation omitted]).  See also St. 2020, c. 253, 
§ 2 (amending public records law to clarify that "records 
related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation" shall not 
be exempt from disclosure under privacy exemption).   
Accordingly, I am doubtful of the arguments to that effect 
raised by the district attorney's office and wary of embracing 
the idea, despite its appearance in some of our cases.