Title: Craig v. Dye
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 991043
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 2000

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Keenan, Koontz and 
Kinser, JJ. 
 
LOU ANN CRAIG, PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE  
OF JOSE SALVADORE ANTONIO 
 
v. Record No. 991043  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
March 3, 2000 
ROBERT GLENN DYE, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Michael Patrick McWeeney, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we construe a personal liability 
umbrella insurance policy provision stating that the 
insurer may not provide coverage if an insured “refuse[s]” 
to perform certain required duties.  Because the insureds 
in this case merely failed to perform those duties but did 
not refuse to do so, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment in favor of the insurance company. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Robert V. Dye (the father), and his wife, Mary L. Dye 
(collectively, the parents), were the named insureds of a 
personal liability umbrella insurance policy (the policy), 
issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State 
Farm).  Their son, Robert Glenn Dye (the son), was a 
                     
1 Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 2, 2000. 
resident of their household, and thus was also an insured 
under the policy. 
The son was the driver of a vehicle that allegedly 
struck and killed Jose Salvadore Antonio on April 1, 1995.  
Lou Ann Craig, personal representative of Antonio’s estate, 
filed this declaratory judgment action in the circuit 
court, seeking a declaration, inter alia, that the son is 
covered under the policy with regard to that accident.2
State Farm denied coverage to the son because of the 
insureds’ alleged failure to timely comply with the 
following policy provision contained in the section titled 
“YOUR DUTIES TO US”: 
These are things you[3] must do for us.  We may not 
provide coverage if you refuse to: 
 
1. 
notify us of an accident.  If something happens 
that might involve this policy, you must let us 
know promptly.  Send written notice to us or our 
agent.  Include the names and addresses of the 
injured and witnesses.  Also include the time, 
place and account of the accident.[4] 
 
                     
2 Prior to filing this action, Craig, in her capacity 
as personal representative of Antonio’s estate, filed a 
wrongful death action against the son. 
 
3 The policy provides that the terms “you” and “your” 
refer to the named insureds, as well as the named insureds’ 
relatives who are residents of the named insureds’ 
household. 
 
4 In this opinion, we will refer to this provision as 
“paragraph 1.” 
 
2
State Farm first received notice of the 1995 accident 
from the father on April 10 or 11, 1997, more than two 
years after the accident occurred.  In a letter to State 
Farm, the father stated that the parents “never had the 
slightest idea” that the policy would cover the son.  The 
father further advised State Farm that he delivered a 
letter from an attorney representing Antonio’s estate to 
State Farm’s agent as soon as the father received the 
letter.  The father got that letter at the same time 
Antonio’s estate filed the wrongful death action against 
the son.  That is also when the father first learned that 
the policy might extend coverage to the son with regard to 
the 1995 accident. 
Soon thereafter, State Farm sent a reservation of 
rights letter to the parents, stating that “delay by or on 
behalf of the insured in giving prompt, written notice 
. . . concerning the accident” may have violated the 
conditions of the policy.  State Farm had no contact with 
the son prior to sending that letter. 
After State Farm answered the declaratory judgment 
action, Craig filed a motion for partial summary judgment.5 
                     
5 In her motion, Craig stated that she sought a 
judgment with regard to State Farm’s notice defense.  She 
acknowledged that State Farm has additional defenses and 
 
3
State Farm responded by filing a motion for summary 
judgment based upon the allegedly untimely notice of the 
accident.  After considering stipulated facts, the parties’ 
memoranda, and oral argument, the trial court denied 
Craig’s motion but granted State Farm’s motion.  The court 
concluded that the son “is not covered under State Farm’s 
Umbrella Policy and there is no coverage applicable to [the 
son] under the policy in question for failure to provide 
timely notice . . . .”  This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
 
We review the decision of the trial court under well-
settled principles.  “An insurance policy is a contract, 
and, as in the case of any other contract, the words used 
are given their ordinary and customary meaning when they 
are susceptible of such construction.”  Hill v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 237 Va. 148, 152, 375 S.E.2d 727, 729 
(1989).  Similarly, “[i]f the language of an insurance 
policy is unambiguous, we will give the words their 
ordinary meaning and enforce the policy as written.”  
United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Webb, 235 Va. 655, 657, 369 
S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988).  Finally, “[s]ince the 
interpretation of a contract is a question of law, we are 
______________________ 
that those would be addressed in a subsequent motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
 
4
not bound by the trial court’s conclusions on this issue, 
and we are permitted the same opportunity as the trial 
court to consider the contract language.”  C.F. Garcia 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Enterprise Ford Tractor, Inc., 253 Va. 
104, 107, 480 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (1997) (citing Langman v. 
Alumni Ass’n of the Univ. of Virginia, 247 Va. 491, 498, 
442 S.E.2d 669, 674 (1994); Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 
184, 187-88, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)). 
On appeal, State Farm argues that timely notice of an 
accident is a condition precedent to an insurance company’s 
obligation to provide coverage, and that an insured must 
therefore substantially comply with an insurance policy’s 
notice requirements.  Thus, State Farm contends that, in 
this case, the insureds’ failure to timely perform the 
duties listed in paragraph 1 warrants State Farm’s denial 
of coverage to the son.  The cases cited by State Farm in 
support of its position involved insurance policies that 
contained a common provision mandating that in the event of 
an accident, “written notice . . . shall be given . . . to 
the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as 
practicable.”  State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Scott, 236 
Va. 116, 119, 372 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1988); accord Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 223 Va. 317, 
323, 288 S.E.2d 469, 473 (1982); Lord v. State Farm Mut. 
 
5
Auto. Ins. Co., 224 Va. 283, 285-86, 295 S.E.2d 796, 798 
(1982); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Porter, 221 Va. 
592, 596, 272 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1980).6  We held that 
compliance with such a notice provision is a condition 
precedent to coverage, with which the insured must 
substantially comply.  Scott, 236 Va. at 120, 372 S.E.2d at 
385. 
 
However, those cases are not dispositive of the 
question before us because there is an important difference 
between the language utilized in the notice provision found 
in those insurance policies and the terms of the provision 
at issue in the present case.  The instant policy, like 
those in the cases cited by State Farm, requires the 
insureds to perform certain duties, such as notifying State 
Farm of an accident and sending written notice.  However, 
in contrast to the notice provision in those other 
policies, the policy at issue today specifically states 
that if the insureds "refuse" to perform the duties 
contained in paragraph 1, State Farm may not provide 
coverage.  A similar provision incorporating the term 
                     
6 Similar language also appears in the policies at 
issue in State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Walton, 244 Va. 
498, 503, 423 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1992), and Dan River, Inc. 
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 227 Va. 485, 489, 317 S.E.2d 
485, 487 (1984), two other cases upon which State Farm 
relies. 
 
6
“refuse” in conjunction with an insured's duties to the 
insurance company does not appear in those other policies. 
 
Furthermore, we find it significant that, in the 
provision at issue, State Farm used only the verb "refuse" 
and did not include the verb "fail."  In other words, the 
policy does not state that if an insured refuses or fails 
to perform the required duties, State Farm may deny 
coverage.  State Farm acknowledged that there is no 
evidence in the record of a “refusal” by the parents or the 
son to perform the duties required of them.  Thus, unless 
the terms “refuse” and “fail” are synonymous, the insureds’ 
failure in this case to perform the duties in paragraph 1 
would not justify State Farm's denial of coverage to the 
son. 
 
To answer this inquiry, we look to the definitions of 
these terms.  Since the policy does not define the term 
“refuse,” we give the word its “ordinary and accepted 
meaning.”  Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Glick, 240 Va. 283, 288, 
397 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1990).  The verb “refuse” is defined 
as a “positive unwillingness to do or comply with” 
something demanded or expected.  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1910 (1993).  A “refusal” is 
“[t]he denial or rejection of something offered or 
demanded.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1285 (7th ed. 1999).  
 
7
These definitions denote an element of intent, manifested 
by a volitional act.  See Meeks v. Stevens, 785 S.W.2d 18, 
20 (Ark. 1990) (noting that definitions of term “‘refuse’ 
stress the active element of refusal[,] . . . expressing 
. . . a determination not to do a particular thing”); 
Nebraska v. Medina, 419 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Neb. 1988) (“‘To 
refuse[]’ . . . requires that a person understand what is 
being asked of him and then in some way manifest 
nonacceptance, nonconsent, or unwillingness.”). 
By comparison, to “fail” to do some act denotes a 
deficiency; and a “failure” is “[a]n omission of an 
expected action . . . or performance[,]” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 613, or the neglect of an assigned or expected 
action, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 815.  
See Laubach v. Franklin Square Hosp., 556 A.2d 682, 690 
n.11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989), aff’d, 569 A.2d 693 (1990) 
(distinguishing “[f]ailed” from “refused” on basis that 
“refused” “involves an act of the will,” while “[f]ailed” 
may be “an act of inevitable necessity”) (quoting Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1152-53 (5th ed. 1979)). 
Based on the distinction between the terms “refuse” 
and “fail,” we conclude that State Farm’s attempt to equate 
the insureds’ failure to timely comply with the 
requirements of paragraph 1 with a refusal to do so does 
 
8
not comport with the ordinary and customary meaning of the 
term “refuse.”  Thus, the insureds’ mere failure to timely 
perform the duties was not a refusal to do so and, 
therefore, did not trigger State Farm’s option to deny 
coverage to the son.7
We are also not persuaded by State Farm’s argument 
that the phrase “if you refuse to:” applies only to the 
duty immediately listed thereafter, i.e., “notify us of an 
accident.”  According to State Farm, the other requirements 
in paragraph 1 are separate duties of the insured that are 
not modified by that phase.  However, the phrase “if you 
refuse to:” introduces and precedes all the duties listed 
                     
7 In four of this Court’s prior cases, Angstadt v. 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 254 Va. 286, 292-93, 492 S.E.2d 
118, 121-22 (1997); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Davies, 226 Va. 310, 319, 310 S.E.2d 167, 172 (1983), 
Cooper v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisc., 199 Va. 
908, 915, 103 S.E.2d 210, 215 (1958), and State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arghyris, 189 Va. 913, 929-30, 55 S.E.2d 
16, 23 (1949), we discussed an insured’s willful failure to 
cooperate with the insurer.  Also, in Porter, we concluded 
that the insured willfully violated several policy 
provisions, including the notice and cooperation 
requirements.  221 Va. at 599, 272 S.E.2d at 200.  However, 
the policies in those cases did not contain any language 
referring to an insured’s refusal to perform certain duties 
while the instant policy contains such language.  Thus, the 
Court did not discuss whether a “willful failure” to 
perform a particular duty was comparable to a “refusal” to 
perform that duty.  Therefore, none of those cases guide 
our decision today. 
 
 
9
in paragraph 1.8  See Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 47a (colon “indicates that what follows it 
coordinates with some element of what precedes” it); see 
also H.W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage 589 
(Sir Ernest Gowers ed., 2d ed. 1996); Thomas S. Kane, The 
New Oxford Guide to Writing 144, 282 (1988).  Thus, we 
conclude that the phrase modifies, and applies to, all 
those duties. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the policy requires a 
“refusal” to perform the duties listed in paragraph 1, not 
merely a negligent delay or failure to do so, before State 
Farm can deny coverage.  For these reasons, we will reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court, enter partial final 
judgment for Craig on the basis that the insureds did not 
“refuse” to perform their duties to State Farm, and remand 
for such further proceedings as are necessary.  See note 5, 
supra. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
8 The phrase precedes not only paragraph 1 but also 
several other enumerated paragraphs that list additional 
duties of the insureds.  However, those duties are not at 
issue in this appeal. 
 
10