Title: Arfor-Brynfield, Inc. v. Huntsville Mall Associates
Citation: 479 So. 2d 1146
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 1985

479 So. 2d 1146 (1985)
ARFOR-BRYNFIELD, INC., a/k/a Germano's Gallery
v.
HUNTSVILLE MALL ASSOCIATES, a partnership.
84-379.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 30, 1985.
Rehearing Denied November 8, 1985.
L. Tennent Lee III of Cleary, Lee, Morris, Evans &amp; Rowe, Huntsville, for appellant.[1]
Frank K. Noojin, Jr. and Michael I. Spearing of Watts, Salmon, Roberts, Manning &amp; Noojin, Huntsville, for appellee.
SHORES, Justice.
The tenant appeals from the final judgment set out below in an unlawful detainer action brought by the owner:
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred to reversal in disallowing the amendment to the tenant's answer offered for the first time on the day the case was set for trial, some seven months after a pre-trial conference was held and a pre-trial order was entered which stated that the tenant's defense was a general denial and that amendments would be allowed only to meet proof at trial of which the parties were presently unaware. The order setting the pre-trial conference cautioned:
Three and one-half months before the case was set for trial, the owner filed the following motion in limine, specifically objecting to any reference to waiver or estoppel:
The tenant did not seek a modification of the pre-trial order, but waited until the day the case was set for trial to orally move for leave to amend its answer.
The pre-trial procedure established by Rule 16, A.R.Civ.P., is designed to clarify and simplify the issues to be tried. The order resulting is to control the subsequent course of the action. The drafters of the Alabama rule were mindful of the justified criticism that the federal pre-trial procedure had attracted and were committed to avoiding the wasteful and burdensome requirements of the federal pre-trial practice. Thus, the Alabama rule offers a simple procedure for defining and narrowing the issues remaining for trial. The pre-trial order is not written in stone, but it is not without meaning either. See Committee Comment, Rule 16, A.R.Civ.P. Obviously, as it is noted in the comment, pre-trial orders cannot be effective unless the judge has the right to disallow amendments to pleadings filed subsequent to the pre-trial conference, particularly where, as here, the subject matter of the proffered amendment was known to the pleader at the time of the pre-trial conference and was not then offered.
In this case, the owner asserts that the tenant breached the lease in that the tenant failed to operate its business during those hours required by the lease and set out in Section 4.3 of the lease (i.e., from 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday). The tenant conceded, in deposition and by way of answers to interrogatories and finally by confessing judgment, that he does not operate his business in accord with the operating hours required by the lease, but argues that because other tenants in the mall likewise do not comply with the identical provision in their leases, the owner has waived the operating hours requirement or is estopped to enforce it. Assuming, without deciding, that because the owner had not insisted upon strict adherence to the operating provision by other tenants, it had waived or was estopped' to assert the provision against the present tenant, we cannot reverse the trial court for disallowing an amendment to the tenant's general denial offered for the first time when the case was called for trial, particularly in light of its express finding that to do so would prejudice the owner in the presentation of its case. This is not to say that it would have been error to allow the amendment. We simply leave to the discretion of the trial court the matter of amendments to pre-trial orders. As the Court noted in Huskey v. W.B. Goodwyn Co., 295 Ala. 1, 321 So. 2d 645 (1975), Rule 16, A.R.Civ.P., must be read in conjunction with Rules 1 and 15, A.R.Civ.P., and thus liberal allowance of amendments when justice so requires must take precedence over strict adherence to the pre-trial order in Alabama practice.
The trial court was not convinced that justice was served by allowing an amendment on the day of trial to raise matters that had been known by the amending party since the suit was filed and had not theretofore been raised. It also found that the nonmoving party would be prejudiced if the amendment was allowed. This was within the trial court's discretion, and nothing has been presented to refute these conclusions. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Sullen, 413 So. 2d 1106 (Ala.1982), the Court affirmed a ruling by the trial court *1150 disallowing an amendment to the defendant's answer offered after entry of a pretrial order. There we said:
413 So. 2d  at 1108.
Also similar is Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 338 So. 2d 1276 (Ala.1976), where a defendant attempted to amend its pleading to include additional affirmative defenses. Those pleas were stricken by the trial court. On appeal, this Court held:
338 So. 2d  at 1278-79. See, also, Vernon Carpet Mills v. Rossville Spinning Corporation, 344 So. 2d 1205 (Ala.1977); Dillon v. Nix, 55 Ala.App. 611, 318 So. 2d 308 (1975).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Reporter's note: Mr. Lee's firm provided counsel at the appellate level only.