Title: Voltz  v. Dyess
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1121223
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2014

REL:01/24/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1121223
____________________
Deborah Voltz et al.
v.
Cameron Leigh Dyess
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-12-901471)
MOORE, Chief Justice.
Deborah 
Voltz, 
Jasmin 
Voltz, 
and 
Princess 
Turner
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs")
appeal from an order entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court
1121223
2
dismissing their action against Cameron Leigh Dyess. We
reverse and remand. 
I. Facts and Procedural History
On November 1, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a complaint
against Dyess in the Montgomery Circuit Court, alleging that
Dyess had negligently and wantonly caused an automobile
accident in which the plaintiffs were injured. The plaintiffs
sought damages in excess of $50,000. On November 1, the
plaintiffs attempted service of process on Dyess by certified
mail. On February 12, 2013, this service of process was
returned unclaimed. On February 21, 2013, the plaintiffs filed
an amended complaint. On May 3, 2013, the plaintiffs attempted
to  serve the amended complaint on Dyess, this time through
personal service by the sheriff. 
On 
June 
12, 
2013, 
without 
giving 
notice 
to 
the
plaintiffs, the trial court entered an order dismissing the
case for lack of service. On the same date, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order of
dismissal. On June 25, 2013, the sheriff's summons was
returned indicating nonservice. Also on June 25, 2013, the
trial court set a hearing for July 11, 2013, on the
1121223
3
plaintiffs' motion to alter, amend, or vacate. However, on
July 1, 2013, the trial court entered an order denying the
plaintiffs' motion to alter, amend, or vacate. On July 12,
2013, the trial court entered a second order, again denying
the plaintiffs' motion. The order stated that on July 11,
2013, the date of the scheduled hearing, "[n]o one appeared."
On July 15, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion to
alter, amend, or vacate and a motion to permit service by a
private process server. On July 18, 2013, the plaintiffs filed
notice of appeal of the trial court's dismissal of the case.
II. Standard of Review
"Before the adoption of our current Rule 4(b), [Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] some Alabama cases evaluated a dismissal for
insufficient service of process under Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ.
P." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 39 So. 3d 1172, 1175
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009). "Failure of a plaintiff to attempt to
obtain service over the defendant within a reasonable time may
amount to a failure to prosecute the action, warranting a
dismissal of the case." Crosby v. Avon Prods., Inc., 474 So.
2d 642, 644 (Ala. 1985); see also State v. Horton, 373 So. 2d
1096, 1097 (Ala. 1979) (same). 
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4
"The general rule, of course, is that a court has
the inherent power to act sua sponte to dismiss an
action for want of prosecution. However, because
dismissal ... is such a drastic sanction, it is to
be used only in extreme situations. Accordingly,
this 
Court 
carefully 
scrutinizes 
any 
order
terminating an action for want of prosecution, and
it does not hesitate to set one aside when an abuse
of discretion is found."
Burdeshaw v. White, 585 So. 2d 842, 847 (Ala. 1991). 
III. Analysis
The plaintiffs argue that the trial court exceeded its
discretion by dismissing their case for lack of service of
process when the trial court did not give them 14 days' notice
of its intent to dismiss for failure of service of process,
pursuant to Rule 4(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(b) provides:
"If service of the summons and complaint is not made
upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of
the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own
initiative, after at least fourteen (14) days'
notice to the plaintiff, may dismiss the action
without prejudice as to the defendant upon whom
service was not made or direct that service be
effected within a specified time; provided, however,
that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the
failure to serve the defendant, the court shall
extend the time for service for an appropriate
period."
(Emphasis added.) Rule 4(b) was taken from Rule 4(m), Fed. R.
Civ. P., "except for the provision[] for 14 days' notice."
1121223
The federal counterpart to Rule 4(b) allows a federal
1
court to dismiss a case for lack of service "on motion or on
its own after notice to the plaintiff." Rule 4(m), Fed. R.
Civ. P.
5
Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 4 Effective August 1,
2004.1
We have noted that "Rule 4(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., allows
for service of process up to, and in some instances beyond,
120 days after the plaintiff filed its complaint." Ex parte
East Alabama Mental Health-Mental Retardation Bd., Inc., 939
So. 2d 1, 5 n.6 (Ala. 2006) (emphasis added). However, we have
not had the opportunity to construe the 14-day-notice
provision in Rule 4(b). The fundamental rule of construction
for our rules of procedure is that "[t]hese rules shall be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 1(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P. "'[W]hen interpreting a rule of procedure, we must
give the wording of the rule its plain meaning.'" Lewis v.
State, 889 So. 2d 623, 665 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting
J.W. v. State, 751 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)). In
addition, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure "are to be
construed liberally to effect the purpose of the rules." B &
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6
M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667, 674 (Ala. 1979)
(emphasis added). 
The notice provision in Rule 4(b) is unambiguous; we thus
must give the wording of the rule its plain meaning and give
effect to the clear purpose of the rule. Hogan, 376 So. 2d at
674. We agree with  the Court of Civil Appeals that "[t]he
obvious purpose of the notice requirement [of Rule 4(b)] is to
give the plaintiff an opportunity to show 'good cause' to
extend the time for service." Moffett v. Stevenson, 909 So. 2d
824, 826-27 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). See also Moore v. Alabama
Dep't of Corr., 60 So. 3d 932, 934 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)
(noting that 14-days' notice gives "opportunity to present
good 
cause 
for 
the 
failure 
to 
perfect 
service" 
and
"opportunity to request additional time in which to perfect
service"). 
On November 1, 2012, the plaintiffs attempted to effect
service through certified mail. On February 12, 2013, with the
120-day deadline for completing service approaching, the
certified-mail receipt was returned, unclaimed. On May 3,
2013, over 180 days after filing suit, the plaintiffs
attempted to effect in-person service through the sheriff's
1121223
7
office. On June 12, 2013, more than 210 days after the
plaintiffs filed suit, the trial court dismissed the case for
lack of service. Under Rule 4(b), the trial court may dismiss
the action after 120 days if a plaintiff fails to perfect
service. 
Standing alone, the plaintiffs' lengthy and unexplained
delay might warrant the involuntary dismissal for lack of
service pursuant to Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (permitting
involuntary dismissal "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of
court"). However, the trial court did not dismiss the
plaintiffs' action pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to
prosecute. Under Rule 4(b), a failure to effect service within
120 days does not, alone, warrant summary dismissal absent at
least 14 days' notice. From our review of the record, we find
no indication that the trial court provided any notice at all
to the plaintiffs before dismissing the action pursuant to
Rule 4(b).
We hold, therefore, that a trial court is required to
give plaintiffs at least 14 days' notice before dismissing an
action against a defendant on whom service was not effected.
1121223
We recognize that the Moore court held that the 14-day
2
notice may be provided by an opposing party's filings. See
Moore, 60 So. 3d at 933-34 ("[T]he rule does not specifically
prescribe a method by which such notice must be given. ...
Moore had received the requisite notice in the form of [a]
motion to dismiss."). No facts in this case provided such
constructive notice, so we give no opinion as to the Court of
Civil Appeals' interpretation of Rule 4(b) in Moore. 
8
See Rule 4(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.;  Moffett, 909 So. 2d at 826
("[T]he trial court is required to give the plaintiff 14 days'
notice before it dismisses an action against the defendants on
whom service was not effected." (emphasis added)); and Moore,
60 So. 3d at 933 ("[T]he text of the rule does require notice
of a dismissal for a failure to timely serve a defendant.").2
The trial court erred when it dismissed the action
without giving at least 14 days' notice to the plaintiffs that
their case was subject to dismissal for failure to effect
service. We reverse the order of dismissal and remand the case
for 
further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion,
including giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to show good
cause to extend the time for service. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., dissent.
1121223
9
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
The main opinion reverses the trial court's order of
dismissal 
because 
it 
concludes that the 14-day-notice
requirement of Rule 4(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., was not met.  Rule
41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., however, expresses no such 14-day-
notice requirement in providing that "[f]or failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules" the trial
court may order the involuntary dismissal of a complaint.
Nothing in the language of Rule 41(b) or Rule 4(b) indicates
that Rule 41(b) could not apply in a case such as this.
Indeed, Rule 41(b), which by its terms does not differentiate
between dismissals with prejudice and dismissals without
prejudice, remains the only way in which a dismissal "with
prejudice" can be achieved for an undue delay in service of a
complaint.  Because the rules provide no definition of the
phrase used in Rule 41(b), "failure ... to prosecute," whether
the plaintiff's delay in accomplishing service has been long
enough to warrant a dismissal under Rule 41(b) is subject to
dispute in any given case.  Rule 4(b) appears to be merely an
attempt to provide some structure to the analysis, creating a
presumption that 120 days is long enough, at least for
1121223
10
purposes of a dismissal without prejudice.  In the present
case, of course, the delay went well beyond the 120-day mark,
and dismissal, for all that appears, was warranted under
either Rule 4(b) or Rule 41(b).  
The main opinion bases its conclusion on the notion that
the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' action under only
Rule 4(b), however.  I find no support for this conclusion in
the trial court's order or elsewhere in the record.  Among
other things, the trial court did not cite Rule 4(b) as the
basis for its order.  If the trial court's order was
authorized by any rule of procedure, then it was authorized.
Given the length of time during which the plaintiffs failed to
serve the complaint, the limited efforts at such service in
relation to that length of time, and the absence of any
compelling reason for that delay expressed by the plaintiffs
in any of their filings, I believe the trial court acted
within its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the
authority of Rule 41(b).
Aside from the foregoing, the sequence of events in this
particular case, including the trial court's reconsideration
on two occasions of its order of dismissal more than 14 days
1121223
11
after being requested by the plaintiffs to do so, appears to
satisfy even the prerequisite in Rule 4(b) of 14 days' notice
prior to a dismissal. 
Shaw, J., concurs.