Title: RCA Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brockton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12619
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2019

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SJC-12619 
 
RCA DEVELOPMENT, INC., & another1  vs.  ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS 
OF BROCKTON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 7, 2019. - May 1, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Subdivision Control, Approval not required, Plan.  Practice, 
Civil, Summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
December 16, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Mark Bobrowski for the defendant. 
 
Scott W. Kramer for the plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  We are called upon to determine whether a 
building permit should have been issued for a lot in Brockton.  
                     
 
1 Michelle Annese. 
2 
 
 
In 1964, the lot at issue was part of a lot that was divided in 
half by its owner in two separate conveyances without any plan 
presented to the local planning board.  If a division 
constitutes a subdivision, there is a statutory requirement that 
it be approved by the planning board.  The questions we must 
answer are first, whether the 1964 division was a subdivision 
under the subdivision control law and Brockton's zoning 
ordinance, and if not, was there a requirement that the division 
be approved by the planning board nonetheless.  Because we agree 
with the Land Court judge's determination that the division of 
the lot was not a subdivision and that the owners were not 
otherwise required to seek any planning board action, we affirm. 
 
Background.  We present the undisputed facts found by the 
Land Court judge. 
 
In 1937, a plan of land in Brockton that was divided into 
lots was recorded in the Plymouth registry of deeds.  Lot 46 was 
located south of lot 45 and north of lot 47.  In 1964, the owner 
of lot 46 conveyed the northern half of the lot to the owner of 
lot 45, and southern half of the lot to the owner of lot 47, 
which is the property at issue here (the locus).  Each half of 
lot 46 had 57.5 feet of frontage on Braemoor Road, and was 
approximately 141 feet deep, with a square footage of 8,132. 
 
The transfer of the locus was recorded.  The next year, lot 
47 and the locus were conveyed in a deed that was recorded and 
3 
 
 
differentiated between "[t]he southerly half of lot 46, and all 
of lot 47."  The boundaries of the two lots were described 
individually.  These transfers were subject to the 1963 Brockton 
zoning ordinance (which was replaced by the current Brockton 
zoning ordinance in 1968).  Houses have been built on lots 45 
and 47, with addresses on Braemoor Road. 
 
The locus, along with lot 47, was conveyed several times 
between 1965 and 2016, when it was conveyed to plaintiff 
Michelle Annese.  Annese and plaintiff RCA Development, Inc., 
applied for a permit to construct a house on the locus, which 
the building inspector denied.  The plaintiffs appealed to the 
zoning board of appeals of Brockton (board), which denied their 
appeal on the basis that the locus had merged with lot 47 and 
had therefore lost its "grandfathered" status as buildable under 
the 1963 zoning ordinance.  The plaintiffs appealed from the 
board's decision to the Land Court, where the plaintiffs argued 
that the locus resulted from a division that did not constitute 
a subdivision, and that the legitimacy and buildability of lot 
46 should be considered under the 1963 zoning ordinance, which 
was in effect at the time of the division.  The board countered 
that the lot was unbuildable because the division of the lot did 
not comply with the subdivision control law, and that the 1963 
zoning ordinance should no longer apply because the locus merged 
with lot 47 due to common ownership. 
4 
 
 
 
The parties submitted a joint statement of agreed-upon 
facts in the Land Court and filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.  A Land Court judge reversed the decision of the 
board, determining that, because each lot that resulted from the 
split of lot 46 had adequate frontage on a public way at the 
time of the division,2 it did not constitute a subdivision under 
G. L. c. 41, § 81L.  Therefore, the division of the lot did not 
require the approval of the planning board under G. L. c. 41, 
§ 81O.  In addition, the judge determined that although the 
owner of lot 46 could have sought the planning board's 
endorsement of the division through an "approval not required" 
(ANR) plan, the owner was not required to do so.  Therefore, his 
failure to seek such endorsement did nothing to invalidate the 
division.  See G. L. c. 41, § 81P (no requirement to submit ANR 
plan if division is not subdivision).3 
                     
 
2 As Braemoor Road was an existing way at the time of the 
division, Section 11C of the 1963 zoning ordinance required 
there be at least fifty feet of street frontage and eighty feet 
of depth when the original lot had a frontage of less than 140 
feet. 
 
 
3 The issue of merger also was before the Land Court.  The 
Land Court judge determined that the lots did not merge, because 
although G. L. c. 40A, § 6, provides that lots rendered 
nonconforming by a new zoning ordinance will receive 
"grandfather" protection only if "not held in common ownership 
with any adjoining land," the Brockton zoning ordinance is more 
forgiving.  Section 27-12 of the zoning ordinance provides that 
a single-family home may be constructed on "any existing lot of 
record," even if nonconforming, so long as it meets certain 
requirements.  Notably, the locus met requirements that the 
5 
 
 
 
Discussion.  We review the allowance of a motion for 
summary judgment de novo, considering the facts "in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom judgment entered."  
Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 
376 (2019), quoting 81 Spooner Rd., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 
of Brookline, 461 Mass. 692, 699 (2012).  Where, as here, the 
judge's decision is based on undisputed material facts, we will 
uphold the summary judgment decision so long as "the ruling was 
correct as a matter of law."  Bellalta, supra, quoting M.P.M. 
Bldrs., LLC v. Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 89 (2004). 
 
The board argues that the Land Court judge erred in 
determining that the division of lot 46 did not require a 
subdivision plan, and that references to subdivisions in G. L. 
c. 41, § 81O, should be read to apply to both divisions and 
subdivisions.  We conclude that the plain language of the 
underlying statutes and the 1963 Brockton zoning ordinance make 
clear that the division of lot 46 did not constitute a 
subdivision and therefore was proper despite no plan being 
submitted to the planning board. 
                     
adjacent, commonly-owned lot was not vacant and the locus had 
more than fifty feet of frontage and a total area of greater 
than 5,000 square feet.  Therefore, the judge determined that 
the locus received grandfather protection because it conformed 
with the 1963 zoning ordinance, in place at the time lot 46 was 
divided, and was accordingly not subject to the merger doctrine.  
The board does not challenge the Land Court judge's decision as 
it relates to merger. 
6 
 
 
The subdivision control law, enacted in 1953, applies to 
every municipality in the Commonwealth that accepts it other 
than Boston.  See G. L. c. 41, § 81N; St. 1953, c. 674, § 7.  
Under G. L. c. 41, § 81O, "No person shall make a subdivision of 
any land in any city or town in which the subdivision control 
law is in effect unless he has first submitted to the planning 
board of such city or town for its approval of a plan of such 
proposed subdivision." 
Under Section 81L, certain divisions of land are excluded 
from the definition of "subdivision" including, insofar as 
relevant here, a division that leaves every resultant lot with 
sufficient frontage on a public way to satisfy the local zoning 
ordinance then in place does not constitute a subdivision.4 
                     
4 General Laws, c. 41, § 81L, provides: 
 
"'Subdivision'" shall mean the division of a tract of land 
into two or more lots and shall include resubdivision, and, 
when appropriate to the context, shall relate to the 
process of subdivision or the land or territory subdivided; 
provided, however, that the division of a tract of land 
into two or more lots shall not be deemed to constitute a 
subdivision within the meaning of the subdivision control 
law if, at the time when it is made, every lot within the 
tract so divided has frontage on (a) a public way or a way 
which the clerk of the city or town certifies is maintained 
and used as a public way, or (b) a way shown on a plan 
theretofore approved and endorsed in accordance with the 
subdivision control law, or (c) a way in existence when the 
subdivision control law became effective in the city or 
town in which the land lies, having, in the opinion of the 
planning board, sufficient width, suitable grades and 
adequate construction to provide for the needs of vehicular 
traffic in relation to the proposed use of the land 
7 
 
 
 
It is undisputed that both the locus and the northern half 
of lot 46 each had 57.5 feet of frontage on Braemoor Road, a lot 
depth of 141 feet, and a total area of 8,132 square feet.  At 
the time of the division, § 11C of the Brockton zoning ordinance 
required lots to have a minimum of fifty feet of frontage on an 
existing public way and a depth of eighty feet, so long as the 
original lot's frontage was not longer than 140 feet.  Because 
the locus satisfied the zoning requirements at the time of its 
creation, the division of lot 46 was not a subdivision under the 
plain language of G. L. c. 41, § 81L.  Therefore, it did not 
require planning board approval under G. L. c. 41, § 81O. 
 
The board next argues that the Land court judge erred when 
he determined that the owner of lot 46 in 1964 was not required 
                     
abutting thereon or served thereby, and for the 
installation of municipal services to serve such land and 
the buildings erected or to be erected thereon.  Such 
frontage shall be of at least such distance as is then 
required by zoning or other ordinance or by-law, if any, of 
said city or town for erection of a building on such lot, 
and if no distance is so required, such frontage shall be 
of at least twenty feet.  Conveyances or other instruments 
adding to, taking away from, or changing the size and shape 
of, lots in such a manner as not to leave any lot so 
affected without the frontage above set forth, or the 
division of a tract of land on which two or more buildings 
were standing when the subdivision control law went into 
effect in the city or town in which the land lies into 
separate lots on each of which one of such buildings 
remains standing, shall not constitute a subdivision 
(emphasis added)."  
8 
 
 
to submit an ANR plan, in accordance with G. L. c. 41, § 81P, 
for the division to be legitimate.  We disagree. 
 
Section 81P provides a procedure for an individual to 
submit an ANR plan to a planning board: 
"Any person wishing to cause to be recorded a plan of land 
situated in a city or town in which the subdivision control 
law is in effect, who believes that his plan does not 
require approval under the subdivision control law, may 
submit his plan to the planning board of such city or town 
in the manner prescribed in section eighty-one T, and, if 
the board finds that the plan does not require such 
approval, it shall forthwith, without a public hearing, 
endorse thereon or cause to be endorsed thereon by a person 
authorized by it the words 'approval under subdivision 
control law not required'" (emphasis added). 
 
 
The board argues that the Land Court judge erred in 
determining that § 81P is permissive, contending instead that it 
creates a mandate that an ANR plan be submitted to a planning 
board before any division of land.  This argument is grounded in 
the legislative intent behind the subdivision control law, which 
the board asserts suggests that all divisions of land should be 
approved by a planning board to prevent "wild deeds."  However, 
"where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent."  Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 
Mass. 174, 178 (2019), quoting Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 
Mass. 586, 594 (2018).  Section 81P is clear:  a person 
believing the land they seek to divide would not constitute a 
subdivision has the option to present an ANR plan to the local 
planning board.  There is nothing ambiguous about the statute's 
9 
 
 
use of the words "wishes" and "may."  "The use of the word 'may' 
in a statute is generally permissive, reflecting the 
Legislature's intent to grant discretion or permission to make a 
finding or authorize an act."  Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 
555, 558 (2014).  See School Comm. of Greenfield. v. Greenfield 
Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 81 (1982) ("It is axiomatic in 
statutory construction that the word 'shall' is an imperative 
and that the word 'may' does not impose a mandate but simply 
authorizes an act").  Here, there is was no requirement to file 
an ANR plan for the division of lot 46 to be legitimate.5 
 
As the locus met all other requirements that existed at the 
time for a proper division of land, we conclude that the denial 
of a building permit for the locus was in error.  The decision 
and order of the Land Court reversing the board's decision and 
granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
5 The board's argument essentially is, regardless of whether 
the locus was created as part of a division or a subdivision, 
planning board action was required under either § 81O or § 81P, 
for that division of land to be proper.  For the reasons stated 
above, we reject that argument.  Had we agreed, the board asked 
us to add the words "division or" before all mentions of 
subdivision in § 81O.  Because we have rejected the underlying 
argument, this question need not be addressed.