Title: Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-2044
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC00-2044
____________
AMENDMENT TO THE RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, 
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.350.
[March 6, 2003]
PARIENTE, J.
We consider once again proposed Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.350,
Placement of Child into Residential Treatment Center after Adjudication of
Dependency, submitted to this Court by the Juvenile Court Rules Committee (the
committee).  See Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P.
8.350, 804 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2001).  We begin by providing the pertinent
background.  
The process that has lead to our final promulgation of rule of procedure
8.350 began with our consideration of M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000), a
case involving the commitment of a dependent child to a locked residential mental
health treatment facility against the child's wishes.  In M.W., this Court considered
2
whether an evidentiary hearing that complied with the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Baker Act was required before a court could order a dependent
child in the temporary legal custody of the Department of Children and Family
Services (the department) to be placed into residential treatment.  We ultimately
found that an evidentiary hearing that complied with the Baker Act was not
required, see id. at 106, but stated:
[T]he procedures that the dependency court must follow before
residential treatment is ordered should be clearly set forth for the
guidance of dependency court judges, the Department and the parties
to the dependency proceeding. As stated above, at a minimum, these
procedures should include a hearing in which the child has a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, we direct  
that the Juvenile Court Rules Committee submit to this Court no later
than June 30, 2000, proposed rules that will set forth the procedures to
be followed by the dependency court when the Department of
Children and Families seeks an order committing a dependent child to
a residential facility for mental health treatment. The Committee shall
give due regard to both the rights of the child and the child's best
interests.
Id. at 109 (emphasis supplied).
The committee subsequently submitted proposed rule 8.350 to this Court. 
The committee's rule provided for notification to the dependency court and all
parties within seventy-two hours of the child's placement in a residential mental
health facility.  Regarding appointment of counsel, the rule provided discretion to
the court in determining whether to appoint counsel for the child.  The proposed
3
rule provided for the first hearing to take place within five days of the court
receiving notice of placement, and it constituted a status conference at which the
child was not required to be present.  A minority of the committee disagreed with
the committee's proposed rule and submitted a minority report detailing the reasons
why the appointment of an attorney should not be discretionary and pointing out
other concerns with the rule.
In Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 804
So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2001), this Court published a modified rule that differed from the
committee's proposed rule in two ways.  First, the Court's rule mandated the
appointment of counsel when the child objected to placement in a residential mental
health treatment facility.  See id. at 1212.  In deciding to make counsel mandatory
when the child objected to placement, the Court stated:
[W]e recognize the strong policy reasons raised by the comments in
favor of appointment of an attorney for a dependent child in order to
ensure that the child has a meaningful opportunity to be heard (e.g.,
the importance of an attorney-client privileged relationship between the
child and counsel, and the therapeutic benefits that representation
would provide to the child). We also anticipate that among the benefits
from the attorney's advocacy for the child may be a determination that
the child's best interests will in fact be served by an alternative less
restrictive placement. This will not only benefit the child but the
system.
Id.  The second difference between the committee's rule and the Court's proposed
4
rule is that the Court's rule incorporated a precommitment hearing.  See id. at 1213. 
The Court noted that a precommitment hearing would "enhance the child's
perception that he or she has a voice and that his or her stated interests are being
considered in determining whether placement is in the child's best interests and
whether the placement is the least restrictive alternative available."  Id. at 1214.  In
proposing these changes, we noted that incorporating counsel and a
precommitment hearing into the proceedings would not be inconsistent with section
39.407(5), Florida Statutes (2001), which lists the procedures the department must
follow in order to place a child who is under the legal custody of the department in
a residential treatment center.  We concluded that these additional safeguards would
"complement the procedures set out by the Legislature."  Id. 
Due to the changes to the committee's proposed rule, this Court "determined
that it is preferable to publish [the] proposed substitute rule for additional comment
in The Florida Bar News so [the Court] can hear from all interested persons prior
to making a final decision as to the rule's adoption."  Id. at 1212 (footnote omitted).
 After the Court published its proposed rule for comment, the committee reported
back to this Court, providing comments and suggesting revisions to the Court's
proposed rule.  We received comments and heard from all interested persons in
oral argument. 
1.  The Legislature amended section 39.407(5), Florida Statutes, in 2002. 
See ch. 2002-219, § 3, Laws of Fla.  We have reviewed the amendments to section
39.407(5) and conclude that incorporating a precommitment hearing into rule 8.350
would not be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
5
After reviewing the committee's proposed revisions, considering the
comments to this Court's proposed rule and to the revisions proposed by the
committee, and hearing oral argument, we adopt rule 8.350 and approve all of the
committee's changes to the Court's proposed rule.  We further add an additional
subdivision to the rule, rule 8.350(a)(10), as discussed below.
We start our analysis by observing that all who commented in the instant
proceedings and appeared at oral argument undoubtedly care about and want what
is best for Florida's children.  We commend each commentator for actively and
vocally advocating for what he or she believed would best serve and protect
dependent children who face placement in a residential mental health treatment
facility.  
Having carefully considered the arguments in support of and against the rule
as proposed by this Court, we conclude that a rule governing the involuntary
placement of children in residential treatment should incorporate both a
precommitment hearing and appointment of counsel for a child when that child
objects to residential placement.1  
2.  We stress that rule 8.350 does not address the issue of counsel for
children in all dependency proceedings.
6
Rule 8.350 will standardize the procedures to be followed by trial courts
before a child is placed against his or her will in a residential treatment facility.2  The
adoption of this rule is necessary to implement our conclusion in M.W. that the
commitment process must afford due regard to both the rights of the child and the
child's best interests.  See M.W., 756 So. 2d at 109.  Further, these additional
procedures are safeguards that will provide the child with the "meaningful
opportunity to be heard," which we concluded in M.W., 756 So. 2d at 108, was the
minimum required to comply with due process and to ensure that commitment to a
residential facility is the least restrictive treatment alternative for the child.
Our decision to adopt a rule that requires the appointment of counsel when
the child objects to placement is consistent with the recommendations made in the
final report of The Florida Bar's Commission on the Legal Needs of Children (the
commission), which studied issues relating to the representation of children over a
three-year period.  In its report, issued in June 2002, the commission recommended
that counsel be mandatory for children in cases where the State seeks commitment
of dependent children to residential mental health treatment facilities. 
The greatest concern expressed by commentators opposed to the
3.  The majority of these children were between 13 and 16 years of age, with
less than 10% under the age of 10 at the time of the commitment.  During these
years there were no children under the age of 5 in residential treatment.
7
appointment of counsel and a precommitment hearing is that there will not be
enough attorneys available to represent dependent children who object to
placement.  These commentators fear that children who are in dire need of
residential treatment will suffer while the court spends days or even weeks
searching for an attorney to represent these children.  We conclude that this fear is
unfounded.  
The children the department seeks to commit to a residential facility
constitute a small percentage of the total number of dependent children.  The
department's February 15, 2002, response to this Court's request for information,
indicates that 392 and 518 dependent children were placed in residential treatment
during fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, respectively.3  Some of these
children had attorneys appointed by the trial court to represent them, as did the
child in M.W. 
Further, there are multiple sources of experienced attorneys that can be
tapped by judges to represent children in rule 8.350 proceedings.  First, there are
legal services and legal programs throughout the State that could provide
8
representation to children.  Second, there are also five law schools in the state that
run clinical programs specializing in advocacy for children.  Graduates of these
clinical programs have had extensive training in children's law and are located
throughout the State.  In addition, the Florida Bar Commission on the Legal Needs
of Children submitted an appendix with its comments demonstrating that there are
attorneys with dependency training and experience in each of the department's
districts.  Attorneys who have filed comments indicate that there is a source of
attorneys throughout the State who, if necessary, are available to provide
representation on a pro bono basis.  Although pro bono representation should be
the exception, not the rule, when it comes to representation of children, we note
that Florida's Rules of Professional Conduct expressly state that attorneys in good
standing with the Bar have a professional responsibility to render legal services to
the poor.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-6.1.  We are aware that some attorneys
seeking to reach the aspirational twenty-hour goal of pro bono legal service
accomplish this goal by representing children in dependency proceedings.  
Finally, regarding potential sources of funding, several commentators pointed
out that during the 2002 legislative session the Florida Legislature appropriated, and
Governor Bush approved, $7.5 million to Guardian Ad Litem programs for
representation of children in chapter 39 proceedings.  See Ch. 2002-394, § 7, at
4.  The proviso to this appropriation contains the following language:
Funds and positions are provided from General Revenue in
Specific Appropriation 3201 through 3218 to enable the Guardian Ad
Litem programs to provide "best interest representation" of children
involved in dependency proceedings.  Services shall be provided by
Guardian Ad Litem staff, attorneys and trained volunteers using the
Osceola County model currently operating in the Ninth Judicial Circuit
Attorney Ad Litem Pilot Project. . . .  The chief judges and/or trial
court administrator of each judicial circuit may only contract for legal
services to assist a Guardian Ad Litem program to provide best
interest representation for a child or only under those circumstances
when a judge determines it is in the best interests of a child to be
represented by an attorney.  Guidelines for the appointment of
attorneys for children should be developed, including appropriate
standards of practice for attorneys who represent children, to
implement these appropriations.
Id. at 4613.  The statute governing the Ninth Judicial Circuit Attorney Ad Litem
Pilot Project provides that "[t]he attorney ad litem's representation shall be limited
to proceedings under this chapter only."  § 39.4086(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2002). 
9
4613-15, Laws of Fla.4  Chapter 39 governs proceedings related to children and
section 39.407(5) specifically governs proceedings related to the placement of
dependent children into residential treatment facilities.  Thus, it is possible that a
portion of the funding appropriated by the Legislature and approved by Governor
Bush could be used as a source to pay those attorneys who are appointed to
represent dependent children in rule 8.350 proceedings as mandated by this rule.
In light of the foregoing, we do not believe that there will be a shortage of
10
attorneys who are experienced and willing to represent dependent children. 
However, even if the worst-case scenario of an attorney not being available to
represent a dependent child arises, the proposed rule has an express exception,
which provides that if the child's condition is so severe that he or she will be
harmed by waiting for a placement hearing, the court may order placement
immediately.  See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350(a)(5).  Thus, the child's mental health is not
compromised under the rule.   
Further, we have added an additional procedural precaution through
subdivision (a)(10).  This subdivision allows the court to hold a precommitment
hearing in the absence of counsel for the child when the trial court determines that
counsel for the child is not immediately available and the trial court determines that
the child will be harmed if the hearing is postponed.  However, if the court
determines that a hearing is necessary under this subdivision, the child must be
present at the hearing and the court must afford the child an opportunity to be
heard (unless the court determines that the child’s mental or physical condition is
such that a court appearance is not in the child’s best interest).  Affording the child
the opportunity to speak in the absence of counsel will serve the aforementioned
goals of providing the court with the maximum information possible and the child
with the assurance that he or she is being listened to and that his or her opinion
11
counts.  The proposed rule provides that, even if counsel is not available at the time
of the hearing, counsel should be appointed as soon as practical thereafter with a
provision for an additional hearing. 
Accordingly, we adopt new Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.350 as reflected in
the appendix to this opinion.  We thank the committee and all the individuals who
filed comments with this Court.  The new rule shall become effective immediately. 
In adopting this rule, we express no opinion as to its constitutionality.  As all of the
language is new, we forego the usual underlining and strike-through type format.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
HARDING, Senior Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS NEW RULE.
HARDING, Senior Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the adoption of the provisions of new Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.350, with one exception.  In my earlier concurring opinion in this case,
I expressed concern that dependent children who are involuntarily placed in
treatment facilities under section 39.407(5), Florida Statutes (2002), are given less
5.  §§ 394.451-.4789, Fla. Stat (2002).
12
protection than children who are civilly committed under the Baker Act.5  See
Amendment to Rules of Juv. Procedure, 804 So. 2d 1206, 1215 (Fla. 2001)
(Harding, J., concurring).  While the Baker Act requires appointment of a public
defender to represent a person who is the subject of an involuntary commitment
petition, see § 394.467(4), Fla. Stat. (2002), there is no provision in section
39.407(5) for appointment of counsel.  I urged the committee and any other
interested parties to comment on this disparity.
The comments received and the majority opinion here take the position that
appointing counsel for dependent children facing involuntary commitment is a good
idea to ensure that a dependent child has adequate protection and to ensure that the
child feels that he or she is being listened to and is being treated fairly.  While I
agree with this position, the majority sets forth no constitutional or statutory basis
for requiring that counsel be appointed.  Absent reliance upon such a basis, I do
not think this Court has the authority, by rule, to require trial judges to appoint
counsel for dependent children facing commitment to treatment facilities.  Cf. State
v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969) ("The rules adopted by the Supreme
Court are limited to matters of procedure, for a rule cannot abrogate or modify
13
substantive law.").
In addition, there are no statutory provisions for compensation of counsel
appointed pursuant to the rule adopted by the majority.  While section 39.0134,
Florida Statutes (2002), provides that counties are to pay for court-appointed
counsel for dependent children, this section applies only to counsel entitled to
compensation "pursuant to a court appointment in a dependency proceeding
pursuant to this chapter."  § 39.0134(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).  The precommitment
hearing required by the rule is not a "dependency proceeding" pursuant to chapter
39, Florida Statutes (2002), nor could a court appointment pursuant to the rule be
considered a court appointment pursuant to chapter 39.  Thus, this section does
not apply.
Nor does there appear to be any other applicable statutory provision for
compensation of attorneys appointed pursuant to the rule adopted by the majority. 
Section 29.001, Florida Statutes (2002), which requires counties to fund the costs
of court-appointed counsel, expressly defines court-appointed counsel as "counsel
appointed to ensure due process in criminal and civil proceedings in accordance
with state and federal constitutional guarantees."  § 29.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).  As
noted above, the majority has identified no constitutional basis for mandating
counsel in these cases; thus, this section does not apply.  Nor would section
14
925.036, Florida Statutes (2002), apply, as it provides compensation only for
counsel appointed in death cases and as special assistant public defenders.
Accordingly, I urge the Legislature to consider and rectify the disparity in
statutory protections afforded to dependent children facing involuntary
commitment under section 39.407(5) and children civilly committed under the
Baker Act by amending section 39.407(5) to provide for the appointment and
compensation of counsel.  Until such time, I simply do not believe this Court can,
by rule, require the appointment of counsel in these cases. 
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I continue to dissent to the adoption of this rule for the same reasons
expressed in my dissent in Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R.
Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2001).
The majority has now adopted a rule, which in material part was rejected by a
vote of eighteen to seven by the committee which had the responsibility to first
review this rule.  As I stated in my earlier opinion, I have serious concerns about
the practical ramifications of the rule that the majority now adopts in respect to the
court-mandated counsel.  I know of no authority for this Court to mandate the
appointment of counsel by rule when there is no constitutional or statutory
15
requirement for counsel.  The majority has no evidentiary support for its statement,
“There are multiple sources of experienced attorneys that can be tapped by judges
to represent children in rule 3.850 proceedings.”  Majority op. at 6.  Nor does the
majority have any sources of funds to pay such attorneys.  Clearly, money
appropriated by the Legislature for the guardian ad litem program cannot be
properly redirected from that program without legislative approval.
I am concerned that this rule will be an overwhelming and frustrating burden
for the dependency court judges, who will have an ongoing responsibility to search
for attorneys in order to comply with this rule.  A comparable situation was in the
early 1980s when this Court attempted to find counsel for defendants in
postconviction capital cases by recruiting a group of pro bono lawyers to perform
these services.  That became a great burden for the Court and the Bar, and
frustrated the process due to the failure to obtain qualified counsel for all of those
defendants through such a program.
I believe the lesson from that experience was that the only effective way that
counsel can be made available is through the cooperation of the legislative and
executive branches of state government for these types of situations.  To date,
neither of the other branches have been convinced of the need for such counsel.
Furthermore, I do not believe that mandating attorneys and then providing
16
exceptions, as the majority’s rule does, is an acceptable procedure.  Such an
exception will be the subject of substantial litigation when a court proceeds under it,
since this Court has now adopted a judicially created right to counsel.
Finally, as apparently the legislative and executive branches do, I have a
continuing real question as to the need for this additional lawyer.  There will now be
a mandated court procedure in which the child has a lawyer, the guardian ad litem
has a lawyer, the parents have a lawyer (often each parent has a lawyer), and the
Department of Children and Families has a lawyer—in a situation which is intended
to be nonadversarial.  That does not seem to me the way this should work.
Original Proceeding - Rules of Juvenile Procedure
The Honorable Joel M. Silvershein, Chair, Juvenile Court Rules Committee, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; the Honorable John M. Alexander, Former Chair, Juvenile
Court Rules Committee, St. Augustine, Florida, and John F. Harkness, Jr.,
Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; the Honorable Sandy E.
Karlan, Circuit Judge, Chair for the Florida Bar Commission on the Legal Needs of
Children, Miami, Florida, and Gerard F. Glynn, Associate Professor, Barry
University School of Law, Orlando, Florida, and Rhoda Smith Kibler, Staff
Director, Florida Bar Commission on the Legal Needs of Children, Tallahassee,
Florida; Teresa A. Kramer, Assistant General Counsel, and Theresa Walsh, Chief
Legal Counsel, Department of Children & Families, Tallahassee, Florida;  Deborah
Anne Schroth, Florida Legal Services, Inc., Jacksonville, Florida, and Sarah Harriet
Bohr of Bohr and Harrington, LLC, Atlantic Beach, Florida, for the Public Interest
Law Section of The Florida Bar; and Christina A. Zawisza and John M. Ratliff,
Children First Project, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and
Stephen F. Hanlon of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, Florida,
17
Petitioner
The Honorable Joseph P. Farina, Chair, Florida Conference of Circuit Judges,
Miami, Florida; the Honorable Cindy S. Lederman, Administrative Judge of the
Juvenile Division, the Honorable Lester Langer, Associate Administrative Judge of
the Juvenile Division, the Honorable Jeri B. Cohen, Circuit Judge, Juvenile
Dependency Division, and the Honorable William E. Gladston, Senior Judge,
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida; the Honorable Daniel P. Dawson, Chair,
Children's Court Improvement Committee, Kissimmee, Florida; Linda A. Wells,
Florida Department of Children & Families, Tallahassee, Florida, and Charles M.
Auslander, District Administrator, District 11, Florida Department of Children &
Families, Miami, Florida; Xavier Cortada of the Voice Project, the University of
Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic, Miami, Florida; Karen Gievers, Children's
Advocacy Foundation, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida; Carolyn S. Salisbury and
Bernard P. Perlmutter, the University of Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic, Coral
Gables, Florida; Professor Susan Stefan, University of Miami School of Law,
Coral Gables, Florida, and Ira A. Burnim, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,
Washington, D.C.; and Ward L. Metzger, Appellate Coordinator, Public
Defender's Office, Jacksonville, Florida on behalf of Howard H. Babb, Jr., Public
Defender, President, Florida Public Defender Association, Tavares, Florida ; Karen
Gievers, Children's Advocacy Foundation, Tallahassee, Florida; the Honorable
Ronald Alvarez, West Palm Beach, Florida, Professor Kathy Cerminara, Nova
Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the Honorable D. Bruce Levy,
Miami, Florida, the Honorable John T. Parnham, Pensacola, Florida, Dr. Edward
Sczechowicz, Ph.D., Coral Gables, Florida, the Honorable Ginger Lerner Wren,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Professor Bruce J. Winick, University of Miami
School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida; Brent R. Taylor, Advocacy Center for
Persons with Disabilities, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida; Nancy Schleifer, a member of
The Florida Bar, Coconut Grove, Florida; David A. Glant, a member of The
Florida Bar, High Springs, Florida; Frank A. Kreidler, a member of The Florida
Bar, Lake Worth, Florida; Walter Honaman, Team Child Project Attorney and
David Bazerman Dependency Law Project Director, Legal Aid Service of Broward
County, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Florida;  Patrick Farrell, Fort Myers, Florida; Sari
and David Rutt, Fort Myers, Florida; Andrew D. Havens, Jr., Fort Myers, Florida;
and Robert G. Schwartz, Executive Director, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania,
18
Responding
19
APPENDIX
RULE 8.350.
PLACEMENT OF CHILD INTO RESIDENTIAL
TREATMENT CENTER AFTER ADJUDICATION OF
DEPENDENCY
(a)
Placement.
(1)
Any reference in this rule to a residential treatment center is to a
residential treatment center or facility licensed under section 394.875, Florida
Statutes, for residential mental health treatment. Any reference to hospital is to a
hospital licensed under chapter 395, Florida Statutes, for residential mental health
treatment. This rule does not apply to placement under sections 394.463 or
394.467, Florida Statutes.
(2)
The placement of any child who has been adjudicated
dependent for residential mental health treatment shall be as provided by law.
 
(3)
Whenever the department believes that a child in its legal
custody may require placement in a residential treatment center or hospital, the
department shall arrange to have the child assessed by a qualified evaluator as
provided by law and shall file notice of this with the court and all parties.  Upon the
filing of this notice by the department, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for the child, if one has not already been appointed, and may also appoint an
attorney for the child.  Both the guardian ad litem and attorney, if appointed, shall
meet the child and shall have the opportunity to discuss the child's suitability for
residential treatment with the qualified evaluator conducting the assessment. Upon
the completion of the evaluator's written assessment, the department shall provide a
copy to the court and to all parties. The guardian ad litem shall also provide a
written report to the court and to all parties indicating the guardian ad litem's
recommendation as to the child's placement in residential treatment and the child's
wishes.
(4)
If the department seeks to place the child in a residential
treatment center or hospital, the department shall immediately file a motion for
placement of the child with the court.  This motion shall include a statement as to
why the child is suitable for this placement and why less restrictive alternatives are
20
not appropriate and also shall include the written findings of the qualified evaluator.
The motion shall state whether all parties, including the child, are in agreement.
(5)
If the evaluator's written assessment indicates that the child
requires immediate placement in a residential treatment center or hospital and that
such placement cannot wait for a hearing, then the department may place the child
pending a hearing, unless the court orders otherwise.
(6)
The guardian ad litem must be represented by an attorney at all
proceedings under this rule, unless the guardian ad litem is acting as an attorney. If
the department's motion, the guardian ad litem's report, or another party based on
communication with the child indicates that the child does not agree with the
department's motion, then the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the child,
if one has not already been appointed.  
(7)
Upon the filing of a motion for placement, the court shall set the
matter for a status hearing within 48 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. The
department shall timely provide notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing to
all parties and participants.  
(8)
The child's attorney or guardian ad litem shall notify the child of
the date, time, and place of the hearing. No hearing shall proceed without the
presence of the child's guardian ad litem and attorney, unless excused by the court
for good cause shown. Should the hearing occur in the absence of the guardian ad
litem and attorney, upon request the court shall set the matter for an additional
hearing within 24 hours, at which time the attorney and guardian ad litem shall be
present.
(9)
If the child appears at the status hearing not represented by an
attorney, the court shall directly inquire of the child whether he or she disagrees
with the motion for placement. If the child does not appear and is not represented
by an attorney at the status hearing, the court shall diligently pursue all available
information to determine if the child disagrees with the department's motion for
placement. If no party disagrees with the department's motion at the status hearing,
then the motion for placement may be approved by the court.  However, if any
party, including the child, disagrees, then the court shall set the matter for hearing
within 10 working days.
21
(10)
If counsel is not immediately available to represent the child,
and the court determines that the child will be harmed if the hearing on placement is
postponed, then the hearing may be held in the absence of counsel.  The child shall
be present at the hearing unless the court determines pursuant to subdivision (c)
that a court appearance is not in the child's best interest. In such circumstances, the
child shall be provided the opportunity to express his or her views to the court by a
method deemed appropriate by the court. Further, if counsel is not available at the
time of the hearing, counsel shall be appointed as soon as practical thereafter and
the court shall set an additional hearing at which time both counsel and the child
shall be present.
(11)
Hearing on Placement.
(A)
At the hearing, the court shall consider, at a minimum, 
all of the following:
(i)
based on an independent assessment of the child, 
the recommendation of a department representative or 
authorized agent that the residential treatment or 
hospitalization is in the child's best interest and a showing that 
the placement is the least restrictive available alternative;
(ii)
the recommendation of the guardian ad litem;
(iii)
a case review committee recommendation, if there 
has been one;
(iv)
the written findings of the evaluation and 
suitability assessment prepared by a qualified evaluator; and
(v)
the views regarding placement in residential 
treatment that the child expresses to the court.
(B)
All parties shall be permitted to present evidence and 
witnesses concerning the suitability of the placement.
(C)
If the court determines that the child is not suitable for 
22
residential treatment, the court shall order the department to place the 
child in the least restrictive setting that is best suited to meet the 
child's needs.
(b)
Continuing Residential Placement Reviews.
(1)
The court shall conduct a hearing to review the status of the
child's residential treatment plan no later than 3 months after the child's admission
to the residential treatment program.  An independent review of the child's progress
toward achieving the goals and objectives of the treatment plan must be completed
by a qualified evaluator and submitted to the court and all parties in writing at least
72 hours before the 3-month review hearing. 
(2)
Review hearings shall be conducted every 3 months thereafter,
until the child is placed in a less restrictive setting. At each 3-month review hearing,
if the child appears and is not represented by an attorney, the court shall directly
inquire of the child whether he or she disagrees with continued placement. If the
child does not appear and is not represented by an attorney, the court shall
diligently pursue all information available to determine if the child disagrees with
continued placement. If the court determines that the child disagrees with the
continued placement, the court shall appoint an attorney for the child.
(3)
If the court determines at any hearing that the child is not
suitable for continued residential treatment, the court shall order the department to
place the child in the least restrictive setting that is best suited to meet the child's
needs. 
(c)
Presence of Child. The child shall be present at all court hearings
unless the court finds that the child's mental or physical condition is such that a
court appearance is not in the child's best interest.  In such circumstances, the child
shall be provided the opportunity to express his or her views to the court by a
method deemed appropriate by the court.