Title: Clay County Animal Shelter, Inc. v. Clay County Commission et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190947
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2021

Rel: May 28, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1190947
____________________
Clay County Animal Shelter, Inc.
v.
Clay County Commission et al.
Appeal from Clay Circuit Court
(CV-18-900023)
STEWART, Justice.1
1This case was originally assigned to another Justice on this Court;
it was reassigned to Justice Stewart on February 19, 2020.
1190947
Clay County Animal Shelter, Inc. ("the animal shelter"), appeals
from a judgment entered by the Clay Circuit Court ("the trial court")
declaring Act No. 2018-432, Ala. Acts 2018, to be unconstitutional.  The
parties to this appeal have previously been before this Court in a related
appeal. See Clay Cnty. Comm'n v. Clay Cnty. Animal Shelter, Inc., 283 So.
3d 1218 (Ala.  2019) ("Clay County"). 
Facts and Procedural History
The animal shelter is a nonprofit organization that provides food,
water, medical care, spay and neutering services, and adoption services
for stray and abandoned animals in Clay County. The animal shelter is a
"no-kill" shelter where the animals are humanely cared for until adopted
or transferred to other shelters for eventual adoption. Most of the people
working at the animal shelter are unpaid volunteers.  The animal shelter
incurs numerous expenses associated with operating the shelter and
caring for the animals.   The legislature has sought to provide funding to
the animal shelter with proceeds from the tobacco tax authorized in Clay
County pursuant to § 45-14-244, Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Clay
County). 
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This Court set forth the following in Clay County:
"In  March 2017, the legislature enacted Act No. 2017-65,
Ala. Acts 2017, which provides, in pertinent part:
" 'Section 1. This act shall apply only in Clay
County.
" 'Section 2. (a) The proceeds from the tobacco
tax authorized in Clay County pursuant to Section
45-14-244 of the Code of Alabama 1975, and as
further provided for in Sections 45-14-244.01 to
45-14-244.03, inclusive, and Section 45-14-244.06
of the Code of Alabama 1975, less two percent of
the actual cost of collection, which shall be retained
by the Department of Revenue, shall be distributed
to the Clay County General Fund to be expended as
follows:
" '....
" '(3) Eighteen percent to the Clay County
Animal Shelter. The Clay County Animal Shelter
shall annually report to the county commission
regarding the expenditure of the funds in the
preceding year.
" '....
" 'Section 4. This act shall become effective on
October 1, 2017.'
"In July 2017, the [Clay] [C]ounty [C]ommission and
three individuals (hereinafter referred to collectively as 'the
plaintiffs') initiated an action in the trial court against the
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animal shelter and certain state officials. In their complaint,
the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a judgment,
pursuant to § 6-6-220 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, declaring that
part of Act No. 2017-65 directing an expenditure of a portion
of Clay County's tobacco-tax proceeds to the animal shelter to
be unconstitutional.
"The plaintiffs asserted that Act No. 2017-65 was
improperly enacted without a sufficient number of legislative
votes in violation of Article IV, § 73, Ala. Const. 1901, which
provides:
" 'No appropriation shall be made to any
charitable or educational institution not under the
absolute control of the state, other than normal
schools established by law for the professional
training of teachers for the public schools of the
state, except by a vote of two-thirds of all the
members elected to each house.'
"The plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking a preliminary
injunction to temporarily restrain distribution of Clay County's
tobacco-tax receipts to the animal shelter. The animal shelter
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint.
"The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the
county commission's motion for a preliminary injunction. On
October 26, 2017, the trial court entered an order requiring the
portion of Clay County's tobacco-tax receipts that would be
distributed to the Clay County General Fund to be disbursed
as an expenditure to the animal shelter under Act No. 2017-65
to be paid into the trial-court clerk's office and held in an
escrow account pending the entry of a final judgment. On
January 16, 2018, the trial court conducted a bench trial, at
which only documentary evidence was admitted.
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"At the trial, the county commission argued that Act No.
2017-65 appropriated public funds to the animal shelter and
that, because the animal shelter is a charitable organization
not under the absolute control of the state, the appropriation
was subject to the requirements of § 73, instead of the ordinary
requirements for the passage of bills by the legislature. As
noted above, § 73 requires that applicable appropriations be
approved 'by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to
each house.' It was undisputed that Act No. 2017-65 did not
receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to
each house. The county commission argued that that portion
of Act No. 2017-65 purporting to distribute funds to the Clay
County General Fund to be disbursed to the animal shelter is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
"In March 2018, the legislature enacted Act No.
2018-432, Ala. Acts 2018, 'to amend Section 2 of Act 2017-65
of the 2017 Regular Session, now appearing as Section 45-14-
244.07 of the Code of Alabama 1975, to further provide for the
distribution of the local tobacco tax; and to provide for
retroactive effect.'[2]  In relevant part, Act No. 2018-432
purports to amend § 45-14-244.07 to increase the share of Clay
County's tobacco-tax revenue to be distributed to the Clay
County General Fund to be disbursed to the animal shelter
from 18% to 20%.
"On April 13, 2018, the trial court entered a final
judgment declaring that the county commission had failed to
meet its burden of proving that the challenged portion of Act
No. 2017-65 is unconstitutional. The trial court also ordered
'that the distribution of the proceeds from the tobacco tax
2It is undisputed that the enactment of Act No. 2018-432 satisfied
the requirements of Article IV, § 73, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). 
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authorized in Clay County be immediately distributed in
accordance with Act [No.] 2017-65, or any law superseding or
replacing said Act.' The plaintiffs filed a motion to stay
execution of the trial court's judgment, asserting, among other
things:
" '[The p]laintiffs note [that] the Court's judgment
directs the county to "immediately distribute [the
tobacco-tax proceeds] in accordance with Act [No.]
2017-65, or any law super[s]eding or replacing said
Act." (emphasis added). Although not expressly
stated, the Court's inclusion of "any law
super[s]eding or replacing said Act" appears to
refer to ... Act [No.] 2018-432 ... which purports to
provide retroactive appropriations to the [a]nimal
[s]helter from the County's tobacco tax receipts.
" '....
" '11. [The county commission] will seek a
declaratory judgment that [Act No. 2018-432] is
void, invalid, and unconstitutional ... and therefore,
[the county commission's] appeal of the judgment
in the instant case will be determinative of
whether the funds held in escrow are due to be
released to the [a]nimal [s]helter.'
"The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the
plaintiffs' motion and entered an order providing as follows:
" '[The p]laintiffs' motion to stay the
implementation of Act [No.] 2018-432, pending a
hearing on the merits of [the county commission's]
challenge to said Act is GRANTED.
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" '[The p]laintiffs' request to stay the
implementation of Act [No.] 2017-65 is DENIED.' "
283 So. 3d at 1220-22 (footnotes omitted).
On appeal in Clay County, the Clay County Commission ("the county
commission") argued that the trial court had erred in determining that it
had failed to meet its burden of proving that the provision of Act No.
2017-65 directing that a portion of Clay County's tobacco-tax proceeds be
distributed to the Clay County General Fund to be disbursed to the
animal shelter had received a sufficient number of legislative votes to
become law.  Specifically, the county commission argued that the portion
of Act No. 2017-65 directing that a portion of Clay County's tobacco-tax
proceeds be disbursed to the animal shelter was an appropriation of funds
by the legislature without a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to
each house and, therefore, violated Article IV, § 73, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.).  This Court agreed, holding:
"Legislative appropriations must comply with the
requirements of the Alabama Constitution, including § 73. The
plain meaning of the language in Act No. 2017-65 provides for
an appropriation to the animal shelter of 18% of Clay County's
tobacco-tax proceeds. The animal shelter does not dispute that
it is a 'charitable or educational institution not under the
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absolute control of the state' within the meaning of § 73, nor
does it argue that an appropriation to it would be exempt from
the voting requirements of § 73. Thus, the legislature's
appropriation to the animal shelter had to receive 'a vote of
two-thirds  of all the members elected to each house' to comply
with § 73. It did not. That part of Act No. 2017-65
appropriating 18% of Clay County's tobacco-tax proceeds, i.e.,
Section 2(a)(3), is, therefore, unconstitutional."
Clay County, 283 So. 3d at 1234-35.  This Court reversed the trial court's
judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
As mentioned in Clay County, in March 2018 the legislature enacted
Act No. 2018-432, Ala. Acts 2018, to amend Section 2 of Act No. 2017-65.
Act No. 2018-432 provides:
"ENROLLED,  An Act,
"Relating to Clay County; to amend Section 2 of Act
2017-65 of the 2017 Regular Session, now appearing as Section
45-14-244.07 of the Code of Alabama 1975, to further provide
for the distribution of the local tobacco tax; and to provide for
retroactive effect.
"BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF ALABAMA:
"Section 1. Section 2 of Act 2017-65 of the 2017 Regular
Session, now appearing as Section 45-14-244.07 of the Code of
Alabama 1975, is amended to read as follows: 
" '§ 45-14-244.07.
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" '(a) The proceeds from the tobacco tax
authorized in Clay County pursuant to Section
45-14-244, and as further provided for in Sections
45-14-244.01 to 45-14-244.03, inclusive, and
Section 45-14-244.06, less two percent of the actual
cost of collection, which shall be retained by the
Department of Revenue, shall be distributed to the
Clay County General Fund to be expended as
follows:
" '(1) Thirty-two percent to the Alabama
Forestry Commission to be utilized for fire
protection in the county, as provided in subsection
(b).
" '(2) Twenty percent to the Clay County
Industrial Development Council.
" '(3) Twenty percent to the Clay County 
Animal Shelter. The Clay County Animal Shelter
shall annually  report to the county commission
regarding the expenditure of  the funds in the
preceding year.
" '(4) Thirteen percent to the Clay County 
Commission to be deposited into a special fund in
the county  treasury and, subject to an application
process developed by the county commission,
disbursed to water districts in the  county for the
purpose of installing feeder lines. The county 
commission shall have the authority to develop
guidelines, promulgate rules, and institute an
application process to  provide for the disbursement
of the funds.
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" '(5) Fifteen percent shall be retained in the
Clay  County General Fund to be utilized as are
other county funds.
" '(b) The funds distributed to the Alabama
Forestry  Commission shall be payable on a
quarterly or monthly basis and will be expended
solely for purposes of fire protection, prevention,
and fire safety education in order to encourage a
strong volunteer firefighters' network in Clay
County. The proceeds shall be distributed to
volunteer fire departments in the county as
determined by rules and regulations set up by the
Alabama Forestry Commission and the Clay
County Volunteer Firefighters Association on an
equal basis, share and share alike. None of the
proceeds shall be used for salaries nor to pay
members for any performance of duties associated
with the  department. Any member fire department
which fails to meet the standards and criteria shall
be denied its share of the funding. The association
shall give noncomplying member fire departments
proper notice of all deficiencies and a reasonable
time period to correct the deficiencies before any
funds are denied.'
"Section 2. This act shall become effective on October 1,
2017."
Act No. 2018-432, in part, amended § 45-14-244.07, Ala. Code 1975 (Local
Laws, Clay County), to increase the share of Clay County's tobacco-tax
proceeds to be distributed to the Clay County General Fund to be
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disbursed to the animal shelter from 18% to 20%.  Act No. 2018-432 also
amended § 45-14-244.07 to decrease from 15% to 13% the share of Clay
County's tobacco-tax proceeds to be disbursed to the county commission
for deposit into a special fund for further disbursement to water districts
in Clay County for the purpose of installing feeder lines. 
While Clay County was still pending on appeal, the county
commission,  Donald M. Harris, and Mary M. Wood ("the plaintiffs") sued
the animal shelter seeking a judgment declaring that Act No. 2018-432 
violates of Article IV, § 111.03 and § 95, Ala. Const. of 1901 (Off. Recomp.).
The animal shelter answered the plaintiffs' complaint, and moved the trial
court to lift the stay implementing Act No. 2018-432 and to release the
funds previously ordered by the trial court to be held in escrow.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint for  declaratory relief to seek
a judgment declaring that Act No. 2018-432 also violates "the single-
subject rule" set forth in Article IV, § 45, Ala. Code 1975 (Off. Recomp.). 
 The plaintiffs alleged that Act No. 2018-432 contains more than one
subject because it both alters an existing earmark and simultaneously
appropriates funds to the animal shelter; because it provides for
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appropriations for multiple purposes and to multiple non-State agencies,
i.e., volunteer fire departments and the animal shelter; because the
appropriation to the animal shelter is an additional and distinctive subject
that was not a subject of any prior local acts concerning Clay County's
tobacco tax; and because its title is devoid of any reference to the fact that
it provides an appropriation to the animal shelter.    
On October 7, 2019, the animal shelter filed a counterclaim seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. The animal shelter sought, among other
things, a judgment declaring that Act No. 2018-432, insofar as it
appropriates a portion of Clay County's tobacco-tax proceeds to the animal
shelter, is constitutional. The animal shelter also sought an order
releasing to it the funds previously ordered by the trial court to be held in
escrow by the trial-court clerk.
The animal shelter moved the trial court for a judgment on the
pleadings, contending that Act No. 2018-432 is constitutional and
requesting that it be allowed to access the funds held in escrow by the
trial-court clerk.  The animal shelter argued, among other things, that Act
No. 2018-432 does not violate § 45 because, it asserted, the language in
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the title to the act providing "for the distribution of the local tobacco tax"
is the single subject of Act No. 2018-432 and, it asserted, the additional
language contained in the act that describes how and to whom the tax
proceeds shall be disbursed is related to the subject and necessary to make
the act complete. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a judgment on the
pleadings, contending that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law declaring Act No. 2018-432 to be null, void, and unenforceable
because it violated § 45. 
The trial court entered a judgment finding that Act No. 2018-432
violates § 45 and is "unconstitutional, void and invalid." The trial court
entered a subsequent order denying the animal shelter's motions to lift
the stay and to order the release of the funds held in escrow by the trial-
court clerk.  The animal shelter appealed. This Court granted motions
filed by the State of Alabama and Senator Jimmy Holley, Chair of the
Legislative Council of the Alabama Legislature, to file amicus curiae
briefs in support of the animal shelter. The county commission is the only
plaintiff that filed an appellee's brief with this court.
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Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews constitutional challenges to legislative
enactments applying the de novo standard. Northington v. Alabama Dep't
of Conservation & Nat. Res., 33 So. 3d 560, 564 (Ala. 2009). Acts of the
legislature are presumed to be constitutional. State v. Alabama Mun. Ins.
Corp., 730 So. 2d 107, 110 (Ala. 1998). Accordingly, we approach the
question of the constitutionality of a legislative act " ' "with every
presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain
rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the
government." ' " Monroe v. Harco, Inc., 762 So. 2d 828, 831 (Ala. 2000)
(quoting Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991),
quoting in turn  Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9,
18 So. 2d 810, 815 (1944)). This is so, because "it is the recognized duty of
the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that it is violative of the fundamental law." McAdory, 246 Ala. at 9, 18 So.
2d at 815. The party challenging the constitutionality of an act bears  the
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burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality. Thorn v.
Jefferson Cnty., 375 So. 2d 780, 787 (Ala. 1979).
Discussion
The animal shelter contends that Act No. 2018-432 does not violate
the "single-subject rule" applicable to legislation as mandated by § 45.
Section 45 provides in relevant part that "[e]ach law shall contain but one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general
appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest,
or revision of statutes."  The general aim of the single-subject rule is to
promote transparency, clarity, and accountability in the legislative process
by limiting legislation to one objective. As this Court has stated, the rule
serves three primary purposes. See Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v.
McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 194, 291 So. 2d 306, 308 (1974). See also Opinion
of the Justices No. 215, 294 Ala. 555, 564, 319 So. 2d 682, 691 (1975).
First, it affords the public of reasonable notice of the subject and the
contents of the legislation that is being considered.  Second, the rule
simplifies the legislative process by providing legislators a means to better
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understand the objectives and ramifications of proposed legislation, while
deterring surprise and fraud by the inadvertent passage of provisions
unrelated to the title of the legislation.  Third, the rule prevents
"logrolling," which is "[t]he legislative practice of including several
propositions in one measure or proposed constitutional amendment so
that the legislature or voters will pass all of them, even though these
propositions might not have passed if they had been submitted
separately." Black's Law Dictionary 1129 (11th ed. 2019). 
Consistent with the presumption favoring the validity and
constitutionality of legislation, in reviewing whether legislation violates
the single-subject rule, this Court will accord the legislation a liberal
interpretation without requiring hypercritical exactness or strict
enforcement " 'in such manner as to cripple legislation.' " Knight v. West
Alabama Env't. Improvement Auth., 287 Ala. 15, 22, 246 So. 2d 903, 908
(1971)(quoting Opinion of the Justices No. 174, 275 Ala. 254, 257, 154 So.
2d 12, 15 (1963)).  See also Smith v. Industrial Dev. Bd. of Andalusia, 455
So. 2d 839, 841 (Ala. 1984) ("This Court has always given a liberal
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construction to the provisions of § 45 ...."). Applying a liberal construction
to § 45, this Court has established that "[t]he title of a bill need not specify
every provision contained. The 'one subject' test of [§ 45] is satisfied when
the bill's provisions are all referable to and cognate of the subject of the
bill,"  Opinion of the Justices No. 215, 294 Ala. 555, 564, 319 So. 2d 682,
692 (1975)(citing Boswell v. State, 290 Ala. 349, 276 So. 2d 592 (1973), and
Opinion of the Justices No. 174, supra).  This Court has stated that "[t]he
general rule is that generality or comprehensiveness of the subject is not
a violation of section 45, and that a broad, comprehensive subject justifies
the inclusion of any matter not incongruous or unconnected with the
subject, provided the title is not uncertain or misleading." Harris v. State
ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 103, 151 So. 858, 860 (1933). 
The single-subject rule encompasses two primary requirements of
legislation. Specifically, the legislation must be limited to a single subject
and the single subject must be clearly expressed in the title of the
legislation. See Bagby Elevator & Elec., 292 Ala. at 194, 291 So. 2d at 308.
The animal shelter contends that Act No. 2018-432 is an act that amends
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an existing revenue statute that applies specifically to taxes levied in Clay
County.  The animal shelter argues that, under this Court's precedent, Act
No. 2018-432 contains a single subject pertaining to the earmarking of the
tax revenue and that the title of the act properly expresses that subject.
In support of its proposition that Act No. 2018-432 satisfies both prongs
of the single-subject rule, the animal shelter cites Harris, supra,  Lane v.
Gurley Oil Co., 341 So. 2d 712 (Ala. 1977), and Nachman v. State Tax
Commission, 233 Ala. 628, 173 So. 25 (1937).  
In Harris, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a 1923 act of
the legislature that amended an existing revenue law.  The amendatory
act included provisions to address the escape of taxation by motor-vehicle
owners, and it created the position of deputy tax assessor, whose duty
would be to assess all personal property that was subject to, but had
escaped, taxation.  The title of the amendatory act stated that the subject
of the act included " 'to further provide for the revenue of the State of
Alabama.' " 228 Ala. at 102, 151 So. at 860. The Court held that "further
provision for or an amendment of the state's revenue in its various
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aspects, whether to provide for it or to regulate matters pertaining to it,
or to amend it generally, is one subject and may be so expressed in the
title of an act." 228 Ala. at 104, 151 So. at 861.  Accordingly, the Court
concluded:
"One feature of the act of 1923 here in question provides
the machinery for collecting the ad valorem tax on motor
vehicles, and to prevent them from escaping such tax, and
another creates a deputy tax assessor to assess and collect
escapes of other personal property in aid of other existing
machinery to that end. But they are both for the purpose of
further providing for the revenue of the state as described in
the title, or to amend the state's revenue law, which is the
essence of the title. The act does not therefore violate section
45 of the Constitution by containing two subjects."
Id. The animal shelter contends that, like the amendatory act in Harris,
Act No. 2018-432 amends a revenue statute and, thus, pertains to that
single subject, which was stated in the title of the act.
The animal shelter also contends that Act No. 2018-432 does not
contain more than one subject merely because it provides for more than
one use of the revenue collected.  It argues that because the tobacco-tax
revenue is earmarked for several recipients on a percentage basis, when
the legislature enacted Act No. 2018-432 to amend the revenue statute to
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disburse 20%, rather than 18%, of the tobacco tax proceeds to the animal
shelter, the legislature necessarily had to adjust another share and did so
by decreasing from 15% to 13% the share of tobacco-tax proceeds to be
disbursed to the county commission for further disbursement to the water
districts in Clay County for the purpose of installing feeder lines. In Lane,
341 So. 2d 712, this Court considered the constitutionality of Act No.
1971-1403, Ala. Acts 1971.   The title of that act provided as follows:
" 'To provide for inspection of certain petroleum products,
including those commonly known as gasoline, naphtha, diesel
fuel, kerosene and lubricating oil, that are sold, offered for
sale, used or stored in the State of Alabama; to provide for the
issuance by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries of
permits for selling, offering for sale, storing, or using such
petroleum products and to require the making of applications
for such permits and payment of a permit fee; to authorize the
Board of Agriculture and Industries to establish minimum
standards for such petroleum products; to require compliance
with such standards; to provide for enforcement of this act,
including provisions for maintenance of records and for
labeling, sampling and testing such products, provisions
prohibiting adulteration thereof, and provisions for penalties
for violation of this act; to prohibit the sale, offering for sale,
storage or use in this State of petroleum products not meeting
the said standards; to impose an inspection fee in respect of
each such petroleum product; to provide for the disposition of
such inspection fees and any penalties collected under this act;
to provide that violation of this act constitutes a misdemeanor;
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and to repeal Article 21 of Chapter 1 of Title 2 of the Code of
Alabama of 1940 and subdivision 2 of Article 26 of the said
Chapter 1.' "
Lane, 341 So. 2d 714 (emphasis omitted). The act also provided that the
first $55,000 of the monthly proceeds from the inspection fee would be
disbursed to an agricultural fund and that the remainder would be
disbursed to a road and bridge fund.  Certain oil companies sued the
Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, seeking a judgment declaring
that the act violated the single-subject rule of § 45.  The trial court in
Lane entered a judgment in favor of the oil companies, declaring that the
act violated § 45 because, the court determined,
"while [the act] described in its title as providing for
'inspection fees,' [it]  is in fact a revenue-producing tax
measure because the revenue generated far exceeds what is
necessary to administer the inspection program and the excess
revenue was, by a subsequent act, pledged for payment of
bonds issued by the intervenor, Alabama Highway Authority,
to provide funds for highway construction."  
Lane, 341 So. 2d at 714-15.  In reversing the trial court's judgment
declaring that the act violated § 45, this Court explained:
"We hold that the act does not contain more than one
subject. The one subject is the inspection program. The levying
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and disposition of inspection fees is part and parcel of the
inspection program. ...
"Furthermore, an act does not contain more than one
subject merely because it provides for more than one use of the
revenue collected under the act. Opinion of the Justices [No.
167], 270 Ala. 38, 42, 115 So. 2d 464 (1959). To uphold the trial
court's judgment would unduly handicap the legislature in the
exercise of its legitimate prerogatives and would not serve the
purposes of § 45 in our judgment. Opinion of the Justices [No.
174], 275 Ala. 254, 154 So. 2d 12 (1963)."
341 So. 2d at 715.   
Relying on Nachman, the animal shelter contends that the
disbursements of the tobacco-tax proceeds set out in Act No. 2018-432
constitute earmarking of funds for specific purposes to be expended or
appropriated by the county commission.  The animal shelter and amici
curiae contend that this Court in Clay County, discussed infra, incorrectly
determined that disbursements set out in Act No. 2017-65 were
appropriations for purposes of § 73 of the Constitution, and they invite
this Court to reconsider and overrule that decision. In Nachman, a 1935
act was challenged as violating the single-subject rule.  The title of the act
provided that the legislation was " '[a]n Act to amend an Act entitled "An
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Act to provide for the general revenue of the State of Alabama, approved
July 10, 1935," ...' " Nachman, 233 Ala. at 631, 173 So. at 27.  The original
act imposed a license or privilege tax on certain commercial operators, and
the amendatory act provided that the revenue collected would be
" 'covered into the State Treasury and become a part of the Alabama
Special Educational Trust Fund.' " 233 Ala. at 635, 173 So. at 31. The
appellants in Nachman argued that the amendatory act violated the
single-subject rule of § 45 because it contained two distinct objectives
consisting of a revenue measure and an appropriation for a special
purpose. The Court first concluded that the challenged provisions of the
amendatory act did not constitute an appropriation for purposes of § 71 of
the constitution and that the disbursement set out in the act, instead,
constituted earmarking.  The Court stated: 
"[T]he act does not undertake to make any appropriation
within the meaning of section 71 of the Constitution. It is
undoubtedly within the competence of the Legislature in
levying a tax to provide, in the same bill, into what fund of the
State the tax money when collected shall be paid, whether into
the general fund, or into any special fund. It is but earmarking
(Webster's New International Dictionary, p. 808; 19 Corpus
Juris, p. 852, note 68; 14 Cyc. p. 1131, note 72; 3 Words and
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Phrases, Third Series, p. 113; 17 Am. Digest [Cent. Ed.] page
1704; Bouv. Law Dict. [Rawle's Third Rev.] p. 964) the fund,
thereafter to be expended, on due appropriation, for the
purposes for which the tax was levied and collected. To provide
that certain funds derived from particular sources shall be
paid and used for designated purposes of government is in no
sense an appropriation as contemplated by section 71 of the
Constitution. We do not think there is any merit in either of
these two insistences of the appellants. It is our opinion that
the bill deals with but one subject."
233 Ala. at 634, 173 So. at 30. The Court further noted that, in Harris,
supra, it had committed to the rule that legislation providing for or
regulating revenue laws, or amendments thereto, encompass a single
subject that may be so expressed in the title of the legislation.  Id. The
Court in Nachman, thus, concluded that the amendatory act contained one
subject and did not violate the single-subject rule.
The county commission contends that Act No. 2018-432 violates the
single-subject rule because it reduces the amount of preexisting earmarks 
disbursed to a special fund managed by the county commission relating to
water feeder lines and then appropriates the corresponding amount to the
animal shelter. It contends that, because  Act No. 2018-432 repeals an
earmark and also makes an appropriation of the previously earmarked
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funds, it contains more than one subject and violates § 45. The county
commission relies on this Court's decision in Childree v. Hubbert, 524 So.
2d 336 (Ala. 1988), in support of this proposition.  Before enacting the
legislation at issue in Childree, the legislature had considered proposed
legislation pertaining to appropriations for education, including for
elementary and secondary schools; for junior and technical colleges; for
colleges and universities; for various other state agencies;  and for entities
that were not state agencies but some of which, at least arguably, served
educational purposes.  The legislature sought an advisory opinion from
the members of this Court as to whether the proposed education-
appropriation bill satisfied the § 45 single-subject rule. All nine Justices
opined that the proposed education-appropriation bill satisfied the
single-subject rule because the subject of public education had historically
been treated comprehensively in such appropriation bills.  Opinion of the
Justices No. 323, 512 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 1987).  The Opinion of the Justices
No. 323 stated that no appropriations could be made in the bill to
institutions not controlled by the State. The Justices also expressed
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reservations as to appropriations to State agencies that were not obviously
educational in nature. After this Court issued Opinion of the Justices No.
323, the legislature removed a number of appropriations from the
education-appropriation bill and added them to the general appropriation
bill, which eventually became Act No. 87-715, Ala. Acts 1987.  Act No. 87-
715 directed that appropriations be made from the Alabama Special
Education Trust Fund ("ASETF") to various State entities.   An action was
brought challenging the constitutionality of Act No. 87-715. The trial court
in Childree entered a judgment declaring Act No. 87-715 unconstitutional
insofar as the act appropriated funds from the ASETF to various State
agencies. In holding that any act appropriating ASETF funds other than
as specified in the legislation creating the ASETF would violate the single-
subject rule of § 45, this Court stated:
"[T]he removal or disregard of earmarking is not a matter
properly to be included in an appropriation bill. Presumably,
the earmarking could be removed in a proper single-subject
bill or in a properly constituted revenue bill, but until such an
action is taken, no appropriation bill can appropriate such
funds other than as they were earmarked.
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"The point that earmarking cannot be repealed by an
appropriation bill becomes even clearer when considered in
light of the fact that the earmarking provisions are now
substantive parts of the Code. See, e.g., § 40-1-31[, Ala. Code
1975]. Therefore, disregard of earmarking would violate the
Code, and repeal of earmarking would amend the Code. For
the legislature to either disregard or repeal earmarking in an
appropriation bill would violate § 71 or § 45, for the same
reasons as discussed above regarding revenue bills."
Childree, 524 So. 2d at 341. 
The county commission also contends that, in violation of the single-
subject rule, Act No. 2018-432 purports to be amendatory legislation but,
in effect, constitutes an appropriation to the animal shelter and that the
act simultaneously repeals earmarks of funds to be disbursed to the
county commission for further disbursement to water districts in Clay
County.  The county commission further contends that Act No. 2018-432
appropriates funds to multiple non-State entities, including the animal
shelter, and that the appropriations to those entities are made for
different purposes. The county commission asserts that Clay County
controls and that, pursuant to that decision, this Court should conclude
that the disbursement to the animal shelter ordered in Act No. 2018-432
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constitutes an appropriation.  As noted above, in analyzing whether Act
No. 2017-65, the predecessor to Act No. 2018-432, violated § 73 of the
constitution, this Court in Clay County concluded that the Act No. 2017-
65 included an appropriation to the animal shelter.  This Court stated as
follows concerning the term "appropriation":
 
"At the time § 73 was adopted as part of the Alabama
Constitution in 1901, Black's Law Dictionary defined
'appropriation' as: 
" 'The act of appropriating or setting apart;
prescribing the destination of a thing; designating
the use or application of a fund.  
" 'In public law.  The act by which the
legislative department of government designates a
particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of
the public revenue or the money in the public
treasury, to be applied to some general object of
governmental expenditure, (as the civil service list,
etc.,) or to some individual purchase or expense.'
Black's Law Dictionary 82 (1st ed. 1891)(emphasis added).
"The relevant language of Act No. 2017-65 provides that
Clay County's tobacco-tax proceeds 'shall be distributed to the
Clay County General Fund to be expended as follows' and
directs that 18% of the proceeds be paid to the animal shelter. 
' "Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain
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language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to
mean exactly what it says." '  Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala.
1998)(quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602
So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)).  
" 'Distribute' is defined as: '1. To apportion; to divide
among several.  2. To arrange by class or order.  3. To deliver. 
4. To spread out, to disburse.'  Black's Law Dictionary 576
(10th ed. 2014).  'Expenditure' is defined as: 'The act or process
of spending or using money, time, energy, etc.; esp. the
disbursement of funds.'  Black's Law Dictionary 698 (10th ed.
2014).  The plain meaning of the relevant language used in Act
No. 2017-65 reflects the legislature's intent to distribute, or
deliver, 98% of Clay County's tobacco-tax proceeds from the
State Department of Revenue to the Clay County General
Fund.  Act No. 2017-65 then sets apart a specified portion of
the public revenue or the money in the public treasury,
specifically 18%, to be applied to a particular expenditure or
disbursement, i.e., a payment to the animal shelter.  Thus, the
plain meaning of the relevant language in Act No. 2017-65
reflects an appropriation to the animal shelter."
Clay County, 283 So. 3d at 1230-31. This Court concluded that "the
requirement in Act No. 2017-65 that 18% of Clay County's tobacco-tax
proceeds be disbursed to the animal shelter constitutes an appropriation
within the meaning of § 73. Because Act No. 2017-65 was not approved by
a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, that portion
is, therefore, void." 283 So. 3d at 1234.
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Act No. 2018-432 makes two changes to § 45-14-244.07 regarding the
percentage of tobacco-tax proceeds to be disbursed to the animal shelter
and to a special fund of the county commission. Specifically, Act No.
2018-432 increases the amount of tobacco-tax proceeds to be disbursed to
the animal shelter from 18% to 20% of tobacco-tax proceeds and decreases
the amount of tobacco-tax proceeds to be disbursed to the county
commission for water feeder lines from 15% to 13% of the tobacco-tax
proceeds. Act No. 2018-432 modifies only the disbursement of tobacco-tax
proceeds applicable to Clay County, but, unlike the general appropriation
bill at issue in Childree, which affected numerous existing statutes and
placed limitations on the use of revenue streams for educational
objectives, Act No. 2018-432 does not impact any other earmarks set forth
in other state laws. Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from
Clay County, in which this Court concluded that the pertinent language
of Act No. 2017-65 expending funds to a non-State entity constituted an
"appropriation" within the meaning of § 73. Clay County did not involve
application of the single-subject rule under § 45.  We, therefore, decline to
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apply the reasoning from Clay County to the present case, and we also
decline the invitation of the animal shelter and amici curiae to overrule
that decision. 
Rather, Act No. 2018-432  is akin to the amendatory acts at issue in
Harris and Nachman, because it amends a revenue law, i.e., Act No.
2017-65, to adjust the amount of specific disbursements. Consistent with
this Court's stated commitment in those cases that the amendment of a
revenue law is a single subject, we conclude that Act No. 2018-432
contains a single subject, i.e. the disbursement of tobacco-tax proceeds in
Clay County, and that all the provisions of the act are "part and parcel"
of that one subject. Lane, 341 So. 2d at 715. 
In addition, Act No. 2018-432 unequivocally states within its title
that its purpose is: "Relating to Clay County ... to further provide for the
distribution of the local tobacco tax."  This title is similar to the titles in
the amendatory acts that this Court determined to be valid under § 45 in
Nachman and Harris. See Harris, 228 Ala. at 102, 151 So. at 860
(concluding that the title including the words " 'to further provide for the
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revenue of the State of Alabama' " clearly expressed the subject of the
amendatory act) and Nachman, 233 Ala. at 631, 173 So. at 27(concluding
that the title of the amendatory act indicating that the act " 'provide[d] for
the general revenue of the State' " was sufficient for purposes of § 45).  As
this Court has stated, "[t]he title need not be an index or catalog of every
power bestowed in the act, nor of every effect of the act."  Lane, 341 So. 2d
at 715 (citing Opinion of the Justices No. 138, 262 Ala. 345, 81 So. 2d 277
(1955)).  Thus,  Act No. 2018-432 satisfies the two-part test for
establishing whether legislation complies with § 45, see  Bagby Elevator
& Elec., supra, and the act fulfills the above-stated objectives of the single-
subject rule.  
The animal shelter also contends that the retroactivity clause of Act
No. 2018-432 is also valid.  In declaring the act to be unconstitutional,
however, the trial court rendered no decision on the issue of retroactivity.
As this Court has stated, "it is familiar law that an adverse ruling below
is a prerequisite to appellate review." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Day, 613 So. 2d
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883, 884 (Ala. 1993). Because the trial court has not decided that issue,
this Court will not address it.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's judgment declaring Act No. 2018-432 to
be unconstitutional on the basis that it violates § 45, and we remand the
cause.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Wise and Mitchell, JJ., concur.  
Parker, C.J., concurs specially.  
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.  
Bolin, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., dissent.
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 
While concurring in the main opinion, I write separately in the hope
of shedding light on this Court's cases applying the single-subject rule to
fiscal legislation. By surveying the history of our precedent in this area,
I believe that the analytical quandary that is manifest in today's case will
become more obvious, and the path forward clearer.
The single-subject rule is contained in §§ 45 and 71 of our State
constitution. Section 45 expresses the rule in its application to legislation
in general: "Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue
bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes ...." Art. IV,
§ 45, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). Section 71 articulates the rule in its
specific application to appropriation bills: "The general appropriation bill
shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the
executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the state, for interest
on the public debt, and for the public schools. ... All other appropriations
shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject." Art. IV,
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§ 71, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). These provisions in the 1901
Constitution were carried forward substantially verbatim from the 1875
Constitution. See Art. IV, §§ 2, 32, Ala. Const. 1875; Opinion of Justices
No. 323, 512 So. 2d 72, 75 (Ala. 1987). The substance of the single-subject
rule traces back to the 1865 Constitution. See Art. IV, § 2, Ala. Const.
1865.
For the first few decades of the rule's existence, this Court seems to
have understood its purpose and application with relative consistency. In
1883, Justice George Washington Stone explained "[t]he abuses which
called the [single-subject] provision into existence." Ballentyne v.
Wickersham, 75 Ala. 533, 535 (1883). Writing for the Court, he described
how the rule was designed to correct the abuse of "logrolling":
"Each subject introduced before the legislative department
shall be considered and voted on singly, without associating
with it any other measure to give it strength. Experience had
shown that measures, having no common purpose, and each
wanting sufficient support on its own merits to secure its
enactment, have been carried successfully through legislative
bodies, and become laws, when neither measure could
command the approval of a majority of that body."
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Id. at 535-36. Justice Stone cautioned, however, that the rule's
"requirements are not to be exactingly enforced, or in such manner as to
cripple legislation." Id. at 536. Rather, the concept of a single "subject"
must be understood broadly:
"[W]hen the subject is expressed in general terms, every thing
which is necessary to make a complete enactment in regard to
it, or which results as a complement of the thought contained
in the general expression, is included in, and authorized by it.
... 'The "subject" ... may be as broad and comprehensive as the
legislature may choose to make it. It may include innumerable
minor subjects, provided all these minor subjects are capable
of being so combined as to form only one grand and
comprehensive subject ....' "
Id. at 536-37 (quoting Division of Howard Co., 15 Kan. 194, 214-15 (1875)).
In 1898, this Court expanded its discussion to recognize three
manifest purposes of the single-subject rule: (1) to prevent logrolling and
"hodgepodge" bills, (2) to prevent surprise to the Legislature caused by
hiding provisions in bills without fair notice in the bills' titles, and (3) to
apprise citizens of the subjects of legislation being considered. Lindsay v.
United States Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 120 Ala. 156, 172, 24 So. 171, 176
(1898). The Court described "hodgepodge" as "the inclusion in one act of
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matters or subjects 'of a very heterogeneous nature,' ... which may mislead
and surprise the good faith of the law-making body." 120 Ala. at 173, 24
So. at 176. And the Court reiterated the concern about logrolling --
"legislation ... intended to enlist varied, and, it may be, hostile, interests,
in support of the proposed act." Id.
Importantly, in Lindsay the Court distinguished between the two
prongs of the single-subject rule that are recognized in today's main
opinion: first, a bill must contain only one "subject"; second, that subject
must be "clearly expressed in [the] title" of the bill. Id. ("The unity of
subject is an indispensable element of legislative acts; but it is not the
only element; the subject must be 'clearly expressed in its title.' "). The
Court expressly connected the "subject" prong to the first purpose of the
rule, preventing logrolling and hodgepodge. In contrast, the Court
connected the "title" prong to the second and third purposes, providing
notice to the Legislature and citizens. Id. This bifurcation of the purposes
makes sense, because the requirement of a single subject is not primarily
designed to provide notice, whereas the requirement that the title clearly
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express the bill's subject is not primarily designed to thwart the ills of
logrolling and hodgepodge. (Here, because I am concerned only with the
subject prong, I will focus on this prong's purpose of preventing those two
ills.)
In 1909, the Court reiterated its concern to avoid overly restrictive
application of the single-subject rule and the competing concern about
logrolling:
"There was no design in this clause to embarrass legislation by
making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and
operation, and thus multiplying their number; but the framers
of the Constitution meant to put an end to a species of vicious
legislation commonly termed 'logrolling,' and to require, in
every case, that the proposed measure shall stand upon its
own merits ...."
State ex rel. City of Birmingham v. Miller, 158 Ala. 59, 62, 48 So. 496, 497
(1909).
In 1933, this Court had an opportunity to apply the single-subject
rule to fiscal legislation. See Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100,
151 So. 858 (1933). As alluded to by today's main opinion, the bill in
Harris primarily attempted to raise revenue and to prevent motor vehicles
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from escaping taxation, but it also created a position of deputy tax
assessor to assess all personal property that had escaped taxation. 228
Ala. at 102, 104, 151 So. at 860-61. The Court again emphasized the
breadth allowed in a single subject: "The general rule is that generality or
comprehensiveness of the subject is not a violation of section 45, and that
a broad, comprehensive subject justifies the inclusion of any matter not
incongruous or unconnected with the subject ...." 228 Ala. at 103, 151 So.
at 860. Because both parts of the bill were "for the purpose of further
providing for the revenue of the state ... or to amend the state's revenue
law," the Court held that they were part of a single subject. 228 Ala. at
104, 15 So. at 861. Thus, up through the early 1930s, this Court seems to
have taken a fairly straightforward course in its application of the single-
subject rule.
Then came Nachman v. State Tax Commission, 233 Ala. 628, 173 So.
25 (1937). As noted by today's main opinion, the bill in Nachman provided
for a new revenue source -- a business-license tax -- and also provided for
distribution of that revenue partly to the Alabama Special Education
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Trust Fund and partly to the State General Fund to replace certain other
revenues. 233 Ala. at 628-29, 631, 633, 173 So. at 27, 29. The plaintiffs
argued that the bill violated the single-subject rule because it both raised
revenue and appropriated that revenue to specific purposes. In particular,
the plaintiffs contended that § 45's creation of separate exceptions from
the single-subject rule for "general revenue bills" and "general
appropriation bills" meant that revenue and appropriation were separate
subjects for purposes of the rule. The plaintiffs reasoned that revenue was
a burden, whereas appropriation was a benefit. 233 Ala. at 634, 173 So.
at 30. 
I pause here to interject what I believe should have been this Court's
response to that argument. Consistent with the principles outlined in the
Court's previous cases, it would have been easy to simply hold that the
revenue-raising and revenue-spending parts of the bill came within the
broadly defined single subject of business-license-tax revenue. See Lane
v. Gurley Oil Co., 341 So. 2d 712 (1977) (illustrating this line of reasoning;
discussed below). Moreover, the plaintiffs' reasoning based on § 45's
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separate exceptions for general revenue bills and general appropriation
bills was clearly fallacious. The fact that § 45 lists those types of bills as
separate exceptions to the single-subject rule has no logical bearing on
whether revenue and appropriation  are different subjects for purposes of
bills to which the rule does apply. Further, nothing about the single-
subject rule forbids including "burdens" and "benefits" in the same bill, if
they are germane to the same subject. Had the Court stayed the course
and stuck with its previous approach of focusing on the purposes
underlying the single-subject rule and the principles of its application, the
current quandaries within our jurisprudence applying the rule to fiscal
legislation would have been avoided.
Instead, the Nachman Court evaded the plaintiffs' argument with a
convoluted distinction that has haunted our single-subject jurisprudence
ever since: "appropriations" versus "earmarks." The Court explained the
distinction thus:
"[T]he [bill] does not undertake to make any appropriation
within the meaning of section 71 of the Constitution. It is
undoubtedly within the competence of the Legislature in
levying a tax to provide, in the same bill, into what fund of the
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State the tax money when collected shall be paid, whether into
the general fund, or into any special fund. It is but earmarking
the fund, thereafter to be expended, on due appropriation, for
the purposes for which the tax was levied and collected. To
provide that certain funds derived from particular sources
shall be paid and used for designated purposes of government
is in no sense an appropriation as contemplated by section 71
of the Constitution."
 233 Ala. at 634, 173 So. at 30 (internal citations omitted). As I will show,
that seemingly simple distinction was not so simple, and it eventually has
led to much head-scratching by the bench and bar.
Twenty-five years after Nachman, the Court had its next major
opportunity to apply the single-subject rule to fiscal legislation. The
Governor requested the opinion of the Justices on the constitutionality of
a bill that created a beer tax and designated the proceeds to pay principal
and interest on certain public bonds that were issued for building and
equipping educational institutions. Opinion of Justices No. 174, 275 Ala.
254, 255, 154 So. 2d 12, 13-14 (1963). The title of the bill described its
purpose as including " '[t]o raise revenue by levying a privilege or excise
tax [on beer] ...; to provide for the collection and distribution of the
proceeds of said tax.' " 275 Ala. at 256, 154 So. 2d at 15. The Justices
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opined that the bill did not violate the subject prong of the rule, relying on
the Court's prior broad understanding of "subject":
"The inhibitions of Sections 45 and 71 ... that an act shall
have but one subject are met if the act has but one general
subject which is contained in its title. ...
" 'A statute has but one subject, no matter
how many different matters it relates to, if they are
all cognate, and but different branches of the same
subject.'
 
"A reading of the title of [the bill], and of the [bill] itself
discloses that the grand and comprehensive pattern of the
[bill] relates to but a single matter, and that all its provisions
are germane and cognate, or complementary to the idea
expressed in the title."
275 Ala. at 257, 154 So. 2d at 15-16 (quoting Yielding v. State ex rel.
Wilkinson, 232 Ala. 292, 296, 167 So. 580, 583 (1936)). 
The Justices then made this curious statement:
"As stated in Nachman ...:
" 'To provide that certain funds derived from
particular sources shall be paid and used for
designated purposes of government is in no sense
an appropriation as contemplated by section 71 of
the Constitution.'
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"That is, merely because an act appropriates funds, it is not
thereby a general appropriation bill." 
275 Ala. at 257, 154 So. 2d at 16. That is clearly not what the Nachman
Court meant by the quoted statement. Under Nachman's distinction, a
purely revenue/earmarking bill did not "appropriate funds"; and under §§
45 and 71, a "general appropriation bill" was a different creature
altogether, not subject to the single-subject rule at all. Already,
Nachman's language and logic were proving hard to follow. 
In 1977, a similar combination revenue/spending bill was examined
by this Court in Lane v. Gurley Oil Co., 341 So. 2d 712 (1977), discussed
in today's main opinion. The bill in Lane provided for a program of
government inspection of petroleum products, including inspection fees,
but the revenue generated far exceeded the cost of the program. Id. at 714-
15. A later act allocated the excess revenue to pay on highway-
construction bonds. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the bill in question
contained two subjects: the inspection program and funding of highways.
Id. at 715. The Court rejected that argument, reasoning that the bill's
single subject was the inspection program, that the fees were part of that
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program, and that the bill properly provided for multiple uses of the
resulting revenue. Id.3 Notably, the Court echoed its earlier emphasis on
the legislative leeway inherent in the subject prong: to hold that the bill
violated the single-subject rule "would unduly handicap the legislature in
the exercise of its legitimate prerogatives and would not serve the
purposes of § 45." Id. at 715. 
Ten years later, this Court employed what I view as a correct
method of analysis of a fiscal bill under the single-subject rule. The State
Senate had asked the Justices' opinion on an education appropriations
bill. Opinion of Justices No. 323, 512 So. 2d 72, 73 (Ala. 1987). The bill
provided money for various public educational institutions, other State
agencies, and non-State entities. Id. at 73, 75. Before determining whether
all those provisions came within a single subject, the Justices surveyed
the history of education-funding bills in Alabama since the Constitution
of 1875. Id. at 75-77. From that survey, the Justices determined that
3It is not clear why the Court treated the separate inspection-
program and revenue-spending bills as one bill.
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public-education appropriations had been treated as a single subject for
about 80 years. Id. at 77. However, the Justices opined that
appropriations to non-State entities had not historically been understood
as coming within that subject, so they could not be included in the bill. Id.
at 77-78. I believe that Opinion No. 323's focus on the history of the
particular type of bill illustrates one aspect of how a court ought to
analyze whether a bill violates the single-subject rule. The fact that a type
of bill has or has not historically included the challenged content is
relevant to whether the bill meets or thwarts the subject prong's concerns
about logrolling and hodgepodge.
Nevertheless, after that five-decade interlude of generally well-
reasoned decisions, the seed planted in Nachman finally bore its odious
fruit in Childree v. Hubbert, 524 So. 2d 336 (Ala. 1988). There, the
Legislature passed a general appropriation bill that included
appropriations from the Alabama Special Education Trust Fund to various
State agencies. Id. at 337-38. This Court held that statutes had designated
the money in the Trust Fund as exclusively for educational purposes. Id.
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at 339-41. And, the Court noted, that restriction had been generally
imposed by revenue bills. Id. at 340. Enter Nachman. After recounting
Nachman's appropriations-versus-earmarks distinction, the Court
proceeded to extend Nachman's suspect logic even further:
"If earmarking is not appropriating, but rather a matter
properly included in a revenue bill, the converse is also true:
the removal or disregard of earmarking is not a matter
properly to be included in an appropriation bill. ...
 
"... For the legislature to either disregard or repeal
earmarking in an appropriation bill would violate § 71 or § 45,
for the same reasons as discussed above regarding revenue
bills.
 
"Thus, any appropriation bill appropriating [Trust Fund]
funds other than as specified in the acts creating the [Trust
Fund] and in the Code would violate § 71 or § 45 of the
Constitution."
Id. at 341. With this language, the implications of Nachman became
evident. Revenue and appropriation were separate subjects, and
earmarking was a subset of revenue. Thus, earmarking (or un-
earmarking) and appropriation (or un-appropriation) could not be
combined in one bill, whether a revenue bill or an appropriation bill. 
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Hence the problem in today's case, which is aptly highlighted by the
dissent: If the allocation to Clay County Animal Shelter, Inc., is an
"appropriation," as we held in an earlier related case, how can that
allocation be included in a bill that partly un-earmarks money that was
designated for a special fund overseen by the County Commission, without
violating the single-subject rule? The main opinion resolves the problem
for the moment by leaving open the possibility that the allocation to the
animal shelter is actually an earmark for purposes of the single-subject
rule. In other words, maybe "appropriation" means something different
under § 73 from what it means under §§ 45 and 71. But the underlying
quandary remains as long as the single-subject rule is seen as
hermetically sealing "appropriations" apart from "earmarks."
Respectfully, the problem is with Nachman and Childree.
Specifically, Nachman set us on the wrong path, fashioning its
unnecessary appropriations/earmarks distinction solely in response to a
party's illogical contention. Then, Childree took our jurisprudence even
further afield from the purpose of the subject prong of the single-subject
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rule. As I have explained above, that purpose is to avoid logrolling and
hodgepodge legislation. And nothing about combining revenue and
appropriations in a bill -- or "earmarks" and appropriations, or "un-
earmarks" and un-appropriations -- necessarily contravenes that purpose.
For example, a bill could provide for a tax on sales of audiobooks while
also providing that the first $10 million in revenue collected will be paid
to the public-library systems of each county in proportion to population. 
The single subject could properly be characterized as simply an audiobook
sales tax and the allocation of the resulting revenue. Cf. Lane, supra. The
technicality that the revenue would be designated for particular
recipients, rather than deposited in a particular "fund," would in no way
implicate the subject prong's concern about logrolling and hodgepodge.
Furthermore, 
although 
Nachman's 
appropriations/earmarks
distinction might have seemed straightforward to apply in 1937, the
complexities of modern fiscal legislation have rendered it anything but.
Today, after tax revenue is collected, it often flows through multiple steps
of distribution, and it is difficult to say at what point in that flow
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"earmarking" ends and "appropriation" begins. For example, one approach
is to distribute part of a particular tax's revenue first to the Alabama
Department of Revenue, after which part of the revenue is distributed to
counties or municipalities, after which those local governments distribute
part of it to particular governmental or nongovernmental purposes and
recipients. Some of those distributions may be on a percentage basis or in
a particular dollar amount, and some of them may be conditioned on
availability of funds or tied to other factors outside the text of the bill. See,
e.g., Ala. Code 1975, § 45-6-242.20 (Bullock County sales tax), § 45-10-
244.37 (Cherokee County sales tax), § 45-44-244.40 (Macon County
occupational tax), § 45-3-244.06 (similar Barbour County tobacco tax); cf.
§ 45-32-242.01 (allocating percentages of Greene County ad valorem tax
directly to governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities); § 45-35-
243 (allocating Houston County lodging tax similarly); § 45-6-241.40
(Bullock County tobacco tax); § 45-30-243 (Franklin County proceeds of
oil-and-gas-severance tax). 
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Indeed, the bill in this case is a prime example. See § 45-14-244.07
(allocating Clay County tobacco tax first to Department of Revenue, then
to 
county 
general 
fund, 
then 
to 
certain 
governmental 
and
nongovernmental entities, with some of those ultimate distributions being
conditional). Nachman's simplistic definitions of "earmarking" --
"provid[ing] ... into what fund of the State the tax money when collected
shall be paid" and "provid[ing] that certain funds derived from particular
sources shall be paid and used for designated purposes of government,"
233 Ala. at 634, 173 So. at 30 -- do not tell us where to draw the line in the
flow of distribution.
The amicus brief of Senator Jimmy Holley, as Chair of the
Legislature's Legislative Council, perhaps comes closest to providing a
workable dividing line: an "appropriation" is a  distribution "from the
State [t]reasury ... in a specific sum certain amount." Holley amicus brief,
at p. 24. Presumably everything before that in the flow of distribution
would be an earmark. Yet even that definition falters under close scrutiny,
if one assumes that a correct definition must square with not only
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Nachman and Childree but also the rest of our precedent. For example,
Lane held that a revenue bill that distributed the first $55,000 in monthly
proceeds to an agricultural fund did not violate the single-subject rule,
implicitly indicating that that sum-certain amount was an earmark rather
than an appropriation. 341 So. 2d at 715. Admittedly, it could be argued
that that monthly distribution was not a sum certain because it was
conditional on $55,000 being collected. But many of the distributions in
the Legislature's annual general appropriation bill are conditional. See
Albert P. Brewer, Alabama State Budgets and Appropriations, 55 Ala.
Law. 344, 346 & n.47 (1994). So the conditional nature of a distribution
does not prevent it from being a sum certain and thus an appropriation
under the amicus brief's definition. Similarly, in Opinion No. 174, the
Justices indicated that a revenue bill that distributed money "not
exceeding $15,000,000" to pay principal and interest on bonds did not
violate the single-subject rule under Nachman, implying that the
distribution was an earmark. 275 Ala. at 255, 257, 154 So. 2d at 13-16.
That distribution could likewise be reasonably seen as a sum certain of
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$15 million, conditional on the principal and interest equaling that
amount. I point out these problems not to denigrate the amicus brief's
valiant effort to distill a definition, but to emphasize my doubt that a
workable definition can be achieved.
But I believe that a more fundamental solution to the current
quandary under the single-subject rule is quite achievable. It simply
requires us to return to this Court's first principles in this area. First, we
should be careful not to conflate the subject prong and the title prong in
our analysis; this Court has at times seemed to lose sight of this
distinction, see, e.g., Harris, supra; Opinion No. 174, supra; Opinion No.
323, supra. Second, we should discard Nachman/Childree's distinction
between appropriations and earmarks, for the reasons I have explained
above. Third, we should refocus on the purpose of the subject prong --
preventing logrolling and hodgepodge legislation. Fourth, we should
constantly bear in mind this Court's commitment that the term "subject"
must be understood broadly and in a manner that does not unnecessarily
hamstring or cripple the Legislature. Fifth, we should take full advantage
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of factually similar precedents in the many other states that have single-
subject rules.4 Although this Court consulted other states' jurisprudence
in some of our early cases, see, e.g., Ballentyne, supra; Miller, supra, we
have seemingly omitted to do so in the more recent cases, see, e.g.,
Nachman, supra; Opinion No. 174, supra; Lane, supra; Childree, supra.
Finally, we should approach single-subject analysis with a healthy
dose of realism, recognizing that the rule is a blunt instrument. The
problems of logrolling and hodgepodge are generalized ones, not limited
to any particular type or topic of legislation. Thus, the constitution's
solution -- the subject prong -- is necessarily also generalized. But that
means that, unlike other restrictions on legislation such as § 73's two-
thirds-vote requirement, the subject prong is incapable of laserlike
surgical precision. Our early, pre-Nachman cases reflected an
understanding of this inherent limitation of the single-subject rule and a
realistic appraisal of the power of the rule to curb legislative abuse. In
4See generally 1A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 17:1 (7th ed. 2009); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 53
(2012); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 248 (2009).
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essence, the rule is capable of invalidating only obvious departures. That
clear-headed outlook, stripped of artificial distinctions, is the one to which
we should return.
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BOLIN, Justice (dissenting).
In my opinion, Act No. 2018-432, Ala. Acts 2018,  violates Article IV,
§ 45, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.),  because it repeals the dedication of
funds to a special fund overseen by the Clay County Commission ("the
county commission") for disbursement to the local water districts while
simultaneously appropriating those funds to the Clay County Animal
Shelter, Inc. ("the animal shelter").  Therefore,  I respectfully dissent from
the main opinion.  
Section 45 provides in relevant part that "[e]ach law shall contain
but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general
appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest,
or revision of statutes."  See also Art. IV, § 71,  Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.),  which provides in relevant part that "[a]ll ... appropriations
[other than general appropriations] shall be made by separate bills, each
embracing but one subject." The pertinent part of § 45 contains two
components: (1) it limits legislation to a single subject and  (2) it requires
that this single subject be clearly expressed in the title of the legislation. 
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Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306
(1974).     The county commission alleges that Act No. 2018-432 violates
§ 45, in part, because it amends preexisting earmarks of the county's
tobacco-tax proceeds and then appropriates the funds removed from one
of the earmarks to the animal shelter, which, it says, constitutes two
separate subjects.   
The animal shelter, which I am sure is a very worthwhile charitable
organization, "urges" this Court to reconsider its holding in Clay County
Commission v. Clay County Animal Shelter, Inc., 283 So. 3d 1218 (Ala.
2019) ("Clay County"), that Act No. 2017-65, Ala. Acts 2017, the
predecessor act amended by Act No. 2018-432, was an appropriations act.
In Clay County, the plaintiffs contended that certain provisions of  Act No.
2017-65 amounted to an appropriation of funds to a charitable
organization by the legislature, without a two-thirds vote of all the
members elected to each house approving it, and that, therefore, the
enactment of Act No. 2017-65 violated Article IV, § 73, Ala. Const. 1901
(Off. Recomp.).  This Court agreed, holding that "[t]he plain meaning of
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the language in Act No. 2017-65 provides for an appropriation to the
animal shelter of 18% of Clay County's tobacco-tax proceeds" and that the
legislature's appropriation to the animal shelter had to receive " 'a vote of
two-thirds  of all the members elected to each house' " to comply with § 73.
283 So. 3d at 1235.
Relying upon Nachman v. State Tax Commission, 233 Ala. 628, 173
So. 25 (1937), the animal shelter now argues, for the first time, that Act
No. 2018-432, which directs the distribution of the county tobacco-tax
proceeds to the county general fund for disbursement to more than one
entity, constitutes "earmarking" rather than appropriation. The animal
shelter contends that because Act No. 2018-432 provides for only 
earmarks and does not contain any appropriations, it does not violate the
single-subject requirement of § 45. Not only is this argument being raised
for the first time on appeal, the animal shelter has heretofore contended
that Act No. 2018-432 provides an appropriation.5  " 'This Court cannot
5The plaintiffs below -- the county commission and several
individuals -- alleged in paragraph 39 of their amended complaint that
"[Act No. 2018-432] attempts to appropriate to the Animal Shelter twenty
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consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal; rather, our review
is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court.' "
America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey, 166 So. 3d 655, 661 n.2 (Ala. 2014)
(quoting Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992)).
Accordingly,  this Court cannot consider the animal shelter's argument
that Act No. 2018-432 provides for only earmarks and does not contain
any appropriations and, therefore does not violate the single-subject
requirement of § 45. 
The animal shelter also argues that Act No. 2018-432 does not
violate § 45 because it has a single subject that is clearly expressed in its
title. 
  
This Court has stated the following:
percent (20%) of the County's tobacco tax revenue." The animal shelter
answered paragraph 39 of the amended complaint by stating: "Admitted.
However, [Act No. 2018-432] speaks for itself."  Further, the animal
shelter filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its Rule 12(c),
Ala. R. Civ. P.,  motion for a judgment on the pleadings in which it argued
that Act No. 2018-432 "does not contain any earmarks, only makes a
single new appropriations," that the act "makes a single new
appropriation, to the Shelter," and that "[t]he other appropriations
contained in [the act] are part of pre-existing law."  
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"As the Court explained in Opinion of Justices No. 174, 275
Ala. 254, 154 So. 2d 12 (1963), an appropriations bill that is
not a general appropriations bill must meet the single-subject
requirement of § 71. If an appropriations bill complies with §
71 in having a single subject, then it necessarily complies with
that portion of § 45 mandating that each law contain but one
subject. Section 45 contains the additional requirement that
the subject of each law 'shall be clearly expressed in its title.' "
Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79, 115-16 (Ala. 2015)(footnote omitted).   See
also Bagby Elevator, supra,  stating that the pertinent part of § 45 has
two components: (1) it limits legislation to a single subject and  (2) it
requires that this single subject be clearly expressed in the title of the
legislation.  The purpose of the single-subject requirement has been
explained in detail: 
" ' "First, to prevent 'hodgepodge' or 'logrolling' legislation;
second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no
intimation, and which might, therefore, be overlooked, and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation
that are being considered, in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise,
if they shall so desire." Cooley, Const. Lim. 172. No one of
these purposes is of more or less importance than the other.
The mischief of hodgepodge legislation, -- the inclusion in one
act of matters or subjects "of a very heterogeneous nature,"
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which may mislead, and surprise the good faith of the
law-making body; or logrolling legislation, intended to enlist
varied, and, it may be, hostile, interests, in support of the
proposed act, -- would have been avoided if the constitutional
limitation had gone no further than the requisition that "each
law shall contain but one subject." The unity of subject is an
indispensable element of legislative acts; but it is not the only
element; the subject must be "clearly expressed in its title."
The purpose of this requisition is, as expressed in the second
proposition of the exposition of Judge Cooley, "to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions
in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might
therefore be overlooked, and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted." The third proposition must be deemed, and by all
authority is deemed, of equal importance, -- "to fairly apprise
the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings
as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they so desire."
When there is a fair expression of the subject in the title, all
matters reasonably connected with it, and all proper agencies
or instrumentalities, or measures, which will or may facilitate
its accomplishment, are proper to be incorporated in the act,
and, as usually said, are cognate or germane to the title.' "
Magee, 175  So. 3d at 116 (quoting Lindsay v. United States Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 120 Ala. 156, 172, 24 So. 171, 176 (1898)).  " '[A] statute has but one
subject, no matter to how many different matters it relates if they are all
cognate, and but different branches of the same subject.' " Ex parte
Hilsabeck, 477 So. 2d 472, 475 (Ala. 1985) (quoting Knight v. West
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Alabama Env't. Improvement Auth., 287 Ala. 15, 22, 246 So. 2d 903, 908
(1971)).   Further, 
" '[i]t is settled under our decisions that however
numerous the subjects stated in the title, and however
numerous the provisions in the body of the act may be, if they
can be by fair intendment considered as falling within the
subject-matter legislated upon in the act, or necessary as ends
and means to the attainment of such subject, the act does not
offend our constitutional provision that no law shall embrace
more than one subject, which must be expressed in its title.' "
Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 10, 18 So. 2d 810,
816 (1944)(quoting State v. Henry, 224 Ala. 224, 227, 139 So. 278, 281
(1931)). 
Relying upon Lane v, Gurley Oil Co., 341 So. 2d 712 (Ala. 1977), the
animal shelter argues that Act No. 2018-432 does not contain more than
one subject merely because it provides for more than one use of the
revenue collected. The animal shelter contends that, because the tobacco-
tax proceeds are earmarked for several recipients on a percentage basis,
when the legislature enacted Act No. 2018-432 to amend Act No. 2017-65
to disburse 20% of the tobacco-tax proceeds, rather than 18%, to the
animal shelter, the legislature necessarily had to adjust another share and
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did so by decreasing from 15% to 13% the share of  tobacco-tax proceeds
to be disbursed to the county commission for further disbursement to the
water districts in Clay County for the purpose of installing feeder lines. 
In Lane, this Court considered the constitutionality of Act No. 1971-1403,
Ala. Acts 1971.   The title of Act No. 1971-1403 provided:
" 'To provide for inspection of certain petroleum products,
including those commonly known as gasoline, naphtha, diesel
fuel, kerosene and lubricating oil, that are sold, offered for
sale, used or stored in the State of Alabama; to provide for the
issuance by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries of
permits for selling, offering for sale, storing, or using such
petroleum products and to require the making of applications
for such permits and payment of a permit fee; to authorize the
Board of Agriculture and Industries to establish minimum
standards for such petroleum products; to require compliance
with such standards; to provide for enforcement of this act,
including provisions for maintenance of records and for
labeling, sampling and testing such products, provisions
prohibiting adulteration thereof, and provisions for penalties
for violation of this act; to prohibit the sale, offering for sale,
storage or use in this State of petroleum products not meeting
the said standards; to impose an inspection fee in respect of
each such petroleum product; to provide for the disposition of
such inspection fees and any penalties collected under this act;
to provide that violation of this act constitutes a misdemeanor;
and to repeal Article 21 of Chapter 1 of Title 2 of the Code of
Alabama of 1940 and subdivision 2 of Article 26 of the said
Chapter 1.' "
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341 So. 2d at 714 (emphasis omitted).  The act also provided that the first
$55,000 of the monthly proceeds from the inspection fee would be
disbursed to an agricultural fund and that the remainder would be
disbursed to a road and bridge fund.
Gurley Oil Company and Gurley Refining Company  ("the oil
companies") sued the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, 
seeking a judgment declaring that the act violated the single-subject
requirement of § 45.  The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the oil
companies, declaring that the act violated § 45 because, the court
determined,
 "while [the act] described in its title as providing for
'inspection fees,' [it]  is in fact a revenue-producing tax
measure because the revenue generated far exceeds what is
necessary to administer the inspection program and the excess
revenue was, by a subsequent act, pledged for payment of
bonds issued by the intervenor, Alabama Highway Authority,
to provide funds for highway construction." 
 Lane, 341 So. 2d at 714-15.  
The oil companies argued on appeal in support of the trial court's
judgment that the title of the act did not clearly express the subject of the
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act and that the act actually contained two subjects, one relating to an
inspection program for petroleum products and the other relating to
funding of the state's highway-construction program.  In reversing the
trial court's judgment, this Court explained:
"We hold that the act does not contain more than one
subject. The one subject is the inspection program. The levying
and disposition of inspection fees is part and parcel of the
inspection program. ... 
"Furthermore, an act does not contain more than one
subject merely because it provides for more than one use of the
revenue collected under the act. Opinion of the Justices [No.
167], 270 Ala. 38, 42, 115 So.2d 464 (1959). To uphold the trial
court's judgment would unduly handicap the legislature in the
exercise of its legitimate prerogatives and would not serve the
purposes of § 45 in our judgment. Opinion of the Justices [No.
174], 275 Ala. 254, 154 So. 2d 12 (1963)."
341 So. 2d at 715.   
The facts of Lane are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this
case, because the act at issue  in Lane did not amend an existing earmark
of the revenue collected pursuant to the act that resulted in one entity
receiving less funding while simultaneously appropriating the funds
removed from that earmark to another entity, resulting in the latter
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entity's receiving an increase in funding.  Here, Act No. 2018-432 
amended the earmark of a portion of the county tobacco-tax proceeds to
a special fund overseen by the county commission by decreasing from 15%
to 13% the share of tobacco-tax proceeds to be disbursed to that special
fund while simultaneously increasing from 18% to 20% the share of the
tobacco-tax proceeds to be disbursed to the animal shelter.
The county commission cites Childree v. Hubbert, 524 So. 2d 336
(Ala. 1988), in support of its contention that an act that repeals an
earmark and also makes an appropriation of the previously earmarked
funds contains more than one subject and violates § 45.  Before enacting
the legislation at issue in Childree, the legislature had considered  an
education appropriations bill that provided appropriations for elementary
and secondary schools; for junior and technical colleges; for colleges and
universities;  for various other state agencies;  and for entities that were
not state agencies but some of which, at least arguably, served educational
purposes.  While the legislature was in session, it sought an advisory
opinion from the members of this Court as to whether the education-
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appropriations bill satisfied the § 45 single-subject requirement. All nine
Justices opined that the education appropriations bill satisfied the single-
subject requirement of § 45 because the subject of public education had
historically been treated comprehensively in such appropriation bills. 
Opinion of the Justices No. 323, 512 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 1987).  Opinion of the
Justices No. 323 stated that no appropriations could be made in the bill
to institutions not controlled by the State.  The opinion also expressed
reservations as to appropriations to State agencies not obviously
educational in nature. 
After that opinion issued, the legislature removed a number of
appropriations from the education appropriations bill and added them to
the general appropriations bill that eventually became Act No. 87-715. 
Act No. 87-715 directed that appropriations be made from the Alabama
Special Education Trust Fund ("ASETF") to various State entities.   An
action was brought challenging the constitutionality of Act No. 87-715.
The trial court in Childree entered a judgment declaring Act No. 87-715
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unconstitutional insofar as the act appropriated funds from the ASETF to
various State agencies.
In holding that any appropriations bill appropriating ASETF funds
other than as specified in the legislation creating the ASETF would violate
the single subject requirement of § 45, this Court stated:
"[T]he removal or disregard of earmarking is not a matter
properly to be included in an appropriation bill. Presumably,
the earmarking could be removed in a proper single-subject
bill or in a properly constituted revenue bill, but until such an
action is taken, no appropriation bill can appropriate such
funds other than as they were earmarked.
"The point that earmarking cannot be repealed by an
appropriation bill becomes even clearer when considered in
light of the fact that the earmarking provisions are now
substantive parts of the Code. See, e.g., § 40-1-31[, Ala. Code
1975]. Therefore, disregard of earmarking would violate the
Code, and repeal of earmarking would amend the Code. For
the legislature to either disregard or repeal earmarking in an
appropriation bill would violate § 71 or § 45, for the same
reasons as discussed above regarding revenue bills."
Childree, 524 So. 2d at 341.  Based on this Court's reasoning in Childree,
because Act No. 2018-432, in part, repeals the dedication of funds to a
special fund overseen by the county commission for disbursement to the
local water districts while simultaneously appropriating those funds to the
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animal shelter, I  conclude that Act No. 2018-432 impermissibly contains
multiple subjects and violates the single-subject requirement of  § 45.
Because I believe that Act No. 2018-432 violates § 45 for the reasons
expressed above, I respectfully dissent from the main opinion. 
Mendheim, J., concurs.
69