Title: Garrison v. Bonfield
Citation: 260 P.2d 718, 57 N.M. 533
Docket Number: 5603
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 1953

260 P.2d 718 (1953) 57 N.M. 533 GARRISON v. BONFIELD et al. No. 5603. Supreme Court of New Mexico. August 25, 1953. Neal &amp; Girand, L. George Schubert, Hobbs, for appellant. Ray C. Cowan, Hobbs, for appellees. McGHEE, Justice. The appellant filed claim for workmen's compensation in statutory form for an injury claimed to have been received while working for Bonfield in a retail lumber yard at Hobbs, New Mexico. The answer denied the claimant suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment while working for the employer, denied claimant suffered any disability, and pleaded by way of new matter: When the case came on for hearing on July 9, 1953, the parties entered into the following stipulation: The statement referred to in the stipulation reads as follows: On the same date they also entered into the following oral stipulation in open court: Whereupon, one of the attorneys for the defendants made the following motion: The motion was sustained and judgment of dismissal was entered. This appeal followed. The claimant makes two points in support of his attempt to secure a reversal. First, the employer and his insurer are estopped from asserting as a defense the failure of the employer to file in the office of the Clerk of the District Court the bond and his election to be bound by the Compensation Act, Section 57-901 et seq., 1941 Compilation, in the operation of his non-hazardous business; and, second, the operation of a retail lumber business is an extrahazardous occupation under the terms of our Workmen's Compensation Act. We will first consider the matters urged under point one. Section 57-904, 1941 Compilation, provides that an employer engaged in other than an extrahazardous occupation may bring himself and his employees under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act by filing a written statement of his election, and a policy of insurance by some company qualified to do business in this state covering claims arising under the act. The appellees strongly rely upon our decision in Eaves v. Contract Trucking Co., 1951, 55 N.M. 463, 235 P.2d 530, where we squarely held the failure of the employer in a nonhazardous occupation to file the written election in the office of the Clerk of the District Court rendered the employer and his insurer immune to action under the act, although the bond was actually filed, basing the decision upon the wording of the act and the case of Keeney v. Beasman, 1936, 169 Md. 582, 182 A. 566, 103 A.L.R. 1515, and making reference to the case of Lester v. Auto Haulaway Co., 1932, 260 Mich. 16, 244 N.W. 213. A majority, including the writer, believe the holding in the Eaves case was too strict and that the decision should have gone the other way in accordance with the rationale of Yeomans v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 1941, 198 S.C. 65, 15 S.E.2d 833, 136 A.L.R. 894, where it was held the filing by *721 the insurer of notice of the policy brought the employees under the protection of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, although the statute also required the filing of notice by the employer. See also L.E. Marks Co. v. Moore, 1933, 251 Ky. 63, 64 S.W.2d 426. We now pass to a consideration of the question of estoppel. In Keeney v. Beasman, supra, the claimant was a laborer on a dairy farm and did not know his employer had taken out a workmen's compensation policy covering the workmen on the farm, and that the insurance carrier had notified the state industrial accident commission of the issuance of the policy, as provided by law. It was held the claimant was not engaged in an extrahazardous occupation, as defined by the act, and such being the case he could only be brought within its terms if three conditions concurred: (1) That the employer and employee jointly elect to accept the statute; (2) that the joint election be filed with the commission; and (3) that the commission approve their acceptance. None of these conditions occurred, and the court held the claimant could not recover under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act. Estoppel was raised by the claimant in the Maryland case, and of this the court said [169 Md. 582, 182 A. 572]: From what has just been quoted we assume if estoppel had been present a different result would have been reached. Here the employer informed the employee when he opened the new business he would buy a workmen's compensation policy, and did so; he informed the workman of such fact, who apparently acquiesced and continued at his work secure, no doubt, in his belief he would be protected in case he suffered an accidental injury, and the employer shared such belief. The insurance company has collected the premium and agreed to pay the losses, if any, and instead of advising its customer where the policy should be filed, as well as the necessity for filing a notice, it would keep the premium and avoid liability, as the employer states he did not know it was necessary to do more than purchase the policy. By giving the stipulations and the statement of Bonfield a liberal construction, as we should do under the Workmen's Compensation Act, we believe the question of estoppel against the employer and insurer was sufficiently raised, and that such question should be determined by the fact finder, along with the claim of injury and the amount, if any, which may be recoverable. It may be well to here state the Legislature has cured our error in the Eaves case by the enactment of Ch. 87, Laws of 1953, providing that the filing by the employer of a statement he elected to be bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act, or the filing of a bond was a sufficient election by the employer to be bound by the act. Under his second point the appellant would have us hold a retail lumber yard where no work of any kind is done on the lumber except to stack it when received and load it out when sold, comes within the definition of a mill under the wording in Section 57-912, 1941 Compilation, as follows: *722 He pins his hopes on the words "or other work in the lumber industry." Undoubtedly this refers back to the wording of the first part of the quoted matter where machinery is used, or material is changed, altered or repaired, and not the activities as detailed in the statement of Bonfield and the record before us. It is easy to see the trial court was controlled by our holding in the Eaves case, supra, which we have overruled in this opinion. The judgment of dismissal will be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to set aside the judgment and proceed with the views herein announced, and it is so ordered. COMPTON, LUJAN and SEYMOUR, JJ., concur. SADLER, C.J., absent from state and not participating.