Title: New Jersey v. Liepe
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 6, 2019

New Jersey v. Liepe Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary After drinking six to ten beers, defendant William Liepe drove his Ford Explorer at approximately 1:00 p.m. Traveling at about forty-five miles per hour, defendant struck the rear end of a Honda Accord waiting to make a left turn. The car was driven by a thirty-five-year-old man, M.G., who was driving his eleven-year-old son, M.J.G., and a nine-year-old family friend, R.S., to a softball game. The collision sent the Honda into the northbound lane, where it was struck by a Cadillac Escalade driven by a woman who was taking her mother, R.V., and her two children on a shopping trip. The second collision sent the car into the parking lot of the softball field. The accident killed R.S. M.J.G. was permanently paralyzed from the waist down as a result of the accident. He was confined to a wheelchair and requires continuous medical care for the rest of his life. M.G. also sustained very serious injuries: he broke many bones, had injured organs, and required a forty-five day hospitalization with multiple surgeries. The driver of the Cadillac and her children were unharmed in the accident; however, R.V. sustained back and neck injuries. Defendant was tried before a jury and was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, observing that defendant would be ineligible for parole until he reached the age of eighty-nine and found that sentence “shocking to the judicial conscience.” The State appealed, challenging the appellate court's holding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive terms and that defendant's aggregate sentence so shocked the judicial conscience. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not share the Appellate Division's view that the trial court erred in arriving at defendant's sentence, and reversed. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. William T. Liepe (A-7-18) (080788)Argued March 12, 2019 -- Decided August 6, 2019PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. The Court reviews consecutive terms of incarceration imposed on defendant William T. Liepe for convictions arising from a motor-vehicle accident he caused when driving while intoxicated. After drinking six to ten beers, defendant drove his Ford Explorer south on Cologne Avenue in Mays Landing at approximately 1:00 p.m. Travelling at about forty- five miles per hour, defendant struck the rear end of a Honda Accord waiting to make a left turn. The car was driven by a thirty-five-year-old man, M.G., who was driving his eleven-year-old son, M.J.G., and a nine-year-old family friend, R.S., to a softball game. The collision sent the Honda into the northbound lane, where it was struck by a Cadillac Escalade driven by a woman who was taking her mother, R.V., and her two children on a shopping trip. The second collision sent the car into the parking lot of the softball field. The accident killed R.S. M.J.G. was permanently paralyzed from the waist down as a result of the accident. He is confined to a wheelchair and will require continuous medical care for the rest of his life. M.G. also sustained very serious injuries: he broke many bones, had injured organs, and required a forty-five day hospitalization with multiple surgeries. The driver of the Cadillac and her children were unharmed in the accident; however, R.V. sustained back and neck injuries. Defendant was tried before a jury and was convicted on all counts. The trial court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). It found three aggravating factors, to which it accorded varying weight, and one mitigating factor, to which it accorded moderate weight. The court concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Citing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5, State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985), and State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 427-31 (2001), the trial court addressed the question of whether defendant’s terms of incarceration for his individual offenses should run concurrently or consecutively to one another. The court noted that, although it was mindful of defendant’s age, its goal was “to impose an appropriate sentence for the crimes committed and not one designed to assure his release prior to the end of his life.” 1 The trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of imprisonment: twenty years for the first-degree aggravated manslaughter of R.S.; seven years for the second-degree aggravated assault of M.J.G.; and five years for the second-degree aggravated assault of M.G. Each of the three terms was subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility. For the fourth-degree assault by auto of R.V., the court imposed a term of one year’s imprisonment to be served concurrently with defendant’s other terms of incarceration. Defendant’s aggregate sentence was thirty-two years’ incarceration with a parole ineligibility period of twenty-seven years. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. 453 N.J. Super. 126, 142 (App. Div. 2018). The Appellate Division observed that defendant would be ineligible for parole until he reached the age of eighty-nine and found that sentence “shocking to the judicial conscience.” Id. at 133, 135. The Appellate Division “discern[ed] from the [trial] judge’s decision to impose consecutive terms that he believed Carey required consecutive terms -- a conclusion the Court expressly rejected” in Carey. Id. at 136. The Appellate Division also construed the holding of Carey to be limited to cases in which a defendant’s conduct killed more than one victim, and thus determined Carey to be inapplicable to a single-fatality case such as this. Id. at 140-41. The Appellate Division stated that defendant’s sentence “has not been shown to be in accord with any other sentence imposed in similar circumstances” and opined that this disparity impairs “the overarching Yarbough goal that there be uniformity in sentencing.” Id. at 142. In support of that contention, the Appellate Division attached an appendix in which it “synopsized all available post-Carey decisions . . . identifying sentences imposed in multiple-victim vehicular homicide cases.” Id. at 139 n.5, 142-45. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 235 N.J. 295 (2018).HELD: The trial court properly applied the factors identified in Yarbough for the imposition of consecutive sentences, and defendant’s sentence is consistent with the principles stated in Carey and does not shock the judicial conscience. The Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstates the sentence that the trial court imposed.1. Appellate review of a sentencing determination is limited to consideration of: (1) whether guidelines for sentencing established by the Legislature or by the courts were violated; (2) whether the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were based on competent credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether the sentence was nevertheless clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience. The sentencing provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice are based on notions of proportionality and focus on the gravity of the offense. In Yarbough, the Court provided guidance to trial courts determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive terms of incarceration, 100 N.J. at 636-37, and identified guidelines for that decision, id. at 643- 44. (pp. 15-18) 2 2. In Carey, the Court reinstated the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court for two counts of vehicular homicide for the deaths of two people in a car accident caused by an intoxicated driver. 168 N.J. at 420-21, 431. The Court concluded that “[c]rimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained serious bodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutive sentences,” id. at 428, and held that when a judge sentences a defendant in a vehicular homicide case, “the multiple-victims factor is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result in the imposition of at least two consecutive terms when multiple deaths or serious bodily injuries have been inflicted upon multiple victims by the defendant,” id. at 429-30. The Court did not impose a presumption in favor of consecutive terms. It simply observed that when a sentencing court compares the harm inflicted by intoxicated driving in the multiple-victim setting with the harm that would have resulted from the offense were there only a single victim, it is likely to conclude that the harm in the former setting is “distinctively worse” than that in the latter. See id. at 428. Like any Yarbough analysis, the sentencing court’s determination regarding consecutive and concurrent terms in the vehicular homicide setting turns on a careful evaluation of the specific case. (pp. 18-24)3. Nothing in the trial court’s determination in this case suggests that it reached its decision through the application of a presumption, contrary to the Appellate Division’s suggestion. 453 N.J. Super. at 135-36. The court deemed the impact of defendant’s conduct on both R.S. and M.J.G. to be the “worst consequences imaginable,” and observed that the impact of defendant’s conduct on M.G. to be “extremely serious.” To the trial court, the imposition of concurrent sentences for defendant’s offenses would not ensure accountability. The trial court considered the fairness of the aggregate sentence, taking into account defendant’s age. It properly viewed its primary obligation, however, not to ensure that defendant would live long enough to be released on parole, but to craft a sentence warranted by the offenses. The Court finds no deviation from the Code’s sentencing objectives in the trial court’s determination, and accordingly finds no error. Nor does the Court find the sentence imposed by the trial court to shock the judicial conscience. The Court has never imposed on a trial court the obligation to demonstrate that a sentence comports with sentences imposed by other courts in similar cases. The Yarbough guidelines promote proportionality not by a comparative analysis of the sentencing practices of different courts, but by focusing the trial court on the “facts relating to” the defendant’s crimes. Carey, 168 N.J. at 423; see also Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44. Here, the trial court properly focused on the case before it, and on the devastating impact of defendant’s crimes. (pp. 24-27) The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the sentence imposed by the trial court is reinstated.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’S opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 7 September Term 2018 080788 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William T. Liepe, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 453 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2018). Argued Decided March 12, 2019 August 6, 2019 Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Jennifer E. Kmieciak and Sarah E. Elsasser, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). Jill R. Cohen argued the cause for respondent (Jill R. Cohen, on the briefs and William T. Liepe, pro se, on the supplemental letter brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we review consecutive terms of incarceration imposed ondefendant William T. Liepe. Defendant was convicted of one count of first- 1 degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a); two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.SA. 2C:12-1(b)(1); two counts of third-degreeassault by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2); and one count of fourth-degree assaultby auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(1). The convictions arose from a motor-vehicleaccident in which defendant, driving while intoxicated, collided with anothervehicle from behind and propelled it into oncoming traffic, causing a secondcollision. The accident killed one child, permanently paralyzed another child,seriously injured the driver of the car struck by defendant’s car, and injured apassenger in the vehicle that was traveling in the opposite lane. After a jury convicted defendant, the trial court imposed threeconsecutive terms of imprisonment: a twenty-year term for aggravatedmanslaughter; a seven-year term for one count of aggravated assault; and afive-year term for another count of aggravated assault. Defendant wassentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-two years’ incarceration, with a paroleineligibility period of twenty-seven years. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’sconvictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v.Liepe, 453 N.J. Super. 126, 142 (App. Div. 2018). It held that the trial courtabused its discretion in imposing consecutive terms and that defendant’s 2 aggregate sentence shocked the judicial conscience. Id. at 135-41. Wegranted the State’s petition for certification. We hold that the trial court properly applied the factors identified inState v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), for the imposition of consecutivesentences, and that defendant’s sentence is consistent with the principles statedin State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001). We do not share the AppellateDivision’s view that the trial court misapplied those principles, or thatdefendant’s sentence shocks the judicial conscience. Accordingly, we reversethe Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstate the sentence that the trial courtimposed. I. A. We derive our summary of the facts from the record of defendant’s trialand sentencing. On the morning of April 10, 2011, defendant, then fifty-eight years old,drove his Ford Explorer to a bar in Egg Harbor City, where he drank twobeers. He proceeded to a second location, unidentified in the record, and drankbetween four and eight additional beers. At approximately 1:00 p.m., defendant drove south on Cologne Avenuein Mays Landing. Ahead of defendant’s car in the southbound lane was a 3 Honda Accord driven by a thirty-five-year-old man, M.G., who was driving hiseleven-year-old son, M.J.G., and a nine-year-old family friend, R.S., to asoftball game. The older boy, M.J.G., was in the front passenger seat of theHonda Accord, and the younger boy, R.S., was in the back seat of the car. M.G. intended to take a left turn from Cologne Avenue into the drivewayof the softball field, but he paused before turning because of traffic in theopposite lane. According to a statement that he later gave to a police officer,defendant briefly took his eyes off the road to look at the softball field.Defendant’s Ford Explorer, traveling at about forty-five miles per hour,collided with the rear of M.G.’s Honda Accord, sending the Honda into thenorthbound lane. There, the Honda was struck by a Cadillac Escalade drivenby a woman who was taking her mother and her two children, ages fifteen andtwo, on a shopping trip. The second collision sent M.G.’s car into the parkinglot of the softball field. Defendant’s car traveled off the road and crashed intoa tree. The accident killed R.S., the nine-year-old passenger in M.G.’s car. Theeleven-year-old passenger, M.J.G., was permanently paralyzed from the waistdown as a result of the accident, and is confined to a wheelchair. Because ofthe injuries that he sustained in the accident, M.J.G. will require continuousmedical care for the rest of his life. 4 M.G. also sustained very serious injuries. He broke five vertebrae, all ofhis ribs, his collarbone, and his shoulder blade. He shattered his pelvis,suffered a collapsed lung, injured his diaphragm, and sustained damage to hisspleen that required a splenectomy. During a forty-five day hospitalization ata trauma center, M.G. underwent five surgeries and was for a time in amedically induced coma. When M.G. left the hospital, he was not yetambulatory. He was eventually able to walk with a cane after an extended stayin a rehabilitation facility. M.G. has a metal plate and four screws in his neck,a metal rod in his back, and metal implants in his pelvis. The driver of the Cadillac and her children were unharmed in theaccident; however, the driver’s mother, R.V., tore her rotator cuff andsustained back and neck injuries that continued to cause pain at the time of hertestimony at defendant’s trial. B. 1. Defendant was indicted for first-degree aggravated manslaughter 1 andsecond-degree vehicular homicide, based on the death of R.S. He was also1 The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the first-degree aggravated manslaughter count of his indictment on the grounds that the State failed to present evidence of defendant’s recklessness, other than evidence of defendant’s intoxication. The State presented additional evidence to a second grand jury, which indicted defendant for the same offenses, but the trial court 5 charged with second-degree aggravated assault and third-degree assault byauto, both arising from the injuries to M.G.; second-degree aggravated assaultand third-degree assault by auto, both arising from the injuries to M.J.G.; andfourth-degree assault by auto, arising from the injuries to R.V.2 Defendant was tried before a jury. The State presented the testimony oflaw enforcement officers, medical professionals, witnesses to the April 10,2011 accident, and an employee at the bar where defendant drank beer on themorning of the accident. It offered opinion testimony by experts in accidentreconstruction, pharmacology, and toxicology. The State presented evidencethat defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was .192 when a blood samplewas taken from him approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after theaccident. Its expert toxicologist estimated that at the time of the accident,defendant’s BAC was approximately .207. The jury convicted defendant of all charges.again dismissed the aggravated manslaughter count. Although the Appellate Division denied the State’s motion for leave to appeal, this Court granted leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for its consideration of the motion. The Appellate Division then reinstated the aggravated manslaughter charge. 2 Defendant received summonses for five motor-vehicle offenses: (1) reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; (2) driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; (3) careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; (4) failure to wear a seatbelt, N.J.S.A. 39:12-15; and (5) possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-51b. 6 2. After merger of two of defendant’s offenses, the trial court sentenceddefendant for one count of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, two counts ofsecond-degree aggravated assault, and one count of fourth-degree assault byauto. The trial court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors. Itfound aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2) (“[t]he gravity andseriousness of harm inflicted on the victim”), and afforded it “substantialweight” with respect to the two counts of second-degree aggravated assault,citing both M.G.’s and M.J.G.’s serious injuries, as well as M.J.G.’s life-altering permanent injury. The trial court found aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (“[t]he risk that the defendant will commit anotheroffense”), due to defendant’s “poor driving record,”3 as well as his history ofalcohol abuse, but afforded that factor “only slight weight.” Finally, the trialcourt found aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (“[t]he need fordeterring the defendant and others from violating the law”), relying on both3 Defendant was convicted in 1977 of driving while intoxicated. His driving record also revealed five prior accidents, including one in which he left the scene, and two license suspensions. Defendant’s other motor vehicle offenses included stop sign violations, speeding, unsafe operation of a motor vehicle, and obstruction of the passage of another vehicle. 7 general and specific deterrence, but viewing general deterrence to be the morecompelling concern in this case. Noting defendant’s lack of prior criminal offenses and his age -- he wassixty-two years old at sentencing -- the trial court found mitigating factorseven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) (“[t]he defendant has no history of priordelinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantialperiod of time before the commission of the present offense”). The court gavethat mitigating factor only moderate weight, however, due to defendant’shistory of motor vehicle violations. The court declined defendant’s requestthat it also find mitigating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2) (“[t]he defendantdid not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm”),and mitigating factor ten, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10) (“[t]he defendant isparticularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment”). Thetrial court concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigatingfactors. Citing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5, Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44, and Carey, 168 N.J. at 427-31, the trial court addressed the question of whether defendant’sterms of incarceration for his individual offenses should run concurrently orconsecutively to one another. The court cited several of the factors set forth inYarbough, including the factor that the crimes “involve[] multiple victims.” 8 100 N.J. at 644. It relied on Carey for the principle that crimes such as the oneat issue here -- involving multiple deaths or seriously injured victims --“represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutivesentences.” See 168 N.J. at 428. The trial court cited the Court’s holding inCarey that the “multiple victims” factor is “entitled to great weight andordinarily should result in the imposition of at least two consecutive terms.”(citing id. at 429). It reasoned: In this case, there are four victims. In terms of the gravity of harm inflicted, two of them suffered the worst consequences imaginable. [R.S.] lost his life, [M.J.G.] faces life in a wheelchair. Certainly, any sense of justice would require that the offense involving [M.J.G.] should receive a sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed for the death of [R.S.] However, the injuries suffered by [M.G.] are also extremely serious. As indicated, requiring several weeks of a hospital stay, numerous surgeries, he likely will not fully recover. Presently walks with the aid of a cane and limp. In this court’s view, the sentence imposed for the offense against him also must be consecutive in order to accomplish accountability for the entire gravamen of the results of defendant’s conduct. The court accordingly found that defendant should be sentenced toconsecutive sentences for his aggravated manslaughter conviction and his twoaggravated assault convictions. It decided to impose a concurrent sentence fordefendant’s conviction of fourth-degree assault by auto, in which the victim,R.V., was less seriously injured than M.G. or M.J.G. 9 The trial court stated that it had considered defendant’s age and hisappeal “that the court not impose a sentence which would amount to one ofdeath while in prison.” It acknowledged that it was required to consider theeffect of the eighty-five percent parole disqualifier prescribed by the No EarlyRelease Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (NERA). The court noted, however, thatalthough it was mindful of defendant’s age, its goal was “to impose anappropriate sentence for the crimes committed and not one designed to assurehis release prior to the end of his life.” The trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms: a term oftwenty years’ imprisonment for first-degree aggravated manslaughter; a termof seven years’ imprisonment for the count of second-degree aggravatedassault in which the victim was M.J.G.; and a term of five years’ imprisonmentfor the count of second-degree aggravated assault in which the victim wasM.G. Each of the three terms was subject to NERA’s eighty-five percentperiod of parole ineligibility. For defendant’s conviction of fourth-degreeassault by auto, the court imposed a term of one year’s imprisonment to beserved concurrently with defendant’s other terms of incarceration. Accordingly, defendant’s aggregate sentence was thirty-two years’incarceration with a parole ineligibility period of twenty-seven years. 10 3. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. The AppellateDivision affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated the trial court’ssentencing determination and remanded for resentencing. Liepe, 453 N.J.Super. at 135-41. The Appellate Division observed that by virtue of defendant’sconsecutive sentences, he faced up to thirty-two years in jail and would beineligible for parole until he reached the age of eighty-nine. Id. at 135. Itconsidered that sentence “shocking to the judicial conscience” and opined thatthe sentence was “based on the judge’s misunderstanding of applicable legalprinciples about when consecutive terms are warranted.” Id. at 133. The Appellate Division acknowledged that in Carey, the Court statedthat when an offender’s use of a motor vehicle causes harm to multiplevictims, the sentencing court should “ordinarily” impose consecutive terms.Id. at 135-36 (quoting Carey, 168 N.J. at 429-30). It urged sentencing courtsnot to “assume from this statement that there exists a presumption in favor ofconsecutive terms.” Id. at 136. The Appellate Division “discern[ed] from the[trial] judge’s decision to impose consecutive terms that he believed Careyrequired consecutive terms -- a conclusion the Court expressly rejected” inCarey. Ibid. 11 The Appellate Division also construed the holding of Carey to be limitedto cases in which a defendant’s conduct killed more than one victim, and thusdetermined Carey to be inapplicable to a single-fatality case such as this. Id.at 140-41. It considered this case to present less egregious circumstances thandid Carey, in which the defendant “revealed a conscious disregard for societalnorms and an enhancement of the danger generated by his intoxication.” Id. at138. The Appellate Division stated that defendant’s sentence “has not beenshown to be in accord with any other sentence imposed in similarcircumstances” and opined that this disparity impairs “the overarchingYarbough goal that there be uniformity in sentencing.” Id. at 142. In supportof that contention, the Appellate Division attached an appendix in which it“synopsized all available post-Carey decisions -- some reported, mostunreported -- identifying sentences imposed in multiple-victim vehicularhomicide cases.” Id. at 139 n.5, 142-45. 4. We granted the State’s petition for certification. 235 N.J. 295 (2018).We denied defendant’s cross-petition for certification, in which he challengedthe Appellate Division’s decision affirming his conviction. 235 N.J. 211(2018). 12 II. A. The State urges the Court to reinstate the sentence that the trial courtimposed. It argues that in Carey, the Court prescribed a presumption in favorof consecutive sentences where an intoxicated driver causes multiple fatalitiesor injuries. The State observes that the trial court did not impose themaximum term for any of defendant’s offenses and properly sought to imposea fair sentence for defendant’s crimes. The State contends that the AppellateDivision unfairly faulted the trial judge for failing to compare defendant’ssentence to sentences imposed on other defendants and stresses that the casescited in the Appellate Division’s appendix involved less serious crimes thanthose at issue here. B. Defendant counters that his sentence shocks the judicial consciencebecause his conduct was no more serious than that of similarly situateddefendants sentenced to more lenient terms. He contends that the facts of thiscase do not support a conviction for aggravated manslaughter and that the trialcourt should therefore have imposed no consecutive sentences. Defendantasserts that the trial court misconstrued Yarbough to mandate consecutivesentences in this case and cites the dissent in Yarbough for the proposition that 13 consecutive sentences are best used when the offender has committed offensesin a series of separate, unrelated episodes. III. A. When it reviews a trial court’s sentencing determination, an appellatecourt must not “substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court.” Statev. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014); State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013).As the Court observed in State v. Roth, the “error which warrants modificationof a sentence must amount to more than a difference of opinion or individualsentencing philosophy. The sentencing objectives are spelled out in the Code.It is deviation from those objectives, in view of the standards and criteriatherein set forth, which constitutes error.” 95 N.J. 334, 365 (1984) (quotingPeople v. Cox, 396 N.E.2d 59, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)). Appellate review is thus limited to consideration of: (1) whether guidelines for sentencing established by the Legislature or by the courts were violated; (2) whether the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were based on competent credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether the sentence was nevertheless “clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.” [State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 158 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 365-66).] 14 B. 1. The sentencing provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justiceare “based on notions of proportionality and desert,” Carey, 168 N.J. at 422(quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 355), and “focus[] on the gravity of the offense,”ibid. As the Court observed in Yarbough, “[t]he Code requires the sentencingcourt to look at the individual offender in balancing the defined aggravatingand mitigating factors (including the defendant’s prior record, cooperation, orthe likelihood of further criminal conduct) to determine the range of thesentence, a parole disqualifier, or an extended term.” 100 N.J. at 636 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a), (b); 2C:43-7; 2C:44-1(f)). The Court noted in Yarbough, however, that “[t]he Code does not definewith comparable precision the standards that shall guide sentencing courts inimposing sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense.” Ibid. “Withcertain narrow exceptions,” ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(3), (c), (h)),“[t]he Code simply states that 'multiple sentences shall run concurrently orconsecutively as the court determines at the time of sentence,’” Carey, 168 N.J. at 422 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)). This Court “recognized early on that investing unbridled discretion insentencing judges would inevitably lead to a lack of sentencing uniformity.” 15 Ibid. Invoking legislative principles expressed in the Code, the Court inYarbough sought to provide practical guidance to trial courts determiningwhether to impose concurrent or consecutive terms of incarceration. 100 N.J.at 636-37. It observed that the Legislature premised the Code on “the conceptthat punishment of crime [should] be based primarily on principles of deservedpunishment in proportion to the offense and not rehabilitative potential, andthat in dispensing that punishment, our judicial system should attain apredictable degree of uniformity.” Ibid. To further the Legislature’s goals, the Court identified the followingguidelines: (1) there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime; (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision; (3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing court should include facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed 16 so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous; (4) there should be no double counting of aggravating factors; [and] (5) successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense. [Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44.]4 The Court noted in Yarbough that a sentencing court “will normallymake an overall evaluation of the punishment for the several offensesinvolved,” and that the trial court’s “goal is not an exercise 'whose object is tofind the maximum possible period of incarceration for a convicted defendant.’”Id. at 646 (quoting People v. Price, 199 Cal. Rptr. 99 , 109 (Ct. App. 1984)). It“recognize[d] that even within the general parameters that we have announcedthere are cases so extreme and so extraordinary” that they may warrant4 A sixth factor, which imposed “an overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of the longest terms,” was eliminated by the Legislature in a 1993 amendment to the statute addressing concurrent and consecutive terms. L. 1993, c. 223, § 1; see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a) (providing that “[t]here shall be no overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses”); see also Carey, 168 N.J. at 423 n.1. 17 “deviation from the guidelines.” Id. at 647. Nonetheless, the Courtencouraged courts sentencing defendants for multiple offenses to “strive forsome degree of proportionality.” Ibid. 2. In Carey, the Court reviewed the sentence of a defendant who wasconvicted of two counts of vehicular homicide, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(b)(1), a second-degree offense, and two counts of fourth-degree assault byauto, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c). 168 N.J. at 420. The defendant,intoxicated and traveling at an excessive speed, drove his pickup truck intooncoming traffic and collided with a car. Id. at 419-20. Two young people --one a passenger in the defendant’s car and one a passenger in the car that hestruck -- died in the accident; the driver of the other car and another passengerin the defendant’s car were seriously injured. Id. at 420. The trial courtsentenced the Carey defendant to two consecutive seven-year terms ofincarceration for the two counts of vehicular homicide, and two concurrentone-year terms of incarceration, which also ran concurrently to defendant’sterms for vehicular homicide, for the two assault by auto convictions. Id. at420-21. 18 The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions but vacated hisconsecutive sentences for the two counts of vehicular homicide and remandedfor the imposition of concurrent sentences for those offenses. Id. at 421. This Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment in Carey andreinstated the consecutive terms that the trial court had imposed. Id. at 431.The Court viewed the third Yarbough guideline, “the facts relating to thecrimes,” to “provide[] the clearest guidance to sentencing courts faced with achoice between concurrent and consecutive sentences.” Id. at 423. The Courtreiterated that the five “facts relating to the crimes” within that guideline“should be applied qualitatively, not quantitatively” and held that,consequently, “a sentencing court may impose consecutive sentences eventhough a majority of the Yarbough factors support concurrent sentences.” Id.at 427-28. The Court required a judge conducting a Yarbough analysis to“determine whether the Yarbough factor under consideration 'renders thecollective group of offenses distinctively worse than the group of offenseswould be were that circumstance not present.’” Id. at 428 (quoting People v.Leung, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290 , 303 (Ct. App. 1992)). Applying that principle to the case before it, the Court concluded that“[c]rimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained seriousbodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition 19 of consecutive sentences.” Ibid. (citing, by way of example, State v. J.G., 261 N.J. Super. 409, 426 (App. Div. 1993), and State v. Russo, 243 N.J. Super. 383, 413 (App. Div. 1990)). It reasoned that “[t]he total impact of singularoffenses against different victims will generally exceed the total impact on asingle individual who is victimized multiple times.” Id. at 429 (alteration inoriginal) (quoting Leung, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 303-04). The Court held that whena judge sentences a defendant in a vehicular homicide case, “the multiple-victims factor is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result in theimposition of at least two consecutive terms when multiple deaths or seriousbodily injuries have been inflicted upon multiple victims by the defendant.”Id. at 429-30. The Court concluded that the defendant’s conduct in Carey, whichresulted in two deaths and inflicted serious injuries on two other individuals,was much more damaging than conduct that kills or injures only one person,id. at 428-29, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when itimposed consecutive sentences, id. at 430-31. The Court recognized that theimpact of multiple victims on sentencing “resonates most clearly in cases inwhich a perpetrator intentionally targets multiple victims” but applied th atsentencing principle to “cases in which, as here, the defendant does not intend 20 to harm multiple victims but it is foreseeable that his or her reckless conductwill result in multiple victims.” Id. at 429. State v. Molina, a companion case to Carey, similarly involved analcohol-related accident in which a car driven by the defendant, whose BAC wasestimated to be .085, veered into oncoming traffic and collided with a vehicle inthe opposite lane. 168 N.J. 436, 438-40 (2001). The accident killed the otherdriver and a passenger in that driver’s vehicle, and injured two other passengersin that vehicle. Id. at 439. The defendant was convicted of two counts ofvehicular homicide, elevated to a second-degree crime prior to defendant’ssentencing, and was sentenced to two consecutive five-year terms ofincarceration. Id. at 440-41. The Appellate Division affirmed the defendant’sconvictions and sentence. Id. at 441. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. Id. at 442. Itdetermined that although the trial court had inadequately explained itsreasoning, it did not abuse its discretion in premising consecutive sentencesentirely on the fact that the defendant had killed multiple victims. Id. at 442-43. The Court reiterated in Molina the core principle of Carey: by virtue oftheir impact on multiple lives, crimes involving two or more victims areparticularly suited for the imposition of consecutive sentences, so that “themultiple-victims factor is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result 21 in the imposition of at least two consecutive terms.” Id. at 442 (quoting Carey, 168 N.J. at 429-30). 3. In this appeal, the Appellate Division held that our decisions in Careyand Molina did not establish a presumption in favor of consecutive sentencesin cases involving alcohol-related accidents in which multiple victims arekilled or seriously injured. See Liepe, 453 N.J. Super. at 135-36. We agree.5 A presumption “is a conclusion that the law directs must be drawn,” or a“mandatory inference that discharges the burden of producing evidence as to afact (the presumed fact) when another fact (the basic fact) has beenestablished.” Shim v. Rutgers, 191 N.J. 374, 386 (2007). This Court hasadopted presumptions in clear and unmistakable language in various settings.See, e.g., In re Keri, 181 N.J. 50, 53, 63 (2004) (“establish[ing] a presumptionin favor of spend-down proposals” permitting “self-sufficient adult children5 We accordingly disagree with the comment made by the Appellate Division in another case, in which it opined that, in Carey, the Court created a “rebuttable presumption” that a trial court should impose consecutive sentences “when a drunken driver’s use of a motor vehicle results in multiple victims.” State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 131-32 (App. Div. 2018). We note that in Locane, the question as to whether the defendant’s terms of incarceration should be consecutive or concurrent was moot at the time of the Appellate Division’s decision because the defendant in that case had “completed service of [her] eighteen-month sentence” for one of her offenses and was “not on parole for that offense.” Id. at 131. 22 who serve as their incompetent parents’ legal guardians” to “transfer tothemselves all or part of their parents’ assets in order to hasten their parents’eligibility for Medicaid benefits”); Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 603(1993) (“[W]e now hold that . . . in a product-liability case based on a failureto warn, the plaintiff should be afforded the use of the presumption that he o rshe would have followed an adequate warning had one been provided.”). There is no such language in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 or our case law. Whenthe Court held in Carey that, in vehicular homicide cases in which more thanone victim has been killed or seriously injured, “the multiple-victims factor”should “ordinarily result in the imposition of at least two consecutive terms ,” 168 N.J. at 429-30, it did not impose a presumption in favor of consecutiveterms. It simply observed that when a sentencing court compares the harminflicted by intoxicated driving in the multiple-victim setting with the harmthat would have resulted from the offense were there only a single victim, it islikely to conclude that the harm in the former setting is “distinctively worse”than that in the latter. See id. at 428. As the Court did “not adopt a per serule” of consecutive sentences in cases such as this, id. at 419, it adopted nopresumption governing such cases. Like any Yarbough analysis, thesentencing court’s determination regarding consecutive and concurrent terms 23 in the vehicular homicide setting turns on a careful evaluation of the specificcase. C. Nothing in the trial court’s determination in this case suggests that itreached its decision through the application of a presumption, contrary to theAppellate Division’s suggestion. Liepe, 453 N.J. Super. at 135-36. In thecourt’s detailed consideration of the facts before it, and its citation to thelanguage of Carey, there was no mention of a presumption. We detect in thetrial court’s analysis no misunderstanding of the governing principles. See id.at 133. Consistent with Yarbough and Carey, the trial court acted within itsdiscretion when it found that the injuries inflicted on multiple victims in thiscase warranted consecutive sentences. As Carey mandated, the trial courtcarefully considered whether the accident’s impact on multiple victims“renders the collective group of offenses distinctively worse” than thoseoffenses would be had defendant killed or injured only one individual. See 168 N.J. at 428. The court deemed the impact of defendant’s conduct on bothR.S. and M.J.G. to be the “worst consequences imaginable,” and observed thatthe impact of defendant’s conduct on M.G. to be “extremely serious”: a child,R.S., was killed; another child, M.J.G., was permanently paralyzed; and M.G. 24 was seriously and permanently injured. To the trial court, the imposition ofconcurrent sentences for defendant’s offenses would not ensure accountability. The trial court considered the fairness of a thirty-two-year aggregateNERA sentence, taking into account defendant’s age. See State v. Cuff, ___N.J. ___ (2019) (slip op. at 37-38) (reminding trial courts to consider thefairness of an aggregate sentence); State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 515 (2005)(same). It properly viewed its primary obligation, however, not to ensure thatdefendant would live long enough to be released on parole, but to craft asentence warranted by the offenses. We find no “deviation from [the Code’s sentencing] objectives, in viewof the standards and criteria therein set forth,” in the trial court’sdetermination, and accordingly we find no error. See Roth, 95 N.J. at 365(quoting Cox, 396 N.E 2d at 65). A court, acting within its broad discretion,could have imposed a concurrent term of incarceration for defendant’saggravated manslaughter conviction or for one or both of his convictions ofaggravated assault, but it was not an abuse of discretion to impose consecutiveterms in this case. Nor do we find the sentence imposed by the trial court to shock thejudicial conscience. 25 The Appellate Division partially premised its conclusion that the trialcourt’s sentence shocked the judicial conscience on a comparison betweendefendant’s sentence and sentences recounted in sixteen Appellate Divisiondecisions. Liepe, 453 N.J. Super. at 138-39. It suggested that the sentencewas an abuse of discretion because it was not “shown to be in accord” withsentences imposed in similar circumstances. Id. at 142. This Court, however, has never imposed on a trial court the obligation todemonstrate that a sentence comports with sentences imposed by other courtsin similar cases. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5; see also Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44.6 The Yarbough guidelines promote proportionality not by a comparativeanalysis of the sentencing practices of different courts, but by focusing the t rialcourt on the “facts relating to” the defendant’s crimes. Carey, 168 N.J. at 423;see also Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44. Here, the trial court properly focusedon the case before it, and on the devastating impact of defendant’s crimes.6 Indeed, it would be impractical for a sentencing court to conduct a fair and comprehensive survey of sentences imposed in matters similar to the case before it. Many sentences are never reported in appellate decisions, and there is no indication that those that are reported provide a representative sample of sentencing practices throughout the State. Even sentences that happen to be reported in appellate opinions may not provide a sentencing court with a detailed understanding of the defendant’s crimes or the trial court’s application of the Yarbough factors in that case. 26 We recognize, as the trial court recognized, that defendant may spendthe rest of his life in jail. We agree with the trial court, however, that its taskwas not to ensure defendant’s eventual release, but to devise a sentencecommensurate with defendant’s crimes. Defendant’s consecutive terms do not violate statutory or judicialguidelines for sentencing, and they do not shock the judicial conscience.There was no abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion in this case. IV. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the sentenceimposed by the trial court is reinstated. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’S opinion. 27