Title: Kole v. Faultless
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 94S00-1112-CQ-692
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 2012

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
Steven W. Griesemer 
Gary P. Price 
Joseph P. Rompala 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
Mark J. Crandley 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
No. 94S00-1112-CQ-692 
MICHAEL R. KOLE, JOSEPH L. WEINGARTEN, 
AND GLENN J. BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY 
SITUATED, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SCOTT FAULTLESS, DANIEL HENKE, EILEEN 
PRITCHARD, STUART EASLEY, DAVID 
GEORGE, ARTHUR LEVINE, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE 
TOWN COUNCIL OF FISHERS, INDIANA, AND 
FALL CREEK TOWNSHIP, 
Defendants. 
Certified Question from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
No. 1:10-CV-1735-TWP-DML 
The Honorable Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge 
March 15, 2012 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
In 2006, the Indiana General Assembly liberalized the framework within which local 
governments may reorganize themselves.  It is clear that this new framework substantially 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Mar 15 2012, 1:08 pm
2 
reduces the barriers to rearranging local units.  This case asks to what extent earlier statutes 
continue to limit the resulting forms that reorganizing local governments may take. 
In particular, Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana has asked us the following question, certified under Indiana Appellate Rule 
64(B): 
Whether a political unit may reorganize into a city under Ind. Code 
art. 36-1.5 (the “Reorganization Act”) in a manner that eliminates 
voting rights recognized under Ind. Code § 36-4-5-2 and Ind. Code 
§ 36-4-6-3(i), including reorganization as a city with (1) a council 
elected entirely at large; and (2) a mayor appointed by that council. 
We have accepted this question and now hold that Article 1.5 of Title 36 does allow a 
political subdivision to do so.1 
Background 
Over 76,000 people reside in the Town of Fishers, making it the largest town in 
Indiana—more than twice as large as the next largest town—and the eighth largest municipality 
overall. 
The present structure of the Town of Fishers adheres to the standard arrangement for 
towns as set out in Article 5 of Title 36 of the Indiana Code.  Citizens of the Town elect a Town 
                                                 
1 The parties and the District Court have taken to calling Article 1.5 of Title 36 the Reorganization Act.  
To avoid confusion with other provisions in other articles of Title 36 that provide for annexations, 
disannexations, and mergers of political subdivisions, we refer to Article 1.5 using the name the 
Legislature gave it—Government Modernization. 
3 
Council at large.  The Town Council, in turn, selects a Town Board President from among its 
own members. 
On May 3, 2010, some 1700 citizens of the Town of Fishers—the Plaintiffs among 
them—filed a petition with the Fishers Town Clerk seeking a referendum on whether the Town 
should convert itself from a town into a second class city.  Under the standard structure for 
second class cities as set out in Article 4 of Title 36, citizens directly elect a city mayor for the 
city, plus six city council members from legislative districts and three more at large. 
On May 5, 2010, two days after receiving the petition, the Fishers Town Council passed a 
resolution proposing a reorganization with Fall Creek Township.  The resolution called for a 
commission to study the possibility of merging the two entities into a reorganized city.  The 
authority for such a merger is the Government Modernization Act, a recently enacted statute that 
appears as Article 1.5 of Title 36. 
As proceedings on the Town Council’s proposal moved forward, the Plaintiffs’ petition 
did not.  The Plaintiffs filed suit in Hamilton Superior Court on September 30, 2010, seeking to 
compel the Fishers Town Council to schedule their petition for a referendum.  They voluntarily 
dismissed that suit and refiled in U.S. District Court on December 30, 2010. 
While the litigation continued, the commission studying the Fishers/Fall Creek merger 
approved the reorganization plan on November 11, 2010.  In its final form, the reorganization 
plan proposed reorganizing the Town of Fishers and Fall Creek Township along the following 
lines: 
(1) 
The Town of Fishers and the Township would merge into a 
single political subdivision; 
(2) 
The new political subdivision, called the City of Fishers, 
would become a “nontraditional” second class city that combined 
attributes of a second class city and a town; 
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(3) 
The citizens of Fishers would elect a nine-member City 
Council at large; 
(4) 
The City Council would appoint a City Mayor to a four-
year term by a majority vote; 
(5) 
The City Mayor would not have the power to veto 
ordinances passed by the City Council; 
(6) 
The City Council would approve a City Manager 
recommended by the City Mayor by a majority vote;  
(7)  
The existing Town Council Members and the Township 
trustee would remain in office as part of the new City Council until 
municipal elections in 2015. 
(Joint App. at 38; Joint Add. at 5–10.) 
On December 20, 2010, the Fishers Town Council and the Township held a public 
meeting during which both entities adopted the final reorganization plan.  A referendum on the 
reorganization plan will occur in the November 2012 general election. 
On February 21, 2011, the Town Council passed a resolution acknowledging the 
Plaintiffs’ petition to incorporate the Town of Fishers into a second class city.  The resolution 
further ordered a referendum on that proposal in the next general election, the same election in 
which residents would vote on the reorganization plan. 
Back in federal court, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint, arguing 
that it failed to present a federal question, thereby depriving the District Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss but otherwise abstained from 
acting so a state court would have a chance to address a novel question of state law that might 
5 
allow the District Court to avoid needlessly addressing a constitutional question.  The Plaintiffs 
moved to reopen the case and further moved to certify that question to this Court.2 
I. 
The Path Away from the Dillon Rule 
Like many other states, Indiana historically adhered to the Dillon Rule that a municipal 
corporation could exercise only the following powers: 
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or 
fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; 
third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable. 
Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Ind. Mfr.’s Ass’n, 784 N.E.2d 463, 465 (Ind. 2003) (citing Dillon, 
Municipal Corporations (1st ed. 1872) (emphasis in original)).  A corollary rule of construction 
required that a court resolve any reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power against 
the corporation and enjoin the corporation from exercising it.  See id. 
Under the Dillon Rule, a person who simply found himself on the wrong side of some 
local action could easily challenge that action by essentially arguing that it was ultra vires.  See, 
e.g., City of S. Bend v. Chicago, S.B. & N.I. Ry. Co., 179 Ind. 455, 458, 101 N.E. 628, 629 (Ind. 
1913) (“[T]he charter of South Bend delegated no power for the enforcement of the ordinance in 
controversy . . . .”).  The resulting legal landscape handcuffed municipal corporations, preventing 
them from taking a wide range of governmental actions we might find commonplace today.  See, 
e.g., Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Town of Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421, 45 N.E. 587 
                                                 
2 We have recently expressed concern over using the certified question process in an apparent attempt to 
bypass the Indiana trial courts.  Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. 2011).  Here, it seems that there 
was plenty of procedural maneuvering on both sides of the v., so we have set aside our concerns out of 
comity with the District Court. 
6 
(1896) (town could not enforce ordinance requiring railroad to post watchmen and maintain 
gates at crossings at railroad’s expense because statute authorizing ordinances to prevent 
nuisances did not provide so specifically). 
Recognizing the disadvantages of the Dillon Rule, the Legislature abrogated it in 1971, 
when it passed the Indiana Powers of Cities Act.  Act of April 14, 1971, P.L. 250-1971, § 1, 
1971 Ind. Acts 955, 967.  The Legislature expanded the applicability of this reforming principle 
in 1980, when it passed the Indiana Home Rule Act.  Act of February 27, 1980, P.L. 211-1980, 
§ 1, 1980 Ind. Acts 1657, 1659–62 (codified as amended at Ind. Code §§ 36-1-3-1 to -9 (2007)).  
In addition to reaffirming the abrogation of the Dillon Rule, the Home Rule Act provides that in 
general, a unit is presumed to possess broad powers of local government, unless the Indiana 
Constitution or a statute expressly denies the unit that power, or expressly grants it to another 
entity.  Ind. Code § 36-1-3-5 (2007); see also City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson 
Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003) (city could file public nuisance claim against handgun 
manufacturer when statute authorizing public nuisance claims did not specifically address 
regulating handguns). 
II. 
The 2006 Act:  A Further Step 
Against this ever-liberalizing landscape, the Legislature passed the Indiana Government 
Modernization Act.  Act of March 24, 2006, P.L. 186-2006, § 4, 2006 Ind. Acts 3892, 3893 
(codified as amended at Ind. Code §§ 36-1.5-1-1 to -5-8 (2007 & Supp. 2011)).  The Act grants 
political subdivisions “full and complete authority” to reorganize, exercise governmental 
functions under a cooperative agreement, and transfer responsibilities between offices and 
officers.  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-1-2. 
A reorganization includes a change in the structure or administration of a political 
subdivision involving (1) a consolidation of two or more political subdivisions; or (2) one of 
multiple other “allowable actions” set out in Indiana Code § 36-1.5-4-4.  Ind. Code §§ 36-1.5-2-
7 
5, -4-3.  Among those other allowable actions, a reorganizing political subdivision may transfer 
the functions of an office to another office; and provide for a legislative body, an executive, or a 
fiscal body of the reorganized political subdivision to exercise the powers of the reorganizing 
political subdivision’s legislative body, executive, or fiscal body.  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-4-4(3)–(4). 
It appears as though at least two political subdivisions must be involved for a 
reorganization to occur, see Ind. Code § 36-1.5-4-1, though it may be that Article 1.5 supplies 
some unidentified additional options.  Section 36-1.5-4-1(a) tends to list out political 
subdivisions of the same type.  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-4-1(a)(1)–(6).  In particular, it permits 
reorganizations between two or more municipalities, which would include cities and towns.  Ind. 
Code § 36-1.5-4-1(a)(3); see also Ind. Code § 36-1-2-11 (2007) (“municipality” includes “city” 
and “town”).  But it also allows political subdivisions of different types to reorganize.  Ind. Code 
§ 36-1.5-4-1(a)(7)–(11).  Regardless, this section does not, at least by its terms, limit the 
resulting forms the reorganized political subdivision may take. 
The Modernization Act provides two mechanisms for initiating a reorganization:  a 
resolution and a petition.  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-4-9 to -11.  In either case, a reorganization study 
commission must adopt a reorganization plan that needs to include, among many other things, 
A description of the membership of the legislative body, fiscal 
body, and executive of the reorganized political subdivision, a 
description of the election districts or appointment districts from 
which officers will be elected or appointed, and the manner in 
which the membership of each elected or appointed officer will be 
elected or appointed. 
Ind. Code § 36-1.5-4-18(b)(4).  After a political subdivision’s legislative body approves the plan, 
it may take effect only after that political subdivision’s voters approve it by referendum.  Ind. 
Code § 36-1.5-4-32. 
Once the voters approve a reorganization, “[t]he political subdivisions are reorganized in 
the form and under the conditions specified by the legislative bodies of the reorganizing political 
8 
subdivisions in the plan of reorganization filed with the county recorder.”  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-4-
34(b). 
III. 
The Non-Traditional City Idea 
Perhaps the centerpiece of the Plaintiffs’ contention is that the Town Council’s 
reorganization plan strips them of their chance to vote for a mayor, who is typically the executive 
head of a second class city.  Whether the chance to vote for such an executive is imbedded in 
Indiana law is not a constitutional question, but rather statutory.  After all, the Indiana 
Constitution provides:  “All officers, whose appointment is not otherwise provided for in this 
Constitution, shall be chosen in such manner as now is, or hereafter may be, prescribed by law.”  
Ind. Const. art. 15, § 1. 
Thus, the Plaintiffs’ contentions rest on various statutes about reorganizations, elections, 
and municipal structure.  For example:  “[A]fter the voters approve a reorganization, one (1) set 
of officers for the reorganized political subdivision . . . shall be elected . . . as prescribed by 
statute.”  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-4-36(b) (emphasis added).  Subsections like the foregoing, Plaintiffs 
argue, demonstrate that the Government Modernization Act mandates that a reorganized city’s 
voters elect a city mayor and city council in the same manner Indiana Code §§ 36-4-5-2, and -6-
3(i) (2007) require of any other second class city.  (Plaintiffs’ Br. at 9–10.) 
The Plaintiffs’ contentions about Section 36(b) and other provisions are plausible, but 
they are best characterized as inference.  The Act itself hardly supplies explicit support for 
Plaintiffs’ position.  As for inferences, it is also plausible to read “as prescribed by statute” as 
referring simply to the time, place, and manner of conducting municipal elections. 
The General Assembly has given us a guiding principle for resolving such subtleties.  It 
has declared that we should liberally construe the Modernization Act to effect its purposes.  Ind. 
Code § 36-1.5-1-5.  The Act gives to all local governments what it calls “full and complete 
9 
authority” to reorganize, exercise governmental functions under a cooperative agreement, and 
transfer responsibilities between offices and officers.  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-1-2.  Except as 
otherwise provided in the Act itself, no other law, procedure, proceeding, or other act by a 
political subdivision, or by the state, is a prerequisite before the political subdivision exercises 
that authority.  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-1-3.  Finally, the Act controls over any inconsistent law unless 
specifically provided otherwise.  Ind. Code § 36-1.5-1-6. 
In light of the Legislature’s directives about construing the Act’s provisions, we conclude 
that Article 1.5 does indeed allow a municipality to reorganize into a city even though the 
reorganization plan provides for a city council elected at large and a city mayor appointed by the 
city council.  If citizens approve a reorganization plan that describes the membership of new 
political branches and the manner in which those members will attain office, then the 
reorganization may proceed along those lines. 
While one might wonder what individual elements of the general manner of elections for 
cities and towns need persist after an Article 1.5 reorganization, we will not adopt a “Dillonist” 
mindset in trying to answer that question.  Indeed, as the long march away from the Dillon Rule 
makes plain, it is far less burdensome on both the courts and the Legislature for the law to 
presume the existence of local authority to act absent some express prohibition, than it is to 
require legislation spelling out every detail of every permissible action a municipality may take.  
So the General Assembly has said, several times over multiple recent decades. 
Conclusion 
We therefore answer the District Court’s certified question in the affirmative. 
Dickson, Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.