Title: Brewington v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 525, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2002

1State v.  Brewington, Del.  Super., No.  9804000245, Herlihy, J. (Nov.  4, 1998).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ERIC T.  BREWINGTON,
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No.  525, 2001
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below–Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in
v.
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and for Kent County in 
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VK98-04-0213-04 and K99-02-
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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0076I.
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Plaintiff Below,
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Def.  ID Nos.  9804000245 &
Appellee.
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9902000315
  
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
Submitted: March 14, 2002
Decided:
May 20, 2002
O R D E R
This 20th day of May 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and the
State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In 1998, Brewington pleaded guilty to Burglary in the First
Degree and was sentenced to five years at Level V suspended for Level IV
home confinement and probation.1  In May 1999, January 2000, and June
2In May 1999, Brewington was sentenced to five years at Level V, suspended after
60 days for 16 months at Level IV Work Release, followed by one year at Level III and
two years at Level II.  In January 2000, Brewington was sentenced to four years and 10
months at Level V, suspended for eight months at Level IV Home Confinement, followed
by one year at Level III followed by three years at Level II.  In June 2000, Brewington was
sentenced to four years at Level V, suspended upon successful completion of the Key
Program or Recovery Center of Delaware Program, for balance at Level III.   
3State v.  Brewington, Del.  Super., No.  9902000315, Vaughn, J. (April 27,
1999).
4Brewington was sentenced to five years at Level V, suspended for two years at
Level III followed by three years at Level II.
2
2000, Brewington was adjudged guilty of violation of probation (VOP) and
was sentenced.2  
(2)
In April 1999, Brewington pleaded guilty to the drug offense of
Manufacture, Deliver or Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled
Substance  and was sentenced to five years at Level V suspended for Level IV
work release and probation.3  In June 2000, Brewington was adjudged guilty
of VOP and was sentenced.4   
(3)
On September 5, 2001, Brewington was charged with having
violated the conditions of his two Level III probations when he (i) failed to
report as directed to his supervising officer on July 18, 2001; (ii) tested
positive for marijuana and cocaine on August 3, 2001, and for marijuana and
amphetamines on August 24, 2001; and (iii) failed to abide by a 10:00 p.m.
5On the burglary VOP, Brewington was sentenced to three years at Level V,
suspended after 18 months.  On the drug VOP, Brewington was sentenced to five years at
Level V, suspended for one year at Level IV work release, followed by two years at Level
III.
3
curfew on August 15, 2001, and September 4, 2001.  On September 21,
2001, Brewington and his counsel appeared in the Superior Court for a VOP
hearing.  At the hearing, Brewington admitted that he missed the two 10:00
p.m. curfews, but he explained that in one instance he was working, and in
the other he was assisting an elderly relative.  Brewington also admitted that
he tested positive for marijuana and cocaine on August 3, 2001.  At the
conclusion of Brewington’s testimony, the Superior Court found him guilty
of  VOP.  The Superior Court sentenced Brewington,5 and this appeal
followed.
(4)
Brewington’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Brewington’s counsel asserts that, based
upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably
appealable issues.  Counsel states that she advised Brewington of the
provisions of Rule 26(c), informed Brewington that he could supplement the
Rule 26(c) brief, and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the
accompanying brief, and the complete hearing transcript.  Brewington
6Penson v.  Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v.  Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v.  California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
4
responded with a submission that raises several issues for this Court’s
consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by Brewington’s
counsel as well as to the issues raised by Brewington and has moved to affirm
the Superior Court’s judgment.
(5)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration
of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is
twofold.  First, this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.
Second, this Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine
whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues
that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.6  
(6)
On appeal, Brewington claims that he had no opportunity to
confront Erik Farinas, the probation officer who filed the VOP report,
because Officer Farinas did not attend the VOP hearing.  In a related claim,
Brewington complains that Officer Carruthers, the probation officer who
presented the case at the VOP hearing, was not personally acquainted with
Brewington, or with what Brewington “may have been going through” and
7See Super.  Ct.  Crim.  R.  32.1 (a) (providing that when a person is taken into
or held in custody on a charge of VOP, the person shall be brought without unreasonable
delay before a magistrate or judge to fix bail and, if not released on bail, shall  be afforded
a prompt hearing on the VOP charge).
8Brown v.  State, 249 A.2d 269, 272 (Del.  1968).
9D.R.E. 1101(b)(3).
5
the “progress [he] was trying to make.”  Also, Brewington complains that
Officer Carruthers “brought up [Brewington’s] prior past violations which had
nothing to do with this violation.”  Finally, Brewington appears to claim that
he was not afforded a prompt VOP hearing.7
(7)
Brewington’s claims are unavailing.   Brewington was charged
with VOP by an administrative warrant that issued on September 7, 2001.
Brewington was held without bail, and a VOP hearing was held on September
21, 2001.  Brewington’s claim that he was not afforded a prompt VOP
hearing is not supported by the record.    
(8)
Hearsay evidence is admissible at a VOP hearing.8  Thus, the
Superior Court could consider the hearsay evidence presented by Officer
Carruthers, even though he was not personally acquainted with Brewington.
(9)
The rules of evidence do not apply to a VOP hearing.9  Thus,
contrary to Brewington’s claim, Officer Carruther’s testimony about
6
Brewington’s prior VOP convictions was admissible and properly considered
by the Superior Court when determining whether to revoke or continue
Brewington’s probations.
(10)
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded
that Brewington’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Brewington’s counsel has made
a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly
determined that Brewington could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice