Title: Upshur v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 139, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 5, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CHARLES UPSHUR,
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§
No. 139, 2005
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Superior Court 
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for Sussex County in Cr. A. 
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Nos. 02-10-1084; 02-08-0224,  
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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0225, 0234 through 0240.
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Def. ID No. 0207009470A
Submitted: May 6, 2005
Decided:
 August 5, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
O R D E R
This 5  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s
th
opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Charles Upshur, has appealed from the Superior
Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").  The State has moved to affirm the
Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of
Upshur’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.
Upshur v. State, 2004 WL 542164 (Del. Supr.). 
1
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
2
2
(2)
Upshur was found guilty in February 2003 of Trafficking in
Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Possession of Marijuana,
Conspiracy in the Second Degree, three counts of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, and three counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child.  Upshur
was sentenced to a total of thirty years followed by probation.  
(3)
On direct appeal, Upshur contended that the Superior Court should
have suppressed statements that he had made during a police interrogation.
This Court concluded that Upshur’s statements were admissible and affirmed
Upshur’s conviction.1
(4)
On March 15, 2005, Upshur filed a motion for postconviction
relief.  Upshur alleged (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) illegal sentence,
and (3) illegal search and seizure.  By order dated March 28, 2005, the Superior
Court denied Upshur’s postconviction motion.  This appeal followed.
(5)
When reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction
motion pursuant to Rule 61, this Court must consider the procedural
requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues.   Rule
2
61(i)(4) provides that any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated is
3
thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest
of justice.  Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is  barred,
unless the movant demonstrates “cause for relief from the procedural default”
and “prejudice” stemming from the alleged grievance.  Rule 61(i)(5) provides
in pertinent part that the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) shall not apply to a
colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a
constitutional violation.
(6)
It appears from the Superior Court record that the police stopped
Upshur’s girlfriend while she was operating a vehicle registered to Upshur. The
police seized paraphernalia and suspected illegal substances from Upshur’s
girlfriend and two envelopes containing suspected illegal substances from
Upshur’s vehicle.  The suspected illegal substances seized from Upshur’s
girlfriend and the vehicle field-tested positive for cocaine.  
(7)
After searching Upshur’s residence, the police seized more
suspected illegal substances, some of which did not field-test positive for
cocaine.  A forensic chemist in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
determined later, however, that all of the substances seized from Upshur’s
residence tested positive for cocaine. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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(8)
In his postconviction motion and now on appeal, Upshur argues
that his defense counsel was ineffective when he did not seek to introduce at
trial the police reports indicating that some of the substances found in Upshur’s
residence had not field-tested positive for cocaine.  To prevail on his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Upshur must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but
for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
trial would have been different.3
(9)
The Superior Court concluded, and we agree, that Upshur’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.  In view of the forensic
chemist’s trial testimony that proved that the substances seized from Upshur’s
residence tested positive for cocaine, Upshur cannot establish a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his
defense counsel presented the results of the initial field tests conducted by the
police.   
(10)
Second, Upshur claims, as he did in his Superior Court motion,
that he should have been sentenced for possessing only 9.8 grams of cocaine
(the amount that field-tested positive) as opposed to the more than 100 grams
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4753A(a)(2)(c)(2002).  
4
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4763(a)(3)(2002).
5
In October 2002, Upshur filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his
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residence.  The Superior Court rejected and returned the motion with instructions for
refiling; but, the motion was not refiled.  Nonetheless, at a suppression hearing held on
January 15, 2003, Upshur moved to suppress the statements that he had made during the
police interrogation.  The Superior Court denied Upshur’s motion.
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of cocaine that were introduced into evidence at his trial.  Upshur’s claim is
without merit.  Upshur was properly sentenced for trafficking in 100 grams or
more of “mixture containing cocaine”  and for possessing with intent to deliver
4
cocaine after having previously been convicted of an offense under Chapter 47.5
(11)
Finally, Upshur claims that the evidence seized at his residence
should have been suppressed because the search warrant did not establish
probable cause.  We agree with the Superior Court that the claim is barred
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).  Upshur has not demonstrated  cause for his failure
to raise the claim or prejudice from the alleged violation of his rights.
Moreover, Upshur has not shown a basis under Rule 61(i)(5) to apply the
exception to the procedural bar.  
(12)
Furthermore, having reviewed the Superior Court record, we
conclude that the suppression claim is barred under Rule 61(i)(4) as formerly
adjudicated.   Upshur has made no showing that reconsideration of this
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
7
Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d
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719, 721 (Del. 1990)).
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previously adjudicated claim is warranted in the interest of justice.   A
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Delaware Court is not required to revisit an issue “simply because the claim is
refined or restated.”8
(13)
It is manifest on the face of Upshur’s opening brief that this appeal
is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled
Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there
was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice