Title: State v. Barnes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP002005-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2023

2023 WI 45 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2005-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Garland Dean Barnes, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 397 Wis. 2d 241,959 N.W.2d 75 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas   
 
JUDGE: 
Kelly J. Thimm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in 
which ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Cole Daniel Ruby and Martinez & Ruby, LLP, Baraboo. 
There was an oral argument by Cole Daniel Ruby. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general.  
 
 
2023 WI 45 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2005-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF118) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Garland Dean Barnes, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court.  ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in 
which ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   This case raises two 
issues.  The first concerns the right of a criminal defendant to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The second 
concerns harmless error. 
  
¶2 
  Garland Dean Barnes was charged with delivering more 
than 50 grams of methamphetamine.  As a discovery sanction, the 
circuit court prohibited Agent Duane Clauer from testifying at 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
2 
 
the trial.1  During the trial, the State asked another officer 
about Clauer's observations during a "controlled buy," i.e., a 
police setup to catch someone selling drugs.  Barnes objected, 
arguing the testimony would be hearsay.  The State responded 
that it was not seeking to introduce hearsay because it was not 
planning to use the testimony for the truth of the matter 
asserted.  Instead, the State claimed the testimony would show 
why this other officer thought Barnes had sold meth (i.e., the 
other officer's state of mind).  The court overruled Barnes's 
objection.  The jury found him guilty.  A judgment of conviction 
was entered, and Barnes sought postconviction relief, arguing 
his confrontation right had been violated.  The circuit court 
denied relief.  Barnes appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's denial, reasoning the testimony was 
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  State v. 
Barnes, No. 2018AP2005-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶33, 35 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2021) (per curiam).  The court of appeals also 
indicated that if an error occurred, it was harmless.  Id., ¶35 
n.7. 
¶3 
We assume without deciding that Barnes's confrontation 
right was violated; however, we hold the error was harmless.  
Among other considerations, the evidence of Barnes's guilt was 
overwhelming. 
 
Accordingly, 
"the 
guilty 
verdict 
actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."  
                                                 
1 The Honorable Kelly J. Thimm, Douglas County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
3 
 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Charles Marciniak, a police informant, told police 
that a man he knew as "Dean"——later identified as Barnes——
offered to sell him meth.2  Marciniak also explained Barnes was 
able to make the sale that same day.  An email from an assistant 
district attorney explained that Marciniak faced serious felony 
charges and received a favorable sentencing recommendation for 
participating in multiple controlled buys.  Marciniak testified 
he did not receive any promise from the State before he decided 
to participate in the buys.   
¶5 
In response, Sergeant Franz Winterscheidt assembled a 
team to catch Barnes selling meth to Marciniak.  In addition to 
Winterscheidt, the team included two officers who testified at 
the trial, Investigator Jason Tanski and Sergeant James Madden.  
The team also consisted of other officers who did not testify, 
including Agent Clauer.   
¶6 
Police first recorded four phone conversations between 
Marciniak and Barnes.  The recordings took place in the presence 
of police and were played for the jury.   
¶7 
At about 5:20 p.m., Marciniak called Barnes.  Barnes 
said he was a mere "40 minutes away."  The controlled buy 
occurred around 6:15 p.m., rendering events between this call 
and the buy temporally proximate. 
                                                 
2 Marciniak had prior criminal convictions. 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Barnes called Marciniak about 15 minutes later, and 
the two discussed where to meet.  Barnes suggested "my little 
spot," but Marciniak did not know what that meant.  When 
Marciniak questioned Barnes, Barnes mentioned a "motel," but 
Marciniak remained confused.  Marciniak testified that the two 
had generally met in the parking lot of a bar.  The two did not 
explicitly agree to meet at a particular location during the 
phone calls, but Marciniak advised police the controlled buy 
would take place in the bar parking lot.  Sergeant Winterscheidt 
testified, based on his training and experience, that the call 
involved "coded talk for the arrangement of a drug transaction." 
¶9 
The recording of the third call picked up only 
Marciniak's voice.  Sergeant Winterscheidt, who was with 
Marciniak during the call, explained that he could hear two 
voices, but only Marciniak's was recorded because another 
officer plugged an earbud into the wrong audio jack.  In the 
recording, Marciniak said:  "Hello.  Two?  Alright.  I'll take 
'em.  You're gonna have to -- you're gonna have to run up again 
then maybe.  You might have to see me sooner than next weekend.  
What's that?  Right on.  Well then, 4?  Alright.  Do that.  
Alright.  Bye." 
¶10 Marciniak's dialogue in the recording of the third 
call is consistent with Sergeant Winterscheidt's testimony as 
well as Marciniak's.  Winterscheidt identified the other voice 
as Barnes's.  Winterscheidt testified the conversation was about 
"the quantity of meth[] that was expected to be delivered," 
although Winterscheidt admitted on cross-examination that he had 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
5 
 
trouble hearing Barnes's "specific words[.]"  After the call 
ended, 
but 
while 
the 
recording 
device 
was 
still 
on, 
Winterscheidt said, "I need that other 1800."  Winterscheidt 
explained Marciniak initially "believed" Barnes would sell 3 
ounces of meth for $1,800 an ounce, so Winterscheidt knew more 
money would be needed after the third call. 
¶11 Marciniak explained that during the third call Barnes 
offered to sell two ounces of meth.  Marciniak responded that he 
would like more to avoid having to meet again soon.  Barnes then 
proposed four ounces.  Marciniak agreed and planned to purchase 
four ounces for $1,800 an ounce, for a total price of $7,200.  
Marciniak 
testified 
he 
had 
initially 
informed 
Sergeant 
Winterscheidt that he was not sure how much he could buy but 
expected about three ounces, so Winterscheidt knew he needed 
more money after the call.  Importantly, the exact amount of 
drugs to be sold was not agreed upon until shortly before the 
controlled buy.  Barnes placed a fourth call to Marciniak to 
tell him, "I'm probably gonna be there 7, 8 minutes."   
¶12 Sergeant Winterscheidt testified that police prepared 
Marciniak for the controlled buy.  Police thoroughly searched 
Marciniak's person——except for his private areas——and his truck, 
looking for currency and contraband.3  Marciniak testified police 
patted him down, checked inside his socks and shoes, and 
                                                 
3 Sergeant Winterscheidt personally searched Marciniak.  Who 
searched Marciniak's vehicle is unclear from the record, but 
multiple officers and Marciniak testified it was in fact 
searched. 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
6 
 
searched his truck.  Finding neither currency nor contraband, 
police fitted Marciniak with a recording device and sent him to 
the bar parking lot with $7,200 in marked bills inside a white 
plastic bag.  Officers followed "within viewing distance." 
¶13 According to Marciniak, he entered the parking lot in 
his truck and parked next to Barnes's truck, with the driver's-
side doors facing each other.  Marciniak testified he threw the 
bag of money into Barnes's truck, and then Barnes threw back a 
black box.  Marciniak noticed Barnes's girlfriend, Bobbi Reed, 
in Barnes's truck.  Marciniak testified he was "one-hundred 
percent" certain that Barnes, not Reed, tossed the box.   
¶14 Police watched from a distance.  Investigator Tanski 
testified he could see Marciniak's parked truck and watched as 
another truck approached.  The officer noted the vehicles parked 
with both driver's-side doors facing one another and the other 
truck left "relatively fast," although he could not see the 
actual transaction from his angle.  Sergeant Madden explained 
the buy occurred "very quick."  The testimony of the various 
officers indicates some officers arrived shortly before the 
controlled buy and others shortly after. 
¶15 The controlled buy was not videotaped, and the audio 
picked up by the recording device Marciniak wore was not 
introduced.  Sergeant Winterscheidt noted that "we've had 
investigators 
spotted 
conducting 
video 
surveillance 
on 
controlled buys.  It makes it difficult."  He explained video 
cameras are used "selectively" in controlled buys.  In this 
case, officers did not know where the buy was going to take 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
7 
 
place until part way through "the process of forming the 
team[.]"  Under the circumstances, Winterscheidt testified 
police did not have time to set up covert video surveillance.  
Investigator Tanski confirmed, "the location was set during 
those phone calls.  So it was a very short time from one of the 
last phone calls to where the location was determined."  
Sergeant Madden also explained that because the buy happened on 
a Sunday, "[i]t was hard to find investigators to come in," 
which 
seems 
to 
have 
contributed 
to 
the 
lack 
of 
video 
surveillance. 
¶16 Sergeant 
Winterscheidt 
testified 
that 
after 
the 
controlled buy, he received a radio call from an unidentified 
officer informing him that "it went down, deal is done."  
Thereafter, Winterscheidt gave the order to arrest Barnes.  
Barnes noticed police were approaching and fled in his truck.  
After a short car chase, police cornered Barnes's vehicle.  The 
$7,200 was found sitting near the center console, still in the 
white plastic bag.  Police also found thousands of dollars in 
unmarked cash on Barnes's person and in his vehicle.  Police 
searched Reed and found meth and heroin.   
¶17 Sergeant 
Winterscheidt 
testified 
that 
about 
five 
minutes after arresting Barnes, police met with Marciniak at a 
predetermined location.4  For a brief period, police did not have 
a visual on Marciniak; however, Winterscheidt testified that "as 
                                                 
4 Investigator Tanski estimated between 5 and 10 minutes 
passed. 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
8 
 
far as [Marciniak] knew, [police] were directly behind him[.]"  
Officers probably would have maintained surveillance but for the 
need to divert attention from Marciniak to Barnes as he 
attempted to flee.  Marciniak testified he did not leave his 
truck or meet with anyone between the time of the controlled buy 
and his later meeting with police.   
¶18 Sergeant Winterscheidt then recovered the black box 
from Marciniak's truck.  Winterscheidt testified the box 
contained four ounces of meth.  When Sergeant Winterscheidt was 
asked why he was so confident that Marciniak did not get the 
black 
box 
during 
the 
five-minute 
period, 
Winterscheidt 
explained: 
There's no way to know [with] 100 percent assurance 
that he didn't receive meth[] from an alien that 
descended from the sky.  It is 
–– given the 
circumstances and the time frame of which we did 
respond to . . . Marciniak's location, I don't believe 
that he could have received meth[] from any other 
source other than . . . Barnes. 
Similarly, Investigator Tanski testified the box was not 
"crumpled or mangled" and did not have any creases that would 
indicate it had been "bent or shoved into any type of nook or 
cranny[.]"     
¶19 The State charged Barnes with delivering more than 50 
grams of meth.  Shortly before trial, Barnes moved to exclude 
Agent Clauer's testimony because the State had only recently 
listed him as a witness and provided Clauer's reports.  The 
reports indicate Clauer observed the transaction.  The circuit 
court granted the motion. 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20 The trial lasted two days.  Barnes attacked the 
thoroughness of the investigation while cross-examining Sergeant 
Winterscheidt.  Specifically, he suggested Marciniak may have 
been the seller and Barnes the buyer, not the other way around 
as police thought.  Barnes's questioning indicated concern that 
police did not videotape the controlled buy.  During closing 
argument, Barnes maintained he was trying to purchase meth for 
his drug-addicted girlfriend, not sell it.  He asserted he was 
tricked by Marciniak, who framed him to curry favor with police.  
Barnes's girlfriend, Reed, did not testify.5 
¶21 On redirect examination, the State asked Sergeant 
Winterscheidt, "[a]re you aware of any specific officers who saw 
the transaction that . . . Marciniak described to you where he 
tossed in the buy money and [Barnes] tossed in the black box?"  
Barnes did not object.  Winterscheidt replied, "[y]es." 
¶22 The State then asked which officer observed the 
controlled buy.  Barnes objected, arguing the testimony would be 
hearsay.  The circuit court overruled the objection, agreeing 
with the State that the testimony would establish Sergeant 
Winterscheidt's "state of mind" (i.e., why he thought Barnes, 
and not Marciniak, was the seller).  The State repeated the 
question, 
worded 
slightly 
differently: 
 
"Sergeant, 
which 
investigator saw . . . Marciniak toss in a white plastic bag 
and . . . Barnes toss in a black box? . . .  What agent saw 
                                                 
5 The State wanted to call Reed to the stand, but the 
circuit court prohibited Reed from testifying as a discovery 
sanction.  
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
10 
 
that?" 
 
Winterscheidt 
responded, 
"[i]t 
was . . . [Agent] 
Clauer."6 
¶23 Barnes recalled Sergeant Winterscheidt, and in an odd 
turn, solicited testimony about Agent Clauer's observations: 
Q. [W]as there a continuous officer present watching 
this entire transaction? 
A. I don't know what you mean by continuous officer 
present watching . . . Marciniak or watching the 
controlled buy. 
Q. I thought you testified yesterday that there were 
police eyes on the transaction at all times.  Do 
you remember saying that or words to that effect? 
A. That's what I was under the impression of. 
Q. Okay.  I didn't ask you what you were under the 
impression of.  I asked you whether or not there 
were eyes always on the suspect. . . .  You didn't 
have 
video 
cameras 
but 
you 
testified 
that 
there . . . [were] a bunch of cops running around 
and 
other 
officers 
watching 
this 
alleged 
transaction.  Do you remember that? 
A. I remember testifying that . . . [Agent] Clauer –– 
that 
I 
learned . . . Clauer 
had 
observed 
the 
transaction. 
Q. So is it your testimony that there was or was not 
constant visual surveillance of the alleged buy? 
A. I don't know that there was constant visual 
surveillance at all times of the events leading up 
to the buy and the hand-to-hand transaction.  I was 
only given information that . . . Clauer actually 
observed the hand transaction. 
                                                 
6 The circuit court indicated it would be willing to give a 
jury instruction to inform the jury it should not use Sergeant 
Winterscheidt's 
testimony 
that 
Agent 
Clauer 
observed 
the 
controlled buy for the truth of the matter asserted.  Barnes did 
not request such an instruction, so one was not given. 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
11 
 
¶24 After Barnes was convicted, he moved for a new trial.   
Among other points, he argued the circuit court erred in 
admitting Sergeant Winterscheidt's testimony that Agent Clauer 
observed the controlled buy.  The court denied the motion, 
reiterating 
its 
conclusion 
that 
the 
testimony 
"went 
to . . . Winterscheidt's state of mind[.]"  The court also 
reasoned if an error occurred, the error was not "of the 
significance that would need the [c]ourt to order a new trial.  
I think [the alleged error was] minor in the context of this 
long –– it wasn't a long trial, but it was two days."  It 
emphasized that "[t]here were a number of witnesses.  There was 
a lot of testimony for even being two days."   
¶25 Barnes later filed a motion for postconviction relief, 
arguing, among other things, that his confrontation right was 
violated.7 
 
He 
asserted: 
 
"The 
reason 
for 
[Sergeant] 
Winterscheidt's actions (moving in to arrest Barnes) was amply 
explained by other evidence[.]"  Barnes maintained "[t]here was 
absolutely no need for [Winterscheidt] to take it a step further 
and explain that one officer claimed to have observed the hand-
to-hand [transfer] and that Barnes produced the meth."  The 
circuit court denied the motion. 
 
¶26 Barnes appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit 
court's 
denial. 
 
Barnes, 
No. 2018AP2005-CR, 
¶33 
                                                 
7 At trial, Barnes objected on hearsay grounds but did not 
make a confrontation objection.  The State has not argued that 
Barnes forfeited his confrontation objection, so we do not 
address the issue. 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
12 
 
(citation omitted).  The court of appeals noted that "[t]he 
testimony had the convenient effect for the State of rebutting 
some of Barnes's attempts to impugn the quality of the 
investigation."  Id.  Applying a discretionary standard of 
review, the court of appeals determined "the circuit court could 
[still] reasonably conclude that the testimony was not being 
offered to show that [Agent] Clauer had, in fact, observed the 
transaction but, rather, to show why [Sergeant Winterscheidt] 
had taken subsequent investigative steps."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Because the court of appeals decided the testimony 
was not hearsay, it concluded Barnes's confrontation right had 
not been violated.  Id., ¶35.  The court of appeals also 
indicated that if an error occurred, it was harmless.  Id., ¶35 
n.7.  Barnes filed a petition for review, which this court 
granted in part, confining the parties to Barnes's confrontation 
right claim and hearsay argument. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 Barnes argues his confrontation right was violated.  
As framed by the parties, the crux of the issue is whether 
Sergeant Winterscheidt's testimony regarding Agent Clauer's 
observations 
constituted 
"hearsay," 
i.e., 
an 
"out-of-court 
statement[] offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."  See State v. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, ¶19, 387 
Wis. 2d 233, 928 N.W.2d 607 (quoting United States v. Tolliver, 
454 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2006)).  We assume without deciding 
that Barnes's confrontation right was violated.  Appellate 
courts often decide cases on "the narrowest possible grounds"——
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
13 
 
in this case, harmless error.  See Barland v. Eau Claire County, 
216 Wis. 2d 560, 566 n.2, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998) (citing State v. 
Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
¶28 The State argues that even if Barnes's confrontation 
right were violated, the error was harmless.  Under well-
established precedent, such a violation "does not result in 
automatic reversal" and "is subject to harmless error analysis."  
See State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶41, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 834 
N.W.2d 362 (citations omitted).  Whether an error was harmless 
is a question of law, subject to our independent review.  State 
v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶29, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42 
(citing Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶43, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 
N.W.2d 191). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
¶29 An error is harmless if "the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."  
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.  The "overall strength of the State's 
case" is often an important consideration.  Deadwiller, 350 
Wis. 2d 138, ¶41 (quoting State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶46, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270).  Other considerations include "the 
frequency of the error" and the "nature of the defense[.]"  Id. 
(quoting Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶46). 
¶30 The evidence against Barnes was overwhelming.  See id.  
The State argues, "[t]he problem with Barnes's argument is that 
it assumes the jury would have questioned who delivered drugs to 
whom had Sergeant Winterscheidt not testified that Agent Clauer 
witnessed the transaction.  Given the strength of the State's 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
14 
 
case, there is simply no chance that would have happened."  We 
agree.  
¶31 The recorded phone conversations before the controlled 
buy significantly strengthen the State's case.  The third call 
is particularly incriminating.  While Barnes's voice cannot be 
heard in it, Sergeant Winterscheidt confirmed Barnes was in fact 
speaking.  Marciniak's recorded dialogue leaves little doubt 
that he was acting as a prospective buyer, not a seller.  
Marciniak was asked a question, to which he responded, "[t]wo?  
Alright.  I'll take 'em."  As the State notes, "[i]f Marciniak 
were dealing to Barnes as suggested, in what context would he 
tell Barnes that he would take two of something?  Two dollars?  
Two of some item in a trade?"  Applying common sense, Marciniak 
responded to an offer to sell something.  As the conversation 
continued, Marciniak stated, "[y]ou're gonna have to run up 
again then maybe.  You might have to see me sooner than next 
weekend.  What's that?  Right on.  Well then, 4?"  These 
comments similarly make little sense if they were coming from a 
seller.  If Marciniak were selling to Barnes, Marciniak probably 
would not tell Barnes they would need to meet again; rather, 
Barnes would dictate when he needed to buy more drugs. 
¶32 Sergeant Winterscheidt emphasized the phone calls were 
like many others he had heard before.  Despite Barnes's 
argument, nothing in the calls caused Winterscheidt any concern.  
In particular, Winterscheidt explained the second call involved 
"coded talk for the arrangement of a drug transaction." 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
15 
 
¶33 After the phone calls, police searched Marciniak and 
his truck before the controlled buy to ensure he did not have 
currency or contraband.  Winterscheidt described the searches as 
thorough, and Marciniak's testimony was consistent with that 
description.  After the searches, police gave Marciniak $7,200 
in marked bills.  Police and Marciniak then went to the buy 
location.  Barnes was indisputably present.  Shortly after the 
sale, Barnes fled from police and was ultimately apprehended 
with the marked bills in addition to thousands of dollars of 
unmarked cash——an unusual amount for an ordinary person to carry 
but not uncommon for a drug dealer.  Marciniak had four ounces 
of meth in a black box.  The box did not appear to have been 
hidden.    
¶34 Marciniak was with police before the controlled buy 
and police met with Marciniak shortly after arresting Barnes, 
minimizing any chance that Marciniak could have obtained the 
black box at some point after the searches.  Sergeant 
Winterscheidt testified Marciniak was out of sight for a mere 
five minutes.  This fact is especially important considering all 
of the evidence indicates the quantity of meth to be sold was 
not known until shortly before the buy.  If Marciniak set Barnes 
up, Marciniak either guessed correctly that the deal would be 
for four ounces or found and placed this exact amount of meth 
into the box within an especially short timeframe.  Neither 
possibility is probable. 
¶35 As the circuit court noted, the error occurred 
infrequently during a two-day trial with "a lot" of testimony 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
16 
 
from multiple witnesses.  See id.  As the State argues, the 
error happened twice at most——once during the State's re-direct 
examination 
and 
once 
when 
Barnes 
recalled 
Sergeant 
Winterscheidt.  The extent to which Barnes can complain about 
the second mention of Agent Clauer's observations is obviously 
questionable considering he is the one who solicited the 
testimony. 
 
¶36 Finally, the "nature of the defense" was weak.  See 
id.  Read as a whole, the record does not support Barnes's 
closing argument that Marciniak set him up and he was merely 
trying to purchase meth for his girlfriend.  While Barnes had no 
duty to prove his innocence, the weakness of the defense theory 
bears on whether the error actually impacted the trial's 
outcome.  Barnes provided little evidence to support his theory 
or to otherwise counter the State's strong case.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 Assuming an error occurred, we conclude it was 
harmless.  The State produced overwhelming evidence against 
Barnes.  Additionally, the error occurred infrequently and 
Barnes's defense did little to counter the State's case.  The 
guilty verdict rendered in this trial was unattributable to the 
error.       
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No. 
2018AP2005-CR   
 
17 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶38 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring).  I 
join the majority opinion and agree that Barnes' conviction is 
valid because, assuming error occurred, the error was harmless.  
I write separately to offer an alternative ground for upholding 
Barnes' conviction.  The conviction is valid because the circuit 
court did not err in admitting the challenged statements of 
Sergeant Winterscheidt.  His statements of what other officers 
told him were properly admitted because they were not offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, were not 
hearsay.  They were offered as relevant evidence to explain 
Sergeant Winterscheidt's order to stop Barnes as part of law 
enforcement's investigation of Barnes' involvement in drug 
trafficking.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
¶39 Barnes' conviction arose out of a controlled drug buy 
that was facilitated by a confidential police informant, Charles 
Marciniak.  Police provided Marciniak with a white plastic bag 
containing $7,200 in marked bills to use in buying drugs from 
Barnes.  On the scheduled day, Marciniak and Barnes, who had 
prearranged a meeting in the Temple Bar parking lot, parked 
their vehicles going in opposite directions, such that both 
driver's side windows were up against one another.  
                                                 
1 The majority opinion capably sets out the factual 
background that led to Barnes' conviction.  Therefore, I relate 
only those facts necessary to understanding the legal principles 
that form the basis for this concurrence.   
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶40 Marciniak, who had a serious felony conviction and was 
awaiting sentence, was to bring $7,200 to the tavern parking 
lot.  Barnes was to bring methamphetamine ("meth").   
¶41 Marciniak testified that he threw the white plastic 
bag of marked bills into Barnes' truck and Barnes then threw 
back a black box containing meth.  That transfer was not video 
recorded, 
but 
other 
investigators 
visually 
observed 
the 
transaction 
and 
relayed 
to 
Sergeant 
Winterscheidt 
that 
Investigator Clauer said he saw the transfer of drugs for money. 
Sergeant Winterscheidt then gave the order to stop Barnes.   
¶42 A transcript of a portion of the trial bears on why 
law 
enforcement 
pursued 
Barnes. 
 
Sergeant 
Winterscheidt 
testified that an unnamed officer told him that Investigator 
Clauer had observed the sale.2  
Q.  As you drove over to the Temple Bar, what do 
you recall happening? 
A.  I remember arriving just as the transaction 
had been completed.  Mr. Marciniak was driving away 
from the meet location and heard on the radio that the 
transaction had taken place so I gave the order to 
take down the suspect.   
. . . .  
Q.  Are you aware of any specific officers that 
observed the transaction? 
A.  Yes.   
Q.  Who was that?   
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Objection 
as 
to 
foundation, Your Honor, and hearsay. 
                                                 
2 Investigator Clauer was prohibited from testifying during 
the trial because of a prosecution discovery violation.   
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
. . . .  
[STATE]:  He opened the door when he asked 
about did any investigators videotape this. 
THE COURT:  He opened the door but how does 
that respond to -– it might make it relevant but how 
does it make it not hearsay?   
[STATE]:  Again, it goes to the officer's 
state of mind at the time.  I could lay further 
foundation for what he did after he was informed of 
seeing the transaction occur.   
THE COURT:  Okay, overruled then.  You can 
lay foundation.  Can you repeat the question?   
Q.  When officers surrounded the Temple Bar, were 
there officers who were able to maintain video -– 
excuse me, visual surveillance?   
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your Honor.  
He wasn't there after. 
THE COURT:  If he knows, he doesn't so 
overruled. 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  You know that there were officers who had 
visual surveillance on the parking lot at that time? 
A.  Yes, 
through 
our 
radio 
communications 
responding to that I was aware that officers had 
reported they were in a position at the Temple Bar. 
Q.  How did you know that the transaction had 
been completed? 
A.  Other investigators observing the transaction 
notified me by radio. 
Q.  Okay.  Do you recall what they said, if 
anything? 
A.  I believe the words were something like, it 
went down, deal is done.  Something like that. 
Q.  Do you know who radioed that to you? 
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
A.  I don't recall specifically who radioed that 
to me. 
Q.  Okay.  Are you aware of any specific officers 
who saw the transaction that Chip Marciniak described 
to you where he tossed in the buy money and Garland 
tossed in the black box? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Who?   
A.  It was –- 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your Honor, 
this is hearsay. 
THE COURT:  [State]? 
[STATE]:  Again, it goes to officer's state 
of mind from them getting told that the transaction 
was done is when officers then moved in to position to 
stop Garland Barnes. 
THE 
COURT:  I'm 
going 
to 
overrule 
the 
objection. 
. . . .  
Q.  Sergeant, 
which 
investigator 
saw 
Chip 
Marciniak toss in a white plastic bag and Garland 
Barnes toss in a black box?  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, hearsay, lack 
of foundation. 
THE COURT:  [State], regarding hearsay? 
[STATE]:  Again, goes to the officer's state 
of mind.   
THE COURT:  So you're not asserting it for 
the truth of the matter? 
[STATE]:  No. 
THE COURT:  Then if it's not asserted for 
the truth of the matter, I'm going to overrule the 
objection.  It's going to the state [of] mind of the 
officer.  If [defense counsel] wants –- if you want to 
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
get a jury instruction on that substantively, I will 
certainly give it.  Go ahead, [State]. 
Q.  What agent saw that? 
A.  It was DCI Investigator Duane Clauer.   
Q.  With that information were you then given the 
code word that the transaction was completed? 
A.  Yeah, it wasn't a code word.  It was just 
common language to let us know the deal was done.   
Q.  Once you knew the deal was done, what 
happened next?   
A.  After the transaction took place, I was just 
arriving on the scene.  Mr. Barnes backed into the 
front of sergeant Madden's vehicle and then proceeded 
out of the parking lot eastbound on Broadway Street. 
Q.  Were you eventually able to stop him after 
some time? 
A.  Yes.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶43 The issue is whether the circuit court's admission of 
Sergeant Winterscheidt's statement that Investigator Clauer 
observed the drug sale violated Barnes' right of confrontation.  
"[W]hether to admit or deny evidence rests in the sound 
discretion of the circuit court, which we will not overturn 
absent an erroneous exercise of discretion."  State v. Novy, 
2013 WI 23, ¶21, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 N.W.2d 610.  We review 
whether the admission of Sergeant Winterscheidt's statements 
violated Barnes' confrontation right independently as a question 
of law.  State v. Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, ¶17, 385 Wis. 2d 700, 
924 N.W.2d 184.   
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶44 Barnes claims Sergeant Winterscheidt's statement that 
Investigator Clauer saw the drug sale take place violated his 
right of confrontation.  The right of confrontation arises from 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.3   
¶45 Under 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause, 
out-of-court 
statements that are both hearsay and testimonial are not 
admissible against a criminal defendant unless the witness is 
unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
59 (2004).  It is undisputed that Barnes did not have a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine Investigator Clauer.   
¶46 Relevant to deciding this case is the hearsay prong of 
Crawford.  In Crawford, the Supreme Court explained the 
Confrontation Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial 
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing 
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).  By definition, 
when an out-of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth 
of the matters asserted, it is not hearsay.  "[A] crucial aspect 
of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, pursuant to 
Crawford, is that it 'only covers hearsay, i.e., out-of-court 
                                                 
3 "'We 
generally 
apply 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
precedents when interpreting' the Sixth Amendment and the 
analogous Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution."  
State v. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, ¶15, 376 Wis. 2d 300, 897 
N.W.2d 363 (quoting State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶13, 299 
Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518).  
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
statements "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."'"  State v. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, ¶19, 387 Wis. 2d 233, 
928 N.W.2d 607 (quoting United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 
666 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice Series:  Wisconsin Evidence § 801.302 (4th ed. 2017) 
("[O]ut-of-court statements may be offered to prove innumerable 
relevant 
propositions 
apart 
from 
the 
truth 
of 
any 
matters . . . .").   
¶47 Hearsay is defined by statute and addressed in 
numerous 
court 
opinions. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 908.01(3) 
provides:  "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  When a 
statement that might be described as hearsay encompasses an 
additional statement that also might be described as hearsay, 
each statement is addressed separately to determine if it is 
employed for the truth of the matter asserted.  Boyer v. State, 
91 Wis. 2d 647, 661-62, 284 N.W.2d 30 (1979); Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.05 ("Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under 
the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements 
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in this 
chapter.").  "There is no question that where a particular state 
of mind of a person is a relevant fact, declarations which 
indicate its existence are admissible . . . ."  Bridges v. 
State, 247 Wis. 350, 365, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945) (explaining that 
"[t]he hearsay rule does not operate, even apart from its 
exceptions, to render inadmissible every statement repeated by a 
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
witness as made by another person.  In some instances, the fact 
that a statement was made, rather than the facts asserted in the 
statement, is material").   
¶48 As a result, "the Confrontation Clause only prohibits 
the introduction of testimonial hearsay, and hearsay is, by 
definition, an out of court statement that is 'offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.'"  State v. 
Thomas, 2023 WI 9, ¶61, 405 Wis. 2d 654, 985 N.W.2d 87.  
¶49 Here, Sergeant Winterscheidt's state of mind was 
relevant because he was the officer in charge of the ongoing 
drug trafficking investigation.  It was for him to decide 
whether to order that officers pursue Barnes.  He so ordered, 
not because of the truth of an unnamed officer's telling him 
that Clauer saw Barnes sell drugs, but because it was 
Winterscheidt's responsibility as part of the investigative plan 
once he was told that the sale had occurred.  Investigator 
Clauer's statement to other officers also was part of the 
investigation wherein he had the role of keeping Marciniak in 
view and passing along what he thought he saw.  Also, the 
defense that Barnes was the buyer, not the seller, was first 
mentioned in Barnes' counsel's closing argument at trial.  It 
followed a long and effective cross-examination wherein Barnes' 
counsel had attempted to show that law enforcement was sloppy in 
its planning and execution of the investigation of this case.  
There is nothing in the record to imply that law enforcement was 
concerned about who was the seller at the time Sergeant 
Winterscheidt 
was 
told 
the 
transaction 
had 
occurred.  
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
Accordingly, Sergeant Winterscheidt would have ordered officers 
to pursue Barnes even if what Clauer thought he saw was not 
correct.   
¶50 As we explained in Hanson, "The question is not 
whether the evidence might be inadmissible hearsay if it is 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather, the 
question is whether the evidence is offered for a legitimate 
reason other than for the truth of the matter asserted."  
Hanson, 387 Wis. 2d 233, ¶25.  Furthermore, "when the State 
offers a statement for a proper non-hearsay purpose . . . it is 
neither 
hearsay 
(evidence 
law) 
nor 
testimonial 
hearsay 
(confrontation law)."  Id., ¶26 (quoting Blinka, supra ¶46, 
§ 802.302).  The evidence at issue in this case was used for a 
purpose other than the truth of its contents.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2006) (testimony 
is not for its truth where it is offered "as an explanation of 
why the investigation proceeded as it did"). 
¶51 This distinction was brought out at Barnes' trial 
where the prosecutor asserted that she was not offering Sergeant 
Winterscheidt's 
testimony 
about 
what 
he 
was 
told 
that 
Investigator Clauer had observed for the truth of the matter 
asserted.  But rather, it was offered to show Sergeant 
Winterscheidt's state of mind about why he took subsequent steps 
in this drug trafficking investigation.  In permitting the 
testimony, the circuit court explained, "It's going to the state 
of mind of the officer.  If [defense counsel] wants -– if you 
want to get a jury instruction on that substantively, I will 
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
certainly give it."  Barnes did not ask for the jury instruction 
that the circuit court offered.  
¶52 In sum, the testimony that Investigator Clauer saw the 
sale occur is relevant to Sergeant Winterscheidt's state of mind 
because it caused him to order Barnes be pursued and stopped as 
part of his investigation of drug trafficking.  When Sergeant 
Winterscheidt gave the order, "officers then moved into position 
to stop Garland Barnes."  It did not matter whether the 
statement was true or not.  What mattered was that the 
investigative plan called for Sergeant Winterscheidt to order 
that Barnes be stopped when he was told that Investigator Clauer 
saw the sale occur.  "[E]vidence is not hearsay when it is used 
only to prove that a prior statement was made and not to prove 
the truth of the statement."  Anderson v. United States, 417 
U.S. 211, 220 n.8 (1974).  Here, the prior statement was that 
Investigator Clauer saw the sale occur.  It is relevant because 
it caused Sergeant Winterscheidt to order law enforcement 
personnel to move forward with their prior plan.  It does not 
matter 
whether 
the 
statement 
he 
received 
was 
correct.  
Therefore, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in admitting the testimony, which was offered for a 
permissible purpose.  Reinwand, 385 Wis. 2d 700, ¶35.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 Barnes' conviction is valid because the circuit court 
did not err in admitting the challenged statements of Sergeant 
Winterscheidt.  His statements of what other officers told him 
were properly admitted because they were not offered for the 
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, were not hearsay.  
They were offered as relevant evidence to explain Sergeant 
Winterscheidt's 
order 
to 
stop 
Barnes 
as 
part 
of 
law 
enforcement's investigation of Barnes' involvement in drug 
trafficking.   
¶54 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
No.  2018AP2005-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1