Title: Miller v. Rath
Citation: 173 Kan. 192, 244 P.2d 1213
Docket Number: 38,660
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 1952

173 Kan. 192 (1952)
244 P.2d 1213
ARLIE MILLER, Appellant,
v.
ROBERT M. RATH, JAMES E. ELY, et al., Appellees.
No. 38,660

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 7, 1952.
George R. Gould, of Dodge City, was on the briefs for the appellant.
Horace H. Rich, and Harold S. Herd, both of Coldwater, were on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WERTZ, J.:
This was an action brought to foreclose a real estate mortgage. Appellant's abstract consists of a statement of facts of ten lines in which he states that the petition sets forth the mortgage, the amount due thereon as against the primary defendant (appellee Robert M. Rath), and alleges that certain others including defendant James E. Ely have or claim some interest in the property covered by the mortgage. It appears from the trial court's order that Ely was a judgment creditor of defendant Rath, the original mortgagor. None of the pleadings are abstracted, and who the other parties to the action were is not disclosed. The abstract contains nothing more than an order of the trial court setting forth that on the 9th of November, 1951, there came on for hearing a motion of defendant Ely for judgment declaring that his lien was prior to that of the mortgage lien owned by the plaintiff Miller (appellant here). The record does not disclose the contents of this motion nor the *193 stage of the proceedings at which it was lodged. The court found that the judgment of the defendant Ely was a prior lien on the property in question to that of the mortgage lien held by plaintiff Miller. From the court's order, plaintiff appealed to this court.
Appellant's abstract contains neither a clear statement of the facts nor any specification of errors. Rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (169 Kan. XI, G.S. 1949, 60-3825), long in force and effect, reads in pertinent part:
A review of the record reveals that appellant has made no attempt to comply with the rules of this court, and we have repeatedly held in a long line of decisions that failure to comply with the rules of the court by setting forth the specification of errors complained of is fatal, and the action will not be considered. (Dupont v. Lotus Oil Co., 168 Kan. 544, 213 P.2d 975, and cases cited therein; City of Independence v. Wendorff, 169 Kan. 14, 216 P.2d 820). The purpose of the mentioned rule is to promote definiteness, fairness and orderly procedure on appellate review, and the sound and substantial reasons supporting it require its rigid enforcement. (Dupont v. Lotus Oil Co., supra.) Moreover, appellant has failed to reproduce such portions of the record in the cause below as would enable this court to arrive at a full understanding of the question presented for review and to arrive at any intelligent conclusion on the appeal.
Moreover, it is apparent from a reading of the record that the order entered therein was not a final order and that the parties apparently recognized this fact, as the record discloses they entered into a stipulation, a portion of which reads:
Our jurisdiction to reverse, vacate or modify an order of the district court is controlled by G.S. 1949, 60-3302. A pertinent part thereof provides:
If the trial court's order comes under any of the mentioned provisions, it is the first one. The question therefore is, was this a final order? G.S. 1949, 60-3303 defines the term "final order." It reads in part:
A further question confronting us is whether a decision by us on the appeal would end the progress of the cause, or would further action be necessary. It is apparent from the record that this was an action to foreclose a mortgage. No final judgment has been rendered in that action foreclosing the mortgage. The only order made by the trial court was that the lien of Ely, the judgment creditor, was superior to the mortgage lien of the plaintiff. There was no determination of amounts due any litigant, or of the priority of claims of any other defendant in the action.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the order made by the trial court is not a final order, and the parties to this appeal cannot by stipulation consider it as such for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on this court. This court has repeatedly held that an order of the trial court to be a final order and appealable must be such an order as would result in a final determination of the action. (Fincham v. Fincham, 171 Kan. 120, 231 P.2d 232; Western Shale Products Co. v. City of Fort Scott, 172 Kan. 336, 239 P.2d 828).
The appeal is dismissed.