Title: IN RE HON WARFIELD MOORE JR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83920
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2001

___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED MAY 30, 2001  
In re HONORABLE WARFIELD MOORE, JR., 
Judge of the Third Circuit Court, 
Detroit, Michigan.  
No. 112416  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, J.  
The 
Judicial 
Tenure 
Commission 
filed 
Formal 
Complaint 
No.  
58 against the Honorable Warfield Moore, Jr., Third Circuit  
Court judge, on June 12, 1998.1  Pursuant to an agreement  
reached between the examiner for the commission and Judge  
Moore in November 1999, the allegations of misconduct set  
forth in paragraphs 1 through 17 of the complaint were  
dismissed with prejudice. Further, the parties agreed that a  
public hearing on the remaining allegations contained in  
paragraphs 18 through 25 of the complaint would be held before  
the full nine-member commission rather than the appointed  
master.  This hearing occurred on March 13, 2000. On July 18,  
1 The commission was established by Const 1963, art 6,  
§ 30.  
 
 
2000, 
the 
commission 
issued 
its 
decision 
regarding 
misconduct,  
finding that Judge Moore had committed various instances of  
misconduct.2  In its recommendation for order of discipline,  
filed October 10, 2000, the commission recommended that Judge  
Moore be suspended for nine months without pay.  
On de novo review,3 we conclude that Judge Moore  
committed misconduct.  However, we disagree that a nine-month  
suspension is warranted.  Instead, we order Judge Moore  
suspended for six months without pay.  
I  
The allegations that form the basis of the commission’s  
findings of misconduct and recommendation of discipline stem  
from incidents occurring during eight separate criminal cases  
over which Judge Moore presided, spanning the years 1994­
1997.4  The commission made the following factual findings in  
relation to each case.  
A  
Paragraph 18 of the complaint concerns People v White,  
Recorder’s Court Case No. 94-3885.  The defendant in this  
matter was charged with first-degree murder and possession of  
2 Although the decision regarding misconduct was issued 
on July 18, 2000, it was not filed until October 10, 2000.  
3 In re Seitz, 441 Mich 590, 594; 495 NW2d 559 (1993); In  
re Bennett, 403 Mich 178, 184; 267 NW2d 914 (1978).  
4 Six of the trials occurred in the Detroit Recorder’s  
Court, which later became part of the Third Circuit Court. 
Judge Moore was first elected to the Detroit Recorder’s Court 
in 1979.  
2  
 
a firearm during the commission of a felony.5  The commission  
found six instances of misconduct arising from this case.  
First, 
the 
commission 
determined 
that 
Judge 
Moore 
created  
sympathy for the victim when, during jury selection, he  
compared the “viable” defendant with the murder victim,  
stating:  
Ladies and gentlemen, you are going to to 
[sic] meet shortly the defendant in this matter. 
He is a very viable individual.  Meaning he is 
alive and well like you and I. He walks and talks  
and sleeps and eats and does all of the other 
function[s] that live human beings are wont to do. 
However, ladies and gentlemen, it is, there is an 
allegation that one Ronald Pemberton, Jr.[,] is no 
longer alive because it is alleged that he was shot 
to 
death, 
I 
believe, 
by 
the 
defendant  
premeditatedly, designedly.  And obviously, you 
won’t see or hear him, from him in terms of seeing 
or hearing from him, ladies and gentlemen.  
Second, in response to a prospective juror’s comments  
that he was biased against the prosecution because his brother  
had been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, Judge Moore  
asked the juror to explain how he would demonstrate his bias,  
stating, “How would you do it? When you leave here, hiss or  
boo at her [the prosecutor]?”6  When this juror was dismissed  
for cause, Judge Moore made the following remark:  
5 The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and 
felony-firearm.  
The 
Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s 
conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that the 
trial court’s behavior had denied the defendant a fair trial.  
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 1, 1997 (Docket 
No. 182605).  This Court peremptorily reversed and reinstated 
the defendant’s convictions for the reasons stated by the 
dissenting Court of Appeals judge. 457 Mich 864 (1998).  
6 The commission’s findings of fact do not quote Judge 
Moore exactly, stating that he asked, “‘How would you show 
your bias’ when you leave here, hiss or boo at [the 
prosecutor]?”  
3  
Of course, now, when anybody is out there with 
a gun and wants to use it, you tell them, come and 
see brother Nunley [the dismissed prospective 
juror].  He understands that.  He understands you 
having a gun and putting it to his head.[7] I  
couldn’t quite get with it myself.  But different  
strokes for different folks, I guess.  
Third, the commission found that a hypothetical example  
given by Judge Moore during jury selection, which named the  
defendant and was modeled on the facts of the case, improperly  
encouraged the prospective jurors to find the defendant  
guilty.  
Fourth, the commission found that Judge Moore had  
commented spontaneously on the defendant’s personal interest  
in the case and the effect of his interest on his credibility.  
Fifth, the commission determined that Judge Moore had  
improperly interjected himself into the proceedings in a  
manner favorable to the prosecution by asserting an objection  
to the defense counsel’s leading question and criticizing the  
prosecutor for failing to do so.  Further, Judge Moore  
commented that the defense counsel was asking for conclusions  
that were really up to the jury to make.  
Sixth, the commission found that Judge Moore unfairly  
criticized the Court of Appeals during sentencing when he  
stated in part:  
Because I say, and I am going to put this on 
whether the Court of Appeals likes it or not.  See, 
Court of Appeals, a lot of you folks up there who 
are white and middle class, you don’t know.  You  
7 When asked during jury selection whether he had been 
the victim of a crime, the dismissed juror explained that 
someone had put a gun to his head.  He further indicated that  
one of his friends was hospitalized, having been robbed at 
gunpoint and shot.  
4  
 
 
 
don’t have relatives who live in the ghetto.  You  
don’t have black relatives who live in the ghetto 
who are trying to get over who are not that way. 
So you may think what I am saying, you shouldn’t 
interject that.  I have to, because that is where I 
come from.  That is where I go to. These are the  
People I talk to.[8]  
B  
The two allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint stem  
from People v Eklour, Recorder’s Court Case No. 94-4189. The  
defendant was accused of attempting to defraud an insurance  
company by falsely claiming that his business was robbed.  The  
defendant was acquitted.  
The commission determined that Judge Moore would not  
permit defense counsel to assert objections or make a record  
and that he made derogatory comments toward counsel in the  
presence of the jury.  Further, the commission found that  
during a trial recess, when the court was off the record,  
Judge Moore commented to the prosecutor that the only reason  
he wanted to cross-examine the witness is because she was not  
wearing a bra.  
C  
The incidents on which the allegations of paragraph 20 of  
the complaint were based occurred during People v Payton,  
Recorder’s Court Case No. 95-006206. The defendant, who was  
charged with first-degree murder, was acquitted. 
The  
commission found six instances of misconduct during this  
matter.  
8 Just before this comment, Judge Moore indicated that he 
resented the “thought that because you are black and you live 
in the ghetto you are fashioned that way.”  
5  
 
First, the commission found that Judge Moore ridiculed a  
prospective juror, who did not think that he could sit on a  
jury 
because 
he 
had 
a 
difficulty 
with 
memory, 
by  
mispronouncing the juror’s name and joking with him about  
whether he could remember his name or where he worked.  
Second, the commission determined that Judge Moore, for  
no apparent reason, inquired about whether a potential juror  
used drugs, asking her when she had last “smoked a joint or  
something.”  
Third, the commission found that Judge Moore had become  
argumentative with defense counsel after the attorney  
attempted to explain the basis for a particular line of  
questioning.  Judge Moore instructed counsel that he should  
not whine and cry, and stated that he sounded like “a little  
spoiled kid.”  The jury was not present when this exchange  
occurred.  
Fourth, the commission determined that Judge Moore had  
deferred his role as judge to the prosecutor by inviting the  
prosecutor to join in a disagreement with defense counsel,  
asking the prosecutor to explain if he [Judge Moore] was in  
error some way.  This exchange also occurred outside the  
presence of the jury.  
Fifth, the commission found that Judge Moore made a  
prosecutorial 
objection 
and 
ordered 
defense 
counsel 
to 
proceed  
with another question without permitting defense counsel to  
respond to the objection or to Judge Moore’s statement  
concerning another objection asserted by the prosecutor.  
Sixth, the commission determined that after the jury  
6  
acquitted the defendant, Judge Moore insinuated that he  
believed that the defendant was culpable, and after the jury  
was excused, chastised the defendant.  
D  
The allegations set forth in paragraph 21 of the  
complaint arose during People v Ford, Recorder’s Court Case  
No. 95-08616.  The defendant was charged with arson of a  
dwelling and  as being an habitual offender.  He was convicted  
by the jury.9  The commission determined that this case gave  
rise to seven instances of misconduct.  
First, Judge Moore made the following comment when a  
witness from the Detroit Fire Department was excused:  
No, all right.  He says he’s finished with you  
Lieutenant.
 Thanks for coming. 
You’re free to  
leave.  Go back and fight some more fires. Don’t  
do like my man, don’t light no fires, fight your 
fires.  
Second, the commission found that Judge Moore advised an  
eight-year-old boy who testified10 that if anyone should try  
to chastise him about testifying, he should tell them to see  
Judge Moore.  
Third, the commission found that Judge Moore objected to  
defense counsel’s questioning the defendant’s ex-wife about  
whether she paid rent to the defendant, with whom she lived  
9 The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s  
conviction, finding that the defendant had been denied a fair 
trial by Judge Moore’s comments during trial.  Unpublished 
opinion per curiam, issued December 1, 1998 (Docket No. 
195964).  
10 The eight-year-old boy was the defendant’s son. 
He  
testified that he observed the defendant set the fire to the  
house in which his (the witness’) mother, who was the 
defendant’s ex-wife, lived.  
7  
 
for a short time, finding the question “irrelevant,  
incompetent, immaterial.”  
Fourth, the commission determined that Judge Moore  
improperly suggested evidence to the jury when he advised the  
jury, during cross-examination of the defendant’s ex-wife,  
when school started in 1995.  The witness could not recall  
when school began that year, and Judge Moore stated that his  
wife was a school teacher and that he believed school began in  
August of that year.  At the end of his explanation, he  
instructed the jury not to “take it as testimony.”  
Fifth, 
the 
commission 
found 
that 
the 
following 
statement,  
made outside the presence of the jury, indicated that Judge  
Moore had reached a conclusion about the testimony of a  
witness and the guilt of the defendant:  
Come on.  I mean, Jesus, I mean, how did he 
know what was in the gas can when he stuck the 
paper in and lit it afire? I mean, for real.  
Sixth, the commission found that after the verdict was  
rendered, 
Judge 
Moore commented three times that the defendant  
should have entered a plea to avoid requiring his eight-year­
old son to testify.  Two of these comments were made in the  
presence of the jury, and one was made after the jury was  
excused.  
Seventh, the commission found that Judge Moore berated  
the defendant during sentencing, calling him a “low life,” “a  
despicable person,” and the “meanest man” he had seen all  
year.  
E  
Paragraph 22 of the complaint concerned People v  
8  
Anderson, Recorder’s Court Case No. 95-012333. The defendant  
was charged with first-degree murder and felony-murder. The  
jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder.11  The  
commission determined that four instances of misconduct  
occurred during this case.  
First, the commission found that during voir dire, Judge  
Moore discoursed about how “ugly people” are not liked and how  
being “cute” helps you get along in the world.  
Second, 
the 
commission found that during voir dire, Judge  
Moore commented that an insurance company must be “out of  
their sick mind” for refusing to provide coverage.  This  
comment was made in response to explanation from a potential  
juror who had been a victim of a crime that the crime was not  
prosecuted because of a lack of evidence and that insurance  
would not provide coverage.  
Third, the commission determined that Judge Moore  
spontaneously asserted an objection and summarized the prior  
testimony of a witness.  Judge Moore failed to acknowledge  
defense counsel’s point that it was the prosecutor’s role to  
object and then proceeded to question the witness.  
Fourth, 
the 
commission 
found 
that 
the 
following 
exchange,  
which occurred between Judge Moore and the defendant’s  
11 The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s  
conviction, holding in part that the trial court’s conduct and 
comments did not amount to manifest injustice.  The Court  
explained that many of the remarks constituted a legitimate 
exercise of the trial court’s responsibility to control 
proceedings and that the remaining remarks were not the type 
that would unduly influence the jury, depriving the defendant 
of a fair trial.  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued 
February 3, 1998 (Docket No. 195911).  
9  
girlfriend when he addressed her regarding her improper  
discussions with two jurors, was misconduct:  
The Court: Come on out here. 
Now, listen. 
You may think you all cute and everything because 
you’re not cute worth a rip of anything.  
I’m going to send you home and I’m not going 
to allow you back.  
Look at me.  
You understand that?  
Ms. Smith: Yes.  
The Court: How old are you?  
Ms. Smith: Nineteen.  
The Court: Nineteen.  Well, you take you and 
them 19 years and you–how many babies you got 
without a husband?  
Ms. Smith: One.  
The Court: Well, take your 19 years and that 
one baby and you stay at home.  
I don’t want you down here tomorrow, you 
understand.  You show up here tomorrow and you’re 
going to spend the rest of the 29 days in jail.  
You look at me.  
You understand what I’m saying?  
Ms. Smith: Yes.  
The Court: You think I’m kidding with you?  
Ms. Smith: No.  
The Court: Yes. 
And if you say anything to  
anybody, if you stand out front, if I see you 
anywhere around this courtroom–look at me–you will 
be going to jail.  
You understand that?  
Ms. Smith: Yes.  
The Court: If you want to know what the 
verdict is, you call back here.  
10 
 
Now, you go home.  
Give her her Social Security Card.  
Ms. Smith: Thank you.  
The Court: Only thing she ever had with her 
name typed on it probably besides a welfare check 
probably.  
Ms. Smith: I work.  
The Court: I know you work.  
F  
People v Holmes, Recorder’s Court Case No. 96-00101,  
formed the basis for the allegations in paragraph 23 of the  
complaint.  The defendant was charged with two counts of armed  
robbery and two counts of felony-firearm and was convicted on  
all counts.12  The commission made six findings of misconduct  
in relation to this case.  
First, the commission found that Judge Moore excessively  
interfered and improperly questioned witnesses to the  
detriment of the defense.  
Second, the commission determined that Judge Moore made  
various objections to defense counsel’s questioning of  
witnesses throughout the trial.  
Third, the commission found that on three occasions,  
Judge Moore interrupted the examination of witnesses and  
summarized testimony on his own initiative.  
12 The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s  
convictions, finding that the trial court’s interruptions and 
criticisms of defense counsel did not deprive defendant of a 
fair trial because his behavior did not pierce the veil of 
judicial impartiality. However, the Court further explained 
that it did not condone and, in fact, seriously questioned the 
trial 
court’s 
condescending 
attitude. 
 
Unpublished 
opinion 
per 
curiam, issued November 14, 1997 (Docket No. 198450).  
11  
Fourth, the commission found that Judge Moore was  
argumentative 
with 
defense counsel and that he prohibited both  
the prosecutor and defense counsel from addressing certain  
issues.  Further, he was abusive and sarcastic toward counsel.  
Fifth, the commission determined that Judge Moore made  
inappropriate remarks concerning the Detroit Free Press and  
other judges from the Recorder’s Court.  In response to a  
juror’s question whether Judge Moore had read an article on  
someone Judge Moore had mentioned, Judge Moore responded that  
he did not “read the scab rag, I haven’t read it since they  
went on strike.”  In explaining the reason for a brief delay,  
Judge Moore stated:  
And we’re happy to have you back again. 
Again, I apologize for the 15 minutes or so delay, 
but we’re still in the picture-taking.  We take  
individual pictures, we take individual things, we 
take group pictures, and there’s nothing like 
getting . . . Getting all judges together is like 
getting the United Nations together, everybody’s a 
king, you know what I mean, and nobody tells the 
king what to do.  And especially if they’re queens.  
What do you mean?  Would you . . . And don’t mess 
with these queens, you talk about stinging you to 
death. Anyway so I apologize once again.  
Sixth, the commission found that at sentencing, Judge  
Moore made stereotypical comments on the basis of race:  
I mean, there were two women who identified 
him pretty good and their circumstances led right 
on down to getting him.  This is not some white  
women out there who think that all black men look  
alike or Chinese women.  They are black women who 
got a good look at him while he was poking his gun 
at ‘em and taking their coats and so forth, and so 
there’s no . . . they do not seem to have any kind 
of special grievance against your client.  
G  
The allegations in paragraph 24 of the complaint were  
12  
based on Judge Moore’s conduct during People v Johnson and  
Brock, Wayne Circuit Court, Criminal Division Case No. 97­
03614.  Each defendant was charged with assault with intent to  
rob while armed and felony-firearm.  Defendant Johnson was  
also charged with assault with intent to commit murder.13  The  
commission made eight findings of misconduct in this case.  
First, the commission found that Judge Moore questioned  
witnesses in a manner favorable to the prosecution.  Judge  
Moore interrupted defense counsel’s questioning of a witness  
concerning 
lineup 
procedures 
and 
then 
discussed 
the 
difference  
between refreshed recollection and past recollection recorded  
for the benefit of some students who were observing the trial.  
Further, 
Judge 
Moore 
interrupted 
defense 
counsel and  
questioned a witness regarding the reading of rights to  
defendant Brock.  
Second, the commission determined that Judge Moore made  
objections during defense counsel’s questioning of witnesses,  
summarized prior testimony of a witness, and discussed the  
anticipated testimony of other witnesses.  
Third, the commission found that Judge Moore improperly  
limited defense counsels’ presentation of their case by  
summarily determining that the anticipated testimony of a  
witness they wished to call was not relevant to the trial and  
prohibiting the witness from being called.  The commission  
13 The Court of Appeals reversed defendant Johnson’s 
convictions for assault with intent to rob while armed, 
felonious assault, and felony-firearm because it determined 
that the trial judge’s conduct deprived the defendant of a 
fair trial. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 21, 
2000 (Docket No. 210699).  
13  
believed that this action indicated that Judge Moore “was more  
concerned with the length of the trial than with providing  
defense counsel with a full opportunity to present its case.”  
Fourth, the commission determined that Judge Moore made  
an abusive remark to counsel when he stated that the attorneys  
sounded like “a bunch of old women,” who didn’t know the Rules  
of Evidence.  
Fifth, the commission found that Judge Moore summarized  
the subject matter of the testimony that he believed the  
attorneys intended to pursue and berated counsel rather than  
discussing the necessity of the anticipated testimony.  
Sixth, the commission determined that Judge Moore raised  
his voice at defendant Johnson while he was testifying. The  
following exchange ensued when defense counsel objected:  
Mr. Lusby (defense counsel): Excuse me, Your 
Honor.  
The Court: Yes, what is it sir?  
Mr. Lusby: My objection really goes to the 
Court, inadvertently I assume, but, you know, my 
client . . .  
The Court: What?  
Mr. Lusby: Raised your voice at my client.  
The Court: I’m a raise voice person, sir.  
Mr. Lusby: Judge, I understand that.  
The Court: Well, fine, sir. I’m not telling  
him to do anything wrong. I’m just telling him to 
realize . . .  Listen, I want to get this case over 
with, gentlemen.  
Mr. Lusby: Judge, listen to yourself now, 
please.  
The Court: I’m listening to myself and I’m 
listening to you too.  
14 
 
Mr. Lusby: Okay, okay.  
The Court: Just want to get this case over.  
Mr. Lusby: Okay.  
The Court: You can scream all you want.  Now  
you gonna cry. Sit down, Mr. Lusby.  
Mr. Lusby: I need some water.  
The Court: I can’t believe this.  Crying. Ask  
your question, sir. Let him get his water.  
Sir, listen to the question.  Answer the  
question that is asked of you, please, so we can 
get on with this case. Carry on, Mr. Prosecutor.  
Now, I’m gonna tell you something, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, and I want you . . . If you think that I 
am screaming and hollering, whatever, then you note 
it. Part of this, see, is to build this record so 
that when it goes to the Court of Appeals, if it 
ever gets there, gonna say well, Judge, you sat 
there screaming at my client.  I don’t believe I’ve  
talked to this man any different than I’ve talked 
to anyone else.  If so, you tell me, have I? Have I 
talked to this man any different than I have? 
Well, that’s my intent is not to talk to him any 
different than anybody else.  Just get this case 
over with.  
Seventh, the commission determined that the following  
exchange occurred between Judge Moore and defendant Brock’s  
father, who was a Detroit police officer, when Mr. Brock left  
the courtroom during sentencing:  
The Court: Listen, Lieutenant . . . Hey, tell 
him to come back here.  Your father can think  
whatever he wants about it. He can jump up and do 
whatever he wants there if he doesn’t like it.  I  
don’t like his attitude.  Just because he . . .  
That’s part of the problem that’s involved.  Go out  
there, tell ‘em if he’s out there, tell ‘em I’m 
ordering him as a police officer to come back in 
here.  
* * *  
Sir, you have a seat here, lieutenant, or 
whatever rank you are.  I don’t like your attitude,  
sir. You as an officer, you are a police officer,  
15 
sir, you come into this court, you treat this court 
with respect.  You understand me, sir? Stand up, 
sir, stand up. You understand me?  
Mr. Brock: Yes, sir.  
The Court: Well, now you walk out of here. I  
didn’t create this situation. I don’t know if you 
did or not.  He’s been your son all your life. All  
I know is that the jury . . . He had a good trial 
with a good lawyer and a good verdict, sir, and 
he’s going to jail. And I don’t need to have your 
arrogance, sir.  
Mr. Brock: Do I have a right to walk out?  
The Court: You have a right to walk out of 
here, sir.  But you have a right also, you, sir, 
have to respect this Court of all people.  
Mr. Brock: I respect the Court.  
The Court: Okay then. 
You just leave here 
with the respect that you deserve this court. And  
I don’t need any of your side glances either, sir. 
You took care of ‘em all your life.  If he’s bad, 
it’s your problem.  
Eighth, the commission found that Judge Moore was also  
abusive when he sentenced defendant Johnson during a separate  
proceeding immediately thereafter.  
H  
The allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the  
complaint were based on People v Turner, Wayne Circuit Court,  
Criminal Division Case No. 97-2664.  The defendant was charged  
with attempted home invasion and as an habitual offender.  He  
chose to represent himself during trial, with his appointed  
attorney available to act as his legal advisor.  The jury  
convicted 
the 
defendant.14 
 
The 
commission 
made 
eleven 
findings  
14 The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s  
conviction, finding that the trial court’s conduct of  
repeatedly gagging the defendant in the presence of the jury, 
(continued...)  
16  
of misconduct in this matter.  
The 
first 
five 
findings of the commission concern threats  
made by Judge Moore to gag the defendant and his ordering  
defendant to be gagged with tape at various points during the  
trial.  
Next, the commission found that during the pretrial  
conference, Judge Moore made disparaging remarks to the  
defendant when he inquired about obtaining relief because he  
had been imprisoned since March. Judge Moore stated:  
What kind of relief?  You better go over there 
and get you an aspirin or Alka Seltzer or maybe 
some Kaopectate ‘cause that’s the only relief 
you’re getting.  We’ll see you when you get back  
here the 13th.  
Third, 
the 
commission found that Judge Moore insulted the  
defendant when the defendant offered to hand him the questions  
he had mapped out by replying, “I don’t need you to hand me  
anything, diddley boy. My boy, just read what you have.”  
Fourth, 
the 
commission 
determined 
that 
Judge 
Moore 
almost  
immediately thereafter made another derogatory remark,  
directing the defendant to shut up and telling him that he had  
“diarrhea of the mouth.”  
Fifth, the commission found that Judge Moore directed  
other derogatory remarks toward defendant, calling him a “low  
life” and a “rat,” and inferring that the defendant knew how  
to commit break-ins by commenting, “Why don’t you [defendant]  
14(...continued) 
making disparaging remarks, and assuming an adversarial 
posture toward the defendant deprived him of a fair trial. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 29, 1999 
(Docket No. 208790).  
17  
 
ask a question.  You know a lot more about it apparently than  
some of the rest of us”15 when the defendant attempted to  
question complainant about pulling iron bars off a window.  
Sixth, the commission found that Judge Moore frequently  
interjected during the defendant’s presentation of his  
defense, 
displaying 
an 
antidefense 
sentiment 
with 
his 
abrasive  
manner and repeated interruptions.  
Seventh, the commission determined that Judge Moore took  
over the questioning concerning the location of the crime.  
Eighth, the commission determined that Judge Moore  
instructed the prosecutor to object.  
II  
The commission made the following conclusions of law,  
stating that the conduct identified in its findings of fact,  
individually and collectively, constituted one or more of the  
following:  
(1) Misconduct in office, as defined by the 
Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Art. 6, 
§ 30, and MCR 9.205;  
(2) 
Conduct 
clearly 
prejudicial 
to 
the  
administration of justice, as defined by the  
Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Art. 6, 
§ 30, and MCR 9.205(C)(4);  
(3) 
A 
persistent 
incompetence 
or  
neglectfulness in the performance of judicial 
duties, contrary to MCR 9.205(C)(5);  
(4) A persistent failure to treat persons 
fairly with courtesy and respect[,] pursuant to MCR 
9.205(C)(6);  
(5) 
Treatment 
of 
persons 
unfairly,  
15 In its decision regarding misconduct, the commission 
inaccurately quotes Judge Moore as saying “Why don’t you (Mr. 
Turner) answer the question.”  
18  
discourteously, or disrespectfully because of race, 
gender or other protected personal characteristic, 
contrary to MCR 9.205(C)(7);  
(6) A failure to observe high standards of 
conduct so that the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary may be preserved, contrary to the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1;  
(7) Conduct involving impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety, thereby eroding public 
confidence in the judiciary, in violation of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A;  
(8) A failure to respect and observe the law 
and to conduct oneself at all times in a manner  
which would enhance the public’s confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, 
contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2B;  
(9) A failure to be patient, dignified and 
courteous to a juror, in violation of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(3);  
(10) A failure to be patient, dignified and 
courteous to litigants, lawyers and others with 
whom Respondent dealt in an official capacity, 
contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
3A(3);  
(11) 
Undue 
interference, 
impatience 
and  
participation in the examination of witnesses; 
demonstrating a severe attitude toward witnesses; 
tending to prevent proper presentation of the cause 
and ascertainment of the truth; failure to avoid a 
controversial 
manner 
and 
tone 
in 
addressing 
counsel, litigants and witnesses; failing to avoid 
interruptions of counsel in their arguments; and 
reaching a premature judgement, in violation of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(8);  
(12) Non-adherence to the usual and accepted 
methods of doing justice, contrary to the Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(9); and  
(13) Failure to treat every person fairly, 
with courtesy and respect, without regard to a 
person’s race, gender or other protected personal 
characteristic, contrary to the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Canons 2B and 3A(10).  
III  
The commission recommended that Judge Moore be suspended  
19  
 
for nine months without pay.  The commission explained that  
this recommendation was based on the collective acts of Judge  
Moore throughout his judicial career, noting that he had  
received two admonitions and a public censure.16  The first  
admonition, which was issued May 22, 1986, arose from five  
criminal proceedings. 
Judge Moore was admonished for  
“displaying obvious sarcasm,” demonstrating “a predisposition  
[for] 
the 
guilt 
of 
the 
defendants,” 
“inappropriately  
expressing sympathy for complainants in criminal cases,”  
“disparaging” defense counsel and denigrating an attorney’s  
professional ability, and improperly treating a witness with  
“discourtesy, 
impatience, and a severe attitude.”  Judge Moore  
was again admonished on September 7, 1989, for having a  
private conversation with a police detective during a trial in  
which the detective was a witness.  Judge Moore was publically  
censured in 1995 for causing a disturbance in the Chief  
Judge’s courtroom while the Chief Judge was conducting a court  
proceeding.  Further, the commission noted that Judge Moore  
had been reversed or criticized on appeal numerous times for  
16 The November 1999 agreement between the examiner and 
Judge Moore limited the misconduct allegations to the eight 
criminal cases discussed in parts I (A)-(H) of this opinion. 
The commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
limited to the eight cases in the complaint as the agreement 
provided.  This Court’s review of the commission’s findings of 
fact and ultimate finding of misconduct involves only the 
events in those eight cases and not the past behavior of Judge 
Moore discussed in part III of this opinion.  However, the 
commission did not err in considering Judge Moore’s past 
behavior in its sanction determination.  His past behavior is  
relevant.
 Moreover, the agreement did not prohibit 
consideration of that behavior for that purpose.  
20  
 
 
 
his conduct.17  
While 
discussing the standards to be considered in making  
a 
recommendation 
for 
discipline, the commission noted that the  
purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish but to  
maintain the integrity of the judicial process. 
The  
commission then examined the factors from In re Deming18 that  
this Court cited in its order in In re Brown19 and applied them  
to 
the 
present case.20  Considering each factor, the commission  
stated as follows:  
(a) Respondent’s misconduct is not an isolated 
instance.  It represents a pattern of misconduct 
continuing throughout Respondent’s career and  
resulting in admonitions, public censure, and  
repeated criticisms and reversals by reviewing 
courts. Respondent was warned repeatedly that his 
conduct was improper. He cannot justifiably assert 
ignorance of the error of his ways. He has failed  
17 
The commission attached as an appendix to its 
recommendation a brief summary of thirty-one appellate cases 
issued between April 1983 and February 2000 that criticized 
Judge Moore’s conduct.  
18 108 Wash 2d 82; 736 P2d 639 (1987).  
19 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (2000).  
20 The factors considered are:  
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance 
or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, 
extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of 
misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in 
or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct 
occurred in the judge’s official capacity or in his 
private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledge 
or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether 
the judge has evidenced an effort to change or 
modify his conduct; (g) the length of service on 
the bench; (h) whether there have been prior 
complaints about this judge; (i) the effect the 
misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect 
for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which the 
judge exploited his position to satisfy his  
personal desires. [Deming, supra at 119-120.]  
21 
 
to acknowledge the criticisms were valid and has 
failed to alter conduct.  
(b) Respondent’s egregious conduct included 
abusive, berating, and sarcastic remarks; excessive 
interjections 
and 
interference 
in 
trial  
proceedings; 
assuming 
a 
prosecutorial 
role; 
expressing 
pro-prosecutorial 
and 
anti-defense  
sentiment; prejudicing juries; and lack of judicial 
demeanor.
 The improper acts were frequent, as 
reflected by the numerous cases cited in the 
attached appendix. In some instances, his conduct 
directly resulted in reversals of convictions of 
criminal defendants, although as the Court of 
Appeals specifically noted, there was sufficient, 
strong, 
or 
even 
overwhelming 
evidence 
of 
a  
defendant’s guilt.  People v Williams, Michigan 
Court of Appeals Docket Number 83920, April 16, 
1986; People v Lippett, Michigan Court of Appeals 
Docket Number 153716, March 23, 1994; People v  
Ford, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket Number 
195964, December 1, 1998.  
(c) All incidents of misconduct in the present 
complaint, except one, occurred in the courtroom 
while court was in session.  The exception occurred  
in the courtroom during a recess when a few  
individuals were present.  Many incidents were in 
the presence of the jury.  
(d) All acts of misconduct occurred in his 
official capacity and not in his private life. 
Therefore, all acts were open to public view.  
(e) Except for the comment concerning a  
witness who supposedly was not wearing a bra, 
Respondent does not dispute the underlying facts. 
Respondent has repeatedly denied that any of the 
acts constitute misconduct.  With the benefit of  
hindsight, Respondent acknowledged at the Formal 
Hearing on March 13, 2000, that a few of his 
comments could or possibly should have been worded 
differently.  
(f) Respondent has made no noticeable effort 
to change or modify his conduct.  He received  
warnings from the Commission and the Court of 
Appeals and has ignored them.  Respondent once 
expressed a desire to avoid having the Examiner, or 
the Commission, “coming back at” him and “to avoid 
a problem” in the future. However, he denied that 
the specific conduct that was the subject of his 
statement was “wrong. . . .”  
The Commission acknowledges that, in his  
22  
sanctions brief, Respondent expressed regret.  He  
admits 
that 
several 
of 
his 
comments 
“were  
inappropriate or ill timed or spoken without  
thinking, or at the very least, in the limited 
context presented, do now upon reading or hearing 
appear to be unacceptable.”  For those statements  
he made a “heartfelt and sincere apology.”  The  
Commission notes this attempt at damage control 
follows a finding that Respondent had engaged in 
serious and continued acts of misconduct.  
(g) Respondent has served on the bench for 
approximately 20 years.  Considering his experience 
and frequent criticisms and reprimands, he should 
know the requisite standards.  He has failed to  
adhere to the directives of the Commission or alter  
his conduct in response to criticisms by reviewing 
courts.  Respondent has repeatedly violated those 
standards.  
(h) There have been many prior complaints 
regarding 
Respondent 
as 
reflected 
in 
prior 
disciplinary proceedings and appellate criticism 
detailed above.  
(i) Respondent’s conduct has tainted the  
integrity of and respect for the judiciary.  His  
abusive comments and demeaning nature have a great 
negative impact upon members of the public with 
infrequent exposure to the courts.  That other  
judges typically strive to maintain an unbiased, 
professional, courteous and dignified manner while 
on the bench is lost to those whose experience is 
limited to encounters with Respondent in his  
courtroom.  
(j) There is no charge that Respondent abused 
his office for personal gain or to satisfy personal 
desires.  
The commission then considered the mitigating and  
aggravating factors in reaching its recommendation. 
In  
addressing the mitigating factors, it noted that Judge Moore  
had been a “diligent jurist during his 20 years on the bench”  
and recognized that he often means well.  Further, it noted  
that he had been transferred to the civil division, where he  
would likely encounter “fewer examples of the darker side of  
human conduct.”  In considering aggravating factors, the  
23  
 
commission stated that Judge Moore “frequently has failed to  
distinguish his role as an impartial arbitrator with that of  
a quasi social worker and partisan advocate.” 
Because no  
previous discipline, criticism, or reversal by a higher court  
had altered his conduct in anyway, and because he had  
occasionally expressed disdain for the commission and the  
Court of Appeals, the commission opined that a significant  
sanction was required.  
IV  
The Michigan Constitution provides:  
On recommendation of the judicial tenure  
commission, the supreme court may censure, suspend 
with or without salary, retire or remove a judge 
for a conviction of a felony, physical or mental 
disability which prevents the performance of  
judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent 
failure 
to 
perform 
his 
duties, 
habitual  
intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial 
to the administration of justice. 
The supreme 
court shall make rules implementing this section 
and providing for confidentiality and privilege of 
proceedings. [Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2).]  
Pursuant to rules promulgated by this Court, when considering  
a recommendation of the commission, this Court  
shall review the record of the proceedings and 
shall file a written opinion and judgement, which 
may 
direct 
censure, 
removal, 
retirement, 
suspension, or other disciplinary action, or reject 
or modify the recommendations of the commission. 
[MCR 9.225.]  
In reviewing the record de novo, we consider whether the  
conduct charged and found by the commission is established by  
the record, whether the conduct is of a nature warranting  
discipline, and whether the discipline recommended by the  
commission or some other form of discipline should be imposed.  
In re Seitz, 441 Mich 590, 594; 495 NW2d 559 (1993).  
24  
  
MCR 9.205(A) provides that a “judge is personally  
responsible for his or her own behavior and for the proper  
conduct and administration of the court in which he or she  
presides.”  Further, a judge is guilty of misconduct in office  
if:  
(1) the judge is convicted in the United 
States of conduct which is punishable as a felony 
under the laws of Michigan or federal law;  
(2) the judge persistently fails to perform 
judicial duties;  
(3) the judge is habitually intemperate within 
the meaning of Const 1963, art 6, § 30;  
(4) the judge’s conduct is clearly prejudicial 
to the administration of justice;  
(5) the judge is persistently incompetent or 
neglectful in the performance of judicial duties;  
(6) the judge persistently fails to treat 
persons fairly, with courtesy and respect; or  
(7) the judge treats a person unfairly, 
discourteously, or disrespectfully because of the 
person’s race, gender, or other protected personal 
characteristic. [MCR 9.205(C).]  
Conduct in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or the  
Rules of Professional Responsibility may also constitute  
misconduct in office, conduct that is clearly 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, or 
another ground for discipline listed in Const 1963, 
art 6, § 30.  The question in every case is whether 
the conduct complained of constitutes misconduct in 
office, conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, or another ground of 
discipline listed in Const 1963, art 6, § 30, not 
whether a particular canon or disciplinary rule has 
been violated.  All the circumstances are to be  
considered in deciding whether action by the  
commission is warranted. [MCR 9.205(E).]  
V  
Judge Moore filed a petition to reject or modify the  
25  
 
commission’s recommendation, arguing that the commission’s  
findings of fact and conclusions of law were against the great  
weight of the evidence, that the commission erred in failing  
to dismiss the formal complaint, and that he was denied  
procedural due process by the examiner and the commission.  We  
will address each argument in turn.  
A  
Judge Moore first argues that the commission’s findings  
of fact and conclusions of law are contrary to the great  
weight of the evidence.  Specifically, Judge Moore disputes  
that there was any evidence to support the commission’s  
finding in Eklour that he had commented that the only reason  
the prosecution wanted to cross-examine a witness was because  
she was not wearing a bra. We disagree.  
Three 
witnesses 
were called during the hearing before the  
commission to testify concerning this matter: Corrine Shoop,  
George Serkian, and John Bianco.  Ms. Shoop, who was an  
attorney representing the insurance company the defendant was  
accused of defrauding, attended the criminal trial.  She  
testified that during a break in the trial, she heard Judge  
Moore remark to the prosecutor, John Bianco, that the only  
reason 
that 
the 
prosecutor wanted to cross-examine the witness  
was because she was not wearing a bra and that Judge Moore was  
joking and laughing when he made the remark.  She further  
testified that she did not believe that there was anyone in  
the courtroom when the remark was made besides herself, Mr.  
Bianco, Judge Moore, and perhaps, a Wayne County sheriff.  She  
stated that she believed that she discussed the comment with  
26  
 
 
Mr. Bianco.  She also filed a grievance with the commission  
concerning the remark.21  
George Serkian represented defendant Eklour during the  
criminal trial before Judge Moore. He testified that he did  
not hear Judge Moore make the remark. When asked whether he  
was in the courtroom during the recess in which the remark was  
made, he responded that if the prosecutor was in the  
courtroom, he was in the courtroom.  He testified that this  
representation was based on both his policy of always being in  
the courtroom when the prosecutor is present and his memory.  
However, he acknowledged that when he met with the examiner,  
he indicated that he had no present recollection of some of  
the specific things from the trial about which he was asked  
during the meeting.  
John Bianco, the prosecutor who tried the Eklour matter,  
testified that he “absolutely did not hear that comment.”  He  
further stated that he had some vague recollection of Ms.  
Shoop being upset about something that she thought the judge  
had said, but he could not recall any specifics regarding her  
concern or their conversation. He vaguely remembered making  
a motion to recall the witness.  
Having reviewed the testimony, we cannot find any fault  
with the commission’s implicit determination that Ms. Shoop’s  
testimony was the most credible.  Consequently, its finding  
that Judge Moore made this remark was not against the great  
weight of the evidence.  
21 
Her 
grievance 
also 
include 
references 
to 
conduct 
during 
the course of the trial.  
27  
 
B  
Judge Moore next argues that the preponderance of the  
evidence fails to support a finding that his comments and  
participation in the eight trials constituted misconduct or  
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and that  
the commission erred in failing to dismiss the formal  
complaint.  Judge Moore alleges that the commission failed to  
review the incidents within the full context of the trial  
proceedings and that his statements, comments, and questions  
are taken out of context.  We agree that the larger context of  
a few of the remarks calls the commission’s findings  
concerning these remarks into question.  However, we disagree  
that the complaint should have been dismissed because there is  
sufficient evidence to sustain the commission’s remaining  
findings of misconduct.  
Two of the findings that are questionable stemmed from  
People v White.22
 The commission found that Judge Moore  
committed misconduct during jury selection by giving a  
hypothetical example that named the defendant and was modeled  
on the facts of the case.  We think it important to note that  
this example occurred during the trial court’s attempt to  
distinguish between the quality and quantity of evidence and  
an extended discussion concerning whether the jurors would be  
able to convict or acquit on the basis of one witness’  
testimony or ten witnesses’ testimony.  While the trial court  
22 This Court peremptorily reversed the Court of Appeals 
determination that the trial court’s conduct had denied  
defendant a fair trial. See footnote 5.  
28  
 
could have more carefully and effectively made this point, we  
do not believe that the example, when considered within the  
context in which it was made, improperly encouraged the  
prospective jurors to find the defendant guilty.  
The commission also determined that Judge Moore had  
spontaneously commented on the defendant’s personal interest  
in the case and the effect it would have on his credibility.  
This comment was made during the preliminary instructions to  
the jury, as Judge Moore was explaining how to judge the  
weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.  We  
disagree 
with 
the 
commission’s 
characterization 
of 
this 
remark  
as a “spontaneous[]” comment on the defendant’s personal  
interest in this case and do not find that it constituted  
misconduct.  
Another finding that we believe is questionable is the  
commission’s determination that in People v Payton, Judge  
Moore improperly deferred his role as judge to the prosecutor  
by asking the prosecutor if he was in error in some way.  See  
part II (C).  This remark was made during a discussion of  
whether one could impeach a witness with something the witness  
did not mention in an earlier statement.  At the beginning of  
this discussion, Judge Moore asked both defense counsel and  
the prosecutor to correct him if he was wrong. In the midst  
of the discussion, he asked defense counsel to tell him if he  
was wrong.  Further, it appears that defense counsel may have  
partially prevailed in his argument because he was permitted  
to question the witness about an “unknown man” mentioned in  
his statement.  Therefore, we disagree that this remark  
29  
constituted an instance of improperly deferring to the  
prosecution.  
The last finding that we question is the commission’s  
determination that Judge Moore committed misconduct by  
advising the eight-year-old witness who testified that if  
anyone 
gave 
him 
difficulties about testifying, he should refer  
that person to Judge Moore.23  While, in the future, Judge  
Moore should be cognizant of the impression that such actions  
might give the jury, we find that Judge Moore’s conduct in  
this instance was motivated by his concern for a young child  
required to testify against his father concerning a crime the  
father committed against the child’s mother.  Therefore, we do  
not consider these actions to be misconduct for which Judge  
Moore should be sanctioned.  
Apart from these specific findings that we question, we  
hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the  
remaining findings of fact made by the commission. Therefore,  
the commission did not err in failing to dismiss the formal  
complaint.  
C  
Judge Moore also argues that he was denied procedural due  
process by the examiner and the commission.  This argument is  
premised on five separate allegations.24  
23 Judge Moore also commented “I’m gonna love you son” 
when he discovered that his wife and the witness shared the  
same birthday.  He also gave the witness some Tootsie Rolls at 
the conclusion of his testimony.  
24 Judge Moore actually raises six bases for his due 
process argument.  However, because the third and sixth bases 
(continued...)  
30  
First, Judge Moore contends that he was denied due  
process by the examiner’s unsolicited and premature filing of  
a sanctions brief.  We determine that this argument is without  
merit.  There is nothing to suggest that the receipt of the  
sanctions brief before the commission’s decision regarding  
misconduct improperly influenced the commission in any way.  
Further, while the commission and Judge Moore agreed to  
dismiss many of the allegations in the complaint and proceed  
on the remaining allegations, these other matters were  
certainly relevant to determining the appropriate sanction to  
be awarded upon a finding of misconduct.  
Second, Judge Moore asserts that he was denied due  
process by the commission’s failure to consider any of the  
eight underlying criminal jury trial transcripts as a whole.  
We find that this argument is also without merit.  While we  
disagree with a few of the commission’s findings because of  
the context of the remarks, the complete transcripts from all  
eight trials were part of the record considered by the  
commission.  
Third, Judge Moore argues that he was denied due process  
by the commission’s failure to limit the issues considered to  
those 
delineated 
in 
the 
November 
1999 
agreement.  
Specifically, Judge Moore challenges the references to  
appellate cases that have criticized Judge Moore because he  
had no opportunity to address or refute these other cases.  We  
disagree that defendant was denied due process by the  
24(...continued) 
are related, we have combined them.  
31  
consideration of these cases in the determination of the  
appropriate sanction.
 Several of the factors we have  
identified as relevant in making a recommendation of  
discipline refer to previous conduct on the part of the judge,  
including whether the conduct is an isolated incident or part  
of a pattern; the nature, extent, and frequency of the  
conduct, whether there have been prior complaints about the  
judge, and whether the judge has demonstrated an effort to  
modify his conduct.  In re Deming, 108 Wash 2d 82, 119-120;  
736 P2d 639 (1987).  The commission therefore appropriately  
considered these relevant prior matters in its sanction  
determination.  
Nothing in the November 1999 agreement between  
the 
examiner 
and 
Judge Moore prohibited consideration of those  
matters for purposes of determining the sanction.  
The commission’s findings of fact do not support Judge  
Moore’s 
claim 
that 
the 
misconduct 
determination 
was  
contaminated 
by 
consideration 
of 
matters 
outside 
the 
complaint  
in violation of the November 1999 agreement. The commission’s  
findings of fact provide adequate support for both the finding  
of misconduct and for the sanction we impose, without taking  
into account the prior extraneous matters.  
Fourth, Judge Moore contends that he was denied due  
process by Judge William Murphy’s participation in the  
commission proceedings because Judge Murphy was a member of  
the Court of Appeals panel that decided People v Johnson, one  
of the eight criminal cases upon which the findings of  
32  
 
misconduct in the present matter are based.25  The Johnson  
decision was issued on July 21, 2000, three days after the  
commission issued its decision regarding misconduct. We note  
that paragraph one of the agreement entered into by the  
parties specifically provided:  
The Examiner and Respondent, through his  
counsel, shall stipulate and request that any 
members of the Commission who may have previously 
recused themselves from participating in any 
discussion or decision-making relating to Formal 
Complaint No. 58 be relieved of such recusal and 
hereinafter participate and vote on all matters. 
The Commission’s Decision shall be made pursuant to 
MCR 9.221.  
Pursuant to this provision, Judge Moore consented to the  
participation of all members in all matters.  Therefore, we  
hold that Judge Moore was not denied due process by Judge  
Murphy’s participation in the proceedings.  
Fifth, Judge Moore contends that he was denied due  
process by the examiner’s attempt to solicit other claims or  
grievances against him by way of a letter mailed to an unknown  
number of members of the criminal appellate bar.  The  
commission granted Judge Moore’s motion to restrain the  
examiner from soliciting claims and ruled that the examiner  
would not be permitted to utilize any of that information  
during the hearing.26  Therefore, we conclude that Judge Moore  
was not denied due process.  
25  The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court’s 
conduct in Johnson deprived defendant Johnson of a fair trial 
and reversed his convictions.  
26
 The commission denied the portion of the motion 
requiring the examiner to disclose to whom the letter was sent 
and any responses received.  
33  
 
  
 
VI  
Having, in our review of Judge Moore’s arguments,  
primarily addressed whether the commission’s factual findings  
are supported by the record, we now consider whether the  
conduct is of a nature warranting discipline and, if so, what  
level of discipline should be imposed.  
A  
The commission determined that Judge Moore’s conduct  
violated numerous provisions of the court rules and Code of  
Judicial Conduct.  We agree with some, but not all, of the  
Judicial Tenure Commission’s conclusions of law. 
In  
particular we disagree that Judge Moore’s conduct constituted  
“persistent incompetence [and] neglectfulness.”  
Specifically, the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that  
“[a]t all times, the conduct and manner of a judge should  
promote 
public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of  
the judiciary” and that “a judge should treat every person  
fairly, with courtesy and respect.”  Canon 2(B).  Further,  
“[a] judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to  
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom  
the judge deals in an official capacity . . . .”  Canon  
3(A)(3). Additionally, Canon 3(A)(8) provides: 
 A judge may properly intervene in a trial of 
a 
case 
to 
promote 
expedition, 
and 
prevent 
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some 
obscurity, but the judge should bear in mind that 
undue interference, impatience, or participation in 
the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude 
on the judge’s part toward witnesses, especially 
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual 
circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the 
proper 
presentation 
of 
the 
cause, 
or 
the  
ascertainment of truth in respect thereto.  
34  
 
 
Conversation between the judge and counsel in 
court is often necessary, but the judge should be 
studious to avoid controversies that are apt to 
obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants 
and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing 
counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should 
avoid a controversial tone.  
A judge should avoid interruptions of counsel 
in 
their 
arguments 
except 
to 
clarify 
their  
positions, and should not be tempted to the  
unnecessary display of learning or a premature 
judgment.  
We conclude that Judge Moore’s conduct frequently  
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and demonstrates, on  
those occasions, a lack of judicial temperament.  While the  
incidents vary in severity, and some may ostensibly seem  
innocuous, misconduct may be proven by “evidence of an  
accumulation of small and ostensibly innocuous incidents  
which, when considered together, emerge as a pattern of  
hostile conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.”  In re  
Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 539; 243 NW2d 86 (1976), quoting In re  
Kelly, 238 So 2d 565, 566 (Fla, 1970). Judge Moore’s conduct  
demonstrates a pattern of persistent interference in and  
frequent interruption of the trial of cases; impatient,  
discourteous, critical, and sometimes severe attitudes toward  
jurors, witnesses, counsel, and others present in the  
courtroom; and use of a controversial tone and manner in  
addressing litigants, jurors, witnesses, and counsel.  This  
conduct frequently resulted in appellate reversal of trials  
over which he had presided. Such behavior undermines public  
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary  
and is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
Therefore, we conclude the conduct is of a nature that  
35  
 
warrants discipline.  
B  
The commission recommended that Judge Moore be suspended  
for nine months without pay.  In so recommending, the  
commission 
assessed 
previous 
discipline 
imposed 
on 
Judge 
Moore  
and applied the Deming factors cited by this Court in In re  
Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (2000).  See part III. We  
principally agree with the commission’s analysis of the case  
under the Deming factors and that Judge Moore’s history of  
such behavior requires a significant sanction.  However, we  
have disagreed with a few of the findings of misconduct on  
which the sanction was based.  Further, we agree with the  
commission that Judge Moore has been a diligent jurist during  
his twenty years on the bench and that he often means well,  
even where his judicial behavior has been inappropriate.  
Therefore, 
we 
modify 
the 
commission’s 
recommendation 
and 
order  
that Judge Moore be suspended for six months without pay.  
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the Clerk is directed to  
issue the judgment order forthwith.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with WEAVER, J.  
36  
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
In re HONORABLE WARFIELD MOORE, JR., 
Judge of the Third Circuit Court, 
Detroit, Michigan.  
No. 112416  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
I would not depart from the Judicial Tenure Commission’s  
findings of fact and conclusions of law and, therefore, would  
impose the recommended sanction, a nine-month suspension  
without pay.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.