Title: Paul G. Everett v. Walter A. McNeil
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-646
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC08-1636 
_____________ 
 
PAUL G. EVERETT, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-646 
____________ 
 
PAUL G. EVERETT, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. McNEIL, 
Respondent. 
 
[October 14, 2010] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Paul G. Everett appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to 
vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Everett also petitions this Court for a 
 
- 2 - 
writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the postconviction court‘s order and 
deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Everett was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 
2001 killing of Kelly M. Bailey.  This Court set out the facts of the case on direct 
appeal: 
[D]uring the late afternoon or early evening of November 2, 2001, 
appellant approached Kelly M. Bailey‘s home, looking for money and 
carrying a wooden fish bat or billy club.  A stranger to the victim, 
appellant entered her home uninvited.  When Ms. Bailey confronted 
him, appellant beat her, and as she tried to escape, knocked her down 
and raped her.  He also forcefully twisted her neck, breaking a 
vertebra, which paralyzed her and caused her to suffocate to death.  
Before leaving, appellant removed his t-shirt, but he took with him 
some money from the victim‘s purse, his fish bat, her credit card, and 
her sweater.  Outside the house, he discarded all but the cash.  The 
victim suffered multiple injuries:  a knocked-out tooth; a fractured 
nose; swollen eyelids; lacerations and bruising of her lips; a lacerated 
lip through which her teeth protruded; abrasions and carpet burns; a 
broken neck; and vaginal abrasion evidencing the use of force and 
consistent with nonconsensual sexual intercourse. 
Appellant was indicted on charges of first-degree murder, 
burglary of a dwelling with a battery, and sexual battery involving 
serious physical force.  Among other evidence at trial, the fish bat was 
traced to the appellant and his DNA matched the vaginal swabs from 
the victim on all thirteen genetic markers tested. 
 
Everett v. State, 893 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 2004).  Moreover, regarding Everett‘s 
apprehension and confession to the crimes, this Court set forth the facts as follows. 
 
- 3 - 
Within hours of the murder, an Alabama bail bondsman, 
unaware of the murder but searching for Everett because he was a 
fugitive, found him in Panama City, Florida, and transferred him to 
Alabama authorities.  On November 14, 2001, roughly two weeks 
after the murder, two Panama City Beach police officers investigating 
the case, having traced the wooden fish bat found near the crime scene 
to Everett, traveled to Alabama.  They read Everett his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Everett agreed to talk.  
During the questioning, however, he abruptly stated, ―I wish to have a 
lawyer present. . . .  I mean I want a lawyer.‖  The officers 
immediately stopped their questioning. 
Several days later, on November 19, the Panama City Beach 
Police requested an Alabama deputy to ask Everett to provide DNA 
samples for the Florida murder investigation.  Everett consented both 
verbally and in writing.  After the DNA swabs were taken, however, 
Everett advised the Alabama deputy that he had information for 
Florida authorities.  The officer read Everett his Miranda rights, and 
Everett began his statement.  At that point Sergeant Tilley of the 
Panama City Beach Police Department arrived to retrieve the DNA 
samples.  On the record, Tilley noted that Everett had previously 
invoked his right to counsel, but had now contacted him desiring to 
provide information.  Sergeant Tilley also read Everett his Miranda 
rights before Everett continued.  At the conclusion of his statement, 
Everett said, ―I do want to talk to a lawyer, but I did want to let you 
know to get you in the right direction.‖  Sergeant Tilley immediately 
stopped the interview.  Appellant‘s November 19 statement was not 
offered at trial. 
Finally, on November 27, Alabama authorities informed Everett 
that Sergeant Tilley was en route to serve an arrest warrant for the 
Florida murder.  After Sergeant Tilley served the warrant, Everett 
asked to speak to him.  At the outset of the interview, Everett 
acknowledged that he had previously invoked his right to have 
counsel present but had now asked to speak to Sergeant Tilley without 
an attorney present.  In the ensuing statement, Everett confessed to the 
crimes. 
 
Everett, 893 So. 2d at 1283 (citation omitted). 
 
- 4 - 
The jury found Everett guilty on each charge and, following the penalty 
phase, unanimously recommended that Everett be sentenced to death for his first-
degree murder conviction.  Id. at 1280.  The sentencing court imposed the death 
sentence.  Id. at 1281.  The sentencing court found three aggravating circumstances 
and five statutory and four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances applicable to the 
murder.  Id. at 1280-81.  Everett appealed his first-degree murder conviction and 
death sentence.  This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.  Id. at 1288. 
In March 2006, Everett filed a motion for postconviction relief.  The motion 
raised twelve issues, some of which included subparts.  In most of his claims, 
Everett asserted ineffective assistance by trial counsel, Assistant Public Defender 
Walter Smith.  After holding a hearing on the motion pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 
So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), the postconviction court entered an order denying 
relief in part and granting an evidentiary hearing on Everett‘s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The postconviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
and, after considering the evidence presented, denied the motion.1  In this appeal, 
                                         
 
1.  Although the postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on 
Everett‘s claims that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to (1) call Jared 
Farmer to the stand, (2) have Everett testify at trial, and (3) object that a juror had 
an inappropriate conversation with a fellow inmate during the trial, Everett 
abandoned these claims at the evidentiary hearing.   
Similarly, although the postconviction court granted a hearing on Everett‘s 
claims that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to (1) challenge the 
discrepancy between medical examiner Dr. Marie Hansen‘s deposition testimony 
and her final testimony, and (2) adequately cross-examine Dr. Hansen, Everett 
 
- 5 - 
Everett raises eleven issues.2  In addition, Everett filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, raising seven claims. 
II.  MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
On appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, Everett raises eleven 
issues.  He raises four guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
asserting that counsel was ineffective due to his (a) failure to adequately 
communicate with Everett; (b) failure to adequately present Everett‘s Miranda 
argument at the pretrial suppression hearing; (c) failure to adequately challenge 
forensic serological evidence and object to an unqualified witness opining on that 
evidence; and (d) failure to adequately represent Everett by presenting the lead 
police detective as the sole defense witness.  Everett also raises four penalty-phase 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, asserting that counsel was ineffective due 
to his (a) improper reliance upon Everett‘s alcoholic father for mitigation; (b) 
failure to present evidence that Everett had no male role model other than his 
alcoholic father and that Everett was denied a stable upbringing; (c) failure to 
                                                                                                                                   
presented no evidence on these issues at the postconviction evidentiary hearing and 
did not address the issues in his memorandum.  Despite this, the postconviction 
court reviewed the trial record and determined that counsel was not ineffective in 
the handling of the discrepancy between Dr. Hansen‘s direct testimony and 
deposition testimony or in the cross-examination of Dr. Hansen. 
 
 
2.  Everett does not appeal the postconviction court‘s denial of his claims 
that attorney Smith was ineffective (1) for ―failing to develop a more effective 
working relationship,‖ (2) for failing to obtain co-counsel, or (3) based upon his 
defense strategy. 
 
- 6 - 
consult with a psychological or psychiatric professional for purposes of 
establishing mitigation; and (d) failure to introduce evidence about Everett‘s drug 
use.  Everett presents three additional arguments.  He contends that the cumulative 
effect of the errors and omissions of counsel in the guilt and penalty phases 
warrants relief.  He asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
denying his claim that Florida‘s death penalty procedures violate due process.  
Finally, Everett argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 
his challenge to Florida‘s lethal injection procedures. 
A.  Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show both that trial counsel‘s performance was deficient and that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair 
trial.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  As to the first prong, the 
defendant must establish that ―counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.‖  
Id. at 687; see also Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  For the 
second prong, ―Strickland places the burden on the defendant, not the State, to 
show a ‗reasonable probability‘ that the result would have been different.‖  Wong 
v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390-91 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
Strickland does not ―require a defendant to show ‗that counsel‘s deficient conduct 
 
- 7 - 
more likely than not altered the outcome‘ of his penalty proceeding, but rather that 
he establish ‗a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.‘‖  
Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455-56 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). 
 
―[T]his Court‘s standard of review is two-pronged:  (1) this Court must defer 
to the circuit court‘s findings on factual issues so long as competent, substantial 
evidence supports them; but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the 
deficiency and prejudice prongs.‖  Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla. 
2004) (citing Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999) (―Thus, under 
Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law 
and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower court‘s factual findings.‖)). 
1.  Guilt-Phase Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
a.  Communication With Everett 
i.  Advising Everett While in Alabama Custody 
 
First, Everett argues that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to 
communicate with and advise Everett not to speak to law enforcement officers 
while Everett was in the Baldwin County Jail, in Baldwin County, Alabama.  
Because attorney Smith had not then been appointed to represent Everett, attorney 
Smith was not ineffective for failing to communicate with Everett while Everett 
 
- 8 - 
was in Alabama custody—before Everett was ever charged with any Florida 
offense.  The postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. 
Chapter 27, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.111 offer guidance on when a public defender is ―representing‖ a defendant.  
Section 27.51(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), provides in pertinent part that ―[t]he 
public defender shall represent . . . any person who is determined by the court to be 
indigent as provided in s. 27.52 and who is . . . [u]nder arrest for, or is charged 
with, a felony.‖  Section 27.51(2) adds that ―[t]he court may not appoint the public 
defender to represent, even on a temporary basis, any person who is not indigent.‖  
§ 27.51(2).  Chapter 27 is in agreement with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.111(a), which provides that ―[an indigent] person entitled to appointment of 
counsel . . . shall have counsel appointed when the person is formally charged with 
an offense, or as soon as feasible after custodial restraint, or at the first appearance 
before a committing magistrate, whichever occurs earliest.‖  Rule 3.111(b)(5) 
states also that ―[b]efore appointing a public defender, the court shall . . . make 
inquiry into the financial status of the accused in a manner not inconsistent with 
the guidelines established by section 27.52, Florida Statutes.  The accused shall 
respond to the inquiry under oath.‖  Finally, the rules provide that the court shall 
―require the accused to execute an affidavit of insolvency as required by section 
27.52, Florida Statutes.‖  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(b)(5)(C). 
 
- 9 - 
In this case, at the time that Everett was in Alabama and gave statements to 
law enforcement officers, the Florida trial court had not determined that Everett 
was indigent, as required by both sections 27.51-.52 and rule 3.111(5).  Likewise, 
attorney Smith had not been appointed as counsel and was not ―representing‖ 
Everett according to sections 27.51-.52 and rule 3.111 because Everett had not 
been formally charged, was not under custodial restraint in Florida, and had not 
had a first appearance for his Florida charges.  Specifically, Everett made 
statements to law enforcement in November 2001, while in Alabama custody for 
an Alabama charge; Everett was indicted for the Florida crimes in late January 
2002; and the trial court determined that Everett was entitled to a Florida public 
defender in late February 2002 upon determining that Everett was indigent.  Based 
on this timeline, it was impossible for attorney Smith, as an assistant public 
defender, to have been ―representing‖ Everett at the time that Everett made the 
statements in Alabama.  Because attorney Smith was not yet representing Everett 
as defined by Florida Law, attorney Smith was not yet responsible for advising 
Everett. 
ii.  Getting Along With Everett 
 
Second, Everett argues that attorney Smith was ineffective because attorney 
Smith did not get along with Everett and disbelieved much of what Everett told 
 
- 10 - 
him about the offenses.  During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, attorney 
Smith testified that he and Everett did not get along well and explained: 
I don‘t get along with a lot of my clients, you know, and I understand 
why.  They‘re in—I‘m over there telling them, look, the best you‘re 
going to get is a life sentence, there is not much I can do for you, you 
know, your confession is coming in, all this evidence is coming in.  
They don‘t want to hear that.  They want somebody to go tell them, 
look, we got an out here, I found a loophole to get you off.  And, you 
know, at that point sometimes the relationship goes sour. 
 
We conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying this claim. 
The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel does not 
―guarantee[] a ‗meaningful relationship‘ between an accused and his counsel.‖  
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).  Under Strickland, an ineffective 
assistance claim must be based on the quality of counsel‘s performance—not on 
the quality of counsel‘s relationship with the defendant.   Strickland requires that 
―the defendant must . . . specify an act or omission of counsel ‗so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the ―counsel‖ guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.‘‖  Ey v. State, 982 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687).  Because Everett has failed to show specifically how his 
relationship with attorney Smith caused any deficient performance on the part of 
attorney Smith, Everett‘s claim is legally insufficient.  See id. 
b.  Pretrial Suppression Hearing 
i.  Calling Everett to Testify 
 
- 11 - 
 
First, Everett claims that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to call 
Everett to testify at the suppression hearing about the statements he made in 
Alabama, allegedly in violation of his rights under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.  At the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, attorney Smith testified that he did not call 
Everett to testify at the pretrial suppression hearing because ―everyone pretty much 
agreed as to what happened‖ and ―if there were some important revelation that [he] 
thought would have bearing on that motion to suppress [he] would have put 
[Everett] on [the stand].‖  At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Everett 
testified that while still in Alabama custody, he made statements to Detective John 
Murphy—an investigator with the Baldwin County Sheriff‘s Office—in between 
Everett‘s statements to Sergeant Rodney Tilley, which were never presented to the 
trial court or jury. 
The postconviction court determined that attorney Smith was not ineffective.  
It found that Everett‘s ―version of what took place [was] not credible‖ and that 
nothing established that if Everett had testified at the suppression hearing, the trial 
court would have reached a different result.  We agree that Everett did not establish 
that counsel was ineffective. 
This Court has consistently held that a ―trial counsel‘s ‗strategic decisions do 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel‘s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
 
- 12 - 
professional conduct.‘‖  Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 509 (Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)).  Here, attorney Smith 
noted that there was nothing else to add at the suppression hearing, that the salient 
facts were basically undisputed, and that if he had needed the testimony he 
certainly would have asked Everett to testify.   
This Court has also consistently held that a trial counsel‘s decision to not 
call certain witnesses to testify at trial can be reasonable trial strategy.  See Bowles 
v. State, 979 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 2008) (holding that counsel‘s failure to call 
clinical psychologist to provide emotional disturbance mitigation was reasonable 
trial strategy); Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 39 (Fla. 2005) (holding that trial 
counsel‘s failure to call defendant‘s family members as witnesses during penalty 
phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel).  
Attorney Smith testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he would 
have called Everett to testify if it would have added something to the defense‘s 
argument.  Based on that testimony and this Court‘s precedent, attorney Smith‘s 
decision to not call Everett to testify was a reasonable strategic decision.  
Moreover, this Court has held that such strategic decisions may be based on 
counsel‘s concern about credibility.  See Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696, 702 
(Fla. 2009) (―It is not deficient performance to make a strategic decision for the 
purpose of retaining credibility . . . .‖).  Therefore, to the extent that attorney 
 
- 13 - 
Smith‘s decision to not call Everett to testify was based on concern about Everett‘s 
credibility, such decision was not deficient. 
Everett has also failed to prove Strickland prejudice.  The postconviction 
court found that Everett‘s postconviction testimony about the events between 
Everett and Lieutenant Murphy was not credible.  Because the postconviction court 
made such a credibility determination, we defer to the postconviction court‘s 
finding that the trial court likely would have found Everett not credible during the 
suppression hearing, so long as the postconviction court‘s findings were supported 
by competent, substantial evidence.  See Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 700.  The 
postconviction record indicates that Everett‘s statements regarding other issues 
during the proceedings were not credible, particularly those statements regarding 
the events surrounding the crimes.  For example, at the postconviction evidentiary 
hearing, attorney Smith indicated that ―by the time this case went to trial I didn‘t 
really know what he would say if he were called to testify because he had come up 
with all sorts of versions, you know, during the interim from the arrest to the trial.‖  
Attorney Smith stated that one of Everett‘s versions included that ―the victim was 
some sort of a double agent and was involved in drugs and they had gone to 
Alabama and she was in Alabama.‖  Moreover, attorney Smith testified that at 
some point Everett had  
sort of reverted back to the second version.  I mean, the third version 
was where he, quote, came clean, end quote, and said, yeah, I did it 
 
- 14 - 
and this is what happened.  But the second version was the one about 
Bubba and other people being involved and that‘s sort of the version 
that he adopted, you know, during the process between arrest and trial.   
Everett‘s inconsistent stories about the events surrounding his crimes and 
attorney Smith‘s testimony about Everett‘s lack of credibility support the 
postconviction court‘s determination that Everett‘s version of the events between 
him and Lieutenant Murphy was also not credible.   
ii.  Calling Lieutenant Murphy to Testify 
Second, Everett argues that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to call 
Lieutenant Murphy to testify at the suppression hearing.  Everett argues that 
Lieutenant Murphy would have testified that there were improper communications 
between Lieutenant Murphy and Everett that were not presented to the trial court.  
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, attorney Smith acknowledged that 
Lieutenant Murphy was a material witness as to Everett‘s pretrial statements and 
that he had been unable to obtain Murphy as a witness.  At the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, Lieutenant Murphy testified that he did not have additional 
contact or conversations with Everett, that he never threatened Everett, and that he 
never told Everett that Everett could avoid the death penalty by confessing to the 
murder and talking to the Panama City police.  The postconviction court 
determined that Lieutenant Murphy‘s testimony was credible and that Everett‘s 
 
- 15 - 
version of the events was not credible.  The postconviction court ultimately 
determined that attorney Smith was not ineffective.  We agree. 
Everett has failed to show that attorney Smith‘s failure to call Lieutenant 
Murphy to testify at the suppression hearing constituted deficient performance or 
resulted in any prejudice.  Despite Everett‘s allegation that Murphy would have 
provided favorable testimony, at the evidentiary hearing Murphy instead denied 
having additional or hidden interviews with Everett and stated that all 
communications with Everett were covered in the report used at the suppression 
hearing.  Because Lieutenant Murphy‘s testimony would not have been favorable, 
Everett could not possibly have been prejudiced by attorney Smith‘s failure to 
secure that testimony. 
c.  Forensic Evidence  
Charles Richards, an employee of the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement (FDLE), testified during the guilt phase on behalf of the State about 
the crime scene (the victim‘s home), particularly about blood spatter.  Everett 
argues that attorney Smith was ineffective by failing to sufficiently object to 
Richards‘ testimony.  Everett admits that attorney Smith did object but argues that 
attorney Smith should have objected again.  It is not clear whether Everett argues 
that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to make a second objection asserting 
that Richards was not qualified to testify as an expert or for failing to object on the 
 
- 16 - 
ground that Richards testified beyond the scope of his qualifications as a crime 
scene analyst. 
The following exchange occurred when Richards was initially questioned on 
direct examination, wherein attorney Smith objected to Richards testifying as an 
expert: 
 
Q.  Now can you tell us anything when you are looking at blood 
spatter from a crime scene technician‘s perspective that it tells you 
regarding directionality in which the blood drop would have come? 
 
MR. SMITH: Judge, if I can be heard. 
 
THE COURT:  If counsel will approach side-bar. 
 
(Side-bar conference:) 
 
MR. SMITH:  Chuck had not been qualified as an expert.  I 
don‘t know if you are going to try to qualify him as a blood expert or 
crime scene—I don‘t really think he‘s a blood spatter expert. 
 
MR. MEADOWS:  We won‘t have Chuck make opinions about 
recreating about this blood was struck here and that blood struck 
there, that‘s not the purpose of what we are offering, but within his 
training and crime scene processing, part of the training they have is 
being able to determine direction in which blood was deposited by 
direction of the tail. 
 
MR. SMITH:  That‘s as far as you are going? 
 
MR. MEADOWS:  And contact, that appears to be a contact, 
but that‘s the extent, so I have not tendered him as an expert and— 
 
MR. SMITH:  Well, if he‘s just going to say this, you know, 
this is it, came from this direction. . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
(Side-bar conference concluded.) 
 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Richards testified that he was 
competent to opine about such blood spatter patterns based on his training as a 
crime scene analyst, and attorney Smith testified that he did not make an additional 
objection because it was not necessary for Richards to be an expert to testify as he 
 
- 17 - 
did.  Ultimately, the postconviction court determined that Everett failed to show 
that attorney Smith was deficient.  We agree. 
To the extent that Everett claims that attorney Smith was deficient for not 
making a subsequent objection about Richards‘ qualifications, such argument is 
without merit.  At the time of Everett‘s trial in 2002, Florida district courts had 
held that a party was not required to reassert his objection after it had been 
overruled.  See, e.g., Howard v. State, 616 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) 
(holding that where defendant sought to exclude evidence prior to trial and again 
just prior to witness‘s testimony at issue, it was not necessary for defendant to 
object to testimony when it was actually put before jury); Thomas v. State, 599 So. 
2d 158, 159-60 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that where an objection was 
made and trial court‘s ruling was treated as conclusive by state and defense 
counsel, there was no need for further objections when evidence was presented to 
jury); Webb v. Priest, 413 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (―We will not require 
Webb to renew his objection each time in what would have been an obviously 
futile gesture.‖).  We agree with the district courts.  Attorney Smith was not 
required to reobject to Richards‘ qualifications when Richards presented his 
testimony to the jury. 
To the extent that Everett claims that attorney Smith was deficient for failing 
to object on grounds that Richards‘ testimony exceeded the bounds of his crime 
 
- 18 - 
scene analyst qualifications, such argument is likewise without merit.  Crime scene 
analysts have testified about blood spatter in similar cases.  For example, in Buzia 
v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1212 (Fla. 2006), this Court stated: 
 
A crime scene analyst concluded that the blood spatter on the 
wall near Mr. Kersch‘s body was the ―result of a beating.‖  Based on 
those blood stains and patterns, she also concluded that there were at 
least two separate swings of the ax and two separate impacts to Mr. 
Kersch‘s head.   
Similarly, in Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 196 n.13 (Fla. 2005), the crime scene 
analyst concluded, based upon ―medium-velocity blood spatter and arterial 
spurting on the front passenger‘s door panel‖ combined with other evidence in the 
car, that the victim was behind the steering wheel when the attack began. 
Richards‘ testimony was similar in scope.  At trial, Richards testified in 
nontechnical terms about different blood spots around the victim‘s home.  He 
testified as to how, based on the shape of the spots, the blood hit surfaces such as 
the walls in the home.  Given Richards‘ testimony and testimony of crime scene 
analysts regarding blood spatter in similar cases, Everett has not established that 
Richards‘ testimony exceeded the bounds of his qualifications as a crime scene 
analyst.  Since Richards did not exceed the scope of his qualifications as a crime 
scene analyst, attorney Smith could not have been deficient for failing to make an 
additional objection that Richards was testifying beyond his qualifications. 
 
- 19 - 
Everett also has failed to show Strickland prejudice.  Everett failed to 
present any evidence that Richards was unqualified, that the stains were not the 
victim‘s blood stains, or that Richards testified incorrectly.  Everett has not 
explained how objecting to Richards‘ testimony would have improved his defense 
or undermined the State‘s presentation.  Because Everett did not present any 
evidence that Richards‘ testimony was improperly inculpating, Everett‘s claim is 
insufficient.  See State v. Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 211 (Fla. 2008) (holding that 
where Larzelere claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a 
concrete expert, defendant failed to prove prejudice because she failed to show 
what a concrete expert would have testified to or how testimony would have ―cast 
doubt on her guilt‖).   
 
The extensive evidence presented at trial concerning blood in the victim‘s 
home makes it clear that the exclusion of this testimony by Richards would have 
had no impact on Everett‘s trial.  At trial, medical examiner Dr. Marie Hansen, 
who observed the murder scene, testified that there was a bloody pillow near the 
victim, that there was blood spatter on the ceiling, and that there were blood 
droplets on the furniture.  Dr. Hansen also pointed out to the jury through 
photographs that there was blood on the victim‘s hand and forearm and on the 
bottoms of the victim‘s feet.  Similarly, Sergeant Tilley testified at trial that there 
was blood in various areas of the victim‘s home.  Most compelling is Everett‘s 
 
- 20 - 
own confession to beating the victim, that she was bleeding, that he somehow got 
blood on his shoes, and that he ―guess[ed]‖ his clothes got blood on them.  At trial, 
the jury was also able to view the crime scene and view the blood through a 
videotape and photographs. 
d.  Presentation of the Lead Police Detective 
 
Everett argues that attorney Smith was ineffective by presenting Sergeant 
Tilley as the sole defense witness because Tilley was the chief witness for the 
State.  At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, when questioned about his 
purpose for presenting Sergeant Tilley as a defense witness, attorney Smith 
testified that he called Tilley because Everett had told Tilley about his drug use and 
Tilley‘s testimony was the only way attorney Smith could get the drug use into 
evidence.  The postconviction court concluded that Everett‘s claim was meritless 
and stated that attorney Smith‘s strategy was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.  Attorney Smith had contemplated alternative courses but 
determined that it was best to focus on the admissibility of Everett‘s statements 
since that was the key to the State‘s case.  We conclude that the postconviction 
court did not err. 
―[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if 
alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel‘s decision was 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.‖  Anderson, 18 So. 3d at 509 
 
- 21 - 
(quoting Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048).  The defendant carries the burden to 
―overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‗might be considered sound trial strategy.‘‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting 
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  Moreover, this Court has held, 
―That there may have been more that trial counsel could have done or that new 
counsel in reviewing the record with hindsight would handle the case differently, 
does not mean that trial counsel‘s performance during the guilt phase was 
deficient.‖  State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 136 (Fla. 2003) (quoting trial court‘s 
order (citing Cherry, 659 So. 2d 1069)). 
It is clear from the record that attorney Smith had a legitimate guilt-phase 
purpose in eliciting such testimony—to undermine the State‘s claim that the crime 
was premeditated.  In particular, attorney Smith seemingly intended to plant doubt 
in the jury‘s mind regarding Everett‘s involvement in the crimes, mental state 
during the crimes, and confessions to the crimes.  Through Tilley‘s testimony, 
attorney Smith highlighted that Everett said he had been using LSD and had been 
―tripping out.‖  This enabled attorney Smith to show that Everett‘s confession was 
not consistent with some other trial evidence.  For example, Sergeant Tilley 
testified that he was unaware of any evidence showing that anal penetration had 
been made to the victim and that the lights at the victim‘s home were on.  This was 
contrary to Everett‘s confession to Tilley, in which Everett stated that there was 
 
- 22 - 
both vaginal and anal penetration to the victim and that the lights at the victim‘s 
home were off.  In a seeming attempt to show Everett‘s mental state, attorney 
Smith also elicited from Tilley that Everett left his shirt but grabbed the victim‘s 
sweater; that Tilley believed Everett even stated that he wore the sweater for a 
brief time; that Everett abandoned both the victim‘s sweater and credit card; and 
that Everett did not use the victim‘s credit card.  During his closing argument, 
attorney Smith argued that Everett‘s statements to police officers were unreliable 
because while ―truthful‖ they were ―not totally accurate‖ and that there was ―no[] 
evidence of premeditation.‖  Attorney Smith concluded, ―In sum, what this case is 
is simply a bungled burglary committed by somebody who was high, committed by 
somebody who committed acts which are inexcusable but that don‘t amount to the 
main charges that have been asserted by the State.‖ 
Given the evidence against Everett, attorney Smith‘s decision to call 
Sergeant Tilley to testify about Everett‘s drug use was proper in order to plan 
ahead for Everett‘s penalty phase, as it was clear to attorney Smith that the State 
would seek the death penalty.  Counsel‘s conduct was not deficient.  See Henry v. 
State, 948 So. 2d 609, 617-18 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim where defense counsel ―ma[de] the decision—well before trial and 
with Henry‘s informed consent—to question Henry about [a previous] murder, the 
sentence he served for this crime, and the death sentence he received for [another 
 
- 23 - 
previous] murder,‖ and noting that ―[w]hile this testimony would not otherwise 
have been admissible if it had not been raised by the defendant on direct 
examination, we recognize that the facts of this case would lead reasonably prudent 
defense counsel to believe there was a strong likelihood Henry would be convicted 
in the guilt phase and, therefore, that counsel would need to consider the impact of 
the guilt phase on the penalty phase‖); Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 219-20 (Fla. 
1999) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where defense counsel 
made strategic decision to offer evidence of a codefendant‘s admission during the 
guilt phase, and noting that ―[a]t the conclusion of the State‘s case, the defendant 
was in a desperate situation‖ because ―[t]he State‘s case-in-chief did not leave any 
doubt that the defendant played a major role in the murder‖). 
Additionally, Everett has failed to show Strickland prejudice.  Everett argues 
that Sergeant Tilley‘s testimony was harmful and that by calling Sergeant Tilley as 
a defense witness, attorney Smith caused Everett to lose the summation-argument 
advantage and that having the final closing argument ―would have had a 
substantial likelihood of producing a new result of the trial.‖  Everett does not 
explain which parts of Tilley‘s testimony were harmful or what counsel could have 
argued in the final closing argument that would have swayed the jury.  We have 
evaluated Tilley‘s testimony and any alleged prejudice that came from calling 
Detective Tilley.  We conclude that calling Tilley and not being able to have the 
 
- 24 - 
final closing argument in no way undermines confidence in the outcome of 
Everett‘s guilt phase, especially in light of the substantial evidence of guilt that 
includes Everett‘s own confession and the DNA evidence.  See Everett, 893 So. 2d 
at 1287. 
2.  Penalty-Phase Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
a.  Reliance on Everett’s Father for Mitigation 
Everett argues that attorney Smith was ineffective by relying on Everett‘s 
alcoholic father to find mitigation and for failing to look elsewhere for mitigation 
after Everett‘s father‘s death.  The postconviction court determined that attorney 
Smith had adequately investigated potential mitigation, had interviewed potential 
witnesses other than Everett‘s father, and simply ―ran into a dead end.‖  We agree. 
Everett has failed to show that attorney Smith performed deficiently.  We 
find that competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court‘s 
finding that counsel investigated potential mitigation and did not solely rely upon 
Everett‘s father, and thus we defer to the postconviction court on this finding.  See 
Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 700.  Attorney Smith traveled to Alabama in search of 
additional mitigating evidence.  While there, he interviewed Everett‘s former 
principal and guidance counselor, but neither offered any viable mitigation 
evidence.  Moreover, even the most promising mitigation witnesses—Everett‘s 
mother, Glenda Everett, and sister, Cindy Everett Griden—whom attorney Smith 
 
- 25 - 
did present as witnesses during the penalty phase, offered little mitigation.  Rather, 
they testified that they loved Everett and that Everett was not violent and gave 
details about Everett‘s upbringing.  Attorney Smith also had Dr. Jill Rowan 
examine Everett for competency, but her examination proved unfavorable. 
In Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 1995), this Court held that 
Hildwin demonstrated both Strickland deficiency and prejudice where trial counsel 
―failed to unearth a large amount of mitigating evidence which could have been 
presented at sentencing.‖  The Court emphasized that at his postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, the defendant ―presented an abundance of mitigating evidence 
which his trial counsel could have presented at sentencing.‖  Id. at 110.  Hildwin 
presented two mental health experts who testified that two statutory mitigating 
circumstances existed: (1) Hildwin committed the murder under influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) Hildwin‘s capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired.  Both experts also testified that they recognized several 
nonstatutory mitigators.  Id.  
Similarly, in Phillips v. State, 608 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1992), the Court 
determined that Phillips demonstrated both Strickland deficiency and prejudice 
where trial counsel admitted to doing ―virtually no preparation for the penalty 
phase.‖  The only testimony presented as mitigation was Phillips‘ mother‘s 
 
- 26 - 
testimony that Phillips was a good son.  During postconviction proceedings, 
Phillips produced much mitigating evidence through testimony of relatives, 
friends, and experts.  The experts opined that ―Phillips [was] emotionally, 
intellectually, and socially deficient, that he [had] lifelong deficits in his adaptive 
functioning, that he [was] withdrawn and socially isolated, that he [had] a schizoid 
personality, and that he [was] passive-aggressive.‖  Id. at 782-83.  Both experts 
concluded that Phillips was within the statutory mitigating circumstances of 
extreme emotional disturbance and inability to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  Id. at 783.  Their opinions were that Phillips did not have 
the requisite intent for either the cold, calculated, and premeditated or heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstances, id., which the trial court had found, 
see Phillips v. State, 476 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1985). 
This case is distinguishable from both Hildwin and Phillips.  In both 
Hildwin and Phillips, trial counsel made severe errors in failing to investigate and 
find compelling mitigating evidence.  The evidence that they failed to discover and 
present would have supported additional mitigating circumstances and, at least in 
Phillips, might have prevented the application of serious statutory aggravating 
circumstances.  In this case, attorney Smith extensively searched for mitigating 
evidence, but he was simply unable to find mitigation beyond the testimonies of 
Everett‘s mother and sister.  Also unlike Hildwin and Phillips, at the 
 
- 27 - 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, Everett presented little evidence that attorney 
Smith had not presented at trial.  Although Everett did present an expert, Dr. 
Umesh Mhatre, who opined that Everett‘s drug use made him paranoid and that 
such paranoia was likely a factor in his violent behavior on the date of the crime, 
even Dr. Mhatre stated that his opinion was based solely on Everett‘s statements 
and did not opine that the paranoia rose to the level of statutory mental health 
mitigation.   
To establish prejudice, Everett has the burden of showing that counsel‘s 
ineffectiveness ―deprived [him] of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.‖  Davis v. 
State, 990 So. 2d 459, 471 (Fla. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Asay v. 
State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000)); see also Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 
216, 223 (Fla. 1998).  Everett did not do so.  See Davis, 990 So. 2d at 471 (holding 
that where much of evidence Davis alleged should have been presented was, in 
fact, presented during penalty phase, Davis had not shown that counsel‘s 
ineffectiveness deprived him of reliable penalty phase). 
b.  No Male Role Model and an Unstable Upbringing 
Everett argues that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to present 
mitigation evidence that Everett had no viable male role model other than his 
alcoholic father and had an unstable upbringing from being moved from place to 
place.  The postconviction court did not make particular findings about these facts.  
 
- 28 - 
Rather, the postconviction concluded that mitigation witnesses had in fact 
presented an account of Everett‘s background.   
The evidence presented during both the penalty phase and the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing showed that Everett‘s father was an alcoholic and acted 
inappropriately toward Everett at times; that Everett loved his father; and that 
Everett moved several times as a result of his parents‘ divorce, remarriage, and 
second divorce.  This Court has held that where the evidence presented at the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing was ―essentially cumulative‖ to that presented 
during the penalty phase, trial counsel cannot be considered deficient.  Rutherford, 
727 So. 2d at 224-25; Darling v. State 966 So. 2d 366, 378 (Fla. 2007) (―[T]rial 
counsel is not ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence.‖).  Because 
the evidence presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing was substantially 
cumulative to that presented during the penalty phase, Everett has failed to show 
either deficiency or prejudice under Strickland.  See Davis, 990 So. 2d at 471; 
Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 226. 
c.  Consulting with a Psychological or Psychiatric Professional 
Everett argues that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to consult with 
a psychological or psychiatric professional for the purpose of discovering and 
developing mitigating circumstances.  At the evidentiary hearing, Everett presented 
Dr. Umesh Mhatre, a psychiatrist, who explained the effects of Everett‘s alleged 
 
- 29 - 
drug use on his behavior during the time of the crimes.  Dr. Mhatre testified in 
pertinent part: 
 
Yes, I talked to [Everett] at length and he has had problems 
with drinking since he was eight years old, actually his father often 
gave him the beer and got him started.  He was drinking up to 12 to 18 
beers a day and would go months without drinking.  He also started 
drinking hard liquor which he found very difficult to handle.  At 12 
years he started abusing marijuana which is given to him by his 
sister‘s boyfriend.  He subsequently started using LSD, powder 
cocaine, crack cocaine and then started doing crystal meth after that 
and actually became pretty good at cooking it himself.  He was then 
selling drugs and using them and this became pretty much part of his 
life.  He had also used Ecstasy and pain pills.  And he had used crystal 
meth, cocaine and LSD intermittently. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
On the day of the alleged offense actually [Everett] claims he 
had used about half an ounce of methamphetamine in a week leading 
to his arrest, five ounces of marijuana, about one gram of powder 
cocaine, a gram of crack cocaine and had drank two six-packs of beer 
every day and he had done about six to seven hits of LSD in a week 
prior to his arrest and he basically said that he was so high on drugs he 
had not slept almost in seven days.   
 
 
. . . . 
 
 . . . [I]t seems like he was getting increasingly paranoid and 
when the victim accidentally got into the room looking for somebody, 
the paranoia just went off the roof, he started thinking she was a law 
enforcement, trying to get her, trying to track her down, ran into her 
unfortunately later on while she was jogging, followed her and stalked 
her and were convinced, and if you notice her initial purpose to go 
there was to find out who her personal [sic], if she does, in fact, 
belong to law enforcement.  So a lot of paranoia, it was very obvious 
at the time. 
   
Dr. Mhatre also stated that his opinion was based solely on what Everett told him.   
The postconviction court did not find Dr. Mhatre‘s testimony compelling.  
The postconviction court emphasized that Dr. Mhatre acknowledged that he was 
 
- 30 - 
unable to corroborate that Everett ―was in a drug induced psychosis at the time of 
the murder.‖  The postconviction court determined that attorney Smith was not 
ineffective.  We agree.  
Everett‘s argument that attorney Smith was deficient for failing to consult 
with a psychological or psychiatric professional is factually incorrect.  At attorney 
Smith‘s request, Dr. Jill Rowan examined Everett for competency, but attorney 
Smith chose not to introduce Dr. Rowan as a mitigation expert because Dr. 
Rowan‘s examination proved unhelpful to Everett‘s case.  Dr. Rowan opined that 
―Everett demonstrated no signs of mental retardation or of a major mental illness‖ 
and that nothing indicated that a full competence evaluation should be done.   
To the extent that Everett asserts that attorney Smith was ineffective for not 
calling Dr. Rowan as an expert, such an argument is meritless.  Attorney Smith‘s 
decision to not call Dr. Rowan as a mitigation witness was not deficient since her 
testimony was not favorable to Everett‘s case.  See, e.g., Winkles v. State, 21 So. 
3d 19, 25 (Fla. 2009) (finding counsel made reasonable decision to not call any of 
the three mental health experts consulted because testimony would not have been 
helpful to defense‘s case); Bowles, 979 So. 2d at 188 (finding that counsel made 
reasonable strategic decision not to call mental health expert as witness where 
expert would have testified that defendant was only mildly impaired, impulsive, 
and dangerous).  
 
- 31 - 
Everett has failed to show that he was prejudiced by attorney Smith‘s failure 
to call a mental health expert for penalty-phase mitigation.  In determining whether 
Everett was prejudiced, it is necessary to determine whether additional evidence of 
Everett‘s substance abuse and paranoia would undermine confidence in his 
sentence in light of the aggravation and mitigation present in Everett‘s case.  In 
Everett‘s case, the evidence in the record indicates that the mitigating evidence 
presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing would not alter the balance 
of aggravation and mitigation.   
The sentencing court found as aggravating circumstances that Everett was a 
convicted felon under a sentence of imprisonment at the time of the murder; 
Everett committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a sexual battery 
or a burglary; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  The 
sentencing court also found five statutory mitigating circumstances and four 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, giving little or very little weight to each.  
Most important to Everett‘s argument is that the sentencing court determined that 
the statutory mitigating circumstance ―under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance‖ was not established.  However, the sentencing court 
determined that  
because [Everett] did say he took ―acid‖ before the crimes were 
committed and there is no evidence that [Everett] did not use some 
type of substance before committing this murder, the Court will 
consider this as a mitigating circumstance by removing the words 
 
- 32 - 
―extreme mental or emotional disturbance‖ and adding the word 
―substance.‖ 
 
The sentencing court assigned little weight to this circumstance. 
Everett argues that evidence of his drug use could have supported the 
conclusion that Everett was suffering from emotional distress, such as fear or 
anxiety.  Because Dr. Mhatre‘s testimony focused on the mental effects of 
Everett‘s alleged drug use, the testimony was seemingly targeted at establishing 
the ―under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance‖ statutory 
mitigator, which the sentencing court rejected.  However, to the extent that Dr. 
Mhatre‘s testimony supports a theory that Everett committed the crimes while 
under a drug-induced paranoia, such a theory is undermined by the facts in 
Everett‘s case.   
This Court addressed similar claims in Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 
2008), and Foster v. State, 929 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2006).  In Owen, this Court 
determined that because there were substantial aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, postconviction expert testimony that Owen‘s substance abuse 
―would certainly exacerbate‖ the impulse-control problems caused by his 
neuropsychological impairment did not provide a basis for establishing prejudice.  
Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d at 552.  The Court emphasized,  
Given the deliberate manner in which Owen twice entered the home 
in which [the victim] was babysitting before attacking her, it seems 
unlikely that [the expert‘s] testimony about how Owen‘s substance 
 
- 33 - 
abuse would have exacerbated his impulsivity would change the trial 
judge or jury‘s evaluation of Owen‘s mitigation. 
 
Id. at 553.  This Court ultimately held that confidence in the death sentence was 
not undermined by counsel‘s failure to present Owen‘s history of substance abuse.   
Similarly, albeit pertaining to guilt-phase evidence, in Foster v. State, this 
Court held that Foster had failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel‘s 
failure to present an involuntary intoxication defense.  The Court held that ―there 
was . . . substantial evidence presented to the jury which invalidated this defense, 
including the fact that Foster had a clear recollection of the details of the offense 
and that the offense involved deliberate behavior.‖  929 So. 2d at 531. 
Like Owen and Foster, Everett acted in a deliberate manner.  As the 
sentencing court correctly emphasized, ―regardless of his use of any substance, 
[Everett] was able to go to the victim‘s home, enter, burglarize her home, commit a 
sexual battery upon her, [and] murder her.‖  Moreover, as this Court emphasized in 
Foster, Everett was able to clearly recollect the events surrounding the crimes.  
Based on the factual circumstances of the crimes which Everett clearly recollected, 
the aggravation and mitigation found by the sentencing court, and this Court‘s 
precedent, the additional evidence of Everett‘s substance abuse and paranoia 
presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing does not undermine confidence 
in his sentence.  See Owen, 986 So. 2d at 551-52. 
d.  Everett’s Drug Use 
 
- 34 - 
Everett also argues that attorney Smith was ineffective for failing to 
introduce more evidence of Everett‘s drug use during the penalty phase.  During 
the penalty phase, Everett‘s mother and sister testified that Everett had been using 
drugs and that Everett was a loving, nonviolent person.  At the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, Everett‘s mother and two of Everett‘s sisters testified.  
Everett‘s mother testified that she was unable to tell when Everett was on drugs, 
and one sister stated that she never saw Everett act violently during the time period 
that she thought he was using drugs.  Dr. Mhatre testified at the postconviction 
hearing about Everett‘s paranoia as a result of Everett‘s drug use.  Everett testified 
at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he was never violent as a result of 
using drugs, and the following exchange occurred:   
 
Q 
Do you recall any unique effects that cocaine and 
methamphetamine together would have on you? 
 
A 
[Everett] Intense paranoia where I was always either 
looking out of the window, thinking I was being watched by the 
police or if I was going down the road always thought the police were 
following me.  And it was just an intense paranoia of the police, of the 
law enforcement. 
 
Q 
Would that ever prompt you to consider or maybe even 
execute violent acts? 
 
A 
No, not, I mean, I really, I really can‘t say, when it gets 
to that point it‘s self-preservation not wanting to go to jail and then, so 
I can‘t say no. 
 
Q 
Did you ever have a discussion with Mr. Smith about 
that? 
 
A 
No. 
 
Q 
Did you ever have a discussion with [Dr.] Rowan about 
that? 
 
A 
No. 
 
- 35 - 
 
Q 
Was any evidence of this presented at your trial? 
 
A 
Not at all. 
 
Q 
Is there any question in your mind as to whether you 
were using these substances in Panama City at that time? 
 
A 
No. 
 
Q 
Were you or were you not? 
 
A 
Oh, I was, yes. 
 
Q 
And within the hours before this incident occurred had 
you used both of those? 
 
A 
Yes. 
 
The postconviction court noted that attorney Smith indeed had presented 
testimony about Everett‘s drug use during the penalty phase.  The postconviction 
court emphasized that Everett‘s accusation that attorney Smith did not properly 
investigate Everett‘s drug use was not credible: 
[Everett] testified at the evidentiary hearing that he never told his 
attorney about the effects of certain drugs on him and that he was 
never violent when he was on drugs growing up.  According to 
[Everett], Mr. Smith never asked him about any problems with drugs 
and Mr. Smith never told [Everett] about drugs [sic].  However, Mr. 
Smith testified the defendant told him about cooking meth and using 
drugs in the past.  Furthermore, [Everett] indicated in his statements 
he was high on LSD or something at the time this occurred.  In light 
of the trial record indicating the constant references to drug use by 
[Everett], the Court finds [Everett‘s] claim that Mr. Smith did not 
adequately investigate his drug usage not credible.  As noted 
previously, Mr. Smith utilized [Everett‘s] purported drug use in an 
effort to avoid not only conviction of premeditated murder but also to 
avoid the death penalty. 
(Citation omitted.)  We agree.  The postconviction record supports these findings, 
and thus there is competent, substantial evidence to support the postconviction 
 
- 36 - 
court‘s credibility determination.  Accordingly, we defer to the trial court.  See 
Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 700. 
Moreover, while the evidence presented at the postconviction evidentiary 
hearing regarding Everett‘s drug use may have provided more detail, particularly 
because of Dr. Mhatre‘s testimony about Everett‘s drug use and resulting paranoia, 
as the postconviction court noted, the testimony of Everett‘s mother and two sisters 
at the postconviction evidentiary hearing was substantially cumulative to the 
evidence presented to the jury during the penalty phase.  Accordingly, attorney 
Smith was not deficient for failing to present such evidence at trial.  See 
Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 224-25; Owen, 986 So. 2d at 546; Darling, 966 So. 2d at 
378; Woods v. State, 531 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1988) (―[T]he testimony now 
advanced, while possibly more detailed than that presented at sentencing, is, 
essentially, just cumulative to the prior testimony.  More is not necessarily 
better.‖). 
Everett has failed to present evidence substantially different from the 
evidence that attorney Smith presented during Everett‘s penalty phase.  Therefore, 
Everett has failed to meet his burden of showing that counsel‘s ineffectiveness 
―deprived [him] of a reliable penalty proceeding.‖  Davis, 990 So. 2d at 471 
(quoting Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000)); see also Rutherford, 727 
 
- 37 - 
So. 2d at 226.  Accordingly, the additional testimony presented at the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing did not undermine confidence in the trial.   
B.  Other Claims 
―To uphold the trial court‘s summary denial of claims raised in an initial 
postconviction motion, the record must conclusively demonstrate that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief.‖  Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 700 (citing Foster v. 
State, 810 So. 2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002)).  ―Where no evidentiary hearing is held 
below, we must accept the defendant‘s factual allegations to the extent that they 
are not refuted by the record.‖  Id. at 700-01 (citing Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 
So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1989)).   
1.  Cumulative Error 
Everett argues that the cumulative effect of the errors in the guilt and penalty 
phases warrants relief.  We disagree.  This Court found no reversible error on 
direct appeal, see Everett, 893 So. 2d at 1288, and Everett has not demonstrated in 
this proceeding that any additional error occurred that was not considered on direct 
appeal.  Thus, he is not entitled to relief on the basis of cumulative error.  See, e.g., 
Owen, 986 So. 2d at 556-57 (denying cumulative error claim because defendant 
did not show that any harmful error occurred). 
2.  Florida’s Death Penalty Laws and Procedures 
 
- 38 - 
Everett argues that in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Florida‘s death penalty procedures are 
unconstitutional.  First, Everett argues that his constitutional rights were denied 
because the jury was not instructed that it was required to find at least one 
aggravating circumstance unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.  This Court 
rejected this claim on direct appeal, see Everett, 893 So. 3d at 1282, and thus this 
claim is procedurally barred, see, e.g., Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1106 (Fla. 
2008) (―Because the dog tracking issue was raised on direct appeal, Green is not 
permitted to relitigate it on postconviction appeal.‖).  
Second, Everett argues that his constitutional rights were denied because the 
jury was improperly instructed that its penalty-phase verdict was only advisory, 
which failed to adequately apprise the jury of the importance of its decision.  The 
Court also rejected this argument on direct appeal, see Everett, 893 So. 2d at 1282, 
and thus it is procedurally barred, see, e.g., Green, 975 So. 3d at 1106.   
Third, Everett argues that his constitutional rights were denied because the 
jury should have been instructed that a life sentence for a conviction of a capital 
offense does not include the possibility of release on parole.  Everett‘s argument is 
factually incorrect and is thus without merit.  During the penalty phase, the jury 
was instructed, ―If you find the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death 
 
- 39 - 
penalty, your advisory sentence should be one of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.‖ 
3.  Lethal Injection Claims 
Everett claims that the use of lethal injection as a method of carrying out the 
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Everett bases this claim on the 
botched execution of Angel Diaz and the 2007 Report of the Governor‘s 
Commission on the Administration of Lethal Injection in Florida, both of which 
arose several years after Everett‘s convictions.  The postconviction court did not 
err in denying Everett‘s claim without an evidentiary hearing, as this Court has 
repeatedly rejected similar lethal injection arguments.  See, e.g., Tompkins v. 
State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1305 (2009); 
Power v. State, 992 So. 2d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2008); Sexton v. State, 997 So. 2d 
1073, 1089 (Fla. 2008).  Additionally, this Court has held the procedures 
constitutional under the requirements of Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).  See 
Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla.) (―Florida‘s current lethal-injection 
protocol passes muster under any of the risk-based standards considered by the 
Baze Court (and would also easily satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by 
Justices Thomas and Scalia).‖) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2839 (2009); Henyard v. 
State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 28 (2008).    
 
- 40 - 
III.  PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Everett raises seven claims in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  He 
claims that (A) Everett was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when law 
enforcement officers initiated contact with Everett before Everett‘s confession; (B) 
Everett is denied due process if his conviction is allowed to stand based on 
inherently unreliable forensic evidence; (C) Everett is entitled to now introduce the 
deposition of Lieutenant Chad Lindsay; (D) the death penalty as applied in Florida 
is unconstitutional; (E) lethal injection as practiced in Florida is cruel and unusual 
punishment; (F) the cumulative effect of all errors requires relief; and (G) Everett 
should be entitled to raise any new issue which could have been discovered but 
that was not discovered based on good-faith omission or neglect. 
A.  Right to Counsel 
 
Everett argues that while he was incarcerated in Alabama, he was subject to 
questioning by Florida law enforcement officers but was without access to Florida 
legal assistance.  Based on this, Everett asserts that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  This claim is procedurally barred because Everett 
raised the trial court‘s rejection of his motion to suppress on direct appeal.  See 
Everett, 893 So. 2d at 1282; Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992) 
(―Habeas corpus is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate 
issues which could have been, should have been, or were raised on direct appeal.‖). 
 
- 41 - 
B.  Forensic Evidence 
 
Everett argues that this Court should not allow his conviction to stand 
because it is based on an incompetent analysis of forensic evidence which was 
presented to the jury without adequate basis, safeguard, or challenge.  While 
Everett‘s claim is not particularly clear, it appears to be based on the testimony of 
Charles Richards, who Everett asserted in his postconviction motion was not 
qualified to testify at trial about blood spatter.  Because Everett challenged 
Richards‘ qualifications within an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his 
motion for postconviction relief, this claim is procedurally barred.  See Hildwin, 
654 So. 2d at 111.  
C.  Deposition of Lieutenant Lindsay 
 
Everett argues that he should now be able to introduce Lieutenant Chad 
Lindsey‘s deposition.  Everett claims that this deposition was not previously 
available to Everett and was not discovered by appellate counsel in materials 
furnished from attorney Smith and that the docket of the court file does not reveal 
that this deposition had been filed.  Everett claims that the deposition demonstrates 
that Lieutenant Lindsay acknowledged using the specter of the death penalty in 
implying to Everett that Everett could avoid the death penalty by making a 
statement. 
 
- 42 - 
 
Everett‘s claim is seemingly a newly discovered evidence claim.  It is thus 
procedurally barred because ―claims of newly discovered evidence should be 
raised in a postconviction motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850 rather than in a 
petition for habeas corpus.‖  Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 668 n.13 (Fla. 
2000); see also Steinhorst v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1994).   
Moreover, Everett has failed to show how the deposition of Lieutenant 
Lindsay is newly discovered evidence, as the deposition is referenced in the record 
as far back as Everett‘s pretrial proceedings.  Specifically, at the pretrial 
suppression hearing, attorney Smith filed Lindsey‘s deposition and the court stated, 
―So, for the record, I have, then, the deposition testimony of Chad Lindsey and 
Rodney Tilley.‖  In its order denying Everett‘s motion to suppress, the trial court 
stated that it had heard argument of counsel and had ―reviewed . . . the depositions 
of Rodney Tilley and Chad Lindsey dated August 6, 2002.‖  Accordingly, 
Everett‘s claim is procedurally barred on this additional ground.  See Glock v. 
Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 2001) (―[A]ny claim of newly discovered 
evidence in a death penalty case must be brought within one year of the date such 
evidence was discovered or could have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence.‖). 
D.  Death Penalty Claims 
 
- 43 - 
 
Everett claims that the death penalty as applied in Florida is unconstitutional 
since it permits a death sentence without a unanimous jury finding as to at least one 
aggravating circumstance; the jury is not adequately informed of its role; and the 
jury is not informed that a life sentence for a capital offense is without the 
possibility of parole.  For the reasons we have already set forth, we reject these 
claims. 
E.  Lethal Injection Claims 
 
Everett claims that the use of lethal injection as a method of carrying out the 
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  For the reasons we have already set 
forth, we reject these claims. 
F.  Cumulative Error 
 
Everett argues that the cumulative effect of all errors in his case warrants 
relief even if no claim individually warrants relief.  This Court found no reversible 
error on direct appeal, see Everett, 893 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2004), and Everett has 
not demonstrated in the current proceedings that any additional error occurred that 
was not considered on direct appeal.  Thus, Everett is not entitled to relief on the 
basis of cumulative error.  See, e.g., Owen, 986 So. 2d at 556-57.  
G.  Issues Not Previously Discovered 
 
- 44 - 
Everett seeks to preserve his right to raise any claim which he has not yet 
presented, even if such claim could have been discovered but was not discovered 
by good-faith omission or neglect.  We reject this claim.  Everett is not exempt 
from the rules of procedure and this Court‘s caselaw.  Thus, as this Court has 
repeatedly held, Everett may not later bring any claim that could have and should 
have been raised on direct appeal.  See, e.g., Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 
(Fla. 2006) (―[A] claim that could and should have been raised on direct appeal is 
procedurally barred.‖).  Moreover, Everett may not later bring a claim in a 
successive postconviction motion that could have been raised during the initial 
postconviction proceeding.  See, e.g., Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 868 (Fla. 
2003) (―We will not entertain a second appeal of claims that were raised, or should 
have been raised, in a prior postconviction proceeding.‖); Downs v. State, 740 So. 
2d 506, 518 n.10 (Fla. 1999) (stating that claim raised in earlier postconviction 
motion is barred in subsequent postconviction motion even if based on different 
facts); Atkins v. State, 663 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1995) (explaining that issues that 
were or could have been presented in postconviction motion cannot be relitigated 
in subsequent postconviction motion). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court‘s denial of Everett‘s 
motion for postconviction relief and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
- 45 - 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County,  
Don T. Sirmons, Judge – Case No. 01-2956C 
And an Original Proceedings – Habeas Corpus 
 
Charles E. Lykes, Jr., Clearwater, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent