Title: Steckel v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 473, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BRIAN D. STECKEL,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§ No. 473, 2001
Appellant,
§
§ Court Below: Superior Court
v.
§ of the State of Delaware in and
§ for New Castle County 
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ Cr. A. No. IN96-06-1760, 1761,
§ 1763, 1765-1770, 1773
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: February 21, 2002
Decided:
April 11, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE,
Justices, constituting the Court En Banc.
Appeal from Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire and John P. Decker, Esquire, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Chief of Appeals Division, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM:
1The circumstances of the underlying conviction and the basis for this Court’s affirmance
are set forth in Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
2
This is an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for
postconviction relief.  The appellant, Brian Steckel (“Steckel”) had previously been
convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death.  His conviction and
sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.1  Steckel’s postconviction
petition was based on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The Superior
Court ruled that Steckel’s counsel was not ineffective for failure to present mitigating
evidence in the penalty phase concerning Steckel’s narcissistic personality.  We
agree and affirm.
I
In the penalty phase of the trial, Steckel’s counsel presented evidence in
mitigation relating to Steckel’s mental state and personality from two forensic
experts, Dr. Stephen Mechanick, a psychiatrist, and Dr. S. Charles Bean, a
neurologist.  The substance of their testimony was that Steckel had experienced a
tragic childhood and was a substance abuser.  They opined that  Steckel’s medical
diagnosis was one of Attention Deficit Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder.
3
Steckel’s postconviction counsel secured an evaluation and opinion of Steckel
which, while supportive of an Antisocial Personality Disorder, emphasized the
narcissistic feature of the diagnosis.  Unlike the other two experts, Dr. John O’Brien
met briefly with Steckel but was unable to interview him because Steckel was
uncooperative.  Dr. O’Brien did, however, review the reports of the other experts
and examine material related to the case, including reports that Steckel had
exaggerated his past criminal conduct.  Dr. O’Brien diagnosed Steckel with
antisocial personality traits, as well as traits associated with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.  Dr. O’Brien opined that these narcissistic traits caused Steckel to greatly
exaggerate his criminal history and the details of the murder for which he was
convicted.  Steckel presented Dr. O’Brien’s opinion in the postconviction
proceedings in the Superior Court and argued that trial counsel was ineffective in not
presenting a narcissistic diagnosis to the jury in the penalty phase of his trial.
II
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s factual findings for abuse of
discretion and findings of law de novo.  Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190
(Del. 1996).
4
Under Strickland v. Washington and its progeny, Steckel must show that: (1)
“under all the circumstances, the attorney’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and (2) there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
Steckel argues that the jury would not have recommended the death penalty
if it had heard expert testimony that he had a narcissistic personality.  Steckel claims
that evidence of a narcissistic personality would “provide an explanation” for
Steckel’s behavior during and after the crime, and would present him as someone
who “suffered from a mental disturbance” rather than an “evil” person.
The Superior Court ruled that trial counsel’s decision not to present evidence
of Steckel’s exaggerating “gamesmanship” was “not only reasonable but was the
right decision.”  Steckel v. State, 2001 WL 1486165, *6 (Del. Super.).  The court
reasoned that, because many of Steckel’s grandiose claims were substantiated by
other evidence, his attorney could have reasonably believed Steckel was just “being
his uncooperative and aggravating self.”  Id.  Given the opinion of the other two
experts who testified, the court held that “[c]ounsel is not required to search for
2The current diagnostic criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder (“NPD”) are defined
by the medical community in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text Revision
(“DSM”).  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  The DSM
lists several criteria for NPD, including “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration,
and lack of empathy.”  DSM at 714.  People who are diagnosed with NPD are often
“interpersonally exploitative ... envious of others ... [or show] arrogant, haughty behaviors, or
attitudes.”  DSM at 7171.
3Britz v. Cowan, 192 F.3d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir. 1999).
5
additional mental health professionals when it appears that the diagnosis given by
those already retained would reasonably explain the conduct of the Defendant.”  Id.
In our view, Steckel’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails under the
first prong of Strickland.  Steckel’s gross exaggeration of his conduct, even if born
of a narcissistic personality, hardly serves to render him a more sympathetic figure
in the eyes of the jury.2  Trial counsel’s decision to emphasize Steckel’s antisocial
personality, partially resulting from his background, with supporting expert
testimony, was a strategic choice which clearly had a reasonable basis.    We agree
with the Superior Court that it would not have helped Steckel’s cause to have
portrayed him as a more dangerous individual because of the narcissistic overlay on
his Antisocial Personality Disorder.  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has noted, defendants may present evidence of a background of antisocial behavior,
however this “does not make them attractive candidates for lenity; rather it
underscores their dangerousness.”3
6
Finally, even if the evidence that Steckel had a narcissistic disorder had been
presented to the jury, there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the
penalty phase would have been any different.  The brutal manner of the killing in
this case, and Steckel’s braggadocio following the event, were sufficiently repulsive
to explain the jury’s vote in favor of the death penalty.  Mental illness was not
tendered as a defense to Steckel’s guilt and there is no basis in the record for
relieving the defendant of his responsibility.  Merely to characterize Steckel as vain
and selfish would distract little from the depiction of him gleaned from the
circumstances of the offense. 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.