Title: Pueblo v. Haas (Opinion - Leave Granted)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 164046
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 2023

PUEBLO v HAAS 
 
Docket No. 164046.  Argued April 4, 2023 (Calendar No. 3).  Decided July 24, 2023. 
 
 
Carrie Pueblo brought an action against her former domestic partner, Rachel Haas, in the 
Kalamazoo Circuit Court under the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., seeking joint 
custody and parenting time for a child whom defendant conceived through in vitro fertilization 
and gave birth to in 2008, during the parties’ relationship.  Defendant moved for summary 
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and MCR 2.116(C)(8), asserting that because the parties had 
never married and plaintiff had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child, plaintiff lacked 
standing to sue and also failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.  Following a 
hearing, the trial court, Stephen D. Gorsalitz, J., granted the motion and dismissed the case without 
prejudice.  After defendant moved for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with 
prejudice.  Plaintiff then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing 
as a natural parent, despite the lack of genetic connection, following the Court of Appeals decision 
in LeFever v Matthews, 336 Mich App 651 (2021), which expanded the definition of “natural 
parent” to include unmarried women who gave birth as surrogates but shared no genetic connection 
with the children.  Plaintiff also asserted that the trial court order violated her Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as well as those of the child.  Plaintiff 
further argued that any dismissal should have been without prejudice.  The trial court denied 
reconsideration, distinguishing LeFever on the ground that plaintiff had not given birth to the child.  
Plaintiff appealed, reasserting her previous arguments and further asserting that the equitable-
parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ relationship, which had been solemnized in a civil 
commitment ceremony when it was not yet legal in Michigan for same-sex partners to marry.  The 
Court of Appeals, GADOLA, P.J., and SWARTZLE and CAMERON, JJ., rejected these arguments and 
affirmed the trial court in an unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
December 28, 2021 (Docket No. 357577).  The Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s application for 
leave to appeal, asking whether and to what extent the equitable-parent doctrine should be 
extended to provide standing under the CCA to plaintiff and those similarly situated in light of 
Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), which invalidated Michigan’s prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage.  510 Mich 936 (2022). 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Chief Justice CLEMENT and Justices 
BERNSTEIN, WELCH, and BOLDEN, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
 
A former member of a same-sex couple seeking custody of a child to whom they did not 
give birth and with whom they share no genetic connection is entitled to make their case for 
equitable parenthood and thus establish standing to bring an action under the CCA.  To do so, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married 
before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban.  When 
determining whether a plaintiff satisfies this standard, courts should consider the nondispositive 
factors set forth in In re Madrone, 271 Or App 116 (2015).  The Court of Appeals judgment was 
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to apply this threshold test.  To the extent that 
Lake v Putnam, 316 Mich App 247 (2016), was inconsistent with the Court’s opinion, it was 
overruled.   
 
 
1.  Under the equitable-parent doctrine, a spouse who is not a biological parent has standing 
to seek custody of a child born or conceived during their marriage when (1) the would-be equitable 
parent and the child acknowledge the parental relationship or the biological or adoptive parent has 
cultivated the development of a relationship over a period of time, (2) the would-be equitable 
parent desires to have the rights afforded a parent, and (3) the would-be equitable parent is willing 
to pay child support.  Before 2015, Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from 
marrying and refused to recognize legal marriages performed in other jurisdictions.  Consequently, 
a same-sex partner did not have the option to adopt their spouse’s child or to marry their pregnant 
partner and benefit from the marital presumption of parentage.  Further, unmarried same-sex 
couples were not permitted to adopt through second-parent adoption.  Obergefell rendered 
Michigan’s unconstitutional bar on same-sex marriage unenforceable, holding that the denial of 
the ability to marry was a denial of same-sex couples’ constitutional due-process and equal-
protection rights.  Obergefell noted generally the importance of the various benefits that the states 
have connected to marriage, referred to as the “constellation of benefits,” and specifically 
emphasized the harm that the unconstitutional prohibition on marriage caused the children of 
same-sex couples.  Recognition of equitable parenthood is one of the “constellation of benefits” 
associated with marriage in Michigan, and, as a matter of equity and constitutional law, Michigan 
courts are compelled to treat same-sex couples equally.  Accordingly, Obergefell demanded the 
extension of the equitable-parent doctrine to those who were unable to marry during their same-
sex relationships because of discriminatory and unconstitutional Michigan laws but who developed 
de facto parent-child relationships with the children born or adopted by their same-sex partners 
during the time they would have otherwise been married.  This extension served the underlying 
rationale of the equitable-parent doctrine, which considers the best interests of the child to be 
paramount, and it was consistent with recent developments in the law recognizing that federal and 
state law protects people from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  It was not 
necessary to overrule Van, which involved parties who chose not to legally marry despite their 
ability to do so.  However, it was necessary to overrule Lake, which had declined to extend the 
equitable-parent doctrine to same-sex couples who had previously been unable to marry, to the 
extent it was inconsistent with the Court’s holding.  Lake’s concern about retroactively and 
unilaterally creating a marriage relationship against the parties’ wishes was remedied by requiring 
the person seeking custody to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parties would 
have married had they been legally permitted to do so in Michigan.  In light of the conclusion that 
plaintiff may pursue standing as an equitable parent, her alternative claims were not addressed.   
 
 
2.  A would-be equitable parent has standing if they demonstrate by the preponderance of 
the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s birth or conception but for the 
unconstitutional laws that prevented them from doing so.  This approach is based on Madrone, 
which crafted a factual inquiry to be applied when extending the presumption of parentage in its 
artificial-insemination statute to same-sex partners of biological mothers.  Madrone concluded that 
the proper focus was on whether the parties would have married but for the previous 
unconstitutional state prohibition on same-sex marriage, which involved a contemporaneous 
inquiry concerning the mutual intent of the parties.  The relevant factors it concluded would 
support an inference that same-sex partners would have married but for the prior unconstitutional 
bar included whether the couple took advantage of other options giving legal recognition to their 
relationship, held each other out as or considered themselves to be spouses, had children during 
the relationship and shared childrearing responsibilities, held a commitment ceremony or 
otherwise exchanged vows of commitment, exchanged rings, shared a last name, commingled their 
assets and finances, made significant financial decisions together, sought to adopt any children 
either of them may have had before the relationship began, or attempted unsuccessfully to get 
married.  The Supreme Court adopted this approach and held that in Michigan, if the intent to 
marry is disputed, a would-be equitable parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the couple would have married based on their contemporaneous conduct, considering the 
illustrative but nondispositive and nonexhaustive factors set forth in Madrone.  If that threshold 
test for standing is satisfied, the court may evaluate the equitable-parent factors to determine 
whether the would-be equitable parent has standing to seek custody and parenting time. 
 
 
3.  Plaintiff made a sufficient showing to survive summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(8) on standing grounds.  In particular, plaintiff’s allegations that she cultivated the 
development of a relationship with the child over a period of time, desires to have parental rights, 
and is willing to pay child support are sufficient to advance her claim for equitable parenthood.  
Plaintiff also alleged facts entitling her to a threshold determination of whether the parties would 
have married but for Michigan’s unconstitutional bar on same-sex marriage. 
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
 
 
Justice BOLDEN, concurring, wrote separately to note that because many state laws relating 
to marriage, out-of-wedlock parenting, and reproductive technologies had been enacted without 
consideration of Obergefell, the Legislature should act to resolve the lingering puzzles that 
remained regarding how the current applicable statutory schemes could fit the practical realities of 
same-sex relationships with regard to parenting.  In particular, she stated that, aside from the 
question whether the Legislature should address the equitable-parent doctrine, it should clarify 
ambiguities in the CCA, which says nothing about biology or marriage and contains an unclear 
definition of “natural parent.”  She echoed former Justice KELLY’s observation in Van that, in 
custody disputes, the Legislature’s overriding concern has not been the preservation of the 
institution of marriage, but rather the best interests of the children, and she suggested that the 
Legislature consider amending the CCA for consistency with this priority in mind.  She also 
suggested that the Legislature consider whether to enact a formal procedure to address situations 
like plaintiff’s.  In sum, she urged the Legislature to answer the questions raised by this case 
regarding children born to same-sex couples by enacting a sufficient statutory scheme that would 
adequately reflect equal-protection and due-process considerations. 
 
 
Justice ZAHRA, joined by Justice VIVIANO, dissenting, disagreed with the extension of the 
equitable-parent doctrine.  He questioned the validity of the doctrine, expressed concern that its 
legally unsupported extension would result in far-reaching ramifications outside the child custody 
context, and did not believe it was an appropriate tool to provide plaintiff the relief she sought.  He 
also questioned the advisability of the “but for” test set forth by the majority and worried that it 
would be applied too broadly.  Finally, he emphasized that plaintiff’s remedy rested with the 
Legislature rather than the judiciary.  For these reasons, he would have declined to disturb the 
lower courts’ decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  July 24, 2023 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
CARRIE PUEBLO, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 164046 
 
RACHEL HAAS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
CAVANAGH, J. 
In this case, we determine that the courthouse doors will open to a former partner in 
a same-sex relationship who was unconstitutionally prohibited from marrying before the 
decision in Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US 644; 135 S Ct 2584; 192 L Ed 2d 609 (2015), to 
seek custody of a child with whom the former partner shares no biological relationship.1  
 
1 In this context, a person who shares “no biological relationship” with a child is someone 
who neither birthed the child nor shares a genetic connection with the child by having 
contributed their reproductive material.  
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement   
 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
 
 
 
2 
 
While the decision in this case likely affects few, it is, nonetheless, important for what it 
represents.  Justice does not depend on family composition; all who petition for recognition 
of their parental rights are entitled to equal treatment under the law.  “[B]iological 
relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family[.]  . . . No 
one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between 
an adult and a child in [their] care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship.”  
Smith v Org of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 US 816, 843-844; 97 S Ct 
2094; 53 L Ed 2d 14 (1977).   
Michigan has long recognized the “equitable-parent doctrine” as providing standing 
to nonbiological fathers as parents when certain criteria are met.  Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 
Mich App 601; 408 NW2d 516 (1987).  Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited 
same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell, we narrowly extend the equitable-
parent doctrine as a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional 
prohibition.  A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for 
Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable 
parenthood to seek custody.  We reverse and remand to the trial court to apply the threshold 
test for standing that we announce today.  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Two women—plaintiff, Carrie Pueblo, and defendant, Rachel Haas—were in a 
long-term committed relationship, or domestic partnership, from the early 2000s until the 
early 2010s.  During their relationship, the parties were unable to legally marry in 
 
3 
 
Michigan, which unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex marriage until 2015.  See 
Obergefell, 576 US 644.  In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties acknowledged 
that they participated in a private civil commitment ceremony in June 2007 that was 
presided over by a priest and involved the exchange of rings and vows to take one another 
as life partners.  Later that year, they decided to use in vitro fertilization to bring a child 
into the world.  Haas conceived and bore the child, JPHP, in November 2008, and shares 
the child’s biology.  Pueblo has no biological connection to JPHP, whose last name is a 
hyphenation of the parties’ last names.  The parties never married, nor was Haas married 
to another person at the time of JPHP’s conception or birth.  Haas is the only parent listed 
on the child’s birth certificate.  Pueblo alleges that both parties acted as parents to JPHP 
from birth, sharing custody and parenting time even after they separated in the early 2010s.  
However, Pueblo alleges that Haas demanded that she cease contact with JPHP beginning 
in 2017 and that Pueblo’s efforts to continue the parent-child relationship were 
unsuccessful.   
In 2020, Pueblo took a legal step toward reunification with JPHP by filing a custody 
complaint under the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., seeking joint custody, 
parenting time, and child support.  Haas countered in her answer that Pueblo lacked 
standing, that the parties never married, and that Pueblo has no biological or adoptive 
relationship to JPHP.  Subsequently, Haas moved for summary disposition on the basis that 
Pueblo lacked standing under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and failed to state a claim under MCR 
2.116(C)(8).   
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case 
without prejudice.  Upon Haas’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the 
 
4 
 
action with prejudice.  Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that 
she had standing as a natural parent despite the lack of genetic connection following the 
recent Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v Matthews, 336 Mich App 651; 971 NW2d 
672 (2021).  She also asserted that the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to due process and equal protection without surviving heightened scrutiny and that 
the minor child’s rights were likewise violated.  Pueblo further argued that, even if 
dismissal was warranted, the dismissal should have been without prejudice.  The trial court 
denied reconsideration, rejecting Pueblo’s arguments on both issues.  As to the standing 
issue, the trial court distinguished LeFever because Pueblo neither birthed the child nor 
shares a biological or genetic connection.  
Pueblo appealed in the Court of Appeals.  Relevant to this appeal, Pueblo argued 
that she had standing to seek custody for several reasons.  First, that the equitable-parent 
doctrine should extend to the parties’ equitable marriage.  Second, that she was a “natural 
parent” under the CCA and the interpretation of the term in the closely analogous LeFever 
case.  Finally, that her rights to equal protection and due process, as well as the child’s, 
were violated by the trial court’s finding that a biological tie was necessary for standing.  
The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Pueblo was not a parent under the CCA and 
affirming the lower court’s dismissal.2  Pueblo v Haas, unpublished per curiam opinion of 
the Court of Appeals, issued December 28, 2021 (Docket No. 357577).  
Pueblo then sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We granted leave to address: 
 
2 The Court of Appeals declined to address Pueblo’s argument that granting defendant’s 
reconsideration motion was an abuse of discretion on the ground that Pueblo had 
abandoned the issue, and Pueblo does not resurrect that argument here.  
 
5 
 
(1) whether, in light of Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the 
equitable parent doctrine should be extended to provide standing to persons 
such as the plaintiff, who, at the time of the parties’ same-sex relationship, 
was not permitted by Michigan law to legally marry the defendant, and if so, 
(2) what the parameters of that extension should be.  [Pueblo v Haas, 510 
Mich 936 (2022).]  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents questions of law that we review de novo.  Questions of statutory 
interpretation and constitutional issues are reviewed de novo.  Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 
247, 257; 771 NW2d 694 (2009); LeFever, 336 Mich App at 661.  Likewise, whether a 
party has standing to seek custody is reviewed de novo.  LeFever, 336 Mich App at 661.  
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.  El-
Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).  When 
deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), a trial court must accept all factual allegations 
in the complaint as true and the motion may only be granted “when a claim is so clearly 
unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.”3  El-Khalil, 
504 Mich at 160.  In child custody disputes, trial court orders and judgments are generally 
entitled to deference on appeal.  See MCL 722.28.  But reversal is required where the trial 
court made a “clear legal error on a major issue.”  Id.  “When a court incorrectly chooses, 
 
3 Although Haas challenged Pueblo’s standing under MCR 2.116(C)(5), like the Court of 
Appeals, we note that standing is more appropriately challenged under MCR 2.116(C)(8) 
or (C)(10) and that we may review the issue under the appropriate subrule regardless of 
which subrule the trial court relied on to grant summary disposition.  Pueblo, unpub op at 2 
n 2.  See also Mich Chiropractic Council v Comm’r of Office of Fin & Ins Servs, 475 Mich 
363, 374 n 25; 716 NW2d 561 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n 
v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (2010); Le Gassick v Univ of Mich Regents, 330 Mich 
App 487, 496 n 2; 948 NW2d 452 (2019). 
 
6 
 
interprets, or applies the law, it commits legal error that the appellate court is bound to 
correct.”  Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 881; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
We are asked to determine whether Pueblo has standing to pursue this custody 
action.  Standing “generally refers to the right of a plaintiff initially to invoke the power of 
a trial court to adjudicate a claimed injury.”  Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v 
Saugatuck Twp, 509 Mich 561, 583; 983 NW2d 798 (2022) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that a party’s interest in the issue is 
“sufficient to ‘ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.’ ”  Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing 
Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355; 792 NW2d 686 (2010) (citation omitted).  Further, in cases 
involving private rights, a litigant must have “some real interest in the cause of action, or 
a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.”  Bowie 
v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 42; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
In child custody matters, “a third party does not have standing to create a custody 
dispute . . . unless the third party is a guardian of the child or has a substantive right of 
entitlement to custody of the child.”  Id. at 49.   
Michigan’s CCA governs custody, parenting time, and child support issues for 
minor children; it is the exclusive means to pursue child custody rights.  MCL 722.24(1); 
LeFever, 336 Mich App at 662.  The CCA is “equitable in nature and shall be liberally 
construed and applied to establish promptly the rights of the child and the rights and duties 
of the parties involved.”  MCL 722.26(1).  The CCA provides the following parental 
presumption: 
 
7 
 
If a child custody dispute is between the parents, between agencies, or 
between third persons, the best interests of the child control.  If the child 
custody dispute is between the parent or parents and an agency or a third 
person, the court shall presume that the best interests of the child are served 
by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the contrary is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.  [MCL 722.25(1).] 
The CCA defines “parent” as “the natural or adoptive parent of a child.”  MCL 
722.22(i).  The act does not define “natural parent.”  A “third person” is “an individual 
other than a parent.”  MCL 722.22(k).  The CCA says nothing about biology or marriage, 
see Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 343, 346; 597 NW2d 15 (KELLY, J., dissenting), and its 
definition of “parent” is circular.  Nor has “natural parent” been clearly defined in caselaw.  
In one case, the Court of Appeals said that the term “natural parent” under the CCA means 
that the person is a parent related to the child by “blood” rather than by adoption.  See 
Stankevich v Milliron (On Remand), 313 Mich App 233, 236; 882 NW2d 194 (2015) 
(Stankevich III).4   
More recently, the Court of Appeals included within the ambit of “natural parent” a 
parent related to the child “by birth” or “through marriage,” regardless of whether there is 
a genetic connection.  LeFever, 336 Mich App at 651, 665-666.5  The LeFever Court 
concluded that the term “natural parent” was “elastic enough” to include an unmarried 
woman who gave birth as a surrogate but whose eggs were not used and who shared no 
 
4 This “related by blood” definition was advanced in Stankevich I, which was vacated by 
this Court.  Stankevich v Milliron, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
issued October 17, 2013 (Docket No. 310710), p 2; Stankevich v Milliron, 498 Mich 877 
(2015) (Stankevich II).  Although the definition was reiterated on remand, see Stankevich 
III, 313 Mich App at 236, it was inconsequential to the holding, see LeFever, 336 Mich 
App at 677 n 1 (GLEICHER, J., concurring).  Stankevich III was not appealed.   
5 LeFever was not appealed.   
 
8 
 
genetic connection with the twins she birthed.  Id. at 666.  Judge GLEICHER, concurring, 
proposed an additional analysis, including the proposition that “[a] woman who gives birth 
to a child is that child’s natural mother under the common law, and there is no reason to 
look elsewhere for the meaning.”  Id. at 677 (GLEICHER, J., concurring).  
The CCA must be read in context not only with judicial decisions interpreting it but 
also within the broad statutory framework of family law.  “Under the doctrine [of in pari 
materia], statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a common purpose should, if 
possible, be read together to create a harmonious body of law.”  People v Mazur, 497 Mich 
302, 313; 872 NW2d 201 (2015), citing People v Harper, 479 Mich 599, 621; 739 NW2d 
523 (2007).  The Legislature has provided several explicit statutory avenues for those who 
did not give birth to a child to establish parentage—through the marital presumption, 
acknowledgment of parentage, paternity proceedings, the assisted-reproduction statute, 
and adoption.  See, respectively, MCL 722.1433(e); MCL 722.1003(1); MCL 722.711 et 
seq.; MCL 333.2824(6); and MCL 710.24(1) and (2); see also MCL 710.51(6).6   
 
6 To the extent that these statutes use gendered language, MCL 8.3b instructs that “[e]very 
word importing the masculine gender only may extend and be applied to females as well 
as males.” 
None of these avenues has been raised by Pueblo.  For example, Pueblo did not raise 
a constitutional or statutory argument that the assisted-reproduction statute must be 
construed to confer standing.  There may be merit to this argument.  See In re Madrone, 
271 Or App 116; 350 P3d 495 (2015) (applying Oregon’s presumption of parentage in 
assisted-reproduction statute to an unmarried same-sex partner where the statute violated 
Oregon’s constitution).  Other avenues were simply not available to her.  See MCL 710.24 
(joint or second-parent adoption unavailable to unmarried couples).  
Once parentage has been established, such as through an acknowledgment of 
parentage or the marital presumption, the Legislature has recognized that the best interests 
of the child may weigh more heavily than the lack of biological connection.  MCL 
722.1443(4) (stating that in a revocation of paternity action, “[a] court may refuse to enter 
 
9 
 
In addition, Michigan courts have held that a person with no biological relationship 
to a child may establish parentage and assert custodial rights as a parent through the 
equitable-parent doctrine.  The doctrine was first recognized in 1987 in Atkinson, 160 Mich 
App 601.  In that case, the plaintiff filed for divorce and sought custody rights over the 
child born during the marriage.  Id. at 604.  The defendant countered that that the plaintiff 
was not the child’s biological father and as such had no parental rights.  Id. at 604-605.  
After blood tests excluded the plaintiff as the biological father, the trial court denied him 
custody and parenting time.  Id.  
The Court of Appeals adopted the plaintiff’s request to recognize the equitable-
parent doctrine, which was grounded on several footings.  First, the panel grounded the 
doctrine in the equitable nature of and liberal construction afforded to the CCA, MCL 
722.26.  Id. at 609.  Second, the panel reasoned that the doctrine is a logical extension of 
the notion that not only responsibilities, but also rights, flow from deeming nonbiological 
fathers to be parents who can be ordered to pay child support, citing Johnson v Johnson, 
93 Mich App 415; 286 NW2d 886 (1979).  Atkinson, 160 Mich App at 609-610.  In 
Johnson, a husband was estopped from disclaiming parenthood of a child born in wedlock 
where he represented himself as a parent for over nine years from the child’s birth.  
Johnson, 93 Mich App at 420.  Thus, it makes sense that a person who is not a biological 
parent may be considered one under the law under certain circumstances where they desire 
to be a parent and are willing to bear parental rights and responsibilities.  See Atkinson, 160 
 
an order setting aside a paternity determination, revoking an acknowledgment of parentage, 
determining that a genetic father is not a child’s father, or determining that a child is born 
out of wedlock if the court finds evidence that the order would not be in the best interests 
of the child”).   
 
10 
 
Mich App at 610.  Third, the panel relied on the analogous doctrine of equitable adoption 
in intestate succession, which it noted has long been recognized by caselaw, Wright v 
Wright, 99 Mich 170 (1984), and was later codified in former MCL 700.111 (replaced in 
2000 by the Estates and Protected Individuals Code, MCL 700.1101 et seq.).  Atkinson, 
160 Mich App at 611.  Finally, the panel emphasized that all custody determinations rest 
on the paramount consideration given to the best interests of the child, citing Hackley v 
Hackley, 426 Mich 582, 597 (1986), and it was thus unlikely that denying custody and 
parenting time to an involved de facto parent would be in a child’s best interests, see id.  
As the Atkinson Court explained, the equitable-parent doctrine recognizes that  
a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived during 
the marriage may be considered the natural father of that child where (1) the 
husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and 
child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a 
relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for 
divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and 
(3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child 
support.  [Atkinson, 160 Mich App at 608-609.] 
A little over a decade later, we declined to extend the parameters of the equitable-
parent doctrine beyond custody sought over children born or conceived of a marriage.  Van 
v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 330-331; 597 NW2d 15 (1999).  Van involved an unmarried 
opposite-sex relationship during which the parties cohabitated and the defendant, Mary 
Zahorik, bore two children, but the plaintiff, Scott Van, was excluded as the biological 
father.  Id. at 323.  This Court rejected Van’s attempt to seek parental rights as an equitable 
parent, reasoning that the CCA does not recognize a theory that extends the doctrine 
beyond marriage, that doing so would implicate public-policy issues appropriately 
addressed by the Legislature, and that the strongest rationales underlying the doctrine—
 
11 
 
reinforcement of the importance of marriage and legitimacy—were not served by its 
extension.  Id. at 324, 331-333.  The dissenting justices, however, would not have made 
the availability of the equitable-parent doctrine contingent on marriage.  See id. at 338-342 
(BRICKLEY, J., joined by M. F. CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); id. at 342-347 (KELLY, J., 
dissenting).   
Before and in the wake of Obergefell, our courts fielded custody disputes over 
children raised by same-sex partners who were previously unable to legally marry in 
Michigan.  Obergefell recognized that the right to marry is a fundamental right and that 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
right and liberty to do so cannot be denied to same-sex couples.  Obergefell, 576 US 644.  
The decision rendered Michigan’s constitutional and statutory prohibitions against same-
sex marriage unenforceable.  MCL 551.1; MCL 551.272; Const 1963, art 1, § 25.  Among 
the bases for extending the right to marry was that marriage safeguards children and 
families and draws meaning from the related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education.  Obergefell, 576 US at 646.  The Obergefell Court noted that, absent the right 
to marry, the children of parents in same-sex relationships are “relegated through no fault 
of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.”  Id. at 668.  The availability of 
marriage for same-sex couples thus affords the permanency and stability important to their 
children’s best interests.  See id.  Following that decision, the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided Pavan v Smith, 582 US 563, 566; 137 S Ct 2075; 198 L Ed 2d 636 (2017), 
holding that a state could not refuse to list a married same-sex parent on a birth certificate 
because that was among the “ ‘constellation of benefits . . . linked to marriage’ ” 
recognized by Obergefell.  Id. at 566, quoting Obergefell, 576 US at 670. 
 
12 
 
The doctrine of equitable parenthood was extended to same-sex partners who legally 
married elsewhere before Obergefell in Stankevich III, 313 Mich App at 240-242.  In 
Stankevich, the plaintiff alleged that the same-sex couple had legally married in Canada 
before the child’s birth and that the defendant bore a child from artificial insemination 
during the marriage.  We vacated the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the plaintiff had 
no standing and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Obergefell.  Stankevich 
v Milliron, 498 Mich 877 (2015) (Stankevich II).  On remand, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that when a same-sex couple marries in a jurisdiction recognizing the validity 
of same-sex marriages, the spouse of the biological parent has standing to seek relief under 
the equitable-parent doctrine.  Stankevich III, 313 Mich App at 240, 242.  The panel 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of the alleged Canadian 
marriage and whether plaintiff could prove that she was an equitable parent.  Id. at 242.  
Notably, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s allegations afforded her standing to seek 
equitable-parent status even though pre-Obergefell, if a same-sex couple was married in 
another jurisdiction, their marriage would not be recognized under MCL 551.17 and MCL 
551.272.8 
The Court of Appeals declined to extend the equitable-parent doctrine outside the 
context of marriage in another custody case involving a same-sex couple, Lake v Putnam, 
 
7 “Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. . . .  A 
marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.”  MCL 
551.1. 
8 “This state recognizes marriage as inherently a unique relationship between a man and a 
woman . . . and therefore a marriage that is not between a man and a woman is invalid in 
this state regardless of whether the marriage is contracted according to the laws of another 
jurisdiction.”  MCL 551.272. 
 
13 
 
316 Mich App 247; 894 NW2d 62 (2016).  In Lake, the parties were likewise in a long-
term relationship during which the defendant, Kerri Putnam, bore a child from artificial 
insemination.  Id. at 249.  The parties never married, and they separated before Obergefell 
was decided.  Id.  After the separation, Putnam refused to permit the plaintiff, Michelle 
Lake, to see the child, so Lake filed a custody action.  Id.  The trial court denied Putnam’s 
motion for summary disposition, which argued that Lake lacked standing as a third party, 
and ordered parenting time for Lake.  Id.  The Court of Appeals granted leave and reversed 
for entry of summary disposition to Putnam.  The majority reasoned:   
While plaintiff claims that she satisfies all requirements under the 
equitable-parent doctrine, she ignores one crucial, and dispositive, 
requirement for the equitable-parent doctrine to apply—the child must be 
born in wedlock.  Van, 460 Mich at 330 (stating that the equitable-parent 
doctrine applies only “to a child born or conceived during the marriage”).  
The child at issue in this case was not born or conceived during a marriage.  
In fact, it is undisputed that the parties were never married.  Therefore, the 
equitable-parent doctrine does not apply.  Had the parties married in another 
jurisdiction, for example, our conclusion might be different.  See, e.g., 
Stankevich v Milliron (On Remand), 313 Mich App 233, 240-241 (2015).  
While we acknowledge that the issue presented in this case is complex, we 
simply do not believe it is within courts’ discretion to, at the request of one 
party and in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Obergefell . . . , retroactively transform an unmarried couple’s past 
relationship into marriage for the purpose of custody proceedings.  Stated 
differently, it is, in our view, improper for a court to impose, several years 
later, a marriage on a same-sex unmarried couple simply because one party 
desires that we do so.  [Lake, 316 Mich App at 252-253.] 
The Lake panel acknowledged Lake’s request to follow an Oklahoma decision that 
had applied that state’s in loco parentis doctrine to unmarried same-sex couples with 
children but held that it could not do the same.  First, it explained that, unlike Michigan’s 
equitable-parent doctrine, Oklahoma’s in loco parentis status “does not only apply to 
 
14 
 
married couples; rather, it appears to apply to anyone ‘who has assumed the status and 
obligations of a parent without a formal adoption.’ ”  Id. at 253-254, quoting Workman v 
Workman, 498 P2d 1384, 1386 (1972).  Second, the panel observed that in Van, 460 Mich 
at 330-331, this Court “rejected the argument that holding oneself out as a child’s parent, 
alone, is sufficient to be considered that child’s parent under the equitable-parent doctrine.”  
Lake, 316 Mich App at 254.  Third, the panel believed it beyond the appropriate role of the 
judiciary to retroactively impose the legal ramifications of marriage onto unmarried 
couples several years after their relationship ended.  Id.  The majority also rejected Lake’s 
argument that the child’s constitutional rights were violated, holding that Lake did not have 
standing to assert them.  Id. at 256. 
Judge SHAPIRO’s concurrence found that the facts at bar did not “fully test the scope 
of Obergefell’s application to Michigan’s equitable-parent doctrine” but that a different 
result might be warranted under different facts.  Lake, 316 Mich App at 257, 259 (SHAPIRO, 
J., concurring).  First, the concurrence rejected Lake’s argument that equitable-parent rights 
arise from the best interests of the child rather than the relationship status of the parties, 
observing that the Court of Appeals remained bound by Van’s rejection of the extension of 
the doctrine beyond marriage until this Court, or the Legislature, reviewed the issue.  Id. at 
259.  However, the concurrence found merit in Lake’s legal argument that Obergefell 
“demands extension of the equitable-parent doctrine.”  Id. at 260.  But because Lake did 
not present any evidence in the trial court evincing the parties’ intent to marry, the 
concurrence concluded that relief was not warranted in this particular case.  Id. at 263. 
Lake was not appealed in this Court.  We declined to review the equitable-parent 
doctrine’s application to unmarried same-sex couples whose relationships ended before 
 
15 
 
Obergefell by denying leave in two analogous cases that same year: Mabry v Mabry, 499 
Mich 997 (2016), and Kolailat v McKennett, 499 Mich 996 (2016).  Then-Justice 
MCCORMACK, joined by Justice BERNSTEIN, dissented, urging the Court to grant leave to 
address whether Obergefell compelled extension of the equitable-parent doctrine to 
custody disputes between same-sex couples who were unconstitutionally prohibited from 
marrying.  Mabry, 499 Mich at 997 (MCCORMACK, J., dissenting); Kolailat, 499 Mich at 
496 (MCCORMACK, J., dissenting).   
Two years later in Sheardown v Guastella, 324 Mich App 251; 920 NW2d 172 
(2018), the Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the definition of “parent” 
in MCL 722.22(i) as applied to a plaintiff in an unmarried same-sex relationship whose 
partner bore a child using a sperm donor during their pre-Obergefell relationship.  The 
Court determined that the definition did not violate equal protection because it applies 
equally to same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples.  Id. at 261; see also Stankevich 
III, 313 Mich App at 238 (noting that its application of the definition of “parent” under the 
CCA did not run afoul of Obergefell because it applies equally to same-sex and opposite-
sex married couples).  Notably, the Court determined that Obergefell’s principles did not 
apply where the plaintiff was not married and had “disavowed any interest . . . in going 
back in time in an attempt to determine whether the parties would have been married had 
they had the legal option to do so prior to Obergefell.”  Id. at 258.  
In sum, in crafting the doctrine, the Atkinson Court relied on the liberal and equitable 
nature of the CCA, the principle that deeming nonbiological fathers to be parents entitles 
them to parental rights, the importance of the best interests of the child, and the existing 
doctrine of equitable adoption.  In Van, this Court declined to extend the doctrine beyond 
 
16 
 
the institution of marriage in deference to legislative policy preferences favoring marriage.  
The Court of Appeals recently rejected a constitutional challenge to the CCA’s statutory 
language in Sheardown.  However, since Atkinson, the CCA’s definition of “parent” has 
been expanded through the equitable-parent doctrine to include parents who are neither 
adoptive parents nor parents by blood.  While courts have been willing to apply the 
equitable-parent doctrine to same-sex couples, as the Court of Appeals did in Stankevich 
III, 313 Mich App at 240, 242, the Court of Appeals and this Court have previously refused 
to extend the doctrine to couples who were not married.  See Van, 460 Mich at 320; Lake, 
316 Mich App at 252-253. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  WHETHER THE EQUITABLE-PARENT DOCTRINE SHOULD BE EXTENDED 
Pueblo did not carry the child, nor did she contribute genetic material.  Yet she 
asserts standing to seek custody as a putative parent who, before 2015, was in a marriage-
like relationship with another woman who birthed a child through in vitro fertilization.  
“[T]he CCA does not specifically address the unique question presented in this case.  The 
United States Constitution fills this gap.”  LeFever, 336 Mich App at 682 (GLEICHER, J., 
concurring).  Pueblo argues that she has standing to seek custody under the equitable-parent 
doctrine.  We agree that Pueblo should have the opportunity to prove that she is entitled to 
assert her rights as an equitable parent.9   
 
9 Although the dissent questions “the soundness of the equitable-parent doctrine itself,” the 
parties have not asked us to reconsider the doctrine. 
 
17 
 
A quick recap of the doctrine in its current state: A spouse10 who is not a biological 
parent has standing to seek custody of a child born or conceived during their marriage when 
(1) the would-be equitable parent and the child acknowledge the parental relationship or 
the biological or adoptive parent has cultivated the development of a relationship over a 
period of time, (2) the would-be equitable parent desires to have the rights afforded a 
parent, and (3) the would-be equitable parent is willing to pay child support.  Mabry, 499 
Mich at 998 (MCCORMACK, J., dissenting); see also Atkinson, 160 Mich App at 608-609. 
The Court of Appeals rejected Pueblo’s argument that she was a parent, relying as 
it was bound to do on the closely analogous decision in Lake, 316 Mich App at 252.  But 
before 2015, Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying and 
refused to recognize legal marriages performed in other jurisdictions.  See MCL 551.1; 
MCL 551.271; Const 1963, art 1, § 25.  Consequently, a same-sex partner did not have the 
option to adopt their spouse’s child or to marry their pregnant partner and benefit from the 
marital presumption of parentage.  See, e.g., MCL 710.24; MCL 722.1433(e); MCL 
333.2824.  Further, unmarried same-sex couples were not permitted to adopt through 
second-parent adoption.  MCL 710.24.  Obergefell rendered Michigan’s unconstitutional 
 
10 It bears noting that the equitable-parent doctrine may be invoked by any married person, 
though it was initially framed within a husband’s bid for custody of nonbiological children 
of a marriage.  See Atkinson, 160 Mich App at 608-609; Stankevich III, 313 Mich App at 
233.  Several reasons support this outcome.  The doctrine itself is concerned with protecting 
close de facto parent-child relationships despite the absence of biological connection—the 
would-be equitable parent’s sex is irrelevant.  Further, the Equal Protection Clause requires 
that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law.  Shepherd Montessori Ctr 
Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 486 Mich 311, 318; 783 NW2d 695 (2010).  Married 
women in same-sex marriages are similarly situated to married men in opposite-sex 
marriages who would be able to pursue custody for children born to or adopted by their 
spouses through the equitable-parent doctrine.  Therefore, women should not be treated 
differently from men.   
 
18 
 
bar on same-sex marriage unenforceable, holding that denying same-sex couples the 
opportunity to marry was an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection and due 
process.  Obergefell, 576 US at 675-676.  But this legal development came too late for 
those same-sex couples whose marriage-like relationships had already ended and who had 
not married in another jurisdiction. 
Obergefell made clear that the denial of the ability to marry was a denial of same-
sex couples’ constitutional rights.  “The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that the 
government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, 
characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment.”  Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 
258; 615 NW2d 218 (2000).  Obergefell emphasized generally the importance of the 
various benefits that the states have connected to marriage, referred to as the “constellation 
of benefits.”  Obergefell, 576 US at 670 (including “taxation; inheritance and property 
rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital 
access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of 
survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance 
restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, 
and visitation rules”).  Further, Obergefell specifically placed much importance on the 
effect of the unconstitutional prohibition on marriage on the children of same-sex couples:  
Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.  
They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried 
parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and 
uncertain family life.  The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and 
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.  [Obergefell, 576 US at 668.] 
 
19 
 
Recognition of equitable parenthood is one of the “constellation of benefits” 
associated with marriage in Michigan.  Obergefell, 576 US at 670.  Because the parties are 
the same sex, they were barred from marrying in Michigan, where they resided during the 
relationship.  Pueblo was subject to dissimilar treatment because she could not marry her 
same-sex partner.  Unlike opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples did not have the option 
to obtain parental rights through marriage.  We can right some of this wrong by invoking 
our equity jurisprudence, which “mold[s] its decrees to do justice amid all the vicissitudes 
and intricacies of life.”  Spoon-Shacket Co v Oakland Co, 356 Mich 151, 163; 97 NW2d 
25 (1959) (citation omitted).   
As a matter of equity and constitutional law, we are compelled to treat same-sex 
couples equally.  Same-sex couples have the constitutional right to marry and to all the 
attendant benefits of marriage.  Id.; see also Pavan, 582 US at 567.  Withholding the benefit 
of the equitable-parent doctrine from couples who were previously unconstitutionally 
prohibited from marrying would perpetuate the harms identified in Obergefell: that denying 
same-sex couples the same legal treatment in marriage and all the benefits afforded to 
opposite-sex couples demeans them, stigmatizes their children and families, and teaches 
society that they are inferior.  Obergefell, 476 US at 665, 670-671.  Given the ruling in 
Obergefell, we cannot justifiably deny same-sex couples—who would have married before 
the arrival of a child but for unlawful prohibitions—the privilege of invoking the equitable-
parent doctrine because of their sexual orientation.  Accordingly, “Obergefell demands 
extension of the equitable-parent doctrine.”11  Lake, 316 Mich App at 260 (SHAPIRO, J., 
 
11 Pueblo did not raise an argument grounded in Michigan’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses. 
 
20 
 
concurring).  Therefore, we narrowly extend the equitable-parent doctrine to Pueblo and 
other similarly situated persons who were unable to marry during their same-sex 
relationships because of discriminatory and unconstitutional Michigan laws but who 
nonetheless developed de facto parent-child relationships with the children born or adopted 
by their same-sex partners during the time they would have otherwise been married.   
And the underlying rationale of the equitable-parent doctrine is served by this 
extension.  The CCA is equitable in nature and must be construed liberally.  MCL 
722.26(1).  The best interests of the child, with whom the would-be equitable parent 
fostered a relationship, are paramount.  The children of same-sex partners bear no lesser 
rights to the enjoyment and support of two parents than children born to married opposite-
sex parents.  Many same-sex couples likely would have chosen to marry before taking on 
joint responsibility for a child had they been they legally permitted to do so.  But for the 
inability of these couples to legally marry because of this state’s unconstitutional 
prohibitions, the equitable-parent doctrine would be available to them. 
This extension is also consistent with recent developments in the law recognizing 
that federal and state law protects people from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  The Supreme Court of the United States held in Bostock v Clayton Co, 590 
US ___; 140 S Ct 1731, 1741; 207 L Ed 2d 218 (2020), that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity is encompassed by Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination 
“because of such individual’s . . . sex.”  We subsequently held in Rouch World v Dep’t of 
Civil Rights, 510 Mich 398; 987 NW2d 501 (2022), that our state’s antidiscrimination law 
protects against discrimination based on sexual orientation.  And the Legislature recently 
 
21 
 
codified that decision.  MCL 37.2102, as amended by 2023 PA 6 (adding “sexual 
orientation” and “gender identity or expression” as protected categories). 
We need not overrule our decision in Van to extend the equitable-parent doctrine as 
we do today because that case is clearly distinguishable.12  Van requires that a child be born 
in wedlock for the equitable-parent doctrine to apply, centering the state’s public policy of 
marriage in its reasoning.  Van, 460 Mich at 330.  In particular, Van found it inappropriate 
to extend the benefits of marriage to those who deliberately eschewed marriage.  Id. at 332.  
But a necessary assumption of the Van case was the parties’ decision not to legally marry 
despite their ability to do so.  See id.  Same-sex partners in this state did not have that 
choice pre-Obergefell.  Stated differently, same-sex partners in a pre-Obergefell world 
neither had access to nor neglected a legal pathway to marriage as did the parties in Van.  
“When the parents themselves did not choose not to marry, but instead had that choice 
made for them by our state’s laws, and the parents otherwise demonstrated the same 
commitment and legitimacy as married parents, their children should not be barred from 
the potential benefits of our common-law rule.”  Mabry, 499 Mich at 999-1000 
(MCCORMACK, J., dissenting).   
Further, Van saw extension of the doctrine to unmarried couples as undermining the 
public policy in favor of marriage.  Van, 460 Mich at 332.  No such justification exists 
when carving out a narrow, backward-looking extension.  Instead, denying this marital 
benefit to those in Pueblo’s position “does nothing to support opposite-sex parenting, but 
rather merely serves to endanger children of same-sex parents by denying them ‘ “the 
 
12 Importantly, Pueblo did not ask us to overrule Van.  
 
22 
 
immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of a stable family structure . . . .” ’ ”  
Golinski v US Office of Personnel Mgt, 824 F Supp 2d 968, 992 (ND Cal, 2012), quoting 
Goodridge v Dep’t of Pub Health, 440 Mass 309, 335; 798 NE2d 941 (2003) (citation 
omitted).  We note that Van’s requirement that a child be born during marriage remains 
applicable to opposite-sex couples generally and same-sex couples to whom a child was 
born post-Obergefell.   
We do, however, overrule Lake v Putnam to the extent it is inconsistent with our 
holding today.  The Court of Appeals in Lake justified the denial of the extension of the 
equitable-parent doctrine as an untenable retroactive transformation of the same-sex 
couple’s relationship into a marriage.  Lake, 316 Mich App at 253.  The Court viewed 
expanding the doctrine as outside its discretion and lacking a solid rationale.  Id.  But Lake’s 
concern about retroactively and unilaterally creating a marriage relationship against the 
parties’ wishes is remedied by requiring the person seeking custody to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the parties would have married had they been legally 
permitted to do so in Michigan.  Moreover, ensuring that constitutional rights are 
safeguarded, and that further harms are not perpetrated, is our duty.  “A major function of 
the judiciary is to guarantee the rights promised in our Constitution.”  Bauserman v 
Unemployment Ins Agency, 509 Mich 673, 693; 983 NW2d 855 (2022), quoting 2 Official 
Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2196 (cleaned up).  And for the reasons above, 
we believe that extension is justified as a matter of equity and constitutional law. 
Haas suggests that the parties’ failure to avail themselves of marriage in another 
jurisdiction during the parties’ relationship is determinative.  However, imposing such a 
per se rule would be inconsistent with Michigan’s contemporaneous unconstitutional 
 
23 
 
prohibition on the recognition of such a marriage, which presumably also would have 
precluded application of the equitable-parent doctrine.  See Mabry, 499 Mich at 998 
(MCCORMACK, J., dissenting).  In light of this unconstitutional bar that limited the exercise 
of any marriage rights they might obtain in another jurisdiction, even a same-sex couple 
residing in Michigan that otherwise would marry might decline to do so.  Michigan law 
imposed the barrier to marriage for same-sex couples, and that Michigan law was struck 
down; that legal marriage might have been available in another state or country is not 
dispositive.  Pueblo’s problem is that she was prohibited from marrying or having a 
marriage recognized here.  
Haas and the dissent express concern that expanding the equitable-parent doctrine 
will create a legal morass in other areas of the law, including divorce and tort.  We disagree.  
We take a narrow approach based on the facts before us, the existing equitable-parent 
doctrine which remains binding law, and the Supreme Court’s recognition of marriage 
equality in Obergefell.  We do not decide whether successful invocation of the equitable-
parent doctrine to gain child custody standing will implicate other rights and liabilities 
associated with marriage.  Haas also contends that her constitutional rights will be violated 
by imposing upon her a marriage that she did not desire.  However, whether the parties 
mutually desired to marry but could not is a fact-specific inquiry best addressed on remand 
where the trial court can evaluate evidence and judge credibility.  Because we decide that 
Pueblo may pursue standing as an equitable parent, we do not address her alternative 
claims.   
 
24 
 
B.  THE PARAMETERS OF THE EXTENSION 
Having decided that Obergefell and principles of equity require us to extend the 
equitable-parent doctrine, we outline the threshold test for standing for Pueblo and other 
would-be equitable parents in her position.  We hold that such a would-be equitable parent 
has standing if they demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence that the parties 
would have married before the child’s birth or conception but did not because 
unconstitutional laws prevented them from doing so.  See Lake, 316 Mich App at 262-263 
(SHAPIRO, J., concurring).  
To assist in creating the test, we find compelling the discussion in the Oregon case 
In re Madrone, 271 Or App 116, 127-129; 350 P3d 495 (2015); see also Lake, 316 Mich 
App at 262 (SHAPIRO, J., concurring) (noting that he would adopt Oregon’s approach).  In 
Madrone, the Oregon Court of Appeals crafted the factual inquiry to be applied when 
extending the presumption of parentage in its artificial-insemination statute to same-sex 
partners of biological mothers—in other words, the court considered how to apply the 
remedy for an analogous constitutional violation previously wrought by an Oregon statute.  
Madrone, 271 Or App at 123.  In Michigan, marriage was unavailable to same-sex couples 
before 2015.  Like the Madrone Court, we believe that whether the choice to marry was 
denied to a particular same-sex couple is key.  See id. at 128.  It follows that the equitable-
parent doctrine should not apply to a same-sex couple who would have chosen commitment 
but not marriage, just as the doctrine does not apply to an opposite-sex couple who chose 
not to marry.  See id.; see also Van, 460 Mich App at 330, 332.  Therefore, the analysis 
should focus on whether the parties would have married but for the unconstitutional 
prohibition.   
 
25 
 
While the Court of Appeals in Lake was concerned about imposing a retroactive 
marriage “simply because one party desires that we do so,” Lake, 316 Mich App at 253, 
and the dissent echoes this discomfort, this concern is “fully addressed by a factual inquiry 
into the facts as they existed at the time the child was born or conceived,” id. at 260 
(SHAPIRO, J., concurring).  This is a contemporaneous inquiry concerning the mutual intent 
of the parties.  While, as Haas and the dissent emphasize, there may be evidentiary 
challenges including those caused by the passage of time and one party’s denial of an intent 
to marry, that is not a compelling reason to refuse to extend the doctrine.   
While this hypothetical inquiry may have practical difficulties, we find instructive 
the Madrone Court’s discussion of relevant factors that support an inference that same-sex 
partners would have married but for the prior unconstitutional bar:  
Whether a particular couple would have chosen to be married, at a 
particular point in time, is a question of fact.  In some cases, the answer to 
that question will be obvious and not in dispute. . . .  In other cases, the 
answer will be less clear.  A number of factors may be relevant to the fact 
finder’s determination.  A couple’s decision to take advantage of other 
options giving legal recognition to their relationship—such as entering into 
a registered domestic partnership or marriage when those choices become 
available—may be particularly significant.  Other factors include whether the 
parties held each other out as spouses; considered themselves to be spouses 
(legal purposes aside); had children during the relationship and shared 
childrearing responsibilities; held a commitment ceremony or otherwise 
exchanged vows of commitment; exchanged rings; shared a last name; 
commingled their assets and finances; made significant financial decisions 
together; sought to adopt any children either of them may have had before 
the relationship began; or attempted unsuccessfully to get married.  We 
hasten to emphasize that the above list is not exhaustive.  Nor is any 
particular factor dispositive . . . , given that couples who choose not to marry 
still may do many of those things.  Instead, we view the factors as tending to 
support, but not compelling, an inference that a same-sex couple would have 
 
26 
 
married had that choice been available.[13]  [In re Madrone, 271 Or App at 
128-129.]   
We adopt this discussion to guide application of the factual inquiry.  If the intent to 
marry is disputed, a would-be equitable parent must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the couple would have married based on their contemporaneous conduct, in 
consideration of the illustrative but nondispositive factors outlined above.  If that threshold 
test for standing is satisfied, the court may evaluate the equitable-parent factors to 
determine whether the would-be equitable parent has standing to seek custody and 
parenting time.  
V.  APPLICATION 
Here, the parties did not legally marry in Michigan or another jurisdiction.14  Pueblo 
has made a sufficient showing in the pleadings to survive summary disposition under MCR 
 
13 Madrone also noted that evidence that one or both partners rejected the institution of 
marriage is not necessarily determinative and should be weighed in light of what each 
partner’s views would have been had marriage not been banned.  Madrone, 217 Or App at 
129.  
14 Had the parties legally married before the child’s birth, Pueblo would be entitled to the 
marital presumption that she is a parent.  See MCL 722.1433(e) (stating that a “man . . . is 
presumed to be the child’s father by virtue of his marriage to the child’s mother at the time 
of the child’s conception or birth”); MCL 333.2824 (stating that “the name of the husband 
at the time of conception or, if none, the husband at birth shall be registered as the father 
of the child”); MCL 552.29 (stating that “the legitimacy of all children begotten before the 
commencement of any action [for divorce] shall be presumed”); see also Serafin v Serafin, 
401 Mich 629; 258 NW2d 461 (1977) (holding that there is a strong but rebuttable 
presumption that a husband is a child’s father); MCL 8.3b (“Every word importing the 
masculine gender only may extend and be applied to females as well as males.”).   
Further, the assisted-reproduction statute provides a presumption of parentage to the 
nonbirth parent for children born to married parents through assisted reproduction.  MCL 
333.2824(6); see also LeFever, 336 Mich App at 679 (GLEICHER, J., concurring) (“A 
 
27 
 
2.116(C)(8) on standing grounds.  In a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we accept all 
factual allegations as true and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant.  El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160.  The parties agreed to use in vitro fertilization, 
and the child was born during their relationship.  Both parties parented the child from birth, 
sharing custody and parenting time, including for some time after their breakup.  Pueblo 
desires to facilitate a close and continuing parent-child relationship with JPHP.  And 
Pueblo requested custody, parenting time, and calculation of child support.  Therefore, 
Pueblo’s allegations that she (1) cultivated the development of a relationship with the child 
over a period of time, (2) desires to have parental rights, and (3) is willing to pay child 
support are sufficient to advance her claim for equitable parenthood.  See Atkinson, 160 
Mich App at 608-609.  Pueblo has also alleged facts entitling her to a threshold 
determination on whether the parties would have married but for Michigan’s 
unconstitutional bar on same-sex marriage under the inquiry set forth above.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Today we announce a limited extension of the equitable-parent doctrine for 
individuals in same-sex couples who were unconstitutionally prevented from marrying 
 
married woman in a same-sex relationship should have precisely the same right” as a 
husband on equal footing.).   
A “father” under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq., is 
defined as “the man who signs an acknowledgment of parentage of a child,” MCL 
722.1002(d).  We see no impediment to any person establishing parental rights by signing 
an acknowledgment of parentage.  See also In re Daniels Estate, 301 Mich App 450, 456; 
837 NW2d 1 (2013) (“Nothing in the Acknowledgement [sic] of Parentage Act requires 
that the man completing the acknowledgement form actually be the child’s biological 
father.”); MCL 8.3b.  
 
28 
 
before Obergefell.  On remand, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on 
whether Pueblo has standing as an equitable parent, applying the threshold test that we 
announce today.  Pueblo must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she 
and defendant would have chosen to marry before the child’s birth but for Michigan’s 
unconstitutional exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry.  Should she do so, 
she has the right to a best-interest evaluation for custody and parenting time.  We reverse 
the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
 
Kyra H. Bolden 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
CARRIE PUEBLO, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 164046 
 
RACHEL HAAS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
  
 
 
BOLDEN, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the Court’s opinion in this matter.  I write separately to draw attention 
to a subsidiary argument raised—but not fully developed—by plaintiff that I believe merits 
further attention from the Legislature.  Given that many of our state laws around marriage, 
out-of-wedlock parenting, and reproductive technologies were enacted without 
consideration of Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US 644; 135 S Ct 2584; 192 L Ed 2d 609 (2015), 
there appear to be many lingering puzzles remaining about how the laws as written can fit 
the practical realities of same-sex relationships.   
Marriage, of course, offers a presumption that both spouses are the natural parents 
of the child for many legal purposes.  See, e.g., MCL 700.2114(1)(a) (“If a child is born or 
conceived during a marriage, both spouses are presumed to be the natural parents of the 
child for purposes of intestate succession.”).  And had the parties had the legal avenue of 
marriage available to them and chosen to pursue it, this case might have been very 
different—even unnecessary.  However, statutory issues remain because state law does not 
yet fully contemplate the interaction between same-sex relationships and parenting.  The 
 
2 
 
Legislature should give clarity to families and consider these lingering questions 
surrounding how same-sex couples resolve custodial disputes if the relationship is 
terminated.  
The United States Supreme Court has held that the relationship between a parent 
and child is a fundamental right and “that the relationship between parent and child is 
constitutionally protected.”  Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246, 255; 98 S Ct 549; 54 L Ed 2d 
511 (1978).  In accordance with this holding, both Congress and the Michigan Legislature 
have since codified protections for parental rights through the Respect for Marriage Act, 
PL 117-228, 136 Stat 2305, and the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., 
respectively.  The Court of Appeals has described the CCA as “ ‘a comprehensive statutory 
scheme’ ” governing child support and parenting time and offering “the exclusive means 
of pursuing” rights to a child’s custody.  LeFever v Matthews, 336 Mich App 651, 662, 
674, 681 n 2; 971 NW2d 672 (2021), quoting Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 327; 597 
NW2d 15 (1999).  The case before us demonstrates the limitations of the statute’s present 
form and underscores its potential to violate constitutional principles of parental rights.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Under the CCA, a parent is defined as the “natural or adoptive parent of a child.”  
MCL 722.22(i).  The CCA does not expressly define “natural parent,” but the Court of 
Appeals has held that it requires such a parent to be related to the child by “blood” rather 
than adoption.  See, e.g., Stankevich v Milliron (On Remand), 313 Mich App 233, 236; 882 
NW2d 194 (2015) (applying the part of the definition of “natural” from Random House 
Webster’s College Dictionary (2005) indicating that it means “ ‘related by blood rather 
 
3 
 
than by adoption’ ”).  In LeFever, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statutory term 
“natural parent” was “elastic enough” to allow a more expansive interpretation to include 
a parent who gestated and birthed the children without genetic link as a “natural parent” 
under the CCA.  LeFever, 336 Mich App at 662.1 
Besides “blood” or birth, the CCA offers a third avenue by which a person may be 
deemed a “natural parent”—Michigan’s equitable-parent doctrine.  Under this doctrine, a 
nonbiological father of a child born or conceived during a marriage may be considered the 
natural father of that child where: 
(1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father 
and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of 
such a relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint 
for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, 
and (3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child 
support.  [Van, 460 Mich at 330 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] 
In this case, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was not a “natural parent” by 
blood, by birth, or through the equitable-parent doctrine.  Pueblo v Haas, unpublished per 
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 28, 2021 (Docket No. 357577).  
The panel likened plaintiff’s case to Lake v Putnam, 316 Mich App 247, 255; 894 NW2d 
62 (2016).  In Lake, the plaintiff and the defendant were in a romantic relationship that 
lasted more than a decade.  Id. at 249.  During that relationship, the plaintiff gave birth to 
a child conceived through a medical procedure.  The couple raised the child together until 
their relationship terminated.  The plaintiff then sued the defendant, seeking parenting time 
 
1 The defendant in LeFever also argued that a narrow interpretation of “natural parent” 
under the CCA would violate her constitutional rights to substantive due process and equal 
protection.  The LeFever Court, however, did not reach the constitutional arguments 
because the decision was based on a statutory analysis.  Id. at 659. 
 
4 
 
with the child and asserting that she satisfied all the requirements of the equitable-parent 
doctrine because she had equally participated in raising the child while the couple was 
together.  Id.  The defendant unsuccessfully moved for summary disposition on the ground 
that the plaintiff lacked standing.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, relying on 
Van, 460 Mich at 330, explaining that the plaintiff ignored one critical—and dispositive—
requirement; namely, “the child must be born in wedlock.”  Lake, 316 Mich App at 252.  
The Court of Appeals in this case was bound by Lake, which presented a parallel 
set of facts.  As in Lake, plaintiff and defendant were in a romantic relationship for about 
a decade through which the parties never married, and defendant gave birth to a child 
conceived through a medical procedure.  Pueblo, unpub op at 1.  Plaintiff sued under the 
CCA seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child.  Id.  Defendant successfully 
moved for summary disposition asserting, among other things, that plaintiff (like the 
plaintiff in Lake) lacked standing to seek custody of the child.  Id. at 2.  Plaintiff appealed 
after unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration.  Id.   
The Court of Appeals followed Lake and affirmed.  The panel rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that she has standing under the “ ‘elastic definition’ ” of natural parent as adopted 
in LeFever.  Id. at 5.  The panel distinguished LeFever by noting that the defendant in 
LeFever had given birth to the children, thereby creating an equivalent of “the physical 
connection of being a parent by virtue of genetic relationship,” which plaintiff lacks.  Id. 
at 6.  The Court of Appeals also discounted the fact that same-sex couples could not legally 
marry at the time of the child’s conception and birth, given that Lake declined to expand 
the scope of the equitable-parent doctrine by imposing the status of marriage upon a couple 
 
5 
 
who had never married.  Id.  In the panel’s view, because this point of law has not changed, 
defendant could not achieve the status of natural parent under the equitable-parent doctrine.   
After Obergefell held that depriving same-sex couples of the right to marry is a 
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court of Appeals extended the equitable-parent doctrine to same-sex couples who had 
legally married outside Michigan.  See Stankevich (On Remand), 313 Mich App at 240.  
The Lake Court, however, declined to extend standing under the doctrine to parties who 
had separated pre-Obergefell, because the Lake majority believed that such an extension 
of the doctrine would be the equivalent of imposing a retroactive marriage on the parties 
and it was not willing to do so upon the unilateral request of one party.  Lake, 316 Mich 
App at 253. 
But considering these questions through a constitutional lens might have brought 
different results.  Under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the door to parental rights for unmarried, same-sex parents remains open.  
The analysis in Obergefell centered on four principles that demonstrate why constitutional 
marriage guarantees must apply with equal force to same-sex couples.2  These principles 
stress that confusion surrounding the status of the children of same-sex couples is a source 
of social instability and suffering, that the right to marriage “safeguards children and 
 
2 These principles are (1) the right of personal autonomy to make choices, (2) the special 
and committed nature of marriage and family, (3) safeguarding children and families, thus 
drawing meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education, and (4) 
that marriage is a keystone of our social order.  Obergefell, 576 US at 665-669.  The 
application of these principles to same-sex couples stems from the Court’s recognition that 
“same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate 
association.”  Id. at 667. 
 
6 
 
families,” and that this right draws meaning from the related rights of procreation and 
childrearing.3  Obergefell, 576 US at 667. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  EXTENDING THE EQUITABLE-PARENT DOCTRINE AS A BASIS FOR 
STANDING  
In his Lake concurrence, Judge SHAPIRO proposed a solution to the equitable-parent 
doctrine’s disparate treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex parents inspired by the Oregon 
Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Madrone, 271 Or App 116, 128-129; 350 P3d 495 
(2015).  Lake, 316 Mich App at 261 (SHAPIRO, J., concurring).  In Madrone, the question 
was how to determine whether an unmarried same-sex couple is similarly situated to a 
married opposite-sex couple for purposes of the state’s artificial-insemination statute.  The 
court reasoned that because the distinction between married and unmarried heterosexual 
couples is that married couples have chosen to be married while the unmarried couples 
have chosen not to be, choice would be the key to determining whether the statute applied 
to a same-sex couple.  Madrone, 271 Or App at 128.  Accordingly, given that same-sex 
couples in Oregon had also been statutorily deprived of the choice to marry before 
Obergefell, the governing inquiry would be whether a same-sex couple “would have chosen 
to marry before the child’s birth had they been permitted to.”  Id.  The court held that this 
inquiry presents a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis where fact-
finders may consider varying factors including whether the couple registered as domestic 
partners, held each other out as spouses, shared parenting responsibilities during the 
 
3 More starkly, the Court stated that “[t]he marriage laws at issue here . . . harm and 
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”  Id. at 668. 
 
7 
 
relationship, held a commitment ceremony, wore or exchanged rings, and shared finances.  
Id. at 128-129.  These factors could be considered to support an inference that a same-sex 
couple would have married had that choice been available.  Id. at 129. 
Judge SHAPIRO suggested adopting this approach in Michigan and would have held 
“that a party is entitled to seek equitable parental rights arising out of a same-sex nonmarital 
relationship when a preponderance of the evidence shows that but for the ban on same-sex 
marriage in the parties’ state of residency, they would have married before the birth of the 
child.”  Lake, 316 Mich App at 262-263 (SHAPIRO, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
Under this expansion of the doctrine, if standing is contested, as it is in the instant matter, 
an evidentiary hearing would generally be required to determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence whether the nonbiological parent and the biological parent would have been 
married but for the ban on same-sex marriage.  Id. at 263. 
Today, the majority adopts this approach and offers a limited extension of the 
equitable-parent 
doctrine 
for 
partners 
in 
same-sex 
relationships 
who 
were 
unconstitutionally prevented from marrying before Obergefell.  On remand, plaintiff must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that she and defendant would have chosen to 
marry before the child’s birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional ban on same-sex 
marriage.  I agree with this approach.  
B.  EXPANDING STANDING UNDER THE EQUITABLE-PARENT DOCTRINE  
The Court of Appeals developed the equitable-parent doctrine to permit married, 
nonbiological parents to secure parental rights.  See Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 Mich App 
601; 408 NW2d 516 (1987).  However, before this decision, this Court refused to apply the 
 
8 
 
equitable-parent doctrine to an unwed nonbiological parent holding that “the extension of 
substantive rights regarding child custody implicates significant public policy issues and is 
within the province of the Legislature, not the judiciary.”  Van, 460 Mich at 331.  The 
doctrine has since been applied in varying circumstances but has never been enacted by 
statute. 
Though the equitable-parent doctrine has never been enacted into statutory law, the 
Michigan Legislature has signaled elsewhere that marriage is not central to parenthood.  In 
addition to allowing unmarried biological fathers to establish paternity under the Genetic 
Parentage Act, MCL 722.1461 et seq., the Legislature allows unmarried men to pursue 
parental rights under the Revocation of Paternity Act, MCL 722.1431 et seq.4  These 
statutes signal that the Legislature has considered the practical realities that relationships 
may result in children but not marriage. 
Additionally, in Lipnevicius v Lipnevicius, unpublished per curiam opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, issued August 26, 2010 (Docket No. 289073), the Court of Appeals 
addressed the equitable-parent doctrine in a case involving a legal father seeking custody 
against the claims of the child’s mother and the biological father.  The panel noted that the 
equitable-parent doctrine can encroach on what has traditionally been the Legislature’s 
arena and stated that, in its view, the “equitable parent doctrine irreconcilably conflicts 
 
4 The Revocation of Paternity Act defines an “alleged father” as “a man who by his actions 
could have fathered the child” in question.  MCL 722.1433(c).  Under the act, an “alleged 
father” may pursue an action to deprive a “presumed father”—defined as “a man who is 
presumed to be the child’s father by virtue of his marriage to the child’s mother at the time 
of the child’s conception or birth,” MCL 722.1433(e)—of parental rights.   
 
9 
 
with statutes intended to occupy the entire field of child custody regulation.”  Id. at 3.5  The 
proposition that the equitable-parent doctrine is sufficient to ground standing has not been 
universally accepted.  This case shows exactly why it may be necessary for the Legislature 
to address these issues.  
That said, aside from the question whether the Legislature should address the 
equitable-parent doctrine, the CCA has ambiguities that should be clarified.  As the 
majority points out, the CCA says nothing about biology or marriage and its definition of 
“natural parent” is unclear.  As Justice KELLY pointed out in her dissent in Van, in custody 
disputes “the Legislature has decreed that the overriding concern is not the ultimate 
preservation by the state of the institution of marriage.  It is, instead, the attainment of the 
best interests of the children.”  Van, 460 Mich at 346 (KELLY, J., dissenting).  Therefore, 
the Legislature should consider how to amend the CCA for consistency, so that the best 
interests of a child are of utmost concern and given due consideration when situations like 
these arise. 
The Legislature should also consider whether to enact a formal procedure to address 
situations like plaintiff’s.  For example, Michigan law provides that a “child conceived by 
a married woman with consent of her husband following the utilization of assisted 
reproductive technology is considered to be the legitimate child of the husband and wife.”  
MCL 333.2824(6).  But there is no explicit right extended for a female spouse who consents 
 
5 Further, Michigan stands nearly alone in its continued commitment to the equitable-parent 
doctrine.  See Titchenal v Dexter, 166 Vt 373, 384-385; 693 A2d 682 (1997) (noting that 
“[v]ery few jurisdictions have embraced the equitable-parent doctrine adopted in 
Atkinson”).  
 
10 
 
to her partner’s conceiving a child using assisted reproductive technology.6  “The essence 
of the Equal Protection Clauses is that the government not treat persons differently on 
account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment.”  
Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 258, 615 NW2d 218 (2000).  Because our reproductive-
assistance technology cannot—at least currently—produce a child who is genetically 
related to both same-sex parents, a nonbiological parent of a child born to a same-sex 
couple that was unconstitutionally barred from marriage pre-Obergefell may be precluded 
from standing to seek a custodial relationship with that child under the CCA.  
In Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 39 (2000), the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental right of parents to make certain decisions 
for their children.  Troxel summarizes the long history of the fundamental liberty interest 
parents have in the “care, custody, and control of their children[.]”  Id. at 65 (opinion of 
O’Connor, J.).  Troxel also highlights that the “ ‘liberty’ ” protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of parents to “ ‘establish a home 
and bring up children’ . . . .”  Id., quoting Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399; 43 S Ct 
625; 67 L Ed 1042 (1923).  And “ ‘those who nurture [a child] and direct his destiny have 
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.’ ”  Troxel, 530 US at 65 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), quoting Pierce v Society of 
Sisters, 268 US 510, 535; 45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925) (emphasis added).  
 
6 While the rules of construction would extend this right to a married female spouse, MCL 
8.3b, MCL 333.2824(6) does not do so explicitly and is therefore confusing to same-sex 
couples trying to navigate the statute. 
 
11 
 
Plaintiff argues that she was involved in nurturing the child even before the child 
was conceived.  Plaintiff alleges that she and defendant decided to use in vitro fertilization 
to bring a child into the world together.  Plaintiff further alleges that both parties acted as 
parents to the child from birth, sharing custody and parenting time even after their 
separation.  Plaintiff alleges that this relationship continued until defendant demanded that 
she cease contact with the child, at which point plaintiff sought a legal avenue to continue 
to parent the child.  Absent our extension of the equitable-parent doctrine in this case, 
plaintiff may not have had standing to do so. 
III.  CONCLUSION  
I concur fully with the majority’s opinion.  However, I write separately to state that 
the Legislature should give clarity for children born to same-sex couples to ensure a 
sufficient statutory scheme that reflects adequate equal-protection and due-process 
considerations.  This case raises important questions.  The Legislature should answer them. 
 
 
Kyra H. Bolden 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
CARRIE PUEBLO, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 164046 
 
RACHEL HAAS, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
ZAHRA, J. (dissenting). 
Today, a majority of this Court holds that “[a] person seeking custody who 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married 
before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is 
entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody.”  While I am 
sympathetic toward plaintiff’s circumstances, extending the equitable-parent doctrine, a 
marriage-based doctrine that rests on shaky legal grounds, is inappropriate and ill-suited to 
provide plaintiff the relief she seeks.  The majority’s extension of the doctrine, and its 
creation of an accompanying “but for” test, is unsupported by the law and likely will result 
in far-reaching ramifications outside the child custody context.  Because I would not extend 
the equitable-parent doctrine and because I believe that the Legislature, not the judiciary, 
 
2 
 
should be making these policy-based decisions, I dissent.1  I would decline to disturb the 
opinions of the lower courts in this case. 
I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether a party has standing is a legal question that is reviewed de novo.2  Whether 
a party has a sufficient basis to assert parental rights under the equitable-parent doctrine is 
also a question of law that is reviewed de novo.3 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., grants limited standing to seek 
custody or parenting time to persons who are not legal parents.   
If a child custody dispute is between the parents, between agencies, or 
between third persons, the best interests of the child control.  If the child 
custody dispute is between the parent or parents and an agency or a third 
person, the court shall presume that the best interests of the child are served 
by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the contrary is shown by 
clear and convincing evidence.[4]   
“Parent” under the CCA “means the natural or adoptive parent of a child.”5  A “third 
person” is “an individual other than a parent.”6  A “natural parent” includes a parent related 
 
1 I note that this Court has denied leave to appeal on this issue twice before: in Mabry v 
Mabry, 499 Mich 997 (2016), and Kolailat v McKennett, 499 Mich 996 (2016).  The only 
factor that has changed since is the composition of the Court. 
2 Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 642-643; 753 NW2d 48 (2008).   
3 Lake v Putnam, 316 Mich App 247, 250; 894 NW2d 62 (2016). 
4 MCL 722.25(1). 
5 MCL 722.22(i). 
6 MCL 722.22(k). 
 
3 
 
to the child “by birth,” as opposed to “by adoption” or “through marriage,” regardless of 
genetic connection.7  Under these definitions, plaintiff is not a “parent,” and she is therefore 
not provided any parental rights by statute.8  Plaintiff nonetheless argues that she has 
standing to bring a suit for custody under Michigan’s equitable-parent doctrine. 
Under the equitable-parent doctrine, set forth by the Court of Appeals in Atkinson v 
Atkinson9 and repeated by this Court in Van v Zahorik,10 
“a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived 
during the marriage may be considered the natural father of that child where 
(1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father 
and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of 
such a relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint 
for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, 
and (3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child 
support.” 
“Once it is determined that a party is an equitable parent, that party becomes endowed with 
both the rights and responsibilities of a parent.”11 
 
7 LeFever v Matthews, 336 Mich App 651, 661, 665-667; 971 NW2d 672 (2021). 
8 Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, LeFever is inapplicable in this case.  There, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling that the birth mother was not a “natural parent” 
under the CCA because she lacked a genetic connection to the children.  In so holding, the 
Court of Appeals relied on dictionary definitions to reason that the term “ ‘natural parent’ 
is elastic enough to include defendant, who, although she has no genetic connection to the 
twins, is related to them by the process of birthing them rather than through marriage.”  
LeFever, 336 Mich App at 666.  Given that plaintiff here is not the birth mother and also 
lacks a genetic connection to the child, LeFever does not provide her with standing under 
the CCA. 
9 Atkinson v Atkinson, 160 Mich App 601, 608-609; 408 NW2d 516 (1987). 
10 Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 330; 597 NW2d 15 (1999). 
11 York v Morofsky, 225 Mich App 333, 337; 571 NW2d 524 (1997). 
 
4 
 
Plaintiff quite clearly does not satisfy one of the requirements of this doctrine: the 
child at issue was not born or conceived during a marriage.  It is undisputed that the parties 
were never married.  Consequently, the equitable-parent doctrine, by its own terms, is 
inapplicable. 
A majority of this Court now creates a potential exception to this marriage 
requirement for those similarly situated to plaintiff.  Specifically, the majority reasons that 
Obergefell v Hodges12 “made clear that the denial of the ability to marry was a denial of 
same sex couples’ constitutional rights” and concludes that “[r]ecognition of equitable 
parenthood is one of the ‘constellation of benefits’ associated with marriage in Michigan.”  
The majority opinion thus holds that, “[a]s a matter of equity and constitutional law, we 
are compelled to treat same-sex couples equally” and that, as the concurring opinion stated 
in Lake v Putnam, “ ‘Obergefell demands extension of the equitable-parent doctrine.’ ”13  
I disagree with the majority’s decision to extend the equitable-parent doctrine under these 
circumstances, and I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Obergefell 
compels this result.  Perhaps plaintiff is entitled to a remedy via some vehicle, but the 
equitable-parent doctrine is quite simply the wrong one. 
The equitable-parent doctrine is a judicially crafted doctrine based entirely on the 
sanctity of marriage.  This Court’s Van opinion addressing the doctrine repeatedly 
emphasized that it is premised on a marriage relationship, stating that the policy 
justifications backing the doctrine “can provide no justification for, and in fact are 
 
12 Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US 644; 135 S Ct 2584; 192 L Ed 2d 609 (2015). 
13 Quoting Lake, 316 Mich App at 260 (SHAPIRO, J., concurring). 
 
5 
 
antithetical to, the extension of the doctrine outside the context of marriage.”14  The 
majority today relies on Obergefell to extend the doctrine beyond the confines of marriage.  
But it is curious to rely on Obergefell to circumvent Van’s marriage requirement when 
Obergefell itself was based on the sanctity of marriage.  Moreover, in Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court of the United States did not compel states to recognize all same-sex 
relationships predating that decision.  “Obergefell did not grant same-sex couples anything 
more than the right to have states recognize their marriage (not an insignificant right, no 
doubt) and to treat those marriages the same as ones between heterosexuals.”15  “[I]t did 
not directly address the rights of same-sex couples who entered into some other 
arrangement or agreement, regardless of whether it took the form of an informal 
understanding or something more formal, such as a civil union or domestic partnership.”16  
I therefore do not read Obergefell as compelling an extension of our unique state doctrine 
 
14 Van, 460 Mich at 333. 
15 Sheardown v Guastella, 324 Mich App 251, 262; 920 NW2d 172 (2018).  In Sheardown, 
the Court of Appeals distinguished the case from others decided post-Obergefell where 
“the parties had been married (either in their state or another) and were seeking to obtain a 
benefit of marriage that was granted to heterosexual married couples.”  Id. at 263.  The 
panel said that “when a party who comes before the court is not a part of a marital 
relationship, . . . he or she is not entitled to the ‘constellation of benefits’ referred to in 
Obergefell.”  Id.  See also Hawkins v Grese, 68 Va App 462, 476-477; 809 SE2d 441 
(2018) (“In sum, the entire basis of the holding of Obergefell is the significance and 
importance of marriage as an institution that should not be withheld from same-sex 
couples.  Barring procreation or adoption, pre-Obergefell, different-sex marriages did not 
automatically result in the spouses becoming legal parents of each other’s children and the 
analysis of the Obergefell majority opinion does not compel a different conclusion with 
respect to same-sex marriages, far less unmarried couples of any sexual orientation.”) 
(formatting altered). 
16 Philip Morris USA, Inc v Rintoul, 342 So 3d 656, 666 (Fla App, 2022) (citations omitted). 
 
6 
 
pertaining to parenthood.  Instead, the majority actually extends Obergefell to, in turn, 
extend the equitable-parent doctrine, and it does so without adequately explaining why this 
extension is constitutionally required.17 
More fundamentally, I question the soundness of the equitable-parent doctrine itself.  
As the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan highlighted in its amicus brief, 
the equitable-parent doctrine is a judicially constructed concept that has not been adopted 
by the Legislature since its inception in 1987.  Instead of codifying the doctrine, the 
Legislature has maintained a comprehensive statutory scheme that includes targeted third-
party custody provisions.  In addition to addressing child custody disputes between parents 
and between a parent and state agency, the CCA specifically addresses the rights of certain 
other third parties, e.g., legal guardians and grandparents.18  Yet the CCA does not 
recognize equitable parenthood.  I question whether the equitable-parent doctrine, which 
is premised on equitable considerations, should at all supplant or conflict with the CCA’s 
statutory scheme, which is seemingly intended to occupy the field of child custody 
 
17 See People v Mathews, 505 Mich 1114, 1125 (2020) (VIVIANO, J., dissenting) (“Of 
course, Supreme Court caselaw is binding and must be faithfully applied.  Abela v Gen 
Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 606[; 677 NW2d 325] (2004).  But if a fair reading of the 
precedent does not resolve the issue we face, we have the power and the responsibility to 
decide the issue for ourselves.  We are under no obligation to extend the scope of a 
precedent to cover the matter at hand . . . .”). 
18 See, e.g., MCL 722.26b (standing provisions addressing guardians and limited 
guardians); MCL 722.26c (limited third-person custody standing and jurisdiction 
provisions); MCL 722.27b (grandparenting-time standing provisions). 
 
7 
 
regulation.19  On this point, I share the following concerns raised by the Court of Appeals 
in Lipnevicius v Lipnevicius:20 
[We] note that the continuing existence of the equitable parent doctrine 
necessitated a lengthy, multifaceted analysis of an otherwise simple and 
straightforward case.  In our view, the equitable parent doctrine 
irreconcilably conflicts with statutes intended to occupy the entire field of 
child custody regulation.  The governing laws, enacted by our Legislature, 
compel a far more direct end to this litigation. 
 
The circuit court’s ruling that [the child at issue] was born out of 
wedlock disestablished defendant’s paternity of the child, rendering 
defendant a “third person” under the [CCA], MCL 722.22(j).  Pursuant to 
MCL 722.26c(1), defendant lacked standing to bring an action for custody.  
These directly applicable statutes chart the way to a simple affirmance of the 
circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition.  
Instead, the equitable parent doctrine resuscitates a claim otherwise 
unrecognized in the statutory framework governing child custody matters.  
Because this doctrine clashes with the well-established principle that “the 
public policy issues related to child custody disputes are to be resolved by 
the Legislature, not the judiciary,” Van, 460 Mich at 327, it has no place in 
Michigan’s jurisprudence. 
*   *   * 
 
Moreover, neither the Child Custody Act nor the Paternity Act 
contemplates the notion of an “equitable” parent.  The Legislature simply has 
not bestowed parental prerogatives on persons whose status falls outside 
MCL 722.22(h).  Absent the equitable parent doctrine introduced in 
Atkinson, defendant would have no legally cognizable interest in custody of 
[the child at issue].  “Very few jurisdictions have embraced the equitable-
parent doctrine adopted in Atkinson . . . .”  Titchenal v Dexter, 166 Vt 373, 
384-385; 693 A2d 682 (1997).  The Connecticut Supreme Court explained as 
 
19 See Van, 460 Mich at 330; LeFever, 336 Mich App at 662 (“The CCA governs custody, 
parenting time, and child support issues for minor children in Michigan, and it is the 
exclusive means of pursuing child custody rights.”). 
20 Lipnevicius v Lipnevicius, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
issued August 26, 2010 (Docket No. 289073), pp 3-5. 
 
8 
 
follows one rationale for other jurisdictions’ rejection of the equitable parent 
doctrine: 
 
[E]ven if we were to conclude that our statutes left room 
for a redefinition of parentage, we are not persuaded that it 
would be wise to employ the equitable parent doctrine in that 
fashion.  It is true that the doctrine has considerable emotional 
appeal, because it permits a court, in a particularly compelling 
case, to conclude that, despite the lack of biological or adoptive 
ties to the child, the deserving adult nonetheless may be 
determined to be the child’s parent.  This appeal may be 
enhanced in a given case because the best interests of the child, 
if determined irrespective of the otherwise invalid claim of 
parentage, may point in that direction.  That doctrine, however, 
would lack the procedural and substantive safeguards provided 
to the natural parents and the child by the adoption statutes.  In 
addition, the equitable parent doctrine, which necessarily 
requires an ad hoc, case-by-case determination of parentage 
after the facts of the case have been determined, would 
eliminate the significant degree of certainty regarding who is 
and who is not a child’s parent that our jurisprudence supplies.  
[Doe v Doe, 244 Conn 403, 444 n 46; 710 A2d 1297 (1998), 
overruled in part on other grounds, In re Joshua S, 260 Conn 
182, 796 A2d 1141 (2002).] 
 
While the [Michigan] Supreme Court has apparently reserved this 
question for another day, the continuing viability of the equitable parent 
doctrine merits prompt and careful evaluation.  In [Hunter v Hunter, 484 
Mich 247, 251, 261, 271-275; 771 NW2d 694 (2009)], our Supreme Court 
overruled Mason v Simmons, 267 Mich App 188; 704 NW2d 104 (2005), a 
case similarly premised in part on equitable considerations, instead of a 
governing statute.  This Court had held in Mason “that unfit parents have the 
burden ‘to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change in the 
established custodial environment with the guardian was in the child’s best 
interests.’ ”  Hunter, 484 Mich at 272, quoting Mason, 267 Mich App at 207.  
The Supreme Court criticized that “Mason and its predecessors created this 
new standard out of thin air.”  Id.  The equitable parent doctrine suffers from 
the same intrinsic infirmities as Mason’s groundless injection of unfitness 
considerations into the parental presumption contained in MCL 722.25(1).  
As did the fit parent requirement adopted in Mason, the equitable parent 
doctrine plainly contravenes the statutory scheme governing child custody.  
For this reason, it should be overruled. 
 
9 
 
The Lipnevicius panel’s general concerns about the equitable-parent doctrine are 
well-taken.  Indeed, the majority in Van seemed to have similar concerns.  While Van did 
apply the doctrine, the majority “[q]uestion[ed] whether it was proper for the judiciary, as 
opposed to the Legislature, to adopt this doctrine,” but left the issue for another day because 
that case did not involve a married couple and therefore did not “squarely raise the issue 
whether equitable parenthood was appropriately adopted as a common-law 
doctrine . . . .”21  I echo the sentiment expressed by this Court in that case: “In the context 
of a subject matter fraught with public policy implications and the Legislature’s occupation 
of the field of child custody with the promulgation of the Child Custody Act, the judiciary 
is not the proper entity to create new rights or extend theories to reach new situations.  The 
creation and extension of rights relating to child custody matters is clearly the province of 
the Legislature, not the judiciary.”22  In short, I am not convinced that the equitable-parent 
doctrine is legally sound, and I would decline to extend it today. 
Putting aside this threshold disagreement, I also question the majority’s new “but 
for” test that is to be applied as a precursor to application of the equitable-parent doctrine.  
The majority holds that “a would-be equitable parent has standing if they demonstrate by 
the preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s 
birth or conception but did not because unconstitutional laws prevented them from doing 
so.”  I tend to agree with the Court of Appeals in Lake that 
we simply do not believe it is within courts’ discretion to, at the request of 
one party and in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
21 Van, 460 Mich at 335 n 6. 
22 Id. at 330. 
 
10 
 
Obergefell, retroactively transform an unmarried couple’s past relationship 
into marriage for the purpose of custody proceedings.  Stated differently, it 
is, in our view, improper for a court to impose, several years later, a marriage 
on a same-sex unmarried couple simply because one party desires that we do 
so.[23] 
I am uncomfortable with retroactively recognizing a marriage-equivalent relationship.  And 
I do not follow the majority’s assertion that these concerns are “remedied” by the creation 
of its but-for test, which undeniably will operate to go back in time to label certain 
relationships a “marriage” for purposes of the equitable-parent doctrine.  Moreover, I 
question the functionality of this but-for test.  The test requires courts to speculate as to 
whether a same-sex couple would have chosen to get married had they possessed the 
opportunity to do so.  Courts will be required to dive into all public and private aspects of 
a now-defunct relationship to hypothesize whether the couple would have chosen to marry.  
This is an especially difficult inquiry where litigation will undoubtedly be complicated by 
facts no longer discoverable and where, as here, one party to the couple adamantly denies 
that they would have married.  I am unsure that a court is even capable of finding with 
confidence that the only reason a same-sex couple did not marry, pre-Obergefell, was 
because they legally could not do so. 
Apart from the practical complications of this test, I am also concerned about the 
broader ramifications of its creation.  While the majority appears confident that its 
expansion of the equitable-parent doctrine and accompanying but-for test will remain 
limited to the child custody context and will not “create a legal morass in other areas of the 
law,” I am not so sure.  Defendant astutely reasons that a similar type of “but for” argument 
 
23 Lake, 316 Mich App at 253 (opinion of the Court) (citation omitted). 
 
11 
 
is likely to be advanced in nearly every area of the law to create avenues of redress for 
individuals, or classes of individuals, for whom prior iterations of the law did not provide 
relief, irrespective of whether the law was valid and constitutional and subsequently 
changed or whether the law was flawed and unconstitutional and successfully challenged.  
In the context of same-sex relationships alone, those couples who were not married pre-
Obergefell might rely on today’s decision to argue that they were denied the same access 
to legal rights on issues of property division, spousal support, and any of the other 
traditional areas of domestic-relations law that accompany a divorce.  Retroactive 
application of Obergefell might also implicate other areas of the law such as consortium 
damages, intestate succession and spousal election, and employee benefits and 
coordination law.  In short, adoption of today’s test might not be a narrow carveout at all, 
but could instead inspire similar challenges in other areas that will prevent finality in the 
law.  I highlight these concerns not because I am necessarily opposed to change in these 
areas of the law, but because they underscore the significance of the majority’s holding and 
because I believe that such matters of policy are for the Legislature to decide. 
Similar concerns seemed to motivate the majority in Van.  There, the Court quoted 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Hewitt v Hewitt,24 noting that it “thoughtfully addressed the 
propriety of the judiciary weighing the equities in claims between cohabitants”: 
 
“There are major public policy questions involved in determining 
whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to 
accord some type of legal status to claims arising from such relationships. . . .  
In the event of death shall the survivor have the status of a surviving spouse 
for purposes of inheritance, wrongful death actions, workmen’s 
compensation, etc.?  And still more importantly: what of the children born of 
 
24 Hewitt v Hewitt, 77 Ill 2d 49; 394 NE2d 1204 (1979). 
 
12 
 
such relationships?  What are their support and inheritance rights and by what 
standards are custody questions resolved?  What of the sociological and 
psychological effects upon them of that type of environment?  Does not the 
recognition of legally enforceable property and custody rights emanating 
from nonmarital cohabitation in practical effect equate with the legalization 
of common law marriage . . . ?”[25] 
Based in part on these concerns, this Court in Van said that “because the requested 
extension of the equitable parent doctrine would affect the state’s public policy in favor of 
marriage, the Legislature is clearly the appropriate entity to consider this issue.”26  I agree 
with this general sentiment that the judiciary should not be making these policy-based 
decisions.  Instead, “[t]he creation and extension of rights relating to child custody matters 
is clearly the province of the Legislature, not the judiciary.”27 
For these reasons, I would decline to extend the equitable-parent doctrine as a 
potential avenue of relief in this case.  Perhaps there were better arguments to be made, but 
plaintiff has not meaningfully grappled with any constitutional analysis.  To the contrary, 
I found plaintiff’s brief to be unhelpful in resolving the important legal issues before us.  I 
decline to dissect constitutional issues for her.  I again emphasize that the Legislature 
constitutes the most appropriate forum for resolving the policy issues presented in this case.  
As defendant herself states, the Legislature might want to reconsider the definition of 
“parent” under the CCA and reexamine the bases upon which a third party or third person, 
unrelated by marriage, might initiate a custody complaint under MCL 722.26c.  But 
because I do not believe that extending the equitable-parent doctrine is the proper vehicle 
 
25 Van, 460 Mich at 332-333, quoting Hewitt, 77 Ill 2d at 58. 
26 Van, 460 Mich at 333. 
27 Id. at 330. 
 
13 
 
through which to provide plaintiff the relief she seeks, and because this is the remedy that 
plaintiff sought in this Court, I would decline to intervene in this case. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
I disagree with this Court’s extension of the equitable-parent doctrine.  I question 
the validity of the doctrine and do not believe it is an appropriate tool to provide plaintiff 
the relief she seeks.  Furthermore, I question the advisability of the “but for” test set forth 
by the majority and worry that it will be applied too broadly.  Plaintiff’s remedy rests with 
the Legislature rather than the judiciary.  For these reasons, I would decline to disturb the 
lower courts’ decisions.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano