Title: Connie J. Motola v. Labor and Industry Review Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP000896
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0896 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Connie J. Motola,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and City of 
New Berlin,  
 
Respondents-Respondents, 
  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 5, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick L. Snyder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs 
(in the Court of Appeals) by Bruce F. Ehlke, Aaron N. Halstead 
and Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, 
Madison and oral argument by Aaron N. Halstead. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, LIRC, the cause 
was argued by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief (in the Court of Appeals) was James E. Doyle, 
attorney general. 
 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, City of New 
Berlin, there was a brief by Elizabeth A. McDuffie, Brent P. 
Bendrud and Krukowski & Costello, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Elizabeth McDuffie. 
 
  
Amicus Curiae was filed (in the Court of Appeals) 
by James W. Conway, city attorney and Susan M. Love and Davis & 
Kuelthau, Milwaukee for The City of Kenosha. 
 
No.  97-0896 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0896 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Connie J. Motola, 
  
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission 
and City of New Berlin 
 
 
Respondents-Respondents, 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Patrick L. Snyder, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   The court of appeals certified 
two questions to this court:  (1) Under Braatz v. LIRC, 174 
Wis. 2d 286, 496 N.W.2d 597 (1993), may any employer limit its 
married employees to coverage under one health insurance policy? 
 (2) When bringing an action under the Wisconsin Fair Employment 
Act, Wis. Stat. § § 111.31-111.395 (1993-94),1 must a complainant 
show actual harm?  
¶2 
In this case, employees of a municipality each were 
enrolled in "single" person coverage through their employer's 
health insurance plan.  Following their marriage, the municipal 
                     
1 All future statutory references will be to the 1993-94 
volume, unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 97-0896 
 
2 
employees continued to carry their separate single coverages 
until they requested family coverage shortly before the birth of 
their child.  The municipal employer responded by enrolling the 
husband under family coverage and including his wife as a 
dependent.  From that point on, the wife no longer was an 
enrollee with her own coverage but was covered only as her 
husband's dependent. 
¶3 
We conclude that a public employer, as defined in Wis. 
Stat. §  40, and the regulations thereto, may limit its married 
co-employees to coverage under one family health insurance 
policy because of their marital status, and therefore, the 
nonduplication policy of the City of New Berlin (the City) does 
not violate the marital status discrimination clause of the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA).2  Because there is no 
violation of the WFEA, we need not reach the second certified 
question regarding actual harm. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
We recite the facts as found by the Labor and Industry 
Review Commission (LIRC).  We will uphold LIRC's factual 
                     
2 To the extent that the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 111.31 through 111.39, can be interpreted as limiting 
the rights of private sector employers to manage their employee 
health insurance plans, we recognize that application of the 
WFEA, in some circumstances, may be subject to preemption by the 
Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as 
amended (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.  See Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).  Our conclusion in this case is 
limited to finding an implied exception to the WFEA for public 
employers who impose a nonduplication policy on their married 
co-employees.  We expressly limit our decision to governmental 
employers and thus, this case is not governed by ERISA 
No. 97-0896 
 
3 
findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).  In this case, the parties do not 
dispute the pertinent facts as found by LIRC. 
¶5 
Ms. Connie J. Motola began employment with the City in 
1977, as a dispatcher in the City Police Department.  Ms. Motola 
remains employed in that position.  When Ms. Motola began her 
City employment, she was unmarried.  At that time she was 
provided health insurance coverage under the City's group health 
insurance policy.  Ms. Motola was enrolled for single coverage 
which extended only to her own medical needs. 
¶6 
In 1980, Ms. Motola married Richard Motola, another 
City employee.  At that time Richard Motola carried single 
coverage health insurance under the City's group health policy 
for his own medical needs.  After their marriage, the Motolas 
continued to maintain their individual health insurance plans.  
Prior to the birth of their child in 1984, the Motolas requested 
family health insurance coverage.  
¶7 
In 
response 
to 
this 
request, 
the 
City 
changed 
Richard's 
enrollment status 
to family 
coverage, 
providing 
coverage for Richard Motola and his legal dependents, including 
his spouse, Connie Motola, and their child(ren).  Ms. Motola's 
status was changed from that of a single coverage enrollee to 
coverage as a dependent under the family coverage enrollment of 
No. 97-0896 
 
4 
Richard Motola.3  The City's policy of offering only one 
enrollment for family coverage where both spouses are employed 
by 
the 
municipality 
is 
described 
by 
the 
parties 
as 
a 
"nonduplication policy." 
¶8 
The City has been a party to a collective bargaining 
agreement with the New Berlin Public Employees Union, Local 
2676, governing the terms and conditions of employment of 
certain City employees since at least 1984.  Since the 1985-86 
collective bargaining agreement became effective, the agreement 
has provided: 
 
The City shall provide the standard health insurance 
program . . . for all employees, except regular part-
time employees, and shall pay the full premium cost of 
the single plan for single employees and the family 
plan for employees with dependents. . . .  In the 
event an employee has a spouse that is also a City 
employee, that employee and the employee's spouse will 
be entitled to only one family health insurance 
contract between them from the City.  (Emphasis 
added.)4 
                     
3 According to Ms. Motola's testimony at the ERD hearing, 
the City responded to the Motolas' request for family coverage 
by canceling her single coverage enrollment. Since July, 1984, 
Ms. Motola has been a dependent under her husband's health 
insurance policy.  The City disputes Ms. Motola's use of the 
term "cancel," contending that the City merely switched Ms. 
Motola's coverage from a single plan to a family plan.  We do 
not regard this as a material factual dispute.   
4 City of New Berlin Civil Service Ordinance sec. 4.25(1) 
similarly states, "If an employee has a spouse that [sic] is 
also a City employee, that employee and the employee's spouse 
will be entitled to only one family health insurance contract 
between them from the City."  Ms. Motola asked LIRC to take 
administrative notice of this ordinance. 
No. 97-0896 
 
5 
Based on evidence referring to the italicized portion of the 
above provision as the "Motola clause," LIRC inferred that this 
provision of the collective bargaining agreement was negotiated 
around the time of the birth of the Motolas' child to 
specifically address their request for family coverage. 
 
¶9 
LIRC found that in applying the "Motola clause," the 
City has allowed married couples who are both City employees to 
elect which one of them will be designated as the enrollee for 
the family coverage under the group health insurance plan.  This 
election also determines which one of them will be covered under 
the group health insurance plan only as a dependent of the 
enrollee spouse. 
 
¶10 On occasion since the mid-1980's, the City has offered 
its employees the option of selecting health coverage under one 
of two or more different insurance plans.  At those times, 
application of the "Motola clause," or the nonduplication 
policy,  would have the effect of precluding two employees who 
were married to one another from each having family coverage for 
their own medical needs under different plans. 
 
¶11 Currently, the City provides its employees only one 
health insurance plan through a group insurance policy between 
the City and Prime Care Health Plan, Inc.  That policy provides 
health 
benefits 
to 
enrollees 
and 
to 
their 
dependents.  
"Dependent" is defined as an enrollee's legal spouse and 
unmarried dependent children.  So long as his or her legal 
marital status continues, the rights of the spouse of an 
enrollee to health insurance benefits under the plan are no 
No. 97-0896 
 
6 
different from the rights of the enrollee spouse to health 
insurance benefits under the plan. 
 
¶12 LIRC also found, however, that if the legal marital 
status of married employees changes, then effective with the end 
of the month in which that change takes place, the rights under 
the plan of a person who had been the spouse of an enrollee 
differ to some extent from the rights of his or her former 
enrollee spouse under the plan.  
¶13 On May 10, 1994, Ms. Motola filed with the Equal 
Rights Division (ERD) of the Department of Workforce Development 
(DWD)5 a discrimination claim against the City.6  Ms. Motola 
alleged that under the WFEA,7 the City's denial of her request 
                     
5 The Department of Workforce Development (DWD) was formerly 
known as the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations 
(DILHR).  See 1995 Wis. Act 289, § 275; 1995 Wis. Act 27, § §  
9130(4), 9430(5) 
6 There is no express reason in the record on appeal why Ms. 
Motola waited nearly 10 years before filing her discrimination 
complaint with the Equal Rights Division of the Department of 
Industry, Labor and Job Development.  Wis. Stat. § 111.39(1) 
provides that "the department may receive and investigate a 
complaint charging discrimination . . . in a particular case if 
the complaint is filed with the department no more than 300 days 
after the alleged discrimination . . . occurred."  This statute 
of limitations may be waived as an affirmative defense.  See 
Milwaukee Co. v. LIRC, 113 Wis. 2d 199, 205, 335 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. 
App. 1983).  Here the City has not raised the statute of 
limitations as a defense.   
7 The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, §§ 111.31-111.395, 
provides in pertinent part: 
111.321 Prohibited bases of discrimination. ". . . [N]o 
employer 
. 
. 
. 
may 
engage 
in 
any 
act 
of 
employment 
discrimination as specified in s. 111.322 against any individual 
on the basis of . . . marital status . . ."  
No. 97-0896 
 
7 
for separate family health insurance coverage in her name 
discriminated against her on the basis of marital status.  An 
ERD investigator determined that there was probable cause to 
believe that the City had violated the WFEA, and certified Ms. 
Motola's complaint for a hearing. 
¶14 The hearing examiner8 agreed that Ms. Motola had 
established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the 
City violated the WFEA by adopting and maintaining a policy that 
provides for the reduction of the compensation paid by the City 
to one spouse if two City employees are married to each other.  
Specifically, the hearing examiner concluded that the City 
violated the WFEA by reducing Ms. Motola’s compensation because 
she was married to another City employee. 
¶15 On review, LIRC reversed the decision of the hearing 
examiner and dismissed Ms. Motola's complaint.  Ms. Motola 
appealed, and the circuit court affirmed LIRC's decision.  The 
circuit court held that the City did not discriminate against 
                                                                  
111.32(12) “Marital status” means the status of being 
married, single, divorced, separated or widowed. 
111.322 Discriminatory actions prohibited.  Subject to ss. 
111.33 to 111.36, it is an act of employment discrimination to 
do any of the following: 
(1) . . . to discriminate against any individual in 
promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment . . . because of any basis enumerated in s. 111.321. 
8 Wis. Stat. § 111.39(4) refers to persons who hear and 
decide complaints of discrimination under the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act as hearing examiners, not administrative law 
judges.  See also Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 292 n.4, 485 
N.W.2d 256 (1992).  
No. 97-0896 
 
8 
Ms. Motola because of her marital status.  The court further 
concluded that Ms. Motola was not harmed because she received 
health coverage as a dependent under a family policy instead of 
as an enrollee of an  individual policy.9 
¶16 Ms. Motola appealed from the order of the circuit 
court, and the court of appeals certified two questions to this 
court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 In an appeal from a circuit court order in an 
administrative review proceeding, the appellate court reviews 
the agency's decision and not the order of the circuit court.  
See Barnes v. DNR, 178 Wis. 2d 290, 302, 506 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. 
App. 1993), aff'd 184 Wis. 2d 645, 661, 516 N.W.2d 730 (1994).  
This case concerns interpretation of a statute, the WFEA, as it 
applies to a municipal employer of a married couple.  We also 
interpret portions of Wis. Stat. ch. 40, pertaining to group 
health insurance for public employees.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law.  We generally review questions of 
law independently, benefiting from the analysis of the circuit 
court. In cases where the agency has expertise in administering 
                     
9 At the ERD hearing, Ms. Motola testified that since the 
City canceled her own policy she has gone without "certain 
health plans that covered glasses or dental work, maybe 
gynecologist."  Ms. Motola testified that she was not able to 
choose the physicians that she used to have once she and her 
husband had to select a new family physician. 
The parties also stipulated that in 1993 through 1995, if 
an employee elected family coverage, the City's contribution was 
in excess of $400 per month for that coverage.  
No. 97-0896 
 
9 
and interpreting the statute, we may afford the agency's 
determination deference.  See, e.g., Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 
284, 290-91, 485 N.W.2d 256 (1992).  In this case LIRC was 
called upon to harmonize a court of appeals decision with a 
supreme court decision.  When an agency is only interpreting 
appellate case law, we accord the agency's determination no 
deference.  Thus, our review is de novo. 
I. 
¶18 Before we review LIRC's reasoning, we describe the two 
Wisconsin opinions which have addressed the application of the 
WFEA marital status discrimination clause to employers’ health 
insurance coverage practices. 
¶19 In 1993, we considered whether the marital status 
clause of the WFEA permitted a school district to enforce its 
health insurance nonduplication policy.  See Braatz, 174 Wis. 2d 
at 288.  Plaintiffs were teachers, married to spouses employed 
by other employers.  The collective bargaining agreement in 
place for the school district provided that “a married teacher 
who [sic] spouse is eligible for family coverage at his/her 
place of work shall have the option of carrying either the 
district’s policy or the spouse’s policy but not both.  If the 
spouse carries a single plan, the employee of the district shall 
be eligible for a single plan through the district.”  Id. at 
289.  The condition of the collective bargaining agreement in 
Braatz applied to both publicly and privately employed spouses 
of district employees. 
No. 97-0896 
 
10
¶20 The nonduplication policy in Braatz was applicable 
only to married employees.  See id. at 290.  We considered that 
the WFEA, which prohibits employers from discriminating against 
an individual based on marital status, is to be liberally 
construed.  See id. at 291.  LIRC contended in Braatz that the 
school 
district’s 
policy 
was 
not 
discriminatory 
but 
was 
triggered by conduct of the employee.  We concluded, however, 
that 
the 
policy constituted 
marital 
status 
discrimination 
because it required only married employees with duplicate 
coverage to make a choice between the district’s insurance plan 
or that of their spouse’s employer.  See id. at 291-92. 
¶21 LIRC also argued in Braatz that health insurance 
benefits were implicitly excepted from the WFEA’s prohibitions 
because the State, as an employer, was statutorily permitted to 
offer different health insurance benefits to married and to 
single employees.  See id. at 292-93, citing Wis. Stat. 
§§ 40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20).  We disagreed with LIRC’s implied 
exception theory.  See id. at 293-94. 
¶22 In reaching that conclusion, we first distinguished 
the court of appeals' decision in Phillips v. Wisconsin 
Personnel Commission, 167 Wis. 2d  205, 220, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. 
App. 1992), because that case involved not a married couple, but 
an employee and her companion.  See Braatz, 174 Wis. 2d at 294. 
 Next, we assumed, for the sake of LIRC's argument, that the 
State's nonduplication policy indicated an implied exception to 
the WFEA prohibition.  We distinguished the State’s policy from 
that of the school district at bar because the district’s policy 
No. 97-0896 
 
11
covered employees with spouses employed elsewhere.  See Braatz, 
174 Wis. 2d at 294.  Third, we pointed to the only express 
exception in the WFEA, the exception for age discrimination on 
health 
insurance 
issues. 
 
See 
id. 
at 
295; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.33(2)(d).  Finally, we took support from the liberal 
construction clause of the WFEA.  Based on all of the above, we 
 declined to adopt LIRC's theory of a general implied exception 
to the WFEA marital status discrimination clause in the case of 
health insurance benefits.  See id. 
¶23 Significantly, we did not decide in Braatz the 
question of whether there are any implied exceptions to the 
marital status discrimination clause of the WFEA for married co-
employees.  We simply held that in that case, the Maple School 
District’s nonduplication policy violated the WFEA, and did not 
fall “within an exception, express or implied, to the WFEA’s 
prohibition . . ."  Id. at 295. 
¶24 Three years after our decision in Braatz, the court of 
appeals decided Kozich v. Employe Trust Funds Board, 203 Wis. 2d 
363, 553 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1996).  In that case, both spouses 
were State employees.  The husband had a family health insurance 
plan through his employing agency since 1987.  That plan covered 
the husband, his wife and their two children.  In 1988, his 
wife, employed by a different state agency, also applied for and 
received family coverage under the State plan.  All four family 
members were covered.  In 1991 the husband was advised that he 
and his wife could not both continue to carry family coverage, 
and that one of them would have to drop their family coverage, 
No. 97-0896 
 
12
or they would both have to change to single plans.  Id. at 366-
67. 
¶25 Although the plaintiffs in Kozich asserted that the 
Braatz 
analysis 
controlled 
their 
WFEA 
marital 
status 
discrimination claim, the court of appeals disagreed.  See id. 
at 371.  The Kozichs asserted that the State’s nonduplication 
policy discriminates on the basis of marital status.  The court 
of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. §§ 40.52(1)(a)10 and 
40.02(20)11 were ambiguous, and so looked to the legislative 
history of those provisions.  
¶26 The court of appeals' research determined that the 
state health insurance program: 
 
was established by Laws of 1959, ch. 211, § 15, and 
the board was authorized, as it continues to be today, 
to "provide a plan . . . of standard health insurance 
coverage" for state employees.  It was also authorized 
                     
10 Wis. Stat. § 40.52 Health care benefits. (1) The group 
insurance board shall establish by contract a standard health 
insurance plan in which all insured employes shall participate 
except as otherwise provided in this chapter.  The standard plan 
shall provide: 
(a) A family coverage option for persons desiring to 
provide for coverage of all eligible dependents and a single 
coverage option for other eligible persons.  
11 Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20) "Dependent" means the spouse, 
minor child, including stepchildren of the current marriage 
dependent on the employe for support and maintenance, or child 
of any age, including stepchildren of the current marriage, if 
handicapped to an extent requiring continued dependence.  For 
group insurance purposes only, the department may promulgate 
rules with a different definition of "dependent" than the one 
otherwise provided in this subsection for each group insurance 
plan.  
No. 97-0896 
 
13
to determine, by rule, "the possible coverage when 
there is or has been state employment by more than one 
member of a family."  Section 66.919(7)(b) and (c), 
Stats. (1959).  Pursuant to that grant of authority, 
the board promulgated WIS. ADM. CODE § GRP 20.10, 
which provided that "[i]f both spouses are eligible 
for coverage each may select individual coverage. . . 
. [But if] one spouse selects family coverage the 
other spouse may not select any coverage. . . . "12 
203 Wis. 2d at 374. 
¶27 The Kozich court continued to trace the legislative 
history of the nonduplication policy of the state health 
insurance program: 
 
In 1981, the legislature enacted §§ 40.52(1)(a) and 
40.02(20), Stats., in the same form as they exist 
today.  See Laws of 1981, chs. 96 and 381, § 24.  
During the same legislative session, WFEA was amended 
to prohibit, for the first time, discrimination based 
on marital status.  See § 111.321, Stats. (created by 
Laws of 1981, ch. 334, § 10).13 
Id. 
¶28 The 
legislature, 
after 
including 
marital 
status 
discrimination as a basis for an employment discrimination 
claim, appeared to have retained an exception for the State as 
                     
12 As the Kozich court noted, the language of the board rule 
was amended (and renumbered) in 1978 to read: “If both spouses 
are eligible for coverage, each may elect single coverage. . . . 
If one eligible spouse elects family coverage, the other 
eligible spouse may be covered as a dependent but may not elect 
any other coverage.  WIS. ADM. CODE § GRP 20.11."  203 Wis. 2d 
at 374 n.8. 
13 The Kozich court then noted that after the adoption of 
§§ 40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20), Stats., and under the authority of 
those statutes, WIS. ADM. CODE § GRP 20.10 was repealed in 1986. 
 See 203 Wis. 2d at 374 n.9. 
No. 97-0896 
 
14
an employer.  The Kozich court resolved the apparent incongruity 
based on legislative intent: 
 
When the Legislature amended the WFEA to prohibit 
marital status discrimination, it could not have 
intended to nullify the restricted options for health 
insurance 
coverage 
which 
it 
created 
in 
secs. 
40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20), Wis. Stats.   This is true 
for several reasons.  First, the Legislature added the 
marital status discrimination provision to the WFEA in 
the same legislative session that it created sec. 
40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20) to restrict options for 
health care insurance coverage. 
Second, the creation of secs. 40.52(1)(a) and 
40.02(20) gave statutory recognition to the long-
standing administrative rule, sec. GRP 20.11, Wis. 
Adm. Code, which had mandated such restricted coverage 
since 1960.  When the legislature enacts a statute it 
is presumed to act with full knowledge of existing 
laws. 
Third, there is no indication on the record that 
the Legislature debated or intended a repeal of secs. 
40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20) or sec. GRP 20.11.  Repeals 
by implication are not favored in the law. 
Fourth, it is a cardinal rule of statutory 
construction that when a general statute and a 
specific statute relate to the same subject matter, 
the specific statute controls.  In this case, the 
specific 
restriction 
on 
health 
insurance 
options 
contained in secs. 40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20), control 
over the general prohibition against marital status 
discrimination contained in the WFEA.   
203 Wis. 2d at 375-76 (citing Ray v. Personnel Comm’n, No. 84-
CV-6165, slip op. at 3-4 (Dane Co. Cir. Ct. May 15, 1985)). 
¶29 By endorsing this explanation of the legislative 
intent, the Kozich court recognized that when the legislature 
created §§ 40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20), it may not have restated 
exactly the language of the repealed Wis. Admin. Code § GRP 
20.10.  See Kozich, 203 Wis. 2d at 376.  However, the court of 
appeals was impressed by what was not in the legislative history 
No. 97-0896 
 
15
for that session.  There was no fiscal estimate of the effect of 
wiping out the limitation on family coverage for married State 
employees.  The financial effect of such a change would have 
been an addition of at least $20,000,000 in annual premium costs 
to the State.  See id. at 376 and n.10.  On the basis of its 
thorough review, the Kozich court concluded that the legislature 
did not intend to wipe out the limitation, but instead intended 
to preserve the long-standing practice of restricting group 
health insurance coverage for State employees.  See id.   
II. 
¶30 In reaching its decision in this case, LIRC agreed 
with 
the 
ERD 
hearing 
examiner 
that 
the 
City's 
policy 
distinguishes based on marital status, potentially subjecting it 
to the WFEA prohibition on marital status discrimination.  
Nonetheless, LIRC reasoned that so long as the Motolas' legal 
marital status continued, the rights of a spouse of an enrollee 
to health insurance benefits under the plan were no different 
from the rights of the enrollee.  LIRC considered our decision 
in Braatz to leave open this question:  Does legislative 
adoption of certain limitations on health insurance choices for 
State employees, whose spouses were also State employees, 
justify an implied exception for other employers who place 
similar limitations on health insurance choices for employees 
whose spouses have the same employer? 
¶31 In LIRC's view, the question left open by Braatz was 
answered by the court of appeals in Kozich.  In its written 
decision, LIRC observed two factual distinctions between Braatz 
No. 97-0896 
 
16
and Kozich.  First, in Braatz, the employer's policy limiting 
coverage extended to employees whose spouses were covered by any 
other employers.  In Kozich, the policy extended only to 
employees whose spouses worked for the same employer.  The 
second distinction between the two decisions, according to LIRC, 
was that in Kozich the employer was the State, while in Braatz 
the employer was not.  LIRC was persuaded that the former 
distinction was most significant for purposes of the WFEA.  LIRC 
derived a rule from Kozich that a policy restricting married co-
employees to one company-sponsored health policy is not marital 
status discrimination.  LIRC also concluded, on policy grounds, 
that application of the WFEA could not differ based on whether 
the employer is the State or another employer. 
¶32 Ms. Motola advances several arguments why the City 
should not be exempted from the marital status clause of the 
WFEA in its provision of health insurance coverage.  First, she 
relies on the statutory construction maxim, expressio unius est 
exclusio 
alterius, 
requiring 
that 
“where 
the 
legislature 
specifically enumerates certain exceptions to a statute, this 
court presumes that the legislature intended to exclude other 
exceptions based on the rule.”   Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 
Wis. 2d 492, 512, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994).  Ms. Motola argues that 
because the legislature enumerated only one exception from the 
WFEA's marital status clause, that of preventing an employee 
spouse from supervising his or her spouse, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.345, the court must conclude that the legislature did not 
No. 97-0896 
 
17
adopt any other exceptions to the marital status discrimination 
clause. 
¶33 Second, Ms. Motola contends that the outcome of this 
decision is controlled by our decision in Braatz.  She reads 
Braatz as squarely rejecting the proposition that health 
insurance benefits are excepted from the WFEA’s marital status 
discrimination clause.  Ms. Motola points to the broad statement 
in 
Braatz, 
“Health 
insurance 
is 
not 
excepted 
from 
this 
prohibition [against marital status discrimination], expressly 
or implicitly.”   174 Wis. 2d at 289.  Ms. Motola also claims 
that our recognition of the sole express exception for insurance 
benefits under the age discrimination statute, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.33(2)(d), does not mean that this court had reserved the 
right to find additional exceptions to the WFEA for insurance 
coverage beyond Wis. Stat. § 111.33(2)(d). 
¶34 Next, Ms. Motola contends that even if there is an 
exception for married State co-employees, there is no basis in 
Wis. Stat. § 40.52(1)(a) or in Braatz upon which to conclude 
that a discrimination exemption should be extended to other 
public employers.  Motola suggests that the legislature could 
have enacted specific legislation if it intended to exempt 
county or municipal employers from the WFEA marital status 
discrimination clause.  Accordingly, she asserts that Kozich is 
not controlling because it is factually distinct, and because by 
its own terms, it is limited to state employment. 
¶35 LIRC 
contends 
that 
its 
original 
decision 
was 
reasonable, and on that basis should be affirmed. LIRC conceded 
No. 97-0896 
 
18
at oral argument that the City has distinguished its employees 
on the basis of marital status.  However, LIRC asserts that if 
this 
court 
in 
Braatz 
had 
meant 
to 
read 
the 
State's 
nonduplication policy for married co-employees as the sole 
exception to marital status discrimination because of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 40, the Braatz court would have said so.  Instead, LIRC 
reads both Braatz and Kozich to mean that any employer may 
impose a nonduplication policy for health insurance benefits for 
its married co-employees. 
¶36 LIRC contends that the legislature's amendment of the 
WFEA, following this court's decision in State ex rel Dept. of 
Public Instruction v. ILHR, 68 Wis. 2d 677, 229 N.W.2d 591 
(1975) to include the State as an "employer" demonstrates a 
legislative intent that the State be treated the same as other 
employers for all purposes of the WFEA. 
¶37 In describing the City's position, we should first 
acknowledge that the City does not concede that it has 
distinguished employees based on marital status.  The City 
agrees with LIRC that the conclusion of Kozich controls the 
outcome here.  The City points out that its nonduplication 
policy is identical to the State's nonduplication rule, and 
therefore Kozich's conclusion that such a policy does not 
violate 
the 
WFEA 
prohibition 
against 
marital 
status 
discrimination should control. 
¶38 The City of Kenosha (Kenosha) acting as amicus curiae, 
begins its argument by referring to Kozich, which held that 
there is an implied exception to the WFEA marital status clause 
No. 97-0896 
 
19
for the State's nonduplication policy.   Kenosha then asserts 
that the exception applies to other public employers, based on 
the ability of other public employers to participate in a state 
health insurance plan offered by the Group Insurance Board. 
Kenosha contends that the health insurance program offered under 
Wis. Stat.  ch. 40, can be offered by the Department of Employe 
Trust Funds to workers employed by employers other than the 
State.  Kenosha specifically refers to a provision in the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code: 
 
ETF 40.10 Public employers health insurance. (1) An 
employe of an employer, other than the state, shall be 
eligible for health insurance under s. 40.51(7), 
Stats., if the requirements of ss. 40.02(46) and 40.22 
or of s. 40.19(4)(a), Stats., are satisfied.  
Therefore, Kenosha argues that the implied exception recognized 
in Kozich not only applies to the State as an employer, but also 
to the City. 
III. 
¶39 We conclude that the legislature intended to exempt 
public employers, as defined in Wis. Stat. ch. 40, and the 
regulations 
promulgated 
thereto, 
from 
the 
marital 
status 
discrimination clause of the WFEA for purposes of family health 
insurance benefits provided to married co-employees.14  We base 
our conclusion on the legislative intent, as reflected in 
                     
14 We do not address the impact of this decision, if any, on 
the obligations of private employers.  We therefore do not reach 
the broad conclusion that LIRC did, namely, that the implied 
exception for nonduplication policies applies to any employer. 
See footnote 2, supra. 
No. 97-0896 
 
20
provisions of Wis. Stat.  ch. 40, to allow public employers to 
restrict family health insurance coverage provided to married 
co-employees. 
¶40 Ms. Motola correctly states that nothing in the text 
of the WFEA expressly exempts public employers from application 
of the prohibition against marital status discrimination.  She 
is also correct in stating that the only express exception with 
regard to health insurance benefits relates to the age of the 
insured.  See Wis. Stat. § 111.33(2)(d).  As this court pointed 
out in Braatz, there is no indication, within the WFEA, of an 
implied exception to the prohibition against discrimination in 
the provision of health insurance benefits.  See Braatz, 174 
Wis. 2d at 295. 
¶41 The implied exception arises, however, from a reading 
of the public employee health insurance provisions of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 40.  We therefore disagree with Ms. Motola when she asserts 
that the legislature did not intend to allow other public 
employers to operate under the same health  insurance rules as 
does the State.  As amicus Kenosha points out, the legislature 
has intended to permit exactly that. 
¶42 Although the facts in Kozich were limited to the 
practice of the State as an employer, the legislative history 
analyzed by Kozich supports our conclusion.  We therefore adopt 
the Kozich court's legislative history analysis of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 40 and its interplay with the WFEA marital status clause.  
We also read the history of the State's nonduplication policy, 
No. 97-0896 
 
21
and its consequent implied exception from the WFEA marital 
status clause, to apply to all public employers.   
¶43 Subchapter IV of Wis. Stat. ch. 40, concerns health 
and long-term care benefits for public employees.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 40.51(7), created by 1985 Wis. Act 29, § 741, provides:  
 
Any employer, other than the state, may offer to all 
of its employes a health care coverage plan through a 
program 
offered 
by 
the 
group 
insurance 
board.  
Notwithstanding 
sub. 
(2) 
and 
ss. 
40.05(4) 
and 
40.52(1), 
the 
department 
may 
by 
rule 
establish 
different 
eligibility 
standards 
or 
contribution 
requirements for such employes and employers and may 
by rule limit the categories of employers, other than 
the state, which may be included as participating 
employers under this subchapter.    
Another statute, Wis. Stat. § 66.185,15 amended at the same time 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 40.51(7) 
was 
created, 
also 
recognizes 
that 
municipalities like the City of New Berlin are authorized to 
participate in a plan offered by the group insurance board.16 
                     
15 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.185 
Hospital, 
accident 
and 
life 
insurance. 
. . .  
In 
addition, 
a 
municipality 
may, 
by 
ordinance 
or 
resolution, elect to offer to all of its employes a health care 
coverage plan through a program offered by the group insurance 
board under ch. 40.  Municipalities which elect to participate 
under s. 40.51(7) shall be subject to the applicable sections of 
ch. 40 instead of this section.  
16 The legislative drafting file for 1985 Assembly Bill 85, 
which resulted in Wis. Stat. § 40.51(7) describes the purpose 
for the changes to chapter 40: "Permits extending ETF benefits 
coverage to local government and other organizations which 
facilitate or carry out public functions.  This is currently of 
prime interest with respect to our ability to make the benefits 
of 
the 
health 
insurance 
plan 
restructuring 
more 
widely 
available."    
No. 97-0896 
 
22
¶44 Section 40.51(7) was enacted after the legislature 
added marital status as a basis for discrimination under the 
WFEA, and also after the legislature codified the nonduplication 
policy for State employees.  We assume that in 1985, when the 
legislature made other public employers and employees eligible 
to participate in the health insurance programs offered by the 
group insurance board, it was aware of both the WFEA provisions 
and the long-standing practice of allowing the State to limit 
its married co-employees to one family coverage policy.  Thus, 
the implied exception recognized by the Kozich court applies 
equally to the State and to other public employers eligible to 
participate in programs offered by the group insurance board. 
¶45 Ms. Motola, and the dissent, argue that even if this 
court, based upon Wis. Stat. ch. 40, were to recognize an 
implicit exception from the WFEA for nonduplication clauses, the 
City would not be eligible for the exception.  Specifically, 
they argue that since the City has not "acted to make [state 
health insurance] available to its employees," pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 40.02(25)(b)9, it cannot benefit from an implicit 
exception. 
¶46 We, however, do not read Wis. Stat. ch. 40 as creating 
an implicit exception to the WFEA for those employers having 
health insurance plans offered only by the state Group Insurance 
Board.  Instead, we read Wis. Stat. ch. 40, as did the court of 
appeals in Kozich, to evince a legislative intent to permit 
restrictions on the health insurance coverage afforded publicly 
employed married co-employees.  We conclude that the legislature 
No. 97-0896 
 
23
intended, by its language in Wis. Stat. ch. 40, to allow a 
public employer to limit its married co-employees to one family 
health insurance policy, and thereby exempt the employer from 
liability for that action under the WFEA. 
¶47 We therefore conclude that the implied exception from 
liability under the WFEA's marital status clause extends to any 
public employer, as defined in Wis. Stat. ch. 40 and the 
regulations thereto, who limits its married co-employees to 
coverage under one family health insurance policy.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the order of the circuit court affirming the decision 
of LIRC. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No. 97-0896.ssa 
 
 
1 
¶48 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).   I 
dissent 
because 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
interpretation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), Wis. 
Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395 (1993-94), and Wis. Stat. §§ 40.52(1)(a) 
and 40.02(20) (1993-94). 
¶49 The 
WFEA 
prohibits 
employers 
from 
discriminating 
"against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment" on the basis of marital 
status.  Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1).  The WFEA provides only one 
express exception to the prohibition against marital status 
discrimination, that is, "it is not employment discrimination 
because of marital status to prohibit an individual from 
directly supervising or being directly supervised by his or her 
spouse."  Wis. Stat. § 111.345.  Moreover, the declaration of 
policy to the WFEA mandates liberal construction of the statute: 
 
In the interpretation and application of this sub-
chapter, and otherwise, it is declared to be the 
public policy of the state to encourage and foster to 
the fullest extent practicable the employment of all 
prop-erly 
qualified 
individuals 
regardless 
of . . . marital status. 
Wis. Stat. § 111.31(3). 
¶50 In this case the City of New Berlin's denial of Connie 
Motola's request for health insurance coverage under a policy in 
her name was discrimination based on her marital status.  The 
Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) concedes that by 
virtue of her loss of choice of health insurance coverage, Ms. 
Motola has suffered actual harm. 
No. 97-0896.ssa 
 
 
2 
¶51 The question this court must address is whether the 
legislature 
exempted 
all 
public 
employers 
eligible 
to 
participate in a health insurance plan offered by the state 
group insurance board pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 40.52(1)(a) from 
the WFEA's prohibition against marital status discrimination 
whether or not they have elected to participate in a state 
health insurance plan.  The City of New Berlin was not 
participating in such a plan at the time it denied Ms. Motola's 
request for health insurance coverage under a policy in her 
name. 
¶52 Nothing in the text of the WFEA exempts public 
employers from complying with the prohibition against marital 
status discrimination.  Accordingly this court has previously 
concluded that the marital status clause of the WFEA prohibits a 
school district from enforcing its health insurance non-
duplication policy against a school district employee married to 
a person employed by a non-public employer.  See Braatz v. LIRC, 
174 Wis. 2d 286, 295, 496 N.W.2d 597 (1993). 
¶53 However, in Kozich v. Employe Trust Funds Bd., 203 
Wis. 2d 363, 374-76, 553 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1996), the court 
of appeals interpreted Wis. Stat. §§ 40.52(1)(a) and 40.02(20) 
as creating an implied exception to the WFEA prohibition for the 
State.  Thus under Kozich the state may enforce its health 
insurance non-duplication policy when both spouses are employed 
by the State. 
¶54 In this case LIRC seeks to read into the WFEA another 
implied exception allowing a municipality to enforce its health 
No. 97-0896.ssa 
 
 
3 
insurance non-duplication policy when both spouses are employed 
by the municipality, regardless of whether the municipality 
participates in a health insurance plan offered by the state 
group insurance board. 
¶55 When a public employer elects to join a health 
insurance plan offered by the state group insurance board 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 40.52(1)(a), it is reasonable to 
conclude that the legislature intended the public employer to be 
treated the same as the State unless the statute provides 
otherwise.  I thus agree with the majority opinion that the 
exception for the State should apply to all public employers who 
join a health insurance plan offered by the state group 
insurance board.  
¶56 However, nothing in the WFEA or ch. 40 indicates that 
the legislature intended a public employer who does not join 
such a health insurance plan to be exempt from the WFEA 
prohibition against marital status discrimination.  There is no 
public policy to support the conclusion that the legislature 
intended that public employers operating under non-state health 
insurance plans would be exempt from the WFEA prohibition.  
Indeed the public policy expressed in the WFEA is that public 
employers should not engage in discrimination on the basis of 
marital status. 
¶57 The legislature has instructed the courts that the 
WFEA shall be "liberally construed" to accomplish its purpose of 
protecting all individuals "to enjoy privileges free from 
employment 
discrimination 
because 
of . . . marital 
status."  
No. 97-0896.ssa 
 
 
4 
Wis. Stat. § 111.31(2),(3).  When the court adds exceptions to 
the WFEA prohibition against discrimination, it contravenes the 
legislature's instructions for interpreting and applying the 
WFEA.  The decision whether to write in an exception to the WFEA 
for all public employers is more properly reserved for the 
legislature. 
¶58 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.  
 
No. 97-0896.ssa 
 
 
1