Title: State v. Corey J.G.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003148-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3148-FT 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Interest of Corey, J.G., a Person  
Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Corey J.G.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  209 Wis. 2d 86, 562 N.W.2d 929 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 23, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
November 19, 1997 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
John G. Buchen 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was submitted on the brief (in the Supreme Court) by Eileen A. 
Hirsch, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was 
submitted on the brief (in the Court of Appeals) by Thomas L. 
Storm, district attorney and pursuant to letter filed by William 
L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, petitioner-respondent 
will stand on the briefs filed in the Court of Appeals. 
 
No. 96-3148-FT  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3148-FT  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Corey, J.G., a Person  
Under the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Corey J.G.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JAN 23 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  The Petitioner, Corey J.G. 
("Corey"), seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Corey's 
motion to dismiss for failure to establish venue pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.185 (1993-94).1  
¶2 
On March 21, 1996, the State of Wisconsin ("State") 
filed a petition in Fond du Lac County charging Corey, a 
juvenile, with delinquency, alleging one count each of criminal 
damage to property and battery.  At the ensuing fact-finding 
                     
1 All future references to Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 
1993-94 version of the statutes unless otherwise indicated.  
Note that although Wis. Stat. ch. 48 (1993-94), The Children's 
Code, governs the juvenile delinquency proceeding in this case, 
the statutory provisions governing juvenile delinquency have 
been amended and renumbered and are currently codified in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 938 (1995-96), The Juvenile Justice Code. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
2 
hearing,2 after the State presented its case, Corey brought a 
motion seeking dismissal of the proceeding, arguing the State 
had failed to establish venue.  The circuit court judge, Reserve 
Judge John G. Buchen, denied the motion and concluded venue had 
been sufficiently established.  The jury found that Corey had 
committed the acts alleged in both counts of the petition, and 
the circuit court judge entered a dispositional order placing 
Corey at Lincoln Hills School3 for one year. 
¶3 
In affirming the circuit court's order, the court of 
appeals declined to address Corey's venue argument, concluding 
Corey had not raised the issue of venue with sufficient 
specificity to preserve it for appeal.  The court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court's denial of the motion 
suggested that the circuit court interpreted the motion as 
challenging the proof that the offenses occurred in Clark County 
rather than venue in the context of a juvenile delinquency 
                     
2 
The purpose of the fact-finding hearing in a 
delinquency case is the same as the purpose of the 
trial in civil and criminal adult proceedings.  Its 
purpose is (1) to determine whether the child comes 
within the court's jurisdiction, (2) to determine 
whether the facts presented to the court prove the 
allegations 
contained 
in 
the 
petition 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt, and (3) to determine whether the 
allegations that are proved by the evidence presented 
in court constitute delinquency.   
 
Wisconsin 
Handbook 
for 
Juvenile 
Court 
Services 
49 
(Wisconsin Committee to Revise the Juvenile Court Services 
Handbook) (1977). 
3 Lincoln Hills School is a State juvenile correctional 
facililty located in Irma, Wisconsin. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
3 
proceeding.  The court of appeals further determined that 
Corey's failure to specifically refer to Wis. Stat. § 48.185, 
the statutory provision governing venue in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings,  deprived the circuit court of an opportunity to 
review the issue and to receive proof of the issue from the 
State.   
¶4 
We conclude that Corey's motion was sufficient to 
preserve for appeal the issue of whether venue was established. 
 We further conclude that the State failed to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Fond du Lac County was the proper venue 
for the juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.185.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.4 
I. 
¶5 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of our review.  
On March 21, 1996, the State filed a Petition for Determination 
of Status of Corey in Fond du Lac County.  In the petition the 
State alleged Corey was delinquent on two counts.  The first 
count was that of criminal damage to property, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.01(1), allegedly occurring on August 22, 1995, at 
                     
4 Our determination to reverse the decision but not remand 
the case is based upon our recognition that the termination date 
of the circuit court's dispositional order was June 4, 1997.  
Further, Wis. Stat. § 48.366, which relates to extended court 
jurisdiction, 
apparently 
would 
not 
be 
applicable 
to 
the 
circumstances presented here; therefore, litigation of the issue 
of venue would serve no useful purpose. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
4 
Sunburst 
Youth 
Homes, 
Inc. 
(Sunburst), 
in 
the 
City 
of 
Neillsville, Clark County, Wisconsin.  The second count was that 
of battery, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1), allegedly 
occurring on August 24, 1995, at Sunburst in the City of 
Neillsville, Clark County, Wisconsin.5 
¶6 
At the time of the alleged incidents, Corey was placed 
at Sunburst pursuant to a prior unrelated dispositional order 
entered in Fond du Lac County.  The March 21, 1996, petition 
listed Corey's address as the City of Neillsville, Wisconsin.  
The petition listed Corey's parents' address as the City of Fond 
du Lac, Wisconsin.   
¶7 
On April 1, 1996, Corey was transferred from Sunburst 
to St. Ives Residential Treatment Center located in Marathon 
County, Wisconsin. On April 22, 1996, a state public defender 
from Fond du Lac County was appointed to represent Corey on the 
criminal damage to property and battery charges filed against 
him in Fond du Lac County.  The Order Appointing Counsel listed 
Corey's address as the City of Fond du Lac, Fond du Lac County, 
Wisconsin.   
¶8 
While at St. Ives Center, Corey exhibited behavioral 
difficulties on numerous occasions.  One such incident occurred 
                     
5 The incidents at Sunburst occurred in August 1995; 
however, the petition was not filed until March 21, 1996, 
because the parties entered into an Informal Disposition 
Agreement under which Corey was to pay $238.50 in restitution to 
Sunburst.  The Informal Disposition Agreement was voided by 
Juvenile Court Services of Fond du Lac County in a letter dated 
February 29, 1996, because Corey was unable to make the 
restitution payment within the scheduled time period. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
5 
on April 25, 1996, at which time Marathon County officials were 
called.  On that same date, an Order for Transportation was 
entered providing that Corey be transferred from the Marathon 
County Sheriff's Department to the Fond du Lac County Juvenile 
Detention Center.  The Temporary Physical Custody Request form 
used to initiate the transport of Corey indicated his address as 
that of St. Ives Center.   
¶9 
Corey remained at the Fond du Lac County Juvenile 
Detention Center until May 15, 1996, when, pursuant to a change 
of placement hearing in an unrelated matter, Corey was ordered 
to be placed at Lincoln Hills School in Irma, Wisconsin, for one 
year.  Corey's transfer to Lincoln Hills was delayed until May 
17, 1996, in light of the fact that he had a fact-finding 
hearing scheduled on May 16, 1996, for the criminal damage to 
property and battery charges arising from the incidents at 
Sunburst. 
¶10 At the May 16, 1996, fact-finding hearing, the State 
called Jeff Crandall, a youth counselor at Sunburst, as a 
witness to the alleged criminal damage to property.  Crandall 
testified that Corey was a student living at Sunburst and that 
at the time of the alleged incident, Corey had been at Sunburst 
for approximately thirteen months.  Crandall further testified 
that on August 22, 1995, Corey was on the roof at the Friedle 
Unit of Sunburst throwing off shingles and ripping off vents and 
a wood support system.   
¶11 With regard to the battery charge, the State called 
Scott Miller and Tess Ward as witnesses.  Miller, a campus 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
6 
support specialist at Sunburst, testified that on August 24, 
1995, while at Sunburst, Corey had an altercation with another 
juvenile 
resident 
which 
subsequently 
led 
to 
Corey's 
confrontation with a youth counselor, Tess Ward.  Miller 
testified that after the juveniles were separated, Corey 
barricaded himself in a restroom.  Miller further indicated that 
upon Ward's attempt to enter the restroom and restrain Corey, 
Corey "head butted" Ward.  Ward testified to a similar rendition 
of the facts, acknowledging that the incident occurred on August 
24, 1995, at Sunburst in Neillsville.  
¶12 At the close of the State's case, Corey brought a 
motion to dismiss the case for failure to establish venue.  The 
court denied the motion, indicating venue had been established. 
 In 
its 
entirety, 
the 
dialogue 
regarding 
Corey's 
motion 
developed as follows: 
 
[STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER]:  I have one more motion.  I 
would move to dismiss for lack of establishment of 
venue. 
 
[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, I think the first 
witness testified that it was at Sunburst Youth Homes, 
which is in Neillsville, which is in Clark County, 
State of Wisconsin.  I think that is sufficient. 
 
THE COURT:  All the witnesses testified to being 
employed at that place in Neillsville.  I'm satisfied 
that venue has been established.  Motion is denied. 
(R. 31 at 54.) 
¶13 The jury determined that Corey had committed both of 
the acts alleged in the petition.  A dispositional hearing was 
subsequently held on June 5, 1996, at which time the circuit 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
7 
court ordered that custody of Corey be transferred to the 
Department of Health and Social Services, and that Corey be 
placed at Lincoln Hills School in Irma, Wisconsin, for one year. 
  
¶14 Corey appealed the circuit court's order, arguing the 
State had not established that Fond du Lac County was the proper 
venue for the juvenile delinquency proceeding.  The court of 
appeals determined Corey's failure to specify that the venue 
motion was brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.185 deprived the 
circuit court of an opportunity to review the issue and receive 
proof of venue from the State.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the order of the circuit court, concluding Corey's claim had 
been waived because it was not properly raised and preserved for 
appeal. 
¶15  Two issues arise from the dispute in this case.  
First, 
in 
his 
motion 
to 
the 
circuit 
court, 
did 
Corey 
sufficiently raise and preserve for appeal the argument that the 
State had not established venue?  Second, if we determine the 
issue was properly preserved, did the State fail to establish 
that Fond du Lac County was the appropriate venue for the 
juvenile delinquency proceeding? 
II. 
¶16 We first decide whether Corey's motion regarding 
failure to establish venue was sufficiently raised to preserve 
the issue for appeal.  This is a question of law, and we review 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
8 
such questions de novo.  See First Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. 
Madison, 81 Wis. 2d 205, 208, 260 N.W.2d 251 (1977). 
¶17 An objection or motion is sufficient to preserve an 
issue for appeal if it apprises the court of the specific 
grounds upon which it is based.  See Holmes v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 
259, 271, 251 N.W.2d 56 (1977).  Specificity is required so that 
the circuit court judge and the opposing party are afforded "an 
opportunity to remedy any defect."  State v. Barthels, 166 
Wis. 2d 876, 884, 480 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd 174 
Wis. 2d 173, 184 n. 8, 495 N.W.2d 341 (1993).  When the basis 
for the objection is obvious, however, "the specific ground of 
objection is not important."  Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 
751, 758, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972).  "To be sufficiently specific, 
an objection must reasonably advise the court of the basis for 
the objection."  State v. Peters, 166 Wis. 2d 168, 174, 479 
N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1991).   
¶18 In his motion at the fact-finding hearing, Corey moved 
to dismiss the case, arguing venue had not been established.  In 
the context of a juvenile delinquency proceeding, Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.185 
governs 
venue. 
 
Section 
48.185 
sets 
forth 
the 
appropriate county or counties in which the juvenile delinquency 
proceeding may be held.  It states, in pertinent part: 
 
Venue.  (1)  . . . venue for any proceeding under ss. 
48.12 . . . may be in any of the following:  the 
county where the child resides, the county where the 
child is present or, in the case of a violation of a 
state 
law . . . 
the 
county 
where 
the 
violation 
occurred. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
9 
¶19 Venue in the context of a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding is distinct from venue in the context of a criminal 
proceeding to the extent that different geographical locations 
provide an appropriate venue.  In a criminal proceeding, as in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding, venue "refers to the place of 
trial, the particular county or district or similar geographical 
area within which a case is to be heard."  LaFave and Israel, 
Criminal Procedure § 16.1(a) at 334 (1984).  See also State v. 
Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d  486, 501-02, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969); 
Wisconsin Handbook for Juvenile Court Services at 11 ("'Venue' 
means the particular court(s) where a specific case may properly 
be heard.").  However, under Wis. Stat. § 971.19, the proper 
venue in a criminal action is generally limited to the county in 
which the crime was committed.6  
¶20 The district attorney's and circuit court's responses 
to Corey's motion to dismiss suggest that the establishment of 
venue was addressed and ruled upon as if it was within the 
context of a criminal proceeding.  The State responded to 
Corey's 
motion, 
stating 
that 
"it 
[the 
alleged 
crime] 
was . . . in Clark County . . . "  The circuit court agreed, 
                     
6 Under Wis. Stat. § 971.19, there are exceptions to the 
requirement that venue is appropriate only in the county where 
the crime was committed.  No exception provides for venue in the 
county in which the criminal defendant is present.  The only 
exception that provides for venue in the county in which the 
criminal defendant resides is § 971.19(9), which addresses 
penalties for failure to comply with sex offender registration 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 175.45. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
10
stating it was "satisfied that venue has been established," and 
denied Corey's motion to dismiss. 
¶21 We conclude that Corey's motion was sufficient to 
preserve the issue of venue for appeal.  Because the proceeding 
was one in regard to juvenile delinquency, the motion to dismiss 
for failure to establish venue was sufficient to advise the 
court that Corey was raising the issue in accordance with The 
Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48, which governs the juvenile 
delinquency proceeding.  We decline to require that a party 
state the specific statutory section upon which an objection is 
based where the stated grounds for the objection are sufficient.7 
  Corey's motion was sufficiently specific to preserve the issue 
of venue as, in the context of the juvenile proceeding, it 
"reasonably advise[d]" the court of the basis for the objection. 
 Peters, 166 Wis. 2d at 174.  See also Champlain, 53 Wis. 2d at 
758. 
III. 
¶22 We next consider whether the evidence produced at the 
fact-finding hearing was sufficient to support a determination 
that Fond du Lac County was the appropriate venue for the 
juvenile delinquency proceeding in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
                     
7 Although we conclude the motion was sufficiently specific 
to preserve the venue issue for appeal under the circumstances, 
we recognize that a party should make an attempt to clarify an 
objection or motion if, as here, there is reason to believe that 
the opposing party and the circuit court judge may have 
misinterpreted the objection. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
11
§ 48.185.  We will not reverse a conviction based upon the 
State's failure to establish venue unless the evidence, viewed 
most 
favorably to 
the state and 
the 
conviction, 
is so 
insufficient that there is no basis upon which a trier of fact 
could determine venue beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Smazal v. 
State, 31 Wis. 2d 360, 142 N.W.2d 808 (1966). 
A. 
¶23 There is no opinion from this court or the court of 
appeals setting forth the applicable burden of proof for 
establishing 
venue 
in 
a 
juvenile 
delinquency 
proceeding.  
However, notwithstanding the fact that differing geographical 
locations provide appropriate venue in juvenile delinquency and 
criminal proceedings, establishing the appropriate location for 
a juvenile delinquency proceeding is analogous to establishing 
the appropriate location for a criminal proceeding.  In both 
instances, the State must establish venue pursuant to the 
statutory language governing venue in the particular proceeding. 
 See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.185; 971.19.  Therefore, we can glean 
support for our analysis in the present proceeding from the 
requirements for establishing venue in a criminal proceeding. 
¶24 In a criminal proceeding, this court has determined 
that the State must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt even 
though venue is a matter of procedure and not an element of a 
crime.  See Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d at 501-02; Smazal v. State, 
31 Wis. 2d 360, 362, 142 N.W.2d 808 (1966).  When venue is not 
contested in a criminal case tried before a jury, a "finding of 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
12
venue is adequately covered by the standard verdict forms" which 
are submitted to the jury8 and provide for a finding of guilt as 
charged in the information or complaint.  See Wis. JICriminal 
267 n.1.  Where venue is contested or an exception to the 
statutory 
criminal 
venue 
provision 
applies, 
the 
jury 
is 
instructed that venue must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 See id. 
¶25 As stated, venue in a juvenile delinquency proceeding 
differs from venue in a criminal proceeding only to the extent 
that the relative governing statutes set forth distinct counties 
in which venue may be appropriate.  The requirement that venue 
be established is equivalent.  The State's burden of proving 
venue 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
is 
therefore 
similarly 
applicable in the context of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. 
 Venue is not an element of the crime and becomes an issue 
                     
8 Wisconsin statutes and common law do not require that a 
determination of venue be made by a jury.  However, as the 
Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee correctly states 
in its comment to Wis. JICriminal 267, numerous decisions from 
this court implicitly support the idea that such a determination 
is an appropriate function of the jury. See, e.g., State v. 
Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 503-04, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969); State 
v. Coates, 262 Wis. 469, 471, 55 N.W.2d 353 (1952); Piper v. 
State, 202 Wis. 58, 61, 231 N.W. 162 (1930). 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
13
before the trier of fact9 only in the event that it is contested 
by the juvenile. 
B. 
¶26 The procedures governing the determination of Corey's 
 delinquency status at the time of the alleged incidents were 
set forth under Wis. Stat. ch. 48.  Section 48.185(1) states 
that venue is appropriate in the county where the child resides, 
the county where the child is present, or the county in which a 
violation of state law occurred.  Thus, § 48.185(1) sets forth 
three exclusive provisions for establishing the appropriate 
venue in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.   
¶27 We address the last of the three provisions first, as 
the parties agree that its application would not support a 
finding of venue in Fond du Lac County.   If there has been "a 
violation of state law," venue is proper in "the county where 
                     
9 In the present case, the circuit court judge, not the 
jury, made a determination that venue had been established.  We 
find it unnecessary to address whether this is improper where a 
jury has been impaneled to act as the trier of fact, since we 
are reversing the court of appeals' decision.  In addition, 
under the current Juvenile Justice Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 938 
(1995-96), a juvenile is not entitled to a jury in delinquency 
proceedings. 
We note that the State contends Corey failed to request and 
thereby waived a jury instruction and a verdict question 
regarding the requirement that venue be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Cf. Wis JICriminal 267 (jury instruction to 
be utilized when venue contested in a criminal proceeding).  
Because we are reversing the court of appeals' decision 
affirming the circuit court, we need not address the issue of 
whether a request for such an instruction has been waived.   
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
14
the violation occurred."  Wis. Stat. § 48.185(1).  Corey's 
alleged delinquent conduct was in violation of a state law, as 
is evident by the State's petition.  Count one alleges that 
Corey engaged in criminal damage to property, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.01(1).  Count two alleges that Corey committed 
battery, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1).  Accordingly, the 
county or counties in which these acts occurred would be an 
appropriate venue for the juvenile delinquency proceeding.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.185(1). 
¶28 The 
State 
concedes 
that 
there 
was 
no 
evidence 
presented at the fact-finding hearing to support a finding that 
the alleged acts occurred in Fond du Lac County.  In fact, there 
was no evidence offered at the fact-finding hearing that would 
contradict the witnesses' testimony that the alleged delinquent 
acts took place at Sunburst, which is in Clark County.  Hence, 
there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that venue would lie in Fond du Lac County as the county 
where the violations of state law occurred. 
¶29  Under Wis. Stat. § 48.185(1), venue would also be 
appropriate in "the county where the child is present."  The 
parties disagree regarding the application of this provision, 
disputing 
the 
time 
at 
which 
the 
juvenile's 
presence 
is 
determined.  Corey contends that the legislature intended the 
language to apply to the juvenile's presence at the time the 
petition is filed.  The State contends that the legislature 
intended the language to apply to the juvenile's presence at the 
time of the fact-finding hearing.   
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
15
¶30  An interpretation of statutory language presents a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  See Stockbridge 
School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). 
 Our goal in statutory interpretation is to "discern the intent 
of the legislature."  Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 
Wis. 2d 973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996).  "In interpreting a 
statute, '[t]he threshold question must be whether or not the 
statute in question is ambiguous.'" MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. 
State, 209 Wis. 2d 310, 316, 562 N.W.2d 594 (1997) (quoting 
Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d  650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 
98 (1995)).  Statutory language "'is ambiguous if reasonable 
minds could differ as to its meaning.'"  Id. (citing Hauboldt v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 160 Wis. 2d 662, 684, 467 N.W.2d 508 
(1991)).  If the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, we 
must "'look beyond the statute's language and examine the scope, 
history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute'" to 
discern legislative intent.  MCI, 209 Wis. 2d at 316 (quoting 
UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 282, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996)).  
We 
will 
resolve 
any 
statutory 
ambiguity 
to 
advance 
the 
legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. See UFE, 201 
Wis. 2d at 288 (citing Carkel, Inc. v. Lincoln Cir. Ct., 141 
Wis. 2d 257, 265-66, 414 N.W.2d 640 (1987)). 
¶31 The statutory language regarding a juvenile's presence 
does not expressly state at what point in time such presence is 
to be determined.  Because the statutory language could 
reasonably be interpreted as defining presence in the county at 
different times, potentially resulting in different conclusions, 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
16
the statute is ambiguous.  See MCI, 209 Wis. 2d at 316.  
Accordingly, it is necessary for us to "examine the scope, 
history, context, subject matter, and object" of the statute.  
Id. (quoting UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 282).  
¶32 The language in Wis. Stat. § 48.185 providing for 
venue in the county where the juvenile is present has undergone 
significant change.  The original language governing venue in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding was codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.01(5)(a) and (am) (1953).  Section 48.01(5)(a) provided 
that venue was appropriate in the county where the child 
resides, and  
§ 48.01(5)(am) provided that if "the child or the parent, 
guardian or custodian is at the time of filing this petition 
present within some other county, but does not reside therein, 
the juvenile court of such other county shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction."   
¶33 Pursuant to Chapter 575 of the Laws of Wisconsin, 
1955, the venue provisions for juvenile delinquency proceedings 
were  recreated and renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 48.16 (1955).  
See  
§ 7, ch. 575, Laws of 1955.  Section 48.16 stated that venue was 
appropriate in "the county where the child resides, the county 
where he is present or,  . . . the county in which the violation 
occurred."   The drafter's note following § 48.16 as proposed in 
Senate Bill No. 444 indicated that the change in the venue 
provision "drops one ground of venue [presence of parent, 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
17
guardian or custodian] . . . and adds another [county where the 
violation occurred]. . . "  1955 S.B. 444.   
¶34 The drafter's note to § 48.16 did not discuss the 
elimination of the language requiring presence "at the time of 
filing this petition" but did cite to an opinion of the attorney 
general which implicitly relies on the requirement of presence 
at the time of the filing of the petition.  See 34 Ops. Attn. 
Gen. 48 (1945).  This suggests that the legislature intended no 
change and that a determination of presence would still be made 
at the time of the filing of the petition.  In 1977, the 
language of § 48.16 was amended and renumbered as § 48.185.  See 
§ 28, ch. 354, Laws of 1977.  Section 48.185, which governs this 
case, provides language nearly identical to that which was 
codified in § 48.16 regarding the presence requirement.  
¶35 The State's assertion that presence be determined at 
the time of the fact-finding hearing would lead to unreasonable 
results, inconsistent with the legislature's purpose of enacting 
provisions to govern venue. See UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 288.  Venue 
provisions in the adult criminal context were originally enacted 
to insure the place of trial would be "sufficiently limited" to 
avoid "the defendant suffering hardship and unfairness."  LaFave 
and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 16.1 at 334 (1984).  This 
concept related back to the Declaration of Independence which 
"denounced George III 'for transporting us beyond Seas to be 
tried for pretended offences.'"  Id. 
¶36 If we were to accept the State's assertion that 
presence be determined at the time of the fact-finding hearing, 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
18
a 
juvenile 
would 
potentially 
be 
subject 
to 
delinquency 
proceedings in any county in which the State chose to file its 
petition.  By appearing for the hearing, the juvenile would then 
be "present" in the county, and venue would be sufficiently 
established.  Such procedures would seem unfair to the juvenile 
and could potentially create a hardship.  We will not reach such 
unreasonable 
results 
in 
our 
interpretation 
of 
statutory 
language.  See Kwiatkowski v. Capitol Indemnity Corp., 157 
Wis. 2d 768, 774-75, 461 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990).  Thus, we 
are convinced that the legislature intended presence to be 
determined at the time of the filing of the petition.   
¶37 The State failed to provide any evidence at the fact-
finding hearing that would support a finding of Corey's presence 
in Fond du Lac County on March 21, 1996, when the petition was 
filed.  The only testimony regarding Corey's presence in any 
county on a specified date was from the State's witnesses who 
asserted that Corey was present at Sunburst, which is in Clark 
County, on August 22 and 24, 1995.  The evidence produced at the 
hearing 
was 
certainly 
not 
sufficient 
to 
prove 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt that Corey was present in Fond du Lac County at 
the time of the filing of the petition. 
¶38 Finally, venue is appropriate in the county where the 
child 
resides. 
 
Neither 
party 
discusses 
the 
appropriate 
interpretation 
of 
"resides." 
 
However, 
we 
find 
such 
interpretation relevant to our analysis and application of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.185(1).  As stated, the threshold question in  
statutory interpretation is whether the relevant statute is 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
19
ambiguous.  See MCI, 209 Wis. 2d at 316.  A statutory provision 
is deemed ambiguous if reasonable minds could reach different 
conclusions regarding its meaning.  See id.  If the language of 
the statute is ambiguous, we will "'examine the scope, history, 
context, subject matter, and object of the statute'" to discern 
legislative intent.  Id. (quoting UFE, 201 Wis. 2d  at 282). 
¶39 We conclude that the legislature's usage of the word 
"resides" 
is 
ambiguous, 
as 
the 
term 
may 
reasonably 
be 
interpreted as meaning "residence" or "domicile." "Residence" is 
defined as the "[p]lace where one actually lives or has his [or 
her] home; a person's dwelling place or place of habitation; an 
abode; . . . "  Black's Law Dictionary 1308 (6th ed. 1990).  
"Domicile," on the other hand, "means living in that locality 
with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home."  Id.  An 
individual may have more than one residence, but may only have 
one 
legal 
domicile 
at 
any 
given 
moment. 
 
Although 
an 
individual's residence is distinct from his or her domicile, the 
two may be, and often are, the same place.  Hence, the terms 
"residence" and "domicile" are "frequently used as if they had 
the same meaning."  Id.  Because the plain language of the 
statute is ambiguous, we will "'examine the scope, history, 
context, subject matter, and object of the statute'" to discern 
the legislature's intent.  MCI, 209 Wis. 2d at 316 (quoting UFE, 
201 Wis. 2d at 282). 
¶40 Unlike 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.185(1) 
providing for venue in the county where the child is present, 
the language of § 48.185(1) providing for venue in the county 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
20
where the child resides has gone essentially unchanged.  As 
previously discussed, § 48.185 has evolved from its original 
formulation which was codified in Wis. Stat. § 48.01(5)(a) and 
(am) (1953).  Section 48.01(5)(a) provided that a court had 
juvenile jurisdiction over delinquent "children residing within 
the county." 
  
¶41 In 1955, Wis. Stat. ch. 48 (1953) was repealed and 
recreated as The Children's Code.  See § 7, ch. 575, Laws 1955. 
 As such, Wis. Stat. § 48.16 (1955) was created to provide for 
appropriate venue in "the county where the child resides, the 
county where he is present or, in the case of a violation of a 
state law or a county, town or municipal ordinance, the county 
where the violation occurred."  Section 48.16 was renumbered as 
§ 48.185(1) and amended slightly in 1977.  See § 28, ch. 354, 
Laws 1977.  Section 48.185 governs this case and provides 
essentially the same language as its predecessor.  Thus, the 
word "resides" has been used since the original enactment of the 
venue provision in juvenile delinquency proceedings.  
¶42 No legislative history could be found addressing 
whether the legislature intended "resides" to mean "residence" 
or "domicile."  However, the purpose and context of The 
Children's Code leads us to conclude that the legislature 
intended it to mean "domicile." 
¶43 The legislature codified language setting forth its 
purpose for enacting The Children's Code in Wis. Stat. § 48.01 
(1993-94).  Section 48.01 states that the purposes of The 
Children's Code include assuring a fair hearing for a child and 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
21
protecting public safety (see § 48.01(a)), providing for the 
child's physical and mental development and preserving the 
family unit (see § 48.01(b)), responding to a child's needs via 
community-based programs and keeping a child in his or her home 
(see § 48.01(e)), and providing a child with a permanent and 
stable family relationship (see § 48.01(g)).  
¶44 Attempting to insure that these legislative purposes 
are promoted includes adopting procedures that provide "[a]n 
integrated 
and 
co-ordinated 
program 
for 
all 
delinquent . . . children both in their own community and while 
in the custody of the state."  Wisconsin Handbook for Juvenile 
Court Services at 3.  Accordingly, venue is most appropriate in 
the county of the child's domicile since: 
 
[c]ourt and social services personnel may be familiar 
with the child and the family.  The local court is 
sensitive to community values and is prepared to 
fashion dispositions to community needs and resources. 
 Finally, the local juvenile court is equipped to 
determine whether or not dispositional alternatives or 
supervision programs are helping the child overcome 
his/her problem. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
22
Id. at 11.10  See also, Huenink, Model Judicial Policies for 
Juvenile Court Intake 2-2 (1985); Plum and Crisafi, Wisconsin 
Juvenile Court Practice and Procedure § 1.09 (1993).  A minor 
child's domicile is generally that of his or her parent or 
parents.  See Carlton v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 271 Wis. 
465, 469, 74 N.W.2d 340 (1956) (Citing Restatement, Conflict of 
Laws, ch. 2, sec. 30.).  See also, 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 20 
(1996). 
¶45 This 
court 
has 
never 
addressed 
the 
issue 
of 
interpreting 
"resides" 
under 
the 
venue 
provision 
of 
The 
Children's Code.  However, a similar analysis was undertaken in 
relation to language set forth under Wis. Stat. ch. 49 (1953), 
which was in effect the same year the original venue provision 
governing juvenile delinquency proceedings was enacted.  In 
Carlton v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 271 Wis. 465, 74 
N.W.2d 340 (1956), this court interpreted language in Wis. Stat. 
                     
10 We recognize that the legislative purpose in enacting the 
current Juvenile Justice Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 938 (1995-96), was 
an attempt to balance the rights of the child with the rights of 
victims and the protection of the community by imposing greater 
accountability on delinquent children and affording greater 
protections to the community.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.01.  
However, the purposes of The Juvenile Justice Code still involve 
assuring a child a fair hearing (see § 938.01(d)), developing a 
child's ability to live as a productive and responsible member 
of the community (see § 938.01(c)), and responding to a child's 
needs for care and treatment in accordance with his or her best 
interests as well as the protection of the public (see 
§ 938.01(f)).  Hence, providing that the juvenile delinquency 
proceeding may be in the county where the child is domiciled is 
still appropriate despite changes in the legislature's purpose 
in enacting The Juvenile Justice Code. 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
23
ch. 49 which provided that any individual who "resides" in a 
municipality for one year is entitled to public assistance.  The 
Carlton court held that "the term residence as used in the 
statutes now in question is the equivalent of domicil as 
generally used by the courts and in the textbooks."11  Id. at 468 
(citing Dutcher v. Cutcher, 39 Wis. 651, 658 (1876) ("residence" 
the equivalent of "domicile" in divorce statutes); State ex rel. 
Wood  County v. Dodge County, 56 Wis. 79, 86-76, 13 N.W. 680 
(1882)("proper residence" equivalent of "acquired domicil" in 
statutes governing liability for care of insane individuals); In 
Guardianship of Figi, 181 Wis. 136, 138, 194 N.W. 41 (1923) 
("residence" 
used 
as 
"domicile" 
in 
statute 
covering 
the 
appointment of a guardian).  The Carlton court also recognized 
that a change of residence does not occur when one lives in a 
place for "mere special or temporary purposes."  Carlton, 271 
Wis. at 468. 
¶46 We therefore conclude that the legislature intended 
"resides" as used in Wis. Stat. § 48.185 (1993-94) to be defined 
as "domicile."  We further conclude that domicile is to be 
determined at the time of the filing of the petition.  No 
legislative history could be found discussing the time at which 
                     
11 
Without specifically addressing the issue, the 
Wisconsin court of appeals has arguably reached a similar 
conclusion under Wis. Stat. § 48.185 and applied the venue 
provision of The Children's Code in the context of 
domicile.  See M.L.S. v. State, 157 Wis. 2d 26, 31, 458 
N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1990) ( ". . . venue is appropriate in 
the juvenile's home county.").   
 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
24
a determination of domicile should be made.  However, our 
conclusion is consistent with our interpretation of presence 
under Wis. Stat. §  48.185(1), as well as the language of Wis. 
Stat. § § 48.185(2) and (3), which provide that residence be 
determined "at the time that the petition is filed."  Our 
conclusion is also consistent with the only exception in the 
criminal venue statutory provisions allowing for venue in the 
county of residence of the defendant.  Thus, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.19(9) provides that, under certain circumstances, venue 
may be appropriate "in the defendant's county of residence at 
the time that the complaint is filed . . . " 
¶47 There was no evidence presented at the fact-finding 
hearing that would support the assertion that Corey was 
domiciled in Fond du Lac County at the time the petition was 
filed.  In testifying for the State, Crandall indicated that 
Corey was staying at Sunburst Homes for approximately thirteen 
months.  This is not dispositive, however, because Sunburst was 
Corey's temporary residence and is not, in any event, in Fond du 
Lac County.  No evidence was offered to show that Corey or his 
parents were domiciled in Fond du Lac County.  We therefore 
conclude that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Corey was "residing" (i.e. domiciled) in Fond du Lac County 
at the time the petition was filed for purposes of establishing 
venue under Wis. Stat. § 48.185.  
¶48 Because the State failed to present any evidence to 
support a finding that venue was appropriate in Fond du Lac 
No. 96-3148-FT 
 
25
County under Wis. Stat. § 48.185, we must reverse the finding of 
delinquency and vacate the dispositional order. 
IV. 
¶49 In sum, we conclude that Corey's motion to dismiss was 
sufficiently specific to preserve the issue of whether venue had 
been established for appeal.  We further conclude that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that venue was proper in Fond du Lac County.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.