Title: Simmons v. DCSE/Henry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 677, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSHUA SIMMONS,1 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DCSE/JESSICA HENRY,  
 
Respondents Below, 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 677, 2012 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§ 
§  File No. CK08-02314 
§  Petition No. 12-23708 
§ 
 
Submitted:  February 22, 2013 
Decided:  April 9, 2013 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 9th day of April 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellees’ motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The petitioner-appellant, Joshua Simmons (“Father”), appeals 
from the Family Court’s November 30, 2012 order affirming the October 17, 
2012 order of the Family Court Commissioner,2 which denied Father’s 
petition for child support modification under Family Court Rule of Civil 
                                                 
1 The Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties by Order dated January 2, 
2013.  SUPR. CT. R. 7(d). 
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 915(d)(1). 
 
2
Procedure Rule 508.3  The respondents-appellees, the Division of Child 
Support Enforcement (“DCSE”) and Jessica Henry (“Mother”), move to 
affirm the Family Court judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the 
face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.4  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) On February 27, 2012, a Family Court Commissioner issued a 
permanent support order regarding the parties’ two minor children.  Under 
that order, Father was required to pay $1,390.00 per month in current child 
support and $60.00 per month in retroactive support, totalling $1,450.00 per 
month.  On July 5, 2012, Father filed a petition for child support 
modification, seeking to decrease the amount of his monthly support 
obligation.  Father argued that, after the entry of the February 27, 2012 
order, he had moved from Wyoming to Kentucky and was earning 
significantly less income. 
 
(3) A hearing on Father’s petition took place before the Family Court 
Commissioner on October 17, 2012.  At the hearing, Father testified that he 
had moved from Wyoming to Kentucky because his fiancée lives in 
Kentucky, and also because he wanted to be closer to his two children, who 
                                                 
3 The Commissioner also granted the petition of the respondents-appellees for support 
arrears. 
4 SUPR. CT. R. 25(a). 
 
3
now live with Mother in Delaware.  He testified that, since moving to 
Kentucky, he has been working at a temporary agency called Work 
Connection and is assembling trucks.  Father testified that he makes 
significantly less income than he did while working in Wyoming and, as a 
result, is unable to drive from Kentucky to have visitation with his children.  
Father also testified that he was not able to have visitation with his children 
during the summer of 2012 “due to financial reasons.”  The Commissioner 
noted that Father’s testimony about his earnings was inconsistent with his 
earlier court filings. 
 
(4) In his October 17, 2012 order, the Commissioner found that 
Father had failed to demonstrate that his change of circumstances was not 
caused by Father’s voluntary conduct, under Family Court Rule of Civil 
Procedure 508.  The Commissioner found that Father owed child support 
arrears in the amount of $14,947.46 as of October 8, 2012 and continued to 
owe monthly payments of $1,450.00.  On November 5, 2012, Father filed a 
request for review of the Commissioner’s order.  Father claimed that he 
moved to Kentucky solely to accommodate Mother and to facilitate 
visitation with his children.  He also stated that his driver’s license had been 
suspended as a result of the garnishment of his wages and, therefore, he 
could not use his car to find a second job.  The Family Court accepted the 
 
4
Commissioner’s findings and declined to address Father’s argument 
concerning his suspended license, because it had not been presented to the 
Commissioner in the first instance.  Following the Family Court’s 
affirmance of the Commissioner’s order, Father appealed to this Court. 
 
(5) On appeal, Father concedes that his move from Wyoming to 
Kentucky was voluntary, but argues, for the first time, that in Kentucky, he 
“earnestly [sought] to achieve maximum income capacity” in accordance 
with Rule 501(g).  He claims that, therefore, his child support obligation 
should be reduced to reflect his current income. 
 
(6) The Family Court’s standard of review of a Commissioner’s 
order is de novo, and requires an independent review of the record to 
determine whether the order should be accepted, rejected, or modified, in 
whole or in part.5  On appeal from the Family Court, this Court reviews the 
factual findings, including the inferences and deductions, of the Family 
Court.6  This Court will not overturn the Family Court’s factual findings 
unless they are clearly wrong and justice requires that they be overturned.7  
                                                 
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 915(d)(1). 
6 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
7 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
 
5
If the Family Court has correctly applied the law, our standard of review is 
abuse of discretion.8  We review errors of law de novo.9 
 
(7) Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 508 governs the 
modification of a child support order.  That Rule provides that a petition for 
modification filed within 2½ years of the last determination of current 
support must allege with particularity a “substantial change of circumstances 
not caused by the petitioner’s voluntary or wrongful conduct except as 
described in Rule 501(g).”  Rule 501(g), in turn, provides that parents who 
suffer a loss of income either voluntarily or due to their own misconduct 
“may have their support obligation calculated based upon reduced earnings 
after a reasonable period of time if the parent earnestly seeks to achieve 
maximum income capacity.” 
 
(8) The testimony presented at the hearing on Father’s petition for 
child support modification clearly supports the Commissioner’s finding that 
Father’s move to Kentucky, and his resulting loss of income, were 
voluntary, a point Father now squarely concedes.  The transcript of the 
hearing further reflects that the Commissioner simply did not believe that 
Father had moved to Kentucky to facilitate visitation with his children and 
                                                 
8 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
9 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995) (citation omitted). 
 
6
that Father was financially unable to have visitation with his children.  While 
the issue of whether Father had “earnestly [sought] to achieve maximum 
income capacity” was not explicitly raised, it is clear from the transcript that 
the Commissioner did not believe that Father had sought to do so. 
 
(9) Our review of the record reflects that the Family Court conducted 
a proper de novo review of the Commissioner’s order.  The Family Court 
also acted within its discretion in accepting the Commissioner’s factual 
findings, including the Commissioner’s negative assessment of Father’s 
credibility.  We find no basis for overturning the factual findings of the 
Family Court or its legal rulings, and conclude that the judgment of the 
Family Court must be affirmed. 
 
(10) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the appellees’ motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice