Title: Desrosiers v. The Governor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12983
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12983 
 
DAWN DESROSIERS1 & others2  vs.  THE GOVERNOR. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     September 11, 2020. - December 10, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.3 
 
 
Governor.  Civil Defense.  Public Health.  Constitutional Law, 
Governor, Separation of powers, Right to assemble.  Due 
Process of Law.  Statute, Construction.  Words, "Other 
natural causes." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 1, 2020. 
 
 
Following transfer to the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 4A, the case was 
reported by Lenk, J. 
 
                     
 
1 Individually and doing business as Hair 4 You. 
 
 
2 Susan Kupelian; Nazareth Kupelian; Naz Kupelian Salon; 
Carla Agrippino-Gomes; Terramia, Inc.; Antico Forno, Inc.; 
James P. Montoro; Pioneer Valley Baptist Church Incorporated; 
Kellie Fallon; Bare Bottom Tanning Salon; Thomas E. Fallon, 
individually and doing business as Union Street Boxing; Robert 
Walker; Apex Entertainment LLC; Devens Common Conference Center 
LLC; Luis Morales; Vida Real Evangelical Center; Ben Haskell; 
and Trinity Christian Academy of Cape Cod. 
 
3 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
Michael P. DeGrandis, of the District of Columbia, for the 
plaintiffs. 
Douglas S. Martland, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Governor. 
John A. Sten, for Representative Shawn C. Dooley, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
Elissa Flynn-Poppey, Emily Kanstroom Musgrave, & Andrew 
Nathanson, for Massachusetts Health & Hospital Association & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On March 10, 2020, Governor Charles D. Baker, 
Jr., declared a state of emergency in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts in response to the pandemic arising from COVID-19, 
a respiratory illness caused by a novel coronavirus.  See 
Governor's Declaration of Emergency, Executive Order No. 591.  
He did so under the Civil Defense Act (CDA), St. 1950, c. 639, 
and G. L. c. 17, § 2A.  At the time of the emergency 
declaration, Massachusetts had about one hundred COVID-19 cases 
and was facing its first outbreak.  Since the Governor declared 
the state of emergency, he has issued numerous COVID-19 
emergency orders (emergency orders).  The emergency orders 
placed restrictions on daily activities, which, among other 
things, prohibited gatherings of more than ten people; suspended 
in-person instruction at schools; ordered restaurants and bars 
to suspend on-premises service; and required all businesses and 
other organizations not providing designated COVID-19 "essential 
3 
 
services"4 to close premises to workers, customers, and the 
public.  As the public health data improved, the Governor 
announced a phased reopening plan, in which he classified 
business and organization types in different reopening phases.  
See Order Implementing a Phased Reopening of Workplaces and 
Imposing Workplace Safety Measures to Address COVID-19, COVID-19 
Order No. 33 (May 18, 2020). 
 
COVID-19 has taken a devastating toll on the Commonwealth, 
the United States, and the world.  As of this writing, in 
Massachusetts alone, over 250,000 people have been infected and 
over 10,000 people have died.  During the April 2020 surge in 
Massachusetts, the number of infections often exceeded 1,500 per 
day and there were more than one hundred deaths per day from 
COVID-19 for the majority of the month.  In addition to the 
medical toll COVID-19 has inflicted, the personal toll resulting 
from the virus and containment measures has been immeasurable.  
Behind every infection and every death are those who could not 
visit loved ones in the hospital due to visitation restrictions, 
or who could not grieve the loss of loved ones with family and 
friends in the traditional manner.  Family and friends had to 
                     
 
4 "Essential services" are those identified by the 
government as "essential to promote the public health and 
welfare."  See Order Assuring Continued Operation of Essential 
Services in the Commonwealth, Closing Certain Workplaces, and 
Prohibiting Gatherings of More Than 10 People, COVID-19 Order 
No. 13 (Mar. 23, 2020) (Order No. 13). 
4 
 
isolate from one another, and visiting a loved one in another 
country became impossible, or nearly so.  COVID-19 and the 
attendant containment measures have also resulted in high 
unemployment, economic hardship, and shuttered businesses. 
 
In June 2020, the plaintiffs5 filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive 
relief and challenging the Governor's declaration of a state of 
emergency and the emergency orders as unauthorized and 
unconstitutional.6  The parties agreed to defer seeking 
preliminary injunctive relief from the Superior Court and 
jointly petitioned for transfer of the case from the Superior 
Court to a single justice of this court for reservation and 
report.  The single justice granted the petition, and the case 
is now before us. 
 
We conclude that the CDA provides authority for the 
Governor's March 10, 2020, declaration of a state of emergency 
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and for the issuance of the 
subsequent emergency orders; the emergency orders do not violate 
                     
 
5 The plaintiffs are two hair salons, a tanning salon, a 
boxing gym, and two restaurants, as well as the respective 
owners of those businesses; two houses of worship and their 
pastors; the head of a religious academy; a family entertainment 
center that offers various indoor attractions; and a conference 
center. 
 
 
6 On June 1, 2020, the plaintiffs commenced their action, 
and on June 19, they filed an amended complaint. 
5 
 
art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and the 
emergency orders do not violate the plaintiffs' Federal or State 
constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process 
or free assembly.7 
 
Background.  1.  COVID-19.  Patients with COVID-19 may be 
asymptomatic, may have a mild respiratory illness, or may 
develop severe complications leading to the need for 
hospitalization, and even death.  The virus spreads primarily 
from person to person but can also spread through a person 
contacting a surface that has the virus on it and then touching 
his or her mouth, nose, or eyes.  A person can be asymptomatic 
or presymptomatic and still spread the virus.  Medical experts 
have identified ways in which the spread of the virus can be 
curtailed, which include wearing a cloth face mask, social 
distancing,8 quarantining when infected or exposed to the virus, 
hand washing, and cleaning frequently touched surfaces.  People 
with certain underlying medical conditions and older adults are 
at a higher risk of developing severe illness from COVID-19.  At 
                     
 
7 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Health & Hospital Association, Massachusetts 
Medical Society, and Organization of Nurse Leaders; and by 
Representative Shawn C. Dooley. 
 
 
8 "Social distancing" refers to keeping at least six feet 
apart from people who are not from one's household, in both 
indoor and outdoor spaces. 
6 
 
this time, there is no cure and effective vaccines have not yet 
been distributed. 
 
COVID-19 emerged at around the start of 2020 in China, and 
within months it spread around the world.  On January 11, 2020, 
the first known death caused by COVID-19 was reported in China.  
Later in January, a man in the State of Washington became the 
first confirmed case in the United States.  On January 30, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) declared "a public health 
emergency of international concern," and in response to the 
growing outbreak, the President's administration implemented 
restrictions on travel from China.9 
 
On February 29, 2020, the United States reported that an 
individual in Washington became the country's first death from 
COVID-19.10  On March 11, WHO declared the coronavirus outbreak a 
pandemic, and on March 13, the President declared a national 
emergency. 
 
2.  The Governor's declaration of a state of emergency.  On 
March 10, 2020, the Governor declared a state of emergency, "to 
protect the health and welfare of the people of the 
                     
 
9 Throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United 
States and other countries implemented various travel 
restrictions.  See Coronavirus Travel Restrictions, Across the 
Globe, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2020 (listing travel restrictions by 
country). 
 
 
10 It later was discovered that other people in the United 
States had died earlier from COVID-19. 
7 
 
Commonwealth" and to "facilitate and expedite the use of 
Commonwealth resources and deployment of federal and interstate 
resources to protect persons from the impacts of the spread of 
COVID-19."  See Executive Order No. 591.  He declared the state 
of emergency pursuant to the powers provided in the CDA11 and in 
G. L. c. 17, § 2A.12  Id.  The state of emergency was effective 
immediately and remained in effect "until notice is given, 
pursuant to [the Governor's] judgment, that the state of 
emergency no longer exists."  Id. 
 
3.  The emergency orders.  From early March to May 2020, 
the number of COVID-19 infections and deaths from COVID-19 in 
the Commonwealth increased at a grim rate.  The Commonwealth 
faced outbreaks at long-term care facilities, fear that a surge 
                     
 
11 The Civil Defense Act (CDA), St. 1950, c. 639, provides 
that the Governor can declare a state of emergency in specified 
circumstances, St. 1950, c. 639, § 5, and provides the Governor 
with "all authority over persons and property, necessary or 
expedient for meeting said state of emergency, which the general 
court in the exercise of its constitutional authority may confer 
upon him as supreme executive magistrate of the commonwealth and 
commander-in-chief of the military forces thereof," St. 1950, 
c. 639, § 7. 
 
 
12 General Laws c. 17, § 2A, provides that upon the 
Governor's declaring "that an emergency exists which is 
detrimental to the public health," the Commissioner of Public 
Health may "take such action and incur such liabilities as he 
[or she] may deem necessary to assure the maintenance of public 
health and prevention of disease" and "may establish procedures 
to be followed . . . to insure the continuation of essential 
public health services and the enforcement of the same." 
 
8 
 
would overwhelm hospitals, and uncertainty about the future.13  
Against that backdrop, the Governor issued numerous emergency 
orders, aimed first at efforts to "flatten the curve," i.e., to 
reduce the number of cases at a given time.  Through the 
emergency orders, the Governor, among other things, banned large 
gatherings;14 suspended all in-person instruction at public and 
private elementary and secondary schools in the Commonwealth;15 
banned on-premises consumption of food or drink at restaurants 
and bars; suspended all child care operations but established 
emergency child care for certain children; designated specified 
service and production sectors as "COVID-19 Essential Services," 
which were "urged to continue operations during the state of 
emergency," and ordered businesses that did not provide 
essential services to close their physical workspaces and 
                     
 
13 The COVID-19 pandemic is far from the first public health 
crisis the Commonwealth has faced.  In 1701, quarantine 
legislation aimed at preventing epidemics empowered the Governor 
or commander-in-chief, once he was made aware of the presence of 
the plague, smallpox, pestilential or malignant fever, or other 
contagious sickness, "with the advice and consent of the 
council, to take such further order therein as they shall think 
fit for preventing the spreading of the infection."  St. 1701-
1702, c. 9. 
 
 
14 He first banned gatherings of more than 250 people, then 
reduced that to no more than twenty-five people, and finally to 
no more than ten people. 
 
 
15 Residential and day schools for special needs students 
were excluded from this order. 
9 
 
facilities;16 mandated wearing a face covering when social 
distancing was not possible; and mandated a fourteen-day 
quarantine for travelers arriving in Massachusetts, unless 
traveling from a specified State, providing a negative COVID-19 
test, or otherwise falling within one of the exceptions.  
Certain orders contained language about the penalties for 
violations.  For example, violation of Order No. 13, which 
limited gatherings to no more than ten people and established 
COVID-19 essential services, would result in criminal penalty 
under § 8 of the CDA or a civil fine of up to $300 per 
violation.  Order Assuring Continued Operation of Essential 
Services in the Commonwealth, Closing Certain Workplaces, and 
Prohibiting Gatherings of More Than 10 People, COVID-19 Order 
No. 13 (Mar. 23, 2020) (Order No. 13). 
 
As the public health data improved, the Governor began 
transitioning the emergency orders to "reopening" the 
Commonwealth.  On May 18, 2020, the Governor implemented a 
phased reopening plan.  Order Implementing a Phased Reopening of 
Workplaces and Imposing Workplace Safety Measures to Address 
COVID-19, COVID-19 Order No. 33.  The plan established phases in 
which categorized businesses and organizations could reopen, 
                     
 
 
16 The order contained an exception that places of worship 
could remain open subject to the emergency order's general 
limitation on the number of people who could gather. 
10 
 
subject to workplace safety rules set forth in the plan.  Id.  
Phase one included businesses that could open first, including 
construction, places of worship,17 and firearms retailers and 
shooting ranges; and businesses that could open second, 
including hair salons and barber shops, general use offices, and 
pet groomers.  On June 1, the Governor announced the businesses 
in phases two, three, and four, which could reopen when the 
Governor authorized it in subsequent orders.  Order Clarifying 
the Progression of the Commonwealth's Phased Workplace Re-
opening Plan and Authorizing Certain Re-opening Preparations at 
Phase II Workplaces, COVID-19 Order. No. 35.  Phase two included 
retail stores, restaurants, golf facilities, and day camps.  
Phase three businesses included casino gaming floors, fitness 
centers and health clubs, museums, and aquariums.  Phase four 
included amusement parks, street festivals and parades, and 
large capacity venues used for entertainment, group or spectator 
sports, business, and cultural events.18  On June 6, the Governor 
issued an order that phase two businesses could reopen in two 
                     
 
17 Although places of worship were not subject to a complete 
closure in the initial shutdown order, see note 16, supra, 
"reopening" in phase one allowed them to operate at higher 
capacity. 
 
 
18 The lists for phases three and four noted that they were 
subject to amendment, and one such amendment was that arcades 
were moved from phase three to phase four, but the Governor 
subsequently allowed arcades to open in September 2020. 
11 
 
steps, the first taking place immediately and including services 
such as outdoor table service at restaurants, and the second 
taking place subject to a subsequent order and including 
services such as indoor dining.  See Order Authorizing the Re-
opening of Phase II Enterprises, COVID-19 Order No. 37.  On July 
2, the Governor issued an order that phase three businesses and 
organizations could reopen, again in a two-step process.  See 
Order Authorizing the Re-opening of Phase III Enterprises, 
COVID-19 Order No. 43.  Phase four businesses will not be 
allowed to open until a COVID-19 vaccine or treatments are 
developed. 
 
4.  Reservation and report.  After the plaintiffs filed 
their amended complaint in the Superior Court, the parties 
jointly petitioned for transfer to a single justice of this 
court for reservation and report.  The single justice ordered 
the case transferred and reserved and reported the matter to the 
full court.  The reported questions are as follows: 
"(1) Whether the [CDA], St. 1950, c. 639, provides 
authority for Governor Baker's declaration of a state of 
emergency on March 10, 2020, and issuance of the emergency 
orders pursuant to the emergency declaration and, if so, 
whether such orders, or any of them, violate the separation 
of powers doctrine reflected in [art.] 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and 
 
"(2) Whether the emergency orders issued by Governor Baker 
pursuant to his declaration of a state of emergency on 
March 10, 2020, violate plaintiffs' federal or state 
constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due 
process or free assembly as alleged by plaintiffs." 
12 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  The Governor's authority under the CDA.  
The plaintiffs argue that the Governor's emergency declaration 
and emergency orders under the CDA are unenforceable, ultra 
vires actions because the CDA vests the Governor with specified 
emergency powers only in the event of "immediate and specific 
cataclysmic events of limited duration," which they argue the 
COVID-19 pandemic is not.  The plaintiffs further argue that the 
Legislature intended the Public Health Act (PHA), codified, as 
amended, in G. L. c. 111, and not the CDA, to be used to protect 
Massachusetts residents from "disease dangerous to the public 
health," such as COVID-19.  The Governor counters that the plain 
language of the CDA gives him broad authority in the context of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the PHA does not preclude the Governor 
from acting under the CDA, and the current Legislature 
repeatedly has ratified his reading of the CDA and his 
application of the CDA to the COVID-19 pandemic.  We conclude 
that the CDA provides authority for the Governor's declaration 
of a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
the issuance of the emergency orders. 
 
In interpreting a statute, we follow the plain language 
"when it is unambiguous and when its application 'would not lead 
to an "absurd result," or contravene the Legislature's clear 
intent.'"  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 689 (2015), 
13 
 
quoting Commissioner of Revenue v. Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. 79, 
82 (1999).  "The words of a statute are the main source from 
which we ascertain legislative purpose . . . ."  Kelly, supra at 
688, quoting Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584, 586 (2002).  
"More specifically, courts construe a statute in accord with the 
intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated" (quotation and citation omitted).  Kelly, supra 
at 688-689. 
 
a.  The CDA.  The CDA, entitled "An Act to provide for the 
safety of the commonwealth during the existence of an emergency 
resulting from disaster or from hostile action," provides the 
Governor with expansive discretionary powers in the face of a 
declared state of emergency, namely, "all authority over persons 
and property, necessary or expedient for meeting said state of 
emergency, which the general court in the exercise of its 
constitutional authority may confer upon him as supreme 
executive magistrate of the commonwealth and commander-in-chief 
of the military forces thereof."  St. 1950, c. 639, § 7.  The 
Legislature enacted St. 1950, c. 639, as a temporary measure.  
See St. 1950, c. 639, § 22 (providing CDA would run only to 
14 
 
July 1, 1952); Director of the Civ. Defense Agency & Office of 
Emergency Preparedness v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 373 Mass. 401, 404 
(1977).  The sunset clause was later extended and eventually 
removed.  See St. 1952, c. 269; St. 1953, c. 491. 
 
Section 5 of the CDA, on which the plaintiffs focus their 
statutory interpretation argument, and under which the Governor, 
in part, declared the state of emergency, provides, in relevant 
part: 
"Because of the existing possibility of the occurrence of 
disasters of unprecedented size and destructiveness 
resulting from enemy attack, sabotage or other hostile 
action, in order to insure that the preparations of the 
commonwealth will be adequate to deal with such disasters, 
and generally to provide for the common defense and to 
protect the public peace, health, security and safety, and 
to preserve the lives and property of the people of the 
commonwealth, if and when the congress of the United States 
shall declare war, or if and when the President of the 
United States shall by proclamation or otherwise inform the 
governor that the peace and security of the commonwealth 
are endangered by belligerent acts of any enemy of the 
United States or of the commonwealth or by the imminent 
threat thereof; or upon the occurrence of any disaster or 
catastrophe resulting from attack, sabotage or other 
hostile action; or from riot or other civil disturbance; or 
from fire, flood, earthquake or other natural causes; or 
whenever because of absence of rainfall or other cause a 
condition exists in all or any part of the commonwealth 
whereby it may reasonably be anticipated that the health, 
safety or property of the citizens thereof will be 
endangered because of fire or shortage of water or food; or 
whenever the accidental release of radiation from a nuclear 
power plant endangers the health, safety, or property of 
people of the commonwealth, the governor may issue a 
proclamation or proclamations setting forth a state of 
emergency." 
 
15 
 
St. 1950, c. 639, § 5, as amended through St. 1979, c. 796, 
§ 26.  The CDA further specifies that "[t]he governor . . . 
shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this 
act," St. 1950, c. 639, § 4, and that the Governor may exercise 
any of the authority conferred on him by any provision of the 
CDA in a declaration of emergency under § 5, including through 
executive orders issued thereafter, St. 1950, c. 639, § 8. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that we must apply the statutory 
interpretation canon of ejusdem generis19 because § 5 of the CDA 
contains general terms preceded by specific, limiting terms.  
However, where, as here, the language of a statute "is 
unambiguous and when its application 'would not lead to an 
"absurd result," or contravene the Legislature's clear intent,'" 
we follow the plain language.  Kelly, 470 Mass. at 689, quoting 
Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. at 82.  See Gooch v. United States, 297 
U.S. 124, 128 (1936) ("The rule of ejusdem generis . . . is only 
an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words 
when there is uncertainty. . . .  [I]t may not be used to defeat 
the obvious purpose of legislation"). 
                     
 
19 Ejusdem generis "applies to lists '[w]here general words 
follow specific words in a statutory enumeration.'"  See Carey 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 479 Mass. 367, 370 n.6 (2018), 
quoting Banushi v. Dorfman, 438 Mass. 242, 244 (2002).  "It 
limits the 'general terms which follow specific ones to matters 
similar to those specified.'"  Carey, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gallant, 453 Mass. 535, 542 (2009). 
16 
 
 
Because the CDA does not specify that the Governor's power 
to declare a state of emergency extends to the COVID-19 pandemic 
specifically or to a health crisis generally, the Governor's 
power turns on whether the phrase "other natural causes" in § 5 
encompasses a health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.  We 
note first that COVID-19 is naturally caused, as scientists 
believe it originated from an animal, likely a bat.  When 
examining the phrase "other natural causes" in the context of 
§ 5 and the statute as a whole, Kelly, 470 Mass. at 688-689, it 
is apparent that the phrase encompasses a pandemic on the scale 
of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Section 5 states the general purposes 
of the CDA as, in part, "to protect the public peace, health, 
security and safety, and to preserve the lives and property of 
the people of the commonwealth."  St. 1950, c. 639, § 5.  Given 
that COVID-19 is a pandemic that has killed over a million 
people worldwide, it spreads from person to person, effective 
vaccines have not yet been distributed, there is no known cure, 
and a rise in cases threatens to overrun the Commonwealth's 
hospital system, it is a natural cause for which action is 
needed to "protect the public peace, health, security and 
safety, and to preserve the lives and property of the people of 
the commonwealth."  Id.  Therefore, we conclude that the CDA, 
through the phrase "other natural causes," encompasses a health 
crisis on the level of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
17 
 
 
b.  The PHA.  The PHA covers an array of public health 
related issues in the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 111, 
§§ 4G (care for epileptics), 8C (fluoridation of water 
supplies), 72D (telephone access at long-term care facilities), 
127A (adoption and enforcement of State sanitary code).  
Specific to the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs argue that 
certain sections of the PHA pertain to the control of the 
pandemic and preclude the Governor from acting under the CDA.20  
See, e.g., G. L. c. 111, § 6 ("The [Department of Public Health] 
shall have the power to define . . . what diseases shall be 
deemed to be dangerous to the public health, and shall make such 
rules and regulations consistent with law for the control and 
prevention of such diseases as it deems advisable for the 
protection of the public health").  However, although it is 
evident that the PHA was designed to protect Massachusetts 
residents from, among other things, dangerous diseases, there is 
nothing to prevent the CDA from supplementing the PHA during 
times of actual public health emergencies, such as the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 
The PHA and the CDA differ significantly in the scope of 
the emergency they seek to address.  It is clear from the 
language of both acts that the Legislature could not have 
                     
 
20 The plaintiffs cite G. L. c. 111, §§ 1, 2, 6, 7, 92, 95, 
96, 96A, 104, 106, 111, 111C, 112, 113. 
18 
 
intended the PHA, and therefore primarily local boards of 
health, to be exclusively responsible for addressing a public 
health crisis such as COVID-19, a pandemic that has killed over 
one million people globally and over 10,000 people in 
Massachusetts.  The CDA is broader in scope for emergencies of a 
larger magnitude than is encompassed by the PHA, which focuses 
largely on the actions required of local boards.  See G. L. 
c. 111, §§ 104 ("If a disease dangerous to the public health 
exists in a town, the selectmen and board of health shall use 
all possible care to prevent the spread of the infection 
. . ."), 106 ("The board of health of a town near to or 
bordering upon an adjoining state may in writing appoint 
suitable persons . . . who may examine such travelers as the 
board suspects of bringing any infection dangerous to the public 
health, and, if necessary, restrain them from traveling until 
licensed thereto by the board of health of the town to which 
they may come").  In contrast, the CDA contemplates the need to 
prepare for and respond to a serious disaster requiring swift, 
top-down, coordinated relief efforts.  See, e.g., St. 1950, 
c. 639, §§ 1 (defining "[c]ivil defense"), 5 (a) (upon 
proclamation of state of emergency, Governor "may employ every 
agency and all members of every department and division of the 
government of the commonwealth to protect the lives and property 
of its citizens and to enforce the law"), 7 (Governor "shall 
19 
 
have and may exercise any and all authority over persons and 
property, necessary or expedient for meeting said state of 
emergency").  It therefore appears that with the emphasis on 
empowering local boards of health, the Legislature contemplated 
the PHA to address public health issues confined to particular 
locales within the Commonwealth.  On the other hand, it appears 
that with the latitude given to the Governor to respond to 
"other natural causes," the Legislature created the CDA to deal 
with Statewide public health crises beyond the scope of local 
authorities.  In essence, the existence of the CDA and the PHA 
demonstrates a legislative intent not to limit the Governor's 
ability to manage a public health crisis like the COVID-19 
pandemic, but to empower him to do so. 
 
Moreover, the CDA directs the Governor and executive 
officers to utilize, to the maximum extent practicable, the 
existing State and local departments, agencies, officers, and 
personnel in carrying out the provisions of the CDA.  St. 1950, 
c. 639, § 16.  See St. 1950, c. 639, § 20 (all members of 
governmental bodies must "fully . . . co-operate with the 
governor and the director of civil defense in all matters 
affecting civil defense").  See also St. 1950, c. 639, § 13 
(political subdivisions empowered "to enter into contracts and 
incur obligations necessary to combat such disaster, protecting 
the health and safety of persons and property, and providing 
20 
 
emergency assistance to the victims of such disaster").  
Therefore, although under a different framework from the PHA, 
local organizations and agencies are part of the over-all CDA 
scheme. 
 
Accordingly, because the CDA encompasses a larger scale 
emergency requiring executive action coordinating State 
resources, the PHA is focused on local health boards, and 
neither the PHA nor the CDA contains language precluding the 
Governor from acting under the CDA when faced with a public 
health emergency, the PHA does not preclude the Governor from 
acting under the CDA in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic.21 
 
c.  Looking forward.  Despite our emphasis on the serious 
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are cognizant of the limits 
of the Governor's power under the CDA. 
 
As is the case here, when the Governor acts pursuant to an 
express authorization of the Legislature, "his authority is at 
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own 
right plus all that [the Legislature] can delegate."  Youngstown 
                     
 
21 The plaintiffs' argument that because the CDA is a 
special law, and therefore not codified in the General Laws, the 
Legislature did not intend for it to apply to diseases also is 
unavailing.  From a legal perspective, a special act has the 
same force and effect as a General Law.  See, e.g., Legislative 
Research Council, Report Relative to Civil Defense, 1971 House 
Doc. No. 5034, at 65, 66 ("it has been the accepted practice of 
the General Court not to incorporate either statutes with a 
specific expiration date or statutes applicable to a unique 
situation in the General Laws"). 
21 
 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("If his act is held unconstitutional 
under these circumstances, it usually means that the [State] 
Government as an undivided whole lacks power").  In Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., the President ordered the Secretary of 
Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the steel 
mills in the country, and because he did not act pursuant to an 
act of Congress, the issue was whether the Constitution provided 
the President with the authority to issue the order.  Id. at 
582-583, 585-587.  The United States Supreme Court held that the 
"Constitution [did] not subject this lawmaking power of Congress 
to presidential . . . supervision or control."  Id. at 588-589 
("The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to 
the Congress alone in both good and bad times"). 
 
In Justice Jackson's concurrence, he detailed three levels 
of executive action:  (1) when the executive acts pursuant to an 
express or implied legislative authorization, (2) when the 
executive acts where the Legislature has neither granted nor 
denied his authority, and (3) when the executive's actions are 
incompatible with the express or implied will of the 
Legislature.  Id. at 635-637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Actions 
taken under the first level receive the strongest presumption of 
validity, whereas when the executive acts under the third level, 
his or her "power is at its lowest ebb" and "[c]ourts can 
22 
 
sustain exclusive [executive] control in such a case only by 
disabling the [Legislature] from acting upon the subject."  Id. 
at 635-638. 
 
In the present case, it is the language of the CDA, and 
therefore an express authorization from the Legislature, that 
enables the Governor to act.  However, although we determine 
that the Governor is acting pursuant to an express grant of 
authority from the Legislature, we emphasize that not all 
matters that have an impact on the public health will qualify as 
"other natural causes" under the CDA, even though they may be 
naturally caused.  The distinguishing characteristic of the 
COVID-19 pandemic is that it has created a situation that cannot 
be addressed solely at the local level.  Only those public 
health crises that exceed the resources and capacities of local 
governments and boards of health, and therefore require the 
coordination and resources available under the CDA, are 
contemplated for coverage under the CDA.  Therefore, although we 
hold that the COVID-19 pandemic falls within the CDA, we do not 
hold that all public health emergencies necessarily will fall 
within the CDA, nor do we hold that when the public health data 
regarding COVID-19 demonstrates stable improvement, the 
threshold will not be crossed where it no longer constitutes an 
emergency under the CDA. 
23 
 
 
2.  Separation of powers under art. 30.  The plaintiffs 
next argue that the Governor's emergency orders violate art. 30.  
They contend that the Governor "does not have the authority to 
suspend, dispense, or make law backed with civil and criminal 
penalties through his COVID-19 Orders."  The Governor counters 
that the emergency orders fall within the limits on executive 
authority set by the Massachusetts Constitution because the 
Governor is discharging his constitutional duty to execute the 
laws and because the orders are grounded in statutory authority 
delegated to the Governor.  We conclude that because the 
Governor's actions were carried out pursuant to the authority 
granted to the Governor in the CDA, the emergency orders do not 
violate art. 30. 
 
Article 30 provides: 
"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them:  the executive shall never 
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of 
them:  the judicial shall never exercise the legislative 
and executive powers, or either of them:  to the end it may 
be a government of laws and not of men." 
 
 
The General Court is the Commonwealth's legislative 
department, and the Governor is its "supreme executive 
magistrate."  See Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 1, and Part II, 
c. II, § 1, art. 1, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.  
"We have recognized that art. 30 does not rigidly demand a total 
separation between the three branches of government but rather 
24 
 
that there is a 'need for some flexibility in the allocation of 
functions among the three departments.'"  Boston Gas Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 387 Mass. 531, 541 (1982), quoting 
Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 813 (1978).  "The 
critical inquiry is whether the actions of one branch interfere 
with the functions of another."  Boston Gas Co., supra, citing 
Opinion of the Justices, supra. 
 
We first note that the Governor asserts that the 
Legislature has expressed its approval of his actions through 
its enactment of a wide range of legislation to address the 
COVID-19 pandemic subsequent to the emergency declaration.  
Assuming for the purposes of this discussion that the 
Legislature has approved the Governor's actions by not moving to 
curtail them, this does not absolve us of our responsibility to 
determine whether the emergency orders are within the bounds of 
art. 30.  We can look to the Legislature's lack of exercise of 
the option under § 22 of the CDA to make any part of the CDA 
inoperative as an indication that it approves of the Governor's 
actions, but that inaction is not determinative of our decision.  
See St. 1950, c. 639, § 22.  The validity of the Governor's 
actions is for the courts -- not the Legislature -- to decide. 
 
We conclude that the emergency orders do not interfere with 
the functions of the Legislature.  See Boston Gas Co., 387 Mass. 
at 541, citing Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. at 813.  As we 
25 
 
have determined supra that the CDA provides authority for the 
Governor's declaration of the state of emergency and for his 
issuance of the emergency orders, by issuing the emergency 
orders, the Governor is executing the laws.  See Opinion of the 
Justices, 375 Mass. 827, 833 (1978) ("constitutional 
prerogative, as well as duty, of the Governor to execute the 
laws").  In addition to the Legislature providing the Governor 
with the authority to act under the CDA, the Governor states in 
each emergency order the sections that authorize him to act 
during the effective period of a declared emergency.  See, e.g., 
Order Extending the Temporary Closure of All Public and Private 
Elementary and Secondary Schools, COVID-19 Order No. 16 (Mar. 
25, 2020) (identifying St. 1950, c. 639, §§ 7, 8, and 8A, as 
"authoriz[ing] the Governor, during the effective period of a 
declared emergency, to exercise any and all authority over 
persons and property necessary or expedient for meeting a state 
of emergency, including but not limited to authority over public 
assemblages in order to protect the health and safety of 
persons").  Because the Governor was acting under an express 
authorization of the Legislature, namely, the CDA, his authority 
was, therefore, at its maximum.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co., 343 U.S. at 635-637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 
Moreover, the emergency orders do not, as the plaintiffs 
argue, "deprive the Legislature of its full authority to pass 
26 
 
laws."  See Opinion of the Justices, 430 Mass. 1201, 1203 
(1999).  Since the Governor declared the state of emergency, the 
Legislature has enacted many pieces of legislation to address 
COVID-19.  See, e.g., St. 2020, c. 118 (expanding take-out and 
delivery options); St. 2020, c. 71 (virtual notarization); 
St. 2020, c. 65 (eviction and foreclosure moratorium); St. 2020, 
c. 45 (municipal election postponement and increased voting 
options).  The CDA also provides that the Legislature can make 
any part of the CDA "inoperative by the adoption of a joint 
resolution to that effect by the house and senate acting 
concurrently."  See St. 1950, c. 639, § 22.  Therefore, not only 
have the emergency orders not precluded the Legislature from 
exercising its full authority to pass laws, but the Legislature 
also has at its disposal a way to curb the Governor's powers 
under the CDA, should it desire to do so, and it has not done 
so.22  See Boston Gas Co., 387 Mass. at 541, citing Opinion of 
the Justices, 375 Mass. at 813 ("critical inquiry is whether the 
                     
 
22 The plaintiffs' argument that the emergency orders amount 
to an improper exercise of police power also fails.  The 
Legislature can delegate the police power, see Arno v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 83, 88-89 (1979); Milton v. 
Donnelly, 306 Mass. 451, 459 (1940), and the penalties that are 
provided for in some of the emergency orders, see, e.g., Order 
No. 13, are provided pursuant to the CDA.  See St. 1950, c. 639, 
§ 8 ("Whoever violates any provision of [an executive order or 
general regulation promulgated by the governor under the CDA] 
. . . shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or by a fine of not more than [$500], or both"). 
27 
 
actions of one branch interfere with the functions of 
another").23  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
emergency orders do not violate art. 30.24 
                     
 
23 The plaintiffs state that the Legislature cannot delegate 
its lawmaking prerogative to the Governor; however, they have 
not demonstrated how the Governor's actions serve to abrogate 
this power.  The argument does not rise to the level required 
for appellate advocacy.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as 
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).  Moreover, nothing in the 
Governor's actions prevents the Legislature from exercising its 
lawmaking prerogative or police power. 
 
 
24 The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Michigan certified questions to the Michigan Supreme Court 
relating to the Michigan Governor's authority to issue her 
COVID-19 emergency orders.  In re Certified Questions from the 
U.S. Dist. Court, No. 161492, slip op. at 2 (Mich. Oct. 2, 2020) 
(In re Certified Questions).  The Michigan Supreme Court held 
that (1) absent legislative authorization, the Michigan Governor 
did not possess the authority under the Emergency Management 
Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 30.401 et seq., to redeclare a state of 
emergency or state of disaster based on the COVID-19 pandemic 
after the twenty-eight days provided for in the statute had run; 
and (2) because the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 
1945, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.31 et seq., was an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power to the executive branch, the 
Michigan Governor did not possess the authority to exercise 
emergency powers under that act.  Id.  Although the Michigan 
Supreme Court addressed facially similar issues to the ones at 
hand in the present matter, a deeper look reveals two core 
differences.  First, unlike the Michigan Emergency Management 
Act, the CDA does not contain a requirement that a set number of 
days after declaring a state of disaster or state of emergency 
"the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation 
declaring the [state of disaster or state of emergency] 
terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of 
the [state of disaster or state of emergency] for a specific 
number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the 
legislature."  See Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.403(3), (4).  Second, 
although the court determined that the Emergency Powers of the 
Governor Act was an unlawful delegation of power because of the 
broad scope and indefinite duration of the delegated powers, and 
the standards of being "reasonable" and "necessary" that 
28 
 
 
3.  Constitutional rights.  The plaintiffs also argue that 
the emergency orders violate their Federal and State 
constitutional rights to due process and assembly.  The Governor 
counters that the emergency orders do not violate the 
plaintiffs' Federal and State due process and assembly rights 
and that broad deference should be afforded to the emergency 
orders.  We conclude that the emergency orders do not violate 
the plaintiffs' Federal or State due process or assembly rights. 
 
As an initial matter, the Governor argues that under 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), during times of 
public health crises State action should be upheld unless it 
lacks a "real or substantial relation to the protection of the 
public health" or represents "a plain, palpable invasion of 
rights secured by the fundamental law."  Id. at 31.  In South 
Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) 
(South Bay), in which the applicants sought to enjoin the 
enforcement of the California Governor's order limiting 
attendance at places of worship, Chief Justice Roberts's 
concurrence relied, in part, on Jacobson, stating that "[the 
                     
governed the Michigan Governor's exercise of emergency powers 
were not sufficient to render the statute constitutional, In re 
Certified Questions, supra at 31-33, the differentiating factor 
is that the CDA provides substantially more detail and guidance 
to the Governor than the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act 
provided the Michigan Governor.  Compare Mich. Comp. Laws 
§§ 10.31, 10.32, 10.33, with St. 1950, c. 639, §§ 1-22. 
29 
 
United States] Constitution principally entrusts '[t]he safety 
and health of the people' to the politically accountable 
officials of the States 'to guard and protect.'"  Id. at 1613 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring), quoting Jacobson, supra at 38.  
Chief Justice Roberts further elaborated that "[w]hen those 
officials 'undertake[] to act in areas fraught with medical and 
scientific uncertainties,' their latitude 'must be especially 
broad.'"  South Bay, supra, quoting Marshall v. United States, 
414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974).  "Where those broad limits are not 
exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an 
'unelected [State] judiciary,' which lacks the background, 
competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not 
accountable to the people."  South Bay, supra at 1613-1614, 
quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528, 545 (1985).  Therefore, as long as the "broad limits" are 
not surpassed, we will look to see whether the emergency orders 
bear a "real or substantial relation to the protection of the 
public health," Jacobson, supra at 31, and will not second guess 
the emergency orders.25 
                     
 
25 In County of Butler vs. Wolf, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:20-
cv-677 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020), the judge was presented with a 
constitutional challenge to the Pennsylvania Governor's orders 
related to the COVID-19 pandemic.  In determining the 
constitutional standard to apply, the judge rejected the 
defendants' argument that the deferential standard of Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), should apply, instead 
applying "regular" constitutional scrutiny.  County of Butler, 
30 
 
 
a.  Due process.  The plaintiffs argue that the emergency 
orders violated their rights to procedural and substantive due 
process under art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
                     
supra at 17.  The judge stated:  "Although the Jacobson Court 
unquestionably afforded a substantial level of deference to the 
discretion of state and local officials in matters of public 
health, it did not hold that deference is limitless."  Id. at 
13.  The judge quoted from Jacobson for the proposition that a 
public health measure may violate the Constitution: 
 
"Before closing this opinion we deem it appropriate, in 
order to prevent misapprehension [of] our views, to observe 
-- perhaps to repeat a thought already sufficiently 
expressed, namely -- that the police power of a [S]tate, 
whether exercised . . . by the legislature, or by a local 
body acting under its authority, may be exerted in such 
circumstances . . . or by regulations so arbitrary and 
oppressive in particular cases . . . as to justify the 
interference of the courts to prevent wrong and 
oppression."  (Alterations added to reflect original 
language in Jacobson.) 
 
Id., quoting Jacobson, supra at 38.  The judge went on to note 
that other courts and commentators question whether "[Jacobson] 
remains instructive in light of the [tiered levels of scrutiny 
developing after Jacobson]."  County of Butler, supra at 13-14.  
And the core basis of the judge's reasoning was that "Jacobson 
should not be interpreted as permitting the 'suspension' of 
traditional levels of constitutional scrutiny in reviewing 
challenges to COVID-19 mitigation measures."  Id. at 16, 17, 
citing Wiley & Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the 
Courts:  The Case Against "Suspending" Judicial Review, 133 
Harv. L. Rev. F. 179, 182 (2020) ("Two considerations inform 
this decision -- the ongoing and open-ended nature of the 
restrictions and the need for an independent judiciary to serve 
as a check on the exercise of emergency government power"). 
 
 
We agree that Jacobson does not lead us to disregard 
constitutional scrutiny and defer completely to the executive's 
orders.  Instead, we determine the appropriate level of scrutiny 
and analyze the issues thereunder. 
31 
 
and under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
 
i.  Procedural due process.  The plaintiffs contend that 
their procedural due process rights were violated because the 
Governor failed to provide adequate process before burdening or 
denying their liberty and property interests.  The Governor 
argues that the plaintiffs were not entitled to individual 
hearings because the emergency orders were in response to a 
public health crisis and because the emergency orders were not 
adjudications, but instead were rules of general and prospective 
application.  We disagree with the plaintiffs' assertion because 
the emergency orders were general rules, not individual 
adjudications.  See American Grain Prods. Processing Inst. v. 
Department of Pub. Health, 392 Mass. 309, 323 n.20 (1984) ("It 
is well settled that, where a proceeding is legislative or 
political rather than adjudicatory, a hearing is not essential 
to due process . . .").  Adjudications involve "specifically 
identified persons" who are affected, whereas general rules 
involve legislative or policy decisions that have a prospective 
and general application.  See Cambridge Elec. Light Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 363 Mass. 474, 486-487 (1973).  The 
emergency orders were general rules because they are policy 
decisions that apply prospectively to entire categories of 
organizations.  See id.; Hayeck v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 
32 
 
335 Mass. 372, 374-375 (1957).  Therefore, because general rules 
do not require an individualized, adjudicatory hearing, see 
American Grain Prods. Processing Inst., supra, the absence of 
the additional procedures here did not violate the plaintiffs' 
rights to procedural due process.26 
 
ii.  Substantive due process.  The plaintiffs contend that 
the emergency orders violate their substantive due process 
rights because the emergency orders interfere with their 
enjoyment of their liberty and property interests and because 
the Governor unlawfully dispensed with the law by deciding 
arbitrarily which businesses were "essential," and that only 
some businesses could reopen.  The Governor argues that the 
emergency orders do not violate the plaintiffs' substantive due 
process rights because in crafting the emergency orders, he 
consulted recommendations from public health officials and acted 
in accordance with public health recommendations, and because 
the plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to conduct 
their business, religious, or educational activities free from 
                     
 
26 The emergency orders are not, as the plaintiffs argue, 
required to go through notice and comment rulemaking pursuant to 
G. L. c. 30A, § 2.  General Laws c. 30A, § 2, in part, requires 
an agency to hold a public hearing before the adoption of a 
regulation if violation of the regulation is punishable by a 
fine or imprisonment.  However, the Governor is exempt from the 
statute's definition of "agency," G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (2), and 
G. L. c. 30A, §§ 1A-1D, which apply the hearing requirement to 
State bodies that are exempt from the definition of "agency," do 
not include the Governor. 
33 
 
government regulation.  We determine that the Governor did not 
act arbitrarily and that the emergency orders did not violate 
the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. 
 
When analyzing due process challenges under art. 10, we 
"adhere[] to the same standards followed in Federal due process 
analysis."  Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 153 n.12 
(2011), quoting Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 
Mass. 309, 353 (2003) (Spina, J., dissenting).  When a 
fundamental right is burdened, we apply strict scrutiny, which 
requires that governmental restraints be "narrowly tailored to 
further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest" 
(citation omitted).  Gillespie, supra at 153.  We apply rational 
basis review where the statute does not "collide with a 
fundamental right."  Id.  As a matter of due process, under the 
rational basis test, governmental action is "constitutionally 
sound if it is reasonably related to the furtherance of a valid 
State interest."  Id. 
 
To the extent the plaintiffs argue that operating a 
business, teaching one's child, and assembling for religious 
reasons are burdened by the emergency orders, these arguments do 
not subject the emergency orders to strict scrutiny.  The right 
to work is not a fundamental right that receives strict 
scrutiny, Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 
542 (1974); the orders do not ban teaching children, but rather 
34 
 
limit gatherings in schools; and limitations on religious 
gatherings to mitigate COVID-19 risks are valid as long as the 
limitations are no more stringent than those imposed on 
similarly situated secular institutions, which they are in this 
case,27 see Roman Catholic Diocese vs. Cuomo, No. 20A87 (U.S. 
Nov. 25, 2020); South Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 
We further disagree with the plaintiffs that the Governor 
unlawfully has dispensed with the law, thereby rendering the 
emergency orders arbitrary and a violation of the plaintiffs' 
substantive due process rights.  The plaintiffs note that the 
CDA allows for the "suspension of the operation of [law]" in 
certain circumstances, St. 1950, c. 639, § 7 (k), and they cite 
Picquet, appellant, 5 Pick. 65, 69-70 (1827), for the 
proposition that a suspension of the law affects all people 
equally.  They argue, however, that instead of suspending the 
law, the Governor has dispensed with the law by closing and then 
reopening some, but not all, businesses.  Dispensing with the 
law occurs when the Legislature, or one acting with authority 
                     
 
27 The petitioners have not argued that the houses of 
worship are being treated differently from the secular 
businesses.  Nevertheless, we have reviewed the orders relating 
to houses of worship in light of the order in Roman Catholic 
Diocese vs. Cuomo, No. 20A87 (U.S. Nov. 25, 2020), and we have 
concluded that the Governor's orders do not suffer from the same 
features criticized by the Court in that case. 
35 
 
from the Legislature, "suspend[s] any of the general laws, 
limiting the suspension to an individual person, and leaving the 
law still in force in regard to every one else."  Id.  See 
Commissioner of Pub. Health v. Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hosp., 
366 Mass. 734, 741 (1975).  That is not what the emergency 
orders have done.  Although the emergency orders do place 
different businesses in different categories, this does not 
equate to dispensing with the law, as the emergency orders do 
not limit the suspension of the law to an individual person, or 
group, but instead apply equally to similarly situated 
categories of businesses.  The Governor is not, as the 
plaintiffs argue, "donn[ing] the mantle and crown" to pick 
winners and losers; he is making difficult decisions about which 
types of businesses are "essential" to provide people with the 
services needed to live and which types of businesses are more 
conducive to spreading COVID-19, and basing his emergency orders 
on those determinations.  Because the CDA grants the Governor 
the authority to issue the emergency orders, and because the 
emergency orders applied to broad categories of similarly 
situated businesses and organizations, we conclude that the 
emergency orders did not dispense with the law, were not 
arbitrary, and therefore did not violate the plaintiffs' 
substantive due process rights. 
36 
 
 
Because we determine that the emergency orders do not 
burden the plaintiffs' fundamental rights, and we reject the 
plaintiffs' arguments that the emergency orders' status as 
executive-made law renders them subject to strict scrutiny and 
that they dispense with the law, we conclude that the emergency 
orders are subject to rational basis review.  The emergency 
orders as a whole were informed by public health recommendations 
and serve the State interest of slowing the spread of COVID-19, 
which is a legitimate State interest.  See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 
31; Gillespie, 460 Mass. at 153.  Although some businesses and 
organizations bear a larger burden than others under the 
emergency orders, this alone does not render arbitrary the 
restrictions imposed by the emergency orders.28  Therefore, the 
emergency orders do not violate the plaintiffs' substantive due 
process rights. 
                     
 
28 The plaintiffs use the example of arcades and casinos 
being in different opening phases.  Casinos were allowed to open 
in phase three, whereas arcades were moved from phase three to 
phase four, but were thereafter allowed to reopen in September 
2020.  See Order Authorizing the Re-opening of Phase III 
Enterprises, COVID-19 Order No. 43 (July 2, 2020); Order Making 
Certain Phase III Adjustments, COVID-19 Order No. 50 (Sept. 10, 
2020).  Although at first glance, casinos and arcades seem like 
they would pose the same level of risk for patrons, unlike 
arcades, casinos are highly regulated by the Gaming Commission, 
and Massachusetts has only three casinos.  The high level of 
regulation that could lessen the risk of spread of COVID-19 
suffices as a reason for the Governor to have placed the 
entities in different phases.  See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 
153 (2011). 
37 
 
 
b.  Free assembly.  The plaintiffs argue that the emergency 
orders unconstitutionally burden their right to free assembly 
under art. 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We agree 
with the Governor that the emergency orders are valid time, 
place, and manner restrictions. 
 
States may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech and assembly "provided the 
restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.'"  Boston v. Back Bay Cultural Ass'n, Inc., 418 
Mass. 175, 178-179 (1994), quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  The same test applies to restrictions 
analyzed under art. 19.  Opinion of the Justices, 430 Mass. 
1205, 1208-1209 & n.3 (2000).  We agree with the Governor that 
reducing the dangers of COVID-19 is a significant government 
interest, and we therefore look to whether the emergency orders 
are content neutral and narrowly tailored and leave open 
alternative channels of communication. 
 
We first determine that the emergency orders are content 
neutral.  The "principal inquiry in determining content 
neutrality . . . in time, place, or manner cases . . . is 
38 
 
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 
because of disagreement with the message it conveys."  Back Bay 
Cultural Ass'n, Inc., 418 Mass. at 179, quoting Ward, 491 U.S. 
at 791.  An order may regulate the secondary effects of speech 
and assembly, such as public health, without being held to 
regulate the expressive content of the speech or assembly at 
issue.  See Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Mendon, 472 Mass. 
102, 107 (2015), quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986). 
 
Here, the purpose of the emergency orders is unrelated to 
regulating the expressive content of the regulated activities.  
The emergency orders, and the regulations they impose, are based 
on the public health data regarding the risks of COVID-19 
spreading in certain types of environments and on which 
businesses are essential in the circumstances presented by the 
pandemic.29  See, e.g., Order No. 13 (list of essential 
                     
 
29 Order No. 46 exempts political and religious gatherings 
from its reach, but this exemption does not render the order 
viewpoint based.  See Third Revised Order Regulating Gatherings 
Throughout the Commonwealth, COVID-19 Order No. 46 (Aug. 7, 
2020) (Order No. 46).  If exemptions "represent a governmental 
'attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an 
advantage in expressing its views to the people," exemptions can 
invalidate an otherwise content-neutral regulation.  See 
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 483 (2014), quoting Ladue v. 
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994).  Here, the exemptions do not 
invalidate the restriction because the exemptions can be 
justified in light of the secondary effect on public health, see 
Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Mendon, 472 Mass. 102, 107 
(2015), quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
39 
 
businesses and other organizations "based on federal guidance 
and amended to reflect the needs of Massachusetts'[s] unique 
economy"). 
 
We next determine that the emergency orders are narrowly 
tailored.  A time, place, or manner restriction must be tailored 
narrowly to achieve a substantial government interest, but "it 
need not be the least restrictive or the least intrusive means 
of doing so."  Opinion of the Justices, 430 Mass. at 1211, 
quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.  We will uphold a restriction 
"[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the government's interest."  Showtime 
Entertainment, LLC, 472 Mass. at 109, quoting Ward, supra at 
800.  The restrictions at issue readily meet this standard, as 
reducing the number of people who can gather together and taking 
other measures aimed at reducing the rate of COVID-19, which 
spreads from person-to-person contact, are not "substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest" of 
reducing the spread of COVID-19.  See Showtime Entertainment, 
LLC, supra, quoting Ward, supra. 
                     
47-48 (1986), and also because religious gatherings are subject 
to the limitations set forth in the "Places of Worship" guidance 
and it was social gatherings that the order specifically 
identified as contributing to the rise in the infection rate.  
See Order No. 46 ("clusters of COVID-19 infections have been 
traced to house parties in the Commonwealth and in other 
States"). 
40 
 
 
We also determine that the emergency orders leave open 
alternative channels of communication.  The orders limit the 
number of people allowed at most gatherings, but do not ban all 
in-person assembly, and the plaintiffs have alternative ways to 
assemble, such as through virtual assembly.  See Renton, 475 
U.S. at 53-54 (leaving more than five percent of town available 
for adult theaters provided sufficient alternative channels of 
communication); Opinion of the Justices, 430 Mass. at 1211-1212 
(proposed buffer zone law left open alternative channels of 
communication because protests could still occur outside 
designated zones); Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 
872, 903 (Pa.), cert. denied, No. 19-1265 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020) 
(restrictions did not ban all in-person gatherings, and online 
mediums of communication also sufficed). 
 
Therefore, the emergency orders do not unconstitutionally 
burden the plaintiffs' right to free assembly because reducing 
the dangers of COVID-19 is a significant government interest, 
and because the emergency orders are content neutral and 
narrowly tailored, and they leave open alternative channels of 
communication. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the CDA provides the Governor with the authority for his 
March 10, 2020, declaration of a state of emergency in response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic and for his issuance of the emergency 
41 
 
orders; the emergency orders do not violate art. 30; and they do 
not violate the plaintiffs' Federal or State constitutional 
rights to procedural and substantive due process or free 
assembly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.