Title: Brantley v. Bassett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1120965
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2014

Rel: 3/14/14
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120965
____________________
Ex parte Clay Merches
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Cora Brantley et al.
v.
Dwight Bassett et al.)
(Hale Circuit Court, CV-11-0028)
BRYAN, Justice.
Clay Merches petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to dismiss, for lack of personal
1120965
jurisdiction, the claims against him.  We grant the petition
and issue the writ.
Procedural History and Factual Background
In September 2011, Cora Brantley, Emanuel Brantley, and
Sharon Brantley (collectively "the plaintiffs") sued Builders
Transportation Company, LLC ("Builders Transportation"), and
Dwight Bassett, an employee of Builders Transportation, 
in 
the
Hale Circuit Court.   The case concerns a missing flatbed
1
trailer 
owned 
by 
Builders 
Transportation, 
a 
Tennessee 
company. 
The plaintiffs are Alabama residents.  The complaint alleged
that the parties had entered into a contract in which Builders
Transportation and Bassett had agreed to pay the plaintiffs
$10,000 in return for information about the location of the
missing trailer.  The plaintiffs further alleged 
that Builders
Transportation and Bassett had breached that contract by
failing to pay the plaintiffs $10,000 for the information
given about the trailer, which was located in a field in Hale
County.  Instead of receiving $10,000, the plaintiffs were
arrested in Hale County and charged with receiving stolen
Although the complaint named "Builder Transportation
1
Company, LLC," as a defendant, the actual name of that company
is "Builders Transportation Company, LLC."
2
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property and conspiracy to commit theft of property.  Those
charges were later dismissed.  Regarding the dismissed
charges, the complaint also alleged claims of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process. 
In July 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to
add Merches, an employee of Builders Transportation, as a
defendant.  The claims and factual allegations made against
Merches in the amended complaint are the same as those made
against Builders Transportation and Bassett.  Merches filed a
Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss the claims
against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.  In his motion
to dismiss, Merches argued that he lacked the required minimum
contacts with Alabama sufficient to give the trial court
personal jurisdiction over him.  In support of his motion,
Merches attached his own affidavit, in which he stated, in
pertinent part:
"2.
On October 20, 2009, I was an employee for
Builders Transportation ... and was a resident of
Memphis, Tennessee at that time.
"3.
On the same day, Plaintiffs placed a
telephone call to Builders Transportation which I
answered.  The telephone call was regarding the
whereabouts of a trailer belonging to Builders
Transportation.  Specifically, Plaintiffs stated
that they had knowledge of the location of the
3
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trailer and if the company would pay $10,000.00 they
would agree to divulge the location of the trailer.
"4.
After the telephone conversation ended, I
called one of my supervisors, Dwight Bassett, and
relayed the information to him.  I also spoke with
officers of the Tuscaloosa Police Department and
Deputy Sheriff Robert Clayton of the Hale County
Sheriffs Office regarding the situation.  After
speaking with Mr. Bassett, the police, and Deputy
Clayton, I again spoke with Plaintiffs regarding the
subject trailer.  All of the mentioned telephone
conversations 
were 
conducted 
from 
Memphis,
Tennessee.
"5.
During my two telephone conversations with
[the] Plaintiff[s], I never knowingly or willingly
entered into a valid contract with regard to the
recovery of the subject trailer.
"6.
I have never lived or worked in the state
of Alabama and I never initiated any communication
with Plaintiffs prior to the subject telephone
conversation.  The only connection I have with this
case or the state of Alabama is answering the
subject telephone call and discussing the situation
via telephone with the Tuscaloosa Police Department,
Deputy Robert Clayton of the Hale County Sheriff's
Office, 
and 
a 
subsequent 
telephone 
call 
to
Plaintiffs.
"7.
Since October 20, 2009, I have obtained new
employment 
and 
now 
reside 
in 
the 
state 
of
Minnesota."
The plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss,
arguing that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over
Merches.  The plaintiffs attached to their response an
incident report, prepared 
by 
the Hale County Sheriff's Office,
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documenting the recovery in Hale County of the trailer
belonging to Builders Transportation.  According to the
incident report, the incident was reported by Bassett,
Merches's supervisor.  The incident report lists Builders
Transportation as the "victim" and lists Cora Brantley and
Sharon Brantley, two of the plaintiffs in this case, as
"suspects."  In pertinent part, the incident report contains
the following description regarding the recovery of the
trailer:
"Victim states that on 10-23-09 ... Merches
received a phone call from Cora Brantley asking if
there was a reward for the stolen trailer[. 
Merches] said he would give her $1,000 if she would
tell him where the trailer was[, but] Cora told him
no.  She said she would tell him [the location of
the trailer] if he gave her $10,000. [Merches]
agreed to give her the $10,000 so that Deputy Robert
Clayton could catch Cora. [Later that day,] Sharon
Brantley met Deputy Clayton at the Sawyerville
Convenience Store. [Builders Transportation] sent a
... driver down[.  The driver] followed Sharon, and
Deputy Clayton followed the ... driver to an
abandoned field where the trailer was found[, but]
a quarter of the load was missing.  Cora Brantley
showed up shortly after Sharon told her she was
going to be arrested.  Both Sharon and Cora Brantley
where then placed under arrest and taken to the Hale
County Jail."
On April 9, 2013, the trial court denied Merches's motion
to dismiss.  Merches subsequently filed another motion, again
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asking the trial court to dismiss the claims against him for
lack of personal jurisdiction.  Although Merches called that
motion a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the denial of his Rule 12(b)(2) motion, a Rule 59
motion may be made only in reference to a final judgment.  See
Ex parte Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (Ala.
2003).  Because the denial of the Rule 12(b)(2) motion was not
a final judgment, Merches's purported Rule 59 motion in
reference to that denial was simply a second motion seeking
dismissal.  The trial court denied the second motion seeking
dismissal also.  On May 21, 2013, Merches filed a petition for
a writ of mandamus to this court.
Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle
by which to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.  Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr,
Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003).
"An appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment
on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction."  Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729
(Ala. 2002).  However, "an appellate court must give
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deferential consideration to any findings of fact made by a
trial court based on evidence received ore tenus in connection
with a determination as to the nature and extent of a foreign
defendant's contacts with the forum state."  Ex parte American
Timber & Steel Co., 102 So. 3d 347, 353 n.7 (Ala. 2011).
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and it will be 'issued only when there is: 1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex parte United
Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala.
1993)."
Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894
(Ala. 1998).  
Discussion
The extent of an Alabama court's personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant is governed by Rule 4.2(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P.  Rule 4.2(b), as amended in 2004, provides: 
"(b) 
Basis 
for 
Out-of-State 
Service. 
An
appropriate basis exists for service of process
outside of this state upon a person or entity in any
action in this state when the person or entity has
such contacts with this state that the prosecution
of the action against the person or entity in this
state is not inconsistent with the constitution of
this state or the Constitution of the United States
...."
7
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In Hiller Investments, Inc. v. Insultech Group, Inc., 957 So.
2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006), this Court explained:
"[Rule 4.2(b)] extends the personal jurisdiction of
Alabama courts to the limit of due process under the
United States and Alabama Constitutions.  When
applying Rule 4.2(b), this Court has interpreted the
due 
process 
guaranteed 
under 
the 
Alabama
Constitution as coextensive with that guaranteed
under the United States Constitution."
"The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the trial
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant."  J.C.
Duke & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. West, 991 So. 2d 194,
196 (Ala. 2008).
"'"'In considering a Rule
12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, 
a 
court 
must
consider as true the allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco
& Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th
Cir. 
1996), 
and 
Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network
Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829
(11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict,
the ... court must construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff."  Robinson, 74
F.3d at 255 (quoting Madara v.
Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990)).'"
8
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"'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &
Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d
795, 798 (Ala. 2001)). However, if the
defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
showing that the Court has no personal
jurisdiction, 
"the 
plaintiff 
is 
then
required 
to 
substantiate 
the 
jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits
or other competent proof, and he may not
merely 
reiterate 
the 
factual 
allegations 
in
the complaint." Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)(citing Future
Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See
also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D.
471, 
474-75 
(D. 
Del. 
1995)("When 
a
defendant files a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and
supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those
affidavits with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to survive the
motion.") (citing Time Share Vacation Club
v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d
226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Bufkin, 936 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Ala. 2006).
"'Two types of contacts can form a
basis for personal jurisdiction: general
contacts and specific contacts.  General
contacts, which give rise to general
personal jurisdiction, consist of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state
that are unrelated to the cause of action
and 
that 
are 
both 
"continuous 
and
systematic."  Helicopteros Nacionales de
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Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
n. 9, 415, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d
404 (1984); [citations omitted].  Specific
contacts, which give rise to specific
jurisdiction, consist of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state that are
related to the cause of action.  Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472–75, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1985).  Although the related contacts need
not be continuous and systematic, they must
rise to such a level as to cause the
defendant to anticipate being haled into
court in the forum state. Id.' 
"Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263,
1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in the
result).  Furthermore, this Court has held that, for
specific in personam jurisdiction, there must exist
'a clear, firm nexus between the acts of the
defendant and the consequences complained of.' Duke
v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37, 39 (Ala. 1986).  See also
Ex parte Kamilewicz, 700 So. 2d 340, 345 n. 2 (Ala.
1997)."
Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 730. 
In this case, the plaintiffs concede that the trial court
does not have general personal jurisdiction over Merches.  The
issue is whether Merches has sufficient minimum contacts with
Alabama to allow the trial court to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over him.   Regarding specific jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court has explained:
"[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the
defendant 
purposefully 
established 
'minimum
contacts' in the forum State.  Although it has been
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1120965
argued that foreseeability of causing injury in
another State should be sufficient to establish such
contacts 
there 
when 
policy 
considerations 
so
require, the Court has consistently held that this
kind of foreseeability is not a 'sufficient
benchmark' for exercising personal jurisdiction. 
Instead, 'the foreseeability that is critical to due
process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.'  In defining when it is that a potential
defendant 
should 
'reasonably 
anticipate'
out-of-state litigation, the Court frequently has
drawn from the reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958):
"'The unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant 
cannot 
satisfy 
the 
requirement 
of
contact with the forum State.  The
application of that rule will vary with the
quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the
defendant 
purposefully 
avails 
itself 
of 
the
privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.'
"This 
'purposeful 
availment' 
requirement 
ensures
that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,'
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the
'unilateral activity of another party or a third
person.'  Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the
contacts proximately result from actions by the
defendant 
himself 
that 
create 
a 
'substantial
connection' with the forum State.  Thus where the
defendant 'deliberately' has engaged in significant
activities 
within 
a 
State, 
or 
has 
created
'continuing 
obligations' 
between 
himself 
and
residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed
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himself of the privilege of conducting business
there, and because his activities are shielded by
'the benefits and protections' of the forum's laws
it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him
to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum
as well.
"....
"Once it has been decided that a defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the
forum State, these contacts may be considered in
light of other factors to determine whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport
with 'fair play and substantial justice.'  Thus
courts in 'appropriate case[s]' may evaluate 'the
burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's
interest 
in 
adjudicating 
the 
dispute,' 
'the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies.'" 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-77 (1985)
(citations and footnotes omitted).  
This Court has summarized the test for minimum contacts
explained in Burger King as follows:
"(1) The nonresident defendant's contacts must be
related to the plaintiff's cause of action or have
given rise to it. (2) By its contacts the
nonresident defendant must have purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting business in
the forum state. (3) The nonresident defendant's
contacts with the forum must be 'such that the
nonresident 
defendant 
"'should 
reasonably 
anticipate
being haled into court'" in the forum state.'"
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Ex parte Alamo Title Co., 128 So. 3d 700, 711 (Ala. 2013)
(quoting Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 101
(Ala. 2010), quoting in turn Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473)
(citations and footnote omitted).  "The issue of personal
jurisdiction '"stands or falls on the unique facts of [each]
case."'"  Ex parte Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 15 So. 3d 511,
515 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Ex parte I.M.C., Inc., 485 So. 2d
724, 725 (Ala. 1986)).
The evidence in this case indicates that Merches's
contacts with Alabama were limited.  According to his
affidavit, Merches, while working for Builders Transportation
in Tennessee, answered a telephone call placed to Builders
Transportation by "the plaintiffs," who are residents of
Alabama.  The incident report notes that Merches actually
spoke 
with 
plaintiff Cora Brantley during that telephone call. 
Cora told Merches that she had information about the location
of Builders Transportation's missing flatbed trailer and that
she would reveal that information if Builders Transportation
would pay her $10,000.  After that first conversation ended,
Merches contacted his supervisor Bassett, and Merches also
contacted law-enforcement authorities in Alabama.  Merches
13
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then telephoned Cora and, according to the incident report,
"agreed to give her the $10,000 so that Deputy Robert Clayton
could catch Cora."  Sharon Brantley subsequently led Deputy
Sheriff Clayton and a driver for Builders Transportation to
the trailer in Alabama. 
It is undisputed that Merches's contacts with Alabama
relate to the cause of action.  However, considering "'the
quality and nature of [Merches's] activity,'" Burger 
King, 
471
U.S. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)), we cannot say that Merches purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Alabama
or that he  could have reasonably anticipated being haled into
court in Alabama.  For one thing, Merches did not initiate
contact with the plaintiffs in Alabama.  Given the limited
contacts in this case, the fact that Merches did not initiate
contact 
with Alabama is particularly significant.  See 
Hiller,
957 So. 2d at 1118-19 (finding the first-contact factor to be
"highly significant" in evaluating whether minimum contacts
exist); and Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc.,
876 So. 2d 459, 465 (Ala. 2003) ("Of particular relevance is
14
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whether the plaintiff initiated the sale or contact."), and
cases cited therein.   
More importantly, Merches's contacts with Alabama were
"'random,' 'fortuitous,' [i.e., occurring by chance, and]
'attenuated.'"  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.  Through no
action by Merches, the missing trailer owned by his employer
happened to turn up in an abandoned field in Alabama.  Through
no action by Merches, the plaintiffs obtained information
about the location of the trailer in Alabama; Merches happened
to answer the telephone for his employer when Cora telephoned
his employer's Tennessee office seeking to trade that
information for $10,000.  Although Merches then contacted the
authorities in Alabama to discuss the situation, he did so
only because he had been drawn into the situation by the
plaintiffs in Alabama.  The evidence indicates that Merches,
acting on his employer's behalf, "agreed" to pay Cora $10,000
only "so that Deputy ... Clayton could catch Cora." 
Considering that fact, we may safely conclude that Merches's
so-called "agreement" with Cora was made pursuant to the
advice of the Hale County Sheriff's Office.  These activities
do not demonstrate purposeful availment.
15
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The evidence indicates that, after Merches's second
telephone conversation with Cora, his contacts with Alabama
ceased.  He was not present when Cora and Sharon were arrested
in Alabama, nor was he ever present in Alabama.  Although
Merches, through telephone calls made on behalf of his
employer, was involved in the recovery of his employer's
trailer, his involvement ended with the second 
telephone call. 
The incident report, completed after the recovery of the
trailer, indicates that Merches's supervisor, Bassett,
reported the incident and lists Merches's employer as the
victim.  An examination of the "nature and quality" of
Merches's contacts with Alabama reveals that his initial
contact was random and uninitiated and that 
subsequent 
limited
contacts naturally stemmed from the initial contact.  In
short, 
Merches's 
contacts 
with 
Alabama 
were 
random,
fortuitous, and attenuated, i.e., they were not "actions by
[Merches] himself that create[d] a 'substantial connection'
with [Alabama]."   Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (emphasis
omitted).    
Our conclusion is in accord with our recent decision in
Ex parte Alamo Title Co., supra, and the cases cited therein. 
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In Alamo, we concluded that Alamo, an escrow agent, lacked
minimum contacts with Alabama.  This Court noted that "Alamo
had virtually no contact with Alabama other than telephone and
electronic-mail communications [with other parties] and the
wiring of funds from [a] Texas bank account to [an] Alabama
bank account in relation to the real-estate transaction"
underlying the action.  128 So. 3d at 712.  We concluded that
there was no evidence that Alamo "'purposefully availed'
itself of the protection of the laws of Alabama or that it
should reasonably have expected to be haled into court here."
128 So. 3d at 712.  The Court in Alamo then noted other
similar cases in which this Court has found a lack of minimum
contacts, including Ex parte No. 1 Steel Products, Inc., 76
So. 3d 805 (Ala. 2011) (finding a lack of personal
jurisdiction when a nonresident defendant entered into a one-
time contract for the purchase of goods from an Alabama
plaintiff), and Vista Land & Equipment, L.L.C. v. Computer
Programs & Systems, Inc., 953 So. 2d 1170, 1177 (Ala. 2006)
("[O]ur caselaw does not authorize the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant solely on the basis
of contracts it may have entered into with Alabama parties;
17
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rather, such jurisdiction is authorized when there is an
ongoing contractual relationship supported by the additional
contacts that are incidental to such a relationship.").
We conclude that Merches lacked sufficient minimum
contacts with Alabama to support the trial court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over him.  Merches has a clear legal
right to have the plaintiffs' claims against him dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we grant
Merches's petition for a writ of mandamus and issue the writ
directing the trial court to vacate its order denying
Merches's motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing
the claims against Merches.  
Our 
holding pretermits discussion
of the other arguments made by Merches.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
The main opinion bases its holding, in part, on the
contacts at issue here being "random," "fortuitous," and
"attenuated."  ___ So. 3d at ___ (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).  Because I do not find the
contacts at issue here to be "random, fortuitous, and
attenuated," in the sense contemplated in Burger King and the
cases it cites as examples (e.g, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (involving an accident
that just happened to occur in Oklahoma resulting from alleged
defects in a car purchased by the plaintiffs in New York and
unilaterally driven by the plaintiffs into Oklahoma)), I
concur in the result reached by the main opinion, but not in
the entirety of its analysis.  Granted, the flatbed trailer at
issue in this case did end up in Alabama through no fault of
Builders Transportation Company, LLC ("Builders").  Once it
did, however, and Builders received a telephone call from an
Alabama resident, Builders then voluntarily, knowingly, and
deliberately proceeded to enter into a contract (or what is
alleged to be a contract) with an Alabama resident for the
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payment of money to be received in Alabama for actions to be
performed in Alabama. 
In place of the alleged "randomness" of the contacts with
the State of Alabama, I would place emphasis on the fact that
the claims in this case are based on a contract between an
out-of-state entity and an Alabama resident and that the out-
of-state entity that is a party to that contract is not
Merches.  Merches may have been the employee or agent of the
out-of-state corporation through which that corporation acted
to enter into the alleged contract, but he did so only on
behalf of that corporation.  That corporation, Builders, may
or may not have sufficient contact with Alabama to be amenable
to suit here, but that is not the question before us.  No
contacts exist between Merches individually and Alabama that
would subject him personally to the jurisdiction of our courts
as to the claims at issue here.  See, e.g, Ex parte Kohlberg
Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 78 So. 3d 959, 974 (Ala. 2011),
distinguishing 
between 
contract-based 
actions 
and 
certain 
tort
actions and quoting with approval from Thames v. Gunter–Dunn,
Inc., 373 So.2d 640, 641–42 (Ala. 1979), quoting in turn Idaho
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Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F.Supp. 171,
181 (D. Idaho 1975), as follows:
"[U]nless there is evidence that the act by the
corporate officer was other than as an agent for the
corporation, then personal jurisdiction over the
corporate officer will not lie.  Fashion Two Twenty,
Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D.N.Y.
1971)."
As to the claims of abuse of process and malicious
prosecution, I also see no actions by Merches other than as
agent for Builders, the owner of the stolen property.
21