Title: Steven McCullough v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S02-0809-CR-508
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 2009

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
 
Steven J. Halbert  
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
 
 
 
 
Carmel, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Ann Marie Sutton 
 
 
 
 
 
Monika Prekopa Talbot 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zachary J. Stock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0809-CR-508 
 
 
 STEVEN MCCULLOUGH, 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G17-0706-FD-102219 
The Honorable Annie Christ-Garcia, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0711-CR-931   
_________________________________ 
 
February 10, 2009 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
 
We grant transfer and hold (1) in the exercise of the appellate authority to review and 
revise criminal sentences, a court may decrease or increase the sentence; (2) the State may not by 
appeal or cross-appeal initiate a challenge to a sentence imposed by a trial court; and (3) if a 
defendant seeks appellate review and revision of a sentence, the State may respond and urge the 
imposition of a greater sentence without the necessity of proceeding by cross-appeal.   
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Feb 10 2009, 10:35 am
2 
 
   
The defendant, Stephen McCullough, was convicted of class C felony Criminal 
Confinement, class D felony Criminal Confinement, and class A misdemeanor Battery, and was 
found to be a habitual offender.  The trial court had ordered a two-year sentence for each of the 
two confinement convictions and one year for the battery conviction, all to be served 
concurrently, plus a four-year habitual offender enhancement, for a total sentence of six years, 
two of which would be served in the Department of Correction and four years in a community 
correction facility.  In this direct appeal, he raises claims of insufficient evidence and double 
jeopardy but does not seek appellate review of his sentence.  The State has cross-appealed, 
asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the aggravating and mitigating 
factors and that the sentence imposed for the class C felony and habitual offender counts were 
inappropriately lenient in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.  The 
Court of Appeals held that (1) the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the 
class D felony confinement conviction must be vacated on double jeopardy grounds; (3) the 
Indiana Constitution's provision authorizing appellate courts to review and revise criminal 
sentences specifically contemplates that an appellate court could impose a more severe sentence; 
and (4) the State may not by cross-appeal challenge a defendant's sentence for abuse of 
discretion or inappropriateness unless the defendant appeals his sentence.  McCullough v. State, 
888 N.E.2d 1272, 1276-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).  While vacating the conviction and concurrent 
sentence for class D felony confinement, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's resulting 
enhanced sentence as to the other counts.  Id. at 1282.  We granted transfer to address whether an 
appellate court may increase a sentence and whether the State may by cross-appeal initiate a 
challenge to the trial court's sentence.  As to the issues of evidence sufficiency and double 
jeopardy, we summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  Ind. App. R. 58(A)(2).   
 
1.  Imposing Longer Sentences on Appellate Review 
 
We first consider whether an appellate court, in reviewing and revising a criminal 
sentence pursuant to authority derived from Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution, may 
impose a more severe sentence than was ordered by the trial court.  Section 4 provides in 
pertinent part: "The Supreme Court shall have, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power . . . to 
review and revise the sentence imposed."  In addition to Section 4, Article 7 also includes 
3 
 
Section 6, which authorizes the Court of Appeals to "exercise appellate jurisdiction under such 
terms and conditions as the Supreme Court shall specify by rules which shall, however, provide . 
. . to the extent provided by rule, review and revision of sentences for defendants in all criminal 
cases."  The review and revise authority for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals was 
implemented by the adoption of Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).  See Anglemyer v. State, 868 
N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007).  
 
 
When it is necessary to interpret our state constitution, we look to "the language of the 
text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and 
structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions."  State v. Monfort, 
723 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alpha Psi Chapter 
v. Auditor of Monroe County, 849 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Ind. 2006); State v. Gerschoffer, 763 
N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. 2002); Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 929 (Ind. 1998).   
 
The text of Section 4 provides no explicit direction as to whether the power to revise a 
sentence authorizes sentence increases as well as reductions.  We thus look to the intent of its 
framers and the history surrounding its drafting and adoption.  Section 4 was part of a 
constitutional amendment that was ratified by the voters in 1970, to become effective in 1972, as 
part of the rewritten judicial article, Article 7.  The new judicial article, including the appellate 
review and revise authority, resulted from the efforts of the Judicial Study Commission, created 
by the Indiana General Assembly to study the needs of the state for revision of the judicial 
system, to continuously survey and study the judicial system's operation, and to submit 
suggestions or recommendations for changes to the judicial system.  Act of March 3, 1965, Ch. 
47, 1965 Ind. Acts 77.  The Commission's work on the revised Article began in 1965 and 
culminated with its 1966 proposal of the new judicial article.  
 
At the December 9, 1965, first meeting of the Judicial Study Commission, a three-
member committee, consisting of C. Ben Dutton, chairman, Representative Robert V. Bridwell 
and William M. Evans, was assembled to recommend changes to the existing judicial article.  
4 
 
Minutes from the Organization Meeting of the Judicial Study Commission, at 4 (Dec. 9, 1965).1  
By April 27, 1966, the Commission had adopted a formal resolution "that the committee 
heretofore appointed to draft an amendment of the judicial article in the Indiana Constitution is 
requested to draft a general judicial article embracing the full scope of the judiciary instead of 
specific changes in separate amendments."  Minutes from a Meeting of the Judicial Study 
Commission, at 2 (Apr. 27, 1966).   
 
The Commission's minutes and reports reveal little as to the Commission's intent 
regarding the precise nature and operation of the review and revise power, but these sources 
provide persuasive evidence that the Commission's inclusion of the review and revise authority 
derived from the 1962 American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Judicial Article.  At an early 
meeting of the Judicial Study Commission, Dutton recommended, with regard to the judicial 
article, that the work should "[s]tart with the model article."  Minutes from a Meeting of the 
Indiana Judicial Study Commission, at 2 (May 17, 1966).   
 
In the Commission's proposed revision of Article 7, the operative text of both Sections 4 
and 6 include language that substantially corresponds to the ABA model article.  Both the 
proposed Section 4 and Section 2, Paragraph 2(B) of the ABA model article grant appellate 
power "to review and revise the sentence imposed."  See Text of the ABA Model State Judicial 
Article, reprinted in 47 J. Am. Judicature Soc'y 6, 9 (June 1963).  And the Commission's 
proposed Section 6 substantially mirrors Section 3 of the ABA version.  Both provisions would 
authorize the Court of Appeals to "exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and 
conditions as the Supreme Court shall specify by rules" that include the authority to review and 
revise sentences in criminal cases.   Compare id. with 1966 JUDICIAL STUDY COMM'N REP. 141.   
                                                 
1 In addition to Dutton, Bridwell, and Evans, the full Commission at the time of the organizational 
meeting also included Rep. Robert D. Anderson, Sen. F. Wesley Bowers, Rep. John W. Donaldson, Carl 
M. Gray, Sen. A. Morris Hall, Gilmore S. Haynie, Sen. Eldon F. Lundquist, Rep. David P. Metzger, and 
Sen. Leonard Opperman.  Minutes from the Organization Meeting of the Judicial Study Commission, at 4 
(Dec. 9, 1965).  And the Commission's 1966 report also lists as members Sen. William W. Erwin and Dr. 
Herman B Wells.  1966 JUDICIAL STUDY COMM'N REP.  Other Commission members are identified in 
either the Commission's 1967-68 Biennial Report or its 1970 Report: Sen. Robert J. Fair, Rep. Elwood H. 
Hillis, Sen. Marshall F. Kizer, Sen. John M. Ryan, Rep. Harry B. Spanagel, Rep. Bernard L. White, Jr., 
Sen. David Rogers, Sen. Frank J. Biddinger, Rep. William J. Brighton, Rep. Ben Lesniak, Jr., and Sen. 
Emil Schmutzler, Jr.  1967-1968 JUDICIAL STUDY COMM'N BIENNIAL REP., 1970 JUDICIAL STUDY 
COMM'N REP.        
5 
 
Of particular significance is the fact that the Indiana Judicial Study Commission's commentary to 
its proposed Section 4 is identical in language to comments published by the ABA in 1962 in 
support of its model provision.  The ABA explained: "The proposal that the appellate power in 
criminal cases include the power to review sentences is based on the efficacious use to which 
that power has been put by the Court of Criminal Appeals in England."  Text of the ABA Article, 
supra, at 9.  This ABA language was utilized in its entirety by the Commission in its report, and 
it represents the only commentary the Commission employed to support the grant of review-and-
revise power.  See 1968 JUDICIAL STUDY COMM'N BIENNIAL REP. 10.   
 
As of the time the ABA approved and issued its Model Judicial Article, the British statute 
establishing the Court of Criminal Appeal provided: 
On appeal against sentence the Court of Criminal Appeal shall, if they think that a 
different sentence should have been passed, quash the sentence passed at the trial, and 
pass such other sentence warranted in law by the verdict (whether more or less severe) in 
substitution therefor as they think ought to have been passed, and in any other case shall  
dismiss the appeal.2 
Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4(3) (emphasis added).3 
                                                 
2 The apparent role of the English system upon the Commission has previously been noted.  Childess v. 
State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind. 2006); Williams v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (Ind. 2005); Serino 
v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. 2003); Hurt v. State, 657 N.E.2d 112, 114 n.2 (Ind. 1995); Cooper v. 
State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 1989); Hardebeck v. State, 656 N.E.2d 486, 489-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1995), trans. denied.  Not explored, however, is the fact that the Commission and the legislature appear to 
have relied solely on the ABA's 1962 understanding and description of the English system of criminal 
sentence review as it then existed.  
         
3 Subsequent to the 1962 publication of the ABA Model Judicial Article’s publication, the ABA 
undertook a more extensive survey of the English Appellate Court procedure.  See ABA Advisory Comm. 
on Sentencing and Review, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences: Approved Draft (1968), 
App’x C.  The field study in England launched in September 1965.  Id. at 96.   
 
When the ABA performed its 1964-65 study of English appellate review of sentences, it was 
within the Court of Criminal Appeal's power to impose a greater sentence than the lower court.  But the 
ABA's 1968 report observed that the appellate courts had essentially halted the exercise of such authority.  
It was predicted when the Advisory Committee drafted its standards that the English Parliament would 
abolish the power of the appellate courts to increase sentences, a change with which the Advisory 
Committee agreed and on which it based its recommendation that such power be excluded from the 
reviewing courts' arsenals.  In 1968, Parliament enacted a provision limiting appellate sentence review, 
providing that an appellant may not be "more severely dealt with on appeal than he was dealt with by the 
court below."  Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c.19, § 11(3).  Since then, however, Parliament has expressly 
authorized the Court of Appeal, if a criminal sentence "has been unduly lenient," to "pass such sentence 
as they think appropriate."  Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 36(1).   
6 
 
 
In 1967, the Indiana General Assembly began the constitutional amendment process, 
passing House Joint Resolution 6.4  As to appellate review and revise authority, the legislature 
precisely followed the recommendation of the Judicial Study Commission.  Compare Act of 
March 6, 1967, ch. 375, 1967 Ind. Acts 1360-61 with 1966 JUDICIAL STUDY COMM'N REP. 5-6.  
In its 1968 Biennial Report, continuing the process of constitutional amendment, the Judicial 
Study Commission again suggested the same language in regard to review and revise in both the 
proposed amendment and its commentary.  1967-1968 JUDICIAL STUDY COMM'N BIENNIAL REP. 
9-10.  In 1969, the Indiana General Assembly passed House Joint Resolution 12, employing 
identical language as to granting appellate review and revise authority.  Act of March 10, 1969, 
ch. 457, 1969 Ind. Acts 1847-48.  This resolution expressly authorized that the report of the 
Judicial Study Commission be consulted for purposes of judicial construction and application of 
the amendment.  Id. at 1853.  The amendment to the Indiana Constitution was ratified by the 
voters on November 3, 1970, and became effective January 1, 1972. 
 
 
Under the plain language of the Indiana Constitution, the Court is granted the ability to 
revise a sentence.  The word "revise" is not synonymous with "decrease," but rather refers to any 
change or alteration.  With no specific prohibition against increasing a sentence on appeal 
appearing in the text of Section 4, and the history of the provision indicating that the framers 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
There is no evidence, however, that the Judicial Study Commission or the Committee that drafted 
the new Article 7 consulted, considered, or even knew of the 1968 ABA Standards.  The Committee 
clearly relied upon the 1962 Model Judicial Article, quoting verbatim from that article in its 1966 Report 
of the Judicial Study Commission.  The developments in England were reported by the ABA in a 
tentative draft released in April 1967, and then in a final draft in 1968 the ABA recommended against 
allowing for an appellate court to increase a sentence on appeal.  But this report was released after the 
first resolution to amend the Indiana Constitution had been approved by the General Assembly, and the 
Judicial Study Commission made no alterations to the original proposed language, taken from the 1962 
ABA Model State Judicial Article.  There is no evidence that the framers contemplated that "revising" a 
sentence would omit the authority to increase a sentence, a power of the English Court of Appeal, as 
envisioned by the 1962 ABA Judicial Model Article upon which the Commission relied.   
  
4 To amend the Indiana Constitution, an amendment must be proposed in either house of the General 
Assembly, and, if agreed upon by a majority of each house, then the proposed amendment is referred to 
the General Assembly chosen at the next general election.  Ind. Const. art. 16, § 1(a).  If the proposed 
amendment is likewise approved by a majority of the next elected General Assembly, the amendment is 
submitted to the voters in the next general election.  Id. § 1(b).  If then approved by a majority of those 
voting on the amendment, it is ratified and becomes part of the Constitution.  Id. § 1(c).   
 
7 
 
chose to adopt the language of the 1962 ABA Model Judicial Article, which intended to emulate 
the British system, which at that time authorized the increase or decrease of criminal sentences 
on appeal, we hold that the appellate review and revise authority derived from Article 4 of the 
Indiana Constitution likewise includes the power to either reduce or increase a criminal sentence 
on appeal.5 
 
 
2.  The State's Challenge of the Defendant's Sentence on Cross-Appeal 
 
 
 
The defendant did not request that the Court of Appeals review or revise his sentence.  
The State, however, on cross-appeal seeks a remand for resentencing due to the alleged 
inadequacy of the trial court's sentencing statement and the insufficient length of its sentence or, 
in the alternative, requests that the defendant's sentence be revised on appeal and a longer 
sentence imposed.     
 
 
The State's authority to appeal a trial court's sentencing determination is restricted by 
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(A), which provides: 
A defendant in a Criminal Appeal may appeal the defendant's sentence.  The State may  
not initiate an appeal of a sentence, but may cross-appeal where provided by law. 
App. R. 7(A) (emphasis added).  The State identifies no provision of law that authorizes it to 
challenge a sentence by cross-appeal under Appellate Rule 7(A).  
 
 
The State's cross-appeal asserts that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion and 
                                                 
5 As noted by the Court of Appeals below, McCullough, 888 N.E.2d at 1281 n.7, several other 
jurisdictions allow for an appellate court to increase a defendant’s sentence on appeal.  See, e.g., Alaska 
Stat. § 12.55.120(b) (2005) ("A sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed by the superior court may be 
appealed to the court of appeals by the state on the ground that the sentence is too lenient; however, when 
a sentence is appealed by the state and the defendant has not appealed the sentence, the court is not 
authorized to increase the sentence but may express its approval or disapproval of the sentence and its 
reasons in a written opinion."); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2320 (2003) ("Whenever a defendant is found guilty 
of a felony following a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty or tendering a plea of nolo contendere, the 
prosecuting attorney charged with the prosecution of such defendant may appeal the sentence imposed if 
such attorney reasonably believes, based on all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case, that 
the sentence is excessively lenient."); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.3-4 (1992) ("Within twenty (20) days of the 
imposition of a sentence which is outside the presumptive sentencing range for the offense, the attorney 
general, if the court imposes a less severe sentence, or the defendant, if the court imposes a more severe 
sentence, may appeal the sentence to the supreme court in accordance with procedures to be established 
by the supreme court."). 
8 
 
also seeks appellate revision on grounds that the sentencing is inappropriately lenient in light of 
the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.  Although the State does not claim 
that the sentence is invalid as contrary to the trial court's statutory sentencing authority, we 
observe that where a trial court fails to sentence a defendant in accordance with statutory 
requirements, the State may raise such a claim for the first time on appeal.  Stephens v. State, 
818 N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (Ind. 2004).   
 
 
We conclude that the State may not by appeal or cross-appeal (a) initiate a challenge to a 
trial court's criminal sentence that is within the court's sentencing authority or (b) seek appellate 
review and revision of such sentence.  When a defendant requests appellate review and revision 
of a criminal sentence pursuant to authority derived from Article 7, Sections 4 or 6 of the Indiana 
Constitution, however, the reviewing court is presented with the issue of whether to affirm, 
reduce, or increase the sentence.  As to this issue, the perspectives of both the defendant and the 
State will be helpful.  Thus, the State's appellee's brief, when responding to such a request for 
sentence review and revision from a defendant, may, if desired, present reasons supporting an 
increase in the sentence without the necessity of proceeding by cross-appeal.  In the present case, 
however, the defendant does not seek appellate review and revision of his sentence, and thus the 
State is precluded from seeking an increase in this sentence.   
 
3.  Resolution 
 
 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and vacated in part, as directed by the 
Court of Appeals.  McCullough, 888 N.E.2d at 1282.   
 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, J., concur.  Boehm, J., concurs and concurs in result with separate 
opinion, in which Rucker, J., concurs in Part II.   
 
 
1 
Boehm, Justice, concurring and concurring in result. 
 
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion and agree with the portion of Part II holding that 
the State is not authorized to challenge a sentence by cross-appeal.  I also agree with the result 
reached by the majority, namely that McCullough's sentence remains as entered by the trial 
court.  I reach that result through a somewhat different path. 
I. 
 The Genealogy of Indiana’s Judicial Article 
 
Justice Dickson’s opinion for the majority uncovers a rich and interesting history of the 
events leading up to the 1970 adoption of a revised Article 7 of the Indiana Constitution that 
overhauled the Indiana judiciary and introduced a number of concepts new to our jurisprudence. 
As one who graduated from law school in 1963 and was a practicing lawyer in Indiana 
throughout the period leading up to the voter’s adoption of this amendment, I cannot altogether 
separate my own impressions of this period from the paper trail that Justice Dickson outlines.  I 
ultimately reach the conclusion that he does:  the language of Article 7, Section 4 authorizes 
appellate courts to revise a sentence either upward or downward.  I do not believe, however, that 
this leads to the conclusion that this Court should consider itself equally ready to revise in either 
direction, or that the defendant’s decision to appeal the sentence is relevant to whether this Court 
may revise it upward. 
 
I believe the history of the 1970 amendment demonstrates that appellate review was to be 
encouraged, but also indicates a strong disposition against upward revision of sentences.  First, I 
do not think these issues were carefully considered by either the study committee, the legislature, 
or the voters.  The public discussion of the revisions to Article 7 focused on the selection process 
for the appellate bench, which changed Indiana from a state that chose its appellate judges by 
contested partisan election every six years to the merit selection plan we now have.  The authors 
and proponents of this were civil lawyers.  I knew the three members of the study commission 
that recommended adoption of the American Bar Association proposal to authorize appellate 
review of sentences.  C. Ben Dutton, William M. Evans, and Robert V. Bridwell were all well-
known Indianapolis attorneys engaged, so far as I recall, either exclusively or overwhelmingly in 
civil practice.  A search of the attorneys field in reported cases confirms this.  All three, like me, 
 
2 
were educated at a time when the conventional wisdom in the United States was that sentencing 
was a trial court function, best left to the judge who is most familiar with the defendant and the 
circumstances of the case.  All three, like me, had little practical experience with the criminal 
justice system.  From this I conclude that the study committee’s recommendation was little more 
than a blind acceptance of the provisions adopted in the ABA’s Model Judicial Article.   
 
We are, however, explicitly instructed to consider the Commission’s report in construing 
this constitutional provision.  In the Joint Resolution agreeing to the proposed amendment, the 
General Assembly advised that “[t]he report of the Judicial Study Commission and the 
comments to the article contained therein may be consulted by the Court of Justice to determine 
the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of this article and may be used as a guide in its 
construction and application.”  H.J.R. 12, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., Ind. Acts, Ch. 457, at 
1853 (Mar. 10, 1969).  The Indiana Judicial Study Commission’s endorsement of the ABA 
Model Judicial Article is therefore relevant. 
And what should we make of the ABA recommendation?  It was not that appellate courts 
should review and revise sentences.  Rather it was that sentences should be subject to appellate 
review “under such terms and conditions as the [state] Supreme Court shall specify by rules.”  In 
other words, this proposal contemplated a fleshing out of the procedures and conditions that 
would govern an appellate court’s review and revision of sentences.  It explicitly asked the voters 
adopting this provision as a constitutional amendment to give the state Supreme Court the 
authority to prescribe whether and how this appellate function should be carried out.  As the 
majority points out, the ABA commentary, adopted by our study commission, explained that 
“[t]he proposal that the appellate power in criminal cases include the power to review sentences 
is based on the efficacious use to which that power has been put by the Court of Criminal 
Appeals in England.”  Slip op. at 4. 
II.  Revision of Sentences 
I agree with the majority that the British background at the time is therefore significant 
but I draw a different conclusion from that background.  Although a 1907 English statute 
explicitly authorized an upward or downward revision, as the majority notes, by the time Indiana 
considered this issue in the 1960s, the British courts had virtually abandoned upward revisions.  
 
3 
It seems reasonable to infer that the working assumption of the proponents of the ABA Model 
was that American judges would come to the same conclusion, and would undertake appellate 
review of sentencing but largely, if not completely, abandon upward revisions.   
As we have noted before, a principal concern leading to the recommendation favoring 
appellate review of sentences was the perception that sentences were not evenly imposed across 
the state.  Rather than adopt a mechanical approach along the lines of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, it was thought that appellate review could address the major inequities.  The initial 
response of the Indiana Supreme Court was to adopt a rule that prescribed no procedures, but 
adopted a substantive standard of review that virtually precluded appellate revision.  In 1972 the 
predecessor of Appellate Rule 7 was adopted calling for affirming a sentence unless it was 
“manifestly unreasonable,” thus requiring an appellate declaration that the trial court had lost its 
bearings altogether before the appellate court would act.  As might be expected, few sentences 
were disturbed under this regime.  But increased concern for disparity in sentencing led to the 
amendment of the rule in 2000 to provide for revision of a sentence that was “inappropriate in 
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”  Under that provision the 
appellate courts of Indiana have engaged in more frequent revision of sentences, but to date have 
never increased a sentence.  I acknowledge, as the Court of Appeals noted in this case, that this 
Court has increased sentences on individual counts in the process of reducing the sentence in 
aggregate.  Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2008) (revising five consecutive twenty-year 
sentences to five concurrent fifty-year sentences).  But we have held that “[u]ltimately the length 
of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served are the issues that matter,” Cardwell v. State, 
895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008), and neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has 
increased an aggregate sentence.  In my view that is the proper result and the result anticipated 
by those who proposed leaving this issue to resolution by Supreme Court rules.   
It would seem that the Constitution contemplates rules fleshing out the appellate review 
of sentences, but Indiana and most other jurisdictions have addressed the issue, if at all, in case 
law.  I have no objection to proceeding by case law, but I do not join in the holding that appellate 
upward revision is dependent on the defendant’s challenging his sentence.  As we confirm today, 
the State can neither appeal nor cross-appeal a sentence.  The majority would permit the State to 
argue for an increased sentence if the defendant challenges the sentence.  I assume this means 
 
4 
that no argument for an increased sentence is to be presented in the State’s appellate briefing 
unless the defendant has sought to invoke the appellate court’s review and revise power.   
This scheme seems impractical to me.  First, I assume the appellate court could exercise 
its review and revise power whether or not the State requested it.  It would not take Louis 
Brandeis to figure out how to smuggle an argument for an increased sentence into a brief 
ostensibly addressing other issues.  More importantly, even if the appellate court would not 
address the sentence unless one or more parties requests it, upward sentence revision would be at 
risk only if the defendant initiates the debate over the sentence.  This puts the defendant’s 
counsel in a very awkward position if upward revision by an appellate court is a realistic 
prospect.  Often the sentence is the only viable issue in the appeal that Article 7, Section 6 of the 
Indiana Constitution guarantees.  We should not force counsel to choose among raising the issue 
and obtaining an increased sentence, or foregoing the issue and either waiving appeal or raising 
frivolous issues.   
It seems highly unlikely that in practice Indiana’s appellate courts will frequently 
exercise their power to increase a sentence.  Although I agree we have had that power for thirty-
six years, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has ever exercised it.  We have tacitly, and 
without awareness of the British legacy Justice Dickson has outlined, followed our British 
cousins in foregoing upward revision of sentences.  In my view we should forthrightly state that 
although we have that power, we have never exercised it and do not expect to exercise it in the 
future except in the most unusual case.  This will leave defendants free to exercise their 
constitutional right to appeal without great concern for retribution, eliminate concern for 
ineffective assistance claims based on taking an appeal that backfired, and avoid the temptation 
for the State to disguise a sentencing argument in some other garb. 
Rucker, J., concurs in Part II.