Title: Carriere v. Penninsula Insurance Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 270, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARIE CARRIERE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
PENINSULA INSURANCE CO., 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 270, 2002 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 99C-02-210 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 4, 2002 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: November 20, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 20th day of November 2002, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Marie Carriere, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant-appellee, 
Peninsula Insurance Company, on plaintiff’s claims for unpaid medical bills, 
wage loss, costs, interest, attorney’s fees, bad faith, and damage to credit and 
reputation.  Carriere also appeals the Superior Court’s denial, in part, of her 
motion to reopen the judgment.1  
                                                 
1 The Superior Court granted Carriere’s motion to reopen the judgment only on 
the limited issue of net lost wages.  The parties ultimately settled the net lost wage claim. 
 
2
(2) 
The record reflects that Carriere received medical treatment for 
injuries resulting from an automobile accident on September 4, 1995.  At the 
time of the accident, Carriere was insured by Peninsula Insurance Company.  
Carriere did not file her complaint in the Superior Court until February 19, 
1999.  The complaint contained three counts asserting breach of contract, 
bad faith, and punitive damages.  After some early motion practice resulting 
from Carriere’s failure to name the proper defendant, Peninsula filed a 
motion for summary judgment, raising four grounds.   
(3) 
Although the Superior Court rejected three of Peninsula’s 
grounds for summary judgment,2 it ultimately granted summary judgment to 
Peninsula on the ground that Carriere’s claims were barred by 21 Del. C. § 
2118(a)(2)i.2., which requires an insurer to pay only those expenses 
submitted within two years and 90 days of the accident.3  Peninsula had 
                                                 
2 In a decision dated January 12, 2000, the Superior Court denied Peninsula’s first 
two grounds for summary judgment, i.e., that Carriere had failed to name the proper 
defendant and Carriere’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  Thereafter, 
Peninsula filed a motion to amend the judgment and requested the Superior Court to 
address the two additional grounds for summary judgment that Peninsula had asserted in 
its motion.  After receiving Carriere’s response, the Superior Court issued an opinion, 
dated June 12, 2000, which denied summary judgment on the ground that Carriere’s 
claims were barred by her failure to attend an independent medical examination but 
granted summary judgment on the ground that Peninsula was required to honor only 
those expenses properly submitted within two years and ninety days of the accident. 
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2)i.2. provides: 
 
Payments of expenses under subparagraph a. of this paragraph shall be 
made as soon as practical after they are received during the period of 2 years from 
the accident.  Expenses which are incurred within the 2 years but which have been 
 
3
included in its summary judgment papers a sworn affidavit from Peninsula’s 
insurance adjuster stating that only three medical bills, totaling $1107.50, 
had been submitted to Peninsula within the statutory time period.  Carriere 
did not refute this sworn assertion.   
(4) 
Peninsula’s affidavit also asserted that Peninsula had never 
received a salary and wage verification form or any other documentation in 
support of a wage loss claim.  In her response to the summary judgment 
motion, Carriere asserted, although not in affidavit form, that her employer 
had provided Peninsula with a salary and wage loss verification form in 
November 1995.  The only documentation Carriere offered in support of this 
unsworn assertion was a copy of a wage and salary verification form that 
apparently was faxed to Carriere’s own counsel in March 1996.  The faxed 
form does not identify the employer on whose behalf it was purportedly 
signed nor does it provide the employer’s address or telephone number.   
(5) 
Based upon Peninsula’s sworn assertion that Peninsula had paid 
the only claims submitted to it within the statutory time period, the Superior 
Court entered judgment for Peninsula and closed the case by order dated 
July 28, 2000.  Thereafter, on August 11, 2000, Carriere filed a motion to 
vacate the judgment on the sole ground that her wage loss claim had not 
                                                                                                                                                 
impractical to present to an insurer within the 2 years shall be paid if presented 
within 90 days after the end of the 2-year period. 
 
4
been paid.  In fact, Carriere stated in her motion, “Plaintiff’s medical bills 
submitted within the time period specified by statute and in the Court’s 
second opinion on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment have been 
paid.”  
 
(6) 
The Superior Court deferred action on Carriere’s motion to 
vacate several times in order to give the parties time to discuss settlement of 
the wage loss claim.  On September 14, 2001, more than a year after she 
filed her first motion to vacate, Carriere filed a second motion to vacate, 
which raised claims she had not raised previously.  On October 29, 2001, the 
Superior Court denied Carriere’s motion to vacate except as to the issue of 
Carriere’s net lost wage claim.  Carriere filed a motion for reconsideration 
on November 14, 2001, which the Superior Court denied on the ground that 
it was not timely filed.  Once the parties indicated that the net lost wage 
claim had been settled, the Superior Court entered its final order in the case. 
 
(7) 
Carriere filed this appeal from the Superior Court’s orders 
granting summary judgment to Peninsula and refusing to vacate the 
judgment except as to the issue of net lost wages.  This Court will review the 
Superior Court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo.4  We review 
the Superior Court’s denial in part of Carriere’s motion to vacate, whether it 
                                                 
4 Abb Flakt, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 731 A.2d 811, 816 
(Del. 1999). 
 
5
is viewed as a motion to alter the judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 
59(d) or a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), for abuse of 
discretion.5 
(8) 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.6  If a motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavit, 
then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that there are 
material issues of fact.7  It is not enough for the opposing party merely to 
assert the existence of such a disputed issue of fact.8  If the facts permit 
reasonable persons to draw from them but one inference, the question is ripe 
for summary judgment.9  
(9) 
In this case, we conclude that the Superior Court properly 
granted summary judgment to Peninsula.  Peninsula, by affidavit, 
established that it had paid the only three claims submitted to it within two 
                                                 
5  Battaglia v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, 379 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Del. 1977). 
6 Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Del. 1995). 
7 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 56(e), which provides in part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial.  If the adverse party does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. 
8 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 
9 Id. 
 
6
years and ninety days of the accident, as required by 21 Del. C. § 
2218(a)(2)i.2.  Carriere made little to no attempt to refute Peninsula’s sworn 
factual assertions.  Her bare allegations were not enough to create a genuine 
issue of material fact to overcome the motion for summary judgment.    
Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in entering judgment for 
Peninsula as a matter of law. 
 
(10) In light of our holding that the Superior Court properly granted 
summary judgment to Peninsula on all of Carriere’s claims, we find no 
abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s October 29, 2001 denial, in part, 
of Carriere’s motion to vacate the judgment.10  Moreover, we find no error in 
the Superior Court’s denial of Carriere’s untimely motion for reargument. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
s/Joseph T. Walsh    
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
10 We express no opinion on the Superior Court’s decision to reopen the judgment 
on the issue of net lost wages, as that issue is not before us.