Title: Ronald Morel v. Michael Joseph Satz, State Attorney, Etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC11-105
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
FRIDAY, JANUARY 21, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRECTED ORDER 
 
CASE NO.:  SC10-2293 
 
Lower Tribunal No.:  2D09-2096,  
 
 
 
 
     09-CA-091 
 
RONALD MOREL 
vs. GEORGE H. SHELDON, ETC. 
Petitioner(s) 
 
Respondent(s) 
 
 
CASE NO.:  SC11-105 
 
Lower Tribunal No.:  CACE02-007799 
 
RONALD MOREL 
vs. MICHAEL JOSEPH SATZ, STATE 
ATTORNEY, ETC. 
Petitioner(s) 
 
Respondent(s) 
 
 
This Court has before it the Second District Court of Appeal‟s Certification 
of Order Requiring Immediate Resolution by this Court in Case No. 2D09-2096, In 
re Commitment of Morel, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2620 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 1, 2010), 
regarding allegations that Ronald Morel has been in pretrial detention for eight 
years as a result of unresolved Jimmy Ryce Act civil commitment proceedings.  
Morel‟s appeal to the Second District resulted from the denial of habeas corpus 
relief challenging the legality of his custody wherein he alleged that he has been 
unable to receive treatment, which would enable him to seek release.  Morel also 
filed separate petitions in this Court challenging recent actions taken in his civil 
commitment proceeding in Broward County, Florida.  We consolidate our review 
of the Second District‟s certification and Morel‟s separately filed petitions in this 
Court for the purpose of this order of relinquishment. 
The Second District‟s decision points out that it lacks territorial jurisdiction 
over all aspects of the legality of Morel‟s pretrial detention, which in part stems 
from (1) alleged action or inaction in Broward County within the Fourth District 
and (2) alleged action or inaction regarding Morel‟s treatment in a facility in 
2 
 
DeSoto County, Florida, within the Second District.  Moreover, in regard to the 
Second District case, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) took the 
position that “it has no statutory or constitutional duty to provide treatment to a 
detainee whose status is „awaiting the commitment trial.‟ ”  Morel, 35 Fla. L. 
Weekly D2620, D2620.  The Second District stated the following in certifying the 
case to this Court: 
 
This case is an extreme example, but from our anecdotal 
experience, it is not unique.  The statute contemplates that detainees 
will receive a speedy trial and then will receive annual reviews.  § 
394.918, Fla. Stat. (1999-2010).  Once the right to the thirty-day trial 
is waived, however, these proceedings often seem to take many years. 
The fact that the detainee is being held sometimes hundreds of miles 
from the trial forum does not facilitate timely resolution of these 
cases.  If the Department is not providing treatment during this delay, 
a pretrial detainee may not actually hold the keys to the cell in which 
he is civilly detained. 
If we were convinced that both this court and the circuit court 
had the power to provide a remedy under habeas corpus, we would 
order the circuit court to issue the writ of habeas corpus returnable 
before itself to require the Department to show cause why Mr. Morel 
should not be released.  However, without a hearing involving the 
circuit court in Broward County, we do not envision how this matter 
could be fairly resolved for all parties.  
The supreme court is the only court that clearly has territorial 
jurisdiction over all aspects of this case. 
 
Id. at D2620.  After the issuance of the Second District‟s decision, the circuit court 
in Broward County apparently set the civil commitment case for trial but later 
granted a continuance and advised counsel for Morel to set a status conference for 
a date in February 2011.  Morel filed an emergency petition in this Court 
requesting a stay of those proceedings so that the issues raised by the Second 
District‟s decision could first be resolved. 
3 
 
We have determined that these matters (i.e., the failure to receive treatment 
as a pretrial detainee and the failure to have held a civil commitment hearing for 
eight years) are interrelated and present serious questions as to the functioning of 
our system for civil commitments and the legality of Morel‟s continued detention.   
In order to obtain a complete answer, it is necessary for DCF, the Attorney 
General‟s Office, the Office of the State Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial 
Circuit, and the lawyers representing Morel, together with Ronald Morel himself, 
to participate in a hearing to be held before one fact-finder.  We conclude that the 
most appropriate forum to hear these interrelated matters would be the Circuit 
Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, which is 
assigned to Morel‟s civil commitment proceeding.  Accordingly, we enter the 
following order: 
1.  The civil commitment trial before Judge Eileen M. O‟Connor as Case 
No. CACE-02-007799 is temporarily stayed pending resolution of the fact-finding 
to be conducted on the issues relating to Morel‟s pretrial detention.  
2.  The Court relinquishes jurisdiction of this matter to the Circuit Court of 
the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, for a period not to 
exceed sixty days and orders that DCF, the Attorney General, the State Attorney 
for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, the lawyers representing Morel, and Ronald 
Morel appear before the circuit court in Broward County at a time to be determined 
for a hearing to resolve all of the facts surrounding the eight-year delay in the civil 
commitment proceedings and the failure of Morel to receive treatment, including, 
but not limited to:  
a.  Whether Morel‟s allegations in his petition regarding the inability to 
receive treatment because of his pretrial detainee status are accurate and to obtain 
details regarding the issues surrounding treatment (or lack thereof) for pretrial 
detainees awaiting civil commitment trials; 
b.  Whether Morel‟s allegations in his petition regarding the waiting list to 
obtain treatment, even if eligible for treatment, are accurate and, if not, explain; 
c.  Whether Morel‟s commitment is illegal or unlawful because of the 
inordinate amount of time (eight years) since his release from his prison sentence; 
and 
d.  The reason why the trial in this case has not taken place for eight years 
and whether Morel has had counsel throughout that time, and if not, the reasons for 
lack of counsel. 
4 
 
The court shall enter a written order as to these issues.  Upon issuance of the 
trial court‟s order, the trial court clerk shall immediately transmit a copy of the 
order to this Court.  
The relinquishment period is for no longer than sixty days.  At the end of the 
relinquishment period, jurisdiction will be returned to this Court.  Any extension of 
time shall be based only upon a timely motion filed in this Court demonstrating 
good cause and representing the positions of the opposing party and the trial court.  
The court reporters shall have ten days after completion of the above 
proceedings in which to file any transcripts with the trial court clerk, and the trial 
court clerk shall have ten days after receipt of the transcripts in which to file a 
record of the entire relinquishment proceeding with this Court.  Under this Court‟s 
Administrative Order In Re: Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of 
Documents, AOSC04-84, dated September 13, 2004, the court reporters are 
directed to transmit a copy of any transcripts, in addition to paper copies, in an 
electronic format as required by the provisions of that order.  The electronic 
version for this Court shall be submitted to the following e-mail address: e-
file@flcourts.org.  
 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
 
I dissent.  I would deny review of Morel‟s appeal from the denial of his 
habeas corpus petition challenging the conditions of his confinement.  In his 
habeas petition, Morel alleged that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) 
refuses to provide sex-offender treatment to individuals who are detained pursuant 
to the Jimmy Ryce Act but not committed.  Morel asserted that due to DCF‟s 
policy of not treating pretrial detainees, he has been unable to receive treatment, 
which may have enabled him to seek release.  Morel also raised several challenges 
to the adequacy of the treatment program offered by DCF to individuals committed 
pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act.  There is no impediment to the full adjudication 
of these claims in the Second District. 
5 
 
I likewise dissent from the majority‟s decision to consider Morel‟s pro se 
petition for prohibition regarding his civil commitment proceeding in the 
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.  Morel is represented by counsel in that proceeding.  
Accordingly, his pro se filing is unauthorized.  See Johnson v. State, 974 So. 2d 
363, 364-65 (Fla. 2008). 
 
LEWIS, J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent.  I agree with a relinquishment and temporary stay of the civil 
commitment proceedings until the court and parties are prepared to proceed to a 
full hearing to determine the pending issues.  I dissent because I would allow the 
circuit court trial judge to whom this case is assigned to decide and resolve all 
factual issues that are pending and ready to be adjudicated without limitation.  
 
POLSTON, J., concurs.  
 
 
 
A True Copy 
Test: 
 
jn 
Served: 
 
JEANINE L. COHEN 
RONALD  MOREL 
SUSAN ADAMS MAHER 
HON. MITZIE  MCGAVIC, CLERK 
HON. JAMES  BIRKHOLD, CLERK 
HON. JAMES S. PARKER, JUDGE 
KRISTIN RAYBON KANNER 
HON. EILEEN M. O'CONNOR, JUDGE 
HON. PAMELA JO BONDI 
HON. HOWARD  FORMAN, CLERK