Title: Matter of Tuso
Citation: 104 N.J. 59, 514 A.2d 1311
Docket Number: N/A
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 1986

104 N.J. 59 (1986) 514 A.2d 1311 IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS K.J. TUSO, AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued June 5, 1986. Decided September 26, 1986. *60 Robyn M. Hill, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of Office of Attorney Ethics. Vincent J. Pancari argued the cause on behalf of respondent (Pancari, Zerella, Tedesco &amp; Pancari, attorneys). *61 PER CURIAM. This matter is before us to consider the Decision and Recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB or Board) determining that respondent, Thomas K.J. Tuso, was guilty of ethical misconduct deserving of disbarment. The Board rendered its determination on a motion for final discipline filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics. The basis for the motion was respondent's convictions in April 1977 of conspiracy to commit bribery and solicitation of misconduct and two counts of offering a bribe, contrary to the former criminal statute N.J.S.A. 2A:98-1, and 2A:93-6 (repealed L. 1978, c. 95, N.J.S.A. 2C:98-2). Respondent was sentenced to three concurrent 12 to 18 month prison terms on May 31, 1977. In an unpublished opinion the Appellate Division on March 20, 1979, affirmed the conviction. Respondent's petition for certification to this Court was denied on May 30, 1979. 81 N.J. 270. Respondent was temporarily suspended from the practice of law on June 26, 1979. Thereafter, the Office of Attorney Ethics requested the DRB to recommend to the Supreme Court that respondent be disbarred. Respondent filed a notice of motion to transfer to the inactive status pursuant to Rule 1:20-9(d), which was denied. The charges of ethics violations against respondent are evidenced by judgments of convictions. A judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of respondent's guilt. In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 36 (1982); In re Mirabelli, 79 N.J. 597, 602 (1979). A conviction of crime that encompasses the conduct constituting ethical wrongdoing obviates the need to make an independent examination of underlying facts in order to ascertain guilt. In re Bricker, 90 N.J. 6, 10 (1982); see In re Coruzzi, 98 N.J. 77 (1984). Respondent's convictions establish beyond dispute that he had engaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. RPC 8.4(b) (DR 1-102(A)(3)). *62 In these circumstances the extent of final discipline to be imposed is the only issue to be determined. R. 1:20-6(b)(2)(ii). A number of factors bear upon this inquiry. Among these are the nature and severity of the crime and whether the crime was related to the practice of law. Mitigating factors, such as the attorney's professional reputation, prior trustworthy professional conduct, and general good character, are relevant. See In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400-01 (1986). In considering appropriate discipline, the DRB, while accepting the conclusive effect of the criminal convictions, carefully reviewed the record to explore the nature and severity of the underlying crime. We have independently examined the record and based upon that review confirm the factual recapitulation of the Board. The record reveals that in March 1975 respondent was contacted by a partner in an architectural firm that was seeking a contract with the Cumberland County Regional School Board in connection with construction of a regional high school. The architectural firm had received no response to a bid it had submitted and it had suspicion that another firm had engaged in "pay-offs." Respondent later undertook to represent this firm for an amount set at 5% of the firm's anticipated fee. Respondent then met with Clarence Custis, who was in charge of the school board's search committee. According to Custis, respondent was willing to share his legal fee. Custis contends that he became indignant at this suggestion and started to leave the room. The DRB noted that respondent had a different version of this meeting: The record discloses that Custis informed the school board of this incident and then informed the County Prosecutor through his personal attorney. In June 1975, respondent renewed his contact with Custis who recorded their conversations. The DRB report states: Thereafter, on July 25, 1975 respondent was confronted by law-enforcement authorities. While respondent initially prevaricated *64 and denied culpability, he later recounted his involvement. According to the DRB: The DRB also noted respondent's different versions of this sequence of events: As amplified by the underlying facts, it is glaringly apparent that respondent committed grave criminal acts and, by virtue of his convictions, is indisputably guilty. He engaged in a pernicious, sustained, and adroit attempt to corrupt a public official, a school board member, to serve his own financial ends. We have said, sadly too often, that bribery of a public official is a "blight that destroys the very fabric of government." In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178, 184 (1976); see In re Sabatino, 65 N.J. 548, 554 (1974). Few crimes other than bribery of a public official so tellingly demonstrate an attorney's lack of honesty, respect for law, and trustworthiness as an officer of the courts. *65 The crime itself is equated with unfitness to practice law. In re Hughes, supra, 90 N.J. at 36. Bribery of a public official Respondent offers as an extenuating factor that he was suffering from a psychological condition, referred to as "burnout." Personal or emotional problems and physical or mental disability or impairment are mitigating factors. We observed in In re Templeton, 99 N.J. 365, 373-74 (1985): The Board carefully reviewed the medical and psychiatric reports respondent submitted and found no causal connection between respondent's misconduct and his illness. We have also closely heeded this evidence and weighed it sympathetically. The Board concluded, and we agree, that the medical explanations of respondent's conduct failed to demonstrate that he suffered a loss of competency, comprehension, or will of a magnitude that could excuse his egregious misconduct; the medical etiology of respondent's course of conduct does not suggest that his actions were not clearly knowing, volitional, and purposeful. See In re Jacob, 95 N.J. 132, 137 (1984). Moreover, his medical condition in no way dispels the damning fact that respondent's calculated course of conduct was designed to secure personal gain. The Board did note as mitigating factors that respondent, who was admitted to the Bar in 1960, had no prior disciplinary history. He also rendered community service, including service as a municipal court judge. However, the mitigating factors do *66 not outweigh the aggravating factor of respondent's crime. This was not a single, aberrational act. Respondent, over a period of months, participated in a calculated scheme to corrupt a public official and subvert government standards for fair and competitive bidding. The discipline to be imposed must accord with the seriousness of the misconduct in light of all relevant circumstances. In re Nigohosian, 88 N.J. 308, 315 (1982). Respondent's conduct leaves the Court without any confidence that respondent could ever again practice law in conformity with the standards of the profession or that the public could reasonably believe that respondent could again become a trustworthy and responsible member of the bar. See In re Hughes, supra, 90 N.J. at 39. Under the circumstances, disbarment is the only appropriate discipline. We so order. We further direct respondent to reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs, including production of transcripts. For affirmance Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN 7. For reversal None. It is ORDERED that THOMAS K.J. TUSO of VINELAND, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1960, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and it is further *67 ORDERED that THOMAS K.J. TUSO be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further ORDERED that respondent comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Ethics Financial Ethics Committee for appropriate administrative costs, including production of transcripts.