Title: State v Benitez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 24PA15
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2015

NO. COA14-133 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 4 November 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Henderson County 
Nos. 11 CRS 55726-31 
CHARLES STEVENS BLOW, JR. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 31 July 2013 by 
Judge Mark E. Powell in Henderson County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 11 August 2014.  
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General 
Christina E. Simpson, for the State.  
 
Paul F. Herzog for defendant-appellant.  
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge. 
 
 
Charles Stevens Blow, Jr. (“defendant”) appeals from six 
judgments entered 31 July 2013 after a jury convicted him on 
three counts each of first degree rape and first degree sex 
offense on a child.  On appeal, defendant contends that the 
trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to dismiss with 
respect to one count of first degree rape and (2) denying his 
motion to continue when defense counsel learned of a potential 
defense witness on the eve of trial.   
-2- 
 
 
After careful review, we vacate one judgment for first 
degree rape, but we find no error in the denial of defendant’s 
motion to continue.   
Background 
Defendant is the biological father of M.B.1 and her sister, 
C.B.  M.B. was born in 2001 and was eleven years old when this 
case went to trial.  Defendant and Angela Blow (“Angela”), the 
mother of M.B. and C.B., married in 2005.  In August 2010, 
Angela and defendant separated and Angela moved to Michigan with 
M.B. and C.B.  While in Michigan, Angela suffered a breakdown 
and left M.B. and C.B. with her brother.  As a result, 
psychological and medical evaluations were performed on M.B., 
C.B., Angela, and defendant in April 2011 in the process of 
determining placement of custody for the children.  During these 
evaluations, M.B. denied the occurrence of any previous abuse 
when her family lived in North Carolina.  Pursuant to an 
agreement between Angela and defendant, M.B. and C.B. moved to 
North Carolina to live with defendant and his new girlfriend in 
June 2011.   
While visiting her mother in Michigan on 23 December 2011, 
M.B. was being teased by other children in the family when she 
                     
1 A pseudonym will be used to protect the privacy and identity of 
the minor and her minor sibling.  
-3- 
 
 
became upset and retreated to the bathroom.  When Angela went in 
to check on her, M.B. revealed to Angela that “[s]ometimes dad 
takes his boy parts and he touches my girl parts.”  M.B. then 
said, “[defendant] told me that if I did not let him do it to 
me, that now that [C.B.] was getting older he was going to do it 
to her.”  M.B. told Angela, and later testified at trial, that 
this abuse had been occurring since she was about six years old.  
The next morning, Angela took M.B. to the local hospital for an 
examination.    
At the hospital, M.B. was questioned by Trooper Ruth 
Osborne (“Trooper Osborne”) of the Michigan State Police.  M.B. 
told Trooper Osborne that defendant would put “his boy parts” 
“on [M.B.’s] girl parts.”  When asked for clarification, M.B. 
later stated to Trooper Osborne that defendant would put his 
“boy parts” inside her.  M.B. stated during the interview that 
defendant would touch her on her private parts with his hand, 
his “boy part,” and his electric toothbrush.  A sexual assault 
examination was performed on M.B. during this hospital visit, 
however the prosecution was not able to present this evidence 
because the swabs were accidentally thrown away before being 
examined by the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation.   
-4- 
 
 
The Michigan State Police contacted Detective Dottie Parker 
(“Detective Parker”) of the Henderson County Sheriff’s Office, 
and a North Carolina investigation began.  Defendant consented 
to an interview with Detective Parker on 28 December 2011.  
During this interview, defendant admitted that he had rubbed his 
penis on M.B.’s vagina, performed oral sex on M.B., and put a 
vibrating 
toothbrush 
on 
her 
vagina. 
 
However, 
defendant 
repeatedly denied ever “penetrating” M.B. with either his 
finger, toothbrush, or penis.  
Defendant was arrested following the interview.  He was 
indicted on 26 March 2012 on three counts of first degree rape, 
alleged to have occurred between June 2011 and December 2011, 
and three counts of first degree sex offense, alleged to have 
occurred between June 2007 and June 2010.   
The defense made a pretrial motion to continue on the eve 
of trial, claiming that defense counsel had learned of the 
psychological evaluations completed on defendant, Angela, and 
M.B. the day before trial was scheduled to begin.  During the 
motion hearing, the defense asserted that the relevance in these 
evaluations lay in (1) the impeachment of M.B. through purported 
prior 
inconsistent 
statements, 
and 
(2) 
the 
psychological 
profiles of M.B. and defendant.  The motion was denied.  
-5- 
 
 
At trial, M.B. testified that during the time period when 
she and C.B. lived with defendant and his girlfriend from June 
to December 2011, defendant would oftentimes come into the small 
bedroom M.B. shared with C.B. and would touch M.B. on her 
“private parts” and chest.  M.B. stated that this happened “a 
lot,” not just once or twice.  M.B. testified that defendant 
performed oral sex on her “a lot,” sometimes taking her into his 
bedroom to perform these acts.  M.B. also stated that defendant 
placed his fingers and electric toothbrush inside her vagina “a 
couple times.”  M.B. further testified that defendant put his 
penis in her vagina “a couple times.”  M.B. did not remember 
exactly how many times defendant put his penis inside her, but 
she testified that it happened “more than one time.”   M.B. 
testified that she did not tell anyone about this abuse 
initially because she was afraid “[defendant] would hurt me.”   
 Defendant presented no evidence, but moved to dismiss all 
charges at the close of the State’s evidence and renewed the 
motion before the case was submitted to the jury. Defendant 
argued in part that one of the charges for first degree rape 
should be dismissed because the only evidence presented by the 
State to support those charges was M.B.’s testimony that 
defendant inserted his penis into her vagina “a couple” times.  
-6- 
 
 
Both motions were denied.  The jury convicted defendant of all 
charges.  Defendant was sentenced to 221 to 275 months 
imprisonment for each of the three charges of first degree rape 
and one count of first degree sex offense, all of which are to 
be served concurrently.  He was also sentenced to 221 to 275 
months imprisonment for the remaining two counts of first degree 
sex offense, which are to be served consecutively.  Thus, in 
total, defendant was sentenced to 663 to 825 months of active 
imprisonment.   
Discussion 
I. Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it 
denied defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to one count 
of first degree rape.  We agree.  
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to 
dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).  To defeat a motion to dismiss, the State 
must present “substantial evidence (1) of each essential element 
of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, 
and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.”  
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) 
(citations omitted).  “Substantial evidence is such relevant 
-7- 
 
 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”  State v. Denny, 361 N.C. 662, 664-665, 
652 
S.E.2d 
212, 
213 
(2007) 
(quotation 
marks 
omitted).  
“Generally, a jury may find a defendant guilty of an offense 
based solely on the testimony of one witness.” State v. Combs, 
__ N.C. App. __, __, 739 S.E.2d 584, 586, disc. review denied, 
__ N.C. __, 743 S.E.2d 220 (2013).   
In considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must 
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference drawn 
from that evidence.  Denny, 361 N.C. at 665, 652 S.E.2d at 213.  
However, if the evidence is “sufficient only to raise a 
suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the 
offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the 
motion to dismiss must be allowed.”  State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 
176, 179, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983). 
 
“A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the 
person engages in vaginal intercourse . . . with a victim who is 
a child under the age of 13 years and the defendant is at least 
12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim.”  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (2013).  Our Supreme Court has 
held that “intercourse” means “the slightest penetration of the 
-8- 
 
 
sexual organ of the female by the sexual organ of the male.” 
State v. Murry, 277 N.C. 197, 203, 176 S.E.2d 738, 742 (1970).   
 
Here, M.B. explicitly testified at trial that defendant put 
his penis into her vagina.  She told Trooper Osborne that she 
“didn’t know what he was doing,” but defendant said that it was 
“just sex.”  M.B. testified that the first time defendant put 
his penis into her vagina, it caused her pain because she “never 
did it before.”  When asked how many times defendant put his 
penis into her vagina, M.B. said “a couple,” and that it 
happened “more than once,” but could not remember exactly how 
many times it occurred.   
Defendant and the State are in agreement that M.B.’s 
testimony supported two charges of first degree rape.  Indeed, 
M.B. testified that defendant inserted his penis into her vagina 
“more than once,” and under any definition of the term, “a 
couple” indicates more than one.  However, defendant contends 
that since M.B. testified that defendant inserted his penis into 
her vagina “a couple” of times, without identifying more than 
two acts of penetration, the State failed to present substantial 
evidence of three counts of rape.  We agree. 
The 
dissent 
relies 
on 
Detective 
Parker’s 
testimony 
regarding her post-interview report to reach the conclusion that 
-9- 
 
 
the State presented substantial evidence of three counts of 
rape.  In the report, Detective Parker indicated that defendant 
admitted to having intercourse with M.B. three times.  We do not 
believe that Detective Parker’s conclusion regarding defendant’s 
statements amounts to substantial evidence supporting three 
charges of first degree rape.  Defendant openly conceded that he 
committed sexual acts with M.B., such as rubbing his penis, 
hands, and a vibrating toothbrush on her vagina and performing 
oral sex on her.  Thus, when asked by Detective Parker if he had 
“sex” with M.B. about three times when she lived with him in 
North Carolina, he answered in the affirmative.  However, 
defendant did not admit to penetrating M.B.’s vagina with his 
penis.  Detective Parker’s testimony revealed that defendant 
seemed confused about what her definition of “sex” was: 
Q: Do you recall Mr. Blow ever telling you 
in his – from his mouth that “I’ve had sex 
with [M.B.] three times”? 
 
A: I would ask him how many times and he 
said “about once every three months.” 
 
. . .  
 
Q: Okay. And from your calculation from that 
to him in the video you indicate you believe 
that was about three times? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: And you got him – when you said that he 
-10- 
 
 
agreed with you. 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: He said okay. And there was a point later 
in the video, a little over an hour into 
your interview with him . . . that Mr. Blow 
indicated to you that – he says “you keep 
saying that I put my penis in her,” but he 
tells you that that didn’t happen, and you 
explain to him, “well, that’s what sex is”? 
 
A: Uh-huh. 
 
Q: . . . It may be difficult, but I’m – 
because I’m referring to a specific point 
where near the end, before you go out the 
second time, for about a 12- to 14- minute 
period you and he are discussing what sex 
is. 
 
A: Uh-huh. 
 
Q: Do you recall that point? 
 
A: I do recall. 
 
Q: Okay. And – and at that point he is 
telling you again that he did not put his 
penis inside of her, that [it] was on her? 
 
A: Uh-huh. 
 
Q: And that – and in fact, actually, I think 
you made a point of it yesterday in your 
direct that he kept saying “on” not “in”? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: He said that a lot? 
 
A: He did.   
 
-11- 
 
 
Thus, defendant’s admission to three instances of “sex” with 
M.B. does not equate to an admission of vaginal intercourse. He 
openly admitted to performing oral sex on M.B., among other 
sexual acts, but vehemently denied penetrating her vagina with 
his penis.  
 
Furthermore, Detective Parker herself conceded on cross 
examination that defendant later clarified his statements and 
denied penetrating M.B. with his penis.  Specifically, Detective 
Parker testified as follows: 
Q: You indicate in your report that Mr. Blow 
admitted to actually having intercourse with 
[M.B.]; is that right? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: Do you recall that Mr. Blow actually told 
you that if there had been changes to [M.B.] 
that 
any 
penetration 
would 
have 
been 
accidental? 
 
A: I recall him saying that, yes. 
 
Q: Okay. And you recall him telling you 
throughout the interview that he had never 
put anything, I think his words were, “I 
never stuck anything in [M.B.]”? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: He told you he never put his finger in 
[M.B.]? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: He told you that he had never put the 
-12- 
 
 
toothbrush in [M.B.]; is that right? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: He told you that he never put his penis 
in [M.B.]? 
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: And he told you that, would it be fair to 
say, about ten times? 
 
A: Sure.   
 
Given the context of Detective Parker’s testimony, we do 
not believe that her assertion in her report that defendant 
admitted to having sex with M.B. three times was a reasonable 
account of defendant’s statements.  This may explain the State’s 
passing mention of this argument in its brief on appeal.2  Even 
giving 
the 
State 
every 
reasonable 
inference, 
defendant’s 
admission to multiple acts of sexual abuse, but adamant denial 
of penetrating M.B.’s vagina with his penis, does not amount to 
evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support” the conclusion that defendant inserted his penis into 
                     
2 Specifically, the entirety of the State’s argument on this 
issue is the following: “The State also submitted evidence of 
Defendant’s extrajudicial admission to an interviewing office 
[sic] to having had sex with the child about once every three 
months over the nine month period she resided in his house since 
her move in April 2010.  Or, as he acceded, according to his 
previous estimation, ‘about three times.’”   
-13- 
 
 
M.B.’s vagina on three separate occasions.  Denny, 361 N.C. at 
664-665, 652 S.E.2d at 213.   
The State therefore relies on the definition of “a couple” 
to argue that it presented substantial evidence of three counts 
of first degree rape.  As the State notes, Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary provides several definitions for the term “couple,” 
one of which being “an indefinite small number” that may be used 
interchangeably with the term “few.”  Additionally, defendant 
points us towards other sources indicating that “a couple” can 
also be defined as “two individuals of the same sort considered 
together”; “two similar things”; “two of the same species or 
kind, near in place or considered together”; and “a pair.”3  
However, we need not determine whether “a couple” means 
“two” or “more than two” of something to rule on this matter.  
Instead, we agree with defendant’s contention that the ambiguous 
nature of the term “a couple” causes M.B.’s testimony to raise 
no more than a suspicion or conjecture that more than two 
instances of rape occurred.  If we agree with the State that 
                     
3 Although not a controlling source of authority on this 
distinction, we find the following anecdote indicative of the 
common usage of the term “a couple.”  When a father asked his 
four-year-old daughter if he could take “a couple” of french 
fries from her plate, the daughter said yes.  But when the 
father took four french fries, the little girl took back two of 
them and stated emphatically, “A couple means two!”   
-14- 
 
 
testimony of “a couple” instances of conduct amounts to 
substantial evidence supporting “an indefinite small number” of 
charges, we open the door to speculation as to how many charges 
can fit within those bounds.  Using this logic, the State could 
potentially charge a defendant with four or five crimes just as 
it could with three, based only on an allegation that the 
criminal conduct happened “a couple” of times. We believe that 
this is the type of “speculation” and “conjecture,” State v. 
Brown, 162 N.C. App. 333, 338, 590 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2004), that 
cannot defeat a motion to dismiss. See State v. McDowell, 217 
N.C. App. 634, 636, 720 S.E.2d 423, 424 (2011) (“A motion to 
dismiss should be granted . . . when the facts and circumstances 
warranted by the evidence do no more than raise a suspicion of 
guilt or conjecture since there would still remain a reasonable 
doubt as to defendant’s guilt.”).   
Accordingly, although “the unsupported testimony of the 
prosecutrix in a prosecution for rape has been held in many 
cases sufficient to require submission of the case to the jury,” 
State v. Carter, 198 N.C. App. 297, 306, 679 S.E.2d 457, 462 
(2009), M.B.’s ambiguous characterization of the number of times 
defendant inserted his penis into her vagina as “a couple” was 
-15- 
 
 
insufficient to charge defendant with three counts of first 
degree rape.   
II. Motion to Continue 
 
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in 
denying defendant’s motion to continue, as defense counsel 
learned of a potential defense witness on the eve of trial.  We 
disagree. 
Ordinarily, 
the 
ruling 
on 
a 
motion 
to 
continue 
is 
“addressed to the discretion of the trial court,” and it is not 
subject to review absent “a gross abuse of that discretion.”  
State v. Taylor, 354 N.C. 28, 33, 550 S.E.2d 141, 146 (2001).  
However, “when a motion to continue raises a constitutional 
issue, the trial court’s ruling is fully reviewable on appeal.”  
Id.  Even if a constitutional issue is raised, denial of a 
motion to continue is grounds for a new trial only if the 
defendant can show that the ruling was both erroneous and 
prejudicial.  State v. Garner, 322 N.C. 591, 594, 369 S.E.2d 
593, 596 (1988).   
“It is implicit in the constitutional [guarantee] of 
assistance of counsel . . . that an accused and his counsel 
shall have a reasonable time to investigate, prepare and present 
his defense.”  State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 616, 234 S.E.2d 
-16- 
 
 
742, 747 (1977).  “However, no set length of time is guaranteed 
and whether defendant is denied due process must be determined 
under the circumstances of each case.”  Id.  Here, defendant 
argues that he was denied this right because his defense counsel 
learned of the psychological reports conducted on defendant and 
M.D. on the eve of trial and did not have adequate time to 
subpoena the psychologist to testify.  At the hearing on the 
motion to continue, defense counsel conceded that defendant had 
knowledge of these proceedings due to his participation in the 
psychological evaluations and that defense counsel had two 
months to confer with defendant in order to prepare their case 
before trial.  Based on these circumstances, McFadden, 292 N.C. 
at 616, 234 S.E.2d at 747, we conclude that the two-month period 
during 
which 
defense 
counsel 
could 
have 
learned 
of 
the 
psychological reports had there been diligent communication with 
his client amounted to a “reasonable time to investigate, 
prepare and present his defense.” McFadden, 292 N.C. at 616, 234 
S.E.2d at 747.  Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s 
denial of defendant’s motion to continue.  
Additionally, even if the denial of the motion to continue 
was erroneous, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  
See Garner, 322 N.C. at 594, 369 S.E.2d at 596. During the 
-17- 
 
 
cross-examination of M.B., defense counsel was allowed to 
introduce relevant parts of the psychologist’s written report.  
Specifically, defense counsel had M.B. read to the jury a 
portion of her psychological evaluation which stated, “[M.B.] 
denies being physically or sexually abused. She denies being 
afraid of either parent or any other relatives.”  After reading 
this part of the report, M.B. testified that she had very little 
recollection of the psychological examination and did not have 
any recollection of denying sexual abuse by defendant.  Thus, 
because defendant was still able to use the psychological 
reports at trial to impeach M.B.’s testimony, the denial of the 
motion to continue did not prevent defendant from “present[ing] 
his defense,”  Carter, 184 N.C. App. at 712, 646 S.E.2d at 851, 
and he has failed to demonstrate the prejudice required to be 
granted a new trial.  
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s denial 
of defendant’s motion to continue.  
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the underlying 
judgment entered for the third count of first degree rape, 
number 11 CRS 55728.  We find no error in the trial court’s 
denial of defendant’s motion to continue.  Because the sentences 
-18- 
 
 
entered on the three judgments for first degree rape are to be 
served concurrently, this decision does not alter defendant’s 
sentence, and we need not remand the matter to the trial court.  
 
JUDGMENT IN NUMBER 11 CRS 55729 VACATED. 
NO ERROR AS TO REMAINING JUDGMENTS. 
Judge MCCULLOUGH concurs.  
Judge ERVIN concurs in part and dissents in part by 
separate opinion. 
 
 
NO. COA14-133 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  4 November 2014 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
Henderson County 
Nos. 11 CRS 55726-31 
 
 
CHARLES STEVENS BLOW, JR. 
 
 
 
ERVIN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
Although I concur in the Court’s determination that the 
trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s continuance 
motion, I am unable to join the portion of the Court’s opinion 
that concludes that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss one of the three first degree rape charges 
that had been lodged against him.  After carefully reviewing the 
record in light of the applicable law, I am compelled to 
conclude, contrary to the result reached by my colleagues, that 
the State presented substantial evidence that was sufficient, if 
believed, to support the jury’s decision to convict Defendant of 
three counts of first degree rape.  As a result, although I 
concur in the remainder of the Court’s opinion, I respectfully 
dissent 
from 
my 
colleagues’ 
decision 
to 
vacate 
one 
of 
Defendant’s first degree rape convictions for insufficiency of 
the evidence. 
-2- 
 
 
In the course of concluding that the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support the jury’s decision to 
convict Defendant of three counts of rape, the Court focuses on 
the testimony of the alleged victim, M.B., who stated that 
Defendant put his penis into her vagina “a couple times.”  In 
the course of clarifying this portion of her testimony, M.B. 
further stated that, although Defendant penetrated her vagina 
with his penis on more than one occasion, she could not remember 
exactly how many times Defendant engaged in this unlawful 
conduct.  Although I agree with my colleagues that this portion 
of M.B.’s testimony, viewed in isolation, does not suffice to 
support a determination that Defendant raped M.B. on three 
different occasions, the record also contains the testimony of 
Detective Dottie Parker of the Henderson County Sheriff’s 
Office, who testified that, in the course of discussing M.B.’s 
allegations with her, Defendant admitted having “had sex” with 
M.B. about once every three months over a seven month period and 
that he had engaged in this conduct “about three times.”  Given 
that, “when considering a motion to dismiss, the evidence must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, giving the 
State the benefit of ‘every reasonable inference to be drawn 
therefrom,’” State v. Denny, 361 N.C. 662, 665, 652 S.E.2d 212, 
-3- 
 
 
213 (2007) (quoting State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 763, 766, 309 
S.E.2d 232, 236 (1983)), I believe that Defendant’s admission 
that he had “had sex” with M.B. “about three times,” when taken 
in the light most favorable to the State, sufficiently supports 
the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to consider the 
issue of Defendant’s guilt of three counts of first degree rape 
and dissent from my colleagues’ decision to the contrary. 
In rejecting the analysis set out in this concurring and 
dissenting 
opinion, 
the 
Court 
relies 
upon 
two 
essential 
arguments. 
 
First, 
my 
colleagues 
appear 
to 
argue 
that 
Defendant’s statement that he had “had sex” with M.B. did not 
constitute an admission that Defendant had vaginally penetrated 
her with his penis on those occasions.  However, when read in 
context, I believe that Defendant’s statements, as recounted by 
Detective 
Parker, 
are 
reasonably 
susceptible 
to 
the 
interpretation, which is consistent with ordinary parlance, that 
Defendant used the term “having sex” as a shorthand reference to 
engaging in vaginal intercourse.  Secondly, my colleagues argue 
that various statements that Defendant made during the remainder 
of his conversation with Detective Parker establish that he did 
not acknowledge having vaginal intercourse with M.B. more than 
twice.  Although Defendant made a number of different statements 
-4- 
 
 
during his conversation with Detective Parker, I believe that 
the 
extent, 
if 
any, 
to 
which 
his 
subsequent 
comments 
contradicted, rather than explained, his admission to having 
“had sex” with M.B. on three different occasions was a question 
for the jury rather than a matter to be resolved by the trial 
court in addressing Defendant’s dismissal motion.  State v. 
Wagoner, 249 N.C. 637, 639, 107 S.E.2d 83, 85 (1959) (stating 
that “[t]he contradictory statements made by the defendant to 
the investigating officer do not cancel out the testimony given 
in the trial”).  As a result, given that I am unable to agree 
with my colleagues that the record fails to contain sufficient 
evidence to support all three of Defendant’s rape convictions 
and would uphold the denial of Defendant’s dismissal motion 
relating to Defendant’s third rape conviction, I concur in the 
Court’s decision in part and dissent from that decision in part.