Title: Robert Rimmer v. Walter A. McNeil, etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-1250
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1272 
____________ 
 
ROBERT RIMMER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1250 
____________ 
 
ROBERT RIMMER,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 16, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Robert Rimmer appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
postconviction motion to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and 
sentences of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He also 
 
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petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit 
court‘s denial of postconviction relief, and we deny Rimmer‘s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.   
OVERVIEW 
 
Rimmer was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1998 murders of 
Bradley Krause and Aaron Knight.  During a robbery of a car audio equipment 
store, Rimmer shot and killed both men.  In addition to the two murder 
convictions, each of which resulted in a sentence of death, Rimmer was also 
convicted of and sentenced to terms of imprisonment for nine other felonies: three 
counts of armed robbery, four counts of armed kidnapping, one count of attempted 
armed robbery, and one count of aggravated assault.  We affirmed Rimmer‘s 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  See Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304 
(Fla. 2002). 
 
Subsequently, pursuant to rule 3.851, Rimmer filed a motion seeking 
postconviction relief.  Following an evidentiary hearing on several of Rimmer‘s 
claims, the circuit court denied the motion in its entirety.  Rimmer now challenges 
the circuit court‘s denial of postconviction relief and raises various claims.  
Additionally, Rimmer petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We begin 
 
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our opinion by reviewing the facts of this case.  We then turn to the claims raised 
in Rimmer‘s 3.851 motion.  Finally, we address Rimmer‘s habeas petition. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On May 2, 1998, Rimmer and codefendant Kevin Parker robbed an Audio 
Logic store in Wilton Manors, Florida.  During the robbery, Rimmer shot and 
killed two victims, Bradley Krause and Aaron Knight.  Both men were Audio 
Logic employees.  On that day, in the store‘s installation area, Krause and Knight 
were confronted and forced to lie face down on the floor, and their hands were 
duct-taped behind their backs. 
During the robbery, Rimmer also confronted three customers: Joe Moore, 
Louis Rosario, and Kimberly Davis Burke.1  Moore was leaving the store when he 
was confronted by Rimmer, who displayed a gun and ordered Moore to go back 
inside into the installation area.  Rosario, who had been standing outside, was also 
ordered to go into the installation area, although he was unable to identify which 
perpetrator ordered him to do so.  Similar to Krause and Knight, they were also 
forced to lie face down on the floor with their hands duct-taped behind their backs. 
During this time, Burke had been sitting in the store‘s waiting room with her 
two-year-old daughter.  She saw a purplish Ford Probe and a Kia Sephia drive up 
                                          
 
 
1.  As noted on direct appeal, there are various name references to Kimberly 
Davis Burke.  Although on direct appeal she was referred to as ―Davis,‖ for the 
purposes of this opinion she will be referred to as ―Burke.‖ 
 
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to the store, and she saw codefendant Parker get out of the Kia Sephia.  Parker 
came into the waiting room, briefly spoke to Burke, and walked into the 
installation area.  Later, Rimmer came from the installation area into the waiting 
room where Burke was sitting.  Rimmer told her that her boyfriend (Moore) was 
waiting for her in the installation area, and she went there and saw the four men 
lying face down on the floor.  Burke understood what was happening and 
immediately sat down with her young daughter in her lap.  Unlike the others, she 
was not forced to lie face down on the floor, but she was told not to look while 
Rimmer and two other people loaded stereo equipment into the Ford Probe.2 
 
Krause, Knight, and Moore were robbed of their personal belongings, which 
included Moore‘s wallet and cellular phone.  Rimmer asked Knight for the keys to 
the cash register and asked if anyone owned a weapon.  Knight told Rimmer that 
he kept a gun in a desk drawer in the store, and Rimmer retrieved it.  Rimmer also 
asked whether the store had surveillance cameras, and Krause and Knight told him 
that the store did not have any. 
 
After the stereo equipment was loaded into the Ford Probe, Rimmer began to 
drive the car out of the installation area and then stopped.  He returned and 
confronted Knight, saying, ―You know me.‖  Knight said that he did not know 
                                          
 
 
2.  Burke testified that there was a third person, a male, who was also 
helping move boxes of stereo equipment.  This person was never identified. 
 
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Rimmer, to which Rimmer responded: ―You do remember me.‖  Rimmer then 
placed his pistol to the back of Knight‘s head and shot him.  Knight died instantly.  
Moore jumped to his feet at the sound of the gunshot, and Rimmer pointed the 
pistol at him, telling him to lie back down.  Rimmer then walked over to Krause 
and shot him in the back of the head.  Krause lost consciousness instantly.  Rimmer 
released the remaining victims after thanking them for their cooperation and telling 
them to ―have a nice day.‖  Krause died later at a hospital.  The police recovered 
from the crime scene shell casings and a spent projectile fragment which were later 
identified as .380 caliber components, and the State‘s firearm expert testified that 
they came from Rimmer‘s gun. 
 
On May 4, 1998, two days after the robbery, Burke provided a description of 
the shooter.  The description was used to create a sketch which was shown to the 
owner of the Audio Logic store and to several competitors.  One of the competitors 
recognized Rimmer from an encounter several months earlier when Rimmer came 
to his store and complained about a speaker installation job recently completed by 
Audio Logic.  With this information, the police used Audio Logic‘s records to 
obtain Rimmer‘s identity, telephone number, and address.   
 
On May 8, 1998, Burke and Moore were shown a photo lineup that included 
Rimmer, and both identified Rimmer as the shooter.  Later, they also identified 
Rimmer from a live lineup.  The owner of Audio Logic, who was not present 
 
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during the robbery, also recognized Rimmer from an earlier conversation that they 
had concerning the installation of stereo equipment in Rimmer‘s car.    
 
On May 10, 1998, Rimmer was arrested following a twelve-minute high-
speed car chase that ended at Rimmer‘s home.  During the chase, while driving his 
1978 Oldsmobile, Rimmer threw his gun, Moore‘s wallet, and the gun stolen from 
Audio Logic out of the car.  Rimmer‘s wife arrived at the home in the Ford Probe 
shortly after Rimmer‘s arrest.  Both the Ford and the Oldsmobile were registered to 
Rimmer. 
 
The police obtained a warrant to search the Oldsmobile, and that search 
revealed an organizer which contained a lease agreement for a storage facility.  The 
storage unit, rented by Rimmer on May 7, 1998, was also searched pursuant to a 
warrant.  The search of the storage unit revealed stereo equipment that was stolen 
from Audio Logic.  Fingerprints of both Rimmer and codefendant Parker were 
found on the stolen equipment, and a surveillance tape from the storage facility 
showed Rimmer renting the unit. 
 
Rimmer was indicted for two counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of 
Krause and Knight.  Additionally, the indictment charged Rimmer with three 
counts of armed robbery, four counts of armed kidnapping, one count of attempted 
armed robbery, and one count of aggravated assault with a firearm.  Rimmer and 
Parker were charged in the same indictment and faced identical charges.  
 
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Rimmer and Parker were tried together, and both defendants were convicted 
of all eleven felonies.  Separate penalty phases were conducted for each defendant, 
and by a vote of nine to three, the jury recommended that Rimmer be sentenced to 
death.  As explained in its sentencing order, the trial court found six aggravating 
factors: 
(1) the murders were committed by a person convicted of a felony and 
under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) the defendant was previously 
convicted of another capital felony and a felony involving use or 
threat of violence to the person; (3) the murders were committed 
while the defendant was engaged in a robbery and kidnapping; (4) the 
murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing 
lawful arrest; (5) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC); and (6) the murders were cold, calculated, and pre-
meditated (CCP).  The trial court only gave moderate weight to the 
HAC and murder in the course of a felony aggravators; the court gave 
great weight to the remaining four aggravators. 
 
Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 311 (footnote omitted).3  Moreover, the trial court found no 
statutory mitigating factors, but it did find five nonstatutory mitigating factors: 
(1) Rimmer‘s family background (very little weight); (2) Rimmer is 
an excellent employee (some weight); (3) Rimmer has helped and 
ministered to others (minimal weight); (4) Rimmer is a kind, loving 
father (not much weight); and (5) Rimmer suffers from a 
schizoaffective disorder (little weight).  
 
                                          
 
 
3.  One of the aggravating circumstances, that Rimmer was convicted of a 
felony and was under a sentence of imprisonment, was based on the fact that at the 
time of the murders Rimmer was on conditional release following an attempted 
armed robbery conviction. 
 
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Id.  The trial court followed the jury‘s recommendation and sentenced 
Rimmer to death for the murders, and it also imposed sentences of 
imprisonment for the other nine felonies.4 
Rimmer challenged his convictions and sentences on direct appeal and 
raised ten issues.5  This Court affirmed Rimmer‘s convictions and sentences, but it 
                                          
 
 
4.  The Court sentenced Rimmer to life imprisonment for the robbery and 
kidnapping counts, thirty years‘ imprisonment for the attempted armed robbery, 
and ten years‘ imprisonment for the aggravated assault.  Codefendant Parker is 
serving life sentences for the murders and for the counts of robbery and 
kidnapping.  He was also sentenced to fifteen years in prison for attempted armed 
robbery, and five years for aggravated assault.  Parker‘s convictions and sentences 
were affirmed on direct appeal.  See Parker v. State, 795 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2001).  
 
5.  Rimmer raised the following issues on direct appeal: 
(1) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress physical 
evidence where the items seized were not part of the search warrant 
for defendant‘s vehicle; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the 
pretrial and trial identifications of appellant by two witnesses where 
the procedures employed by the police were unnecessarily suggestive; 
(3) the trial court erred in excusing two prospective jurors; (4) the trial 
court erred in allowing Detective Kelley to testify about his ability to 
see without prescription eyeglasses as rebuttal testimony to evidence 
that appellant could not function without his glasses; (5) the trial court 
erred in failing to declare a mistrial when the prosecutor asked the 
appellant‘s wife whether she had ever asked her husband about the 
murders, thereby encroaching upon appellant‘s right to remain silent; 
(6) prosecutorial comments during the guilt phase proceedings denied 
appellant of a fair trial; (7) the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to cross-examine the defense‘s mental health expert about 
appellant‘s criminal history where the expert did not rely on the 
evidence in her evaluation or opinion; (8) improper prosecutorial 
comments during the penalty phase proceedings denied appellant a 
 
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struck HAC as an aggravating circumstance after concluding that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the trial court‘s finding that the murders were 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  However, this Court deemed the error 
harmless.  Additionally, this Court concluded on direct appeal that Officer Kelley, 
one of the law enforcement officers involved in Rimmer‘s capture, was improperly 
allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness for the State.  However, this Court 
determined that there was no reasonable possibility the error caused by allowing 
Kelley‘s rebuttal testimony contributed to the verdict.   
After this Court affirmed Rimmer‘s convictions and sentences, Rimmer filed 
a rule 3.851 postconviction motion.6  The circuit court held a Huff7 hearing to 
                                                                                                                                        
fair trial; (9) the evidence is insufficient to support the heinous, 
atrocious, and cruel (HAC) aggravator; and (10) the trial court erred in 
permitting the jury to consider victim impact evidence. 
Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 311 n.9. 
 
6.  As restated, Rimmer raised the following claims in his original and his 
amended postconviction motions: (1) Rimmer was deprived of due process and 
equal protection because he has been denied access to files and records that are in 
the custody of certain state agencies; (2) the application of new rule 3.851 deprives 
Rimmer of due process and equal protection; (3) Rimmer‘s inability to interview 
jurors to determine whether juror misconduct occurred violates his constitutional 
rights; (4) Rimmer‘s convictions are unreliable because trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate and prepare a defense and to adequately challenge the 
State‘s case; (5) Rimmer‘s sentencing phase was unreliable because trial counsel 
failed to adequately investigate and prepare mitigating evidence and to adequately 
challenge the State‘s case; (6) Rimmer‘s right to effective counsel was violated 
because of trial counsel‘s conflict of interest; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to improper prosecutorial argument; (8) Rimmer was deprived of 
 
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determine whether the claims Rimmer raised in his motion required an evidentiary 
hearing.  Following the Huff hearing, the court granted an evidentiary hearing on 
the following six claims: (4) Rimmer‘s convictions are unreliable because trial 
counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare a defense and to adequately 
challenge the State‘s case; (5) Rimmer‘s sentencing phase was unreliable because 
trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare mitigating evidence and 
to adequately challenge the State‘s case; (6) Rimmer‘s right to effective counsel 
was violated because of trial counsel‘s conflict of interest; (8) Rimmer was 
deprived of his rights under Ake v. Oklahoma; (9) the State withheld material and 
exculpatory evidence and violated Rimmer‘s constitutional rights (Brady8 claim); 
and (11) penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the 
unconstitutionality of Rimmer‘s death sentence.  Following the evidentiary 
                                                                                                                                        
his rights under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (9) the State withheld 
material and exculpatory evidence and violated Rimmer‘s constitutional rights; 
(10) Rimmer is insane to be executed; (11) Rimmer‘s death sentence is 
unconstitutional because it improperly shifts the burden to the defense and because 
the trial court employed a presumption of death in sentencing him, and trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to make this argument; (12) Rimmer is innocent 
of first-degree murder, and there was insufficient evidence to convict him;  
(13) Ring (Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)) claim; (14) Florida‘s methods of 
execution constitute cruel and unusual punishment; and (15) hearsay admitted at 
trial deprived Rimmer of a full and fair trial, and counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to such hearsay. 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
8.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
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hearing, the court issued an order that denied postconviction relief.  Rimmer now 
appeals the court‘s order and also raises additional claims in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  We will address Rimmer‘s postconviction appeal first, and then we 
will address Rimmer‘s habeas petition.  
RIMMER’S 3.851 CLAIMS 
The Issues on Appeal 
Rimmer raises multiple issues in his appeal of the circuit court‘s denial of 
postconviction relief.  In addition to claims that both guilt phase and penalty phase 
counsel were ineffective in the preparation for and presentation of his trial, that 
guilt phase counsel had a conflict of interest, and that the State committed Brady 
violations, Rimmer also alleges that certain procedural rulings made by the trial 
court deprived him of a full and fair evidentiary hearing.  We will discuss the 
procedural matters first, then discuss Rimmer‘s remaining claims.  
Procedural Rulings 
First, Rimmer contends that the circuit court improperly excluded five 
witnesses whose testimony he wished to present during his evidentiary hearing, 
and that the court improperly granted the State‘s motion for discovery pertaining to 
the proposed witnesses.  We disagree and find no error in the court‘s rulings.   
At the evidentiary hearing, Rimmer sought to present the testimony of 
codefendant Parker, Rosario‘s girlfriend, and victims Moore, Rosario, and Burke.  
 
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The State filed a motion for discovery that sought a proffer of each witness‘s 
testimony.  After the court granted the State‘s motion, Rimmer proffered the 
testimony and argued that each witness‘s testimony was necessary to support 
Rimmer‘s misidentification defense and demonstrate how trial counsel was 
ineffective in investigating and presenting it.  In response, the State filed a motion 
to strike the witnesses‘ testimony.  The court granted the State‘s motion to strike, 
but it reserved the right to revisit the issue if Rimmer later made a sufficient 
showing that the witnesses‘ testimony was relevant.  Rimmer argues that the court 
should not have required him to proffer the testimony, nor should the court have 
precluded the testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  We disagree with Rimmer‘s 
arguments.   
In State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 1994), this Court concluded 
that a trial court may permit pre-hearing discovery during postconviction 
proceedings under rule 3.850.  We stated that in ruling on such a motion for 
postconviction discovery, the court shall consider ―the issues presented, the 
elapsed time between the conviction and the post-conviction hearing, and burdens 
placed on the opposing party and witnesses, alternative means of securing the 
evidence, and any other relevant facts.‖  Lewis, 656 So. 2d at 1250 (citing People 
ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 526 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ill. 1988)).  We reject Rimmer‘s 
criticism of the court‘s analysis of the State‘s motion for discovery, and we 
 
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conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State‘s 
motion and requiring the proffer.   
We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it granted 
the State‘s motion to strike the testimony of the five witnesses.  It is well settled 
that ―[t]he admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and the trial court‘s determination will not be disturbed on appellate review absent 
a clear abuse of that discretion.‖  Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 2005).  
The court granted the State‘s motion on the grounds that the testimony was not 
relevant.  However, the court reasonably allowed Rimmer the possibility of 
introducing the witnesses‘ testimony later if he demonstrated relevance.  We find 
no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s ruling.            
Second, Rimmer contends that the circuit court improperly denied certain 
public records demands.  Although the court granted many of Rimmer‘s demands, 
it denied Rimmer‘s demands for information relating to thirty-four people whose 
names appeared in various police reports or case records.  With respect to these 
people, Rimmer‘s demands sought the following from the Broward Sheriff‘s 
Office, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the State:  
Any and all files (regardless of form and including 
photographs, sound or video recordings, physical evidence, and 
electronic mail and/or files) related to any matter in which the    
below-listed individuals were the subject of an investigation, accused, 
charged and/or convicted of a crime, and/or was a witness, suspect, or 
victim. 
 
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The agencies objected to Rimmer‘s demands on the grounds that the demands were 
overly broad and unduly burdensome, and the court concluded that Rimmer did not 
satisfy the burden that he was required to meet under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.852 (Capital Postconviction Public Records Production).  Under rule 
3.852(g)(3), additional public records are to be produced when all of the following 
criteria are met: (1) collateral counsel has made a timely and diligent search; 
(2) the written demand for records specifically identifies the additional records that 
are not at the records repository; (3) the records sought are relevant to the subject 
matter of a rule 3.851 proceeding or appear reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence; and (4) the additional public records demand is 
not overly broad or unduly burdensome.   
 
The postconviction record contains detailed orders which reflect the court‘s 
careful consideration of the parties‘ positions on this issue.  Among the 
information considered by the court was the ability of the agencies to conduct 
searches of the degree required by Rimmer‘s demand.  We emphasize that rule 
3.852 ―is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for 
records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.‖  Sims v. State, 
753 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000).  The court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Rimmer‘s demands.      
 
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Third, Rimmer contends that his postconviction record is incomplete.  
However, ―[b]are allegations of unrecorded depositions and proceedings are 
legally insufficient‖ to warrant relief.  Armstrong v. State, 862 So. 2d 705, 721 
(Fla. 2003).  Consequently, we find no merit in this claim.     
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Rimmer also asserts that both guilt and penalty phase counsel provided him 
with ineffective assistance of counsel, and that as a result, he is entitled to 
postconviction relief.  However, Rimmer bears the burden of demonstrating that 
counsel‘s performance met the standard of ineffectiveness as explained in the 
United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  Rimmer‘s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to the 
following analysis: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.  
 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).   
Therefore, in order to be successful, Rimmer‘s claims must demonstrate both 
deficient performance and prejudice that are consistent with the standard as 
 
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outlined in Strickland.  Because an analysis of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel presents mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed 
standard of review, deferring to the circuit court‘s factual findings that are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the court‘s legal 
conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  
Our analysis of Rimmer‘s claims is guided by a strong presumption that trial 
counsel‘s performance was not ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  ―A 
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel‘s 
perspective at the time.‖  Id. at 689.  The defendant carries the burden to overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ―might be 
considered sound trial strategy.‖  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 
101 (1955)).  Moreover, we note that trial counsel‘s ―strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel‘s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.‖  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  
Rimmer contends that there were multiple instances of ineffective assistance of 
counsel by both guilt and penalty phase counsel, but we conclude that Rimmer has 
demonstrated neither deficiency nor prejudice as to the majority of his claims.  
 
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Although we find that the performance of penalty phase counsel was deficient with 
respect to the investigation of possible mitigation, we conclude that Rimmer has 
not made a sufficient showing of prejudice.  Therefore, Rimmer is not entitled to 
relief. 
Guilt Phase Ineffectiveness Claims 
 
Rimmer alleges several instances of ineffective assistance of guilt phase 
counsel, Richard Garfield.  First, Rimmer argues that counsel failed to properly 
develop the defense theory of misidentification.  Second, Rimmer contends that 
counsel failed to properly investigate other suspects and leads.  Third, Rimmer 
contends that counsel failed to rehabilitate the testimony of Rimmer‘s wife and that 
counsel failed to assert a marital privilege objection.  Fourth, Rimmer contends 
that counsel improperly waived speedy trial.  As we explain below, we find no 
merit in any of these claims. 
Ineffective Development of Misidentification Defense 
 
Rimmer contends that counsel was ineffective in developing and presenting 
the defense theory of misidentification.  Specifically, Rimmer argues that counsel 
failed to properly investigate and present his prior medical records from the Florida 
Department of Corrections (DOC), failed to rebut the testimony of Detective 
Kelley, and failed to obtain an eyewitness identification expert.  We conclude that 
each of these claims is without merit. 
 
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Rimmer, who contends that he must wear prescription eyeglasses in order to 
see properly, argues that counsel was ineffective because he failed to use Rimmer‘s 
DOC medical records in aid of his defense that he was not the shooter.  Rimmer 
states that he is unable to wear contacts because of corneal ulcers, and argues that 
the DOC records would have aided his defense by demonstrating his dependence 
upon prescription glasses and enhancing trial testimony that the shooter did not 
wear glasses.   
At the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he did not want to use 
Rimmer‘s DOC records to support the misidentification defense because doing so 
would have alerted the jury to the fact that Rimmer previously spent time in prison.  
In its order denying postconviction relief, the circuit court concluded that counsel‘s 
failure to use the DOC records did not amount to deficient performance.  The court 
noted that rather than make the jury aware of Rimmer‘s prison record, counsel 
chose to introduce more recent testimony about Rimmer‘s eyesight through two 
witnesses.  One of these witnesses was an optician who filled an eyeglasses 
prescription for Rimmer less than three months before the murders, and the other 
witness was an optometrist who had examined Rimmer‘s vision and testified that 
Rimmer required corrective lenses in order to see properly.  The optometrist 
testified that Rimmer‘s eyesight was 20/400 and that Rimmer was legally blind 
without corrected vision.  Without corrected vision, the optometrist said, Rimmer 
 
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would have to squint and get close to an object to see it, and also would be unable 
to drive without getting into an accident.  The court concluded that counsel‘s 
decision to introduce the testimony of these witnesses instead of the DOC records 
was a well-reasoned decision.  Competent, substantial evidence in the record 
supports the court‘s findings, and we agree with the circuit court‘s conclusion that 
counsel‘s performance was not deficient.  Therefore, we find no merit in Rimmer‘s 
claim. 
Next, Rimmer argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut 
the testimony of Officer Kelley.  Kelley was one of the officers involved in the 
high-speed chase that led to Rimmer‘s arrest on May 10, 1998, and he was 
originally called as a State witness to testify about that pursuit.  However, the State 
recalled Kelley as a rebuttal witness in order to counter the testimony offered by 
the defense regarding Rimmer‘s eyesight.  The State used Kelley, whose 
uncorrected vision was 20/300, to testify that although objects and people appeared 
blurry without his eyeglasses, he could still see them.  Thus, the inference that the 
State hoped the jury would draw was that because the vision-impaired Kelley 
could see without his eyeglasses, so could Rimmer.  Defense counsel 
contemporaneously objected to Kelley‘s testimony and moved for a mistrial that 
was denied by the trial court.  On direct appeal, this Court concluded that the 
admission of Kelley‘s rebuttal testimony was erroneous, but that in light of the 
 
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evidence of Rimmer‘s guilt, there was ―no reasonable possibility that the erroneous 
admission . . . contributed to the verdict.‖  Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 322 (citing State 
v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)).   
At the evidentiary hearing, Rimmer introduced the testimony of Dr. Darrell 
Teppler, who stated that Kelley‘s testimony about his own eyesight could have led 
the jury to make an erroneous conclusion about Rimmer‘s eyesight.  Rimmer now 
argues that the failure to use testimony like that of Dr. Teppler to rebut Kelley‘s 
testimony amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because we have 
determined that the admission of Kelley‘s rebuttal testimony was harmless error, 
Rimmer cannot demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.     
See, e.g., Cox v. State, 966 So. 2d 337, 347-48 (Fla. 2007).  Therefore, Rimmer is 
not entitled to relief.9     
 
Additionally, Rimmer argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
obtain an expert who would challenge the eyewitnesses‘ identifications.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Rimmer‘s expert testified that eyewitness identifications are 
generally unreliable, especially in stressful situations.  The trial court rejected this 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and noted that counsel ―continually 
challenged the identification of the Defendant prior to and during trial.‖  Because 
                                          
 
 
9.  Moreover, we reject Rimmer‘s argument that the State committed an act 
of prosecutorial misconduct by placing Officer Kelley on the stand during rebuttal.   
 
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counsel conducted an effective cross-examination of the eyewitnesses and 
consistently attacked the eyewitness identifications and the process of making 
those identifications, Rimmer has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by 
counsel‘s failure to obtain an eyewitness identification expert.  See Rose v. State, 
617 So. 2d 291, 297 (Fla. 1993).  Consequently, Rimmer is not entitled to relief. 
Ineffective Investigation of Other Suspects and Leads 
 
Rimmer also argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
properly investigate other suspects and leads.  Rimmer‘s argument fails because he 
has not demonstrated prejudice that undermines this Court‘s confidence in his 
guilt.  Two eyewitnesses, Burke and Moore, identified Rimmer as the person who 
robbed Audio Logic and shot Krause and Knight.  The description that Burke 
provided to the sketch artist was so consistent with Rimmer‘s actual appearance 
that an employee of one of Audio Logic‘s competitors recognized the person in the 
sketch as Rimmer.  Burke also had an opportunity to view Rimmer in a 
nonconfrontational mode while sitting in the waiting room before she walked into 
the installation area and observed the robbery taking place.  Additionally, at the 
time of his arrest, Rimmer had just led police on a high-speed chase during which 
he threw the gun stolen from Audio Logic, one of the victims‘ wallets, and the 
murder weapon out of the car.  Moreover, Rimmer owned a car of the same make, 
model, and description that was seen at Audio Logic before and during the 
 
- 22 - 
robbery.  Audio equipment stolen from Audio Logic and bearing Rimmer‘s 
fingerprints was found in a storage unit that Rimmer rented just days after the 
robbery.  In light of this overwhelming evidence of guilt, Rimmer cannot 
demonstrate prejudice.  Rimmer is not entitled to relief.     
Testimony of Rimmer‘s Wife 
Rimmer‘s next claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relates to the 
testimony of his wife, Joanne, who was a witness for the defense.  Joanne testified 
during direct examination that Rimmer had an alibi for the time of the robbery 
because he left home with his sons that morning to go fishing.  She also testified 
that she, not Rimmer, drove the Ford Probe that morning, and he drove the 
Oldsmobile.  During cross-examination, the State sought to attack her credibility 
and to use her knowledge of Rimmer‘s income and monthly expenses to suggest 
that Rimmer had an inordinate amount of money in his possession at the time of 
his arrest.  Rimmer argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to rehabilitate 
Joanne‘s testimony and that as a result, the jury was less likely to believe the alibi 
she provided. 
Here, Rimmer has demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice.   
When asked about his failure to address Joanne‘s testimony, counsel testified that 
he did not object because he did not believe that the testimony was inconsistent 
with the defense theory, and he did not want to bring attention to what he believed 
 
- 23 - 
was an insignificant issue.  The circuit court concluded that counsel‘s handling of 
Joanne‘s testimony was ―a matter of reasoned trial strategy and not a deficiency.‖  
We find no error in the court‘s determination that counsel‘s strategic decision was 
reasonable.   
 
Rimmer also argues that counsel‘s failure to object to certain questions 
asked by the State constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the 
questions were an improper comment on his right to remain silent.  Rimmer‘s 
entire argument on this issue consists of the following: ―At trial, the State 
questioned Mr. Rimmer‘s wife about communications she had had with her 
husband pertaining to the case.  Trial counsel failed to object for no strategic 
reason.  Trial counsel‘s failure to object was deficient.‖   
Rimmer argued on direct appeal ―that the prosecutor improperly solicited 
comment on his right to remain silent by asking his wife, Joanne Rimmer, about 
her conversations with [Rimmer] as to his involvement in the double homicide.‖  
Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 322.  Although we concluded that ―the State‘s question 
[came] very close to infringing on [Rimmer‘s] right to remain silent,‖ we 
nonetheless determined that ―the question coupled with the answer [that she did 
not ask Rimmer about the murders] was not fairly susceptible of being interpreted 
by the jury as a comment on the defendant‘s failure to testify.‖  Id.  Because we 
 
- 24 - 
previously concluded that this issue was without merit, Rimmer‘s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is likewise without merit.      
Speedy Trial 
 
Rimmer also argues that counsel waived speedy trial and did so improperly 
because the State was at fault for failing to provide timely discovery.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, counsel recalled a status conference in July 1998, but stated 
that he was not certain that he actually waived Rimmer‘s right to a speedy trial.  
However, counsel testified that to ensure that he would have enough time to 
prepare for trial, he agreed to a trial date of January 18, 1999.  Because of a 
holiday, trial began on January 19, 1999, some eight and one-half months after the 
murders.  Rimmer has not shown how counsel‘s performance was deficient and has 
not shown how he was prejudiced.  This claim has no merit.     
Conflict of Interest 
 
Rimmer also argues that he was deprived of effective counsel during the 
guilt phase because counsel had a conflict of interest.  Effective representation for 
the purpose of the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be free of actual 
conflict.  See Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 786, 791-92 (Fla. 2002).  In order to 
prevail on this claim, Rimmer must demonstrate an actual conflict that adversely 
affected counsel‘s performance.  Id.  Rimmer argues that the source of the conflict 
 
- 25 - 
is a letter written by counsel to the lead detective between the end of the guilt 
phase and the beginning of the penalty phase: 
Dear Detective Lewis, 
Please accept my congratulations for your role in the successful 
prosecution of Robert Rimmer and Kevin Parker for committing the 
double homicide and robberies that occurred on May 2, 1998 in the 
above-referenced matter. 
You demonstrated that hard work and diligence are ultimately 
rewarded.  Hopefully the families of the victims and the community of 
Wilton Manors recognize you for your accomplishments in this case.   
 
Warmest Regards, 
Richard Garfield 
 
We conclude that Rimmer has not met his burden of ― ‗identify[ing] specific 
evidence in the record that suggests that . . . [his] interests were impaired or 
compromised‘ for the benefit of [his] attorney.‖  State v. Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 
209 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Herring v. State, 730 So. 2d 1264, 1267 (Fla.1998)).  At 
the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified at length about the letter, and he stated 
that he wrote it as an act of good will and was motivated to do so after hearing how 
the detective was subjected to racist comments during the course of another, 
unrelated investigation.  The circuit court concluded in its order: 
The record also demonstrates that Mr. Garfield was aggressive in 
challenging work done by Detective Lewis, both at trial, and pretrial.  
Mr. Garfield argued pretrial motions to suppress based upon the work 
done by Detective Lewis.  Mr. Garfield cross-examined Detective 
Lewis during the trial and advanced legal arguments critical of the 
work done on the case by Detective Lewis.   
 
- 26 - 
This Court finds Mr. Garfield‘s explanation for the letter to be 
adequate and does not find that there was any conflict of interest that 
affected the defendant‘s case.   
 
The court‘s findings are based on competent, substantial evidence in the record, 
and Rimmer is not entitled to relief on this claim.   
Penalty Phase Ineffectiveness Claims 
 
Rimmer also alleges that his penalty phase counsel, Hale Schantz, also 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  Rimmer‘s most significant allegation is 
that counsel failed to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence.  
Additionally, Rimmer asserts that counsel failed to object to certain comments 
made by the prosecutor and failed to object to certain aggravating circumstances.  
We conclude that while some of Rimmer‘s claims have merit as to counsel‘s 
deficient performance, Rimmer has not demonstrated the necessary element of 
prejudice, and therefore, he is not entitled to relief.   
Investigation and Presentation of Mitigating Evidence 
According to Rimmer, counsel failed to conduct an adequate background 
investigation.  Rimmer contends that counsel conducted only a limited 
investigation of his family and social history, religious and cultural experiences, 
employment, and education.  In particular, Rimmer argues that counsel‘s 
inadequate investigation failed to produce evidence that he suffered a traumatic 
childhood that included physical abuse at the hands of his father.  Counsel testified 
 
- 27 - 
that while preparing for the penalty phase, he had no indication that Rimmer was 
physically abused during his childhood.  Moreover, Rimmer‘s mother testified that 
she did not tell counsel about the abuse because she was embarrassed.  Counsel 
also testified that he had a great deal of difficulty getting potential witnesses to 
speak with him.  However, at the evidentiary hearing, witnesses testified that 
Rimmer and his brothers grew up in an extremely unstable and often unsafe 
environment.  These witnesses included Rimmer‘s aunt, Jeanette, who provided 
credible testimony about Rimmer‘s childhood and the abuse sustained at the hands 
of his father.  The evidence of Rimmer‘s childhood abuse notwithstanding, our 
confidence in the outcome has not been undermined.  In light of the significant 
aggravation in this case, we conclude that Rimmer has not satisified the prejudice 
prong of Strickland, as is necessary to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
Rimmer also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to present the 
testimony of his brother O‘Dell and his girlfriend Sabrina as mitigation.  We 
disagree.  Counsel testified that he made a strategic decision to use neither O‘Dell 
nor Sabrina as a mitigation witness.  Counsel testified that he was concerned that 
the jury might become aware of O‘Dell‘s prison sentence for murder, and he did 
not want to create the impression for the jury that Rimmer is a part of a family of 
murderers.  Additionally, counsel testified that he made a strategic decision not to 
 
- 28 - 
present the testimony of Rimmer‘s girlfriend because her testimony would have 
eroded the picture that he was trying to paint of Rimmer as a loving and committed 
husband and father.  Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for his strategic 
decision not to use O‘Dell and Sabrina as witnesses.  See Davis v. State, 928 So. 
2d 1089, 1116 (Fla. 2005) (holding that counsel‘s strategic decisions did not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).   
While counsel‘s performance was not deficient with respect to the 
investigation of possible childhood abuse or the decision to exclude certain 
witnesses, we do find that counsel conducted an unreasonably incomplete 
investigation into Rimmer‘s records, including school, employment, and prison 
records.  As we discuss below, counsel‘s deficient performance deprived 
Dr. Martha Jacobson, the defense‘s mental health expert at trial, of information that 
was important to her assessment of Rimmer‘s mental health.   
Dr. Jacobson testified during the penalty phase that Rimmer suffered from 
schizo-affective disorder.  At that time, Jacobson also concluded that Rimmer was 
not under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  When the 
court sentenced Rimmer, it specifically rejected the statutory mitigating 
circumstance that Rimmer was under the influence of an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.   
 
- 29 - 
However, at the evidentiary hearing, Jacobson testified that although she 
normally reviews a defendant‘s mental health, family, school, and prior criminal 
history records, penalty phase counsel did not provide her with any of this 
information.  Then, based on her review of additional documentation obtained 
post-trial of Rimmer‘s mental health history, including Rimmer‘s school records 
and prior prison records, Jacobson opined at the evidentiary hearing that Rimmer 
was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time 
of the murders.   
Indeed, when questioned at the evidentiary hearing about this matter, 
counsel testified that he relied on Jacobson to tell him what records she needed.  
Counsel made virtually no effort to search for records or to assist Jacobson in her 
evaluation of Rimmer‘s mental health.  Despite counsel‘s acknowledgment that he 
failed to provide Jacobson with relevant records, the circuit court concluded that 
―penalty phase trial counsel was not ineffective in preparing for and presenting 
Defendant‘s mental health mitigation.‖  The court also stated that ―the additional 
background information and records would have bolstered Dr. Jacobson‘s trial 
testimony, but not to the extent that the results would likely have been any 
different.‖  The trial court found that while ―the testimony presented at the 
evidentiary hearing was more detailed than that presented at trial,‖ it ―for the most 
part was cumulative, with the exception of the information about physical abuse.‖  
 
- 30 - 
Although we agree with the court‘s ultimate conclusion that counsel‘s performance 
does not undermine confidence in the outcome of Rimmer‘s penalty phase, we do 
conclude that counsel‘s failure to obtain Rimmer‘s relevant and reasonably 
accessible records and to provide them to the defense expert does constitute 
deficient performance.   
However, even if we accept as credible the evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing, Rimmer still has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by 
counsel‘s failure to properly investigate and present this information.  In light of 
the severe aggravation in this case, the possible mitigation presented at the hearing 
does not undermine our confidence in Rimmer‘s sentence of death.   On direct 
appeal, this court upheld the trial court‘s finding of five aggravating circumstances, 
including that the murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP).  We 
have said that CCP is among the weightiest aggravators in the sentencing scheme.  
See McKenzie v. State, 29 So. 3d 272, 287 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 
(U.S. Oct. 4, 2010); Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233, 243 (Fla. 2008).  In addition 
to CCP, the trial court found that the murders were committed while Rimmer was 
under a sentence of imprisonment, Rimmer was previously convicted of a capital 
felony and a violent felony, the murders were committed during the course of a 
robbery and kidnapping, and the murders were committed to avoid arrest.  Given 
these aggravating circumstances, we conclude that Rimmer has not demonstrated 
 
- 31 - 
the requisite prejudice that is necessary to prove that counsel was ineffective under 
Strickland.  Because Rimmer has not satisfied his burden under Strickland, he is 
not entitled to relief.  
Prosecutor‘s Statements 
 
Rimmer also argues that penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to certain remarks by the prosecutor during closing argument.  Specifically, 
he contends that the prosecutor made an improper comment about victim Knight‘s 
fear: 
Aaron Knight, duct-taped, hands behind his back, laying down on the 
floor, depicted here in State‘s 4 in evidence, as depicted in State‘s 6 
and 7, State‘s 6 and 7, [sic] the 10- to 20-minute period in which 
Aaron was down on the floor, face down, the terror and the thoughts 
that went through his mind, that then a car starts to drive and stops; 
and the defendant gets out of the Ford Probe and then walks back to 
Aaron Knight, duct-taped, on the floor and says, ―You know me, 
don‘t you?‖  And then Aaron Knight is shot in the back of the head.  
Heinous, atrocious, and cruel, I submit to you yes, the mental terror 
and anguish that Aaron Knight went through that has been proven in 
this case.   
 
In its order, the circuit court concluded that this issue was procedurally barred 
because it was not raised on direct appeal.  Moreover, the court concluded that the 
comment was relevant. 
 
While we conclude that counsel‘s failure to object to the prosecutor‘s 
comment is properly raised as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we 
nonetheless conclude that this claim is without merit.  The comment was relevant 
 
- 32 - 
to a finding that the murders were heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) and was a fair 
comment on the evidence presented at trial.  Unlike other cases where this Court 
has concluded that statements about the victim were improper, this argument by 
the prosecutor did not invite the jury to imagine Knight‘s anguish or put 
themselves in his place.  Cf. Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 358-59 (Fla.1988) 
(―[Y]ou can just imagine the pain this young girl was going through as she was 
laying there on the ground dying . . . . I would hope . . . that the jurors will listen to 
the screams and to her desires for punishment.‖).  Additionally, although the 
comment was made while the prosecutor argued HAC, which was reversed on 
appeal, the comment was also relevant to prove CCP, which this Court upheld.  
Moreover, Rimmer has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the comment.  
Given the gravity of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, our 
confidence in the outcome has not been undermined, and Rimmer is not entitled to 
relief. 
Rimmer also contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
another of the prosecutor‘s comments. While discussing the murder of Aaron 
Knight, the prosecutor held the murder weapon and ―clicked‖ it during the 
following excerpt of the closing argument: 
The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, 
calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or 
legal justification.  Certainly the murder of Aaron Knight has no 
 
- 33 - 
moral or legal pretense or justification at all.  Cold, calculated and 
premeditated.   
Judge, I have already cleared State‘s 60 with your bailiffs.   
Defendant Rimmer walks up to Aaron Knight, back from his 
car, and says, ―You know me, don‘t you?‖  And Aaron Knight says, 
―No.‖  And then what does the defendant do? 
(―Click‖ from gun.) 
Shoots him in the back of the head.  I submit to you that the 
murder of Aaron Knight fits all of those aggravating circumstances.  
And I submit to you all that the proper legal recommendation for 
Defendant Rimmer for the murder of Aaron Knight is death.   
 
This conduct does not even rise to the level of that in Smith v. State, 866 So. 2d 51 
(Fla. 2004), where the defense attorney moved for mistrial after the prosecutor 
slammed the murder weapon down on the table.  Defense counsel moved for 
mistrial, arguing that the sound was ―louder than a gunshot.‖  Id. at 63.  The 
defendant argued in this Court ―that the prosecutor‘s action prejudiced his defense 
by injecting fear and emotion into the jury‘s consideration of the case.‖  Id.  In 
concluding that the trial court properly admonished the prosecutor and denied the 
motion for mistrial, this Court said, ―In respect to claims such as this, we respect 
the vantage point of the trial court, being present in the courtroom, over our 
reading of a cold record.‖  Id. at 64 (citing Justus v. State, 438 So. 2d 358, 366 
(Fla. 1983)).  Likewise, we respect the vantage point of the trial court, and we 
conclude that there was no error.  Rimmer is not entitled to relief. 
 
Rimmer also argues that the Spencer hearing testimony of Bradley Krause 
Sr., the father of victim Bradley Krause, ―was also improper and should have been 
 
- 34 - 
objected to or otherwise corrected by trial counsel.‖  Rimmer points to Krause Sr.‘s 
statement where he expressed his desire to see Rimmer sentenced to death: 
Prosecutor:  Mr. Krause, you‘re Bradley Krause, Jr.‘s father? 
 
Krause:  Yes. 
 
Prosecutor:  Did you have something which you would like to say to 
His Honor, Judge Cohn? 
 
Krause:  Yes, I do.  The jury found Robert Rimmer guilty of 
murdering my son on May 2nd.  I would like to ask you to follow the 
recommendation and sentence him to the electric chair.  That‘s all I 
have to say. 
 
The Court:  Thank you, Mr. Krause.   
 
Rimmer claims that the father‘s statement was improper and that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to this testimony. 
 
Although section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (1997), prohibits victim 
impact testimony that suggests an appropriate sentence, we note that this testimony 
occurred during the Spencer10 hearing and outside of the jury‘s presence.  
Therefore, there is no risk that the jury‘s advisory sentence was improperly 
affected by sympathy for the victim‘s father.  See Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 
628 (Fla. 2001) (―Although [the witness‘s] testimony exceeded the proper bounds 
of victim impact evidence because she commented on the defendant and the crime 
and provided her opinion as to a proper punishment, defense counsel failed to 
                                          
 
 
10.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
- 35 - 
contemporaneously object to her testimony.  Thus, this issue was not preserved for 
review and would not demonstrate fundamental error because the testimony came 
during the Spencer hearing and outside the presence of the jury.‖).  Rimmer is not 
entitled to relief.11      
Aggravating Circumstances 
With only a cursory argument to support his claim, Rimmer also asserts that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury being instructed on both the 
                                          
 
 
11.  On direct appeal, Rimmer challenged several comments that were made 
by the prosecutor during the penalty phase.  In denying relief for these allegedly 
improper comments, this Court noted that the defense counsel did not object to 
them.  Rimmer now argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
comments.  The argument in Rimmer‘s brief is contained in a footnote, and the 
summary of these comments is taken directly from our opinion on direct appeal: 
These comments include: (1) describing the shootings as ―vicious and 
brutal executions‖; (2) describing the mental health expert's opinion as 
―legal mumbo-jumbo‖; (3) asserting that the prison system is filled 
with individuals like appellant who suffer from antisocial personality 
disorders; (4) telling the jury to do its job and return the ―morally‖ 
correct death sentence; (5) reciting the victim-impact evidence, 
followed by a statement advising the jury that while Florida no longer 
paroles inmates, it does release prisoners through a conditional release 
program; and (6) during the Spencer hearing, describing the appellant 
as a ―worthless piece of fecal matter . . . whose death should come 
prior to natural causes.‖ 
Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 325.  Rimmer is correct that we noted counsel‘s failure to 
object.  However, we also proceeded to conclude that ―none of the alleged 
improper comments rise to the level of fundamental error, individually or 
collectively.‖  Id.  Therefore, Rimmer‘s claim fails, and he is entitled to no relief.  
 
- 36 - 
pecuniary gain and the witness elimination aggravating circumstances.12  Rimmer‘s 
argument is without merit.   
At trial, the court instructed the jury to consider a series of aggravating 
circumstances, including whether the murders were committed to prevent lawful 
arrest or to prevent escape, and whether the murders were committed for financial 
gain.  The trial court also gave the doubling instruction to the jury and stated that 
―if two or more of the aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt by a single aspect of the offense, you‘re to consider that as supporting only 
one aggravating circumstance.‖   At sentencing, the trial court stated that it ―did 
not consider the pecuniary gain aggravator‖ because the circumstance was not 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although Rimmer contends that ―it is legally 
inconsistent for a jury to consider both aggravators,‖ and that the jury was 
erroneously allowed to consider both of these circumstances, his argument is 
without merit.   
 First, the trial court‘s determination that the pecuniary gain aggravating 
circumstance was not proven does not mean that the jury should have been 
precluded from considering it.  We have said that ―[i]f evidence of an aggravating 
factor has been presented to a jury, an instruction on the factor is required.‖  Henry 
                                          
 
 
12.  Rimmer also raises this claim in his habeas petition as a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  
 
- 37 - 
v. State, 649 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1994) (citing Bowden v. State, 588 So. 2d 
225, 231 (Fla.1991)).  The trial court‘s ultimate decision not to consider pecuniary 
gain ―does not mean there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider 
the factor.‖  Id.  We have observed that 
[i]f the advisory function [of the jury] were to be limited initially 
because the jury could only consider those mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances which the trial judge decided to be appropriate in a 
particular case, the statutory scheme would be distorted.  The jury‘s 
advice would be preconditioned by the judge‘s view of what they 
were allowed to know. 
 
Stewart v. State, 558 So. 2d 416, 421 (Fla. 1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Floyd v. State, 497 So. 2d 1211, 1215 (Fla. 1986)). 
Moreover, although Rimmer argues that ―[i]t is impossible for the state to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the killing 
was pecuniary gain, and at the same time prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
sole or dominant motive for the killing was elimination of a witness,‖ we note that 
we have previously held that these particular circumstances can, based on the facts 
of the case, be properly considered at the same time.  See Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 
2d 882, 885-86 (Fla. 2002) (holding that claim that CCP, avoid arrest, and 
pecuniary gain were unconstitutionally duplicated was without merit, and that 
appellate counsel was not ineffective).  Because the evidence introduced at trial 
justified giving jury instructions on both aggravating circumstances, and because 
the trial court issued the doubling instruction, the jury was properly allowed to 
 
- 38 - 
consider both aggravating circumstances.  Counsel‘s performance was not 
deficient, and therefore, Rimmer has not demonstrated that counsel was 
ineffective.  
Brady Claim 
 
Rimmer also contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963), by withholding various reports prepared by law enforcement agencies.  
He argues that the State‘s conduct prejudiced him because it hindered his 
misidentification defense by lessening his ability to attack the competence of the 
law enforcement investigation and the credibility of the eyewitnesses.  The circuit 
court found that the evidence ―does not establish that any of the reports, not 
provided to the defense, contained favorable evidence, or did not contain 
information that the defense already had.‖  We agree with the court‘s conclusion.        
In order to demonstrate a Brady violation, Rimmer must show that (1) favorable 
evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently 
suppressed by the State, and (3) that because the evidence was material, the 
defendant was prejudiced.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see 
also Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  To meet the materiality prong, 
Rimmer must demonstrate a reasonable probability that had the suppressed 
evidence been disclosed the jury would have reached a different verdict.  See 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
 
- 39 - 
undermine confidence in the outcome. See Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; see also 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.  The remedy of retrial for the State‘s suppression of 
evidence favorable to the defense is available when ―the favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict.‖  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  This Court‘s review of factual findings relating to 
Brady claims is based on whether the trial court‘s findings are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  Therefore, this gives deference to the court‘s 
findings on questions of fact but reviews de novo the application of the law and 
independently reviews the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence.  See 
Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 169 (Fla. 2004); Way, 760 So. 2d at 913.   
Rimmer has not shown that the State committed a Brady violation.  Based 
on the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made the following 
findings: 
 
Mr. Garfield testified that he did not have some of the 
documents included in Defense Exhibit 43.  According to 
Mr. Garfield, some of the documents relate only to the codefendant 
and/or would not have provided him with any useful information that 
he did not already have.  According to Mr. Garfield, some of the 
information in the FDLE documents, was provided to the FDLE by 
the WMPD, and not the other way around.  Peter Magrino, the trial 
prosecutor also testified that the FDLE reports were a synopsis of the 
Wilton Manors reports and that all the FDLE did was assist in 
compiling a photo lineup.  
 
 
- 40 - 
 
The Court heard testimony at the hearing concerning a West 
Pam [sic] Beach Police Department report of an investigation they 
conducted of a ―chop shop‖ and a suspect Greg Langman.  It was 
learned that Langman went to a vocational school attended by the 
Defendant and that the gun used in the crimes was connected to the 
―chop shop.‖  Mr. Garfield testified that he was aware of this 
information because it was contained in a report from WMPD.  
Mr. Garfield also stated that the West Palm Beach information is not 
something he would have used because it would have associated his 
client with other crimes and the last thing he wanted to do was 
establish that his client had the murder weapon prior to the day he was 
arrested and to associate him with ―a gang of thieves in West Palm 
Beach.‖   
 
 
There was also testimony, at the evidentiary hearing, about a 
Plantation Police Department investigation of a murder at a muffler 
shop.  Mr. Garfield testified that he does not believe he could have 
used this information because the crimes are not similar enough to 
each other, to get into evidence, and that jury‘s [sic] expect you to 
prove it was the other person.  Concerning the reports that two Wilton 
Manors Police Officers observed Ford Probes, the same kind of car 
used in the crimes, Mr. Garfield stated that this information would not 
have been any use to him because there was nothing to follow-up on. 
 
As discussed in the court‘s order, Rimmer has not proven each of the elements 
required of a successful Brady claim.  In particular, Rimmer has not shown how 
the evidence would have been exculpatory or impeaching.  Therefore, he is not 
entitled to relief.  
RIMMER’S HABEAS CLAIMS 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
We now turn to Rimmer‘s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, which he brings before this Court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
 
- 41 - 
Specifically, Rimmer contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the following: the testimony of a witness for the State; the trial court‘s 
denial of the motion to sever defendants; a comment made by the prosecutor; the 
trial court‘s denial of motions for mistrial; the presence of the conjunction ―and/or‖ 
in the jury instructions; and the consideration of certain aggravating factors.  We 
address each claim in turn and conclude that none of them merits relief. 
Appellate counsel‘s ineffectiveness is properly raised in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  In order 
to grant habeas relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this 
Court must determine 
whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a 
serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the 
range of professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether 
the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to 
such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the 
result. 
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986).  ―The defendant has the 
burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.‖  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069. 
Witness Testimony 
 
Rimmer‘s first argument is that he was prejudiced by the admission of the 
testimony of Dynette Potter Mallard, a witness for the State.  Mallard, a former 
girlfriend of codefendant Parker, owned the Kia Sephia that was used in the 
 
- 42 - 
robbery.  Although the State obtained a sworn statement from Mallard on 
December 22, 1998, this statement was not disclosed to the defense until  
January 15, 1999, the Friday before jury selection.  As a result, the trial court 
conducted a Richardson13 hearing, where it concluded that the State committed a 
substantial and prejudicial, but not willful, discovery violation.  The court 
determined that the proper remedy would be to allow the defense to depose 
Mallard before she was placed on the stand at trial.   
At trial, Mallard testified that she had seen Rimmer and Parker together 
before and that she knew Rimmer casually.  She acknowledged that she may have 
seen Rimmer at her apartment talking with Parker as recently as the end of April or 
beginning of May 1998.  She stated that Parker drove her Kia Sephia on occasion 
and on the day of the robbery.  She also stated that Parker told her that he was 
going to the auto shop that day to get repair work done on her car speakers.  Parker 
also recounted to Mallard seeing a woman and her little girl in the shop‘s waiting 
room.  After that, he walked to the back of the store, saw some people in the back 
of the shop, and left.  Mallard also testified that Detective Lewis contacted her 
while looking for Parker some time after the robbery.  Rimmer suggests that the 
trial court should have prohibited Mallard‘s testimony at trial, and that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this argument on direct appeal.  Rimmer 
                                          
 
 
13.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
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argues that Mallard‘s testimony was prejudicial because it strengthened the 
connection between him and Parker.   
We reject Rimmer‘s argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge Mallard‘s testimony given the State‘s discovery violation.  
―Richardson mandates that once a discovery violation is revealed, the trial court 
must conduct an inquiry to determine the sanctions that should be imposed on the 
violating party.‖  Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560, 567 (Fla. 2005).  Although 
the exclusion of a witness is a potential remedy, the exclusion of evidence is to be 
imposed only when no other adequate remedy exists.  See McDuffie v. State, 970 
So. 2d 312, 321 (Fla. 2007) (―We are mindful that Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.220(n)(1) authorizes a trial court to exclude evidence as a sanction for 
a violation of the discovery rules, but this sanction should only be imposed when 
there is no other adequate remedy.‖).  Moreover, a trial court‘s decision on a 
Richardson hearing is subject to reversal only upon a showing of abuse of 
discretion.  Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 958 (Fla. 2003) (citing State v. 
Tascarella, 580 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 1991)). 
In this case, the trial court conducted the appropriate analysis to determine 
whether a Richardson violation occurred.  Having concluded that the late 
disclosure of Mallard‘s statement was not willful, the court ruled that Mallard be 
made available for deposition by the defense.  When Mallard took the stand, her 
 
- 44 - 
personal observations were appropriate for examination.  Moreover, she was 
subject to cross-examination by the defense.  The court did not abuse its discretion 
when it declined to exclude Mallard as a witness.  Therefore, appellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.   
Severance 
Rimmer also claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the trial court‘s denial of Rimmer‘s motion to sever.  Before trial, 
Rimmer moved to sever his trial from that of codefendant Parker.  Rimmer pointed 
to Parker‘s statement to Detective Lewis that he last saw Rimmer in December 
1997.  Rimmer argued that because identity would be a key issue during the trial, 
introducing Parker‘s statement that the two knew each other would be prejudicial.  
Rimmer‘s motion was initially denied by the trial court, although it reexamined the 
admissibility of the statement at trial and ruled that Lewis could not be examined 
on the matter.   
The error that Rimmer sought to prevent was the violation of a defendant‘s 
right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).   In 
Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that at a joint trial where a 
codefendant does not testify, a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation is violated when a statement by the codefendant that inculpates the 
 
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defendant is admitted into evidence.  Id. at 136-37.  The court did not err in 
denying Rimmer‘s motion, and Rimmer is not entitled to relief.   
―Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b)(1)(A), a severance of 
defendants may be ordered when it is appropriate to promote a fair determination 
of the guilt or innocence of the defendants.‖  Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 52 
(Fla. 2001).  However, ―severance is not necessary when the evidence is ‗presented 
in such a manner that the jury can distinguish the evidence relating to each 
defendant‘s acts, conduct and statements, and can then apply the law intelligently 
and without confusion to determine the individual defendant‘s guilt or   
innocence.‘ ‖  Id. (quoting Coleman v. State, 610 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 1992)).      
The trial court‘s decision on a motion to sever is subject to review for an 
abuse of discretion.  See Farina, 801 So. 2d at 52.  Given that the trial court 
ultimately ruled that Parker‘s statement was inadmissible, no Bruton violation can 
be gleaned from the trial court‘s denial of the motion to sever.  Therefore, appellate 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this issue.   
Moreover, we reject Rimmer‘s argument that a Bruton violation occurred in 
light of Mallard‘s testimony.  Our review of the record shows that Mallard did not 
testify to any statements made by Parker that inculpated Rimmer.  Her testimony 
that she saw Rimmer and Parker together was the result of her own personal 
observations, which were certainly admissible.  Even if this testimony had resulted 
 
- 46 - 
in a Bruton error, any error was harmless in light of the significant evidence 
linking Rimmer to the crime scene.  This significant evidence includes two 
victim/eyewitness identifications of Rimmer as the shooter and Rimmer‘s 
discarding of the murder weapon and other crime scene evidence.  Appellate 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims.       
Prosecutor‘s Comment 
Rimmer also alleges appellate counsel‘s ineffectiveness for failing to 
challenge one of the prosecutor‘s comments.  At the end of Detective Lewis‘s 
testimony, the prosecutor said: ―Given Court‘s ruling [as to the admissibility of 
Parker‘s statement], I have no further questions of Detective Lewis at this time.‖  
At trial, counsel moved to strike the prosecutor‘s statement, and the motion was 
granted.  Rimmer contends that although appellate counsel challenged this 
statement as an improper prosecutorial comment, appellate counsel failed to raise 
this issue on direct appeal in the correct context.  Rimmer argues that the comment 
should have been challenged in light of the State‘s discovery violation and the 
motion to sever, and that the failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  On direct appeal, we concluded that the claim regarding this 
―isolated remark‖ was without merit.  Rimmer, 825 So. 2d at 324.  This Court said: 
―Following the comment, defense counsel objected, which the trial court sustained, 
instructing the jury to disregard the comment.  Later in the trial, the court 
 
- 47 - 
admonished counsel not to make any extraneous comments concerning the court's 
evidentiary rulings.  Thus, this claim is without merit.‖  Id.  The additional 
perspective of Mallard‘s testimony and the motion to sever do not affect our 
conclusion that this comment, when viewed individually or cumulatively, does not 
entitle Rimmer to relief.  
Motions for Mistrial 
Rimmer argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
the trial court‘s denial of a motion for mistrial made during the testimony of 
Michael Dixon.  Dixon and victim Knight were partners in ownership of the Audio 
Logic store.  Dixon provided lengthy testimony about the store, the stolen 
equipment, and a prior encounter with Rimmer, but the testimony at issue is a 
statement where Dixon indicated that there was a motion to suppress in the case: 
Defense attorney: Not that I‘m questioning your identification, but 
when you went to that line-up on July 13th, 1998, you, in your mind, 
you knew Robert would be in that line-up? 
 
Dixon: We have been through this several times before, you and me.  
But I guess for the Court— 
 
Defense attorney: This is the first time it‘s you and me and the jury, 
correct? 
 
Dixon: Right. 
 
Defense attorney: Just since you brought that up, I took one 
deposition of you? 
 
Dixon: Yes.  
 
- 48 - 
 
Defense attorney: That would have been on September 18th, 1998? 
 
Dixon: I‘ll take that as correct. 
 
Defense attorney: That was myself, Mr. Miller, and Mr. Magrino? 
 
Dixon: Yes. 
 
Defense attorney: I met you one time at a deposition? 
 
Dixon: Yes. 
 
Defense attorney: And I was present when you were at the live line-
up? 
 
Dixon: Yes. 
 
Defense attorney: I didn‘t ask you any questions? 
 
Dixon: No, sir. 
 
Defense attorney: And we had a hearing which you testified for a 
short period of time, correct? 
 
Dixon: Yes, the motion to suppress. 
 
Defense attorney: Judge, may we approach? 
 
The Court: Yes, sir.   
 
During the sidebar that followed, defense counsel Garfield moved for mistrial on 
the grounds that Dixon‘s answer was unresponsive and that it suggested to the jury 
that Rimmer had something to hide.  The trial court denied the motion for mistrial 
and gave the following curative instruction to the jury: 
 
- 49 - 
The Court: Folks the last answer given by the witness was 
unresponsive.  The Court has therefore stricken the answer.  You‘re 
instructed to disregard the answer. 
 
Rimmer contends that appellate counsel‘s failure to raise this issue constitutes 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  We review the trial court‘s denial of 
the motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  See Tumblin v. State, 29 So. 3d 
1093, 1103 (Fla. 2010).   
Rimmer relies on this Court‘s decision in Walsh v. State, 418 So. 2d 1000 
(Fla. 1982), where this Court concluded that a motion for mistrial was properly 
granted after the jury became aware that the defendant took a polygraph test.  
Although the trial court initially gave a curative instruction, it granted a mistrial the 
following day.  Id.  In concluding that the trial court properly granted a mistrial, 
this Court said, ―We agree with the trial judge that this type of testimony would be 
difficult for the jurors to disregard and that the evidence would likely influence the 
jury‘s decision.  We agree that there was a sufficient manifest necessity to grant a 
mistrial . . . .‖  Id. at 1003. 
 
However, in Rimmer‘s case, Dixon‘s innocuous mention of the motion to 
suppress hearing does not warrant a mistrial.  The jury was not made aware of the 
context or the result of the motion to suppress.  Moreover, the trial court 
appropriately gave the jury a curative instruction.  Because counsel cannot be 
 
- 50 - 
deemed ineffective for raising meritless issues, Rimmer is not entitled to relief on 
this claim.                      
Rimmer also contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the trial court‘s denial of a motion for mistrial following the admission 
of a particular statement by a police officer during the car chase on May 10, 1998.  
Following the police chase, which led to Rimmer‘s home, he was arrested.  The 
State sought to introduce the recorded transmissions between the officers during 
the chase.  Trial counsel initially objected on the basis of hearsay, but the trial 
court conditionally admitted the tape providing that the State proved that the 
recording was made during the course of a police chase.   
On the tape, an unidentified voice says, ―We can‘t let him barricade himself 
in the house.‖  The State‘s brief notes that although the transcription of the tape 
does not contain this phrase, after the tape was published to the jury and introduced 
into evidence without objection, trial counsel represented to the court that the tape 
said, ―We can‘t let him barricade himself in the house.‖  Counsel moved for 
mistrial on the grounds that the tape ―implie[d] that [Rimmer] is particularly 
dangerous.‖  The trial court denied the motion for mistrial.  Rimmer argues that 
this statement was so prejudicial that it entitled him to a mistrial.  Although 
Rimmer offers arguments about the presumption of innocence and likens the 
recorded statement to the jury seeing a defendant in shackles, we conclude that 
 
- 51 - 
Rimmer‘s motion for mistrial was properly denied.  Based on the facts of this case, 
and given the nexus between Rimmer‘s flight and the crimes with which he was 
charged, the statement is probative of Rimmer‘s consciousness of guilt.  Moreover, 
as the State notes, this isolated statement was not made a feature of the trial.  
Consequently, Rimmer is not entitled to relief on this claim.   
Jury Instructions 
Rimmer argues that the use of the ―and/or‖ conjunction between his name 
and codefendant Parker‘s name in the jury instructions constituted fundamental 
error in his case and warrants a new trial.  Because appellate counsel failed to raise 
this issue, Rimmer contends that counsel was ineffective.  Our review of the record 
in this case leads us to conclude that Rimmer is not entitled to relief.   
In Garzon v. State, 980 So. 2d 1038, 1045 (Fla. 2008), we condemned the 
use of ―and/or‖ and concluded that its use in jury instructions was improper.  
However, relying heavily on the facts and the strength of the link between the 
appellant and the crimes, we also concluded that the use of ―and/or‖ did not 
constitute fundamental error.  Id.   
 
In Rimmer‘s case, although none of the fingerprints found at the crime scene 
matched Rimmer‘s prints, the following evidence links him to the crimes for which 
he was convicted: (1) Rimmer had a prior connection with Audio Logic; (2) a car 
matching the description of the Ford Probe registered to Rimmer was seen at 
 
- 52 - 
Audio Logic during the robbery; (3) eyewitness Burke saw Rimmer before and 
during the robbery; (4) Rimmer was identified by both Burke and Moore as the 
shooter; (5) a sketch based on Burke‘s description of Rimmer was used to locate 
him; (6) Rimmer rented a storage unit days after the murder and stored stolen 
stereo equipment in it; (7) Rimmer‘s fingerprints were found on the stolen 
equipment; (8) Rimmer was pursued in a high-speed chase just over a week after 
the murders; (9) during the chase, Rimmer threw three items—the murder weapon, 
the gun taken from Audio Logic, and Moore‘s wallet—out of the window and was 
seen doing so.   
 
We also find it instructive that as in Garzon, the jury in Rimmer‘s case was 
given both a principals instruction and a multiple defendants instruction.  The jury 
was advised that a verdict of guilty or not guilty as to either Rimmer or Parker 
should not affect its verdict as to the codefendant and was instructed by the trial 
court as follows: ―[A] separate crime is charged against each defendant and each 
count of the indictment.  The defendants have been tried together.  However, the 
charges against each defendant and the evidence applicable to him must be 
considered separately.‖  As we noted in Garzon, these instructions ―reinforced that 
the jury was to consider each defendant individually.‖  Garzon, 980 So. 2d at 1044. 
 
Moreover, like the jury in Garzon, the jury in Rimmer‘s case was given a 
separate verdict form for each defendant and for each crime.  We observed in 
 
- 53 - 
Garzon that ―the jury therefore had before it individualized jury forms that further 
reinforced the individualized consideration each defendant was to receive,‖ and 
concluded that ―[w]orking in tandem, the instructions and verdict forms strongly 
emphasized to the jury that each defendant was to receive an individualized 
consideration.‖  Id. 
 
Although Rimmer argues that his case is distinguishable from Garzon, we 
reject this argument.  In light of the strong evidence that linked Rimmer to the 
crimes, the use of the principals and multiple defendants instructions, and the use 
of separate verdict forms, we conclude that Rimmer has not demonstrated that the 
use of the ―and/or‖ conjunction in the jury instructions constituted fundamental 
error.  See also Hunter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1052 (Fla. 2008) (holding that under the 
totality of the circumstances, the use of the ―and/or‖ conjunction, while erroneous, 
did not constitute fundamental error).  As a result, counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective, and Rimmer is not entitled to relief.      
Aggravating Circumstances 
 
Rimmer also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue that the jury was improperly instructed on both the pecuniary gain and the 
witness elimination aggravating circumstances.  Rimmer‘s argument is without 
merit.  Because we have already concluded that penalty phase counsel was not 
deficient for failing to object to the jury instructions, we now conclude that 
 
- 54 - 
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.  
See Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 886 (Fla. 2002). 14   Rimmer is not entitled to 
relief.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of 
postconviction relief, and we also deny Rimmer‘s petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Ana I. Gardiner, Judge – Case No. 98-12089CF10B 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Celeste Bacchi, 
Assistant CCRC, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Linda 
McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Special Assistant CCRC-South, 
Estero, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
                                          
 
 
14.  We also reject Rimmer‘s arguments that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to argue that the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance 
did not apply to Rimmer as a matter of law, or for failing to argue that the statute 
underlying the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance was facially vague and 
overbroad. 
 
- 55 - 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent