Title: Kiddell v. Labowitz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 111236
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2012

1 
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
LAURIE A. KIDDELL, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.    Record No. 111236 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
November 1, 2012 
KEN LABOWITZ, EXECUTOR OF THE  
ESTATE OF LOUISE BRADFORD JUDSEN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Alfred D. Swersky, Judge Designate 
 
In this will contest, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in instructing the jury as to the existence of the 
presumption of testamentary capacity.  Appellant contends that, 
under the facts of this case, the presumption disappeared, and 
it was error to instruct the jury regarding the presumption.  We 
conclude that the presumption does not necessarily disappear in 
the face of evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, the circuit 
court, in this case, did not rule, at the motion to strike, that 
the presumption had been rebutted.  Therefore, the circuit court 
did not err in instructing the jury about the presumption, and 
we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Louise Bradford Judsen executed a will on April 19, 2010, 
(“the April will”), naming her beneficiaries: Judsen’s cousin, 
Laurie Kiddell (“Laurie”); Laurie’s husband, Lee Kiddell 
(“Lee”); their daughter, LeAnn Kiddell (“LeAnn”); two other 
2 
first cousins; and the “American Cancer Association.”  The April 
will was prepared by Laurie from an online template. 
On June 15, 2010, Judsen executed another will (“the June 
will”), naming Kenneth E. Labowitz, an attorney, as the executor 
of her estate.  In the June will, Judsen bequeathed her dog and 
a cash gift for the dog’s care to Laurie.  Judsen bequeathed 
one-third of her residuary estate to the “Leukemia & Lymphoma 
Society Inc.,” one-third to the “American Cancer Society Inc.,” 
and one-third to a “Head Trauma Research Center” to be chosen in 
the sole discretion of her executor.  
Judsen died on June 18, 2010, and the June will was 
admitted to probate.  Laurie and LeAnn (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as “Kiddell”) filed a “Complaint to Impeach Will, 
Nullify Probate Order and Admit Earlier Will to Probate” against 
Labowitz, the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, Inc., and the 
American Cancer Society, Inc.  In this complaint, Kiddell 
alleged that Judsen lacked testamentary capacity when she 
executed the June will.1  Kiddell sought to have the order 
admitting the June will to probate nullified and the April will 
admitted to probate.  Labowitz filed an answer denying Kiddell’s 
claims.2 
                                                          
 
1 Lee was not a party to the complaint and is not a party to 
this appeal.  
2 The other named defendants did not respond to the 
complaint. 
3 
At a jury trial, the evidence showed that Judsen was 
diagnosed with a terminal illness in February 2010.  On May 13, 
2010, Judsen’s health had deteriorated and she was admitted to a 
hospital.   
At the request of Laurie, who lived in Illinois, Labowitz 
contacted Judsen in the hospital because Laurie wanted him to 
assist Judsen with her financial matters.  Specifically, Laurie 
wanted Labowitz to be authorized to act under Judsen’s power of 
attorney instead of Laurie.  According to Labowitz, Judsen 
became “upset” with Laurie for sending Labowitz “to [perform 
duties under] the new power of attorney.”  Despite her anger, 
Judsen executed a new power of attorney naming Labowitz as her 
attorney in fact.  Labowitz testified that, during the meetings 
that he had with Judsen, she was insistent on returning home, 
concerned about her dog, and aware that she had only a small 
amount of cash among her assets.   
According to Labowitz, Judsen also told him she wanted to 
execute a new will.  Consequently, Labowitz contacted Sean 
Dunston, an attorney practicing primarily in the area of wills, 
trusts, and estates, to assist Judsen with her new will.  
Although Laurie sent the April will to Labowitz, Labowitz did 
not give Dunston the April will because Labowitz had previously 
filed it with the Fairfax County Circuit Court.  Labowitz did 
not believe that he told Dunston about this will.   
4 
Dunston met with Judsen at the hospital on multiple 
occasions concerning the preparation of her will.  According to 
Dunston, during a meeting with Judsen on June 3, she explained 
that she wanted to dispose of her estate by providing for the 
care of her dog and leaving the residue of her estate to three 
specific charities.  On June 14, Dunston reviewed a draft will 
with Judsen.  Judsen indicated that there was an error in the 
paragraph stating that she was “not unmarried.”  She advised 
Dunston that she was divorced.  When Dunston asked if she wished 
to include any family members as beneficiaries, Judsen answered 
“no.”  However, she told Dunston that she wanted Laurie to take 
care of her dog.  Dunston specifically reviewed with Judsen the 
clause that bequeathed her residuary estate to three charities.   
Dunston finalized Judsen’s will and returned to the 
hospital on June 15 with two paralegals from his office.  After 
Dunston read all the provisions of the will aloud to Judsen, she 
confirmed that the will expressed her wishes, that she was of 
sound and disposing mind, and that she was signing the document 
freely and voluntarily.  Judsen then executed the will.  Dunston 
and one of the paralegals from his office witnessed the 
testator’s execution of her will, and the other paralegal served 
as the notary public in accordance with the provisions of Code 
§ 64.1-49.  According to Dunston, there was no question in his 
mind that when Judsen executed the June will, she knew her 
5 
property and the natural objects of her bounty.  She understood 
that she was executing a will and knew how she wished to dispose 
of her property.  The two paralegals also confirmed that 
although the testator seemed tired, she was coherent and able to 
respond to Dunston’s questions.  Neither paralegal had any 
concerns about the testator’s ability to execute the will.  One 
of them testified that the testator “fully underst[ood]” the 
document she was executing.   
Laurie testified that she and Judsen were “very close” when 
they were growing up.  Since 2005, when Judsen became involved 
in Laurie’s business, they spoke several times each week.  
Laurie also testified that at some point, she talked with Judsen 
about drafting a will, and according to Laurie, Judsen stated 
that she wished to leave her estate to Laurie, her husband and 
daughter.  Nevertheless, Laurie admitted that Judsen became 
angry with her when she contacted Labowitz to assist with 
Judsen’s financial matters.  Laurie believed that Judsen was 
being “spiteful” when she executed the June will with terms that 
were dramatically different than the terms of the April will.   
James Carlton, a tenant in Judsen’s home and a witness to 
the April will, testified that when he visited Judsen at the 
hospital on June 14, she did not maintain eye contact with him 
and responded “yes” to every question he asked her.  Carlton did 
not, however, see Judsen on the day she executed the June will.  
6 
He also stated that Judsen had a tendency to “get mad at anybody 
who didn’t do what she wanted when she wanted.”   
Dr. Abdulkadir Salhan, one of Judsen’s attending 
physicians, testified that he completed a report on June 15, 
2010, for the purpose of evaluating her competency.  In that 
report, he opined that Judsen was “not competent” and “ha[d] a 
disability that prevent[ed] [her] from making or communicating 
any responsible decisions concerning [her] property.”  Dr. 
Salhan, however, conceded that medical record notations dated 
June 15 stated that Judsen understood “her disease, her 
diagnosis, stage, and prognosis.”  Dr. Salhan also admitted that 
he did not question Judsen concerning her property, finances, or 
family, and that he did not specifically assess her capacity to 
execute a will.  
Dr. Thomas Hyde, who testified at trial as an expert in the 
field of neurology, reviewed Judsen’s medical records, treatment 
plan, and medications.  He opined that Judsen’s cognitive 
abilities were markedly impaired on June 15, 2010, such that she 
would have been precluded from fully understanding the nature 
and extent of her property, the members of her family and “to 
whom she was giving property and in what manner.”  Dr. Hyde 
further opined that Judsen would have known that she was signing 
a paper but would not have known what was on it.   
7 
At the close of Kiddell’s case, Labowitz moved to strike 
the evidence, arguing that Kiddell failed to overcome the 
presumption of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  The circuit court denied Labowitz’ motion.   
At the close of all the evidence, Kiddell moved to strike 
Labowitz’ evidence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient 
to prove that Judsen had testamentary capacity when she executed 
the June will.  The circuit court denied the motion and allowed 
the case to go to the jury.   
 
In submitting the case to the jury, the parties agreed on 
two jury instructions, Instructions 5 and 6, related to this 
appeal.  Jury Instruction 5 stated: 
Your verdict must be based on the facts as 
you find them and on the law contained in all of 
these instructions.  
 
The only question in this case is whether 
this writing is the last will of Louise Judsen. 
In deciding this question, you will have to 
consider this issue: 
 
(1) Did Louise Judsen have testamentary 
capacity when she signed it? 
 
On this issue, the proponents of the will 
have the burden of proof by the greater weight of 
the evidence. 
 
Your decision on this issue must be governed 
by the instructions that follow. 
 
The instruction that followed, Jury Instruction 6, stated: 
 
You shall find the writing dated June 15, 
2010 to be the last will [of] Louise Judsen if 
8 
the proponent proved by the greater weight of the 
evidence that: 
 
 
(1) Louise Judsen was capable of making a will 
at the time she executed the writing. 
 
 
You shall find that the writing dated June 
15, 2010 was not the last will [of] Louise Judsen 
if the proponent failed to prove the element 
above.  
 
The circuit court also granted two jury instructions over 
Kiddell’s objection that allowed the jury to consider the 
existence of the presumption of testamentary capacity and 
whether the presumption had been rebutted.  Instruction 8 
stated:  
Your verdict must be based on the facts as 
you find them and on the law contained in all of 
these instructions.  
 
The only question in this case is whether 
the writing of June 15, 2010, is the last will of 
Louise Bradford Judsen.  In deciding this 
question you will have to consider these issues: 
 
(1) The proponent of the will, the defendant 
Mr. Labowitz is entitled to a presumption that 
Ms. Judsen had testamentary capacity on June 15, 
2010, at the time she executed the writing. 
 
(2) The opponents of the will, Laurie A. 
Kiddell and Leann M. Kiddell, must introduce 
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
testamentary capacity. 
 
(3) If you find that the opponents of the 
will have introduced evidence sufficient to rebut 
the presumption, the burden rests upon the 
proponent of the will to prove by the greater 
weight of the evidence that Ms. Judsen had 
testamentary capacity at the time of the 
execution of the June 15, 2010, writing.  
9 
 
Similarly, Instruction 9 stated: 
 
You shall find your verdict in favor of 
complainants, Laurie A. Kiddell and Leann M. 
Kiddell, if you find that they have introduced 
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
testamentary capacity and defendant, Mr. 
Labowitz, has failed to prove by the greater 
weight of the evidence that Ms. Judsen had 
testamentary capacity at the time of the 
execution of the writing. 
 
You shall find your verdict in favor of the 
defendant, Mr. Labowitz, if the complainants have 
failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome 
the presumption of testamentary capacity or 
defendant, Mr. Labowitz, has proved testamentary 
capacity at the time of execution by the greater 
weight of the evidence.  
 
Kiddell objected to these instructions, arguing that because the 
presumption of testamentary capacity had been rebutted, the 
presumption disappeared and the only issue for the jury to 
resolve was whether Labowitz proved Judsen’s testamentary 
capacity by the greater weight of the evidence.  The trial court 
responded that “I haven’t ruled [that] you rebutted the 
presumption.  I ruled there was . . . sufficient evidence on the 
question . . . of whether you rebutted it.  If you hadn’t, this 
case would have been over this morning.”3 
                                                          
 
 
3 When ruling on Labowitz’ motion to strike, the trial court 
stated that the “burden has been met,” and “therefore the motion 
to strike will be denied.”  Standing alone, this statement 
leaves one to wonder whether the “burden” that had been “met” 
was the submission of sufficient evidence to survive a motion to 
strike or evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.  The 
trial court answered this question by rejecting Kiddell’s 
10 
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Labowitz, 
as executor of Judsen’s estate.  In a final order, the circuit 
court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and 
ordered that the June will is Judsen’s “Last Will and 
Testament.”  We awarded Kiddell this appeal on two issues: (1) 
whether the circuit court erred by granting Instructions 8 and 
9; and (2) whether the circuit court erred by denying Kiddell’s 
motion to strike the evidence. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Presumption of Testamentary Capacity 
 
When reviewing whether proper jury instructions were given 
by a trial court, this Court’s “sole responsibility . . . is to 
see that the law has been clearly stated and that the 
instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.”  
Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 
(1982); accord Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 131, 
670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009).  “Whether the content of [an] 
instruction is an accurate statement of the relevant legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
specific assertion during discussions regarding the jury 
instructions at issue, when counsel asserted that “Your Honor 
has ruled that we have . . . rebutted the presumption.”  The 
court immediately responded, “I haven’t ruled [that] you 
rebutted the presumption.”  This clarification, coupled with the 
fact that the trial court proceeded to instruct the jury that 
there was a presumption that they should consider, clearly 
indicates that the trial court did not decide that Kiddell had, 
as a matter of law, rebutted the presumption. 
 
11 
principles is a question of law that, like all questions of law, 
we review de novo.”  Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 131, 670 
S.E.2d at 722. 
On appeal, Kiddell argues that the presumption disappears 
when a trial court determines that the opponent has presented 
evidence to rebut it.  Thus, according to Kiddell, it was 
reversible error for the court to give Instructions 8 and 9 and 
that only Instructions 5 and 6 were necessary to instruct the 
jury properly.  Labowitz responds that Instructions 8 and 9, 
together with Instructions 5 and 6, clearly stated which party 
“was aided by a presumption and the obligations of each party to 
present evidence on the issue of testamentary capacity.”  
Labowitz contends he was entitled to Instructions 8 and 9 
because those instructions properly informed the jury that, as 
the proponent of the validly executed June will, he was aided in 
meeting his burden of persuasion by a presumption of 
testamentary capacity that remained unless Kiddell produced 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. 
Generally, “[a] presumption is a rule of law that compels 
the fact finder to draw a certain conclusion or a certain 
inference from a given set of facts.”  Martin v. Phillips, 235 
Va. 523, 526, 369 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1988).  Thus,  
[a] party is as much entitled to a benefit of a 
presumption of law as he would be to have any 
other appropriate legal rule applied to the facts 
12 
of his case; and, where the facts which are 
required to give rise to the presumption are 
proven, the presumption must be applied (the 
presumed fact must be assumed to have been 
proven) until evidence sufficient to overcome the 
presumption and prove the contrary shall have 
been introduced. 
 
Simpson v. Simpson, 162 Va. 621, 642, 175 S.E. 320, 329 (1934).  
“The primary significance of a presumption is that it operates 
to shift to the opposing party the burden of producing evidence 
tending to rebut the presumption.”  Martin, 235 Va. at 526, 369 
S.E.2d at 399; see also Rule 2:301. 
In a will contest, “the proponent of the will is entitled 
to a presumption that testamentary capacity existed by proving 
compliance with all statutory requirements for the valid 
execution of the will.”  Gibbs v. Gibbs, 239 Va. 197, 200, 387 
S.E.2d 499, 501 (1990).  Such a  
presumption arises where the will is “in writing 
and signed by the [testatrix] . . . in such 
manner as to make it manifest that the name is 
intended as a signature; and moreover, unless it 
be wholly in the handwriting of the testator, the 
signature shall be made or the will acknowledged 
by him in the presence of at least two competent 
witnesses, present at the same time; and such 
witnesses shall subscribe the will in the 
presence of the testator, but no form of 
attestation shall be necessary.” 
 
Weedon v. Weedon, 283 Va. 241, 252-53, 720 S.E.2d 552, 558  
(2012) (quoting Code § 64.1-49).  The burden of persuasion 
always remains with the proponent of the will, but once the 
proponent has proven compliance with statutory requirements for 
13 
a valid will, the burden of production shifts to the opponent to 
“go forward with evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.”  
Gibbs, 239 Va. at 200-01, 387 S.E.2d at 501 (emphasis added). 
 
When a word is commonly used and has an accepted meaning, a 
trial court need not instruct the jury as to the meaning of the 
word.  See Wells v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 111, 123-24, 724 
S.E.2d 225, 231 (2012) (citing Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 
201, 211, 257 S.E.2d 784, 790 (1979)).  Black’s Law Dictionary 
treats “sufficient evidence” and “satisfactory evidence” as 
synonymous.  State v. Narron, 666 S.E.2d 860, 865 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2008).  It defines “satisfactory evidence” as “[e]vidence that 
is sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking the truth. 
– Also termed sufficient evidence; satisfactory proof.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 639 (9th ed. 2009).  “Sufficient” means 
“[a]dequate; of such quality, number, force or value as is 
necessary for a given purpose  
.”  Id. at 1571. 
As early as 1908, this Court addressed the propriety of 
advising the jury of the presumption in will contests and 
allowing them to consider it.  Hopkins v. Wampler, 108 Va. 705, 
706-08, 62 S.E. 926, 927-28 (1908); see also Tate v. Chumbley, 
190 Va. 480, 500-01, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160-61 (1950); Jenkins v. 
Trice, 152 Va. 411, 440, 147 S.E. 251, 260 (1929); Rust v. Reid, 
14 
124 Va. 1, 26, 97 S.E. 324, 331 (1918); Huff v. Welch, 115 Va. 
74, 76, 86, 78 S.E. 573, 575, 578 (1913).   
 
Where, however, the sanity of the testator 
is put in issue by the evidence of the 
contestant, the onus probandi lies upon the 
proponent to satisfy the court or jury that the 
writing propounded is the will of a capable 
testator.  Yet, upon the trial of that issue, 
there is an existent presumption in favor of the 
testator’s sanity.  Indeed, of such force is that 
presumption in our jurisprudence, that though one 
be on trial for a felony, involving life or 
liberty, when the defense of insanity is relied 
on, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the 
jury. 
Hopkins, 108 Va. at 707, 62 S.E. at 927.  A few years later, 
this Court approved the following instruction based on its 
holding in Hopkins: 
While the burden of proof is upon those offering 
a will for probate, to show testamentary capacity 
on the part of the testator at the time the will 
was executed to the satisfaction of the jury, yet 
the court tells the jury that there is in all 
cases an existing presumption in favor of the 
testator’s sanity and capacity, which is to be 
taken into consideration by the jury in 
determining the question of competency. 
 
Huff, 115 Va. at 76, 86, 78 S.E. at 575, 578.4  For the next 
hundred years, the Court addressed and approved the exact same 
                                                          
 
 
4 The jury in the instant case was specifically told to 
determine whether the opponents had presented sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity.  In 
prior cases, the jury was told that they were to take “into 
consideration” the presumption of testamentary capacity when 
“determining the question of competency.”  Rust, 124 Va. at 26, 
97 S.E. at 331; see e.g., Tate, 190 Va. at 500, 57 S.E.2d at 
160; Huff, 115 Va. at 76, 86, 78 S.E. at 575, 578.  Telling the 
jury to take the presumption into consideration is the 
15 
instruction or a close variant.  See Tate, 190 Va. at 500-01, 57 
S.E.2d at 160-61; Jenkins, 152 Va. at 440, 147 S.E at 260; Rust, 
124 Va. at 26, 97 S.E.2d at 331. 
Here, Labowitz contends that Instructions 8 and 9 were 
similar to jury instructions approved by this Court in Rust and 
Tate.  In Rust, one of the issues on appeal involved the 
following jury instruction:  
While the burden of proof is upon those offering 
a will for probate, to show testamentary capacity 
on the part of the testator at the time the will 
was executed to the satisfaction of the jury, yet 
the court tells the jury that there is in all 
cases an existing presumption in favor of the 
testator’s sanity and capacity, which is to be 
taken into consideration by the jury in 
determining the question of competency. 
 
124 Va. at 26, 97 S.E. at 331 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The objecting party contended that the latter part of 
the instruction conflicted with the first part.  Id.  Rejecting 
that argument, this Court first explained that when the 
proponent of a will shows compliance with all the statutory 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
functional equivalent of instructing the jury to determine 
whether the evidence was sufficiently rebutted.  Indeed, this 
practice is not without precedent in will contest cases.  With 
regard to lost wills, the Virginia Model Jury Instructions 
inform the jury that there is a presumption that a will that was 
in the possession of the decedent prior to his death but cannot 
be found after his death was destroyed and “[t]o overcome this 
presumption the burden is on [the proponent] to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that [decedent] did not revoke the 
will.”  2 Virginia Model Jury Instructions – Civil, No. 48.055, 
at 48-27 (repl. ed. 2011). 
 
16 
requirements for due execution, “the legal presumption of sanity 
comes to his relief and dispenses with any evidence to the 
contrary.” Id. at 25, 97 S.E. at 331.   
In Tate, the issue at trial was “which, if either, of two 
paper writings, both being testamentary in character, dated 
respectively April 27, 1915, and November 29, 1916 . . . 
constitute[d the] last will and testament” of Margaret S. Tate.  
190 Va. at 485-86, 57 S.E.2d at 153.  A jury returned a verdict 
sustaining the 1916 will.  Id. at 486, 57 S.E.2d at 154.  
Evidence at trial showed that Tate was “mentally capable” of 
making the 1915 will but that during the six months thereafter, 
her mental capacity became impaired.  Id. at 489, 57 S.E.2d at 
155.  On November 23, 1915, she was “adjudged to be insane.”  
Id. 
In that case, the jury was instructed, inter alia, that 
while the burden of proof is upon those offering 
a will for probate, to show testamentary capacity 
on the part of the testatrix at the time the will 
was executed to the satisfaction of the jury, yet 
the court tells the jury that all persons who 
have not been adjudged insane are presumed to be 
sane and capable of making a will until the 
contrary is proved, and that this presumption is 
to be taken into consideration by the jury in 
determining the question of competency. 
 
Id. at 500, 57 S.E.2d at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
This Court again approved instructing a jury as to the 
presumption of testamentary capacity.  
17 
 
Thus, recognizing that this Court has a long history of 
approving jury instructions on the presumption of testamentary 
capacity, we must determine whether such instructions were 
appropriate in this case. 
As Kiddell correctly argues, in most contexts in Virginia, 
a presumption disappears when the presumption is rebutted as a 
matter of law.  Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 175 Va. 105, 113, 7 
S.E.2d 125, 128 (1940).  However, Kiddell’s contention that the 
presumption of testamentary capacity disappears in the face of 
any evidence presented to the contrary is incorrect.  
A presumption of law cannot be said to be 
rebutted where the evidence of equally credible 
witnesses for and against the presumption is 
equally balanced.  The rebutter has not carried 
the burden imposed upon him by law.  Where the 
evidence for and against the presumption are 
equal the presumption will prevail.  
 
Rowe v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925).  “The 
presumption of sanity is rebuttable, but it is not necessarily 
extinguished by conflicting evidence.”  Nelms v. Nelms, 236 Va. 
281, 287, 374 S.E.2d 4, 8 (1988).   
 
Kiddell’s argument not only ignores the fact that the trial 
court did not actually rule that the presumption was rebutted, 
but also, in persisting in her argument, Kiddell ignores the 
trial court’s ultimate role in ruling on a motion to strike.  
“In ruling on a motion to strike, trial courts should not 
undertake to determine the truth or falsity of testimony or to 
18 
measure its weight.”  Williams v. Vaughan, 214 Va. 307, 310, 199 
S.E.2d 515, 517-18 (1973).  “The credibility of witnesses and 
the weight to be given their testimony are matters peculiarly 
within the province of the jury.”  Id. at 310, 199 S.E.2d at 
517; see also Higgins v. Bowdoin, 238 Va. 134, 141, 380 S.E.2d 
904, 908 (1989) (holding the trial court failed to adhere to the 
principles governing motions to strike when it “undertook to 
determine the truth or falsity of the testimony and to weigh the 
evidence”).  For purposes of the motion to strike, a trial court 
must “accept as true all evidence favorable to a plaintiff and 
any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence.”  
James v. City of Falls Church, 280 Va. 31, 38, 694 S.E.2d 568, 
572 (2010). 
 
In ruling on Labowitz’ motion to strike Kiddell’s evidence, 
the trial court was required to accept as true all evidence 
favorable to Kiddell and any reasonable inferences therefrom.  
It necessarily follows that when the trial court denied 
Labowitz’ motion to strike, it implicitly found that the 
evidence presented by Kiddell, if accepted by the jury as true 
and given sufficient weight, could rebut the presumption of 
testamentary capacity.  However, the determination of whether 
the evidence did, in fact, rebut the presumption, was not made 
by the trial court when it ruled on the motion to strike.  The 
trial court’s denial of Labowitz’ motion to strike amounted only 
19 
to a ruling that Kiddell’s evidence could potentially rebut the 
presumption, not that it did, as a matter of law, rebut the 
presumption. 
 
Indeed, to hold otherwise would improperly equate the 
denial of a motion to strike with the granting of a motion for 
partial summary judgment.  The trial court may only enter a 
partial summary judgment when it has granted a motion to strike.  
See Code § 8.01-378.  When the trial court has denied a motion 
to strike, “the trial continues as if the motion had not been 
made.”  William H. Bryson, Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure 
§ 11.05[4] (4th ed. 2005).  Therefore, when the trial court 
denied Labowitz’ motion to strike, the trial was to continue, as 
it did, with the presumption in favor of testamentary capacity 
still in place and for consideration by the jury. 
 
The existence of the presumption of testamentary capacity 
is a matter of law, but whether the presumption has been 
sufficiently rebutted is a question of fact.  Given the 
necessary role of the presumption in the factual determinations, 
the presumption does not disappear unless, as a matter of law, 
no rational finder of fact could find that the presumption had 
not been rebutted.   
 
Unlike in some other jurisdictions, in Virginia a 
presumption disappears only if rebutted by ascertained or 
established facts or by substantial evidence “showing the true 
20 
facts to be to the contrary.”  Kavanaugh, 175 Va. at 113, 7 
S.E.2d at 128(emphasis added); Schmitt v. Redd, 151 Va. 333, 
344, 143 S.E. 884, 887 (1928); but cf., In re Mid-South Towing 
Co., 418 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Evidentiary 
presumptions . . . are designed to fill a factual vacuum. Once 
evidence is presented . . . presumptions become superfluous 
because the parties have introduced evidence to dispel the 
mysteries that gave rise to the presumptions.”); Hertz v. Record 
Publ’g Co., 219 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1955) (holding that a 
presumption “disappears when contrary evidence of the fact in 
issue is introduced”); Heffenger v. Heffenger, 3 A.2d 95, 97 
(N.H. 1938) (“When there is either evidence, or an inference 
from evidence, bearing upon the issue of a testator’s intention 
to include or exclude a particular item of property from the 
terms of his will the presumption against partial intestacy 
disappears.”)  Once Labowitz presented evidence that the June 
will was executed in compliance with statutory requirements, 
there was a presumption that Judsen had testamentary capacity at 
the time she executed that will.  That presumption could be 
rebutted by evidence that Judsen was not competent at that time.  
However, even when the opponent of a will produces evidence 
that, if believed, could ascertain or establish facts sufficient 
to rebut the presumption of the testator’s capacity, the 
determination of whether the presumption has been rebutted is to 
21 
be determined by the jury, unless the opponent has rebutted the 
presumption as a matter of law.  The evidence presented by 
Kiddell, while potentially sufficient to rebut the presumption 
of capacity if believed, did not, as a matter of law, ascertain 
or establish Judsen’s incapacity as a true fact.  Thus, it was 
not sufficient to rebut the presumption as a matter of law.  The 
circuit court did not err in ruling that the presumption had not 
been rebutted or in sending the evidence to the jury. 
 
When the proponent of a will enjoys the presumption of 
testamentary capacity, the jury must be instructed as to this 
presumption.  Where the evidence is in equipoise, the 
presumption comes to the proponent’s rescue, allowing him to 
prevail.  Indeed, if the jury is not advised of the presumption, 
the proponent is deprived of this benefit and, in the face of 
equal evidence, would be found to have not carried his burden 
even though the law is otherwise.  For this reason, we hold that 
the presumption of testamentary capacity does not disappear, 
unless the circuit court rules that the presumption was rebutted 
as a matter of law because no rational fact finder could find 
that the presumption had not been rebutted.  In this case, the 
circuit court did not err in instructing the jury as to the 
existence of the presumption.   
B.  Motion to Strike the Evidence 
22 
Kiddell also argues that the circuit court erroneously 
denied the motion to strike Labowitz’ evidence because he failed 
to prove Judsen was aware of her family members and the natural 
objects of her bounty when she executed the June will.  In light 
of the terms of Judsen’s April will leaving her estate primarily 
to Laurie, Lee Kiddell, and LeeAnn Kiddell and also naming 12 
other relatives who were to receive nothing, Kiddell contends 
that it was incumbent upon Labowitz to prove that Judsen was 
aware of all these individuals when she executed the June will.  
According to Kiddell, even Dunston had no knowledge of the 
Judsen’s family members because he was not aware of the April 
will. 
Kiddell does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain the jury verdict.  Instead, by challenging the 
circuit court’s refusal to sustain her motion to strike 
Labowitz’ evidence, Kiddell contends that Labowitz failed to 
establish a prima facie case of testamentary capacity because he 
failed to prove that Judsen knew the natural objects of her 
bounty.  See Costner v. Lackey, 223 Va. 377, 382, 290 S.E.2d 
818, 820 (1982) (“In considering the motion to strike the 
plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial court was not sitting as the 
fact finder but was ruling on a matter of law to determine 
whether the [plaintiffs] had made out a prima facie case.”).  
When considering such a motion to strike, a trial court must 
23 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.  Baysden v. Roche, 264 Va. 23, 25, 563 S.E.2d 725, 
726 (2002).  The same standard applies to our review of the 
trial court’s decision on the motion to strike.  Id. at 26, 563 
S.E.2d at 726. 
Generally, “[t]estamentary capacity is the term used to 
describe the degree of mental capacity required for the valid 
execution of a will.”  Gibbs, 239 Va. at 199, 387 S.E.2d at 500.  
Such capacity exists, if at the time a will is executed, the 
testator is “ ‘capable of recollecting her property, the natural 
objects of her bounty and their claims upon her, knew the 
business about which she was engaged and how she wished to 
dispose of the property.' "  Weedon, 283 Va. at 252, 720 S.E.2d 
at 558 (2012) (quoting Tabb v. Willis, 155 Va. 836, 859, 156 
S.E. 556, 564 (1931)).  The time of a will’s execution “is the 
critical time for determining testamentary capacity.”  Thomason 
v. Carlton, 221 Va. 845, 853, 276 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1981); accord 
Parish v. Parish, 281 Va. 191, 200, 704 S.E.2d 99, 104 (2011).  
The testimony of witnesses present at the time of execution is 
entitled to “the greatest consideration” on the issue of a 
testator’s mental capacity.  Id.  “[I]n determining the mental 
capacity of a testator, great weight is to be attached to the 
testimony of the draftsman of the will, of the attesting 
witnesses, and of attending physicians.”  Hall v. Hall, 181 Va. 
24 
67, 76, 23 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1943); accord Parish, 281 Va. at 
200, 704 S.E.2d at 105. 
According to Dunston, who drafted the June will and 
witnessed its execution, Judsen fully understood that she was 
executing a will.  He described Judsen as knowing her property, 
the natural objects of her bounty, and her wishes for the 
disposal of her assets.  The two paralegals from his office, one 
who served as a witness to the execution of the June will and 
the other who served as the notary public, agreed.  Both 
testified that they would not have witnessed or notarized the 
will if they had doubted that Judsen understood what she was 
doing or if she had seemed confused. 
Furthermore, Dunston testified that he asked Judsen if she 
wished to include any family members as beneficiaries and she 
responded “no.”  She did, however, leave a cash gift and her dog 
to Laurie, and she requested that the bequest to the “Leukemia & 
Lymphoma Society Inc.” be made in the name of her mother.  
Moreover, both Laurie and Labowitz testified that Judsen became 
angry with Laurie when she asked Labowitz to have Judsen 
substitute him for her as Judsen’s attorney in fact. 
This evidence, however, was in conflict with the testimony 
of Dr. Salhan and Dr. Hyde.  Both opined that on June 15, 2010, 
Judsen was not capable of making decisions about her property.  
When a conflict exists in the “testimony on a material point, or 
25 
if reasonably fair-minded [persons] may differ as to the 
conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence, or if the 
conclusion is dependent on the weight to be given the 
testimony,” a jury issue exists.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Davies, 226 Va. 310, 319, 310 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Cohn v. Knowledge 
Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 362, 366, 585 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2003); 
O’Brien v. Everfast, Inc., 254 Va. 326, 330, 491 S.E.2d 712, 714 
(1997).  Thus, the circuit court did not err by refusing to 
strike Labowitz’ evidence and, instead, allowing the issue of 
testamentary capacity to be decided by the jury. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The circuit court did not err in granting Instructions 8 
and 9, nor did it err in refusing to grant Kiddell’s motion to 
strike Labowitz’ evidence.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s judgment.  
Affirmed. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE MIMS 
join, dissenting. 
 
In Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 175 Va. 105, 7 S.E.2d 125 (1940), 
this Court held that if a presumption "is rebutted or overcome 
by substantial evidence showing the true facts to be to the 
contrary, the presumption disappears."  Id. at 113, 7 S.E.2d at 
26 
128.  The majority does not disagree with this principle.  
Citing Kavanaugh, the majority, nevertheless, concludes that the 
presumption of testamentary capacity does not disappear unless, 
as a matter of law, no rational finder of fact could find that 
the presumption has not been rebutted.1  Continuing, the majority 
concludes that because the evidence presented by the opponents 
of the will did not establish the testator's incapacity as a 
matter of law, it was not sufficient to rebut the presumption.  
Finally, the majority holds that if the evidence is in 
equipoise, the presumption of testamentary capacity "comes to 
the proponent's rescue, allowing him to prevail." 
Under the majority's construct, the presumption remains in 
the case as positive evidence to be weighed in determining 
whether the proponent has carried the ultimate burden of proving 
testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence unless 
the opponent has established testamentary incapacity as a matter 
of law.  In my view, that test for determining when the 
presumption of testamentary capacity disappears is inconsistent 
with the principle stated in Kavanaugh.  Moreover, a finding 
that the opponent of a will has proven testamentary incapacity 
as a matter of law means that no rational fact finder could find 
the existence of testamentary capacity when the will was 
                                                          
 
 
1 The decision in Kavanaugh does not hold that a presumption 
disappears only when rebutted "as a matter of law." 
27 
executed and judgment must therefore be entered in favor of the 
opponent.  Furthermore, assuming the majority is correct in its 
conclusion that, unless the opponent establishes testamentary 
incapacity as a matter of law, the presumption of testamentary 
capacity remains as evidence in the case and aids the proponent 
in carrying the ultimate burden of persuasion, Instructions 8 
and 9 did not instruct the jury accordingly.  The majority, 
nevertheless, holds that the circuit court did not err by giving 
Instructions 8 and 9. 
Unlike the majority, I believe that the presumption of 
testamentary capacity disappears when an opponent goes forward 
with evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.  In my view, 
the presumption is not evidence for a jury to consider.  Thus, I 
respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.2 
In a will contest, a presumption of testamentary capacity 
arises when the proponent of a will proves compliance with all 
statutory requirements for the valid execution of the will.  
Gibbs v. Gibbs, 239 Va. 197, 200, 387 S.E.2d 499, 501 (1990).  
"The primary significance of a presumption is that it operates 
to shift to the opposing party the burden of producing evidence 
tending to rebut the presumption."  Martin v. Phillips, 235 Va. 
                                                          
 
2 I concur with part II, section B. of the majority opinion 
and agree that the circuit court did not err by denying the 
opponents' motion to strike the evidence.  
28 
523, 526, 369 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1988).  To rebut the presumption 
of testamentary capacity, the opponent of the will must go 
forward with evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.  
Gibbs, 239 Va. at 201, 387 S.E.2d at 501.  When "the facts which 
are required to give rise to the presumption are proven, the 
presumption must be applied (the presumed fact must be assumed 
to have been proven) until evidence sufficient to overcome the 
presumption and prove the contrary shall have been introduced."  
Simpson v. Simpson, 162 Va. 621, 642, 175 S.E. 320, 329 (1934) 
(emphasis added). 
As we explained in Kavanaugh, a presumption disappears when 
evidence sufficient to rebut it is introduced.  175 Va. at 113, 
7 S.E.2d at 128.  There, a plaintiff sought to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained when an automobile owned by 
defendants was negligently operated by their employee.  Id. at 
108, 7 S.E.2d at 125.  The defendants asserted that, at the time 
of the accident, the employee was not operating the vehicle 
within the scope of his employment but rather was using it for 
his own "mission."  Id.  The plaintiff argued that certain 
evidence adduced at trial, along with "the prima facie 
presumption that the automobile was being operated in the 
business of its owners," was sufficient to present to the jury 
the question whether the employee was acting within the scope of 
29 
his employment at the time of the accident. Id. at 111-12, 7 
S.E.2d at 127. 
We concluded that the trial court erred by failing to 
sustain a motion to strike at the close of the evidence. 
Discussing the presumption that "proof that [an] automobile was 
owned by [a] defendant establishes a prima facie case that the 
automobile was being operated by the defendant or someone for 
him, under circumstances making him liable" for injuries 
sustained by the negligent operation of the vehicle, we 
explained that the prima facie case was "merely an inference or 
presumption that may be rebutted, with the burden of overcoming 
it resting upon the defendant."  Id. at 112-13, 7 S.E.2d at 128.  
Continuing, we stated: 
This prima facie presumption, like other 
presumptions, cannot stand in the face of 
positive facts to the contrary. . . . Therefore, 
if the presumption thus created is rebutted or 
overcome by substantial evidence showing the true 
facts to be to the contrary, the presumption 
disappears.  Presumptions give way to ascertained 
or established facts. 
 
Id. at 113, 7 S.E.2d at 128.  
In other words, " '[p]resumptions are indulged in to supply 
the place of facts; they are never allowed against ascertained 
and established facts.  When these appear, presumptions 
disappear.' "  Schmitt v. Redd, 151 Va. 333, 344, 143 S.E.2d 
884, 887 (1928) (quoting Lincoln v. French, 105 U.S. 614, 617 
30 
(1882)).  See also Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury 
Comp. Program v. Young, 34 Va. App. 306, 310-11, 541 S.E.2d 298, 
300-01 (2001) (explaining that, under one theory, a presumption 
disappears if evidence is produced to rebut the presumption); In 
re Mid-South Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2005) 
("Evidentiary presumptions . . . are designed to fill a factual 
vacuum.  Once evidence is presented . . . presumptions become 
superfluous because the parties have introduced evidence to 
dispel the mysteries that gave rise to the presumptions."); 
Hertz v. Record Publ'g Co., 219 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1955) 
(holding that a presumption "disappears when contrary evidence 
of the fact in issue is introduced"); Richmond Sand & Gravel 
Corp. v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 170 F.2d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 
1948) ("The presumption is not evidence for the consideration of 
the jury . . . and once rebutted in either of these fashions, 
disappears from the case."); Heffenger v. Heffenger, 3 A.2d 95, 
97 (N.H. 1938) ("When there is either evidence, or an inference 
from evidence, bearing upon the issue of a testator's intention 
to include or exclude a particular item of property from the 
terms of his will the presumption against partial intestacy 
disappears."); Dromgoole v. White, 239 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1963) (A "presumption is not evidence but serves in 
place of evidence until the opposing party comes forward with 
his proof, whereat it disappears.  It has no weight as evidence 
31 
and is never to be considered in weighing evidence."); but cf. 
City of Hopewell v. Tirpak, 28 Va. App. 100, 117, 502 S.E.2d 
161, 169 (1998) (discussing "three . . . presumptions in 
Virginia law that have the effect of shifting both the burdens 
of production and persuasion with regard to a particular factual 
issue"). 
Contrary to the majority and Kenneth E. Labowitz, the 
proponent of the will at issue, our decisions in Tate v. 
Chumbley, 190 Va. 480, 57 S.E.2d 151 (1950); Jenkins v. Trice, 
152 Va. 411, 147 S.E. 251 (1929); Rust v. Reid, 124 Va. 1, 97 
S.E. 324 (1918); Huff v. Welch, 115 Va. 74, 78 S.E. 573 (1913); 
and Hopkins v. Wampler, 108 Va. 705, 62 S.E. 926 (1908), did not 
address, much less answer, the question whether the presumption 
of testamentary capacity disappears when rebutted by sufficient 
evidence of incapacity or as the majority concludes, when the 
opponent establishes the testator's incapacity as a matter of 
law.  Quoting jury instructions from those cases, the majority 
states that "this Court has a long history of approving jury 
instructions on the presumption of testamentary capacity." 
Instructions in those cases did tell the jury that a 
presumption exists in favor of a testator's capacity and that 
the presumption was to be considered in determining competency.  
However, in all those cases, this Court discussed jury 
instructions to address issues different than the one now before 
32 
us.  Not one of those cases even tangentially involved the 
question whether the presumption of testamentary capacity 
disappears when rebutted by sufficient evidence of incapacity.  
The majority does not claim otherwise, nor can it.  Thus, the 
mere fact that the instructions were given and quoted with 
approval is not dispositive in the instant case.  See Gibbs, 239 
Va. at 202, 387 S.E.2d at 501 (stating that the fact an 
instruction similar to one challenged on appeal was given in 
another case was "not instructive in the instant case").  Any 
suggestion otherwise cannot stand in the face of our cases that 
have dealt specifically with rebuttable presumptions and 
recognize that they disappear when rebutted.  See Kavanaugh, 175 
Va. at 113, 7 S.E.2d at 128 (holding that "if the presumption 
. . . created is rebutted or overcome by substantial evidence 
. . . , the presumption disappears"); Simpson, 162 Va. at 642, 
175 S.E. at 329 (holding that "the presumption must be applied 
(the presumed fact must be assumed to have been proven) until 
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption and prove the 
contrary shall have been introduced"); Schmitt, 151 Va. at 344, 
143 S.E. at 887 (" 'Presumptions are indulged in to supply the 
place of facts; they are never allowed against ascertained and 
established facts.  When these appear, presumptions 
disappear.' ") (quoting Lincoln, 105 U.S. at 617). 
33 
Moreover, Instructions 8 and 9 are different from those 
given in Tate, Jenkins, Rust, and Huff.  Those instructions told 
the jury to consider the presumption when determining the 
question of competency.  In contrast, Instructions 8 and 9 did 
not inform the jury that it should consider the presumption in 
determining whether Labowitz, as the proponent of the will, met 
his burden of proving testamentary capacity by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Instead, Instruction 8 informed the jury that 
Labowitz was entitled to a presumption that the testator had 
testamentary capacity at the time she executed the will at 
issue, that Laurie Kiddell and LeAnn Kiddell (collectively 
referred to as "Kiddell"), must introduce evidence "sufficient" 
to rebut the presumption, and that, if Kiddell did so, Labowitz 
had the burden to prove testamentary capacity by the greater 
weight of the evidence.  Instruction 9 told the jury to decide 
in favor of Kiddell, if they "introduced evidence sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity" and if Labowitz 
then "failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence" 
that the testator had testamentary capacity when she executed 
the will.  The instructions further told the jury to find in 
favor of Labowitz if Kiddell failed to rebut the presumption of 
testamentary capacity or if Labowitz proved testamentary 
capacity "by the greater weight of the evidence." 
34 
Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion, nothing in 
Instructions 8 or 9 was the "functional equivalent" of the 
instructions recited in our prior cases because those 
instructions did not inform the jury that the opponent had to go 
forward with evidence to rebut the presumption of testamentary 
capacity, nor did they tell the jury to decide if the opponent 
had rebutted the presumption of testamentary capacity.  
Furthermore, contrary to the majority's construct of the role 
the presumption plays, Instructions 8 and 9 did not tell the 
jury that if the evidence is in equipoise, the presumption tips 
the scales in favor of Labowitz and permits a finding that he 
proved testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Yet, this is one of the reasons offered by the majority to 
explain why a jury must be instructed about the presumption of 
testamentary capacity.  Thus, using the majority's rationale, 
the circuit court erred by giving Instructions 8 and 9.  But, 
the majority does not so hold.  Consequently, trial courts in 
the future will not know whether to instruct a jury in a will 
contest using instructions like those in our prior cases or 
instructions similar to Instructions 8 and 9. 
In my view, the presumption of testamentary capacity arose 
when Labowitz demonstrated that the testator executed the will 
at issue in accordance with the requirements of Code § 64.1-49.  
The presumption remained in the case "until evidence sufficient 
35 
to overcome the presumption and prove the contrary [was] 
introduced."  Simpson, 162 Va. at 642, 175 S.E. at 329.  Thus, 
Kiddell had to go forward with evidence of testamentary 
incapacity sufficient to rebut the presumption.3  If Kiddell 
failed to do so, then the presumption remained and Labowitz was 
entitled to judgment in his favor at that point in the trial.4 
When Labowitz moved to strike Kiddell's evidence, arguing 
that the opponents had failed to rebut the presumption of 
testamentary capacity, the circuit court stated that "the only 
question is whether or not there is evidence presented by the 
opponents of the will to rebut the presumption of capacity. And 
the [c]ourt is going to find that that burden has been met by 
the [opponents] and therefore the motion to strike will be 
denied."5  Thus, as explained by this Court in both Kavanaugh and 
                                                          
 
 
3 Kiddell had to present "sufficient" evidence, not merely 
"any" evidence, of incapacity. 
4 A presumption is not rebutted and prevails when "evidence 
of equally credible witnesses for and against the presumption is 
equally balanced."  Rowe v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 
771, 772 (1925); see also Nelms v. Nelms, 236 Va. 281, 287, 374 
S.E.2d 4, 8 (1988). 
5 The majority states that it is unclear whether the circuit 
court concluded that Kiddell had rebutted the presumption 
because of its later decision to give Instructions 8 and 9.  
During the colloquy regarding jury instructions, the circuit 
court stated it had not ruled that the opponents rebutted the 
presumption but had ruled that there "was . . . sufficient 
evidence on the question . . . of whether you rebutted it.  If 
[the opponents] had [not], this case would have been over this 
morning."  The court's last statement is unquestionably correct.  
Moreover, under our prior decisions, a finding of sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity means 
36 
Simpson, the presumption of testamentary capacity disappeared at 
that point.  Accordingly, the circuit court erred by granting 
Instructions 8 and 9.  See Diederich v. Walters, 357 N.E.2d 
1128, 1132 (Ill. 1976) (once evidence opposing the presumption 
comes into the case, the presumption ceases to operate, 
"therefore eliminat[ing] the need for any instruction to the 
jury regarding the presumption"); Breadheft v. Cleveland, 110 
N.E. 662, 663 (Ind. 1915) ("The ordinary function of most so-
called presumptions of law, as they relate to the law of 
evidence, is to cast on the party against whom the presumption 
works, the duty of going forward with evidence, and when that 
duty is performed the presumption is functus officio and has no 
proper place in the instructions to the jury."); United Missouri 
Bank v. March, 650 S.W.2d 678, 680-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) 
("[W]hen some substantial evidence is produced by the party 
presumed against, 'however slight' the presumption disappears 
and the trier of facts receives the issue free of the 
presumption."). 
Finally, I point out that, under the majority's decision 
today, a jury will determine whether the opponent of a will has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the presumption is rebutted.  Gibbs, 239 Va. at 201, 387 S.E.2d 
at 501.  The majority's conclusion that the circuit court's 
denial of Labowitz's motion to strike "amounted only to a ruling 
that Kiddell's evidence could potentially rebut the presumption" 
begs the question whether a trial court or a jury decides if the 
opponent of a will has rebutted the presumption of testamentary 
capacity.  In my view, a trial court makes that determination. 
37 
rebutted the presumption of testamentary capacity.  The 
majority, however, gives no guidance as to the definition of the 
legal standard of "sufficient evidence."6  So, each jury in a 
will contest will have to decide what is meant by "evidence 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity."   
I fear that different juries will use varying definitions.  Even 
the circuit court in ruling on Labowitz's motion to strike noted 
the absence in our jurisprudence of a definable evidentiary 
standard to employ in deciding if the opponent of a will has 
rebutted the presumption of testamentary capacity.  Perhaps the 
absence of such guidance is indicative of the fact that a jury 
in such a case does not decide whether a presumption, operating 
as a rule of law, has been rebutted.  See Martin v. Phillips, 
235 Va. 523, 526, 369 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1988) ("A presumption is 
a rule of law . . . ."). 
For these reasons, I conclude that the circuit court erred 
by giving Instructions 8 and 9.  Instructions 5 and 6 correctly 
                                                          
 
6 The majority states that the phrase "sufficient evidence" 
has a commonly accepted definition and that a trial court, 
therefore, does not need to instruct a jury as to its meaning.  
But if a jury is instructed as to the meaning of the phrase 
"greater weight of the evidence" or "preponderance of the 
evidence" and is also told that the opponent of a will must 
present "sufficient evidence" to rebut the presumption of 
testamentary capacity, it is unclear that a jury will know that 
it should apply its common understanding of the phrase 
"sufficient evidence." 
38 
stated the applicable law.7  I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part, and I would remand this case to the circuit 
court for a new trial. 
                                                          
 
7 Instructions 5 and 6 are set forth in 2 Virginia Model 
Jury Instructions - Civil, No. 48.040, at 48-19 (repl. ed. 
2011).  
 
39 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring. 
 
 
I agree with the majority's holding that the circuit court 
did not err in granting Instructions 8 and 9 or in refusing to 
grant Kiddell's motion to strike Labowitz's evidence.  I write 
separately because I believe it is unnecessary for us to 
determine whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity as a matter of 
law because Kiddell did not move the circuit court for such a 
determination. 
 
When Kiddell objected to Instructions 8 and 9, she argued 
that in denying Labowitz's motion to strike, the circuit court 
ruled that the presumption of testamentary capacity had been 
rebutted as a matter of law.  As the majority states, however, 
the circuit court did not rule that the presumption had been 
rebutted.  Rather, the circuit court ruled that Kiddell had 
presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to determine 
whether the presumption had been rebutted.  Furthermore, as the 
majority explains, when the circuit court denied Labowitz's 
motion to strike, it could not have ruled that the presumption 
had been rebutted as a matter of law since such a ruling would 
have amounted to the granting of a motion for partial summary 
judgment at trial.  See Code § 8.01-378 (circuit court may only 
enter partial summary judgment when it has granted a motion to 
40 
strike).  Thus, the only ruling made by the circuit court on the 
issue of whether Kiddell rebutted the presumption of 
testamentary capacity was that Kiddell presented sufficient 
evidence to submit this issue to the jury. 
Kiddell did not move for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of whether she rebutted the presumption as a matter of 
law, but only opposed the motion to strike her evidence.1  
Therefore, the issue of whether Kiddell rebutted the presumption 
as a matter of law was not before the circuit court and is not 
before this Court.  Since the circuit court did not rule, and 
indeed could not have ruled, that the presumption was rebutted 
as a matter of law when it denied Labowitz's motion to strike, I 
would hold that it was not error for the circuit court to 
instruct the jury regarding the presumption of testamentary 
capacity.2  However, because Kiddell did not move for partial 
                                                          
 
 
1 In fact, had Labowitz simply not made the motion to 
strike, the issue of whether Kiddell presented sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity would 
not have been addressed by the court prior to its instructions 
to the jury. 
2 I agree with the majority that the content of instructions 
8 and 9 was consistent with instructions on the presumption of 
testamentary capacity that this Court has previously approved 
and, thus, was an "accurate statement of the relevant legal 
principles."  Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 131, 670 
S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009).  See, e.g., Tate v. Chumbley, 190 Va. 
480, 500, 57 S.E.2d 151, 160 (1950); Culpepper v. Robie, 155 Va. 
64, 70, 154 S.E. 687, 689 (1930); Jenkins v. Trice, 152 Va. 411, 
440, 147 S.E. 251, 260 (1929); Green v. Green's Ex'rs, 150 Va. 
452, 462, 143 S.E. 683, 686 (1928); Rust v. Reid, 124 Va. 1, 26, 
97 S.E. 324, 331 (1918); Huff v. Welch, 115 Va. 74, 76, 86, 78 
41 
summary judgment on the issue of whether she rebutted the 
presumption as a matter of law, I would not address whether 
Kiddell, in fact, rebutted the presumption as a matter of law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
S.E. 573, 757, 578 (1913) (holding that the trial court did not 
err in giving instruction informing jury that in “all cases 
there is an existing presumption in favor of testator’s sanity 
and capacity, which is to be taken into consideration by the 
jury in determining the question of competency).