Title: Wayne Tompkins v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-277
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 10, 2007

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-277 
____________ 
 
WAYNE TOMPKINS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 10, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Wayne Tompkins, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order of 
the circuit court denying his second successive motion for postconviction relief.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  The issue is whether the 
circuit court erred in summarily denying Tompkins’ claim that new information 
that impeaches a portion of an important witness’s trial testimony requires reversal 
of the conviction and sentence of death.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 
trial court’s order.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 1985, Tompkins was convicted of the first-degree murder of fifteen-year-
old Lisa DeCarr and was sentenced to death on the recommendation of a 
unanimous jury.  Lisa disappeared from her home in Tampa on March 24, 1983.  
In June 1984, her skeletal remains, along with her pink bathrobe and jewelry, were 
found in a shallow grave under her house.  In September 1984, Tompkins, the 
boyfriend of Lisa’s mother, was charged with the murder.   
The State presented “three key witnesses” at trial—Barbara DeCarr, Lisa’s 
mother, Kathy Stevens, Lisa’s friend, and Kenneth Turco, a jailhouse informant.  
Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 1986) (“Tompkins I”).  Kathy 
Stevens, whose testimony is at issue in Tompkins’ current motion, testified at trial 
that she went to Lisa’s house between eight and nine o’clock on the morning of 
March 24, 1983.  After hearing a loud crash, she opened the front door and saw 
Lisa on the couch struggling and hitting Tompkins who was on top of her 
attempting to remove her clothing.  Lisa asked her to call the police but Stevens 
did not do so.  Stevens explained that after she left Lisa’s house, she walked to the 
corner store where she ran into Lisa’s boyfriend, James Davis.1  Stevens stated that 
she told Davis what she had witnessed but Davis seemed unconcerned.  Because 
she was scared and Davis “walked away like it was nothing,” Stevens just went to 
school.  When Stevens returned to Lisa’s house later that day to retrieve her purse, 
Tompkins answered the door and told her that Lisa had left with her mother.  
                                          
 
 
1.  James Davis is also known as Junior Davis. 
 
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Stevens also testified that Tompkins made sexual advances towards Lisa on two 
previous occasions. 
Mrs. DeCarr’s and Turco’s testimony was summarized by this Court on 
direct appeal as follows:             
Barbara DeCarr . . . testified that she left the house on the morning of 
March 24, 1983, at approximately 9 a.m., leaving Lisa alone in the 
house. Lisa was dressed in her pink bathrobe.  Barbara met Wayne 
Tompkins at his mother’s house a few blocks away.  Some time that 
morning, she sent Tompkins back to her house to get some 
newspapers for packing.  When Tompkins returned, he told Barbara 
that Lisa was watching television in her robe.  Tompkins then left his 
mother’s house again, and Barbara did not see or speak to him again 
until approximately 3 o’clock that afternoon.  At that time, Tompkins 
told Barbara that Lisa had run away.  He said the last time he saw 
Lisa, she was going to the store and was wearing jeans and a blouse.  
Barbara returned to the Osborne Street house where she found Lisa’s 
pocketbook and robe missing but not the clothes described by 
Tompkins.  Barbara then called the police. 
. . . .  
Kenneth Turco . . . testified that Tompkins confided details of 
the murder to him while they were cellmates in June 1985.  Turco 
testified that Tompkins told him that Lisa was on the sofa when he 
returned to the house to get some newspapers for packing.  When 
Tompkins tried to force himself on her, Lisa kicked him in the groin. 
Tompkins then strangled her and buried her under the house along 
with her pocketbook and some clothing (jeans and a top) to make it 
appear as if she had run away. 
 
Id. at 417-18.  Tompkins did not present any evidence and the jury found him 
guilty of first-degree murder.  See id. at 418.  
At the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that Tompkins had been 
convicted of kidnapping and rape stemming from two separate incidents in Pasco 
 
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County that occurred after Lisa’s disappearance.  Tompkins presented testimony 
regarding his good work record, shy and nonviolent personality, and honesty.  See 
id.  The jury recommended death by a vote of twelve to zero and the trial court 
imposed a sentence of death.  This Court affirmed the conviction and death 
sentence.  See id. at 421.   
  
Beginning with his initial motion for postconviction relief filed in March 
1989, Tompkins has asserted that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that impeaches Stevens’ trial 
testimony.  In his first postconviction motion, Tompkins alleged that the State 
failed to disclose file memoranda prepared by prosecutor Michael Benito in which 
he memorialized two conversations with Stevens that were inconsistent with her 
trial testimony.  The inconsistencies Tompkins identified were: (1) the difference 
in the time of Stevens’ observation of the assault on the day Lisa disappeared;2 (2) 
Stevens’ statement at trial that Lisa asked her to call the police was not mentioned 
in Benito’s memo; and (3) Stevens’ testimony that during Tompkins’ prior assault 
on Lisa five months before the murder, Tompkins commented that he was going to 
kill Lisa, was different than her statement to Benito that Tompkins threatened to 
                                          
 
 
2.  Benito’s memo states that Stevens saw the struggle between Tompkins 
and Lisa at 8 a.m.  Tompkins asserted in his motion that Stevens testified at trial 
that this occurred at 9:30.  However, Stevens actually testified that she returned to 
Lisa’s house between 8 and 9 a.m., but that she could not be sure of the time.   
 
 
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kill Lisa if she ever hit him again.3  Tompkins also alleged that the State failed to 
disclose that at the time Stevens first told Benito that she had witnessed Tompkins 
attacking Lisa, which occurred two years after Lisa’s disappearance, Benito 
arranged for Stevens to visit her boyfriend in jail.  
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied all of Tompkins’ Brady 
claims without discussion.  On appeal, this Court affirmed without specifically 
addressing the claims related to Stevens.  See Tompkins v. State, 549 So. 2d 1370, 
1372 (Fla. 1989) (“Tompkins II”).   
In a federal habeas petition, Tompkins raised the same Brady claims 
regarding the inconsistencies in Stevens’ statements and the fact that Benito 
arranged for Stevens to visit her boyfriend in jail.  Regarding Benito’s file 
memoranda, the federal district court found that  
                                          
 
 
3.  Stevens testified that on one occasion when she spent the night at Lisa’s 
house, Tompkins attempted to get into bed with them.  Her testimony about who 
Tompkins threatened as he left Lisa’s room is ambiguous:   
 
 
Q [by the prosecutor]:  After she dug her nails into him, do you 
recall Wayne saying anything to Lisa and you at this time?  
 
A [by Stevens]:  He was— 
 
Q:  Speak up please. 
 
A:  He was telling her to stop and calling her a bitch and vulgar 
names. 
 
Q:  Did he say anything else? 
 
A:  He said—he looked at me and he said, “I’m going to kill 
you,” and then he looked at Lisa and then he got up, and he looked 
disgusted and he left the room.    
 
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[e]ven assuming that [memoranda] qualif[y] as evidence 
covered by the Brady rule, there is no reasonable probability that 
availability of such evidence, either separately or collectively, would 
have changed the outcome of the trial.  It cannot reasonably be said 
that [Tompkins] was denied a fair trial as a result of the prosecuting 
attorney’s failure to affirmatively disclose these materials.     
Tompkins v. Singletary, No. 89-1638-CIV-T-99B, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22582, 
*38 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 1998).  In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted 
that “at the 3.850 evidentiary hearing, Benito testified that his two memoranda to 
his file did not purport to recite all the details of what Kathy Stevens told him 
during his telephone conversations with her.”  Id. at *38 n.13. 
Addressing Tompkins’ claim that the State violated Brady by failing to 
disclose that Benito assisted Stevens in arranging a visit with her boyfriend, the 
district court found that “[a]ssuming arguendo that this is something that should 
have been disclosed to the jury, such failure can hardly be regarded as implicating 
such gravity as would put the case in a different light or undermine confidence in 
the verdict.”  Id. at *39.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial 
of these claims without discussion.  See Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1331 
n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Tompkins III”).   
On March 22, 2001, after Governor Bush signed Tompkins’ third death 
warrant, Tompkins filed a second postconviction motion in state court.  In this 
motion, Tompkins asserted, among other claims, that the State failed to disclose 
favorable evidence in violation of Brady that demonstrated that the testimony of 
 
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the State’s three key witnesses and the State’s closing arguments were false in 
violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  See Tompkins v. State, 
872 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2003) (“Tompkins IV”).  Specifically, Tompkins alleged that 
the State withheld several police reports and other documents which he claimed 
contained (1) statements that tended to contradict the testimony of Mrs. DeCarr, 
Stevens, and Turco, (2) information about other possible suspects, (3) information 
about a police investigation into the disappearance of one of Lisa’s friends that was 
being investigated in conjunction with the DeCarr case, and (4) information related 
to the credibility of Stevens and Turco.  Id. at 238.  The circuit court denied the 
motion and this Court affirmed.  See id. at 233.  Regarding Tompkins’ Brady 
claim, this Court concluded that “[e]ither the undisclosed documents are not Brady 
material because they are neither favorable to Tompkins nor suppressed, or 
Tompkins has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the lack of disclosure.”  
Id. at 241.        
 Tompkins’ current motion, which was filed in accord with this Court’s 
decision in Tompkins v. State, 894 So. 2d 857, 858-59 (Fla. 2005) (“Tompkins 
V”),4 alleges that new information provided by James Davis, Lisa’s boyfriend at 
                                          
 
 
4.  In August 2002, while his appeal in Tompkins IV was pending, 
Tompkins filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction to allow the circuit court to 
consider a claim based on new evidence disclosed by the State in 2001.  The Court 
denied the motion and Tompkins filed another successive postconviction motion in 
the trial court, alleging new evidence to support his Brady and Giglio claims.  The 
 
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the time of her disappearance, significantly impeaches the testimony of Kathy 
Stevens and requires reversal of the conviction and death sentence.  Specifically, 
Davis stated that he did not see Stevens at the corner store on the morning Stevens 
witnessed Tompkins assaulting Lisa.  In April 2002, Davis made the following 
statements in a sworn affidavit:  
1.   
My name is James M. Davis, Jr., and I currently reside in 
Hillsborough County Florida. 
2. 
At the time that Lisa DeCarr disappeared, she was my 
girlfriend.  We were both pretty young at the time, but I cared 
about her very much.   
3. 
Lisa and I would hang out most of the time.  I did not drive at 
that time.  I would ride my bike over to her house and we would 
hang out around the neighborhood.  At first, I thought that I 
might like to date Lisa’s older sister, Sue, but it ended up that I 
had feelings for Lisa.  We met going to school when I was in 
6th or 7th grade.  Everyday a group of us would walk to and 
from school through a pretty rough neighborhood. 
4. 
Lisa would talk to me about not being happy living at home.  
Her mother always had a lot of men around and Lisa did not 
like that.  She took care of her younger brothers a lot of the 
time.  She never talked about her relationship with Wayne 
Tompkins; she never said that he attacked her, or that there was 
any violent contact between them.  I do not remember Lisa ever 
having any cigarette burns on her chest or anywhere else on her 
body. 
5. 
I remember that there were some friends of Lisa’s that did hang 
around.  I do not remember Kathy Sample, Stevens, or Mamroe 
being a close friend of Lisa’s. 
6. 
At the time when Lisa disappeared I was working for National 
                                                                                                                                        
circuit court dismissed the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction due to the 
pending appeal.  This Court affirmed the trial court’s order but gave Tompkins “60 
days to refile his successive postconviction motion nunc pro tunc to February 5, 
2003, the date his prior motion was filed in the trial court.”  Tompkins V, 894 So. 
2d at 859. 
 
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Utilities Cable Company.  We laid underground cable for 
telephones.  I had to be at work every morning by 7:00 am.  
The story of Kathy running into me at the store the day Lisa 
disappeared is not true.  If anyone had told me that Wayne was 
attacking Lisa and she was screaming for someone to call the 
police, I would have gone directly there.  Also, I never went to 
work drunk, I am not a big drinker, and I was never drunk at 
7:00 in the morning at work.  It never happened.   
7. 
I was very upset about Lisa being missing.  She was very 
special to me, I did want to go and look for her when I found 
out, but my parents wanted me to stay out of it.  
8. 
I only remember talking to the police once, I am very sad about 
what happened to Lisa DeCarr.  If I thought there was anyway I 
could have helped her, I would have, especially if she were in 
trouble.  This is why what Kathy said is not true.  I never saw 
Kathy on the morning that Lisa disappeared, nor did Kathy ever 
tell me that she had just seen Lisa being attacked by Wayne.  In 
fact, the first time I heard of anything having possibly happened 
to Lisa was when I heard on the radio she was missing. 
 
Tompkins alleged that his counsel attempted but failed to locate Davis in 
1989 and had no indication that Davis possessed any relevant information until he 
received new documents from the State in April 2001.  Tompkins specifically 
referred to two lead sheets prepared by Detective Burke, the lead detective on the 
case, and a police report dated June 8, 1984, both of which Tompkins alleged that 
the State withheld in violation of Brady in his prior successive motion for 
postconviction relief.  See Tompkins IV, 872 So. 2d at 238 n.12.   
 
After ordering a response from the State and holding a Huff5 hearing to 
determine whether an evidentiary hearing was required, the circuit court issued an 
                                          
 
 
1.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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order denying Tompkins’ motion.  The circuit court evaluated Tompkins’ claim as 
one of newly discovered evidence and found that Tompkins failed to both timely 
raise the claim and establish that Davis’s affidavit was of such a nature that it 
would probably produce an acquittal at retrial.  Regarding the merits of Tompkins’ 
claim, the circuit court ruled that      
[n]othing that Defendant presented in the hearing on August 29, 2005 
leads the Court to believe that if the evidence as presented in the 
affidavit from Junior Davis was taken as true, the outcome at trial 
would have been any different.  Kathy Stevens was subjected to 
staunch cross examination and the fact that as counsel for Defendant 
alleges, there might have been more material upon which to challenge 
her recollection of the facts of the case is insufficient in and of itself to 
vacate the judgment in this case.   
ANALYSIS 
Initially, Tompkins argues that the circuit court erred in evaluating his claim 
regarding Davis’s affidavit under the newly discovered evidence standard of Jones 
v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991), rather than as a claim under Brady and 
Giglio because the State allegedly withheld the evidence that indicated that Davis 
was an important witness and presented Stevens’ false testimony.  Davis’s 
statement itself was not suppressed by the State6 and Tompkins has presented no 
                                          
 
 
6.  To obtain relief under Brady, the defendant must establish: “(1) that the 
evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it 
is impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.”  Johnson v. State, 
921 So. 2d 490, 507 (Fla. 2005).   
 
 
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evidence that the State knowingly presented false testimony.7  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the trial court correctly evaluated Tompkins’ claim as one of newly 
discovered evidence.        
Turning to the merits of Tompkins’ claim, the circuit court denied 
Tompkins’ motion without an evidentiary hearing.  Thus, we “must accept all 
allegations in the motion as true to the extent they are not conclusively rebutted by 
the record.”  Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 355 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Gaskin v. 
State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 (Fla. 1999)); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(d) 
(providing that the motion shall be denied without an evidentiary hearing if “the 
motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled 
to no relief”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B) (providing that a successive 
postconviction motion in a capital case may be denied without an evidentiary 
hearing if “the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the 
movant is entitled to no relief”).     
To have his conviction set aside based on newly discovered evidence, 
Tompkins must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Jones.  First, the “asserted 
facts ‘must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the 
time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have 
                                          
 
 
7.  To establish a Giglio violation, the defendant must show: “(1) the 
testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) 
the statement was material.”  Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003).   
 
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known them by the use of diligence.’”  Jones, 591 So. 2d at 916 (quoting Hallman 
v. State, 371 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1979)).  Second, “the newly discovered 
evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.”  Id. at 915.       
 
The circuit court found, and the State argues, that Tompkins’ claim is  
untimely because Davis was listed in police reports provided to the defense prior to 
trial.  We do not address the timeliness of Tompkins’ claim because we affirm the 
trial court’s denial of relief based on the second prong of Jones.   
In determining whether the discovery of new evidence compels a new trial, 
the trial court was required to “consider all newly discovered evidence which 
would be admissible,” and “evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered 
evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.”  Id. at 916.  This 
determination includes  
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court should also 
determine whether the evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case.  The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence. 
Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (citations omitted).  
 
There is no question that Stevens was a very important witness at trial.  Her 
testimony that she witnessed Tompkins assaulting Lisa on the day Lisa 
disappeared, if believed by the jury, was strong circumstantial evidence of 
 
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Tompkins’ guilt.  And the State emphasized the significance of her testimony 
during closing arguments.  Thus, the impeachment evidence in Davis’s affidavit 
cannot be viewed as insignificant.  However, we conclude that this impeachment 
evidence, when considered with the other evidence presented at trial, is not of 
“such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Jones, 591 So. 
2d at 915.   
 
The impeachment evidence included in Davis’s affidavit is much different 
than the undisclosed interviews at issue in Cardona v. State, 826 So. 2d 968, 981 
(Fla. 2002), which this Court determined required a new trial under Brady.  In that 
case, the witness was the codefendant involved in the abuse and murder of the 
defendant’s three-year-old son.  See id. at 969-70.  We described this witness as 
“the most important witness to testify as to which of the two defendants was the 
more culpable, and to the escalating abuse the State claimed [the defendant] 
committed against [the victim].”  Id. at 974.  The witness was also “the only 
witness who testified to the significant events of the day preceding [the victim’s] 
death and the day of [the victim’s] death.”  Id.  After trial, the defense learned that 
the State failed to disclose three interviews and a report that contained statements 
from the witness that contradicted her trial testimony on these central issues.  We 
concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the undisclosed 
interviews with the witness “contain[ed] material inconsistencies on several key 
 
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points not addressed at trial that could have seriously undermined [the witness’s] 
credibility,” id., and suggested coaching by the State.  Id. at 980-81. 
 
In this case, Davis’s affidavit contradicts Stevens’ testimony regarding her 
encounter with Davis at the corner store, which Stevens indicated was part of the 
reason she did not call the police.  However, his statements do not address Stevens’ 
testimony that she saw Tompkins attacking Lisa.   
Further, Stevens, who was fifteen when she witnessed the assault and 
seventeen at the time of trial, was significantly impeached by defense counsel.  She 
waited almost a year to come forward after Lisa’s body was discovered and made 
previous statements to the prosecutor and Mrs. DeCarr that she had no information 
about Lisa’s disappearance.  The State’s argument to the jury regarding Stevens’ 
credibility in the face of this impeachment was that Stevens had no reason to lie.  
The statements in Davis’s affidavit do not provide any new information that 
suggests that Stevens did, in fact, have a motive to lie.  Cf. Cardona, 826 So. 2d at 
981 (noting that a crucial witness’s inconsistent version of “critical events . . . 
‘would have introduced a new source of bias’”) (quoting United States v. Rivera 
Pedin, 861 F.2d 1522, 1530 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
Davis’s affidavit is not the type of evidence this Court has held requires an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether it would probably produce an acquittal.  
This is not a case in which the defense has credible new evidence that another 
 
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person may have committed the murder.  See Swafford v. State, 679 So. 2d 736, 
739 (Fla. 1996) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether new 
evidence that placed alternative suspect at a bar with .38 caliber handgun near the 
time that murder weapon was discovered in that locale, when considered 
cumulatively with the evidence alleged in Swafford’s prior 3.850 motion and the 
conflicting evidence presented in Swafford’s trial with regard to exactly where 
within the bar the gun was found, was of such a nature to probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial).  
 This is also not a case where an important witness has recanted his or her 
testimony.  See Lightbourne v. State, 742 So. 2d 238, 249 (Fla. 1999) (remanding 
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether newly recanted testimony, when 
considered cumulatively with all of the post-trial evidence indicated that other 
witnesses testified falsely, required a new penalty-phase hearing).  Indeed, none of 
the State’s three “key witnesses”—Mrs. DeCarr, Stevens, or Turco—has recanted.               
Tompkins’ case is more akin to Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 662-63 (Fla. 
2000), in which the Court affirmed the denial of a newly discovered evidence 
claim based on hearsay statements that a person other than the defendant 
committed the crime.  The Court noted that the evidence was admissible solely for 
impeachment purposes, did not place the alternative suspect at the scene of the 
crime, and did not affect the testimony of the three eyewitnesses who identified the 
 
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defendant as the perpetrator.  See id. at 662.  The Court also observed that the 
defendant had not presented any evidence that directly refuted the State’s case.  
See id. at 662-63.  
Finally, even when Davis’s affidavit is considered cumulatively with any 
favorable evidence the State withheld, as alleged in Tompkins’ prior two 
postconviction motions, we conclude that the motions, files, and records show that 
Tompkins is not entitled to relief under either the materiality prong of Brady or the 
second prong of Jones.8  In Tompkins IV, we affirmed the summary denial of 
Tompkins’ Brady claims, concluding that “[e]ither the undisclosed documents are 
not Brady material because they are neither favorable to Tompkins nor suppressed, 
or Tompkins has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the lack of 
disclosure.”  872 So. 2d at 241.  We further stated that “even if we were to engage 
in a cumulative analysis and consider the undisclosed, favorable documents in 
conjunction with Tompkins’ claims raised in his first motion for postconviction 
relief, our conclusion as to prejudice would not change.”  Id. at 241-42.  We reach 
the same conclusion in this case.   
CONCLUSION  
                                          
 
 
8.  Unlike the second prong of Jones, which requires that the defendant 
establish that the new evidence is of “such nature that it would probably produce 
an acquittal on retrial,” 591 So. 2d at 915, the materiality prong of Brady asks 
whether the evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 290 (1999).        
 
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of 
Tompkins’ second successive motion for postconviction relief.   
It is so ordered. 
 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit - Case No. 84-CF-010538 
 
 
(Hillsborough County) 
 
Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and 
Martin J. McClain of Backhus and Izakowitz, P.A., Special Assistant CCRC – 
South, Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert J. Landry, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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