Title: State v. Curtis E. Gallion
Citation: 2004 WI 42
Docket Number: 2001AP000051-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2004

2004 WI 42 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0051-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Curtis E. Gallion,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 265 
Reported at:  258 Wis. 2d. 473, 654 N.W.2d 446 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 15, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John J. Di Motto   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Randall E. Paulson, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Counsel for 
Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Walter J. Dickey, David 
E. Schultz, and Michael E. Smith, University of Wisconsin Law 
School, and oral argument by Walter J. Dickey. 
 
2004 WI 42 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0051-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 1148) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Curtis E. Gallion,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 15, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    
In 
all 
Anglo-American 
jurisprudence 
a 
principal 
obligation of the judge is to explain the reasons for 
his actions.  His decisions will not be understood by 
the people and cannot be reviewed by the appellate 
courts unless the reasons for decisions can be 
examined.  It is thus apparent that requisite to a 
prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial 
judge 
detailing 
his 
reasons 
for 
selecting 
the 
particular sentence imposed. 
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 280-81, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971). 
¶2 
Those words are as true today as they were when they 
first appeared in McCleary.  Yet, sentencing courts have strayed 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
2 
 
from the directive.  Instead, for some, merely uttering the 
facts, invoking sentencing factors, and pronouncing a sentence 
is deemed sufficient.  Such an approach confuses the exercise of 
discretion with decision-making. 
¶3 
As the McCleary court instructed, evidence of the 
exercise of discretion must be set forth on the record:  "there 
must be evidence that discretion was in fact exercised.  
Discretion is not synonymous with decision-making.  Rather, the 
term contemplates a process of reasoning."  Id. at 277.   
¶4 
Now, in the wake of truth-in-sentencing legislation, 
we reinvigorate the McCleary directive that the exercise of 
sentencing discretion must be set forth on the record.  Although 
we do not change the appellate standard of review, appellate 
courts are required to more closely scrutinize the record to 
ensure that "discretion was in fact exercised and the basis of 
that exercise of discretion [is] set forth."  Id.   
¶5 
The legislature well recognized that explaining the 
reasons for the particular sentence should not be optional for 
the circuit court under truth-in-sentencing.  It codified the 
requirement 
adopted 
in 
McCleary 
by 
enacting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.017(10m) (2001-02): "Statement of reasons for sentencing 
decision.  (a) The court shall state the reasons for its 
sentencing decision and . . . shall do so in open court and on 
the record."1 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(10m) reads in full: 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
3 
 
¶6 
In this opinion, we examine the process of reasoning 
which demonstrates the proper exercise of sentencing discretion.  
Having emphasized that both our precedent and the legislative 
mandate that the exercise of sentencing discretion be set forth 
on the record, we turn to the facts of this case. 
¶7 
Curtis Gallion seeks review of a published court of 
appeals' decision that affirmed a judgment convicting him of 
                                                                                                                                                             
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR SENTENCING DECISION (a) The 
court shall state the reasons for its sentencing 
decision and, except as provided in par. (b), shall do 
so in court and on the record. 
(b) If the court determines that it is not in the 
interest of the defendant for it to state reasons for 
its sentencing decision in the defendant's presence, 
the court shall state reasons for its sentencing 
decision in writing and include the written statement 
in the record. 
This statute codifies what was recognized in McCleary.  
There, this court expressly adopted Standard 2.3(c) of the ABA 
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, which 
provides: 
The sentencing judge should be required in every case 
to state his reasons for selecting the particular 
sentence imposed.  Normally, this should be done for 
the record in the presence of the defendant at the 
time of sentence.  In cases in which the sentencing 
judge deems it in the interest of the defendant not to 
state fully the reasons for the sentence in the 
presence of the defendant, he should prepare such a 
statement for transmission to the reviewing court as a 
part of the record. 
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 281-82, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971). 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
4 
 
homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.2  He asserts that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
failing to provide an adequate explanation for the sentence 
given, citing McCleary.  Essentially, Gallion advances that the 
basic prerequisites for the sound exercise of discretion must be 
reexamined in light of the changes brought by truth-in-
sentencing legislation.3  In addition, he contends that the 
circuit court erred in placing undue emphasis on the character 
of the victim and imposing a sentence that is harsh and 
excessive.    
¶8 
We agree that truth-in-sentencing provides an impetus 
for this court to reexamine the basic requirements for the sound 
exercise of discretion.  Accordingly, we reaffirm the sentencing 
standards established in McCleary and determine that the 
application of those standards, demonstrating the exercise of 
discretion, must be set forth on the record for future cases.4   
                                                 
2 State v. Gallion, 2002 WI App 265, 258 Wis. 2d 473, 654 
N.W.2d 446 (affirming a decision of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, John J. DiMotto, Judge).  
3 Wisconsin adopted truth-in-sentencing legislation in two 
phases.  The first phase, TIS-I, was enacted in June 1998 and 
applied to offenses committed on or after December 31, 1999.  
See 1997 Wis. Act 283.  The second phase, TIS-II, was enacted in 
July 2002 and became effective February 1, 2003.  See 2001 Wis. 
Act 109.   
4 The legislature has defined the cases subject to truth-in-
sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § 973.017(1) provides: 
(1) 
DEFINITION. 
 
In 
this 
section, 
"sentencing 
decision" means a decision as to whether to impose a 
bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01 or place a person 
on probation and a decision as to the length of a 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
5 
 
 ¶9 Further, we determine that the circuit court provided 
an adequate explanation for the sentence given, used relevant 
information regarding the character of the victim, and imposed a 
sentence that was neither unduly harsh nor excessive.  In 
essence, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion.  Therefore, we affirm the court of 
appeals.  
I 
¶10 On March 3, 2000, at about 1:30 a.m., Gallion was 
drunk and driving his car at a high rate of speed in Milwaukee.  
He ran a red light and collided with another vehicle, crashing 
into its side.  Vanessa Brown, a passenger in the other car, was 
killed by the collision.  A blood test, taken within three hours 
of the accident, revealed Gallion's blood alcohol content to be 
.237, nearly two-and-a-half times the legal limit.  
¶11 Two months later, Gallion entered a plea of guilty to 
homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.5  Pursuant to 
this plea, the State agreed to recommend prison, but leave the 
length of confinement for the circuit court to determine.  A 
presentence investigation was ordered, and the presentence 
writer recommended a sentence of 13 to 16 years in prison 
followed by 5 to 7 years of extended supervision. 
                                                                                                                                                             
bifurcated sentence, including the length of each 
component of the bifurcated sentence, the amount of a 
fine, and the length of a term of probation.     
This opinion is directed to those cases that come within 
this statutory definition. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.09(1)(b)(1997-98). 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 At sentencing, the circuit court heard testimony from 
Brown's mother, father, teacher, and employer.  The court also 
received several letters from her relatives and associates.  
Both the witnesses and writers addressed Brown's admirable 
qualities along with the impact her death had on their lives. 
¶13 In a lengthy explanation, covering 20 pages of 
transcript, the circuit court referenced relevant facts and 
discussed sentencing factors.  The court addressed: (1) the 
gravity of the offense, (2) the character and rehabilitative 
needs of Gallion, and (3) the need to protect the community.  It 
then sentenced Gallion to 21 years of confinement followed by 9 
years of extended supervision.  The maximum penalty for the 
offense was 40 years of confinement, followed by 20 years of 
extended supervision.  
¶14 Gallion subsequently moved to modify his sentence, 
alleging an erroneous exercise of discretion.  He asserted that 
the circuit court's sentence was arbitrary in that it failed to 
explain the length it imposed.  Gallion further argued that the 
court accorded too much weight to Brown's character and had 
increased 
the 
sentence 
because 
his 
character 
compared 
unfavorably to hers.   
¶15 The circuit court denied Gallion's motion.  In doing 
so, it concluded that its sentencing remarks provided ample 
basis for its exercise of discretion.  The court also explained 
that it was "obliged to consider all aspects of the defendant's 
crime, including the character of the victim and the impact of 
the defendant's crime on the people who were close to her, as 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
7 
 
relevant to the gravity of the offense."  The court then 
concluded that it was "allowed by law to sentence the defendant 
to a maximum of 60 years for this offense and was only required 
to consider the relevant sentencing factors in determining an 
appropriate sentence within the exercise of its discretion." 
¶16 The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court's 
decision.  It rejected Gallion's argument that more specificity 
was required of the circuit court at sentencing.  State v. 
Gallion, 2002 WI App 265, ¶9, 258 Wis. 2d 473, 654 N.W.2d 446.  
The 
court 
further 
determined 
that 
"the 
sentencing 
court 
considered Vanessa Brown's character in the context of assessing 
crime severity and did not punish Gallion simply because Brown 
was an extraordinary person."  Id., ¶20.  It noted that Gallion 
"[had] not met his burden of showing that the court imposed a 
more harsh sentence because of that contrast [of character]."  
Id., 
¶24 
(emphasis 
in 
original). 
 
Upon 
reviewing 
the 
circumstances surrounding the sentence, the court concluded that 
the sentence imposed was not "so excessive and unusual and so 
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public 
sentiment . . . ."  Id., ¶41 (citations omitted).  
II 
¶17 It is a well-settled principle of law that a circuit 
court exercises discretion at sentencing.  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 
at 277.  On appeal, review is limited to determining if 
discretion was erroneously exercised.  See id. at 278.  When 
discretion is exercised on the basis of clearly irrelevant or 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
8 
 
improper factors, there is an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
Id.     
¶18 On review, "[i]n any instance where the exercise of 
discretion has been demonstrated, [the appellate court] follows 
a consistent and strong policy against interference with the 
discretion of the trial court in passing sentence."  Id. at 281.  
See also In re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 
203, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984).  "[S]entencing decisions of the 
circuit court are generally afforded a strong presumption of 
reasonability because the circuit court is best suited to 
consider the relevant factors and demeanor of the convicted 
defendant."  State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 781, 482 N.W.2d 
883 (1992) (citing State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 622, 350 
N.W.2d 633 (1984)).  "Appellate judges should not substitute 
their preference for a sentence merely because, had they been in 
the trial judge's position, they would have meted out a 
different sentence."  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281.6 
¶19 The McCleary court summarized the reasoning process 
necessary to facilitate appellate review: 
[T]he term [discretion] contemplates a process of 
reasoning.  This process must depend on facts that are 
of record or that are reasonably derived by inference 
from the record and a conclusion based on a logical 
rationale founded upon proper legal standards.   
Id. at 277.     
III 
                                                 
6 In this case, we neither decide nor address the 
application of the independent appellate review doctrine. 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20 As indicated, the seminal case for sentencing in 
Wisconsin is State v. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263.  McCleary 
outlined the purposes to be served by sentencing along with the 
scope and extent of the circuit court's discretion.  In it, this 
court criticized a circuit court for imposing a sentence close 
to the maximum without adequate explanation.   
¶21 McCleary was a young man, a first-time offender, who 
was convicted of forging and uttering a $50 check.  Id. at 266-
67.  For this offense, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of nine years, one year less than the maximum available by 
statute.  Id. at 270.  Although the circuit court stated its 
reasons 
for 
rejecting 
probation, 
it 
failed 
to 
give 
any 
explanation for the sentence imposed.  Id.  Because this court 
was unable to find facts in the record to support the circuit 
court's 
decision, 
it 
concluded 
that 
McCleary's 
sentence 
constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See id. at 
273.  The court, therefore, reduced McCleary's sentence to an 
indeterminate term of not more than five years.  Id. at 290. 
¶22 The McCleary court concluded that the discretion of 
the sentencing judge "must be exercised on a rational and 
explainable basis."  Id. at 276.  It determined that in order to 
have a valid sentence there must be "a statement by the trial 
judge detailing his reasons for selecting the particular 
sentence imposed."  Id. at 281. 
¶23 McCleary 
further 
recognized 
that 
"[t]he 
sentence 
imposed in each case should call for the minimum amount of 
custody or confinement which is consistent with the protection 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
10 
 
of the public, the gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant."  Id. at 276.  This principle has been 
reiterated in subsequent cases.  E.g., State v. Setagord, 211 
Wis. 2d 397, 416, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997); Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 
764; State v. Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 327, 336-37, 351 N.W.2d 738 
(1984). 
¶24 Thus, these requirements of "detailing the reasons for 
selecting the particular sentence imposed" and a sentence 
calling for the "minimum amount of custody or confinement" are 
not new under Wisconsin law.  Indeed, both the Criminal Jury 
Instructions Committee and the Criminal Bench Book Committee 
acknowledge as much.  See Wis. J.I.——Crim. SM-34 at 8-9 (1999) 
("The justification for the length of the sentence should always 
be set forth in the record, as well as the reasons for not 
imposing a sentence of lesser duration."); Wisconsin Judicial 
Benchbook, CR 36-18 (2002) ("Judge must detail reasons for 
selecting particular sentence imposed"). 
¶25 Likewise, not new to our sentencing jurisprudence is 
the concept that probation should be considered as the first 
alternative.  In Bastian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 240, 248-49, n.1, 
194 N.W.2d 687 (1972), this court expressly adopted Standard 1.3 
of the ABA Standards Relating to Probation.  That standard 
provides in part that, "Probation should be the sentence unless 
the sentencing court finds that: 
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public 
from further criminal activity by the offender; or 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
11 
 
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment 
which can most effectively be provided if he is 
confined; or 
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of 
the offense if a sentence of probation were imposed." 
This requirement is consistent with the McCleary standard 
calling for the minimum amount of custody or confinement. 
¶26 We believe that McCleary was and still is one of the 
best statements addressing how a circuit court should exercise 
its discretion.  As we noted, there has been a regrettable 
disconnect, however, between its principles as-stated and its 
principles as-applied.  This disconnect has resulted in a more 
mechanical form of sentencing: as long as the sentencing 
transcript reflects that the circuit court enunciates the 
primary sentencing factors and discusses the facts, followed by 
the imposition of an ultimate sentence, it has properly 
exercised its discretion.7 
 
¶27 Apparently concerned with this approach, the court of 
appeals recently asked this court to "clarify the showing 
necessary to overcome the presumption that a trial court has 
properly exercised its sentencing discretion."  Certification by 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, State v. Crouthers, 99-1307-CR, 
filed March 30, 2000, p. 1.  The court explained: 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., State v. Wagner, 191 Wis. 2d 322, 332-33, 528 
N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1995).  See also State v. Curbello-
Rodriguez, 119 Wis. 2d 414, 439, 351 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(Bablitch, J., concurring) ("So long as the trial court 
discusses each such factor, this court is a rubber stamp for any 
sentence which may be imposed.") 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
12 
 
[T]he collective memory of the panel members assigned 
to this appeal could not produce any ready examples of 
cases since [McCleary] in which an appellate court 
overturned a sentence determination, absent the use of 
an improper factor or other illegality. . . . 
There appears to be some truth to the appellant's 
contention that a trial court that articulates the 
magic words "seriousness of the offense," "character 
of the offender" and "need to protect the public" will 
avoid any meaningful review of the sentence it 
imposes. 
Id. at 2.  In remarks prescient to this case, the court further 
noted: "[c]hallenges to sentencing discretion are likely to 
increase under truth-in-sentencing legislation."  Id.   
¶28 With the advent of truth-in-sentencing, we recognize a 
greater need to articulate on the record the reasons for the 
particular sentence imposed.  Under the old, indeterminate 
system, sentencing discretion was shared among all three 
branches of government.  The legislature set the maximum penalty 
and the manner of its enforcement; the courts imposed an 
indeterminate term; and the executive branch, through the parole 
board, determined how much of that term was going to be served.  
See Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 767 (citation omitted).  Under 
truth-in-sentencing legislation, the executive role has been 
diminished with the elimination of parole.  The legislative role 
is limited to setting the parameters of the penalty.  As a 
result, the judiciary's responsibility for ensuring a fair and 
just sentence has significantly increased. 
¶29 The Criminal Penalties Study Committee, an 18-person 
committee charged with making recommendations and drafting 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
13 
 
proposed 
truth-in-sentencing 
legislation, 
noted 
that 
the 
judiciary must respond to our evolving system of sentencing: 
This 
shift 
of 
more 
complete——and 
informationally 
accurate——sentencing decisionmaking to the judiciary 
places upon judges the task to more carefully fashion 
a sentence based upon the severity of the crime, the 
character of the offender, the interests of the 
community, and the need to protect the public.  Judges 
are on the front lines of the criminal justice system 
every day, listening to victims and their families, 
defendants 
and 
their 
families, 
law 
enforcement, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the public. 
State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee, Final 
Report, August 31, 1999, at i.8   
¶30 We share some of the concerns voiced by the court of 
appeals in the Crouthers certification.  In light of truth-in-
sentencing, a clarification of the requisite standards of 
sentencing is necessary to ensure that the sentencing court 
demonstrates compliance with McCleary and to assist in appellate 
review.   
¶31 Likewise, we agree with the Criminal Penalties Study 
Committee 
that 
the 
judiciary 
must 
address 
the 
increased 
responsibility placed upon the sentencing court in light of 
truth-in-sentencing.  As the Committee observed, truth-in-
sentencing legislation caused a "shift of more complete——and 
informationally 
accurate——sentencing 
decisionmaking 
to 
the 
judiciary."  The center of gravity for determining when an 
inmate should be released from prison changed from the parole 
                                                 
8 
This 
report 
can 
be 
accessed 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=42. 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
14 
 
board's determination, positioned much later in the process, to 
the judiciary's sentencing determination at the outset. 
¶32 Previously 
the 
sentencing 
court had 
only 
modest 
control over the length of time actually spent in prison.  
Judges were thought to possess inadequate information to address 
the future progress of the inmate.  Instead, only prison 
officials with sustained contacts with the inmate were thought 
to be in a position to determine if the rehabilitative efforts 
had been successful.  Likewise, if the inmate was determined to 
be incorrigible over the years, it was thought that the on-the-
scene prison officials advising the parole board were better 
positioned to assess the inmate's dangerousness and commensurate 
need for additional prison time.   
¶33 Parole boards, in essence, served as a check on 
sentencing courts' exercise of discretion.  Under truth-in-
sentencing legislation, parole is abolished and that check is 
removed. 
¶34 Now judges have an enhanced need for more complete 
information upfront, at the time of sentencing.  Judges would be 
assisted in knowing about a defendant's propensity for causing 
harm, the circumstances likely to precipitate the harm (e.g., 
alcoholic beverages, proximity to school children, etc.), and 
the connection between the elements of the sentence recommended 
and the objectives of sentencing.  To this end, we encourage 
judges to request more complete presentence reports.  
¶35 Information compiled by a sentencing commission will 
also be helpful in providing comparative data as to the length 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
15 
 
of 
sentence 
for 
the 
same 
crimes 
and 
similarly 
situated 
defendants.  The rule of law is advanced by providing advisory 
guidelines that channel outcomes in the majority of cases and 
serve as a touchstone for explaining the reasons for the 
particular sentence imposed.      
¶36 Experience has taught us to be cautious when reaching 
high consequence conclusions about human nature that seem to be 
intuitively correct at the moment.  Better instead is a 
conclusion 
that 
is 
based 
on 
more 
complete 
and 
accurate 
information and reached by an organized framework for the 
exercise of discretion.  
¶37 McCleary and its progeny established standards to 
assist and assess the exercise of sentencing discretion.  Until 
now, adherence to these standards has been implied as long as 
the "magic words" were stated, some facts were detailed, and the 
sentence imposed was within the statutory limits.  McCleary, 
however, requires more. 
¶38 In light of the increased responsibility placed upon 
the 
sentencing 
court, 
we 
reaffirm 
McCleary's 
sentencing 
standards and reexamine the manner in which they are to be 
applied. What has previously been satisfied with implied 
rationale must now be set forth on the record.  McCleary 
certainly contemplates this when it states, "decisions will not 
be understood by the people and cannot be reviewed by the 
appellate courts unless the reasons for decisions can be 
examined."  49 Wis. 2d at 281. 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
16 
 
¶39 As McCleary observed, judges are to explain the 
reasons for the particular sentence they impose.  Id. at 280-81.  
How much explanation is necessary, of course, will vary from 
case to case.  Judges, however, are required to provide a 
"rational and explainable basis" for the sentence.  Id. at 276. 
¶40 A basic framework for this process of reasoning that 
demonstrates 
the 
exercise 
of 
sentencing 
discretion 
has 
previously been set forth for sentencing courts.  See Wis. J.I.—
—Crim. SM-34 at 8-9 (1999).9  Circuit courts are required to 
specify the objectives of the sentence on the record.  These 
                                                 
9 The oral pronouncement of sentence should include the 
following: 
. . . . 
5. Explain the general objectives that a criminal 
sentence may address:  
protection of the community 
punishment 
rehabilitation of the defendant 
deterrence of others 
6. 
Identify 
the 
general 
objectives 
of 
greatest 
importance in this case.   
7. Identify the factors that were considered in 
arriving at the sentence and indicate how they 
influenced the decision. 
8. If probation is rejected, indicate why. 
. . . .  
Wis. J.I.——Crim. SM-34 at 9 (1999). 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
17 
 
objectives include, but are not limited to, the protection of 
the community, punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of 
the defendant, and deterrence to others.  Id.10 
¶41 Courts are to identify the general objectives of 
greatest importance.  These may vary from case to case.  In some 
cases, punishment and protection of the community may be the 
dominant objectives.  In others, rehabilitation of the defendant 
and victim restitution may be of greater import.  Still others 
may have deterrence or a restorative justice approach as a 
primary objective. 
¶42 Courts are to describe the facts relevant to these 
objectives.  Courts must explain, in light of the facts of the 
case, why the particular component parts of the sentence imposed 
advance the specified objectives. 
¶43 Courts must also identify the factors that were 
considered in arriving at the sentence and indicate how those 
factors fit the objectives and influence the decision.  In 
Harris, we detailed factors that courts may take into account in 
                                                 
10 Likewise, under truth-in-sentencing, the legislature has 
mandated that when a court makes a sentencing decision that the 
court shall consider the protection of the public, the gravity 
of the offense, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and 
any applicable mitigating or aggravating factors, including the 
aggravating factors specified in subs. (3) to (8).  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.01(2)(ad), (ag), (ak), and (b) 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
18 
 
the exercise of discretion.11  These factors assist courts in 
identifying relevant considerations at sentencing.  In addition, 
the 
legislature 
has 
mandated 
consideration 
of 
applicable 
mitigating or aggravating factors.12   
                                                 
11 These factors include: "(1) Past record of criminal 
offenses; (2) history of undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the 
defendant's personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of presentence investigation; (5) vicious or aggravated nature 
of the crime; (6) degree of the defendant's culpability; (7) 
defendant's demeanor at trial; (8) defendant's age, educational 
background and employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, 
repentance and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; and (12) 
the length of pretrial detention."  Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 
513, 519-20, 250 N.W.2d 7 (1977).  Additional factors have been 
recognized as appropriate considerations (e.g., read-ins, Austin 
v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971), and the effect 
of the crime on the victim, State v. Jones, 151 Wis. 2d 488, 444 
N.W.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1989)).  The circuit court need discuss 
only the relevant factors in each case.  See State v. Echols, 
175 Wis. 2d 653, 683, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993). 
12 These factors are applicable for felonies committed on or 
after February 1, 2003.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2).  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.017(3) provides: 
(3) AGGRAVATING FACTORS: GENERALLY.  When making a 
sentencing decision for any crime, the court shall 
consider all of the following as aggravating factors: 
(a) The fact that the person committed the crime 
while his or her usual appearance was concealed, 
disguised, or altered, with the intent to make it 
less likely that he or she would be identified 
with the crime. 
(b) The fact that the person committed the crime 
using information that was disclosed to him or 
her under s. 301.46. 
(c) The fact that the person committed the crime for 
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with any criminal gang, as defined in 
s. 
939.22(9), 
with 
the 
specific 
intent 
to 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
19 
 
¶44 In each case, the sentence imposed shall "call for the 
minimum amount of custody or confinement which is consistent 
with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense 
and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant."  McCleary, 49 
Wis. 2d at 276.  See also Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 416; Borrell, 
167 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
764; 
Krueger, 
119 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
336-37.  
Accordingly, the circuit courts should consider probation as the 
first alternative.  Probation should be the disposition unless:  
confinement is necessary to protect the public, the offender 
needs correctional treatment available only in confinement, or 
                                                                                                                                                             
promote, further, or assist in any criminal 
conduct by criminal gang members, as defined in 
s. 939.22(9g). 
(d) The fact that the person committed the felony 
while wearing a vest or other garment designed, 
redesigned, or adapted to prevent bullets from 
penetrating the garment. 
(e) 1. Subject to subd. 2., the fact that the person 
committed the felony with the intent to influence 
the policy of a governmental unit or to punish a 
governmental unit for a prior policy decision, if 
any of the following circumstances also applies 
to the felony committed by the person: 
. . . . 
Additionally, the legislature has set forth aggravating 
factors for specific crimes.  These include (1) Serious Sex 
Crimes Committed While Infected With Certain Diseases, (2) 
Violent Felony Committed Against Elder Person, (3) Child Sexual 
Assault or Child Abuse By Certain Persons, (4) Homicide or 
Injury By Intoxicated Use of a Vehicle, and (5) Controlled 
Substances Offenses.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 973.017 (4), (5), (6), 
(7), and (8).   
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
20 
 
it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense.  
Bastian, 54 Wis. 2d at 248-49, n.1.   
¶45 If a circuit court imposes probation, it shall explain 
why the conditions of probation should be expected to advance 
the objectives it has specified.  Likewise, if a circuit court 
imposes jail or prison, it shall explain why the duration of 
incarceration should be expected to advance the objectives it 
has specified.  Finally, if a circuit court imposes a bifurcated 
sentence for a crime committed after December 31, 1999, it shall 
explain why its duration and terms of extended supervision 
should be expected to advance the objectives. 
¶46 In short, we require that the court, by reference to 
the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's 
component parts promote the sentencing objectives.  By stating 
this linkage on the record, courts will produce sentences that 
can be more easily reviewed for a proper exercise of discretion. 
 
¶47 Because we recognize the difficulty in providing a 
reasoned explanation in isolation, we encourage circuit courts 
to refer to information provided by others.  Courts may use 
counsels' recommendations for the nature and duration of the 
sentence and the recommendations of the presentence report as 
touchstones in their reasoning.  Courts may also consider 
information about the distribution of sentences in cases similar 
to the case before it.  We note that Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) 
requires sentencing courts to consider any applicable temporary 
sentencing guidelines adopted by the Criminal Penalties Study 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
21 
 
Committee 
and 
to 
consider 
in 
the 
future 
any 
applicable 
guidelines adopted by a sentencing commission.13  
 
¶48 Although we anticipate less disparity with the advent 
of sentencing guidelines, that does not mean there is less of a 
need for the exercise of discretion.  Individualized sentencing, 
after all, has long been a cornerstone to Wisconsin's criminal 
justice jurisprudence.  "[N]o two convicted felons stand before 
the sentencing court on identical footing. . . . and no two 
cases will present identical factors."  State v. Lechner, 217 
Wis. 2d 392, 427, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).  Sentencing guidelines 
will provide helpful information and serve as a touchstone for 
explaining the reasons for the particular sentence imposed.      
 
¶49 We are mindful that the exercise of discretion does 
not lend itself to mathematical precision.  The exercise of 
discretion, by its very nature, is not amenable to such a task.  
As a result, we do not expect circuit courts to explain, for 
instance, the difference between sentences of 15 and 17 years.  
We do expect, however, an explanation for the general range of 
the sentence imposed.  This explanation is not intended to be a 
                                                 
13 For crimes committed on and after February 1, 2003, 
circuit courts are required to use sentencing guidelines where 
applicable.  Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a).  Until the new 
sentencing commission develops these guidelines, courts shall 
apply the temporary advisory guidelines drafted by the Criminal 
Penalties Study Committee.  While the circuit courts must 
consider the guidelines, they are not intended to replace the 
court's exercise of discretion.  The defendant does not have a 
right to appeal a sentencing decision on the basis that the 
court departed in any way from the guideline.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.017(10).     
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
22 
 
semantic trap for circuit courts.  It is also not intended to be 
a call for more "magic words."  Rather, the requirement of an 
on-the-record explanation will serve to fulfill the McCleary 
mandate that discretion of a sentencing judge be exercised on a 
"rational and explainable basis."  49 Wis. at 276.  This will 
assist appellate courts in determining whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion.14 
 
¶50 In sum, Wisconsin's common law of sentencing has 
failed to produce the guidance that McCleary envisioned, not 
because McCleary was wrong, but because the application of 
McCleary has been eroded.  Allowing implied reasoning rather 
than requiring an on-the-record explanation for the particular 
sentence imposed lies at the heart of this erosion.   
¶51 The rule of law suffers when the sentencing judge's 
discretion is unguided and unchecked.  The rationale for 
sentencing decisions must be made knowable and subject to 
                                                 
14 Explaining the benefits of appellate review, the McCleary 
court noted: 
In addition to the desirability of reviewing sentences 
to make sure that they are just, commensurate with the 
degree of guilt and the need for rehabilitation of the 
defendant, the American Bar Association Standards 
point out that sentence review will facilitate the 
rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an 
opportunity to assert a reasonable grievance he may 
have regarding his sentence.  A byproduct of a 
reasonable review of sentencing by an appellate court 
may well be the diminution of the appellate court's 
workload by reducing appeals on the merits. 
49 Wis. 2d at 278.   
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
23 
 
review.  We determine that with the advent of truth-in-
sentencing, the standards established by McCleary and its 
progeny must be reaffirmed and the application of those 
standards must be on the record.15 
IV 
¶52 We turn next to Gallion's arguments that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in this case by (1) 
failing to provide an adequate explanation for the sentence 
given, (2) placing undue emphasis on the character of the 
victim, and (3) imposing a sentence that is harsh and excessive. 
¶53 Gallion's first claim is that the circuit court 
committed error in not providing an adequate explanation for the 
sentence imposed.  Specifically, he contends that re-sentencing 
is required in light of the circuit court's failure to describe 
the comparative weight given to the factors it identified, or to 
explain why the sentence constitutes the minimum amount of 
necessary confinement.  Gallion complains, "almost any number of 
years in prison could be plugged in [the sentence imposed]."  He 
further 
asserts 
that, 
"the 
court 
never 
stated 
how 
much 
incarceration 
was 
needed 
to 
accomplish 
                                                 
15 The concurrence conveys its apprehension in this case 
with a litany of unanswered questions.  Concurrence, ¶93.  It 
then suggests that the answer to these questions lies in 
acknowledging the validity of a "fully explained, rationally 
based sentence[]."  Concurrence, ¶94.  What the concurrence 
apparently fails to realize, however, is that our decision today 
is not meant to undermine such recognition.  Rather, it should 
be viewed as a means of achieving that end in a manner that is 
consistent with McCleary and its progeny. 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
24 
 
rehabilitation/protection, 
or 
how, 
or 
why, 
21 
years 
of 
incarceration was needed . . . ." 
¶54 In 
addition, 
Gallion 
argues 
that 
he 
has 
a 
constitutional right to have the court explain why it imposed 21 
years of confinement rather than a shorter period, such as 15 
years.  He maintains, "Due Process does not allow a court to 
impose a 20-year sentence, without being able to explain its 
last five years."  Gallion also notes, "[i]mprisonment for even 
one day has a substantial impact on a man's liberty."  United 
States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 715 (7th Cir. 
1973) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)). 
¶55 Neither the prior application of McCleary nor due 
process mandates the specificity that Gallion seeks.  As noted 
above, although the standards of McCleary are clear, there has 
been a regrettable disconnect between its principles as-stated 
and its principles as-applied. 
¶56 For his due process argument, Gallion relies solely on 
Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 772.  The court in Borrell set forth 
"three due process rights at sentencing:  (1) to be present at 
the hearing and to be afforded the right to allocution, (2) to 
be represented by counsel, and (3) to be sentenced on the basis 
of true and correct information."  Id. at 772.  It emphasized 
the need for circuit courts to express the factual basis for the 
sentence imposed so that defendants may challenge the accuracy 
of those facts.  It stated: 
In Wisconsin, the third [due process] right that 
requires a judge to sentence only on the basis of true 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
25 
 
and correct information incorporates the requirement 
enumerated in McCleary that the judge must articulate 
the basis for the sentence imposed on the facts of the 
record. 
Id.   
¶57 We are not persuaded that this proposition supports 
Gallion's argument.  Although Borrell required a circuit court 
to articulate the basis for the sentence imposed, it did not 
require that articulation to be done with the specificity that 
Gallion claims.  
¶58 Accordingly, we examine the circuit court's actions 
under the law as it has been understood since McCleary.  That 
law emphasized the delineation of the primary sentencing factors 
to the particular facts of the case.  State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 
108, ¶17, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 648 N.W.2d 41.  Here, the circuit 
court's explanation, which spans 20 pages of transcript, 
provides ample evidence of that. 
¶59 With respect to the gravity of the offense, the 
circuit court focused on the recklessness of Gallion's behavior 
and the consequences of his actions.  It stated: 
What brings you here today is a vehicular homicide.  
You drank and drank and drank to excess.  You were 
almost two and a half times the legal limit.  You got 
behind the wheel of a car.  You drove it recklessly, 
irresponsibly, excessively, like your drinking.  You 
went through the intersection of 35th and Locust, 
struck the car that Vanessa Brown was riding in and 
extinguished her life. 
The court further impressed upon Gallion that his crime would 
forever affect the victim's friends, co-workers, and family, 
especially her three-year-old son. 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
26 
 
 
¶60 In considering Gallion's character, the circuit court 
again discussed particularized facts.  It stated that Gallion 
was a young man with limited education and employment history.  
Additionally, it recognized that he suffered from a severe drug 
and alcohol dependency.  After examining his prior criminal 
record, however, the court concluded that Gallion did not have a 
good track record in trying to turn around his life.  It seemed 
especially concerned with the fact that he had not taken 
advantage of the treatment options offered to him in the past.  
 
¶61 Finally, the circuit court took into account the need 
to protect the public from Gallion and others like him.  It 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant 
could 
best 
accomplish 
his 
rehabilitation in an institutional setting.  The court also 
observed that society has an interest in punishing Gallion so 
that his sentence might serve as a general deterrence against 
drunk driving. 
¶62 After considering these factors, the circuit court 
identified the recommendations of the defense counsel and 
presentence report writer.  It further recognized that it was 
imposing a truth-in-sentencing disposition.  The court then 
arrived at a sentence it believed was fair and just "given the 
nature of this specific crime, given who [Gallion is], and the 
interest of the community as a whole."  Upon examining the 
circuit court's actions under the law as it has been understood 
since McCleary, we are satisfied that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion.   
V 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
27 
 
¶63 Gallion's next claim on appeal is that the circuit 
court erred in placing undue emphasis on the character of the 
victim.  His arguments are twofold.  First, he contends that the 
court improperly considered the victim's character in evaluating 
the gravity of the offense.  Second, he maintains that the court 
improperly increased his sentence because his character compared 
unfavorably to the character of the victim. 
¶64 Under Wisconsin law, victims have certain rights at 
sentencing.  Article I, § 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in part that, "[t]his state shall ensure that crime 
victims have . . . the opportunity to make a statement to the 
court at disposition . . . ."  This right is implemented by two 
statutes imposing obligations on the court.  One obligation is 
to inquire of the district attorney whether he or she has 
consulted 
with the 
victim 
and has 
given 
notice of the 
sentencing.16  The other is to determine whether victims wish to 
provide information to the court.17  The only limitation on the 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.14(2m) provides:  
 
Before pronouncing sentence, the court shall inquire 
of the district attorney whether he or she has 
complied with s. 971.095(2) and with sub. (3)(b), 
whether any of the victims of a crime considered at 
sentencing requested notice of the date, time and 
place of the sentencing hearing and, if so, whether 
the district attorney provided to the victim notice of 
the date, time and place of the sentencing hearing. 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.14(3)(a) provides:  
Before pronouncing sentence, the court shall determine 
whether a victim of a crime considered at sentencing 
wants to make a statement to the court.  If a victim 
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
28 
 
victim's ability to make a statement is that it must be relevant 
to the sentence. 
¶65 One type of information that appears to be relevant is 
that which relates to the impact of the crime on the victim or 
victim's family.  Crime victims have the right "[t]o have the 
court provided with information pertaining to the economic, 
physical and psychological effect of the crime upon the victim 
and have the information considered by the court."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.04(1v)(pm).  "A statement from the victims about how the 
crime 
affected 
their 
lives 
is 
relevant 
to 
one 
of 
the 
considerations 
that 
a 
judge 
must 
take 
into 
account 
at 
sentencing——the gravity of the crime."  State v. Voss, 205 Wis. 
2d 586, 595-96, 556 N.W.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1996)  
¶66 Notwithstanding these rights, Gallion argues that the 
circuit court and court of appeals erred in concluding that the 
gravity of the offense depended, in part, on the good character 
of the victim.  He takes issue with the circuit court's 
determination 
that 
his 
crime 
was 
"especially 
tragic 
and 
aggravated because of the kind of person the victim was."  He 
also takes exception to the court of appeals' observation that, 
"It is precisely because of [Vanessa Brown's] outstanding 
                                                                                                                                                             
wants to make a statement, the court shall allow the 
victim to make a statement in court or submit a 
written statement to be read in court.  The court may 
allow any other person to make or submit a statement 
under this paragraph.  Any statement under this 
paragraph must be relevant to the sentence. 
   
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
29 
 
character that the loss is so great."  Gallion, 258 Wis. 2d 473, 
¶17.   
¶67 Gallion asserts that the character of the victim is 
irrelevant to the gravity of a homicide by intoxicated use of a 
motor vehicle.  Moreover, he warns that "[t]here is simply no 
way to validate [the circuit court's] conclusion without holding 
open the door to an argument, when a victim of lesser character 
is killed, that the offense is 'not aggravated' or 'less 
aggravated.'"   
¶68 We reject Gallion's assertion that the good character 
of the victim is irrelevant.  The circuit court possesses wide 
discretion in determining what factors are relevant to its 
sentencing decision.  State v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 683, 499 
N.W.2d 631 (1993).  Here, it determined that Brown's good 
character and the loss her death caused her family, friends, and 
co-workers, were both relevant and appropriate considerations in 
assessing the gravity of the offense.  This was reflected at 
sentencing when the court told Gallion, "[y]ou have [inflicted] 
so much hurt on so many people.  You have affected so many 
lives."  Indeed, it is unrealistic to expect judges to listen to 
friends and family of the victim and to not consider their 
testimony.  
 
¶69 
Similarly, 
we 
reject 
Gallion's 
admonition 
that 
acknowledging the positive contributions of one victim will 
devalue the worth of victims who do not have family or friends 
to speak for them.  We fail to see how one necessitates the 
other.   
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
30 
 
 
¶70 In doing so, however, we are mindful of the dangers in 
measuring a victim's comparative worth.  In State v. Spears, the 
dissent addressed this concern: 
The court should . . . not attempt to measure the 
relative value of the victim's life.  While the 
defendant may benefit when no one appears to mourn the 
deceased, there is no corresponding right to argue 
that "since nobody else cares, why should we" or to 
otherwise diminish the value of the victim's life. 
 
Even though there might be circumstances in which 
the court could weigh the positive contributions and 
worth of the victim in assessing the harm caused by 
the crime, it does not follow that there is a right to 
have a court consider that a victim was a terrible 
burden on society. 
State v. Spears, 227 Wis. 2d 495, 516, 596 N.W.2d 375 (1999) 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).    
¶71 In his second argument, Gallion contends that the 
circuit court gave weight to the irrelevant factor that his 
character compared unfavorably to the character of the victim.  
For support, he cites a passage in the circuit court's 
postconviction decision, which he maintains is an admission that 
the court punished him for this comparison.  It states: 
Their lives crossed paths, however, on March 3, 2000, 
when the defendant drank to the point of intoxication 
more than two times the legal limit and got behind the 
wheel 
of 
a 
car 
which 
he 
drove 
recklessly 
and 
irresponsibly, and ultimately caused the victim's 
death.  The court highlighted the contrast between the 
victim and the defendant not to punish the defendant 
for being "the exact opposite," but rather to punish 
him for the choices he made on March 3, 2000, which so 
needlessly brought their lives together in such a 
tragic way. 
(emphasis added).  
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
31 
 
 
¶72 Again, we disagree with Gallion.  The defendant has 
the burden of showing that the "sentence was based on clearly 
irrelevant or improper factors."  See State v. Haskins, 139 Wis. 
2d 257, 268, 407 N.W.2d 309 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Wickstrom, 
118 Wis. 2d 339, 354-55, 348 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1984).  
Gallion has not met this burden with the passage in question.  
Indeed, when read in context, it is evident that the court was 
punishing him not for his contrast in character, but rather for 
the choices he made that fateful night. 
VI 
¶73 Gallion's final claim in this case is that the 
sentence imposed was "harsh and excessive."  He bases this on 
the legislature's subsequent reclassification of his offense.  
Since Gallion's sentencing, the maximum term of confinement for 
homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle has been reduced 
to 15 years.  Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1c)(a).  This dramatic change 
in the law, Gallion reasons, requires resentencing. 
¶74 The problem with Gallion's argument is that the 
reclassification does not apply to him; rather, it only applies 
to offenders who commit their crimes on or after February 1, 
2003.  See id.  As the State correctly notes, the legislature 
had an opportunity to make the change retroactive, but chose not 
to do so.  Consequently, the maximum term of confinement for 
Gallion's offense remains 40 years, and the maximum term of 
extended 
supervision 
remains 
20 
years. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(b) (1997-98).  Given the facts of this case, we 
cannot say that his sentence is "harsh and excessive" or that it   
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
32 
 
shocks the public sentiment.  State v. Daniels, 117 Wis. 2d 9, 
22, 343 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1983). 
¶75 Gallion's argument is further undermined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.195, the statutory provision specifically enacted to 
address sentencing disparity between TIS-I and TIS-II.  Under 
it, an offender serving a bifurcated sentence on a Class C to E 
felony may petition the sentencing court to adjust the sentence 
if the inmate has served 85 percent of the term of confinement 
in prison.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.195.  Likewise, an offender 
serving a bifurcated sentence on a Class F to I felony may 
petition the sentencing court to adjust the sentence if the 
inmate has served 75 percent of the term of confinement in 
prison.  See id.  Offenders like Gallion serving bifurcated 
sentences for Class B felonies, however, may not petition for 
sentence adjustment under the statute.  See id.  Accordingly, we 
reject his claim. 
VII 
¶76 In sum, we reaffirm the standards of McCleary and 
require the application to be stated on the record for future 
cases.  McCleary mandates that the discretion of a sentencing 
judge be exercised on a "rational and explainable basis."  49 
Wis. 2d at 276.  Although we do not change the appellate 
standard of review, appellate courts are required to more 
closely scrutinize the record to ensure that "discretion was in 
fact exercised and the basis of that exercise of discretion [is] 
set forth."  Id. at 277.   
No. 
01-0051-CR   
 
33 
 
¶77 Additionally, we determine that the circuit court 
provided Gallion an adequate explanation for the sentence given, 
used relevant information regarding the character of the victim, 
and imposed a sentence that was neither harsh nor excessive.  
Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶78 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority that our decision in McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 
182 N.W.2d 512 (1971), and the sentencing standards articulated 
therein need to be reaffirmed.  Rendering just, individualized 
sentences is a very difficult process and it encompasses 
probably the most important part of the circuit courts' duties 
in this state.  Well-defined sentencing standards and sentences 
that are fully explained lead to less disparities and make the 
function of reviewing courts easier.  However, some sentencing 
disparity will be a necessary corollary to the modern philosophy 
of individualized sentencing.  As the majority recognizes, 
sentencing is not amenable to mathematical precision.  Majority 
op., ¶49. 
¶79 While I agree with much of the majority opinion 
regarding the need for circuit courts to fully explain their 
sentences, I write separately because I have apprehensions over 
some of the language the majority employs.  I concur in the 
majority's sentiment that "McCleary was and still is one of the 
best statements addressing how a circuit court should exercise 
its discretion," majority op., ¶26.  However, the majority does 
not merely reaffirm McCleary; rather, it supplements selective 
portions of McCleary and in doing so seemingly undercuts other 
sections, which may lead to imprudent appellate interference 
with the sentencing discretion of circuit courts.   
¶80 The majority states that it is not changing the 
appellate standard of review, but nonetheless states that 
appellate courts should "more closely scrutinize the record" of 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
the sentencing court.  Majority op., ¶¶4, 77.  Further, the 
majority declares that "[w]hat has previously been satisfied 
with implied rationale must now be set forth on the record."  
Majority op., ¶38.  Yet, this court in McCleary stated:   
We will not, however, set aside a sentence for 
[failure to set forth the factors considered in 
rendering a sentence]; rather, we are obliged to 
search the record to determine whether in the exercise 
of proper discretion the sentence imposed can be 
sustained.  It is not only our duty not to interfere 
with the discretion of the trial judge, but it is, in 
addition, our duty to affirm the sentence on appeal if 
from the facts of record it is sustainable as a proper 
discretionary act. 
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 282 (emphasis added).  See also State v. 
Hall, 2002 WI App 108, ¶19, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 648 N.W.2d 41.  
This statement from McCleary forms the basis of the independent 
review doctrine.  Although the majority states that it is not 
deciding the application of the independent review doctrine, 
majority op., ¶18 n.6, this doctrine constitutes an integral 
part of McCleary.  Clearly, if the majority is reaffirming 
McCleary, this doctrine should continue to apply.   
¶81 I fear the majority opinion will be interpreted as an 
invitation for appellate courts to take a more active role in 
modifying sentences.  The majority quotes with approval language 
contained in the court of appeals' certification in State v. 
Crouthers, 99-1307-CR, filed March 30, 2000, which suggests that 
appellate courts should take a more active role in modifying and 
overturning sentences.  Majority op., ¶¶27, 30.  Further, the 
majority subjects not only the final sentencing decision to 
appellate review, but also the rationale utilized by the circuit 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
court:  "[t]he rationale for sentencing decisions must be made 
knowable and subject to review."  Majority op., ¶51.  This 
language, considered in light of the requirement that circuit 
courts describe the goals 
of the 
sentence 
and 
why the 
constituent parts of sentence advance those objectives, majority 
op., ¶¶42, 45, as well as how the relevant sentencing factors 
influence the final decisions, majority op., ¶46, should not be 
interpreted as suggesting that appellate courts may overturn or 
modify fully-explained, reasonable sentences, simply because the 
appellate court disagrees with the rationale of the sentencing 
court.   
¶82 I agree with the majority that circuit courts need to 
explain their sentencing decisions by considering the relevant 
sentencing factors, setting forth the facts upon which the 
decisions are based, and describing the reasons why a particular 
sentence was given in light of the interrelationship between the 
goals of sentencing, the sentencing factors, and case specific 
facts.  However, once those decisions are fully explained, and 
so long as they are reasonable and based on appropriate factors, 
appellate courts should not second-guess the reasoning behind 
those decisions.   
¶83 As this court stated in McCleary, sentences that are 
explained and rendered in accordance with the appropriate 
factors 
are 
presumptively 
reasonable 
and 
should 
not 
be 
disturbed: 
An appellate court 
should 
not supplant the 
predilections 
of 
a 
trial 
judge 
with 
its 
own. . . . [A]ll an appellate court can ask of a trial 
judge is that he state the facts on which he 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
predicates his judgment, and that he give the reasons 
for his conclusion.  If the facts are fairly inferable 
from 
the 
record, 
and 
the 
reasons 
indicate 
the 
consideration 
of 
legally 
relevant 
factors, 
the 
sentence should ordinarily be affirmed.  If there is 
evidence that discretion was properly exercised, and 
the 
sentence 
imposed 
was 
the 
product 
of 
that 
discretion, the trial judge fully complies with the 
standard.  
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281 (emphasis added).  However, the 
majority suggests that even if a sentence is fully explained and 
its rationale explicitly set forth on the record, it should 
nonetheless be subject to heightened scrutiny by appellate 
courts.  See majority op., ¶¶4, 49, 51.  I am apprehensive that 
the opinion of the majority today will be read as signaling a 
departure from this court's previous "consistent and strong 
policy against interference with the discretion of the trial 
court in passing sentence."  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281.  As 
this court has previously stated:  "sentencing decisions of the 
circuit court are generally afforded a strong presumption of 
reasonability because the circuit court is best suited to 
consider the relevant factors and demeanor of the convicted 
defendant."  State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 781-82, 482 
N.W.2d 883 (1992).  The majority recognizes this as an accurate 
statement of the law.  Majority op., ¶18.   
¶84 Thus, any reading of the majority opinion as an 
invitation to overturn or modify a sentence that has been fully 
explained and rationally justified would be in direct conflict 
with the dictates of McCleary.  Under McCleary, once discretion 
is exercised, that is, so long as there is a reasonable 
explanation for the sentence given in connection with the 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
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appropriate factors and the facts of the case, an appellate 
court should uphold the sentencing determination of the circuit 
court.  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 280-81.  Therefore, as long as 
the circuit court indicates that it considered the appropriate 
factors and explains how those factors relate to the ultimate 
sentence imposed, the circuit court's value judgments as to the 
weight and relevance of certain factors and how they relate to 
the imposed sentence should not be disturbed.   
¶85 As this court has previously stated:  "Judicial review 
of a judge's exercise of sentencing discretion is available in 
the appellate courts to prevent arbitrariness, capriciousness 
and unjustified disparity, but even that review 'must be made in 
light of the strong policy against interferences with the trial 
court's discretion in passing sentence.'"  In re Felony 
Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 353 N.W.2d 793 
(1984)(quoting State v. Killory, 73 Wis. 2d 400, 408, 243 
N.W.2d 475 (1976)).  While these comments were made in the 
context of the old indeterminate sentencing system, nothing in 
the language or history of truth-in-sentencing (TIS) suggests 
that the legislature intended a greater degree of appellate 
interference with the circuit courts' discretion in rendering 
sentences.  To be sure, "[w]ithout an elaborate system of 
sentencing grids, like there is in the federal system, no 
appellate-court-imposed tuner can ever modulate with exacting 
precision the exercise of sentencing discretion."  State v. 
Ramuta, 2003 WI App 80, ¶25, 261 Wis. 2d 784, 661 N.W.2d 483. 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
6 
 
¶86 Indeed, nothing about the nature of TIS changes the 
fundamental reality that circuit court judges, as members of 
their community who preside over sentencing, are in the best 
position to determine the appropriate sentence, rather than 
distant appellate tribunals examining a cold record: 
"[Appellate courts], distant in time and place from 
the sentencing scene, cannot understand the facts, 
know the nuances, see and hear the defendants and 
victims, and feel the forces in the courtroom as only 
a trial judge can.  [An appellate court] cannot 
recapture the trial judge's unique opportunity to 
address the defendant, the victim, the friends and 
families, and the public to provide the moral and 
legal leadership——the justice——that sentencing, at its 
best, seeks to assure."  
Hall, 255 Wis. 2d 662, ¶32 (Schudson, J., concurring) (quoting 
State v. Williams, No. 96-1584-CR, unpublished slip op. at 4-5 
(Wis. Ct. App. April 8, 1997) (Schudson, J., concurring)).  The 
advent of TIS does not alter the fact that judges sentence in 
the context of the community in which they were elected, each of 
which has unique standards and needs.  "[T]he interests of the 
public, too, will vary according to the particular community in 
which the crime was committed, the capacity of the community to 
rehabilitate the criminal, and the needs of that community for 
protection from that type of criminal activity."  In re Felony 
Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d at 202.   
¶87 While the arrival of the new sentencing guidelines18 
will provide a much needed tool for circuit courts and will 
                                                 
18 See Wis. Stat. § 973.30; Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a)(2001-
02).  All statutory references are to the 2001-02 version, 
unless otherwise noted.   
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
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hopefully result in less disparity between sentences for similar 
crimes and defendants, these guidelines will not replace the 
need for discretion on the part of the circuit courts.  As the 
majority recognizes, majority op., ¶47 n.13, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10), compliance with the range of sentences 
provided in the guidelines is not mandatory and the defendant 
does not have a right to appeal on the basis that the court 
departed from the guidelines.   
¶88 Furthermore, 
greater 
appellate 
interference 
in 
sentencing decisions would run contrary to the very purpose of 
TIS.  While the legislature has indicated the need under TIS for 
circuit courts to explain the reasons for their sentencing 
decisions, Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10m), there is no indication 
that the legislature intended appellate courts to take a more 
active role in altering the length of a rationally explained 
sentence.  The legislature's unambiguous overriding goal in 
enacting TIS was to "create certainty in the length of 
confinement at the time of sentencing."  State v. Champion, 2002 
WI App 267, ¶17, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242.  The 
legislature wished to ensure that both the public and the 
defendant would be certain that the defendant would serve 100 
percent of the sentence rendered and not a minute less.  Id., 
¶¶13-16.19  This purpose is entirely inconsistent with the 
                                                 
19 Truth-in-Sentencing was enacted in two stages.  Under TIS 
I, 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 419, an inmate's sentence could not be 
reduced 
based 
on 
good 
behavior 
while 
in 
prison. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(4)(1997-98).  However, under TIS II, 2001 
Wis. Act 109, § 1143m, inmates convicted of certain felonies may 
petition the court for sentence reduction after completing a 
certain percentage of their sentence.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.195.   
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
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concept of appellate courts actively modifying or overturning 
sentences that are rationally considered and fully explained on 
the record.  "It is not reasonable that the legislature would 
intend to provide both the defendant and the public with 
certainty regarding confinement and then permit the courts to 
undo that certainty . . . ."  Id., ¶16 (emphasis added).    
¶89 Yet, portions of the majority opinion seem to read as 
questioning the propriety and wisdom of TIS and the concomitant 
elimination of parole boards, suggesting that since parole 
boards no longer exist, appellate courts must now take a more 
active role in modifying sentences.  Majority op., ¶¶28, 30-37.20  
Specifically, the majority states that "[t]he rule of law 
suffers when the sentencing judge's discretion is unguided and 
unchecked," majority op. ¶51, and that the advent of TIS 
requires more detailed sentencing standards "to assist in 
appellate  review."  Majority op., ¶30.  While I agree with the 
majority that, in light of TIS, there is a "greater need to 
articulate on the record the reasons for the particular sentence 
imposed," majority op., ¶28, I fear that the majority's 
directive to "more closely scrutinize the record," majority op., 
¶4, will be read as an invitation for appellate courts to modify 
or overturn sentences on a more frequent basis.  However, such 
                                                 
20 After discussing the philosophy behind the inclusion of 
parole boards under indeterminate sentencing and the elimination 
of parole by TIS, the majority remarks:  "Experience has taught 
us to be cautious when reaching high consequence conclusions 
about human nature that seem to be intuitively correct at the 
moment."  Majority op., ¶36. 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
9 
 
interference with the circuit courts' discretion would erode the 
certainty the legislature sought to provide with TIS.   
¶90 Moreover, while I agree that it is necessary to 
impress upon the circuit courts the need for fully explained, 
rationally based sentences under the standards of McCleary, that 
reaffirmation should not be read as implying that there are now 
increased opportunities for appellate courts to interfere with 
sentencing discretion.  The majority requires that circuit 
courts must comply with the following list of prerequisites in 
order to render a valid sentence.  Circuit courts must:  1) 
explain the objectives of the sentence; 2) identify which 
objectives are of the greatest importance; 3) describe the facts 
relevant to these sentencing goals; 4) explain why the elements 
of the sentence advance those goals; 5) consider the 12 factors 
identified in Harris and three primary factors in McCleary; 6) 
explain how these factors influence the decision and are 
expected to meet the goals of the sentence; 7) consider the 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors 
listed 
in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.017(3) to (8); 8) consider probation as the 
first alternative and explain why probation is or is not 
sufficient and whether probation would further the goals of the 
sentence; 9) explain why the existence and duration of any 
prison term advances the objectives of the sentence; 10) explain 
why the existence and duration of any term of extended 
supervision advances the objectives of the sentence; and 11) 
consider 
any 
applicable 
sentencing 
guidelines 
pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a).  Majority op., ¶¶39-46.   
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
10 
 
¶91 Most of these requirements already exist by virtue of 
statutes or previous decisions of this court.  However, in 
addition to reaffirming the requirements of McCleary, the 
majority today imposes an additional requirement on circuit 
courts.  The majority requires that sentencing courts, "by 
reference to the relevant facts and factors explain how the 
sentence's component parts promote the sentencing objectives."  
Majority op., ¶46.  That this requirement appears nowhere in 
McCleary is somewhat understandable, as courts did not determine 
the constituent parts of a sentence until the advent of TIS.  
While it is important to stress the need for circuit courts to 
consider all the applicable sentencing factors, appellate courts 
should not, under the auspices of closely scrutinizing the 
record, view these factors as a mandatory checklist that a 
circuit court must abide by to avoid reversal.  As the majority 
aptly notes, the amount of explanation necessary to sustain a 
given sentence "will vary from case to case."  Majority op., 
¶39.   
¶92 I 
also 
wish 
to 
emphasize 
that 
Judge 
DiMotto's 
sentencing decision would pass muster under the standards the 
majority articulates.  Judge DiMotto's sentencing decision, 
covering 20 pages of transcript, painstakingly explained the 
rationale for Gallion's sentence and incisively described the 
relationship between the 
applicable 
facts 
and 
appropriate 
factors.  This sentencing decision clearly was not of the type 
that necessitated today's decision.  See majority op., ¶26 
(concluding it is necessary to reinvigorate McCleary in light of 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
11 
 
sentences that are rendered in a "mechanical form").  Judge 
DiMotto provided an entirely logical, on-the-record explanation 
for Gallion's sentence that considered all the appropriate 
sentencing factors and relevant facts of the case.  While not 
necessarily the pinnacle of sentencing perfection, this type of 
sentence should be sufficient under any interpretation of 
McCleary.  
¶93 Furthermore, because appellate courts will undoubtedly 
face an increasing number of requests to modify or overturn 
sentencing decisions on the basis of today's decision, I am 
troubled by the fact that the majority leaves many important 
questions unanswered by providing very little guidance as to how 
its reinvigoration of McCleary is to be applied in future cases.  
Must circuit courts comply with all of these requirements in 
every case?  If a case involves a heinous crime, such as the one 
at bar, and the court does not discuss why probation is 
obviously inappropriate, may the circuit court's sentence be 
vacated for failure to discuss just this one factor?  What 
standard is to be applied when reviewing whether the circuit 
court adequately explained how the parts of a sentence further 
the sentencing objectives identified or why the circuit court 
emphasized certain factors and minimized others?  May a sentence 
be overturned or modified simply because the appellate court 
does not believe the sentence rendered would further the 
objectives identified or disagrees with the circuit court's 
determination as to which factors are most important?  May an 
appellate court modify a sentence, even if the circuit court has 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
12 
 
fully complied with the above list of prerequisites, if the 
appellate court believes the objectives of the sentence could be 
accomplished by a less harsh sentence?  May a sentence be 
overturned because the appellate court does not agree with the 
sentencing objectives the circuit court has identified?  For 
example, if the circuit court sentences an offender while 
emphasizing the need for deterrence and punishment, may an 
appellate 
court 
modify 
the 
sentence 
because 
it 
believes 
rehabilitation should have been the primary objective of the 
sentence?  The majority leaves these questions unanswered by 
simply stating that the amount of explanation for a valid 
sentence "will vary from case to case," majority op., ¶39, and 
by failing to give appellate courts any guidance in determining 
how much explanation is enough.   
¶94 These questions highlight the need to look to McCleary 
as a whole and presume that fully explained, rationally based 
sentences are valid.  So long as the circuit court considers the 
case specific facts, the appropriate sentencing factors, and 
rationally explains why it believes the sentence is appropriate 
in light of the factors it considers most important and the 
goals it has identified, the appellate court should not second-
guess the substance of those decisions.  All that McCleary 
requires is that sentences be fully explained after considering 
the applicable sentencing factors and case specific facts.  
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281.  Indeed, McCleary was chiefly 
concerned with circuit courts that offered no explanation for 
sentences; it did not contemplate that appellate courts would 
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
13 
 
reverse sentencing determinations that were fully explained and 
based on legally relevant factors merely because they might 
disagree with the rationale employed by the circuit courts.  Id. 
at 280-81.  While a sentence should not be affirmed when the 
circuit court offers no explanation (as in McCleary), a sentence 
should not be overturned simply because the circuit court failed 
to discuss one of the legally relevant factors.  Rather, 
McCleary requires that an appellate court search the record "to 
determine whether in the exercise of proper discretion the 
sentence imposed can be sustained."  Id. at 282.  Moreover, 
while the majority repeatedly states the sentence rendered must 
call for the "minimum amount of custody or confinement" majority 
op., ¶¶23-24, 44 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276), it bears 
emphasizing that although "trial courts should impose '"the 
minimum amount of custody"' consistent with the appropriate 
sentencing 
factors, 
'minimum' 
does 
not 
mean 
'exiguously 
minimal,' that is, insufficient to accomplish the goals of the 
criminal justice system[.]"  Ramuta, 261 Wis. 2d 784, ¶25 
(explaining that "each sentence must navigate the fine line 
between what is clearly too much time behind bars and what may 
not be enough")(internal citations omitted).  
¶95 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the standards 
announced today should not be applied retroactively to cases 
that are final.  Indeed, the majority recognizes that the 
requirements it articulates apply only to future cases.  See 
majority op., ¶8.  Were it otherwise, the validity of all 
sentences rendered heretofore under TIS would be in question.  
No.  01-0051-CR.jpw 
 
14 
 
As discussed supra, the requirements announced today clearly 
supplement 
what 
was 
previously 
required 
under 
McCleary.  
Therefore, the rule the majority announces today should not be 
available to defendants sentenced under TIS whose cases are 
final.  See generally, State v. Lagundoye, 2004 WI 4, 268 
Wis. 2d 77, 674 N.W.2d 526 (discussing and applying Wisconsin's 
retroactivity rules for criminal cases). 
¶96 Despite my concerns with the majority opinion, I join 
the ultimate mandate that Gallion's sentence should not be 
reversed.   
 
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