Title: City of Pewaukee v. Thomas L. Carter
Citation: 2004 WI 136
Docket Number: 2003AP001114
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2004

2004 WI 136 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1114 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
City of Pewaukee,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas L. Carter,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 260 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 507, 673 N.W.2d 380 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 4, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 22, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark Gempeler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
H. Stanley Riffle, Rick D. Trindl, Julie A. Aquavia and Arenz, 
Molter, Macy & Riffle, S.C., Waukesha, and oral argument by Rick 
D. Trindl. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by Rex R. 
Anderegg and Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Rex Anderegg. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
2004 WI 136 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-1114  
(L.C. No. 
02-CV-1581) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Pewaukee,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas L. Carter,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 4, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of the 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of 
the circuit court for Waukesha County, Mark Gempeler, Judge.1  
The circuit court denied the City of Pewaukee's request for a 
new trial and dismissed the case upon the motion of Thomas L. 
Carter, the defendant.  The City requested a new trial pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) (2001-02),2 which provides that upon a 
                                                 
1 City of Pewaukee v. Carter, 2003 WI App 260, 268 
Wis. 2d 507, 673 N.W.2d 380.   
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
2 
 
request from either party to a municipal court action (or on its 
own motion), the circuit court shall order that a new trial be 
held in circuit court.3  
¶2 
Relying 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) 
and 
Village 
of 
Menomonee Falls v. Meyer,4 the court of appeals affirmed the 
order of the circuit court.  The court of appeals held that no 
trial occurred in municipal court under § 800.14(4) because the 
matter had not been "fully litigated."  The matter had not been 
fully litigated, according to the court of appeals, because only 
the City had presented witnesses and evidence and the municipal 
court dismissed the City's case with prejudice after the 
defendant moved for dismissal at the close of the City's 
presentation of its evidence, but before the defendant put in 
his evidence.  
¶3 
The issue before this court is whether a "trial" 
occurred in the municipal court for the purpose of triggering 
the City's right to obtain a new trial in circuit court under 
Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4).  More precisely, the question is: Did 
the municipal court proceeding constitute a "trial" under 
§ 800.14(4) when the City presented sworn witnesses, those 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 800.14(4) reads: "Upon the request of 
either party within 20 days after notice of appeal under 
sub.(1), or on its own motion, the circuit court shall order 
that a new trial be held in circuit court.  The new trial shall 
be conducted by the court without a jury unless the appellant 
requests a jury trial in the notice of appeal under sub.(1).  
The required fee for a jury is prescribed in s. 814.61(4)." 
4 Village of Menomonee Falls v. Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d 811, 601 
N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999).   
No. 
03-1114   
 
3 
 
witnesses were cross-examined by the defendant, and the case was 
dismissed with prejudice upon the defendant's motion to dismiss 
at the close of the City's case-in-chief? 
¶4 
We conclude that the municipal court proceeding in the 
present case constituted a trial under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) 
because the City presented its case, the defendant had an 
opportunity to present his evidence (even though he chose not to 
do so), and the matter was judicially resolved on its merits.  
We therefore conclude that the municipal court proceeding in the 
instant case triggered the City's statutory right to a new trial 
under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4).  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and the order of the circuit 
court and remand the cause to the circuit court to grant the 
City's request for a new trial. 
I 
¶5 
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  At 
approximately 7:30 a.m. on July 27, 2001, after his involvement 
in an automobile accident, Thomas L. Carter (the defendant) was 
cited by the City of Pewaukee for operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration.  
After several delays, the trial was set for June 20, 2002, in 
municipal court for the Town of Brookfield.5 
¶6 
The City presented three witnesses at the municipal 
court proceeding.  The first was an analyst from the State 
                                                 
5 The case was moved to the Town of Brookfield on the 
defendant's request for substitution of a judge. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
4 
 
Laboratory of Hygiene who testified regarding the defendant's 
blood 
sample 
and 
on 
how 
blood-alcohol 
concentration 
was 
determined.  The second witness was the driver of the car with 
which the defendant's car collided.  Finally, the City presented 
the police officer who was called to photograph the accident 
scene. The City elicited testimony from all three witnesses, and 
the defendant cross-examined each one.  The City also presented 
documentary evidence.   
¶7 
After the City's witnesses testified and were subject 
to cross examination, the City informed the municipal court that 
it would not move to admit the defendant's blood test because 
the arresting officer (who had ordered the defendant's blood 
drawn but was not the officer who had testified) was unavailable 
to testify.  Instead of requesting a continuance or adjournment, 
the City rested its case, relying on the evidence already 
presented. 
¶8 
Before presenting any evidence, the defendant moved to 
dismiss the action on the ground that the City had failed to 
meet its burden of proof.  The municipal court granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. 
¶9 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4), the City requested 
a new trial in circuit court.  The defendant filed a motion in 
circuit court to dismiss the City's request on the ground that 
the municipal court proceeding was not a "fully litigated" trial 
and therefore the City did not have the right to request a "new 
trial" as provided in § 800.14(4).  The circuit court, relying 
on the Meyer case, issued an order granting the defendant's 
No. 
03-1114   
 
5 
 
motion.  The circuit court reasoned that the matter was not 
fully litigated because each party was not able to litigate 
fully its respective position.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the order of the circuit court, concurring with the circuit 
court's reasoning that a full trial requires that a defendant 
have the opportunity to present a defense or rest its case.  The 
City now seeks review of the decision of the court of appeals. 
II 
¶10 This 
case 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) and the application of the statute to the 
undisputed facts of the present case.  These are issues of law 
that we determine independently of the circuit court and court 
of appeals, benefiting from their analyses.6 
A 
¶11 We begin with the statutes governing the parties' 
rights to move a case from municipal court to circuit court.  
Either party may move a case from municipal court to circuit 
court by way of appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(1)7 and by 
way of a new trial (before a judge or jury) pursuant to 
§ 800.14(4).  A defendant may also in certain cases plead not 
                                                 
6 Garcia v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶7, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 682 N.W.2d 365. 
7 Section 800.14(1) allows an appeal from municipal courts 
to "be taken by either party to the circuit court of the county 
where the offense occurred.  The appellant shall appeal by 
giving the municipal judge written notice of the appeal within 
20 days after the judgment." 
No. 
03-1114   
 
6 
 
guilty, bypass the municipal court, and seek a jury trial in 
circuit court pursuant to § 800.04(1)(d). 
¶12 An appeal differs from a new trial.  An appeal is 
determined on the record in the municipal court.8  No one 
disputes that in the instant case the City could have appealed 
the circuit court's order of dismissal under Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.14(5); the circuit court would have reviewed the record of 
the municipal court to determine the validity of the dismissal 
of the action.   
¶13 In a new trial, each party presents its evidence anew. 
"[A]ny errors committed by the municipal court are completely 
vitiated.  A party may also raise issues in the circuit court 
that he or she failed to raise in the prior proceeding."9 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 800.14(4) provides that after notice 
of appeal is filed under § 800.14(1) and "[u]pon request of 
either party . . . or on its own motion, the circuit court shall 
order that a new trial be held in circuit court."     
¶15 The very words of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) that "a new 
trial be held in circuit court" presuppose that a trial has 
taken place in municipal court.10  This interpretation of 
§ 800.14(4) is uncontroversial and leaves us with the seemingly 
simple question of determining whether a particular proceeding 
in municipal court constitutes a trial under § 800.14(4).   
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 800.14(5). 
9 City of Middleton v. Hennen, 206 Wis. 2d 347, 355, 557 
N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1996). 
10 Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d at 817.   
No. 
03-1114   
 
7 
 
B 
¶16 Defining the word "trial" would not seem to present a 
particularly difficult task, and in the abstract, it is not 
difficult.  Black's Law Dictionary defines "trial" as "[a] 
formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of 
legal claims in an adversary proceeding."11   
¶17 This dictionary definition is consistent with the 
definition of "trial" found in the 1856 Wisconsin statutes and 
in later versions of the statutes: "A trial is the judicial 
examination of the issues between the parties, whether they be 
issues of law or of fact."12   
¶18 The word "trial" is not currently defined in the 
Wisconsin statutes.  The lack of a definition matters little 
though, because the definitions of the word "trial" set forth 
above are not particularly helpful in determining for the 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) what events in a particular 
municipal court proceeding constitute a judicial examination of 
the issues between the parties, whether they be issues of law or 
fact.  Resolving what events constitute a "trial" under the 
statutory right to a new trial in Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) 
requires a more nuanced determination of the meaning of "trial" 
than provided by a general definition. 
                                                 
11 Black's Law Dictionary 1510 (7th ed. 1999). 
12 1856 Wis. Laws ch. 120 § 164.  See also 1917 Wis. Laws 
§ 2842 (same); Wis. Stat. § 270.06 (1967) (same). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
8 
 
¶19 The word "trial" has different meanings in different 
contexts.  Trials take many forms depending on such factors as 
the nature of the case, the forum and the purpose for which the 
word "trial" is being determined. Trials are also a continuum of 
events.  
¶20 Courts 
and 
legislatures 
have 
taken 
different 
approaches to describing the events needed to constitute a 
trial.  On the one hand, the events constituting a trial may be 
established by setting forth a bright-line rule for the 
commencement of a trial and then treating the commencement of a 
trial sufficient to constitute a trial.   
¶21 For example, the California civil procedure code 
declares that a trial shall be deemed to actually commence at 
the beginning of the opening statement of any party, or if there 
is no opening statement, then on the administering of the oath 
or affirmation to the first witness or the introduction of 
evidence.13 Similarly, in determining when an accused's double 
jeopardy protections attach, the rule is that the protections 
                                                 
13 See Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 581(6) (West 2004) ("A trial 
shall be deemed to actually commence at the beginning of the 
opening statement or argument of any party or his or her 
counsel, or if there is no opening statement, then at the time 
of the administering of the oath or affirmation to the first 
witness, or the introduction of any evidence.").  See also Gray 
v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 4th 165, 171 (1997) (the 
statutory language is illustrative rather than exclusive of the 
circumstances under which a trial has begun). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
9 
 
attach once a jury is empanelled (in a jury trial) or once the 
first witness has been sworn (in a bench trial).14   
¶22 In the context of substitution of a judge, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court described the commencement of a trial as 
follows: 
Plaintiffs . . . assert[] that the trial was commenced 
at the hearing on the temporary injunction because 
evidence was adduced which could be used in the final 
determination of the merits.  We think not. 
In People v. Rice Associates a New York court held 
that "trial" in its commonly accepted meaning is that 
part of a civil or criminal proceeding beginning with 
the opening of the case to the jury and ending with 
the verdict.  And in Molen v. Denning & Clark 
Livestock Co. the Idaho court quoted with approval the 
definition of "trial" as set forth in Corpus Juris.  
"A trial may be said to have commenced when all of the 
preliminary questions have been determined and the 
jury, or the court in the absence of a jury, enters on 
the examination of the facts for the purpose of 
determining the controversy."  And in Superior Oil Co. 
v. Superior Court it was contended that a trial had 
been commenced with the hearing of a motion for a 
preliminary injunction. . . . The court held that 
under the practice in California it is assumed that a 
trial on the merits follows the hearing and issuance 
of a preliminary injunction.  Thus, we conclude that 
the "trial" was not actually commenced at the time of 
the hearing on the preliminary injunction within the 
meaning of that line of Wisconsin cases holding that a 
request for substitution comes too late if made after 
the commencement of the trial of the action.15     
                                                 
14 See Serfass v. U.S., 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975); State v. 
Seefeldt, 2002 WI App 149, ¶12, 256 Wis. 2d 410, 647 N.W.2d 894. 
15 Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 64 
Wis. 2d 241, 247-48, 219 N.W.2d 564 (1974) (citations omitted). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
10 
 
¶23 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth 
a number of indicia to assist courts in determining whether a 
trial had taken place for the purpose of allowing a new trial.  
The Ohio court started with a definition of the word "trial" 
similar to the definition in earlier Wisconsin statutes16 and 
went on to state the indicia of a trial as follows: 
We further hold that the proper test for determination 
of whether a proceeding is a trial . . . is an inquiry 
that focuses on the substance of the proceeding rather 
than on its form.  A proceeding is considered a 
trial . . . when the indicia of trial substantially 
predominate in the proceeding.  In deciding whether a 
proceeding rises to the level of a trial . . . courts 
should 
consider 
the 
nature 
of 
an 
individual 
proceeding. 
A list of relevant indicia may include (1) whether the 
proceeding was initiated by the pleadings, (2) whether 
it took place in court, (3) whether it was held in the 
presence of a judge or magistrate, (4) whether the 
parties or their counsel were present, (5) whether 
evidence was introduced, (6) whether arguments were 
presented in court by counsel, (7) whether issues of 
fact were decided by the judge or magistrate, (8) 
whether the issues decided were central or ancillary 
to the primary dispute between the parties, (9) 
whether a judgment was rendered on the evidence.17  
The Ohio court noted the indicia listed were not exhaustive and 
that the focus of the inquiry "is whether there is a substantial 
predominance of indicia of trial . . . ."18   
                                                 
16 "A trial is a judicial examination of the issues, whether 
of law or of fact, in an action or proceeding."  Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2311.01 (West 2003-04). 
17 First Bank of Marietta v. Mascrete, Inc., 684 N.E.2d 38, 
41 (Ohio 1997). 
18 Id. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
11 
 
¶24 In contrast to the indicia described by the Ohio 
court, Judge Richard Brown's dissent in the court of appeals in 
the instant case used a test more along the lines of Justice 
Potter Stewart's famed "I know it when I see it" test.19  Judge 
Brown declared that a trial is what lawyers commonly view as a 
trial:  "I would bet that there is not a litigator in this state 
who, following a directed verdict after evidence was taken and 
one party rested, would walk out of the courtroom believing that 
he or she was not in trial."20 
¶25 The court of appeals in the present case relied 
neither on the definition of the word "trial" nor on these 
indicia of a trial.  Rather, the court of appeals relied on its 
earlier decision in Village of Menomonee Falls v. Meyer, 229 
Wis. 2d 811, 601 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999), to declare that a 
trial had not occurred in the municipal court in the instant 
case.  We therefore turn to the Meyer case. 
C 
¶26 We first compare the facts in Meyer and in the instant 
case to determine whether they are analogous.  We next explore 
the reasoning of the Meyer case to determine whether we agree 
with it.   
¶27 Although the facts of Meyer and the instant case may 
seem similar, the two cases are in fact different. 
                                                 
19 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (Stewart, 
J., concurring). 
20 City of Pewaukee, 268 Wis. 2d 507, ¶25 (Brown, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
12 
 
¶28 Paul Meyer, like the defendant in the instant case, 
was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration.21  Prior to any 
proceeding in municipal court, Meyer requested the police report 
of his arrest.22  The Village informed Meyer that no such report 
existed.  The report later turned up.  Meyer then moved in 
limine in municipal court to preclude the introduction of the 
police report; the municipal court granted the motion.23  Meyer 
then moved to dismiss the action on the merits.  The Village 
conceded it would not be able to prosecute Meyer without the 
police report, and the municipal court granted Meyer's motion to 
dismiss the action on the merits.24  
¶29 The Village sought a new trial in circuit court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4).  In response, Meyer 
contended that a circuit court could not grant a new trial 
because "the merits of the case had not been determined before 
the municipal court."25  The circuit court allowed the new trial, 
and Meyer was ordered to pay the forfeiture.26  Meyer appealed, 
                                                 
21 Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d at 813. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 813-14. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
13 
 
and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order 
allowing a new trial.27   
¶30 Unlike in the present case, the motion to dismiss in 
Meyer was made prior to opening statements, prior to the 
introduction of any evidence, and prior to the swearing of any 
witnesses.  Indeed, the court of appeals in Meyer employed the 
word "trial" four times only in sentences using the future 
tense.  Apparently in Meyer the court of appeals was attempting 
to distinguish pretrial motion practice from the prerequisite 
trial under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4). 
 
¶31 In the instant case, unlike in Meyer, several indicia 
of a trial are present.   
 
¶32 This case does not involve pretrial motion practice in 
municipal court; the municipal court proceeding went beyond 
pretrial motions.  The motion in the instant case was made after 
the City presented its evidence and closed its case in chief. 
¶33 The City presented three witnesses to address the 
substantive question at issue, namely whether the defendant had 
operated 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
intoxicants.  The defendant cross-examined the City's witnesses. 
The defendant's motion after all the City's evidence was 
presented did not transform the municipal proceeding into a 
motion hearing or interlocutory matter.  
¶34 The municipal court examined the facts (in the 
testimony of the City's witnesses and the documentary evidence) 
                                                 
27 Id. at 818. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
14 
 
and the law in deciding the legal issue of whether to grant the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the matter on the merits.  The 
municipal court judicially resolved the merits of the City's 
case. 
¶35 In the instant case, the proceeding in the municipal 
court had several events ordinarily occurring in a trial, and 
indeed the case was fully litigated as far as the parties were 
concerned.  The party with the burden of proof presented its 
evidence 
in 
full, 
and 
the 
defendant 
engaged 
in 
cross-
examination.  The defendant chose not to present his evidence.  
The municipal court then judicially decided the case upon the 
defendant's motion by resolving a question of law on the basis 
of the testimony and documentary evidence presented.28   
¶36 For these reasons, although we agree with the court of 
appeals that in Meyer no prior trial occurred in the municipal 
court, Meyer and this case are factually distinguishable, and 
the court of appeals' reliance on the Meyer case to decide the 
instant case was erroneous. 
D 
¶37 Viewing the municipal court proceeding in the instant 
case as a trial is consistent with the definitions of the word 
"trial" and the various indicia of a trial.  The court of 
appeals did not, however, consider any definition of trial or 
                                                 
28 As the court of appeals explained, the municipal court 
held that the City failed to meet its burden of proof and 
whether a party meets its burden of proof is a question of law.  
Hallin v. Hallin, 228 Wis. 2d 250, 258, 596 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
15 
 
the distinguishing facts of the instant case.  Instead the court 
of appeals relied on the reasoning of the Meyer case to decide 
the instant case.  We do not find the Meyer case persuasive.  
¶38 In Meyer, although the case was resolved at the 
municipal court, the court of appeals adopted the proposition 
that "[b]efore a case can be tried 'for an additional time,' it 
must have been fully litigated at an earlier time."29  The court 
of appeals in the present case read Meyer as explicitly 
requiring that "a full trial of the parties' issues in the 
municipal court is a condition precedent to a 'new' trial in the 
circuit court."30  The City challenges the court of appeals' 
insistence that a matter be "fully litigated" or be "fully 
tried" in municipal court before a new trial can be granted in 
circuit court.  The City correctly points out that the words 
"fully litigated" or "full trial" appear neither in Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.14(4) nor in any case law prior to Meyer.  
¶39 Differentiating 
between 
a 
case 
that 
has 
been 
"judicially resolved" on its merits and one that had been "fully 
litigated" on its merits, the court of appeals opined in the 
case at bar that even though several elements of a trial had 
taken place in municipal court, these elements were not enough 
to constitute a trial in municipal court for purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 800.14(4).31     
                                                 
29 Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d at 817 (emphasis added). 
30 City of Pewaukee, 268 Wis. 2d 507, ¶15 (quoting Meyer, 
229 Wis. 2d at 816) (emphasis added in City of Pewaukee). 
31 City of Pewaukee, 268 Wis. 2d 507, ¶14. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
16 
 
¶40 The court of appeals concluded that the municipal 
court proceeding was not "fully litigated on the merits" in 
municipal court because both parties did not exercise their 
respective prerogative to present evidence or rest their case.32  
Once the municipality presented evidence, the defendant did not 
present evidence or rest his case but moved for dismissal. 
According to the court of appeals, the municipal court's 
granting the defendant's dismissal motion "effectively truncated 
his opportunity to present a defense—an opportunity required for 
the merits of a case to be considered fully litigated."33  
¶41 We disagree with the court of appeals that the 
defendant did not have the opportunity to present a defense in 
the municipal court or that his opportunity to present a defense 
was truncated.   
¶42 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
apparently 
overlooked 
the 
defendant's three options in municipal court: (1) move to 
dismiss the action at the end of the plaintiff's case; (2) rest 
his case without presenting any testimony or evidence, arguing 
the merits of the case based on the evidence the plaintiff 
presented; or (3) present witnesses and evidence. Under any of 
the three options, the defendant had the opportunity to 
introduce his evidence, although he was not required to do so.34   
                                                 
32 Id., ¶16. 
33 Id., 268 Wis. 2d 507, ¶18. 
34 Wis. Stat. § 800.08(1) ("The municipality shall first 
offer evidence . . . . The defendant may offer evidence . . ." 
(emphasis added)).    
No. 
03-1114   
 
17 
 
¶43 The defendant chose to move to dismiss at the end of 
the City's case. The defendant alone made the decision not to 
introduce evidence, presumably because he concluded that he 
might succeed on the merits on the basis of the City's evidence.  
But for the defendant's own successful motion to dismiss, the 
defendant would have been allowed to present his evidence.  
Similarly, if the municipal court had denied the defendant's 
motion to dismiss, the defendant would have had the opportunity 
to present his evidence in full.  The defendant did not default 
in the present case. 
¶44 To allow a defendant to move to dismiss at the close 
of the City's evidence, and yet to refuse to classify the 
municipal court proceeding as a trial, leads to a peculiar 
distinction between a motion to dismiss made before a defendant 
puts in his evidence and a motion to dismiss made after a 
defendant presents his evidence.  Judge Brown explained this 
problem in his dissent in the court of appeals as follows:  "[A] 
motion made at the close of the plaintiff's case does not allow 
for a trial de novo in the circuit court but a motion made at 
the close of all the evidence, based on the same legal 
grounds . . . does allow for a trial de novo."35  We agree with 
Judge Brown on this point.  
¶45 Section 800.14(4) also gives the circuit court the 
right to grant a new trial on its own motion.  It is hard to 
                                                 
35 City of Pewaukee, 268 Wis. 2d 507, ¶27 (Brown, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
18 
 
believe that the legislature would allow a defendant to 
extinguish both an opposing party's ability to obtain a new 
trial and a circuit court's power to order a new trial merely by 
tendering his or her motion to dismiss at the end of a 
plaintiff's case instead of later in the proceeding.36   
                                                 
36 The City asserts that the municipal court's granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss was an adjudication on the merits 
under Wis. Stat. § 805.17(1).  Section 805.17(1) provides, inter 
alia, that a dismissal on a defendant's motion to dismiss after 
a plaintiff has completed the presentation of evidence operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits.   
While a forfeiture action in municipal court is a civil 
action, it does not necessarily follow that the rules of civil 
practice and procedure in chapters 801-847 of the statutes apply 
to municipal court proceedings.   
The basis for the City's assertion that the rules of civil 
practice and procedure apply to municipal court proceedings, is 
Village of Bayside v. Bruner, 33 Wis. 2d 533, 535, 148 N.W.2d 5 
(1967).  However, the origin of this proposition is much older. 
See, e.g., City of Appleton v. Sauer, 271 Wis. 614, 616-17, 74 
N.W.2d 167 (1956);  South Milwaukee v. Schantzen, 258 Wis. 41, 
43, 44 N.W.2d 628 (1950); Milwaukee v. Burns, 225 Wis. 296, 299, 
274 N.W. 273 (1937); De Vries v. Dye, 222 Wis. 501, 503, 269 
N.W. 270 (1936);  Seely v. Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 124, 130, 248 
N.W. 912 (1933); Neenah v. Krueger, 206 Wis. 473, 475-76, 240 
N.W.2d 402 
(1932) 
(cited 
in 
the 
annotation 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 260.05 (1935)  for applying civil practice rules to 
municipal court cases).  
All these cases predate the 1976 revision of the Wisconsin 
rules of civil practice and procedure. Section 801.01(2) of the 
revised rules explicitly applies chapters 801-847 (the rules of 
civil practice and procedure) to civil actions in circuit court. 
No mention is made of the applicability of chapters 801-847 to 
municipal court proceedings.   
No. 
03-1114   
 
19 
 
¶46 It is apparent that the court of appeals' use of the 
words "fully litigated" and "full trial" has led and may lead to 
confusion.  Accordingly we withdraw the language in Meyer 
requiring that a case be "fully litigated," or that there be a 
"full trial" in municipal court in order for a municipal 
proceeding to constitute a trial. 
¶47 For the reasons set forth, we do not agree with the 
court of appeals that the word "trial" in Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) 
required both parties in the present case to exercise their 
prerogative to present evidence or rest their case. 
E 
¶48 The court of appeals in Meyer and in the instant case 
rely on the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) to 
support its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) that if a 
municipal court grants a defendant's motion to dismiss at the 
end of the municipality's case in chief, no trial occurred in 
the municipal court.  We conclude that the legislative history 
does not support this interpretation proffered by the court of 
appeals.  
                                                                                                                                                             
The Wisconsin Municipal Judge Benchbook includes a copy of 
chapter 800 of the statutes, but not chapter 805. Chapter 6 of 
the Benchbook, entitled "Conducting a Trial," makes no reference 
to chapter 805, Wis. Stat.  Chapter 6 does state, however, that 
at the conclusion of the municipality's case the municipal court 
may dismiss the case either on its own motion or on motion of a 
defendant. 
We need not and do not decide the applicability of chapter 
805 to municipal court proceedings. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
20 
 
¶49 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
in 
Meyer 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation and is ambiguous.  Thus the court of appeals 
examined the legislative history of § 800.14(4) in Meyer to 
determine the legislative objective in order to interpret and 
apply the statute in accordance with its objective.  
¶50 In 1987, the legislature revamped Chapter 800.37  
Before the 1987 amendments, parties in municipal court had  
several ways to reach the circuit court.38  Either party could 
seek an appeal on the municipal court record39 or could seek a 
new trial in circuit court without a jury.40  These routes to the 
circuit court from municipal court are still available.41 
¶51 Alternatively, a defendant could plead not guilty in 
municipal court and request a jury trial in circuit court.42  The 
                                                 
37 1987 Act 389. 
38 See Wis. Stat. §800.04(d); Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) (1985-
86).   
39 Wis. Stat. § 800.14 (1985-86); Wis. Stat. § 800.14. 
40 Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) (1985-86) ("Upon the request of 
either party within 20 days after the notice of appeal under 
sub. (1), or on its own motion, the circuit court shall order 
that a trial de novo without a jury be held in circuit court.").  
See also Wis. Stat. § 800.14. 
41 Wis. Stat. § 800.14. 
42 Wis. Stat. § 800.04(1)(d) (1985-86) ("If the defendant 
pleads not guilty and within 10 days after entry of the plea 
requests a jury trial . . . the municipal judge shall promptly 
transmit all the papers and fees in the cause to the clerk of 
the circuit court . . . .").    
No. 
03-1114   
 
21 
 
1987 revision severely restricted a defendant's ability to 
bypass municipal court and go directly to circuit court.  After 
the 1987 revision, only defendants charged with violating Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63, which governs driving while under the influence 
of intoxicants, could plead not guilty in municipal court and go 
directly to circuit court for a jury trial.43 The legislature 
limited the burden on the circuit courts to conduct jury trials 
at the request of a defendant.    
¶52 Most notably a new third alternative for reaching the 
circuit court was provided in the 1987 revision:  On appeal from 
any municipal court proceeding, an appellant could request a new 
trial in circuit court before a jury.44  The 1987 revision gave 
both municipalities and defendants, as the appellant, the right 
to seek a new trial by jury in the circuit court.          
¶53 The objective of the 1987 revision is revealed in the 
drafting record of the 1987 bill to amend chapter 800.  The 
drafting request stated that the problem to be ameliorated was 
the excessive requests for jury trials in cases involving 
forfeitures and ordinance violations.45  Because at the time of 
the proposed revision a defendant had the right to a jury trial 
in circuit court only if no municipal court trial was held, the 
                                                 
43 Wis. Stat. § 800.04(1)(d). 
44 1987 
Act 
389, 
§ 30. 
 
See 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 800.14(4)(1987-88).  The circuit court may grant a new trial 
on its own motion.     
45 Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d at 815.  See also Village of Oregon v. 
Waldofsky, 177 Wis. 2d 412, 419, 501 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1993).  
No. 
03-1114   
 
22 
 
legislature's 
objective 
in 
the 
revision 
was 
to 
limit 
a 
defendant's ability to get a jury trial in circuit court without 
a trial in municipal court.  
¶54 The solution proposed by the drafting request was "to 
require that all alleged violators go to municipal court first, 
exhaust their options there, and if they lose, they may exercise 
the right to 1. a new trial, 2. a jury trial, or 3. to request 
review by a judge."46   
¶55 Other 
documents 
included 
in 
the 
drafting 
record 
further reveal the objective of the revamped Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.14(4).47  A handwritten note reads, "Make sure it's not 
possible to default in [municipal court and] then file for a 
jury trial."  The note continued, "Must try issues in [municipal 
court]" (emphasis added).  The Drafting Request further states: 
"Aim at practice of person bypassing [the municipal court] by 
always requesting JT [jury trial in circuit court]."   
¶56 Additionally, the fiscal estimate prepared by the 
Director 
of 
State 
Courts 
opines 
that 
"[this] 
bill 
also 
eliminates the right to request a jury trial when the action is 
commenced in municipal court [by pleading not guilty].  The 
trial must be conducted in municipal court after which an appeal 
                                                 
46 Bill Draft Request Form completed by Cheryl Wittke on 
behalf of Senator Lynn Adelman on December 4, 1986. 
47 These documents are found in the drafting record for 1987 
Act 389, available at the Wisconsin Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin.   
No. 
03-1114   
 
23 
 
may be taken to circuit court and a jury trial requested" 
(emphasis added). 
¶57 These documents together express a legislative concern 
that allowing defendants to get a jury trial in circuit court 
without a prior trial in municipal court unnecessarily increases 
the number of circuit court jury trials.48   
¶58 The court of appeals acknowledged this concern and 
declared in Village of Oregon v. Waldofsky,  177 Wis. 2d 412, 
419, 501 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1993), that the objective of the 
1987 revision was to "encourage municipal ordinance defendants 
to have their cases heard in municipal court and thus cut down 
on what were believed to be 'excessive requests' for circuit 
court jury trials in civil forfeiture and ordinance violation 
cases."49 
¶59 Although the 1987 revision limited a defendant's 
ability to get a jury trial without a prior trial in municipal 
court, it granted both a defendant and a municipality the 
ability to get a new jury trial in circuit court after a trial 
in municipal court. Therefore, in interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 800.14(4), the court of appeals transformed the stated 
legislative objective to limit a defendant's right to jury 
trials in circuit court to a legislative objective to limit all 
                                                 
48 The 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau's 
prefatory 
notes 
("Analysis") to the 1987 bill describe the current law and the 
proposed changes but add no additional insight to what has 
already been discussed.   
49 Village of Oregon v. Waldofsky,  177 Wis. 2d 412, 419, 
501 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
24 
 
new 
trials 
in 
circuit 
court 
at 
the 
request 
of 
either 
municipalities or defendants.  This transformation of the 
legislative objective in the legislative history to limit both 
municipalities 
and 
defendants 
rests 
on 
the 
language 
of 
§ 800.14(4).  On its face § 800.14(4) treats municipalities and 
defendants the same for purposes of requiring a trial in the 
municipal court before either party may get a new trial in 
circuit court.   
¶60 Thus in Meyer, the court of appeals concluded that the 
legislature sought to reduce the number of new trial requests to 
the circuit court from municipal ordinance violations,50 and in 
the instant case the court of appeals concluded "that without a 
trial on the merits in the municipal court, a party could not 
request a new trial in the circuit court."51   
¶61 Although the legislative history demonstrates that the 
legislature was concerned that a defendant not default in 
municipal court before seeking a new trial in circuit court, we 
do not find legislative history supporting the court of appeals' 
conclusion that allowing a new trial in circuit court when a 
municipality fails to meet its burden of proof in municipal 
court defeats the legislative objective of limiting new trials 
in circuit court.  There is no evidence in the legislative 
history that a circuit court is to review the record of the 
                                                 
50 Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d  at 816. 
51 City of Pewaukee, 268 Wis. 2d 507, ¶13 (citing Meyer, 229 
Wis. 2d at 815). 
No. 
03-1114   
 
25 
 
municipal 
court 
trial 
to 
determine 
whether 
either 
the 
municipality or defendant acted in good faith in presenting 
their respective cases in municipal court.  Nor do we find any 
legislative history supporting the court of appeals' conclusion 
that it is unfair to force defendants to undergo a new trial 
when they have received a judicial determination in municipal 
court and believed their case to be completed.52  Nothing in 
§ 800.14(4) or the legislative history supports the court of 
appeals' 
conclusion 
that 
it 
is 
an 
absurd 
result 
if 
municipalities are permitted "to correct errors fatal to their 
municipal court case by requesting a new trial before the 
circuit court."53    
¶62 We do not agree with the court of appeals that the 
legislative history supports the conclusion that if a court 
                                                 
52 Meyer, 229 Wis. 2d at 816. 
53 Id. 
The defendant presents a similar public policy argument 
favoring the decision of the court of appeals.  The defendant 
argues that if a municipality's failure to meet its burden of 
proof in the municipal court prohibits a municipality from 
seeking a new trial, the public policy of requiring diligent 
preparation by the municipality is promoted.  If the City is not 
obliged to meet its burden of proof in the municipal court 
before the municipality proceeds to circuit court, even the most 
unmeritorious cases will not be filtered out by the municipal 
court, asserts the defendant.  
The City answers this public policy argument by asserting 
that it was prepared even though it failed to present the 
testimony of the officer who ordered the blood draw and that the 
public policy asserted by the defendant does not come into play 
in the present case or in most cases because a municipality 
cannot afford to waste its resources in this manner. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
26 
 
grants a defendant's motion to dismiss at the end of the 
municipality's case in chief, no trial occurred in the municipal 
court. We therefore do not adopt the court of appeals' 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) to the 
facts of the instant case.   
*   *   *   * 
¶63 We conclude that the municipal court proceeding in the 
present case constituted a trial under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) 
because the City presented its case, the defendant had an 
opportunity to present his evidence (even though he chose not to 
do so), and the matter was judicially resolved on its merits.  
We therefore conclude that the municipal court proceeding in the 
instant case triggered the City's statutory right to a new trial 
under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4).  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and the order of the circuit 
court, and remand the cause to the circuit court to grant the 
City's request for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for a 
new trial. 
No. 
03-1114   
 
 
 
1