Title: State v. Thibodeaux
Citation: 352 N.C. 570
Docket Number: 157A99
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2000

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAYMOND THOMAS THIBODEAUX
No. 157A99
(Filed 25 August 2000)
1.
Evidence--murdered wife’s testimony of prior assault by husband--hearsay--admissible
The trial court did not err in a capital first-degree murder prosecution by admitting the victim’s
testimony from a domestic violence protective order hearing regarding an assault upon her by defendant. 
Defendant was precluded from raising on appeal an objection based upon N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(1)
because it was not raised at trial; the hearsay statements in the testimony were admissible as statements of the
declarant’s then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition; when a husband is charged with murdering
his wife, evidence spanning the entire marriage is allowed to show malice, intent, and ill will; and the court’s
ruling that the probative value was not outweighed by the prejudice was not manifestly unsupported by reason. 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 804(b)(5), 803(3), 404(b), and 403.
2.
Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--objection when witness called--no objection when
evidence introduced
A defendant in a capital first-degree murder prosecution did not preserve for appellate review
evidentiary issues where he objected when the witnesses were called; the trial judge removed the jury,
considered the forecast of evidence and the legal arguments, and found the evidence admissible; and defendant
did not object when the testimony was subsequently introduced before the jury.  The arguments preceding the
calling of the witnesses were tantamount to motions in limine and defendant must make an objection at the time
the evidence is actually introduced to preserve the question of admissibility for appeal.
3.
Homicide--second-degree murder--voluntary intoxication--no evidence of intoxication when
killing occurred
The trial court in a capital first-degree murder prosecution did not err by not submitting second-degree
murder based upon voluntary intoxication where there was testimony that defendant appeared impaired when a
detective arrived at his house, but defendant offered no evidence to show that he was voluntarily intoxicated at
the time of the killing and the pathologist opined that the victim had been dead for at least twenty-four hours
when officers found the body.
4.
Sentencing--capital--proportionality
A sentence of death was not disproportionate where the record supports the aggravating circumstance
found by the jury, there is nothing to suggest that the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and this case was more similar to cases in which the death penalty was
found proportionate than to those where it was found disproportionate.  Defendant was convicted based upon
premeditation and deliberation, the jury found the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating
circumstance, the crime was brutal and there is evidence that the victim was conscious and suffered as she died,
and defendant showed no apologetic or ameliorative conduct.
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a judgment
imposing a sentence of death entered by Albright, J., on 2 March 1999 in
Superior Court, Forsyth County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant
guilty of first-degree murder.  Heard in the Supreme Court 13 March 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John H. Watters, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
David B. Freedman and Dudley A. Witt for defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
Defendant was indicted 20 July 1998 for the first-degree murder of his
wife, Bertha Annette (Hyatt) Thibodeaux, and was tried capitally in
Superior Court, Forsyth County.  On 25 Feb. 1999, the jury returned a
guilty verdict of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and
deliberation and, on 2 March 1999, a recommendation of death for defendant. 
Judgment was entered accordingly, and defendant gave notice of appeal to
this Court on 2 March 1999.
After consideration of the questions presented by defendant, and a
thorough review of the transcript of the proceedings, the record on appeal,
the briefs, and oral arguments, we find no error meriting reversal of
defendant’s conviction or sentence.
Defendant and the victim, Annette Thibodeaux, resided at 204 Barney
Road in High Point, Forsyth County, North Carolina.  Members of the High
Point Police Department were sent to their home on 13 April 1998 after an
out-of-town caller had contacted police and expressed concern that he was
unable to reach the couple.  Police arrived at the Thibodeaux home at
approximately 10:00 p.m.
After observing the home for an hour, police approached and knocked on
the door several times.  When defendant answered, the officers standing at
the doorway could see in clear view what appeared to be a woman lying face
down between two couches in the living room.  Also visible were what
appeared to be blood stains on the walls and both couches.  Based upon
these observations, the police asked defendant to step outside, and they
began to search the residence.
After placing defendant in a patrol car, Forsyth County Sheriff’s
Detective Dwayne V. Hedgecock advised defendant that law enforcement
officers were there because there was a dead body in his house.  In trial
testimony, Detective Hedgecock described his subsequent conversation with
defendant thusly:
“He said, ‘A dead body is in my house?’  He asked me who was in
the house and I replied, ‘A female.’  He said, ‘You mean a
woman?’  And I replied, ‘yes.’  He looked at me in a very puzzled
manner when he asked about the body . . . .  He asked me again
why I was there and if I was a police officer.  I told him that I
was a detective with the Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office and that
I was there to investigate what had happened.  He again asked me
if there was a dead woman in his house, and I said, ‘Yes, Ray,
there is.’  He said, ‘You’re kidding me.’  I said, ‘No, Ray, I’m
not kidding you.’”
At the same time inside the Thibodeaux home, Forsyth County Sheriff’s
Deputy Robert Shinault, Jr., examined the body of the victim, noting there
was a hole in the back of her skull and that her hands were severely
bruised and discolored.  He also found a phone cord wrapped around her
neck.
Police Detective Elizabeth Culbreth, also on the scene, testified that
she discovered a white trash bag in a box in the corner of the dining room. 
It contained a telephone that appeared to have blood on it.  In the spare
room, she saw a shirt that appeared to have blood on it.  Detective
Culbreth also noted a number of beer cans in the garbage bag and other cans
around the house.
When Detective Hedgecock entered the house and went into the bedroom,
he observed that the mattress and box spring of the bed had been pulled
away, exposing the floor underneath.  He also observed that the area
immediately surrounding the victim was covered with blood splatter, and
that there were faint footsteps in blood trailing from the bedroom into the
kitchen.
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Jennifer A.
Elwell, who was employed as a forensic serologist, testified as to a number
of items of evidence seized in the investigation.  The shirt found in the
spare room of the home showed the presence of human blood, as did the
aforementioned telephone.  A watch found in the bathroom and the tissue
paper it was wrapped in were also examined for blood tracings.  The tissue
reacted positively to phenolphthalein, the chemical used to test for human
blood.  A small stain on the watch, as well as two shade-control rods found
in the living room, also tested positive for human blood.  Agent Elwell
testified that a hammer found at the scene also contained traces of human
blood on its surface.
Forsyth County Sheriff’s Sergeant Darrell O. Hicks was tendered and
accepted at trial as an expert in the field of latent fingerprint
identification.  Sgt. Hicks used an original fingerprint card of defendant
as a comparison to prints lifted from the crime scene.  He concluded that
the bloody fingerprints taken from the two shade-control rods and telephone
were those of defendant.  He further testified that there were no
fingerprints found on the hammer, and that it appeared to have been wiped
clean.
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent David
Freeman was tendered and accepted as an expert in the field of forensic DNA
analysis.  Agent Freeman examined the evidence and concluded that the blood
located on the hammer and tissue paper matched the DNA profile of the
victim.  He also testified that blood samples taken from the shirt,
telephone, and watch all had a DNA pattern consistent with that of the
victim.
On appeal to this Court, defendant brings forward twelve questions for
review.  For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that defendant’s trial
and capital sentencing proceeding were without prejudicial error and that
the death sentence is not disproportionate.
[1] Defendant’s first four questions presented before this Court
relate to a prior civil domestic violence protective order hearing pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 50-B (“50-B hearing”), in which the victim, Ms. Thibodeaux,
testified against defendant concerning a violent assault that took place in
February 1997.  Generally, defendant contends that the trial court’s
admission of the victim’s testimony from the 50-B hearing is hearsay
evidence and, as such, violates defendant’s right to confront the witness
against him as guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred under Rules 804(b)(1),
804(b)(5, 803(3), 404(b), and 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
in allowing the State to introduce into evidence the transcript and
audiotape testimony of the victim from the 50-B hearing.  We disagree with
defendant’s contention.  As discussed below, we further note that defendant
failed to raise the Rule 804(b)(1) objection at trial.  Thus, this argument
is deemed waived.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).
On 3 February 1997, at the 50-B hearing held in District Court,
Guilford County, Judge Susan Bray presiding, Ms. Thibodeaux described
defendant’s alleged violent assault in part as follows:
[H]e came into the living room where I was eating and he didn’t
say anything, he walked up and he slapped the plate of food out
of my lap, and it went flying across the living room.  And it
smashed into the fireplace, and food got everywhere.
And so, of course, I became quite upset that that happened
. . . .  I went into the bedroom to change my shirt to get ready
to leave, and he comes running into the bedroom, and he shut --
we have two doors that access our bedrooms, one is into a
hallway, a long hallway, because our bedroom is at the back of
the house, and one door leads into a bathroom.
And he shut both doors, so that I could not escape, and he
started hitting me with his fists, and I fell on the floor, and
he started kicking me.
. . . .
. . . [H]e hit me with his fist on this side of my face,
this has been over a week, so some of the swelling has gone down,
and the bruises have began [sic] to clear up.  But he hit me with
his fist on this side of the face.  This side of my face was
swollen.  I had a very severe black eye all under here.
He kicked me repeatedly over my entire body.  I have some
really bad bruises right here.
. . . .
. . . I got extremely scared because of the fact that this
has been -- this has happened to me on three other occasions, and
my husband, when he gets angry he gets violent.  And on the other
occasions it’s not like he gets upset and hits me a couple of
times, and then it’s over, I am used to the continual kicking,
and the continual hitting, and I became very afraid.
I tried several times to get out one door that leads to the
hallway, and every time I would turn for that door he would grab
me and throw me down and start kicking me some more.  And then
when I would try to get toward the other door, he would grab me
and throw me down.
And I began to realize that this was going to turn into a
long ordeal, and that I was not going to escape.  So, I figured
if I can’t get out of this bedroom, the only recourse I have is
to get under the bed.
So, I went under the bed.  And our bed is like very low to
the floor.  It’s a very tight space I could crawl under.  I just
had to do the best I could and slide under.  And where I was
positioned under the bed the frame work of the bed had, I was
like pinned under the frame because I couldn’t move.
And during the course of the event, this is about,
approximately, a three hour ordeal, he told me that he was going
to kill me.  And at one point I said, “Well, Ray, you can kill
me,” you know, “But they are going to trace it to you, they are
going to find out you did it.”
And he said, “No they won’t, because I will kill you.  I
will put your body in the trunk of your car, and I will get rid
of your car, and they’ll never know it was me.”
And then at another point he says, “Annette, you’re going to
stay under that bed, and you’re going to die under the bed,
because I don’t” -- this happened Thursday night, and he didn’t
have to go back to work until Sunday night, and he said, “You’re
going to be under that bed for days, and you’re going to die
under the bed, because you’re going to starve to death, and
you’re going to have to go to the bathroom on yourself.”
And that’s not the way he put it, but that’s what it -- what
he was saying.  And he said, “I’ve been sleeping for a while, and
I’m refreshed, and I’m ready to go.”  So, I knew what he meant,
he had had plenty of rest, and he had plenty of sleep.  He had
slept for several days, after coming off his job, so he was ready
to have the energy to do what he was going to do.
And I kept asking him, I said, “Ray, why are you doing this
to me?”, and he kept saying, “Because you deserve it.”  He said,
“I’m tired of your nagging me, and this is what you deserve.”
And I said, “Well, Ray, I, I understand that you’re angry at
me, because I just told you I want to leave you,” I said, “But --
and you have a right to be angry,” but I said, “hurting me is not
the way to solve the problem, we should -- if you’re hurt that I
told you I wanted to leave, then you should -- we should just sit
down and talk about this and work it out, and not -- you don’t
hit me because you’re angry.”
And he said that it was his right to have the revenge.
Ms. Thibodeaux proceeded to explain in detail the manner in which
defendant abused her during that evening.  She testified that defendant
next instructed her to take her shoes off, threatening her by holding a
dumbbell over her head and stating, “‘If you don’t do what I say I will
smash your skull in, and by the time I get through with you, you won’t have
a face.’”  After she realized that he was going to tie her feet up, she
retreated again to the area underneath the bed.
Ms. Thibodeaux testified that over the course of the next several
hours, as she remained under the bed, defendant swung at her with a butcher
knife, removed the mattress and poured boiling water on her, and “jabbed”
at her with a mop handle and a steel weight lifting bar, resulting in
extensive bruising to her legs and ankles.  Ms. Thibodeaux stated that
defendant eventually “just snapped out of it” and ended the assaultive
conduct later that night.
Prior to defendant’s trial in February 1999 for the murder of
Ms. Thibodeaux, defendant filed a motion and an attached memorandum of law
objecting to the State’s introduction of the 50-B hearing transcript.  In
the motion and memorandum, defendant specifically objected to the admission
of this evidence based on the North Carolina Rules of Evidence 803(3),
804(b)(5), and 404(b), but failed to object under Rule 804(b)(1). 
Moreover, during the trial court’s evidentiary hearing on defendant’s
motion, defendant again failed to specifically object to the transcript and
audiotape’s admission into evidence based on Rule 804(b)(1).  The trial
court ultimately held the challenged hearsay statements to be admissible
under Rules 804(b)(1), 804(b)(5), 803(3), 404(b), and 403.
During the trial, defendant merely reiterated his earlier objections
to the aforementioned evidence, again failing to object on the Rule
804(b)(1) ruling.  Thus, in the absence of a specific objection premised on
Rule 804(b)(1), defendant has failed to properly preserve the issue for
appellate review.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).  Accordingly, defendant is
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal.  “This Court will
not consider arguments based upon matters not presented to or adjudicated
by the trial tribunal.”  State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809,
814 (1991).
As to defendant’s arguments under Rules 804(b)(5), 803(3), 404(b), and
403, upon examining the record on appeal, we find that the hearsay
statements in question constitute, and are admissible as, statements of the
declarant’s then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition pursuant
to Rule 803(3).  “In general, hearsay evidence is not admissible.  However,
Rule 803(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence allows the admission of
hearsay testimony into evidence if it tends to show the declarant’s then-
existing state of mind.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (1997).”  State v.
Rivera, 350 N.C. 285, 288, 514 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1999) (citation omitted).
It is well established in North Carolina “that a murder victim’s
statements that she fears the defendant and fears that the defendant might
kill her are statements of the victim’s then-existing state of mind and are
‘“highly relevant to show the status of the victim’s relationship to the
defendant.”’  State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 76, 472 S.E.2d 920, 927
(1996) (quoting State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 230, 461 S.E.2d 687, 704
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996)).”  State v.
Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 392, 501 S.E.2d 625, 634 (1998).  In the instant case,
the victim’s testimony from the 50-B hearing clearly relates to her
relationship with her husband as well as to her fear of him.  “We
consistently have allowed evidence spanning the entire marriage when a
husband is charged with murdering his wife in order ‘“to show malice,
intent, and ill will toward the victim.”’ State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210,
219, 393 S.E.2d 811, 816 (1990) (quoting State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553,
561, 324 S.E.2d 241, 247 (1985)). . . .  Therefore, evidence of the entire
pattern and history of violence between defendant and the victim was
relevant.”  State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 591, 509 S.E.2d 752, 763
(1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1999).
Although Rule 802 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides
that “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these
rules,”  we conclude that the statements complained of were properly
admitted as expressions of the victim’s then-existing state of mind,
pursuant to Rule 803(3).  Rule 803(3), therefore, satisfies the exception
requirement of Rule 802.  As such, it is unnecessary for us to decide
whether the contested evidence is also admissible under Rules 804(b)(5).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing these
hearsay statements into evidence under Rule 404(b) because the prejudicial
effect of the statements substantially outweighs their probative value. 
See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1999).  We disagree.  The admissibility of
specific acts of misconduct by a defendant is governed by Rule 404(b),
which provides:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. -- Evidence of other crimes
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident. 
N.C.G.S. §  8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1999).  In applying Rule 404(b), this Court
has repeatedly held that “[t]estimony about a defendant-husband’s arguments
with, violence toward, and threats to his wife are properly admitted in his
subsequent trial for her murder.”  Murillo, 349 N.C. at 591, 509 S.E.2d at
762; see also  State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 376-78, 428 S.E.2d 118, 132,
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993).
When such testimony is ruled admissible at trial under Rule 404(b), it
nevertheless remains subject to the balancing test of Rule 403.  “The
responsibility to determine whether the probative value of relevant
evidence is outweighed by its tendency to prejudice the defendant is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court.”  Alston, 341 N.C. at 231, 461
S.E.2d at 704.  In the case sub judice, the trial court carefully
considered the probative value of the transcript and audiotape as well as
its prejudicial effect.  During the hearing on this evidence, the trial
court made specific findings of fact and concluded, “[U]pon a fair
consideration of the nature of the evidence and the purposes for which the
evidence may be received and upon consideration of the long line of cases
that admit the entire history of the marriage to prove malice and intent
and ill will, matters of that sort toward the victim, the Court is of the
opinion and finds that the probative value of this testimony substantially
outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading of the jury, that the evidence should not be excluded.”
 Abuse of the trial court’s discretion will be found only where the
ruling is “manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary it could not
have been the result of a reasoned decision.”  Syriani, 333 N.C. at 379,
428 S.E.2d at 133.  Such is not the case here.  Therefore, we hold that the
trial court properly admitted these hearsay statements into evidence.
[2] In his next four questions presented, defendant argues that the
trial court erred in allowing into evidence various witnesses’ testimony
about the victim’s relationship with her husband, the defendant, and that
such testimony was substantially more prejudicial than probative under Rule
403.  Specifically, defendant argues that:  (1) “[t]he trial court erred in
allowing exhaustive evidence recounting statements made by the victim under
Rule 803(3) as said statements were not expressions of fear or otherwise
emotion-based, but rather were mere recitations of fact”; (2) “[t]he trial
court erred in allowing evidence under the residual hearsay exception of
804(b)(5) pertaining to unavailable witnesses when said evidence did not
possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness or was
provable by other means”; (3) “[t]he trial court erred in allowing
exhaustive propensity and character evidence of [defendant] under the guise
of Rule 404(b) evidence”; and (4) “[t]he trial court erred in admitting
evidence that was either irrelevant under Rule 401 or more prejudicial than
probative under Rule 403 and as a result of the cumulative effect of the
admission of said prejudicial evidence, the jury verdict was rendered under
the influence of passion or prejudice and was arbitrary and capricious.”
Through these arguments, defendant contends that the trial court erred
in allowing the testimony of witnesses Deputy Robert Shinault, Jr.;
attorney Georgia Nixon; Laura Teachey; Danny Dotson; and Officer Amber
Goforth Blue under the Rule 803(3) then existing state of mind or emotion
hearsay exception.  We note, however, that a review of the transcript pages
to which defendant cites in support of his argument as to Laura Teachey
discloses that defendant mistakenly confused the witnesses’ names and that
the contested testimony is actually that of Robin Medley rather than that
of Laura Teachey.  Defendant also contends that the respective testimonies
of Dotson, Medley, and Teachey were improperly admitted under Rule
804(b)(5).  Further, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
admitting statements made by Deputy Shinault, Nixon, Judge Susan Bray, and
Officer Blue as improper character evidence under Rule 404(b).  In a
separate but related argument, defendant asserts that the admission of
Nixon’s testimony was improper as it violated the victim’s attorney-client
privilege.
We note at the outset that although defendant objected as each of the
aforementioned witnesses was called to testify at trial, he failed to
substantively object during any portion of their testimonies to which he
now assigns error.  The transcript reveals that defendant objected to the
designated witnesses as the State called them to testify, but did so only
before the witnesses took the stand.  Each time, the trial judge removed
the jury from the courtroom and considered both the attorneys’ forecast of
evidence to be offered by the respective witness and the legal arguments
surrounding the proffered testimony.  After each of these conferences, the
trial court made specific findings and found the forecasted testimony to be
admissible under various rules of evidence.  The trial judge then
instructed the jury to return to the courtroom and allowed each witness, in
turn, to testify.  During the testimony of each of the above witnesses,
defendant failed to substantively object to their specific testimony as it
was being introduced.
For example, when the State called Officer Blue to testify, defendant
initially objected.  During subsequent arguments out of the jury’s
presence, defendant’s attorney predicated his objections on what he
anticipated the witness would say, i.e.,“it is my understanding that the
witness will testify about...,” and “I believe she’ll testify as to what
Annette Thibodeaux had said...”  After the State responded by arguing, in
essence, that the proffered evidence was admissible under Rules 803(3) and
404(b), the trial court ruled for the State and allowed Officer Blue to be
called as a witness.
During Officer Blue’s direct examination, defendant made no objections
to any of her actual testimony.  The trial transcript also shows that
witnesses Shinault, Nixon, Medley, and Teachey each appeared under similar
circumstances, and that each testified without substantive objection by
defendant.  Although no objection or argument preceded the testimony of
Danny Dotson, defendant made only two objections during the course of his
testimony, neither of which related to hearsay or substantial prejudice.
Here, the arguments preceding the calling of the witnesses during
trial were tantamount to motions in limine.  We therefore will apply
established principles relating to motions in limine.  It is well settled
that “‘[a] motion in limine is insufficient to preserve for appeal the
question of the admissibility of evidence if the defendant fails to further
object to that evidence at the time it is offered at trial.’”  State v.
Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 437, 502 S.E.2d 563, 576 (1998) (quoting State v.
Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 521, 453 S.E.2d 824, 845, cert. denied, 516 U.S.
884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995)) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1124, 142 L. Ed.
2d 907 (1999); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).  Thus, in order to
preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of evidence offered
by a witness, defendant must make an objection to such evidence at the time
it is actually introduced at trial.  As with motions in limine, it is
insufficient for defendant to premise his objection on matters and
evidentiary issues that he merely anticipates will be discussed by a
prospective witness.  Moreover, it is of no consequence if the witness’
actual testimony substantively coincides with counsel’s preliminary
assumptions.  For purposes of appeal preservation, objections to testimony
must be contemporaneous with the time such testimony is offered into
evidence.  See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); and State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409,
420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991).  The record shows that defendant failed to
do so.  Therefore, we find his arguments on these questions must fail. 
Additionally, as defendant has not alleged plain error in his arguments to
this Court, he has waived appellate review of these issues on such grounds. 
See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); and State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 496, 461
S.E.2d 664, 677 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526
(1996).
Although defendant offers separate arguments with regard to the
respective testimonies of attorney Georgia Nixon and Judge Susan Bray, we
find his contentions fail for the reasons set forth above.  As for Judge
Bray, defendant by reference expressly incorporates his prior arguments
premised on hearsay and its potential prejudicial effect.  Again, however,
defendant failed at trial to object to Judge Bray’s statements at the time
they were introduced into evidence.  Thus, he has waived his right to
appellate review on the issue.  The same applies to defendant’s separate
argument regarding the testimony of Nixon.  Although defendant premises his
argument here on a different legal principle -- namely, that Nixon’s
testimony violated the attorney-client privilege -- he again failed to
object to her testimony in a timely manner.  As a result, the substance of
his argument is beyond the purview of this Court.
[3] In his next question presented, defendant claims that the trial
court committed reversible error by failing to submit second-degree murder
based on voluntary intoxication.  We disagree.  Second-degree murder is
defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice but without
premeditation and deliberation.”  State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 29, 489
S.E.2d 391, 407 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 140 L. Ed. 2d 150
(1998).  A defendant is entitled to have “a lesser-included offense
submitted to the jury only when there is evidence to support that
lesser-included offense.”  Id.  When the State’s evidence establishes “each
and every element of first-degree murder and there is no evidence to negate
these elements, it is proper for the trial court to exclude second-degree
murder from the jury’s consideration.”  Id.  Moreover, if there is no
evidence of intoxication, “the court is not required to charge the jury
thereon.”  State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 41, 361 S.E.2d 882, 888
(1987).  “The presence of such evidence is the determinative factor.” 
State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 159, 84 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1954).
More specifically, this Court has stated:
A defendant who wishes to raise an issue for the jury as to
whether he was so intoxicated by the voluntary consumption of
alcohol that he did not form a deliberate and premeditated intent
to kill has the burden of producing evidence, or relying on
evidence produced by the state, of his intoxication. Evidence of
mere intoxication, however, is not enough to meet defendant’s
burden of production.  He must produce substantial evidence which
would support a conclusion by the judge that he was so
intoxicated that he could not form a deliberate and premeditated
intent to kill.
State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 365, 471 S.E.2d 379, 390 (1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1061, 136 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1997).
In the present case, defendant has failed to present any evidence to
support an instruction for second-degree murder based on voluntary
intoxication.  Defendant relies primarily on Detective Hedgecock’s
testimony that, on 13 April 1998, soon after the detective arrived at the
Thibodeauxs’ residence, defendant appeared to have consumed a large
quantity of alcohol, and based upon the detective’s opinion and experience,
defendant appeared impaired.  Defendant, however, offers no evidence to
show that he was voluntary intoxicated at the time of the killing.  To the
contrary, based on the autopsy results and the decomposition of the
victim’s body, the pathologist opined that Ms. Thibodeaux had been dead for
at least twenty-four hours when officers discovered her body on 13 April. 
Therefore, defendant’s evidence is insufficient to mandate an instruction
on the issue of whether defendant was so voluntarily intoxicated at the
time of the killing that he was incapable of forming a deliberate and
premeditated intent to kill.  Thus, the trial court properly refused to
submit an instruction on second-degree murder, and this argument is
overruled.
[4] Having concluded that defendant’s trial and capital sentencing
proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we must now turn to the record
and determine:  (1) whether the record supports the aggravating
circumstance found by the jury and upon which the sentence of death was
based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the
death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.  See N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-2000(d)(2) (1999).
After thoroughly reviewing the record, transcripts, and briefs in this
case, we conclude that the record fully supports the jury’s finding of the
aggravating circumstance that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9).  Further, we conclude that nothing in
the record suggests that defendant’s death sentence in this case was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor.  We must now turn to our final statutory duty of proportionality
review.
One purpose of our proportionality review is “to eliminate the
possibility that a sentence of death was imposed by the action of an
aberrant jury.”  State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 294, 439 S.E.2d 547, 573,
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994).  Our review also
serves as a guard “against the capricious or random imposition of the death
penalty.”  State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544
(1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980).
We begin our proportionality analysis by comparing this case with
other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was
disproportionate.  See State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d
144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  We
have found the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases.  State v.
Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1,
352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713
(1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483
S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by
State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312
N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d
163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State
v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
We conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case in
which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate.  Here,
defendant was convicted of murder on the basis of premeditation and
deliberation.  In three of the cases found disproportionate by this Court
-- Benson, Stokes, and Rogers -- the defendants were convicted solely on
the basis of the felony murder rule.  That the jury convicted defendant
under the theory of “premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-
blooded and calculated crime.”  State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384
S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023,
108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).  Finally, the jury found the aggravating
circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
N.C.G.S. §  15A-2000(e)(9).  Of the cases in which this Court found the
death penalty to be disproportionate, the jury found the especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance in only two cases. 
Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653; Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d
170.  The defendant in Stokes was convicted solely on the basis of the
felony murder rule, whereas defendant in the instant case was convicted of
premeditated and deliberate murder.  The defendant in Bondurant exhibited
the kind of conduct that this Court has recognized as ameliorating.  State
v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 278, 506 S.E.2d 702, 711 (1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1135, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1015 (1999).  However, in the case sub judice,
defendant showed no such apologetic or ameliorative conduct.  The crime
committed by defendant in this case was equally as brutal as other murders
for which a death sentence was imposed.  Additionally, there is evidence
that the victim suffered before she died, and that she was conscious during
at least part of her attack.  The victim’s hands were discolored and
swollen.  The left hand had twelve separate broken bones, and the right
hand had similar injuries.  These wounds were defensive-type wounds
received while the victim was conscious as she tried to ward off blows to
her head.  The victim suffered six to eight individual contusions to the
left side of her head, and six to eight abrasions on the back of her neck,
with associated bruises.  She sustained fifty to seventy-five discrete
blows to the head, as well as a hole in her skull resulting from a blow
with a hammer.  This blunt trauma to the head was the victim’s ultimate
cause of death.  The pathologist described the multitude of injuries to the
victim as “overkill.”
It is also proper to “compare this case with the cases in which we
have found the death penalty to be proportionate.”  McCollum, 334 N.C. at
244, 433 S.E.2d at 164.  In addition, while it is important for this Court
to review all the cases in the pool when engaging in our duty of
proportionality review, “we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of
those cases each time we carry out that duty.”  Id.  It is sufficient to
state that we have concluded that the instant case is more similar to cases
in which we have found the death penalty proportionate than to those in
which we have found the sentence of death disproportionate.
Based on the foregoing and the entire record in this case, we cannot
conclude as a matter of law that the sentence of death was either excessive
or disproportionate.  We hold that defendant received a fair trial and
capital sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial error.  Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court must be and is left undisturbed.
NO ERROR.