Title: Duane E. Owen v. James v. Crosby, Jr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-2146
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
Nos. SC01-2146 & SC01-2476
____________
DUANE E. OWEN,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc., et al.,
Respondents.
                                                
DUANE E. OWEN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 11, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Duane Eugene Owen, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order
of the trial court denying a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of
1.  The trial judge found four aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant
had been previously convicted of a violent felony; (2) the murder was committed
during a burglary or sexual battery; (3) the murder was especially heinous,
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Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Additionally, Owen petitions this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For
the reasons expressed below, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying
postconviction relief and deny habeas corpus relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Duane Eugene Owen (Owen) was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual
battery, and burglary, and sentenced to death.  The facts of the case are
summarized by this Court in Owen v. State, 596 So. 2d 985, 986-87 (Fla. 1992):
The body of the victim, Georgianna Worden, was discovered
by her children on the morning of May 29, 1984, as they prepared for
school. An intruder had forcibly entered the Boca Raton home during
the night and bludgeoned Worden with a hammer as she slept, and
then sexually assaulted her.  Owen was arrested the following day on
unrelated charges and was interrogated over several weeks.  He
eventually confessed to committing numerous crimes, including the
present murder and a similar murder in Delray Beach in March 1984.
See Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
855, 111 S.Ct. 152, 112 L.Ed.2d 118 (1990).  At trial on the present
murder, sexual battery and burglary, the evidence consisted of Owen's
confession, his fingerprint on a library book at the murder scene, and
other corroborating evidence. The jury returned guilty verdicts on the
charges and recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The trial
judge followed the jury's recommendation and imposed death, finding
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating.[1]
atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated.  The
Court considered the following claims made by the defense in mitigation:  (1)
Owen's mother died when he was very young; his alcoholic father committed
suicide a year later; (2) Owen and his brother were shuffled from one foster home
to another until his brother finally ran away and left him; (3) Owen was sexually and
otherwise abused in the foster homes; (4) Owen's mind "snapped" during the
murder; and (5) Owen had enlisted twice in the Army and aspired to be a
policeman.
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On July 31, 1986, after Owen was convicted and sentenced, but before this Court
ruled on his appeal, he prematurely filed a motion for postconviction relief.  The
postconviction proceeding was stayed pending his appeal, and Owen was
permitted to amend his motion several times.  On November 5, 1997, the trial court
held a hearing pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993), after which the
trial court summarily denied a number of claims.  However, the trial court found
that an evidentiary hearing was required on the following claims:
(1) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the guilt phase by
failing to provide mental health experts with information necessary to
conduct an accurate competency exam; (2) trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in the guilt phase by failing to mount an insanity
or any other defense and failing to call any defense witnesses; (3)
attorneys Kohl and Krischer failed to disclose to Owen various
conflicts of interest; (4) trial counsel was ineffective in the penalty
phase by failing to investigate and present statutory and nonstatutory
mitigating evidence and by presenting only one (minor) witness; (5)
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise various issues.  The
court also deferred ruling on several additional claims.
Owen v. State, 773 So. 2d 510, 512-13 n.4 (Fla. 2000).  At the evidentiary hearing,
2.  The facts of the Slattery case are set forth fully in this Court's opinion on
direct appeal in that case.  See Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990). 
3.  Owen’s claims were as follows:  (1) the trial court should have stayed the
hearing pending completion of the retrial on the Slattery murder; (2) the court
should have conducted a hearing pursuant to  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975), when Owen opted not to proceed with the evidentiary hearing; (3) trial
counsel was ineffective and suffered a conflict of interest; (4) the instruction on the
aggravating factor “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” (HAC) was improper under
Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992); (5) the felony murder instruction was
improper;  (6) the "avoiding arrest" instruction was improper; (7) the "prior violent
felony" instruction was improper; (8) the instruction on the “cold, calculated, and
premeditated” factor (CCP) was improper; (9) details of prior violent felonies were
improperly admitted during the penalty phase; (10) attorney Barry Krischer was
ineffective during the suppression hearing; (11) the penalty phase instructions
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant; (12) the penalty phase jury
was improperly instructed concerning its role in violation of  Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); (13) the prosecutor made inflammatory remarks
during closing argument; (14) Owen should have been allowed to poll the jurors;
(15) the trial court erred in failing to allow a change of venue;  (16) Florida's capital
sentencing statute is unconstitutional; (17) the video of the crime scene was unduly
prejudicial; and (18) the cumulative weight of errors deprived Owen of a fair trial.
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after the first witness's testimony, Owen’s counsel informed the court that Owen
had decided not to proceed with the hearing because the attorney-client privilege in
the Slattery murder case would be violated.2  After explaining to Owen the
consequences of his decision, the trial court ended the hearing and denied relief on
the rule 3.850 motion.
Subsequently, Owen appealed the trial court's denial to this Court.  Owen
raised eighteen claims.3  This Court affirmed the trial court, finding that Owen
4.  Owen asks this Court to consider (1) whether the trial court erred by
failing to grant Owen an evidentiary hearing on his claim that prior postconviction
counsel was ineffective because of a conflict of interest; (2) whether the trial court
should have granted Owen an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel during the litigation of his initial motion for
postconviction relief; (3) whether the trial court erred by finding that Owen's claim
of actual innocence was procedurally barred; (4) whether the trial court erred in
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waived any attorney-client privilege that existed between him and trial counsel when
he accused counsel of ineffectiveness and conflict of interest. This Court also
found that Owen waived his ineffective assistance of counsel and conflict of
interest claims.  Next, this Court held that the principles underlying Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), were inapplicable to the instant case.  Finally, the
Court found that Owen's remaining claims were procedurally barred.  See Owen,
773 So. 2d at 515.  On June 29, 2001, Owen filed a pro se motion for
postconviction relief, which was summarily denied.  Owen now appeals the trial
court's denial of his rule 3.850 motion.  Additionally, Owen petitions this Court for a
writ of habeas corpus, raising eleven claims.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rule 3.850 Motion
Owen raises a total of five claims on appeal from the denial of
postconviction relief.4  We find that this successive motion is governed by Florida
summarily denying Owen's claim that the State withheld evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (5) whether the trial court's order
denying Owen's pro se postconviction motion was inadequate because it did not
contain record attachments or specify what information contained in the court file
was considered by the trial court in reaching its decision.
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(f), which allows a trial court to dismiss a
successive petition if it fails to allege new or different grounds and the prior
determination was on the merits; or if new and different grounds are alleged, the
trial court finds the failure to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an
abuse of the procedures governed by the rule.  A second or successive motion for
postconviction relief can be denied on the ground that it is an abuse of process if
there is no reason for failing to raise the issues in the previous motion.  See Pope v.
State, 702 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1997).  Although claims that could have been
raised in a prior postconviction motion are procedurally barred, this Court has held
that a defendant may file successive postconviction relief motions that are based on
newly discovered evidence.  See White v. State, 664 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. 1995). 
In order to overcome a procedural bar, a defendant must show that the newly
discovered facts could not have been discovered with due diligence by collateral
counsel and raised in an initial rule 3.850 motion.  See id.  Based on these
principles, we affirm the summary denial of relief on claims 1, 2, and 3, which are
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, because these claims were raised in
5.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6.  Owen raises the following claims:  (1) whether appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise and argue on direct appeal that Owen was denied a
fair trial because of the admission into evidence of statements he made during plea
negotiations with the State; (2) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise and argue that the venire from which the jury was selected in Owen's trial
was unconstitutional because it excluded African Americans; (3) whether appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise and argue on direct appeal that the trial
court should have declared a mistrial or struck Officer Kevin McCoy's improper
statement from the record; (4) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
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Owen's prior 3.850 motion.  Since Owen does not base these present claims upon
newly discovered evidence, that exception does not apply here.  Claim 4, Owen’s
Brady5 claim, is insufficiently pled because it is unclear as to when Owen obtained
the information he claims that the State withheld.  Moreover, Owen fails to allege
this material was in the State’s possession as required under Brady.  See Brady,
373 U.S. at 87.  Finally, because Owen’s claims are either successive or
insufficiently pled, it is unnecessary for this Court to reach the merits of claim 5
concerning the trial court’s failure to attach portions of the record.  Therefore, we
affirm the trial court's order summarily denying postconviction relief.
Habeas Corpus Petition
Owen raises, inter alia, seven claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel as well as issues involving the constitutionality of Florida’s capital
punishment statute.6  After reviewing each claim, we find that Owen has failed to
to raise and argue on direct appeal that Owen was denied due process of law
because the trial judge was biased toward the State and should have recused
himself; (5) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise and argue
on direct appeal the trial court's denial of Owen's jury instruction on the difference
between sexual battery and vaginal penetration of a deceased individual killed prior
to any sexual contact; (6) whether appellate counsel ineffectively raised and argued
the sufficiency of the State's evidence used to prove the aggravators and failed to
argue that the trial court did not properly consider all of the mitigation in favor of
Owen; (7) whether Owen's sentence on the noncapital cases is illegal because his
offenses predated the effective date of the sentencing guidelines used by the trial
court; (8) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to cite controlling
authority on the issue of whether Owen's confession was involuntary; (9) whether
the Florida death penalty sentencing statute as applied is unconstitutional under the
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (10)
whether Owen's Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will
be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution; and (11)
whether this Court erred by not appointing conflict-free counsel for Owen's direct
appeal.
7.  The issue of the appropriate sentencing guidelines for the noncapital
offenses is pending in the trial court on a 3.800 motion and will not be addressed
here.  Additionally, the issue of Owen’s competency to be executed is not ripe for
review at this time.  See Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2002); see also
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811(c).
-8-
demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.7  
We have repeatedly held that claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel are properly brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See
Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000); Groover v. Singletary, 656
So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1995); Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla. 1981).  To prove
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a claimant must show that appellate
8.  Section 90.410, Florida Statutes (2001), reads: “Evidence of a plea of
guilty, later withdrawn; a plea of nolo contendere; or an offer to plead guilty or nolo
contendere to the crime charged or any other crime is inadmissible in any civil or
criminal proceeding.  Evidence of statements made in connection with any of the
pleas or offers is inadmissible, except when such statements are offered in a
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counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency compromised the appellate
process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the fairness and
correctness of the appellate result.  See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009,
1026 (Fla. 1999); Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985). 
Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise issues not preserved for
appeal.  See Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 1991).  However, an
exception is made when appellate counsel fails to raise a claim which, although not
preserved at trial, represents fundamental error.  See Roberts v. State, 568 So. 2d
1255, 1261 (Fla. 1990).  A fundamental error is error that “reaches down into the
validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d
895, 898 (Fla. 1997). 
Owen first argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
the State violated section 90.410, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.172 by introducing into evidence statements that he made
during plea negotiations.8  In Stevens v. State, 419 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1982), this
prosecution under chapter 837.”  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172 governs
the acceptance of guilty or nolo contendere pleas.  
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Court described the two-tiered process for determining whether a discussion
should be characterized as a plea negotiation so as to render it inadmissible in
evidence.  
     To determine whether a statement is made in connection with plea
negotiations, a court should use 
a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the
accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to
negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and,
second, whether the accused's expectation was
reasonable given the totality of the objective
circumstances. 
United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc); see also United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858, 101 S.Ct. 157, 66 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980);
United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1979). Whether a
defendant's subjective expectation of negotiating a plea is reasonable
depends on whether the state has indicated a willingness to
plea-bargain and has in fact solicited the statement in question from the
defendant. Unsolicited, unilateral utterances are not statements made in
connection with plea negotiations.
Id. at 1062.  Here, Owen fails to meet either prong of the test.  
Owen claims that because he had previously negotiated a plea with Detective
Marc Woods in 1982, this led him to believe that he was negotiating a plea with the
State in the instant case.  Owen also contends that numerous statements made by
Officer Kevin McCoy (McCoy) led him to actually and reasonably believe that the
9.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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officers had the power to negotiate which charges he would face.  However, Owen
fails to acknowledge that McCoy told him prior to the interview and repeatedly
throughout the interview that he could not make any promises.  Further, after a
dinner break, McCoy read Owen his Miranda9 rights, which included the statement:
“I can make no threats or promises to induce you or force you to make a
statement.  It must be of your own free-will.”  Owen indicated that he understood
his rights.  Moreover, McCoy told Owen that he was not prepared to “dwindle
down” the charges to get him to talk.  In fact, McCoy told Owen that he could not
even tell him what the charges against him would be:  “I have to sit down with the
attorney and review it, pal.  I can't —I can't tell you what it's going to be.”  Owen
acknowledged that he knew if he confessed there was a possibility that he could
receive a death sentence because McCoy could not “guarantee promises.”  Owen
also stated that he knew the State Attorney was the only person that could “give
guarantees.”  Thus, it appears that Owen has misrepresented the record with
respect to his actual, subjective expectation; clearly the record shows that Owen
knew that the officers could not negotiate a plea in this case.     
The instant case differs from the situation this Court considered in
Richardson v. State, 706 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1998).  In Richardson, the defendant's
10.  It appears that Owen is also attempting to relitigate the admissibility of
his confession under the guise of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
argument.  Owen raised this argument on direct appeal.  See Owen, 596 So. 2d at
987.  An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel argument cannot be used as a
means of relitigating an issue previously considered.  See Porter v. Dugger, 559 So.
2d 201, 203 (Fla. 1990).  To the extent that Owen is attempting to reargue the
admissibility of his confession, his claim is procedurally barred. 
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confession took place during ongoing plea negotiations, where a written plea
agreement predicated upon prior plea discussions was fully executed by the State
Attorney and presented to the defendant for consideration.  See id. at 1354.  The
officer in Richardson, unlike the officers here, repeatedly told the defendant “that
the State would negotiate with him if he would give a statement.”  Id. at 1355.  
Since the facts show that Owen could not have had a reasonable subjective belief
that his statement was a part of any plea negotiations, Owen fails to show how
appellate counsel’s failure to raise this claim was deficient conduct.10  
Next, Owen argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that
the jury venire was unconstitutional because it excluded African Americans.  Owen
cites Spencer v. State, 545 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1989), as support for his claim.  In
Spencer, the defendant's conviction for first-degree murder was reversed because
this Court found that an administrative order that created special districts for jury
selection caused an unconstitutional exclusion of a large portion of the black
population from the jury pool of the district from which the jury for the trial of the
11.  The Court had previously reversed two other cases on this issue at the
time of Moreland.  See Craig v. State, 583 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1991); Amos v. State,
545 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1989).
12.  Owen’s trial in this case occurred in 1986 and the direct appeal opinion
was issued by this Court in 1992.  
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defendant, a black man, was drawn.  Subsequently, in Moreland v. State, 582 So.
2d 618 (Fla. 1991), this Court stated that Spencer did not constitute a fundamental
change in law.  We held that the decision should be applied retroactively because it
would be fundamentally unfair to deny the defendant relief where other convicted
defendants had obtained relief based upon a systematic exclusion of blacks from a
jury pool. 11  See id. at 620.  However, we noted that had Moreland failed to raise
the issue of the constitutionality of the jury pool, he would not be entitled to relief. 
See id. at 620 n.3.   
Here, trial counsel failed to raise an issue regarding the constitutionality of the
jury pool at trial and the issue was not raised on direct appeal. 12  Similarly, in Nelms
v. State, 596 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1992), the defendant failed to challenge the
constitutionality of the jury pool at trial or on direct appeal.  This Court denied
relief, stating:
     We indicated in Moreland that had the petitioner failed to raise the
issue of the constitutionality of the jury pool at trial and on direct
appeal, he would not be entitled to relief.  582 So. 2d at 620 n. 3. 
13.  Furthermore, this Court could not have concluded without the existence
of record evidence to substantiate Owen’s Spencer claim that fundamental error
occurred in this case.  See Spencer, 545 So. 2d at 1353-54.   
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Nelms did not raise at trial or on direct appeal the issue upon which we
granted relief in  Moreland.  His statutory challenge to the grand jury
cannot be equated to the constitutional claim regarding petit jury
selection upon which relief was granted in  Moreland.  The
fundamental fairness or uniformity concerns present in that case are
not present here.  Further, Spencer, the first case recognizing this
claim, was decided more than three years after Nelms' conviction was
affirmed.  Defense counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to
anticipate the change in the law.  Stevens v. State, 552 So.2d 1082,
1085 (Fla. 1989).
Nelms, 596 So. 2d at 442.  Here, because trial counsel did not challenge the Palm
Beach County jury selection process, this issue was not preserved for appellate
review.  Moreover, this Court has never held that the error identified in Spencer
may be considered fundamental.  Appellate counsel cannot be considered
ineffective for failing to raise issues that were unpreserved and do not constitute
fundamental error.  See Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 2001). 
Therefore, we conclude that on this issue, Owen has not met either the deficiency
or the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).13
 
In his third claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Owen argues
that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the trial court's
improper admission of McCoy's testimony.  Owen argues that the following
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statements destroyed his chance for a fair trial:
      MCCOY:  I went one step further and I asked him, I says, “Well
suppose you were found not guilty.” I says, “Who would be the
winner then?  Mr. Owen said, “No one would be the winner.” And I
said, “Then the hurting will start all over again.”  And Mr. Owen was
nodding his head in the affirmative.
Trial counsel objected to and moved to strike McCoy's statement because the
statement implied a propensity to commit crimes and kill people.  Trial counsel then
made a motion for a mistrial.  The trial court denied both of the motions.
Owen’s specific argument is that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
on appeal that the admission of the statement was unfairly prejudicial in violation of
section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2001).  Section 90.403 provides for the exclusion
of relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”  § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2001).  Although
section 90.403 mandates the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence, a large
measure of discretion rests in the trial judge to determine whether the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See
Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 309 (Fla. 1997).    
Trial counsel preserved this issue by objecting to the admission of the
14.  In reviewing this claim, it appears that Owen may be challenging the
admission of his confession into evidence.  To the extent that he is attempting to do
so, this Court has already ruled against Owen on this issue on direct appeal.  See
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above-mentioned evidence, thus appellate counsel could have raised this issue on
appeal.  However, the fact that appellate counsel could have, but did not, challenge
the admission of this testimony “does not constitute a deficiency falling below
prevailing professional norms.”  Davis v. Wainwright, 498 So. 2d 857, 859 (Fla.
1986).  As this Court has noted, appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable
claim, see Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1994); appellate counsel could
have reasonably concluded that this issue had no merit.  In light of the record,
Owen's appellate counsel could not have effectively and convincingly argued
against the admissibility of the above-mentioned testimony.  See Ruffin v.
Wainwright, 461 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1984) (stating that if there is no chance of
convincingly arguing a particular issue, appellate counsel's failure to raise that issue
is not a substantial and serious deficiency).  Reviewing McCoy's testimony as a
whole and in context, it does not appear that the statement implied guilt or future
dangerousness; in fact, McCoy never referred to Owen hurting or continuing to
hurt other people.  Furthermore, McCoy's statement is similar to other statements
made by Owen during his videotaped confession, which was admitted into
evidence.14  Accordingly, Owen has failed to satisfy the two-pronged Strickland
Owen, 596 So. 2d at 988. 
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test by failing to demonstrate (1) how his appellate counsel's performance was
substantially deficient under the circumstances; and (2) how any alleged deficiency
was prejudicial to him.  See 466 U.S. at 687.
Owen next argues appellate counsel failed to raise and argue on direct appeal
that he was denied due process of law because the trial judge was biased toward
the State and should have recused himself.  Owen contends he was denied due
process when the trial judge inquired into what effect granting a motion to suppress
would have on the cases against him.  Here, trial counsel failed to raise a claim of
judicial bias, and thus this claim is procedurally barred.  Appellate counsel cannot
be deemed deficient for failing to raise a procedurally barred issue.  
Moreover,
Owen's claim is without merit.  A review of the transcript of the suppression
hearing shows that the trial judge made no statements which would cause Owen to
believe that he would not receive a fair trial.  The comments made by the judge are
insufficient to show that Owen was denied the right to a fair and impartial tribunal. 
Cf.  Porter v. State, 723 So. 2d 191, 194 (Fla. 1998) (finding comments made by
the trial judge indicated that he was not impartial when he sentenced the defendant
to death).   
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Additionally, Owen argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
argue the sufficiency of the State's evidence used to prove the cold, calculated, and
premeditated (CCP) aggravator.  To establish CCP:  
 
[T]he jury must first determine that the killing was the product of cool
and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy,
panic, or a fit of rage (cold);  and that the defendant had a careful plan
or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident
(calculated);  and that the defendant exhibited heightened
premeditation (premeditated);  and that the defendant had no pretense
of moral or legal justification. 
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994).  To prove this aggravator, the
State must show a heightened level of premeditation establishing that the defendant
had a careful plan or prearranged design to kill.  See Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d
526, 533 (Fla. 1987).  The key to this aggravator is the plan.  See Sweet v. State,
624 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1993).  On direct appeal, this Court found that the trial
court's finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner was established.  The Court noted: 
Owen selected the victim, removed his own outer garments to prevent
them from being soiled by blood, placed socks on his hands, broke
into the home, closed and blocked the door to the children's room,
selected a hammer and knife from the kitchen, and bludgeoned the
sleeping victim before strangling and sexually assaulting her. 
Owen, 596 So. 2d at 990.  Since this claim was addressed and disposed of on
15.   Owen also argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to cite
other authority on the issue of the voluntariness of his confession.  This Court
addressed the voluntariness issue on direct appeal and will not revisit that claim in
this habeas petition.  We also addressed on direct appeal the sexual battery/live
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direct appeal, appellate counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless claim. See Happ v. Moore, 784 So. 2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 2001). 
Owen also claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that
the trial court did not properly consider all of the mitigation. This argument is
meritless, and we deny relief.  We have stated that “[w]hen addressing mitigating
circumstances, the sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its written order
each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.”  Campbell v. State, 571
So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990), receded from on other grounds by Trease v. State,
768 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 2000).  Here, the trial court in its sentencing order
properly considered each mitigating factor raised by Owen.  Owen claims that
appellate counsel should have “argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to consider the 21 hours of video taped confessions which showed that Mr.
Owen had mental health problems and attempted to seek treatment, and Mr.
Owen's cooperation with law enforcement.”  It is unlikely that these factors could
outweigh the strong aggravators in this case; thus, Owen has failed to meet
Strickland's prejudice prong.  See 466 U.S. at 687.15
victim issue and will not revisit it in the guise of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.
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Owen also argues that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional
under the United State’s Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), because the jury was not required to make specific factual
findings as to aggravation and mitigation.  Owen’s Apprendi claim must be
considered in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), which made Apprendi applicable to capital cases.  See Bottoson
v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002).  In Bottoson,
we rejected the type of constitutional challenge Owen presents in this case.  We
again reject this claim.  Moreover, it should be noted that the trial court found as
aggravating factors that Owen has been previously convicted of a violent felony
and that the murder was committed during a burglary or sexual battery; both factors
involve circumstances that were submitted to a jury and found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt.  See § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2001).  Thus, habeas relief based on
Apprendi/ Ring is hereby denied.
As his final claim, Owen argues that this Court erred by not appointing
conflict-free counsel for his direct appeal.  To establish a claim premised on an
alleged conflict of interest:  
-21-
[T]he defendant must “establish that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance.”  A lawyer suffers from
an actual conflict of interest when he or she “actively represent[s]
conflicting interests.”  To demonstrate an actual conflict, the defendant
must identify specific evidence in the record that suggests that his or
her interests were compromised.  A possible, speculative or merely
hypothetical conflict is “insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” 
Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 786, 791-92 (Fla. 2002)(citations omitted).  Here, as the
State points out, Owen fails to identify specific evidence in the record which shows
that his interests were compromised.  Owen only states “conflict existed because
appellate counsel could not raise his own ineffectiveness and could not raise the
fact that Owen had filed a bar complaint”; thus, Owen's claim is insufficiently pled
and relief is therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of postconviction
relief and deny Owen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
-22-
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except for the discussion of
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Two Consolidated Cases:
An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
and An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, 
Hubert R. Lindsey, Judge - Case No. 84-4000CF A02
James L. Driscoll, Jr., Assistant CCRC and Eric Pinkard, Assistant CCRC, Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner/Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Celia A. Terenzio, Melanie Dale, and
Debra Rescigno, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent/Appellee