Title: People v. Moss
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87134
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2001

Docket No. 87134-Agenda 4-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								SANANTONE MOSS, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2001.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant was convicted on two counts of first degree murder for
the deaths of his ex-girlfriend, Emma Renee Jones (Renee), and
her 11-year-old daughter, Diandra Jones. The same jury found
defendant eligible for the death penalty and found no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude its imposition. The circuit court
sentenced defendant to death. Defendant appeals his convictions
and death sentence directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
	The murders of Diandra and Renee occurred in November
1991, while defendant was incarcerated and awaiting trial on
charges that he sexually assaulted Diandra. Subsequent to the
murders, the State proceeded to trial on the alleged sexual assault.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault
and sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment. In connection with the
murders, defendant was initially charged with four counts of first
degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)),
two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 8-2(a)), two counts of solicitation of
murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 8-1.1(a)), and one count
of intimidation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 12-6(a)(1),
(a)(3)). The State nol-prossed all charges except those for first
degree murder. Defendant's mother, Sandra Major, his aunt,
Danita Best, and his sister, Kerrie Major, were also charged with
the murders. Sandra died of natural causes while awaiting trial.
Danita pled guilty to first degree murder and agreed to testify
against defendant in exchange for a sentence of natural life. Kerrie
was found guilty after a bench trial and received a sentence of
natural life.
	At defendant's murder trial, his sister, Orvette Davis, testified
that defendant telephoned her collect several times while he was
incarcerated during the fall of 1991. In a September 1991
conversation, defendant asked her to "get rid of" Diandra and
Renee because he did not want them to testify at his upcoming
sexual assault trial. He did not want to "get the boot," meaning the
electric chair. Defendant made the same request in October 1991,
which Orvette understood as a request to kill Diandra and Renee.
Orvette refused to help her brother. She told Danita Best about
defendant's first request.
	 Danita Best testified that she was also charged with the
murders of Diandra and Renee. She pleaded guilty and agreed to
testify against defendant in exchange for a sentence of natural life.
Danita had approximately 15 telephone conversations with
defendant from August to November 1991. Danita accepted
defendant's collect phone calls in Sandra Major's apartment,
where Danita lived at the time. During their first conversation in
August 1991, defendant told Danita that he wanted her to help
Sandra "get rid of" Diandra and Renee so they could not testify
against him. Danita understood this to mean that defendant wanted
them killed. She told defendant that she could not help him
because she was on parole after a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter and theft. Defendant threatened that if she did not,
the same thing that had happened to one of his girlfriends would
happen to her. Danita thought he was referring to a woman named
Cora whom defendant had beaten on the head with a hammer.
Danita believed that she needed to do as she was told or something
would happen to her. In the past, defendant had attempted to throw
her out of a ninth-floor window. However, she testified that she
did not decide to participate in the murders until the day they
occurred. Defendant reiterated during their remaining
conversations that Danita had to help Sandra get rid of Diandra
and Renee because of the upcoming trial. Danita believed that
defendant's requests were serious.
	Danita further testified that Diandra and Renee lived in an
apartment below Sandra's. On November 22, 1991, the date of the
murders, Sandra told Danita to get cocaine from her room, mix it
with rat poison, and go to Renee's apartment and let her smoke the
mixture. When Renee was "knocked out," they were going to kill
her. Danita mixed the cocaine and poison; she then went to the
store at Sandra's request to buy cigarettes, gin, and wine. Danita
brought these items to Renee's apartment. Renee and her children,
13-year-old Matthew, 11-year-old Diandra, and 2-year-old Troy,
were in the apartment. Later in the evening, Matthew left to go to
a friend's house. Renee attempted to smoke the cocaine but it
would not burn. Danita returned to her apartment where Sandra
gave her more cocaine that was not laced with rat poison. Back in
Renee's apartment, Danita and Renee began drinking and smoking
the cocaine. In time, Sandra and Kerrie Major joined them.
	When the cocaine ran out, Kerrie and Renee left the apartment
to buy more. Once they left, at Sandra's instruction, Danita
retrieved a knife from the kitchen, went to the couch where
Diandra was sleeping, and stabbed her in the chest, neck, and
upper face several times until she was dead. Sandra stood over
Danita and told her to make sure that Diandra was dead. When
Renee and Kerrie returned, Renee did not realize that Diandra was
dead because her body had been covered with a blanket to make
it appear as though she was still sleeping. Shortly thereafter,
Sandra gestured to Danita that it was time to kill Renee. Sandra
and Kerrie wrapped a cord from an iron around Renee's neck and
began choking her. Danita started stabbing Renee in the upper part
of her chest, and in her throat and face. Danita stated that she
stabbed Renee "[t]hirty, forty, a lot of times." Renee pleaded with
Sandra that she would not testify, but Sandra told her it was too
late. Kerrie then broke a wine bottle over Renee's face and began
stabbing her with it and with a screwdriver.
	According to Danita, although Renee's youngest son, Troy,
was in the apartment at the time of the murders, his life was spared
because Sandra thought he was defendant's son and her grandson.
After Renee was dead, Sandra told Kerrie and Danita to gather up
the bottles, glass, and sheets. Sandra left the apartment and
returned shortly with her husband, James Patterson. At some point,
defendant's sister Cecelia joined them. Sandra told Cecelia to take
the glass and knives to her apartment. The bodies were loaded into
Patterson's car; then Sandra, Patterson, Danita, Kerrie, and Cecelia
drove to an empty lot and discarded the bodies. They left Troy
next to a garbage can in an alley near a hospital. On their way
home, they stopped to buy gin and cigarettes.
	Upon returning to her apartment, Sandra instructed her
daughter Rosaline to take their clothes to the laundromat. The day
after the murders, Sandra told Danita to stay at Patterson's house
for a while because Matthew could place her at the crime scene on
the day of the murders. Danita complied. About one week later,
Danita flagged down a police officer on the street and told him
that she had witnessed a murder. In her testimony, Danita
acknowledged that she first lied to the police about her
involvement in the murders but stated that she eventually
confessed.
	On cross-examination, Danita admitted that she made
numerous false statements to the police regarding the events of
November 22, 1991. In several statements, Danita told the police
that she did not take part in the murders and fabricated several
persons that were involved. Later, in a written statement, Danita
admitted that she was involved in the crime but minimized her
level of participation. Ultimately, she acknowledged to the police
the extent of her involvement and implicated defendant for the
first time in a court-reported statement. The defense attorney
further elicited that Danita had been smoking cocaine for three
days prior to the murders and that she believed her life depended
on whether her testimony made "the prosecutors happy."
	Eliza Warner, Renee's mother, testified that on the morning
of November 23, 1991, she tried to telephone her daughter. When
no one answered, she went to her daughter's apartment. She
entered the apartment with her key and noticed that all the
windows were open and the television was on but no one was
home. In the back bedroom, she discovered blood on the floor, the
walls, draperies, and clothing. She also found a bloody
screwdriver. Eliza left the apartment and went to a neighbor's
apartment to call the police.
	Matthew Warner testified that on the evening of November
22, 1991, he left his mother's apartment around 10 p.m. to spend
the night at a friend's house. Danita Best had been at the apartment
on that day. The following morning, Matthew had been expecting
a phone call from his mother to let him know when to return
home. When she did not call, Matthew went home and learned that
his mother and sister were missing.
	Daniel Pierce testified that on the morning of November 23,
1991, he heard a car stop abruptly by the window of his apartment.
The car door opened and he heard some rumbling near a garbage
can outside the window. The car then sped away. Pierce heard
whimpering and crying outside the window. He went outside and
found a baby boy later identified as Troy Jones.
	Detective Guy Habiak testified that on the morning after the
murders, he was called to Renee's apartment to investigate a
missing persons incident. Upon entering the apartment, he
observed a large amount of blood on the couch, a trail of blood
leading to a bedroom, and blood spattering on the walls, drapes,
and mattress covers. He also noticed a broken bottle and a bloody
screwdriver. The following day, he was called to a location where
two bodies were found. The bodies were later identified as Renee
and Diandra. Habiak also learned during his investigation that a
child was discovered in an alley the day after the murder.
	Habiak further testified that he personally interviewed Danita
three times. Danita gave several statements to investigators,
including a handwritten statement. She later admitted that parts of
her statements were untrue. Danita gave a court-reported statement
on December 6, 1991. Subsequent to this statement, Danita was
charged with two counts of first degree murder.
	Dr. Edmond Donoghue testified that he performed an autopsy
on Diandra and Renee. Donoghue noted that there were over 74
evidences of injury on Renee's body, including 29 stab wounds to
the face and 10 stab wounds to the chest that were deep and
entered body cavities or involved vital organs. Diandra's body
contained 22 evidences of injury.
	The State entered into evidence the telephone records of
Orvette Davis and Sandra Major. Both records contained several
collect telephone calls from the Cook County jail from August to
November 1991.
	The only evidence presented by the defense was the autopsy
protocol for the body of Fred Herndon, Jr., who was killed by
Danita in 1996. The report showed that the body had suffered 30
stab wounds.
	The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of
Diandra and Renee Jones. At the first stage of defendant's
sentencing hearing, the jury considered the evidence presented at
trial. In addition, the State presented evidence that defendant's
date of birth was August 10, 1966, and Diandra's date of birth was
February 21, 1980. The jury returned three separate eligibility
verdicts. The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty
based on the statutory aggravating factors of multiple murder,
brutal and heinous murder of a child under 12, and murder to
prevent an individual from testifying in a criminal prosecution. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(b)(3), (b)(7), (b)(8).
	At the second stage of sentencing, the State presented
evidence of defendant's criminal history. This included evidence
that defendant had been adjudicated delinquent for the offense of
robbery in 1982 and was sentenced to the Department of
Corrections. In 1985, defendant was convicted of battery and
received supervision. In August 1985, defendant was arrested for
aggravated arson but was released. In January 1986, he was again
convicted of battery and served two days in the Cook County
Department of Corrections. Additionally, he was arrested in May
1986 for threatening to kill his girlfriend, Magnolia Williams, and
threatening to set her apartment on fire.
	The State presented the testimony of Alvina Anderson. On
April 30, 1987, while outside her house, defendant came up to
Anderson, put a knife to her back, and told her that if she moved
he would kill her. Defendant took Anderson up the street and in
between two buildings. There he beat and raped her. Defendant
threatened that if she told anyone, he would kill her and her
mother, father, and sister. He then raped Anderson again. She was
15 at the time. After he was finished, defendant robbed her of
$1.50. Defendant plead guilty to aggravated criminal sexual
assault and armed robbery. He was sentenced to six years'
imprisonment.
	Magnolia Williams was unavailable to testify at defendant's
sentencing hearing. The State, however, read into the record her
testimony from defendant's 1992 aggravated criminal sexual
assault sentencing hearing. There, Williams testified that she had
a relationship with defendant for eight years. In 1987, after
defendant learned that Williams wanted to end the relationship, he
butted her in the face with his head, took a sharpened screwdriver,
and stabbed her in the arm three times and once in the chest.
Williams further testified that, during their relationship, defendant
"brutally beat" her. She remained in the relationship because there
"was no way out." Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery
and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment to be served
consecutively to the six-year sentence already imposed for the
aggravated criminal sexual assault and armed robbery of Alvina
Anderson.
	The State presented further evidence that, while defendant
was incarcerated from 1988 to 1990, he received 25 disciplinary
tickets. These included tickets for insolence, intimidation, and
threats. During his incarceration from 1992 to 1994, defendant
received 19 disciplinary tickets, including tickets for assault.
Defendant was charged with bribery and extortion while in prison.
In addition, during a routine search of his cell, officers found a
homemade knife. As a result, defendant was charged with
possession of dangerous contraband.
	 Rosaline Major, defendant's sister, testified that when she
was seven or eight, defendant began fondling her and repeatedly
forced her to have sex. Defendant threatened to hurt her if she told
anyone. Rosaline further testified that defendant was physically
abusive to her. The sexual abuse ended when Rosaline was 14
after she told her mother who, in response, put defendant out of
the house "for a couple of hours."
	Orvette Davis testified that when she was 12 years old,
defendant held a fork to her neck, threatened to kill her, and then
raped her. At the time of the rape, her sisters were in the
apartment. Orvette did not tell her sisters about the rape because
"they already knew what was happening." Defendant raped her
again when she was 14. Orvette told her mother about the incident,
but Sandra said nothing. Later, when Orvette asked her mother
why she did not do anything, her mother responded that
"[defendant] just got a little problem."
	Cecelia Major testified that, during her childhood, defendant
repeatedly raped her at gunpoint or knifepoint and threatened to
kill her if she told anyone. She eventually told her mother about
the rape, but her mother did nothing. Cecelia further testified that
she had witnessed defendant hit Magnolia Williams in the head
with a bed rail and, on another occasion, stab Williams with an ice
pick. Cecelia also witnessed defendant beat and push a man named
Booker Singleton through a ninth-story window and threaten to
drop him.
	In conclusion, the State entered into evidence a certified copy
of defendant's conviction and sentence for the aggravated criminal
sexual assault of Diandra Jones, and presented the victim impact
statements of Doyle Warner, Renee's brother, Eliza Warner, and
Matthew Warner.
	In mitigation, defendant presented the testimony of Sarah
Hodges, the sister of Magnolia Williams. She stated that defendant
had voluntarily agreed to terminate his parental rights to his two
children.
	Dr. Daniel Hardy, a psychiatrist, testified for the defense that
he had diagnosed defendant with schizo-affective disorder of the
bipolar type that is aggravated or caused by a history of brain
injury. This disorder is comprised of paranoia and bipolar mood
disorder. Tests revealed that defendant had frontal and temporal
lobe abnormalities in his brain. The frontal and temporal lobes
govern judgment and impulse control respectively. Hardy opined
that defendant has suffered for many years from a significant
condition that has resulted in extreme emotional and mental
disturbance.
	Dr. Jonathan Pincus was qualified as an expert in neurology.
Pincus interviewed defendant and reviewed various records and
reports regarding defendant's condition. He testified that
defendant was psychotic and exhibited signs of paranoia and
delusional behavior. A physical examination revealed that
defendant had frontal lobe abnormalities.
	The jury found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty, and the circuit court sentenced
defendant to death based on his first degree murder convictions.
Defendant's death sentence was stayed by this court pending direct
review. 134 Ill. 2d R. 609(a).

ANALYSIS
I. Trial
	Prior to defendant's trial, the State filed a motion "to allow
proof of other crimes evidence." This motion sought to introduce
certain evidence of the December 2, 1990, sexual assault of
Diandra to establish defendant's motive in ordering his family to
kill Diandra and Renee. Over defendant's objection, the circuit
court granted the motion. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion
in limine to bar as hearsay out-of-court statements made by
Diandra regarding the alleged sexual assault. The State had
indicated that it would introduce Diandra's statements through the
testimony of four witnesses. The circuit court rejected defendant's
motion.
	The State introduced the following evidence regarding the
alleged sexual assault at defendant's murder trial.
	Matthew Warner testified that on the afternoon of December
2, 1990, he was at home baby-sitting his younger brother and sister
while his mother was at a neighbor's apartment. Around 12 p.m.,
defendant came by the apartment to sleep off a hangover. Later on,
defendant asked Matthew to do some push-ups and told Matthew
to change his clothes so he could do the exercises better. Matthew
went to his bedroom to change; when he returned to the living
room, he noticed that Diandra was "abnormally quiet" and did not
want to be near defendant. Diandra asked defendant to leave
several times. Defendant replied that he would leave if Diandra
would get his jacket and cigarette lighter from the back room.
Diandra tried to find the items without success. Defendant told her
to try again, and this time "really look." When Diandra was again
searching for the items, defendant announced that he would get his
own things. About 20 minutes later, Diandra came running from
the back of the apartment with defendant chasing her. Matthew
testified that Diandra was hysterical and scared; she was
screaming for defendant to leave her alone. Diandra ran to the
front door but defendant put one foot against the bottom of the
door and one hand against the door. Diandra started screaming for
her mother. At some point, her mother forced her way into the
apartment and Diandra exclaimed that defendant had tried to have
sex with her. When her mother asked her to repeat what she had
said, Diandra stated: "he tried to have sex with me." Renee then
told defendant to leave and subsequently called the police.
	Matthew further testified that after defendant left, Diandra
went to the bathroom and called out for her mother. Matthew later
learned that Diandra had shown her mother some "white stuff"
that she had found.
	Officer Steve Martin testified that he responded to a criminal
sexual assault call on December 2, 1990. He arrived at Renee's
apartment and spoke directly with Diandra. She informed him that
defendant took her to a back room of the apartment, removed her
clothing, and threw her on a bed. Defendant then removed his
clothing and had sexual intercourse with her. Diandra told Martin
that she broke free and tried to get out of the apartment. She
struggled with defendant at the front door and, eventually, her
mother pushed open the door. Diandra immediately told her
mother about what had happened. Martin testified that Diandra
was shaking and scared when she spoke with him.
	The physician who examined Diandra after the sexual assault,
Dr. Kinga Jokay, testified that Diandra informed her that
defendant had coaxed her into a room, undressed her below the
waist, undressed himself, and attempted to have sex with her.
Diandra stated that defendant had not placed his penis into her
vagina, but he had rubbed himself on her and ejaculated. Due to
this information, Jokay did not conduct an internal examination.
An external examination revealed a dried white secretion,
consistent with sperm, on the inner part of Diandra's thighs and
external genitalia. Jokay's medical opinion was that Diandra had
been sexually assaulted.
	Finally, the State presented the testimony of Lieutenant
Edward Griffin, who, along with another detective, interviewed
Diandra at the hospital. Diandra told Griffin that, as soon as her
mother left for the neighbor's apartment, defendant began to ask
her questions about sex. Defendant asked her if she had
"whiskers" on her vagina. He also asked if he was making her
uncomfortable and if she wanted him to leave. Diandra answered
yes. Defendant said he would leave if Diandra brought him his
jacket and cigarette lighter from the rear bedroom. She did this and
defendant followed her to the bedroom, where he forced her onto
the bed, removed her clothes, and had intercourse with her. When
he was finished, Diandra tried to leave the apartment but defendant
stopped her. While she was struggling with defendant, Diandra's
mother pushed open the door of the apartment. While Griffin was
interviewing Diandra, she appeared very nervous, frightened, and
apprehensive.
A. Evidence of Another Crime
	We begin by addressing defendant's contention that the circuit
court erred by admitting evidence of another crime. Evidence of
other crimes is inadmissible if it is relevant merely to show a
defendant's propensity to commit crime. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 146 (1998). However, this evidence may be properly
admitted when it is relevant to prove a defendant's motive to
commit the crime for which he is being tried. People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 388 (1994). The circuit judge must weigh the probative
value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, and may
exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353,
365 (1991). A circuit court's ruling on the admissibility of other-crimes evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 146.
	Defendant acknowledges that the testimony pertaining to the
alleged sexual assault was admissible to establish his motive;
however, he maintains that the circuit court failed to weigh the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. He
further argues that the evidence should have been limited. Motive
could have been established simply by informing the jury of his
conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault or that he was
awaiting trial on the sexual assault at the time of the murders.
Alternatively, the court should have limited the number of
witnesses on this issue as each witness established the same facts.
According to defendant, this testimony prejudiced him because it
focused the jury's attention on the alleged sexual assault and away
from the State's evidence on his involvement in the murders. This
prejudice was compounded by the use of the word "rape"
throughout the trial to refer to the sexual assault.
	The State responds that its theory of the case was that
defendant was awaiting trial on the sexual assault charges at the
time of the murder. Defendant feared that the evidence against him
was sufficient to convict; therefore, he solicited his family to kill
the principal witnesses against him. The State argues that the four
witnesses demonstrated the strength of the State's sexual assault
case and the fact that much of its case depended upon Diandra.
The witnesses established the consistency of Diandra's story, her
credibility as a witness, and, as such, defendant's motive to
prevent her from testifying.
	As stated, the admissibility of other-crimes evidence is within
the discretion of the circuit court. Contrary to defendant's
argument, the circuit court did weigh the probative value of this
evidence against its prejudicial effect. In ruling on the State's
pretrial motion to allow proof of other crimes, the court explicitly
stated that the evidence would not unduly prejudice defendant.
Both parties acknowledge that this evidence was relevant and
probative of defendant's motive. Although motive could have
been established in the way suggested by defendant, the method
chosen by the State and approved by the circuit court was within
the court's discretion. We agree that the testimony established the
consistency of Diandra's description of the events of the sexual
assault, and, with the exception of Matthew Warner, the testimony
was primarily limited to this description. Also, the prejudicial
effect of the evidence was minimized when the trial court properly
instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of other-crimes
evidence. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14
(3d ed. 1992). We find that the probative value of the evidence
was not substantially outweighed by its prejudice. The circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence under the
circumstances of this case.
	Defendant further contends that the prejudice of the testimony
was compounded by the use of the word "rape" to refer to the
alleged sexual assault. The circuit court originally sustained a
defense objection to the use of the word. The court apparently
changed its decision after the State argued the word was
admissible under section 115-11.1 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code). This section provides that the use of the
word "rape" "by any victim, witness, State's Attorney, defense
attorney, judge or other court personnel in any prosecutions of
offenses in Sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code
of 1961, as amended, is not inadmissible." (Emphasis added.) 725
ILCS 5/115-11.1 (West 1998). Defendant is correct that first
degree murder is not one of the crimes listed in section 115-11.1;
however, this fact is not dispositive. Section 115-11.1, by
specifically allowing the use of the word "rape" in certain
prosecutions, does not thereby limit its use in other prosecutions.
We conclude that the use of this word did not result in prejudice
to defendant.

B. Admission of Diandra's Statements
	With respect to the testimony regarding the alleged sexual
assault, defendant also argues that the circuit court erred by
admitting, through this testimony, several out-of-court statements
made by Diandra. In his motion in limine, defendant argued that
the witnesses' statements were hearsay and were not admissible
under any exception to the hearsay rule. The circuit court rejected
defendant's argument and allowed the testimony pursuant to
section 115-10 of the Code, which provides in relevant part:
			"(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act
perpetrated upon or against a child under the age of 13,
*** including but not limited to prosecutions for
violations of Sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 and [various other sections] of the
Criminal Code of 1961, the following evidence shall be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
				***
				(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by
such child *** describing any complaint of such act or
matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an
element of an offense which is the subject of a
prosecution for a sexual or physical act perpetrated
upon or against a child ***." 725 ILCS 5/115-10(a)(2)
(West 1996).
	Here, defendant argues that the circuit court erroneously
allowed this testimony pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code.
Defendant maintains that section 115-10 provides an exception to
the hearsay rule only in sexual assault cases; therefore, this
testimony was improperly admitted at his murder trial. The State
disagrees, arguing that the testimony was admissible under the
section 115-10 exception and certain statements were admissible
under traditional or other statutory hearsay exceptions. We need
not resolve this question because we conclude that the testimony
was not hearsay.
	Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 65 (1999).
When an out-of-court statement is offered for some purpose other
than to establish the truth of the matter asserted, the statement is
not hearsay and is admissible. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 150. As stated,
the State's theory was that defendant ordered members of his
family to murder the victims to prevent them from testifying at his
upcoming sexual assault trial. Both Danita Best and Orvette Davis
testified that defendant called them collect while he was
incarcerated and either asked or told them to "get rid of" Diandra
and Renee so they could not testify. As such, Diandra's out-of-court statements concerning the alleged sexual assault were not
offered to prove that the sexual assault actually occurred; they
were offered to prove defendant's motive. Accordingly, since
Diandra's out-of-court statements were not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, defendant's argument that the
statements were improperly admitted as hearsay must be rejected.
See United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993)
(testimony of out-of-court statements indicating that defendant
stole from murder victims was not hearsay because it was offered
to prove defendant's motive for hiring a hitman and not to prove
the matters asserted in the statements); Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 66
(testimony offered to prove defendant's motive to commit murder
was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted). In addition,
we reiterate that the probative value of this testimony was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to
establish his accountability for the murders of Diandra and Renee.
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder pursuant to
section 5-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (herein Code), which
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is legally accountable
for the conduct of another when *** [e]ither before or during the
commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or
facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or
attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission
of the offense." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 5-2(c). The State
maintains that defendant's act of solicitation of murder made him
legally accountable for the completed murders. According to
section 8-1.1 of the Code, a person commits solicitation of murder
"when, with the intent that the offense of first degree murder be
committed, he commands, encourages or requests another to
commit that offense." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 8-1.1(a).
Defendant points out that he was initially charged with solicitation
of murder but that charge was nol-prossed prior to trial.
	Defendant's argument can be divided into two parts. First, he
maintains that section 5-2(c) of the Code requires more than the
unilateral act of requesting, commanding, or encouraging another
to commit a crime; it requires evidence of an agreement or an act
on the part of a defendant that evidences a common plan or
scheme. Second, he argues that the State failed to produce
evidence of an agreement or a common scheme or plan;
consequently, the State failed to prove that defendant was
accountable for the murders. We understand defendant's first
argument to be that solicitation within the meaning of section
5-2(c) of the Code concerning accountability differs from the type
of solicitation found in section 8-1.1(a) of the Code concerning
the inchoate offense of solicitation of murder. Thus, defendant is
arguing that the jury could not hold him legally accountable for the
murders based on the inchoate offense of solicitation of murder.
Because this issue raises a legal question, our review is de novo.
Kleinwort Benson North America, Inc. v. Quantum Financial
Services, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 214, 218 (1998).
	In support of his argument, defendant relies on certain
language found in People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348 (1970). In
Hairston, the accused was charged with murder, attempted
murder, and solicitation to commit murder. The State sought to
convict the defendant of murder and attempted murder on an
accountability theory based solely on the allegation that the
defendant solicited another to kill the victim. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 
at 355-56. The defendant was acquitted of the murder and
attempted murder charges, but he was found guilty of solicitation
to commit murder. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d  at 356. On appeal to this
court, the defendant maintained that, because the proof necessary
to convict him of the principal crimes was identical with the proof
necessary to convict him of solicitation, the verdicts were
inconsistent and he was placed in double jeopardy. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d  at 357. This court rejected the defendant's argument.
	In addressing the defendant's double jeopardy argument, we
held that because the defendant was tried for the charges of
murder, attempted murder, and solicitation of murder in a single
prosecution, the defendant was not twice placed in jeopardy.
Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d  at 357. Following this conclusion, we
explained that the proof necessary to obtain a conviction for
solicitation and the proof necessary to obtain convictions for the
principal crimes were not identical:
		"The crimes charged, viz. solicitation on the one hand and
murder and attempted murder on the other hand, were
separate and distinct crimes predicated upon different
statutes, even though both arose out of the same act of
defendant. But whereas proof that defendant had
commanded or requested the principal crimes with the
requisite intent was all that was necessary to establish his
guilt of the crimes of solicitation[,] to establish his guilt
of the principal crimes it was necessary to prove the
additional fact that the principal crimes had in fact been
committed." Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d  at 359.
	In support of his argument, defendant relies on language
immediately following the above passage. This language reads:
		"While the use of the word 'solicit' in the accountability
statute would appear to be grammatically out of harmony
with its purport, we are constrained to remark that section
5-2 (accountability) and section 8-1 (solicitation) relate
to different conduct and as a consequence entail different
elements of proof. Section 5-2, in its full context,
contemplates an accessorial act which 'promotes' or
'facilitates' another person in 'the planning or
commission' of an offense; section 8-1, on the other
hand, encompasses only conduct whereby an accused
'commands, encourages or requests another' to commit an
offense." Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d  at 359.
	Defendant urges this court to adopt the distinction drawn in
Hairston and hold that accountability requires more than the
unilateral act of commanding, encouraging, or requesting another
to commit a crime. Defendant maintains that a review of cases in
which the accused was found accountable by means of solicitation
reveal that the accused must take a "step beyond" the solicitation.
See, e.g., People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 63-64 (1997) (defendant
solicited the murder, participated in the acquisition of the murder
weapon, and provided her car to the principals); People v. Smith,
278 Ill. App. 3d 343, 347 (1996) (incarcerated defendant solicited
a murder and lured the victim to the location of the attempted
murder by instructing the victim to go there to pick up money);
People v. Martinez, 264 Ill. App. 3d 807, 815-16 (1994)
(incarcerated defendant solicited a murder and provided a
telephone number to the principal in the event the principal could
not locate a gun).
	Defendant's argument is unpersuasive. Nothing in the cited
cases suggests that an act of solicitation alone, as defined in
section 8-1.1, is insufficient to establish accountability. Further,
we conclude that the explanation in Hairston is dictum. See
People v. Crews, 191 Ill. App. 3d 228, 233 (1989). Even so, in that
dictum, this court made it clear that the only additional fact
necessary to establish accountability beyond the act of solicitation
is the fact that the principal crimes had been committed. Hairston,
46 Ill. 2d  at 359. The plain language of section 5-2(c) clearly
states that a person may be held legally accountable for the
conduct of another if he "solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to
aid" another in the planning or commission of the offense.
(Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 5-2(c)).
Legislative intent is best determined by examining the plain and
ordinary meaning of the statutory language, and, if that language
is clear, we apply the statute without further aids of statutory
construction. Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (1997). We
reject defendant's first contention and hold that a person may be
held legally accountable for first degree murder if he, either before
or during the commission of an offense, and with the requisite
intent, commands, encourages, or requests another to commit the
offense of first degree murder. See also 2 W. LaFave &amp; A. Scott,
Substantive Criminal Law §6.1, at 14 (1986) ("it is generally true
that if A solicits B to commit a crime and B then proceeds to
commit the crime in response to A's solicitation, then A is liable
as an accomplice for the crime which B has committed").
	We must now address the second part of defendant's
argument-that the evidence was insufficient to hold him legally
accountable for the murders. When a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, a reviewing
court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1989), citing
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). It is the function of the jury to assess the
credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence presented, resolve
conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338 (2000). The
jury's determination is entitled to great deference and, when the
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, this court will not retry
the defendant. People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 474 (1989). We
will not reverse a defendant's conviction unless the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 338.
	After a review of the record in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was accountable
for Diandra's and Renee's murders. Evidence presented at trial
indicated that defendant called Orvette Davis and Danita Best
collect several times while he was incarcerated. Telephone records
were introduced to corroborate this testimony. Defendant asked
Orvette on two separate occasions to "get rid of" the victims. He
made the same request of Danita during a number of phone
conversations. Danita testified that defendant's requests were
serious. As a result, Danita, along with Kerrie Major and Sandra
Major, murdered Diandra and Renee. We hold that the evidence
supports the jury's guilty verdict.
	Defendant further challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
on the grounds that the testimony of Danita Best lacked credibility
in that she was contradicted with four pretrial statements in which
she lied repeatedly; she had a strong motive to lie because she
believed she had to please the prosecution to save her own life; she
was a drug addict; she had previously been convicted of
manslaughter; and because Orvette's testimony that defendant did
not ask Orvette to participate in the murders after she refused casts
doubts on Danita's statements that defendant repeatedly solicited
her to kill the victims after her own refusal.
	The jury in this case was fully aware of Danita's drug use and
prior conviction. The jury was also cognizant of Danita's plea
agreement with the State where, in exchange for a plea of guilty
and testimony against defendant, the State would seek natural life.
The court fully instructed the jury that the testimony of an
accomplice is subject to suspicion and should be considered with
caution. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17
(3d ed. 1992). Further, on cross-examination, defendant elicited
the details of Danita's prior statements to the police and Danita
admitted that she lied in those statements. Finally, we believe that
Orvette's testimony corroborates rather than casts doubt on
Danita's statements as suggested by defendant. Certainly, the jury
had in front of it all this information. It was in the best position to
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of Danita Best.
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury on
questions involving the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly,
defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is without merit.

D. Closing Arguments
	Next, defendant claims that the cumulative effect of several
improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing
argument deprived him of a fair trial. First, at the outset of his
closing argument, the prosecutor commented:
		"[L]ittle Matthew Warner could not know on December
2nd, of 1990[,] that that was the beginning of the end for
his sister and for his mother. And he could not know in
December of 1990, when the defendant got locked up for
the rape of his sister that no one in the Jones family would
be safe from [defendant]. And he could not know that on
November 22, of 1991, when he left home that night at
about 10 [p.m.] that he would never see his sister and his
mother again."
	In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor further commented on
the victims' family and stated: "Mrs. Warner[,] who no longer has
a daughter or a granddaughter. Matthew and Troy no longer have
a mother and a sister. Now, thank God Troy was so young back
then because he can't remember what happened that night. Thank
God."
	Defendant also maintains that the following remark deprived
him of a fair trial:
		"[T]he defendant has had his trial. The defendant doesn't
have one, he's got [three] lawyers and he's got a Judge
who has protected his rights every step of the way. Who
protected [Diandra and Renee's] rights? How come they
couldn't get a trial? The defendant and his evil family
violated every one of their rights. And *** every
prosecutor in this courtroom, in this building, in this state,
we can't tell our reluctant witnesses, don't worry about it
any more. [objection overruled] He caused that. But I
don't want you to do it for any prosecutor, ladies and
gentlemen, I don't want you to do the right thing for any
prosecutor in this country. I want you to do it, ladies and
gentlemen, for [Renee] and Diandra. Ladies and
gentlemen, you are in a unique position right now. You
and only you can give [Renee] and Diandra the only thing
they wanted. A chance to be heard. Your verdicts can be
their testimony. You can speak for them. Today is their
day in Court. Today is their day in Court. Give it to them.
Give them their day in Court. If you don't speak for
[them], no one will. And they will forever be silenced.
Don't let that happen. You speak for them. And you say
[it] with one word, you say it with guilty."
	Finally, the prosecutor made the following comment
regarding Diandra's thwarted day in court:
		"[She] would have woken up and put on her suit, her
mother would have helped her put her little pigtails in her
hair, put the bows on her pigtails [objection overruled]
[a]nd come down to the courthouse and she would have
squared her shoulders, taken a deep breath and walked
into the courtroom of Judge Schreier holding her mother's
hand. She would have gone up on that witness stand, her
feet barely touching the floor. She would have raised her
right [hand] and [objection overruled] swore to tell the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. She would
have pointed to that man right there [objection overruled]
[a]nd said that's the man who raped me and her mother
would have done the same. But because of that man, he
made sure neither she nor her mother would ever get the
chance to do that. He made sure that neither she nor her
mother would ever walk into a Court of law. He made
sure, he made sure that Diandra Jones would never lace
her shoes up again, never square her shoulders and never
ever walk out that door into a Court of law to tell the truth
about what happened on December 2, of 1990."
	Defendant does not dispute that he failed to object to the first
three of these statements and thereby waived these issues for
review. Nonetheless, he urges this court to review the statements
under the plain error rule. The State, however, argues that
defendant has waived review of all the statements. We agree. To
preserve an issue for review, a defendant must raise an objection
at trial and in a written post-trial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). While defendant objected to the last comment
at trial, his written post-trial motion alleged generally that the
prosecutor "made prejudicial[,] inflammatory[,] and erroneous
statements in closing argument designed to arouse the prejudices
and passions of the court." Defendant's general allegation of error
is insufficient to preserve this issue for review. See People v.
Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 150 (1996).
	The plain error rule serves as an exception to the rule of
waiver. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Plain error exists only if (1) the
evidence is closely balanced; or (2) the errors are of such
magnitude that defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial and
remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
judicial process. People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2000).
Defendant makes no effort to argue that the evidence at his trial
was closely balanced nor does he maintain the alleged errors were
so fundamental that they denied him a fair and impartial trial. This
failure results in waiver. See Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d  at 503. Although
defendant has twice waived this argument, we conclude that no
plain error resulted from the prosecutor's comments. As our
discussion of defendant's sufficiency of the evidence argument
demonstrates, the evidence in this case was not closely balanced.
Further, these comments did not rise to the level whereby
defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. Accordingly,
defendant's arguments are without merit.

II. Sentencing
	We now turn to defendant's assertions of error at the
sentencing proceedings.

A. Prosecutors' Comments
	Similar to the preceding argument, defendant contends that
certain comments made by the prosecutors during the
aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing were improper and
inflammatory and denied him a fair sentencing hearing. During his
testimony, Dr. Daniel Hardy attempted to locate a reference in his
notes. The prosecutor commented: "So again you have to search
through your records, you don't know this, do you, off the top of
your head?" Defendant's objection was overruled. The following
dialogue, to which defendant did not object, then occurred:
			"Q. Would it be correct, Doctor, the longer it takes you
to look through the records the more money you're going
to make here today?
			A. The longer I'm on the witness stand, yes.
			Q. Okay. So the answer to that question would be yes?
			THE COURT: He answered it.
* * *
			THE COURT: Move on."
	Next, after Hardy stated his diagnosis that frontal lobe
abnormality was a factor in defendant's behavior, the prosecutor
asked: "Are you actually telling us that [defendant's] criminality
is caused by some boo-boo to the head?" The court admonished
the prosecutor to "stop that."
	Additionally, in closing arguments, the prosecutor urged the
jury to weigh the evidence in aggravation against a "boo-boo to the
brain." "[W]e heard about [defendant's] problems, *** we've
heard about his medication, we've heard about his brain ad
nauseum from psycho-babble that went on and on and on." "When
you consider all [the evidence in aggravation] and you weigh it
against those [two] cash for trash doctors ***, you'll see that there
are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the
death penalty."
	In rebuttal argument, a different prosecutor stated:
"[Defendant] has the audacity to suggest to you that we, the People
of the State of Illinois[,] are doing the same thing now that he did
behind his jail cell. You know, I don't care about a criminal
defense lawyer trying to insult me, but don't let him insult you.
Because he's suggesting to you that you're killing him now too.
Shame on him." The prosecutor went on to say that "[g]iving him
natural life is an American Express Gold Card for this defendant
to assault correctional officers, prison staff, cafeteria workers,
possessing shanks, sharpened to a point to stab anybody who
makes him angry."
	Again, defendant failed to object to all but the first of these
comments at trial and did not include an objection to any of the
comments in his post-trial motion, thereby waiving review of the
issue. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. In his argument, defendant does
not acknowledge his waiver, nor does he request this court to
address the issue under the plain error rule. Therefore, we
conclude that defendant has waived any challenge to these
remarks. This conclusion should not be interpreted in any way as
condoning improper prosecutorial remarks that have become all
too frequent in criminal trials. The prosecutor's use of sarcasm to
describe Dr. Hardy's diagnosis as a "boo-boo to the head" and
reference to both expert witnesses as "cash for trash doctors" is
completely unacceptable. Although a new trial is not always a
necessary sanction for improper remarks of a prosecutor,
comments denigrating defendant's witnesses must be strongly
condemned.

B. Danita Best's and Kerrie Major's Sentences
	Defendant also contends that his death sentence is
unconstitutionally disproportionate to the natural life sentences of
his codefendants Danita Best and Kerrie Major. In support,
defendant claims that both Danita and Kerrie are more culpable
than he because they physically stabbed the victims and actively
participated in the cover-up while his role in the murders was
minimal.
	A disparity in the sentences of codefendants does not, by
itself, show a violation of fundamental fairness. To be
impermissible, the disparity must be arbitrary and unreasonable.
People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 216 (1997). In comparing the
sentences, this court considers the nature of the offense, each
individual's relative involvement, character, background, criminal
record, and potential for rehabilitation. People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 80 (1995).
	Defendant has not established an unconstitutional disparity
with respect to either Danita's or Kerrie's sentence. Danita
pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against defendant in exchange
for natural life. A sentence imposed pursuant to a plea of guilty
does not provide a valid basis of comparison to a sentence
imposed subsequent to trial and conviction. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 217. A court may grant dispositional concessions to defendants
who enter a guilty plea when the public's interest in the effective
administration of justice would thereby be served. People v. Sivels,
60 Ill. 2d 102, 105 (1975). By pleading guilty and testifying
against defendant in exchange for a sentence of natural life, Danita
(1) acknowledged her guilt; (2) made a public trial unnecessary;
and (3) gave cooperation which resulted in the successful
prosecution of another offender engaged in equally serious or more
serious criminal conduct. See Sivels, 60 Ill. 2d  at 105.
	With respect to Kerrie Major, defendant argues only that his
sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate because Kerrie is
more culpable for the murders. He does not provide this court with
evidence or argument regarding Kerrie's character, background,
criminal record, or potential for rehabilitation. While Kerrie did
actively participate in the murders, defendant could not participate
because he was incarcerated at the time the murders took place.
Nevertheless, the murders would not have occurred but for
defendant's solicitation of them. Additionally, the evidence
presented at defendant's sentencing hearing indicates that
defendant has a significant criminal record, including convictions
for battery, aggravated battery, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
and armed robbery. The evidence showed that defendant had
repeatedly raped three of his sisters, beat his former girlfriend, and
pushed a man through a ninth-story window. Further, defendant
adjusted poorly to incarceration as evidenced by his possession of
weapons and his receipt of 44 disciplinary tickets while in prison.
Based on this evidence, we reject defendant's contention that his
death sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the
sentence of natural life imposed on Kerrie Major.

C. Death Penalty Eligibility Based on Accountability
	Defendant next challenges the constitutionality of section
9-1(b)(7) of the Code as applied to him on the basis of
accountability. That section provides for death penalty eligibility
if "the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the
death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(7). Defendant argues that sentencing him to death based on
the manner in which other individuals carried out the killing
violates the eighth amendment's guarantee of individualized
consideration of the defendant's culpability.
	The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty under
three separate aggravating factors. " '[W]here a defendant is found
eligible based upon two or more statutory aggravating factors, the
fact that one of those factors may later be invalidated will not
generally impair the eligibility finding as long as a separate, valid
aggravating factor supported eligibility.' " People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 64 (1998), quoting People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132,
165 (1996); see also People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 102-03 (1996).
Even if we did invalidate defendant's eligibility verdict based on
the brutal or heinous murder of a child under 12, defendant would
continue to be eligible for the death penalty based on the multiple-murder and murder to prevent an individual from testifying in a
criminal prosecution aggravating factors.

D. Constitutionality of Illinois Death Penalty
	Finally, defendant makes four constitutional challenges to the
Illinois death penalty statute. This court has previously considered
and rejected the challenges raised by defendant, including his
arguments that the death penalty statute (1) will inevitably be
applied to innocent persons (see, e.g., People v. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d 63, 114 (2000); People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 260
(1998); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 211-20 (1998)); (2) places
a burden of proof on defendants that precludes meaningful
consideration of mitigation (see, e.g., Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 376;
Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d  at 504; Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 220; (3) allows the
sentencer to weigh the vague aggravating factor of "any other
reason" why a defendant should be sentenced to death (see, e.g.,
People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 637-38 (2000); People v. Nielson,
187 Ill. 2d 271, 300 (1999); People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 248
(1999)); and (4) does not sufficiently minimize the risk of
arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death sentences (People v.
Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 162 (1998)). Defendant provides no
persuasive reason for our reconsideration of these holdings.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting
Wednesday, January 30, 2002, as the date on which the sentence
of death, entered by the circuit court of Cook County, shall be
carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is
confined.



Affirmed.
	I join Justice Freeman's opinion to the extent it holds that
customary plain error analysis should be applied to defendant's
arguments concerning prosecutorial misconduct at trial and
sentencing.
	Also, like Justice Freeman, I believe that the remarks made by
the prosecutors during closing argument at defendant's sentencing
hearing must be strongly rebuked. Capital sentencing proceedings
impose upon the jury the intellectually and emotionally demanding
task of determining whether or not a defendant is eligible for and
deserving of death, the most severe of all state-sanctioned
punishments. In such a proceeding, where the outcome is literally
a matter of life or death, there can be no place for sarcasm or
improper name-calling. The matter is far too portentous, and the
risk that the jury might be swayed by passion or prejudice is far
too real, to conclude otherwise.
	Given the horrific nature of capital offenses, it is
understandable that a prosecutor's emotions may run high. But,
"[n]o matter how deplorable the crime in issue or how inadequate
the defense theories may be perceived by the prosecution, the
larger policies of fair trial and proper courtroom decorum inveigh
against the type of prosecutorial remarks and conduct that
occurred here. Such behavior benefits no one, not the people of
Illinois who are represented by the prosecutor, not the victim's
families, and certainly not the individuals whose sole transgression
was to give testimony on behalf of the defense." People v. Kidd,
175 Ill. 2d 1, 58 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by
Freeman, J.).
	The prosecutorial remarks in this case were unprofessional
and debased the sentencing proceeding. Nevertheless, having
carefully considered the remarks in the context of the entire
proceeding, I am constrained to conclude that the comments do not
rise to the level of plain error. Thus, I join the majority in holding
that defendant's death sentence should not be disturbed. I
emphasize, however, my strong disapproval of the remarks at issue
in this case. I caution prosecutors not to make these comments
again, and I urge judges to vigorously guard against such
unprofessional conduct.
	I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from today's
decision.
	With respect to the issues raised by defendant concerning the
guilt phase of his trial, I agree with my colleagues in the majority
that the convictions must be affirmed. I do take issue, however,
with the analysis used to resolve defendant's argument concerning
the propriety of the prosecution's closing argument at this phase
of the trial. Defendant maintains that the prosecutors engaged in
improper argument during the closing of the guilt phase of the
trial. The court holds, correctly, that the issue was waived because
it was not properly preserved. The court then states that defendant
"urges this court to review the statements under the plain error
rule." Slip op. at 21. After noting the plain error exception to the
waiver rule, the court observes:
		"Defendant makes no effort to argue that the evidence at
his trial was closely balanced nor does he maintain the
alleged errors were so fundamental that they denied him
a fair and impartial trial." Slip op. at 22.
The court concludes that defendant's failure to so argue results in
waiver. Slip op. at 22.
	Our plain error doctrine is based upon Supreme Court Rule
615(a), which provides the following:
		"Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of
the trial court." 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
We have consistently interpreted Rule 615(a) to allow a court of
review to consider those errors that have not been properly
preserved when (i) the evidence is closely balanced or (ii) the
purported error is of such magnitude so as to deny the defendant
a fair and impartial trial. People v. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363
(1996) (and cases cited therein.). If one of these prongs is met, the
procedural default is excused.
	The court's determination that defendant "makes no effort" to
argue plain error results from the narrow and restrictive reading
the court accords to defendant's briefs. On page 47 of his opening
brief, defendant invokes this court's Rule 615(a), which, as noted
above, is the plain error rule. Defendant then goes on to cite cases
that he believes support his view that the argument deprived him
a fair and impartial trial. Defendant further contends that the
State's closing argument was designed to "divert the jury's
attention from the weakness of the State's murder case."
Defendant also maintains on page 50 of his brief that another
comment also served "to muddy the waters because the evidence
against [defendant] was so weak and their key witness was so
completely lacking in credibility." Defendant reasserts these same
arguments in his reply brief. In light of these contentions, I cannot
join the court in its summary conclusion that defendant has made
"no effort" to demonstrate plain error. Defendant is clearly arguing
that (i) the evidence of his guilt was weak, and (ii) the errors were
of such a nature so as to deprive him of a fair and impartial trial.
For these reasons, I do not believe that defendant has, in any way,
"twice waived this argument."
	Our precedent dictates that, unless plain error exists by which
to excuse a procedural default, the bar must be honored. People v.
Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995). I have reviewed the remarks
defendant claims were improper and find no reason to excuse the
procedural default. The evidence adduced at the guilt phase of the
trial was not closely balanced, as the court correctly notes.
Moreover, none of the complained of remarks were of the nature
to undermine the fairness of the guilt phase of the trial. In all other
respects, I join in the court's opinion as to the guilt phase of
defendant's trial.
	Notwithstanding my agreement that defendant's convictions
must be affirmed, I am unable to join in the court's disposition of
defendant's argument concerning remarks made by the prosecution
during closing argument at the death sentence hearing. I, therefore,
respectfully dissent from that portion of today's opinion.
	Defendant maintains that certain comments made by the
prosecutors during the aggravation/mitigation stage of his death
sentencing hearing were improper and inflammatory and denied
him a fair sentencing hearing. In resolving the issue, the court
notes that defendant failed to object to most of the comments and
did not include the issue in his post-trial motion. As a result, the
court holds that the issue is precluded from review on appeal. Slip
op. at 23. The court states that defendant failed to acknowledge his
procedural default and failed to request that the court address the
issue under the plain error rule. Slip op. at 23. Accordingly, the
court concludes:
		"[d]efendant has waived any challenge to these remarks.
This conclusion should not be interpreted in any way as
condoning improper prosecutorial remarks that have
become all too frequent in criminal trials. The
prosecutor's use of sarcasm to describe Dr. Hardy's
diagnosis as a 'boo-boo to the head' and reference to both
expert witnesses as 'cash for trash doctors' is completely
unacceptable. Although a new trial is not always a
necessary sanction for improper remarks of a prosecutor,
comments denigrating defendant's witnesses must be
strongly condemned." Slip op. at 23-24.
Thus, the court holds that defendant's failure to argue plain error
in his brief precludes review. Although purporting not to address
the issue, the court takes the position that, while the prosecutor's
use of sarcasm was "completely unacceptable," a new trial is not
a proper sanction in this case. I strongly disagree with the court's
approach to this issue for several reasons.
	As an initial matter, the court again, as it did in addressing the
guilt phase improper argument issue, takes defendant to task for
failing to define just how the defaulted error constitutes "plain"
error. This happens because, once again, the court reads the briefs
much too narrowly and much too restrictively. In his opening
brief, defendant argues that several remarks made in closing
arguments by the prosecutors during the aggravation-mitigation
phase of the sentencing hearing were improper and necessitated
reversal. I note that, in so doing, I note that defendant cites to at
least one case in which this court held that comments similar to
those at issue in this case constituted plain error. People v.
Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133 (1984). Therefore, it appears to me that
defendant has, in fact, couched his presentation in terms of plain
error. I believe that the better approach to this issue is for the court
to address the argument under the traditional plain error analysis
that I noted in the foregoing section of this separate opinion.
	Additionally, I do not understand why, after having concluded
that defendant's failure to invoke the plain doctrine results in a
waiver of the issue, the court feels compelled to assert that "its
conclusion [that the issue is waived] should not be interpreted in
any way as condoning improper prosecutorial remarks that have
become all too frequent in criminal trials" (slip op. at 24) or that
comments denigrating a defendant's witnesses "must be strongly
condemned" (slip op. at 24). If the issue has been waived due to
deficiencies in briefing (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)), then I do not
see the point in making these statements. The reason for this
seemingly contradictory treatment is that the court wants to have
it both ways. The court takes this approach in order to "send the
message" that the type of conduct that occurred in this trial should
not really be tolerated. This approach, however, will not serve as
a substitute for addressing the argument in depth because this
court has sent these types of "messages" before. See People v.
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1 (1996). Our past "messages" appear to go
unheeded as this case more than amply demonstrates. I am further
troubled by the fact that the court's handling of this issue does
nothing that would serve to diminish the likelihood of such
conduct from recurring in our courtrooms. In fact, I see quite the
contrary: Today's opinion reveals that this court (i) will not
concern itself with improper argument in the courtroom if a
defendant's brief does not conform with the court's own notions
of an articulate argument and (ii) will not, even in the face of
conduct that is, by the court's own admission, both "condemnable"
and "all too frequent in criminal trials" attempt to discipline or
even name those who engage in conduct that this court has
prohibited. Why then should any prosecutor re-adjust his or her
argument to conform to our holdings when nothing happens to
those who do not? In light of these facts, I am more than confident
that such conduct will be repeated in the future because there are
simply no adverse consequences for those prosecutors whose
behavior crosses the line, which is what happened in this case. As
I explain more fully below, the plain error rule is satisfied here
because the complained-of conduct served to deny defendant a fair
and impartial sentencing hearing.
	At the second stage of the sentence hearing, the State
presented evidence in aggravation which consisted of, inter alia,
defendant's (i) lengthy and violent criminal history, (ii) extensive
disciplinary record while incarcerated in the Department of
Corrections, and (iii) abusive behavior towards friends and family
members. The State did not present any medical or psychiatric
experts. The defense case in mitigation consisted of an attempt to
establish, as the sole mitigating factor, that defendant suffered
from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he
committed the crimes in the fall of 1991. To that end, the defense
presented the testimony of Dr. Daniel Hardy and Dr. Jonathan
Pinkus.
	Dr. Hardy, a forensic psychiatrist, evaluated defendant and
found that he suffered from a schizo-affective disorder that was
either aggravated or caused by a history of brain injury
documented by previous physicians. Dr. Hardy was aware that
other doctors had examined defendant closer in time to the events
in question and had diagnosed defendant as a "malingerer."
However, Dr. Hardy disagreed with these diagnoses. Dr. Hardy
acknowledged that the other doctors had examined defendant
closer in time to the events in question and had concluded that
defendant did not have a mental illness. These facts did not cause
Dr. Hardy to change his opinion because a significant personality
disorder and mental disturbances had been documented in
defendant's medical records, which predated the murders in
question.
	Dr. Pinkus, a professor of neurology, also evaluated
defendant. Based upon his own observations and the reports of
other professionals, Dr. Pinkus stated that defendant suffered from
a brain dysfunction. Dr. Pinkus testified that his diagnosis was
confirmed by Dr. Hier, the chairman of the department of
neurology at the University of Illinois, who concluded that
"cerebral organicity could be a contributing factor in either
excessively aggressive behavior or failure to inhibit anti-social or
aggressive behavior."
	The cross-examination of Dr. Hardy, by Assistant State's
Attorney Laura Morask, was vigorous and oftentimes intense. At
one point, the following exchange occurred.
			"Q. Doctor let me ask it a different way. Did he ever tell
you in the 2 hours and 10 minutes that you spent with him
that he suffered any childhood abuse?
			A. That's the reference that I'm trying to locate, please.
			Q. So again you have to search through your records,
you don't know this, do you, off the top of your head?
			Mr. Mullane [defense counsel]: Objection, Judge.
			THE COURT: Overruled.
			MS. MORASK:
			Q. Would it be correct, Doctor, the longer it takes you
to look through the records the more money you're going
to make here today?
			A. The longer I'm on the witness stand, yes.
			Q. Okay. So the answer to that question would be yes?
			THE COURT: He answered it.
			MS. MORASK: Thank you Judge.
			THE COURT: Move on."
The cross-examination continued until the following colloquy:
			"Q. [by Ms. Morask] Are you actually saying the
defendant's criminal conduct is the result of a physical
abnormality, is that what you're saying?
			A. Well that he has an abnormal brain that has
contributed to it, absolutely.
			MR. McKAY [prosecutor]: Objection, Judge, not
responsive again.
			MR. LEVITT [defense attorney]: You already
admonished counsel once about that.
			THE COURT: Mr. McKay, Mrs. Morask is the attorney
questioning.
			MR. McKAY: Can you instruct the witness to answer
the question Judge, for once.
			THE COURT: Mr. McKay, the attorney questioning
him has not required it or asked for it.
			MS. MORASK: Judge, I'm asking for this particular
question once again.
			THE COURT: Ask the question again.
			MS. MORASK:
			Q. Are you actually telling us that Sanantone Moss'
criminality is caused by some boo-boo to the head?
			THE COURT: All right, Miss Morask, stop that.
The cross-examination concluded shortly thereafter.
	Notwithstanding the circuit court's admonitions during cross-examination, Morask returned to these very themes during closing
argument. The record reveals that Morask began her summation
by pointing out the suffering defendant had caused, not only to the
victims in this case, but to his past victims. She then argued:
		 "And your job is to weigh that and balance that against
what? A boo-boo to the brain. That's what they want you
to find precludes imposition of the death penalty.
			Ladies and gentlemen, do not forget over the last 2 days
we've heard about his life, we heard about his problems,
we've heard about his jail cell, we've heard about his
medication, we've heard about his brain ad nauseum [sic]
from psycho-babble that went on and on and on. Do not
forget the face of 10 year-old Diandra Jones. Do not
forget the face of her mother, Emma Renee Jones and her
baby brother, Troy Jones. And her other brother, Matthew
Warner. Do not forget what this case was all about in the
beginning.
			You may and you must and you shall consider all of the
evidence that you have already heard. All of the evidence
at the trial, all of the evidence at the eligibility phase.
			When you consider all of this evidence and you weigh
it against those 2 cash for trash doctors *** you'll see that
there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty."
At this point, the argument turned toward detailing the evidence
that had been adduced regarding defendant's past crimes. Morask
then addressed defendant's case in mitigation:
		"Then we come to the good doctors. They told you in
opening statement that these doctors, that the mitigation,
would not be presented as excuses for his behavior. But
that's exactly what it is. It's excusing, they're trying to
excuse his responsibility for his own criminal conduct.
That is what those doctors were trying to do. Doctor
Hardy. Doctor, 'I can't answer a question straight if my
life depends on it,' Hardy. Doctor 'I can't give a one word
answer when 50 words will make me more money.' ***
He's a bought and paid for witness.
			If you do the math, his 2 hours and 10 minutes with the
defendant was charged at four dollars a minute. What he
made here in the time he was on the witness stand was far
more than you folks make in a day of jury service. This is
outrageous. 
* * *
			Psycho-babble folks, it was all psycho-babble. He
discounts, throws away and disregards what was the real
evidence, the real findings, from doctors who examined
the defendant closest to the time of the crime. And who
were they? Doctor Kaplan, Doctor Reifman, Doctor
Messina. No evidence of mental illness, no psychosis.
What did they find? They found he [defendant] was a
malingerer, he's a liar. Doctor Pinkus prefers to call that
delusions and Doctor Hardy prefers to call them schizo-affective disorder. If it walks like a duck, it's a duck. They
are lies.
			They aren't even consistent with their own findings,
with each other. Doctor Hardy says there is no childhood
abuse, Doctor Pinkus says, oh, well there is overwhelming
childhood abuse but he didn't tell me about it and the fact
that he didn't tell me about it is a delusion, not a lie. It's
all psycho-babble.
			And what do they both rely on? This boo-boo to his
brain. This is what they want you folks to rely on to
excuse, to justify his criminal conduct, to explain as they
say, to take away his responsibility for his criminal
conduct."
Morask concluded her argument by pointing out that defendant
had preyed upon children and had chosen a life of violent crime.
She asked the jury to sentence defendant to death for all the evil he
had done and to protect future children as well as society.
	Defendant argues that Morask's comments on the testimony
of the two defense experts were improper. According to defendant,
the comments did not explain, modify or discredit the substance
of their testimony. Rather, their only purpose was to denigrate the
witnesses in the eyes of the jury. 
	Under our plain error analysis, in order to determine whether
an alleged error amounts to "plain error," we must first determine
whether error even occurred. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17
(1995); People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 621 (2000). Generally,
courts allow prosecutors great latitude in making closing
arguments. People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1987). The
State may, during closing, comment on the evidence presented and
draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. People v. Pasch,
152 Ill. 2d 133, 184 (1992). Nevertheless, argument that serves no
purpose other than to inflame the jury constitutes error. People v.
Tiller, 94 Ill. 2d 303, 321 (1982). Closing arguments must be
viewed in their entirety and the purported improper argument must
be taken in context. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d  at 176. 
	After reviewing the proceedings as a whole, it becomes clear
to me, at least, that a good portion of Morask's cross-examination
and the argument that followed it was intended to degrade and
insult the defense witnesses in an attempt to weaken the impact
their testimony might have had on the jury and to inflame the
passions of the jury against defendant's case in mitigation. This
court has held that "cross-examination which is designed to harass,
annoy or humiliate a witness should not be tolerated." People v.
Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 402 (1985), citing Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956, 959-60, 88 S. Ct. 748, 750-51 (1968).
Although the trial judge, during the actual cross-examination,
admonished Morask to move on, which should have been enough
to cure the problem, Morask proceeded to disregard the trial
judge's admonition and to inject the term "boo-boo" not once, but
twice, into her closing remarks. These comments were exacerbated
by Morask's (i) continued references to the doctors' testimony and
opinions as "cash for trash," "bought and paid for," and "psycho-babble" and (ii) use of derisive, sarcastic names to refer to the
doctors. This type of rhetoric serves no purpose other than to
inflame the passions of the jury and denigrate and belittle the
defense witnesses in its eyes. Prosecutorial remarks which serve
no purpose but to inflame the emotions of the jury are highly
improper and have no place in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial. People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 81 (1984). This court has
repeatedly warned that prosecutors "must exercise the utmost
caution in capital cases to avoid the use of such comments." Lyles,
106 Ill. 2d  at 406.
	The complained-of remarks take on added significance when
viewed against the fact that the defense called both Dr. Pinkus and
Dr. Hardy to testify as expert witnesses regarding their opinion of
defendant's mental condition, and the State did not call any such
expert witnesses to testify to a contrary opinion. Instead, the State
relied solely-during cross-examination-on the reports of others in
order to contradict and discredit the defense experts' opinions. I
note that in this respect, Morask argued to the jury that Dr. Hardy
"discounted," "threw away," and disregarded the "real evidence"
and
		"the real findings, from doctors who examined the
defendant closest to the time of the crime. And who were
they? Doctor Kaplan, Doctor Reifman, Doctor Messina." 
I must point out that Doctors Kaplan, Reifman, and Messina did
not testify in this case so the reference to their opinions as the "real
evidence" is misleading.(1)
	Morask's vouching for the credibility of these doctors was
also an improper expression of personal opinion: "It is
unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her
personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any
testimony, or evidence ***." 1 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice 3-5.8(b) (2d ed. 1980). In the commentary to this rule, the
ABA notes that prosecutorial conduct in argument "is a matter of
special concern because of the possibility that the jury will give
special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only because of
the prestige associated with the prosecutor's office, but also
because of the fact-finding facilities presumably available to the
office." 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b),
Commentary, at 3.88 (2d ed. 1980). See also ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct R. 3.4(e) (2001) (prohibiting a lawyer in a
trial from "assert[ing] personal knowledge of facts in issue except
when testifying as a witness, or stat[ing] a personal opinion as to
*** the credibility of a witness ***"). The United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged similar concerns: "[T]he prosecutor's
opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may
induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its
own view of the evidence." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,
18-19, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 14, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1048 (1985). Put
another way, the prosecutor "ostensibly speaks with the authority
of his office. The prosecutor's 'personal status and his role as a
spokesman for the government tend to give what he [says] *** the
ring of authenticity *** tend[ing] to impart an implicit stamp of
believeability.' " Commonwealth v. De Christoforo, 360 Mass.
531, 550, 277 N.E.2d 100, 112 (1971) (Tauro, C.J., dissenting),
quoting Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 583-84 (5th Cir.
1969). For these reasons, I believe Morask's remarks were
improper.
	Having determined that the challenged remarks constituted
error, the question turns to whether defendant's procedural default
can be excused. See Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17 (noting that if the
error is found not to rise to the level of plain error, the procedural
default must be honored). As I noted previously, this court has
interpreted Rule 615(a) so as to excuse a procedural default if
either the evidence was closely balanced or the error affected
substantial rights. We have explained the latter prong of the
analysis to mean that "what must be affected by the asserted error
must be something 'fundamental to the integrity of the judicial
process.' " Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17, quoting People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (1979) (Ryan, J., specially concurring). In essence,
the fairness of the proceeding must be undermined. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17. In a similar vein, I note that the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that plain error occurs when the error is said
either (i) to have created an "unacceptable danger of prejudicial
influence on the jury's verdict," or (ii) to have "seriously affect[ed]
the *** integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial
proceedings." United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 80 L. Ed. 555, 557, 56 S. Ct. 391, 392 (1936).
	I believe that the argument conducted by Morask in this case
created an "unacceptable danger of prejudicial influence on the
jury's verdict" such as to excuse defendant's procedural default.
This court has recognized:
		"It is axiomatic that parties in closing argument may not
go beyond the scope of the evidence presented and facts
fairly inferable therefrom [citation], misstate the law
[citation], or express their personal opinions on the
evidence [citation] or on defendant's guilt [citation].
Further, arguments which are calculated to play upon the
jurors' emotions are clearly improper. A penalty of death
that may have been imposed under the influence of
passion or prejudice cannot stand." (Emphasis added.)
People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 78 (1994).
In my view, it is impossible in this case to say what impact
Morask's continued sarcastic characterizations of the defense
witnesses and their testimony-as well as her vouching for the
credibility of experts who did not testify-may have had on the jury
as it deliberated on the question of whether the mitigation
precluded the imposition of the death penalty. The record in this
case demonstrates that the prosecution chose to respond to the
defense's case in mitigation with derision, sarcasm, and rudeness.
At times, McKay would "object" that the witness' responses were
"nonresponsive" even though his partner, Morask, was conducting
the cross-examination. This was done despite repeated
admonishments from the trial judge to refrain from the behavior
and, unfortunately, added to what was a generally caustic and
inflamed atmosphere during cross-examination. Compounding this
problem of juvenile behavior on the part of the prosecution team
was Morask's tendency to bolster her case by vouching for the
credibility of witnesses that she did not call to the stand. This leads
me to conclude that the prosecutors' conduct in this matter
consisted of "a calculated course of action to play upon and incite
the emotions *** of the jury." Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 81. Thus, I
cannot say that Morask's argument did not divert the jurors'
attention from considering, dispassionately, the mitigation offered
by the defendant in this case, and I am unable to conclude that the
misconduct did not serve to increase the likelihood that the jury's
decision at the aggravation-mitigation portion of the hearing was
based on emotion rather than reason.
	In addition, the prosecutorial improprieties of the sort present
here appear to indicate a recurring problem in capital proceedings.
I must point out that a pattern and practice of intentional
prosecutorial misconduct that has not been deterred through other
remedies, such as admonishment and condemnation, "may well so
seriously undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings as to
support reversal under the plain-error doctrine." Young, 470 U.S. 
at 33 n.16, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 24 n.16, 105 S. Ct.  at 1055 n.16
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ). This court has repeatedly held that
the conduct at issue here is improper and is to be avoided. Lyles,
106 Ill. 2d  at 402-03 (denigration of defense witnesses); Williams,
161 Ill. 2d  at 80 (expressions of personal opinion); Holman, 103 Ill. 2d  at 172-73 (same). These cases are the established precedent
of this court. It must be remembered that this court, by virtue of
constitutional mandate, reviews every capital sentence imposed in
this state. As such, when we issue an opinion that holds that
certain types of arguments are to be avoided and that certain types
of arguments are improper, we expect those who practice in our
courtrooms to heed our rulings and conform their behavior to our
mandates. When members of the bar, who are officers of the court,
fail to follow our holdings-designed to ensure the fairness of
capital proceedings-the result serves to compromise the very
integrity and public reputation of this court's administration of
justice.
	As I alluded to earlier, this court has attempted to police this
type of argument before by admonishing against its future
commission. In People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1 (1996), the court was
confronted with very similar conduct occurring, as in this case, in
a capital trial in Cook County. The prosecutor in Kidd engaged in
the same type of juvenile name-calling and sarcasm that is present
in the case at bar. We upheld the sentence, noting that the trial
judge had taken steps to lessen the prejudicial effect of the
improper remarks and conduct, a fact that is absent in this case.
Nevertheless, we specifically warned that prosecutors "violate the
trust reposed in them by the public when they risk reversal of an
otherwise proper conviction or death sentence for unprofessional
conduct of this nature." (Emphasis added.) Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 54.
More pointedly, two justices specially concurred in order to
strongly condemn the conduct and to advise against its future
occurrence:
		"Unless the trial and reviewing courts rebuke such
egregious misconduct, there is little incentive in future
cases for others to refrain from improper jibes, sarcasm,
and outright distortions of the law. No matter how
deplorable the crime in issue or how inadequate the
defense theories may be perceived by the prosecution, the
larger policies of fair trial and proper courtroom decorum
inveigh against the type of prosecutorial remarks and
conduct that occurred here. Such behavior benefits no
one, not the people of Illinois who are represented by the
prosecutor, not the victim's families, and certainly not the
individuals whose sole transgression was to give
testimony on behalf of the defense.
			In my opinion, the conduct described herein borders on
constituting reversible error. For these reasons, I write
separately to emphasize my strong disapproval of the
prosecutorial remarks in the instant case and to caution
lawyers and judges to vigorously guard against such
unprofessional conduct." (Emphasis added.) Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 58-59 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined
by Freeman, J.).
Kidd was issued on December 19, 1996. The oral argument
conducted in the present case was held on October 30, 1998,
nearly two years later. Nevertheless, the juvenile name-calling here
is very similar to that condemned in Kidd as improper and
unprofessional. It is obvious to me that our admonishments-that
such behavior risks reversal-have not been heeded. Indeed, the
sarcasm in this case was worsened by the fact that the prosecutor
improperly bolstered her case by vouching for the credibility of
witnesses who did not testify. Thus, the conduct that we urged
prosecutors to refrain from in Kidd was not only repeated here, but
was compounded by even more improper conduct. For this reason,
the result that obtained in Kidd, an affirmance, cannot be obtained
in this case.
	Unfortunately, the kind of courtroom tactics which occurred
in this case does not appear to be an isolated occurrence. This
court recently cited the conduct of two assistant State's Attorneys
as lacking in maturity and professionalism, once again in a Cook
County courtroom during a capital trial. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 142 (2000). The frequency with which this court is
seeing such behavior is not only alarming, but causes legitimate
public concerns regarding the fairness and integrity of these
proceedings. At a capital sentencing hearing, the trier of fact is
given the duty of determining whether the ultimate punishment is
to be inflicted upon the defendant. As such, the proceeding is a
solemn one. Courtroom decorum and dignity must be vigorously
guarded. In this regard, I believe that the United States Supreme
Court's observation in Young is particularly relevant in this case.
			"The kind of advocacy shown by this record has no
place in the administration of justice and should neither
be permitted nor rewarded; a trial judge should deal
promptly with any breach by either counsel. ***
* * *
			We emphasize that the trial judge has the responsibility
to maintain decorum in keeping with the nature of the
proceeding; 'the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the
governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper
conduct.' [Citation.]" Young, 470 U.S.  at 9-10, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 8-9, 105 S. Ct.  at 1043-44. 
I agree with this sentiment and urge our trial judges to deal
promptly with actions that serve to debase our criminal
proceedings and jeopardize their fairness.
	Although I find the remarks of Morask to constitute reversible
error, in and of themselves, I also wish to address the other
comments that defendant identifies on appeal as being plain error.
In this regard, I note that the court states that Morask's use of
sarcasm was "completely unacceptable" but does not speak to the
comments made during rebuttal by Assistant State's Attorney
James McKay. I believe the court errs greatly by not mentioning
these other remarks because they are equally as egregious and
improper as those made by Morask.
	In rebuttal closing argument, McKay told the jury, among
other things, that "[g]iving [defendant] natural life is an American
Express Gold Card for this defendant to assault correctional
officers, prison staff, cafeteria workers, possessing shanks,
sharpened to a point to stab anybody, who makes him angry."
McKay further argued that "[t]he bed on death row was reserved
for him. Natural life is the minimum. Natural life is the minimum
sentence. You know, just killing Diandra, just killing a girl under
the age of 12, just killing one witness to prevent her from
testifying gets the minimum. Are we suggesting that Emma's
murder was a freebe? He's asking you for the minimum. What in
the world has he done in his life to deserve the minimum."
	This court has, in the past, allowed arguments regarding a
defendant's future dangerousness when those arguments are based
on the evidence. See People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1996);
People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 66 (1995), People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 148-49 (1991). Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has held that a jury may determine a defendant's future
dangerousness in weighing whether to impose a sentence of death.
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 96 S. Ct. 2950
(1976). McKay's argument, however, did more than ask the jury
to consider the defendant's potential, as shown by the evidence,
for future violence. McKay told the jury that it would be providing
the means for defendant to commit such acts if it chose to impose
a sentence of natural life. In today's culture, an American Express
Gold card has certain connotations that are unmistakable, among
which are the freedom and the privileges bestowed upon the
holders of a such a card. In this case, McKay subtly told the jurors
that they would be giving defendant the freedom to commit future
violent acts and that, as a result, they would bear the responsibility
for those acts if the jury were to choose to impose a sentence of
natural life. Rather than emphasize the jury's responsibility in
deciding whether defendant should live or die, McKay emphasized
the jury's responsibility for future criminal acts that might be
committed at defendant's hands if he were not sentenced to death.
This type of argument serves no function other than to increase the
likelihood of a verdict reached by emotion rather than reason,
which is unacceptable.
	Moreover, I note that McKay's use of the term "freebe" to
characterize the murder of Emma Jones was also improper. See
People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 144-47 (2001). McKay's
argument was not an accurate statement of the law as we explained
in Kuntu. The use of the term "freebe," in this context, improperly
conveys to the jury the notion that, if it did not return a sentence
of death, defendant would be "getting away" with something. See
Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d  at 145-46 (holding that such an argument is an
improper statement of law which warrants reversal of death
sentence). Although I acknowledge that defendant did not identify
this remark as error, the precedent of this court nevertheless
dictates that we reverse on this basis. The court today does not
honor this precedent and, in so doing, calls into question whether
Kuntu, an opinion decided just four months ago is still good law.
My concern in this area is more than just rhetorical-we have taken
under advisement People v. Morris, No. 87645, which raises
questions concerning yet another closing argument in which a
prosecutor speaks in terms of "freebies." The law of this court,
particularly in capital cases, cannot be seen by the bar and the
public to be one that is constantly "in flux," changing from
opinion to opinion with respect to the same issue.
	In voicing my dissent, I am mindful that closing arguments
"are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event;
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and
meaning less than crystal clear" and that a court "should not lightly
infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its
most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less
damaging interpretations." Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431, 439, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (1974).
This cannot be said of the complained-of comments in the present
case. 
	The United States Supreme Court has noted the importance of
a prosecuting attorney as "the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods *** as it is to use every legitimate means ***."
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935). This court has echoed the same concerns
by reminding that an assistant State's Attorney "is the
representative of all the people, including the defendant, and it is
as much his duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of the
defendant as those of any other citizen." People v. Oden, 20 Ill. 2d 470, 483 (1960). Moreover, we have stated that a prosecutor "has
an obligation to comport himself in a manner which not only
ensures that the defendant receives a fair sentencing hearing but
which inspires respect for the administration of justice." Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d  at 412. It is very difficult to see how either of these
objectives were achieved in this case.
	Notwithstanding the court's words of condemnation (slip op.
at 24) nor the concurring justice's reiteration of her strong
disapproval of this type of courtroom behavior (see slip op. at 27-28 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring), my colleagues'
disposition of this issue will serve only to embolden those who
would engage in such highly charged rhetoric and confuse the trial
judges who have to deal with it. This court cannot expect the trial
judges to vigorously guard against improper conduct if we
ourselves fail to address the problem with any consistency. I note
that this court, in 1999, established a Special Supreme Court
Committee on Capital Cases in order "to study the trial and
sentencing processes in capital cases in Illinois." M.R. 15833
(April 6, 1999). Both the executive and legislative branches of our
state government likewise established similar committees designed
to review the state's administration of capital punishment. Each of
these committees focused, inter alia, on the role of improper
prosecutorial conduct in death penalty cases and ways to improve
upon the trial processes which lead to capital convictions and
sentences. In some cases, recommendations were made from these
committees. The committees serve noble goals; however, they do
not and cannot replace the responsibility of this court to take
action against improper conduct when confronted with such
conduct on appeal. The notions of reform ring hollow when this
court, faced with conduct which requires reversal, fails to
acknowledge it.
	In light of the above, I would vacate defendant's death
sentence and remand the matter for a new second phase of the
death sentencing hearing. See People v. Thompkins, 191 Ill. 2d 438, 477 (2000).
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this partial concurrence and
partial dissent.
	While this matter was pending on direct review, our court
adopted a comprehensive set of new rules governing the conduct
of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. With
certain exceptions, the new rules took effect March 1, 2001.
Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 6 (March 21, 2001). For the
reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, No.
87286, slip op. at 31-36 (June 21, 2001) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting), the procedures contained in the new rules are
indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now
coming before us on direct review. Because this defendant was
tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules,
his conviction and sentence should be vacated, and the cause
should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial in
conformity with our new rules.
	Even if defendant were not entitled to a new trial, I still could
not join in the majority's opinion. For the reasons set forth in my
partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). At a minimum,
defendant's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the
cause should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j).
	I respectfully join with Justice Freeman in his partial dissent
concerning the prosecution's closing arguments. Additionally, for
the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, No.
87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I agree with Chief
Justice Harrison that defendant's convictions and sentence should
be set aside because the trial proceedings were not conducted in
accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital
cases. As I stated in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases
prior to this court's adoption of the new rules were inherently
unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant's
constitutional rights. Consequently, since the new rules were
promulgated to address the deficiencies of constitutional
dimension that regularly occurred under the old system, the rules
must be applied retroactively to all capital cases currently pending
on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126
(2001), citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For those reasons, I
respectfully dissent.
 



 



1.      1I note that several of these doctors did, in fact, testify at a pretrial
hearing on the issue of defendant's fitness for trial. However, none of
these doctors testified during the trial proceedings conducted in front of
the jury.