Title: Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield
Citation: 143 N.W.2d 813
Docket Number: 39824
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1966

143 N.W.2d 813 (1966) MANGOLD MIDWEST CO. et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF RICHFIELD, Respondent. No. 39824. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 1, 1966. Rehearing Denied April 4, 1966. *814 Feinberg, Mirviss, Meyers, Schumacher &amp; Malmon, Minneapolis, for appellants. Howard, Peterson, LeFevere, Lefler &amp; Hamilton, Minneapolis, for respondent. FRANK T. GALLAGHER, C. This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court declaring Ordinance No. 11.10 of the Village of Richfield to be a valid and enforceable ordinance. Plaintiffs in this case, Mangold Midwest Company, United Distributors of Minnesota, Inc., and A. M. Servicing Corporation of Raytown, operate a large retail department store at 7701 Nicollet Avenue South in the village of Richfield. The store has been operating in that location since 1959. From the time of its opening until May 1962, the plaintiffs experienced no difficulty in keeping their store open on Sundays as was the practice of other retail stores in Richfield at that time. On February 13, 1962, the village of Richfield passed Ordinance No. 11.10 entitled "An Ordinance Relating to Business Activities on Sundays, Prohibiting Certain of Such Activities, and Providing Penalties for Violations." The predecessor of plaintiff A. M. Servicing Corporation commenced a declaratory judgment action shortly after the enactment of the ordinance seeking to have the ordinance declared invalid. The trial court found for the defendant village *815 and no appeal was taken from that decision, dated May 9, 1962. Plaintiffs' store remained closed on Sundays from May 1962 until October 11, 1964, during which period other stores in Richfield remained open and sold restricted items. There was testimony from owners and managers of those stores which remained open that their employees were instructed not to sell restricted items on Sunday, but several also testified that they were aware that at one time or another restricted items were sold either by inadvertence or in case of an assurance by the buyer that an emergency existed. The Richfield police officers apparently witnessed few violations in their regular investigation of the establishments which remained open on Sundays during this period and brought charges against only two. During September and October 1964, plaintiffs hired three persons to attempt to purchase restricted items in other stores in Richfield. It was apparent from affidavits of those persons that they were very successful in purchasing such items. In any event, plaintiffs wrote a letter to the officials of the village October 7, 1964, and informed them of the results of the purchasing project and their feeling that it revealed discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance. The letter also informed the officials that plaintiffs intended to again engage in business on Sundays, beginning October 11, 1964. On that Sunday plaintiffs' store did open for business and plaintiffs were charged with violation of the "Sunday closing" ordinance. Two other stores in Richfield, not owned by plaintiffs, were also served with complaints on that day charging them with violation of the same ordinance. The officer responsible for serving the complaints testified that he had been told by his supervisor to serve a couple of other stores so that it would not look as if the village were discriminating against the plaintiffs. Sales at the plaintiffs' store amounted to about $18,000 each Sunday the store was open from October 11, 1964, to the time of trial, October 29, 1964. Plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order on October 13, 1964, enjoining the village from enforcement of the ordinance and commenced this declaratory judgment action. After a decision on January 19, 1965, upholding the validity of the ordinance, the trial court restrained the village from enforcement of the ordinance until this court could determine the matter which is now before us on appeal. The legal issues raised by plaintiffs on appeal are: (1) Is Richfield Ordinance No. 11.10 invalid as being in conflict with Minn.St. 624.01 to 624.03? (2) Is the ordinance invalid on the basis that it attempts to regulate business in a field preempted by state law? (3) Has the village of Richfield been guilty of purposeful discriminatory enforcement of Ordinance No. 11.10 so that such further enforcement should be enjoined? 1. Turning to the first issue, there is little question as to the general law concerning the latitude allowed a municipality in passing ordinances relating to Sunday observance. It is simply that such ordinances passed by a municipality in the exercise of a police power conferred on it either expressly or by necessary implication will generally be upheld if they are not inconsistent with the state law. See, Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N.W. 967, 18 A.L.R. 733; Annotations, 29 A.L.R. 397, 400, and 37 A.L.R. 575. The leading annotation goes on to point out that the fact that there is a state law on the same subject as that covered by a municipal ordinance relating to Sunday observance does not render the ordinance invalid, provided the municipality has authority to legislate in that field and the ordinance is not in conflict with the state enactment. Annotation, 29 A.L.R. 397, 409. Although there are numerous cases supporting the general rule, the law is not too *816 clear as to when a particular ordinance conflicts with a state statute. For example, there is language in the cases which indicates that by lack of conflict is meant "harmony," City of Clinton v. Wilson, 257 Ill. 580, 586, 101 N.E. 192, 195; the "same direction," Ex parte Johnson, 20 Okl.Cr. 66, 72, 201 P. 533, 536; and that the ordinance does not authorize the doing of any act on Sunday which the general laws of the state have prohibited, City of St. Louis v. Bernard, 249 Mo. 51, 155 S.W. 394. The case which probably goes furthest in an effort to define the type of conflict which would make an ordinance invalid is the Minnesota case of Power v. Nordstrom, supra. This court there took account of nearly all of the other less definitive attempts when it stated (150 Minn. 232, 184 N.W. 969): Later Minnesota cases have not altered this test and for the most part have not been faced with a question of what constitutes conflict except in the area of ordinances making certain acts punishable as crimes by punishment which differs from the state standard. The law on that matter is well set out in City of Duluth v. Evans, 158 Minn. 450, 452, 197 N.W. 737, as follows: See, also, City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779; State v. Weeks, 216 Minn. 279, 12 N.W.2d 493; State v. Houston, 210 Minn. 379, 298 N.W. 358; State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N.W. 387, 531; State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202. Taking into consideration the discussions appearing in 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 143b(3); 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) § 23.07; and 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 5.20, together with Minnesota cases, it appears to us that the following general principles can be established: (a) As a general rule, conflicts which would render an ordinance invalid exist only when both the ordinance and the statute contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each other. (b) More specifically, it has been said that conflict exists where the ordinance permits what the statute forbids. Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N.W. 967, 18 A.L.R. 733. (c) Conversely, a conflict exists where the ordinance forbids what the statute expressly permits. Power v. Nordstrom, supra. A part of the holding of that case was that an ordinance requiring the closing of movie theatres on Sunday was not inconsistent with the state Sunday *817 closing statute since the latter, while not specifically forbidding threatres to open, did not expressly permit them to either. (d) It is generally said that no conflict exists where the ordinance, though different, is merely additional and complementary to or in aid and furtherance of the statute. This rule is illustrated in State v. Clarke Plumbing &amp; Heating, Inc., 238 Minn. 192, 56 N.W.2d 667. That case dealt with an ordinance requiring a license and permits to install heating systems. Defendant was denied a permit because his plans were not prepared by a registered engineer, as required by the ordinance. The court held the ordinance valid despite the existence of a similar statute that did not have as broad a coverage as the ordinance, saying that the city could well have determined that greater restriction was necessary in a community of its size. This was consistent with the statute. Guided by the above standards we now examine the legislative enactments in question. Minn.St. 624.01 to 624.03 (§§ 614.28 to 614.30 prior to renumbering by the revisor of statutes in 1963) provide: The pertinent parts of Richfield Ordinance No. 11.10 read as follows: "Section 2. Definitions. * * * Plaintiffs, in an attempt to find a conflict between the two enactments which would meet the test of the Power case, assert that the state law prohibits the sale of all groceries on Sunday while the local ordinance permits grocery stores which regularly employ four persons or less in the conduct of the business to sell groceries on Sunday. Thus plaintiffs maintain that the ordinance "specifically authorizes" what the statute forbids, and that the resulting conflict invalidates the ordinance. A reading of the section of the ordinance in question, § 5(2), reveals no such specific authorization. Defendant village, on the *819 other hand, maintains that all that the ordinance is actually doing is selecting a part of the statutethat prohibiting the sale of groceriesand emphasizing it by making it a violation of a local ordinance also when stores with four or more employees sell groceries on Sunday. This analysis has some merit. The terms of the statute and ordinance are not irreconcilable. This provision of the ordinance does not permit, authorize, or encourage violation of the statute. It might be termed a complementary regulation which simply fails to make sales of groceries by certain establishments an additional offense under the ordinance. See, Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321, 26 L.R.A. 234. It is our opinion that the governing body of Richfield, in the exercise of its ordinance-making functions and police powers, decided that it was in the best interest of the municipality under the facts and circumstances here not to prohibit by ordinance small stores employing four persons or less from selling on Sunday miscellaneous groceries for the convenience, use, health, and general welfare of the people in the community. This it may do, and the failure to create a prohibition as broad as that of the statute does not invalidate the ordinance. While there are other variances between this ordinance and the statute, it does not appear that they were alleged as conflicts at the trial level, and they are not argued before us on this appeal. 2. Plaintiffs here assert that the Richfield ordinance should be declared invalid because the state legislature has preempted the field of legislation on Sunday observance. Although some cases have confused the two and even used them interchangeably, it is our opinion that preemption and conflict are separate concepts and should be governed by separate doctrines. The pre-emption doctrine has also been known as the "occupation of the field" concept, and is familiar in drawing the line between state and Federal powers. It is based on the type of reasoning expressed by a California court in People v. Commons, 64 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 925, 930, 148 P.2d 724, 727, when it stated: There are many cases sustaining and many cases invalidating ordinances in the face of state legislation, and the area as a whole is pervaded with conflicts of authority. See, 37 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 166; 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 5.22.[1] The California court in In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398, 396 P.2d 809, 814, in attempting to create order of the many cases decided on the preemption issue in that state, stated: While the essence of Minnesota cases in the area of preemption has been to follow the type of analysis set forth by the California court, it has nowhere been clearly expressed what factors should be considered in determining whether or not there has been preemption. The Minnesota law in the area of preemption is limited, and much has to be inferred from the more general holdings of this court. It should first be stated that municipalities have no inherent powers and possess only such powers as are expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers which have been expressly conferred. Minnetonka Elec. Co. v. Village of Golden Valley, 273 Minn. 301, 141 N.W.2d 138; Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 96 N.W.2d 585. It is also true that a municipality can act to protect the security of the community and that in so doing it is not limited to the things enumerated in the general welfare clause in its charter. Minnetonka Elec. Co. v. Village of Golden Valley, supra; State ex rel. Remick v. Clousing, 205 Minn. 296, 285 N.W. 711, 123 A.L.R. 465; State v. Morrow, 175 Minn. 386, 221 N.W. 423; Crescent Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 175 Minn. 276, 221 N.W. 6. It would therefore seem that, generally stated, the rule would be that once the municipality is granted a charter with a general welfare clause, as the village has been, that clause will be construed liberally to allow effective self-protection by the municipality. With these broad policies in mind we turn to the narrower question of preemption. In looking at the Minnesota and other cases we should keep in mind four questions: (1) What is the "subject matter" which is to be regulated? (2) Has the subject matter been so fully covered by state law as to have become solely a matter of state concern? (3) Has the legislature in partially regulating the subject matter indicated that it is a matter solely of state concern? (4) Is the subject matter itself of such a nature that local regulation would have unreasonably adverse effects upon the general populace of the state? The most recent case involving preemption in Minnesota is Minnetonka Elec. Co. v. Village of Golden Valley, supra, in which this court stated that while local regulation of building and electrical installations may be valid, a municipality may not require a license of an electrical contractor since he is already licensed by the state. Clearly the subject matter in that case was licensing of electrical contractors, and the reasons for finding preemption were that the legislature had covered the complete subject matter with its regulation, and the adverse effects upon the electrical contractors of the state outweighed the policy of allowing local regulation. Another recent case dealing with preemption is State ex rel. Sheahan v. Mulally, 257 Minn. 27, 99 N.W.2d 892, in which this court stated that although there was a statute regulating disorderly conduct the municipality was not foreclosed from also proscribing such behavior. The legislature had not acted comprehensively on the subject; nor had it expressly indicated that it was a matter of state concern; nor were there adverse effects of local regulation which outweighed the historical regulation of this area by local governments. A case discussed at some length in the Sheahan case was State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, *821 98 N.W.2d 813, involving violation of a traffic ordinance. We recognized in that case that the legislature had allowed municipalities to regulate traffic but had specified that the statutory provisions be applicable and uniform throughout the state. The court held that the jury trial guaranteed in a prosecution under the statute must be allowed in a prosecution under the ordinance. The subject matter there was clearly traffic regulation, and the provision requiring uniformity and statewide application clearly showed the legislative intent to preempt this field except for the limited local regulation the statute expressly permitted. A further Minnesota decision is Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 96 N.W.2d 585, in which this court held a local ordinance requiring the licensing of boats to be invalid. The subject matter there was clearly boat licensing, and the grounds for finding preemption was that the subject matter was of such a nature that there would be unreasonably adverse effects upon the general populace of the state if local licensing were allowed. One other Minnesota case in this area is State v. The Crabtree Co., 218 Minn. 36, 15 N.W.2d 98, in which the court upheld the local regulation of cigarette sales in spite of a state statute covering the matter. The subject matter was obviously cigarette sales, and in that case the fact that another statute expressly allowed cities to regulate cigarette sales disposed of the issue. Other cases cited by plaintiffs and defendant on this issue are inapplicable inasmuch as they were decided on the question of whether there was a conflict with the statute or on some other basis. See, Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N.W. 967, 18 A.L.R. 733; City of Duluth v. Evans, 158 Minn. 450, 197 N.W. 737; State v. Weeks, 216 Minn. 279, 12 N.W.2d 493; State v. Marciniak, 97 Minn. 355, 105 N.W. 965; State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N.W. 387, 531; State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202. In the case before us the subject matter is clearly regulation of Sunday sales. It will be noted that the legislature did not expressly preclude local regulation of Sunday sales. It is also unlikely that the subject matter is such that local regulation would have unreasonably adverse effects upon the general populace of the state. It should be observed, however, that the varied types of ordinances and, in some places, their absence, in the different communities in the Twin City metropolitan area have resulted in very unequal or spotty regulation of Sunday sales in a small trade area. The result is that those stores located in areas without any regulation benefit anew as each other suburban community restricts the vendors in its own community. The other consideration in questions of preemption is whether the state legislature has so fully covered an area as to have made it an area solely of state concern. While this is a fairly close question in the instant case, it would appear that this area of Sunday closing is not one which has been impliedly declared by the legislature to be solely of state concern. This is not the type of legislative enactment which purports to completely dictate the specific regulation of an area as, for instance, the tax and traffic provisions do. Instead, this is a rather complete policy statement by the legislature which the local municipality should be able to shape to its own needs by supplementary ordinances. We find no reversible error here. 3. The third issue raised by plaintiffs is that the trial court erred in not finding that defendant has been guilty of purposeful discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance and should thus be enjoined from such further enforcement. Defendant does not seem to quarrel with the general assertion of plaintiffs that discriminatory enforcement of a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This issue boils down to a question of fact which must be determined in the first instance by the trial court. Its *822 determination will not be reversed by this court unless clearly erroneous. Rule 52.01, Rules of Civil Procedure. The relevant finding of the trial court reads as follows: In his memorandum the trial court further explained his finding as follows: This language, as well as that of the memorandum as a whole, reveals a careful consideration of the evidence as it was presented. We do not find sufficient evidence in the record to say that this decision was clearly erroneous, and we are unwilling to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Affirmed. [1] For a good discussion and critique of the problems in this area and their solutions by the California courts, see Haynes, The State v. The City: A Study in Pre-emption, 36 So.Cal.L.Rev. 430.