Title: Skjonsby v. Ness
Citation: 221 N.W.2d 70
Docket Number: 9001
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 1974

221 N.W.2d 70 (1974) Joe SKJONSBY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Joyce M. NESS, Defendant/Appellee. Civ. No. 9001. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 14, 1974. Rehearing Denied August 26, 1974. *72 Johnson, Milloy, Eckert &amp; Johnson, Wahpeton, and Lanier, Knox &amp; Olson by P. W. Lanier, Jr., Fargo, for plaintiff/appellant. Nilles, Hansen, Selbo, Magill &amp; Davies by John Michael Nilles, Fargo, for defendant/appellee. CLIFFORD JANSONIUS, District Judge, retired; now Supreme Court Commissioner. The legal issue in this case arises by virtue of an order of the trial court reducing a jury verdict or, in lieu thereof, granting a new trial. The main issue, therefore, is whether the trial court was justified in reducing the verdict or if such reduction amounted to an abuse of the court's discretion. The pertinent part of the order reads as follows: The parties to this lawsuit are brother and sister. The parents are still living and for many years the plaintiff, Joe Skjonsby, remained on the farm, assisting his father with the farming operations. Subsequently Joe Skjonsby rented land which he also operated. During the several years prior to 1970 and continuing through the cropping season of 1970 Joe apparently did all the farming, handling his father's land on a one-third, two-thirds lease arrangement. The record indicates that certain property transfers and joint tenancy transactions became known to Joe Skjonsby, these transactions involving the parents and the defendant, Joyce M. Ness. Joe Skjonsby then petitioned the court, asking that a guardian be appointed for the father, contending that he was not mentally competent to make decisions. This proceeding, which involved claims and counterclaims, was not concluded in court, a settlement having been effected and a stipulation entered into wherein it was agreed that the father was incompetent and should have a guardian. The claims which had been made against the plaintiff, Joe Skjonsby, were dismissed in this settlement with prejudice. The present action is brought on a claim that the plaintiff has sustained damages because of alleged slanderous statements made by the defendant, Joyce M. Ness. The first paragraph of the complaint reads: *73 The answer of the defendant was a general denial. The determination of the jury resulted in the plaintiff recovering a verdict for "actual damages for defamation of character in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), exemplary damages for injury to person through oppression, fraud or malice in the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00), for a total of $25,000.00." Judgment was entered accordingly. The defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial in accordance with Rule 59 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Numerous reasons and grounds were set forth in the motion, and the specifications of error go both to the law and the sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court, in its memorandum opinion required by Rule 59(f), disposed of each contention against the defendant except the matter of the amount of the verdict. The following portion of the memorandum opinion is pertinent to the facts involved: On appeal the parties have accepted the fact that the issues before the Court are: 1. Should the trial court have entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff as contrary to the weight of the evidence? 2. Did the trial judge manifestly abuse his discretion in granting a new trial, or requiring a reduction in the verdict from $25,000.00 to $2,500.00? In connection with the question of whether or not a new trial should have been granted, the defendant contends that "the alleged slanderous statement made by Joyce Ness is subject to a qualified privilege." The defendant contends that our statute, N.D.C.C. Sec. 14-02-05, in part, defines privileged communications as follows: North Dakota Century Code. Moen v. Moen, 65 N.D. 40, 256 N.W. 254 (1934), disposes of that contention when it states that the charging of thievery and other crimes constitutes slander per se. Damages are therefore presumed, and considering the question of the insufficiency of the evidence on appeal from the order denying the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it must be considered in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. The facts preclude a challenge to the finding of the jury, as the evidence is sufficient to sustain such finding, and it cannot be disturbed on motion or on appeal. Willard v. Owens, 164 N.W.2d 910 (N.D.1969); Christensen v. Farmers State Bank of Richardton, 157 N.W.2d 352 (N. D.1968); Johnson v. Frelich, 153 N.W.2d 775 (N.D.1967); Mikkelson v. Risovi, 141 N.W.2d 150 (N.D.1966); Larson v. Meyer, *74 135 N.W.2d 145 (N.D.1965); Nelson v. Scherling, 71 N.D. 337, 300 N.W. 803 (1941); La Bree v. Dakota Tractor &amp; Equipment Co., 69 N.D. 561, 288 N.W. 476 (1939). There is no argument or dispute as to the right of the trial court to reduce the damages or in lieu thereof grant a new trial if the verdict is deemed excessive and such excessiveness results from passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The grounds for a new trial are governed by N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)5, which reads as follows: The language of the rule above quoted is almost identical with the statute which preceded the adoption of our rules of civil procedure, having come down for many years entirely unchanged. The question of excessive damages and whether or not passion or prejudice entered into the verdict has been before the Court several times. In the case of Reid v. Ehr, 36 N.D. 552, 162 N.W. 903 (1917), decided by a divided opinion of three to two, the majority stated: The majority of the Court laid down the following rule: In a subsequent divided opinion the majority of the Court again decided the question in the same way but stressed the point that: The Legislature, by ch. 334, S.L.1923, gave the Court authority to reduce a portion of the verdict or grant a new trial. Thus the rule on remission of damages came into being in this state. *75 A review of the decisions, including Ziegler v. Ford Motor Co., 67 N.D. 286, 272 N.W. 743 (1937), leads the Court to believe that the rule in North Dakota, so far as pecuniary or special damages are concerned, permits the trial court to exercise its sound judicial discretion in making a determination as to whether passion or prejudice existed, and unless the court has abused its discretion, this court will not interfere. In many respects the case of Moen v. Moen is decisive of the problem presented here. The Court stated: The trial court, in reviewing the evidence, came to the conclusion that the verdict was clearly excessive, determining that the verdict was given under the influence of passion and prejudice, and that there should be a reduction in the verdict or a new trial had. The appellate court stated that it would not interfere except for an abuse of discretion. The case of Reid v. Ehr, supra, would lead one to believe that the question of exemplary damages might be treated differently from the issue of compensatory damages. We believe this point was overlooked in the decision in the case of Moen v. Moen and resulted in the Court applying the same criteria to both situations. This language was used in the decision: In the instant case the statements of the defendant, being slanderous per se, *76 justified the jury in finding both actual and punitive damages. A careful reading of the transcript does not indicate anything that would tend to establish a reason for believing that the jury was guided by passion or prejudice in arriving at their verdict. The fact that a verdict in a case of this kind is more than the court believes is justified does not entitle the court to substitute its judgment for that of the twelve jurors selected to try the case. The verdict in this case is in the amounts of $5,000 and $20,000. Certainly this amount of money is not so great as to justify a court in arriving at the conclusion that the jury disregarded their oath and let prejudice and passion take over. A situation somewhat analogous to this is found in the opinion in the case of Bolen v. Dolph, 62 N.D. 700, 704, 245 N.W. 259, 260 (1932): This statement was again emphasized in Ackerman v. Fischer, 79 N.D. 51, 54 N.W.2d 734, 739 (1952), which cites Bolen v. Dolph, supra. The action of the court in reducing the verdict of the jury on the matter of damages must be set aside unless there is a showing of a very positive nature that passion and prejudice entered into the award of the jury, this being a matter entirely within the province of the jury. Ordinarily, a new trial may be granted on the ground of excessiveness of the recovery, where, after making all due allowances, the verdict is clearly arbitrary, unjust, or such as to shock the conscience, or it is so excessive as to indicate the jury was influenced by passion, prejudice, or other improper motive. Leonard v. N. D. Co-op. Wool Market Ass'n, 72 N.D. 310, 6 N.W.2d 576 (1942); 66 C.J.S. New Trial Sec. 76, at 242-243 (1950). Cases attempting to define "passion" and "prejudice" in connection with jury verdicts are limited. A search of Words and Phrases reveals the following: From a review of the entire record, we conclude that the order denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed, and the order granting remittitur or a new trial is reversed and the original judgment reinstated. The verdict of the jury does not appear as to be such as would shock the conscience. The verdict as rendered by the jury was within the exercise of sound discretion. To hold otherwise would be to deny the plaintiff the right to trial by jury. Bolen v. Dolph, supra. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion by the Honorable CLIFFORD JANSONIUS, a retired judge and duly appointed and qualified Commissioner of the Supreme Court, is adopted and made the opinion and decision of the Court. KNUDSON, Acting C. J., and TEIGEN, VOGEL and PAULSON, JJ., concur. The Honorable RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice, deeming himself disqualified did not participate; the Honorable CLIFFORD JANSONIUS, Supreme Court Commissioner, sitting in his place.