Title: Ruff v. Ruff
Citation: 645 So. 2d 944
Docket Number: 93-CA-0293
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: November 17, 1994

645 So. 2d 944 (1994) Joan (Tate) RUFF v. Robert Jean RUFF, Jr. No. 93-CA-0293. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 17, 1994. Drue D. Birmingham, Jr., Olive Branch, for appellant. No Brief Filed for appellee; Before HAWKINS, C.J., and PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ. HAWKINS, Chief Justice, for the Court: On August 24, 1990, appellant Joan (Tate) Ruff (hereinafter Joan) filed a Complaint in the Nature of a Bill for Divorce. Sometime later, on January 7, 1992, she filed an Amended Complaint for Divorce. On January 21, 1992, Joan filed a Motion for Temporary Relief and a Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order Without Notice. The Temporary Restraining Order Without Notice was granted that same day. On January 28, 1992, Joan's husband Robert Jean Ruff, Jr. (hereinafter Robert), responded with his Answer to Complaint for Divorce and Counterclaim. Joan replied in turn with an Answer to Counterclaim for Divorce on February 3, 1992. Then, on February 10, 1992, her Order for Temporary Relief was granted. A hearing was held December 8, 1992, in the Chancery Court of DeSoto County before Chancellor Melvin McClure and a Final Decree of Divorce was entered December 21, 1992. Joan subsequently filed a Motion to Amend Judgment on December 23, 1992, which was denied on February 24, 1993. On March 16, 1993, she filed a Notice of Appeal. Joan (Tate) Ruff and Robert Jean Ruff, Jr., were married on April 11, 1984. No children were born to Joan and Robert although during the course of the marriage he adopted her daughter Nicole, born June 4, 1973. In 1986 Robert's parents gave about an acre and a half of land to him and Joan as tenants in the entirety. This gift split up a 20-acre tract which the parents owned and on which they lived. Robert and Joan then built a Jim Walter home upon their newly-acquired land. The value of this house is hard to determine. At the time of the hearing, a home mortgage of $46,000 was still outstanding. Furthermore, according to Joan, Robert was responsible for extensive damage caused to the home in her absence which would have to be repaired before the home could be sold. Finally, Joan stated that in her opinion the land was worth $1,300 an acre and the house was worth $50,000-$60,000. At the hearing, both parties testified that their marriage suffered greatly because of Robert's excessive drinking. According to Joan, Robert became intoxicated and passed out daily by drinking half a liter of Jack Daniels. He in turn admitted that his alcoholism was the primary cause of the problems *945 in their marriage. Joan additionally stated that Robert's drinking binges at times became violent with him attempting to kick in their bedroom door once, breaking their living room window twice, and trying to choke her so many times that she lost count. She also claimed that at one point in June of 1990: Joan left Robert that same month and filed for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences the following August 24. She returned in April of 1991, however, after Robert completed an alcoholic treatment program at Parkwood. Nevertheless, according to Joan, the drinking and violence soon resumed despite the treatment. She stated that another incident happened in December of 1991: The record states that Joan left Robert for the final time in November of 1991.[1] On January 7, 1992, Joan filed an Amended Complaint for Divorce which added the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. In addition, the amended complaint also contained an elaborate plan for the disposition of the parties' house. Joan requested that: Robert filed an Answer to Complaint for Divorce and Counterclaim on January 28, 1992, to which Joan replied on February 3, 1992. A hearing was held before Melvin McClure on December 8, 1992, who handed down his Final Decree of Divorce on December 21, 1992. The Chancellor granted Joan a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. His decree also stated: Disagreeing with the Chancellor's disposition of the property and plan for payment of attorney fees, Joan filed a Motion to Amend Judgment on December 23, 1992, which was denied by Chancellor McClure on February 24, 1992. Joan appealed to this Court on March 16, 1993. Although the appellant Joan Ruff cites four issues in her brief for this court to consider on appeal,[2] there is actually only one can a chancellor divest title from one spouse in a divorce action and vest it in the other? In the past there was some amount of confusion in the law of Mississippi as to whether a chancellor was so authorized. However, the case of Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993), laid the matter to rest. In that case the chancellor took title in the family home from the husband and forced him to deed it to his wife. In affirming the *947 actions of lower court, this Court stated, "The chancellor in a divorce case now has the authority to divest title from one spouse, and vest it in the other spouse, when equitably dividing the marital assets." Id. at 305. Furthermore, in order to determine what the proper equitable division of property between the spouses should be, a chancellor must make a careful analysis of the parties' economic contributions to the marriage. Johnson v. Johnson, 550 So. 2d 416 (Miss. 1989). Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994), and Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1994), provide useful guidelines for making this equitable division. The chancellor did not have the benefit of our decisions in Draper, Ferguson, and Hemsley that chancellors do have the authority to transfer title, and therefore did not have the occasion to consider the factors set forth in those decisions. We therefore reverse and remand for the chancellor to consider the principles enunciated in those recent decisions. In addition, as the chancellor's plan for repayment of attorney's fees was based upon his pre-Draper division of property, it too should be reversed and redetermined consistent with our recent holdings. This case is therefore reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., concurs in result only. [1] Note that this places the December, 1991, violent episode one month after Joan had moved out. The record does not explain this discrepancy. [2] It bears noting that the appellee Robert Ruff did not file an appellee's brief.