Title: State v. Cook
Citation: 362 N.C. 285
Docket Number: 341A07
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2008

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD LIONEL COOK
No. 341A07
FILED: 12 JUNE 2008
1.
Appeal and Error-–appealability--motion to dismiss--scope of dissent
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s appeal in a second-degree murder case
is denied even though defendant contends the State’s briefed arguments exceed the scope of the
dissent, because: (1) although the case cited by the State is distinguishable from the instant case,
it involved the issues of unfair surprise and the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
exclude evidence when the State unexpectedly advised on the day of trial that it would present an
expert on retrograde extrapolation; and (2) the State’s arguments fall within the scope of the
dissent.
2.
Criminal Law--denial of motion to continue--abuse of discretion--harmless
error 
Although the trial court abused its discretion in a second-degree murder case by
failing to grant a continuance based on the State’s failure to provide sufficient notice of an expert
witness, failure to provide sufficient notice of the nature of the expert testimony, and failure to
provide a copy of the expert’s retrograde extrapolation report within a reasonable time before
trial, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because: (1) defendant’s continuance
motion only sought more time to prepare a defense for the expert’s testimony; (2) even if a
continuance had provided defendant sufficient time to muster resources to rebut the expert’s
testimony, the State had abundant other admissible evidence of defendant’s impairment
including witnesses who observed defendant’s consumption of alcohol at a poker game;
witnesses who saw defendant’s erratic driving just before the crash; a paramedic in the
ambulance who smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath; defendant’s admission to the paramedic
that he had consumed alcohol; a physician’s note on defendant’s medical records that defendant
was intoxicated; the results of two blood samples showing alcohol, amphetamines, and
marijuana in defendant’s system shortly after the wreck; and the notation in defendant’s medical
records on the morning after the crash that he admitted to alcohol and marijuana consumption;
and (3) the trial court’s instructions to the jury on second-degree murder did not require the State
to prove that defendant was impaired since the State could prove either reckless driving or
speeding as an alternative to impairment, and numerous witnesses testified to defendant’s erratic
driving and speeding before the wreck.  The ruling of the Court of Appeals remanding to the trial
court for a hearing concerning the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to continue is
vacated, and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s
remaining assignments of error.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 184 N.C.
App. 401, 647 S.E.2d 433 (2007), finding no error in part and
-2-
remanding in part judgments entered 22 February 2006 by Judge
J.B. Allen, Jr. in Superior Court, Alamance County.  Heard in the
Supreme Court 18 March 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery, III,
Special Counsel, for the State-appellant.
Constance E. Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defender,
and Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, for
defendant-appellee.
EDMUNDS, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether the trial court
should have allowed defendant’s motion for continuance when the
State failed to provide timely discovery to defendant.  Although
we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
grant a continuance, we hold that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.  We vacate the ruling of the Court of Appeals
remanding this case to the trial court for a hearing concerning
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to continue and
remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of
defendant’s remaining assignments of error.
At trial, the State presented evidence that, on the
evening of 28 October 2004, defendant was playing poker and
drinking alcoholic beverages with friends and coworkers. 
Although he initially accepted an offer from one of the other
players for a ride to the hotel in Burlington where he was
staying, defendant drove away from the game in his own car.  Two
-3-
witnesses testified that they later observed defendant’s
automobile speeding and moving erratically moments before the
crash, swerving around other vehicles and veering onto the
shoulder.  Shortly after midnight on 29 October 2004, defendant
crashed his vehicle into a car parked on the shoulder of
Interstate 40/85.  Three men were sitting inside the parked car
and as a result of the impact, Anibal Amaya Guevara was killed. 
The other two occupants, Adan Guerrero Rosales and Sergio
Guerrero Rosales, suffered serious injuries.
Defendant complained of pain at the scene and was taken
to a hospital.  A paramedic in the ambulance smelled alcohol on
defendant’s breath and was advised by defendant that he had
consumed a couple of beers.  At the hospital, an emergency
department physician wrote on defendant’s medical records that
defendant was “intoxicated.”  A blood sample drawn at 1:38 a.m.
indicated that defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of
0.059 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.  The same
toxicology screen also yielded a positive result for amphetamines
and marijuana.  A second blood sample, drawn at 3:00 a.m., showed
defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.03 grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.  The hospital’s medical
records for defendant also included a 5:30 a.m. notation that
defendant “[a]dmits to [alcohol] and cannabis.”
-4-
On 14 February 2005, defendant was indicted for second-
degree murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury, as well as for several other charges
that were withdrawn before trial.  On 23 March 2005, defendant
filed a “Request for Voluntary Disclosure” pursuant to Article 48
of Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes, serving a
copy on the Office of the District Attorney.  In this request,
defendant sought, among other things, the name and curriculum
vitae of each expert witness the State intended to call, a
concise and specific statement of each expert opinion the State
intended to present, and the results of all reports of any
scientific tests or studies made in connection with the case. 
Defendant filed a second similar discovery request on 19 January
2006.
The State retained Paul Glover as an expert witness in
blood analysis and the effects of alcohol and drugs on human
performance and behavior.  Glover was a research scientist and
training specialist employed by the Forensic Test for Alcohol
Branch of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services.  Before defendant’s trial, Glover had testified
approximately one hundred times in North Carolina courts
regarding toxicology reports.
In a report dated 13 January 2006, Glover prepared a
retrograde extrapolation of defendant’s blood alcohol
-5-
concentration at the time of the crash.  Retrograde extrapolation
is a mathematical analysis in which a known blood alcohol test
result is used to determine what an individual’s blood alcohol
level would have been at a specified earlier time.  The analysis
determines the prior blood alcohol level on the bases of (1) the
time elapsed between the occurrence of the specified earlier
event (e.g., a vehicle crash) and the known blood test, and (2)
the rate of elimination of alcohol from the subject’s blood
during the time between the event and the test.  Glover’s initial
retrograde extrapolation report for defendant utilized
defendant’s 3:00 a.m. blood test along with an average blood
alcohol elimination rate of 0.0172 grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood per hour.  This analysis indicated that
defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood at the time of the crash.
Defendant’s trial had been set for Monday, 20 February
2006.  On Wednesday, 15 February 2006, the State notified
defendant that Glover would testify as an expert witness,
supplying Glover’s curriculum vitae but no other information. 
Two days later, on the afternoon of Friday, 17 February 2006, the
State provided defendant with Glover’s 13 January 2006 retrograde
extrapolation report.  The hearing transcript indicates that the
prosecutor received the written report on that Friday.
-6-
Upon receiving the report, defendant immediately filed
a motion to continue the trial for at least sixty days.  Citing
N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2), which regulates discovery of expert
testimony, defendant argued that the State had failed to notify
him of Glover’s expert opinion within a reasonable time before
trial.  Defendant’s counsel averred in the motion that he was
unfamiliar with blood alcohol concentration retrograde
extrapolation and that, as a result of the late notice, he lacked
sufficient time to find and consult an expert for defendant.
The trial court heard defendant’s motion to continue
the following Monday.  Although defense counsel stated to the
court that he sought a continuance because he needed time to
retain an expert, the discussion among the court, defense
counsel, and the prosecutor focused almost entirely on the
admissibility of retrograde extrapolation testimony and whether
Glover could be recognized as an expert.  After the court
instructed the prosecutor that he could not discuss Glover’s
proposed testimony in his opening statement, the court denied
defendant’s motion to continue and the trial began.
Glover testified that he was able to calculate the
specific rate at which defendant metabolized alcohol because
defendant’s blood was tested at two different times after the
crash.  Over defendant’s objections, Glover testified that, by
utilizing defendant’s actual blood alcohol elimination rate of
-7-
0.0147 in lieu of an average blood alcohol elimination rate of
0.0172, he calculated defendant had a blood alcohol concentration
of 0.07 at the time of the crash.  This concentration level was
lower than the 0.08 concentration Glover calculated in his
January 2006 report, which had been based on a single blood test
and an average rate of elimination.  Glover further testified
that the toxicology screen showed both amphetamines and marijuana
in defendant’s blood system.  In Glover’s expert opinion, the
combination of alcohol, amphetamines, and marijuana in
defendant’s system could have a synergistic effect, increasing
defendant’s impairment.
Defendant presented no evidence.  The jury found
defendant guilty of second-degree murder and both counts of
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.  The
trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of
176 to 221 months for second-degree murder and 27 to 42 months
for each count of assault.  Defendant appealed his second-degree
murder conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing in part that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
continue.
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals found no
error in part and remanded in part.  In its mandate remanding the
case, the majority instructed the trial court to hold a hearing
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning, among
-8-
other things, whether the State complied with N.C.G.S. § 15A-903
(“Disclosure of evidence by the State–Information subject to
disclosure”) and N.C.G.S. § 15A-907 (“Continuing duty to
disclose”) when it provided Glover’s curriculum vitae and
retrograde extrapolation report.  State v. Cook, 184 N.C. App.
401, 410-11, 647 S.E.2d 433, 439 (2007).  The dissenting judge
believed this issue was controlled by a prior Court of Appeals
opinion, State v. Fuller, 176 N.C. App. 104, 626 S.E.2d 655
(2006), and accordingly would have affirmed the trial court’s
denial of the motion to continue.  Cook, 184 N.C. App. at 413,
647 S.E.2d at 439–40 (Wynn, J., dissenting).  The majority
preserved defendant’s remaining assignments of error for
consideration after the trial court’s hearing and entry of order
on remand.  Id. at 411, 647 S.E.2d at 439.
[1] The State appeals to this Court as of right on the
basis of the dissent, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by
remanding the case for a hearing on the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion to continue.  In response, defendant initially
contends that the State’s appeal should be dismissed because the
State’s briefed arguments exceed the scope of the dissent, which
focused on whether the Court of Appeals holding in Fuller
controlled this case.  In addition, defendant filed with this
Court a separate “Motion To Dismiss State’s Appeal Or, In The
Alternative, To Strike The State’s Brief,” repeating the
-9-
arguments made in its brief concerning the scope of the State’s
appeal.  Although Fuller is distinguishable from the case at bar,
Fuller involved issues of unfair surprise and the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to exclude evidence when the
State unexpectedly advised on the day of trial that it would
present an expert on retrograde extrapolation.  We conclude that
the State’s arguments fall within the scope of the dissent and
deny defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s appeal.
[2] Defendant contends the State, within a reasonable
time before trial, failed to provide sufficient notice that
Glover would be called as an expert witness, failed to provide
sufficient notice of the nature of Glover’s expert testimony, and
failed to provide a copy of Glover’s retrograde extrapolation
report.  Defendant maintains that he was prejudiced both by the
State’s late provision of discovery and by the court’s denial of
his motion to continue.  As to each issue, defendant presents
arguments based on state and federal constitutional grounds and
on statutory grounds.
Turning first to defendant’s contentions concerning the
timeliness of the discovery, his rights to discovery are
statutory.  Constitutional rights are not implicated in
determining whether the State complied with these discovery
statutes.  “There is no general constitutional or common law
right to discovery in criminal cases.”  State v. Haselden, 357
-10-
N.C. 1, 12, 577 S.E.2d 594, 602 (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 988, 157 L. Ed. 2d 382 (2003); see also
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30, 42
(1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in
a criminal case, and Brady did not create one . . . .”).  We will
address defendant’s constitutional arguments below when we
consider whether he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of
his motion for a continuance.
The discovery process for criminal cases within the
original jurisdiction of our superior courts is governed by
Article 48 of Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-901 (2007).  Before filing a motion for discovery
“before a judge,” a defendant must make a written request for
voluntary discovery from the State.  Id. § 15A-902(a) (2007).  If
the State voluntarily complies with the discovery request, “the
discovery is deemed to have been made under an order of the
court,” id. § 15A-902(b) (2007), and the State then has a
continuing duty to disclose additional evidence or witnesses:
If a party, who is required to give or
who voluntarily gives discovery pursuant to
this Article, discovers prior to or during
trial additional evidence or witnesses, or
decides to use additional evidence or
witnesses, and the evidence or witness is or
may be subject to discovery or inspection
under this Article, the party must promptly
notify the attorney for the other party of
the existence of the additional evidence or
witnesses.
-11-
Id. § 15A-907 (2007).
Here, defendant filed two requests for voluntary
discovery.  Because the record indicates that the State
thereafter voluntarily provided some timely discovery pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-902(a), it was obligated to provide discovery as
to its expert witness and the expert’s report, pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2) and (b).  Section 15A-903(a)(2) governs
the State’s disclosure of expert witnesses and any reports made
by such witnesses.  Specifically, the State must:
(2)
Give notice to the defendant of any
expert witnesses that the State
reasonably expects to call as a witness
at trial.  Each such witness shall
prepare, and the State shall furnish to
the defendant, a report of the results
of any examinations or tests conducted
by the expert.  The State shall also
furnish to the defendant the expert’s
curriculum vitae, the expert’s opinion,
and the underlying basis for that
opinion.  The State shall give the
notice and furnish the materials
required by this subsection within a
reasonable time prior to trial, as
specified by the court.
Id. § 15A-903(a)(2) (2007) (emphasis added).  In discussing a
previous version of this statute, we stated that “‘[t]he purpose
of discovery under our statutes is to protect the defendant from
unfair surprise by the introduction of evidence he cannot
anticipate.’”  State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 585, 509 S.E.2d
752, 759 (1998) (quoting State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 455,
-12-
439 S.E.2d 578, 589 (1994)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838, 145
L. Ed. 2d 87 (1999).
We conclude the State violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2)
when it failed to furnish defendant with sufficient notice within
a reasonable time prior to trial.  Once the voluntary discovery
process began when defendant made his first request for voluntary
discovery on 23 March 2005 and the State initiated its response,
a continuing duty arose and lasted throughout the trial requiring
the State to disclose additional evidence or witnesses.  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-907 (stating the continuing duty to “promptly notify” the
opposing party of additional evidence or witnesses persists
“prior to or during trial”).  Although Glover’s report was
completed five weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, the
State failed to provide notice that it planned to call Glover as
a witness until five days before trial.  Even then, the State
provided only Glover’s curriculum vitae, which was insufficient
to put defendant on notice of the State’s intent to use blood
alcohol concentration retrograde extrapolation evidence at trial. 
Not until the afternoon of 17 February 2006 did the
State furnish Glover’s report to defendant.  Although the
prosecutor apparently provided the report as soon as it was
received in the District Attorney’s office, N.C.G.S. § 15A-
903(a)(2) requires that the State’s expert witnesses “shall
prepare, and the State shall furnish to the defendant, a report
-13-
of the results of any examination or tests conducted by the
expert.”  The record reveals that approximately five weeks
elapsed between the preparation of the report and its disclosure
to defendant the Friday before trial.  Only upon receipt of the
report did defendant learn he would be facing retrograde
extrapolation testimony.  Defendant then had just a weekend to
find his own expert in this field and to decide whether to call
such a witness to counter the State’s evidence.  Thus, under the
facts of this case, the State’s last-minute piecemeal disclosure
of its expert’s name, curriculum vitae, and written report was
not “within a reasonable time prior to trial” as required by
N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2).
The State nevertheless argues that this statute does
not apply because it is “unclear” whether blood alcohol
concentration retrograde extrapolation requires expert testimony
since the extrapolation is performed by a “simple mathematic
formula.”  If the process does not require an expert, the result
is not an examination or test subject to discovery under N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-903(a)(2).
This argument is undermined by the State’s pretrial
conduct.  The State provided Glover’s name, curriculum vitae, and
report to defendant and filed a corresponding “discovery
certificate” with the trial court, just as it would with any
other expert witness.  In addition, unlike its lay witnesses, the
-14-
State qualified Glover on voir dire as an expert on “blood
alcohol physiology, pharmacology, and the effects of drugs on
human performance and behavior” and questioned Glover on direct
examination regarding his “specialty” and “specialized degrees or
training experience.”  Moreover, North Carolina courts have
consistently regarded blood alcohol retrograde extrapolation as
the domain of expert witnesses.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 142
N.C. App. 81, 89–90, 542 S.E.2d 236, 241 (examining the “expert
testimony” of a toxicologist under the standard of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469
(1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 143
L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999), and noting “[w]e have accepted the
reliability of extrapolation evidence since 1985”), disc. rev.
denied, 353 N.C. 386, 547 S.E.2d 818 (2001); State v. Catoe, 78
N.C. App. 167, 168–69, 336 S.E.2d 691, 692–93 (1985) (holding
blood alcohol concentration retrograde analysis admissible when a
“qualified expert” gave “opinion testimony on scientific matters”
and noting the “simple mathematical extrapolation” performed),
disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 380, 344 S.E.2d 1 (1986).
Relying on the dissent in the Court of Appeals, the
State also argues that State v. Fuller, 176 N.C. App. 104, 626
S.E.2d 655 (2006), should have controlled.  In Fuller, the
defendant pled guilty in district court to driving while
impaired, then appealed to the superior court for trial de novo. 
-15-
Id. at 107, 626 S.E.2d at 657.  On the morning of trial, the
State gave notice to the defendant that it intended to call an
expert witness on blood alcohol concentration retrograde
extrapolation.  Id.  The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion to prevent the State from calling the expert witness and
the Court of Appeals found no error.  176 N.C. App. at 107–08,
626 S.E.2d at 657–58.
Fuller is distinguishable from the case at bar.  The
statutory discovery requirements at issue here were inapplicable
in Fuller because, as the Fuller court itself noted, these
discovery statutes apply only to cases within the original
jurisdiction of the superior court.  Id. at 107–08, 626 S.E.2d at
657; N.C.G.S. § 15A-901.  Moreover, the defendant in Fuller
attempted to have the expert’s testimony excluded outright. 
Here, in contrast, defendant instead sought only a continuance to
prepare for Glover’s testimony.  Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals panel was not bound by the holding in Fuller.
The State points out that the Court of Appeals noted in
Fuller that the defendant “was on notice that [extrapolation]
evidence might be offered” in the superior court trial because
extrapolation evidence “has been accepted in this State since
1985.”  Id. at 108, 626 S.E.2d at 657.  The State now adopts this
approach and argues defendant “should have known” extrapolation
evidence would be presented because the Court of Appeals in Catoe
-16-
first approved admission of such evidence in 1985, and defendant
“cannot close his eyes and hope the State will not offer certain
testimony.”
This argument echoes our statement in Murillo that
“[t]he purpose of discovery under our statutes is to protect the
defendant from unfair surprise by the introduction of evidence he
cannot anticipate.”  349 N.C. at 585, 509 S.E.2d at 759 (emphasis
added).  Here, defendant had no effective ability to “anticipate”
the evidence, as that term is used in Murillo.  For example,
while a defendant in a burglary or forgery case reasonably might
anticipate the State will use fingerprint evidence, the defendant
can do little to prepare to confront that evidence until he or
she has seen the latent prints the State intends to use and
copies of the report prepared by the State’s expert.  Similarly
here, defendant’s mere knowledge that the process of retrograde
extrapolation existed did not require him to anticipate that the
State would pursue this line of inquiry, retain an expert, and
present such evidence.  Even if defendant foresaw that the State
would present such evidence, he had virtually no ability to
prepare an effective response until he knew the result of the
State’s testing.
Defendant argues that no statute under Article 48
provides exceptions under which the State can fail to comply with
the discovery statutes and rely on defendant’s educated guess as
-17-
to what evidence the State will present.  This argument is
persuasive.  The language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2) is
mandatory, providing that once voluntary discovery is initiated,
the State “must” “[g]ive notice to the defendant of any expert
witnesses that the State reasonably expects to call as a witness
at trial.”  Each expert witness “shall prepare” and the State
“shall furnish” a report of any examinations or tests conducted
by the expert.  The State “shall furnish” an expert’s curriculum
vitae and opinion “within a reasonable time prior to trial.”  The
State’s proposed exception to these statutory provisions, if
accepted, would invite sandbagging.
Although we conclude that the State violated the
pertinent discovery statutes, defendant moved for a continuance
without seeking more severe sanctions for the violation.  The
trial court has discretionary power under N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-910(a)(2) to “[g]rant a continuance or recess” if a party
fails to comply with the discovery statutes.  Id. § 15A-910(a)(2)
(2007).  “Determining whether the State failed to comply with
discovery is a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.”  State v. Jackson, 340 N.C. 301, 317, 457 S.E.2d 862, 872
(1995) (citation omitted).  “The trial court may be reversed for
an abuse of discretion in this regard only upon a showing that
its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the
-18-
result of a reasoned decision.”  State v. Carson, 320 N.C. 328,
336, 357 S.E.2d 662, 667 (1987) (citation omitted).
After careful consideration, we conclude that the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to continue was an abuse of
discretion.  As noted above, defendant’s motion was filed the
Friday before trial and heard the day the trial was scheduled to
begin.  Defendant’s written motion cited N.C.G.S. § 15A-903, and
at the hearing defense counsel advised the trial court, “I don’t
believe I had sufficient time . . . to retain an expert on
Mr. Cook’s behalf.”  Nevertheless, the participants in the
hearing focused almost entirely on whether Glover could be
qualified as an expert and whether testimony based upon blood
alcohol concentration retrograde extrapolation had been found
admissible in previous cases.  Distracted by these questions, the
trial court made no mention during the hearing of the discovery
statutes nor of the timeliness of the notice to defendant.  Once
the trial court determined that the evidence was admissible, it
denied defendant’s motion.  We are satisfied that a continuance
would have alleviated any “unfair surprise” to defendant,
Murillo, 349 N.C. at 585, 509 S.E.2d at 759, and would have
“afforded the defense opportunity to meet [the State’s]
evidence,” Jackson, 340 N.C. at 317, 457 S.E.2d at 872. 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying defendant’s motion to continue.
-19-
In so holding, we are not establishing a bright line
rule automatically mandating a continuance whenever a party is
untimely in providing discovery.  The pertinent statute itself
only requires disclosure “within a reasonable time prior to
trial, as specified by the court.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2). 
Often, as here, a party providing discovery only a short time
before trial has just received it and is disclosing it
immediately.  We acknowledge that trial judges must have
substantial latitude to deal with the myriad unforeseeable
circumstances that arise during the course of litigation.  The
trial court here faced a familiar but difficult decision where
the motion had to be considered while the jury pool waited. 
Nevertheless, the information was prepared by the State’s expert
weeks before trial but was only revealed to defendant at the
eleventh hour.  The hearing transcript indicates that, even
before receiving Glover’s written report, the prosecutor planned
to use retrograde extrapolation analysis, though no notice had
been provided to defendant.  The furnishing to defendant of
Glover’s curriculum vitae the Wednesday before trial was,
standing alone, insufficient to put defendant on notice of the
type of expert testimony he faced.  While we are sympathetic to
the trial court’s dilemma, we believe that, in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation in the record for the delay between the
State’s expert’s preparation of the report and its provision to
-20-
defendant by the prosecutor, the trial court should have allowed
a continuance.  In so holding, we express no opinion as to an
appropriate duration, a matter best left to the discretion of the
trial court.
We next consider whether defendant was prejudiced by
the error.  Defendant raises the constitutional issues noted
above, contending that the denial of his motion to continue
violated his due process and confrontation rights under the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions because
“[i]mplicit in these constitutional provisions is the requirement
that an accused have a reasonable time to investigate, prepare
and present his defense.”  State v. Tunstall, 334 N.C. 320, 328,
432 S.E.2d 331, 336 (1993) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).  However, “[t]he denial of a motion to continue,
even when the motion raises a constitutional issue, is grounds
for a new trial only upon a showing by the defendant that the
denial was erroneous and also that his case was prejudiced as a
result of the error.”  State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 104, 291
S.E.2d 653, 656 (1982) (citation omitted).  Therefore, even
though we have concluded that the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion to continue, the error is subject to harmless
error analysis.  “A violation of the defendant’s rights under the
Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the
-21-
appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(b) (2007).
Here, even if we assume without deciding that
defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by the denial of
a continuance, the record demonstrates that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Gardner, 322
N.C. 591, 595, 369 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1988) (“Assuming without
deciding that the error complained of is of constitutional
dimension, we are satisfied that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”)  Defendant’s continuance motion only sought
more time to prepare a defense for Glover’s testimony.  However,
even if a continuance had provided defendant sufficient time to
muster resources to rebut Glover’s testimony utterly, the State
had abundant other admissible evidence of defendant’s impairment,
including witnesses who observed defendant’s consumption of
alcohol at the poker game; witnesses who saw defendant’s erratic
driving just before the crash; a paramedic in the ambulance who
smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath; defendant’s admission to
the paramedic that he had consumed alcohol; a physician’s note on
defendant’s medical records that defendant was “intoxicated”; the
results of two blood samples showing alcohol, amphetamines, and
marijuana in defendant’s system shortly after the wreck; and the
notation in defendant’s medical records on the morning after the
crash that he admitted to alcohol and marijuana consumption. 
-22-
Glover’s extrapolation testimony was but a thread in the web of
evidence presented by the State.
In addition, the trial court’s instructions to the jury
on second-degree murder did not require the State to prove that
defendant was impaired.  The court followed the pattern
instruction on second-degree murder by motor vehicle and listed
impairment as one of several methods of satisfying the element of
the offense that defendant violated a law governing the operation
of a motor vehicle.  The pertinent instructions were:
Now, I charge you for you to find the
defendant, Richard Cook, guilty of second
degree murder, the State must prove six
things beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . .
Fourth, that the defendant violated the
following law or laws of this State governing
the operation of the motor vehicle.
The law of this State makes it unlawful
to drive while impaired, to drive recklessly
and [to] exceed the posted speed limit.  For
you to find the defendant guilty of impaired
driving, the State must prove these things
beyond a reasonable doubt.  That the
defendant was driving a vehicle.  That he was
driving the vehicle on a highway within the
State.  And that at the time the defendant
was driving that vehicle, he was either:
(A) Was under the influence of an impairing
[substance].  Alcohol is an impairing
substance.  Amphetamines is an impairing
substance.  Marijuana is an impairing
substance.
. . . .
Or (B) The defendant had consumed
sufficient alcohol at any relevant time after
the driving the defendant had an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more grams of alcohol
in his blood. . . . 
-23-
Now, for you to find the defendant
guilty of reckless driving, the State must
prove two things.  That the defendant drove a
vehicle on a highway.  I-40/I-85 in Alamance
County is a highway.
And second, that he drove that vehicle
on I-85/I-40 by speeding, running another
vehicle off the road, and hitting a parked
vehicle in the emergency lane.  And in so
doing, he acted carelessly and heedlessly in
willful or wanton disregard to the rights or
safety of others.
And for you to find the defendant guilty
of exceeding the posted speed limit, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant drove a vehicle on a
highway in this State at a speed exceeding
the posted speed limit.
Thus, to establish the fourth element, the State could
prove either reckless driving or speeding as an alternative to
impairment.  As detailed above, numerous witnesses testified to
defendant’s erratic driving and speeding before the wreck. 
Accordingly, the State was not limited to proof that defendant
was impaired to secure a conviction of second-degree murder by
vehicle.
We find beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to continue was harmless
error.  Although the State violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-903(a)(2) when
it failed to provide defendant with the required information
“within a reasonable time prior to trial,” and the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to grant defendant’s motion to
continue the trial, defendant suffered no prejudice.
-24-
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals as to
the appealable issue of right, that is, whether the Court of
Appeals erred in remanding this case to the trial court for a
hearing on the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
continue, and we vacate the Court of Appeals remand to the trial
court.  The remaining issues addressed by the Court of Appeals in
its opinion are not properly before this Court and its decision
as to these issues remains undisturbed.  This case is remanded to
the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s remaining
assignments of error.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.