Title: People v. Capers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S146939
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 8, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LEE SAMUEL CAPERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S146939 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FBA06284 
 
 
August 8, 2019 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
S146939 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
A San Bernardino County jury found defendant Lee 
Samuel Capers guilty of the first degree murders of Nathaniel 
Young and Consuelo Patrida Young.  (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. 
(a).)1  As relevant here, the jury found true multiple murder, 
robbery-murder, and burglary-murder special circumstances.  
(§§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (a)(17), & (a)(17)(G).)  The jury found 
defendant guilty of two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211), 
arson of property (§ 451, subd. (d)), and felon in possession of a 
dagger in a penal institution (§ 4502, subd. (a)).  The jury found 
defendant personally used a deadly weapon—a handgun—
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subd. (b).  The jury 
separately tried and found defendant’s five prior section 211 
robbery convictions to be true.   
After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.2  
The court denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict and 
imposed a judgment of death.  (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)  This appeal 
                                        
1 
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise stated. 
2 
As to the noncapital count of being a felon in possession of 
a dagger, defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life.  The court 
stayed the sentences on the remaining noncapital counts.  
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its 
entirety. 
I.  The Facts 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Overview 
 
The evidence showed that on Monday, November 9, 1998, 
defendant and three accomplices entered the Barstow T-shirt 
shop owned by married couple Nathaniel and Consuelo Young, 
robbed the store, shot and killed Nathaniel, and raped and beat 
Consuelo before killing her.  They then set fire to both victims’ 
bodies. 
Defendant cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but 
presented no evidence of his own. 
2.  Prosecution Evidence 
Nathaniel and Consuelo, who had been married for seven 
years, opened a T-shirt store in Barstow called “T’s Galore ’N 
More” in 1998.  Consuelo typically managed the store because 
Nathaniel worked on the Marine Logistics Base nearby.   
 
Ramon Tirado lived behind the T-shirt shop and had 
known defendant and defendant’s half-brother Anthony 
Leatham for years.  Leatham and two other individuals 
inquired about the Barstow T-shirt shop that the Youngs 
owned.  He asked Tirado to join them in robbing the store.  
Tirado declined.  
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
 
On Monday November 9, 1998, Nathaniel did not arrive 
for his scheduled shift at the base; he had never missed work 
without first calling.  After he missed work the next day, 
Margaret Carter, the base’s comptroller, became concerned.  She 
called his home and left a message on his answering machine.  
She then asked a superior what to do about her concern.  He told 
her to call the Barstow Police Department and request a welfare 
check, which she did.   
 
At the same time Margaret called the Barstow police, two 
of Nathaniel’s colleagues at the base, Loretta Becknall and 
Nancy Derryberry, went to the T-shirt store to check on him.  
They could not see inside the store because soot covered the 
windows.  The colleagues notified Margaret that there might 
have been a fire at the store.  Margaret again called Barstow 
police and also spoke to Bonnie Hulse, an investigative assistant 
for the Criminal Investigation Division of the Marine Corps.  
Margaret was told to call the Provost Marshal, who had 
jurisdiction over the military base.  The Provost Marshal’s Office 
notified the Barstow Fire Department.   
 
On 
Tuesday, 
November 
10, 
1998, 
Barstow 
Fire 
Department personnel inspected the victims’ T-shirt store for 
signs of a fire.  Salvatore Carrao, the Barstow Fire Department 
Division Chief, and Fire Engineer Steve Ross noticed heavy 
black soot on the inside of the store windows.  They checked the 
front door, but it did not open.  They checked the back door, 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
which was unlocked, and Carrao opened it to look inside.  He 
immediately saw two corpses and concluded there had been a 
fire inside.  He closed the door, called law enforcement, and 
secured the store.   
 
Law enforcement soon arrived.  Barstow Police Sergeant 
Andrew Espinoza and criminalist Randy Beasley entered the 
building.  There they found five .45-caliber bullets and only one 
bullet casing.  They also found a trash can that contained blood, 
water, and a bloody mop.  Taken together, Beasley believed 
these items strongly suggested that someone had attempted to 
clean up a crime scene.  Beasley found a pair of women’s panties 
in a toilet that had been cut straight across, from one leg hole to 
the other.  Beasley also found a wallet and a purse next to each 
other.  The wallet, which belonged to Nathaniel, contained no 
money or credit cards.  Consuelo’s purse also contained a wallet, 
which, like Nathaniel’s held no money.  One of the bodies, 
tentatively identified as Nathaniel’s, was stained with blood, 
and duct tape had been wrapped around its throat and neck.  
The body was partially burned.   
 
Fire inspection specialist Rita Gay was also on the scene.  
She believed the fire to have been a “slow burn” that did not 
immediately flame up but smoldered for a long time.  Gay 
observed soot on the furnishings and floor.  She saw the two 
victims on the floor.  The male victim lay prone and had golf 
clubs laying across his back.  The female victim was more 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
severely burned, such that the left side of her body had been 
largely consumed by fire.  Gay detected the odor of gasoline in 
close proximity to the bodies.  Gay did not examine either victim, 
but concluded that each had been separately set on fire. 
 
Law enforcement personnel identified the second body as 
likely belonging to Consuelo.  Her body had been largely 
consumed by the fire; much of her remains consisted of ashes 
and bones.  They also discovered a large amount of blood and 
two metal golf clubs covered in blood.  They noticed human hair 
on the golf clubs and deemed it to have come from Consuelo’s 
head because she had wavy hair while Nathaniel’s was more 
tightly curled.  Catherine Wojcik, a sheriff’s department 
criminalist, later compared the hairs found at the crime scene 
with the hair of both victims.  Wojcik determined that the two 
hairs found on the golf club were similar to samples of 
Consuelo’s hair, though she could not say definitively that they 
came from Consuelo.  She determined Nathaniel was not the 
source of the two hairs.   
 
Arson investigators later concluded the perpetrators had 
started two fires, each originating on the body of the two victims.  
A thick greasy substance was observed on the floor adjacent to 
the bodies; investigators concluded it might have been the 
victims’ melted body fat.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
 
Charlene Garcia, Nathaniel’s daughter, cleaned out the T-
shirt store.  She informed the police that Nathaniel’s gun was 
the only item she found missing.   
 
Forensic pathologist and deputy medical examiner Dr. 
Steven Trenkle performed autopsies on both bodies.  He testified 
that Nathaniel had been shot at least four times, and that his 
body contained eight entrance and exit wounds and had been 
moderately charred by fire.  One bullet had cut through the 
brain stem and lodged in the base of the skull, and another went 
through the neck and severed the first cervical vertebrae 
underneath the skull.  None of the injuries were consistent with 
having been struck with a metal golf club.  Dr. Trenkle 
concluded Nathaniel died as a result of multiple gunshot 
wounds to the head, neck, and chest.   
Dr. Trenkle explained that Consuelo had suffered 
extensive blunt force trauma and that her body had been 
significantly burned.  As noted, much of her body had been 
consumed in the fire.  The blunt force trauma had shattered the 
skull and facial bones.  Dr. Trenkle concluded Consuelo died as 
a result of multiple blunt force head injuries.  He could not be 
certain whether Consuelo was alive when her body was burned.   
 
On November 15, 1998, Barstow Police Officer John 
Cordero notified Barstow Police Detective Leo Griego that 
defendant wished to speak with Griego about the T-shirt store 
murders.  Griego spoke with defendant, first at defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
residence and later at the Barstow Police Department.  
Defendant denied involvement in the murders, but said he knew 
two of the people involved.   
 
Lisa Martin became acquainted with defendant a month 
after the murders.  She let defendant stay at her home.  During 
his stay, defendant mentioned four or five times how he killed a 
man and woman in Barstow.  Defendant described how he 
personally shot the man, poured gasoline on both victims, and 
lit them on fire.  He told Lisa that the woman begged and 
screamed for her life and that he thought it was funny.  He also 
told her that he committed the crimes with his younger half-
brother, Antonio Leatham (whom he called “Eagle”).  Lisa 
testified that defendant kept the lighter he used to set the 
victims on fire and showed no remorse for killing them.  
Leatham also came to Lisa’s house at one point and defendant 
mentioned the murders in front of him.  Blake Martin-Ramirez, 
Lisa’s 14-year-old son, testified that he heard defendant 
describe his role in killing the victims and taking their sports 
car.  About a week after defendant told Lisa about the murders, 
she called defendant’s mother and told her to move him out of 
the apartment.   
 
Griego’s investigation focused on defendant and Leatham 
as suspects.  In January 1999, Griego questioned defendant, 
who was incarcerated at Chino State Prison.  Defendant again 
denied involvement in the crimes.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
 
In December 1999, Griego collected defendant’s biological 
samples so they could be compared to DNA samples obtained 
from evidence collected at the crime scene.  All the DNA 
collected at the crime scene was matched to either Consuelo or 
Nathaniel.   
 
Although defendant had denied involvement in the crimes 
and only talked about who he thought might have committed 
the T-shirt store murders, his version of events surrounding the 
murders changed when he met with detectives Steve Shumway 
and Ronald Sanfilipo on January 5, 2001.  The interview, 
conducted at the Riverside Police Department, came about 
because defendant’s cellmate in Riverside County Jail told 
authorities that defendant had discussed a Barstow double-
murder where the victims had been burned.  Griego watched on 
a video monitor in an adjoining room.  After being read and 
waiving his Miranda3 rights, defendant explained he had asked 
to speak to them about the murders because it was “something 
that ha[d] been weighing [him] down.”4 
After a half-hour’s conversation, Griego entered the 
interview room.  Defendant again was read and waived his 
Miranda rights, and he and Griego discussed the crimes for 45 
                                        
3  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 184 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 
4 
These interviews, in redacted form, were played for the 
jury during trial and entered into evidence as exhibits.  (Exh. 
78A-83A.)  The jury was also provided with transcripts of the 
redacted recordings.  (Exh. 78B-83B.)  
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
minutes to an hour.  Defendant was then transported to the 
Barstow Police Department where detectives Griego and Keith 
Libby conducted an interview.  During that interview, 
defendant, who was 24 years old (and nicknamed “Oso”) at the 
time of the murders, explained that he committed the crimes 
with 15-year-old Carlos Loomis (whom he called “Bam-Bam”), 
22-year-old Ruben Romero (whom he called “Wino”), and 
“another guy ” (whom he sometimes called “the other juvenile” 
or “a 14-year-old kid.”  Defendant consistently asserted the 
fourth perpetrator was not his half-brother Leatham.5   He said 
Loomis and Romero offered him “an ounce of dope and money if 
he agreed to act as a lookout” during a robbery.  Defendant said 
he agreed to be a lookout because “he was real bad on dope.”  
Defendant maintained that Romero was in charge, and while 
they were all waiting around before the robbery, defendant went 
to Barstow Liquor and purchased a 40-ounce beer, half of which 
he drank immediately.  Once the robbery commenced, Loomis 
                                        
 
5 
Apparently, the police knew that Loomis brought a stolen 
vehicle to the area, and that Romero had committed a robbery 
at the Downtown Motel, directly across from the Young’s store.  
Detectives Griego and Espinoza contacted Loomis on February 
6, 2001, at the former California Youth Authority facility in Paso 
Robles, California, and Romero on February 9, 2001, at 
Ironwood State Prison in Blythe, California.  Loomis told Griego 
that he knew nothing about the Young murders.  Griego found 
two rolls of duct tape at Loomis’s house, but the tape did not 
match the duct tape found at the T-shirt store.  Neither Loomis 
nor Romero nor Leatham was charged with the Young robbery 
and murders.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
and Romero verbally and physically abused the victims and 
“took the couple out of [defendant’s] line of sight.”  About 10 or 
15 minutes later, defendant heard gunshots.  Loomis and 
Romero jumped into a blue or white Camaro and told defendant 
that they were headed to a Motel 6.  Defendant then went back 
to his mother’s house.   
Detective Libby then told defendant that telling only “a 
little bit of the truth” would not be good for him, and that it 
would be best if he told the “whole truth.”  Libby also said that 
if defendant wanted him to believe that Leatham was not 
involved in the murders, he would have to convince him that 
he was telling them the “complete truth.”  Defendant then 
admitted that he entered the store and forced Consuelo and 
Nathaniel through the store’s back door.  Defendant claimed 
that Loomis hit Consuelo with a stick-like object several times.  
During the beating, Consuelo was pleading:  “Stop please.  
Don’t hurt us.  Don’t hurt us.”  According to defendant, Romero 
shot Consuelo before Loomis raped her while she was barely 
moving and forced Nathaniel to watch.  Defendant said that 
during the rape, Consuelo had screamed “for a little while.”  
During this same interview, defendant said that he beat 
Nathaniel a number of times after Nathaniel yelled and 
screamed to protect his wife.   
 
Defendant also said that Romero then shot a .45-caliber 
firearm with a taped-up handle an unspecified number of times, 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
but defendant did not say whom he shot, or how he came into 
possession of the gun.  He said, “I know my guns . . . I’ve been 
messing with guns for a long time, [so I] knew the caliber . . . 
right off the top.”  Defendant also said, “I didn’t pull the trigger; 
I didn’t rape nobody; I didn’t set nobody on fire.”  After the rape, 
beating, and shooting, defendant said either Romero or Loomis 
used gasoline and a lighter to set the bodies on fire.  When 
asked, defendant said he could not recall anyone cleaning up the 
crime scene.  He also said that someone, probably Loomis, had 
gathered up the .45-caliber shell casings.   
 
After completing the robbery and murders, defendant said 
he and the other perpetrators stole a Camaro parked at the store 
and drove it to a nearby Motel 6, where they went their separate 
ways.  At the end of the interview, defendant agreed to walk the 
detectives through the crime scene.   
 
The next day, officers taped defendant’s reenactment of 
the crimes at the T-shirt store.  Defendant reiterated what he 
told officers during the interviews the day before and again 
admitted to beating Nathaniel.  At the conclusion of the 
reenactment, defendant said, “I’m just as guilty as the man who 
pulled the trigger and the man who started the fire.”  Defendant 
said he felt bad for the victims, that “it wasn’t supposed to 
happen that way to them, you know, but that still isn’t going to 
change the fact that I was actually involved here and it’s not 
going to change the fact, yes, I’m expecting a conviction out of 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
this and whatever I receive, I deserve, that’s it.  That’s all I got 
to say.”  Two weeks later, Griego contacted Leatham to speak 
with him about the murders before transporting Leatham to the 
Riverside Police Department so that he could speak with 
defendant before his arraignment on an unrelated offense. 
 
During a subsequent interview on January 25, 2001, 
defendant took full responsibility for the crimes.  Defendant 
assured detectives that he was now confessing because he 
wanted to come clean.  He admitted that the crimes happened 
quickly and that he fired the fatal shots.  He subsequently 
disposed of the murder weapon and the shell casings near 
some railroad tracks.  However, he said Loomis poured the 
gasoline on the victims, and Romero lit them on fire.  He also 
claimed Leatham stayed outside during the murders and did 
not do anything.  He then stated:  “But just so you know, get 
my little brother involved with this, you know, putting him in 
custody, you know, I mean, where does [Loomis] and [Romero] 
fall into this?  You know what I mean. It seems like this is just 
a conspiracy against me and him.  Me and my brother you 
know?”  After defendant was asked why he wanted to “take the 
rap” for everyone, defendant replied, “Just charge me with 
everything, you know what I mean?”  He could not remember 
who he shot, but he did remember that he shot three rounds.  
He did not want to tell detectives where he got the gun, fearing 
that his “whole family would be in jeopardy and everything you 
know what I mean?”   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
 
Detectives Griego and Espinoza interviewed defendant 
one last time at North Kern State Prison on April 16, 2002.  
Defendant said he met with the group to plan the robbery.  
During the robbery, defendant took $100 in cash and the keys to 
the Camaro from Nathaniel’s pocket.  He also stole Consuelo’s 
wedding ring, trading it for “dope.”  Since Nathaniel continued 
yelling during the robbery, the group bound him with duct tape.  
Defendant then poured gasoline on the victims to scare them 
into giving him their money.  Defendant changed his story to say 
that Romero then shot the victims, but defendant used a lighter 
to set them on fire.  He said he dropped a match on them but it 
“didn’t ignite.”  When asked who started the fire, defendant said, 
“somebody else could have . . . hit them with a match or 
something, I don’t know.  I do remember that when I dropped 
that match it did not go up.”  He said he did not want to 
implicate anyone else because he “can’t really identify the 
individuals with me.”  He also said he did not feel bad for the 
victims and their families because he was “gonna have to do 
prison time.”   
Detective Dennis Florence testified that a shoot-out 
involving a man named Jerry Corhn occurred in March 2002.  
Corhn fired on officers as they pursued him following an 
attempted narcotics transaction at a restaurant in Barstow.  
Corhn ultimately died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the 
head.  Ballistics testing showed that the .45-caliber firearm 
recovered from Corhn’s vehicle matched bullet casings recovered 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
from the T-shirt store murders.  When Griego showed defendant 
a photo lineup that included a picture of Corhn, defendant 
pointed to Corhn’s picture and said he knew him because Corhn 
had purchased a firearm from him when he was staying in 
Barstow.   
3.  Defense Evidence 
 
Defendant did not testify at trial, nor did he present any 
evidence.  He did attempt to call one witness, Amber Renteria-
Kelsey, but she successfully invoked her Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination, and the court excused her.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
Lisa Martin and her mother, Penny Bartis, testified that 
on January 4, 2000, a month after he moved out of Martin’s 
home, defendant returned with two other men and committed a 
home invasion robbery.  Defendant knocked on the door.  When 
Bartis answered, defendant burst into the house.  His two 
accomplices followed and took the victims to a back bedroom.  
Defendant was armed and threatened to kill Martin and her 
family.  He then stole money and personal property.  Martin 
testified that the robbery lasted several hours, and defendant 
and his accomplices stole $6,000 cash as well as jewelry, 
expensive vases, a safe, and important papers.  Martin 
explained that after the robbery defendant called her and told 
her that her son, who was also present during the robbery, was 
being watched.  She subsequently took her son out of school.  
Bartis testified that after the robbery, she received four or five 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
phone calls from defendant asking for Martin.  Martin fled to 
Colorado, leaving her son with Bartis.   
 
Misty Sedillo testified that in 1993, when she was 16 years 
old, she rode with defendant in a car.  Defendant and his friends 
wanted to shoot at a house, but Misty asked them not to because 
her brother was playing in the front yard.  Later during the ride, 
defendant pointed a gun at Misty’s head.   
 
In September 2002, a deputy sheriff found a homemade 
shank in defendant’s jail cell.  Defendant said he feared for his 
life and that he would not hesitate to use the shank and would 
make another.  He also admitted that for two months he 
smuggled the shank into court because he planned to stab one 
of the witnesses who was testifying against him.  Another 
deputy sheriff found a letter defendant tried to mail to elected 
District Attorney Michael Ramos.  In the letter, defendant 
advised the prosecution to give him the death penalty or else 
there will be “a lot of blood” on the “County’s hands.”  The 
prosecution also presented evidence of defendant’s 1994 felony 
conviction for receiving stolen property.   
 
Charlene Garcia, Nathanial’s daughter and Consuelo’s 
stepdaughter, testified that her parents’ murder had a 
significant negative impact on her and her family.   
 
Defendant presented the testimony of Albert Capers, his 
biological grandfather. Capers stated that he and his wife 
adopted and raised defendant, whom they loved.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Issues Regarding Guilt 
1.  Alleged Lack of Independent Evidence 
 
Defendant initially contends that his statements to law 
enforcement about his involvement in the T-shirt store crimes 
were so inconsistent and contradictory that they could not serve 
as corroboration of one another.  He does not challenge the 
admission of his statements on Miranda grounds.  However, he 
contends that because there was no physical evidence or 
eyewitness testimony to corroborate the trustworthiness of any 
one of his various confessions, his conviction must be reversed.  
Defendant relies on the federal common law corroboration rule 
intended to prevent errors in convictions based on a witnesses’ 
untrue statement alone.  (Opper v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 
84, 93.)  If applied here, the rule means that defendant’s 
admissions or confessions may not serve as the basis for his 
conviction absent “substantial independent evidence which 
would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the [admissions 
or confessions].”  (Ibid.)  However, as part of the federal common 
law, we are not bound to follow the federal corroboration rule.   
Some state courts follow the federal corroboration rule 
(see, e.g., Armstrong v. State (Alaska 1972) 502 P.2d 440, 447), 
but California does not.  We instead apply the corpus delicti rule, 
which originally required independent proof of an actual crime 
before extrajudicial admissions could be admitted as evidence.  
(See People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1169-1170 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
(Alvarez).)  The rule derives from California common law.  (Id. 
at p. 1173.)   
In 1982, Proposition 8 abrogated much of the corpus delicti 
requirement when it added the Right to Truth-in-Evidence 
provision to article I of the California Constitution.  (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 28, subd. (d), added by initiative, Primary Elec. (Jun. 8, 
1982), commonly known as Prop. 8 (section 28(d).)6  As Alvarez 
observed, with certain exceptions, Proposition 8 abolished “all 
state law restrictions on the admissibility of relevant evidence, 
necessarily including the prong of the corpus delicti rule that 
bars introduction of an accused’s out-or-court statements absent 
independent proof a crime was committed.”  (Alvarez, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 1179; see People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 341.)  
We cautioned that the pre-2008 version of “section 28(d) did not 
eliminate the independent-proof rule insofar as that rule 
prohibits conviction where the only evidence that the crime was 
committed is the defendant’s own statements outside of court.”  
(Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)  We noted that the 
amount of independent evidence required is not great and may 
be circumstantial with only “ ‘a slight or prima facie showing’ ” 
that permits “an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a 
criminal agency, after which the defendant’s statements may be 
                                        
6  
Subdivision (d) of section 28 of article I of the California 
Constitution was redesignated to be subdivision (f)(2) by voter 
initiative in 2008.  (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 5, 2008).) 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
considered to strengthen the case on all issues.”  (Id. at p. 1181.)  
Alvarez made it clear, however, that the pre-2008 version of 
“section 28(d) did not affect the rule to the extent it (1) requires 
an instruction to the jury that no person may be convicted 
absent evidence of the crime independent of his or her out-of-
court statements or (2) allows the defendant, on appeal, directly 
to attack the sufficiency of the prosecution’s independent 
showing.”  (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)   
Even though the prosecution need satisfy only one prong 
of section 28(d)’s post-Proposition 8 requirement, both prongs of 
original section 28(d) were met here.  Specifically, the record 
shows that the trial court instructed with CALJIC No. 2.72, 
which informed the jury that defendant’s statements to law 
enforcement must be supported by independent evidence:  “No 
person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is 
some proof of each element of the crime independent of any 
confession or admission made by him outside of this trial.  [¶]  
The identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a 
crime is not an element of the crime nor is the degree of the 
crime.  The identity or degree of the crime may be established 
by a confession or admission.  [¶]  The corpus delicti of a felony-
based circumstance need not be proved independently of a 
defendant’s extrajudicial statement.”  Indeed, defendant’s words 
alone may establish the degree of his crime or his identity as the 
perpetrator.  (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 297; 
People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 721.)  The jury was 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
also instructed that it was the exclusive judge of the truth of 
defendant’s confessions and admissions; the instruction defined 
both a confession and an admission and instructed that the jury 
should view any such statements with caution.    
The People’s showing of a criminal act, independent of 
defendant’s statements, satisfies the corpus delicti rule.  Here, 
there was substantial independent evidence of “injury, loss, or 
harm by a criminal agency.”  (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 
1171.)  Defendant told law enforcement that he fired the fatal 
shots that killed one of the victims, hid the .45-caliber gun and 
bullet casings, poured gasoline on the victims, and lit them on 
fire.  Much of the physical evidence corroborates defendant’s 
statements, including the victims’ burnt bodies, .45-caliber 
bullets and one bullet casing recovered at the scene of the 
murders, and the ample physical evidence that the victims were 
beaten before they were killed.  As noted, the autopsy concluded 
Nathaniel died from gunshot wounds and that Consuelo died 
from blunt force head injuries.   
Defendant, however, contends that his well-documented 
drug and alcohol abuse render all his recollections fatally 
suspect.  Defendant advances a related argument, namely, that 
his statements were so contradictory, and his history of drug 
and alcohol abuse, including during the day of the crimes, is so 
clear, that none of his statements is trustworthy enough to 
even warrant corroboration.  He notes he gave 10 separate 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
statements to authorities.  He recounts that in his first 
statements to Griego, he denied all involvement in the crimes.  
Later he claimed only to be a lookout.  Still later, he confessed 
to pouring gasoline on the victims.  Similarly, his description of 
the perpetrators changed over time and was thus unreliable.  
Defendant claims that statements of someone with his 
history of substance abuse, who admitted to being under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the event in 
question, do not even evidence minimal indicia of reliability and 
trustworthiness.  Additionally, defendant asserts that when he 
spoke to law enforcement in 2001, he was on “psychotopic [sic] 
medication.”   
Defendant also contends that his most inculpatory 
statements to law enforcement were effectively coerced, and 
thus even less trustworthy than some of his earlier statements 
because he was threatened with his half-brother’s incarceration 
if he did not tell them what they wanted to hear.  Additionally, 
he claims that his statements to Martin and Bartis lacked 
trustworthiness because they were biased against him because 
he robbed them.  
Contrary to defendant’s argument, considerations of 
trustworthiness, whether based on his ability to recall or on 
other factors, are the exclusive province of the jury.  (People v. 
Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 404.)  Thus, allowing the jury to 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
judge the relevant evidence did not violate defendant’s due 
process rights.  (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 353-354.) 
Initially, we note that defendant presents no evidence that 
investigators either tainted the evidence or coerced defendant’s 
inculpatory statements. Rather, the jury was presented with 
ample 
evidence 
corroborating 
defendant’s 
inculpatory 
statements.  In addition to the physical evidence that matched 
defendant’s statements, the jury heard Griego testify that law 
enforcement purposefully withheld from the public certain 
information about the crimes—e.g., the caliber of the firearm 
used, that Nathaniel’s cause of death was by a firearm, and that 
Nathaniel had been bound with duct tape.  Defendant’s 
statements contained this same information.  Defendant also 
admitted that he and the others stole Consuelo’s Camaro and 
drove it to a nearby Motel 6.  As already noted, the car was found 
in a Motel 6 parking lot about two miles from the crime scene.   
In addition, Tirado testified that a week before the murders 
defendant and his brother spoke with him about robbing the 
victims’ T-shirt shop, and Leatham asked if Tirado wanted to 
participate in the robbery, but Tirado declined.  Although Tirado 
stated at one point that it was Leatham who did most of the 
talking about planning to rob the T-shirt store, his statement 
was consistent with defendant’s admission that he and his 
cohorts planned the robbery.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
We conclude the corpus delicti rule was satisfied here and 
that the jury properly considered all of defendant’s independent 
statements regarding his participation in the robbery and 
murders.  To the extent there was inconsistency among 
defendant’s various statements, the court properly left it to the 
jury to decide the veracity of each statement.  This is true 
whether defendant characterizes some of his statements as 
voluntary, internalized (from a susceptible or weak defendant), 
compliant (occurring during police 
interrogation), 
false 
confessions—or as the product of a memory rendered unreliable 
by years of substance abuse, by sleep deprivation, or by 
psychotropic drugs.  Similarly, we find, despite defendant’s 
argument to the contrary, that his statements contained 
sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy what we have described 
as the Eighth Amendment’s “heightened reliability standards 
for both guilt and penalty determinations in capital cases.”  
(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 623.) 
2.  Alleged Due Process Denial  
 
 
 
a.  Background 
The prosecution’s trial theory was that four people were 
involved in the T-shirt store murders:  Defendant, Loomis, 
Romero, and defendant’s half-brother, Leatham.  The 
prosecution’s case was that defendant’s videotaped confessions 
supported the theory that defendant was the principal actor 
who had robbed and set fire to the victims.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
23 
To support his defense that he was not responsible for 
robbing, shooting or burning the victims, defendant sought to 
present the testimony of Amber Renteria-Kelsey (Renteria) who 
made two statements to Griego (one on May 26, 1999, and one 
on October 5, 1999) that she had overheard Loomis admit to 
another gang member nicknamed “Midget” that he and Romero 
were involved in robbing and burning down  the victims’ T-shirt 
store.   
On November 1, 1999, Barstow Police Department 
received two handwritten letters addressed to Griego from 
Renteria, asserting that “there was no truth” to the statements 
she made to the detective during their May 26 and October 5, 
1999 interviews.  The letters did not mention the names of the 
perpetrators, or specifically describe the crime.  They merely 
stated that Renteria “was pretty much scared because I had 
already told you one thing and didn’t know how to tell you the 
truth” but she could not go on lying “about this situation.”  
Another letter was sent to Griego in October 2003, in which 
Renteria again retracted her statements implicating both men, 
claiming she was on drugs when she made them, “not in [her] 
right state of mind,” and the statements were not true.  She told 
the detective that “What I told you at first about the two people, 
Bam-Bam [Loomis] and Wino [Romero] is not true.”      
During the trial’s guilt phase and outside the presence of 
the jury, defense counsel stated that he intended to call Renteria 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
24 
as a defense witness.  Renteria was in custody for an unrelated 
case and was present in court.  The court appointed supervising 
deputy public defender Mark Shoup to represent Renteria and 
to determine if her testimony might tend to incriminate her such 
that she might assert her Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent.  Later, when the court asked if Renteria’s testimony 
might expose her to criminal prosecution, Shoup stated that 
Renteria could be charged with committing a misdemeanor 
offense for falsely reporting criminal offenses to a peace officer.  
(See § 148.5 [falsely reporting criminal offenses to a peace officer 
is misdemeanor offense].)7  Counsel advised Renteria to assert 
her Fifth Amendment privilege.  The court then noted that the 
prosecution could offer Renteria transactional immunity.  
However, the prosecutor indicated that the People were not 
willing to provide immunity in the case.  The court upheld 
Renteria’s privilege invocation after concluding that it could not 
“force her to make statements that may tend to incriminate her.”  
The court ruled that defendant could not call Renteria as a 
witness.  It explained that its ruling was tentative and that it 
would allow defense counsel to present points and authorities to 
support defendant’s argument.  The court noted that it would 
                                        
7 
Initially, Shoup stated that false reporting could be a 
crime under section 148, which actually makes it a crime to 
verbally resist arrest; but the court understood him to mean 
Renteria could be charged under section 148.5 for giving a false 
report to a police officer.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
25 
reopen the issue if it found “something different as far as the 
testimony of Renteria.”   
During a subsequent discussion outside the presence of 
the jury, Shoup conceded that Renteria had no basis to assert 
her Fifth Amendment privilege for the section 148.5 
misdemeanor offense of making the false police report to Griego 
because the one-year statute of limitations for that offense had 
run.  When the court asked the prosecutor for his view whether 
there was a felony statute that applied to Renteria’s statements, 
the prosecutor stated that he did not know, but that Renteria 
might be liable as an accessory under section 32.  The court 
responded:  “I don’t know how realistic [sic] she can be an 
accessory . . . if her initial statement to [Griego] was that 
something that pointed suspicion at somebody else.  I don’t 
know.”  Defendant’s counsel then asserted that Renteria did not 
have a valid privilege.   
Later, the prosecutor told the court that he had spoken to 
Shoup, and based on that conversation, he believed Renteria 
would be susceptible to a section 32 charge if her intent was to 
protect Loomis.  He also noted that he was not sure of her intent 
because he had never spoken with her.  Shoup agreed with the 
prosecutor’s section 32 evaluation and noted that Renteria had 
exposure to the criminal statute because her last contact with 
Griego was in October 2003, and that if it was determined she 
lied in 2003, the three-year statute of limitations for a violation 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
26 
of section 32 had yet to run.  Defense counsel argued that 
Renteria’s statement implicating Loomis and Romero would 
exonerate defendant.  When the court asked the prosecutor to 
explain how Renteria could make a false statement and still be 
criminally liable for a section 32 violation, the prosecutor 
hypothesized:  “She could have made up that first statement, 
but still know that he was involved.  If she overheard another 
conversation that she never told Griego about, and then [lied] to 
Griego when she talked to him in 2003 to protect Loomis,” then 
she could be liable as an accessory under section 32.   
Shoup later interjected, “Just so the record’s clear here, 
the only statements that I see that Amber Renteria [attributes] 
to Bam-Bam [Loomis] is that Bam-Bam said that he had to get 
out of town because he and his homie, Wino [Romero], had 
robbed a place on Main Street and the place burned down.  And 
then, Renteria told me that Bam-Bam had also said that he had 
to burn the place to get rid of evidence.  Those are the only 
statements that I am aware of.  There is nothing in that that 
exonerates this defendant.”   
Before the commencement of the penalty phase, Renteria 
again testified under oath, outside the presence of the jury.  She 
repeated her invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege.  The 
court stated that it would grant Renteria immunity if it had the 
power to do so in order to resolve the matter, and again asked 
the prosecutor if his office would grant the witness immunity.  
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
27 
The prosecutor declined, explaining, “If we believe that Renteria 
had any credibility whatsoever, we would have used [her] 
statement to file on Carlos Loomis murder charges.  We did not 
do that.  We believe she has no credibility at all.  That’s 
important to put on the record.”  The court observed that the 
case was different from cases in which false testimony led to an 
erroneous conviction.  (See e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 
410 U.S. 284, 298.)  The court then upheld Renteria’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege and dismissed her as a defense witness.  
It concluded that the three-year statute of limitations for a 
violation of section 32 had not expired, and that Renteria was 
potentially exposed to criminal prosecution under section 32 for 
her statements to Griego that she recanted.  During the penalty 
phase, the court similarly ruled that it would not allow the 
defense to call Renteria.   
 
 
b.  Discussion  
Defendant asserts that Renteria’s refusal to testify and 
thereby admit she lied to Griego about defendant’s involvement 
in the T-shirt store murders denied him his due process right to 
present a defense under the Sixth Amendment.  We disagree. 
The state and federal constitutions provide that a criminal 
defendant has the right “to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor.”  (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. 
Const. art. I, § 15.)  The federal compulsory process right is “so 
fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
28 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
making it applicable to the states.  (Washington v. Texas (1967) 
388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (Washington).)  Under federal law, a denial 
of the right to present a defense occurs when the exclusion of the 
evidence infringes “upon a weighty interest of the accused.”  
(United States v. Schaefer (1988) 523 U.S. 303, 308.)  A weighty 
interest of the defendant is infringed when “[t]he exclusions of 
evidence . . . significantly undermined fundamental elements of 
the accused’s defense.”  (Id. at p. 315.)   
Our state compulsory process right “is independently 
guaranteed by the California Constitution” under article 1, 
section 15, and is “deemed to be at least as broad and 
fundamental as the federal” right.  (In re Martin (1987) 44 
Cal.3d 1, 30 (Martin).)  The government violates a defendant’s 
constitutional right to compulsory process when it interferes 
with the exercise of a defendant’s right to present witnesses on 
his own behalf.  (Ibid.)  A defendant establishes such 
interference when he or she demonstrates the prosecution 
intimidated defense witnesses by telling them they could be 
prosecuted for any crimes they revealed during their testimony.  
(Ibid.)  Defendant must also demonstrate the misconduct was a 
substantial cause of his witness’s refusal to testify.  (Id. at p. 31.)  
Defendant additionally “must show at least a reasonable 
possibility that the witness could have given testimony that 
would have been both material and favorable.”  (Id. at p. 32.)  If 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
29 
a defendant successfully sustains his burden of demonstrating 
prejudice, the verdict must be reversed.  (Id. at p. 51.)  
In Martin, we held that the defendant successfully 
demonstrated a compulsory process violation.  (Martin, supra, 
44 Cal.3d at p. 42.)  There, the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct when he informed the defense witness’s attorney 
that if the defense witness testified, he would not get immunity 
and would be prosecuted if he implicated himself in a crime or 
committed perjury.  (Id. at pp. 36-37, 40.)  We found substantial 
causation between the misconduct and the defendant’s inability 
to present witnesses on his own behalf because the witness 
stated he decided to assert his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent after he learned the prosecutor would not grant him 
immunity and he had an encounter with a district attorney 
investigator who threatened arrest and got “ ‘in his face.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 37.)  Martin also held the testimony was reasonably 
“ ‘material and favorable’ ” because the witness’s statements 
contradicted the testimony of another witness adverse to the 
defendant.  (Id. at p. 42.) 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct when he told Shoup that Renteria could be charged 
as an accessory under section 32, and that he would not grant 
Renteria immunity from prosecution on the ground that her 
statements and retractions were not credible.  (See ante, at p. 
26; Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 37.)  Defendant would have 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
30 
us find prejudice because Renteria’s proposed testimony was 
material and favorable to the defense because (1) her testimony 
would have exonerated him, and (2) the prosecutor’s actions 
were a substantial factor in causing Renteria to invoke her Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  
We find no constitutional violation or prosecutorial 
misconduct.  It was Shoup who initially told the court that his 
client was exposed to potential misdemeanor criminal liability.  
The prosecutor told the court that Shoup was in the best position 
to determine any potential criminal liability.  He also agreed 
with Shoup that Renteria had exposure to criminal liability.  
Later, in answer to a question from the court, the prosecutor 
opined that Renteria would be exposed to criminal liability 
under a different statute (§ 32) than that initially identified by 
Shoup.  Shoup agreed with the prosecutor’s assertion.  There is 
also no indication that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
when he refused to grant the witness immunity.  He explained 
to the court that Renteria had no credibility as a witness.  As he 
pointed out, if she had any credibility, the District Attorney 
would also have charged Loomis with the murders.   
In contrast to the trial court in Martin, the court here did 
not deny defendant the right to “put on the stand a witness who 
was physically . . . capable of testifying . . . and whose testimony 
would have been relevant and material to the defense.”  
(Washington, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 23.)  Renteria’s testimony 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
31 
would not have exonerated defendant, or been material to his 
defense, either by tending to prove he did not commit the crimes 
charged or by diminishing his involvement.  In fact, Renteria’s 
proposed testimony would have reiterated the prosecution’s 
theory, based in part on defendant’s admissions, that defendant 
committed the crimes with Loomis and Romero.  Even if her 
statement had been admitted, she could have been impeached 
with her subsequent recantation and comments that she was on 
drugs when she implicated Loomis and Romero in the murders.  
Renteria’s decision not to testify, upheld by the court, did not 
deny defendant the right to present a defense. 
3.  Alleged Fifth Amendment Privilege  
 
Apart from asserting a compulsory process violation, 
defendant also claims the court erred in granting Renteria’s 
Fifth Amendment privilege because the statute of limitations to 
charge her had run on any violation of section 32 before she was 
to be called as a witness.  Defendant asserts that the statute of 
limitations started running on a section 32 violation in October 
1999, when Renteria sent her first retraction letter to the police 
and not when she retracted her inconsistent statements in 
October 2003.   
 
The Attorney General responds that defendant forfeited 
this argument because he did not raise it in the trial court.  
Defendant effectively concedes he never raised the claim in the 
trial court but contends he did not forfeit his claim because it is 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
32 
based on “undisputed facts” contained in one of Griego’s reports 
that states:  “Renteria later (on 10-29-99) sent me a letter at the 
Barstow Police Department ‘retracting’ her statements.”  (See 
Williams v. Mariposa County Unified School District (1978) 82 
Cal.App.3d 843, 850 [if facts supporting new contention on 
appeal are undisputed, court may entertain the contention as a 
question of law on those facts].)  Defendant also contends that 
although defense counsel might have been aware of Renteria’s 
1999 retraction letter and yet failed to raise it as a defense to 
her exposure to criminal liability, the prosecution team, 
including Griego, “had an independent duty to make sure that 
the trial court was made aware of Renteria’s earlier retraction.”  
Defendant’s claims fail.  Even if we were to assume that 
Renteria’s testimony would have assisted defendant’s defense, 
and that he did not forfeit his claim regarding the 1999 
retraction letter, he has stated no constitutional or prosecutorial 
violations.   
 
The standards governing defendant’s contention that the 
court erred in granting Renteria’s Fifth Amendment assertion 
are well established.  The Fifth Amendment privilege provides 
that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself.”  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 15.)  The high court has held that the privilege 
“marks an important advance in the development of our liberty.”  
(Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 444.)  It “must 
be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
33 
intended to secure.”  (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 
479, 486 (Hoffman).)  Recognizing that the trial court must 
determine whether there is reasonable cause for the privilege to 
extend to the witness, Hoffman left it to the court to determine 
whether the witness’s “silence is justified.”  (Ibid.)  Hoffman 
instructed:  “To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident 
from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it 
is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an 
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous 
because injurious disclosure could result.  The trial judge in 
appraising the claim ‘must be governed as much by his personal 
perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually 
in evidence.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 486-487.)  Our state jurisprudence 
incorporates the broad Hoffman standard.  (See People v. Seijas 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 (Seijas).)   
 
Our Evidence Code implements the privilege as follows:  
“Whenever the proffered evidence is claimed to be privileged 
under Section 940 [privilege against self-incrimination], the 
person claiming the privilege has the burden of showing that the 
proffered evidence might tend to incriminate him; and the 
proffered evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to 
the court that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a 
tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege.”  
(Evid. Code, § 404.)   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
34 
 
We conclude that the federal and state constitutions 
supported the trial court’s decision to grant Renteria her Fifth 
Amendment privilege whether or not the court was aware of  the 
1999 retraction letter that Renteria had sent to Griego.  (See 
Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304.)  On review of a witness’s 
successfully invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege, we look 
only to see whether it is evident from the “implications of the 
question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive 
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be 
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure 
could result.”  (Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. at pp. 486-487.)  In fact, 
a trial court may deny Fifth Amendment privilege only if it is 
“ ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the 
circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and 
that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency’ to 
incriminate.”  (Id. at p. 488, italics omitted.)  Our state 
jurisprudence is equally strong in its protection of the right and 
holds that the Fifth Amendment does not allow “the court to 
assess the likelihood of an actual prosecution in deciding 
whether to permit the privilege.”  (Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
p. 305; see Evid. Code, § 404.)  
 
Renteria and her counsel could reasonably have concluded 
that Renteria would be subject to criminal prosecution under 
section 32 for her statements to Griego about what she 
overheard if compelled to testify.  Section 32 subjects a person 
to criminal liability for aiding a principal in avoiding conviction 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
35 
or punishment for a crime.  Renteria’s inconsistent statements 
could have a tendency to incriminate her because it is possible 
they could have supported a charge that she sought to help 
Loomis and Romero in avoiding prosecution of the crimes at 
issue.  (See § 32; Evid. Code, § 404.)  We find the court did not 
err when it granted Renteria her Fifth Amendment privilege.  
(Hoffman, supra, 34 U.S. at p. 488.) 
 
We also find that the prosecution did not engage in 
misconduct in failing to raise Renteria’s 1999 retraction earlier 
during the trial court’s colloquy about Renteria’s asserted Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  We have held that “[a] prosecutor’s 
conduct violates the federal Constitution when it infects the 
trial with such unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process.  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not rise 
to this level nevertheless violates California law if it involves the 
use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the court or the jury.”  (People v. Whalen (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 1, 52.)  Even though the statute of limitations had 
passed on Renteria’s initial alleged lie to Detective Griego in 
1999, it had not passed when she allegedly lied in her second 
retraction letter of 2003.  Here, there is no indication that the 
prosecutor’s conduct rendered the trial so unfair as to deny 
defendant due process, or that his silence on the issue misled 
the court in order to persuade it in violation of California law.  
(Ibid.)  The prosecutor thoroughly discussed the effect of 
Renteria’s 2003 statement with the court in the presence of 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
36 
defendant’s counsel as well as Renteria’s counsel, as discussed 
ante, at pages 25 to 26.  Additionally, the prosecution’s theory 
was based on defendant’s own statements that he had 
committed the crimes with Loomis and Romero.  There is simply 
no indication that awareness of the 1999 retraction letter would 
have changed the court’s decision to grant Renteria’s right to 
silence or would have otherwise infected the trial with such 
unfairness that defendant’s conviction amounted to a denial of 
due process. 
B.  Issues Regarding Penalty 
1.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Statute  
 
Defendant asserts numerous challenges to California’s 
death penalty law that we have repeatedly rejected.  We 
reiterate our previous decisions.   
 
a.  Whether Penal Code section 190.2 is 
impermissibly broad  
 
Defendant asks that we reconsider our well-established 
holding that “special circumstances listed in section 190.2 that 
render a murderer eligible for the death penalty, which include 
felony murder and lying in wait, are not so numerous and 
broadly interpreted that they fail to narrow the class of death-
eligible first degree murderers as required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 
114-115; see ibid. [upholding the current version of section 190.2 
which is very similar to version defendant was convicted under]; 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
37 
People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 842-843.)  We decline to 
do so.  
 
b.  Whether Penal Code section 190.3 is 
arbitrary and capricious  
 
We have repeatedly rejected the claim that section 190.3, 
factor (a), which requires the jury to consider as evidence in 
aggravation the circumstances of the capital crime, arbitrarily 
and capriciously imposes the death penalty under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  (See Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 115.)  
We decline defendant’s request to review our prior holdings. 
c.  Whether unanimous jury findings are 
required  
 
As we have many times held, “[t]he jury’s reliance on 
unadjudicated criminal activity as a factor in aggravation under 
section 190.3, factor (b), without any requirement that the jury 
unanimously find that the activity was proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, does not deprive a defendant of any federal 
constitutional rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process.”  (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 115.)  We have also held 
that the federal Constitution does not require unanimous jury 
findings for imposing the death sentence, nor must the jury 
agree on the existence on any one aggravating factor.  (People v. 
Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 960.)  Defendant contends that 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
38 
we must reconsider these holdings and others, including People 
v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 263 (Prieto), in light of Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 602 (Ring), which followed Blakely 
v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303-205 (and Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490), to hold that any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt before its decision that death is the appropriate sentence.   
 
Defendant makes the same argument as the defendant 
made in Prieto, that Ring undermines our previous holdings 
that:  “(1) the jury need not find that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt; (2) the jury need not find each aggravating 
factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) juror unanimity on the 
aggravating factors is not necessary; and (4) written findings are 
not required.”  (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275.)  As we 
explained in Prieto, the jury’s penalty determination is 
normative, not factual, and is “analogous to a sentencing court’s 
traditionally discretionary decision to impose one prison 
sentence rather than another.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Defendant also asserts that the high court’s decision in 
Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. ___ [193 L.Ed 2d 504, 136 S.Ct. 
626] (Hurst), which invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme, also invalidates California’s capital sentencing scheme.  
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
39 
Like Ring, Hurst requires a jury to find each fact necessary to 
impose the death sentence.  (Ibid.)  Further, defendant claims 
that Hurst makes it clear that our sentencing determination 
violates the Sixth Amendment because it collapses “the 
weighing finding and the sentence-selection decision into one 
determination and labeling it ‘normative’ rather than 
factfinding” by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  It does not.  
(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235 & fn. 16.)  Our 
cases have consistently rejected similar arguments.  (Ibid.)  The 
California sentencing scheme is materially different from that 
in Florida, which, in contrast to our death penalty statutes, 
mandates that the trial court alone must find that sufficient 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances.  (Hurst, supra, 577 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. at p. 622]; 
see Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1).)  Once the jury renders a verdict of 
death, “our system provides for an automatic motion to modify 
or reduce this verdict to that of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  (Pen. Code, § 190.4.)  At the point the court 
rules on this motion, the jury ‘has returned a verdict or finding 
imposing the death penalty.’ ”  (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 
1235, fn. 16.)  We do not find that Hurst in any way undermines 
our previous rulings upholding the constitutionality of our death 
penalty scheme.  (See People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 
1038; see also People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 512, 541 [jury 
may reject death sentence even after it has found aggravation 
outweighs mitigation].) 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
40 
 
 
d.  Validity of California’s Death Penalty Jury 
Instructions 
 
 
 
 
i.  Reasonable doubt  
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it did 
not instruct the jury that the prosecution bore the burden of 
proof.  He argues that his “jury should have been instructed that 
the State had the burden of persuasion regarding the existence 
of any factor in aggravation, whether aggravating factors 
outweighed mitigating factors, and the appropriateness of the 
death penalty, and that it was presumed that life without parole 
was an appropriate sentence.”  Alternatively, defendant asserts 
that if there is no burden of proof, the jury should have been 
informed that the prosecution has no burden of proof in capital 
sentencing.   
 
We have never held that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require a jury instruction regarding the burden of 
proof in capital sentencing.  (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 
Cal.3d 883, 960.)  As the Attorney General observes, the only 
burden of proof applicable at the penalty phase “relates to 
aggravating evidence of other crimes under factor (b) [People v. 
Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1364], and aggravating evidence 
of prior convictions under factor (c).  (See Williams, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 459.)”   Otherwise, our cases do not require that a 
burden of proof be applied to aggravating evidence.  (See People 
v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1319.) 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
41 
 
ii.  Unanimous agreement on 
aggravating factors  
 
Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights 
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when it 
failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the 
same factors in aggravation.  We have “consistently held that 
unanimity with respect to aggravating factors is not required by 
statute or as a constitutional procedural safeguard.”  (People v. 
Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 749 (Taylor).) 
 
The same is true for prior unadjudicated criminal activity.  
We have repeatedly rejected claims that the jury’s findings of 
prior unadjudicated crimes must be unanimous in relation to 
evidence admitted under section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. 
Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1364-1365.)   
 
 
iii.  Alleged vague instructions  
 
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, California’s death 
penalty jury instructions are not unconstitutionally vague, 
because they provide that a jury “must be persuaded that the 
aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison 
with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death 
instead of life without parole.”  (CALJIC No. 8.88, italics added.)  
The “ ‘so substantial’ ” language does not violate the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 
250, 292.)  
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
iv.  Requiring written findings  
 
We also decline defendant’s request that we reconsider our 
prior holdings that do not require jurors to submit written 
findings during a capital case’s penalty phase.  (Taylor, supra, 
52 Cal.3d at p. 749.) 
 
 
 
 
v.  Converse principle instruction  
 
Contrary to defendant’s view, it is unnecessary for the 
trial court to instruct the jury that if it determines mitigation 
outweighs aggravation, it must return a verdict of life without 
the possibility of parole.  (People v. Kopatz (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 
95 (Kopatz).) 
 
 
 
 
vi.  Jury Unanimity on mitigation  
We continue to reject the contention raised here that a 
jury must be instructed regarding the standard of proof and the 
lack of a need for jury unanimity as to mitigating circumstances.  
(Kopatz, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 95, citing People v. Streeter 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 268.) 
 
 
 
vii.  Presumption of life instruction  
Consistent with our cases, we affirm the view that the trial 
court, contrary to defendant’s argument, is not required to 
instruct the jury that the law favors a presumption of life in the 
penalty phase.  (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 190.) 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
43 
 
 
viii.  Failure to delete inapplicable 
sentencing factors 
As we held in People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618, 
“[th]e trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC No. 
8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors.”  We decline to reconsider 
our decision as defendant requests. 
 
 
 ix. Failure to instruct that statutory 
mitigating factors are relevant solely as potential 
mitigators 
We also decline to reconsider our conclusion that the jury 
need not be advised which sentencing factors in CALJIC No. 
8.85 are aggravating and which are mitigating.  As we have 
held, the court does not need to define the statutory factors 
because the “nature of those factors is self-evident within the 
context of each case.”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 
509.) 
 
 
e.  Inter-case Proportionality Review  
 
As we have stated before, neither California’s death 
penalty law nor the federal and state constitutions require inter-
case proportionality review.  (People v. Virgin (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
1210, 1289-1290; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511.) 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
44 
 
f.  Equal Protection and California’s Capital 
Sentencing Scheme   
 
Consistent with our precedent, California’s capital 
sentencing scheme does not, as defendant contends, violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution because 
capital defendants and noncapital defendants “are not similarly 
situated.”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 295.)  
Consequently, it is permissible for noncapital defendants to 
have more procedural protections than capital defendants.  
 
 
 
g.  International Law  
Contrary to defendant’s contention, international law does 
not prohibit application of the death penalty in the United 
States.  Although the United States is a signatory to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “it signed 
the treaty on the express condition ‘[t]hat the United States 
reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to 
impose capital punishment on any person (other than a 
pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws’ ” 
allowing capital punishment.  (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 1043, 1130, citing People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 
403-404.)  
2.  Alleged Cumulative Error 
 
Defendant 
contends 
the 
alleged 
errors 
at 
trial 
cumulatively make his trial unfair and hence resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice, violating due process.   
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
45 
 
Cumulative error is present when the combined effect of 
the trial court’s errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant.  
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 487; People v. Hinton 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 897, 913.)  Although a defendant is 
entitled to a fair trial, he or she is not entitled to “a perfect one.”  
(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009.)  Even 
though the cumulative error rule recognizes the value in the 
efficient administration of justice, it does not elevate it above the 
protection of individual rights.  (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 
Cal.App.4th 785, 795.)  
 
We conclude that defendant has not established 
cumulative error.  There are no errors to aggregate.  The corpus 
delicti rule was vindicated, and Renteria’s failure to testify did 
not represent a compulsory process violation.  The court also did 
not err prejudicially in sustaining Renteria’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege.  Renteria’s proposed testimony had no tendency in fact 
to lessen defendant’s criminal culpability and the jury heard 
overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. CAPERS 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
46 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment in its 
entirety.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Capers 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S146939 
Date Filed: August 8, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: John M. Tomberlin 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointments by the Supreme 
Court, and Peter R. Silten, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Robin Urbanski and Donald W. 
Ostertag, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Peter R. Silten 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Donald W. Ostertag 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9557