Title: Millis Public Schools v. M.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12384
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 2018

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SJC-12384 
 
MILLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS  vs.  M.P. & others.1 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     October 2, 2017. - February 6, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Child Requiring Assistance.  Statute, Construction.  Words, 
"Wilfully." 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Norfolk County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department on November 30, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Mary M. McCallum, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Katrina McCusker Rusteika, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for M.P. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The children requiring assistance (CRA) statute, 
G. L. c. 119, §§ 21, 39E-39I, confers jurisdiction upon the 
Juvenile Court to intervene in the custody arrangements of 
                     
 
1 The mother and father of M.P. 
2 
 
 
children who are, inter alia, "habitually truant," meaning that 
they "willfully fail[] to attend school for more than [eight] 
school days in a quarter."  G. L. c. 119, § 21.  The statute is 
aimed at children who exhibit "misbehavior which is not 
violative of any criminal statute, but which is the cause for 
concern that it is indicative of problems or tendencies that may 
eventually lead to delinquent or criminal activity."  R.L. 
Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.1 (2d ed. 2006 & Supp. 
2017) (Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law).  In such cases, the 
Juvenile Court is tasked with examining the children's 
circumstances and determining whether changing or placing 
conditions on their custody arrangements will help deter their 
potentially harmful behaviors.  Id.  The party that initiates a 
CRA proceeding must prove the allegations beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G. 
 
In this case, we decide whether a child, M.P., who has 
failed continually to attend school due to a combination of 
physical and mental disabilities, including a severe bladder 
condition and autism, was properly adjudicated as a child 
requiring assistance on the basis of a habitual truancy CRA 
petition filed by the Millis public schools (school district).2 
To make this determination, we must address the novel question 
                     
 
2 Millis public schools did not participate in this appeal. 
3 
 
 
of what it means for a child to "willfully fail[] to attend 
school."  In light of the CRA statute's goal of deterring 
delinquency, the statutory requirement that a child's failure to 
attend school be wilful reflects legislative concern as to why 
the child is regularly skipping school:  it contemplates 
purposeful conduct by the child.  The wilfulness requirement 
thus necessitates judicial inquiry into and assessment of the 
child's reasons for not attending school.  When the child's 
repeated failure to attend school arises from reasons portending 
delinquent behavior, it is wilful under the statute.  Using the 
definition we set forth today, the evidence in the record does 
not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. 
"willfully fail[ed] to attend school." 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Statutory scheme.  The Juvenile Court 
has jurisdiction over three primary areas:  delinquency and 
youthful offender cases, care and protection matters, and CRA 
proceedings.  G. L. c. 119, §§ 26, 39E, 54.  Children in CRA 
proceedings often are said to have committed "status offenses," 
because the statute is "couched in terms of the child's 
condition rather than in terms of the commission of specific 
acts" (citation omitted).  See Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law, 
supra at § 4.1.  Unlike children who are adjudicated delinquent, 
children requiring assistance have not committed wrongdoing 
4 
 
 
against another or against society, but, rather, are deemed to 
be acting against their own interests.  See id. 
 
The CRA statute defines a child requiring assistance as one 
who is between the ages of six and eighteen and who 
"(i) repeatedly runs away from the home of the child's parent, 
legal guardian or custodian; (ii) repeatedly fails to obey the 
lawful and reasonable commands of the child's parent, legal 
guardian or custodian, thereby interfering with their ability to 
adequately care for and protect the child; (iii) repeatedly 
fails to obey the lawful and reasonable regulations of the 
child's school; (iv) is habitually truant; or (v) is a sexually 
exploited child."  G. L. c. 119, § 21.  As relevant here, the 
CRA statute defines one who is "[h]abitually truant" as "a 
school-aged child, not excused from attendance under the lawful 
and reasonable regulations of such child's school, who willfully 
fails to attend school for more than [eight] school days in a 
quarter."  Id. 
 
CRA proceedings are initiated when a parent, legal 
guardian, custodian, or school district files an application in 
the Juvenile Court for issuance of a petition that seeks a 
determination that the child requires assistance.  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39E.  Upon this filing, the court issues a summons requiring 
the child and his or her parents or guardian to appear before 
it.  Id.  A Juvenile Court judge then conducts a preliminary 
5 
 
 
hearing to determine whether the petition should issue.3  Id.  At 
this hearing, the judge may decline to accept the application 
because there is "no probable cause to believe that the child 
and family are in need of assistance," or because "the interests 
of the child would best be served by informal assistance, in 
which case the [judge] shall, with the consent of the child and 
the child's parents or guardian, refer the child to a probation 
officer for assistance."  Id.  Alternatively, a judge may accept 
the application and schedule a fact-finding hearing.  Id.  In 
order for a judge ultimately to find that the child requires 
assistance, the petitioner must prove the allegations of the 
petition beyond a reasonable doubt.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G. 
 
Only after a child is proved habitually truant beyond a 
reasonable doubt should the judge contemplate changes to the 
child's custody arrangements.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G.  The judge, 
"taking into consideration the physical and emotional welfare of 
the child, may make any of the following orders of disposition": 
(1) permit the child to stay with the parents, custodians, or 
guardians, subject to conditions and limitations that the court 
                     
 
3 Both the child and the parents or legal guardians have a 
right to counsel at all stages of CRA proceedings.  G. L. 
c. 119, § 39F. 
 
6 
 
 
may choose;4 (2) place the child in the care of a relative, 
probation officer, other qualified adult, private charitable or 
childcare agency, or other authorized or qualified private 
organization, subject to conditions and limitations; or 
(3) place the child in the custody of the Department of Children 
and Families.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G.  The disposition is not a 
direct order requiring the child to comply with the conditions, 
however, and the judge may not impose penalties for criminal 
contempt for the child's failure to comply.5  See Commonwealth v. 
Florence F., 429 Mass. 523, 524-525 (1999). 
 
b.  Factual background.  We summarize the Juvenile Court 
judge's findings of fact concerning M.P., supplemented with 
certain uncontested facts in the record.  See Chin v. Merriot, 
470 Mass. 527, 529 (2015). 
 
i.  Medical conditions.  M.P. is a fifteen year old girl 
who has been diagnosed with significant detrusor sphincter 
discoordination (bladder condition), autism spectrum disorder 
                     
 
4 These conditions include "provision for medical, 
psychological, psychiatric, educational, occupational, and 
social services, and for supervision by a court clinic or by any 
public or private organization providing counseling or guidance 
services."  G. L. c. 119, § 39G. 
 
 
5 The order of disposition is effective for 120 days, and 
may be extended for three additional periods of up to ninety 
days each.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G.  After that, a new hearing is 
required.  See Matter of Hilary, 450 Mass. 491, 493-494 (2008).  
The disposition is no longer effective after the child's 
eighteenth birthday.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G. 
7 
 
 
(autism), anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), 
and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).6  Her bladder condition 
is such that she has difficulty voiding, and when she does so, 
she usually "leaves behind a large volume of urine."  As a 
result, she needs to use the restroom frequently, often for 
hours at a time.  This condition makes her predisposed to 
urinary tract infections.  She also has an abnormally large 
bladder.  M.P. has experienced this condition since the age of 
six, when she underwent a surgical procedure for her urinary 
tract.7 
 
M.P.'s bladder condition is compounded by her numerous 
cognitive and emotional disorders.  In kindergarten she was 
diagnosed with "pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise 
specified"; this nomenclature is now subsumed under the 
                     
 
6 The Juvenile Court judge's findings of fact omitted M.P.'s 
diagnoses of anxiety disorder, OCD, and PTSD.  These diagnoses, 
however, were contained in both doctors' letters and in service 
providers' notes, the same medical records upon which the judge 
relied without qualification. 
 
 
7 In May, 2017, one of M.P.'s doctors prescribed a new 
bladder relaxation medication in the hopes of improving her 
condition.  The fact-finding hearing in this case took place in 
the same month that this medication was prescribed; accordingly, 
the record is silent as to the effectiveness of this medication. 
 
8 
 
 
diagnosis of autism.  In December, 2016, a child neurologist 
confirmed that M.P. meets the criteria for autism.8 
 
The child neurologist further opined that M.P. exhibits 
many symptoms of OCD and has a "number of difficulties 
processing sensory information -- she does not like to change 
her clothes and some sounds are really bothersome."  Relatedly, 
a developmental pediatrician noted that M.P.'s autism and OCD 
cause her to fixate on "obsessive rituals and rigidities that 
control every aspect of her daily life."  M.P. feels that she 
cannot leave the house until her bladder is completely empty, 
which typically takes hours.  If she hears noises while she is 
in the restroom, she has to begin her process of voiding from 
the beginning.  She has difficulty tolerating busy and 
unpredictable settings and cannot use public restrooms.  At one 
point, in order to obtain a medical evaluation, her family had 
to rent a nearby hotel room so that M.P. could have a "safe and 
comfortable place to use the bathroom."  Her anxiety regarding 
                     
 
8 The judge noted that, while the child neurologist shared 
her opinions in writing with M.P.'s school district in 
February, 2017, "no neurological testing results, evaluation 
information, data, or the like were shared with the school.  It 
is unclear whether any such neurological testing, evaluation, 
etc.  actually was conducted.  [The child neurologist] provided 
her opinion based on her review of the literature . . . [and 
M.P.'s] medical and educational history combined with her one 
appointment with the child [in December, 2016]."  The judge did 
not, however, express any doubt as to whether M.P. has autism, 
nor does the record suggest any reason to doubt this diagnosis. 
9 
 
 
her bladder condition is so great that she sleeps on a couch 
close to the bathroom, rather than in her own bed.  She also 
often will hold her urine until her parents go to sleep. 
 
M.P. also has aversions to many practices for ordinary 
hygiene.  She refuses to use feminine hygiene products or wear 
appropriate seasonal clothing.  She will not shower at home and 
has only taken two showers in the past year, choosing instead to 
clean herself with body wipes that in turn cause skin 
irritation.  She previously has been sent home from school for 
offensive body odor.  M.P. has almost no social or peer contact 
outside her family. 
 
In February, 2017, the developmental pediatrician concluded 
that M.P.'s anxiety and OCD were associated with PTSD.  She 
opined that M.P. has medical necessity for direct one-to-one 
"home based, behavioral therapy services utilizing Applied 
Behavioral Analysis to target functional communication, social 
pragmatics and other skills in order to generalize skills across 
environments from the school to the home and general community."  
In addition, the pediatrician observed that the CRA proceeding, 
as described below, had "further impact[ed] [M.P.'s] wellbeing 
with escalating anxiety and sadness and resultant worsening of 
her emotional fragility and function."  She reported that M.P. 
was "not sleeping and [wa]s filled with anxiety regarding the 
10 
 
 
outcome of [the] case," and urged that the CRA case "be dropped 
at once out of medical necessity." 
 
ii.  School attendance.  M.P. initially was enrolled in an 
online high school, but her parents decided to place her in the 
Millis public school system for the 2016-2017 year in order to 
obtain special education services.9  She did not attend classes 
from the first day of school on August 31, 2016, through October 
20, 2016.  At the start of the school year, the school district 
conducted an evaluation and the special education team 
recommended that M.P. attend an extended forty-five day 
evaluation in a therapeutic setting, because the school district 
did not believe it could provide the services that M.P. 
required.  The school district enrolled her in the ACCEPT 
Collaborative Therapeutic program from October 21, 2016, until 
January 6, 2017, which provided her with a shortened school day.  
Under this program, M.P. attended only nine shortened school 
days, for a total of 10.5 hours of learning time. 
 
The school district then arranged for home-based services 
for M.P. through a private provider, beginning on December 27, 
2016.  A service provider began meeting with M.P. at her house 
from 9 A.M. until 11 A.M., Monday through Thursday, to help her 
                     
 
9 Although the school district initially enrolled M.P. as a 
ninth grader for the 2016-2017 year, later that year she was 
offered enrollment at Keough Memorial Academy, a special 
education day school, as an eighth grader. 
11 
 
 
prepare to leave the house.  The provider arranged for tutoring 
at home, and then helped her transition to tutoring at the 
library; M.P. demonstrated increased ability to leave the house 
and was making "great strides."  Notably, after a few weeks, the 
provider changed the meeting time to 12 P.M., to accommodate 
both the schedule of the library and the tutor.  The provider 
explained that when M.P. had a clear understanding of what was 
expected of her, she was successful in leaving the house with 
him.  Occasionally, however, M.P. continued to be unable to 
leave the bathroom for long periods of time.  Additionally, of 
the thirty sessions scheduled between December 27, 2016, and 
February 21, 2017, M.P.'s family canceled eight times (once for 
a holiday and once for an appointment, but otherwise for reasons 
that are not known) and the home-based service provider canceled 
four times (three times due to weather conditions, and one time 
for reasons unknown).  M.P. was able to attend 55.5 per cent of 
the scheduled tutoring sessions, for a total of 33.5 hours. 
 
On March 13, 2017, M.P. was enrolled in Keough Memorial 
Academy (Keough Memorial), a special education day school 
designed for children with emotional disabilities, and was to 
begin classes on March 29 of that year.  Keough Memorial 
educators were aware of M.P.'s disabilities and were confident 
that they could meet her needs.  M.P. was to continue with the 
home-based service provider while attending Keough Memorial, and 
12 
 
 
the school district made an exception to permit the provider to 
meet M.P. on weekends, not just on school days, to help her 
maintain a routine.  The provider then attempted to change his 
appointments with M.P. back to 9 A.M., so that she could be 
ready in time for the Keough Memorial school day.  After this 
change, the family canceled the home-based provider sessions 
more frequently; of the twenty-four appointments scheduled 
between February 22 and May 2, 2017, M.P.'s family canceled 
twelve (once for an illness and once for an appointment, but 
otherwise for unknown reasons) and the home-based provider 
canceled three (once due to weather conditions, once because of 
M.P.'s health, and once because of "unclear . . . 
expectations"). 
 
Between April 5 and April 28, 2017, the home-based provider 
did not schedule any appointments because the provider wanted to 
meet M.P. in the morning, but the family wanted him to come in 
the afternoon.  The provider testified, however, that M.P. never 
said that she did not want to go to school; to the contrary, 
M.P. communicated to him that she did want to attend.  By 
May 1, 2017, M.P. had attended only eight shortened days at 
Keough Memorial, for a total of 7.9 learning hours.  She 
typically arrived near the end of the school day. 
 
As of April 20, 2017, M.P. also became eligible for 
services with the Department of Developmental Services.  That 
13 
 
 
month, the family arranged to have an applied behavior analyst 
from an independent organization provide an initial assessment 
of M.P.  In his initial report, the analyst noted that her 
behavior "poses a serious risk to the health and wellbeing of 
herself and her family," and that her behaviors and anxieties 
had persisted and intensified despite her parents' provision of 
several accommodations and modifications.  The analyst stated 
that M.P.'s "challenging behavior" arose from pain and 
discomfort due to complications regarding her bladder retention, 
which was an "automatic" or "internal" function. 
 
As of the time of the fact-finding hearing, the analyst had 
met with M.P. only a few times, but he stated that an applied 
behavior analysis therapist would soon work with M.P. for 
eighteen hours per week.  He anticipated that M.P. would need 
treatment for from six months to one year.  He also explained 
that M.P. conveyed on "many occasions" that "she's very excited" 
to start the program and loves school; she had been crying daily 
because of her inability to attend school. 
 
iii.  CRA proceedings.  On November 30, 2016, just a few 
months after M.P.'s initial enrollment in the Millis public 
schools, the school district filed a CRA petition, alleging that 
M.P. was a child requiring assistance on the grounds that she 
was habitually truant.  A Juvenile Court judge held a 
preliminary hearing on December 14, 2016, and accepted the 
14 
 
 
petition.10  The judge then scheduled a fact-finding hearing for 
January 19, 2017, which was continued twice.  A two-day fact-
finding hearing took place on May 4 and 26, 2017. 
 
At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the judge 
found that M.P. was habitually truant and adjudicated her a 
child requiring assistance.  The judge noted that, under the CRA 
statute, a child's failure to attend school must be wilful, 
which the judge defined as "acting intentionally, as opposed to 
accidentally or involuntarily."  She concluded that 
"[a]lthough . . . [M.P.'s] actions of failing to attend school 
have been attributed to her medical conditions and emotional 
challenges, they are still actions taken by the child not to 
attend school."  The judge noted that none of M.P.'s assessments 
indicated that she "was either home bound or unable to benefit 
from an education," and that there was no evidence indicating 
that M.P. should be exempt from school. 
 
The judge further found that M.P.'s parents "are now 
working hard to obtain additional therapeutic services for their 
daughter so that she can attend school."  She stated that 
"[m]any of the therapeutic services assessed by the parents were 
pursued after the commencement of this CRA petition, while the 
home based therapeutic services offered by the school were not 
                     
 
10 The record does not provide the basis for the judge's 
decision to accept the CRA petition. 
15 
 
 
consistently utilized by the child or the parents."  Ultimately, 
however, the judge decided that M.P. "appears to be receiving 
appropriate services and no further services need be ordered at 
this time," and did not alter M.P.'s custody arrangements.  
Nonetheless, the judge stated that later dispositional review 
would be necessary to determine whether the newly implemented 
services, meaning the sessions with the applied behavior 
analyst, were sufficient.  The judge also excused M.P. from 
attending future hearings, noting that her time would be better 
spent in school, rather than in the CRA hearings, which 
"increase[d] her stress." 
 
M.P. appealed from the CRA determination to a single 
justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 39I.  
The single justice referred the case to a full panel of the 
Appeals Court.  We then transferred the case to this court on 
our own motion.  The school district did not participate in the 
appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  There is no dispute that M.P. missed more 
than eight days of school in each quarter of the 2016-2017 
school year, and that most of her absences were not excused 
"under the lawful and reasonable regulations of such child's 
16 
 
 
school."11  See G. L. c. 119, § 21.  The question before us is 
whether she "willfully fail[ed] to attend school."  Id.  This 
court has not previously examined the meaning of this language.  
We conclude that the CRA statute's habitual truancy provision 
requires purposeful conduct by the child.  When the child's 
repeated failure to attend school arises from reasons portending 
delinquent behavior, it is wilful under the statute. 
 
a.  Plain meaning.  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund 
v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 564–565 (2010).  In order to determine 
what it means to "willfully fail[] to attend school," we turn 
first to the plain meaning of the statutory language.  "Where 
the language is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given its 
'ordinary meaning.'"  Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 
633 (2013).  The plain meaning of a statute "must be reasonable 
and supported by the purpose and history of the statute."  Id., 
quoting Wright v. Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 
455, 457–458 (1996). 
 
We look initially "to dictionary definitions as a guide to 
a term's plain or ordinary meaning."  Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 
476 Mass. 497, 501 (2017).  One dictionary defines "willful" as 
"done deliberately" or "intentional," and "not accidental or 
                     
 
11 M.P. does not challenge the lawfulness or reasonableness 
of her school's regulations regarding truancy. 
17 
 
 
without purpose."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
2617 (1993).  According to Black's Law Dictionary, "willful" 
means "[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily 
malicious."  Black's Law Dictionary 1834 (10th ed. 2014).  
Black's Law Dictionary further states, however, that a 
"voluntary act becomes willful in law, only when it involves 
conscious wrong or evil purpose on the part of the actor, or at 
least inexcusable carelessness, whether the act is right or 
wrong."  Id.  Thus, some definitions focus on the actor's 
purpose, while others focus only on whether the actor's conduct 
was voluntary or intentional. 
 
Nor does wilfulness have a consistent meaning in our 
jurisprudence.  In the adoption context, we have explained that, 
while wilfulness implies intentional conduct, it does not 
require ill will.  See Adoption of a Minor, 343 Mass. 292, 297 
(1961) (statute permitting adoption without consent of parent 
where parent wilfully deserts or neglects child "does not 
require that the neglect to provide be done with malevolence or 
ill will; it is enough if the conduct resulting in the failure 
to provide was not unintentional").  In criminal cases, on the 
other hand, we have held that conduct is wilful "when the actor 
intends both the conduct and its harmful consequences."  
Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 443 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 352 (1990).  See 
18 
 
 
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 Mass. 236, 242 (2012).  
Nonetheless, "in only a few select areas of law does 'willfully' 
require a showing of an intent to violate a known legal duty."  
Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Commissioner of the Dep't 
of Envtl. Protection, 466 Mass. 454, 456, 464 n.12 (2013) 
(rejecting argument that wilfulness, as used in G. L. c. 21A, 
§ 16 [administrative penalties act], requires knowledge that 
"conduct will or may constitute a violation of applicable 
environmental standards," and instead holding that wilfulness 
only requires that "party who has not complied with the law knew 
or should have known of the operative facts that made their acts 
unlawful"). 
 
The question remains, then, whether wilfulness under the 
CRA statute's habitual truancy provision implies merely 
voluntary or intentional conduct, or also necessitates inquiry 
into a student's purpose in missing school. 
 
b.  Legislative history.  As the term "willfully" may have 
several meanings when read in isolation, we turn to the broader 
statutory context and legislative history of the CRA statute to 
ascertain the intended meaning.  See Franklin Office Park Realty 
Corp., 466 Mass. at 463 ("Although 'willful' may have several 
meanings when read in isolation, its meaning in any particular 
statute may be determined from examining the act itself as well 
as the larger statutory scheme"). 
19 
 
 
 
The habitual truancy provision dates back to 1873, when the 
Legislature enacted a statute requiring each city and town in 
Massachusetts to impose criminal penalties for "habitual 
truants."  See St. 1873, c. 262 § 3 ("An Act concerning truant 
children and absentees from school").  The legislation was 
enacted in response to a report from the Board of Education, 
which had collected numerous school committee reports 
complaining of a lack of proper enforcement mechanisms to 
address widespread truancy.12  See id.; Thirty-Sixth Annual 
                     
 
12 For example, the school committee of Barnstable noted 
that four-fifths of the crimes in New England were committed by 
those who had not been educated, and "[o]f juvenile offenders, 
ninety-five hundredths [were] from ignorant and idle homes, and 
a large number of them were truants from school at the time of 
arrest."  Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the Board of Education, 
Abstracts of School Committee Reports, at 3 (Jan. 1873).  
Peabody's committee stated that the practice of sending truant 
children to almshouses had done little to combat the growing 
problem of truancy, and called for "habitual truants" to face 
criminal sentences.  Id. at 89-90.  Salem's committee touted its 
then recently enacted ordinance criminalizing truancy as a means 
of deterrence.  Id. at 94.  Cambridge's committee, in turn, 
attributed the majority of its truancy cases to the 
"indifference, neglect or parsimony of parents," and stated that 
"reformatory institutions" were better than almshouses for 
addressing truancy.  Id. at 121-122.  Malden's superintendent of 
public schools stated that truant children required greater 
attention because other pupils "[were] led to imitate their bad 
practices, and thus the evil [had] increased to no small 
magnitude."  Id. at 139.  Wakefield's school committee stated 
that "[i]gnorant boys [could] be seen every day in [the town's] 
streets with nothing but mischief to occupy their time.  Their 
parents [were] too indifferent to their welfare, or too imbecile 
to send them to school," and called for "strict enforcement" of 
compulsory education.  Id. at 147.  Clinton's committee chairman 
also called for trial judges to handle cases of truancy, noting 
 
20 
 
 
Report of the Board of Education, Abstracts of School Committee 
Reports (Jan. 1873). 
 
A century later, Governor Francis W. Sargent and others 
recognized that to send habitual truants and other status 
offenders "away from their homes to an institution which 
deprives them of their liberty and individuality and, at times, 
inflicts physical punishment and harassment, is to blame the 
victims of society's neglect and to hinder their eventual 
rehabilitation."  See F.W. Sargent, Letter to the Senate and 
House of Representatives (Nov. 20, 1972), 1973 House Doc. No. 
5593.  As then Governor Sargent explained, "we now know that 
there is an alternative to institutionalization -- community 
based treatment.  It is better for the child and better for the 
taxpayers."  Id. 
 
Thus, the Legislature enacted the children in need of 
services (CHINS) statute, the predecessor of the CRA statute, in 
1973.  The CHINS statute decriminalized status offenses such as 
truancy by removing them from the delinquency jurisdiction of 
                                                                  
that its local truancy officer was ill-equipped to address the 
problem.  Id. at 202-203.  Westborough's school committee 
chairman attributed the problem of truancy to the indifference 
of parents who were often "ignorant" themselves and advocated 
for a "board of truant officers."  Id. at 219.  Worcester's 
truant school committee also noted that its truant officer was 
overburdened and that the children who were "not sent to school 
at all" were those whom it considered the "children most sinned 
against."  Id. at 230. 
21 
 
 
the Juvenile Court and tasking Juvenile Court judges with 
providing "nonpunitive care to address the problem of certain 
children."  See Florence F., 429 Mass. at 527, citing St. 1973, 
c. 1073; Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.2.  Notably, the 
CHINS statute defined a "child in need of services" on the 
grounds of truancy in almost the same language as does the 
current CRA statute:  as a child who is "between the ages of six 
and sixteen who persistently and wilfully fails to attend 
school."  See 1973 Senate Doc. No. 1922; 1973 House J. 3941.  
The statute's inclusion of habitual truants is consistent with 
the Legislature's recognition that education is vital to a 
child's progress.  See, e.g., Care & Protection of Charles, 399 
Mass. 324, 335 (1987) ("[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and 
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education . . . .  It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment" [citation omitted]). 
 
CHINS proceedings were intended to target children who 
"fall between the chairs, so to speak.  They are not the 
dependent children who are clearly entitled to the full 
protection of the [J]uvenile [C]ourt.  Neither are they law 
breakers entitled to whatever firm or lenient treatment the law 
22 
 
 
or individual judge feels appropriate for such offenders."  
Florence F., 429 Mass. at 528, quoting In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. 
App. 3d 866, 869 (1977).  The goals of the CHINS statute were 
"(a) preventing delinquency involvement; (b) fostering the 
pursuit of education; and (c) providing support to families 
during periods of emotional turbulence."  Ireland & Kilcoyne, 
Juvenile Law, supra at § 4.5.  See id. at § 4.1 ("the court's 
approach is that through the provision of certain rehabilitative 
or preventive services . . . the child will be diverted from the 
tendency to engage in future delinquent behavior"). 
 
The CHINS statute was significantly amended in 2012, when 
it was reformulated as the CRA statute, but the overarching 
purpose of the statute did not change.  The 2012 amendments were 
enacted in response to the Legislature's recognition of the 
CHINS statute's failure to "[keep] children out of the juvenile 
justice system as the [L]egislature intended."  See Press 
Release, Governor Patrick Signs Legislation to Reform Children 
in Need of Services System (Aug. 7, 2012).  The amendments 
sought to achieve this goal by making proceedings less 
adversarial, and to "divert cases from the courts into a system 
of community-based service providers."13  Senate OK's Changes on 
                     
13 The amendments provided for the establishment of a system 
of community-based resources and assistance to families to 
coordinate screenings, assessments, and referrals, and required 
 
23 
 
 
Runaways, Truants, State House News Service, July 15, 2011.  The 
CRA statute treats involvement of the Juvenile Court system as 
something of a last resort.  See G. L. c. 119, § 39E (before CRA 
petition is filed, "the clerk shall inform the petitioner that 
the petitioner may delay filing the request and choose to have 
the child and the child's family referred to a family resource 
center, community-based services program or other . . . 
community-based services in the [J]uvenile [C]ourt district 
where the child resides and return to court at a later time to 
file an application for assistance, if needed"; clerk also is 
required to "prepare, publish and disseminate to each petitioner 
educational material relative to available family resource 
centers, community-based services programs and other entities 
designated by the [S]ecretary of [H]ealth and [H]uman 
services"). 
 
Proponents of the CRA statute reasoned that "the current 
studies suggest[ed] that children . . . who are regularly 
                                                                  
school districts to establish truancy prevention programs for 
habitually truant students before referring them to the Juvenile 
Court.  See R.L. Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.1 
(Supp. 2017).  The revisions also made CRA proceedings 
confidential; adjusted the adjudication procedures by, inter 
alia, removing the provisions for a jury trial; and provided 
that, where a child was in need of assistance, he or she no 
longer could be placed with the Department of Youth Services or 
shackled and restrained in a delinquent juvenile facility, but 
could be placed with the Department of Children and Families.  
See id. 
24 
 
 
exposed to the courts are more likely to be involved in serious 
crimes later in life."  Senate OK's Changes on Runaways, 
Truants, supra.  See Lawmakers, Advocates Urge Overhaul of Child 
Services System, State House News Service, Mar. 30, 2011 
("Arguing that the [S]tate's [thirty-eight year old] system of 
services for troubled children forces them into the court system 
prematurely and can tear families apart, lawmakers and advocacy 
groups called yesterday for an overhaul of the system"); State 
House Rally Calls for Children's Services Reform, MetroWest 
Daily News, June 28, 2012; Politicians Push for New Way to Deal 
with Troubled Kids, MetroWest Daily News, Mar. 30, 2011 (Reis) 
("Advocates, parents and graduates of Children in Need of 
Service argue early court involvement can push adolescents into 
a life of crime").  Although CRA determinations are not entered 
on children's juvenile records, see G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 
proponents noted that the mere fact of children's involvement 
with the Juvenile Court stigmatizes them and makes them "more 
likely to be involved in serious crimes later in life."  See 
State Capitol Briefs, State House News Service, July 14, 2011.  
See, e.g., Lawmakers Push New System to Serve Troubled Kids, 
State House News Service, Oct. 6, 2009; Politicians Push for New 
Way to Deal with Troubled Kids, supra. 
 
As Senator Karen Spilka, the lead Senate sponsor of the CRA 
bill, explained: 
25 
 
 
 
"[The CHINS statute] began with good intentions.  Its 
goal was to prevent children from entering the juvenile 
justice system.  But the irony of this is that the court 
system was telling parents and families to go to this 
system, so we were sending messages that didn't make sense.  
We heard time and time again after many meetings that 
parents and children should not have to go to court to get 
services.  The second thing we were hearing was focusing on 
the children's behavior, and this was an adversarial 
system.  This was not bad for all families but it tore a 
lot of them apart. . . .  The third thing was that each 
community needs to have services available for children[] 
and families; this is faster, easier, and resolves issues 
more quickly. . . .  This bill removes labels from children 
and removes stigma from them . . . .  [T]hat is a wonderful 
thing." 
 
2011 House Doc. No. 3492, Senate Floor Debate, July 12, 2011. 
 
Therefore, as with the CHINS statute, the purpose of the 
CRA statute is to "address the root causes of juvenile 
delinquency."  State House Rally Calls for Children's Services 
Reform, supra.  The legislative history and statutory scheme as 
a whole demonstrate that in order to determine whether a child 
has "willfully fail[ed] to attend school," a Juvenile Court 
judge must examine the child's purpose or reasons for being 
absent, so that the judge can decide whether the student's 
behavior arises from reasons portending delinquent behavior. 
 
c.  Authority in other jurisdictions.  Nearly every State 
has a statute authorizing courts or law enforcement officers to 
intervene in the custody arrangements of children who are in 
need of services or supervision because, inter alia, they have 
run away from home, are truant, are beyond the control of their 
26 
 
 
parents or guardians, or otherwise are jeopardizing their own 
welfare or that of others.14  Although most of these statutes 
                     
 
14 See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 12-15-201(4), 12-15-215; Alaska 
Stat. §§ 47.10.011, 47.10.142(e); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-
201(19), 8-341(A)(2), 15-803(B); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-27-303(24), 
9-27-322; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 601; Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 46b-120(5), 46b-149; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 921(6)(b); 
D.C. Code §§ 16-2301(8), 16-2320(c); Fla. Stat. §§ 984.03(9), 
984.22(2); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15-11-2(11), 15-11-381, 15-11-442; 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-11(2)(B)-(D); Idaho Code Ann. § 20-505; 
705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405 / §§ 3-3, 3-24, 3-33.5; Ind. Code 
§§ 31-34-1-6, 31-34-20-1; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-2022(d), 38-
2253; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 159.150, 630.020, 630.120; La. 
Child. Code Ann. arts. 728, 730, 779; 15 Me. Rev. Stat. § 3501; 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-01(e), 3-8A-19; Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 712A.2(a)(4); Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.007(6), 260C.201; 
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-105(k), 43-21-607; Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 211.031; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 41-5-103(22), (51), 41-5-1512; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62B.320; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 169-D:2(II), 169-D:17; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4A-
83, 2A:4A-89; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A-3B-2, 32A-3B-16; N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. Act § 712(a), 754; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1501(27), 7B-2503; 
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 27-20-02(19), 27-20-32; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 2151.022, 2151.354; 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254 (S.B. 718) 
(enacted 2017); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.100; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 6302 ("[d]ependent child"), 6351; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-
3(9), 14-1-32;  S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-19-20(9), 63-19-1440; S.D. 
Codified Laws §§ 26-8B-2, 26-8B-6; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-
102(26), 37-1-132; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.02(15), 51.03(b), 
54.05; Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78A-6-103, 78A-6-105(18); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 5102, 5318; Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-228 
("[c]hild in need of services"), 16.1-278.4, 16.1-278.6; Wash. 
Rev. Code §§ 43.185C.260, 28A.225.030; W. Va. Code §§ 49-1-202 
("[s]tatus offender"), 49-4-712; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-
402(a)(iv), 14-6-429.  Colorado had similar provisions, which 
have since been repealed.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-103(5), 
(20)(f), repealed by Laws 1994, S.B. 94-21, § 1 (effective July 
1, 1997).  The Wisconsin and Iowa statutes concerning children 
in need of services or supervision only cover children who are 
the subject of abandonment, abuse, or neglect, rather than those 
who are deemed to be engaging in improper or injurious behavior.  
See Iowa Code §§ 232.2(6), (20), 232.102; Wis. Stat. § 48.13. 
27 
 
 
include provisions on truancy,15 only Massachusetts and five 
other States (Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
and Rhode Island) have statutory language that expressly 
includes a wilfulness component in the truancy provision.16 
                     
 
15 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-201(4); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 8-201(19)(b); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(24)(A); Cal. Welf. & 
Inst. Code § 601; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120(5); D.C. Code § 16-
2301(8)(A)(i); Fla. Stat. § 984.03(9); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-
2(11); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-11(2)(C); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405 
/ § 3-33.5; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2022(d)(6); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 159.150, 630.020(3); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 730(1); Md. 
Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-01(e)(1); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 712A.2(a)(4); Minn. Stat. § 260C.007(6)(14), (19); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 43-21-105(k)(ii); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031(1)(2)(a); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-103(22), (51); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-
247(3); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62B.320(1)(a); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 169-D:2(II)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-3B-2(A); N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
Act § 712(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1501(27)(a), 7B-2503; N.D. 
Cent. Code § 27-20-02(19); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2151.022, 
2151.354; 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254 (S.B. 718); 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 6302; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(9), 14-1-32; S.C. Code 
Ann. § 63-19-20(9); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8B-2(1); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 37-1-102(26)(A); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.02(15)(C); Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78A-6-103(1)(i), 78A-6-105; Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 33, §§ 5102(3)(D), 5318; Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228; 
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 43.185C.260, 28A.225.030(4); W. Va. Code 
§ 49-4-712; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-402(a)(iv). 
 
 
16 Mass. G. L. c. 119, § 21 ("[c]hild requiring assistance" 
includes one who is "habitually truant," meaning he or she 
"willfully fails to attend school for more than [eight] school 
days in a quarter"); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.2(a)(4) (family 
court has jurisdiction over, inter alia, juvenile who "willfully 
and repeatedly absents himself or herself from [a] school or 
other learning program intended to meet the juvenile's 
educational needs"); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-105(k)(ii) 
("[c]hild in need of supervision" includes one who "willfully 
and habitually absents himself" from school); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 169-D:2(II)(a) ("[c]hild in need of services" includes 
one "[w]ho is subject to compulsory school attendance, and who 
is habitually, willfully, and without good and sufficient cause 
 
28 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of a wilfulness component in 
their comparable statutes, Minnesota and New York have, in turn, 
interpreted their truancy provisions to require purposeful 
conduct.  See Matter of the Welfare of B.K.J., 451 N.W.2d 241, 
243 (Minn. App. 1990); Matter of Simon v. Doe, 165 Misc. 2d 379, 
380-381 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995).  For example, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has determined that under its "child in need of 
protection or services" framework, "[t]ruancy implies volitional 
conduct on the part of the child for which the child is 
responsible."  Matter of the Welfare of B.K.J., supra.  Thus, a 
"child who is absent from school in obedience to a parent's 
wrongful command should not be stigmatized or confused by an 
unwarranted truancy label."17  Id.  By inquiring whether the 
                                                                  
truant from school"); 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254(8)(c) (S.B. 
718) ("[c]hild or juvenile in need of supervision" includes one 
who is "willfully and voluntarily absent from school"); R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 14-1-3(9) ("[w]ayward" child includes one who is 
required to attend school and "willfully and habitually absents 
himself or herself from school").  Michigan has further held 
that a child's absences are not wilful, as required by its 
truancy statute, where they are attributable to illness and fear 
of bullying, as "Michigan courts must infer a criminal intent 
for every offense in the absence of an express or implied 
[l]egislative intent to dispense with criminal intent" (citation 
omitted).  In re Napieraj, 304 Mich. App. 742, 747-748 (2014). 
 
 
17 See Matter of Simon v. Doe, 165 Misc. 2d 379, 380-381 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995) (New York's "person in need of supervision" 
statute requires "[an] intentional failure to attend school" for 
purposes of truancy; therefore, child with extreme anxiety-based 
school phobia who was not attending school was not in need of 
supervision because her will was "overborne by anxiety"). 
 
29 
 
 
child is responsible for his or her own conduct, and not simply 
whether the child is acting intentionally, Minnesota's 
instructive approach seeks to ascertain the underlying reason 
for the child's absences. 
 
d.  Wilfulness under the CRA statute.  In order to 
effectuate the Legislature's goals, the phrase "willfully fails 
to attend school," as used in the CRA statute's habitual truancy 
provision, must require more than voluntary or intentional 
conduct.  The primary concern of the truancy provision is to 
target children who are, for instance, "playing hooky" or beyond 
their parents' control.  Cf. Matter of the Welfare of L.Z., 
C.R.P., & S.L.P., 396 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Minn. 1986) ("The classic 
case of truancy is the child sent to school by his parents, who 
then skips").  We conclude that a child "willfully fails to 
attend school" when he or she acts purposefully, such that his 
or her behavior arises from reasons portending delinquent 
behavior.18  Ascertaining the child's purpose in failing 
                                                                  
 
 
The Vermont Supreme Court declined to adopt Minnesota's 
approach because it determined that the language of the Vermont 
statute defining a truant as one who, "being subject to 
compulsory school attendance, is habitually and without 
justification truant from school," did not imply a volitional 
element.  See Matter of A.V., S.T., A.C., & E.V., 176 Vt. 568, 
571 (2003). 
 
18 Even in such cases, the intervention and other services 
contemplated under the CRA statute may be a more effective 
method of changing the child's behavior than bringing the child 
 
30 
 
 
repeatedly to attend school allows the court to focus on whether 
the behavior is such that it can and should be deterred, and on 
whether the child's home circumstances are such that the court 
should change, or place conditions on, the child's custody 
arrangements.  See G. L. c. 119, § 39G (choices available to 
Juvenile Court judge in CRA proceedings concern only custody, 
and provision of services may be merely conditions of custody).  
See also Oscar F. v. County of Worcester, 412 Mass. 38, 41 
(1992) (statute "is concerned with social and family problems.  
It does not make the kind of education that a child receives a 
central judicial concern"). 
 
We emphasize that a finding of wilfulness is a fact-based 
inquiry that will depend on the circumstances of each case.  Not 
every case involving a mental or physical disability necessarily 
will shield a child from a finding of wilfulness, since not 
every disability affects a child's ability to attend school.  
Each child's purpose or reasons for missing school should be 
examined individually in order to determine whether the absences 
are wilful beyond a reasonable doubt.  Given their experience 
with juveniles and with delinquency matters, Juvenile Court 
judges are uniquely situated to assess whether the child's 
                                                                  
into court.  The design of the CRA statute, with its emphasis on 
community-based resources, indicates that the Legislature 
envisioned a deliberate set of escalating measures, in which 
court intervention would be the last alternative. 
31 
 
 
reasons for regularly missing school are of the concerning 
nature that would portend delinquency and call for deterrence. 
 
e.  Application to M.P.  With this definition in mind, the 
evidence in the record does not support a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that M.P. "willfully fail[ed] to attend 
school."  Even assuming that the judge correctly determined that 
M.P.'s acts of staying home were voluntary or intentional, it is 
uncontested that her purpose was to address her bladder 
condition and associated mental and emotional impairments.  
While M.P. was not "home bound" per se, nor exempt from school, 
nothing of record suggests that M.P.'s behavior exhibited 
problems or tendencies that could lead toward juvenile 
delinquency.  To the contrary, the Juvenile Court judge 
acknowledged that M.P. desired to go to school, and it is 
undisputed that M.P. was saddened by her inability to do so.  
Even during the short period when she established a routine with 
the in-home service provider, M.P.'s bladder condition still 
interfered with her ability to leave the house. 
 
Nor do the judge's findings and the record show that a 
modification of her custody arrangements would help improve 
M.P.'s attendance record.19  Cf. Matter of Benjamin A., 2011 N.Y. 
                     
 
19 If, unlike here, a child's absences were the result of 
parental neglect such that the child's truant behavior was not 
found to be wilful, the child could not be adjudicated a child 
 
32 
 
 
Slip Op. 52217, at n.14 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Oswego County Sept. 26, 
2011) (unreported) ("Even if the Court could find otherwise, a 
[person in need of services] label is not going to get Benjamin 
to school.  All the services he needs to be successful are 
available to him through the school district and diversion 
services.  If those services do not . . . work and Benjamin does 
not attend school, what could this Court do but remove[] him 
from his family and place him into an ill-prepared and 
overworked juvenile justice system"). 
 
We note that an incorrect CRA adjudication is not without 
consequences.  Even where, as here, there is no change in 
custody, such a finding can be harmful in at least two respects.  
First, CRA proceedings could affect parents' custodial rights in 
the future; courts have considered such proceedings in care and 
protection cases when terminating parental custody.  See, e.g., 
                                                                  
requiring assistance by virtue of habitual truancy and the 
matter of appropriate custodial arrangements accordingly could 
not be addressed pursuant to that statute.  That being said, 
however, the matter of parental neglect and custodial 
arrangements for the child may be addressed in care and 
protection proceedings brought in the Juvenile Court pursuant to  
G. L. c. 119, §§ 24, 26.  Such proceedings may be brought on 
behalf of a child who "(a) is without necessary and proper 
physical or educational care and discipline; (b) is growing up 
under conditions or circumstances damaging to the child's sound 
character development; (c) lacks proper attention of the parent, 
guardian with care and custody or custodian; or (d) has a 
parent, guardian or custodian who is unwilling, incompetent or 
unavailable to provide any such care, discipline or attention."  
G. L. c. 119, § 24. 
33 
 
 
Care & Protection of Sam, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (2015); 
Adoption of Odessa, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2010).  Second, as 
discussed, the CRA statute was amended specifically to minimize 
children's exposure to the Juvenile Court unless court 
involvement is necessary, in order to prevent the stigma and 
other negative consequences of premature court involvement.  In 
this case, the evidence showed that the CRA proceedings worsened 
M.P.'s condition and increased her anxiety, stress, and 
sadness.20 
 
The evidence of record does not support a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that M.P. "willfully fail[ed] to attend 
school."  Accordingly, the judgment must be vacated and set 
aside.  The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for entry 
of an order dismissing the CRA petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
20 We note that the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may 
have been a more appropriate venue in this case to ensure that 
M.P. was receiving an adequate education.  See G. L. c. 71B, 
§ 2A.  This administrative body has authority to provide 
"adjudicatory hearings, mediation and other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution" concerning "any matter relating to the 
identification, evaluation, education program or educational 
placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a 
free and appropriate public education to the child."  Id.