Title: FARMERS CO-OP. ELEVATOR OF CAVALIER v. Lemier
Citation: 328 N.W.2d 833
Docket Number: 10272
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 1982

328 N.W.2d 833 (1982) FARMERS CO-OP ELEVATOR OF CAVALIER, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lionel LEMIER, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. No. 10272. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 30, 1982. *834 DePuy, Kopperud, Goulet &amp; Hall, Grafton, for defendant and appellant; argued by W.R. Goulet, Jr., Grafton. Fleming &amp; DuBois, Cavalier, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by Neil W. Fleming, Cavalier. PAULSON, Justice. Lionel Lemier appeals from an order denying a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict dated June 9, 1982, and issued by the District Court of Pembina County. We affirm. Farmers Co-op Elevator, Cavalier, North Dakota [Elevator] is engaged in the business of buying and reselling grain. Lionel Lemier [Lemier] is a farmer who has farmed in the Cavalier area for a number of years. Ray Robinson [Robinson], at the time the contract at issue in this case was entered into, was the manager of the Elevator and had acted in that capacity for at least fourteen years. Lemier hauled grain to the Elevator during the spring and summer of 1980. On April 15, 1980, Robinson and Lemier entered into an oral agreement whereby Lemier would sell 12,000 bushels of durum to the Elevator at the price of $4 per bushel, with possible discounts of from 15¢ to 30¢ per bushel, depending upon the grade, weight, and color of the grain. Delivery of the grain was to take place during the month of October 1980. Robinson reduced the oral agreement to writing by preparing a written contract which he then signed and placed in Lemier's file in the Elevator office. The written contract was never signed by Lemier. Robinson, as manager of the Elevator, subsequently sold the 12,000 bushels of grain to a commission firm. Lemier had knowledge of this transaction. The price of durum increased during the summer of 1980 as did the amount of the discounts; however, the discounts in the instant case were governed by the contract of April 15, 1980. Lemier failed to deliver the durum in October 1980 and, accordingly, Robinson contacted Lemier in November *835 1980 to determine whether or not he would deliver the grain. Lemier refused to deliver the grain at the price of $4 per bushel. In November 1980 the commission firm required the Elevator to repurchase the 12,-000 bushels of durum at $5.83 per bushel. Robinson then contacted Lemier and informed him that the durum could be repurchased at $1.83 per bushel, but Lemier refused to pay that amount. Thereafter, the Elevator commenced an action against Lemier for breach of an oral contract of sale. Lemier, in his answer, generally denied the allegations of the complaint and, further, counterclaimed for damages.[1] The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the Elevator's case, Lemier made a motion for a directed verdict which was denied by the district court. The Elevator, at the close of the trial, made a motion for a directed verdict which was also denied by the court. The case was then submitted to the jury for a special verdict on the issue of whether or not an oral contract was formed between the parties. The jury found that an oral contract was formed and returned the special verdict in favor of the Elevator. The trial court incorporated the special verdict into its order, together with the assessment of damages in the sum of $21,960, plus interest, costs, and disbursements. A post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was submitted by Lemier to the court and denied by the trial judge. Lemier appeals from the order denying his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Lemier raises the following issues on appeal: (1) Did the Farmers Co-op Elevator, Cavalier, North Dakota, carry its burden of proving that a contract existed with Lionel Lemier; and, (2) Did the court err in denying Lemier's motion for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict? The question of whether or not an oral contract existed between the parties was submitted to the jury for a special verdict. The jury rendered a verdict as follows: In Powers v. Martinson, 313 N.W.2d 720, 728 (N.D.1981) this court stated: In the instant case, both parties testified as to the nature of a discussion between the parties on April 15, 1980, concerning the sale of 12,000 bushels of number one hard amber durum for a price of $4 per bushel. On direct examination, Robinson testified as follows: On cross-examination Lemier testified as follows: Upon our review of the record, including the foregoing testimony, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that a contract was formed between the Elevator and Lemier. Accordingly, Lemier's contention that the Elevator failed to carry its burden of proving that a contract existed between the parties is without merit. Because there is substantial evidence to sustain the jury verdict, we will not set it aside. *837 The second issue raised by Lemier is whether or not it was proper for the trial court to deny his motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Lemier contends that the evidence was insufficient to create a question of fact for the jury. In determining whether or not the evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact, and, consequently, in determining whether or not a motion for a directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted, the trial court must ascertain whether or not the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the party against whom the motion is made and without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, is such that reasonable men could reach but one conclusion as to the verdict. Okken v. Okken, 325 N.W.2d 264 (N.D.1982); Anderson v. Kroh, 301 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.1980); Nokota Feeds, Inc. v. State Bank of Lakota, 210 N.W.2d 182 (N.D.1973). In employing this standard, the trial judge is required to accept the truth of the evidence presented by the party opposing the motion and the truth of all reasonable inferences from that evidence which supports the jury verdict. The trial court must give proper deference to the jury's evaluation of the evidence and its judgment of the credibility of the witnesses. Okken, supra. In the trial court's order denying Lemier's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge stated, in pertinent part: We agree with the trial court. The evidence presented to the jury, including the testimony quoted in this opinion, was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral contract existed. Furthermore, upon reviewing the evidence in this case in a light most favorable to the Elevator, the party against whom the motions were made, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lemier's motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It cannot be said when viewing the testimony presented to the jury that the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn therefrom is that no contract was formed between Lemier and the Elevator. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and PEDERSON, VANDE WALLE and SAND, JJ., concur. [1] Lemier did not plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense and the statute of frauds is not an issue on appeal. Lemier's counterclaim was withdrawn during the trial.