Title: Padmanabhan v. Executive Director of the Bd. of Registration in Medicine
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13358
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2023

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SJC-13358 
BHARANI PADMANABHAN  vs.  EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD OF 
REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE. 
 
 
March 17, 2023. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Board of Registration in Medicine.  Mandamus.  Clerk of 
Court.  Practice, Civil, Default, Service of process.  
Attorney General. 
 
 
The petitioner, Bharani Padmanabhan, filed a petition in 
the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5, seeking relief 
in the nature of mandamus.  The petition was denied by a single 
justice of this court, and Padmanabhan appealed.  We affirm. 
 
Background.  This matter stems from a civil action that the 
petitioner commenced in the Superior Court against the executive 
director of the Board of Registration in Medicine (board), 
acting in his official capacity.  The petitioner timely served 
the complaint upon the board, but did not also serve the office 
of the Attorney General, as required when the party served is a 
State agency.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (3), as amended, 370 
Mass. 918 (1976).  No answer was filed within twenty days, 
prompting the petitioner to file a motion requesting entry of 
default by the clerk, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 (a), 365 
Mass. 822 (1974).1  Thereafter, the office of the Attorney 
General learned of the suit and filed an opposition to the 
motion on behalf of the board.  A judge in the Superior Court 
subsequently denied the petitioner's motion based on the 
 
1 The rule provides:  "When a party against whom a judgment 
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or 
otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is 
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter 
his default."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 (a), 365 Mass. 822 (1974). 
2 
 
 
 
petitioner's failure to timely serve the office of the Attorney 
General. 
 
The petitioner later filed a second request for entry of 
default.  That request was denied without prejudice, for failure 
to certify compliance with Rule 9A of the Superior Court.  The 
petitioner then brought the instant petition for relief in the 
nature of mandamus, requesting that the clerk for the Superior 
Court in Suffolk County be compelled to enter a default against 
the board.  Upon denial of his petition by the single justice, 
the petitioner appealed to the full court.2 
 
Discussion.  A request for relief in the nature of mandamus 
is "a call to a government official to perform a clear cut duty, 
and the remedy is limited to requiring action on the part of the 
government official" (quotation and citation omitted).  Ardon v. 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 464 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2012), 
cert. denied, 571 U.S. 872 (2013).  Relief in the nature of 
mandamus is not appropriate to compel an official to perform a 
discretionary act, or to obtain review of an action already 
taken.  See id.; Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of 
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 463 Mass. 447, 470 
(2012).  "Further, even if the act sought to be compelled is 
ministerial in nature, relief in the nature of mandamus is 
extraordinary and may not be granted except to prevent a failure 
of justice in instances where there is no other adequate remedy" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Mederi, Inc. v. Salem, 488 
Mass. 60, 65 (2021). 
 
The petitioner is correct that entry of default under rule 
55 (a) is a "formal, ministerial act of the clerk" that does not 
require judicial authorization.  Reporters' Notes to Rule 55 
(1973), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure 
(LexisNexis 2023).  Here, the petitioner's requests were 
apparently treated as motions and ruled upon by a judge in the 
trial court, rather than acted upon by the clerk, as provided 
 
2 After the appeal was entered in this court, the petitioner 
filed a motion for judicial notice, requesting that the court 
take notice of DiMasi v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 491 
Mass. 186 (2023), insofar as the case discusses statutory 
interpretation.  Although styled as a motion, the filing is 
effectively a letter under Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), as appearing 
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), notifying the court of a supplemental 
authority, and as such, no ruling is necessary. 
3 
 
 
 
for under the rule.3  Nonetheless, in the circumstances of the 
underlying case, the clerk did not have a "clear duty" to enter 
a default. 
 
Contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the board is an 
agency of the Commonwealth, and the office of the Attorney 
General must be served in order to perfect service of process, 
pursuant to rule 4 (d) (3).  See G. L. c. 12, § 3; Currier v. 
National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 462 Mass. 1, 4 (2012) 
(describing board as "the Commonwealth's licensing agency for 
physicians").  See also Levy v. Board of Registration & 
Discipline in Med., 378 Mass. 519, 523 (1979) (discussing 
board's statutorily delegated authority as administrative 
agency).  Perfection of service "is a prerequisite" for entry of 
default because such service triggers the deadline for filing an 
answer.  Curly Customs, Inc. v. Pioneer Fin., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 
92, 99 (2004).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (a) (1), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974) (deadline for responsive pleading begins to run "[a]fter 
service upon" responding party).  Because service was not 
perfected here, the board's twenty-day deadline to respond under 
rule 12 (a) did not begin to run, the board had not "failed to 
plead or otherwise defend" as required by rule 55 (a), and the 
clerk had no clear cut duty to enter a default.  See Curly 
Customs, Inc., supra.  Cf. Lally v. Dorchester Div. of the Dist. 
Court Dep't, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 724, 727-728 (1988) (removal of 
default required where plaintiff did not serve complaint upon 
office of Attorney General, which was "essential to valid 
service" under rule 4 [d] [3], and caused defendant's failure to 
timely respond).  Indeed, the failure to perfect service was 
apparent from the docket as well as the petitioner's request for 
default, each of which indicated that service was made and 
returned for the board, but not for the office of the Attorney 
General.4 
 
 
3 The court's denial of the petitioner's second request 
appears to reflect uncertainty about whether it was intended to 
be ruled upon by the court.  The endorsement states:  "To the 
extent this is a motion for consideration by the court, it is 
denied without prejudice for failure to certify compliance with 
Rule 9A of the Superior Court." 
 
4 In light of our conclusion that the petitioner was not 
entitled to entry of default, we need not consider his argument 
that requests for entry of default under rule 55 (a) are not 
subject to Rule 9A of the Superior Court. 
4 
 
 
 
Moreover, even if the clerk had entered a default upon the 
petitioner's initial request, the petitioner would not have 
benefited from it, where the defect in service provided a basis 
for removal of the default at the request of the Attorney 
General.  See Lally, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 727-728 (although 
relief from entry of default judgment is discretionary, such 
relief "must" be granted "where a defect in service is itself 
the cause of the failure to answer and of delay in removing a 
default"). 
 
Accordingly, the single justice did not err or abuse her 
discretion in denying relief under G. L. c. 249, § 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Bharani Padmanabhan, pro se. 
 
Samuel Furgang, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
respondent.