Title: TOMA v. TOMA
Citation: 163 P.3d 540, 2007 OK 52
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2007

TOMA v. TOMA Annotate this Case TOMA v. TOMA 2007 OK 52 163 P.3d 540 Case Number: 102801 Decided: 06/26/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TIMOTHY N. TOMA, Administrator of the estate of Margaret E. Meszaros, Plaintiff, v. CLAIRE HENRIETTA TOMA, MATTHEW C. TOMA, and JILL RENEE TOMA, f/k/a JILL RENEE EDDY, Defendants and CLAIRE HENRIETTA TOMA, in her capacity as settlor and trustee of the CLAIRE HENRIETTA TOMA REVOCABLE TRUST u/a dtd 12/30/2003, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. TIMOTHY N. TOMA, in his individual capacity and in his capacity as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Margaret E. Meszaros, Deceased, Defendant/Appellee. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III ¶0 Appellant Claire Henrietta Toma brought this declaratory judgment action for a ruling the judgment lien held by Appellee, Timothy N. Toma, was extinguished when her husband, Charles Toma, died. Appellee obtained a judgment in Ohio against Charles and filed the judgment against Charles' interest in his homestead property in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, pursuant to OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED; APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES ARE DENIED; APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR COSTS ARE GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Steven M. Harris, Douglas R. Haughey, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellant, Christopher J. Petersen, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee. OPINION WATT, Justice: ¶1 In this case, we are asked to find an exception to the general rule that a lien on joint tenancy property is extinguished if the creditor fails to execute on the lien before the death of the joint tenant. The lien at issue arose pursuant to FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Charles John Toma and Claire Henrietta Toma formed the Toma Family Living Trust (Family Trust) on September 3, 1987, to which they as trustees conveyed their homestead property. Defendant/Appellee Timothy N. Toma (Timothy) obtained a judgment against Charles in Ohio on October 28, 2002 ¶3 Timothy attempted to execute on his lien for the first time after Charles' death. ¶4 Claire appealed the trial court's judgment pursuant to the accelerated procedure for summary judgment appeals. See Supreme Court Rule 1.36, ¶5 The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the trial court's judgment. COCA considered the general rule relating to the common law rule of "joint tenancy" and stated: The facts are undisputed and the issue is therefore one of law: whether the general rule, that executing on a lien severs a joint tenancy, while a lien on joint tenancy property is extinguished if the creditor fails to execute on the lien before the death of the debtor joint tenant, applies where execution is barred by law, as in the case of homestead property. [emphasis added]. ¶6 Citing Ladd v. State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Tax Commission, CONTENTIONS ¶7 In his petition for certiorari, Timothy argues the dispositive issue has been stated incorrectly as whether attachment of the lien itself constitutes severance, or whether he took the necessary steps to accomplish such a severance. Instead, he contends the true problem before the Court is the still unreconciled conflict between the requirement that such a severance be accomplished and the legal prohibitions that forbid an execution and forced sale of homestead property. We find the overriding issue is whether a §706 judgment lien properly filed against a judgment debtor's homestead can survive a deceased joint tenant/judgment debtor's interest in his homestead. ¶8 Timothy acknowledges a judgment lien on homestead property cannot be enforced "while homestead protections are in effect." However, in support of his argument that the lien remains viable, he contends the 1997 amendment of §706 providing for attachment of liens to homestead property is intended to place an effective encumbrance on property and to provide security to judgment creditors which did not previously exist. He argues that because a §706 lien now attaches to the homestead, the amendment protects legitimate judgment creditors by remaining an encumbrance on the property. Thus he argues amended §706 requires judgment liens, once they have attached to the homestead, to be satisfied to give clear title. He contends this is accomplished without depriving a judgment debtor of traditional homestead protections while the property is used as his homestead. ¶9 Claire contends COCA correctly found Charles' joint tenancy interest in the homestead property was extinguished at the time of his death because Timothy made no attempt to execute on the judgment and thus sever the joint tenancy. ¶10 Timothy takes issue with COCA's determination that a sale is required in Oklahoma to sever a joint tenancy. As authority, COCA cited [T]he provisions of this act shall apply to all estates in joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety in either real or personal property heretofore or hereafter created. Nothing herein contained shall prevent execution, levy and sale of the interest of the judgment debtor in such estates and such sale shall constitute a severance. [emphasis added]. JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW ¶11 The principal characteristic of joint tenancy property is the right of survivorship in the joint tenants. Casey v. Casey, ¶12 We note the above cited statute, ¶13 The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the conditions and wants of the people, remains in force in aid of the general statutes in Oklahoma. See ¶14 The common law may not be abrogated by implication; instead, its alteration must be explicitly expressed. See Brown v. Founders Bank and Trust Company, ¶15 The rule that a lien on a joint tenancy interest is extinguished upon the death of the joint tenant is an accepted substantive concept of the common law. See Ladd v. State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, DISCUSSION AND AUTHORITIES ¶16 With the common law rule on joint tenancies in Oklahoma in mind, we examine ¶17 Timothy offers citations to bankruptcy cases which recognize the amendment of §706 as a change in Oklahoma exemption law because judgment liens now specifically attach to a debtor's homestead. While the issue of whether such liens should be avoided under bankruptcy law is a matter of federal law and not pertinent to our decision in this case, the bankruptcy courts' discussion of the nature of a §706 lien is instructive and persuasive. He cites, inter alia, In re Richardson, 224 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998) which cites In re McKinney-Jones, 219 B.R. 619 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998). Although these cases reached different results on the lien avoidance issue, ¶18 The reasoning of the bankruptcy courts is reasonable and persuasive. It recognizes the clear language in §706 shows an intent to protect the homestead even if the lien has attached. The property may not be sold to pay the outstanding judgment while it is used as the judgment debtor's homestead. Applying this rule to this case, Timothy never had a chance to enforce his lien because there was never a time that Charles did not use the property as his homestead. As we did in Ladd, we also decline to infer legislative intent to abandon the common law rule regarding judgment liens on joint tenancy interests. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL ¶19 Claire has filed motions for attorney fees and costs incurred in the trial court and on appeal. Her authority for an award of attorney fees is Supreme Court Rule 1.14(b), ¶20 Claire's motion for attorney fees at trial and on appeal is denied. Although she filed this action for declaratory judgment in response to Timothy's lawsuit to satisfy his lien, neither action was brought pursuant to the lien statutes under title 42 of the Oklahoma Statutes pertaining to mechanics and materialmen's liens. Therefore, her citations to ¶21 Claire's verified motion to tax costs is granted in part and denied in part. Claire is entitled to costs on appeal for Supreme Court filing fees and for completion of the appellate record prepared in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 1.36, in the total amount of $213.00. See CONCLUSION ¶22 Judgment liens pursuant to ¶23 The §706 judgment lien attached to the homestead, but it could not be enforced while the property was used as Charles' homestead. The Oklahoma legislature's amendment of §706 to allow judgment liens to attach to homestead property remains explicitly limited by its reference to constitutional and statutory provisions ¶24 Timothy thus had only a limited remedy under the terms of §706 to enforce his judgment due to the homestead character of Charles' property. This limitation exists for two reasons. First, the Legislature clearly and specifically made §706 judgment liens subject to existing Oklahoma law which protects homestead property from forced sale. Second, the Legislature did not include any language showing an intent to abrogate the common law rule regarding joint tenancy property. We find this omission to indicate the absence of legislative intent to change the common law rule on joint tenancy interests. ¶25 We agree with COCA's holding that a sale, in conjunction with an execution and levy, is required to sever the joint tenancy. Perfection of the judgment lien under the requirements of §706 is not sufficient. The terms of §74 indicate the severance of a joint tenancy, after execution and levy, is only accomplished with a sale of the property. The lien in this case, filed against the interest of a deceased joint tenant, was not preserved without an act taken to sever the joint tenancy during the debtor/joint tenant's life. The joint tenancy was extinguished and the entire ownership of the property became vested in Claire. OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED; APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES ARE DENIED; APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR COSTS ARE GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. WINCHESTER, C.J., EDMONDSON, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, WATT, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ., concur OPALA, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part Insofar as the court concludes that the death of the joint tenant extinguished the lien sought to be enforced in this cause against an interest no longer in legal existence, I concur in the result. Insofar as the court denies the surviving tenant's motion for counsel-fee award as the prevailing party in the suit, I dissent. KAUGER, J., concurs in part; dissents in part FOOT