Title: Lowe v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-263
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-263 
____________ 
 
RODNEY TYRONE LOWE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
October 19, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on direct appeal from a resentencing of death.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Rodney Tyrone Lowe 
appeals his sentence of death for the 1990 first-degree murder of Donna Burnell.  
The trial judge sentenced Lowe to death after the new penalty phase jury 
recommended the death penalty by a vote of twelve to zero.  We first set forth the 
factual and procedural background of this case and then address Lowe’s claims, 
including his Hurst v. Florida (Hurst v. Florida), 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), claim and 
his claim that his death sentence is disproportionate.  For the reasons explained 
below, we affirm Lowe’s sentence of death.  
 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Lowe was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death for the July 1990 first-
degree murder of Donna Burnell.  The jury also convicted Lowe of attempted 
robbery.  We set forth the following facts in Lowe’s first direct appeal:  
On the morning of July 3, 1990, Donna Burnell was working as a 
clerk at the Nu-Pack convenience store in Indian River County when a 
would-be robber shot her three times with a .32 caliber handgun.  Ms. 
Burnell suffered gunshot wounds to the face, head, and chest and died 
on the way to the hospital.  The killer fled the scene without taking 
any money from the cash drawer.  
 
During the week following the shooting, investigators received 
information linking the defendant, Rodney Lowe, to the crime.  Lowe 
was questioned by investigators at the police station and, after 
speaking to his girlfriend, gave a statement that implicated him in the 
murder.  Following this statement, Lowe was arrested and indicted for 
first-degree murder and attempted robbery. 
 
At trial, the State presented witnesses who testified that, among 
other things, Lowe’s fingerprint had been found at the scene of the 
crime, his car was seen leaving the parking lot of the Nu-Pack 
immediately after the shooting, his gun had been used in the shooting, 
his time card showed that he was clocked-out from his place of 
employment at the time of the murder, and Lowe had confessed to a 
close friend on the day of the shooting.  The State also presented, over 
defense objection, the statement Lowe gave to the police on the day of 
his arrest.  Lowe advanced no witnesses or other evidence in his 
defense.  After closing arguments, the jury returned a verdict finding 
Lowe guilty of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery with 
a firearm as charged.  
 
Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 971 (Fla. 1994).  
 
 At the conclusion of the original penalty phase, the jury, by a vote of nine to 
three, recommended death.  Id. at 972.  The trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendation and sentenced Lowe to death, finding two aggravators: (1) the 
 
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defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to the person; and (2) the capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in an attempt to commit robbery.  
Id.  The trial court also found that the mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators.  
Id.  In addition to the sentence of death, the trial court sentenced Lowe to fifteen 
years’ imprisonment for the attempted robbery conviction.  Id.  
 
On direct appeal, Lowe raised ten guilt phase issues and seven penalty phase 
issues.  Id.1  We rejected Lowe’s arguments on all claims and affirmed his 
                                          
 
 
1.  Lowe asserted that: (1) the trial court erred in denying Lowe’s motion to 
suppress his confession; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear certain 
portions of Lowe’s taped interrogation; (3) the trial court erred in admitting a box 
of Lowe’s personal items; (4) he was denied his constitutional rights to effective 
assistance of counsel and the equal protection of the law when the trial court 
declined to appoint two attorneys for his defense; (5) the trial court erred in failing 
to conduct a hearing under Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); 
(6) the trial court erred in denying a motion for disqualification; (7) county court 
Judge Wild lacked jurisdiction to preside over the instant felony; (8) the trial court 
erred in giving the State’s special jury instruction; (9) the trial court erred in 
overruling defense counsel’s objections to the State’s closing arguments and in 
denying a motion for mistrial; (10) the trial court erred in granting the State’s 
motion in limine; (11) the trial court erred in denying the defense’s requested 
penalty phase instruction regarding the presence of the child at the murder scene; 
(12) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC) and cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating circumstances; 
(13) the State’s penalty phase argument was improper; (14) the trial court gave 
excessive weight to the prior violent felony aggravator; (15) the trial judge erred in 
allowing evidence of the circumstances surrounding Lowe’s prior felony to be 
admitted in the penalty phase; (16) the trial judge erred in failing to inquire into the 
whereabouts of two defense witnesses who failed to appear during the penalty 
 
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convictions and sentence of death.  650 So. 2d at 971.  On October 2, 1995, the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Lowe v. Florida, 516 U.S. 887 
(1995).  
 
Lowe filed an initial motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 28 (Fla. 2008).  
Following several amended postconviction motions and amendments to these 
motions, the trial court held a Huff2 hearing.  2 So. 3d at 28.  The trial court 
summarily denied twelve of the thirty-three claims and held an evidentiary hearing 
on the remaining twenty-one claims.  Id.  Lowe filed two supplemental claims after 
the hearing, and an additional evidentiary hearing was set for the Brady3 violation 
claim.  2 So. 3d at 28.  After the second evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued 
an order denying all of Lowe’s claims.  Id.   
 
Lowe then filed a successive postconviction motion based on newly 
discovered evidence and also filed a motion for rehearing.  Id.  The trial court held 
a hearing on the motion for rehearing and the first successive postconviction 
motion.  Id.  On March 18, 2005, the trial court issued an order denying a new trial 
                                          
 
phase; and (17) the trial court did not consider or weigh mitigation.  See Lowe v. 
State, 2 So. 3d 21, 28 n.1 (Fla. 2008).  
 
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).  
 
3.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
 
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but granting a new penalty phase based on the motion for rehearing and the first 
successive motion.  Id. at 29.  Lowe appealed the trial court’s denial of part of his 
postconviction motion, raising five claims.  Id.4  Lowe also petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus, raising three claims.  Id.5  The State cross-appealed.  2 So. 3d at 29.  
                                          
 
 
4.  Lowe claimed that:  
(1) he was denied an adversarial testing at the guilt phase of his trial 
because trial counsel was ineffective, the State suppressed material 
exculpatory evidence, and newly discovered evidence has been 
disclosed, and for these reasons the jury did not know that Dwayne 
Blackmon was the shooter; (2) evidence that Lowe did not act alone 
was never presented to the jury because counsel failed to properly 
investigate and the State withheld evidence that multiple parties were 
involved in the crime; (3) because counsel was ineffective and the 
State withheld material evidence, critical impeachment of Dwayne 
Blackmon was never presented to the jury; (4) trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to object to irrelevant and 
inflammatory evidence; and (5) trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to challenge the admissibility of Lowe’s 
statement on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and by failing to impeach Patricia White.  
Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 29.  
 
5.  Lowe claimed that: 
(1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise several claims 
on direct appeal; (2) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it violates the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution; and (3) Lowe’s death sentence is unconstitutional 
because the State used prior convictions based on acts committed by 
Lowe when he was a juvenile to establish an aggravating factor, in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). 
 
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This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief on all claims raised by Lowe, 
affirmed the trial court’s order granting a new penalty phase, and denied habeas 
relief.  Id. at 46. 
 
The new penalty phase commenced on September 12, 2011.  On September 
23, 2011, the jury unanimously recommended death.  At the Spencer6 hearing held 
on October 28, 2011, no additional evidence of aggravation or mitigation was 
presented.  On January 26, 2012, the trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendation and sentenced Lowe to death, finding that five aggravators, 
merged to four, outweighed one statutory mitigator and various nonstatutory 
mitigators.7  This appeal follows. 
                                          
 
Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 42.  
 
6.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
7.  The trial court found five aggravators, merged to four: (1) under sentence 
of imprisonment/on community control (great weight); (2) prior violent felony 
(great weight); (3A) murder in the course of a felony (great weight) merged with 
(3B) pecuniary gain; and (4) avoid arrest (great weight).  The trial court found one 
statutory mitigator—statutory age (little weight).  The trial court rejected the 
statutory mitigator that Lowe was a minor participant in a homicide committed by 
another person.  Regarding the ten nonstatutory mitigators argued by Lowe, the 
trial court made the following findings: (1) good behavior while in confinement 
(moderate weight); (2) family relationships (little weight); (3) creative ability (not 
a mitigating circumstance—no weight); (4) maturity (little weight); (5) religious 
faith (little weight); (6) work ethic (little weight); (7) extracurricular sporting 
activities (not a mitigating circumstance—no weight); (8) Lowe is emotionally 
supportive of his sister (no weight); (9) low risk of future danger (little weight); 
and (10) good courtroom behavior (little weight). 
 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Now on appeal from the new penalty phase, Lowe raises the following 
eighteen claims: (1) the trial court improperly granted the State a cause challenge 
to a prospective juror; (2) the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel’s 
objection to the State’s use of a mannequin; (3) the State’s use of a computer-
generated diagram of the crime scene as a demonstrative aid was improper; (4) the 
trial court erred in admitting Officer Ambrum’s testimony regarding Lowe’s 
possible sentence for a violation of community control; (5) the trial court erred in 
restricting mitigating evidence and limiting cross-examination; (6) the trial court 
erred in excluding the defense expert’s testing results due to a discovery violation; 
(7) comments made by the State during closing amounted to fundamental error; (8) 
the trial court erred in sending prejudicial evidence not introduced at trial to the 
jury room for consideration during deliberations; (9) the trial court erred in 
precluding the jury from considering evidence of Lowe’s limited role in the killing, 
disproportionate treatment compared to others, and a lawful evaluation of the 
aggravators; (10) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to make a 
culpability finding before it considered imposing a death sentence; (11) the jury 
was misled regarding sentencing options by the trial court and the State; (12) the 
trial court erred in not independently weighing the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances; (13) the aggravators found were not submitted to the jury properly 
 
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and were not supported by competent, substantial evidence; (14) the trial court did 
not apply the correct law and its mitigation findings are not supported by record 
evidence; (15) the trial court erred in denying Lowe’s special verdict form and 
instructions; (16) the incomplete record on appeal requires reversal; (17) death is 
not a proportionate punishment in this case; and (18) cumulative error.  We address 
each issue in turn.   
I.  Cause Challenge to Prospective Juror 
Based on the responses prospective juror Charles Simard provided on his 
juror questionnaire regarding the death penalty, the State conducted the following 
voir dire:  
 
(Prosecutor) Mr. Butler:  You indicated also on your 
questionnaire that you don’t believe in the death penalty? 
 
Charles Simard:  That’s right. 
 
Mr. Butler:  Now at first glance it would look then like it might 
be difficult for you to sit as a juror in a case where the only issue is 
whether the Defendant receives a death sentence or life without the 
possibility of parole for twenty-five years; is that fair? 
 
Charles Simard:  Yes. 
 
. . . .  
 
Mr. Butler:  Given your personal opposition to the death 
penalty, are you going to be able to engage in that weighing process, 
or do you think that because of where you stand personally you’re 
always going to tilt those scales towards -- towards a life sentence? 
 
Charles Simard:  Yes, I’d probably go for life. 
 
Mr. Butler:  And that’s even though the Judge would tell you 
you’re supposed to weigh it? 
 
Charles Simard:  Yes. 
 
. . . .  
 
(Defense counsel) Mr. Garland:  Do you think as you sit here 
today that you could put aside your personal opinions, and listen to 
 
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Judge Pegg’s instructions and make a decision as to whether or not 
you could recommend life or death in this case? 
 
Charles Simard:  I think so. 
 
Mr. Garland:  You think you can follow the law? 
 
Charles Simard:  Uh-huh. 
 
Mr. Garland:  Is that a yes? 
 
Charles Simard:  Yes.  
 
 
At sidebar, the State moved for a cause challenge, arguing that Mr. Simard 
told the defense he could follow the law, but told the State otherwise.  The State 
argued that “there’s certainly a reasonable doubt as to whether [Simard] can be fair 
and impartial.”  Defense counsel objected, arguing that Mr. Simard’s responses did 
not rise to the level of a cause challenge, and suggesting that “if the State wants to 
use a peremptory that’s up to them.”  The trial court granted the State’s challenge, 
finding that it was “not convinced” by Mr. Simard.  The State later withdrew its 
cause challenge and substituted a peremptory challenge before the jury was sworn 
in.  Defense counsel did not make a specific objection to the substitution. 
Lowe argues that Mr. Simard merely voiced a general objection to the death 
penalty and thus the trial court reversibly erred by granting the State’s cause 
challenge.  Lowe further argues that the error was not cured by the trial court’s 
subsequent decision to allow the State to substitute a peremptory strike against Mr. 
Simard.  Lowe relies on this Court’s decision in Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 
2003).  The State counters that Mr. Simard’s answers were inconsistent and the 
 
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trial court thus made the proper credibility finding.  The State further contends that 
Ault is distinguishable.  We conclude that Ault does not entitle Lowe to relief. 
In Ault, we concluded that it was reversible error for the trial court to have 
dismissed a prospective juror for cause where the juror’s responses to questioning 
indicated “that she could put her personal feelings aside and be fair in the penalty 
phase and that she could be fair in the guilt and penalty phases even though she 
opposed the death penalty.”  Id. at 685-86.  We also concluded that the erroneous 
removal for cause was not subject to a harmless error analysis.  Id. at 686.  We 
relied on Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 664-65 (1987), and rejected the State’s 
argument that “the error was harmless as the State had two peremptory challenges 
left at the end of voir dire questioning and could have used one of these to strike” 
the juror at issue.  Ault, 866 So. 2d at 686.  
At the outset, we note that unlike Ault, Gray, and other cases rejecting the 
“unexercised peremptory argument,” this case involves the trial court permitting 
the State to substitute a peremptory strike before the jury was sworn, as opposed to 
the State presenting an argument on appeal regarding what the State would have 
done at trial.  We also note that Lowe did not object to the substitution.  
Nevertheless, because we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the 
initial cause challenge, we need not reach the question of whether such a 
substitution can cure an erroneous removal for cause.  
 
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We review a trial court’s ruling on a cause challenge under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. 2001).  We have 
held that “[a] juror should be excused for cause if there is any reasonable doubt 
about the juror’s ability to render an impartial verdict.”  Id.  “However, prospective 
jurors may not be excused for cause simply because they voice general objections 
to the death penalty.”  Ault, 866 So. 2d at 684 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 510, 522 (1968)).  Instead, as it relates to a prospective juror’s views on 
capital punishment, “[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is ‘whether the juror’s views would 
“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with [the court’s] instructions and [the juror’s] oath.” ’ ”  Id. 
(alterations in original) (quoting Gray, 481 U.S. at 658 (quoting Wainwright v. 
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985))).  The Supreme Court has recognized that “there 
will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a 
prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. . . .  
[T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the 
juror.”  Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26.   
In Ault, we ordered a new penalty phase after concluding that the trial court 
erroneously dismissed a potential juror for cause based on the juror’s “opposition 
to the death penalty.”  Ault, 866 So. 2d at 683.  But we did so because the trial 
court’s determination was based on an “erroneous recitation of [the prospective 
 
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juror’s] statements.”  Id. at 685.  Among other things, we noted that, despite the 
State’s argument to the contrary, the prospective juror never indicated that she 
“would not impose death even if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating.”  Id.  Here, on the other hand, Mr. Simard gave two conflicting 
responses, one of which specifically informed the prosecutor that he would 
“probably go for life” irrespective of the trial court’s instruction regarding the 
weighing of the evidence.  The statement was more than merely voicing a general 
objection to the death penalty.  Moreover, Mr. Simard then gave an “uh-huh” 
response when asked by defense counsel whether he could follow the law, before 
being asked again and stating “yes.”  The trial judge personally observed Mr. 
Simard and was “not convinced.”  On this record, we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in concluding that Mr. Simard could not “faithfully and 
impartially apply the law.”  Witt, 469 U.S. at 426; see also Taylor v. State, 638 So. 
2d 30, 32 (Fla. 1994) (“The trial judge found [the prospective juror’s] answers 
conflicting and properly exercised the court’s discretion in excusing [her].”).  
Accordingly, Lowe is not entitled to relief as to this claim.     
II.  The State’s Use of a Mannequin 
 
During the State’s direct examination of the medical examiner, the State 
sought to use a mannequin as a demonstrative aid in order to show the position of 
the gun in relation to Burnell’s body.  Defense counsel objected to the use of the 
 
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mannequin, arguing that the anatomical figure had zero probative value “as far as 
assisting the jury in determining where the bullet came from” and noting that the 
medical examiner testified that he could not opine as to specific trajectories.  The 
trial court overruled the objection, questioning what the difference was if the 
medical examiner was “off a few degrees one way or another” and noting that the 
mannequin was “just a gray faceless body part” and not a gruesome reproduction 
of the victim.  The medical examiner then used the mannequin, which was slightly 
taller and thinner than Burnell and had dowels inserted into it, to demonstrate the 
relative trajectories of the three bullets that entered the victim’s body.  The medical 
examiner testified that because he could not state what position Burnell was 
actually in when she was shot, he could only give anatomical, not spatial, 
trajectories, and that the trajectories had a small degree of error.   
“The standard of review for the use of a demonstrative aid at trial is abuse of 
discretion.”  Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 752 (Fla. 2007).  In State v. 
Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2004), we affirmed the standard set out in Brown v. 
State, 550 So. 2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), that: 
Demonstrative exhibits to aid the jury’s understanding may be utilized 
when relevant to the issues in the case, but only if the exhibits 
constitute an accurate and reasonable reproduction of the object 
involved.  The determination as to whether to allow the use of a 
demonstrative exhibit is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. 
 
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Duncan, 894 So. 2d at 829 (quoting Brown, 550 So. 2d at 528).  In Duncan, we 
concluded that it was within the trial court’s discretion to allow an eyewitness to 
demonstrate the attack by using a dummy in place of the victim.  Id. at 829-30.  
Among other things, we noted that the “dummy was used to aid the jury’s 
understanding of a relevant issue . . . and there is no claim that the exhibit was not 
an accurate and reasonable reproduction of the attack.”  Id. at 830.  We also noted 
that there was no claim that “the dummy was altered to resemble the victim and 
thereby evoke a more emotional action from the members of the jury.”  Id.   
 
Here, the use of the mannequin satisfies Duncan.  The mannequin was used 
to set out the circumstances of the crime and to attempt to establish aggravation.  
The mannequin was used to demonstrate the location of the gunshot wounds, the 
angle of impact against the skin, and the incapacitating nature of each gunshot.  
The jury was advised that the trajectories were anatomical, not spatial, and had a 
small degree of error.  There only were slight differences between Burnell’s size 
and the mannequin’s dimensions, and there is nothing to suggest that the 
mannequin was altered to resemble Burnell.  Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, and Lowe is not entitled to relief as to this claim.   
III.  The State’s Use of a Computer-Generated Diagram 
 
During opening statements, the State used a computer-generated diagram of 
the crime scene, that is, the interior of the Nu-Pack convenience store.  Defense 
 
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counsel asked to approach the bench.  At sidebar, defense counsel noted that the 
diagram “appears to be some sort of computer recreation of the event or the store.”  
Defense counsel also noted that they had “never seen” the diagram and that they 
could not see it from the defense table.  Defense counsel then noted that “it’s just a 
diagram, but still.”  The State explained that “it’s just the diagram,” that there were 
no “figures or anything,” and that it would not be introduced into evidence.  
Defense counsel then stated for the record that “it is animated and there’s moving 
along as [the prosecutor] talks.”  The trial judge overruled defense counsel’s 
objection and concluded that the diagram was a demonstrative aid, it was not a 
recreation of the crime scene, it was just “a picture,” there was no animation of a 
building, and there were no people.  The trial judge then sent out the jury and had 
the seating rearranged to accommodate defense counsel and Lowe.  Lowe now 
argues that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Richardson8 inquiry after the 
defense objected to the State’s use of the computer animation. 
We review the trial court’s decision to allow the use of the computer-
generated diagram under an abuse of discretion standard.  Williams, 967 So. 2d at 
752.  “It is well settled that the use of ‘demonstrative devices to aid the jury’s 
comprehension is well within the court’s discretion.’ ”  McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 
                                          
 
 
8.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
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396, 405 (Fla. 2003) (quoting United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 
1988)).  Demonstrative aids may be used when they are “relevant to the issues in 
the case” and “constitute an accurate and reasonable reproduction of the object 
involved.”  Brown, 550 So. 2d at 528. 
Here, the State used the computer-generated diagram as a demonstrative aid 
to help the jury visualize where the crime took place.  The State used the picture to 
identify specific locations in the store that would be relevant to the aggravation the 
State hoped to prove in the case.  There is nothing to suggest that the diagram was 
an inaccurate or unreasonable reproduction of the interior of the Nu-Pack store.  
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the diagram was an animated recreation 
of the crime or included depictions of the people involved.     
Lowe fails to explain how this “diagram” that was “not a recreation 
situation,” that was never admitted into evidence, and that was never used with any 
witness constitutes a discovery request violation.  Even assuming that a 
Richardson inquiry was required, we see no conceivable prejudice to Lowe.  See 
Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473, 505-06 (Fla. 2009) (noting that failure to conduct a 
Richardson hearing is not per se reversible error); State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 
1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995) (“[T]here are cases . . . where a reviewing court can say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not prejudiced . . . .”).  Lowe 
presents no explanation of how the diagram could have “materially hindered the 
 
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defendant’s trial preparation or strategy.”  Smith, 7 So. 3d at 506 (quoting Scipio v. 
State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1150 (Fla. 2006)).  The only case cited by Lowe, Jones v. 
State, 32 So. 3d 706, 710-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), is wholly distinguishable, as it 
involved the late disclosure by the State, in the middle of the trial, of a threat 
allegedly made by the defendant against the victim.   
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to use the 
computer-generated diagram.  Consequently, we deny relief as to this claim.  
IV.  Officer Ambrum’s Testimony 
 
Lowe argues that Officer Ambrum, who was Lowe’s probation officer at the 
time of Burnell’s murder, erroneously testified regarding the maximum sentence 
Lowe faced for the violation of community control (VOCC) and that the erroneous 
testimony was used to mislead the jury regarding the avoid arrest aggravator.  
Lowe also contends that the State relied on this testimony during its closing to 
argue for the aggravator.  We conclude that these arguments were not preserved at 
trial and that Lowe cannot demonstrate fundamental error. 
 
During direct examination, after multiple sustained objections caused the 
State to have to rephrase its question, the State asked Officer Ambrum what “the 
maximum penalty Mr. Lowe would look at under the law at that time if he was 
violated under community control.”  Officer Ambrum testified that he “believe[d] 
it would be somewhere in the area of thirty years.”  Defense counsel did not object.  
 
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On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Ambrum about that 
testimony given that Lowe had been sentenced as a youthful offender for the 
previous robbery he committed in 1987.  Officer Ambrum was clearly uncertain 
regarding how the youthful offender statute worked and the impact a new 
substantive crime would have on Lowe’s community control: 
 
Q.  Now, certainly your answer would be different if you were 
told that the person were sentenced as a youthful offender; correct? 
 
A.  At that time I’m not sure what they -- I know that there’s 
been some changes with the -- whether or not they were in violation, 
I’m not sure what the law was on that at that time.  
 
. . . .  
 
Q.  Isn’t it true that someone sentenced as a youthful offender is 
looking at a different potential maximum sentence than someone 
convicted as an adult? 
 
A.  Possibly. 
 
Q.  Thus the different classifications; correct? 
 
A.  But I have seen youthful offenders go back to court on a 
violation.  Are you talking about being out -- sentenced outside of 
youthful offender, too? 
 
Q.  So you’re aware of the youthful offender statute; correct? 
 
A.  If I understand you correctly you’re asking me if -- if he 
would have only be (sic) able to be sentenced to six years probation? 
 
Q.  I’m asking is there a difference between being sentenced as 
a youthful offender -- your knowledge, is there a difference between 
being sentenced as a youthful fender (sic) and as an adult? 
 
A.  Yes, absolutely. 
 
Q.  And the distinction is with regard to potential maximum 
penalty; correct? 
 
A.  To my knowledge it’s the initial sentence, not potential. 
 
Despite Officer Ambrum’s clearly uncertain testimony, the State in its closing 
argument did make one mention of Officer Ambrum’s testimony that Lowe “could 
get up to thirty years for violating his community control.”  The State did so in the 
 
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overall context of arguing the avoid arrest aggravator and that Lowe “does not like 
to get caught” and knew he would go back to prison if he were arrested for the Nu-
Pack robbery.  The State also mentioned that Lowe would get more time for any 
new offense.  Lowe did not object to the State’s closing argument.  
 
The State concedes on appeal that Officer Ambrum misstated the law and 
that in no event would the maximum sentence be more than six years, less credit 
for time served.  However, the State argues that the misstatement does not render 
the sentence fundamentally unfair and does not detract from the evidence 
supporting the avoid arrest aggravator, given that Officer Ambrum’s testimony was 
not the thrust of the State’s argument for the aggravator.  We agree. 
Admission of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion, and its ruling 
will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.  Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 
747-48 (Fla. 2007).  Likewise, control of prosecutorial argument lies with the trial 
judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  Esty v. State, 642 
So. 2d 1074, 1079 (Fla. 1994).  “To preserve error for appellate review, the general 
rule is a contemporaneous, specific objection must occur during trial at the time of 
the alleged error.”  Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1265 (Fla. 2007).  When an 
alleged error is unpreserved—as is the case here—“this alleged error must 
constitute a fundamental error” in order to be reversible.  Doty v. State, 170 So. 3d 
731, 743 (Fla. 2015).  To constitute fundamental error, it must be shown that the 
 
- 20 - 
error “ ‘reaches down into the validity of the trial itself’ and that a sentence of 
death ‘could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.’ ”  
Id. (quoting Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d 242, 257 (Fla. 2012)). 
 
We conclude that Officer Ambrum’s testimony and the State’s reliance on 
that testimony do not rise to the level of fundamental error.  During the specific 
segment of closing argument in which the State argued for the avoid arrest 
aggravator, the State did not mention Officer Ambrum’s testimony and instead 
largely focused on the fact that when Lowe walked into the Nu-Pack store, he 
recognized Burnell from another store where he had become friends with her.  And 
the State argued that, unlike the previous robbery Lowe committed in 1987, he did 
not want to leave behind a witness who could identify him.  The State then went 
through the facts that supported its conclusion that Lowe killed Burnell because he 
wanted to avoid arrest and not leave a witness.  Namely, the State explained that: 
Lowe spent time in the store getting a soda and putting a hamburger in the 
microwave and had a chance to reflect before making the conscious choice to kill 
Burnell; Lowe then shot Burnell three times; common sense dictated that the first 
gunshot was to the top of Burnell’s head as she was bent over tending to her three-
year-old nephew9; there were no signs of a struggle; Burnell offered no resistance 
                                          
 
 
9.  In our original decision affirming Lowe’s conviction and death sentence, 
we referred to the three-year-old child as Burnell’s son.  Lowe, 650 So. 2d at 975-
 
- 21 - 
as she was with her nephew; Lowe did not wear gloves or a mask; and there were 
numerous pieces of evidence, including the position of Burnell’s body, indicating 
that Burnell was shot before any attempt was made to retrieve the money from the 
register.  The State then summed up its argument for the avoid arrest aggravator: 
Why do you do that but to avoid an arrest, avoid being recognized, 
avoid being apprehended? 
Why would you kill the clerk first?  Because his motivation 
changed.  He wanted to eliminate Donna Burnell who he knew, and 
who knew him from six months earlier at Fran’s Market. 
That’s the aggravator of avoiding an arrest. 
 
While the State did later mention Officer Ambrum’s testimony, it was not central 
to the State’s argument for the aggravator.  Moreover, with respect to the 
aggravator, the trial court’s sentencing order made no mention of the possible 
sentence Lowe would face for a VOCC and only mentioned that Lowe was on 
community control and would have returned to prison.  The trial court also found 
that a death sentence was justified even without the avoid arrest aggravator.   
Lowe has not shown that the aggravator, much less his death sentence, 
“could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Doty, 
170 So. 3d at 743.  Accordingly, we deny Lowe relief as to this claim.   
 
                                          
 
76.  Testimony in the new penalty phase revealed that the child was Burnell’s 
nephew, but Burnell was raising him as her own and trying to adopt him. 
 
- 22 - 
V.  Trial Court’s Restriction of Mitigation and Cross-Examination 
 
Lowe argues the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objections to 
testimony implicating Lorenzo Sailor in the shooting and to the admission of 
Dwayne Blackmon’s sworn affidavit.  Testimony was presented that Lowe, Sailor, 
and Blackmon had twice before gone to the Nu-Pack store together intending to 
rob the store but left both times without committing the robbery due to the 
presence of potential witnesses.  It was Lowe’s position that Sailor and Blackmon 
were also involved in the third and final attempted robbery that resulted in 
Burnell’s murder.  Lowe claims that the trial court’s rulings unlawfully restricted 
his mitigation presentation and limited his cross-examination of Officer Green.   
 
Regarding Sailor, Lowe sought to present bad character testimony that Sailor 
and another individual, sometime before and unrelated to Burnell’s murder, had 
been seen by Officer Ewert pointing guns at traffic after Officer Ewert responded 
to reports of shots being fired at an elementary school.  Sailor later pointed the gun 
at Officer Ewert before he (Sailor) and the other individual dropped their guns and 
ran through the woods.  Lowe argued that the testimony was relevant to the 
defense’s theory that Sailor participated in the robbery of the Nu-Pack store and 
was a potential suspect who was not investigated.  The defense further argued that 
the gun incident with Officer Ewert showed Sailor’s “proclivity for pointing guns 
at law enforcement” and that Sailor was “not afraid to engage in gun play.”   
 
- 23 - 
 
Admission of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion, and its ruling 
will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion.  Williams, 967 So. 2d at 747-48.  
Relevant evidence is evidence that “tend[s] to prove or disprove a material fact.”  
§ 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2017).  In the penalty phase context, the jury may not be 
barred from considering “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any 
of the circumstances of the offense” offered as mitigation.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586, 604 (1978).  “[T]he sentencer may not be precluded from considering . . . 
any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.”  Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 
U.S. 269, 276 (1998).  
 
We conclude that the trial court properly excluded the testimony regarding 
Sailor.  Even if credible evidence showed Sailor to be involved in Burnell’s 
murder—which the trial court concluded was not shown—Sailor’s prior criminal 
act of pointing a gun at traffic and at Officer Ewert had no relevance to any aspect 
of Lowe’s character or record, or to any circumstances of the murder and 
attempted robbery.10  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
 
Regarding Blackmon’s affidavit, Blackmon, who was deceased at the time 
of the resentencing trial, had signed an affidavit in October 1990 in which he stated 
                                          
 
 
10.  In any event, Lowe was improperly offering Sailor’s prior act of 
misconduct solely to prove Sailor’s bad character or propensity.  See § 90.404(1), 
(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). 
 
- 24 - 
that Officer Green and another officer had made certain promises and threats.  
During cross-examination of Officer Green, Lowe attempted to impeach Officer 
Green with Blackmon’s affidavit.  The State objected to the introduction of the 
affidavit into evidence as well as to any direct reading from the affidavit.  The trial 
court eventually sustained the objection but ruled that, among other things, defense 
counsel could directly ask Officer Green “any questions . . . about whatever he said 
to Mr. Blackmon,” including whether he intimidated or threatened Blackmon.  
Defense counsel then asked Officer Green whether he made certain specific 
promises and threats to Blackmon.  Officer Green denied doing so. 
 
“To impeach a witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to 
section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2008), the prior statement must be both (1) 
inconsistent with the witness’s in-court testimony, and (2) the statement of the 
witness.”  Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 383 (Fla. 2014).  The State cites Wilcox 
for the proposition that a witness may never be impeached with another person’s 
affidavit.  The State misreads Wilcox.  In Wilcox, this Court concluded that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s objection to an attempt to 
impeach a witness with an arrest affidavit.  Id. at 384.  We approved the trial 
court’s decision not on the basis that the affidavit was an affidavit of another 
person but rather, in part, on the basis that the statements in the affidavit “were not 
‘statements of the witness’ as contemplated by section 90.608.”  Id. at 383.  
 
- 25 - 
Namely, the affidavit only included a summation of statements made by four 
witnesses and briefly stated that those witnesses “denied any knowledge or 
involvement” in the crime.  Id.  Moreover, in Williamson v. State, 961 So. 2d 229, 
234-35 (Fla. 2007), this Court in a postconviction case theorized that the defendant 
there could have introduced, under section 90.608, the affidavit of an unavailable 
(deceased) declarant to impeach one of the State’s key witnesses through prior 
inconsistent statements and to show the witness’s bias in favor of the State, 
assuming the witness first denied the statements.  Ultimately, this Court in 
Williamson concluded that the affidavit was inadmissible as substantive evidence 
and that even assuming the affidavit was admissible to impeach the witness, the 
affidavit would not have probably produced an acquittal or conviction of a lesser 
included offense on retrial.  Id. at 235. 
 
Here, even assuming that Lowe should have been permitted to introduce 
Blackmon’s affidavit—but only to the extent that the purported statements could 
be isolated to Officer Green, and only after the proper foundation had been laid and 
Officer Green first denied making the statements—any such error was harmless.  
Prior to the State’s objection, defense counsel made the jury aware of Blackmon’s 
affidavit (which defense counsel was holding) and the general accusations against 
Officer Green.  After the objection was sustained, defense counsel directly 
questioned Officer Green regarding whether he ever threatened Blackmon with the 
 
- 26 - 
electric chair, whether he mentioned to Blackmon that he could be prosecuted as 
an accomplice and serve fifty to one hundred years, and whether he told Blackmon 
that in order for Blackmon to receive reward money he would have to testify that 
Lowe committed the murder.  It is clear from the context that the jury understood 
that Lowe was questioning Officer Green regarding the specific accusations 
Blackmon made against Officer Green.  Accordingly, we conclude that Lowe is 
not entitled to relief as to this claim.11 
VI.  Defense Expert’s Testing Results 
 
Lowe argues that the trial court, without an adequate Richardson hearing 
and consideration of alternatives, excluded scientific statistical evidence that would 
have supported the lack of future violence mitigator.  
During the latter portion of defense counsel’s direct examination of its 
medical expert, Dr. Riebsame, defense counsel asked him whether he had enough 
information to form a risk assessment regarding the likelihood or absence of 
Lowe’s future violence.  Dr. Riebsame answered in the affirmative and then 
                                          
 
 
11.  We also note that during Lowe’s prior postconviction case, Lowe 
argued to this Court that Blackmon had “attempted to recant his affidavit and 
accused the assistant public defenders of forcing him to sign the affidavit even 
though some of the facts in the affidavit were not true.”  Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 36.  
Blackmon himself testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that, among 
other things, “most of the statements in the affidavit were either lies or statements 
that had been twisted.”  Id. 
 
- 27 - 
discussed how he looks at certain risk factors in coming up with a probability of 
low, medium, or high risk of reoffending or doing something violent again.  Dr. 
Riebsame went on to note that “we can even do what’s known as an actuarial 
assessment like your insurance agent would do” and testified that “the most widely 
used actuarial statistical tool” for predicting future violence is called the “violence 
risk appraisal guide.”  After explaining that this tool involves looking to the 
presence or absence of various factors, Dr. Riebsame then briefly discussed those 
factors.  When defense counsel then asked Dr. Riebsame “where does Mr. Lowe 
fall on that scale,” the State objected and asked to approach.  At sidebar, the State 
objected, on the basis of a discovery violation, to Dr. Riebsame discussing the 
specific test results.  The State explained that it had deposed Dr. Riebsame one 
month earlier and that the statistical tool was neither discussed during the 
deposition nor listed in Dr. Riebsame’s report that was provided to the State prior 
to the deposition.12  Defense counsel explained that he had just found out about it 
in the hall while discussing Dr. Riebsame’s testimony with him.  The trial court 
sent the jury out and conducted a Richardson hearing.  The State argued that it was 
“completely prejudiced,” given that, based on Dr. Riebsame’s deposition, the State 
                                          
 
 
12.  For unexplained reasons, Dr. Riebsame appears to have performed the 
statistical analysis at issue during the one-month period between the date of his 
deposition and the day he testified at trial, even though he testified that it was “the 
most widely used actuarial statistical tool for predicting violence in the future.”  
 
- 28 - 
chose not to bring its expert, Dr. Rifkin, for rebuttal.  The State also argued that the 
discovery violation was taking place on what was effectively the last day of the 
new penalty phase and that the State had no ability to cross-examine or even 
research whether such testing met the Frye13 standard.  The defense countered that 
they had already gotten “well into” Dr. Riebsame’s testimony on the subject before 
the objection.   
The trial court concluded that the discovery violation was not intentional but 
was also not trivial and impaired the State’s ability to cross-examine or to present 
its own testimony.  The trial court noted that the violation was taking place “at the 
eleventh hour and fifty-ninth minute” and involved a subject with which the State 
was not familiar.  The trial judge ruled that Dr. Riebsame was “not precluded from 
giving his opinion, he’s just precluded from saying I conducted this test and on the 
basis of this test I’m concluding this.”  Defense counsel then pointed out that Dr. 
Riebsame had other bases to talk about his opinion, and the trial court made clear 
that Dr. Riebsame was free to testify to those things but was simply precluded from 
discussing the calculations he made after his deposition. 
When the jury returned, Dr. Riebsame testified that he was able to render an 
expert opinion regarding Lowe’s likelihood of future violence based on the 
                                          
 
 
13.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 
- 29 - 
information he knew about Lowe “and the testing” he carried out.  Dr. Riebsame 
then explained the factors that diminished the risk of Lowe reoffending, as well as 
the risk factors that increased the likelihood of Lowe reoffending.  He also testified 
that the risk varied based on whether Lowe was in or out of custody, with Lowe 
presenting “a minimal risk of a violent offense” if in custody.  Finally, when asked 
whether there are “greater factors that lower or increase” the risk, Dr. Riebsame 
testified that the greater lowering factors were that Lowe was now forty years old 
as opposed to twenty years old when he carried out the violent offense and violated 
community control, that Lowe continued to have no history of a substance abuse 
problem, and that Lowe had no severe mental health disorder.  On cross-
examination, the State did not attack Dr. Riebsame’s conclusions on the basis of a 
lack of statistical analysis testing.  Instead, the State asked Dr. Riebsame whether 
he would agree that human behavior “is extremely unpredictable,” and the doctor 
answered in the affirmative.  The State then asked questions which indicated that 
Lowe previously behaved well while he was at a juvenile facility and again when 
he went to the Department of Corrections in 1988 but that each time when he got 
out he reoffended.  And Dr. Riebsame testified “that’s true.” 
 
When a trial court has notice of a discovery violation, Richardson holds that 
the trial court’s discretion can only be properly exercised once it has determined: 
(1) whether the violation was willful or inadvertent; (2) whether it was trivial or 
 
- 30 - 
substantial; and (3) whether it had a prejudicial effect on the opposing party’s trial 
preparation.  Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 775.  This Court will then review the 
record “to determine if this full inquiry was made and if the trial court’s actions 
pursuant to the inquiry were proper.”  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 321 (Fla. 
2007).  This Court will reverse a trial court’s decision on a Richardson hearing 
only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.  See Rimmer v. State, 59 So. 3d 763, 
787 (Fla. 2010).  We have previously noted that the exclusion of evidence for a 
discovery violation “should only be imposed when there is no other adequate 
remedy.”  McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 321.  Moreover, this “extreme sanction [is] to 
be employed only as a last resort and only after the court determines no other 
reasonable alternative exists to overcome the prejudice and allow the witness to 
testify.”  Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134, 162 (Fla. 2012).  That is especially true 
when there is “a defense discovery violation, because there are few rights more 
fundamental than the right of an accused to present evidence or witnesses in his 
own defense.”  Id. at 162-63 (citing McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 321).   
Here, it appears the trial court excluded the testimony as a “first resort,” id. 
at 163, as opposed to a last resort.  Indeed, the trial court does not appear to have 
“considered less extreme alternatives before excluding the testimony.”  Dawson v. 
State, 20 So. 3d 1016, 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).  However, we conclude that any 
error by the trial court was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
- 31 - 
Prior to the State’s objection, the jury was made aware that Dr. Riebsame 
conducted a risk assessment using a statistical model for predicting future violence 
known as the “violence risk appraisal guide.”  And the jury was made aware of the 
various factors that are relevant to that risk assessment.  Defense counsel himself 
recognized that the defense had gone “well into” Dr. Riebsame’s testimony on the 
subject before the State objected.  After the State’s objection, the jury was 
permitted to hear Dr. Riebsame’s expert opinion regarding Lowe’s likelihood of 
future violence, including Riebsame’s other bases for his opinion.  The full context 
of the record reveals that Dr. Riebsame’s expert opinion was that there was a low 
risk of Lowe engaging in violence in the future.  And Dr. Riebsame testified that 
he formed his expert opinion based on the information he knew about Lowe as 
well as “the testing” he “carried out.”  He further testified that he “appl[ied] that 
information to what we know are specific factors associated with reoffending or 
not reoffending in a violent fashion.”  The jury was clearly informed that Dr. 
Riebsame’s determination was that Lowe had a low risk of future dangerousness 
and that the determination was made, in part, by the use of a statistical model.  
Moreover, the trial court found the mitigator proven.  We conclude that “there is 
no reasonable possibility” that the trial court’s failure to consider any alternative 
remedies contributed to Lowe’s death sentence.  Delhall, 95 So. 3d at 164.  
Accordingly, we deny relief as to this claim.  
 
- 32 - 
VII.  State’s Comments during Closing Argument 
 
Lowe argues that the State made several improper comments during its 
closing argument that warrant reversal.  Specifically, he claims that the State used 
victim impact statements to compare the worth of Burnell and Lowe and that the 
State argued to the jury that Lowe had been sentenced to death before and should 
be again because nothing had changed since then.   
 
Control of prosecutorial argument lies within the trial court’s sound 
discretion, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  Esty, 642 So. 
2d at 1079.  “Wide latitude is permitted in arguing to a jury.  Logical inferences 
may be drawn, and counsel is allowed to advance all legitimate arguments.”  
Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982) (citations omitted).  However, 
prosecutorial argument “must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the 
jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response to the crime or the 
defendant rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable 
law.”  Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985).  “Any error in 
prosecutorial comments is harmless, however, if there is no reasonable possibility 
that those comments affected the verdict.”  King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 
1993).   
 
Lowe points to the following statements made by the State during its closing 
arguments: 
 
- 33 - 
 
How about the Defendant has changed and grown spiritually 
since he was convicted of first-degree murder?  Well, that’s good, 
that’s a good thing.  But, really, when you stack it up against Donna 
Burnell’s life, really, is that mitigating?  Donna Burnell used her 
rosary every night.  Is that really mitigating compared to what he did 
on July 3rd of 1990? 
 
 . . . . 
 
They [Lowe’s family] care about him.  They love him.  Donna 
Burnell loved her family.  Her family cared about her. 
  
. . . . 
 
He is a caring and loving brother.  We love the ones we have in 
our family.  We love our family and we love that part of it.  But 
Donna Burnell cared and loved her family, too. 
 
 . . . . 
 
We know he wasn’t doing well, we know what he was up to.  
We know what he was up to.  Planning robberies, guns.  Murdering 
innocent store clerks.   
 
Does this outweigh what happened to Donna Burnell?  Does it?   
Think about what Rodney Lowe did that morning.  Think about 
what he came from, what he was doing, his activities.  His behavior 
prior to that.  Does that outweigh what happened to Donna Burnell? 
 
 . . . . 
 
Whether or not this Defendant matured over the last twenty 
years, behaved well in prison doesn’t take away what happened to 
Donna Burnell.   
 
Donna Burnell was a human being who cared about her family.  
Mr. Lowe should be held accountable for taking away that life.  
 
Lowe did not contemporaneously object to any of these statements.  Thus, Lowe is 
entitled to relief only if the “[u]nobjected-to comments . . . rise to the level of 
fundamental error.”  Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2007).  To meet 
this burden in the sentencing context, Lowe “must demonstrate that the error 
‘reaches down into the validity of the trial itself’ and that a sentence of death 
‘could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.’ ”  
 
- 34 - 
Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 42 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 
1135, 1146 (Fla. 2009)).  
 
In Wheeler v. State, 4 So. 3d 599, 610-11 (Fla. 2009), we cautioned the State 
and its prosecutors that it is improper to use victim impact evidence to urge juries 
“to compare the worth of the life of the victim against that of [the defendant],” but 
we declined to find fundamental error in that case because the unobjected-to 
prosecutorial comments were not “shown to have deprived [the defendant] of a fair 
penalty phase” and were not “shown to be so inflammatory that the jury’s advisory 
verdict could not have been obtained without it.”  In Hayward, we again voiced 
our disapproval regarding prosecutorial use of victim impact evidence to 
“compar[e] the life or choices of the victim with that of the defendant.”  24 So. 3d 
at 42-43.  But we declined to find fundamental error in that case after viewing the 
unobjected-to prosecutorial comments “in the context of the entire closing 
argument and in light of the evidence presented in the penalty phase,” namely, “the 
strength of the evidence against [the defendant] and the gravity of the aggravators.”  
Id. at 42. 
 
In light of Wheeler and Hayward, we conclude that the State’s comments 
comparing Burnell’s life and Lowe’s life do not rise to the level of fundamental 
error.  The comments at issue represented a very brief portion of the State’s entire 
closing.  Moreover, the comments were made in the context of discussing three 
 
- 35 - 
nonstatutory mitigators—family relationships, religious faith, and maturity—each 
of which the trial court found and weighed in the sentencing calculus.  On this 
record, including the evidence presented and the fact that the jury was instructed 
on the proper use of victim impact testimony, it cannot be said that the unobjected-
to comments deprived Lowe of a fair penalty phase or were “so inflammatory” that 
a sentence of death could not have been obtained without it.  Wheeler, 4 So. 3d at 
611. 
Lowe also argues that the State impermissibly argued to the jury that he had 
been sentenced to death before and should be again because nothing had changed 
since then.  Lowe did not make a contemporaneous objection to the State’s closing, 
and we conclude that the State’s references to the prior death sentence do not 
amount to fundamental error.  In Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745-47 (Fla. 
1986), we rejected a similar argument from a defendant who claimed that it was 
reversible error for the jury to have been informed of his prior death sentence that 
had been vacated by this Court.  We did so on two separate grounds.  First, we 
examined the record and concluded “that the prior sentence did not in any way 
play a significant role in th[e] proceeding and was not prejudicial to the 
[defendant].”  Id. at 747.  We also noted that the defendant’s own witness, and the 
defendant himself, provided testimony that alluded to the defendant’s prior 
sentence.  Id. at 746.  And we noted that none of the witness testimony mentioned 
 
- 36 - 
“the prior jury’s recommendation, only that a death sentence had been imposed by 
the original trial judge.”  Id. at 747.  Second, we concluded that the issue was 
unpreserved and that any error, including the prosecutor mentioning the prior 
sentence during closing argument, was not fundamental.  Id.  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Barkett noted that “because the defendant himself advised the jury 
of his prior status on death row,” a new penalty phase was not required.  Id. at 748 
(Barkett, J., concurring specially). 
 
Here, before the State’s closing argument, several of Lowe’s own 
witnesses—through testimony elicited by defense counsel—informed the jury of 
Lowe’s prior status on death row.  First, Dale Resinella testified that he was the 
chaplain on death row and that he had provided counsel to Lowe.  Later, Ron 
McAndrew, a retired warden, was asked by defense counsel if Lowe was “housed 
on death row” in a cell by himself, to which McAndrew responded in the 
affirmative.  Finally, Lowe’s mental health expert, Dr. Riebsame, described 
Lowe’s case as a “postconviction appeal” involving “a person [who] has been on 
death row for 20 years.”  Although the State mentioned during closing that Lowe 
had been on death row for twenty years, it was only after defense counsel elicited 
testimony from its witnesses of the same fact.  Moreover, a review of the record 
reveals that the State did not make the prior sentence a key feature of the 
proceedings.  Id. at 746.  And we do not find that the State’s brief comments were 
 
- 37 - 
“so prejudicial or inflammatory that a new sentencing proceeding is required.”  Id. 
at 747 (citing Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1981)). 
 
Accordingly, we deny relief as to this claim. 
VIII.  Evidence in Deliberation Room 
 
Lowe argues that it was fundamental error for the trial court to allow a letter 
his mother, Sherri Lowe, wrote to him in 1988 to be given to the jury during 
deliberations, given that the letter was not admitted into evidence in the 
resentencing proceedings and contained prejudicial information.  The letter was 
part of a box of personal contents that had been admitted into evidence as State’s 
Exhibit 32 during the original trial.  We reject Lowe’s claim of fundamental error. 
 
On cross-examination, the State presented Sherri with the letter and asked 
whether she recalled saying that, among other things, she thought the course Lowe 
was on “was leading to death.”  After Sherri testified that it “was certainly my 
handwriting, but I don’t remember,” defense counsel made a general objection and 
asked to approach.  At sidebar, defense counsel asked if the letter was from the box 
of contents, and the prosecutor answered in the affirmative.  The prosecutor 
explained that she was going to “admit it into evidence.”  Defense counsel 
countered that he did not know it was coming in and had not had a chance to read 
it.  The trial judge then dismissed the jury for lunch, and defense counsel was given 
a chance to read the letter during the lunch break.  After lunch, and before the jury 
 
- 38 - 
was recalled, the trial judge asked if counsel for both sides had “worked out any 
problems with [the letter].”  Both responded in the affirmative.  Without objection, 
the State then asked more questions of Sherri regarding the letter, while apparently 
inadvertently failing to have the letter admitted into evidence.  Sherri testified that 
she recognized her handwriting and the letter itself and that she was very 
concerned about Lowe’s behavior.  On redirect, defense counsel asked Sherri, 
“What else is in that letter?”  She responded: 
I was encouraging him to do what’s right.  I mean, we’ve always 
taught him bible principal, what is right and what is wrong, to obey or 
disobey.  Now, of course I was encouraging him to go forth, to repent 
and turn around and go forth in a positive manner, according together 
[sic] scriptures. 
 
Defense counsel then asked Sherri if she included a scripture verse in the letter, 
and she said “yes.”   
 
After closing arguments, the trial judge and counsel for both parties 
discussed the evidence that was going to be sent back to the jury.  The trial judge 
specifically asked about the box identified as State’s 32 and whether there was “a 
stipulation between the parties as to whether [the box] will go back to the jurors.”  
The State responded that it had “agree[d] with the defense” that the box containing 
“a lot of personal items and some other stuff” would not be sent back to the jury.  
But the State specifically noted that the “letter that was used” would indeed be sent 
back.  Defense counsel did not object or suggest that the State’s response did not 
 
- 39 - 
accurately reflect what had been agreed to.  The trial court then asked defense 
counsel if he had agreed not to send the box back, and he responded in the 
affirmative. 
“As a general rule, it is improper to allow materials into the jury’s 
deliberation room that have not been admitted into evidence if the materials are of 
such character as to influence the jury.”  Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1145 
(Fla. 2014).  “However, it is not per se reversible error when any unauthorized 
materials are present in the jury room.  Rather, where an objection is raised, 
Florida courts have applied a harmless error analysis.”  Id. (citing Keen v. State, 
639 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1994); State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 124, 129-30 (Fla. 
1991)).  Given the absence of any specific, contemporaneous objection, either to 
the examination of Sherri with the letter or to the trial court sending the letter back 
to the jury room, Lowe is entitled to relief only if the purported error rises to the 
level of fundamental error.  See Merck, 975 So. 2d at 1061.   
We have recognized that “[a] party may not invite error and then be heard to 
complain of that error on appeal.”  Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 
1983); see also Tomas v. State, 126 So. 3d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 
(finding defendant consented to the unauthorized materials being given to the jury 
and thus any error was invited error).  We have also recognized, in the context of 
certain erroneous jury instructions, a fundamental error analysis exception “where 
 
- 40 - 
defense counsel affirmatively agreed to or requested the incomplete instruction.”  
State v. Lucas, 645 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. 1994), receded from on other grounds by 
State v. Spencer, 216 So. 3d 481 (Fla. 2017).  However, we also recognized in that 
context that the exception did not apply “where defense counsel merely acquiesced 
to [the incomplete] instructions.”  Spencer, 216 So. 3d at 486; see, e.g., Black v. 
State, 695 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“[D]efense counsel must be aware 
that an incorrect instruction is being read and must affirmatively agree to, or 
request, the incomplete instruction.”). 
Given this record, defense counsel’s conduct goes well beyond mere 
acquiescence.  Moreover, we conclude that any error was not fundamental.  We 
agree with the State that the content of the letter was largely duplicative of Sherri’s 
testimony—both on cross-examination and redirect—as well as certain other 
testimony, including from Dr. Riebsame.  That is, Lowe had gotten into trouble at 
school and committed other crimes during his teen years, Sherri was concerned 
with his behavior, the family tried to counsel Lowe, Sherri encouraged Lowe to go 
forth and repent in accordance with the Bible, Lowe’s brother had also been in 
trouble, and Lowe had been shunned by his family and their church congregation.  
See Bottoson v. State, 443 So. 2d 962, 966 (Fla. 1983) (“There is no prejudice 
where the information conveyed by the unauthorized materials merely duplicates 
 
- 41 - 
evidence that had been properly presented to the jury at the trial.”).  Consequently, 
we deny relief as to this claim.  
IX.  Evidence Not Considered by Jury 
 
 Lowe argues the jury was precluded from considering evidence of his 
limited role in the killing, his disproportionate treatment compared to others 
involved, and a lawful evaluation of the aggravators.  In support, Lowe points to 
the juror questionnaires as well as the instructions given at the outset and 
conclusion of the penalty phase.  The instructions informed the jury that Lowe had 
been found guilty of first-degree murder and that the jury should only consider the 
sentence to be imposed, not guilt.  Lowe contends that these instructions prevented 
the jury from considering “substantial” mitigation and accurately assessing 
aggravation.  We find Lowe’s argument unavailing. 
In this Court’s previous decision to uphold the trial court’s grant of a new 
penalty phase, we found ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland14 
regarding counsel’s failure to “discover[] evidence to call into question 
Blackmon’s alibi and Blackmon’s contention that he did not participate in the 
crimes.”  Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 40.  That evidence included testimony from Lisa Miller 
and Ben Carter “that Blackmon had confessed to his involvement in the crime 
                                          
 
 
14.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
- 42 - 
during a conversation at Blackmon’s grandmother’s house.”  Id. at 41.  This Court 
noted that although “there were some inconsistencies between the testimony of 
Miller and that of Carter as to the specific details of the crime,” “the testimony of 
both witnesses provided credible support for two of the mitigating circumstances 
raised by defense counsel” and rejected by the trial court, namely, “the 
disproportionate punishment mitigator and the relatively minor participation 
mitigator.”  Id.  And this Court noted that although there was evidence presented 
“that proved that Lowe was involved in the crime,” the evidence did “not 
conclusively prove Lowe acted alone.”  Id. at 41-42. 
 
During the new penalty phase, the State’s theory continued to be that Lowe 
acted alone.  And the defense’s theory was that Lowe was a minor participant.  
During its opening statement, defense counsel informed the jury that the evidence, 
including “statements that were made by others after the fact,” would show that 
Lowe did not act alone and was not the shooter.  Defense counsel later called 
Miller and Carter—former girlfriend and boyfriend who had fourteen felony 
convictions and eleven felony convictions, respectively—who testified about 
admissions made by Blackmon years later while Blackmon was threatening other 
people.  Miller claimed that Blackmon admitted to being the shooter, and Miller 
also claimed to have brought Blackmon’s confession to the attention of several 
detectives.  Carter similarly claimed that Blackmon admitted to being the shooter, 
 
- 43 - 
but Carter later claimed that Blackmon on several occasions said that Lorenzo 
Sailor was the shooter.  Carter also denied ever telling the police about a 
conversation he overheard in which Lowe admitted he was the shooter.  The State 
later presented several rebuttal witnesses to impeach both Miller and Carter.  Those 
witnesses included Steve Kerby, a retired investigator with the State Attorney’s 
Office, who testified that, a few days after Burnell’s murder, Carter told him that 
he (Carter) overheard a conversation in which Lowe told Blackmon that he (Lowe) 
had attempted to rob the convenience store and had shot the attendant.  During 
closing, defense counsel continued to argue that Lowe was not the shooter, instead 
asserting that Sailor was the shooter.   
Defense counsel requested the minor participant mitigator instruction, which 
the trial court granted.  The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider as a 
mitigating circumstance that Lowe “was an accomplice in a capital felony 
committed by another person, and his participation was relatively minor.”  The 
jury was also informed that “mitigating circumstances may include any aspect of 
the Defendant’s character, background, or life, or any circumstance of the offense 
that reasonably may indicate that the death penalty is not an appropriate sentence 
in this case.”  And the jury was repeatedly informed that its recommendation must 
be based only upon the evidence and the instructions.     
 
- 44 - 
Despite being permitted to argue minor participation, including presenting 
the testimony of Miller and Carter, and despite the jury being instructed regarding 
the mitigator, Lowe argues that instructing the jury to not concern itself with 
Lowe’s guilt misled the jury into believing it “could give no effect to” the minor 
participant mitigator.  Lowe argues that although he was allowed to present the 
mitigation, the fact that the jury believed it could not consider the mitigation 
violates Lockett and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).   
 “Jury instructions are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, and in 
the absence of a contemporaneous objection at trial, relief regarding error in the 
instructions can be granted on appeal only if that error is fundamental.”  Floyd v. 
State, 850 So. 2d 383, 403 (Fla. 2002).  “Fundamental error is that which ‘reaches 
down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict . . . could not 
have been obtained without [that] error.’ ”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 
Archer v. State, 673 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1996)).  Here, Lowe did not object to the 
instruction, and he fails to show that fundamental error, or any error for that matter, 
occurred.   
As an initial matter, we note that defense counsel himself during closing 
“ma[d]e it clear” to the jury that the defense was “not contesting that Rodney Lowe 
is guilty of first degree murder” and was instead asking the jury “to look at the 
evidence” and “take into consideration that someone else was in that store with 
 
- 45 - 
Rodney Lowe on July 3rd, 1990.”  Even putting aside that fact, we find no error in 
the instructions given to the jury.  Moreover, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, we presume that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions.  See Hurst v. 
State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40, 63 (Fla. 2016) (“In a capital case, the gravity of the 
proceeding and the concomitant juror responsibility weigh even more heavily, and 
it can be presumed that the penalty phase jurors will take special care to understand 
and follow the law.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).  Here, the jury heard 
testimony related to Lowe’s role in the crime.  After being properly instructed, the 
jury made a unanimous recommendation that the death penalty was appropriate.  
There is nothing to suggest that the jury was led to believe it could not consider the 
minor participant mitigator.  And the trial court’s sentencing order reveals that the 
trial court rejected the minor participant mitigator for several reasons, including 
that the trial court found neither Miller nor Carter to be credible and that the 
evidence established that Lowe acted alone.  Accordingly, we deny Lowe relief on 
this claim.   
X.  Culpability Finding 
 
Lowe argues that this Court’s previous decision to remand for a new penalty 
phase required the trial court to make Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), findings and that the trial court therefore 
 
- 46 - 
fundamentally erred by failing to give the Enmund/Tison instruction.  The State 
counters that Lowe declined an Enmund/Tison instruction.  We deny Lowe relief. 
As an initial matter, nowhere in our previous decision did we mention 
Enmund or Tison let alone indicate that we were remanding for resentencing for an 
Enmund/Tison finding.  Instead, as noted above, we found ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland regarding counsel’s failure to “discover[] evidence to call 
into question Blackmon’s alibi and Blackmon’s contention that he did not 
participate in the crimes.”  Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 40.  That evidence included testimony 
from both Miller and Carter regarding Blackmon’s purported confessions to 
shooting Burnell.  Id. at 41.  And we noted that the testimony “provided credible 
support for two of the mitigating circumstances raised by defense counsel,” 
including “the disproportionate punishment mitigator.”  Id.   
During the charge conference, the trial judge specifically raised the issue of 
giving an Enmund/Tison instruction.  After questioning whether either side was 
requesting the instruction, defense counsel stated, “Well, before we tell you we’re 
not gonna ask for it, I again would just ask for the evening to make sure that I don’t 
wanna ask for it.”  Defense counsel then indicated they would research the issue 
and email the prosecutor to “have that worked out.”  The next day, defense counsel 
did not ask for an Enmund/Tison instruction and instead announced they were 
“okay” with revised instructions that had been provided by the prosecutor.  After 
 
- 47 - 
the trial court instructed the jury, Lowe agreed the instructions were read in 
accordance with the trial court’s rulings.   
Jury instructions “are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, and, 
absent an objection at trial, can be raised on appeal only if fundamental error 
occurred.”  State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1991).  Fundamental error 
occurs only when the omission is material to what the jury must consider in order 
to reach its verdict.  Id. at 645.  Lowe did not object to the absence of an 
Enmund/Tison instruction and therefore this claim is unpreserved.  Indeed, defense 
counsel requested time to research the specific issue and, after being granted the 
time, declined to request the instruction.  On this record, any error was invited, and 
Lowe may not “be heard to complain of that error on appeal.”  Pope, 441 So. 2d at 
1076.  In any event, Lowe is unable to show fundamental error.  Lowe points to 
this Court’s decisions in Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 409, 413 (Fla. 1986), and 
Diaz v. State, 513 So. 2d 1045, 1048 n.2 (Fla. 1987), as mandating reversal.  We 
disagree.   
In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that, in the context of felony murder, it 
was unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on a defendant “who aids and 
abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who 
does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal 
force will be employed.”  458 U.S. at 797.  The Supreme Court later clarified that 
 
- 48 - 
Enmund’s requisite culpability finding could be made by “an appellate court, a trial 
judge, or a jury.”  Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 392 (1986).   
In the wake of Enmund and Cabana, this Court, out of concern that an 
appellate court’s factual findings may in some cases be inadequate, set forth a 
procedure for trial courts to follow “in appropriate cases.”  Jackson, 502 So. 2d at 
413.  Under that procedure, the penalty phase jury is first to be instructed “that in 
order to recommend a sentence of death, the jury must first find that the defendant 
killed or attempted to kill or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be 
employed.”  Id.  And the trial court judge is “to make an explicit written finding 
that the defendant killed or attempted to kill or intended that a killing take place or 
that lethal force be employed, including the factual basis for the finding, in its 
sentencing order.”  Id.   
In Tison, the Supreme Court expanded the Enmund culpability requirement, 
holding that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless 
indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability 
requirement.”  481 U.S. at 158.  And in the wake of Tison, this Court modified its 
previously announced procedures to reflect that Tison had expanded the culpability 
requirement.  Diaz, 513 So. 2d at 1048 n.2.  Again, we did so because “an 
appellate court’s factual findings may be inadequate in some cases.”  Id.   
 
- 49 - 
As an initial matter, Lowe points us to no authority to support reversal, 
based on lack of an Enmund/Tison jury instruction, in a case in which the 
convicted defendant is the only person to have been conclusively linked to the 
crime and in which there is no evidence showing that any other person has ever 
even been charged with the same crime.  Moreover, Lowe’s mandatory reversal 
argument ignores that in Diaz, this Court, in rejecting a defendant’s argument 
regarding lack of an Enmund instruction, itself made the requisite culpability 
finding, “[b]ased on our review of the record.”  Id. at 1048.  Here, although Lowe 
consistently argued that he was not the only participant and that someone else was 
the shooter, the trial court’s sentencing order makes clear that, among other things, 
Miller and Carter were not credible witnesses and that the evidence established that 
Lowe acted alone.  And the sentencing order makes clear why the trial court 
concluded that Lowe acted alone.  The fact that the sentencing order does “not 
engage in a specific Enmund/Tison analysis” does not change our conclusion.  
Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 575 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s 
Enmund/Tison argument because the defendant’s role in the murder was 
“explained in detail in the sentencing order” and was “supported by the evidence”).   
The record here supports the finding that Lowe “was not merely an aider or 
abetter in a felony where a murder was committed by others.”  Stephens v. State, 
787 So. 2d 747, 760 (Fla. 2001).  And the record supports the finding of “major 
 
- 50 - 
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to 
human life.”  Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.  Lowe is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
XI.  Sentencing Options 
 
Because Lowe committed the first-degree murder in 1990, the two 
sentencing options available at the time of his new penalty phase were either death 
or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.  See 
§ 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).  That is the case even though at the time of Lowe’s 
new penalty phase, the Legislature had amended the sentencing statute to eliminate 
any possibility of parole in life sentences for first-degree murder.  See Bates v. 
State, 750 So. 2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that the amended sentencing statute 
did not apply retroactively); see also ch. 94-228, § 1, at 1577, Laws of Fla.  Lowe 
argues that the jury was misled regarding the effect of a life sentence and was 
prejudiced by the State’s argument relying on the prior death sentence.  More 
specifically, he argues that because the jury was told he would be credited for time 
served and because he was precluded from discussing the improbability of his 
release on parole and from mentioning his fifteen-year consecutive sentence for 
attempted robbery, the jury was misled as to the effect of a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.  We disagree. 
 
Before voir dire, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Lowe 
from arguing that, given how the parole system works, he would not be released 
 
- 51 - 
after serving the mandatory twenty-five years of his sentence if the judge 
sentenced him to life.  The trial court eventually ruled that neither side could argue 
anything related to the parole system, including that Lowe, who had already served 
approximately twenty years in prison, could get out in a few years if given a life 
sentence.15  The trial court also ruled that the jury could be informed of Lowe’s 
conviction for attempted robbery but could not be informed whether the fifteen-
year sentence was consecutive or concurrent. 
 
During voir dire, a potential juror asked the prosecutor whether with a life 
sentence, there is a chance for parole after twenty-five years.  The prosecutor 
explained that Lowe would be eligible for parole after twenty-five years but that it 
did not mean he would get out, that Lowe would only be “eligible for parole,” that 
the parole decision was not up to the courts, and that it was not something the 
prospective juror should consider.  The prosecutor then asked the prospective juror 
whether he understood what she (the prosecutor) was saying, and the prospective 
juror responded in the affirmative.   
 
Another prospective juror then asked the prosecutor whether Lowe would 
receive credit for time served and asked when Lowe was originally sentenced.  The 
prosecutor answered that Lowe would receive credit for time served.  As the 
                                          
 
 
15.  The prosecutor explained that the State would not be arguing that if 
given a life sentence, Lowe might get out in just a few short years. 
 
- 52 - 
prosecutor was answering the second part of the question, defense counsel objected 
and stated that it was improper to respond to such questions.  During the ensuing 
sidebar, the trial court referenced this Court’s case law, including Gore v. State, 
706 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1997), for the proposition that if the jury asks such 
questions, the jury may be told the truth.  And the trial court observed that the 
prosecutor properly answered the questions.  After the sidebar, the trial judge 
directly addressed the prospective juror.  The trial judge explained that Lowe 
would indeed receive credit for time served and then emphasized that parole 
eligibility should not factor into deliberations: 
THE COURT:  Also, but, as far as eligibility, none of us in the 
judicial system have anything to do with whether a person is either 
granted parole or not granted parole, so we’re unable to speculate on 
the likelihood of parole and it just is out of our hands. 
On the other hand, also, that should not be a consideration.  The 
only consideration that you should make in making your 
determination is the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors.  
That should not enter into your decision making in your deliberations. 
 
Neither of these two prospective jurors was selected to sit on the actual jury.   
In instructing the jury prior to deliberations, the trial judge informed the jury 
of the two sentencing options.  The trial judge also repeatedly explained that the 
jury was to base its decision only on the evidence and the jury instructions.  The 
trial judge later explained: “Before you ballot you should carefully weigh, sift and 
consider the evidence, realizing that a human life is at stake, and bring your best 
judgment to bear in reaching your advisory sentence.”  After being instructed, the 
 
- 53 - 
jury deliberated for approximately two hours before unanimously recommending a 
sentence of death.  
Lowe fails to establish error.  This Court has repeatedly addressed the issue 
of whether, in a resentencing proceeding for a defendant who committed a pre-
1994 first-degree murder, the trial court abuses its discretion by answering (or not 
answering) questions posed by the actual jury regarding parole eligibility and 
credit for time served if given a life sentence.  See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 73 So. 
3d 155, 173-74 (Fla. 2011) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
decision to instruct the jury that the defendant would be credited with time served, 
even though the trial court did not also instruct the jury that the defendant “was not 
guaranteed parole at or after 25 years”); Green v. State, 907 So. 2d 489, 496-99 
(Fla. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to instruct 
the jury that the defendant would receive credit for time served and that “there is 
no guarantee that the defendant would be granted parole at or after 25 years”).16  
This Court has also repeatedly declined to find error when the trial court excludes 
certain irrelevant testimony or argument regarding a defendant’s other convictions 
or the likelihood of parole.  See, e.g., Merck, 975 So. 2d at 1059-60 (finding the 
                                          
 
 
16.  In 2014, subsequent to Lowe’s new penalty phase, Florida’s Standard 
Criminal Jury Instruction 7.11 was amended based on Green.  See In re Standard 
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2013-03, 146 So. 3d 1110, 1120 
(Fla. 2014). 
 
- 54 - 
trial court did not abuse its discretion “in excluding proffered expert testimony 
regarding Florida’s parole procedures and [the defendant’s] likelihood of being 
paroled”); Bates, 750 So. 2d at 11 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that it would 
have been “relevant mitigation” for the jury to hear about his other consecutive 
sentences).  The trial court’s decisions and instructions here were consistent with 
our precedent.  And the prospective jurors were repeatedly told not to concern 
themselves with the likelihood of parole.  Accordingly, there is no error. 
We also reject Lowe’s reliance on Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 
1996).  We have made clear that Hitchcock error occurs when the State argues that 
a defendant nearing the expiration of the twenty-five years should be sentenced to 
death in order to avoid the possibility of parole.  See, e.g., Merck, 975 So. 2d at 
1060 n.3; Bates, 750 So. 2d at 11; Gore, 706 So. 2d at 1333.  Here, the State never 
argued or suggested that Lowe should be sentenced to death because he would 
otherwise soon be eligible for parole.  The record does not support the conclusion 
that the State “inject[ed] [the defendant’s] future dangerousness into its evidence or 
argument.”  Bates, 750 So. 2d at 11.  Lastly, we reject Lowe’s related argument 
that he was prejudiced by the State’s “rel[iance] on the prior death sentence” 
during closing argument.  Not only was the issue unpreserved, but, as noted above, 
several of Lowe’s own witnesses informed the jury of Lowe’s prior status on death 
row.  Lowe is not entitled to relief on this claim.  
 
- 55 - 
XII.  Sentencing Order 
 
Lowe claims he is entitled to a new penalty phase on the grounds that the 
trial court did not independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and thus did not comply with section 921.141, Florida Statutes, and 
Spencer.  He argues that the sentencing order is a verbatim adoption of the State’s 
sentencing memorandum with respect to the aggravation and analysis sections.  
And he points to some inconsistencies between the weight assigned to certain 
mitigators in the mitigation and analysis sections.  We deny Lowe relief. 
 
At the Spencer hearing, the trial court requested that both sides submit a 
sentencing memorandum.  In its sentencing order, the trial court ended up adopting 
virtually all of the State’s sentencing memorandum with respect to the aggravation 
section and most of the State’s memorandum with respect to the analysis section.  
With respect to the mitigation section, the sentencing order did not wholly copy the 
memorandum of either party; rather, the sentencing order generally followed the 
format in Lowe’s memorandum and then explained the trial court’s findings with 
respect to each proposed mitigator.  Although the trial court did overall adopt 
substantial portions of the State’s memorandum verbatim, a review of the 
memoranda and the sentencing order reveals that the trial court independently 
engaged in the weighing process.  For example, in rejecting the minor participation 
mitigator, the trial court noted that among other things it personally found both 
 
- 56 - 
Lisa Miller and Ben Carter to be not credible or believable witnesses.  In addition, 
the trial court personally assigned a weight to each of the aggravators in the 
aggravation section and to each of the mitigators in the mitigation section.  The 
trial court also included several paragraphs of its own in the analysis section, 
including a discussion of the jury’s unanimous recommendation.   
 
Lowe cites to Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324, 333 (Fla. 2001), as requiring 
reversal.  We disagree.  In Morton, the issue was whether the death sentence 
imposed by the resentencing judge should be reversed “because the trial judge 
adopted a majority of the findings from the original sentencing judge’s sentencing 
order.”  Id. at 334.  Although we cautioned resentencing judges to avoid adopting 
prior sentencing orders or substantial parts thereof, we rejected the defendant’s 
argument for a new penalty phase because, among other things, “the resentencing 
order included differences indicating that the resentencing judge did fulfill his 
statutory responsibilities.”  Id.  We find sufficient differences exist in this case 
between the State’s memorandum and the sentencing order to show that the trial 
court independently engaged in the weighing process.  See Valle v. State, 778 So. 
2d 960, 964 n.9 (Fla. 2001) (“In the sentencing context, this Court has held that the 
trial court may not request that the parties submit proposed orders and adopt one of 
the proposals verbatim without a showing that the trial court independently 
weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”); see also Farr v. State, 
 
- 57 - 
124 So. 3d 766, 781-82 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting the defendant’s postconviction claim 
that the sentencing order “simply cop[ied] the State’s sentencing memorandum 
verbatim,” given that the trial judge made certain changes to the memorandum). 
 
Regarding the inconsistencies Lowe references in the trial court’s weighing 
of certain mitigators, we find they do not show abdication by the trial judge of its 
responsibility and do not hamper this Court’s review.  These inconsistencies 
appear to stem from the fact that the trial court personally assigned a weight to 
each of the mitigators in the mitigation section and then later adopted most of the 
State’s memorandum with respect to the analysis section, in which the State 
discussed weight to be assigned to the proposed mitigators.  However, we agree 
with the State that these inconsistencies are generally minor, and we find that any 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  For example, there is no significant 
difference here between an initial finding that mitigation evidence is entitled to 
“little weight” and a subsequent mention of that mitigation being entitled to “little 
to no weight.”  Regarding the “good behavior while in confinement” mitigator, 
which the trial court initially assigned “moderate weight” but later mentioned in 
the analysis section as being not mitigating and “only entitled to little or no 
weight,” we conclude that this inconsistency does not make a significant difference 
in the overall calculus, particularly given that the trial court found that four 
 
- 58 - 
aggravators were proven and assigned each “great weight.”  Accordingly, Lowe is 
not entitled to relief as to this claim.  
XIII.  Aggravators  
 
Lowe argues the following aggravators were unlawfully presented to the 
jury and applied to him as a basis for his death sentence: (1) on community control; 
(2) prior violent felony; and (3) avoid arrest.  Lowe also argues that he was denied 
fundamental fairness under the principle of former jeopardy where the State had 
not sought the community control, avoid arrest, and pecuniary gain aggravators in 
the original penalty phase.  We conclude that Lowe is not entitled to relief. 
 
In reviewing the finding of an aggravating circumstance,  
[I]t is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt—that is the trial court’s job.  Rather, [this Court’s] 
task on appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial 
court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance 
and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its 
finding. 
Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997) (footnote omitted); see also 
Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 905 (Fla. 1990) (“When there is a legal basis 
to support finding an aggravating factor, we will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial court . . . .”). 
 
First, Lowe challenges the community control aggravator, notwithstanding 
the fact that he conceded the aggravator during closing argument.  He argues that 
 
- 59 - 
the aggravator only applies to those “on community control” and that individuals 
sentenced under the youthful offender statute—as was the case with Lowe and the 
previous robbery he committed in 1987—are instead put in a “community control 
program.”  We disagree.  A simple look at the relevant statutes reveals that the 
definition of “community control” under section 948.001(3), Florida Statutes 
(2011), is virtually identical to the definition of “community control program” in 
section 958.03(2), Florida Statutes (2011), of the Florida Youthful Offender Act.  
Moreover, chapter 948 itself repeatedly refers to a “community control program.”  
In other words, the Legislature clearly uses the terms interchangeably.  The trial 
court did not err in finding that Lowe qualified for the aggravator.  
 
Second, Lowe challenges the prior violent felony aggravator, again 
notwithstanding the fact that he conceded the aggravator during closing argument.  
Lowe argues that the aggravator was unlawfully applied because his conviction 
was for robbery without a weapon for which he was given a youthful offender 
sentence, and the crime was not life threatening.  “Whether a crime constitutes a 
prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding facts and circumstances of 
the prior crime.”  Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1150 (quoting Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 
845, 855 (Fla. 2003)).  Additionally, “any evidence showing the use or threat of 
violence to a person during the commission of such felony would be relevant in a 
sentencing proceeding.”  Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1255 (Fla. 1983).  
 
- 60 - 
 
For Lowe’s prior conviction of robbery, the facts were that after the victim 
(Crosby) drove his van home from the library one evening and pulled into his own 
driveway, Lowe, who had earlier broken into and was quietly hiding in the back of 
Crosby’s van, grabbed Crosby from behind, put something sharp up against 
Crosby’s neck, which Crosby thought might have been a knife, told Crosby “don’t 
move, don’t turn around, I don’t want to hurt you,” and instructed Crosby to turn 
over his wallet and leave the keys on the dashboard.  Crosby complied, and Lowe 
fled with the van before being apprehended.  The trial court here relied on these 
surrounding facts and circumstances and did not err in finding that Lowe qualified 
for the aggravator.17  In any event, we have previously noted that, for purposes of 
this aggravator, “robbery is as a matter of law a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence.”  Simmons v. State, 419 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 1982).   
                                          
 
 
17.  Lowe also invites this Court to hold that even though he was adjudicated 
guilty and convicted of the previous robbery, the prior violent felony aggravator is 
inapplicable because he was a juvenile at the time and was sentenced as a youthful 
offender.  We decline to do so.  See Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 46 (finding prior juvenile 
convictions can be used to establish an aggravating factor); Green v. State, 975 So. 
2d 1090, 1112-13 (Fla. 2008) (noting that under Florida’s youthful offender 
statute, “[i]f the trial court adjudicates the defendant guilty of the charged offense 
and orders a youthful offender sentence, then the adjudication counts as a 
conviction”); England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 406-07 (Fla. 2006) (concluding 
that Roper does not prohibit the use of prior juvenile felony convictions as an 
aggravating circumstance); Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 1990) 
(finding that prior juvenile convictions can be considered to support the prior 
violent felony aggravator), receded from on other grounds by Trease v. State, 768 
So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2000). 
 
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Third, Lowe argues the avoid arrest aggravator was not supported by the 
evidence.  He claims that the only relevant fact cited by the trial court was that he 
knew Burnell.  “To establish the avoid arrest aggravating factor where the victim is 
not a law enforcement officer, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of a witness.”  
Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 610 (Fla. 2001).  “In such cases, proof of the 
intent to avoid arrest or detection must be very strong.”  Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 
3d 642, 667 (Fla. 2009) (citing Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978)).  
“Mere speculation on the part of the state that witness elimination was the 
dominant motive behind a murder cannot support the avoid arrest aggravator.”  
Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 819 (Fla. 1996).  “Likewise, the mere fact that 
the victim knew and could identify defendant, without more, is insufficient to 
prove this aggravator.”  Id.  “However, this factor may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence from which the motive for the murder may be inferred, without direct 
evidence of the offender’s thought processes.”  Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 54 
(Fla. 2001).   
 
Here, the sentencing order lays out all of the evidence from which the trial 
court concluded that there was no other plausible explanation for the murder other 
than to eliminate Burnell as a witness.  That evidence included: Lowe’s statement 
that he knew Burnell, that he was unaware she worked at the Nu-Pack store, and 
 
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that he knew her from when she worked at a different store; Lowe was on 
community control and would return to prison if he committed another robbery; 
the absence of evidence showing any struggle or resistance; Burnell had a three-
year-old child with her and posed no threat; the silent hold-up alarm was not 
activated; Lowe wore no mask or gloves; Lowe’s fingerprints on the hamburger 
wrapper indicated he had time to reflect on his actions before the murder; Burnell 
was shot three times, including twice from very close range; the gunshot wound to 
the top of Burnell’s head was likely the first shot and indicated she was bending 
over at the time; and various other pieces of evidence indicating that Burnell was 
shot before any attempt was made to remove money from the register, including 
the position of Burnell’s body when she was found lying on her back.  The trial 
court cited Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144, 151 (Fla. 1998), as support that the 
avoid arrest aggravator can be circumstantially established through these types of 
factors, including whether the defendant knew and could be identified by the 
victim, whether the defendant used gloves or wore a mask, whether the victim 
offered resistance or posed a threat, and whether the killing was a product of 
reflection as opposed to a reactionary act. 
 
We conclude that any error in the trial court’s decision to present the avoid 
arrest aggravator to the jury and to find that the aggravator was proved was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As an initial matter, Lowe’s reliance on 
 
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Calhoun v. State, 138 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 2013), and Wilcox is misplaced.  In 
Calhoun, we struck the trial court’s finding of the avoid arrest aggravator as 
speculative because “[m]ost of the facts on which the trial court relied in support of 
finding this aggravator were based on [the defendant’s] attempts to avoid arrest 
after [the victim’s] death, not on his motive to kill [the victim].”  Calhoun, 138 So. 
3d at 362.  In Wilcox, we struck the aggravator because the only relevant evidence 
“support[ed] the theory that [the defendant] murdered [the victim] to protect his 
family,” not to eliminate a witness.  Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 385-86.  Here, the 
circumstantial evidence relied on by the trial court is related to and consistent with 
the theory that Lowe’s sole or dominant motivation for the murder was witness 
elimination.  See Farina, 801 So. 2d at 54; see also McMillian v. State, 94 So. 3d 
572, 580-81, 581 n.16 (Fla. 2012) (finding the medical examiner’s testimony 
together with the totality of the evidence proved the sequence of shots); Serrano v. 
State, 64 So. 3d 93, 114 (Fla. 2011) (upholding the avoid arrest aggravator in part 
because the victim was personally known to the defendant, and there was no 
evidence that the victim offered resistance or posed a threat); McLean v. State, 29 
So. 3d 1045, 1051 (Fla. 2010) (concluding that the evidence supported giving the 
avoid arrest aggravator instruction to the jury, including that the victims “were 
compliant and helpless” and the defendant “did not wear a mask or otherwise 
disguise his appearance”); Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1211 (Fla. 2006) 
 
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(affirming the avoid arrest aggravator in part because the victim did not pose an 
immediate threat to the defendant).  Even if we were to conclude that the 
circumstantial evidence in this case was insufficient to prove the avoid arrest 
aggravator and that the aggravator should be stricken, any error by the trial court 
would be harmless.  The trial court concluded that the aggravators “far outweigh” 
the mitigation offered by Lowe, and three other aggravators would remain—prior 
violent felony, community control, and pecuniary gain.  The trial court assigned 
great weight to each of these three aggravators and expressly made clear that they 
“alone justify the imposition of the death penalty in this case.”  There is no 
reasonable possibility that any potential error affected the sentence imposed.  See 
Middleton v. State, 220 So. 3d 1152, 1172 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 829 
(2018) (“Because we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the 
erroneous findings of the avoid arrest and CCP aggravators contributed to 
Middleton’s death sentence, the errors were harmless.”).  Lowe is not entitled to 
relief. 
 
Finally, Lowe argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the 
State sought, and the trial court found, aggravators that were not sought by the 
State and were not found by the trial court in the original penalty phase.  Although 
the record reflects that Lowe sought only to exclude the CCP and HAC 
aggravators, he now argues that the State should not have been permitted to seek 
 
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the aggravators of community control, avoid arrest, and pecuniary gain.  We have 
repeatedly stated, in the same context of a resentencing proceeding stemming from 
a previously vacated death sentence, that this Court applies the “clean slate” rule.  
See, e.g., Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 917 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he resentencing judge 
is not obligated to find the same aggravating and mitigating circumstances that 
were established in the original sentencing proceeding.”); Preston v. State, 607 So. 
2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1992) (noting that a resentencing must be allowed “to proceed in 
every respect as an entirely new proceeding”); Teffeteller, 495 So. 2d at 745 (“The 
resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence 
. . . .”).  Accordingly, Lowe is not entitled to relief. 
XIV.  Mitigators 
 
Lowe argues that the trial court’s treatment of mitigation rendered his capital 
sentence unconstitutional.  He argues that the trial court: (1) unlawfully relied on 
the prior death sentence affirmance; (2) failed to apply the correct law and weight 
to the statutory age mitigator; (3) improperly assessed the “family relationships” 
mitigator and used it as aggravation; (4) improperly and arbitrarily used 
nonstatutory aggravation; and (5) failed to give any weight to uncontested 
mitigation.  This Court requires the sentencing judge to “expressly evaluate in his 
or her written sentencing order each statutory and non-statutory mitigating 
circumstance proposed by the defendant.”  Ferrell v. State, 653 So. 2d 367, 371 
 
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(Fla. 1995).  “The finding of whether a mitigating circumstance has been 
established is a question of fact that will not be overturned where it is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.”  Fletcher v. State, 168 So. 3d 186, 218 (Fla. 
2015) (citing Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1997)).  “This Court reviews a 
trial court’s assignment of weight to mitigation under an abuse of discretion 
standard.”  Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 521 (Fla. 2008); see also Trease v. State, 
768 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 2000) (receding from Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 
415 (Fla. 1990), “to the extent [Campbell] disallows trial courts from according no 
weight to a mitigating factor”).   
First, Lowe claims that the trial court erroneously relied on this Court’s prior 
affirmance of his original death sentence.  This argument is insufficiently briefed 
and otherwise without merit.  In the analysis section of its sentencing order, the 
trial court began by noting that, under Morton, it should not rely on the prior 
sentencing order.  The trial court then noted as “instructive” the fact that this Court 
previously upheld Lowe’s initial death sentence based upon the presence of only 
two aggravators.  After pointing out that the new penalty phase involved the State 
proving those same two aggravators, as well as two additional ones, the trial court 
then set forth its lengthy analysis of the weighing process explaining why the four 
proven aggravators, each of which was assigned great weight, “far outweigh” “the 
mitigation offered by the defendant.”  Although the trial court referenced our 
 
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previous decision, the trial court independently engaged in the weighing process.   
Next, Lowe takes issue with the trial court’s findings regarding the statutory 
age mitigator, given that Lowe was just over twenty years old at the time of the 
murder.  He argues that the trial court unlawfully attributed “little weight” and then 
“little to no weight” to the mitigator and that greater weight should have been 
assigned due to “the scientifically and constitutionally recognized immaturity of 
youth and the profoundly mitigating effect of age, both in the caselaw and expert 
testimony” presented at trial.  He also argues that the trial court erroneously 
required a nexus of age to the offense.  We find no abuse of discretion. 
 
As an initial matter, a trial court is not required to assign great weight to the 
age mitigator.  “We have long held that the fact that a defendant is youthful, 
‘without more, is not significant.’ ”  Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391, 400 (Fla. 1998) 
(quoting Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360, 367 (Fla. 1986)).  “In Florida, numerical 
age alone may not be mitigating if not linked to some other material characteristic 
(e.g., immaturity).”  Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 660 (Fla. 2008).  Lowe’s 
reliance on Lockett and other cases is unavailing because Lowe was not barred 
from presenting age as mitigation.  Indeed, the trial court considered the mitigator, 
determined that it was proved, and assigned it little weight.  A review of the entire 
context of the sentencing order reveals that the trial court was not convinced that 
the evidence showed a link between Lowe’s age and “some other material 
 
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characteristic.”  Id.  The trial court acknowledged that there was testimony to the 
effect that Lowe was immature at the time, but the trial court relied on certain other 
evidence in reaching its conclusion that Lowe’s age did not in and of itself 
significantly reduce the degree of his culpability, including that Lowe had been 
living on his own for several years, maintained gainful employment, and lived with 
a steady girlfriend in a middle-class neighborhood.  See Sanchez-Torres v. State, 
130 So. 3d 661, 673-74 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting nineteen-year-old capital defendant’s 
claim that the trial court erred in failing to give great weight to the age mitigator, 
given that the defendant’s age was not “linked with some other characteristic of 
[the defendant] or the crime,” and the record “painted a picture of a responsible 
and reliable young man who had faced difficulties in his life, but had nevertheless 
consistently held and excelled at the same job for years, provided financial 
assistance to others, and shouldered numerous responsibilities”); see also Lebron, 
982 So. 2d at 664 (finding no abuse of discretion in assigning limited weight to 
certain mitigators because the evidence did not provide “a crucial, missing nexus 
between these mitigation findings and the life of [the defendant] before the time of 
the murder”).  Lowe has not shown an abuse of discretion.   
 
Next, Lowe argues that the trial court improperly assessed the “family 
relationships” mitigator and used it as aggravation by incorrectly finding that he 
came from a “loving, normal functioning family.”  He argues that the trial court 
 
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should have instead found certain other mitigation, including that he was exposed 
to an alcoholic, brutally abusive father and was shunned by his family—despite the 
fact that Lowe never suggested to the trial court that he had proven such 
mitigation.  In any event, we reject Lowe’s claim and conclude that any error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
In his sentencing memorandum, Lowe contended that the following relevant 
mitigating circumstance had been proven: “The Defendant is a loving family 
member and capable of maintaining family relationships.”  In its sentencing order, 
the trial court determined that Lowe had proven the following “family 
relationships” mitigator, which it assigned little weight: “The Defendant comes 
from a loving, normal functioning family.  He has maintained relationships with 
his mother and sister during his long period of incarceration.”  In the analysis 
section of the sentencing order, the trial court discussed, as not particularly 
mitigating, Lowe’s “love for his family and the emotional support he has provided 
them over the course of his confinement.”  The trial court later discussed Lowe’s 
“normal upbringing, free from abuse or deprivation,” and explained that Lowe’s 
normal life did not mitigate a death sentence.   
The essence of Lowe’s argument is that instead of focusing solely on 
Lowe’s love for his family, the trial court erred by also finding that Lowe’s family 
loved him and that he had a normal upbringing.  We disagree that the trial court 
 
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used nonstatutory aggravation.  At worst, the trial court misinterpreted the specific 
mitigation proposed by Lowe.  However, it is difficult to fault the trial court for 
doing so, given that Lowe himself presented the testimony of his mother, Sherrie, 
who very much painted the picture of Lowe having a normal life in an average 
family that did lots of activities together, including many related to church.  She 
testified that Lowe was an easy child to raise until about age fifteen, and she 
attributed Lowe’s troubles as stemming entirely from peer pressures coming from 
outside the home, in particular from kids who had very lenient boundaries.  She 
also painted the picture of Lowe’s father as a very responsible family man.  She 
did mention that she and Lowe’s father separated for “a short time” when Lowe 
was twelve years old because Lowe’s father usually drank one night per week and 
would sometimes use inappropriate language when doing so.  But she also testified 
that during their six-week separation, Lowe’s father made positive changes 
including that he stopped drinking.  Lastly, she testified that she and Lowe’s father 
had guidelines for disciplining their children depending on the infraction, including 
revoking privileges and administering some corporal punishment.  
 
Although Lowe also presented the testimony of Dr. Riebsame, who testified 
that Lowe’s criminal activity problems in middle adolescence began “in response 
to what’s going on in the household”—i.e., running away from his father’s 
discipline, being embarrassed by Jehovah’s Witnesses evangelizing, and being 
 
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shunned by his family and the congregation—the trial court was free to reject that 
testimony in favor of Lowe’s mother’s testimony.  See Hampton v. State, 103 So. 
3d 98, 117 (Fla. 2012) (“A trial court may reject mitigation based on expert 
testimony, even if that testimony is uncontroverted, ‘where it is difficult to square 
with the other evidence in the case.’ ” (quoting Morton, 789 So. 2d at 330)).  
Moreover, regarding corporal punishment, Dr. Riebsame himself made it very 
clear that he was not testifying that the punishment Lowe received was abusive. 
 
In the end, even assuming that the trial court should not have considered 
Lowe’s loving family and normal upbringing and should have instead found 
mitigation involving negative family relationships, there is no reasonable 
possibility that the mitigation would be sufficient to outweigh the substantial 
aggravation in this case.  We deny relief. 
 
Next, Lowe argues that the trial court used unfounded nonstatutory 
aggravation by making certain comments that were “totally unrelated to any of the 
aggravation.”  We disagree.  When read in context, almost all of the complained-of 
comments—i.e., that Lowe unlawfully possessed a firearm, was given a great 
chance to rehabilitate himself, and otherwise made his own decision to commit a 
murder—go directly to explaining why the trial court assigned great weight to the 
community control aggravator.  The trial court explained that Lowe committed the 
murder while being on community control for only a relatively short period of 
 
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time, that the terms of his community control prohibited him from possessing a 
firearm, and that he blatantly flouted the rules by which he agreed to abide.  There 
is nothing improper about the trial court’s explanation of the weight it assigned to 
the aggravator in the overall context of weighing the aggravation and mitigation.  
To the extent any remark by the trial court can be considered improper, we 
conclude that it “does not reflect an underlying improper sentencing rationale.”  
Oyola v. State, 158 So. 3d 504, 509 (Fla. 2015).  We deny Lowe’s claim. 
 
Finally, Lowe argues that the trial court assigned no weight to much 
nonstatutory mitigation without adequately explaining its decision, thus violating 
Trease.  Here, the trial judge personally assigned “no weight” to three of the ten 
nonstatutory mitigators proposed by Lowe, and two of those three were determined 
by the trial judge to “not in fact” be mitigating circumstances.  Although the 
sentencing order later contains some inconsistencies and may be “less than a model 
of clarity,” Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 739 (Fla. 1994), it is apparent that 
the trial court considered each of the mitigating circumstances proposed by Lowe 
and determined that such circumstances hardly distinguished Lowe from other 
members of society, were supported by “underwhelming” evidence, or were in fact 
not mitigating.  To the extent the trial judge should have gone into greater detail, 
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Deparvine v. State, 995 
So. 2d 351, 381 (Fla. 2008) (concluding that any error in not treating certain 
 
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mitigation in greater detail was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given that 
four proven aggravators were each assigned “great weight” and that little weight 
was given to the mitigating circumstances described in the sentencing order).  We 
deny Lowe’s claim. 
XV.  Hurst v. Florida 
 
Lowe relies on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), to argue that the trial 
court erred in denying his requests for special verdict forms and jury instructions to 
separately and unanimously find each aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.  
While Lowe’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Hurst v. Florida, and on remand we issued our decision in Hurst.  In 
the wake of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst, we granted supplemental briefing to 
address the impact of those decisions on Lowe’s sentence.  
 
In Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 175 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2218 (2017), this Court held that a jury’s unanimous recommendation of death is 
“precisely what we determined in Hurst to be constitutionally necessary to impose 
a sentence of death” because a “jury unanimously f[inds] all of the necessary facts 
for the imposition of [a] death sentence[] by virtue of its unanimous 
recommendation[].”  Here, the jury was informed that before it could consider the 
death penalty, it must first determine that at least one aggravating circumstance has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Also, as in Davis, the jury was informed 
 
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“that it needed to determine whether sufficient aggravators existed and whether the 
aggravation outweighed the mitigation before it could recommend a sentence of 
death.”  Id. at 174.  Among other things, the jury was also informed that, regardless 
of its findings, it was neither compelled nor required to recommend a sentence of 
death.  Despite the mitigation presented and the fact that the jury was properly 
informed that it may consider mitigating circumstances proven by the greater 
weight of the evidence, the jury unanimously recommended that Lowe be 
sentenced to death.  “Th[is] recommendation[] allow[s] us to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that there 
were sufficient aggravators to outweigh the mitigating factors.”  Id.   
 
This Court has consistently relied on Davis to deny Hurst relief to 
defendants who have received a unanimous jury recommendation of death.  See, 
e.g., Cozzie v. State, 225 So. 3d 717, 733 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1131 
(2018); Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 46 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 452 
(2017); Tundidor v. State, 221 So. 3d 587, 607-08 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 829 (2018); Oliver v. State, 214 So. 3d 606, 617-18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 3 (2017); Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 956-57 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 3 (2017).  Lowe’s arguments do not compel departing from our precedent.  
Because the Hurst error in Lowe’s penalty phase was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, he is not entitled to a new penalty phase. 
 
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XVI.  Incomplete Record on Appeal 
 
Lowe argues that certain missing items render the record incomplete and 
prevent a complete review.  We reject Lowe’s claim because, among other things, 
he fails to explain how he is prejudiced by any of the missing items or has been 
hindered from presenting meritorious appellate issues tied to any of the items.  See 
Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1287 (Fla. 2005) (“Rodriguez has not 
sufficiently pled this claim as he has not explained what issues he was unable to 
raise as a result of any missing or inaccurate record.  Thus, Rodriguez is not 
entitled to relief on this claim.”); Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1983) 
(“In the absence of some clear allegation of prejudicial inaccuracy we see no 
worthwhile end to be achieved by remanding for new trial.”).   
First, Lowe claims that the absence of the completed juror questionnaires, 
which were destroyed, precludes proper review.  Lowe’s argument primarily 
focuses on the trial court’s decision to grant the State’s challenge for cause (later 
changed to a peremptory strike) regarding prospective juror Charles Simard—an 
issue we have already addressed.  Lowe asserts that there are “substantial grounds 
for reversal based on the trial court’s exclusion of Mr. Simard that cannot be 
developed adequately” without the questionnaires.  But Lowe fails to identify any 
such grounds.  See Armstrong v. State, 862 So. 2d 705, 721 (Fla. 2003) 
(“Armstrong has failed to link a meritorious appellate issue to the allegedly 
 
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missing record and thus cannot establish that he was prejudiced by its absence.”).  
In any event, the record reflects that the entire voir dire was transcribed, and both 
parties had copies of the questionnaires from which they were able to question the 
prospective jurors.  The absence of the questionnaires has not hindered our ability 
to conduct meaningful review on this issue.  Lowe does not identify any other 
potential voir dire errors.  We deny relief.  
Second, Lowe asserts that meaningful appellate review is precluded because 
the court reporter did not certify the accuracy of the transcription of certain 
recordings played during the resentencing, including Lowe’s statement, and there 
are a number of inaudible sections.  Here, the reporter transcribed what was played 
to the jury and certified that such was done to the best of her ability.  Moreover, the 
reporter certified the accuracy of the transcript at the end of each volume.  In any 
event, Lowe fails to identify what specific prejudice has resulted from the 
inaudible portions of the trial transcript.  See Jones v. State, 923 So. 2d 486, 489 
(Fla. 2006) (“[T]his Court requires that the defendant demonstrate that there is a 
basis for a claim that the missing transcript would reflect matters which prejudice 
the defendant.”); Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 163 (Fla. 2002) (“Darling has 
failed to demonstrate what specific prejudice, if any, has been incurred because of 
the missing transcripts.”).  We deny relief.   
 
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Finally, Lowe argues that without the computer-generated diagram used by 
the State during opening argument and the mannequin used by the medical 
examiner during his testimony, this Court cannot determine whether the use of 
either item was improper.  As an initial matter, these items were not entered into 
evidence or otherwise documented by Lowe.  They were not items that could 
supplement the record under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(a)(1).  
Moreover, as we explained earlier in this opinion, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting the use of either item.  We deny relief.   
XVII.  Proportionality Review  
Lowe also challenges the proportionality of his death sentence.  
Proportionality review is not a quantitative analysis involving comparing the 
number of aggravators and mitigators, but a qualitative review of the underlying 
basis for each aggravating and mitigating factor and of the totality of the 
circumstances as compared to other capital cases.  See Gregory v. State, 118 So. 3d 
770, 785-86 (Fla. 2013).  In conducting our proportionality analysis, we “will 
accept the weight assigned by the trial court to the aggravating and mitigating 
factors.”  Hayward, 24 So. 3d at 46.  “Further, we will not disturb the weight 
assigned to a particular mitigating circumstance absent an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court.”  Jeffries v. State, 222 So. 3d 538, 548 (Fla. 2017).  As always, we 
keep in mind that the death penalty is “reserved for only the most aggravated and 
 
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least mitigated of first-degree murders.”  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 
1998).  
 
In following the jury’s unanimous recommendation of death, the trial court 
found the following five aggravating circumstances, merged to four: (1) under 
sentence of imprisonment/community control (great weight); (2) prior violent 
felony (great weight); (3A) murder in the course of a felony (great weight) merged 
with (3B) pecuniary gain; and (4) avoid arrest (great weight).  The trial court found 
one statutory mitigator, statutory age (little weight).  Regarding the ten 
nonstatutory mitigators argued by Lowe, the trial court gave them all little to no 
weight, except for good behavior while in confinement, which the trial court gave 
moderate weight.  Lowe argues that this case is nowhere near the most aggravated 
and least mitigated of cases.  We disagree and conclude that Lowe’s death sentence 
is proportionate under Florida law, with or without the avoid arrest aggravator.  We 
have affirmed other cases with similar aggravation and mitigation.  See, e.g., 
Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 437 (Fla. 2001) (finding death sentence 
proportionate in armed-robbery-turned-murder of store owner shot three times at 
close range, with three aggravators of prior violent felony, murder committed 
during course of robbery, and avoid arrest, and one nonstatutory mitigator); Miller 
v. State, 770 So. 2d 1144, 1146 n.1, 1150 (Fla. 2000) (finding death sentence 
proportionate with two aggravators of prior violent felony and robbery/pecuniary 
 
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gain, no statutory mitigators, and ten nonstatutory mitigators); Pope v. State, 679 
So. 2d 710, 716 (Fla. 1996) (finding death sentence proportionate in robbery-
murder with two aggravators of prior violent felony and pecuniary gain, two 
statutory mitigators, and several nonstatutory mitigators). 
Lowe cites to Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996), and Yacob v. 
State, 136 So. 3d 539, 550 (Fla. 2014), in support of his argument that Lowe’s case 
is the archetype of a “robbery gone bad.”  We disagree.  As an initial matter, Terry 
and Yacob both involved far less weighty aggravation than Lowe’s case.  Terry 
involved the two aggravators of (1) during the course of a robbery merged with 
pecuniary gain and (2) prior violent felony, and this Court noted that, among other 
things, the prior violent felony aggravator did not “represent an actual violent 
felony previously committed by” the defendant.  Terry, 668 So. 2d at 965.  And 
Yacob involved the single merged aggravator of during the course of a robbery and 
pecuniary gain.  Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 551.  Moreover, it cannot reasonably be said 
that Lowe’s case involves a “robbery gone bad.”  There is no indication that 
Burnell resisted or impeded an attempted robbery.  Instead, the record establishes 
that a decision was made to shoot Burnell three times, including twice from very 
close range, before any attempt was made to retrieve the money.  Terry and Yacob 
are wholly distinguishable. 
We also find Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232, 238 (Fla. 1998), to be 
 
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distinguishable.  Johnson involved the two aggravators of prior violent felony and 
burglary/pecuniary gain, the statutory mitigator of age, and six nonstatutory 
mitigators, one of which the trial court accorded substantial weight.  Id.  This Court 
noted that the prior violent felony aggravator was “not strong when the facts are 
considered” because the aggravator was based in part on an aggravated assault 
upon the defendant’s brother based on a misunderstanding.  Id.  And in balancing 
the two aggravators, one of which was “not strong,” against the mitigators, this 
Court vacated the death sentence while noting that it was a “close question.”  Id.  
Lowe’s case involves aggravation that is more substantial and mitigation that is 
less weighty.  We similarly find Ballard v. State, 66 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 2011), to be 
distinguishable.  Ballard was a single aggravator case (CCP) with several statutory 
mitigators and numerous nonstatutory mitigators.  Id. at 916 n.1.  Lowe’s case 
involves several aggravators assigned great weight.  Finally, Lowe cites to Brooks 
v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 208 (Fla. 2005), receded from in part by State v. 
Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2012), in support of the proposition that Lowe’s 
death sentence is disproportionate when compared to his equally or more culpable 
codefendants.  But as noted above, the trial court’s sentencing order makes clear 
that the trial court concluded that Lowe acted alone.  The record supports that 
finding. 
 
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XVIII.  Cumulative Error 
 
As his final claim, Lowe argues cumulative error.  In this appeal, Lowe 
presented several preserved arguments claiming error.  We determined that those 
arguments either involved no errors or errors that were harmless and not 
prejudicial to Lowe.  Lowe also presented several unpreserved arguments claiming 
error.  See Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219, 1238 (Fla. 2015) (“[W]e also consider 
[unobjected-to errors] in this analysis.”).  We determined that those arguments 
were either without merit or involved error that was invited or not fundamental or 
both.  In the end, after reviewing the record and the entire context of the penalty 
phase, we conclude that the cumulative effect of any errors in this case did not 
deprive Lowe “of a fair penalty phase hearing.”  Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 
(Fla. 2001).  Because Lowe has failed to establish that any errors occurred that 
individually or cumulatively entitle him to a new penalty phase, we deny relief. 
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Lowe’s death sentence.   
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., 
concurs. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result and dissents in part with an opinion. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.  
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, C.J., concurring specially. 
 
I concur in the opinion except regarding the Hurst issue, on which I would 
conclude that there was no error.  The jury’s verdict convicting Lowe of attempted 
armed robbery with a firearm satisfies the requirement of Hurst v. Florida that an 
aggravator be found by the jury.  See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 77-82 (Fla. 
2016) (Canady, J., dissenting).  
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
LEWIS, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part. 
 
Although I am in agreement with the result of the majority’s opinion, I write 
to voice my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that Lowe’s avoid arrest 
aggravator is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  When the victim is 
not a law enforcement officer, proof of intent to avoid arrest and detection must be 
very strong.  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1081, 1087 (Fla. 2008) (citing Jones v. 
State, 963 So. 2d 180, 186 (Fla. 2007)).  Competent, substantial evidence does not 
support the conclusion that the sole or dominant motive behind Burnell’s murder 
was witness elimination as is required by our jurisprudence.  Cf. Wilcox v. State, 
143 So. 3d 359, 384-86 (Fla. 2014) (reversing a finding of the avoid arrest 
aggravator because the evidence failed to demonstrate that the dominant motive for 
the murder was to avoid arrest); Green, 975 So. 2d at 1086-88 (same); Jones, 963 
 
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So. 2d at 186-87 (same); Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 695-96 (Fla. 2002) (same); 
Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 610 (Fla. 2001) (same); Geralds v. State, 601 So. 
2d 1157, 1164 (Fla. 1992) (same); Cook v. State, 542 So. 2d 964, 970 (Fla. 1989) 
(same); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 360 (Fla. 1988) (same); Perry v. State, 
522 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1988) (same); Floyd v. State, 497 So. 2d 1211, 1214-15 
(Fla. 1986) (same); Caruthers v. State, 465 So. 2d 496, 499 (Fla. 1985) (same); 
Rembert v. State, 445 So. 2d 337, 340 (Fla. 1984) (same).  Here the evidence does 
not support a finding that Lowe’s dominant motive was to avoid arrest.  Lowe 
knew the victim, however, this Court has stated that “the mere fact that the victim 
knew and could identify defendant, without more, is insufficient to prove this 
aggravator.”  Hurst, 819 So. 2d at 696 (quoting Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 
819 (Fla. 1996)).  Thus, while the evidence reflects that Lowe may have had 
several motives for killing Burnell, it does not support a finding that Lowe’s 
dominant motive was to avoid arrest.  Accordingly, I would conclude that the 
majority’s holding with regard to Lowe’s avoid arrest aggravator is contrary to this 
Court’s fundamental jurisprudence.  For the reasons set forth above, I concur in 
result only and dissent in part.  
QUINCE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with my colleagues that Lowe is not entitled to relief on the 
majority of his claims; however, I cannot agree that the Hurst error in this case is 
 
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harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The majority supports this conclusion by 
relying primarily on the jury’s unanimous recommendation for death.  The 
majority finds that because the jury unanimously recommended death, the Court 
can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
unanimously found all of the findings necessitated by Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 44.  I 
respectfully disagree for three reasons.   
 
First, the trial judge improperly curtailed Lowe’s ability to fully inform the 
jury regarding the operation of Florida’s parole system and Lowe’s consecutive 
fifteen-year sentence for robbery.  Additionally, the prosecutor and the trial court 
explained to the jury that Lowe would get credit for time served and that the court 
could not speculate as to when Lowe would be released on parole.  As the majority 
states, after the State told the jurors that Lowe would get credit for time served, the 
court explained: 
Also, but, as far as eligibility, none of us in the judicial system 
have anything to do with whether a person is either granted parole or 
not granted parole, so we’re unable to speculate on the likelihood of 
parole and it is just out of our hands.  
On the other hand, also, that should not be a consideration.  The 
only consideration that you should make in making your 
determination is the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors.  
That should not enter into your decision-making deliberations. 
 
The majority concludes that there was no error in the trial court’s 
instructions to the jury.  In support of this holding, the Court relies on Armstrong, 
where we found no error where the jury was informed that the capital defendant on 
 
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resentencing was entitled to credit for time served for life without the possibility of 
parole for twenty-five years option.  73 So. 3d at 173-74.  In light of Hurst, 
however, this Court’s opinion in Armstrong no longer supports the conclusion that 
this type of error—incompletely explaining to the jury Florida’s parole system or 
credit for time served—is harmless.   
Armstrong argued “that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to 
instruct the jury that [he] was not guaranteed parole at or after 25 years.”  Id. at 
173.  We stated that case law “does not require that a jury be instructed on the 
eligibility of parole,” and denied relief because “[t]he jury instruction below was 
not confusing, misleading, . . . contradictory,” or “a misstatement of law.”  Id. at 
174.  The jury also asked whether Armstrong would be entitled to credit for time 
served, and the trial court instructed the jury that he would.  Id.  The majority 
concluded: 
[E]ven if the trial court abused its discretion, it would be of no 
consequence, because any error is harmless.  Armstrong had already 
been convicted of the crime.  It cannot be said that this instruction 
would have caused the jury to arrive at a conclusion they would not 
have otherwise reached as there is substantial aggravation in the 
instant case that provides independent support for the jury 
recommendation.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion below. 
 
Id.   
Justice Pariente concurred in part and dissented in part in Armstrong, writing 
that she “would reverse for a new penalty phase” due to “the trial judge’s answer to 
 
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a question from the jury regarding sentencing options.”  Id. at 175 (Pariente, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Pariente explained that it was 
“apparent on the face of the jury’s inquiry that the jurors had a very logical 
question regarding the effect of a recommendation of life and wanted to know in 
advance how such a recommendation would work in this case, since the defendant 
had already served seventeen years of any sentence to be imposed.”  Id. at 176.  
She concluded “that by not answering the question to explain that the twenty-five 
years was not the defendant’s actual sentence, but rather the minimum length of a 
sentence of life, and that there was no guarantee of parole at or after twenty-five 
years, the court gave the jurors a confusing and incomplete answer, leading them to 
believe that he would be released in another eight years.”  Id. 
This explanation of how the trial court’s incomplete explanation as to parole 
and credit for time served is even more compelling post-Hurst for the conclusion 
that defendants in this situation are entitled to a new penalty phase.  It is 
impossible to know the true effect the information the jury received regarding 
Lowe’s previous death sentence and the lack of appropriate information it received 
regarding the parole system and Lowe’s other sentences had on its unanimous 
recommendation for death.  However, it is clear these errors could have very easily 
influenced the jury’s perception of the case and had an adverse impact on the 
jury’s unanimous recommendation.   
 
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Second, the jury was improperly informed that Lowe had previously been 
sentenced to death.  During the State’s closing argument, it referenced Lowe’s 
prior death sentence four times: 
(1) “You’ve heard he’s on – has been on death row for the last twenty 
years.  We’re asking you to impose the death sentence.  Nothing has 
changed since 1990.”   
 
(2) “He’s been on death row for twenty years, he’s watched 24/7; of 
course he’s gonna act well.  He does well in a structured environment, 
absolutely.  That’s not the problem.”   
 
(3) “Now you’ve heard the testimony.  Nothing has changed since 
1990.  Nothing.  The Defendant’s story is still the same, and we’ve 
shown you that it’s not true, and as a result of that you should send 
him back to death row.”   
 
(4) “With your recommendations you can send Rodney Lowe back to 
death row, and that’s what I’m asking you to do.”   
 
These statements, in my view, amount to fundamental error.  The majority opinion 
correctly cites to Teffeteller, wherein we held that “a death sentence which has 
been vacated by this Court should not play a significant role in resentencing 
proceedings.”  495 So. 2d at 745.  There, the defendant argued that it was 
reversible error to inform the jury of his prior sentence of death.  Id. at 745.  In 
finding that testimony from the State’s psychiatric expert did not amount to 
reversible error, we relied on previous testimony from the defendant’s witness and 
the defendant himself that informed the jury of his prior death sentence.  Id. at 747.   
 
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The defendant also argued that the State’s comments during closing 
improperly informed the jury of his prior death sentence.  Id.  In rejecting that 
argument, we found that “the single sentence” that referenced the defendant’s prior 
sentence “was not so prejudicial or inflammatory that a new sentencing proceeding 
[was] required.”  Id.  Here, however, the State’s comments went beyond a single 
sentence.  The State mentioned several times during its closing that Lowe had been 
previously sentenced to death and nothing had changed since Lowe’s initial 
sentence of death was imposed.  While Lowe did not object during the State’s 
closing, these comments may have influenced the jury and preconditioned it to 
recommend a death sentence.     
 
 Third, we cannot know that the jury found each aggravating factor 
unanimously, despite the jury’s unanimous death sentence recommendation.  
Because one of the aggravators found by the trial court for the murder in this 
case—that the capital felony was committed to avoid arrest—requires specific 
factual findings, Hurst requires that the jury, not the trial judge, make that 
determination.  The jury made no such determination in Lowe’s case.  By ignoring 
the record and concluding that all aggravators were unanimously found by the jury, 
the majority is engaging in the exact type of conduct the United States Supreme 
Court cautioned against in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 622.   
 
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Because harmless error review is neither a sufficiency of the evidence 
review nor “a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact 
by simply weighing the evidence,” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 
1986), I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors here were 
harmless, and I would vacate Lowe’s death sentence and remand for resentencing.   
PARIENTE, J., dissenting. 
 
This is Lowe’s direct appeal from resentencing.  I dissent because several 
errors in Lowe’s resentencing cry out for this Court to grant Lowe a new penalty 
phase.  Not only did the jury consider an improper aggravating factor of avoid 
arrest, as explained by Justice Lewis’s separate opinion,18 but the jury was also 
misled regarding certain key aspects that undoubtedly affected its considerations in 
recommending between life and death, as explained by Justice Quince’s separate 
opinion.19  Therefore, because the jury was presented with the improper avoid 
arrest aggravating factor, received misleading instructions as to its sentencing 
options, and was further misled as to Lowe receiving credit for time served, we 
                                          
 
 
18.  Concurring in result and dissenting in part op. at 82-83 (Lewis, J.). 
 
19.  Concurring in part and dissenting in part op. at 84-89 (Quince, J.). 
 
 
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cannot conclude that the Hurst20 error in Lowe’s resentencing was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 175 (Fla. 2016).   
 
Hurst necessarily changed how this Court reviews the information that the 
jury considered in making its recommendation as to the appropriate sentence in 
each case.  This Court has made clear that a proper understanding of Florida’s 
parole system and defendants receiving credit for time served affects the jury’s 
ability to understand its sentencing options.  Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859, 
863 (Fla. 1996).  Former Justice Anstead and I have both expressed the importance 
of the trial court’s role in fully informing the jury as to the reality of Florida’s 
parole system.  Justice Anstead explained in Green v. State, 907 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 
2005): 
[E]ven assuming [the trial court’s] response [to the jury’s inquiry] was 
technically accurate, the response was clearly flawed for what it did 
not tell the jurors.  First, we should be clear that the response given 
certainly did not favor the defendant since it told the jury that with a 
life sentence the defendant would soon be eligible for parole, not in 
twenty-five years, but in ten, a very short time, indeed, if the jury is 
concerned, as jurors logically would be, with keeping a killer off the 
streets for a long time. 
 
Id. at 505 (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); 
see Armstrong v. State, 73 So. 3d 155, 176 (Fla. 2011) (Pariente, J., concurring in 
                                          
 
 
20.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
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part and dissenting in part).  I echoed this sentiment in Armstrong, joined by 
Justice Labarga, stating: 
[U]nlike the trial judge, the jury has no working knowledge of the 
actual length of the sentence that a defendant is facing if it 
recommends the option of life without the possibility of parole for 25 
years.  Therefore, to the extent that its vote for life or death may hinge 
on concerns that the defendant may be released from prison, the jury 
should be informed of all relevant information that bears upon the 
ultimate length of the prison sentence.  In this context, the jury is 
solely dependent upon the instructions from the trial court and the 
answers to questions regarding the actual sentence. 
 
73 So. 3d at 178 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis 
added); see concurring in part and dissenting in part op. at 85-86 (Quince, J.).   
In this case, the cumulative effect of the errors in Lowe’s resentencing—the 
improper avoid arrest aggravating factor, misleading the jury as to the effect of its 
sentencing options, and references to Lowe’s prior death sentence—require this 
Court to vacate Lowe’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase 
pursuant to Hurst.  As in Armstrong, the jury’s inquiry in this case “regarding the 
effect of a recommendation of life” was a “very logical question,” considering that 
Lowe had already served twenty “years of any sentence to be imposed.”  73 So. 3d 
at 176 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Green, 907 So. 
2d at 505 (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  However, as a 
result of the incomplete information given in response to this inquiry, the jury—
without understanding Florida’s parole system or knowing that Lowe had an 
 
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outstanding consecutive fifteen-year sentence for robbery—was misled to believe 
that Lowe could be released within five years of resentencing, if sentenced to life 
with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years instead of death.  In fact, the 
trial court’s answer in this case suggested that Lowe would be eligible for release 
in even less time than what was suggested in Hitchcock, Green, and Armstrong.   
Further, the trial court did not allow Lowe to inform the jury of his 
consecutive fifteen-year sentence for robbery.  Even if Lowe was granted parole 
within a few years of resentencing, he would still be required to serve an additional 
fifteen years in prison.  Therefore, despite the prosecutor’s and trial court’s 
suggestions, it was impossible that Lowe would be released sooner than twenty 
years after resentencing. 
The majority concludes that Lowe has not established error, noting that 
“[n]either of the[] two prospective jurors” who asked questions prompting this 
explanation “was selected to sit on the actual jury.”  Majority op. at 52.  However, 
regardless of whether the inquisitive prospective jurors were empaneled, the jury 
pool heard the information and could have understood the information to suggest 
that Lowe could be released soon after resentencing.  This Court cannot speculate 
about the effect this incomplete information had on the jury.  Once the jury was 
told that Lowe would receive credit for time served and was eligible for parole 
after twenty-five years, the defense should have been allowed to properly explain 
 
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Florida’s parole system and inform the jury of Lowe’s consecutive fifteen-year 
sentence.   
 
Exacerbating the error of misleading the jury as to its sentencing options, the 
jury heard multiple references to Lowe’s prior death sentence throughout the 
resentencing.  In one instance, Chaplain Resinella discussed during direct 
examination his time as the chaplain on death row and providing counsel to Lowe.  
In another instance, Warden McAndrew testified on direct examination: 
DEFENSE:  Now, you’ve heard that [Lowe] is housed on death row.  
He’s by himself in a cell? 
 
WARDEN:  Yes he is. 
 
See majority op. at 36.  Dr. Riebsame also referenced Lowe’s time on death row 
during his direct examination, stating: 
RIEBSAME:  Often times also more volumes, particularly in a case 
where there’s, you know, a postconviction appeal and a person has 
been on death row for twenty years. 
 
See id.   
Finally, as Justice Quince explains, the prosecutor made four references to 
Lowe’s prior death sentence during closing argument and argued that the jury 
should impose the same sentence imposed before.  Concurring in part and 
dissenting in part op. at 87 (Quince, J.); see majority op. at 32-33, 35, 54.  Contrary 
to the majority’s assertions, the references to the prior death sentence in Teffeteller 
v. State, 495 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1986), which this Court determined did not warrant 
 
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reversal, are distinguishable.  See concurring in part and dissenting in part op. at 
87-88 (Quince, J.).  Even if Lowe’s witnesses referenced Lowe’s prior death 
sentence, the State’s comments during closing argument compounded the error and 
went far beyond “merely mentioning the prior sentence of death.”  Teffeteller, 495 
So. 2d at 747. 
 
Considering the cumulative effect of these errors in Lowe’s resentencing in 
conjunction with the improper aggravating factor of avoid arrest, as explained by 
Justice Lewis, it is clear that Lowe’s defense was prejudiced.  The jury was left 
with the improper impression that Lowe could have been released from prison 
shortly after resentencing if sentenced to life instead of death.  This impression 
could have easily “influenced the jury and preconditioned it to recommend a death 
sentence.”  Concurring in part and dissenting in part op. at 88 (Quince, J.).  Thus, it 
is impossible for this Court to determine how the inappropriate information the 
jury received and the information the jury did not receive affected the jury’s 
unanimous recommendation for death.   
CONCLUSION 
 
As this Court stated in Wood v. State, 209 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 2017), “Our 
inquiry post-Hurst must necessarily be the effect of any error on the jury’s 
findings, rather than whether beyond a reasonable doubt the trial judge would have 
still imposed death.”  Id. at 1233 (emphasis added).  The errors in Lowe’s 
 
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resentencing could have easily tainted the jury’s recommendation for death.  
Therefore, I would vacate Lowe’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty 
phase. 
 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Indian River County,  
Robert L. Pegg, Judge - Case No. 311990CF000658AXXXXX 
 
Antony P. Ryan, Regional Counsel, Steven H. Malone, Special Assistant Regional 
Counsel, and Melanie L. Casper, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal 
Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Fourth District, West Palm Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee