Title: Johnson v. Tice
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 070531
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2008

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
GENE M. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF THE 
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
v.   Record No. 070531 
 
   OPINION BY  
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
January 11, 2008 
DEREK ELLIOTT TICE  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a circuit court erred 
in awarding a writ of habeas corpus based on its holding that 
a petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to 
file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s confession.  We 
also address as a matter of cross-error whether the circuit 
court erred in denying the petitioner’s separate claim that 
trial counsel were ineffective, thereby causing the petitioner 
to suffer prejudice, because trial counsel failed to lay a 
proper foundation for the introduction of a certain letter 
into evidence at trial. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 2003, Derek Elliott Tice was convicted in a jury trial 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk of the capital 
murder of Michelle Moore-Bosko, in violation of Code § 18.2-
31(2), and the rape of Michelle Moore-Bosko, in violation of 
Code § 18.2-61.  The circuit court sentenced Tice to two terms 
 
2
of life imprisonment.1  The Court of Appeals denied Tice’s 
petition for appeal.  Tice v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0408-
03-1 (December 23, 2003).  This Court likewise refused Tice’s 
petition for appeal.  Tice v. Commonwealth, Record No. 040160 
(October 1, 2004). 
 
In 2005, Tice filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (the habeas 
court), in which he alleged claims of police and prosecutorial 
misconduct and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
The habeas court dismissed most of Tice’s claims by order and 
held an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Tice alleged that his trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress Tice’s confession on the ground that he had invoked 
his right to remain silent.  Tice also alleged that his trial 
counsel were ineffective for failing to properly introduce 
into evidence a letter written by another inmate, Omar A. 
Ballard, who had admitted his participation in the crimes for 
which Tice was convicted. 
                     
1 Tice’s earlier convictions for these offenses were 
reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, which held that 
the jury had not been properly instructed.  Tice v. 
Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 332, 563 S.E.2d 412 (2002).  The 
present opinion discusses only the evidence presented at 
Tice’s second trial.  
 
3
After the evidentiary hearing, the habeas court dismissed 
Tice’s claim concerning Ballard’s letter but held that trial 
counsel were ineffective in failing to move to suppress Tice’s 
confession, because such a motion “would probably have been 
granted” on the ground that Tice had invoked his right to 
remain silent.  The habeas court further held that there was a 
“reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted [Tice] 
if his confession had not been admitted into evidence.”  On 
that basis, the habeas court awarded Tice a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
II.  TICE’S CRIMINAL TRIAL 
At Tice’s trial, the Commonwealth contended that Tice was 
one of several men who had raped and murdered Michelle Moore-
Bosko (Michelle).  Tice’s attorneys, however, maintained that 
Omar A. Ballard was the sole perpetrator of the crimes 
committed against Michelle. 
The evidence showed that on July 8, 1997, William A. 
Bosko returned to his apartment in Norfolk after a tour 
of duty with the United States Navy and found the dead 
body of his wife, Michelle.  Michelle had died from 
manual strangulation and multiple stab wounds to the 
chest.  The evidence further revealed that Michelle had 
suffered “forcible injuries” to her vaginal area. 
 
4
City of Norfolk police officers found a blood-stained, 
serrated knife near Michelle’s body.  The police also 
recovered some DNA samples from Michelle’s vagina and from a 
blanket on the bed.  Robert Scanlon, a forensic scientist, 
testified that Tice was eliminated as the source of this DNA 
evidence.  Scanlon’s testimony further revealed a very high 
correlation between these DNA samples collected at the crime 
scene and the DNA sample obtained from Ballard. 
The jury also heard the testimony of Joseph Dick, who had 
participated in the rapes and murder of Michelle and had 
entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth.  Dick 
testified that at the time the crimes against Michelle were 
committed, he lived across the hall from Michelle’s apartment 
with Danial Williams.  Dick stated that on the night of 
Michelle’s death, he was present at Williams’ apartment with 
Williams and five other men, including Tice, Eric Wilson, 
Richard Pauley, Geoffrey Farris, and John Danser. 
Dick testified that during a group conversation, he heard 
Williams state that he would like to see Michelle’s “panties.”  
After further discussion, the seven men knocked on Michelle’s 
apartment door, but Michelle directed them to leave. 
 
Dick testified that the men walked to a parking lot where 
Ballard, a man Dick did not know, joined the group.  According 
to Dick, the men, including Ballard, returned to Michelle’s 
 
5
apartment and knocked on the door again.  Michelle opened the 
door, and the eight men forced their way into the apartment 
and carried Michelle to the bedroom.  Dick testified that each 
man assisted in restraining Michelle, and that all the men, 
including Tice, had forcible sexual intercourse with her. 
 
Dick further testified that each man, including Tice, 
took turns stabbing Michelle with a knife obtained from her 
kitchen.  After the men left Michelle’s apartment, they “made 
a pact not to say anything” about the crimes and not to “turn 
each other in.”  Dick stated that he entered into this “pact” 
because he was afraid of Ballard. 
 
Dick acknowledged in his testimony that he originally was 
charged with capital murder and that as a result of his plea 
agreement, he had been convicted of first-degree murder.  In 
the plea agreement, Dick promised to cooperate in the police 
investigation and to testify truthfully against all others 
charged with the crimes. 
 
Dick testified that he gave an initial account to the 
police that contained some false statements but, that after 
further police questioning, he admitted being present with 
Williams when Williams raped Michelle.  In a second 
conversation with the police, Dick told the police that he 
also had raped Michelle.  Dick testified that he informed the 
police that he, Williams, and Eric Wilson had committed the 
 
6
crimes.  Dick admitted in his testimony, however, that he had 
lied to the police in that second interview about other 
details of the crimes. 
Dick further testified that in a third conversation with 
the police, he related that there were six men who each raped 
and stabbed Michelle but that he did not know all their names.  
Dick additionally stated that he had identified Tice as one of 
the perpetrators based on a photograph shown from a Navy 
yearbook, and that he had met Tice only once before the night 
of Michelle’s death. 
Dick admitted in his testimony that during this third 
police interview, he again provided inaccurate details of the 
crime to the police.  Also, Dick admitted that he had written 
a letter to a member of the media in which he denied 
involvement in the crimes and claimed that he was pressured by 
the police to confess.  Dick explained that he had written the 
letter containing those false statements in an attempt to 
generate media attention and to help his own case. 
 
Detective Robert G. Ford testified that after Dick 
identified Tice as one of the perpetrators, the police 
arrested Tice in Florida.  Ford stated that when Tice arrived 
at the police station in Norfolk, Ford advised Tice of his 
Miranda rights, and that Tice waived these rights and 
indicated that he wanted to speak with the police.   
 
7
Ford further testified that Tice initially denied 
participating in the crimes but acknowledged that he knew 
Williams and was aware that Williams had been arrested.  Ford 
stated that he and Detective Brian Wray continued to question 
Tice, who eventually began crying and relating details of the 
crimes.  At this time, Tice stated that he, Williams, Wilson, 
Dick, Farris, and another man whose name Tice did not know, 
all participated in the crimes.  Tice ultimately advised Ford 
that Pauley also participated in the crimes, and stated that 
each of the men raped Michelle and stabbed her with a knife 
obtained from the kitchen.  Tice added that Williams desired 
to rape Michelle first because she was Williams’ “trophy.” 
Ford made a tape recording of Tice’s statement, and a 
transcript of that statement was admitted into evidence.  In 
the recorded statement, Tice explained that before the murder, 
all the men agreed to participate in raping and murdering 
Michelle so that each would be culpable for the crimes. 
 
Ballard was served with a subpoena to appear at Tice’s 
trial but refused to testify.  However, Detective David M. 
Peterson testified regarding the contents of three statements 
that Ballard made to the police. 
 
Peterson testified that after he learned that Ballard’s 
DNA sample “matched” the DNA samples found in Michelle’s 
apartment, Peterson interviewed Ballard, who was incarcerated 
 
8
for another crime.  Ballard claimed that he was alone with 
Michelle in her apartment on the night in question and that, 
after they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, something 
in Ballard “ticked” causing him to obtain a knife from the 
kitchen and stab Michelle.  Ballard also told Peterson that 
Michelle had informed him that Williams was “stalking her.”  
Peterson testified that when he interviewed Ballard a 
second time, Ballard admitted that he had raped Michelle, and 
that he had choked and stabbed her.  Ballard further admitted 
writing a letter (the Ballard letter) to a friend stating that 
he had murdered Michelle.  When Tice’s counsel asked that the 
Ballard letter be admitted into evidence, the circuit court 
sustained the Commonwealth’s objection. 
Peterson also testified that he spoke with Ballard a 
third time, after Ballard pleaded guilty to the rape and 
murder of Michelle.  At that time, Ballard admitted being 
present at Michelle’s apartment complex on the date of her 
death and hearing a group of four men, including Williams, 
discussing an attempt to enter Michelle’s apartment.  Ballard 
stated that he helped the men enter Michelle’s apartment and 
that, after entering, they all raped and stabbed Michelle. 
Tamika Taylor testified that Michelle was her closest 
friend and that on nights when Michelle’s husband was away 
from home, Taylor and Michelle usually stayed together in 
 
9
Michelle’s apartment.  Taylor related that Williams 
“constantly” knocked on Michelle’s door when Michelle’s 
husband was not at home and asked to use Michelle’s telephone.  
Taylor stated that Williams also would often “peep” through 
his window in an apparent attempt to observe Michelle walking 
in the hallway. 
Taylor testified that she spent the night at Michelle’s 
apartment the night before Michelle’s death and left about 
7:00 a.m.  At that time, Ballard, a friend who often visited 
Michelle and Taylor early in the morning, was still present in 
Michelle’s apartment. 
III. HABEAS HEARING 
 
At the habeas hearing, Tice presented evidence concerning 
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Tice 
testified that when the police first interrogated him, prior 
to his confession, he told Detective Randy Crank that “[he 
didn’t] want to talk anymore. . . but [he] might after [he] 
talked to a lawyer.”  Tice stated that the police then left 
him alone for a few minutes, until two detectives entered the 
room and accused him of committing the crimes. 
 
Tice confirmed that he eventually confessed to the police 
that he had participated in the crimes.  However, Tice also 
maintained at the habeas hearing that he was not involved in 
the crimes committed against Michelle.  Tice further testified 
 
10
that he did not recall discussing with his trial counsel any 
statement he made during the police interrogation regarding 
his desire to remain silent. 
 
Detective Crank stated that during Tice’s first interview 
with the police, Crank advised Tice of his Miranda rights and 
administered a polygraph test to him.  Crank testified that at 
the conclusion of the polygraph test, Tice made a statement 
that Crank entered in his notes, which were admitted into 
evidence at the habeas hearing.  Crank’s notes reflected the 
following exchange: 
[Tice] told me [that Tice] decide[d] not to say any more; 
that [Tice] might decide to after he talks with a lawyer, 
or spends some time alone thinking about it.  I told 
[Tice that] he would be given time to think about it.  
[Tice] did not request a lawyer. (Emphasis in original.) 
 
Detective Ford testified that Crank did not inform Ford 
of this particular statement that Tice made.  When Tice 
returned to the interrogation room, Ford told Tice that he had 
failed the polygraph test.  Ford resumed the interrogation, 
and Tice eventually confessed his involvement in the crimes. 
James O. Broccoletti, one of Tice’s trial counsel, 
testified concerning his representation of Tice, which began 
more than six years before the habeas hearing.  Broccoletti 
stated that he discussed with Tice whether Tice had invoked 
his Miranda rights but could not recall the details of that 
conversation.  However, Broccoletti remembered that Tice did 
 
11
not say that he had invoked his right to remain silent during 
the police interrogation.   
Broccoletti acknowledged that he had received a copy of 
Crank’s notes before Tice’s trial and had reviewed every 
statement Tice made to the police.  Broccoletti testified that 
Crank’s notes “may have generated” a motion to suppress and 
that, although he could not offer an explanation, there must 
have been a reason that Broccoletti did not file such a 
motion.   
Broccoletti also testified that he attempted to have the 
Ballard letter admitted into evidence at Tice’s trial because 
Ballard had referenced the letter in his statement to police.  
Broccoletti explained that he had assumed that Detective 
Peterson could identify Ballard’s handwriting for purposes of 
having the letter admitted into evidence.   
Jeffrey R. Russell, also trial counsel for Tice, 
testified that trial counsel met with Tice many times and had 
several conversations with Tice on “every conceivable topic.”  
Russell stated that he was “confident” that Tice had not 
informed trial counsel that he had invoked his Miranda rights 
during the police interrogation. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The Commonwealth argues that the habeas court erred in 
concluding that Tice received ineffective assistance of 
 
12
counsel and was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file 
a motion to suppress Tice’s confession.  The Commonwealth 
contends that trial counsel reasonably could have declined to 
file a motion to suppress because Tice’s invocation of the 
right to remain silent was conditional and, thus, did not 
constitute an unambiguous request to remain silent.  The 
Commonwealth further argues that Tice was not prejudiced by 
his counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the 
confession because such motion would have been denied. 
In response, Tice argues that the habeas court correctly 
determined that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing 
to file a motion to suppress his confession because he 
unambiguously had invoked his right to remain silent.  Tice 
also contends that the habeas court properly concluded under 
the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), that he suffered prejudice as a result of his 
counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion.  Tice asserts 
that his defense was prejudiced because the jury likely 
accorded his confession great weight and Dick’s testimony was 
subjected to “damaging” cross-examination by Tice’s counsel. 
In deciding this issue, we apply well-established 
principles of law.  A defendant’s right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment includes the right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); Roe v. 
 
13
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-77 (2000); Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 685-86; Lewis v. Warden, 274 Va. 93, 111, 645 S.E.2d 
492, 502 (2007); West v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 273 
Va. 56, 62, 639 S.E.2d 190, 194 (2007).  Under this guarantee, 
a defendant is entitled to counsel who is reasonably competent 
and who gives advice that is within the range of competence 
required of attorneys in criminal cases.  Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 521-23 (2003); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 
365, 384 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Lewis, 274 Va. 
at 111-12, 645 S.E.2d at 502-03; West, 273 Va. at 62, 639 
S.E.2d at 194. 
The issue whether trial counsel provided effective 
assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Lewis, 274 Va. at 112, 645 S.E.2d 
at 503; Yarbrough v. Warden, 269 Va. 184, 195-96, 609 S.E.2d 
30, 36 (2005).  A circuit court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law “are not binding upon this Court, but are 
subject to review to determine whether the circuit court 
correctly applied the law to the facts.”  Curo v. Becker, 254 
Va. 486, 489, 493 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1997); see also Green v. 
Warden, 264 Va. 604, 608-09, 571 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2002). 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a petitioner must ordinarily satisfy both parts of 
the two-part test set forth in Strickland.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. 
 
14
at 521; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000); 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Lewis, 274 Va. at 112, 645 S.E.2d 
at 503; West, 273 Va. at 62, 639 S.E.2d at 194.  The 
petitioner first must show that “counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687-88; accord Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521; Williams, 
529 U.S. at 390-91; Lewis, 274 Va. at 112, 645 S.E.2d at 503; 
West, 273 Va. at 62, 639 S.E.2d at 194.  In making this 
determination, the court considering the habeas corpus 
petition “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; accord Kimmelman, 
477 U.S. at 381; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185-86 
(1986); Lewis, 274 Va. at 112, 645 S.E.2d at 503; West, 273 
Va. at 62, 639 S.E.2d at 194; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 196, 609 
S.E.2d at 37. 
If counsel’s performance is found to have been deficient 
under the first part of the Strickland test, to obtain relief 
the petitioner must also show that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694; accord Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Williams, 529 U.S. at 
 
15
390-91; Lewis, 274 Va. at 113, 645 S.E.2d at 503-04; 
Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 37-38; Lovitt v. 
Warden, 266 Va. 216, 250, 585 S.E.2d 801, 821 (2003). 
When, as in the present case, the principal allegation of 
ineffectiveness is trial counsel’s failure to litigate 
competently a constitutional claim, a habeas petitioner first 
must prove that the constitutional claim is meritorious.  See 
Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375.  The habeas petitioner secondly 
must establish that there is a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different had the fact finder not 
considered the excludable evidence.  Id.; see Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. 
A reviewing court, however, is not required to determine 
whether “counsel’s performance was deficient before examining 
the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the 
alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course 
should be followed.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also 
Lewis, 274 Va. at 113, 645 S.E.2d at 504; Yarbrough, 269 Va. 
at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 38; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 250, 585 S.E.2d 
at 821. 
In addressing Tice’s claim, as directed by the Supreme 
Court in Strickland, we move directly to consider the second 
 
16
prong of the Strickland test, namely, the issue whether Tice 
suffered prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome of the proceedings as a result of the admission of his 
confession at trial.  We resolve this issue by reviewing the 
remaining trial evidence, in the absence of Tice’s confession, 
under the Strickland standard. 
Upon this review, we note that Dick admitted at trial 
that he had not told the truth to the police regarding several 
details of the crimes.  Those details included the room in 
which the crimes occurred, the question whether Michelle 
performed oral sodomy on Tice and Williams, and the issue 
whether Michelle had gained control of the knife and 
threatened Williams.  However, despite these and other 
inaccuracies in his earlier statements to the police, Dick was 
consistent in his sworn testimony implicating himself and Tice 
in the rapes and murder of Michelle, and did not change or 
retract any aspect of that testimony on cross-examination by 
Tice’s trial counsel. 
We also observe that Tice’s counsel failed to present any 
evidence showing that Dick had a motive to fabricate his 
testimony concerning Tice’s role in the crimes.  When Dick 
gave his testimony at Tice’s trial, Dick was serving two 
sentences of life imprisonment for his crimes against Michelle 
 
17
and was not subject to any additional penalties for those 
crimes.   
Dick’s testimony further revealed that he had seen Tice 
on only one occasion prior to Michelle’s murder, and had 
identified Tice from a photograph that appeared among many 
other photographs in a Navy yearbook.  This evidence 
established that Dick and Tice did not have a prior 
relationship that could support a charge that Dick disliked 
Tice or was otherwise biased against him.  Thus, this evidence 
additionally supported the credibility of Dick’s testimony 
about Tice’s participation in the crimes. 
Tice’s defense at trial was based on the theory that 
Ballard alone committed the offenses against Michelle.  Tamika 
Taylor’s testimony undermined this theory.  Her testimony 
revealed that Williams had an apparent obsession with 
Michelle, providing a link to the crimes perpetrated by the 
group that included Williams, Tice, and Dick.  This testimony 
also was consistent with Dick’s testimony that Williams wanted 
to “go over and see Michelle’s panties.”   
Taylor’s testimony also established that Ballard and 
Michelle were friends, and that Ballard frequently visited 
Michelle in her apartment.  This testimony helped explain 
Ballard’s statement to Detective Peterson that Michelle opened 
 
18
her apartment door to the group that included Ballard, when 
she earlier had refused entry to the original group.  
In addition to the above testimony, the jury also 
received evidence concerning DNA samples recovered from 
Michelle’s body and from a blanket found on the bed at the 
crime scene.  Forensic scientists Robert Scanlon and Jerry 
Sellers both testified that intercourse can occur during a 
rape without DNA material being deposited in a victim’s 
vagina, provided that the perpetrator did not ejaculate.  
Scanlon further explained a perpetrator would not usually 
leave epithelial cells containing DNA as a result of sexual 
intercourse and stated that, thus, “if there is no 
ejaculation, typically I don’t expect to detect anything.”  
This expert testimony, therefore, provided an explanation with 
regard to how several men could have raped Michelle with only 
one man, Ballard, having deposited bodily fluids from which 
DNA samples could be extracted. 
 
We also observe that Tice presented evidence showing that 
John Danser and Richard Pauley, who were part of the group 
that Dick implicated in committing these crimes, had produced 
alibi evidence concerning their activities on the night 
Michelle was murdered.  This evidence, however, did not relate 
to Tice’s activities on the date of the offense and, 
 
19
therefore, was of questionable relevance to the issue whether 
Tice participated in committing the crimes against Michelle. 
 
With these considerations in mind, and having reviewed 
all the evidence presented at Tice’s criminal trial with the 
exception of his confession, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred in holding that Tice satisfied his evidentiary 
burden under Strickland.  We hold, as a matter of law, that 
Tice failed to meet his burden of proving the prejudice prong 
of Strickland, namely, that there was a reasonable probability 
of a different result at his criminal trial if the jury had 
not considered his confession.  See 466 U.S. at 694; see also 
Lewis, 274 Va. at 117, 645 S.E.2d at 506; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 
257, 585 S.E.2d at 825-26.  In short, the record before us 
does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
proceedings.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Wiggins, 539 
U.S. at 534; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 257, 585 S.E.2d at 826. 
 
Our conclusion that the circuit court erred in awarding 
Tice a writ of habeas corpus is not altered upon our 
consideration of Tice’s assignment of cross-error.  In this 
assignment, Tice contends that he suffered prejudice resulting 
from his trial counsel’s failure to have the Ballard letter 
admitted into evidence. 
The Ballard letter contained the following statement: 
“Remember that night [I] went to Mommie’s house and the next 
 
20
morning Michelle got killed guess who did that, Me HA, HA.” 
(Emphasis in original.)  Although this representation 
constituted an admission by Ballard that he murdered Michelle, 
that writing notably is silent regarding the question whether 
Ballard acted alone in killing Michelle. 
Again, as directed by Strickland, we directly consider 
the question whether the exclusion of the Ballard letter from 
evidence prejudiced Tice’s defense.  We conclude that 
Ballard’s admission in the letter that he murdered Michelle 
would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of 
Ballard’s commission of the crimes.  Although Ballard refused 
to testify at Tice’s trial, Ballard’s statements to Detective 
Peterson that were admitted into evidence contained an 
admission that Ballard wrote a letter to a friend stating that 
he had killed Michelle.  In addition, the jury heard testimony 
from Detective Peterson that Ballard made three other 
admissions that he had murdered Michelle, and also admitted 
twice that he had raped her.  Therefore, we hold that the 
exclusion of this cumulative evidence did not constitute 
prejudice under the Strickland standard.  See Snow v. Sirmons, 
474 F.3d 693, 729 (10th Cir. 2007); Huffington v. Nuth, 140 
F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 1998); Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327, 
1333 (4th Cir. 1995).  Accordingly, the circuit court did not 
 
21
err in holding that Tice failed to establish prejudice 
regarding this allegation in his petition. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
determination that the exclusion of the Ballard letter did not 
prejudice Tice, we will reverse the circuit court’s award of a 
writ of habeas corpus on the claim that Tice’s counsel were 
ineffective in failing to move to suppress his confession, 
thereby prejudicing Tice, and we will enter final judgment 
dismissing Tice’s petition.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Affirmed in part, 
    reversed in part, 
 
 
petition dismissed. 
                     
2 Based on our holding, we do not address the 
Commonwealth’s additional assignment of error that the habeas 
court applied an incorrect legal standard in considering the 
issue whether trial counsel’s failure to file a suppression 
motion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.