Title: State v. James
Citation: 169 So. 2d 89, 246 La. 1033
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 1964

169 So. 2d 89 (1964) 246 La. 1033 STATE of Louisiana v. Otis JAMES. No. 46857. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 8, 1964. Dissenting Opinion June 11, 1964. On Rehearing November 9, 1964. Rehearing Denied December 14, 1964. *91 G. W. Gill, Sr., and George M. Leppert, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. SANDERS, Justice. This is a criminal proceeding. The state charged that the defendant, Otis James, had unlawfully possessed one morphine tablet, a narcotic drug. He was tried and convicted. The court sentenced him, as a second offender, to a total of ten years in the state penitentiary. He has appealed, relying upon twenty-nine bills of exception reserved in the trial court. Initially, the defendant filed a motion to quash the Bill of Information on the ground that LSA-R.S. 40:961 et seq., the Uniform Narcotic Act, is unconstitutional. To the overruling of the Motion to Quash, the defendant reserved Bill of Exception No. 1. In support of the motion, the defendant asserts that LSA-R.S. 15:85 does not authorize *92 bail pending appeal for an offender who has received a sentence of five years or more in a felony case. Under LSA-R.S. 40:981, the minimum sentence for the illegal possession of narcotics is five years. Hence, such a narcotic offender is denied bail pending appeal. The denial of bail, the defendant contends, is tantamount to harsh, cruel, and unusual punishment prohibited by the federal and state constitutions and renders the Uniform Narcotic Act unconstitutional. The defendant also contends that the statute is unconstitutional on the additional ground that it makes narcotic addiction a criminal offense. He relies upon Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758, in which the United States Supreme Court struck down the addiction provisions of the California statute. The denial of bail pending appeal to a narcotic offender based upon the length of his sentence does not constitute either cruel or unusual punishment.[1] The restriction of such bail to felony offenders receiving a sentence of less than five years is a reasonable expression of legislative policy. The defendant, in our opinion, has no standing to attack the constitutionality of the addiction provisions of the Narcotic Law. Since he has not been charged with addiction, he is not adversely affected by those provisions.[2] The attack upon the constitutionality of the Uniform Narcotic Act must fail. We find no merit in Bill of Exception No. 1. Bill of Exception No. 2 has given us serious concern. It was reserved to the overruling by the trial judge of a motion to suppress the demonstrative evidencea morphine tablet and narcotics equipment alleged to have been unlawfully seized by the police in the defendant's residence without a search warrant.[3] The evidence discloses that on June 19, 1961, about 11:15 a. m., Officers Duffy and Warner of the New Orleans Police Department parked their unmarked automobile on Camp Street to watch the James' residence at 2013 Camp Street. The officers knew that the defendant was a narcotic addict because of a previous arrest. Shortly after the surveillance began, James left his residence and walked along Camp Street toward its intersection with Jackson Avenue. The officers followed him in their car. When he reached the intersection, he turned left on Jackson Avenue, at which time the officers lost sight of him. When the police reached the intersection, they saw James in the front seat of an automobile, driven by another man. The vehicle was leaving the curb. It crossed Jackson Avenue in a Uturn. Intending to question James and his companion, the officers forced the automobile to the curb. As Officer Duffy stepped from the police car, James stuffed a piece of cellophane, containing what appeared to be a white tablet, in his mouth and jumped from the automobile. He had some paper currency in his hand. Officer Duffy shouted, "Police! Stop!" But, James ran. The officers caught and subdued him. Apparently, he had swallowed the cellophane. The officers picked up approximately $50.00 in currency, scattered on the ground. Meanwhile, the driver of the automobile had driven away in the confusion. He was not apprehended. Having informed James that he was under arrest, the officers drove him to his residence about two blocks away. Although *93 James stated that the front door was open, they found it locked. The officers heard a sound inside the house as if someone were running. They broke open the door and entered the house. They found the defendant's wife in the bathroom. They called for assistance to make a search of the house. Four other officers aided them in searching the small, "shotgun" house, occupied by the defendant and his wife. The officers made an intensive search of both the house and yard. They examined the cabinets, shelves, and furniture. One officer found a morphine tablet in a chest of drawers. Another officer found an eyedropper and a pacifier (narcotic equipment) in a kitchen cabinet. James admitted the ownership of the narcotic equipment, but denied that the morphine tablet was his. He suggested that the tablet had been placed in the chest by his brother, who had been committed to the penitentiary. The defendant asserts that the morphine tablet and equipment were the products of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the LSA-Constitution. Hence, he contends that the evidence is inadmissible in this criminal prosecution under the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides: Article I, Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution contains language similar to that of the Fourth Amendment.[4] The purpose of this historic provision is the protection of the right of privacy of the people in their homes and effects. It prohibits the arbitrary intrusion of the police into houses for unreasonable searches and seizures. As a general rule, a search is unreasonable if it is not conducted under the authority of a search warrant. However, the rule is subject to the important exception that a search may be reasonably made as an incident of a lawful arrest. In the present case, the police officers concede that they had no search warrant authorizing them to search the defendant's home. Hence, to justify the forcible intrusion into his residence, it must be established that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Presented to us for resolution are two questions: Was the arrest lawful? If so, was the search of defendant's residence incidental to it? We shall resolve these questions in the light of the following pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. California:[5] LSA-R.S. 15:60, the statutory authority for arrest without a warrant in this state, provides: The state asserts that, at the time the officers arrested James, they had reasonable cause to believe that he was committing the offense of unlawful possession of narcotics, a felony. Reasonable cause to make an arrest without a warrant exists when the facts within the knowledge of the arresting officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a felony has been or is being committed.[6] The evidence discloses that the police officers knew the defendant was a drug addict from their prior contact with him. When the officers approached the automobile in which the defendant was seated, he quickly stuffed what appeared to be a white tablet in his mouth, jumped out of the automobile, holding paper currency, and ran, ignoring the call, "Police! Stop!" From these facts, in our opinion, the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant unlawfully possessed narcotics. Hence, the officers had the authority to arrest him without a warrant. We conclude that the arrest was lawful. More difficult is the question of whether the search of the residence two blocks from the arrest site is within the bounds of a search incident to the arrest. The doctrine that a search without a warrant may be legally conducted if incident to a lawful arrest has long been recognized. It infringes no constitutional rights.[7] Such a search may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of the one arrested to the place or premises where the arrest is made.[8] The space boundaries of a search incident to an arrest have not been specifically defined. Doubtless, they depend, to some extent, upon the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Generally, for fixed premises to fall within the bounds of a search incident to an arrest, the arrest must take place on the premises. This rule applies with special *95 force to a private residence because of the strong policy of the law favoring the privacy and sanctity of the home.[9] We are of the view that a private residence wholly unconnected to the place where the arrest is made lies beyond the ambit of a search incident to the arrest.[10] The state concedes that the residence searched was two blocks from the point of arrest. It argues, however, that the residence was within the bounds of incidental search because the defendant left the residence shortly before his arrest. We do not agree with this argument. The occasion for the arrest arose on the street two blocks from the residence, and the arrest was completed there. To adopt a search rule broad enough to embrace the residence in the instant case would largely dispense with the requirement of search warrants after an arrest has been made. The protection of the people in the security of their homes would be seriously impaired. The state has cited several decisions of the lower federal courts in its endeavor to sustain the present search. We have reviewed these cases. Based, as they are, upon diverse circumstances, we find nothing in them to alter our view that the search was outside legal bounds. Since the disputed items were obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure, they are not admissible in evidence in this criminal prosecution. Mapp v. Ohio, supra. The inadmissible evidence constituted an important part of the evidence produced at the trial. We are of the opinion that its introduction requires this court to order a new trial. LSA-R.S. 15:557. We need not consider the remaining Bills of Exception. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. HAMITER, J., dissents, being of the opinion that the assailed search was legally made following and as an incident to the lawful arrest. SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons. HAMLIN, J., dissents being of the view that the residence was within the bounds of incidental search in connection with the lawful arrest. See, State v. Aias, 243 La. 945, 149 So. 2d 400; State v. Pickens, 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577. SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting). My view is in conflict with that of the majority on the question of whether the search of the residence in this case was incident to the arrest and was reasonable. The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must be the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest, since the officers had no search warrant. I agree with the majority that the arrest was lawful. I cannot agree, however, that the defendant's constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated. For the search to be reasonable it must be an incident of the arrest which we have found to be lawful. In our consideration we are warranted in examining the facts surrounding the arrest to determine whether the method of entering the house two blocks away may offend the constitutional standards of reasonableness. U.S.Const. amends. IV &amp; V; La.Const. of 1921, art. 1, § 7; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). The information within the knowledge of the officers at the time they arrested James clearly furnished grounds for a reasonable belief on their part that the accused had committed and was committing the offense of illegal possession of narcotics. James *96 was convicted of possession of narcotics in 1954. He had often been "handled" by the New Orleans Police in connection with narcotics. Just a week before, Officer Duffy had arrested James and his wife for possession of narcotics and had discovered a morphine pill in the car the couple was using. In other words, the arresting officers knew that James was a drug addict. Furthermore, before the arrest, Officers Duffy and Warner, knowing that James used narcotics, began a surveillance of his house. They saw James come out of his residence, walk a block or two and turn a corner. When they confronted him sitting in a car with a colored man, he recognized them and shoved a piece of cellophane, which appeared to contain a white tablet, into his mouth, jumped out of the car with a lot of bills clutched in his hand, and began to run. It was reasonable for the arresting officers to assume that James had been in the process of selling narcotics to the colored man in whose car he was sitting when he was interrupted by the untimely appearance of the police officers. The logical conclusion for the officers to reach, under these circumstances, was that there were narcotics in the house from which James had just emerged, two blocks away, apparently to make a sale to the colored man in the car. Thisit seems clear to meconstitutes one transaction, making the search of that same house, which ensued immediately thereafter, an incident to the arrest. State v. Green, 244 La. 80, 150 So. 2d 571 (1963); State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417 (1963); State v. Aias, 243 La. 945, 946, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963). One of the historical reasons for permitting a search following a legal arrest is to avoid destruction of evidence. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409 (1925). This authority is appropriate here. The colored man who was with James in the car when the police approached managed to escape while the police officers were chasing and subduing James. James was able to consume and thus destroy whatever narcotics he had on him when the officers closed in. The reasonable place for the officers to search under these circumstances was the house from which James had just emerged, a scant two blocks away. No appreciable interval of time or space separated the arrest and search; both were intimately connected parts of a continuous transaction. Certainly, if James had managed to outrun the police officers long enough to reach his home two blocks away, and had been caught and arrested by the pursuing officers as he entered his dwelling, there would be no question about the constitutionality of the search. It would seem an affront to common sense to say that the officers could not search James' home from which he had emerged shortly before simply because they caught and arrested him two blocks away. Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Circ. 1932). James' house was in such reasonably close proximity to the place of arrest, and the arrest was in such close proximity in time to his leaving the house, and the search was in such close proximity in time to the arrest, and there existed such probable cause to believe that a search of his home would reveal evidence pertinent to the arrest for possession of narcotics, that the search and seizure herein must be viewed as incident to the arrest and therefore authorized. State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952). The private residence here was not "wholly unconnected to the place where the arrest is made" as the majority finds. Rather, I find a very close, a very real and a very obvious connection with the cause of the arrest. The practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement by the states are not reprobated by the Federal and State Constitutions. The majority decision places another unwarranted legal impediment in the path of already heavily burdened law enforcement. Cf. State v. Pickens, 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577 (1964); *97 State v. Aias, 243 La. 945, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963). I respectfully dissent. HAMLIN, Justice. A rehearing was granted in this matter in order that we might reconsider our finding with respect to Bill of Exceptions No. 2. On original hearing, this Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the defendant for the crime of wilfully and unlawfully possessing and having under his control a narcotic drug, to-wit, one morphine tablet, a crime prohibited by LSA-R.S. 40:962; the matter was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. The majority opinion[1] held that the trial court was in error in overruling defendant's motion to suppress demonstrative evidence (a morphine tablet and equipment), which alleges that all of the evidence in the possession of the State in this case was seized contrary to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, depriving defendant of equal protection of the law. This Court on original hearing held that the disputed items were obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure and were inadmissible in evidence in the instant criminal prosecution. Bill of Exceptions No. 2, taken to the overruling of the motion to suppress, was considered in the light of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726. A reconsideration of Bill of Exceptions No. 2 constrains us to conclude that it is without merit; because of our finding, we feel that it is necessary to quote the pertinent facts associated with the bill as stated on original hearing: The State, on whose application this rehearing was granted, contends that the statement, "To adopt a search rule broad enough to embrace the residence in the instant case would largely dispense with the requirement of search warrants after an arrest has been made. The protection of the people in the security of their homes would be seriously impaired", is unrealistic. It argues that the search of James' residence was a reasonable one incident to a lawful arrest, and that the evidence seized as a result of such search is legally admissible in evidence. On original hearing, we properly found that the arresting officers had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant unlawfully possessed narcotics, and that, therefore, they had authority to arrest him without a warrant. We concluded that the arrest was lawful. (The defendant did not apply for a rehearing.) Since the arrest was lawful, we have posed for our determination the question of whether the search and seizure were reasonable and incidental to arrest and were within the bounds of incidental arrest. We shall approach our determination in the light of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, which held that the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy is enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. In reviewing the evidence adduced herein in connection with Bill of Exceptions No. 2, we find that the arresting officers had the defendant's home under surveillance immediately prior to his arrest. They had reason to believe that the defendant was committing the crime of possessing narcotics; one of the arresting officers, Officer Thomas Duffy, had arrested him for the possession of narcotics eight days prior to the instant arrest; also, he had been convicted in 1954 for possession of narcotics. In the instant case, the defendant left his home, travelled two blocks and met an apparent acquaintance; he sat in the car with the acquaintance until the police arrived. The officers had grounds to suspect that there was a relation between defendant's house and his meeting with the man who escaped. Immediately prior to the arrest, defendant bit Officer William Warner's finger when he was endeavoring to retrieve from defendant's mouth what he thought was a morphine tablet wrapped in cellophane. The defendant swallowed cellophane and tablet; no test could be made of the contents of his stomach. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 *100 L. Ed. 183. Within minutes after a lawful arrest, the arresting officers and the defendant were back at the defendant's house, a distance of two blocks travelled by car.[4] Defendant did not object to the officers entering his home; Officer Warner asked him for the key and he told the officer that a key was not needed as the door was open. Officer Warner had to force the door open, Cf. LSA-R.S. 15:46, but no resistance was offered by James. Other officers were called to assist in the ensuing search which revealed the controverted evidence. We find no remoteness between the place of search and the place of arrest, nor between the time of arrest and the time of search and seizure. We find that there was a direct connection between the place of arrest and the place of search and seizure; such a substantial nexus between the arrest and the search and seizure existed, that they were a continuous transaction. People v. Aleria, 193 Cal. App. 2d 352, 14 Cal. Rptr. 162, Certiorari denied, 374 U.S. 832, 83 S. Ct. 1876, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1055. See, State v. Pickens, 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577. We find that the search and seizure were incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Aias, 243 La. 945, 149 So. 2d 400. The search and seizure under the facts of this prosecution were within the bounds of incidental arrest; they were substantially contemporaneous. Preston v. United States, supra, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S. Ct. 881, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777. The evidence seized was under the defendant's control and could have been offered in evidence. Harris v. United States of America, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399. Cf. State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668; Anno: Search Incident to Arrest, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1982. We find, as stated supra, that Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit. Our finding on original hearing with respect to this bill is now set aside. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3 and 14 shall be considered jointly. They were reserved to the trial judge's overruling certain objections advanced by counsel for the defendant to the State's opening statement. During the course of the opening statement, the assistant district attorney said: The objection to the above statement recites: Counsel for the defendant contended that under the circumstances of the opening statement, the defendant could not proceed to trial and receive a fair and impartial trial; counsel objected to testimony which enlarged or explained the opening statement. LSA-R.S. 15:333 sets forth the steps in a trial. It recites that the district attorney *102 shall give an opening statement which explains the nature of the charge and the evidence by which he expects to establish the same. LSA-R.S. 15:378 states: In State v. White, 244 La. 585, 153 So. 2d 401, this Court held: We have read the testimony of record attached to all bills of exceptions submitted for our consideration (all testimony of record is made part of Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3 and 14); we find that there is evidence which attempts to substantiate all declarations made by the assistant district attorney in his opening statement. State v. Augustine, 241 La. 761, 131 So. 2d 56, Certiorari denied, 368 U.S. 922, 82 S. Ct. 246, 7 L. Ed. 2d 137. There is also evidence of record showing that Officer Patrick Lampard testified to facts substantiating the opening statement. Officer William Warner testified at length with respect to his conversation with James at the time of the search and seizure concerning his use of narcotics; he also testified with respect to his observation of James' body. Under the facts and circumstances shown by the testimony and evidence of record, we do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in overruling the objections of counsel for the defendant to the opening statement of the assistant district attorney. The testimony of Officer Lampard fell within the ruling of State v. Di Vincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So. 2d 676; its purpose was to associate the defendant with the possession of narcotics. The testimony of Officer Warner also had for its purpose the connection of the defendant with the possession of narcotics. This testimony was neither compulsive nor self-incriminating. State v. Hughes, 244 La. 774, 154 So. 2d 395; State v. Robinson, 221 La. 19, 58 So. 2d 408. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3 and 14 are without merit. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 will be considered jointly; they all relate to the trial judge's refusal to give to the jury various special charges requested by counsel for the defendant. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 1, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 3, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was reserved to the trial judge's refusal to give Special Charge No. 4, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 7 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 5, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 6. This charge treats of the subject of arrest; because we have found on original hearing that the arrest herein was a legal arrest, we find no need for quoting the requested charge. Bill of Exceptions No. 9 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 7, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 8, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 11 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 9, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 12 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 10, which recites: Bill of Exceptions No. 13 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to give Special Charge No. 11, which recites: In State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So. 2d 12, 34, we explicitly stated: The trial judge states in several of his per curiams that counsel for the defendant did not request a written charge. Cf. LSA-R.S. 15:389; State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 552, 124 So. 2d 543. In his per curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. 5, the trial judge states that he delivered a stereotyped general charge, which was in writing. Apparently the general charge was not taken down and reduced to writing by the court reporter, as it is not in the record. The trial judge also states that he particularly covered the law with respect to "possession", "search and seizure", "arrest", and "flight" in his general charge. He felt that Special Charge No. 7 was argumentative and invaded the province of the jury. Special Charge No. 8, which requested the trial judge to instruct the jury as to certain enumerated verdicts which it could bring in, set forth one verdict which was not responsive, "Guilty of being an addict." State v. Robinson, 221 La. 19, 58 So. 2d 408. LSA-R.S. 15:390 provides that the trial judge must give every requested charge that is wholly correct and wholly pertinent, unless the matter contained in such charge had already been given, or unless such charge requires qualification, limitation or *106 explanation. The trial judge's per curiams to the bills being considered under this discussion informs us that his general charge covered all matters set forth in the requested special charges. We conclude that the trial judge was not required to give the requested special charges in view of the fact that he states that the matter contained therein was given in the general charge. State v. Bickham, 239 La. 1094, 121 So. 2d 207. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 15 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to the introduction in evidence of a piece of a rubber finger stall and an eye-dropper with a rubber pacifier secured to it with a rubber band; these objects were found by Officer Thomas Duffy in defendant's kitchen during the search following the arrest. This bill was also reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to certain testimony given by Officer Duffy concerning the interrogation of the defendant by Officer William Warner with respect to his use of narcotics. Bill of Exceptions No. 16 was reserved to the trial court's permitting Officer Thomas Duffy to testify with respect to his conversation with the defendant concerning the morphine tablet. Officer Duffy testified that the defendant told him that the tablet must have belonged to his brother Leslie who was in the penitentiary. Bill of Exceptions No. 17 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to the testimony of Officer Justin Favalora with respect to his conversation with the defendant concerning the morphine tablet. Officer Favalora stated: Bill of Exceptions No. 18 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to the testimony of Officer William Warner with respect to his conversation with the defendant concerning his use of narcotics. Bill of Exceptions No. 21 was reserved to the overruling of defendant's objection to the trial court's permitting Officer Dominick Verdi (called in by the arresting officers to assist in the search) to testify with respect to a search he had made of defendant's home eight days previous to the present search. The officer stated that at the time of the present search the house contained the same furniture as had been there when he made his previous search. Bill of Exceptions No. 22 was reserved when the trial court permitted Officer Raymond Comstock to testify with respect to a search he had made of defendant's house eight days prior to the present search. The officer testified that he had searched the same drawer in which the present morphine tablet was found and that at that time the drawer was devoid of narcotics. Defendant contended that the testimony adduced in connection with the bills being presently discussed was damaging and objectionable. *107 He also contended that the reputation of his whole family was brought before the jury by placing before it the question of previous raids. LSA-R.S. 15:441 provides: The physical evidence was properly introduced; its purpose was to connect the defendant with the equipment found in his home. State v. Gaines, 223 La. 711, 66 So. 2d 618. The testimony of Officers Duffy and Warner was admissible to show intent; it was relevant and material. It was corroborative of the alleged fact that defendant possessed a narcotic drug. State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 95 So. 2d 290; State v. Clark, 220 La. 946, 57 So. 2d 904. The testimony of the officers with respect to a previous search of the defendant's house and with respect to statements of the defendant to the effect that his brother Leslie was sending him to the penitentiary, was admissible to prove falsity. State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940, 37 So. 883. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in admitting the controverted evidence. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in admitting the testimony of Officers Duffy, Warner, Favalora, Verdi, and Comstock. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, 21 and 22 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 19 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to a certain question propounded by the court to Officer Warner. The facts associated with this bill are stated by the trial judge in his per curiam as follows: Counsel for the defendant contends that the court in asking the above question committed substantial error, and that the rights of the defendant were abused. Counsel argues that the contention of the court is in substance that a pacifier is a piece of narcotic paraphernalia, and that the question to the presiding officer was of character as to persuade the jury that only narcotic users would have such paraphernalia. We find that the trial judge was endeavoring to clarify the testimony adduced so that it would be intelligible; under such conditions, he had a right to interrogate Officer Warner in the manner above set out. State v. Coffil, 222 La. 487, 62 So. 2d 651; LSA-R.S. 15:384. The rights of the defendant were not prejudiced by the question propounded to Officer Warner; LSA-R.S. 15:557; the trial judge did not commit reversible error. Bill of Exceptions No. 19 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 20 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to certain testimony given by Officer Patrick Lampard with respect to an incoming telephone call to defendant's home during the time of search and seizure. We do not find that the testimony of Officer Lampard was hearsay testimony as contended by counsel for the defendant; it was relevant and was offered for the purpose of associating the defendant with the possession of narcotics. State v. Di Vincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So. 2d 676. Bill of Exceptions No. 20 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 23 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to the introduction in evidence of the objects seized at defendant's home at the time of the search and seizure. The trial judge states in his per curiam that, "In each instance same were properly identified, connected with the defendant and relevant to the issues in the case." In view of the trial judge's statement and our findings on Bill of Exceptions No. 2, there is no need for further discussion. Bill of Exceptions No. 23 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 24 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to grant counsel for the defendant a five minute recess at the time the State rested its case. The trial judge states in his per curiam that at the time the request was made counsel did not assign any reason for the request, nor did the court know of any reason justifying the same. *109 Counsel does not state in the instant bill his reasons for the request. "* * * it is well settled that a bill of exception must state the grounds of objection or point out specifically the errors complained of in order that an opportunity may be given the trial judge to correct them, and that, if it is not sufficiently specific, it will not avail the party raising it. * * *" State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So. 2d 333. Counsel states in brief that he was surprised by the testimony adduced from various witnesses concerning the addiction of the defendant; that he needed a few minutes to obtain information to properly proceed with his defense. In view of the facts associated with the taking of this bill, we do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion. We do not find that the defendant suffered any prejudice by the refusal of the trial judge to grant his counsel the five minute recess requested. LSA-R.S. 15:557. Bill of Exceptions No. 24 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 25 was reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to grant a mistrial. The trial judge's per curiam sets forth as follows the events associated with the motion for a mistrial: In view of the fact that the witness Herbert K. Dempsey stated that he did not know the defendant James to be a user of narcotics, we find that the defendant suffered no prejudice. LSA-R.S. 15:557; Cf. State v. Broussard, 202 La. 458, 12 So. 2d 218; State v. Scruggs, 165 La. 842, 116 So. 206. The trial judge was correct in overruling the motion for a mistrial. Bill of Exceptions No. 25 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 26 was reserved when the trial court overruled objections advanced by counsel for the defendant to certain testimony elicited from defendant's wife on cross-examination by the State. The testimony had to do with Mrs. James' appreciation of her husband's situation at the time of the search and seizure; it also concerned her conversation with her husband when he was incarcerated at the Sixth District Precinct. The formal bill gives no reasons for the objections advanced. No reasons were given for the objections at the time they were offered during trial. Under these circumstances, this bill presents nothing for our consideration. Bill of Exceptions No. 26 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 27 was reserved to the overruling of defendant's objection to the rebuttal testimony of Officer Justin Favalora. Counsel for the defendant contended at the time of the objection that the matter to which the witness was testifying had been gone into on cross-examination. Officer Favalora was rebutting the testimony of defendant's witness Herbert Dempsey as to the contents of the chest of drawers in which the morphine tablet was found. Rebuttal testimony is that which is given to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by an adverse party. LSA-R.S. 15:378-379; State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359. It was within the sound discretion of the trial judge to sustain or overrule counsel's objection. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's ruling admitting the testimony which was strictly for the purpose of rebuttal. Bill of Exceptions No. 27 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 28 was reserved to the trial court's overruling a motion to quash a bill of information filed against defendant as a multiple offender prior to sentence. After the jury had rendered its verdict and a motion for a new trial had been denied, the State filed a bill of information against the defendant under LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, in which it charged that he was a double offender and urged that he should be sentenced as such. The State alleged that on August 31, 1954 the defendant was arraigned and pleaded guilty to violating LSA-R.S. 40:962 relative to the possession of narcotics; he was then sentenced to serve five years in the State Penitentiary. In the instant matter the defendant was sentenced to serve a term of ten years in the State Penitentiary. Counsel for the defendant contended that there was no legal evidence upon which to predicate his conviction in the present prosecution, and that the statute under *111 which he was convicted, LSA-R.S. 40:962, was unconstitutional. On original hearing we disposed of Bill of Exceptions No. 1 (defendant did not ask for a rehearing) and ruled upon defendant's allegations with respect to the unconstitutionality of LSA-R.S. 40:962. Our rulings herein with respect to Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is dispositive of the defendant's contention with respect to the admissibility of the controverted evidence. Bill of Exceptions No. 28 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 29 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's motion for a new trial. A number of the averments set forth in the motion for a new trial have been passed upon in our disposition of the foregoing bills of exceptions. The following averment, however, presents a charge that has not heretofore been considered: The shortness of time spent by a jury in deliberating on a verdict is not a ground for granting a new trial. State v. Le Blanc, 116 La. 822, 41 So. 105; State v. Nahoum, 172 La. 83, 133 So. 370; State v. Terrell, 175 La. 758, 144 So. 488, Certiorari Denied, 288 U.S. 589, 53 S. Ct. 386, 77 L. Ed. 968. LSA-R.S. 15:470 provides: Under the provisions of the above statute, the trial judge was correct in not permitting the jurors to be interrogated with respect to their alleged acquisition of knowledge concerning the defendant's record. Bill of Exceptions No. 29 is without merit. For the reasons assigned, it is now ordered that the conviction and sentence of the defendant be affirmed. The right is granted to defendant to apply for a rehearing. FOURNET, C. J., dissents being of the opinion our opinion on original hearing is correct. McCALEB, J., dissents as to the ruling on Bill No. 2 being of the view that our original opinion is correct. SANDERS, J., dissents and will assign written reasons. *113 SANDERS, Justice (dissenting). We have before us a narcotic addict convicted of possessing a morphine tablet and sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary, as a multiple offender. Blighted as his life is, his personal cause evokes no ardent support. The constitutional question that he raises, however, is of grave import to all citizens. At issue is the security of the home. The essential facts may be restated briefly: The defendant, James, left his home at 2013 Camp Street on the morning of June 19, 1961. Two officers of the New Orleans Police Department followed him. At that time, they intended only to observe his movements. They had no cause to arrest him. The officers lost sight of him after he turned on Jackson Avenue. When they again saw him, he was in a moving automobile with another man. Intending to question him, they forced the automobile to the curb. When he swallowed what appeared to be a white tablet and ran, the officers arrested him. The point of arrest was more than two blocks from and out of sight of the James' home. The officers returned him to his home, broke in the front door, and entered without a search warrant. Six officers intensively searched the house and its contents for several hours. During the wall-to-wall rummage, they found, in a chest of drawers, the morphine tablet on which this prosecution is based. For impelling reasons, perhaps too briefly stated in the original opinion, I hold that the intrusion into the James' home without a search warrant violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions. The Fourth Amendment[1] and the specific mandate of the Louisiana Constitution[2] guarantee immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures by the police. The right protected is that of privacy, which has been described as "one of the unique values of our civilization."[3] The keystone of protection is the search warrant, which requires judicial endorsement of the need to invade private premises. In Mapp v. Ohio,[4] the Supreme Court of the United States held that evidence obtained by unlawful searches and seizures was inadmissible in state criminal prosecutions. The Mapp decision established no uniform code of search and seizure for the states. Hence, the state rules of search and seizure need not be identical with those followed in the federal courts. A state, however, cannot fall below the standard of the Fourth Amendment in fashioning these rules. The constitutional standard of reasonableness is the same in federal and state courts.[5] As early as 1914, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of law enforcement officers to search the person arrested.[6] Such a right arises from the necessity of protecting the arresting officers, preventing the escape of the prisoner, and safeguarding the fruits and implements of the crime. The practice may have been a surviving incident of the ancient hue and *114 cry in Anglo-Saxon law.[7] The expansion of this doctrine from a search of the person arrested to a search of the person and the place of arrest can be traced in the decisions.[8] The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have limited the incidental search of a private residence to those instances in which the arrest is made on the premises. In Weeks v. United States,[9] the Court condemned a search of the defendant's room without a warrant after he was arrested at his place of employment. Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States[10] likewise condemned a search of the defendant's office after his arrest at home. In Agnello v. United States,[11] the officers arrested the defendant, Frank Agnello, in the residence of a co-defendant for a sale of narcotics there and searched Agnello's residence "several"[12] blocks away, from which he had emerged shortly before the narcotics sale and arrest. The Court rejected the government's contention that the search was incidental to the arrest because the building was in the immediate vicinity and formed part of the scene of the crime, stating: The Court adheres to its position in the Agnello case, having cited it with approval in its two recent decisions on search and seizure. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 and Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S. Ct. 881, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777. The best reasoned decisions of the lower federal courts sustain the view that a search of a private dwelling without a search warrant, following an arrest away from the premises, violates constitutional guarantees. In Page v. United States, 282 F.2d 807, the officers arrested the defendant in front of his dwelling house after he emerged from it and started to enter a taxicab. They then searched the house and found a sawed-off shotgun, which gave rise to the prosecution. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the search was outside the bounds of an incidental search. In Papani v. United States, 9 Cir., 84 F.2d 160, a government investigator had a private residence under surveillance. The subject left the residence with untaxed alcohol in his automobile. He was followed and arrested at a considerable distance from the *115 residence. The officers then returned to the residence and searched it. In holding the search unlawful, the Court stated: In Drayton v. United States, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 35, the officers arrested the defendant in a downstairs bedroom of a rooming house and searched a closed room on the second floor. In reversing the conviction, the Court stated: In United States v. Scott, D.C., 149 F. Supp. 837, the officers arrested the defendant on the street near his apartment. They then brought him to the apartment and searched it. In condemning the search, Judge Youngdahl declared: In United States v. Coffman, D.C., 50 F. Supp. 823, the officers arrested the defendant on his ranch about a quarter of a mile from his ranch house. In condemning the search of the dwelling without a warrant, the Court stated: See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653; Carlo v. United States, 2 Cir., 286 F.2d 841; United States v. Garnes, 2 Cir., 258 F.2d 530; McKnight v. United States, 87 U.S. App.D.C. 151, 183 F.2d 977; United States v. Steck, 3 Cir., 19 F.2d 161; Poulos v. United States, 6 Cir., 8 F.2d 120; United States v. Fowler, 9 Cir., 17 F.R.D. 499; United States v. Hamm, D.C., 163 F. Supp. 4; United States v. Alberti, D.C., 120 F. Supp. 171; United States v. Johnson, D.C., 113 F. Supp. 359; Machen, The Law of Search and Seizure (1950), § 13, p. 72; and Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Northwestern University Law Review 65, 67. The great weight of state authority likewise supports the rule that a search of a private residence can be made only as an incident to an arrest on the premises. When the arrest is made elsewhere, a search of a private residence without a warrant violates constitutional rights. See Fowler v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 645, 22 S.W.2d 935; Warwick v. State, 104 Fla. 393, 140 So. 219; Riddle v. State, 73 Okl.Cr. 419, 121 P.2d 1014; Wallace v. State, 42 Okl.Cr. 143, 275 P. 354; People v. Heidman, 11 Ill. 2d 501, 144 N.E.2d 580; People v. King, 60 Cal. 2d 308, 32 Cal. Rptr. 825, 384 P.2d 153; Castaneda v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 439, 30 Cal. Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641; Tomkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113; Hernandez v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 313, 299 P.2d 678; People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469; 47 Am.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 19, p. 515; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 67, pp. 843-844; and Machen, The Law of Search and Seizure (1950), § 13, pp. 72-73. In Fowler v. State, supra, the officers arrested the defendant adjacent to his residence, which had a separate bathroom. They searched the closed bathroom, located several yards from the point of arrest. In holding the search unlawful, the Texas court described the following principle as well settled: In the Hernandez case, supra, the officers made the arrest on the public street near the residence. In rejecting the evidence obtained in the house-search, the California court stated: Insofar as I can determine, only two states, Illinois and Delaware, have codified the law of incidental search. The statute of neither state permits the search of the interior of a residence when the arrest is made elsewhere than on the premises. The Delaware statute authorizes the search only when "The arrest is made on the premises * * *." Title 11, § 2303, Delaware Code Annotated. Adopted in 1963, the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure fixes the scope of the arrest-search as "the area within such person's immediate presence * * *." S.H.A. Ch. 38, § 108-1. Aside from cases supporting general principles of search and seizure, the majority relies chiefly upon the decision of the California Court of Appeal in People v. Aleria, 193 Cal. App. 2d 352, 14 Cal. Rptr. 162. In that case, the police arrested the defendant, who was under the influence of narcotics, in the hotel lobby. They took the room key, which he held in his hand, and returned him to his room, up one flight of stairs and 20 to 30 feet down the hall. After the defendant invited them to search, the officers found narcotics. These facts differ materially from those in the present case, and the decision may be distinguished on that ground. The decision, however, has been criticized as diverging from the federal standard and tending to abolish search warrants. See Manwaring, California and The Fourth Amendment, 16 Stanford Law Review 318, 336, 343. To this point, I have emphasized only the rule applied: A private dwelling may not be constitutionally searched without a warrant as an incident of an arrest made elsewhere. I have deferred an examination, of the basis for the rule. The rule may be explained, of course, by simply stating that the "place of arrest," as used in the decisions, means only the area immediately surrounding the prisoner as he stands when arrested. The real basis, however, is more than semantics. The jurisprudence suggests at least two reasons, intimately connected with the nature of the protected right and historical development of the incidental search, to support the rule. The first of these reasons is common to all searches incidental to arrest. As we have observed, the arrest-search is rooted in necessity, that of seizing the weapons that might be used to assault an officer and preventing the destruction or loss of the fruits and implements of the crime. Desperation born of arrest is sometimes heedless of the strength of the law. The drawing of a revolver or the casting aside of narcotics may thwart the law enforcement effort at the time of the arrest. The danger-area is that immediately surrounding the prisoner. This critical area fixes the scope of the search incidental to the arrest. The same necessity that creates the search also limits its extent. From this practical viewpoint, the area of overriding necessity does not include the interior of a residence at any substantial distance from the point of arrest. When, as here, a person is brought into secure custody by arrest on a public street, the search area, even when liberally drawn, does not embrace a residence two blocks away. The second reason underlying the rule is peculiar to the premises-search. Under appropriate circumstances, the entry of premises to make an arrest is authorized. When officers enter premises to make an arrest, the privacy is incidentally, but lawfully, breached by their presence. Once the privacy has thus been lawfully broken, a search of reasonable scope, concurrent with the arrest, may be made as a necessary projection of the search of the person arrested.[13] This legal base, of course, does *118 not support the search of a dwelling when the entry is made, not to make an arrest, but to search following an arrest elsewhere. The arrest-on-the-premises rule has much to commend it from the standpoint of police administration. Law enforcement officers need workable standards. They need to know in advance the extent of their authority. While no search rule has absolute precision, the requirement that the arrest be made on the premises is reasonably clear and concrete. In contrast, the "time-distance rule" adopted by the majority creates much uncertainty for the law enforcement officer, who must make prompt decisions as to his authority. How far from the residence can an arrest be made without loss of the rights of incidental search? What is the maximum time interval between the arrest and search? These questions only illustrate the desirability of a more specific rule for law enforcement. A case-by-case approach to these questions does not assist the law enforcement officer now. The search of a home without a warrant is banned notwithstanding probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or other seizable articles.[14] Such a search, moreover, is not validated by what it brings to light.[15] The traditions of time immemorial sustain this firm constitutional policy protecting the privacy of the home.[16] Additionally, full practical support for it is found in the fact that a house is immovable. Unlike an automobile, it cannot be moved from place to place, thereby defeating search warrant procedures. The foregoing principles are particularly applicable in Louisiana. LSA-R.S. 15:68 authorizes arresting officers to "take from the person arrested, all offensive weapons or incriminating articles which he may have about his person * * *." LSA-R.S. 15:72 authorizes arresting officers to enter a house "to make an arrest." The statute, of course, does not apply if the arrest has already been made. Moreover, the Narcotics Law, LSA-R.S. 40:972, has announced a strong public policy against the invasion of a private residence without a warrant to search for narcotics. It provides: In our recent decision in State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417 (1963), we recognized this strong statutory policy and sustained the search for narcotics solely on the ground that the officers arrested the defendant in his residence after observing him make a sale of narcotics there. Quoting from United States v. Rabinowitz, we stated: The prosecution has urged this Court to adopt a liberal search rule because this state has been "forced to adopt the exclusionary doctrine" by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio. Although this plea has been adroitly presented, I find no merit in it. The Mapp decision did not reduce the search authority of state law enforcement officers. Such searches as the one in the present case were violative of constitutional rights before Mapp.[17] The decision did add a sanction: It made the evidence from unconstitutional searches inadmissible in state criminal proceedings. At the time of the decision, over half the states had already adopted the exclusionary rule.[18] While this Court had rejected the exclusionary rule, it at one time had been divided on the question.[19] The main defect in the state's argument, however, is that it confuses the exclusionary sanction, as to the worth of which there may be a divergence of view, with the substantive restriction against the invasion of private homes without a search warrant, which forms a sacred feature of our American heritage. Curtailing the substantive restriction not only renders Mapp v. Ohio an exercise in legal futility, but also impairs the protection of the right of privacy of all the homes in our statethose of both the just and unjust. I respectfully dissent. [1] See State v. Green, 244 La. 80, 150 So. 2d 571; State v. Morgan, 238 La. 829, 116 So. 2d 682; State v. Bellam, 255 La. 445, 73 So. 2d 311; and State v. Thomas, 224 La. 731, 69 So. 2d 738. [2] See State v. Rue, 236 La. 451, 107 So. 2d 702. See, however, State ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368, upholding the constitutionality of the addiction provision of the law. [3] The defendant also interposed objection to the evidence at the time of its later introduction. [4] "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no such search or seizure shall be made except upon warrant therefor issued upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." [5] 374 U.S. 23, 34, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 738. [6] State v. Pickens, 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577; State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417; State v. Aias, 243 La. 945, 149 So. 2d 400. [7] State v. Cade, 244 La. 534, 153 So. 2d 382; State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417; State v. Aias, 243 La. 945, 946, 149 So. 2d 400; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 81 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726. [8] State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145. [9] See, e. g., LSA-R.S. 40:972. [10] See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145; Papani v. United States, 9 Cir., 84 F.2d 160; United States v. Coffman, D.C., 50 F. Supp. 823; United States v. Fowler, D.C., 17 F.R.D. 499; Annotation, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1982, 1986; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 67d, pp. 843-844. [1] The author of this opinion on rehearing dissented on original hearing. [2] We have carefully read the Agnello case, relied on by the defendant, and do not find it apposite. The premises searched, Agnello's and Pace's quarters, were not incidental to the place of arrest. The evidence secured at Alba's house where the arrest was made was held admissible. [3] The U. S. Supreme Court found the search to be unreasonable in the Preston Case because the car occupied by the accused at the time of arrest was not searched until after the men had been taken to the police station and booked. The Court held that the search was too remote in time or place to have been incidental to arrest. [4] Defendant's wife testified that he was brought back to his home fifteen minutes after he left. [1] "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." [2] Art. I, Sect. 7: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no such search or seizure shall be made except upon warrant therefor issued upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." [3] McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 153. [4] 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). [5] See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723; Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856; and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726. [6] Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652. [7] People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583, 32 A.L.R. 676. [8] Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950); Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and SeizureA Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 Indiana Law Journal 259; Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incident to Arrest, 1959 Washington University Law Quarterly 261; Macy, Search and Seizure Incident to Lawful Arrest, 10 Louisiana Law Review 546. [9] 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652. [10] 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319. [11] 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145. [12] Fixed at three blocks by one commentator. See 10 La.Law Review 546, 548. [13] Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 1102, 91 L. Ed. 1399, 1407 ("Here the agents entered the apartment under the authority of lawful warrants of arrest."); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 58, 70 S. Ct. 430, 431, 94 L. Ed. 653, 656 ("Armed with this valid warrant of arrest, the Government officers * * * went to respondent's place of business, a one-room office open to the public"); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482 ("Thus, if the search follows a lawful entry to effect an arrest, then it is valid * * *"). See also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514 (majority and dissenting opinions); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S. Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (dissenting opinion); United States v. Coffman, D.C., 50 F. Supp. 823; and People v. Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N.W. 679. [14] Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828; Davis v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 421, 21 S.W.2d 509. [15] McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 153; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436; United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520; People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528; People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 179 N.E.2d 478. [16] Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937), p. 123. [17] Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782; Art. I, Sect. 7, Louisiana Constitution. [18] See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (Appendix). [19] See State v. Shotts, 207 La. 898, 22 So. 2d 209; State v. Alvarez, 182 La. 908, 162 So. 725; and State v. Eddins, 161 La. 240, 108 So. 468.