Title: Scott R. Ross v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR07-494
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2007

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 07-494 SCOTT R. ROSS Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered October 11, 2007 PRO SE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF [CIRCUIT COURT OF GARLAND COUNTY, CR 2004-143, HON. DAVID B. SWITZER, JUDGE] APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION MOOT. PER CURIAM In 2005, Scott R. Ross, appellant herein, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder and using a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to 480 months’ and 180 months’ imprisonment, with the sentences to be served consecutively. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Ross v. State, 96 Ark. App. 385, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). Subsequently, appellant timely filed in the trial court a verified pro se petition for relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim P. 37.1. In the petition, appellant alleged numerous bases for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel, his mental incompetency, wrongly-decided evidentiary rulings, a violation of double jeopardy, and denial of a fair and impartial trial based upon cumulative error. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and appellant has lodged an appeal here from the order. Now before us is appellant’s pro se motion for extension of time to file the brief-in-chief. We need not consider the motion as it is apparent that appellant could not prevail in this appeal if -2- it were permitted to go forward. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and hold the motion moot. This court has consistently held that an appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam). In his Rule 37.1 petition, appellant initially claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for the recusal of the trial judge. He maintained that the judge was biased against him, as the judge had presided over appellant’s divorce proceedings and had previously cited appellant for contempt of court for failure to appear at past hearings. In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a petition under Rule 37.1, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel’s performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). The Strickland standard is a two-part test, commonly known as the “cause and prejudice” test. When a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show first that counsel’s performance was deficient through a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, a petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam). The standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel places the burden on appellant to provide facts to support his claims of prejudice. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 -3- (2001) (per curiam). Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Id. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Jackson, supra. Here, appellant failed to state facts to show that the trial judge was biased against him, either from presiding over the divorce matter, or from finding appellant in contempt for failure to appear. His petition contained merely bare conclusions regarding the judge’s bias, which were insufficient to support a petition for postconviction relief. Nelson, supra; Jackson, supra. Next, appellant contended that counsel was ineffective for failing to prevent appellant from being cross-examined by the prosecutor regarding certain testimony. He claimed that the trial court initially ruled that the testimony was inadmissible, but allowed the testimony during trial. Appellant referred to a particular page of the trial transcript; however, that page of the transcript concerned jury selection. We note that the trial transcript contained a number of objections made by counsel to cross-examination questions posed to appellant. These objections concerned testimony that was the subject of pre-trial motions in limine. However, without further factual information in the Rule 37.1 petition, appellant failed to state facts in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nelson, supra; Jackson, supra. In his third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant posited that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to exclude certain testimony given by a witness, Craig Adams, regarding a cut on appellant’s finger. The cut resulted from an altercation prior to the murder that was initiated by appellant. At trial, after the defense had rested, the prosecutor called Mr. Adams as a witness to rebut testimony that appellant was not a violent man. On appeal, the court of appeals determined that appellant’s own testimony and testimony from two defense witnesses invited Mr. Adam’s -4- rebuttal, and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Contrary to appellant’s contention, trial counsel objected to Mr. Adams’s testimony. The trial court overruled the objection. Appellant failed to show that counsel was ineffective, as he did take action at trial. In his Rule 37.1 petition, appellant also failed to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s actions. Consequently, he did not meet either prong of the Strickland test. Next, appellant contended that he was mentally incompetent at the time of the trial. He claimed that he should not have been convicted as a result, and that the trial court erred by failing to “provide an adequate competency determination[.]” However, appellant misstated the facts of his case in this allegation. Prior to trial, counsel moved for a mental evaluation of appellant. After a psychological examiner for the State of Arkansas issued a medical opinion, the trial court held a hearing on appellant’s competency. The trial court accepted the examiner’s findings, and appellant was found to be legally competent to stand trial. In short, the facts of the matter contradict appellant’s contentions. Also, in his postconviction petition, appellant failed to state facts to show that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial. Appellant’s petition contained no basis for postconviction relief on the issue. In his fifth argument, appellant maintained that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing testimony from Craig Adams, as discussed above. He also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony regarding appellant’s possession of a firearm at a particular bar on other occasions. Appellant maintained that such testimony from Mr. Adams and others evidenced prior bad acts on his part, and was irrelevant to the charges filed against him. Rule 37.1 does not provide a postconviction remedy when an issue could have been raised at the trial or argued on appeal. Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001) (citing -5- Davis v. State, 345 Ark. 161, 44 S.W.3d 726 (2001)). The issue of Mr. Adam’s testimony was addressed on direct appeal by the court of appeals, and no error was found. Furthermore, the court of appeals reviewed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings that allowed testimony concerning appellant’s prior possession of a firearm. The appellate court rejected appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in allowing such testimony. As these issues have previously been decided on appeal, and are considered a direct attack on the judgment, the claim is not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Camargo, supra. Appellant next argued that a double jeopardy violation occurred at trial. This argument was based on his contention that he was not formally charged with using a firearm during the commission of a felony, for which he received a fifteen-year sentence. However, appellant again misstated the facts of the case. While he maintained that he was charged only with first-degree murder, he was additionally charged with a sentence enhancement for employing a firearm as a means of committing first-degree murder. At his arraignment, the trial court recited both charges filed against him, and appellant stated that he understood the charges. The felony information filed by the prosecutor contained both charges. The jury found appellant guilty of the firearm enhancement, and sentenced him to the maximum term of imprisonment allowed under the statute for that charge. This sentence was imposed in addition to the sentence he received for first-degree murder. Appellant stated no factual or legal support for postconviction relief based on a violation of double jeopardy in his petition. In his final argument, appellant complained that he was denied a fair and impartial trial due to the cumulative evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. His complaints focused on the trial court’s allowing testimony by his wife, and his friend Steven Long, who was a minister and a disc -6- jockey at the bar that was frequented by appellant. In the court below, appellant claimed that the husband-wife marital privilege applied to communications with his wife, and that the religious privilege applied to his conversation with Mr. Long after the murder. He then sought to exclude testimony by both potential witnesses based on those privileges. The issue of privilege was addressed on appeal, and the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s rulings. As part of this argument, he also complained about testimony at trial related to his prior bad acts, as discussed above. Evidentiary rulings made by the trial court that allowed testimony regarding appellant’s prior bad acts were considered by the court of appeals, and no error was found. Here, appellant’s argument again centered on evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. As noted above, these issues are not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 petition or sufficient to void a judgment. Camargo, supra; Davis, supra. Appeal dismissed; motion moot.