Title: Robert Sheldon Peters v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-341
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-341 
____________ 
 
ROBERT SHELDON PETERS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 1, 2008] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
We have for review a decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Peters 
v. State, 919 So. 2d 624, 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), on the following question 
certified to be of great public importance: 
DOES THE “TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY” RULE SET FORTH IN 
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) APPLY IN 
COMMUNITY CONTROL AND/OR PROBATION REVOCATION 
PROCEEDINGS? 
 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that the rule set forth in Crawford, which provides that testimonial 
hearsay is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution unless the declarant is unavailable 
 
2 
and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, does not 
apply to probation or community control revocation proceedings in Florida. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Robert Sheldon Peters, already on probation in August 2000, entered a plea 
of nolo contendere to new charges of criminal mischief, assault, and escape.  The 
trial court adjudicated him guilty of escape, withheld imposition of sentence, and 
placed him on probation, merging the previous probations into a new three-year 
probationary period.  In January 2003, Peters‟ probation officer filed an affidavit of 
violation of probation, alleging use of marijuana and failure to follow instructions 
by refusing to submit a urine sample.  Peters pled nolo contendere, and the court 
modified his probation in May 2003 by ordering him to serve twelve months of 
community control.  By June 2003, Peters‟ probation officer filed a new notice of 
violation, alleging that Peters tested positive for amphetamines on two separate 
dates.  In July 2003, the court revoked the prior community control, sentenced 
Peters to twenty-four months in the Department of Corrections (suspended), and 
again ordered him to serve twelve months of community control under the original 
terms and conditions. 
Pursuant to the terms of his supervision, Peters was required to submit urine 
samples to be tested for the presence of illegal narcotics.  His April 2004 sample 
was sent to PharmChem, an independent laboratory used by the Department of 
 
3 
Corrections.  The lab report indicated that the sample was positive for 
amphetamines and methamphetamines, and the result was confirmed by 
PharmChem in a second testing.  The State submitted the urinalysis report at a new 
revocation hearing in June 2004, along with a “Certification and/or Declaration of 
the Report as a Business Record Pursuant to 90.803(6), Fla. Evid. Code,” which 
was signed by the corporate records custodian and notarized.  No one from the 
laboratory testified at the hearing.  Defense counsel objected to the report, arguing 
that the proceeding was a trial and that admission of the report violated Peters‟ 
right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
Defense counsel also objected on the ground that under Monroe v. State, 679 So. 
2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), and Williams v. State, 553 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1989), the report constituted hearsay, which cannot form the sole basis for finding 
a violation of community supervision.  In turn, the State argued that the report was 
admissible as a business record.  The circuit court found Peters guilty of the 
violation, revoked community control, and sentenced him to twenty-four months of 
incarceration.  The First District affirmed and held that the rule in Crawford does 
not apply to community supervision revocation proceedings.  Peters v. State, 919 
So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). 
DISCUSSION 
 
4 
Peters primarily contends that he is entitled to confront and cross-examine 
the witnesses against him because the PharmChem lab report is considered 
testimonial hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  He 
contends that because Florida probation revocation proceedings constitute 
“criminal prosecutions” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, they are 
sufficiently analogous to trials that his Confrontation Clause rights are prescribed 
by Crawford.  Peters also argues that he was denied due process of law because he 
was prevented from confronting and cross-examining anyone from PharmChem.1   
Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation and Revocation Proceedings 
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held an out-of-court 
testimonial statement of an unavailable declarant is not admissible at a criminal 
trial unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  If 
these requirements are not satisfied, the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of 
the evidence.  The Crawford decision applies specifically to the use of testimonial 
statements during a criminal prosecution.  The Crawford Court did not establish a 
precise definition of testimonial but said at a minimum testimonial statements 
                                          
 
1.  Though Peters additionally argues that the lab report does not fall within 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule, no objection was made on this 
basis in the trial court and that argument is not discussed in this opinion.  Further, 
in State v. Johnson, No. SC06-86 (Fla. May 1, 2008), we held that lab reports such 
as the one involved here are in fact testimonial under the Crawford analysis. 
 
 
5 
would include prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial, and police interrogations.  This pronouncement was clarified 
somewhat in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), a case centering upon an 
exchange between a victim/witness and a 911 operator.  In Davis, the Court said: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively demonstrate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution. 
Id. at 822. 
In the instant case, the district court found the lab report testimonial under 
the Crawford formulation.  However, this Court need not address whether the 
specific laboratory report relied upon in Peters‟ revocation hearing was testimonial, 
because the issue presented by the certified question is really whether a revocation 
proceeding is a criminal prosecution as that term is used in Crawford.  We find that 
revocation of probation or community control proceedings are not criminal 
prosecutions and that Crawford does not apply to revocation proceedings. 
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court began its 
opinion with the proposition that “the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal 
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a 
proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”  408 U.S. at 480 (citing Mempa 
 
6 
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)).  The Court emphasized that its decision was not an 
attempt “to equate [a revocation hearing] to a criminal prosecution in any sense.”  
Id. at 489.  A year later, the Supreme Court extended that holding to probation 
revocation proceedings.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) 
(“Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal 
prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty.”).  The overwhelming majority of 
state and federal courts that have considered Crawford have decisively concluded 
that Crawford concerns only Sixth Amendment confrontation rights in criminal 
prosecutions and that parole or probation revocation proceedings are not criminal 
prosecutions within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.2 
                                          
 
2.  United States v. Wooden, No. 05-13981 (11th Cir. May 3, 2006) (noting 
that neither the Circuit nor the Supreme Court had extended Crawford to 
supervised release proceedings) (unpublished); See United States v. Williams, 443 
F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to 
supervised release revocation hearings); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44 
(1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to 
postconviction proceedings and that Crawford does not apply to supervised release 
revocation hearings); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that nothing in Crawford purported to alter the standards set forth in Morrissey or 
Scarpelli); Untied States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); United 
States v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding, in an ineffective assistance of 
counsel action, that a revocation hearing is not part of a criminal prosecution); 
United States v. Barraza, 318 F.Supp.2d 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that 
Crawford is not controlling authority regarding the right to confrontation in a 
probation revocation proceeding); People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (holding that probation revocation proceedings are not criminal 
prosecutions); Jenkins v. State, 862 A.2d 386 (Del. 2004) (declining to apply 
Crawford because a violation of probation hearing is neither a formal trial nor a 
criminal prosecution); Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804 (D.C. 2004) (likening 
 
7 
Peters, however, contends that probation revocation proceedings in Florida 
are judicial, adversarial inquiries that are more akin to a criminal prosecution 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment than the informal revocation 
proceedings considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrissey and Scarpelli.  
These cases both distinguished between informal revocation proceedings, in which 
the state is represented by the parole or probation officer, and the formal 
adversarial nature of criminal prosecutions, where the state is represented by a 
prosecutor.  Peters notes that in Florida revocation proceedings, a prosecutor rather 
than a probation officer represents the state, and a judge rather than an informal 
panel of hearing officers determines whether to revoke probation.  However, 
Scarpelli makes a distinction between the two types of proceedings in order to 
resolve the narrow issue of whether a probationer had an absolute right to counsel 
                                                                                                                                        
probation revocation to an administrative hearing rather than a criminal 
prosecution and declining to apply Crawford); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 841 
N.E.2d 1240 (Mass. 2006) (holding that a probation revocation proceeding is not a 
criminal prosecution and that Crawford does not apply); Diaz v. State, 172 S.W.3d 
668 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding that a community supervision revocation is not a 
stage of a criminal prosecution and agreeing that Crawford does not apply); State v. 
Abd-Rahmaan, 111 P.3d 1157 (Wash. 2005) (accord).  Florida‟s district courts of 
appeal hold similarly.  Sproule v. State, 927 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA) (rejecting 
claim that admission of driving record at trial was hearsay and a violation of Sixth 
Amendment right to confront and cross-examine under Crawford), review denied, 
935 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2006); see also Russell v. State, 920 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA) 
(rejecting appellant‟s claim that his probation was improperly revoked because the 
revocation was based solely on otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence, and 
holding that Crawford does not apply to revocation of supervised release 
proceedings), approved, No. SC06-335 (Fla. May 1, 2008).  
 
8 
at a probation hearing.  411 U.S. at 783.  Notably, Peters does not allege a violation 
of his right to counsel, but a violation of his right to confront and cross-examine an 
adverse witness. 
Peters also argues that a probation revocation hearing is a criminal 
prosecution because prosecution terminates only with sentencing and a revocation 
hearing is a deferred sentencing.  See Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 
1985) (referring to the revocation process as deferred sentencing).  He contends 
that the term “prosecution” encompasses proceedings following the determination 
of guilt and in support notes that Florida courts have held that defendants retain 
certain other constitutional rights at the sentencing stage.  See, e.g., Tur v. State, 
797 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the court could not impose a 
deferred sentence at a revocation hearing without having appointed counsel for the 
defendant); Santeufemio v. State, 745 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding 
that a defendant has a right to be present at a revocation hearing).  We reject both 
arguments. 
In Morrissey, the Supreme Court stated that revocation proceedings are not 
criminal prosecutions but noted, “Parole arises after the end of the criminal 
prosecution, including imposition of sentence.”  408 U.S. at 480.  The Court in 
Scarpelli observed, “Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation 
and parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation where 
 
9 
sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the 
revocation of parole.”  411 U.S. at 782 n.3.  In contrast, sentence is often not 
imposed on a Florida probationer.  The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provide, “Pronouncement and imposition of sentence of imprisonment shall not be 
made on a defendant who is to be placed on probation, regardless of whether the 
defendant has been adjudicated guilty.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.790(a); see also § 
948.01(2) Fla. Stat. (2006).  Thus, Peters contends that criminal prosecution 
continued in his case throughout the probationary period and did not conclude until 
the court imposed sentence at the conclusion of the revocation hearing.3  Though 
probation revocation may constitute a part of the sentencing process, case law 
supports the proposition that a “criminal prosecution” concludes with the 
determination of guilt of the crime charged, not with a determination that a later 
violation of probation has occurred.  Cf. Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 498 
(Fla. 1974) (“Probation revocation is an entirely different stage of the criminal-
correctional process.” (quoting In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337, 338 (1st Cir. 1970))); 
see Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782 (“Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not 
a stage of a criminal prosecution ….”). 
                                          
 
3.  We note, without comment, that in Peters‟ prior July 2003 revocation 
hearing, the trial court revoked community control, imposed a suspended sentence 
of twenty-four months, and again ordered that Peters submit to community control 
for a period of twelve months. 
 
10 
Critical to the distinction between a criminal prosecution at trial, during 
which a defendant enjoys the protections of the Sixth Amendment, and a criminal 
proceeding such as a revocation hearing is the fact that the accused at trial awaits a 
determination of guilt or innocence.  In Scarpelli, the Supreme Court asserted that 
it dealt “not with the right of an accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but 
with the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only 
because he has been convicted of a crime.”  Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789 (emphasis 
added).   In Florida, a court may only place on probation a defendant who “has 
been found guilty by the verdict of a jury, has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of 
nolo contendere, or has been found guilty by the court trying the case without a 
jury.”  § 948.01, Fla. Stat. (2006).  Although a court may not impose sentence, i.e., 
incarceration, at the time it places a defendant on probation and may further choose 
to withhold adjudication of guilt, the “conviction” of the defendant is concluded 
prior to the commencement of probation.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.790(a).   
We stated in an early revocation case that “[t]he purpose of the granting of 
probation . . . without an actual adjudication of guilt, is rehabilitation of one who 
has committed the crime charged without formally and judicially branding the 
individual as a convicted criminal and without the loss of civil rights and other 
damning consequences.”  Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 495 (Fla. 1974).  The 
imposition of sentence is not withheld in order to ensure the retention of 
 
11 
constitutional rights by a party who is presumed innocent; rather, sentence is 
withheld solely to aid in the rehabilitation of a party whose guilt has been 
established.  In Bernhardt, we acknowledged that while a defendant is not 
incarcerated when placed on probation, the defendant is nonetheless serving a type 
of suspended sentence.  This Court, quoting from Brill v. State, 32 So. 2d 607, 
608-09 (Fla. 1947), said: 
The major concern of the court at the [revocation] hearing was 
whether or not appellant had been on good behavior during his 
suspended sentence.  The liberty he was enjoying was by judicial 
grace, he had already plead [sic] guilty to the offense of selling 
moonshine liquor.  The hearing is in no sense a retrial of the main 
offense.  Having plead [sic] guilty to that, he is now subject to be 
sentenced as he might have been at the time the suspended sentence 
was promulgated if he has not observed its conditions.  The hearing 
was to determine this and no more. 
Such hearings are informal and do not take the course of a 
regular trial, neither does the evidence have the same objective as that 
taken at a regular trial.  Its purpose is to satisfy the conscience of the 
court as to whether the conditions of the suspended sentence have 
been violated.  A secondary purpose is to give the person accused of 
violating the suspended sentence a chance to explain away the 
accusation against him, but even this does not contemplate a strict or 
formal trial.   
 
288 So. 2d at 495. 
 
Since Bernhardt, we have continued to acknowledge that while probation is 
not necessarily a sentence, the criminal prosecution has ended with either a 
sentence of incarceration or a suspended sentence of probation.  See, e.g., Perez v. 
State, 599 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (acknowledging probation as a 
 
12 
sentence in lieu of immediate imprisonment); McGuirk v. State, 382 So. 2d 1235 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (acknowledging that a court may suspend all or some of a 
defendant‟s sentence in order to place the defendant on probation).   
Case law uniformly draws a distinction between the full array of rights due 
to a defendant before conviction and the limited rights available during sentencing 
proceedings.  “It is well-established . . . that a defendant‟s rights at sentencing 
differ considerably from his pre-conviction rights.”  United States v. Jackson, 453 
F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir.) (affirming denial of defendant‟s right to present a witness 
during sentencing to rebut presentence investigation report), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 462 (2006); see also  United States v. Young, 981 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(“Concerning the right to confrontation, it is more than well-established that „a 
defendant‟s confrontation rights at sentencing are severely restricted.‟”); United 
States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a noncapital 
defendant does not have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses at sentencing to rebut presentence investigation report).  The 
rights available to the defendant awaiting sentencing are limited because the 
interest at stake at the sentencing stage is limited.  See United States v. Giltner, 889 
F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1989) (“It is widely recognized that the sole interest 
being protected at sentencing is the right not to be sentenced on the basis of 
inaccurate or unreliable information.”); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 
 
13 
555 (5th Cir. 1973) (“What is involved…is the right of a defendant to at least 
minimal safeguards to insure that the sentencing court does not rely on erroneous 
factual information when assessing sentence.”). 
Similarly, the constitutional rights available to a probationer are also limited.  
Cf. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (holding that a warrantless 
search of the probationer‟s home without probable cause was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment under a lesser standard of reasonable suspicion where the 
terms of probation included consent to a warrantless search); Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984) (reiterating that there is no right to a jury 
trial before probation is revoked); Prellwitz v. Berg, 578 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 
1978) (affirming revocation and recognizing that probation revocation hearings are 
not subject to the full constitutional standards of a criminal trial); Scott v. State, 
937 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that the Fifth Amendment 
prohibition against double jeopardy does not pertain to probation revocation 
hearings). But see State v. Scarlet, 800 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 2001) (holding that in the 
absence of a controlling federal decision, the exclusionary rule applies to illegally 
seized evidence in Florida probation revocation hearings). 
Because a probationer has already been found guilty of the crime charged 
before being placed on probation or under community supervision, the revocation 
proceeding implicates only a limited, conditional liberty interest rather than the 
 
14 
absolute liberty interest enjoyed by a criminal defendant prior to trial.  Therefore, a 
revocation proceeding cannot be equated to a criminal prosecution for Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause purposes.  Because Crawford addresses the use 
of testimonial hearsay only in the context of criminal prosecutions, the decision 
does not apply to Florida revocation proceedings. 
Due Process Right in Revocation Proceedings 
Peters also argues that even if this Court finds that he does not have a right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse testimony or evidence under the Sixth 
Amendment, he still has a due process right to confront and cross-examine 
evidence against him pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In Morrissey, the U.S. Supreme Court also addressed and rejected 
the argument that parolees had no due process rights.  The Court specifically found 
that parolees are entitled to: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to 
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the 
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to 
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 
 
408 U.S. at 489;  see also Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610 (1985) (“The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes procedural and substantive 
 
15 
limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation.”); Moody 
v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1976) (“In Morrissey, we held that the conditional 
freedom of a parolee generated by statute is a liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which may not be terminated absent 
appropriate due process safeguards.”).  After outlining these minimum 
requirements of due process, the Supreme Court also said, “We emphasize there is 
no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal 
prosecution in any sense.  It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible 
enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that 
would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.”  408 U.S. at 489.   
The Supreme Court, however, described a limited right where it held that 
due process requires that a parolee have the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses “unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not 
allowing the confrontation.”  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.  Other courts have more 
directly stated the limitation.  See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (holding that a noncapital defendant does not have a constitutional right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at sentencing to rebut information 
in a presentence report); Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding 
that the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is not absolute in a 
combined probation revocation and deferred sentencing proceeding); Young v. 
 
16 
United States, 863 A.2d 804, 808 (D.C. 2004) (holding that the probationer holds a 
“qualified” due process right to confrontation); see also Baber v. State, 775 So. 2d 
258, 260 (Fla. 2000) (“Federal and Florida courts have recognized, however, that 
the right to confront one‟s accusers is not absolute.”). 4 
The Supreme Court emphasized that the revocation process must be 
“flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other 
material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.”  Morrissey, 
408 U.S. at 489.  “The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, 
if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in 
mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.”  Id. at 488; see 
also United States v. Giltner, 889 F.2d 1004, 1007 (11th Cir. 1989) (“While 
hearsay evidence may be considered at sentencing, due process requires both that 
the defendant be given an opportunity to refute it and that it bear minimal indicia 
of reliability.”).  “What is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that 
the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise 
                                          
 
4.  The federal courts have applied a balancing test to determine whether the 
right of confrontation is triggered under due process.  See United States v. Pierre, 
47 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming revocation, assuming that laboratories 
performed double-blind validity tests and noting that the record failed to show 
evidence that PharmChem urinalysis reports were unreliable); United States v. 
Bell, 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986) (remanding on different basis, but finding that 
the independent urinalysis lab reports were substantially reliable as regular reports 
of a company which expected its clients to act on the information, and noting that 
probationer made only general claims that the results might have been defective). 
 
17 
of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee‟s 
behavior.”  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484.  Acknowledging these due process 
requirements, this Court stated, “[T]he evidence upon which to predicate a 
revocation introduced at the hearing must be sufficient to satisfy the conscience of 
the court that a condition of probation has been violated.”  Bernhardt, 288 So. 2d at 
495. 
We do not interpret the Crawford decision as changing these standards in 
regard to revocation hearings.  The court in Crawford specifically limited its 
holdings to testimonial hearsay in the context of a criminal prosecution under the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.  We will not extend the holding in 
Crawford beyond the bounds outlined by the United States Supreme Court. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative 
and hold that Crawford does not apply to revocation proceedings in the State of 
Florida.  We approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting.  
 
18 
 
In a single proceeding, the trial court revoked Peters‟ community control and 
sentenced him to two years in prison.  This Court has held that community control 
and probation revocation proceedings are deferred sentencing proceedings.  We 
have also held that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), applies to 
sentencing proceedings.  Hence, I cannot agree with the majority‟s holding that 
Crawford should not be applied in probation revocation proceedings.   
 
The majority opinion relies on the United States Supreme Court‟s opinions 
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778 (1973), in concluding that parole revocation and probation revocation are 
essentially identical and that neither is a criminal prosecution to which the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation applies.  However, while I can agree with the 
majority‟s conclusions as to parole proceedings, it is apparent that under Florida 
law probation revocation proceedings are not identical to administrative parole 
revocation proceedings.  In fact, this Court has consistently held that probation 
revocation proceedings are more akin to sentencing proceedings, and as a 
consequence, we have held that numerous constitutional protections must be 
extended to such proceedings.  We should not ignore our prior law in considering 
the Crawford issue.  
Morrissey 
 
19 
In Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court held that the liberty of a 
parolee is an interest entitled to only limited protection under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since a parolee has already been tried, 
convicted, and sentenced under the full panoply of rights accorded a criminal 
accused under the Constitution.  408 U.S. at 480-82.  The Court held that the 
termination of the privilege of parole requires only an informal hearing.  Id. at 482-
84.  The Court reasoned that “[p]arole arises after the end of the criminal 
prosecution, including imposition of sentence.”  Id. at 480.  The Court further 
observed that “[t]he granting and revocation of parole are matters traditionally 
handled by administrative officers.”  Id. at 486.  The Court further identified two 
stages in the typical process of parole revocation: a preliminary hearing and a 
revocation hearing.  Id. at 485, 487.  The Court outlined the minimum 
requirements of due process for the revocation hearing: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to 
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the 
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to 
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 
 
Id. at 489.  The Court held that revocation proceedings mandated only minimum 
requirements of due process and emphasized that “there is no thought to equate this 
 
20 
second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense.  It is a 
narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence 
including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an 
adversary criminal trial.”  Id.  The Court asserted that “the revocation of parole is 
not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a 
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”  Id. at 480.5   
Parole in Florida 
 
As a whole, parole revocation procedures in Florida largely parallel the 
parole proceedings contemplated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Morrissey.  In fact, the parole revocation statute appears to codify the minimum 
due process requirements outlined in Morrissey.  Compare § 947.23, Fla. Stat. 
(2003) (outlining parole revocation procedures), with Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 
(listing minimum due process requirements for parole revocation hearings).   
The granting of parole is a function of the executive branch that is exercised 
only after the defendant has been convicted and sentenced.  Marsh v. Garwood, 65 
So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1953); see also Holston v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm‟n, 
394 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“The commission is not, of course, a 
sentencing court.”).  Moreover, the authority to grant parole is vested solely in the 
                                          
 
5.  The Court declined to address “the question whether the parolee is 
entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he is 
indigent.”  Id. at 489.     
 
21 
Parole Commission.  Owens v. State, 308 So. 2d 171, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); 
see also § 947.13(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) (stating that the Parole Commission has 
the power to determine what persons shall be placed on parole).  The Parole 
Commission administers parole.  Floyd v. Parole & Probation Comm‟n, 509 So. 2d 
919, 920 (Fla. 1987).  Furthermore, the Parole Commission is responsible for 
determining whether a person has violated parole and taking action with respect to 
a violation.  § 947.13(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003).6  Accordingly, parole revocation 
proceedings may be conducted by nonlawyers.  See Floyd, 509 So. 2d at 920.   
Parole revocation proceedings retain other distinctions from criminal trials.  
A parole revocation hearing “is not a traditional adversary criminal trial, and 
evidentiary proof is not required to follow strict rules of evidence.”  Jones v. Fla. 
Parole & Probation Comm‟n, 348 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (citing 
Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)).  Moreover, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hearings.  Pa. Bd. of 
Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 359 (1998).  Further, although the 
parole revocation statute requires that the parolee be informed of the right to be 
represented by counsel, § 947.23(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003), we have held that counsel 
                                          
 
6.  If the charges are sustained, the commissioners must enter an order 
revoking the parole and returning the parolee to prison to serve the sentence 
originally imposed, reinstating the original order of parole, ordering the placement 
of the parolee into a community control program, or entering such other order as is 
proper.  § 947.23(6)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). 
 
22 
does not need to be furnished to indigent parolees in all parole revocation 
proceedings, Floyd, 509 So. 2d at 920.  Finally, in lieu of a statutory right to 
appeal, review of the Parole Commission‟s orders is available only by petitions for 
habeas corpus or mandamus filed in the circuit court.  Richardson v. Fla. Parole 
Comm‟n, 924 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). 
 
In sum, Florida‟s parole proceedings are virtually identical to those 
contemplated in Morrissey.   
Scarpelli 
 
In Scarpelli, the Court appeared to extend its holding in Morrissey to 
probation revocation proceedings.  Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782.  Importantly, 
however, the Court distinguished its earlier decision in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 
128 (1967), in which it had held that a probationer is entitled to the right to counsel 
at a combined revocation and sentencing hearing.  Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781.  The 
Scarpelli Court explained that in Mempa it had reasoned that sentencing, even if it 
is part of a subsequent probation revocation proceeding, is one of the stages “of a 
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be 
affected”; therefore, counsel must be provided at sentencing.  Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 
781 (quoting Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134).  The Court then declined to extend 
Mempa‟s reasoning to the case before it, explaining that “this line of reasoning 
does not require a hearing or counsel at the time of probation revocation in a case 
 
23 
such as the present one, where the probationer was sentenced at the time of trial.”  
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781 (emphasis supplied).  The Court further qualified its 
holding in explaining its understanding of the nature of the revocation proceeding 
it was dealing with.  The Court explained that “[d]espite the undoubted minor 
differences between probation and parole, the commentators have agreed that 
revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is 
constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole.”  Id. at 782 n.3 
(emphasis supplied).  Hence, the Court expressly based its holding on the fact that, 
unlike the situation in Mempa, where revocation and sentencing took place at the 
same hearing, sentencing in Scarpelli had been imposed previously.   
 
The Court‟s holding in Scarpelli was also predicated on the assumption that 
the probation revocation proceeding being reviewed was an informal 
administrative proceeding like the parole violation hearing in Morrissey.  In 
holding that the right to counsel for parolees and probationers must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, the Court indicated its concern with transforming informal 
administrative proceedings into full-blown adversary proceedings: 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will 
alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.  If counsel is provided 
for the probationer or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide 
its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates 
and bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and 
arguments in support of their clients‟ positions and to contest with 
vigor all adverse evidence and views.  The role of the hearing body 
itself, aptly described in Morrissey as being “predictive and 
 
24 
discretionary” as well as factfinding, may become more akin to that of 
a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the 
individual probationer or parolee. 
 
Id. at 787-88.  The Court went on to explain its understanding of the difference 
between criminal trials and revocation hearings: 
 
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; 
formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of 
procedural rights which may be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury 
trial, a defendant must make a presentation understandable to 
untrained jurors.  In short, a criminal trial under our system is an 
adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics.  In a 
revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by 
a prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation described 
above; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and 
the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and 
practice of probation or parole. 
 
Id. at 789.  In sum, the Court‟s holding in Scarpelli was expressly based on the 
assumption that parole and probation revocations were essentially identical 
administrative proceedings rather than adversarial judicial criminal proceedings.  
That assumption was critical to the holding in Scarpelli; however, it is clear that 
the assumption is inconsistent with the way probation revocation proceedings are 
conducted in Florida. 
Probation Revocation and Sentencing in Florida 
 
Some jurisdictions have rejected the application of Scarpelli to probation 
revocation proceedings because Scarpelli did not contemplate the kind of judicial 
revocation proceedings conducted in those jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Pearl v. State, 
 
25 
996 P.2d 688, 692 (Wyo. 2000) (finding that “revocation proceedings in Wyoming 
are fundamentally different than the administrative process upon which [Scarpelli] 
is based” and holding that under Wyoming‟s judicial revocation procedure, the 
Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for indigent probationers).   
Similarly, in Florida, probation revocation proceedings retain important 
distinctions not contemplated by the Court in Scarpelli.  This Court has 
emphasized the differences between parole and probation in recognizing that a 
probationer is entitled to more rights than parolees: 
Probation is under the jurisdiction of the courts, and it was in 
the exercise of our authority over the court system that we determined 
in Hicks that counsel must be furnished in all probation revocation 
hearings.  Parole is administered by the [Parole] Commission.  
Moreover, parole revocation proceedings are conducted by 
nonlawyers.  Requiring that counsel be furnished in every case would 
inevitably lead to the use of counsel by the state.  As noted in 
[Scarpelli], the decision-making process would be prolonged and the 
financial cost to the state would be substantial.  Finally, unlike 
probation revocation, parole revocation does not lead to a sentencing 
hearing which necessarily requires the appointment of counsel. 
 
Floyd, 509 So. 2d at 920.  Unlike the parallel situations for parole and probation 
contemplated by Scarpelli, probation revocation procedures in Florida possess 
numerous important characteristics distinguishing them from parole proceedings.  
In fact, Florida‟s judicial revocation procedures are more closely akin to the 
circumstances faced by the Supreme Court in Mempa, where the Court held there 
was a right to counsel, than those faced by the Court in Scarpelli, where the Court 
 
26 
was careful to distinguish its facts from those in Mempa.  In short, probation 
revocation proceedings in Florida, as in Mempa, are adversarial criminal 
proceedings that ordinarily contemplate consideration of both revocation and 
sentencing at a single judicial hearing.   
In light of the direct relationship of sentencing to probation revocation 
proceedings, this Court and others have characterized probation revocation 
hearings as deferred sentencing proceedings.  See Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139, 
1140 (Fla. 1985); Tur v. State, 797 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Santeufemio v. 
State, 745 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  Florida law explicitly reflects 
this characterization: if probation or community control is revoked, the court is 
required to adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and 
proven or admitted, unless the probationer or offender has been previously 
adjudged guilty of the offense, and impose any sentence which it might have 
originally imposed before placing the defendant on probation or into community 
control.  § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2003);7 see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.790(b)(1).  The 
interrelated nature of probation revocation and sentencing was a direct concern of 
this Court in State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1985), where, unlike the Court in 
Scarpelli, we held that counsel must be appointed to probationers in all revocation 
proceedings:  “Further, a probation revocation usually leads to sentencing; an 
                                          
 
7.  This law is currently codified as section 948.06(2)(b), Florida Statutes 
(2007). 
 
27 
attorney is required at a sentencing proceeding.  It seems illogical not to mandate 
an attorney when revocation is likely to lead to incarceration and to require an 
attorney only when the length of that incarceration is being decided.”  Hicks, 478 
So. 2d at 23 n.*. 
While both probation and parole revocation proceedings must adhere to 
constitutional due process requirements, see Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 
498 (Fla. 1974), this Court has consistently recognized they differ in many critical 
respects.  Importantly, for example, probation in Florida is under the jurisdiction of 
the courts, rather than an administrative agency like the Parole Commission.  See 
Floyd, 509 So. 2d at 920.  Furthermore, a court may place a defendant on probation 
either with or without an adjudication of guilt.  See § 948.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2003); 
see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.670 (“[W]here allowed by law, the judge may withhold 
an adjudication of guilt if the judge places the defendant on probation.”).8  
Although probation revocation proceedings do not require strict adherence to the 
formal rules of evidence, see Cuciak v. State, 410 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1982), 
such proceedings provide a defendant with other protections and rights also found 
in criminal trials.  For example, the exclusionary rule applies in probation 
revocation proceedings.  See State v. Scarlet, 800 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. 2001); 
                                          
 
8.  The “where allowed by law” language was added to the rule after 2003.  
See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure–Conform Rules to 
2004 Legislation, 900 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 2005). 
 
 
28 
State v. Cross, 487 So. 2d 1056, 1057-58 (Fla. 1986).  And, as noted above, a 
defendant charged with a violation of probation has an absolute right to counsel in 
revocation proceedings.  Hicks, 478 So. 2d at 23.  While a trial court has broad 
discretion to revoke probation, Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007) 
(citing State ex rel. Roberts v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1962)), and may 
conduct probation revocation proceedings in an informal manner, the judge may 
not assume the role of a prosecutor, Edwards v. State, 807 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2002).  As in all criminal prosecutions, the judicial factfinder in a revocation 
proceeding must be neutral and detached, so the roles of prosecutor and judge must 
remain separate and distinct.  Merchan v. State, 495 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1986).  Further, unlike the limited rights granted parolees, a defendant may appeal 
an order revoking probation as well as the sentence imposed after revocation.  See 
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D).   
As recognized by this Court in Floyd and as set out above, there are 
numerous important differences between parole and probation in Florida.  First, 
parole and parole revocation are conducted by the Parole Commission, which is an 
administrative body that may be composed of nonlawyers.  In contrast, probation 
and probation revocation fall under the jurisdiction of the courts.  Second, while 
the exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation proceedings, it applies in 
probation revocation proceedings.  Third, in Florida all probationers are entitled to 
 
29 
the appointment of counsel in probation revocation proceedings, whereas all 
parolees are not similarly entitled to the appointment of counsel.  Fourth, a parolee 
seeking review of a revocation order must seek an extraordinary writ in the circuit 
court, while a probationer seeking review of a revocation order may appeal the 
decision to a district court of appeal.  Finally and perhaps most importantly, parole 
is imposed and revocation proceedings are commenced only after the individual 
has been tried, convicted, and sentenced, while probation, and certainly probation 
revocation, is only an interim step in the criminal sentencing process.  
As outlined above, it is apparent that parole and probation revocation 
proceedings in Florida are not the identical administrative proceedings 
contemplated in Scarpelli.  Hopefully, this analysis demonstrates that reliance on 
Scarpelli is unwarranted in light of the important distinctions between probation 
revocation procedures in Florida and the administrative procedures contemplated 
in Scarpelli.  These differences are especially important in light of the fact that the 
Court in Scarpelli specifically distinguished its earlier decision in Mempa which 
involved probation revocation proceedings like those in Florida which we have 
characterized as deferred sentencing.  The judicial nature of probation revocation 
proceedings was simply not contemplated by the Court in Scarpelli. 
Crawford and Sentencing 
 
30 
Florida law establishing probation revocation proceedings as deferred 
sentencing hearings is critical to any determination of whether Crawford and the 
right of confrontation should apply to such proceedings.  This Court has expressly 
held that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and Crawford apply to 
sentencing proceedings.  See Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 663 (Fla. 2006) 
(holding that “a defendant‟s rights under the Confrontation Clause apply to the 
guilt phase, the penalty phase, and sentencing” and that Crawford applies to the 
penalty phase of a capital trial), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 59 (2007); Way v. State, 
760 So. 2d 903, 917 (Fla. 2000) (agreeing with defendant‟s assertion that the 
Confrontation Clause applies to sentencing proceedings); Rodriguez v. State, 753 
So. 2d 29, 43 (Fla. 2000) (stating that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 
applies to all three phases of a capital trial); Engle v. State, 438 So. 2d 803, 813-14 
(Fla. 1983) (observing that “sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal 
proceeding” and that “the right of confrontation protected by cross-examination is 
a right that has been applied to the sentencing process”); accord Desue v. State, 
908 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (assuming that the Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation applies to sentencing hearings).  We cannot logically refuse 
to apply Crawford to the deferred sentencing proceedings that take place at a 
probation revocation hearing while applying Crawford to other sentencing 
proceedings. 
 
31 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, because this Court has identified revocation proceedings as 
deferred sentencing proceedings, and we have held that Crawford applies to 
sentencing proceedings, I cannot agree with the majority‟s determination that 
Crawford should not apply to probation revocation proceedings in Florida.  Here, 
in the same criminal proceeding, the trial court found Robert Sheldon Peters guilty 
of a violation of his community control, revoked his community control, and 
sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison for his crime.  Probation and 
community control revocation proceedings, such as these, are deferred sentencing 
proceedings to which Crawford should apply.   
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D04-2642 
 
 
(Walton County) 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David A. Davis, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, 
Bureau Chief, and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent