Title: Ex parte Insurance Express, LLC, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2022-0939
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2023

Rel: August 25, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
SPECIAL TERM, 2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0939  
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Insurance Express, LLC, Wayne Taylor, and Julie 
Singley 
   
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: Insurance Express, LLC  
 
v. 
 
 Lynne Ernest Insurance, LLC, et al.)  
 
(Choctaw Circuit Court: CV-20-9) 
 
SHAW, Justice. 
SC-2022-0939 
2 
 
 
Insurance Express, LLC ("Insurance Express"), Wayne Taylor, and 
Julie Singley ("the petitioners") have filed a petition for a writ of 
mandamus directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate an order 
staying the underlying action against the defendants below, Lynne 
Ernest Insurance, LLC ("LEI"), Lynne Ernest, Chynna Ernest, and 
Deadra Stokley.  We grant the petition and issue the writ. 
Facts and Procedural History 
Insurance Express commenced an action against LEI, Lynne, 
Chynna, and Stokley ("the defendants").  According to the complaint, 
Lynne and Stokley were longtime employees of Insurance Express.  It 
alleged that they, while still employed by Insurance Express, entered 
Insurance Express's office after business hours and, without 
authorization, made electronic copies of various business records related 
to Insurance Express's clients and insurance policies.  Lynne and Stokley 
resigned soon after and began employment with LEI, which purportedly 
had been formed by Lynne and Chynna and was a direct competitor of 
Insurance Express.  Lynne and Stokley, it is alleged, then induced some 
Insurance Express clients to transfer their policies to LEI.  The complaint 
also claimed that Lynne had paid premiums for Insurance Express 
SC-2022-0939 
3 
 
clients from a trust account without first collecting the premiums from 
the clients and had used Insurance Express funds to pay her personal 
expenses. 
Insurance Express sought injunctive relief to, among other things, 
prevent the defendants from communicating with past or current 
customers of Insurance Express and to require the defendants to return 
any customer information taken by them.  It further sought damages for 
breach of contract, conversion, intentional interference with business 
relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. 
The defendants filed counterclaims apparently seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief and damages on counts of hostile work 
environment/sexual harassment, assault and battery, defamation, 
tortious interference with a contractual or employment relationship, and 
conversion.  The counterclaim pleadings are not included in the materials 
provided to this Court, but it appears that Taylor, the principal owner of 
Insurance Express, and Singley, an employee, were added to the action 
as counterclaim defendants. 
As discovery progressed, Taylor was deposed.  After the deposition, 
the defendants filed a motion to stay the litigation.  They asserted that, 
SC-2022-0939 
4 
 
in his deposition, Taylor had stated that he had contacted the Alabama 
Department of Insurance ("the Department"), the Alabama Attorney 
General's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and the 
Choctaw County District Attorney, requesting that those entities 
criminally prosecute the defendants for their conduct alleged in the 
complaint.  Taylor, the defendants alleged, had indicated that some of 
those entities had opened investigations of the defendants' conduct, that 
he believed that those investigations remained open, and that he 
intended to continue to push for the prosecution of Lynne and Stokley.  
The defendants argued that, under Alabama law, the underlying action 
was due to be stayed until such time as any statute of limitations expired 
for any criminal charges that Taylor intended to pursue. 
In their response to the motion to stay, the petitioners contended, 
among other things, that the evidence did not demonstrate that there 
was a criminal investigation.  Specifically, the petitioners claimed that 
the defendants' "sole evidence" consisted of assertions by Taylor during 
his deposition that "he intended to pursue a criminal case" against them, 
which, the petitioners argued, was insufficient to support a motion to 
stay. 
SC-2022-0939 
5 
 
After the filing of a reply by the defendants and a hearing, the trial 
court granted their motion and stayed the case "until all applicable 
statutes of limitations have expired for any potential criminal 
prosecution that could be brought against Defendants based on the 
allegations [in Insurance Express's] Complaint."  The trial court stated 
that "Taylor's deposition testimony unequivocally shows that he intends 
to use Defendants' deposition testimony in an attempt to have ongoing 
criminal investigations culminate in criminal charges against" the 
defendants and that Taylor's testimony showed that investigations by the 
Choctaw County District Attorney and the Department were still 
pending.   
The petitioners timely filed their petition seeking a writ of 
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the stay.  This Court 
ordered answer and briefs.  We grant the petition and issue the writ. 
Standard of Review 
Generally, a trial court's decision on a motion to stay a civil action 
when a party alleges that it is the subject of a criminal proceeding may 
be challenged by a petition for a writ of mandamus.  See, e.g., Ex parte 
SC-2022-0939 
6 
 
Rawls, 953 So. 2d 374 (Ala. 2006), and Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011 
(Ala. 1998). 
 
"'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that 
is available when a trial court has exceeded its discretion. Ex 
parte Fidelity Bank, 893 So. 2d 1116, 1119 (Ala. 2004).  A writ 
of mandamus is "appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) 
a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty 
upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to 
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the 
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court."  Ex parte BOC 
Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).'" 
 
Rawls, 953 So. 2d at 377 (quoting Ex parte Antonucci, 917 So. 2d 825, 
830 (Ala. 2005)).  In granting the motion for a stay in the instant case, 
the trial court received no live, in-court testimony and instead considered 
only the arguments of counsel and evidentiary materials.  Thus, our 
review of the facts and the application of the law to those facts is de novo.  
Antonucci, 917 So. 2d at 830.  Further, "the purpose of our review is to 
determine only if the petitioner[s] [have] shown that the trial court 
exceeded the discretion accorded it in determining whether to grant the 
requested stay."  Id. 
Discussion 
 
Under certain circumstances, a civil action may be stayed by a court 
when a party's right against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
SC-2022-0939 
7 
 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States may be implicated.  
"Generally, under the Fifth Amendment …, '[n]o person ... shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'"  Ex parte 
McDaniel, 291 So. 3d 847, 852 (Ala. 2019).  The Fifth Amendment "'not 
only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a 
witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him 
not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil 
or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate 
him in future criminal proceedings.'" Rawls, 953 So. 2d at 379-80 
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).  A party in a civil 
action may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination even when "no criminal charges have been instituted ... so 
long as the party reasonably apprehends a risk of self-incrimination.  A 
party need not be indicted to properly claim the Fifth Amendment 
privilege."  Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 787 (Ala. 2003). 
 
However, "'the Constitution does not require a stay of civil 
proceedings pending the outcome of potential criminal proceedings.'"  
Rawls, 953 So. 2d at 378 (quoting Ex parte Coastal Training Inst., 583 
So. 2d 979, 980 (Ala. 1991)).  Nevertheless, a trial court has the discretion 
SC-2022-0939 
8 
 
to delay or postpone discovery in a civil action "'when "justice requires" 
that it do so "to protect a party or persons from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."'"  Id. (quoting 
Ex parte Coastal Training, 583 So. 2d at 981, quoting in turn Rule 26(c), 
Ala. R. Civ. P.).   
 
Three factors are addressed in determining whether a stay is 
warranted: 
"(1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding 
are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala. 
1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination will be threatened if the 
civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So. 
2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether the requirements of 
the balancing tests set out in Ex parte Baugh, 530 So. 2d 
[238,] 244 [(Ala. 1988)], and Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 
789 (Ala. 2003), are met." 
 
Rawls, 953 So. 2d at 378. 
 
The petitioners contend that the defendants did not demonstrate 
that there exists a parallel criminal proceeding to the underlying civil 
action.  It is undisputed that the defendants have not been criminally 
charged.  Despite this, a stay may be warranted if the existence of a 
parallel criminal investigation is clearly demonstrated: 
 
"Alabama caselaw is staunchly committed to the 
proposition that actual criminal charges are not necessary to 
SC-2022-0939 
9 
 
justify the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, so long as the party moving for the stay 
clearly demonstrates to the trial judge that that party is the 
subject 
of 
an 
ongoing, 
and 
overlapping, 
criminal 
investigation." 
 
Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 785 (second emphasis added).  Compare 
McDaniel, 291 So. 3d at 854-55 (holding that a party who was the target 
of a criminal investigation failed to clearly demonstrate that such 
investigation was parallel to the civil proceedings in which the party 
sought a stay), and Ex parte Pegram, 646 So. 2d 644, 646 (Ala. 1994) 
(holding that a plaintiff demonstrated a clear right to a writ of mandamus 
vacating a stay when the evidence was insufficient to show that the 
defendant was under a criminal investigation), with Ex parte Williams, 
775 So. 2d 146, 148 (Ala. 2000) (holding that a stay was warranted when, 
although a criminal charge had been withdrawn, there remained an 
ongoing criminal investigation and allegations by a State agency of 
statutory violations), and Ex parte S.B., 164 So. 3d 599, 601 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2014) (holding that a stay was required in a termination-of-
parental-rights case when the mother faced a criminal investigation and 
likely criminal prosecution). 
SC-2022-0939 
10 
 
 
The key evidence relevant to the possibility of a criminal 
investigation in this case is Taylor's deposition testimony and a letter 
from the Department discussing an investigation of the defendants.  As 
to Taylor's testimony, it appears that he was questioned regarding 
certain documents and letters he had sent to Insurance Express's 
customers urging them to not change their insurance from Insurance 
Express to LEI.  He was also questioned as to his efforts to have various 
law-enforcement entities investigate the defendants.  
 
Specifically, Taylor was questioned regarding a letter from the 
Choctaw County District Attorney's Office indicating that it "couldn't 
help" him with an investigation.  Taylor denied knowing whether any 
such investigation was "closed" and stated that it was "possibly" still 
ongoing.  However, Taylor had not actually spoken to the Choctaw 
County District Attorney after receiving the letter. 
 
Taylor was further questioned about a letter he had sent to a United 
States Attorney's Office.  Taylor did not know the status of any complaint 
to that office or any investigation by that office, did not receive a "formal" 
response to his letter, and received no communication from anyone in the 
office.  Taylor also stated that he had communicated with individuals 
SC-2022-0939 
11 
 
from the National Insurance Crime Bureau, a non-law-enforcement 
organization, whose representatives had told him that the matter should 
be "in the hands of the FBI."  Taylor, however, testified that he had not 
actually spoken with the FBI. 
 
Taylor did contact the local sheriff, who indicated that his office 
could not handle a "very large white-collar case" involving "forensic 
computer work" and advised Taylor to consult other law-enforcement 
agencies.  Taylor further contacted the Gilbertown Police Department, 
who examined his records but, purportedly at his request, did not charge 
the defendants.  The materials before us do not indicate that Taylor 
further pursued the matter with that department.  Taylor also testified 
that he had contacted the Attorney General's Office, which, he said, had 
referred him to the Department. 
 
Taylor was also questioned about correspondence he had sent to 
Insurance Express's customers claiming that there was a fraud 
investigation against LEI, that the individual defendants would be soon 
arrested, that there were 15 counts of fraud involved, and that theft, 
forgery, and other charges existed.  Taylor acknowledged, when 
questioned, that no such charges had been filed and that the individual 
SC-2022-0939 
12 
 
defendants had never been arrested.  At one point Taylor also claimed 
that he had documentation from his computerized record system showing 
that Lynne had received customer information, but he had not provided 
such documentation in discovery and, despite all his efforts to seek a 
criminal investigation, had not provided it to law enforcement.  The 
following exchange appears to summarize the status of any investigation: 
"[Counsel for the petitioners:] And in some of your 
contacts with law enforcement it sounds like you were told 
that they were considering or potentially planning on 
pursuing criminal charges against Lynne Ernest and/or Ms. 
Stokley, was that your understanding of some of these 
conversations? 
 
"[Taylor:] That's correct. 
 
"[Counsel:] Again, as we sit here today you're not aware 
that anything like that has happened; is that right? 
 
"[Taylor:] That's right." 
 
Taylor, however, indicated that he had not "given up" on seeking 
criminal charges against the defendants: 
"[Taylor:] Let's just say this has been a pretty big thing, 
there's been a lot of work going into this and it's not something 
that I'm taking lightly. 
 
"[Counsel for the defendants:] You haven't given up on 
criminal prosecution, have you? 
SC-2022-0939 
13 
 
 
"[Taylor:] No, I have not. 
 
"[Counsel:] You plan to continue to pursue that as long 
as you can? 
 
"[Taylor:] Yes."1 
 
It appears that the Department, in response to complaints by 
Taylor, conducted some form of an investigation of the defendants.  
Taylor indicated that an investigator with the Department, Agent Reed, 
came to Insurance Express's office and reviewed materials.  According to 
Taylor, Agent Reed said that 15 insurance-fraud charges were uncovered.  
The Department also received documents and records from Taylor as well 
as a response from Lynne.  It subsequently issued a letter, authored by 
counsel for the Department, stating in part as follows: 
"[O]fficials with the Department made a significant 
investment of time and effort in determining whether the 
allegations presented in your complaint and the opposing 
claims set forth by [Lynne] were supported by confirmed facts 
and existing documentary evidence.  From the initial 
investigation performed by Special Agent Reed to the several 
conference calls and meetings between you and your team and 
 
1There was no testimony by Taylor indicating that he intended to 
use the deposition testimony of the defendants to further his attempts to 
have the defendants criminally prosecuted, nor is there anything before 
this Court suggesting the defendants' deposition testimony would reveal 
information relevant to such attempts.   
SC-2022-0939 
14 
 
members of the Department staff, every claim was carefully 
substantiated to the extent possible and analyzed to 
determine if an actionable violation was committed by 
[Lynne], or any other licensee of the Department whom you 
identified as a potential wrongdoer." 
 
The letter indicated that the Department "did not identify any 
instances of actionable insurance fraud, or clear violations of the 
Alabama Insurance Code, which would provide a sufficient basis for 
initiating an administrative action against [Lynne]" or "to take 
regulatory action."  (Emphasis added.)  It concluded: 
"Lastly, it is my understanding all of these allegations, 
or areas of dispute, are the subject of civil litigation which you 
initiated against [Lynne].  Once concluded, that action would 
presumably resolve the question of whether [Lynne] 
committed the acts you alleged in your complaint to the 
Department.  Because it is the Department's policy to refrain 
from duplicating, or relitigating, issues and disputes 
currently before the courts, no further action will be taken at 
this time regarding your complaint until a final result is 
reached in the civil case. Upon its conclusion, we will be happy 
to revisit the matter if the outcome and conditions warrant 
doing so." 
 
 
The evidence in this case, namely Taylor's deposition and the 
Department's letter, does not clearly establish the existence of a criminal 
investigation.  The agencies Taylor claimed that he had contacted have 
either not replied, declined to investigate, not initiated charges, or, after 
SC-2022-0939 
15 
 
an actual investigation and review of the allegations and evidence, found 
no actionable wrongdoing.  Many forms of conduct underlying the basis 
of civil litigation may also form the basis of a potential criminal 
prosecution.  When allegations of wrongdoing in a civil action purportedly 
could rise to the level of criminal misconduct, but law-enforcement and 
regulatory agencies repeatedly decline to investigate, to prosecute, or to 
prosecute after an investigation, and years have passed with no further 
law-enforcement action -- in this case, three years -- we cannot hold that 
a party has "clearly demonstrate[d]" that it "is the subject of an ongoing, 
and overlapping, criminal investigation."  Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 785 
(emphasis added).   
 
The defendants point out that Taylor testified that he continues to 
desire to seek criminal prosecution.  Although it is true that he claims to 
maintain that subjective desire, the evidence indicates that his efforts 
have been continually fruitless and, in effect, rejected.  The defendants 
further point out that the Department has not foreclosed the possibility 
of later opening another investigation.  This, however, merely confirms 
that an investigation does not exist; as Ebbers notes, to require a stay, 
there must be an "ongoing" investigation.  The Department previously 
SC-2022-0939 
16 
 
conducted and concluded an investigation, found no wrongdoing, and 
declined to pursue charges.  At best, the defendants' concerns are 
speculative, which will not support the issuance of a stay.  Ebbers, 871 
So. 2d at 788 ("'[A] motion to stay civil discovery during the pendency of 
a parallel criminal proceeding is not properly granted upon speculative 
or conclusory grounds.'" (quoting Ex parte Hill, 674 So. 2d 530, 533 (Ala. 
1996))).    
 
The defendants did not establish that a stay was warranted in the 
underlying action.  Thus, the trial court exceeded its discretion in 
granting a stay.   
Conclusion 
 
  For the above reasons, the petitioners have established that they 
have a clear legal right to the relief sought.  Therefore, we grant the 
petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its 
order granting a stay. 
 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, 
Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur.