Title: Duncan v. Smith, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 610, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AMY DUNCAN,1  
 
 
 
§   No. 610, 2018 
Respondent Below, Appellant,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Court Below—Family Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
PAMELA SMITH, 
 
 
 
§   File No. CK17-03850 
Petitioner Below, Appellee, 
 
§   Petition No. 17-33357 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
CINDY DUNCAN,  
 
 
 
§ 
FREDRICK DUNCAN, JR., 
 
 
§ 
FREDRICK DUNCAN, SR., 
 
 
§ 
Respondents Below, Appellees,  
§ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
AMY DUNCAN,  
 
 
 
§   No. 610, 2018 
Respondent Below, Appellant,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Court Below—Family Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
CINDY DUNCAN, 
 
 
 
§   File No. CK14-02301 
FREDRICK DUNCAN, SR., 
 
 
§   Petition No. 17-30023 
Petitioners Below, Appellees, 
 
§ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
FREDRICK DUNCAN, JR.,   
 
§ 
Respondent Below, Appellee.  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  May 31, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  July 30, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 
 
ORDER 
 
 
 Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that:  
(1) 
The appellant, Amy Duncan (“Mother”), and the appellee Fredrick 
Duncan, Jr. (“Father”) have three children—Grant, Iris, and Heather.  Grant is now 
four years old, Iris is eight, and Heather is twelve.  Mother filed this appeal from a 
Family Court order that, among other things, granted guardianship of Grant to the 
appellees Fredrick Duncan, Sr. (“Paternal Grandfather”) and Cindy Duncan 
(“Paternal Grandmother” and, together with Paternal Grandfather, the “Paternal 
Grandparents”).  The order also denied the petition of the appellee Pamela Smith 
(“Maternal Grandmother”) for guardianship of the children.  Mother appeals the 
order solely to the extent it awarded guardianship of Grant to the Paternal 
Grandparents, arguing that the Family Court’s factual findings do not support its 
conclusion that Grant is dependent.  For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.   
(2) 
On August 25, 2014, before Grant was born, the Paternal Grandparents 
filed a petition for guardianship of Heather and Iris, and a Commissioner of the 
Family Court granted the accompanying motion for emergency guardianship.  
Mother and Father, who it appears may have been undergoing inpatient treatment in 
Florida at the time, failed to appear at a mediation conference on October 23, 2014, 
and a Commissioner entered a default order granting guardianship of Heather and 
3 
 
Iris to the Paternal Grandparents, with visitation to occur as mutually agreed by the 
parties. 
(3) 
After Mother and Father returned from Florida, Heather and Iris began 
living with them again, although the Paternal Grandparents continued to have 
guardianship.  In April 2017, Mother and Father filed a petition to rescind 
guardianship of Heather and Iris.  The Family Court denied the parents’ petition for 
rescission on October 23, 2017.  The court found that the Paternal Grandparents paid 
the parents’ living expenses; Mother and Father did not have fulltime employment; 
and Mother and Father had not demonstrated that they were financially able to 
support and care for Heather and Iris.  The court was also concerned that the parents 
continued to suffer from substance abuse issues. 
(4) 
On September 25, 2017 the Paternal Grandparents filed a petition for 
guardianship of Grant.  They alleged that Mother and Father were in drug 
rehabilitation and had no means of supporting Grant.  They also alleged, without any 
factual specificity, “possible neglect” of Grant.  In her answer to the petition, Mother 
indicated that she could provide clean drug screens and had provided clean screens 
to the Paternal Grandparents; that the Paternal Grandmother was emotionally and 
mentally abusive to Heather and Iris; that Paternal Grandfather suffered from 
Parkinson’s disease, which placed the children at risk when they were in his care; 
4 
 
and that she worked as a server at a restaurant in Wilmington and part-time for a 
friend’s house-flipping company.  
(5) 
A few weeks after the Paternal Grandparents filed their petition for 
guardianship of Grant, Maternal Grandmother filed a petition for guardianship of 
Heather and Iris, alleging that Heather and Iris were dependent, neglected, or abused 
in the Paternal Grandparents’ care.  Mother supported Maternal Grandmother’s 
petition.  Maternal Grandmother also filed a motion for emergency guardianship of 
Heather and Iris, which the Family Court denied. 
(6) 
The court held a hearing on the petitions for guardianship on November 
9, 2018.  At the hearing, Maternal Grandmother orally amended her petition, in order 
to request guardianship of Grant as well.   
(7) 
The testimony provided at the hearing reflected that in mid-October 
2018—approximately a year after the grandparents filed their guardianship petitions 
and just a few weeks before the hearing on the guardianship petitions—Mother and 
Father separated.  Mother moved to Maternal Grandmother’s home in Lewes, 
Delaware, and could no longer work at the restaurant in Wilmington.  She therefore 
applied to truck-driving school and was awaiting financial approval and an 
opportunity to begin the four-week program.  At the time of the separation, Mother 
and Father placed Grant in the Paternal Grandparents’ care, because the parents 
could not afford daycare and to allow time for Mother to complete her move to 
5 
 
Lewes.  After moving to Lewes, Mother applied, and was approved, for the State 
Purchase of Care program and, using that assistance, had secured a place for Grant 
at a daycare in Lewes. 
(8) 
At the time of the hearing, Grant had been staying with the Paternal 
Grandparents for a few weeks.  Paternal Grandmother did not allege that Grant was 
abused when he was living with Mother.  But Paternal Grandmother believed that 
Grant’s clothes were not clean and testified that trash and clothes had been strewn 
around Mother’s and Father’s house and mattresses were placed on the floor.  By 
contrast, no one provided any testimony that the conditions at Paternal 
Grandmother’s home, where Mother had moved after the parents’ separation, were 
not suitable for children. 
(9) 
The Family Court granted the Paternal Grandparents’ petition for 
guardianship of Grant.  The court found that Grant was dependent because (i) Mother 
was not financially independent, having recently separated from Father and relying 
on Maternal Grandmother for housing and to pay expenses while Mother “plans to 
attend school to hopefully obtain a job to support herself”; and (ii) by placing Grant 
with the Paternal Grandparents, “Mother and Father made the decision that they 
were unable to care for [Grant] at that time.” 
6 
 
(10) On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal 
determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.2  We will not disturb the 
Family Court’s rulings on appeal if the court’s findings of fact are supported by the 
record and its explanations, deductions, and inferences are the product of an orderly 
and logical reasoning process.3  We review legal rulings de novo.4  If the Family 
Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of review is abuse of discretion.5  
On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
trier of fact.6 
(11) On appeal, Mother argues that the Family Court erred by (i) failing to 
make factual findings sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that Grant is 
dependent, as required by 13 Del. C. § 2330(a)(2)(a), and (ii) failing to afford Mother 
a presumption that returning Grant to her care and custody is in Grant’s best interests.  
Mother also contends that the Family Court’s factual findings relating to Grant do 
not support the court’s conclusion that guardianship with the Paternal Grandparents 
is in Grant’s best interests. 
(12) Mother did not consent to the Paternal Grandparents’ guardianship of 
Grant.  Therefore, under 11 Del. C. § 2330(a), before granting a guardianship 
                                                 
2 Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012). 
3 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
4 Id. 
5 CASA v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 2003). 
6 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
7 
 
petition the Family Court was required to find that (i) Grant is “dependent, neglected 
or abused and the reasons therefor” and (ii) it is in Grant’s best interests for the 
guardianship to be granted.7  The Paternal Grandparents, as the parties seeking 
guardianship, had the burden of establishing both dependency and best interests by 
a preponderance of the evidence.8  The guardianship statute defines dependency in 
accordance with 10 Del. C. § 901.9  10 Del. C. § 901(8) provides as follows: 
“Dependency” or “dependent child” means that a person: 
 
a. Is responsible for the care, custody, and/or control of the child; 
and 
 
b. Does not have the ability and/or financial means to provide for 
the care of the child; and 
 
1. Fails to provide necessary care with regard to: food, clothing, 
shelter, education, health care, medical care or other care 
necessary for the child’s emotional, physical or mental 
health, or safety and general well-being; or 
 
2. The child is living in the home of an “adult individual” who 
fails to meet the definition of “relative” in this section on an 
extended basis without an assessment by DSCYF, or its 
licensed agency; or 
 
3. The child has been placed with a licensed agency which 
certifies it cannot complete a suitable adoption plan. 
 
In making a finding of dependency under this section, consideration 
may be given to dependency, neglect, or abuse history of any party.10 
                                                 
7 11 Del. C. § 2330(a)(2). 
8 Id. 
9 See 13 Del. C. § 2302(7) (referring to 10 Del. C. § 901 for the definition of dependency). 
10 10 Del. C. § 901(8). 
8 
 
 
Grandparents are “relatives” under Section 901.11 
(13) In this case, the Family Court based its determination of dependency on 
two facts:  Mother’s lack of financial independence and the parents’ placing Grant 
in the care of the Paternal Grandparents in the wake of the parents’ separation.  We 
conclude that these grounds are insufficient to support a finding of dependency under 
13 Del. C. § 2330(a)(2)(a) and 10 Del. C. § 901(8). 
(14) First, the Family Court’s factual findings regarding Mother’s lack of 
financial independence are insufficient to support a finding of dependency.  A child 
is dependent under the statute only if the parent lacks the financial means to provide 
for the care of the child and actually fails to provide necessary care.12  The court did 
not find facts indicating that Grant was not receiving appropriate care when he was 
living with Mother during the year between when the Paternal Grandparents filed 
for guardianship and when the guardianship hearing occurred.  The testimony at the 
hearing reflected that, during that period, Mother worked while Father stayed home 
with Grant;13 Mother regularly took Grant to his medical appointments;14 and Mother 
was compliant with her methadone treatment and had clean drug screens. Although 
Mother appears to have relied heavily on family members to provide care for Grant 
                                                 
11 Id. § 901(20). 
12 10 Del. C. § 901(b), (b)(1). 
13 Transcript of Hearing, Nov. 9, 2018, at 93-94. 
14 Id. at 92-93. 
9 
 
while she worked, that is not unusual in many families and neither the Family 
Court’s decision nor the transcript of the hearing indicate that she failed to provide 
or obtain appropriate care for him at any time.  Parents frequently rely on family 
members to assist with child care, and a parent’s enlisting others to help does not 
establish dependency.  Indeed, the statutory definition of dependency supports that 
conclusion, as extended placement in a nonrelative’s home without DSCYF 
involvement is sufficient to support a finding of dependency, while extended 
placement in a relative’s home is not.15  Moreover, it was the unfortunate timing of 
the parents’ separation in relation to the hearing—and Mother’s accompanying move 
to Lewes—that resulted in Mother’s moving in with her mother and not being 
employed at the time of the hearing.  But, the move to the Maternal Grandmother’s 
house itself cuts against the rationality of the Family Court’s ruling.  The Mother’s 
mother has a house adequate for children and, along with the Mother, is capable of 
adequately providing for Grant. 
(15) Second, Mother’s and Father’s decision to entrust Grant to the care of 
his grandparents during a transitional period also is insufficient to find him 
dependent.  As noted above, a parent’s decision to place a child with a relative, as 
opposed to a nonrelative, is not grounds for a finding of dependency under the 
                                                 
15 10 Del. C. § 901(b)(2). 
10 
 
statute.16  In addition, although the testimony at the hearing did not reflect that 
Mother and Father indicated how long they planned for Grant to stay with the 
Paternal Grandparents, it also did not reflect that they intended it to be a permanent 
arrangement or that Mother entirely abdicated her responsibilities to care for Grant.  
Indeed, Mother remained involved with Grant, as evidenced by the fact that shortly 
after the parents placed Grant in the Paternal Grandparents’ care, Paternal 
Grandmother reported that Grant had a fever and she was going to take him to see 
the doctor, but Mother insisted that she would take him instead.17   
(16) We respect that the Family Court is familiar with this family and had 
determined in 2017 that Heather and Iris remained dependent.  But the parents’ 
circumstances may have been different at that time; Heather and Iris are different 
children than Grant; and Heather has some substantial medical and behavioral issues.  
We also recognize that the Family Court had the opportunity to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses, which we do not on a paper record.  But the court’s written decision 
does not reflect that the court discounted Mother’s credibility regarding her 
employment and care for Grant in the year preceding the guardianship hearing, nor 
do the court’s reasons for finding dependency indicate that the court found that 
Mother actually provided insufficient care to Grant during that period.  For these 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Transcript of Hearing, Nov. 9, 2018, at 103:15-23. 
11 
 
reasons, we conclude that the Family Court’s factual findings, as set forth in its 
decision, are insufficient to support a determination that the Paternal Grandparents 
proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Grant is dependent under Section 
901.  In light of our conclusion regarding dependency, we need not reach Mother’s 
arguments concerning the Family Court’s application of the best interest factors. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court relating to the guardianship of Grant is REVERSED.  The matter is 
REMANDED to the Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this order.  
Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice