Title: OLR v. Stanley Woodard
Citation: 2012 WI 41
Docket Number: 1993AP001135-D, 1994AP001838-D, 1996AP000884-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2012

2012 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Stanley v. Woodard, Attorney At Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Stanley V. Woodard, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Stanley V. Woodard, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
   v. 
Stanley V. Woodard, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WOODARD 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 27, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
2012 WI 41
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Stanley V. Woodard, Attorney At Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Stanley V. Woodard, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 27, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Stanley V. Woodard, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Stanley V. Woodard, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.   Reinstatement granted 
upon conditions.   
 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
2 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee, Lisa C. Goldman, that the license of Attorney 
Stanley V. Woodard to practice law in Wisconsin should be 
reinstated with certain specified conditions.1  After fully 
reviewing this matter, we agree with the referee that Attorney 
Woodard's license should be reinstated and that conditions 
should be placed upon his practice of law in this state.  We 
conclude, however, that the referee's suggested conditions on 
Attorney Woodard's return to the practice of law must be 
strengthened and clarified.  We also determine that Attorney 
Woodard 
should 
be 
required 
to 
pay 
the 
costs 
of 
this 
reinstatement proceeding, which were $5,263.16 as of October 17, 
2011. 
¶2 
The standards that apply to all petitions seeking 
reinstatement after a disciplinary suspension or revocation are 
set forth in SCR 22.31(1).2  In particular, the petitioning 
                                                 
1 Because neither party appealed from the referee's report 
and recommendation, our review proceeds under SCR 22.33(3), 
which provides that "[i]f no appeal is timely filed, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report, order reinstatement, 
with or without conditions, deny reinstatement, or order the 
parties to file briefs in the matter." 
2 SCR 22.31(1) states: 
The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating, 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, all 
of the following: 
(a) That he or she has the moral character to 
practice law in Wisconsin. 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
3 
 
attorney must demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that he or she has the moral character necessary to 
practice law in this state, that his or her resumption of the 
practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or subversive of the public interest, and that the 
attorney has complied fully with the terms of the suspension or 
revocation order and the requirements of SCR 22.26.  In 
addition, SCR 22.31(1)(c) incorporates the statements that a 
petition 
for 
reinstatement 
must 
contain 
pursuant 
to 
SCR 22.29(4)(a)-[(4m)].3  Thus, the petitioning attorney must 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) That his or her resumption of the practice of 
law will not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or subversive of the public interest. 
(c) That 
his or her representations in the 
petition, including the representations required by 
SCR 
22.29(4)(a) 
to 
[(4m)] 
and 
22.29(5), 
are 
substantiated. 
(d) That he or she has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
with the requirements of SCR 22.26. 
3 SCR 22.29(4)(a) through (4m) provides that a petition for 
reinstatement shall show all of the following: 
(a) The 
petitioner 
desires 
to 
have 
the 
petitioner's license reinstated. 
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during 
the period of suspension or revocation. 
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
will 
continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until 
the 
petitioner's license is reinstated. 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
4 
 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
required 
representations 
in 
the 
reinstatement petition are substantiated. 
¶3 
The following facts are taken from the referee's 
report.  No party has alleged that any of these factual findings 
are erroneous.   
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and 
learning in the law by attendance at identified 
educational activities. 
(e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension 
or revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. 
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of 
and attitude toward the standards that are imposed 
upon members of the bar and will act in conformity 
with the standards. 
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to 
the legal profession, the courts and the public as a 
person fit to be consulted by others and to represent 
them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence and in general to aid in the administration 
of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of 
the courts. 
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the 
requirements set forth in SCR 22.26. 
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license 
if reinstated. 
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's 
business activities during the period of suspension or 
revocation. 
(4m) The petitioner has made restitution to or 
settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by 
petitioner's misconduct, including reimbursement to 
the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection for 
all payments made from that fund, or, if not, the 
petitioner's explanation of the failure or inability 
to do so. 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
5 
 
¶4 
Attorney Woodard was admitted to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin in 1977.  He held a number of different positions 
during the time that he possessed an active license to practice 
law.  He was a staff attorney for Legal Action of Wisconsin, a 
staff attorney with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
and an assistant district attorney in Milwaukee County.  After a 
two-year stint in private practice, Attorney Woodard spent eight 
years in the Madison office of the State Public Defender.  He 
then worked in his own firm for approximately three years. 
¶5 
Attorney Woodard has an extensive disciplinary history 
that includes six separate impositions of public discipline over 
an 11-year period.   
¶6 
Attorney Woodard's first disciplinary matters resulted 
in public reprimands in 1985 and 1986 for neglecting client 
matters, failing to respond promptly to requests for information 
from the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR), 
the predecessor to the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR); 
failing to deposit client funds in a trust account; and 
misrepresenting the location of those client funds. 
¶7 
In 1989 Attorney Woodard's license was suspended for a 
period of 60 days due to his failure to file income tax returns 
and his failure to respond to inquiries from BAPR and the 
Department of Revenue.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Woodard, 150 Wis. 2d 594, 441 N.W.2d 750 (1989). 
¶8 
In 1994 
this court suspended Attorney Woodard's 
license for three years.  His misconduct in that case involved 
five separate clients and stemmed from (1) assisting the 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
6 
 
girlfriend of a client to violate the terms of the girlfriend's 
probation by delivering two packages from the girlfriend to the 
client in jail, one of which contained dangerous, banned 
material; (2) failing to attend to client matters; (3) failing 
to prepare for trial; (4) failing to act with diligence; (5) 
failing to keep a client properly informed; (6) failing to 
return a client's file upon request; (7) failing to refund 
unearned fees; (8) failing to appear at scheduled court hearings 
in three criminal matters; and (9) failing to cooperate with 
BAPR's investigations.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Woodard, 183 Wis. 2d 575, 515 N.W.2d 700 (1994).  In this 1994 
proceeding, Attorney Woodard submitted a psychiatrist's report 
that stated that Attorney Woodard suffered from major depression 
and dysthymia.4  The referee found that Attorney Woodard did 
suffer from those conditions, but concluded that they did not 
cause his misconduct and rejected Attorney Woodard's request 
that the disciplinary proceeding be converted to a medical 
incapacity 
proceeding. 
 
The 
court 
adopted 
the 
referee's 
recommendation that the reinstatement of Attorney Woodard's 
license should be conditioned on Attorney Woodard establishing 
that he no longer suffers from the medical incapacity that he 
had asserted in the proceeding.  Id., 183 Wis. 2d at 585-86.  
Attorney Woodard's license has not been reinstated since the 
time of this order. 
                                                 
4 Dysthymia has been defined as "morbid anxiety and 
depression accompanied by obsession."  Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary Unabridged 712 (1981). 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
7 
 
¶9 
This court imposed another one-year suspension in 1995 
for Attorney Woodard's misconduct in two more representations.  
His misconduct in those matters included failing to return a 
client's file, failing to refund unearned fees, failing to 
communicate with a client about not pursuing a criminal 
sentencing matter and not refunding a portion of the fees, and 
failing 
to 
communicate 
with 
BAPR 
in 
response 
to 
its 
investigations.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 
190 Wis. 2d 487, 526 N.W.2d 510 (1995). 
¶10 After Attorney Woodard stated that he could not 
successfully defend against BAPR's allegations of additional 
misconduct, this court granted Attorney Woodard's petition for 
the consensual revocation of his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1996.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Woodard, 200 Wis. 2d 66, 546 N.W.2d 162 (1996).  His admitted 
misconduct in that proceeding included using client trust 
account funds to pay for personal expenses, failing to maintain 
required trust account records, failing to document the purpose 
of trust account checks made payable to himself, and failing to 
account to a client for funds that Attorney Woodard had received 
and disbursed on the client's behalf. 
¶11 Since the revocation of his law license, Attorney 
Woodard has worked in a number of jobs.  He has taught at a 
local college, worked for the Boys and Girls Club, and worked 
for the University of Wisconsin.  His second most-recent 
position was with the University of Wisconsin Family Voices 
program, where he worked for three years.  His current position 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
8 
 
is the program director for the Lussier Community Education 
Center in Madison.  He has also volunteered with a number of 
community organizations. 
¶12 The referee's report discussed a number of issues and 
concerns regarding Attorney Woodard's reinstatement to the 
practice of law in this state.  She noted that having a license 
to practice law is a privilege that demands behavior above 
reproach so that an attorney can be trusted and respected by 
members of the community.  She pointed out that Attorney 
Woodard's prior conduct had not met that standard, as he had 
engaged 
in 
"dishonest, 
arrogant 
and 
criminal 
behavior."  
Specifically, she noted that Attorney Woodard had on multiple 
occasions taken money that did not belong to him and had refused 
to have meaningful discussions with his clients regarding 
financial issues.  Moreover, Attorney Woodard had abused his 
special status as an attorney to gain access to inmates in the 
jail when he had carried dangerous, banned items into the jail, 
which could have led to catastrophic results. 
¶13 The referee contrasted the conduct that resulted in 
Attorney Woodard's multiple suspensions and revocation with his 
conduct since the revocation of his law license in 1996.  She 
stated that since that time Attorney Woodard "has engaged in 
many activities that show a genuine desire to live a life 
demonstrated by good conduct."  He has maintained steady 
employment to contribute to his family's income.  He has also 
excelled as a volunteer for various causes.  Indeed, the referee 
noted that Attorney Woodard had received awards from a number of 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
9 
 
volunteer and community organizations, including, among others, 
the American Red Cross, the Madison Urban Ministry, the NAACP, 
and the Boys and Girls Club of Dane County.  In addition, 
Attorney Woodard submitted a host of letters from other lawyers 
and members of the community that spoke highly of his legal 
abilities and his volunteer contributions. 
¶14 The referee also addressed a couple of concerns raised 
by 
the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
(OLR) 
and 
her 
own 
consideration of the matter.  First, the referee noted that 
Attorney Woodard had faced the need to repay multiple debts 
stemming from his actions prior to the revocation of his law 
license and otherwise.   
¶15 Although this court's prior disciplinary orders did 
not expressly require Attorney Woodard to pay restitution, there 
were three former clients to whom Attorney Woodard owed money.  
The referee found that two of the clients had forgiven Attorney 
Woodard's debts.  One such client even spoke at the public 
hearing in favor of the reinstatement of Attorney Woodard's 
license. 
¶16 The third former client, R.F., had apparently not 
forgiven Attorney Woodard's debt nor had Attorney Woodard repaid 
the debt to R.F. prior to seeking reinstatement.  The referee 
indicated that she was wary of Attorney Woodard's handling of 
this matter.  Rather than fully repay the debt, which the 
referee believed was at least $1,500, or make arrangements to 
repay the debt over time, Attorney Woodard had recently sent a 
check for $500 to R.F. with a notation on the check and in a 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
10 
 
letter that the check would be a full and final settlement.  
R.F. cashed the check but also sent a letter disputing that the 
$500 payment had constituted a final settlement of the debt.  
R.F. did not appear at the reinstatement hearing or send a 
letter to the referee, however, to contend that Attorney Woodard 
still owed him any money.  Ultimately, although the referee 
questioned whether Attorney Woodard's attempt to have a partial 
payment constitute a final settlement of a debt to a client 
missed the need to demonstrate good conduct, the referee did not 
believe that this situation required that Attorney Woodard's 
reinstatement petition be denied. 
¶17 The referee also discussed the condition on Attorney 
Woodard's 
reinstatement 
set 
forth 
in 
this 
court's 
1994 
suspension order.  Specifically, this court ruled that in order 
to have his license reinstated, Attorney Woodard needed to 
"establish 
that 
he 
no 
longer 
suffers 
from 
the 
medical 
incapacity" 
he 
asserted 
in 
that 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
(depression and dysthymia).  The referee properly stated that 
Attorney Woodard bore the burden to prove this fact by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 
¶18 The referee noted that Attorney Woodard had presented 
only a single letter from a social worker, which stated that 
Attorney Woodard no longer suffers from depression or dysthymia 
to a degree which would render him incapable of performing the 
duties of an attorney.  The referee concluded that Attorney 
Woodard really needed to show that he was "fit" to resume the 
practice of law.  Although the referee acknowledged that this 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
11 
 
was not a medical incapacity reinstatement proceeding, she 
pointed to SCR 22.36, which relates to reinstatement following a 
medical incapacity suspension, as a basis to conclude that "fit" 
is "sufficiently broad to imply a state of preparedness to 
render competent legal services; that is, to be prepared to 
provide the measure of expertise to ensure the attorney may be 
safely recommended to the community as a person to be consulted 
by and to represent others in legal matters."  In re Medical 
Incapacity Proceedings Against Schlieve, 2010 WI 22, ¶24, 323 
Wis. 2d 654, 780 N.W.2d 516.  The referee concluded that an 
opinion from a psychiatrist or a psychologist regarding the lack 
of any medical incapacity was not required to show such a state 
of preparedness, especially where the OLR had not disputed the 
current lack of a medical incapacity or objected to the referee 
relying on the opinion of the social worker.  The referee 
emphasized that the OLR had agreed that if Attorney Woodard had 
been suffering from a major clinical depression, he would not 
have been able to hold the employment positions he has held in 
recent years.  Consequently, the referee concluded that Attorney 
Woodard had sufficiently demonstrated that he no longer suffers 
from a medical incapacity related to a major depression or 
dysthymia. 
¶19 Ultimately, 
after 
considering 
the 
documentary 
materials in the reinstatement file and the testimony submitted 
at the reinstatement hearing, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Woodard had complied with each of this court's prior 
disciplinary orders and the requirements imposed by SCR 22.26 on 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
12 
 
individuals whose licenses to practice law in Wisconsin have 
been suspended or revoked.  The referee further concluded that 
Attorney 
Woodard 
had 
satisfied 
all 
of 
the 
criteria 
for 
reinstatement set forth in SCR 22.29. 
¶20 Although 
the 
referee 
recommended 
that 
Attorney 
Woodard's license to practice law in this state be reinstated, 
she also recommended that three conditions be imposed on his 
return to the practice of law.  First, she recommended that 
Attorney Woodard be required to contact the State Bar's 
Wisconsin Lawyers Assistance Program (WisLAP) and obtain a 
mentor attorney to assist him for the first two years following 
reinstatement. 
¶21 Second, 
she 
suggested 
that 
Attorney 
Woodard 
be 
required to obtain further continuing legal education regarding 
appropriate fee agreements and the requirements for maintaining 
a client trust account.  She noted that many of the trust 
account rules have changed significantly since Attorney Woodard 
last practiced law.  Since this was an area in which Attorney 
Woodard previously failed to meet his requirements, she believed 
that such required education would be appropriate to protect the 
public from "negligent office management mistakes." 
¶22 Finally, the referee recommended that Attorney Woodard 
be required to provide quarterly trust account and business 
accounting records to the OLR for a period of two years.  These 
records should show what advance fees Attorney Woodard has 
received and where such client funds were deposited.  The 
records to be provided should also include copies of Attorney 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
13 
 
Woodard's fee agreements with all of his privately retained 
clients. 
¶23 The 
standards 
for 
our 
review 
of 
reinstatement 
proceedings are similar to the standards we use for reviewing 
referee reports in disciplinary proceedings.  We do not overturn 
a referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
On the other hand, we review a referee's legal conclusions, 
including whether the attorney has satisfied the criteria for 
reinstatement, on a de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Jennings, 2011 WI 45, ¶39, 334 Wis. 2d 335, 
801 N.W.2d 304; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gral, 
2010 WI 14, ¶22, 323 Wis. 2d 280, 779 N.W.2d 168. 
¶24 As noted above, neither party has challenged the 
referee's 
factual 
findings, 
legal 
conclusions, 
or 
recommendation.  After thoroughly reviewing this matter, we 
accept the referee's findings of fact.  There is no dispute 
regarding generally what has occurred since the revocation of 
Attorney Woodard's license to practice law in Wisconsin in 1996.  
The evidence submitted shows that Attorney Woodard has been a 
productive member of the community and has engaged in extensive 
volunteer work. 
¶25 We do find it necessary, however, to address two 
portions of the referee's report.  First, in our 1994 decision 
suspending Attorney Woodard's license for three years, we did 
not transform that disciplinary proceeding into a medical 
incapacity proceeding, but we did condition the reinstatement of 
Attorney Woodard's license to practice law in Wisconsin on his 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
14 
 
demonstration that he no longer suffers from the medical 
incapacity (depression and dysthymia) he alleged in that 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney 
Woodard's 
license 
has 
never 
been 
reinstated since the time of that 1994 decision.  Thus, he was 
required to satisfy that condition in this reinstatement 
proceeding. 
¶26 The referee questioned whether Attorney Woodard's 
evidence was sufficient to satisfy this condition since, 
although he offered evidence from community members and other 
lawyers that he currently was capable of practicing law, the 
only evidence he presented that he no longer suffers from 
depression or dysthymia was a letter from a clinical social 
worker.  
The 
referee concluded that an opinion from a 
psychologist or psychiatrist regarding the existence or non-
existence of a medical incapacity was not required, and that the 
social worker's opinion was sufficient.   
¶27 We need not decide whether a social worker is 
qualified to render an opinion regarding the presence or absence 
of 
medical/psychological conditions such as depression or 
dysthymia, and the impact of such conditions on an individual's 
ability to practice law.  Here, the OLR did not object to the 
referee's reliance on the social worker's opinion and conceded 
that Attorney Woodard had satisfied the condition, in part by 
the evidence of his holding responsible employment positions 
since the time of his suspension and subsequent revocation.  
Moreover, the OLR did not appeal from the referee's report and 
recommendation.  Thus, given the OLR's concession, we conclude 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
15 
 
that Attorney Woodard has sufficiently demonstrated that he no 
longer suffers from the medical/psychological conditions he 
raised as a potential basis for incapacity in the 1994 
disciplinary proceeding. 
¶28 The second item we address is Attorney Woodard's debt 
to his former client R.F.  R.F. was a grievant in one of 
Attorney Woodard's prior disciplinary proceedings.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 190 Wis. 2d at 490-92.  
In that proceeding, Attorney Woodard and BAPR stipulated that 
R.F. had paid $3,000 to Attorney Woodard.  There was, however, a 
disagreement as to what the $3,000 was supposed to cover.  R.F. 
believed 
that 
the 
$3,000 
was 
a 
flat 
fee 
that 
covered 
representation for both his sentencing hearing and any appeal.  
The stipulation states that Attorney Woodard sent a letter to 
R.F. stating that the $3,000 covered only the sentencing hearing 
and his review of the trial transcripts for any appellate 
issues, but not the actual prosecution of any appeal.  In any 
event, it is undisputed that Attorney Woodard did not go forward 
with any appeal on R.F.'s behalf.  Based on this stipulation, 
the court concluded that Attorney Woodard had, among other 
things, failed to communicate with his client, failed to give 
notice that he was not pursuing an appeal on R.F.'s behalf, and 
failed to refund an unearned advance payment of fees.  At that 
time, however, this court did not impose a specific restitution 
obligation on Attorney Woodard. 
¶29 Whether or not a restitution obligation is explicitly 
imposed in a disciplinary opinion and order, SCR 22.29(4m) 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
16 
 
requires that an attorney petitioning for reinstatement must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney has made 
restitution to or settled the claims of all persons who were 
injured or harmed by the attorney's misconduct, or to provide an 
explanation for the failure to do so.   
¶30 Here the referee found that there was a minimum debt 
of $1,500 owed by Attorney Woodard to R.F.  This is supported by 
Attorney Woodard's acknowledgement at the reinstatement hearing 
that he did receive $1,500 from R.F., that he never pursued an 
appeal on R.F.'s behalf, and that he owed R.F. $1,500.  On the 
other hand, Attorney Woodard testified at the reinstatement 
hearing that he disputed R.F.'s claims that Attorney Woodard had 
received more than $1,500 and still owed him anywhere from 
$1,500 to $2,500.  Attorney Woodard claimed that he had received 
only $1,500 as a flat fee and that R.F. was supposed to pay an 
additional $3,000 for the cost of obtaining trial transcripts, 
but never did so.   
¶31 In any event, rather than return even the $1,500 that 
he had admittedly received from R.F. and owed to him or make 
arrangements to pay that amount over time, Attorney Woodard 
attempted to avoid paying a large portion of the debt by sending 
a $500 partial payment to R.F. with a notation on the check and 
in a separate letter stating that the payment constituted a full 
and final settlement of the matter.  R.F. cashed the check sent 
by Attorney Woodard, but also responded in a subsequent letter 
that he disputed that the $500 payment constituted a final 
settlement of the full debt. 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
17 
 
¶32 Attorney Woodard claimed at the reinstatement hearing 
that he viewed R.F.'s cashing of his $500 check as an accord and 
satisfaction, which would appear to constitute a "settlement" of 
the claim of a person harmed by Attorney Woodard's misconduct 
under SCR 22.29(4m).  We choose not to decide in this 
reinstatement proceeding, however, whether the cashing of the 
check constituted a valid accord and satisfaction, and thus a 
"settlement" for purposes of SCR 22.29(4m). 
¶33 Even if Attorney Woodard's partial payment legally 
constitutes an accord and satisfaction, we are troubled by this 
attempt——after more than 15 years of non-action and on the eve 
of a reinstatement proceeding——to avoid making full restitution 
through sending a check to an unrepresented former client with a 
notation of a full and final settlement in order to claim an 
accord and satisfaction in the reinstatement proceeding.  All 
attorneys have a professional obligation, in exchange for being 
granted the privilege to practice law in this state, to put the 
interests of their clients above their own interests.  This 
includes putting the client's interest in receiving a refund of 
an unearned fee above the lawyer's own financial interests.  
This is a precept that Attorney Woodard will have to follow as 
he returns to the practice of law.   
¶34 Although this court did not impose a restitution 
obligation in the original disciplinary proceeding, we now 
require Attorney Woodard to make an additional restitution 
payment to R.F. as a condition of his reinstatement.  The 
stipulation in the original disciplinary proceeding provided 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
18 
 
that Attorney Woodard had received $3,000 and had provided some 
services to R.F. by representing him at his sentencing hearing.  
On the other hand, Attorney Woodard now essentially claims that 
he agreed to the stipulation in the original disciplinary case 
only due to his depressed state at the time and that he actually 
received only $1,500 from R.F.   Even if Attorney Woodard did 
receive only $1,500 from R.F. and did represent him at the 
sentencing hearing, we now conclude that Attorney Woodard should 
return that entire amount as a condition of his reinstatement.  
Because he has already sent a $500 payment to R.F., we will 
require him to make an additional payment of $1,000 to R.F.  We 
consider this additional restitution payment as satisfying 
Attorney Woodard's obligation under SCR 22.29(4m). 
¶35 Having resolved these two matters, we conclude that 
the facts as found by the referee support the legal conclusion 
that Attorney Woodard has satisfied the criteria for the 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
¶36 Although we determine that Attorney Woodard has now 
satisfied the criteria for reinstatement, we agree with the 
referee that some additional conditions on Attorney Woodard's 
return to the practice of law are appropriate.  We are 
particularly concerned about Attorney Woodard's stated intention 
to practice by himself in his own law firm or in conjunction 
with just his wife.  As the referee noted, the rules regarding 
the handling of client trust funds and advance fees have changed 
considerably in the more than 15 years that have passed since 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
19 
 
Attorney Woodard last practiced law.  Moreover, much of Attorney 
Woodard's misconduct involved violations of the rules governing 
client trust accounts and the financial side of attorney/client 
relationships.  We are not convinced that allowing Attorney 
Woodard to practice by himself in his own firm with only an 
outside mentor attorney or with just his wife sufficiently 
ensures Attorney Woodard's successful reintegration into the 
practice of law.  Consequently, we determine that in order to 
ensure that Attorney Woodard does not lapse into a repetition of 
the misconduct that led to his suspension and revocation, his 
first three years of practice following reinstatement should be 
in a law firm or organization where he is subject to the direct 
supervision of another attorney.  Further, in order to eliminate 
the temptation of merely relying on the trust that exists 
between spouses rather than providing direct supervision, we 
further direct that the supervising attorney must be someone 
other than Attorney Woodard's spouse.  We also agree with the 
referee that continuing legal education regarding fee agreements 
and client trust accounts is appropriate.  We clarify that 
Attorney Woodard must complete seven (7) hours of classes 
dealing with those topics, as well as the subject of law office 
management.  We also clarify the items that Attorney Woodard 
must disclose to the OLR. 
¶37 Finally, we turn to the issue of the costs of this 
reinstatement proceeding.  Attorney Woodard has not filed an 
objection to the OLR's statement of costs, and we do not find a 
basis to depart from our general practice of imposing full costs 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
20 
 
in 
both 
disciplinary 
and 
reinstatement 
proceedings.  
Consequently, we impose the full costs of this proceeding on 
Attorney Woodard. 
¶38 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for reinstatement of 
the license of Stanley V. Woodard to practice law in Wisconsin 
is granted, effective the date of this order. 
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the reinstatement of 
Stanley V. Woodard's license to practice law is subject to the 
following conditions: 
A. 
During 
the 
first 
three-year 
period 
after 
his 
reinstatement, Attorney Woodard shall practice law in Wisconsin 
only in a law firm or organizational setting and shall be 
subject to the direct supervisory authority of a supervising 
attorney, who shall not be his spouse, pursuant to the 
requirements of SCR 20:5.1(b).  
B. 
Within six months following reinstatement, Attorney 
Woodard shall attend a minimum of seven (7) hours of continuing 
legal education concerning the subjects of fee agreements, 
client trust account management, and law office management.  
Attorney Woodard shall provide certificates of attendance for 
such seminars to the Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
C. 
For a period of two years following reinstatement, 
Attorney Woodard shall, on a quarterly basis, provide or open 
for inspection to the Office of Lawyer Regulation all trust 
account and business accounting records related to Attorney 
Woodard's practice of law.  Such records shall show, among other 
things, what advance fees or client funds have been received by 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
21 
 
Attorney Woodard, where such advance fees or client funds have 
been deposited, and whether such advance fees or client funds 
have been disbursed and to whom they have been disbursed.  Such 
records shall include copies of all client retainer or fee 
agreements negotiated or executed by Attorney Woodard. 
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 90 days of the date 
of this order, Stanley V. Woodard shall pay restitution to R.F. 
in the additional amount of $1,000 and shall provide evidence of 
such payment to the Office of Lawyer Regulation.  If this 
additional restitution payment is not paid within the time 
specified, the Office of Lawyer Regulation is authorized to move 
this court for a further suspension of the license of Stanley V. 
Woodard to practice law in Wisconsin. 
¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 120 days of the date 
of this order, Stanley V. Woodard shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and Stanley V. Woodard 
has not negotiated a resolution as to the payment of the costs 
over time with the Office of Lawyer Regulation, the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation is authorized to move this court for a further 
suspension of the license of Stanley V. Woodard to practice law 
in Wisconsin.   
¶42 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the $1,000 additional 
restitution payment to R.F. shall be paid prior to the payment 
of the costs of this proceeding. 
 
 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
22 
 
 
Nos. 1993AP1135-D, 1994AP1838-D & 1996AP884-D   
 
 
 
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