Title: Lyons v. Secretary of Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13307
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13307 
 
JAMES LYONS1 & others2  vs.  SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     July 6, 2022. - August 30, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Elections, General Court.  Elections, 
Ballot, Absentee ballot, Primary.  Secretary of the 
Commonwealth.  General Court. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on June 23, 2022. 
 
 
The case was reported by Kafker, J. 
 
 
 
Michael Walsh for the plaintiffs. 
 
Adam Horstine, Assistant Attorney General (Anne Sterman, 
Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
John Paul Moran, pro se. 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for Jewish Alliance for Law and 
Social Action. 
 
Lisa C. Goodheart, Christine M. Netski, Dylan Sanders, 
Anthony V. Agudelo, John G. O'Neill, Andrea Studley Knowles, 
 
1 In his capacity as chair of the Massachusetts Republican 
Party. 
 
2 Rayla Campbell, Evelyn Curley, Raymond Xie, and Robert 
May. 
2 
 
Jessica H. Park, Gwen Nolan King, Kenneth C. Thayer, Lon F. 
Povich, Tamara S. Wolfson, David S. Mackey, M. Patrick Moore, 
Jr., & Clinton R. Prospere for Common Cause Massachusetts & 
another. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  On June 16, 2022, the Legislature passed "An 
Act fostering voter opportunities, trust, equity and security" 
(VOTES act), which expanded opportunities to vote in 
Massachusetts.  St. 2022, c. 92.  The VOTES act provided that 
any qualified voter in Massachusetts, without need for excuse, 
can vote early, in person or by mail (universal early voting), 
in primaries and biennial State elections.3  Id.  This expanded 
early voting options first enacted in 2014 and then further 
enlarged in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  See St. 2014, 
c. 111, § 12; St. 2020, c. 115, §§ 6, 7, 10.  The VOTES act also 
made other changes in the Commonwealth's election laws.  See 
St. 2022, c. 92.  Six days later, the Governor approved the act, 
and it went into effect as an emergency law.  See St. 2022, 
c. 92, preamble. 
 
3 The "biennial state election" is "held on the Tuesday next 
after the first Monday in November in every even-numbered year" 
and, depending on the year and the applicable term of office 
(two, four, or six years), can involve the election of State 
officers (i.e., Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, Treasurer, Auditor, Attorney General, councillors, 
senators, and representatives), Federal officers (i.e., 
presidential electors, senators, and representatives), county 
officers (i.e., district attorneys, clerks of courts, registers 
of probate, registers of deeds, county commissioners, sheriffs, 
and treasurers), and regional district school committee members.  
See G. L. c. 54, §§ 62, 150-160, 162. 
3 
 
The following day, the plaintiffs, all associated with the 
Massachusetts Republican party,4 initiated this action in the 
county court against the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
(Secretary), raising facial constitutional challenges to various 
aspects of the VOTES act, including the universal early voting 
provisions, and seeking to enjoin the Secretary from putting the 
act into effect for the September 6, 2022, primary and the 
November 8, 2022, biennial State election.  On June 29, 2022, 
after the Secretary moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, 
the single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full 
court for decision due, in large part, to the significant time 
constraints involved, including, most urgently, the requirement 
in the VOTES act that the Secretary mail applications for early 
voting ballots to all registered voters by July 23, 2022.  See 
G. L. c. 54, § 25B (a) (7) (i), as appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, 
§ 10.  Thereafter, on July 11, 2022, following briefing5 and oral 
argument, the court issued an order entering judgment in the 
 
4 James Lyons, chair of the Massachusetts Republican Party; 
Rayla Campbell, Republican candidate for Secretary of the 
Commonwealth; Evelyn Curley, member of the Massachusetts 
Republican State committee; Raymond Xie, member of the "ballot 
question committee"; and Robert May, Republican candidate for 
the United States House of Representatives in the sixth 
Massachusetts congressional district. 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by John Paul 
Moran; the Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action; and Common 
Cause Massachusetts and the League of Women Voters of 
Massachusetts. 
4 
 
county court for the Secretary on all claims in the plaintiffs' 
complaint and denying the plaintiffs' request for injunctive 
relief.  As the court further stated, while time constraints 
dictated the immediate issuance of the order, the underlying 
reasoning was to follow in due course.  We now set forth that 
reasoning. 
The self-professed "heart" of the plaintiffs' complaint is 
the claim that the universal early voting provisions are 
facially unconstitutional because, except for in three limited 
circumstances where "absentee voting" is authorized under art. 
45 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as 
amended by art. 105 of the Amendments, the Legislature is 
prohibited from providing for any form of voting other than in 
person on the day of the primary or election.  We disagree.  
Voting is a fundamental right, and nothing in art. 45, as 
amended by art. 105, or in other parts of the Constitution cited 
by the plaintiffs, prohibits the Legislature, which has plenary 
constitutional powers, including broad powers to regulate the 
process of elections and even broader powers with respect to 
primaries, from enhancing voting opportunities.  This is 
particularly true with respect to the universal early voting 
provisions in the VOTES act, which, in stark contrast to the 
narrow and discrete absentee-voting provisions of art. 45, 
enhance voting opportunities equally for all voters. 
5 
 
The plaintiffs also claim that the VOTES act (1) violates 
the elections clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 4, by allowing municipalities to fill poll 
worker vacancies in the six weeks leading up to the election 
without regard to political party affiliation; (2) violates the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and its State 
constitutional equivalents by extending the ban on 
electioneering in and around polling places to the early voting 
period; (3) violates art. 38 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution by allowing disabled, overseas, and 
military voters to cast votes electronically; and 
(4) arbitrarily and irrationally counts the votes of people who 
lawfully cast their ballots during the early voting period but 
die before election day, which the plaintiffs characterize as 
allowing "dead people to vote."  We discern no merit to these 
claims as well. 
1.  Background.  a.  Universal early voting introduced in 
2014.  In 2014, years before the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
enactment of the VOTES act, the Legislature passed and the 
Governor approved "An Act relative to election laws" (2014 
voting act), which, among other things, provided for universal 
early voting in biennial State elections and any municipal 
election held on the same day, whereby any voter, without 
excuse, could apply for and vote by mail or vote in person at an 
6 
 
early voting location.6  See St. 2014, c. 111, § 12, inserting 
G. L. c. 54, § 25B.  Voters who applied and chose to vote early 
by mail would mark their ballot, seal it in an envelope provided 
for that purpose, execute an affidavit on the envelope, and mail 
it in a second envelope provided for that purpose in time for it 
to be received by the city or town clerk before the closing of 
the polls on election day.  See St. 2014, c. 111, § 12, 
inserting G. L. c. 54, § 25B (b), (e), (h).  For those who chose 
to vote early in person, voting was to take place over ten 
business days preceding a biennial State election.  St. 2014, 
c. 111, § 12, inserting G. L. c. 54, § 25B (c).  During that 
period, early voting locations were required to be open during 
 
6 Massachusetts is not alone in providing no-excuse early or 
absentee voting.  By our count, at least twenty-four other 
States and the District of Columbia do not require an excuse to 
vote early and by mail.  See Alaska Stat. § 15.20.010; Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-541; Fla. Stat. §§ 101.62, 101.657; Ga. 
Code Ann. § 21-2-380; Idaho Code Ann. § 34-1001; 10 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 5/19-1, 5/19A-1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-1119(a); Me. Rev. 
Stat. tit. 21-A, § 751; Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9-304; Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 168.759; Minn. Stat. § 203B.02; Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 13-13-201; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-938; N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 19:15A-1, 19:63-3; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-3; N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 163-226; N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-01; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3509.02; Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 14-105; 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3150.11; S.D. Codified Laws § 12-19-1; Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-
700; Wis. Stat. § 6.20; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-9-102; D.C. Mun. 
Regs. tit. 3, § 720.  Eight other States go even further and 
automatically mail ballots to all voters.  See Cal. Elec. Code § 
3000.5; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-5-401; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-101; 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.269911; Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.465; Utah 
Code Ann. § 20A-3a-202; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2537a; Wash. 
Rev. Code § 29A.40.010. 
7 
 
the usual business hours of the city or town clerk, although 
cities and towns were permitted to provide additional early 
voting hours, including on weekends.  St. 2014, c. 111, § 12, 
inserting G. L. c. 54, § 25B (d). 
Universal early voting under the 2014 voting act did not 
apply to primaries and was first implemented for the 2016 and 
then 2018 biennial State elections.  See St. 2014, c. 111, § 26.  
Reportedly, more than twenty percent of voters chose to take 
advantage of the new voting option during both of those 
elections.7 
b.  Universal early voting expanded following declaration 
of COVID-19 pandemic.  The adoption of universal early voting in 
2014 proved to be prescient when, in 2020, a presidential 
election year, the COVID-19 pandemic struck.  On July 26 of that 
year, slightly over four months after the pandemic had been 
declared,8 the Legislature and Governor, concerned "for the 
immediate preservation of the public health and convenience," 
passed and approved an emergency law that further expanded 
 
7 See Secretary of the Commonwealth, 2016 Early Voting 
Statistics, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele16/early-
voting_16/ev16idx.htm [https://perma.cc/2K3W-DAUR]; Secretary of 
the Commonwealth, 2018 Early Voting Statistics, https://www.sec 
.state.ma.us/ele/ele18/early-voting_18/ev18idx.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/23YJ-TVUV]. 
 
8 The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to be a 
global pandemic on March 11, 2020.  See Goldstein v. Secretary 
of the Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 516, 522 (2020). 
8 
 
voting opportunities.  See St. 2020, c. 115, preamble, "An Act 
relative to voting options in response to COVID-19" (COVID-19 
voting act).  Most notably, the act further expanded universal 
early voting, which already applied to the November 2020 
biennial State election by virtue of the 2014 voting act, to the 
September 2020 primary and city and town elections held before 
December 31, 2020.  See St. 2020, c. 115, §§ 6 (b), 7, 10. 
With respect to early mail-in voting, the COVID-19 voting 
act required the Secretary to mail applications for early voting 
ballots to all registered voters by July 15, 2020, for the 
primary and by September 14, 2020, for the biennial State 
election, rather than waiting for them to request an 
application.  See St. 2020, c. 115, § 6 (d) (1)-(2).  It 
expanded the ways in which early voting ballots could be 
returned to the city or town clerk by allowing for voters to 
deliver them in person or place them in a secured municipal drop 
box.  See St. 2020, c. 115, § 6 (h) (1)-(2).  And whereas early 
voting ballots still had to be received from voters before the 
hour fixed for the closing of polls on the day of the primary or 
biennial State election, those that were mailed on or before the 
day of the biennial State election and received within three 
days after the election (by 5 P.M. on November 6, 2020) would be 
counted.  See St 2020, c. 115, § 6 (h) (3). 
The COVID-19 voting act also changed the early in-person 
9 
 
voting period from ten business days to fourteen calendar days 
for the biennial State election (October 17, 2020, through 
October 30, 2020) and added seven calendar days of early in-
person voting for the primary (August 22, 2020, through August 
28, 2020).  See St. 2020, c. 115, § 7 (b) (1)-(2).  In addition 
to continuing to require early voting locations to be open 
during the usual business hours of the city or town clerk on 
weekdays during those periods, the act required them to be open 
on the weekend days for at least a minimum number of hours 
determined based on the size of a municipality's electorate.  
See St. 2020, c. 115, § 7 (c) (1)-(2). 
The Secretary reported that for the 2020 biennial State 
election, forty-two percent of voters chose to vote early by 
mail, twenty-three percent voted early in person, and thirty-
five percent voted in person on election day.9 
The COVID-19 voting act was extended to March 31, 2021, 
St. 2020, c. 255; to June 30, 2021, St. 2021, c. 5, § 4; and 
finally to December 15, 2021, St. 2021, c. 29, §§ 51-55.  By the 
beginning of 2022, therefore, the options for universal early 
voting in Massachusetts had reverted to those that had been 
available prior to the enactment of the COVID-19 voting act. 
 
9 See Secretary of the Commonwealth, 2020 Early Voting & 
Vote by Mail Statistics, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele20 
/early-voting_20/ev20idx.htm [https://perma.cc/ACN6-TRS3]. 
10 
 
c.  The VOTES act.  With the approval of the VOTES act on 
June 22, 2022, however, the Legislature and the Governor have, 
among other things, made the expanded universal early voting 
provisions from the COVID-19 voting act permanent.  G. L. c. 54, 
§ 25B, as appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, § 10.  Under the VOTES 
act, 
• 
universal early voting is again extended to primaries 
and municipal elections,10 and now further extended to 
primaries or elections to fill vacancies for senator 
or representative in Congress, see G. L. c. 54, 
§ 25B (a) (1); 
• 
early voting ballots again can be returned by voters, 
or now by a family member, by delivering such ballots 
in person or placing them in a secured municipal drop 
box, in addition to mailing them, see G. L. c. 54, 
§ 25B (a) (13); 
• 
early voting ballots mailed on or before the day of a 
biennial State election and received within three days 
after the election can again be counted and the same 
is now true for absentee ballots, see G. L. c. 54, 
§§ 25B (a) (13), 93; 
 
10 Municipalities can opt out of the early voting provision 
for municipal elections that are not held on the same day as a 
Federal or State election, and special or annual town meetings 
were exempted.  G. L. c. 54, § 25B (a) (1). 
11 
 
• 
early voting periods are again set at fourteen 
calendar days for a biennial State election (the 
seventeenth through fourth day preceding the election) 
and seven calendar days for a primary (the tenth day 
through fourth day preceding the primary), see G. L. 
c. 54, § 25B (b) (2); and 
• 
weekend voting during early voting periods is again 
made mandatory, rather than discretionary, for at 
least a minimum number of hours determined based on 
the size of the municipality's electorate, while the 
minimum number of hours of early in-person voting on 
weekdays during the period is either discretionary or 
mandatory, again depending on the size of the 
electorate, see G. L. c. 54, § 25B (b) (3). 
As noted at the outset, the Secretary is again required 
under the VOTES act to automatically mail early voting ballot 
applications to all registered voters, now by "[n]ot later than 
[forty-five] days before" a primary or election.  See G. L. 
c. 54, § 25B (a) (7).  In the case of the upcoming September 6, 
2022, primary, therefore, this had to be accomplished by not 
later than July 23, 2022.  Given the number of registered voters 
in Massachusetts11 and the capacity of the United States Postal 
 
11 According to statistics published by the Secretary, there 
 
12 
 
Service, however, the Secretary, as a practical matter, 
understandably could not wait until the last day to commence 
that mailing. 
d.  Procedural history.  This case proceeded on an 
expedited schedule.  With the Secretary's mass mailing of early 
voting ballot applications looming, the plaintiffs filed their 
complaint in the county court on June 23, 2022, requesting a 
preliminary and permanent injunction, as well as declaratory, 
certiorari, and mandamus relief.  They also filed an emergency 
motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Secretary 
from implementing the VOTES act for the upcoming primary and 
general elections.  On June 28, 2022, the Secretary filed an 
opposition to the temporary restraining order and a motion to 
dismiss the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 
Mass. 754 (1974).  The next day, the single justice reserved and 
reported the case to the full panel, ordered expedited briefing 
by July 5, 2022, and scheduled oral argument for July 6, 2022.  
Five days after the oral argument, the court, due to the 
statutorily mandated deadline for mailing early voting ballot 
applications, issued an order "that judgment shall enter in the 
 
were 4,731,940 registered voters in Massachusetts as of February 
1, 2021.  See Secretary of the Commonwealth, Enrollment 
Breakdown as of 02/01/2021, at 1, https://www.sec.state.ma.us 
/ele/elepdf/enrollment_count_20210201.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/7AY5-9RUP]. 
13 
 
county court for the Secretary on all claims in the plaintiffs' 
complaint.  The plaintiffs' request to enjoin the Secretary from 
putting the VOTES act into effect is denied."  The court further 
noted that a full opinion would "follow in due course." 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Universal early voting.  We begin our 
analysis by addressing the plaintiffs' principal claim:  that 
the Legislature, in effect, acted ultra vires (i.e., beyond its 
constitutional authority) insofar as it provided in the VOTES 
act for universal early voting at primaries and biennial State 
elections.  Specifically, the plaintiffs maintain that universal 
early voting is repugnant or contrary to the absentee-voting 
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, art. 45, as amended 
by art. 105.  The plaintiffs' claim amounts to a facial 
constitutional challenge.  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 481 Mass. 
767, 771 (2019) ("A facial challenge is an attack on a statute 
itself as opposed to a particular application" [citation 
omitted]).  It is, we might add, a narrow challenge.  In the 
plaintiffs' own words:  "This case is not, substantially, about 
voting rights but rather about the power of the Legislature to 
enact the current measures in relation to absentee and early 
voting."  Thus, they do not argue that the right to vote has 
been restricted or that the equal protection of that right has 
been violated.  They simply argue that the Legislature lacks the 
power to pass the VOTES act due to art. 45.  Before we proceed 
14 
 
to address this limited argument, we take a moment to outline 
certain well-established principles that guide our analysis. 
i.  Constitutional interpretation.  We must be mindful that 
when construing the Constitution, "we look to its language and 
structure, bearing in mind that the Constitution is a statement 
of general principles and not a specification of details.  It is 
to be interpreted as the Constitution of a State and not as a 
statute or an ordinary piece of legislation" (quotation, 
citation, and alteration omitted).  Brookline v. Secretary of 
the Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 406, 419 (1994).  As this court 
counselled nearly 200 years ago, "it must never be forgotten, 
that [our Constitution] was not intended to contain a detailed 
system of practical rules, for the regulation of the government 
or people in after times; but that it was rather intended, after 
an organization of the government, and distributing the 
executive, legislative and judicial powers, amongst its several 
departments, to declare a few broad, general, fundamental 
principles, for their guidance and general direction."  
Commonwealth v. Blackington, 24 Pick. 352, 356 (1837).  See 
Moore v. Election Comm'rs of Cambridge, 309 Mass. 303, 312 
(1941), citing Blackington, supra. 
ii.  Plenary legislative power.  We also must recognize 
that, under our Constitution, "full power and authority [was] 
given and granted to the [Legislature], from time to time, to 
15 
 
make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and 
reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions 
and instructions, either with penalties or without; so as the 
same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they 
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this commonwealth, 
and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects 
of the same."  Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  This grant of legislative authority has been 
described as plenary.  As this court acknowledged in 
Blackington, 24 Pick. at 357, a "large discretion is thus given 
to the legislature to judge what the welfare of the Commonwealth 
may require; and this power is restrained only so far, as not to 
be expressly, or by necessary implication, repugnant to the 
constitution.  The power is the general rule; the restraint of 
it the specific exception."  Notably, included in this 
constitutional grant of plenary "legislative authority are broad 
powers to regulate the process of elections."  Opinion of the 
Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 810 (1978), citing Part II, c. 1, § 1, 
art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution.  See Opinion of the 
Justices, 368 Mass. 819, 821 (1975); Opinion of the Justices, 
359 Mass. 775, 777 (1971). 
Given these plenary powers, a party asserting that the 
Legislature has acted ultra vires bears a heavy burden.  The 
legislative action must be shown "to be plainly inconsistent 
16 
 
with the provisions of the constitution," Merriam v. Secretary 
of the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 246, 253-254 (1978), quoting 
Blackington, 24 Pick. at 355, including the constitutional grant 
of plenary legislative power.  Recognizing our constitutional 
power to overturn legislation, we exercise it with restraint:  
such power "is to be resorted to and exercised with great 
caution and deliberation, and it is always to be presumed that a 
coordinate branch of the government has acted within the limits 
of its constitutional authority, until the contrary shall 
clearly and satisfactorily appear."  Merriam, supra at 254, 
quoting Blackington, supra at 356.  See Atwater v. Commissioner 
of Educ., 460 Mass. 844, 853 (2011) (statute subjected to facial 
challenge "is presumed constitutional" [citation omitted]).  See 
also Boston v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Boston, 338 Mass. 245, 
248 (1958) ("All rational presumptions are to be made in favor 
of [statute's] validity"). 
iii.  Constitutional provisions on absentee voting.  With 
this constitutional backdrop in mind, we turn to the provision 
relied on by the plaintiffs to limit this authority.  Article 45 
of the Amendments, when it was ratified in 1917, declared that 
the Legislature "shall have power to provide by law for voting 
by qualified voters of the commonwealth who, at the time of an 
election, are absent from the city or town of which they are 
inhabitants in the choice of any officer to be elected or upon 
17 
 
any question submitted at such election."12 
Twenty-seven years later, in 1944, art. 45 was amended by 
art. 76 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution to 
empower the Legislature to provide for absentee voting by voters 
who, at the time of "an election, are absent from the city or 
town of which they are inhabitants or are unable by reason of 
physical disability to cast their votes in person."13 
Then, in 1976, art. 45 was amended for a second time by 
art. 105 of the Amendments to authorize the Legislature to 
provide "for voting, in the choice of any officer to be elected 
or upon any question submitted at an election, by qualified 
voters of the commonwealth who, at the time of such an election, 
are absent from the city or town of which they are inhabitants 
or are unable by reason of physical disability to cast their 
votes in person at the polling places or who hold religious 
beliefs in conflict with the act of voting on the day on which 
 
12 A year after the ratification of art. 45, the Legislature 
enacted a statute providing for voting by those in "the military 
or naval service" who were absent "at the time of a regular 
state or national election."  St. 1918, c. 293, § 1.  Then, in 
1919, it enacted a statute that more broadly provided for voting 
by "[a]ny voter" who was absent "on the day of the annual state 
election."  St. 1919, c. 289, § 1. 
 
13 In 1945, following the amendment of art. 45 by art. 76, 
the Legislature followed suit and amended the statute to allow 
for absentee voting by those "who will be unable by reason of 
physical disability to cast his vote in person at the polling 
place."  See St. 1945, c. 466, § 1, amending G. L. c. 54, § 86. 
18 
 
such an election is to be held."14 
iv.  Analysis.  A.  Primaries.  As an initial matter, the 
plaintiffs concede that their principal claim "stand[s] on a 
fundamentally different footing" with respect to primaries from 
that with respect to biennial State elections.  That is an 
understatement, given the express language of art. 45, which 
refers only to elections and not primaries, and prior opinions 
from the justices of this court.  In fact, the justices of this 
court, more than fifty years ago, rejected the foundational 
premise of that aspect of the plaintiffs' principal claim -- 
that art. 45 governs primaries.  See Opinion of the Justices, 
359 Mass. at 776-777. 
In 1971, the Legislature was contemplating extending 
absentee voting, which, at the time, only was available in 
connection with biennial State elections, to voters at 
primaries.  See id. at 775-776.  To accomplish this, it 
considered two options:  proposing a constitutional amendment 
for consideration by voters or passing a law.  See id.  
Uncertain of its authority to do the latter, the Legislature 
propounded the following question to the justices:  "May the 
general court provide by statute for voting, at primaries and 
 
14 In 1977, following the amendment of art. 45 by art. 105, 
the Legislature again amended the statute accordingly.  See St. 
1977, c. 426, amending G. L. c. 54, § 86. 
19 
 
preliminary elections, by qualified voters of the commonwealth 
who are, at the time of such primary or preliminary election, 
absent from the city or town of which they are inhabitants or 
who are unable by reason of physical disability to cast their 
votes in person at the polling places?"  Id. at 776.  The 
justices responded in the affirmative.  Id. at 777. 
In reaching that conclusion, the justices first noted that 
the "Massachusetts Constitution does not refer to primaries and 
nominations as such, but concerns itself only with elections." 
Id. at 776-777, citing arts. 8 and 9 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and arts. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24, 38, 45, 
61, 64, and 76 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  In particular, the justices interpreted the 
absentee voting amendment, art. 45, as then amended by art. 76, 
"to apply only to State and other final elections."  Opinion of 
the Justices, supra at 777.15  A primary, as the justices noted, 
"is not an election to public office.  It is merely the 
selection of candidates for office by the members of a political 
party in a manner having the form of an election" (citation 
 
15 The justices noted that, in the debates in 1917 preceding 
the ratification of art. 45, a proposal to extend the absentee 
voting under consideration to primaries was deemed unnecessary 
because there was no question that the Legislature had the 
authority to do so.  See Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 775, 
776 (1971), citing 3 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention 1917–1918, at 3, 13 (1918). 
20 
 
omitted).  Id.  Moreover, primaries are not a creation of the 
Constitution, but, rather, of legislation, first enacted in 
1911.  See id., citing St. 1911, c. 550.  "Prior to the 1911 
statute, nomination was largely by party conventions the 
delegates to which were elected or selected by caucus methods."  
Opinion of the Justices, supra, citing St. 1893, c. 417, §§ 71—
91, and R. L. c. 11, §§ 85—155.  For these reasons, the justices 
concluded that "[n]o constitutional provisions prevent the 
Legislature from enacting [a statute to extend absentee voting 
to primaries]."  Opinion of the Justices, supra.16 
Four years later, the justices reinforced this conclusion 
in Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 828 (1975).  The 
Legislature asked the justices whether a proposed statute 
requiring candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor to run 
together as a group in primaries would violate art. 9 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Id. at 828-829.  In 
response, the justices noted that they had been "asked a similar 
question in a parallel situation" in 1971 and had "concluded 
that the Massachusetts Constitution, including art. 9 of the 
Declaration of Rights, did not refer to primaries and 
 
16 Following the justices' 1971 opinion, the Legislature 
amended the statute to extend absentee voting to primaries.  See 
St. 1971, c. 920, § 9 (amending G. L. c. 54, § 86, to provide 
for absentee voting during "a special state election or the 
biennial state election or . . . any special or regular state 
primary or . . . a presidential primary"). 
21 
 
nominations as such, but concerned itself only with elections."  
Id. at 830-831, citing Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. at 
776-777.  The justices then went on to conclude that because the 
proposed statute at issue "[s]imilarly . . . deal[t] only with 
primaries," art. 9 did not apply and "the answer to the question 
submitted [was], 'No.'"  Opinion of the Justices, supra at 831. 
We see no reason to reconsider the 1971 opinion now, as the 
plaintiffs suggest we should.  Our resolve in this regard starts 
with recognition of the Legislature's plenary powers under the 
Constitution, as discussed above.  See part II, c. 1, § 1, 
art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution.  As the justices 
effectively concluded in 1971, there is nothing in the 
Constitution that expressly, or by necessary implication, 
restrains the Legislature's authority to provide for voting 
prior to the day of a primary.  Certainly, there is nothing in 
art. 45, in any of its iterations, that does so.  Article 45 
makes no mention of primaries; all three iterations speak of 
"elections" and apply to voters who are absent at the time of 
"the choice of any officer to be elected or upon any question 
submitted at an election."  See arts. 45, 76, and 105 of the 
Amendments.  Also, it is noteworthy that art. 105 was proposed 
and ratified after the justices' 1971 opinion, and the language 
was not altered to bring primaries within its reach.  
Accordingly, we conclude that whatever import art. 45 may or may 
22 
 
not have with respect to universal early voting, it does not 
prevent the Legislature from providing it for primaries. 
B.  Elections.  We now turn to the question that was not 
answered by the justices in 1971:  whether the Legislature's 
provision of universal early voting for biennial State elections 
is "repugnant or contrary" to the Massachusetts Constitution.  
We conclude just the opposite.  In addressing any claim that the 
Legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority, we must 
view the Constitution as a whole, considering all relevant 
provisions, including those defining its plenary powers, the 
conduct of elections, and the right to vote.  We conclude that 
the Legislature's enactment of universal early voting is well 
within its plenary powers and fully consistent with the 
principles set out in the many different provisions governing 
the right to vote in the Massachusetts Constitution, including 
art. 45. 
As this court has recently explained: 
"'[V]oting has long been recognized as a fundamental 
political right and indeed the "preservative of all 
rights."'  Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 85, 94 (1978), 
quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).  The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth expressly protects the 
right to vote for qualified voters in both art. 9[17] of the 
 
17 "All elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants 
of this commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall 
establish by their frame of government, have an equal right to 
elect officers, and to be elected, for public employments."  
 
23 
 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and in art. 3[18] of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended 
. . . . 
 
"We have established that the fundamental right to vote is 
also implicitly protected under other provisions of the 
Declaration of Rights.  See Dane v. Registrars of Voters of 
Concord, 374 Mass. 152, 160 (1978) (right to vote is 
protected as 'natural, essential, and unalienable right[]' 
under art. 1 of Declaration of Rights[19] [citation 
omitted]); Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 
Mass. 271, 276 (1932) ('The right to vote is a precious 
personal prerogative to be sedulously guarded' under 
 
Art. 9 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. 
 
18 "Every citizen of eighteen years of age and upwards, 
excepting persons who are incarcerated in a correctional 
facility due to a felony conviction, and, excepting persons 
under guardianship and persons temporarily or permanently 
disqualified by law because of corrupt practices in respect to 
elections who shall have resided within the town or district in 
which he may claim a right to vote, six calendar months next 
preceding any election of governor, lieutenant governor, 
senators or representatives, shall have a right to vote in such 
election of governor, lieutenant governor, senators and 
representatives; and no other person shall be entitled to vote 
in such election."  Art. 3 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended through art. 100 of the 
Amendments. 
 
19 "All people are born free and equal and have certain 
natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be 
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety 
and happiness.  Equality under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin."  
Art. 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, as amended by art. 106 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution. 
24 
 
'[a]rts. 4,[20] 7,[21] 8,[22] [and] 9 of the Declaration of 
Rights'); Attorney Gen. v. Suffolk County Apportionment 
Comm'rs, 224 Mass. 598, 601 (1916) ('The right to vote is a 
fundamental personal and political right' protected under 
arts. 1 through 9 of Declaration of Rights)."  (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
 
Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
480 Mass. 27, 32-33 (2018). 
Indeed, we have emphasized:  "[t]he right to vote freely 
for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a 
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at 
the heart of representative government."  Id. at 32 n.19, 
quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).  Not 
 
20 "The people of this commonwealth have the sole and 
exclusive right of governing themselves, as a free, sovereign, 
and independent state; and do, and forever hereafter shall, 
exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right, which 
is not, or may not hereafter, be by them expressly delegated to 
the United States of America in Congress assembled."  Art. 4 of 
the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 
 
21 "Government is instituted for the common good; for the 
protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and 
not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, 
family, or class of men:  Therefore the people alone have an 
incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute 
government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, 
when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require 
it."  Art. 7 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. 
 
22 "In order to prevent those, who are vested with 
authority, from becoming oppressors, the people have a right, at 
such periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their 
frame of government, to cause their public officers to return to 
private life; and to fill up vacant places by certain and 
regular elections and appointments."  Art. 8 of the Declaration 
of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 
25 
 
surprisingly, therefore, "Massachusetts follows a clear policy 
of facilitating voting by every eligible voter" (citation 
omitted).  Cepulonis v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 
930, 934 (1983).  To that end, Chief Justice Parker counselled 
as follows almost 200 years ago: 
"In construing so important an instrument as a 
constitution, especially those parts which affect the vital 
principle of a republican government, the elective 
franchise, or the manner of exercising it, we are not, on 
the one hand, to indulge ingenious speculations, which may 
lead us wide from the true sense and spirit of the 
instrument; nor on the other, to apply to it such narrow 
and constrained views as may exclude the real object and 
intent of those who framed it. . . .  If an enlarged sense 
of any particular form of expression should be necessary to 
accomplish so great an object as the convenient exercise of 
the fundamental privilege or right, that of election, such 
sense must be attributed." 
Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312, 317 (1830).  See Tobias v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 665, 674 (1995), 
quoting Henshaw, supra (when interpreting provision of 
Constitution concerning voting, "words should be capable of 
being extended, if consistent with the general object of the 
authors, 'to other relations and circumstances which an improved 
state of society may produce'"). 
Additionally, we must respect the express plenary powers of 
the Legislature set out in part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, discussed above, and its essential 
role in enacting the laws that will transform fundamental 
constitutional principles, including the right to vote, into 
26 
 
practical realities.  Blackington, 24 Pick. at 356.  In 
performing this task, the Legislature was given substantial 
power, so long as the exercise of that power was not repugnant 
to another provision in the Constitution. 
Finally, we are attentive to the considerations expressly 
recognized in art. 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
which provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll elections ought 
to be free; and all the inhabitants of this commonwealth, having 
such qualifications as they shall establish by their frame of 
government, have an equal right to elect officers."23  As this 
court has previously observed, it "is obvious . . . that the 
primary, if not the exclusive, purpose of [art. 9] is to 
guarantee equality among all qualified voters" (citation and 
alterations omitted).  Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. at 
821. 
All of these considerations support the constitutionality 
of universal early voting.  In the VOTES act, and in the COVID-
19 voting act and 2014 voting act before that, the Legislature, 
pursuant to its plenary powers, sought to protect and enhance 
 
23 The plaintiffs suggested in their motion for a temporary 
restraining order that voting by mail is more susceptible to 
fraud than voting in person, but at oral argument they expressly 
disavowed having any evidence of such fraud, even though 
absentee voting has been occurring by mail for over one hundred 
years in Massachusetts.  See St. 1918, c. 293, §§ 16-32 
(establishing procedures for mailing, marking, return mailing, 
and counting of absentee ballots). 
27 
 
the exercise of the right to vote guaranteed by these different 
constitutional provisions.  It also did so universally and 
equally, without granting any particular group special 
privileges or imposing any special burdens on others as required 
by art. 9. 
I.  Article 45.  Article 45 is not to the contrary.  First, 
we observe that the plaintiffs have not cited to any express 
language in art. 45 negating the Legislature's power to enact 
universal early voting.  Instead, the plaintiffs maintain that 
we must necessarily imply such a requirement from art. 45's 
grant of authority to the Legislature to provide for absentee 
voting in the three identified circumstances.  This novel 
constitutional "negative implication" argument, based on the 
maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ignores not only 
the other constitutional provisions discussed above and the 
fundamental purposes of those provisions, but also the specific 
problem art. 45 was designed to address.  For all of these 
reasons, we reject it. 
The plaintiffs have not cited to any case that discusses 
the appropriateness or contours of applying the maxim of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius to interpret the 
Massachusetts Constitution.  It is a maxim that has oft been 
considered in connection with interpreting statutes.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 455 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2009); Harborview 
28 
 
Residents' Comm., Inc. v. Quincy Hous. Auth., 368 Mass. 425, 432 
(1975); County of Bristol v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 324 
Mass. 403, 406-407 (1949).  Even in the statutory context, 
however, it "requires great caution in its application," Reuter 
v. Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 474 (2022), quoting Halebian v. Berv, 
457 Mass. 620, 628 (2010), and "will be disregarded where its 
application would thwart the legislative intent made apparent by 
the entire act," Reuter, supra, quoting Halebian, supra, or 
"lead to an illogical result," Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 
Mass. 613, 620 (2013).  It is "a guide to construction, not a 
positive command" (citation omitted), Halebian, supra, and "at 
most only a fallible aid to decision" (citation omitted), 
Sellers's Case, 452 Mass. 804, 813 (2008). 
Cases from other jurisdictions have consistently counselled 
that the maxim should be applied with even greater caution when 
interpreting a State constitution, especially where its 
application would act as a restraint on the plenary power of the 
Legislature.  See, e.g., Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 
225 (1947) (maxim "applied with greatest caution to provisions 
of constitutions relating to the legislative branch of the 
government, as it cannot be made to restrict the plenary power 
of the legislature" [quotation and citation omitted]); State ex 
rel. Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 409 (1935) (maxim "cannot 
be made to serve as a means to restrict the plenary power of the 
29 
 
legislature"); Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 337 (1991) 
(application of maxim "flies directly in the face of" 
Legislature's plenary powers under State Constitution); State ex 
rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 9 Ohio 
St. 2d 159, 163 (1967) ("Since the legislative power of the 
General Assembly is plenary, the judiciary must proceed with 
much caution in applying the [maxim] to invalidate 
legislation"); Myers v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 303 P.2d. 443, 447 
(Okla. 1956) ("maxim should be applied with caution to 
provisions of constitutions relating to the legislative branch 
of the government, since it cannot be made to restrict the 
plenary power of the legislature" [citation omitted]); Pine v. 
Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 821 (1917) (maxim "will be resorted 
to with hesitation, especially when it would . . . hamper the 
Legislature in amply providing for the health, morals, safety, 
and welfare of the people").  See also Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 
2d 392, 420 (Fla. 2006) (Bell, J., dissenting) ("It is generally 
agreed in courts across this nation that expressio unius is a 
maxim of statutory construction that should rarely be used when 
interpreting constitutional provisions and, then, only with 
great caution").  Given the plenary power of the Legislature 
under our Constitution, and particularly its "broad powers" with 
respect to elections, see Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. at 
810, we likewise proceed with great caution to consider 
30 
 
application of the maxim in the constitutional context. 
Most importantly, neither the language, history, nor 
purpose of art. 45, as amended by art. 105, provides clear 
support for the adoption of the plaintiffs' negative implication 
argument.  The amendment grants authority to the Legislature to 
provide for absentee voting to voters who can satisfy any of the 
three specified criteria but makes no mention of limiting the 
Legislature's plenary authority to provide for other forms of 
voting or otherwise restricting voting to in person on election 
day.  Silence is subject to multiple interpretations; it is not 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of constitutionality or to 
prove repugnancy.24  We need only look at other provisions in our 
Constitution to see that its framers knew how to expressly 
restrict legislative authority when they wanted to do so.  The 
most relevant example may be art. 3, as amended through art. 
100, which lays out very specific qualifications for voters and 
ends by expressly providing that "no other person shall be 
 
24 The presumption underlying the maxim of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius -- that specific intent can be inferred 
from silence -– has been viewed with some skepticism.  As one 
court put it, "Not every silence is pregnant; expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius is therefore an uncertain guide . . . ."  
Illinois, Dep't of Public Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 
(7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).  See Sunstein, Law and 
Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2109 n.182 
(1990) (declaring maxim to be "a questionable one in light of 
the dubious reliability of inferring specific intent from 
silence"). 
31 
 
entitled to vote."  The failure to expressly include similar 
limiting language in art. 45 is noteworthy because we know from 
the debates during the constitutional convention preceding its 
submission to the voters in 1917 that there was much back-and-
forth discussion over who should be specifically identified in 
art. 45.  See 3 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention 1917–1918, at 3-8 (1918) (Debates) (discussing 
whether various types of laborers, such as fishers, 
firefighters, locomotive operators, and traveling salespersons, 
as well as soldiers and sailors, should be referenced in art. 
45).  Having engaged in such debate, it is reasonable to assume 
that the drafters would have included language expressly 
foreclosing the Legislature's authority to further expand voting 
opportunities if that was the result they intended.  In the end, 
art. 45's silence in this regard only leaves us to speculate 
regarding their intentions.  It is the speculative nature of the 
maxim that has led at least one jurisdiction to rule that it 
"applies to provisions of [its State Constitution] that 
expressly limit power, but it does not apply to provisions that 
merely enumerate powers" (citation omitted).  Idaho Press Club, 
Inc. v. State Legislature of the State, 142 Idaho 640, 642-643 
(2006) ("[T]here is no reason to believe that a Constitutional 
provision enumerating powers of a branch of government was 
intended to be an exclusive list.  The branch of government 
32 
 
would inherently have powers that were not included in the 
list").  It is enough to say that the framers' silence in this 
instance is not enough to rebut the presumption of 
constitutionality of legislation or to prove repugnancy. 
Finally, we note that the concern that prompted the 
Legislature in 1917 to pursue a constitutional amendment, as 
opposed to merely passing a law, to provide for absentee voting 
was a very limited concern.  The 1917 report from the Secretary 
and Attorney General that proposed the original absentee voting 
amendment and the debates that followed at the constitutional 
convention reflect a general acceptance that, at least as to the 
election of Federal officers and State representatives, the 
Legislature already had the authority to provide for voting 
other than in person on election day.  See 1917 House Doc. No. 
1537, at 5, 8; Debates, supra at 6, 12. 
There was some concern at the time, however, that the same 
was not true for State senators and the Governor due to the 
allegedly then-existing requirement in the Constitution of a 
"meeting" for the election of those officers.  See part II, 
c. 1, § 2, art. 2, and part II, c. 2, § 1, art. 3, of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth; 1917 House Doc. No. 1537, at 
7-8; Debates, supra at 6, 12.  Addressing the uncertainty of the 
meaning of "meeting," the Secretary and the Attorney General 
concluded, "It hardly seems advisable to have elections to 
33 
 
Federal and State offices conducted on one basis as to some, and 
a different basis as to others, because of the confusion likely 
to result therefrom . . . ."  1917 House Doc. No. 1537, at 8. 
Whether the meeting requirement was actually a 
constitutional problem that needed to be resolved we need not 
answer.  At no time prior to 1917 had there been a judicial 
interpretation that the "meeting" requirement with respect to 
the election of State senators and the Governor required all 
voters to vote in person on the day of that "meeting."  
Moreover, as the plaintiffs acknowledge, the provisions 
containing historical references to "meetings" to elect State 
senators, see part II, c. 1, § 2, art. 2, and the Governor, see 
part II, c. 2, § 1, art. 3, have been "heavily amended" and 
"surpassed" by subsequent amendments, rendering the meaning of 
"meeting" only a matter of historical interest.  The use of the 
word "meeting" has been overtaken by use of the word "election," 
and the Legislature long ago was granted express authority with 
respect to the manner of calling, holding, and conducting 
elections.25 
 
25 Long before art. 45 was ratified, the Legislature was 
vested with "full power and authority . . . to prescribe the 
manner of calling, holding and conducting" meetings within each 
town "for the election of officers under the constitution" 
(Governor, Lieutenant Governor, councillors, Secretary, 
Treasurer and Receiver General, Attorney General, and Auditor).  
See art. 29 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution 
 
34 
 
II.  Article 64.  The plaintiffs also make a subsidiary 
argument based on art. 64, § 3, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 82 of the 
Amendments, which provides:  "[E]lections for the choice of a 
governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary, treasurer and 
receiver-general, attorney general, and auditor shall be held 
quadrennially on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in 
November and elections for the choice of councillors, senators 
and representatives shall be held biennially on the Tuesday next 
after the first Monday in November."  Specifically, the 
 
(ratified in 1885).  Then, in 1918, a year after art. 45's 
adoption, the Constitution was amended to provide for a biennial 
"election" (rather than a "meeting") for constitutional 
officers, senators, and representatives.  See art. 64, §§ 1, 4, 
of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  The same 
language was retained when art. 64 was amended in 1950, see art. 
80 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, and when 
it was amended again in 1964 to provide for a quadrennial 
"election" for constitutional officers.  See art. 82 of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution (continuing to 
provide for senators and representatives to be "elected" 
biennially).  In 1974, the Constitution was further amended to 
provided that the "manner of calling and conducting the 
elections for the choice of senators and councillors . . . shall 
be prescribed by law" (emphasis added).  Art. 101 of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  By that time, the 
same already had been true for State representatives for well 
over one hundred years.  See art. 21 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution ("The manner of calling and 
conducting the meetings for the choice of representatives, and 
of ascertaining their election, shall be prescribed by law") 
(ratified in 1857), as amended by art. 71 of the Amendments 
("The manner of calling and conducting the elections for the 
choice of representatives, and of ascertaining their election, 
shall be prescribed by law") (ratified in 1930). 
35 
 
plaintiffs contend that art. 45, when viewed in connection with 
art. 64's requirement that the election "be held" on a set date, 
must be read to imply that no votes can be cast other than on 
that day unless a voter falls within one of the three limited 
categories of persons eligible for absentee voting. 
We reject the plaintiffs' arguments in regard to art. 64.  
Articles 45 and 64 serve different purposes.  Article 64 sets 
the date and frequency of the election (and thereby the length 
of term) for certain State government offices.  It is not 
directed at the manner of voting.  Its timing provisions also do 
not preclude early or absentee voting, alone or in combination 
with art. 45.  Although the parties have not identified any 
Massachusetts cases interpreting art. 64's requirement that the 
election "be held" on a certain day, similar issues and 
arguments have arisen under Federal law.  Although our State 
constitutional analysis is in no ways bound by these Federal 
statutory interpretations, their reasoning is helpful to our 
resolution here. 
Federal law provides that "[t]he Tuesday next after the 
[first] Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is 
established as the day for the election" for representatives, 
senators, and presidential electors.  See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; 3 
U.S.C. § 1.  The United States Supreme Court has defined "the 
election" for purposes of these statutes as "the combined 
36 
 
actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection 
of an officeholder."  Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997).  
In Foster, the Court struck down a Louisiana law that 
effectively dispensed with the November election if a candidate 
for representative or senator received a majority of the votes 
in an "open primary" conducted in October because it clearly 
violated Federal law by leaving "no act in law or in fact to 
take place on the [election] date chosen by Congress."  Id. at 
72.  In other words, "if an election does take place, it may not 
be consummated prior to federal election day."  Id. at 72 n.4. 
Federal courts applying the definition from Foster have 
rejected claims that State laws allowing early voting violate 
provisions in Federal statutes regarding the day of election.  
See Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 
1174-1175 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Decker v. 
Bradbury, 535 U.S. 986 (2002) (Keisling) (Oregon law); Millsaps 
v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 545-547 (6th Cir. 2001) (Tennessee 
law); Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 
775-776 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1230 (2000) (Bomer) 
(Texas law); Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way, 492 F. 
Supp. 3d 354, 366-368 (D.N.J. 2020) (New Jersey law).  Under 
those early voting systems, voting was still held on election 
day and no winners were determined or announced until after 
polls closed.  See, e.g., Keisling, supra at 1176 ("Although 
37 
 
voting takes place, perhaps most voting, prior to election day, 
the election is not 'consummated' before election day because 
voting still takes place on that day"); Millsaps, supra at 547 
("So long as no combined action occurs on any day other than 
federal election day, or so long as any such combined action is 
not intended to make a final selection of a federal 
officeholder, a State has complied with the federal elections 
statutes"); Bomer, supra at 774 (early voting is not preempted 
"[b]ecause the election of federal officials in Texas is not 
decided until Texas voters go to the polls on federal election 
day").  In addition, the courts noted that the Federal law was 
intended to facilitate rather than limit voting, and thus was 
unlikely to be inconsistent with a law providing for early 
voting.  See Bomer, supra at 777 ("[W]e cannot conceive that 
Congress intended the federal election day statutes to have the 
effect of impeding citizens in exercising their right to vote").  
See also Millsaps, supra at 548 (statute intended "to remove the 
burden of voting in multiple elections in a single year"). 
We see no reason to interpret art. 64 narrowly to preclude 
early voting.  The election is not "consummated" during the 
early voting period, and the "final selection" of winners must 
wait for the polls to close on the day designated in the 
Constitution.  See Foster, 522 U.S. at 71, 72 n.4.  Although the 
VOTES act allows early and absentee ballots to be "deposited 
38 
 
into a tabulator" or ballot box in advance of the date of the 
primary or election in accordance with regulations promulgated 
by the Secretary, it also provides that "no results shall be 
determined or announced until after the time polls close on the 
date of the preliminary, primary or election" (emphasis added). 
G. L. c. 54, §§ 25B (h), 95.  See Millsaps, 259 F.3d at 546 ("an 
official's mere receipt of a ballot without more is not an act 
meant to make a final selection").  Early disclosures of results 
are punishable by fines and imprisonment.  G. L. c. 54, § 95.  
See Bomer, 199 F.3d at 777, citing Tex. Elec. Code §§ 61.007, 
81.002; Donald Trump for President, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d at 
368-369 (noting that although votes are "canvassed" before 
election day, laws making voting results confidential and 
punishing disclosures negate any "appreciable risk that the 
results of New Jersey's election will be reported prior to 
Election Day").  Unlike the Louisiana open-primary system at 
issue in Foster, traditional in-person voting still takes place 
on election day under the VOTES act, and voters do not receive 
notice of results or vote counts that could influence the 
outcome of the election until after polls close.  Also, as 
discussed above, in connection with art. 45, we cannot conceive 
that the framers of art. 64 intended to impede the Legislature's 
authority to enhance opportunities to exercise the fundamental 
right to vote, as it has done, equally, by providing for 
39 
 
universal early voting. 
Taking into consideration the foregoing, we conclude that 
the plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of 
establishing that universal early voting for biennial State 
elections as provided under the VOTES act is repugnant or 
contrary to the Constitution. 
b.  Elections clause.  General Laws c. 54, §§ 11-16A, 
govern the appointment of "election officers," also known as 
election workers or poll workers.26  The statutory scheme found 
therein permits political party committees to compile lists of 
individuals, drawn from the ranks of registered members of their 
party, who are willing and able to serve as election officers.  
G. L. c. 54, §§ 11B-12.  Those lists are submitted to the local 
registrar of voters, who confirms that the candidates are 
eligible and then transmits the lists to the local appointing 
authority.  Id.  The authority then "shall" appoint election 
officers, G. L. c. 54, §§ 11-12, but in doing so its discretion 
is constrained by the party affiliation requirements of § 13: 
"Such election officers shall be enrolled voters so 
appointed as equally to represent the [two] leading 
political parties, except that, without disturbing the 
 
26 There are several different varieties of election 
officer, each with distinct responsibilities at the polling 
place.  Each voting precinct generally requires a warden, a 
clerk, and at least two inspectors.  In addition, precincts may 
have a deputy clerk, a deputy warden, additional inspectors, and 
as many tellers as are necessary to count the votes after the 
election.  See generally 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 52.01 (2011). 
40 
 
equal representation of such parties, not more than [one 
third] of the election officers not representing either of 
them may be appointed.  The warden shall be of a different 
political party from the clerk, and not more than one half 
of the inspectors shall be of the same political party.  In 
each case the principal officer and his deputy shall be of 
the same political party." 
 
Should the party committees fail to submit lists, however, the 
party affiliation constraints do not apply.  G. L. c. 54, 
§§ 11B-12.  Additionally, strict attention to political party 
affiliation is sometimes, although not always, required when 
officers are absent on election days.27  G. L. c. 54, §§ 16-16A. 
The VOTES act changed the procedure for filling election 
officer vacancies that arise after initial appointments but 
before polls open on election days.  See G. L. c. 54, § 14, as 
appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, § 9.  Prior to the act's passage, 
such appointments were to be made so "as to preserve the equal 
representation of the two leading political parties."  G. L. 
 
27 By default, G. L. c. 54, § 16, mandates that absent 
wardens, clerks, and inspectors are succeeded by their deputies, 
who are necessarily from the same party.  If both the primary 
officer and the deputy are absent, then "the voters of the 
precinct, on nomination and by hand vote, shall fill the 
vacancy" without regard to political affiliation.  Id.  In 
cities where a deputy warden or a deputy clerk was never 
appointed in the first place, see G. L. c. 54, § 11A, "the 
senior inspector of the same political party" as the absent 
warden or clerk is the replacement; the inspector's replacement 
need not, however, come from the same political party.  G. L. 
c. 54, § 16.  Finally, individual municipalities may choose to 
adopt § 16A, which allows the town or city clerk to fill 
election day vacancies with "an enrolled voter of the same 
political party as the absent officer." 
41 
 
c. 54, § 14, as amended through St. 1989, c. 491, § 4.  The 
VOTES act now permits the appointing authority (if within six 
weeks of an election) or the municipal clerk (if within three 
weeks) to fill an election officer vacancy "without regard to 
political party membership, voter status, residence in the city 
or town or inclusion on a list filed by a political party 
committee."  G. L. c. 54, § 14, as appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, 
§ 9.  The Secretary posits that the purpose of easing the 
vacancy appointment requirements is to help smaller towns find 
qualified replacements as an election draws near, thereby 
ensuring orderly and secure operation of polling places that 
might otherwise go understaffed.28 
 
28 A survey of our sister States reveals a multiplicity of 
approaches to staffing the polls.  Some require all poll workers 
to be evenly split between the two major parties.  See, e.g., 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-6-109; N.Y. Elec. Law § 3-400(3); Wis. 
Stat. § 7.30(2)(a).  Others require much less balance, see Fla. 
Stat. § 102.012(2) (requiring only that not every poll worker in 
precinct be from same party); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-231 
(same), or only consider party affiliation for some, but not 
all, positions, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-531(A) (affiliation 
considered for inspectors, marshals, and judges, but not for 
clerks).  Some require vacancies to be filled by a member of the 
same party as the individual originally appointed.  See, e.g., 
Iowa Code § 49.18; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.093.  Others, like 
Massachusetts, require attention to party affiliation for 
initial appointments but do not always do so for filling 
vacancies.  See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7-4-107, 7-4-108; Kan. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 25-2802, 25-2805; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 503-
A; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 658:2, 658:6.  Although the 
approaches vary, each reflects the States' consideration of the 
procedures designed to provide for "orderly, fair, and honest 
elections 'rather than chaos.'"  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
 
42 
 
In the plaintiffs' eyes, however, the new procedure injects 
an impermissible partisan advantage, rendering it 
unconstitutional under art. I, § 4, of the United States 
Constitution.29  This provision, the elections clause, "grants to 
the States 'broad power' to prescribe the procedural mechanisms 
for holding congressional elections."30  Cook v. Gralike, 531 
U.S. 510, 523 (2001), quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).  "It cannot be doubted" that 
the clause grants the States "authority to provide a complete 
code for congressional elections," Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 
366 (1932), which "encompasses matters like 'notices, 
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, 
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, 
duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication 
of election returns,'" Cook, supra at 523-524, quoting Smiley, 
supra.  State regulation of Federal elections may not, however, 
 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 834 (1995), quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 
U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 
 
29 The plaintiffs' sole challenge to this provision of the 
VOTES act is under art. I, § 4, of the United States 
Constitution, and thus, its scope is necessarily limited to 
elections for Federal office. 
 
30 The elections clause states in its entirety:  "The Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators." 
43 
 
go beyond regulating procedure "to dictate electoral outcomes, 
to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade 
important constitutional restraints."31  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833-834 (1995) (Thornton). 
We conclude that the procedures included in the VOTES act 
for the selection of those supervising voting comply with the 
constitutional requirements set out in the relevant Supreme 
Court case law.  As the Supreme Court emphasized in Cook, States 
have "broad" powers to impose procedural requirements regarding 
the time, place, and manner of Federal elections, including the 
supervision of voting.  Cook, 531 U.S. at 523, quoting Tashjian, 
479 U.S. at 217. 
The procedures at issue here also have nothing in common 
with the substantive requirements found unconstitutional in 
Cook.  There, the Court struck down an amendment to the Missouri 
State Constitution that sought to punish individual candidates 
for their stance on congressional term limits by emblazoning 
next to their names on the official ballots, "DISREGARDED 
VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" or "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO 
SUPPORT TERM LIMITS."  Cook, 531 U.S. at 513-515, 525-526.  
Other regulations struck down under the elections clause were 
 
31 The plaintiffs have identified no other "constitutional 
restraints" violated by the poll worker appointment provisions 
at issue. 
44 
 
likewise ones that were clearly designed to pick electoral 
winners and losers.  See, e.g., Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835, 837-
838 (State's imposition of term limits on its members of 
Congress not permissible procedural regulation under elections 
clause); Committee to Recall Robert Menendez from the Office of 
U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 117 (2010) (recall of 
sitting United States Senators outcome-determinative, not 
procedural). 
In contrast, the appointment procedure established by the 
VOTES act does not unconstitutionally favor or disfavor a class 
of candidates.  As the plaintiffs correctly note, the statutory 
framework includes a proportional two-party requirement for the 
initial appointment of election officers.  Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs significantly overstate the impact of the VOTES act, 
which does not eliminate that two-party oversight requirement.  
Indeed, the act changes little in the over-all scheme that the 
Legislature has prescribed for appointing poll workers.  The 
default is, as it was before the VOTES act, that the municipal 
appointing authority appoints election officers in equal numbers 
from lists prepared by the local committees of the two largest 
political parties.  G. L. c. 54, §§ 11-13.  The appointing 
authority has no discretion not to make such appointments.  Id.  
On an election day, vacancies must still be filled in accordance 
with party affiliation in municipalities that have adopted 
45 
 
§ 16A, while in those that have not, certain positions may be 
filled by a substitute of any affiliation.  G. L. c. 54, § 16. 
The provision enacted by the VOTES act only permits a local 
appointing authority (or clerk) to disregard party affiliation 
when there is a vacancy during a limited window preceding an 
election.  G. L. c. 54, § 14.  As the Secretary explains in his 
brief, this provision "facilitates the conduct of elections by 
ensuring that there are sufficient poll workers present to 
ensure that polling places run smoothly and in accordance with 
all relevant laws."  In smaller towns, as the Secretary notes, 
such additional flexibility may be required to provide the 
necessary supervision of the election.  Finally, regardless of 
party affiliation or how they are appointed, all election 
officers must swear the same oath of office before performing 
their official duties.  G. L. c. 54, § 20. 
In sum, the procedures for the selection of supervisory 
officials included in the VOTES act do not impose substantive 
requirements designed to influence the outcome of the election, 
nor do they unconstitutionally favor or disfavor one party.  For 
all of these reasons, the VOTES act's vacancy appointment 
procedures for the supervision of elections are not 
unconstitutional on their face.32 
 
32 Considering the Secretary's provided rationale for the 
 
46 
 
c.  Anti-electioneering and free speech.  General Laws 
c. 54, § 65, requires election officials to post certain 
information at polling places and, at the same time, mandates 
that  
"no other poster, card, handbill, placard, picture or 
circular intended to influence the action of the voter 
shall be posted, exhibited, circulated or distributed 
in the polling place, in the building where the 
polling place is located, on the walls thereof, on the 
premises on which the building stands, or within [150] 
feet of the building entrance door to such polling 
place."33 
 
The forbidden acts are all species of electioneering, and 
similar anti-electioneering laws can be found in all fifty 
 
change to § 14, the Legislature's decision to allow appointment 
without regard to party affiliation in the six weeks before an 
election, while leaving undisturbed the requirement that party 
affiliation be considered in election day appointments made 
under § 16A, seems somewhat curious.  But we have never required 
perfectly crafted statutes, only constitutional ones.  See 
Cuticchia v. Andover, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 128 n.10 (2019) 
("It often has been observed that 'people who love sausage and 
respect the law should never watch either one being made' [a 
quote of uncertain provenance that has been attributed variously 
to Mark Twain, Otto von Bismarck, and several others]"). 
 
33 Section 65 also forbids the collection of signatures for 
petitions and the distribution of "[p]asters, commonly called 
stickers."  The latter prohibition presumably does not ban 
distribution of the ubiquitous "I Voted" stickers celebrating 
the discharge of an important civic duty, but rather stickers 
preprinted with a candidate's name that were designed to be 
affixed to a paper ballot.  See generally O'Brien v. Board of 
Election Comm'rs, 257 Mass. 332 (1926) (analyzing irregularities 
in ballots with pasters). 
 
47 
 
States.34  See Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 
1876, 1886 (2018) (Mansky). 
In addition to establishing early voting periods, the VOTES 
act also makes explicit that § 65 applies whenever polls are 
open during early voting.  G. L. c. 54, § 65, fifth par.  The 
plaintiffs allege that in doing so the act creates an 
unconstitutional restriction on free speech.35  Specifically, 
according to the plaintiffs, banning attempts to influence 
voters for the extended periods of time provided by early voting 
effectively ends "all free speech activities, for weeks at a 
time" around town halls, a problem "[e]specially for 
 
34 These laws are many and varied, and a number appear to 
have a longer reach than § 65.  California forbids 
electioneering in the presence of those voting by mail.  Cal. 
Elec. Code § 18371.  Louisiana bans electioneering at nursing 
homes for seven days before any voting.  La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18:1334.  South Carolina recently enacted a law that 
establishes a 500-foot electioneering-free zone around polling 
places for an early voting period of two weeks.  S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 7-25-180. 
 
35 The plaintiffs' appellate brief also attempts to expand 
the scope of their First Amendment challenge to include long-
standing formal regulations issued by the Secretary and a 2020 
guidance document.  See 950 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 52.03(22)(d), 
54.04(22)(d) (2011); Secretary of the Commonwealth, Election 
Advisory #20-12:  Regarding Electioneering, the 150-foot Rule, 
and Maintaining Order in the Polling Place (Oct. 30, 2020).  
"Pleadings must stand or fall on their own."  Mmoe v. 
Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620 (1985).  We decline to address 
claims not articulated in the plaintiffs' complaint, which was 
directed solely at the VOTES act and its application of § 65 to 
early voting periods.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 8, 365 Mass. 749 
(1974). 
48 
 
municipalities with populations under 5,000." 
 
In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), the seminal case 
on the constitutionality of electioneering prohibitions, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld Tennessee's "campaign-free 
zone" of one hundred feet around polling places, notwithstanding 
that the law was "a facially content-based restriction on 
political speech in a public forum," and thus subject to 
"exacting scrutiny."  Id. at 193-194, 198, 211.  The Court 
acknowledged that each State "indisputably has a compelling 
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process," 
id. at 199, quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989), and in "protecting the right of 
its citizens to vote freely," Burson, supra at 198.  Then, 
probing the necessity of the electioneering prohibitions, the 
Court undertook an extensive historical review of voting 
procedures in the United States.  Id. at 200-206.  That survey 
revealed that in elections from colonial times through the late 
Nineteenth Century, voters at the polls were regularly beset 
with attempts at bribery and intimidation.  See id. at 200-202.  
"In short," the Court summarized, "these early elections 'were 
not a very pleasant spectacle for those who believed in 
democratic government.'"  Id. at 202, quoting E. Evans, A 
History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States 10 
(1917). 
49 
 
 
The remedy came in the form of the "Australian system" of 
elections, which entailed both official ballots and private 
polls.  Burson, 504 U.S. at 202-205.  Massachusetts was the 
first State in the country to adopt the system.  Ludington, 
Present Status of Ballot Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 252, 252 n.1 (1909).  As a contemporary noted, the 
Commonwealth quickly reaped the rewards of its reform: 
"Quiet, order, and cleanliness reign in and about the 
polling-places.  I have visited precincts where, under the 
old system, coats were torn off the backs of voters, where 
ballots of one kind have been snatched from voters' hands 
and others put in their places, with threats against using 
any but the substituted ballots; and under the new system 
all was orderly and peaceable." 
 
Burson, supra at 204 n.8, quoting 2 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 738 (1892).  In light of 
the "persistent" problems that predated voting reform and the 
"widespread and time-tested consensus" that anti-electioneering 
laws were their antidote, the Court concluded that "some 
restricted zone is necessary in order to serve the States' 
compelling interests in preventing voter intimidation and 
election fraud."  Burson, supra at 206. 
But how much restriction is necessary?  To survive, the 
Court determined, an anti-electioneering restriction may not 
"significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights."36  
 
36 This modified burden is applicable "only when the First 
 
50 
 
Id. at 209, quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 
189, 195 (1986).  The Court concluded that Tennessee's buffer 
zone inflicted no such significant impingement and was thus "on 
the constitutional side of the line."  Burson, supra at 210-211.  
In doing so, the Court recognized that the State was provided 
some latitude to determine the extent of the restriction; the 
difference between buffer zones of twenty-five and one hundred 
feet was simply not one "of constitutional dimension" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Id. at 210. 
As the plaintiffs concede, the essential interests at stake 
and the necessity of regulation are the same here as in Burson.  
The Commonwealth's compelling interest in securing free and fair 
elections is identical, as is the necessity of anti-
electioneering restrictions to safeguard against the proven 
perils of election fraud and voter intimidation.  These 
protections are no less vital when voting on a Saturday instead 
of a Tuesday. 
The buffer zone here is also similarly geographically 
limited.  The area in which § 65 operates remains modest.  One 
hundred and fifty feet may be traversed in seconds.  See Burson, 
504 U.S. at 210 ("The State of Tennessee has decided that these 
last [fifteen] seconds before its citizens enter the polling 
 
Amendment right threatens to interfere with the act of voting 
itself."  Burson, 504 U.S. at 208-209 & n.11. 
51 
 
place should be their own, as free from interference as 
possible.  We do not find that this is an unconstitutional 
choice").  Beyond the 150 feet, the restrictions on campaigning 
do not apply. 
The plaintiffs allege that the VOTES act nevertheless 
significantly impinges on First Amendment rights by expanding 
the temporal reach of § 65's anti-electioneering proscription to 
early voting periods.  In Frank v. Buchanan, 550 F. Supp. 3d 
1230 (D. Wyo. 2021), the United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming upheld a buffer zone of one hundred feet 
that applied during early absentee voting periods stretching 
ninety days.  Id. at 1239 ("Burson did not premise its holding 
on a factual scenario where a regulation is only effective for 
two days a year").  Several other courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of anti-electioneering restrictions during 
early voting periods, even if the issue of their duration was 
not placed front and center.37  See, e.g., Citizens for Police 
 
37 We note that the anti-electioneering restriction 
considered by the Supreme Court in Mansky applied during 
"election days and for [forty-six] days before at absentee 
voting locations."  Reply Brief of Petitioners at 1, Mansky, No. 
16-1435 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2017).  Nonetheless, we do not rely on 
that aspect of Mansky, because it appears to have played no part 
in the Court's decision, and because the challenged Minnesota 
law applied only in a nonpublic forum, engendering a different 
standard of review.  See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1886-1888, 1891 
(holding States may permissibly prohibit certain apparel inside 
polling places, but finding prohibitions in Minnesota statute at 
issue too "indeterminate" to be enforceable). 
52 
 
Accountability Political Comm. v. Browning, 572 F.3d 1213, 1215 
(11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1086 (2010) (upholding 
Florida's buffer zone of one hundred feet around polling places 
and early voting sites); Schirmer v. Edwards, 2 F.3d 117, 118 & 
n.2 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub. nom. Recall '92 v. 
Edwards, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994), and abrogated by State v. 
Schirmer, 646 So. 2d 890 (La. 1994) (upholding Louisiana's 600-
foot buffer zone applied during early absentee voting periods); 
Clark v. Schmidt, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1021-1022, 1028-1034 (D. 
Kan. 2020) (upholding Kansas buffer zone enforced during twenty-
day early voting period).  Moreover, numerous other States have 
such restrictions, and the plaintiffs have not identified any 
that have been declared unconstitutional for applying during 
early voting.  See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 7-1-103(a)(8); Cal. 
Elec. Code § 18370(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1-5-105(1), 1-13-
714(1); Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(a)-(b); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 11-109(b), 11-132(a); Ind. Code § 3-14-3-16(c); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 25-2430; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.235(3); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 18:1462; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1524; Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 293.361(1); N.Y. Elec. Law § 8-104(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-
166.4(e), 163-227.2; Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695(3); S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 7-25-180; S.D. Codified Laws § 12-18-3; Utah Code Ann. § 20A-
3a-501; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2508(a); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 29A.84.510; W. Va. Code § 3-9-9; Wis. Stat. § 12.03(2); Wyo. 
53 
 
Stat. Ann. § 22-26-113. 
The plaintiffs' argument also overstates the impact of the 
VOTES act.  First, as the plaintiffs themselves point out, the 
existence of municipal, State, and Federal elections, as well as 
primaries and special elections, means that polling places were 
already open in the Commonwealth on multiple days every year 
before the act's passage.  The plaintiffs do not dispute the 
constitutionality of enforcing G. L. c. 54, § 65, on those days, 
where it has applied for over a century.  This suggests that the 
act's application of § 65 to additional voting periods is "a 
difference only in degree," not an "alternative in kind."  
Burson, 504 U.S. at 210. 
Further, the main objection leveled by the plaintiffs is to 
the application of § 65's restrictions during early voting in 
smaller towns, where they would curtail political speech around 
the key public forum of a town hall.  But in towns with under 
5,000 registered voters -- over one third of the municipalities 
in the Commonwealth -- the act is tailored to require only four 
additional hours of early voting, to be held on weekends.  G. L. 
c. 54, § 25B (b) (2)-(3).  Although the act's sliding scale 
requires longer hours for larger municipalities -- up to two 
full weeks of voting in the Commonwealth's largest cities -- 
those are communities that provide many other public forums for 
54 
 
campaigning.38  Cf. Munro, 479 U.S. at 198-199 (finding 
availability of alternative avenue of campaigning expression 
significant in concluding ballot regulation did not 
significantly impinge First Amendment rights). 
Doubtlessly a significantly more expansive combination of 
time and space restriction would constitute an impermissible 
restraint on speech, but here we are confident that the VOTES 
act's application of § 65 remains "on the constitutional side of 
the line."  Burson, 504 U.S. at 210-211.  The geographic scope 
of the restrictions on campaigning at polling places is limited 
and not meaningfully different from that approved by the Supreme 
Court in Burson.  See id. at 221.  The time periods for early 
voting are likewise limited, particularly in municipalities 
where the plaintiffs have alleged a heightened risk of 
impingement.  The fact that, outside of the circumscribed 
"island[s] of calm" around a polling place, Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1887, the tumult of campaigning can continue unabated also 
confirms that the impingement is not significant.  The 
Legislature's decision that voters are entitled to peace while 
they undertake this most "weighty civic act," id. at 1880, when 
they do so during early voting as well as on an election day is 
 
38 Local officials also have the discretion to designate a 
different polling place if town or city hall is "unavailable or 
unsuitable."  G. L. c. 54, § 25B (b) (4). 
55 
 
not an unconstitutional one.39 
d.  Electronic systems to aid voters with disabilities or 
living or serving overseas.  Like the COVID-19 voting act before 
it, the VOTES act enhances the ability of persons with 
disabilities to participate in the electoral process on similar 
terms as other voters.  See G. L. c. 54, § 25B, as appearing in 
St. 2022, c. 92, § 10; St. 2020, c. 115, § 6 (i).  In 
particular, voters who wish to vote early by mail and who are 
unable independently to mark a paper ballot because of a 
disability may apply for accommodations.  See G. L. c. 54, § 25B 
(a) (4), (5).  Among other enumerated possible accommodations,40 
 
39 The plaintiffs' complaint also lodges parallel challenges 
under arts. 9 and 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
Article 9, as discussed above, guarantees "equality among all 
qualified voters" (citation and alterations omitted), Opinion of 
the Justices, 368 Mass. at 821; the plaintiffs make no argument 
as to how forbidding electioneering during early voting 
implicates this provision. 
 
Article 16, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments, states 
that "[t]he right of free speech shall not be abridged."  We 
have historically interpreted the protections provided by this 
provision to be "comparable to those guaranteed by the First 
Amendment."  1A Auto, Inc. v. Director of the Office of Campaign 
& Political Fin., 480 Mass. 423, 440 (2018), cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 2613 (2019), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 418 Mass. 
1201, 1212 (1994).  The plaintiffs do not argue that we should 
depart from that practice here, nor do they provide us with any 
basis for doing so.  The plaintiffs' art. 9 and art. 16 claims 
therefore also fail. 
 
40 Other possible accommodations include accessible 
electronic instructions, accessible electronic applications that 
may be signed and submitted electronically, and alternative 
 
56 
 
such voters may be granted use of an authorized accessible 
electronic ballot, which can be marked and submitted 
electronically using a system that does not collect or store 
personally identifying information, and use of an accessible 
electronic affidavit of certification, which can be signed with 
a hand-drawn electronic or typewritten signature.  See G. L. 
c. 54, § 25B (a) (4).  The Secretary is required under the VOTES 
act to promulgate regulations to implement these provisions.  
See G. L. c. 54, § 25B (i). 
The VOTES act also will facilitate the ability of 
individuals voting absentee pursuant to the Federal Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, i.e., members of the 
United States uniformed services and merchant marines, their 
family members, or qualified persons residing outside the United 
States, to cast their absentee ballots.  See G. L. c. 54, § 91C, 
as appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, § 18 (effective Dec. 1, 2022); 
52 U.S.C. § 20310(1), (4), (5), (7).  Among other enhancements, 
the VOTES act will require the Secretary to approve an 
"electronic system" through which such voters may apply for, 
 
methods of signing affidavits of certification.  See G. L. 
c.  54, § 25B (a) (4), as appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, § 10.  
Voters approved for accommodation by reason of a disability may 
also print their electronically marked ballots and return them 
by delivering them, in person or by a family member, to the 
appropriate clerk's office or secured municipal ballot drop box, 
or by mailing them using a postage-guaranteed envelope provided.  
Id. 
57 
 
receive, mark, verify, and cast absentee ballots and submit 
electronic voter affidavits.41  See G. L. c. 54, § 91C (b), (c).  
Any approved electronic system shall "not store personal 
identifying information beyond the time necessary to confirm the 
identity of the voter."  G. L. c. 54, § 91C (c).  Once again, 
the Secretary is required under the act to promulgate 
implementing regulations, this time by a specific deadline, 
January 1, 2023.  See G. L. c. 54, § 91C (g); St. 2022, c. 92, 
§ 28. 
Characterizing these limited voter-access enhancements as 
"electronic voting," the plaintiffs argue that they exceed the 
constitutional scope of art. 38 of the Amendments, which 
provides that "[v]oting machines or other mechanical devices for 
voting may be used at all elections under such regulations as 
may be prescribed by law:  provided, however, that the right of 
secret voting shall be preserved."  They further claim that the 
electronic processes authorized by the VOTES act cannot meet the 
constitutional requirements of secrecy or a written vote.  The 
Secretary, meanwhile, maintains that the act does not provide 
for "electronic voting" but, rather, for an "electronic system" 
for "ballot conveyance."  He further maintains that the 
enactment of these provisions represents a rational means of 
 
41 Absentee ballots may also be applied for and submitted by 
mail, facsimile, or e-mail.  See G. L. c. 54, § 91C (c), (e). 
58 
 
meeting the Commonwealth's obligations under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 12101 et seq., and the Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301 et 
seq. 
We agree with the Secretary that the provisions are a 
reasonable response to Federal requirements, not least because, 
on its face, the VOTES act enables qualified and approved voters 
who may otherwise require assistance or be unable to vote to 
cast their ballots privately and independently.  We also 
conclude that the plaintiffs' claims, including the claim that 
the identity of any approved individual who submits a ballot 
electronically is inherently knowable, thus voiding the secrecy 
of that ballot, are speculative and advanced without a 
demonstrated understanding of how the electronic voting 
enhancements authorized by the VOTES act will operate.42  For all 
 
42 Similarly, the plaintiffs asserted in their complaint 
that the VOTES act violates the Massachusetts Constitution by 
changing residency requirements for voting.  In fact, no such 
change was made, and the plaintiffs were forced to withdraw that 
claim. 
 
The plaintiffs also claim that the VOTES act eliminated the 
requirement of a police presence at each polling place on 
election day for purposes of preserving order, enforcing 
election laws, and guarding against interference with election 
officers' duties.  In fact, the VOTES act preserves this 
election day requirement and only altered the designation of the 
entities responsible for detailing a sufficient number of police 
officers or constables.  G. L. c. 54, § 72, as appearing in St. 
2022, c. 92, § 13.  It also preserves the discretion of a city 
 
59 
 
these reasons, the plaintiffs' arguments, to the extent they 
even rise to the level of appellate argument, fail.  See 
Merriam, 375 Mass. at 253-254, citing Blackington, 24 Pick. at 
355-356. 
e.  Voting by "dead people."  In 2020, with the passage of 
the COVID-19 voting act, Massachusetts joined a handful of 
States43 in expressly providing that an early or absentee ballot 
 
or town to maintain, at its own expense, a police presence at 
early voting sites.  G. L. c. 54, § 25B (j), as appearing in St. 
2022, c. 92, § 10.  The plaintiffs appear to have recognized 
this, having not pressed the claim in their brief to the full 
court.  The claim, therefore, is waived.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 
(a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (requiring 
appellant's brief to contain "the contentions of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor," 
and providing that "[t]he appellate court need not pass upon 
questions or issues not argued in the brief"). 
 
The plaintiffs also claimed that the VOTES act eliminated a 
second mandatory list of registered voters, thereby preventing 
candidates and the minority party from deploying poll watchers 
to challenge any perceived election day irregularities and to 
assess the success of the campaign's efforts to increase voter 
turnout.  In fact, the VOTES act preserves the requirement that 
election officers mark a voter's name on a voting list and 
distinctly announce the voter's name as part of early in-person 
voting and election-day check-in procedures.  See G. L. c. 54, 
§§ 25B (b) (7), 67, as appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, §§ 10, 12; 
G. L. c. 54, § 76.  As did the COVID-19 voting act, it merely 
left to the discretion of city and town clerks whether to use a 
second voting list as part of a check-out procedure before 
voters deposit their ballot in the ballot box.  See G. L. c. 54, 
§§ 67, 83, as appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, §§ 12, 14; St. 2020, 
c. 115, § 13.  Once again, the plaintiffs appear to have 
recognized this and did not address the claim in their brief, 
thereby waiving it.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A). 
 
43 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-416(c); Conn. Gen. Stat. 
 
60 
 
cast by an eligible voter would not be invalidated solely 
because the voter later died.  See St. 2020, c. 115, 
§ 7 (j) (1)-(2).  As part of the VOTES act, the Legislature made 
these protections permanent.  See G. L. c. 54, § 25B (e), as 
appearing in St. 2022, c. 92, § 10; G. L. c. 54, § 92 (d), 
inserted by St. 2022, c. 92, § 19; St. 2022, c. 92, § 22, 
repealing G. L. c. 54, § 100.  Relying more on rhetorical 
flourish than reasoned analysis, the plaintiffs invoke the 
specter of "zombie votes" to perfunctorily claim that the VOTES 
act is "simply arbitrary and irrational" because it allows "dead 
people to vote."  The law, however, does not allow dead people 
to vote;44 it protects the constitutional right to vote by 
ensuring that ballots validly cast45 by living registered voters 
 
§ 9-140d; Fla. Stat. § 101.6103(8); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 15-13.5; 
Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-204(6); N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-12(2); 
Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-709(D).  Other States have repealed 
provisions that invalidated ballots cast by absentee voters who 
died before election day.  See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 34-1009. 
 
44 The plaintiffs cite only to cases concerning the effect 
that should be given to votes cast for a deceased, disqualified, 
or ineligible candidate for public office, a situation that has 
no bearing on the status of votes cast in accordance with 
governing law by living registered voters. 
 
45 The VOTES act provides that early and absentee ballots 
are "cast" when deposited in the mail, returned to the 
appropriate election official either by hand or via a secured 
municipal drop box, or, where permitted, submitted 
electronically.  See G. L. c. 54, § 25B (e), as appearing in St. 
2022, c. 92, § 10; G. L. c. 54, § 92 (d), inserted by St. 2022, 
c. 92, § 19. 
61 
 
are counted.  See Cepulonis, 389 Mass. at 934 (acknowledging 
"clear policy" in Massachusetts "of facilitating voting by every 
eligible voter").  Moreover, the law actually serves to avoid 
the arbitrary results that could occur under G. L. c. 54, § 100, 
which was repealed by the VOTES act, whereby the decision to 
count a ballot validly cast by an absentee voter who 
subsequently died prior to the opening of polls on election day 
turned on whether the election officers charged with the duty of 
counting happened to become "cognizant" of the voter's death. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, on July 11, 
2022, we ordered that judgment enter in the county court for the 
Secretary on all claims in the plaintiffs' complaint and that 
the plaintiffs' request to enjoin the Secretary from putting the 
VOTES act into effect be denied.