Title: In Re French's Estate
Citation: 351 P.2d 548
Docket Number: N/A
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 1960

351 P.2d 548 (1960) Matter of the ESTATE of Mabel FRENCH, Deceased. Edyth M. BROWN, Objector and Appellant, v. Emmett KELLY and Earl T. Gangner, Petitioners and Respondents. No. 9921. Supreme Court of Montana. April 21, 1960. Rehearing denied May 11, 1960. *549 John H. Risken, Helena, for appellant. John H. Risken Helena, argued orally for appellant. W. E. Coyle and Lewis F. Rotering, Butte, for Gangner. Thomas F. Kiely, Butte for Kelly. Thomas F. Kiely, Butte, and W.E. Coyle Butte, argued orally for respondents. CASTLES, Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the district court in and for the county of Silver Bow admitting a holographic will to probate. Mabel French died in Butte on July 13, 1957. The only surviving relatives are several cousins, all of whom are nonresidents of the state. After her death, several documents were discovered among the decedent's effects, two of which purported to be testamentary dispositions of her property. The sole beneficiary, under both the above instruments, petitioned the court to admit a typewritten will bearing the date July 18, 1955, to probate. Edyth M. Brown, a cousin of the testatrix, filed objections to admitting this will to probate and subsequently a hearing was held to determine whether or not this will could qualify for probate. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1 is a holographic will entirely in the handwriting of the testatrix and signed by her. Appended to the body of this will is the phrase "In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and seal this [blank] day of [blank] 1951. [signed] Mabel French." On the back of this instrument the testatrix wrote "I started to make out a will but owing to attorney's fees, tax, etc., I make it the other way for you Mabel." Emphasis supplied. On July 18, 1955, the testatrix executed petitioner's exhibit No. 2, which is a typewritten will signed by Mabel French and witnessed by Margaret H. Tullis and Pauline Murphy Hitt. This will, though witnessed, had no attestation clause and the name of the sole beneficiary and executor was filled in by pen in the handwriting of testatrix rather than being typewritten. The sole beneficiary, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, did not appear at the hearing. Mrs. Margaret Tullis was the only witness introduced by the petitioner to prove the validity of the will. She testified that she and the testatrix were good friends up until two years before the hearing was held, and that the witness was of sound mind when this will was executed. Further testimony by this witness showed that the testatrix had signed this will in the presence of both witnesses and all were present when the witnesses signed. The testatrix had stated to the witnesses that the document was her will and she asked them to witness it for her. On direct examination, the witness was asked "You don't know anything about the contents of the Will?" She replied, "No, I didn't look at that. I just witnessed her signature." Later in the testimony the witness volunteered *550 this statement: "And this I do know: this was blank [indicating the space where the name Earl T. Gangner, M.D., had been inserted by the testatrix]. I know that. There was nothing on there, no signature. Only her signature, I witnessed that. She signed that in front of Pauline and myself." On cross-examination the witness stated: "That's right. It was a blank. She wouldn't put that in there and let me see it anyway. Anyway I wouldn't look for it because it wasn't my business, and they both were blanks." The other exhibits introduced by the petitioner are, under our view of the case, of no importance in this appeal except to note that they all express an intent that Dr. Gangner should receive certain assets which the testatrix possessed. One exhibit, dated the same day as the typewritten will, contains instructions to Dr. Gangner regarding her burial and in general expresses the trust reposed in Dr. Gangner by the testatrix. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge took the matter under advisement and subsequently admitted petitioner's exhibit No. 1, the holographic will, to probate. In the same order he sustained the heir's objections to exhibit No. 2, the typewritten will, and denied it probate. The respondent contends that the holographic will is valid even though the only date it bears is the year 1951. The court below based its order admitting this will to probate on the case of In re Irvine's Estate, 114 Mont. 577, 139 P.2d 489, 147 A.L.R. 882. The statute which we are here concerned with is section 91-108, R.C.M. 1947, which provides as follows: In the Irvine case, this court held that a holographic will, bearing the month and year but not the day on which the will was executed, constituted substantial compliance with the above statute and was entitled to be admitted to probate. The statutory requirement of dating a holographic will is based primarily on two grounds: (1) In order that the courts may determine whether the testator had the requisite testamentary capacity when he executed the will; and (2) If there are two or more wills, containing incompatible provisions, in order to determine which is the later will. In re Noyes' Estate, 40 Mont. 190, 105 P. 1017, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 1145. It is possible that if the month is given this is a sufficient delimitation to enable the courts to determine the above questions should they arise. Given only the year, however, we fail to see how the courts could determine such questions. In this latter situation, the contestant would have each of 365 days, testamentary incapacity on any one of which could invalidate the will. Conversely, the proponent of the will would have to be prepared to rebut evidence of testamentary incapacity on any day throughout the given year. Due to these complications, we feel that a holographic will which is dated with the year but not the day or month on which it was executed does not constitute substantial compliance with section 91-108, supra. In addition to what has been said above, the writing on the back of this instrument illustrates, when viewed with subsequent documents and actions, that the testatrix did not intend this instrument to operate as a will. If the requisite animus testandi is lacking, the instrument cannot stand as a valid will. In re Watts' Estate, 117 Mont. 505, 160 P.2d 492. It is evident that Mabel French did not intend this instrument to be her last will and testament because of this writing and also because the typewritten will was in exactly the same language as the holograph, thus effectuating the intent which she expressed on the back of the holograph to "make it the other way". *551 A probate proceeding is equitable in nature and is governed, on appeal, by rules of equity. In re Woodburn's Estate, 128 Mont. 145, 273 P.2d 391. The district court, in admitting the holographic will to probate, sustained the heir's objections to the typewritten will but gave no reasons for this ruling. We must infer that this action was taken because the court had decided to admit the holographic will to probate. Under our view, that the holographic will is invalid, it is necessary to briefly consider the typewritten will so that on remand the district court will know our views on the subject. The first objection to the typewritten will is that it lacks an attestation clause. While we feel that the better practice is to include an attestation clause so that it may operate as prima facie evidence of the validity of the will, such a clause is not absolutely necessary under our statute, section 91-107, R.C.M. 1947, which requires no formal attestation clause. In re Woodburn's Estate, supra; see also 94 C.J.S. Wills, § 196; 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 296; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1512 (3d ed. 1940); 1 Page, Wills, § 373 (3d ed. 1941); and cases cited therein. Since there is no question here regarding compliance with the statutory formalities of execution and attestation, the lack of an attestation clause should not cause the will to be denied probate. It is the fact of attestation and not its recitation that the statute requires. The second objection to the typewritten will is that there are blanks in the will which were filled in by the testatrix with the name of the sole beneficiary and executor, Dr. Earl T. Gangner. There is a well-recognized presumption of law that blanks in a will which are left for the insertion of names of legatees are presumed to have been filled in before the execution of the will. See generally 67 A.L.R. 1138, 1144, and 34 A.L.R.2d 619, 634. This court has held that "No will, fair upon its face, should be denied probate, except for good and sound reasons. The policy of our courts is to sustain a will, if it is possible to do so, and every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the due execution of a will. The presumption is against intestacy." In re Woodburn's Estate, 128 Mont. at page 151, 273 P.2d at page 394, supra. In the instant case the writing, in the two places where the name, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, has been inserted, is apparently in the same handwriting, and signed with the same pen and ink as the signature of the testatrix. Given the above presumptions, (1) against intestacy and (2) that the blanks were filled in before execution, coupled with the similarities of pen, ink and handwriting, we feel that the district court should reconsider the typewritten will. The only evidence which raises any question as to the validity of the will is the self-impeaching statement of Mrs. Tullis. This statement should be carefully reconsidered by the court and further testimony taken if necessary so that the court will be in a position to determine whether the testimony of this witness is worthy of belief in these particulars; and if so, whether it is sufficient to rebut the presumptions discussed above. There has been no cross-assignment of error in this case and therefore we will not decide the validity of the typewritten will. The cause is reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to take further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. HARRISON, C. J., concurs. ANGSTMAN, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Castles on the only point presented by the appeal. That point is whether the instrument dated 1951 was properly admitted to probate as a holographic will. The case of In re Irvine's Estate, 114 Mont. 577, 589, *552 139 P.2d 489, 498, 147 A.L.R. 882, quoted with approval from 1 Page on Wills (3d ed.), p. 702, the following: "If the date gives the year and the month, but without the day of the month, some courts have held that such date is insufficient; while others have held that it is sufficient." There are no cases that hold a document is sufficiently dated with nothing but the year given as here. There is much said in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Adair to the effect that Exhibit 2, the instrument dated July 18, 1955, should be admitted to probate as a valid will. Respondents have not filed a cross appeal. They have made no cross assignments of error raising this point. They do not argue that it is a valid will. Both opinions indicate that it is a valid will and with that I agree. The only substantial difference between the two opinions is the matter of directions to the district court. The opinion of Mr. Justice Castles directs the district court to reconsider the question as to whether it was properly attested as a will, either on the evidence already taken or on additional evidence. This conclusion was arrived at because of the fact that having admitted the instrument of 1951 to probate the court, in all probability, gave but little consideration to the instrument executed on July 18, 1955, which contained the identical language. Since the question is not argued here and very likely was not argued in the trial court and since in all probability was given but little, if any, consideration by the trial court, the directions given in the opinion of Mr. Justice Castles, I think, are proper. Whether the instrument dated 1951 should be taken and considered with the instrument dated July 18, 1955, under section 91-204 is of no moment here because there is no dispute as to the intention of testatrix. Both instruments are identical in form and substance and clearly express her intention. I concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Adair so far as it holds that Dr. Gangner should not be ruled out as executor without notice and hearing on charges regularly made, and I also agree with much that is said in the opinion of Mr. Justice Adair regarding the rights of the public administrator, though as to the latter question there is some doubt whether it is properly before us, a point on which I express no opinion. ADAIR, Justice (dissenting). The record presented on this appeal reveals a most startling and shocking attempted spoliation of the estate of Mabel French, deceased, the whole of which estate, the decedent left to Dr. Earl T. Gangner, whom she named and appointed sole executor. In the period from 1951 to 1957, both inclusive, Mabel French made and signed five separate instruments written on five separate sheets of paper wherein she wrote words, which taken and construed together, clearly express and evidence her definite intention to make testamentary disposition of all her property at her death. It is not any single one of these sheets of paper, standing alone, that constitutes the decedent's last will. It is the words that are written on all five sheets that constitute the will of Mabel French. "A will is not a sheet of paper, nor a number of sheets of paper; it is the words written thereon. The law affords the right of testamentary disposition; such disposition is to be gathered from language * * *". Emphasis supplied. In re Golden's Will, 165 Misc. 205, 300 N.Y.S. 737, 738. Also see In re Chase's Estate, 51 Cal. App. 2d 353, 124 P.2d 895, 899. No one of the five instruments is either inconsistent, irreconcilable, or incompatible with any of the others. None of these instruments stands alone. They all stand together as one instrument. Mabel French kept these instruments together in what she termed her "strong box" where, at her death, they were all found together. *553 On the fifth day after Mabel French's death, all five instruments were placed in a blue linen envelope and filed together in the office of the clerk of the district court for Silver Bow County. At the trial, in the district court, the five instruments were identified and received in evidence together and marked as Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 herein. All five instruments must be taken and construed together as one instrument. So says the law. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-204, reads: The trial judge neither observed nor obeyed the plain and express mandate of the provisions of section 91-204, supra. This failure, to follow the law as it is written in section 91-204, has precipitated much of the confusion attendant upon the proceedings in both the trial court and in this, the supreme court. The trial judge singled out and separated decedent's 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, from its companions and admitted this lone instrument to probate as the last will and testament of the decedent. This done, the trial judge then sustained the appellant Edyth M. Brown's objections (quoting the trial judge) "to the other instruments offered as the last will and testament of decedent, to-wit: Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5" all of which he erroneously refused to admit to probate. On the appeal to this court, Mr. Justice Castles, in his review, first took, isolated and considered decedent's 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, separate and apart from its companions and wound up by declaring it to be invalid. He indicated that the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, badly needed the day and the month in addition to the year of its execution, to make it valid and that to give only the year 1951 was wholly insufficient to meet the requirements of R.C.M. 1947, § 91-108, defining a holographic will. The statute requires that decedent's 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, and her 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, "are to be taken and construed together as one instrument". Section 91-204, supra. The 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, has two complete dates. The first date, "July 18, 1955". is written at the beginning of the instrument. The second date consists of a complete testimonium clause written at the end of the instrument. Such clause reads: "In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and seal this 18th day of July, 1955". Neither date is required by the provisions of the governing statute, § 91-107, supra. Either date could have been taken and construed to supply any deficiency complained of in the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, thus enabling it to strictly and fully conform to all the requirements of section 91-108, supra. The dispositive and testamentary words written by the hand of Mabel French in longhand script in Exhibit No. 1 and the same dispositive and testamentary words employed by her in the writing of Exhibit No. 2, express and evidence one and the same testamentary intent, and one and the same will. When taken and construed together as one instrument, Exhibit No. 1, and Exhibit No. 2, express and evidence a complete and valid will. No lawyer in this state could have drafted a better one. It fully meets all the statutory requirements governing the execution of a valid witnessed will. In sustaining appellant's objections to Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 and in refusing to admit such exhibits, together with Exhibit No. 1, to probate the trial court committed reversible error. In Estate of Moody, 118 Cal. App. 2d 300, at pages 307, 308, 257 P.2d 709, at page 713, it is said: Intermeddlers. Neither Frank Quinn, who instituted these proceedings in the district court, nor Emmett Kelly, the public administrator for Silver Bow County, had any standing whatever in these proceedings. Neither was "a person interested" that is, interested in the estate, and not in the mere fees of an administration thereof. See In re Sanborn's Estate, 98 Cal. 103, 105, 32 P. 865, 866; State ex rel. Eakins v. District Court, 34 Mont. 226, 85 P. 1022; State ex rel. Hill v. District Court, 126 Mont. 1-5, 242 P.2d 850, 31 A.L.R.2d 749. Both Quinn and Kelly were unauthorized intermeddlers. Both were and are clients without a cause. Neither is entitled to any "cut" or fees from, or out of this estate which was given and bequeathed to Dr. Earl T. Gangner and to whom it belongs subject only to the discharge of the just debts and obligations of the testatrix. A full, fair, just, and correct determination, under the law, of all the questions, both of fact and of law, requires a full understanding of all the essential facts as well as of the controlling statutes and decisions. The Facts. In the year 1929, Mabel French, a single woman, entered the employ of the Post Publishing Company, at Butte, Montana. She continued in such employment until some time in the year 1957. Her work was that of a newspaper woman. She worked on both The Butte Daily Post and The Montana Standard of which last-named daily newspaper she was the long-time capable society editor. On July 13, 1957, Mabel French died in the Community Hospital at Butte, Montana. She left an estate consisting of both real and personal property, then of the estimated value of between $26,000 and $30,000 or more, all situate in Silver Bow County, Montana, wherein she resided and made her home during all of the above-mentioned years. Mabel French left no husband, child, father, mother, sister or brother. See R.C.M. 1947, § 91-1405. At the time of her death, she had no known relative or next of kin residing anywhere within the State of Montana. At the initial hearing held in the district court on August 9, 1957, Frank Quinn, a newswriter and columnist for both The Butte Daily Post and The Montana Standard and long-time fellow employee of Mabel French, called as a witness on behalf of the proponent, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, testified that during Mabel French's last illness, her attending physician informed the witness, that his patient was dying and asked that the witness attempt to contact the dying woman's nearest relatives and apprise them of such fact. The witness Quinn testified: The "Mrs. Brown" mentioned in Mr. Quinn's above-quoted testimony is Edyth M. *555 Brown, the appellant herein, who resides at 720 East 75th Street, in Cheney in the State of Washington, and who represents herself to be a cousin of Mabel French. Harry McGee, referred to in Mr. Quinn's above-quoted testimony, likewise is an actual bona fide resident of the State of Washington who resides on Route 1, Oaksdale, Washington, and who is represented to be a cousin of Mabel French. At the time of her death and, for a number of years prior thereto, Mabel French maintained and made her home in a rented apartment in the Tripp and Dragstedt Apartments in the City of Butte, Montana. Frank Quinn Takes Over. Immediately following Mabel French's death on July 13, 1957, Frank Quinn proceeded to take over the affairs pertaining to decedent's estate by proceeding to the Tripp and Dragstedt Apartments, accompanied by Mr. Chazer, the deputy coroner of Silver Bow County, where, after contacting Mrs. Jones, the landlady in charge of said apartment building, the three, namely, Quinn, Chazer and Mrs. Jones entered and searched the apartment and home of Mabel French, where, among her personal possessions and effects the three searchers discovered what Mabel French called her "strong box" which contained, among other valuable papers, five separate instruments in writing, each and all bearing the signature of Mabel French written in ordinary longhand script by the hand of Mabel French, herself, which five writings, collectively and "taken and construed together as one instrument" (R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-204, 91-205), set forth and plainly express the last wishes, directions and will of Mabel French, in the event of her death, as to the disposition of all her property, both real and personal; the payment of her just debts; the handling and administration of her estate; the conduct of her funeral and burial; the collection and disposition of the proceeds of her group life insurance policy and the location of her checking account, of her safety deposit box and her investments and savings, including her stocks and bonds. Frank Quinn testified that upon discovering decedent's strong box containing the above-mentioned five instruments he "looked over some of them" and Mr. Chazer, the acting coroner, then "took them" with him. The original instruments have been marked as Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 herein and a photocopy of each is inserted later in this opinion. The law of Montana requires that "Every custodian of a will, within thirty days after receipt of information that the maker thereof is dead, must deliver the same to the district court having jurisdiction of the estate, or to the executor named therein." R.C.M. 1947, § 91-801. Emphasis supplied. The one and only executor named, nominated and appointed by Mabel French in her above dispositive testamentary writings is Earl T. Gangner, M.D. The self-appointed custodian of the wills of Mabel French elected to comply with the provisions of section 91-801, supra, by delivering "the same to the district court" rather than "to the executor named therein", namely, Earl T. Gangner, M.D., section 91-801, supra. Quinn Commences These Proceedings. On July 18, 1957, being five days after the death of Mabel French, Frank Quinn commenced these probate proceedings, No. 15824, in the district court for Silver Bow County, by filing simultaneously therein the following, viz: 1. A blue envelope containing the five written instruments of testamentary character that had been found in and taken from the "strong box" in Mabel French's apartment by Frank Quinn and Mr. Chazer, the deputy coroner; 2. A typewritten "Request for Appointment of Administrator" subscribed by Harry McGee and Edyth M. Brown, the nonresident cousins, requesting that the district court appoint Frank Quinn, as administrator of Mabel French's estate; and 3. A "Petition for Letters of Administration" signed by Frank Quinn requesting that letters of administration be issued *556 him on the grounds that he is a person competent to act as the administrator "and that it is the desire of certain of the next of kin [Harry McGee and Edyth M. Brown] that he be appointed as such, as is evidenced by their requests to the Court filed simultaneously herewith." Emphasis and bracket insert supplied. Request for Appointment Void. Since the petitioners, Harry McGee and Edyth M. Brown, then were and still are actual bona fide residents of the State of Washington, it follows that under the Montana law neither is either competent, eligible or entitled to be appointed or to serve as administrator or administratrix of this estate. See R.C.M. 1947, § 91-1405, subd. 2. Nor did either of these nonresident cousins have the right to petition or to request the district court or judge to appoint Frank Quinn or any other person to act or serve as the administrator of this estate. The statute, section 91-1405, is clear, specific and controlling. It declares and establishes the public policy of this state on this feature of this proceeding. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-1405, so far as pertinent here, reads: The joint "Request for Appointment of Administrator" signed and filed by Harry McGee and Edyth M. Brown, the non-resident reputed cousins of Mabel French, deceased, was and is contrary to the express public policy of this state; it is contrary to the express provisions of section 91-1405, subd. 2, supra, and it is wholly unauthorized, null and void. Such joint request is obviously evasive and misleading. It was and is confusing to the judge of the district court and to the justices of this court. It needlessly encumbers the record of both the trial and the appellate court. It should be ordered stricken from the records and files of the district court as being against established public policy and as void ab initio. Frank Quinn's petition for the issuance to him of letters of administration, grounded as it was upon the above void, joint request gave the petitioner Quinn no rights nor standing to either institute or to prosecute these probate proceedings and his petition for letters of administration should be ordered stricken from the records and files of the district court notwithstanding the fact that at the conclusion of the second and final hearing herein held on November 1, 1957, the trial judge, in open court, granted the oral motion of Quinn's counsel to withdraw the latter's frivolous and sham petition for letters. Wills of Mabel French. On the outside of the blue linen envelope containing the five written instruments "filed simultaneously" with Frank Quinn's petition for letters of administration, is the following pen and ink longhand script endorsement, viz: The five original writings so filed in the blue envelope are marked as Exhibits No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 herein. 1951 Will Exhibit No. 1. The earliest document is the 1951 holograph marked Exhibit No. 1. It was wholly written by the hand of Mabel French, in ordinary *557 longhand script with a pen and blue ink on a single sheet of plain white letter-size paper. It is in the following words and figures: The above is one way of making a will. See R.C.M. 1947, § 91-108. It is the do it altogether by yourself way. It is the simplest form in which a will may be expressed. It requires no witness. It may be made anywhere, either in or out of this state. It may be expressed in its maker's own words. It need not follow any particular form. It does not require the services of any lawyer in its drafting hence there is no outlay of any money for attorney's fees required or resulting from its making. It is an inexpensive way of making one's will. Explanatory Undated Lead Pencil Note. Written lengthwise across the back or reverse side of the single sheet of paper, on the front or obverse side whereof is written decedent's 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, is an explanatory note entirely written *558 by the hand of Mabel French with a lead pencil and in longhand script. The explanatory note is in the following words: In her above-undated holograph, Mabel French apologetically explained that she "started to make out a will but owing to attorney's fees, tax, etc." [attendant, attaching, incident to and to be incurred in the making in such way, R.C.M. 1947, § 91-107] she "made it the other way for you" being the simple, informal, inexpensive, do it altogether by yourself way sanctioned by R.C.M. 1947, § 91-108, adopted and exhibited by and in her 1951 pen and ink holograph so wholly written by her own hand on the front or obverse side of Exhibit No. 1, made for Dr. Earl T. Gangner, the sole legatee, devisee and executor named therein. No person other than Dr. Gangner and the testatrix being mentioned in Exhibit No. 1, the concluding words of the above lead pencil holograph "for you" refers to and means Dr. Gangner and none other. The above-explanatory lead pencil note evidences the fact that Mabel French considered Exhibit No. 1 to be a valid holographic will. She carefully and safely kept and preserved it in her strong box which contained her valuable papers wherein it was found immediately after her death on July 13, 1957. 1955 Will Exhibit No. 2. On July 18, 1955, Mabel French made her same will in yet another way wherein the provisions of R.C.M. 1947, § 91-107, are controlling, when she restated. re-executed, reiterated, remade, republished, redeclared and reaffirmed her 1951 holograph by and in her 1955 witnessed will, marked Exhibit No. 2. This more recently executed document, together with her 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, became and constitute Mabel French's last will and testament. See R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91 204, 91-117 and 91-205. The 1955 document is written on one side of a single sheet of white letter-size paper bearing at the top, the printed three line letterhead of The Butte Daily Post Newspaper. This document, Exhibit No. 2, is subscribed at the end by Mabel French, whose signature is written in longhand script with a pen and in blue ink. The name Earl T. Gangner, M.D., is twice *559 written in the document in longhand script and in blue ink by the hand and pen of Mabel French. Beneath the signature of Mabel French and opposite the typewritten word "Witnesses" are the signatures of the two subscribing witnesses, Margaret H. Tullis and Pauline Murphy Hitt, both written with a pen and in black ink. Exhibit No. 2 is in the following words and figures, viz.: No part of the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, is, in anywise or manner, either inconsistent, irreconcilable or incompatible with any part of the more recent 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, and under the express provisions of the statutes of Montana, both of these testamentary instruments, Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, are to be taken and construed together as one instrument. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-204. Alse see sections 91-117, 91-125 and 91-205. *560 R.C.M. 1947, § 91-117 reads: 1955 Letter of Directions. Exhibit No. 3. The document, marked Exhibit No. 3, is a typewritten letter of directions written on one side of a single sheet of white letter-size paper, bearing at the top, the same printed three-line letterhead of The Butte Daily Post as appears at the top of Exhibit No. 2, supra, and bearing the same date as Exhibit No. 2. This letter of directions, Exhibit No. 3, bears the longhand script signature of Mabel French. It is in the following words and figures: *561 Attention is directed to Mabel French's statement in the above-writing declaring: 1957 Holograph Exhibit No. 4. The document, marked Exhibit No. 4, is a longhand script holograph written with pen and ink on both the front and reverse sides of a portion of a sheet of poor quality absorbent paper, about four inches by eight and one-half inches in size and it bears the longhand script signature of Mabel French. Exhibit No. 4 is in the following words and figures: On July 18, 1955, in the typewritten letter of directions addressed to Dr. Earl T. Gangner, marked Exhibit No. 3, it is written: "* * * prefer Richards Funeral Home (owing to the owner, Arlo T. Axelson.)" In the holograph note of April 17, 1957, marked Exhibit No. 4, it is written: "In will I stated Richards Funeral Home change to Whites if you like. Mabel." Thus does Exhibit No. 4 definitely refer to and dovetail into Exhibit No. 3, under *562 which facts the courts are bound by the legislative mandate set forth in sections 91-117, 91-204, and 91-205, supra. Holograph Note Exhibit No. 5. The document, marked Exhibit No. 5 is a holograph written in ordinary longhand script, with pen and in blue ink, on one side of a single sheet of plain white letter-size paper. It bears the signature of Mabel French, and is in the following words: The words "I mentioned * * * where funeral on other note to you" in Exhibit No. 5, point, refer and tie to decedent's holograph of April 17, 1957, Exhibit No. 4, *563 wherein she wrote "In will I stated Richards Funeral Home change to Whites if you like." Mabel French's holograph of April 17, 1957, Exhibit No. 4 was written less than three months before her death on July 13, 1957. It follows that Mabel French's holograph Exhibit No. 5, addressed to Dr. Gangner, the executor named and appointed in both of decedent's wills, was written on a date not earlier than April 17, 1957, the date given in Exhibit No. 4 and not later than July 13, 1957, the date whereon Miss French died. In Exhibit No. 5, Mabel French wrote her named executor, Dr. Gangner, as to the payment of her funeral expenses, thus: "I want that all to come out of the group insurance with the paper which is marked to go to estate." Here again holograph, Exhibit No. 5, ties into holograph, Exhibit No. 4, wherein Mabel French wrote "April 17, 1957 This group insurance goes to my estate E.T. Gangner, M.D. Signed Mabel French". In 1951, Mabel French commenced preparing for her greatest adventure since her birth. She set about getting her house in order. She began the writing of her instructions to be followed by others after she had crossed the Great Divide. The first chapter in her book of intention and instructions was produced when she wrote and then placed in her "strong box" her 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1. The second and third chapters in her book of intention and instructions were written on July 18, 1955, when she made, declared, published and signed her 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, and her typed letter of instructions, Exhibit No. 3, addressed to Dr. Earl T. Gangner, the named executor of her will. The fourth chapter in her book of intention and instructions was added on April 17, 1957, when she wrote her holograph of that date, Exhibit No. 4. The fifth and final chapter in her book of intention and instructions came with the writing of her final holograph, Exhibit No. 5, addressed to Dr. Gangner, the named executor of her will, instructing him, inter alia, to pay the expenses of her funeral "out of the group insurance with the paper." Each and all of these documents, Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, which Mabel French safely kept together and preserved in her "strong box", are to be taken and construed together as different chapters of her one book of intention and instructions which book evidences the positive, persistent and unfaltering intent of Mabel French, commencing in 1951 and ending in 1957, to nominate and appoint Dr. Gangner to be the executor of her will and to give, devise and bequeath to him all property possessed by her at the time of her death. Dr. Gangner's Petition for Probate of 1955 Witnessed Will. On July 26, 1957, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, filed in this probate proceeding in the district court, a petition wherein he "objects to the granting of Letters of Administration to the said Frank Quinn, and requests that the said [Quinn's] Petition for Letters of Administration be dismissed", and wherein he requests that the above-quoted witnessed document, Exhibit No. 2, herein, bearing date of July 18, 1955, be admitted to probate as decedent's last will and testament and that letters testamentary be issued to the proponent, Earl T. Gangner, herein. In his above petition, the proponent, Dr. Gangner, in part alleged: *564 Orders Appointing Time for Hearing Petitions. By two separate orders the district court ordered that the petition of the proponent, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, for the issuance to him of letters testamentary be heard on "the 9th day of August 1957, at 9:30 o'clock A.M.", and that Frank Quinn's petition for the issuance to him of letters of administration be heard on the same date, but "at 10 o'clock A.M." of that day. Opposition and Contest. On August 5, 1957, counsel for Edyth M. Brown, subscribed her name to, and then personally verified on her behalf, a pleading designated as "Heir's Opposition to Admission of Purported Will or Wills to Probate" which was filed on August 6, 1957. This pleading consists of four separately numbered paragraphs followed by a prayer for relief and a verification. This pleading must conform to the established rules of pleading and to the requirements of R.C.M. 1947, § 91-901, which provides that the contestant "must file written grounds of opposition to the probate" of the will or wills challenged. In the third paragraph of her pleading the contestant, as grounds of her opposition to the probate of the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, alleged that, "said document does not meet the statutory requirement for a holographic will in that it is undated, and, further, writing thereon in what is apparently deceased's hand indicates that she did not consider it to be a valid will; that this document does not meet the requirements of section 91-108, R.C.M. 1947, defining holographic wills." Also in the third paragraph of her pleading the contestant, as grounds of her opposition to the probate of the 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, alleged that, "the said document does not meet the statutory requirement for a written will in that it is completely devoid of an attestation clause." Emphasis supplied. Improper Objections and Grounds of Opposition. The prayer for relief, which follows the fourth and last paragraph of Edyth M. Brown's above pleading, reads as follows: The established rules of pleading do not permit the pleader to add, insert or plead in the prayer of his pleading any such after thoughts as the above-italicized portion of the contestant's prayer. Any and all such allegations, charges and accusations are of no avail and must be disregarded. It has long been the well-established law in this jurisdiction that "the prayer is no part of the pleading or cause of action stated, and cannot enlarge the relief sought by the allegations of the complaint [Citing cases.] and, in so far as the prayer is broader than the allegations of the complaint, it must be disregarded [Citing cases.]" Murray v. Creese, 80 Mont. 453, at page 459, 260 P. 1051, at page 1054. Under the above decision and the authorities therein cited, it is quite plain that the above-quoted allegations, with which the contestant, Edyth M. Brown, concluded the prayer to her pleading, should be wholly disregarded and ordered stricken forthwith. First Hearing August 9, 1957. At 9:30 o'clock on the morning of August 9, 1957, being the time theretofore appointed by the court "as the time for proving the Last Will and Testament of Mabel French, Deceased, and hearing the application of Earl T. Gangner, M.D. for letters Testamentary" the petition of the proponent, Dr. Gangner, the petition of Frank Quinn and the opposition and contest of Edyth *565 M. Brown, in probate proceeding No. 15824, came on for hearing in the district court. The proponent, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, was present in person and was also there represented by his counsel, W.E. Coyle, Esq., and Lewis F. Rotering, Esq. The then sole objector and contestant, Edyth M. Brown, was not present in person, but was represented by her counsel, John H. Risken, Esq. The petitioner for letters of administration, Frank Quinn, was present in person and represented by his counsel, John H. Risken, Esq. Also present were Emmett Kelly, the public administrator of Silver Bow County and his counsel, Thomas F. Kiely, Esq., who at the commencement of the hearing appeared to be innocent onlookers and bystanders. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for the proponent, Dr. Gangner, called to the court's attention the fact that under the controlling Montana statute (R.C.M. 1947, § 91-1405) the petitioners, Harry McGee and Edyth Brown (being nonresidents of Montana and but reputed cousins of the deceased), have no authority or power to appoint or request the court to appoint an administrator of this estate. Testimony of Frank Quinn. Frank Quinn was called as a witness on behalf of the proponent, Dr. Earl T. Gangner. On his direct examination by Attorney Coyle, the witness Quinn testified: That he is a newswriter working at the Post Standard; that in 1929, Mabel French began working on the Post Standard and that the witness had continuously known her from then until her death; that she was society editor of the Montana Standard and that the witness considered her a capable editor; that the witness was a pallbearer at Mabel French's funeral; that following her death, on July 13, 1957, the witness accompanied by Mr. Chazer, the deputy county coroner and Mrs. Jones, the landlady at the Tripp and Dragstedt Apartments where Mabel French had an apartment, searched such apartment and therein found decedent's strong box which contained each and all of the above-mentioned five written instruments marked as the proponent Gangner's Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 herein; that in company with Mrs. Brown, Mr. McGee Mr. Risken, and the attorney for the Metals Bank at Butte, plus an employee of the bank, the witness inspected the contents of decedent's safety deposit box at such bank and that they failed to find therein any document that purported to be the last will and testament of the deceased. The witness Frank Quinn, was then taken on cross examination by Attorney Risken, who propounded but eight questions to the witness, one of which was put and answered thus: On his redirect examination this witness testified: On the date appointed by the court for the above hearing, Margaret H. Tullis, also known as Mrs. Jim Tullis, was the one and only subscribing witness to the 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, then within the State of Montana, the other subscribing witness, Mrs. Pauline Murphy Hitt, then being and residing at Powder River in the State of Wyoming. *566 The Missing Witness. At 9:30 a.m. on the morning of August 9, 1957, being the precise time appointed by the trial court for the hearing to begin, the subscribing witness, Margaret H. Tullis, sprang a most disturbing surprise upon the proponent and his counsel by calling Attorney Coyle, and telling him that she wasn't feeling well enough to come up to the hearing. As soon as he had concluded his examination of the witness Quinn, Attorney Coyle, in open court, informed the trial court and the parties and their counsel of his unfortunate predicament and requested a continuance by reason thereof, informing the court that the assets of the estate would not be endangered or lost as the property had all been "picked up and nobody is bothering" it. Thereupon, the trial judge invited Attorney Risken to proceed with the intoduction of any evidence that he had, but said counsel declined to proceed with his proof, the record thereon being as follows: Simple Solution. With Frank Quinn's testimony completed and before the court all that was required to entitle Mabel French's 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, to be admitted to probate was the testimony of the indisposed subscribing witness, Mrs. Tullis. This situation could have been met and handled, precisely as it was handled in the subsequent hearing held on November 1, 1957, where a regularly scheduled morning hearing was recessed at 10:10 A.M. and then continued until 2:00 P.M. that same day, to enable the production in court of this same subscribing witness, Mrs. Tullis. Both subpoenas and bench warrants were available and, if for any good and sufficient reason, the witness could not attend upon the court, the trial judges have been known to meet such emergency and adjust themselves to the situation by adjourning to the presence of the ailing witness, and there, with the court reporter, the parties involved and their counsel present, hearing and reducing to writing, the testimony of the subscribing witnesses so necessary to entitle the witnessed will to be admitted to probate. The solution is not adjournment of the hearing for almost three months, the appointment of the public administrator, the issuance to this public administrator of letters of special administration and the *567 ouster of the executor nominated and appointed by the testatrix in her last will and testament. Kelly Was Ready. At the conclusion of Frank Quinn's testimony given at the August 9th hearing, Emmett Kelly and his counsel stepped out of their role as mere onlookers and bystanders by seizing upon the opportunity and excuse supplied by the failure of the subscribing witness, Mrs. Tullis, to show up for the hearing and then and there stepping forward in open court and exhibiting and presenting to the trial judge, without any previous notice of any kind, Emmett Kelly's already prepared "Petition for Letters of Special Administration" which had theretofore been signed by both the petitioner Kelly and by his counsel. As soon as such petition was produced in court, the trial judge directed the filing of the petition wherein the petitioner Kelly alleged and represented, inter alia: "That the value and character of said property so far as known to your Petitioner is as follows: real property consisting of Lots Six (6) and Seven (7), Block Ten (10) Big Butte Addition to the City of Butte, Montana, value unknown; miscellaneous items of jewelry, value unknown; various stocks in different corporations and two (2) Government bonds; personal effects and clothing; that the value of said stocks and bonds as your Petitioner is advised and believes, and therefore alleges, is approximately $15,000. * * * "That in view of the objections to probate of said purported will or wills, that there shall be a delay in the administration of said estate; that all of the known heirs of said decedent cedent consists of property of such a nature that it will be lost, wasted, or depreciated in value unless cared for and administered upon at once; that your Petitioner is advised and believes, and therefore alleges, that dividend checks have or will be payable on the corporate stocks owned by decedent, and that there is the possibility that some of said shares should be sold due to a declining market and in order to preserve values for those interested in said estate. "Wherefore, your Petitioner prays that after hearing upon this petition that Letters of Special Administration may be issued to your Petitioner, and that notice of said hearing be dispensed with as provided by law. Immediately upon directing the filing of the foregoing petition, the trial judge proceeded to hear the testimony of the petitioner Kelly who testified as follows, viz.: (Witness, Mr. Emmett Kelly, Excused.) Thereupon on August 9, 1957, Emmett Kelly took and subscribed the statutory oath and letters of special administration of the estate were that day issued to him. Kelly's Barrage. Emmett Kelly, the public administrator of Silver Bow County pursued the following procedure and peppered the proponent with the following papers herein, viz.: 1. On August 8, 1957, the day before the initial hearing in these proceedings, Kelly verified his typewritten pleading designated "Objections to Petition of Frank Quinn for Letters of Administration"; 2. Also on August 8, 1957, Kelly signed his typewritten "Petition for Letters of Administration" bearing that date; 3. On August 9, 1957, Kelly presented and filed his "Petition for Letters of Special Administration"; 4. On August 10, 1957, Kelly filed his verified typewritten "Objections to Petition of Frank Quinn for Letters of Administration"; 5. Also on August 10, 1957, Kelly filed his verified typewritten "Objections to Petition of E.T. Gangner for Letters Testamentary"; and 6. On August 20, 1957, Kelly filed in the trial court his above-mentioned "Petition for Letters of Administration" dated August 8, 1957, seeking letters of general Administration or letters of administration with the will annexed, the concluding paragraph of such petition and the prayer thereto reading as follows: "That your Petitioner is the duly elected, qualified and acting Public Administrator of Silver Bow County, Montana, and that all of the known heirs-at-law of Decedent reside without the State of Montana, as hereinbefore alleged, and that the Estate of Decedent consists of property of such a nature that it will be lost, wasted, or depreciated in value, unless cared for and administered upon at once; that as hereinbefore alleged, a portion of the assets of said estate consists of corporate stocks upon which dividends are, or will be, payable, and it may be necessary to sell such stocks in order to preserve the value of said estate, in view of a declining market. "Wherefore, your Petitioner prays that a day of Court be appointed for hearing this Petition, that due Notice be given by the Clerk of said Court by posting Notices according to law and that the Petition of said Frank Quinn for Letters of Administration and the Petition of said E.T. Gangner for Letters Testamentary and Probate of Will be, and each of them, be continued to the same date set for hearing of this petition, and that upon the hearing of said Three (3) petitions that proof be adduced, and Letters of Administration of said estate issued to your Petitioner, as Public Administrator of said Silver Bow County, Montana, and that in the event said will or wills be admitted to probate and said E.T. Gangner determined to be uneligible to act as executor thereof, that your petitioner be appointed administrator with will annexed herein. "Dated at Butte, Montana, this 8th day of August, 1957. "Thomas F. Kiely, Attorney for Petitioner. "Filed: August 20, 1957." Second Hearing November 1, 1957. On November 1, 1957, the following matters in probate proceeding No. 15824 came on for hearing before the Honorable John B. McClernan, district judge presiding, viz.: (a) Frank Quinn's petition for the issuance to him of letters of administration; (b) The request by Edyth M. Brown and Harry McGee that Frank Quinn be appointed administrator; (c) Emmett Kelly's "Objections" to Frank Quinn's petition for issuance to Quinn of letters of administration; (d) Earl T. Gangner's petition for admission to probate of decedent's witnessed *570 will, Exhibit No. 2, bearing date of July 18, 1955, and for the issuance to Dr. Gangner of letters testamentary; (e) Edyth M. Brown's opposition, objections and contest to the granting of Dr. Gangner's above petition; (f) Emmett Kelly's objections to Dr. Gangner's above petition; and (g) Emmett Kelly's petition for appointment as administrator with the will annexed. At the hearing ordered for 10:00 A.M. on November 1, 1957, the petitioner, Harry McGee, was neither present nor represented by counsel; the objector and contestant, Edyth M. Brown was not present in person, but was represented by her counsel, John H. Risken, Esq.; the proponent, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, was not present in person, but was represented by his counsel, W.E. Coyle, and Lewis F. Rotering, Esq.; the petitioner, Frank Quinn, was present in person and represented by his counsel, John H. Risken, Esq.; and Emmett Kelly, the combination public administrator, appointee holding special letters of administration, objector, contestant and petitioner for both letters of general administration and for letters of administration with will annexed, was present in person and by his counsel, Thomas F. Kiely, Esq. Subscribing Witness Absent. Again the subscribing witness, Margaret H. Tullis, failed to appear in court at the time ordered for the hearing and counsel for the objectors, contestants and petitioners, other than counsel for the proponent, Dr. Gangner, declined to proceed with the introduction of any evidence in support of their various contentions, whereupon, at 10:10 A.M. the court recessed to continue with the hearing at 2:00 P.M. that same day. Testimony of Margaret H. Tullis. At the appointed hour on the afternoon of November 1, 1957, the hearing was resumed and Mrs. Margaret H. Tullis, the subscribing witness to Exhibit No. 2, called as a witness on behalf of the proponent, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, took the witness stand and on direct examination by the proponent's counsel, W.E. Coyle, Esq., testified as follows: At the conclusion of her testimony on her direct, cross and re-direct examination the witness, Margaret H. Tullis. was excused and thereupon counsel for the proponent, Dr. Gangner, rested proponent's case as follows: The receiving in evidence of the proponent's Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 was proper. It is authorized by the provisions of R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-117, 91-204 and 91-205. Thereupon Mr. Kiely, of counsel for the petitioner, Emmett Kelly, proceeded as follows: Thereupon the petitioner, Emmett Kelly, was called as a witness in his own behalf and upon direct examination, by his counsel, Thomas F. Kiely, Esq., in part, testified: That he then was the public administrator for Silver Bow County, Montana, and was then acting in the the capacity of special administrator of the estate of Mabel French, deceased; That he had received a number of dividend checks from stocks held in the name of the decedent and also the proceeds of the group life insurance that she had at her place of employment; *575 That decedent owned certain real property on Harrison Avenue and also lots 6 and 7 in Block 10 of the Big Butte Addition to the City of Butte, Montana; That according to his best information, decedent's estate approximates somewhere in the neighborhood of $25,000; That the witness Kelly was petitioning for letters of administration in the event none of the wills theretofore filed in the proceeding are admitted to probate and that if for any reason the court should determine that the proponent E.T. Gangner named as executor, in two of decedent's wills (Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2), should not be able to act as executor, that then and in such event the witness Kelly, as public administrator, requests that he be appointed as administrator with the will annexed; that his "efforts as special administrator were merely to gather the assets together and preserve them until such a time as a general administrator or executor or administrator with will annexed was appointed for this estate." On cross-examination by Attorney Coyle the witness Kelly, in part, testified: That he is petitioner for the issuance to him of letters of administration in the event that none of the instruments in writing, Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, are admitted to probate and that the witness claims a prior right thereto under the statute because the nominations filed herein by the next of kin are not valid in Montana; and that if any of the Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 be admitted to probate as the last will and testament of the decedent, then it is the desire and request of the witness Kelly that he be appointed administrator with the will annexed. Petition of Quinn Withdrawn. At the conclusion of his above testimony, the witness Kelly was excused, whereupon the following occurred: Thereupon the court allowed respective counsel additional time within which to prepare, serve and submit their respective briefs and continued Emmett Kelly, the public administrator, as special administrator of the estate. (Whereupon the trial of this case was ended as above.) Minute Entry Rulings. On January 10, 1958, the court made and caused to be entered in its Journal BF at page 594 a minute entry wherein it ruled: (1) That the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, is admitted to probate as decedent's will; (2) that the petition for letters of administration by Frank Quinn is denied; (3) that the petition of Earl T. Gangner. M.D., for the issuance to him of letters testamentary is denied; (4) that the petition of Emmett Kelly for the issuance to him of letters of administration with the will annexed is granted; (5) that an order be entered accordingly; (6) that exceptions to the court's rulings were noted by counsel for the proponent, Earl T. Gangner; and (7) that the latter be granted sixty days, in addition to time allowed by law, to serve and file a bill of exceptions. Court Orders of January 13, 1958. On January 13, 1958, the trial court made, signed and caused to be filed a multiple court order, designated "Order Admitting Will to Probate And Order Appointing Emmett Kelly Administrator with the Will Annexed", wherein it ordered: (1) That Emmett Kelly's objections to Dr. Gangner's petition for letters testamentary are sustained; (2) that Emmett Kelly's petition for letters of administration is denied; (3) that Emmett Kelly's objections to Frank Quinn's petition for letters of administration are overruled, Quinn, in open court, having withdrawn his said petition; (4) that Emmett Kelly's petition for letters of administration cum testamento annexo is granted; (5) that Edyth Brown's objections to Dr. Gangner's petition for letters testamentary are sustained; (6) that Edyth Brown's objections to the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, are overruled; (7) that Edyth Brown's objections to the other written instruments, being Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, are sustained and all are denied probate; (8) that the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, is a holographic will and is admitted to probate as the last will and testament of decedent; and (9) that E.T. *577 Gangner's petition for the issuance to him of letters testamentary is denied. Judge's Certificate. On January 13, 1958, the trial judge made and filed his "Certificate of Proof of Will and the Facts Found" wherein he certified: Notice of Appeal. On March 5, 1958, the contestant and objector, Edyth M. Brown, filed a notice of appeal from the above-mentioned multiple court rulings and orders so made and filed in the district court. Supreme Court's Duty. In the case of In re Woodburn's Estate, 128 Mont. 145, at pages 150, 151, 273 P.2d 391, 393, this court said: In the case of In re Minder's Estate, 128 Mont. 1, at pages 8 and 9, 270 P.2d 404, at page 408, 45 A.L.R. 898, this court said: Section 93-216, supra, inter alia, provides: In In re Connolly's Estate, 79 Mont. 445, at pages 450, 451, 257 P. 418, at page 421, this court said: "The administration of estates is peculiarly within the cognizance of equity * * *. The court is not fettered by any rule of law from doing exact justice as between all parties in interest. [Citing case.] And in proceedings of an equitable nature this court will, in proper cases, review all questions of fact arising from the evidence presented by the record, and determine the same, as well as questions of law. Section 8805, R.C.M. 1921. [now R.C.M. 1947, § 93-216]." To like effect see: In re Sikorski's Estate, 127 Mont. 563, at page 571, 268 P.2d 395. Compare Shaw v. City of Kalispell, 135 Mont. 284, 290, 340 P.2d 523, 527; Roth v. Palutzke, 137 Mont. __, 350 P.2d 358. Procedure and Practice. In the case of In re Bragg's Estate, 106 Mont. 132, at pages 137-142, 76 P.2d 57, at page 60, this court said: The 1951 Holograph, Exhibit No. 1. The appellant has assigned as error the trial court's ruling and order admitting to probate Mabel French's 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-901, requires that "If any one appears to contest the will, he must file written grounds of opposition to the probate thereof * * *." Emphasis supplied. Appellant's written grounds of opposition to the probate of the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, were: (1) that "it was undated"; (2) that writing on Exhibit No. 1 indicates that the deceased "did not consider it a valid will"; and (3) that "it does not meet the requirements of section 91-108, R.C.M. 1947, defining holographic wills." As the concluding paragraph of her holograph, Mabel French wrote a testimonium clause which ends with the numerals "1951" entirely written by the hand of *580 the testatrix herself. Thereby she dated her holograph, Exhibit No. 1. A good coin minted by the United States of America, whether it be a silver dollar, a half dollar, a quarter of a dollar or a dime, or whether it be a nickel or a one cent piece bears no other or better or more complete date nor does a five or ten dollar bill or note. The word "undated" used by the contestant in her written grounds of opposition is defined thus: "a. Not dated; not marked with a date", The New Century Dictionary, Vol. 3, p. 2088; "a. Having no date", Funk &amp; Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 2603; "1. Not dated, bearing no date; as an undated letter". Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., Unabridged, Vol. III, p. 2764. The 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, is not an "undated" instrument. It is marked with the date 1951. It was and is dated. The numerals, "1951", written in the testimonium clause, evidences the fact that such instrument was written in the year 1951, at a time not more remote than January 1, 1951, and not later than midnight of December 31, 1951. Mabel French left no other will or purported will bearing date of 1951, hence, no question is here presented as to which of two or more wills purporting to have been executed in 1951 is decedent's last will. There was and is no merit in appellant's objection and contention that decedent's 1951 holograph "was undated". In the majority opinion in In re Irvine's Estate, 114 Mont. 577, 585, 586, 139 P.2d 489, 492, 147 A.L.R. 882, it is said: Volume 1, Page on Wills, Bowe-Parker Revision, § 1.3, at page 6 says, "a holographic will is one that is written wholly in the testator's handwriting and signed by him." The Montana statute, defining a holographic will, makes no mention whatever of inserting or incorporating in such a will, either, the day of the month, or, the month of the year of its execution. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-108, reads: It stands undisputed that each and every word, figure, number, character, symbol, abbreviation, letter, period and comma in the entire 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, was wholly written by the hand of Mabel French, herself, and by no other person. The Legislature possesses the authority to require, by legislative enactment, that to be entitled to admission to probate, a holographic will, must specifically set forth the month, the day, the hour and the minute of the hour of its execution, but as yet, no Montana Legislature has ever exercised any such authority. In the absence of such legislative enactment, the judges of the courts of this state most certainly are lacking in the authority and power to invade this field that is reserved for the Legislative Department alone and legislate any such specific omitted requirement, into a most general statute, section 91-108, supra, which at no time since its original enactment in 1877, has ever contained any such specification or requirement. In fact, the Montana Legislature by its enactment of R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-15, has prohibited the judges of this state, when construing or interpreting statutes, such as R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-107 and 91-108, and instruments such as Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 herein, from either inserting therein what has been omitted, or from omitting therefrom what has been inserted except in the rare instances such as are expressly provided for in such special statutes as R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-117, 91-204 and 91-205. The Legislature, by its enactment of R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-15, has definitely declared that, "In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted *582 as will give effect to all." Emphasis supplied. R.C.M. 1947, § 12-202, provides: "Codes, how construed. The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the codes or other statutes of the state of Montana. The codes establish the law of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice." Emphasis supplied. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-210, reads: R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-16, in part, reads: "In the construction of a statute the intention of the legislature, and in the construction of the instrument the intention of the parties, is to be pursued if possible." "Interpretation must be reasonable." R.C.M. 1947, § 49-134. "An interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one which makes void." R.C.M. 1947, § 49-133. "The law respects form less than substance." R.C.M. 1947, § 49-120. "The law neither does nor requires idle acts." R.C.M. 1947, § 49-124. "The law disregards trifles." R.C.M. 1947, § 49-125. In Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540, 546, 49 S.E. 668, 669, it is said: Re-execution of Will. In 1951 Mabel French by her own hand, on a single sheet of paper, wrote and signed her 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, without the aid or assistance of either attorneys or attesting witness. The words that she wrote expressed her wishes and will. This is one way of disposing of all her property at death. It is a way that required neither the aid of attorneys nor witnesses. It involved no fees for attorneys nor scriveners. It is a way sanctioned by R.C.M. 1947, § 91-108. "A will is not a sheet of paper, nor a number of sheets or pages; it is the words written thereon." Emphasis supplied. In re Golden's Will, 165 Misc. 205, 300 N.Y.S. 737, 738. Also see In re Estate of Chase, 51 Cal. App. 2d 353, 124 P.2d 895, 899. "A will is defined to be `the just sentence of our will touching what we would have done after our death.'" Payne v. Sale, 22 N.C. 455, 458. To like effect see Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa.St. 126, at page 132, and Barney v. Hayes, 11 Mont. 571, at pages 575, 576, 29 P. 282, 284, 28 Am.St.Rep. 495, 497. In Killian v. Nappier, 244 Ala. 130, 12 So. 2d 402, 403, 404, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a written instrument duly executed and witnessed, stating "I will all of my property to my wife, and make her executrix of my will, without bond", was obviously a will. "Of all written instruments, wills are the least formal. Anything written, in any form, goes for a will, if it reveals the intention of the maker to dispose of his property at death * * * the intention of the testator is the guiding principle." Adams v. Simpson, 358 Mo. 168, at page 176, 213 S.W.2d 908, at page 913. In 1955, Mabel French executed, acknowledged and signed another document, Exhibit No. 2, in the presence of two attesting witnesses who subscribed their names to the document. Again the words that she there wrote expressed her wishes and will. This is another and different way of disposing of all her property at death. *583 It is also a way that required no attorney and that involved no attorney's fees. However, it did require the attendance and assistance of two attesting witnesses. This is a way sanctioned by R.C.M. 1947, § 91-107. In each document, Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, Mabel French employed the same dispositive testamentary words and left all her property to the same individual, Dr. Earl T. Gangner, whom she therein nominated and appointed to be the executor thereof and whose name appears twice in each document, and in each instance the testatrix inserted such name in longhand script, written wholly and entirely by her own hand. In her writing of each document, Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, the testatrix, Mabel French, consistently experienced the same spelling difficulties, writing the word devise with but one "e", thus "divise", and omitting the letter "u" from the word executor which she wrote "exector". The dispositive testamentary words were the same and the named devisee, legatee and executor was one and the same individual in both Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, hence while written on two separate sheets of letter-size paper, there is, in truth and in fact, but one and the same will wherein the testatrix expresses the same desires, wishes and will touching that which she would have done with her property after her death. Barney v. Hayes, supra. Clearly, under the plain mandate of the statute these two testamentary instruments, Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, executed by the same testatrix, are required to be taken and construed together as one instrument. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-204. When this is done any claimed deficiency in the dating of the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, may be readily supplied by the 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, which is twice dated, first by the word and figures "July 18, 1955" appearing at the top of document and second, in the testimonium clause with which the writing ends reading, "In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and seal this 18th day of July 1955," neither of which date is required by the provisions of R.C.M. 1947, § 91-107, governing the execution of witnessed wills. Simple Method of Changing Will. After its execution in 1951, Mabel French was privileged to make any change she desired in her 1951 holograph Exhibit No. 1 for same could not be effective as a will until her death. Had she desired to change her holograph, which required no witness (§ 91-108, supra), into a witnessed will which requires two witnesses (§ 91-107, supra) it was not at all necessary that she rewrite her entire will to achieve this result. Mabel French could have effected the desired change by simply exhibiting to her two attesting witnesses her already written 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, acknowledging to them that she had written and signed same as and for her last will and then, in the presence of the testatrix and at her request, having each witness sign her name at the end of the document opposite the word "Witnesses", which word the testatrix had written thereon more than three years before. This done, the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, would have been changed into a duly attested will requiring no other or further writing thereon and to which section 91-107 alone would apply. This statute contains no requirement that such witnessed will give or show either the place where nor the date when it was made or executed. See R.C.M. 1947, § 91-107. Instead of adopting the above simple method, Mabel French rewrote, re-executed, redeclared and republished the same will that she had theretofore written entirely in longhand script but with these two additions: (1) she twice dated her witnessed will giving the day, month and year of its execution, and (2) she acknowledged such witnessed will before two attesting witnesses each of whom signed her name at the end thereof. In the probate of this witnessed will, the provisions of sections 91-204, 91-205, and 91-125 apply, as no part of Exhibit No. 1 is in any wise or manner inconsistent or irrreconcilable or incompatible with any part of Exhibit No. 2. These *584 two writings are to be taken and construed together as one instrument and they are to be admitted to probate as such. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-204. Mabel French's two writings expressing her will do not stand alone they stand together. She kept them together during her lifetime. They were found together in her strong box upon her death. "An attempted holograph which is not entirely in the handwriting of testator may be republished by a codicil which is executed as an attested will." 2 Page on Wills, 3rd ed., § 552, pp. 25, 26, note 2. In Johnson v. Johnson, Okl., 279 P.2d 928, 930, it is said: "By definition a codicil is a supplement to, an addition to or qualification of, an existing will, made by the testator to alter, enlarge, or restrict the provisions of the will, to explain or republish it, or to revoke it, and it must be testamentary in character. In re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wash. 2d 833, 176 P.2d 281. A codicil need not be called a codicil. In re Carr's Estate, 93 Cal. App. 2d 750, 209 P.2d 956; In re Atkinson's Estate, 110 Cal. App. 499, 294 P. 425." Emphasis supplied. R.C.M. 1947, § 19-103, subd. 6, reads: It would appear that the 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, republishes the 1951 holograph, Exhibit No. 1, and that it is in effect but a codicil regardless of by what other name it may be called. In the case of In re Eggleston's Estate, 129 Cal. App. 2d 601, 277 P.2d 469, 471, two instruments were admitted to probate as a single holographic will. There the court said: In Sloan v. Beatty, 1 Ill. 2d 581, 589, 590, 116 N.E.2d 375, 380, a holographic will dated in February 1903 and a holographic codicil thereto, dated in June 1910, more than seven years later, were admitted to probate as testator's last will. There the appellate court said: In Kramer v. Crout, Tex.Civ.App. 1955, 279 S.W.2d 932, 934, the appellate court affirmed an order of the trial court admitting to probate a holographic will of the testatrix and receiving in evidence a number of specimens of handwriting of testatrix, including a lengthy letter of instructions to one Elizabeth Crout of similar purport as Exhibit No. 3 herein, which letter, the appellate court said, "indeed might well have been probated as the will of testatrix itself." In part, the letter reads: The date on the above letter in the Kramer case, supra, is the same as the date on the will and in the instant French case the date on the letter of instructions to Dr. Gangner, Exhibit No. 3, herein is of the same date as the witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, herein. In Watts v. Choate, 117 Mont. 505, at pages 523-527, 160 P.2d 492, at pages 500, 501. Mr. Justice Angstman, dissenting wrote: Attestation Clause. As heretofore shown the statute requires that any person who appears to contest a will "must file written grounds of opposition to the probate thereof." R.C.M. 1947, § 91-901. Emphasis supplied. The one and only written ground of opposition to the probate of the 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, asserted by the contesting appellant, Edyth M. Brown, was "that said document does not meet the statutory requirement for a written will in that it is completely devoid of an attestation clause." *587 The statute neither requires nor does it even mention an attestation clause. See R.C.M. 1947, § 91-107. "A will is perfectly valid though there is no attestation clause." Atkinson on Wills, p. 297. "The attestation clause is deemed a formal, nonmaterial and nondispositive provision which, although forming part of the will, is not necessary to the validity thereof." In re Mackris' Estate, Sur. 1953, 124 N.Y.S.2d 891, at page 894. "Neither a formal attestation clause nor even words in addition to the signatures of the witnesses are prerequisites to a valid execution of a will." Barber v. Barber, 368 Ill. 215, 220, 13 N.E.2d 257, at pages 260, 261. To same effect see Spangler v. Bell, 390 Ill. 152, 60 N.E.2d 864. "An attestation clause has weight in showing the proper execution of a will, but it is not an essential part thereof." In re Frechette's Will, Sur. 1954, 133 N.Y.S.2d 80, at page 81. In the case of In re Bragg's Estate, 106 Mont. 132, at page 142, 76 P.2d 57, at page 62, this court said that in this state, "no particular attestation clause is prescribed by statute". Since the statute, § 91-107, supra, does not require any attestation clause neither the trial judge nor the justices of this court may lawfully read into nor insert in the provisions of § 91-107, any such requirement. See R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-15. In Thompson on Wills, 3d ed., 209, § 132, it is said: In 1 Page on Wills (3d ed.), § 373, p. 677, it is said: "Under a statute which provides that the witnesses must sign the will, but which makes no provision for their signing a certificate in any specified form, a formal attestation clause is not necessary. Any form of signing which shows it is done with the intention of acting as a witness is sufficient. * * * The signatures of the witnesses, without any additional word explanatory of their purpose in signing is held sufficient." In Alexander's Commentaries on the Law of Wills, Vol. 1, § 506, p. 688, it is said: "An attestation clause appended to a will is useful as proof * * * but it is no part of the execution of a will and is not essential to its validity. The attestation clause may consist of the single word `witness', or `attest', or the witnesses may simply sign their names without any additional writing." See Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush., Mass., 532, 59 Am.Dec. 155. In the case of In re Fowle's Estate, 292 Mich. 500, 290 N.W. 883, 886, the court said: In Burkland v. Starry, 361 Mo. 348, 234 S.W.2d 608, 611, 40 A.L.R.2d 1217, the court said, concerning a contested will that had no attestation clause: "Such clause is not required. `Attestation' by `subscription' is sufficient." In Cunningham v. Hallyburton, 342 Ill. 442, 445, 174 N.E. 550, 551, the court held that in the execution of a will, "Neither a formal attestation clause nor even words in addition to the signatures of the witnesses are necessary." *588 In re Pitcairn's Estate, 6 Cal. 2d 730, 59 P.2d 90, at page 92, it is said: "There is no need of an `attestation clause'; it is sufficient that a will be witnessed or attested, and the recital of the steps in execution is not required. 68 C.J. 711, § 392. It does not seem reasonable, therefore, to have the important presumption of due execution turn upon the presence or absence of this unnecessary provision. The foundation of the presumption is the proof of genuineness of the signatures, for the instrument is then on its face a valid will." In re Chambers' Estate, 187 Wash. 417, 60 P.2d 41, at page 43, it is said: "The document now before us contains no attestation clause whatsoever, but, if competent witnesses present before the court testify that they subscribed their names to a document in the presence of the testator, and to facts which amount in law to an attestation, under the law of this jurisdiction it is not essential that formal words of attestation be attached to the will." In re Akin's Esate, 41 N.M. 566, 72 P.2d 21, an action to contest a will, holds that in the absence of an attestation clause, where the will is subscribed by the genuine signature of the testator with the genuine signatures of two persons under the word "witnesses" below the signature of the testator, that such showing raises a presumption of the due execution of the will in compliance with the requirements of the statutes of that state. In Wehrkamp v. Burnett, 82 Colo. 5, 256 P. 630, it is said: "It is objected that there is not the usual statement of attestation by the witnesses, but such statement is merely a memorandum of facts which if they exist without it, are sufficient, and is perhaps prima facie evidence, but no more." In Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 408, 33 S.W. 61, 63, the court held that under a statute providing that every will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator, the signatures of the witnesses, without the attestation clause is sufficient. Therein the court said: Appellant's written objection, that the 1955 witnessed will fails to meet the statutory requirements because it has no formal attestation clause, is wholly lacking in merit and such objection should be denied. Filling In Blanks. Mr. Justice Castles' opinion herein, in considering the 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, states that "the name of the sole beneficiary and executor was filled in by pen in the handwriting of the testatrix rather than being typewritten," and then states that, "The district court, in admitting the holographic will to probate, sustained the heir's objections to the typewritten will but gave no reasons for this ruling." As before stated the statute, section 91-901, supra, requires that the contestant, Edyth M. Brown, "must file written grounds of opposition to the probate * * * and serve a copy on the petitioner and other residents of the county interested in the estate". Since the contesting appellant's only written ground of objection to the 1955 witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, was "that it is completely devoid of an attestation clause", appellant is precluded from urging, either before the trial court or in the supreme court, that the validity of such will is affected by the writing in by the hand and pen of the testatrix of the name of the sole beneficiary and executor. The testatrix had the right to write part of the will with a typewriter and to write part of it with pen and in longhand script if she chose. She likewise had the right, at any time during the remainder of her life, either before or after acknowledging the instrument to fill in any blank space *589 left for the name of her devisee and legatee or for the name of her executor, by writing such name therein in her own handwriting regardless of whether the will was on a partly printed form or on a partly typewritten form. "Interlineations in a will which show upon their face that they are but the filling of blanks or completion of the sense of the instrument need not be proved to have been made before the will was executed." 57 Am.Jur. Wills, § 511, p. 355, note 12. "The filling of blanks left in the form or draft of a will to allow the names of legatees or the amounts of legacies to be inserted is an act presumptively done prior to the execution. In fact, the mere filling of blanks of that character is probably not to be regarded as an alteration, and a similar view is taken of words added to complete the sense, seemingly on the theory that it is fair to presume in the first instance that the omission of the needed words when the instrument was first prepared was discovered in due time." 34 A.L.R.2d at pages 627, 628, 629. In Martin v. Martin, 334 Ill. 115, 165 N.E. 644, 648, 67 A.L.R. 1127, at pages 1134, 1136, 1137, it is said: In Williams v. Swords, 129 Mont. 165, 284 P.2d 674, 677, the district court sitting without a jury found against the contestant opposing the probate of the witnessed will of Violet Williams Swords. The subscribing witnesses were husband and wife, who for many years prior to signing their names as witnesses to the will, were close and intimate friends of the testatrix and specially selected by her to act as such witnesses, as testatrix placed special trust in them for such purpose. At the trial, both subscribing witnesses testified: That the testatrix did not sign the will in their presence; that she did not acknowledge that the document was her will; that when they signed the paper it was folded so that all they could see was the line whereon they signed as witnesses; that they did not sign in the presence of each other; that they went to the home of the testatrix at her request to witness the paper; that the husband signed first and then handed the pen to his wife and left the room as the wife signed and that they did not learn the document was a will until after the testatrix had died and after the will was publicly read. In affirming the order and decree of the district court dismissing the contest and admitting the will to probate, Mr. Justice Angstman, speaking for this court, in part, said: Executor's Competency. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-1302, so far as pertinent here, provides: (1) There was no contention here that the proponent Dr. Gangner is under the age of majority. (2) There was an evasive and abortive attempt by counsel for the appellant, Edyth M. Brown, to plead and allege in appellant's prayer to her "Opposition" to the admission to probate of Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, that the proponent "is not eligible to receive letters testamentary upon the ground" that he "has been convicted of an infamous crime and is disqualified under the provisions of section 91-1302(2), R.C.M. 1947", but there was and is no evidence in the record before us to support any such charge even though it had been properly pleaded, which is not the situation here. The records of this court, as well as those of two district courts of different jurisdictions in this state, bear witness to the fact that in these proceedings the proponent was falsely accused of having been convicted of an infamous crime. (3) Notwithstanding, the mandate of the statute that anyone who appears to contest a will "must file written grounds of opposition to the probate thereof" (§ 91-901, supra), no party to these proceedings has at anytime filed any writing herein charging that the proponent has ever been adjudged incompetent to execute the duties of his trust as executor by reason of either drunkenness, or improvidence, or want of understanding or want of integrity and, had any such charge been made, there was and is no evidence or proof of any sort or character in this entire record that would prove or establish such a charge. The word "adjudge" is defined as follows: "To decide, settle, or decree judicially; to sentence or condemn." 1 Rapalje and Lawrences Law Dictionary, p. 27; "To determine, in the exercise of judicial power. Adjudged: decided judicially." 1 Abbott's Law Dictionary, p. 31; "To pass a sentence; to decree; to decide judicially." Law Dictionary by Arthur English, p. 22. The transcript on appeal filed in this court contains a bill of exceptions to which is attached *592 the certificate of the trial judge bearing date of March 26, 1958, wherein that judge certified that such bill "is full, true and correct and contains all of the evidence and testimony introduced upon said trial, together with all matters and proceedings had at the trial, and the orders of the Court then and thereafter made, and the same is by me signed, settled and allowed." Denial of Due Process Drunkenness. In the second paragraph of the mutiple minute entry ruling and order made and entered on January 10, 1958, in the trial court's Journal BF, page 594, the trial judge denied the petition of the proponent for the issuance to him of letters testamentary upon the ground that at the hearing of this cause and elsewhere the proponent has demonstrated himself incompetent to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness. The seventh paragraph of the trial court's multiple formal order of January 13, 1958, reads: There is no evidence in the entire record before this court that in any wise or manner sustains, supports or warrants the making of either of the above rulings and orders. There are no written objections filed herein by any party to these proceedings that accuse the proponent, Dr. Gangner, with being incompetent by reason of drunkenness, nor is there any evidence that he was at any time either charged, cited, heard or tried for being incompetent by reason of drunkenness. Both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Montana require that the proponent Gangner be given and accorded due process of law, which includes an adequate accusation, complaint or charge in writing and that he shall be given due notice and an opportunity to be represented by counsel and a proper hearing before he shall be condemned. The record fails to show that Dr. Gangner has been accorded any of such rights. In Root v. Davis, 10 Mont. 228, 244, 245, 25 P. 105, the facts were: On March 10, 1890, Andrew J. Davis, a resident of Butte. died leaving an estate of the estimated value of four and one half or five million dollars. John A. Davis, a brother of the deceased, petitioned for letters of administration as did Henry A. Root, a nephew of the deceased. Each petitioner filed written contest and objections to the appointment of the other. The district court of Silver Bow County overruled all objections to the appointment of John A. Davis and granted his petition for letters, whereupon Henry A. Root, the unsuccessful applicant for letters, appealed to this court. Among his written grounds of objection filed in the district court, decedent's nephew, Henry A. Root, charged that decedent's brother, John A. Davis, was incompetent to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness. After a trial on the issues presented by Root's written objections and hearing the testimony of numerous witnesses, the district court found that the respondent, John A. Davis, was not disqualified and that he should not be adjudged incompetent by reason of drunkenness. Relative to the trial court's finding on such issue of alleged drunkenness, this court, in determining the appeal, said: In 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice (2d ed.), § 231, p. 10, it is said: "Where drunkenness is a disqualification, it is only such excessive, inveterate, and continuous use of intoxicants as renders one an unsafe agent to entrust with property or business that is contemplated." In 20 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 104, p. 151, it is said: "The drunkenness contemplated by the statutes as a basis for an adjudication of incompetency to execute the duties of an administrator or executor is such an excessive, inveterate, and continuous use of intoxicants as to render the person an unsafe agent to be entrusted with the care of property or the transaction of business. However, the question is not merely the extent of the use of intoxicants by such person. He may be in the habit of imbibing intoxicants, even to a considerable extent, without being incompetent. The vital question is whether the use of the intoxicants is so habitual and inveterate as to incapacitate him for a great portion of the time from properly attending to business." Appointment of Executor. In re Minder's Estate, 128 Mont. 1, at pages 4, 5, 6, 28, 29, 270 P.2d 404, at page 406, 45 A.L.R. 2d 898, at pages 901, 902, 914, 915, this court said: In re Estate of Buckman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 554, 267 P.2d 73, 80, 47 A.L.R.2d 291, it is said: The above-quoted seventh paragraph of the district court's multiple order of January 13, 1958, and the second paragraph of its minute entry ruling and order of January 10, 1958, entered in its Journal BF, page 584, wherein the trial court denied the petition of E.T. Gangner, M.D., for the issuance to him of letters testamentary should be reversed, annulled, set aside and ordered stricken forthwith, as being erroneous, arbitrary and wholly unsupported by any evidence in the record before this court on this appeal. Spoliation of Estate Void Orders. The concluding paragraph of the trial court's order of August 9, 1957, reads: The concluding paragraph of the trial court's multiple order of January 13, 1958, reads: The district court did not have jurisdiction to make either of the above-quoted orders. State ex rel. Eakins v. District Court, 34 Mont. 226, 85 P. 1022. Each order is void. The making of each constitutes prejudicial error. These orders should be ordered stricken forthwith. In the case of In re Sanborn's Estate, 98 Cal. 103, 105, 32 P. 865, 866, it is said: "The probate of a will can be contested only upon `written grounds of opposition' filed by a `person interested,' that is, interested in the estate, and not in the mere fees of an administration thereof. Sections 1307-1312. Code Civil Proc. A public administrator has no interest in an estate, or in the probate of a will. That is a matter which concerns only those to whom the estate would otherwise go. In Estate of Parsons, 65 Cal. 240, 3 Pac.Rep. 817, one J.W. Parsons, had been appointed administrator, and afterwards a document was offered for probate as a will of the deceased. Parsons, as public administrator, contested the probate, and afterwards charged the expenses of the contest in his account; but this court said: `This item is not a charge against the estate. It was the affair of the heirs, as such, to contest, if they wished, the probate of the document; not of the administrator.' See, also, Roach v. Coffey, 73 Cal. 281, 14 Pac.Rep. 840, and cases there cited. If a public administrator could legally assume the character of a standing contestant of wills, notwithstanding the wishes of heirs and devisees, he would certainly enlarge the sphere of his activities; but the limitations of the statute do not allow such inflation." Emphasis supplied. In 20 Cal.Jur.2d, § 114, pp. 163, 164, it is said: Again the same authority (§ 113, pp. 162, 163) says: In re Sanborn's Estate, supra, was cited in the case of In re Estate of Golden, 4 Cal. 2d 300, 48 P.2d 962, to the effect that the public administrator was not an interested person entitled to object to the probate of a will. State ex rel. Eakins v. District Court, 34 Mont. 226, 85 P. 1022, involved the unauthorized activities of John B. O'Reilly, then the public administrator of Silver Bow County, who filed written objections to the probate of the will of John Eakins, deceased, wherein decedent's widow, Mary A. Eakins, was named as legatee and devisee as well as executrix of the will. O'Reilly, *597 the public administrator, filed written objections to the probate of the will and petitioned the district court of Silver Bow County to appoint him administrator of the estate and, in the meantime, to appoint him special administrator. In reviewing, on appeal these unauthorized activities of the public administrator in the Eakins' case, supra, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holloway, said: In his special concurring opinion in the Eakins' case, supra, Mr. Justice Milburn wrote: In State ex rel. Hill v. District Court, 126 Mont. 1, 3, 4, 5, 242 P.2d 850, 851, 31 A.L.R.2d 749, this court said: The quoted concluding paragraph of the district court's order of August 9, 1957, and the quoted concluding paragraph of that court's multiple order of January 13, 1958, should be reversed, annulled, set aside and ordered stricken as being void ab initio. It should be further ordered that no funds, moneys or other property or assets of this estate be allowed, delivered or paid to Emmett Kelly or to his counsel or on their behalf as or for costs, administrator fees or attorney fees herein or otherwise or at all, and that none such is their due. It should be further ordered that the letters of special administration with the will annexed heretofore issued to Emmet Kelly be forthwith recalled, revoked and cancelled as being null and void. Right to Make a Will. One of our most valuable rights is the right to make a will and control the disposition of our worldly goods after death. Thus a will, directing as it does the disposition of our property after we die, is one of the most important documents a person will ever be called upon to write. The law affords the right of testamentary disposition, R.C.M. 1947, § 91-101, and such disposition is to be gathered from the words and language we use in writing our will or wills and the codicils thereto. By the words she employed in writing Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Mabel French left all her property at death to Dr. Earl T. Gangner. She left nothing whatever to the appellant, Edyth M. Brown, or to the contestant, Harry McGee, or to anyone other than Dr. Gangner. "A will is a means of transferring title to property." White v. White. Tex.Civ.App. 1943, 176 S.W.2d 987, at page 990. By means of the words used in writing Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Mabel French transferred the title to all her property, effective at her death, to Dr. Gangner so that all the property involved in this controversy is the property of Dr. Gangner. Supreme Court's Duty Herein. In Padbury v. Nagelhus, 1957, 132 Mont. 417, 427, 319 P.2d 503, 510, Mr. Justice Castles, speaking for this court, with all justices concurring said: In Shaw v. City of Kalispell, decided June 3, 1959, 135 Mont. 284, 290, 340 P.2d 523, 527, Mr. Justice Castles, with Mr. Justice Angstman and District Judge Flachsenhar, concurring, quoted with approval the above quotation from the Bradbury case, supra. In Roth v. Palutzke, decided March 23, 1960, 137 Mont. 77, 350 P.2d 358, 359, this court speaking through District Judge Lester H. Loble, with Chief Justice Harrison and Justices Adair and Castles concurring, said: In his version of the instant appeal, Mr. Justice Castles states: "There has been no cross-assignment of error in this case and therefore we will not decide the validity of the typewritten will." This refusal to decide the validity of the witnessed will, Exhibit No. 2, is violative of the plain mandate of section 93-216, supra, which says that on appeals of this character "the supreme court shall review all questions of fact * * * and determine the same, as well as questions of law * * *." The refusal to decide and determine all the questions presented by the record now before us is contrary to this court's rulings and holding in the cases of Bradbury, Shaw and Roth, supra. The original testamentary instruments, Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, have all been duly certified and transmitted to this court as part of the record on this appeal. All five original instruments are now before us. They are on our desk as we write this review of the facts and the rules of law that here obtain. Each and all of these instruments have been fully identified and proven by the testimony of the witnesses, Frank Quinn and Margaret H. Tullis, above set forth. The provisions of section 91-204, supra, require that these five testamentary instruments "be taken and construed together as one instrument." It is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of section 91-204 to divorce the instruments, one from the other. By so doing each instrument is subject to an independent contest, an independent trial and an independent appeal, until at long last, by reason of such needless and prolonged litigation, all the property is consumed in administrator's fees, attorneys' fees, and the costs and expenses incident to such contests. The words written by Mabel French on the five sheets of paper marked as Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, express and constitute the valid will of Mabel French. All five instruments should be taken and construed together as one instrument and all should be admitted to probate on the evidence already introduced by the proponent, Dr. Gangner, at the two hearings and trials held in 1957. The various erroneous rulings and orders of the trial court shown by the record herein should be reviewed and determined *601 by this court here and now, to the end that the record in the trial court and the prejudice and wrongs occasioned thereby may be corrected and remedied, and so that such erroneous rulings and orders be neither condoned nor repeated. Failure to do this is failure to perform the duty imposed upon this court by statute. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-216. For more than a quarter of a century Mabel French, the newswriter and editor, wrote understandingly for two powerful daily newspapers. Now that Mabel French is dead, the five justices of this court are experiencing extreme difficulty in reaching a common understanding as to precisely what Miss French intended to say and do when she wrote the words appearing on the five dispositive testamentary instruments, Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 herein. This court should order that Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 be admitted to probate as the decedent's last will and testament; that letters testamentary be issued to the named executor, Dr. Earl T. Gangner; and that the letters of administration with the will annexed heretofore issued to Emmett Kelly be set aside as null and void ab initio. MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY. I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Adair. Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, collectively, express the valid will of Mabel French. All the proof required for their admission to probate was supplied in the district court. There is no evidence whatever to sustain any of the charges of incompetency on the part of the named executor. This court should order the admission to probate of the five exhibits and the issuance, to the named executor, of letters testamentary. A retrial in the district court of these issues is neither required nor proper.