Title: People v. Montgomery
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82527
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2000

Opinion filed June 15, 2000.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Ulece Montgomery, brings this appeal from an order of the 
circuit court of Cook County denying him post-conviction relief. Because the 
defendant received the death sentence for the underlying convictions, the 
present appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). We now affirm 
the judgment of the circuit court.
The transcripts of the defendant's trial proceedings are included in the 
present record, and we will summarize here the evidence presented at the guilt 
and sentencing phases. The offenses for which the defendant was convicted and 
now seeks post-conviction relief occurred in Robbins on April 25, 1981. On that 
date two women, Pearl Briggs, 72 years old, and Betty Tyson, 68 years old, were 
raped and murdered. The defendant, who was 24 at the time, later confessed to 
committing these offenses. The defendant and his girlfriend rented an apartment 
from the two victims, who lived together in a separate building on the property. 
According to the defendant's statement, which was introduced into evidence at 
trial, Briggs had offered to give a couch to the defendant and his girlfriend. 
During the afternoon of April 25, the defendant went to obtain the couch from 
the two women. The couch was in the basement apartment of the building in which 
the victims lived, and Briggs got keys and a flashlight and led the defendant to 
the lower level. As Briggs helped the defendant move the couch, it fell on his 
foot, and the defendant became angry with her. The defendant then hit Briggs, 
and she fell to the floor. The defendant dragged her to the kitchen in the 
apartment. She did not seem to be conscious, and the defendant removed the 
woman's clothes and raped her.
The defendant then picked up the keys and flashlight and went upstairs to 
return those things to Tyson. Tyson opened the door, and the defendant handed 
the items to her. The defendant began to leave, but he then turned and pushed 
Tyson, who fell. The defendant removed the woman's hose and wrapped them tightly 
around her neck. The defendant said that he then applied baby oil to his penis 
and raped Tyson.
A member of the church attended by the two victims called the women's great 
niece when they failed to appear at a church function that day. The great niece 
went to their address and summoned the police when she believed she saw a shadow 
behind their door. Police officers found Briggs with her dress pulled up and her 
genital area exposed. Subsequent forensic testing disclosed the defendant's 
fingerprint was discovered on a lens of Briggs' eyeglasses. Blood spatters found 
on the defendant's jacket were consistent with Briggs' blood type but not with 
his own, and a head hair found under Briggs' fingernail was consistent with the 
defendant's hair. An autopsy revealed that the cause of death for Briggs was 
strangulation.
Like Briggs, Tyson was found partially clothed, with her genital area 
exposed. A bottle of baby oil was lying next to her on the floor. The 
defendant's palm print was later found on a camera case sitting on a couch near 
Tyson. Blood spatters found on the defendant's dress shirt were consistent with 
Tyson's blood type, but not with the defendant's own. Also, a head hair found on 
the defendant's undershirt was consistent with Tyson's hair. According to the 
autopsy evidence, Tyson's cause of death was ligature strangulation.
Police arrested the defendant that evening. At the time, the defendant had 
scrapes on his hands and spatters of blood on his pants. The defendant told 
police that he had injured himself while trying to repair his bicycle. 
Fingerprints and hair samples were taken from the defendant at this time. The 
defendant was released, but he was arrested again on April 27, after authorities 
learned that the defendant's fingerprint and palm print had been found on 
articles at the women's residence. The defendant then gave a statement in which 
he confessed his commission of the crimes described above.
The defendant originally chose to be tried by a jury. Shortly after jury 
selection began, however, a mistrial was declared when the defendant attempted 
to commit suicide one night in his cell; it appears that during the day's 
proceedings the defendant had overheard a prospective juror say that he could 
decide to convict the defendant simply by looking at him. The defendant later 
elected to submit the case to the trial judge alone, in a stipulated bench 
trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found the defendant guilty of 
the two murders. The defendant also chose to waive a jury for purposes of a 
death penalty hearing, which was conducted before the same judge. In the first 
stage of the sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated to the introduction of 
the evidence presented at trial. The judge found the existence of two statutory 
aggravating circumstances that rendered the defendant eligible for the death 
penalty: the murder of more than one person, and the commission of murder during 
another felony, rape. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(b)(3), (b)(6).
During the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the parties again 
stipulated to the introduction of the trial evidence, and they presented 
additional evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The State introduced evidence 
of the defendant's criminal history, which revealed one conviction for 
contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor and two convictions for 
possession of stolen motor vehicle. The State also introduced testimony from 
Lynn Rosiejka, a social worker who had interviewed the defendant's mother, 
Carolyn Montgomery, in 1976, when he was charged with contributing to the sexual 
delinquency of a minor. Rosiejka testified that Carolyn said that the charge 
against the defendant was based on two acts of intercourse with his half sister, 
Jean, who was then 11 years old; the defendant was 19. According to Rosiejka, 
Carolyn also said that the defendant had raped his half brother Eugene six years 
earlier, and had attempted to rape his sister Rene a year before that. Carolyn 
told Rosiejka that the defendant routinely carried guns and knives. Rosiejka 
also stated that after the attack on Eugene, the defendant was sent to the Audy 
Home. After his release, the defendant went to live with an aunt in Evanston. 
The aunt could not control the defendant, however, so he then returned to his 
mother. When Carolyn was unable to control the defendant, he was sent again to 
the Audy Home, and he became a ward of the court. The defendant then lived in 
different foster homes for a period.
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited from Rosiejka testimony about 
the defendant's background that the defense believed would be mitigating. 
According to this information, Carolyn was an alcoholic, and Carolyn 
acknowledged that she had been being hospitalized at least once for her 
alcoholism. The defendant's father was an alcoholic and a drug abuser, and he 
had left the family when the defendant was young. According to Rosiejka, Carolyn 
said that the defendant's older brother, Douglas, had been a bad influence on 
the defendant, and the defendant and Douglas had lived on the streets for some 
time.
Carolyn Montgomery testified in the defendant's behalf at the sentencing 
hearing. She said that she has six children; the defendant is the second oldest. 
She described in her testimony the defendant's turbulent childhood and the 
difficulties he had encountered while growing up. She said that her first 
husband, Douglas Montgomery, was an alcoholic and drug addict who would beat 
her. Carolyn said that she also had been an alcoholic, until seven years ago. 
She would drink every day and was often absent from the home, spending her time 
in taverns. Drinking caused her to be mean, and she would beat her children. On 
one occasion, she beat the children so severely that their grandmother had to 
take them from her and "heal them up." Because of her continual intoxication, 
she was often unable to care properly for her children. She would bring food 
home but would not cook for the family. As a result, the children were left to 
fend for themselves.
At the sentencing hearing, Carolyn also recounted the series of homes in 
which the defendant lived while growing up. She testified that the defendant was 
seven when the family moved to Harvey, in 1963. The defendant began to have 
problems after that age. When the defendant was 10, he began to stay out all 
night with his older brother, Douglas; they would sleep in abandoned cars or 
buildings. She later took the defendant to the Audy Home because she could not 
control him. Later, Carolyn's sister took the children to her home in Evanston, 
and at one point became their guardian. Carolyn testified that she lost custody 
of the children because she was not fit. When the defendant was 11, he returned 
to his mother's home, in Robbins. She testified that she knew the defendant 
needed help; he began drinking when he was in junior high school, and he was 
unable to control his behavior when he was drunk. When the defendant was 16, he 
was sent to a school in Wisconsin. After that, he was placed in foster care in 
Chicago, and then lived in a group home in Chicago. Also, Carolyn denied that 
the sexual incidents involving Eugene or Rene had occurred; she explained that 
if she did mention them to Rosiejka, she was simply trying to obtain help for 
her son.
Three of the defendant's siblings testified in his behalf at the capital 
sentencing hearing. Jean Hayes acknowledged that the defendant had raped her, 
but she otherwise provided favorable testimony. Both Eugene Hayes and Rene 
Littleton denied that the defendant had ever molested or assaulted them, and 
they, too, spoke favorably of their brother. The defense also called as a 
witness Douglas Meyer, a Lutheran pastor who regularly visited the defendant 
while he was facing trial on the charges involved here. Meyer described the 
defendant as being cooperative and respectful and said that he was never 
threatening or aggressive. Meyer believed that the defendant was becoming more 
religious while he was incarcerated.
The defendant also presented testimony from two relatives with whom he had 
lived while growing up. Melva Alexander, one of Carolyn Montgomery's sisters, 
testified that she would sometimes have to take care of Carolyn's children when 
Carolyn was drinking. Alexander said that the defendant first lived with her, in 
Evanston, when he was about four years old. Some years later, she acquired 
custody of the defendant and his older brother when the defendant was 10 or 11, 
and he then lived in her home for about three years. Carolyn was still drinking 
a lot at that time, and the children had to raise themselves. Alexander 
testified that she did not have any problems with the defendant at home, but 
that he was experiencing problems in school. A teacher and a school counselor 
told her that the defendant need psychiatric help, but he did not receive any 
treatment at that time.
Viola Lattimore, who is also a sister of Carolyn and Melva, similarly 
testified about Carolyn's drinking habits. Lattimore said that Carolyn would get 
mad and hit the children. Lattimore was also living with Alexander when the 
defendant came to live in Evanston at the age of 10, and she described the 
defendant as being quiet and well-mannered. She believed that the defendant had 
mental problems and said that he never received help when he was little.
Defense counsel presented expert psychiatric testimony regarding the 
defendant's mental condition. Dr. Stephen Porter, a psychiatrist, had examined 
the defendant and had reviewed records pertaining to the case. Dr. Porter 
learned that the defendant had an extensive history of alcohol and drug abuse. 
Dr. Porter found that the defendant had grown up in a chaotic home. Both parents 
drank heavily, and there was much physical violence. The defendant had little 
supervision, and by the time he was 9 or 10 years old he often wandered the 
streets with his older brother, spending the nights in abandoned cars or 
buildings. Dr. Porter also noted that the defendant had a number of different 
residences from the age of 10 on, living at the Audy Home, with relatives, in a 
state shelter, and in a group home. Dr. Porter concluded that the defendant was 
a chronic alcoholic and drug abuser and that he had an antisocial personality. 
Dr. Porter believed that the defendant committed the present offenses while 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, a statutory 
mitigating circumstance. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(c)(2). In Dr. 
Porter's view, the consumption of alcohol and drugs by the defendant on the day 
of the offenses had impaired his judgment and self-control.
The defense presented further expert testimony through Dr. Albert Stipes, a 
psychiatrist at the Cook County Psychiatric Institute, who had also examined the 
defendant and reviewed records in the case. The defendant told Dr. Stipes about 
his history of alcohol and drug abuse. According to this information, during a 
five-year period the defendant consumed about a quart of wine a day, and also 
drank rum and beer. The defendant used drugs, too, taking as many as five 
amphetamines daily during a six-month period. The defendant had a history of 
alcoholic blackouts. Dr. Stipes diagnosed the defendant as having continuous 
alcoholic dependence and antisocial personality disorder with stimulant abuse. 
Dr. Stipes testified that he did not have any significant disagreement with Dr. 
Porter's assessment, though Dr. Stipes declined to say whether the defendant was 
acting under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed the 
offenses. Dr. Stipes explained that those are not medical terms.
After hearing the parties' evidence, the trial judge found that there were no 
mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude a sentence of death, and the 
judge therefore sentenced the defendant to death for the two murder convictions. 
This court subsequently affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentence 
(People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517 (1986)), and the United States 
Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari 
(Montgomery v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 1101, 94 L. Ed. 2d 181, 107 S. Ct. 1329 (1987)).
The defendant then commenced the present action in December 1987 by filing a 
post-conviction petition in the circuit court of Cook County. Following an 
evidentiary hearing on a portion of the defendant's petition, the circuit judge 
denied all post-conviction relief. In an appeal from that ruling, this court 
found that the circuit judge had improperly restricted certain avenues of 
inquiry in the defendant's cross-examination of two witnesses. Accordingly, this 
court remanded the cause for further proceedings. People v. Montgomery, 
162 Ill. 2d 109 (1994). On remand, the case was assigned to a different circuit 
judge, and a fresh evidentiary hearing was then held on portions of the 
post-conviction petition. The evidence presented at the hearing focused on two 
discrete issues: first, whether the judge who presided at the defendant's trial 
and sentencing hearing had assured defense counsel that the defendant would 
receive a sentence other than death if the defendant waived a jury and pleaded 
guilty to the charges, and, second, whether trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate the defendant's background further and present the 
information at the sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, the judge denied all post-conviction relief sought by the defendant. 
Because the defendant received the death penalty for the underlying convictions, 
his appeal is to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). We now affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court.
I
As a preliminary matter, we note the scope and purpose of post-conviction 
relief. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-7 (West 
1996)) affords a means by which a defendant may challenge his conviction or 
sentence for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. 
Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1997). An action for post-conviction relief 
is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the prior judgment. People v. 
Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction 
relief, a defendant must demonstrate a substantial deprivation of federal or 
state constitutional rights in the proceedings that resulted in the conviction 
or sentence being challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 
(1999). Considerations of res judicata and waiver narrow the scope of 
post-conviction relief "to constitutional matters which have not been, and could 
not have been, previously adjudicated." People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Accordingly, issues that were raised on appeal from the 
underlying judgment of conviction, or that could have been raised but were not, 
ordinarily will not be considered in a post-conviction proceeding. People v. 
West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999). Determinations made by the 
post-conviction court following an evidentiary hearing on the petition will not 
be disturbed on review unless they are manifestly erroneous. People v. 
Childress, No. 84566, at 3 (April 20, 2000); People v. Coleman, 
183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998); see also People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999); People v. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d 541, 554 (1997).
In this appeal, the defendant renews the two principal contentions that 
informed the evidentiary hearing conducted on our remand from the defendant's 
earlier post-conviction appeal. We first consider the defendant's argument that 
the judge who presided at the defendant's trial and sentencing hearing, in 1983, 
allegedly promised trial counsel that he would not sentence the defendant to 
death if the defendant pleaded guilty and selected a bench sentencing hearing. 
On remand following the earlier post-conviction appeal, the circuit judge 
conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing on the defendant's claim that trial 
counsel had received an assurance from the trial judge regarding the sentence in 
the case. At the new evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel was permitted 
to question the trial judge, Judge Samuels, and his court reporter, Shirley 
Thompson, on the subjects previously barred, as this court had instructed in 
reversing the circuit court's initial decision denying post-conviction relief. 
People v. Montgomery, 162 Ill. 2d 109, 113 (1994). On remand, the 
defendant introduced testimony from his two trial lawyers, John J. McNamara and 
Michael J. Morrissey, as well as from several other persons who, the defendant 
contends, are able to support trial counsel's testimony describing their ex 
parte meetings with Judge Samuels.
According to the defendant's evidence, three meetings occurred between 
defense counsel and Judge Samuels at which ex parte communications 
regarding the defendant's sentence were made. One meeting was between McNamara 
and the judge, another meeting was between Morrissey and the judge, and the 
third meeting was between both lawyers and the judge.
McNamara was lead counsel in the defendant's case. At the evidentiary 
hearing, he testified that prior to the initial trial date, which ended in a 
mistrial, he asked Judge Samuels to conduct a Rule 402 plea conference, but the 
judge declined to do so because the State would not take part. McNamara stated 
that he went to the Markham courthouse in April 1983 to inform Judge Samuels 
that there was no need to schedule a fitness hearing in the case because a 
psychiatric report made after the defendant's suicide attempt showed that the 
defendant was fit. According to McNamara, he entered Judge Samuels' chambers and 
sat down; no one else was present. He and the judge discussed the amount of time 
that would be needed for trial and sentencing. According to McNamara, after he 
told Judge Samuels what evidence the defense planned to present at trial and 
sentencing, the judge suggested that the defendant should probably plead guilty. 
McNamara replied that he could not advise a defendant to plead guilty without 
first obtaining a commitment from the sentencing judge that the death penalty 
would not be imposed. According to McNamara, Judge Samuels then urged him to 
" 'look at my record.' " McNamara testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that he construed this comment to mean that the defendant would not receive the 
death penalty if he waived a jury for sentencing and chose instead to be 
sentenced in a bench proceeding. McNamara said that he told Morrissey about his 
conversation with Judge Samuels the next time he saw Morrissey, which he 
believed was later the same day. According to McNamara, Morrissey reported that 
he, too, had had a conversation with the judge, in which the judge suggested 
that he would sentence the defendant to life if the defendant pleaded 
guilty.
McNamara also testified that at some point he spoke to Judge Samuels' court 
clerk, Moses Cole, about the case. McNamara stated that he originally believed 
that the conversation with Cole occurred the same day that he spoke to the 
judge, but that he had since learned that Cole was not at work that day. 
According to McNamara's testimony, Cole approached the lawyer and said that the 
defendant should choose a bench sentencing proceeding because Cole did not 
believe that Judge Samuels would impose the death penalty in this case. McNamara 
also testified to a conversation he had had with Shirley Thompson, the court 
reporter assigned to Judge Samuels' courtroom. According to McNamara, Thompson 
said that she did not believe that the judge would sentence anyone to death. 
McNamara testified that he was not sure when the conversation with Thompson 
occurred.
Paul Foxgrover, a friend of McNamara, described in an affidavit conversations 
he had had with McNamara concerning Judge Samuels' alleged sentencing promise. 
In the affidavit, Foxgrover stated:
The parties stipulated at the hearing that Foxgrover pleaded guilty in July 
1992 to charges of felony theft contained in two separate Cook County 
indictments, and that he received concurrent prison terms of six years, three 
years, and nine months for those offenses.
Michael Morrissey also testified at the post-conviction hearing regarding the 
alleged ex parte conversations with Judge Samuels. Morrissey said that 
in April 1983, he met alone with the judge in his chambers to discuss 
scheduling. Morrissey referred to certain conflicts in his schedule. According 
to Morrissey, Judge Samuels said, " 'Why don't you guys have Ulece plead 
guilty. I'll give him life. You know my record in these kinds of cases.' " 
Morrissey further testified that the judge then leaned back in his chair and 
said, " 'Oh, the cat's out of the bag now.' " Morrissey further 
testified that he told both his office partner, Andrea Lyon, and McNamara about 
the conversation later that day. According to Morrissey, when he mentioned it to 
McNamara, McNamara replied that he, too, had had a conversation with Judge 
Samuels.
Andrea Lyon, who had shared an office with Morrissey from 1981 to 1987 when 
she was a public defender, testified that Morrissey told her about a 
conversation he had had with Judge Samuels. She was not sure when Morrissey 
mentioned this to her, but she believed it was shortly after the mistrial was 
declared, and before the sentencing hearing occurred. According to Lyon, 
Morrissey believed that the defendant's suicide attempt might have affected how 
the judge viewed the defendant. Morrissey said that Judge Samuels told him that 
if the defendant pleaded guilty, the judge would not impose the death sentence. 
As related by Lyon, Judge Samuels then said, " ' "Oops, the cat is out 
of the bag, I guess." ' " Lyon also testified that Morrissey talked to 
her by telephone after the sentencing hearing. Morrissey was upset, and he 
complained that the judge had reneged on his promise.
McNamara and Morrissey, according to their testimony at the post-conviction 
hearing, had one more meeting with Judge Samuels. McNamara testified that he and 
Morrissey traveled to the Markham courthouse on Friday, June 10, 1983, in 
anticipation of the start of the defendant's trial on the following Monday. They 
wanted to put the case files in the public defender's office at the courthouse. 
They also wanted to tell Judge Samuels that the defendant was going to stipulate 
to the State's evidence during the guilt phase of the proceedings and to waive a 
jury for sentencing. At the evidentiary hearing, they explained that they wanted 
to advise the judge about their plans to ensure that the judge would consider a 
stipulated trial tantamount to a guilty plea, so that they could be sure that 
the judge would adhere to his promise to impose a sentence other than death. The 
two defense lawyers entered the judge's chambers and found two assistant State's 
Attorneys there, neither of whom was involved in the defendant's case. According 
to McNamara's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, one of the assistants left 
the room while the other one remained. The two defense lawyers testified that 
they mentioned to Judge Samuels the defendant's intention to stipulate to the 
evidence and waive juries for trial and sentencing. According to McNamara, he 
told Judge Samuels that a stipulated bench trial is the same as a guilty plea 
and would take the same amount of time, and the judge agreed. According to 
Morrissey, counsel told the judge of the defendant's intended waivers, and the 
judge nodded and said that he understood that that was what they were going to 
do.
Both lawyers testified that Judge Samuels did not say anything to suggest 
that he would fail to honor what they claim was his prior commitment. McNamara 
and Morrissey testified that their conversation with the judge came to an abrupt 
end when one of the prosecutors assigned to the case, Scott Arthur, entered the 
judge's chambers. According to McNamara, Arthur yelled at the judge and the 
defense lawyers and said that defense counsel should not be there talking to the 
judge. Arthur was angry, and he refused Judge Samuels' suggestion that he sit 
down and discuss the case with them. McNamara testified that Arthur said, 
" 'I'm not going to participate in any of this,' " and left the 
judge's chambers, followed by the other assistant State's Attorneys. According 
to Morrissey, Arthur accused them of talking about the case behind his back. 
Both McNamara and Morrissey testified that the other assistant State's Attorney 
followed Arthur out of the room, and that defense counsel then left also.
Trial began the next week, as scheduled, and the defendant was convicted of 
the two murders at the conclusion of the proceedings. A capital sentencing 
hearing was then held, at which Judge Samuels sentenced the defendant to death. 
McNamara and Morrissey acknowledged at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
that they did not then mention to the trial judge his failure to follow through 
on his alleged promise to impose a sentence other than death. Instead, defense 
counsel met the following Monday with a supervisor, Robert Isaacson, to discuss 
their next step. According to the testimony, they decided that it would be best 
not to confront Judge Samuels directly with the issue. They decided instead to 
refer to the problem indirectly in the defendant's post-judgment motion, to see 
if that would prompt the judge to carry through with his earlier promise. The 
plan was not successful, however; at the hearing on the motion, the judge did 
not grant the defendant relief or otherwise refer to the supposed promise.
Judge Samuels also testified at the evidentiary hearing held on the 
post-conviction petition. He denied making any promises to defense counsel 
regarding what sentence he might impose on the defendant in this case. Judge 
Samuels said that he had an "open door" policy and that he encouraged lawyers to 
come in to talk with him. He testified that he probably met with one or another 
of the defense lawyers to discuss scheduling matters, but he asserted that he 
did not promise to impose a sentence other than death, or give counsel any 
indication of what sentence he might give the defendant. He denied telling 
either his court reporter, Shirley Thompson, or his court clerk, Moses Cole, to 
advise defense counsel that he would not sentence the defendant to death. Judge 
Samuels did recall meeting with defense counsel the Friday before the beginning 
of trial. Judge Samuels was also questioned regarding his failure to deny the 
allegations raised in the defendant's post-conviction petition. Judge Samuels 
said that he first became aware of the allegations when the defendant filed his 
post-conviction petition, in December 1987. He then recused himself from further 
proceedings in the case. He said that although he spoke with the defendant's 
post-conviction counsel in court or out of court several times following that, 
he did not deny the allegations until 1990. Judge Samuels also stated that a 
number of family matters occupied much of his time and attention during this 
period.
Judge Samuels' court reporter, Shirley Thompson, who was retired at the time 
of the post-conviction hearing, also testified. Thompson acknowledged that Judge 
Samuels would meet alone with counsel, but she denied that the judge ever spoke 
to her about cases. Thompson denied that she had advised McNamara, with whom she 
was acquainted, about possible sentences for the defendant or had told the 
lawyer that Judge Samuels would not impose the death sentence if the defendant 
pleaded guilty or waived a jury.
Moses Cole had died before the post-conviction hearing was conducted. The 
parties stipulated, however, to the days when he was present at work during 
1983. According to the stipulation, Cole was not at work on the day that 
McNamara originally believed Cole had approached the lawyer about the 
defendant's sentence.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction judge made 
a number of findings with respect to the trial judge's alleged promise. 
Reproduced below are the post-conviction judge's findings regarding this 
issue:
The parties agree that this was essentially a credibility question, and we 
believe that it is appropriate here to defer to the judge who presided at the 
defendant's post-conviction hearing, who was in a superior position to gauge the 
witnesses' credibility and to evaluate the sharply conflicting testimony. The 
defendant argues, however, that the post-conviction judge's findings were 
against the manifest weight of the evidence and contends that the judge 
erroneously discounted the corroboration provided by witnesses who testified 
that the lawyers had spoken to them of Judge Samuels's assurances. Foxgrover, 
however, was impeached with his prior convictions. Lyon was somewhat vague about 
when Morrissey spoke to her. In any event, the corroborating witnesses could 
testify only to what the defense lawyers believed they had heard from Judge 
Samuels. In addition, McNamara's testimony that he had spoken with Moses Cole 
and Shirley Thompson about the possible sentence that the judge might impose in 
this case was contradicted by other evidence. Here, the post-conviction court 
made certain credibility determinations. We cannot say that they were against 
the manifest weight of the evidence.
The defendant did not testify at the post-conviction hearing, except for the 
purpose of waiving his continued presence at the proceeding. In an affidavit 
accompanying the post-conviction petition, however, the defendant stated that 
defense counsel did not tell him, prior to the judge's imposition of sentence, 
about Judge Samuels' supposed assurances regarding the sentence. Rather, 
defendant stated that counsel said only that Judge Samuels had never before 
sentenced a defendant to death in a bench proceeding, and that counsel therefore 
encouraged him to waive a jury for the sentencing hearing.
As the State suggested in argument at the evidentiary hearing, defense 
counsel might have been hoping to hear an indication from the trial judge about 
what sentence he would impose in this case, and counsel could have 
misinterpreted the judge's comments. McNamara and Morrissey testified that it 
was their practice not to waive a jury for a capital sentencing hearing in the 
absence of an indication from the trial judge that he would give a sentence 
other than death, and they could have believed that they had an indication from 
Judge Samuels about the sentence that he would impose. Other evidence showed, 
however, that in 22 cases defendants waived juries for sentencing hearings yet 
still received the death sentence, even though the policy among the public 
defenders was to waive a jury only when an indication had been received 
regarding the expected sentence in the case.
There was another reason, too, why counsel and the defendant could have 
believed that waiving a jury was the better course to take in this case. The 
defendant's suicide attempt, during jury selection, was prompted by a 
prospective juror's comment that the juror could decide to convict the defendant 
simply by looking at him. Thus, even though the defendant had previously 
persisted in his intention to have the case submitted to a jury, the prospective 
juror's comment demonstrated the potential weakness of that strategy.
For these reasons, too, we must reject the defendant's additional contention 
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance even if they believed they 
had an indication from the trial judge and were mistaken in their belief. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) (expressing standard for ineffective assistance claims). A similar 
question arose in People v. Maxwell, 173 Ill. 2d 102 (1996). In that 
case, the defendant alleged in his post-conviction petition that he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because, in deciding to waive a jury for 
sentencing, he relied on defense counsel's statement that the judge had 
indicated that he would not impose the death penalty. In rejecting the 
defendant's argument, the court noted that on direct appeal this court addressed 
a similar challenge to the defendant's jury waiver and had concluded then that 
counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance. Notably, on direct appeal this 
court had found, from an examination of counsel's remarks at trial, that counsel 
had three distinct reasons for recommending that the defendant waive a jury:
Thus, counsel's conclusion that the judge was less likely than a jury to 
impose the death penalty would be a legitimate ground on which to base a jury 
waiver.
Finally, we reject the defendant's argument that if Judge Samuels took part 
in any ex parte conversations, the defendant is entitled to a new trial 
and sentencing hearing. If any conversations occurred, it appears that they were 
limited to matters of scheduling. Though not in force when the alleged 
conversations took place, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct now permits 
ex parte communications "for scheduling, administrative purposes or 
emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits," 
provided that "the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a 
procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte 
communication," and "the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other 
parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an 
opportunity to respond." 155 Ill. 2d R. 63(A)(4)(a). Although there is no 
showing in this record whether the State received prompt notification of the 
supposed communications, we do not believe that a violation of the canon would 
warrant granting the relief the defendant now seeks. See People v. 
Hicks, 44 Ill. 2d 550 (1970); People v. Dunigan, 96 Ill. App. 3d 
799 (1981).
II
The defendant also contends that his two trial lawyers were ineffective for 
failing to investigate and present certain evidence in mitigation. At the 
evidentiary hearing conducted following this court's order of remand on the 
earlier post-conviction appeal, the defendant presented a number of witnesses 
who testified about additional evidence that trial counsel could have introduced 
during the sentencing hearing. One of the psychiatrists who had testified in the 
defendant's behalf at the sentencing hearing also testified at the 
post-conviction hearing, and he described how the additional information would 
have influenced his earlier assessment of the defendant. Finally, 
post-conviction counsel introduced expert testimony critical of trial counsel's 
failure to investigate, develop, and present this additional information. These 
witnesses-Jill Miller, a forensic social worker, and Robert Isaacson and Kevin 
McNally, criminal defense lawyers-believed that trial counsel should have 
introduced at the defendant's sentencing hearing the new evidence compiled by 
post-conviction counsel.
The new mitigating evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing 
consisted primarily of records relating to the defendant's family life before 
1976. These documents consisted of the defendant's juvenile court records and of 
Carolyn Montgomery's mental health records. Both sets of records were available 
to defense counsel at the time of the defendant's sentencing hearing, in 1983, 
yet counsel had not obtained them.
The new evidence compiled by post-conviction counsel showed that the 
defendant's mother, Carolyn Montgomery, suffered from depression and alcoholism. 
She was hospitalized on five occasions between 1965 and 1968 following a series 
of suicide attempts. The evidence also showed that the defendant's parents 
physically attacked each other a number of times, and once his mother stabbed 
his father with a knife. The records further revealed that the defendant was 
often neglected. For example, in 1966 neighbors reported to county authorities 
that Carolyn was neglecting her family and that the children were not attending 
school regularly because they did not have adequate food and clothing.
The new material gathered by post-conviction counsel also established that 
while Carolyn was in the hospital in May and June 1967, the defendant and his 
siblings stayed with the mother of Carolyn's boyfriend. The defendant returned 
to the family home after Carolyn was released from the hospital, but he soon ran 
away with his older brother, Douglas. The defendant and Douglas were then placed 
in the Audy Home, and a caseworker subsequently reported that Carolyn was doing 
a poor job of taking care of her children, that she drank excessively, and that 
she was frequently hospitalized. The defendant stayed at the Audy Home for 
several months, until he was released to live with relatives in Evanston. The 
defendant was referred to the Cook County juvenile court in August 1967, and he 
was then examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Ariel David. Dr. David found the 
defendant to be deprived and thought that these experiences of deprivation could 
produce hostility and depression and possibly antisocial behavior. Dr. David 
recommended, unsuccessfully, that the defendant be placed outside the family 
residence, in a boys' home or boarding school.
The new evidence further showed that the defendant's mother was hospitalized 
again in April 1968 for extreme depression following a fourth attempt at 
suicide. She was admitted to a hospital again in September 1969 with pneumonia 
and chronic anxiety. Early in 1970, Carolyn Montgomery was hospitalized again 
for anxiety. Soon after that, the defendant's older brother, Douglas, received 
several referrals to juvenile court, and Carolyn told an investigator that she 
was sick and was not physically capable of taking care of Douglas and the other 
children.
According to the newly compiled evidence, later in 1970, the defendant 
returned to the family home. He was then 14, and all six children were sleeping 
in the same room. The defendant was referred to juvenile court in May 1971 for 
having sexual relations with one of his half sisters, Jean. The author of a 
social investigation report concluded that the defendant needed psychiatric 
treatment. The report also expressed the view that the presence of all six 
children in a single bedroom was one circumstance explaining the defendant's 
sexual aggression toward his siblings. This report further noted that Carolyn 
did not believe that she could supervise the defendant, in light of her history 
of mental illness, and the report recommended the defendant's removal from the 
family home. The recommendation was not followed, however; after an adjudication 
of delinquency, the defendant was placed on probation and returned to the 
home.
In 1972 the defendant was taken from the family home again, and he was held 
in the Audy Home while an alternative placement was pursued. Late in 1973, 
another finding of neglect was made, and the defendant was then placed in a 
group home, where he remained for more than a year. During this period, the 
defendant was said to be respectful and obedient, and he attended school 
regularly.
After hearing the defendant's new evidence in mitigation, which was 
documented at the evidentiary hearing in defendant's exhibit nine, the 
post-conviction judge concluded that trial counsel's failure to present this 
information at sentencing was not prejudicial to the defendant. The judge 
explained:
The defendant argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to investigate these matters more fully and by failing to introduce, at 
the sentencing hearing, this information about his juvenile history and his 
mother's mental condition. The parties agree that the applicable standard 
governing the resolution of this issue is found in the Supreme Court's decision 
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance under 
Strickland, a defendant must show both a deficiency in counsel's 
performance and prejudice resulting from that error. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel's performance is highly deferential, and a court considering a claim of 
ineffective assistance "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065. 
To demonstrate prejudice resulting from an alleged deficiency in counsel's 
performance,"[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
The parties dispute whether the post-conviction judge found that the 
defendant had established the first part of the Strickland test, a 
deficiency in his trial lawyers' performance. We need not resolve this question, 
however, for we believe that the judge's finding of a lack of prejudice is 
supported by the evidence and that his rejection of the defendant's 
ineffective-assistance argument must therefore be affirmed. Because a 
defendant's failure to establish either part of the Strickland test 
will defeat the claim, a court need not "address both components of the inquiry 
if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069. Accordingly, a court 
considering a claim of ineffective assistance "need not determine whether 
counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by 
the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069. In the context of a 
capital sentencing hearing, the relevant inquiry into prejudice requires an 
examination of the effect of counsel's error on the sentencer's decision. 
People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 384 (1997); People v. 
Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1996); People v. Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494, 505 (1995); People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 536 (1995). The 
relevant question here, then, is "whether there is a reasonable probability 
that, absent the errors, the sentencer-including an appellate court, to the 
extent that it independently reweighs the evidence-would have concluded that the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2069.
Even if we assume that trial counsel was deficient in failing to investigate 
more thoroughly the defendant's juvenile and family history and in failing to 
present at sentencing the evidence compiled by post-conviction counsel, we do 
not believe that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's performance. The 
evidence that the defendant now contends should have been introduced related to 
his life before 1976. As we have shown above, trial counsel presented evidence 
regarding the defendant's troubled childhood, through the testimony of the 
defendant's family members, including his mother. We agree with the 
post-conviction court that, to a large extent, the additional evidence now urged 
by the defendant is cumulative of information that trial counsel did introduce 
at the sentencing hearing.
For example, mitigation specialist Jill Miller testified at the evidentiary 
hearing on the post-conviction petition that the defendant had endured a chaotic 
and violent home: both parents were alcoholic, the father was a drug addict, the 
children frequently lacked sufficient food and clothing, and the children were 
subject to abuse. Evidence introduced by defense counsel at the sentencing 
hearing told much the same story, however. As we noted earlier in this opinion, 
the testimony at sentencing showed that the defendant's parents were alcoholic, 
that they fought frequently, that Carolyn Montgomery was often unable to care 
for her family because of her drinking, and that she was physically abusive 
toward the children.
Another feature of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing was testimony 
showing that Carolyn Montgomery did not want the defendant living in the family 
home, and that the family frequently moved. According to this evidence, Carolyn 
took the defendant to the Audy Home on two occasions when she felt that she was 
unable to control him. In addition, post-conviction counsel showed that the 
family moved frequently from one location to another in Robbins or Evanston. 
Again, however, the evidence introduced by defense counsel at the sentencing 
hearing conveyed much the same message. That testimony showed that Carolyn often 
was unable to control the defendant and that she lost custody over him. The 
sentencing evidence also described the family's frequent moves and lack of a 
stable home environment. A comparison of the evidence compiled by 
post-conviction counsel and the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing 
thus reveals that much of the newly acquired evidence is actually cumulative of 
information presented to the court at sentencing.
Moreover, the additional evidence that the defendant faults counsel for 
failing to present at the sentencing hearing focuses on the defendant's troubled 
youth and on his and other family members' abuse of alcohol and drugs. Evidence 
about a defendant's turbulent childhood is not inherently mitigating, however. 
People v. Childress, No. 84566, at 7 (April 20, 2000); People v. 
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 140 (1997); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491-92 (1996); People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 335-37 (1992). The 
sentencing authority may regard that information as aggravating, particularly if 
the evidence suggests that the defendant might be dangerous in the future. 
People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 101 (1999) ("The judge could have 
regarded defendant's troubled life, with his criminal record, as an indicator of 
defendant's future dangerousness"); People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 339 (1990) ("[E]vidence of an upbringing that has caused a defendant to 
become violent and aggressive can be considered in aggravation, for one duty a 
sentencer has is to predict a defendant's future behavior based on his past 
behavior"). In this case, the sentencing judge could have viewed the testimony 
about the defendant's chaotic home as aggravating.
For similar reasons, testimony about a defendant's history of alcohol and 
drug abuse is not necessarily mitigating. Although a defendant might urge this 
evidence in mitigation, as an explanation for his misconduct, the sentencer is 
not required to share the defendant's assessment of the information. People 
v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 138-39 (1997). In People v. Shatner, 
174 Ill. 2d 133 (1996), this court rejected the argument that the sentencing 
judge erred in failing to attribute offenses committed by the defendant to his 
use of drugs. The court explained:
Thus, the sentencing judge in this case was not required to accept as 
mitigating the defendant's evidence of his and his parents' substantial problems 
with alcoholism.
In determining the potentially prejudicial effect of counsel's failure to 
investigate and present specific testimony or documentation, our analysis must 
focus "on the totality of the evidence," and not just on the newly proffered 
mitigation. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 538 (1995). 
Consideration of the aggravating nature of the defendant's offenses is 
appropriate in assessing what effect the omitted evidence might have had on the 
sentencing determination. See People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 
416-17 (2000). In view of the offenses in this case and the mitigating evidence 
actually presented at the defendant's sentencing hearing, we do not believe that 
the defendant has succeeded in demonstrating that he was prejudiced as a 
consequence of trial counsel's failure to investigate and present the new 
information he now raises. The defendant's offenses were particularly brutal, 
involving the rape and murder of two women in their own home.
As we have noted, trial counsel presented similar evidence about the 
defendant's troubled and alcohol-ridden background, so we do not have in this 
case a complete failure on the part of counsel to investigate and present 
evidence regarding the defendant's personal history. We believe that the 
evidence actually introduced by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing serves 
to distinguish the present case from those in which this court has found 
prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to investigate and introduce evidence 
about a defendant's personal history and family background. In People v. 
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), defense counsel presented only two 
witnesses in mitigation, and their testimony filled only 10 pages of the record. 
In addition, counsel had notice of brain damage incurred by the defendant as a 
child, yet counsel made no investigation into the defendant's mental condition. 
Counsel also failed to make any inquiry into the defendant's family background, 
which contained a history of abuse and other violence. In People v. 
Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 (1992), the only evidence introduced in mitigation 
was a report prepared by a psychologist for the Department of Corrections; the 
report described the defendant as dangerous and a likely repeat offender. 
Counsel made no investigation of the defendant's personal or family history and 
even failed to present mitigating evidence that he had access to. Unlike trial 
counsel in Morgan and Perez, trial counsel in the present case 
compiled and introduced a body of mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's 
personal history and background. On this record, we cannot say that the 
post-conviction judge's determination of the issue was manifestly erroneous.
Opposing this result, the defendant raises several arguments in support of 
his contention that trial counsel's failure to discover and present this 
evidence was prejudicial. The defendant first argues that the additional 
testimony would have contradicted a number of the trial judge's remarks at the 
sentencing hearing. The defendant cites the following comments made by the judge 
in imposing sentence:
The defendant contends that introduction of the additional evidence compiled 
by post-conviction counsel would have contradicted the trial judge's comments 
and would have precluded the judge from making those findings regarding the 
defendant and his family.
Unlike the defendant, we do not believe that the comments quoted above are 
entirely inconsistent with the new evidence in mitigation presented at the 
post-conviction hearing. The judge's positive references to the defendant's 
siblings and aunts were supported by the evidence-both the evidence introduced 
at sentencing, and the new evidence gathered by post-conviction counsel. When 
the defendant's mother proved to be unable to take care of the children, help 
was offered by the extended family. The judge's favorable comments about the 
defendant's mother may simply reflect on Carolyn Montgomery's earlier decision 
to quite drinking, as she testified at the sentencing hearing she had done, and 
on her frank acknowledgment of the terrible toll her alcoholism had taken on the 
family. In her own way, she was at least as deserving of the judge's sympathy as 
the defendant insists he was.
Moreover, we believe that the defendant's argument overstates the 
significance of the comments quoted above. The judge made these remarks at the 
beginning of his announcement of the defendant's sentence, and we do not 
consider the comments quoted above to have been central to the judge's decision. 
Nor do we believe that there is a reasonable probability that introduction of 
the new evidence assembled by post-conviction counsel would have led the judge 
to impose a sentence other than death. As we have already noted, the offenses 
involved here were particularly brutal, involving the murders and rapes of two 
women in their home; much of the new information cited by the defendant is 
cumulative of evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and may actually be 
viewed as aggravating. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different-in this context, that a sentence of death would not 
have been imposed. The additional evidence that the defendant contends should 
have been presented at sentencing might have removed some of the shadows from 
the defendant's personal history, but the light cast by this information would 
not likely have led the trial judge to impose a different sentence.
As a further ground in opposition to the post-conviction judge's finding of 
no prejudice, the defendant argues that the failure to investigate and present 
records of the defendant's juvenile history and Carolyn Montgomery's medical 
history was fatal to the mitigation strategy pursued at the sentencing hearing 
by trial counsel. The defendant characterizes the defense strategy as being 
based on testimony, from family members and Carolyn Montgomery, that Carolyn was 
a bad mother, and on Carolyn's further testimony in which she pleaded in support 
of her son's life. The defendant maintains that the "central weakness" in this 
strategy was the inconsistent role played by Carolyn Montgomery: in the 
defendant's phrasing, she was both the villain of the defendant's childhood and 
the vehicle through which sympathy for the defendant's plight would be invoked. 
The defendant contends that counsel's failure at sentencing to present the new 
evidence raised in the post-conviction proceedings deprived the defense strategy 
of corroboration that would have been crucial to that strategy's success.
We have carefully reviewed the testimony presented at the defendant's 
sentencing hearing, and we do not believe that there is a reasonable probability 
that introduction of the new evidence cited by the defendant would have altered 
the outcome of the earlier proceeding. The defense strategy at sentencing did 
not require Carolyn to assume inconsistent roles in her testimony. Carolyn spoke 
freely of her own history of alcoholism and acknowledged the problems it had 
caused her family. She also said that she had not been drinking for the last 
seven years, and thus she was able to speak from a perspective that enhanced her 
credibility and made her more sympathetic. Nor did Carolyn shoulder the entire 
weight of the defense strategy: the defendant's siblings and aunts also 
testified, presenting a consistent description of the defendant's disordered 
childhood and chaotic home environment, and those witnesses also spoke in favor 
of sparing the defendant's life. Finally, as we have previously noted, the 
evidence the defendant now urges is not inherently mitigating; a sentencer could 
find it either aggravating or mitigating, depending on how it viewed the 
information.
As additional proof of prejudice arising from trial counsel's failure to 
present at sentencing the new evidence gathered by post-conviction counsel, the 
defendant points to the testimony given by Dr. Stephen Porter at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Dr. Porter had testified in the defendant's 
behalf at the sentencing hearing, describing then the defendant's history of 
alcohol and drug abuse and expressing the view that the defendant was acting 
under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of 
the offenses. Dr. Porter subsequently reviewed the new evidence compiled by 
post-conviction counsel. At the evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction 
petition, Dr. Porter stated that the new information would have assisted him in 
formulating his earlier assessment of the defendant. Dr. Porter said that the 
evidence would have given him a better understanding of the extent of the abuse 
and deprivation the defendant experienced as a child, and that it would have 
given him a better understanding of the origins of the defendant's substance 
abuse problems. With regard to the latter point, Dr. Porter said that he could 
have traced the defendant's substance abuse problems to chronic depression that 
commenced when the defendant was a youth. As Dr. Porter explained at the 
evidentiary hearing, the defendant's heavy consumption of alcohol and drugs 
seemed to be the defendant's way of self-medicating himself.
We do not believe that Dr. Porter's testimony at the post-conviction hearing 
establishes that the defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to 
collect this additional information. Dr. Porter stated that if he had had this 
information at the time of sentencing, he could have been more confident about 
his conclusions, and he could have provided a more detailed depiction of the 
defendant's background and mental functioning. Thus, even with the new evidence, 
it appears that the central thrust of Dr. Porter's evaluation of the defendant 
would have remained the same. Given the nature of the testimony in mitigation 
and the brutality of the defendant's offenses, we do not believe that there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have 
been different, even if Dr. Porter had then been armed with the new information 
compiled by post-conviction counsel.
Finally, the defendant cites certain expert testimony introduced at the 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's post-conviction petition. These 
witnesses-Jill Miller, Robert Isaacson, and Kevin McNally-found the new evidence 
compiled by post-conviction counsel to be compelling, and they believed that 
trial counsel's failure to introduce this material at the sentencing hearing was 
prejudicial to the defendant. The post-conviction judge heard the same evidence, 
however, and his conclusion is not manifestly erroneous. See People v. 
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998). In sum, we do not believe that the 
defendant was prejudiced, under Strickland, as a result of defense 
counsel's failure to investigate and present the evidence now cited by the 
defendant.
III
The defendant also briefly raises several other contentions before this 
court, and we now turn to these issues. The defendant argues that the 
post-conviction judge erred in dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, a 
number of other post-conviction claims; these are identified as counts IV 
through VI, VIII through X, XII, and XXXII, and all of them allege the 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel.
Counts IV, V, VI, and VIII all involve the trial judge's alleged promise to 
impose a sentence other than death if the defendant pleaded guilty to the 
charges against him and waived a jury for sentencing. Count IV alleges that 
trial counsel's reliance on the judge's promise caused a breakdown in the 
adversary process; count V alleges that counsel erroneously urged the defendant 
to waive juries for trial and sentencing because of the judge's promise; count 
VI alleges that counsel failed to ensure that the defendant was competent to 
waive his rights to a jury; count VIII alleges that trial counsel's reliance on 
the judge's promise caused counsel to fail to represent the defendant 
vigorously. A psychiatric examination of the defendant after his suicide attempt 
found him to be fit, however. In addition, the proceedings at trial show that 
the defendant made knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waivers of juries, both 
before trial and before sentencing. The trial judge admonished the defendant of 
his rights, and the defendant agreed to give them up. Also, the record shows 
that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily agreed to the 
submission of the case to the trial judge through a stipulated bench trial. On 
each occasion, the defendant denied that he had been promised anything in 
exchange.
The defendant also mentions that he told defense counsel prior to the 
beginning of trial that he wished to retract his jury waiver, and that counsel 
replied that it was too late to do so. The defendant observes that the decision 
to allow a defendant to withdraw a jury waiver is within the trial judge's 
discretion (People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 414 (1986)), and that 
counsel therefore misunderstood the applicable law. We do not agree that trial 
counsel misunderstood the law. The statement attributed to counsel demonstrates 
nothing more than counsel's realization that the trial was about to begin and 
that the defense strategy had already been developed in reliance on the 
defendant's decision to waive a jury.
Counts IX and X allege that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
because they did not raise two challenges to the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in Illinois on two specified grounds, that the death penalty statute is 
unconstitutionally vague and that a defendant sentenced to death may be denied 
equal access to post-conviction relief. The defendant does not support these 
points with any argument in his brief, however, and therefore they may be 
considered waived. Moreover, we note that appellate counsel did raise on direct 
appeal a number of challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
which this court rejected. People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 
531-32 (1986).
In counts XII the defendant alleges that appellate counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance because he failed to contest the defendant's waiver of 
the juries and agreement to a stipulated bench trial. We have rejected similar 
challenges to trial counsel's performance, however, and the same result should 
obtain with respect to appellate counsel. Finally, for count XXXII, the 
defendant alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to create a 
record and raise on direct appeal the issues regarding the trial judge's alleged 
promise to not impose the death sentence. The evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing showed, however, that trial and appellate counsel agreed 
that the better course would be to raise the issue in a post-conviction petition 
rather than on appeal from the conviction and sentence. As a strategic choice 
made by counsel after thorough discussion, this decision is "virtually 
unchallengeable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is 
affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting 
Thursday, November 16, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death, entered 
in the circuit court of Cook County, is to be carried out. The defendant shall 
be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The 
clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to 
the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to 
the warden of the institution where the defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
McNamara and Morrissey, Montgomery's attorneys, are, by all accounts, 
respected and able members of the bar. There is no basis in the record for 
suggesting that they would manufacture testimony against Judge Samuels. Judge 
Samuels, on the other hand, had very compelling reasons for reneging on his 
promise to McNamara and Morrissey and then disavowing that a promise had been 
made. Having been caught by the assistant State's Attorneys engaging in ex 
parte communications with McNamara and Morrissey, Judge Samuels may have 
believed that imposition of the death penalty and denial of impropriety were his 
best defense against investigation by the Judicial Inquiry Board.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge should respect and 
comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary." 155 Ill. 2d R. 62(A). The Code further provides that "[a] judge 
shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or 
consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the 
parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding." 155 Ill. 2d R. 
63(A)(4).
A trial judge has an obligation to assure the public that justice is 
administered fairly because the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as 
damaging to public confidence as would be the actual presence of bias or 
prejudice. People v. Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d 971, 975-76 (1988). The 
situation before us provides a useful illustration of this. Regardless of what 
was actually said or done in Judge Samuels' chambers, the circumstances of the 
conversations have left an indelible taint on the proceedings. The integrity of 
the process has been fatally compromised. In a normal case, this would require 
that we vacate the judgment and remand the matter for a new trial. See, 
e.g., In re Wheatley, 297 Ill. App. 3d 854 (1998); People 
v. Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d 832 (1976). I fail to see how we can order 
anything less where, as here, a man's life hangs in the balance.
On retrial, the State should not be permitted to seek the death penalty 
against Montgomery. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and 
partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois 
death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, 
of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). It is therefore 
void and unenforceable.
JUSTICE McMORROW, also dissenting:
I join in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Harrison, except for the 
final paragraph, in which he discusses his partial concurrence and partial 
dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998). I agree with Chief 
Justice Harrison that the circumstances of the ex parte conversations 
in this case require that defendant's conviction and sentence be reversed. 
Cf. People v. Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d 971, 976-77 (1988). 
In my view, this cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial 
and unrestricted sentencing hearing.