Title: State v. Jenkins
Citation: 472 S.E.2d 251
Docket Number: 24440
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 1996

472 S.E.2d 251 (1996) The STATE, Respondent, v. Tyrone JENKINS, Petitioner. No. 24440. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard March 20, 1996. Decided June 10, 1996. Assistant Appellate Defender M. Anne Pearce of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for petitioner. Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, Columbia; and Solicitor Randolph Murdaugh, III, Hampton, for respondent. BURNETT, Justice: We granted certiorari to review the opinion in State v. Jenkins, ___ S.C. ___, 452 S.E.2d 612 (Ct.App.1994), in which the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction for first degree burglary.[1] We reverse and remand for a new trial. At petitioner's trial, Pam and Samuel Dinger testified their home had been burglarized during the early morning hours of May 5, 1992. An investigation revealed the burglar or burglars entered the Dingers' home through a second-story laundry room window and stole items valued at approximately $3,000. A Gatorade bottle and a beer bottle that had been removed from an outdoor refrigerator were found discarded in the Dingers' yard. Petitioner's fingerprints were found on both bottles. Over petitioner's objections, a police officer was allowed to testify about oral statements petitioner made following his arrest. The officer testified as follows: The trial judge and the Court of Appeals held that this testimony was admissible under State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923), as evidence of a common scheme or plan. Under Lyle, supra, and its progeny, evidence of other crimes or bad acts is generally not admissible to prove a defendant committed the specific crime charged unless the evidence tends to establish motive, intent, the absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or plan.[2]See State v. Johnson, 306 S.C. 119, 410 S.E.2d 547 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 993, 112 S. Ct. 1691, 118 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1992); State v. Douglas, 302 S.C. 508, 397 S.E.2d 98 (1990); State v. Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 393 S.E.2d 364, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 227, 112 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1990). In the case of the common scheme or plan exception, there must be a close degree of similarity or connection between the other crimes/bad acts and the crime charged which enhances the probative value of the evidence so as to outweigh its prejudicial effect. State v. Parker, 315 S.C. 230, 433 S.E.2d 831 (1993); State v. Hallman, 298 S.C. 172, 379 S.E.2d 115 (1989); State v. McClellan, 283 S.C. 389, 323 S.E.2d 772 (1984). Here, the testimony introduced over petitioner's objections was evidence that petitioner had committed other burglaries. However, nothing was introduced to show any similarity between these previous burglaries and the burglary for which petitioner was on trial. Further, although the testimony indicated petitioner was involved in a scheme in which he taught other individuals how to commit burglaries and then would fence the property stolen by these individuals, there was no evidence that the crime petitioner was charged with was in any way related to this scheme. Therefore, admission of this testimony under the common scheme or plan exception was error. State v. Parker, *253 supra; State v. Hallman, supra.[3] Consequently, the Court of Appeals' decision is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. FINNEY, C.J., and TOAL, MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur. [1] Petitioner was indicted and tried for grand larceny and first degree burglary. He was acquitted of grand larceny but convicted of first degree burglary and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. [2] As the Lyle Court pointed out, the latter two exceptions are interrelated because evidence of a common scheme or plan essentially goes to prove the identity of the perpetrator. [3] The error was not harmless as the testimony was clearly prejudicial and the other evidence of petitioner's guilt was far from overwhelming.