Title: STATE v TAYLOR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12394
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 1973

No. 12394 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - ANDREW TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Truman Bradford, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert A . Tucker, Great F a l l s , Montana Jack L. Lewis argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For ~ e s p o n d e n t : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas J. Beers, Assistant Attorney General, appeared, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana N e i l E. Ugrin, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: September 11, 1973 Decided : NOV 5 7973 F i l e d : NQM 5 197'3 M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by defendant Andrew Taylor from a judg- ment of the d i s t r i c t court of Cascade County entered on a jury verdict of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced t o l i f e imprisonment. The f a c t s of t h i s case a r e repelling. However, our inquiry a s appears hereinafter i s whether o r not defendant has had a f a i r t r i a l ; and not whether defendant may be g u i l t y or innocent. O n the morning of December 22, 1971, Victoria Lynn Mullen died a t Columbus Hospital i n Great F a l l s , Montana. Death was caused by a massive subdural hematoma, i.e. a bleeding i n t o the c r a n i a l cavity i n the space separating the brain and the membrane l i n i n g the boney vault. Within s i x days of her death Vicky Mullen would have been two years old. Vicky was the child of defendant's wife, Linda Taylor, by a previous marriage. The Taylors were married e a r l y i n November 1971, and the marriage continued a t l e a s t u n t i l a f t e r the t r i a l of t h i s cause. Shortly a f t e r the marriage defendant, an e n l i s t e d man i n the United States A i r Force, was reassigned t o Malmstrom A i r Force Rase i n Great Falls. It was the s t a t e ' s theory t h a t shortly a f t e r the Taylors arrived i n Montana the defendant embarked on a course of conduct which culminated i n Vicky's death. While there i s a great deal of testimony i n the record impli- cating defendant i n vicky1s death, t h e most damaging i s t h a t of defendant's wife, Linda Taylor. Testifying over defendant's con- tinuing objection based on the marital privilege provisions of sections 93-701-4(1) and 94-8802, R.C.M. 1947, M r s . Taylor indicated hat defendant frequently spanked the c h i l d very hard, often hard enough t o leave bruises, when she soiled herself o r misbehaved. She t e s t i f i e d : t h a t shortly a f t e r the family arrived i n Montana defendant began t o spank the child with a s t i c k f o r wetting her pants and on a t l e a s t one occasion there was blood on the s t i c k following a spanking; t h a t defendant spanked the child on numerous occasions with a p l a s t i c s t i c k and beat her with a b e l t leaving severe b r u i s e s , t h i s a l s o a s punishment f o r misbehavior; t h a t when Vicky refused t o e a t defendant would slap her, slam her head very hard against the back of the high chair and beat her head with a s t i c k . I n another incident, Mrs. Taylor t e s t i f i e d defendant became angry over the c h i l d ' s r e f u s a l t o walk i n a shopping center parking l o t and backhanded her hard enough t o knock her down. This occurred on December 13 o r 14, 1971. On another occasion, de- fendant slapped the c h i l d f o r wetting her pants, causing her t o s t r i k e her head against t h e armrest of t h e couch and go i n t o con- vulsions. This occurred on the evening preceding the c h i l d ' s death. M r s . Taylor a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t on December 18, 1971, defendant t i e d a b e l t around the c h i l d ' s f e e t , strapped the b e l t t o the doorknob and then opened and closed t h e door several times, causing the child t o bang her head against t h e door. Also, t h a t same evening he strapped the b e l t over the top of a door and suspended the child head down and then opened the door very quickly causing Vicky t o f a l l t o the floor on her head. A t t r i a l , M r s . Taylor admitted having made a number of p r i o r statements a s t o the cause of Vicky's i n j u r i e s which were inconsis- t e n t with her testimony a t t r i a l . She indicated t h e e a r l i e r accounts were f a l s e and t h a t her account a t the time of t r i a l was t r u e and accurate. However, under cross-examination, she did s p e c i f i c a l l y affirm an e a r l i e r statement i n which she said "He never r e a l l y intentionally meant t o hurt her. It was h i s way of disciplining her." She a l s o t e s t i f i e d the defendant played with the c h i l d , kissed her, often gave her t r e a t s of cookies and would look i n on her a t night t o see i f she was covered. Mrs. ~ a y l o r ' s testimony was supported i n part by the testimony of M r . and M r s . Hyatt. The Hyatts were close friends of t h e Taylors and the two families v i s i t e d frequently. Both Hyatts t e s t i f i e d a s t o defendant's punishment of the child. Mrs. Hyatt confirmed one incident, t e s t i f i e d t o by Mrs. Taylor, when defendant spanked Vicky hard enough t o produce bruises. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t on another occasion a f t e r defendant spanked Vicky, t h e r e was blood on h i s hand and her bottom. M r . Hyatt t e s t i f i e d he heard o r saw defendant d i s c i p l i n e Vicky on a number of occasions and t h a t i n h i s opinion the d i s c i p l i n e administered by defendant was f a r too severe f o r a child of v i c k y f s age. Both Hyatts agreed the spankings they saw o r heard being administered were f o r the purpose of disciplining Vicky f o r some misbehavior. They a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t on occasion defendant displayed affection toward the c h i l d by hugging and kissing her. Defendant t e s t i f i e d on h i s own behalf and acknowledged disciplining the child by spanking and standing her i n a corner as punishment f o r various misdeeds. Defendant a l s o recalled the parking l o t incident of December 13 o r 14 when Vicky was having trouble walking but denied slapping her on t h a t occasion. He denied ever having h i t her with a b e l t , denied ever having hung the c h i l d from a door, and denied h i t t i n g her with s t i c k s . I n general, defendant denied mistreating Vicky i n any of the ways t e s t i f i e d t o by h i s wife. He stated he knew of one f a l l which accounted f o r some of Vicky's bruises and t h a t h i s wife had t o l d h i m of other f a l l s which would explain some of the other i n j u r i e s . The extent of Vicky's i n j u r i e s was t e s t i f i e d t o by D r . John Pfaff, Jr., a pathologist who performed the autopsy. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t the cause of death was bleeding which occurred i n the space between the brain and the membrane l i n i n g of the skull. This bleeding was estimated t o have begun approximately 10 t o 13 days prior t o death. However, the doctor believed there were episodes of rebleeding caused by i n j u r i e s t o the head which occurred between the time of the f i r s t injury and the time of death. D r . Pfaff further s t a t e d t h a t the e n t i r e scalp was swollen and had a "boggy" consistency, suggesting bleeding over the e n t i r e scalp. This condition was consistent with h i s finding t h a t the bleeding which caused v i c k y l s death was the r e s u l t of one o r a s e r i e s of severe blows, with the area of i n i t i a l bleeding being subsequently aggravated and enlarged by other severe blows t o the head. I n further testimony, D r . Pfaff s t a t e d the autopsy examina- t i o n revealed additional multiple i n j u r i e s . While these i n j u r i e s were not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the cause of death, they did tend t o corroborate the testimony of Mrs. Taylor and the Hyatts a s t o repeated severe disciplinings of the child. These i n j u r i e s in- cluded multiple bruises and abrasions of t h e face and neck areas; multiple bruises on both arms and legs; r a t h e r large bruises on both upper legs and the area of the thighs; and, a t l e a s t two areas of hemorrhage i n the abdomen r e s u l t i n g from severe blunt force impacts. The majority of these i n j u r i e s had been i n f l i c t e d from three t o fourteen days p r i o r t o the c h i l d ' s death. D r . McKenzie t e s t i f i e d he treated the child on December 3 , 1971, and t h a t he examined her again on December 9, 1971, a t which time he noticed head and face i n j u r i e s which would be c l a s s i f i e d a s contusions and abrasions. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t his examina- t i o n of December 9 would have revealed a massive subdural hematoma, but he ascertained none. However, he did indicate t h a t h i s examina t i o n would not have revealed t h a t a bleeding process, which could end i n a massive subdural hematoma, had begun, Mrs. Taylor t e s t i f i e d t h a t following Vicky's death defendant gathered up the c h i l d ' s clothes and forced her t o go with him t o the dump where he discarded the bloody clothes, a f t e r giving a f a l s e name t o the proprietor of t h e dump. Defendant, on the other hand, t e s t i f i e d it was Mrs. Taylor who picked up the clothes, and t h a t he took them t o the dump and gave a f a l s e name and address there t o protect h i s wife. Finally, there was testimony by defendant's c e l l mate t h a t defendant had t o l d him he spanked the c h i l d with a b e l t and h i t her with a b e l t , because she was a spoiled b r a t . He a l s o t e s t i f i e d defendant had said he did not r e a l l y mean t o hurther, he was j u s t trying t o correct her. At the close of the evidence, the district court refused defendant's offered instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. It also refused defendant's request for change in the general cautionary instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses which would have specifically instructed the jury to consider prior inconsistent statements as possibly repelling the presumption that each witness spoke true. Over defendant ' s objection, the court gave two instructions regarding the burden of proof to the effect that the State had only to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, defendant raises numerous issues for review which we shall consider in this order: ( 1 ) That the district court erred in refusing defendant's offered instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (2) That it was error to allow defendant's wife to testify over his objection. ( 3 ) Corpus delecti was not established beyond a reasonable doubt . (4) That it was error to admit over objection testimony "considering the possibility of Battered Child ~yndrome". (5) That testimony as to other injuries was improper. ( 6 ) That the jury was not properly instructed regarding prior inconsistent statements. (7) That it was error to qualify the State's burden of proof with the word "only" in two of the court's instructions. Since only the failure to give the requested manslaughter instructions requires reversal and a new trial, we will consider issue ( I ) , and then deal with the other issues only as their resolution bears on a new trial. In justifying the district court's refusal of defendant's offered instructions on manslaughter, the State argues essentially two things. First, that once the commission of the homicide by the defendant is shown the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation devolves on the defendant and since in this case defendant denied the doing of the acts causing death, rather than showing circum- stances of mitigation, he failed to meet this burden and was not entitled to instructions on manslaughter. Second, the jury had the choice of believing either all the testimony of Mrs. Taylor or all the testimony of Mr. Taylor, and since the jury convicted Mr. Taylor it obviousiy believed Mrs. Taylor, whose testimony was sufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder. The central proposition of the State's first argument is specifically established by section 94-7212, R.C.M. 1947, which provides : "Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon him, unless the proof on the part of the prosecution tends to show that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that the defendant was justifiable or excusable. ' 1 It is immediately apparent from a consideration of section 94-7212, that there is an exception to the burden placed on a defendant of coming forward with evidence of mitigation, after proof of the commission of a homicide. This exception is appli- cable to those situations in which the proof relied on by the prosecution to establish guilt also tends to show circumstances of mitigation. This exception is well established in ~ontana's case law. State v . Rivers, 133 Mont. 129, 133, 320 P.2d 1004, describes it thusly: "Still there is an exception or modification to this general rule, most explicit in our Montana law. It is that such a presumption of malice does not exist in the face of evidence tending to show that the acts of the defendant amount only to manslaughter. I I As in Rivers, this rule is most important in the instant case. At trial, the state's principal witness, Mrs. Taylor, testi- fied that defendant "never really intentionally meant to hurt her. It was his way of disciplining her." With regard to specific incidents, she testified that defendant's acts in striking the child were, with one exception, for purposes of discipline. Similarly the ~yatts' testimony, who were also state's witnesses, was to the effect that defendant's striking of the child was punish- ment f o r various misdeeds. Even the admissions of the defendant, a s r e l a t e d by h i s former c e l l mate, were t o the e f f e c t t h a t de- fendant struck the child a s a punishment f o r being "spoiled", but he had not meant t o hurt her. From these f a c t s a t t e s t e d t o by the S t a t e ' s own witnesses, the inference could have been drawn by the jury t h a t defendant i n f l i c t e d the f a t a l i n j u r i e s while disciplining the child. I f t h e jury reached t h i s conclusion under proper instructions, it could then have concluded t h a t the death occurred a s the r e s u l t of t h e doing of a lawful a c t , the disciplining of a c h i l d permitted by section 94-605(4), R.C.M. 1947, i n an unlawful manner o r without due caution o r circumspection. A properly instructed jury could find involuntary manslaughter under the provisions of section 94-2507, R.C.M. 1947: "Manslaughter i s the unlawful k i l l i n g of a human being, without malice. It i s of two kinds: " (2) Involuntary, i n the commission of an unlawful a c t , not amounting t o felony; o r i n the commission of a lawful a c t which might produce death, i n an unlawful manner, o r without due caution or circumspection. I I Mrs. Taylor t e s t i f i e d t o one instance where defendant became angry with the child and slapped her hard enough t o knock her down. This incident occurred near t h e c r i t i c a l time established by the medical testimony f o r the i n f l i c t i o n of the i n i t i a l injury causing the c h i l d ' s death. I f the jury believed it was t h i s incident which led t o the onset of the hematoma, it could have found t h a t t h e death was the r e s u l t of "a sudden quarrel o r heat of passion" and found defendant g u i l t y of voluntary manslaughter under the provisions of section 94-2507(1), R.C.M. 1947. Further, there was testimony by M r s . Taylor t h a t defendant played with the c h i l d , kissed her, often gave her t r e a t s of cookies and would look i n on her a t night t o see i f she was covered, The Hyatts a l s o t e s t i f i e d t o displays of affection by defendant t o the child. This testimony tends t o put i n issue the question of malice. In State v . Thomas, 147 Mont. 325, 331, 332, 413 P.2d 315, this Court observed that testimony by the defendant stating affection and lack of ill feeling toward the deceased was suffi- cient to put in issue the question of malice by tending to "'elim- 1 inate' or negative' the presence of malice". Also in Rivers, testimony relating to the defendant's treatment of the deceased was held to show a lack of malice. While the district court may have considered the evidence in support of manslaughter weak and inconclusive, still it was bound to instruct the jury on manslaughter since the weight to be given the evidence is a question for the jury. Section 95- 1 9 0 1 ( b ) , R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Questions of law shall be decided by the court, and questions of fact by the jury * *." Since the weight to be given testimony is in essence a question of fact, it follows that the court should have allowed the jury to resolve it by instructing the jury as to manslaughter. The conclusion that the district court erred in refusing the offered manslaughter instructions is reenforced by this Court's observations in Thomas, where it stated: "It is a fundamental rule that the court's instruc- tions should cover every issue or theory having support in the evidence. I' The Court then, in Thomas, applied this general rule to homicide cases : "'Any evidence, however slight, which shows that the homicide was committed under such circumstances as to eliminate the element of malice, requires a charge on the law of manslaughter. 1 I t In view of the foregoing, the State's second argument justifying the refusal of the offered manslaughter instructions can be dealt with in a more summary fashion. It is premised on the assertion that the jury had the choice of believing all of Mrs. Taylor ' s testimony or all of Mr. Taylor's testimony. That premise is in- correct. A jury is not obligated to believe all of any witness's testimony. This Court in State v. Le Duc, 89 Mont. 545, 562, 300 P . 919, said the jury is: ' I * * * at liberty to believe all, a part of, or none of the testimony of any witness. I I Accordingly, even if the jury rejected all of defendant's testimony, it was still at liberty to believe only parts of Mrs. ~aylor's testimony. With the right to reject any part of Mrs. ~aylor's testimony, a properly instructed jury could have found that defendant struck the blow causing the fatal bleeding while disciplining the child and returned a verdict of involuntary man- slaughter, or that the blow which caused the fatal bleeding was struck by defendant in sudden anger and returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. To the second part of the state's argument--that the conviction should stand because Mrs. Taylor's testimony was sufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder--we merely observe that while this may be so, it is not enough. Mrs. ~aylor's testimony also supports a manslaughter theory, thus requiring in- structions on manslaughter. State v. Thomas, supra. Since the evidence could be interpreted to support a finding that the killing was done without malice in the course of doing a lawful act without due circumspection; was done without malice in the doing of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony; or, was done without malice on a sudden passion; the failure to in- struct the jury as to manslaughter requires reversal of this cause for new trial with a jury properly instructed. This cause will be tried again so we will consider defendant's other specifications of error as they bear on a new trial. Chief among those specifications of error is the denial of defendant's claim of marital privilege against the admission of his wife's testimony. We find this specification of error to be without merit. Defendant's contention is that his wife, Linda Taylor, could not testify against him over his objection. In support of his claim of marital privilege, defendant cites sections 93-701-4(1) and 94-8802, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-701-4(1), provides: I I There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness i n the following cases: (1). A husband cannot be examined for or against h i s wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without h i s consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterward, be, without the consent of the other, examined a s t o any communi- cation made by one t o the other during the marriage; but t h i s exception does not apply t o a c i v i l action or proceeding by one against the other, nor t o a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other. 11 Section 94-8802, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Except with the consent of both, or i n cases of criminal violence upon one by the other, or i n case of abandonment, o r neglect of children by either party, or of abandonment or neglect of the wife by the husband, neither husband nor wife i s a competent witness for or against the other i n a criminal action or proceeding t o which one or both a r e parties. 11 While both the State and defendant t r e a t each of these sections as applicable t o t h i s case, we find that only section 94-8802, R.C.M. 1947, need be considered on these facts. Section 93-701-4(1), R.C.M. 1947, a rule of evidence for c i v i l causes, i s applicable t o criminal causes only through the operation of section 94-7209, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "The rules of evidence i n c i v i l actions are applicable also t o criminal actions, except as otherwise provided i n t h i s code. 11 I n the instant case, defendant and the witness are s t i l l husband and wife. Since "this code" has fully provided i n section 94- 8802, R.C.M. 1947, for the admission or exclusion of testimony of persons who are s t i l l husband and wife, it i s apparent that it has been "otherwise provided" within the meaning of section 94-7209, R.C.M. 1947, excluding the applicability of section 93- 701-4(1), R.C.M. 1947, to t h i s fact situation. The State argues that Mrs. ~ a y l o r ' s testimony i s admissible against her defendant husband on a number of bases, including assertions: that a wife can t e s t i f y as to the acts as distinguished from the communications of her husband ; that a crime against the wife's child i s a crime against the wife for purposes of the exception t o the s t a t u t e allowing a spouse t o t e s t i f y i n cases involving criminal violence by one spouse against the other; and, t h a t t h e wife's testimony i s admissible under the exception t o the s t a t u t e allowing one spouse t o t e s t i f y against the other i n cases involving "abandonment o r neglect of children". W e do not comment on the v a l i d i t y of t h e f i r s t two grounds urged by the S t a t e since we find t h i s case squarely within t h e e x p l i c i t exception t o the s t a t u t e allowing one spouse t o t e s t i f y against t h e other i n cases of abandonment o r neglect of children. 1 I Defendant claims t h a t f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of the term neglect" used i n framing t h e exception we must r e l y on section 19-103(16), R.C.M. 1947, which defines neglect a s : It* * * a want of such a t t e n t i o n t o the nature o r probable consequences of the a c t o r omission a s a prudent man ordinarily bestows i n acting i n h i s own concerns. 11 From t h i s d e f i n i t i o n defendant then argues t h a t the exception cannot be applied t o allow testimony when t h e charge i s murder, since murder requires an i n t e n t which denotes a willfulness in- consistent with negligence. This position i s untenable. While defendant's statement of the s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of neglect i s correct, it i s incomplete i n t h a t section 19-103, R, C.M. 1947, a l s o provides t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n s h a l l apply only I I unless otherwise apparent from the context." I n t h i s case the context i s the s t a t u t e , the purpose of which i s the protection of the s a n c t i t y of marriage and t h e home. W e f e e l t h a t t h e pur- pose of the exceptions t o t h i s s t a t u t e i s a l s o protective. I n the case of the exception r e l a t e d t o the neglect of children, the purpose i s protection of children from abuse which could other- wise be practiced without f e a r of r e t r i b u t i o n under protection of the marital privilege. I f dekendant ' s construction of t h i s protective exception i s adopted, the protection would extend t o i n j u r i e s negligently in- f l i c t e d but not w i l l f u l a s s a u l t , t o a negligent homicide but not t o premeditated murder. Such a construction is c l e a r l y too narrow, outraging both reason and justice. I n t h i s context a broader d e f i n i t i o n of neglect i s required than t h a t offered by section 19-103, R.C.M. 1947. For the purposes of t h i s exception, we hold t h a t the term "neglect" includes any abuse of children whether i n f l i c t e d negligently or intentionally. I n adopting t h i s cot~struction we a r e s a t i s f i e d t h a t we reach a r e s u l t which i s required by both reason and j u s t i c e and which i s within the contemplation of the l e g i s l a t u r e a t the time it enacted section 94-8802, R.C.M. 1947. Under t h i s construction of the marital privilege s t a t u t e s , M r s . Taylor's testimony w i l l be properly admissible on r e t r i a l . It should be noted t h a t i n view of our discussion of issue ( I ) , on r e t r i a l of t h i s matter t h e jury w i l l be instructed a s t o manslaugh- t e r thus r a i s i n g the issue of negligence and making M r s . ~ a y l o r ' s testimony admissible even under defendant's construction of t h i s exception. Considering defendant's t h i r d specification of error--that the S t a t e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h corpus d e l e c t i s u f f i c i e n t t o support a conviction of murder--it i s s u f f i c i e n t a t t h i s time merely t o observe t h a t of the showings required by section 94- 2510, R.C.M. 1947, there i s no dispute a s t o the c h i l d ' s death and there was s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence t o support the jury's finding t h a t defendant was responsible beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing more i s required. State v. Medicine Bull, Jr., 152 Mont. 34, 445 P.2d 916; S t a t e v. Bosch, 125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477. Defendant's fourth and f i f t h specifications of e r r o r question the propriety of allowing c e r t a i n testimony. Itlhile defendant's I' 11 point t h a t testimony a s t o f ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l not without more, supply evidence" (LaForest v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 147 Mont. 431, 414 P.2d 200) i s well taken, it i s not applicable t o t h i s case. The doctor was not asked i f there was a possiblity of Battered Child Syndrome, but r a t h e r , i f he had considered the p o s s i b i l i t y of Battered Child Syndrome. After he answered t h a t question i n the affirmative, he went on t o describe such of h i s findings a s sup- ported t h e conclusion t h a t the Battered Child Syndrome was present. This further testimony takes the doctor's consideration out of the realm of mere possibility and makes it fully admissible as expert testimony. Defendant also claims it was error for the court to allow testimony concerning injuries which were not specifically related to the cause of death. This testimony was clearly admissible on the first trial of this action, since one of the offenses charged was murder by torture and the condition of the body was evidence from the the jury could have inferred the essential element of intent to inflict cruel suffering. People v . Lawhon, 33 Cal.Rptr. 718, 723, 220 C.A.2d 311. We feel the testimony will also be admissible on retrial of this cause on the alternative ground of showing a common scheme, plan, or design to inflict injury on the child. While the general rule is that evidence of other offenses other similar acts at other times inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular crime charged, there are certain well established exceptions. State v . Tiedemann, 139 Mont. 237, 362 P.2d 529; State v . Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 238, 455 P.2d 63. These exceptions are summarized in Jensen: 11 There are recognized exceptions to this general rule: similar acts with the same prosecuting witness, State v . Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 232 P.2d 731 (1951); similar acts not too remote in time, State v . Nicks, supra; and 'where the evidence of other crimes tends to establish a common scheme, plan or system and where such other crimes are similar to, closely connected with and not too re- mote from the one charged, and also where they are so that proof of one tends to establish the other.' State v . Merritt, 138 Mont. 546, 357 P.2d 683 (1960); State v. Gransberry, 1 4 0 Mont. 70, 367 P.2d 766 (1962)." Having established the exceptions, Jensen goes on to set out a three part test to guide the determination of what other acts can be admitted under the exceptions. The elements of the Jensen test are: "similarity of crimes or acts, nearness in time, and tendency to establish a common scheme, or plan or system. I1 In Jensen a pattern of behavior is held to be a "common scheme or plan. 11 In the instant case, the testimony objected to went not directly to the acts of the defendant but rather to injuries from which acts could be inferred and which were corroborative of acts by the defendant testified to by other witnesses. These we hold are also admissible under the Jensen exceptions, if they meet the criteria of Jensen and can be related to defendant's acts. In this case, the criteria of Jensen are met in that: (1) Various beatings all administered to the same child are similar acts; ( 2 ) injuries inflicted within 21 days of death satisfy the requirement of nearness in time; and ( 3 ) by showing a continuous pattern of behavior toward the child there appears a common scheme or plan within the meaning of the exception. These injuries were sufficiently related to defendant by the testimony of other witnesses regarding the severe beatings ad- ministered by defendant to the child during the final 21 days of her life. ~efendant's final specifications of error relate to certain instructions given by the court. The court gave the general cautionary instruction on duties of the jury, No. 1.02C, Montana Jury Instruction Guide Criminal. In giving this instruction the court refused a request by defendant to specifically include in the instruction prior inconcistent statements as one of the factors which the jury should consider as possibly repelling the presumption that a witness speaks the truth. It is defendant's claim that the court erred in refusing to so specifically instruct the jury. Section 93-1901-12, R.C.M. 1947, specifically provides: 1' A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony * * *.I' Clearly, such an instruction would have been proper and in a case, such as this, where the State's principal witness had ad- mittedly made a number of prior inconsistent statements, it would seem particularly appropriate. The giving of the instruction with the defendant's requested inclusion regarding prior inconsis- tent statements would better accord with the accepted principle of f u l l y and c l e a r l y instructing the jury a s t o the specifics of the law applicable t o the case. Defendant a l s o objects t o the use of the word "only1' i n c e r t a i n of the c o u r t ' s instructions r e l a t i n g t o the S t a t e ' s burden of proof and quantum of proof required t o show proof beyond a reasonable doubt. W e agree with defendant's contention t h a t describing t h e s t a t e ' s burden a s "only t h a t degree of proof1', and proof beyond a reasonable doubt a s "only such proof a s may" could tend t o confuse a jury composed of laymen and i n e f f e c t d i l u t e the degree of g u i l t and proof the S t a t e i s bound t o establish. The use of the limiting word "only" is not necessary t o c l e a r l y and f u l l y describe the burden and should not be in- cluded i n t h e instructions on r e t r i a l . The judgment i s reversed and the cause remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r further proceedings not inconsistent with t h i s opinion. , , . * J u s t i c e / I Chief Justice ,/'\ Justices. I / 1 M r \ J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly, deeming himself disqualified, took no {{part i n t h i s opinion. ' , i