Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. KRUG
Citation: 2004 OK 28, 92 P.3d 67
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 2004

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. KRUG Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. KRUG 2004 OK 28 92 P.3d 67 Case Number: SCBD-4733 Decided: 04/13/2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA State of Oklahoma, ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. SANDRA W. KRUG, Respondent. RULE 6 BAR DISCIPLINE PROCEEDING ¶0 The Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA) charged Sandra W. Krug (Respondent) with two counts of professional misconduct: Count I - making a false statement of fact and offering false evidence to a tribunal, and Count II - failing to fully respond to the General Counsel's notification that he was investigating allegations of her misconduct. The parties stipulated to the facts and that Respondent engaged in misconduct. The PRT held a hearing, found misconduct on both Counts, recommended a 30-day suspension and one year probation, and further recommended that if Respondent commits an ethical violation within the probation period, the suspension for the instant offenses be extended to one year. The OBA and Respondent stipulated to a public reprimand and one year probation. We exonerate Respondent on both Counts and deny the OBA's application for costs. RESPONDENT EXONERATED; OBA'S APPLICATION FOR COSTS DENIED. Loraine Dillinder Farabow, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, OK, for Complainant. Jack S. Dawson, Miller Dollarhide, Oklahoma City, OK, for Respondent. BOUDREAU, J. ¶1 The Oklahoma Bar Association (OBA) filed a Complaint against Sandra W. Krug (Respondent) under Rule 6, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, charging her in Count I with making a false statement of fact and offering false evidence to a tribunal, and in Count II with failing to fully respond to the General Counsel's notification that he was investigating allegations of her misconduct. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶2 We review the entire record de novo to determine if the OBA proved its allegations of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. RGDP Rule 6.12(c). Even when the parties stipulate to misconduct the stipulations do not bind us because our duty is to review the evidence de novo. OBA v. Taylor, II. FACTS ¶3 Upon our de novo review of the record we find the following facts. Respondent initiated probate proceedings as attorney for the estate of Callie Ann Robinson (the deceased). While the probate matter was pending, Respondent filed a related Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED) action to evict Barbara J. Brown (Brown) and Basil Mack because they refused to vacate a house owned by the deceased. Brown defended her possession of the house by contending she inherited it from the deceased. She presented an affidavit allegedly signed by the deceased and asserted that it was the deceased's last Will wherein Brown inherited the deceased's entire estate. Judge James B. Croy, who was presiding over the FED matter, declined to rule on the validity of the affidavit as a Will and instead instructed Respondent to seek a ruling from Judge Carol Ann Hubbard, who was presiding over the related probate matter. Respondent hired a certified handwriting examiner to review the signature on the affidavit and the signatures on additional documents that she suspected Brown had forged (including numerous bank checks, a will, a joint tenancy deed, at least five credit card applications, gas and electric utility applications, an insurance policy and direct deposit applications for the deceased's social security and pension checks). ¶4 In anticipation of Judge Hubbard's ruling, Respondent prepared an order and made several copies of it, as is common practice in Oklahoma County District Court. The order consisted of one page and two lines on the second page followed by signature blocks. It included language finding that the signature on the affidavit was forged as well as language that the affidavit did not satisfy the execution requirements for a valid Will. ¶5 After notice to all parties, Judge Hubbard reviewed the affidavit in chambers in Respondent's presence and determined the affidavit did not satisfy the execution requirements for a valid Will. Because this determination was sufficient to resolve the issue, Judge Hubbard did not reach the question of forgery. She struck through the language of the order that concerned forgery, wrote her initials on the changes and signed the order. Judge Hubbard told Respondent that she should have known the affidavit was not a valid Will, that she wasted estate funds by hiring a document examiner, and that she, Judge Hubbard, would not allow such conduct. Immediately thereafter, Respondent took the original order and the previously made copies to the Court Clerk's office for filing and asked the clerk to certify the copies. Neither Respondent nor the clerk conformed the copies to the original order. ¶6 Approximately five months later, Respondent applied for fees and costs in the FED matter. She stated in the application that she had rendered "extraordinary services" and detailed those services as follows: that she has had to make five court appearances relating to the removal of [Barbara Brown and Basil Mack] from the home; that defendant Mack defaulted; that defendant Brown presented as evidence a forged document entitled Affidavit of Callie A. Robinson in an attempt to persuade this court that Brown was entitled to the entire Robinson estate and was therefore entitled to remain in the Robinson home; that this matter was held in abeyance until this attorney filed the questioned Affidavit with the probate court for the purpose of having it interpreted as to its authenticity and validity; that she had to employ a professional document examiner to have the questioned document examined; that said professional expert charges $500.00; that but for defendant Brown said extraordinary costs and fees would not have been necessary. Respondent attached two exhibits in support of the application. The first exhibit was an itemized statement showing $2,175 in fees (which included $150 for one hour spent with the document examiner) and $631.88 in costs (which included $500 for the document examiner's fee). The second exhibit was one of the non-conformed copies of the order Judge Hubbard had entered in the probate matter. About three weeks later, Judge Croy ruled on Respondent's application. Judge Croy did not award the requested $500 for the document examiner. Of the requested $631.88 in costs, he awarded zero. It is not clear whether he awarded $150 for the time Respondent spent with the document examiner. Of the requested $2,175 in fees, he awarded $1,320. ¶7 On November 6, 2000, approximately eight months after Respondent had applied for fees in the FED matter, she filed her third interim application for fees in the probate matter. ¶8 One month later, on February 11, 2001, the OBA General Counsel wrote his first letter to Respondent. The letter said: Pursuant to [RGDP Rule 5.1], I am opening an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations that you filed a certified copy of an Order with an Application before another judge when the Order was not the Order that was filed in the previous case. Enclosed is a copy of the document that constitutes the basis of this grievance. This instrument, in my opinion, may indicate that you may have committed actions that would constitute a violation of the [ORPC], which is the standard of conduct for all attorneys in the State of Oklahoma. Under the above-cited Rules, this matter will be presented to the Professional Responsibility Commission, along with any response you make in this matter, and the results of our independent investigation. The Commission will then decided what action, if any, to take in this matter. Our investigation will address, but is not limited to, alleged violation of [ORPC Rule 1.3]. According to [RGDP Rule 5.2], you are required to file a written response to this grievance within twenty (20) days from the date of this letter. A copy of your response will be furnished to the complainant, if appropriate. No particular form is prescribed for responding to the grievance. Please include copies of any documents you have or statements of others that are relevant to the grievance so that this matter may be promptly concluded. If you need additional time to respond, have questions regarding the procedure, or simply wish to talk to an attorney about your grievance, please contact our office. If you choose to respond to us by facsimile, we request that you also timely send your original letter to us. (emphasis in original). Respondent and General Counsel exchanged several letters during the next thirty days. III. COUNT I ¶9 In Count I the OBA alleges Respondent violated ORPC Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(4), 8.4(a) and 8.4(c), and RGDP Rule 1.3. ¶10 The resolution of Count I depends on whether Respondent's conduct was done knowingly. The PRT found that Respondent's conduct constituted a knowing false statement of fact to a tribunal because one could interpret Respondent's act as an effort to recover the handwriting examiner's fee as a cost in the FED matter. The PRT also concluded that "regardless of whether [Respondent] intended to deceive Judge Croy," her mere act of attaching the non-conformed order constituted a violation of Rule 3.3(a), citing State ex rel. OBA v. Johnston, ¶11 Johnston does not go as far as the PRT suggests. Although Johnston does say a "false statement to a tribunal . . . requires no proof of bad or evil intent, nor must it be material," id. at 1143, it does not do away with ORPC Rule 3.3(a)'s requirement that the alleged act be done knowingly. In fact, the case cited by Johnston makes this clear. The cited case, OBA v. McMillian, ¶12 For purposes of ORPC Rule 3.3(a), knowingly means "actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." 5 O.S.2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A (Terminology). Thus, to prevail on Count I of its Complaint in this matter, the OBA must prove more than the fact that Respondent physically "attached" (i.e., stapled) a copy of the non-conformed order to her fee application. Rather, the OBA must prove Respondent had actual knowledge she was making a false statement of fact to Judge Croy, i.e., that the order she attached to her fee application was a non-conformed copy of the original. ¶13 Despite the PRT's conclusion that Respondent violated ORPC Rule 3.3(a), it acknowledged in its Report: "It is not certain whether [Respondent's] use of the erroneous order in her fee application was intentional or an oversight." In other words, the panel itself questioned whether the Respondent's conduct was done with actual knowledge. Our de novo review of the evidence leads us to the same question. At the hearing, Respondent testified that she did not realize the copy of the order she attached to her fee application was non-conformed until Judge Hubbard pointed it out to her. While there is evidence in the record from which one could infer Respondent's conduct was knowingly done, we find that such evidence does not rise to the clear and convincing level required in a bar discipline proceeding. Accordingly, we find that the OBA failed to prove Respondent violated ORPC Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(4), 8.4(a), and RGDP Rule 1.3 and we exonerate Respondent on Count I. IV. COUNT II ¶14 In Count II the OBA alleges Respondent violated ORPC Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(a), and RGDP Rules 1.3 and 5.2. Letter dated 2/12/02, from Respondent to General Counsel Letter dated 3/05/02, from Respondent to General Counsel You state no one is accusing me of anything and then set forth violations of [RGDP Rule 1.3], to which you now add rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4) and rule 8.4(c). Your last correspondence was dated March 1st, but I did not receive it until today. Obviously I will not be able to comply with the response date of March 11th. And why are you setting such short response dates? Additionally, the issues set forth in all my correspondence do not appear to be satisfactorily resolved. Therefore, I request a reasonable amount of additional time. I do not want to engage in a power struggle with you. I just want full disclosure. Letter dated 3/11/02, from Respondent to General Counsel As a basis for grievance against me you sent me a packet of pleadings from one of my cases. You did not come by this information on your own. You are evasive and are apparently covering up for someone for whom you deny showing favoritism. This in my opinion is unconscionable, and I question the ethics of it, as well as the constitutionality of it. I think you are stretching the rules in your favor while tightening the screws on me each time I respond. The rules call for an initial response time of 20 days from the date of receipt of the grievance, but you mandated 20 days from the date of the letter. Time extensions are discretionary under the rules, but you allowed one 10 day extension with a direction to meet that deadline. I can only assume that means you will proceed to saddle me with another grievance. And I wonder why time is of the essence here. I am concerned that this grievance may be an attempt to gain tactical advantage of me in another case. But I do not know because you refuse to disclose information when there is no logical reasons to withhold it, and in my opinion, in this matter, this is a stretch of the "Rules", and unconstitutional. I have responded several times to your grievance letter. And I have raised issues to which you have not responded. As to the accusation pertaining to the certified copies of Orders, I do not know the answer. Perhaps the court clerk made a mistake which is not uncommon. I await your response as to the identify of the person responsible for supplying you with the pleadings. ¶15 At first glance, the resolution of Count II seems to call for a review of these letters to determine if they provide a full and fair disclosure of the facts pertaining to Respondent's alleged misconduct. Under the unusual facts of this case, however, we will first determine what is required of the General Counsel under RGDP Rules 5.1 and 5.2. ¶16 RGDP Rule 5.1(a) authorizes allegations of misconduct to be brought to General Counsel's attention either in a "written, signed grievance" or "in any [other] manner whatsoever." Under either circumstance, General Counsel then conducts a preliminary investigation to determine if further action is warranted. ¶17 RGDP Rule 5.2 sets out the procedure when General Counsel determines further action is warranted. The procedure varies depending on whether the allegation of misconduct came to the General Counsel in a written, signed grievance or in some other manner. If the allegations came in a written, signed grievance, General Counsel must file and serve a copy of "the grievance" upon the lawyer. The copy of the grievance will, of course, reveal not only the basis for the alleged misconduct but also the identity of the person who submitted the grievance. If the allegations came in some other manner, General Counsel must file and serve a "recital of relevant facts or allegations" upon the lawyer. RGDP Rule 5.2 does not specify whether this recital must include the identity of the person who made the allegations. ¶18 Although RGDP Rule 5.2 does not specify the contents of the recital, we conclude that the identity of the person who made the allegations of misconduct is a relevant fact that the General Counsel must include in the recital to the accused lawyer under Rule 5.2. In our view, the identity of the complaining person in an attorney discipline matter is a relevant fact because it may help shape the lawyer's response. In addition, we can discern no reason why a lawyer whose conduct has been reported to General Counsel in an informal way should be treated differently in this regard than a lawyer whose conduct has been reported by way of a written, signed grievance. ¶19 Having concluded that the recital provided by General Counsel must include the identity of the complaining person, we apply this conclusion to the facts of this case. The record reveals that despite Respondent's repeated requests for the identity of the complaining person, General Counsel never revealed this information to her, either in his initial recital, in his subsequent letters, or in his deposition of Respondent. Without this information, Respondent did not have all the "relevant facts or allegations" at her disposal. ¶20 This is not a case in which Respondent wholly failed to respond to the General Counsel's notification that her conduct was being investigated. Rather, her February 12, March 5 and March 11, 2002, letters were attempts to secure relevant information necessary to fully respond. Because Respondent maintained communication with General Counsel and requested information to which she is entitled, we conclude the OBA failed to prove Respondent violated ORPC Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(a), and RGDP Rules 1.3 and 5.2. V. CONCLUSION ¶21 We exonerate Respondent on Count I because the OBA failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made a false statement of fact or knowingly offered evidence that she knew to be false to a tribunal. We also exonerate Respondent on Count II. Since General Counsel never revealed to Respondent the identity of the person who made the informal report of misconduct, and since he has a duty to reveal that information, Respondent's February 12, March 5 and March 11, 2002, letters to General Counsel did not violate RGDP Rule 5.2. Finally, because we exonerate Respondent on both Counts, we deny the OBA's application for costs. RESPONDENT EXONERATED; OBA'S APPLICATION FOR COSTS DENIED. Watt, C.J., Hodges, Lavender, Hargrave, Kauger, Boudreau and Edmondson, JJ., concur. Opala, V.C.J and Winchester, J., dissent. 2004 OK 28 APPENDIX Letter dated 2/11/02, from General Counsel to Respondent Enclosed is a copy of the document that constitutes the basis of this grievance. This instrument, in my opinion, may indicate that you may have committed actions that would constitute a violation of the [ORPC], which is the standard of conduct for all attorneys in the State of Oklahoma. Under the above-cited Rules, this matter will be presented to the Professional Responsibility Commission, along with any response you make in this matter, and the results of our independent investigation. The Commission will then decided what action, if any, to take in this matter. Our investigation will address, but is not limited to, alleged violation of [ORPC Rule 1.3]. According to [RGDP Rule 5.2], you are required to file a written response to this grievance within twenty (20) days from the date of this letter. A copy of your response will be furnished to the complainant, if appropriate. No particular form is prescribed for responding to the grievance. Please include copies of any documents you have or statements of others that are relevant to the grievance so that this matter may be promptly concluded. If you need additional time to respond, have questions regarding the procedure, or simply wish to talk to an attorney about your grievance, please contact our office. If you choose to respond to us by facsimile, we request that you also timely send your original letter to us. Letter dated 2/12/02, from Respondent to General Counsel Please inform me of who is responsible for this complaint, who brought this matter to your attention, who is behind this, who is the complainant? Letter dated 2/l9/02, from General Counsel to Respondent [RGDP Rule 5.1] provides that the General Counsel or the Professional Responsibility Commission of the [OBA] may institute an investigation based on information brought to their attention in any manner whatsoever. The above-referenced grievance was opened based on information brought to my attention. No other information will be provided. You are again requested to respond to the grievance as directed by my letter dated February 11, 2002. Letter dated 2/28/02, from Respondent to General Counsel 1. I am not able to find anywhere in the rules where it is said the complainant may be kept secret. And it is my understanding the Constitution does not permit this. Where is it written that I have no right to know who my accuser is? As I read [RGDP Rule 5.1], which you cite, it provides that you may conduct an investigation based upon facts and allegations brought to you in any manner, meaning they do not have to be given to you in writing. But where is the rule or law that provides that my accuser can remain concealed? 2. Your February 11th letter states a copy of my response will be furnished to the complainant. But your position is that I cannot know who that complainant is. At the same time you are demanding full disclosure from me. Where is the fairness here? I can not reasonably respond until I know what this is really about, and who is doing this. 3. I am not clear what Rule of Professional Conduct you are accusing me of violating. Is it Rule 1.3, Diligence? 4. Therefore, I respectfully request sufficient additional time to respond until these issues are satisfactorily resolved. Letter dated 3/1/02, from General Counsel to Respondent 1. No one is accusing you of anything. I am investigating a matter pursuant to the [RGDP]. You may consider me the complainant. 2. I am the complainant. Please review the first paragraph of my letter dated February 11, 2002 to know what this is all about. 3. The possible rule violation is [RGDP Rule 1.3]. However, after further review, I am also directing your attention to Rules 3.3(a)(1) and (4) and 8.4(c). Copies of those rules are enclosed. These matters are satisfactorily resolved. I will expect your response by March 11, 2002. Letter dated 3/05/02, from Respondent to General Counsel You state no one is accusing me of anything and then set forth violations of [RGDP Rule 1.3], to which you now add rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4) and rule 8.4(c). Your last correspondence was dated March 1st, but I did not receive it until today. Obviously I will not be able to comply with the response date of March 11th. And why are you setting such short response dates? Additionally, the issues set forth in all my correspondence do not appear to be satisfactorily resolved. Therefore, I request a reasonable amount of additional time. I do not want to engage in a power struggle with you. I just want full disclosure. Letter dated 3/06/02, from Tony Blasier, Investigator, to Respondent No one is being shown favoritism. The General Counsel's office and Mr. Murdock have acted in accordance with the [RGDP]. You have been supplied a copy of the documents which formed the basis of the grievance, a list of the rules that may have been violated, and our written notification of your obligation to respond. If we didn't insist that you timely respond to the grievance as required by the [RGDP] then this office would be showing you favoritism. In regards to you allegation that we are setting short response dates, that is not the case. The [RGDP] requires your response within twenty days of the date you receive a copy of the grievance. You requested an extension and one was granted. Our initial letter, advising you of the grievance, was mailed on February 11, 2002. You received that letter on February 12, 2002. Twenty days from February 12 would have made your response due by no later than March 4, 2002. By letter dated February 28, 2002, you requested an extension of time and on March 1, 2002, you were mailed a letter notifying you that your response time had been extended to March 11, 2002. In summary, you have been provided with everything the [RGDP] requires. You are again directed to submit a response which complies with [RGDP Rule 5.2] on or before March 11, 2002. Letter dated 3/11/02, from Respondent to General Counsel As a basis for grievance against me you sent me a packet of pleadings from one of my cases. You did not come by this information on your own. You are evasive and are apparently covering up for someone for whom you deny showing favoritism. This in my opinion is unconscionable, and I question the ethics of it, as well as the constitutionality of it. I think you are stretching the rules in your favor while tightening the screws on me each time I respond. The rules call for an initial response time of 20 days from the date of receipt of the grievance, but you mandated 20 days from the date of the letter. Time extensions are discretionary under the rules, but you allowed one 10 day extension with a direction to meet that deadline. I can only assume that means you will proceed to saddle me with another grievance. And I wonder why time is of the essence here. I am concerned that this grievance may be an attempt to gain tactical advantage of me in another case. But I do not know because you refuse to disclose information when there is no logical reasons to withhold it, and in my opinion, in this matter, this is a stretch of the "Rules", and unconstitutional. I have responded several times to your grievance letter. And I have raised issues to which you have not responded. As to the accusation pertaining to the certified copies of Orders, I do not know the answer. Perhaps the court clerk made a mistake which is not uncommon. I await your response as to the identify of the person responsible for supplying you with the pleadings. Subpoena issued 3/14/02. Letter dated 3/18/02. Deposition taken 3/27/02. FOOT