Title: Martin v. State
Citation: 547 S.W.2d 81
Docket Number: CR 76-201
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 1977

547 S.W.2d 81 (1977) Franklin D. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 76-201. Supreme Court of Arkansas. February 22, 1977. Rehearing Denied March 28, 1977. *82 Harold L. Hall, Public Defender, by Robert W. Govar, Deputy Public Defender, Little Rock, for appellant. Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by Frederic L. Frawley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. ROY, Justice. Appellant Franklin D. Martin was convicted of first degree battery in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1601(1)(c) (Criminal Code 1976), the illegal act being that of shooting a person in the face with a .38 caliber revolver. The sentence imposed was ten years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The pertinent statute defines first degree battery as follows: On appeal appellant contends that § 41-1601 (1)(c), on its face and as applied to him, is unconstitutionally vague, and also defective because the culpable mental state necessary to warrant a conviction is not set out therein. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-204(2) (Criminal Code 1976) provides in pertinent part: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-203(1) (Criminal Code 1976) defines "purposely" and, in accordance with the provisions of the statute, the court gave the following instruction to which appellant objected: In the commentary to § 41-1603 (Criminal Code 1976) it is stated: A criminal statute must give fair warning of the proscribed conduct. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S. Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954), the Court stated: In Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976), this Court applied the standard of specificity as defined in U. S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 1538, 91 L. Ed. 1877 (1947): We find appellant's objection without merit since Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-204(2) (Criminal Code 1976) clearly provides a culpable mental state must be proved. The court in its instruction imposed the highest burden upon the State, requiring the State to prove the conduct of appellant was done purposely instead of knowingly recklessly. *83 Appellant admits in his brief that the extent of harm to the victim is adequately defined in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-115(19) (Criminal Code 1976) as follows: Appellant argues that the statutory phrase "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" does not provide sufficient notice to the accused or the jury of the acts or conduct prohibited by the statute. We do not agree as we find sufficient notice in the words of the statute to indicate the type of conduct proscribed. In United States v. Harriss, supra, it was stated: In State v. Weston, 255 Ark. 567, 501 S.W.2d 622 (1973), we pointed out why it is desirable to use general language in defining libel rather than a precise and inflexible definition. Almost the same argument made by appellant here was made in Harmon v. State, supra. In Harmon appellant argued that the provisions of the statute were patently vague and overbroad and that inadequate guidelines were given to the accused and to the jury. In that case the Court stated: In the case at bar the phrase "circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" indicates that the attendant circumstances themselves must be such as to demonstrate the culpable mental state of the accused. The language of the Arkansas statute does not require reasonable men to speculate as to its common understanding or application. In People, by Russel v. District Court for Fourth J. D., 185 Colo., 78, 521 P.2d 1254 (1974), the court had before it inter alia a first degree murder statute using the words "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." The statute was challenged as being unconstitutional "on the grounds that it was facially void for vagueness ..." and the court applying the test of whether men of common intelligence apprehend the statute's meaning found the statute valid. We have reached the same conclusion in regard to the Arkansas statute. Affirmed. FOGLEMAN, J., concurs. BYRD and HICKMAN, JJ., dissent. FOGLEMAN, Justice, concurring. I concur in the majority opinion, but because of the dissents, I feel compelled to state my concurrence in this separate opinion. I will first address the fallacy in the conclusion of Mr. Justice Byrd that the Arkansas Criminal Code section under which appellant was charged, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1601(1)(c) (Crim.Code, 1976), when considered with the general section defining culpable mental state, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-203 (Crim.Code, 1976) results in a requirement that one have a conscious object to cause serious physical injury to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life in order to be guilty of battery in the first degree. First, I would point out that Justice Byrd's recitation of the definition of culpable mental state is incomplete. It omits the definitions of three of the four kinds of the *84 required mental state. Two of the three kinds he omitted to mention are: The seriousness of this omission is apparent when we proceed to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-204(2) and (3) (Crim.Code, 1976), which provides: A reading of these pertinent subsections of the Criminal Code clearly shows the error in the conclusion that a conscious object to cause a result is a necessary requisite to establish the offense. Reference to portions of the commentary to the pertinent sections leaves absolutely no room for doubt about the matter. This Commentary was before the General Assembly when the Code was adopted. The Commentary on Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-203 includes the following: Turning to the Commentary on § 41-204, I find: Moving now to the Commentary following Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1603 (Crim.Code, 1976), which also specifically relates to §§ 41-1601, 1602, I would here emphasize a portion of the Commentary quoted by Justice Roy, to wit: "Each subsection describes conduct that would produce murder liability, if death resulted." [Emphasis mine.] Clearly, the subsection in question is violated if there is a conscious object to engage in conduct[1] of the nature prohibited, even if the person charged has no conscious object to cause serious physical injury to another person. But the statute would also be violated if the conduct was engaged in "knowingly" or "recklessly" as defined by Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-203. The statutory definitions require more than simple negligence or recklessness. There must be a "conscious" or "gross" recklessness or a "gross" negligence. This is in keeping with preexisting law that there must be culpable negligence before there can be a crime. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-116 (Repl.1964) provided that acts committed by misfortune or accident should not be deemed as criminal when it appeared that there was no evil design, intention or culpable negligence. See also, Ray v. State, 251 Ark. 508, 473 S.W.2d 161; Benson v. State, 212 Ark. 905, 208 S.W.2d 767; Phillips v. State, 204 Ark. 205, 161 S.W.2d 747. Cf. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2209 (Repl.1964). The hypothetical bugbear erected by my brother Byrd is actually an illusion. Only looking at the Criminal Code with "shaft vision" could create it. This is not to say that a prison guard who acted with grossly reckless indifference to the value of human life could not and should not be prosecuted. Still, the likelihood that a law enforcement officer, jailer or guard who properly used, or reasonably thought he properly used, a weapon in discharge of his duties will go to prison for doing so is no greater than the probability that an innocent person will be imprisoned for any crime. There is no more likelihood that he would go to prison for this action than for involuntary manslaughter or assault with a deadly weapon under pre-Code law. See Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 41-2209 (Repl.1964), 41-605 (Repl.1964). Of course, the legislature did not intend to create the monster envisioned by my brother Byrd, and did not do so. The difference between the escaping prisoner and the "machine-gunning guard" is distinctly recognized in the Code. Here again, I point out that battery in the first degree requires a wanton or purposeful mental state. See Commentary, § 41-1601. I also call attention to the fact *86 that one does not commit an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state with respect to every element of the offense. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-202(2) (Crim.Code, 1976). The provisions on justification afford a real protection to the hypothetical "machine-gunning guard." Justification is, of course, a defense to any offense charged. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-502 (Crim.Code, 1976). This has the effect of requiring the prosecution to negate the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, once evidence tending to support it has been adduced either by the state or defense. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-110(3) (Crim.Code, 1976). Conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when it is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise or performance of his official powers, duties or functions. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-503(1) (Crim.Code 1976). The hypothetical "machine-gunning guard" would certainly be a public servant. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-115(16) (Crim.Code, 1976). A law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person when he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person whom he reasonably believes has committed or attempted to commit a felony. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-510(2)(a) (Crim.Code, 1976). A law enforcement officer, or a guard employed in a correctional facility, is justified in using deadly physical force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner from a correctional facility, unless the law enforcement officer or guard knows or reasonably should know that the prisoner is charged with or has been convicted of only a misdemeanor, in which case only non-deadly physical force may be used. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-513 (Crim.Code, 1976). This section provides special protection to persons under a duty to prevent the escape of inmates from correctional facilities. Although the entire spirit of the Code in this situation is expressed in its words, it is summarized in the words of the Commentary on the section last cited in this language. Furthermore, it is a defense to a prosecution that the actor engaged in the conduct, charged to constitute the offense, under a mistaken belief of fact, if his mistaken belief of fact establishes a defense of justification. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-206 (Crim.Code, 1976). This section is intended to codify what was believed to be the prevailing view as to the relevance of mistake of fact. See Commentary on § 41-206, where I find the following: Of course, the Code provides that there is no justification if the belief that the use of force is necessary is arrived at recklessly or negligently or the force is excessive. Ark. Stat.Ann. § 41-514(1) (Crim.Code, 1976). Such a belief is not a reasonable belief. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-115(18) (Crim.Code, 1976). The stance adopted in the Commentary on § 41-514 is stated even more clearly than elsewhere in the Commentary to the Code. It is stated thus: The "machine-gunning guard" is protected under the Code as fully as he is under existing law. He gets no more protection than he should. Turning now to my brother Hickman's conclusion that the phrase "[under] circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" is obviously so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence could not conceive of the criminal conduct proscribed, and thus it is unconstitutional. I would point out that we have not heretofore experienced great difficulty with equally broad terms in our criminal statutes. The concept is widely used and only the words are new. Our capital felony murder statute contains these very words. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1501 (Crim.Code, 1976). There the Commentary is enlightening. I find: The identical words also appear in Ark.Stat. Ann. § 41-1502 (Crim.Code, 1976) defining non-capital felony murder as first degree murder, to which the following Commentary is added: The precise words again appear in the definition of murder in the second degree. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1503 (Crim.Code, 1976). The Commentary clearly points out that the language is more definite than language used to define the crime in pre-Code statutes, viz: I submit that this language is as definite and certain as other phrases and clauses with which we have experienced no such difficulty as that Mr. Justice Hickman finds in the use of new words to express old thoughts. For example: To require more explicit language in the statute in question would virtually require the impossible. BYRD, Justice, dissenting. What the majority does not explain is what is meant by "culpable mental state." The Criminal Code provides the answer in § 41-203 (1976) as follows: When the foregoing definition of a culpable mental state is added to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1601(1)(c) (Criminal Code 1976) the statute then reads as follows: That the foregoing does not give the citizenry of this state fair notice of the type of conduct forbidden can be demonstrated by a prisoner who steals an automobile to effectuate his escape. Suppose that the prisoner after stealing the automobile runs *90 over the gate guard and that the prisoner is then shot by the tower guard who is manning a .30 caliber machine gun. The term "serious physical injury" is defined by the New Criminal Code as a "physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death," Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-115(19). As far as the substantial risk of death is concerned, the conduct and conscious object of both the escaping prisoner and the machine gunning guard would create "a serious physical injury." The only other phrase left is "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." I submit that the majority opinion does not give an explanation of why the conduct of both the escaping prisoner and the machine gunning guard would not fall within the category of "manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Obviously, I have used an extreme example to demonstrate how vague and indefinite the phrase "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" is when applied to law enforcement officers. However, since the foregoing statute is broad enough and vague enough to send to prison any law enforcement officer, jailer or guard who uses a gun in the discharge of his duties, I cannot believe that the legislature intended to create such a monster. Therefore, since the statute creates an overly broad definition which fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is forbidden, it looks to me that the statute should be declared unconstitutional, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S. Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954). Those who refer to my position as "fallacy" "hypothetical bugbear" and as being "shaft vision" do a better job than I of showing that the statute under consideration was intended to be as broad as "Mother Hubbard's dress." Otherwise there would be no need for supplying defenses to certain classes of persons termed "JUSTIFICATION," Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 41-501-41-514 (Crim.Code 1976). See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-110 (Crim.Code 1976) which provides: See also Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-502 (Crim. Code 1976) which provides: The record shows that appellant was a Pulaski County Deputy Sheriff at the time of the events giving rise to this prosecution. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. HICKMAN, Justice, dissenting. Franklin D. Martin was convicted of first degree battery in violation of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1601(c) (Supp.1975). This section is part of the Arkansas Criminal Code which was adopted effective January 1, 1976, and the appropriate parts of the statute are: The appellant raises the issue that this statute is unconstitutional because it is vague and does not provide a person sufficient notice of the prohibited act. It is a principle of law that a criminal statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the forbidden conduct. U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S. Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954). The phrase "circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" is not defined in the new criminal code. The language is obviously vague and it is difficult to believe that a person of ordinary intelligence could readily conceive of the criminal conduct described. It may be that attorneys, judges and legal scholars have no doubts as to the meaning of each and every word, but that is not the test. The legal arguments of the majority opinion and the concurring opinion are evidence enough of the utter futility these words will cause anyone, attempting to justify their "clear and simple" meaning. I find that the phrase can have no real meaning by which a juror or an individual accused of such conduct could really understand what it means. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority and would find that the statute in question is void as unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. I would reverse the decision of the lower court and dismiss the case. [1] Conduct under the Code means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-201 (Crim.Code, 1976). [2] Our adopted definition of "with malice aforethought" is no more definite than the language under examination here. In Gordon v. State, 125 Ark. 111, 187 S.W. 913, Ann.Cas. 1918A 419, we quoted it, viz: "The phrase `malice aforethought' was properly defined as the voluntary and intentional doing of an unlawful act, with the purpose, means, and ability to accomplish the reasonable and probable consequence of it * * * by one of sound mind and discretion, the evidence of which is inferred from acts committed or words spoken.'"