Title: Matter of Evrard
Citation: 333 N.E.2d 765
Docket Number: 1172S154
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: September 5, 1975

333 N.E.2d 765 (1975)
In the matter of David E. Evrard, Judge of Perry Circuit Court.
No. 1172S154.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
August 22, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion September 5, 1975.
*766 John G. Bunner, Evansville, for respondent.
David V. Miller, Sp. Prosecutor, Evansville, for petitioners.
DeBRULER, Justice.
This original action was presented to this Court by a Petition for Removal of the respondent Judge of the Perry Circuit Court. This Court assumed jurisdiction of the case under authority vested in this Court by Art. 7, of the Indiana Constitution. Following our acceptance of the case, respondent challenged our jurisdiction. In In re Evrard (1974), Ind., 317 N.E.2d 841, this Court rejected that challenge and appointed a judge pro tempore of the Perry Circuit Court to serve until final resolution of the case. The Court also appointed a successor hearing officer and a special prosecutor to serve in the case. On January 30, 1975, respondent filed a response to the Petition for Removal.
The successor hearing officer, the Honorable Saul I. Rabb, conducted a hearing upon the petition and filed his special Findings of Fact with us on March 7, 1975. Respondent addressed several motions to this Court, which we deem unnecessary to rule upon in light of the decision we make today.
The Petition for Removal is based in part upon alleged violations of the election laws, occurring in the season of the 1970 Primary Election at which respondent was a candidate. The first charge is that respondent filed a declaration of candidacy for the office of Judge of the Perry Circuit Court with the Clerk of the Perry Circuit Court on March 7, 1970, and with the Secretary of State on March 16, 1970, in which he knowingly made the false statement that he was a qualified voter and resident of Perry County, Indiana, in violation of I.C. 1971, X-X-XX-XX, being Burns § 29-5948.[1]
*767 The second charge is that respondent unlawfully voted, and aided and abetted his wife in unlawfully voting, in the Primary Election on May 5, 1970, in that at the time of the Primary Election respondent and his wife were legal residents of the State of Virginia, in violation of I.C. 1971, X-X-XX-XX, being Burns § 29-5910,[2] and I.C. 1971, XX-X-XX-X, being Burns § 9-102.[3]
The third charge is that on May 5, 1970, respondent passed from, and aided his wife in passing from, the State of Virginia into the State of Indiana, and voted in the May 5th Election, while neither was a bona fide resident of the voting precinct, in violation of I.C. 1971, X-X-XX-XX, being Burns § 29-5913.[4]
The fourth charge is that respondent conspired with his father, Fred J. Evrard, for the purposes of committing the three offenses enumerated above, in violation of I.C. 1971, XX-X-XXX-X, being Burns § 10-1101.[5]
The substance of petitioners' case is that respondent had no legal residence in Perry County at the time he filed his sworn declaration of candidacy, and that neither respondent nor his wife had legal residences in that county at the time they voted on May 5, 1970. It was petitioners' belief that at said times, both were residents of the State of Virginia. It is a fact that both respondent and his wife registered to vote on March 7, 1970, in Perry County, and it therefore follows that both were registered to vote on the date respondent filed his declaration and on the date both voted in the Primary. There is no allegation made in this case that respondent did establish a legal residence in Perry County prior to the Primary, but that such residence was insufficient in duration to qualify as a legal residence for candidacy and voting purposes. Rather, petitioners contend that no residence at all was established by respondent and his wife prior to the Primary Election. We accept this posture of the case and do not consider the requirements of the law, if any there be, that pre-primary residence be of any particular duration. If respondent and his wife had a bona fide residence at the date of filing the declaration and voting, then those acts would not be unlawful. If, on the other hand, respondent and his wife did not have a bona fide residence on those dates, his acts would have involved false statements, and the existence of such statements would give considerable support to petitioners' contention that this Court should subject respondent to disciplinary action. Upon these assumptions, we proceed to consider this case.
In Pedigo v. Grimes (1887), 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700, this Court considered the legal requirements for establishing a voting residence. The law requires that *768 the person definitely intend to make a particular place his permanent residence and act upon that intention in good faith. The person must show to the court evidence of acts undertaken in furtherance of the requisite intent, which make that intent manifest and believable. Whether or not a person meets the residency requirement for voting is a contextual determination to be made by a court upon a consideration of the individual facts of any case. While one is probably limited to having a single residence for voting purposes at any given time, the fact that he has more than one "residence," or place of abode, in which he has substantial investment, social commitment, and interest, and which is useful for any number of purposes, is only one relevant fact among many others to be considered by a court. Brownlee v. Duguid (1931), 93 Ind. App. 266, 178 N.E. 174. Conduct such as the abandonment of a prior residence and contemporary statements of intention to establish a new principal residence are to be considered also. Brittenham v. Robinson et al. (1897), 18 Ind. App. 502, 48 N.E. 616.
In the late Fall of 1969, the then incumbent Judge of the Perry Circuit Court announced his intention to resign his judgeship effective January 1, 1970. During Thanksgiving and Christmas visits to Tell City, respondent was asked to run for the judgeship at the next General Election. He discussed this matter with friends and Democratic Party officials and, early in January, 1970, decided to run for the office. He immediately discussed the purchase of a house in Tell City with a realtor and asked the realtor to look for a house for him to buy. On February 10, 1970, respondent publicly announced his candidacy for the office of Judge and his intention to return permanently to Perry County. Both respondent and his wife registered to vote in Perry County on March 7, 1970, claiming 914 Eleventh Street, Tell City, as their residence. On March 11, 1970, respondent signed the declaration of candidacy under oath, and, on March 16, 1970, he filed it with the Secretary of State of Indiana.
Respondent and his wife returned periodically to Tell City during the months of January, February, March and May, 1970. In April, respondent obtained an estimate of the cost of moving his furniture to Tell City. In that same month, he resigned as patent attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, but was offered and assumed a contractual relation with that Department from April, 1970 to July, 1970, for the purpose of winding up his work.
At an earlier time, in the year 1965, respondent had purchased an airplane and his visits to Tell City had become more frequent. This airplane and a newer airplane which was purchased in 1967, had been registered with the FAA giving the address of the respondent at Tell City. From 1954, when he graduated from Purdue, through July, 1970, at which time he completed his move to Perry County, respondent was absent from the State of Indiana by reason of his military service and his employment with the U.S. Government. Respondent and his wife traveled from Virginia to Tell City on May 3, 1970, and voted on May 5th.
Most of the foregoing facts tend to support the formation of an intent to establish a residence in Tell City at the times relevant here, coupled with acts in furtherance thereof. The respondent made several public statements and commitments to run for office, which clearly were an expression of an intent to establish a residence in Tell City at the home of his parents. These statements did not stand alone. He took overt steps to sever his connections in Virginia and Washington, D.C., and to move to Tell City. On the other hand, the evidence also established that respondent owned a house in Virginia and that his new wife's children were in school there and that the cars and driver's licenses of both respondent and his wife reflected their residence in Virginia, even *769 up to the time of the Primary Election. We believe, however, that respondent's position was that he had substantial commitments and responsibilities in Virginia and Washington, D.C., as a lawyer, step-father, husband, homeowner, pilot and driver at the time he decided to become a candidate for Judge in Perry County and to establish a residence there. To require a person in respondent's position to have sold his house in Virginia and acquired one in Tell City, given up his employment abruptly and entirely, moved his wife's children from their school to Indiana, obtained an Indiana driver's license, and accomplished all such other odds and ends as would have severed completely all connections with Virginia and the Washington area, as a condition of establishing a residence in Indiana, would be unreasonable. No such absolute assurance of a voter's township and precinct residence is required to protect the integrity of the election process. Here the evidence shows without question that respondent formed the intent to establish a residence with his parents until he could sell his house in Virginia and buy another one in Perry County. The fact that the residence with his parents was intended to be for a limited period only is not decisive. Pedigo v. Grimes, supra. Both respondent and his wife were bodily present at that place periodically during the months of January, February, March and May. Both conducted themselves in Indiana and Virginia in a manner consistent with their expressed intent to move to Perry County. The steps which they took were sufficient to establish a residence at the home of his parents and to qualify them to register, declare candidacy, and vote in the Primary Election. No false statement is therefore shown to have been made in the declaration of candidacy or to be implied from the act of voting, as respondent had registered to vote and had established a residence at the home of his parents in Tell City.
Upon consideration of the charge that respondent aided and abetted his wife in violating the election laws in the manner described above, we find that the same legal test of residence should be applied to determining whether or not respondent's wife established a voting residence at the home of her husband's parents. It would appear to us that Margaret Evrard had the right to choose to adopt the voting residence of her husband. By reason of this voluntary choice and her marriage to respondent, she was entitled to claim the benefit of his connections with his parents' home. We therefore find that the evidence is insufficient to support any conclusion that respondent aided and abetted his wife in unlawfully violating the election law or conspired with his father to so violate the law.
The final part of the Petition for Removal is based upon the allegation that respondent unlawfully aided and abetted his wife, Margaret, in the commission of the felony of Bigamy, as defined in I.C. 1971, XX-X-XX-X, being Burns § 10-4204:
The facts relating to this charge show that on December 29, 1969, respondent married Margaret Buckler. At that time Margaret Buckler had a living husband from whom she was not divorced. She had been informed from some unspecified source that her husband had been killed or had died in Vietnam. After the marriage, she learned that her husband was in fact living. She thereupon secured a divorce from him, and she and respondent were remarried.
The hearing officer found that respondent had no knowledge at the time of his marriage that Margaret's husband was still living. He had been told by her that her husband was dead, and, according to the findings of fact, he believed that he was dead, although he did nothing to verify the information she had given him. Under *770 these facts, we cannot conclude that respondent acted unlawfully when he married Margaret on December 29, 1969.
The appointment of the judge pro tempore for the Perry Circuit Court is hereby ordered terminated, and David E. Evrard is hereby authorized and instructed to reassume the functions and duties as regular Judge of the Perry Circuit Court.
GIVAN, C.J., and PRENTICE, J., concur.
HUNTER, J., dissents with opinion to follow.
ARTERBURN, J., not participating.
HUNTER, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. The lengthy record in this matter, upon careful review in its entirety, sustains the charges against respondent. The facts disclosed in this dissent are set out verbatim from the record, so that the conclusions drawn herein may be compared with those drawn by the majority. This Court has been repeatedly harassed by outsiders since its appointment of a judge pro tempore in this matter last November. While such pressure is to be expected, it is no excuse for a less than complete review of the entire record, which, of course, takes a great deal of time and creates additional pressures until a decision is finally reached.
The responsibilities of this Court in maintaining and policing the judiciary deserve no less attention than we devote to civil and criminal appeals.
The first charge is that respondent filed a declaration of candidacy for the office of Judge of the Perry Circuit Court with the Clerk of the Perry Circuit Court on March 7, 1970, and with the Secretary of State on March 16, 1970, in violation of IC 1971, X-X-XX-XX, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-5948 (Burns 1969 Repl.), which provides in pertinent part:
The essence of the crime of filing a false declaration of candidacy is the false swearing and filing of any of the averments required by IC 1971, 3-1-9-5, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-3605 (Burns Code Ed.) [hereinafter declaration of candidacy statute], which provides:
An analysis of the declaration of candidacy statute shows that three material averments must be made by the candidate. First, the candidate must swear that he is a qualified voter. Secondly, he must swear to his residence. Finally, he must swear to his party membership. The allegations contained in the first charge relate to the first two averments; there is no question that respondent truly was a member of the Democratic Party.
To be a qualified voter, one must meet the age, citizenship and residency requirements of IC 1971, 3-1-7-26, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-3426 (Burns Code Ed. Supp. 1974), [hereinafter cited as voter qualification statute], which provides:
This statute must be read without the italicized language, for it has been declared unconstitutional. Affeldt v. Whitcomb (1970), D.C., 319 F. Supp. 69, aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1034, 92 S. Ct. 1304, 31 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1972).
Under the voter qualification statute, respondent met the citizenship and age requirements. Thus, respondent would be a qualified voter for purposes of the declaration of candidacy statute if he also met the residence requirement of the voter qualification statute.
"Residence" as that term is used in our voting laws means domicil. Perhaps unfortunately, the terms have been used interchangeably in Indiana case law. Thus, in Yonkey v. State ex rel. Cornelison (1866), 27 Ind. 236, 245-50, we find the following statement:
*773 Ordinarily, residence simply connotes the place where a person lives. In this sense, a person may have more than one residence; i.e., he may have a summer home in Indiana, and a winter home in Florida. As that term is employed in the voting laws, however, the mere fact that one has a residence in Indiana does not ipso facto mean that such person's domicil or legal home  his "residence"  is in Indiana so that he may exercise the right of franchise or become an office-seeker. Thus, it must be kept in mind that the term "resident" as it appears in our voting laws is a word of art, which represents the legal conclusion of domicil. The significance of such distinction is that while one may have several residences, he may have only one domicil. Restatement of Conflicts § 11 (1934). In the following discussion, I will use the terms "resident" and "residence," because those are the terms appearing in both the statutes and the case law; however, the precise legal issue is respondent's domicil.
In determining residence, there are constitutional, statutory and case law guidelines to be applied. I have no disagreement with the majority's restatement of Pedigo v. Grimes (1887), 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700, that residence is established when a "... person definitely intend[s] to make a particular place his permanent residence and act[s] upon that intention in good faith," although such restatement appears a little broad.
The portions of Pedigo from which the legal standard was gleaned states:
A similar formulation of residence may be found in Green v. Simon (1896), 17 Ind. App. 360, 367, 46 N.E. 693, 695:
See also, Brendel v. Kugler (1951), 122 Ind. App. 104, 101 N.E.2d 661; Brownlee v. Duguid (1931), 93 Ind. App. 266, 178 N.E. 174; Petty v. Petty (1908), 42 Ind. App. 443, 85 N.E. 995; Brittenham v. Robinson (1897), 18 Ind. App. 502, 48 N.E. 616.
And finally, in State ex rel. White v. Scott (1908), 171 Ind. 349, 358-59, 86 N.E. 409, 412-13, we find the following summary:
Moreover, a review of the above case law indicates a presumption which may be useful in determining one's residence. According to Green, supra:
See also, State ex rel. White v. Scott, supra; but see Vlandis v. Kline (1973), 412 U.S. 441, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 37 L. Ed. 2d 63.
The statutory guidelines are set forth in IC 1971, 3-1-21-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803 (Burns Code Ed.), which provides:
The constitutional provisions are Art. 2, §§ 3 and 4. Those provisions correspond with IC 1971, 3-1-21-3(8) and (10), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803(8), (10), (Burns Code Ed.), and so are not repeated here.
The hearing officer found, and the record supports, such finding that:
*776 Thus, respondent's domicil of origin was Tell City.
The next significant finding is:
Under that portion of IC 1971, 3-1-21-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803 (Burns Code Ed.), supra, which provides, "No person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in the state by reason of his absence ... on business ... of the United States," respondent's domicil of origin was not lost while he was in the Air Force.
After respondent left the military service, the facts indicate that he gave up his domicil of origin (Tell City) and established a domicil of choice, perhaps several, in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. The following findings, supported by the record indicate such change.
Additionally, the record indicates that respondent purchased and refurbished real estate for resale, and maintained rental property in the D.C. area.
While respondent remained at all times in the employment of the U.S. government after his severance from the service, I believe the foregoing evidence clearly shows that respondent established a domicil of choice in the D.C. area, and finally at Falls Church, Virginia. I reach this conclusion notwithstanding the provisions of IC 1971, 3-1-21-3(10) upon which respondent relied and the majority apparently ("From 1954, when he graduated from Purdue through July, 1970, at which time he completed his move to Perry County, respondent was absent from the State of Indiana by reason of his military service and his employment with the U.S. Government,") finds applicable.
The declaration of candidacy statute, supra, indicates that the proper place for filing a declaration of candidacy for the office of circuit court is with the secretary of state, not the county clerk. The critical point for determining whether respondent had established a new domicil of choice in Indiana is not March 7, 1970, the date when respondent filed his declaration in Perry County, but rather, March 11, 1970, when respondent swore to the truth of his declaration of candidacy and March 16, 1970, when it was filed with the secretary of state.
*778 Respondent alternatively maintained, and the majority opinion implicitly holds, that respondent acquired a new domicil of choice in Indiana, prior to March 16, 1970. This finding is based upon:
The majority apparently finds these actions sufficient to show that respondent's intent to remove was unequivocally formed, and a fixed settlement at Tell City was resolved upon with no present intention of returning to Falls Church, Virginia. See State ex rel. White v. Scott, supra. The majority finds that the above evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption that respondent's residence in Falls Church, Virginia continued as of March 16, 1970. See Green, supra. The record does not sustain this conclusion.
Before setting out that portion of the record which demonstrates that respondent's plans to return to Tell City had not yet become unequivocal, the following sections, comments and illustrations of the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS should be considered:
See also, IC 1971, 3-1-21-3(3), (4), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803(3), (4), (Burns Code Ed.), supra.
The record shows that the declaration of candidacy filed with the secretary of state on March 16, 1970, was completed and sworn to before a notary in Washington, D.C. on March 11, 1970. On those dates, respondent, his wife and family lived at 3224 Graham Road, Falls Church, Virginia, and respondent's stepchild attended *779 school in Falls Church. On March 4, 1970, respondent procured new Virginia vehicle registration.
Most of the overt steps which respondent took in demonstrating his intention to move to Tell City did not transpire until after his declaration of candidacy had been filed. The first of these steps occurred in mid-April when respondent submitted his resignation to the Justice Department, thereby severing his financial lifeline. The testimony regarding his resignation should be carefully scrutinized, for it shows that respondent had not yet  the middle of April, 1970  irrevocably committed himself to Indiana; he had to discuss the matter with his wife to decide whether to resign and run, or to withdraw from the race and continue his employment with the Justice Department.
With respect to his resignation, respondent testified at the hearing before Judge Rabb as follows:
In his deposition, on February 5, 1975, respondent testified as follows:
And finally, Gary H. Baise, who at the time of respondent's resignation was serving as special assistant to the Assistant Attorney General of the United States, testified in his deposition, filed of record in this matter, as follows:
The next significant overt act was respondent's purchase of a home in Tell City, on May 8, 1970, following the primary of May 5. Finally, respondent moved his family to Tell City in mid-summer.
It is fitting and proper to consider the acts of respondent prior to March 16, 1970, in determining his intent on that date. It is a bootstrap approach, however, to consider the events which occurred after that date, as the majority opinion does, as establishing respondent's intent on March 16, 1970. From the record, respondent's acts prior to March 16, 1970, do not demonstrate, to paraphrase the language of § 19 of the Restatement of Conflicts, supra, an intention to make Tell City a home in fact, but demonstrate only a desire to acquire a domicil.
The writer is of the opinion that respondent was not a qualified voter as required by the declaration of candidacy statute and is, therefore, guilty of the offense charged.
Respondent was also charged with aiding and abetting his wife in her violation of the election laws of this state which prohibit non-residents from voting. These laws are set out in the majority opinion. In a very cursory treatment of this charge, the majority states:
Ordinarily, the domicil of the husband is the domicil of the wife. Jenness v. Jenness (1865), 24 Ind. 355; IC 1971, 3-1-21-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803 (Burns Code Ed.). Where no separation is shown to have occurred, the finding that respondent's domicil was Virginia dictates, as a matter of law, that respondent's wife was also a Virginia domiciliary. Such conclusion, however, does not rest solely upon the principle of law announced. With regard to the residence and voting of respondent's wife, the hearing officer made the following findings:
The whole record clearly shows that Margaret Anne Evrard was not a resident of this state when she voted in the primary election of 1970. The record also shows that respondent flew her to this state for the purpose of voting in said election. This charge is supported by sufficient evidence. The majority's failure to address the hearing officer's finding that there was insufficient evidence of Mrs. Evrard's residence is inexcusable. At the same time, a review of the record indicates that there was insufficient evidence presented of any conspiracy to violate the above laws involving respondent and his father. I, therefore, concur with such finding of the majority.
The final charge against respondent is that he aided and abetted his wife in the commission of the felony of bigamy. While the majority finds that respondent had no knowledge that Mrs. Evrard's husband was still alive, a review of the entire record does not lead to that conclusion.
The parties stipulated to the authenticity of the following facts:
The full findings of the hearing officer on the issue are as follows:
*785 In addition to these stipulations of fact and the hearing officer's findings, the record as a whole, particularly the testimony of Mrs. Evrard, deserves closer scrutiny than that which the majority opinion gives it. It is incredulous, to say the least, that a mother of two children would not make further inquiry upon being advised by a stranger that her husband and father of her children had been killed in the war. It is only common knowledge that advice of death in such cases travels by official messenger. Mrs. Evrard had a high school education and attended a junior college for one year. She testified that on learning of her husband's purported death:
Although apparently concerned about her financial condition, Mrs. Evrard made no effort whatsoever to procure any death benefits to which she or her family might have been entitled. When Mrs. Evrard told respondent of her husband's death, he failed to verify the death with the Department of Defense, although the record shows he was familiar with the military locator service and was himself a former member of the armed forces. Nor did respondent or Mrs. Evrard notify the attorney, whom the respondent knew and selected for Mrs. Evrard, to terminate his efforts in procuring her a divorce from Lawrence Buckler. In short, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom lead inescapably to the conclusion that respondent knew when he married Mrs. Evrard that her former marriage had not been terminated by the death of her husband or by a decree of divorce.
The actions for which respondent was charged transpired prior to his election. Since his election, respondent has served responsibly in his position as judge of the Perry Circuit Court. Based on evidence introduced by the respondent, the hearing officer found that:
It is commendable that respondent has conducted the Perry Circuit Court in accordance with the Code of Judicial Ethics. It is unfortunate that respondent did not adhere to the same high standards when he was a candidate.
Impressed by respondent's service upon the Perry Circuit bench, the majority opinion has chosen to ignore or disregard facts in the record which demonstrate respondent's guilt as charged.
Respondent's post-election conduct might be considered in mitigation of punishment upon finding of guilt, but it should not be considered in deciding guilt or innocence of the acts charged.
It is my belief the record as a whole sustains three of the charges against respondent. These transgressions are of such serious nature that this Court should not in good conscience ignore them. At a very minimum, this Court should issue a public reprimand to respondent and should consider a definite period of suspension. Only then would we announce with judicial vehemence that the office of circuit judge is not yet a prize in a race where no holds are barred.
[1]  "Any person who shall ... file any declaration of candidacy, certificate or petition of nomination, knowing the same, or any part thereof, to be falsely made ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony."
[2]  "Whoever, not having the legal qualifications of a voter who is duly registered and authorized to vote as he represents himself to be, or whoever falsely represents himself as a voter at any election authorized by law to be held in this state for any office whatever, votes or offers to vote at such election, shall be guilty of a felony."
[3]  "Every person who shall aid or abet in the commission of a felony ... may be ... convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal ... and, upon such conviction he shall suffer the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment of the principal."
[4]  "Whoever passes from any other state into this state, and votes or attempts to vote at any voting precinct or ward of this state, not being at the time a bona fide resident of such voting precinct or ward, shall be guilty of a felony."
[5]  "Any person or persons who shall unite or combine with any other person or persons for the purpose of committing a felony, within or without this state; or any person or persons who shall knowingly unite with any other person or persons, body, association or combination of persons, whose object is the commission of a felony or felonies, within or without this state, shall, on conviction, be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned in the state prison not less than two years nor more than fourteen years."