Title: Turner v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1181076
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2020

Rel: May 29, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1181076
____________________
David R. Turner
v.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-17-901256)
BRYAN, Justice.
David R. Turner appeals from a summary judgment entered
by the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the circuit court") in favor of
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company ("State Farm").  We
affirm.
1181076
Background
In August 2017, Turner was on duty as a paramedic and was
riding in the passenger seat of an ambulance while responding
to an emergency call.  While traversing an intersection, the
ambulance collided with a vehicle being driven by Michael
Norris.  Turner suffered multiple injuries, including a 
broken
leg.  In November 2017, Turner sued Norris, asserting claims
of negligence and "recklessness."  Norris answered the
complaint, denying that he had been negligent or reckless.  
In January 2018, Norris filed in the circuit court a
suggestion of bankruptcy, asserting that he had named Turner
as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding.  The circuit court
thereafter entered an order dismissing Turner's action,
without prejudice.  Turner later moved the circuit court to
reinstate the action, asserting that he had obtained relief
from the relevant bankruptcy court to proceed with his action
against Norris.  The circuit court granted Turner's motion. 
Once the action was reinstated, Turner filed an amended
complaint, naming his insurance carrier, State Farm, as an
additional defendant and including a claim for "underinsured-
motorist coverage" against State Farm.  State Farm answered
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the amended complaint.
In September 2018, Norris and Norris's insurance carrier
offered to settle Turner's claims against Norris for $25,000,
the liability limits of Norris's insurance policy.  Turner's
attorney sent a letter notifying State Farm of the settlement
offer and stating: "We would like State Farm to investigate
the claim and determine if State Farm will waive subrogation
and allow us to accept the $25,000 offered by [Norris's
insurance carrier] or if State Farm intends to tender $25,000
and force us to pursue our claims against ... Norris."  
In November 2018, State Farm's attorney sent a letter to
Turner's attorney, stating:
"Please find enclosed herewith a check from
State Farm ..., in the amount of $25,000 ... which
represents the 'buy out' of ... Norris'[s] policy
limits offer.  Please hold the proceeds in trust
pending satisfaction of any liens and subrogation
claims. 
 
All 
subrogation 
rights 
of 
the
[underinsured-motorist] carriers against ... Norris
are reserved pursuant to Lambert v. State Farm, 576
So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1991), and its progeny."
State Farm enclosed with its letter a check for $25,000.
In January 2019, State Farm filed a motion to "opt out"
of the action pursuant to the procedure described by this
Court in Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309,
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1310 (Ala. 1988), in which this Court stated, in relevant
part:
"A plaintiff is allowed either to join as a party
defendant his own liability insurer in a suit
against the underinsured motorist or merely to give
it notice of the filing of the action against the
motorist and of the possibility of a claim under the
underinsured motorist coverage at the conclusion of
the trial.  If the insurer is named as a party, it
would have the right, within a reasonable time after
service of process, to elect either to participate
in the trial (in which case its identity and the
reason for its being involved are proper information
for the jury), or not to participate in the trial
(in which case no mention of it or its potential
involvement is permitted by the trial court).  Under
either election, the insurer would be bound by the
factfinder's decisions on the issues of liability
and damages."
The circuit court granted State Farm's motion to opt out of
the action.
Turner's attorney sent a letter in response to State
Farm's November 2018 letter, in which Turner's attorney
requested an explanation regarding State Farm's decision to
decline consent to the settlement offered by Norris and
Norris's insurance carrier, explaining his opinions that
Norris's liability was clear, that Turner's damages clearly
exceeded $25,000, and that no recovery could be had against
Norris 
personally in 
light 
of 
Norris's 
bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
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State Farm's attorney responded in a letter stating his belief
that 
Turner's 
attorney 
had 
"mischaracterized liability 
in 
this
matter" and insisting that State Farm had properly exercised
its rights under Lowe and Lambert v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 576 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1991).  
In February 2019, Turner's attorney sent a letter to
State Farm stating his belief that, in light of information
learned in discovery regarding Norris's alleged liability and
Norris's bankruptcy proceedings, Turner should accept the
settlement offered by Norris and Norris's insurance carrier,
release Norris and Norris's insurance carrier from further
liability, return the $25,000 previously advanced by State
Farm, and pursue a direct action against State Farm.  Turner's
attorney also asserted that he believed State Farm had not
conducted a good-faith investigation regarding the merits of
Turner's claims against Norris and that, "[a]t the very least,
State Farm should disclose the findings of 
its 
investigation." 
State Farm's attorney responded in a letter, stating that
State 
Farm's 
investigation 
of 
Turner's 
claim 
was 
substantially
conducted by him and was, therefore, privileged.  He also
stated his belief that "liability [wa]s clearly disputed based
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on the answer filed by Norris" and that he was aware of no
authority supporting the proposition that, by declining to
accept Norris's settlement offer, Turner would be violating
the relevant bankruptcy court's order granting Turner relief
from an automatic bankruptcy stay to proceed in his action
against Norris.
Turner thereafter entered into a settlement agreement
with Norris and Norris's insurance carrier, whereby Turner
released them from all liability related to this action and
agreed to a dismissal of Turner's claims against Norris, with
prejudice, in exchange for $25,000.  Turner's attorney sent a
letter informing State Farm of the settlement agreement,
returning the $25,000 previously advanced by State Farm, and
expressing Turner's intent to pursue a direct action against
State Farm.  The circuit court entered an order dismissing
Norris from the action.
After amending its answer with the circuit court's
permission, State Farm moved for a summary judgment in July
2019 regarding Turner's claim for underinsured-motorist
("UIM") benefits, arguing that Turner had forfeited his right
to UIM coverage by entering into the settlement agreement with
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Norris and Norris's insurance carrier without State Farm's
consent.  Turner filed a response in opposition to State
Farm's summary-judgment motion.  On August 23, 2019, the
circuit court entered an order stating, in relevant part:
"[T]he Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and State Farm is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."1  Turner appealed.
Standard of Review
"'An order granting or denying a summary
judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court applied.  American Gen.
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 886 So. 2d
807, 811 (Ala. 2004). ...  Where, as here, the facts
of a case are essentially undisputed, this Court
must determine whether the trial court misapplied
the law to the undisputed facts, applying a de novo
standard of review.  Carter v. City of Haleyville,
669 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. 1995).'"  
McKinney v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 So. 3d 1203,
1206 (Ala. 2009)(quoting Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v.
Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033, 1034–35 (Ala. 2005)).
Analysis
In relevant part, § 32–7–23, Ala. Code 1975, defines an
1The circuit court certified the August 23, 2019, order
as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
because the order did not dispose of a claim for workers'
compensation benefits that Turner has asserted against his
employer.
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"uninsured motor vehicle" to include
"motor vehicles with respect to which ... [t]he sum
of the limits of liability under all bodily injury
liability bonds and insurance policies available to
an injured person after an accident is less than the
damages which the injured person is legally entitled
to recover."
§ 32–7–23(b)(4).  
As noted above, Turner settled his claims against Norris
for $25,000, the liability limits of Norris's policy with his
insurance carrier.  On appeal, Turner does not clearly state
what he believes his total damages to be, but he contends that
they "exceed" $25,000.  Turner's brief, at 16.2  Similarly,
the parties' briefs do not clearly state the limits of the UIM
coverage provided by Turner's policy with State Farm.  The
record indicates, however, that the bodily injury limits of
Turner's UIM coverage under his policy, which appears to have
included another named insured, were $50,000 per person and
$100,000 per accident.3
2Turner's position is also that the amount of a lien
asserted 
by 
his 
workers' 
compensation carrier 
exceeds 
$25,000,
the amount of Turner's settlement with Norris.  Turner's
brief, at 23.  The record indicates that, in July 2018, the
amount of the lien asserted by the workers' compensation
carrier was $29,109.18.
3Turner does not contend that his damages exceed the
limits of the UIM coverage under his policy with State Farm.
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On appeal, Turner does not challenge the validity of the
pertinent provision in his insurance policy with State Farm
that required Turner to obtain State Farm's consent before
entering into a settlement agreement with Norris and Norris's
insurance carrier, i.e., the "consent-to-settle" provision. 
Instead, Turner argues that the circuit court erred by
entering a summary judgment for State Farm regarding his claim
for UIM benefits because, he says, State Farm's purported
reasons for refusing to consent to Turner's settlement of his
claims with Norris and Norris's insurance carrier were not
legitimate.  Turner also alternatively argues that he should
have been permitted to accept Norris's offer without
forfeiting UIM benefits because State Farm did not provide
additional explanation for its decision to withhold consent to
the settlement agreement.  Turner asserts that his arguments
raise questions of first impression for this Court.  Turner's
brief, at ii.
We begin by considering the pertinent language of
Turner's policy with State Farm.  "'An insurer may contract
with its insured upon conditions expressed in its policy,
limited only by statute and public policy.  The insured, by
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acceptance of a policy, is deemed to have approved it with all
conditions and limitations expressed therein which are
reasonable and not contrary to public policy.'"  Gulf American
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gowan, 283 Ala. 480, 486, 218 So. 2d 688,
693 (1969)(quoting MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 245 Ark. 95,
99-100, 431 S.W.2d 252, 254 (1968)). 
In Hardy v. Progressive Insurance Co., 531 So. 2d 885,
887 (Ala. 1988), this Court explained:
"Underinsured motorist coverage applies where
the negligent or wanton tort-feasor has some
liability insurance but does not have enough to
fully compensate the victims of his negligence or
wantonness.  Underinsured motorist coverage provides
compensation to the extent of the insured's injury,
subject to the insured's policy limits.  It is an
umbrella coverage that does not require the insurer
to 
pay 
to 
its 
insured 
the 
amount 
of 
the
tort-feasor's bodily injury liability limits, as
those limits pertain to the insured.  Therefore, the
insurer has no right to subrogation insofar as the
tort-feasor's limits of liability are concerned. 
Its right of subrogation would be for sums paid by
the insurer in excess of the tort-feasor's limits of
liability."
 
As noted above, Turner's policy with State Farm included
a consent-to-settle provision.  In particular, the policy
provided, in pertinent part: "There is no coverage ... for an
insured who, without our written consent, settles with any
person or organization who may be liable for the bodily injury
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and thereby impairs our right to recover our payments."  
"[T]he purpose of consent-to-settle clauses in the
uninsured/underinsured motorist 
insurance 
context 
is
to protect the underinsured motorist insurance
carrier's 
subrogation 
rights 
against 
the
tort-feasor, as well as to protect the carrier
against the possibility of collusion between its
insured and the tortfeasor's liability insurer at
the carrier's expense."  
Lambert, 576 So. 2d at 167. 
Thus, to retain his entitlement to UIM benefits under the
terms of his policy, Turner agreed to obtain State Farm's
consent before entering into a settlement agreement with
Norris and Norris's insurance carrier and releasing them from
liability for Turner's injuries.  See Gowan, 283 Ala. at 486,
218 So. 2d at 693.  As explained above, Turner ultimately
entered into a settlement agreement with Norris and Norris's
insurance carrier and granted them a release.  It is
undisputed that State Farm did not consent to the settlement
agreement and that, by nonetheless entering into the
settlement agreement, Turner violated the consent-to-settle
provision of his policy with State Farm.  Moreover, by
releasing 
Norris 
and 
Norris's 
insurance carrier 
from 
liability
for Turner's injuries, any 
subrogation interest State Farm may
have otherwise had against either of those parties was
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extinguished.  
"'A repudiation is a manifestation by one party to the
other that the first cannot or will not perform at least some
of his obligations under the contract.'  E. Allan Farnsworth,
Contracts, § 8.21, at 633–34 (1982)."  Congress Life Ins. Co.
v. Barstow, 799 So. 2d 931, 938 (Ala. 2001).  "The general
rule with respect to repudiation is that when one party
repudiates a contract, the nonrepudiating party is discharged
from its duty to perform."  Beauchamp v. Coastal Boat Storage,
LLC, 4 So. 3d 443, 451 (Ala. 2008).  Thus, under general
contract principles, by refusing to abide by the terms of the
consent-to-settle provision in his policy with State Farm,
Turner 
repudiated their 
agreement, 
and 
State 
Farm's 
obligation
to pay Turner UIM benefits was discharged.
However, as a matter of public policy, this Court has
held that an injured party's settlement with a tortfeasor
without the consent of the injured party's UIM insurance
carrier does not necessarily preclude the injured party from
recovering UIM benefits.  See Lambert, 576 So. 2d at 166
("[W]e have not held that consent-to-settle and subrogation
clauses are void, but we have placed many restrictions on
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their enforceability.").  Among other "general rules"
pertaining to notice and other considerations not 
contested by
the parties in this case, this Court's decision in Lambert
provided the following guidelines for UIM insurance carriers
that do not wish to consent to a settlement agreement between
their insureds and tortfeasors:
"If the uninsured motorist insurance carrier refuses
to consent to a settlement by its insured with the
tort-feasor, or if the carrier denies the claim of
its insured without a good faith investigation into
its merits, or if the carrier does not conduct its
investigation in a reasonable time, the carrier
would, by any of those actions, waive any right to
subrogation 
against 
the 
tort-feasor 
or 
the
tortfeasor's insurer.
"... If the underinsured motorist insurance
carrier wants to protect its subrogation rights, it
must, within a reasonable time, and, in any event
before the tort-feasor is released by the carrier's
insured, advance to its insured an amount equal to
the tort-feasor's settlement offer.
"....
"This Court stated in Lowe v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 521 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1988), that there are
three primary concerns in an insurance claim
involving underinsured motorist insurance coverage:
"'1) that of protecting the right of the
[underinsured motorist insurance carrier]
to know of, and participate in, the suit;
2) that of protecting the right of the
insured to litigate all aspects of his
claim in a single suit ... and 3) that of
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protecting the liability phase of the trial
from the introduction of extraneous and
corrupting influences, namely, evidence of
insurance ....'"
576 So. 2d at 167-68 (emphasis added).  
The Lambert Court applied the guidelines it had
articulated as follows:
"We hold that the trial court erred, and we
reverse its judgment.  We have studied the record
and we find that State Farm's refusal to consent to
the proposed settlement offer, based on these facts,
was unreasonable.  If, in fact, as the record
suggests, State Farm was convinced that its
insureds' damages did not exceed $25,000, then its
rights under the policy would be protected, because
it ostensibly could prove to a factfinder that there
was no liability under the underinsured motorist
insurance policy.  Applying the guidelines we have
adopted, we believe that when State Farm evaluated
the [insureds]' claim for damages, it should have
paid them $25,000, the amount offered by [the
tortfeasor's insurance carrier], if it wanted to
retain its right of subrogation against [the
tortfeasor] 
and 
[the 
tortfeasor's 
insurance
carrier].  Although State Farm did ultimately offer
to pay the [insureds] $25,000, we find that, under
the facts of this case, the offer was 'belated,'
especially in view of the position State Farm was
taking -- that if the [insureds] settled, State Farm
would refuse to pay any benefits under its
underinsured motorist policy.  In short, the record
suggests that State Farm took the legal position
that it had a right to insist on refusing to give
its consent to the settlement.
"Based on the foregoing, we conclude that State
Farm, by its refusal to consent to the settlement or
to timely advance the amount of the settlement
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offer, 
effectively 
waived 
its 
right 
to 
be
subrogated, and that the [insureds]' acceptance of
the settlement, under the facts of this case, does
not 
affect 
their 
rights 
under 
State 
Farm's
underinsured motorist insurance policy."
576 So. 2d at 168-69 (emphasis added.) 
Unlike in Lambert, in this case, upon learning of the
$25,000 policy-limits settlement offer that Turner received
from Norris and Norris's insurance carrier, State Farm
declined to consent to the settlement agreement and instead
sent Turner a check for $25,000 before the settlement
agreement was consummated, citing the Lambert guidelines as
its basis for doing so.  With the circuit court's approval,
State Farm also opted out of the action, pursuant to the
procedure provided by Lowe.  Turner, however, sent the check
back to State Farm and entered into the settlement agreement
with Norris and Norris's insurance carrier anyway, in
violation of the consent-to-settle provision in Turner's
policy with State Farm.
In Ex parte Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,
237 So. 3d 199, 205 (Ala. 2017), this Court discussed whether
trial courts could properly enforce settlement agreements
between tortfeasors and injured parties when the injured
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parties' respective UIM insurance carriers, Allstate Property
and Casualty Insurance Company ("Allstate") and GEICO
Indemnity Company ("GEICO"), did not consent to 
the 
settlement
agreements and chose instead to avail themselves of the
procedures provided by this Court in Lowe and Lambert.  When
Allstate and GEICO petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus seeking vacatur of the trial courts' orders enforcing
the respective settlement agreements, this Court held that the
petitioners had a clear legal right to the relief they sought. 
Ex parte Allstate, 237 So. 3d at 208.  
Specifically, we reasoned:
"It is undisputed that, at all times pertinent
hereto, the insurers complied, to the very 'letter
of the law,' with the Court's dictates in Lowe and
Lambert, as set out above.  Specifically, Allstate
and GEICO, after receiving notice of a settlement
offer but declining to consent, which right was
secured by the respective contracts between the
insurers and their insureds, properly advanced an
amount 
equal 
to 
the 
tortfeasor's 
respective
settlement offer.  Further, Allstate ultimately
exercised the available option of opting out of
further participation in the litigation in order to
prevent mention of 'its potential involvement.' 
Despite that compliance, the actions of the trial
courts in attempting to order that the settlements
be effected and the tortfeasors dismissed have
essentially nullified the insurers' legal right both
to withhold consent to settlement and to opt out of
further proceedings.  In essence, despite the
insurers' payment of the funds necessary to enjoin
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the insureds' consummation of the tortfeasors'
offered settlements, the insurers were, nonetheless,
ultimately forced to accept the exact settlement to
which they had previously declined to consent. 
Further, as a result of the trial courts' attempted
dismissal of the tortfeasors, the insurers -- each
of which would be the sole remaining defendant in
each case -- are being denied the right to opt out
of further proceedings and to avoid mention of their
involvement in the case."
Ex parte Allstate, 237 So. 3d at 207 (footnotes omitted).  We
concluded:
"Because the insurers, in following the express
directives of this Court, have been deprived of
their contractual rights as well as the benefit of
the procedures set forth in Lowe and Lambert, we
conclude that they have demonstrated a clear legal
right to the requested relief.  We, therefore, in
case no. 1150511 and case no. 1151266, direct the
applicable circuit court to vacate its respective
order purporting both to 'enforce' the pro tanto
settlement agreements against the insurer's consent
and to dismiss the tortfeasors."
Ex parte Allstate, 237 So. 3d at 208.
This Court's decision in Ex parte Allstate indicates
that, by complying with the guidelines set out by this Court
in Lowe and Lambert, State Farm, as a matter of public policy, 
was justified in standing on its contractual right to withhold
its consent to the settlement agreement between Turner and
Norris and Norris's insurance carrier.  On appeal, however,
Turner argues that State Farm's refusal to consent to his
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settlement agreement with Norris was not reasonable or
legitimate, an argument not raised by the respondents in Ex
parte Allstate.  See Ex parte Allstate, 237 So. 3d at 207 n.2
("There appears to be no suggestion that, in any of the three
cases, the consent of the respective insurer was unreasonably
withheld ....").  
Specifically, Turner argues: (1) that State Farm was
precluded from asserting any subrogation interest against
Norris by virtue of Norris's bankruptcy proceedings4 and (2)
that "disputing liability or damages is not a legitimate
reason to refuse consent."  Turner's brief, at 22.  Thus,
Turner argues, State Farm had no legitimate reason for
refusing to consent to Turner's settlement agreement with
Norris.  In essence, Turner appears to argue that, under the
circumstances of this case, State Farm should have consented
to his settlement agreement with Norris and 
Norris's insurance
carrier and that, by refusing to do so, State Farm did not act
4Turner's 
argument 
regarding 
Norris's 
bankruptcy
proceedings is based on the automatic-stay provisions imposed
by federal bankruptcy law.  Turner does not assert that Norris
obtained a discharge injunction in bankruptcy and that State
Farm could, therefore, have never recovered against Norris. 
See Turner's reply brief, at 12 ("Whether [State Farm] could
ever pursue subrogation is speculative.").
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in good faith and wrongfully deprived Turner of UIM benefits. 
Turner's reply brief, at 3-5.
In LeFevre v. Westberry, 590 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1991), an
insured sued his UIM insurance carrier alleging bad-faith
failure to pay his claim for UIM benefits.  590 So. 2d at 156. 
This Court explained:
"Uninsured motorist coverage in Alabama is a
hybrid in that it blends the features of both
first-party 
and 
third-party 
coverage. 
 
The
first-party aspect is evident in that the insured
makes a claim under his own contract.  At the same
time, however, third-party liability principles also
are operating in that the coverage requires the
insured to be 'legally entitled' to collect -- that
is, the insured must be able to establish fault on
the part of the uninsured motorist and must be able
to prove the extent of the damages to which he or
she would be entitled.  The question arises: when is
a carrier of uninsured motorist coverage under a
duty to pay its insured's damages?
"There is no universally definitive answer to
this question or to the question when an action
alleging bad faith may be maintained for the
improper handling of an uninsured or underinsured
motorist claim; the answer is, of course, dependent
upon the facts of each case.  Clearly, there is a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the
insurer and the insured, as with direct insurance,
but the insurer and the insured occupy adverse
positions until the uninsured motorist's liability
is fixed; therefore, there can be no action based on
the tort of bad faith based on conduct arising prior
to that time, only for subsequent bad faith
conduct."
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590 So. 2d at 159.
 Although Turner does not rely on LeFevre on appeal, we
note that the LeFevre Court provided the following standards
that were intended to "allow the [UIM] insurer to aggressively
defend the claim and attempt to defeat the claim, or at least
to minimize the size of the award, while concomitantly
fulfilling the duties imposed on it by law and the obligations
imposed on it by its contract with the insured."  590 So. 2d
at 160-61.  Specifically, the LeFevre Court held:
"1. When a claim is filed by its insured, the
uninsured motorist carrier has an obligation to
diligently investigate the facts, fairly evaluate
the claim, and act promptly and reasonably.
"2. The uninsured motorist carrier should
conclude its investigation within a reasonable time
and should notify its insured of the action it
proposes with regard to the claim for uninsured
motorist benefits.
"3. Mere delay does not constitute vexatious or
unreasonable delay in the investigation of a claim
if there is a bona fide dispute on the issue of
liability.
"4. Likewise, mere delay in payment does not
rise to the level of bad faith if there is a bona
fide dispute on the issue of damages.
"5. 
If 
the 
uninsured motorist carrier refuses to
settle with its insured, its refusal to settle must
be reasonable."
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LeFevre, 590 So. 2d at 161 (footnotes omitted).  The foregoing
standards were set out to better define the duties owed by a
UIM insurance carrier to its insured regarding the payment of
UIM benefits for the purposes of establishing the UIM
insurance carrier's tort liability for acting in bad faith. 
See LeFevre, 590 So. 2d at 160-61 (expounding upon principles
set out in Quick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 429 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Ala. 1983), which had discussed
"whether the tort of bad faith should be extended to the
uninsured motorist claim in th[at] case").
In this case, however, the question presented is not
whether State Farm is liable in tort for damages to Turner for
acting in bad faith by refusing to pay Turner's claim for UIM
benefits.  Turner did not assert such a tort claim against
State Farm in the circuit court and, as noted above, does not
cite or discuss LeFevre on appeal.  See Smiths Water Auth. v.
City of Phenix City, 436 So. 2d 827, 830-31 (Ala. 1983)("It is
well-established that this Court will not consider a theory or
issue where it was not pleaded or raised in the trial
court.").  Instead, the question presented in this appeal is
whether State Farm could be compelled to pay Turner's claim
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for UIM benefits as a matter of contract law and public
policy.
As explained above, under general contract principles,
Turner repudiated his policy with State Farm by violating the
consent-to-settle provision, and State Farm's obligation to
pay Turner UIM benefits was discharged.  Moreover, pursuant to
the public-policy guidelines imposed by this Court in 
Lambert,
State Farm advanced Turner $25,000, the amount of the
settlement offered by Norris and Norris's insurance carrier,
before the settlement agreement was consummated.  In  Ex parte
Allstate, 237 So. 3d at 207, this Court explained that a UIM
insurance carrier's payment of a Lambert advance "enjoin[s]
the insureds' consummation of the tortfeasors' offered
settlements."  Turner, however, settled with Norris and
Norris's insurance carrier notwithstanding State Farm's
refusal to consent to the settlement agreement and State
Farm's payment of a Lambert advance.
In essence, Turner is arguing that he should have been
permitted to unilaterally decide that State Farm's decision to
avail itself of the Lambert procedure was unreasonable, to
release Norris from all further liability, and still to retain
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his entitlement to UIM benefits in contravention of the
consent-to-settle provision in his policy with State Farm. 
Turner presents no compelling reason for such a rule.
In his reply brief, Turner cites this Court's decision in
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Allen, 519 So. 2d 506
(Ala. 1988), a decision the LeFevre Court cited for the
proposition that "a refusal of a carrier of underinsured
motorist coverage to consent to settle must be reasonable." 
LeFevre, 590 So. 2d at 161 n.4; see also Lambert, 576 So. 2d
at 164 (noting that, in Allen, "[t]his Court did hold, of
course, that the refusal of an underinsured motorist insurance
carrier to consent to settle must be reasonable").  We
reaffirm that principle here.  
Turner ignores, however, that he did not avail himself of
the procedure employed by the insured in Allen.  In pertinent
part, the insured in Allen sought injunctive relief compelling
his UIM insurance carrier to consent to the tortfeasor's
proposed settlement before entering into the settlement
agreement and releasing the tortfeasor from liability.  On
appeal from the trial court's order "restraining" the UIM
insurance carrier 
"from 
withholding 
its 
permission 
and 
consent
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for" the insured to receive the tortfeasor's settlement offer,
519 So. 2d at 507, this Court stated: "[T]here is nothing in
the record before us to show that [the UIM insurance carrier]
has a reasonable basis for withholding such consent .... 
Enough is enough.  We refuse to hold that the trial court
abused its legal or judicial discretion in granting the
injunction, and we affirm."  519 So. 2d at 508.
Allen was decided before Lambert.  However, in light of
this Court's explanation that a Lambert advance "enjoin[s] the
insured['s] consummation of the tortfeasor['s] offered
settlements," Ex parte Allstate, 237 So. 3d at 207, the
decision of the insured in Allen to seek judicial intervention
regarding his UIM insurance carrier's refusal to consent to a
settlement agreement with a tortfeasor -- in lieu of
repudiating his policy altogether by accepting the settlement
offer -- appears all the more prudent under the current state
of the law, which actually requires UIM insurance carriers to
pay their insureds the amount of the settlement offered as a
prerequisite for withholding consent to the settlement.  See,
e.g., Ex parte Allstate, 237 So. 3d at 201-03 (reviewing
interlocutory orders entered by circuit courts regarding
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whether 
settlement 
agreements 
between 
insureds 
and 
tortfeasors
should be effectuated).
As noted above, one of the primary concerns in an action
seeking UIM benefits is "protecting the right of the insured
to litigate all aspects of his claim in a single suit."  Lowe,
521 So. 2d at 1309.  The communications between Turner's
attorney and State Farm's attorney regarding this case
indicate that Turner's attorney understood that, pursuant to
Lambert, State Farm had the option of paying Turner the amount
of the settlement offered by Norris and Norris's insurance
carrier and declining to consent to the settlement agreement. 
Turner could have sought the circuit court's intervention
regarding the reasonableness of State Farm's refusal to
consent to his settlement agreement before accepting the
settlement offer.  If Turner had obtained a determination from
the circuit court concerning that question and whether State
Farm should have been compelled to consent to the settlement
agreement, those issues might have been before us.  However,
Turner did not request such a decision from the circuit court. 
Therefore, we need not decide whether the circuit court could
have properly compelled State Farm to consent to the
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settlement agreement based on Turner's assertion that State
Farm's decision was unreasonable, and we express no opinion
concerning that issue at this time.
As explained above, in this appeal, we are faced with an
unambiguous consent-to-settle provision, State Farm's payment
of a Lambert advance, Turner's unilateral decision to release
Norris and Norris's insurance carrier from all liability
pertaining to this action, and the circuit court's judgment
enforcing the exclusionary aspects of the consent-to-settle
provision.  Turner has failed to demonstrate that, under
principles of contract law or the public-policy principles
articulated by the this Court in Lambert and its progeny, the
circuit court's judgment should be reversed based on the
undisputed facts presented.  See McKinney, 33 So. 3d at 1206.
Conclusion
The circuit court's summary judgment in favor of State
Farm is affirmed.  Because we hold that State Farm was
discharged from its obligation to pay Turner UIM benefits
based on State Farm's payment of a Lambert advance and
Turner's repudiation of his policy with State Farm, we
pretermit consideration of Turner's alternative argument
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regarding State Farm's failure to disclose the substance of
its investigation of Turner's claim for UIM benefits, and we
express no opinion concerning that issue.  We also express no
opinion regarding any potential liability State Farm may or
may not have to Turner in tort because, as explained above,
Turner has not asserted such a claim in this action. 
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Stewart,
and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Mendheim, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
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MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I entirely agree with the main opinion's conclusion that
David R. Turner repudiated his insurance policy with State
Farm Mutual Insurance Company ("State Farm") by violating the
consent-to-settle provision in that policy and that therefore
State Farm's obligation to pay Turner uninsured- or
underinsured-motorist 
("UIM") 
benefits 
was 
discharged. 
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is due to be affirmed.
I write separately to note my misgivings about the main
opinion's discussion of United Services Automobile Ass'n v.
Allen, 519 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1988), a discussion that is
clearly dictum, given that the opinion states that "we express
no opinion concerning th[e] issue" raised by Allen, but that
could lead to uncertainty in this area of the law. ___ So. 3d
at ___.
In Allen, a plaintiff-insured filed an action for
injunctive relief against his UIM insurer, United Services
Automobile Association ("USAA"), seeking an order requiring
USAA to consent to a settlement between the insured and the
tortfeasor.  The trial court entered the injunction, and this
Court affirmed the trial court's judgment because "[t]here is
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nothing in the record before us to show that USAA had a
reasonable basis for withholding such consent."  Allen, 519
So. 2d at 508. 
The main opinion correctly notes that Allen was decided
before Lambert v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
576 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1991), the case that sought to provide a
"bright-line" procedure for UIM insurance carriers, their
insureds, and tortfeasors in the context of settlement
negotiations between the insured and the 
tortfeasor.  Lambert,
576 So. 2d at 165.  However, the main opinion then goes on to
observe:
"[T]he decision of the insured in Allen to seek
judicial intervention regarding his UIM insurance
carrier's refusal to consent to a settlement
agreement 
with 
a 
tortfeasor 
-- 
in 
lieu 
of
repudiating his policy altogether by accepting the
settlement offer -- appears all the more prudent
under the current state of the law, which actually
requires UIM insurance carriers to pay their
insureds the amount of the settlement offered as a
prerequisite 
for 
withholding 
consent 
to 
the
settlement."
___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis added). The main opinion later
adds that "Turner could have sought the circuit court's
intervention regarding the reasonableness of State Farm's
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refusal to consent to his settlement agreement before
accepting the settlement offer."  ___ So. 3d at  ___.
The above-quoted portions of the main opinion appear to
suggest that the injunction remedy approved in Allen may be
available to a plaintiff-insured who believes that his or her
UIM insurer has unreasonably refused to consent to a
settlement between the insured and the tortfeasor even when --
under the Lambert procedure -- the UIM insurer has advanced to
the insured the amount of the offered settlement, thereby
preserving its subrogation interests.  Such speculation seems
unnecessary given that, as the main opinion observes, Turner
did not seek such relief from the circuit court.  We also have
no clear idea as to the ramifications of allowing such an
injunctive remedy given that we do not have the benefit of any
commentary about Allen from State Farm because Turner cited
Allen for the first time in his reply brief.
I express no opinion on the continued viability of the
remedy approved in Allen, but I would consider the issue if it
is presented in a proper case.  This is not such a case
because Turner failed to pursue an injunction from the trial
court. My concern is the main opinion's suggestion in this
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case that an Allen injunction "appears all the more prudent
under the current state of the law."  ___ So. 3d at ___. 
Accordingly, I cannot fully concur with the main opinion.
31