Title: Senator Fred Risser v. James R. Klauser
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP000042-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
96-0042-OA 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Senator Fred Risser, Senator Brian Burke, 
 
 
 
Representative David Travis and Sheila R. Mooney, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
James R. Klauser and Governor Tommy G. Thompson, 
 
 
 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
January 31, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 29, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
STEINMETZ and WILCOX, JJ, join dissent. 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the petitioners there were briefs by Lynn 
Adelman, Jon Deitrich and Adelman, Adelman & Murray, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Lynn Adelman. 
 
 
For the respondents there was a brief by Bruce L. Harms, 
Michael J. Modl and Axley Brynelson, Madison and oral argument by 
Michael J. Modl. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Senator Fred Risser, Senator Brian Burke, 
Representative David Travis  
and Sheila R. Mooney, 
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
James R. Klauser  
and Governor Tommy G. Thompson, 
 
 
Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 31, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Rights declared. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an original 
action by several Wisconsin state legislators and a taxpayer 
(petitioners)
1 seeking a declaration that the Governor’s write-in 
veto of a monetary figure in the second sentence of section 57 of 
1995 Assembly Bill 557 exceeded his authority under art. V, § 10 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
¶2 
The "write-in" veto in issue in the present case was 
first recognized as within a governor's art. V, § 10 powers in 
Citizens Utility Board v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 534 N.W.2d 
608 (1995), hereinafter C.U.B. The write-in veto is a lesser 
                     
1 The respondents are James R. Klauser, Secretary of the 
Department of Administration, and Tommy G. Thompson, Governor of 
the State of Wisconsin, collectively referred to herein as the 
Governor. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
2
included subset of the partial veto made available to a governor 
by the 1930 amendment to Wis. Const. art. V, § 10. 
¶3 
The petitioners contend that the constitution limits 
the write-in veto to reductions of appropriation amounts and that 
the revenue bonding limit in the second sentence of section 57 is 
not an appropriation amount.  
¶4 
The Governor advances two arguments in support of his 
exercise of the write-in veto in this case. First, the Governor 
contends that the write-in veto is not limited to reducing 
appropriation amounts and that the write-in veto may be exercised 
on any monetary figure in an appropriation bill. Second, the 
Governor argues that even if a governor's write-in veto is 
limited to appropriation amounts, the monetary figure in issue in 
the present case is an appropriation amount subject to the write-
in veto. 
¶5 
We conclude that the Governor’s write-in veto may be 
exercised only on a monetary figure which is an appropriation 
amount and that the monetary figure in the second sentence of 
section 57 of 1995 A.B. 557 is not an appropriation amount. 
Accordingly, we hold that the Governor's write-in veto challenged 
in the present case is not authorized by the constitution and is 
therefore invalid.  
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
3
I. 
¶6 
This case comes to us on stipulated facts. As 
background for our legal analysis we shall summarize the facts, 
the constitutional law relating to the partial veto and the 
statutory context of the second sentence of section 57 of 1995 
A.B. 557.  
¶7 
On November 16, 
1995, the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
enrolled 1995 A.B. 557, an omnibus bill setting forth the 
transportation budget. In addition to appropriating funds for 
transportation purposes, it creates, repeals and amends various 
transportation-related statutes. The bill, among other things, 
imposes 
taxes, 
authorizes 
highway 
construction, 
provides 
penalties, makes appropriations and grants bonding authority. 
This latter function is the subject of section 57 of the bill.  
¶8 
On December 6, 1995, the Governor vetoed numerous parts 
of 1995 A.B. 557 and approved the remainder. The part approved 
was enacted as 1995 Wis. Act 113.  
¶9 
This case is ruled by the 1930 amendment to the 
Wisconsin 
constitution 
authorizing 
a 
governor 
to 
approve 
appropriation bills "in whole or in part." Wis. Const. art. V, 
§ 10(1)(b). The parties agree, and the court holds, that 1995 
A.B. 557 is an appropriation bill within the meaning of art. V, 
§ 10(1)(b). Article V, § 10(1), provides as follows: 
 
(1)(a) 
Every 
bill 
which 
shall 
have 
passed 
the 
legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be 
presented to the governor. 
 
(b) If the governor approves and signs the bill, the 
bill shall become law. Appropriation bills may be 
approved in whole or in part by the governor, and the 
part approved shall become law. 
 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
4
(c) In approving an appropriation bill in part, the 
governor may not create a new word by rejecting 
individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill.  
¶10 Certain 
principles 
emerge 
from 
the 
court's 
interpretations of this language. First, a governor may exercise 
the 
partial 
veto 
only 
on 
parts 
of 
bills 
that 
contain 
appropriations within their four corners. State ex rel. Finnegan 
v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 147-48, 264 N.W. 622 (1936). Second, 
the partial veto must be exercised in such a manner that the part 
of the bill remaining constitutes a "complete, entire, and 
workable law." State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 
218 Wis. 302, 314, 260 N.W. 486 (1935); State ex rel. Martin v. 
Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 450, 289 N.W.2d 662 (1940). Third, the 
disapproval of part of an appropriation bill may not result in a 
provision which is "totally new, unrelated or non-germane" to the 
original bill. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 
451-53, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988). Fourth, the partial veto authority 
extends to any part of an appropriation bill, not only to 
appropriations. State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 
130, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976). Fifth, a governor may strike words or 
digits from an appropriation bill. State ex rel. Kleczka v. 
Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 685, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978); Wisconsin 
Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 457. However a governor "may not create a 
new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the 
enrolled bill." Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(c), (1990 amendment); 
C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 501. Sixth, a governor may exercise the 
partial veto power by writing in a smaller number for a number 
expressing an appropriation amount. C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 499-
500 and n.10 (relying on Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 461). 
¶11 A governor's authority to alter legislation granted in 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
5
Wis. Const. art. V, § 10 is part of the constitution's carefully 
balanced separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislative branches. It is the judiciary's role to declare the 
boundaries which the constitution sets between the other two 
branches. Our inquiry in this case is whether the Governor's 
actions comport with the constitutional grant of authority set 
out in art. V, § 10(1)(b).  
¶12 The Governor’s veto of part of the second sentence of 
section 57 of 1995 A.B. 557 is at issue in this case. Section 57 
provides as follows:  
 
Section 57. 84.59(6) of the statutes is amended to 
read:  
  84.59(6) Revenue obligations may be contracted by the 
building commission when it reasonably appears to the 
building commission that all obligations incurred under 
this section can be fully paid from moneys received or 
anticipated and pledged to be received on a timely 
basis. Revenue obligations issued under this section 
shall 
not 
exceed 
$950,834,000
2 
$1,123,638,100
3 
[$1,083,638,100]
4 
in 
principal 
amount, 
excluding 
obligations 
issued 
to 
refund 
outstanding 
revenue 
obligations. Not more than $841,634,000 $1,081,341,000 
[$1,041,341,000] of the $950,834,000 $1,123,638,100 
[$1,083,638,100] 
may 
be 
used 
for 
transportation 
facilities 
under s. 
84.01(28) and 
major 
highway 
projects under ss. 84.06 and 84.09. 
 
¶13 Section 57 amended Wis. Stat. § 84.59(6) (1993-1994).
5 
The first sentence of section 57 authorizes the building 
commission to contract for the sale of revenue obligations,
6 the 
proceeds 
of 
which 
may 
under 
§ 84.59(1) 
fund 
certain 
                     
2 The figures lined through are from the previous enactment. 
3 The figures underlined are those approved by the legislature 
and stricken by the Governor. 
4 The final, bracketed figure of each trio was written in by the 
Governor. 
5 All further references are to the 1993-1994 statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
6 Revenue obligations are governed generally by Wis. Stat. 
§§ 18.51 through 18.64. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
6
transportation facilities and projects.
7 This sentence is not in 
dispute.  
¶14 In the second sentence of section 57 the legislature 
raised the cumulative limit on revenue obligations that may be 
contracted under § 84.59. The Governor struck this increased 
limit on revenue bonds and wrote in a figure $40 million lower. 
It is this veto that the petitioners challenge.  
¶15 The write-in vetoes in the third sentence, as well as 
numerous other write-in vetoes, were not challenged or discussed 
in the briefs by either party. At oral argument, in response to 
the court’s questions, counsel for the Governor urged the court 
to consider the third sentence as 
part 
of 
the overall 
revenue/appropriation scheme informing the meaning of the second 
sentence 
and 
its 
monetary 
figure. 
At 
oral 
argument 
the 
petitioners described the third sentence and the figures therein 
as setting forth a use limitation, in contrast with appropriation 
amounts subject to the partial veto. We shall examine the third 
sentence in our discussion of the challenged write-in veto.  
¶16 The Governor makes two alternative arguments to support 
his write-in veto of the monetary figure in the second sentence 
of section 57. The first argument is that a governor’s write-in 
veto power is not limited to reducing appropriation amounts; 
rather it is limited to reducing any monetary figures in an 
appropriation bill. The second argument is that even if a 
                     
7 Revenues from the sale of revenue obligations and those derived 
from motor vehicle registration fees under Wis. Stat. § 341.25, 
pledged to secure the repayment of the revenue obligations, are 
deposited in a fund created under Wis. Stat. § 18.57(1). Various 
continuing appropriation provisions appropriate the moneys in 
this fund. Wis. Stat. §§ 20.395(3)(br), 20.395(4)(at) and (jq) 
and 20.395(6)(as). 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
7
governor’s write-in veto is limited to appropriation amounts, the 
monetary figure in the second sentence is an appropriation amount 
subject to the write-in veto. Under either argument, the Governor 
contends that his write-in veto in the present case is 
constitutional. We shall discuss each of these positions in turn.  
II. 
¶17 The Governor's contention that the write-in veto 
applies to any monetary figure in an appropriation bill and is 
not limited to appropriation amounts rests on the Governor’s 
interpretation of C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d 484. In C.U.B. the Governor 
had exercised his veto by striking the figure $350,000 and 
writing in $250,000 in an entry within § 20.005(3), the 
appropriations schedule. The Governor argues that C.U.B. should 
be limited to its factsa veto of an appropriation amountand 
that the court did not intend C.U.B. to address the issue of the 
constitutionality of a write-in veto of a monetary figure that is 
not an appropriation amount. According to the Governor, the 
C.U.B. court's limitation of the write-in veto to appropriation 
amounts merely reflected the fact that the veto at issue in that 
case involved an appropriation amount.  
¶18 In this part of his argument the Governor does not ask 
that we rule narrowly on the facts at hand, but rather that we 
state a generally applicable rule: that the write-in veto applies 
to all monetary figures in appropriation bills. This rule would 
preclude a governor’s writing in "Eau Claire city" in place of 
"Eau Claire county," "37 counties" in place of "72 counties" and 
"Route 69" in place of "Route 151."
8 
                     
8 The Governor's proposed rule would not preclude reducing the 
following monetary figures if set forth in an appropriation 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
8
¶19 We disagree with the Governor’s interpretation of 
C.U.B. for three reasons. First, in C.U.B. the court relied on 
the oral argument in which the Governor’s counsel focused 
explicitly on the critical necessity to limit the write-in veto 
power of a governor to appropriation amounts. Second, the court 
fully discussed, and then relied upon, Wisconsin Senate as 
creating a dichotomy between appropriation amounts and other 
parts of appropriation bills. Third, the text of the C.U.B. 
decision expressly limits the write-in veto to appropriation 
amounts.  
¶20 At oral argument in the C.U.B. case, counsel for the 
Governor was pressed for a standard by which the court might 
sanction the write-in veto. Counsel for the Governor replied that 
"the standard is if it appears in an appropriation bill first of 
all and it is a number of an appropriation, the Governor may 
reduce it by striking it and writing in a smaller number." The 
following colloquy demonstrates the rule proposed by counsel for 
the Governor and some of the justices' concerns:  
 
Justice 
Bablitch: 
You're 
saying 
that 
only 
an 
appropriation can be approved in whole or in part? 
 
Counsel for the Governor: Yes. And an appropriation 
bill also, as the court has said before. 
 
Justice Abrahamson: But you can't write in on the 
appropriation bill, but you can write in on the 
appropriation? 
 
Counsel for the Governor: Correct. 
 
Justice Geske: Is there any other basis upon which you 
can distinguish between reducing numbers and reducing 
conceptually other concepts? 
 
                                                                  
bill: "Ten Twelve [three] dollars for issuing a copy of a birth 
certificate." See 1995 A.B. 150, § 3343d (executive budget bill) 
(amending Wis. Stat. § 69.22(1)(c)).  
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
9
Counsel for the Governor: If you allow striking outside 
of an appropriation number you're going to run into 
problems very quickly with the 1990 amendment. For 
example, if the legislature passes a bill that says 
"something shall happen in 15 days" and the governor 
can cross that out and write in the number "10," we 
have created a problem because if the legislature had 
written 
out 
in 
script 
"fifteen" 
under 
the 
new 
constitutional amendment he could not cross out the 
letters to get to "ten."  
 
Justice 
Geske: 
So 
you 
agree 
with 
Mr. 
Adelman 
[petitioner's counsel] on the numbers outside of 
appropriation numbers? 
 
Counsel for the Governor: Yes. But at the core of the 
partial veto authority are dollars. That is the core; 
that is what the people were speaking to in 1930, the 
first amendment, and in 1990 when it was amended again. 
If the governor can approve parts of appropriation 
bills, and this court has certainly held that the 
governor can, and included within that concept is part 
of appropriations. That is, I thought, the easier 
concept to grasp. 
¶21 Addressing the concerns of these justices and adopting 
the limited rule proposed by counsel for the Governor, C.U.B. 
expressly draws a distinction between appropriation amounts and 
other parts of appropriation bills, allowing a write-in veto of 
the former but not the latter. C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 499, 506 
n.13, 508-10. 
¶22 The second indication that C.U.B. limited the write-in 
veto to appropriation amounts is that it rested its holding on 
precedent, namely Wisconsin Senate. C.U.B. interpreted Wisconsin 
Senate as having “set forth a dichotomy between a governor's 
partial veto power over appropriation figures and over non-
appropriation parts of an appropriation bill” and having declared 
that “a governor has the power to reduce an appropriation, 
whereas he may only strike out letters, digits or words in regard 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
10
to non-appropriation concepts in the appropriation bill.” C.U.B., 
194 Wis. 2d at 499.
9 
¶23 Third, the text of the C.U.B. opinion limits the write-
in veto to appropriation amounts. To quote the C.U.B opinion, the 
issue presented was whether the partial veto power "permits the 
governor to strike a numerical sum appropriated in the bill and 
to insert a different, smaller number as the appropriated sum." 
Id. at 488. The court responded unequivocally in the affirmative 
to this issue: “We now make explicit the fact that a governor may 
only reduce an appropriation by a number contained within the 
original appropriation allotment.” C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 508-09.  
¶24 And further, in response to the specter raised by the 
dissent of an unlimited write-in veto power, the C.U.B. majority 
explicitly addressed the issue of a write-in veto of other 
monetary sums and limited the C.U.B. decision to a write-in veto 
of appropriation amounts. Id. at 510-11 n.18. 
¶25 The C.U.B. majority emphasized the limited nature of 
its holding, as follows: "[F]or the powers of the governor to be 
extended in the fashion suggested by the dissent, this court 
                     
9 The C.U.B. court summarized its reading of Wisconsin Senate as 
follows: 
[T]his court 
has already 
implicitly limited the 
governor's power in this area in Wisconsin Senate to 
reductions of amounts of appropriations. [citation 
omitted] "[C]onsistent with the broad constitutional 
power we have recognized the governor possesses with 
respect to vetoing single letters, words and parts of 
words in an appropriation bill, that the governor has 
similar broad powers to reduce or eliminate numbers and 
amounts of appropriations" . . . . We now make explicit 
the 
fact 
that 
a 
governor 
may 
only 
reduce 
an 
appropriation by a number contained within the original 
appropriation allotment. 
 
Citizens Utility Board v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 508-509 
(quoting Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 457, 424 
N.W.2d 385 (1988)). 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
11
would have to overrule the present decision's limitation to 
reduce only monetary appropriations." C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 510-
11 n.18. The reference to the need for overruling makes 
abundantly clear that this limitation was intended as an element 
of the holding. 
¶26 In numerous parts of the opinion, the C.U.B. court 
sanctioned the write-in veto but limited its applicability to 
lowering appropriation amounts and only appropriation amounts.
10 
The court summed up as follows: 
 
Accepting the common sense rationale of this opinion in 
no way expands the governor's power; rather, the 
approach espoused today simply makes the prescribed 
power of sec. 10(1)(b) more logical. Succinctly stated, 
the governor has the power to approve part of an 
appropriation bill by reducing the amount of money 
appropriated so long as the number is part of the 
original appropriation. This power stems from the right 
to reduce appropriations recognized in Wisconsin Senate 
and extends only to monetary figures and is not 
applicable in the context of any other part of an 
appropriation. 
 
Id. at 510 (emphasis added). Only monetary figures which are 
appropriation amounts are subject to the write-in veto power 
under C.U.B.. 
¶27 In sum, 
the Governor’s 
interpretation 
of 
C.U.B. 
contravenes the basis upon which C.U.B. was argued by the parties 
                     
10 See, e.g., C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 506 n.13 (the write-in veto 
applies “whether the legislature chooses to write out the amount 
of the appropriation in word form. . . . a 'part' of a larger 
appropriation sum is any sum, whether written out in words or 
specified with numerals.”); Id. at 506 n.13 (“what matters is 
the distinction between an appropriation sum and a non-
appropriation sum”); Id. at 509 (“we now make explicit the fact 
that a governor may only reduce an appropriation by a number 
contained within the original appropriation allotment”); Id. at 
510 (“Succinctly stated, the governor has the power to approve 
part of an appropriation bill by reducing the amount of money 
appropriated so long as the number is part of the original 
appropriation”); Id. at 510 (the governor’s write-in veto power 
“extends only to monetary figures and is not applicable in the 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
12
and written by the court. The C.U.B. decision adjudicated the 
constitutional scope of the governor's write-in veto power and is 
precedential.
11 Accordingly, following precedent we conclude that 
the constitution prohibits a write-in veto of monetary figures 
which are not appropriation amounts. 
III. 
¶28 The Governor’s second argument is that even if C.U.B. 
limits the write-in veto to appropriation amounts, the vetoed 
figure in the second sentence of section 57 is an appropriation 
amount. The Governor advances several overlapping and related 
rationales for characterizing the monetary figure in the second 
sentence as an appropriation amount.  
¶29 First, the Governor asserts that the revenue bonding 
limit at issue in the case at bar lies within the definitions of 
appropriation set out in Finnegan, 220 Wis. 143. To determine 
that the bill in question in that case did not contain an 
appropriation, the Finnegan court was called upon to define the 
word appropriation. The court set forth three similar definitions 
as follows:  
In 
Webster's 
New 
International 
Dictionary 
the 
following definition is made: 
 
"Appropriation bill. Govt. A measure before a 
legislative body authorizing the expenditure of public 
moneys and stipulating the amount, manner, and purpose 
of the various items of expenditure." 
                                                                  
context of any other aspect of an appropriation”).  
11 The Governor implies that the C.U.B. court's comments about a 
governor's power to write in a veto relating to non-
appropriation amounts are dicta. The court has stated, however, 
that "when a court of last resort intentionally takes up, 
discusses, and decides a question germane to, though not 
necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a 
dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will 
thereafter recognize as a binding decision.” State v. Kruse, 101 
Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981) (quoting Chase v. 
American Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 N.W. 598 (1922)). 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
13
 
In State v. LaGrave, 23 Nev. 25, 41 Pac. 1075, 
1076, the court said: 
 
"An appropriation in the sense of the constitution 
means the setting apart a portion of the public funds 
for a public purpose." 
 
In Hunt v. Callaghan, 32 Ariz. 235, 257 Pac. 648, 
649, the court said: 
 
"An appropriation is 'the setting aside from the 
public revenue of a certain sum of money for a 
specified object, in such manner that the executive 
officers of the government are authorized to use that 
money, and no more, for that object, and no other." 
 
Id. at 148; Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 688. Under each definition, an 
appropriation involves an expenditure or setting aside of public 
funds for a particular purpose. 
¶30 We can find nothing in section 57 that authorizes an 
expenditure or the setting aside of public funds for a particular 
purpose. Section 57 deals with raising revenue and limiting the 
use to which the revenue may be put. Sentences one and two 
provide that revenue obligations may be contracted for under 
certain conditions and not in excess of a certain amount. The 
third sentence provides that no more than a stated amount may be 
used for two specified transportation purposes. Section 57 thus 
establishes a level of funds that the state is authorized to 
generate by the sale of bonds and limits the purposes for which 
the revenue raised may be expended. 
¶31 Section 57 does not appropriate the funds. The sale of 
bonds is the commitment of the state to a debtor relation to 
those who purchase the bonds and is therefore distinguishable 
from an appropriation.
12 The sale of bonds is revenue raising; 
revenue raising and appropriation are more nearly antonyms than 
                     
12 The contracting of state debt is governed by Wis. Const. art. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
14
synonyms. Finnegan, 220 Wis. at 148. Whether the three sentences 
of section 57 are looked at individually or collectively, 
increasing a bond authorization and limiting the purposes for 
which a certain amount of the moneys raised might be used do not 
constitute an expenditure or setting aside of public funds for a 
particular purpose. 
¶32 We are unpersuaded by the Governor’s position that 
section 57 is an appropriation because this view contravenes 
legislative procedures relating to appropriations. In Wisconsin 
all appropriations are listed in chapter 20 of the statutes. Wis. 
Stat. § 20.003(2) governs the enactment of appropriations as 
follows: 
All appropriations made by the legislature shall be 
listed in this chapter. The revisor of statutes shall 
assign numbers in this chapter to any appropriation not 
so numbered and if appropriation laws are enacted which 
are not so numbered to correspond with the numbering 
system of this chapter as outlined in sub. (3), the 
revisor 
of 
statutes 
shall 
renumber 
such 
laws 
accordingly. 
¶33 The legislative attorneys at the Legislative Reference 
Bureau, upon whom the task of drafting legislation falls, Wis. 
Stat. § 13.92(1)(b)1, follow a drafting manual to implement the 
statutory directives of § 20.003(2). The Bill Drafting Manual 
instructs that: "[s]ubchapters II to IX of ch. 20, stats., 
provide the appropriation 'text.' The text is the enactment of 
law providing for the appropriations." Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual 1997-1998, § 20.001(2) 
(revised August 1996). "The text of a statutory appropriation 
paragraph must state from what fund the money is appropriated and 
                                                                  
VIII. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
15
the type, duration and general purpose of the appropriation." Id. 
at § 20.02.  
¶34 The requirement that appropriations be listed in 
chapter 20 of the statutes is consistently heeded. With one early 
exception, namely Henry,
13 in each of the prior partial veto cases 
in which the court affirmed a governor's power to veto in part, 
the appropriation was listed in ch. 20. Section 57, on the other 
hand, amended a statute found in chapter 84, governing highways. 
¶35 Finnegan, 220 Wis. at 147-48, and legislative practice 
thus make clear that a change in a revenue generation provision 
is not an appropriation. 
¶36 A second and overlapping rationale urged by the 
Governor is that the monetary figure in the second sentence of 
section 57 is an appropriation amount because the figure affects 
and is closely interrelated with appropriations found elsewhere 
in the bill and in the statutes. 
¶37 The Governor reasons as follows: Various sections of 
ch. 20 effectively appropriate all the moneys raised through 
sales of § 84.59 revenue obligations for use on transportation 
projects and facilities; the second sentence of section 57 raises 
the limit on revenue obligations which may be sold under § 84.59; 
no further legislative action is necessary to expend any funds 
raised 
under 
the 
authority 
of 
the 
increase 
in 
revenue 
obligations; thus, the second sentence of section 57 is an 
appropriation. 
                     
13 In the first partial veto case, State ex rel. Wisconsin 
Telephone Company v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 260 N.W.2d 486 (1935), 
section 8 of 1935 A.B. 48 was titled "Appropriations." The bill 
did not specify a statutory section in which the appropriations 
were to be codified.  
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
16
¶38 The Governor reads Finnegan as stating that if a bill 
contains provisions which set in motion a chain of events such 
that funds are disbursed without further legislative action, the 
bill contains an appropriation. This is not what Finnegan says. 
Indeed the Governor's argument was explicitly rejected by the 
court in Finnegan.  
¶39 Finnegan construed the constitution as barring exercise 
of the partial veto on parts of any bill which "does not within 
its four corners contain an appropriation." Finnegan, 220 Wis. 2d 
at 147.
14 The bill at issue in Finnegan increased a revenue 
raising provision; it increased the permit fees to be paid by 
motor carriers. The increase in permit fees changed the amount 
appropriated because the funds generated by the fees were 
appropriated by a previously enacted appropriation. When the 
governor struck the sentences increasing the fees, the partial 
veto was challenged on the ground that the bill was not an 
appropriation bill. The Secretary of State argued that the fee 
increase 
in 
concert 
with 
other 
statutes 
constituted 
an 
appropriation.
15 
¶40 The Finnegan court applied its four corners rule by 
inquiring whether "the fact that [the bill] indirectly affects 
continuing revolving fund appropriations theretofore enacted by 
raising the permit fees of various types of carriers, constitute 
it an appropriation bill.” Finnegan, 220 Wis. 2d at 147-48. The 
                     
14 Finnegan has been cited with approval in numerous cases, 
including most recently in C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 494. See also 
Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis 2d at 441-42; State ex rel. Kleczka v. 
Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 689, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978); State ex rel. 
Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 131, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976).  
15 Brief for Defendant at 7-10, Cases and Briefs, Vol. 1990, 
Wisconsin State Law Library.  
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
17
Finnegan court concluded: “We are convinced that this question 
must be answered in the negative." Id. at 148. In sum, the fact 
that a provision generates revenue and affects an appropriation 
because the amount appropriated is determined by the amount of 
revenue generated does not convert the bill into an appropriation 
bill nor the provision into an appropriation.  
¶41 Finnegan's result was based on the court's construction 
of the 1930 amendment, the same constitutional text at issue 
here. The Finnegan court's analysis of the intent underlying the 
newly enacted amendment led it to conclude that extending the 
partial veto power to provisions which raise revenue would extend 
the scope of that power “far beyond the evils it was designed to 
correct." Id. at 148. The evil principally in view at the time 
was the practice of legislative logrolling.
16  
¶42 In Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 454-55, 457, 461, 
and C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 509, the court emphasized a different 
rationale for the partial veto: the governor's significant 
constitutional role in the budget process. With this emphasis, 
those decisions read the governor's authority as at its broadest 
when vetoing appropriation amounts. 
¶43 The budgetary control rationale is consistent with 
limiting the write-in power of the governor to the reduction of 
appropriation amounts. At the core of our tripartite system of 
government is the principle that the power of each branch must 
know limits. Wisconsin governors have perhaps more extensive 
                     
16 The evil was "the practice of jumbling together in one act 
inconsistent subjects in order to force a passage by uniting 
minorities with different interests when the particular 
provisions could not pass on their separate merits." State ex 
rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 447-48, 289 N.W. 662 
(1940). 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
18
power to alter legislation than do any other state governors. But 
a governor's power to craft legislation necessarily must have 
constitutional limits. A write-in veto power which extends beyond 
the reduction of appropriation amounts intrudes too far into the 
constitutional grant of legislative power vested in the Senate 
and the Assembly. Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
¶44 In the 60 years since Finnegan we have rarely been 
called upon to determine whether a provision is an appropriation 
or a bill is an appropriation bill such that the partial veto is 
available to a governor. Because Wisconsin bill drafters follow 
the statutory directive to list appropriations in ch. 20, and 
because we have the benefit of the clear Finnegan rule, we avoid 
the repeated need to resolve this question. Under the Governor's 
proposal the courts would be pressed to determine anew in each 
case whether a provision was an appropriation. This course should 
be avoided.  
¶45 The Governor advances no argument to explain or 
distinguish the reasoning or holding of Finnegan. Applying the 
teachings of Finnegan to this case we must conclude that the 
monetary figure in the second sentence in issue here is not an 
appropriation amount. Nor does the interrelationship of that 
provision with the statutory scheme transform the provision into 
an appropriation amount.  
¶46 We reject the Governor's expansive view of what 
constitutes an appropriation for purposes of his write-in veto 
authority. A governor can strike parts of a bill if that bill 
contains an appropriation. Only when a governor seeks to exercise 
the write-in veto is this partial veto power limited further. The 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
19
constitution, as interpreted by C.U.B. and Finnegan, cabins the 
write-in veto power to monetary figures which are themselves 
appropriation amounts. 
IV. 
¶47 Aside 
from 
the 
teachings 
of 
Finnegan, 
we 
are 
unpersuaded by the Governor’s proposed expansive and flexible 
definition of appropriation because (1) it is in conflict with 
the court's interpretation of the word appropriation in a related 
constitutional provision; (2) it is in conflict with the 
Governor’s veto message explaining the partial veto of section 
57; and (3) it would disturb a core principle of our art. V, § 10 
jurisprudence. 
¶48 First, the Governor’s position contravenes other case 
law. The word "appropriation" appears in several other provisions 
in the Wisconsin constitution.
17 Although the interpretation of a 
word used in a constitutional provision is not determinative of 
the word’s meaning in all constitutional provisions, it may prove 
helpful. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185 (1891), 
raised the issue of the meaning of the word appropriation as used 
in art. VIII, § 8.  
¶49 In McDonald a 
criminal 
defendant 
challenged his 
conviction on the ground that the bill creating the fifteenth 
judicial circuit, in which he was prosecuted, was not enacted 
pursuant to the mandates of art. VIII, § 8. Thus, the court was 
                     
17 Art. VIII, § 2 states that "[n]o money shall be paid out of 
the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law." 
Art. VIII, § 8 provides that any law which "makes, continues or 
renews an appropriation of public or trust money" requires a 
three-fifths quorum and a vote of yeas and nays entered in the 
journal. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
20
called upon to determine whether the bill made, continued or 
renewed an appropriation. 
¶50 McDonald argued that because the bill created a 
judgeship which necessarily would be funded from existing 
appropriations without further legislative action, the bill made 
an appropriation for purposes of art. VIII, § 8. The court 
concluded that the provision creating the judgeship was not an 
appropriation because it did not in itself appropriate funds. Id. 
at 
412-13. 
The 
bill’s 
indirect 
effect 
on 
an 
existing 
appropriation was not enough to transform this provision into an 
appropriation. 
¶51 The McDonald rule is consistent with Finnegan. A 
necessary relation between the provision in issue and another 
provision which is an appropriation does not transform the 
provision in issue into an appropriation. 
¶52 Second, the Governor’s position in the case at bar, 
that the figure in the second sentence is an appropriation 
amount, conflicts with the position the Governor took in his veto 
message explaining the write-in veto of section 57.
18 The 
                     
18 The Governor reported his objections to the disapproved parts 
as follows: 
The revenue obligation limit and appropriation level in 
the bill reflect actions by the Legislature to provide 
$40,000,000 in additional revenue bonding authority 
over the 1995-97 biennium to replace anticipated 
decreases in federal highway aid. I object to this 
increase in bonding authority because it does not 
reflect sound fiscal management of the transportation 
fund. This additional bonding authority contributes to 
increasing the share of the major highway program 
funded from revenue bond proceeds from the historical 
55% to almost 75%. Furthermore, this additional amount 
of borrowing for infrastructure projects presents 
problems for future transportation budgets. Prudent 
financial management demands that debt be balanced with 
sufficient revenues. Replacing declining federal aid 
primarily with bond proceeds will divert limited future 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
21
Governor’s veto message to the legislature clearly distinguished 
the two write-in vetoes, one of the section 57 revenue obligation 
limit increase and the other of an item in the § 20.005(3) 
appropriations schedule. Although the Governor clearly saw the 
two as interrelated, he clearly characterized the bond provision 
as a revenue raising provision and the § 20.005(3) provision as 
an appropriation. He did not characterize the revenue obligation 
limit to be an appropriation. 
¶53 Aside from these two considerations and considerations 
of stare decisis, we adhere to Finnegan because it is a sound 
interpretation of the Wisconsin constitution. The Governor asks 
us 
to 
find 
an 
appropriation 
by 
analyzing 
the 
complex 
interrelation of various statutes so that what appears to be an 
amount authorizing bonding is actually an appropriation amount. 
The dangers of the Governor’s approach are obvious. 
¶54 Were we to agree with the Governor's expansive reading 
that a monetary sum “interrelated” with an appropriation is an 
                                                                  
transportation fund revenues for debt service. By 
vetoing the revenue obligation limit established under 
s. 84.59(6) and writing in a smaller amount that 
deletes the $40,000,000 increase in bonding authority, 
I am vetoing the increase of the revenue obligation 
limit. By vetoing the Department of Transportation's 
appropriation under s. 20.395(3)(br) and writing in a 
smaller amount that deletes the $20,000,000 SEG-S 
[segregated 
service 
funds, 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 20.001(2)(da)] in each fiscal year of the 1995-97 
biennium, I am vetoing the authorization to expend 
proceeds of revenue obligations issued under this 
increase in the revenue obligation limit. I am also 
requesting the Department of Administration Secretary 
not to allot these funds. 
 
Veto message at 1 (emphasis added).  
The parties, by stipulation, attached a portion of the 
Governor's veto message as an appendix to the petitioners' 
brief. The appendix did not include the language quoted above. 
The entire veto message is on file at the Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, WI. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
22
appropriation 
we 
would 
expand 
the 
definition 
of 
the 
constitutional term "appropriation bill" and the governor’s 
partial veto power beyond the limits recognized in Finnegan and 
the court's subsequent holdings. This we are not free to do. 
¶55 If a provision authorizing the raising of revenue can 
be considered an appropriation amount, there would be no 
discernible distinction, certainly no clearly applicable one, 
with which to differentiate appropriation bills from all other 
bills. Much, if not all, legislation would be susceptible to the 
partial veto, perhaps even to a governor’s write-in veto, because 
much, if not all, legislation can affect and be interrelated with 
the appropriation of money. 
¶56 By adopting the Governor’s position we would be 
abandoning Finnegan’s bright line rule for determining what is an 
appropriation and what is an appropriation bill. A bright line 
rule is especially suitable when the court is called upon, as we 
are in veto cases, to referee disputes between our co-equal 
branches of government. In such disputes the constitution must 
have intended that whenever possible a court provide clear 
guidance to the other two branches to preclude continuing 
judicial involvement in and the need for frequent judicial 
resolution of inter-branch disputes.  
¶57 The Finnegan bright line rule affords the legislature 
and the Governor the ability to predict the consequences of their 
actions and to guide their conduct accordingly without the 
intercession of the judicial branch. The separation of powers 
principle operates best when the judiciary is not continually 
called upon to resolve conflicts between the other two branches. 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
23
The large volume of veto litigation is not a sign of a healthy 
discourse on state constitutional law. It indicates that the 
branches have been unable to resolve the issues with clarity. 
¶58 We disagree with the Governor's suggestion that the 
constitution intended a flexible rule defining an appropriation 
amount subject to the write-in veto and therefore defining an 
appropriation bill subject to the partial veto. Far from giving 
us reason to revisit the Finnegan "four corners" approach, 60 
years of partial veto cases, including the present one, 
demonstrate the need to reaffirm the Finnegan principles.  
¶59 We conclude that the Wisconsin constitution does not 
authorize the Governor to disapprove parts of legislation by 
writing in new numbers except when the part disapproved is a 
monetary figure which expresses an appropriation amount in an 
appropriation 
bill 
and 
the 
inserted 
number 
is 
a 
lesser 
appropriation amount.
19 Figures in appropriation bills which are 
not themselves appropriation amounts but which affect and are 
closely interrelated with an appropriation are not subject to the 
write-in veto.  
 
By the Court.Rights declared. 
                     
19 It is of no import whether the appropriation amount is 
expressed in numerals or numeric words. The court has addressed 
this issue as follows: "it is not the underlying conceptual 
framework that matters, rather, what matters is the distinction 
between an appropriation sum and a non-appropriation sum." 
C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 506 n.13 (citation omitted). 
 
 
No.  96-0042-OA 
 
 
24
 
 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
1
¶60 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (dissenting).  The majority 
holds that "the Wisconsin constitution does not authorize 
the Governor to disapprove parts of legislation by writing 
in new numbers except when the part disapproved is a 
monetary figure which expresses an appropriation amount in 
an appropriation bill and the inserted number is a lesser 
appropriation amount."  Majority op. at 25.  In determining 
the limitations to the governor's partial veto power, the 
majority 
distinguishes 
between 
monetary 
figures 
in 
appropriation bills that are appropriation amounts, which 
are subject to the partial veto power, and monetary figures 
in appropriation bills that "affect and are closely 
interrelated with an appropriation," which are not subject 
to such power.  Id.  I do not join the majority opinion 
because I do not agree that the court in Citizens Utility 
Board v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 510, 534 N.W.2d 608 
(1995) 
(hereinafter 
"C.U.B."), 
recognized 
such 
a 
distinction. 
¶61 I also do not join the majority opinion because I 
do not agree that in State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 
Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622 (1936), the court "construed the 
constitution as barring exercise of the partial veto power 
on parts of any bill which 'does not within its four 
corners contain an appropriation.'" Majority op. at 17 
(emphasis added).  The Finnegan court held that the 
exercise of the partial veto power does not extend to any 
bill that does not contain an appropriation within its four 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
2
corners, not that such power does not extend to any part of 
an 
appropriation 
bill 
that 
does 
not 
contain 
an 
appropriation within the four corners of that part.  220 
Wis. at 147-49. 
I.  
¶62 The 
power 
of 
the 
governor 
to 
approve 
appropriation bills in part, as provided by the 1930 
amendment to article V, section 10(1) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, is a "uniquely broad and expansive power." 
State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 
429, 450, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988).  For example, in State ex 
rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 315, 
260 N.W. 486 (1935), this court stated: "[T]here is nothing 
in [art. V, sec. 10] which warrants the inference or 
conclusion that the governor's power of partial veto was 
not intended to be as coextensive as the legislature's 
power to join and enact separable pieces of legislation in 
an appropriation bill."  The partial veto power provides 
the governor with a "quasi-legislative" authority, State ex 
rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 134, 237 N.W.2d 910 
(1976), in that the governor can affirmatively legislate by 
exercising this power.  Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 
453.   
¶63 The grant of partial veto power was partially 
"aimed at achieving joint exercise of legislative authority 
by the governor and the legislature over appropriation 
bills.  It gave the governor a constitutionally recognized 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
3
role in the legislative budgetary function."  Id. at 454.  
Accordingly, 
the 
underlying 
purpose 
of 
the 
1930 
constitutional amendment was to give the governor strong 
authority to control spending.  As this court has stated: 
"[A]n important rationale of the partial veto is clearly 
linked 
to expenditure 
reduction 
and 
fiscal 
balance."  
C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 509.   
¶64 Along these lines, this court has held that the 
governor has the power to veto any part of an appropriation 
bill, regardless of whether such part is an appropriation 
amount.  Sundby, 71 Wis. 2d at 130; Henry, 218 Wis. at 314-
15.  We have also held that the governor can strike words, 
phrases, and digits from an appropriation bill.  Wisconsin 
Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 457.  Furthermore, this court has 
determined that "the governor has the power to approve part 
of an appropriation bill by reducing the amount of money 
appropriated so long as the number is part of the original 
appropriation."  C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 510.  Regardless of 
the manner in which the governor exercises the partial veto 
power, the result must be that the remaining part of the 
bill is a complete, workable law.  State ex rel. Martin v. 
Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 450, 289 N.W.2d 662 (1940).      
¶65 In the present case, Petitioners concede that 
Section 57 was an appropriation bill, and that Governor 
Thompson had the power to strike the monetary figure at 
issue.  Petitioners only question whether the Governor had 
the power to write in a different, smaller amount in the 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
4
second sentence of section 57.  Thus, the pertinent inquiry 
is:  Under what circumstances did the C.U.B. court 
determine the governor can exercise his or her write-in 
veto power?  
¶66 In C.U.B., this court considered whether the 
partial veto power authorizes the governor to strike an 
appropriated sum contained within an appropriation bill and 
insert a different, smaller number as the appropriated sum. 
 194 Wis. at 488.  The court held that the governor "may 
strike a numerical sum set forth in an appropriation and 
insert a different, smaller number as the appropriated 
sum."  Id. at 504.  The C.U.B. court did not determine that 
this write-in veto power does not similarly extend to a 
monetary figure that is inseparably connected to an 
appropriation amount, or to such figures "which affect and 
are closely related with an appropriation."  Majority op. 
at 25.  The C.U.B. decision reflects the fact that the 
write-in veto at issue there involved only an appropriation 
amount.  
¶67 Although the C.U.B. court did not determine that 
the write-in veto power does not extend to a monetary 
figure that is inseparably connected to an appropriation 
amount, the majority concludes that this is a proper 
reading of C.U.B.  However, this interpretation, in its 
application here, is contrary to common sense.  Consider 
the effect of the majority's conclusion that the write-in 
veto is not valid.  The majority concludes that the 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
5
Governor may strike the monetary sum in the second sentence 
of section 57, but may not write in a different, smaller 
amount.  In the third sentence, the Governor struck the 
same figure and wrote in the same new figure as he did in 
the second sentence of section 57.  He also struck and 
wrote in other figures in the third sentence as well.20  If 
the governor may use the write-in veto power in regard to 
monetary amounts in the third sentence, but not the second 
sentence, the following is the result:  
 
Section 57. 84.59(6) of the statutes is amended 
to read: 
  84.59(6) Revenue obligations may be contracted 
by the building commission when it reasonably 
appears to the building commission that all 
obligations incurred under this section can be 
fully paid from moneys received or anticipated 
and pledged to be received on a timely bases.  
Revenue obligations issued under this section 
shall not exceed ---------- in principal amount, 
excluding 
obligations 
issued 
to 
refund 
outstanding revenue obligations.  Not more than 
$1,041,341,000 of the $1,083,638,100 may be used 
for transportation facilities under s. 84.01(28) 
and major highway projects under ss. 84.06 and 
84.09. 
¶68 Therefore, in accord with the reasoning of the 
majority, the building commission has no authority to raise 
the revenue through bonding, because the Governor has 
struck this amount.  Yet, the provisions in the third 
sentence that allocate the money remain intact.21  
                     
20  The majority indicates that the write-in vetoes in the 
third sentence "were not challenged or discussed in the 
briefs by either party."  Majority op. at 6.  Accordingly, 
the governor's striking of the original number in the third 
sentence, and his writing in of a different, smaller 
number, will be unaltered.   
21  The majority contends that the third sentence places a 
limit on the purposes for which the revenue raised may be 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
6
¶69 The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
article 
V, 
section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution is not consistent 
with 
the 
budgetary 
control 
rationale 
underlying 
the 
governor's power, contrary to its contention.  See majority 
op. at 19.  Instead, this interpretation leads to an absurd 
result in the budget, and a bill which is not a "complete, 
workable law."  See Martin, 233 Wis. at 450.   
¶70 In addition, I do not agree that, if the write-in 
veto power extends to sentence two, this will intrude too 
far into the constitutional grant of legislative power 
vested in the Senate and Assembly.  See majority op. at 19. 
 The Governor undisputedly can strike the entire figure of 
"$1,123,638,100" from sentence two, or can change it to a 
variety of smaller amounts, such as $123,638,100, $638,100, 
or $100.  Since the Governor possesses such authority, then 
why does the majority find it to be an intrusion upon the 
legislative power when he reduces such an amount by writing 
in a smaller figure?  As the C.U.B. court determined: 
"Simply put, to accept the conclusion that the governor has 
the authority to strike digits from an appropriation bill, 
but not the authority to write in smaller digits, elevates 
form over substance in contravention of common sense and 
case law."  C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 507.  Likewise, as the 
                                                             
used.  Majority op. at 14.  However, the third sentence is 
not merely a use limitation.  Rather, it is an 
appropriation, because it sets apart a portion of public 
funds for a public purpose or specified object.  See State 
ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d at 679, 689, 264 
N.W.2d 539 (1978) (quoting Finnegan, 220 Wis. at 148). 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
7
petitioners 
in 
Wisconsin 
Senate 
recognized: 
"It 
is 
difficult to imagine what public purpose or policy might be 
served by permitting a governor to reduce appropriations 
but restricting the reductions to the limited subset of 
figures 
derivable 
from 
the 
digits 
in 
a 
particular 
appropriation." Petitioner's brief in Wisconsin Senate at 
43, quoted in C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 507 n.15. 
¶71 Moreover, the majority approach results in the 
governor's power to disassemble legislation not being 
coextensive with the legislature's power to assemble it.  
This directly contradicts established precedent, in which 
this court has recognized that the partial veto power is a 
broad and expansive authority, a quasi-legislative power 
that 
gives 
the 
governor 
joint 
authority 
with 
the 
legislature 
to approve 
and 
veto 
appropriation bills.  
Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 450, 453; Sundby, 71 Wis. 
2d at 134; Henry, 218 Wis. at 315.  
¶72 Accordingly, I am convinced that, after reading 
the C.U.B. decision, the C.U.B. court did not intend to 
draw a sharp distinction between "non-appropriation" and 
"appropriation" amounts in determining a limitation on the 
exercise of the partial veto power, especially when the 
amount 
at 
issue 
is 
inseparably 
connected 
to 
an 
appropriation amount.  Instead, I am persuaded that, 
pursuant to C.U.B., the governor's write-in veto power 
extends to: (1) any monetary sum; (2) in an appropriation 
bill; (3) if the monetary sum is an appropriation or is 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
8
inseparably connected to an appropriation.22  Support for 
this conclusion is found in the following language from 
C.U.B.: "We conclude that the governor, acting within the 
scope of his power derived from Art. V., sec. 10 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, may strike a numerical sum set 
forth in an appropriation and insert a different, smaller 
number as the appropriated sum;" and, "Succinctly stated, 
the governor has the 
power to 
approve 
part of 
an 
appropriation 
bill 
by 
reducing 
the 
amount 
of 
money 
appropriated so long as the number is part of the original 
appropriation.  This power stems from the right to reduce 
appropriations recognized in Wisconsin Senate and extends 
only to monetary figures and is not applicable in the 
context of any other aspect of an appropriation."  C.U.B., 
194 Wis. 2d at 504, 510 (emphasis added).  Upholding the 
write-in veto power under the circumstances outlined herein 
is consistent with a rational, logical interpretation of 
C.U.B.  
¶73 Furthermore, this interpretation is in accord 
with the concerns the C.U.B. court indicated it considered 
in 
recognizing 
a 
limitation 
to 
the 
write-in 
veto.  
                     
22  The term "inseparably connected" was originally used by 
this court in Henry, 218 Wis. at 309, the first case 
challenging the governor's veto power.  However, the Henry 
court found it unnecessary to consider whether the 
governor's partial veto power extends to provisos or 
conditions that are "inseparably connected" to an 
appropriation bill.  Instead, the Henry court found that 
the governor's partial veto power extends to any part of an 
appropriation bill.  Nonetheless, it is logical to consider 
this distinction, in order to achieve a rational, logical 
application of C.U.B. to the present case. 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
9
Specifically, the C.U.B. court determined that the write-in 
veto power does not extend to parts of an appropriation 
bill that are conceptually different than monetary figures, 
such as dates, times, counties, cities, groups, and so 
forth.  194 Wis. at 509.  This is demonstrated by the 
court's clear instruction that the governor cannot use such 
power to change "year" to "ten days," or "State of 
Wisconsin" to "City of Milwaukee."  C.U.B., 194 Wis. 2d at 
504, 508-09.  This is further illustrated by the colloquy 
cited in the majority opinion.  As counsel for the Governor 
explained, the write-in veto cannot be exercised to change 
"15 days" to "10 days." Yet, counsel also emphasized that 
"at the core of the partial veto power are dollars."  
Majority op. at 9 (emphasis added). 
¶74 Under the three-part test set forth above, the 
write-in veto in the present case is valid.  The vetoed 
portion of the bill, "$1,123,638,100," is a monetary 
figure. 
 
It 
is 
contained 
in 
section 
57 
of 
the 
transportation budget, which is concededly an appropriation 
bill. 
 
It 
also 
is 
inseparably 
connected 
to 
an 
appropriation.  Specifically, an appropriation is defined 
as "the setting apart a portion of public funds for a 
public purpose." Finnegan, 220 Wis. at 148 (quoting State 
v. LaGrave, 41 P. 1075, 1076 (Nev. 1895)).  In reading 
sentence two of section 57 in conjunction with sentence 
three, it becomes clear that the vetoed portion is 
inseparably connected with the setting aside of public 
 
 
No. 96-0042-OA.NPC   
 
10
funds for the public purpose of transportation projects and 
facilities.  Sentence two must be read in conjunction with 
sentence three, not isolated and removed from the entire 
section.  Furthermore, not only is the second sentence 
inseparably connected with the third sentence, but it is 
also inseparably connected with the entire transportation 
budget.  The second sentence is inseparably connected to 
the entire budget because it authorizes funding for various 
specific transportation projects and facilities. 
II. 
¶75 Upholding the write-in veto power under the 
circumstances outlined herein is not beyond the limits 
recognized in Finnegan.  See majority op. at 13-19, 23.  
First, the majority asserts that the Finnegan court 
rejected the argument that the veto power extends to parts 
of an appropriation bill that are inseparably connected to 
an appropriation.  Majority op. at 16-17.  It did not.  In 
Finnegan, the court rejected the argument that a bill is an 
appropriation bill if it is inseparably connected to 
appropriations in other bills.  Second, the majority 
contends 
that 
the 
Finnegan 
court 
"construed 
the 
constitution as barring exercise of the partial veto power 
on parts of any bill which 'does not within its four 
corners contain an appropriation.'"  Majority op. at 17 
(emphasis added).  Again, this is not an accurate statement 
of the holding in Finnegan.  The Finnegan court held that 
the governor's partial veto power does not extend to any 
 
 
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bill that does not contain an appropriation within its four 
corners, not any part of a bill that does not contain an 
appropriation within its four corners.   
¶76 Furthermore, Finnegan is distinguishable from the 
present case.  In Finnegan, the court considered whether 
the bill at issue was an appropriation bill.  In so doing, 
the court indicated that Henry was not determinative, 
because the bill at issue in Henry was concededly an 
appropriation bill.  Likewise, because the bill at issue in 
the present case is concededly an appropriation bill, 
Finnegan is not determinative here.       
¶77 Finally, contrary to the majority's assertions, 
recognizing that the governor's write-in veto power extends 
to circumstances set forth herein will not expand the 
definition of an appropriation bill.  Majority op. at 23.  
In order for the write-in veto authority to apply, the bill 
at issue must be an appropriation bill.  In other words, 
the bill must set aside public revenue for a public purpose 
or specified object, under Finnegan and its progeny.  
Therefore, the established definition of "appropriation 
bill" would not be at risk of being expanded. 
¶78 Thus, for all of these reasons, I conclude that 
the write-in veto power properly extends to monetary 
amounts in an appropriation bill that are an appropriation, 
or are inseparably connected with an appropriation, as are 
the monetary figures in the second sentence of section 57. 
 Such a conclusion is consistent with a logical, rational, 
 
 
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and common sense reading of C.U.B., and is in accord with 
established precedent.  
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. 
STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.