Title: In the Matter of Foster
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13360
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13360 
 
IN THE MATTER OF KRIS C. FOSTER & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 3, 2023. - August 31, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension, 
Disbarment, Public reprimand.  Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
 
 
 
Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk on September 23, 2022. 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
Joseph M. Makalusky, Assistant Bar Counsel. 
Allen N. David (Kristyn K. St. George also present) for 
Kris C. Foster. 
Patrick Hanley (Thomas J. Butters also present) for John C. 
Verner. 
Thomas R. Kiley (Meredith G. Fierro also present) for Anne 
K. Kaczmarek. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A prosecutor "may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor -- indeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike 
 
1 Anne K. Kaczmarek and John C. Verner. 
2 
 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."  Berger 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  In this appeal, we 
address disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Board of Bar 
Overseers (board) on three assistant attorneys general accused 
of crossing that line. 
 
The consolidated bar disciplinary proceedings arise from 
the respondents' involvement in the withholding of exculpatory 
evidence during the prosecution of a chemist in the State 
Laboratory Institute in Amherst (Amherst lab or drug lab), Sonja 
Farak, by the Attorney General's office (AGO).  As detailed in 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 
700, 705-720 (2018), we dismissed with prejudice thousands of 
pending drug charges and drug convictions tainted by evidence 
tampering at the Amherst lab.  Id. at 725.  This "strong 
medicine" was necessary, we stated, to remedy the intentional 
and egregious governmental misconduct of Farak and two of the 
three respondents, Anne K. Kaczmarek and Kris C. Foster.  Id. 
 
In the wake of the Farak drug lab scandal, bar counsel 
filed petitions for discipline with the board charging 
Kaczmarek, Foster, and John C. Verner with various violations of 
the Massachusetts rules of professional conduct.  The matter was 
heard by a special hearing officer (SHO).  The board adopted in 
full the extensive factual findings of the SHO.  The board 
recommended that Verner, who supervised the Farak prosecution, 
3 
 
be suspended for three months for neglecting his supervisory 
duties.  The board further recommended that Foster, who was 
responsible for the AGO's response to subpoenas and discovery 
motions filed by defense counsel, be suspended for one year and 
one day for her violations that, for the most part, amounted to 
"gross incompetence" and "reckless lawyering."  In so holding, 
the board rejected bar counsel's argument that Foster engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 
426 Mass. 1429 (1998).2  Finally, the board recommended 
disbarment for Kaczmarek, who, as lead prosecutor in the Farak 
case, "[bore] the greatest responsibility" and "the greatest 
culpability."  A single justice reserved and reported the matter 
to the full court. 
 
We adopt, in part, the board's recommendations.  The record 
supports a finding that the prosecutors failed in their 
collective duty to disclose potentially exculpatory information 
that was known to the AGO.  We also conclude, however, that in 
certain circumstances, reasonable and good faith reliance on 
another attorney's representations may be a special mitigating 
factor.  Because Verner reasonably relied in good faith on 
 
2 Because this case concerns misconduct that occurred in 
2013, we refer to the rules of professional conduct as they 
existed at that time.  See Matter of Brauer, 452 Mass. 56, 64 
n.11 (2008). 
4 
 
Kaczmarek's misrepresentations that she had turned over 
exculpatory information, and his liability is limited to failing 
to follow up with her as to whether she had disclosed all such 
information, we differ with the board and conclude that anything 
more severe than a public reprimand would be inappropriate.  
Because Foster was reckless in her representations about what 
the AGO had disclosed, and otherwise exhibited incompetence in 
her response to the subpoena and discovery motions, we accept 
the board's recommendation that she receive a suspension of one 
year and one day.  Finally, because Kaczmarek was most culpable 
for the AGO's failure to turn over all exculpatory information, 
and because she displayed a lack of candor and remorse at the 
disciplinary hearing, we accept the board's recommendation that 
she be disbarred.  The matter is remanded to the county court 
for entry of final judgment. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the relevant factual findings 
of the SHO from his detailed ninety-two page hearing report, as 
adopted by the board, concluding that they are supported by 
substantial evidence.3  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as 
appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009).  We supplement the facts 
 
3 We therefore refer to the SHO's factual findings as those 
of the board.  See Matter of Laroche-St. Fleur, 490 Mass. 1020, 
1021 n.7 (2022), citing Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 449 
n.1, cert. denied sub nom. Eisenhauer v. Massachusetts Bar 
Counsel, 524 U.S. 919 (1998). 
5 
 
with undisputed evidence in the record as needed.  See Matter of 
Angwafo, 453 Mass. 28, 29 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Isaiah 
I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008). 
a.  Arrest and initial investigation of Farak.  From 2004 
through 2013, Farak worked as a chemist at the drug lab, located 
on the campus of the University of Massachusetts in Amherst.  
Farak was responsible for analyzing suspected narcotics 
submitted by law enforcement agencies, issuing drug analysis 
certificates, and testifying in criminal proceedings regarding 
her analyses.  On January 17, 2013, another chemist in the 
Amherst lab noticed that two samples that had been assigned to 
Farak were missing from the evidence locker.  The next day, 
Farak's supervisor searched the lab and found the packaging for 
the two missing samples at Farak's work area.  Farak had 
identified the samples as cocaine, but subsequent testing of the 
substances in the packaging showed one sample adulterated with a 
foreign substance and the other negative for cocaine. 
On the next day, January 18, 2013, the State police began a 
criminal investigation into Farak's potential tampering with 
drug samples submitted for analysis.  The AGO agreed to 
undertake the investigation and the potential prosecution of 
Farak.  In the early morning hours of January 19, 2013, a team 
of investigators, which included State police Sergeant Joseph 
Ballou, executed a search warrant on Farak's car.  The search 
6 
 
team catalogued twenty separate items, including several "zip-
lock" plastic bags containing capsules, pills, and a white 
powder, as well as manila envelopes dated as early as 2008 and 
2009, and what seemed to be assorted paperwork from the drug 
lab.  When the search was complete, the State troopers secured 
the evidence in the evidence room at the Springfield State 
police barracks (Springfield barracks). 
Farak was arrested on January 19, 2013, and arraigned three 
days later, charged with two counts of evidence tampering, and 
possession of cocaine and heroin.  It generally was recognized 
by the AGO that the Farak case was a matter of high importance. 
At the time, Verner was the chief of the AGO's criminal 
bureau, and between 2012 and 2014, Verner managed more than one 
hundred people, including about fifty lawyers.  Verner assigned 
Kaczmarek, an assistant attorney general in the enterprise, 
major, and cyber crimes division (EMC) of the AGO's criminal 
bureau, as lead prosecutor on the Farak case.  Verner chose 
Kaczmarek in part because she had been assigned to, and was at 
the time working on, the prosecution of another State drug 
laboratory chemist who tampered with evidence, Annie Dookhan.  
See Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 
Mass. 298, 303 (2017).  Kaczmarek primarily was responsible for 
the prosecution of Farak, while Verner was available for support 
and assistance as needed. 
7 
 
Verner and Kaczmarek understood early in the Farak case, as 
had been the case in the Dookhan investigation, that defendants 
with pending cases, as well as those who had been convicted on 
the basis of Farak's drug analysis, would be entitled to receive 
from the district attorneys' offices (DAOs) potentially 
exculpatory information obtained by State police and the AGO in 
the investigation and prosecution of Farak.  Verner and 
Kaczmarek further understood that any information inculpatory 
toward Farak potentially would be exculpatory toward those 
defendants. 
Verner adopted the same discovery policy for the Farak case 
that the AGO had in the Dookhan case.  In the Dookhan case, a 
discovery policy had to be created due to the unprecedented 
nature of Dookhan's misconduct and the AGO's indirect 
relationship with affected defendants.  Generally, the vast 
majority of drug cases are prosecuted by the DAOs, so the AGO's 
connection with those defendants affected by Dookhan's 
misconduct was through the DAOs.  Thus, Verner and his 
supervisor, First Assistant Attorney General Edward Bedrosian, 
developed a policy that they would provide "discoverable 
information . . . [w]hether it was exculpatory or not," obtained 
by the State police and the AGO to the DAOs, so that the DAOs 
could provide it to the affected defendants.  Verner made it 
8 
 
clear to Kaczmarek that the AGO would adopt the Dookhan protocol 
in the Farak case. 
During the investigation of Farak, Ballou obtained 
information from a prosecutor in Hampden County regarding two 
cases in which the drug samples appeared to have been tampered 
with by Farak.  On January 23, 2013, after Ballou informed 
Kaczmarek, Verner, and his supervisor, Detective Lieutenant 
Robert Irwin, about the two additional cases, Kaczmarek and 
Verner each approved and authorized Ballou to obtain additional 
information about Farak's potential tampering.  Kaczmarek wrote 
in an e-mail message to Verner, Ballou, and Irwin, "I think this 
is the tip of the iceberg." 
On further investigation, Ballou learned about a March 2012 
case involving suspected oxycodone pills; in that case, Farak 
returned more pills than she had received from police, and the 
pills were different in appearance from those initially 
submitted to the drug lab.   Ballou also learned of a 2005 case 
in which the amount of cocaine had decreased by four grams 
between the time it initially was weighed by police and when it 
was returned by Farak.  A prosecutor involved in the 2005 
"light" cocaine case told Ballou that he thought the difference 
in weight could be explained by the weight of the packaging, 
drying of the product, and inaccuracy in the police scale.  In 
January 2013, Ballou informed Verner and Kaczmarek by e-mail 
9 
 
about the two cases.  In response, Kaczmarek wrote, "Please 
don't let this get more complicated than we thought.  If she 
were suffering from a back injury -- maybe she took some oxys?" 
Despite the oxycodone and cocaine cases, Ballou, Verner, 
and Kaczmarek operated on the theory that Farak's drug use and 
tampering had been confined to cocaine and only dated back to 
November or December 2012; they believed the 2005 cocaine case 
and the 2012 oxycodone case to be "outliers."  The board found 
that the 2012 oxycodone case and the 2005 cocaine case were 
potentially exculpatory evidence.  Verner testified that these 
cases were "exculpatory information," and the SHO did not credit 
that Kaczmarek failed to realize that this evidence was 
potentially exculpatory.  While the 2012 oxycodone case was 
eventually sent to at least one of the DAOs by Ballou, the 2005 
cocaine case was not turned over. 
At around the same time, Kaczmarek also learned that Farak 
had tested positive for cocaine on a urinalysis to which she 
submitted near the time of her arrest, and that Farak had 
admitted to using cocaine on Friday, January 18, the day before 
her arrest.  Kaczmarek forwarded this information to Verner, 
Ballou, and Randall Ravitz, the chief of the appeals division of 
the AGO's criminal bureau.  Verner testified that he agreed that 
the January 2013 urinalysis potentially was exculpatory, but 
Kaczmarek denied that it was. 
10 
 
By the end of January, Farak's conduct was attracting 
considerable attention.  A colleague sent an e-mail message to 
Verner and Kaczmarek that the district attorney for the Hampden 
district "was getting pressure from the judges to identify cases 
that were handled by Farak." 
 
b.  Discovery of mental health worksheets.  On February 14, 
Ballou reviewed the paperwork in the manila envelopes recovered 
from the search of Farak's car.  Ballou realized that papers 
police originally thought were related to the drug lab actually 
were personal papers, which included mental health counselling 
worksheets that detailed Farak's struggles with drug addiction, 
as well as her failed efforts to resist using drugs at work.  
Handwritten notes on these papers suggested that Farak's 
misconduct may have had a longer history than the AGO had 
realized.  Ballou, knowing that Kaczmarek was preparing for a 
grand jury and recognizing the potentially inculpatory value of 
the mental health worksheets, telephoned Kaczmarek to tell her 
about them.  During the telephone call, he expressed a concern 
that the worksheets could be privileged.  Kaczmarek said that 
she would inquire of Verner whether a court order was needed to 
present them to the grand jury. 
That same day, Ballou scanned and attached eleven pages 
found within Farak's vehicle to an e-mail message with the 
subject "FARAK Admissions" addressed to Irwin, Kaczmarek, and 
11 
 
Verner.  The first four pages were news articles, dated sometime 
in 2011, about drug use by law enforcement officers, a 
pharmacist, and a former technician of a drug laboratory in 
another State, with what appeared to be Farak's handwritten 
comments in the margins discussing their drug use.  Ballou 
included these articles because he believed they indicated that 
"the case could have gone back much further than the time frame 
[at which they] had been looking."  In the remaining pages, 
Farak referenced lying on or about a Drug Enforcement Agency 
application, having "urge-ful" samples to analyze at work, 
having urges to use a good sample at work, and knowing there 
would be periods when she would be alone at work.  One of the 
pages provided:  "Thursday:  tried to resist using @ work, but 
ended up failing"; and "Friday:  @ work use w/out debating doing 
it." 
 
When Kaczmarek received Ballou's e-mail message, she 
reviewed the pages and researched their contents for about 
thirty minutes.  Kaczmarek then saved a combined electronic copy 
of the documents on her computer, titling the file "mental 
health worksheets."  Kaczmarek also printed copies of each 
document, placed them in a manila envelope likewise labeled 
"mental health worksheets," and added the envelope to a box 
dedicated to Farak's trial.  In a follow-up telephone call with 
Kaczmarek, Ballou advised her that, because "there were so many 
12 
 
papers and things" seized from Farak's car, she should "come out 
and look" at everything, not just the eleven pages he had sent 
to her by e-mail.  She never did. 
 
Kaczmarek sought Verner's advice about whether to include 
the mental health worksheets in her grand jury presentation.  
She told Verner that there had been documents discovered in 
Farak's car in which Farak "was talking about how she felt using 
drugs and it may have been with some form of clinician" but that 
she had a concern that the documents might be privileged.  
Verner advised Kaczmarek not to include the mental health 
worksheets in her grand jury presentation.  Kaczmarek told 
Ballou that she had discussed the issue with Verner and that 
they had decided not to include the mental health worksheets in 
the grand jury presentation because they had sufficient evidence 
without the worksheets. 
Before the SHO, Verner testified that he neither had read 
Ballou's e-mail message nor opened the attachments.  The SHO 
rejected this testimony as not credible and found instead that 
he had looked at the attachments.  The SHO also found that both 
Kaczmarek and Verner had known the documents Ballou had sent 
them were exculpatory:  "Any prosecutor or criminal defense 
counsel who spent even a few minutes reviewing the attachments 
to Ballou's February 14 [e-mail message] would have recognized 
their significance:  highly inculpatory to Farak, and highly 
13 
 
exculpatory to all Farak defendants."  The mental health 
worksheets remained in the evidence room at the Springfield 
barracks.4  Copies of the mental health worksheets also were on 
Kaczmarek's computer, on Verner's computer as an attachment to 
Ballou's February 14, 2013, e-mail message, and in Kaczmarek's 
trial box. 
c.  Prosecution memorandum and grand jury preparation.  In 
late March 2013, Kaczmarek wrote a prosecution memorandum5 
seeking approval from the executive bureau of the AGO to indict 
Farak.  In the section of the memorandum discussing items 
recovered from Farak's vehicle, Kaczmarek included "mental 
health worksheets describing how Farak feels when she uses 
illegal substances and the temptation of working with 'urge-ful 
samples.'"  Her direct supervisor, the chief of the EMC 
division, Dean Mazzone, reviewed the prosecution memorandum and 
suggested edits, which Kaczmarek adopted.  Before Mazzone signed 
off on the prosecution memorandum, he and Kaczmarek had a 
 
4 It is unclear whether the mental health worksheets, or 
photocopies of them, were located in Ballou's investigatory 
file.  Before the SHO, Ballou testified that he did not know 
whether the mental health worksheets were in his case file.  The 
SHO found that Ballou's file contained his reports, search 
warrants, returns, and other similar items, but not the actual 
evidence in the evidence locker in the Springfield barracks. 
 
5 A prosecution memorandum, or a "pros memo," is an internal 
memorandum that prosecutors write at the AGO to obtain approval 
to charge a particular case. 
14 
 
conversation about the mental health worksheets because 
Kaczmarek was concerned that they possibly were privileged or 
too prejudicial.  In footnote seven in the memorandum, Kaczmarek 
described the mental health worksheets:  "These worksheets were 
not submitted to the grand jury out of an abundance of caution 
in order to protect possibly privileged information.  Case law 
suggests, however, that the paperwork is not privileged." 
Verner also reviewed Kaczmarek's prosecution memorandum.  
He signed his approval on March 27, but made significant and 
substantial comments throughout it, including comments and 
questions directed specifically to Kaczmarek.  In one instance, 
Verner made a handwritten notation next to footnote seven, 
writing as to the mental health worksheets:  "this paperwork NOT 
turned over to DAs office yet."  Verner "absolutely" understood 
that these worksheets needed to be turned over to the DAOs. 
At the hearing before the SHO, Kaczmarek testified that she 
never had reviewed a signed, approved prosecution memorandum, 
and that even if she had seen Verner's note about the mental 
health worksheets, she would not have interpreted it as an 
instruction to turn them over to the DAOs.  The SHO did not 
credit Kaczmarek's testimony, relying on the fact that Kaczmarek 
had incorporated Verner's comments in another section of the 
memorandum, and that Kaczmarek not viewing Verner's comments 
with the purpose of acting on them would have been a knowing 
15 
 
violation of office policy and protocol.  The SHO found that 
Verner had instructed Kaczmarek to turn over the mental health 
worksheets through the prosecution memorandum and, as was 
Verner's expectation with every assistant attorney general, he 
expected Kaczmarek to review this instruction and take the 
required actions. 
In late March 2013, before the grand jury Kaczmarek 
presented various testimony and exhibits, including the 
newspaper articles from 2011 that had been found with the mental 
health worksheets.  On April 1, 2013, the grand jury indicted 
Farak on four counts of tampering with evidence, two counts of 
unlawful possession of a class B controlled substance, and four 
counts of theft of a controlled substance from a dispensary. 
d.  AGO's formal disclosures.  At around the same time as 
the grand jury proceedings, the AGO began receiving discovery 
requests from the DAOs.  While the prosecution memorandum was 
being edited and finalized, Kaczmarek and Verner discussed the 
language of a discovery letter to be sent to the DAOs along with 
documents related to and obtained in the course of the Farak 
investigation.  Verner testified that, as was done in the 
Dookhan case, the evidence the AGO uncovered "would be turned 
over by [the AGO] to the individual [DAOs] who would then make 
the determination on what to do with them."  On March 27, 2013, 
Verner signed the first discovery letter sent to the DAOs, which 
16 
 
Kaczmarek helped draft, and which accompanied 210 pages of 
potentially exculpatory material, but excluded the mental health 
worksheets, 2005 cocaine case, 2012 oxycodone case, and Farak's 
urinalysis. 
 
Kaczmarek also was responsible for providing discovery to 
Farak's defense attorney, Elaine Pourinski.  When Farak was 
arraigned on April 22, 2013, Kaczmarek provided Pourinski with 
assorted documents, which included the six pages of mental 
health worksheets.  On May 14, Kaczmarek arranged with Ballou 
for Pourinski and Farak to review the evidence located in the 
evidence room at the Springfield barracks.  Kaczmarek did not 
review that evidence herself. 
There were two subsequent discovery letters and packages 
sent to the DAOs on June 26, 2013, and July 12, 2013, signed by 
Kaczmarek, which Verner did not review, but the second discovery 
letter was sent to Verner for his approval.  Kaczmarek's second 
and third discovery letters noted the AGO's "continuing 
obligation to provide potentially exculpatory information to the 
[d]istrict [a]ttorneys as well as information necessary to your 
[o]ffices' determination about how to proceed with cases in 
which related narcotics evidence was tested at the Amherst 
lab[]."  The second and third disclosures, sent on June 26 and 
July 12, respectively, included minutes and exhibits from the 
grand jury, but did not include information about the 2005 
17 
 
cocaine case, the 2012 oxycodone case, the mental health 
worksheets, or Farak's urinalysis.  There were no additional 
disclosures sent to the DAOs after July 12, 2013. 
As of March 27, 2013, Verner knew that the mental health 
worksheets had not yet been turned over, but understood that his 
office had an obligation to do so, and reasonably expected that 
Kaczmarek was going to disclose them, along with all other 
exculpatory information.  Verner never followed up with 
Kaczmarek to ensure that the mental health worksheets and other 
information had been disclosed to the DAOs. 
e.  Defendants' additional discovery requests.  As the 
prosecution of Farak progressed, multiple defendants filed 
subpoenas and discovery requests for information related to 
Farak's conduct.  The matters were consolidated before Superior 
Court Judge C. Jeffrey Kinder, who assigned Francis E. Flannery, 
then first assistant district attorney for the Hampden district, 
to serve as lead counsel on behalf of the Commonwealth, and 
attorneys Luke Ryan and Jared Olanoff to serve as lead counsel 
for the Farak defendants.  A hearing was set for September 9, 
2013, for the purpose of determining "the timing and scope of 
. . . Farak's alleged criminal conduct." 
Prior to the hearing, Ryan served Kaczmarek and Ballou with 
subpoenas seeking documents pertaining to the scope of evidence 
tampering at the Amherst lab in connection with a matter 
18 
 
captioned Commonwealth vs. Penate, Mass. App. Ct., No. 2015-P-
0054.  At around the same time, the AGO also received other 
subpoenas and discovery requests for the September 9 hearing, 
including a discovery motion from Ryan in Commonwealth vs. 
Rodriguez, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 1079CR01181 (Hampden County 
2013), and a subpoena for Ballou from Olanoff in Commonwealth 
vs. Watt, Mass. Super. Ct., Nos. 0979CR01068 & 0979CR01069 
(Hampden County 2013).  The discovery motions and subpoena each 
sought substantially the same documents, such as "all documents 
and photographs pertaining to the investigation of . . . Farak 
and the Amherst drug lab[]."  In the Rodriguez case, Ryan also 
filed a motion to inspect the evidence seized from Farak's car 
that was located at the Springfield barracks.  Ballou sent the 
subpoenas to Verner, Mazzone, Irwin, and Kaczmarek, writing, 
"Anne asked me to forward this to the group to see if it can be 
quashed." 
On August 23, 2013, Ravitz assigned Foster, who had started 
in the appeals division of the AGO in July 2013 and had no 
experience in responding to subpoenas, to serve as the lead 
attorney representing the AGO in the Superior Court proceedings.  
A few days later, Ravitz met with Foster to provide her some 
guidance on the process for responding to subpoenas and a few 
sample motions.  Foster was told not to "reinvent the wheel" and 
was advised to copy wholesale from the sample motions.  The 
19 
 
board noted that, "[g]iven the nature of the Farak prosecution, 
and the subpoenas' importance both to the Farak case and to the 
Farak defendants' cases, someone with significant experience 
with subpoenas should have been assigned." 
Under the direction of Susanne Reardon, the deputy chief of 
the AGO's criminal bureau's appeals division, Foster prepared a 
motion to quash the subpoena for Ballou in the Watt case.  
Reardon told Foster to speak with Kaczmarek and Ballou before 
responding, so that she could determine what had yet to be 
turned over.  Foster did not consult Kaczmarek or Ballou about 
what had been turned over and proceeded to draft a motion to 
quash the Watt subpoenas and a memorandum of law in support of 
the motion.  Foster sent Reardon a draft to review, and Reardon 
provided comments, again noting that it would be "helpful" if 
Foster verified what had and had not been turned over to defense 
counsel.  Neither Ravitz nor Reardon explicitly instructed 
Foster to review Ballou's file. 
After a meeting with Verner, Mazzone, Kaczmarek, and 
Reardon, Foster filed a motion to quash the Watt subpoena on 
September 6.  Foster asserted that Ballou had limited first-hand 
knowledge of the events described in the document requests, some 
documents were protected by the qualified law enforcement 
privilege, and Ballou should not be compelled to reveal his 
thought process or the work product of the AGO.  Foster 
20 
 
alternatively asked Judge Kinder to restrict the subpoena's 
scope and to protect certain categories of information.  Foster 
did not review Ballou's file prior to filing these documents, 
despite Reardon's suggestion. 
Foster also filed an opposition to the discovery motion in 
the Rodriguez case.  She argued that the discovery requests were 
unreasonably broad and sought documents outside the scope of the 
issues to be litigated at the hearing on September 9.  In 
response to the motion to inspect the evidence seized from 
Farak's car, Foster replied that the AGO was taking the position 
that this would not be possible because the investigation of 
Farak was ongoing. 
At this time, lead counsel for the DAOs, Flannery, was also 
actively preparing for the September 9 hearing.  He reached out 
to Ballou seeking information about Farak's potential tampering 
in the 2012 oxycodone case.  Ballou prepared and sent a report 
to Flannery on September 4, including Kaczmarek on the e-mail 
message, detailing what he knew about the 2012 oxycodone case.  
Flannery also requested that Ballou set up a date "so a team of 
defense attorneys [could] review the FARAK evidence at [his] 
office" before the hearing.  Ballou forwarded the request to 
Irwin and Kaczmarek.  Kaczmarek quickly responded, "No.  This is 
still an open criminal case.  I do not want defense attorneys 
going through evidence on a fishing expedition."  As a result of 
21 
 
Kaczmarek's response, the parties did not arrange a time to view 
the evidence prior to the September 9 hearing. 
Also on September 4, at a meeting in her office, Kaczmarek 
informed John Bossé, an assistant district attorney in Berkshire 
County, that he should advise defense attorneys that "all 
relevant discovery had been provided to the [DAOs]."  
Kaczmarek's statement to Bossé was materially false and 
intentionally misleading; it was not possible at that time for 
Kaczmarek to know whether all relevant evidence had been 
provided to the DAOs, as she had made no effort to review the 
evidence at the Springfield barracks. 
Kaczmarek also did not review Ballou's file prior to the 
September 9 hearing, even though the subpoena required Ballou to 
bring his file to the hearing and to testify about the 
investigation.  The board described Kaczmarek's failure to 
review the file and her failure to meet with and help prepare 
Ballou for the hearing a "dereliction of . . . duty," noting 
that "[a]ny prosecutor should want to review the contents of the 
lead investigator's file and all the evidence he had collected."  
No one from the AGO prepared Ballou for the hearing. 
f.  Superior Court proceedings.  Foster represented the AGO 
at the September 9 Superior Court hearing before Judge Kinder, 
where her motion to quash the subpoena in the Watt case was 
denied.  As to Foster's request for a protective order, Judge 
22 
 
Kinder asked:  "Have you personally reviewed the file to 
determine that there are categories of documents in the file 
that fit the description of those that you wish to be 
protected?"  Foster responded that she had not, but that she had 
spoken with Kaczmarek, who indicated that several documents, e-
mail messages, and correspondences that had been requested would 
be protected as work product.  Judge Kinder then asked, "But you 
don't know, having never even looked at the file, what those 
documents are?"  Foster answered, "Correct." 
Judge Kinder next asked whether the file was present, and 
Foster told him, incorrectly, that she did not believe it was.  
When Ballou was called to the stand, he brought his file with 
him.  Ballou testified that "everything in my case file has been 
turned over."  Olanoff asked if he knew whether everything in 
Kaczmarek's file had been turned over, and Ballou stated:  "I 
believe everything pertaining to the Farak investigation has 
been turned over.  I am not aware of anything else."  This 
statement may have been true as it related to Ballou's case 
file, but this file was a subset of the totality of discovery 
material within the custody and control of the State police and 
the AGO.  For example, the mental health worksheets were located 
at the Springfield barracks.  Despite Judge Kinder's probing, 
Foster still did not request to see Ballou's file; Ballou 
23 
 
testified before the SHO that he would have shown it to her had 
she asked to see it. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, with respect to the 
subpoena in the Watt case and the discovery motion in the 
Rodriguez case, Judge Kinder ordered Foster to send to him all 
responsive documents for which a claim of privilege was being 
asserted so he could conduct an in camera review.6  Foster asked 
Judge Kinder to clarify the scope of his order, to which he 
responded by explaining that he did not want to see anything 
that had been turned over or that the AGO already had agreed to 
turn over, but that he did want to see the documents Foster 
believed were privileged or not discoverable.7 
 
6 Judge Kinder's order stated:  "[W]hat I expect, again, if 
you can provide and that will be for my in camera review, those 
documents that you feel should not be disclosed with some 
indication somewhere in the body of the pleading why it is you 
feel those documents should not be disclosed." 
 
7 Foster then again asked Judge Kinder to clarify the scope 
of the Watt subpoena: 
 
Foster:  "It's just [that the] language of the subpoena was 
for all documents and photographs for the whole 
investigation, so I was wondering since the subpoena was 
for Sergeant Ballou, the documents he has or the documents 
the [AGO] has?" 
 
Judge Kinder:  "The subpoena duces tecum, as I understood 
it, went to Sergeant Ballou and that was the subpoena that 
you sought to quash." 
 
Foster:  "Correct." 
 
Judge Kinder:  "So that is what we are talking about." 
24 
 
The board characterized Foster's failure to review the file 
and lack of preparedness, particularly at the September 9 
hearing, as "at best inconvenient and at worst incompetent." 
The day after the hearing, in an e-mail message to Mazzone, 
Kaczmarek, Verner, Ravitz, and Reardon, Foster explained that 
her motion to quash had been rejected and that Judge Kinder had 
given them until September 18 to go through Ballou's file and to 
provide him anything that they thought was privileged, along 
with a memorandum explaining the basis for each privilege claim.  
Verner responded to the entire group almost immediately, asking:  
"Anne, can you get a sense from Joe what is in his file?  
Emails[,] etc[.]?  Kris, did the judge say his 'file' or did he 
indicate Joe had to search his emails[,] etc[.]?" 
At that point, Verner reasonably believed that both Foster 
and Kaczmarek had reviewed Ballou's file; Foster was 
representing Ballou in court, and Kaczmarek had spent nine 
months on the case and had obtained indictments with Ballou's 
aid.  This belief was further supported by Kaczmarek's response 
to Verner's e-mail message, minutes later:  "Joe has all his 
reports and all reports generated in the case.  All photos and 
videos taken in the case.  His search warrants and returns.  
Copies of the paperwork seized from her car regarding new[s] 
25 
 
articles and her mental health worksheets."8  Verner then 
replied, "Is that every[thing] in his file?"  Kaczmarek 
responded:  "Yes.  By file, we are talking about his working 
file.  Think trial binder.  The boxes of actual evidence are in 
Springfield.  Log books (which we have copied), actual items 
taken from car, tote bag, and drawer (all of which are 
photographed)." 
Later that same day, a brief meeting was held among 
Kaczmarek, Foster, Verner, Reardon, Ravitz, and Mazzone.  At 
that meeting, Kaczmarek informed the attendees that she believed 
everything in Ballou's file had been turned over.9 
Kaczmarek did not clearly explain that the materials in 
Ballou's file were but a subset of the evidence stored at the 
Springfield barracks.  She also failed to inform her superiors 
that no one in the AGO had reviewed the evidence in Springfield.  
On the basis of Kaczmarek's representations about Ballou's file, 
Verner believed that the mental health worksheets had been 
turned over. 
 
8 This was the first time the mental health worksheets had 
been mentioned to Foster. 
 
9 The SHO found that a meeting had been held at which 
Kaczmarek told Foster and the other attendees that everything 
had been turned over.  He did not make a finding as to the 
attendees, but none of the parties disputes Foster's or 
Reardon's testimony that Kaczmarek, Foster, Reardon, Ravitz, and 
Mazzone attended.  See Matter of Angwafo, 453 Mass. at 29, 
citing Isaiah I., 448 Mass. at 337. 
26 
 
That same day, Kaczmarek sent an e-mail message to Ballou 
asking, "Can you come to Boston sometime this week and bring 
your file so we can see what[']s in it?"  She then sent a 
message to Verner, confirming that she had asked Ballou "to come 
to Boston sometime this week so we/I can look at his file."  
Verner thought that Kaczmarek was being cautious in requesting 
the file, wanting to confirm what was in it. 
On September 12, Ballou brought his file to the AGO in 
Boston.  No one at the AGO reviewed it.  Foster unreasonably 
assumed Ballou and Kaczmarek would meet and that she was not 
invited to that meeting.  Kaczmarek expected someone else to 
review the file, not believing it to be her responsibility.  
Verner assumed that Foster, in conjunction with Kaczmarek, would 
review the file.  Verner never followed up with Kaczmarek about 
her review of Ballou's file. 
At a meeting with Verner and Mazzone on September 16, 
Ravitz told Foster that everything had been turned over and she 
should draft a letter to the judge saying as much.  Following 
those instructions, Foster prepared a letter to send to the 
judge concerning the Watt subpoena to Ballou.10  Before Foster 
 
10 The discovery motion in the Rodriguez case was denied on 
September 9 as untimely to the extent that it sought the 
production of additional discovery.  The judge took under 
advisement the question whether additional discovery should be 
forthcoming, and he ultimately denied this motion and general 
relief to Rodriguez later that year. 
27 
 
filed the letter with the court, Ravitz quickly reviewed the 
draft of the letter and approved it.  It stated: 
"Dear Judge Kinder, 
 
"On September 9, 2013, pursuant to a subpoena issued by 
defense counsel, you ordered the [AGO] to produce all 
documents in Sergeant Joseph Ballou's possession that the 
[AGO] believes to be privileged by September 18, 2013, to 
be reviewed by your [sic] Honor in camera.  After reviewing 
Sergeant Ballou's file, every document in his possession 
has already been disclosed.  This includes grand jury 
minutes and exhibits, and police reports.  Therefore, there 
is nothing for the [AGO] to produce for your review on 
September 18, 2013.  (Emphases added.) 
 
"Please do not hesitate to contact me should your [sic] 
require anything further. 
 
"Sincerely, 
 
"Kris C. Foster" 
 
The board found that the statements in Foster's letter were 
misleading and intentionally vague.  Contrary to Foster's 
assertion in her letter, no one at the AGO had reviewed Ballou's 
file and no one had determined whether every document in 
Ballou's possession had been disclosed.  The board found that by 
using the passive voice, Foster had intended to keep her 
statements vague so as to shield the AGO from further inquiry at 
that stage by the judge.  Further, in her letter, Foster did not 
distinguish between Ballou's case file and the larger set of 
evidence located at the Springfield barracks.  Ballou had 
substantial evidence in his "possession," including all 
documents from Farak's car, so Foster's reference to such 
28 
 
evidence was found by the board to be "reckless" and 
"misleading." 
Ryan continued to press the AGO for access to documents 
related to Farak's tampering.  On September 17, Ryan, in the 
Penate case, served a motion on the AGO and the State police to 
compel production of documents pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
17 (a) (2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979).  An attorney for the State 
police, Sean Farrell, sent an e-mail message to Kaczmarek 
seeking information she had on the discovery history and 
responses.  Kaczmarek responded, "We also received this gem," 
warning Farrell "not [to] give this attorney an inch, he is very 
rude and aggressive."  As to the specific categories requested 
by Ryan, Kaczmarek falsely implied that the AGO had no 
information in its files responsive to the Penate requests in 
its files.  Farrell also reached out to Ballou, telling Ballou 
that Kaczmarek had advised him that there were no records 
responsive to certain requests and asking Ballou to confirm.  
Ballou responded to Farrell, including Kaczmarek on the e-mail 
message, explaining that his "entire investigative file ha[d] 
been turned over."  Kaczmarek did not correct or clarify 
Ballou's statements. 
The parties returned to court on October 2, where Foster 
once again represented to the court that all the contents of 
Ballou's file had been produced.  Foster objected to Ryan's 
29 
 
argument for permission to view the physical evidence seized in 
the search of Farak's car, arguing that the evidence was 
irrelevant and that to allow one defense lawyer to look at it 
would "open the floodgates" to similar requests by other 
defendants.  In response to a comment by Judge Kinder that it 
might be helpful for her to look at the information about which 
she was making representations, Foster stated, "I have talked to 
[Kaczmarek and Ballou] and both of them said there's nothing -
- there's no smoking gun . . . ."  The board found this 
statement to be inaccurate and misleading.  The judge denied 
Ryan's motion to inspect physical evidence, reasoning that 
"physical evidence has been described in detail for the 
defendant and photographs of that evidence have been provided." 
Judge Kinder allowed Ryan's motion to compel production of 
documentary evidence "insofar as it [sought] production of drug 
testing administered to Sonja Farak by her employer, and any 
correspondence related directly to drug use or evidence 
tampering by Sonja Farak."  Foster, at the direction of Verner, 
and with the guidance of Ravitz and Kaczmarek, filed a motion to 
clarify what Judge Kinder meant by "correspondence."  After 
Kaczmarek reviewed the motion for clarification, she failed to 
ensure that all potentially exculpatory information known to her 
had been turned over to the DAOs. 
30 
 
Over the next two months, Judge Kinder denied discovery 
requests and other forms of relief to the consolidated 
defendants before him.  In general, he reasoned that the 
defendants had failed to show that Farak had been abusing drugs 
and tampering with evidence in 2011 or earlier, when the 
defendants had been arrested.  He denied a motion to dismiss 
filed by Ryan in Penate because there was insufficient evidence 
that Farak had engaged in misconduct in November 2011 and 
January 2012 when the defendant had been arrested and the drug 
samples had been tested. 
The board found that Foster's letter's misguided phrasing, 
and her incompetence and lack of diligence, in part caused Judge 
Kinder to find that the defendants had not met their burden to 
show that Farak's misconduct had occurred early enough to make a 
difference in their cases.  The board also found that "defense 
counsel could have used the undisclosed mental health worksheets 
to show that Farak was engaged in drug tampering and drug abuse 
in 2011, and perhaps could have used the [2005] light cocaine 
case to attempt to show that Farak's drug tampering and drug use 
had extended back many years before 2011." 
g.  Ryan's discovery of mental health worksheets.  In 
January 2014, Farak pleaded guilty to four counts of evidence 
tampering, four counts of larceny of a controlled substance from 
a dispensary, and two counts of unlawful possession of a class B 
31 
 
controlled substance.  After the guilty plea and sentencing, the 
Farak matter was no longer an open criminal investigation, and 
the AGO had no basis for objecting to turning over evidence to 
defendants in related criminal matters. 
On October 30, 2014, after the AGO assented to a motion to 
inspect physical evidence, Ryan was granted access to all the 
evidence that originally had been stored at the Springfield 
barracks.11  Ryan saw the mental health worksheets and 
immediately recognized their significance.  This was the first 
time any of the defendants affected by Farak's misconduct had 
gained access to the mental health worksheets and other 
potentially exculpatory evidence. 
Ryan wrote an eleven-page letter to the AGO, detailing the 
withheld evidence, explaining its exculpatory value, and 
observing that "[i]t would be difficult to overstate the 
significance of these documents."  On receiving the letter from 
Ryan, Verner immediately met with Foster, Ravitz, and Mazzone.  
Members of the Farak prosecution team were shocked, upset, and 
concerned that their office may have made inaccurate 
representations. 
 
11 Prior to Ryan's discovery, Kaczmarek had left the AGO to 
take a position as an assistant clerk-magistrate in the office 
of the clerk of the Superior Court for criminal business in 
Suffolk County. 
32 
 
Verner himself reviewed the entirety of the Farak material 
to ensure there was nothing else that had not been produced.  On 
November 13, 2014, the AGO produced an additional 289 pages of 
previously undisclosed documents, including the mental health 
worksheets and other papers that supported a strong inference 
that Farak's misconduct began before 2012. 
In December 2016, Superior Court Judge Richard Carey held a 
six-day evidentiary hearing in Hampden County on renewed motions 
to dismiss and motions for new trials or to withdraw guilty 
pleas filed by ten defendants who claimed a right to relief 
based on Farak's tampering and the AGO's misconduct.12  All three 
respondents testified under oath before the judge, who granted 
relief to some of the defendants, focusing mostly on those whose 
certificates of drug analysis (drug certificates) had been 
signed by Farak.  The Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(CPCS) and other defendants then sought relief in this court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and G. L. c. 231A, § 1. 
On October 11, 2018, we ordered relief for the defendants 
affected by Farak's misconduct, dismissing (1) "all convictions 
based on evidence that was tested at the Amherst lab on or after 
 
12 The SHO did not admit in evidence the judge's 2017 
findings and conclusions of law, except for three pages of his 
final memorandum and order.  The majority of the judge's 
findings, therefore, were not considered as part of these 
proceedings. 
33 
 
January 1, 2009, regardless of the chemist who signed the drug 
certificate," and (2) "all methamphetamine convictions where the 
drugs were tested during Farak's tenure at the Amherst lab."  
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 480 Mass. at 729.  Unlike in 
the Dookhan cases, where we established a conclusive presumption 
of government misconduct, see Bridgeman, 476 Mass. at 321-322, 
we concluded that the more drastic remedy of dismissal was 
required for Farak defendants because the government misconduct 
by Farak and the assistant attorneys general was "so intentional 
and so egregious" (citation omitted), Committee for Pub. Counsel 
Servs., supra at 725. 
2.  Procedural history.  In June 2019, bar counsel filed a 
three-count petition for discipline against Foster, Kaczmarek, 
and Verner, alleging multiple violations of the Massachusetts 
rules of professional conduct related to the AGO's prosecution 
of Farak.  The first count alleged violations stemming from 
Verner and Kaczmarek's failure to disclose to the DAOs 
potentially exculpatory information as to the timing and scope 
of Farak's drug use and tampering, as well as Verner's failure 
to fulfill his duties as Kaczmarek's supervisor.  The second 
count alleged violations stemming from Kaczmarek's failure to 
disclose to Flannery, Bossé, and Farrell potentially exculpatory 
information, and Verner's failure to ensure that Kaczmarek had 
made such disclosures.  The third count alleged violations 
34 
 
stemming from Foster's response to the Watt subpoena and the 
Rodriguez and Penate motions, Kaczmarek's failure to undertake a 
review of her file and to produce documents in response to the 
subpoena and discovery motions, Kaczmarek's failure to alert 
Foster to the existence of undisclosed documents, and 
Kaczmarek's and Verner's failure to ensure that potentially 
exculpatory information had been disclosed following their 
respective reviews of the motion to clarify. 
The respondents filed their answers in August 2019.  On 
Foster's motion, the board chair appointed an SHO to preside 
over the proceedings.  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 5 (3) (d), as 
amended, 453 Mass. 1305 (2009).  An evidentiary hearing was held 
by video conference over the course of twenty-three 
nonconsecutive days, beginning in September 2020 and ending in 
December 2020, and included testimony from fifteen witnesses and 
the submission of 305 exhibits. 
In July 2021, the SHO issued his hearing report.  On the 
first count of the petition, the SHO concluded that Kaczmarek, 
by failing to disclose to the DAOs potentially exculpatory 
evidence known to her, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 426 Mass. 
1308 (1998) (provide competent representation); Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998) (act with diligence in 
representing client); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (a), 426 Mass. 1389 
(1998) (do not obstruct another's access to evidence); Mass. R. 
35 
 
Prof. C. 3.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998) (do not knowingly 
disobey obligation under rules of tribunal); Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.8 (d), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998) (as prosecutor, timely disclose 
to defense all evidence or information known to prosecutor that 
tends to negate guilt or mitigates offense); and Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 8.4 (d), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (do not engage in conduct 
prejudicial to administration of justice).  The SHO concluded 
that Verner violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3; and Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 5.1 (b), 426 Mass. 1405 (1998) (as supervising attorney, make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that supervised lawyer's conduct 
conforms to rules of professional conduct).  The SHO concluded 
that bar counsel had not proved that Verner had violated any 
other rules. 
On the second count of the petition, the SHO concluded that 
Kaczmarek, by knowingly failing to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence and by knowingly making materially 
misleading statements to assistant district attorneys Bossé and 
Flannery and State police counsel Farrell, had violated Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (a), 3.4 (c), and 3.8 (d); Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 4.1 (a), 426 Mass. 1401 (1998) (do not knowingly make false 
statement of material fact to third person); Mass. R. Prof. C. 
8.4 (a), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (do not knowingly assist or 
induce another to violate rules of professional conduct or do so 
through acts of another); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c) (do not 
36 
 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (d); and Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 8.4 (h), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (do not engage in any 
other conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice 
law).  He also found that, by failing to direct Ballou to 
provide Flannery with potentially exculpatory information known 
to her, Kaczmarek violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (a), 
3.4 (c), and 3.8 (d); Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.3 (b), 426 Mass. 1408 
(1998) (as supervisory lawyer over nonlawyer, make sure 
nonlawyer's conduct complies with lawyer's obligations); and 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (a), 8.4 (d), and 8.4 (h).  Finally, he 
found that, by failing to take remedial action when she learned 
that Ballou had not disclosed potentially exculpatory evidence 
to Flannery, Kaczmarek had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 
5.3 (c) (2), as appearing in 426 Mass. 1408 (1998) (as 
supervisory lawyer, take remedial action to avoid or mitigate 
misconduct by nonlawyer).  The SHO concluded that Verner was not 
responsible for any of the alleged rules violations on the 
second count. 
On the third count of the petition, the SHO determined that 
Foster had committed violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1; Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998) (seek lawful 
objectives of client through reasonably available means 
permitted by law and rules of professional conduct); and Mass. 
37 
 
R. Prof. C. 1.3, by failing to adequately prepare to respond to 
subpoenas and appear at hearings regarding the production of 
evidence and by failing to ensure that the AGO reviewed Ballou's 
file.  The SHO also concluded that, by drafting a letter with 
reckless disregard for the truth that misled the judge to 
believe that the entirety of the file had been reviewed and all 
documents had been produced, Foster had violated Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 8.4 (d) and 8.4 (h).  The SHO rejected Foster's argument that 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.2 (b), 426 Mass. 1407 (1998) (subordinate 
lawyer may act in accordance with supervisory lawyer's 
reasonable resolution of arguable question of duty), relieved 
her of responsibility because she had been acting in accordance 
with her supervisor's instructions.  The SHO held that 
Kaczmarek, by failing to undertake a review of her file and 
produce documents responsive to the subpoenas and discovery 
motions, and by failing to alert Foster to the existence of 
undisclosed documents, had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 
and 3.4 (c).  Finally, the SHO concluded that, by failing to 
ensure that potentially exculpatory information known to her had 
been disclosed following her review of the motion to clarify, 
Kaczmarek had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (a), and 
8.4 (d).  The SHO found that bar counsel had not proved any of 
the charges against Verner in the third count. 
38 
 
In October 2021, the SHO issued a supplemental report 
detailing aggravating and mitigating factors, and recommended 
sanctions, for each respondent.  Based on his findings, the SHO 
recommended a public reprimand for Verner, a suspension of one 
year and one day for Foster, and a two-year suspension for 
Kaczmarek. 
Bar counsel and Foster filed timely appeals with the board.  
Bar counsel challenged the sanctions for all three respondents, 
arguing that the SHO improperly considered several mitigating 
factors and failed to consider notable aggravating factors.  
Neither Kaczmarek nor Verner appealed from the SHO's findings 
and conclusions. 
In June 2022, the board issued its final memorandum.  The 
board adopted the SHO's recommendation of a suspension of one 
year and one day for Foster, but recommended a three-month 
suspension for Verner and disbarment for Kaczmarek.  The board 
thereafter filed an information with a single justice of this 
court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), in addition to a 
motion to reserve and report without decision.  In November 
2022, a single justice reserved and reported the case to the 
full court. 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "In bar 
disciplinary cases where a single justice has reserved and 
reported the case to the full court, we review the matter and 
39 
 
'reach our own conclusion.'"  Matter of Finneran, 455 Mass. 722, 
730 (2010), quoting Matter of Wainwright, 448 Mass. 378, 384 
(2007).  In doing so, we keep in mind that the disciplinary 
rules exist to "protect the public and maintain its confidence 
in the integrity of the bar and the fairness and impartiality of 
our legal system."  Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 520-521 
(2008).  Accordingly, "[t]he appropriate level of discipline is 
that which is necessary to deter other attorneys and to protect 
the public."  Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. 1034, 1038 (2017), 
quoting Matter of Curry, supra at 530.  To ensure that a 
recommended disciplinary sanction achieves its desired ends, we 
focus our review on whether it is "markedly disparate from 
judgments in comparable cases."  Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. 
154, 163 (2007).  It is not necessary to this endeavor, however, 
that we "find perfectly analogous cases" (citation omitted).  
Matter of Doyle, 429 Mass. 1013, 1014 (1999).  Where no 
analogous cases exist, we "must establish independently a 
sanction adequate to address the seriousness of the misconduct."  
Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 339 (2003).  Each case "must be 
decided on its own merits and every offending attorney must 
receive the disposition most appropriate in the circumstances."  
Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 883 (2010), quoting Matter of 
the Discipline of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 837 (1984). 
40 
 
Although the board's findings and recommendations are not 
binding on the court, they are "entitled to great weight."  
Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481, 487 (1996), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 1149 (1997).  We generally afford substantial deference to 
the board's recommended disciplinary sanction.  See Matter of 
Griffith, 440 Mass. 500, 507 (2003).  Further, we defer to the 
board's findings of subsidiary facts if they are "supported by 
substantial evidence, upon consideration of the record."  Matter 
of Murray, 455 Mass. at 879, quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (4).  
We may, however, draw reasonable inferences from the board's 
findings.  See Matter of Driscoll, 447 Mass. 678, 685 (2006), 
citing Matter of Orfanello, 411 Mass. 551, 556 (1992).  The SHO 
is the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony presented 
at the hearing.  S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (5) (a). 
b.  Verner.  The SHO found that Verner violated Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.3 and 5.1 (b) because he failed to follow up with 
Kaczmarek about whether she had disclosed the mental health 
worksheets, along with all other potentially exculpatory 
information, to the DAOs.  The SHO also found that Verner 
neglected his supervisory duties when he failed to follow up 
with Kaczmarek about the contents of Ballou's file, and likewise 
failed to verify whether all potentially exculpatory evidence in 
that file had been disclosed, following Kaczmarek's e-mail 
message on September 10.  The board adopted these findings, and 
41 
 
Verner does not dispute them.  Verner argues, however, that a 
public reprimand, rather than a three-month suspension, is the 
appropriate sanction for his violations.  Bar counsel argues 
that, as the board concluded, Verner's misconduct warrants a 
suspension. 
i.  Reliance as mitigating factor.  "In assessing the 
appropriate level of discipline, [we] must . . . consider 
factors that mitigate, and those that aggravate, the misconduct 
the lawyer committed."  Board of Bar Overseers, Massachusetts 
Bar Discipline:  History, Practice, and Procedure 62 (2018) 
(Massachusetts Bar Discipline).  The SHO found as mitigating 
that Verner relied on Kaczmarek's September 10, 2013, statement 
that she had turned over everything in Ballou's file, including 
the mental health worksheets.  The board, on the other hand, 
concluded that Verner's reliance was not mitigating, because 
Verner nonetheless had a duty to follow up rather than accept 
the statement at face value.  Accordingly, the board found that 
no factors mitigated Verner's misconduct.  Verner argues that 
his reliance should be treated as a mitigating factor.  Bar 
counsel argues that we should adopt the board's reasoning. 
 
We conclude that Verner's misconduct is mitigated by his 
reliance on Kaczmarek's false representations.  Reliance, when 
it is reasonable and in good faith, may indicate a lesser degree 
of culpability.  See Massachusetts Bar Discipline, supra at 393 
42 
 
("The principle underlying a special mitigating consideration is 
that it shows that the lawyer who committed misconduct acted 
unintentionally, had some reason beyond the attorney's voluntary 
control for engaging in the misconduct, or was less culpable 
than the category of misconduct would otherwise imply"). 
 
Verner's reliance was reasonable and in good faith:  
Kaczmarek was Verner's subordinate, and Verner knew her to be an 
experienced prosecutor who had demonstrated her competence 
during her work on the Dookhan case.  See Admonition No. 19-09, 
35 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 698, 698-699 (2019) (respondent's 
failure to ensure filing of motion for postconviction relief was 
mitigated by his reliance on more experienced co-counsel's false 
representation that motion had been filed); Camilo-Robles v. 
Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 46 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1999) (attorney is 
"entitled to rely, at least to some extent, on the work of his 
predecessors and subordinates" because for "bureaucratic 
structures . . . to function, the ability to delegate 
responsibility and to trust the judgments of others is 
essential").  In addition, by the time Kaczmarek represented 
that Ballou's file had been turned over, she had been in charge 
of the Farak investigation and prosecution for nine months, and 
there had been no signs indicating that Kaczmarek was not 
complying with the rules of professional conduct.  Contrast 
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Kimmel, 405 Md. 647, 673 
43 
 
(2008) ("numerous warning or alert indicators should have 
informed the . . . managing attorneys . . . of the need for more 
heightened supervision"). 
Although the SHO found that Verner should have followed up 
with Kaczmarek to ensure that she indeed had disclosed all 
potentially exculpatory evidence, Kaczmarek's deceit gave Verner 
some reason to believe that such follow up was unnecessary.  See 
Matter of Newman, 31 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 482, 483 (2015) 
(in mitigation, respondent made false representations after 
consulting "with an experienced appellate lawyer, who 
incorrectly advised the respondent that [his contemplated 
actions would be] appropriate").13 
Bar counsel argues that, even if reasonable and good faith 
reliance is a mitigating factor, in the context of a rule 
5.1 (b) violation it is a "typical" mitigating factor, and so 
should be discounted.  Typical mitigating factors are those that 
"are common to almost all such violations by an attorney."  
Matter of Barkin, 1 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 18, 21 (1977).  
See Matter of Parigian, 33 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 375, 381 
(2017) (typical mitigating factors include "unblemished 
 
13 Bar counsel argues that Verner's belief that the mental 
health worksheets had been turned over was not reasonable 
because, had the worksheets been disclosed, there would have 
been a flood of motions to dismiss or for a new trial.  Bar 
counsel, however, does not point to anything in the record that 
indicates Verner should have had such an expectation. 
44 
 
disciplinary record" and "cooperation with bar counsel").  They 
are generally "not given great weight in determining the 
appropriate sanction."  Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 576 
n.55 (2008).  By contrast, "special" mitigating factors are 
those that generally do warrant a deviation from the "usual and 
presumptive sanction."  See Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 1016, 1017 
(2003), quoting Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 330 (1996). 
We conclude that reasonable and good faith reliance is a 
special rather than a typical mitigating factor, and so should 
weigh in favor of a lesser sanction.  See Matter of Finneran, 
455 Mass. at 736.  Unlike the mitigating factors that this court 
previously has found to be typical, reasonable and good faith 
reliance on another attorney is not an excuse that generally 
will be available to attorneys -- supervisory or otherwise -- 
who have engaged in misconduct.  See Matter of Gleason, 28 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 352, 354-355 (2012) (rule 5.1 [b] 
violation stemmed from respondent's failure to discuss case with 
associate, rather than any misrepresentations by associate); 
Kimmel, 405 Md. at 677-678 (rule 5.1 [b] violation stemmed from 
failure to provide support following subordinate's requests for 
help).  Even where there is reliance, it will not always be 
reasonable and in good faith.  See Matter of McDonald, 18 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 382, 388 (2002) (respondent placed "too 
much trust in his friend and colleague" when he relied "upon his 
45 
 
representations as to the progress of the case"); In re Dickens, 
174 A.3d 283, 298 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017) (respondent violated rule 
5.1 [a] because she "ignored clear warning signs that the trust 
and confidence" placed in associate "was no longer justified"). 
ii.  Aggravating factors.  The board's recommendation that 
Verner receive a suspension was based in part on several 
aggravating circumstances.  This included Verner's years of 
experience as a lawyer and prosecutor, the extent of the harm to 
and the vulnerability of the victims, the notoriety of the case 
and the deleterious effect on the public's confidence in the 
criminal justice system, and the lack of candor he demonstrated 
in his testimony. 
We first address the board's conclusion that Verner lacked 
candor in his testimony.  The board's conclusion was based 
solely on Verner's denial that he had read Ballou's February 14, 
2013, e-mail message and its attachments.  The SHO found that, 
because Verner was detail-oriented and this was a high-profile 
case, it was not plausible that Verner had failed to review the 
e-mail message and its attachments.  The board, but not the SHO, 
characterized Verner's contention that he had not seen Ballou's 
message as a "self-servingly untruthful denial."  Verner argues 
that the board erred in finding a lack of candor in his 
testimony. 
46 
 
We agree with Verner.  The SHO, whose task it is to 
determine whether a respondent's testimony was "deliberately 
false or . . . merely confused or mistaken," did not find 
Verner's representation about Ballou's e-mail message to be a 
deliberate falsehood.  Matter of Hoicka, 442 Mass. 1004, 1006 
(2004).  See Strigler v. Board of Bar Examiners, 448 Mass. 1027, 
1029-1030 (2007) (distinguishing failure to remember from lack 
of candor).  This is in contrast to the SHO's finding that 
Foster's testimony was "dissembling, disingenuous[], and 
evasive[]," and his finding that Kaczmarek's testimony was 
"vague" and "dissembling."  Instead, the SHO found that "during 
the hearings, Verner demonstrated candor, remorse, and a 
recognition of and responsibility for his mistakes," and that 
Verner's "forthrightness . . . [was] noteworthy and laudatory."  
See Matter of Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2008), quoting 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (4) ("special hearing officer is the 'sole 
judge of the credibility of the testimony presented at the 
hearing'"). 
Verner next argues that the board erred in considering his 
experience as an aggravating factor, given that virtually all 
supervising attorneys are experienced.  This argument is 
unavailing.  See Matter of Corbett, 478 Mass. 1004, 1007 (2017) 
("substantial experience in the practice of law" may be 
considered as aggravating factor by board).  Verner does not 
47 
 
provide any legal authority to suggest that we categorize 
aggravating factors in terms of whether they are "typical."  
Contrast Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. at 1017 n.3 (discussing 
"typical" mitigating factors).  Regardless, however, the board 
did not merely focus on Verner's experience as an attorney 
generally; instead, the board considered Verner's extensive 
experience as a supervising attorney to be aggravating.  See 
Admonition No. 22-06, 38 Mass. Att'y Discipline 
Rep.    ,    (2021) (particular type of experience may be 
considered as aggravating factor).  In particular, Verner served 
in three different supervisory positions during the time he 
worked as a prosecutor in the office of the district attorney 
for the northern district.  While virtually all supervisory 
attorneys may be experienced, this amount of supervisory 
experience is not necessarily typical.  We therefore hold Verner 
to a higher standard than a supervising attorney who lacks such 
experience.  See Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. 1016, 1022 (2018) 
("substantial experience in the . . . practice area in which the 
misconduct occurred . . . properly was considered an aggravating 
factor"). 
Verner also contends that consideration of his experience 
was inappropriate because the board did not draw a causal 
connection between his experience and the charged misconduct.  
This argument also fails.  Experience is considered as an 
48 
 
aggravating factor because an "experienced attorney should 
understand ethical obligations to a greater degree than a 
neophyte."  Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 312 (1993).  
Verner's experience, therefore, can be said to have aggravated 
Verner's misconduct without having caused it.  See Matter of 
Weisman, 30 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 440, 455 (2014) (citing 
experience as aggravating factor without drawing causal 
connection). 
Finally, Verner argues that the board erred by including as 
an aggravating factor the significant harm that resulted from 
the AGO's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.  According 
to Verner, because his misconduct was not willful, and because 
he made some reasonable efforts to supervise Kaczmarek, he did 
not cause the harm that resulted.  Verner points to the SHO's 
conclusion that, because Kaczmarek's actions "were deliberate 
acts for which Verner bore no responsibility," there was "no 
causal connection between Verner's lack of follow-up . . . and 
the harm that ensued."  The board disagreed with the SHO and 
concluded that Verner's failure to adequately supervise 
Kaczmarek caused "catastrophic harm." 
Verner's argument misses the mark.  The SHO found that 
Kaczmarek's failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence 
was "due at least in part to Verner's failure adequately and 
diligently to supervise . . . and follow up with her."  This 
49 
 
finding, which Verner does not dispute, plainly establishes that 
Verner's misconduct was a contributing cause of the harm that 
resulted.  See Matter of Nealon, 26 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
427, 429, 435 (2010) (respondent's failure to take remedial 
action after learning of subordinate attorney's "ongoing delay 
and neglect of the estate . . . resulted in potential or actual 
harm").  There is simply no legal authority to support the SHO's 
reasoning that, because Kaczmarek's acts were deliberate, Verner 
cannot be held responsible for the harms that resulted from his 
failure to prevent her misconduct.  Under rule 5.1, Verner was 
not entitled to assume that Kaczmarek would "inevitably conform" 
to the rules of professional conduct.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.1 
comment 2. 
 
The harm that resulted from the combined misconduct of 
Verner, Foster, and Kaczmarek cannot be overstated.  Over the 
course of a year, from October 2013 through the time defense 
attorney Ryan discovered the exculpatory mental health 
worksheets in October 2014, many criminal defendants were found 
guilty, admitted to sufficient facts, or pleaded guilty because 
of the AGO's failure to turn over exculpatory evidence.  
Thousands of defendants, who otherwise would have been eligible 
for relief at an earlier date, remained incarcerated during this 
time.  As a result of Farak's prolonged misconduct and the AGO's 
failure to produce exculpatory evidence relating to that 
50 
 
misconduct, this court dismissed with prejudice thousands of 
convictions based on drug offenses.  See Committee for Pub. 
Counsel Servs., 480 Mass. at 704-705.  We held that "[t]he 
government misconduct by Farak and the assistant attorneys 
general[14] was 'so intentional and so egregious' that [the] 
harsher sanction[]" of dismissal with prejudice was necessary.  
Id. at 725, quoting Bridgeman, 476 Mass. at 322.  This was a 
system-wide failure.  It is unsurprising that "the publicity has 
taken an ugly toll on the public's perception of the legal 
profession and those who practice it."  Matter of Donahue, 22 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 193, 276 (2006). 
While harm is not everything, it is properly taken into 
account as an aggravating factor for all three respondents here.  
See Matter of Heartquist, 29 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 332, 
333-334 (2013).  Generally speaking, the more culpable a 
respondent is in causing harm, however, the more heavily the 
harm weighs in aggravation.  See, e.g., Matter of Curry, 450 
Mass. at 531 (disbarment); Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. at 576 
(disbarment); Matter of Donahue, 22 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
at 276-277 (three-year suspension for Donahue, whose "overall 
 
14 Our holding in that case, which was based on Judge 
Carey's findings, was only with regards to the misconduct of 
Kaczmarek and Foster.  See Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 
480 Mass. at 720.  Judge Carey, unlike the SHO, determined that 
"the misconduct by the [AGO] was limited to Foster and 
Kaczmarek."  Id. 
51 
 
involvement did not approach the scope or severity of Curry's or 
Crossen's"). 
 
iii.  Verner's sanction.  In Matter of Kane, 13 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 321, 327-328 (1997), the board set forth the 
presumptive sanctions in matters involving "neglect or failure 
of zealous representation."  The board held that, absent 
aggravating and mitigating factors, a public reprimand is 
"generally appropriate where a lawyer has failed to act with 
reasonable diligence . . . or otherwise has neglected a legal 
matter and the lawyer's misconduct causes serious injury or 
potentially serious injury to a client or others."  Id. at 327.  
The board further explained that suspension is generally 
warranted for misconduct that, in addition to causing serious or 
potentially serious injury, involves "repeated failures to act 
with reasonable diligence, or . . . a pattern of neglect."  Id. 
at 328.  This court has endorsed these principles.  See Matter 
of Grayer, 483 Mass. 1013, 1018 (2019).  See also Massachusetts 
Bar Institute, New Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct 
110 (1998) ("Public reprimand or private admonition may be 
considered if the lawyer's conduct is merely negligent"). 
 
The question, then, is whether Verner's misconduct was of 
the sort that warrants a more severe sanction than public 
reprimand.  Rule violations that involve the neglect of 
supervisory duties have "never resulted in a disbarment or a 
52 
 
suspension unless combined with other rules violations."  
Massachusetts Bar Discipline, supra at 327.  According to the 
board, however, Verner did not merely engage in "'run-of-the-
mill' negligence."  Rather, the board concluded that Verner, by 
passively relying on his subordinates to comply with the rules 
of professional conduct, abdicated his responsibility to ensure 
such compliance, and thereby took part in "protracted" 
negligence.  For these reasons, in addition to aggravating 
circumstances, the board recommended that Verner receive a 
three-month suspension.  The SHO, in contrast, had recommended 
that Verner receive a public reprimand. 
We conclude that Verner did not engage in a pattern of 
neglect.  Generally, either several instances of misconduct or a 
protracted period of neglect are necessary before a "pattern of 
neglect" finding is appropriate.  See American Bar Association, 
Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 202 (2d ed. 
2019).  Verner's misconduct was limited to a single matter.  
Contrast Matter of Lagana, 26 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 295, 
298 (2010) (three-month suspension stayed for year15 for repeated 
 
15 A stayed suspension is "effectively a public reprimand, 
but with more teeth and a greater opportunity for ongoing 
monitoring."  Board of Bar Overseers, Massachusetts Bar 
Discipline:  History, Practice, and Procedure 51 (2018).  The 
board has stated that "staying all or part of a suspension that 
would otherwise be appropriate for the misconduct involved 
should be reserved for matters in which the stay itself 
functions as an incentive or a deterrent, as the case may be, to 
53 
 
neglect of client's temporary protected status application and, 
in a separate matter, violating rules 5.1 [a] and 5.1 [b]; 
misconduct aggravated by substantial experience, previous 
admonition for similar misconduct, lack of candor, and harm to 
clients).  Further, Verner did not commit several rule 
violations with respect to a particular matter over an extended 
period of time.  Contrast Matter of Perrault, 29 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 531, 532-534 (2013) (three-month suspension 
stayed for year for several instances over period of years in 
which both respondent and, as result of inadequate supervision, 
his inexperienced associate did not handle matters diligently 
and efficiently, to detriment of estate; aggravated by prior 
disciplinary history).  Rather, he neglected to follow up with 
Kaczmarek on two occasions -- after he instructed her on the 
prosecution memorandum to disclose the mental health worksheets, 
and after Kaczmarek said she would review Ballou's file when he 
came to Boston.  This does not constitute the sort of pattern of 
neglect that warrants a suspension.  See Massachusetts Bar 
Discipline, supra at 124 ("a lawyer who neglects a single matter 
and causes harm ought to receive a public reprimand"). 
 
encourage or discourage certain conduct, whether for the sake of 
safeguarding the public or assisting the lawyer to take certain 
remedial steps, or both."  Matter of O'Neill, 30 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 289, 295 (2014). 
54 
 
Further, Verner did take some steps to ensure that 
Kaczmarek would disclose potentially exculpatory evidence.  
Verner chose to adopt the discovery policy used in the Dookhan 
case and made this policy known to Kaczmarek.  Verner 
additionally wrote the initial letter informing the DAOs of the 
AGO's obligation to provide potentially exculpatory information, 
which was reviewed by Kaczmarek.  Finally, Verner communicated 
with Kaczmarek about particular decisions related to the 
disclosure of exculpatory information.  Verner instructed 
Kaczmarek to disclose the mental health worksheets in his 
feedback on her prosecution memorandum, and he attempted to gain 
an understanding of what was in Ballou's file, and whether it 
had been turned over, following the September 9 hearing.  See 
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 467, at 10 (Sept. 8, 
2014) (among appropriate measures that supervising prosecutor 
might adopt, he or she might participate in major decisions such 
as "identifying Brady material, and, where feasible, documenting 
the basis for [such] decisions in writing," and he or she might 
"designat[e] a specific attorney to oversee the review of files 
for Brady material").  Contrast Matter of Myers, 355 S.C. 1, 9, 
15 (2003) (respondent received private reprimand after failing 
to instruct his subordinate to "inform the defense of [an] 
eavesdropped conversation"). 
55 
 
Because of Kaczmarek's experience handling the Dookhan 
case, Verner also was not required to engage in the sort of 
oversight that might have been required of a less experienced 
attorney.  See Admonition No. 18-31, 34 Mass. Att'y Discipline 
Rep. 632, 632 (2018) (respondent should have engaged in greater 
"supervision of [subordinate] lawyer's activities" because 
lawyer "lacked sufficient experience to handle the [case] 
without oversight and guidance").  Rather, Verner had reason to 
believe that Kaczmarek was competent to engage in the processes 
necessary to uncover and disclose potentially exculpatory 
evidence.  See In re Dickens, 174 A.3d at 303 (less oversight is 
needed "for a small firm with experienced attorneys").  Indeed, 
the SHO found that, excepting the instances where Verner should 
have followed up with Kaczmarek, Verner was "entitled to rely on 
[her] to discharge competently and fully the duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence." 
The board's recommendation that Verner be suspended, 
however, was not only grounded in the extent of Verner's 
negligence; the board also took into account the aforementioned 
aggravating factors, as well as an absence of mitigating 
factors.  We conclude that, once the mitigating effect of 
Verner's reliance on Kaczmarek is considered, the factors 
aggravating Verner's misconduct do not warrant a suspension.  
See S.J.C. Rule 3:07 scope 5, as appearing in 426 Mass. 1301 
56 
 
(1998) ("the severity of a sanction . . . depend[s] on all the 
circumstances, including the wilfulness and seriousness of the 
violation, [and] extenuating factors"). 
The board's decision in Matter of Gleason, 28 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. at 352-357, is instructive.  There, the 
respondent reviewed a complaint written by an associate over 
whom he had supervisory authority, but "did not take any action 
to have it corrected or filed before the expiration of the 
statutes of limitations against [the defendants]."  See id. 
at 353-354.  Further, over the course of seven years, the 
respondent did not discuss the case with the associate and took 
no "action[s] of substance to determine the actual status of the 
case" throughout its proceedings.  See id. at 354.  This led the 
respondent to negligently misrepresent to his clients on 
multiple occasions that their case was proceeding.  See id.  The 
board found that the respondent's misconduct was aggravated by 
his substantial experience, the protracted nature of his 
negligence, and the harm suffered by his clients.  See id. 
at 356.  The only mitigating factors found by the board were 
typical.  See id.  The respondent received a public reprimand.  
See id. at 356-357.  See also Matter of Goldberg, 34 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 135, 136-138 (2018) (respondent received public 
reprimand for widespread practice of allowing attorneys and 
other staff members to sign respondent's name to pleadings and 
57 
 
motions without respondent's review, resulting in default of 
client's case, as well as false representations to court). 
Verner, unlike the respondent in Matter of Gleason, did 
take actions to determine the status of the case under his 
supervision.  Most notably, Verner inquired into the contents of 
Ballou's file, which led Kaczmarek to falsely represent to him 
that everything in the file, including the mental health 
worksheets, had been disclosed.  Kaczmarek's representation 
bolstered Verner's already reasonable expectation that she would 
disclose all potentially exculpatory evidence. 
In the absence of said expectation and reliance, Verner's 
misconduct might have resembled the sort of negligence that 
warrants a public reprimand.  See Matter of Gleason, 28 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. at 356.  But see Matter of Myers, 355 S.C. 
at 8-9.  Verner's misconduct is somewhat excused, however, 
because he had reason to believe that Kaczmarek was complying 
with the rules of professional conduct.  See Matter of the 
Discipline of an Attorney, 448 Mass. 819, 831, 833-835 (2007) 
(private admonition, rather than public reprimand, issued for 
misleading statements to clients because respondent's misconduct 
was mitigated by his inexperience and absence of selfish 
motive).  Hence, absent aggravating factors, a private reprimand 
would be appropriate.  See Matter of Kane, 13 Mass. Att'y 
58 
 
Discipline Rep. at 327 (presumed sanctions are "[a]bsent 
aggravating and mitigating factors"). 
Because Verner's negligence was also aggravated by several 
aforementioned factors, however, we conclude that a public 
reprimand is warranted.  See Matter of Anderson, 416 Mass. 521, 
525-526 (1993) (public censure, rather than private reprimand, 
warranted because of respondent's twenty-year history of 
neglecting clients and violating disciplinary rules).  Verner 
had experience as a supervisor, his misconduct caused harm that 
was "particularly outrageous" to victims who were vulnerable, 
and the Farak case has taken on public notoriety.  Matter of 
Kane, 13 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 329.  These factors 
suffice to warrant the issuance of a public reprimand.  See 
Matter of Kelley, 489 Mass. 300, 307 (2022) (public reprimand, 
rather than private admonition, warranted because respondent had 
"substantial experience" and previous disciplinary history, and 
"committed multiple rules violations involving multiple clients, 
. . . who were vulnerable individuals"). 
c.  Foster.  Bar counsel appeals from the board's 
conclusion that Foster did not violate rule 8.4 (c).  Foster 
appeals from the sanction recommended by the board, a term 
suspension of one year and one day.  We address each in turn. 
i.  Alleged rule 8.4 (c) violation.  Bar counsel charged 
Foster with violating rule 8.4 (c), alleging that she knowingly 
59 
 
made materially misleading statements to Judge Kinder in her 
September 16 letter.  More specifically, bar counsel took issue 
with Foster's deliberate obfuscation regarding who reviewed 
Ballou's file when she wrote "[a]fter reviewing Sergeant 
Ballou's file," and her reckless expansion of the alleged review 
to include "every document in [Ballou's] possession."  The SHO 
found that although a "close call," Foster's use of 
intentionally vague language did not rise to the level of 
conduct sanctioned by rule 8.4 (c); while grossly incompetent 
and reckless, Foster's statements were not knowingly false 
statements of material fact. 
On appeal, bar counsel challenges this determination and 
asks us to conclude that Foster intended to deceive Judge Kinder 
into believing that she had personal knowledge that Ballou's 
file had been reviewed and that everything had been turned over 
or, alternatively, to hold that Foster knew that the statements 
she made in her letter were false based on principles of willful 
blindness. 
 
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c).  To prove a 
violation of rule 8.4 (c), bar counsel must establish either 
(1) an intent to deceive or (2) at least knowledge of the 
falsity and an understanding that someone will likely rely on 
60 
 
it.  Matter of Zimmerman, 17 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 633, 
645-646 (2001).  See Matter of Grossman, 448 Mass. 151, 155, 
157, 161-162 (2007) (respondent violated rule 8.4 [c] when she 
"intentionally altered" documents submitted to bar counsel 
"knowing that it was false"); Matter of MacDonald, 23 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 411, 415 (2007) (respondent made 
"knowingly false statements of fact" in affidavits submitted to 
court in violation of rule 8.4 [c]).  A lawyer's knowledge of a 
fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence.  Matter of 
Zimmerman, supra at 646, quoting Mass. R. Prof. C. 9 (f) (now 
rule 1 [h]) ("A person's knowledge may be inferred from the 
circumstances").  Further, "a lawyer cannot avoid 'knowing' a 
fact by purposefully refusing to look."  Zimmerman, supra.  
Under the doctrine of willful blindness, a lawyer's "studied 
ignorance of a readily accessible fact by consciously avoiding 
it is the functional equivalent of knowledge of the fact."  Id. 
The SHO found that Foster did not have actual knowledge 
that "no one had reviewed Ballou's file[,] and no one had 
determined whether every document in his possession had already 
been disclosed."  Specifically, the SHO determined that Foster's 
statements "were not knowing false statements of material fact."  
See Admonition No. 02-13, 18 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 640, 
652, 654 (2002), citing Matter of Provanzano, 5 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 300, 302 (1987) (no violation of [S.J.C. Rule 
61 
 
3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102 (A) (4),] where respondent's statements 
in affidavit "may have been misleading" but "were not 
intentionally false").  The SHO's finding that Foster lacked 
actual knowledge is based on a credibility determination that we 
do not disturb.  See Matter of Zimmerman, 17 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. at 647 (accepting hearing committee's subsidiary 
findings on respondent's subjective knowledge, based on 
committee's credibility determinations); Matter of Provanzano, 5 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 304 (credibility findings by the 
hearing officer shall not be disturbed "absent some clear 
error"). 
To support a finding of willful blindness, the facts must 
be sufficiently "substantial and obvious" or "overwhelmingly 
clear or unambiguous" to put a respondent on notice that 
something is amiss.  Matter of Driscoll, 447 Mass. at 685-686.  
See Matter of Zimmerman, 17 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 678 
(forgery of client's former wife's signature was so obvious 
based on respondent's knowledge of couple's tenuous relationship 
and client's evasive behavior that board found respondent 
"steadfastly kept his eyes closed" to ensure transaction was 
successful). 
Bar counsel argues that Foster's incompetence -- her 
failure to personally review Ballou's file, her failure to 
consult Kaczmarek and Ballou to determine what had been turned 
62 
 
over, her failure to ask more questions, and her failure to meet 
Ballou when he came to Boston with his file -- is evidence that 
she "closed her eyes to what was right in front of her," 
supporting a finding of willful blindness.  We disagree.  There 
is no evidence that supports the inference that Foster was 
purposefully avoiding familiarizing herself with the contents of 
Ballou's file or the larger set of evidence in Springfield by 
refusing to look.  Further, as Foster suggests, unlike in Matter 
of Zimmerman, there was nothing about Kaczmarek's, Ravitz's, or 
Ballou's behavior to arouse suspicion that documents were being 
withheld.  On the contrary, all three represented that 
everything had been disclosed.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.2 (b) 
comment 1 (fact that lawyer acts at direction of supervisor "may 
be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge 
required to render conduct a violation of the [r]ules").  Bar 
counsel relies on the notion that it would have been easy for 
Foster to confirm whether everything had been turned over to the 
DAOs by "simply" reviewing the disclosure letters.  While the 
ease of confirming the representations at issue is certainly 
part of the analysis of whether a respondent was willfully 
blind, it is not dispositive.  See, e.g., Matter of Driscoll, 
447 Mass. at 680, 685-686 (no willful blindness where 
respondent's secretary forged her husband's signature on loan 
documents despite that it would have been easy for respondent to 
63 
 
confirm legitimacy).  Because there is insufficient evidence 
that Foster knew the AGO had exculpatory evidence that had yet 
to be turned over, and was not willfully blind to this fact, we 
agree with the board that there was no rule 8.4 (c) violation. 
ii.  Mitigating factors.  The SHO concluded that Foster 
violated rules 1.1, 1.2 (a), and 1.3 in connection with how she 
handled the responses to the Watt subpoena and the Rodriguez and 
Penate motions.  Specifically, the SHO found that Foster 
performed her role in an incompetent manner by failing to 
adequately prepare to respond to the motions, by failing to 
ensure that the AGO reviewed Ballou's file, and by failing to 
prepare Ballou for the hearings before Judge Kinder.  The SHO 
also concluded that, by making misleading statements in a letter 
to Judge Kinder with reckless disregard for their truth, Foster 
violated rules 1.1, 1.2 (a), 1.3, 8.4 (d), and 8.4 (h).  As a 
result, both the SHO and the board recommended a suspension of 
one year and one day.  Bar counsel supports the recommended 
suspension.  On appeal, Foster argues that a suspension is 
unwarranted and instead seeks a public reprimand. 
 
A.  Lack of experience as mitigating factor.  Although she 
had been an attorney for five years, the board found Foster's 
lack of experience in having never responded to a subpoena 
before to mitigate some of her misconduct.  The board agreed, 
and bar counsel does not dispute that Foster's inexperience 
64 
 
should be considered in mitigation.  See Matter of the 
Discipline of an Attorney, 448 Mass. at 834-835 (special 
mitigating factors that respondent was new attorney in first 
legal position, made misleading statements in negotiations, and 
mishandled client funds at direction of employer); Admonition 
No. 95-36, 11 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 373, 375 (1995) 
(mitigating factor that respondent lacked prior experience in 
civil litigation and, specifically, in real estate).  We assign 
minimal weight to this.  Foster's lack of experience in 
responding to subpoenas does little to mitigate misconduct based 
largely on her competence and diligence; more is expected of a 
fifth-year attorney. 
B.  Reliance as mitigating factor.16  Next, Foster contends 
that her reliance on Ravitz and Kaczmarek is a "substantial" 
mitigating factor under rule 5.2 (b).17  The SHO credited and 
 
16 Foster argues that her reliance on the instructions and 
misrepresentations of Ravitz and Kaczmarek is a complete defense 
to her rules violations pursuant to rule 5.2 (b).  This argument 
is waived.  See Matter of Gannett, 489 Mass. 1007, 1009 (2022) 
("Claims that were not raised before the hearing [officer] or 
the board have been deemed waived").  Although Foster raised the 
issue before the SHO, the SHO found that rule 5.2 (b) did not 
apply, and Foster did not appeal that finding to the board:  
"Foster is not asking the [b]oard to give [rule 5.2 (b)] 
exculpatory effect." 
 
17 In her brief, Foster includes among the representations 
on which she relied Ballou's testimony at the September 9 
hearing.  Foster, however, does not argue that reliance on a 
nonattorney client is mitigating. 
65 
 
considered as mitigating the fact that Foster's September 16 
letter to Judge Kinder had been reviewed and approved by Ravitz.  
The SHO also found, regarding Foster's September 16 letter, that 
Foster's misconduct was further mitigated because Kaczmarek had 
misrepresented what had been disclosed to the DAOs and the 
nature of the evidence that had been found during the Farak 
investigation.  The board declined to consider Foster's reliance 
on Ravitz's review or Kaczmarek's deception, however, reasoning 
that neither fact fell into the category of a special mitigating 
factor recognized by this court.  Bar counsel concedes that a 
subordinate attorney's reliance on a supervising attorney may be 
considered a special mitigating factor in appropriate cases, as 
long as the reliance is reasonable and in good faith.  Bar 
counsel maintains, however, that Foster's reliance on Ravitz 
does not meet this standard.  We disagree. 
Bar counsel has not pointed to any evidence in the record 
indicating that Foster relied on Ravitz's statements in bad 
faith.  At a meeting on September 16, Ravitz told Foster that 
because everything had been turned over, there was nothing to 
produce, and directed Foster to draft her letter to Judge Kinder 
saying as much.  Thereafter, Ravitz approved Foster's draft of 
the letter prior to Foster filing it. 
Foster presumably requested Ravitz's review because he was 
her supervisor, this was an important matter, and she was a new 
66 
 
employee at the AGO who had no prior experience in responding to 
subpoenas.  See Matter of Orfanello, 411 Mass. at 556 ("we may 
draw reasonable inferences from [the board's findings of fact] 
even if the board did not draw them").  As the SHO found, given 
Foster's status, and the importance of complying with Judge 
Kinder's order, it made "good sense" for her to have sought out 
Ravitz's approval. 
Bar counsel cites Foster's failure to explain the 
distinction between Ballou's file and the evidence in 
Springfield at the September 10 meeting, which was attended by 
Ravitz, as evidence that Foster was acting in bad faith.  We are 
unconvinced.  This behavior is sufficiently explained by 
Foster's lack of diligence and competence and, therefore, is not 
evidence of an intent by Foster either to avoid her 
responsibilities or to mislead Ravitz and her colleagues. 
Further, Foster's reliance on Ravitz's advice was 
reasonable.  Ravitz was her direct supervisor, and he had worked 
at the AGO's office in the appeals division since 2004.  See 
Matter of Newman, 31 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 483 
(mitigating that attorney, in making false statements, relied on 
experienced appellate attorney).  He also helped to train Foster 
in responding to subpoenas.  See Matter of Galat, 18 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 229, 237 (2002) (mitigating that junior 
attorney, who was not decision maker, relied on senior attorney 
67 
 
who had hired her, for guidance in using receivership funds).  
It was reasonable for Foster to assume that the information 
Ravitz provided her -- that everything had been turned over -- 
was correct.  Because Foster's reliance on Ravitz's instructions 
and approval of her September 16 letter was reasonable and in 
good faith, it may be considered in mitigation of her rules 
violations related to the filing of her September 16 letter. 
Foster's reliance on Kaczmarek may also be considered in 
mitigation.  There were two misrepresentations by Kaczmarek on 
which Foster relied:  her e-mail message on September 10 and her 
statements in the September 10 meeting.  Both times, Kaczmarek 
detailed the contents of Ballou's file, and at the meeting, she 
represented that everything in Ballou's file had been turned 
over.  Similar to Verner's reliance, Foster's reliance on 
Kaczmarek was reasonable.  Bar counsel argues that we should not 
find mitigating a subordinate's reliance on a colleague who is 
not her direct supervisor.  We decline to limit our holding in 
this way.  A respondent's reliance on a colleague's false 
statements -- as long as the reliance is reasonable and in good 
faith -- has been and may be a special mitigating factor in 
certain circumstances.  See, e.g., Admonition No. 19-09, 35 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 700 (reliance on more experienced 
co-counsel, who was not respondent's supervisor, mitigating).  
 
Although we conclude that Foster's reliance on Ravitz and 
68 
 
Kaczmarek is a mitigating factor, we assign less weight to 
Foster's reliance on Kaczmarek and Ravitz than we assigned to 
Verner's reliance on Kaczmarek.  We do so for two reasons. 
First, Foster was making affirmative representations in 
court filings, on which she signed her name.  It should have 
been abundantly clear to Foster that it was her responsibility 
to verify the truth of her own representations.  See Matter of 
Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 1020 (2016), quoting Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 3.3 comment 2, 426 Mass. 1383 (1998) ("[A]n assertion 
purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an 
affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may 
properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is 
true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably 
diligent inquiry").  While the SHO found that Verner also should 
have verified the truth of Kaczmarek's representations, Verner 
did not adopt those representations as his own before a 
tribunal. 
Second, Foster took the information Ravitz and Kaczmarek 
gave her and added her own "gloss" to it.  The first statement 
in the letter, "After reviewing Sergeant Ballou's file," was not 
based on Kaczmarek's or Ravitz's statements; neither had 
indicated to Foster that Ballou's file had been reviewed.  The 
SHO found that Foster's addition was reckless and misleading. 
69 
 
iii.  Aggravating factors.  The SHO found significant 
aggravating factors for Foster, including lack of candor, lack 
of remorse, lack of awareness of wrongdoing, great harm to and 
vulnerability of the victims, notoriety and harm to the public, 
and multiple instances of significant incompetence, lack of 
diligence, and repeated misrepresentations.  Foster does not 
challenge all of the individual aggravating factors assigned to 
her, but we review them to determine the most appropriate 
sanction.18 
Foster's lack of candor, lack of awareness of her 
wrongdoing, and lack of remorse before the SHO all weigh heavily 
in aggravation.  See Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 456 
 
18 The SHO considered Foster's uncharged misconduct relating 
to statements she made at the October 2 hearing before Judge 
Kinder and her testimony before Judge Carey in 2016, finding, 
"Foster showed pervasive dishonesty across three tribunals."  
The board declined to consider Foster's uncharged misconduct 
from the October 2 hearing and the 2016 Judge Carey hearing in 
aggravation.  While uncharged misconduct has been considered to 
be an aggravating factor in the past, see Matter of Strauss, 479 
Mass. 294, 300 n.9 (2018) ("we have permitted uncharged 
misconduct to be considered in aggravation of sanction"), the 
board has recently cited a discomfort with doing so where bar 
counsel was in a position to raise the charge in the petition 
for discipline, but declined to do so, see Matter of Parker, 38 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep.     ,     (2022) (considering 
uncharged misconduct in aggravation "deprived the respondent of 
notice and an opportunity to defend against [the charges]").  As 
the petition for discipline was filed in 2019, bar counsel had 
the opportunity to charge her with misconduct relating to the 
events from 2013 and 2016, but chose not to do so.  Thus, it was 
appropriate for the board to avoid considering Foster's conduct 
at these hearings as aggravating. 
70 
 
(1998), cert. denied sub nom. Eisenhauer v. Massachusetts Bar 
Counsel, 524 U.S. 919 (1998) (credibility, candor, remorse, and 
awareness of wrongdoing all relevant in deciding sanctions).  
The SHO found Foster's testimony before him to be "dissembling, 
disingenuous[], and evasive[]."  Specifically, the SHO did not 
credit Foster's testimony that she was not trying to be 
intentionally vague in her September 16 letter, and described 
her answers to his questions about the September 16 letter as 
"disingenuous[]." 
Another example of Foster's lack of candor before the SHO 
is her testimony about her prior work experience.  On her resume 
that she submitted to the AGO, she indicated that she had 
substantial Superior Court experience, including "second-
seating" homicide cases and drafting and arguing postconviction 
motions.  Before the SHO, however, she claimed that she had no 
Superior Court experience.  When questioned about the 
discrepancy, Foster refused to agree that she had embellished 
her prior experience and, instead, claimed disingenuously that 
she had a different understanding of the terms "drafting" and 
"arguing" when she compiled her resume.  Foster's lack of candor 
was properly considered aggravating by the board, and we 
consider it here as well.  Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 
at 456 ("respondent's candor and trustworthiness both directly 
affect [her] capacity to practice law"). 
71 
 
iv.  Foster's sanction.  Foster, like Verner, maintains 
that bar counsel failed to prove that her misconduct was the 
proximate cause of any of the harm that resulted.  Foster's 
attempt to make this argument is no more persuasive than 
Verner's.  Despite Foster's suggestion otherwise, the SHO found 
a causal connection between Foster's reckless misrepresentations 
and Judge Kinder's decision in the cases before him.  Foster's 
representation that everything had been turned over led Judge 
Kinder to decline to grant new trials in the defendants' cases 
before him, because there was insufficient evidence that Farak 
had engaged in misconduct when the defendants had been arrested 
in 2011 or earlier.  Moreover, when recommending a sanction of 
one year and one day, the SHO considered "the significant and 
far-reaching harm to the public and the insult to the legal 
system [Foster] caused." 
As stated, each respondent's misconduct caused great harm, 
both to the criminal defendants whose cases were corrupted by 
Farak's tampering and to the public's perception of the criminal 
justice system.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Claudio, 484 Mass. 
203, 210 (2020) ("In [Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 352 
(2014)], we recognized that Dookhan's misconduct 'cast a shadow 
over the entire criminal justice system.'  In comparison, the 
government misconduct committed by Farak and members of the 
Attorney General's office cast a shadow even longer and 
72 
 
darker").  Accordingly, the board appropriately considered the 
extent of the harm caused by Foster, including the harm to 
vulnerable third parties, as aggravating.  See Matter of 
Zimmerman, 17 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 651 (harm to third 
party aggravating factor).  See also Matter of Crossen, 450 
Mass. at 581 (vulnerability of third parties aggravating 
factor). 
We adopt the board's recommendation of a suspension of one 
year and one day for Foster.  "When an attorney has engaged in 
misconduct 'involving repeated failures to act with reasonable 
diligence . . . and the lawyer's misconduct causes serious 
injury . . . to a client or others,' a suspension is warranted."  
Matter of Grayer, 483 Mass. at 1018, quoting Matter of Kane, 13 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 328.19  After considering the 
mitigating factors and the multiple significant aggravating 
factors, particularly Foster's lack of candor and her 
recklessness that led to extensive harm, we do not believe that 
this is markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in other 
cases involving similar circumstances.  See Matter of Serpa, 30 
 
19 Foster argues that bar counsel only proved she engaged in 
"essentially negligent conduct."  As stated, Foster's conduct 
went beyond negligence; the SHO found that her conduct rose to a 
level of recklessness and gross incompetence.  And "reckless 
misrepresentation[s] to the court add[] weight to the . . . 
balance in determining the appropriate sanction."  Matter of 
Serpa, 30 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 370. 
73 
 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 358, 362, 372-373 (2014) (sixty-day 
suspension for violation of rules 1.5 [a], 3.3 [a], 8.4 [c], 
8.4 [d], and 8.4 [h], absent certain aggravating factors, for 
"respondent's reckless misrepresentations [that were] 
particularly troublesome because they contaminated a process 
that . . . is likely to have had an impact on a person's 
liberty"); Matter of Scannell, 21 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 
580, 581-584 (2005) (suspension of one year and one day for 
neglect of three client matters in violation of rules 1.1, 
1.2 [a], 1.3, and 1.4 aggravated by prior disciplinary history).  
See also Matter of Moore, 442 Mass. 285, 294-295 (2004) (fact 
that respondent failed to appreciate gravity of misconduct and 
lied to committee took case "beyond the short suspensions 
usually imposed" and for violations of [S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 
1,] DR 1-101 [A], DR 1-102 [A] [4], [5], and [6], [as appearing 
in 382 Mass. 769 (1981),] respondent received two-year 
suspension). 
d.  Kaczmarek.  The SHO concluded that Kaczmarek, by 
failing to disclose to the DAOs potentially exculpatory evidence 
known to her, violated rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (a), 3.4 (c), 
3.8 (d), and 8.4 (d).  The SHO also concluded that Kaczmarek, by 
knowingly failing to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence 
and by knowingly making materially misleading statements to 
assistant district attorneys Bossé and Flannery and State police 
74 
 
counsel Farrell, violated rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (a), 3.4 (c), 
3.8 (d), 4.1 (a), 8.4 (a), 8.4 (c), 8.4 (d), and 8.4 (h).  
Further, the SHO found that Kaczmarek, by failing to direct 
Ballou to provide Flannery with potentially exculpatory 
information known to her, violated rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (a), 
3.4 (c), 3.8 (d), 5.3 (b), 8.4 (a), 8.4 (d), and 8.4 (h).  The 
SHO found that, by failing to take remedial action despite her 
awareness that Ballou had not disclosed potentially exculpatory 
information to Flannery, Kaczmarek violated rule 5.3 (c) (2).  
The SHO further concluded that Kaczmarek, by failing to 
undertake a review of her file and produce documents responsive 
to the subpoenas and discovery motions, and by failing to alert 
Foster to the existence of undisclosed documents, violated rules 
1.1, 1.3, and 3.4 (c).  Finally, the SHO found that, by failing, 
after reviewing the motion to clarify, to ensure potentially 
exculpatory information known to her that could be useful to 
Penate had been disclosed to the DAOs, Kaczmarek violated rules 
1.1, 1.3, 3.4 (a), and 8.4 (d).  As a result, the SHO 
recommended a two-year suspension for Kaczmarek.  Reasoning that 
Kaczmarek bore the most responsibility for the AGO's failure to 
disclose exculpatory information, and that Kaczmarek was thereby 
the most culpable for the resulting harm, the board recommended 
disbarment.  Bar counsel agrees with the board's recommendation; 
Kaczmarek appeals. 
75 
 
The only issue before us with respect to Kaczmarek is what 
sanction is most appropriate.  Kaczmarek argues that we should 
reject the board's recommendation of disbarment and instead 
impose a public reprimand or a two-year suspension.  Anything 
more than a two-year suspension, Kaczmarek argues, would be 
disproportional to her misconduct.20 
 
i.  Aggravating factors.  The SHO and the board did not 
find any factors in mitigation for Kaczmarek.  Conversely, the 
SHO found, and the board adopted, a litany of factors in 
aggravation.  These included Kaczmarek's experience; her lack of 
remorse, lack of admission of wrongdoing, and her failure to 
show appreciation for her role in what occurred; her lack of 
candor; her multiple rules violations; her improper motivation 
for her misconduct; and the significant harm to third-party 
defendants, the criminal justice system, and the public.  
 
20 In support of her argument, Kaczmarek maintains that at 
the time of her misconduct, no disciplinary rule imposed an 
obligation on a prosecutor to disclose evidence from a pending 
criminal case to third persons.  She alleges that, if she were 
to be disbarred, the court would be engaging in a "retroactive" 
application of rule 3.8 (d).  In making this claim, Kaczmarek 
attempts to seek review of the SHO's finding that she violated 
3.8 (d) by cloaking her argument as one that affects her 
sanction.  As this argument is not properly before the court, we 
do not address it.  We note, however, that the only way the 
Farak defendants could have accessed the exculpatory evidence 
was through the AGO; it acted as a gatekeeper to the 
information.  The AGO was the only entity that possessed the 
mental health worksheets and the 2005 cocaine case, both of 
which "tend[ed] to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate[] 
the offense."  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d). 
76 
 
Kaczmarek challenges some, but not all, of the factors 
considered by the board, arguing that the board "ignore[d] the 
nuances that distinguish this matter." 
First, Kaczmarek argues that the board improperly 
considered the number of rules violations in aggravation because 
she committed only three acts of misconduct:  (1) failing to 
disclose potentially exculpatory information to the DAOs; 
(2) misleading Bossé by telling him that "all relevant discovery 
had been provided"; and (3) misleading Farrell when he inquired 
about Ryan's subpoena for documents.  This, however, understates 
Kaczmarek's misconduct.  We are not persuaded that Kaczmarek's 
misconduct can be characterized as three discrete instances; it 
is "neither possible nor logical to isolate each distinct 
instance of wrongdoing.  They infect each other."  Matter of 
Hayes, 39 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep.     (2023) (respondents' 
multiple rules violations considered in aggravation).  
Kaczmarek's deceit was protracted.  See Matter of Griffith, 440 
Mass. at 510 ("the length of time the respondent permitted his 
[or her] concealment of information to stand" may be aggravating 
factor).  She "actively and intentionally" misled assistant 
district attorneys and her colleagues at the AGO, failed to 
correct Ballou's inaccurate and misleading statements, and 
avoided learning anything more about the extent of Farak's 
misconduct over the course of her involvement in the Farak 
77 
 
investigation.  It was appropriate for the board and the SHO to 
consider Kaczmarek's multiple rules violations as aggravating.  
See Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 326-327 (1989) 
("consideration of the cumulative effect of several violations 
is proper"). 
Kaczmarek next argues that the board erred in considering 
her improper motive.  The board found that Kaczmarek's primary 
motivation was to contain the damage of Farak's misconduct to a 
few cases in order to avoid further complications.  Kaczmarek 
maintains that this characterization of her motivation is not 
supported by substantial evidence.  We agree with Kaczmarek that 
there was not substantial evidence that her intentional 
misrepresentations were motivated by a desire to downplay the 
extent of Farak's misconduct.  The SHO found, however, that 
Kaczmarek's "disturbing attitude" toward defense counsel 
evidenced an improper motive.  Kaczmarek was wholly 
uncooperative and dismissive of Ryan's appropriate discovery 
requests.  She obstructed defense attorneys' access to important 
exculpatory evidence.  Indeed, Kaczmarek conceded at the hearing 
before the SHO that she was "annoyed" that Ryan continued to ask 
for access to evidence in the Farak case:  "it's probably the 
90th time he asked if he could see the evidence in the lab." 
An attorney's motive can be relevant in determining the 
proper sanction.  See Massachusetts Bar Discipline, supra 
78 
 
at 403.  The SHO properly considered this factor in aggravation, 
and we assign it some weight in our determination of her 
sanction.  See Matter of Finneran, 455 Mass. at 736 (improper 
motive constitutes aggravation); Matter of the Disciplinary 
Proceeding Against Schafer, 149 Wash. 2d 148, 170 (2003) (lawyer 
who violated client confidences and was partly motivated by 
vindictiveness found to have met standard for having selfish 
motive). 
Kaczmarek also takes issue with the board's consideration 
of her experience as an aggravating factor.  Specifically, 
Kaczmarek argues that "her experience disclosing exculpatory 
evidence to the defendant she was prosecuting did not provide 
her with knowledge of how to handle disclosure to others."  We 
are wholly unconvinced that Kaczmarek's experience as an 
attorney for thirteen years, her experience both as an assistant 
district attorney and in private practice, and her eight-year 
long tenure at the AGO did not provide her with the knowledge of 
how to handle disclosures to others.  Even more significant was 
Kaczmarek's work on the Dookhan case.  By the time Kaczmarek was 
assigned to the Farak prosecution, she had already possessed an 
intimate familiarity with the AGO's discovery policy adopted in 
the case, because it was the same policy that she had used in 
the Dookhan case.  Kaczmarek's experience is properly considered 
79 
 
aggravating.  See Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. at 1022; Matter of 
Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 312 (1993). 
In further aggravation, Kaczmarek exhibited a lack of 
candor before the SHO; Kaczmarek's testimony was characterized 
as "vague" and "dissembling."  See Matter of Zankowski, 487 
Mass. 140, 153 (2021) ("While an attorney is entitled to defend 
against allegations of a petition for discipline, the hearing 
[officer] may determine whether to credit the testimony and 
evidence, and [the officer] may consider in aggravation any lack 
of candor [he or she] finds").  Indeed, the SHO found a 
remarkable number of instances in which Kaczmarek's testimony 
was not credible:  her failure to realize that the 2012 
oxycodone case and the 2005 light cocaine case were potentially 
exculpatory; her claim that she had no reason to review, and her 
failure to review, the prosecution memorandum once Verner 
returned it to her; her assertion that it was not her job to 
identify and disclose exculpatory evidence to the DAOs for the 
benefit of the Farak defendants; her claim that her September 10 
e-mail message listing the mental health worksheets triggered 
nothing in her mind; and her denial that the meeting on 
September 10 with Foster, Verner, Reardon, Ravitz, and Mazzone 
had occurred, wherein she informed everyone that everything in 
Ballou's file had been turned over.  The SHO found, on the basis 
of these falsehoods, that Kaczmarek's testimony was not candid.  
80 
 
Kaczmarek's striking lack of truthfulness is deeply troublesome 
with respect to her capacity to practice law.  See Matter of 
Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. at 456. 
Moreover, Kaczmarek misled Verner, Foster, and other 
colleagues about what had been disclosed to the DAOs, something 
the SHO labeled as "particularly disturbing" in an office where 
colleagues must be able to rely on each other for accurate 
information.  We consider this, too, as aggravating.  See Matter 
of Ferris, 9 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 110, 112 (1993) ("In 
aggravation, the committee found that . . . the respondent 
intentionally misled his clients for his own gain"); 
Massachusetts Bar Discipline, supra at 406 ("the extent of an 
attorney's . . . manipulation in the course of the misconduct" 
may be aggravating factor). 
Additionally, the SHO found that Kaczmarek displayed no 
remorse, admitted no wrongdoing, and showed no appreciation for 
her role in what occurred.  As it was with Foster, this was 
properly considered by the board as aggravating.  See 
Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. at 456. 
Finally, the board assigned weight to the gravity of the 
harm and to the fact that Kaczmarek's intentional misconduct 
directly caused this harm.  Kaczmarek argues that the harm 
caused by the AGO's failure to disclose exculpatory information 
cannot be solely attributable to her because institutional 
81 
 
failures and Farak's own misconduct were also contributing 
causes.  As discussed supra, each of the respondents played a 
role in causing the harm.  Accordingly, we do not find Kaczmarek 
solely responsible.  We do conclude, however, as the SHO did, 
that she bears the greatest responsibility, as well as the 
greatest culpability.  Kaczmarek "knowingly failed" to produce 
exculpatory evidence and made "materially false and 
intentionally misleading" statements to the DAOs and to her 
colleagues that all relevant discovery had been turned over.  
See Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 741 (1990) ("intentional 
abdication of . . . professional obligations" may warrant more 
severe sanction). 
Kaczmarek further maintains that the record contains 
evidence of only thirteen convicted defendants, not thousands, 
who were party to the consolidated case before Judge Kinder and 
who were affected by their inability to access the mental health 
worksheets and exculpatory evidence.  We reject this 
characterization of the harm for reasons we have already 
discussed. 
ii.  Kaczmarek's sanction.  To start, as noted by the 
board, although they are not entirely unprecedented, there are 
few disciplinary cases in Massachusetts against prosecutors.  
See Matter of Dunne, 36 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 143, 144 
(2020) (in reciprocal discipline case, one-year suspension for 
82 
 
prosecutor's misrepresentation to court and opposing counsel 
that she did not possess tape recording of defendant's 
conversations with his son, in violation of Fla. R. Prof. C. 
3.3, 4.1, and 8.4 [d]); Matter of Marshard, 34 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 283, 286, 295 (2018) (one-month suspension for 
prosecutor's meeting with represented witness without witness's 
attorney, in violation of rules 4.2 and 8.4 [d], aggravated by 
experience, lack of understanding of ethical obligations, lack 
of candor, and misrepresentations to judge).  In reviewing these 
cases, we have come across none that is comparable to the facts 
we have here.  Although we consider whether the recommended 
sanction is "markedly disparate from judgments in comparable 
cases," see Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. at 163, when there are 
no comparable cases, 
"[w]e . . . must establish independently a sanction 
adequate to address the seriousness of the misconduct, to 
reassure the bar and the public that such conduct is 
completely contrary to the oath of office taken by every 
lawyer, and to underscore that, when it is uncovered, such 
conduct will be treated with the utmost severity." 
 
Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. at 339. 
In determining what sanction to assign, "the primary factor 
. . . is 'the effect upon, and perception of, the public and the 
bar.'"  Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. at 1041, quoting Matter of 
Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 829 (2008).  Our rules of professional 
conduct "[e]xist to protect the public and maintain its 
83 
 
confidence in the integrity of the bar and the fairness and 
impartiality of our legal system."  Matter of Zak, supra 
at 1038. 
As a result of Kaczmarek's intentional and egregious 
misconduct, the due process rights of thousands of criminal 
defendants were violated for a prolonged period based on the 
withholding of exculpatory evidence.  Kaczmarek failed in her 
duties as a prosecutor by knowingly impeding access to evidence 
and information.  She made materially false and misleading 
statements to the DAOs and her colleagues.  Due to the gravity 
of the harm, the multitude of serious aggravating factors, and 
the lack of any mitigating factors, we adopt the board's 
recommendation of disbarment for Kaczmarek. 
4.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we adopt the 
board's recommendations of a suspension of one year and one day 
for Foster and disbarment for Kaczmarek.  For Verner, we 
conclude that a public reprimand is appropriate.  We remand to 
the county court where a judgment consistent with this decision 
shall enter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.