Title: Adjartey v. Central Division of Housing Court Department
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12380
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12380 
 
RUTH ADJARTEY & others1  vs.  CENTRAL DIVISION OF THE HOUSING 
COURT DEPARTMENT2 & others.3 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 6, 2018. - April 10, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Ismail Abdelhamed, Vesta Ballou, Mildred Collins, 
Jackeline Cucufate, Marjorie Evans, Matthew Griffin, Gerard 
Hughes, Donna Mejias-Berrios, Janet Montgomery, Elizabeth 
Norris, Luciano Oliveira, Mychelyne Oliveira, Daniel Peristere, 
Christy Raymond, John Schumacher, Myron Swanston, and Susan 
Osborne. 
 
 
We note that Caitlin Ryals is also listed as a petitioner 
in the petitioners' filings, but did not sign the G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, petition or submit an affidavit of indigency to the county 
court.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a), as amended, 456 Mass. 1401 
(2010) ("A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign his pleadings . . .").  For this reason, Ryals was not 
considered a petitioner in the county court action and should 
not be considered a party here. 
 
 
2 In their filings, the petitioners name "Worcester Housing 
Court" as the respondent.  The Housing Court Department has been 
reorganized by statute, however, and the Worcester Division is 
now part of the Central Division.  St. 2017, c. 47, § 78.  The 
court is a nominal party only.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 
1302 (1996). 
 
 
3 Santander Bank, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 
and Lisa Barron, interested parties. 
2 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Housing Court, Costs and fees.  Uniform 
Summary Process Rules.  Indigent.  Handicapped Persons.  
Practice, Civil, Summary process, Costs.  Constitutional 
Law, Access to court proceedings.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 28, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was considered by Lowy, J., and a 
motion for reconsideration was also considered by him. 
 
 
 
Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Central Division of the Housing Court Department. 
 
Brian Linehan for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
 
Marjorie Evans, pro se. 
 
Christine Hilton, pro se. 
 
John Schumacher, pro se. 
 
Annette Bent, pro se. 
 
Mychelyne Oliveira, pro se. 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin, Jessie J. Rossman, & Matthew R. Segal, 
for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The petitioners in this case raise numerous 
concerns regarding summary process proceedings in the Worcester 
Division of the Housing Court Department, now part of the 
Central Division (Housing Court).4  See St. 2017, c. 47, § 78.  
Although we affirm the single justice's order denying the 
petitioners' request for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, we take 
                     
 
4 This case is one of three that we decide today involving 
self-represented litigants in summary process eviction cases.  
See Evans v. Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp., 481 Mass.     
(2019); Hilton v. Central Div. of the Housing Court Dep't, 481 
Mass.     (2019). 
3 
 
 
 
this opportunity to clarify several important issues raised by 
the facts alleged in this case:  (1) the appropriate process for 
waiving court fees and costs based on indigency; (2) more 
narrowly, the process for waiving the cost of audio recordings 
of prior court proceedings for those found indigent; and (3) the 
obligation of Massachusetts courts to provide reasonable 
accommodations for parties with disabilities.  In providing this 
guidance, we recognize that the complexity and speed of summary 
process cases can present formidable challenges to individuals 
facing eviction, particularly where those individuals are not 
represented by an attorney.5 
Background.  Each petitioner in this case is or was 
involved in a summary process eviction action commenced in the 
Housing Court.  Although the alleged experiences of these 
petitioners vary widely, each claims that he or she was 
improperly denied a fee waiver for audio recordings of his or 
her trial court proceedings, was unable to access audio 
recordings in time to prepare for a Housing Court or appellate 
court proceeding, or was required to reveal his or her indigency 
in open court while requesting audio recordings.  The 
petitioners who were denied access to audio recordings argue 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., and the Center for 
Public Representation. 
4 
 
 
 
that they were unable to learn what had happened at court 
hearings they were unable to attend or fully understand, and 
that they were therefore unable to adequately protect themselves 
from adverse legal action.  Several petitioners further claim 
that the Housing Court denied them reasonable accommodations for 
their disabilities, thereby depriving them of equal access to 
the courts. 
On or about February 28, 2017, the petitioners in this case 
applied for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county 
court.  They argued in their petition that this court should 
exercise its superintendence power to (1) require that all 
requested audio recordings be provided to all indigent parties 
or, in the alternative, that recordings be provided without 
hearing in certain limited circumstances; (2) bar courts from 
following procedures that require parties publicly to reveal 
their indigency; (3) halt eviction executions for all indigent 
individuals pending thorough review of the Housing Court's 
denial of requests for audio recordings; (4) rewind petitioners' 
cases back to the point at which they were denied access to an 
audio recording; (5) order all courts hearing summary process 
actions visibly to display at least one poster explaining the 
rights of indigent litigants; (6) send an explanatory memorandum 
to judges and clerk-magistrates regarding the proper treatment 
of indigent litigants; and (7) reimburse indigent petitioners 
5 
 
 
 
who paid for their audio recordings, or had others pay for them 
on their behalf.  The petition further stated that the Housing 
Court repeatedly failed to provide reasonable accommodations for 
petitioners with disabilities. 
The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the petition 
on behalf of the Housing Court, arguing that the relief sought 
by the petitioners was available through the normal appellate 
process and that the petition failed to comply with a court rule 
requiring petitions filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to 
"name as respondents and make service upon all parties to the 
proceeding before the lower court."  S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 
1302 (1996).  The petitioners filed an opposition to the 
Attorney General's motion. 
On June 30, 2017, the single justice allowed the Attorney 
General's motion to dismiss the petition and ordered that the 
petition be denied without hearing.  Having granted the motion 
to dismiss, the single justice made no findings of fact.  The 
petitioners moved for reconsideration, and this motion was 
likewise denied without hearing.  The petitioners filed a notice 
of appeal seeking review of the single justice's dismissal of 
their petition and denial of their motion for reconsideration, 
and the appeal was entered in this court. 
 
Discussion.  "Decisions of a single justice will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent clear error of law or abuse of 
6 
 
 
 
discretion."  Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 103, 106 
(1989).  "Parties seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
must demonstrate both a violation of their substantive rights 
and the absence of another adequate or effective avenue of 
relief" (quotations and citation omitted).  McDonough, 
petitioner, 457 Mass. 512, 517-518 (2010).  Because the 
petitioners had adequate alternative avenues to seek review of 
their claims, we conclude that the single justice did not abuse 
his discretion or commit clear error of law in denying the 
petitioners' G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.6  In light of the facts 
                     
 
6 With regard to the petitioners' specific claims regarding 
fee waivers for the cost of audio recordings, G. L. c. 261, 
§ 27D, allows for appellate review in "any case where the court 
denies a request for waiver, substitution or payment by the 
commonwealth of fees and costs."  And with regard to any 
potential claims under art. 114 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act 
(MERA), or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the 
petitioners could have initiated a separate action in a court of 
competent jurisdiction or argued on direct appeal that they were 
prejudiced by a judge's erroneous denial of a request for 
reasonable accommodations.  See McDonough, petitioner, 457 Mass. 
512, 520 (2010); G. L. c. 93, § 103 (b) ("Any person whose 
rights under the provisions of subsection [a] [of MERA] have 
been violated may commence a civil action for injunctive and 
other appropriate equitable relief . . . in the superior court 
. . ."); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (describing "remedies, procedures, 
and rights" available to persons alleging violation of Title II 
of ADA).  To the extent that the petitioners allege that they 
were prejudiced by other Housing Court actions, they could 
likewise have pursued those claims on direct appeal. 
 
 
We further note that the petitioners failed to comply with 
S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996), which requires "[a]ny 
petition seeking to invoke the general superintendency power of 
the court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, [to] name as 
7 
 
 
 
alleged in this case, however, we think it important to clarify 
three issues:  (1) the proper application of the so-called 
Indigent Court Costs Law, G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G; (2) the 
process for obtaining audio recordings of Housing Court 
proceedings; and (3) the obligation of courts to provide 
reasonable accommodations for parties with disabilities. 
 1.  The complexity and speed of summary process cases, and 
disparities in legal representation between landlords and 
tenants.  Before we confront the specific issues raised by this 
case, we must address its broader context:  the unique nature of 
a summary process eviction.  Specifically, we note that summary 
process cases are complex, fast-moving, and generally litigated 
by landlords who are represented by attorneys and tenants who 
are not.7  See Housing Court Department, Fiscal Year 2018 
Statistics. 
                     
respondents and make service upon all parties to the proceedings 
before the lower court."  This petition failed to name as 
respondents the various plaintiffs who initiated summary process 
eviction actions against the petitioners. 
 
 
7 For the sake of simplicity, we often refer to Housing 
Court plaintiffs as "landlords" and Housing Court defendants as 
"tenants."  We acknowledge that these terms do not fully capture 
all of the individuals who initiate and defend against summary 
process evictions.  In fact, eight categories of persons may 
initiate a summary process eviction under G. L. c. 239, § 1:  
(1) persons whose premises has been forcibly entered; (2) 
persons forcibly and unlawfully kept out of possession of their 
premises by one who entered the premises peaceably; (3) lessors 
whose tenants hold over -- that is, remain on the property -- 
without right after the termination of the lease; (4) purchasers 
8 
 
 
 
We include a full discussion of the complexities and speed 
of an eviction case in an Appendix to this opinion, but briefly 
summarize the process here.  In a summary process action 
pursuant to G. L. c. 239, a landlord or homeowner asserts a 
statutory right to remove an occupant from property and recover 
possession of the property.  See Fafard v. Lincoln Pharmacy of 
Milford, Inc., 439 Mass. 512, 515 (2003) ("Summary process is a 
purely statutory procedure and can be maintained only in the 
instances specifically provided for in the statute" [citation 
omitted]). Before filing a summary process action in court, a 
landlord must serve his or her tenant with a "notice to quit" 
                     
of the premises after a mortgage has been foreclosed by a sale; 
(5) purchasers of the premises where the seller (or any person 
holding under the seller) refuses to surrender possession; (6) 
persons entitled to the premises under a tax title foreclosure 
by decree of the Land Court; (7) sellers of land where the 
purchaser is in possession of the premises but fails to take 
title as called for in the written agreement to purchase; and 
(8) persons who have obtained registered title in the Land 
Court, except where the person in possession has erected 
buildings or improvements on the land and held possession of the 
land for six years, or held the land under a title he or she had 
reason to believe was good.  Under G. L. c. 239, § 1A, a 
landlord may initiate a no-fault summary process action thirty 
days prior to a lease's termination where certain statutory 
requirements are met and where there are "substantial grounds 
upon which the court could reasonably conclude that the 
defendant is likely to continue in possession of the premises at 
issue without right after the designated termination date." 
 
 
We also note that many of the petitioners here are former 
homeowners who, after the foreclosure of their mortgages and the 
sale of their properties, remained in their homes.  As a result, 
the new owners of their homes sought their eviction. 
9 
 
 
 
informing the tenant that after a specified period of time, the 
landlord intends to evict the tenant.  See Cambridge St. Realty, 
LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 122 (2018) ("legally effective 
notice to quit is a condition precedent to a summary process 
action and part of the landlord's prima facie case"). 
Once the period specified in the notice to quit has ended, 
a landlord may serve his or her tenant with a "summons and 
complaint" specifying, among other things, the reasons for the 
requested eviction and the entry date by which the case will be 
commenced in the court.  See Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1993); Rule 2(d) of the Uniform Summary Process 
Rules (1993).  This entry date must be scheduled for a Monday 
seven to thirty days after the tenant's receipt of the summons 
and complaint.  See Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Summary Process 
Rules; Rule 2(c) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).  
The tenant's deadline to file an answer is determined from the 
entry date:  no later than the Monday following the entry date, 
the tenant must file an answer denying any disputed statement in 
the complaint and setting forth all applicable defenses or 
counterclaims.  See Rule 3 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules 
(1993); Rule 5 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980).  
Also by the Monday following the entry date, either party may 
file a request for discovery.  See Rule 7(a) of the Uniform 
Summary Process Rules (1993). 
10 
 
 
 
An eviction hearing is automatically scheduled to take 
place on the second Thursday following the entry date.  See Rule 
2(c) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  If either party 
files a request for discovery, this hearing is postponed to the 
fourth Thursday following the entry date.  See Rule 7(b) of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).  On the date of the 
hearing, the parties may settle the dispute themselves, mediate 
their dispute with a housing specialist, or proceed to trial.  
If the parties reach an agreement, whether through settlement 
discussions or mediation, and that agreement is approved by a 
judge, it becomes a binding court order.  See Boston Hous. Auth. 
v. Cassio, 428 Mass. 112, 113-114 (1998).  If the parties 
proceed to trial, the judge issues a decision from which either 
party may appeal within ten days.  G. L. c. 239, § 5 (a). 
Where a judgment enters in favor of the landlord after 
trial and the tenant files a notice of appeal, the tenant 
generally may not be evicted until the appeal is resolved because 
execution upon the judgment generally is stayed pending appeal.8  
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 62 (d), 365 Mass. 829 (1974).  However, a 
court may order that the tenant provide the court with an appeal 
                     
 
8 There is an exception to the general rule that no 
execution may issue while a timely filed appeal from the 
judgment is pending where the tenant is being evicted from 
public housing for one of several specified reasons, see G. L. 
c. 121B, § 32. 
11 
 
 
 
bond payable to the landlord or pay a sum of money for the use 
and occupancy of the premises while the appeal is pending.  See 
G. L. c. 239, §§ 5-6.9  In contrast, where a default judgment 
enters in favor of the landlord and the tenant files a motion 
for relief from that judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 
Mass. 828 (1974), an appeal from the denial of that motion does 
not stay execution unless a separate motion to stay is allowed.  
See id. ("motion under [Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)] does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation"); Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 62 (b), 365 Mass. 829 (1974) (court in its discretion 
may stay execution of judgment pending decision on motion for 
relief from judgment). 
If the judge concludes that the landlord is entitled to 
possession of the property and the ten-day window passes without 
a notice of appeal being filed, the landlord may obtain an 
execution authorizing a sheriff or constable to serve the tenant 
with forty-eight hours' notice of eviction.  G. L. c. 239, §§ 3, 
5 (a).  Once these forty-eight hours have expired, a tenant and 
his or her possessions may be physically removed from the 
                     
 
9 If a tenant fails to pay the appeal bond or use and 
occupancy payment as ordered, his or her appeal may be 
dismissed.  See G. L. c. 239, § 5; Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v. 
Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 137 n.19 (2018) (G. L. c. 239, § 5 [h], 
"permits dismissal of an appeal by the trial court . . . when a 
tenant fails to post the initial appeals bond or use and 
occupancy payment"). 
12 
 
 
 
property.  G. L. c. 239, § 3.  A residential defendant, however, 
may apply for up to a six-month stay of execution where the 
tenancy was terminated without fault and the termination was not 
based on the tenant's failure to pay rent.10  See G. L. c. 239, 
§§ 9-10. 
The complexity of a summary process eviction is exacerbated 
by the web of applicable statutes and rules.  While the Uniform 
Summary Process Rules aim to outline each step of an eviction 
action, see Rules 1-13 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules, a 
litigant must consider a variety of other rules and statutes in 
order to comprehend the full scope of the process.  For 
instance, the substance of summary process eviction actions -- 
as well as various procedural details not addressed in the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules -- are governed by G. L. c. 239.  
And aspects of the process not specifically addressed by the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules are governed by the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as the latter rules "are not 
inconsistent with [the Uniform Summary Process Rules], with 
applicable statutory law or with the jurisdiction of the 
particular court in which they would be applied."  Rule 1 of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980).  Where a tenant seeks to 
                     
 
10 Where the property is occupied by a disabled person or a 
person who is at least sixty years old, the court may grant up 
to a twelve-month stay of execution.  G. L. c. 239, § 9. 
13 
 
 
 
waive the fees and costs associated with a Housing Court 
eviction action, the tenant must satisfy the eligibility 
requirements described in G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G.  The various 
rules and statutes are not only complicated, but at times 
overlapping.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 261, § 27A (describing appeal 
bonds as "extra fees and costs"); G. L. c. 239, § 5 (describing 
appeal bond requirement and waivers of appeal bond).  Deciding 
when to apply which of these rules -- and how to resolve 
inconsistencies among them -- is therefore a formidable 
challenge for an unrepresented litigant seeking to comply with 
fast-moving deadlines, especially when that litigant is also 
facing the stress of a potential eviction. 
 
Based on the above timeline, fewer than seven weeks might 
elapse between the time that the defendant is served with a 
notice to quit and the time that he or she is removed from his 
or her residence, provided that neither party requests 
discovery.  Even if a discovery request is filed, the process 
can take fewer than nine weeks.  The swiftness of this process 
reflects the purpose of eviction proceedings -- to provide 
"'just, speedy, and inexpensive' resolution of summary process 
cases."  Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327, 334 (2011), 
quoting Rule 1 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  But it 
leaves little room for error.  A defendant facing eviction is 
required to understand, in the time between compressed 
14 
 
 
 
deadlines, the meaning of a notice to quit; the filing 
requirements for an answer, including those relating to defenses 
and counterclaims; the method for requesting and providing 
discovery; the workings of a trial or mediation; and the options 
available after a judgment has issued. 
 
The challenges inherent in navigating a complex and fast-
moving process are compounded for those individuals who face 
summary process eviction without the aid and expertise of an 
attorney.  And the vast majority of tenants in the Housing Court 
proceed without the benefit of counsel -- in fiscal year 2018, 
92.4 percent of Housing Court summary process defendants were 
unrepresented.  See Housing Court Department, Fiscal Year 2018 
Statistics.  In contrast, 70.2 percent of plaintiffs initiating 
summary process eviction cases in the Housing Court were 
represented by counsel.11  Id.  The result, in most cases, is 
that the landlord has an attorney who understands how to 
navigate the eviction process and the tenant does not. 
The Housing Court has recognized the challenges inherent in 
the fact that "a significant number of litigants appear in court 
                     
 
11 We are mindful that a significant number -- close to 
thirty percent -- of plaintiffs seeking an eviction are 
unrepresented, see Housing Court Department, Fiscal Year 2018 
Statistics, and that unrepresented landlords face their own 
challenges.  We focus this opinion on the challenges faced by 
unrepresented tenants, however, because the petitioners before 
us were defendants in the Housing Court and because landlords 
are represented far more frequently than tenants. 
15 
 
 
 
pro se and are unfamiliar with the Uniform Rules of Summary 
Process."  Housing Court Standing Order 1-04 (2004).  It 
therefore requires Housing Court judges to "apply the rules in a 
fair, reasonable and practical manner" and allows them to 
exercise their discretion to reschedule hearings and allow 
filings after their due date has passed.  Id.  The facts as 
alleged, however, reflect the continued difficulties that exist 
for unrepresented parties navigating a process characterized by 
complex requirements and tight deadlines. 
Legal services organizations and attorneys working pro bono 
have sought to mitigate these difficulties by providing 
unrepresented litigants with free legal assistance.  The "lawyer 
for a day program," for example, is available to Housing Court 
litigants on the date of their eviction hearings.  See Housing 
Court Standing Order 1-01 (2001).  This program, which operates 
on a first-come, first-served basis, "seeks to address the 
challenge and promote the fairness of the process by allowing 
self-represented parties to obtain limited representation from 
volunteer lawyers."  Cambridge St. Realty, LLC, 481 Mass. at 
133.  See Housing Court Standing Order 1-01.  A volunteer lawyer 
may, for instance, assist or represent a party during mediation, 
answer legal questions, or even enter an appearance in a 
litigant's eviction case.  Legal services organizations and 
programs, however, are severely underresourced, leaving most 
16 
 
 
 
individuals to face summary process without legal 
representation.  See Boston Bar Association, Investing in 
Justice:  A Roadmap to Cost-Effective Funding of Civil Legal Aid 
in Massachusetts 1 (Oct. 2014) (due to insufficient resources, 
Massachusetts civil legal aid programs turn away approximately 
two-thirds of eligible cases). 
In addition, a wealth of information on summary process 
evictions is available online.12  But the intricacy and speed of 
the process make it difficult for a self-represented litigant to 
understand the available resources.  It is therefore important 
that self-represented litigants receive assistance from court 
clerks and from walk-in court service centers, where 
                     
12 Much of the information contained in this opinion is 
summarized online.  We encourage tenants, occupants, landlords, 
and others involved in summary process eviction proceedings to 
visit the following web pages:  https://www.mass.gov/eviction-
for-tenants [https://perma.cc/7C5B-ZWLJ]; https://www.mass.gov 
/eviction-for-landlords [https://perma.cc/FQ45-45Y5]; https:// 
www.mass.gov/guides/housing-appeals-guide [https://perma.cc 
/8T98-EATD]; https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/document 
-file-09-2017/eviction_guide_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2VM-
UGLY]; https://www.mass.gov/trial-court-rules/trial-court-rule-
i-uniform-summary-process-rules [https://perma.cc/MBL6-WRJP]; 
https://www.masslegalhelp.org/housing [https://perma.cc/FYX2-
YAEA].  Sample forms related to landlord-tenant disputes can be 
accessed at https://www.mass.gov/info-details/massachusetts-
legal-forms-for-subjects-i-l [https://perma.cc/QD8H-LCMQ] and at 
https://www.masslegalhelp.org/housing/evictions-court-forms 
[https://perma.cc/V3BA-LHFW].  Tenants seeking legal aid can 
find useful resources at https://www.masslegalservices.org 
/FindLegalAid [https://perma.cc/F54C-QHLM].  Tenants facing 
eviction can learn how to properly respond to a landlord's case 
against them by filling out a free guided interview, available 
at https://www.gbls.org/MADE [https://perma.cc/YN6K-6C4X]. 
17 
 
 
 
"nonattorneys help people navigate the court system by assisting 
with forms, providing information about court procedures, and 
answering questions about how the court works" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 
Mass. 542, 549 n.8 (2018).  Currently, court service centers 
exist in the Worcester court house and in five other court 
houses across the State.13 
 
Lastly, it can be beneficial for self-represented litigants 
to work informally with one another and with other nonattorneys 
to acquire and spread information about navigating the eviction 
process.  We acknowledge, of course, that it is unlawful for any 
nonattorney to engage in the unauthorized practice of law -- for 
instance, by signing and filing a complaint on behalf of an 
unrepresented litigant.  See Hatcher, 479 Mass. at 549-551.  But 
there are plenty of ways for nonattorneys to assist litigants 
without venturing into the unauthorized practice of law.  They 
may, for example, "provide information to self-represented 
litigants to help them understand their legal rights," "assist 
self-represented litigants in articulating the facts that are 
necessary to present the litigants' claims and defenses clearly, 
                     
 
13 Walk-in court service centers exist at the Worcester 
Trial Court Complex, the Edward W. Brooke Courthouse in Boston, 
the Franklin County Courthouse in Greenfield, the Fenton 
Judicial Center in Lawrence, the George N. Covett Courthouse in 
Brockton, and the Roderick L. Ireland Courthouse in Springfield. 
18 
 
 
 
accurately, and comprehensively," and "help self-represented 
litigants navigate through a legal system the litigants may not 
adequately understand."  Id. at 549 n.8.  In a complex, high-
stakes process where the right to counsel is not guaranteed and 
professional assistance is not universally available, the 
assistance provided by nonattorneys may be the only way for many 
litigants to learn about and assert their rights. 
 
2.  Waiver of fees and costs based on indigency.  Under the 
Indigent Court Costs Law, G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, indigent 
parties are able to obtain waivers or reductions of various fees 
and costs (including, for example, filing fees, fees related to 
the service of process, and appeal bond costs) incurred while 
litigating a summary process action.  See G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A, 
27B; Reade v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 573, 574 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1729 (2016) (describing 
Indigent Court Cost Law's "mechanism for indigent persons to 
obtain waivers or reductions of court fees and other costs").  
The Indigent Court Costs Law exists to "ensur[e] that the doors 
of the Commonwealth's courts will not be closed to the poor."  
Reade, supra.  The equitable and consistent application of this 
law is therefore critically important to safeguarding every 
Massachusetts litigant's ability to "obtain right and justice 
19 
 
 
 
freely, and without being obliged to purchase it."14  Art. 11 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The facts as alleged, 
however, demonstrate the various challenges presented by the fee 
and cost waiver application process.  We seek to clarify this 
process here. 
 
a.  Determining whether an applicant is indigent.  An 
individual is eligible for a fee waiver based on indigency only 
if one or more of the following applies:  (1) the individual 
receives public assistance under the Massachusetts transitional 
aid to families with dependent children program, the 
Massachusetts emergency aid to elderly, disabled and children 
program, the Federal supplemental security income program, the 
Massachusetts MassHealth program (formerly, Medicaid), or 
veterans benefits programs; (2) the individual's income, after 
taxes, does not exceed 125 percent of the current Federal 
poverty line;15 or (3) the individual is unable to pay the court 
                     
 
14 To ensure that litigants are informed of their right to 
access the courts regardless of their ability to pay, the clerk 
of each court is required to "conspicuously post in the part of 
his [or her] office open to the public a notice informing the 
public in plain language of the availability of waiver, 
substitution or payment by the commonwealth of fees and costs 
for indigent persons."  G. L. c. 261, § 27C (5). 
 
 
15 As of January 2019, an individual's income does not 
exceed 125 percent of the Federal poverty line if it is 
$15,612.50 for a household of one, $21,137.50 for a household of 
two, $26,662.50 for a household of three, $32,187.50 for a 
household of four, $37,712.50 for a household of five, 
$43,237.50 for a household of six, $48,762.50 for a household of 
20 
 
 
 
fees or costs without depriving him or herself (or those 
dependent on him or her) of the "necessities of life," including 
food, shelter, and clothing.  G. L. c. 261, § 27A. 
 
To apply for a fee waiver based on indigency, the landlord 
or tenant must file an affidavit of indigency demonstrating that 
he or she satisfies one or more of the above requirements.16  
G. L. c. 261, §§ 27B, 27C.  Unless otherwise stated in a court 
order, all information submitted in an affidavit of indigency is 
confidential and may not be accessed by anyone other than 
authorized court personnel, the applicant, the applicant's 
attorney, or a representative with written consent from the 
applicant.  See Reade, 472 Mass. at 574 n.2; Instructions to 
Courts on the Administration of the Indigent Court Costs Law 2 
(2003).  If the affidavit "appears regular and complete on its 
face," indicates that the affiant is indigent as defined above, 
and requests a waiver of "normal fees and costs," the clerk 
"shall grant such request forthwith without hearing and without 
                     
seven, or $54,287.50 for a household of eight.  For households 
comprised of more than eight people, $5,525 is added for each 
additional person.  84 Fed. Reg. 1167 (2019). 
 
 
16 The affidavit of indigency form is available at https:// 
www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/09/01/affidavitofindigency.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3T3-V3DG]. 
21 
 
 
 
the necessity of appearance of any party or counsel."17  G. L. 
c. 261, § 27C (2). 
 
If, however, the affidavit is not regular and complete on 
its face,18 does not adequately demonstrate that the applicant is 
indigent under § 27A, or seeks "extra" fees and costs, described 
infra, "the clerk or register shall forthwith bring the 
affidavit to the attention of the justice or judge."  G. L. 
c. 261, § 27C (3).  See Reade, 472 Mass. at 577 (waiver of extra 
fees and costs must be approved by judge).  Where no "extra" 
fees or costs are sought, this court's "Instructions to Courts 
on the Administration of the Indigent Court Costs Law" directs 
clerks to refer an affidavit to a justice or judge "where there 
is a 'significant question about whether the applicant is 
indigent.'"  Reade, supra at 585, quoting Instructions to Courts 
                     
 
17 The amici state in their brief that based on the 
experiences of counsel for indigent clients, clerks often 
approve indigency requests without hearing only if they are 
based on the applicant's receipt of public benefits.  We clarify 
that based on the text of the statute, clerks are required to 
approve all fee waiver requests based on indigency where the 
affidavit is regular and complete on its face, demonstrates that 
the applicant is indigent under G. L. c. 261, § 27A, and 
requests a waiver of normal fees and costs.  See G. L. c. 261, 
§ 27C (2). 
 
 
18 Where the application is incomplete, we expect clerks to 
notify the applicant that it is incomplete and invite the 
applicant to complete it.  Incomplete applications should be 
brought to a judge only where the applicant fails to complete 
the application after having been alerted by the clerk to any 
missing information. 
22 
 
 
 
on the Administration of the Indigent Court Costs Law, supra at 
2.  In determining whether a "significant question" warranting a 
judge's review exists, the clerk may consider the applicant's 
affidavit "as a whole," as well as any prior affidavits 
submitted to the court by the applicant.  Reade, supra, citing 
Roe v. Rosencratz, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903 (2007).  If the 
clerk has serious reason to doubt the applicant's indigency 
under the statute, the clerk should transfer the affidavit to a 
judge for consideration.  See Reade, supra at 585-586. 
 
After an affidavit is referred to a judge, the judge has 
two options:  grant the waiver request without hearing or 
schedule a hearing to determine the applicant's eligibility for 
a waiver.  See G. L. c. 261, § 27C (3)-(4) (court may not deny 
request for waiver based on indigency without first holding 
hearing).  Where a judge decides that a hearing is necessary to 
determine the applicant's eligibility for a waiver of costs and 
fees, such hearing must take place within five days.  G. L. 
c. 261, § 27C (3). 
 
If, at the hearing, the judge determines that there is a 
"serious question as to the affiant's indigency," the judge 
"shall consider the following facts with respect to the 
applicant as of the time of hearing, in the immediate past and 
with respect to the immediate future[:]  his [or her] age, 
education, training, physical and mental ability and number of 
23 
 
 
 
dependents; gross and net income; regular and extraordinary 
expense, if any; assets and liabilities; whether or not he [or 
she] is a recipient of public assistance and for what purposes; 
and any other facts which are relevant to the applicant's 
ability to pay court costs."  Id.  The judge shall then issue a 
decision allowing or denying the applicant's waiver application. 
 
If the court denies a party's request to waive or reduce 
fees and costs, the applicant may appeal from this decision to a 
single justice of the Appeals Court (if the matter arose in the 
Superior Court or Housing Court) or to the Appellate Division 
(if the matter arose in the District Court or Boston Municipal 
Court).  See G. L. c. 261, § 27D.  An applicant has seven days 
to file a notice of appeal.  Id.  Once the judge who denied the 
waiver application is notified that the applicant has chosen to 
appeal from the decision, the judge must -- within three days -- 
set forth his or her written findings and reasons justifying the 
denial.  G. L. c. 261, §§ 27C (4), 27D.  These findings must 
then be forwarded, along with the affidavit and request, to the 
court deciding the applicant's appeal.  Id.  Once the appellate 
court renders its decision on the fee waiver request, that 
decision is final under G. L. c. 261, § 27D.  See Hunt v. 
Appeals Court, 444 Mass. 460, 463 n.2 (2005). 
 
We urge judges to be mindful of the confidential nature of 
affidavits of indigency when conducting such hearings, and to 
24 
 
 
 
avoid revealing sensitive information regarding a party's 
indigency whenever possible.  We also urge judges presiding over 
a summary process case to make every effort to issue a decision 
regarding an applicant's indigency as quickly as practicable.  
See G. L. c. 261, § 27C (2)-(3) (regular requests shall be 
granted by clerk "forthwith"; applications raising significant 
questions about indigency or requesting extra costs shall be 
brought to attention of judge "forthwith").  Where, because of a 
delay in the indigency determination, a Housing Court clerk or 
judge is unable to provide an indigent applicant with relevant 
documents, services, or objects in time for the applicant to 
review them in advance of an upcoming court appearance, we 
encourage Housing Court judges to exercise their discretion to 
postpone hearings as needed to ensure that all parties have 
sufficient time to prepare.  See Housing Court Standing Order 1-
04 ("Housing Court judges may reschedule hearings in the 
exercise of their sound discretion"). 
 
b.  Process for waiving the cost of an audio recording.  If 
the court, with or without a hearing, finds that the applicant 
is indigent, it may not deny a request for "normal fees and 
costs."  G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4).  The court also may not deny 
an indigent applicant's request for "extra fees and costs" if it 
finds that the "document, service or object is reasonably 
necessary to assure the applicant as effective a prosecution, 
25 
 
 
 
defense or appeal as he [or she] would have if he [or she] were 
financially able to pay."  Id.  It is therefore necessary, in 
evaluating an applicant's rights to a fee waiver, to distinguish 
between "normal" and "extra" fees and costs.  The relevant 
statute, G. L. c. 261, § 27A, provides guidance,19 but does not 
explicitly address the question raised by the facts alleged in 
this case:  whether the cost of obtaining an audio recording of 
prior trial court proceedings -- $50.50 for a compact disc or 
ten dollars for an online download -- should be considered 
"normal" or extra." 
                     
 
19 General Laws c. 261, § 27A, defines "[n]ormal fees and 
costs" as "the fees and costs a party normally is required to 
pay in order to prosecute or defend the particular type of 
proceeding in which he [or she] is involved."  These costs 
"shall include, but not be limited to, the following:  in all 
civil cases, filing or entry fees, including the surcharges 
required by [G. L. c. 262, § 4C]; fees and related costs for 
service of process, including publications of a citation when 
publication is ordered; fees and costs for the issuance or 
service of a subpoena and witness fees for trial or deposition; 
jury trial fees; removal fees; costs assessed in a bill of 
costs; in equity, fees for the issuance of an injunction, 
restraining order, writ or other process; in the probate and 
family court department, fees for an amendment of record."  Id. 
 
 
"Extra fees and costs" are defined as "the fees and costs, 
in addition to those a party is normally required to pay in 
order to prosecute or defend his [or her] case, which result 
when a party employs or responds to a procedure not necessarily 
required in the particular type of proceeding in which he [or 
she] is involved."  Id.  These costs "shall include, but not 
necessarily be limited to, the cost of transcribing a 
deposition, expert assistance and appeal bonds and appeal bond 
premiums."  Id. 
26 
 
 
 
 
We agree with the Housing Court that the cost of an audio 
recording is technically an "extra cost" under G. L. c. 261, 
§ 27A.  This conclusion is in keeping with the established 
practice of our other trial courts, the text of the indigency 
affidavit form, and the examples of "extra costs" provided for 
by statute.  Although the Housing Court has no rule or standing 
order addressing whether the cost of audio recordings is 
"normal" or "extra," the approach adopted by other Massachusetts 
trial courts is instructive.  The Superior Court and the 
District Court, which also have jurisdiction over eviction 
actions, consider the cost of an audio recording to be an "extra 
cost" under G. L. c. 261, § 27A.20  See Superior Court Standing 
Order 2-87 (1988); Rule 211 of the Special Rules of the District 
Courts (1989).  We see no reason for the recordings to be 
characterized differently in the Housing Court.  Furthermore, 
the affidavit of indigency form approved by this court lists 
"[c]assette copies of tape recording of trial or other 
proceeding, needed to prepare appeal for applicant not 
represented by Committee for Public Counsel Services" under 
                     
 
20 The Land Court, the Juvenile Court, and the Probate and 
Family Court also consider the cost of an audio recording to be 
an "extra cost" under G. L. c. 261, § 27A.  See Land Court 
Standing Order 1-18 (2018); Juvenile Court Standing Order 2-09 
(2009); Rule 201 of the Supplemental Rules of the Probate and 
Family Court (2012). 
27 
 
 
 
Section 3 as "extra fees and costs."21  Finally, our conclusion 
that the cost of audio recordings is an "extra cost" is 
supported by the fact that G. L. c. 261, § 27A, lists the cost 
of appeal bonds among "extra fees and costs."  As further 
described in the Appendix, infra, a tenant wishing to appeal 
from a court's summary process decision is required to supply 
the trial court with an appeal bond to be paid to the landlord 
should the landlord prevail on appeal, unless the cost of that 
appeal bond is waived.  See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (c), (e).  If the 
cost of an appeal bond is considered "extra," it makes sense 
that the cost of audio recordings is likewise considered 
"extra," regardless of whether the audio recordings are required 
for the appeal to proceed.  See generally Mass. R. A. P. 8, as 
appearing in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019) (describing assembly of 
record on appeal). 
 
We note, however, that classifying the cost of a trial 
court audio recording as an "extra cost" should not prevent many 
indigent litigants from obtaining these recordings at no cost.  
Under G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4), a judge is required to grant a 
request for a waiver of extra fees and costs if he or she finds 
                     
 
21 Relatedly, a party seeking to download audio recordings 
online via For The Record -- a third-party provider allowing 
litigants to access trial court recordings at a cost of ten 
dollars -- is asked to confirm whether he or she has "an 
approved Affidavit of Indigency which includes allowances under 
Section 3:  Extra Fees and Costs" (emphasis added). 
28 
 
 
 
"the document, service or object is reasonably necessary to 
assure the applicant as effective a prosecution, defense or 
appeal as he [or she] would have if he [or she] were financially 
able to pay."  The standard is "essentially one of 
reasonableness, and looks to whether a defendant who was able to 
pay and was paying the expenses himself, would consider the 
'document, service or object' sufficiently important that he 
would choose to obtain it in preparation for his [or her] 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Lockley, 381 Mass. 156, 160 (1980).  
"The test is not whether a particular item or service would be 
acquired by a defendant who had unlimited resources, nor is it 
whether the item might conceivably contribute some assistance to 
the [case presented] by the indigent person. . . .  The test is 
whether the item is reasonably necessary to prevent the party 
from being subjected to a disadvantage in preparing or 
presenting his case adequately, in comparison with one who could 
afford to pay for the preparation which the case reasonably 
requires."  Id. at 160-161. 
 
In deciding whether an audio recording satisfies this test, 
a judge may look to factors including the cost of the recording 
and its potential value to the litigant.  Id. at 161.  See 
Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 106 n.2 (2018).  The 
cost of a recording is $50.50 for a compact disc or ten dollars 
for an online download -- potentially substantial for an 
29 
 
 
 
indigent party but modest for a person who can afford to pay.  
Contrast Salazar, supra (no error in denial of motion for funds 
where estimated cost of translation was $12,348, defendant had 
access to translator throughout trial, and his counsel was 
provided with trial transcripts).  And as illustrated by the 
facts alleged in this case, audio recordings can serve a number 
of valuable purposes for parties facing further court 
appearances or appeals:  they allow litigants to learn what 
happened at a hearing the litigants missed or did not fully 
comprehend, to prepare for subsequent hearings, and to formulate 
appeals based on alleged errors at trial.  This means, under the 
test described in Lockley, 381 Mass. at 160-161, that audio 
recordings will often be "reasonably necessary" for an applicant 
to adequately prepare for his or her trial or appeal.  See G. L. 
c. 261, § 27C (4).  We therefore expect that judges will allow 
motions seeking fee waivers for audio recordings where (1) the 
applicant qualifies as indigent and (2) the applicant has an 
upcoming hearing related to the prior recorded proceedings or is 
pursuing a nonfrivolous appeal to which the requested audio 
recordings are relevant.22  Cf. G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e) (indigent 
                     
 
22 We note that in the District Court, which also has 
jurisdiction over eviction actions, audio recordings are always 
supplied at no cost to parties represented by a Committee for 
Public Counsel Services attorney, to the Attorney General's 
office, to any district attorney's office, to any other 
30 
 
 
 
party's motion to waive appeal bond shall be allowed if court 
"is satisfied that the person requesting the waiver has any 
defense which is not frivolous and is indigent").  We further 
expect that judges will do so without hearing unless the 
affidavit raises significant questions as to the applicant's 
indigency or the recordings' potential value to the applicant. 
 
3.  Reasonable accommodations for parties with 
disabilities.  Several petitioners claim that the Housing Court 
improperly denied their requests for reasonable accommodations, 
thereby denying them equal access to the courts.  Specifically, 
the petitioners allege that they were unable to attend or to 
fully participate in their eviction hearings due to the court's 
failure to accommodate their disabilities.  For this reason, the 
petitioners argue, their need to access audio recordings of the 
hearings was heightened.  Based on the record before us, which 
provides little information about the specific disabilities at 
issue or the particular accommodations requested, we are unable 
to evaluate the individual claims of these petitioners.  We do, 
however, take this opportunity to clarify and confirm the 
                     
Commonwealth agency, and to police prosecutors.  See Rule 211 of 
the Special Rules of the District Courts (1989). 
 
31 
 
 
 
obligation of Massachusetts courts to provide reasonable 
accommodations to litigants with disabilities.23 
 
Article 114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified 
handicapped[24] individual shall, solely by reason of his [or her] 
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, denied the 
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program 
or activity within the commonwealth."  Relatedly, the 
Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA) provides that "[a]ny 
person within the commonwealth, regardless of handicap . . . 
shall, with reasonable accommodation, have the same rights as 
other persons to . . . sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property, including, but not limited to, 
                     
 
23 We also encourage disabled tenants and tenants with 
disabled household members to consider working with the tenancy 
preservation program (TPP), available in the Housing Court.  TPP 
aims to prevent homelessness by serving as a resource for 
tenants whose disabilities were directly related to the reason 
for their eviction.  TPP, in the role of a neutral party, 
collaborates with landlords and tenants to investigate whether a 
tenancy can be preserved through reasonable accommodations for a 
tenant's disability.  TPP may also help the parties create a 
plan for maintaining the tenancy, monitor the case, and create 
progress reports for the landlord, the tenant, and the court.  
If a tenancy cannot be preserved, TPP may help to coordinate the 
tenant's transition to a different home. 
 
 
24 For the purposes of this opinion, we interpret "handicap" 
synonymously with "disability."  See McDonough, 457 Mass. at 514 
n.6. 
32 
 
 
 
the rights secured under [art. 114] of the Amendments to the 
Constitution."  G. L. c. 93, § 103 (a).  These laws exist to 
address the "'pervasive unequal treatment' of individuals with 
disabilities," who "have been faced with restrictions and 
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, and relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness in our society."  McDonough, 457 Mass. at 514, 
528, quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516, 524 (2004).  
It is therefore critically important that these laws be enforced 
in our courts, where "[e]very subject of the commonwealth" has a 
right to obtain justice (emphasis added).  Art. 11 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
In McDonough, 457 Mass. at 520 n.19, 528, we addressed the 
duty of Massachusetts courts to make reasonable accommodations 
for witnesses with disabilities who require accommodations in 
order to testify in a criminal trial.  We concluded, in relevant 
part, that (1) "where a witness with a disability requests 
accommodation in order to testify, MERA requires that the court 
provide such accommodation, so long as it is 'reasonable'" and 
(2) "where there is a dispute concerning such a witness's 
request for accommodation, a judge should conduct a hearing to 
resolve the dispute, preferably before trial, and the witness 
should be provided with reasonable accommodation, if available, 
33 
 
 
 
during the pretrial hearing."25  Id. at 528, quoting G. L. c. 93, 
§ 103 (a).  The court also concluded that in order to facilitate 
appellate review of decisions concerning requests for 
accommodation, judges "should make findings adequate to permit 
such review."26  McDonough, supra at 526. 
 
We see no reason to limit these aspects of the McDonough 
holding to witnesses or to criminal trials.  See id. at 520 n.19 
(noting that "[s]ome or all of the . . . trial court guidance" 
outlined may be applicable in civil context).  We therefore 
conclude that where a party in a summary process eviction action 
                     
 
25 In various sections of their brief, the petitioners 
assert that the Housing Court violated their rights under Title 
II of the ADA.  In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-534 
(2004), the United States Supreme Court held that "Title II, as 
it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental 
right of access to the courts," is constitutional.  Because the 
question of the obligation of Massachusetts courts under the ADA 
has not been adequately briefed, however, we do not address our 
courts' obligations under the ADA here.  Instead, we rely on 
MERA, on the Massachusetts Constitution, and on our own 
superintendence power to confirm Massachusetts courts' 
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations.  See McDonough, 
457 Mass. at 518 & n.16 (declining to address scope of courts' 
obligations under ADA where question could be resolved under 
MERA). 
 
 
26 The McDonough court further concluded that "where a judge 
precludes a witness with a disability from testifying by denying 
a request for accommodation, the party proffering the witness, 
but not the witness, may appeal the judge's interlocutory ruling 
as a matter of right to the Appeals Court."  McDonough, 457 
Mass. at 528.  Because the issue of interlocutory appeals has 
not been adequately briefed, we do not address it here.  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 
(2019) ("The appellate court need not pass upon questions or 
issues not argued in the brief . . ."). 
34 
 
 
 
alerts the court and the adverse party to a disability requiring 
accommodation, the court, if it determines that the party indeed 
has a disability, shall provide the disabled party with 
reasonable accommodation.  See Massachusetts Court System, ADA 
Accessibility Policy (2018) (Accessibility Policy) (recognizing 
duty, where reasonable, to "provide appropriate aids and 
services to qualified persons with disabilities so they can 
participate equally in the services, programs, or activities of 
the Judiciary").  What accommodation is reasonable must be 
determined on an individualized basis depending on the 
particular circumstances presented.  See Garcia v. Department of 
Hous. & Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 749 (2018) ("The 
determination whether an accommodation is reasonable is fact-
specific, and made on a case-by-case basis"). The "ADA does not 
require the Judiciary to take any action that would 
fundamentally alter the nature of its services, programs, or 
activities, or result in an undue financial or administrative 
burden."  Accessibility Policy, supra.  We further conclude that 
judges considering requests for reasonable accommodations should 
accompany their decisions with "findings adequate to permit 
[appellate] review."27  McDonough, 457 Mass. at 526. 
                     
 
27 Although we require judges who deny requests for 
accommodation to put their reasons for denial on the record, we 
are mindful of the fact that such determinations often involve 
sensitive information.  We therefore encourage judges, when 
35 
 
 
 
 
We recognize that where a party's disability interferes 
with his or her ability to appear in court, holding an in-court 
hearing to determine whether accommodations are reasonable 
creates its own set of problems.  Such issues must be addressed 
by the Housing Court on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Conclusion.  We acknowledge the many challenges that exist 
for self-represented litigants navigating eviction cases in the 
Housing Court, and intend this opinion and its Appendix to 
provide guidance regarding various aspects of summary process.  
Because we conclude that the single justice did not abuse his 
discretion or otherwise err in denying the G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition, however, we affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
making findings, to avoid the needless revelation of 
confidential information. 
Appendix. 
 
Because summary process is designed "to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination" of eviction actions, Rule 
1 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980), it progresses 
rapidly through a series of complex steps and deadlines.  This 
Appendix is meant as a guide for litigants seeking to navigate 
those steps and deadlines; it does not purport to be a 
comprehensive treatise.  In formulating this guide, we reviewed 
the rules, statutes, and case law relevant to summary process 
evictions, as well as publicly available legal resources, 
including those listed in the opinion accompanying this 
Appendix, see ante at note 12.  We are mindful, however, of the 
possibility that this guide may not always reflect the way that 
the described rules and statutes are applied by clerks and 
judges in every division of the Housing Court and in other trial 
courts with jurisdiction over eviction actions.  There is, 
perhaps, no better demonstration of the complexity of a summary 
process eviction action than our own recognition that this 
Appendix may not fully capture day-to-day practices at the trial 
court level. 
1.  Notice to quit.  Prior to eviction, a landlord must 
serve the tenant with a "notice to quit" to inform the tenant 
that the landlord will be seeking eviction after a specified 
period of time.  See Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v. Stewart, 481 
2 
 
 
 
Mass. 121, 122 (2018) ("legally effective notice to quit is a 
condition precedent to a summary process action and part of the 
landlord's prima facie case").  A tenant is entitled to "actual 
receipt" of the notice to quit "within the time prescribed and 
before an eviction action is brought."  Harris vs. Munro, Mass. 
App. Div. (Dist. Ct. Mar. 9, 1999), citing Regan v. Atlantic 
Ref. Co., 304 Mass. 353, 354 (1939).  "The burden is on the 
landlord to establish that he [or she] provided the requisite 
notice in compliance with the statute."  Harris, supra, citing 
Ryan v. Sylvester, 358 Mass. 18, 21 (1970).1 
 
Because the document's title -- "notice to quit" -- does 
nothing to clarify its meaning, a tenant may reasonably 
misunderstand the legal force of a notice to quit.  A standard 
notice to quit states that a tenant may be evicted if he or she 
fails to vacate the premises within a certain period of time.2  
                     
 
1 A notice to quit is considered compliant unless it 
includes "a material error or omission, i.e., a defect that has 
some meaningful practical effect."  Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v. 
Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 130 (2018).  The notice is therefore 
legally adequate even where it includes "minor errors of 
technicality or form."  Id. 
 
 
2 The sample fourteen-day notice to quit form available at 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/wg/notice-quit-
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7PE-AH9S], for example, includes the 
following language:  "Your rent being in arrears, you are hereby 
notified to quit and deliver up in fourteen (14) days from your 
receipt of this notice, the above described premises now held by 
you as my tenant.  If you fail to so vacate, I shall employ the 
due course of law to evict you." 
3 
 
 
 
Receipt of a notice to quit, however, does not legally require 
the tenant to move out of his or her home.  See Commonwealth v. 
Chatham Dev. Co., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 528 (2000).  Rather, it 
simply declares the landlord's intent to go to court to seek an 
eviction order if the tenant does not move out voluntarily 
before the stated deadline.  Nevertheless, a tenant may 
reasonably -- but incorrectly -- believe the notice to quit to 
mean that he or she must move out before the deadline. 
The requirements and timeline for a notice to quit vary 
based on the reason for eviction and the type of tenancy. 
a.  Notice to quit for failure to pay rent.  Where the 
eviction is based on a tenant's failure to pay rent, fourteen 
days' notice to quit must be provided in writing.  See G. L. 
c. 186, § 12 (failure to pay rent owed under tenancy at will); 
G. L. c. 186, § 11 (failure to pay rent owed under written 
lease).  If a tenant with no formal written lease agreement (a 
tenant at will) who has not received a notice to quit for 
nonpayment of rent in the past year pays the rent due within ten 
days of receiving notice to quit, the tenant "cures" the missing 
payments and thereby prevents the tenancy from terminating.  
G. L. c. 186, § 12.  The tenant at will must be notified of this 
right to cure in writing.  Id.  In the absence of such written 
notification, the tenant at will's deadline to pay rent is 
extended to the day that the answer in a summary process action 
4 
 
 
 
is due (described in part 3, infra).  Id.  If a tenant with a 
written lease agreement (tenant under lease) repays (1) the rent 
owed, (2) any interest on the rent owed, and (3) the landlord's 
actual costs for filing an eviction case by the day the answer 
is due, any missed payments are "cured" and the tenant may not 
be evicted.  G. L. c. 186, § 11.  A landlord, however, is not 
required by statute to notify a tenant under lease of this right 
to cure.  See Rockport Schooner Co. v. Rockport Whale Watch 
Corp., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 911 (2003) ("there is no explicit 
statutory requirement that a landlord notify a tenant under a 
written lease of the tenant's right to cure").  This decreases 
the chance that a tenant under lease will understand the full 
extent of his or her right to avoid eviction following receipt 
of a notice to quit.3 
b.  Notice to quit for reasons unrelated to rent payments.  
Where the eviction is not based on a tenant's failure to pay 
                     
 
3 The potential for confusion is increased by the fact that 
some sample notice to quit forms, available online, include 
language that could cause a reasonable tenant to believe that 
there is no right to avoid eviction by repaying the full amount 
of rent due.  The sample form available at https://www.mass.gov 
/files/documents/2016/08/wg/notice-quit-14.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/X7PE-AH9S], for instance, states that "[a]ll monies paid to the 
landlord after your receipt of this notice will be accepted as 
use and occupancy and not as rent, without waiving any right to 
possession of the premises, and without any intention of 
reinstating your tenancy or establishing a new tenancy."  
Although the form goes on to discuss a tenant's cure rights, 
this language is likely to create misunderstandings. 
5 
 
 
 
rent, the eviction process also varies based on the type of 
tenancy.  In a tenancy at will, either the landlord or the 
tenant may terminate the tenancy by giving three months' written 
notice.  G. L. c. 186, § 12.  Where the rent is payable more 
frequently than once every three months, notice is sufficient if 
"it is equal to the interval between the days of payment or 
thirty days, whichever is longer."  Id.  This means, in the case 
of most tenancies where rent is payable monthly, that one 
month's notice will be sufficient to terminate the tenancy.  In 
a tenancy under lease, the notice requirements are governed by 
the terms of the lease, provided that those terms are not 
unlawful.  See Cambridge St. Realty, LLC, 481 Mass. at 130-132 
(evaluating legal sufficiency of notice to quit under lease 
terms); Ciriello vs. Fortin, Mass. App. Div., No. 11-ADMS-10002 
(Dist. Ct. July 1, 2011) ("a notice to quit must be timely, in 
compliance with both the terms of the lease and the requirements 
of law").  See also G. L. c. 186, § 15A ("Any provision of a 
lease . . . relating to residential real property whereby a 
lessee or tenant enters into a covenant, agreement or contract 
. . . the effect of which is to waive the notices required . . . 
shall be deemed to be against public policy and void"). 
Lastly, where a title-holding plaintiff seeks to evict a 
former homeowner following a foreclosure, the title holder 
typically serves the occupant with at least seventy-two hours' 
6 
 
 
 
notice to quit.4  See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 
467 Mass. 421, 424 (2014); Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Murphy, 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2015). 
 
2.  Service of summons and complaint; entry of action.  
Once the deadline stated in the notice to quit has passed, the 
landlord may serve his or her tenant with a "summons and 
complaint" specifying in "concise, untechnical form and with 
sufficient particularity and completeness" the reasons for the 
requested eviction.5  See Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1993); Rule 2(d) of the Uniform Summary Process 
Rules (1993).  The basis for the landlord's eviction action is 
limited to the reasons for eviction provided in the notice to 
quit.  Strycharski v. Spillane, 320 Mass. 382, 384-385 (1946).  
Where a landlord seeks to evict the defendant for reasons other 
than those provided in the notice to quit, the landlord must 
                     
 
4 We note that institutional lenders and certain financial 
institutions that own foreclosed properties may not evict 
tenants who were entitled to occupy the property at the time of 
foreclosure "except for just cause or unless a binding purchase 
and sale agreement has been executed for a bona fide third party 
to purchase the housing accommodation."  G. L. c. 186A, §§ 1-2.  
See also Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511, 512, 
523 (2011). 
 
 
5 A sample summary process summons and complaint form is 
available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/pe 
/summary-process-complaint-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/23R5-N9T4].  
A landlord seeking to evict a tenant must obtain this form from 
the clerk's office.  See Rule 2(a) of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1993). 
7 
 
 
 
"recommence the summary process procedure and issue a new notice 
to quit" explaining the new grounds for eviction, and then file 
a new summary process summons and complaint if the tenant 
chooses not to vacate the premises.  Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n 
v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511, 520 n.11 (2011), citing Strycharski, 
supra. 
 
Before initiating an action in the Housing Court, the 
landlord must serve his or her tenant with a copy of the summons 
and complaint.  See Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Summary Process 
Rules ("date of service . . . shall be deemed the date of 
commencement of the action subject to proper entry").  More 
specifically, the tenant must receive a copy of the summons and 
complaint between seven and thirty days before the "entry date" 
by which the landlord is required to file relevant documents in 
the Superior Court, the District Court, the Boston Municipal 
Court, or the Housing Court.6  See id.; Rule 1 & commentary of 
the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  The landlord must schedule 
                     
 
6 In order to initiate a summary process action, the 
landlord must file the original summons and complaint, return of 
service confirming the tenant's receipt of the summons and 
complaint, and a copy of the notice to quit.  Rule 2(d) of the 
Uniform Rules of Summary Process (1993).  Depending on the 
jurisdiction, the landlord may also be required to file a copy 
of a certificate of eviction granted by a rent control agency 
(or an affidavit of exemption) or a copy of an affidavit 
verifying compliance with local laws governing condominium 
conversion evictions.  Id.  The landlord must also pay an entry 
fee, unless that fee has been waived.  Id. 
8 
 
 
 
this entry date for a Monday or, if Monday happens to be a 
holiday, the following Tuesday.  Rule 2(c) & commentary of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).  For example, if a 
landlord plans to serve his or her tenant with a copy of the 
summons and complaint on Wednesday, January 2, 2019, the entry 
date must be scheduled for a Monday between seven and thirty 
days from January 2.  This means that the entry date could be 
scheduled for Monday, January 14, 2019; Tuesday, January 22, 
2019 (because Monday, January 21, 2019, is Martin Luther King 
Jr. Day); or Monday, January 28, 2019.  Once the landlord has 
filed the required documents with the court clerk, the summary 
process eviction case is entered.  See Rule 2(d)-(e) of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).  If the landlord initiates 
his or her summary process action in the Superior Court, 
District Court, or Boston Municipal Court, the tenant may 
transfer that action to the Housing Court by filing a transfer 
form in both courts before the day of trial.7  See Rule 4 of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1982); G. L. c. 185C, § 20. 
 
3.  Answer.  No later than the first Monday after the entry 
date, which could come as soon as two weeks after the tenant 
receives the summons and complaint, the tenant must file a 
                     
 
7 A sample notice of transfer form is available at https:// 
www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/07/30/noticeoftransfer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87JE-8TZW]. 
 
9 
 
 
 
written answer.8  See Rule 3 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules 
(1993).  This answer shall deny every disputed statement in the 
complaint and set forth all of the tenant's defenses (reasons 
that the tenant should not be evicted), and may also set forth 
any of the tenant's counterclaims (reasons that the landlord 
owes money to the tenant).9  Id.  See also G. L. c. 239, § 8A.10  
Potential defenses and counterclaims include, for example: 
(1) unlawful apartment conditions, in violation of G. L. 
c. 239, § 8A (tenant may preclude landlord from recovering 
possession where "premises are in violation of the standard 
of fitness for human habitation"); 
                     
 
8 If either party wishes to make an argument prior to trial, 
he or she must also file a written "pretrial motion" explaining 
the basis for that argument.  See Rule 6 of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1993).  The deadline for submitting this motion 
is the same as the deadline for submitting the written answer -- 
the first Monday after the entry date.  Id.  Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, pretrial motion hearings generally take 
place on the date that the case is originally scheduled for 
trial.  Id.  A motion to dismiss hearing, however, may take 
place sooner if (1) a motion to dismiss is filed and served on 
the plaintiff on or before the entry date and (2) the defendant 
so requests after notice to the plaintiff.  Id. 
 
 
9 A sample summary process answer form is available at 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/01/31 
/summaryprocanswer.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6G5-9SL6]. 
 
 
10 General Laws c. 239, § 8A, states in relevant part that 
"[i]n any action under this chapter to recover possession of any 
premises rented or leased for dwelling purposes, brought 
pursuant to a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent, or where 
the tenancy has been terminated without fault of the tenant or 
occupant, the tenant or occupant shall be entitled to raise, by 
defense or counterclaim, any claim against the plaintiff 
relating to or arising out of such property, rental, tenancy, or 
occupancy for breach of warranty, for a breach of any material 
provision of the rental agreement, or for a violation of any 
other law." 
10 
 
 
 
 
(2) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, see 
Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 746 (2005), 
quoting Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 
(1973) (property must be "fit for human occupation");11 
 
(3) interference with the quiet enjoyment of the 
residential premises, in violation of G. L. c. 186, § 14; 
 
(4) violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection act, 
G. L. c. 93A, § 2 ("unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared 
unlawful");12,13 
                     
 
11 The implied warranty of habitability, which reflects the 
State's public policy in favor of safe and habitable homes, 
cannot be waived or disclaimed.  See Trustees of the Cambridge 
Point Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC, 478 Mass. 697, 
705-706 (2018). 
 
 
12 The Attorney General has promulgated detailed regulations 
interpreting G. L. c. 93A in the context of the landlord-tenant 
relationship.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17 (1993) (unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices include, for example, commencing 
summary process action prior to expiration of time period stated 
in notice to quit, depriving tenant of access to property 
without receiving valid eviction execution, and requiring 
excessive security deposit). 
 
 
13 A tenant may raise the first, second, or third defense or 
counterclaim described supra if, for example, his or her home is 
infested with bugs or rodents, suffers from severe plumbing or 
electrical problems, lacks heat or hot water, or fails to comply 
with State codes.  See, e.g., Cruz Mgt. Co. v. Thomas, 417 Mass. 
782, 787 (1994) (apartment lacked adequate heat and hot water, 
was infested, had unsanitary common areas, and was in violation 
of fire and building codes).  A tenant may raise the fourth 
defense or counterclaim described supra where such conditions 
result from the landlord's unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.  G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a).  See Cruz Mgt. Co., supra at 
790 ("substantial and material breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability" violates G. L. c. 93A); South Boston Elderly 
Residences, Inc. v. Moynahan, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 470 (2017) 
("failure by a landlord to cure a [sanitary] code violation 
within a reasonable time after notice constitutes a violation" 
of G. L. c. 93A); 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(6)(f) (willful 
violation of covenant of quiet enjoyment violates G. L. c. 93A). 
11 
 
 
 
 
(5) retaliation, see G. L. c. 239, § 2A (where landlord 
initiates summary process in retaliation for tenant's 
lawful actions, tenant can assert defense); G. L. c. 186, 
§ 18 (where landlord or landlord's agent retaliates against 
tenant for tenant's lawful actions, tenant may receive 
damages); and 
 
(6) discrimination, see Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 
474 Mass. 329, 339 (2016) (in summary process action, 
occupant may assert affirmative defenses or counterclaims 
based on violation of antidiscrimination statute, G. L. 
c. 151B).14 
 
 
Although a tenant's time to respond to his or her 
landlord's complaint is sharply limited, the tenant must 
generally assert any affirmative defenses and counterclaims in 
the answer.  See Rule 3 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules 
("defendant shall . . . state in the answer any affirmative 
defenses which may be asserted"); Aronovitz v. Fafard, 78 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1, 8 (2010) ("Affirmative defenses are waived when they 
are not raised in the first responsive pleading"); Rule 5 of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980) ("right to counterclaim 
shall be deemed to be waived as to the pending action if such a 
                     
 
 
14 Other potential defenses and counterclaims include, but 
are not limited to, a landlord's violation of the security 
deposit statute, see Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 208 (2016) 
("a violation of the security deposit statute is encompassed 
within the definition of 'counterclaim or defense' in G. L. 
c. 239, § 8A"), a landlord's termination of the tenancy in 
violation of regulations applicable to those living in Section 8 
housing, see 24 C.F.R. § 982.310 (2018), and a landlord's 
failure to properly terminate the tenancy, for instance, by 
failing to serve the tenant with a legally adequate notice to 
quit, see G. L. c. 186, §§ 11-13, 17. 
12 
 
 
 
claim is not filed with the answer . . . , unless the court 
shall otherwise order on motion for cause shown").  An 
unrepresented tenant is therefore expected, within a matter of 
weeks, to understand and set forth his or her legal rights, or 
risk waiving them. 
 
4.  Discovery.  Once a summary process eviction case is 
commenced, the landlord and the tenant may obtain information 
relevant to the case -- known as "discovery" -- by serving a 
discovery demand on the opposing party and filing a copy of the 
demand with the court.  See Rule 7(a) of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1993).  Service and filing of the discovery 
demand must take place on or before the first Monday after the 
entry date.  Id.  Parties may demand discovery in the form of 
written interrogatories (questions written by one party and 
submitted to the other party for responses), requests for 
admission (requests that the opposing party explicitly admit or 
deny particular statements), or requests for the production of 
documents.  Id.  Where either party submits a demand for 
discovery, the opposing party has a total of ten days to respond 
with the requested answers or documents.  See Rule 7(c) of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993).  This timeline may prove 
challenging for many unrepresented litigants, particularly when 
they do not have ready access to the requested materials. 
13 
 
 
 
 
5.  Hearing date.  Once a landlord commences his or her 
summary process case, a hearing is automatically scheduled, 
typically for the second Thursday following the Monday entry 
date.  See Rule 2(c) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  This 
hearing is automatically postponed for two weeks where either 
party requests discovery.  See Rule 7(b) of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules (1993).  Under such circumstances, the party 
demanding discovery is required to notify the opposing party of 
the rescheduled trial date.  Id.  Although the summons and 
complaint refers to this Thursday court appearance as a 
"hearing," the full trial is expected to take place at this 
time.  See Rule 2(c) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  
Thus, an unrepresented tenant might come to court prepared only 
for a preliminary hearing and learn instead that the case could 
be tried that day. 
 
If a tenant fails to appear in court on the day of his or 
her scheduled trial, he or she is defaulted at the time that the 
case is called, so long as the landlord has appeared.  See Rule 
10(a) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (2004).  If the 
landlord and the tenant appear in court but the tenant has not 
filed a timely answer to the landlord's complaint, the court 
postpones the trial date by one week, unless the landlord agrees 
in writing to proceed with trial immediately.  Id. 
14 
 
 
 
 
A default may be removed at the court's discretion, either 
on its own initiative or by a party's written motion, "at any 
time prior to the entry of judgment on such default."  Rule 
10(c) of the Uniform Rules of Summary Process (2004).  Default 
judgments issue at 10 A.M. on the business day following their 
entry, and are not subject to appeal.15  See Rule 10(d) of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (2004); Rule 12 of the Uniform 
Rules of Summary Process (2004).  An unrepresented tenant, then, 
has less than twenty-four hours to learn of a default judgment 
and timely move to contest it.16 
 
If both the landlord and the tenant fail to appear for the 
hearing, the case must be dismissed seven days after the 
scheduled trial date, unless either party requests a new trial 
date before the expiration of seven days.  Rule 10(a) of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules.  If a landlord does not appear 
for trial and the tenant appears for trial after having filed a 
timely answer, the case is dismissed.  See Rule 10(b) of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (2004).  However, if the tenant 
has not filed a timely answer and appears in court, and the 
                     
 
15 After a default judgment issues, the defaulted party may 
seek to set aside that judgment by filing a motion under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). 
 
 
16 We do not address whether Rule 10(c)-(d) of the Uniform 
Summary Process Rules (2004) lawfully may be enforced where a 
party does not receive notice that a default judgment may issue 
until after the deadline to remove that default has passed. 
15 
 
 
 
landlord fails to appear, the court shall postpone the trial 
date by one week and send notice of this postponement to the 
landlord.  See Rule 10(a) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  
Then, if the landlord fails to appear for the rescheduled trial 
date, the case shall be dismissed.  Id. 
 
Where both parties are present in the Housing Court on the 
day of the hearing, they are faced with a decision:  proceed to 
trial, or attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement 
through negotiation or mediation.  Mediation is an informal, 
confidential process during which the parties meet with a 
housing specialist to discuss a potential settlement.17  If the 
parties reach an agreement -- either on their own or with the 
help of a mediator -- and that agreement is approved by the 
judge, it becomes a binding court order.18  Boston Hous. Auth. v. 
Cassio, 428 Mass. 112, 113-114 (1998). 
                     
 
17 Housing specialists are Housing Court employees who work 
as impartial mediators in cases commenced in the court.  They 
are also tasked with providing the public with information on 
Massachusetts housing laws and available resources.  At times, 
housing specialists also conduct inspections of residential 
properties to determine whether they comply with applicable 
codes or to resolve a dispute between parties regarding the 
condition of the property. 
 
 
18 A sample summary process agreement for judgment form is 
available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/01/31 
/agreementjudgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A87-Z4JS].  A sample 
stipulation form is available at https://www.mass.gov/files 
/documents/2018/01/31/new-civilagreement.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/37U3-ZWNB]. 
16 
 
 
 
 
Where it is not settled through mediation, a summary 
process eviction case may proceed in a bench trial or a jury 
trial.  See Rule 8 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980); 
Cort v. Majors, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 153 (2017).  If a party 
wishes to have the matter heard by a jury, he or she must file a 
demand for a jury trial no later than the due date for the 
defendant's answer (the Monday following the entry date).  See 
Rule 8 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.  This deadline, 
however, is not clearly stated on the summons and complaint form 
or on the summary process answer form.19  An unrepresented tenant 
may therefore unknowingly miss the deadline to timely notify the 
court of his or her decision to exercise the constitutional 
right to trial by jury.  See Cort, supra (right to trial by jury 
declared in art. 15 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
incorporated in Mass. R. Civ. P. 38, as amended, 423 Mass. 1406 
[1996], and Rule 8 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules). 
 
At 10 A.M. on the day after a judge renders his or her 
decision in a summary process action, the decision is entered on 
the docket.  See Rule 10(d) of the Uniform Summary Process 
                     
 
19 See https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/pe 
/summary-process-complaint-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/23R5-N9T4] 
(sample summary process summons and complaint form); https:// 
www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/01/31/summaryprocanswer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6G5-9SL6] (sample summary process answer 
form). 
17 
 
 
 
Rules.  Notice of the judgment must then be sent to all parties.  
See Rule 10(e) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (2004). 
6.  Appeal.  After a court issues its decision, the parties 
have ten days to file a notice of appeal.  G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5 (a).  Our courts have "required strict adherence to the 
short period for claiming an appeal prescribed by G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5," explaining that the "process provided for in [G. L. 
c. 239] is designed, after all, to be summary."  Kobayashi v. 
Orion Ventures, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 504-505 (1997).  
If, however, a party files certain postjudgment motions (i.e., a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 50 [b], as amended, 428 Mass. 1402 [1998]; motion to alter or 
amend findings, Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 [b], as amended, 423 Mass. 
1402 [1996]; motion to alter or amend a judgment, Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 59 [e], 365 Mass. 827 [1974]; motion for a new trial, Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 59, 365 Mass. 827 [1974]; or motion for relief from 
judgment, Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 [b], 365 Mass. 828 [1974]) within 
the ten-day period for appeal, the ten-day deadline to file a  
notice of appeal starts anew on the day that the postjudgment 
motion is decided.20  See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (2), as appearing 
                     
 
20 The commentary to Rule 11 of the Uniform Summary Process 
Rules (1980) incorrectly states that "the running of time for 
appeal in summary process actions is not affected by the filing 
of a motion under Rule 60."  While this statement of law was 
accurate when rule 11 became effective in 1980, it fails to 
capture a 2013 amendment to Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a), which added 
18 
 
 
 
in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019); Manzaro v. McCann, 401 Mass. 880, 882 
(1988).  An eviction order (execution), described in part 7, 
infra, may not issue until the expiration of the ten-day period 
for appeal.  See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (a). 
Where a judgment enters in favor of the landlord after 
trial and the tenant files a notice of appeal, the tenant 
generally may not be evicted until the appeal is resolved because 
                     
motions for relief from judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60, 365 
Mass. 828 (1974), to the list of motions that reset the time for 
appeal.  Compare Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a), as amended, 464 Mass. 
1601 (2013) (including "relief from judgment under Rule 60" 
among motions resetting time for appeal) with Mass. R. A. P. 4 
(a), as amended, 430 Mass. 1603 (1999) (excluding Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 60 from list of covered motions).  Rule 4 (a) was amended 
again in 2019, and the amended version continues to include 
motions for relief from judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60.  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (2), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019). 
 
 
This error in the commentary to the Uniform Rules of 
Summary Process is problematic, particularly because under Mass. 
R. App. P. 4 (a) (3), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019), a 
"notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any timely 
motion listed in Rule 4(a)(2) shall have no effect."  This means 
that if a party files a notice of appeal before his or her 
motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) is decided, that party must 
refile the notice of appeal within ten days of the judge's 
decision on the rule 60 (b) motion.  See Mass. R. A. P. 
4 (a) (3).  A tenant who reads the commentary to Rule 11 of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules could incorrectly believe, 
however, that motions under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) do not 
affect the timeline for an appeal.  And if, as a result, that 
tenant fails to refile a notice of appeal within ten days of the 
postjudgment motion decision, an eviction order could issue.  
See Rule 13 & commentary of the Uniform Summary Process Rules 
(1980). 
 
19 
 
 
 
execution upon the judgment generally is stayed pending appeal.21  
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 62 (d), 365 Mass. 829 (1974).  In contrast, 
where a default judgment enters in favor of the landlord and the 
tenant files a motion for relief from that judgment under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 60 (b), an appeal from the denial of that motion does 
not stay execution unless a separate motion to stay is allowed.  
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) ("motion under [Mass. R. Civ. P. 
60 (b)] does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend 
its operation"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 62 (b), 365 Mass. 829 (1974) 
(court in its discretion may stay execution of judgment pending 
decision on motion for relief from judgment). 
 
Before a tenant's appeal is allowed to proceed, the tenant 
may be ordered to furnish the court with an appeal bond "in a 
sum as the court orders," payable to the landlord.  G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (c).  That bond must be "conditioned to pay to the 
plaintiff, if final judgment is in plaintiff's favor, all rent 
accrued at the date of the bond, all intervening rent, and all 
damage and loss which the plaintiff may sustain by the 
withholding of possession of the land or tenements demanded and 
by any injury done thereto during the withholding, with all 
                     
 
21 There is an exception to the general rule that no 
execution may issue while a timely-filed appeal from the 
judgment is pending where the tenant is being evicted from 
public housing for one of several specified reasons, see G. L. 
c. 121B, § 32. 
20 
 
 
 
costs, until delivery of possession thereof to the plaintiff."  
Id.  In actions for possession after a foreclosure, the appeal 
bond must be conditioned to pay "all costs and . . . a 
reasonable amount as rent of the land from the day when the 
mortgage was foreclosed until possession of the land is obtained 
by the plaintiff."  G. L. c. 239, § 6.  In actions for 
possession after the land is purchased, the appeal bond must be 
conditioned to pay "all costs and . . . a reasonable amount as 
rent of the land from the day that the purchaser obtained title 
to the premises until the delivery of possession thereof to him, 
together with all damage and loss which he may sustain by 
withholding of possession of the land or tenement demanded, and 
by any injury done thereto during such withholding with all 
costs."  Id. 
 
An indigent party may move to waive the appeal bond by 
filing a motion within the ten-day period for appeal.  G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (e).  The court must grant this motion if it finds 
(1) that the appellant is indigent and (2) that the appellant 
has a nonfrivolous defense to the eviction action.  Id.  A 
judge's "determination that a defense is frivolous requires more 
than the judge's conclusion that the defense is not a winner and 
that the party claiming it is wrong as a matter of law.  
Frivolousness imports futility -- not a 'prayer of a chance.'"  
Home Sav. Bank of Am., FSB v. Camillo, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 
21 
 
 
 
911 (1998), quoting Pires v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 829, 838 
(1977).  Even if the appeal bond is waived, a court may order 
the tenant to make "use and occupancy" payments -- similar to 
rent -- while an appeal is pending.  See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e); 
Kargman v. Dustin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 101, 110 (1977) 
("Legislature, after providing for the waiver of bond in 
hardship cases, decided to redress an imbalance in summary 
process appeals to permit a judge, in the exercise of his sound 
discretion, to order payment of an appropriate portion of the 
rent as security").  If a tenant fails to pay the appeal bond or 
use and occupancy as ordered, his or her appeal may be 
dismissed.  See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (h); Cambridge St. Realty, 
LLC, 481 Mass. at 137 n.19 (G. L. c. 239, § 5 (h), "permits 
dismissal of an appeal by the trial court . . . when a tenant 
fails to post the initial appeals bond or use and occupancy 
payment"). 
 
7.  Execution.  If the court finds that the landlord is 
entitled to possession of the property and that the tenant can 
therefore be evicted, judgment shall issue in the landlord's 
favor.  G. L. c. 239, § 3.  Then, if the tenant has not appealed 
from the judgment within the ten-day period for appeal, an 
eviction order (execution) shall issue upon the landlord's 
application, so long as the landlord applies for the eviction 
22 
 
 
 
order within three months of the judgment.22  See id.; G. L. 
c. 235, § 23 ("Executions for possession of premises rented or 
leased for dwelling purposes obtained in actions pursuant to 
[G. L. c. 239] shall not be issued later than three months 
following the date of judgment, except that any period during 
which execution was stayed . . . shall be excluded from the 
computation . . ."); Rule 13 & commentary of the Uniform Summary 
Process Rules & Commentary (1980).  Once an execution order has 
issued, a sheriff or constable can serve the tenant with forty-
eight hours' notice of eviction.  G. L. c. 239, § 3.  This 
notice must inform the tenant that, if he or she does not move 
out by a certain date and time, the officer will physically 
remove the tenant -- as well as his or her possessions -- from 
the premises.  Id.  The execution may be used to evict a tenant 
only on a nonholiday weekday between 9 A.M. and 5 P.M.  Id.  If 
                     
 
22 If, however, the tenant pays and the landlord accepts in 
full the underlying money judgment for nonpayment of rent in 
rented or leased residential premises, as well as any use and 
occupancy payments, "the [landlord] shall be barred from levying 
on any execution for possession that has issued" or, if no 
execution has issued yet, "the [landlord] shall notify the court 
of the satisfaction of judgment and no execution shall issue 
thereafter."  G. L. c. 239, § 3.  Under such circumstances, "the 
[tenant] shall be considered a lawful tenant."  Id.  The 
landlord, however, "shall not be required to accept full 
satisfaction of the money judgment."  Id.  If the landlord 
refuses to accept payment, the eviction can go forward.  See id. 
(landlord's refusal to accept satisfaction of money judgment 
"shall not be a bar to the enforcement of said judgment in any 
lawful manner"). 
23 
 
 
 
an eviction order is not used within three months of its 
issuance, it expires.  G. L. c. 235, § 23. 
 
A residential defendant facing execution may apply to the 
court for a stay of execution pursuant to G. L. c. 239, §§ 9-10, 
if his or her tenancy was terminated without fault and not based 
on a failure to pay rent.  G. L. c. 239, § 9.  Upon receiving an 
application for a stay of execution, the court shall hold a 
hearing.  G. L. c. 239, § 10.  If, at this hearing, the court 
finds that "the premises of which possession is sought to be 
recovered are used for dwelling purposes; that the applicant 
cannot secure suitable premises for himself [or herself] and his 
[or her] family elsewhere within the city or town in a 
neighborhood similar to that in which the premises occupied by 
him [or her] are situated; that he [or she] has used due and 
reasonable effort to secure such other premises; that his [or 
her] application is made in good faith and that he [or she] will 
abide by and comply with such terms and provisions as the court 
may prescribe; or that by reason of other facts [a stay of 
execution] will be warranted,"  the court may grant a stay of up 
to six months, or twelve months in the case of premises occupied 
by a person who is disabled or at least sixty years of age.  
G. L. c. 239, §§ 9-10. 
 
8.  Timeline example.  The following timeline illustrates 
the above-described process. 
24 
 
 
 
 
If a landlord serves his or her tenant with a fourteen-day 
notice to quit on Thursday, October 25, 2018, the two-week 
notice period will expire on Thursday, November 8.  The landlord 
can then serve his or her tenant with a summons and complaint on 
Friday, November 9.  This summons and complaint must specify an 
entry date by which the landlord must file his or her case in 
court.  Under these circumstances, the soonest available entry 
date would be Monday, November 19 (a Monday between seven and 
thirty days from the date that the tenant was served with the 
summons and complaint).  By the Monday following the entry date 
-- Monday, November 26 -- the tenant must file his or her answer 
with the court.  Also by Monday, November 26, either party may 
file a request for discovery. 
 
The trial is automatically scheduled to take place two 
Thursdays from the entry date -- on Thursday, November 29.  If 
either party requests discovery, this trial date is pushed back 
by two weeks to Thursday, December 13.  For the purpose of this 
timeline, we assume that one or both parties requested 
discovery.  To calculate the timeline in the absence of a 
discovery request, consider each of the following events as 
occurring two weeks earlier. 
 
On Friday, December 14 (the day after the December 13 
trial), judgment could enter in favor of the landlord or tenant.  
Then, the losing party has ten days -- until Monday, December 24 
25 
 
 
 
-- to file a notice of appeal.  If the landlord prevails and 
neither party appeals from the decision, execution could issue 
on Wednesday, December 26 (because Tuesday, December 25, is a 
holiday).  A sheriff could then serve the tenant with forty-
eight hours' notice of eviction and, if the tenant remains on 
the premises, physically evict the tenant two days later, on 
Friday, December 28.  Based on this timeline, approximately nine 
weeks would elapse between the date on which the tenant received 
a notice to quit and the date on which he or she could be 
forcibly removed from the property.