Title: Public Building Authority of the City of Huntsville v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080733
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 2010

Rel 10/08/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1080733 and 1080734
_________________________
Public Building Authority of the City of Huntsville
v.
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company
Appeals from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-06-1887 and CV-06-1943)
_________________________
1080735 and 1080736
_________________________
Public Building Authority of the City of Huntsville
v.
Dawson Building Contractors, Inc.
Appeals from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-06-1887 and CV-06-1943)
_________________________
1080737 and 1080738
_________________________
Dawson Building Contractors, Inc.
v.
Public Building Authority of the City of Huntsville
Appeals from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-06-1887 and CV-06-1943)
_________________________
1081297
_________________________
Fibrebond Corporation, Raley & Associates, Frank J. Raley,
Ruffin Enterprises, Inc., Richard McKee Hall, Enhanced
Technical Construction, Inc., Bibler Masonry, Inc., Nolan
Maintenance Company, Inc., and American Pan & Engineering
Company, Inc.
v.
Public Building Authority of the City of Huntsville
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-06-1887 and CV-06-1943)
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals all arise from the same
factual scenario.  The Public Building Authority of the City
of Huntsville ("the PBA") appeals from a summary judgment
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
3
entered in favor of St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company
("St. Paul") (cases no. 1080733 and no. 1080734), and it
appeals by permission, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P.,
from the denial of its motion to reconsider the trial court's
decision 
to 
grant 
Dawson 
Building 
Contractors, 
Inc.
("Dawson"), a partial summary judgment (cases no. 1080735 and
no. 1080736).  Dawson appeals by permission, pursuant to Rule
5, from an adverse portion of the trial court's order granting
Dawson a partial summary judgment (cases no. 1080737 and no.
1080738).  Fibrebond Corporation ("Fibrebond"); Raley &
Associates and Frank J. Raley ("the Raley defendants"); Ruffin
Enterprises, Inc.; Richard McKee Hall; Enhanced Technical
Construction, Inc.; Bibler Masonry, Inc.; Nolan Maintenance
Company, Inc.; and American Pan & Engineering Company, Inc.
(hereinafter 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"the
subcontractors"), appeal by permission, pursuant to Rule 5,
from the trial court's order granting in part and denying in
part their motion for a summary judgment (case no. 1081297).
All seven cases have been consolidated for the purpose of
writing one opinion. 
Facts and Procedural History
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
4
On February 4, 2004, Dawson, a building contractor
headquartered in Gadsden, entered into a contract with the PBA
("the contract") pursuant to which Dawson agreed that it would
act as the contractor for certain construction work on a
project to build a modular jail and attendant facilities
servicing the City of Huntsville and Madison County ("the
project").  The contract was drafted by the PBA.  Pursuant to
the contract, Dawson was required to secure a penal bond in
favor of the PBA ("the bond").  St. Paul issued the bond in
the sum of $24,364,218, naming Dawson as the principal and the
PBA as the owner and obligee.  
The PBA issued Dawson a notice to begin construction of
the project on February 9, 2004.  During construction, Dawson
and various of the subcontractors informed the PBA of
purported structural problems affecting the project.  As a
result, on October 11, 2005, the PBA suspended work on the
project to investigate the situation and to identify the
source of the structural problems.  Construction proceeded
sporadically until June 2006, when work on the project
essentially halted at the PBA's direction.  
On February 2, 2006, Dawson informed the PBA that Dawson
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
5
was incurring substantial damage as a result of the delay.  On
June 6, 2006, while the PBA investigation into the structural
problems was still ongoing, Dawson informed the PBA that it
intended to terminate the contract.  
On June 20, 2006, the PBA notified Dawson in writing that
it would terminate the contract for convenience, effective
June 30, 2006; St. Paul was copied on the letter.  The
termination-for-convenience provision in the contract states,
in pertinent part:
"12.2.1.1 The Owner [the PBA] may for any reason
whatsoever terminate performance under this Contract
by the Contractor [Dawson] for convenience. The
Owner shall give written notice of such termination
to 
the 
Contractor specifying when termination
becomes effective.
"12.2.1.2 The Contractor shall incur no further
obligations in connection with the Work and the
Contractor shall stop Work when such termination
becomes 
effective. 
The 
Contractor 
shall 
also
terminate outstanding orders and subcontracts. The
Contractor shall settle the liabilities and claims
arising out of the termination of subcontracts and
orders. Ths Owner may direct the Contractor to
assign the Contractor's right, title and interest
under terminated orders of Subcontracts to the Owner
or its designee."
In its letter terminating the contract for convenience, the
PBA stated that it was reserving its right to convert the
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
6
termination for convenience into one for cause if the facts
warranted.  The PBA's June 20, 2006, letter read, in pertinent
part:
"Notwithstanding 
this 
termination 
by
convenience, due to issues recently raised regarding
the work and materials provided by Dawson, the PBA
specifically reserves and does not waive any claims
it currently has or may have against Dawson for
defective and/or deficient work provided to the
Project and/or for any latent defects arising from
the work provided and/or performed by Dawson on the
Project. Likewise, the PBA does not release Dawson
from any of Dawson's contractual or warranty
obligations. 
"The PBA reserves the right to convert this
termination for convenience into a termination for
cause, if warranted, after the PBA has had an
opportunity to inspect the work in place and review
of all relevant documentation. The PBA will also
look to Dawson to correct and repair any defective
and/or deficient work related to the work performed
or provided by Dawson on the Project. Finally, as
noted herein, the PBA expressly reserves all rights
of actions, claims, demands or other rights accorded
by 
law 
or 
by 
contract 
with 
respect 
to 
the
construction project which is the subject of the
contract referenced above."
Following the PBA's termination for convenience of the
contract, the PBA continued its investigation into the
potential design and construction defects.  On September 14,
2006, without notifying St. Paul, the PBA entered into a
contract with Lee Builders, Inc. ("Lee Builders"), to complete
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
7
the project ("the completion contract").  The completion
contract explicitly stated that Lee Builders would carry the
project to completion:
"The parties acknowledge and understand that
this Project was initiated and partially constructed
pursuant to an earlier contract between [the PBA]
and [Dawson]. That contract has now been terminated
by [the PBA] effective June 30, 2006. This contract
includes the completion of this Project from its
current 
status, 
pursuant 
to 
recent 
design
modifications and revisions to the project plans and
specifications ...."
Bruce Lee, vice president of Lee Builders, stated in his
affidavit:
"From late August [of 2006] until January of
2007, Lee Builders' work on the Project was limited
to site clean-up, construction preparation, on-site
office trailer set-up, dewatering of the building,
the installation of temporary rails on the building,
the installation of a silt fence on the site, the
temporary stabilization or 'shoring' of identified
areas of the building where life and safety concerns
existed, and generally 'closing-up' the building to
preserve the existing interior from outside weather
conditions. 
"5. Between February and December of 2007, Lee
Builders performed remedial work for the Project,
based upon remedial drawings generated by the City
of Huntsville's new structural engineer, Robinson
and Associates, and/or pursuant to other directives
from the City. At present, Lee Builders is working
to achieve substantial completion of the Project."
On September 25, 2006, the PBA sent Dawson notice that,
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
On December 13, 2006, Dawson was voluntarily dismissed
1
from the PBA's action.  
8
based on the results of its investigation, the PBA intended to
convert its termination for convenience into a termination for
cause.  The PBA also requested a meeting with Dawson and St.
Paul to discuss completion of the project.  
On September 27, 2006, Dawson sued, among others, the
PBA, alleging breach of contract and seeking payment owed
under § 12.2.1.4 of the contract for the work performed before
the PBA terminated the contract for convenience; Dawson also
sought declaratory relief regarding the parties' rights and
obligations under the applicable termination-for-convenience
provision of the contract, § 12.2.1 (case no. CV-06-1887).
The PBA responded by filing a separate action against Dawson
and the subcontractors (case no. CV-06-1943).   The PBA
1
alleged 
various tort and contract claims against the
subcontractors; 
the 
tort 
claims 
included 
negligence,
wantonness, fraud, and suppression.  
In November 2006, a meeting was held between the PBA,
Dawson, and St. Paul at the project site; the PBA alleges that
November 2006 was the earliest St. Paul was available for such
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
9
a meeting.  The PBA alleges that St. Paul and its counsel
toured the project site with an expert hired by St. Paul in
order to inspect Dawson's work on the project.  
On November 21, 2006, Dawson filed a motion for a partial
summary judgment in case no. CV-06-1887, seeking a declaration
from the trial court that the termination-for-convenience
provision of the contract exclusively governed the parties'
rights and obligations.  Dawson argued that, because the PBA
elected to terminate the contract for convenience, both
parties' contractual obligations, except those specifically
set out in § 12.2.1 of the contract, ended.  The PBA opposed
the motion.
On November 27, 2006, the PBA answered Dawson's complaint
and asserted counterclaims of breach of contract, negligence,
wantonness, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent
suppression.  On December 4, 2006, having already canceled the
contract 
pursuant 
to 
the 
termination-for-convenience
provision, the PBA sent notice to Dawson and St. Paul
purportedly converting the termination for convenience to a
termination for cause:
"Please be advised that pursuant to [§] 12.2.2.1
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
10
of the Contract between Dawson Building Contractors
and 
[the 
PBA], 
that 
the 
Contract 
is 
hereby
terminated for cause. Furthermore, by copy of this
letter, the PBA demands that, pursuant to [the
bond], St. Paul undertake to perform its obligations
under the [b]ond and complete the [contract] or
obtain bids from qualified contractors, acceptable
to the PBA, to complete the [contract]."
  
St. Paul denied the PBA's claim on December 21, 2006, citing,
among other things, the PBA's termination of the contract for
convenience and the completion contract the PBA had entered
into with Lee Builders.  
On January 3, 2007, the PBA filed an amended complaint in
its action, adding St. Paul as a defendant.  The PBA asserted
claims of breach of contract and bad faith against St. Paul.
On January 31, 2007, Dawson's action and the PBA's action were
consolidated under case no. CV-06-1887 for purposes of
discovery and trial.  
On June 4, 2007, the PBA sent St. Paul a letter stating:
"For the last time and pursuant to the terms of
the performance bond, demand is made for St. Paul to
assume its obligations under the performance bond.
If you wish to engage another contractor to correct
and complete Dawson's work, the PBA will immediately
terminate [Lee Builders'] contract for convenience
and make the remaining contract funds -- subject to
adjust 
for 
Dawson's 
purported 
overbilling 
--
available to St. Paul to correct and complete
Dawson's work."
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
11
On October 26, 2007, the Madison Circuit Court entered an
order granting Dawson's motion for a partial summary judgment.
On April 4, 2008, Dawson filed a motion for a summary judgment
on the remaining claims against it, arguing that, pursuant to
the trial court's order dated October 26, 2007, Dawson had no
liability to the PBA.  On April 21, 2008, the PBA sought
reconsideration of the trial court's October 26, 2007, order
pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P, or, in the
alternative, a clarification of that order.  On November 5,
2008, the subcontractors filed a motion for a summary judgment
as to all claims against them. 
On December 9, 2008, the trial court denied the PBA's
Rule 59(e) motion to alter, amend, or vacate or, in the
alternative, to clarify the trial court's order dated October
26, 2007, holding that the contract had been terminated for
convenience.  In so doing, the trial court reaffirmed that the
contract had been terminated for convenience but held that
certain of Dawson's obligations survived under § 5.3 of the
contract.  On December 31, 2008, Dawson filed a Rule 59(e),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial
court's order dated December 9, 2008, arguing that § 5.3 of
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
12
the contract should not survive a termination for convenience
of the contract.  On January 22, 2009, the trial court denied
Dawson's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment.
On January 9, 2009, St. Paul filed a motion for a summary
judgment, which the PBA opposed.  The trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of St. Paul on January 30, 2009.  On
February 12, 2009, the PBA filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ.
P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's order
entering a summary judgment in favor of St. Paul.  Also on
February 12, 2009, Dawson and the PBA each filed with the
trial court a motion for an order certifying for permissive
appeal under Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App. P., issues underlying the
trial court's December 9, 2008, and January 22, 2009, orders.
On February 25, 2009, the trial court denied the PBA's
Rule 59(e) motion and made its summary judgment for St. Paul
final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; the PBA
appealed on March 13, 2009 (cases no. 1080733 and no.
1080734).  In the same order, the trial court also certified
"that [its] order of December 9, 2008, as clarified by the
order of January 22, 2009, is the proper subject for an
interlocutory appeal."
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
13
On March 11, 2009, Dawson and the PBA filed separate
petitions for permission to appeal the trial court's orders in
this Court, which this Court granted (cases no. 1080735, no.
1080736, no. 1080737, and no. 1080738).  
On May 20, 2009, the trial court granted in part and
denied in part the subcontractors' summary-judgment motion.
The trial court granted the subcontractors' summary-judgment
motion as to the PBA's contract claims against them, but it
denied the motion as to the PBA's tort claims against them.
In denying the subcontractors' summary-judgment motion as to
the PBA's tort claims, the trial court stated:
"The movants ... argue that the PBA may not
assert tort claims against them. The primary basis
for this argument is the economic loss doctrine, by
which a cause of action in tort is barred if a
commercial product malfunctioned or was defective
and such malfunction or defect resulted in damage
only to the product itself. The PBA defends by
arguing that the economic loss doctrine has been
interpreted by Alabama courts as applying only to
AEMLD [Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine] 
claims 
and 
has 
no 
bearing 
in 
a
construction law dispute such as this one. While the
movants 
cite 
a 
number 
of 
cases 
from 
other
jurisdictions as authority for the conclusion that
the doctrine may apply here, this Court rejects the
argument. A review of reported decisions in Alabama
construction cases fails to show an instance in
which the economic loss doctrine has been used to
bar a tort claim, and this Court will leave it up to
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
14
the appellate courts whether to craft an expanded
scope of this doctrine's application."
On June 17, 2009, the trial court certified for permissive
appeal pursuant to Rule 5 the above portion of its
interlocutory order dated May 20, 2009, which denied in part
the subcontractors' summary-judgment motion.  On June 30,
2009, the subcontractors filed a petition for permission to
appeal the trial court's order in this Court, which this Court
granted on August 11, 2009 (case no. 1081297).
Analysis
I. Cases no. 1080733 and no. 1080734
A. Additional Relevant Facts and Procedural History
The bond was written on form "AIA Document A-312," a form
published by the American Institute of Architects.  The bond
imposes certain obligations on St. Paul in the event the PBA
terminated the contract for default and satisfied certain
conditions precedent set forth in the bond:
"If there is no Owner [PBA] Default, the
Surety's [St. Paul's] obligation under this Bond
shall arise after:
"3.1 The Owner has notified the Contractor
[Dawson] and the Surety at its address described in
Paragraph 10 below that the Owner is considering
declaring a Contractor Default and has requested and
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
15
attempted 
to 
arrange 
a 
conference 
with 
the
Contractor and the Surety to be held not later than
fifteen days after receipt of such notice to discuss
methods of performing the Construction Contract ...;
and 
"3.2 The Owner has declared a Contractor Default
and formally terminated the Contractor's right to
complete the contract. Such Contractor Default shall
not be declared earlier than twenty days after the
Contractor and the Surety have received notice as
provided in Subsection 3.1; and 
"3.3 The Owner has agreed to pay the Balance of
the Contract Price to the surety in accordance with
the 
terms 
of 
the 
Construction 
Contracts 
in
accordance with the terms of the contract with the
Owner." 
In its motion for a summary judgment, St. Paul asserted
three arguments: 
"First, under Alabama law, the PBA failed to
satisfy 
conditions 
precedent 
to 
St. 
Paul's
obligations 
under 
the 
... 
[b]ond 
prior 
to
terminating Dawson for convenience. As this Court
has ruled, the PBA's efforts to resurrect Dawson's
Contract for the purposes of declaring Dawson in
default and terminating for cause are 'ineffective.'
Thus, 
[the] 
PBA's post-termination efforts to
declare Dawson in default and meet the other
conditions of the [b]ond are immaterial. Rather, St.
Paul's 
Principal 
(Dawson) 
was 
terminated 
for
convenience without any preceding declaration of
default, notice of intent to declare default, or
termination for default pursuant to Paragraph 3 of
the [b]ond. Consequently, St. Paul is released from
any liability to the PBA.
"Second, even if the PBA could somehow establish
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
16
compliance with the [b]ond's conditions precedent,
this Court's Orders release [Dawson] from its
performance obligations. Hence, pursuant to the
well-established law of suretyship, St. Paul also is
relieved of any obligations under the ... [b]ond.
Indeed, St. Paul's liability for performance cannot
exceed Dawson's. Third, regardless of the foregoing
defenses, the PBA materially breached the terms of
the Bond. Through its post-termination actions, the
PBA impaired St. Paul's rights of suretyship,
thereby rendering the [b]ond null and void under
applicable law."
The trial court found St. Paul's first argument convincing and
granted St. Paul's summary-judgment motion on that ground; the
trial court did not consider St. Paul's other two arguments.
B. Standard of Review
This Court has clearly stated the standard by which it
reviews the disposition of a summary-judgment motion:
"'"In reviewing the disposition of a
motion for summary judgment, we utilize the
same standard as that of the trial court in
determining whether the evidence before the
court made out a genuine issue of material
fact" and whether the movant was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.  Bussey
v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862
(Ala. 1988); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
When the movant makes a prima facie showing
that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence
creating such an issue.  Bass v. SouthTrust
Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 
(Ala. 
1989). 
 
Evidence 
is
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
17
"substantial" if it is of "such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the
exercise 
of 
impartial 
judgment 
can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact
sought to be proved."  West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 906
(Ala. 1999)."
Brown v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 899 So. 2d 227, 233 (Ala. 2004).
"Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court
must review the record in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the
movant."  Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d
341, 344 (Ala. 1997).  
C. Discussion
The PBA alleges that the trial court's entry of a summary
judgment for St. Paul was error because, the PBA argues, it
fully complied with the conditions precedent to St. Paul's
liability set forth in the bond.  Alternatively, the PBA
argues that it at least raised a genuine issue of material
fact concerning its compliance with the conditions precedent
set forth in the bond.  We disagree with the PBA's argument,
and we hold that the trial court's judgment is without error.
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
18
In Bank of Brewton, Inc. v. International Fidelity
Insurance Co., 827 So. 2d 747 (Ala. 2002), this Court
interpreted an identical performance bond, also written on
form "AIA Document A-312."  This Court explained the plain
language of paragraph 3 of the bond, as follows:
"The plain language of paragraph 3 is that in the
event 
of 
a 
contractor 
default, 
the 
surety's
obligation under the bond shall arise after the
occurrence of the events listed in subparagraphs
3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. The owner first must give proper
notice, call a meeting, discuss the problems, and
attempt to resolve them (subparagraph 3.1); then, if
the problems are not resolved, the owner must
declare a contractor default, formally terminating
the contractor's right to complete the contract, and
must declare the default at least 20 days after
giving notice (subparagraph 3.2); and finally the
owner must agree to pay the balance of the contract
to the surety or to a new contractor who will
complete 
the 
contract 
as 
originally 
agreed
(subparagraph 3.3)."
827 So. 2d at 753.  
In the present case, it is undisputed that the PBA
terminated the contract for convenience effective June 30,
2006.  The effect of such a termination, as stated in the
contract, is that "[Dawson] shall incur no further obligations
in connection with the Work and [Dawson] shall stop Work when
such termination becomes effective."  It is clear that, based
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
19
on the PBA's termination of the contract for convenience, the
PBA could not have subsequently satisfied the conditions
precedent in the bond.  Only after the PBA terminated the
contract for convenience did it attempt to satisfy the
conditions precedent, which, according to the plain language
of the bond, is too late.  Therefore, the trial court did not
err in entering a summary judgment in favor of St. Paul.  
The PBA argues that its June 30, 2006, termination for
convenience was conditional and, thus, could be converted into
a termination for cause if it was discovered that Dawson had
defaulted under the contract.  We find this argument
unpersuasive.  It is undisputed that the contract was
terminated by the PBA for convenience effective June 30, 2006.
Under the terms of the contract, a termination for convenience
unequivocally terminates the contract and relieves Dawson from
incurring any further obligation associated with the project.
There is no language in the contract allowing a termination
for convenience to be converted into a termination for cause,
and the PBA offers no applicable legal authority to support
its position that a termination for convenience may be
converted to a termination for cause absent contractual
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
20
language allowing such a conversion.  In light of the
unambiguous terms of the contract, there is no basis for
reading the contract in such a way as to allow the PBA to
resuscitate a dead contract so that it may re-terminate it.
The PBA also addresses the other arguments raised by St.
Paul in its summary-judgment motion.  However, having decided
that the trial court properly entered a summary judgment for
St. Paul on the ground that the PBA failed to satisfy the
conditions precedent to St. Paul's obligations under the bond,
it is not necessary to address the other arguments.  
II. Cases no. 1080735 and no. 1080736
Pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App. P., the trial court
certified the following question of law in its certification
for permissive appeal in cases no. 1080735 and no. 1080736:
"(1) Whether the PBA, as owner of a commercial
construction 
project, 
could 
legally 
convert
termination of its contract with Dawson ..., the
general contractor, into one for cause after having
previously 
provided notice of termination for
convenience, in the absence of explicit contractual
language authorizing such a conversion."
In conducting our de novo review of a question presented on a
permissive appeal, "this Court will not expand its review ...
beyond the question of law stated by the trial court.  Any
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
The PBA quotes the following from Accent Builders as the
2
"two-part" test: 
"[T]he question for the jury was not whether Accent
intended to terminate for convenience, but instead
whether it acted in bad faith or whether Southwest
changed its position in reliance. Absent a finding
on one or both of these issues, Accent was entitled
as a matter of law to its issues pertaining to
termination for cause."
679 S.W.2d at 110.
21
such expansion would usurp the responsibility entrusted to the
trial court by Rule 5(a)[, Ala. R. App. P.]."  BE&K, Inc. v.
Baker, 875 So. 2d 1185, 1189 (Ala. 2003).  
The PBA, as the appellant, alleges that the question
presented by the permissive appeal is one of first impression
and urges this Court to adopt what it characterizes as a two-
step test set forth by the Court of Appeals of Texas in Accent
Builders Co. v. Southwest Concrete Systems, Inc., 679 S.W.2d
106 (Tex. App. 1984).   However, the interpretation of a
2
contract does not present a novel legal issue.  Rather, the
rules of contract construction and interpretation are well
established in Alabama and will be applied to answer the
certified question presented by the trial court.  
Under Alabama law, this Court, when interpreting a
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
22
contract, must follow the plain language of the contract:
"'General contract law requires a court to
enforce an unambiguous, lawful contract, as it is
written. P & S Business, Inc. v. South Central Bell
Telephone Co., 466 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala. 1985). See
also McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Development Co.,
541 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. 1989). A court may not make a
new contract for the parties or rewrite their
contract under the guise of construing it. Estes v.
Monk, 464 So. 2d 103 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)....
"'....
"'When interpreting a contract, a court should
give the terms of the agreement their clear and
plain meaning and should presume that the parties
intended what the terms of the agreement clearly
state. Pacific Enterprises Oil Co. (USA) v. Howell
Petroleum Corp., 614 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1993).'"
Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So. 2d 333, 339 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Ex
parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 35-36 (Ala.
1998)); see also Southland Quality Homes, Inc. v. Williams,
781 So. 2d 949 (Ala. 2000) (recognizing that the primary
source for determining whether a contract is clear is the text
of the document itself; when an instrument is unambiguous its
construction and legal effect will be based upon what is found
within the four corners of the instrument).
As noted above, nothing in the contract allowed for a
conditional termination or for a conversion of a termination
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
23
for convenience to a termination for cause.  Therefore, in
light of the unambiguous terms of the contract, we hold that
the PBA cannot convert its termination for convenience to a
termination for cause. 
Also significant to our determination that the PBA's
termination for convenience cannot be converted to a
termination for cause is the language used in the sections of
the contract providing for termination by the owner, i.e., the
PBA.  Section 12.2 of the contract sets forth the alternative
ways the PBA may cancel the contract.  Section 12.2.1 of the
contract allows the PBA to cancel the contract for convenience
but gives no right to the PBA to convert such a termination to
one for cause.  Section 12.2.2 of the contract, on the other
hand, allows the PBA to cancel the contract for cause and
explicitly grants the PBA the right to later convert such a
termination to one for convenience if "a [c]ourt of competent
jurisdiction" 
subsequently 
determines 
that 
the 
termination 
was
without cause.  
The legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) is
frequently applied to aid courts in interpreting statutory
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
24
language, and it is useful in this instance to interpret the
language of the contract at issue here.  See Bon Aventure,
L.L.C. v. Craig Dyas L.L.C., 3 So. 3d 589, 866 (Ala. 2008)
(Lyons, J., concurring in the result).  Here, the PBA drafted
the contract and gave itself the right in § 12.2.2 of the
contract to convert a termination for cause to one for
convenience.  However, the PBA did not grant itself the same
right in § 12.2.1 of the contract.  The fact that the right to
convert is included in § 12.2.2 of the contract, but not in §
12.2.1 of the contract, leads us to conclude a more
restrictive boundary was intended in § 12.2.1, the provision
under which the contract was terminated.  For this reason as
well, we answer the certified question of law in the negative;
the PBA could not have converted its termination for
convenience to one for cause absent contractual language
granting it the right to do so.  Therefore, we affirm the
trial court's order dated December 9, 2008, to the extent that
it denied the PBA's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of Dawson based on its
finding that the contract was terminated for convenience.  
The PBA also argues that a summary judgment in favor of
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
25
Dawson was inappropriate because, it says, genuine issues of
material fact exist.  However, this case is before this Court
on permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5.  Therefore, the only
issue before this Court is the question of law certified by
the trial court.  The PBA's argument is not properly before
this Court and will not be addressed.  
III. Cases no. 1080737 and no. 1080738
Pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App. P., the trial court
certified the following question of law in its certification
for permissive appeal in cases no. 1080737 and no. 1080738:
"Whether 
Dawson 
has 
any 
remaining 
legal
obligations owing to the PBA under Section 5.3 of
the contract between them if the contract is deemed
to have been terminated for convenience."
Dawson, as the appellant, argues that § 5.3 of the
contract does not survive the termination of the contract
under § 12.2.1 because § 12.2.1 unambiguously terminates the
contract and exclusively governs any obligation the parties
have to one another following such termination.  We agree.  
Applying the principles of contract interpretation
discussed earlier, it is clear from the plain language of the
contract that § 5.3 does not survive the PBA's termination of
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
26
the contract for convenience.  In its entirety, § 12.2.1
provides:
"12.2.1.1 The Owner [the PBA] may for any reason
whatsoever terminate performance under this Contract
by the Contractor [Dawson] for convenience. The
Owner shall give written notice of such termination
to 
the 
Contractor specifying when termination
becomes effective.
"12.2.1.2 The Contractor shall incur no further
obligations in connection with the Work and the
Contractor shall stop Work when such termination
becomes 
effective. 
The 
Contractor 
shall 
also
terminate outstanding orders and subcontracts. The
Contractor shall settle the liabilities and claims
arising out of the termination of subcontracts and
orders. Ths Owner may direct the Contractor to
assign the Contractor's right, title and interest
under terminated orders of Subcontracts to the Owner
or its designee.
"12.2.1.3 The Contractor shall transfer title
and deliver to the Owner such completed or partially
completed Work and materials, equipment, parts,
fixtures, information and Contract rights as the
Contractor has. 
"12.2.1.4 (a) The Contractor shall submit a
termination claim to the Owner and the Architect
specifying 
the 
amounts 
due 
because 
of 
the
termination for convenience together with costs,
pricing or other data required by the Architect. If
the Contractor fails to file a termination claim
within one (1) year from the effective date of
termination, the owner shall pay the Contractor, an
amount derived in accordance with subparagraph (c)
below. 
"(b) The Owner and the Contractor may agree to
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
27
the compensation, if any, due to the Contractor
hereunder. 
"(c) Absent agreement to the amount due to the
Contractor, the Owner shall pay the Contractor the
following amounts: 
"(i) 
Contract 
prices 
for 
labor,
materials, equipment and other services
accepted under this Contract 
"(ii) Reasonable costs incurred in
preparing to perform and in performing the
terminated portion of the Work, and in
terminating the Contractor's performance,
plus a fair and reasonable allowance for
overhead and profit thereon (such profit
shall not include anticipated profit or
consequential damages); provided however,
that if it appears that the Contractor
would have not profited or would have
sustained a loss if the entire Contract
would have been completed, no profit shall
be allowed or included and the amount of
compensation shall be reduced to reflect
the anticipated rate of loss, if any; 
"(iii) Reasonable costs of settling
and paying claims arising out of the
termination of subcontracts or orders
pursuant to Subparagraph 12.2.1.2 of this
Paragraph. These costs shall not include
amounts paid in accordance with other
provisions hereof. 
"The Total sum to be paid the Contractor under
this Subparagraph 12.2.1 shall not exceed the total
Contract Price, as properly adjusted, reduced by the
amount of payments otherwise made, and shall in no
event include duplication of payment."  
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
28
Section 12.2.1 clearly sets forth the method by which final
payment is to be made to Dawson for the work it completed
under 
the 
contract 
before 
the 
PBA's 
termination 
for
convenience.
Further, when § 5.3 is read in the context of the article
in which it is found, Article 5, it is clear that § 5.3 is an
interim-payment mechanism to be used during the life of the
contract.  Section 5.2 of the contract requires the contract
price to be paid through a series of "progress payments."
Section 5.3 allows the progress payments to be modified.
Specifically, § 5.3 provides:
"5.3.1 The Owner may decline to make payment,
may withhold funds, and, if necessary, may demand
the return of some or all of the amounts previously
paid to the Contractor, to protect the Owner from
loss because of: 
"(a) defective Work not remedied by
the Contractor nor, in the opinion of the
Owner, likely to be remedied by the
Contractor.
"(b) the quality of a portion, or all,
of the Contractor's work not being in
accordance with the requirements of this
Contract.
"(c) the quantity of the Contractor's
work not being as represented in the
Contractor's Application for Payment. 
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
29
"(d) claims made or likely to be made
by third parties against the Owner or the
Owner's property. 
"(e) failure by the Contractor to use
Contract 
funds, 
previously 
paid 
the
Contractor 
by 
the 
Owner, 
to 
pay
Contractor's 
work 
related 
obligations
including 
Subcontractors, 
laborers,
materialmen, 
material 
and 
equipment
suppliers or others in a prompt and proper
fashion. 
"(f) evidence that the balance of the
Work cannot be completed in accordance with
the Contact for the unpaid balance of the
Contract Price. 
"(g) 
evidence 
related 
to 
the
Contractor's rate of Progress which in the
Owner's opinion indicates that the Work
will not be completed in the time required
for substantial or final completion. 
"(h) 
the 
Contractor's 
persistent
failure to carry out the Work or refusal to
perform 
any 
of 
its 
obligations 
in
accordance with the Contract. 
"(i) damage or loss caused by the
Contractor 
or 
a 
Subcontractor, 
materialman,
laborer, or supplier to the Owner or a
third party to whom the Owner is, or may
be, liable. 
"In the event that the Owner makes written
demand upon the Contractor for amounts previously
paid 
by 
the 
Owner 
as 
contemplated 
in 
this
Subparagraph 5.3.1, the Contractor shall promptly
comply with such demand."  
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
30
Later in Article 5, § 5.7, entitled "Completion and Final
Payment," makes clear that § 5.3 is to be applied only during
the life of the contract and alters the final payment amount
only if the final payment is made pursuant to § 5.7.  Section
5.7.5 states that "[t]he Owner shall make final payment of all
sums due the Contractor subject to [§] 5.3.1."  When § 5.3 is
analyzed within the context of Article 5 it is clear that §
5.3 is an interim-payment mechanism that may affect § 5.7
alone.  However, § 5.3 has no effect on the final payment due
under §§ 12.2.1 and 12.2.2; thus, it is not necessary to look
to § 5.3 because § 12.2.1.4 governs.  
Our holding is further bolstered by the fact that the PBA
did not include in § 5.3 of the contract any language
indicating that that section would survive a termination for
convenience.  However, in § 12.2.2.2 of the contract, the PBA
did include a clause indicating that that section of the
contract would survive the termination of the contract:
"12.2.2.2 If the unpaid balance of the Contract
Price exceeds the cost of finishing the work,
including compensation for the Owner's and the
Architect's additional services and expenses made
necessary thereby, such excess shall be paid to the
Contractor. If such costs exceed the unpaid balance,
the Contractor shall pay the difference to the
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
31
Owner. This obligation for payment shall survive the
termination of the Contract."
(Emphasis added.)  Therefore, we must conclude that had the
PBA intended for § 5.3 to survive termination of the contract
it would have so stated, as it did in § 12.2.2.2 of the
contract. 
We answer the question certified by the trial court in
the negative; § 5.3 of the contract did not survive the PBA's
termination for convenience.  Therefore, we reverse the trial
court's judgment to the extent that it held that § 5.3
survived the termination of the contract.   
IV. Case no. 1081297
Pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App. P., the trial court
certified the following question of law in its certification
for permissive appeal in case no. 1081297:
"Does 
the 
economic 
loss 
doctrine, 
first
recognized in Alabama in Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v.
Clark Equipment Co., 543 So. 2d 671 (Ala. 1989), a
product liability case, also apply in the context of
a commercial construction dispute so as to preclude
the [PBA], as the owner of the subject property,
from 
asserting 
tort 
claims 
against 
various
subcontractors given that the only damage claimed to
have 
resulted 
from 
any 
defective 
conditions
allegedly caused by the subcontractors was to the
property itself?"
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
32
The economic-loss rule "prevents tort recovery when a
product damages itself, causing economic loss, but does not
cause personal injury or damage to any property other than
itself."  Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., 901
So. 2d 84, 106-07 (Ala. 2004).  However, the economic-loss
rule does not prevent a tort action when the injury caused is
personal or is to property other than the complained-of
product.  See Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So.
2d 671, 674 (Ala. 1989) (adopting the reasoning of East River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106
(1986)).  
In denying the subcontractors' summary-judgment motion,
the trial court properly recognized that this Court has not
applied the economic-loss rule to bar a tort claim in a
commercial-construction context.  Rather, as the trial court
held, 
"the Supreme Court of Alabama appears to have
instead focused on whether there exists a duty from
which a tort might arise in a construction context.
See, e.g., RaCON, Inc. v. Tuscaloosa County, 953 So.
2d 321 (Ala. 2006); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc.
v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984)."
Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984),
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
33
provides clear legal precedent concerning the situation
presented by the certified question; thus, we see no reason to
apply the economic-loss rule to bar tort claims in a
commercial-construction context.  
In RaCON, Inc. v. Tuscaloosa County, 953 So. 2d 321 (Ala.
2006), we applied Berkel to determine whether one party had a
duty in tort to another in a commercial-construction context.
In RaCON, a county undertook a project to extend a road.  The
county hired a project engineer, Burk-Kleinpeter, Inc.
("BKI"), which retained a consultant, TTL, Inc., "to perform
consulting services for BKI on soil or other geotechnical
conditions along the proposed roadway." 953 So. 2d at 323.
TTL provided studies that BKI used in developing the bid
package for the project.  Based on TTL's studies, the bid
package indicated that "rock buttresses might be required by
BKI on the project." 953 So. 2d at 325.  RaCON, Inc.,
submitted a bid for the project.  RaCON alleged that,
"prior to bidding, [a RaCON representative] had
conversations with Jeff Wood of BKI and Jim
Bamberger of TTL in which both Wood and Bamberger
allegedly assured [the representative] that (a)
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
ALDOT specification 219.203(a) provides that the work
3
needed to correct a landslide varies based on the site
conditions. Construction of a rock buttress is one of several
methods discussed in ALDOT specification 219.203(a) to correct
landslides.
34
ALDOT specification 219[ ] applied to the project;
3
(b) RaCON's interpretation of ALDOT specification
219, i.e., that rock buttresses were intended as
remedial, not preventive, structures to correct
actual slope failures, was accurate; and (c) rock
buttresses would be required only as a last resort
on the project if less costly measures (e.g.,
installation of above ground or subsurface drainage
systems) failed to correct a landslide."
 
953 So. 2d at 325.  As a result, RaCON did not include the
cost of constructing rock buttresses in its final bid "because
it was willing to take a commercial risk that there would be
no slope failures on the project that would require" the
construction of rock buttresses. 953 So. 2d at 325.  RaCON was
awarded the project and contracted with the county.  
Three slope failures occurred during RaCON's preliminary
construction work.  As a result of the slope failures, which
RaCON alleged it remedied by installing underground drains,
RaCON was furnished with designs by TTL for the rock
buttresses to be constructed.  RaCON constructed the rock
buttresses under protest, claiming that the construction of
the rock buttresses was extra work not contemplated under the
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
35
contract.  RaCON later sued TTL, among others, alleging
negligence and seeking damages resulting from its work on the
project.  TTL moved for a summary judgment, which the trial
court granted, finding that TTL owed no duty to RaCON.  
On appeal, in considering whether TTL owed RaCON a duty
for purposes of its negligence claim, we stated:
"RaCON and TTL acknowledge that this Court has
rejected the absence of privity of contract as a
defense to a negligence claim against a party to a
construction project. Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc.
v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496, 501 (Ala.
1984). 
This 
Court 
held 
in 
Berkel 
that 
a
subcontractor retained by the general contractor to
install foundational pilings for a building could
assert a negligence claim against the owner,
Providence Hospital, for expenses incurred by the
subcontractor in performing that work. 454 So. 2d at
503. The Berkel Court noted six factors that should
be analyzed to determine whether a party not in
privity with the claimant owes the claimant a duty
of care in a construction setting. Those six factors
are as follows:
"'"'(1) 
[T]he 
extent 
to 
which 
the
transaction was intended to affect the
other person; (2) the foreseeability of
harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty
that he suffered injury; (4) the closeness
of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury; (5) the moral blame
attached to such conduct; and (6) the
policy of preventing future harm.'"'
"454 So. 2d at 503 (quoting Howe v. Bishop, 446 So.
2d 11, 15 (Ala. 1984) (Torbert, C.J., concurring in
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
36
the result), quoting in turn United Leasing Corp. v.
Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 406-07, 263 S.E.2d 313,
318 (1980))."
RaCON, 953 So. 2d at 334-35.  Applying the Berkel factors to
the facts in RaCON, we held that TTL did not owe RaCON a duty
of care, and, thus, we affirmed the trial court's judgment
granting TTL's summary-judgment motion.  
The same analysis and factors derived from Berkel and
applied in RaCON apply in the present case, obviating any need
to apply the economic-loss rule in a commercial-construction
context.  Rather, our focus is on whether the claimant was
owed a duty by the party he is suing, as demonstrated by the
trial court's following holding:
"From [Berkel] comes a number of factors to be
considered in deciding whether to impose a duty in
a construction context. Those factors lead to the
necessity of conducting a fact-intensive inquiry. At
this juncture, the Court cannot conclude that the
movants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Rather, further evidence regarding the parties'
relationships is needed before the Court can
comfortably address the matter." 
Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative
and 
affirm 
the 
trial 
court's 
judgment 
denying 
the
subcontractors' summary-judgment motion concerning the PBA's
tort claims against them.  
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
37
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's
judgments in cases no. 1080733, no. 1080734, no. 1080735, no.
1080736, and no. 1081297, and we reverse the trial court's
judgments in cases no. 1080737 and no. 1080738 and remand the
cases.
1080733 –- AFFIRMED.
1080734 –- AFFIRMED.
1080735 –- AFFIRMED.
1080736 –- AFFIRMED.
1080737 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1080738 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1081297 –- AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., dissents.
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
38
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I disagree with the interpretation of § 12.2.1.2 of the
contract set out in the main opinion and the corollary holding
that § 5.3 does not apply in this case.
The language of § 12.2.1.2 of the contract bears
repeating:
"12.2.1.2  The Contractor shall incur no further
obligations in connection with the Work and the
Contractor shall stop Work when such termination
becomes 
effective. 
The 
Contractor 
shall 
also
terminate outstanding orders and subcontracts. The
Contractor shall settle the liabilities and claims
arising out of the termination of subcontracts and
orders. The Owner may direct the Contractor to
assign the Contractor's right, title and interest
under terminated orders of Subcontracts to the Owner
or its designee."
(Emphasis added.)
The first clause of the first sentence of this section is
not a provision relieving the contractor of any liability or
responsibility under the contract; rather, it is a directive
to the contractor that, if and when the owner invokes its
right to terminate the contract for reasons other than for
cause, the contractor is not to incur any "further"
obligations beyond those to which it has already committed
itself.  In other words, it is a command to the contractor to
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
39
cease and desist from entering into any new or additional
commitments to subcontractors and suppliers.  This, in my
view, is simply a plain reading of the language in this
clause.
"'General contract law requires a
court to enforce an unambiguous, lawful
contract, as it is written. P & S Business,
Inc. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.,
466 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala. 1985). See also
McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Development
Co., 541 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. 1989). A court
may not make a new contract for the parties
or rewrite their contract under the guise
of construing it. Estes v. Monk, 464 So. 2d
103 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)....'"
Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So. 2d 333, 339 (Ala. 2001) (quoting
Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 35-36
(Ala. 1998)).  Furthermore, it is a reading of this language
that is in pari materia with the remainder of the first
sentence, which commands that "the Contractor shall stop Work"
upon a termination for convenience.  See Celtic Life Ins. Co.
v. McLendon, 814 So. 2d 222, 224 (Ala. 2001) (noting that
contracts "'are construed so as to give effect to the
intention of the parties, and, to determine this intent, a
court must examine more than an isolated sentence or term; it
must read each phrase in the context of all other provisions'"
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
40
(quoting Attorneys Ins. Mut. of Alabama, Inc. v. Smith,
Blocker & Lowther, P.C., 703 So. 2d 866, 870 (Ala. 1996)
(emphasis omitted))); Sullivan, Long & Hagerty v. Southern
Elec. Generating Co., 667 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala. 1995) ("Terms
of a written instrument should be construed in pari materia
....").  Similarly, it is a reading that is consistent with
the next sentence of § 12.2.1.2, which requires the contractor
to "terminate outstanding order and subcontracts." See id.
Consistent with this understanding, I see nothing that
prohibits the Public Building Authority of the City of
Huntsville ("the PBA") from terminating the contract "for
convenience," 
subsequently 
discovering 
or 
making 
a
determination that a termination for cause is warranted, and
then acting on that discovery or determination.  A fortiori,
the PBA could terminate for convenience –- thereby halting any
"further" work by the contractor –- while expressly reserving
any claims against the contractor for defective work or, as it
chose to do here, expressly reserving its right to thereafter
assess the work that had been done by the contractor and
subsequently terminate for cause if a termination for cause is
found to be warranted.
1080733; 1080734; 1080735; 1080736; 1080737; 1080738; and
1081297
41
I also disagree with the treatment as tort claims claims
that 
are 
merely 
breach-of-contract claims against 
the
subcontractors and the majority's decision not to apply the
economic-loss rule to those claims.