Title: NELSON v. NELSON
Citation: 1998 OK 10, 69OBJ452, 954 P.2d 1219
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 1998

NELSON v. NELSON Annotate this Case NELSON v. NELSON 1998 OK 10 954 P.2d 1219 69 OBJ 452 Case Number: 88764 Decided: 02/03/1998 Mandate Issued: 03/06/1998 Supreme Court of Oklahoma DEBBIE D. NELSON, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. RICHARD E. NELSON, Defendant/Appellant. [954 P.2d 1221] APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF NOWATA COUNTY; Honorable James L. Sontag, Associate District Judge. ¶0 The plaintiff/appellee, Debbie D. Nelson (wife/mother), filed for divorce seeking custody of two minor children with the defendant/appellee, Richard E. Nelson (husband/father), to have reasonable visitation. In a default proceeding, the trial judge, Honorable James L. Sontag, granted the parties a divorce, set child support, divided marital property and awarded the wife $5,000 in lieu of alimony as a property division. Custody of the children was placed with the wife. Because the father had not followed the mandate of Administrative Rule CV-95-1 requiring him to complete a course, Helping Children Cope with Divorce, he was denied visitation. The husband filed a motion to vacate the judgment. After a hearing, the trial court required that an order nunc pro tunc be entered to conform payment of child care expenses with the Oklahoma Child Support Guidelines, 43 O.S. Supp. 1995 §118, et seq., and it overruled the husband's motion to vacate. In a motion to retain, the husband requested that we consider the constitutionality of Administrative Order CV-95-1 and of 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.2 which require the divorcing parents of minors to attend educational courses intended to help their children cope with divorce. We find that: 1) Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.2 do not deny divorcing parents with minor children equal protection or due process nor do they constitute a prohibited delegation of the legislative authority; and 2) under the facts presented, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to vacate a default judgment entered without notice to the father that his visitation rights were in jeopardy. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. James H. Hadley, II, For Plaintiff/Appellee. Pamela Pitcher-Hartley, Vinita, Oklahoma Bill R. Scarth, For Defendant/Appellant. B. Ruth Kupcha, Claremore, Oklahoma, Sam P. Daniel, For Amicus Curiae. Ronald W. Little Tulsa, Oklahoma. ¶1 KAUGER, C.J.: ¶2 Two issues are presented: 1) whether Administrative Order CV-95-11 and 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.22 which require divorcing [954 P.2d 1222] parents with children to attend classes intended to help minors to cope with divorce are constitutional; and 2). whether, under the facts presented, the husband was entitled to have his timely-filed motion to vacate sustained. We find the administrative order and the statute do not violate constitutional standards of equal protection or due process nor do they constitute a prohibited delegation of the legislative authority. However, the cause must be reversed in part, because the father did not have notice that his rights to visitation were in jeopardy. Under the facts presented, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to vacate the default judgment. The cause is remanded and the trial court is ordered to consider the father's application for visitation. FACTS ¶3 On July 19, 1996, the plaintiff/appellee, Debbie D. Nelson (wife/mother), served the defendant/appellant, Richard E. Nelson (husband/father), with a petition for divorce. In the petition, the wife sought: custody of the couple's two minor children with the husband to have "reasonable visitation"; an award of child support and child care expenses computed in accordance with the Oklahoma Child Support Guidelines, 43 O.S. Supp. 1995 §118, et seq.; medical insurance and payment of a portion of any unpaid medical expenses of the children; an equitable division of marital property and debt; and attorney fees and costs. Because the husband believed that he and his wife were in the process of settling the issues presented in the divorce proceeding, he did not hire an attorney or file an answer. ¶4 Finding the husband in default, the trial court granted the divorce on November 4, 1996. Under the decree, the wife was given custody of the minor children, and the husband was denied visitation based on his failure to attend the course, "Helping Children Cope with Divorce."3 The husband was ordered to pay $611.16 monthly for child support and sixty-six percent of any child care expenses. He was also required to provide medical insurance for the children and to pay a portion of any uncovered medical expenses. The decree divided marital property between the parties and awarded the wife $5,000.00 in lieu of alimony as property division. Each party was directed to discharge the debt on vehicles awarded as their separate property. Finally, the husband was ordered to pay the wife's attorney fee of $550.00. It is undisputed that the only pleading served on the husband was the petition. In that filing, there was nothing to put the husband on notice that he could be denied visitation with his children. ¶5 On November 27, 1996, the husband filed a motion to vacate the judgment and decree of divorce.4 He asserted that: he did not file an answer because he believed that the property and child support issues would be settled; the child support awarded exceeded provisions of the Oklahoma Child Support Guidelines, 43 O.S. Supp. 1995 §118, et seq.; the division of property and debt was inequitable; and the decision to deny visitation based on his failure to attend the parenting seminar violated his right of association with his children and was not based on a consideration of the children's best interests. ¶6 A hearing on the motion to vacate was held on December 30, 1996, in which the husband requested that the decree be set aside as to all matters except for the portion of the judgment granting the parties' divorce. At the hearing, the husband acknowledged that he knew that he was required to attend the Children Coping With Divorce Seminar and that, after the decree was entered, he [954 P.2d 1223] completed the course.5 All attempts of the husband to offer evidence on the actual value of the marital estate were overruled. The trial court did accept evidence of the husband's income. Nevertheless, this information was not considered in adjusting the child support obligations. Instead, the wife was ordered to prepare an order nunc pro tunc removing child care expenses from the amount of child support originally ordered. On March 4, 1997, an order was entered designating the husband's child support obligation at $409.86 rather than $611.19 and requiring him to pay sixty-six percent of any employment-related child care expenses. ¶7 The husband appealed and he requested that the cause be retained to address the constitutionality of Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.2. The motion was granted on April 25, 1997. Family and Children's Services, Inc. was given leave to file an amicus brief on May 29,1997,6 and the husband's final response was filed on June 27, 1997. I ¶9 The husband argues that Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.2, requiring the divorcing parents of a minor child to attend educational programs relating to the impact of divorce on a couple's children, are unconstitutional on equal protection and due process grounds. The wife and amicus curiae assert that neither the order nor §107.2 violate constitutional standards. ¶10 The issue of the constitutionality of statutes similar to Administrative Order CV-95-1 and 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.2 is one of first impression in Oklahoma and in the nation.7 In other areas relating to divorce, state-enacted restrictions have been upheld, i.e., a one-year residency condition for maintaining an action for divorce,8 and a waiting period between the time of filing and the entry of the final decree.9 Additionally, there are established standards for the consideration of statutory enactments attacked on constitutional grounds. A. Equal protection. ¶11 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that no state "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."10 Due process protections encompassed within the Okla. Const. Art. 2, §711 are coextensive with those of its federal counterpart. The United States Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution each contain built-in anti-discrimination components which afford protection against unreasonable or unreasoned classifications which serve no important governmental interests.12 The same equal protection component found in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is present in the due process clause of art. 2, §7.13 [954 P.2d 1224] ¶12 There is a strong presumption which favors legislative enactments. A statute will be upheld unless it is clearly, palpably, and plainly inconsistent with fundamental law. ¶13 Administrative Order CV-95-1 and §107.2 make a single distinction----parents, or persons standing in the parental role, who invoke the jurisdiction of the court in an action which will alter the character of the parental unit may be required to take an educational course intended to lessen the impact of the change on minor children----if minor children are not involved, the requirement does not apply. Recognizing the harmful impact of divorce on children and in attempt to minimize the involvement of minors in parental conflict, ¶14 States may seek to protect and facilitate the parental bond through parental participation, B. Due process. ¶15 The husband's due process attack on CV-95-1 and on §107.2 is procedural25---relating to his lack of notice---and substantive,26 concerning the burden attending an educational course relating to the impact of divorce on minors bears on his parental rights. We agree that the husband did not receive notice sufficient to appraise him that his visitation rights might be in peril.27 We also agree that a parent may not be penalized for failure to attend courses mandated either by the administrative order or by the statute absent notice that completion of the course is required. However, this Court will not assume that simply because here the husband did not receive adequate notice that parties generally will not be advised of the obligation to complete the educational courses. ¶16 The husband's constitutional attack on CV-95-1 and §107.2 on substantive grounds centers on an argument that, absent some jeopardy to the health or safety of children, the government may not intrude in the familial relationship and require parents to attend the mandated educational courses. However, in determining whether the order or the statute constitute a substantive due process violation, a balance must be struck between the right protected and the demands of society.28 We recognize that the relationship of parents to their children is a fundamental, constitutionally protected right.29 However, the liberty interest of the [954 P.2d 1225] parent must be balanced against the best interests of the child. In this arena, the child's interest are paramount30 and the parents rights are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.31 Unquestionably, the state has a constitutional right to declare and maintain a policy regarding marriage and divorce concerning persons domiciled within its borders.32 The Legislature's enactment of §107.2 and the district court's adoption of CV-95-1 is a recognition that children are impacted socially, emotionally and economically by divorce.33 The extent to which a parent may be inconvenienced by attendance at the educational seminars is subordinate to the need to protect the child's welfare. In addition, the requirement to attend the class or seminar creates no burden on the parent's right of association with the child. We find that neither Administrative Order CV-95-1 nor 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.2 are unconstitutional on procedural or substantive due process grounds. C. Delegation of legislative authority. ¶17 The husband's final attack on 43 O.S. Supp. 1997 §107.2 and on Administrative Order CV-95-1 centers on an argument that the statute and the rule provide for an unauthorized delegation of the legislative authority in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution art. IV, §134 and art. V, §1.35, because the courts are allowed to make rules to carry out the policy announced by the provision. However, this argument is unpersuasive. The language of §107.2(a) provides standards for the kind of educational course which is mandated. Subsection (b) merely authorizes the courts to implement local rules governing the program the Legislature has required.36 ¶18 Additionally, neither the statute nor the administrative order are result determinative. Unquestionably, the relationship of a parent to a child is a constitutionally protected right. II. ¶20 The father asserts that although he was served with the petition, he was not aware that he could be denied visitation with his children or that a money judgment could be entered against him. ¶21 It is elementary and fundamental that "due process of law" encompasses more than a party's right to be heard. It begins with a party's right to notice of the pendency of an action and of the nature of any relief sought. ¶22 The mother argues that the husband had constructive notice that his visitation rights were at issue by virtue of the existence of Administrative Order CV-95-1 requiring him to attend the seminar, "Children Coping with Divorce." Although it appears that the husband was aware of the order and of the requirement that he attend the class, ¶23 Because litigants are entitled to a fair day in court, policy encourages actions being tried on the merits. Default judgments are not favored. CONCLUSION ¶24 Only in exceptional cases should a parent be denied the right to visit his or her minor child. [954 P.2d 1229] ¶25 The cause is remanded and the divorce decree is reversed and remanded for further proceedings insofar as it denies the husband visitation. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, WILSON, WATT, JJ. concur. OPALA, J., with whom SIMMS, J. joins, concurs in part and dissents in part. HARGRAVE, J. dissents. FOOT