Title: Jackson v. State
Citation: 556 So. 2d 335
Docket Number: 07-58598
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: January 17, 1990

556 So. 2d 335 (1990) George W. JACKSON v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 07-58598. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 17, 1990. Clarence A. Whitaker, Vicksburg, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen., (elected Supreme Court Justice Jan. 3, 1989) Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Leyser Q. Morris, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. ANDERSON, Justice, for the Court: George W. Jackson was convicted of sexual battery in the Circuit Court of Warren County and sentenced to serve a term of fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, Jackson timely appealed raising four issues as error by the lower court. We find no merit to any of the issues raised by Jackson; and therefore, we affirm. However, in affirming, we address the issue of whether the lower court erred in refusing to grant a peremptory instruction for a directed verdict after the State failed to establish venue of the crime. Jackson fathered two children by the victim's mother. The victim being the second of the two children. However, Jackson and the mother of his children never married each other. On April 15, 1987, for various reasons, the victim's mother asked Jackson *336 to keep the children overnight until a friend picked them up the next day. When Jackson arrived to take the children home with him, the victim said that she did not want to go with Jackson, began to cry and displayed unusual behavior. The mother then took the victim into another room of the house to talk with her about her behavior. The victim told her mother, "Mama, I think it's about time I tell you." At this time, the victim related to her mother that Jackson had engaged in sexual intercourse with her on several occasions. On the following morning, April 16, 1987, the mother reported the victim's recount of the sexual intercourse to the Welfare Department in Jackson. The victim then was taken to a physician for an examination. Various other reports and interviews were conducted by the appropriate authorities which we need not go into here with the exception that the victim, in a video interview, told a Warren County Deputy Sheriff that Jackson had sexual intercourse with her in November 1986 and three (3) times in January 1987 at his house on First North Street, as well as at the home of a friend of Jackson's. At trial the prosecutor put on several witnesses, including the victim and her mother, in order to establish the venue of the crime. Jackson argued, however, that the prosecution failed to prove the fact that the scene of the crime occurred in Warren County, Mississippi. Ruling on Jackson's motion for peremptory instruction, the trial court stated: On appeal, Jackson again argues that the prosecution failed to establish venue of the crime of which he was convicted. However, Jackson incorrectly relies on Jackson v. State, 246 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 1971), as basis for his argument for reversal. Unlike the case at bar, in Jackson the trial court took judicial notice that Tougaloo College was located in Madison County when, in fact, it is located in both Madison and Hinds Counties, and we correctly reversed. Here, the trial testimony reveals that the sexual battery occurred in Vicksburg by identifying specific street names unique to the surrounding community. Testimony from the investigative officer which the trial judge used as a basis to take judicial notice that Vicksburg is located within Warren County included: When the victim's mother was asked about the location of Jackson's friend house she testified: We find that the trial court correctly took judicial notice of the fact that the crime of sexual battery by Jackson occurred in Warren County, Mississippi. Vicksburg is located only in Warren County which is located in the State of Mississippi. We may take judicial notice that a certain town or city is in a certain county. See Rule 201(b), Miss.R.Ev.; Clark v. State, 230 Miss. 143, 92 So. 2d 452, 453 (Miss. 1957). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the lower court. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON and BLASS, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., dissent. PITTMAN, J., not participating. DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice, dissenting: It is not the justice of today's case on its merits with which I am concerned; instead, it is the gradual whittling away of the burden of proof of the State of Mississippi required in a criminal case. That burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, including the geographical location of the crime, called venue jurisdiction. Today's majority allows the establishing of venue as Warren County, Mississippi, by judicial knowledge, rather than proof. With this I must respectfully dissent., because our latest decision dealing with this subject is Jackson v. State (not the same Jackson here), 246 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 1971). The majority attempts to factually distinguish the Jackson case cited, contending that, in fact, Tougaloo College is located partially in Madison and Hinds Counties, Mississippi. This may or not be true, but having lived in the City of Jackson since 1947, I cannot take judicial knowledge of that fact, because I simply do not know that Tougaloo is so located in two counties. Be that as it may, the evil that the Jackson Court in 1971 was speaking to and reversed the case upon is the identical question in today's majority. The Court in Jackson (1971) stated: As in Jackson, the prosecution failed to prove the essential venue jurisdictional facts in this case: the county and state in which the violation took place. The record fails to show that the scene of the crime, First North Street, is situated in Warren County or in the State of Mississippi. When asked to take judicial knowledge of the fact that Tougaloo College is located in Madison County, the Jackson Court further held: Id. at 555. Here, as in Jackson, it is a "dangerous practice to invoke the doctrine of judicial knowledge in trying criminal cases before a jury." For this reason, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. SULLIVAN, J., joins this dissent.