Title: Stamp v. Windsor Power House Coal Company
Citation: 177 S.E.2d 146
Docket Number: CC881
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 1970

177 S.E.2d 146 (1970) Fred P. STAMP and Louise A. Stamp v. WINDSOR POWER HOUSE COAL COMPANY, a Corporation. No. CC881. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Submitted May 26, 1970. Decided June 23, 1970. Rehearing Denied November 13, 1970. *147 Schmidt, Laas, Schrader &amp; Miller, Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Thomas B. Miller, Richard M. Alker, Wheeling, for plaintiffs. Bachmann, Hess, Bachmann &amp; Garden, John L. Allen, Lester C. Hess, Jr., Wheeling, for defendant. BROWNING, President. This case arises from an action instituted on July 11, 1968, in the Circuit Court of Ohio County by Fred P. and Louise A. Stamp, appellees herein, against the Windsor Power House Coal Company, a corporation, appellant herein. Appellees purchased a certain 38-acre tract of land in Ohio County in 1954, and resided in a two-story brick house located thereon until October 26, 1966, when surface subsidence forced them to vacate the premises. Appellant is the owner of the Pittsburgh No. 8 seam of coal underlying appellees' property. Severance of the coal was completed in 1917 by appellant's predecessors in title. This seam of coal was conveyed by a prior deed containing the following language: The right to drill through said coal for oil, gas, coal and water is expressly reserved by said party of the first part, for herself, and her assigns, and also the right to mine and remove all coal under or below the Pittsburgh No. 8 vein, which is the coal conveyed by this deed, with the understanding, however, that such right shall not deprive the second *148 party herein of his right to remove all the coal conveyed by this deed, and shall further be exercised in a way so as not to interfere with the mining and removal of the coal hereby sold and conveyed. (Emphasis added.) On or about October 26, 1966, surface subsidence began on appellees' property, allegedly making their house unsafe to live in. Appellees instituted the aforementioned action alleging that because of appellant's "gross, wilfull and wanton negligence" in its mining operations, damages in the amount of $109,704.07 resulted. Appellant made a motion for a summary judgment on the ground that the appellees had waived their right to subjacent support in the severance deed and released the appellant from liability. This motion was denied, and the circuit court, on its own motion, on December 18, 1969, certified the following questions to this Court: This case was docketed by this Court upon the ruling of the trial court denying summary judgment upon the pleadings under the authority of Code, 58-5-2, as amended. This is what is generally referred to as a certified case, and we are limited to passing upon the questions of law adjudicated by the trial court and propounded by it to this Court. The law is well settled in this State that a party to a valid contract may in advance limit his liability for acts of negligence whether the subsequent action be based on contract or tort. Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W.Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225. The issue inherent in the first question certified has been the subject of much litigation in this State over a long period of years and, of course, in other jurisdictions where coal mining is extensive. It is the view of this Court that the ruling of the trial court on the first question certified was clearly erroneous. We do answer the first certified question: "It does." Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal &amp; Coke Co., 82 W.Va. 665, 97 S.E. 186, is indistinguishable from the present action. That, too, was an action against a coal company for damage to the surface alleged to have been caused by removal of an underlying vein of coal. This, insofar as pertinent, is a portion of the deed conveying the coal to the defendant in that case: *149 The trial court in that case sustained demurrers to each of the four counts of the declaration. This Court affirmed its action in so doing. In the third syllabus point of that case, the Court held that the foregoing language was "a clear, express and unequivocal waiver or release of the usual right to subjacent support." This Court has gone further and, in the third syllabus point of the controversial Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W.Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24, 34 held the following: This Court in that case emphasized and relied upon the use of the words "all of it" in arriving at its decision. Judge Cox, concurring in the decision of the Court, asked by what means a surface owner could "waive or exclude the benefit of the rule of law," sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes. He stated: In Simmers v. Star Coal &amp; Coke Co., 113 W.Va. 309, 167 S.E. 737, the Griffin case was approved. Judge Hatcher said for a unanimous Court: In Continental Coal v. Connellsville By-Products Coal Co., 104 W.Va. 44, 138 S.E. 737, the Court said: "We are not directed to any law or public policy which prohibits a land owner from selling subjacent support, although thereby his overlying minerals and surface may be damaged or destroyed. Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal &amp; Coke Co., 82 W.Va. 665, 97 S.E. 186. The legislature has not seen fit to act in that regard." See also Hall v. Harvey Coal &amp; Coke Co., 89 W.Va. 55, 108 S.E. 491, and the many other cases cited in the cases to which reference has heretofore been made. The Honorable Robert T. Donley, Professor of Law at the West Virginia University College of Law and a former Judge of this Court in his book, The Law of Coal, Oil and Gas in West Virginia and Virginia, at page 213, made this statement: In the more recent case of Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 134 W.Va. 387, 59 S.E.2d 655, it was held that a structure built upon the surface becomes a part of the *150 surface. That holding would seem to answer the contention that the plaintiffs could recover for damage to their dwelling house even though they could not recover for the subsidence of the land beneath it, i.e., the surface. The answer to the second certified question is not so simple. However, upon a careful review of the pertinent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that it also should have been answered in the affirmative, and we do answer the second certified question by the words: "It does." In the Griffin case, the second count of the declaration alleged, according to the trial judge's written opinion, that the defendant "through its agents, servants and employees entered said mine under the said premises and wrongfully and wilfully" performed such acts as caused damage to the surface of the land which was owned by the plaintiff. The Court nevertheless held that there could be no recovery of the damages. This Court, as presently constituted, does not necessarily approve of the holding in the Griffin case that a surface owner could not recover for a wilful or wanton act of those who were producing coal which they owned beneath the surface of the plaintiff's land. We are merely holding that the language of the instant deed precludes recovery for negligence. As to the third question certified, these statements are contained in 13 Michie's Jurisprudence under the subtitle "Degrees of Negligence or Care," at page 510: "The distinction between gross and ordinary negligence has been disapproved of as too vague and shadowy to be of any practical importance. * * * `Negligence' and `ordinary care' are correlative terms." West Virginia cases cited in the footnotes support this proposition. Therefore, the answer to the third certified question is: "It does." The judgment of the Circuit Court of Ohio County is reversed and the case is remanded. Reversed and remanded.