Title: Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v. Vos
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000622, 2019AP000614-LV
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2020

2020 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), 
Local 1,  
SEIU Healthcare Wisconsin, Milwaukee Area 
Service and  
Hospitality Workers, AFT-Wisconsin, Wisconsin 
Federation  
of Nurses and Health Professionals, Ramon 
Argandona, Peter  
Rickman, Amicar Zapata, Kim Kohlhaas, Jeffrey 
Myers,  
Andrew Felt, Candice Owley, Connie Smith and 
Janet Bewley, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Robin Vos, in his official capacity as Wisconsin 
Assembly  
Speaker, Roger Roth, in his official capacity as 
Wisconsin  
Senate President, Jim Steineke, in his official 
capacity  
as Wisconsin Assembly Majority Leader and Scott  
Fitzgerald, in his official capacity as 
Wisconsin Senate  
Majority Leader, 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
Josh Kaul, in his official capacity as Attorney 
General of  
the State of Wisconsin and Tony Evers, in his 
official  
capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Frank D. Remington   
 
 
 
 
 
2 
JUSTICES: 
 
The opinion of the court is being announced in two writings.  
HAGEDORN, J., delivered a majority opinion of the Court 
addressing all issues other than the provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 
369 concerning guidance documents.  This is a majority opinion 
of the Court with respect to Part II.E.2.-4., in which all 
Justices joined; and a majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I, II.A.-D., II.E.1., and III, in which 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, 
JJ., joined.  KELLY, J., delivered a majority opinion of the 
Court with respect to the provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369 
concerning guidance documents, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined.  ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. DALLET, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined. 
HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there were briefs filed by 
Misha Tseytlin and Troutman Sanders LLP, Chicago, Illinois, and 
Eric M. McLeod, Lisa M. Lawless and Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison. 
There was an oral argument by Misha Tseytlin. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Nicole G. Berner, Claire Prestel, John M. D’Elia and Service 
Employees International Union, Washington, D.C.; Timothy E. Hawks, 
Barbara Z. Quindel and Hawks Quindel, S.C., Milwaukee; Jeremy P. 
Levinson, Stacie H. Rosenzweig and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee; 
David Strom and American Federation of Teachers, Washington, D.C.; 
and Matthew Wessler and Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, D.C.  There 
was an oral argument by Matthew Wessler. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there were briefs filed by 
Lester A. Pines, Tamara B. Packard, Christa O. Westerberg, Leslie 
A. Freehill, Beauregard W. Patterson and Pines Bach LLP, Madison; 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, Thomas C. Bellavia, assistant 
 
 
3 
attorney general and Colin T. Roth, assistant attorney general.  
There was an oral argument by Joshua L. Kaul and Lester A. Pines. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin Law 
and Liberty, Inc. by Richard M. Esenberg, CJ Szafir, Lucas T. 
Vebber and Anthony LoCoco, Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce by Corydon J. Fish, Madison.   
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV302) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), 
Local 1, SEIU Healthcare Wisconsin, Milwaukee 
Area Service and Hospitality Workers, AFT-
Wisconsin, Wisconsin Federation of Nurses and 
Health Professionals, Ramon Argandona, Peter 
Rickman, Amicar Zapata, Kim Kohlhaas, Jeffrey 
Myers, Andrew Felt, Candice Owley, Connie Smith 
and Janet Bewley, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Robin Vos, in his official capacity as 
Wisconsin Assembly Speaker, Roger Roth, in his 
official capacity as Wisconsin Senate 
President, Jim Steineke, in his official 
capacity as Wisconsin Assembly Majority Leader 
and Scott Fitzgerald, in his official capacity 
as Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Josh Kaul, in his official capacity as Attorney 
General of the State of Wisconsin and Tony 
Evers, in his official capacity as Governor of 
the State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
The opinion of the court is being announced in two writings.  
HAGEDORN, J., delivered a majority opinion of the Court addressing 
 
2 
 
all issues other than the provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369 
concerning guidance documents.  This is a majority opinion of the 
Court with respect to Part II.E.2.-4., in which all Justices 
joined; and a majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts 
I, II.A.-D., II.E.1., and III, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined.  KELLY, J., 
delivered a majority opinion of the Court with respect to the 
provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369 concerning guidance documents, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., 
joined.  ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. DALLET, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court of Dane County, 
Frank D. Remington, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, injunction vacated in part, cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   Under our constitutional order, 
government derives its power solely from the people.  Government 
actors, therefore, only have the power the people consent to give 
them.  The Wisconsin Constitution is the authorizing charter for 
government power in Wisconsin.  And that document describes three—
—and only three——types of government power:  legislative, 
executive, and judicial.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. 
V, § 1; id. art. VII, § 2.  Legislative power is the power to make 
the law, to decide what the law should be.  Executive power is 
power to execute or enforce the law as enacted.  And judicial power 
is the power to interpret and apply the law to disputes between 
parties. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
3 
 
¶2 
The constitution then provides that each type of power 
is "vested" in a corresponding branch of government.  The 
legislative power is vested in two elected bodies——the senate and 
the assembly.  Id. art. IV, § 1.  The executive power is vested in 
the governor.  Id. art. V, § 1.  And the judicial power——being 
exercised in this very writing——is vested in a "unified court 
system" headed by the supreme court.  Id. art. VII, §§ 2-3.  With 
some exceptions, the general rule is that this diffusion of power 
into three separate branches creates a concomitant separation of 
powers requiring each branch to exercise only the power vested in 
it by the people of Wisconsin. 
¶3 
This case arises from enactment of 2017 Wis. Act 369 and 
2017 Wis. Act 370.  These acts were passed by the legislature and 
signed by the governor following the 2018 election, but before the 
newly elected legislature, governor, and attorney general were 
sworn into office.  In response, several labor organizations and 
individual taxpayers (the Plaintiffs) filed suit against the 
leaders of both houses of the legislature (the Legislative 
Defendants), the Governor, and the Attorney General.  The 
Plaintiffs broadly claimed that many of the enacted provisions 
violate the separation of powers.  In particular, the Plaintiffs 
argued these new laws either overly burden the executive branch or 
took executive power and gave it to the legislature. 
¶4 
The complaint unequivocally presents a facial attack on 
all the laws challenged.  That is, the Plaintiffs seek to strike 
down application of the challenged laws in their entirety, rather 
than as applied to a given party or set of circumstances.  Briefing 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
4 
 
below and to this court confirms this.  By presenting their 
challenge this way, the Plaintiffs face a tall task.  Under our 
well-established law, a facial challenge succeeds only when every 
single application of a challenged provision is unconstitutional. 
¶5 
The procedural history is a bit complicated, but in 
short, the Legislative Defendants moved to dismiss the entire 
complaint, which the circuit court denied in full.  In the same 
order, the circuit court granted a temporary injunction against 
enforcement of some of the provisions, most notably, laws requiring 
legislative approval of settlements by the attorney general, a 
provision allowing multiple suspensions of administrative rules, 
and a set of statutes defining and regulating administrative agency 
communications called "guidance documents."  We took jurisdiction 
of this case, and therefore review the circuit court's denial of 
the motion to dismiss and its partial grant of a temporary 
injunction. 
¶6 
The court's opinion in this case is being announced in 
two writings.  Justice Kelly's opinion constitutes the majority 
opinion of the court on all of the guidance document provisions.  
This writing constitutes the majority opinion of the court on all 
other issues raised in this case.   
¶7 
In light of the procedural posture of this case and the 
briefing before us, our analysis in this opinion rests on our 
review of the circuit court's denial of the Legislative Defendants' 
motion to dismiss.  Our task is to determine whether the complaint 
states a valid legal claim against the challenged laws assuming 
the allegations in the complaint are true.  Accordingly, this is 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
5 
 
purely a question of law and requires no factual development.  See 
infra, ¶26. 
¶8 
While the Legislative Defendants moved to dismiss the 
entire complaint, they have not sufficiently briefed or developed 
arguments regarding several challenged provisions.  Where the 
party seeking dismissal has not developed arguments on a legal 
issue, we will not develop arguments for them.  See infra, ¶24.  
Therefore, we offer no opinion on the merits of these undeveloped 
claims——none of which were enjoined by the circuit court——and they 
may proceed in the ordinary course of litigation on remand. 
¶9 
All of the enjoined claims, as well as several other 
related claims, were sufficiently briefed and argued.  We conclude 
that with respect to each of these claims, other than those 
separately addressed in Justice Kelly's opinion for the court, the 
Plaintiffs have not met their high burden to demonstrate that the 
challenged provisions are unconstitutional in all of their 
applications.  Each of these provisions can be lawfully enforced 
as enacted in at least some circumstances.  Accordingly, the motion 
to dismiss the facial challenges to these claims should have been 
granted.  This therefore means the temporary injunction is vacated 
in full except as otherwise instructed in Justice Kelly's opinion 
for the court. 
¶10 Specifically, the provisions regarding legislative 
involvement in litigation through intervention and settlement 
approval authority in certain cases prosecuted or defended by the 
attorney general are facially constitutional.  The legislature may 
have an institutional interest in litigation implicating the 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
6 
 
public purse or in cases arising from its statutorily granted right 
to request the attorney general's participation in litigation.  
These institutional interests are sufficient to allow at least 
some constitutional applications of these laws, and the facial 
challenge asking us to declare the laws unenforceable under any 
circumstances necessarily fails. 
¶11 In a similar vein, the provision permitting legislative 
committee review of any proposed changes to security at the State 
Capitol has at least some constitutional applications with respect 
to security of legislative space.  It follows that a facial 
challenge to this provision must fail. 
¶12 Likewise, the provision allowing multiple suspensions of 
administrative rules plainly has constitutional applications under 
Martinez v. DILHR, where we held that one three-month suspension 
is constitutionally permissible.  165 Wis. 2d 687, 702, 478 
N.W.2d 582 (1992).  No party asks us to revisit Martinez or its 
principles.  We conclude that if one three-month suspension passes 
constitutional muster, two three-month suspensions surely does as 
well.  Therefore, the facial challenge to this provision fails. 
¶13 Finally, the provision partially codifying our holding 
in Tetra Tech is also clearly constitutional in many, if not all, 
applications.  Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.  The facial challenge to this provision 
cannot survive. 
¶14 With this summary in view, our analysis begins with how 
we got here. 
 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
7 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶15 In December 2018, both houses of the Wisconsin 
legislature passed and the governor signed into law 2017 Wis. Act 
369 and 2017 Wis. Act 370.  The specific provisions challenged——
because there are many——will be discussed in more detail below.  
For now, we give a high-level overview of the somewhat complicated 
procedural posture. 
¶16 Two months after Act 369 and Act 370 became law——and 
after the new legislature, governor, and attorney general were 
sworn in——the Plaintiffs brought the complaint underlying this 
appeal in Dane County Circuit Court.1  They sued the Legislative 
Defendants,2 Attorney General Josh Kaul, and Governor Tony Evers—
—all in their official capacities.  The complaint sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of numerous 
                                                 
1 The Plaintiffs are:  Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU), Local 1; SEIU Healthcare Wisconsin; Milwaukee Area Service 
and Hospital Workers; AFT-Wisconsin; Wisconsin Federation of 
Nurses and Health Professionals; Ramon Argandona; Peter Rickman; 
Amicar Zapata; Kim Kohlhaas; Jeffrey Myers; Andrew Felt; Candice 
Owley; Connie Smith; and Janet Bewley. 
The Honorable Frank D. Remington, Dane County Circuit Court, 
presided. 
2 The Legislative Defendants, all sued in their official 
capacities, are:  Wisconsin Assembly Speaker Robin Vos; Wisconsin 
Senate President Roger Roth; Wisconsin Assembly Majority Leader 
Jim Steineke; and Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader Scott 
Fitzgerald. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
8 
 
provisions of these acts.  Concurrent with the filing of their 
complaint, the Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary injunction.3 
¶17 The Legislative Defendants responded with a motion to 
dismiss the entire complaint, arguing all challenged provisions 
were consistent with the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶18 Although a defendant in his official capacity, the 
Governor supported the Plaintiffs' arguments and took them a step 
further.  The Governor brought his own motion for a temporary 
injunction seeking to enjoin additional provisions not raised in 
the Plaintiffs' temporary injunction motion.4  The Governor also 
filed a cross-claim joining the complaint in full and requesting 
his own declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the 
additional provisions he sought to enjoin.5 
¶19 The Attorney General was also sued in his official 
capacity, but did not render a substantive defense of the laws.  
Rather, the Attorney General largely supported the Plaintiffs, and 
                                                 
3 The Plaintiffs' motion was styled as a request for a 
temporary restraining order; however, the circuit court, by 
agreement of the parties, construed the motion as one for a 
temporary injunction. 
4 The Governor's motion was similarly titled a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and construed as a motion for a 
temporary injunction. 
5 We observe that the Governor, who was sued in his official, 
not personal, capacity, signed these bills into law.  We leave for 
another day whether the governor of Wisconsin may sue the 
legislature over laws that the legislature passed, and here, ones 
the governor himself in his official capacity signed into law.  We 
also leave for another day whether the legislature may be sued by 
the governor for passing laws the governor at some point thereafter 
believes are inconsistent with the constitution. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
9 
 
asked the circuit court to strike down multiple laws impacting his 
authority. 
¶20 On March 25, 2019, the circuit court heard arguments on 
all pending motions, and it provided its decision and order the 
following day.  The circuit court denied in full the Legislative 
Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.  It also granted the 
motions for temporary injunction in part and denied them in part.  
The laws enjoined concern legislative involvement in state-related 
litigation; the ability of the Joint Committee for Review of 
Administrative Rules to suspend an administrative rule multiple 
times; and various provisions regarding a newly defined category 
of agency communications called guidance documents.6 
¶21 The Legislative Defendants then sought appellate review 
of both the denial of the motion to dismiss and the order granting 
                                                 
6 The circuit court enjoined the following sections:  2017 
Wis. Act 369, § 26 (Wis. Stat. § 165.08(1) (2017-18)); § 30 (Wis. 
Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1.); § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)); § 33 
(Wis. Stat. § 227.05); § 38 (Wis. Stat. § 227.112); § 64 (Wis. 
Stat. § 227.26(2)(im)); § 65 (Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1)); § 66 (Wis. 
Stat. § 227.40(2)(intro.)); § 67 (Wis. Stat. § 227.40(2)(e)); § 68 
(Wis. Stat. § 227.40(3)(ag)); § 69 (Wis. Stat. § 227.40(3)(ar)); 
§ 70 (Wis. Stat. § 227.40(3)(b) & (c)); § 71 (Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(4)(a)); and §§ 104-05. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
10 
 
injunctive relief.7  On April 19, 2019, this court assumed 
jurisdiction over the appeal of the temporary injunction.  And on 
June 11, 2019, we assumed jurisdiction over and granted the 
Legislative Defendants' interlocutory appeal of the denial of the 
motion to dismiss.  On the same date, we issued an order imposing 
a stay on the temporary injunction issued by the circuit court 
with respect to all but one provision.8 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Scope of Review 
¶22 Because of the procedural posture of this case, we have 
two categories of claims before us.  The first category comprises 
claims raised by the Plaintiffs in their complaint and challenged 
by the Legislative Defendants' in their motion to dismiss the 
entire complaint.  Some of these were enjoined by the circuit 
court, some were not.  But the motion to dismiss, which includes 
all issues raised in the complaint, is before us on review. 
¶23 The second category of claims are new issues raised in 
the Governor's cross-claim and in the Governor's motion for a 
temporary injunction.  These are, with one exception, not properly 
                                                 
7 Originally, the Legislative Defendants filed one appeal 
requesting review of both the denial of the motion to dismiss and 
the order granting injunctive relief.  However, this appeal was 
split into two separate appeals——No. 2019AP622 is the appeal as of 
right from the temporary injunction while No. 2019AP614-LV is the 
petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the circuit 
court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 
8 We did not stay the circuit court's temporary injunction of 
2017 Wis. Act 369, § 38 with respect to Wis. Stat. § 227.112(7)(a). 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
11 
 
before us on review.  The exception is 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 33 
(Wis. Stat. § 227.05), a guidance document provision addressed in 
Justice Kelly's opinion for the court. 
¶24 Although the Legislative Defendants seek dismissal of 
the entire complaint, several provisions challenged by the 
Plaintiffs either were not argued at all or were only perfunctorily 
raised in briefing before us.  We do not step out of our neutral 
role to develop or construct arguments for parties; it is up to 
them to make their case.  State v. Pal, 2017 WI 44, ¶26, 374 
Wis. 2d 759, 893 N.W.2d 848.  If they fail to do so, we may decline 
to entertain those issues.  See State v. Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, ¶42, 
374 
Wis. 2d 98, 
892 
N.W.2d 682 
("We 
dismiss 
Lepsch's 
argument . . . as 
undeveloped."). 
 
Because 
the 
Legislative 
Defendants failed to set forth sufficient arguments on several 
challenged provisions, these claims may proceed in the ordinary 
course of litigation on remand.  We express no opinion on the 
merits of those claims.9 
¶25 This opinion therefore addresses only the provisions 
properly raised in the complaint and substantively argued in the 
circuit court and before us.  Accordingly, we will address all 
                                                 
9 Provisions raised in the complaint that we do not address 
are 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 87 (Wis. Stat. § 238.399(3)(am)); 2017 
Wis. Act 370, § 10 (Wis. Stat. § 20.940), and § 11 (Wis. Stat. 
§ 49.175(2)(a)).  In the course of briefing, the parties reference 
many additional and often related provisions.  We similarly decline 
to opine on any additional provisions not explicitly addressed in 
either this or Justice Kelly's opinion for the court. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
12 
 
claims enjoined by the circuit court along with several additional 
provisions not enjoined but nonetheless argued by the parties. 
 
B.  Standard of Review 
¶26 A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint.  Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, 
¶19, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693.  For purposes of our review, 
we treat all allegations in the complaint as true.  Id., ¶18.  
"However, legal conclusions asserted in a complaint are not 
accepted, and legal conclusions are insufficient to withstand a 
motion to dismiss."  Id.  Thus, our focus is on the factual 
allegations, not on any additional claims or arguments asserted by 
the parties.  We then determine whether the facts alleged in the 
complaint state a viable cause of action.  This is a legal question 
we review de novo, and one requiring no further factual 
development.  Id., ¶17. 
¶27 Granting injunctive relief is a discretionary decision 
that we review for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Werner v. 
A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 259 N.W.2d 310 
(1977).  Here, we conclude the circuit court should have granted 
the motion to dismiss with respect to the enjoined provisions 
discussed in this opinion and direct it to do.  By necessity, the 
temporary injunction based on these to-be-dismissed claims must be 
vacated as well. 
¶28 This case raises questions requiring interpretation of 
constitutional and statutory provisions.  These are questions of 
law we review de novo.  League of Women Voters of Wis. v. Evers, 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
13 
 
2019 WI 75, ¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209.  It is the text 
of statutes that reflects the policy choices of the legislature, 
and therefore "statutory interpretation focus[es] primarily on the 
language of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
The text of the constitution reflects the policy choices of the 
people, and therefore constitutional interpretation similarly 
focuses primarily on the language of the constitution.  See League 
of Women Voters, 387 Wis. 2d 511, ¶¶16-18.  "It is the enacted 
law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."10  
State ex rel. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44. 
¶29 Our analysis begins in Part C with an overview of the 
separation of powers under the Wisconsin Constitution.  In Part D, 
we address the standards governing facial and as-applied 
challenges.  Finally, in Part E, we apply these principles claim 
by claim. 
 
                                                 
10 For this reason, in statutory interpretation, we generally 
do not resort to extrinsic aids like legislative history unless 
the statute is ambiguous.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
Resort to these extrinsic aids is likewise unnecessary where 
the constitutional text is plain.  See League of Women Voters of 
Wis. v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209 
(determining a historical review was unnecessary because the 
meaning of the constitutional text was clear).  But where 
necessary, helpful extrinsic aids may include the practices at the 
time the constitution was adopted, debates over adoption of a given 
provision, and early legislative interpretation as evidenced by 
the first laws passed following the adoption.  See State v. City 
of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
14 
 
C.  Separation of Powers Under the Wisconsin Constitution 
¶30 "If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary."  The Federalist No. 
51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).  James 
Madison's sober assessment of human nature and government power 
was rooted in the reality that fear of tyranny was not far from 
the men who risked their lives in the service of liberty.  It was 
these men who drafted our country's Constitution and established 
a system where power is diffused to different branches.  We are 
more than two centuries into the American constitutional 
experiment, but the separation of powers is not an anachronism 
from a bygone era.  Our founders believed the separation of powers 
was not just important, but the central bulwark of our liberty.  
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("The Framers of the Federal Constitution . . . viewed 
the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central 
guarantee of a just Government."). 
¶31 The Wisconsin Constitution, adopted in 1848, was born of 
these same beliefs.  Government power is divided into three 
separate branches, each "vested" with a specific core government 
power.  Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384.  By "vesting" the respective powers, 
our constitution "clothe[s]" that branch with the corresponding 
power; each branch is "put in possession of" a specific 
governmental power.  Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1828).  "The legislative power shall be vested 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
15 
 
in a senate and assembly"; "The executive power shall be vested in 
a governor"; and "The judicial power of this state shall be vested 
in a unified court system."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. V, 
§ 1; id. art. VII, § 2.  To exercise this vested power, the 
legislature is tasked with the enactment of laws; the governor is 
instructed to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 
and courts are empowered to adjudicate civil and criminal disputes 
pursuant to the law.  Id. art. IV, § 17; id. art. V, § 4; id. art. 
VII, §§ 3, 5, 8, 14. 
¶32 While the separation of powers is easy to understand in 
theory, it carries with it not-insignificant complications.  
Notably, the Wisconsin Constitution itself sometimes takes 
portions of one kind of power and gives it to another branch.  For 
example, the governor is granted the power "to convene the 
legislature on extraordinary occasions" and is required to 
"communicate to the legislature, at every session, the condition 
of the state, and recommend such matters to them for their 
consideration as he may deem expedient."  Id. art. V, § 4.  And 
while the legislature generally makes the law, the supreme court 
has authority over the practice of law, which requires us to 
establish normative rules and guidelines that, although not 
legislation as such, have the same prescriptive effect.  Id. art. 
VII, § 3(1); see also Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (detailing the supreme 
court's authority to "regulate pleading, practice, and procedure 
in judicial proceedings in all courts"); Rao v. WMA Sec., Inc., 
2008 WI 73, ¶35, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 220 ("A rule adopted 
by this court in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 751.12 is numbered 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
16 
 
as a statute, is printed in the Wisconsin Statutes, may be amended 
by both the court and the legislature, has been described by this 
court as 'a statute promulgated under this court's rule-making 
authority,' and has the force of law." (footnotes omitted)). 
¶33 That said, these are exceptions to the default rule that 
legislative power is to be exercised by the legislative branch, 
executive power is to be exercised by the executive branch, and 
judicial power is to be exercised by the judicial branch.  "The 
Wisconsin constitution creates three separate co-ordinate branches 
of government, no branch subordinate to the other, no branch to 
arrogate to itself control over the other except as is provided by 
the constitution, and no branch to exercise the power committed by 
the constitution to another."  State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 
42, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982). 
¶34 Nevertheless, determining "where the functions of one 
branch end and those of another begin" is not always easy.  Id. at 
42-43.  Thus, we have described two categories of powers within 
each branch——exclusive or core powers, and shared powers.  See 
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶30. 
¶35 A separation-of-powers analysis ordinarily begins by 
determining if the power in question is core or shared.  Core 
powers are understood to be the powers conferred to a single branch 
by the constitution.  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 
N.W.2d 772 (1999).  If a power is core, "no other branch may take 
it up and use it as its own."  Tetra Tech, 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶48 
(Kelly, J.).  Shared powers are those that "lie at the 
intersections of these exclusive core constitutional powers."  
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
17 
 
Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 643.  "The branches may exercise power within 
these borderlands but no branch may unduly burden or substantially 
interfere with another branch."  Id. at 644 (citing State ex rel. 
Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 
N.W.2d 32 (1995) (per curiam)). 
¶36 This legal framework is our starting point, but it must 
be filtered through the type of challenge before us.  The 
Plaintiffs brought what is known as a facial challenge to all the 
statutory provisions in dispute.  This is key to our disposition 
of the issues before us, and worthy of some extended examination. 
 
D.  Facial and As-Applied Challenges 
¶37 Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are 
generally defined in two manners:  as-applied and facial.  League 
of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 
¶13, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302.  As-applied challenges 
address a specific application of the statute against the 
challenging party.  Id.  With that focus, the reviewing court 
considers the facts of the particular case in front of it to 
determine whether the challenging party has shown that the 
constitution was actually violated by the way the law was applied 
in that situation.  Id. 
¶38 In a facial challenge, however, the challenging party 
claims that the law is unconstitutional on its face——that is, it 
operates unconstitutionally in all applications.  Id.  We have 
repeatedly reaffirmed that to successfully challenge a law on its 
face, the challenging party must show that the statute cannot be 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
18 
 
enforced "under any circumstances."  Id.; see also State v. Wood, 
2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 ("If a challenger 
succeeds in a facial attack on a law, the law is void 'from its 
beginning to the end.'" (quoted source omitted)).11 
¶39 This is no small wall to scale.  Proving a legislative 
enactment cannot ever be enforced constitutionally "is the most 
difficult of constitutional challenges" and an "uphill endeavor."  
League of Women Voters, 357 Wis. 2d 360, ¶15; State v. Dennis H., 
2002 WI 104, ¶5, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851. 
¶40 The United States Supreme Court has described facial 
challenges as "disfavored," and the type of constitutional attack 
                                                 
11 See also Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, 
¶29, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 (explaining "the standard for 
a facial challenge" is that the law "'cannot be constitutionally 
enforced' . . . 'under 
any 
circumstances'" 
(quoted 
source 
omitted)); Soc'y Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶26, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 
786 N.W.2d 385 ("[A] facial constitutional challenge attacks the 
law itself as drafted by the legislature, claiming the law is void 
from 
its 
beginning 
to 
the 
end 
and 
that 
it 
cannot 
be 
constitutionally enforced under any circumstances . . . ."); State 
v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶30, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 ("A 
'facial' challenge to the constitutionality of a statute means 
that the 'challenger must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that there are no possible applications or interpretations of the 
statute which would be constitutional.'" (quoted source omitted)). 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
19 
 
that raises the risk of judicial overreach.12  Wash. State Grange 
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).  This 
is so in part because claims of facial invalidity often rest on 
speculation about what might occur in the future.  Id.  They raise 
the serious risk of calling on courts to interpret statutes 
prematurely and decide legal questions before they must be decided.  
Id. at 450-51.  Striking down a law facially "threaten[s] to short 
circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the 
will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent 
with the Constitution."  Id. at 451.  Thus, caution in the face of 
a facial challenge shows due respect to the other branches of 
government——allowing the legislature to legislate and the 
executive to execute——which gives them space to carry out their 
own constitutional duties. 
¶41 And beyond respect for other branches, facial challenges 
raise the risk of the judiciary overstepping its own constitutional 
authority.  The United States Supreme Court has explained the 
solemnity of exercising the judicial power:   
                                                 
12 This court has previously acknowledged that requiring 
facial challenges to show a law cannot be enforced "under any 
circumstances" mirrors the standard enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 
(1987).  League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. 
Walker, 2014 WI 97, ¶15, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302; see also 
id., ¶60 n.1 (Crooks, J., concurring) (citing Salerno as the 
applicable framework of law for facial challenges).  In Salerno, 
the Court explained that "[a] facial challenge to a legislative 
Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."  481 
U.S. at 745. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
20 
 
This Court, as is the case with all federal courts, "has 
no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a 
State 
or 
of 
the 
United 
States, 
void, 
because 
irreconcilable with the constitution, except as it is 
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in 
actual controversies.  In the exercise of that 
jurisdiction, it is bound by two rules, to which it has 
rigidly adhered:  one, never to anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is to be applied."  Kindred to 
these rules is the rule that one to whom application of 
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack 
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also 
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations 
in which its application might be unconstitutional. 
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (citation omitted). 
¶42 Judicial modesty, then, counsels that "courts should not 
nullify more of a . . . law than necessary."  Wash. State Grange, 
552 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted).  It also ensures that courts 
stay 
in 
their 
lane 
by 
prohibiting 
only 
unconstitutional 
applications 
of 
laws. 
 
If 
a 
law 
can 
only 
be 
applied 
unconstitutionally, it is our duty to say so.  But if it can be 
applied constitutionally, it would be an overstep on our part to 
strike 
down 
a 
legislative 
enactment 
with 
constitutional 
applications.13 
                                                 
13 In her partial dissent, Justice Dallet suggests that 
subjecting broad statutes to piecemeal, as-applied litigation 
invites this court to engage in policymaking.  Justice Dallet's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶178-179.  Quite the contrary.  Requiring a 
party to prove a law is unconstitutionally applied to the facts of 
a given case is precisely how as-applied challenges work.  Our 
decision here invites no more policymaking than any other as-
applied challenge that a court entertains.  Justice Dallet's 
alternative proposal to sweep aside more of a law than is necessary 
to quickly settle a matter is not, by any definition, a more modest 
route. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
21 
 
¶43 It is with this understanding and appreciation of a 
modest judicial power that this court has continually required a 
party bringing a facial challenge to prove that the statute cannot 
be constitutionally enforced "under any circumstances."  This has 
not been a principle selectively applied; it is not optional.14  
Parties casting the widest possible net and seeking the broadest 
possible remedy must make the maximum possible showing. 
¶44 At oral argument, the Attorney General asserted that 
this standard should not apply to the laws affecting him because 
the facial challenge doctrine is applied only in cases involving 
private litigants.  The Attorney General described the doctrine as 
a matter of standing, and claimed that because every controversy 
                                                 
14 The United States Supreme Court has recognized the validity 
of facial challenges premised on general claims of statutory 
overbreadth; however, the circumstances in which such challenges 
may be raised are very limited and not applicable here.  See Sabri 
v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004).  This court has 
taken a similar approach.  See State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 
305, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998) ("With the exception of a challenge 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a 
party does not have standing to raise a facial challenge that a 
statute is overbroad."). 
In the face of our precedent, Justice Dallet dispenses with 
well-established law and instead chooses to adopt and apply the 
overbreadth standard to two legislative approval provisions.  As 
an initial matter, Justice Dallet raises this sua sponte; no party 
argued that we should adopt overbreadth in place of our standard 
facial challenge framework.  Moreover, in a case with many 
separation-of-powers questions, Justice Dallet does not argue that 
this new standard should apply across the board.  It is unclear 
why.  One is left to surmise that Justice Dallet's approach is a 
tacit, if not explicit, admission that current law does not support 
her conclusion on these issues.  We see no need to change our law 
to fit this case.  We will stick with and apply the law as it 
exists.  
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
22 
 
arising from the legislative approval provisions would involve the 
same public parties, the traditionally recognized concerns with 
facial-challenge adjudication are not at issue here.  Hence, the 
Attorney General contends these provisions may be facially 
challenged because every application will implicate his office and 
interested parties in the legislature.  No such argument was made 
in briefing.  And when pressed for supporting authority at oral 
argument, the Attorney General cited only to our decision in 
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147. 
¶45 Gabler plainly does not stand for the propositions 
advanced by the Attorney General.  In that case, the Crime Victims 
Rights Board issued a decision that Judge Gabler had violated a 
victim's constitutional right to speedy disposition of the 
proceedings. 
 
Id., ¶21. 
 
Judge 
Gabler 
challenged 
the 
constitutionality of certain provisions under Wis. Stat. ch. 950 
as they applied to judges.  Id., ¶29.  We agreed with him that the 
provisions could never be constitutionally applied against judges.  
Id., ¶60.  In so doing, we recognized that the label of a 
challenging party's claim "is not what matters"; rather it is the 
"claim and the relief that would follow" that dictate the relevant 
standard of constitutional review.  Id., ¶¶28-29 (quoting Doe v. 
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010)).  The statutory challenge in Gabler 
included characteristics of both a facial and an as-applied claim.  
Id., ¶29.  Namely, Judge Gabler sought to invalidate the challenged 
provisions insofar as they could ever be applied against judges——
that is, he brought a broad challenge to a specific category of 
applications.  Id., ¶29.  In a challenge of this kind, we explained 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
23 
 
that the challenging party is still required to demonstrate that, 
as to the specific category of applications, the statute could not 
be constitutionally enforced under any circumstances.  Id.  Judge 
Gabler had to show that the provisions could never be 
constitutionally applied against judges, even if it could be 
constitutionally applied to others.  The statutory provisions in 
Gabler were neither challenged nor struck down in their entirety.  
In no way did our decision change the basic difference between a 
facial and an as-applied challenge. 
¶46 In contrast, under the Attorney General's theory, so 
long as the relief requested does not reach beyond the parties 
before the court, a facial challenge can be subject to a more 
lenient standard of constitutional review.  The Attorney General's 
approach would allow a court to order far broader relief than 
necessary to alleviate any unconstitutional applications of the 
law simply because litigation involves the same two public parties. 
¶47 The Attorney General has acknowledged the existence of 
constitutional applications of the challenged provisions (more on 
this below), yet still asks that we strike down the laws in their 
entirety.  As we have explained, this is contrary to an appropriate 
exercise of judicial power.  The facial versus as-applied 
distinction is not merely a question of standing or whether the 
parties are public or private litigants.  It goes to the 
appropriate reach of the judicial power to say what the law is, 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
24 
 
and to craft a remedy appropriately tailored to any constitutional 
violation.15 
¶48 In short, our law is clear and of long standing.  A 
facial challenge requires a showing that all applications of the 
law are unconstitutional.  It is the burden of the party bringing 
the challenge to prove this.  And to the extent a party challenges 
the application of a law, it is the burden of that party to show 
that the specific application or category of applications is 
unconstitutional. 
¶49 Before us, no arguments have been developed by any party 
setting forth challenges to specific applications or categories of 
applications.  The parties arguing against the constitutionality 
of the provisions ask that we prohibit enforcement of the laws in 
their entirety.  Therefore, we analyze each of the challenged 
provisions as facial challenges. 
 
E.  Application to Challenged Provisions 
1.  Legislative Involvement in Litigation 
¶50 Several challenged provisions give the legislature or 
its committees power to participate in litigation involving the 
State.  As a general rule, prior to 2017 Wis. Act 369, Wisconsin 
law authorized the attorney general to represent the State in 
                                                 
15 Furthermore, the default rule in Wisconsin is that statutes 
are severable.  See Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11) ("If any provision of 
the statutes or of a session law is invalid, or the application of 
either to any person or circumstance is invalid, such invalidity 
shall not affect other provisions or applications which can be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application."). 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
25 
 
litigation and to settle cases in the State's best interest.  
Provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369 substantially changed that.  See 
§ 5 (Wis. Stat. § 13.365); § 26 (Wis. Stat. § 165.08(1)); § 30 
(Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1.); and § 97 (Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m)). 
¶51 Previously, the legislature had limited power to 
intervene in litigation.  Now, Wis. Stat. § 13.365 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09(2m) give three state legislative committees, each acting 
on behalf of a particular legislative entity——the assembly, the 
senate, and the whole legislature, respectively——the power to 
intervene in an action in state or federal court when a party 
argues a state statute is unconstitutional or "preempted by federal 
law," "or otherwise challenges [the statute's] construction or 
validity."16 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 13.365 provides:   
Pursuant to [Wis. Stat. §] 803.09(2m), when a party to 
an action challenges in state or federal court the 
constitutionality of a statute, facially or as applied, 
challenges a statute as violating or preempted by 
federal law, or otherwise challenges the construction or 
validity of a statute, as part of a claim or affirmative 
defense:   
(1) The committee on assembly organization may intervene 
at any time in the action on behalf of the assembly.  
The committee on assembly organization may obtain legal 
counsel other than from the department of justice, with 
the cost of representation paid from the appropriation 
under [Wis. Stat. §] 20.765(1)(a), to represent the 
assembly in any action in which the assembly intervenes. 
(2) The committee on senate organization may intervene 
at any time in the action on behalf of the senate.  The 
committee on senate organization may obtain legal 
counsel other than from the department of justice, with 
the cost of representation paid from the appropriation 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
26 
 
¶52 In addition, prior to Act 369, the attorney general had 
the power in many cases to settle litigation impacting the State 
as he thought in the best interest of the State.  In Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.08(1) and Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1., much of that 
unilateral power has been removed and is now subject to legislative 
approval. 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.08(1) provides that the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), the agency headed by the attorney general, cannot 
settle or discontinue a case prosecuted by the attorney general 
unless either the legislative intervenor approves, or if the 
legislature has not intervened, DOJ receives approval from the 
                                                 
under [Wis. Stat. §] 20.765(1)(b), to represent the 
senate in any action in which the senate intervenes. 
(3) The joint committee on legislative organization may 
intervene at any time in the action on behalf of the 
legislature.  The joint committee on legislative 
organization may obtain legal counsel other than from 
the 
department 
of 
justice, 
with 
the 
cost 
of 
representation paid from the appropriation under [Wis. 
Stat. §] 20.765(1)(a) or (b), as determined by the 
cochairpersons, to represent the legislature in any 
action in which the joint committee on legislative 
organization intervenes. 
While Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) states:   
When a party to an action challenges in state or federal 
court the constitutionality of a statute, facially or as 
applied, challenges a statute as violating or preempted 
by federal law, or otherwise challenges the construction 
or validity of a statute, as part of a claim or 
affirmative defense, the assembly, the senate, and the 
legislature may intervene as set forth under [Wis. Stat. 
§] 13.365 at any time in the action as a matter of right 
by serving a motion upon the parties as provided in [Wis. 
Stat. §] 801.14. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
27 
 
Joint Committee on Finance (JFC).  Further, if DOJ wishes to 
concede the validity of a statute, "it must first get permission 
from the joint committee on legislative organization before asking 
the joint committee on finance."  § 165.08(1).17 
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1. amends the power of the 
attorney general to settle actions seeking injunctive relief or 
involving a proposed consent decree.  In such cases, the attorney 
general must obtain the approval of any legislative intervenor.  
If no legislative entity has intervened, the new law establishes 
a multi-phase approval process with JFC.  DOJ must first submit a 
plan to JFC.  The JFC co-chairs, in turn, have 14 working days to 
notify the attorney general that the committee will meet to review 
the plan.  If the attorney general receives notification from the 
committee of a meeting, the attorney general is required to obtain 
permission from JFC in order to settle.  Moreover, the attorney 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.08(1) states:   
Any civil action prosecuted by the department by 
direction of any officer, department, board, or 
commission, or any civil action prosecuted by the 
department on the initiative of the attorney general, or 
at the request of any individual may be compromised or 
discontinued with the approval of an intervenor under 
[Wis. Stat. §] 803.09(2m) or, if there is no intervenor, 
by submission of a proposed plan to the joint committee 
on finance for the approval of the committee.  The 
compromise or discontinuance may occur only if the joint 
committee on finance approves the proposed plan.  No 
proposed plan may be submitted to the joint committee on 
finance if the plan concedes the unconstitutionality or 
other invalidity of a statute, facially or as applied, 
or concedes that a statute violates or is preempted by 
federal law, without the approval of the joint committee 
on legislative organization. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
28 
 
general 
cannot 
submit 
a 
plan 
that 
concedes 
"the 
unconstitutionality or other invalidity of a statute, facially or 
as applied, or concedes that a statute violates or is preempted by 
federal law," without first getting approval from the Joint 
Committee on Legislative Organization.  § 165.25(6)(a)1.18 
                                                 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1. now provides:   
At the request of the head of any department of state 
government, the attorney general may appear for and 
defend any state department, or any state officer, 
employee, or agent of the department in any civil action 
or 
other 
matter 
brought 
before 
a 
court 
or 
an 
administrative agency which is brought against the state 
department, or officer, employee, or agent for or on 
account of any act growing out of or committed in the 
lawful course of an officer's, employee's, or agent's 
duties.  Witness fees or other expenses determined by 
the attorney general to be reasonable and necessary to 
the defense in the action or proceeding shall be paid as 
provided for in [Wis. Stat. §] 885.07.  The attorney 
general may compromise and settle the action as the 
attorney general determines to be in the best interest 
of the state except that, if the action is for injunctive 
relief or there is a proposed consent decree, the 
attorney general may not compromise or settle the action 
without the approval of an intervenor under [Wis. Stat. 
§] 803.09(2m) or, if there is no intervenor, without 
first submitting a proposed plan to the joint committee 
on finance.  If, within 14 working days after the plan 
is submitted, the cochairpersons of the committee notify 
the attorney general that the committee has scheduled a 
meeting for the purpose of reviewing the proposed plan, 
the attorney general may compromise or settle the action 
only with the approval of the committee.  The attorney 
general may not submit a proposed plan to the joint 
committee on finance under this subdivision in which the 
plan 
concedes 
the 
unconstitutionality 
or 
other 
invalidity of a statute, facially or as applied, or 
concedes that a statute violates or is preempted by 
federal law, without the approval of the joint committee 
on legislative organization. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
29 
 
¶55 The Plaintiffs argue (and the Governor and Attorney 
General agree) that this takes a core executive power and gives it 
to the legislature in violation of the separation of powers.19  
Specifically, they maintain that such a requirement impermissibly 
limits the governor's duty to "take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed."  Wis. Const. art. V, § 4.  If deemed a shared 
power, the Plaintiffs and Attorney General argue that these 
provisions substantially burden the executive branch in violation 
of the separation of powers.  The Legislative Defendants offer two 
main defenses, and we take each in turn. 
¶56 First, the Legislative Defendants argue these provisions 
are constitutional because the attorney general has no inherent 
constitutional powers, and the powers that are statutorily granted 
are therefore entirely subject to legislative modification.  With 
this, they argue that because the attorney general is not the 
governor (whom the Wisconsin Constitution specifically "vests" 
with the executive power), any modifications to the attorney 
general's power cannot implicate the separation of powers. 
¶57 We disagree.  Our constitution describes only three 
types of power——legislative, executive, and judicial.  When 
pressed to say at oral argument what exactly the attorney general 
is doing if not executing the law, the Legislative Defendants had 
no good answer.  There is none.  The attorney general is assuredly 
                                                 
19 "Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, 
is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them."  Koschkee 
v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 
(quoting Schuette v. Van De Hey, 205 Wis. 2d 475, 480-81, 556 
N.W.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
30 
 
a member of the executive branch whose duties consist in executing 
the law. 
¶58 The constitution itself plainly acknowledges officers 
other than the governor who may permissibly deploy executive power.  
Article IV, Section 28 requires "Members of the legislature, and 
all officers, executive and judicial, except such inferior 
officers as may be by law exempted," to take an oath before 
entering upon the duties of their office.  Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 28 (emphasis added).  The only fair reading of this is that there 
are other executive officers besides the governor. 
¶59 Article VI of the constitution covers administrative 
officers.  This article establishes three statewide officers——the 
secretary of state, the treasurer, and the attorney general.  
Id. art. VI, §§ 2, 3.  It also establishes various county officers, 
including coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys, 
sheriffs, and chief executive officers.  Id. art. VI, § 4.  But 
these administrative officers do not constitute a separate 
"administrative" branch of government carrying out something 
called "administrative" power.  We have repeatedly recognized that 
the constitution describes only three types of government power 
and creates only three branches of government.  Panzer v. Doyle, 
2004 WI 52, ¶48, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666 ("Our state 
constitution has created three branches of government, each with 
distinct functions and powers."), overruled on other grounds by 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 295 
Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408; Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11 (same); 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
31 
 
State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 816, 825, 266 N.W.2d 597 
(1978) (same). 
¶60 While the constitution vests executive power in the 
governor and also places primary responsibility on the governor to 
see that the laws are faithfully executed (Wis. Const. art. V, 
§§ 1, 4), our cases have made clear that these "administrative" 
officers carry out executive functions.  In 1855, just a few short 
years after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, Justice Abram 
Smith observed "that sheriffs, coroners, registers of deeds, and 
district attorneys . . . are a part of the executive department."  
Attorney Gen. ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 795 (1855).  
Just last term we held that the superintendent of public 
instruction "has the executive constitutional function to 
supervise public instruction."  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, 
¶¶2, 25-29, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600.  We have also said 
that state administrative agencies "are considered part of the 
executive branch."  Id., ¶14.  DOJ, through which the attorney 
general carries out his functions, is such an administrative agency 
and therefore part of the executive branch.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 15.01(5) and Wis. Stat. § 15.25 (creating the "executive branch" 
agency, the department of justice, "under the direction and 
supervision of the attorney general").  And we have explicitly 
made this point with reference to the attorney general himself, 
calling him "a high constitutional executive officer."  State v. 
Woodington, 31 Wis. 2d 151, 167, 142 N.W.2d 810 (1966); see also 
Milo M. Quaife, The Struggle Over Ratification 1846-47, at 456 
("The subordinate executive, or as they are called, administrative 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
32 
 
officers, are a secretary of state who is ex officio auditor, a 
treasurer, and an attorney general . . . ."). 
¶61 The Legislative Defendants also hang their hat on Oak 
Creek 
where 
we 
held 
that 
the 
attorney 
general 
has 
no 
constitutionally granted powers.  State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 
WI 9, ¶¶24, 55, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526.  The powers the 
attorney general does have, we explained, "are prescribed only by 
statutory law," and the attorney general "has no common-law powers 
or duties."  Id., ¶¶21, 24 (quoted source omitted); see also State 
v. Snyder, 172 Wis. 415, 417, 179 N.W. 579 (1920) ("In this state 
the attorney general has no common-law powers or duties."). 
¶62 This principle is true, but inapplicable to the case at 
hand.  The question in this case is not whether the legislature 
may give or take powers away from the attorney general; it may.  
The question is whether the legislature may participate in carrying 
out the executive branch functions previously assigned to the 
attorney general.  Or said another way, the question is not whether 
the legislature may circumscribe the attorney general's executive 
powers, but whether it may assume them, at least in part, for 
itself.  Thus, Oak Creek is inapposite to the separation-of-powers 
argument at the heart of this case. 
¶63 The Legislative Defendants offer a second argument, this 
one with more traction.  They argue that the attorney general's 
power to litigate on behalf of the State is not, at least in all 
circumstances, within the exclusive zone of executive authority.  
We agree.  While representing the State in litigation is 
predominately 
an 
executive 
function, 
it 
is 
within 
those 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
33 
 
borderlands of shared powers, most notably in cases that implicate 
an institutional interest of the legislature. 
¶64 One kind of institutional interest is reflected in the 
statutory language authorizing the attorney general to represent 
the State or state officials at the request of the legislature.  
Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m).  Early enactments following the adoption 
of the constitution are appropriately given special weight.  Oak 
Creek, 232 Wis. 2d 612, ¶18.  This is because these enactments are 
likely to reflect the original public meaning of the constitutional 
text.  See id., ¶¶29-31; Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶32.  In that 
vein, the attorney general was granted the power, even the duty, 
to represent the legislature or to represent the State at the 
request of the legislature from our state's earliest days. 
¶65 When the Wisconsin Constitution created the office of 
attorney general, it specified that his duties "shall be prescribed 
by law."  Oak Creek, 232 Wis. 2d 612, ¶15 (quoting Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 3 (1846) (proposed)); Wis. Const. art. VI, § 3.  So the 
first legislature of our new state went about prescribing those 
duties by statute.  In 1848, the same year the constitution was 
adopted, the legislature enacted a law requiring the attorney 
general to "appear for the state in any court or tribunal in any 
other causes criminal or civil in which the state may be a party 
or be interested," and this was to occur "when required by the 
governor or either branch of the legislature."  An Act concerning 
the Attorney General, Wis. Laws 1848 (emphasis added).  This 
language was modified in 1849:  "[W]hen requested by the governor 
or either branch of the legislature," the attorney general was 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
34 
 
required to "appear for the people of this state, and prosecute or 
defend in any other court, or before any officer, in any cause or 
matter, civil or criminal, in which the people of this state may 
be a party or interested."  Wis. Stat. ch. 9, § 36 (1849) (emphasis 
added). 
¶66 This language remains substantially the same today.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m).20  Therefore, under the law since our 
state's founding, the attorney general may defend a legislative 
official, employee, or body.  And either house of the legislature 
can request the attorney general to "prosecute or defend in any 
court or before any officer, any cause or matter, civil or 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.25(1m) provides:   
The department of justice shall:   
. . . . 
(1m) REPRESENT STATE IN OTHER MATTERS.  If requested by 
the governor or either house of the legislature, appear 
for and represent the state, any state department, 
agency, official, employee or agent, whether required to 
appear as a party or witness in any civil or criminal 
matter, and prosecute or defend in any court or before 
any officer, any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in 
which the state or the people of this state may be 
interested. 
 The joint committee on legislative 
organization may intervene as permitted under [Wis. 
Stat. §] 803.09(2m) at any time.  The public service 
commission may request under [Wis. Stat. §] 196.497(7) 
that 
the 
attorney 
general 
intervene 
in 
federal 
proceedings.  All expenses of the proceedings shall be 
paid 
from 
the 
appropriation 
under 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§] 20.455(1)(d). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
35 
 
criminal, in which the state or the people of this state may be 
interested."  Id. 
¶67 These 
early 
prescriptions, 
adopted 
nearly 
contemporaneously with the adoption of our state constitution, 
reflect an understanding that the attorney general's role is not, 
at least in all cases, a core executive function.  The 
legislature's institutional interest as a represented party, and 
as one that can authorize the attorney general to prosecute cases, 
puts at least some of these cases within the zone of shared powers. 
¶68 Another 
on-point 
institutional 
interest 
of 
the 
legislature is spelled out in the constitution.  Article VIII, 
Section 2 states in relevant part, "No money shall be paid out of 
the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law."  Wis. 
Const. art. VIII, § 2.  The legislature, of course, is the branch 
granted the power to enact laws.  Id. art. IV, § 17. 
¶69 The takeaway is that the constitution gives the 
legislature the general power to spend the state's money by 
enacting laws.  Therefore, where litigation involves requests for 
the state to pay money to another party, the legislature, in at 
least some cases, has an institutional interest in the expenditure 
of state funds sufficient to justify the authority to approve 
certain settlements.  The Attorney General himself conceded during 
oral argument that Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1. has constitutional 
applications where the power of the purse is implicated. 
¶70 Other state legislatures appear to have this power as 
well under various circumstances.  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-
621(N) (2019) (requiring approval of some settlements by joint 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
36 
 
legislative budget committee after reaching certain dollar 
threshold); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 3-125a(a) (2019) (requiring 
approval of settlements exceeding certain dollar threshold by the 
legislature); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,239.05(4) (2018) (requiring 
legislative approval in order to pay punitive damages); Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 51 § 200(A)(1) (2019) (requiring legislative approval 
for settlement or consent decrees above certain dollar threshold); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-10-202 (2018) (same).  Although the practice 
of other states is not determinative of the constitutional 
questions 
before 
us, 
this 
generally 
reflects 
a 
shared 
understanding that legitimate institutional, even constitutional, 
legislative interests may be implicated when the attorney general 
purports 
to 
enter 
settlement 
agreements 
affecting 
state 
appropriations. 
¶71 These institutional interests of the legislature are 
sufficient to defeat the facial challenge to the provisions 
authorizing legislative intervention in certain cases, and those 
requiring legislative consent to defend and prosecute certain 
cases.  Namely, where a legislative official, employee, or body is 
represented by the attorney general, the legislature has, in at 
least some cases, an institutional interest in the outcome of that 
litigation.  Similarly, where a legislative body is the principal 
authorizing the attorney general's representation in the first 
place, the legislature has an institutional interest in the outcome 
of that litigation in at least some cases.  This is true where the 
attorney general's representation is in defense of the legislative 
official, employee, or body, or where a legislative body is the 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
37 
 
principal authorizing the prosecution of a case.  And in cases 
where spending state money is at issue, the legislature has a 
constitutional institutional interest in at least some cases 
sufficient to allow it to require legislative agreement with 
certain litigation outcomes, or even to allow it to intervene. 
¶72 Because this is a facial challenge, and there are 
constitutional applications of these laws, that challenge cannot 
succeed.  In at least some cases, the legislature may permissibly 
give itself the power to consent to an agreement where the action 
involves injunctive relief or a proposed consent decree (Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.25(6)(a)1.), or in the compromise or discontinuance of a 
matter being prosecuted (Wis. Stat. § 165.08).  In at least some 
cases, we see no constitutional violation in allowing the 
legislature to intervene in litigation concerning the validity of 
a statute, at least where its institutional interests are 
implicated.21  See Wis. Stat. § 13.365; Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m).  
As we have explained, because the Plaintiffs have not met their 
burden to prove these provisions may not be constitutionally 
                                                 
21 The legislature, or its committees or members, have 
litigated cases in Wisconsin impacting potential institutional 
interests throughout the history of the state.  See Risser v. 
Klauser, 207 Wis. 2d 176, 180, 558 N.W.2d 108 (1997) (original 
action brought by several legislators against the governor); 
Citizens Util. Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 487-88, 534 
N.W.2d 608 (1995) (original action brought by citizens utility 
board and several legislators against the governor and the 
secretary of the Department of Administration); State ex rel. Wis. 
Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 433, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) 
(original action brought by, among other petitioners, the senate 
and assembly against the governor). 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
38 
 
applied under any circumstances, the motion to dismiss the 
Plaintiffs' facial challenge should have been granted.22 
¶73 We stress that this decision is limited.  We express no 
opinion on whether individual applications or categories of 
applications may violate the separation of powers, or whether the 
legislature 
may 
have 
other 
valid 
institutional 
interests 
supporting application of these laws.  But the facial challenge 
seeking to strike down Wis. Stat. § 13.365; Wis. Stat. § 165.08(1); 
Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1.; and Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m) in their 
entirety——the only claim developed before us——does not succeed.  
Given this, the order enjoining these provisions is vacated as 
well. 
 
2.  Capitol Security 
¶74 The Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of 
2017 Wis. Act 369, § 16 (Wis. Stat. § 16.84(2m)), which grants the 
Joint Committee of Legislative Organization (JCLO) the authority 
to review and approve changes proposed by the Department of 
Administration (DOA) to security at the Capitol.23  This new 
                                                 
22 As explained above, the attorney general's litigation 
authority is not, in at least some cases, an exclusive executive 
power.  These types of cases fall under a shared powers analysis.  
Where the legislature has appropriate institutional interests, 
legislative exercise of this shared power in at least some cases 
does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the attorney 
general's executive authority.  Hence, the facial challenge gets 
nowhere under an "unduly burdensome" shared powers analysis. 
23 This provision, Wis. Stat. § 16.84(2m), which was not 
enjoined by the circuit court, states as follows:   
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
39 
 
provision requires DOA to notify JCLO of any proposed security 
changes.  § 16.84(2m).  If JCLO does not notify DOA within 14 days 
that a meeting has been scheduled to discuss the proposed changes, 
DOA may implement those changes.  Id.  However, if JCLO schedules 
a meeting to discuss the proposal, DOA may proceed with the 
proposed changes only with the approval of JCLO.  Id.  The statute 
also provides an exception if there is risk of imminent danger.  
Id. 
¶75 The Legislative Defendants contend this section is 
squarely permissible within the framework of J.F. Ahern Co. v. 
Wisconsin 
State 
Building 
Commission, 
114 
Wis. 2d 69, 
336 
N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1983), and Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d 687.  
Specifically, the Legislative Defendants maintain this is "a 
cooperative venture" with the "proper standards or safeguards" to 
                                                 
Send notice to the joint committee on legislative 
organization of any proposed changes to security at the 
capitol, including the posting of a firearm restriction 
under [Wis. Stat. §] 943.13 (1m)(c)2. or 4.  If, within 
14 working days after the date of the notice, the 
cochairpersons of the joint committee on legislative 
organization do not notify the department that the 
committee has scheduled a meeting to review the 
department's proposal, the department may implement the 
changes as proposed in the notice.  If, within 14 working 
days after the date of the department's notice, the 
cochairpersons of the committee notify the department 
that the committee has scheduled a meeting to review the 
department's proposal, the department may implement the 
proposed changes only upon approval of the committee.  
If there is a risk of imminent danger, the department 
may take any action related to security at the capitol 
that is necessary to prevent or mitigate the danger and 
the cochairpersons may review the action later if the 
cochairpersons determine review is necessary. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
40 
 
avoid a separation-of-powers violation.  Ahern, 114 Wis. 2d at 
108; Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 701 (quoted source omitted).  The 
Plaintiffs 
characterize 
this 
section 
as 
an 
impermissible 
legislative veto that violates bicameralism and presentment as 
well as the constitution's quorum requirement.  See Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 7; id. art. V, § 10. 
¶76 Ahern 
correctly noted that the construction and 
maintenance of public buildings is an executive function.  114 
Wis. 2d at 106.  In fact, the legislature created DOA and granted 
it broad duties to construct and repair state buildings, among 
other tasks.  Wis. Stat. § 15.10; Wis. Stat. § 16.85.  See 
generally Wis. Stat. ch. 16.  However, before the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 16.84(2m), the legislature, by statute, created and 
implemented limitations on DOA's authority.  For example, Wis. 
Stat. § 16.843 denotes where and how vehicles may park around the 
Capitol.  Likewise, even before § 16.84(2m) was enacted, DOA's 
authority to use state buildings for public events did not include 
the areas of the Capitol reserved for use by the legislature.  See 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOA 2.04(1) (July 2014). 
¶77 We conclude that control of at least legislative space 
in the Capitol is a shared power between the legislature and 
executive branches.  It logically follows that if the legislature 
can control the use of legislative space, as it already does in 
many ways, it can also control the security measures put in place 
for use of that space.  Because there are at the very least some 
constitutional applications of this provision, 
the facial 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 16.84(2m) cannot succeed. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
41 
 
 
3.  Multiple Suspensions of Administrative Rules 
¶78 The Plaintiffs also challenge 2017 Act 369, § 64 (Wis. 
Stat. § 227.26(2)(im)), which allows the Joint Committee for 
Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) to suspend a rule more than 
once.24 
¶79 Wisconsin agencies are required to promulgate rules for 
"each statement of general policy and each interpretation of a 
statute which it specifically adopts to govern its enforcement or 
administration of that statute."  Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1).  When 
promulgated as required by statute, rules have "the force of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13).  Current statutory law authorizes JCRAR 
to review rules prior to promulgation, and to suspend rules 
following promulgation.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.19; Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.26.  The legislature can establish the procedures by which 
an agency promulgates rules, and can even take away rulemaking 
authority 
altogether. 
 
Koschkee, 
387 
Wis. 2d 552, 
¶20.  
Additionally, the legislature may limit or retract its delegation 
of rulemaking authority, review rules prior to implementation, and 
determine the methods agencies must use to promulgate rules.  Id. 
¶80 In Martinez, this court addressed the constitutionality 
of this temporary rule suspension power.  165 Wis. 2d at 691.  We 
upheld the ability of JCRAR to temporarily suspend a rule for three 
months, reasoning that "[i]t is appropriate for the legislature to 
                                                 
24 This new paragraph states:  "Notwithstanding pars. (i) and 
(j), the committee may act to suspend a rule as provided under 
this subsection multiple times."  Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(im). 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
42 
 
delegate rule-making authority to an agency while retaining the 
right to review any rules promulgated under the delegated power."  
Id. at 698.  In so doing, we also stressed the importance of the 
temporary nature of the suspension.  Id. at 699-700.  To 
permanently repeal a suspended rule, the legislature must pass a 
bill in both houses and have it signed by the governor.  Id.  If 
no repeal occurs, the rule remains in effect and cannot be 
suspended again.  Id. at 700.  This structure, we concluded, did 
not violate the separation of powers.  Id. at 700-01. 
¶81 Under the new legislative changes, the legislature may 
impose the temporary three-month suspension addressed in Martinez 
multiple times.  The parties do not ask us to revisit Martinez or 
any of its conclusions.  Under Martinez, an endless suspension of 
rules could not stand; there exists at least some required end 
point after which bicameral passage and presentment to the governor 
must occur.  Id. at 700.  But also under Martinez, a single 
temporary three-month suspension is permissible. 
¶82 Accepting these boundary markers, if one three-month 
suspension is constitutionally permissible, two three-month 
suspensions are as well.  Under such a scenario, the six-month 
(rather than three-month) delay would still be followed by 
acceptance of the rule or repeal through bicameral passage and 
presentment.  This fits comfortably within the unchallenged 
reasoning of Martinez——a modest suspension that is temporary in 
nature. 
¶83 Again, this case comes to us as a facial challenge.  To 
succeed, 
every 
application 
of 
this 
law 
must 
be 
found 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
43 
 
unconstitutional.  Because this provision has constitutional 
applications, the facial challenge must necessarily fail.  To 
strike down all applications of this law, or to draw a line in the 
future under which an additional suspension is too long is exactly 
the sort of speculation that counsels caution and a narrow 
application of Martinez in the context of a facial challenge.  The 
facial challenge to Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(im) must be dismissed 
on remand, and the order enjoining this provision is thereby 
vacated as well. 
 
4.  Agency Deference Provision 
¶84 The Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of 
2017 Wis. Act 369, § 35 (Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2g)), which provides:  
"No agency may seek deference in any proceeding based on the 
agency's interpretation of any law."  This provision partially 
codifies our holding in Tetra Tech where we ended "our practice of 
deferring to administrative agencies' conclusions of law."  382 
Wis. 2d 496, ¶108.  Given our own decision that courts should not 
defer to the legal conclusions of an agency, a statute instructing 
agencies not to ask for such deference is facially constitutional. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶85 This writing constitutes the majority opinion of the 
court on all issues raised in this case other than the guidance 
document provisions, which are addressed in Justice Kelly's 
opinion for the court.  With respect to the issues addressed in 
this opinion, we conclude as follows.     
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
44 
 
¶86 For all provisions where arguments were sufficiently 
developed, the Legislative Defendants have successfully shown that 
the motion to dismiss the facial challenge to these laws should 
have been granted.  On remand, we direct the circuit court to grant 
the motion to dismiss with respect to these provisions.25  We also 
vacate the temporary injunction in full for all provisions 
addressed in this opinion.26  We stress that we pass no judgment 
on the constitutionality of individual applications or categories 
of applications of these laws.  The judicial power is at once 
immense, yet modest.  While it is our solemn obligation to say 
what the law is, that power extends to deciding only the cases and 
claims actually presented.  And that is what we do today.27 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part, the temporary injunction is vacated 
in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings 
                                                 
25 Specifically, we reverse the circuit court's order denying 
the motion to dismiss with respect to:  2017 Wis. Act 369, § 5 
(Wis. Stat. § 13.365); § 16 (Wis. Stat. § 16.84(2m)); § 26 (Wis. 
Stat. § 165.08(1)); § 30 (Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1.); § 35 (Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2g)); § 64 (Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(im)); and § 97 
(Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m)). 
26 The circuit court's temporary injunction is vacated with 
respect to the following provisions:  2017 Wis. Act 369, § 26 (Wis. 
Stat. § 165.08(1)); § 30 (Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1.); § 64 (Wis. 
Stat. § 227.26(2)(im)). 
27 Following oral argument, the Attorney General moved to 
modify the stay of the temporary injunction that we imposed on 
June 11, 2019.  As we remand this case for the circuit court to 
issue an order vacating its temporary injunction order in part, we 
deny the Attorney General's motion. 
Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622 
 
2 
 
consistent with this opinion and the opinion of Justice Daniel 
Kelly. 
 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
1 
 
¶87 DANIEL KELLY, J.   The great Justice Joseph Story once 
said "the three great powers of government . . . should for ever 
be kept separate and distinct."  2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States § 519, at 2-3 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).  We agree.  As a consequence, we 
conclude that when the legislature prohibited the executive branch 
from communicating with the public through the issuance of guidance 
documents without first going through a pre-clearance process and 
including legislatively-mandated content, it invaded the executive 
branch's exclusive province to "take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed."  Wis. Const. art. V, § 4.   
¶88 This opinion is the opinion of the court with respect to 
2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 31, 33, 38, 65-71, and 104-105, all of which 
address (at least in part) the subject of guidance documents.  
Here, we explain why § 33 (to the extent it applies to guidance 
documents) and § 38 unconstitutionally intrude on power the 
constitution vested in the executive branch of government.  We 
also describe why § 31 (which defines what a guidance document 
is), §§ 65-71 (to the extent they provide judicial review of 
guidance 
documents), 
and 
§§ 104-05 
(which 
describe 
the 
applicability and effective date of § 33) are not facially 
unconstitutional.  
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND1 
¶89 "Guidance documents" are not conceptually new to 
administrative agencies, although they had no statutory definition 
until the Act created Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m) (2017-18)2 to read 
as follows: 
(a) "Guidance document" means, except as provided in 
par. 
(b), 
any 
formal 
or 
official 
document 
or 
communication issued by an agency, including a manual, 
handbook, directive, or informational bulletin, that 
does any of the following: 
1. Explains the agency's implementation of a statute or 
rule enforced or administered by the agency, including 
the current or proposed operating procedure of the 
agency. 
2. Provides guidance or advice with respect to how the 
agency is likely to apply a statute or rule enforced or 
administered by the agency, if that guidance or advice 
is likely to apply to a class of persons similarly 
affected. 
2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)). 
¶90 The Act regulates guidance documents in several ways, 
the following two of which implicate the boundaries between the 
executive and legislative branches.  The first is § 33, which 
requires administrative agencies (with some exceptions) to 
identify existing law that supports a guidance document's 
contents: 
                                                 
1 The part of the court's opinion authored by Justice Brian 
Hagedorn provides the broad background strokes necessary to 
consider SEIU's claims.  In this part of the court's opinion, we 
provide some additional context for our treatment of the "guidance 
document" provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
3 
 
Agency publications. An agency, other than the 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 
the Technical College System Board, or the department of 
employee trust funds, shall identify the applicable 
provision of federal law or the applicable state 
statutory or administrative code provision that supports 
any statement or interpretation of law that the agency 
makes in any publication, whether in print or on the 
agency's Internet site, including guidance documents, 
forms, pamphlets, or other informational materials, 
regarding the laws the agency administers. 
2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 33 (Wis. Stat. § 227.05).  The second is 
§ 38, which describes the procedure an administrative agency must 
follow when creating a guidance document. 
(1)(a) Before adopting a guidance document, an agency 
shall submit to the legislative reference bureau the 
proposed guidance document with a notice of a public 
comment period on the proposed guidance document under 
par. (b), in a format approved by the legislative 
reference bureau, for publication in the register.  The 
notice shall specify the place where comments should be 
submitted and the deadline for submitting those 
comments. 
(b) The agency shall provide for a period for public 
comment on a proposed guidance document submitted under 
par. (a), during which any person may submit written 
comments to the agency with respect to the proposed 
guidance document.  Except as provided in par. (c), the 
period for public comment shall end no sooner than the 
21st day after the date on which the proposed guidance 
document is published in the register under s. 
35.93(2)(b)3.im.  The agency may not adopt the proposed 
guidance document until the comment period has concluded 
and the agency has complied with par. (d). 
(c) An agency may hold a public comment period shorter 
than 21 days with the approval of the governor. 
(d) An agency shall retain all written comments 
submitted during the public comment period under par. 
(b) and shall consider those comments in determining 
whether to adopt the guidance document as originally 
proposed, modify the proposed guidance document, or take 
any other action. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
4 
 
(2) An agency shall post each guidance document that the 
agency has adopted on the agency's Internet site and 
shall permit continuing public comment on the guidance 
document.  The agency shall ensure that each guidance 
document that the agency has adopted remains on the 
agency's Internet site as provided in this subsection 
until the guidance document is no longer in effect, is 
no longer valid, or is superseded or until the agency 
otherwise rescinds its adoption of the guidance 
document. 
(3) A guidance document does not have the force of law 
and does not provide the authority for implementing or 
enforcing 
a 
standard, 
requirement, 
or 
threshold, 
including as a term or condition of any license.  An 
agency that proposes to rely on a guidance document to 
the detriment of a person in any proceeding shall afford 
the person an adequate opportunity to contest the 
legality or wisdom of a position taken in the guidance 
document.  An agency may not use a guidance document to 
foreclose consideration of any issue raised in the 
guidance document. 
(4) If an agency proposes to act in any proceeding at 
variance with a position expressed in a guidance 
document, it shall provide a reasonable explanation for 
the variance.  If an affected person in any proceeding 
may have relied reasonably on the agency's position, the 
explanation must include a reasonable justification for 
the agency's conclusion that the need for the variance 
outweighs the affected person's reliance interest. 
(5) Persons that qualify under s. 227.12 to petition an 
agency to promulgate a rule may, as provided in s. 
227.12, petition an agency to promulgate a rule in place 
of a guidance document. 
(6) Any guidance document shall be signed by the 
secretary or head of the agency below the following 
certification:  "I have reviewed this guidance document 
or proposed guidance document and I certify that it 
complies with sections 227.10 and 227.11 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  I further certify that the guidance 
document or proposed guidance document contains no 
standard, requirement, or threshold that is not 
explicitly required or explicitly permitted by a statute 
or a rule that has been lawfully promulgated.  I further 
certify that the guidance document or proposed guidance 
document contains no standard, requirement, or threshold 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
5 
 
that is more restrictive than a standard, requirement, 
or threshold contained in the Wisconsin Statutes." 
(7)(a) This section does not apply to guidance documents 
adopted before the first day of the 7th month beginning 
after the effective date of this paragraph . . . [LRB 
inserts date], but on that date any guidance document 
that has not been adopted in accordance with sub. (1) or 
that does not contain the certification required under 
sub. (6) shall be considered rescinded. 
(b) This section does not apply to guidance documents or 
proposed guidance documents of the Board of Regents of 
the University of Wisconsin System, the Technical 
College System Board, or the department of employee 
trust funds. 
(8) The legislative council staff shall provide agencies 
with assistance in determining whether documents and 
communications are guidance documents that are subject 
to the requirements under this section. 
2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 38 (Wis. Stat. § 227.112). 
¶91 SEIU alleges § 38 violates the separation of powers, and 
Governor Tony Evers alleges that, to the extent it addresses 
guidance documents, § 33 does the same.  For the following reasons, 
we agree.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶92 We are reviewing the circuit court's denial of the 
Legislative Defendants'3 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
complaint, as well as the temporary injunction the circuit court 
granted with respect to §§ 31, 33, 38, 65-71, and 104-05.  The 
motion to dismiss asserted that the plaintiffs' complaint failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  "Whether a 
                                                 
3 The "Legislative Defendants," who were sued in their 
official capacity, are Wisconsin Assembly Speaker Robin Vos, 
Wisconsin Senate President Roger Roth, Wisconsin Assembly Majority 
Leader Jim Steineke, and Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader Scott 
Fitzgerald. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
6 
 
complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted is a 
question of law for our independent review[.]"  Data Key Partners 
v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶17, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 
N.W.2d 693.  The motion puts at issue whether the guidance document 
provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369 are facially unconstitutional.  A 
statute is facially unconstitutional only when it "cannot be 
enforced 'under any circumstances.'"  Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured 
Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶24, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 
914 N.W.2d 678 (quoted source omitted). 
¶93 A circuit court may issue a temporary injunction if:  
"(1) the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm if a temporary 
injunction is not issued; (2) the movant has no other adequate 
remedy at law; (3) a temporary injunction is necessary to preserve 
the status quo; and (4) the movant has a reasonable probability of 
success on the merits."  Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. 
Milwaukee Cty., 2016 WI App 56, ¶20, 370 Wis. 2d 644, 883 
N.W.2d 154 (citing Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 
Wis. 2d 513, 520–21, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977)).  We review the circuit 
court's decision to issue a temporary injunction for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶94 Our inquiry into the constitutionality of the Act's 
guidance document provisions requires that we determine whether 
the creation of such a document represents the exercise of 
executive as opposed to legislative power.  We then assess whether 
the Act's guidance document provisions impermissibly encroach on 
the executive branch's authority to promulgate those documents. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
7 
 
A.  The Nature of Executive and Legislative Powers 
¶95 It is common knowledge that the Wisconsin Constitution 
organizes our government in a tripartite structure.  Goodland v. 
Zimmerman, 
243 
Wis. 459, 
466-67, 
10 
N.W.2d 180 
(1943) 
("[G]overnmental powers are divided among the three departments of 
government, the legislative, the executive, and judicial[.]").  At 
the risk of oversimplification, the legislature's authority 
comprises the power to make the law,4 whereas the executive's 
authority consists of executing the law.5  The distinction between 
the two has been described as the difference between the power to 
prescribe and the power to put something into effect: 
In 1792, Jacques Necker, the famous French 
statesman, 
neatly 
summed 
up 
the 
function 
and 
significance of the executive power.  Of the function:  
"[I]f by a fiction we were for a moment to personify the 
legislative and the executive powers, the latter in 
speaking of the former might . . . say:  All that this 
man has talked of, I will perform."  Of the significance: 
"The laws would in effect be nothing more than counsels, 
than so many maxims more or less sage, without this 
active and vigilant authority, which assures their 
empire and transmits to the administration the motion of 
which it stands in need." 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 819 (2003) (quoted source omitted).  This 
commentator concluded that, "[i]n the late-eighteenth century, 
someone vested with the executive power and christened as the chief 
executive enjoyed the power to control the execution of law."  Id. 
                                                 
4 "The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and 
assembly."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
5 "The executive power shall be vested in a governor."  Wis. 
Const. art. V, § 1. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
8 
 
¶96 The executive, however, is not a legislatively-
controlled automaton.  Before executing, he must of necessity 
determine for himself what the law requires him to do.  As 
Alexander Hamilton said, "[h]e who is to execute the laws must 
first judge for himself of their meaning."  See Alexander Hamilton, 
Letters of Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 4 The 
Works of Alexander Hamilton 438 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1904).  This 
is intrinsic to the very nature of executive authority. 
The executive must certainly interpret and apply the 
law; it would be impossible to perform his duties if he 
did not.  After all, he must determine for himself what 
the law requires (interpretation) so that he may carry 
it into effect (application).  Our constitution not only 
does not forbid this, it requires it. 
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶53, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 
N.W.2d 21 (Kelly, J., lead op.).  See also Wis. Const. art. V, § 1 
("The executive power shall be vested in a governor . . . ."); 
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) ("It is undoubtedly true that the other branches 
of Government have the authority and obligation to interpret the 
law . . . ."). 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
9 
 
¶97 The executive oftentimes carries out his functions 
through administrative agencies.6  
Although agencies have sometimes 
been criticized as a "headless fourth branch of government,"7 they 
are not——we have only three.  Agencies must belong to one of them, 
and we have said before that they are one manifestation of the 
executive.  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶14, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 
929 N.W.2d 600 ("Agencies are considered part of the executive 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 
U.S. 302, 327 (2014) ("Under our system of government, Congress 
makes 
laws 
and 
the 
President, 
acting 
at 
times 
through 
agencies . . . 'faithfully execute[s]' them." (quoting U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 3 (alterations in original))); State ex rel. Wisconsin 
Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 159, 277 N.W. 278 on reh'g, 
228 Wis. 147, 280 N.W. 698 (1938) ("It is fundamental that under 
our constitutional system the governmental power to execute the 
laws is vested in the executive department of the state, and can 
be exercised only by duly constituted officers thereof."); DOR v. 
Nagle-Hart, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 224, 226–27, 234 N.W.2d 350 (1975) 
("It is for the department[s] to implement and carry out the 
mandate of the legislative enactments . . . and stop at the limits 
of such legislative mandate or direction."); Black & Decker, Inc. 
v. DILHR, No. 1988AP0409, unpublished slip op. (Sept. 15, 1988) 
(Wherein the court of appeals described the function of an agency 
as one of carrying out and implementing a legislative act.). 
7 Peter L. Strauss Agencies' Place in Government, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1984) (internal marks and quoted source 
omitted). 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
10 
 
branch.").8  This understanding is not unique to Wisconsin.9  And 
when an administrative agency acts (other than when it is 
exercising its borrowed rulemaking function), it is exercising 
executive power.  See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 
217 (1890) ("[T]here can be no doubt that it [the power "conferred 
on the president of the United States"] may be declared through 
the department of state, whose acts in this regard are in legal 
contemplation the acts of the president." (emphasis added)); 
Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755, 769 (1879) ("[T]he acts of the 
heads of departments, within the scope of their powers, are in law 
the acts of the President."); Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 424 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Although the 
                                                 
8 This is also apparent from the fact that the governor 
appoints agency secretaries, all of whom serve at the governor's 
pleasure.  Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(a) ("If a department is under the 
direction and supervision of a secretary, the secretary shall be 
nominated by the governor, and with the advice and consent of the 
senate appointed, to serve at the pleasure of the governor."). 
9 See, e.g., Town of Walkerton v. New York, C. & St. L. R. 
Co., 18 N.E. 2d 799, 803 (Ind. 1939) ("Under our form of government 
an administrative agency belongs to the executive department."); 
Barrett v. Tennessee Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 
284 S.W. 3d 784, 789 (Tenn. 2009) ("Administrative agencies are 
part of the executive branch of government."); Meyers v. Chapman 
Printing Co., 840 S.W. 2d 814, 820 (Ky. 1992) ("Decisionmaking 
performed by an administrative agency is an executive function."); 
Judges of 74th Judicial Dist. v. Bay Cty., 190 N.W. 2d 219, 226 
(Mich. 1971) ("Administrative agencies are a part of the executive 
branch of government.  While they often act in a quasi-judicial 
capacity, it is recognized that they are established to perform 
essentially executive functions."); 
Matter of Kallen, 455 
A. 2d 460, 463 (N.J. 1983) ("Administrative agencies are the arms 
of the executive branch of government that implement the laws 
passed by the Legislature."); Muddy Boys, Inc. v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 
440 
P. 3d 741, 
747 
(Ut. 
Ct. 
App. 
2019) 
("[A]dministrative agencies are part of the executive."). 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
11 
 
Constitution says that '[t]he executive Power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States of America,' [U.S. Const.] Art. 
II, § 1, it was never thought that the President would have to 
exercise that power personally.  He may generally authorize others 
to exercise executive powers, with full effect of law, in his 
place." (alterations in original)).; Frank B. Cross, Executive 
Orders 12,291 and 12,498:  A Test Case in Presidential Control of 
Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & Pol. 483, 507 (1988) ("Obviously, one 
person cannot execute all the functions of government personally. 
In order to carry out his constitutional responsibility, the 
president must delegate his authority to other executive 
officers."). 
¶98 In addition to the executive power that agencies 
exercise as a consequence of their placement in the executive 
branch, they also exercise some limited legislative power.  This 
second type of authority depends entirely on the legislature's 
delegation of the power to promulgate rules that have the force 
and effect of law.  Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2) ("Rule-making authority 
is expressly conferred on an agency[.]"); Kieninger v. Crown Equip. 
Corp., 2019 WI 27, ¶16 n.8, 386 Wis. 2d 1, 924 N.W.2d 172  
("Administrative rules enacted pursuant to statutory rulemaking 
authority have the force and effect of law in Wisconsin." (quoted 
source omitted)).  We have recognized before that when an agency 
promulgates a rule, it is exercising "a legislative power[.]"  
Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶39.  An agency, however, "has no 
inherent constitutional authority to make rules . . . ."  Martinez 
v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 698, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992).  To the 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
12 
 
extent it exists, it comes solely through express delegation from 
the legislature.  Because this capability is only on loan,10 
agencies necessarily "remain subordinate to the legislature with 
regard to their rulemaking authority."  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 
¶18. 
¶99 The 
constitutional 
authority 
of 
the 
executive 
encompasses determining what the law requires as well as applying 
it (preferably in that order).  Because the executive's power is 
supplemented by a legislatively-delegated authority to promulgate 
rules that have the force and effect of law, we must determine 
what manner of authority an agency uses to create guidance 
documents before we can evaluate the legislature's right to control 
them.  If it is a delegated rulemaking authority, then the 
legislature's power to dictate their content and manner of 
promulgation would be almost beyond question.  If, however, the 
authority to create guidance documents is executive, then we must 
consider whether the legislature's reach extends far enough to 
control how members of the executive branch explain statutes and 
provide guidance or advice about how administrative agencies are 
likely to apply them. 
¶100 Our analysis on this point necessarily begins with the 
undisputed understanding that a guidance document does not have 
the force or effect of law.  The Act explicitly says so:  "A 
guidance document does not have the force of law and does not 
provide the authority for implementing or enforcing a standard, 
                                                 
10 "As a legislative creation, [an agency's] . . . rule-
making powers can be repealed by the legislature."  Martinez v. 
DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 698, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992). 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
13 
 
requirement, or threshold, including as a term or condition of any 
license."  2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 38 (Wis. Stat. § 227.112(3)).  
That's an important place to start because right away it 
establishes that, unlike a rule,11 the executive branch needs no 
borrowed authority from the legislature to create a guidance 
document.  In fact, the executive was creating them long before 
the legislature passed the Act and gave them that name.  The Act 
implicitly recognizes this by not even purporting to delegate the 
authority to create such documents to the executive——it assumed 
the power already resided there. 
¶101 Having established that guidance documents are not 
rules, we must determine what manner of thing they are.  The Act 
describes them as:   
[A]ny formal or official document or communication 
issued by an agency, including a manual, handbook, 
directive, or informational bulletin, that does any of 
the following: 
1. Explains the agency's implementation of a statute or 
rule enforced or administered by the agency, including 
the current or proposed operating procedure of the 
agency. 
2. Provides guidance or advice with respect to how the 
agency is likely to apply a statute or rule enforced or 
administered by the agency, if that guidance or advice 
is likely to apply to a class of persons similarly 
affected. 
2017 Wis. Act 369, § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)(a)1.-2.).12   
                                                 
11 Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 
N.W.2d 600 (Executive "agencies ha[ve] no inherent constitutional 
authority to make rules[.]" (some alterations in original)). 
12 The Act also describes what a guidance document is not: 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
14 
 
                                                 
(b) "Guidance document" does not include any of the 
following: 
1. A rule that has been promulgated and that is currently 
in effect or a proposed rule that is in the process of 
being promulgated. 
2. A standard adopted, or a statement of policy or 
interpretation made, whether preliminary or final, in 
the decision of a contested case, in a private letter 
ruling under s. 73.035, or in an agency decision upon or 
disposition of a particular matter as applied to a 
specific set of facts. 
3. Any document or activity described in sub. (13) (a) 
to (zz), except that "guidance document" includes a 
pamphlet or other explanatory material described under 
sub. (13) (r) that otherwise satisfies the definition of 
"guidance document" under par. (a). 
4. Any document that any statute specifically provides 
is not required to be promulgated as a rule. 
5. A declaratory ruling issued under s. 227.41. 
6. A pleading or brief filed in court by the state, an 
agency, or an agency official. 
7. A letter or written legal advice of the department of 
justice or a formal or informal opinion of the attorney 
general, including an opinion issued under s. 165.015 
(1). 
8. Any document or communication for which a procedure 
for public input, other than that provided under s. 
227.112 (1), is provided by law. 
9. Any document or communication that is not subject to 
the right of inspection and copying under s. 19.35(1). 
2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)(b)1.-9.). 
 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
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¶102 The Act's plain language allows us to discern the 
following essential attributes of guidance documents.13  They are 
not law, they do not have the force or effect of law, and they 
provide no authority for implementing or enforcing standards or 
conditions.  They simply "explain" statutes and rules, or they 
"provide guidance or advice" about how the executive branch is 
"likely to apply" a statute or rule.  They impose no obligations, 
set no standards, and bind no one.  They are communications about 
the law——they are not the law itself.  They communicate intended 
applications of the law——they are not the actual execution of the 
law.  Functionally, and as a matter of law, they are entirely 
inert.  That is to say, they represent nothing more than the 
knowledge and intentions of their authors.  It is readily apparent, 
therefore, that the executive need not borrow any legislative 
authority, nor seek the legislature's permission, to create 
guidance documents.  It could hardly be otherwise.  This creative 
power is necessarily inherent to the executive because no other 
                                                 
13 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language 
is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."). 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
16 
 
branch of government has even the theoretical ability to know the 
executive's mind with respect to the law he is to execute.14   
B.  May the Legislature Regulate the Executive's Guidance 
Documents? 
¶103 Because the executive branch has the native authority to 
create and disseminate guidance documents, we must next determine 
whether the legislature may nonetheless prescribe the content or 
method of disseminating such documents.  The answer depends on 
whether the creation of guidance documents represents an exercise 
of the executive's core function, or merely a power shared with 
the legislature.   
The separation of powers doctrine "envisions a system of 
separate branches sharing many powers while jealously 
guarding certain others, a system of 'separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.'"  State ex 
rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 192 
Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (quoting Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)).  "The constitutional powers 
of each branch of government fall into two categories:  
exclusive powers and shared powers."  State v. Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  "Shared powers 
lie at the intersections of these exclusive core 
constitutional 
powers," 
and 
"[t]hese 
'[g]reat 
borderlands of power' are not exclusive to any one 
branch."  Id. at 643-44 (quoting Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 
14); 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Holmes, 
106 
Wis. 2d 31, 42–43, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  Although the 
"branches may exercise [shared] power within these 
borderlands," 
they 
"may 
[not] 
unduly 
burden 
or 
                                                 
14 Chief Justice Roggensack suggests that this is a "change 
in 
the 
law[.]" 
 
See 
Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶150.  But she does not say what it is a 
change from.  We have never said that the creative power to make 
a guidance document resides somewhere other than the executive 
branch, and the Chief Justice cites no authority suggesting we 
have. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
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substantially interfere with another branch."  Horn, 226 
Wis.2d at 644. 
Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶46 (alterations in 
original). 
¶104 A branch's core powers are those that define its 
essential attributes.15  With respect to these, we have previously 
recognized that "[e]ach branch has exclusive core constitutional 
powers, into which the other branches may not intrude."  Flynn v. 
DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 545, 576 N.W.2d 245.  "Core powers," as has 
been previously observed, "are not for sharing."  Tetra Tech EC, 
Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶47.  "Shared powers[, however,] lie at the 
intersections of these exclusive core constitutional powers," and 
"[t]hese '[g]reat borderlands of power' are not exclusive to any 
one branch."  Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 643-44 (quoting Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 14 (alterations in original)).  "Although the 'branches 
may exercise [shared] power within these borderlands,' they 'may 
[not] unduly burden or substantially interfere with another 
branch.'"  Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶46 (quoting Horn, 
226 Wis. 2d at 644 (alterations in original)).  So if guidance 
documents fall somewhere in the realm of shared powers, the 
legislature would conceivably retain some claim of right to govern 
                                                 
15 The Chief Justice's concurrence says there is no basis for 
this definition of core powers.  See Chief Justice Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶152.  That is simply not true; the 
constitution itself constitutes the source.  First, we know that 
"[e]ach branch has exclusive core constitutional powers[.]"  State 
v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  These core 
powers are the "zones of authority constitutionally established 
for each branch of government[.]"  State ex rel. Fiedler v. 
Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990).  In 
other words, a core power is a power vested by the constitution 
that distinguishes that branch from the other two. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
18 
 
their content and dissemination.  But if they lie within the 
executive's core authority, the legislature must retain a 
constitutionally-respectful distance.  
¶105 We conclude that the creation and dissemination of 
guidance documents fall within the executive's core authority.  
Guidance documents, as the legislature has defined them, 
necessarily exist outside of the legislature's authority because 
of what they are and who creates them.  As we explained above, a 
guidance document is something created by executive branch 
employees through the exercise of executive authority native to 
that branch of government.  Creation of a guidance document 
requires no legislative authority and no legislative personnel.  A 
guidance document cannot affect what the law is, cannot create a 
policy, cannot impose a standard, and cannot bind anyone to 
anything.   
¶106 This is all true because guidance documents merely 
explain statutes and rules, or provide guidance or advice about 
how the executive is likely to apply them.  Thought must precede 
action, of course, and guidance documents are simply the written 
record of the executive's thoughts about the law and its execution.  
They contain the executive's interpretation of the laws, his 
judgment about what the laws require him to do.  Because this 
intellectual homework is indispensable to the duty to "take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed," Wis. Const. art. V, § 4, it 
is also inseparable from the executive's constitutionally-vested 
power.  It is all one, and has been one since the creation of our 
tripartite form of government centuries ago.  See Hamilton, supra, 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
19 
 
¶96; see also Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 600 
(1838) ("If, therefore, the executive be clearly satisfied as to 
the meaning of such a law, it is his bounden duty to see that the 
subordinate officers of his department conform with fidelity to 
that meaning; for no other execution, however pure the motive from 
which it springs, is a faithful execution of the law." (emphasis 
added)); Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶53 ("The executive 
must certainly interpret and apply the law; it would be impossible 
to perform his duties if he did not. After all, he must determine 
for himself what the law requires (interpretation) so that he may 
carry it into effect (application)."); State v. Whitman, 196 
Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928) ("Every executive officer in the 
execution of the law must of necessity interpret it in order to 
find out what it is he is required to do."). 
¶107 Sections 33 and 38 of the Act are problematic, therefore, 
because they insert the legislature as a gatekeeper between the 
analytical predicate to the execution of the laws and the actual 
execution itself.  The legislature may see itself as a benign 
gatekeeper between the two, but that is entirely irrelevant.  The 
question is whether it may install a gate at all.  If the 
legislature can regulate the necessary predicate to executing the 
law, then the legislature can control the execution of the law 
itself.  Such power would demote the executive branch to a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the legislature.  Capturing the executive's 
ability 
to 
communicate 
his 
knowledge, 
intentions, 
and 
understanding of the laws he is to execute makes him a drone 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
20 
 
without the energy or independent wherewithal to act as a co-equal 
member of government.16 
¶108 The legislature may enact the laws the executive is duty-
bound to execute.  But it may not control his knowledge or 
intentions about those laws.  Nor may it mute or modulate the 
communication of his knowledge or intentions to the public.  
Because there are no set of facts pursuant to which § 33 (to the 
extent it applies to guidance documents) and § 38 would not 
impermissibly interfere with the executive's exercise of his core 
constitutional 
power, 
they 
are 
in 
that 
respect 
facially 
unconstitutional.  
C.  Challenges to The Remaining Guidance Document Provisions 
¶109 The plaintiffs' challenge to the guidance document 
provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369 goes beyond §§ 33 and 38, but as 
it reaches §§ 31, 65-71, and 104-05, the focus of their argument 
becomes so diffuse that the justification for declaring them 
unconstitutional appears to rely almost entirely on their 
association with §§ 33 and 38.  As we now explain, the plaintiffs 
have not established that these remaining provisions "cannot be 
                                                 
16 The problem is especially acute because this regulation on 
the executive's pre-execution analysis and communication is 
infinitely recursive.  That is, if he wished to publish a bulletin 
about his understanding of 2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 33 and 38 or how 
he intends to implement them, that bulletin itself would have to 
go through the legislatively-mandated pre-clearance procedure.  
And if he wished to communicate about the communication he was 
required to submit to the legislative mandate, that communication 
too would be subject to pre-clearance.  Ultimately, the Act's 
guidance document provisions prohibit the executive branch of 
government 
from 
publicizing 
his 
thoughts, 
knowledge, 
and 
intentions about the laws he is to execute without first 
surmounting the legislature's hurdles. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
21 
 
enforced 'under any circumstances.'"  Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24 
(quoted source omitted). 
¶110 Section 31 of 2017 Wis. Act 369 defines the term 
"guidance document" (see supra, ¶90).  It is conceivable that the 
legislature might introduce an unneeded and even unwanted entry 
into our legal glossary, but the parties do not describe how that 
could even potentially impose upon or detract from any part of the 
executive's vested authority.  SEIU's brief acknowledged creation 
of this definition, noted the circuit court's global lack of faith 
in the utility of any of the guidance document provisions, and 
asserted that this provision (in conjunction with all the other 
guidance 
document 
provisions) 
"improperly 
intrude 
on 
the 
Governor's authority to implement state law."  The Governor said 
pretty much the same thing, and the Attorney General did not 
specifically mention § 31 at all.  The parties, therefore, have 
identified no basis for asserting that there is no constitutional 
application of § 31, and we see none. 
¶111 Sections 65-7117 make guidance documents reviewable by 
the courts in the same fashion as administrative rules.  Each of 
                                                 
17 Sections 65 to 71 of the Act provide: 
Section 65. 227.40 (1) of the statutes is amended to 
read:  227.40 (1) Except as provided in sub. (2), the 
exclusive means of judicial review of the validity of a 
rule or guidance document shall be an action for 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of the rule or 
guidance document brought in the circuit court for the 
county where the party asserting the invalidity of the 
rule or guidance document resides or has its principal 
place of business or, if that party is a nonresident or 
does not have its principal place of business in this 
state, in the circuit court for the county where the 
dispute arose.  The officer or other agency whose rule 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
22 
 
                                                 
or guidance document is involved shall be the party 
defendant.  The summons in the action shall be served as 
provided in s. 801.11 (3) and by delivering a copy to 
that officer or, if the agency is composed of more than 
one person, to the secretary or clerk of the agency or 
to any member of the agency.  The court shall render a 
declaratory judgment in the action only when it appears 
from the complaint and the supporting evidence that the 
rule or guidance document or its threatened application 
interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere 
with or impair, the legal rights and privileges of the 
plaintiff.  A declaratory judgment may be rendered 
whether or not the plaintiff has first requested the 
agency to pass upon the validity of the rule or guidance 
document in question. 
Section 66. 227.40 (2) (intro.) of the statutes is 
amended to read:  227.40 (2) (intro.)  The validity of 
a rule or guidance document may be determined in any of 
the 
following 
judicial 
proceedings 
when 
material 
therein: 
Section 67. 227.40 (2) (e) of the statutes is amended to 
read:  227.40 (2) (e)  Proceedings under s. 66.191, 1981 
stats., or s. 40.65 (2), 106.50, 106.52, 303.07 (7) or 
303.21 or ss. 227.52 to 227.58 or under ch. 102, 108 or 
949 for review of decisions and orders of administrative 
agencies if the validity of the rule or guidance document 
involved was duly challenged in the proceeding before 
the agency in which the order or decision sought to be 
reviewed was made or entered. 
Section 68. 227.40 (3) (intro.) of the statutes is 
renumbered 227.40 (3) (ag) and amended to read:  227.40 
(3) (ag)  In any judicial proceeding other than one set 
out above under sub. (1) or (2), in which the invalidity 
of a rule or guidance document is material to the cause 
of action or any defense thereto, the assertion of such 
that invalidity shall be set forth in the pleading of 
the party so maintaining the invalidity of such the rule 
or guidance document in that proceeding.  The party so 
asserting the invalidity of such the rule or guidance 
document shall, within 30 days after the service of the 
pleading in which the party sets forth such the 
invalidity, apply to the court in which such the 
proceedings are had for an order suspending the trial of 
said the proceeding until after a determination of the 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
23 
 
                                                 
validity of said the rule or guidance document in an 
action for declaratory judgment under sub. (1) hereof. 
Section 69. 227.40 (3) (a) of the statutes is renumbered 
227.40 (3) (ar) and amended to read:  227.40 (3) (ar)  
Upon the hearing of such the application, if the court 
is satisfied that the validity of such the rule or 
guidance document is material to the issues of the case, 
an order shall be entered staying the trial of said 
proceeding until the rendition of a final declaratory 
judgment in proceedings to be instituted forthwith by 
the party asserting the invalidity of such the rule or 
guidance document.  If the court shall find finds that 
the asserted invalidity of a the rule or guidance 
document is not material to the case, an order shall be 
entered denying the application for stay. 
Section 70. 227.40 (3) (b) and (c) of the statutes are 
amended to read:  227.40 (3) (b)  Upon the entry of a 
final order in said the declaratory judgment action, it 
shall be the duty of the party who asserts the invalidity 
of the rule or guidance document to formally advise the 
court of the outcome of the declaratory judgment action 
so brought as ordered by the court.  After the final 
disposition of the declaratory judgment action the court 
shall be bound by and apply the judgment so entered in 
the trial of the proceeding in which the invalidity of 
the rule or guidance document is asserted. 
(c) Failure to set forth the invalidity of a rule or 
guidance document in a pleading or to commence a 
declaratory judgment proceeding within a reasonable time 
pursuant to such the order of the court or to prosecute 
such the declaratory judgment action without undue delay 
shall preclude such the party from asserting or 
maintaining such that the rule or guidance document is 
invalid. 
Section 71. 227.40 (4) (a) of the statutes is amended to 
read:  227.40 (4) (a)  In any proceeding pursuant to 
this section for judicial review of a rule or guidance 
document, the court shall declare the rule or guidance 
document 
invalid 
if 
it 
finds 
that 
it 
violates 
constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory 
authority of the agency or was promulgated or adopted 
without 
compliance 
with 
statutory 
rule-making 
or 
adoption procedures. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
24 
 
these sections does little more than add the term "guidance 
document" to various subsections of Wis. Stat. § 227.40, which 
formerly applied only to rules.  The parties do not make any 
particularized argument against judicial review of guidance 
documents, and we see no reason why the legislature's provision 
for such review differs so profoundly from judicial review of 
administrative rules that the former would necessarily be 
unconstitutional under any circumstances, while the latter is not.  
Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24 (A statute is facially unconstitutional 
only when it "cannot be enforced 'under any circumstances.'" 
(quoted source omitted)). 
¶112 The final two provisions of 2017 Wis. Act 369 that 
implicate guidance documents are §§ 104 and 105.  Section 104 
establishes the initial applicability of § 33.  It says:  "(1) 
Agency publications.  The treatment of [Wis. Stat. § ]227.05 with 
respect to printed publications first applies to guidance 
documents, forms, pamphlets, or other informational materials that 
are printed 60 days after the effective date of this subsection."  
Section 105 is similarly unremarkable in that it simply determines 
the effective date of the Act's provisions:  "(1) Agency 
publications.  The treatment of [§] 227.05 and Section 104 (1) 
takes effect on the first day of the 7th month beginning after 
publication."  None of the respondents provide any reason to 
believe these provisions are facially unconstitutional, and no 
such reason immediately presents itself to us. 
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES 
                                                 
2017 Wis. Act. 369, §§ 65-71 (amending Wis. Stat. § 227.40). 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
25 
 
¶113 Sections 33 and 38 are before us today on different 
procedural footings.  The latter is here on a straightforward 
review of the circuit court's denial of a motion to dismiss.  
Section 33, however, presents in a somewhat awkward posture for 
two reasons.  First SEIU does not claim this provision is 
unconstitutional.  That allegation appears in the Governor's 
cross-claim.  The Legislative Defendants' answer to the cross-
claim asserts the Governor does not have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a law.  However, the Legislative Defendants 
did not advance that argument in this court, and they fully briefed 
their position on the section's constitutionality.  Because 
standing is a matter of judicial prudence, Milwaukee District 
Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, ¶38 n.7, 244 
Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866 ("[S]tanding is generally a matter of 
judicial policy rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite."), and 
it was not argued here, we will not apply it.  State v. Chamblis, 
2015 WI 53, ¶54 n.15, 362 Wis. 2d 370, 864 N.W.2d 806 ("We choose 
not to address that argument because it was not briefed by the 
parties.").  We do not opine on whether the Governor actually has 
standing; we simply do not address it. 
¶114 The second postural oddity with respect to § 33 is that 
we are reviewing it in the context of determining whether the 
circuit court properly issued a temporary injunction against its 
enforcement.  That is to say, this section was not included in the 
Legislative Defendants' motion to dismiss.  That means our task is 
to determine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion 
in 
issuing 
the 
temporary 
injunction. 
 
Such 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
26 
 
interlocutory relief is available when:  "(1) the movant is likely 
to suffer irreparable harm if a temporary injunction is not issued; 
(2) the movant has no other adequate remedy at law; (3) a temporary 
injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo; and (4) the 
movant has a reasonable probability of success on the merits."  
Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 370 Wis. 2d 644, ¶20 (citing 
Werner, 80 Wis. 2d at 520–21). 
¶115 We conclude the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction with 
respect 
to 
§§ 33 
and 
38 
because 
those 
provisions 
are 
unconstitutional, and it would therefore be unlawful to enforce 
them.  Justice Hagedorn, however, does not believe this ends the 
inquiry:  "The majority could have determined the claim is likely 
to be successful, and gone on to analyze the remaining factors."  
Justice Hagedorn's concurrence/dissent, ¶211 n.6. 
¶116 Justice Hagedorn acknowledges that one aspect of the 
temporary injunction test is the likelihood of success on the 
merits.  The merits in this case depend entirely on whether the 
challenged portions of the Act are unconstitutional. Consequently, 
our 
review 
unavoidably 
requires 
us 
to 
inquire 
into 
the 
constitutionality of the enjoined provisions, including §§ 33 and 
38.  We performed that inquiry, and have concluded that both of 
those provisions are unconstitutional.     
¶117 Justice Hagedorn's insistence that we analyze the 
remaining factors makes sense only if there are circumstances under 
which it would be appropriate to continue enforcing a law we have 
already decided is unconstitutional.  If we concluded that the 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
27 
 
movant would not suffer irreparable harm, would that make it 
acceptable for the executive to enforce an unconstitutional law?  
If there were an alternative legal remedy, would we tell the 
circuit 
court 
that 
the 
continued 
application 
of 
an 
unconstitutional law is legally warranted?  If the status quo would 
not change without a temporary injunction, would that mean the 
unconstitutional law could remain in effect?  Obviously not.  
¶118 Justice Hagedorn's concerns grow out of a failure to 
account for the supreme court's position in the judiciary.  If we 
were the circuit court, or the court of appeals, he would be 
correct——consideration of each of the remaining factors would be 
necessary because the relief sought would be interlocutory.  That 
is to say, when the case was pending in the circuit court, the 
merits of the plaintiffs' claims were in question because a 
declaration of unconstitutionality was subject to judicial review.  
Once this court opines on a state statute's fidelity to the state 
constitution, however, the ultimate result is no longer in doubt 
because there is no further judicial review of our decision (unless 
it implicates federal law, which this does not).18  So the only 
purpose in considering the remaining temporary injunction factors 
would be if we would consider remanding the case to the circuit 
court to decide whether a law we declared unconstitutional should 
                                                 
18 J. C. Penney Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 238 Wis. 69, 72, 
298 N.W. 186 (1941), overruled in part on different grounds by 
Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 250 Wis. 
533, 27 N.W.2d 889 (1947) ("As we understand the law, our 
construction of the state statute is conclusive upon the Supreme 
Court of the United States."). 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
28 
 
nevertheless be enforced.  We believe such a result would be 
anomalous and contrary to law. 
¶119 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
denying the Legislative Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect 
to 2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 31, 65-71, and 104-05 because the 
plaintiffs have not established that they cannot be enforced under 
any set of circumstances.  Further, because the interlocutory 
relief rested on their asserted unconstitutionality, which we have 
now rejected, the temporary injunction can have no further force 
or effect with respect to those provisions.  However, because we 
have declared that 2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 33 and 38 are 
unconstitutional, there can be no reason to further consider 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
granting 
the 
temporary 
injunction 
with 
respect 
to 
these 
provisions. 
V.  THE DISSENTS 
¶120 Justice Hagedorn says our reasoning "is wrong on the 
facts and runs contrary to the plain language of the laws the 
legislature passed.  This means its constitutional conclusion is 
similarly faulty."  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence/dissent, ¶191.  
But he never identifies any error in our understanding of the laws 
the legislature passed.  In fact, there appears to be no 
disagreement at all with respect to what §§ 33 and 38 actually do.  
Instead, the disagreement is over what the constitution requires.  
It is also about Justice Hagedorn's misunderstanding of what we 
said about the constitution, which he mischaracterizes as having 
rejected §§ 33 and 38 "on the thinnest of foundations——its 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
29 
 
misguided determination that guidance documents regulate executive 
branch thought."  Id.  At the risk of repeating what we have 
already said, this is not just about regulating the executive's 
thought——it is about interfering in the relationship between the 
executive branch's interpretation of the law, its communication of 
that interpretation to the public, and its execution of the law. 
¶121 Then, after selectively ignoring our analysis, Justice 
Hagedorn announces that "[g]uidance documents regulate executive 
branch 
communications 
with 
the 
public——a 
permissible 
and 
longstanding area of legislative regulation."  Id.  But how would 
he know this is constitutionally permissible?  His opinion makes 
no effort to determine what lies within the executive branch's 
core authority, or how the statutory definition of "guidance 
document" might relate to that authority.  He simply asserts that 
"[b]y enacting the guidance document provisions, the legislature 
is carrying out its function of determining what the law should be 
by passing laws pursuant to its constitutional authority."  Id., 
¶198.  If this is the correct standard for determining whether the 
legislature invaded the executive's exclusive zone of authority 
(and his opinion contains no further exploration of this concept), 
then there can be no structural limitations on the scope of laws 
the legislature may adopt.  Of course §§ 33 and 38 are laws the 
legislature adopted under its constitutional authority to make the 
law.  That is not the question.  The question is whether, in making 
this law, the legislature legislated on something the constitution 
says it may not.   
The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
30 
 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is 
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.  
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a 
legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; 
if the latter part be true, then written Constitutions 
are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit 
a power in its own nature illimitable.  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  Ultimately, 
because Justice Hagedorn offers no constitutional analysis, his 
opinion is little more than an invitation to place our faith in 
his personal pronouncement about what is and is not within the 
executive branch's core authority. 
¶122 We part ways with Justice Hagedorn's belief that the 
legislature's power to command the executive branch to create and 
disseminate a document is coextensive with the power to ban the 
executive branch from creating and disseminating a document unless 
it complies with the legislature's content (§ 33) and publication 
(§ 38) requirements.  There is no logical correlation between those 
two concepts, and Justice Hagedorn's opinion does nothing to link 
them.  Nonetheless, the bulk of his opinion is simply an extended 
discussion of statutes that require the executive branch to create 
certain documents, followed by his assumption that this confers on 
the legislature the power to prevent the executive branch from 
creating and disseminating documents unless they comply with the 
legislature's content and publication requirements.  Justice 
Hagedorn introduces this part of his analysis by accusing the court 
of resting its analysis on "its mistaken interpretation of what 
guidance documents are."  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence/dissent, 
¶192.  He then proceeds to essentially repeat the statute's 
definition of guidance documents, a definition on which we based 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
31 
 
our entire analysis.  As relevant here, a guidance document 
"[e]xplains the agency's implementation of a statute or rule[,]" 
or "[p]rovides guidance or advice with respect to how the agency 
is likely to apply a statute or rule[.]"  See 2017 Wis. Act 369, 
§ 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)(a)1.-2.).  Because the executive 
branch (through its agencies) creates and issues guidance 
documents, 
it 
necessarily 
follows 
that 
they 
contain 
the 
executive's explanations, or the executive's guidance or advice.  
Naturally, that means the explanations, guidance, and advice must 
originate in the minds of executive branch employees, which further 
means 
guidance 
documents 
are 
nothing 
but 
the 
written 
manifestations of the executive branch's thought processes.  But 
if the legislature can "determine the content" of a guidance 
document, then it is no longer the executive's explanation, or the 
executive's 
guidance 
or 
advice——it 
is 
the 
legislature's 
explanation, guidance, or advice.  So, to the extent the 
legislature commands production of a document, or determines the 
content of a guidance document, it simply is no longer a guidance 
document.  The failure to make that distinction explains his 
assertions that "determining the content and timing of executive 
branch communications are not the exclusive prerogative of the 
executive," and that "nothing in the constitution suggests the 
legislature cannot, at least in some circumstances, make laws that 
determine the content of certain formal communications from the 
government 
to 
the 
public." 
 
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶198.  His assertions are correct with 
respect to documents the legislature has the power to command.  
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
32 
 
But they are not correct with respect to guidance documents, 
because having not been commanded, they belong entirely to the 
executive.  Nothing in Justice Hagedorn's opinion describes how 
the power to command the former translates into the power to ban 
the latter unless they comply with the legislature's content and 
publication requirements. 
¶123 Justice Hagedorn says he does not see why there is any 
difference between:  (a) commanding the creation of a document 
and; (b) preventing the executive branch from creating a certain 
class of documents unless they comply with the legislature's 
requirements.  "For example," he says, "if an executive agency 
must by legislative command create a youth hunting bulletin and 
cite the relevant law, this is a reflection of the executive 
branch's understanding of the law no less than if the executive 
chooses to do the same thing in the absence of such a command."  
Id., ¶206.  In the absence of a legislative command, of course, 
the document would belong to the executive department.  Justice 
Hagedorn's reasoning works only if the executive branch has no 
authority to create or disseminate guidance documents, and depends 
on legislative permission to do so.  This, of course, is not true 
and Justice Hagedorn does not even attempt to demonstrate 
otherwise. 
¶124 But the really instructive aspect of Justice Hagedorn's 
discussion of this bulletin is its revelation that his paramount 
concern is with the amount of the executive's authority the 
legislature pre-empts, rather than with whether the legislature 
may pre-empt it at all.  He says "Wisconsin Stat. § 227.05 requires 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
33 
 
that a guidance document cite the applicable laws.  But the 
majority opinion holds that this is too much for the legislature 
to demand of the executive branch because it controls executive 
branch thought."  Id., ¶210.  The question is not whether the 
legislature demanded too much, but whether it had the right to 
demand at all.  Now, it is obviously true that the legislature 
could require the Department of Natural Resources to issue a 
bulletin citing the law applicable to the youth hunting season.  
It would simply need to pass a law mandating such a bulletin and 
require the citation.  But that authority does not translate into 
the power to ban executive guidance documents on that subject 
unless 
they 
meet 
the 
legislature's 
content 
and 
process 
requirements. 
¶125 To these errors Justice Hagedorn adds a metaphysical 
impossibility.  He says the legislature can, and regularly does, 
co-opt the executive's thought processes that go into creating 
what are now known as guidance documents:  "The legislature has 
long regulated . . . the executive branch's understanding of what 
the law is . . . and how the executive branch intends to execute 
the law going forward."  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence/dissent, 
¶199.  That, of course, is not and cannot be true.  The legislature 
may tell executive branch employees what the law is and what to do 
with it, but regulating the employees' understanding of the law or 
their intentions with respect to the execution of the law is 
entirely beyond the legislature's reach——not as a matter of 
separation of powers, but as an epistemological recognition that 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
34 
 
one person cannot control another's understanding or intentions.19  
He says "[t]he clearest example [of this phenomenon] may be the 
mandatory creation of certain executive branch reports," such as 
Wis. Stat. § 15.04(1)(d), which he says requires the executive 
agencies to "include what the agency has done, how it operates, 
and its goals and objectives moving forward."  Justice Hagedorn's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶199.  Commanding the executive to divulge 
its understanding of the law and intentions with respect to the 
law is not the same thing as regulating the executive's 
understanding and intentions.  So the dispositive difference 
between this and the guidance document provisions is really not 
that hard to spot.  The legislature may command the executive to 
speak, and even provide content to include in that speech.  But 
absent a command to produce a document, the document is the 
executive's own, and the legislature cannot, as an epistemological 
matter, control how the executive understands the law he is 
addressing, or his intentions with respect to that law.  Justice 
                                                 
19 Another 
epistemological 
error 
shows 
up 
in 
Justice 
Hagedorn's reversal of our observation that "[t]he constitutional 
authority of the executive encompasses determining what the law 
requires as well as applying it (preferably in that order)."  
Supra, ¶99.  He says this is "wrong on the facts, and therefore, 
wrong on the law" because guidance documents "are the result of, 
rather than the necessary predicate to, executing the law."  
Justice 
Hagedorn's 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶203. 
 
But 
this 
formulation——act first, do the intellectual homework later——cannot 
possibly be correct.  Creating a guidance document does not reflect 
the execution of any law.  It is simply a written record of the 
executive branch's thoughts about how it will——future tense——
execute the law, or how others ought to——future tense——conform 
themselves to the law.  In the relationship between guidance 
documents and execution of the law, therefore, guidance documents 
come first as a definitional and epistemological matter. 
 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
35 
 
Hagedorn could probably provide an endless list of examples in 
which he believes this type of legislative control over the 
executive branch would be a good idea and minimally intrusive (and 
he makes a good start on it (see id., ¶207)), but that would be to 
entirely miss the point.  With respect to core powers, the 
constitutionality of the legislature's reach into the executive 
branch is not determined by the wisdom of what it would do once 
there, or the relative lack of discomfort to those exercising core 
powers.  It is determined by whether the legislature is exercising 
that control at all.  But for Justice Hagedorn, there is no 
difference between:  (a) a mandatory report describing an agency's 
understandings and intentions and; (b) a law that attempts to 
regulate the executive branch's "understanding of what the law is" 
and how it "intends to execute the law."  Id., ¶199.  The former 
is clearly lawful and achievable; the latter is impossible because 
the executive branch's thought processes about the implementation 
of the law, and its guidance and advice, are (by definition) its 
own. 
¶126 These are some of the granular reasons we believe Justice 
Hagedorn's analysis is incorrect.  But taking a step back to get 
an overall picture of the legislature's assertion of power in §§ 33 
and 38 reveals why, as a structural matter, it simply cannot work.  
To the extent Justice Hagedorn's opinion contains a constitutional 
analysis, it rests solely on the proposition that because the 
legislature can command the executive to produce certain 
documents, it may ban those that do not follow the legislature's 
content and publication requirements.  Because his analysis 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
36 
 
focuses on the legislature's power, without any reference to what 
might lie within the executive's core authority, there is no reason 
his analysis would not be equally applicable to the judiciary.  
Would Justice Hagedorn be as sanguine about §§ 33 and 38 if they 
applied to us?  Would he pick up our "constitutional penalty flag," 
Justice Hagedorn's concurrence/dissent, ¶190, if the legislature 
told us that, prior to publishing our opinions, we must submit 
them to a public comment process, and then take those comments 
into consideration before finalizing and publishing our work?  
Would he find it constitutionally unobjectionable if the 
legislature were to mandate that "draft [court opinions] be posted 
for 21 days before they are officially issued"?  Id., ¶211.  Would 
he quizzically ask why "[p]osting a draft before issuance of some 
[court opinions] is now denominated a regulation of [judicial] 
branch thought and invades core [judicial] power"?  Id.  Would he 
say that "[t]he legislature is not invading the [judiciary]'s 
ability to read the law or think about the law when it regulates 
how [the courts] officially communicate to the public about what 
the law is and where in the statutes the law may be found"?  Id., 
¶204.  Would he conclude that the legislature may mandate the 
content and publication process of our opinions because "[b]y the 
time [the court's opinion] has been reduced to writing, the 
thinking and analyzing has been done"?  Id., ¶203.  Would he be 
mollified if we could reduce the pre-clearance time period to 
something inconsequential? 
¶127 One could do this with the entirety of Justice Hagedorn's 
analysis.  And even though the answers are so obvious they make 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
37 
 
the questions rhetorical, he has no substantive response to any of 
this.  But he does reject it on the sweeping basis that "the 
legislature's relationship to the judiciary is far different than 
its relationship to the branch charged with the constitutional 
duty to execute the laws the legislature passes."  Id., ¶204 n.5.  
A long time ago the notion that the branches of government are co-
equal passed into the realm of common knowledge.  But Justice 
Hagedorn's assertion, coming as it does with no explanation, 
carries a suggestion that the executive is less than equal in its 
relationship with the legislature.20 Perhaps it is because his 
guiding principle (as far as he says in his opinion, at least) is 
simply that, so long as "the legislature is carrying out its 
function of determining what the law should be by passing laws 
pursuant to its constitutional authority," there are no structural 
limitations on the scope of that law.  Id., ¶198.  He certainly 
provides no analysis of the legislature's limits, nor does he even 
attempt to describe what might be included in the executive's core 
                                                 
20 Justice Hagedorn apparently misses the import of these 
illustrations.  He says: 
Moreover, the majority's criticisms ring hollow because 
the majority says the legislature can pass laws that do 
the very things it cites; the legislature just has to 
enact laws regarding specific documents (create a youth 
hunting bulletin, for example). So the majority's 
criticisms apply just as forcefully to its own 
reasoning, which is to say, not much at all. 
Justice Hagedorn's concurrence/dissent, ¶204 n.5.  The whole point 
of putting the "very things" we cite in the judicial context is to 
illustrate why the legislature may not do what Justice Hagedorn 
thinks it may.  So, to be clear, the illustrations identify things 
Justice Hagedorn says the legislature may do with respect to the 
executive, but which we say the legislature may not do.  
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
38 
 
powers. And yet without doing any of this work, he says "[our] 
analysis falls far short of the mark,"  id., ¶201, even though the 
constitutional principles informing our analysis are well-
documented and fundamental to the separation of powers established 
under our constitution more than 170 years ago.   
* 
¶128 And now a few closing words about Chief Justice 
Roggensack's partial concurrence and partial dissent.  She says 
our analysis is flawed because it does not recognize that the 
legislature has plenary authority over administrative agencies, 
and that they may do nothing without legislative permission.  This 
is so, she says, because of the nature of administrative agencies 
within our constitutional structure:  "[A]dministrative agencies 
have no constitutional core powers because they are not a branch 
of government in our tripartite system."  Chief Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶148.  She also asserts that we 
have previously said that administrative agencies can do nothing 
but what the legislature tells them to do:  "[A]dministrative 
agencies are creations of the legislature and that they can 
exercise only those powers granted by the legislature."  Id., ¶150 
(quoting Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 697). 
¶129 But this is only partly true.  With respect to what 
agencies are, it is certainly true that they are not "a branch of 
government" in the sense of being discrete from the standard three.  
But as we said just last term, "they are considered part of the 
executive branch."  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶14.  The Chief 
Justice agrees, or at least she did last year.  See id.  
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
39 
 
("[A]gencies 
are 
part 
of 
the 
executive 
branch 
once 
established[.]").  And the executive, at times, acts through 
administrative agencies to fulfill his constitutional obligation 
that the laws be faithfully executed.  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014) ("Under our system of 
government, Congress makes laws and the President, acting at times 
through agencies . . . 'faithfully execute[s]' them." (quoted 
source omitted; alterations in original)); see also supra, ¶97. 
¶130 With respect to the granting of power to administrative 
agencies, the Chief Justice mistakes the import of our analysis in 
Martinez.  There, we said "administrative agencies are creations 
of the legislature and . . . they can exercise only those powers 
granted by the legislature."  Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d 20 at 697.  
From this the Chief Justice concludes that because agencies are 
created by the legislature they are subject to its plenary control.  
Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶147.  That, 
however, overlooks the fact that agencies exercise both executive 
and legislative powers.  Our observations in Martinez related to 
the legislature's ability to govern the rule-making authority——
that is, the legislative power——it delegates to administrative 
agencies.  So our statements on the legislature's ability to limit 
the legislative authority the agencies exercise say nothing about 
its ability to limit the agencies' exercise of executive authority.  
Nor does the Chief Justice find any authority for the proposition 
that an agency's exercise of that executive authority arises from 
or is dependent on the legislature.  The legislature undeniably 
has plenary authority to govern administrative agencies' exercise 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
40 
 
of their delegated rule-making power because the legislature could 
simply choose to revoke it altogether.  Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 
698.  It naturally follows that if the legislature may eliminate 
the power it conferred, it may also condition the exercise of that 
power.  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶20.  But the legislature does 
not confer on administrative agencies the ability to exercise 
executive power; that comes by virtue of being part of the 
executive branch.  The Chief Justice cites no authority nor 
presents any argument suggesting the legislature's authority over 
an agency's exercise of legislative power is necessarily (or even 
potentially) co-extensive with its authority over an agency's 
exercise of executive power. 
¶131 This is a dangerous path the Chief Justice is pursuing.  
The Wisconsin Constitution provides for a circuit court, but does 
not say how many circuit court judges there shall be.  So the 
existence of any given circuit court judge is dependent entirely 
on the legislature's choice to create the position.  The Chief 
Justice says the power to create includes the ability to control 
the exercise of authority in that position, even when the 
legislature is not the source of the authority the employee 
exercises.  If that logic is sound, the legislature could tell 
circuit court judges how to exercise their judicial power on the 
grounds that it did not have to create the circuit court position 
in the first place and could eliminate it. 
¶132 The Chief Justice also says the executive's authority to 
explain the law, or give guidance or advice about it, is not core 
to the executive: 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
41 
 
While the executive may interpret laws so that he can 
"faithfully execute" them, it does not follow that 
interpretation of the law is a constitutional core power 
of the executive.  Many elected and appointed persons 
interpret the law in order to carry out their assigned 
duties, be they constitutional functions or otherwise. 
Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶137.  In support, 
she quotes Justice Clarence Thomas, who said:  
[t]he judicial power was understood [at the time of the 
founding of the United States] to include the power to 
resolve ambiguities over time.  Alexander Hamilton 
lauded this power, arguing that '[t]he interpretation of 
the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts.'  It is undoubtedly true that the other branches 
of Government have the authority and obligation to 
interpret the law, but only the judicial interpretation 
would be considered authoritative in a judicial 
proceeding." 
Id., ¶138 (quoting Perez, 575 U.S. at 119–20 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (some alterations in original; internal citations 
omitted)).  Justice Thomas, of course, was careful to note that 
the judiciary's interpretation of the law is authoritative "in a 
judicial proceeding."  Perez, 575 U.S. at 120.  He made no claim 
that our interpretation would be authoritative in the executive 
branch's determination of what the law requires.  As Alexander 
Hamilton said:  "He who is to execute the laws must first judge 
for himself of their meaning."  See Hamilton, supra, ¶96 (emphasis 
added).   
¶133 The question here is not whether the executive branch 
alone may interpret the law.  The question is whether interpreting 
the law within the executive branch is an exercise core to the 
executive and his employees.  The Chief Justice says this is a 
shared power, but does not indicate how that could possibly be.  
The general power to interpret the law is "shared" in the sense 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
42 
 
that each of the branches must perform that function while 
performing their vested responsibilities, but the Chief Justice 
does not explain how the interpretation of the law within the 
executive branch could be shared with any other branch.  She simply 
concludes that "[i]f explaining what the law means through guidance 
documents actually were a constitutional core power of the 
executive, courts could not strike down such an interpretation."  
Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶154.  But we 
don't strike down executive interpretations of the law.  We strike 
down the executive's application of the law in specific cases.  A 
guidance document is not an application of the law, it is simply 
the executive branch's understanding of what the law requires.21 
¶134 Finally, the Chief Justice says that, "[e]ven though 
guidance documents do not have the force of law as rules of 
administrative agencies do, employees of agencies apply them to 
the public's interaction with the agency.  Sometimes those 
interactions result in litigation when a person against whom a 
guidance document is being enforced objects to enforcement."  Chief 
Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶141.  She also cautions 
                                                 
21 The Chief Justice says we ignored State v. Unnamed 
Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989), as an example 
of the judiciary properly invading the executive's interpretation 
of the law.  Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶151.  
There, as the Chief Justice notes, "an acting district attorney 
concluded that he could not prove a sexual assault occurred beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, decided not to commence 
criminal proceedings."  Id. (citing Unnamed Defendant, 150 
Wis. 2d at 356). We ultimately approved the circuit court's order 
authorizing issuance of a complaint under Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3).  
But this does not illustrate what the Chief Justice thinks it does.  
We didn't countermand the district attorney's interpretation of 
the law, we countermanded his exercise of discretion. 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
43 
 
that "[g]uidance documents can have a practical effect similar to 
an unpromulgated rule," noting that "historically, administrative 
agencies have relied on guidance documents to circumvent 
rulemaking."  Id., ¶¶142-43.  Now that the legislature has 
specifically defined a guidance document as something that cannot 
be a rule, impose any obligations, set no standards, or bind 
anyone, it is no longer even conceptually possible for them to be 
"applied" or "enforced" against a person in accordance with the 
law.  However, should an administrative employee treat a guidance 
document as a source of authority, that employee would be making 
a mistake, not defining the nature of a guidance document.  So 
although the Chief Justice accurately describes how guidance 
documents were used prior to adoption of 2017 Wis. Act 369, they 
may no longer be lawfully used in that manner.  We expect, as 
befits a co-equal branch of government, that executive branch 
employees will respect that change in the law.  But if they should 
mistakenly use them as before, their mistakes are subject to 
judicial review pursuant to §§ 65-71, as we explained above.  The 
Chief Justice's concern that executive branch employees will 
misuse guidance documents in the future is not a justification for 
allowing the legislature to overstep its constitutional boundaries 
in order to check those transgressions.  Procedural safeguards 
enacted by the legislature, even those that respond to the 
executive's historical misuse of guidance documents, must comport 
with the constitution.  Sections 33 and 38 do not. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Nos.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 
 
44 
 
¶135 We affirm the circuit court's judgment that 2017 Wis. 
Act 369 § 33 (to the extent it addresses guidance documents) and 
§ 38 are facially unconstitutional because they intrude on power 
the Wisconsin Constitution vests in the executive branch of 
government.  However, we reverse the circuit court's judgment with 
respect to 2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 31, 65-71, 104-05. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶136 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I conclude that 2017 Wis. Act 369's 
regulation of guidance documents does not invade the executive's 
core powers.  I write to point out the fundamental flaw that 
underlies Justice Kelly's reasoning and on which he bases his 
conclusion that "the creation and dissemination of guidance 
documents fall within the executive's core authority."  Justice 
Kelly's majority op., ¶105.   
¶137 The executive's constitutional core power is to "take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed."  Wis. Const. art. V, 
§ 4.  Justice Kelly gets to the conclusion he seeks by adding 
interpretation of the law to Article V, § 4's core power of 
execution of the law.  Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶¶105–06.  
While the executive may interpret laws so that he can "faithfully 
execute" them, it does not follow that interpretation of the law 
is a constitutional core power of the executive.  Many elected and 
appointed persons interpret the law in order to carry out their 
assigned duties, be they constitutional functions or otherwise.   
¶138 In judicial proceedings, interpretation of the law is 
the constitutional core power of the courts.  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 2; State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("It is, of course, a 
solemn obligation of the judiciary to faithfully give effect to 
the laws enacted by the legislature, and to do so requires a 
determination of statutory meaning.").  When an executive's 
interpretation of a law has been challenged in court, it is the 
court's interpretation that prevails, not the executive's.  State 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
2 
 
v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 360, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989); 
see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 119–20 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("The judicial power was understood [at 
the time of the founding of the United States] to include the power 
to resolve these ambiguities over time.  Alexander Hamilton lauded 
this power, arguing that '[t]he interpretation of the laws is the 
proper and peculiar province of the courts.'  It is undoubtedly 
true that the other branches of Government have the authority and 
obligation 
to 
interpret 
the 
law, 
but 
only 
the 
judicial 
interpretation would be considered authoritative in a judicial 
proceeding." (Internal citations omitted.)).   
¶139 Outside of judicial proceedings, interpreting the law is 
a power that is shared by many governmental actors, e.g., state 
executive agency employees, state legislative employees, county 
agency employees, court employees and municipal employees, to name 
only a few who must interpret the law in order to perform their 
functions.  Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 696, 478 N.W.2d 
582 (1992).  Although the executive interprets laws, such 
interpretation 
does 
not 
convert 
a 
shared 
power 
into 
a 
constitutional core power of the executive.  Rather, outside of 
court proceedings, interpreting the law remains a shared function.  
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶140–41, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 
914 N.W.2d 21 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶140 2017 Wis. Act 369 has several provisions that affect 
guidance documents.  Section 31 generally defines guidance 
documents; § 33 addresses required content of guidance documents; 
§ 38 regulates creation of guidance documents and §§ 65-71 set out 
how litigation may proceed when guidance documents are at issue.1  
Justice Kelly has concerns with only §§ 33 and 38.  Justice Kelly's 
majority op., ¶88.  He has concluded that the other guidance 
document provisions are facially constitutional.  Id.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Remedial Nature of 2017 Wis. Act 369 
¶141 Guidance documents explain agencies' interpretations of 
provisions in statutes and administrative agency rules.  They 
explain how the agency that created the guidance document likely 
will apply the law, often giving factual examples in the guidance 
document.  Guidance documents include such things as handbooks, 
"how to" instructions for meeting various agency requirements and 
many other suggestions for successful interactions with the 
agency.  Even though guidance documents do not have the force of 
law as rules of administrative agencies do, employees of agencies 
apply them to the public's interaction with the agency.  Sometimes 
those interactions result in litigation when a person against whom 
a guidance document is being enforced objects to enforcement.  
Newcap, Inc. v. DHS, 2018 WI App 40, ¶3, 383 Wis. 2d 515, 916 
N.W.2d 173. 
                                                 
1 Sections 104–05 address the initial applicability and 
effective date of § 33. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶142 Guidance documents can have a practical effect similar 
to 
an 
unpromulgated 
rule. 
 
To 
explain, 
"[a]gency 
guidance . . . can have similar effect to an enforcement action or 
regulation——imposing 
norms 
on 
regulated 
entities 
or 
the 
beneficiaries of regulatory programs.  Moreover, the individual 
interests subject to agency guidance frequently are no less 
important than those interests regulated through administrative 
enforcement actions and regulations."  Jessica Mantel, Procedural 
Safeguards for Agency Guidance:  A Source of Legitimacy for the 
Administrative State, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 343, 345 (2009).   
¶143 Given the rule-like practical effects of guidance 
documents, we should not be surprised that, historically, 
administrative agencies have relied on guidance documents to 
circumvent rulemaking.  Andrew C. Cook, Extraordinary Session 
Laws:  New Limits on Governor and Attorney General, 92 Wis. Law. 
26, 27 (2019) (discussing the problem created when "guidance 
documents contain new interpretations that operate essentially as 
administrative rules but without going through the proper 
rulemaking process"); Written Testimony of Senator David Craig on 
Senate Bill 745 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Regulatory 
Reform 
(Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://docs.legis. 
wisconsin.gov/misc/lc/hearing_testimony_and_materials/2017/sb745
/sb0745_2018_02_06.pdf (explaining that guidance documents have 
been used "to avoid the deliberative process of rulemaking") (last 
visited June 25, 2020); Floor Speech by Andre Jacque Floor Session 
on 
2017 
Assembly 
Bill 
1072 
(2017 
Wis. 
Act 
369), 
at  
3:25, https://wiseye.org/2018/12/05/assembly-floor-session-part-
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
5 
 
2-8/ (last visited June 25, 2020) (explaining the assemblyman 
"frequently heard from constituents, small businesses [and] local 
government" about "how guidance documents have been abused as a 
vehicle to actually change the law" and how they are sometimes 
"hidden from sight or dusted off after decades").   
¶144 Wisconsin's troublesome history with guidance documents 
is not unique.2  The D.C. Circuit summarized the problem well in 
2000: 
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar.  Congress 
passes a broadly worded statute.  The agency follows 
with regulations containing broad language, open-ended 
phrases, ambiguous standards and the like.  Then as years 
pass, the agency issues circulars or guidance or 
memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often 
expanding the commands in the regulations.  One guidance 
document may yield another and then another and so on.  
Several words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of pages 
of text as the agency offers more and more detail 
regarding what its regulations demand of regulated 
entities.  Law is made, without notice and comment, 
without public participation, and without publication in 
the Federal Register of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (emphasis added). 
¶145 Justice Kelly ignores the remedial nature of 2017 Wis. 
Act 369.  He argues that "should an administrative agency employee 
treat a guidance document as a source of authority, that employee 
would be making a mistake, not defining the nature of a guidance 
                                                 
2 Hale Melnick, Comment, Guidance Documents and Rules: 
Increasing Executive Accountability in the Regulatory World, 44 
B.C. Environmental Affairs L. Rev. 357, 364 (2017) ("By issuing 
guidance documents, agencies circumvent the costly and time-
consuming——but 
democratically 
important——notice-and-comment 
requirements."). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
6 
 
document. . . .  [T]heir mistakes are subject to judicial review."  
Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶134.   
¶146 I cannot ignore the history that led to the enactment of 
2017 Wis. Act 369 simply because judicial review is available.  
Recently, we explained that judicial review is, by itself, an 
inadequate protection against the deprivation of the people's 
liberty.  Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶¶32–35, 391 
Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900.  As we explained, "[j]udicial review 
does not prevent oppressive conduct from initially occurring."  
Id., ¶35.  The legislature has a legitimate interest in providing 
effective procedural safeguards.  Id.  Justice Kelly should not be 
so quick to dismiss the history that led to the enactment of 2017 
Wis. Act 369. 
B.  Agencies 
¶147 While agencies are part of the executive branch once 
established, it is the legislature that creates agencies and grants 
them "power as is necessary to carry into effect the general 
legislative purpose."  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶12, 387 
Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600.  An administrative agency has only 
those powers as are expressly conferred by the statutory provisions 
under which it operates.3  State ex rel. Castaneda v. Welch, 2007 
                                                 
3 2011 Wis. Act 21 affected the authority of agencies by 
imposing an "explicit authority requirement" on agency authority.  
See generally Kirsten Koschnick, Comment, Making "Explicit 
Authority" Explicit:  Deciphering Wis. Act 21's Prescriptions for 
Agency Rulemaking Authority, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 993.  This 
requirement is set out in Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), which provides:   
No agency may implement or enforce any standard, 
requirement, or threshold, . . . unless that standard, 
requirement, or threshold is explicitly required or 
explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule that has 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
7 
 
WI 103, ¶26, 303 Wis. 2d 570, 735 N.W.2d 131 (quoting Brown Cty. 
v. DHSS, 103 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 307 N.W.2d 247 (1981)); see also 
Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 56, 158 N.W.2d 306 
(1968) ("The very existence of the administrative agency or 
director is dependent upon the will of the legislature; its or his 
powers, duties and scope of authority are fixed and circumscribed 
by the legislature and subject to legislative change."); Gray Well 
Drilling Co. v. Wis. State Bd. of Health, 263 Wis. 417, 419, 58 
N.W.2d 64 (1953) (explaining that administrative agencies are not 
required to follow rules governing judicial proceedings unless a 
statute requires otherwise because "rules of procedure for 
administrative bodies" are a "function" that "belongs to the 
legislature"); State ex rel. Wis. Inspector Bureau v. Whitman, 196 
Wis. 472, 508, 220 N.W. 929 (1928) ("[A]dministrative agencies are 
the creatures of the legislature and are responsible to it.  
Consequently the legislature may withdraw powers which have been 
granted, prescribe the procedure through which granted powers are 
to be exercised, and if necessary wipe out the agency entirely.").   
¶148 I agree that separation of powers is a doctrine that is 
firmly established under Wisconsin law.  Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 
696 n.8 (explaining that the Wisconsin Constitution "art. IV., 
sec. 1 vests legislative power in the senate and assembly; art. 
V., sec. 1 vest[s] executive power in the governor and lieutenant 
                                                 
been promulgated in accordance with this subchapter[.]   
Section 227.10(2m) clearly limits agency authority from what 
courts had held in the past.  Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 
42, ¶52, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900.  Justice Kelly never 
mentions the explicit authority requirement of § 227.10(2m). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
8 
 
governor; and art. VII, sec. 2 vest[s] judicial power in a unified 
court system"); see also Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 360.  
However, administrative agencies have no constitutional core 
powers because they are not a branch of government in our 
tripartite system.  Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 696 n.8.  Stated 
otherwise, the core power of the executive resides with the 
governor and lieutenant governor; it does not reside with 
administrative agencies, which are merely "creatures of statute."  
Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, ¶23, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 
799 N.W.2d 73; see also Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶47 (R. Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring) ("Article V, Section 1 'vest[s]' the 
'executive 
power . . . in 
a 
governor' . . . . 
 
These 
constitutional 'grants are exclusive,' which has been understood 
to mean 'only the vested recipient of that power can perform it.'" 
(alterations in the original) (internal citations omitted)). 
¶149 Justice Kelly reasons that creating guidance documents 
is a core power of the executive because the power to create 
guidance documents does not come from the legislature:  "[A] 
guidance document is something created by the executive branch 
employees through the exercise of executive authority native to 
that branch of government."  Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶105.  
Justice Kelly asserts that "unlike a rule, the executive branch 
needs no borrowed authority from the legislature to create a 
guidance document."  Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶100.  He 
asserts, "This creative power is necessarily inherent to the 
executive because no other branch of government has even the 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
9 
 
theoretical ability to know the executive's mind with respect to 
the law he is to execute."  Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶102.   
¶150 He cites no authority for this change in the law, which 
has repeatedly held that "administrative agencies are creations of 
the legislature and that they can exercise only those powers 
granted by the legislature."  Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 697; see 
also Castaneda, 303 Wis. 2d 570, ¶26; Brown, 103 Wis. 2d at 43.  
As creatures of statute, the legislature may "prescribe the 
procedure through which granted powers [of administrative 
agencies] are to be exercised."  Whitman, 196 Wis. at 508. 
¶151 Justice Kelly also ignores our decision in Unnamed 
Defendant where an acting district attorney concluded that he could 
not prove a sexual assault occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and, therefore, decided not to commence criminal proceedings.  
Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 356.  Notably, his conclusion 
occurred outside the context of a judicial proceeding, as most 
charging decisions do.  Nevertheless, the circuit court ordered 
the district attorney or his designee to file charges pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3), which states a judge "may permit the filing 
of a complaint" in a John Doe proceeding "if the judge finds there 
is probable cause to believe that the person to be charged has 
committed an offense after conducting a hearing."  Id. at 357.  We 
upheld the circuit court's decision.  Id. at 367.  In so doing, we 
authorized circuit courts to disregard prosecutors' statutory 
interpretations in light of the "John Doe Law," Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.02(3) and 968.26.  Id. at 366.  The interpretation of the 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
10 
 
acting district attorney would not have been overruled if 
interpretation of the law were a core power of the executive. 
¶152 Justice Kelly ultimately concludes that the answer to 
whether the legislature can legislate in regard to guidance 
documents "depends on whether the creation of guidance documents 
represents an exercise of the executive's core function, or merely 
a power shared with the legislature."  Justice Kelly's majority 
op., ¶103.  To address this concern, he creates his own definition 
core powers:  "A branch's core powers are those that define its 
essential attributes."  Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶104.  He 
acknowledges that if guidance documents fall within shared powers, 
the legislature may have the "right to govern their content and 
dissemination."  Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶104.  However, he 
does not give a moment's pause to shared powers, but rather, he 
opines that all of his legal contentions are "true because guidance 
documents merely explain statutes and rules, or provide guidance 
or advice about how the executive is likely to apply them."  
Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶106. 
¶153 To explain shared powers, and their relationship to core 
powers, "it is neither possible nor practicable to categorize all 
governmental action as exclusively legislative, executive or 
judicial."  Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 696 (quoting State v. 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 825, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978)).  
Therefore, separation of powers is transgressed only when one 
branch "interferes with a constitutionally guaranteed 'exclusive 
zone' of authority vested in another branch," Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d 
at 697, i.e., a constitutional core power, or when a shared power 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
11 
 
is unduly burdened.  Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 556, 576 N.W.2d 
245 (1998). 
¶154 If explaining what the law means through guidance 
documents actually were a constitutional core power of the 
executive, courts could not strike down such an interpretation.  
Yet courts have done so when an agency oversteps the authority 
granted 
by 
the 
legislature 
in 
reliance 
on 
the 
agency's 
interpretation of what the law requires.  Newcap, 383 Wis. 2d 515, 
¶3; Papa v. DHS, 2020 WI __, ¶2, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
¶155 Additionally, the legislature often interprets its own 
laws.  In the case before us, members of the legislature would not 
have standing if the legislature had no power to interpret its 
laws.  Yet Justice Kelly takes no issue with these members arguing 
before our court. 
¶156 Justice Kelly also supports his legal conclusion with 
quotes from portions of Tetra Tech.  For example, he says: 
The executive must certainly interpret and apply the 
law; it would be impossible to perform his duties if he 
did not. . . .  Our constitution not only does not 
forbid this, it requires it.   
Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶96 (citing Tetra Tech, 382 Wis. 2d 
496, ¶53 (lead)).  However, this paragraph of Tetra Tech was joined 
by only one justice in addition to Justice Kelly who wrote the 
provision; it does not represent the opinion of the court.  Id., 
¶3 n.4.  Indeed, Justice Ziegler wrote a concurrence, which I 
joined, in part to respond to this portion of the lead opinion in 
Tetra Tech.  Id., ¶141 & n.10 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  She 
explained that "the power to interpret and apply the law" is a 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
12 
 
shared power outside the context of a judicial proceeding.  Id., 
¶¶140–41. 
¶157 That an executive would interpret a law as he executes 
it does not convert interpretation of the law into a constitutional 
core power.  Interpretation of the law is a shared power that many 
governmental actors employ as they interpret what they must do in 
order to be in compliance with the law.  See e.g., State v. Horn, 
226 Wis. 2d 637, 644-45, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999) (discussing the 
shared power of administrative revocation of probation and the 
court's power to sentence); State v. Dums, 149 Wis. 2d 314, 323-
24, 440 N.W.2d 814 (1989) (discussing the shared power to amend or 
dismiss a filed charge under the separation of powers doctrine). 
¶158 A final note worth mentioning is the standard of review.  
Justice Kelly and I agree on the standard of review, although we 
apply it quite differently.  He explains that, because this lawsuit 
is a facial challenge, we must uphold the statutes unless they 
cannot be enforced under any circumstances.  Justice Kelly's 
majority op., ¶92.  He later states: 
[The legislature] may not control [the Governor's] 
knowledge or intentions about those laws.  Nor may it 
mute or modulate the communication of his knowledge or 
intentions to the public.  Because there are no set of 
facts pursuant to which §§ 33 (to the extent it applies 
to guidance documents) and 38 would not impermissibly 
interfere with the executive's exercise of his core 
constitutional power, they are in that respect facially 
unconstitutional. 
Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶108.  
¶159 There are a few issues with this application of the 
standard of review.  First, I would not conflate administrative 
agencies with the governor as Justice Kelly does.  The governor is 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
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a constitutional officer; administrative agencies are "creatures 
of statute."   Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶23.   
¶160 Second, even if I were to assume, arguendo, that 
administrative agencies were equivalent to the governor, 2017 Wis. 
Act 369, §§ 33 & 38 do not "control" the governor's "knowledge or 
intentions."  Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶108.  Instead, they 
require administrative agencies to follow certain procedures.  For 
example, agencies must "provide for a period for public comment on 
a proposed guidance document."  Wis. Stat. § 227.112(1)(b).  Public 
comments might inform the "knowledge or intentions" of the 
administrative agency; however, they would not control it.  Justice 
Kelly rhetorically questions whether I would feel similarly if the 
legislature required the Wisconsin Supreme Court to submit its 
opinions to a public comment period before publication.  No, I 
would not, because we are constitutional officers; administrative 
agencies are not. 
¶161 Third, and relatedly, this case is not an as-applied 
challenge.  In some situations, §§ 33 & 38 might contain procedural 
hurdles on the issuance of guidance documents that are so difficult 
to meet that they are unduly burdensome.  However, we do not have 
an as-applied challenge before us. 
¶162 Justice Kelly's conclusion is in error because his 
reasoning relies on a fundamentally inaccurate legal premise.  
Interpreting the law is a shared power, not a constitutional core 
power of the executive.  As a shared power, it cannot be unduly 
burdened.  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 556.  However, before us is a 
facial challenge, and the plaintiffs have not established that 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr 
 
14 
 
2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 33 & 38 are unduly burdensome in all 
circumstances.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur with respect to 
the majority opinion on all issues except guidance documents, and 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding 
guidance documents.   
 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶163 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  Just days before the swearing-in of 
Wisconsin's newly elected governor and attorney general, the 
legislature passed, and the outgoing governor signed into law, 
2017 Wis. Act 369 and 2017 Wis. Act 370.  The Plaintiffs, a group 
of labor organizations and individual taxpayers, filed this 
lawsuit alleging several provisions of these Acts violate the 
separation of powers enshrined in the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶164 I agree with the scope of the majority opinions1 and join 
several parts.2  I write separately, however, because the complaint 
                                                 
1 I agree the following provisions were not properly before 
the court on this interlocutory appeal:  2017 Wis. Act 369, § 87 
(Wis. Stat. § 238.399(3)(am)), 2017 Wis. Act 370, § 10 (Wis. Stat. 
§ 20.940), and 2017 Wis. Act 370, § 11 (Wis. Stat. § 49.175(2)(a)).  
See Justice Hagedorn's majority op., ¶24 n.9. 
2 Specifically, I join Justice Kelly's majority opinion with 
respect to 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01 (3m)), 
§ 33 (Wis. Stat. § 227.05), § 38 (Wis. Stat. § 227.112), §§ 65-71 
(amending Wis. Stat. § 227.40), and §§ 104-05 in full, and Justice 
Hagedorn's majority opinion on the following parts: 
 Part II.E.1., insofar as it reverses the circuit court with 
respect to 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 5 (Wis. Stat. § 13.365) 
and § 97 (Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m)); 
 Part II.E.2., "Capitol Security" provision, 2017 Wis. Act 
369, § 16 (Wis. Stat. § 16.84(2m)); 
 Part II.E.3, "Multiple Suspensions of Administrative 
Rules" provision, 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 64 (Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.26(2)(im)), in light of Martinez v. DILHR, 165 
Wis. 2d 687, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992); and 
 Part II.E.4., "Agency Deference Provision," 2017 Wis. Act 
369, § 35 (Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2g)), in light of Tetra Tech 
EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 
N.W.2d 21. 
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plausibly suggests that the sweep of the "Litigation Control" 
provisions, 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 26 (Wis. Stat. § 165.08(1)) and 
§ 30 (Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1.), violates our constitutional 
separation of powers because it unduly burdens and substantially 
interferes with executive power.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
concur in part and dissent in part. 
I 
¶165 This case was snatched from the circuit court in its 
infancy, on the eve of the first trial on the challenged 
provisions.3  Consequently, the facts have not been developed and 
the parties have not had the opportunity to amend their pleadings 
to conform to those facts.4  The impact of the majority opinions 
is therefore limited, as is our review.  Several undeveloped claims 
are remanded right back to the circuit court to proceed in the 
ordinary course of litigation.  Even those claims dismissed by the 
majority will likely find their way back to us after newly filed 
lawsuits result in the very development that this court's 
                                                 
Because I join the majority opinions with respect to 2017 
Wis. Act 369, § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)), § 64 (Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.26(2)(im)), §§ 65-71 (amending Wis. Stat. § 227.40), and 
§§ 104-05, I would similarly vacate the circuit court's temporary 
injunction with respect to these sections. 
3 This court assumed jurisdiction over the Legislative 
Defendants' interlocutory appeal on June 11, 2019, staying all 
circuit court proceedings the day before the first part of the 
bifurcated trial was set to commence. 
4 A litigant's ability to amend the pleadings pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 802.09(1) is "liberally construed . . . so as to present 
the entire controversy providing the amendment does not unfairly 
deprive the opposing party of timely opportunity to meet the issue 
created by the amendment."  Wiegel v. Sentry Indem. Co., 94 
Wis. 2d 172, 184, 287 N.W.2d 796 (1980) (quoted source omitted). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
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assumption of jurisdiction snuffed.  This court's impatience did 
not allow the challenges to 2017 Wis. Act 369 and 2017 Wis. Act 
370 to percolate and will prove to be an unfortunate waste of 
judicial resources.5 
¶166 We have before us a limited review of the circuit court's 
denial of a motion to dismiss.  "A motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint."  
Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶27, 382 
Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131 (quoting Data Key Partners v. Permira 
Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶19, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693).  
The legal sufficiency of a complaint, in turn, "depends on [the] 
substantive law that underlies the claim made because it is the 
substantive law that drives what facts must be pled."  Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Data Key Partners, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, ¶31). 
¶167 Here, the underlying substantive law is this court's 
jurisprudence on the separation of powers under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, as well as the United States Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence regarding the separation of powers under the United 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:  Crisis 
and Reform 163 (1985) ("[A] difficult question is more likely to 
be answered correctly if it is allowed to engage the attention of 
different sets of judges deciding factually different cases than 
if it is answered finally by the first panel to consider it."); 
John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 
Judicature 177, 183 (1982) ("The doctrine of judicial restraint 
teaches us that patience in the judicial resolution of conflicts 
may sometimes produce the most desirable result."). 
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States Constitution.6  The Wisconsin Constitution establishes a 
tripartite state government whereby it vests the senate and 
assembly with the legislative power, Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1; the 
governor with the executive power, id., art. V, § 1; and the 
unified court system with the judicial power, id., art. VII, § 2.  
"[N]o branch [is] subordinate to the other, no branch [may] 
arrogate to itself control over the other except as is provided by 
the constitution, and no branch [may] exercise the power committed 
by the constitution to another."  Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, 
¶10, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (quoting State ex rel. 
Friedrich v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 531 
N.W.2d 32 (1995) (per curiam)). 
¶168 Despite 
this 
formal 
proscriptive 
language, 
our 
separation-of-powers doctrine at times embraces a functionalist 
approach:  "the doctrine envisions a system of separate branches 
sharing many powers while jealously guarding certain others, a 
system of 'separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.'"  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14 (quoting Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).  Our doctrine 
distinguishes core powers that the Wisconsin Constitution 
exclusively vests in one of the branches from shared powers that 
"lie at the intersections of these exclusive core constitutional 
powers."  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 
                                                 
6 The 
"principles 
underlying 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution . . . 'inform our understanding of the separation of 
powers under the Wisconsin Constitution.'"  League of Women Voters 
of Wisconsin v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶31, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 
N.W.2d 209 (quoting Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 
67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384). 
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(1999).  The core powers are "jealously guard[ed]," while branches 
with intersecting powers may exercise their shared authority so 
long as they do not "unduly burden or substantially interfere with 
another branch."  Id. at 644. 
¶169 This 
court's 
functionalist 
approach, 
however, 
is 
vulnerable to one branch's accretion of another's power in their 
shared zone of authority.7  That vulnerability threatens our 
constitutional structure8 and requires this court to vigorously 
apply the limiting principle in our shared-power analysis:  the 
exercise of shared power cannot unduly burden or substantially 
interfere with a coequal branch's function.  Mindful of this 
limiting principle, I turn to the Litigation Control provisions. 
II 
¶170 The complaint alleges that the Litigation Control 
provisions, 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 26 (Wis. Stat. § 165.08(1)) and 
§ 30 (Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1.), violate the separation-of-
powers doctrine because they effectively eliminate executive power 
                                                 
7 Justice Brennan, a prolific modern advocate of living 
constitutionalism and constitutional functionalism generally, 
adhered to a formal separation-of-powers philosophy because of 
this vulnerability.  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 859–62 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasoning 
that the Court's functional approach risked the "incremental 
erosion" of the separation between the branches "central to our 
constitutional scheme"); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Brennan, J.). 
8 "While individual encroachments on the constitutional 
structure may appear harmless, at some point the structure will 
fail, and '[w]hen structure fails, liberty is always in peril.'"  
Ara Lovitt, Fight for Your Right to Litigate:  Qui Tam, Article 
II, and the President, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 853, 866 (1997) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 
491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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6 
 
to settle civil litigation by enacting an overriding legislative 
veto.  Prior to Act 369, executive branch officials could direct 
a civil prosecution to be compromised or discontinued.  Act 369 
amended § 165.08(1) to remove the executive branch's unilateral 
control by barring the attorney general from compromising or 
discontinuing a civil prosecution without prior "approval of a[] 
[legislative] intervenor" or, if there is no legislative 
intervenor, "only if the joint committee on finance approves the 
proposed plan [to compromise or discontinue]" the prosecution.  
(Emphasis added.)  Further, pursuant to § 165.08(1) the attorney 
general can no longer concede "the unconstitutionality or other 
invalidity of a statute" or that "a statute violates or is 
preempted by federal law" without first receiving the approval of 
another legislative committee, the joint committee on legislative 
organization. 
¶171 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a)1. removes the 
executive branch's unilateral control by mandating legislative 
approval in cases where the attorney general defends the State of 
Wisconsin in a civil action for injunctive relief or where there 
is a proposed consent decree.  Section 165.25(6)(a)1. dictates 
that the attorney general "may not compromise or settle the action 
without the approval of a[] [legislative] intervenor . . . or, if 
there is no intervenor, without first submitting a proposed plan 
to the joint committee on finance."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
attorney general may now only settle a case in defense of the State 
of Wisconsin with the committee's approval, if the committee 
chooses to meet.  And if the plan "concedes the unconstitutionality 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
7 
 
or other invalidity of a statute, facially or as applied, or 
concedes a statute violates or is preempted by federal law," 
section 165.25(6)(a)1. adds yet another layer of legislative 
control:  "the approval of the joint committee on legislative 
organization" before the attorney general may even submit the plan.  
Collectively, the Litigation Control provisions make legislative 
officials the final arbiters over the attorney general's 
discretionary authority to resolve state-related litigation. 
¶172 The question presented to this court is whether the 
Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim that the sweep of the 
Litigation Control provisions "unduly burden[s] or substantially 
interfere[s] with" the executive branch's power to execute the 
law.  Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 645.  It is indisputable that litigation 
is a tool of the executive branch for executing the law, see 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (per curiam),9 and that 
removal of sufficient executive control over litigation can 
violate the constitution, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
685-96 (1988).  However, the majority undertakes no substantive 
analysis of whether the Litigation Control provisions' removal of 
executive control over resolving litigation unduly burdens or 
substantially interferes with the executive branch's function.  
Instead, the majority mechanically applies a strict review 
standard for facial challenges and concludes that the Plaintiffs' 
                                                 
9 "A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, 
and it is to the President . . . that the Constitution entrusts 
the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.'"  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (per curiam) 
(quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
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challenge 
fails 
because 
the 
court 
can 
conceive 
of 
some 
unarticulated constitutional application of the Litigation Control 
provisions. 
¶173 I dissent for two reasons.  First, the legislature does 
not have a constitutionally-vested "institutional interest as a 
represented party" in civil litigation resolution and the power of 
the purse cannot be understood so broadly as to permit substantial 
burdens on another branch's intersecting power.  Second, the 
majority's rigid application of a strict facial-challenge standard 
in this case achieves the exact opposite of judicial modesty.  
Application of the overbreadth doctrine better safeguards the 
separation of powers established by the Wisconsin Constitution. 
A 
¶174 The 
majority's 
conception 
of 
the 
legislature's 
"institutional 
interest 
as 
a 
represented 
party," 
Justice 
Hagedorn's majority op., ¶67, is unsupported by the Wisconsin 
Constitution and creates a dangerously expansive ability for the 
legislature to unduly burden and substantially interfere with the 
other branches.10  The Wisconsin Constitution, like the United 
States Constitution, does not contemplate an active role for the 
legislature in executing or in supervising the executive officers 
                                                 
10 If the legislature had an institutional interest such that 
it could arrogate the executive power to ensure its laws were 
upheld (or at least not conceded) in court, the legislature could 
also rely on this interest to enact the same controls on the 
judiciary's 
authority 
to 
declare 
its 
laws 
invalid, 
unconstitutional, or preempted by federal law.  Such a result is 
constitutionally suspect. 
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9 
 
charged with executing the laws it enacts.11  See Schuette v. Van 
De Hey, 205 Wis. 2d 475, 480–81, 556 N.W.2d 127, (Ct. App. 1996) 
("Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the 
authority to make laws, but not to enforce them, or appoint the 
agents charged with the duty of such enforcement." (quoting 2A 
Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 10.06 at 311 (3d ed. 
1996))); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722, 726 (1986).  
Justice Hagedorn's majority opinion fails to tie its concept of an 
institutional interest to any constitutional text.  This is fatal 
to its argument because a separation-of-powers analysis begins and 
ends with the Wisconsin Constitution. 
                                                 
11 I do not contest that the legislature's institutional 
interest may permit it to intervene in litigation on its own 
branch's behalf.  For this reason, I join Justice Hagedorn's 
opinion with respect to 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 5 (Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.365) and § 97 (Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m)). 
I further emphasize that this concurrence/dissent should not 
be read to advance the position that the attorney general, as part 
of the executive branch, has the sole power to decide the 
litigation positions of other constitutional officers when those 
officers are named parties in a lawsuit.  We have previously warned 
that such a practice "would give the attorney general breathtaking 
power" and "would potentially make the attorney general a 
gatekeeper for legal positions taken by constitutional officers, 
such as the governor or justices of this court sued in their 
official capacity."  Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶13, 382 
Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878 (per curiam). 
Likewise, irrespective of Wis. Stat. § 14.11(2), when a 
conflict arises and the attorney general, as part of the executive 
branch, is unable to represent a named judicial party, it is the 
judicial branch rather than the executive branch that selects 
subsequent representation.  See id., ¶13 n.3 (citing SCR 81.02(1)) 
(referring to "this court's practice of appointing counsel for a 
court, for judges sued in their official capacity . . . and for 
boards, commissions and committees appointed by the supreme 
court"). 
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¶175 The other legislative power relied upon by the majority, 
the power of the purse, is found in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 2 ("No money shall be paid out of the 
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law."); see 
Justice Hagedorn's majority op., ¶68.  The legislature's control 
of the purse strings, however, cannot be read so broadly that it 
allows the legislature to curtail the functions of another branch 
even in an area of shared authority.12  See Gabler v. Crime Victims 
Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶4, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 
("[N]either the legislature nor the executive nor the judiciary 
'ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence 
over the others in the administration of their respective powers.'" 
(quoting The Federalist No. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961))).  If it were so broad, the legislature could 
authorize itself to veto any function constitutionally assigned to 
the executive or judiciary because money is required to enforce 
the law and maintain a judiciary.  Such an "overruling influence" 
over the other branches is not constitutionally tolerable. 
B 
¶176 Even assuming the power of the purse gives the 
legislature a share of the power to resolve litigation, I do not 
                                                 
12 In fact, the Wisconsin legislature's constitutional "power 
of the purse" is substantially more constrained relative to other 
state and the federal constitutions because the Wisconsin 
Constitution grants the governor "coextensive" authority over 
appropriations legislation.  Wis. Const. art. V, § 10(1)(b); State 
ex rel. Wis. Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 315, 260 N.W. 486 
(1935). 
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agree with the majority's mechanical adherence to a strict "no set 
of circumstances" test for facial challenges. 
¶177 The majority cites to United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 745 (1987), for the standard that the challenging party "must 
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
[challenged act] would be valid."  See Justice Hagedorn's majority 
op., ¶40 n.12.  However, this dicta from the Salerno case has been 
applied inconsistently by the United States Supreme Court 
depending upon the nature of the facial challenge.  See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(adopting the undue burden test for facial challenges to state 
abortion laws); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 
55 n.22 (1999) (plurality opinion) ("To the extent we have 
consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, 
it is not the Salerno formulation . . . ."); Janklow v. Planned 
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 n.1 (1996) 
(mem.) (citing United States Supreme Court cases that did not apply 
the Salerno test to a facial challenge).  Recognizing the United 
States Supreme Court's inconsistency with regard to facial 
challenges, this court has previously declined to apply the no set 
of circumstances test to an Establishment Clause challenge where 
there was no clear United States Supreme Court precedent for doing 
so.  Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 854 n.4, 578 N.W.2d 602 
(1998); see also State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 305 n.15, 577 
N.W.2d 601 (1998) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has not 
consistently applied the 'no set of circumstances' language."). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
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¶178 The majority claims this test is nonetheless appropriate 
as an exercise of judicial modesty that will avoid judicial 
overstepping into the legislature's prerogative.  However, the 
majority effectuates the exact opposite result.  Instead of 
respecting the coequal branches, it forces the subverted branch, 
here the executive, to repeatedly vindicate its constitutionally 
delegated role through as-applied challenges.  That litigation 
burden may itself be undue and substantially detracts from the 
time and resources that both branches should instead be directing 
toward their respective constitutional functions. 
¶179 More distressingly, the piecemeal litigation invited by 
the majority means that the judiciary will have to engage in line-
drawing that is effectively policy-making, a clear overstep of its 
constitutional role.  The much narrower statutes enacted by other 
states demonstrate that it is for the legislature, not the 
judiciary, to determine a dollar threshold where the power of the 
purse is implicated.  See Justice Hagedorn's majority op., ¶70.  
For example, the Connecticut legislature limited its involvement 
to settlements over $2,500,000.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 3-
125a(a) (2019).  The Oklahoma legislature set a threshold of 
$250,000.  See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51 § 200A.1. (2019).  In Utah, 
legislative approval only becomes mandatory for settlements that 
might cost more than $1,000,000 to implement.  Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-10-202 (2018).  In contrast, Wisconsin's legislature granted 
itself an unfettered veto power in every proposed settlement, 
compromise, or discontinuation of not only civil cases where the 
attorney general is defending the State of Wisconsin, but also 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
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where the executive is prosecuting the law.  I fail to see the 
touted judicial modesty in an approach that will result in an 
exercise of judicial policy-making. 
¶180 Instead, this court should determine whether the 
Litigation Control provisions substantially interfere with the 
function of the executive because of their unconstitutional 
overbreadth.13  An overbreadth challenge is appropriate upon 
"specific reasons weighty enough to overcome our well-founded 
reticence" in entertaining facial challenges.  Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004) (citing United States Supreme 
Court cases applying an overbreadth test to facial challenges in 
various substantive contexts).  Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court will evaluate a facial challenge alleging that a statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad where "good reason" exists——generally 
where the statute may encumber a fundamental constitutional 
protection.  Id.; see, e.g., Aptheker v. U.S. Sec'y of State, 378 
U.S. 500, 515–517 (1964) (applying overbreadth to evaluate a facial 
challenge to a statute affecting the right to travel because it is 
"a personal liberty protected by the Bill of Rights"). 
¶181 The United States Supreme Court's broader understanding 
of the overbreadth doctrine is instructive for this court, as we 
have not had the opportunity to address the overbreadth doctrine 
outside of the First Amendment context.  See, e.g., State v. 
Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90; Konrath, 218 
                                                 
13 At oral argument, Attorney General Kaul and the Legislative 
Defendants debated the issue of whether analyzing this case as a 
traditional facial challenge was appropriate.  My analysis stems 
from their debate. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
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Wis. 2d 290.  As we noted in Konrath, the limited use of the 
overbreadth doctrine is based on third-party standing concerns:  a 
private party to whom a statute constitutionally applies could 
escape his or her deserved sanction because of the statute's 
unconstitutional application to parties not before the court.  218 
Wis. 2d at 305.  We tolerate this result and modify the rules of 
standing in the First Amendment context because of "the gravity of 
a 'chilling effect' that may cause others not before the court to 
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."  
Stevenson, 236 Wis. 2d 86, ¶12 (quoted sources omitted). 
¶182 Here, there is no third-party standing concern.  The 
constitutional and unconstitutional applications of the Litigation 
Control provisions affect a single party:  the attorney general.  
By assuming jurisdiction over this case, the court obtained 
jurisdiction over the only party that could be affected by the 
requested declaratory and injunctive relief.14  This eliminates the 
possibility for judicial overreach that standing is meant to 
moderate. 
¶183 Additionally, application of the overbreadth doctrine in 
a separation of powers challenge such as this one would prevent 
the "incremental erosion" of our tripartite constitutional 
structure, a harm as grave as the chilling effect on protected 
                                                 
14 In other words, the facial remedy would be no broader than 
the as-applied remedy since the only potential as-applied 
challenger is currently under this court's jurisdiction.  This 
renders the distinction between the two analytically meaningless.  
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 
(2010) 
("The 
distinction 
[between 
facial 
and 
as-applied 
challenges] . . . goes to the breadth of the remedy."). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
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speech in the First Amendment context.15  See Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859–62 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  With respect to the Litigation Controls provisions 
particularly, the overbreadth doctrine would alleviate the danger 
of the legislature's "selective enforcement" of its new veto power 
to discriminately force the executive to continue litigation no 
longer deemed to be in the public interest.  Cf. Stevenson, 236 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶13; see also Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶5 (warning 
that absent separation of powers the legislature could "first 
'enact tyrannical laws' then 'execute them in a tyrannical 
manner.'" (quoting 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 151-52 
(Oskar Piest et al. eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748))).  
It also would prevent "practically unbridled . . . discretion" in 
delaying or denying executive decision-making on how to best 
enforce the law.  Cf. Stevenson, 236 Wis. 2d 86, ¶13. 
¶184 Given the absence of third-party standing issues and the 
gravity of the harm alleged with respect to these provisions, there 
is "good reason" for this court to apply the overbreadth doctrine 
to the Litigation Control provisions,16 consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court's approach.  See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10; 
                                                 
15 Incremental 
erosion 
"undermines 
the 
checks 
and 
balances . . . designed to promote governmental accountability and 
deter abuse."  Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 
680 N.W.2d 666, overruled on other grounds by Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408. 
16 This conclusion might be true in all shared-powers 
analyses, but I leave that question for another time.  I focus my 
application of the overbreadth doctrine on the Litigation Control 
provisions 
because, 
as 
compared 
to 
the 
other 
challenged 
provisions, only their sweeping grab of power could unduly burden 
or substantially interfere with the executive branch's function. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
16 
 
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges 
and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000) (advocating 
that the review of a facial challenge should be evaluated on a 
"doctrine-by-doctrine basis" and guided by "the applicable 
substantive tests of constitutional validity"). 
¶185 In the context of a motion to dismiss review, this 
court's overbreadth inquiry is whether the Plaintiffs have stated 
a claim that the Litigation Control provisions sweep so broadly 
that they "unduly burden or substantially interfere with" the 
executive branch's power to execute the law.  See Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 
at 644.  We must accept as true the Plaintiffs' allegations that 
the Litigation Control provisions can:  (1) prolong litigation 
deemed no longer in the public interest; (2) lock in public 
resources on those cases; (3) undermine the attorney general's 
leverage at settlement conferences by removing ultimate settlement 
authority; 
and 
(4) inhibit 
the 
executive's 
check 
on 
unconstitutional legislative action.  See Voters with Facts, 382 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶27 (quoting Data Key Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶19). 
¶186 To assess the burden on a branch of government, the 
concern is with "actual and substantial encroachments by one branch 
into the province of another, not theoretical divisions of power."  
Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 697, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992) 
(quoting J.F. Ahern v. Bldg. Comm'n, 114 Wis. 2d 69, 104, 336 
N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1983)).  The court has in previous cases 
relied upon affidavits and statistical analyses.  See Friedrich, 
192 Wis. 2d at 25-30 (relying on affidavits from judges and 
attorneys to assess burden to the judicial branch); State v. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
17 
 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 70, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (relying on 
statistical evidence to assess the burden on the judicial branch 
caused by the challenged statute).  In this case, however, there 
has been no factual development as to the amount and types of cases 
the attorney general litigates, the types and frequency of 
resolutions pursued in those cases, or the kinds of burdens the 
Litigation Control provisions now impose on that litigation.  Only 
after development of the facts can a court determine whether the 
sweep of the Litigation Control provisions unduly burdens or 
substantially interferes with the attorney general's ability to 
execute the law through litigation. 
¶187 I conclude that the complaint and the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom sufficiently states a claim that the 
sweep of the Litigation Control provisions will unduly burden or 
substantially interfere with the executive branch's power to 
execute the law through civil litigation.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the circuit court's denial of the motion to dismiss the 
Litigation Control provisions and remand the case to the circuit 
court to proceed through the ordinary course of litigation.  The 
temporary injunction should be reinstated on remand because the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.  Its 
written decision states the correct law, applies that law to the 
facts of record, and demonstrates a reasoned process in reaching 
its conclusion.  See Thoma v. Vill. of Slinger, 2018 WI 45, ¶11, 
381 Wis. 2d 311, 912 N.W.2d 56. 
¶188 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part 
and dissent in part. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.rfd 
 
2 
 
¶189 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this concurrence/dissent. 
 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
1 
 
¶190 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  In 2017 Wis. Act 369, the legislature defined a new 
category of formal or official executive branch documents and 
communications called "guidance documents."  The legislature 
established certain requirements governing their contents, a 
process governing their issuance, and a procedure permitting their 
administrative and judicial challenge.  The majority bases its 
declaration that two provisions are unconstitutional on this 
proposition:  legislative governance over guidance documents 
regulates executive branch thought and therefore invades core 
executive power.  Hence, it throws the constitutional penalty flag 
and declares as facially unconstitutional a statutory provision 
requiring that the law be cited in formal agency communications.  
It also declares a notice-and-comment period prior to the issuance 
of guidance documents facially unconstitutional. 
¶191 The majority's thesis, however, is wrong on the facts 
and runs contrary to the plain language of the laws the legislature 
passed.  This means its constitutional conclusion is similarly 
faulty.  The court may assert it is upholding the separation of 
powers, but it is not.  The powers exercised by the legislature 
here are properly within their province, at least on a facial 
challenge.  Although the majority denies it, the majority takes 
these powers away based on the thinnest of foundations——its 
misguided determination that guidance documents regulate executive 
branch thought.  This isn't what the statutes do, and every other 
error follows from this flawed wellspring.  Guidance documents 
regulate executive branch communications with the public——a 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
2 
 
permissible and longstanding area of legislative regulation.  I 
would hold that all of the guidance document provisions survive a 
facial challenge. 
 
I.  WHAT GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS ARE 
¶192 My disagreement with the majority is not over the meaning 
of the constitution; we both embrace the same separation-of-powers 
principles.  Rather, the majority's analytical error rests with 
its mistaken interpretation of what guidance documents are and 
what they do.  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m).1  The new statute affirms 
                                                 
1 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 31 created the following subsection: 
(a) "Guidance document" means, except as provided in 
par. 
(b), 
any 
formal 
or 
official 
document 
or 
communication issued by an agency, including a manual, 
handbook, directive, or informational bulletin, that 
does any of the following: 
1. Explains the agency's implementation of a statute or 
rule enforced or administered by the agency, including 
the current or proposed operating procedure of the 
agency. 
2. Provides guidance or advice with respect to how the 
agency is likely to apply a statute or rule enforced or 
administered by the agency, if that guidance or advice 
is likely to apply to a class of persons similarly 
affected. 
(b) "Guidance document" does not include any of the 
following: 
1. A rule that has been promulgated and that is currently 
in effect or a proposed rule that is in the process of 
being promulgated. 
2. A standard adopted, or a statement of policy or 
interpretation made, whether preliminary or final, in 
the decision of a contested case, in a private letter 
ruling under s. 73.035, or in an agency decision upon or 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
3 
 
that guidance documents are not rules; they do not have the force 
of law.  Rather, guidance documents are "formal or official 
documents or communications issued by an agency" that either 
explain how an agency is implementing a rule, or provide guidance 
or advice on how the agency is likely to apply a statute or rule 
if it is likely to apply to a class of persons similarly affected.  
§ 227.01(3m)(a). 
                                                 
disposition of a particular matter as applied to a 
specific set of facts. 
3. Any document or activity described in sub. (13) (a) 
to (zz), except that "guidance document" includes a 
pamphlet or other explanatory material described under 
sub. (13) (r) that otherwise satisfies the definition of 
"guidance document" under par. (a). 
4. Any document that any statute specifically provides 
is not required to be promulgated as a rule. 
5. A declaratory ruling issued under s. 227.41. 
6. A pleading or brief filed in court by the state, an 
agency, or an agency official. 
7. A letter or written legal advice of the department of 
justice or a formal or informal opinion of the attorney 
general, including an opinion issued under s. 165.015 
(1). 
8. Any document or communication for which a procedure 
for public input, other than that provided under s. 
227.112 (1), is provided by law. 
9. Any document or communication that is not subject to 
the right of inspection and copying under s. 19.35 (1). 
Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m) (2017-18). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
4 
 
¶193 The statute contains some clue as to the type of 
communications being envisioned:  "a manual, handbook, directive, 
or informational bulletin."  Id.  While this list is nonexclusive, 
these examples help us understand what is meant by "formal or 
official document[s] or communication[s]."  Id.  Not every agency 
communication is a guidance document, only formal or official 
communications that either are or are like manuals, handbooks, 
directives, or bulletins.  See Schill v. Wis. Rapids School Dist., 
2010 WI 86, ¶66, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (explaining that 
"general terms . . . may be defined by the other words and 
understood in the same general sense" under the interpretive canon 
of noscitur a sociis (a word is "known by its associates")). 
¶194 The guidance document provisions undoubtedly reach far 
and wide into agency operations.  Agencies regularly create 
informational documents to inform the public regarding a given 
area of law.  These communications do not themselves carry the 
force of law; rather they explain the agency's understanding and 
execution of the law to the public.  The Plaintiffs and the 
Governor provided the following examples of guidance documents:   
 A pamphlet issued by the Department of Public 
Instruction explaining how the department administers 
funding;  
 A Department of Health Services guide about health 
insurance;  
 A bulletin from the Division of Motor Vehicles about 
driver's license exams; and  
 Forms created by the Department of Children and 
Families explaining eligibility for child support. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
5 
 
These are, in the main, ordinary sorts of official communications 
that greatly affect the public's knowledge of the laws that govern 
them. 
¶195 This newly defined category of communications comes with 
new statutory requirements.  Of particular moment are the two 
provisions receiving the court's disapproval.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 227.05 states that agencies "shall identify the applicable 
provision of federal law or the applicable state statutory or 
administrative code provision that supports any statement or 
interpretation of law that the agency makes in any publication."  
And Wis. Stat. § 227.112 requires, among other things, that 
proposed guidance documents be sent to the legislative reference 
bureau and undergo a notice-and-comment period before the guidance 
documents are issued, subject to the caveat that public comment 
periods shorter than 21 days are allowed with the governor's 
approval.2 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶196 I refer the reader to the discussion of the separation 
of powers in the majority opinion analyzing the remaining issues 
in this case.  Justice Hagedorn's majority op., ¶¶30-35.  But by 
way of reminder, a core power is one conferred by the constitution 
such that only the branch vested with a core power may exercise 
that power.  See State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 
N.W.2d 772 (1999); Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶48, 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.112 is cited in full in paragraph 90 
of Justice Kelly's majority opinion. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
6 
 
382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (Kelly, J.).  Not all government 
power has this exclusive character.  Shared powers, those residing 
where the powers of the branches converge, may be exercised by 
more than one branch so long as no branch "unduly burden[s] or 
substantially interferes[s] with another branch."  Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d at 643-44. 
¶197 The Plaintiffs and the Governor argue that all of the 
guidance document provisions impermissibly infringe on a core 
executive power——namely, the Governor's constitutional duty to 
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed."  Wis. Const. 
art. V, § 4.  This occurs, the parties contend, because the 
legislature is regulating non-legislative power——the power to give 
advice, for example.  The majority agrees in part and holds that 
two of the guidance document provisions intrude upon the core 
powers of the executive branch.3 
¶198 The challenged provisions do not intrude upon the core 
powers of the executive branch because determining the content and 
timing of executive branch communications are not the exclusive 
prerogative of the executive.  By enacting the guidance document 
provisions, the legislature is carrying out its function of 
determining what the law should be by passing laws pursuant to its 
constitutional authority.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1, § 17; Koschkee 
                                                 
3 In the alternative, the Plaintiffs and the Governor assert 
that 
the 
guidance 
document 
provisions 
unduly 
burden 
and 
substantially interfere with the Governor's ability to faithfully 
execute the laws under a shared powers analysis.  I conclude that 
all of the disputed guidance document provisions survive a facial 
challenge under both a core powers and shared powers analysis.  
But in light of the majority's decision, a separate analysis 
regarding shared powers is unnecessary. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
7 
 
v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (stating 
legislative power "is the authority to make laws").  And nothing 
in the constitution suggests the legislature cannot, at least in 
some circumstances, make laws that determine the content of certain 
formal communications from the government to the public, or 
prescribe the process by which certain formal or official documents 
and communications are finalized and issued. 
¶199 The legislature has long regulated at least some formal 
executive branch communications about the law——including the 
executive branch's understanding of what the law is, how the 
executive branch is executing the law, and how the executive branch 
intends to execute the law going forward.  The clearest example 
may be the mandatory creation of certain executive branch reports.  
For instance, Wis. Stat. § 15.04(1)(d) requires executive agencies 
to create a report each biennium, delivered "[o]n or before October 
15 of each odd-numbered year."  The report must include what the 
agency has done, how it operates, and its goals and objectives 
moving forward.  Id.  Similar mandated reports regarding what the 
executive branch is doing and plans to do are found throughout 
Wisconsin law.4 
                                                 
4 For example, the Read to Lead Development Council, a 
subordinate of the Department of Children and Families, annually 
submits an operation report to appropriate standing committees of 
the legislature.  Wisconsin Blue Book 194 (2019-20).  Likewise, 
the Board on Aging and Long-Term Care reports to both the governor 
and the legislature regarding "long-term care for the aged and 
disabled."  Id. at 184.  And the Farmland Advisory Council, a 
subordinate council of the Department of Revenue, is also required 
to report annually to the legislature.  Id. at 226. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
8 
 
¶200 In short, while the formal delineation of a category of 
executive branch communications called guidance documents are 
something new in state law, they are not new in kind.  Here, the 
legislature has passed laws telling the executive branch what 
content must be included in certain communications, how those 
communications must be issued, and the process by which those 
communications may be challenged.  This has never been thought of 
as a power exclusive to the executive, and nothing in the 
constitution makes it so.  The constitution gives the legislature 
the power to say what the law should be.  At the very least, this 
gives the legislature a say in at least some formal executive 
                                                 
Sometimes the legislature is quite specific in directing the 
content of formal communications and the internal operations and 
decision-making processes in the executive branch.  One example is 
the groundwater coordinating council, found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 15.347(13).  This statutory provision not only creates the 
council and its membership, it also details with particularity how 
often and under what conditions it can meet.  § 15.347(13)(f) ("The 
council shall meet at least twice each year and may meet at other 
times on the call of 3 of its members.").  The legislature has 
further mandated that the council must file a report every August 
which summarizes the operations and activities of the 
council during the fiscal year concluded on the 
preceding 
June 
30, 
describes 
the 
state 
of 
the 
groundwater resource and its management and sets forth 
the recommendations of the council.  The annual report 
shall include a description of the current groundwater 
quality in the state, an assessment of groundwater 
management programs, information on the implementation 
of [Wis. Stat.] ch. 160 and a list and description of 
current and anticipated groundwater problems.  In each 
annual report, the council shall include the dissents of 
any council member to the activities and recommendations 
of the council. 
§ 15.347(13)(g). 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
9 
 
branch communications to the public about the law.  The challenged 
provisions therefore should survive a facial challenge. 
¶201 The majority disagrees and concludes Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.05 and 227.112 violate the core powers of the executive 
branch.  Its analysis falls far short of the mark because it rests 
on a singular proposition that finds no support in the statutory 
provisions at issue, and therefore has no basis in the 
constitution. 
¶202 The majority summarizes its reasoning and conclusion as 
follows:   
Thought must precede action, of course, and guidance 
documents are simply the written record of the 
executive's thoughts about the law and its execution.  
They contain the executive's interpretation of the laws, 
his judgment about what the laws require him to do.  
Because this intellectual homework is indispensable to 
the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed," Wis. Const. art. V, § 4, it is also 
inseparable from the executive's constitutionally-
vested power. 
Justice Kelly's op., ¶106. 
¶203 This conclusion, however, does not follow from the 
premises because the guidance document provisions do not control 
or 
regulate 
executive 
branch 
thought, 
at 
least 
in 
all 
circumstances.  That is the hook upon which the majority's entire 
analysis rests, and it is mistaken.  The only thing the legislature 
purports to regulate here is a "formal or official document or 
communication" 
about 
the 
law——in 
other 
words, 
formal 
communications reflecting the product of thought.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(3m)(a).  The majority's explanation that the legislature 
is regulating "the necessary predicate to executing the law," 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
10 
 
Justice Kelly's op., ¶107, is wrong on the facts, and therefore, 
wrong on the law.  The legislature is regulating formal 
communications that are the result of, rather than the necessary 
predicate to, executing the law.  By the time a guidance document 
has been reduced to writing, the thinking and analyzing has been 
done. 
¶204 It is true that an executive branch document explaining 
when fishing season starts will require the executive branch to 
read and think about the law.  But there's nothing core to the 
executive branch's powers in disseminating formal information 
which answers that legislatively determined question.  Indeed, 
under our constitutional structure, it must be the executive that 
formally disseminates that information; that is the branch that 
executes the law, which necessarily includes communication about 
the law.5  The majority's abstract approach misses what's actually 
going on here.  The legislature is not invading the executive's 
ability to read the law or think about the law when it regulates 
how agencies officially communicate to the public about what the 
law is and where in the statutes the law may be found. 
                                                 
5 The majority raises a series of questions asking whether 
the legislature could tell the judicial branch to do similar things 
as the disputed laws do here.  Justice Kelly's op., ¶126.  But the 
legislature's relationship to the judiciary is far different than 
its relationship to the branch charged with the constitutional 
duty to execute the laws the legislature passes.  Moreover, the 
majority's criticisms ring hollow because the majority says the 
legislature can pass laws that do the very things it cites; the 
legislature just has to enact laws regarding specific documents 
(create a youth hunting bulletin, for example).  So the majority's 
criticisms apply just as forcefully to its own reasoning, which is 
to say, not much at all. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
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¶205 The majority realizes, of course, that the legislature 
can tell the executive branch to communicate on a topic and can 
specify what the communication must include.  Justice Kelly's op., 
¶¶122-23.  But such a communication, the majority tells us, does 
not meet the statutory definition of a guidance document.  The 
majority explains:   
[I]f the legislature can "determine the content" of a 
guidance document, then it is no longer the executive's 
explanation, or the executive's guidance or advice——it 
is the legislature's explanation, guidance or advice.  
So, to the extent the legislature commands production of 
a document, or determines the content of a guidance 
document, it simply is no longer a guidance document. 
Id., ¶122. 
¶206 Nothing in the statutes, however, supports this 
conclusion.  If the law commands that a manual be created 
reflecting the executive's understanding and intended application 
of the law——and the statutes are full of such mandates——by 
definition, the manual will reflect the executive's understanding 
and intended application of the law.  The "authorship," as the 
majority calls it, doesn't change one bit.  For example, if an 
executive agency must by legislative command create a youth hunting 
bulletin and cite the relevant law, this is a reflection of the 
executive branch's understanding of the law no less than if the 
executive chooses to do the same thing in the absence of such a 
command. 
¶207 Moreover, the statutory definition of guidance documents 
contains strong internal clues that the majority's analysis is 
unsound.  The law tells us guidance documents include manuals, 
handbooks, 
or 
informational 
bulletins. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
12 
 
§ 227.01(3m)(a).  These have lay definitions, but they also appear 
as terms of art throughout our statutes to describe formal agency 
communications.  Sometimes our law requires the creation of 
specific informational communications.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 7.08(3) (instructing the Elections Commission to create an 
election law manual); Wis. Stat. § 49.32(3) (instructing the 
Department of Health Services (DHS) to create a policy and 
procedural manual regarding aid to families with dependent 
children); Wis. Stat. § 73.03(57) (instructing the Department of 
Revenue to create a tax increment financing manual); Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.02(4)(e) (instructing the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
to create a manual establishing uniform traffic control devices); 
Wis. Stat. § 108.14(23) (instructing the Department of Workforce 
to create an unemployment insurance handbook).  And at other times 
the statutes authorize, rather than command, the creation of 
informational communications.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 84.01(11) 
(instructing that the DOT shall issue bulletins, pamphlets and 
literature as necessary); Wis. Stat. § 115.28(4) (instructing the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction to create informational 
bulletins); Wis. Stat. § 452.05(2) (authorizing the Real Estate 
Examining Board to prepare informational letters and bulletins); 
Wis. Stat. § 458.03(2) (authorizing the Department of Safety and 
Professional Services to create informational letters and 
bulletins). 
¶208 It would be extraordinarily odd to read the use of terms 
like manual, handbook, and bulletin in the definition of a guidance 
document to exclude nearly all other statutory uses of the terms 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
13 
 
"manual," "handbook," and "bulletin."  That's not normally how we 
do statutory interpretation.  Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Constr., 
Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462 ("When the 
same term is used throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a 
reasonable deduction that the legislature intended that the term 
possess an identical meaning each time it appears." (citation 
omitted)). 
¶209 The majority's mistaken interpretation also produces 
results at odds with other portions of the definition of guidance 
documents.  Under the majority's reasoning, the optional creation 
of a manual by the executive branch is a guidance document, while 
the mandatory creation of that same manual containing the same 
thoughts and written by the same authors is not a guidance 
document.  But both a legislative command to communicate and 
legislative permission to communicate fall well within the 
statutory language that a guidance document "[e]xplains the 
agency's implementation of a statute or rule enforced or 
administered by the agency" or "[p]rovides guidance or advice with 
respect to how the agency is likely to apply a statute or rule 
enforced 
or 
administered 
by 
the 
agency." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.01(3m)(a).  The majority's approach to authorship does not 
square with the words the legislature wrote. 
¶210 The two provisions the majority opinion strikes down 
should easily survive a facial challenge.  Wisconsin Stat. § 227.05 
requires that a guidance document cite the applicable laws.  But 
the majority opinion holds that this is too much for the 
legislature to demand of the executive branch because it controls 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
14 
 
executive branch thought.  Again, the majority's analysis is not 
grounded in the constitution, but in its misinterpretation of the 
statutes.  The legislature can, at least sometimes, command the 
executive branch to cite the legal basis for its formal explanation 
of laws. 
¶211 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 227.112 mandates draft guidance 
documents be posted for 21 days before they are officially issued, 
among other related requirements.  Posting a draft before issuance 
of some formal communications is now denominated a regulation of 
executive branch thought and invades core executive power.  The 
majority's reasoning is likewise rooted in its notion of authorship 
that runs counter to the statutory language.  Again, the 
constitution allows the legislature to regulate the process by 
which at least some formal executive branch communications are 
issued.  The majority agrees the legislature may do this if it 
commands the creation of such documents, but says the legislature 
may not do this if it merely permits the creation of such 
documents.  Nothing in the statutes or the constitution suggests 
such a distinction.6 
                                                 
6 As the majority notes, Wis. Stat. § 227.05 was not 
challenged by the Plaintiffs; it was raised in the Governor's 
motion for a temporary injunction.  Therefore, the underlying 
merits are not before us, only the motion for temporary injunction.  
Rather than conduct an analysis under the rubric we have 
established for reviewing temporary injunctions, the majority goes 
right to the merits and decides the legal claim.  The majority 
could have determined the claim is likely to be successful, and 
gone on to analyze the remaining factors.  That is ordinarily how 
a claim under this posture would be analyzed since the legal 
question presented here relates only to the temporary injunction, 
not to the legal claim in the case itself. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
¶212 I part ways with the majority not in the general 
constitutional principles at stake, but in the majority's 
erroneous interpretation of what guidance documents are under the 
laws the legislature passed.  The majority's criticisms and 
constitutional conclusion all derive from this error.  The 
unfortunate result is that the court's decision undermines, rather 
than protects, the separation of powers by removing power the 
people gave to the legislature through their constitution.  I would 
have directed the circuit court to grant the motion to dismiss the 
facial challenge to all the guidance document provisions 
challenged here and vacated the order enjoining these provisions 
in full. 
¶213 I am authorized to state that Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
I also observe that even if the circuit court appropriately 
granted the temporary injunction, as the majority opinion 
concludes, the Legislative Defendants should still be able to raise 
their affirmative defenses on remand, including their claim that 
the governor does not have standing to sue the legislature on this 
question.  The Legislative Defendants did not waive any opportunity 
to brief that question in the circuit court on remand given the 
question now before us relates only to the temporary injunction. 
No.  2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.bh 
 
1