Title: State of Missouri, Respondent vs. Kellen C. McKinney, Appellant.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90607
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2010

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,   
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
SC90607 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
KELLEN C. MCKINNEY,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Marco A. Roldan, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 29, 2010 
 
A jury found Kellen McKinney guilty of two counts of first degree murder, two 
counts of armed criminal action, and one count of attempted escape.  He was sentenced to 
consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the murder and armed criminal action charges; 
he also was sentenced to a consecutive four-year term for the attempted escape charge.  
He appeals, asserting that the attempted escape charge was joined wrongly to the other 
charges and, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing his motion seeking severance of 
the attempted escape charge. 
 
1
Because McKinney's attempted escape charge was connected to the other charges, 
joinder was proper, and the judgment is affirmed.1    
I.  Background 
 
John and Mildred Caylor, a couple in their 70s, were murdered.  McKinney was 
arrested for their murders after being linked to the crime by blood, DNA, and other 
evidence.   
While McKinney was incarcerated, jailers searching his cell discovered evidence 
that he was planning an escape.  The evidence of McKinney's attempted escape included:  
a floor drain was found in a sock wrapped in one of McKinney's prisoner jumpers; a latch 
from his cell was missing; the cage over a smoke detector showed signs of tampering; a 
sock and screw were found under McKinney's bed with a number of bed sheets that were 
tied together; mortar in the wall near McKinney's cell window had been chiseled and 
loosened; and McKinney's belongings included two metal brackets, two screws, and a 
hand-drawn map of the jail area.  Based on this evidence, a charge of attempted escape 
from confinement while under arrest for a felony was added to the murder and armed 
criminal action charges McKinney was facing for the Caylors' deaths. 
McKinney filed a "Motion For Severance Of Offenses, Due To Improper Joinder 
and Substantial Prejudice."  He argued that joinder was improper under section 545.140, 
RSMo 2000,2 and Rule 23.05 because the alleged attempted escape offense occurred nine 
weeks after the Caylors' murder, was not of the same or similar character, was not based 
                                                 
1 This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10, as this case 
was taken on transfer after its disposition by the court of appeals.   
2 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
 
2
on the same act or transaction, and was not a connected part of a common scheme or 
plan.   He contended that severance was required to prevent substantial prejudice to him.  
He argued that joinder might impact his willingness to testify in his own defense and 
likely would cause the jury to consider evidence of guilt on one charge as evidence of 
guilt on another charge.  The State responded that joinder was proper because the crimes 
were of the same or similar character and part of the same occurrence.   
McKinney's severance motion was overruled after a hearing.  The trial court 
concluded that the State was entitled to join McKinney's attempted escape offense to his 
other charges because the attempted escape showed his consciousness of guilt.   
McKinney ultimately was found guilty by the jury on all the charges.  He 
appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to sever based on 
improper joinder. 
II.  Joinder Was Proper 
Whether joinder is proper is a question of law.  State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 
109 (Mo. banc 1998).  Liberal joinder of criminal offenses is favored.  Id. (citing State v. 
Simmons, 815 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Mo. banc 1991)).   
Joinder of offenses is governed by Rule 23.05, which states: 
All offenses that are of the same or similar character or based on two or 
more acts that are part of the same transaction or on two or more acts or 
transactions that are connected or that constitute parts of a common scheme 
or plan may be charged in the same indictment or information in separate 
counts. 
 
Section 545.140.2 also provides for joinder of offenses, stating: 
 
3
[T]wo or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or 
information …if the offenses charged … are of the same or similar 
character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts 
or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan. 
 
McKinney asserts that joinder was improper because the attempted escape 
occurred nine weeks after the Caylors' murders and at a different location.  He contends 
that the attempted escape cannot be considered part of the "same transaction" as the 
Caylors' murders or part of a "common scheme or plan" relating to their deaths.  And he 
also argues that the attempted escape charge was joined improperly to the other charges 
because it was dissimilar in character.  McKinney's arguments, however, fail to give 
effect to all the provisions for joinder under Rule 23.05 and section 545.140.2.  These 
joinder provisions are listed as alternatives, and one alternative permits joinder where 
offenses are "connected."   
In Morrow, this Court noted definitions of "connected" for purposes of reviewing 
the propriety of joinder:  
"Connected" is defined as:  "[j]oined; united by junction, by an intervening 
substance or medium, by dependence or relation, or by order in a series."  
Black's Law Dictionary 302 (6th ed. 1990).  In Webster's, "connected" is 
defined as:  "joined or linked together [in] a series, having the parts or 
elements logically related …."  Webster's International 480 (3d ed.1981). 
 
968 S.W.2d at 109. 
 
Morrow discussed a number of ways that the offenses in that case were 
"connected" – by time, by similarities in the manner they were committed, by motive, 
and "by their dependence and relationship to one another."  Id.  Morrow's discussions 
focused on the facts of that particular case and did not limit the factors that can "connect" 
 
4
offenses for joinder purposes.  Charges may be "connected" for reasons other than 
sharing a common time or location.   
In this case, McKinney's charges shared a "dependence and relationship to one 
another" that rendered them "connected" in satisfaction of the joinder provisions of Rule 
23.05 and section 545.140.2.  McKinney's incarceration for the felony charges of murder 
and armed criminal action provided the basis for the State to charge him with attempted 
escape from confinement while under arrest for a felony.  His apparent motive for the 
attempted escape was avoidance of prosecution for the other charges, and the trial court 
correctly noted that his attempted escape provided evidence of his consciousness of guilt 
that was relevant to the other charges.3  The trial court did not err in finding that joinder 
was proper in McKinney's case. 
III.  Severance Was Not Required 
Even where joinder is proper, however, severance may be necessary to prevent 
substantial prejudice to the defendant that could result if the charges are not tried 
separately.  Morrow, 968 S.W.2d at 109; see Rule 24.07.  Whether to grant severance is a 
decision left to the trial court's sound discretion.  Morrow, 968 S.W.2d at 109.  The trial 
court's decision overruling McKinney's motion to sever will be reversed if the trial court 
                                                 
3 This Court noted in State v. Williams: 
Evidence of escape is admissible as bearing on defendant's consciousness of guilt 
as to pending charges. … The existence of circumstances indicating the escape 
was not motivated by consciousness of guilt may be considered by the jury to 
reduce the weight of the escape evidence, but it does not render the escape 
evidence inadmissible. Whether the escape was motivated by a consciousness of 
guilt or another reason is a question for the jury.  
97 S.W.3d 462, 469 (Mo. banc 2003) (internal citations omitted).  
 
 
 
5
abused its discretion in overruling the motion and if there was a clear showing of 
prejudice.  See State v. Hobbs, 826 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. App. 1992).  A trial court 
abuses its discretion if its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then 
before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and 
indicate a lack of careful consideration.  State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 115 (Mo. 
banc 2008). 
In considering whether severance is required, the court considers "the number of 
offenses joined, the complexity of the evidence, and the likelihood that the jury can 
distinguish the evidence and apply it, without confusion, to each offense."  Morrow, 968 
S.W.2d at 109.  Severance is proper only after the defendant "makes a particularized 
showing of substantial prejudice if the offense is not tried separately" and after the "court 
finds the existence of a bias or discrimination against the party that requires a separate 
trial of the offense."  Rule 24.07; see also Morrow, 968 S.W.2d at 109.  Any prejudice 
from joinder "may be overcome where the evidence with regard to each crime is 
sufficiently simple and distinct to mitigate the risks of joinder."  Morrow, 968 S.W.2d at 
109 (internal quotation omitted). 
In McKinney's case, the evidence relating to the attempted escape charge and the 
murder and armed criminal action charges was "sufficiently simple and distinct to 
mitigate the risks of joinder."  Cf. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d at 110.  Because the jury could 
distinguish the evidence for each offense and apply it without confusion, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that severance was unnecessary.   
 
 
6
IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no error in McKinney's case.  The trial 
court's judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
 
All concur. 
 
7