Title: Janvier v. Arminio
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: s
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2006

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BETHANIE JANVIER 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 052231 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
September 15, 2006 
GARY ARMINIO, D.P.M., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
 
In this appeal, which arises from a medical malpractice 
action, the principal issue to be resolved is whether an order 
granting the plaintiff a second nonsuit without prejudice, 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(B), is void ab initio in the absence 
of notice to the named defendants when the named defendants in 
the suit have not yet been served with the plaintiff’s motion 
for judgment.  The merits of the underlying malpractice claim 
are not at issue, and the procedural facts necessary to our 
resolution of this appeal are not in dispute. 
BACKGROUND 
As will become apparent, this case involves protracted 
litigation spanning a period of some five years with no 
resolution of the merits of the plaintiff’s asserted claim.  
Although several familiar statutes and rules of this Court are 
implicated by the procedural facts of the case that have been 
addressed by this Court in a number of our prior decisions, we 
have not addressed previously the specific issue presented here 
 
2
with regard to the application of Code § 8.01-380 as currently 
enacted.  Nevertheless, for reasons that will also become 
apparent, we take this opportunity initially to observe that the 
prospect of similar cases in the future resulting from a series 
of nonsuits is not speculative.  Both future plaintiffs and 
defendants might well benefit should the General Assembly amend 
Code § 8.01-380 by providing a requirement for notice or the 
exercise of due diligence to give notice to a defendant when a 
plaintiff seeks a second or subsequent nonsuit. 
The several statutes and rules of this Court implicated in 
this case impose, in combination, critical limitations upon the 
plaintiff’s right to maintain a civil action such as the present 
one.  Accordingly, we begin our analysis with a brief 
recitation, in pertinent part, of those statutes and rules in 
order to bring the procedural facts into appropriate focus. 
Code § 8.01-243(A) provides a two-year limitations period 
“after the cause of action accrues” in actions for medical 
malpractice.  Once timely filed, the plaintiff may nonsuit the 
action pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 under specific circumstances 
and limitations.  Code § 8.01-380(A) provides that “[a] party 
shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit . . . unless he does so 
before a motion to strike the evidence has been sustained or 
before the jury retires from the bar or before the action has 
been submitted to the court for decision.”  Code § 8.01-380(B) 
 
3
further provides that “[o]nly one nonsuit may be taken . . . as 
a matter of right, although the court may allow additional 
nonsuits or counsel may stipulate to additional nonsuits.”  When 
the plaintiff properly suffers a nonsuit, Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) 
provides that “the statute of limitations with respect to such 
action shall be tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited 
action, and the plaintiff may recommence his action within six 
months from the date of the order entered by the court, or 
within the original period of limitation . . . , whichever 
period is longer.” 
In addition to these statutory provisions, the procedural 
facts of this case implicate consideration of the applicability 
of Code § 8.01-275.1, which provides that “[s]ervice of process 
. . . within twelve months of commencement of the action or suit 
against a defendant shall be timely as to that defendant.”  This 
statute further provides that service of process on a defendant 
more than twelve months after the suit or action was commenced 
“shall be timely upon a finding by the court that the plaintiff 
exercised due diligence to have timely service made on the 
defendant.” 
 
4
Finally, turning to the rules of this Court implicated in 
this case, Rule 3:5(e)1 provides that “[n]o order, judgment or 
decree shall be entered against a defendant who was served with 
process more than one year after the institution of the action 
. . . unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff 
exercised due diligence to have timely service on that 
defendant.”  Rule 1:1 provides that “[a]ll final . . . orders 
. . . shall remain under the control of the trial court and 
subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one 
days after the date of entry, and no longer.” 
On May 21, 2001, Bethanie Janvier filed a motion for 
judgment in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County (“trial court”) 
against Gary Arminio, D.P.M. and Burke Foot and Ankle Center, 
P.C. (collectively, “Arminio”), alleging medical malpractice 
arising from Dr. Arminio’s treatment of Janvier while acting 
within the scope of his employment.2  The last date Janvier 
received treatment from Arminio was November 14, 1999.  Code 
                     
1 Former Rule 3:3(c) was in force at the time the 
proceedings in this case were conducted in the trial court.  The 
provisions of former Rule 3:3(c) are now contained in Rule 
3:5(e) and are substantially identical.  Accordingly, we will 
refer to the current rule in this opinion. 
 
2 Brantley P. Vitek, Jr., M.D. was also named as a 
defendant.  Dr. Vitek subsequently was dismissed from the suit 
with prejudice and is not a party to this appeal. 
 
5
§ 8.01-243(A); see Justice v. Natvig, 238 Va. 178, 180, 381 
S.E.2d 8, 9 (1989). 
Janvier did not seek to obtain service of process on 
Arminio within one year of filing her motion for judgment.  
Code § 8.01-275.1.  In order to avoid dismissal of the case 
under Rule 3:5(e), Janvier filed a motion for entry of a 
voluntary nonsuit.  Janvier did not provide Arminio with notice 
of her intent to seek the nonsuit.  On June 3, 2002, the trial 
court entered an order of nonsuit (“first nonsuit”).  Code 
§ 8.01-380(B). 
On October 7, 2002, Janvier recommenced her medical 
malpractice action against Arminio by filing a second motion for 
judgment making substantially the same allegations as in the 
first suit.  Code § 8.01-229(E)(3).  Once again, Janvier did not 
seek to obtain service of process on Arminio within one year. 
On December 4, 2003, without providing Arminio notice of 
intent to do so, Janvier’s counsel appeared before a judge of 
the trial court in chambers and requested that the case be 
nonsuited.  Janvier’s counsel presented the judge with a draft 
order of nonsuit, which the judge entered on that day (“second 
nonsuit”).  Code § 8.01-380(B).  The order prepared by Janvier’s 
counsel did not indicate that the nonsuit was a subsequent 
nonsuit. 
 
6
On May 27, 2004, Janvier filed a third motion for judgment 
making the same allegations against Arminio as those made in her 
prior two suits.  Code § 8.01-229(E)(3).  On August 8, 2004, 
Arminio was served with the third motion for judgment.  On 
August 30, 2004, Arminio, unaware of the two prior nonsuited 
actions that had preceded the May 27, 2004 motion for judgment, 
filed a plea in bar contending that Janvier’s third motion for 
judgment was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 
Code § 8.01-243(A). 
During the pendency of Arminio’s plea in bar, the parties 
engaged in extended discovery proceedings.  As germane to this 
appeal, Arminio ultimately succeeded in deposing Janvier’s 
counsel concerning the proceedings and circumstances that led to 
the granting of the second nonsuit.  In that deposition, 
Janvier’s counsel stated that in making the oral motion for 
nonsuit he had advised the trial judge that he was requesting a 
second nonsuit.  Janvier’s counsel further stated that the judge 
had asked whether the order of nonsuit required the endorsement 
of opposing counsel, and Janvier’s counsel had replied that he 
believed endorsement was unnecessary because Arminio had not 
been served with the motion for judgment.3 
                     
3 While the record does not reflect the basis for it, the 
trial court subsequently concluded that the judge who entered 
the second nonsuit order had no recollection of the 
 
7
The parties then filed memoranda addressing the issue of 
whether the second nonsuit order had been properly obtained 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 and, therefore, whether Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3) provided an extension of the limitations period for 
filing the third motion for judgment.  Initially, Arminio 
contended that the second nonsuit order should not be given 
effect because it was obtained by actual or constructive fraud 
on the court.  Alternatively, Arminio contended that the second 
nonsuit order should not be given effect because the named 
defendants were not given notice of Janvier’s intent to seek the 
order or provided an opportunity to be heard before its entry.  
Arminio contended that the lack of notice rendered the trial 
court without jurisdiction to enter a second nonsuit order 
because to do so would result from “a mode of procedure . . . 
the court could ‘not lawfully adopt.’ ”  Singh v. Mooney, 261 
Va. 48, 51-52, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001) (quoting Evans v. 
Smyth-Wythe Airport Comm’n, 255 Va. 69, 73, 495 S.E.2d 825, 828 
(1998)). 
Janvier responded that there had been no fraud or deception 
perpetrated on the trial court in obtaining the second nonsuit 
                                                                  
circumstances surrounding the entry of that order.  
Additionally, the record contains an assertion by Janvier’s 
counsel that the reason given to this judge for seeking the 
second nonsuit was that Janvier’s anticipated expert witness was 
no longer willing to testify on Janvier’s behalf. 
 
8
order.  She further contended that no provision in Code § 8.01-
380 requires notice to an unserved defendant of a motion for a 
second nonsuit.  Finally, Janvier maintained that the second 
nonsuit order was a final judgment and was not subject to 
collateral attack in a subsequent proceeding. 
In an opinion letter dated June 22, 2005, the trial court 
addressed the issues raised by Arminio’s plea in bar to the May 
27, 2004 motion for judgment.  The trial court first concluded 
that “there [was] no clear evidence of fraud” in Janvier’s 
obtaining the second nonsuit order.  Thus, despite the order not 
specifically stating that a second nonsuit was being granted or 
that the nonsuit was without prejudice, the trial court 
concluded that it could not “treat the [second nonsuit] as void 
for having been procured by fraud.” 
The trial court next addressed Arminio’s contention that 
the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the second nonsuit order 
in the absence of notice to Arminio.  The trial court 
acknowledged that Code § 8.01-380 “is silent as to whether all 
parties must be noticed when a plaintiff requests a nonsuit, 
regardless of whether it is the first or an additional nonsuit.”  
Citing Waterman v. Halverson, 261 Va. 203, 208, 540 S.E.2d 867, 
869 (2001) and McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 32, 458 S.E.2d 
759, 762 (1995), the trial court further acknowledged that this 
Court “has held that a plaintiff may take a first nonsuit, as a 
 
9
matter of right, without providing notice to a defendant who has 
not yet been served with the Motion for Judgment.”  (Emphasis in 
original.) 
The trial court declined to adopt the view, asserted by 
Janvier, that the rationale of Waterman and McManama would apply 
to second nonsuits as well a first nonsuits.  The trial court 
concluded that while a first nonsuit is an absolute right, a 
second nonsuit, being only discretionary, requires that “all 
affected parties should be heard” before a court could exercise 
that discretion.  The trial court reasoned that “where a court 
is to exercise discretion, it must have the benefit of hearing 
from all persons affected thereby” and concluded that when 
requesting a second nonsuit “the plaintiff must notice all 
defendants affected by such nonsuit regardless of whether they 
have been served with process.” 
In an order dated June 22, 2005, the trial court adopted 
the rationale of its opinion letter and sustained Arminio’s plea 
in bar of the statute of limitations, ruling that the second 
nonsuit order was void and, thus, the third motion for judgment 
was not timely filed as it was not filed within six months of 
the entry of the first nonsuit order.  The trial court further 
concluded, however, that because the second nonsuit order was 
void, the suit initiated by Janvier’s second motion for judgment 
remained an open case. 
 
10
Janvier filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial 
court’s judgment sustaining Arminio’s plea in bar.  The trial 
court promptly entered an order suspending execution of that 
judgment until such time as the motion for reconsideration could 
be argued and decided.  Janvier also filed a motion for entry of 
nonsuit with respect to the second motion for judgment filed 
October 7, 2002.  Janvier contended that if the second nonsuit 
order was void and, consequently, the October 7, 2002 motion for 
judgment was still pending, that action could be properly 
nonsuited because Arminio currently would have notice of her 
intent to seek a nonsuit. 
In a combined hearing, the trial court heard argument on 
both motions.  With respect to the motion for reconsideration, 
Janvier contended that if the second nonsuit order was void, 
then her second motion for judgment remained pending and, thus, 
the statute of limitations was tolled with respect to her 
ability to file the third motion for judgment.  In the 
alternative, Janvier contended that the trial court could grant 
a nonsuit as to the second motion for judgment and that, by 
relation back, the third motion for judgment would then be 
timely.  In the course of this argument, counsel for Janvier 
conceded that “it would . . . be too late to proceed [to] 
service” in the action on the second motion for judgment under 
Rule 3:5(e).  Janvier did not contend that she had exercised due 
 
11
diligence to obtain service on Arminio within one year after 
filing the second motion for judgment. 
In an order dated July 29, 2005, the trial court denied the 
motion for reconsideration and lifted the order suspending the 
prior judgment.  In a subsequent order dated August 4, 2005, the 
trial court denied Janvier’s motion for nonsuit and dismissed 
the second motion for judgment on the ground that Arminio had 
not been served with process within one year of the filing of 
that suit, citing Rule 3:5(e). 
Janvier filed notices of appeal with respect to both her 
second and third motions for judgment and filed a joint petition 
for appeal in this Court.  Rule 5:17(d).  We awarded Janvier an 
appeal with respect to both suits. 
DISCUSSION 
As a preliminary matter, we address an issue raised by 
Arminio in a motion to dismiss this appeal.  Arminio contends 
that Janvier may not combine appeals of the trial court’s 
judgments in the cases involving her second and third motions 
for judgment under Rule 5:17(d) because the cases were not 
“tried together in the [trial] court.”  We disagree. 
The purpose of Rule 5:17(d) is to promote judicial economy 
and ensure consistency in the rulings of this Court.  Under this 
rule, where “two or more cases were tried together in the court 
. . . one petition for appeal may be used to bring all such 
 
12
cases before this Court even though the cases were not 
consolidated by formal order.”  (Emphasis added.) 
As the records of the two cases sent to this Court by the 
trial court amply demonstrate, in the proceedings subsequent to 
the trial court’s June 22, 2005 order finding that the second 
nonsuit order was void and that the suit initiated by the 
October 7, 2002 motion for judgment remained an open case, the 
trial court received motions relevant to both cases initiated by 
the second and third motions for judgment and heard argument 
from the parties relevant to both cases in the same hearing.4  
The transcript and the trial court’s subsequent opinion letter 
reference the separate docket numbers of both cases.  
Accordingly, even though the trial court did not consolidate the 
two cases and entered separate orders in each case, there can be 
                     
4 On brief, Arminio’s counsel contends that they did not 
present argument with respect to the motion for entry of a 
nonsuit to the October 7, 2002 motion for judgment “[b]ecause 
Janvier never served Dr. Arminio . . . with the second action.”  
While it may be true that Arminio’s counsel chose not to offer 
any argument with respect to the motion for nonsuit, the 
contention that they did not, or could not, do so because 
Arminio had not been served with the second motion for judgment 
is directly contrary to their contention that unserved 
defendants are entitled to notice of a motion for a 
discretionary nonsuit.  Clearly, Arminio had notice of Janvier’s 
intention to seek the nonsuit at that stage of the proceedings. 
Apparently, Arminio was concerned with not making a general 
appearance as opposed to a special appearance in order to 
challenge the second nonsuit.  We note that such a concern has 
been resolved by the current provisions of Code § 8.01-277, 
 
13
no doubt that the “cases were tried together in the court” and, 
thus, could be appealed together in a single petition. 
We turn now to consider Janvier’s assignments of error.  
Because we are presented solely with questions of law, we will 
apply a de novo standard of review.  Wilby v. Gostel, 265 Va. 
437, 440, 578 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003); Transcontinental Insurance 
Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 262 Va. 502, 514, 551 S.E.2d 313, 319 (2001). 
As we have already indicated, the procedural facts in this 
case provide the basis and explanation for the legal assertions 
of the parties premised upon the statutes and rules of this 
Court implicated by those facts.  A review of those facts in 
conjunction with those statutes and rules illustrates that the 
ultimate focus here is necessarily upon the validity of the 
second nonsuit order at issue. 
Janvier was last treated by Arminio on November 14, 1999 
and, within the two-year limitations period provided by Code 
§ 8.01-243(A), she timely filed her first motion for judgment 
asserting a malpractice claim against Arminio on May 21, 2001.  
She took a first nonsuit of that action on June 3, 2002 as a 
matter of right pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(B).  Although 
Arminio had not been served with process and had no notice of 
Janvier’s motion for a nonsuit, Janvier had an absolute right to 
                                                                  
which now specifically permit a special appearance in these 
 
14
this nonsuit because none of the other restrictions on that 
right as provided in Code § 8.01-380(A) or (D) were applicable. 
Upon suffering the first nonsuit, Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) 
permitted Janvier to recommence her malpractice action within 
six months from June 3, 2002, the date of the entry of that 
nonsuit order.  This she did on October 7, 2002.  Janvier did 
not serve Arminio with process.  Rather, on December 4, 2003, 
more than twelve months after commencing the suit, she obtained 
a second nonsuit of the action without notice to Arminio.  
Janvier then, within six months of the entry of the second 
nonsuit order, filed her third motion for judgment against 
Arminio for the same malpractice claim on May 7, 2004.  Arminio 
was then served with process in a timely manner. 
Despite a two-year limitations period for the filing of a 
medical malpractice action, Arminio was not aware and was not 
served with process regarding Janvier’s present claim from late 
1999 until mid-2004.  Clearly, the malpractice claim filed on 
October 7, 2002 was potentially subject to dismissal pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-275.1 and Rule 3:5(e) because Arminio was not served 
with process within twelve months of the filing of that suit.  
Moreover, unless the second nonsuit was properly granted, 
Janvier’s third malpractice action was clearly barred by the 
                                                                  
circumstances. 
 
15
limitations period in Code § 8.01-243(A) because it would not 
have had the benefit of a further extension of time for filing 
under Code § 8.01-229(E)(3).  To unravel this sequence of 
procedural knots, the focus is then necessarily upon the trial 
court’s judgment vacating the second nonsuit order as void ab 
initio.  This is so because Rule 1:1 limits the trial court’s 
authority to vacate a valid order to a period of 21 days, and no 
longer.  Here, the trial court on July 29, 2005 vacated a prior 
order entered on December 4, 2003.  Thus, if the latter order 
was not void ab initio this protracted case becomes readily 
resolved. 
Although Janvier has raised five assignments of error 
challenging both the sustaining of the plea in bar to her third 
motion for judgment and the dismissal of her second motion for 
judgment, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court 
correctly determined that in the absence of notice being given 
to a party who had not yet been served with the underlying 
action and whose rights potentially would be affected thereby, 
an order granting a second nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 
is void ab initio.  This issue is ultimately resolved by 
whether, as the trial court found, in the absence of such notice 
to that party and an opportunity to be heard, a trial court 
would lack jurisdiction to enter a second nonsuit “because the 
character of the judgment was not such as the court had the 
 
16
power to render because the mode of procedure employed by the 
court was such as it might not lawfully adopt.”  Anthony v. 
Kasey, 83 Va. 338, 340, 5 S.E. 176, 177 (1887); see also Evans, 
255 Va. at 73-74, 495 S.E.2d at 828; Watkins v. Watkins, 220 Va. 
1051, 1054, 265 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1980).  “The lack of 
jurisdiction to enter an order under [such] circumstances 
renders the order a complete nullity and it may be ‘impeached 
directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, 
or in any manner.’ ”  Singh, 261 Va. at 52, 541 S.E.2d at 551 
(quoting Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705, 
130 S.E. 902, 906 (1925)). 
The trial court acknowledged, and it is self-evident, that 
Code § 8.01-380 does not expressly require notice to be given to 
a party who has not yet been served with process of the 
plaintiff’s intent to seek a nonsuit.  And, we have held that 
with respect to a first nonsuit a trial court may not place 
limitations on the absolute right of the plaintiff to seek the 
nonsuit beyond those found in the statute.  McManama, 250 Va. at 
32, 458 S.E.2d at 762.  Thus, in McManama we held that the trial 
court erred when it ruled that the plaintiff could not seek a 
nonsuit unless the defendant had “ ‘been served with process, 
[was] before a court with jurisdiction over the defendant’s 
person, and [had] been given notice of hearing and an 
opportunity to be heard.’ ”  Id.; see also Waterman, 261 Va. at 
 
17
208, 540 S.E.2d at 869 (“McManama stands for the proposition 
that a plaintiff can secure a valid voluntary nonsuit pursuant 
to Code § 8.01-380 even though there has been no service of 
process on the defendants”); Clark v. Butler Aviation-Washington 
National, Inc., 238 Va. 506, 511-12, 385 S.E.2d 847, 849-50 
(1989). 
Janvier contends, as she did in the trial court, that the 
rationale of McManama and Waterman with respect to a first 
nonsuit should apply to a second nonsuit.  Arminio responds that 
because a second nonsuit is not a matter of right under Code 
§ 8.01-380, the trial court properly rejected the rationale of 
those two cases.  Arminio contends that, by providing in Code 
§ 8.01-380(B) for the ability of a plaintiff to obtain a second 
nonsuit at the discretion of the trial court or by stipulation 
of the parties, the General Assembly evinced an intent that 
second nonsuits be treated differently from first nonsuits with 
regard to a notice requirement.  We disagree.  Contrary to 
Arminio’s contention, nothing in the language of Code § 8.01-
380(B) suggests that the General Assembly intended to place any 
additional restriction on the granting of a second nonsuit other 
than to leave the matter to the trial court’s discretion or the 
concurrence of the parties.  Thus, the circumstance presented by 
this case is not distinguishable from the trial court’s 
erroneous judgment in McManama to impose on a plaintiff seeking 
 
18
a second nonsuit procedural “requirements [not] found in the 
applicable statutes . . . by judicial fiat.”  250 Va. at 32, 458 
S.E.2d at 762. 
The duty of the courts is “to construe the law as it is 
written.”  Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm’n v. City of 
Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1978).  We 
have consistently held that “[c]ourts cannot add language to the 
statute the General Assembly has not seen fit to include.  Nor 
are they permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial 
interpretation.  Where the General Assembly has expressed its 
intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of 
the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain 
meaning.”  Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 
608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Accordingly, we cannot, and will not, add 
words to Code § 8.01-380 in order to impose requirements on a 
plaintiff seeking a second nonsuit that are not found in the 
plain language of the statute as enacted by the General 
Assembly. 
Arminio contends, however, that when a plaintiff seeks a 
second nonsuit and the defendant is not given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on any defenses in opposition to the 
granting of the second nonsuit, the defendant is denied his 
right to due process.  Clearly, the granting of a nonsuit does 
 
19
not operate to deprive a defendant of any valid or vested 
defense of the statute of limitations or the time limits of Rule 
3:5(e).  McManama, 250 Va. at 34, 458 S.E.2d at 763; Clark, 238 
Va. at 512 n.5, 385 S.E.2d at 850 n.5; see also Berry v. F & S 
Financial Marketing, Inc., 271 Va. 329, 334, 626 S.E.2d 821, 824 
(2006).  The thrust of Arminio’s contention then is that in the 
absence of notice, Arminio was denied the opportunity to ensure 
that in exercising discretion, pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(B), 
to grant or deny the second nonsuit the trial judge was made 
aware that at that stage of the proceedings more than four years 
had elapsed since the alleged malpractice occurred and, 
moreover, that the second malpractice action had been pending 
for more than one year without an attempt to serve Arminio with 
process and, thus, was subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 
3:5(e). 
We do not disagree with Arminio’s contention insofar as it 
ultimately rests on the recognized notion that justice is best 
served when a trial judge called upon to exercise discretion has 
the benefit of hearing the positions of all parties potentially 
affected as a result of the exercise of that discretion.  
Indeed, as the trial judge here so aptly noted, “[a] contrary 
notion is antithetical to any sense of fair play and substantial 
justice.”   
 
20
Arminio’s contention, however, does not mandate a 
conclusion that the second nonsuit order was void ab initio on 
the facts of this case and the provisions of Code § 8.01-380(B).  
As we have previously demonstrated, Janvier had timely filed her 
second motion for judgment in the trial court as permitted by 
Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) following her first nonsuit as a matter of 
right.  At the time Janvier sought her second, discretionary 
nonsuit, Arminio could not have asserted a valid defense of the 
running of the limitations period provided by Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3), and Arminio did not have an absolute defense of the 
time limits of Rule 3:5(e).  In the absence of a requirement of 
notice to Arminio under Code § 8.01-380(B), the trial judge 
could properly exercise discretion to grant the second nonsuit.  
It necessarily follows then that the second nonsuit order was 
not void ab initio, and pursuant to Rule 1:1 that order was not 
subject to be vacated more than 21 days after its entry.  
Accordingly, we hold that upon a proper finding that the 
second nonsuit order did not result from fraud, the trial court 
erred when it found that the failure to provide notice to 
Arminio deprived the court of jurisdiction to enter the second 
nonsuit order and in declaring that order to be void ab initio.  
Because that order was not void ab initio, the trial court had 
no authority to vacate it because it became final 21 days after 
its entry.  We further hold that because that order was not void 
 
21
ab initio, the trial court erred in finding that Janvier’s third 
motion for judgment was time barred, because it was filed within 
six months of the entry of the second nonsuit order, as 
permitted by Code § 8.01-229(E)(3). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court in case No. L208197 dismissing the second motion for 
judgment with prejudice and reinstate the second nonsuit order.  
Because the second nonsuit order renders further action with 
respect to Janvier’s second motion for judgment moot, we will 
enter final judgment as to that suit here.  We also will reverse 
the judgment of the trial court in case No. L223259 sustaining 
Arminio’s plea in bar of the statute of limitations to Janvier’s 
third motion for judgment and remand that case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed in part and final judgment; 
and Reversed in part and remanded.