Title: Haga v. Moss, Administrator
Citation: 181 Kan. 171, 311 P.2d 281
Docket Number: 40,348
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 1957

181 Kan. 171 (1957)
311 P.2d 281
In the Matter of the Estate of Clark J. Armstrong, also known as C.J. Armstrong, deceased. (ARLEY D. HAGA, Appellant,
v.
HAROLD L. MOSS, Administrator of the Estate of Clark J. Armstrong, deceased, Appellee.)
No. 40,348

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 11, 1957.
Payne H. Ratner, Jr., of Wichita, argued the cause and Payne H. Ratner, Louise Mattox, Russell Cranmer, Dale B. Stinson, Jr., Cliff W. Ratner, William L. Fry, A. Wayne Murphy, Ray A. Overpeck, Bernard V. Borst, D. Clifford Allison, Gerald D. Lasswell, all of Wichita, and E.E. Pedroja, of Eureka, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Harold G. Forbes, of Eureka, argued the cause and Thos. C. Forbes and George Forbes, both of Eureka, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HALL, J.:
This was an action to recover damages for negligence in the operation of an automobile. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the evidence and the plaintiff appeals.
No important issue is raised as to the pleadings.
This action was filed in the probate court by a petition of demand against decedent's estate with appropriate request that the matter be transferred and tried in the district court pursuant to G.S. 1953 Supp., 59-2402a. The answer is a written defense to the allowances of the claim in demand against the estate.
In summary the petition alleged the plaintiff was proceeding west on a county road north of Eureka, Kansas. Loose gravel was piled parallel to the north shoulder of the road forming a ridge 4 to 5 feet wide and 1 1/2 to 2 feet high. The weather was clear. While the petitioner was proceeding westerly along the road and occupying the north half, or right hand, of the roadway the automobile operated by the decedent approached from the west proceeding east. The decedent's automobile suddenly turned to the *173 left, or north, and crossed the center line. The accident resulted. The petition also alleges the decedent was 79 years old and suffered infirmities and disabilities.
The written defenses denied generally and specifically allegations of the petitioner and set up the contributory negligence of petitioner.
Upon these issues joined, the matter came on for trial to a jury. The plaintiff introduced his evidence and rested. The defendant demurred to the evidence and, after consideration of argument on the issues raised by the demurrer, the court sustained the demurrer, discharged the jury and disallowed plaintiff's claim against the estate of defendant with costs to the plaintiff. After overruling of post trial motions, plaintiff takes this appeal.
Plaintiff and appellant makes five specifications of error but urges only a consideration of the demurrer to the evidence.
Following the well established rule of this court, a consideration of such demurrer requires a review of the evidence to determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the cause of action of the petitioner.
An examination of the plaintiff's evidence shows:
There were no eye witnesses to the accident other than the petitioner.
In support of the petition plaintiff introduced the testimony of Mr. Edward E. Arnold. Mr. Arnold testified that he worked on an oil lease near the scene of the accident and drove the road where the accident occurred twice a day five days a week. On the day of the accident he was driving the road and came up behind decedent's car. He said, "There were two people in this automobile and I drove up behind them. They were going down the road and on the left side of the road part of the time and part of the time they would be on the right side. I didn't know what side he was going to drive on. I judge they were driving around 20 miles an hour...." He attempted to pass decedent but decedent did not respond to his horn.
"Q. Did you honk it just once?
"A. No, continuously.
Arnold went on to say that he could observe perfectly as he had *174 perfect vision. As he started around decedent's car, "the car was three feet over on the left side of the black center line and he had to slow his car down and put it in second gear, straddling clear over the gravel bar, the wheels being clear on the left side of the road and possibly up the gravel bar, the wind row, to get around Armstrong."
Arnold further testified that he could see several cars coming from the east, one of which was the Haga car.
A Mr. John Runyan testified next for plaintiff. He was also an oil worker on his way home. He testified that he met the Armstrong car.
"A. Yes.
..............
Mr. Runyan was followed by a Mr. Al Baumgardner and a Mr. Merle Braymer both of whom were oil field workers and testified that they were traveling over the road at the approximate time of the accident and as to the condition of the road. Mr. Baumgardner testified that he too met a car which "was driving pretty much on his side of the road and that he pulled over into the gravel ridge a foot or more".
Mr. Braymer testified that Mr. Haga passed him and at that time Mr. Haga's speed did not seem unusual.
Mr. Charles B. Williams, Highway Patrolman, then testified that he arrived at the scene at 5:26 p.m. He said:
..............
"A. No, it was clear."
The counter abstract includes the following testimony of Trooper Williams:
..............
"A. That is correct.
"Q. How much does it show each way?
"A. That is correct.
"A. Yes.
"A. Yes.
"A. That is right.
"Q. How wide is a car?
"A. Approximately six feet.
"A. Yes.
"A. That is correct.
"A. That would be three feet.
"Q. Three feet south of the true center line?
"A. Yes."
Plaintiff then called a Mr. Ernest Grooms who testified concerning Mr. Armstrong's infirmaties and disabilities. He testified:
The court sustained objection to other testimony of Mr. Grooms.
A Dr. Henry O. Marsh then testified in behalf of plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff's final witness was Mr. Kenneth Razak, Dean of the School of Engineering, University of Wichita, who in answer to a hypothetical question reconstructed the scene of the accident and testified as follows:
..............
"A. Yes.
Other pertinent testimony in the counter abstract is as follows:
..............
The court sustained defendant's demurrer to the evidence on these grounds stated in the Journal Entry:
In sustaining the demurrer the court said:
..............
In the argument on demurrer the court said:
In presenting the appeal to this court, counsel for defendant admitted the negligence of Armstrong. He said:
The ground rules on the consideration of the evidence under demurrer are well established by this court. In Brent v. McDonald, 180 Kan. 142, 300 P.2d 396, the court said:
Likewise in Krey v. Schmidt, 172 Kan. 319, Syl. 1 and 2,240 P.2d 153:
In the decision the court further said on page 325:
To sustain a demurrer to the evidence the negligence or contributory negligence must clearly appear from the evidence introduced. Most v. Holthaus, 170 Kan. 510, 513, 227 P.2d 144:
In applying the ground rules to this case, we believe the court did not follow them in sustaining the demurrer to the evidence. To sustain the demurrer on the grounds that Armstrong was not negligent and that Haga was contributorily negligent required the court to weigh conflicting testimony on both direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. In fact it is difficult to determine how the court absolved Armstrong from negligence in the light of its own statement that "the old gentleman wobbled around the road." That reasonable minds would differ on the testimony is certainly borne out by the fact that defendant's counsel admits negligence notwithstanding the finding of the court to the contrary.
Many similar factual situations have been before this court and the court has held such questions of fact as were raised by plaintiff's evidence should go to the jury. A leading case is Sawhill v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 152 Kan. 735, 107 P.2d 770:
The Sawhill case was followed in Briggs v. Burk, 174 Kan. 440, Syl. 1, 257 P.2d 164:
In the decision the court further said:
Likewise the question of negligence or contributory negligence was not clearly shown in plaintiff's evidence and should have gone to the jury. In Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28, the court said:
See, also, Beecher v. Stepanian, 170 Kan. 201, 224 P.2d 1017.
Appellee relies strongly upon DeGraw v. Kansas City &amp; Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713, 228 P.2d 527; and Krey v. Schmidt, 172 Kan. 319, 240 P.2d 153. Both of these cases can be distinguished because they went to the jury and the points raised by argument of appellee need not be considered here. Of course, the Krey case also stated the above ground rules on demurrer to the evidence but appellee was directing his attention to other portions of the case. Likewise Meng v. Penner, 179 Kan. 789, 298 P.2d 246, involved a demurrer to the petition and is not persuasive. Appellee argues many other authorities which no doubt will be applicable in the defense of this matter but should not be considered on a demurrer to the evidence.
*182 The ruling on the demurrer to the evidence is reversed, the judgment thereafter rendered is set aside, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
SCHROEDER, J., (dissenting):
In my opinion the plaintiff, Arley D. Haga, the appellant herein, has established by his evidence contributory negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law.
All of the evidence in this case presented by the plaintiff was in the nature of physical facts and circumstances, since there were no eye witnesses. The plaintiff himself by reason of a brain injury incurred a retrograde amnesia which impaired his recollection of the circumstances surrounding the collision in which he received his injury.
The factual situation presented by the record is important in this decision. Set forth in the most favorable light to the plaintiff, as the facts must be in ruling a demurrer to the evidence in accordance with the rules correctly set out in the majority opinion, they are as follows:
An improved gravel highway runs north of Eureka, Kansas, and at a point ten miles north turns one mile east, and then extends north four and one-half miles past what is known as the Burket Lease. This one mile stretch running east and west is twenty-six feet wide, marked in the center with a black center line with thirteen feet on each side. Upon the north half it has a windrow of gravel varying in width from four and one-half feet to six feet and in height from twelve to eighteen inches. This is the one mile stretch of road upon which the accident occurred.
Six and one-half miles to the northeast of the west intersection of this one mile stretch of road is Thrall where the Sinclair Lease is located.
The plaintiff, Arley D. Haga, was employed on the Burket Lease and lived at Eureka. For some period of time prior to the accident he drove over the one mile stretch of road in question twice each day. Other witnesses were employed on either the Burket Lease or the Sinclair Lease, and drove the one mile stretch of road in question at approximately the time the accident occurred. Approximately midway between the east and west intersections of this one mile is a driveway entering the Grooms residence to the *183 north. This driveway is used as a point from which distances are estimated and measured in connection with the accident and the use of the one mile stretch of road in question.
On the 12th day of January, 1954, that being the date of the accident, Edward E. Arnold, a witness who worked at the Sinclair Lease, left the lease at approximately 5:00 o'clock p.m. on said day. Arnold testified that he was proceeding in an easterly direction about forty to forty-five miles per hour and overcame the vehicle driven by Armstrong on the one mile east-west stretch of road heretofore described. At the time he came upon Armstrong he was driving about twenty miles per hour going east, driving part of the time on the left side and part of the time on the right side of the road; that it was necessary for him to continually sound his horn, shift the automobile into second gear and straddle the gravel windrow on the north side of the highway to overtake and pass the Armstrong vehicle, which would not pull over onto its proper side of the road. He saw Armstrong driving and his sister sitting in the front of the car and recognized them to be old people, and particularly recognized a cane between them. The point of passing was fifteen hundred feet east of the west intersection. After Arnold passed the Armstrong auto and about one thousand feet west of Grooms driveway he met the Baumgardner car coming from the opposite direction, and about five hundred feet east of Grooms driveway he met the Haga car also coming from the opposite direction. It was being driven by the plaintiff, whom he recognized. At the time of passing the Armstrong car the right side of his vehicle was only about twelve to fourteen inches from the left side of the Armstrong vehicle. At all times in question he could observe perfectly, the weather was clear and sunshiny and he had no difficulty seeing vehicles as they approached. He could see two vehicles coming from the east on this one mile east-west section of road.
Four persons worked on the Burket Lease and left at or near 5:00 o'clock on the day in question. The first to leave was Al Baumgardner who left about 5:00. With Baumgardner was riding John Runyan. The second was Merle Braymer who was driving a pick-up truck, and the third to leave was the plaintiff, Arley D. Haga. They all traveled over this one mile stretch of road in a westerly direction. Mr. Baumgardner drove approximately forty-five miles per hour for the entire distance, which was approximately *184 five miles to the scene of the accident. He first met the vehicle driven by Arnold and then met the vehicle driven by Armstrong about one thousand feet west of Grooms driveway. At that time he had to slow up and went a foot or more into the edge of the gravel windrow to play safe and avoid the Armstrong vehicle going in the opposite direction. The Armstrong vehicle was described as being pretty much on the witness's side of the road. Haga in traveling from the Burket Lease, overtook the vehicle driven by Braymer and met with the Armstrong vehicle where the accident occurred ninety-six feet west of the entrance to Grooms driveway. As a result of the accident Mr. Armstrong and his sister were killed and Mr. Haga was severely injured, which injury resulted in his having a complete loss of memory. About midpoint between the east intersection on this road and the point of the accident Braymer saw the two vehicles stopped ahead of him.
Specific reference is here made to the testimony of Charles B. Williams, Highway Patrolman, quoted in the majority opinion.
For clarity plaintiff's Exhibit 2 used in evidence which was drawn to scale, and described as correct by all the witnesses who were questioned concerning it, is set forth:
*185 
*186 All witnesses who testified said there was at least one-half mile of clear vision on this road.
This court will take judicial notice that a half mile is two thousand six hundred forty feet. This was the range of clear vision on the road in question in which Arnold at the time he overtook Armstrong west of Grooms driveway could see the Haga vehicle east of Grooms driveway. All the events heretofore related on this one mile stretch of road occurred at points between the location of Arnold and Haga as just related.
The driver of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is, in law, presumed to have seen and heard that which he could have seen and heard had he kept a proper look-out and exercised ordinary care and caution.
Haga, therefore, in law is charged with seeing everything that occurred as heretofore related on this one mile east-west stretch of road on the day of the accident. Haga was familiar with the road and knew there was a hazard by virtue of the windrow of gravel. He also knew that this windrow of gravel would, to some degree, prohibit or hinder him in turning to the right in order to give the oncoming driver the right of way which he was claiming.
The defendant presented his case in this court upon the admission that Armstrong was guilty of negligence. The defendant says:
According to the witnesses, Armstrong's speed was from ten to twenty miles per hour, depending on the estimate of the particular witness.
The defendant demurred to the evidence of the plaintiff and the trial court sustained the demurrer. The sole question raised here is whether or not plaintiff by his own evidence is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In the case of DeGraw v. Kansas City &amp; Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713, 228 P.2d 527, this court held:
In the DeGraw case the defendant's demurrer to the evidence was overruled and the defendant presented no evidence whatever. The case went to a jury without further evidence being presented by the defendant, and this court affirmed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that the contributory negligence of the decedent was a question in controversy and should go to the jury. There the parties are in the reverse position from the parties in the instant case. The next of kin of the decedent brought the action in the DeGraw case as plaintiffs, and in this case it is the administrator of the decedent that is being sued as a party defendant. This is material because the decision in the DeGraw case was based upon the fact that the contributory negligence of the decedent was a matter in controversy and for the jury to determine, while in this case the evidence of the plaintiff clearly established beyond any doubt the negligence of the decedent which is admitted by the defendant, the decedent's representative.
We thus have here presented clearly a situation which calls for the application of the law in the DeGraw case.
Applying all the rules applicable in connection with ruling a demurrer to the evidence, the plaintiff is charged in law with knowing that the decedent driver Armstrong was driving on both sides of the highway within a one-half mile range of vision before the two vehicles collided; that the Arnold vehicle had difficulty in passing the Armstrong vehicle by straddling the center of the gravel strip and that the Baumgardner vehicle had difficulty and was required to pull into the gravel windrow in meeting the Armstrong vehicle coming from the opposite direction. He is likewise charged with knowing that the east-west one mile stretch in question was divided by a black center line, upon which the evidence is uncontradicted, and that a gravel windrow approximately six feet wide at its widest *188 part occupied the north part of this highway in his lane of traffic; and that Armstrong was using not only all of the south half of the highway which was south of the black center line, but also a portion of that north of the black center line, at least part of the time, and that in so doing the driver Armstrong at his slow rate of speed was consistent in the negligent operation of his vehicle within a range of approximately one-half mile prior to the time the plaintiff met him.
The facts of the accident itself show that the vehicles of Haga and Armstrong collided with such speed and force that both occupants of the Armstrong vehicle were killed. And this force in colliding was sufficient after Haga had laid down thirty feet of skidmarks, with his vehicle three feet on the south side of the black center dividing line and the left wheels ten feet south of the south edge of the gravel windrow, to drive the Armstrong vehicle nine feet in the reverse direction killing both of its occupants.
The best evidence presented by the plaintiff was that approximately four-fifths of the front of each of the vehicles met head-on. The physical facts determined from the location of the vehicles at the time of the collision, also indicate that there was sufficient room for the plaintiff's vehicle to safely pass the Armstrong vehicle on its proper side of the black center line without driving onto or in the gravel windrow.
Cases similar on the factual situation to the instant case in which a demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff was sustained are Most v. Holthaus, 170 Kan. 510, 227 P.2d 144, and Dolloff v. City of Wichita, 147 Kan. 63, 75 P.2d 221.
The contention of the appellant, in an effort to explain the location of the Haga vehicle, is that the center line of the road has shifted three feet to the south, since with six feet of the north lane being occupied by the gravel windrow, the remaining traveled portion of the roadway was only twenty feet wide. Our statute (G.S. 1949, 8-537) provides:
The evidence is uncontradicted that there was sufficient room on the right half, between the black center line and the south edge of the gravel windrow, for the Haga vehicle to travel without using *189 the windrow to drive on. Further, no part of said road was closed to traffic as the gravel windrow could be used and was used for a passageway of vehicles at a reasonable rate of speed.
Even if it were assumed that the center line of the road shifted three feet to the south, Haga is charged with knowing that Armstrong claimed and was using all of that portion south of the black center line in regard to other vehicles using the highway.
Where both vehicles are crowding the center of the road, the case of Fodor v. Interstate Transit Lines, 149 Kan. 174, 86 P.2d 574, explains the law of negligence in regard to the center of the road:
This court further said in Beecher v. Stepanian, 170 Kan. 201, 224 P.2d 1017:
Even under this theory, regardless of what may have been the correct center line on the one mile stretch of road, both Armstrong and Haga were crowding the center line of what they may have regarded as their proper side of the road as taken from the location of the vehicles on the road at the point of impact and the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses.
The language of this court in the case of Krey v. Schmidt, 172 Kan. 319, 240 P.2d 153, on facts reflecting negligence of the plaintiff which closely parallel the negligence of Haga is enlightening:
*190 Under all the facts and circumstances presented by the evidence of the plaintiff, giving full consideration to all laws applicable thereto, it is my opinion that reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion, and that was that Haga was negligent, which negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. This is especially true when the accident could have been avoided by Haga. He could have slowed down. He could have turned right and straddled the ridge of gravel, or he could have continued in his own traffic lane and the accident would never have occurred.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, since in my opinion the demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff was properly sustained.
PARKER, C.J., and PRICE, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
WERTZ, J., (concurring specially):
I concur in the decision of the majority and have no criticism of the opinion as written. However, I wish to supplement that opinion.
The general rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that when a driver of a motor vehicle on a public highway is on his proper side of the road he has a right to presume the driver of a car approaching him from the opposite direction and on the lefthand or wrong side of the highway will get over on his proper side in time to avoid a collision, and, under such circumstances, does not have to anticipate that the driver of the other car will not do so. (Citing Clark v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 148 Kan. 155, 79 P.2d 906.)
In Smith v. Salts, 170 Kan. 313, Syl. 1, 2, 224 P.2d 1025, we held:
In Duncan v. Branson, 153 Kan. 344, 350, 110 P.2d 789, it was said:
One is bound to anticipate and guard against what usually happens or is likely to happen, but it would impose too great a burden to be held responsible for guarding against what is unusual or unlikely to happen and what may be said to be only remotely or slightly probable. (Mehl v. Carter, 171 Kan. 597, 603, 237 P.2d 240.)
It is a well-established rule in this state that in determining whether a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence when tested by a demurrer, the question must be submitted to the jury if the facts of record are such that reasonable minds, in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment, might reach different conclusions thereon. Moreover, the question whether a negligent act is the proximate cause of an injury and whether an ordinarily reasonable and prudent man would have seen that injury might have occurred as the result of a negligent act is also a question for a jury.
In Harshaw v. Kansas City Public Ser. Co., 154 Kan. 481, 485, 119 P.2d 459, Mr. Chief Justice Dawson, speaking for this court, stated:
The rule applicable to the instant case was stated in Lawrence *192 v. Kansas Power &amp; Light Co., 167 Kan. 45, 49, 204 P.2d 752, wherein Mr. Chief Justice Harvey, speaking for this court stated:
The reasoning and the rules in the mentioned cases have been reasserted and cited with approval in our most recent cases. (Thompson v. Barnette, 170 Kan. 384, 387, 227 P.2d 120; Fry v. Cadle, 171 Kan. 14, 17, 229 P.2d 724; Blankenship v. Fraker, 173 Kan. 438, 441, 249 P.2d 683; Cain v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 873, 252 P.2d 909; Siegrist v. Wheeler, 175 Kan. 11, 15, 259 P.2d 223; Roehrman v. D.S. &amp; O. Rural Electric Cooperative Ass'n, 178 Kan. 52, 60, 283 P.2d 411.)
In Mehl v. Carter, 171 Kan. 597, Syl. 3, 237 P.2d 240, we stated:
Mr. Justice Thiele, in speaking for this court, said in Rowell v. City of Wichita, 162 Kan. 294, Syl. 6, 176 P.2d 590:
See also Emmerich v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 177 Kan. 443, 280 P.2d 615; Atherton v. Goodwin, 163 Kan. 22, 180 P.2d 296.
Many other cases of like effect may be found in 4 Hatcher's Kan. Dig. [Revised Edition], Negligence §§ 74, 75; and West's Kan. Dig., Negligence, § 136 (9), (25), (26).
The law favors trial by jury and the right should be carefully guarded against infringements. It is a right cherished by all free *193 people. A trial court, in the exercise of its prerogative in determining questions of law only in these kinds of cases, should not usurp the power and function of the jury in weighing evidence and passing upon questions of fact. In the instant case, I am of the opinion that plaintiff's evidence presented a situation where reasonable minds might differ as to just who was negligent and whose negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the injury complained of, and hence was clearly a question to be presented to the jury.
ROBB and FATZER, JJ., concur in the foregoing specially concurring opinion.