Title: State v. Robert John Prihoda
Citation: 2000 WI 123
Docket Number: 1998AP002263-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 14, 2000

2000 WI 123 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Robert John Prihoda,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
November 14, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 5, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Timothy T. Kay, Ronald J. Sonderhouse and Kay & Kay Law 
Firm, Brookfield, and oral argument by Timothy T. Kay. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 123 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2263-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert John Prihoda,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.  This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, 
affirming an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 
Elsa C. Lamelas, Circuit Court Judge.  The circuit court's order 
denied the motion of the defendant, Robert John Prihoda, seeking 
to vacate the 1997 change that the office of the Milwaukee 
County clerk of circuit court made in the sentence portion of 
his 1976 written judgment of conviction.  The office of the 
Milwaukee County clerk of circuit court had modified the 
sentence portion of the defendant's 1976 written judgment of 
conviction 
to 
conform 
the 
written 
judgment 
to 
the 
oral 
FILED 
 
NOV 14, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
2 
pronouncement of sentence by the circuit court evidenced in the 
transcript of the 1976 sentence proceeding. 
¶2 
Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
concluded that the clerk's office had the authority to correct 
the clerical error in the sentence portion of the written 
judgment of conviction without first obtaining the approval of 
the circuit court. 
¶3 
Three questions of law are presented to this court:1 
(1) whether the office of the clerk of circuit court may correct 
a clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment 
of conviction without prior court approval; (2) whether an 
offender should be given notice that a clerical correction of 
the sentence portion of the written judgment of conviction is 
being considered and should be present at a hearing to consider 
whether the written judgment is to be modified; and (3) whether 
the doctrine of laches or Wis. Stat. § 893.40 (1997-98)2 
proscribes a correction of a clerical error in the written 
judgment of conviction more than twenty years after the judgment 
is entered. 
¶4 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, 
although our reasoning differs from that of the court of appeals 
and the circuit court. 
                     
1 This court determines these questions of law independently 
from the circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from 
their analyses. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
3 
¶5 
As to the first question of law, unlike the circuit 
court and court of appeals, we conclude that the office of the 
clerk of circuit court does not have the authority to correct a 
clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction.  We conclude that the circuit court, not the office 
of the clerk of circuit court, must determine the merits of a 
request for a change in the sentence portion of a written 
judgment of conviction because of an alleged clerical error.  We 
further conclude that the circuit court may either correct the 
clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction or may direct the clerk's office to make such a 
correction. 
¶6 
As to the second question of law, we conclude that the 
circuit court has discretion to determine whether an offender is 
entitled to notice and a hearing before the correction of a 
clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction is made. 
¶7 
As to the third question of law, we conclude that 
neither the doctrine of laches nor Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars a 
correction of a clerical error in the sentence portion of a 
written judgment of conviction in the present case. 
¶8 
In response to the defendant's postconviction motion, 
the circuit court determined that the sentence portion of the 
written judgment of conviction in this case contained a clerical 
error that should be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement 
of the sentence.  The defendant has had ample opportunity to 
raise his arguments against the correction in the court of 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
4 
appeals and in this court, and we have concluded that his 
arguments are without merit.  Therefore, we conclude that it is 
unnecessary to remand the cause to the circuit court to 
determine the question of law whether the sentence portion of 
the written judgment of conviction should be corrected.  No 
remand is needed.3 
 
I 
 
¶9 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On February 
11, 1976, the defendant was sentenced on one count of first-
degree murder as party to a crime and four counts of armed 
robbery while concealing identity as party to a crime.  During 
the 1976 sentence proceeding at which the defendant was present, 
the circuit court stated on the record that the defendant's 
sentence in count one was a life sentence and the sentence in 
count five was thirty years, to run consecutive to the sentence 
in count two.  The sentence in count two was thirty years, to 
run consecutive to the life sentence imposed in count one. 
¶10 On the same date as the sentence proceeding, a written 
judgment of conviction was signed by the chief deputy clerk in 
the office of the Milwaukee County clerk of circuit court.  The 
written judgment of conviction adjudges the defendant guilty of 
                     
3 The defendant does not seek a remand.  The defendant asks 
that the amended written judgment of conviction be vacated and 
the original written judgment of conviction be allowed to stand 
as a matter of law. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
5 
one count of first-degree murder as a party to a crime and four 
counts of armed robbery while concealing identity as party to a 
crime.  It further states that the defendant is committed to the 
Wisconsin State Prisons for an indeterminate term of life 
imprisonment for count one (first-degree murder) and for four 
additional 
terms 
for 
the 
counts 
of 
armed 
robbery 
while 
concealing identity.  At issue is the sentence for count five, 
the 
fourth 
charge 
of 
armed 
robbery, 
which 
provides 
"an 
indeterminate term of not more than 30 years, consecutive to 
count one, plus 5 years for concealing identity, to run 
consecutive to the first portion of this count (30) years and 
consecutive to count 2."4 
                     
4 The entire sentence is set forth in the written judgment 
of conviction as follows: 
It is adjudged that the defendant is hereby committed 
to the Wisconsin State Prisons for . . .  
COUNT ONE: [Life Imprisonment]; 
COUNT TWO: 30 years as to Armed Robbery, consecutive 
to 
count 
1; 
plus 
five 
years 
for 
concealing, 
consecutive to first portion of this count (30 years); 
COUNT THREE: 30 years as to Armed Robbery, concurrent 
with count 1; plus five years for concealing, to run 
consecutive to first portion of this count (30 years) 
and concurrent with count 1; 
COUNT FOUR: 30 years as to Armed Robbery, concurrent 
with count 1; plus five years for concealing, to run 
consecutive to first portion of this count (30 years) 
and concurrent with count 1; 
COUNT FIVE: 30 years as to Armed Robbery, consecutive 
to count 1, plus five years for concealing, to run 
consecutive to first portion of this count (30 years) 
and consecutive to count 2.  Said sentences to run 
concurrent with any other sentence defendant may be 
serving at this time. 
 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
6 
¶11 Simply stated, the 
discrepancy between 
the 
oral 
pronouncement of the sentence and the written judgment of 
conviction in count five is whether the sentence in count five 
runs consecutive to the sentence in count one or consecutive to 
the sentence in count two.  Whether the thirty-year sentence in 
count five is consecutive to the sentence in count one or 
consecutive to the sentence in count two affects the total 
length of the defendant's sentence.  If the thirty-year sentence 
in count five is consecutive to the sentence in count two, as 
the circuit court stated on the record, then the defendant's 
total sentence is life plus seventy years.  If, as stated in the 
written judgment of conviction, the thirty-year sentence in 
count five is consecutive to the sentence in count one, then the 
defendant's total sentence is life plus forty years.5 
¶12 The discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of 
sentence and the written judgment of conviction was brought to 
the attention of the office of the Milwaukee County clerk of 
circuit court on November 13, 1997, when two employees of the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections sent a memorandum to the 
felony clerk asking for clarification of the discrepancy between 
the sentence portion of the written judgment of conviction and 
the circuit court's oral pronouncement of sentence.  Apparently 
this request for clarification resulted from the defendant's 
                     
5 Because the sentence in count two also was consecutive to 
the sentence in count one, the written judgment of conviction 
appears to make the thirty years under count five concurrent 
with, rather than consecutive to, the sentence under count two. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
7 
request to receive a reduced classification in the prison system 
from medium security to minimum security. 
¶13 On November 20, 1997, the office of the Milwaukee 
County clerk of circuit court corrected the sentence portion of 
the written judgment of conviction to correspond to the 
unambiguous statement in the sentencing transcript that the 
sentence in count five ran consecutive to the sentence in count 
two.  The clerk's office, acting independently of the circuit 
court and without giving the defendant notice, issued a 
corrected written judgment of conviction.  The Department of 
Corrections notified the defendant of the corrected written 
judgment of conviction on January 6, 1998. 
¶14 The defendant filed a postconviction motion with the 
Milwaukee County circuit court on July 10, 1998, seeking to 
vacate the "corrected" judgment of conviction.  On July 15, 
1998, the circuit court denied the defendant's motion for post-
conviction relief.  On January 4, 2000, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's order, agreeing that the clerk's 
office may correct a clerical error independently of the circuit 
court and without notice to the defendant or a hearing. 
 
II 
 
¶15 We must first resolve whether a clerk of circuit court 
may act independently of the circuit court in correcting a 
clerical error in an offender's written judgment of conviction. 
 The parties appear to agree that the error in the present case 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
8 
is clerical.  A difference between the sentence portion of the 
written 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
unambiguous oral pronouncement of the sentence is a clerical 
error.6  Furthermore, the law is clear in Wisconsin that the 
record of the circuit court's unambiguous oral pronouncement of 
sentence trumps the written judgment of conviction.7  The circuit 
                     
6 The "clerical error" in this case involves a "failure to 
accurately record a statement or action by the court . . . ."  
6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 636.02 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
It may not be easy to determine whether an error should be 
classified as clerical.  In Bostwick v. Van Vleck, 106 Wis. 387, 
390, 82 N.W. 302 (1900), the court stated: 
The test to be applied in determining whether an error 
in a judgment is of a judicial character, or a mere 
clerical mistake which may be corrected in the court 
where it was made at any time, saving intervening 
rights of third parties and with due regard to 
equitable considerations, is whether the error relates 
to something that the trial court erroneously omitted 
to 
pass 
upon 
or 
considered 
and 
passed 
upon 
erroneously, or a mere omission to preserve of record, 
correctly in all respects, the actual decision of the 
court, which in itself was free from error. 
 
See also Utah v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) 
("A clerical error, as contradistinguished from judicial error, 
is not 'the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial 
reasoning and determination.'" (quoting State v. Mossman, 706 
P.2d 203, 204 (Or. Ct. App. 1985))). 
7 State v. Schordie, 214 Wis. 2d 229, 231 n.1, 570 N.W. 2d 
881 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 114, 
401 N.W.2d 748 (1987)).  In Schordie, the court of appeals noted 
that "when there is a conflict between the judgment of 
conviction and an unambiguous record of the trial court's 
pronouncement, the record is controlling"; the court of appeals 
"modif[ied] the judgment of conviction to reflect the correct 
sentence." 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
9 
court and court of appeals concluded that a clerk of circuit 
court may correct a clerical error in a written judgment of 
conviction independent of the circuit court.  We disagree with 
these courts. 
¶16 The State's position is that "issues relating to the 
correction of clerical errors in judgments of conviction should 
first be considered by the court rather than by the clerk."8  We 
agree with the State for several reasons. 
¶17 First, the law is clear that a court has the power to 
correct clerical errors at any time.9  If the circuit court 
                     
8 State's Brief at 24. 
9 See Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101-02, 175 N.W.2d 625 
(1970), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 
210 N.W.2d 873 (1973) (stating that "[t]here seems to be no 
question that a court has the power to correct formal or 
clerical 
errors . . . at 
any 
time" 
but 
holding 
that 
the 
reduction of defendant's criminal sentence was a modification 
rather than correction of a clerical error); Packard v. Kinzie 
Ave. Heights Co., 105 Wis. 323, 325-26, 81 N.W. 488 (1900) 
(allowing the court to correct a clerical error in a foreclosure 
judgment, and stating "[t]hat such mistakes can be corrected by 
the court in which they occurred, regardless of the time limit 
upon the power of the court to correct judicial errors, is too 
well settled to require any extended argument or citation of 
authorities"); Hoffman v. State, 88 Wis. 166, 173-77, 59 N.W. 
588 (1894) (allowing court to amend record of criminal case that 
mistakenly failed to show defendant's presence during trial, and 
stating that "the court has power, after the term, to correct a 
mistake in the entry of its judgment, so as to make the record 
conform to the judgment actually pronounced"). 
Hayes is still good law for the proposition that a court 
can correct a clerical error at any time.  See Krueger v. State, 
86 Wis. 2d 435, 440, 272 N.W.2d 847 (1979) (quoting Hayes with 
approval). 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
10
concludes that a correction is warranted, the circuit court may 
direct the clerk to make the correction. 
¶18 Second, no statute authorizes a clerk of circuit 
court, acting independently of the circuit court, to correct a 
clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction to reflect an unambiguous oral pronouncement of 
sentence made by a circuit court at a sentence proceeding.  In 
particular, Wis. Stat. §§ 806.06, 972.13(4), and 971.26 do not 
authorize a clerk, independent of the circuit court, to correct 
a clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment 
of conviction. 
¶19 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.06(2), governing civil 
proceedings, a clerk has the authority to sign a judgment, but 
only upon the written order of a judge.10  Although neither party 
argues that this civil provision applies to criminal judgments, 
rules of evidence and practice in civil actions are applicable 
to criminal proceedings unless the context of the section or 
                                                                  
For federal courts, Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure similarly authorizes the courts to correct 
clerical errors in written judgments at any time.  Federal 
courts have this power apart from Rule 36.  Kennedy v. Reid, 249 
F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
10 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 806.06(2) 
provides: 
"RENDITION, 
PERFECTION AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.  The judge or the clerk upon 
the written order of the judge may sign the judgment.  The 
judgment shall be entered by the clerk upon rendition." 
Section 806.06(1)(a) provides: "A judgment is rendered by 
the court when it is signed by the judge or by the clerk at the 
judge's written discretion." 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
11
rule manifestly requires a different construction.11  Even if 
Wis. Stat. § 806.06(2) were applicable in the present case, the 
statute authorizes clerks to sign judgments only upon the 
written order of a judge.  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 806.06 does not 
authorize the clerk in the present case, independently of the 
circuit court, to correct a clerical error in the sentence 
portion of a written judgment of conviction. 
¶20 Section 972.13(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes governs 
the authority to sign judgments in criminal proceedings and 
appears to control the present case, rather than Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.06(2).  Section 972.13(4) states that "[j]udgments [of 
conviction] shall be in writing and signed by the judge or 
clerk."  Although the statute allows a clerk to sign a judgment, 
§ 972.13(4) is silent about how corrections to a written 
judgment of conviction are to be made.  Thus, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.13(4) does not authorize clerks to correct written 
judgments of conviction or sign corrected judgments independent 
of the circuit court. 
¶21 Section 971.26, applicable to criminal proceedings, 
provides that a judgment shall not be affected by reason of any 
defects or imperfections in matters of form that do not 
                     
11 Section 972.11(1), Wis. Stat. (1997-98), provides that 
"the rules of evidence and practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the context of a 
section or rule manifestly requires a different construction." 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
12
prejudice the defendant.12  In the present case, the parties 
disagree about whether the defect prejudiced the defendant.13  
However, regardless of whether the defect prejudiced the 
defendant and whether Wis. Stat. § 971.26 protects the validity 
of the 1976 written judgment of conviction, the statute does not 
authorize a clerk's office, independent of the circuit court, to 
change a written judgment of conviction to reflect the circuit 
court's unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence.  In sum, we 
can find no statute that authorizes an office of a clerk of 
circuit court to correct a clerical error in the sentence 
portion of a written judgment of conviction, and the parties 
cite none. 
¶22 Third, the case law indicates that a clerk of circuit 
court may not change a written judgment of conviction when the 
change can be characterized as a "judicial decision."  The issue 
                     
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.26 provides: "FORMAL DEFECTS.  No 
indictment, information, complaint or warrant shall be invalid, 
nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings be affected 
by reason of any defect or imperfection in matters of form which 
do not prejudice the defendant." 
13 The defendant claims that he has been prejudiced because 
his total sentence may impact his efforts to receive a 
reclassification in the prison system from medium security to 
minimum security.  
The State argues that postconviction motions and briefs 
filed on behalf of the defendant, along with a pro se motion 
filed by the defendant, show that he knew that his sentence was 
life plus seventy years.  Because defendant was aware of the 
true length of his sentence, the State concludes that the 
defendant has not been prejudiced by the correction to the 
written judgment of conviction. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
13
then becomes what is a judicial decision.  In Mikrut v. State, 
212 Wis. 2d 859, 868, 569 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1997), the court 
of appeals concluded that the clerk of circuit court made a 
judicial decision in changing the date of the offender's prior 
conviction from the date of the judgment of conviction to the 
date the offender pled guilty.  The court of appeals held that 
because the change was a judicial decision and the change was 
not directed by any judge, it was void.  The court of appeals 
did not set forth the criteria for what constitutes a judicial 
decision, that is, a decision for a court rather than for a 
clerk. 
¶23 Examining the statutes and case law, we conclude that 
a judicial decision includes the correction of a clerical error 
in the sentence portion of a written judgment of conviction.  
Requests for correction of clerical errors in the sentence 
portion of a written judgment of conviction may involve 
questions of interpretation of the oral pronouncement of 
sentence or of the written judgment.  Such requests may also 
involve disputes about whether the error is clerical or 
substantive. 
¶24 Even 
this 
case 
arguably 
raises 
an 
issue 
of 
interpretation. 
 
Neither 
party 
disputes 
that 
the 
oral 
pronouncement of sentence unambiguously provides for a sentence 
of life plus seventy years.  The defendant concedes that State 
v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 115, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987), holds that 
an unambiguous oral pronouncement controls when a conflict 
exists between a court's oral pronouncement of sentence and a 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
14
written judgment.14  However, the parties disagree about whether 
the written judgment of conviction is ambiguous.  The State 
contends that the original 1976 written judgment of conviction, 
although not as clear as the oral pronouncement of judgment or 
the corrected judgment, does in fact impose a total sentence of 
life plus seventy years.  A correction was not even necessary, 
according to the State. 
¶25 The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
written 
judgment 
unambiguously provides a sentence of life plus forty years, and 
the clerk changed the sentence.  The parties' disagreement about 
how to characterize the written judgment of conviction in this 
case highlights the importance of having a court, rather than a 
clerk of circuit court, consider any change in the sentence 
portion of a written judgment of conviction. 
¶26 Accordingly, we adopt a bright-line rule to avoid 
disputes about a clerk's powers: The office of a clerk of 
circuit court may not correct a clerical error in the sentence 
portion of a written judgment of conviction independent of the 
circuit court. 
¶27 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the office 
of the clerk of circuit court does not have authority to correct 
a clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment 
of conviction independent of the circuit court.  We conclude 
that the circuit court, not the office of the clerk of circuit 
court, must determine the merits of a request for a correction 
                     
14 Defendant's Brief at 8. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
15
in the sentence portion of a written judgment of conviction 
because of an alleged clerical error.  We further conclude that 
the circuit court may either correct the clerical error in the 
sentence portion of a written judgment of conviction or direct 
the clerk's office to make such a correction. 
 
III 
 
¶28 The defendant argues that he should have been given 
notice that a correction of the sentence portion of the written 
judgment of conviction was being considered and should have been 
present at a hearing to consider whether the written judgment 
should be modified. 
¶29 The defendant relies on Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g), 
which 
provides 
that 
a 
defendant 
is 
to 
be 
present 
at 
"pronouncement of judgment and the imposition of sentence."  In 
Wisconsin, 
an 
unambiguous 
oral 
pronouncement 
of 
sentence 
controls over a written judgment of conviction.  Because the 
defendant was present at the 1976 sentence proceeding in which 
the circuit court unambiguously pronounced the sentence of life 
plus seventy years, the defendant was present when his sentence 
was pronounced and imposed.  A correction of the sentence 
portion of a written judgment of conviction to reflect the 
circuit court's unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence at 
which the defendant was present is not a pronouncement of 
judgment or the imposition of sentence under § 971.04(1)(g).  
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
16
The statute does not mandate a defendant's presence when a 
clerical error is corrected.15 
¶30 The defendant also relies on Siegel v. State, 201 Wis. 
12, 229 N.W. 44 (1930).  In Siegel, this court held that 
proceedings during which the circuit court restated the initial 
sentence in slightly different form but in substance providing 
the same sentence, were void and of no effect because the 
offender had a constitutional right to be present in court.  
Siegel can be distinguished from the present case.  The Siegel 
court apparently did not consider the changes the trial court 
made to be corrections of a clerical error.  To the extent that 
Siegel can be interpreted to mean that an offender has a federal 
or state constitutional right to be present when a circuit court 
corrects a clerical error in a written judgment of conviction, 
that interpretation is erroneous. 
¶31 Because a clerical error by definition is minor and 
mechanical in nature, we conclude that it is within the 
discretion of the circuit court to determine whether to give an 
offender notice and a hearing at which the offender is present 
before a clerical error in a written judgment of conviction is 
corrected.  The circuit court should exercise its discretion, 
considering the need for adversary proceedings to clarify the 
                     
15 Using the same rationale, we conclude that the defendant 
was not deprived of constitutional rights by his failure to get 
notice or a hearing.  See Cook v. United States, 426 F.2d 1358, 
1360 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 932 (1970); Flowers 
v. Oklahoma, 356 F.2d 916, 917 (10th Cir. 1966); Sampson v. 
North Dakota, 506 N.W.2d 722, 727 (N.D. 1993). 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
17
issue.  The circuit court may consider such factors as the 
nature of the request, the state of the record, the ease by 
which the determination can be made that a clerical error 
occurred and should be corrected, issues of equity, and the risk 
and cost of transporting the offender for the purpose of 
attending the hearing.  In any event, either the circuit court 
or the office of the clerk of court, pursuant to directive from 
the circuit court, shall give the offender notice of any 
correction of a clerical error in the sentence portion of a 
written judgment of conviction after the correction is made. 
¶32 Our conclusion that the circuit court has discretion 
whether to give notice to the offender and to hold a hearing at 
which the offender may be present before correcting the written 
judgment of conviction is consistent with the approach taken in 
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Adopting 
prior law,16 Rule 36 provides that "[c]lerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the 
                     
16 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
18
court orders."17  Numerous states have adopted the federal rule 
or a similar rule by court rule or statute.18 
¶33 In deciding the merits of the correction in this case, 
the circuit court need not have given notice to the defendant 
and need not have held a hearing at which he could have 
appeared. 
 
The 
oral 
pronouncement 
of 
the 
sentence 
was 
unambiguous; the written judgment of conviction was arguably 
ambiguous; the law is clear that the oral pronouncement trumps 
the sentence portion of the written judgment; the correction 
could readily be made.  In this case, notice and a hearing did 
not appear to be necessary because adversary proceedings did not 
appear necessary to clarify the correction. 
                     
17 Several commentators suggest that the better practice is 
for the offender to be present when the court corrects clerical 
errors in judgments.  See, e.g., 6 James Wm. Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice § 636.04[3][a] (3d ed. 2000); 3 Charles 
Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 534 (2d ed. 1982); 
5 Mark S. Rhoades, Orfield's Criminal Procedure Under The 
Federal Rules § 36:10 (2d ed. 1987).  See also Kennedy v. Reid, 
249 F.2d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (better practice to order 
notice to the offender but reversal is not required when no 
substantial rights of the defendant have been affected). 
18 Numerous states have adopted rules or laws identical to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  See, e.g., 17 Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. R. Crim. P. 24.4 (West 1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 813.2, R. 
22(3)(g) (West 1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 176.565 (Michie 
1997). 
Several other states have adopted rules or laws similar to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  See, e.g., Ky. R. Ann. 
R. Crim. P. 10.10 (Michie 2000); Mass. Ann. Laws R. Crim. P. 42 
(Lexis 1997); R.I. Ct. R. Ann. Super. R. Crim. P. 36 (Lexis 
2000). 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
19
¶34 The defendant, however, presents legal arguments in 
this court about laches and the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40, the statute of limitations for actions on a judgment. 
 These arguments do raise issues that have benefited from the 
adversary proceedings in this court. 
 
IV 
 
¶35 The defendant argues that the circuit court erred in 
denying his postconviction motion to vacate the corrected 
written judgment and to reinstate the original written judgment. 
 The defendant argues that it was erroneous for either the clerk 
of the circuit court or the circuit court to correct the 
clerical error in the sentence portion of his written judgment 
of conviction because more than twenty years have elapsed since 
the written judgment.  Specifically, the defendant argues that 
either the doctrine of laches or Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars a 
clerical correction to a judgment of conviction when the written 
judgment was entered more than twenty years ago.19 
¶36 We are not persuaded that either the doctrine of 
laches or Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars the correction to the 
defendant's written judgment of conviction. 
¶37 The defendant's laches argument fails because he has 
not 
satisfied 
all 
three 
elements 
of 
the 
doctrine: 
(1) 
                     
19 The court of appeals did not consider these arguments, 
which were raised for the first time in the defendant's reply 
brief. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
20
unreasonable delay; (2) lack of knowledge on the part of the 
party asserting the defense that the other party would assert 
the right on which he bases his suit; and (3) prejudice to the 
party asserting the defense in the event the action is 
maintained.20  The defendant has not established the third 
element, prejudice. 
¶38 The defendant's brief asserts that the defendant was 
prejudiced because he did not believe that he would be given an 
additional thirty years in prison.  The record reflects that the 
defendant knew that the thirty-year sentence in count five was 
consecutive to the sentence in count two and that his sentence 
amounted to a life sentence plus seventy years. 
¶39 For example, on February 3, 1977, the defendant, 
through counsel, filed a motion for sentence modification and 
other postconviction relief and a brief in support thereof.  The 
joint brief filed by counsel for the defendant and his co-
defendants in support of the motion stated that "the Court 
sentenced each defendant to a term of not more than thirty (30) 
years, consecutive to the sentence imposed on count two." 
¶40 On December 5, 1980, the defendant filed a pro se 
postconviction motion in which the defendant himself asserted 
that he was sentenced on February 11, 1976, "to a total term of 
Life and Seventy Years Consecutive." 
                     
20 See Smart v. Dane County Bd. of Adjusters, 177 Wis. 2d 
445, 458, 501 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1993). 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
21
¶41 Further, on March 26, 1985, the defendant, through 
counsel, filed a § 974.06 motion in the circuit court and the 
brief in support thereof described his sentence for the armed 
robbery and concealing identity charges in count five as thirty 
years and five years respectively, consecutive to each other and 
consecutive to counts one and two.  His brief to the court of 
appeals in the 1985 case similarly described his sentence.21 
¶42 The defendant's brief asserts that he always believed 
that the written judgment of conviction was in effect and that 
he did not learn otherwise until he was notified by the 
Department of Corrections in 1998.  He asserts that "the prior 
Motions were basically 'boiler plate' Motions and that he did 
not know that the Motion stated life plus seventy (70) years."22 
 Even if under certain circumstances we might give some credence 
to an offender's assertion that he was a victim of "boiler 
plate" motions, we do not in the present case.  Numerous 
documents filed on the defendant's behalf support that the 
thirty-year sentence in count five was consecutive to the 
sentence in count two and that the sentence was life plus 
seventy years.  Furthermore, the defendant himself filed a 
document describing his sentence as life plus seventy years.  
Under these circumstances, the defendant's claim that he 
expected the lower sentence cannot be given credence. 
                     
21 State v. Prihoda, No. 85-2140 (Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1986), 
unpublished order. 
22 Defendant's Brief at 7. 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
22
¶43 The defendant further argues that he is prejudiced if 
the corrected judgment is allowed to stand because this "change 
in the sentence" could affect the Department of Corrections' 
decision to change his placement.  The clerical correction to 
the written judgment of conviction is not a "change in the 
sentence"; it merely correctly reflects the actual sentence 
imposed on the defendant by the circuit court.  The defendant's 
opportunity 
to 
change 
placement 
is 
not 
affected 
by 
the 
correction in the judgment; it is affected by the oral 
pronouncement. 
¶44 Accordingly, we conclude that even though more than 
twenty years have elapsed between the written judgment of 
conviction and the corrected judgment, there is no prejudice to 
the defendant under the circumstances of this case in correcting 
the clerical error in the written judgment of conviction. 
¶45 The defendant's argument based on Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
is also not persuasive.  Section 893.40 limits actions on 
judgments.  It provides that an action upon a judgment or decree 
of a court of record of any state shall be commenced within 
twenty years after the judgment or decree is entered or be 
barred.23  This statute of limitations makes no distinction 
between judgments in civil and criminal actions.  The State and 
                     
23 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.40 provides: "ACTION ON JUDGMENT OR 
DECREE; COURT OF RECORD.  Except as provided in s. 846.04(2) and 
(3), action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of 
any state or of the United States shall be commenced within 
twenty years after the judgment or decree is entered or be 
barred." 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
23
the defendant disagree whether § 893.40 applies to a judgment in 
a criminal action and, if § 893.40 is applicable to criminal 
judgments, whether a motion to correct a clerical error in a 
written judgment of conviction to reflect an unambiguous oral 
pronouncement of sentence in a criminal case is an "action upon 
a judgment" within Wis. Stat. § 893.40. 
¶46 The defendant argues that Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) makes 
§ 893.40 applicable to criminal cases.  Section 972.11, which we 
discussed previously, provides that rules of evidence and 
practice in civil actions shall be applicable in all criminal 
proceedings unless the context of the section or rule manifestly 
requires a different construction.  Statutes of limitations are 
substantive rules of law rather than rules of evidence or 
practice.  Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 
141, 149, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992).  Accordingly, the statute of 
limitations embodied in § 893.40 is not a rule of evidence or 
practice and therefore is not applicable to criminal judgments 
through § 972.11. 
¶47 Even if we were to assume that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 
applies to written judgments of conviction, neither party has 
cited any cases helpful in deciding whether a correction of a 
clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction is an "action on a judgment" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40.  This court has been unable to find any cases 
supporting the position that correction of such a clerical error 
is an "action upon a judgment."  Indeed the cases we have found 
state that a court may make a clerical correction to a written 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
24
judgment of conviction "at any time."24  Because correction of a 
clerical error is designed to conform the record to the court's 
intention and not to relitigate the merits, the policy of 
finality embodied in the statute of limitations does not come 
into play.25 
¶48 Nothing in chapter 893 or any other provision of the 
statutes indicates that the legislature intended Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.40 to govern the correction of clerical errors in a 
written judgment of conviction.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the legislature did not intend the twenty-year statute of 
limitations to apply to either the state's or an offender's 
request to correct a clerical error in the sentence portion of a 
written judgment of conviction to reflect accurately the 
unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence. 
 
V 
 
¶49 In sum, we conclude that the office of the clerk of 
circuit court does not have the authority to correct a clerical 
error in the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction.  We further conclude that a circuit court, not the 
office of the clerk of circuit court, must determine the merits 
                     
24 Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101-02, 175 N.W.2d 625 
(1970), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 
210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). 
25 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 636.04[1] (3d ed. 2000). 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
25
of a request for a correction in the sentence portion of a 
written judgment of conviction because of an alleged clerical 
error.  The circuit court may correct the clerical error in the 
sentence portion of a written judgment of conviction, or the 
circuit court may direct the clerk's office to make such a 
correction.  
¶50 We further hold that the circuit court has discretion 
to determine whether an offender should receive notice and a 
hearing before any correction is made to an alleged clerical 
error in the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction.  Notice and a hearing ensure that the defendant has 
an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner."26 
¶51 In the present case, the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, 
and 
this 
court 
have 
considered 
the 
defendant's 
challenges to the correction of a clerical error in his written 
judgment of conviction and have concluded that his arguments are 
without merit.  The defendant has had his day in court, and his 
challenges to the correction have been fully considered.27  It is 
not necessary to remand the defendant's case to the circuit 
court to determine the questions of law involved in correcting 
                     
26 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
27 State v. Amos, 153 Wis. 2d 257, 281, 450 N.W.2d 503 
(1989) (defendant who should have received notice and hearing 
before circuit court corrected sentence based on erroneous 
presentence credit nonetheless had ample opportunity for review 
through postconviction motion). 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
26
the sentence portion of the written judgment of conviction in 
the present case. 
¶52 Finally, we conclude that neither the doctrine of 
laches nor Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars a correction of a clerical 
error in the written judgment of conviction in the present case. 
¶53 For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the 
court 
of 
appeals 
denying 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief although our rationale differs from that 
of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
98-2263-CR 
 
 
1