Title: Dickerson v. State
Citation: 360 So. 2d 1053
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 1978

360 So. 2d 1053 (1978)
In re Kenneth Wesley DICKERSON
v.
STATE of Alabama.
Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General.
77-384.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 19, 1978.
*1054 William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., Montgomery, and James L. O'Kelley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Birmingham, for the State, petitioner.
William H. Mills, of Rogers, Howard, Redden &amp; Mills, Birmingham, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
In denying the State's petition for writ of certiorari, we deem it appropriate to address two points: (1) Whether the specific question propounded by Defendant, and found objectionable by the trial Court, sought information relating to the details of prior controversy between the Defendant and the deceased; and (2) Whether the scope of the evidence solicited relative to such prior controversy was relevant to any defense raised at trial.
The specific question to which objection was raised and sustained was:
It appears that defense counsel merely sought to elicit the time frame during which these difficulties existed. This cannot be equated with a solicitation seeking the specific details of these prior difficulties and confrontations. Thus viewed, such evidence is admissible even under the more restrictive rules applicable for pleas of self-defense. See Crenshaw v. State, 205 Ala. 256, 87 So. 328 (1921).
In answer to the second query stated above, it appears Dickerson raised several possible defenses to this action. Though he did raise a self-defense theory, he also sought utilization of the defense of accidental homicide and sought to negate both the intent and malice elements needed for a first-degree murder conviction. Therefore, as stated in Sashington v. State, 56 Ala. App. 698, 325 So. 2d 205, cert. denied, 295 Ala. 416, 325 So. 2d 211 (1976), and quoted in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals:
Evidence as to prior difficulties between Dickerson and the deceased is clearly relevant as to the reason the Defendant had the shotgun with him at the time of the homicide. Furthermore, such evidence could negate the intent and malice elements previously shown by the State. Therefore, such evidence is admissible and the exclusion of such evidence is reversible error. See Arnold v. State, 291 Ala. 149, 279 So. 2d 130 (1973); and Bedsole v. State, 274 Ala. 603, 150 So. 2d 696 (1963).
WRIT DENIED.
BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER, JONES, SHORES, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX and BEATTY, JJ., dissent.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 360 So. 2d 1045, states:
Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Dickerson's conviction because the trial court refused to permit him to show the details of prior difficulties. The trial court permitted Dickerson to testify that shortly prior to the shooting, the deceased had threatened to "blow both his and his ex-wife's heads off", and that the deceased had made numerous threats on him during the "past three years." Certainly, Dickerson is not entitled to a new trial because the trial court prevented him from going into the details of these prior difficulties.
The general rule regarding threats by a victim is contained in McElroy's Alabama Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 45.01, p. 78:
The facts of this case are not similar to those of Sashington v. State, 56 Ala.App. 698, 325 So. 2d 205 (1975). Sashington involved the fatal shooting of an elderly-beloved man at his own birthday party by a neighbor who was a friend of the elderly man and with whom the deceased had never had any prior difficulties. Many persons were in attendance at this birthday party, *1056 including the appellant-neighbor and one James Abston, a person with whom the appellant had had some prior difficulties. Amidst the birthday merry-making, several isolated arguments ensued amongst the guests. The appellant, during one of these arguments which transpired on the front porch of the deceased's home, saw Abston a short distance away waving a shotgun in the air. Apparently sensing danger to himself because of the prior difficulties with Abston, appellant went home and returned with his shotgun. The argument on the front porch was still in progress, and appellant, standing in the front yard with a gun held waist high pointed toward the porch, fired a shot, and the friend fell dead. The context of the Sashington court's decision shows that the appellant did not intend specifically to kill the honored host, but acted in such a way as to show that he did have the intent to kill a human being standing on that porch.
The opinion in Sashington shows, in short, that "(1) the deceased and the appellant were friends with no prior difficulties; (2) the appellant probably armed himself because of prior difficulties with the shotgun-wielding Abston; (3) appellant did not have the specific actual intent to kill the deceased, and actual malice did not exist toward the deceased."
Had Dickerson killed a friend here instead of his avowed enemy, Sashington might be applicable. In any event, Dickerson was allowed to prove the prior threats, but was not allowed to go into their details.
I would grant the writ because I think it shows probable merit.
TORBERT, C. J., and BEATTY, J., concur.