Title: State v. Haider
Citation: 150 N.W.2d 71
Docket Number: 351
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 1967

150 N.W.2d 71 (1967) STATE of North Dakota, Respondent, v. Johnnie HAIDER, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 351. Supreme Court of North Dakota. April 14, 1967. *72 Wheeler &amp; Daner, Bismarck, for appellant. Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., Bismarck, Albert A. Wolf, State's Atty., Bismarck and, on oral argument, Larry A. Kraft, Asst. State's Atty., for Dale H. Jensen, State's Atty., for Burleigh County, Bismarck, for respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge. By criminal complaint dated May 17, 1966, the defendant, Johnnie Haider, was charged with having committed on or about April 15, 1966, at Bismarck in Burleigh County the crime of libel. The complaint specifically alleged: To this charge the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. The defendant having waived a jury, the county court with increased jurisdiction found Mr. Haider guilty. Judgment upon conviction was imposed upon him on August 15, 1966. It is from that judgment that he appeals and demands a trial de novo in this court. Trial de novo is not available to a defendant on an appeal from a judgment in a criminal action. State v. Timm, 146 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1966). Our view of this appeal is that Mr. Haider asserts that the trial court erred in receiving in evidence facts surrounding the publication of a certain canceled check which made libelous a publication that otherwise would not have been libelous. In other words, it is Mr. Haider's contention that a publication of a writing must be libelous per se to support a charge of criminal libel. As the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict (in this case the findings of the trial court) is not in issue, we may assume, for the purpose of deciding the legal issue before us, that the evidence establishes that the complaining witness, Leo Braun, a member of Local 229 of the American Federation of Musicians (hereafter referred to as the union) had been given a check for $20 by Mr. Haider, a person not a member of the union, for one dance job, but that after it had cleared the bank and had been returned to Mr. Haider, Mr. Haider had written on its face the words "two dance jobs" or "two dance dates"; that this check, with the aforesaid inscription, was shown to some of the officers and members of the union following a meeting of the council of clubs within the city of Bismarck; that to these officers and members this inscription indicated that Mr. Braun had committed four violations of the union rules in that he had been employed twice for less than the minimum union wage scale and had been employed twice by a non-member of the union, whereas in truth the only offense he had committed was that of having been employed by a non-member of the union, inasmuch as he had been employed only once and the $20 payment exceeded the minimum wage scale for one job; that Mr. Haider had written this misleading information on the check and had presented it to an officer of the Moose Lodge so that the officer could prove that members of the union were violating their rules, with the intention that this would result in the council of clubs establishing a rule that the clubs would employ non-members of the union as well as union members at their functions; and that after this check so inscribed was seen by officers and members of the union, Mr. Braun was tried by the officers of the union, was found to have been guilty of four violations of union rules, and was fined $75, resulting in loss of favor with the union and loss of future employment. The practical question presented then is whether the trial court erred in considering any evidence which went to explain the significance of the words "two dance jobs" or "two dance dates." Our statute on criminal libel reads as follows: There is obviously nothing in the statute on criminal libel which prohibits the receipt in evidence of testimony explaining the circumstances surrounding the publication of the writing. In his brief on appeal Mr. Haider asserts that there appears to be very little distinction between a civil libel and a criminal libel, but that it must be borne in mind that not every libel for which a civil action lies will support a criminal prosecution. The following is part of his argument: In support of this contention he refers us to Wharton's Criminal Law, as follows: In support of that part of Wharton which we have italicized, the following cases are cited: Merchants' Insurance Company of Newark, N.J. v. Buckner, 39 C.C.A. 19, 98 F. 222; State v. Norton, 89 Me. 290, 36 A. 394; State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30, 41 Am.Rep. 487. It is apparently Mr. Haider's contention that the rule he would have us follow is supported by and based on the common law of England. It should be noted that in this state there is no common law in any case in which the law is declared by the Code. See § 1-01-06, N.D.C.C. We find no present day advocate of Mr. Haider's rule and see no reason why we should follow it; we therefore reject it. Accepting the first part of his premise, that there is little distinction between civil and criminal libel (notwithstanding the distinction noted in McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512, 518, 87 A.L.R. 683, which is not pertinent to this case), we note what one of the students of the common law of England had to say regarding the meaning of words: *75 To these different classes of words special rules of pleading, evidence, and construction apply. Odgers, Libel and Slander 119 (5th ed. 1912). Odgers states that with words obviously defamatory no innuendo is necessary and no parol evidence is admissible at the trial to explain the meaning of the words, but that when the words, if taken literally in the primary and obvious meaning, are harmless, it is still open to the plaintiff to show from the surrounding circumstances that on the occasion in question they bore a secondary and defamatory meaning. Two of his illustrations of (4) follow: Our civil statute reads as follows: In construing our statute on civil libel, this court has said: We believe it is reasonably inferable from that quotation that this court recognized that under certain circumstances extrinsic evidence could be received to aid the jury in determining whether a publication was libelous. We accordingly hold that this was such an occasion and that it was therefore not error for the trial court to permit testimony going to the proof of the libelous nature of the words "two dance jobs" or "two dance dates" written on the canceled check. Lest it be argued that it is only the meaning that the general public would ascribe to the words that could be considered in ascertaining their libelous nature, *76 we think especially significant what has been said on this subject by the District Court of Appeal of California. In Pridonoff v. Balokovich, 215 P.2d 929 (Cal.App.1950), the defendant had written an article which was published in the newspaper Narodni Glasnik, read by persons of Yugoslav origin or ancestry, saying that the plaintiff, while a member of the staff of the American Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, was "caught carrying on flagrant espionage activities." It was contended by the defendant that this article had an innocent connotation and was therefore not actionable. The court said: In a Washington libel action arising from a letter sent by the agent of the defendant union to officials of other unions, which charged the plaintiffs with having deserted the defendant union during a maritime strike and which characterized the plaintiffs as renegades, the court said: When the canceled check was given to the officer of the Moose Lodge to display at a meeting of the council of clubs (to which meeting union officers and members had been invited), the false writing placed on it took on a sinister meaning, a meaning which ultimately deprived Mr. Braun of public confidence and social intercourse. Mr. Haider's next contention is that inasmuch as Mr. Braun could lawfully violate union rules, the writing was not libelous. His view is that to accuse one of doing what he may lawfully do is not defamatory and therefore not libelous. In support of this contention he cites Garland v. State, 211 Ga. 44, 84 S.E.2d 9; and State v. Darwin, 63 Wash. 303, 115 P. 309. We believe, however, that the better rule is that to constitute libel it is not necessary that a publication shall impute to a person the commission of a crime. White v. Birmingham Post Co., 233 Ala. *77 547, 172 So. 649, 651; Pridonoff v. Balokovich, 215 P.2d 929 (Cal.App.1950); Morley v. Post Printing &amp; Publishing Co., 84 Colo. 41, 268 P. 540, 542; Children v. Shinn, 168 Iowa 531, 150 N.W. 864, 868. Mr. Haider's last argument appears to be that he had an innocent motive, and that therefore malice cannot be presumed. In support of this contention he argues that it is reasonable to assume that he delivered the publication which is the subject of this action to the officer of the Moose Lodge in order to protect what he considers to be a legitimate interest. His alleged interest was in preventing the council of clubs from adopting a rule which would thereafter prevent him, a non-member of the union, from receiving employment. In support of this argument Mr. Haider cites us to no statutory or case law. The only statute that we find that in any way relates to the issue is § 12-28-11, which reads as follows: We do not believe that the evidence submitted in this case is sufficient to bring Mr. Haider within the privilege contained in § 12-28-11. It should be noted that no witnesses were called on behalf of the defendant nor was any evidence submitted on his behalf. The statute which we believe controls here follows: The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. TEIGEN, C.J., and STRUTZ, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.