Title: YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM INC V STATE OF MICH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 113656
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                      
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED MAY 15, 2001  
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
 No. 113656  
STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT 
OF TREASURY and ITS STATE TREASURER, 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE and  
ITS DIRECTOR, and MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION and ITS COMMISSIONERS,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, C.J.  
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation.  
Plaintiff, 
Yellow Freight 
System, 
Inc., 
alleges 
that  
defendants 
collected 
registration fees in excess of the amount  
allowed under the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation  
Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 49 USC 11506, which restricts a  
state's registration fees to an amount "equal to the fee . . .  
that such state collected or charged as of November 15, 1991,"  
49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). 
Specifically, plaintiff  
contends that in determining the amount of the fee charged or  
1  
collected on November 15, 1991, one must consider the effect  
that any then existing reciprocity agreements had on the fees.  
We 
reject 
plaintiff's claims and hold that in determining  
the "fee . . . collected or charged" under 49 USC  
11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), 
Michigan's 
reciprocity 
agreements 
are  
irrelevant.
 We reverse the Court of Appeals decision  
affirming the Court of Claims order for summary disposition in  
favor of plaintiff and remand this case to the Court of Claims  
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I  
Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among  
the several States” and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be  
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” that power  
to regulate commerce.  US Const, art I, § 8. Under the  
Commerce Clause, states can impose significant regulatory  
burdens on interstate motor carriers only when authorized to  
do so by Congress. Michigan Pub Utility Comm v Duke, 266 US  
570, 577; 45 S Ct 191; 69 L Ed 445 (1925).  Over the years  
Congress has authorized the states to require registration of  
interstate motor carriers, subject to the supervision of the  
Interstate Commerce Commission.  See Motor Carrier Act of  
1935, PL 74-265, 49 USC 301 et seq. In 1991, Congress passed  
the ISTEA,1 which directed the Interstate Commerce Commission  
(ICC) to restructure the then existing regulations governing  
vehicle registration and registration fees.  49 USC 11506. As  
a result, the ICC issued the “single state” registration  
1Provisions similar to those in this section are now 
contained in 49 USC 14504. 
2  
 
  
system (SSRS) in 1993, 49 CFR 1023.2  
A 
brief 
overview of the previous interstate motor carrier  
registration system is helpful in understanding the dispute  
now before this Court.  Before 1991, states could require  
interstate motor carriers to annually register and pay fees on  
each vehicle that operated within its borders.  Thirty-nine  
states, 
including 
Michigan, elected to participate in a "bingo  
card" system.3  Under the “bingo card” system interstate motor  
carriers attached a "bingo card" to each of their motor  
vehicles.  States through which the vehicle traveled then  
issued each vehicle a registration "stamp" which was placed in  
a designated area on the bingo card.  Participating states  
were allowed to charge no more than $10 per stamp.  
While 
operating 
under 
the 
prior 
"bingo 
card" 
registration  
system, 
some 
states 
entered 
into 
reciprocity 
agreements, 
under  
which a state would discount or waive the registration fee for  
carriers based in the other's state.  The motor carrier’s  
principal place of business was most commonly used as the  
basis for determining reciprocity. 
Michigan, however,  
initially based its reciprocity agreements on the state in  
which the vehicle was “base-plated,” i.e. where it was  
2This was redesignated in 1996 as 49 CFR 367. 
3The “bingo card” system served three main purposes: (1)
to make it easier to determine whether a specific vehicle had
been registered by simply looking at the “bingo card,”  (2) to
ensure 
compliance 
by 
interstate motor carriers to register all
vehicles in operation, and (3) to prevent carriers from
operating uninsured vehicles. 
3  
 
 
registered or license-plated.4  
Seeking 
to 
“benefit 
the 
interstate 
carriers 
by  
eliminating unnecessary compliance burdens” and “to preserve  
revenues for the states which had participated in the bingo  
program,” Congress  replaced the old system by enacting the  
ISTEA.5  The SSRS was intended to serve as the sole avenue for  
state registration of interstate carriers.6 Nat'l Ass'n of  
Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v Interstate Commerce Comm 309 US  
App DC 325; 41 F3d 721 (1994). Under the SSRS a motor carrier  
registers annually with only one state.  This “registration  
state” is responsible for collecting the per-vehicle fees and  
distributing them to any participating states through which  
the 
carrier 
runs 
its 
motor 
vehicles. 
49 
USC  
11506(c)(2)(A)(iii).  
The section of the ISTEA at issue in the present case is  
subsection 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).  It provides that each state  
“shall establish a fee system” that “result[s] in a fee for  
each participating state that is equal to the fee, not to  
exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State collected or charged  
as of November 15, 1991 . . . .”  
In 1991, before the implementation of the SSRS, the  
4In other words, Michigan would waive its registration
fee for vehicles base-plated in a state that waived its fee
for vehicles that were base-plated in Michigan. 
5H R Conf Rep No 102-404, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess 437 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U S Code Cong & Admin News, 1526, 1679,
1817. 
6Participation in the SSRS was limited to the thirty-nine
states that had elected to participate in the “bingo card”
program. 49 USC 11506(c)(2)(D) 
4  
 
 
Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) altered its  
reciprocity agreements.  The MPSC adopted the more common  
"place 
of 
business" 
method 
of 
determining 
reciprocity, 
instead  
of the "base-plated" system that the MPSC had been using.  
This change was scheduled to become effective in February  
1992.  The MPSC mailed renewal applications reflecting this  
change to all interstate motor carriers, including the  
plaintiff, in September 1991.  Plaintiff paid its 1992 fees7  
in September of 1991, under protest. Subsequently, plaintiff  
instituted this litigation.  
Plaintiff contended that Michigan could not alter its  
reciprocity 
agreements, 
arguing 
that 
under 
the 
federal 
statute  
those agreements were frozen at their November 15, 1991,  
levels.  Ruling on cross motion, the Court of Claims agreed  
with plaintiff and granted its motion, in part, for summary  
disposition.8  In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals  
affirmed the Court of Claims ruling. 231 Mich App 194; 585  
NW2d 762 (1998).  This Court granted leave to appeal, 461 Mich  
1009 (2000).  
7At that time plaintiff’s principal place of business was
in Kansas, and it had 3,730 vehicles base-plated in Illinois
and Indiana. 
Under Michigan's old reciprocity agreements,
Michigan's fees for those 3,730 vehicles base-plated in
Illinois and Indiana would have been waived. However, after
Michigan 
changed 
its 
method for determining reciprocity to one
based on a company’s principal place of business, Plaintiff
was required to pay a $10 vehicle registration fee for each of
the 3,730 vehicles.  Thus, rather than paying nothing under
the old reciprocity method, plaintiff was required to pay
$37,300 annually under Michigan’s new system. 
8 Plaintiff’s complaint also sought attorney fees under 
42 USC 1988. The Court of Claims did not grant this relief, 
and plaintiff has not appealed that decision to this Court.  
5  
 
 
III  
There is no dispute that 49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III)  
froze the registration fees that a state can charge as of  
November 
15, 
1991. 
The 
parties 
dispute 
the 
proper  
interpretation of a key phrase in that section of the ISTEA:  
"equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such  
State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."  The  
fundamental 
question 
before 
us 
is 
whether 
Michigan's  
reciprocity agreements should be considered in determining  
what fees were charged or collected as of November 15, 1991.  
We conclude that under the plain language of the statute,  
reciprocity agreements are not relevant in making that  
determination.  
A  
This is an issue of first impression for this Court; nor  
have any other state courts addressed it.  The only court that  
has considered it is the District of Columbia Circuit Court of  
Appeals, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs, supra.  
That court followed the ICC's decision9 to ban states from  
9The ICC has taken varying positions on this issue.  In 
its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 57 Fed Reg 20,072
(1992), and its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed Reg 5951
(1993), the ICC found that the reciprocity agreements were
made voluntarily, and that there was no good reason for the
ICC's involvement in them. The ICC had noted that "it might
place a heavy administrative burden on a registration State
were we to require that it collect from different carriers
different fees from the same State depending on the various
reciprocal agreements negotiated by the various states in
which each carrier operates." 9 ICC2d 610, 617 (1993). 
However, the ICC subsequently reversed its position, and 
now says "we have concluded that participating States must 
consider 
fees 
charged 
or 
collected 
under 
reciprocity 
agreements when determining the fees charged or collected as  
6  
 
 
 
 
 
charging 
registration 
fees 
in 
excess 
of 
preexisting 
reciprocal  
discounts, saying:  
[W]e think the Commission was correct in  
concluding that the plain language of the statute 
precludes petitioners’ interpretation.  It does not  
matter whether Congress actually focused on the 
reciprocal discount practice or even was aware of 
it.
 Nor is it of any significance that the 
Commission initially misread the statute; that is 
what comment periods are for. Id., at 729.  
We are not bound to follow that decision,10 and, for the  
reasons given below, we do not agree with the federal court's  
decision to defer to the ICC's interpretation of the ISTEA.  
B  
Plaintiff 
contends that in interpreting the ISTEA we must  
give deference to the ICC's interpretation. Because the issue  
is the interpretation of a federal statute and the deference  
due a federal agency's construction of that statute, we will  
apply the rules of construction set out by the federal  
judiciary.11  The seminal case is Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural  
of Nov 15, 1991, as required by § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)."  Single 
State Insurance Registration Exparte No MC-100 (Sub-No 6), 9 
ICC2d 610, 618-619 (1993).  
10 Michigan adheres to the rule that a state court is 
bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts upon 
federal questions, including interpretations of federal  
statutes.  See Bement v Grand Rapids & Indiana R Co, 194 Mich  
64; 160 NW 424 (1916), and In re Hopps Estate, 324 Mich 256; 
36 NW2d 908 (1949).  However, where there is no United States 
Supreme Court decision upon the interpretation in question, 
the lower federal courts' decisions, while entitled to 
respectful consideration, are not binding upon this Court. 
See Winger v Grand Trunk W R Co, 210 Mich 100, 117; 177 NW 273  
(1920), Schueler v Weintrob, 360 Mich 621; 105 NW2d 42 (1960), 
and 21 CJS, Courts, § 159, pp 195-197.  
11This Court has not previously determined what deference 
the courts of this state owe to a federal agency's
interpretation of a federal statute.  However, in that 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S Ct 2778; 81  
L Ed 2d 694 (1984).  There the United States Supreme Court  
established that a court must first determine whether the  
statute's meaning is clear; if so, then the court must apply  
the statute as written.  If the statute is ambiguous, then the  
court must give deference to the agency's interpretation.  
When a court reviews an agency's construction 
of the statute which it administers, it is  
confronted with two questions.  First, always, is 
the question whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of  
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.  If, however, the court determines  
Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose 
its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative  
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency's 
answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute. Id. at 842-843.  
Here we find that the plain meaning of the terms of the ISTEA  
is clear, and we apply the statute as written.  Because we  
find that the statute is not ambiguous12, we need not proceed  
circumstance the Court of Appeals has applied the federal 
standards of deference as set out in  Chevron, supra 2778.  
See Walker v Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc, 217 Mich  
App 705, 713; 552 NW2d 679 (1996), Gibbs v General Motors  
Corp, 134 Mich App 429, 432; 351 NW2d 315 (1984), and 231 Mich 
App 200.  This is also the approach taken by several other 
state courts.  See for example: Totemoff v State, 905 P2d 954,  
967 (Alas, 1995), Delorme v North Dakota Dep’t of Human  
Services, 492 NW2d 585, 587, n 2 (ND, 1992), Rodriguez v 
Perales, 86 NY2d 361, 367; 657 NE2d 247; 633 NYS2d 252 (1995),  
and Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc v Dep’t of Public Utility 
Control, 253 Conn 453, 470; 754 A2d 128 (2000).  
12 
The dissent contends that the statute is ambiguous, 
asserting that this is demonstrated by “the several  
interpretations of its wording advanced by the parties.” If  
8  
 
to the second step of Chevron, supra, and we do not reach the  
agency’s interpretation.  
C  
The question before us is whether any then-existing  
reciprocity agreements should be considered when determining  
what fee the state charged or collected as of November 15,  
1991. The ISTEA itself refers only to the fee collected or  
charged, and contains no reference to reciprocity agreements.  
49 USC 11504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) directs the ICC to “establish  
a fee system” that " result[s] in a fee for each participating  
State that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle,  
that such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."  
The new “fee system” is based not on the fees collected from  
one individual company, but on the fee system that the state  
had in place on November 15, 1991.  We must look not at the  
fees paid by plaintiff in any given year, but at the generic  
fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of November  
15, 1991.  
To determine what registration fee Michigan charged on  
November 15, 1991, we examine MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4)  
in the Motor Carrier Act.  Since 1989 that statute has  
provided for a fee of $10 to be charged for those motor  
carrier 
vehicles 
operating in Michigan and licensed in another  
state or province of Canada:  
The annual fee levied on each interstate or  
the parties’ conflicting interpretations were the measure of 
a statute’s ambiguity, then almost every statute litigated 
would be deemed ambiguous.  A statute is not ambiguous because 
it requires careful attention and analysis.  
9  
 
 
foreign motor carrier vehicle operated in this 
state and licensed in another state or province of 
Canada shall be $10.00.  
The same statute, MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4), also gives  
the commission the ability to waive the $10 fee under certain  
circumstances:  
The commission may enter into a reciprocal 
agreement with a state or province of Canada that 
does not charge vehicles licensed in this state 
economic regulatory fees or taxes and may waive the 
fee required under this subsection.  
Thus, under MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4), the fee charged as  
of November 15, 1991, was $10.  While that fee may be waived,  
and thus not “charged or collected,” for a particular carrier  
under a reciprocity agreement, such voluntary agreements to  
waive the fee that happen to benefit a particular carrier do  
not affect the generic per vehicle fee in place on November  
15, 1991. 
As stated, the clear focus of 49 USC  
11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) is on the generic “fee” that Michigan  
charged or collected as of November 15, 1991, and not on  
whether that fee was charged to or collected from a particular  
carrier.  
The ICC's position that "participating States must  
consider 
fees 
charged 
or 
collected 
under 
reciprocity  
agreements when determining the fees charged or collected as  
of Nov 15, 1991, as required by § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv),”13  added  
a concept not within the express language of the statute.  It  
added 
consideration 
of 
voluntary 
agreements 
between 
the 
states  
to waive or reduce the fees imposed. It is not for the ICC,  
13Single State Insurance Registration Exparte No MC-100
(Sub-No 6) 9 ICC2d 610 (1993) 
10  
  
 
or this Court, to insert words into the statute.  
IV  
We hold that Michigan's reciprocity agreements are not  
relevant in determining what fee was "charged or collected" as  
of November 15, 1991.  The lower courts erred in granting  
summary disposition for plaintiffs. We reverse the Court of  
Appeals decision, and remand this case to the Court of Claims  
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with WEAVER, J.  
11  
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 113656 
STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY and ITS 
STATE TREASURER, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE and ITS 
DIRECTOR, and MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION and ITS 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
___________________________________ 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining the  
registration fees that Michigan charged under the 1991  
Intermodel Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 49  
USC 11506.1  One such agreement waived registration fees for  
vehicles 
licensed 
in 
Illinois, 
including 
plaintiff's 
vehicles,  
so that no fee was collected or charged within the meaning of  
the statute. Consequently, I would affirm the decisions of  
the Court of Appeals and the Court of Claims.  
1The ISTEA now appears at 49 USC 14504. 
  
The ISTEA replaced the bingo card system of registering  
interstate motor carriers with a single state registration  
system. 
Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v  
Interstate Commerce Comm, 309 US App DC 325, 328; 41 F3d 721  
(1994).  Under the ISTEA system, a state can charge a fee  
"that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that  
such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991." 49  
USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III).  The question in this case is  
what 
effect 
reciprocity agreements have on determining the fee  
that Michigan can charge under the single state registration  
system.  
As an initial point, I disagree with the majority's  
conclusion that the meaning of the language in the statute is  
plain, reasonably susceptible of only one interpretation.  
Rather, I find it ambiguous.  A statute is ambiguous when  
reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning.  In re MCI  
Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164  
(1999).
 That the ISTEA is ambiguous as regards the  
reciprocity agreements is demonstrated by the several  
interpretations of its wording advanced by the parties and by  
justices on this Court.  The language of the statute supports  
both positions, allowing for opposing and similarly plausible  
constructions.
 Despite careful attention and analysis,  
reasonable minds can and do differ with respect to the  
statute's meaning concerning reciprocity agreements.  
Alternatively, if the statute's language were plain, the  
meaning of the words "collected or charged" must lead to a  
result opposite that reached by the majority.  The majority  
2  
 
concludes that Michigan was entitled to charge plaintiff a  
registration fee, but the majority's interpretation of the  
ISTEA depends on addition to  the statute of words not present  
there.  Whether the state of Michigan could have collected or  
charged a "generic" per vehicle fee is not pertinent.  The  
statute specifies "fees . . . collected or charged as of  
November 15, 1991."  It does not say "fees that the state  
could have collected or charged."  
While the ISTEA does not expressly make reference to  
reciprocity agreements, the fee system in place on November  
15, 1991, does. MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4) provides:  
The annual fee levied on each interstate or  
foreign motor carrier vehicle operated in this 
state and licensed in another state or province of 
Canada shall be $10.00.  The commission may enter 
into a reciprocal agreement with a state or  
province of Canada that does not charge vehicles 
licensed in this state economic regulatory fees or 
taxes and may waive the fee required under this 
subsection.  
A plain reading of this provision leads to the conclusion that  
reciprocity agreements are an inherent part of the state's  
registration fee system.  The generic fee levied under the  
statute 
is 
not 
absolute, but subject to reciprocity agreements  
that waive the fee.  Thus, the fee charged as of November 15,  
1991, was $10.00, unless a reciprocity agreement pertained.  
Voluntary agreements to waive the fee are relevant in  
determining the per vehicle fee system in place on November  
15, 1991, as well as the fee collected or charged pursuant to  
that system.  
The parties do not dispute that Michigan had a  
reciprocity 
agreement with Illinois that, by its terms, waived  
3  
Michigan registration fees for interstate motor carriers  
licensed in Illinois.  Pursuant to the agreement, the state  
did not charge registration fees for plaintiff's vehicles in  
1990 and in 1991.  It was not until Michigan revised its  
reciprocity system in 1991 that it charged plaintiff a  
registration fee.  
This change in the reciprocity system did not become  
effective until the 1992 registration year.  Plaintiff was not  
charged a registration fee in Michigan, nor was one collected  
from it in Michigan for the 1991 registration year.  The fact  
that the state had a right to or could have charged a  
"generic" registration fee does not change the fact: it did  
not charge plaintiff a fee until the 1992 registration year.  
The majority's characterization of the language of the  
statute as "plain" is belied by the fact that the majority is  
obliged to construe the phrase "collected or charged" to reach  
its result.  Only a strained reading of "collected or charged"  
leads to the conclusion that the state charged a fee when it  
did not do so.  That the statute does not expressly mention  
reciprocity agreements does not change the fact that  
reciprocity agreements were an inherent part of the fee system  
in place on November 15, 1991.  In this case, the reciprocity  
agreement 
with 
Illinois in effect during the 1991 registration  
year caused Michigan to waive the fees it might have imposed  
under MCL 478.7; MSA 22.565(1). As a consequence, no fees had  
been "collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."  
The Court should give deference, as did the District of  
4  
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,2 to the Interstate Commerce  
Commission's 
construction 
of 
the 
language 
in 
question, 
because  
it is based on a permissible construction of the ISTEA.  
Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,  
467 US 837, 842-844; 104 S Ct 2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984).  It  
should affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the  
Court of Claims in favor of plaintiff.  
2Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs, supra. 
5 
 
________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 113656  
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
TREASURY, STATE TREASURER, 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DIRECTOR 
OF DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE  
COMMISSION and MICHIGAN PUBLIC  
SERVICE COMMISSIONERS,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the  
relevant 
provision of 
the 
federal 
Intermodal 
Surface  
Transportation 
Efficiency 
Act 
(ISTEA), 
49 
USC  
11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), 
is 
unambiguous 
and 
that 
this 
Court 
is  
free to decide that the section does not take into account  
reciprocity agreements. 
Rather, I conclude that this  
provision is ambiguous, and that the Interstate Commerce  
Commission (ICC) has permissibly construed it to take into  
account reciprocity agreements.  Under Chevron, USA, Inc v  
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S Ct  
2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984), then, this Court should defer to  
 
the ICC’s interpretation of that provision.  I, therefore,  
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and must  
respectfully dissent.  
In this case, the Court is called on to review a federal  
statute that was administered by the ICC when this case  
arose.1  As the majority points out, under the Supreme Court’s  
decision in Chevron, when a court reviews an agency’s  
construction of a statute the agency administers, the court  
faces a two-part inquiry.  First, the court must determine  
whether the statute clearly and unambiguously expresses the  
legislative intent.  If so, it then must give effect to the  
statute as written.  However, if the statute is not clear and  
unambiguous, the court “does not simply impose its own  
construction on the statute,” but instead reviews whether the  
agency has permissibly construed the statute.  If it has, the  
court should defer to the agency’s construction. Chevron at  
842-843.
 As alluded, the ICC, in Single State Insurance  
Registration, 9 ICC2d 610, 618-619 (1993), construed the  
statute in question to take into account reciprocity  
agreements that exempted some interstate carriers from state  
fees, a conclusion opposite to that reached by the majority.  
To determine whether a statute clearly and unambiguously  
expresses legislative intent, courts begin with the statutory  
language.
 If the words of a statute are clear and  
unambiguous, the court must apply them as written, and no  
1 The ICC was abolished in 1996, and the references to 
the ICC in the governing statute, which was recodified, were 
changed to refer to the Secretary of Transportation. See 49  
USC 14505; see also PL 104-88, 109 Stat 803, tit I, § 103.  
2  
further judicial construction is required or permitted.  See,  
e.g., Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135;  
545 NW2d 642 (1996).  However, when there can be reasonable  
disagreement over a statute’s meaning, see People v Adair, 452  
Mich 473, 479; 550 NW2d 505 (1996), or, as others have put it,  
when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably  
well-informed persons in two or more different senses, that  
statute is ambiguous.  See 2A Singer, Statutes & Statutory  
Construction (6th ed), § 45.02, pp 11-12. For example, this  
Court has concluded that statutes have been ambiguous when one  
word in the statute has an unclear meaning, see Perez v Keeler  
Brass Co, 461 Mich 602, 610; 608 NW2d 45 (2000), when a  
statute’s interaction with another statute has rendered its  
meaning unclear, see People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 699; 564  
NW2d 13 (1997), or when application of the statute to facts  
has 
rendered 
the 
correct application of the statute uncertain,  
see Elias Bros v Treasury Dep’t, 452 Mich 144, 150; 549 NW2d  
837 (1996).  
In this case, the majority concludes that the governing  
ISTEA provision is plain and unambiguous.  In the words of our  
prior decisions, then, the majority concludes that there  
cannot be reasonable disagreement over the statute’s meaning,  
and 
that 
reasonably 
well-informed 
people 
cannot 
understand 
the  
statute in two or more different senses.  Before amendment,  
the governing section provided that the ICC, and through it,  
states  
shall establish a fee system for the filing of 
proof of insurance as provided under subparagraph 
(A)(ii) of this paragraph that (I) will be based on 
the number of commercial motor vehicles the carrier  
3  
operates in a State and on the number of States in 
which the carrier operates, (II) will minimize the 
costs of complying with the registration system, 
and 
(III) 
will 
result 
in 
a 
fee 
for 
each  
participating State that is equal to the fee, not 
to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State  
collected or charged as of November 15, 1991 . . . 
. [49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).]  
I cannot agree that the meaning of this language is clear and  
unambiguous.
 
Rather, 
it 
is 
subject 
to 
reasonable  
disagreement.  
The majority concludes that the fee “collected or  
charged” refers only to the fee system a state had in place on  
November 15, 1991, and that this is clear from the plain  
meaning of § 11506(c)(2)(B)(IV).  See slip op at 11-12.  
However, the conclusion that the fee “collected or charged”  
refers only to the fee system requires that “collected or  
charged” include the possibility that the fee “charged” can be  
simultaneously “waived.” Id. at 12. Otherwise, there would  
be no question that the state had not collected or charged  
anything from plaintiff until the changes in the reciprocity  
system became effective in 1992, after the cutoff date  
provided in § 11506.  The conclusion that a fee can be  
“charged,” 
yet 
concurrently 
“waived,” 
though, 
is 
not  
consistent with this Court’s approach to plain language.  
When construing a statute according to its plain  
language, unless the statute itself dictates otherwise, this  
Court generally turns to dictionary definitions of the  
statutory terms to find those terms’ ordinary and generally  
accepted meanings.  See, e.g., Denio at 699. Applying this  
approach to the instant case calls the majority’s conclusion  
that a fee can be simultaneously “charged” and waived into  
4  
 
question.  “Charge” is defined variably as (1) “To hold  
financially liable; demand payment from,” (2) “To demand or  
ask payment,” (3) “A financial burden, as a tax or lien,” (4)  
“To set or ask (a given amount) as a price,” (5) “Expense;  
cost,” or (6) “The price set or asked for something.”  The  
American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed, 1982).  
The problem in this case is that the ordinary and  
generally accepted meanings of the term “charge” do not  
dictate 
the 
majority’s conclusion.  Rather, the definitions of  
“charge” present a spectrum of concepts ranging from those  
that might encompass the majority understanding that a fee can  
be “charged” but concurrently “waived”—definitions 4, 6, and  
arguably 5—to those that do not encompass that understanding  
because they require that the charge be a “demand” or a  
“burden.”
 Definitions 1, 2, and 3 do not support the  
majority’s conclusion because, under those meanings of  
“charge,” the state would have to waive a fee, yet also hold  
a carrier financially liable for it, or demand or ask for  
payment of a fee that had been waived.  Similarly, if a fee  
has been “waived,” it is not a financial burden on the party  
responsible for the fee.  In this case, plaintiff was not made  
financially liable for, or financially burdened with, the  
waived fee, and the state did not demand the waived fee before  
November 15, 1991. 
Thus, although several accepted  
definitions of “charge” support the majority conclusion,  
several others weigh against it.  
As 
mentioned 
above, the meaning of a facially unambiguous  
term can be ambiguous in certain circumstances.  See Denio at  
5  
 
 
699; Perez at 610. Thus, although “charged” may not at first  
blush appear ambiguous, in the context of a fee that was  
established in a fee system, but never demanded because of a  
reciprocity agreement, “charged” is ambiguous because the fee  
may or may not fit the definition of a fee that is “charged.”  
If the statutory term “charged” is narrow and requires a  
demand for payment, the state had not charged plaintiff the  
fees before November 15, 1991, and cannot charge plaintiff for  
later years.  On the other hand, if “charged” is broad and  
requires only the setting of a fee, the state had charged the  
fee by the cutoff date, and plaintiff cannot avoid payment.  
Compare Perez at 610 (“refuses” could have a broad or narrow  
meaning).  
Although it does so without explanation, the majority  
chooses the latter meaning, concluding that even when the fee  
was waived for particular carriers, it still had been charged  
in general.
 Slip op at 12. 
I do not contend that the  
majority has chosen the wrong definition of “charge,” or that  
its conclusion about § 11506's meaning is unreasonable.  
However, for the majority to come to its conclusion, it had to  
resolve 
the 
ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the statutory  
term “charged,” specifically, whether “charged” was used in  
its broad or narrow sense.2  Normally, this Court has a duty  
2 To conclude that the fee “charged” refers only to the 
fee set by the fee system, the majority must nevertheless 
conclude that “charged” is broad, meaning only that the state 
“set a price” for carriers but did not hold a carrier liable 
for that price.  Such an understanding comports only with 
definitions 4 and 6 above, but not the narrower meaning of 
“charge” in definitions 1, 2, and 3. Otherwise, the fee 
“charged” could refer to only a particular fee and not the 
(continued...) 
6  
 
 
 
to make such a decision.  In this case, however, the different  
possible meanings of “charged” present an ambiguity in §  
11506.  Under Chevron, rather than this Court imposing its own  
construction on the statute, we must consider whether the ICC,  
the agency responsible for administering this statute and  
which has already resolved this ambiguity in § 11506, did so  
permissibly.  
I conclude that the ICC did permissibly construe the  
statute, and, therefore, I would defer to that agency.  In  
Single State, the ICC considered whether the freeze on  
registration fees enacted through the ISTEA should take  
reciprocity agreements into account.  It decided that the  
ISTEA does take reciprocity agreements into account when  
freezing the fees that states “charged.”  Thus, an interstate  
carrier that was not charged any fees before November 15,  
1991, because it was operating under a reciprocity agreement,  
could not be charged fees after that time.  See Single State,  
supra at 617-619.  This interpretation evidences that the ICC  
preferred 
the 
narrow 
approach to “charged,” concluding that an  
2(...continued)
system itself.  
Further, if the majority is correct that the fee charged 
refers only to the fee system in place, but not the fees 
charged 
of 
particular 
carriers, 
then 
apparently 
Michigan 
could 
waive fees for every carrier operating in the state, under 
reciprocity 
agreements or not, but nevertheless continue to be 
said to “charge” a generic fee.  In such a scenario, the 
majority would apparently conclude that Michigan “charged” a 
fee even though it held no carrier financially liable for any 
fee.  
Again, 
there 
is 
room for reasonable disagreement over the 
proper understanding of these statutory terms.  That room for  
disagreement, though, indicates that we should defer to the 
ICC understanding.  
7  
 
interstate carrier had not been “charged” a registration fee  
unless a state had made a demand for the fee, or unless the  
carrier had been held financially liable for the fee. Under  
reciprocity agreements, states did not make demands for fees,  
and did not hold carriers liable for fees.  Hence, carriers  
operating 
under 
those agreements were not “charged” before the  
cutoff date, and could not be charged after it. Though this  
Court may not prefer the ICC’s interpretation of § 11506 or  
the narrow approach to the term “charged,” in light of the  
different possible meanings of the statute, the ICC approach  
is certainly a permissible construction.  I would, therefore,  
defer to that agency’s interpretation of this section.  
In sum, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 49  
USC 
11506 
is 
not 
reasonably 
subject 
to 
different  
understandings.  Whether the statutory term “charged” is  
understood 
narrowly 
or 
broadly 
affects 
this 
statute’s 
meaning.  
Because the statute can be understood differently, this  
Court’s only role is to consider whether the federal agency  
responsible for administering this statute, which has already  
considered the question before this Court, permissibly  
answered that question.  The ICC took a narrow view of the  
meaning of “charged,” but nevertheless a view that is  
supported by § 11506.  I would defer to that agency’s view  
and, therefore, must respectfully dissent.  
8