Title: Sacks v. Dissinger
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13105
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13105 
 
MATTHEW SACKS & another1  vs.  NANCY DISSINGER & others.2 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 8, 2021. - December 29, 2021. 
 
Present:  Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Trust, Beneficiary.  Undue Influence.  Unlawful Interference.  
Unjust Enrichment.  Limitations, Statute of.  Uniform Trust 
Code. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 22, 2019. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Michael D. Ricciuti, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Robert L. Hamer for the plaintiffs. 
Mardic A. Marashian for the defendants. 
 
 
 
1 Rebecca Sacks. 
 
2 Donna Sacks, individually and as personal representative 
of the estate of Sheila Sacks; Joan Rosenthal; and Cheryl Sacks 
O'Toole. 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This case involves three generations of the Sacks 
family.  After learning that they had been removed as 
beneficiaries of their grandfather's trust, the plaintiffs, 
Matthew and Rebecca Sacks,3 brought suit against their aunts and 
their grandmother's estate.  The plaintiffs alleged that their 
exclusion from the trust -- and their aunts' correspondingly 
larger shares of distributions -- arose from undue influence 
exerted by one of their aunts and their grandmother upon their 
grandfather. 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, 
arguing that the claims were time barred under G. L. c. 203E, 
§ 604 (§ 604), which requires that actions "contest[ing] the 
validity of a trust" be brought within one year of the trust 
settlor's death.  A Superior Court judge agreed and granted the 
defendants' motion.  The plaintiffs appealed, maintaining that 
their claims for intentional interference and unjust enrichment 
did not challenge the validity of the trust and, therefore, were 
not time barred by § 604.  We transferred this case from the 
Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
We conclude that the plaintiffs' claims for intentional 
interference and unjust enrichment are substantively different 
from the trust contests governed by § 604 and therefore are not 
 
3 Because many parties share a surname, we refer to them all 
by their first names. 
3 
 
time barred.  We reverse and remand to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Background.  We take the following facts from the complaint 
as supplemented by undisputed facts from the plaintiffs' 
grandparents' probate records.  See Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014). 
 
The grandparents, Aaron and Sheila Sacks, are deceased; 
Aaron was the settlor of the trust at issue, and Sheila's estate 
is represented as one of the defendants.  Aaron and Sheila had 
five children:  Jeffrey Sacks, who is deceased, and four of the 
defendants, Nancy Dissinger, Joan Rosenthal, Donna Sacks, and 
Cheryl Sacks O'Toole.  The plaintiffs, Matthew and Rebecca, are 
Jeffrey's children. 
 
Aaron established the Aaron H. Sacks Revocable Trust 
(trust) in August 2011.  The original terms of the trust 
provided that, after Aaron's and Sheila's deaths, each of their 
five children would receive one-fifth of the trust's assets.  If 
any of their children predeceased Aaron and Sheila, that child's 
share would go to that child's heirs.  By contemporaneous wills 
and subsequent codicils, both Aaron and Sheila devised the 
residues of their estates to the trust, including their 
interests in their family home. 
In June 2012, Jeffrey died after battling a brain tumor for 
almost two years.  Based on the recommendation of his doctors 
4 
 
and with the support of his son, Matthew, and his sisters Donna 
and Joan, Jeffrey made the difficult decision to decline any 
further treatment.  Sheila by then was suffering from the 
effects of a stroke and the onset of dementia.  Distraught over 
her son's end-of-life decision, she blamed grandson Matthew and 
daughters Donna and Joan for supporting it.  Sheila considered 
them complicit in Jeffrey's "murder."  Nancy, another of Aaron 
and Sheila's children, encouraged this belief in their mother. 
Within months of Jeffrey's death, Aaron was persuaded by 
Sheila and Nancy to remove Jeffrey's heirs as beneficiaries of 
the trust.  Aaron executed an amendment to the trust in July 
2012, providing that after Aaron's and Sheila's deaths, the 
trust property would be divided equally among only their four 
daughters. 
When Aaron died in August 2017, the trust, as amended, 
became irrevocable.  Sheila survived her husband, and during her 
lifetime, the trust property was to be available only for her 
health, education, support, and maintenance.  Sheila died in 
July 2019, precipitating the events that brought this matter 
before us. 
The plaintiffs claim that they learned of their exclusion 
from the trust only upon Sheila's death in July.  In November 
2019, the plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior 
Court, filing a three-count complaint.  The plaintiffs first 
5 
 
sought rescission of the 2012 amendment; second, they brought a 
claim against Sheila's estate and against Nancy for intentional 
interference with advantageous relations;4 and finally, they 
brought a claim against all four of their aunts for unjust 
enrichment.  In each of these claims, the plaintiffs alleged 
that Nancy and Sheila had exerted undue influence upon Aaron. 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that 
all three counts were time barred under § 604.  In response, the 
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed count I (rescission) but 
maintained that counts II and III (intentional interference and 
unjust enrichment, respectively) were not governed by § 604 and 
thus timely.5  A Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the 
defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims.  The plaintiffs 
appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the grant 
of a motion to dismiss de novo, "accept[ing] as true the facts 
alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint as well as any favorable 
 
4 In their complaint, the plaintiffs pleaded their claim as 
"interference with advantageous relationship."  We interpret 
this to be for interference with an expectancy.  See Labonte v. 
Giordano, 426 Mass. 319, 320-321 (1997).  See also Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  Liability for Economic Harm § 19 (2020). 
 
5 The plaintiffs argue that count II is governed by the 
three-year statute of limitations set forth in G. L. c. 260, 
§ 2A, and that count III is governed by the six-year statute of 
limitations set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2. 
6 
 
inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them."  Galiastro, 
467 Mass. at 164. 
 
2.  Section 604.  Adopted as part of the Massachusetts 
Uniform Trust Code (MUTC), § 604 states in relevant part:  "A 
person may commence a judicial proceeding to contest the 
validity of a trust that was revocable at the settlor's death 
within . . . [one] year after the settlor's death."  G. L. 
c. 203E, § 604 (a) (1).6  Aaron undoubtedly is the settlor of the 
trust, and the plaintiffs filed their complaint over two years 
after Aaron's death; thus, to the extent the plaintiffs are 
seeking to "contest the validity" of the trust, their claims are 
time barred.  The plaintiffs argue, however, that their claims 
of intentional interference and unjust enrichment are not trust 
contests but rather distinct causes of action.  The Superior 
Court judge rejected this argument, holding that, although the 
plaintiffs' claims were not pleaded as challenges to the 
 
6 General Laws c. 203E, § 604 (a), states in full:  "A 
person may commence a judicial proceeding to contest the 
validity of a trust that was revocable at the settlor's death 
within the earlier of:  (1) [one] year after the settlor's 
death; or (2) [sixty] days after the trustee sent the person a 
copy of the trust instrument and a notice informing the person 
of the trust's existence, the trustee's name and address and the 
time allowed for commencing a proceeding."  Neither party 
suggests that G. L. c. 203E, § 604 (a) (2), applies here. 
7 
 
validity of the trust, they remained, in substance, trust 
contests.  We disagree.7 
 
The plain language of § 604 suggests that the statute 
applies to proceedings to litigate, call into question, or 
challenge the validity of a trust instrument (or any part 
thereof).  Black's Law Dictionary 398 (11th ed. 2019).  See 
Uniform Trust Code § 604 comment (2003) ("A 'contest' is an 
action to invalidate all or part of the terms of the trust or of 
property transfers to the trustee"). 
The question that follows is:  what does it mean to 
litigate, call into question, or challenge the validity of a 
trust?  As the plaintiffs seemed to acknowledge by voluntarily 
dismissing count I (rescission), this definition clearly 
captures claims -- whatever those claims may be titled -- that 
seek relief against the trust (e.g., rescission or reformation).  
Because the relief sought would change or revoke the trust, 
implicit in any such claim is that the trust, as is, is not 
legally enforceable or valid.  However, while it is necessary to 
consider the relief sought when determining whether a claim 
constitutes a trust contest, it is not sufficient.  That is, a 
claim that does not seek rescission or reformation can still be 
 
7 Because we hold that the plaintiffs' claims are timely and 
not governed by § 604, we do not reach the question whether 
§ 604 serves as a statute of repose or a statute of limitations. 
8 
 
a trust contest.  To focus exclusively on the relief sought 
would be to elevate the labels placed on a claim or prayer for 
relief over the substance of a claim.  Cf. Hendrickson v. Sears, 
365 Mass. 83, 85 (1974) ("we have looked to the 'gist of the 
action' or the essential nature of the plaintiff's claim" to 
determine whether it sounds in contract or tort). 
Our treatment of will contests is informative here.  
Although the processes by which wills and trusts become objects 
of contests are quite different, see infra, our analyses of 
these two instruments -- once they have become objects of 
contests -- are quite similar.  Compare G. L. c. 203E, § 406 ("A 
trust shall be void to the extent its creation was induced by 
fraud, duress or undue influence"), with Neill v. Brackett, 234 
Mass. 367, 370 (1920) ("Fraud or undue influence . . . 
invalidates a will . . .").  See G. L. c. 203E, § 112 ("The 
rules of construction that apply in the [C]ommonwealth to the 
interpretation of and disposition of property by will shall also 
apply, as appropriate, to the interpretation of the terms of a 
revocable trust and the disposition of the trust property").  
See also Report of the Ad Hoc Massachusetts Uniform Trust 
Committee § 112 comment, at 11 (rev. July 18, 2012) ("[T]his 
section made applicable to all trusts the rules of construction 
applicable to wills.  The Committee revised this section to 
provide that such rules of construction should apply only to 
9 
 
'revocable trusts,' defined as trusts intended to be will 
substitutes"). 
In the context of wills, we have recognized the distinction 
between contests, which seek to determine the validity of a 
legal instrument, and other causes of action, which do not.  We 
have reasoned that "a will contest is in the nature of a 
property right" and is not a "vindication of personal rights."  
Sheldone v. Marino, 398 Mass. 817, 819 (1986).  The 
determination of a will's validity "establishes the will against 
all the world"; it does not ultimately speak to a specific 
relationship among persons.  Finer v. Steuer, 255 Mass. 611, 616 
(1926). 
 
We understand a trust contest, then, as an action where the 
underlying facts are assessed for their effect on all or part of 
a trust (e.g., invalidity), while a noncontest is an action 
where the underlying facts are assessed for their effect on a 
person (e.g., harm).  The ultimate object of a contest is a 
determination of a trust's validity, not the personal liability 
or even culpability of the settlors, beneficiaries, or trustees.  
Cf. Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 299 Mass. 457, 464 (1938) 
(treating matter about trustee's proper distribution of trust 
10 
 
property as matter in rem or quasi in rem).  We now apply this 
reasoning to the plaintiffs' claims.8 
3.  Intentional interference.  The Uniform Trust Code 
(UTC), in an explanatory comment to its own nearly identical 
§ 604, explicitly carves out intentional interference with an 
expectancy claims from the statute's purview:  "An action 
against a beneficiary or other person for intentional 
interference with an inheritance or gift, not being a contest, 
is not subject to this section" (emphasis added).  Uniform Trust 
Code § 604 comment.  The MUTC was modeled on the UTC, and the 
UTC comment sheds valuable light on the statute at issue here.  
Report of the Ad Hoc Massachusetts Uniform Trust Code Committee, 
 
8 The defendants cite a number of cases from other States, 
interpreting those States' equivalents of § 604, which likewise 
were modeled on or adopted from the Uniform Trust Code.  In each 
of those cases, the court held that the plaintiff's claims, 
although not pleaded as such, actually were contests and thereby 
time barred under the equivalent of § 604.  However, we do not 
find those cases persuasive as to the matter before us, as all 
of those cases addressed claims that centered on the validity of 
all or part of a trust, not, as here, on the personal 
consequences of the defendants' conduct.  See, e.g., Derringer 
v. Emerson, 729 F. Supp. 2d 286, 290-291 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd, 
435 Fed. Appx. 4 (2011) (claim seeking declaratory judgment on 
invalidity of trust amendments was time-barred contest); In re 
Gerald L. Pollack Trust, 309 Mich. App. 125, 147 (2015) (claim 
seeking to set aside trust was time-barred contest); Morris v. 
Trust Co. of the Ozarks, 423 S.W.3d 918, 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) 
(claim seeking to terminate trust was time-barred contest); In 
re the Admin. of the Lee R. Wintersteen Revocable Trust 
Agreement, 2018 S.D. 12, ¶ 16 (claim challenging validity of 
trust amendment was time-barred contest); Matter of Elizabeth A. 
Briggs Revocable Living Trust, 2017 S.D. 40, ¶¶ 9-10 (claim to 
invalidate trust amendments was time-barred contest). 
11 
 
supra at 3 (although not officially adopted, "the official 
comments to the [UTC] are helpful to understand [the MUTC's] 
provisions").  We agree with the UTC commentary's explicit 
carveout -- which was not disavowed in the MUTC's own commentary 
-- and hold that the plaintiffs' intentional interference claim 
is not a trust contest. 
"[W]e have long recognized a cause of action for tortious 
interference with the expectancy of receiving a gift[, including 
an inheritance,] in certain limited conditions."  Labonte v. 
Giordano, 426 Mass. 319, 320 (1997).  The claim derives from the 
harm one person causes another:  to prevail, a plaintiff must 
show that a defendant intentionally interfered through unlawful 
means with the plaintiff's legally protected interest by acting 
on the would-be donor continuously "until the time the 
expectancy would have been realized."  Id. at 321.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Economic Harm § 19 
(2020) ("A defendant is subject to liability for interference 
with an inheritance or gift if:  [a] the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of receiving an inheritance or gift; [b] 
the defendant committed an intentional and independent legal 
wrong; [c] the defendant's purpose was to interfere with the 
plaintiff's expectancy; [d] the defendant's conduct caused the 
expectancy to fail; and [e] the plaintiff suffered economic loss 
12 
 
as a result").  This is an in personam action, not an in rem or 
quasi in rem action. 
 
Here, the plaintiffs seek recourse against their 
grandmother, Sheila, via her estate, and against their aunt 
Nancy, in her capacity not as a trustee but as an individual.  
The plaintiffs' claim for intentional interference does not 
challenge the nature or validity of the trust, but rather seeks 
a determination of the harm caused by Sheila and Nancy.  
Moreover, the plaintiffs' intentional interference claim is 
predicated upon the amendment's effectiveness:  without such 
amendment being given effect, the plaintiffs would suffer no 
harm flowing from its enforcement. 
 
In ruling for the defendants, the Superior Court judge 
adopted the defendants' view that the plaintiffs' reliance on 
undue influence rendered this claim substantively 
indistinguishable from a contest.  However, a charge of undue 
influence may underlie a tort claim, in addition to a trust or 
will contest, and thus may equally be a basis for a claim of 
tortious interference with an expectancy.9  See Brignati v. 
 
9 It is hardly unusual for a factual predicate to give rise 
to more than one cause of action.  Section 604 establishes an 
unforgiving one-year deadline by which to bring a trust contest.  
While the Legislature may have good reason to preclude a 
challenge to a revocable trust beyond one year from its 
settlor's death, the Legislature could not have intended that 
this one-year statutory deadline preclude intended beneficiaries 
 
13 
 
Medenwald, 315 Mass. 636, 637-638 (1944) (undue influence claim 
not brought as part of will contest sounded in tort).  Compare 
G. L. c. 203E, § 406 ("A trust shall be void to the extent its 
creation was induced by fraud, duress or undue influence"), with 
Labonte, 426 Mass. at 321 n.4 ("unlawful means" required as 
element of interference with expectancy tort "include duress, 
fraud, or undue influence").  Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
DeNicola, 317 Mass. 416, 419-420 (1944) (distinguishing between 
action to "recover damages for fraud" and "the right to have a 
contract annulled for fraud or mistake").  The difference 
between a trust contest and a tort claim derives not from the 
predicate conduct -- which may be identical across the claims -- 
but rather from where the effect of the conduct is being 
assessed (i.e., on the trust or on a person). 
Even so, in the wills context, this court has held that 
there could be no separate cause of action in tort based on a 
defendant's undue influence if there had been an adequate remedy 
during probate (i.e., through a contest).  See Brignati, 315 
Mass. at 638-639.  See also Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Liability for Economic Harm § 19 comment c ("Some common forms 
of interference with inheritance can be adequately redressed in 
 
from seeking recovery simply because they suffered from tortious 
conduct that also gives rise to grounds for a trust contest.  
Rather, the legislative history, common sense, and basic 
fairness suggest the opposite. 
14 
 
a probate court, and thus cannot form the basis of a claim under 
this Section").  In Brignati, supra at 637-638, we affirmed a 
directed verdict against the plaintiff for her claim of 
intentional interference with an expectancy -- where the 
expectancy was a testamentary bequest -- reasoning that the 
plaintiff had tried to make a claim inconsistent with the "final 
and conclusive" probate decree.  See Tobin v. Larkin, 187 Mass. 
279, 282 (1905) ("A decree of the Probate Court within its 
jurisdiction is good unless it is set aside, and it cannot be 
attacked collaterally").  Cf. Alba v. Raytheon Co., 441 Mass. 
836, 841 (2004) ("The judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel 
provides that '[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually 
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the 
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is 
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether 
on the same or a different claim'" [citation omitted]).  In 
prohibiting a separate claim for intentional interference with 
an expectancy where a final and conclusive probate decree 
necessarily addresses such a claim, we do not permit plaintiffs 
"a second bite at the apple" where probate proceedings 
invariably provide a forum.  The implication is, of course, that 
where there is no such decree, it may be permissible for 
plaintiffs to bring suit. 
If the plaintiffs' claim for intentional interference with 
15 
 
an expectancy fell within the ambit of Brignati, then it would 
be unable to stand as a distinct cause of action sounding in 
tort:  even if it were substantively distinguishable from a 
contest, that distinction would be inconsequential, and this 
inquiry irrelevant.  However, our holding in Brignati was based 
on the universal nature of the probate process to which wills 
are uniquely subject.  While wills and trusts are treated 
similarly when objects of contests, they arrive at being such 
objects in different ways.  Unlike trusts, the property of which 
is often distributed without a formal declaration of the trust's 
validity by a court, virtually every will subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth must be declared valid before 
any transfers of property may occur pursuant to the will.  G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-102.  Indeed, revocable trusts have become such 
popular will substitutes precisely because they typically remain 
out of probate, providing greater administrative ease and 
privacy.10  Unless a trust contest expressly is brought, there is 
 
10 See, e.g., E.P. Hayes, S.T. Donovan, & L. Macauley, 
Understanding and Using Trusts § 2.1 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 
4th ed. 2020) ("[A] revocable pour-over trust is not filed with 
the court.  Thus, its dispositive provisions also remain 
unavailable to the public"); P.L. Halter, D.L.S. Freytag, & J.W. 
Murphy, Seminar, How to Structure Revocable Living Trusts (Mass. 
Cont. Legal Educ. June 9, 2020) (touting cost, time, and privacy 
saved by using revocable trusts to avoid probate); J.E. 
Steffensen, T.E. Bator, T.A. Craig, W.N. Friedler, J.W. Moore, 
E.V. Moreno, L.M. Neeley, J.W. Roberts, & M.J. Simolo, A 
Practical Guide to Estate Planning in Massachusetts § 3.3, at 3-
 
16 
 
no affirmative ruling on the validity of a revocable trust; in 
fact, usually no court ever sees a trust instrument.  Therefore, 
our holding in Brignati -- which was premised on the 
understanding that virtually every will in the Commonwealth is 
reviewed by a judge of the Probate and Family Court and subject 
to a probate decree regarding its validity -- does not apply. 
 
Moreover, although trusts are common will substitutes, we 
decline to extend Brignati's line of reasoning to the instant 
case.  Not only are trusts not probated, but also would-be 
beneficiaries are far less likely to learn of their exclusion 
from a trust.  While a decedent's heirs-at-law and devisees are 
required to receive notice of the probate of a will, G. L. 
c. 190B, §§ 3-306, 3-403, only qualified beneficiaries -- who 
represent a subset of beneficiaries and certainly do not include 
family members who have been excluded -- may be entitled to 
information about a trust, G. L. c. 203E, § 103.  See, e.g., 
Matter of the Colecchia Family Irrevocable Trust, 100 Mass. App. 
Ct. 504, 521 (2021) ("Upon Lillian's death, Michael became a 
distributee under the trust and, thus, met the definition of 
'qualified beneficiary.'  Until then, he was not a 'qualified 
beneficiary' . . . .  Accordingly, the MUTC provides no basis 
 
41 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 4th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2019) (listing 
"avoidance of probate" and "privacy" as first two advantages of 
revocable trusts). 
17 
 
for Michael to quarrel with the trustees' failure to inform him 
of the existence of the trust prior to Lillian's death . . .").  
While the law of wills and trusts may overlap considerably, with 
an understanding that both often serve a single testamentary 
objective, the lack of preemptive judicial review of trusts and 
of robust notice requirements for trust beneficiaries, where 
such review and notice are provided for wills, marks a 
significant difference between the two instruments and 
necessitates that we do not apply the reasoning in Brignati to a 
tort claim involving a trust.  See Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Liability for Economic Harm § 19 comment c ("A probate court, 
for example, is the appropriate forum for determining whether a 
will is valid. . . .  A probate court[, however,] is unable to 
provide a remedy for wrongful conduct in relation to a 
nonprobate transfer, such as a transfer by inter vivos 
trust. . . .  Again, a restitution or tort claim may be used to 
address those circumstances"). 
 
Because an intentional interference with an expectancy 
claim inquires into one person's (harmful) effect on another -- 
not one person's effect on the trust's validity -- and because 
undue influence can support such a tort claim distinct from a 
contest in these circumstances, we conclude that the intentional 
interference claim here is not subject to § 604's one-year 
18 
 
deadline.  Instead, it is subject to the three-year statute of 
limitations prescribed by G. L. c. 260, § 2A. 
4.  Unjust enrichment.  "Unjust enrichment is defined as 
retention of money or property of another against the 
fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass. 
App. Ct. 324, 329 (2005).  An unjust enrichment claim sounds in 
equity, see, e.g., Keller v. O'Brien, 425 Mass. 774, 778 (1997) 
("Restitution is an equitable remedy by which a person who has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to 
repay the injured party"), but may bear considerable resemblance 
to a claim for intentional interference with an expectancy.  In 
fact, the two claims often go hand in hand:  "[M]ost cases of 
liability under [intentional interference with inheritance or 
gift] can also be redressed by a claim in restitution rather 
than tort. . . .  In cases that arise under this Section, as in 
. . . most others that involve intentional wrongdoing, a 
plaintiff may choose which theory of recovery to pursue."11  
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Economic Harm § 19 
comment f.  Indeed, "[a] remedy in equity where the plaintiff 
may lay hold of the property in the hands of the wrongdoer [is] 
 
11 It is worth emphasizing that while we hold that 
plaintiffs may timely bring either or both of their remaining 
claims, we do not hold that plaintiffs may ultimately recover 
under both claims. 
19 
 
preferable in many cases to an action of tort [for intentional 
interference].  Damages at best are only an approximation of the 
loss, while relief in equity, by requiring the wrongdoer to 
transfer to the intended devisee or legatee that which would 
have gone to him but for the [wrongful conduct] of the former, 
gives the intended beneficiary exactly what he would have 
received in the absence of such [wrongful conduct]."12  
(Citations omitted.)  Monach v. Koslowski, 322 Mass. 466, 470-
471 (1948).  Given the reasoning supra, where, as here, a claim 
for unjust enrichment is predicated on allegedly tortious 
conduct, we hold that it is not a trust contest under § 604. 
It is true that liability for unjust enrichment, unlike 
liability for intentional interference, may extend to recipients 
who were not responsible for wrongful conduct.13  See, e.g., 
 
 
12 Vitally, "[r]estitution is not damages" (citation 
omitted).  Santagate, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 336.  Rather, 
restitution serves as a flexible remedy, arising from equitable 
unjust enrichment claims, and may be distinguishable in form but 
not in substance from remedies that seek reformation or 
rescission. 
 
13 While an unjust enrichment claim may be brought against 
innocent recipients, those innocent recipients "are entitled to 
the standard affirmative defenses, the most significant in this 
context being change of position."  Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 46 comment h (2011).  
Additionally, a plaintiff bringing a claim for unjust enrichment 
must give "fair notice" to any innocent recipients that 
restitution is sought "under an 'innocent recipient' theory" and 
"provide [a] foundation for entry of judgment against [the 
innocent recipients] on such a theory."  Jensen v. Daniels, 57 
Mass. App. Ct. 811, 818 (2003). 
20 
 
Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 572 (1998) (constructive 
trust to remedy unjust enrichment may be imposed against 
property transferred by wrongdoer to his children, who committed 
no wrong but were not bona fide purchasers).  See also Stevens 
v. Nagel, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 139-140 (2005); Jensen v. 
Daniels, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 818 (2003) ("There are, to be 
sure, circumstances under which the innocent recipient of money, 
or goods the money bought, may be required to make restitution 
to the person from whom the money was wrongfully obtained"); 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 46 
("The misconduct that invalidates the transfer to the recipient 
may be the act of the recipient or of a third person").  Cf. 
Cavadi v. DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615, 627 (2011) ("[A] constructive 
trust, implied by law as a result of mistake, violation of a 
fiduciary duty, or unjust enrichment, may be imposed, generally 
as between transferor and transferee, without proof of 
fraudulent intent" [emphasis added]).  But in claims for unjust 
enrichment such as the one before us, these so-called innocent 
parties have benefited directly due to the harm one person has 
tortiously perpetrated against another.  Where intentional 
interference claims seek a determination of the harm effected by 
wrongful conduct, unjust enrichment claims seek a determination 
of the benefit resulting from that conduct.  Thus, the inquiry 
21 
 
still goes to the effects of tortious conduct on people and not 
to the validity of a legal instrument. 
 
Therefore, because this claim for unjust enrichment -- like 
the intentional interference with an expectancy claim -- derives 
from tortious conduct perpetrated by one person against another, 
for the reasons stated supra, the plaintiffs' claim for unjust 
enrichment is not a contest under § 604.14 
 
Conclusion.  Because the plaintiffs' claims of intentional 
interference with an expectancy and unjust enrichment do not 
constitute trust contests, they are not governed by G. L. 
c. 203E, § 604.  The order granting the defendants' motion to 
dismiss is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
14 The plaintiffs argue that the six-year statute of 
limitations set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2, applies to their 
unjust enrichment claim.  While we need not reach the issue, we 
presume that the statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment 
claim predicated on tortious conduct is instead the three-year 
statute of limitations set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2A.  See, 
e.g., SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., 332 F. Supp. 3d 
446, 466 (D. Mass. 2018) ("Where an unjust-enrichment claim is 
contractual in nature, the limitations period for that claim is 
. . . six years" under Massachusetts law); Cambridge Literary 
Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co. Kg., 
448 F. Supp. 2d 244, 262-263 (D. Mass. 2006), aff'd, 510 F.3d 77 
(1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 815 (2008) (unjust 
enrichment claim governed by three-year tort statute of 
limitations).  Nonetheless, since the plaintiffs commenced their 
action within the shorter three-year limitations period, it is 
unnecessary for us to determine which period applies to this, or 
other, unjust enrichment claims.