Title: CORRIGAN v JANNEY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 80-198
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1981

No. 8 0 - 1 9 8 I N THE SUPREME: COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA 1 9 8 1 CARMEN CORRIGAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MAX MORRIS CORRIGAN, DECEASED, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , W. P. JANNEY and KAY JANNEY, H i s w i f e , and JANNEY TRUCKING CO., a M o n t a n a C o r p o r a t i o n , D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of P o w e l l . H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t B o y d , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : K n i g h t , D a h o o d , M c L e a n and E v e r e t t , A n a c o n d a , M o n t a n a D a v i d M. M c L e a n argued, A n a c o n d a , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : P o o r e , R o t h , R o b i s c h o n and R o b i n s o n , B u t t e , M o n t a n a J a m e s A. P o o r e , Jr., argued, B u t t e , , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : January 1 2 , 1 9 8 1 D e c i d e d : Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f Carmen C o r r i g a n , a s p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a - t i v e , f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o recover damages f o r wrongful d e a t h and s u r v i v a l . Defendants, W. P. Janney and Kay Janney, answered by denying t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e complaint, a l l e g i n g t h r e e d e f e n s e s : (1) f a i l u r e t o s t a t e f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a c l a i m f o r r e l i e f ; ( 2 ) assumption of r i s k ; and ( 3 ) c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . A motion f o r summary judgment was f i l e d on behalf of t h e Janneys. Defendants ' motion f o r summa.ry judgment was based on t h e t h e o r y t h a t no v a l i d c l a i m f o r r e l i e f was s t a t e d i n t h e complaint based upon p r e v i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a Montana s t a t u t e by t h e Supreme Court of Montana. S e c t i o n s 42-201 and 42-202, R.C.M. 1947; Dier v. Mueller ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 53 Mont. 288, 163 P. 466. The D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d t h e motion f o r summary judgment on t h i s c o n t e n t i o n because ". . . t h e Court b e l i e v e s it has no a l t e r n a t i v e b u t t o f o l l o w t h e mandates of t h e Supreme Court i n t h i s r e g a r d . . ." The p r e s e n t a p p e a l is based upon t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e motion f o r summary judgment . The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d f o r review is simply: Was t h e g r a n t i n g o f t h e m o t i o n f o r summary judgment f i l e d by d e f e n d a n t s Janney proper? More s p e c i f i c a l l y , should t h i s Court r e v e r s e its l o n g s t a n d i n g r u l e on t h e d o c t r i n e of "deduct and r e p a i r " and t h e r e b y a l l o w an a c t i o n f o r damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d by a t e n a n t a g a i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d ? Janney Trucking Company was t h e owner of a r e n t a l house l o c a t e d a t J a n n e y v i l l e , about four miles west of G a r r i s o n , Montana. During 1973 t h e house was r e n t e d t o Max Morris Corrigan and h i s w i f e , Carmen C o r r i g a n , by Kay Janney on b e h a l f of Janney Trucking Company. The C o r r i g a n s a l l e g e d t h e y r e c e i v e d e l e c t r i c a l shocks when t h e y touched a p o r t i o n of t h e plumbing system from t h e day t h e y occupied t h e premises. Numerous g u e s t s i n t h e house a l s o r e c e i v e d e l e c t r i c a l shocks from touching p o r t i o n s of t h e plumbing system. A p p e l l a n t contends s h e and her husband requested t h e Janneys t o i n s p e c t t h e e l e c t r i c a l system and t o have it r e p a i r e d , b u t t h e Janneys d i d n o t h i n g . A t e n a n t who occupied t h e same house p r i o r t o t h e C o r r i g a n s a l s o r e p e a t e d l y r e p o r t e d e l e c t r i c a l shocks from t h e plumbing system t o t h e Janneys. When t h e y r e f u s e d t o make t h e n e c e s s a r y r e p a i r s , t h i s t e n a n t moved o u t . On February 2, 1974, while t h e C o r r i g a n s were t a k i n g a b a t h , a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t Max C o r r i g a n came i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e f a u c e t on t h e b a t h t u b and r e c e i v e d an e l e c t r i c a l shock which u l t i m a t e l y caused h i s d e a t h . The house was l a t e r i n s p e c t e d by E a r l D. R o b e r t s , a S t a t e of Montana e l e c t r i c a l i n s p e c t o r . The house was condemned u n t i l such time a s it was wired s a f e l y . R o b e r t s noted t h a t i f t h e e l e c t r i c a l system had been p r o p e r l y grounded and banded t o t h e plumbing system, t h e c i r c u i t breaker would have opened. Wayland Smith, a master e l e c t r i c i a n , t e s t i f i e d t h a t i f t h e house had been p r o p e r l y grounded, t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s h o u l d have t r i p p e d and t h e a c c i d e n t would h a v e b e e n avoided. P r e v i o u s l y t h i s Court has maintained t h a t t h e r e is no implied warranty of h a b i t a b i l i t y i n r e s i d e n t i a l l e a s e s ; t h a t a t e n a n t chooses e i t h e r t o r e p a i r t h e d e f e c t by d e d u c t i n g one month's r e n t o r t o v a c a t e t h e premises i f t h e d e f e c t c o n t i n u e s . Landt v. Schneider (1904, 31 Mont. 1 5 , 77 P. 307; Busch v. Baker ( 1 9 1 5 ) , 5 1 Mont. 326, 152 P. 750. F u r t h e r , t h i s Court h a s denied recovery a g a i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y t o a t e n a n t , holding t h a t t h e " r e p a i r and deduct" s t a t u t e is t h e e x c l u s i v e remedy. Dier v. Mueller ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 53 Mont. 288, 163 P. 466. I n 1977 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d t h e R e s i d e n t i a l L a n d l o r d and T e n a n t A c t . S e c t i o n s 70-24-101 t h r o u g h 70-24-442, MCA. T h i s Act a d o p t s t h e d o c t r i n e of implied warranty of h a b i t a b i l i t y which a l l o w s recovery of damages i n c a s e s involving i n j u r y t o t e n a n t s from dangerous l a t e n t d e f e c t s i n r e s i d e n t i a l r e n t a l p r o p e r t y . However, t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e A c t cannot be made r e t r o a c t i v e t o a p p l y t o c a s e s p r i o r t o 1977. See Chap. 313, S e c t i o n 47, Laws of Mont. ( 1 9 7 7 ) . T h e r e f o r e , w e must look t o t h e c a s e law of t h i s S t a t e p r i o r t o t h e enactment. I n Dier v. M u e l l e r , s u p r a , t h i s Court a p p l i e d t h e " r e p a i r and deduct" s t a t u t e t o a c l a i m by a t e n a n t a g a i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s . I n D i e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment, noted t h a t it was bound by Busch v. Baker ( 1 9 1 5 ) , 51 Mont. 326, 152 P. 750. Q u o t i n g from Busch, w e s t a t e d : " ' . . . T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n is t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t , i f t h e l a n d l o r d f a i l s t o r e p a . i r , a f t e r n o t i c e , t h e t e n a n t may himself r e p a i r , w i t h i n a c e r t a i n l i m i t , or move o u t ; b u t he h a s no r e d r e s s i n damages f o r i n j u r y t o p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y c o n s e q u e n t upon t h e l a n d l o r d ' s f a i l u r e t o r e p a i r . . . I " D i e r , 163 P. a t 467. (Emphasis added.) I t should be noted t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t with r e g a r d t o t h e absence of r e d r e s s f o r i n j u r y was dictum i n Busch. Busch involved a s u i t f o r unlawful d e t a i n e r of t h e p r e m i s e s , n o t p e r s o n a l i n j u r y . I n D i e r t h i s C o u r t f a i l e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h between a c l a i m f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y and damages t o a l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t . W e now f i n d t h a t t h e Court e r r e d , and we o v e r r u l e t h e h o l d i n g a s n o t being a p p l i c a b l e t o c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t e n a n t s u i t s f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s a g a i n s t a l a n d l o r d . I t is unnecessary t o o v e r r u l e our holding i n Lowe v. Root (1975) 166 Mont. 150, 531 P.2d 674, because Lowe involved a c o n t r a c t a c t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of damages t o t h e l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t and, f u r t h e r , because we a r e n o t d e c i d i n g t h i s c a s e on breach of implied w a r r a n t y of h a b i t a b i l i t y . W e need n o t h e r e t r a c e t h e h i s t o r i c a l developments of t h e r e p a i r and d e d u c t d o c t r i n e o r t h e d o c t r i n e of c a v e a t emptor a s a p p l i e d t o t e n a n t s of r e n t a l r e s i d e n c e s . C o u r t s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a v e a d e q u a t e l y t r a c e d t h o s e developments. See Mease v. Fox (Iowa 1 9 7 2 ) , 200 N.W.2d 791; Green v. S u p e r i o r C t . of C i t y & Cty. of San F r a n c i s c o ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 111 C a 1 . R p t r . 7 0 4 , 517 P.2d 1 1 6 8 . The same c o n c l u s i o n s reached by t h e s e c o u r t s a r e a p p l i c a b l e h e r e : t o d a y ' s urban t e n a n t s a r e i n t e r e s t e d , n o t i n t h e l a n d , b u t i n a house s u i t a b l e f o r human o c c u p a t i o n . The r e s i d e n t i a l t e n a n t r e n t s a p l a c e t o l i v e . The common-law d o c t r i n e of c a v e a t emptor does n o t a p p l y i n t h e s e contemporary s e t t i n g s . Art. 11, S16, 1972 Mont. Const., provides: "The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . C o u r t s of j u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o every p e r s o n , and speedy remedy a f f o r d e d f o r e v e r y i n j u r y of p e r s o n , p r o p e r t y , o r c h a r a c t e r . . ." I t would be p a t e n t l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t o deny a t e n a n t a l l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s o r w r o n g f u l d e a t h a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n t management of r e n t a l premises by a l a n d l o r d . I f t h i s a c t i o n were t o be taken away, a s u b s t i t u t e remedy would have t o be provided. Arguably, t h e r e p a i r and d e d u c t s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s an a l t e r n a t i v e remedy f o r damage t o t h e l e a s e h o l d i n t e r e s t . However, i n no way can it be c o n s i d e r e d an a l t e r n a t i v e remedy f o r damages caused by p e r s o n a l i n j u r y o r wrongful d e a t h . I n view of our h o l d i n g t h a t a c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s and wrongful d e a t h can be m a i n t a i n e d h e r e , we must d e t e r m i n e t h e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e owed under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A g e n e r a l o b l i g a t i o n s t a t u t e was i n e f f e c t i n Montana when t h i s a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d . S e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947, provided: "Every one is r e s p o n s i b l e , n o t o n l y f o r t h e r e s u l t of h i s w i l l f u l a c t s , b u t a l s o f o r an i n j u r y occasioned t o a n o t h e r by h i s want o f o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l i n t h e management of h i s p r o p e r t y o r p e r s o n , e x c e p t s o f a r a s t h e l a t t e r h a s , w i l l f u l l y o r by want of o r d i n a r y c a r e , brought t h e i n j u r y upon h i m s e l f . The e x t e n t of l i a b i l i t y i n such c a s e s is d e f i n e d by t h e t i t l e on compensatory r e l i e f . " I n Brennan v. C o c k r e l l I n v e s t m e n t s , I n c . , ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 1 1 Cal.Rptr. 122, 35 Cal.App.3d 796, t h e C a l i f o r n i a a p p e a l s c o u r t had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f an i d e n t i c a l s t a t u t e t o a l a n d l o r d / t e n a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n Brennan an a c t i o n was brought by a t e n a n t s e e k i n g t o r e c o v e r damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d when he f e l l o f f t h e back s t a i r s of a house. The p l a i n t i f f sought an i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t t h e owner of t h e p r e m i s e s is under a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y c a r e i n t h e management o f t h e p r e m i s e s t o avoid exposing p e r s o n s t h e r e o n t o an u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k o f harm. T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was r e f u s e d . I n s t e a d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h a t o r d i n a r i l y t h e owner of p r e m i s e s l e a s e d t o a t e n a n t is n o t l i a b l e f o r any i n j u r y t o t h e t e n a n t t h a t r e s u l t s from a dangerous c o n d i t i o n which e x i s t e d when t h e t e n a n t took p o s s e s s i o n . The C a l i f o r n i a a p p e a l s c o u r t r e v e r s e d t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and, i n doing s o , s t a t e d : " C a l i f o r n i a d e p a r t e d from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e s governing t h e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e owners and o c c u p i e r s of l a n d i n t h e c a s e o f Rowland v. C h r i s t i a n , 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 5 6 1 , when t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t s e c t i o n 1714 o f t h e C i v i l Code c o n t r o l l e d t h e l i a b i l i t y o f t e n a n t s f o r i n j u r i e s t o t h e i r s o c i a l g u e s t s . T h a t s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s : 'Everyone is r e s p o n s i b l e , n o t o n l y f o r t h e r e s u l t o f h i s w i l l f u l a c t s , b u t a l s o f o r an i n j u r y occasioned t o a n o t h e r by h i s w a n t o f o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l i n t h e management of h i s p r o p e r t y o r p e r s o n , e x c e p t s o f a r a s t h e l a t t e r h a s , w i l l f u l l y o r by want of o r d i n a r y c a r e , brought t h e i n j u r y upon himself . . .' . . . "The Rowland c o u r t decided t h a t no p u b l i c p o l i c y r e q u i r e d t h a t an e x c e p t i o n be carved o u t of t h e s t a t u t e f o r t e n a n t s i n p o s s e s s i o n when t h e y were sued by t h e i r g u e s t s . The q u e s t i o n i n t h e c a s e under review is whether one should be made f o r l a n d l o r d s n o t i n p o s s e s s i o n when t h e y a r e s u e d by t h e i r t e n a n t s . ". . . That a l a n d l o r d must a c t toward h i s t e n a n t a s a r e a s o n a b l e person under a l l of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d of i n j u r y , t h e p r o b a b l e s e r i o u s n e s s o f such i n j u r y , t h e burden o f reducing o r a v o i d i n g t h e r i s k , and h i s d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l over t h e r i s k - c r e a t i n g d e f e c t , seems a s o u n d p r o p o s i t i o n and one t h a t e x p r e s s e s w e l l t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e and r e a s o n a b l e n e s s upon which t h e law o f t o r t s is based. I t is no p a r t of f a i r n e s s and r a t i o n a l i t y t o t r a n s f o r m p o s s e s s i o n and c o n t r o l f r o m m e r e f a c t o r s b e a r i n g on n e g l i g e n c e i n t o b a r r i e r s t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h a t i s s u e . (See 2 Harper and James, The Law of T o r t s , 27.16 a t p. 1509 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . ) A s t h e c o u r t s a i d i n Rowland, ' [ T l o f o c u s upon t h e s t a t u s o f t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y , . . . i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e q u e s t i o n whether t h e landowner h a s a d u t y o f c a r e , i s c o n t r a r y t o o u r modern s o c i a l mores and humanitarian v a l u e s . ' ( I b i d , a t p. 118, 70 Cal.Rptr. a t p. 104, 443 P.2d a t p. 5 6 8 ) . ". . . The d i r e c t i o n t h e law is now t a k i n g c l e a r l y is toward ' " ' i m p o s i n g on owners and o c c u p i e r s a s i n g l e d u t y of r e a s o n a b l e c a r e i n a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' ' I ' . . . If Brennan, 111 Cal.Rptr. a t 124-126. B r e n n a n w a s l a t e r f o l l o w e d i n G o l d e n v . Conway ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 128 Cal.Rptr. 69, 55 Cal.App.3d 948. W e h o l d t h a t t h e d u t y o f care s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947, is c o n t r o l l i n g . The owner o f p r e m i s e s is under a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y c a r e i n t h e management o f t h e p r e m i s e s t o a v o i d exposing p e r s o n s t h e r e o n t o an u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k of harm. I n summary, w e o v e r r u l e Dier v. M u e l l e r , s u p r a , and hold t h a t our C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f have a form of r e d r e s s f o r wrongful d e a t h and s u r v i v a l damages. W e hold t h a t s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947, is c o n t r o l l i n g and t h a t one is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n j u r y o c c a s i o n e d t o a n o t h e r by h i s want of o r d i n a r y c a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e d e f e n s e s of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e or assumption of r i s k . T h i s c a s e is remanded f o r t r i a l under t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s e n u n c i a t e d h e r e i n . W e concur: