Title: Quintero v. Board of Parole
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45064
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 8, 1999

Filed:  September 8, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

ANTONIO QUINTERO, SR.,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

BOARD OF PAROLE AND
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,

	Respondent on Review.

(CA A97382; SC S45064)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted June 4, 1999.

	Andy Simrin, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause
and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the
brief were David E. Groom, Public Defender, and Anne Morrison,
Deputy Public Defender.

	Philip Schradle, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.  Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant
Attorney General, and Kelly Knivila, Assistant Attorney General,
filed the brief.  With them on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The order of dismissal of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
The petition for judicial review is dismissed. 

	*On judicial review of an order of the Board of Parole

	 and Post-Prison Supervision.

    **Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of the case.

		GILLETTE, J.

		Petitioner seeks review of a Court of Appeals' order
dismissing his petition for judicial review of an order of the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (Board).  The order,
which was issued after petitioner's parole had been revoked for
violating a condition of parole, denied petitioner rerelease and
set a new release date some 23 years in the future.  When
petitioner attempted to challenge the order, the Court of Appeals
dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that,
because the order was a "decision relating to a [parole] release
date," it was immune from judicial review under ORS 144.335(3),
set out post.  Petitioner sought review by this court, arguing
that the Court of Appeals interpreted ORS 144.335(3) too broadly
and that the statute does not apply to the order that he
challenges.  We accepted review to consider the scope of the bar
to review contained in ORS 144.335(3).  We conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly construed that statute as barring
review of any decision relating to a parole release date,
including the order at issue here.  Accordingly, we affirm the
Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's petition for judicial
review.

		Petitioner was released on parole in April 1996, after
serving seven years in prison for crimes that he committed in
1988.  As a condition of parole, petitioner was required to
refrain from the use of intoxicants.  In October 1996,
petitioner's parole officer reported to the Board that petitioner
had consumed alcohol on at least two occasions since his release. 
As a result of that report, petitioner's parole was revoked, and
he was returned to prison.  

		Shortly after his return to prison, the Board conducted
a hearing to consider whether to rerelease petitioner immediately
or to keep him in prison and set a new release date some time in
the future.  After the hearing, the Board issued an order denying
rerelease and setting a new release date approximately 23 years
in the future.  

		Petitioner requested administrative review, arguing,
among other things, that the Board's decision was contrary to
statute and to various provisions of the United States
Constitution.  The Board denied that its actions violated any
statute or constitutional provision, and noted that the statutes
and rules in effect at the time when petitioner committed his
crimes expressly authorized the Board to deny rerelease.

		Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review of the
Board's order in the Court of Appeals.  The state moved to
dismiss the petition, arguing that the order was immune from
judicial review under ORS 144.335(3).  That statute provides, in
relevant part:

	"(1) When a person over whom the [B]oard exercises
its jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by
a final order of the [B]oard related to the granting,
revoking or discharging of parole, the revoking of
post-prison supervision or the imposition of conditions
of parole or of post-prison supervision and after
exhaustion of administrative review as provided by
[B]oard rule, such person is entitled to judicial
review of the final order.

	"* * * * *

	"(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this
section, the [B]oard's order is final and is not
subject to judicial review when the [B]oard makes any
decision relating to a release date or a parole
consideration hearing date, including:

	"(a) Setting an initial release date under ORS
144.120, except that the setting of an initial release
date under ORS 144.120 remains subject to judicial
review if the prison contests the crime severity
rating, the history risk score or aggravation factors
found by the [B]oard under the rules of the [B]oard.

	"(b) Setting a date for a parole consideration
hearing under ORS 144.228.

	"(c) Setting a release date, or declining to set a
release date, after a parole consideration hearing,
under ORS 144.228.

	"(d) Denying, granting or granting in part a
prisoner's request under ORS 144.122 for advancement of
the initial release date.

	"(e) Referring a prisoner for psychological
evaluation under ORS 144.223.

	"(f) Postponing a prisoner's release date because
of serious misconduct during confinement under ORS
144.125(2).

	"(g) Postponing a prisoner's release date because
of a psychological diagnosis under ORS 144.125(3).

	"(h) Postponing a prisoner's release date because
of a prisoner's refusal to submit to a psychological
evaluation.

	"(i) Denying a prisoner's request under ORS
144.228(1) for an early parole consideration hearing."

		The Court of Appeals agreed with the state that the
order was not reviewable and dismissed the petition.  In its
order of dismissal, the court cited its own intervening decision
in Luckey v. Board of Parole, 150 Or App 480, 946 P2d 361 (1997). 
In Luckey, the Court of Appeals had held that ORS 144.335(3)
unambiguously expresses a legislative intent that any "decision
relating to a release date" be immune from review.  Id. at 483.  

		Petitioner argues in this court that, although the
order at issue indisputably is a "decision relating to a release
date," it nevertheless falls outside the purview of ORS
144.335(3), because it is not one of the nine specific types of
orders that paragraphs (3)(a) through (i) of that statute
describe expressly.  He contends, in other words, that ORS
144.335(3) does not preclude review of all decisions relating to
release dates but, instead, only of the nine specific types of
decisions relating to release dates specifically enumerated
therein.

		Because petitioner raises a question of statutory
construction, we proceed under the analytical framework set out
in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d
1143 (1993).  We begin by examining the text and context of ORS
144.335(3).  If the meaning of the statute is clear at that
level, our inquiry ends there.  Id. at 610-11.

		By its express terms, the statute precludes review of
"any decision relating to a release date."  Read out of context,
those words would negate any contention that the legislature had
something less than the entire class of decisions of that kind in
mind.  Petitioner does not deny that that wording appears to
comprehend all release date decisions.  He relies, instead, on
the words that follow that phrase.  In his view, the statutory
list of orders that begins with the word "including" plausibly
may be read as undercutting the wording that precedes it, i.e.,
it may be read to mean that only the specifically enumerated
orders are unreviewable.

		Petitioner acknowledges that the most immediately
available explanation of the latter portion of the statute is
that it provides examples of the variety of orders that are
included in the preceding phrase, but argues that that
explanation is problematic, because the preceding wording is
self-explanatory and because the enumerated orders do not in any
way explain or expand upon that wording.  Ultimately, petitioner
argues, reading the enumerated orders as mere examples adds
nothing to the statute:  It relegates a whole section of the
statute to a state of mere surplusage, a result that is
inappropriate, given this court's stated goal of giving effect to
every provision of a statute.  See, e.g., State v. K. P., 324 Or
1, 8, 921 P2d 380 (1996) (whenever possible, court will construe
statute in manner that gives effect to every provision).

		Petitioner argues further that, if the list of orders
that follows the word "including" is construed to be a specific
enumeration of the types of orders for which judicial review is
precluded, the foregoing problem is avoided.  Such a reading is
possible, petitioner contends, because, in some instances, the
term "including" can be used as a term of limitation.  In fact,
petitioner argues, one can infer that the legislature intended
the word as a term of limitation in ORS 144.335 from the fact
that the statute does not include any wording that would counter
such an inference (such as "including, but not limited to"), as
the statute ordinarily would be expected to do, if it were
enumerating examples of a broader term.

    		As noted, petitioner acknowledges that there is a
plausible, possibly more likely, explanation of that latter part
of the statute, viz., that the list merely sets out examples of
the variety of orders that are included in the phrase that
precedes it.  But petitioner suggests that, because his competing
theory also is at least plausible, an ambiguity exists at this
first level of analysis that must be resolved by proceeding to
the second level of analysis -- legislative history.  See Martin
v. City of Albany, 320 Or 175, 182, 880 P2d 926 (1994) (where
most likely reading of text is not only plausible reading, court
proceeds to second level of analysis);  Weidner v. OSP, 319 Or
295, 301, 877 P2d 62 (1994) (even where one reading of statute is
more likely at first level of analysis, court will proceed to
second level if another reading is possible).  

		We do not agree that petitioner's proposed
interpretation is plausible.  Reading the latter part of ORS
144.335(3) as an exclusive list of orders that are made
unreviewable by the statute is directly contrary to the wording
that precedes it, viz., the statement that "any decision relating
to a release date" is not subject to judicial review.  When a
reasonable and natural reading of that part of the statute is
available that is wholly consonant with the use of the word
"any," we cannot hold that a reading that ignores that term is
"plausible."

		Petitioner suggests that we must accept his
interpretation as plausible, because it is the lesser of two
evils.  In that regard, he contends that it is better to read a
single word out of the statute than to relegate fully 80 percent
of it to the status of mere surplusage.  We find that argument
unpersuasive both on a theoretical level and as it applies to
this particular statute.  As to theory, our response is simple: 
We do not make decisions about the meaning of a statute by
comparing the numbers of words that are affected by the competing
interpretations.  Furthermore, even if petitioner's argument had
some value as a general proposition, it has no relevance to the
statute at issue.  Reading the latter part of ORS 144.335(3) as a
list of illustrative examples does not turn that list into "mere
surplusage."  Even if the concept of a "decision relating to a
release date" is relatively clear, and further description of the
kinds of orders included in the concept is not necessary, the
legislature reasonably could believe that an illustrative list
would be helpful and include it on that basis. 

		Finally, petitioner contends that the plausibility of
his argument is illustrated by the fact that the state took an
allegedly inconsistent position about the availability of review
under ORS 144.335(3) in Quintero v. Hill (CV98-0824), a related
habeas corpus case.  Petitioner has moved this court to take
judicial notice of various facts and submissions in that case, in
the apparent belief that an understanding of the state's
arguments in that proceeding might be helpful to this court in
its resolution of the present controversy.  We disagree.  It is
for this court, not the Board's legal representatives, to
determine what the legislature intended when it enacted ORS
144.335(3).  See Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 317 Or
192, 199, 855 P2d 151 (1993) (determination of meaning of statute
is one of law for the court).  In view of that fundamental rule,
the fact that the state has taken a certain position elsewhere
about the meaning of the statute that is not consonant with the
state's position here is not pertinent and, even if it were
pertinent, not persuasive.

		We conclude that the meaning of ORS 144.335(3) is clear
from text and context, and that petitioner's arguments provide no
occasion for delving into legislative history or other levels of
analysis.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (when legislature's intent is
clear from text and context, further inquiry is unnecessary).  On
its face, the statute provides that "any decision relating to a
release date" is not subject to judicial review. 

		Petitioner petitioned for judicial review of a decision
that, by his own concession, relates to a release date.  Because
such decisions are not subject to review under ORS 144.335(3),
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.(1)  

		The order of dismissal of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.  The petition for judicial review is dismissed. 

1. 	Petitioner also argued, on the merits, that the Board's
order violates Oregon law.  Because we conclude that the order is
exempt from review, we do not consider those arguments.