Title: State v. Morgan
Citation: 222 Kan. 149, 563 P.2d 1056
Docket Number: 48,412
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1977

222 Kan. 149 (1977)
563 P.2d 1056
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
GARTH E. MORGAN, FARRELL D. HAUSER, SHELDON W. CORDRY, LESLIE M. MORGAN and O'LINDA D. SOLORIO, Appellees.
No. 48,412

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 9, 1977.
Stephen M. Joseph, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, Vern Miller, district attorney, and Robert L. Kennedy, Jr., assistant district attorney, were on the brief for the appellant.
Jack Focht, of Smith, Shay, Farmer &amp; Wetta, of Wichita, and William D. Rustin, of Wallace, Rustin, Just, Dewey &amp; Thomas, of Wichita, argued the cause and were on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OWSLEY, J.:
This is an interlocutory appeal by the state from an order suppressing evidence obtained under a search warrant.
The search warrant was issued as the result of almost a month of investigative work by the Wichita Police Department narcotics section. Detective John Hayworth made contact with a young couple who offered to obtain drugs for him, unaware that he was a police officer. After Hayworth made several purchases from the couple he attempted to determine the source of their supply. His investigation led him to believe their drugs came from a duplex at 1162 North Richmond in Wichita.
On January 12, 1976, Hayworth made application for a search warrant for the duplex. The application stated the affiant believed an unknown quantity of cocaine and United States currency, listed by serial numbers, were located at 1162 North Richmond. In addition, the application revealed the following relating to probable cause:
As a result of the application, a search warrant for the north half of the duplex known as 1162 North Richmond was issued by Judge Owen Ballinger of the Sedgwick County Court of Common Pleas.
On January 14, 1976, Hayworth contacted Gary Hollingsworth and arrangements were made to meet the next day to purchase the cocaine described in the search warrant and affidavit. The next *151 evening the two men met and negotiated the sale of one-half ounce of cocaine for $750. Hayworth gave Hollingsworth the money and Hollingsworth left to pick up the cocaine. The police followed him to 1162 North Richmond. Hollingsworth returned to deliver the cocaine to Hayworth and was arrested. Other officers converged on the duplex and executed the warrant; whereupon, they recovered a large quantity of cocaine, other drugs and the marked money.
An information was filed against the five defendants in this action charging them with possession and sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, possession of amphetamines, possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell and conspiracy to sell cocaine. The defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search at 1162 North Richmond. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court suppressed the evidence.
It is an elementary rule of law that a search warrant may not issue except on a showing of probable cause. The warrant must particularly describe the person, place or means of conveyance to be searched and the things to be seized. (K.S.A. 1976 Supp. 22-2502; State v. Gordon, 221 Kan. 253, 559 P.2d 312.) Sufficient facts must be placed before the issuing magistrate to enable him to make an intelligent and independent determination that probable cause exists. Bald conclusions, mere affirmations of belief, or suspicions are not enough and, while an affidavit may be based on hearsay, there must be sufficient affirmative allegations of fact as to affiant's personal knowledge to provide a rational basis upon which a magistrate can make a judicious determination of probable cause. (Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 78 S. Ct. 1245; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 78 L. Ed. 159, 54 S. Ct. 11; State v. Hart, 200 Kan. 153, 162, 434 P.2d 999.)
"Probable cause" to issue a search warrant is like a jigsaw puzzle. Bits and pieces of information are fitted together until a picture is formed which leads a reasonably prudent person to believe a crime has been or is being committed and that evidence of the crime may be found on a particular person or in a place or means of conveyance. (K.S.A. 1976 Supp. 22-2502.) In State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 497 P.2d 275, this court explained:
The burden is on the prosecution to show a search and seizure was lawful and supported by probable cause (K.S.A. 22-3216 [2]; State v. Youngblood, 220 Kan. 782, 785, 556 P.2d 195); but once a search warrant has been issued, supported by an affidavit which recites facts sufficient to find probable cause, prima facie evidence of a lawful search and seizure is established. (79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, Sec. 98, pp. 917-18. See also, State v. Yates, 202 Kan. 406, 449 P.2d 575; State v. Emory, 193 Kan. 52, 391 P.2d 1013, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 906, 13 L. Ed. 2d 179, 85 S. Ct. 200.)
The question in this case is whether the search warrant application shows on its face probable cause to believe a crime had been or was being committed on January 14, 1976, and that evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of that crime were at 1162 North Richmond. We hold there was probable cause.
The affidavit contained information that four previous drug sales had been made to affiant. On one occasion a sale was made whereby affiant gave money to the seller and the seller made a nonstop trip to 1162 North Richmond, returning with cocaine. It was later determined the seller was dealing with persons named "Garth" and "Farrell." Affiant knew a person named Farrell D. Hauser lived at 1162 North Richmond and had a recent connection with drugs.
*153 Evidence of a single isolated drug sale may not give probable cause to believe drugs are present at a particular location; however, where an affidavit gives evidence of activity indicating protracted or continuous conduct at a particular location and that evidence provides a reasonable basis to infer drugs are still present, probable cause may exist. (United States v. Jones, 500 F.2d 1085 [4th Cir.1974]; United States v. Thompson, 495 F.2d 165 [D.C. Cir.1974]; Commonwealth v. Vynorius, ___, Mass. ___, 336 N.E.2d 898 [1975]; 100 A.L.R.2d Anno., Search Warrant  Affidavit  Sufficiency, Sec. 7, pp. 542-43.) A police officer may also add to other evidence the fact the location to be searched is occupied or frequented by known narcotics users or sellers. (United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 91 S. Ct. 2075; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725; United States v. Watts, 540 F.2d 1093 [D.C. Cir.1976]; People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 330 N.E.2d 631 [1975].)
In United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir.1976), federal drug officers participated in arrangements for a large heroin sale to be made to an informant. During two telephone conversations, defendant Hodge discussed details of the sale with the informant, unaware the conversations were overheard by federal officers. The sale was to take place in Detroit at a certain time and place. When the defendant and the informant met, arrangements were made for defendant to get a sample of the drug. As in our case, officers followed the defendant to a certain address and, without stopping elsewhere, he returned to the informant with the heroin. The next morning the informant and defendant met and the sale was completed. Agents arrested defendant Hodge. A search warrant was obtained for the residence where the defendant picked up the heroin sample. The search uncovered a quantity of money, plastic bags having traces of heroin, and other items. The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the search warrant, stating probable cause existed to believe a quantity of heroin would be found at the residence because of defendant's actions in obtaining the drug, his return with it, the fact he was under surveillance, and his statement that he could sell additional quantities of the drug.
The district court held the search warrant in the present case *154 was invalid because its probable cause was based on future crimes or events and past drug sales which were "stale." Probable cause to search must be based on crimes which have been or are being committed at the time the warrant is issued (K.S.A. 1976 Supp. 22-2502), and not on a belief that a crime may be committed in the future. Although we recognize this distinction in the statute, it is immaterial to this case. Based on the continuous course of past transactions which related to the duplex and its occupants, probable cause that drugs were stored there at the time the warrant was issued existed independent of any future event. While the possibility of a future sale would not create its own probable cause, it would lend support to the reasonable belief that drugs were still present and being stored at 1162 North Richmond. The past sales were not "stale" in light of the fact they revealed a protracted or continuous course of conduct. It is reasonable for a prudent man to believe that illicit drugs are stored at a location where recent sales have been made, and where known or suspected drug dealers are residing.
It is of no consequence that the police waited to execute the search warrant until they had reason to believe additional drugs would be present at the duplex. It also makes no difference that they waited until the marked money was taken to 1162 North Richmond in the last sale before they executed the warrant. Probable cause existed irrespective of the presence of the "buy" money. The time, manner and place of execution of a search warrant are governed by K.S.A. 1976 Supp. 22-2502, et seq. A search warrant must be executed within ninety-six hours from the time of issuance (K.S.A. 22-2506), but the exact time of execution within that period should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers.
A trial court should review applications for search warrants with common sense and in a realistic manner, realizing they are often drawn in haste and by nonlawyers. (United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 85 S. Ct. 741.) We believe in this case the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to suppress.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.