Title: State v. Hilton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 292A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-115 
No. 292A20 
Filed 24 September 2021 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
DONALD EUGENE HILTON 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 271 N.C. App. 505, 845 S.E.2d 81 (2020), affirming in part, 
reversing in part, and remanding an order entered on 10 May 2018 by Judge Daniel 
A. Kuehnert in Superior Court, Catawba County. On 23 September 2020, the 
Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary review as to additional 
issues and the State’s petition for discretionary review. Heard in the Supreme Court 
on 17 May 2021. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State-appellee. 
 
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Nicholas C. Woomer-Deters, Assistant 
Appellate Defender, and James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for 
defendant-appellant. 
 
 
NEWBY, Chief Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that North Carolina’s satellite-
based monitoring (SBM) program effects a Fourth Amendment search. As such, the 
imposition of SBM on a limited category of sex offenders is constitutional so long as 
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it is reasonable. “The reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the 
circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to 
which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.” Grady v. North 
Carolina (Grady I), 575 U.S. 306, 310, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam). The 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test requires balancing significant competing 
interests: the State’s interest in protecting children and others from sexual abuse and 
a convicted sex offender’s right to privacy from government monitoring. 
¶ 2 
 
Upon remand from the Supreme Court’s Grady I order, this Court held the 
SBM program to be unconstitutional as applied to the narrow category of individuals 
“who are subject to mandatory lifetime SBM based solely on their status as a 
statutorily defined ‘recidivist’ who have completed their prison sentences and are no 
longer supervised by the State through probation, parole, or post-release 
supervision.” State v. Grady (Grady III), 372 N.C. 509, 522, 831 S.E.2d 542, 553 (2019) 
(footnote omitted). Our Grady III decision, however, left unanswered the question of 
whether the SBM program is constitutional as applied to sex offenders who are in 
categories other than that of recidivists who are no longer under State supervision.  
¶ 3 
 
Defendant here is not a member of the category contemplated in Grady III. 
Rather, he falls into the aggravated offender category, which consists of defendants 
who are subject to SBM due to their conviction of at least one statutorily defined 
“aggravated offense.” A limited number of very serious sexual offenses such as rape 
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are categorized as aggravated. Defendant’s crime being one of the most serious sex 
offenses impacts our weighing of the reasonableness factors, including society’s 
interest in protecting its most vulnerable members and the expectation of privacy 
that society recognizes as legitimate. As such, the task here is to determine whether 
the SBM program1 is constitutional as applied to aggravated offenders. 
¶ 4 
 
For guidance, the Supreme Court has provided two examples for conducting 
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test in the context of categorical searches. 
Grady I, 575 U.S. at 310, 135 S. Ct. at 1371 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 
843, 857, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006) (suspicionless search of parolee was 
reasonable); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 
2396 (1995) (random drug testing of student athletes was reasonable)). Having 
conducted the reasonableness analysis in light of Samson, Vernonia, and our prior 
decision in Grady III, we conclude that searches effected by the imposition of lifetime 
SBM upon aggravated offenders are reasonable. We also conclude that the SBM 
program does not violate Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. The 
trial court’s order imposing lifetime SBM based upon defendant’s status as an 
aggravated offender thus complies with the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 
                                            
1 The General Assembly recently amended the SBM program. See Act of Sep. 2, 2021, 
S.L. 2021-138, § 18, https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2021/Bills/Senate/PDF/S300v8.pdf. The 
relevant amendments, however, do not become effective until 1 December 2021. See id. 
§ 18.(p). Therefore, the version of the SBM program in effect on the date of the trial court’s 
SBM order governs the present case. 
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20. Accordingly, we (1) modify and affirm the portion of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals which upheld the imposition of SBM during post-release supervision and (2) 
reverse the portion of the decision which held the imposition of post-supervision SBM 
to be an unreasonable search. Therefore, the trial court’s SBM order is reinstated. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
¶ 5 
 
During an interview with a criminal investigator on 8 June 2005, defendant 
admitted to having sexual intercourse with one minor child and sexual contact with 
another while a third minor child watched. On 5 July 2005, defendant was charged 
with first-degree statutory rape and first-degree statutory sexual offense. On 26 April 
2007, he pled guilty to the charges and received a sentence of 144 to 182 months. 
Defendant was released from prison on 9 July 2017 and placed on post-release 
supervision for a period of five years. Defendant’s post-release supervision terms 
prohibited him from leaving Catawba County without first obtaining approval from 
his probation officer. Defendant, however, traveled to Caldwell County on several 
occasions without his probation officer’s consent. While in Caldwell County, 
defendant sexually assaulted his minor niece. As a result, defendant was charged in 
Caldwell County with taking indecent liberties with a child.2 
¶ 6 
 
The trial court in Catawba County conducted a hearing on 19 April 2018 and 
                                            
2 Subsequent to the SBM order in this case, defendant was convicted of this indecent 
liberties charge. 
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10 May 2018 to determine whether defendant should be enrolled in SBM based upon 
his 2007 convictions. Finding that defendant “[fell] into at least one of the categories 
requiring [SBM] under [N.C.]G.S. [§] 14-208.40, in that . . . the offense of which . . . 
defendant was convicted was an aggravated offense,” the trial court ordered 
defendant to enroll in lifetime SBM. In support of its order, the trial court made the 
following additional findings:  
l. That the defendant admitted to sexually assaulting more 
than one minor child prior to being convicted of first degree 
rape and first degree sexual offense. 
2. That the defendant [completed his prison sentence] for 
the crimes of first degree rape and first degree sexual 
offense[.] 
3. That probable cause has been found to currently charge 
the defendant with the crime of taking indecent liberties 
with a minor. 
4. That the defendant was charged with this crime just a 
couple months after being released from custody from 
serving his sentence for the crimes of first degree rape and 
first degree sexual offense. 
5. That the alleged victim in the pending charge is related 
to one of the victim’s [sic] associated with the defendant’s 
previous convictions of first degree rape and first degree 
sexual assault. 
6. That the defendant has been monitored by probation and 
parole since his release from prison on July 9, 2017. 
7. That one of the conditions of defendant’s post release 
supervision is not to leave Catawba County without the 
permission of his probation/parole officer. 
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8. That the defendant has violated this condition of post 
release supervision and has traveled to Caldwell County 
without the knowledge of probation and parole. 
9. That defendant’s current charge of taking indecent 
liberties with a minor is out of Caldwell County were [sic] 
the alleged victim lives. 
10. That the [SBM] program in Catawba County utilizes an 
ankle monitoring device to detect the location of one subject 
to [SBM] through Global Positioning System. 
11. That the ankle monitoring device is light weight, small 
in size, can be adjusted for comfort and is of little intrusion 
to the person wearing the device. 
12. That the monitoring of this device is done by authorized 
personnel from probation and parole that are assigned to 
monitor a particular person subject to [SBM]. 
13. That there are safe guards [sic] in place to protect a 
person subject to [SBM] in the case of an emergency or 
malfunction of the equipment. 
14. That there are no known circumstances regarding this 
defendant that would cause a unique concern about his 
ability to wear the ankle monitoring device whether it be 
physical health, mental health, the defendant’s occupation, 
the defendant’s leisure or otherwise. 
15. That there does not currently exist any other way for 
probation and parole to utilize [SBM] other than the 
current practice of using an ankle bracelet. 
16. That there does not exist currently any other form of 
monitoring available to probation and[ ]parole other than 
physical monitoring similar to what is understood as 
supervised probation and [SBM] as described above. 
Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded that, under the totality of the 
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circumstances, the SBM program is constitutionally reasonable as applied to 
defendant. Defendant appealed. 
¶ 7 
 
Before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued: (1) the trial court exceeded its 
constitutional authority because the SBM order effected an unreasonable search; (2) 
the SBM statute is facially unconstitutional due to the State’s failure to demonstrate 
that the program serves a legitimate government interest; and (3) orders authorizing 
SBM pursuant to the program constitute “general warrants” in violation of Article I, 
Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. That court issued a divided decision 
where it affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court. State v. 
Hilton, 271 N.C. App. 505, 514, 845 S.E.2d 81, 88 (2020). The Court of Appeals noted 
that under Grady I the constitutionality of an SBM order depends on whether it is 
reasonable “based on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 509, 845 S.E.2d at 85 
(quoting Grady I, 575 U.S. at 310, 135 S. Ct. at 1371). It also recognized that a 
reviewing court should “consider, among other things, ‘the nature and purpose of the 
search’ and ‘the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable expectations of 
privacy.’ ” Id. (quoting Grady I, 575 U.S. at 310, 135 S. Ct. at 1371).  
¶ 8 
 
The Court of Appeals then considered this Court’s holding in Grady III and 
opined: 
Though the holding was limited to a subset of 
unsupervised, convicted sex offenders, the Grady [III] 
holding appears to impose a high standard on the State to 
meet in order to show reasonableness when imposing SBM 
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on any convicted sex offender who is not under any form of 
State supervision, mainly because of the high burden of 
showing the efficacy of SBM in helping solve future crimes.  
In its analysis, though, our Supreme Court 
recognized that the calculus of reasonableness is different 
when a defendant is subject to State supervision. For 
instance, in the Conclusion section, the Court emphasized 
that its holding does not enjoin all of the SBM program’s 
applications, in part, “because this provision is still 
enforceable against a [sex offender] during the period of his 
or her State supervision[.]” 
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Grady III, 
372 N.C. at 546, 831 S.E.2d at 570). As such, the Court of Appeals held that based on 
Grady III, “the trial court’s imposition of SBM on [d]efendant for any period beyond 
his period of post-release supervision is unreasonable.” Id. at 510, 845 S.E.2d at 85.  
¶ 9 
 
The Court of Appeals, however, then noted that “the expectation of privacy for 
a defendant who is still under a form of State supervision is extremely low.” Id. at 
510, 845 S.E.2d at 86 (citing Grady III, 372 N.C. at 533, 831 S.E.2d at 561). According 
to that court, “[w]hile the intrusion [upon defendant’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy] is great, . . . it is not as great as in Grady [III]” because “the imposition [here] 
is only for the remainder of the period that [d]efendant is subject to supervision.” Id. 
at 511, 845 S.E.2d at 86. It also recognized that “there is a justification for SBM 
during [d]efendant’s post-release supervision period” in that it “help[s] law 
enforcement determine whether [d]efendant is violating the condition of his post-
release supervision that he remain in Catawba County.” Id. The Court of Appeals 
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thus held that “the imposition of SBM during [d]efendant’s post-release supervision 
period is reasonable.” Id. at 510, 845 S.E.2d at 85.  
¶ 10 
 
Regarding defendant’s facial challenge to the SBM statute, the Court of 
Appeals noted that “[t]he General Assembly’s enactments are presumed to be 
constitutional.” Id. at 513, 845 S.E.2d at 88. In recognizing that the State’s interest 
in the SBM statute is “without question legitimate,” id. (quoting Grady III, 372 N.C. 
at 543, 831 S.E.2d at 568), the Court of Appeals held that the SBM statute “is facially 
valid, at least to the extent that it can be applied to defendants under State 
supervision,” id. Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed defendant’s general warrant 
argument and concluded that “the imposition of SBM on individuals who are 
otherwise under State post-release supervision does not violate our Constitution.” Id. 
at 514, 845 S.E.2d at 88. As such, the Court of Appeals affirmed the SBM order “to 
the extent that it imposes SBM on [d]efendant for the remainder of his post-release 
supervision,” reversed the SBM order “to the extent that [it] imposes SBM beyond 
[d]efendant’s period of post-release supervision,” and remanded for further 
proceedings. Id.  
¶ 11 
 
The dissent agreed with the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse the SBM 
order to the extent that it imposed SBM beyond defendant’s post-release supervision 
period. Id. (Brook, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). The 
dissent, however, would have reversed the entire SBM order because “the State 
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introduced no evidence of the SBM program’s efficacy.” Id. at 527, 845 S.E.2d at 96. 
According to the dissent, 
the trial court made no findings of fact regarding the 
efficacy of the program in preventing or solving sex crimes. 
Nor did the State present any witnesses to testify that SBM 
is an effective law enforcement tool. As in Grady III, the 
State here presented no data or empirical studies to show 
that SBM is effective at preventing recidivism or deterring 
sex crimes. Nor did it request that the trial court take 
judicial notice of any studies or reports regarding the 
efficacy of SBM in reducing recidivism. The State also put 
forth no evidence regarding general recidivism rates of sex 
offenders to support the reasonableness of the intrusion. 
Id. at 527, 845 S.E.2d at 95–96. The dissent noted that the State’s “evidence of the 
likelihood of SBM to prevent [d]efendant’s own recidivism . . . does not provide the 
requisite evidence ‘regarding the actual efficacy of [the State’s] SBM program in 
preventing recidivism.’ ” Id. at 527–28, 845 S.E.2d at 96 (third alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Anthony, 267 N.C. App. 45, 48, 831 S.E.2d 905, 907 (2019)). The 
dissent further opined that the State’s “interest in preventing defendants from 
absconding” is insufficient to justify imposing SBM. Id. at 529, 845 S.E.2d at 97. As 
such, the dissent would have held “that the absence of evidence supporting SBM’s 
efficacy in this instance means that the State cannot justify this significant lifetime 
intrusion on [d]efendant’s privacy interests.” Id. at 519, 845 S.E.2d at 91.  
¶ 12 
 
Defendant appealed to this Court based upon the dissenting opinion at the 
Court of Appeals. Additionally, this Court allowed (1) defendant’s petition for 
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discretionary 
review 
to 
address 
whether 
orders 
authorizing 
SBM 
are 
unconstitutional “general warrants” prohibited by Article I, Section 20 of the North 
Carolina Constitution and (2) the State’s petition for discretionary review to address 
whether the trial court properly determined that defendant was subject to lifetime 
SBM. We disagree with defendant’s contention that the SBM order effects an 
unreasonable search. Rather, we hold that a search effected by the imposition of 
lifetime SBM upon a defendant due to his status as an aggravated offender is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We also hold that the SBM program does 
not violate Article I, Section 20 because SBM orders do not constitute “general 
warrants.”  
II. 
Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment 
¶ 13 
 
We first address whether North Carolina’s SBM statute violates the Fourth 
Amendment by authorizing the imposition of lifetime SBM upon aggravated 
offenders. Enactments of the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional. 
Grady III, 372 N.C. at 521–22, 831 S.E.2d at 553; see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1311 (1973) (recognizing “the basic 
presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law” as 
“one of the first principles of constitutional adjudication”). As such, “we will not 
declare a law invalid unless we determine that it is unconstitutional beyond 
reasonable doubt.” Grady III, 372 N.C. at 522, 831 S.E.2d at 553 (alteration omitted) 
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(quoting Cooper v. Berger, 370 N.C. 392, 413, 809 S.E.2d 98, 111 (2018)). 
¶ 14 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the imposition of SBM pursuant to North 
Carolina’s SBM program effects a Fourth Amendment search. Grady I, 575 U.S. at 
310, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable 
searches. The reasonableness of a search depends on the 
totality of the circumstances, including the nature and 
purpose of the search and the extent to which the search 
intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations. See, e.g., 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. 
Ed. 2d 250 (2006) (suspicionless search of parolee was 
reasonable); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995) (random drug 
testing of student athletes was reasonable). 
Grady I, 575 U.S. at 310, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. “[W]e ‘examin[e] the totality of the 
circumstances’ to determine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 848, 126 S. Ct. at 2197 (second 
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct. 
587, 591 (2001)). This examination must consider the government’s purpose in 
conducting the search and the nature of the search balanced with the degree of 
intrusion upon the recognized privacy interest. See Grady I, 575 U.S. at 310, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1371; Grady III, 372 N.C. at 538, 831 S.E.2d at 564 (“The balancing analysis 
that we are called upon to conduct here requires us to weigh the extent of the 
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intrusion upon legitimate Fourth Amendment interests against the extent to which 
the SBM program sufficiently ‘promot[es] . . . legitimate governmental interests’ to 
justify the search, thus rendering it reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653, 115 S. Ct. at 2390)). In 
assessing reasonable expectations of privacy, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that society recognizes 
as ‘legitimate.’ What expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context.” 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (citing and quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 337–38, 105 S. Ct. 733, 740–41 (1985)). 
¶ 15 
 
By citing Samson and Vernonia in Grady I, the Supreme Court provided an 
instructive framework for conducting the reasonableness balancing test to determine 
whether imposing SBM on a limited category of convicted sex offenders is valid. See 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 848, 126 S. Ct. at 2197; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652–53, 115 S. Ct. 
at 2390. In Samson the Supreme Court evaluated the reasonableness of a statute 
that required parolees to agree to any warrantless search, without cause, at any time. 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, 852–53 n.3, 126 S. Ct. at 2196, 2199–200 n.3. The Court 
began “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. at 848, 126 S. Ct. at 2197 
(quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19, 122 S. Ct. at 591). The Court first concluded 
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that parolees “have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their 
status alone.” Id. at 852, 126 S. Ct. at 2199. Viewing that diminished privacy 
expectation in the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded the 
warrantless search did not intrude upon “an expectation of privacy that society would 
recognize as legitimate,” despite the unlimited breadth of the right to search and 
regardless of the crime. Id. Therefore, balancing no intrusion upon any reasonable 
expectation of privacy against the State’s substantial interests in deterring 
recidivism, the Court found the statute constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 853, 857, 126 S. Ct. at 2200, 2202.  
¶ 16 
 
In Vernonia the Supreme Court applied the same balancing test for another 
categorical warrantless search “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, ma[d]e the warrant . . . requirement impracticable.” Vernonia, 515 U.S. 
at 653, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. Ct. 
3164, 3168 (1987)). A school policy required that high school athletes consent to 
random drug screenings in order to participate in school athletics. Id. at 650, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2389. The Court noted that the school had a special relationship with the 
students and that “[p]ublic school locker rooms [where the drug screenings take 
place] . . . are not notable for the [bodily] privacy they afford.” Id. at 655–57, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2391–93. As such, the Court determined that student athletes based on their 
status have diminished expectations of privacy. Id. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 2392–93. 
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Next, the Court examined the intrusion upon privacy by the drug screening process 
and determined it had a “negligible” effect on a student athlete’s privacy interests. 
Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. The Court then noted that “a drug problem largely 
fueled by the ‘role model’ effect of athletes’ drug use, and of particular danger to 
athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs.” Id. 
at 663, 115 S. Ct. at 2395–96. Therefore, the State’s important interest in deterring 
drug use among all teenagers, particularly for the narrow, at-risk category of student 
athletes, justified the search under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. 
Id. at 661–62, 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2395, 2397.  
¶ 17 
 
In Grady III the trial court imposed SBM on the defendant solely due to his 
status as a recidivist even though he had completed his prison sentence and was no 
longer subject to post-release supervision at the time of the SBM order. Grady III, 
372 N.C. at 516, 522, 831 S.E.2d at 550, 553. In applying the Supreme Court’s Grady 
I order on remand, this Court conducted the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
analysis with respect to the category in which the defendant fell—i.e., recidivists no 
longer subject to post-release supervision. Id. at 522, 831 S.E.2d at 553. This Court 
held the SBM program to be unconstitutional as applied to the narrow category of 
individuals “who are subject to mandatory lifetime SBM based solely on their status 
as a statutorily defined ‘recidivist’ who have completed their prison sentences and are 
no longer supervised by the State through probation, parole, or post-release 
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supervision.” Id. (footnote omitted).  
¶ 18 
 
Our Grady III holding specifically left unanswered the question of whether the 
SBM program is constitutional as applied to defendants who fall outside of the narrow 
category of recidivists who are no longer under State supervision. See id. (“We decline 
to address the application of SBM beyond [the specified] class of individuals.”). As 
such, we must now use the framework provided by the Supreme Court to determine 
the reasonableness of the General Assembly’s decision to impose SBM on the category 
of convicted sex offenders whose convictions arose from defined aggravated offenses.  
¶ 19 
 
The first step of our reasonableness inquiry under the totality of the 
circumstances requires analyzing the legitimacy of the State’s interest. Though the 
General Assembly has the authority to impose harsher prison sentences or lengthier 
parole times for convicted sex offenders, it chose to use an alternative civil remedy. 
Specifically, it enacted the SBM program as a civil, regulatory scheme to further its 
paramount interest in protecting the public—especially children—by monitoring 
certain sex offenders after their release. The General Assembly has “recognize[d] that 
sex offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being 
released from incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public from sex 
offenders is of paramount governmental interest.” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5 (2019).3 “The 
                                            
3 In Grady III, we recognized that “N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5 is relevant to . . . the ‘nature 
and immediacy of’ the State’s concern in protecting the public from sex offenders.” Grady III, 
372 N.C. at 542, 831 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660, 115 S. Ct. at 2394).  
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General Assembly also recognize[d] . . . that the protection of [sexually abused] 
children is of great governmental interest.” Id. These findings are supported by 
Supreme Court precedent, congressional action, the public policy of the various 
states, and “the moral instincts of a decent people.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017); see 34 U.S.C. § 20981 (authorizing grants to states that 
implement twenty-four-hour, continuous GPS monitoring programs for sex 
offenders); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 
(2003); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89–90, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1145 (2003).4  
¶ 20 
 
This Court’s precedent also supports the General Assembly’s findings 
regarding the dangers posed by the recidivist tendencies of sex offenders. Specifically, 
in Bryant, we stated that “[c]onvicted sex offenders ‘ “are a serious threat in this 
Nation. [T]he victims of sex assault are most often juveniles,” and “[w]hen convicted 
sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of 
offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” ’ ” State v. Bryant, 359 
                                            
4 When presented with conflicting evidence supporting the legislature’s public policy 
determinations, courts should defer to the legislature’s findings of fact, especially where, like 
here, that determination is corroborated. See Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 362 N.C. 328, 333, 
661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008) (deferring to the General Assembly’s finding “that sex offenders 
often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from 
incarceration,” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5, and concluding that a town’s concern in protecting 
children and others from convicted sex offenders was thus “founded on fact”); Redevelopment 
Comm’n of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Greensboro, 252 N.C. 595, 611, 114 S.E.2d 688, 
700 (1960) (stating that legislative findings “are entitled to weight in construing [a] statute 
and in determining whether the statute promotes a public purpose or use under the 
Constitution”).  
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N.C. 554, 555, 614 S.E.2d 479, 480 (2005) (second and third alterations in original) 
(quoting Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4, 123 S. Ct. at 1163 (quoting McKune 
v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2024 (2002))). We later noted in Standley 
that “released sex offenders are four times more likely to be rearrested for subsequent 
sex crimes than other released offenders.” Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 362 N.C. 328, 
333, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008) (citing Patrick A. Langan, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, at 1 (2003)).  
¶ 21 
 
Given the dangers posed by convicted sex offenders, we have recognized that 
“[p]rotecting children and other[s] . . . from sexual attacks is certainly a legitimate 
government interest.” Id. Most recently, we opined in Grady III that the State’s 
“interests [in protecting the public through SBM] are without question legitimate.” 
Grady III, 372 N.C. at 543, 831 S.E.2d at 568. There, however, our analysis applied 
only to the recidivist category. Id. at 522, 831 S.E.2d at 553. Notably, we made the 
following observation regarding the recidivist category: 
[l]ifetime monitoring for recidivists is mandated by our 
statute for anyone who is convicted of two sex offenses that 
carry a registration requirement. A wide range of different 
offenses are swept into this category. For example, a court 
is required to impose lifetime SBM on an offender who 
twice attempts to solicit a teen under the age of sixteen in 
an online chat room to meet with him, regardless of 
whether the person solicited was actually a teen or an 
undercover officer, or whether any meeting ever happened. 
Id. at 544, 831 S.E.2d at 568. Unlike the recidivist category, the aggravated offender 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
category applies only to a small subset of individuals who have committed the most 
heinous sex crimes. An individual can only receive aggravated offender status if he  
(i) engag[es] in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral 
penetration with a victim of any age through the use of 
force or the threat of serious violence; or (ii) engag[es] in a 
sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with 
a victim who is less than [twelve] years old.  
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.6(1a) (2019). When compared to the Grady III example of a 
recidivist with two convictions of attempted solicitation of a child by a computer, see 
id. § 14-202.3(a) (2019), it is clear that those who have committed statutorily defined 
aggravated offenses pose a much greater threat to society. As such, the State’s 
interest in protecting the public from aggravated offenders is paramount.  
¶ 22 
 
Further, the General Assembly has clearly stated the purpose of North 
Carolina’s “Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs” is to 
proactively protect children and others from dangerous sex offenders:  
[T]he General Assembly recognizes that law enforcement 
officers’ 
efforts 
to 
protect 
communities, 
conduct 
investigations, and quickly apprehend offenders who 
commit sex offenses or certain offenses against minors are 
impaired by the lack of information available to law 
enforcement agencies about convicted offenders who live 
within the agency’s jurisdiction. . . . 
 
Therefore, it is the purpose of this Article to assist 
law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect communities 
by requiring persons who are convicted of sex offenses or of 
certain other offenses committed against minors to register 
with law enforcement agencies, to require the exchange of 
relevant information about those offenders among law 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
enforcement agencies, and to authorize the access to 
necessary and relevant information about those offenders 
to others as provided in this Article.  
 
Id. § 14-208.5.  
¶ 23 
 
In furtherance of this purpose, the SBM program “uses a continuous [SBM] 
system” for narrowly defined categories of sex offenders who present a significant 
enough threat of reoffending to “require[ ] the highest possible level of supervision 
and monitoring.” Id. § 14-208.40(a) (2019). Under the statute, after our decision in 
Grady III,5 the three categories of offenders who require continuous lifetime SBM to 
protect public safety are (1) sexually violent predators, (2) aggravated offenders, and 
(3) adults convicted of statutory rape or a sex offense with a victim under the age of 
thirteen (adult-child offenders). Id. § 14-208.40A(c) (2019). A “sexually violent 
predator” is a person who “has been convicted of a sexually violent offense,” such as 
rape or incest, and “who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder,” 
as determined by a board of experts, “that makes the person likely to engage in 
sexually violent offenses directed at strangers or at a person with whom a 
                                            
5 Grady III held lifetime SBM is unconstitutional as applied to defendants “who are 
subject to mandatory lifetime SBM based solely on their status as a statutorily defined 
‘recidivist’ who have completed their prison sentences and are no longer supervised by the 
State through probation, parole, or post-release supervision.” Grady III, 372 N.C. at 522, 831 
S.E.2d at 553 (footnote omitted). We explicitly “decline[d] to address the application of SBM 
beyond this class of individuals” in Grady III. Id. As such, our analysis in that case has no 
bearing on cases where lifetime SBM is imposed on sexually violent offenders, aggravated 
offenders, or adult-child offenders. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of 
victimization.” Id. §§ 14-208.6(5)–(6), -208.20 (2019). The second category comprises 
those who commit “aggravated offenses” defined as “engaging in a sexual act 
involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration” either (1) through use or threat of force 
or (2) “with a victim who is less than [twelve] years old.” Id. § 14-208.6(1a). Here the 
trial court properly found that defendant falls within this aggravated offender 
category. The third category includes convictions of any sex act by a person over 
eighteen years old against any victim under thirteen years old. Id. §§ 14-27.23, -27.28 
(2019). If a trial court finds that an offender falls into one of these categories, the 
statute requires the court to “order the offender to enroll in a[n] [SBM] program for 
life.” Id. § 14-208.40A(c).  
¶ 24 
 
Though the program is commonly referred to as “lifetime” monitoring, one year 
after a defendant completes his sentence, probation, or parole, the defendant may 
petition the Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission for termination of 
enrollment. Id. §§ 14-208.41(a), -208.43 (2019). Further, the SBM program is a “civil, 
regulatory scheme.” State v. Bowditch, 364 N.C. 335, 352, 700 S.E.2d 1, 13 (2010). As 
such, a defendant subject to SBM may petition “the court . . . [to] relieve [him] from 
a final . . . [SBM] order . . . for . . . [a]ny . . . reason justifying relief from the operation 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
of the [order].” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) (2019).6  
¶ 25 
 
Imposing lifetime SBM upon aggravated offenders serves the General 
Assembly’s stated purpose by assisting law enforcement agencies in solving crimes. 
For instance,  
[p]assive GPS data may place a sex offender at the scene of 
a crime, allowing an agency to identify potential suspects 
or witnesses. A sex offender’s alibi may be supported or 
discredited using GPS data. This information could assist 
law enforcement agencies with verifying sex offender 
registration 
information, 
such 
as 
residential 
or 
employment address, and locating noncompliant sex 
offenders and absconders. . . . 
Active GPS systems can assist law enforcement agencies in 
enforcing exclusion and inclusion zones. If an agency 
receives notification that an offender has entered an 
exclusionary zone, a quick response may prevent an 
offense. If the agency finds the sex offender near a school 
or playground, the officer on the scene can report this 
information to the offender’s probation or parole officer. 
Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Tracking Sex Offenders with Electronic Monitoring 
Technology: Implications and Practical Uses for Law Enforcement 4 (2008).  
¶ 26 
 
Further, in a case pending before this Court, State v. Strudwick, No. 
334PA19-2, the State’s witness, a probation officer, testified concerning situations in 
which lifetime SBM would assist law enforcement in preventing and solving future 
                                            
6 The General Assembly’s recent amendments to the SBM statute become effective on 
1 December 2021. See Act of Sep. 2, 2021, S.L. 2021-138, § 18.(p). These changes may provide 
defendant with an additional avenue of relief. Id. § 18.(i).  
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
crimes. The trial court in Strudwick found that “when a sexual assault is reported, 
location information from the monitor could be used to implicate the participant as a 
suspect if he was in the area of the sexual assault, or to eliminate him as a suspect if 
he was not in the area of a sexual assault.” We take judicial notice of this finding from 
Strudwick. See State ex rel. Swain v. Creasman, 260 N.C. 163, 164, 132 S.E.2d 304, 
305 (1963) (taking judicial notice of the Court’s own records). As such, we conclude 
that the SBM program assists law enforcement agencies in solving crimes.  
¶ 27 
 
SBM also serves the State’s interest in protecting the public from aggravated 
offenders by deterring recidivism. See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 943 (7th Cir. 
2016) (“[I]t is undisputed that the [SBM] law promotes deterrence.”); accord Doe v. 
Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1007 (6th Cir. 2007). SBM “deter[s] future offenses by making 
the [subject] aware that he is being monitored and is likely therefore to be 
apprehended should a sex crime be reported at a time, and a location, at which he is 
present.” Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935; see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663, 115 S. Ct. at 
2395–96 (remarking that the “efficacy” of the search was “self-evident” where the goal 
was to deter drug use by athletes and the school promulgated the drug-testing policy 
so that athletes would know they would be tested); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 632, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1421 (1989) (recognizing that drug tests “are 
highly effective means of . . . deterring the use of drugs”). Just as the drug-testing 
policy in Vernonia serves as an effective deterrent with respect to student athletes 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
categorically, the SBM program in the present case serves as an effective deterrent 
with respect to aggravated offenders categorically. 
¶ 28 
 
SBM’s efficacy as a deterrent is supported by empirical data. The National 
Institute of Justice sponsored a “research project examin[ing] the impact that GPS 
monitoring has on the recidivism rates of sex offenders in California.” Philip Bulman, 
Sex Offenders Monitored by GPS Found to Commit Fewer Crimes, 271 NIJ J. 22, 22 
(Feb. 2013). The study “found that those placed on GPS monitoring had significantly 
lower recidivism rates than those who received traditional supervision.” Id. In fact, 
offenders not placed on GPS monitoring “returned to custody at a rate 38 percent 
higher than [those placed on GPS monitoring].” Id. at 23. Similarly, a more recent 
study “examine[d] whether GPS is effective in terms of reducing violations for 
supervision conditions as well as new criminal behavior and returns to custody 
among” high risk sex offenders. Susan Turner, Alyssa W. Chamberlain, Jesse 
Jannetta & James Hess, Does GPS Improve Recidivism among High Risk Sex 
Offenders? Outcomes for California’s GPS Pilot for High Risk Sex Offender Parolees, 
Victims & Offenders: Int’l J. Evidence-based Rsch., Pol’y, and Prac., Jan. 2015, at 7. 
The study found that offenders not placed on GPS monitoring “were significantly 
more likely to be violated for new criminal behavior compared to GPS offenders 
(35.2% versus 19.1%[)].” Id. at 15. These studies demonstrate that SBM is efficacious 
in reducing recidivism. Since we have recognized the efficacy of SBM in assisting with 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the apprehension of offenders and in deterring recidivism, there is no need for the 
State to prove SBM’s efficacy on an individualized basis.  
¶ 29 
 
Having found that the SBM program serves a legitimate government interest, 
we next consider the scope of the privacy interests involved. An aggravated offender’s 
expectation of privacy is severely diminished while he is subject to post-release 
supervision. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 844, 126 S. Ct. at 2195 (“An inmate electing to 
complete his sentence out of physical custody remains in the Department of 
Corrections’ legal custody for the remainder of his term and must comply with the 
terms and conditions of his parole. The extent and reach of those conditions 
demonstrate that parolees have severely diminished privacy expectations by virtue 
of their status alone.”); Grady III, 372 N.C. at 546, 831 S.E.2d at 570 (stating that the 
SBM statute is “still enforceable against a recidivist during the period of his or her 
State supervision”). At the SBM hearing, defendant’s counsel admitted that “[d]uring 
the time that [defendant] is out on parole . . . he has a lower expectation of privacy. 
He has [a] diminished expectation of privacy.” Defendant’s counsel thus conceded that 
SBM “would be appropriate” during defendant’s period of parole. Therefore, SBM is 
clearly constitutionally reasonable during a defendant’s post-release supervision 
period.  
¶ 30 
 
Though an aggravated offender regains some of his privacy interests upon the 
completion of his post-release supervision term, these interests remain impaired for 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the remainder of his life due to his status as a convicted aggravated sex offender. “[I]t 
is beyond dispute that convicted felons do not enjoy the same measure of 
constitutional protections, including the expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment, as do citizens who have not been convicted of a felony.” Bowditch, 364 
N.C. at 349–50, 700 S.E.2d at 11 (citations omitted); see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 
654, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (“[T]he legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-à-vis the 
State may depend upon the individual’s legal relationship with the State.”); Grady 
III, 372 N.C. at 534, 831 S.E.2d at 561 (recognizing that “a person’s status as a 
convicted sex offender may affect the extent to which the State can infringe upon 
fundamental rights”). Convicted felons face a plethora of lifetime rights restrictions 
including a reduction in liberty interests and Fourth Amendment privacy 
expectations “that society recognizes as ‘legitimate.’ ” Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654, 115 
S. Ct. at 2391 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338, 105 S. Ct. at 741). For example, their 
liberty interests are restricted regarding firearms possession. Cf. District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008) (affirming that the 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” survive Second 
Amendment scrutiny). Additionally, individuals convicted of sex offenses may be 
permanently barred from certain occupations, a harsh sanction that limits them from 
choosing where they work and what type of livelihood they may pursue. E.g., 
N.C.G.S. § 84-28(b)(1), (c) (2019) (attorney); id. § 90-14(a)(7), (c) (2019) (medical 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
doctor); id. § 93-12(9)(a) (2019) (certified public accountant); id. § 93A-6(b)(2) (2019) 
(real estate broker). 
¶ 31 
 
Sex offender registration requirements also manifest a diminished expectation 
of privacy. Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89–90, 123 S. Ct. at 1145–46. For instance, a 
registrant is required to provide the following information to the public: “name, sex, 
address, physical description, picture, conviction date, offense for which registration 
was required, the sentence imposed as a result of the conviction, and registration 
status.” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.10(a) (2019). Since aggravated offenders are required to 
remain on the sex offender registry for life, see N.C.G.S. § 14-208.23 (2019), certain 
liberty, movement, and privacy restrictions apply even after the completion of any 
post-release supervision term. Specifically, aggravated offenders are perpetually 
inhibited by limitations on their movements and residency restrictions. See N.C.G.S. 
§ 14-208.18(a)(1), (4) (2019) (prohibiting registered sex offenders from being present 
at “any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors, including, 
but not limited to, schools, children’s museums, child care centers, nurseries, and 
playgrounds,” as well as the State Fair); Standley, 362 N.C. at 333, 661 S.E.2d at 732 
(upholding prohibition on convicted sex offenders entering public parks); N.C.G.S. 
§ 14-208.16(a) (2019) (prohibiting registered sex offenders from “knowingly resid[ing] 
within 1,000 feet of the property on which any public or nonpublic school or child care 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
center is located”).7 Society therefore recognizes that aggravated offenders have 
restricted liberty interests and diminished privacy expectations for the entirety of 
their lives.   
¶ 32 
 
We lastly consider the level of intrusion effected by the imposition of lifetime 
SBM. Unlike punitive measures, SBM “does not impose a significant affirmative 
disability or restraint.” Belleau, 811 F.3d at 943. As the trial court found, “the ankle 
monitoring device is light weight, small in size, can be adjusted for comfort and is of 
little intrusion to the person wearing the device.” Specifically, the device is 
“approximately 2-inches wide” and “is the size of an 8-ounce coke can.” Charging the 
device takes approximately two hours per day. Further, the device does not hamper 
medical treatment because it can easily be removed by any medical provider in the 
event of an emergency. “The restraint imposed by these requirements is minimal and 
incidental to [SBM’s] actual purpose—tracking [the offender’s] whereabouts.” Id. 
“[A]s GPS devices become smaller and batteries last longer, any affirmative restraint 
imposed by [SBM] will, over time, become less and less burdensome.” Id. These 
physical limitations are more inconvenient than intrusive and do not materially 
                                            
7 The General Assembly recently amended N.C.G.S. § 14-208.16(a) to broaden its 
scope. 
See 
Act 
of 
Aug. 
23, 
2021, 
S.L. 
2021-115, 
§ 
3, 
https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2021/Bills/House/PDF/H84v4.pdf (prohibiting registered sex 
offenders from knowingly residing “within 1,000 feet of any property line of a property on 
which any public or nonpublic school or child care center is located” or “[w]ithin any structure, 
any portion of which is within 1,000 feet of any property line of a property on which any 
public or nonpublic school or child care center is located”). 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
invade an aggravated offender’s diminished privacy expectations.  
¶ 33 
 
Regarding the effect on other privacy interests, SBM falls on a spectrum of 
available “regulatory schemes that address the recidivist tendencies of convicted sex 
offenders.” Bowditch, 364 N.C. at 341, 700 S.E.2d at 6. At one end of the continuum, 
criminal sanctions—i.e., imprisonment, probation, and parole—and civil commitment 
involve a highly invasive affirmative restraint and deprivation of rights. See Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1997); Belleau, 811 F.3d at 
932. Next, housing, career, and travel limitations significantly restrict the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms. Finally, on the other end of the spectrum, registration 
statutes impose the fewest restrictions on a defendant’s liberty and privacy, yet they 
still require the offender to provide certain personal information to law enforcement 
and the public. See N.C.G.S. § 14-208.10.  
¶ 34 
 
The privacy intrusion effected by SBM falls on the less intrusive side of the 
regulatory spectrum. See Belleau, 811 F.3d at 943 (noting that SBM “imposes as little 
burden as possible on the offender”). Similar to sex offender registration, SBM 
provides information to the State that is not ordinarily required for the general 
public, protects the public through deterrence, and allows for termination. 
Specifically, under the statute, a defendant may petition to be removed from SBM 
after one year. N.C.G.S. § 14-208.43 (permitting termination if a defendant shows he 
has not been convicted of any additional qualifying convictions, has substantially 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
complied with the SBM program, and “is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of 
others”). Since the SBM program is civil in nature, the North Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure govern. As such, a defendant may also seek removal of SBM through Rule 
60(b). Id. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) (“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . [a]ny . . . 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”). These avenues for 
termination reduce the degree of intrusion caused by lifetime SBM.8 
¶ 35 
 
SBM also stands in stark contrast to the potential confinement measures that 
convicted sex offenders face. Unlike criminal imprisonment or civil commitment, 
“[t]he SBM program does not detain an offender in any significant way.” Bowditch, 
364 N.C. at 349, 700 S.E.2d at 11. Additionally, “[t]he monitoring taking place in the 
SBM program is far more passive and is distinguishable from the type of State 
supervision imposed on probationers.” Id. at 346, 700 S.E.2d at 9. While these 
alternative measures limit a sex offender’s liberty interests, SBM does not. For 
instance, SBM does not prevent a defendant from going anywhere he is otherwise 
allowed to go. See Belleau, 811 F.3d at 936 (“It’s untrue that ‘the GPS device burdens 
liberty . . . by its continuous surveillance of the offender’s activities’; it just identifies 
locations; it doesn’t reveal what the wearer of the device is doing at any of the 
locations.” (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 
                                            
8 See footnote 6 of this opinion.  
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
570, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 (2009))). Where a defendant is unsupervised, no one 
regularly monitors the defendant’s location, significantly lessening the degree of 
intrusion. See id. at 941 (Flaum, J., concurring). “Occupational debarment is [also] 
far more harsh than an SBM program . . . .” Bowditch, 364 N.C. at 349, 700 S.E.2d at 
10; see also Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1005 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S. Ct. at 
1151) (noting SBM is less harsh than occupational debarment). Therefore, SBM is 
significantly less intrusive than the harsher alternatives that convicted sex offenders 
face.9 Given the totality of the circumstances, SBM’s collection of information 
regarding physical location and movements effects only an incremental intrusion into 
an aggravated offender’s diminished expectation of privacy.  
¶ 36 
 
In sum, the State’s interest in protecting the public—especially children—from 
aggravated offenders is paramount. The SBM program furthers this interest by 
deterring recidivism and assisting law enforcement agencies in solving crimes. 
Further, an aggravated offender has a diminished expectation of privacy both during 
and after any period of post-release supervision as shown by the numerous lifetime 
restrictions that society imposes upon him. Lastly, the imposition of lifetime SBM 
causes only a limited intrusion into that diminished privacy expectation. Therefore, 
                                            
9 We in no way opine that SBM is a form of punishment. Rather, in looking at the full 
spectrum of potential State action, we highlight criminal imprisonment, civil commitment, 
probation, and occupational debarment to show that SBM is a less intrusive means of 
protecting the public from convicted sex offenders. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
in light of the totality of the circumstances, the paramount government interest 
outweighs the additional intrusion upon an aggravated offender’s diminished privacy 
interests. As such, we hold that a search effected by the imposition of lifetime SBM 
on the category of aggravated offenders is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
Therefore, the SBM statute as applied to aggravated offenders is not 
unconstitutional. 
¶ 37 
 
Here defendant was convicted of first-degree statutory rape and first-degree 
statutory sexual offense. These convictions qualify defendant as an aggravated 
offender under N.C.G.S. § 14-208.6(1a). The trial court thus appropriately ordered 
lifetime SBM pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40A(c). “The touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 
855 n.4, 126 S. Ct. at 2201 n.4. Further, this Court’s practice is to examine searches 
effected by the SBM statute categorically. See Grady III, 372 N.C. at 522, 831 S.E.2d 
at 553. Therefore, in light of our determination in the present case that searches 
effected by the imposition of lifetime SBM are reasonable as applied to the aggravated 
offender category, the trial court’s imposition of SBM in this case does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
III. 
“General Warrant” Under Article I, Section 20 
¶ 38 
 
We next address whether the SBM program complies with Article I, Section 20 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
of the North Carolina Constitution.10 “The analytical framework for reviewing a facial 
constitutional challenge is well-established.” Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 
130, 794 S.E.2d 710, 714 (2016). “Our ‘State Constitution is in no matter a grant of 
power,’ and as such, ‘[a]ll power which is not limited by the Constitution inheres in 
the people, and an act of a State legislature is legal when the Constitution contains 
no prohibition against it.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. 102, 112, 102 S.E.2d 853, 
861 (1958), aff’d, 360 U.S. 45, 79 S. Ct. 985 (1959)). “We seldom uphold facial 
challenges because it is the role of the legislature, rather than this Court, to balance 
disparate interests and find a workable compromise among them.” Id. (quoting 
Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 363 N.C. 500, 502, 681 
S.E.2d 278, 280 (2009)). Thus, we will only declare an act of the General Assembly to 
be unconstitutional when “it [is] plainly and clearly the case” and “its 
unconstitutionality [is] demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt.” Id. (first alteration 
in original) (first quoting State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 
473, 478 (1989), then citing Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 334–35, 410 S.E.2d 887, 
                                            
10 Defendant asks this Court to “declare the SBM procedures codified in [the statute] 
facially unconstitutional because they authorize the issuance of orders which are 
indistinguishable from, and tantamount to, . . . ‘general warrants.’ ” 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
889 (1991)).  
¶ 39 
 
Article I, Section 20 provides that “[g]eneral warrants, whereby any officer or 
other person may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the 
act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not 
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and shall 
not be granted.”11 N.C. Const. art. I, § 20. “Both the state and the U.S. constitutions 
prohibit general warrants, but only the state constitution defines them as such: 
warrants that are not supported by evidence and that do not name names.” John V. 
Orth & Paul Martin Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution 73 (2d ed. 2013). 
“Drawn originally from a section of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the ban on 
general warrants reflects colonial experience with abuses of the procedures of 
criminal investigation by the authorities.” Id. (citing Va. Const. of 1776, Declaration 
of Rights § 10). “Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those 
general warrants known as writs of assistance12 under which . . . . customs officials 
                                            
11 The language of Article I, Section 20 is nearly identical to that in North Carolina’s 
original Constitution. See N.C. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § XI (“That General 
Warrants whereby any Officer or Messenger may be commanded to search suspected Places, 
without Evidence of the Fact committed, or to seize any Person or Persons not named, whose 
offence is not particularly described and supported by Evidence, are dangerous to Liberty, 
and ought not to be granted.”). 
12 These writs of assistance “received their name from the fact that they commanded 
all officers and subjects of the Crown to assist in their execution.” Nelson B. Lasson, The 
History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 53–54 
(1937). 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
[had] blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation 
of the British tax laws.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481, 85 S. Ct. 506, 510 (1965). 
“[T]he consistent and overarching themes in colonial judicial resistance to the writs 
was opposition to their unparticularized nature and to the unconstrained discretion 
they therefore afforded a searcher.” Fabio Arcila Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and 
the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. Pa. 
J. Const. L. 1, 13 (2007) (emphases added).  
Courts and commentators condemned general warrants 
precisely because they lacked each of the protections 
afforded by specific warrants: a complainant’s swearing out 
of specific allegations, the complainant’s accountability for 
fruitless searches, a judge’s assessment of the grounds for 
the warrant, and—perhaps most importantly—clear 
directions to the officer as to whom to arrest or where to 
search. 
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 
655–57 (1999).  
¶ 40 
 
Unlike the writs of assistance seen during the founding era, orders imposing 
lifetime SBM adhere to a meticulous statutory procedure. Under the SBM program, 
a defendant is entitled to a hearing where the State must present evidence 
establishing how the defendant qualifies for SBM enrollment. N.C.G.S. 
§ 14-208.40A(a). The defendant may then present evidence to refute the State’s 
presentation. Id. After hearing evidence from both parties, the trial court must make 
findings of fact for every category of eligibility under which the defendant qualifies. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Id. § 14-208.40A(b). The trial court must then order SBM depending on the 
defendant’s statutory category, each of which requires that the defendant be a 
convicted sex offender. Id. § 14-208.40A(c). These procedural protections are 
significantly more robust than the protections afforded by specific warrants. 
¶ 41 
 
Further, the scope of the search effected by an SBM order is not 
“indiscriminate.” Rather, the General Assembly has defined the limited scope of any 
such search:  
The [SBM] program shall use a system that provides all of 
the following: 
(1) Time-correlated and continuous tracking of the 
geographic location of the subject using a global positioning 
system based on satellite and other location tracking 
technology. 
(2) Reporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive and 
proscriptive schedule or location requirements. Frequency 
of reporting may range from once a day (passive) to near 
real-time (active). 
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40(c). Thus, the State may only access a defendant’s physical 
location as recorded by the satellite monitoring device. Unlike general warrants and 
writs of assistance, the SBM program does not authorize State officials to 
indiscriminately search unidentified individuals for unspecified items and for an 
indefinite period of time without stated cause or constraint. Orders imposing SBM 
pursuant to the program thus do not constitute general warrants. Defendant has 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
failed to demonstrate that the SBM program is unconstitutional beyond reasonable 
doubt. As such, we hold that the SBM order complies with Article I, Section 20.  
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 42 
 
A search arising from the SBM program for a limited category of aggravated 
offenders, given the totality of the circumstances, is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. The purpose of the SBM program to protect the public from sex crimes 
is of paramount importance, and an aggravated offender’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy is significantly diminished. The incremental nature of a search providing 
location information and the method of data collection via an ankle bracelet are more 
inconvenient than intrusive. Moreover, the SBM program provides a particularized 
procedure for imposing SBM and thus does not violate Article I, Section 20. 
Accordingly, we modify and affirm the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision which 
upheld the imposition of SBM during post-release supervision and reverse the portion 
of the decision which held the imposition of post-supervision SBM to be an 
unreasonable search. Therefore, we reinstate the trial court’s SBM order.  
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting. 
 
¶ 43 
 
The majority addresses a version of the satellite-based monitoring (SBM) 
statutes which, as of 2 September 2021, have been amended in ways that likely 
obviate at least some of the constitutional issues which form the basis of Mr. Hilton’s 
appeal. 
See 
Act 
of 
Sept. 
2, 
2021, 
S.L. 
2021-138, 
§ 
18, 
https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2021/Bills/Senate/PDF/S300v8.pdf. 
Although 
the 
majority acknowledges that the new law applies to Mr. Hilton, the majority fails to 
account for the fact that operation of its newly enacted provisions will afford Mr. 
Hilton the opportunity to have the order requiring him to enroll in SBM for life 
converted into an order requiring him to enroll in SBM for ten years. A decision which 
fails to examine the consequences of S.L. 2021-138 ignores the actual manner in 
which SBM will be applied to Mr. Hilton and thus has no relevance to future decisions 
interpreting the statutes governing the SBM program.   
¶ 44 
 
The proper course for a Court to follow when the General Assembly amends a 
statute while litigation involving the constitutionality of that statute is pending is, at 
a minimum, to permit further briefing on the impact of the amendments. Further 
briefing is necessary because when a statute is amended 
it is presumed that the legislature intended either (a) to 
change the substance of the original act, or (b) to clarify the 
meaning of it. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 384, p. 897 (1953). The 
presumption is that the legislature “intended to change the 
original act by creating a new right or withdrawing any 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
existing one.” 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 1930 
(Horack, 3d ed. 1943). 
 
Childers v. Parker's, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260 (1968). As the majority acknowledges, 
the new statutes provide Mr. Hilton with a new remedy. Thus, the opinion rendered 
by the Court today is only relevant for the few weeks remaining until the new law 
takes effect. Absent any exigent or urgent circumstances attendant to the parties in 
this case, the Court acts rashly, and without any apparent rationale or justification, 
in issuing an unnecessary opinion about a law the General Assembly has seen fit to 
change. 
¶ 45 
 
Even on its own terms, the majority’s soon-to-be-irrelevant conclusion that 
imposing lifetime SBM on Mr. Hilton is constitutional, based solely upon his status 
as having been convicted of an aggravated offense as defined under N.C.G.S. § 14-
208.6(1a), without an assessment of his individual circumstances, and absent any 
evidence in the record indicating that lifetime SBM serves the State’s asserted 
interest, is patently incorrect. The majority reaches this conclusion only by flouting 
or mischaracterizing precedents from this Court and the United States Supreme 
Court and by disregarding the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, I dissent. 
I. 
Although Mr. Hilton is currently subject to an order requiring him to 
enroll in lifetime SBM, he will not be required to enroll in SBM for more 
than ten years. 
¶ 46 
 
In Grady III, this Court held unconstitutional the imposition of lifetime SBM 
as applied to “individuals who are subject to mandatory lifetime SBM based solely 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
upon their status as a statutorily defined ‘recidivist’ who have completed their prison 
sentences and are no longer supervised by the State through probation, parole, or 
post-release supervision.” State v. Grady (Grady III), 372 N.C. 509, 522 (2019) 
(footnote omitted). Although we “decline[d] to address the application of SBM beyond 
this class of individuals,” id., our examination of the Fourth Amendment and the 
contours of the SBM program plainly had implications for any individual subject to 
lifetime SBM pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40. Every panel of the Court of Appeals 
confronted with a challenge to a lifetime SBM order—including challenges raised by 
individuals who fell outside the category of offenders addressed in Grady III—turned 
to Grady III for guidance. See, e.g., State v. Gordon, 270 N.C. App. 468, 469 (2020), 
review allowed, writ allowed, 853 S.E.2d 148 (N.C. 2021); State v. Jackson, No. 
COA18-1122, 2020 WL 2847885, at *15–18 (N.C. Ct. App. June 2, 2020) 
(unpublished), review denied, 375 N.C. 494 (2020); State v. Hutchens, 272 N.C. App. 
156, 160–61 (2020).1 The same Fourth Amendment and the same statutes obviously 
apply to any individual subject to SBM, whether he or she is an aggravated offender 
or a recidivist.   
¶ 47 
 
The General Assembly also recognized that Grady III cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40 as applied to all categories of offenders 
                                            
1 A longer list of Court of Appeals decisions interpreting and applying Grady III to 
resolve the merits of an individual’s challenge to an SBM order can be found in Appendix I. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
automatically made subject to lifetime SBM, not just recidivists. S.L. 2021-138, an 
omnibus criminal justice reform bill, is titled in relevant part “AN ACT TO . . . 
ADDRESS 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES 
WITH 
SATELLITE-BASED 
MONITORING RAISED IN STATE VERSUS GRADY AND CREATE A PROCESS 
TO REVIEW WHETHER OFFENDERS SUBJECT TO THAT CASE WHICH WERE 
REMOVED FROM SATELLITE-BASED MONITORING ARE OTHERWISE 
ELIGIBLE.”2  The final version of S.L. 2021-138 which contains the provisions 
amending the SBM program was ratified by the Legislature on 25 August 2021—
after oral argument was heard in this case—and signed by the Governor on 2 
September 2021. The Act becomes effective on 1 December 2021. 
¶ 48 
 
S.L. 2021-138 made changes to the SBM program which will be applicable to 
all individuals ordered to enroll in SBM on the basis of their status as among one of 
the categories of offenders singled out by N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40(a), including 
aggravated offenders similarly situated to Mr. Hilton, after the law becomes effective. 
Many of these changes directly respond to constitutional concerns identified by this 
Court in Grady III. Together, they render much of the majority’s reasoning 
unnecessary dicta. 
                                            
2 As we have noted, “even when the language of a statute is plain, ‘the title of an act 
should be considered in ascertaining the intent of the legislature.’ Smith Chapel Baptist 
Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 812, 517 S.E.2d 874, 879 (1999) (citing State ex rel. 
Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1992)).” Ray v. N.C. DOT, 366 N.C. 
1, 8 (2012). 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 49 
 
First, the Act adds a new section, N.C.G.S. § 14-208.39, which for the first time 
provides some evidentiary basis for the State’s assertion that SBM effectively deters 
individuals convicted of sex offenses from committing further sex crimes. Id. at 
§ 18.(a). Second, the Act amends N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40(a)(1) to impose SBM only upon 
certain categories of offenders, including aggravated offenders and recidivists3, who 
“based on the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice’s risk assessment 
program require[ ] the highest possible level of supervision and monitoring.” Id. at 
§ 18.(c). Third, the Act amends N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40A to establish that an offender 
eligible for SBM pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40(a)(1) shall be ordered to enroll in 
SBM for a period of ten years, rather than for life. Id. at § 18.(d). 
¶ 50 
 
Each of these changes significantly alters the legal terrain upon which the 
constitutionality of SBM as applied to individuals subject to SBM due to their status 
as aggravated offenders will be assessed going forward. Because the majority opinion 
addresses a version of the SBM program yet to incorporate these changes, our 
decision today has no relevance to the disposition of future legal challenges brought 
by any individual after S.L. 2021-138 takes effect on 1 December 2021.  
¶ 51 
 
However, because the majority’s opinion also ignores changes the General 
Assembly made to the SBM program which directly and unmistakably apply to 
                                            
3 S.L. 2021-138 uses the term “reoffender” instead of “recidivist.” For ease of reading, 
I continue to use the term “recidivist” throughout. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
individuals ordered to enroll in lifetime SBM prior to the enactment of S.L. 2021-138, 
the majority opinion has little relevance as applied to Mr. Hilton, either.  
¶ 52 
 
S.L. 2021-138 adds a new section to Article 27A which provides that an 
offender like Mr. Hilton who is “enrolled in a satellite-based monitoring [program] for 
life may file a petition for termination or modification of the monitoring requirement 
with the superior court in the county where the conviction occurred five years after 
the date of initial enrollment.” Act of Sept. 2, S.L. 2021-138, § 18.(i) (to be codified at 
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.46(a)). Only two outcomes can result when an individual files such 
a petition. For individuals who have been enrolled in SBM for less than ten years, 
“the court shall order the petitioner to remain enrolled in the satellite-based 
monitoring program for a total of 10 years.” Id. (to be codified at N.C.G.S. § 14-
208.46(d)). For individuals who have been enrolled in SBM for more than ten years, 
“the court shall order the petitioner’s requirement to enroll in the satellite-based 
monitoring program be terminated.” Id. (to be codified at N.C.G.S. § 14-208.46(e)). 
Thus, upon motion of any individual subject to an order requiring lifetime enrollment 
in SBM, the order requiring lifetime enrollment in SBM will be converted into an 
order requiring enrollment in SBM for a period of time not to exceed ten years. 
¶ 53 
 
Shortening the period of time an individual is required to enroll in SBM from 
life to ten years significantly diminishes the burden SBM places on an individual’s 
constitutional privacy interests. It reduces the likelihood that an individual will be 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
required to enroll in SBM for an extended period of time beyond his or her period of 
incarceration and post-release supervision. It also reduces the risk that technological 
advancements—or changes in an individual’s circumstances—will render the 
considerations justifying the initial imposition of SBM obsolete. The period of time 
Mr. Hilton would be subject to SBM was undoubtedly relevant to the Court of 
Appeals’ disposition of his appeal, which correctly distinguished between the period 
of time during which Mr. Hilton was under post-release supervision and the 
remainder of his life after completing the terms of his sentence. State v. Hilton, 271 
N.C. App. 505, 512–13 (2020) (“After [his] period of supervision, the imposition of 
SBM is no longer reasonable, as [Mr. Hilton’s] expectation of privacy is too high and 
the State’s legitimate purpose in monitoring [his] location . . . is extinguished.”). At a 
minimum, this Court should consider the changes implemented by S.L. 2021-138 
before resolving Mr. Hilton’s constitutional claims.  
¶ 54 
 
Consistent with the text, purpose, and structure of S.L. 2021-138, Mr. Hilton 
will be entitled to avail himself of the new procedural mechanism created by 
subsection 18.(i) of the Act. Subsection 18.(p) provides that “[s]ubsection (i) of this 
section becomes effective December 1, 2021, and applies to any individual required to 
enroll in satellite-based monitoring for life on or after that date.” As the statutes 
governing the SBM program make readily apparent, individuals like Mr. Hilton who 
were initially ordered to enroll in lifetime SBM prior to 1 December 2021 will be 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
“required to enroll” in SBM on 1 December 2021, 2 December 2021, and on every day 
afterwards unless and until the initial order is modified or terminated. 
[W]hen an offender is required to enroll in satellite-based 
monitoring . . . the offender shall continue to be enrolled in 
the satellite-based monitoring program for the period 
required [ ] unless the requirement that the person enroll in 
a satellite-based monitoring program is terminated. . . . The 
offender shall cooperate with the Division of Adult 
Correction and Juvenile Justice and the requirements of 
the satellite-based monitoring program until the offender's 
requirement to enroll is terminated[.]” 
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.42 (2019) (emphases added). Further, if individuals like Mr. Hilton 
are not entitled to utilize the procedural mechanism created by subsection 18.(i) of 
the Act, then nobody is. Subsection 18.(i) provides that “[a]n offender who is enrolled 
in a satellite-based monitoring for life may file a petition for termination or 
modification of the monitoring requirement . . . .” Id. at § 18.(i). However, after 1 
December 2021, every court entering an SBM order must comply with the statutory 
changes enacted by subsection 18.(d), which amends N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40A to require 
a court to “order the offender to enroll in a [SBM] program for a period of 10 years.” 
Id. at § 18.(d). To respect the legislature’s policy choice to afford offenders required to 
enroll in lifetime SBM a process through which those orders will be modified or 
terminated, individuals like Mr. Hilton who were previously ordered to enroll in 
lifetime SBM must be able to utilize the procedural mechanism subsection 18.(i) 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
creates.4  
¶ 55 
 
The practical effect of S.L. 2021-138 is that no individual in North Carolina, no 
matter when they were initially ordered to participate in SBM, will be required to 
enroll in the program for life if they avail themselves of the process established by 
statute. Thus, the majority’s sweeping holding that “a search effected by the 
imposition of lifetime SBM upon a defendant due to his status as an aggravated 
offender is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” does not address the 
circumstances of this case, or of any case that is likely to arise under North Carolina 
law. We lack authority and reason to construe a statute the legislature has chosen to 
amend. Cf. State v. McCluney, 280 N.C. 404, 407 (1972) (holding that “repeal of [the 
challenged statute] renders moot the question of its constitutionality”). Given the 
changes enacted by S.L. 2021-138, the majority opinion does no more than express 
the speculative view of four Justices that it would not offend the Fourth Amendment 
to require an individual to enroll in SBM for life based solely upon his or her status 
                                            
4 The final report summarizing S.B. 300 (now S.L. 2021-138) released by the General 
Assembly’s Legislative Analysis Division stated that the provisions amending the SBM 
program “to address constitutional issues” would “[r]educe lifetime SBM to ten years” and 
“[a]llow for a judicial review to terminate or modify SBM for offenders.” Legislative Analysis 
Division, 
2021–22 
N.C. 
Gen. 
Assemb., 
Bill 
Summary 
(Aug. 
18, 
2021), 
https://dashboard.ncleg.gov/api/Services/BillSummary/2021/S300-SMSA-67(e6)-v-
2.  Although not determinative, this “contemporaneous committee report[ ]” sheds further 
light on the “purpose of this specific part” of the broader Act, Est. of Savino v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 375 N.C. 288, 296 (2020), which is to ensure that no individual in 
North Carolina is required to enroll in SBM for life given the significant constitutional issues 
such a requirement creates.  
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
as an aggravated offender. Under our precedents, that is not a function this Court is 
empowered to perform. 
II. 
The Fourth Amendment does not permit the State to impose lifetime 
SBM solely on the basis of an individual’s status as an aggravated 
offender. 
¶ 56 
 
For the reasons stated above, I do not believe it is necessary for the majority 
to opine on the constitutionality of subjecting Mr. Hilton to lifetime SBM when S.L. 
2021-138 will afford him the opportunity to seek and obtain an order reducing his 
required period of enrollment from life to ten years. However, because the majority 
chooses to reach this question, I also write to explain why its choice to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and leave the trial court’s SBM order undisturbed 
cannot be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment or with the precedent we 
established in Grady III. 
A.  
SBM is a “civil, regulatory scheme,” not a lesser “punishment.” 
¶ 57 
 
First, the majority justifies the imposition of lifetime SBM on Mr. Hilton as a 
lesser punishment than imprisonment. The implication is that because the 
alternative to an order imposing SBM is criminal imprisonment or civil commitment, 
the intrusion on Mr. Hilton’s privacy rights is minimal. Yet the order imposing SBM 
on Mr. Hilton is not restricted to Mr. Hilton’s period of incarceration and post-release 
supervision—the order imposes SBM for life, including any time remaining after he 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
has completed all of the terms of his sentence.5 The majority’s sweeping logic simply 
does not hold true under circumstances contemplated in the order itself. 
¶ 58 
 
More fundamentally, this Court held in State v. Bowditch, 364 N.C. 335 (2010), 
that North Carolina’s SBM program is a “civil, regulatory scheme” with a 
“nonpunitive” legislative intent. Id. at 342–44. Ignoring this holding, the majority 
adopts a “heads I win, tails you lose” approach. On the one hand, SBM (arguably) can 
be applied consistently with the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 
because it is non-punitive. On the other hand, SBM (arguably) can be applied 
consistently with the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures because it is a lesser form of punishment. The State should not be 
afforded the opportunity to have its cake and eat it too. Having decided Bowditch, 
this Court should adhere to its conclusions about the SBM program’s purpose and 
effect. The SBM program cannot be justified as a substitute for a more intrusive form 
of criminal punishment because SBM is not a form of criminal punishment.  
B.  
The majority’s sweeping opinion is untethered to the facts. 
¶ 59 
 
Second, the majority goes far beyond the issue presented by the facts in this 
                                            
5 To reiterate, Mr. Hilton will not be required to enroll in SBM for life because of the 
changes to the SBM program contained in S.L. 2021-138. Additionally, as stated above, 
reducing the period of time an offender will be required to enroll in SBM from life to ten years 
has significant implications for our examination of SBM’s constitutionality as applied to Mr. 
Hilton or to any other similarly situated individual. However, for the purposes of illustrating 
the errors in the majority’s constitutional analysis, I adopt the majority’s premise that Mr. 
Hilton will be required to enroll in SBM for the remainder of his life. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
case. The majority declares that any offender who has committed an aggravated 
offense may constitutionally be ordered to enroll in SBM for life, whether currently 
under state supervision or not. Yet Mr. Hilton’s present status as someone under the 
supervision of the Division of Adult Corrections has immense constitutional 
ramifications. Because he has not completed his sentence, Mr. Hilton arguably has a 
lesser privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment than someone who has 
completed his sentence and re-entered society. See Grady III, 372 N.C. at 533 
(“[T]here is no precedent for the proposition that persons . . . who have served their 
sentences and whose legal rights have been restored to them (with the exception of 
the right to possess firearms . . . nevertheless have a diminished expectation of 
privacy in their persons and in their physical locations at any and all times of the day 
or night for the rest of their lives.”). Mr. Hilton could also be required to participate 
in electronic monitoring as a condition of his post-release supervision independent of 
the sex-offender statute at issue here. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1368.4(e)(13) (2019). He is 
not similarly situated to every aggravated offender subject to a lifetime SBM order. 
The majority errs in proceeding as if he is. 
¶ 60 
 
The majority repeatedly characterizes this Court’s opinion in Grady III as 
limited or narrow. This characterization is correct, to a point: the holding of Grady 
III was carefully tailored to the facts before the Court at that time, although it was 
not so limited or narrow as to have no applicability in any case involving an individual 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
who is not a recidivist. See Grady III, 372 N.C. at 545. Regardless, it is the majority’s 
(mis)characterization of Grady III as being so limited and so narrow that it has no 
applicability beyond the specific facts of that case which allows the majority to 
pretend a precedent we established in 2019 simply does not exist.  
¶ 61 
 
Yet, for some reason, the majority now feels completely unburdened by our 
longstanding norms of judicial modesty and by constitutional constraints on judicial 
power. Rather than issue an opinion limited to the category of offenders implicated 
by the facts of this case—aggravated offenders who are currently under State 
supervision and control—the majority feels entitled to opine on categories of 
individuals who differ from Mr. Hilton in constitutionally salient ways. Rather than 
wait for a case that presents the issue of whether SBM is constitutional as applied to 
an offender who is no longer subject to State supervision and control,6 the majority 
eagerly jumps at the chance to try to immunize a soon-to-be-outdated version of the 
SBM program from constitutional challenge in every conceivable circumstance. Our 
role as judges has traditionally meant avoiding broad, facial holdings when a narrow, 
case-specific one will suffice. See Kirkman v. Wilson, 328 N.C. 309, 312 (1991) (“The 
                                            
6 The majority rests heavily on the fact that because SBM is a civil judgment (except 
when it is not), a defendant who is subject to SBM but no longer subject to State supervision 
or control may move “the court . . . [to] relieve [him] from a final . . . [SBM] order . . . for . . . 
[a]ny . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 
60(b)(6) (2019). Of course, it flips the Fourth Amendment on its head to affirm an order 
allowing the State to effectuate what may very well be an unconstitutional search on the 
promise that an individual could someday get back into court. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
function of appellate courts . . . is not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical 
matters.” (alteration in original)). There is no justification for abandoning this rule 
in this case. 
C. The majority improperly excuses the State from its burden of 
demonstrating the efficacy of the SBM program. 
¶ 62 
 
Third, the majority’s Fourth Amendment analysis rests on factual conclusions 
it draws out of thin air. A warrantless search is only constitutional if it is reasonable. 
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014). Reasonableness requires 
an examination of “the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the 
search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.” Grady v. North Carolina, 575 
U.S. 306, 310 (2015) (per curiam). The Fourth Amendment places the burden on the 
State to prove that the search is reasonable, not on the individual being searched to 
prove that it is not. Grady III, 372 N.C. at 543 (“[T]he State bears the burden of 
proving the reasonableness of a warrantless search.”). If a search does not effectively 
advance the interest the State invokes to justify it, then it is hard to fathom how the 
search could be reasonable, no matter how weighty the State’s interest. Thus, 
adhering to United States Supreme Court precedent, we held in Grady III that we 
must “consider the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, 
and the efficacy of this means for meeting it.” 372 N.C. at 538 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995)). 
¶ 63 
 
It is undisputed that in this case, the State did not present any evidence to 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
support its assertion that imposing lifetime SBM deters sex offenders from 
committing future sex crimes. In the face of that stark evidentiary void, the majority 
is willing to lend a helping hand. According to the majority, “[t]he SBM program 
furthers [the State’s asserted] interest by deterring recidivism and assisting law 
enforcement agencies in solving crimes.” To be clear, there is not actually any 
evidence in the record demonstrating the efficacy of SBM, either categorically or 
specifically in this case. The empirical studies the majority relies upon were not 
introduced by the State at Mr. Hilton’s initial SBM hearing. They were not even cited 
by the State on appeal. Mr. Hilton did not have an opportunity to dispute the efficacy 
of SBM by introducing his own studies or critiquing the ones the majority finds 
persuasive. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 n.20 
(2008) (“Supposition . . . is not an adequate substitute for admissible evidence subject 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
to cross-examination in constitutional adjudication.”).7 It is difficult to imagine a 
more glaring example of an “impermissible exercise of appellate factfinding,” In re 
Harris Teeter, LLC, 2021-NCSC-80, ¶ 34, than the majority making two studies the 
parties did not cite in any proceeding below the linchpin of its analysis.  
¶ 64 
 
In further support of its conclusion regarding the efficacy of SBM, the majority 
claims that “[j]ust as the drug-testing policy in Vernonia serves as an effective 
deterrent with respect to student athletes categorically, the SBM program in the 
present case serves as an effective deterrent with respect to aggravated offenders 
categorically.” This analogy does not hold up. The efficacy of a program for drug 
testing students is “self-evident” because the only thing the program needs to do is 
identify the presence or absence of drugs in a student’s system. See Vernonia, 515 
U.S. at 663. Provided that the tests are accurate, there is simply no disputing that a 
                                            
7 This Court specifically rejected the argument that the deterrence effect of SBM was 
self-evident in Grady III in part because the social science research available at the time that 
case was decided indicated that “applications of electronic monitoring as a tool for reducing 
crime are not supported by existing data.” State v. Grady (Grady III), 372 N.C. 509, 543 n. 20 
(2019) (quoting Deeanna M. Button et al., Using Electronic Monitoring to Supervise Sex 
Offenders: Legislative Patterns and Implications for Community Corrections Officers, 20 
Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 414, 418 (2009)). Further, the studies the majority relies upon in 
support of its conclusion that “SBM’s efficacy as a deterrent is supported by empirical data” 
both involved a California-specific program requiring intensive supervision of parolees. One 
of the studies found that the likelihood of a parolee violating the conditions of his or her 
parole or reoffending correlated significantly with a parole officer’s caseload, leading the 
researchers to recommend “smaller caseloads of no more than 20 people per officer.” Philip 
Bulman, Sex Offenders Monitored by GPS Found to Commit Fewer Crimes, 271 NIJ J. 22 
(Feb. 2013). This conflicting empirical data further undermine the majority’s assertion that 
the efficacy of lifetime SBM is “self-evident” and illustrate the need for these evidentiary 
issues to be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
program which regularly subjects students to drug testing—and promises they will 
be punished if they test positive—serves the government’s interest in deterring 
student drug use.8   
¶ 65 
 
By contrast, the link between lifetime SBM and recidivism is far more complex. 
Even in this case, the most the State’s witness could offer was to answer in the 
affirmative when asked “hypothetically if the first time [Mr. Hilton] went to Caldwell 
County he had no contact with [the victim], then you possibly, if in fact an assault did 
occur, you might have been able to avoid that with satellite-based monitoring?” 
Lifetime enrollment in SBM “[h]ypothetically,” “possibly,” “might” have helped deter 
a crime allegedly committed by an aggravated offender still subject to post-release 
supervision. This is hardly the kind of ringing endorsement one would expect of a 
proposition the majority suggests is self-evident.   
¶ 66 
 
It may seem pedantic to hold the State to its burden of proving that the SBM 
program effectively deters sex offenders from committing future sex crimes, and 
maybe it would be, if the only interest implicated here was the State’s interest in 
                                            
8 Further, in Vernonia, the United States Supreme Court went out of its way to 
“caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass 
constitutional muster in other contexts. The most significant element in this case is the first 
we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s 
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to 
its care.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995). The majority’s 
willingness to cherry-pick and expand Vernonia’s limited, context-specific holding—which 
involved very different circumstances and very different interests—stands in stark contrast 
to its disavowal of Grady III based upon its convenient view of that decision’s limits. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
promoting public safety. After all, it certainly seems possible that strapping a plastic 
box to a person’s leg in order to collect location data in perpetuity will deter that 
person from committing future crimes. The problem with this view is that the State’s 
interest is not and cannot be the only interest that matters when evaluating the scope 
of protection afforded to North Carolinians under our state and federal constitutions.   
¶ 67 
 
When we allow the State to define for itself when a presumptively 
unreasonable search is reasonable, we place all North Carolinians’ constitutional 
rights at risk. After all, the Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” by the 
government. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Preventing law enforcement officers and other 
government officials from acting unlawfully is “[t]he point of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). The State could have 
presented evidence to support its assertion that SBM promotes its legitimate 
governmental interest in preventing sex offenders from reoffending. It did not. That 
should end our inquiry. Yet rather than hold the State to this very much 
surmountable burden, the majority excuses the State’s inability or unwillingness to 
present any evidence demonstrating that SBM helps deter recidivism and instead 
invents a new test: a warrantless, suspicionless search is reasonable when the State 
says it is. The danger for abuse should be self-evident.  
 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
D. The majority’s flagrant disregard for precedent. 
¶ 68 
 
Finally, the majority has adopted numerous arguments advanced in the 
dissenting opinion in Grady III which the majority in that case rejected. Key factual 
and legal conclusions established in Grady III have been turned upside down. 
Without acknowledgment, the majority proceeds as if the dissent in Grady III controls 
in analyzing the constitutionality of a lifetime SBM order under the Fourth 
Amendment.9 The majority’s refusal to adhere to precedent is inconsistent with this 
Court’s longstanding respect for the doctrine of stare decisis, creates unnecessary and 
inexplicable fissures in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and threatens this 
Court’s legitimacy. 
¶ 69 
 
On numerous occasions, the majority opinion in this case discards legal 
principles articulated by the majority in Grady III which plainly apply in examining 
any offender’s challenge to an order imposing lifetime SBM, including Mr. Hilton’s. 
For example, in Grady III, we explained that “[i]n addressing the search’s ‘intrusion 
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests,’ ‘[t]he first factor to be considered is 
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search here at issue intrudes,’ or, 
in other words, ‘the scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue.’ ” Grady 
                                            
9 To be sure, the majority does not expressly or impliedly overrule Grady III. Thus, its 
holding that it is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to require certain offenders 
to enroll in lifetime SBM remains binding precedent, at least with respect to the category of 
offenders addressed in that case. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
III, 372 N.C. at 527 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652–54, 658).  Now, the majority decides instead that “[t]he 
first step of our reasonableness inquiry under the totality of the circumstances 
requires analyzing the legitimacy of the State’s interest.” 
¶ 70 
 
In assessing the State’s interest in Grady III, this Court held that “the extent 
of a problem justifying the need for a warrantless search cannot simply be assumed; 
instead, the existence of the problem and the efficacy of the solution need to be 
demonstrated by the government.” Id. at 540–41. We explicitly rejected the argument 
that “we must defer to . . . legislative findings concerning the significance of the 
problem the SBM program is intended to address and the risk of sex offenders re-
offending as codified at N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5 (stating the ‘Purpose’ of Article 27A) 
despite the absence of any record evidence supporting the State’s position.” Id. at 
541–42. We found an inconsistency between the record evidence in that case and the 
relevant legislative findings and further noted that the referenced “findings” related 
to the sex offender registry, not the SBM program.  Id.  Today, the majority relies on 
the exact same legislative statement of purpose to support the factual conclusion that 
sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending.  
¶ 71 
 
A central question in the constitutional analysis and one that should be of 
concern to all is whether the SBM program actually accomplishes the purposes it is 
intended to achieve. On this fundamental issue of efficacy, in Grady III this Court 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
again explicitly rejected the position now adopted by the majority that the program’s 
deterrent effect is self-evident. See Id. at 543–44 (“[T]he State has not presented any 
evidence demonstrating that the SBM program is effective at deterring crime. . . . We 
cannot simply assume that the program serves its goals and purposes . . . .”).  
¶ 72 
 
Another example of the majority’s abandonment of Grady III when conducting 
the balancing required under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry is its 
characterization of the intrusiveness of the search SBM effectuates. In Grady III, this 
Court explicitly rejected the State’s argument that “[t]he physical intrusion here is 
minimal,” id. at 536 (alteration in original), concluding instead that the physical 
intrusiveness of SBM is both distinct in nature from the requirements of the sex 
offender registry and substantial, id. at 537. We stated that “[w]e cannot agree with 
the Court of Appeals that these physical restrictions, [like charging the ankle 
monitoring device,] which require defendant to be tethered to a wall for what amounts 
to one month out of every year, are ‘more inconvenient that intrusive.’ ” Id. at 535–
36 (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Grady, 259 N.C. App. 664, 672 (2018)). Today, 
the Court holds, directly contra Grady III, that “[t]hese physical limitations are more 
inconvenient than intrusive and do not materially invade an aggravated offender’s 
diminished privacy expectations.” SBM technology has not changed. The requirement 
that the person wearing an ankle monitoring device must be tethered to the wall for 
two hours a day to charge the battery has not changed. The fact that an audible sound 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
is emitted when voice commands are made has not changed. And there is no 
difference in the level of intrusiveness of SBM for an individual who is a recidivist as 
compared to an aggravated offender.  
¶ 73 
 
On the question of whether a court order to enroll in lifetime SBM is easily 
terminated, the Grady III Court examined the significance of the fact that North 
Carolina law provides for review by the Post-Release Supervision and Parole 
Commission and found several practical and constitutional problems with this 
purported remedy. Id. at 534–35, 534 n.16. We noted that from 2010 through 2015 
the Commission received only sixteen requests for termination by individuals subject 
to lifetime SBM and denied all of them. Id. at 535. The majority now makes the 
completely unsupported factual assumptions that “the aggravated offender category 
applies only to a small subset of individuals” and that while the statute refers to 
“lifetime” monitoring, termination is practically available after one year.  
¶ 74 
 
Similarly, with regard to Mr. Hilton’s state constitutional claim, the majority 
relies upon reasoning rejected by the United States Supreme Court and by this Court 
in the Grady cases. The majority concludes that an order imposing mandatory 
lifetime SBM is not a general warrant, and is thus constitutional, because SBM only 
provides information about a person’s location. Yet this requires embracing a 
characterization of the SBM program as not actually effectuating a constitutional 
search—a characterization the United States Supreme Court unanimously overruled 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
in a per curiam opinion. The majority’s fact-free, tautological reasoning has the effect 
of nullifying any meaningful judicial review of claims arising under Article I, Section 
20 of the North Carolina Constitution altogether.  
¶ 75 
 
I could go on. But proceeding issue by issue to examine all the ways in which 
this Court is now disavowing Grady III, without acknowledging what it is doing or 
even trying to justify its norm-breaking opinion, risks missing the forest for the trees. 
Nothing about SBM or the Fourth Amendment has changed between our decision in 
Grady III and the decision today. The only thing that has changed is the composition 
of the Court. 
¶ 76 
 
In refusing to adhere to Grady III, the majority ignores the dozens of Court of 
Appeals decisions interpreting and applying Grady III’s logic in cases involving non-
recidivists. See, e.g., State v. Perez, 854 S.E.2d 15, 21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (“Since our 
Supreme Court’s holding in Grady III, this Court has applied the reasonableness 
analysis under the totality of the circumstances to non-recidivists in SBM appeals in 
accordance with Grady I.”); Gordon, 270 N.C. App. at 475–77 (applying the 
reasonableness analysis employed in Grady III to a defendant convicted of an 
aggravated offense and subject to lifetime SBM as a result); State v. Griffin, 270 N.C. 
App. 98, 106 (2020) (“Grady III offers guidance as to what factors to consider in 
determining whether SBM is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.”), 
review allowed, writ allowed, 854 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 2021); Jackson, 2020 WL 2847885, 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
at *16 (“Defendant is an aggravated offender subject to mandatory lifetime SBM 
following his release from incarceration, placing his circumstances outside of the 
limited facial holding of Grady III. Accordingly, as we did in Griffin . . . , we employ 
Grady III as a roadmap . . . .”). This Court is not bound by Court of Appeals decisions, 
but the majority’s failure to explain why Grady III is inapposite in a case applying 
Fourth Amendment principles to examine the constitutionality of a lifetime SBM 
order—contrary to the reasoning of every Court of Appeals panel which has 
considered the very same question—is inexcusable.10 
¶ 77 
 
Ostensibly, our Court adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis. See, e.g., In re 
T.A.M., 2021-NCSC-77, ¶ 61 (Ervin, J. dissenting) (“[T]hose who disagree with an 
earlier decision are expected to continue to adhere to it unless and until it is 
overruled.”). “This Court has always attached great importance to the doctrine 
of stare decisis, both out of respect for the opinions of our predecessors and because it 
promotes stability in the law and uniformity in its application.” Wiles v. Welparnel 
Constr. Co., 295 N.C. 81, 85 (1978). Indeed, respect for our own precedents is 
necessary for us to remain faithful to the rule of law. 
                                            
10 The majority states that Grady III “has no bearing on cases where lifetime SBM is 
imposed on sexually violent offenders, aggravated offenders, or adult-child offenders” because 
the decision was limited to a narrow class of recidivists. But the majority does little to explain 
the distinction between recidivists and aggravated offenders which justifies discarding the 
reasoning we articulated in Grady III. Again, the Fourth Amendment and the SBM statutes 
which govern the lawfulness of subjecting an individual to lifetime SBM are the same for 
recidivists and aggravated offenders.  
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
This rigorous standard for constitutional challenges 
ensures uniformity and predictability in the application of 
our constitution. State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 584, 31 
S.E.2d 858, 861 (1944) (“[Constitutions] should receive a 
consistent and uniform construction . . . even though 
circumstances may have so changed as to render a different 
construction desirable.” (citing, inter alia, State ex rel. 
Att’y-Gen. v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 85 S.E. 418 (1915))); see 
also Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712, 549 S.E.2d 840, 851–
52 (“A primary goal of adjudicatory proceedings is the 
uniform application of law. In furtherance of this objective, 
courts generally consider themselves bound by prior 
precedent, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis.” (citations 
omitted)), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 975, 122 S. Ct. 22, 150 L. 
Ed. 2d 804 (2001). Adhering to this fixed standard ensures 
that we remain true to the rule of law, the consistent 
interpretation and application of the law. State v. Bell, 184 
N.C. 701, 720, 115 S.E. 190, 199 (1922) (Stacy, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]here must be some uniformity in judicial 
decisions . . . or else the law itself, the very chart by which 
we are sailing, will become as unstable and uncertain as 
the shifting sands of the sea . . . .”). 
 
State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 651 (2016) (Newby, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (alterations in original). “Our system of constitutional 
adjudication depends upon a vast reservoir of respect for law and courts.”  Archibald 
Cox, The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform 25 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1968). Public acceptance of the legitimate authority of judicial 
decisions rests “at least partly upon the understanding that what the judge decides 
is not simply his personal notion of what is desirable but the application of rules that 
apply to all men equally, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.” Id. at 26. This Court’s 
actions today threaten to drain that “reservoir of respect for law and courts.”  
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 78 
 
Of course, “stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable command.’ ” Janus v. Am. Fed’n 
of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (quoting 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009)). On rare occasion, a Court will find it 
necessary to depart from the conclusions and reasoning it endorsed in its own prior 
decisions. Although this Court has not articulated factors to consider when examining 
the continued vitality of our precedents—perhaps because this Court has for so long 
respected the doctrine of stare decisis—the United States Supreme Court considers 
“the quality of [ ] reasoning [of the precedent being challenged], the workability of the 
rule it established, its consistency with other related decisions, developments since 
the decision was handed down, and reliance on the decision.” Id. at 2478–79.  
¶ 79 
 
In light of these factors, what is particularly troubling about the majority’s 
unwillingness to adhere to Grady III is that it comes in precisely the circumstances 
where respect for our precedent should be at its apex. Here, based upon a plausible 
reading of Grady III, the General Assembly expended significant time and energy to 
address the SBM program’s constitutional deficiencies. The constitutionality of a law 
was challenged. This Court ruled. The General Assembly responded. This is precisely 
how our system of constitutional adjudication and judicial review should proceed. Cf. 
Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (“Stare decisis has added 
force when the legislature, in the public sphere . . . ha[s] acted in reliance on a 
previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative response.”). The majority 
should not ignore a precedent it does not like, in a circumstance where doing so is 
both unwarranted and, given the passage of S.L. 2021-138, completely unnecessary, 
absent a compelling reason or any identifiable reason at all.  
¶ 80 
 
A Court which discards its own precedents without explaining why it is doing 
so—which refuses to even admit what it is doing—is a Court which forfeits its claim 
to the special legitimacy the judiciary purports to derive from its capacity to reason 
and persuade. That is precisely what this Court does today. In “disregarding or 
distorting precedent as necessary to reach their desired result,” the majority flaunts 
its power and tells the public “ ‘C’est légal, parce que je le veux’ (‘It is legal because it 
is my will.’).” State v. Robinson, 375 N.C. 173, 193 (2020) (Newby, J., dissenting). The 
majority also signals to future litigants that the relevance of our decisions depends 
not upon any objective set of rules articulated by the Court, but rather upon the 
whims of its members. Whether or not one agrees with the outcome of Grady III or 
with the outcome of this case, the majority’s flagrant disregard for precedent and its 
unwillingness to own up to its actions should be alarming to anyone in North Carolina 
who cares about constitutional rights and the rule of law.   
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 81 
 
It is important to not shy away from the facts of this particular case. Mr. Hilton 
was convicted of sexually abusing two minors. When he was released from prison 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
after serving a 12-year sentence, he violated a condition of his post-release 
supervision by traveling to Caldwell County without his probation officer’s 
permission. He was subsequently accused of sexually assaulting another minor 
during at least one of these unauthorized trips. Although the State’s testimony was 
extremely speculative, it is certainly possible that if the assault was not on his first 
trip and if the probation officer supervising Mr. Hilton had intervened after the first 
trip to stop Mr. Hilton from leaving Catawba County, then the second assault may 
have been avoided. Given the magnitude of the harm inflicted by individuals who 
commit aggravated sex offenses—and the frightening prospect of prior offenders 
reoffending upon their release from prison—it is tempting to allow the State to do 
pretty much whatever it wants in the name of deterring crime.  
¶ 82 
 
Yet without disputing the magnitude of the interest the State asserts to justify 
its imposition of SBM in this case, I cannot join the majority in its unqualified 
embrace of an application of SBM that is both unconstitutional and irreconcilable 
with recent precedents of this Court and the United States Supreme Court, in a case 
that has been significantly altered by the General Assembly’s substantial revision of 
the SBM program. I cannot join the majority in its decision to “shr[i]nk from declaring 
the truth” that the constitutions of North Carolina and the United States do not 
permit the State to intrude upon the privacy of its citizens merely because the 
legislature declares the intrusion wise. Stanmire v. Taylor, 48 N.C. 207, 211 (1855). 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Although of limited relevance, the majority opinion represents a grievous violation of 
our “solemn obligation” to enforce constitutional rights against State overreach. Id.   
¶ 83 
 
The practical result of the majority’s holding has been nullified because, as 
explained above, the law the majority purports to interpret will no longer exist after 
1 December 2021. Nevertheless, the majority’s reasoning is troubling. According to 
the majority, the State would be permitted to physically affix an electronic tracker to 
Mr. Hilton’s ankle and collect pinpoint location data from now until the day he dies, 
based solely upon his status as an aggravated offender, even after he has completed 
all terms of his criminal sentence. The majority may think this an effective way to 
prevent recidivism. It may very well be. But allowing the State to conduct an invasive, 
never-ending search of an individual’s person, without requiring the State to present 
any evidence that doing so in any way serves the interest the State advances to justify 
the search, makes a mockery of the constitutional rights which protect all North 
Carolinians. I disagree with the majority’s abandonment of the state and federal 
constitutions, its refusal to respect the Court and its precedents, and its abdication of 
our judicial role. If this Court believes it necessary to reach the merits of Mr. Hilton’s 
claim absent further briefing on the ramifications of S.L. 2021-138, I would affirm 
the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing in part the order imposing lifetime 
SBM on Mr. Hilton. Therefore, I dissent. 
Justice HUDSON and Justice ERVIN join in this dissenting opinion. 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
Appendix: 
Case 
Category 
Court of 
Appeals 
Disposition as 
to SBM 
State v. Clemons, No. COA18-469, 2019 WL 6134546 
(N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2019) (unpublished). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Dravis, 269 N.C. App. 617 (2020). 
Lifetime 
(unknown 
category) 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Griffin, 270 N.C. App. 98 (2020), review 
allowed, writ allowed, 854 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 2021). 
30 years 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Gordon, 270 N.C. App. 468 (2020), review 
allowed, writ allowed, 853 S.E.2d 148 (N.C. 2021). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime  
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Graham, 270 N.C. App. 478, writ allowed, 845 
S.E.2d 788 (N.C. 2020), review allowed in part, denied 
in part, 375 N.C. 272 (2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
Vacated 
and 
Remanded  
State v. Willis, No. COA18-507, 2020 WL 2126759 
(N.C. Ct. App. May 5, 2020) (unpublished). 
Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Ricks, 271 N.C. App. 348, writ allowed, 375 
N.C. 281 (2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Vacated  
State v. Jackson, No. COA18-1122, 2020 WL 2847885 
(N.C. Ct. App. June 2, 2020) (unpublished), review 
denied, 375 N.C. 494 (2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Hutchens, 272 N.C. App. 156 (2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Tucker, 272 N.C. App. 223, writ denied, 843 
S.E.2d 647 (N.C. 2020), review denied, 376 N.C. 546 
(2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Springle, No. COA17-652-2, 2020 WL 4187312 
(N.C. Ct. App. July 21, 2020) (unpublished). 
Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Lindquist, 273 N.C. App. 163 (2020). 
Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Vacated 
and 
Remanded 
State v. Thompson, 273 N.C. App. 686 (2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Strudwick, 273 N.C. App. 676 (2020), writ 
allowed, 849 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. 2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Ennis, No. COA19-896, 2020 WL 5902804 
(N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2020) (unpublished), review 
denied, 851 S.E.2d 49 (N.C. 2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Vacated  
State v. Battle, No. COA19-677, 2020 WL 6140629 Non-Recidivist SBM 
Order 
STATE V. HILTON 
2021-NCSC-115 
Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
(N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2020) (unpublished). 
Lifetime 
Vacated 
State v. Cooper, No. COA18-637-2, 2020 WL 6140636 
(N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2020) (unpublished). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Anthony, No. COA18-1118-2, 2020 WL 
6742712 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2020) (unpublished). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Essary, No. COA19-917, 2020 WL 7038839 
(N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2020) (unpublished), review 
denied, 376 N.C. 902 (2021). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Vacated 
State v. Harris, 854 S.E.2d 51 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020), 
writ allowed, 376 N.C. 679 (2021). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Perez, 854 S.E.2d 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Robinson, 854 S.E.2d 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020). Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Westbrook, No. COA18-32-2, 2020 WL 
7973944 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2020) (unpublished). 
Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. White, No. COA18-39-2, 2020 WL 7974418 
(N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2020) (unpublished). 
10 years 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Clark, No. COA19-318, 2020 WL 7974412 
(N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2020) (unpublished). 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM Order Held 
Unconstitutional 
State v. Chaudoin, No. COA20-340, 2021 WL 1978943 
(N.C. Ct. App. May 18, 2021) (unpublished). 
Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Vacated 
and 
Remanded 
State v. Spinks, 2021-NCCOA-218. 
Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Reversed in Part 
and Remanded 
State v. Billings, 2021-NCCOA-306. 
Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Vacated 
State v. Barnes, 2021-NCCOA-304. 
Non-Recidivist 
Lifetime 
SBM 
Order 
Vacated 
and 
Remanded