Title: Perreault v. The Free Lance-Star
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 071978
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2008

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Agee,1 
and Goodwyn, JJ. 
 
SUE CAROL PERREAULT, ADMINISTRATRIX AND 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
ALBERT L. PERREAULT, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 071978 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
     September 12, 2008 
THE FREE LANCE-STAR, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 
Ann Hunter Simpson, Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises from four separate wrongful death 
actions brought pursuant to Code § 8.01-50 and ultimately 
settled by the parties through mediation.  The principal issue 
we consider is whether the circuit court erred in requiring 
the settling parties to those actions to file written 
petitions reciting the financial terms of the compromise 
settlements in order to obtain court approval of those 
settlements pursuant to Code § 8.01-55.  We also consider 
whether the contents of such petitions remain subject to the 
presumption of public access to court records mandated by Code 
§ 17.1-208 notwithstanding the provisions of Code § 8.01-
581.22, which govern the confidentiality of mediation 
                     
1 Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 30, 
2008. 
 
proceedings.  Finally, we review the decision of the circuit 
court denying a request to partially seal the records in these 
cases by permitting the redaction of the monetary amounts of 
the compromise settlements in the court records. 
BACKGROUND 
Sue Carol Perreault, Phyllis Ann Mulholland, Sue Ella C. 
Musselman, and Dona J. Holt, each in her capacity as 
administratrix of an estate (collectively, “the personal 
representatives”), brought wrongful death actions in the 
Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County against several 
defendants including B. Braun Medical, Inc. and its subsidiary 
Central Admixture Pharmacy Services (collectively, “CAPS”).  
With respect to the alleged liability of CAPS, each action 
asserted that the decedent’s death resulted from the 
administration during open-heart surgery of an improperly 
formulated or contaminated cardioplegic solution manufactured 
and distributed by CAPS.2   
                     
2 Cardioplegia is the medical term for the temporary 
paralyzation of the heart muscle during cardiac surgical 
procedures.  Since the 1960s, the most common method of 
protecting the heart during cardioplegia is the infusion of a 
cold crystalloid solution into the heart.  Hans J. Geissler 
and Uwe Mehlhorn, Cold crystalloid cardioplegia, The 
Multimedia Manual of Cardiothoracic Surgery (2006). 
 
2
The personal representatives entered into mediation with 
CAPS that resulted in compromise settlements of the wrongful 
death claims.  As expressed in the settlement agreements, a 
principal concern of the personal representatives and CAPS was 
the desire to keep the terms, and specifically the financial 
terms, of the settlements confidential. 
Thereafter, on a date not specified in the record, 
Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman applied to the circuit 
court under Code § 8.01-55 for approval of their respective 
compromise settlements by making oral motions to the court in 
a closed, in camera hearing.  Because no written petitions 
seeking approval of the settlements were submitted to the 
circuit court in these cases, the record originally provided 
to this Court by the circuit court was unclear as to how this 
hearing was docketed and whether notice was given to potential 
“parties in interest” or that such parties were convened as 
required by Code § 8.01-55. 
By writ of certiorari entered May 21, 2008, this Court 
directed the circuit court to forward the records of the 
original actions filed by the personal representatives.  An 
examination of those records did not disclose any praecipe 
for, or notice to any parties of, the in camera hearing.  The 
proceeding conducted during that hearing was not transcribed.  
The record merely reflects that on February 16, 2007, the 
 
3
circuit court entered orders approving the compromise 
settlements in these three cases.  The orders recite only the 
fact that the claims against CAPS had been resolved by 
compromise and that the personal representatives and statutory 
beneficiaries of the decedent in each case agreed to and 
approved the compromise.3 
By letter from counsel to the circuit court dated 
February 28, 2007, The Free Lance-Star, a newspaper published 
in Fredericksburg, and Media General Operations, Inc., 
publisher of The Richmond Times-Dispatch (collectively, “the 
newspapers”), complained of a “lack of transparency” in the 
approval of the compromise settlements in the Perreault, 
Mulholland, and Musselman cases.  The newspapers contended 
that a reporter for The Free Lance-Star had been barred from 
attending the hearing concerning approval of the compromise 
settlements and that the failure to require petitions setting 
out the terms of the compromises was “inconsistent with” the 
requirements of Code § 8.01-55.  The newspapers further 
                     
3 There is no suggestion of any misconduct by any of the 
personal representatives in these cases or that the compromise 
settlements were not appropriate.  We are confident in our 
assumption that the circuit court was made fully aware of the 
specific financial terms of the compromise settlement in each 
case. 
 
 
4
contended that under Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. 
Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 368 S.E.2d 253 (1988), petitions for 
approval of compromise settlements of wrongful death claims 
were judicial records subject to disclosure under Code § 17.1-
208. 
On March 2, 2007, the newspapers filed a formal petition 
to intervene in the Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman 
cases.  The newspapers again asserted that approval of a 
compromise settlement of a wrongful death claim pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-55 required the filing of a petition that recited 
the particulars of the settlement and, thus, that the circuit 
court erred in approving the settlements in these cases based 
on oral motions.  The newspapers further asserted that, under 
Shenandoah Publishing and Code § 17.1-208, such petitions were 
judicial documents subject to inspection by the media and the 
general public.  The newspapers requested that Perreault, 
Mulholland, and Musselman be required to file petitions “that 
fully comply with [Code] Section 8.01-55.”  In response to the 
petition to intervene, on March 8, 2007, the circuit court 
entered orders suspending the February 16, 2007 orders 
approving the compromise settlements.  On May 2, 2007, the 
court entered an order permitting the newspapers to intervene 
in the Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman cases. 
 
5
On June 6, 2007, Holt filed in the circuit court a 
written petition for approval of the compromise settlement of 
her wrongful death action against CAPS.  The petition noted 
the fact of the compromise settlement and that “the reason for 
the compromise is that the matter is highly contested, 
liability is not admitted, there is uncertainty associated 
with litigation, the time value of settlement versus trial 
currently scheduled greater than one year from the date of the 
Petition [to approve the settlement], and the best interests 
of all parties concerned.”  However, no specific terms of the 
settlement with regard to the consideration to be paid were 
recited in the petition.  An unexecuted copy of the settlement 
agreement appended to the petition was redacted to remove all 
references to payments to be made to the appropriate statutory 
beneficiaries of the estate. 
On June 11, 2007, the circuit court entered an order 
requiring Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman to file 
petitions that “shall state as to each of the settled cases 
the compromise, its terms and the reasons therefor.”  The 
order further provided that “[t]he settling parties and the 
newspaper[s]” would be permitted “to present evidence and to 
otherwise be heard on the issue of whether the settling 
parties can meet the burden imposed by law to permit the 
petition[s] filed . . . to remain under seal.” 
 
6
Also on June 11, 2007, during a hearing on Holt’s 
petition for approval of the compromise settlement in her 
case, the newspapers appeared and made an oral motion to 
intervene in that case as well.  The circuit court directed 
that Holt be required to file under seal an unredacted copy of 
the settlement agreement.  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the court entered an order, styled as a final order, approving 
the settlement based upon the petition and the redacted 
exhibit.  The order, however, provided that the issue whether 
Holt would be required to file an unredacted settlement 
agreement would be subsequently reviewed. 
In response to the circuit court’s order, Perreault, 
Mulholland, and Musselman filed the requested petitions, which 
were placed under seal.  They also filed a joint motion to 
permit the petitions to be filed with “limited redactions” 
along with supporting affidavits by each of them and Michael 
Koch, Vice President of Sales and Support Services for CAPS, 
stating the reasons therefor.  Holt filed an identical motion 
supported by her own affidavit and that of Koch.  Each motion 
also contained exhibits showing the media coverage of wrongful 
death actions involving the alleged misformulation or 
contamination of cardioplegic solutions by CAPS. 
The circuit court heard extensive argument on the issue 
whether Code § 8.01-55 required a party seeking approval of a 
 
7
compromise settlement in a wrongful death action to file a 
petition, whether that petition was required to contain 
comprehensive details of the compromise, and also whether the 
contents of such petitions were subject to disclosure both 
generally and in the present cases specifically.  Apart from 
the affidavits already submitted, no additional evidence was 
received in the Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman cases 
with respect to the request to redact the compromise 
settlements.  Holt and two other beneficiaries under the 
compromise settlement in that case did testify.  Their 
testimony was limited to explaining their decision to agree to 
the compromise. 
On June 29, 2007, the circuit court entered orders in the 
four cases ruling that Code § 8.01-55 required the personal 
representatives to file petitions for approval of the 
compromise settlements and that the petitions must “includ[e] 
the terms and conditions of each such settlement.”  The court 
further ruled that “the settling parties have failed to meet 
their burden to establish a compelling reason sufficient to 
overcome the presumption of openness of such settlement 
information.”  Accordingly, the court denied the motions to 
permit the filing of redacted copies of the settlement 
agreements.  However, the court permitted the petitions and 
the unredacted settlement agreements to remain under seal “for 
 
8
the purpose of preserving the settling parties’ objections to 
the [c]ourt’s ruling pending such appeal as they may choose to 
take from this Order.”4  In an order dated March 6, 2008, we 
awarded the personal representatives in all four cases and 
CAPS this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
The personal representatives and CAPS (collectively, “the 
settling parties”) have asserted three assignments of error in 
this appeal.  First, they contend that the circuit court erred 
in construing Code § 8.01-55 to require the filing of a 
petition stating the particulars of a compromise settlement, 
and specifically the financial terms of the compromise 
settlement, in order for the court to approve the settlement 
of a wrongful death action.  Next, they contend that the 
circuit court erred as a matter of law in these cases by 
failing to give proper effect to the confidentiality 
provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22.  Finally, the settling 
parties contend that even if the court did not err in its 
application of Code § 8.01-55 as applied to court-approved 
compromise settlements of wrongful death actions generally, it 
                     
4 In Holt’s case, the court also granted, nunc pro tunc to 
June 11, 2007, the newspapers’ motion to intervene in that 
case. 
 
9
nonetheless erred in failing to find that the specific 
circumstances of these cases warranted permitting the filing 
of redacted settlement agreements.  We will address these 
issues seriatim, beginning with the challenge to the circuit 
court’s interpretation of Code § 8.01-55. 
Because the construction of a statute presents a pure 
question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review to the 
judgment of the circuit court, as here, that is based solely 
on its interpretation of a statute.  Logan v. City Council, 
275 Va. 483, 492, 659 S.E.2d 296, 300 (2008).  Code § 8.01-55 
in relevant part, provides that: 
The personal representative of the deceased may 
compromise any claim to damages arising under or by 
virtue of § 8.01-50, including claims under the 
provision of a liability insurance policy, before or 
after an action is brought, with the approval of the 
court in which the action was brought, or if an 
action has not been brought, with the consent of any 
circuit court.  Such approval may be applied for on 
petition to such court, by the personal 
representative, or by any potential defendant, or by 
any interested insurance carrier . . . .  The 
petition shall state the compromise, its terms and 
the reason therefor.  The court shall require the 
convening of the parties in interest . . . .  The 
parties in interest shall be deemed to be convened 
if each such party (i) endorses the order by which 
the court approves the compromise or (ii) is given 
notice of the hearing and proposed compromise as 
provided in § 8.01-296 if a resident of the 
Commonwealth or as provided in § 8.01-320 if a 
nonresident, or is otherwise given reasonable notice 
of the hearing and proposed compromise as may be 
required by the court. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
10
The settling parties essentially contend that nothing in 
Code § 8.01-55 requires the “petition” made to the court for 
approval of a compromise of a wrongful death claim to be in 
writing or to otherwise require disclosure of the financial 
terms of that compromise in a public record.  We disagree. 
In resolving this issue, we consider the language of Code 
§ 8.01-55 under the settled principle of statutory 
construction that courts are bound by the plain meaning of 
statutory language.  Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657 
S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008); Young v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 528, 
533, 643 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2007); Alliance to Save the 
Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 439, 621 S.E.2d 78, 
86-87 (2005).  Under this principle, when the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, courts may not interpret 
that language in a manner effectively holding that the General 
Assembly did not mean what it actually stated.  Hicks, 275 Va. 
at 218, 657 S.E.2d at 144; Young, 273 Va. at 533, 643 S.E.2d 
at 493; Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 
630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006). 
Initially, we note that in enacting Code § 8.01-55, the 
General Assembly required that “settlements of wrongful death 
claims must be approved by the courts.”  Shenandoah 
Publishing, 235 Va. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 256.  In plain and 
unambiguous language, Code § 8.01-55 requires that before a 
 
11
circuit court may approve any settlement of a wrongful death 
claim, the statutorily designated party must apply for such 
approval by petition to the court.  The usual and accepted 
meaning of “petition” is “[a] formal written request presented 
to a court or other official body.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
1182 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).  Moreover, Code § 8.01-
55 is equally unambiguous in its requirement that “[t]he 
petition shall state the compromise, its terms and the reason 
therefor.”  (Emphasis added.)  Common sense dictates that the 
most significant of the “terms” of any compromise settlement 
of a wrongful death claim include the monetary provisions in 
consideration of which the party with the right to seek 
damages is compromising its right to sue for those damages.  
Clearly, the settling parties’ contention that Code § 8.01-55 
does not require a written petition to the circuit court or 
that such petition need not state the financial terms of the 
compromise settlement is not supported by the plain meaning of 
the language of the statute. 
Furthermore, in Ramey v. Bobbitt, 250 Va. 474, 481, 463 
S.E.2d 437, 441 (1995), we held that “[t]hose portions of a 
release that are not made part of a wrongful death compromise 
settlement approved by a circuit court [under Code § 8.01-55] 
are not binding on the parties to the release.”  Accordingly, 
if the terms of a settlement were not made express in the 
 
12
petition filed under Code § 8.01-55 or were not otherwise made 
a part of the record, there would be no definite basis upon 
which the court would later be able to determine what the 
parties had bound themselves to in the compromise settlement 
if a dispute subsequently arose regarding compliance with the 
settlement. 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err in construing Code § 8.01-55 to require a party seeking 
approval of a compromise settlement of a wrongful death claim 
to file in the court a written petition that includes the 
complete and unredacted terms of the compromise settlement. 
We now turn to the settling parties’ contention that the 
circuit court erred by failing to give proper effect to the 
confidentiality provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22.  The 
resolution of this contention necessarily invokes the 
interplay among the applications of Code §§ 8.01-55, 8.01-
581.22 and 17.1-208. 
In relevant part, Code § 17.1-208 provides that: 
 
 
Except as otherwise provided by law, any 
records and papers of every circuit court that are 
maintained by the clerk of the circuit court shall 
be open to inspection by any person and the clerk 
shall, when requested, furnish copies thereof, 
except in cases in which it is otherwise specially 
provided. 
 
In Shenandoah Publishing, we identified the “judicial 
records” that ordinarily come within the ambit of this statute 
 
13
as “the pleadings and any exhibits or motions filed by the 
parties and all orders entered by the trial court in the 
judicial proceedings leading to the judgment under review.”  
235 Va. at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 255.  The petition required by 
Code § 8.01-55 is clearly a pleading and comports with this 
definition of a judicial record.  Accordingly, the petition 
comes within the statutory presumption of openness to the 
public contained in Code § 17.1-208. 
In relevant part, Code § 8.01-581.22 provides that: 
All memoranda, work products and other 
materials contained in the case files of a mediator 
or mediation program are confidential. . . .  
However, a written mediated agreement signed by the 
parties shall not be confidential, unless the 
parties otherwise agree in writing. 
 
Confidential materials and communications are 
not subject to disclosure in discovery or in any 
judicial or administrative proceeding except (i) 
where all parties to the mediation agree, in 
writing, to waive the confidentiality, . . . or (ix) 
as provided by law or rule. 
 
The settling parties initially stress the undisputed fact 
that the compromise settlements of the wrongful death claims 
in these cases resulted from mediation and that the parties to 
the mediation agreed that the terms of the settlements were to 
remain confidential.  Consequently, the settling parties 
contend, notwithstanding the mandate of Code § 8.01-55 that 
the terms of the compromise settlements be included in the 
proper petitions to the circuit court for approval of the 
 
14
settlements, that Code § 8.01-581.22 operates so as to ensure 
the confidentiality of the terms of the mediated settlements. 
The settling parties’ contention creates an unnecessary 
tension between the provisions of Code §§ 8.01-55 and 8.01-
581.22 and is an unwarranted interpretation of the pertinent 
statutory scheme.  The thrust of their contention is that the 
confidentiality provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22 require that 
the provisions of Code § 8.01-55 be applied so that the 
circuit court will be informed of the specific financial terms 
of the compromise settlement but those terms would not be 
included in the written petition so as to be subject to 
disclosure to the public under Code § 17.1-208.  On brief in 
this appeal, the settling parties suggest that this could be 
accomplished by permitting the circuit court “to conduct all 
portions of the settlement approval petition in open court, 
but permit the [s]ettling [p]arties to present (but not file) 
a written document to the court that states the settlements’ 
dollar amount and distribution.”  We disagree. 
In resolving this issue we acknowledge that within the 
pertinent statutory scheme there exists at least a facial 
tension between the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” 
provision contained in Code § 17.1-208 and the “as provided by 
law or rule” provision contained in the confidentiality 
provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22(ix).  The former suggests a 
 
15
limitation upon public access to judicial records whereas the 
latter suggests a limitation upon otherwise confidential 
mediated agreements.  Because of the view we take in resolving 
this case, we need not further address that issue. 
The statutory scheme that provides for resolution of 
civil disputes through mediation found in Code § 8.01-581.21 
et seq., including the confidentiality provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-581.22 at issue here, is one of general application to 
all mediated settlements, not just to settlements of wrongful 
death claims.  By contrast, Code § 8.01-55 is a statute of 
precise and specific application, dealing only with the 
requirement for court approval of compromise settlements of 
wrongful death claims.  Cf. Peerless Ins. Co. v. County of 
Fairfax, 274 Va. 236, 244, 645 S.E.2d 478, 483 (2007) (holding 
that when one statute addresses a subject in a general manner 
and another statute addresses part of the same subject in a 
more specific manner, the differing statutes should be 
harmonized if possible, but when they conflict the more 
specific statute prevails); see also, Alliance to Save the 
Mattaponi, 270 Va. at 439-40, 621 S.E.2d at 87; Capelle v. 
Orange County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005). 
Undoubtedly, and consistent with the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-581.22, it may be common for settlements of various 
types of civil claims to be achieved through mediation and, 
 
16
yet, for the terms of such settlements not to be publicly 
disclosed because the parties agree not to do so.  In this 
case, however, we must consider the harmonious application of 
Code § 8.01-55 and Code § 8.01-581.22 in light of the fact 
that the settling parties were required to obtain court 
approval of the mediated settlements of these wrongful death 
claims and to disclose the terms of those settlements in the 
petitions to the court seeking such approval. 
Although Shenandoah Publishing did not involve a mediated 
settlement of a wrongful death claim, we nonetheless find the 
rationale underlying the decision in that case to be 
instructive.  In Shenandoah Publishing, we stated that the 
legislative purpose underpinning Code § 8.01-55 served the 
public’s “societal interest in learning whether compromise 
settlements are equitable and whether the courts are 
administering properly the powers conferred upon them.”  235 
Va. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 256.  This is so because “the people 
have a vital interest, one of personal and familial as well as 
community concern, in cases involving claims of medical 
malpractice on the part of licensed practitioners and other 
health care providers.”  Id. 
Given the salutary purpose of Code § 8.01-55, we cannot 
conceive that the General Assembly intended to permit the 
confidentiality provisions allowed but not required by Code 
 
17
§ 8.01-581.22 to trump the provisions of Code § 8.01-55 and, 
consequently, the right of public access provided for by Code 
§ 17.1-208 in the context of the records of court approval of 
the compromise settlement of a wrongful death claim achieved 
through mediation.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit 
court did not err in ruling that in approving the compromise 
settlements in the present cases, the court was not subject to 
a de jure requirement under Code § 8.01-581.22 to place the 
record, or at least that portion of it detailing the financial 
terms of the compromise settlements, under seal. 
Finally, we consider the settling parties’ assertion that 
the circuit court erred in finding that the circumstances of 
these particular cases did not warrant their being permitted 
to redact from the record all references to the financial 
terms of the compromise settlements.  When the sealing of a 
record or part thereof is not a duty imposed by law, the 
decision whether to seal the record rests within the sound 
discretion of the circuit court.  See In re Worrell Enters., 
Inc., 14 Va. App. 671, 675, 419 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1992).  In 
Shenandoah Publishing, we said that in order to overcome the 
strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial 
records “the moving party must bear the burden of establishing 
an interest so compelling that it cannot be protected 
 
18
reasonably by some measure other than a protective order.”  
235 Va. at 259, 368 S.E.2d at 256. 
On brief, the settling parties assert that under 
Shenandoah Publishing, “when a court considers a motion to 
seal records, or exclude the public from civil judicial 
proceedings, ‘it may not base its decision on conclusory 
assertions alone, but must make specific factual findings.’ ”  
Thus, they contend that the circuit court was required to make 
express findings of fact supporting its decision not to permit 
redaction of the records.  We disagree. 
The settling parties’ assertion wholly mischaracterizes 
the holding in Shenandoah Publishing.  The quotation that the 
settling parties have drawn from the opinion appears only as a 
parenthetical to a citation in the opinion of the Court.  235 
Va. at 259, 368 S.E.2d at 256 (citing and quoting In re 
Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 392 (4th Cir. 1986)).  
Moreover, in context it is clear that the citation and its 
explanatory parenthetical were supporting a proposition 
directly contradictory of the position being asserted by the 
settling parties in this case.  When correctly interpreted, 
Shenandoah Publishing requires that a court may not base its 
decision to limit public access to court proceedings or 
records upon the conclusory assertions of the party requesting 
the closure.  Id.  Thus, the court must make specific factual 
 
19
findings only to support a decision to restrict public access 
to court records or proceedings.  Because the presumption is 
in favor of openness, a court need not make findings of fact 
to justify a decision denying a request for closure of a 
proceeding or record absent any applicable statute or Rule of 
Court requiring such finding. 
Similarly, the settling parties’ reliance on Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 590, 281 S.E.2d 
915, 924 (1981), to assert that the newspapers as “intervenors 
. . . have the burden of showing that reasonable alternatives 
to closure are available” is misplaced.  That burden exists 
only after the party seeking to restrict public access to 
judicial proceedings or records has made an adequate showing 
that it is entitled to such relief.  Accordingly, our focus in 
this appeal is limited to whether the circuit court abused its 
discretion in finding that the settling parties failed to meet 
their burden to establish a compelling reason sufficient to 
overcome the presumption of public access to the records of 
the compromise settlements in these cases. 
In Koch’s affidavit submitted on behalf of CAPS, it is 
asserted that if the terms of the compromise settlements were 
made public, CAPS “could become the target of lawsuits by 
individuals and/or businesses who might file lawsuits for the 
sole purpose of extracting a ‘nuisance value’ settlement.”  
 
20
Koch further asserted that CAPS would not have entered into 
the settlement agreements had it known that the terms would 
not remain confidential and that an order requiring disclosure 
of the financial terms of the settlement would “deprive the 
CAPS defendants of one of the benefits it bargained for and 
obtained in exchange for the consideration paid.” 
CAPS’s concern that disclosure of the financial terms of 
the compromise settlements might subject it to further 
litigation may be well founded.  However, that concern 
reflects no more than an unsupported conclusory assertion and 
pales in view of the statutory presumption of public access to 
judicial records contained in Code § 17.1-208.  
CAPS’s assertion that the circuit court’s order denying 
the request to redact the settlement agreements would deny it 
the benefit of its bargain is based on the legally flawed 
presumption that private parties can agree to deprive the 
public of the right of access to judicial records guaranteed 
by Code § 17.1-208.  While CAPS may have anticipated that the 
court would permit the petitions to approve the compromise 
settlements of the wrongful death claims at issue here to be 
made without disclosure of the financial terms of these 
settlements, it did so at its own risk.  Clearly it did not 
lose any benefit of its bargains through the court’s decision 
denying its request to redact the financial terms of the 
 
21
settlement agreements.  The personal representatives and the 
beneficiaries to the settlements are still bound by their 
agreements that they keep the terms thereof confidential, and 
they fulfilled that duty by joining with CAPS in seeking to 
have the records sealed.  The court’s decision to not permit 
redaction of the financial terms from the petitions does not 
constitute a breach of that duty. 
In their affidavits submitted to the circuit court, the 
personal representatives stated various concerns they had with 
respect to having the financial terms of the compromise 
settlements made public.  They asserted that the settlements 
of their claims were “private matter[s] between [the 
beneficiaries] and the defendants;” that they did not desire 
to be subject to further publicity as this would cause them 
“to re-live the trauma” associated with their decedents’ 
demise; and, that publicity concerning the financial terms of 
the settlements might result in unwanted solicitations.  Holt 
further expressed concern that she might be targeted by 
criminals and that she and her family “will be subject to 
public ridicule, criticism, and embarrassment” for having 
accepted the compromise settlement. 
While we are not unmindful of the seriousness of the 
concerns expressed by the personal representatives with 
respect to the potential consequences of the financial terms 
 
22
 
23
of their settlements being made public, concerns of emotional 
damage or financial harm when stated “in the abstract, [do 
not] constitute sufficient reasons to seal judicial records.”  
Shenandoah Publishing, 235 Va. at 259, 368 S.E.2d at 256. 
“[T]he desire of the litigants is not sufficient reason to 
override the presumption of openness.”  Id.  Moreover, it is 
not within the province of this Court to alter the pertinent 
statutory scheme which otherwise might warrant amendment by 
the legislature so as to preserve the confidentiality of the 
mediated settlement terms involving wrongful death claims such 
as those at issue here.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit 
court did not err in denying the settling parties’ request to 
have the financial terms of the compromise settlements 
redacted in the court records. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court.  We will remand the cases to the circuit court 
with direction that the records be unsealed in the Perreault, 
Mulholland, and Musselman cases and that an unredacted version 
of the settlement in the Holt case be entered into the record 
in accord with the prior order of the court. 
Affirmed and remanded.