Title: Dorsey v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.
Citation: 353 So. 2d 800
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1977

353 So. 2d 800 (1977)
In re William DORSEY
v.
UNITED STATES PIPE &amp; FOUNDRY COMPANY, a corporation.
Ex parte William Dorsey.
SC 2748.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 9, 1977.
*801 John W. Haley and D. Leon Ashford, Birmingham, for petitioner.
John H. Morrow and Stephen E. Brown, Birmingham, for respondent.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Dorsey v. United States Pipe and Foundry Company, 353 So. 2d 797, holding that fraud does not toll the one-year statute of limitations for workmen's compensation actions contained in Tit. 26, § 296, Code of Alabama 1940 (now § 25-5-80 Code of Alabama 1975).[1] We reverse and remand.
Petitioner, William Dorsey, brought this workmen's compensation action against respondent, United States Pipe and Foundry Company, in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, contending, inter alia, that respondent had fraudulently misrepresented certain facts to him; that he had relied upon respondent's fraudulent misrepresentations to his detriment; and that the one-year statute of limitations (Tit. 26, § 296, Code of 1940, now § 25-5-80 Code 1975) was tolled by respondent's fraud. The case was heard ore tenus and the trial court held, inter alia, that fraud does not toll the statute of limitations.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed although in its opinion it invited our review of this question. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed and granted to review the sole issue as to whether fraud tolls the one-year statute of limitations in workmen's compensation cases found in Tit. 26, § 296. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
This is a case of first impression. Petitioner cites several cases from other jurisdictions which have held that fraud does toll the statute of limitations in workmen's *802 compensation cases. Respondent concedes that some jurisdictions have adopted this liberal posture but argues that Alabama has not done so. Respondent contends that since the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act is a statutory creation, and not a creature of the common law, then the one-year statute of limitations is considered as a part of the newly created right and cannot be tolled or suspended for any reason not expressly cited in the statute.
This Court has held that Tit. 26, § 296, is a limitation on the right itself and not alone upon the remedy. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Parker, 282 Ala. 151, 209 So. 2d 647 (1967).
It has also been held that the time limitation within which such actions must be brought is a condition precedent to the right to maintain such actions and is jurisdictional. Id.; Shepard v. Chrysler Corporation, 430 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1970).
Where a statute creates a cause of action which did not theretofore exist, and where it provides that such cause of action must be brought within the time specified in the statute, the general rule is that fraud does not toll the statute of limitations unless the statute in question expressly so provides. See, e. g., Central of Georgia Railway Company v. Ramsey, 275 Ala. 7, 151 So. 2d 725 (1962). This rule has met with widespread dissatisfaction, however, and is replete with exceptions. See, e. g., "Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing action prescribed in statute creating the right of action." 15 A.L.R.2d 500, at 519-526. See also, 3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 78.45.
In Central of Georgia, supra, Mr. Justice Harwood, writing for the Court, pointed out that the more recent federal appellate court decisions are to the effect that legal fraud does toll the time within which suit must be brought under the F. E. L. A. Our Court followed such decisions and those of the United States Supreme Court in holding that fraud does toll the statute in, F. E. L. A. cases.
Apparently, the general rule alluded to above has met with particular disaffection in workmen's compensation cases. See, e. g., "Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing action prescribed in statute creating the right of action," supra.
Respondent has argued that because Tit. 26, § 296, is a limitation upon the right itself and not alone upon the remedy, and because the statute is jurisdictional, we must affirm. We cannot agree. Many other jurisdictions have faced this obstacle, and have not found it to be insurmountable. E. g., Mackanitz v. Pittsburgh &amp; W. V. R. Co., 157 Pa.Super. 359, 43 A.2d 586 (1945).
43 A.2d  at 588-89. See also, 3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 78.45.
Following is a pertinent comment from the federal appellate bench quoted with approval in our Central of Georgia, supra:
Respondent has argued that we cannot affirm this cause in view of the holding in B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Parker, supra. We cannot agree. The primary issue in Parker was whether voluntary payments of compensation made to an employee by his employer after his cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations revived the cause of action. Parker held that they did not. There were no allegations of fraud in Parker as there are here, and no issue was raised regarding the effect of fraud on the limitation of actions under Tit. 26, § 296. Thus, we see no conflict between Parker and our holding here.
In conclusion, we take note, as did the United States Supreme Court in Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S. Ct. 760, 762, 3 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1959), of the age old maxim "that no man may take advantage of his own wrong." See also, Mazer v. Jackson Insurance Agency, 340 So. 2d 770 (Ala.1976).
Nothing we have said herein should indicate that we entertain any views as to the merits of the fraud claim. The only issue presented to us is the legal question and we have answered it.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All the Justices concur.
[1]  The 1975 Code became effective October 31, 1977.