Title: Squier v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 192, 2022
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NATHANEAL SQUIER, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 192, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 2103010390 (K) 
§                     
§                     
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   September 7, 2022 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 14, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.  
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
Upon consideration of the opening brief, motion to affirm, and record on 
appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Nathaneal Squier, filed this appeal from a Superior Court 
order sentencing him for a violation of probation (“VOP”). The State of Delaware 
has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on 
the face of Squier’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and  
affirm. 
(2) 
In August 2021, a grand jury charged Squier with multiple crimes, 
including first-degree rape, strangulation, and third-degree assault.  The victim was 
Squier’s girlfriend.  On November 9, 2021, Squier pleaded guilty to strangulation 
2 
 
and third-degree assault in exchange for the State entering a nolle prosequi on the 
remaining charges.  The Superior Court sentenced Squier as follows: (i) for 
strangulation, five years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 120 days for one 
year of Level III probation; and (ii) for third-degree assault, one year of Level V 
incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III probation. The Superior Court also 
ordered Squier to obtain a mental health evaluation and not to have any contact with 
the victim. 
(3) 
On January 26, 2022, the Department of Correction (“DOC”) filed an 
administrative warrant alleging that Squier had violated his probation, which he had 
started on December 14, 2021, by committing new domestic violence offenses 
against a different female victim.  The subsequent VOP reports alleged that Squier 
had violated his probation by committing new crimes (strangulation, third-degree 
assault, intentionally or recklessly causing physical injury to another, and 
noncompliance with bond conditions) and failing to comply with the no-contact and 
mental health evaluation provisions of the sentencing order.  At the first VOP 
hearing on February 4, 2022, the Superior Court granted the parties’ request for a 
continuance.   
(4) 
At the May 13, 2022 VOP hearing, the State advised the court that 
Squier had pleaded guilty to third-degree assault in his new criminal case.  Squier 
admitted that he had violated his probation and had pleaded guilty to  third-degree 
3 
 
assault.  After expressing concern about Squier’s pattern of serious violence against 
women, the Superior Court sentenced Squier as follows: (i) for strangulation, four 
years and eight months of Level V incarceration, suspended after three years, 
followed by one year of Level IV DOC discretion and one year of Level III GPS; 
and (ii) for third-degree assault, one year of Level V incarceration, suspended after 
six months, followed by six months of Level IV discretion and eighteen months of 
Level III GPS.  This appeal followed. 
(5) 
In his opening brief, Squier does not dispute that he violated his 
probation, but asks for the VOP sentence he says the State originally offered him 
(one or two years of Level V incarceration followed by a year of probation) and 
represents that he will take a domestic violence class and turn his life around.  He 
claims that the Superior Court judge was biased against him.  The State argues that 
Squier’s claims are without merit, but concedes that the eighteen-month Level III 
portion of the VOP sentence for the third-degree assault conviction exceeds the one-
year statutory limit established by 11 Del. C. § 4333(b)(3).1 
(6) 
This Court’s appellate review of a sentence is extremely limited and 
generally ends upon a determination that the sentence is within statutory limits.2  If 
 
1 As the State notes, the period of probation does not include Level IV time.  11 Del. C. § 
4333(g)(2) (“As used in this section, the phrase ‘period of probation or suspension of sentence’ 
shall not include any period of a sentence that is designated by the sentencing court to be served 
at Supervision Accountability Level IV as defined in § 4204(c)(4) of this title.”).     
2 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 714 (Del. 2006). 
4 
 
the sentence falls within the statutory limits, “we consider only whether it is based 
on factual predicates which are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, 
judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.”3   
(7) 
Once Squier committed a VOP, the Superior Court could impose any 
period of incarceration up to and including the balance of the Level V time remaining 
on Squier’s sentence.4  Squier’s VOP sentence does not exceed the Level V time 
remaining on his original sentence.  In addition, the record does not support Squier’s 
conclusory claim of judicial bias.  In sentencing Squier for his VOP, the Superior 
Court judge was understandably concerned that shortly after Squier started serving 
probation for crimes of domestic violence, he committed new crimes of domestic 
violence.   
(8) 
Although Squier’s claims have no merit, the State concedes that the 
eighteen-month Level III portion of the VOP sentence for the third-degree assault 
conviction exceeds the one-year statutory limit for felonies that are neither violent 
nor drug-related.5  We agree and conclude that the proper course of action is to vacate 
the Superior Court’s VOP sentencing order and remand for resentencing.  Squier is 
entitled to be present and represented by counsel when he is resentenced.    
 
 
 
3 Id.  
4 11 Del. C. § 4334(c); Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Del. 2005). 
5 11 Del. C. § 4333(b))(3) (providing that the period of probation for a crime that is not designated 
a violent felony under § 4201(c) or  set forth in Title 16 shall not be more than one year). 
5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s 
finding that the appellant violated the terms of his probation is AFFIRMED.   The 
Superior Court’s May 13, 2022 sentencing order is VACATED, and the matter 
is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice