Title: State v. Lewis
Citation: 252 Kan. 535, 847 P.2d 690
Docket Number: 66,932
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 1993

252 Kan. 535 (1993)
847 P.2d 690
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
DARVIN K. LEWIS, Appellant.
No. 66,932

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 5, 1993.
Brenton G. Lonker, of Shultz, Webb &amp; Lonker, Chtd., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Debra S. Byrd, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Rachelle Worrall Smith, assistant district attorney, Nola Foulston, district attorney, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
Defendant appeals his jury trial convictions of attempted rape (K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3301, K.S.A. 21-3502) and kidnapping (K.S.A. 21-3420).
The complaining witness, T.J., age 16 years, testified that on February 27, 1991, she was walking along a Wichita street when she was accosted by the defendant and forced into his automobile. While restraining her in a headlock, defendant drove to his residence on Kansas Avenue. There, T.J. was forced into the house, where defendant attempted to rape her. A few minutes later defendant told her she could leave and she did.
Defendant testified he was home at the date and time in question, working on his automobile. While so engaged, he was approached by T.J., who asked if she could use his telephone. He agreed; T.J., used the telephone and left. No sexual activity of any type occurred, consensual or otherwise.
*536 For his first issue on appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit four defense witnesses to testify as to the reputation of the complaining witness as to veracity. We agree. In State v. Smallwood, 223 Kan. 320, 574 P.2d 1361 (1978), we discussed the admission of evidence relevant to the credibility (or lack thereof) of a witness. This discussion and the factual framework on which it was based is as follows:
"K.S.A. 60-420 provides:
See Herbstreith v. de Bakker, 249 Kan. 67, 76-77, 815 P.2d 102 (1991).
The proffers of the testimony of the four witnesses who were excluded indicates they were acquaintances of T.J., the complaining witness, and they would have testified she had a reputation for having a lack of veracity or, as they put it, for being a liar.
The trial court excluded the testimony on a number of grounds. The trial court disapproved of the former residence of some of the witnesses, stating:
....
The trial judge, from the above statement and others, made it clear he disapproved of the lifestyles and socio-economic status of the witnesses. One of the witnesses testified that he, the other reputation witnesses, and T.J. were "street people." All were young. The trial judge indicated that by virtue of their age and prior emotional involvement with T.J., they were apt to be "spiteful" and that he "doubt[ed] their motive."
All of these expressions go to the weight the trial court felt should be afforded to such witnesses' testimony and have no bearing on the admissibility of such testimony.
*538 Also, the trial court expressed the opinion that evidence relative to T.J.'s lack of veracity would be violative of the rape shield statute (K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-3525), which provides in pertinent part:
The trial court made the following comments on the rape shield statute and the issue of T.J.'s veracity:
*539 One of the witnesses herein was the boyfriend (or former boyfriend) of T.J. His proffered testimony was not as to prior sexual activities of T.J., however, but as to her reputation for lack of veracity.
The rape shield statute is inapplicable to the issue herein, and the trial court erred in holding otherwise.
The trial court erred, also, in excluding the evidence on the basis that it did not want the jury diverted from its proper purpose of determining whether defendant was or was not guilty of the crimes charged by "arguing more about the issue of veracity." Credibility was everything in this case. No evidence corroborated either T.J.'s or defendant's versions of the events. Guilty verdicts could be obtained herein only if T.J.'s testimony was believed in all significant respects. Thus, the State's whole case rested on T.J.'s testimony being believed by the jury.
If the jury had been permitted to hear and consider evidence relevant to T.J.'s reputation for lack of veracity and afford to it such weight as it deemed to be appropriate, a different verdict may have been reached. Under the circumstances herein, we conclude the exclusion of such evidence constitutes reversible error requiring a remand for new trial. By so holding, we are not stating that a sufficient foundation was laid for the testimony of each of the four witnesses. For our purposes, it was sufficient to consider the proffered testimony collectively and find its exclusion to be erroneous.
We further conclude that upon remand this case should be assigned to a different judge for all further proceedings.
A number of other issues are raised, including such matters as the alleged improper restriction of voir dire, refusal to excuse a juror for cause, judicial misconduct during trial, exclusion of alibi witness testimony, and admission of prior crimes evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. We have carefully reviewed these other issues and conclude they are tied to and interwoven with the particular circumstances existing in the trial herein. Inasmuch as we are reversing the convictions and remanding the case for retrial under a different judge, there is nothing to be gained from discussing each such issue and determining whether the complained-of matter constituted error or abuse of judicial discretion.
*540 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.