Title: GRIFFIN v SCOTT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85-273
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1985

No. 85-273 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 WILLIWi J. GRIFFIN and BRENDA G. GRIFFIN, Plaintiffs and Respondents, KENNETH E. SCOTT and BARBARA 2. SCOTT, Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Tn and for the County of Sanders, The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Tipp, Hnven, Skjelset & Frizzell; Raymond P. Tipp, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Baxter, Fletcher & Hanson; Robert L. Fletcher, Thompson Falls, Montana Submitted on briefs: Aug. 15, 1985 Decided: November 6, 1985 Filed : , . , 1 , ' . . '1985 M r . J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Kenneth and Barbara S c o t t , a p p e l l a n t s , a p p e a l t h e d e n i a l o f a motion t o set a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Twentieth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Sanders County. W e a f f i r m . William and Earbara G r i f f i n , r e s p o n d e n t s , f i l e d a complaint on November 28, 1984, c l a i m i n g a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement o v e r a n e x i s t i n g roadway a c r o s s a p p e l l a n t s 1 a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t y . The complaint and summons w e r e p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d on a p p e l l a n t s on December 5 , 1984, a t t h e i r home i n Wyoming. O n a b o u t December 1 4 , 1984 a p p e l l a n t s mailed t h e s e and o t h e r documents t o t h e i r c o u n s e l , Raymond Tipp, i n Missoula, Montana. H e l e f t f o r a two-week v a c a t i o n on December 2 0 , 1984, unaware t h a t t h e summons and c o m p l a i n t a r r i v e d a t h i s o f f i c e t h a t day. Tipp r e t u r n e d t o h i s o f f i c e on J a n u a r y 4 , 1985, b u t d i d n o t r e v i e w t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a p p e l l a n t s had s e n t because o f t h e amount o f m a i l and o t h e r work which had accumulated. H e d i d n o t d i s c o v e r t h a t a d e f a u l t judgment had been e n t e r e d on J a n u a r y ll., 1985, u n t i l h e saw a c r e d i t bureau r e p o r t on February 1 2 , 1985. A t t h a t t i m e he reviewed t h e i n f o r m a t i o n from h i s c l i e n t s and c o n t a c t e d r e s p o n d e n t s 1 a t t o r n e y t o r e q u e s t a s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e judgment b e set a s i d e . H e t h e n asked t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , on February 21, 1985, t o set a s i d e t h e judgment on t h e b a s i s o f m i s t a k e , i n a d v e r t e n c e o r e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t p u r s u a n t t o Rule 60 (b) , l4.R.Civ.P. Respondents opposed t h i s motion c i t i n g appel.lants' l a c k o f d i l i g e n c e i n a d d i t i o n t o c o u n s e l l s f a i l u r e t o r e a d h i s incoming m a i l . A p p e l l a n t s had n o t responded t o a l e t t e r from r e s p o n d e n t s mailed August 2, 1984 which o u t l i n e d t h e problems between t h e p a r t i e s i n d e t a i l and urged them t o c o n t a c t an a t t o r n e y . They a l s o d e c l i n e d t o respond t o a follow-up letter t h r e e weeks l a t e r a d v i s i n g them t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s would proceed f o r m a l l y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i r easement. Even a f t e r t h e y r e c e i v e d t h e c o m p l a i n t and summons, a p p e l l a n t s a p p a r e n t l y d i d n o t h i n g t o m o n i t o r t h e s t a t u s o f t h e s u i t . Respondents f i l e d t h e i r motion f o r d e f a u l t judgment on January 8 , 1985. The judgment, e n t e r e d January 11, 1985, awarded r e s p o n d e n t s a n easement o v e r an e x i s t i n g roadway a l o n g t h e edge o f a p p e l l a n t s 1 p r o p e r t y and permanently e n j o i n e d a p p e l l a n t s from o b s t r u c t i n g t h e easement. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d a h e a r i n g on a p p e l l a n t s 1 motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment on March 26, 1985 and d e n i e d t h e motion on A p r i l 1 2 , 1985. A p p e l l a n t s r a i s e two i s s u e s on a p p e a l : ( I ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by n o t s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment on t h e b a s i s o f m i s t a k e , i n a d v e r t e n c e or e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t . ( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had a u t h o r i t y t o e n t e r a d e f a u l t judgment i n a q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n w i t h o u t a prima f a c i e showing o f a r i g h t t o easement by competent e v i d e n c e . The s t a n d a r d o f review where a d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a s d e n i e d a motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t "is t h a t no g r e a t abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n need b e shown t o w a r r a n t r e v e r s a l . " Lords v. Newman (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 688 P.2d 2 9 0 , 294, 4 1 St.Rep. 1793, 1797. Another s t a t e m e n t o f t h i s s t a n d a r d "is t h a t o n l y ' s l i g h t a b u s e 1 i s s u f f i c i e n t t o r e v e r s e an o r d e r r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t . " ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) Lords, 688 P.2d a t 293. The test t o determine whether t h e n e g l e c t i s excusable and s u f f i c i e n t t o set a s i d e a d e f a u l t is: . . . whether t h e reasons given f o r t h e n e g l e c t a r e such t h a t reasonable minds might d i f f e r i n t h e i r conclusions concerning excusable n e g l e c t . I f s o , doubt should be resolved i n f a v o r o f a t r i a l on t h e merits. United S t a t e s P-ubber Co. v. Community Gas & O i l Co. (1961), 139 Mont. 36, 39, 359 P.2d 375, 376. In United S t a t e s Rubber, t h e a t t o r n e y ' s n e g l e c t c o n s i s t e d o f h i s f a i l u r e t o read h i s mail f o r two o r t h r e e weeks "because of b e i n g busy, t h e h o l i d a y season, and t h e mistaken assumption t h a t t h e letter concerned a d i f f e r e n t matter." (~mpha sis i n o r i g i n a l . ) 139 Mont. a t 39. FJe held t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y ' s a c t i o n s w e r e inexcusable n e g l e c t and t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had n o t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying a motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment. I n t h e c a s e a t b a r t h e a t t o r n e y ' s a c t i o n s a r e s u r p r i s i n g l y s i m i l a r t o t h o s e a t i s s u e i n United S t a t e Rubber. The a t t o r n e y h e r e , i n h i s a f f i d a v i t , c i t e d t h e accumulation o f mail and work i n h i s o f f i c e and h i s absence o v e r t h e Christmas holiday a s t h e reason f o r f a i l i n g t o read h i s c l i e n t s ' letter f o r about f i v e weeks. During t h e h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment, he s t a t e d t h a t he had n o t given t h e documents prompt a t t e n t i o n because, i n h i s p a s t d e a l i n g s w i t h a p p e l l a n t s , problems g e n e r a l l y went on f o r months and months. Although t h i s i s n o t an assumption t h a t t h e documents concerned a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r , t h e a t t o r n e y d i d mistakenly assume t h e documents d i d n o t concern a m a t t e r r e q u i r i n g prompt a t t e n t i o n . Another d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t i n United S t a t e s Rubber t h e l e t t e r was from an opposj-ng a t t o r n e y . However, t h e s e f a c t u a l d i f f e r e n c e s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e two c a s e s . W e n o t e a l s o t h a t t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l o t h e r a t t o r n e y s i n T i p p ' s o f f i c e , according t o s i g n a t u r e s i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court f i l e , who could have reviewed t h e mail and discovered t h e complaint. A s i n United S t a t e s Rubber, t h i s a t t o r n e y ' s f a i l u r e t o read h i s mail f o r f i v e weeks because of work which had accumulated i n h i s absence over a h o l i d a y i s n o t excusable n e g l e c t . The n e g l e c t o f an a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l l y may be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e c l i e n t except where t h e a t t o r n e y ' s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s " a c t u a l misconduct," Lords, 688 P.2d a t 295, and t h e c l i e n t s a r e "blameless." Lords, 688 P.2d a t 296. I n Lords, t h e a t t o r n e y made a genera1 appearance i n c o u r t on b e h a l f o f c l i e n t s who had n o t been served with p r o c e s s and who had n o t authorized him t o a c t . H e then disappeared from s i g h t . The c l i e n t s attempted t o c o n t a c t him and proceeded "with d i l i g e n c e t o r e c t i f y t h e c o u r t ' s a c t i o n . " Lords, 688 P.2d a t 296. Here t h e a t t o r n e y ' s a c t i o n does n o t approach t h e misconduct o f t h e a t t o r n e y i n Lords. F u r t h e r , knowing t h a t an appearance was due t h e day a f t e r Christmas, a p p e l l a n t s waited u n t i l a t l e a s t December 1 4 t o mail t h e papers t o t h e i r a t t o r n e y and a p p a r e n t l y d i d nothing t o check on t h e s u i t . Nothing i n t h e record shows they l e t t h e i r a t t o r n e y know t h e m a t t e r would r e q u i r e prompt a t t e n t i o n . Under t h e s e circumstances, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n r e f u s i n g t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment. I n t h e second i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t s r e f e r t o p l a i n t i f f s ' a c t i o n a s a q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n under S 70-28-101 e t . s e q . , MCA. They contend t h a t § 70-28-108, MCA r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f s "produce evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o prima f a c i e e n t i t l e [them] t o r e l i e f " b e f o r e t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o a d e f a u l t decree was n o t s a t i s f i e d . They claim t h e p l a i n t i f f s produced no evidence t o show t h e y w e r e e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f , t h u s t h e d e f a u l t judgment should b e set a s i d e . T h i s a c t i o n d i d n o t a d j u d i c a t e ownership o f r e a l p r o p e r t y , o r even a d j u d i c a t e t h e ownership o f t h e easement. The judgment a d d r e s s e s o n l y t h e u s e o f t h e roadway between t h e i n d i v i d u a l s named a s p a r t i e s . A s s u c h it i s n o t a q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n t o which § 70-28-108, M C A a p p l i e s . W e t h e r e f o r e hold t h e D i s t r i c t Court had a u t h o r i t y t o e n t e r t h e d e f a u l t judgment. / The o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirme@/ , / / ' pp, 2 4 1 J u s t i c e , W e concur: -