Title: In re M.H.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89599
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2001

Docket No. 89599-Agenda 10-March 2001.
In re M.H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, 								Appellant, v. V.D., Appellee).
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In July 1998, the State filed a "Supplemental Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights and Power to Consent to
Adoption" (supplemental petition) with respect to each of
respondent V.D.'s two minor daughters, M.H. and T.H.
Respondent admitted to count III of the supplemental petitions,
which alleged that she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct
the conditions which were the basis of the minors' removal or to
make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to her
within 12 months after adjudication of neglect. The circuit court
of Winnebago County, after inquiring whether respondent
understood that she had a right to require the State to prove her
unfit, accepted respondent's admission to count III. No factual
basis was elicited before the circuit court accepted the admission
of unfitness. Following a best interests hearing, respondent's
parental rights were terminated.
	On appeal, respondent argued that the State should have
elicited a factual basis prior to accepting her admission, as the
State is required to do when a criminal defendant enters a guilty
plea pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(c) (177 Ill. 2d R.
402(c)). The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded.
313 Ill. App. 3d 205. We granted the State's petition for leave to
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).
BACKGROUND
	Respondent has six children. This appeal involves only
respondent's parental rights with respect to M.H., born on April
28, 1993, and T.H., born on June 3, 1989. On August 1, 1995, the
circuit court adjudicated M.H. and T.H. neglected because they
lived in an environment injurious to their welfare in that one of
their brothers, J.H., played with matches and on occasion set
things on fire, thereby placing M.H. and T.H. at risk of harm. The
circuit court appointed the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) as the minors' guardian and custodian and
allowed DCFS to place the children with respondent. In February
1996, M.H. and T.H. were removed from respondent's custody
because of poor conditions in the home and were placed with
respondent's sister. Later, M.H. and T.H. were placed in separate
foster homes.
	After M.H. and T.H. were adjudicated neglected, a hearing
was held in February 1998, regarding respondent's youngest son,
Mi. H. During the hearing, respondent stipulated that M.H. and
T.H. had been sexually molested by their brothers and that
respondent had failed to protect them. Based on this stipulation,
evidence, and testimony, the circuit court found Mi. H. to be an
abused minor and made him a ward of the court.
	In July 1998, the State filed two supplemental petitions for
termination of respondent's parental rights with respect to M.H.
and T.H. The petitions alleged that respondent was unfit because
she (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)
(West 1996)); (2) failed to protect the minors from conditions that
were injurious to their welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West
1996)); and (3) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis of the minors' removal, or to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to her within
12 months after the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)
(West 1996)).
	During the January 1999 termination hearing, the State
informed the court that respondent would admit that she failed to
make reasonable progress towards the return of M.H. and T.H. to
her home. Respondent's attorney stated that he had thoroughly
discussed respondent's admission with her. The court then asked
respondent whether she understood her right to have the State
prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was unfit:
			"THE COURT: Okay. I want to be clear on the record,
[V.D.], that you have a right of requiring [that] the State
prove the allegations, including the allegations that you
failed to make reasonable progress on your service plan,
that the State has a very high burden of proof, they can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that you
failed to follow through or failed to progress, basically, in
terms of meeting your service plan goals, finishing
whatever classes or counseling that was required in order
that [M.H.] and [T.H.] can be returned to you. Do you
understand that you have the right to require that the State
present a trial, and if you agree to this you are giving up
your right to that?
			MR. BRENNER [respondent's attorney]: [V.D.]?
			THE COURT: Did you want to take a moment to talk
to your attorney more? You are hesitating, so I don't want
to be-This is a big step, and I want you to be comfortable
with it, and I want your [sic] to understand what's being
said. What I understand is if you admit to this then the
question becomes, at the point in time we set the second
portion of it. It's a two-part consideration, first the
unfitness issue and then what's in the best interests, and
before anything would be done affecting your parental
rights findings would have to be made. It would have to
be found it would not be in the children's best interests to
go home with you, or whatever, but the first part is-what
we are talking about today-and you do have the right to
require the State to prove that you are unfit, so if you give
up that right I just want that to be made with your
understanding and your agreement. Do you understand
that?
			[RESPONDENT]: Yeah.
			THE COURT: Are you agreeable with that?
			[RESPONDENT]: Yeah."
Without further evidence, the court accepted respondent's
admission.
	In April and June of 1999, the circuit court held hearings on
the best interests of M.H. and T.H. Based on the testimony of
caseworkers, respondent, and respondent's husband, the circuit
court found that it was in the best interests of M.H. and T.H. that
respondent's parental rights be terminated.
	The appellate court for the second district reversed holding
that the circuit court was required to determine that a factual basis
existed for respondent's admission of unfitness. The appellate
court analogized termination of parental rights proceedings to
criminal proceedings and stated that, although Supreme Court
Rule 402(c) does not directly apply to admissions of parental
unfitness, the precautionary measures of Rule 402(c) should apply
in parental rights termination proceedings. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 212.
	The court relied on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 612, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1399 (1982), in which the
United States Supreme Court stated that "the factfinding stage of
a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding bears many of the
indicia of a criminal trial." The appellate court concluded that the
protection afforded by a factual-basis inquiry is "necessary" and
will ensure that a parent's admission is knowing and voluntary. 
313 Ill. App. 3d at 215.
	The appellate court noted that no facts were elicited at the
hearing pertaining to respondent's unfitness, and the supplemental
petitions contained only general allegations. Relying on In re D.L.,
191 Ill. 2d 1 (2000), the court rejected the State's argument that
there was sufficient evidence to accept respondent's admission
based on the evidence presented at the February 1998 adjudicatory
and subsequent best interests hearings regarding respondent's son,
Mi. H. The court concluded that since D.L. only allowed for
consideration of the parents' conduct within the 12 months
following the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency, the
circuit court could only consider evidence of respondent's
reasonable progress from August 1, 1995, to August 1, 1996. 313
Ill. App. 3d at 216. The appellate court vacated respondent's
admission of unfitness for lack of a factual-basis determination,
reversed the order terminating respondent's parental rights, and
remanded the cause to the circuit court for a new hearing to
determine respondent's fitness.
ANALYSIS
	We first address the appropriate standard of review.
Ordinarily, a circuit court's finding as to fitness is afforded great
deference on review. The circuit court is in the best position to
make factual findings and to assess the credibility of witnesses;
accordingly, a reviewing court will only reverse a circuit court's
ruling if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274 (1990). In the present case,
however, the circuit court's ruling was based not on testimony or
factual findings, but solely on respondent's admission. Therefore,
the question presented in this case, whether the circuit court was
required to elicit a factual basis prior to accepting respondent's
admission, is a question of law and will be reviewed de novo.
Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998).
	The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., amend. XIV,
§1. The due process clause "guarantees more than fair process" as
it also "provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 787, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997). These liberty interests
include the right to contract, engage in an occupation, acquire
knowledge, marry, establish a home and raise children, and
worship God. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 558, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2706-07 (1972),
citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042,
1045, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626 (1923).
	In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 56,
120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000), the United States Supreme Court
stated that "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court." Parental rights protected by the
due process clause include the right to bring up one's children and
control their education (Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus &amp; Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 69 L. Ed. 1070,
1077-78, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925)), and the freedom of personal
choice in the matters of family life (Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 606, 102 S. Ct. at 1394). Illinois courts have also
recognized a parent's liberty interest in raising children. See, e.g.,
Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 470-71 (2000); People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (1989); In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124, 128-29 (1988);
In re Vanessa C., 316 Ill. App. 3d 475, 481 (2000); In re D.R., 307
Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (1999).
	Although the United States Supreme Court and Illinois courts
recognize a parent's fundamental right in the care, custody, and
control of their children, courts also recognize that parental rights
must sometimes be terminated. Because of the liberty interests
involved, courts will not easily terminate those rights. In re Paul,
101 Ill. 2d 345, 351-52 (1984). The United States Supreme Court
has noted that "[w]hen the State initiates a parental rights
termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that
fundamental liberty interest, but to end it." Santosky, 455 U.S.  at
759, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 610, 102 S. Ct.  at 1397. Therefore, procedures
involved in terminating parental rights must meet the requisites of
the due process clause. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at
606, 102 S. Ct.  at 1394.
	In this case, we must ascertain whether due process requires
a circuit court to first determine whether a factual basis exists for
a parent's admission of unfitness. Our analysis begins with the
Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). There, the Court addressed
the issue of whether the due process clause of the fifth amendment
required an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of a
recipient's Social Security disability benefit payments. Mathews,
424 U.S.  at 323, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 26, 96 S. Ct.  at 897. The Court
identified three factors to be considered in determining what due
process requires: (1) the private interest affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
safeguards would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S.  at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 
at 33, 96 S. Ct.  at 903.
	Although the Mathews case dealt with a property interest in
disability benefits, the Supreme Court has applied the Mathews
factors to cases involving the termination of parental rights. In
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 652, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2161-62 (1981), the Court was
asked to decide whether due process required the appointment of
counsel for an indigent parent in a parental rights termination
proceeding. Applying the Mathews factors, the Court found that:
(1) the parent's interest was extremely important; (2) the
complexity of the proceeding, together with an uncounseled
parent, could lead to an erroneous deprivation of the parent's
rights; and (3) the State had an interest in a correct decision and a
strong interest in informal procedures. Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 31, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 652, 101 S. Ct.  at 2161-62. After considering the
presumption against the right to appointed counsel in the absence
of a possible loss of physical liberty, the Court found no due
process violation in the trial court's failure to appoint counsel.
Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 32-33, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 652-53, 101 S. Ct.  at
2162-63. See also Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (determining the standard of proof required in a
parental rights termination case and applying the Mathews factors,
the Court: (1) reiterated the parent's fundamental liberty interest
in raising a child; (2) noted an increased burden of proof could
reduce the possibility of erroneous terminations; and (3) stated a
higher standard would promote the welfare of the child through
accurate decisions without any burdens for the State or the fact
finder).
	Illinois courts have also applied the Mathews factors in
determining whether procedures followed in a parental rights
termination proceeding satisfied the constitutional requirements of
due process. In D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 482-84, the appellate
court was asked to decide whether a mother's due process rights
were violated when the circuit court barred her counsel from
cross-examining witnesses, presenting a defense, or making an
argument because of the mother's absence in court even though
she was eight months pregnant and had a mandatory meeting with
her probation officer that day. Applying the Mathews factors, the
appellate court held that: (1) the mother had a liberty interest in
maintaining her parental relationship; (2) the procedures used by
the circuit court led to an erroneous deprivation of her parental
rights; and (3) there would not have been an undue burden on the
government in allowing the mother's counsel to present evidence
or cross-examine witnesses. See also Vanessa C., 316 Ill. App. 3d
at 482-83; In re M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402-03 (2000); In re
C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465-66 (1995).
	We now turn to the application of the Mathews test to the
facts of this case. The private interest at stake here is the interest
of a parent in the control, custody, and care of her child. It is well
established that this interest is fundamental and will not be
terminated lightly. See Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 470-71; Paul, 101 Ill. 2d  at 351-52. Prior to children being adjudicated wards of the
court, the State must prove abuse, neglect or dependence by a
preponderance of the evidence. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 343
(2000). Before a circuit court can adjudicate a parent unfit and
terminate parental rights, the State must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit. Syck, 138 Ill. 2d  at
275. These burdens underscore the importance of a parent's
fundamental right in the control, custody, and care of their children
and the fact that these rights may not be easily taken away.
	Next, we believe that the procedures, or lack thereof, utilized
by the circuit court in this case may lead to an erroneous
deprivation of a parent's fundamental rights. A factual-basis
requirement ensures that the State has a basis for its allegation of
unfitness. In addition, a factual-basis requirement makes certain
that a parent's admission of unfitness is knowing and voluntary.
Illinois courts have held that in a neglect proceeding, pursuant to
the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West 1998)),
circuit courts must state in writing the factual basis supporting the
determination that a minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. In
re M.Z., 294 Ill. App. 3d 581, 599 (1998). The purpose of this
statutory requirement is to set forth the grounds for termination of
parental rights if there were no reasonable efforts made by the
parent to correct the grounds in the original adjudication of the
child. In re Z.Z., 312 Ill. App. 3d 800, 804 (2000). This
requirement puts the parent on notice as to what is required of her
in the future as to rehabilitation or progress to be made with
regards to her children. It is clear that if sufficient facts must be
presented to and found by the court in determining abuse, neglect,
or dependence, then a factual-basis presentation must be required
for a finding of unfitness as well.
	Illinois courts have also held that admissions under the
Juvenile Court Act must be voluntarily and intelligently made. In
re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 391 (1977); In re Johnson, 102 Ill. App.
3d 1005, 1012 (1981). The appellate court in Johnson held that for
a parent's admission to be valid in an adjudicatory phase of a
neglect proceeding it must be intelligently and voluntarily made.
Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 1012-13. This knowing and voluntary
requirement protects a parent from admitting to neglect or abuse
when their conduct does not fall within the State's allegations.
	Clearly, if an admission of neglect must be knowing and
voluntary, then an admission of unfitness must also be knowing
and voluntary. The factual basis allows the parent to hear the State
describe the alleged facts relating to fitness and gives the parent an
opportunity to challenge or correct any facts that are disputed.
Without a factual basis, "there is a danger that a parent may
understand the State's alleged grounds of unfitness but may not
realize that his or her conduct does not fall within those
allegations." 313 Ill. App. 3d at 215. Thus, if a parent is not fully
informed of the factual basis underlying the State's allegations,
there is an increased risk that her parental rights will be
erroneously terminated because of an ill-advised admission of
unfitness.
	Finally, we must consider the governmental interest and any
burdens a factual-basis requirement would place on that interest.
Although the interests of the parent are important, the State also
has a fundamental interest in the proceeding to terminate parental
rights. The State's interest in parental rights termination
proceedings is twofold: a parens patriae interest in preserving and
promoting the child's welfare and a fiscal and administrative
interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings.
Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 766, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 615, 102 S. Ct.  at 1401.
Since the State is concerned with the welfare of the child, it shares
the parent's interest in a correct and just decision at the fact-finding proceeding. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 766, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 615,
102 S. Ct.  at 1401. A factual-basis requirement furthers the State's
interest also.
	Furthermore, a factual-basis requirement will not burden the
State or the court. In the instant case, the State informed the court
that respondent would admit that she was unfit. The circuit court
accepted the admission after questioning respondent as to whether
she understood her right to require the State to prove her unfit by
clear and convincing evidence. Hearing the State's recitation of the
facts supporting the underlying petition and determining that a
factual basis exists is not unduly burdensome to either the court or
the State. The State should have readily available sufficient facts
since the State initiated the petition. A recitation of facts requires
far less time than a contested evidentiary hearing and does not
require witnesses to testify.
	The application of the Mathews balancing test makes clear
that due process requires a circuit court to determine whether a
factual basis exists for an admission of parental unfitness before
it accepts the admission. A factual-basis determination safeguards
against an erroneous deprivation of respondent's fundamental right
to parent her children. Further, such a requirement does not
impose any increased burden on the State, but fosters just and
accurate decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court's 
judgment vacating respondent's admission of unfitness for lack of
a factual-basis determination, reversing the order terminating
respondent's parental rights as to M.H. and T.H., and remanding
the cause for a new fitness hearing.
Affirmed.