Title: Commonwealth v. Francis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12118
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 11, 2017

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SJC-12118 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROGER D. FRANCIS. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 3, 2017. - August 11, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Plea. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court on May 
11, 1967. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 355 Mass. 108 (1969), a 
motion for a new trial, see 411 Mass. 579 (1992), and the 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty and a second trial, see 450 Mass. 
132 (2007), a motion for a new trial, filed on August 5, 2013, 
was heard by Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., 
in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The Commonwealth claims that an order granting 
the specific performance of a plea agreement constituted error.  
We agree. 
2 
 
 
 
Background.  In 1967, the defendant, Roger Francis, was 
convicted of murder in the first degree for killing his fifteen 
year old girl friend.  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 355 Mass. 
108, 108-109 (1969).  In 1989, a Superior Court judge allowed 
the defendant's motion for a new trial because of errors in the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction given in his 1967 trial.  
Thereafter, this court, considering the Commonwealth's appeal on 
report of a single justice pursuant to the gatekeeper provisions 
of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 
Mass. 579, 580 (1992). 
 
In May, 1994, the defendant reached a plea agreement with 
the Commonwealth:  The defendant would plead guilty to murder in 
the second degree in exchange for the opportunity to immediately 
seek parole, which the Commonwealth would not oppose.1  If the 
parole board declined to grant the defendant parole, the 
agreement allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and 
proceed to trial on the murder in the first degree charge.  
After the plea agreement had been reached, the defendant pleaded 
guilty on May 25, 1994, before a Superior Court judge (plea 
judge).  At the plea hearing, the defendant's counsel made 
representations that there was an understanding between the 
                                                          
 
 
1 At the time of the defendant's 1994 plea, he had already 
served more than fifteen years in prison.  Those convicted of 
murder in the second degree in 1967 were eligible for parole 
after fifteen years.  St. 1965, c. 766, § 1. 
3 
 
 
parole board and the defendant that the defendant would not be 
required to be in custody to be considered for parole.2  To 
effectuate the understanding as it was represented,3 the plea 
judge -- over the Commonwealth's objection -- stayed the 
execution of the sentence on the charge of murder in the second 
degree while the defendant's parole application was being 
considered.  The parole hearing was scheduled for August, 1994. 
 
Before the scheduled parole hearing, the parole board 
informed the parties and the plea judge of its position that 
pursuant to the terms of G. L. c. 127, § 133A,4 the defendant had 
to be in custody in order for the parole board to have 
jurisdiction over him.  Because the defendant disagreed with 
returning to custody, the August parole hearing was canceled. 
 
In September, 1994, in response to the parole board's 
position, the plea judge issued a revised order that would 
terminate the stay of the defendant's sentence once the parole 
                                                          
 
 
2 Nothing occurred during the plea colloquy to suggest that 
the Commonwealth had agreed as a condition of the plea that the 
defendant need not be in custody during the parole hearing. 
 
 
3 It is questionable at best whether there was ever an 
understanding between the parole board and the defendant that 
the defendant need not be in custody during his parole hearing. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 127, § 133A, provides:  "Every prisoner 
who is serving a sentence for life in a correctional institution 
of the commonwealth . . . shall be eligible for parole at the 
expiration of the minimum term fixed by the court . . ." 
(emphasis added). 
4 
 
 
board commenced its hearing.  The order was designed to 
accommodate the defendant's request to avoid custody. 
 
The parole hearing was rescheduled for March, 1999.5  This 
hearing was canceled in part due to the defendant's resistance 
to returning to custody.  The parole hearing was rescheduled for 
March, 2000.  Because the defendant would have to return to 
custody to have his parole hearing, he filed a motion to 
continue the stay of his sentence, or, alternatively, to 
withdraw his plea. 
 
At the hearing on this motion, in March, 2000, a different 
judge attempted to craft a solution that would allow the 
defendant to remain out of custody while conforming with the 
parole board's position that the defendant must be in custody 
for it to conduct a hearing.  The judge proposed that the stay 
be continued until the moment the parole hearing commenced (in 
keeping with the 1994 plea judge's order), and that the stay be 
automatically reimposed following the parole hearing if the 
defendant were denied parole, so that he could withdraw his 
plea.  The Commonwealth objected to this proposal.  The judge 
then granted the defendant's alternative request for relief, 
                                                          
 
 
5 This five-year gap was the result of the defendant 
requesting that his attorney not pursue a parole hearing and, 
apparently, the Commonwealth losing track of the defendant's 
case.  In 1998, the prosecutor's office was informed by the 
Superior Court clerk's office in Brockton that the court was 
still holding the defendant's bail money, and the case began to 
proceed. 
5 
 
 
allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to murder in 
the second degree. 
 
The defendant was retried on the original indictment for 
murder in the first degree in 2003 before a third Superior Court 
judge and jury.  His conviction of that crime was upheld by this 
court.6  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 133 (2007).  
In 2013, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel and that his 1967 sentence was 
cruel or unusual.  Although the judge -- who was the judge at 
the defendant's 2003 trial -- found the defendant's arguments 
unavailing, "[i]n light of the extenuating facts of this case," 
she granted the motion based on "principles of fundamental 
fairness and due process," even though she found that the 
Commonwealth had not reneged on the plea offer.  The judge 
ordered specific performance of the 1994 plea agreement, and 
allowed the defendant to plead guilty to murder in the second 
degree.  The judge reasoned that this was the correct result 
because "another party to the negotiation, the court, adopted an 
interpretation of the [s]tatute -- that the Parole Board could 
entertain the defendant's request for parole and conduct a 
hearing at the Board's office without his surrendering into 
[Department of Correction] custody -- on which the defendant 
                                                          
 
 
6 Prior to this trial, the defendant filed a motion to 
enforce the plea agreement, which the trial judge denied. 
6 
 
 
relied to his detriment."7  The Commonwealth appealed to a single 
justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, who 
allowed the petition. 
 
Discussion.  The decision whether the Commonwealth enters 
into a plea agreement with the defendant is the prosecutor's 
alone.  See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 500 (1991).  
See also Commonwealth v. Hart, 149 Mass. 7, 8 (1889) ("Only an 
attorney authorized by the Commonwealth to represent it has 
authority to declare that he will not further prosecute a case 
in behalf of the Commonwealth.  A court is not a prosecuting 
officer . . .").  As a general matter, when a judge accepts a 
defendant's plea of guilty to murder in the second degree to an 
indictment for murder in the first degree over the objection of 
the Commonwealth, she usurps "the decision-making authority 
constitutionally allocated to the executive branch."  Gordon, 
supra at 501, and cases cited.  A judge may, however, enforce a 
plea agreement over the Commonwealth's objection if she finds 
that the defendant has reasonably relied on a prosecutor's 
promise to his or her detriment.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 384 
Mass. 519, 521 (1981).  Whether an enforceable promise exists is 
primarily a question of contract law, id. at 521-522, but, in 
addition, "[w]e would go beyond contract principles to order 
                                                          
 
 
7 As we explain, infra, the court is not a party to plea 
negotiations, and, more importantly, the defendant never relied 
to his detriment on any promise related to custody. 
7 
 
 
specific performance of a prosecutor's promise even where no 
contract may have existed, if, on principles of fundamental 
fairness encompassed within notions of due process of law, the 
promise should be enforced."  Id. at 522. 
 
The issue before us is whether the judge in 2013 abused her 
discretion in deciding to enforce the 1994 plea agreement 
between the Commonwealth and the defendant.  More particularly, 
the issue is whether the prosecutor made an enforceable promise 
to the defendant that he need not be in custody for the parole 
hearing. 
 
Applying contract principles, the record does not indicate 
that the Commonwealth made any enforceable promise to the 
defendant that he would not have to go into custody before his 
parole hearing could take place.  Indeed, the record is to the 
contrary.  Thus, we apply a two-prong test to determine whether 
fundamental fairness requires us to find an enforceable promise 
in the plea agreement:  first, we ask "whether the defendant had 
reasonable grounds for assuming his interpretation of the 
bargain," Smith, 384 Mass. at 523, quoting Blaikie v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 375 Mass. 613, 616 n.2 (1978); 
and second, we ask "whether [the defendant] relied on that 
interpretation to his detriment."  Smith, 384 Mass. at 523. 
 
Here, the defendant's argument fails both prongs of the 
test.  There were no reasonable grounds for the defendant to 
8 
 
 
believe that the prosecutor acquiesced to his not being in 
custody during the parole hearing process.  The prosecutor 
consistently objected to the stay of the defendant's sentence 
throughout the plea process and continued to object to it over 
the course of subsequent hearings.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 62 
Mass. App. Ct. 610, 612 (2010).  The prosecutor's objection 
demonstrates that it had made no enforceable promise that the 
defendant would avoid custody at the time he would be considered 
for parole.  This view is consistent with the judge's finding 
that the Commonwealth never reneged on its offer. 
 
Even if there were reasonable grounds for the defendant to 
believe that the Commonwealth had promised him that he would not 
have to be in custody for the parole board to conduct its 
hearing, the defendant's argument also fails the second prong of 
the test, because there is no evidence that he relied on the 
alleged promise to his detriment.  The parole board did not hold 
a hearing between 1994 and 2000 while the defendant was at 
liberty.  The defendant, therefore, took advantage of his 
interpretation of the plea agreement (adopted by the court) that 
he be allowed to withdraw his plea if he were required to go 
into custody as a condition of his parole hearing.  Contrast 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-262 (1971) 
(detrimental reliance where defendant pleaded guilty based on 
promise of prosecutor to make no sentencing recommendation, but 
9 
 
 
prosecutor subsequently broke promise and recommended maximum 
sentence); Commonwealth v. Benton, 356 Mass. 447, 448-449 (1969) 
(detrimental reliance where defendants pleaded guilty based on 
promise of prosecutor to enter nolle prosequi to certain 
charges, but prosecutor subsequently indicted defendants on 
charges that had been so disposed).  The defendant never relied 
to his detriment on any alleged promise from the Commonwealth.  
His plea agreement specifically allowed him to withdraw the plea 
and have the trial he requested.  The plea bargaining process 
did not put the defendant in a worse position than he would have 
been if the prosecutor had never agreed to the bargain in the 
first place.  Smith, 384 Mass. at 522.  The defendant withdrew 
his plea and he was then left with the adequate remedy of 
proceeding to trial.  Id.8 
 
A judge may not use the vantage point of hindsight to 
second guess the decisions of a defendant in rejecting a plea 
agreement.  See Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass. 11, 17 (2004).  
That is what happened here.  There was no enforceable promise 
made by the Commonwealth that the defendant did not have to ever 
                                                          
 
 
8 This situation is different from that presented by 
Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass. 11 (2004).  In that case, we 
held that a fair trial does not ameliorate the harm of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea consideration 
process.  Id. at 14-15.  Here, where the judge below rejected 
the defendant's ineffective assistance claim, nothing impeded 
the defendant during plea negotiations besides his refusal to go 
back into custody so that the board could conduct a hearing. 
10 
 
 
go into custody.  Thus, there were no grounds for the judge to 
allow the defendant to plead guilty to murder in the second 
degree.9  We conclude that the judge abused her discretion in 
granting the defendant's motion for new trial.  See Commonwealth 
v. Yardley Y., 464 Mass. 223, 227 (2013) (grant or denial of 
motion to challenge or enforce plea reviewed for abuse of 
discretion). 
 
Conclusion.  The grant of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
9 We note that following the 2003 trial, the judge had the 
authority to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree to 
murder in the second degree under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), 
379 Mass. 896 (1979).  There is no argument before us that the 
judge's action in 2013 was undertaken pursuant to this rule.