Title: People v. Lombardi
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83810, 83950, 83951, 83952
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 1998

People v. Lombardi, No. 83810 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 83810, 83950, 83951, 83952 cons.-Agenda 9-September 
1998.
Opinion filed December 17, 1998.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The issue presented in these four consolidated appeals is whether the 
statutory penalty for armed violence involving a Category I weapon (720 ILCS 
5/33A-3 (West 1996)) is unconstitutional when the underlying felony for this 
offense is possession of a controlled substance or residential burglary. Prior 
to trial, the circuit court of Kankakee County dismissed the armed violence 
charges against the defendant in each case on the basis that the penalty for 
armed violence violates the due process and proportionate penalties provisions 
of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§2, 11). The 
State appealed the dismissal orders directly to this court pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603). We hold that the penalty for armed violence 
predicated on possession of a controlled substance while armed with a Category I 
weapon is not unconstitutional. However, we determine that the penalty for armed 
violence predicated on residential burglary while armed with a Category I weapon 
violates the proportionate penalties clause. 
BACKGROUND
Causes Nos. 83810 and 83952
In cause No. 83810, defendant Daniel Lombardi was charged by indictment with 
multiple offenses stemming from his alleged October 6, 1995, sale of a 
controlled substance to an undercover police officer while carrying a handgun in 
his jacket pocket. Among the charges included in the indictment was one count of 
armed violence predicated on possession of a controlled substance while armed 
with a Category I weapon (see 720 ILCS 5/33A-2; 570/402(c) (West 1994)). Prior 
to trial, Lombardi moved to dismiss the armed violence count on the basis that 
the penalty for this offense violates the proportionate penalties clause of the 
Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11), as well as the 
due process provisions of both state and federal constitutions (U.S. Const., 
amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
In cause No. 83952, an indictment charged defendant Elijah Thomas with armed 
violence, possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful use of a weapon. 
According to the allegations of the indictment, on April 7, 1997, Thomas was 
found in possession of a controlled substance while armed with a handgun. Like 
Lombardi, he filed a pretrial motion to dismiss his armed violence charge, which 
was also predicated on possession of a controlled substance while armed with a 
Category I weapon (see 720 ILCS 5/33A-2; 570/402(c) (West 1996)). Thomas 
asserted that the penalty for this offense is unconstitutionally 
disproportionate.
On July 29, 1997, the circuit court granted Lombardi's and Thomas' motions 
and dismissed the armed violence charges against them. In its written order, the 
circuit court compared armed violence (possession of a controlled substance) 
while armed with a Category I weapon with other offenses involving the use of 
dangerous weapons. The court found that armed violence (possession of a 
controlled substance) is a less serious offense than aggravated battery of a 
police officer with a firearm or aggravated criminal sexual assault because 
these offenses are inherently violent, whereas armed violence (possession of a 
controlled substance) does not necessarily involve violence. After noting that 
the 15- to 30-year penalty for the armed violence offense (720 ILCS 5/33A-3(a) 
(West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996)), is greater than the penalty 
for aggravated battery of a police officer with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 
(a)(2), (b) (West 1996)), or aggravated criminal sexual assault when a dangerous 
weapon is used (720 ILCS 5/12-14 (a)(1), (d) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) 
(West 1996)),(1) 
the circuit court concluded that penalty for armed violence based on possession 
of a controlled substance while armed with a Category I weapon violates the due 
process and proportionate penalties provisions of the Illinois 
Constitution.
Causes Nos. 83950 and 83951
In the two other cases consolidated for review, the circuit court also 
dismissed the armed violence charges against defendants prior to trial. In 
causes Nos. 83950 and 83951, a joint indictment alleged that defendants Shavez 
L. Evans and Timothy L. Washington committed residential burglary on December 7, 
1996, while armed with a handgun. The indictment included a charge of armed 
violence predicated on residential burglary while armed with a Category I weapon 
(720 ILCS 5/19-3 (a), 33A-2 (West 1996)). Evans and Washington moved for 
dismissal of the armed violence charge, arguing that the penalty for this 
offense violates the proportionate penalties and due process provisions of the 
Illinois Constitution of 1970. 
On August 18, 1997, the circuit court dismissed the armed violence charges 
against Evans and Washington. In accordance with its decision in Lombardi's and 
Thomas' cases, the circuit court concluded that the penalty for armed violence 
(residential burglary) involving a Category I weapon is disproportionate because 
this offense is "nonviolent," yet it results in a greater penalty than provided 
for violent offenses, such as home invasion.
In each defendant's case, the State appealed the circuit court's order 
directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. We granted the State's motion to 
consolidate the cases for purposes of review.
ANALYSIS
Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party bringing a constitutional 
challenge to a statute has the burden of clearly establishing a constitutional 
violation. People v. Miller, 171 Ill. 2d 330, 333 (1996). In this case, 
defendants(2) argue that the penalty for the armed violence charges 
alleged in their indictments violates article I, section 2, of the Illinois 
Constitution of 1970, which provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal 
protection of the laws." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2. In addition, they contend 
that the penalty for these charges violates article I, section 11, which is 
commonly known as the proportionate penalties clause. This clause provides in 
relevant part: "All penalties shall be determined *** according to the 
seriousness of the offense ***." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11.
The constitution empowers the legislature to 
"declare and define conduct constituting a crime and to determine the nature and 
extent of punishment for it." People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319 
(1985). The legislature is "more aware of the evils confronting our society and 
therefore is more capable of measuring the seriousness of various offenses." 
People v. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d ___ (1998). For these reasons, courts are 
reluctant to invalidate penalties established by the legislature. People v. 
Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145 (1995).
1. Due Process
With these standards in mind, we first address 
defendants' argument that the penalty for armed violence with a Category I 
weapon violates the due process requirements of the Illinois Constitution when 
the underlying felony is possession of a controlled substance or residential 
burglary. A penalty prescribed for a certain offense satisfies the requirements 
of due process so long as it is "reasonably designed to remedy the evils that 
the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety, and 
general welfare." People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 259 
(1994).
The armed violence statute was enacted as a response 
to the " ` "growing incidence of violent crime." ' " 
People v. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d 96, 109 (1992), quoting People v. 
Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502, 507-08 (1983), quoting People v. Graham, 
25 Ill. App. 3d 853, 858 (1975). Specifically, it was intended to deter 
individuals from carrying a dangerous weapon when committing a felony. 
Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at ___. The statute makes it an offense to commit 
any felony defined by Illinois law while armed with a dangerous weapon (720 ILCS 
5/33A-2 (West 1996)) and describes three categories of "dangerous weapon" (720 
ILCS 5/33A-1 (West 1996)). The sentence for an offense of armed violence depends 
on the category of weapon used. 720 ILCS 5/33A-3 (West 1996).
In the consolidated cases before us, all four 
defendants are alleged to have been armed with a handgun during the commission 
of a felony. The armed violence statute designates a handgun as a Category I 
dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(a), (b) (West 1996). Armed violence involving 
a Category I weapon is a Class X felony, for which the minimum sentence is 15 
years. 720 ILCS 5/33A-3 (a) (West 1996).
Had Lombardi and Thomas been unarmed during the 
commission of the felony underlying their armed violence charges, possession of 
a controlled substance, they would have been subject to a sentence of only one 
to three years. See 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(7) 
(West 1996). Absent previous controlled substance offenses, they would have been 
eligible for probation. See 720 ILCS 570/410(a) (West 1996). Based on the 
involvement of a handgun in their alleged offenses, however, the armed violence 
statute increases their minimum potential sentence to 15 years. 
Similarly, had Washington and Evans been unarmed 
during the residential burglary they are alleged to have committed, their 
potential sentence for this offense, a Class 1 felony, would have been 4 to 15 
years. 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (a), (b) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 1996). 
Under the armed violence statute, however, their potential penalty is increased 
to 15 to 30 years, based on the allegation that they were armed with a handgun 
during the burglary.
Although the penalties for the offenses with which 
defendants were charged are substantially increased by the armed violence 
statute, we find no due process violation. "The presence of a weapon enhances 
the danger that any felony that is committed will have deadly consequences 
should the victim offer resistance." People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502, 
508 (1983). Based on this concern, the legislature could have reasonably 
determined that the stringent penalties prescribed by the armed violence statute 
were necessary to achieve its objective of discouraging offenders from carrying 
weapons when committing a felony.
Thomas contends, however, that the penalty for armed 
violence (possession of a controlled substance) violates the principles of due 
process because it is not rationally related to the purpose of the controlled 
substance statutes. He points out that, in enacting the controlled substance 
statutes, the legislature intended to punish controlled substance traffickers 
more severely than individuals committing other drug offenses, such as 
possession of a controlled substance. See 720 ILCS 570/100, 401(e), 401.1(b), 
402(c) (West 1996). According to Thomas, the armed violence statute "nullifies" 
this intended distinction because the penalty for an offense of armed violence 
is the same, regardless of which controlled substance offense serves as the 
predicate felony. Thomas concludes that the penalty for armed violence is 
unconstitutional because it is not reasonably designed to achieve the purpose of 
the controlled substance statutes.
The flaw in Thomas' analysis is that he relies on a 
perceived inconsistency between the penalty for armed violence (possession of a 
controlled substance) and the purpose of the controlled substance statutes. Due 
process, however, requires only that the challenged penalty be reasonably 
related to the purpose of the statute containing the penalty. See 
Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d  at 259 ("Due process requires that the legislature 
reasonably design penalty provisions to remedy the particular evil which the 
legislature has selected for treatment under the statute in question" 
(emphasis added)). If Thomas were challenging the constitutionality of the 
penalties contained in the controlled substance statutes, the purpose of these 
statutes would be relevant to our analysis. Instead, he argues that the penalty 
imposed by the armed violence statute violates due process. Accordingly, the 
proper inquiry is whether the armed violence penalty is relevant to the purpose 
of the armed violence statute, and we need not consider the purpose of 
the controlled substance statutes. Because we find that the penalty contained in 
the armed violence statute is reasonably designed to achieve the legislature's 
goal of deterring individuals from arming themselves with dangerous weapons 
during the commission of a felony, we reject Thomas' due process challenge to 
the penalty for armed violence (possession of a controlled substance) while 
armed with a Category I weapon.
For similar reasons, we find that Evans and 
Washington's discussion of the home invasion statute fails to show that the 
penalty for armed violence violates due process when the underlying felony is 
residential burglary. Evans and Washington attempt to show a due process 
violation by comparing the penalty for armed violence (residential burglary) 
with a Category I weapon to the penalty for home invasion. The elements of this 
armed violence offense are (1) knowingly and without authority entering the 
dwelling place of another, (2) with the intent to commit therein a theft or 
felony (3) while armed with a dangerous weapon. See 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a), 33A-2 
(West 1996). A person commits home invasion when he or she (1) knowingly enters 
the dwelling place of another with knowledge that one or more persons is 
present, and (2) while armed with a dangerous weapon, uses force or the threat 
of imminent force upon any person in the dwelling place or causes injury to such 
a person. See 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a) (West 1996). The sentence for armed violence 
(residential burglary) while armed with a Category I weapon is 15 to 30 years 
(720 ILCS 5/33A-3(a) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996)), while the 
sentence for home invasion is 6 to 30 years (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 1996); 
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996)). According to Evans and Washington, the fact 
that armed violence (residential burglary) is punished more severely than home 
invasion, a more violent crime, demonstrates that there is no rational 
relationship between the penalty for armed violence and the purpose of the armed 
violence statute, which is the deterrence of violent felonies. 
Again, Evans and Washington's argument reflects a 
misunderstanding of the limited scope of the due process analysis. The essential 
question with respect to their due process challenge is whether the armed 
violence statute is reasonably related to the legislature's purpose in enacting 
that statute. The fact that home invasion may be a more serious crime and be 
punished less severely does not demonstrate that the armed violence 
statute is not reasonably related to the goal of deterring violent crime. This 
court has recognized that "the availability of different punishments for 
separate offenses based on the same acts does not offend due process." 
Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d  at 260; see also, e.g., People v. 
Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 179 (1990); People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 379 (1989). By attaching a 15-year minimum sentence to felonies committed 
while armed with a Category I weapon, the legislature reasonably designed the 
armed violence statute to achieve its purpose: discouraging individuals from 
carrying weapons when committing a felony. We hold that defendants have failed 
to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the penalty for armed violence 
predicated on possession of a controlled substance or residential burglary while 
armed with a Category I weapon violates due process. 
2. Proportionality
Having rejected defendants' due process challenge, 
we turn to their other constitutional argument, that the armed violence statute 
violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). This clause requires the legislature to 
proportion penalties according to the seriousness of offenses. Koppa, 
184 Ill. 2d at ___.
In evaluating challenges to penalties under the 
proportionate penalties clause, this court has employed three different 
analyses. First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is 
" ` "cruel," "degrading" or so "wholly disproportionate to the offense 
committed as to shock the moral sense of the community." ' " 
People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 236 (1995); see also People v. 
Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (1997); People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 210 (1995). Second, a penalty is invalid under the proportionate penalties 
clause where similar offenses are compared, and conduct that creates a less 
serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. See, 
e.g., Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 503, 506-07; People v. 
Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 194-97 (1983). Third, there is a violation of the 
proportionate penalties clause when identical offenses are given different 
sentences. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 417-18 
(1996); Christy, 139 Ill. 2d  at 181.
The State and defendants agree that only the 
analysis involving the comparison of similar offenses is applicable to 
defendants' limitation-of-penalties challenge. Thus, the limited issue before us 
is whether the penalty for armed violence (possession of a controlled substance) 
or armed violence (residential burglary) involving a Category I weapon is 
invalid under the cross-comparison analysis.
Causes Nos. 83810 and 
83952
With respect to the charges in Lombardi's and 
Thomas' cases, Thomas argues that the penalty for armed violence (possession of 
a controlled substance) is disproportionate when compared to aggravated battery 
with a firearm or aggravated criminal sexual assault. In addition, he argues 
that a comparison of armed violence (possession of a controlled substance) to 
armed violence predicated on other controlled substance offenses demonstrates a 
violation of the proportionate penalties clause. We begin with a discussion of 
the first comparison. 
Thomas argues that the circuit court correctly based 
a finding of disproportionality on a comparison of armed violence (possession of 
a controlled substance) involving a Category I weapon to aggravated battery with 
a firearm and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Armed violence (possession of 
a controlled substance) involving a Category I weapon is a Class X felony, for 
which the punishment is 15 to 30 years' imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/33A-3 (West 
1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996). Aggravated battery with a firearm and 
aggravated criminal sexual assault are Class X felonies, for which the 
punishment is 6 to 30 years' imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(b), 12-14(d) (West 
1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996).(3) 
Thomas contends that aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated criminal 
sexual assault are more serious crimes than armed violence (possession of a 
controlled substance) while armed with a Category I weapon because they involve 
an actual threat or use of violence, whereas the armed violence offense concerns 
simple possession of a weapon. He maintains that the greater penalty for armed 
violence, therefore, violates the proportionate penalties clause. 
In People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495 (1997), we explained that the 
cross-comparison analysis involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the purposes 
of the compared offenses are "distinct such that comparative proportionality 
review is not appropriate"; and (2) if the purposes are "related," whether the 
offense with the harsher penalty is more serious than the offense with the less 
severe penalty. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506. Thomas ignores the first 
step of the Davis inquiry and jumps to a comparison of the relative 
seriousness of armed violence (possession of a controlled substance), aggravated 
battery with a firearm, and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Absent a showing 
that the purposes of these statutes are related, however, Thomas' comparison 
cannot establish a violation of the proportionate penalties clause.
It is well established by this court's precedent that it is inappropriate to 
compare offenses and their penalties unless they have common statutory purposes. 
When offenses have different purposes, we presume that the legislature 
considered different factors in establishing the penalties for them, and we 
defer to its judgment. See, e.g., Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at ___ 
(finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a 
comparison of armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed 
violence (aggravated kidnaping) to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and 
aggravated kidnaping); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 235-37 (1995) 
(finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a 
comparison of stalking to assault and disorderly conduct); People v. 
Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145-47 (1995) (finding no violation of the 
proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of aggravated battery with 
a firearm to involuntary manslaughter, second degree murder, and battery); 
People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 259-60 (1994) (finding no violation 
of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of criminal drug 
conspiracy to calculated criminal drug conspiracy); People v. Steppan, 
105 Ill. 2d 310, 320-22 (1985) (finding no violation of the proportionate 
penalties clause based on a comparison of theft to burglary); People v. 
Bales, 108 Ill. 2d 182, 195-96 (1985) (finding no violation of the 
proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of residential burglary to 
aggravated kidnaping and indecent liberties with a child).
In Koppa, for example, we held that a comparison of the penalties 
for armed violence (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) and armed violence 
(aggravated kidnaping) with the penalties for aggravated criminal sexual abuse 
and aggravated kidnaping failed to demonstrate a violation of the proportionate 
penalties clause. The defendant argued that it violated the proportionate 
penalties clause to have different penalties for these offenses because their 
purposes are the same. According to the defendant, all of these statutes were 
intended to deter the use of a weapon during a felony. Koppa, 184 Ill. 
2d at ___. We observed, however, that, while the armed violence statute targets 
carrying a weapon during the commission of a felony, the offenses of aggravated 
criminal sexual abuse and aggravated kidnaping do not necessarily involve a 
weapon. Therefore, we concluded, the statutes have different purposes, and the 
legislature is presumed to have considered different factors in enacting the 
penalty for each offense. Accordingly, we refused to find that the penalty for 
armed violence predicated on these felonies violates the proportionate penalties 
clause. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at ___.
Based on this case law, Thomas cannot establish a violation of the 
proportionate penalties clause without first showing that the purposes of the 
statutes involved in his cross-comparison analysis are related. Thomas is unable 
to make this showing. 
The language of a statute is the best indication of the legislature's intent. 
Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at ___. The language that the legislature used in 
defining armed violence, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated 
criminal sexual assault demonstrates that the purpose of each of these statutes 
is different. The elements of the armed violence offense with which Lombardi and 
Thomas were charged are (1) knowing possession of a controlled substance (2) 
while armed with a Category I weapon. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 33A-2, 402(c) (West 
1996). The elements of aggravated battery with a firearm are (1) knowingly or 
intentionally committing a battery by means of the discharge of a firearm and 
(2) causing any injury to another person. 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 1996). A 
person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault when (1) he commits a criminal 
sexual assault and (2) one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the 
statute exists. 720 ILCS 5/12-14 (West 1996).
Generally, the problem targeted by the armed violence statute is the risk of 
harm associated with the presence of a weapon during the commission of a felony. 
When the felony underlying a charge of armed violence is possession of a 
controlled substance, the particular evil addessed by the legislature is the 
danger connected with the presence of a weapon during this type of felony. By 
contrast, the purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm statute is to 
discourage individuals from inflicting injury by knowingly discharging a 
firearm. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at 146. Unlike the armed violence statute, 
the aggravated battery with a firearm statute is not intended to deter the use 
of weapons other than firearms and is not specifically aimed at conduct 
committed during another felony.
The purpose of the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute also differs 
from that of the armed violence statute in that the former is intended to deter 
certain types of forcible sexual penetration. See People v. Printy, 232 
Ill. App. 3d 735, 743 (1992). Unlike the offense of aggravated criminal sexual 
assault, a charge of armed violence (possession of a controlled substance) may 
arise in situations involving no forcible sexual penetration. Likewise, the 
offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault may occur in circumstances 
involving no dangerous weapon. Given that the purposes of these statutes are 
distinct, a comparative proportionality analysis is not appropriate. See 
Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506.
Contrary to Thomas' assertion, this court's decisions in People v. 
Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996), and People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190 (1983), do not support a finding that the penalty for armed violence 
(possession of a controlled substance) while armed with a Category I weapon 
violates the proportionate penalties clause when compared to the penalties for 
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated criminal sexual assault. 
Lewis involved a finding of disproportionality based on a comparison of 
identical offenses. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 418 (comparing armed violence 
(robbery) involving a Category I weapon with armed robbery). In 
Wisslead, we found a violation of the proportionate penalties clause 
based on a comparison of similar offenses. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 
194-97 (comparing armed violence (unlawful restraint) with aggravated kidnaping 
and forcible detention). By contrast, as we have explained, the offenses 
involved in Thomas' cross-comparison analysis are distinct. Lewis and 
Wisslead, therefore, do not provide a basis for finding a violation of 
the proportionate penalties clause in his case.
Despite these factual differences, Thomas argues that language in 
Lewis indicates that his cross-comparison analysis is valid. Thomas 
relies on our statement in Lewis that "the general practice of 
comparing different offenses and their respective penalties is an accepted part 
of this court's proportionality review." Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 420. 
Contrary to Thomas' suggestion, Lewis does not stand for the 
proposition that a proportionate penalties clause violation may be established 
by comparing any combination of offenses in the criminal code, notwithstanding 
differences in their statutory purposes. Rather, throughout the Lewis 
opinion, we described this court's proportionality review as involving the 
comparison of similar offenses. See Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 
420-21 ("The comparison of similar statutes and their penalties helps 
impose a measure of objectivity upon the process of proportionality review ***. 
*** [T]he large number of decisions of this court which have employed a 
proportionality review involving the comparison of similar statutes is 
an indication of the utility and acceptance of this type of analysis" (emphasis 
added)). Accordingly, Lewis is consistent with cases in which we have 
held that comparative proportionality review is not appropriate unless the 
compared statutes have similar purposes. See, e.g., Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506; Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d  at 236-37.
Because the armed violence statute serves a different purpose than the 
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated criminal sexual assault 
statutes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in 
establishing the penalties for these offenses and defer to its judgment in doing 
so. See Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 32. Our conclusion that the penalty for 
armed violence should not be invalidated based on a comparison of offenses with 
different purposes is not only compelled by this court's precedent (see, 
e.g., Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at ___; Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 235-37; Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 145-47; Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 
259-60; Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d at 320-22; Bales, 108 Ill. 2d at 
195-96), it gives the necessary deference to the legislature's constitutional 
role in determining the appropriate penalties for criminal conduct. By declining 
to compare the penalties of offenses with distinct purposes, we avoid making 
unnecessary subjective judgments as to the seriousness of offenses or the 
severity of penalties, thereby minimizing the risk of violating separation of 
powers principles. See Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d  at 421-22. For these reasons, 
we refuse to find a violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a 
comparison of armed violence (possession of a controlled substance) to 
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated criminal sexual assault. 
Thomas' argument that the penalty for armed violence (possession of a 
controlled substance) is unconstitutional is not, however, based exclusively on 
a comparison of this offense to aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated 
criminal sexual assault. He also contends that it violates the proportionate 
penalties clause for the offense of armed violence (possession of a controlled 
substance) to carry the same penalty as an armed violence offense predicated on 
a more serious controlled substance offense, such as possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver or controlled substance trafficking. See 720 
ILCS 570/401(e), 401.1(b), 402(c) (West 1996).
Again, Thomas argues that this court's decision in People v. 
Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1983), requires a finding of 
disproportionality. In Wisslead, we determined that unlawful restraint, 
a Class 4 felony, is a less serious crime than kidnaping, a Class 2 felony. We, 
therefore, found that it violates the proportionate penalties clause for armed 
violence (unlawful restraint) to be punished more severely than aggravated 
kidnaping: "Since each offense is enhanced by the identical additional element, 
a gun, the lesser offense of unlawful restraint should not thereby become a 
graver offense than kidnaping." Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 195. Similarly, 
we found that the penalty for armed violence (unlawful restraint) is 
disproportionate when compared to the penalty for forcible detention. We 
explained that the offense of forcible detention consists of the same elements 
as armed violence (unlawful restraint), except that it includes the additional 
element of holding a hostage. Based on the additional element required for a 
forcible detention conviction, we concluded that it violates the proportionate 
penalties clause for armed violence to be classified a Class X felony when 
forcible detention is a Class 2 felony. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 196-97. 

Thomas' reliance on Wisslead is misplaced. Rather than support his 
argument that the proportionate penalties clause is violated when equal 
penalties are prescribed for armed violence offenses premised on felonies of 
differing seriousness, Wisslead contains language directly contrary to 
this proposition. In Wisslead, this court stated that the proportionate 
penalties clause is not violated if the penalty for a more serious 
offense is equal to or greater than that established for a less serious offense. 
Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 196 ("The policy underlying [the proportionate 
penalties and due process] provisions would be violated if the penalty 
prescribed for an offense is not as great or greater than the penalty prescribed 
for a less serious offense").
In addition to this language, there are important differences between the 
cross-comparison analysis performed in Wisslead and the analysis Thomas 
advances which undermine his reliance on this case. In Wisslead, we 
compared armed violence (unlawful restraint) with aggravated kidnaping and 
forcible detention and determined that it violates the proportionate penalties 
clause for the armed violence offense to be punished more severely than these 
other, more serious, offenses. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d  at 194-97. By 
contrast, Thomas bases his cross-comparison analysis on a comparison of one 
armed violence offense to another armed violence offense, and notes that the 
penalties for these offenses are equal. The issues presented in Thomas' 
cross-comparison analysis were not addressed in Wisslead. Accordingly, 
we find the holding in that case inapplicable to Thomas' proportionality 
analysis. 
Moreover, in People v. Barry, 152 Ill. App. 3d 915 (1987), the 
appellate court rejected the argument that Thomas makes in this case. In 
Barry, the defendant argued that the penalty for armed violence 
(attempted burglary) was disproportionate because the more serious offense of 
armed violence (burglary) was treated with equal severity. The Barry 
court observed, however, that the legislature had "seen fit to treat with equal 
seriousness the commission of any felony while armed with a dangerous weapon." 
Barry, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 917. In upholding the legislature's 
judgment, the Barry court explained that felonies underlying a charge 
of armed violence carry their own penalties, and the armed violence statute was 
designed to address "only the connection of the weapon to the underlying 
offense." Barry, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 917.
We agree with the court in Barry that, in selecting the penalty for 
armed violence, the legislature was within its discretion to focus on the use of 
the weapon rather than the character of the underlying felony. Accordingly, the 
penalty for armed violence does not violate the proportionate penalties clause 
despite the fact that it does not vary according to the seriousness of the 
underlying felony. We hold that the penalty for armed violence (possession of a 
controlled substance) while armed with a Category I weapon does not violate the 
proportionate penalties clause.
Causes Nos. 83950 and 83951
We now turn to Evans and Washington's proportionality challenge to the 
penalty for armed violence (residential burglary) while armed with a Category I 
weapon. Evans and Washington contend that the penalty for this offense is 
disproportionate when compared to the penalty for home invasion. Pursuant to the 
Davis inquiry, we must first determine whether the purposes of these 
statutes are related. As defined by the legislature, the elements of armed 
violence (residential burglary) with a Category I weapon are (1) knowingly 
entering the dwelling place of another, (2) with the intent to commit therein a 
felony or theft, (3) while armed with a Category I weapon. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a), 
33A-2 (West 1996). The elements of home invasion are (1) knowingly entering the 
dwelling place of another with knowledge that the dwelling is occupied, and (2) 
(a) using or threatening force while armed with a dangerous weapon or (b) 
causing any injury to an occupant of the dwelling. 720 ILCS 5/12-11 (West 1996). 
Armed violence (residential burglary) while armed with a Category I weapon is a 
Class X felony for which the sentence is 15 to 30 years. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(b), 
33A-1, 33A-2, 33A-3 (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996). Home 
invasion is a Class X felony, punishable by 6 to 30 years' imprisonment. 720 
ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 1996).
The description of the elements of these offenses indicates that, although 
not identical, the purposes of the statutes are related. The purpose of the home 
invasion statute is to protect the safety of persons in their homes. People 
v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 549 (1998). Similarly, when predicated on 
residential burglary, the armed violence statute targets the risk that an 
unauthorized entry into a residence by an armed intruder may result in violence. 
See Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at ___; Bales, 108 Ill. 2d  at 196. 
Based on this relationship between the purposes of the statutes, we find that a 
cross-comparison analysis is fitting and that it is appropriate to advance to 
the second step of the Davis cross-comparison inquiry, which requires 
us to determine whether armed violence (residential burglary) while armed with a 
Category I weapon is more serious than home invasion. See Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 506. We find that home invasion is a more serious offense. 
When a defendant commits armed violence (residential burglary) the invaded 
dwelling need not be occupied. That a dwelling be occupied, on the other hand, 
is an element of the offense of home invasion. In addition, to be guilty of 
armed violence (residential burglary) a defendant need not actually use or 
threaten violence or injure an occupant, whereas the use or threat of violence 
or injury to an occupant is inherent to the offense of home invasion. Because 
the offense of home invasion necessarily involves actual or threatened violence, 
we conclude that it is a more serious offense than armed violence predicated on 
residential burglary and the use of a Category I weapon. Thus, the more severe 
penalty assigned to this armed violence offense violates the 
limitation-of-penalties provision contained in article I, section 11, of the 
Illinois Constitution of 1970.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the penalty for armed violence predicated on possession of a 
controlled substance while armed with a Category I weapon does not violate the 
due process or proportionate penalties provisions of the Illinois Constitution 
of 1970. We, therefore, reverse the dismissal of the armed violence charges in 
causes Nos. 83810 and 83952 and remand those causes for further proceedings on 
these charges. While we also find no due process violation with respect to the 
penalty for armed violence based on residential burglary while armed with a 
Category I weapon, we conclude that this penalty is unconstitutionally 
disproportionate. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the 
armed violence charges in causes Nos. 83950 and 83951.
Nos. 83810 &amp; 83952-Reversed and remanded.
Nos. 83950 &amp; 83951-Affirmed.
Footnotes:
1. We note that the circuit court's statement 
that aggravated battery of a police officer with a firearm is punished less 
severely than armed violence (possession of a controlled substance) involving a 
Category I weapon is incorrect. Like aggravated criminal sexual assault, 
aggravated battery with a firearm is generally a Class X felony for which the 
penalty is 6 to 30 years. If the victim of the battery is a police officer, 
however, the penalty is increased to 15 to 60 years. See 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 
(a)(2), (b), 12-14 (a)(1), (d) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996). 

2. The office of the State Appellate Defender 
filed a brief in these consolidated appeals on behalf of defendants Evans, 
Washington, and Thomas. There has been no brief filed on behalf of defendant 
Lombardi. We note, however, that the issues presented by the State's appeal in 
Lombardi's case are identical to the issues presented by Thomas' case, which are 
fully addressed in the brief filed by the office of the State Appellate 
Defender. The briefs and the record are sufficient for us to review the circuit 
court's decision to dismiss Lombardi's armed violence charge. Notwithstanding 
Lombardi's failure to file a brief, therefore, we will consider the merits of 
the appeal in cause No. 83810. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis 
Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).
3. Although the circuit court's cross-comparison 
analysis was based on a comparison of aggravated battery of a police officer 
with a firearm (see 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(2) (West 1996)) to armed violence 
(possession of a controlled substance), Thomas appears to base his comparison on 
a violation of subsection (a)(1) of the aggravated battery with a firearm 
statute, for which the sentence is 6 to 30 years.