Title: State v. Cummings
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 102527
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2013

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 102,527 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JESSICA D. CUMMINGS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Under K.S.A. 22-3414(3), no party may assign as error on appeal a district court's 
giving or failure to give a particular jury instruction, unless:  (a) that party objected 
before the jury retired to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which the 
party objected and the grounds for the objection; or (b) the instruction or failure to give 
the instruction is clearly erroneous. If an instruction is clearly erroneous, appellate review 
is not predicated upon an objection in the district court. 
 
2. 
 
The determination of whether an instruction is clearly erroneous employs a two-
step process:  (1) The reviewing court, employing an unlimited review, determines 
whether the subject instruction was legally and factually appropriate; and (2) if error is 
found, the court must assess whether it is firmly convinced that the jury would have 
reached a different verdict had the instruction error not occurred. The party claiming a 
clearly erroneous instruction maintains the burden to establish the degree of prejudice 
necessary for reversal. 
 
2 
 
 
 
3. 
 
In order to avoid finding that Kansas' endangering a child criminal statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, our appellate courts have narrowly construed the statutory 
language of K.S.A. 21-3608(a) to require that the risk that the child's life, body, or health 
may be injured or endangered must mean something more than a faint or remote 
possibility; it must mean that there is a reasonable probability, a likelihood, that harm to 
the child will result. 
 
4. 
 
Child neglect cases are susceptible to the phenomena of risk distortion and 
hindsight bias. Those risks are exacerbated by statutory vagueness. 
 
5. 
 
A strict mathematical probability standard fails to encompass all unacceptable 
risks of harm to a child that the legislature would intend to include in the endangering a 
child statute. 
 
6. 
 
To ensure that a defendant is not convicted of endangering a child under a 
standard that requires less culpability than the law requires, while allowing the jury to 
consider factors outside of the strict mathematical probability of harm, the pattern 
instruction on the elements of endangering a child, PIK Crim. 3d 58.10, should be 
supplemented with clarifying language, such as the following: 
 
 
"In determining if there was a reasonable probability that [the child's] life, body or health 
would be injured or endangered, you should consider (1) the gravity of the threatened 
harm, (2) the legislature's or regulatory body's independent assessment that conduct is 
inherently perilous, and (3) the likelihood that harm to the child will result or that the 
3 
 
 
 
child will be placed in imminent peril. 'Likelihood' means more than a faint or remote 
possibility." 
 
7. 
 
In prosecuting an endangering a child charge, the State has the burden to establish 
that the defendant's acts created a likelihood that the child would be injured or 
endangered. A conviction for endangering a child cannot be based primarily upon 
speculation and surmise. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 45 Kan. App. 2d 15, 243 P.3d 697 (2010). 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOSEPH BRIBIESCA, judge. Opinion filed June 28, 2013. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed 
and remanded with directions. 
 
Lydia Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, 
district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Jessica D. Cummings seeks our review of the Court of Appeals 
decision that affirmed her conviction for involuntary manslaughter based on the 
underlying crime of endangering a child. Cummings contends that the district court 
should have supplemented the pattern jury instruction on the elements of endangering a 
child, PIK Crim. 3d 58.10, by explaining to the jury what was meant by "reasonable 
probability." We agree and find that the failure to define "reasonable probability" was 
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial with a clarifying 
instruction on the elements of the crime of endangering a child.  
4 
 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
Jessica Cummings provided daycare services for children in her home. On March 
25, 2008, Cummings was caring for 13-month-old K.H., along with her own daughter and 
two other children. At 9 a.m., Cummings gave K.H. a bottle and placed her in a playpen 
in Cummings' bedroom where Cummings' adult sister was sleeping. Because K.H. was 
being too noisy, Cummings' sister moved K.H. to another bedroom where another child 
was sleeping. At 10 a.m., Cummings decided to move K.H. again so that she would not 
disturb the sleeping child. Cummings gave K.H. a pacifier and placed her into a car seat, 
fastening the car seat's top strap, but not the bottom strap. Cummings placed the car seat 
in a bathroom off of the kitchen, facing the seat toward the door and leaving the door 
open about 7 or 8 inches. 
 
Cummings went approximately three to four steps away from the bathroom and 
into the kitchen to prepare lunch for the other children. Cummings heard K.H. crying for 
about 2 to 5 minutes and then K.H. was quiet; Cummings assumed K.H. had gone to 
sleep. Cummings did not visually check on K.H. again until 12:30 p.m., at which time 
Cummings discovered K.H. was not breathing. The child had strangled to death in the car 
seat.   
 
The State charged Cummings with involuntary manslaughter, alleging that she 
unintentionally killed K.H. during the commission of the crime of endangering a child. 
The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which a forensic pathologist, Deborah Johnson, 
testified that the autopsy of K.H. revealed that the child had died of asphyxia due to 
ligature strangulation. Although Johnson had heard of deaths occurring like this one, they 
were not common, and she had not personally dealt with a car seat strangulation case 
during her 12 years of practicing forensics. In fact, Johnson had placed K.H.'s body in the 
5 
 
 
 
car seat to determine whether strangulation by car seat was even possible. She opined that 
K.H. was too big for the car seat and that the child's weight had caused the car seat to tip 
forward, putting more weight on the child's neck. However, Johnson testified that even a 
larger car seat that was improperly fastened could have caused the same result, which is 
the reason that a child should never be left unattended in a car seat, as noted on the car 
seat's warning label.  
 
Detective Wendy Hummell testified at trial, informing the jury that the purpose of 
the car seat's bottom strap between the child's legs is to keep the child from slipping or 
falling out of the car seat. Hummell noted that the car seat's instructions stated that it was 
designed for a child age 1 year and under and weighing less than 20 pounds. K.H. was 13 
months old and weighed 23 pounds. One of the warning labels on the car seat said:  
"[C]hild can strangle in loose restraint straps. Always use harness. Never leave child in 
carrier when straps are loose or undone." Hummell declared that it was not proper to put 
a child in the car seat without strapping the child into the seat. But the detective admitted 
that she had never investigated a death that had resulted from a child being in a car seat.  
 
Cummings testified on her own behalf. She told the jury that she thought the car 
seat was a safe place for a child to sleep. She related that she had previously placed other 
daycare children in the car seat when they were fussy; that one of the children she cared 
for would only sleep in a car seat, as the child's mother was aware; that Cummings' own 
daughter frequently slept in the car seat; and that Cummings had never experienced any 
problem having a child sleep in a car seat. She had specifically never had any issue with 
K.H. rocking forward in the car seat, and on the day in question she had placed the car 
seat's handle close to the ground to prevent it from rocking. On cross-examination, 
however, Cummings admitted that during her daycare orientation she was informed of 
the requirement that napping periods be supervised. She was also informed that children 
6 
 
 
 
under 18 months old are to be placed in either a crib or playpen for naps. See K.A.R. 28-
4-116(b)(2)(A).  
 
The jury found Cummings guilty, and the court sentenced her to 32 months in 
prison. Cummings filed a timely appeal with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed her 
conviction in a split decision. The Court of Appeals dissent opined that the endangering a 
child jury instruction was clearly erroneous because it failed to accurately explain what 
the State was required to prove in order to find a "reasonable probability" that K.H.'s life, 
body, or health would be injured or endangered. State v. Cummings, 45 Kan. App. 2d 15, 
28-29, 243 P.3d 697 (2010) (Leben, J., dissenting). The majority found that the term 
"reasonable probability" was a risk assessment readily comprehensible by a jury, that 
supplementing the instruction would have been redundant, and that the Kansas Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that the current version of the endangering a child jury 
instruction provides the proper legal standard for determining whether a violation of 
K.S.A. 21-3608(a) has occurred. 45 Kan. App. 2d at 24-25.  
 
Cummings sought our review, stating the issue as:  "The district court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury that a 'reasonable probability' is 'something more than a faint or 
remote possibility,' and 'a likelihood that harm to the child will result or that the child will 
be placed in imminent peril.'" We granted review on the instruction issue. 
 
ENDANGERING A CHILD JURY INSTRUCTION 
 
Cummings contends that the fact that K.H. died after Cummings placed her in a 
car seat with only the top strap fastened was insufficient, by itself, to establish the crime 
of endangering a child. Rather, Cummings argues the State had to prove she knew, at the 
time she placed the child in the car seat, that a reasonable probability the child's life, 
body, or health would be injured or endangered was "something more than a faint or 
7 
 
 
 
remote possibility" and that there was "a likelihood that harm to the child [would] result 
or that the child [would] be placed in imminent peril." Accordingly, she argues that it was 
clearly erroneous to fail to explain to the jury that it could not convict her of involuntary 
manslaughter if it believed that the child's death was the result of a "freak accident" 
instead of the crime of endangering a child. 
  
Standard of Review 
 
Cummings did not object to the endangering a child jury instruction below. 
Therefore, our standard of review is governed by K.S.A. 22-3414(3) and State v. 
Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). In Williams, we explained that a jury 
instruction issue, like all issues on appeal, is subject to a three-step process:  
 
"(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, i.e., whether 
there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) 
considering the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3) 
assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be deemed 
harmless." Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 1. 
 
Regarding the first step, we recognized that K.S.A. 22-3414(3) creates a 
procedural hurdle for a party that fails to object to or request a jury instruction:  
 
  
"K.S.A. 22-3414(3) establishes a preservation rule for instruction claims on 
appeal. It provides that no party may assign as error a district court's giving or failure to 
give a particular jury instruction, including a lesser included crime instruction, unless:  
(a) that party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
matter to which the party objects and the grounds for objection; or (b) the instruction or 
the failure to give the instruction is clearly erroneous. If an instruction is clearly 
erroneous, appellate review is not predicated upon an objection in the district court." 
Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 3. 
8 
 
 
 
 
The determination of whether an instruction is clearly erroneous employs a two-
step process. First, "the reviewing court must . . . determine whether there was any error 
at all. To make that determination, the appellate court must consider whether the subject 
instruction was legally and factually appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the 
entire record." Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 4. Here, the legal appropriateness of the 
endangering a child instruction hinges upon whether it adequately explained to the jury 
what claims the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction.   
 
If error is found, then the second step is for the court to assess "whether it is firmly 
convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction error 
not occurred. The party claiming a clearly erroneous instruction maintains the burden to 
establish the degree of prejudice necessary for reversal." Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. 
¶ 5; see State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1121, 299 P.3d 292 (2013).  
 
Analysis 
 
The instruction under attack in this appeal mirrored the language of PIK Crim. 3d 
58.10 and recited as follows:   
 
"The elements of endangering a child are as follows: 
 
"1. That the defendant intentionally and unreasonably caused or permitted [K.H.] 
to be placed in a situation in which there was a reasonable probability that [K.H.]'s life, 
body or health would be injured or endangered; 
 
"2. That [K.H.] was then a child under the age of 18 years; and 
 
"3. That this act occurred on or about the 25th day of March, 2008, in Sedgwick 
County, Kansas." (Emphasis added.)  
 
9 
 
 
 
Cummings argues that the instruction did not adequately inform the jury that a 
"reasonable probability" means "something more than a faint or remote possibility," and 
that there must be "a likelihood that harm to the child will result or that the child will be 
placed in imminent peril." See State v. Sharp, 28 Kan. App. 2d 128, 135, 13 P.3d 29 
(2000); PIK Crim. 3d 58.10, Comment. Cumming's argument is founded upon the prior 
appellate decisions that have narrowly construed the statute in order to uphold its 
constitutionality. Accordingly, a brief historical review is in order.  
 
The misdemeanor crime of endangering a child is defined by statute as 
"intentionally and unreasonably causing or permitting a child under the age of 18 years to 
be placed in a situation in which the child's life, body or health may be injured or 
endangered." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3608(a). This statute was enacted in 1969, 
and the language in place at the time of Cummings' alleged criminal acts dates back to 
1993. See L. 1993, ch. 291, sec. 59; L. 1992, ch. 298, sec. 36; L. 1969, ch. 180, sec. 21-
3608.  
 
In State v. Fisher, 230 Kan. 192, 631 P.2d 239 (1981), the predecessor to K.S.A. 
21-3608(a) (then K.S.A. 21-3608[1][b] [Ensley]) was challenged as being 
unconstitutionally vague. The Fisher court endeavored to fulfill its duty to construe a 
statute in a manner that would uphold its constitutionality, where possible. See State v. 
Gaona, 293 Kan. 930, 958, 270 P.3d 1165 (2012) (courts must interpret statute in way 
that makes it constitutional unless to do so violates legislative intent). Ultimately, Fisher 
recited: 
 
 
"The purpose of K.S.A. 21-3608(1)(b) is salutary. It is to protect children, and to 
prevent their being placed where it is reasonably certain that injury will result. . . . 
 
 
"The wording of the statute is broad, but the purpose is likewise broad; to prevent 
people from placing children in situations where their lives and bodies are obviously in 
10 
 
 
 
imminent peril. . . . We conclude that K.S.A. 21-3608(1)(b) is clear and understandable; 
that ordinary persons can determine what conduct is proscribed by a common-sense 
reading of the statute; that the statute conveys a sufficiently definite warning when 
measured by common understanding; and that it is not void for vagueness." (Emphasis 
added.) 230 Kan. at 199-200. 
 
But in reaching its result, Fisher determined that it was necessary to narrowly 
construe the language defining the crime of endangering a child, specifically finding that 
the word "may" "means something more than a faint or remote possibility; it means that 
there is a reasonable probability, a likelihood that harm to the child will result." 230 Kan. 
at 195.   
  
The constitutionality of K.S.A. 21-3608(a) was again challenged in State v. 
Wilson, 267 Kan. 550, 987 P.2d 1060 (1999), albeit under a different factual pattern. 
Wilson took the tack that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it criminalized 
conduct and activities which are obviously lawful, such as permitting one's child to play 
football, where injury is highly likely. Relying on Fisher, this court again held that the 
endangering a child statute was not unconstitutionally vague. 267 Kan. at 556. The 
Wilson court rejected the defendant's facially seductive argument by declaring that 
"courts will not give strained meanings to legislative language through a process of 
imaginative hypothesizing; a common-sense interpretation of the statute is the guiding 
principle." 267 Kan. at 557. The court then opined that the statute only prohibits 
"unreasonably" permitting a child to be placed in dangerous circumstances, which would 
ostensibly foreclose prosecution of a parent who permitted a child to play football, for 
example. 267 Kan. at 557-58.  
 
The dilemma of how and when to hold an adult criminally responsible for causing 
or permitting a child to be placed in dangerous circumstances arose once again in Sharp, 
28 Kan. App. 2d 128. In Sharp, a Court of Appeals panel was presented with the question 
11 
 
 
 
of the efficacy of the version of PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 in effect at that time. The pattern 
instruction had substituted the word "might" where the statute used the word "may." 28 
Kan. App. 2d at 133. The instruction stated, in relevant part:  "That the defendant 
intentionally and unreasonably caused or permitted [a child] to be placed in a situation in 
which [the child]'s life, body or health might be injured or endangered." (Emphasis 
added.) See PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 (1993); see also PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 (1999 Supp.) 
(containing the same relevant language). 
 
The Sharp panel found that it was clear error for the trial court to fail to define the 
word "might" for the jury, reasoning that although Fisher had found that K.S.A. 21-
3608(a) was constitutional, Fisher's "discussion on the different meanings of the word 
'may' iterates why it is important that that particular word be defined in the context of this 
statute." 28 Kan. App. 2d at 134. Therefore, the instruction's use of the word "might," 
relying upon its ordinary meaning without further definition, was not legally sufficient to 
inform a conviction for endangering a child. 28 Kan. App. 2d at 134. The Sharp panel 
concluded:  
 
"The ordinary or normal meaning of the word 'may' was specifically rejected by the 
Fisher court in favor of a definition containing a legal standard: reasonable probability. 
230 Kan. at 195. There is a very real possibility, especially under the facts of this case, 
that the jury would have returned a different verdict had the term 'might' been properly 
defined as more than a faint or remote possibility, a reasonable probability, a likelihood 
that harm to the child will result or that the child will be placed in imminent peril. See 
Comment to PIK Crim. 3d 58.10." 28 Kan. App. 2d at 135.  
 
After Sharp, PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 was amended to remove the word "might" and 
replace it with the following phrasing:  "That the defendant intentionally and 
unreasonably caused or permitted [a child] to be placed in a situation in which there was 
a reasonable probability that [the child]'s life, body or health would be injured or 
12 
 
 
 
endangered." (Emphasis added.) PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 (2000 Supp.); see also PIK Crim. 3d 
58.10 (2006 Supp.) (containing the same language). Cummings argues that while the 
post-Sharp version of PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 is preferable to the old version, it still fails to 
accurately and thoroughly define endangering a child for the jury. The State, on the other 
hand, argues that the instruction used in this case contains the precise language that the 
Fisher and Sharp courts found to be critical to the analysis, i.e., "reasonable probability"; 
and, therefore, the instruction reflects the proper legal standard. The State does not 
discuss Wilson's "common-sense" distinction between activities, such as playing football 
and napping in a car seat.   
 
 
The Court of Appeals decided Cummings before our decision in Williams clarified 
the analytical process for instruction challenges raised for the first time on appeal. 
Therefore, the panel did not separately consider whether the instruction was legally and 
factually appropriate before concluding that the instruction was not clearly erroneous. 
The majority stated three reasons that it believed the instruction was not clearly 
erroneous: 
 
"First, we find 'reasonable probability' to be a risk assessment readily comprehensible to 
a jury; in other words, a jury would not be misled or confused by the instruction. Second, 
we find it redundant to instruct a jury that 'reasonable probability' means 'more than a 
faint or remote possibility' and 'a likelihood.' Supplementing the instruction with 
redundant phrases and legalese necessarily works to impede, rather than assist, the jury in 
executing its duties. Third, our Supreme Court has acknowledged the post-Sharp version 
of PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 is the proper legal standard to consider in determining whether a 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3608(a) had occurred." Cummings, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 24-25.  
 
To support its third point that the Supreme Court had acknowledged PIK Crim. 3d 
58.10 as stating the proper legal standard for determining a violation of the endangering a 
child statute, the Court of Appeals relied upon State v. Daniels, 278 Kan. 53, 91 P.3d 
13 
 
 
 
1147, cert. denied 543 U.S. 982 (2004). Cummings, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 23. As the Court 
of Appeals dissent pointed out, the issue in Daniels was the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction for endangering a child; Daniels did not challenge the efficacy of the 
elements instruction given in that case. Cummings, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 31 (Leben, J., 
dissenting). 
 
Granted, in finding sufficient evidence to support Daniels' conviction, the opinion 
gratuitously offered that PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 had been modified to reflect the standard set 
forth previously in the Sharp decision. Daniels, 278 Kan. at 72-73. From that, one might 
discern that Daniels was suggesting that the elements instruction in that case had been 
legally appropriate. Recently, we made the following observation about relying on dicta:  
"Dicta in a court opinion is not binding, even on the court itself, because the court should 
consider the issue in light of the briefs and arguments of counsel when the question is 
squarely presented for decision." Law v. Law Company Building Assocs., 295 Kan. 551, 
Syl. ¶ 1, 289 P.3d 1066 (2012). The issue before us today poignantly illustrates that point. 
 
 Fisher, Wilson, and Sharp appear to have hinted at the inherent problems with 
ensuring that a jury understands and finds the appropriate level of culpability to support a 
conviction under our endangering a child statute. Recently, a commentator has given 
voice to the problematic interplay between criminal child neglect laws and parenting 
styles, observing that while the legal system has historically trusted a defendant's 
neighbors and fellow citizens to determine what reasonable behavior is, a jury's verdict in 
this context is often made "without any evidence of what constitutes a statistically-
significant probability of feared or anticipated harm." Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect 
and the "Free Range Kid":  Is Overprotective Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 
Utah L. Rev. 947, 987 (2012). The commentator explained that jurors tend to exaggerate 
a risk when the facts are related to a specific person or persons, i.e., humanized:  
 
14 
 
 
 
 
"If people can put a human face on the risk and tell the story of the harm to a 
child or a family, they will systematically exaggerate that risk. Josef Stalin understood 
this principle, noting, 'A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.' This 
tendency explains why 'people gloss over statistics of automobile deaths, but when the 
press writes page after page about nine people trapped in a mine—complete with human-
interest stories about their lives and families—suddenly everyone starts paying attention 
to the dangers with which miners have contended for centuries.'" Utah L. Rev. at 984.  
 
Likewise, jurors are susceptible to the risk of hindsight bias when a child actually 
suffers harm:  
 
 
"The case may seem easier if the child does in fact come into harm as a result of 
the parent's choice to pursue a more laissez-faire parenting style. In that case, a 
prosecutor may feel the need to vindicate the wrong. However, there is a flaw in this 
reasoning as well. If a parent exposes a child to a one-in-twenty risk of serious harm, the 
parent might be deemed to have breached the standard of care; in other words, the 5% 
probability of harm might be considered by the jury to be an unreasonable risk. The 
wrongfulness of the parent's act is the same whether or not the child comes to harm, but 
to a jury the fact of actual harm may be taken as proof that the parent's choice was 
unreasonable. If the risk of harm is literally one in a million—in the category of 'freak 
accident'—it would be patently unreasonable to expect any significant investment in 
precaution against that harm. And yet, every time that freak accident occurs, the parent 
may face liability for endangerment, as jurors are likely to take the fact of the harm itself 
as conclusive evidence of its likelihood: '[h]ere's the problem—what might seem prudent 
precaution before an accident occurs might appear, in hindsight, to have been imprudent. 
That is, if an accident has occurred, the hindsight bias may tell us that the accident was 
more inevitable than we would have thought before.'  
 
 
"When the child is not harmed, the situation is far more compelling for the parent 
to be let off with a warning, and with a lesson learned." (Emphasis added.) Utah L. Rev. 
at 980-81.  
 
15 
 
 
 
The commentator further suggests that the risk distortion in child neglect 
prosecutions is exacerbated by statutory vagueness: 
 
"[C]hild neglect statutes are vague, and because everything a parent does exposes the 
child to some risk, the only thing that stands between parents and jail is the prosecutor's 
determination in the charging phase and the jury's determination in the guilt phase that 
the parents' actions or risks were 'unreasonable.' Accordingly, if jurors overestimate the 
risks to children, they are likely to find parental conduct that fails to take precautions 
against these exaggerated risks to be unreasonable." Utah L. Rev. at 986. 
 
Recently, in State v. Chavez, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 (2009), the New Mexico 
Supreme Court reviewed and reflected upon its past interpretation of that state's child 
endangerment statute. In the process, the Chavez court discussed the need for specific 
evidence explaining the actual risk that the infant child faced to ensure that the conviction 
was based on science and not emotion, noting:  "Natural factors of sympathy and even 
outrage in the face of an infant death can create a perilous situation where judgment is 
based on emotion and not evidence." 146 N.M. at 447. We follow that lead and pause to 
reassess whether the use of the phrase "reasonable probability," without more, adequately 
instructs the jury on the level of culpability it must find to convict a person of 
endangering a child. 
 
The Court of Appeals majority opined that "'reasonable probability' [is] a risk 
assessment readily comprehensible to a jury; in other words, a jury would not be misled 
or confused by the instruction," but to the contrary it would have been redundant and 
confusing to further define the term. Cummings, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 24. In State v. 
Adams, 292 Kan. 151, 168, 254 P.3d 515 (2011), we provided district courts with a 
definition of "reasonable probability," as that term is used in the second prong of the test 
for ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that it meant "'a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.'" 292 Kan. at 168 (quoting Chamberlain v. State, 
16 
 
 
 
236 Kan. 650, 656-57, 694 P.2d 468 [1985]). One might find it ironic that this court 
found it necessary to define "reasonable probability" for judges if we believed that it was 
a readily comprehensible risk assessment for laypersons on a jury.  
 
In contrast, the dissent found ambiguity in the term "reasonable probability," 
pointing out that it is unclear whether something with a "reasonable probability" of 
occurring happens more—or less—frequently than something with a "probability" of 
occurring. The dissent believed that Fisher had sought additional precision by adding the 
phrase "a likelihood that harm to the child will result," after "reasonable probability." 
Cummings, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 26 (Leben, J., dissenting). We agree. Moreover, the 
ambiguity conflicts with the holding in Sharp that a jury must be told that to convict of 
endangering a child, the defendant's acts must have caused "a reasonable probability, a 
likelihood that harm to the child will result." 28 Kan. App. 2d at 135.  
 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals dissent concluded that the endangering a child 
statute should be construed "to require that harm to the child was more likely to occur 
than not from the defendant's conduct." 45 Kan. App. 2d at 28 (Leben, J., dissenting). 
That conclusion was based upon four factors:  (1) The combination of "a reasonable 
probability" and "a likelihood" under circumstances that suggested the use of "ordinary, 
prototypical meanings, not alternate definitions"; (2) the fact that the limitation on the 
meaning of the statutory term "may" was put in place to counter a "void-for-vagueness 
challenge," and the key test requires that the statute gives adequate warning as to the 
conduct that is illegal; (3) the rule of lenity, which requires that the criminal statute be 
narrowly interpreted in favor of the accused; and (4) the language used in Fisher, i.e., "'a 
likelihood that harm . . . will result.'" 45 Kan. App. 2d at 27-28 (Leben, J., dissenting).  
 
 
We share the dissent's concerns about the ambiguity of the term "reasonable 
probability" and its inability to ensure that convictions for endangering a child will not be 
17 
 
 
 
premised upon less culpability than the criminal statute requires in order to maintain its 
constitutional validity. While our cases have indicated that the purpose of the 
endangering a child statute is broad, they have also clarified that it was not meant to 
criminalize all conduct that could potentially lead to harm to a child.  In Fisher, we noted 
that "[t]he wording of the statute is broad, but the purpose is likewise broad; to prevent 
people from placing children in situations where their lives and bodies are obviously in 
imminent peril." (Emphasis added.) 230 Kan. at 199. In Wilson, we cautioned against 
overly expansive application of the statute: "This court does not question that the goal of 
K.S.A. 21-3608 is to protect children from abuse and neglect, but this does not mean we 
should expand criminal liability to every circumstance which would arguably protect 
children despite the statute's express or implied limitations." 267 Kan. at 567.  
 
 
Accordingly, we hold that, without further clarification, the term "reasonable 
probability" creates an ambiguity for the jury as to the level of risk that constitutes 
criminal conduct. The problem associated with this ambiguity is real; a defendant could 
be convicted based on the jury's misunderstanding of the level of culpability that our 
endangering a child statute requires. The severity of this problem increases because of 
hindsight bias and risk distortion. The pattern instruction given, therefore, was not legally 
appropriate.  
 
Before proceeding to assess the reversibility of the instruction error, we pause to 
offer some guidance on what the instruction should state. As noted, the Court of Appeals 
dissent suggested that the phrase "more likely than not" could be used to describe 
reasonable probability. Cummings, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 27 (Leben, J., dissenting). While 
that simple solution has some practical appeal, it is not free of risk, as suggested by the 
New Mexico Supreme Court.  
 
18 
 
 
 
Chavez found that New Mexico's child endangerment statute's "reasonable 
probability or possibility" standard created uncertainty, which led the court to seek a 
more precise terminology that could be employed to describe the degree of risk to which 
a child must be exposed before the risk constitutes criminal child endangerment. 146 
N.M. at 439. In that vein, Chavez declined to adopt a strict mathematical probability 
standard, explaining as follows:  
 
 
"However, we acknowledge there are many situations that may not produce a 
strict mathematical probability of harm, but nevertheless endanger a child. For example, 
if a defendant placed one bullet in a six-shot revolver, spun the chamber, placed the pistol 
to the child's head, and pulled the trigger, the risk that the child will suffer a lethal shot is 
only 16.67%, less than a statistical probability. Yet few would doubt the very real and 
unacceptable risk of harm to the child. 
 
 
"Even more problematic are situations such as the present case, where the 
probability of harm cannot easily be measured or accurately quantified as a mathematical 
statistic. Therefore, a standard that requires proof of a strict probability under all 
circumstances poses too rigid a bar in its application. For these reasons, it is apparent that 
neither probability nor possibility provides an accurate, universal description of 
legislative intent." 146 N.M. at 440.  
 
Chavez' reasoning against adopting a strict probability standard is supported by 
our discussion of the word "unreasonably" in the endangering a child statute in Fisher: 
 
 
"'It is true that no hard and fast rule can be stated that would set an 
obvious standard of conduct in every factual situation. No such standard is required. The 
fact that the prescribed standard of conduct in a criminal statute may be one of varying 
degree dependent upon the factual circumstances in each case does not make a criminal 
law unconstitutional. As Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said in 
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 57 L. Ed. 1232, 33 S. Ct. 780 (1913): 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
'"[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating 
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his 
judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may 
incur the penalty of death. 'An act causing death may be murder, manslaughter, or 
misadventure, according to the degree of danger attending it' by common experience in 
the circumstances known to the actor. . . . 'The criterion in such cases is to examine 
whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more 
circumspect conduct.'"'" Fisher, 230 Kan. at 193-94 (quoting State v. Randol, 226 Kan. 
347, 351, 597 P.2d 672 [1979]).  
 
Instead of a strict probability standard, Chavez found that the explanation of New 
Mexico's mens rea element of reckless disregard, which provides that the "defendant's 
conduct created a substantial and foreseeable risk" of harm, more closely aligned with 
New Mexico's legislative purpose "to punish conduct that creates a truly significant risk 
of serious harm to children." 146 N.M. at 440; see New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction 
14-604. The court then set forth several factors to consider when determining if the risk 
created by a defendant's conduct is substantial and foreseeable:  the gravity of the 
threatened harm, the legislature's independent assessment that conduct is inherently 
perilous, and, although no longer determinative in New Mexico, the likelihood that harm 
will occur. 146 N.M. at 440-41.  
 
Chavez illustrated the legislature's independent assessment factor by pointing out 
that marijuana is inherently perilous because the legislature has separately criminalized 
possession and distribution of it. 146 N.M. at 441. But we would add that a regulatory 
body's assessment that conduct is inherently perilous is an appropriate consideration as 
well. For example, here, the Kansas Administrative Regulations applicable to daycare 
centers could suggest that some types of conduct are inherently perilous. 
  
20 
 
 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that, while the likelihood that harm will occur is a 
relevant consideration, it is not the sole consideration the jury must weigh in reaching its 
decision. Instead, the jury should be instructed on three considerations:  (1) the gravity of 
the threatened harm, (2) the legislature's or regulatory body's independent assessment that 
the conduct is inherently perilous, and (3) the likelihood that harm to the child will result 
or that the child will be placed in imminent peril. Further, the instruction must explain 
that the term "likelihood" means more than a faint or remote possibility. To ensure that a 
defendant is not convicted under a standard requiring less culpability than the law 
requires, while also allowing the jury to consider factors outside of the strict 
mathematical probability, PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 should be supplemented with clarifying 
language such as the following:  
  
 
In determining if there was a reasonable probability that [the child's] life, body, or 
health would be injured or endangered, you should consider (1) the gravity of the 
threatened harm, (2) the legislature's or regulatory body's independent assessment 
that conduct is inherently perilous, and (3) the likelihood that harm to the child 
will result or that the child will be placed in imminent peril. "Likelihood" means 
more than a faint or remote possibility. 
 
Returning to the analysis of the instruction error in this case, we move to the 
reversibility determination after finding that the instruction given was legally erroneous. 
The test is whether this court is "'firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict had the instruction error not occurred.'" State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 
631, 294 P.3d 281 (2013) (quoting Williams, 295 Kan. at 516).  
 
We begin by pointing out that the State manipulated the instruction's "reasonable 
probability" language to its advantage in closing argument. The Court of Appeals dissent 
characterized the prosecutor's closing argument as turning the question of probability into 
one of foreseeability: 
 
21 
 
 
 
"'Was it a reasonable probability that that could happen? . . . [R]ead the warning labels 
that are clearly displayed on that car seat. It is specific about the danger of strangulation. 
It is reasonably foreseeable[;] you could believe if they put a warning label on the seat 
that it could happen. Clearly, somebody foresaw that it could happen.'"  Cummings, 45 
Kan. App. 2d at 29 (Leben, J., dissenting).  
 
Consequently, we are firmly convinced that the jury applied an incorrect legal 
standard to assess Cummings' criminal culpability, as opposed to her potential civil 
liability. Further, we are firmly convinced that, if the jury had been properly instructed, it 
would have reached a different result. 
 
Obviously, death by strangulation posed the gravest of threatened harm. 
Moreover, the severity of threatened harm was conveyed by the car seat's warning label.  
Likewise, one could argue that the daycare regulation providing that a child under 18 
months old is to be placed in either a crib or playpen for naps is a regulatory body's 
independent assessment that placing a child in any other place to sleep is inherently 
perilous. See K.A.R. 28-4-116(b)(2)(A). But the State's case was particularly weak in 
establishing the likelihood that harm would occur. As the Court of Appeals dissent 
pointed out, the jury would have been justified in concluding that there was only a small 
chance that harm to K.H. would result from placing her in the car seat to nap. 45 Kan. 
App. 2d at 30 (Leben, J., dissenting). We agree. The State did not present evidence 
proving more than a faint or remote possibility of harm. Cf. Chavez, 146 N.M. at 446. As 
the Chavez court pointed out, the State can meet its burden by presenting testimony from 
a medical doctor or health care professional explaining the increased risk under these 
circumstances or by referring to medical treatises or statistics on the risk of death from 
certain infant sleeping arrangements. 
 
On the other hand, Cummings testified that she thought the car seat was a safe 
place for a child to sleep; she explained that she had placed other children, including her 
22 
 
 
 
own daughter, in the car seat with no consequences. The testimony of both the forensic 
pathologist and the detective corroborated the notion that the likelihood of harm was 
small. The forensic pathologist testified that deaths of this nature were uncommon and 
that in 12 years in forensics she had never personally dealt with a car seat strangulation 
case. She also testified that she placed K.H. in the car seat to see if car seat strangulation 
was even possible. Similarly, the homicide detective testified that she had never before 
investigated a death that resulted while a child was in a car seat.  
 
Without evidence establishing the increased level of risk, it is difficult to imagine 
that the State would have even prosecuted Cummings under identical circumstances in 
the absence of K.H.'s death, i.e., the influence of hindsight bias was enormous. Therefore, 
we conclude that the State's failure to establish the increased level of risk led to a jury 
conviction based "primarily [upon] speculation and surmise." Chavez, 146 N.M. at 447. 
 
Having no confidence in the jury's verdict, we reverse and remand for a new trial 
at which the district court will clarify its instruction regarding the legal standard the jury 
must apply in determining if the State has met its burden of proof to convict Cummings 
of the criminal offense of endangering a child. 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. 
Judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded with directions.