Title: Langel v. Board of Supervisors of Carroll County
Citation: 186 N.W.2d 608
Docket Number: 54461
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 1971

186 N.W.2d 608 (1971) Ted LANGEL, Sylvester Irlbeck and Henry Schneider, Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CARROLL COUNTY, Iowa, consisting of Donald O'Herron et al., Appellees. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CARROLL COUNTY, Iowa, consisting of Donald O'Herron et al., Cross-Petitioners-Appellees, v. CARROLL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, consisting of Walter Roster, President, et al., Defendants on Cross-Petition, Appellees. No. 54461. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 5, 1971. *609 Wunschel &amp; Schechtman, Carroll, for appellants. David E. Green, Carroll, for appellees. Hanson &amp; Barron, Audubon, for cross-petition-appellees. BECKER, Justice. Plaintiff taxpayers of Eden Township, Carroll County, Iowa, filed a petition in mandamus in the district court against the Board of Supervisors of Carroll County. The Carroll County Board of Education are intervenors. Plaintiffs seek refund of taxes paid by them under what they contend was an illegal levy. The case was tried under a stipulation of facts. Trial court held the taxes were legally assessed and dismissed the petition. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. The sole issue raised here is whether Eden Township School District, comprising about 30 sections in Carroll County, is a part of the Carroll County School System. Eden Township School District did not operate a public school within its district during the years 1964 to 1968 (pertinent here) but sent its public school students to schools operated by nearby Manning Community School District and Templeton Independent School District. Tuition was paid by the school district of residence to the host district. Electors living in the Eden County District voted at the elections held for directors of the Carroll County Board of Education. It was further stipulated: I. Plaintiffs rely on their interpretation of Iowa Code, 1966, §§ 273.1, 273.2 and 273.13 (10): Section 273.2 states the county school system shall embrace the public schools of the county. Plaintiffs contend use of the words public schools rather than public school districts is fatal. They say: We disagree. As observed by the trial court the statute is ambiguous. When the statute provides for exclusion of certain independent school districts it excludes what is not included in the general definition. This is true unless, as the trial court concluded, the use of the term "public schools" is construed to mean "public school districts". In essence plaintiffs argue for one more addition. They contend the term should be construed to read "public school districts that operate a public school". Statutory construction is properly invoked where the statute contains an ambiguity or obscurity. The construction should be reasonably and sensibly consistent with the intent of the legislature to effectuate the purpose of the statute. The applicable rules of construction are set out at length in Hedges v. Conder, 166 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Iowa 1969) and Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 1968). Plaintiffs' school district and its residents have been furnished services by the county school system; its resident electors have voted for county school system officials; it has in fact operated as a part of the county school system. The school district residents are subject to taxes in the same manner as other school districts which are a part of the county system. II. In 1966 the legislature changed section 273.13(10) which empowers the Board of Supervisors to levy a tax on the affected property. The language was changed from the power to levy a tax "on all the taxable property in the county" to "on all the taxable property in the county school system". This does not change our view of the scope to be given the term county school system. The statute excludes independent and consolidated school districts that maintain four-year high schools.[1] This factor indicated possibilities of taxing situations which would include tax areas within the county school system which are not a part of the county school system itself. Further, we now have school districts comprised of territory in two counties. The amendment clarifies the statutes as to the area in which the property is to be taxed. It does not show an intent to exclude from the county school system those school districts that do not operate a school. The trial court acted correctly when it dismissed plaintiffs' case. Affirmed. All Justices concur, except REYNOLDSON, J., who takes no part. [1] This exclusion was removed in 1970. But the amendment does not affect this decision. Acts of the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, 63 G.A., chapter 1025, section 16.