Title: All Star Awards & Ad Specialties, Inc. v. HALO Branded Solutions, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC99007
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2022

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
ALL STAR AWARDS & 
  ) 
AD SPECIALTIES, INC., 
 ) 
  ) 
Appellant-Respondent, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC99007 
  ) 
HALO BRANDED SOLUTIONS, 
  ) 
INC.,  
  ) 
  ) 
Respondent-Appellant.        
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable John M. Torrence, Judge 
All Star Awards & Ad Specialties Inc. appeals the reduction of a jury’s punitive 
damages award against HALO Branded Solutions, Inc.  The jury awarded All Star 
$25,541.88 in actual damages after finding All Star’s employee, Doug Ford, breached his 
duty of loyalty to All Star and HALO conspired with Ford to breach this duty of loyalty.  
The jury also found Ford and HALO tortiously interfered with All Star’s business and 
awarded All Star $500,000 in actual damages.1  Finally, the jury assessed $5.5 million in 
punitive damages against HALO.  The circuit court thereafter reduced the punitive 
1 Ford is not a party to this appeal or cross-appeal. 
Opinion issued April 5, 2022
2 
 
damages award to $2,627,709.40 pursuant to section 510.265.2  All Star contends the 
application of the statutory punitive damages cap found in section 510.265 violated its right 
to a jury trial.   
HALO cross-appeals.  In three multifarious points relied on, HALO contests the 
circuit court’s rulings: (1) overruling HALO’s motion for directed verdict and partially 
overruling its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) as to the tortious 
interference claim; (2) allowing All Star to submit the issue of future damages to the jury 
as to the tortious interference claim; (3) permitting All Star to introduce an exhibit as 
evidence of lost profits; (4) refusing to strike testimony regarding that exhibit and regarding 
lost profits; (5) overruling HALO’s motions for directed verdict and JNOV because 
punitive damages were not submissible; (6) overruling, in part, HALO’s motion to reduce 
punitive damages because All Star failed to make a submissible case for punitive damages; 
and (7) overruling, in part, HALO’s motion to reduce punitive damages because even the 
reduced punitive damages award violated due process.   
Despite All Star and HALO’s various challenges, the circuit court’s application of 
the punitive damages cap in section 510.265 did not violate All Star’s right to a jury trial, 
and the reduced award did not violate HALO’s due process rights.  This Court declines to 
review the remaining arguments HALO raises on appeal, as they fail to comply with Rule 
84.04.  The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.  
                                                 
2 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise indicated. 
3 
 
Factual and Procedural History3 
Both HALO and All Star sell branded promotional products and offer other 
branding services to their clients.  HALO is a large, full-service promotional products 
distributor employing about 2,000 people.  HALO is an expanding company; its expansion 
comes, in part, from hiring other promotional companies’ account executives who have 
preexisting clients.  All Star is a small, family-operated business that employs about 20 
people.  All Star employees build client relationships, but those clients belong to All Star 
and not individual employees.   
All Star hired Doug Ford in 1994.  In early 2018, Ford informed All Star he intended 
to take a sales position with HALO.  But, unbeknownst to All Star, Ford had begun working 
for HALO before the end of 2017 and had surreptitiously engaged in several activities 
intended to benefit HALO.  At HALO’s request, Ford sent HALO confidential information 
about All Star customers.  Ford also informed his All Star clients of his impending move 
to HALO; transferred customer orders to HALO; acquired promotional artwork and files 
from All Star for HALO; and induced All Star employees to prepare material, such as 
customer reports, that Ford intended to share with HALO.4  Ford did these things in 
coordination with HALO’s management and staff.  All Star, then unaware of Ford’s 
                                                 
3 The facts are presented in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, giving All Star 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences and disregarding any evidence and inferences that 
conflict with the verdict.  Est. of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat’l Auto Sales N., LLC, 361 
S.W.3d 364, 371 (Mo. banc 2012).   
4 While Ford was employed at All Star, HALO processed orders from All Star clients, 
including several who no longer do business or have reduced their annual promotional 
orders with All Star.  Ford promised HALO he could transfer $450,000 in sales from All 
Star, and a HALO regional vice president increased this expectation to $550,000.   
4 
 
activities, agreed to allow Ford to stay on until he officially started working for HALO.  
About a week after Ford gave his notice, All Star discovered evidence of Ford’s activities 
and terminated him.  All Star demanded HALO cease processing orders from All Star 
clients, but HALO refused.  Instead, HALO processed orders only from All Star customers 
with whom Ford had a longstanding prior relationship.   
In March 2018, All Star sued Ford and HALO.  A jury found HALO tortiously 
interfered with All Star’s business expectancy.  The jury also found Ford breached his duty 
of loyalty to All Star and HALO conspired with Ford to breach this duty of loyalty.5  The 
jury awarded All Star $525,541.88 in actual damages for both claims.  All Star further 
alleged HALO acted with an evil motive or reckless indifference and sought punitive 
damages.  In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury assessed $5.5 million in punitive damages 
against HALO.6  The circuit court subsequently accepted the jury’s verdicts and award of 
actual and punitive damages against HALO and entered judgment for All Star.  Following 
HALO’s motion for JNOV, new trial, and remittitur, the circuit court applied section 
510.265 and capped the punitive damages award at five times All Star’s actual damages, 
or $2,627,709.40, but otherwise overruled HALO’s motions and entered final judgment in 
accordance with the jury’s verdicts.  All Star appealed; HALO cross-appealed.  After an 
opinion by the court of appeals, this Court transferred the case pursuant to article V, section 
10 of the Missouri Constitution.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The jury found in All Star’s favor on Ford’s counter-claim for unpaid commissions.  
6 The jury also assessed $12,000 in punitive damages against Ford.  
5 
 
Analysis 
I. 
All Star’s Claims 
All Star raises four points on appeal, all challenging the circuit court’s reduction of 
the $5.5 million punitive damages award.  This Court need only consider All Star’s first 
two arguments related to the application of the punitive damages cap in section 510.265, 
as they are dispositive.7   
a. The Right to Trial by Jury and Punitive Damages Caps 
Article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution states “the right of trial by jury 
as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”  This provision endows litigants pursuing 
legal claims today with the right to a jury trial if they would have enjoyed such right at 
common law when the Missouri Constitution was first adopted in 1820.  Dodson v. 
Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542, 553 (Mo. banc 2016).  The phrase “as heretofore enjoyed” as 
used in article I, section 22(a), however, limits the modern scope of the right to trial by 
jury.  Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. banc 2012).  “The 
phrase heretofore enjoyed means that the constitution protects the right as it existed when 
the constitution was adopted and does not provide a jury trial for proceedings subsequently 
created.”  Dodson, 491 S.W.3d at 553 (internal quotation omitted).  The right applies only 
                                                 
7 In its third and fourth points relied on, All Star argues the circuit court erred by reducing 
the $5.5 million punitive damages award based on HALO’s due process and remittitur 
arguments.  Because the circuit court was justified in relying on section 510.265 to reduce 
the award, this Court declines to address All Star’s challenges related to due process and 
remittitur.  While the circuit court’s order stated it reduced punitive damages based on both 
section 510.265 and due process, this Court is primarily concerned with the correctness of 
the circuit court’s result, not the route taken to reach that result. See Bus. Men’s Assur. Co. 
of Am. v. Graham, 984 S.W.2d 501, 506 (Mo. banc 1999).   
6 
 
to causes of action that would have been tried by a jury when the Missouri Constitution 
was adopted in 1820.8  Id.  In 1820, juries were authorized to assess punitive damages for 
common law tort claims, and statutory caps on punitive damages did not exist.  Lewellen 
v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136, 143 (Mo. banc 2014) (noting “imposing punitive damages 
was a peculiar function of the jury”); see also Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371, 13 
(1851) (observing assessing damages by way of punishment “has been always left to the 
discretion of the jury”). 
 In 2005, the Missouri legislature enacted section 510.265, which caps the amount 
of punitive damages litigants can recover.9  Statutory caps on punitive damages violate the 
right to a trial by jury as provided by article I, section 22(a) if the litigant’s common law 
cause of action existed in 1820 and the claim would have supported a finding of punitive 
damages in 1820.  Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 143; Dodson, 491 S.W.3d at 557; Overbey, 
361 S.W.3d at 375.  Statutory caps on punitive damages also violate the right to a trial by 
jury as provided by article I, section 22(a) if the litigant’s common law cause of action is 
“analogous” to a claim that existed in 1820 and the claim would have supported a finding 
of punitive damages in 1820.  Dodson, 491 S.W.3d at 553.  But, if the particular legal cause 
of action did not exist or if the modern common law claim is not sufficiently “analogous” 
                                                 
8 “Missouri’s common law is based on the common law of England as of 1607,” so litigants 
may support their right to jury trial claim with authority either from this state or from 
seventeenth-century England.  Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638; see also § 1.010. 
9 Section 510.265.1 limits the award of punitive damages to the greater of: 
(1) Five hundred thousand dollars; or  
(2) Five times the net amount of the judgment awarded to the plaintiff against 
the defendant. 
7 
 
to a claim existing in 1820, then article I, section 22(a) does not guarantee litigants the right 
to have a jury make an unlimited determination of damages, and the legislature may enact 
statutory limits on punitive damages.  Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638.  Finally, if the legal claim 
or analogous legal claim was cognizable in 1820 but did not support the assessment of 
punitive damages in 1820, then article I, section 22(a) does not ensure a modern litigant 
the right to a jury’s determination of unlimited damages on that claim and the legislature 
may enact statutory limits on punitive damages.  See Dodson, 491 S.W.3d at 558 (“The 
phrase heretofore enjoyed means that the constitution protects the right as it existed when 
the constitution was adopted.” (internal quotation omitted)).  
In its appeal, All Star contends the circuit court violated its right to trial by jury as 
guaranteed by Missouri’s Constitution because it reduced the jury’s punitive damage award 
pursuant to the statutory cap on punitive damages found in section 510.265.  All Star asserts 
that, in applying the statutory punitive damages cap, the circuit court misapplied this 
Court’s prior precedent.  All Star maintains “the applicable analysis is not whether the 
plaintiff’s claims are ‘common law claims,’ and is instead whether … civil conspiracy to 
breach the duty of loyalty and tortious interference with business expectancy [ ] are civil 
actions for damages involving a fact issue” for which a jury would have had limitless power 
to decide punitive damages in 1820 when Missouri’s Constitution was first adopted.   
All Star contends its legal claims against HALO are not subject to the statutory 
punitive damages cap in section 510.265 because the factual “nature” of both claims 
support causes of action for which juries determined damages before 1820.  Specifically, 
All Star claims its civil conspiracy to breach the duty of loyalty and tortious interference 
8 
 
with business expectancy claims against HALO are, in essence, actions for trespass or fraud 
encompassing a variety of claims for wrongs to person and property tried without limitation 
to juries in 1820.  All Star’s arguments lack merit and contravene the precedent to which 
it cites.  Utilizing the analysis dictated by our cases, the relevant inquiry examines the cause 
of action, not the facts supporting the cause of action, as All Star contends.   See Dodson, 
491 S.W.3d at 557 (finding a statutory limit on punitive damages constitutional as applied 
to the modern statutory wrongful death claim because such claim is not analogous to a 
common law loss of services claim).  Having articulated the correct framework to analyze 
the issue, this Court assesses the modern, common law causes of action brought in this 
case—civil conspiracy to breach the duty of loyalty and tortious interference with business 
expectancy—to determine if these claims existed or are sufficiently analogous to common 
law legal claims existing in 1820 and would have supported a punitive damage award in 
1820.  See Dodson, 491 S.W.3d at 555.  
“This Court reviews constitutional challenges de novo.”  Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 
143.  This Court presumes a statute is valid and declares it unconstitutional only when the 
statute’s challenger demonstrates a clear violation of the constitution.  Id.   
b. Conspiracy to Breach Ford’s Duty of Loyalty 
All Star’s civil conspiracy to breach the duty of loyalty claim is rooted in the law of 
contracts and would not have supported a punitive damages award in 1820.  Civil 
conspiracy is a common law tort.  Oak Bluff Partners, Inc. v. Meyer, 3 S.W.3d 777, 781 
(Mo. banc 1999).  Even assuming civil conspiracy as it exists today is largely the same as 
its seventeenth-century English counterpart and nineteenth-century Missouri counterpart, 
9 
 
a civil conspiracy does not exist independent of an underlying claim.  Id. (“In Missouri, if 
tortious acts alleged as elements of a civil conspiracy claim fail to state a cause of action, 
then the conspiracy claim fails as well.”).  This Court, therefore, must determine how 
Missouri courts would have characterized the duty of loyalty claim in 1820.10   
All Star attempts to position its duty of loyalty claim as arising under either trespass 
or fraud, and notes, under common law, a master could bring an action in damages against 
a servant in the master’s employ for an employee’s disclosure of the master’s secrets 
learned in the course of employment.  The master’s cause of action to which All Star refers, 
however, did not arise from fraud, trespass, or any other kind of tort: 
With us in England the several units, or remedial instruments of justice, are 
… distinguished into three kinds: actions personal, real, and mixed.   
Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or personal 
duty, or damages in lieu thereof; and, likewise, whereby a man claims 
satisfaction in damages for some injury done to his person or property. The 
former are said to be founded on contracts, the latter upon torts or wrongs 
…. Of the former nature are all actions upon debt or promises[.] 
 
Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the Third 1113 
(Lewis’s ed. 1900) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).  In 1820, an employee’s 
common law duty of loyalty was conceptualized as an implied contract or promise, the 
breach of which was ordinarily remedied by an action of “assumpsit” or any other action 
to enforce a contractual right:   
A second class of implied contracts are such as do not arise from the express 
determination of any court, or the positive direction of any statute; but from 
natural reason, and the just construction of law.  Which class extends to all 
                                                 
10 To do otherwise would permit litigants to use civil conspiracy as a Trojan horse, masking 
any common law claim created or substantially altered after 1820 to evade section 
510.265’s damages cap.    
10 
 
presumptive undertakings or assumpsits; which though never perhaps 
actually made, yet constantly arise from the general implication and 
intendment of the courts of judicature, that every man hath engaged to 
perform what his duty or justice requires. 
….  
… The last class of contracts, implied by reason and construction of law, 
arises upon this supposition, that every one [sic] who undertakes any … 
employment, trust, or duty, contracts with those who employ or intrust [sic] 
him, to perform it with integrity, diligence, and skill. 
 
Id. at 1154, 1156 (second emphasis added).11  All Star does not assert any authority 
suggesting litigants could demand punitive damages for breaches of contractual causes of 
                                                 
11 All Star relies on a different portion of Blackstone’s commentaries: 
Also if any person do hire or retain my servant, being in my service, for 
which the servant departeth from me and goeth to serve the other, I may have 
an action for damages against both the new master and the servant, or either 
of them: but if the new master did not know that he is my servant, no action 
lies; unless he afterwards refuse to restore him upon information and deman 
[d]. The reason and foundation upon which all this doctrine is built, seem to 
be the property that every man has in the service of his domestics; acquired 
by the contract of hiring, and purchased by giving them wages. 
Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the First 417 (2009).  
But this provision does not support All Star’s argument.  The modern duty of loyalty claim 
under which All Star sues does not encompass the right enumerated above for two reasons. 
First, this provision of Blackstone’s Commentaries is not relevant to facts of the 
present case.  The right of a master to sue a fellow master who had poached the first 
master’s servant was based in contract, and the fellow master’s interference with that 
contract.  But here, All Star did not sue HALO for poaching Ford.  In other words, All Star 
did not sue HALO for interfering with the labor contract between Ford and All Star.  
Neither party suggests harm resulted from the mere fact that Ford left All Star’s employ.  
All Star sued Ford and HALO because Ford was disloyal while he was still in All Star’s 
employ and because HALO encouraged, enabled, and profited from that disloyalty.  
Second, an employee’s duty to faithfully serve a master was originally understood 
as contractual in nature, while the modern duty of loyalty claim for which All Star demands 
unlimited punitive damages is framed within the concept of a tort.   
Neither does this passage support All Star’s tortious interference claim, as that claim 
was predicated not on HALO’s interference with Ford’s employment and the 
corresponding labor contract but rather on HALO’s interference with All Star’s poached 
clients and the contractual relationship between All Star and those clients.  
11 
 
action before 1820.12  Regardless, All Star attempts to leverage its claim for civil 
conspiracy to breach Ford’s duty of loyalty as a tort to avoid the punitive damage cap, 
despite the fact that, at common law, the duty of loyalty was contractual in nature.  All Star 
offers no authority suggesting that, prior to 1820, an employee’s breach of the implied 
promise to perform work with integrity would have enabled the employer to sue the 
                                                 
12 Punitive damages were first recognized in 1763 in England.  See Huckle v. Money, 2 
Wils. 205 (K.B. 1763) (permitting “exemplary damages” for a tort action filed after the 
authorization of a generalized, “nameless warrant” used against the plaintiffs); see also 
Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.1763), (validating exemplary, or punitive 
damages as compensation, punishment, and deterrence on an action for trespass); see also 
David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 
1262-63 (1976).  Punitive damages were recognized in America shortly thereafter.  Pac. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (“Among the first reported American 
cases [allowing punitive damages] are Genay v. Norris, (1 Bay 6 S.C. 1784), and Coryell 
v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791).”); The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 553 (1818) (“Actual 
wrongdoers in a marine trespass are responsible for exemplary damages ….”).  All Star 
advances no authority suggesting a Missouri court—or any court for that matter—
adjudicating an action for assumpsit or any other action to enforce a contract sanctioned 
the use of the then-new remedy of punitive damages outside a claim for trespass or other 
common law tort.  What relevant authority this Court did locate suggests awarding punitive 
damages as a remedy for a contractual breach has long been disfavored.  In Trammell v. 
Vaughan, 59 S.W. 79, 82 (1900), after rejecting a claim of punitive damages on a claim for 
the breach of a contract to marry, this Court observed: 
The statements of the defendant to many persons after he returned from 
Hartsburg to the effect that he never had intended marrying the plaintiff, and 
had only taken the matter as far as he had to show Alfred Longley, Bill Gibbs, 
and Mr. Reynolds that he could marry her if he wanted to, were unmanly, 
cruel, and depraved, and were properly admitted in evidence to aggravate 
plaintiff's damages. But they do not constitute a separate cause of action, 
nor can exemplary or punitive damages, as such, be recovered for a 
breach of a contract of marriage. The law punishes the defendant for the 
breach of his contract by making him compensate the plaintiff, whether 
his intentions when he entered into the contract were sincere or sinister.  
(Emphasis added).  Of course, punitive damages are not presently recoverable in contract 
actions under Missouri law.  Peterson v. Cont’l Boiler Works, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 896, 902 
(Mo. banc 1990).  But Trammell advises Missouri law never allowed such damages for 
breaches of contractual obligations, even when bad faith motivated the breach.   
12 
 
breaching employee and a third party outside the realm of contract law and seek punitive 
damages.   
This Court addressed a similar situation in Dodson, 491 S.W.3d 542.  In Dodson, 
this Court affirmed the application of a statutory punitive damages cap for a wrongful death 
action in part because it found wrongful death, a statutorily created cause of action enabling 
a claimant to recover damages resulting from another’s death, was not “analogous to” a 
common law action for loss of services.  Id. at 557.  This Court explained the common law 
action for loss of services “rests on the theory that the relationship between [claimant and 
decedent] is akin to the contractual relationship of master and servant.”  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted).  Therefore, the recovery for this common law action “flowed from the 
impairment of … property rights under [a] quasi-contractual relationship” which “sounds 
in contract, [and] is not analogous to a modem [sic] wrongful death claim, which sounds 
in tort.  They may both be civil actions for monetary damages, but they arise from 
completely different principles of law.”  Id.   Dodson persuasively compels the same 
conclusion here.  While All Star attempts to frame its cause of action as a common law 
trespass or fraud claim warranting unlimited punitive damages, the breach of the duty of 
loyalty claim was nothing more than a breach of contract claim under common law for 
which punitive damages were not available in 1820, even if its current iteration sounds in 
tort.  All Star has, therefore, not demonstrated civil conspiracy to breach the duty of loyalty 
was a claim entitling it to punitive damages at common law in 1820, and the circuit court 
did not err in applying the cap in section 510.265 to the punitive damages arising from the 
modern claim.  
13 
 
c. Tortious Interference with Business Expectancy 
Turning to the tortious interference with a business expectancy claim, All Star’s 
attempts to evade the punitive damage cap in section 510.265 meet a similar fate.  Tortious 
interference with a business contract was not a claim available to Missouri litigants before 
1820.  See Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Comm’n Co., 40 S.W. 93, 94 
(1897), overruled by Downey v. United Weatherproofing, 253 S.W.2d 976 (1953)).  In 
Glencoe, this Court refused to permit a claim of contractual interference after the defendant 
induced a railway company to breach its contract with the plaintiff to transport the 
plaintiff’s gravel and sand.  Id.  This Court stated, “[m]erely to induce or procure a free 
contracting party to break his covenant, whether done maliciously or not … is not 
actionable ….  An action cannot, in general, be maintained for inducing a third person to 
break his contract with the plaintiff.”  Id. at 95.   
All Star attempts to avoid this Court’s holding in Glencoe by generally alleging 
HALO’s actions were fraudulent and deceitful and, therefore, subject to an exception 
Glencoe carved out for third-party breaches resulting from “the fraud, deceit, or coercion 
of defendant.”  Id. at 94.  All Star’s tortious interference claim, however, does not rely on 
or require a finding that HALO or Ford induced All Star’s clients to breach its relationship 
with All Star based on fraud, deceit, or coercion.  The jury instruction for All Star’s tortious 
interference claim did not ask or direct the jury to determine if HALO or Ford acted with 
fraud, deceit, or coercion in interfering with All Star’s business expectancy.  In fact, the 
instruction merely required the jury to find HALO and Ford “interfered” with a business 
expectancy “intentionally and without justification or excuse[.]”  While All Star may have 
14 
 
presented evidence of fraud, deceit, or coercion, these facts were unnecessary to establish 
All Star’s tortious interference claim.  All Star’s claim, therefore, does not fall within the 
exception Glencoe enumerated, and, as Glencoe demonstrates, Missouri did not otherwise 
recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with a business expectancy in 1820.13   
Attempting to evade the definitive guidance Glencoe provides, All Star insists the 
common law right to conduct one’s business without interference has been recognized at 
least since the seventeenth century without the need to independently allege fraud, deceit 
or coercion, citing Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1707).  In Keeble, the court 
permitted suit against a man who shot at ducks from the plaintiff’s pond for the purpose of 
scaring the ducks away and causing the plaintiff to lose profits.  Id.  But Keeble is easily 
distinguishable.  That case arose from the fact that the defendant interrupted the plaintiff’s 
right to enjoy and build a livelihood upon the plaintiff’s real property.  Id. at 1128 (“[E]very 
man that hath a property may employ it for his pleasure and profit, as for alluring and 
procuring decoy ducks to come to his pond.”).  As Justice Holt stated, “in short, that which 
is the true reason is that this action is not brought to recover damage for the loss of the 
fowl, but for the disturbance.”  Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).  As was later clarified, Keeble 
was not an economic torts case but rather a nuisance case grounded in principles of property 
law.  See Allen v. Flood, A. C. 1-181 (1898) (Keeble “was decided on the ground that the 
                                                 
13 While a tortious interference claim may have been recognized in some form under the 
common law of other states, in Glencoe this Court explained that a cause of action akin to 
the claim brought against HALO had never before been recognized in Missouri and refused 
to adopt the claim.  It was not until 1953 that this Court reversed course, first recognizing 
this cause of action.  See Downey, 253 S.W.2d 976. 
15 
 
act of the defendant was, a wilful [sic] disturbance of the enjoyment by the plaintiff of his 
own land for a lawful and profitable purpose, and what is called in law a nuisance.”); see 
also Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Philosophical Foundations of Property Law 230 
(2013). 
All Star is correct that Keeble generally states “damage to a man’s employment” is 
actionable when “a violent or malicious act is done to a man’s occupation, profession, or 
way of getting a livelihood[.]”  103 Eng. Rep. at 1128.  In support of this proposition, the 
court provided several hypothetical situations in which a business owner could sue another 
who interrupted the owner’s business by violence or threats of violence.14  Id.  All Star’s 
tortious interference claim, however, is very different from an action to recover damages 
for harm suffered to one’s business as a result of violence or the threat of violence.  To 
prevail in its tortious interference with a business expectancy claim, All Star was not 
required to establish or prove HALO and Ford acted violently or maliciously.  As noted, 
the jury instruction for All Star’s tortious interference claim merely required the jury to 
find HALO and Ford “interfered” with a business expectancy “intentionally and without 
                                                 
14 Keeble explains: 
[S]uppose Mr. Hickeringill should lie in the way with his guns, and fright the 
boys from going to school, and their parents would not let them go … [the] 
schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his scholars. A man hath a 
market, to which he hath toll for his horses sold: a man is bringing his horse 
to market to sell: a stranger hinders and obstructs him from going thither to 
the market: an action lies, because it imports damage.  Action upon the case 
lies against one that shall by threats fright away his tenants at will.  Trespass 
was brought for beating his servant, whereby he was hindered from taking 
his toll; the obstruction is a damage, though not the loss of his service. 
103 Eng. Rep. at 1128. 
16 
 
justification or excuse[.]”  For this reason, the modern tortious interference claim is much 
broader and can be distinguished from its predecessor, which limited suit only to situations 
in which the claimant demonstrated the business interference resulted from violence, fraud, 
or defamation.  As the Restatement (Second) of Torts observed: 
Historically the liability for tortious interference with advantageous 
economic relations developed first in cases of intentional prevention of 
prospective dealings, by violence, fraud or defamation—conduct that was 
essentially tortious in its nature, either to the third party or to the injured party   
 
In 1853, the decision in Lumley v. Gye … began the development of 
inducement of breach of contract as a separate tort .… Subsequent cases 
extended the rule of Lumley v. Gye to contracts other than contracts of 
service and to interference with advantageous business relations even 
when they were not cemented by a contract.  
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. c (1979) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  It 
was not until the nineteenth century when Lumley v. Gye was decided that a claim for 
tortious interference was cognizable on the mere allegation that the interference was 
intentional and without justification.  This Court in Glencoe, however, expressly refused 
to follow the Lumley majority view and instead adopted the reasoning from the Lumley 
dissent that such an action was not recognized and was not cognizable under Missouri 
common law.  40 S.W. at 94.  While English courts prior to 1820 may have adjudicated 
causes of action against business and contract disruptors who were violent or threatened 
violence, All Star has not advanced any case from Missouri in which a court entertained a 
cause of action against a disruptor who merely acted “intentionally and without 
justification or excuse” until after Downey was decided.  
17 
 
All Star also broadly alleges tortious interference, like the duty of loyalty, is a claim 
a Missouri court could have adjudicated under common law trespass.  Even assuming 
Glencoe is not controlling, All Star’s trespass argument misfires.  While All Star may be 
correct that trespass actions generally encompassed harm to a person’s property, the 
Blackstone’s Commentaries - the authority All Star asserts supports this argument - 
indicate the trespass actions a litigant could assert for damages to property contemplated 
damage only to tangible property in the litigant’s personal possession.  Personal property:    
consists in goods, money, and all other moveable chattels, and things 
thereunto incident ….  
[I]njuries that may be offered to the rights of personal property … first the 
rights of personal property in possession, and those that are in action only.  
[ ] The rights of personal property in possession are liable to two species of 
injuries: the amotion or deprivation of that possession; and the abuse or 
damages of the chattels while the possession continues in the legal owner.  
The former, or deprivation of possession, is also divisible into two branches; 
the unjust and unlawful taking them away; and the unjust detaining them, 
though the original taking might be lawful.   
 
Blackstone, Commentaries, Book the Third 1140 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).  
Aside from damages, litigants could seek the remedies of replevin, detinue, trover, and 
conversion.  Id. at 1139-47.  The tortious interference with a business expectancy and the 
lost profits alleged here arose from harm to the contractual relationship between All Star 
and its customers, not from any interference with All Star’s chattels.15  Cmty. Title Co. v. 
                                                 
15 Admittedly, All Star did allege Ford stole tangible property from All Star, such as 
physical files, but this fact is irrelevant to the tortious interference claim, which litigants 
can only succeed on if they demonstrate the existence of the following elements:  
(1) a contract or a valid business expectancy; (2) defendant’s knowledge of 
the contract or relationship; (3) intentional interference by the defendant 
inducing or causing a breach of the contract or relationship; (4) absence of 
justification; and, (5) damages resulting from defendant’s conduct.  
18 
 
Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 796 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo. banc 1990).  This kind of 
harm to a business relationship or contract is not analogous to a cause of action for 
damages due to harm or injury to tangible property or goods.  Blackstone later discusses 
harm to “franchises,” but such causes of action arose from an individual’s right to use real 
property as the individual wished.  Blackstone, Commentaries, Book the Third 1218-19 
(discussing the rights of real property).  This right, called “disturbance of franchises” 
happens when a man has the franchise of holding a court-leet, of keeping a 
fair or market, of free-warren, of taking toll, of seizing waifs or estrays, or 
(in short) any other species of franchise whatsoever, and he is disturbed or 
incommoded in the lawful exercise thereof.  As if another, by distress, 
menaces, or persuasions, prevails upon the suitors not to appear at my court; 
or obstructs the passage to my fair or market; or hunts in my free-warren; or 
refuses to pay me the accustomed toll; or hinders me from seizing the waif 
or estray, whereby it escapes or is carried out of my liberty; in every case of 
this kind…there is an injury done to the legal owner; his property is 
damnified; and the profits arising from such his franchise are diminished. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  Because All Star does not allege HALO and Ford disturbed or 
interfered with the use of its real property, it cannot establish its tortious interference claim 
is analogous to—or has any relevance to—a claim of disturbance of franchise or trespass 
under common law in 1820.  All Star does not proffer any other authority or make more 
specific arguments as to why these claims should be considered “analogous” to a modern 
tortious interference claim, and it cannot show the circuit court erred in applying the 
statutory damages cap in section 510.265 to that claim. 
For these reasons, this Court finds All Star’s common law causes of action against 
HALO and Ford either did not exist prior to 1820 or are not analogous to claims existing 
                                                 
Cmty. Title Co., 796 S.W.2d at 372. 
19 
 
before 1820 for which juries could have awarded punitive damages.  See Dodson, 491 
S.W.3d at 555.  Accordingly, this Court affirms the circuit court’s application of the 
statutory damages cap to All Star’s award of punitive damages.   
II. 
HALO’s Claims 
In its cross-appeal, HALO alleges a variety of errors.  This Court considers only one 
of the several arguments HALO asserts.  
a. HALO’s Briefing Deficiencies 
In three points relied on, HALO raises seven distinct arguments.  Each of HALO’s 
points relied on and corresponding arguments violate the straightforward and mandatory 
requirements in Rule 84.04 governing appellate briefing.  Fowler v. Mo. Sheriffs’ Ret. Sys., 
623 S.W.3d 578, 582-83 (Mo. banc 2021).  Specifically, all three of HALO’s points relied 
on are multifarious, in that they contain multiple, divisible claims.  Id.  “Multifarious points 
relied on are noncompliant with Rule 84.04(d) and preserve nothing for review.”  Macke 
v. Patton, 591 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. banc 2019); see also Rule 84.13 (instructing 
“allegations of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not be considered in any civil 
appeal”).  While this Court possesses the discretion to review non-compliant briefing, it 
must “cautiously exercise this discretion” else it “send[s] an implicit message that 
substandard briefing is acceptable.”  Scott v. King, 510 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Mo. App. 2017). 
20 
 
HALO’s briefing is rife with deficiencies, and these deficiencies are more than 
superficial.16   
Though this Court has discretion to review noncompliant briefing, it will exercise 
this discretion to review only one of HALO’s claims.  The court of appeals noted HALO’s 
inadequate briefing before that court and sharply rebuked HALO for the deficiencies.  The 
court of appeals nonetheless exercised its discretion to review all of HALO’s relevant 
claims to the extent the arguments could be deciphered.  HALO then submitted to this 
Court an appellate brief that replicated many, if not all, of those same flagrant flaws.  There 
                                                 
16 Aside from being multifarious, HALO’s first point relied on, for example, references a 
claim of instructional error for future damages that HALO does not later pursue or 
otherwise explain in the corresponding argument section: 
Tortious Interference with Business Expectancy. The trial court erred in 
denying HALO’s motion for a directed verdict on the claim for tortious 
interference with business expectancy, in submitting to the jury the 
question of future damages on that claim, and in denying HALO’s motions 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the tortious-interference claim, 
because All Star failed to submit any legally sufficient evidence of damages, 
in that the only legally sufficient evidence of damages was the $25,541.88 in 
lost profits from a handful of one-time diverted orders, which All Star 
expressly conceded and the trial court held was not the basis for the jury’s 
$500,000 award for tortious interference, leaving that award unsubstantiated 
by any competent evidence. 
(Emphasis added.).  HALO’s second point relied on contains two separate claims of error 
and is also multifarious: 
Unreliable Evidence of Lost-Profit Damages. The trial court erred in 
permitting All Star to introduce Exhibit 235 as evidence of All Star’s lost 
profits and refusing to strike Mrs. Vogt’s testimony regarding Exhibit 235 
and lost profits, because that evidence and testimony was not admissible 
evidence of lost profits, in that Exhibit 235 was a made-for-litigation 
document containing a lay witness’s calculations prepared through an 
unreliable methodology, and Mrs. Vogt’s testimony was not based on actual 
facts or data that supported a rational estimate of lost profits. 
21 
 
was nothing inadequate about the court of appeals’ process of review, and this Court will 
not once again extend HALO the benefit of ex gratia review.   
The court of appeals, however, did not reach the due process claim raised in 
HALO’s third point relied on, contending the reduced punitive damage award violated due 
process.  This point relied on also violates Rule 84.04 as it is clearly multifarious and 
contains multiple, divisible claims.17    Nevertheless, because HALO has not had the benefit 
of appellate review of this due process claim, this Court will exercise its discretion to do 
so.   
b. Due Process and Punitive Damages 
HALO alleges the punitive damages award is grossly excessive and violates due 
process.  HALO argues even the reduced $2,627,709.40 award is unconstitutional.  The 
Missouri and United States constitutions prohibit the state from denying any person “life, 
liberty or property without due process of law.”  Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 10; U.S. Const. 
amend XIV, sec. 1.  The United States Supreme Court has held this guarantee protects 
tortfeasors from “grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments[.]”  State Farm Mut. Auto. 
                                                 
17 The point relied on contends both that punitive damages were not submissible and that 
the punitive damages award was excessive and in violation of due process: 
Punitive Damages. The trial court erred in denying HALO’s motions for a 
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on punitive 
damages and in denying, in part, HALO’s motion to reduce the $5.5 million 
punitive damages award, because All Star did not make a submissible case 
for punitive damages, and the punitive damages award is grossly and 
unconstitutionally excessive, in that punitive damages are an extraordinary 
and harsh remedy that should be applied only sparingly and in cases with the 
kind of outrageous conduct not present here, and are subject to due process 
constraints that were not satisfied here. 
22 
 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).  This is because “[e]lementary notions of 
fairness” require defendants have “fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him 
to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”  BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
When faced with a claim that a punitive damages award violates due process, a court 
must consider three guideposts: (1) the degree of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct; (2) the ratio between the harm the defendant inflicted—measured in actual 
damages—and the punitive damages award; and (3) a comparison of the punitive damages 
award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.  
Id. at 575; see also Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 146. 
The degree of the offensiveness of HALO’s conduct is the most important of the 
three factors.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.  Relevant to this consideration is whether: 
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious 
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health 
or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial 
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, 
or deceit, or mere accident.  
 
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419.  All Star made a compelling demonstration that HALO’s 
actions in the instant case deserve the reduced punitive damages award.  In coordination 
with Ford, HALO pillaged All Star’s client information, including confidential information 
about All Star’s customers.  HALO conspired with Ford to obtain a report that contained 
information on desirable, poachable clients that Ford directed All Star employees to 
unwittingly prepare.  Using Ford’s position and the information he procured, HALO 
23 
 
processed orders from All Star customers.  HALO took these actions knowing Ford was 
still employed with and obliged to be faithful to All Star.  When All Star learned of HALO 
and Ford’s actions and demanded HALO cease taking orders from All Star customers, 
HALO initially refused.  While HALO insisted it would take orders only from those 
customers with whom Ford had a long prior relationship, it did not actually ensure Ford 
had such relationships.  This Court has found “infliction of economic injury, especially 
when done intentionally through affirmative acts of misconduct … can warrant a 
substantial penalty.”  Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 146; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 576.  The 
first guidepost weighs in favor of the punitive damages award’s constitutional validity.  
The second guidepost—the ratio of actual damages to punitive damages—likewise 
suggests the reduced punitive damages award was constitutional.  The jury awarded All 
Star $525,541.88 in actual damages.  Following the jury’s determination that $5.5 million 
in punitive damages was warranted, the circuit court reduced that award to $2,627,709.40, 
or five times the actual damages award.  “Single-digit multipliers are more likely to 
comport with due process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and 
retribution[.]”  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.  HALO's conduct justified the circuit court's 
single-digit-ratio award.18   
                                                 
18 In Lewellen, the defendants, a car dealership and its owner, trapped Lillian Lewellen, an 
elderly, financially vulnerable widow, into a fraudulent scheme in which they sold her a 
vehicle as part of a special deal, promising they would contribute to her payments to keep 
her monthly payment at $49.  441 S.W.3d at 140.  Lewellen repeatedly told the defendants 
she could not afford to pay more than $49 a month, and the defendants assured her that 
would be the extent of her obligation, stating they would cover the rest.  Id.  The defendants 
later stopped contributing payments; Lewellen became unable to make up the difference.  
Id. at 141.  The bank that provided her with the loan repossessed Lewellen’s vehicle.  Id.  
24 
 
The third guidepost concerns “the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.”  Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.  “The fundamental question is whether [HALO] 
had reasonable notice that its [participation in a civil conspiracy to breach an employee’s 
duty of loyalty] and tortious interference with contracts and prospective business advantage 
could result in such a large punitive award.”  Cont’l Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 
F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996).  No Missouri statute imposes civil penalties for civil 
conspiracy to breach the duty of loyalty or tortious interference with a business expectancy.  
One Missouri court tasked with analyzing the constitutional validity of a punitive damages 
award based in part on a tortious interference claim declined to assess this guidepost, 
finding: 
Tortious interference with contract involves acts that are ethically and 
morally reprehensible and are, in a civil sense, legally wrongful, 
whereas fraud claims founded in misrepresentation type acts are akin 
to criminal conduct for which sanctions might be identified and 
compared. The factor of comparative penalties is inconsequential in 
an action for tortious interference with contract.  
 
Env’t Energy Partners, Inc. v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., 178 S.W.3d 691, 708 (Mo. App. 
2005).  In Environmental Energy Partners, the jury issued two compensatory damages 
awards—one for the defendant’s tortious interference and the other compensating the 
plaintiff for a contract that a third party breached because of the defendant’s tortious 
interference—totaling $127,546.25. Id. at 708.  The corresponding punitive damages 
                                                 
This Court found the resulting 22:1 punitive damages award satisfied due process.  Id. at 
147.  While HALO’s actions may not be as egregious as the defendants’ actions in 
Lewellen, the ratio of punitive to actual damages here was much smaller.  The 
reprehensibility of HALO’s conduct was sufficient to support a 5:1 punitive damages 
award. 
25 
 
award totaled $500,000.  Id.  The court of appeals, disregarding the third guidepost, 
ultimately upheld the nearly 4:1 ratio.  Id.  
Whether this Court disregards the final guidepost for the reasons Environmental 
Energy Partners articulates or discerns whether HALO had reasonable notice under the 
third guidepost, the result is the same.  The third guidepost does not suggest the award was 
unreasonable and unconstitutional.  In Environmental Energy Partners, the court of appeals 
affirmed the constitutional validity of a punitive damages award against a subcontractor 
who breached his subcontract with a primary contractor and interfered with the primary 
contractor’s contract with a hospital.  Id. at 695.  The subcontractor failed to timely perform 
his end of the subcontract and refused to communicate with the contractor and to submit 
reports used to justify the subcontractor’s payment requests to the contractor.  Id. at 707.  
The subcontractor’s actions resulted in the hospital withholding payment from the 
contractor on the contract between the hospital and the contractor.  Id.  The subcontractor 
later attempted to secure payment for his unfinished work by filing and attempting to 
perfect a mechanic’s lien against the hospital, falsely representing his work on the 
hospital’s property was complete.  Id.  The subcontractor ultimately reached an agreement 
with the hospital whereby the hospital paid the subcontractor money owed to the 
contractor; the hospital also agreed not to inform the contractor of the agreement.  Id. at 
708.    
While the facts vary from the present case, Environmental Energy Partners 
provided a general warning that a defendant’s intentional, wrongful actions resulting in 
tortious interference with a contract alone could reap at least a punitive damages award 
26 
 
near a 4:1 ratio.  This warning was sufficient to give HALO adequate notice that its conduct 
constituting tortious interference and civil conspiracy to breach the duty of loyalty could 
result in substantial punitive damages award.  Because none of the three guideposts suggest 
the reduced punitive damages award was arbitrary or excessive, or that HALO was 
deprived of fair notice of the potential consequences of its conduct, the 5:1 punitive 
damages award did not violate due process.  This point is denied.   
Conclusion 
Because the circuit court did not err in applying the punitive damages cap in section 
510.265 to reduce All Star’s award of punitive damages and the reduced award is well 
within the constitutional parameters of due process, the circuit court’s judgment is 
affirmed.   
 
___________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilson, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge, Fischer  
and Ransom, JJ, concur; Draper, J., dissents