Title: People v. Taylor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85907
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 1999

People v. Taylor  (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 85907-Agenda 4-March 1999.
Opinion filed May 20, 1999.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Tory R. Taylor, was convicted in the circuit court of Winnebago County of
aggravated discharge of a firearm (720
ILCS 5/24-1.2(a) (West 1994)) under the theory of accountability (720 ILCS 5/5-2 (West 1994)).
The appellate court affirmed
the conviction (287 Ill. App. 3d 254), and defendant sought leave to appeal to this court. In denying
defendant's petition for leave
to appeal, this court exercised its supervisory authority and directed the appellate court to vacate its
judgment and to reconsider
the cause in light of our opinion in People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87 (1998). On remand,
the appellate court entered an order
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23(b) (166 Ill. 2d R. 23(b)) once again affirming defendant's
conviction. We allowed
defendant's subsequent petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse the
judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts.
BACKGROUND
This case arose from a traffic altercation on August 28, 1993, in Rockford, Illinois. Defendant,
who was 15 years old at the time,
was driving an automobile accompanied by his friend, Lynn Hollingshed. Witnesses testified that
defendant was the driver of the
vehicle and that Hollingshed was a passenger sitting in the front seat. Defendant testified that, while
driving, Hollingshed showed
him a .25-caliber handgun that he had pulled out of his pocket. At approximately 7:30 p.m., defendant
turned from a large street
onto a two-lane, two-way side street.
At the same time, Edward Dawson, his wife Alta, and a friend were traveling on the same side
street. Vehicles were parked on
both sides of the street, diminishing the lane sizes. Defendant turned onto that street as Edward was
approaching the intersection.
The accounts of the incident vary beyond these facts. Edward and Alta testified that defendant's
vehicle came quickly around the
corner, partially occupied both lanes, and forced their vehicle close to a parked car. Defendant
testified that the street was too
narrow for both automobiles to pass and that he stopped his car and backed it up to allow the other
vehicle to pass.
Edward and Alta testified that they exited their vehicle to look for damage done to it or any
parked cars. They stated that
Hollingshed then exited defendant's vehicle and that Edward asked whether the young man had a
"problem." Defendant testified
that, as Edward drove past, Edward directed the racial remark, "You got a problem you fu*** n***?"
at defendant and
Hollingshed. Both Edward and Alta testified that Hollingshed had a small, black machine gun in his
left hand and that, when
asked if he had a problem, Hollingshed responded, "Yes, I got a fu*** problem, white boy."
According to the Dawsons,
Hollingshed then removed a small handgun and fired it in Edward's direction. Defendant testified that
the shot was fired upward,
while Edward testified that the bullet "whizzed" past his ear. Edward testified that he jumped back
into his automobile as another
bullet was immediately fired. Alta, who had also exited the vehicle, stated that she abruptly reentered
the car and wrote down the
license plate number of defendant's vehicle. Defendant and the Dawsons testified that Hollingshed
then reentered defendant's
automobile and that defendant drove from the scene. The Dawsons then proceeded to the closest
service station and called the
police.
Defendant testified that Hollingshed was the shooter. According to defendant, Hollingshed was
angered by Edward's racial slur
and had told defendant to stop the vehicle. Defendant stated that Hollingshed did not indicate why
he wanted him to stop the car,
nor did he give defendant any reason for exiting the car. Defendant testified that Hollingshed jumped
out of the automobile,
yelled back at Edward, and quickly fired two shots into the air in Edward's general direction.
Defendant further testified that he
was startled when the first shot rang out and that, after immediately firing a second shot in the air,
Hollingshed came back to
defendant's car. Defendant asked Hollingshed why he fired the shots, but received no response from
him. Defendant then drove
from the scene.
Defendant was arrested and later charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant was
subsequently convicted of that
offense under the theory of accountability, and he appealed to the appellate court. The appellate court
affirmed, and defendant
petitioned this court for leave to appeal. We denied defendant's petition, but, under our supervisory
authority, directed the
appellate court to vacate its judgment affirming defendant's conviction and to reconsider the action
in light of our decision in
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court once again affirmed
defendant's conviction, reasoning that,
because defendant knew of Hollingshed's prior possession of a gun and became aware of the
aggravated discharge of a firearm
offense during its commission, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant formed the
requisite intent to aid Hollingshed.
Defendant once again filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court. We allowed defendant's
petition and now reverse the
judgment of the appellate court.
ANALYSIS
The issue in the present appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant
under accountability on the ground
that he facilitated the commission of aggravated discharge of a firearm by providing Hollingshed with
an escape from the scene of
the incident. Defendant contends that, in light of Dennis, he was not proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated
discharge of a firearm under the theory of accountability and that the appellate court erred in basing
its affirmance on its
conclusory determination that defendant simply could have "formed the intent to aid his passenger."
We agree.
In assessing whether the evidence against a defendant was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, a reviewing court
must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any
rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v.
Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1996);
People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 25 (1994); People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 455 (1990), quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). A defendant's conviction should not be set aside on grounds of insufficient evidence
unless the proof is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt exists about the defendant's guilt.
Furby, 138 Ill. 2d  at 455; Collins, 106 Ill. 2d  at 261.
The Illinois statute on accountability states, in relevant part, that a defendant is legally
accountable for the actions of another
when:
Consequently, in order to hold defendant accountable for aggravated discharge of a firearm,
defendant must have, with the
requisite intent, aided or abetted Hollingshed prior to or during the commission of the offense.
Importantly, this court addressed the scope of the accountability statute in Dennis,
concluding that:
This court further determined in Dennis that:
Significantly, we observe that a person may not be held accountable for a crime merely for being
present, even when that person
knows that a crime is being committed. Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d at 375-76; People
v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 140 (1995); People v.
Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61 (1990). Similarly, a person generally will not be deemed accountable
for acquiescing to the criminal
activities of another. People v. Hobbs, 400 Ill. 143 (1948); People v.
Powers, 293 Ill. 600 (1920); People v. Miscichowski, 143
Ill. App. 3d 646 (1986).
In the present appeal, defendant argues that the appellate court erred in reaffirming his conviction
in spite of this court's holding
in Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87. In Dennis, the defendant was charged under
accountability with armed robbery for driving the
"getaway" car for a friend who had just completed an armed robbery. The defendant in that case had
no knowledge of his friend's
plan of robbery and did not learn of the robbery until after he began driving the friend away from the
scene of the robbery. This
court reversed the defendant's conviction, reasoning that the defendant's facilitation of the
perpetrator's escape amounted to
neither a facilitation of nor an intent to facilitate the commission of any element of the underlying
offense. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at
103-04.
We find Dennis to be instructive in the case at bar. As was the case in
Dennis, it is uncontroverted that defendant in this matter
had no knowledge of his passenger's intentions upon exiting defendant's vehicle. Immediately after
the traffic incident, defendant
merely stopped his car upon Hollingshed's demand. As the State concedes, defendant did not know
that Hollingshed was about
to discharge his firearm after the traffic altercation. Moreover, as in Dennis, defendant's
actions were merely directed at
effectuating an escape and not at promoting the commission of an offense.
It is the State's position, however, that, by the mere fact that defendant knew of Hollingshed's
possession of a firearm that day,
defendant knew that a crime was going to be committed after the traffic incident. The State further
argues that the jury could
have concluded that defendant "formed the intent to aid his passenger" during the minute period of
time between the first and
second shots fired by Hollingshed. The State supports this contention with the fact that defendant did
not leave the scene of the
offense before the second shot was fired. Based on these arguments, the State contends that
defendant satisfied the test for
accountability in that, during the commission of the offense, he intentionally aided Hollingshed by
providing a means of escape
from the scene. In our opinion, the State's reasoning is unpersuasive.
As this court emphasized in Dennis, in order to convict a defendant under
accountability, the State must show that the defendant,
either before or during the commission of the offense, intentionally aided or abetted an offender in
conduct that constitutes an
element of the offense. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 101. In the present case, the elements of
the offense of aggravated discharge of a
firearm are (1) the knowing or intentional discharge of a firearm (2) in the direction of another
person.720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2)
(West 1994). In this case, defendant neither had knowledge that Hollingshed intended to fire his gun
upon exiting the vehicle nor
made any effort to aid Hollingshed in the discharge of the weapon. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that defendant knew of, or
facilitated, the shooting in the direction of the Dawsons. In accordance with Dennis,
therefore, we conclude that, despite the
deference given to the State on review, no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant, either
before or during the commission of the offense, aided or abetted Hollingshed in the commission of
any element of the offense of
aggravated discharge of a firearm.
The State's additional arguments concerning defendant's intent are equally unavailing. Firstly,
defendant's knowledge of
Hollingshed's possession of a firearm on the day of the incident cannot satisfy the element in
accountability requiring specific
intent to promote or facilitate an offense. The fact that defendant was involved in an unforeseeable,
spontaneous traffic
altercation militates heavily against any notion that he somehow had knowledge of Hollingshed's
intentions once defendant's
vehicle came to a halt and Hollingshed exited. Moreover, we are not convinced by the State's
reasoning that, before
Hollingshed's second shot, defendant may have formed the intent to aid his passenger by deciding to
remain at the scene and
provide a means of escape for his friend. Even assuming that the evidence could support this inference
of intent, we reiterate the
principle stressed in Dennis: that guilt under accountability is not supported where one
merely facilitates the escape of an
offender and neither intends to facilitate nor aids or attempts to aid the offender in the commission
of any element of the offense.
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 103-04; see also In re D.C., 259 Ill. App. 3d 637
(1994). Furthermore, as this court recently stressed in
People v. Shaw, No. 80378, slip op. at 15 (October 22, 1998), "[p]resence at the
commission of the crime, even when joined with
flight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability.
Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 108." See
also Furby, 138 Ill. 2d  at 456 (mere presence at scene of offense is not sufficient to
sustain conviction under accountability
theory); People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61 (1990) (same); People v. Ruiz,
94 Ill. 2d 245, 256 (1982) (same).
Escape is not an element of aggravated discharge of a firearm, and it is uncontested that
defendant did not facilitate, or intend to
facilitate, the commission of any element of that offense. Defendant's intent to facilitate an
escape-even if it occurred during the
commission of the offense-did not amount to both an intent to facilitate as well as an actual attempt
to aid in the commission of
any conduct constituting an element of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Instead, defendant's
possible intent to effectuate
Hollingshed's flight from the scene related solely to defendant's involvement with Hollingshed's escape
and not to any element of
the firearm offense. See Shaw, slip op. at 14 ("Unless the accomplice
intends to aid the commission of a crime, no guilt will
attach" (emphasis in original)), citing Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d  at 105. Accordingly, we hold
that the appellate court erred in
concluding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury could have based defendant's
conviction for aggravated
discharge of a firearm under the theory of accountability.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit
courts.
Judgments reversed.