Title: Penland v. Redwood Sanitary Sewer Service Dist.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44152
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1998

Filed:  April 9, 1998

		IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

D.E. (GENE) PENLAND, CATHY
PENLAND, ENID MADDING, RAY
RITCHEY, LUCY RITCHEY, KEN
GOODRICH, LEOLA GOODRICH,
RICHARD VISCHER, PAM VISCHER, RON
DANYLUK, SUE DANYLUK, WILLIAM
BUSHNELL, JUDY BUSHNELL, ROGER
BARKLOW, SHIRLEY BARKLOW, DAVE
PRICE, LINDA PRICE, CHUCK KING,
WANDA KING, GORDON HEWLETT, and
AMELIA HEWLETT,

	Petitioners on Review,

	v.

REDWOOD SANITARY SEWER SERVICE
DISTRICT, a municipal corporation,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC 94-CV-0209; CA A90247; SC S44152)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted November 6, 1997; reassigned 

February 3, 1998.

	John R. Huttl, of Frohnmayer, Deatherage, Pratt, Jamieson &amp;
Clarke P.C., Medford, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioners on review.

	James H. Boldt, Grants Pass, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.

	Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

	*Appeal from Josephine County Circuit Court,

	 Rebecca G. Orf, Judge pro tempore.

	 146 Or App 225, 934 P2d 434 (1997).

    **Fadeley, J., retired on January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		GILLETTE, J.

		This is an action by plaintiffs, property owners in
Josephine County, to enjoin defendant, Redwood Sanitary Sewer
Service District (the District), a municipal corporation, from
composting sewage material at its neighboring sewage treatment
plant.  The only issue before the court concerns the validity of
the District's "discretionary function" immunity defense to the
action, which the District asserts under the Oregon Tort Claims
Act (OTCA), ORS 30.265.(3)(c).(1)  The trial court rejected that
defense and, having found that the composting operation
constitutes a nuisance, issued an injunction.  

		On the District's appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the District was entitled to prevail on a
"discretionary function" immunity defense under the OTCA. 
Penland v. Redwood Sanitary Sewer Service Dist., 146 Or App 225,
934 P2d 434 (1997).  We allowed plaintiffs' petition for review,
and conclude that the "discretionary function" immunity provision
of the OTCA is inapplicable in actions for injunctions.  We
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case to that court for consideration of the District's other
assignments of error.  

		The facts of the case that are pertinent to the issue
before the court are not in dispute and are taken in large part
from the opinion of the Court of Appeals.  In 1990, the District
began a relatively large scale operation at its sewage treatment
plant to transform sewage sludge, a condensed form of sewage that
is the ordinary by-product of a sewage treatment plant, into
compost.  The compost ultimately is sold to the public as a soil
amendment called Jo-Gro.(2)  

		The process of turning sludge into compost generates
hydrogen sulfide, which can cause headaches, nausea, and throat
problems.  Beginning in late 1991, plaintiffs began to notice
excessive noise, odor, and dust, which they associated with the
composting operation.  In February 1992, they began to complain
to the District about the problems and, in response, the District
undertook several remediation measures.  The neighboring property
owners, however, found those measures to be inadequate.  

		The complaints continued and, in early 1994, the
District's board of directors appointed a nine-member ad hoc
citizen's committee to recommend further mitigation measures. 
The committee made various recommendations, which were then
reviewed by the District's manager at the board's request.  The
manager, in turn, sent the District a report based on the
committee's recommendations in which he accepted some of the
committee's recommendations and rejected others in an effort to
balance the need to reduce the impact of the operation on the
neighborhood with the need to minimize capital and operating
costs.  The District's board of directors voted to approve the
manager's report and the mitigation measures recommended therein
were implemented.  

		Plaintiffs remained unsatisfied.  They filed the
present action to enjoin the composting operation at the sewage
treatment plant.  Their complaint alleged that the operation
created a nuisance by generating excessive odor, noise, and dust,
thereby interfering with the reasonable use and enjoyment of
their properties.  The District denied that the operation created
a nuisance and argued that, even if it did, the balance of the
equities favored allowing the operation to continue. 
Alternatively, the District asserted that plaintiffs' claims are
based on the District's performance of a "discretionary function"
and, therefore, that the District is immune from a claim under
the OTCA.  

		As noted, the trial court found that the composting
operation does create a nuisance and that it substantially and
unreasonably interferes with the property owners' use and
enjoyment of their land.  The trial court rejected the District's
immunity defense, finding that the board merely rubber-stamped
the manager's decision to adopt various mitigation measures and
never made an independent decision of its own.  Based on its
finding that plaintiffs were entitled to prevail on the nuisance
claim, the trial court issued an injunction.  

		In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, the District
assigned error to the trial court's finding of nuisance, to its
failure to find that the balance of the equities favored the
continued operation of the composting operation, and to its
failure to accept the District's OTCA discretionary function
immunity defense.  The Court of Appeals considered only the
latter argument, holding that the OTCA controls.  146 Or App at
233.  

		In making its ruling, the Court of Appeals first
rejected plaintiffs' argument that the OTCA cannot be read to
confer immunity in nuisance actions, because there was no
governmental immunity for nuisance actions before the enactment
of the OTCA.  Ibid.  It then reviewed the elements of a
discretionary function immunity defense as set out in this
court's case law and concluded that the District's choice to
adopt certain mitigation measures and reject others, rather than
to move the compost operation elsewhere, was "the essence of
immunized discretion."  146 Or App at 235.  Because of the its
ruling on the immunity defense, the Court of Appeals did not
address the District's assignments of error relating to the trial
court's nuisance finding.  

		ORS 30.265 provides in part:

		"(1) Subject to the limitations of ORS 30.260 to
30.300, every public body is subject to action or suit
for its torts and those of its officers, employees and
agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties, whether arising out of a governmental or
proprietary function or while operating a motor vehicle
in a ridesharing arrangement authorized under ORS
276.598.  

		"* * * * *

		"(3) Every public body and its officers, employees
and agents acting within the scope of their employment
or duties, or while operating a motor vehicle in a
ridesharing arrangement authorized under ORS 276.598,
are immune from liability for: 

		"* * * * *

		"(c) Any claim based upon the performance of or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty, whether or not the discretion is
abused."

(Emphasis supplied).  Not surprisingly, the parties disagree
whether the District met the prerequisites for immunity under ORS
30.265(3)(c).  A basic assumption underlying the parties'
arguments and the decisions of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals is that, if the District is immune from liability
under the OTCA for its actions in creating a nuisance, it also is
immune from an action for an injunction to stop the nuisance
activity.  We reject the validity of that assumption.  

		ORS 30.265(1) provides that "every public body is
subject to action or suit for its torts."  "Tort" is defined in
ORS 30.260(8) as the breach of a legal duty which results in
injury and for which "the law provides a civil right of action
for damages or for a protective remedy."  (Emphasis supplied.) 
Thus, the OTCA permits public bodies to be sued in tort for
monetary damages as well as to be subject to actions for
injunctions, while the immunity clause in ORS 30.265(3)(c),
provides that the public body is "immune from liability" for
torts in various situations, without defining the term
"liability."  Whether the phrase "immune from liability" in ORS
30.265(3)(c) encompasses immunity from an action for an
injunction is a matter of statutory interpretation.  

		In resolving that question, our task is to determine
the intent of the legislature.  ORS 174.020; PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  At
the first level of analysis, we examine the text and context of
the provision as the best evidence of the legislature's intent. 
PGE, 317 Or 610-611.  Context includes other provisions of the
same statute and other related statutes.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.  In
the court's consideration of the context of a statute, the court
follows rules of construction that bear directly on the statutory
provision in context.  Ibid.  One rule pertinent to our inquiry
here is that the same term in the same statute generally has the
same meaning throughout the statute.  Ibid.  If the legislature's
intent is clear after the first level of examination, further
inquiry is unnecessary.  Ibid.  

		In this case, when the phrase "immune from liability"
is viewed in context, it is clear that the legislature intended
to limit the scope of the immunity conferred to immunity from
monetary or financial liability.  It did not contemplate that
public bodies also would be immune from actions for injunctions
and similar nonmonetary remedies.  In the other sections of the
OTCA in which the term "liability" appears, that term plainly
refers specifically to financial or monetary liability.  For
example, ORS 30.270 provides various dollar limitations on the
"liability" of a public body or its officers, employees, or
agents for claims authorized under the OTCA.  See Griffin v. Tri-Met, 318 Or 500, 508-09, 870 P2d 808 (1994) (so indicating with
respect to use of word "liability" in former version of that
statute).  In addition, ORS 30.282 provides that the "governing
body of any local public body may procure insurance against
liability of the public body and its officers, employees and
agents" or, instead, may self-insure against such liability.  In
neither of these sections can the term also be read to encompass
injunction actions.  At the same time, no other provision of the
OTCA suggests that the term "liability" in the immunity clause
should be read to encompass anything other than monetary
liability.  

		Based on the foregoing examination of the text of the
statute and of the context in which that statute appears, we are
satisfied that the meaning of the statute is clear.  We hold that
ORS 30.265(3)(c) confers immunity on public bodies only from
liability for damages and does not confer immunity from
injunction actions.  

		It follows that, whether or not the District has met
all of the prerequisites for discretionary function immunity so
as potentially to immunize the District from "liability" for
monetary relief for creating and maintaining a nuisance, the
District has no immunity from an action brought by neighboring
property owners to enjoin its continuing operation of that
nuisance.  The contrary decision of the Court of Appeals was
error.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. 

1. 	The property owners also urge the court to consider
whether the Court of Appeals' application of the OTCA's
discretionary immunity provision to the facts of this case
results in the taking of their property without just compensation
in violation of Article 1, section 18, of the Oregon
Constitution.  That issue was not raised below and, therefore, is
not preserved for review. 

2. 	Before the composting operation, the District disposed
of the sludge by trucking it away from the treatment facility.