Title: Goldston v. Chambers
Citation: 157 S.E.2d 676, 272 N.C. 53
Docket Number: N/A
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 22, 1967

157 S.E.2d 676 (1967) 272 N.C. 53 Margaret Stumpf GOLDSTON v. Brenda Henderson CHAMBERS, Edwin Ray Chambers, Henry Sloan Medlin and Grover Cleveland Medlin. Robert John GOLDSTON v. Brenda Henderson CHAMBERS, Edwin Ray Chambers, Henry Sloan Medlin and Grover Cleveland Medlin. Margaret Stumpf GOLDSTON v. Brenda Henderson Chambers LYNCH, Edwin Ray Chambers, Henry Sloan Medlin and Grover Cleveland Medlin. Robert John GOLDSTON v. Brenda Henderson Chambers LYNCH, Edwin Ray Chambers, Henry Sloan Medlin and Grover Cleveland Medlin. Nos. 608-611. Supreme Court of North Carolina. November 22, 1967. *678 Ottway Burton, Asheboro, for Margaret Stumpf Goldston and Robert John Goldston, appellants and appellees. Steve Glass and Miller, Beck &amp; O'Briant, by Adam W. Beck, Asheboro, for defendants Chambers, appellants. Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell &amp; Hunter, by Richmond G. Bernhardt, Jr., Greensboro, for defendants Medlin, appellees. PARKER, Chief Justice. The orders were signed by the trial judge out of term and out of the district by agreement of the parties, and such action when so authorized is permissible. In Knowles v. Savage, Son &amp; Co., 140 N.C. 372, 52 S.E. 930, the facts were these: The Court, in its unanimous opinion, said: In Cogburn v. Henson, 179 N.C. 631, 103 S.E. 377, the facts were these: The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Clark and joined in by Justices Brown, Hoke, and Allen, held as correctly summarized in the second headnote in our Reports: Justice Walker wrote a dissenting opinion stating in substance that the decision in Knowles v. Savage, supra, should be followed and not overruled. He closed his dissenting opinion with this language: "I shall, though, hereafter accept this decision of the court, and abide by its construction of such agreements, as it is only a question of procedure, which should be finally decided, and closed." See as apposite to the decision in the Cogburn case, Bailey v. Dibbrell Mineral Co., 183 N.C. 525, 112 S.E. 29. In the Knowles case the agreement was simply that the judge could sign the judgment out of term. In the present case the agreement was, as stated in the appeal entries, that "it is further agreed by counsel for all parties that the Order and Appeal *680 Entries may be signed out of the District and out of the Term." (Italics ours.) It seems to us that the only reasonable and just construction of the agreement here made in open court at the trial term by counsel for all the parties was that for the purposes of entertaining such motions and signing orders related thereto the term of the court was prolonged, and this case should be treated by Judge Latham as if the trial term of the court were in session. We are fortified in our opinion by the fact that counsel in their briefs have not assailed Judge Latham's power to set the verdicts aside in his discretion except on the ground that he committed a manifest abuse of discretion. According to the agreement here, we are of the opinion and so hold that Judge Latham had the power to set aside the verdicts in his discretion out of the district and out of the term. Judge Latham was fully authorized to set aside the verdicts in these two consolidated cases as a matter of discretion. It is within the power of the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion to set aside a jury verdict, in whole or in part. G.S. § 1-207; Alligood v. Shelton, 224 N. C. 754, 32 S.E.2d 350; Geer v. Reams, 88 N.C. 197. A verdict is a solemn act of a jury, and it should not be set aside without mature consideration; but the power of the court to set aside a verdict as a matter of discretion has always been inherent and is necessary to the proper administration of justice. Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N.C. 488, 42 S.E. 936. This is said in Settee v. Charlotte Electric Ry., 170 N.C. 365, 86 S.E. 1050: We have held repeatedly since 1820 in case after case, and no principle is more fully settled in this jurisdiction, that the action of the trial judge in setting aside a verdict in his discretion is not subject to review on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Scott v. Trogdon, 268 N.C. 574, 151 S.E.2d 18; Goldston v. Wright, 257 N.C. 279, 125 S.E.2d 462; Walston v. Greene, 246 N.C. 617, 99 S.E.2d 805; Goodman v. Goodman, 201 N.C. 808, 161 S.E. 686; Bird v. Bradburn, supra; Brink v. Black, 74 N.C. 329; Long v. Gantley, 20 N.C. 457; Alley v. Hampton, 13 N.C. 11; Armstrong v. Wright, 8 N.C. 93. The records in these two cases disclose no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge; hence, the order setting aside the verdict in each case is not subject to review on appeal. The assignment of error of plaintiffs that the court erred in setting aside the entire verdict in each case in its discretion is without merit and is overruled. Defendants Chambers assign as error the setting aside of the verdict on the first issue in each case which found that neither plaintiff was injured nor the male plaintiff's car damaged by the negligence of the defendants Chambers. They contend that the setting aside of the verdict on the first issue in each case in his discretion by the trial judge was a manifest abuse of discretion and has produced a "miscarriage of justice," "an inequitable result," and "a *681 palpable error," for the reason that the plaintiffs presented no evidence tending to show any actionable negligence on the part of the defendants Chambers, and that they are entitled to a judgment on the verdict adjudging and decreeing that each plaintiff have and recover nothing from the defendants Chambers. Considering plaintiffs' evidence in the record before us as true and in the light most favorable to them and giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference in their favor which may be reasonably deduced therefrom, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury. 4 Strong's N.C. Index, Trial, § 21. No manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Latham appears in the record. Defendants Chambers were not entitled to have the suit as against them terminated by a judgment of compulsory nonsuit. All assignments of error of the defendants Chambers are overruled. Appeals of plaintiffs and defendants Chambers are Dismissed.