Title: Huffman v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-2681
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-2681
____________
DAVID HUFFMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[June 7, 2000]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
David Huffman petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.  We deny the petition but write to
explain the application of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 to all cases
except those in which the death penalty is actually imposed.
Huffman sought postconviction relief from his 1972 conviction
1. Huffman does not list the claims that he raised in his motion for
postconviction relief.
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for capital rape of an adult female.1  Huffman's motion was denied by
the trial court and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed,
sanctioning Huffman for his abuse of the judicial system.  See
Huffman v. State, 741 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  In the
opinion, the district court noted that the trial court has similarly
barred Huffman from filing further challenges to his 1972 conviction. 
Id. at 533.  
In the instant petition, Huffman alleges that the trial court is
wrongfully denying his rule 3.850 motions as untimely and the
district court is refusing to take his appeals.  Huffman further claims
that the filing time limits listed in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850 only cover noncapital defendants and capital defendants who
are sentenced to death.  Thus, Huffman argues that since he is a
capital defendant who is serving a life sentence, he does not fit under
these time limits and he should be allowed to file for postconviction
relief at any time.  Huffman claims that the lower courts are denying
him access to the courts and therefore this Court should issue a writ
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of mandamus, compelling the lower courts to accept and consider his
filings for relief from his 1972 conviction. 
We conclude that Huffman's claims against the lower courts have no merit. 
In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus the petitioner must have a clear legal
right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to
perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate
remedy available.  See Turner v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 1st DCA
1993).  If Huffman has abused the judicial process to the point that the lower courts
have sanctioned him by prohibiting further filings, we conclude that he has no right
to continue to file procedurally barred or successive petitions or postconviction
motions.  As such, we conclude that Huffman is not entitled to mandamus relief as
a means to override the lower courts' sanction orders.   
Regarding Huffman's claim that the rule 3.850 time limits do not apply to
capital defendants serving life sentences, we conclude that this argument similarly
lacks merit.  Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to clarify the term "noncapital"
as it is used in rule 3.850.  We agree that upon first glance, it appears that
defendants convicted of capital crimes, but not sentenced to death, are excluded
from the time limits delineated under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  As
written, rule 3.850(b) provides: 
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A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law
may be filed at any time.  No other motion shall be filed or considered
pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and
sentence become final in a noncapital case or more than 1 year after
the judgment and sentence become final in a capital case in which a
death sentence has been imposed [unless the claim raised falls under
certain exceptions listed in this rule].
However, a review of our case law in this area demonstrates that even though
certain types of sexual crimes qualify as capital felonies under either current or prior
versions of the Florida Statutes, Huffman and other defendants convicted of capital
crimes, but not sentenced to death, qualify as noncapital defendants for the
purposes of rule 3.850.
Huffman was charged with violating section 794.01, Florida Statutes (1971),
titled "Rape and forcible carnal knowledge."  This statute provided: "Whoever
ravishes and carnally knows a female of the age of ten years or more, by force and
against her will, or unlawfully or carnally knows and abuses a female child under the
age of ten years, shall be guilty of a capital felony, punishable as provided in §
775.082."  Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1971), provided:
A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished
by death unless the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a
majority of the jury, in which case the punishment shall be life
imprisonment.
2. Section 794.021(1) provided: "A person of the age of eighteen (18) years
or older who commits sexual battery upon, or injures the sexual organs of a person
eleven (11) years or younger in an attempt to commit sexual battery upon said
person commits a capital felony punishable as provided in sections 775.082 and
921.141."  See ch. 74-121, § 2, at 373, Laws of Fla.  
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In 1974, the statute under which Huffman was charged was repealed.  See
ch. 74-121, § 1, at 372, Laws of Fla.  In the same chapter, the Legislature enacted
section 794.021, titled "Involuntary Sexual Battery."2  In 1981, this Court held that
a sentence of death for capital sexual battery constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.  See Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981).  Thus, a conviction
for capital sexual battery would result in a mandatory life sentence.  See id. at 954
("This is an automatic sentence, and the Court has no discretion.").  This Court
cited Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a sentence of death for the crime of rape of an adult
woman was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment.  Subsequently, in Rusaw v. State, 451 So. 2d 469, 470 (Fla.
1984), this Court held that "a capital crime is one in which the death sentence is
possible."  Under this holding, even if a felony is classified in the Florida Statutes
as a capital offense, it is not "capital" under case law unless it is subject to the
death penalty.
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Under the aforementioned case law, forcible rape of a female over the age of
ten years constitutes a noncapital offense even though the 1971 Florida Statutes
classified this crime as a "capital offense."  Hence, we conclude that Huffman and
all other defendants convicted of crimes that may be classified as capital in the
Florida Statutes, but who were not actually sentenced to death, qualify as
noncapital defendants under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Under the
time limits delineated by rule 3.850, Huffman as a noncapital defendant had two
years from the time his judgment and sentence in his “capital” rape case became
final to file for postconviction relief (absent the presence of one of the exceptions
listed under the rule). 
Accordingly, we find no merit to Huffman's argument that he has the right to
file rule 3.850 motions for postconviction relief at any time.  The petition for writ of
mandamus is hereby denied.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Mandamus
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David Huffman, pro se, Arcadia, Florida,
for Petitioner
No appearance,
for Respondent