Title: Day v. Moore
Citation: 771 P.2d 436
Docket Number: S-2629
State: Alaska
Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 1989

771 P.2d 436 (1989) Robert DAY, Appellant, v. Jeffrey MOORE, Appellee. No. S-2629. Supreme Court of Alaska. March 24, 1989. Patrick J. McKay, Anchorage, for appellant. Charles W. Ray, Bradbury, Bliss &amp; Riordan, Anchorage, for appellee. Before MATTHEWS, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, BURKE, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ. PER CURIAM. This appeal arises from the award of attorney's fees in a suit involving Moore's claim for services rendered and Day's counterclaim for breach of contract. Following a trial by jury, judgment was entered in favor of Moore in the amount of $3,854.57. Moore was awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $12,560.37.[1] Appellant Robert Day is a commercial fisherman. Appellee Jeffrey Moore is a pilot in the business of spotting fish by airplane. The two parties had worked together on a regular basis for approximately five years. The dispute between the parties centers around the 1982 and 1984 fishing seasons. *437 Day hired Moore for the purpose of spotting fish in both 1982 and 1984. Moore brought suit to collect $6,554.43 from Day for his services in those two years. Moore also sought an equal amount in penalty wages for the two years on the theory that Moore was an employee of Day. Day answered that, although Moore was still owed money for the 1982 season, Day was not liable because he had not yet collected all of the monies payable for fish caught in that season. Day denied that he owed Moore any money for services performed in the 1984 season, and counterclaimed for damages in excess of $25,000.00 against Moore on the theory that Moore breached the contract by failing to provide spotting services. This counterclaim was based on Day's belief that he would have caught more fish if Moore had performed in a more competent fashion. After four days of trial, the jury returned special verdicts in which it found that (1) Moore was not owed any money for the 1982 season; (2) Day owed Moore $3,854.57 for the 1984 season; and (3) Moore was not an employee of Day in 1982 or 1984. As indicated at the outset, Moore was awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $12,560.37. This appeal followed. Day contends that Moore presented four issues to the jury: Day further contends that neither he nor Moore was the prevailing party because Moore prevailed on only one out of four issues. We have articulated guidelines for determining the "prevailing party." For purposes of awarding fees pursuant to Civil Rule 82, the general rule is that the prevailing party is the one "who has successfully prosecuted or defended against the action, the one who is successful on the `main issue' of the action and `in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered.'" Adoptionof V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788, 795 n. 14 (Alaska 1974) (citations omitted). The determination of who is the "prevailing" party is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Id. at 795. Moore did not succeed in recovering any money for the 1982 season. Moore apparently was unsuccessful on the employee issue. However, a party does not have to prevail on all the issues in the case to be a "prevailing party." Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575, 586 (Alaska 1973) (citing cases). One who defeats a claim of great potential liability may be the prevailing party even though the other side receives an affirmative recovery. Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Alaska 1973) (citing Owen Jones &amp; Sons v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1972)). Our review of the record persuades us there was no abuse of discretion on the superior court's part in ruling that Moore was the "prevailing party." Moore successfully prosecuted his action for monies owed from the 1984 fishing season. Moore also defeated Day's counterclaim for damages. We will interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion in determining which party prevailed only where it appears that the court's determination is manifestly unreasonable. Adoption of V.M.C., 528 P.2d at 795. On this record it cannot be said that the superior court's determination that Moore was the prevailing party was manifestly unreasonable. The superior court based its decision to award Moore $12,560.37 in attorney's fees on the following rationales: In Adoption of V.M.C., we noted that: 528 P.2d at 795 (emphasis added). Day argues that the superior court erred in departing from the attorney's fees schedule for contested cases contained in Civil Rule 82(a)(1). In this regard Day contends that his settlement "posture" was not unreasonable, and that his counterclaim was neither meritless nor vexatious. Our recent opinion in Myers v. Snow White Cleaners and Linen Supply, 770 P.2d 750, (Alaska 1989), controls the disposition of this issue. There we concluded that the superior court erred where it used past settlement negotiations as a reason to justify a reduction in the amount of attorney's fees that it would have awarded. In reaching this conclusion in Myers we said: Id. at 752-753 (footnote omitted). In light of Myers we hold that the superior court impermissibly considered Day's settlement posture in making its attorney's fee award determination under Civil Rule 82. Given this conclusion, the question of an appropriate award of attorney's fees must be remanded to the superior court for redetermination.[3] REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [1] The total judgment was entered in the amount of $19,231.96. The judgment reflected $3,854.57 in compensatory damages; $1,316.20 in prejudgment interest; $12,560.37 in attorney's fees and $1,500.82 in costs. [2] Of further relevance here is Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487, 495-96 (Alaska 1976), where we stated: Although the trial court's discretion under Rule 82 is broad enough to warrant denial of attorney's fees altogether, denial of a proper motion for attorney's fees by the prevailing party may not result from improper motive. (Emphasis supplied.) [3] In ordering a remand we do not intend to infer approval or disapproval of the amount of attorney's fees which were initially awarded. Inherent in our disposition is the conclusion that it is permissible for the trial court to depart from the fee schedule of Civil Rule 82(a)(1) where the reasons for the departure appear in the record, Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487, 496 (Alaska 1976), such as where a defense or claim borders on the frivolous. Steenmeyer Corp. v. Mortenson-Neal, 731 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Alaska 1987); Crook v. Mortenson-Neal, 727 P.2d 297, 306 (Alaska 1986).