Title: Johnson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S-CR-00655
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 1, 2020

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-655 
Michael D. Johnson 
Appellant (Defendant below) 
–v– 
State of Indiana 
Appellee (Plaintiff below) 
Argued: June 29, 2020 | Decided: December 1, 2020 
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court, 
No. 48C01-1602-F5-402 
The Honorable Angela G. Warner Sims, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 19A-CR-975 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David and Goff concur. 
Justice Slaughter dissents with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 01 2020, 9:46 am
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Massa, Justice. 
Michael Johnson offered to sell a substance he called “white girl” to a 
stranger at Hoosier Park Casino in Anderson. After the solicited patron 
reported the incident to security, and the account was verified by video 
surveillance, a Gaming Enforcement Agent led Johnson back to an 
interview room. Once they entered the room, the agent told Johnson that 
he would need to pat him down. Upon this pat-down, the agent 
immediately felt what he deemed a “giant ball” in Johnson’s pocket. 
Consistent with his training, the agent immediately believed this lump 
was packaged drugs, and after removing the baggie containing white 
powder from Johnson’s pocket, placed him under arrest.   
At his trial, the court admitted, over Johnson’s objection, the evidence 
stemming from the pat-down. Because we find that the agent had 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot (so he could stop 
Johnson), that Johnson could be armed and dangerous (so he could pat 
Johnson down after entering a confined space), and the lump in Johnson’s 
pocket was immediately apparent as contraband (so it could be seized), 
we affirm the admission of the evidence because the search and seizure 
proceeded within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.  
Facts and Procedural History 
After hours of playing quarter slots with a friend at Hoosier Park 
Casino in Anderson, Brett Eversole was tired and fighting to stay awake 
on November 8, 2015. Just before he began to doze off, Eversole was 
approached by a stranger—Michael Johnson, the defendant in this case—
who offered to sell him some “white girl.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 87–89. Believing 
that this slang referred to cocaine, or less likely in his view a prostitute, 
and having no interest in either, Eversole rejected Johnson’s offer. 
Rebuffed, Johnson walked away. After consulting with his friend about 
what “white girl” might mean, Eversole decided to tell security officers 
that a “man approached me when I was sitting at a slot machine and 
offered to sell me some drugs, I believe, and he called it white girl.” Id., 
p.92. A security supervisor then sought video surveillance that would 
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show the encounter and “notified the gaming commission[,] who are law 
enforcement on the property.” Id., p.100.  
After viewing the soundless video and conferring with Eversole, 
Gaming Enforcement Agent Zach Wilkinson—who was a thirteen-year 
law enforcement veteran specially trained in “issues inside the casino,” 
including “drug trends” and “criminal issues”—quickly located Johnson 
because the Casino “wasn’t super crowded at that moment” and Johnson 
was easy to identify from Eversole’s description and the video’s depiction. 
Id., pp. 103–04, 109. Agent Wilkinson then told him that there had been “a 
report of him attempting to sell drugs to casino patrons,” and Johnson 
“voluntarily [went] back to the [gaming commission’s] interview room.” 
Id., p.111.  
After entering the room, Agent Wilkinson informed Johnson that he 
“needed to pat him down.” 1 Id. Upon this pat-down, Agent Wilkinson 
skimmed over a lump that—through his mandated yearly “training for 
identification of drug[s] by feel or by sight”—felt like a “ball of drugs.” Id., 
pp. 113–14. After Agent Wilkinson removed a baggie filled with “white 
powder” from Johnson’s pocket, he placed him under arrest. Id., p.114. 
Although this substance appeared to be cocaine, later testing merely 
revealed it to be sodium bicarbonate, also known as baking soda. The 
State later charged Johnson with “dealing in a look-a-like-substance,” a 
Level 5 felony under Indiana Code section 35-48-4-4.6. After 
unsuccessfully moving to suppress the admission of any evidence flowing 
from the search, a jury convicted Johnson of the charge, and he appealed, 
renewing his argument under the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court of Appeals reversed. While stating that “[i]t is incumbent 
upon the State to prove that the measures it used to conduct a search and 
seize evidence were constitutional,” the panel also implied that the State 
must parry every constitutional attack by refuting any claim that 
 
1 Although Johnson’s attorney asserted during oral argument that the pat-down occurred 
outside the room, Agent Wilkinson repeatedly testified that it occurred inside the room. This 
discrepancy does not impact the outcome.   
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“suggests alternative scenarios” for how evidence was obtained. Johnson v. 
State, 137 N.E.3d 1038, 1043–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), reh’g denied, vacated. 
Ultimately, even though “Agent Wilkinson would arguably have . . . 
developed probable cause for an arrest,” the court concluded that “the 
evidence does not dispel concern that the ball of powder retrieved from 
Johnson’s pocket was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure.” Id. at 1044. 
The State sought transfer, which we now grant. 
Standard of Review 
“The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence.” Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017) (citation 
omitted). Ordinarily, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 
discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic 
and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. But when a challenge to an 
evidentiary ruling is based “on the constitutionality of the search or 
seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo.” Id. 
Discussion and Decision 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.2 
The Fourth Amendment, then, generally requires warrants for searches 
and seizures, and any “warrantless search or seizure is per se 
unreasonable.” Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. 2017) (quotation 
omitted). “As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of 
 
2 Although Johnson offhandedly mentioned Article 1, Section 11 of our Indiana Constitution, 
he has waived the assertion for lack of specific argument. 
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this rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of 
the unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception.” 
Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). While the State can 
overcome this bar to admission by proving “that an exception to the 
warrant requirement existed at the time of” a warrantless search, Bradley 
v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016) (quotation omitted), it need not 
disprove every alternative explanation forwarded by a defendant. 
Although the parties and the courts below largely focused on whether 
there was probable cause to arrest Johnson at the time of the search 
(potentially bringing the seizure within the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception to the Fourth Amendment), there is a clearer path to sustaining 
the evidence’s admission: “the encounter was along the lines of a Terry 
stop.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. To determine, then, whether the evidence here 
should be suppressed, we must resolve three issues: (1) whether Agent 
Wilkinson had justification to stop Johnson under Terry; (2) whether 
Agent Wilkinson could perform a Terry frisk of Johnson; and (3) whether 
Agent Wilkinson could seize the baggie felt in Johnson’s pocket. 
Answering yes to each in turn, we hold the evidence admissible. 
I. 
Agent Wilkinson was justified in stopping 
Johnson under Terry after watching the video and 
talking to Eversole. 
An officer can stop a person if the officer “observes unusual conduct 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). While 
this stop requires less than probable cause, an officer’s reasonable 
suspicion demands more than just a hunch: “the police officer must be 
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” 
Id. at 21.  
Agent Wilkinson knew that Eversole, a disinterested third-party, 
informed security officers that Johnson had tried to sell him “white girl,” 
which he believed to be cocaine and believed was offered because the 
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stimulating effect of the drug could perk him up when he was nearly 
asleep. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“The informant here 
came forward personally to give information that was immediately 
verifiable at the scene.”). Eversole stayed at the scene, and confirmed this 
account with Agent Wilkinson, subjecting himself to false informing if he 
concocted the story. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233–34 (1983) (“[I]f an 
unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal 
activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we 
have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge 
unnecessary.”); Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. 2006) (“[T]he 
prospect of prosecution for making a false report heightens the likelihood 
of the report’s reliability.”), rev’d on reh’g on other grounds; Ind. Code § 35-
44.1-2-3(d) (2015) (“A person who . . . gives a false report of the 
commission of a crime or gives false information in the official 
investigation of the commission of a crime, knowing the report or 
information to be false . . . commits false informing.”). Because 
“informants who come forward voluntarily are ordinarily motivated by 
good citizenship or a genuine effort to aid law enforcement officers in 
solving a crime,” Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010), there is 
scant reason to doubt the veracity of Eversole’s account. 
And ensuing police work bolstered the impartial tip. Surveillance video 
confirmed Eversole’s narrative, and the man in the video matched his 
earlier description of Johnson. See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 528 
(Ind. 2018) (holding that an “independent investigation to confirm the 
street address, the color of the house, the names of the occupants, and the 
bright light” sufficiently augmented an anonymous tip to form probable 
cause that a house was being used to grow marijuana). Relatively few 
patrons populated the casino, narrowing the field of suspects who could 
match the specific description and depiction of Johnson. Abel v. State, 773 
N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2002) (finding reasonable suspicion supported when 
suspect “fit the general description of the sought-after person, was in the 
general area, and it was the early morning hours”) (quotation omitted). 
When “a tip from an identified informant or concerned citizen [is] coupled 
with some corroborative police investigation,” an officer has “reasonable 
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suspicion for an investigative stop.” Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 353. Agent 
Wilkinson had reasonable suspicion to stop Johnson under Terry. 
II. Agent Wilkinson could perform a Terry frisk of 
Johnson after they entered the interview room 
because it was reasonable to believe he was armed 
and dangerous. 
On appeal, Johnson asserted that even if reasonable suspicion 
supported a Terry stop, “the pat down search that revealed the substance 
exceeded the allowable legal scope” because “there was no evidence in the 
record that would have led officers to believe that Johnson was either 
armed or dangerous.” Appellant’s Br. at 11–12 (emphasis added). Not so. 
After making a Terry stop, an officer may, if he has reasonable fear that a 
suspect is armed and dangerous, frisk the outer clothing of that suspect to 
try to find weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The purpose of this protective 
search “is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to 
pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 
508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (quotation omitted). “The officer need not be 
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the 
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
To determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the 
specific, reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his experience, 
can draw from the facts. Id. Here, the facts supported the reasonableness 
of the pat-down: Agent Wilkinson suspected Johnson of trying to sell 
drugs and was about to interview him one-on-one in a small windowless 
room early in the morning.  
“[C]ourts have often considered evidence of drug involvement as part 
of the totality of the circumstances contributing to an officer’s reasonable 
belief that a subject is armed and dangerous.” Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 
478, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). While our Court of Appeals has held that 
evidence of marijuana use by a driver may not create a reasonable fear 
that a suspect is armed, see Rybolt v. State, 770 N.E.2d 935, 941 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2002) (holding pat-down unjustified when officer merely believed 
“that individuals who use narcotics also carry weapons”), trans. denied, 
further evidence of other criminal activity can, see, e.g., Durstock v. State, 
113 N.E.3d 1272, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding pat-down search 
justified when officers, among other things, believed that a suspect “was 
involved in drug activity” and other evidence revealed that the situation 
could be dangerous—a loaded gun was found in an adjacent bathroom 
the suspect had just left), trans. denied. What’s more, “the right to frisk is 
automatic whenever the suspect has been stopped upon the suspicion that 
he has committed, was committing, or was about to commit a type of 
crime for which the offender would likely be armed,” in that case, a 
burglary. N.W. v. State, 834 N.E.2d 159, 165–66. (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 
(cleaned up), trans. denied. 
Based on the facts of this case, a reasonably prudent officer in Agent 
Wilkinson’s position would believe that his safety was potentially in 
danger. All information available to Agent Wilkinson suggested that 
Johnson, unlike the defendant in Rybolt, was trying to sell drugs—a crime 
for which Johnson could possibly be armed—to strangers on a casino 
floor. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, officers know that it is 
“common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics 
transactions.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000); see also Parker v. 
State, 662 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“Based on the informant’s 
tip, he believed that narcotics would be present. . . . [The officer] knew . . . 
that firearms were frequently present in drug transactions.”), trans. denied. 
“[F]irearms are ‘tools of the trade.’” United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 25 
(1st Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 
1987)); see also Swanson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 
(acknowledging that “it is not uncommon for drug dealers to carry 
weapons”), trans. denied. Agent Wilkinson’s suspicion that Johnson 
attempted to sell drugs—supported by Eversole’s statements and 
surveillance footage—helped justify the pat-down.  
Whether a Terry stop occurs in a confined space can impact the 
reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down. See United States v. Post, 607 
F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1979). An experienced officer, “enclosed in a small 
room with a man he reasonably suspects to be a dealer in narcotics, [does 
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not have to] be certain that a suspect is armed before he can make a 
limited pat-down for weapons.” Id. Here, Agent Wilkinson spoke with 
Johnson alone in the “pretty small” windowless interview room. Tr. Vol. 
1, p.77. Given his “close proximity” to Johnson as they were about to 
discuss the attempted drug sale, it was reasonable for Agent Wilkinson to 
pat down Johnson. United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 
1080, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 
717 F.2d 1090, 1099 (7th Cir. 1983). The fact that another agent helped 
escort Johnson to the room and was, presumably, in the area does not 
make Agent Wilkinson’s decision any less reasonable. See Post, 607 F.2d at 
852 (finding a pat-down reasonable even after “[f]our agents stopped and 
accompanied [the suspect] to the interview room” when only one agent 
entered the room with the suspect). The one-on-one nature of the 
interview also increased the danger for Agent Wilkinson. See id.; $84,000 
U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d at 1099 (finding a pat-down justifiable when 
agents were “in a two-on-two situation” in a confined space). In a small 
confined space, it would have been easy for a suspect to attack Agent 
Wilkinson. Here, being alone with Johnson—suspected of trying to sell 
drugs—in the small interview room supports the reasonableness of Agent 
Wilkinson’s pat-down.                           
Courts also consider “the time of day” to evaluate the reasonableness of 
a Terry frisk. United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 998 (11th Cir. 2019) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 376. Whether a frisk occurs early in the 
morning may impact its reasonableness. See id. (upholding frisk after 
considering that police found the suspect after 4:00 A.M.); Abel, 773 N.E.2d 
at 279; N.W., 834 N.E.2d at 166 (a pat-down was justified partially because 
“it was early in the morning”). Here, the attempted sale took place a little 
before 7:00 A.M., and Agent Wilkinson first learned of it at 7:15 A.M. 
Because Agent Wilkinson had limited, if any, knowledge about Johnson’s 
activities earlier that morning and the previous evening, it was reasonable 
for him to believe Johnson may have been armed and dangerous. Of 
course, not every act—nor every suspected crime—that occurs at an early 
hour automatically allows for a pat-down. But here, when combined with 
the suspected crime of selling drugs and the small interview room, the 
time furthers the pat-down’s reasonableness.  
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“[T]o pursue his investigation without fear of violence,” Dickerson, 508 
U.S. at 373 (quotation omitted), Agent Wilkinson patted down Johnson 
after they entered the interview room. Johnson’s suspected crime, the 
small interview room, and the early morning hour all support finding 
Agent Wilkinson’s decision to pat down Johnson was reasonable. 
III. Agent Wilkinson could seize the baggie when he 
immediately identified the lump as contraband 
the moment he grazed Johnson’s pocket. 
Johnson urged that the “pat down exceeded the scope of a pat down 
[u]nder Terry” when Agent “Wilkinson testified that upon feeling the item 
in Johnson’s pocket he knew that it was not a weapon.” Appellant’s Br. at 
11–12. But this argument ignores later Supreme Court development of 
Terry, notably Dickerson. “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s 
outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its 
identity immediately apparent”—even if that item is not a weapon—
“there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already 
authorized by the officer’s search for weapons.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376. 
When, for example, an officer performing a pat-down search for 
weapons “felt a ‘tubular object’ in [a suspect’s] pocket that was ‘consistent 
with being a syringe,’” it could be seized under Terry because its “identity 
was immediately apparent.” Durstock, 113 N.E.3d at 1278. Contraband 
was properly seized when officers “testified they immediately recognized 
[it], based on their experience and training, to be marijuana based on 
its feel.” Holbert v. State, 996 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. 
denied. When an officer during a lawful pat-down “felt an object located in 
[a suspect’s] right front pants pocket, which she immediately recognized 
as ‘narcotics’ . . . due to its texture, describing it as ‘lumpy’ and ‘wadded,’” 
the seizure tracked the Fourth Amendment’s strictures. Patterson, 958 
N.E.2d at 487–88. When, during a weapons frisk, an officer “felt an object, 
located in [a suspect’s] left front pants pocket, which he recognized, based 
on its packaging, shape, and feel to be rock cocaine,” the unlawful nature 
of the object was again immediately apparent and its seizure permissible. 
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Wright v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1233–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). When an 
officer “conducted a pat down search for weapons” and “noticed a hard 
object” in a suspect’s left front shorts pocket, he “immediately determined 
its incriminating character” as cocaine, justifying its seizure. Parker, 662 
N.E.2d at 999. And when an officer “determined contemporaneously with 
his patdown search for weapons that the item in [a suspect’s] pocket was 
marijuana,” its seizure was Terry-authorized. Bratcher v. State, 661 N.E.2d 
828, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
On the other hand, if an officer must manipulate or further examine an 
object before its nature as contraband becomes apparent, the search 
exceeds Terry’s scope. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378 (holding search 
unreasonable when “the officer determined that the lump was contraband 
only after squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of 
the defendant’s pocket—a pocket which the officer already knew 
contained no weapon”) (quotation omitted). In other words, “the 
reasonable suspicion that gives authority to a Terry stop does not, without 
more, authorize the examination of the contents of items carried by the 
suspicious person.” Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ind. 1998) 
(emphasis added). A seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, for 
example, when an officer “did not claim that he could detect, from the 
limited touch, the incriminating nature of the object,” but instead just 
“suspected the object was something illegal[,] . . . ‘possibly a weapon.’” 
Peele v. State, 130 N.E.3d 1195, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation 
omitted). An unlawful seizure occurred when an officer felt and removed 
a pen cap from a suspect then, “‘upon further investigation and looking at 
it,’ he saw a baggie hanging from the pen cap, and based on previous 
experiences of finding narcotics in baggies in pen caps, he suspected that 
this baggie contained narcotics.” Clanton v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1018, 1026 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012). And a seizure exceeded Terry when an officer 
removed a bottle from a suspect’s “pocket during a patdown for weapons, 
but the contraband was detected only after [the officer] shined a light into 
the bottle and opened it.” Harris v. State, 878 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2007), trans. denied. 
During the pat-down in the interview room, Agent Wilkinson quickly 
encountered something that “felt like a giant ball” in Johnson’s pocket. Tr. 
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Vol. 2, p.113. Agent Wilkinson immediately recognized, consistent with 
his training and knowledge of the situation at hand, all the apparent 
hallmarks of narcotics packaged for sale: the lump felt “like a ball of 
drugs.” Id. Once the contour or mass is at once identified as contraband, as 
here, “its warrantless seizure [is] justified.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375–76. 
Because Agent Wilkinson discerned the lump to be contraband as soon as 
he felt it without further manipulation, he was justified in seizing the 
powder-filled baggie from Johnson’s pocket. This “patdown search did 
not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result.” 
O'Keefe v. State, 139 N.E.3d 263, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). 
Conclusion 
Agent Wilkinson lawfully removed the baggie from Johnson’s pocket 
after immediately identifying it as contraband during the reasonable pat-
down search. Because this seized evidence was properly admitted under 
the Fourth Amendment, we need not entertain any alternative 
explanations that could theoretically foreclose the baggie’s admission. We 
affirm. 
Rush, C.J., and David and Goff, JJ., concur.                                                                
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
A TT O R N E YS  F O R  AP P E L LA N T  
 
Paul J. Podlejski  
Law Office of Paul J. Podlejski 
Anderson, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS  F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
Stephen R. Creason 
Chief Counsel  
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Page 13 of 13 
Courtney L. Staton 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Slaughter, J., dissenting. 
The Court holds that the officer’s frisk of defendant, Michael Johnson, 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. I agree with the Court that this is 
a close case. But I cannot join the Court’s careful analysis and write briefly 
to explain why. 
The issue here is when a law-enforcement officer can search a person’s 
outer clothing for weapons during an investigative stop—commonly 
known as a Terry stop and frisk. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the 
Supreme Court struck a fragile balance between a person’s rights under 
the Fourth Amendment and legitimate law-enforcement needs. Balancing 
these interests, Terry mandates that law enforcement may use a “self-
protective search for weapons”—a frisk—only if an officer can “point to 
particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was 
armed and dangerous.” Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). 
Under this framework, the Court finds that Johnson’s frisk was 
permissible for three reasons. One, the officer received a tip that Johnson 
offered to sell “white girl”—a street term for cocaine—to a casino patron. 
Two, the tip occurred about 7 a.m. Three, the officer was one-on-one with 
Johnson in a small room. Ante, at 7. As the Court recognizes, Johnson’s 
suspected drug activity is the most suggestive that he might be armed and 
dangerous. Id. at 8. But, as the Court also recognizes, this alone is not 
enough. Id. at 7–8; United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 486 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(“The authority to frisk is not automatic in a drug investigation.”). 
Unlike the Court, I do not find that Johnson’s suspected drug activity, 
in combination with the time of the encounter and the fact that the officer 
was alone in a room with Johnson, gives rise to the crucial inference Terry 
requires. These facts do not suggest that Johnson was armed and 
dangerous. As to the timing, nothing in the record connects the early 
morning with any likelihood that Johnson (or any other casino patron) 
was armed. For instance, there is no evidence that 7 a.m. is a unique time 
when casino patrons, or even drug dealers in casinos, are more likely to be 
armed. As to the location, while a weapon may be more dangerous in a 
small, closed-off space, this location does not suggest that Johnson was 
armed in the first place. Yet that is the necessary inference. Because 
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neither the time nor the location gives rise to the inference that Johnson 
was armed, Terry’s critical link is missing, and this protective weapons 
search was unconstitutional.  
Admittedly, this is a fine point on which to disagree. But Terry draws 
an intentionally fine line—one I do not wish to see eroded. After all, a 
frisk is not merely a “petty indignity . . . [but] a serious intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the person,” and one that can “inflict great indignity and 
arouse strong resentment.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. Because law enforcement 
provides a vital service, this intrusion will often be worth the cost. But to 
protect rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, we must respect 
Terry’s limitation. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.