Title: State v. Ponec
Citation: 236 Neb. 710, 463 N.W.2d 793
Docket Number: 541, 563, 612
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 1990

463 N.W.2d 793 (1990) 236 Neb. 710 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Jeff M. PONEC, Appellant. No. 90-541. Supreme Court of Nebraska. November 30, 1990. Thomas M. Kenney, Douglas County Public Defender, Michael Dowd, and Brian S. Munnelly, Omaha, for appellant. Herbert M. Fitle, Omaha City Atty., and Gary P. Bucchino, Omaha City Prosecutor, and J. Michael Tesar, Omaha, for appellee. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. PER CURIAM. Upon pleas of guilty to theft by unlawful taking and destruction of property in violation of ordinances of the city of Omaha, the defendant, Jeff M. Ponec, was sentenced by the county court to concurrent terms of 45 days in the county jail. Upon appeal to the district court the judgment was affirmed. The factual basis for the pleas was contained in the police reports, which show that at 1:15 a.m. on January 17, 1990, the defendant stole a stereo radio from an automobile, damaging the car's dashboard in the process. The defendant has appealed to this court and has assigned as error the county court's failure to advise him of the nature of the charges and its failure to determine whether he understood the charges. Prior to the county court's acceptance of the defendant's pleas, the record shows, the following transpired: THE COURT: I find that the basis for the complaints to be [sic] valid and that the pleas are voluntarily and intelligently tendered. They will be accepted and you will be found guilty. What explanation do you have for doing this? The court then sentenced the defendant to serve two concurrent terms of 45 days in jail and to pay the costs of prosecution. In State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 820, 394 N.W.2d 879, 883 (1986), regarding acceptance of guilty or no contest pleas, we said: a. inform the defendant concerning (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the right to assistance of counsel; (3) the right to confront witnesses against the defendant; (4) the right to a jury trial; and (5) the privilege against self-incrimination; and The State relies upon State v. Clark, 217 Neb. 417, 418, 350 N.W.2d 521, 523 (1984), in which the court informed the defendant that he was charged with robbery, and argues that the nature of the offense was adequately made known to the defendant under the circumstances of the case. In the Clark case, the defendant was represented by counsel, had been charged with only one offense, and had discussed the matter with his attorney. In State v. Walker, 235 Neb. 85, 453 N.W.2d 482 (1990), the defendant, like the defendant in this case, was not represented *795 by an attorney and had been charged with two offenses in violation of Omaha city ordinances. Under those circumstances, this court stated: Id. at 89, 453 N.W.2d at 484. Although the prosecutor's statement of the charges in this case may have been sufficient, the record fails to show that the trial court "examine[d] the defendant to determine" that he understood the nature of the charges. The failure of the county court to inform the defendant concerning the nature of the charges and to examine him to determine that he understood the nature of the charges, as required by State v. Irish, supra, requires that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.