Title: Sinora Glenn v. Michael T. Plante, M.D.
Citation: 2004 WI 24
Docket Number: 2002AP001426
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2004

2004 WI 24 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1426 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Sinora Glenn and Christopher Glenn,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Michael T. Plante, M.D. and Family Health Plan,  
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 96 
Reported at: 264 Wis. 2d 361, 663 N.W.2d 375 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 24, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Maxine A. White   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Michael P. Russart and Hinshaw & Culbertson, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Michael P. Russart. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by John K. 
Brendel and Brendel Law Offices, Brookfield, and oral argument 
by John K. Brendel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, III, Milwaukee, and 
Edward E. Robinson and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.   
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy J. Muldowney, 
Jennifer L. Peterson and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, and 
Mark L. Adams and Melanie Cohen, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Medical Society and American Medical Association. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David E. McFarlane, 
Sheila M. Sullivan and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, on 
behalf of the Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
 
2004 WI 24 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1426  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 1934) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sinora Glenn and Christopher Glenn,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael T. Plante, M.D. and Family Health  
Plan,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 24, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The petitioner in this case, 
Michael T. Plante, M.D., (Plante) seeks review of a published 
court of appeals' decision, Glenn v. Plante, 2003 WI App 96, 264 
Wis. 2d 361, 663 N.W.2d 375, affirming a non-final order of the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court in a medical malpractice action, 
which stated that a treating physician of the plaintiff Sinora 
Glenn (Glenn) would be compelled to provide expert testimony at 
trial.  Due to the plaintiffs' counsel's failure to meet the 
scheduling order deadline for naming expert witnesses, Glenn and 
No. 
02-1426   
 
2 
 
her husband, Christopher Glenn, (Glenns) planned to call only 
one expert witness, Charles Koh, M.D. (Koh).  However, Koh 
refused to provide expert testimony for the plaintiffs.  The 
circuit court ordered Koh to provide expert testimony because it 
concluded that there were compelling circumstances that rendered 
his testimony unique.  A divided court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit 
court 
order, 
concluding 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
reasonably exercised its discretion in ordering Koh to provide 
expert testimony.   
¶2 
We conclude that Koh should not have been ordered to 
give expert opinion testimony in this case, since the record 
does not clearly reflect the question or questions to be asked 
of Koh, nor was Koh given the opportunity formally to invoke a 
privilege not to testify.  In Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 
89, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999), we held that a physician who has 
asserted his or her privilege not to testify can be required to 
give expert testimony only if all of the following factors are 
present:  (1) there are compelling circumstances present; (2) 
the party seeking the testimony has presented a plan for 
reasonable compensation of the expert; and (3) the expert will 
not be required to do additional preparation for the testimony.  
Alt does not apply to observations made by a person's treating 
physician regarding the care and treatment provided to the 
patient, but rather applies to expert testimony from such a 
physician as to the standard of care and treatment provided by 
another physician.  Where there is a correct application of Alt, 
the determination as to whether compelling circumstances exist 
No. 
02-1426   
 
3 
 
involves a discretionary decision by the circuit court judge.  
The compelling circumstances should focus on whether there is 
unique or irreplaceable opinion testimony sought from an expert, 
not on procedural aspects of the case. 
¶3 
The circuit court in this case misapplied the standard 
set forth in Alt, as there was no definite question or questions 
before the court and no clear formal invocation by Koh of a 
claimed privilege not to testify.  Because the circuit court 
misapplied our holding in Alt, it erroneously exercised its 
discretion.  Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, which affirmed the circuit court order, and remand the 
cause to the circuit court for further proceedings in accord 
with this decision. 
I 
 
¶4 
The Glenns allege the following:  In September 1995, 
Glenn experienced abdominal pain that was determined to be a 
right ovarian cyst.  As a result of this diagnosis, she was 
referred by her physician to Plante, a gynecologist in the 
Family Health Plan group.  Plante recommended to Glenn that she 
undergo a laparotomy1 with a right ovarian cystectomy.2  Plante 
performed the recommended surgery, but also performed a right 
                                                 
1 Laparotomy is a surgical incision into the abdominal wall.  
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1013-14 
(3d ed. 1992). 
2 Cystectomy is the surgical removal of a cyst.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 466 (3d ed. 
1992).  
No. 
02-1426   
 
4 
 
oophorectomy3 allegedly without Glenn's knowledge or consent.  
Glenn continued to experience abdominal pain after this surgery.  
Plante then recommended that Glenn undergo a hysterectomy.4  
Glenn wanted to obtain a second opinion before undergoing the 
operation.  Glenn's primary physician provided her with the name 
of another specialist, but Glenn's HMO advised her that she was 
ineligible to make an appointment with this specialist.  Thus, 
although Glenn desired to have more children, she relied on 
Plante's determination and underwent a hysterectomy.  After the 
operation, Glenn continued to experience the abdominal pain and 
also developed symptoms commonly associated with menopause.  In 
addition, she suffered from depression, which she claimed was 
due to her inability to conceive additional children.  In order 
to relieve her persistent pain, Glenn visited Koh, a physician 
outside of the Family Health Plan group.  Koh removed abdominal 
adhesions, and Glenn's pain subsided.  Koh suggested to Glenn 
that the procedures performed by Plante were not necessary, and 
the Glenns thereafter consulted an attorney. 
 
¶5 
The Glenns filed this action in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court against Plante and Family Health Plan.  In the 
complaint, Glenn alleged that Plante failed to exercise the 
degree of care, skill, and judgment that physicians reasonably 
                                                 
3 Oophorectomy is the surgical removal of an ovary.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1266 (3d 
ed. 1992). 
4 Hysterectomy is the surgical removal of the uterus.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 891 (3d ed. 
1992). 
No. 
02-1426   
 
5 
 
and usually exercise under such circumstances.  As a result of 
Plante's alleged negligence, Glenn contended that she was 
damaged both mentally and physically.  Glenn further alleged 
that Family Health Plan was liable for Plante's negligence, and 
was further negligent in failing to provide her with alternate 
physicians, or opportunities for other treatment that might have 
alleviated her pain.  Glenn's husband also alleged that he 
suffered loss of consortium, society, and companionship with his 
wife, as well as losing his ability to have additional children 
with 
his 
wife, due to 
Plante and 
Family 
Health 
Plan's 
negligence.  The case was assigned to Circuit Judge Christopher 
R. Foley, and a scheduling conference was set for June 10, 1999.  
Glenn 
subsequently 
requested 
mediation 
with 
the 
Medical 
Mediation Panels.  Plante and Family Health Plan requested that 
the scheduling conference be reset for a time after the 
mediation period had ended.  Accordingly, Judge Foley reset the 
scheduling conference to July 1, 1999. 
 
¶6 
As a result of judicial rotation, the case was 
reassigned to Circuit Judge William J. Haese.  Plante and Family 
Health 
Plan 
immediately 
filed 
a 
request 
for 
judicial 
substitution, and Circuit Judge Diane S. Sykes (now Justice 
Sykes) was assigned to the case.  Judge Sykes held a scheduling 
conference on June 23, 1999, and required the Glenns and Plante 
and Family Health Plan to name their expert witnesses by 
September 23 and December 23, 1999, respectively.  The case was 
then reassigned to Circuit Judge Dominic S. Amato effective 
November 8, 1999.  On December 27, 1999, Plante and Family 
No. 
02-1426   
 
6 
 
Health Plan filed a motion to dismiss due to the Glenns' failure 
to provide the names of their expert and lay witnesses, as well 
as their failure to provide a statement of itemized special 
damage claims that was also due on September 23, 1999.  In 
response, the Glenns named Koh, Dr. Sul Chung, and Dr. David 
Nash as expert witnesses, and moved the court to amend the 
scheduling order for purposes of extending the time available to 
name expert witnesses.  Judge Amato ordered that the Glenns were 
not permitted to call any expert witnesses other than Chung5 and 
Koh.  Judge Amato further ordered that, by February 24, 2000, 
the Glenns had to provide the court and opposing counsel with, 
among 
other 
information, 
written 
reports 
involving 
the 
physicians' areas of expertise and their opinions regarding this 
case.  The Glenns' counsel never provided written reports 
regarding the expert witnesses, or a statement of itemized 
special damage claims, to the court.   
¶7 
On February 24, 2000, Koh wrote a letter to Judge 
Amato, stating his concern about the treatment Glenn received 
from Plante and another doctor in the Family Health Plan group.  
Although he felt that "the hysterectomy and the removal of the 
left ovary (were) unwarranted," Koh stated that he did not wish 
to be a witness in this case.  Koh stated that he was writing 
the letter at the request of the Glenns' counsel, who had 
                                                 
5 Counsel for the Glenns ultimately decided not to call Dr. 
Sul Chung, who was a psychiatrist treating Sinora Glenn's 
depression, since the Glenns' counsel expressed concern that 
this testimony might cloud the medical malpractice issue. 
No. 
02-1426   
 
7 
 
informed him that such a letter was necessary in order for the 
Glenns 
to 
file 
suit. 
 
Nevertheless, 
Koh 
conveyed 
his 
dissatisfaction with having to write the letter and noted that 
few doctors would want to be part of a malpractice action 
against a fellow local physician.  In a letter to the Glenns' 
counsel dated November 6, 2000, Koh again noted his displeasure 
with counsel's attempt to secure his expert testimony and stated 
the following:  "I clearly stated at the time of the meeting 
that I would not be (an) expert witness as I was (Glenn's) 
treating physician."   
¶8 
Judge Amato recused himself on December 20, 2000, and 
the case was assigned to Circuit Judge David A. Hansher for 
further proceedings.  The case was ultimately reassigned to 
Circuit Judge Maxine A. White on January 2, 2001.  The case was 
adjourned on January 29, 2001, due to Family Health Plan's 
involvement in bankruptcy proceedings.  In May 2001, the parties 
stipulated that Family Health Plan would be dismissed from the 
case, and all claims against it were waived.  The Glenns 
continued their suit against Plante alone. 
¶9 
Trial was ultimately set for February 4, 2002.  
However, on January 25, 2002, the Glenns' counsel requested an 
adjournment, stating that he had recently learned that Koh would 
be out of the country during the time counsel had planned to 
examine Koh.  The circuit court adjourned the scheduled trial 
date and directed the parties to file appropriate motions.  The 
Glenns' counsel then made a motion requesting additional time to 
name expert witnesses.  Plante opposed providing the Glenns with 
No. 
02-1426   
 
8 
 
additional time to secure other expert witnesses and filed a 
motion to dismiss the case.   
¶10 Judge White denied the Glenns' request for more time 
to name expert witnesses and denied Plante's motion to dismiss 
the Glenns' complaint.6  Judge White concluded that based on 
Koh's existing report and opinion, he would be compelled to 
provide expert testimony.  The circuit court noted that Alt 
provided that, if parties can demonstrate a compelling need, an 
expert can be forced to testify.  In order for a need to be 
compelling, 
the 
circuit 
court 
stated 
that 
the 
following 
requirements must be met under Alt:  (1) a compelling need 
exists for the expert's opinion/testimony; (2) there is a plan 
for reasonable compensation for the expert; and (3) the expert's 
testimony can only be compelled with respect to existing 
opinions.   
¶11 After a lengthy discussion of the circumstances and 
principles involved in Alt, the circuit court ultimately 
concluded that Koh's testimony fell under the compelling need 
exception, and that all three prongs of the Alt standard were 
satisfied.  With respect to the compelling need prong, the 
circuit court concluded that Koh's testimony concerning the 
treatment he provided to Glenn would be unique, as he was her 
treating physician.  The circuit court further noted that it 
                                                 
6 A circuit judge clearly has discretionary authority to 
allow the amendment of a scheduling order and to permit the 
naming 
of 
additional 
expert 
witnesses 
in 
accord 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 802.10 (2001-02).  The circuit judge in this case 
retains such authority upon remand. 
No. 
02-1426   
 
9 
 
presumed that a reasonable plan for Koh's compensation could be 
shown, and Koh would provide testimony only as to his pre-
existing opinions of Glenn's condition.  Plante then petitioned 
the court of appeals for leave to appeal the non-final order 
issued by the circuit court, which would require Koh to give 
expert medical testimony in this case. 
¶12 A divided court of appeals, Judges Charles B. Schudson 
and Ted E. Wedemeyer, Jr., affirmed the decision of the circuit 
court.  Judge Schudson, writing for the majority, concluded that 
"'under 
the 
circumstances 
presented,'" 
the 
circuit 
court 
reasonably exercised its discretion when it concluded that 
compelling 
circumstances 
required that 
Koh 
provide 
expert 
testimony.  The majority noted that the circuit court carefully 
analyzed the relevant facts and applicable statutes and case law 
in reaching its decision.  The majority further noted that, 
although the complicated procedural history of the case did not 
excuse the Glenns' counsel's failure to provide the witness 
list, his failure to do so could not be deemed intentional or 
egregious.  Given that dismissal would be a particularly harsh 
sanction, 
the 
majority 
concluded 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
reasonably exercised its discretion in deciding to order Koh to 
provide expert opinion testimony. 
¶13 In her dissent, Judge Patricia S. Curley noted that 
the testimony sought from Koh was similar to the testimony 
sought from Dr. Acosta in Alt.  Given the similarities, Judge 
Curley concluded that simply because Koh was Glenn's treating 
physician did not automatically render his testimony unique.  
No. 
02-1426   
 
10 
 
The dissent criticized the majority for failing to specify what 
compelling 
circumstances 
were 
present 
that 
would 
justify 
requiring Koh to testify and offer expert opinion testimony.  
The dissent surmised that the compelling circumstances in this 
case were the Glenns' counsel's failure to meet the scheduling 
order deadline for submitting the names of witnesses and the 
circuit court's refusal to extend the time to name more 
witnesses.  Judge Curley noted that counsel's negligence in this 
case had the effect of depriving Koh of his privilege to refuse 
to testify.  Further, the dissent noted that the majority 
appeared to apply an outcome determinative test; that is, 
because they perceived the dismissal of the case to be a 
compelling circumstance, the majority concluded that the circuit 
court was justified in requiring Koh to give expert opinion 
testimony. 
II 
 
¶14 We now consider whether the circumstances were such 
that Koh should have been required to give expert opinion 
testimony in this case.  Whether a witness has a legal privilege 
to refuse to provide expert opinion testimony is a question of 
law, which we review de novo.  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 84.  See also 
Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis. 2d 326, 330, 572 N.W.2d 450 (1998). 
 
¶15 Plante contends that expert witnesses have a broad 
privilege to refrain from providing expert testimony in a given 
case and, as stated in Alt, only a showing of compelling 
circumstances can require an unwilling expert to testify.  
Plante notes that, simply because Koh was Glenn's treating 
No. 
02-1426   
 
11 
 
physician, it does not mean that he is uniquely qualified to 
render expert testimony in this case.  In fact, Plante argues, 
Koh would not provide any unique testimony regarding Glenn's 
condition.  Moreover, Plante maintains that, while lack of 
availability of other expert witnesses may be a factor that a 
court could consider, this is true only with respect to the 
number of experts in a given field.  Here, Plante contends that 
the lack of availability of expert witnesses is due to Glenn's 
counsel's own failures, not because of a shortage of the number 
of expert witnesses in the field of gynecology.   
¶16 Plante asserts that the circuit court improperly 
concluded that there were compelling circumstances in this case 
that 
would 
provide 
a 
justification 
for 
compelling 
Koh's 
testimony.  Opposing counsel's negligence in this case, Plante 
contends, is not a compelling circumstance that would require 
Koh to provide such testimony.  Plante further states that the 
circuit court erred when it reasoned that dismissal would be a 
drastic sanction, as it was the Glenns' counsel's own error 
which could have precipitated this result.  Plante asserts that, 
while dismissal is a harsh result, it is warranted in this case 
due to counsel's inexcusable failure to name additional expert 
witnesses when it became apparent that Koh would not provide 
expert opinion testimony.   
¶17 In contrast, the Glenns contend that there is a 
compelling need for Koh to provide expert testimony because his 
personal observations of Sinora Glenn's condition render his 
testimony unique.  The Glenns state that Koh will be fully 
No. 
02-1426   
 
12 
 
compensated for his expert testimony, and the circuit court has 
already limited Koh's testimony to his pre-existing opinion.  
Thus, the Glenns maintain that the circuit court correctly 
applied the factors in Alt to this case.  The Glenns note that 
Koh has never formally asserted a privilege not to testify.  
Nevertheless, if this court concludes that Koh will not testify, 
the Glenns contend that this court must also conclude that Koh 
waived his privilege not to provide expert testimony, as Koh 
urged Sinora Glenn to bring this action, referred her to another 
specialist, and told her that he would testify on her behalf. 
¶18 The Glenns further note that counsel's failure to meet 
the deadline for submitting the witness list was not egregious.  
Instead, the Glenns contend that it was due to counsel's belief 
that a newly assigned judge would set his or her own deadline 
for the naming of witnesses.  Given the convoluted procedural 
history 
of 
this 
case, 
the 
Glenns 
assert 
that 
it 
is 
understandable, but nevertheless regrettable, that counsel could 
miss such a deadline.  Moreover, the Glenns caution that if 
doctors are permitted to avoid testifying whenever they choose 
to, this will result in a very small group of physician experts 
who could charge an inflated price for their services or, 
conversely, an influx of less qualified doctors that are 
prepared to testify for a requisite fee.   
¶19 We conclude that Koh cannot be compelled to give 
expert testimony in this case, since the record does not include 
the questions proposed to be asked of Koh, nor was Koh given the 
opportunity formally to invoke a privilege not to testify. 
No. 
02-1426   
 
13 
 
¶20 In general, the public has a right to every person's 
evidence at trial.  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 85; State v. Gilbert, 
109 Wis. 2d 501, 505, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982).  At its core, the 
adversary 
system 
is 
based 
upon 
the 
proposition 
that 
an 
examination 
of 
all 
of 
the 
persons 
possessing 
relevant 
information, which will lead to the discovery of all of the 
relevant facts, will produce a just result.  Gilbert, 109 
Wis. 2d at 505.  See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
709-10 (1974).  Nevertheless, this fundamental legal principle 
is 
tempered 
by 
constitutional, 
common 
law, 
or 
statutory 
privileges.  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709-10; Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d at 
505.  Because the adversary system places a premium on the 
discovery of relevant information, courts are cautious not to 
overly interfere with this goal.  The United States Supreme 
Court has noted that "these exceptions to the demand for every 
man's 
evidence 
are 
not 
lightly 
created 
nor 
expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."  
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.  Moreover, this court has commented that 
"(p)rivileges are the exception, not the rule."  Alt, 224 
Wis. 2d at 85. 
¶21 In Wisconsin, a person may not refuse to be a witness, 
"(e)xcept as provided by or inherent or implicit in statute or 
in rules adopted by the supreme court or required by the 
constitution 
of 
the 
United 
States 
or 
Wisconsin. . . . " 
Wis. Stat. § 905.01 (2001-02).7  See also Alt 224 Wis. 2d at 85.  
                                                 
7 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.  
No. 
02-1426   
 
14 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 907.06 implicitly provides expert witnesses 
with such a privilege.  In relevant part, § 907.06 states:  "The 
judge may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the 
parties, and may appoint witnesses of the judge's own selection.  
An expert witness shall not be appointed by the judge unless the 
expert witness consents to act."  We have concluded that, 
implicit in this statutory language, an expert witness has the 
privilege to refuse to testify if he or she is called by a 
litigant.  Alt, 224 Wis. 2d at 86.   
¶22 Since expert witnesses may assert a privilege not to 
testify, we must now determine whether the proposed expert in 
this case, Koh, could properly assert a privilege not to testify 
or whether he will be compelled to provide expert opinion 
testimony as to the standard of care and treatment provided by 
another physician.  Both the Glenns and Plante cite Alt as 
supporting their theories of the case, and the circuit court and 
the court of appeals have referenced Alt extensively in reaching 
conclusions.  Under such circumstances, we find it necessary to 
go into some detail regarding the background and principles 
underlying the Alt decision. 
¶23 The Alt case arose out of the alleged negligence of a 
physician during the delivery of a child by cesarean section.  
Dawn Alt went into labor, and Richard S. Cline, M.D. (Cline) 
performed a cesarean section to deliver her child, Cody Alt.  
Id. at 80.  At birth, Cody Alt had varying severe temporary and 
permanent injuries.  Id.  Dawn Alt, Mark Alt, and Cody Alt, by 
his guardian ad litem, (Alts) brought suit against numerous 
No. 
02-1426   
 
15 
 
parties, 
including 
Cline, 
alleging 
that 
the 
medical 
professionals were negligent when delivering Cody.  Id.  During 
the discovery phase of the proceedings, the Alts named numerous 
physician expert witnesses, including Ernesto L. Acosta, M.D. 
(Acosta).  Id.  Although Acosta was not present at Dawn's 
delivery, he did provide prenatal care to Dawn and wrote her 
discharge summary after her delivery of Cody.  Id.  The Alts did 
not name Acosta as a defendant.  Id. 
¶24 During 
Acosta's 
second 
deposition, 
his 
attorney 
directed him not to answer questions which would require him to 
render an expert opinion, as opposed to simply relaying his 
observations of Dawn's condition.  Id.  at 81.  The relevant 
deposition question posed to Acosta, relating to Cline's 
treatment, was as follows:  "No matter what the cause, a patient 
with a history of term pregnancy and a gush of blood[,] that's 
abnormal?"  Id.  The circuit court determined that the question 
should have been answered and imposed sanctions on Acosta's 
attorney for directing him not to answer.  Id. at 81-82.  The 
court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 82. 
¶25 After concluding that the relevant question required 
Acosta to render an expert opinion, this court then addressed 
the issue of whether Acosta had a legal privilege to refuse to 
answer such a question.8  We concluded that Wis. Stat. § 907.06 
                                                 
8 We also addressed the issue of whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in imposing sanctions on 
Acosta's attorney for directing him not to answer the question.  
Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 92, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999).  
Because that issue is irrelevant to the case at hand, we do not 
discuss it further here. 
No. 
02-1426   
 
16 
 
conferred a privilege on witnesses to refuse to provide such 
expert opinion testimony.  Id. at 86.  Noting that such a 
privilege existed, we were then faced with the task of 
determining the extent of such privilege.  We recognized that 
different jurisdictions have varying approaches as to how broad 
the privilege should be.  Id. at 87.  In analyzing whether an 
absolute privilege, a narrow qualified privilege, or a broad 
qualified privilege best served the principles underlying the 
adversary system, we stated the following: 
The 
appropriate 
scope 
of 
expert 
privilege 
requires a balance between the right of expert 
witnesses to be free from testifying against their 
will and the needs of the court and litigants for 
testimony.  A person who has expended resources to 
attain specialized knowledge should not be forced to 
part 
with 
that 
knowledge 
upon 
demand, 
absent 
compelling circumstances.   
Id. at 88. 
¶26 Although 
we 
recognized 
that 
a 
person 
who 
has 
specialized knowledge in a certain area should not be forced to 
testify, we noted that, in certain circumstances, an expert 
witness's testimony could be uniquely necessary.  Id.  In Alt, 
we concluded that the approach adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court 
in Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236 (Iowa 1983), struck the 
appropriate balance between the need for testimony to assist the 
trier of fact and the privilege an expert possesses to refuse to 
testify.  Id. at 89.  Thus, we held that "absent a showing of 
compelling circumstances, an expert cannot be required to give 
expert testimony whether the inquiry asks for the expert's 
No. 
02-1426   
 
17 
 
existing opinions or would require further work."  Id.  We 
outlined two other requirements in addition to the mandate that 
there be compelling circumstances present.  We stated that the 
party seeking the expert's testimony was required to present a 
plan of reasonable compensation for the expert's services.  Id.  
Moreover, we concluded that an expert could be required to 
testify only as to his or her existing opinion and could never 
be required to do additional preparation.  Id.   
¶27 In applying these requirements to the facts presented 
in Alt, we concluded that, while Acosta had to testify regarding 
his observations made during the prenatal care he provided to 
Dawn Alt, Acosta was not so unique as to be required to answer a 
deposition question that required his expert opinion about 
another physician's treatment.  Id. at 90.  Thus, a physician 
who invokes the privilege could still be required to testify 
regarding his or her observations as the patient's treating 
physician regarding the care and treatment provided to the 
patient, but not on the standard of care and treatment provided 
by another physician.  Moreover, when there are other persons 
within a specialized field capable of rendering an expert 
opinion, we noted that the opinion of one such expert is not 
No. 
02-1426   
 
18 
 
irreplaceable.9  Id. at 89.  Because expert testimony is often 
times not unique, litigants will not usually be harmed if they 
cannot have their preferred choice for an expert.10  Id.   
¶28 Using the principles set forth in Alt, we conclude 
that Koh should not have been required to provide expert opinion 
testimony, given the lack of an appropriate record in this case.  
Simply because Koh was Glenn's treating physician, it does not 
necessarily follow that his expert opinion is unique or 
irreplaceable and must be required.  Nevertheless, we conclude 
that a treating physician may still be required to testify 
regarding his or her observations relating to the care or 
treatment provided to his or her patient, as such compulsion is 
considerably different than forcing a physician to testify as to 
the 
standard 
of 
care 
and 
treatment 
provided 
by 
another 
physician. 
¶29 We acknowledge that this case took a long and 
circuitous path through the circuit courts, and the frequent 
                                                 
9 In contrast, the witnesses in Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 
F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976), were compelled to give expert testimony 
in the government's antitrust suit against IBM because the 
witnesses possessed expert knowledge on the computer industry.  
Their testimony was unavailable from any other source and, thus, 
vital to the trial.  The Kaufman case is significantly different 
from the present circumstances, as Koh is not the only expert in 
the field of gynecology capable of providing expert testimony 
for the Glenns.  
10 See 
also 
Janet 
Fairchild, 
Annotation, 
Right 
of 
Independent Expert to Refuse to Testify as to Expert Opinion, 50 
A.L.R.4th 680 (2004) ("[A] litigant will not usually be deprived 
of critical evidence if he cannot have the expert of his 
choice."). 
No. 
02-1426   
 
19 
 
scheduling and rescheduling of proceedings certainly complicated 
matters to some extent.  We further recognize that, if Koh does 
not testify and the circuit court declines to permit the naming 
of additional expert witnesses, the Glenns' case may ultimately 
be dismissed.  Nevertheless, we decline to afford these 
considerations 
any 
substantial 
weight 
in 
reaching 
our 
conclusion.  Although Koh was the only witness, based on the 
circuit court's orders, that the Glenns could call, and Koh's 
apparent refusal to testify and offer his expert opinions might 
result in a dismissal, his testimony was not automatically 
rendered unique.  We agree with Plante's assessment that the 
compelling circumstances determination must focus on whether 
there is unique or irreplaceable opinion testimony sought from 
an expert, not on procedural aspects of the case.   
¶30 We decline to adopt an outcome determinative approach 
where testimony would become compelling if the absence of such 
testimony would adversely affect a litigant.  Instead, we re-
emphasize Alt's requirement that there must be a link between a 
finding of compelling circumstances and the uniquely necessary 
or irreplaceable opinion testimony that the expert could 
provide.  Here, Koh's testimony regarding liability and standard 
of care does not appear to be uniquely necessary, as other 
experts in the field of gynecology likely could testify as to 
their opinions on such issues.  Thus, the Glenns would not 
normally be harmed if they were denied their choice of an expert 
as, barring counsel's failure to meet the appropriate deadline, 
No. 
02-1426   
 
20 
 
the Glenns would have been able to draw upon the opinion 
testimony of another expert.  
¶31 Even if Koh is not required to give expert opinion 
testimony in this case, he may be compelled to testify as to his 
observations as Glenn's treating physician.  Such compulsion is 
considerably different than forcing a physician to testify as to 
the 
standard 
of 
care 
and 
treatment 
provided 
by 
another 
physician.  As noted by Koh in his letter, forcing a physician 
to serve as the lead expert witness in a medical malpractice 
action against a fellow local physician would be, at the very 
least, uncomfortable for such expert.  Thus, the standard set 
forth in Alt assures experts that their opinions will not be 
required 
barring 
circumstances 
that 
make 
their 
testimony 
uniquely necessary.  Nevertheless, we emphasize that a physician 
can be required to testify as to his or her own observations 
regarding his or her care and treatment provided to the patient 
while serving as the patient's treating physician.  
¶32 We further conclude that where there is a correct 
application of Alt, such that there is an exact question or 
questions regarding expert opinion, and a clear invocation of 
the privilege by the expert witness, the determination as to 
whether 
compelling 
circumstances 
exist, 
or 
unique 
or 
irreplaceable testimony is sought, is left to the discretion of 
the circuit court.  Here, the circuit court, given the lack of a 
sufficient record, misapplied Alt in deciding that Koh's expert 
testimony should be compelled.  The record does not include any 
direct question or questions that required Koh to render his 
No. 
02-1426   
 
21 
 
expert opinion.  Moreover, Koh never clearly asserted a claimed 
privilege not to answer questions that required his opinion.  
Certainly, it can be inferred from Koh's conduct that he did not 
wish to testify.  Koh's letter to the circuit court stating that 
he urged the Glenns' counsel to find an out-of-state expert, 
Koh's letter to the Glenns' counsel stating that he did not want 
to testify, and Koh's departure from the country during the time 
counsel had scheduled him to testify all suggest that he was 
reluctant to testify.  However, it is clear that there was never 
a formal assertion of privilege in this case.  It is necessary 
to have an exact question or questions requiring expert opinion 
testimony, and a clear assertion of a privilege not to provide 
such expert opinion testimony, before the circuit court can 
decide whether compelling circumstances exist.  Because the 
circuit court did not have the question or questions at issue 
and lacked a clear assertion of a privilege, we conclude that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in this 
case. 
¶33 At this time, we note that no trial has taken place, 
apparently no physicians, including Koh, have been deposed, and 
there is a need for the circuit court to hold another scheduling 
conference and issue a new scheduling order.  Moreover, the 
record is unclear what questions Koh will be asked or whether he 
will clearly and formally invoke his privilege not to testify.  
Given these circumstances, it is certainly necessary to remand 
this case to the circuit court. 
III 
No. 
02-1426   
 
22 
 
¶34 In sum, we conclude that Koh should not have been 
ordered to give expert opinion testimony in this case, since the 
record does not clearly reflect the question or questions to be 
asked of Koh, nor was Koh given the opportunity formally to 
invoke a privilege not to testify.  According to Alt, a person 
who has asserted his or her privilege not to testify and offer 
expert opinion testimony can be required to give such expert 
testimony only if all of the following factors are present:  (1) 
there are compelling circumstances present; (2) the party 
seeking the testimony has presented a plan for reasonable 
compensation of the expert; and (3) the expert will not be 
required to do additional preparation for the testimony.  Alt 
does not apply to observations made by a person's treating 
physician relating to the care or treatment that he or she 
provided to the patient, but rather applies to expert opinion 
testimony from such a physician as to the standard of care and 
treatment provided by another physician.  Where there is a 
correct application of Alt, the determination as to whether 
compelling circumstances exist involves a discretionary decision 
by the circuit court judge. 
¶35 The 
compelling 
circumstances 
determination 
should 
focus on whether there is unique or irreplaceable opinion 
testimony sought from an expert, not on the procedural aspects 
of the case.  Because the circuit court misapplied our holding 
in Alt, it erroneously exercised its discretion.  Thus, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the 
No. 
02-1426   
 
23 
 
circuit court's order, and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for further proceedings in accord with this decision. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶36 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
02-1426   
 
 
 
1