Title: Lane v. Chiles
Citation: 698 So. 2d 260
Docket Number: 88609
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 1997

698 So. 2d 260 (1997)
Cecil LANE, et al., Appellants,
v.
Lawton M. CHILES, etc., et al., Appellees.
No. 88609.

Supreme Court of Florida.
August 21, 1997.
*262 Frank J. Santry and Victoria E. Heuler of Granger, Santry, Mitchell &amp; Heath, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Jonathan A. Glogau, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee; M.B. Adelson IV and Andrew J. Baumann, Assistant General Counsels, Tallahassee, on behalf of Florida Department of Environmental Protection; Richard Blaylock and David Guest of Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Tallahassee, on behalf of Florida Wildlife Federation; Terry L. McCollough of Terry L. McCollough, P.A., Orlando, on behalf of Florida Conservation Association, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a final summary judgment of the Circuit Court in Leon County, upholding the constitutionality of article X, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, limiting marine net fishing. The First District Court of Appeal certified the trial court order to be of great public importance, requiring immediate resolution by this Court. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(5), Fla. Const. We affirm.
In November 1994, article X, section 16, known as the "net ban" amendment, was adopted through an initiative petition. Eight months after the amendment was passed, but immediately prior to its effective date, Cecil Lane and four other individuals engaged in the business of commercial net fishing brought an action in circuit court challenging its validity on both procedural and substantive grounds. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court applied the rational basis test in analyzing Lane's claims, finding there were no fundamental rights or suspect classes involved. The trial court found that the amendment does not violate Lane's rights under the due process, equal protection, or impairment of contract clauses of the Florida or Federal Constitutions; that there is no legal restraint on the subject matter of a constitutional amendment in Florida except for the single-subject rule; that the time had passed for Lane to challenge the sufficiency of the ballot summary; and that the ballot summary meets the requirements of Florida law.
Lane argues that the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny standard to review the amendment's validity. We disagree. As the trial court explained in its order,
We agree with the trial court's reasoning. In most cases the rational basis standard is used to test the constitutional validity of a state statute.[1] It follows logically that the same test would be used to determine the validity of a constitutional amendment adopted through the initiative process. In exceptional cases, where actions by the state abridge some fundamental right or adversely affect a suspect class, the strict scrutiny standard should be applied. Lite, 617 So. 2d  at 1060 n. 2. Because fishing is not a fundamental right,[2] and commercial fishermen do not constitute a suspect class,[3] the rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny standard applies in the instant case. Thus, article X, section 16, must be upheld if it bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible governmental objective, and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. See 617 So. 2d  at 1059-60.
Lane also claims that the amendment constitutes special interest legislation and is improper subject matter for inclusion in the Florida Constitution. We disagree. This Court has stated that
Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla.1976)(emphasis added). There is no limitation on matters which can be the subject of a constitutional amendment in Florida; thus, Lane's claim is without merit.
Lane next argues that the amendment is unconstitutional because it deprives him of his right to due process of law. He claims that he and other fishermen have been deprived of a fundamental liberty interest[4] and property interest[5] and that his personal property has been taken without just compensation.[6] We find no merit to these claims. To comply with the constitutional guarantee of due process under the rational basis standard, the amendment must bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible governmental objective. See Lite, 617 So. 2d  at 1059. We hold that the net ban amendment seeks to protect the state's natural resources which is a valid state objective, and the amendment's limitation on the types and sizes of nets that can be used to fish in Florida waters is rationally related to that goal and does not constitute a taking.
*264 As to Lane's assertion that he has been deprived of his right to due process in a liberty or property interest, we disagree and approve of the trial court's analysis and conclusion:
We also reject Lane's contention that the amendment is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Lane argues that the amendment unequally burdens him and the other fishermen by making an irrational distinction between commercial fishermen and sport fishermen. We again agree with the trial court's analysis and conclusion:
Finally, Lane challenges article X, section 16, on the grounds that the ballot summary did not properly inform the citizens of the effect of the amendment. Lane argues that the ballot summary was insufficient because it failed to fairly advise voters that regulations governing fishing nets already existed; that the limitations on non-entangling nets would prohibit the use of purse seines; that Florida's commercial mullet fishery would be eliminated; that fishermen on the east coast of Florida would receive more favorable treatment than fishermen on the west coast; that commercial fishing property would be taken to serve a public purpose and would require public compensation; and that the amendment would negatively impact only licensed commercial fishermen and would actually benefit sport and recreational fishermen.
*265 We find this claim to be untimely and without merit. In addition to the fact that this Court specifically approved the ballot summary,[7] the general rule is that a challenge to the form of a proposed amendment must be made before the amendment is adopted. Sylvester v. Tindall, 154 Fla. 663, 18 So. 2d 892 (1944). Lane filed this challenge on June 20, 1995, eight months after the amendment was adopted by a vote of the people and less than two weeks before the amendment was to be effective on July 1, 1995.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that article X, section 16, is constitutional.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in result only.
[1]  Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla. 1993).
[2]  LaBauve v. Louisiana Wildlife &amp; Fisheries Comm'n, 444 F. Supp. 1370, 1382 (E.D.La.1978)(holding that the property interest in confiscated fishing nets and the property and liberty interests in the pursuit of a livelihood are not fundamental interests requiring strict scrutiny); Sisk v. Texas Parks &amp; Wildlife Dep't, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981)(holding that fishing is not a fundamental right).
[3]  Sisk, 644 F.2d  at 1058 n. 5 (holding that the class of commercial fishermen is not a suspect class which would subject the state's disparate treatment of them to strict scrutiny). "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect," Graham v. Ramani, 383 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 1980), because they are groups that "have been the traditional targets of irrational, unfair and unlawful discrimination." Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla.1987).
[4]  right to engage in a lawful occupation
[5]  right to possess and enjoy private property, i.e., fishing nets
[6]  fishing nets
[7]  Advisory Opinion to the Attorney GeneralLimited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla.1993).