Title: State v. Marshall
Citation: 270 P.2d 702, 58 N.M. 286
Docket Number: 5771
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 1954

270 P.2d 702 (1954) 58 N.M. 286 STATE ex rel. HOCKENHULL et al. v. MARSHALL. No. 5771. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 11, 1954. *703 Irwin S. Moise and Lewis R. Sutin, Albuquerque, for relators. Joseph M. Montoya and Edwin L. Felter, Santa Fe, for respondent. COMPTON, Justice. Relators challenge respondent's jurisdiction to act in a proceeding now pending in the district court of Santa Fe County wherein James L. Brandenburg sued relators for the custody of his minor daughter, Kathryn Rae Brandenburg. Kathryn Rae Brandenburg is the infant daughter of James L. Brandenburg and Jo Ann Brandenburg. On March 6, 1952, they were divorced in Bernalillo County and the custody of Kathryn Rae was awarded to the mother, Jo Ann Brandenburg, with the usual right of visitation by the father. Subsequently, on August 17, 1953, the mother died; but the fact of her death being uncertain at the time, relators, the great grandparents of Kathryn Rae, went to Bernalillo County, the place of domicile of Kathryn Rae, and took her to their home in Clovis, Curry County. Thereafter, on September 8, 1953, when the death of the mother was established, without notice to the father, they applied to the Probate Court of Curry County and were appointed guardians of her estate and person. The father, James L. Brandenburg, resides in Santa Fe County. On October 27, 1953, while the minor was physically in relators' custody in Curry County, he petitioned the Probate Court of Santa Fe County and was appointed guardian of her estate and person. He then filed an action in the District Court of Santa Fe County against relators for her custody. A motion challenging the jurisdiction of the District Court of Santa Fe County, filed by relators, was denied by respondent, after which they instituted this proceeding. The questions presented are (a) whether the Probate Court has jurisdiction to determine custody status, (b) whether the Curry County proceedings being ex parte are void for want of due process, and (c) whether upon the death of the mother, custody reverted automatically to the father. We readily conclude that Probate Courts are vested with jurisdiction. Hagerman v. Meeks, 13 N.M. 565, 86 P. 801. The statute which confers exclusive jurisdiction in guardianship matters upon Probate Courts is § 16-410, N.M. Sts. Anno. 1941 Comp. The section reads: Nor do we believe the due process clause has been violated. Whether notice to parents is essential to the validity of appointment of guardians has not been determined in this jurisdiction. Other courts with similar statutes hold that notice is not essential unless required by statute. Our statutes relating to the appointment of guardians are sections 35-105 to 109, inclusive, and these make no such requirement. In Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 190 P. 1020, the court, while dealing with the question of notice to a putative father, cited with approval the Massachusetts case of In re Gibson, 154 Mass. 378, 28 N.E. 296, 297, wherein that court held: In re Lundberg, 143 Cal. 402, 77 P. 156, 159, under consideration was a statute which required notice be given only to persons having the care of minors and to relatives of the county, as the court at its discretion might direct, and the court said: Likewise, In re Thomsen, 1 Neb.Unoff. 751, 95 N.W. 805, 806, it was held: And the California Court In re Morhoff's Estate, 179 Cal. 595, 178 P. 294, 295, held: See also Ware v. Farmers National Bank of Dansville, 37 N.M. 415, 24 P.2d 269; Jones v. Prairie Oil &amp; Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195, 47 S. Ct. 338, 71 L. Ed. 602. Our own courts hold that the controlling consideration in child custody cases is the child's welfare. Jurisdiction in such cases does not depend upon legal domicile. Where the child is actually residing and physically present within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such courts have jurisdiction by virtue of the doctrine of parens patriae, though the child may have its domicile elsewhere; its welfare transcends all other considerations. Bassett v. Bassett, 56 N.M. 739, 250 P.2d 487; State ex rel. Day v. Parker, 55 N.M. 227, 230 P.2d 252; Cook v. Brownlee, 54 N.M. 227, 220 P.2d 378; Evens v. Keller, 35 N.M. 659, 6 P.2d 200; Payton v. Payton, 29 N.M. 618, 225 P. 576; Lowery v. Fayette County Children's Bureau, 306 Ky. 817, 209 S.W.2d 487. In Bassett v. Bassett, supra [56 N.M. 739, 250 P.2d 491], we said: It is our opinion that custody of the infant did not automatically revert to James L. Brandenburg by survival. Her status had theretofore been fixed by decree of the District Court of Bernalillo County and the death of the mother rendered that judgment functus officio and no one was entitled to her custody as a matter of right. The father's claim, however, is a matter to be determined by the court having jurisdiction upon proper application. In Bryan v. Lyon, 104 Ind. 227, 3 N.E. 880, 884, the mother died and the father was contending for their children by survival, and the court denied his plea, saying: In re Elmer's Guardianship, 125 N.J. Eq. 148, 4 A.2d 387, the father made a similar contention, and the court in rejecting his plea, said: It is our conclusion that the Probate Court of Curry County having first acquired jurisdiction of the guardianship *706 proceeding when Kathryn Rae was found actually residing in Curry County, retains it to the end free from collateral attacks. Malcomb v. Smith, 54 N.M. 203, 218 P.2d 1031. But the father is entitled to a full hearing in that forum as a matter of right. The writ should be made permanent, and it is so ordered. McGHEE, C.J., and SADLER, LUJAN, and SEYMOUR, JJ., concur.