Title: City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 950916
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 1996

Present: All the Justices 
 
CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v.  Record No. 950916                 March 1, 1996 
 
EDWARD L. FLIPPEN 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
John E. Clarkson, Judge 
 
 
In this tort action against a municipality, we consider 
whether, absent gross negligence, the municipality is immune from 
liability for personal injuries suffered by a permissive user on 
privately owned recreational property for which the municipality 
had limited responsibility. 
 
Appellee Edward L. Flippen (Flippen) owned a vacation beach 
home in the Sandbridge area of the City of Virginia Beach (the 
City).  Although the oceanfront and beach in the Sandbridge area 
are privately owned, the property owners have permitted the public 
to use the beach for recreational purposes for many years.  When 
the City approved the subdivision plat, the developers reserved 
pedestrian access strips to the beach.  These access strips have 
never been conveyed to the City by fee transfer or easement.  But 
since the time of the subdivision's creation and consistent with 
the reservation in the plat, the City has maintained these access 
strips to the beach for pedestrian ingress and egress. 
 
Concern for beach erosion during the 1970s and 1980s prompted 
the Sandbridge property owners to seek permission to build a 
series of bulkheads along Sandbridge beach.  The City approved the 
construction of the bulkheads with the understanding that the 
property owners would construct stairways over the bulkheads which 
the City would thereafter maintain to preserve public access to 
the beach.  In addition to maintaining the access strips and 
stairways, the City provides and maintains refuse receptacles, 
information signs, and sand fences at the access points to the 
stairways. 
 
The 
City 
also 
provides 
and 
maintains 
refuse 
receptacles on the beach itself during the warmer months. 
 
On December 11-13, 1992, the City was struck by a severe 
Northeastern storm.  Extensive damage occurred to several of the 
stairways over the Sandbridge bulkheads.  City workers surveyed 
this damage on December 14 and 15 and blocked the entrances to 
noticeably damaged stairways with lumber and warning tape. 
 
On the evening of December 31, 1992, Flippen was walking his 
dog along Sandfiddler Road adjacent to the bulkheads.  Flippen 
mounted a stairway which was not blocked by lumber or tape, 
crossed the bulkhead and descended the stairway toward the beach. 
 Storm damage to this stairway had resulted in a single tread 
missing from the first flight of stairs on the beach side of the 
bulkhead.  Flippen fell through the gap in the stairs to the beach 
below and suffered personal injuries. 
 
By motion for judgment filed March 30, 1993 in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk,
* Flippen sought $1,000,000 
compensatory 
damages, 
alleging 
that 
the 
City 
negligently 
maintained the stairway.  The City defended on the ground that its 
                     
     
*Prior to trial, the City objected to the propriety of 
Norfolk as a venue for this action.  The City assigned error to 
the trial court's ruling approving the venue.  Because our 
resolution of the appeal moots the question, we express no 
opinion on this issue. 
negligence, if any, did not amount to gross negligence, and it was 
thus immune under one or more statutory provisions or under a 
common law theory of sovereign immunity.  The trial court rejected 
these legal theories and permitted the case to be submitted to the 
jury which, by special verdict, found that the City was guilty of 
simple negligence and awarded Flippen damages in the amount of 
$246,280.90.  We awarded the City an appeal. 
 
The City contends that it is immune from liability under the 
provisions of Code § 29.1-509(B).  In pertinent part, that statute 
provides: 
 
 
A landowner shall owe no duty of care to keep land 
or premises safe for entry or use by others for . . . 
recreational use . . . .  No landowner shall be required 
to give any warning of hazardous conditions or uses of, 
structures on, or activities on such land or premises to 
any person entering on the land or premises for such 
purposes . . . . 
 
Code § 29.1-509(A) defines the term "landowner" as "the legal 
title holder, lessee, occupant or any other person in control of 
land or premises."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Initially, we note that Flippen's activity as a recreational 
use of the stairway in question is not an issue in this appeal.  
Additionally, there is no dispute that following the construction 
of the stairway by the property owners, the City alone assumed 
responsibility for the maintenance of the stairway and provided 
additional services to enhance the aesthetic appearance of the 
adjoining public access ways.  The evidence thus substantiates the 
City's claim that it was in control of the stairway at the time of 
Flippen's recreational use of it.  Accordingly, the City asserts 
that it comes within the definition of a landowner in that it was 
"in control of [the] land or premises" as contemplated by Code 
§ 29.1-509. 
 
In 
response, 
Flippen 
contends 
that 
Code § 29.1-509 
is 
inapplicable to municipal corporations.  Rather, he asserts that 
the legislature intended the statute to extend immunity only to 
private landowners, having provided for recreational use immunity 
for municipalities elsewhere.  See Code § 15.1-291.  Our 
resolution of this issue centers on whether, on the particular 
facts of this case, the City is included within the term "any 
other person" as used in Code § 29.1-509(A). 
 
Municipal corporations have a dual identity, existing both as 
a body politic and a body corporate.  In the latter identity, a 
municipal corporation may be a "person" just as any corporation or 
other legal entity is a person.  Code § 1-13.19; see also Hanbury 
v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182, 187, 122 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1961).  We 
further recognize that, in certain instances, the legislature has 
expressly 
excluded 
municipalities 
from 
coming 
within 
the 
definition of the term "person".  See, e.g., Code §§ 7.1-12 & 
8.01-636.  When, as here, a statute contains no express definition 
of a term, the general rule of statutory construction is to infer 
the intent of our legislature from the language and "the plain 
meaning of the words."  Marsh v. City of Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 
360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987); see also City of Portsmouth v. 
Daniels, 157 Va. 614, 618, 162 S.E. 324, 325 (1932)(construing 
term "any person" with respect to application of Workers' 
Compensation Act to municipal corporations). 
 
The clear legislative intent of Code § 29.1-509 is to 
encourage the opening of private land to public recreational use. 
 Flippen contends that the City's maintenance of this stairway is 
comparable to its maintenance of sidewalks, suggesting that the 
City's actions are not motivated by the statute.  This contention 
is without merit.  The maintenance of sidewalks is a proprietary, 
not a governmental, function of a municipal corporation, City of 
Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 551-52, 9 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1940), 
making sidewalk maintenance an act of the corporate entity.  
Moreover, the intended use of the stairway in question is clearly 
to provide access to the recreational beach.  The City's actions 
in providing and maintaining public access over private land for 
recreational purposes is entirely consistent with the purpose of 
Code § 29.1-509 and the conclusion that the legislature intended a 
broad interpretation of the definition of the term "landowner" 
contained therein.  Accordingly, we see no logical reason, under 
the specific facts of this case, to exclude the City from the 
definition of landowner found in that statute. 
 
We hold that the City is a "person in control of [the] land 
or premises" as contemplated by Code § 29.1-509 and is entitled to 
the immunity extended by that statute for the activities it 
undertook to provide public access to the beach adjacent to the 
stairway.  Having reached this conclusion, we need not address the 
City's additional claims of immunity under Code § 15.1-291 and the 
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Similarly, an issue 
raised on cross-error is rendered moot by our decision reversing 
the trial court disposition. 
 
The judgment of the circuit court will be reversed and final 
judgment will be entered for the City. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.