Title: RAS v. State
Citation: 718 So. 2d 117
Docket Number: 1961990
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 1998

718 So. 2d 117 (1998)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(Re R.A.S.
v.
State).
1961990.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 29, 1998.
*118 Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Yvonne A.H. Saxon, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
Michael A. Dasinger III of Hoiles &amp; Dasinger, P.C., Robertsdale, for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
This case involves a prosecution of an alleged resident child molester in which there was evidence of multiple acts of alleged molestation that had occurred over an extended period of time, and it involves legal questions similar to those presented in R.L.G., Jr. v. State, 712 So. 2d 348 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), affirmed, Ex parte R.L.G., Jr., 712 So. 2d 372 (Ala.1998).
Traditionally, Alabama follows a strict election rule, by which the State must elect the offense on which it will proceed when the evidence discloses two or more offenses growing out of distinct and separate transactions. In R.L.G. v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals expanded the strict election rule in sexual abuse cases involving a resident abuser of small children where only generic evidence was presented, stating:
*119 712 So. 2d  at 367 (emphasis omitted). The "either-or" rule provides that the prosecution must elect which single act it is relying for a conviction or else the trial judge must give a specific unanimity instruction.
This Court granted certiorari review in R.L.G. and affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' expansion of the strict election rule, stating:
Ex parte R.L.G., 712 So. 2d  at 373.
In this case, the specific question presented is whether, in child molestation cases involving an alleged resident abuser and where there is both generic and specific evidence of sexual abuse, this Court should further modify or expand the exception to Alabama's long-standing rule requiring the State to make an election.
R.A.S. was convicted of first degree sexual abuse of his stepdaughter A.M., § 13A-6-66(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975; first degree sodomy of A.M., § 13A-6-63(a)(3); second degree rape of A.M., § 13A-6-62(a)(1); first degree sexual abuse of his stepdaughter C.M., § 13A-6-66(a)(3); and first degree sodomy of C.M., § 13A-6-63(a)(3).
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, R.A.S. v. State, 718 So. 2d 108 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), basing its reversal on this Court's holding in Ex parte King, 707 So. 2d 657 (Ala.1997), in which a majority of this Court declined to overrule or to make an exception to the long-standing doctrine of election as it was enunciated in Deason v. State, 363 So. 2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711, 63 So. 2d 293 (1953).
Even though the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, it specifically urged this Court to consider extending the expansion of the strict election rule to apply to cases based upon generic and specific evidence, such as this one. The court wrote:
718 So. 2d  at 116. We granted the State's petition for the writ of certiorari primarily to consider, as requested by the Court of Criminal Appeals, reexamining the holding in Ex parte King and to consider extending the expansion of the strict election rule to apply to cases based upon generic and specific evidence.
*120 After reexamining the holding in Ex parte King and the holding in Ex parte R.L.G., we agree with the State that the strict election rule should be expanded in cases that, like this one, involve a resident child molester and in which there is both generic evidence and specific evidence indicating that multiple acts of molestation have occurred over an extended period.
In R.L.G. v. State, supra, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted an expanded election rule in cases involving only generic evidence, the court discussed many of the same legal issues that are presented in this case, such as (1) a defendant's due process right to fair notice of the charges against him and to a reasonable opportunity to defend against those charges; (2) a defendant's entitlement to a verdict in which all 12 jurors concur, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each offense charged; and (3) the right of a defendant to have his or her conviction sustained only if it is supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court reviewed each of these issues in the R.L.G. cases, and we have reviewed them again in this case.
In R.L.G. v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed at length the defendant's right to procedural due process, stating:
712 So. 2d  at 362-63.
The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly noted that any critical details that are available to the State could be gathered by the defendant through a preliminary hearing, a motion for a more definite statement, as authorized by Rule 13.2(e), Ala.R.Crim.P., or other pretrial discovery procedures. The court stated:
R.L.G. v. State, 712 So. 2d  at 363-364.
After noting that an alibi defense would be unavailing to a resident abuser, given that the defendant would have lived with the victim for an extensive, uninterrupted period, day and night, and also given that certain of the illicit sexual conduct would have taken but moments to perform, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in R.L.G., quoting People v. Fernandez, 263 Cal. Rptr. 139, 147 (Cal.App. 1989), stated: "`[T]he similarity and repetition of the acts would make it difficult, if not impossible, for an adult, let alone a child, to pinpoint the specific circumstances of each act.'"[1] 712 So. 2d  at 364.
After reexamining the law, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that an expansion of the strict election rule is needed in cases, like this one, that involve a resident child abuser, and we today adopt an expansion of that rule. In cases, such as this one, that involve both generic and specific evidence, where evidence of multiple culpable acts is adduced to prove a single charged offense,[2] jury unanimity must be protected. Therefore, in such a case, the defendant is entitled either to have the State elect the single act upon which it is relying for a conviction or to have the court give a specific unanimity instruction. If the State chooses not to elect the specific act, the trial court must instruct the jury that all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby assuring a unanimous verdict on one criminal act. Cf. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 571, 683 P.2d 173, 178 (1984) (where, in a factually similar case, the Washington Supreme Court required either that the State make an election or that the trial judge provide a unanimity instruction to the jury). See also, People v. Aldrich, 849 P.2d 821, 825 (Colo.App.1992) (where the court held that the defendant's right to a unanimous jury was ensured because, (1) "although the trial court denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to compel an election, at the close of the trial, the trial court did compel the prosecutor to elect the specific incidents of conduct upon which it relied," (2) "the jury ultimately was instructed as to the specific incidents upon which the charges were based," and (3) the jury "was also given a unanimity instruction" (emphasis omitted)).
Both to assist the jury in its deliberations and to ensure jury unanimity, the trial judge could submit special interrogatories to the jury in cases like this one, even though it has been held that the submission of special interrogatories to the jury is not authorized by statute or by court rule.[3] The submission of special interrogatories would be helpful to the jury in reaching a just verdict and could protect the rights of a defendant to a unanimous jury verdict in those cases where the *123 trial judge elects to use the jury instruction alternative rather than compelling the State to make an election.[4]
Now, we must determine whether the principle we adopt today applies in this particular case. When R.A.S. was convicted, a majority of this Court was applying the strict election rule in child molestation cases. In R.L.G, this Court adopted the so-called "either-or" rule in cases in which there was purely generic evidence involved. Today, as suggested by the Court of Criminal Appeals, we expand the "either-or" rule to apply in cases involving generic and specific evidence. Because we cannot say with certainty that the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict was guaranteed, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury in this case, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, but our affirmance is based upon the condition that if R.A.S. is retried, the new rule that we adopt today will be applicable in his trial.[5]
AFFIRMED.
SHORES, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, SEE, and LYONS, JJ., concur.
HOOPER, C.J., concurs in the result.
[1]  For the California courts' treatment of Fernandez, see Judge Patterson's fn. 11 in R.L.G. v. State, 712 So. 2d  at 364.
[2]  Whether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decision within prosecutorial discretion. There are probably many factors the prosecutor weighs in making that decision, including the victim's ability to testify to specific times and places. Our decision today is not intended to affect that discretion or to encourage the bringing of multiple charges when, in the prosecutor's judgment, they are not warranted. Obviously, there may be times when the prosecutor's decision to bring only a single charge may indicate that the election of one particular act for prosecution is impractical.
[3]  Flowers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Rule 22, Ala. R.Crim. P.
[4]  The options of allowing a special jury instruction and using special interrogatories are allowed because, in the majority of cases in which this issue will arise, the sexual abuse charge will involve crimes against children; in such cases the occurrence of multiple instances of criminal conduct with the same victim is a frequent, if not the usual, pattern.

Although they do not involve charges of sexual abuse, some decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit support the imposition of a requirement that the jury be given a specific unanimity instruction under circumstances similar to those in this case. See United States v. Echeverry, 719 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir.1983) ("When it appears ... that a conviction may occur as a result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice. To correct any potential confusion in such a case, the trial judge must augment the general instruction to ensure [that] the jury understands its duty to unanimously agree to a particular set of facts."). Also, see, United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836-37 (9th Cir.1986) (ruling that there was "the genuine possibility that some jurors may have believed [that the defendant] used extortionate means on one occasion while others may have believed that he was guilty of engaging in extortion at a different time and place"; stating that "Echeverry clearly sets forth the rule that we are not free to speculate about what the jurors agreed to in their ... deliberation over [the defendant's] guilt or innocence"; and, accordingly, holding that "[a] general unanimity instruction will not suffice when the possibility of such jury confusion exists" and that the trial court committed plain error in failing to give a specific unanimity instruction). Cf. United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206, 1211-13 (9th Cir.1988) (reaffirming Echeverry and Payseno and holding (1) there was "a genuine possibility that the jurors were not unanimous as to the conjunction of two of the material elements of the crime," (2) "[t]his [was] not a case ... `sufficiently simple and clear in its presentation that unanimity [could] be assumed based on the general [unanimity] instruction,'" (3) "[r]ather, it [was] a case involving a sufficiently complex set of facts requiring the judge sua sponte to give a specific unanimity instruction," (4) "[b]ecause the deficiency in the trial judge's instruction prejudiced the defendant's substantial right to a unanimous jury verdict ..., plain error occurred," and (5) "a conviction for conducting an illegal gambling business ... cannot stand where the guilty verdict cannot with reasonable certainty be said to stem from a unanimous verdict").
[5]  The result we reach today is consistent with Justice Houston's special concurrence in Ex parte King, 707 So. 2d  at 662 (on application for rehearing).