Title: Barron v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96151
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2017

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MIASIA BARRON, 
 et al., 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
and 
) 
) 
MADDISON SCHMIDT, by next friends, 
) 
GARRY SCHMIDT and 
 
) 
TAMMY SCHMIDT, 
) 
) 
Respondents, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96151 
) 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Steven R. Ohmer, Judge 
Abbott Laboratories, Inc., appeals the circuit court’s judgment awarding Maddison 
Schmidt $15 million in compensatory damages and $23 million in punitive damages for 
her personal injury claim.  Abbott argues the circuit court erred in overruling: (1) its pretrial 
motion to transfer venue; (2) its pretrial motion to sever Schmidt’s claim from other 
plaintiffs’ claims; (3) its motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on Schmidt’s failure-to-warn claim; and (4) its motions for directed verdict and 
Opinion issued September 12, 2017
2 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Schmidt’s demand for punitive damages. 
Because Abbott received a fair trial, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. 
I. Factual and Procedural History
Schmidt was born with spina bifida and other birth defects.  She was born and 
resides in Minnesota.  Her mother ingested Depakote, an antiepileptic drug manufactured 
and marketed by Abbott, while Schmidt was in utero.  Her mother ingested the Depakote 
in Minnesota.  Abbott’s company headquarters are in Illinois.  Despite this lack of 
connection to Missouri, Schmidt joined with four Missouri plaintiffs and 19 other non-
Missouri plaintiffs to file a single action against Abbott in the circuit court of the city of 
St. Louis.  Each plaintiff alleged birth defects from in utero exposure to Depakote and 
sought both compensatory and punitive damages.1   Abbott moved to sever the plaintiffs’ 
individual claims, arguing they should not have been joined together in a single action. 
Abbott also moved to transfer the non-Missouri plaintiffs’ claims to the circuit court of  
St. Louis County, which Abbott argued was the proper venue for these plaintiffs.2  After 
the circuit court overruled Abbott’s motions, Abbott raised its venue and joinder arguments 
in a petition for a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of prohibition.  Both the court 
of appeals and this Court denied Abbott’s writ petition without opinion.   
The circuit court then ordered each side to nominate plaintiffs for separate, 
individual trials, though all the plaintiffs’ claims remained joined in one action.  Schmidt 
1  Two of the Missouri plaintiffs alleged they were born with birth defects in the city of St. Louis. 
2  Abbott waived personal jurisdiction. See Rule 55.27(g).  The United States Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cnty., 
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), therefore, has no application to this appeal. 
3 
was nominated by the plaintiffs’ counsel, and a jury trial was held solely on Schmidt’s 
claims without severing the other plaintiffs’ claim.  Schmidt advanced a failure-to-warn 
theory contending Depakote’s label did not adequately warn of the risk of birth defects 
posed by the drug.  At the close of Schmidt’s evidence and at the close of all evidence, 
Abbott moved for a directed verdict on both Schmidt’s failure-to-warn claim and her 
demand for punitive damages.  The circuit court overruled Abbott’s motions.  The jury 
found in Schmidt’s favor and awarded her $15 million in compensatory damages and $23 
million in punitive damages.  Abbott then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
or, alternatively, a new trial, and renewed the arguments it made for a directed verdict, as 
well as its venue and joinder arguments.  The circuit court overruled Abbott’s motion and 
entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.3  Abbott appealed and, after 
opinion, the court of appeals transferred the case to this Court pursuant to article V, § 10 
of the Missouri Constitution. 
II. Venue and Joinder
In Point I, Abbott argues the circuit court erred in overruling its pretrial motion to 
transfer venue of the non-Missouri plaintiffs’ claims, which included Schmidt’s claim.  
Abbott argues, pursuant to § 508.010.5, RSMo Supp. 2013, the proper venue for Schmidt’s 
claim is St. Louis County and the joinder of Missouri plaintiffs  with Schmidt’s claim could 
not be used to make venue proper in the city of St. Louis.  In Point II, Abbott argues the 
circuit court erred in overruling its pretrial motion to sever all individual plaintiffs’ claims 
3  Although other plaintiffs’ claims remained pending in the action, the circuit court entered a 
separate judgment on Schmidt’s claim pursuant to Rule 74.01(b).   
4 
because joinder of the claims was improper pursuant to Rule 52.05.  Abbott claims this 
errant ruling resulted in improper venue in the city of St. Louis.  Abbott’s first two points 
on appeal, therefore, contend the circuit court’s errors resulted in Schmidt’s claim being 
tried in the city of St. Louis, rather than St. Louis County.    
Even assuming the circuit court erred by either failing to transfer venue or failing to 
sever the claims, an error does not warrant reversal on appeal unless the error results in 
prejudice.  Dieser v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 498 S.W.3d 419, 435-36 (Mo. banc 2016); 
Lewis v. Wahl, 842 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Mo. banc 1992).  Rule 84.13(b) provides: “No 
appellate court shall reverse any judgment unless it finds that error was committed by the 
trial court against the appellant materially affecting the merits of the action.”  Despite this 
clear mandate of Rule 84.13(b), Abbott insists it is not required to show prejudice, relying 
on this Court’s decision in Igoe v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, 152 
S.W.3d 284 (Mo. banc 2005).   
In Igoe, this Court reversed a judgment based on the circuit court’s error in failing 
to transfer venue, but it did not discuss whether the error resulted in prejudice.  See id. at 
288–89.  This silence should not be inferred as an implicit holding that no prejudice is 
required when error results in improper venue.  Such a holding would be contrary to Rule 
84.13(b), and would be akin to treating improper venue as a jurisdictional defect—which 
it certainly is not.4  See State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 822 
(Mo. banc 1994) (differentiating between venue and personal jurisdiction); see also J.C.W. 
4   A showing of prejudice is not required for a jurisdictional defect because such a defect renders 
a judgment void.  See Blanchette v. Blanchette, 476 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Mo. banc 2015).  
5 
 
ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253-54 (Mo. banc 2009) (explaining that 
errors in complying with a statute are not jurisdictional in nature).  The circuit court of the 
city of St. Louis—even if it were the improper venue—had jurisdiction to enter a judgment 
against Abbott, and its failure to transfer venue or sever the claims is like any other alleged 
non-jurisdictional error and is subject to Rule 84.13(b).  See In re Marriage of Hendrix, 
183 S.W.3d 582, 590 (Mo. banc 2006). 
While maintaining its position that prejudice is not required, Abbott also argues it 
was prejudiced by the circuit court’s failure to transfer venue or sever the claims because 
the city of St. Louis is a more favorable venue to plaintiffs than St. Louis County.  
Essentially, Abbott argues the city of St. Louis is biased in general but fails to point to any 
specific event or action in the case or trial to support this generality.  Abbott fails to identify 
any particular ruling by the circuit court suggesting bias or any particular juror who should 
have been disqualified for bias.  This claim of prejudice will not suffice. 
While Abbott may have preferred a trial in St. Louis County, it cannot establish the 
trial in the city of St. Louis was unfair.  This Court declines to hold Abbott was prejudiced 
simply because a fair judge and jury in the city of St. Louis rendered the judgment and 
verdict rather than a fair judge and jury in St. Louis County.5  Because Abbott fails to 
                                              
5  Abbott also suggests the city of St. Louis and the circuit court of the city of St. Louis have 
suffered prejudice by being burdened with tort claims filed by out-of-state plaintiffs.  Any burden 
on the city of St. Louis or the circuit court is not relevant to the prejudice contemplated by Rule 
84.13(b). 
6 
 
satisfy the prejudice requirement, this Court need not decide whether the circuit court erred 
in either failing to transfer venue or failing to sever the claims.  Points I and II are denied.6 
III.  Failure to Warn 
 
  In Point III, Abbott argues the circuit court erred in overruling its motions for 
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Schmidt’s failure-to-warn 
claim because the Depakote label provided adequate warning as a matter of Minnesota 
law.7  “The standard of review for failures to sustain motions for directed verdict and for 
JNOV is essentially the same.”  Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95 
(Mo. banc 2010).  “This Court must determine whether the plaintiff presented a submissible 
case by offering evidence to support every element necessary for liability.”  Id.  “Evidence 
is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, giving the plaintiff all reasonable 
inferences and disregarding all conflicting evidence and inferences.”  Id. 
 
  “In general, a supplier has a duty to warn end users of a dangerous product if it is 
reasonably foreseeable that an injury could occur in its use.”  Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 
676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004).  “The duty to warn includes the duty to give adequate 
                                              
6  The concurring opinion suggests this opinion “demands” a showing of prejudice as though such 
a requirement were arbitrarily created by this opinion.  But it is this Court’s Rule 84.13(b) that 
governs and requires the showing of prejudice on appeal in this case.  While the concurring opinion 
is troubled by the difficulty in showing prejudice on appeal for these types of claims, Rule 84.13(b) 
contains no exceptions for improper venue claims.  Perhaps the difficulty in showing prejudice on 
appeal is why these types of claims are better raised in the pretrial writ context, which requires no 
showing of prejudice.  See State ex rel. Jakobe v. Billings, 421 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. banc 1967); 
see also State ex rel. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 282 S.W.3d 363, 367 n.1 (Mo. banc 2009) 
(Fischer, J., dissenting) (“Direct appeal after completion of a jury trial historically has not been 
considered an adequate remedy to address improper venue.”).   Furthermore, if the General 
Assembly deems it wise to create an exception to the showing of prejudice requirement found in 
Rule 84.13(b), it is free to do so.  See Mo. Const. Art. V, § 5.          
7  The parties agree Minnesota substantive law applies. 
7 
instructions for the safe use of the product.”  Id.  “To be legally adequate, the warning 
should (1) attract the attention of those that the product could harm; (2) explain the 
mechanism and mode of injury; and (3) provide instructions on ways to safely use the 
product to avoid injury.”  Id.  “Generally, the adequacy of a warning is a fact question for 
the jury.”  Id. at 279.  Abbott argues Depakote’s label satisfied the three requirements 
needed to make its warning adequate for purposes of Minnesota law.   
Even assuming these three requirements were facially satisfied, the contents of a 
warning also have to be complete and accurate, so as to not mislead.  See Glorvigen v. 
Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 582 (Minn. 2012).  Depakote’s label stated: there 
was clinical literature indicating “the use of antiepileptic drugs during pregnancy results in 
an increased incidence of birth defects;” Depakote had “a possible similar association” as 
other antiepileptic drugs to birth defects; and the Centers for Disease Control estimated the 
risk of pregnant women exposed to Depakote having children with spina bifida was 1 or 2 
percent.  Schmidt, however, presented evidence Abbott was aware of multiple studies 
concluding: (1) Depakote posed a considerably higher risk of overall birth defects than 
other antiepileptic drugs, and should be avoided by women of childbearing potential unless 
all other alternatives had been tried and failed; (2) the overall risk of birth defects was 10 
percent or even greater; (3) the risk of spina bifida was significantly higher than 1 or 2 
percent; and (4) the risk of spina bifida amounted to a twentyfold increased risk compared 
with the background rate in the general population.  As Depakote’s label did not reflect 
this relevant information, a reasonable inference could be drawn from this evidence that 
8 
 
Abbott’s warning was not complete and accurate and, therefore, did not adequately warn.  
Point III is denied. 
IV.  Punitive Damages 
 
In Point IV, Abbott argues the circuit court erred in overruling its motions for 
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Schmidt’s demand for 
punitive damages.8  Minnesota law provides: 
(a) Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate 
disregard for the rights or safety of others. 
 
(b) A defendant has acted with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety 
of others if the defendant has knowledge of facts or intentionally 
disregards facts that create a high probability of injury to the rights or 
safety of others and: 
 
(1) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or intentional disregard of  
the high degree of probability of injury to the rights or safety of 
others; or 
 
(2) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the high probability 
of injury to the rights or safety of others. 
 
Minn. Stat. § 549.20.1 (2012).  Abbott argues there was not clear and convincing evidence 
it acted with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others because Depakote’s label 
contained a “black box” warning, “the most serious type of warning mandated by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration.”   
The black box warning is not relevant for purposes of this Court’s standard of 
review.  In reviewing a circuit court’s overruling of a motion for directed verdict or 
                                              
8  On appeal, Abbott challenges only the award of punitive damages, not the amount. 
9 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, gives the plaintiff all reasonable inferences, and disregards all 
contrary evidence and inferences.  Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 95.  As discussed above, there 
was evidence Abbott was aware there were studies indicating Depakote was much more 
dangerous in terms of birth defects than its label suggested.  In addition, there was evidence 
presented that, despite this knowledge, Abbott conducted no independent research or 
studies of its own to evaluate Depakote’s risks for birth defects.  There was evidence 
showing Abbott instead spent $50 million to $100 million per year marketing Depakote, 
sought to “squeeze every dollar and every [prescription for Depakote] out of the market,” 
and intended to make Depakote the first choice antiepileptic drug for women, despite 
internally referring to it as a “dirty drug.”  A reasonable inference from this evidence is 
that, motivated by profits, Abbott deliberately disregarded the safety of Depakote users. 
Point IV is denied.9 
V. Conclusion
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. 
W. Brent Powell, Judge
Draper, Russell and Breckenridge, JJ., concur; 
Wilson, J., concurs in separate opinion filed; 
Fischer, C.J., and Stith, J., concur in opinion of 
Wilson, J. 
9  In addition, Abbott argues the award of punitive damages violates due process.  This 
constitutional claim was not properly raised before the circuit court and, therefore, has not been 
preserved for review.  See Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City, 430 S.W.3d 260, 266 (Mo. 
banc 2014).    
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MIASIA BARRON, 
 et al., 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
and 
) 
) 
MADDISON SCHMIDT, by next friends, 
) 
GARRY SCHMIDT and 
 
) 
TAMMY SCHMIDT, 
) 
) 
Respondents, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96151 
) 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
CONCURRING OPINION 
The principal opinion affirms the judgment below on the ground that, even 
assuming the trial court erred in failing to grant the motions to transfer and to sever by 
Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (“Abbott”), reversal is not required because Abbott failed to 
show prejudice.  Respectfully, though I agree the judgment should be affirmed, I disagree 
with the analysis used to reach that result. 
2 
 
Even though the use of a Rule 52.05(a) joinder to combine multiple in-state and 
out-of-state plaintiffs in a single action largely will be prevented in the future by Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S. Ct. 
1773 (2017), I am compelled to write separately because – in cases like the present one – 
the use of Rule 52.05(a) to join the claims of multiple Missouri plaintiffs in a single 
petition will (and should) still occur.  In my view, the analysis in the principal opinion 
falls short because it fails to highlight critical distinctions between non-discretionary 
rulings on motions to transfer and discretionary rulings on motions to sever and, more 
importantly, between a motion to sever made at the outset of an action and one made 
after pretrial proceedings are complete and the trial court has determined to try each 
plaintiff’s claims separately.   
Under the analysis in the principal opinion, when a defendant’s initial efforts to 
sever each plaintiff’s claims and transfer the resulting separate actions to proper venues 
fail (both in the trial court and, by way of petitions for extraordinary writs, in the 
appellate courts), the defendant is left without a remedy unless it can scale the nearly 
insurmountable hurdle of proving prejudice on appeal.  The analysis set forth below, on 
the other hand, focuses on the fact that (unlike a motion to transfer) the trial court has 
discretion in ruling on motions to sever and the fact that this discretion will vary 
depending upon the circumstances of the litigation at the time the motion to sever is 
made.  This analysis protects the rights of all parties, furthers the policies of efficiency 
and expeditiousness that animate Rule 52.05(a), and avoids creating the analytical 
dead-end of a prejudice requirement that seldom (if ever) can be met.  
3 
First, it bears emphasizing that Rule 52.05(a) expressly permits multiple plaintiffs 
to join their claims in a single petition “if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, 
or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or 
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of 
them will arise in the action.”  [Emphasis added.]  Though there are obvious differences 
among Plaintiffs’ claims in this case, it is clear those claims arose out of a series of 
occurrences (i.e., the taking of Depakote) and at least one common question of law or fact 
will arise in resolving those claims (e.g., whether Abbott’s design was defective, whether 
its testing was deficient, or whether its warnings were inadequate).  As a result, joinder of 
Plaintiffs’ claims in a single petition was proper in this case and the trial court’s decision 
not to grant Abbott’s original motion to sever – made at the outset of this case – was not 
an abuse of discretion. 
Second, because joinder of Plaintiffs’ claims in a single petition was proper under 
Rule 52.05(a), venue for this action in St. Louis City also was proper.  Section 508.010, 
RSMo 2005, in relevant part, provides:  
4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions in which there
is any count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff was first injured in
the state of Missouri, venue shall be in the county where the plaintiff was
first injured by the wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the action.
§ 508.010.4 (emphasis added).  The first requirement in this subsection is that the petition
must contain at least one count alleging a tort.  Plainly, that requirement is met in this 
case because the petition contained numerous tort counts.  The second requirement in this 
section is that “the plaintiff” in one of these tort counts must allege they were first injured 
4 
 
in this state.  Here, four Plaintiffs alleged in their separate tort counts that they were first 
injured in the City of St. Louis, Missouri.  As a result, both of the requirements of section 
508.010.4 were met in this case and venue for the entire “action” (and not merely for the 
qualifying tort counts) was proper in St. Louis City.1 
 
At this point, the analysis is clear that the question of venue in a multi-plaintiff, 
single-defendant case such as the present one is determined by section 508.010.4 and, 
therefore, venue is proper in any Missouri county in which any one of the plaintiffs in the 
many tort counts alleges he or she was first injured.  The application of section 
508.010.4, in turn, requires a determination as to whether the various counts of the 
various plaintiffs were properly joined in a single petition under Rule 52.05(a), which 
requires the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the same 
transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and whether common 
questions of law or fact will arise during the resolution of those claims.  If so, joinder is 
proper under Rule 52.05(a) and any one of the joined counts may create venue for the 
                                              
1   Arguably, section 508.010.5 compels a different result because there is at least one count in 
Plaintiffs’ petition that both alleges a tort and alleges the plaintiff for that count was first injured 
outside the state.  If so, subsections 4 and 5 would compel contrary and conflicting results – in 
cases such as the present one – where there are multiple plaintiffs seeking relief against a single, 
common defendant and where some of the plaintiffs were first injured in-state while other 
plaintiffs were first injured out of state.  This quandary is enhanced by the fact that the 
introductory phrase in each subsection instructs this Court to ignore the other subsection.  
Perhaps this conflict suggests that, read as whole, section 508.010 simply does not define a 
proper venue for this action and, therefore, venue was proper in any county.  See State ex rel. 
Heartland Title Servs., Inc. v. Harrell, 500 S.W.3d 239, 243 (Mo. banc 2016) (where section 
508.010 fails to identify proper venue in a given case, venue is proper in any county).  In my 
view, however, that approach is unnecessary.  Here, Plaintiffs contend that, as filed, venue in this 
action was controlled by section 508.010.4, and the plain wording of that provision instructs this 
Court to ignore all contrary provisions of law, including section 508.010.5. 
5 
entire action under section 508.010.4.  Finally, if joinder is proper under Rule 52.05(a), a 
trial court’s decision to overrule a motion to sever the properly joined counts at the outset 
of the litigation – by operation of Rule 52.05(a) alone – cannot be an abuse of discretion.  
But to say a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever properly 
joined claims at the outset of an action, however, does not mean there will not come a 
time in the course of the litigation when severance is required.  The efficient resolution of 
claims with common questions of law and fact is the driving force behind permissive 
joinder under Rule 52.05(a), and the trial court’s discretion to pursue that end is bounded 
only by its ingenuity and the circumstances of the action.  See, e.g., Rule 66.02 (when 
“conducive to expedition and economy,” the trial court may order a separate trial of any 
claims or issues).  Resolution of early dispositive motions, coordinated discovery, 
adjudication of motions for full or partial summary judgment, and joint trials of common 
questions under Rule 66.02 are just a few of the tools trial courts have to manage multi-
party civil litigation in pursuit of the just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of claims 
that Rule 41.03 requires.  Accordingly, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether and when to sever properly joined claims, and its decisions in that regard should 
be affirmed as long as they are rationally related to the goals of efficiency and 
expeditiousness underlying Rule 52.05(a). 
Once the trial court has determined that each plaintiff’s claims are to be tried 
separately, however, the trial court necessarily has decided there are no further gains in 
efficiency or expeditiousness to be had from the joinder authorized by Rule 52.05(a).  
Once that decision has been made, therefore, the trial court has discretion to deny a 
6 
 
subsequent or renewed motion to sever only in the rarest of circumstances.  Moreover, an 
abuse of discretion in denying such a motion will be patently prejudicial under section 
508.012, RSMo 2005, which provides: 
At any time prior to the commencement of a trial, if a plaintiff or 
defendant, including a third-party plaintiff or defendant, is either added or 
removed from a petition filed in any court in the state of Missouri which 
would have, if originally added or removed to the initial petition, altered the 
determination of venue under section 508.010, then the judge shall upon 
application of any party transfer the case to a proper forum under section 
476.410.  
 
§ 508.012 (emphasis added).   
A decision to sever each plaintiff’s claims in a multi-plaintiff case “removes” a 
plaintiff for purposes of section 508.012 and, therefore, doing so will require the trial 
court (on application of a party) to determine the proper venue for the various actions 
resulting from that severance.  Where those venues are different from the original venue, 
section 508.012 requires the trial court to transfer those actions to their proper venues for 
trial.   
In the present case, if Abbott had renewed its motion to sever after the trial court 
announced its intention to try each Plaintiff’s claims separately – and if Abbott had 
challenged that failure in this appeal – the proper result would be to vacate the judgment 
entered below and remand with instructions for the trial court: (1) to sever each Plaintiff’s 
claims into separate actions; (2) to reassess venue for each of the newly severed actions 
under section 508.012; and (3) to transfer those actions for which venue in St. Louis City 
is not proper under section 508.010 to their proper venue.  That said, I am not convinced 
this is the proper result.   
7 
Even assuming Abbott renewed its motion to sever after pretrial proceedings were 
complete and the trial court had announced its intention to try each Plaintiff’s claims 
separately, Abbott failed to identify clearly the trial court’s denial of that renewed motion 
to sever – rather than the denial of Abbott’s original motion – as the action being 
challenged in its point relied on.  See Rule 84.04(d)(1) (each point relied on “shall … 
[i]dentify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges”).  Instead, Abbott’s
point relied on regarding severance is ambiguous as to whether it is the denial of Abbott’s 
original or renewed motion to sever that is being challenged, while Abbott’s appendix 
and the other sections in its brief refer only to the trial court’s denial of Abbott’s original 
motion.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Abbott’s original 
motion, I agree with the principal opinion that the proper result of this appeal is to affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Though I agree with the result in the principal opinion, my disagreement with the 
analysis in that opinion is not an academic one, and the effects of the path chosen by the 
Court in this case will be immediate and significant.  As explained above, once the trial 
court determined that each Plaintiff’s claims should be tried separately in this case, I 
believe it was error not to sever them and transfer those for which venue was no longer 
proper under sections 508.012 and 508.010.  The principal opinion is at least willing to 
assume this is true.  Nevertheless, under the principal opinion, the trial court may 
continue to try each of the remaining 23 Plaintiff’s claims separately in the City of        
St. Louis even though venue would not be proper for 19 of those Plaintiffs’ claims under 
section 508.012 if severance had occurred.  Abbott may claim this is error, but it will 
8 
never obtain relief without showing the elusive, undefined, and likely unprovable 
prejudice that the principal opinion demands.  I am unwilling to countenance such an 
immediate, improper, and easily avoidable outcome. 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge