Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: G. E. G., alias v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080779
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 2010

rel: 05/07/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
____________________
1080779
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: G.E.G.
v.
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-07-623;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-07-0036)
BOLIN, Justice.
The State of Alabama petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari to review whether the Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in reversing the trial court's denial of G.E.G.'s motion
1080779
2
to withdraw his guilty pleas. For the reasons discussed below,
we reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 6, 2007, G.E.G. was indicted for two counts of
first-degree sexual abuse; two counts of first-degree rape;
two counts of first-degree sodomy; two counts of sexual
torture; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia; and
one count of second-degree possession of marijuana.  With
regard to the two drug-related charges, the indictment
provided as follows:
"G.E.G. ... did unlawfully possess with intent
to use, or did use, drug paraphernalia, to-wit: a
pipe, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, 
test, 
analyze, 
pack, 
repack, 
store,
contain, 
conceal, 
inject, 
ingest, 
inhale, 
or
otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled
substance, in violation of section 13A-12-260(c) of
the Code of Alabama.
"G.E.G. ... did 
unlawfully 
possess 
marijuana 
for
personal use, in violation of section 13A-12-214 of
the Code of Alabama." 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, G.E.G. pleaded guilty to
the one count of sexual torture of his seven-week-old
daughter, see § 13A-6-665.1, Ala. Code 1975; possession of
marijuana in the second degree, see § 13A-12-214, Ala. Code
1080779
3
1975; and possession of drug paraphernalia, see §  13A-12-
260(c), Ala. Code 1975.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial
court sentenced G.E.G. to life imprisonment for the sexual-
torture conviction and to 12 months in jail for each of the
drug-related charges.  The sentences were to run concurrently.
At the plea hearing on June 18, 2007, the following
exchange occurred:
"THE COURT: [G.E.G.], you have multiple counts here.
I understand he is going to plead guilty to which
counts, please?
"MS. JAMES [prosecutor]: He will be pleading guilty
to Count 6, Count 9, and Count 10, and the rest will
be nol-prossed as alternate counts.
"THE COURT: Then he will be pleading guilty to
sodomy in the first degree. That's a Class A felony.
Well, I am looking at the Case Action Summary.  It
could be an error.  Let me look at the indictment as
well.
"MS. JAMES: I am sorry, Judge.  That will actually
be Counts 8, 9, and 10, and Counts 1 through 7 will
be nol-prossed as alternate counts. So he will be
pleading guilty to the sexual torture, possession of
marijuana 
second, 
and 
possession 
of 
drug
paraphernalia.
"THE COURT: That does appear correct on the Case
Action Summary.  9 is drug paraphernalia, 10 is
possession of marijuana in the second degree, both
of which are misdemeanors punishable by a term of
imprisonment not to exceed 12 months. What is the
classification of Count 9, Ms. James? Is that a
felony or misdemeanor?
1080779
4
"MS. JAMES: That's a misdemeanor, possession of
marijuana. 
"THE COURT: I am sorry. Count 7 [sic], sexual
torture, what classification?
"MS. JAMES: That's a Class A felony.
"THE COURT: Punishable by a term of imprisonment of
not less than 10 years, no more than life. So two of
them are Class A misdemeanors and the sexual torture
you are saying is a Class A felony?
"MS. JAMES: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: So you looked at that, Ms. Williams
[defense counsel]. Is that correct?
"MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Two of these are punishable by a term of
imprisonment not to exceed 12 months in the county
jail. One is not less than 10 years, no more than
life in the penitentiary.  Do you understand that?
"(Defendant confers with counsel.)
"THE COURT : Do you understand you have the right to
plead not guilty and have a jury trial?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: A jury trial is where twelve people are
selected to hear the evidence and determine your
guilt. Do you understand that?  You have to speak
up.
"THE DEFENDANT: I don't want a jury trial.
"THE COURT: I have to go through these rights with
you before I ask you at the end if you want to plead
guilty. Okay? So these are rights if you wanted to
1080779
5
have a jury trial. A jury trial would be where
twelve people are selected to hear the evidence and
determine your guilt if you had one. Do you
understand that?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: You have the right to see, hear,
confront, and cross-examine each witness at that
trial. Do you understand that?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And do you understand that you have the
right to testify yourself if you wanted to, but you
wouldn't have to, and nobody could say anything
about you not testifying?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And you could subpoena witnesses to
testify for you. 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: By pleading guilty, you are waiving all
these rights. Do you understand all those rights?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And you want to waive your right to a
jury trial and plead guilty; is that right?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything to get
you to plead guilty?
1080779
6
"THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Are you doing this voluntarily?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And how do you plead?
"THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
"THE COURT: The State's evidence is?
"MS. JAMES: That the victim in the case is seven
weeks old. [G.E.G.] is the victim's father. On or
about September 1st, 2004 [G.E.G.] called the
victim's mother at work, her first day back at work
after having the victim in the case, and in that
call [G.E.G.] told the victim's mother that the
victim was bleeding and he was about to take her to
the hospital. He also told the victim's mother at
that time that he apologized for hurting the victim,
that he wanted to die. Once he got the victim to the
hospital, a nurse at the hospital saw that the
victim was split from the top of her vagina to the
bottom of her anus.
"[G.E.G.] at that time said that he had drank
five beers and smoked some marijuana, rubbed baby
oil over the victim, and at that time he thinks his
fingers must have slipped and entered her vagina.
The defendant also wrote a statement saying he put
baby oil all over my baby and sexually abused her.
The doctor in the case, Dr. Saltzer, after examining
the baby, said the damage could not have been done
by a finger, but had to have been done by an
inanimate object or a sexual organ. And also the
medicals in this case would show the victim was
split from the top of her vagina to the bottom of
her rectum, that she will also have future problems
with her bowels, with her female organs, and also
with controlling her bladder. And all of this
happened in Montgomery County.
1080779
7
"THE COURT: Accept your plea, adjudicate you
guilty."
On July 24, 2007, the trial court sentenced G.E.G.  On
August 22, 2007, G.E.G. filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas to the three charges.  G.E.G. argued, among other
things, that the record failed to establish a factual basis
for any plea entered as required by Rule 14.4(b), Ala. R.
Crim. P.   On August 27, 2007, the trial court denied G.E.G.'s
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  On September 19, 2007,
G.E.G. appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
affirmed 
G.E.G.'s
conviction for the offense of sexual torture but reversed the
two guilty-plea convictions on the drug-related charges
because it concluded that there was no independent factual
basis to support G.E.G.'s admission that he smoked marijuana
before he sexually tortured his child.  G.E.G. v. State, [Ms.
CR-07-0036, Dec. 19, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2008).  The Court of Criminal Appeals, citing Boyington v.
State, 748 So. 2d 897 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), stated that
G.E.G. was never seen with marijuana, that the record was
silent as to the existence of drug paraphernalia, and that the
indictment appeared to be based strictly on G.E.G.'s remark to
1080779
8
the nurse who examined the infant that he had been smoking
marijuana.  The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that
G.E.G.'s guilty plea may have relieved the State of its burden
to present evidence; however, it reasoned, the underlying
factual basis relied upon for bringing the indictment was
insufficient 
to 
support 
a 
conviction 
because 
a 
mere
"confession," without any corroborating evidence, is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction.   
Both the State and G.E.G. sought certiorari review.  We
denied G.E.G.'s petition and granted the State's petition.  
Discussion
With regard to the requirement that a defendant's
confession be corroborated to sustain a conviction it has long
been the rule in Alabama that the State must offer independent
proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense to
authorize the admission of the defendant's confession or
inculpatory statement.  Robinson v. State, 560 So. 2d 1130,
1135-36 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).  "While a confession is
inadmissible as prima facie proof of the corpus delicti, it
can be used along with other evidence to satisfy the jury of
the existence of the corpus delicti."  Bracewell v. State, 506
1080779
9
So. 2d 354, 360  (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).  The purpose of
requiring that a defendant's confession be corroborated is to
alleviate the concern that the confession could be false and
the conviction thereby lack fundamental fairness. 
"The purpose of requiring proof of the corpus
delicti, as a condition precedent to the admission
of a confession, is to insure its trustworthiness.
For this reason, there is some judicial language to
the effect that corroborative evidence independent
of the confession need not be sufficient to
establish corpus delicti but must be sufficient
independent evidence which would tend to establish
the trustworthiness of the confession."
Charles W. Gamble & Robert J. Goodwin, McElroy's Alabama
Evidence § 200.13 at 1262 (6th ed. 2009)(footnotes omitted).
"'Evidence of facts and circumstances, attending the
particular 
offense, and usually attending the
commission of similar offenses--or of facts to the
discovery of which the confession has led, and which
would not probably have existed if the offense had
not 
been 
committed--would 
be 
admissible 
to
corroborate the confession.  The weight which would
be 
accorded 
them, 
when 
connected 
with 
the
confession, the jury must determine, under proper
instructions from the court.'"
Bush v. State, 695 So. 2d 70, 118 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995)(quoting Matthews v. State, 55 Ala. 187, 194 (1876)); see
also Bracewell, supra.  "Proof of the corpus delicti does not
necessarily include evidence connecting [the] defendant with
the crime.  The term, meaning body of the offense, connotes
1080779
10
the actual commission of the crime by someone."  Arnold v.
State, 57 Ala. App. 172, 173, 326 So. 2d 700, 701 (1976). 
In reversing G.E.G's convictions on the drug-related
charges, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied, in part, on
Boyington v. State, supra, to support its determination that
G.E.G.'s admission that he smoked marijuana on the day he
injured his child was insufficient alone to provide a factual
basis for G.E.G.'s guilty plea.   In Boyington, the defendant
was convicted following a trial at which the evidence to
support his conviction was testimony from a police officer who
had seen the defendant and a companion smoking what appeared
to be a marijuana cigarette.  At trial, the arresting officer
stated that there was a very strong smell of burning marijuana
in the air when he approached the defendant and his companion.
When the officer identified himself as a police officer, the
defendant rubbed his fingers together, causing the cigarette
to disintegrate.  The officer testified that the defendant's
fingers smelled like marijuana and that he saw the companion
take a green leafy substance from his pocket and throw it in
the air.  The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
defendant's conviction, stating:
1080779
11
"We can find no case in Alabama upholding a
conviction for possession of a controlled substance
where the controlled substance was not confiscated
from the defendant and identified or where the
defendant was not in constructive possession of the
controlled substance. Absent that factual scenario,
the element of possession could not be established.
"In the present case, considering that the
officers did not see Boyington in possession of
marijuana, that Boyington did not have in his
possession or was not in constructive possession of
marijuana when he was apprehended, that it is not a
criminal offense to smell like marijuana, and that
there was a possibility that the odor of marijuana
was the result of other bar patrons' smoking
marijuana in the area before the officers arrived,
the evidence presented at trial did not establish
that Boyington was or had been in possession of
marijuana."
748 So. 2d at 902-03.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals here also relied upon the
following cases for the proposition that a defendant's
confession to or statement regarding a given offense, without
any corroborating evidence, is insufficient to support a
conviction: Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); State
v. Chatelain, 220 Or. App. 487, 188 P.3d 325 (2008); and
People v. O'Neil, 18 Ill. 2d 461, 165 N.E.2d 319 (1960).  Like
Boyington, Smith, Chatelain, and O'Neil involved trials, and
not guilty-plea proceedings.  
1080779
12
It is important to recognize the difference between a
guilty-plea proceeding and a trial.  "'"A voluntary guilty
plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses with the need for
judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to the defendant's
guilt, and is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged
in the indictment."'"  Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159, 166
(Ala. Crim. App. 2005)(quoting Whitman v. State, 903 So. 2d
152, 155 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), quoting in turn Morrow v.
State, 426 So. 2d 481, 484 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)).  "A plea
of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission
or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction.
Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive.  More is not
required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and
sentence."  Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223
(1927).  "By pleading guilty, a defendant waives three
constitutional rights: the right against self-incrimination,
the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his
accusers."  Heptinstall v. State, 624 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993)(citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969)).  Because these rights are waived upon the entry of a
guilty plea, the colloquy at the guilty-plea hearing centers
1080779
13
on whether the defendant's plea is being made voluntarily and
knowingly.  
"A 
defendant 
who 
enters 
[a 
guilty 
plea]
simultaneously waives 
several 
constitutional 
rights,
including his privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his
right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to
be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be
'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 
458, 
464 
(1938). 
 
Consequently, 
if 
a
defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and
knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due
process and is therefore void.  Moreover, because a
guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of
a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly
voluntary 
unless 
the 
defendant 
possesses 
an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts."
McCarthy 
v. 
United 
States, 
394 
U.S. 
459, 
466-67
(1969)(footnotes omitted).
In light of the waiver of constitutional rights inherent
in a guilty plea, the factual-basis requirement of Rule
14.4(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., allows the trial court to satisfy
itself subjectively as to whether the defendant knows what he
or she has done and that the acts committed by the defendant
constitute the crime with which he or she was charged.  Scott,
917 So. 2d at 165.  "A trial court [in a guilty-plea
proceeding] 
need 
not 
make 
itself 
aware 
of 
evidence
establishing the pleader's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in
1080779
14
order to satisfy itself subjectively that the pleader knows
both what he has done and that those acts constitute the crime
with which he is charged."  King v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 655, 656,
496 S.E.2d 30, 32 (1996).
Rule 
14.4(b), 
Ala. 
R. 
Crim. 
P., 
provides:
"Notwithstanding the acceptance of the plea of guilty, the
court shall not enter a judgment upon such plea without being
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea."  The
Committee Comments to Rule 14.4(b) provide:
"Section (b) satisfies the requirement in Clark
v. State, 294 Ala. 485, 488, 318 So.2d 805, 807-808
(1974), that:
"'In a plea of guilty proceedings, the
judge should undertake a factual inquiry to
determine if the plea is voluntarily made
with an understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.
Further, the judge should be satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea. ...
"'In such proceedings a trier of fact
does not seek to determine if the accused's
actions would justify a conviction on the
full charge contained in an indictment, but
only if such action satisfies the degree of
guilt admitted by the plea.'  
"The court may meet this requirement by eliciting an
in-court statement from the defendant, by an in-
court statement from the district attorney, or from
evidence presented, including that of witnesses,
which may be hearsay in whole or in part."
1080779
15
(Emphasis omitted.)
"The purpose of requiring the trial judge to determine
that there is a factual basis for the plea 'is to ensure the
accuracy of the plea through some evidence that a defendant
actually committed the offense.'" Alderman v. State, 615 So.
2d 640, 647 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)(quoting United States v.
Keiswatter, 860 F.2d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 1998), remand order
withdrawn and plea vacated on rehearing, 866 F.2d 1301 (10th
Cir. 1989)(en banc)).  "The only factual basis required for a
guilty plea is that which will satisfy the court that the
[defendant] knows what he is pleading guilty to."  Garner v.
State, 455 So. 2d 939, 940 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).  The
factual basis for a guilty plea may be established by several
sources.  "'As long as the factual basis is developed on the
record, it may come from several sources.'"  Yamada v. State,
426 So. 2d 906, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)(quoting United
States v. King, 604 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis
omitted)).  The district attorney's "assertions of what he
expects the evidence to show" will suffice.  Atteberry v.
State, 448 So. 2d 425, 427 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).  "[T]he
reading of the indictment [is] sufficient to establish a
1080779
16
factual basis for a guilty plea in certain cases, [and] in
those cases it is not required that the indictment be read
into the record during the guilty plea hearing."  Alvis v.
State, 740 So. 2d 459, 461 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).   
"A 
guilty 
plea, 
if 
entered 
voluntarily 
and 
with
understanding 
of 
the 
consequences, 
waives 
all 
non-
jurisdictional defects."  Ex parte Horton, 456 So. 2d 1120,
1122 (Ala. 1984).  A guilty plea waives the right to claim a
denial of a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Davis v. State, 469 So. 2d 1348 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); a
guilty plea waives the right to challenge the trial court's
refusal to suppress evidence.  Roden v. State, 384 So. 2d 1248
(Ala. Crim. App. 1980).  
"A guilty plea is a waiver of trial and a waiver
of the right to contest the admissibility of any
evidence the state might have offered against the
defendant, see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25
L.Ed.2d 785 (1970), including an illegal arrest, the
validity of a search and seizure, Vann v. State, 44
Ala.App. 523, 214 So.2d 925 (1968), or a prior
involuntary confession. Williams v. State, 283 Ala.
668, 220 So.2d 609 (1969)." 
 
Barnes v. State, 354 So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
1080779
17
The issue before this Court is whether the rule that a
defendant may not be convicted solely on the basis of a
confession should also apply to a guilty-plea conviction.  We
hold that the issue of the admissibility of the defendant's
confession without corroboration is waived by the defendant's
plea of guilty.  A guilty plea is a judicial confession.  "'A
voluntary guilty plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses
with the need for judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to
the defendant's guilt, and is an admission of all facts
sufficiently charged in the indictment.'"  Whitman v. State,
903 So. 2d 152, 155 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)(quoting Morrow v.
State, 426 So. 2d at 484).  The rule under which the corpus
delicti of a crime must be established applies only when the
confession is extrajudicial and the accused pleads not guilty,
compelling the prosecution to present evidence to prove its
case.  When a defendant pleads guilty, he or she admits every
fact constituting the elements of the offenses and such a plea
conclusively establishes the defendant's guilt.  Once the
trial court has determined that the plea is knowing and
voluntary, the trial court need only satisfy itself that the
defendant knew what he was pleading guilty to.  
1080779
18
"'In the United States our concept of
justice that finds no man guilty until
proven has led our state and federal courts
generally to refuse conviction on testimony
concerning confession of the accused not
made by him at the trial of his case....
In our country the doubt persists that the
zeal of the agencies of prosecution to
protect the peace, the self-interest of the
accomplice, the maliciousness of the enemy
or the aberration or weakness of the
accused under the strain of suspicion may
tinge or warp the facts of the confession.'
"No such doubt persists as to a voluntary plea
of guilty made with an understanding of the charge."
 
Waley v. United States, 233 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.
1956)(quoting Opper v United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90
(1954)).
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
reversing the trial court's denial of G.E.G.'s motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas to the drug-related charges and
remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
Shaw, J., recuses himself.*
*Justice Shaw was a member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals when that court considered this case.