Title: State v. Riley
Citation: 106 Ariz. 318, 475 P.2d 932
Docket Number: 2086
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 1970

106 Ariz. 318 (1970) 475 P.2d 932 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Vic Gregory RILEY, Appellant. No. 2086. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 28, 1970. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Clay G. Diamos, Tucson, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice. Appellant, Vic Gregory Riley, (hereinafter referred to as defendant) was convicted of violation of A.R.S. § 13-641, robbery, and sentenced to serve not less than five nor more than six years in the Arizona State Penitentiary. From his conviction and sentence he appeals. On January 2, 1969, three men entered the building of the Community Finance Company located at 3950 East Speedway, Tucson, Arizona. One of the three (hereinafter referred to as applicant) asked to apply for a loan and was directed to a booth to fill out an application. He then asked to use the restroom and upon his return produced a pistol and ordered the manager of the finance company, George Martinez, to fill a paper bag with money. Martinez complied and the applicant spoke to the other two men, telling them to take the manager and the two other employees, Joan Holdbrook and Tillie Martinez to the restroom in the back of the office. The employees were taken back and Joan Holdbrook testified that the two men followed them back part of the way. She also identified the defendant as one of the men who escorted them to the back of the building. The two other employees identified the defendant as being one of the three men who entered the building but could not state if he escorted them to the rear of the building. A preliminary hearing was held on April 9, 1969, for the defendant at which time Joan Holdbrook was the only witness. No counsel was appointed for the defendant at the preliminary hearing and he was bound over for trial. Defendant made a motion for severance which was granted and he went to trial on June 19, 1969, and was found guilty. Defendant first contends that the proof offered by the state was insufficient to *319 establish that he aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. He cites the case of State v. Bearden, 99 Ariz. 1, 405 P.2d 885, in his opening brief and argues that under the rule announced in that case the proof is insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. With this reading of the case we cannot agree. This court stated in Bearden, supra, that: The holding in the above supports the proposition that there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict in the instant case. There was no conflicting testimony here as to the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime with the two other men who robbed the finance company office but only a conflict among the witnesses as to the degree of the defendant's involvement. We have held that in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. State v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 142, 449 P.2d 607. We therefore hold that the proof introduced was sufficient to support a guilty verdict against this defendant. The defendant next contends that he was denied due process of law in that counsel was not appointed to represent him at the preliminary hearing. In State v. Schumacher, 97 Ariz. 354, 400 P.2d 584, we passed upon the question of whether the failure to assign counsel at a preliminary hearing was a violation of Sixth Amendment rights. In passing upon the question of whether a defendant is entitled to representation of counsel at preliminary hearing we held: In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387, decided June 22, 1970, in passing upon the right of counsel at a preliminary hearing the Supreme Court said: In Schumacher, supra, this court placed the duty upon the defendant to show that his rights had been prejudiced by not having counsel at the preliminary hearing. While in Coleman, supra, the court placed the duty upon the State to show that the defendant's rights had not been prejudiced by not having counsel at preliminary hearing. This is a procedural question and it is plain that in the future all defendants in this state should be represented by counsel or intelligently waive their rights to counsel. The instant case was tried on the 19th day of June, 1969, which was a year before the decision in the Coleman case. We are therefore confronted with the question of what effect it has on defendant's rights and whether it is retroactive. The record shows that the defendant was arraigned *321 in the Justice Court and that the complaint was read in full; that he was advised of his right to counsel. The record does not show whether he requested the appointment of counsel at that time or at any other time before his arraignment in the Superior Court. He called two witnesses at the trial, both of whom refused to answer questions upon the ground that it might incriminate them. The defendant presented no other evidence. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, in passing upon the question as to whether the decision in Miranda was retroactive said: In the instant case to hold that the procedure set forth in Coleman, supra, was retroactive would even more seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws for it would require a determination as to whether the rights of a defendant were prejudiced in some cases years after the trial and when such evidence was not available. The defendant, under the previous holding of this court in Schumacher, supra, could have raised the question as to whether his rights were prejudiced at or before trial, which was not done by the defendant in the instant case. Counsel for the defendant cross-examined each of the state's witnesses at his trial, including Joan Holdbrook, the only witness testifying at the preliminary hearing. The cross-examination does not reveal that the defendant was prejudiced by not having counsel at the preliminary hearing to cross-examine witnesses. The *322 same is true in regard to the defendant's right to call the other state's witnesses to testify at the preliminary hearing, nor would the two witnesses called at the trial by defendant who claimed their right to remain silent have been of any benefit to him at the preliminary hearing. The defendant in support of his argument that he was denied due process contends that Maricopa County provides attorneys for indigents at a preliminary hearing and that the failure of Pima County to provide attorneys for indigents at preliminary hearing is a denial of equal protection of the law. This is included in the question as to whether defendant's rights were prejudiced by not having an attorney at the preliminary hearing. We hold defendant's rights were not prejudiced by not having counsel at the preliminary hearing. State v. Schumacher, supra. We also hold Coleman v. Alabama, supra, is not retroactive as to cases tried before the date of the decision. Defendant's final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to give defendant's instruction No. 3. The requested instruction dealt with the defendant's silence at the time the crime was committed and the inferences that could be drawn therefrom. Defendant admits that the question of fact as to whether the defendant was an aider or abettor was covered by defendant's requested instruction No. 2 which was given. This court has held in State v. Michael, 103 Ariz. 46, 51, 436 P.2d 595, 600, that "Where requested instructions are adequately covered by other instructions of the court * * * it is not error to refuse them." In the instant case we feel that the matters dealt with in the refused instruction No. 3 were adequately covered by the instructions given and hence no error resulted from the refusal to give it. Judgment affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL, and HAYS, JJ., concur.