Title: Ex parte Ralph Eustace et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1171103
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2019

Rel: April 5, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1171103
____________________
Ex parte Ralph Eustace et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Ralph Eustace et al.
v.
James Ray Wilbourn et al.)
(Jackson Circuit Court, CV-04-150;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2161079)
BOLIN, Justice.
1171103
Ralph Eustace, Linda Eustace, and Daryl Eustace sued
James Ray ("Ray") Wilbourn and his wife Karen Wilbourn in the
Jackson Circuit Court ("the trial court"), alleging a 
trespass
to land and conversion of timber. The Wilbourns filed a
counterclaim, seeking to establish title to the subject land
and to recover in tort for intentional interference with a
contractual relationship. The trial court entered a judgment
in favor of the Eustaces on the trespass and conversion-of-
timber claims and determined that the Eustaces were entitled
to recover compensatory damages on those claims. The trial
court also entered a judgment in favor of the Wilbourns on the
claim 
asserting 
an 
intentional 
interference 
with 
a 
contractual
relationship and determined that the Wilbourns were  entitled
to an award of compensatory damages on that claim.  
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court, without an opinion.  Eustace v. Wilbourn (No.
2161079, July 13, 2018), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2018)(table).  The Eustaces petitioned this Court for a writ
of certiorari, asserting that the Court of Civil Appeals'
decision affirming the trial court's judgment on the
Wilbourns' claim of tortious interference with a contractual
2
1171103
relationship was in conflict with this Court's decision in
Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. Steiner, 404 So. 2d 14
(Ala. 1981). We granted the petition and, upon review,
determine that the Court of Civil Appeals lacked jurisdiction
over the case, because the appeal was taken from a nonfinal
judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2002, the Wilbourns purchased approximately 300 acres
of land from Ollie Fowler.  Before the Wilbourns purchased the
property, Fowler had showed the Wilbourns what Fowler thought
were the boundary lines of the property.  The land purchased
by the Wilbourns adjoined land owned by Ralph Eustace.  Ralph
Eustace  had lived on his property for 82 years, excepting the
time he spent in the military.  
In 2004, the Wilbourns entered into an auction contract
with Fowler Auction and Real Estate Service, Inc. ("Fowler
Auction Company"), pursuant to which Fowler Auction Company
agreed to auction the Wilbourns' property for a fee of
$14,000. Before the property was auctioned, the Wilbourns had
the timber on their property cut.  Ray Wilbourn testified that
he told the loggers to stay 150 feet away from what he thought
3
1171103
was the property line between his property and the Eustaces'
property.  While Wilbourn was having the timber cut from his
property, he also had a surveyor on the property surveying it
for the upcoming auction. Ray Wilbourn testified that one
evening the surveyor informed him that Ray Wilbourn had a
"problem," because Wilbourn had cut timber on land owned by
Ralph Eustace.  Wilbourn immediately ceased cutting timber
that evening and contacted Ralph Eustace the 
following morning
to explain that his crew had cut a significant amount of
timber on Ralph Eustace's side of the property line. In order
to survey the area together, Ray Wilbourn testified that he
and Ralph Eustace  rode to the area where the timber had been
cut. After learning of the error, Ray Wilbourn did not cut any
additional timber on Ralph Eustace's  property. 
Ralph Eustace testified that approximately $40,000 worth
of timber had been mistakenly cut from his property.  The
Eustaces presented  testimony from a certified forester that
indicated that the value of the timber removed from the
property was approximately $35,810. Ralph Eustace further
testified that his  property was valued at approximately
$97,000 before the timber was cut from the property and that
4
1171103
the property was valued at approximately $48,000 after the
timber had been removed from his property.
On April 13, 2004, Ray Wilbourn entered into an auction
sales contract with Morris Sherlis for the sale of his
approximately 300 acres of land. The closing on the sale was
set for May 13, 2004.  Before closing, Ray Wilbourn and
Sherlis had agreed that the Wilbourns would "clean up the
roads ... and put in some gates" on the property. Ralph
Eustace testified that, in the process of selling the
property, the Wilbourns restricted the access to his property
by rerouting a road, pushing up a berm, and erecting a gate.
Ralph Eustace testified that it would cost approximately
$2,500 to remediate the road allowing access to the Eustaces'
property.
On May 13, 2004, the date the Wilbourns and Sherlis were
scheduled to close on the sale of the Wilbourns' land,  the
Eustaces sued the Wilbourns, alleging a trespass to their
property and conversion of timber. The Eustaces also sought a
declaration of the parties' respective rights as to a right-
of-way that traversed the Wilbourns' property to 
the 
Eustaces'
property.  On that same date, the Eustaces also filed a lis
5
1171103
pendens notice in the Jackson Probate Court pursuant to § 35-
4-131(a), Ala. Code 1975.  The lis pendens notice described
only that portion of the Eustaces' property from which Ray
Wilbourn had cut the timber. Ray Wilbourn testified that he
received a telephone call from the closing attorney on the day
of closing, notifying him that the closing could not proceed
because of the lis pendens notice filed by the Eustaces. 
Subsequently, Sherlis backed out of the purchase of the
Wilbourns' property.  The Wilbourns eventually sold the
property to a second purchaser for the same sale price they
had contracted with Sherlis for the purchase of the property. 
However, Ray Wilbourn testified that  the canceled sale of the
property caused him to incur additional expenses related to
the sale of the property to a second purchaser. 
On July 16, 2004, the Wilbourns filed a counterclaim
against the Eustaces, asserting a claim of intentional
interference with a contractual relationship.  The Wilbourns
alleged that the Eustaces refused to acknowledge to the
closing 
attorney 
that 
no 
property 
outside 
the 
land
specifically described in the lis pendens notice was subject
to the notice. In other words, the Wilbourns claimed that the
6
1171103
Eustaces "weaponized" the lis pendens notice by allowing the
closing attorney to believe and/or to be convinced that the
Wilbourns' property as a whole was subject to the lis pendens
notice, rather than just the portion of the Eustaces' property
described in the lis pendens notice.
Following an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court, on
May 5, 2017, entered the following order, which states, in
relevant part:
"The Court finds that [the Eustaces are]
entitled to an award of compensatory damages for
[the Wilbourns'] trespass upon the property owned by
[the Eustaces] and the cutting and selling of timber
thereon without [the Eustaces'] permission.
"The Court 
further finds that [the Eustaces are]
entitled to an award of compensatory damages for the
conversion of the timber cut and sold by [the
Wilbourns] on [the Eustaces'] property. 
"....
"The Court 
further finds that [the Eustaces] did
intentionally 
interfere 
with 
the 
contractual
relations of [the Wilbourns] by filing a lis pendens
notice in the Office of the Judge of Probate,
Jackson County Alabama, thereby interfering with
[the Wilbourns'] sale of the property to third-party
purchasers. [The Wilbourns are] therefore entitled
to damages from [the Eustaces] associated with the
harm caused by said intentional conduct. 
"The Court finds that any damages awarded to
[the Eustaces] from [the Wilbourns] herein and any
damages awarded to [the Wilbourns] from [the
7
1171103
Eustaces] herein are hereby offset against the
other."
Discussion
This Court addresses ex mero motu the lack of appellate
jurisdiction when an appeal is taken from a nonfinal judgment.
Beam v. Taylor, 149 So. 3d 571 (Ala. 2014); Powell v. Republic
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 293 Ala. 101, 300 So. 2d 359 (1974).  In
Ford Motor Co. v. Tunnell, 641 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Ala. 1994),
this Court stated the following regarding the finality of
judgments: 
"This Court has defined a final judgment as 'a
terminative decision by a court of competent
jurisdiction which demonstrates there has been a
complete adjudication of all matters in controversy
between the litigants within the cognizance of that
Court. That is, it must be conclusive and certain in
itself.' Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co.,
331 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1976). Further, we had
stated: 'All matters should be decided; damages
should be assessed with specificity leaving the
parties with nothing to determine on their own.'
Jewell, 331 So. 2d at 625."
"'A judgment for damages to be final must ... be for a sum
certain determinable without resort to extraneous facts.'"
Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 351 So. 2d 547, 551 (Ala. 1977)
(quoting Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So. 2d
623, 625 (Ala. 1976)). "That a judgment is not final when the
8
1171103
amount of damages has not been fixed by it is unquestionable."
"Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of America v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
351 So. 2d 555, 557 (Ala. 1977).
Here, the trial court determined that all parties were
entitled to compensatory damages and purportedly awarded said
damages without determining with specificity the amount of
compensatory damages to which each party was entitled. 
Although the trial court did offset the damages awards, doing
so did not remedy the defect inherent in the judgment by the
trial court's failure to assess with specificity the amount of
damages to which each party was entitled. The finality of the
judgment is merely illusory, because it is conditioned upon
the judgment in favor of the Wilbourns on the intentional
interference with a contractual relationship claim being
affirmed on appeal. Should the judgment on that claim be
reversed on appeal, the basis for the offset of the
compensatory-damages awards is removed, and the case must then
be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the
damages to which the Eustaces are entitled on the judgment in
their favor on the trespass and conversion claims. In that
9
1171103
case, there would not have been a "complete adjudication of
all matters" between the parties. Tunnell, 641 So. 2d at 1238.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals
lacked jurisdiction over this case, because the judgment from
which it was taken was not a final judgment.  Therefore, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand
the case to that court with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as being from a nonfinal judgment. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result. 
   
 
 
 
10