Title: Clark v. Wright
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALLISON (WRIGHT) CLARK, 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 130, 2007 
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below—Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   File No:  CK05-02420, 05-29202 
RICHARD WRIGHT, 
 
 
§     06-31685 and 06-34972 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  August 8, 2007 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  August 20, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
This 20th day of August 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
The petitioner-appellant, Allison Wright Clark (the “Mother”), 
appeals from the Family Court’s final judgment granting the respondent-
appellee, Richard Wright (the “Father”), primary residential placement of 
the parties’ daughter, S., and providing the Mother with standard visitation.  
On appeal, the Mother contends that the Family Court’s award of primary 
custody to the Father constitutes an abuse of discretion because the 
inferences drawn concerning the Mother’s remarriage and relocation are not 
supported by the record, nor are they the product of an orderly and logical 
deductive process.  Alternatively, the Mother contends that the Family 
Court’s award of primary custody to the Father constitutes an abuse of 
 
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discretion because it relied solely on unsupported inferences to the exclusion 
of other relevant established facts, including evidence that the child was 
being primarily cared for by the paternal grandmother and great 
grandmother while in the Father’s custody. 
2) 
We have concluded that the record evidence does not support 
either of the Mother’s arguments.  The record reflects that the Family Court 
properly exercised its discretion in applying established law to the facts of 
this case.  Consequently, the judgment of the Family Court must be 
affirmed. 
3) 
The parties are the parents of a three-year-old child born on 
November 6, 2003.  The Mother is twenty-six years old and is employed as 
an Information Manager with the United States Air Force.  The Father is 
twenty-nine years old and is employed by Comcast Cable.  In September 
2005, the Mother filed petitions for divorce and custody with the Family 
Court, seeking primary residential placement of S. 
4) 
After being served with the Mother’s petition for custody, 
which the Father answered on October 5, 2005, the Father refused to return 
S. to the Mother at the next scheduled exchange on advice of his Maryland 
counsel.  The Mother then moved for Emergency Relief, which the Family 
Court granted.  The Family Court’s order reinstated the 50/50 shared 
 
3
placement arrangement between the parties, which remained in place from 
the parties separation in February 2005 until the Family Court’s February 
2007 Order for Custody—a period of two years. 
 
5) 
The Mother and the Father divorced in October 2005.  On 
August 20, 2006, the Mother remarried George C. (“George”), who is a 
member of the United States Air Force.  By the time of trial, George had 
transferred from his base in Florida to Maguire Air Force Base in New 
Jersey to be with the Mother in Yardley, Pennsylvania.  The Mother, who 
was residing in Delaware, testified that she intended to move to 
Pennsylvania.  The Father resided in Baltimore, Maryland.  Thus, there was 
a hundred mile distance between the parents, who were dividing residential 
custody of S. equally between their residences.  The Mother’s new residence 
in Yardley, Pennsylvania added twenty-three additional miles from her 
former residence in Dover, Delaware to the Father’s residence in Baltimore.   
6) 
A hearing on the Mother’s petition for custody was scheduled 
for January 31, 2006.  The Mother appeared with counsel and was prepared 
to go forward, but the Father requested a continuance to retain counsel and 
the hearing was rescheduled to April 21, 2006.  On the Mother’s request, a 
review hearing was scheduled for December 6, 2006.  At the hearing, both 
 
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the Father and the Mother requested an award of primary residential 
custody. 
7) 
The testimony at the December 6, 2006 hearing established that 
the Mother works Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and 
that the Father works Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.  
In addition to his Comcast employment, the Father runs a real estate 
business rehabilitating properties.  He also takes courses twice a week from 
6:00 to 10:00 p.m.  Although the Father lives alone, his mother and 
grandmother live 200 yards away.  While in the Father’s care, S. attends 
daycare.  The Father takes S. to daycare at 6:30 a.m. and S.’s paternal 
grandmother picks her up when the the Father cannot get off work in time to 
do that himself.  According to the paternal grandmother, S. called her (the 
grandmother) S.’s best friend.  Both S.’s grandmother and her great 
grandmother were involved in taking care of S. from time to time. 
8) 
The evidence at trial disclosed that both parents love and care 
for the child in their own way,1 and both were adamant that they wanted the 
Family Court to decide who would have primary placement of their minor 
child.  The Mother testified that she wanted primary residential placement of 
S. because she and the Father do not communicate well and they have two 
                                          
 
1 Family Court’s Order, dated February 26, 2007, at 6. 
 
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different styles of rearing the child.  The Mother was also concerned about 
the Father’s use of physical discipline.  The Mother testified that she noticed 
several marks on S. that concerned her, including a large red bruise like 
mark on the child’s face and scratches and bruises on the child’s buttocks.  
The Mother also testified that she had found ringworm on child’s leg 
approximately two weeks before trial.  The Father explained that the large 
red mark on S.’s face was a “something bite” and that the marks on S.’s 
backside were caused by “wood chips” on the slide at the playground.  The 
Father admitted that he had spanked S. once, but was able to speak with her 
in a stern voice to make certain she behaved. 
9) 
On February 26, 2007, after considering the eight interests-of-
the-child factors under 13 Del. C. § 722(a),2 the Family Court awarded 
                                          
 
2 13 Del. C. § 722(a) provides that:  
 
(a) 
The Court shall determine the legal custody and residential 
arrangements for a child in accordance with the best interests of 
the child.  In determining the best interests of the child, the Court 
shall consider all relevant factors including: 
(1) 
The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his or her 
custody and residential arrangements; 
(2) 
The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian(s) and 
residential arrangements; 
(3) 
The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or 
her parents, grandparents, siblings, persons cohabiting in 
the relationship of husband and wife with a parent of the 
child, any other residents of the household or persons who 
may significantly affect the child's best interests; 
(4) 
The child's adjustment to his or her home, school and 
community; 
 
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primary residential placement of S. to the Father, with standard visitation 
rights awarded to the Mother.   
10) 
The Mother first claims that the Family Court’s award of 
primary residential custody to the Father was an abuse of discretion because 
the inferences drawn concerning the mother’s remarriage and relocation are 
not supported by the record and are not the product of an orderly and logical 
reasoning process.  We review the Family Court’s decisions concerning 
child custody for abuse of discretion.  The judgment of the trial judge will 
not be disturbed if it is a product of a logical and orderly reasoning process.3  
“It is only when the rulings of law or the findings in the Family Court are 
clearly wrong and the doing of justice requires their overturn that we are free 
to make contradictory findings.”4 
 
11) 
In this case, the Father has continuously resided in Maryland, 
within walking distance of his mother and grandmother, both of whom have 
                                                                                                                             
 
(5) 
The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; 
(6) 
Past and present compliance by both parents with their 
rights and responsibilities to their child under § 701 of this 
title; 
(7) 
Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in Chapter 
7A of this title; and 
(8) 
The criminal history of any party or any other resident of 
the household including whether the criminal history 
contains pleas of guilty or no contest or a conviction of a 
criminal offense. 
13 Del. C. § 722(a) (1999 & Supp. 2004). 
3 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
4 Delong v. Stanley, 1997 Del. LEXIS 374, at *2 (Del. Oct. 9, 1997), citing Levitt v. 
Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671 (Del. 1972). 
 
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significant relationships with S.  At one point, the paternal great 
grandmother provided care for S. until a recent surgery.  The paternal 
grandmother also picks up S. from daycare if the Father cannot get off from 
work on time.  According to the Father, he, his mother, his grandmother and 
S. usually eat dinner together.  In addition (according to S.’s grandmother) 
S. called the grandmother her best friend.  There was also evidence showing 
that S.’s great grandmother was accustomed to spending significant time at 
the Father’s home to take care of S. before she recently became too ill.  
12) 
Thus, the facts of record support the Family Court’s finding 
that: (i) a close and tender relationship exists among the Father, S.’s 
grandmother and S.’s great grandmother, and the child herself, and (ii) the 
child integrated into the Father’s home and extended family very well.  
Moreover, the child was evidently happy and doing well in Kindercare in 
Baltimore, Maryland, when the Father took custody of the child. 
13) 
In contrast (the record reflects), had the Mother been awarded 
primary residential placement of S., the child’s life could be more uncertain 
and unpredictable.  First, the Mother’s new husband and S.’s stepfather—
George—had never resided with the Mother and S.  Second, George had 
only seen S. about five times.  George testified that he had never been alone 
with S.  Third, if primary placement of the child were granted to the Mother, 
 
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the Mother would change the child’s daycare again in the near future, since 
she planned to relocate to Pennsylvania in February 2007. 
 
14) 
The record does not support the contention that the Family 
Court improperly inferred that the Mother’s remarriage to George and her 
impending relocation from Dover to Yardley, Pennsylvania could 
detrimentally affect S.  The Family Court balanced the Father’s home, which 
affords the child a permanent, secure, and stable environment, against the 
Mother’s home, which would be unpredictable and uncertain, and reached 
its conclusion based on that evidence.  That is, based on the evidence and the 
relevant factors of 13 Del. C. § 722(a), the Family Court reasonably 
determined that moving S. from Father’s home to an unknown, tenuous 
situation in Mother’s home was not in the child’s best interests.5   
15) 
Alternatively, the Mother claims that the Family Court’s award 
of primary residential custody to the Father was an abuse of discretion 
because it relied solely on unsupported inferences to the exclusion of other 
relevant facts.  The standard of review of a Family Court’s child support 
determination is abuse of discretion.6  The Mother contends that there were 
                                          
 
5 See B.A.S. v. J.E.S., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 49 (Del. Fam. Apr. 3, 2006), in a 
decision regarding child custody, the court considered the factors of 13 Del. C. § 722, 
finding that it was important for the children to enjoy a consistent, stable environment, 
and that the children should continue to make their primary residence with the mother. 
6 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
 
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nine “relevant factors” with ample evidentiary support, that outweighed all 
the other factors relevant to the custody determination.7   
(16) None of the nine factors relied upon by Mother are statutory 
factors set forth in 13 Del. C. § 722.  However, we have held that “a Family 
Court judge ‘has discretion to consider additional factors as long as it 
considers all of the statutory enumerated factors’ mandated in section 722.”8  
Here, the record reflects that all the factors claimed by the Mother were 
refuted by the Father in his testimony.  It was for the Family Court to view 
the witnesses and weigh their credibility.  There was no abuse of discretion 
by the Family Court for failing to specifically address each of the non-
statutory factors upon which the Mother claims to have relied in this case. 
                                          
 
7 The nine “relevant factors” Mother claims are: 
1. Father’s failure to comply with his obligations as a custodian by 
wrongfully keeping and retaining the child for one month and preventing 
contact with Mother in complete disregard for the child’s emotional 
health. 
2. Father’s failure to communicate with Mother regarding the selection of daycare 
for S. in Baltimore. 
3. Father’s failure to inform Mother that he moved his residence. 
4. Father’s overzealous use of discipline and his unrealistic expectations for his 
daughter’s behavior. 
5. Father’s flimsy explanation for the numerous bruises or scratches on his 
daughter’s buttocks that were so alarming to cause Mother to take child for a 
pediatric examination. 
6. The generally poor condition the child is in when returned to Mother’s care. 
7. Father’s complete delegation of responsibility of care of S. to his mother and 
grandmother when the child is with him. 
8. The child’s attachment to Mother. 
9. Mother’s greater availability to care for the child after her regular work hours. 
8 Mundy v. Devon, 906 A.2d 750, 753 (Del. 2006), citing Potter v. Branson, 2005 Del. 
LEXIS 219, at *2 (Del. June 13, 2005). 
 
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17) 
Finally, the Mother contends that the Family Court’s decision 
improperly permits the paternal grandmother and great grandmother to have 
an involvement in the day-to-day care of S. superior to that of the Mother, 
based upon speculative and unfounded concerns regarding the Mother’s 
remarriage and relocation.  The record reflects that the paternal grandmother 
and great grandmother are involved in raising and caring for S. and that a 
good, close and loving relationship exists between them.  However, those 
relationships are only one of the relevant statutory factors that the Family 
Court took into account in reaching its decision.  The Family Court also 
considered each of the eight “best interest” factors under 13 Del. C. § 
722(a), none of which is solely determinative.  The primary residential 
placement of the child was granted to the Father, not to the Father’s mother 
or grandmother.  Thus, Family Court did not hold that the role of the 
paternal grandmother and great grandmother in caring of S. took precedence 
over the natural mother’s right to custody. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Family Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice