Title: Wyeth, Inc., and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050926
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 2010

REL: 01-15-2010 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 (334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
____________________
1050926
____________________
Wyeth, Inc., and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-03-6046)
PER CURIAM.
Wyeth, Inc., and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Wyeth"), appeal from a class-
certification order of the Jefferson Circuit Court concluding
that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama ("BCBSAL") met the
1050926
2
prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a) and
23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  We vacate the order and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On or about July 15, 1997, Wyeth began distributing
Duract, a nonsteroidal, anti-inflammatory drug prescribed for
the short-term management of acute pain.  The labeling for
Duract included an insert provided to physicians, pharmacists,
and patients, directing that patients take at most 1 to 2
capsules every 6 to 8 hours and that Duract should be used
only for a period of 10 days or less.  The Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") had approved Duract and its labeling
before the drug was released into the marketplace.
In December 1997, Wyeth received reports of liver
problems, some life-threatening, in patients who had taken
Duract for an extended period.  In February 1998, Wyeth sought
and received FDA approval for a revised package insert for
Duract, which described the reports of liver problems
resulting from the overuse of the drug and which reemphasized
that Duract was intended "only for the short term (10 days or
less)."  
1050926
Wyeth used a different formula to reimburse pharmacies,
1
distributors, and wholesalers for the capsules of Duract those
entities had in their possession.
3
Following the release of the new package insert, Wyeth
continued to receive reports of adverse liver effects for
long-term users of Duract.  These reports caused Wyeth to
conclude that no change in the package insert could guarantee
that physicians would stop prescribing Duract for long-term
use.  Therefore, Wyeth voluntarily withdrew Duract from the
market on June 22, 1998, notifying the public of its decision
to do so through a press release.  
As part of the process of withdrawing Duract from the
market, 
Wyeth 
voluntarily 
instituted 
a 
customer-refund 
program
for retail customers who still had Duract capsules in their
possession.  The program provided that Wyeth would reimburse
retail customers at the rate of $1.15 per capsule for every
Duract capsule returned to Wyeth, with a minimum of a $5.00
refund regardless of the number of pills returned.   The
1
reimbursement amount was set at a price above the retail cost
of the capsules in order to provide a greater incentive for
customers to return the capsules that remained in their
possession.  Wyeth did not require that customers have a
1050926
This case was filed before the February 18, 2005,
2
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d), which is one reason this Court has jurisdiction to
address the class-certification issues presented here.
4
receipt in order to take advantage of the refund.  Wyeth
refunded 
approximately 
$705,000 
to 
approximately 
18,000 
retail
customers during the refund program.  Wyeth's designated
corporate representative in this litigation, Dennis Markle,
testified by deposition that Wyeth instituted the customer-
refund program because "it was the right thing to do." 
BCBSAL sued Wyeth on September 23, 2003, alleging breach
of implied contract and unjust enrichment.  BCBSAL is a
health-insurance company that pays, in whole or in part, the
health-care costs of its insureds in exchange for premiums;
BCBSAL is what is known as a third-party payer ("TPP") of
health-care services.  BCBSAL also acts as an administrator
for health plans of self-funded insurance groups, performing
administration functions in exchange for a fee.
BCBSAL filed its first amended complaint on June 22,
2004, asserting that class treatment for all TPPs nationwide
was appropriate and seeking certification of a class of all
TPPs.   On December 17, 2004, BCBSAL filed a motion for class
2
certification 
and 
asking 
to 
be 
designated 
the 
class
1050926
5
representative for all TPPs that paid for Duract capsules that
went unused following the withdrawal of the drug from the
market on June 22, 1998.
BCBSAL filed a second amended complaint on December 29,
2004, in which it sought recovery against Wyeth solely on a
theory of unjust enrichment.  BCBSAL alleged that it and other
TPPs "conferred on [Wyeth] a benefit in the form of the
consideration of the purchase price paid by [the putative
class members] for unused Duract."  The payment for these
unused capsules, BCBSAL claimed, "was erroneously made, and
would not have been made if [the putative class members] had
been aware that substantial portions of the Duract for which
it conferred a benefit would be unused due to the withdrawal
of Duract."  The complaint concluded that the "[r]etention of
the benefit conferred upon [Wyeth] by [the putative class
members] is inequitable and has resulted in the unjust
enrichment of [Wyeth]."  
After a hearing on the class-certification motion, the
trial court entered an order certifying a nationwide class of
TPPs "who paid for the prescription drug Duract that was not
used as of the date of its withdrawal from the market on June
1050926
Section 6-5-642 provides, in pertinent part:  "A court's
3
order certifying a class or refusing to certify a class action
shall be appealable in the same manner as a final order to the
appellate court which would otherwise have jurisdiction over
the appeal from a final order in the action." 
6
22, 1998, because the prescribed course of Duract for which
payment was made did not expire until after its withdrawal
from the market."  Any TPPs that purchased Duract directly
from Wyeth were explicitly excluded from class membership.
Pursuant to § 6-5-642, Ala. Code 1975,  Wyeth filed an
3
interlocutory appeal from the order certifying the class.  
II.  Standard of Review
"This Court applies an abuse-of-discretion
standard 
of 
review 
to 
a 
trial 
court's
class-certification order, but we will review de
novo the question whether the trial court applied
the correct legal standard in reaching its decision
to certify a class.  ...
"If 
the 
[plaintiffs] 
fail 
to 
meet 
the
evidentiary burden as required by Rule 23, [Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] then the order certifying the ... class[]
constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. ...  The [plaintiffs] must establish all of
the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P., 
and 
one 
of 
the 
criteria 
set 
forth 
in
Rule 23(b)."
Smart Prof'l Photocopy Corp. v. Childers-Sims, 850 So. 2d
1245, 1248-49 (Ala. 2002) (citing Compass Bank v. Snow, 823
So. 2d 667 (Ala. 2001)).
1050926
Wyeth also contends that it does not "hold" any money
4
related to the sales of unused Duract capsules because it
refunded the value of the capsules (plus an incentive amount)
to retail customers and because it credited pharmacies and
wholesalers for all Duract capsules they returned.  Similarly,
it contends that it does not "hold" any money from TPPs
related to Duract sales because the TPPs never paid Wyeth
directly; the TPPs paid the pharmacies or their insureds. 
7
III.  Analysis
A.  Standing
At the outset, Wyeth contends that BCBSAL lacks standing
to serve as class representative because, Wyeth argues, BCBSAL
did not sustain an injury of a nature required for standing.
It argues that BCBSAL did not allege any loss, financial or
otherwise, resulting from the withdrawal of Duract from the
market, and that BCBSAL did not allege that it made payments
to insureds or to pharmacies that were more than it would have
made had the withdrawal not occurred.  Wyeth also notes that,
despite the withdrawal, BCBSAL received the same premiums from
its insureds that it normally would receive in exchange for
paying their health-care expenses.   
4
BCBSAL contends that Wyeth's argument that the payments
made by BCBSAL do not give BCBSAL standing actually goes to
the merits of BCBSAL's unjust-enrichment claim despite being
"dressed up as if ... subject matter jurisdiction were
1050926
Because 
standing 
does 
implicate 
subject-matter
5
jurisdiction, we address it before considering whether BCBSAL
has 
demonstrated 
the 
elements 
necessary 
for 
class
certification under Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P.
8
implicated."  BCBSAL also contends that Wyeth's argument as to
standing was not presented to the trial court.  
5
BCBSAL specifically alleges that the payments made by
TPPs for the purchase of Duract were "erroneously made, and
would not have been made if the TPPs had been aware that
substantial portions of the Duract for which it conferred a
benefit would be unused due to the withdrawal of Duract."  In
other words, under the particular theory of unjust enrichment
urged by BCBSAL, the withdrawal of Duract from the market
rendered BCBSAL's payments, to the extent allocable to those
Duract capsules that eventually went unused, an unjust benefit
to Wyeth.  BCBSAL's claimed injury is its payment for unused
Duract capsules. 
We begin our analysis of this issue by observing that our
courts too often have fallen into the trap of treating as an
issue of "standing" that which is merely a failure to state a
cognizable cause of action or legal theory, or a failure to
satisfy the injury element of a cause of action.  As the
authors of Federal Practice and Procedure explain:
1050926
9
"The question whether the law recognizes the
cause of action stated by a plaintiff is frequently
transformed into inappropriate standing terms. The
[United States] Supreme Court has stated succinctly
that the cause-of-action question is not a question
of standing."
13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur K. Miller, and Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531 (2008) (noting,
however, that the United States Supreme Court, itself, has on
occasion "succumbed to the temptation to mingle these
questions").  The authors go on to explain:
"Standing goes to the existence of sufficient
adversariness 
to 
satisfy 
both 
Article 
III
case-or-controversy 
requirements 
and 
prudential
concerns. In determining standing, the nature of the
injury asserted is relevant to determine the
existence of the required personal stake and
concrete adverseness.  ...  The focus of the
cause-of-action inquiry must not be confused with
standing -- it does not go to the quality or extent
of the plaintiff's injury, but to the nature of the
right asserted."
13A Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.6 (emphasis added).
Cf. 13B Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.10 (discussing
citizen and taxpayer standing and explaining that "a plaintiff
cannot rest on a showing that a statute is invalid, but must
show 'some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common
with people generally'").
1050926
10
In the present case, Wyeth appears to argue that the
plaintiff, BCBSAL, lacks standing because, Wyeth says,
BCBSAL's allegations, even if true, would not entitle it to a
recovery.  In responding to a similar argument, the court in
Angleton v. Pierce, 574 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D.N.J. 1983),
articulated a correct understanding of the aforestated
difference between the issue of a plaintiff's standing and the
issue of the viability of a plaintiff's cause of action:
"Associates appears to argue that plaintiffs
lack standing because they have no legal right to
the relief they seek. Associates has confused
standing with failure to state a claim. The two are
conceptually distinct: when standing is at issue,
the court asks whether the plaintiffs are the proper
parties to bring the action, whereas failure to
state a claim focuses not on the parties but on the
existence of a cause of action (i.e., on the
merits). Kirby v. Department of HUD, 675 F.2d 60,
63-64 (3d Cir. 1982); Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d
1145, 1151 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1982)."
Thus, the focus of an inquiry into standing is not on the
viability of the legal theory asserted; rather, the focus is
on whether the plaintiff is the "proper part[y] to bring the
action."  If the legal theory itself is not a viable one under
applicable law, that is a different question.  The question
whether the right asserted by BCBSAL is an enforceable one in
the first place, i.e., whether BCBSAL has seized upon a legal
1050926
11
theory our law accepts, is a cause-of-action issue, not a
standing issue. 
Thus, 
although 
questions 
may 
exist 
regarding 
the
viability under Alabama law of the particular legal theory
asserted by BCBSAL (see the discussion in Part III.B. of this
opinion), if we assume that theory to be viable for purposes
of our standing inquiry, it is easy to see that BCBSAL has
"the required personal stake" to assert that theory.  If
BCBSAL's legal theory is viable, i.e., if BCBSAL's payment for
unused Duract capsules resulted in the unjust enrichment of
Wyeth at BCBSAL's expense, BCBSAL's effort to recover the
funds it paid for the unused Duract reflects the "personal
stake and concrete adverseness" necessary for standing. 
Nor do we see that the consideration of the legal theory
asserted by BCBSAL is outside the subject-matter jurisdiction
of either the trial court or this Court.  The courts of this
State exist for the very purpose of performing such tasks as
sorting out what constitutes a cognizable cause of action,
what are the elements of a cause of action, and whether the
allegations of a given complaint meet those elements.  Such
tasks lie at the core of the judicial function.  See
1050926
12
generally, e.g., Art. VI, § 139(a), Ala. Const. 1901 (vesting
"the judicial power of the state" in this Court and lower
courts of the State); Art. VI, § 142, Ala. Const. 1901
(providing that the circuit courts of this State "shall
exercise general jurisdiction in all cases except as may
otherwise be provided by law").  Trial courts and appellate
courts routinely undertake to determine whether there is a
"provable set of facts, upon [a] cognizable theory of law."
Anderson v. Clark, 775 So. 2d 749, 750 (Ala. 1999).  See also
Dawson v. Bank Independent, 602 So. 2d 351 (Ala. 1992); Bonner
v. Henson, 693 So. 2d 484, 485-86 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).  The
issue Wyeth seeks to frame for this Court as one of "standing"
is, in reality, an issue as to the cognizability of the legal
theory asserted by BCBSAL, not of BCBSAL's standing to assert
that theory or the subject-matter jurisdiction of this Court
to consider it.
B.  Class-Action Requirements Under Rule 23
Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P., states, in pertinent part:
"(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action.  One or
more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
1050926
13
of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
"(b) Class Actions Maintainable.  An action may
be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites
of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
"....
"(3) the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class
predominate 
over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action."
"A Rule 23 determination is wholly procedural and has nothing
to do with whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail ...."
Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236, 241
(E.D. Mich. 1997) (comment on Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.).  We
also note that, in examining the several prerequisites for
class certification contained in Rule 23, it should be kept in
mind that "Alabama's Rule 23 and the corresponding federal
1050926
14
rule (Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.) are 'virtually identical,' ...
and '[f]ederal authorities are persuasive when [a court is]
interpreting the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.'"  Mitchell
v. H & R Block, Inc., 783 So. 2d 812, 816 (Ala. 2000) (quoting
Marshall Durbin & Co. v. Jasper Utils. Bd., 437 So. 2d 1014,
1025 (Ala. 1983), and Rowan v. First Bank of Boaz, 476 So. 2d
44, 46 (Ala. 1985)).  
"The party seeking certification bears the burden of
showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and
at least one requirement of Rule 23(b) have been met."  Allied
Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group L.P., 247
F.R.D. 156, 164 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  BCBSAL seeks certification
under Rule 23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  We have previously noted
that "[a] number of these criteria, such as the Rule 23(a)
requirements 
of 
commonality 
and 
typicality 
and 
the
Rule 23(b)(3) requirement of predominance, are analytically
similar."  Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So. 2d
1111, 1116 (Ala. 2003) (citing Heartland Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Sprint Corp., 161 F.R.D. 111, 117 (D. Kan. 1995)).  Wyeth
questions the trial court's conclusions with regard to
predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3), as well as
1050926
15
commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a).  We turn first to
the trial court's conclusion that common questions of law or
fact predominate in this case.
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that "questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members ...."  The trial
court considered the question of predominance in response to
Wyeth's contention that claims alleging unjust enrichment
generally are not suitable for class treatment.  Among other
things, Wyeth argued to the trial court, and argues to this
Court, that the predominance requirement is not met here
because prosecution of an unjust-enrichment claim will require
each class member to establish that it paid for unused Duract
under a mistake of fact or in reliance on a fraudulent
misrepresentation.  
The trial court acknowledged that this Court's decisions
provide ample support for Wyeth's contention that unjust-
enrichment claims generally are not appropriate for class
certification.  This Court explained in Heilman as follows:
"Because unjust-enrichment claims are fact
specific to each case, this Court has repeatedly
held 
that 
such 
claims 
are 
unsuitable 
for
class-action treatment.  Funliner of Alabama, L.L.C.
1050926
16
v. Pickard, 873 So. 2d 198, 211 (Ala. 2003)
(unjust-enrichment claims based on allegations of
'mistake 
or 
fraud' require an 'individualized
inquiry into the state of mind of each plaintiff');
[Voyager Life Ins. Co. v.] Whitson, 867 So. 2d
[1065,] 1074 [(Ala. 2003)] (unjust-enrichment claims
based on an alleged 'mistake of fact' could not be
certified 
for 
class-action 
treatment, 
because
'[c]lass members would be required to demonstrate
mistake of fact on an individual basis'); Smart
Professional Photocopy Corp. v. Childers-Sims, 850
So. 2d 1245, 1249 (Ala. 2002) ('proof essential to
support the [class-action plaintiffs'] claims of
unjust enrichment ... defeats the predominance and
superiority 
requirements 
of 
Rule 
23(b)(3)');
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Hill, [825 So. 2d 100 (Ala.
2002)]."
876 So. 2d at 1123.
The trial court distinguished all of these cases on the
basis that they involved a mistake of fact or fraud and agreed
with BCBSAL's argument that "[a]n unjust enrichment claim need
not depend on proof of mistake or fraud."  For support, the
trial court cited this Court's explanation of unjust
enrichment in Heilman:  "To prevail on a claim of unjust
enrichment, the plaintiff must show that the '"defendant holds
money which, in equity and good conscience, belongs to the
plaintiff or holds money which was improperly paid to
defendant because of mistake or fraud."'"  Heilman, 876 So. 2d
at 1122-23 (quoting Dickinson v. Cosmos Broad. Co., 782 So. 2d
1050926
As discussed in Part III.A., supra, the questions
6
concerning the viability of BCBSAL's asserted cause of action
and BCBSAL's standing to present that cause of action to a
court are two separate questions.  What the elements of that
cause of action are, however, and the commonality of those
elements under Alabama law and the law of the 49 other states
must be considered in relation to the requirement of
predominance in Rule 23(b)(3).  In Eisen v. Carlisle &
17
260, 266 (Ala. 2000), quoting, in turn, Hancock-Hazlett Gen.
Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Ala. 1986)
(some emphasis added)).  From this statement in Heilman, the
trial court deduced that there are two types of unjust-
enrichment claims:  (1) those based on the theory that "equity
and good conscience" require the defendant to disgorge money
that belongs to the plaintiff; and (2) those based on the
theory that a "mistake [of fact] or fraud" requires the
defendant to return money that belongs to the plaintiff.  
The trial court concluded that BCBSAL based its theory of
the case on the first type of unjust-enrichment claims, claims
based on "equity and good conscience," and that such claims
are appropriate for class certification.  We conclude that the
trial court's analysis asks too much of what it considers to
be a separate type of unjust-enrichment claim, particularly
insofar as providing a basis for the certification of a
nationwide class action.6
1050926
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974), the United States Supreme
Court, construing Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P., held that a trial
court cannot "conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of
a suit" and observed, "[w]e find nothing in either the
language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of
a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as
a class action."  Later, however, in General Telephone Co. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982), the Court stated that the
certification required a "rigorous analysis" and noted that
"'the class determination generally involves considerations
that are "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising
the plaintiff's cause of action."'"  (Quoting Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978).)  Lower federal
courts have since wrestled with this potentially conflicting
dichotomy.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit 
in 
In 
re 
Initial 
Public 
Offering 
Securities
Litigation, 471 F.3d 24, 33 (2d Cir. 2006), limited Eisen as
follows:  "The oft-quoted statement from Eisen [condemning
inquiry into the merits] was made in a case in which the
district judge's merits inquiry had nothing to do with
determining the requirements for class certification."  The
IPO court, after reviewing precedent from other circuits,
concluded:
"With 
Eisen 
properly 
understood 
to 
preclude
consideration of the merits only when a merits issue
is unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement, there is no
reason to lessen a district court's obligation to
make a determination that every Rule 23 requirement
is met before certifying a class just because of
some or even full overlap of that requirement with
a merits issue."
471 F.3d at 41.  The IPO court's analysis appears to be a
reasonable reading of the limits of Eisen.
18
Citing Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 2006),
Wyeth argues that an unjust-enrichment claim based on an
allegation that the "defendant holds money which, in equity
1050926
19
and good conscience, belongs to the plaintiff," requires proof
of mistake on the part of the plaintiff or wrongful conduct on
the part of the defendant.  Wyeth quotes from Mantiply as
follows:
"'"The doctrine of unjust enrichment is an
old equitable remedy permitting the court
in equity and good conscience to disallow
one to be unjustly enriched at the expense
of another."'
"'"One is unjustly enriched if his retention of a
benefit would be unjust."' ...  The retention of a
benefit is unjust if
"'"(1) the donor of the benefit [Blue
Cross] ... acted under a mistake of fact or
in misreliance on a right or duty, or
(2) 
the 
recipient 
of 
the 
benefit
[presumably Wyeth, although Blue Cross did
not make any payment to Wyeth] ... engaged
in some unconscionable conduct, such as
fraud, coercion, or abuse of a confidential
relationship.  In the absence of mistake or
misreliance by the donor or wrongful
conduct by the recipient, the recipient may
have been enriched, but he is not deemed to
have been unjustly enriched."'"
Wyeth's brief, at 42 (quoting Mantiply, 951 So. 2d at 654-55
(citations omitted) (final emphasis added)).  Wyeth also cites
Welch v. Montgomery Eye Physicians, P.C., 891 So. 2d 837, 843
(Ala. 2004), and Jordan v. Mitchell, 705 So. 2d 453, 458 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1997), as standing for the same principle.  Wyeth
1050926
See also 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts § 9 (2007) (citing
7
Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 2006)):
"The retention of a benefit is 'unjust,' for
purposes of an unjust enrichment claim, if the donor
of the benefit acted under a mistake of fact or in
misreliance on a right or duty, or the recipient of
the benefit engaged in some unconscionable conduct,
such as fraud, coercion, or abuse of a confidential
relationship."
20
then argues that the phrase "holds money" in the description
of an unjust-enrichment claim, as stated in Heilman, refers to
the "enrichment" element of "unjust enrichment" and that the
phrase "in equity and good conscience" refers to the "unjust"
element of "unjust enrichment."  Consistent with this Court's
statements in Mantiply and Welch, Wyeth argues that, at least
under Alabama law, "in the absence of some mistake,
misreliance, fraud or wrongful conduct, there may be
enrichment, but not unjust enrichment."  
7
Among other things, BCBSAL responds by asserting that
Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988 (Ala. 2006), holds that in
Alabama an unjust-enrichment claim requires no proof of
mistake on the part of the plaintiff or of wrongful conduct by
a defendant.  BCBSAL relies on the fact the parties stipulated
in Scrushy that the defendant "did not participate in and is
not responsible for any of the criminal activities that
1050926
21
resulted in the falsification of the financial statements."
955 So. 2d at 1012.  We are not persuaded, however, that
Scrushy stands for the proposition that the prosecution of an
unjust-enrichment claim does not require proof of "mistake,
misreliance, fraud, or wrongful conduct."  As Wyeth points
out, although the parties stipulated in Scrushy that the
defendant "did not participate in the criminal fraud that
resulted in the falsification of the financial statements,"
the evidence showed that it was the defendant's managerial
responsibility and fiduciary duty to ensure that the financial
statements were accurate and that he failed to do so.  Wyeth's
reply brief, at 20.  In point of fact, as Wyeth notes, the
financial statements the defendant in Scrushy signed and
approved were, in fact, inaccurate and unreliable, and it was
in reliance on those financial statements that the bonuses at
issue in Scrushy were paid.  
Both the trial court and BCBSAL also rely upon Cheminova
America Corp. v. Corker, 779 So. 2d 1175, 1179 (Ala. 2000),
contending that it is an example of an Alabama unjust-
enrichment case in which the court did not require proof of
mistake or fraud.  Wyeth correctly notes, however, that the
1050926
22
term "unjust enrichment" appears nowhere in the Cheminova
opinion; moreover, the elements of unjust enrichment are
nowhere discussed in that case.  Wyeth further argues that,
even assuming that Cheminova could be read as involving an
unjust-enrichment claim, mistaken reliance and/or wrongful
conduct in that case existed in connection with the
mislabeling of a consumer product that was the basis for the
plaintiff's claim of entitlement to restitution.  Wyeth's
reply brief, at 20 n. 8 (citing Cheminonva, 779 So. 2d at
1179). 
Wyeth appears to have the better argument as to the
requirements of Alabama law regarding unjust enrichment.
Ultimately, however, we need not definitively address this
question in order to determine the appropriateness of class
certification of a statewide class of Alabama plaintiffs.
This case is about the certification of a nationwide class.
Whether Alabama law allows the packaging of an unjust-
enrichment claim solely under what the trial court and BCBSAL
refer to as an "equity and good conscience" type of unjust-
enrichment claim is, at best from the plaintiff's perspective,
a close question.  There has been no adequate showing, either
1050926
23
to the trial court or to this Court, that the laws of all (or
even most of) the 49 other states would allow unjust-
enrichment claims to proceed on such a basis, nor are we
willing to undertake the task of parsing the law of other
states in order to determine whether this is true.  Further,
the fact that legitimate questions exist as to the plaintiff's
legal theory and that there is a need to parse the laws of
50 states to see if that theory is cognizable in all or most
of those states is itself inconsistent with a finding that
common questions of law predominate.  As one federal court
noted:  "[V]ariances exist in state common laws of unjust
enrichment.  The actual definition of 'unjust enrichment'
varies from state to state. Some states do not specify the
misconduct necessary to proceed, while others require that the
misconduct include dishonesty or fraud."  Clay v. American
Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 501 (S.D. Ill. 1999).  Another
federal court recently emphasized differences in the law
regarding unjust enrichment among various states, including
Alabama: 
"Courts in Arkansas do not require a tortious,
illegal or fraudulent act by the defendant to prove
unjust enrichment. Frigillana v. Frigillana, 266
Ark. 296, 584 S.W.2d 30 (Ark. 1979).  ...  In other
1050926
24
words, Arkansas plaintiffs do not have to prove any
misconduct on the part of the defendant in an unjust
enrichment action.
"In contrast, Montana courts require a showing
of misconduct or fault on the part of the defendant
to recover under an unjust enrichment theory.
'Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine wherein
the plaintiff must show some element of misconduct
or fault on the part of defendant, or that the
defendant somehow took advantage of the plaintiff.'
Randolph V. Peterson, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 239
Mont. 1, 778 P.2d 879, 883 (Mont. 1989) (citing
Brown v. Thornton, 150 Mont. 150, 432 P.2d 386, 390
(Mont. 1967)).  See also Hayes Mechanical, Inc. v.
First Industrial, L.P.,351 Ill. App. 3d 1, 12, 285
Ill. Dec. 599, 812 N.E.2d 419 (Ill App. 1st Dist.
2004)('[I]njustice involves some form of improper
conduct by the party to be charged.'); National
Employment Service Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Service,
Inc., 145 N.H. 158, 761 A.2d 401, 406-07 (N.H. 2000)
('Because ... Olsten did not act wrongfully ..., the
facts 
do 
not 
support 
a 
finding 
of 
unjust
enrichment.')[.]
"Alabama courts have an even higher standard for
defendant's 
conduct. 
 
Alabama 
courts 
require
unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant
in order to make a claim for unjust enrichment. The
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the retention
of a benefit is unjust if '(1) the donor of the
benefit ... acted under a mistake of fact or in
misreliance on a right or duty, or (2) the recipient
of the benefit ... engaged in some unconscionable
conduct, such as fraud, coercion, or abuse of a
confidential relationship.  In the absence of
mistake or misreliance by the donor or wrongful
conduct by the recipient, the recipient may have
been enriched, but he is not deemed to have been
unjustly enriched.'  Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So.
2d 638, 654-55 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Welch v.
Montgomery Eye Physicians, P.C., 891 So. 2d 837, 843
1050926
25
(Ala. 2004)) (emphasis in original)). See also
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Southwestern Elec.
Power Co., 925 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. App. 1996)
('Unjust 
enrichment 
is 
typically 
found 
under
circumstances in which one person has obtained a
benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking
of an undue advantage.'); ServiceMaster of St. Cloud
v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 306
(Minn. 1996) ('[I]t must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term
"unjustly" could mean illegally or unlawfully.');
Haggard Drilling, Inc. v. Greene, 195 Neb. 136, 236
N.W.2d 841 (Neb. 1975) (fraud, misrepresentation, or
other wrongful conduct required on the part of the
defendant to prove unjust enrichment); DCB Const.
Co., Inc. v. Central City Development Co., 965 P.2d
115, 117 (Colo. 1998) ('[F]or the enrichment to the
landlord to be unjust and therefore actionable, the
contractor must show some improper, deceitful, or
misleading conduct by the landlord.'); Barker v.
Dicicco, [No. 234443, Dec. 20, 2002] [not reported
in N.W.2d] (Mich. App. 2002) ('proof of coercion or
mistake to recover on unjust enrichment grounds.');
Qualichem v. Xelera, Inc., [62 Va. Cir. 179] (Va.
Cir. Ct. 2003) ('claims of unjust enrichment based
on quasi-contract have been limited by the appellate
courts of the Commonwealth to those arising from:
money paid by mistake; failed consideration; money
got through imposition; extortion; oppression; or
any other undue advantage taken of the claiming
party's situation, where the advantage is contrary
to laws made for the protection of persons under
those circumstances.').  The misconduct element of
unjust enrichment in these states is in direct
conflict 
with 
the 
unjust 
enrichment 
law 
of
Arkansas."
Thompson v. Bayer Corp. (No. 4:07cv00017, Feb. 12, 2009) (E.D.
Ark. 2009) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d) (emphasis added).  
1050926
BCBSAL 
also 
relies 
upon 
the 
decision 
in 
In 
re
8
Pennsylvania Baycol Third-Party Payor Litigation (No. 1874,
April 4, 2005) (Pa. Com. Pl.) (not reported in A.2d), and, in
particular, the following statement in that decision:
"All state laws commonly find unjust enrichment when
a defendant wrongfully retains the money received
from the sale when the defendant thereafter advises
the consumer not to use the product because it may
be unsafe.  Essentially, the law everywhere requires
proof that the defendant has kept what a plaintiff
paid for a product under circumstances in which
retention is inequitable."  
We note, however, that Baycol is a decision rendered by a
Pennsylvania trial court, one not tested by a Pennsylvania
appellate court.  Moreover, the Pennsylvania trial court does
not include in its opinion any discussion of what is required
for a retention of money to be "wrongful" or "inequitable."
It therefore provides no persuasive analysis for the
proposition that an "unjust enrichment" can occur other than
under the circumstances explained in Mantiply. 
In the present case, Duract was not "unsafe" if used in
accordance 
with 
the 
manufacturer's 
instructions 
and
limitations.  One cannot discern from the trial court's
opinion in Baycol whether the same could be said of the drug
at issue there; all we are told is that the defendants advised
the consumer "not to use the product because it may be
unsafe."  
In addition, Baycol was designed for long-term use in
treating chronic high cholesterol and was a drug patients must
take daily, regardless of the present or absence of subjective
symptoms.  Part of the reasoning of the court in Baycol was
that the discontinuance of the drug would require TPPs to
26
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that BCBSAL
has met its burden of demonstrating that common questions of
law and fact predominate for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).8
1050926
incur the expense of substitute medications for their insureds
and the expense of certain medical monitoring that would be
required during the process of switching to a different
chronic-use medication.  In contrast, Duract is intended for
temporary use, no more than 10 days, for the temporary
management of acute pain, and it may be discontinued as
symptoms permit.  There is no claim in any version of BCBSAL's
complaint or in the evidence presented for damages for the
cost of "replacement" drugs or the cost of any medical
monitoring associated with the switch to a different drug. 
27
In light of our conclusion regarding the predominance element
of Rule 23(b)(3), we pretermit consideration of Wyeth's
argument regarding the "superiority" element of Rule 23(b)(3),
as well as the other arguments made by Wyeth regarding the
inappropriateness of class certification in this case.
IV.  Conclusion
Because we conclude that BCBSAL has failed to make the
necessary showing regarding the "predominance" requirement
imposed by Rule 23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., we conclude that
the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying the
class of TPPs of unused Duract. Therefore, we vacate the trial
court's certification order and remand the case.
ORDER VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker,
Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Woodall, J., dissents.
1050926
28
WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
Wyeth, Inc., and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Wyeth"), argue that Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Alabama ("BCBSAL") lacks standing to
maintain this action because, according to Wyeth, BCBSAL "has
[alleged] no legally cognizable injury."  Wyeth's brief, at
27-28.  I agree.  Therefore, at the risk of being accused by
the majority of "hav[ing] fallen into the trap of treating as
an issue of 'standing' that which is merely a failure to state
a cognizable cause of action or legal theory, or a failure to
satisfy the injury element of a cause of action," ___ So. 3d
at ___, I respectfully dissent.  "Because [Wyeth] had no
standing, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction,
and, consequently, no alternative but to dismiss the action."
State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029
(Ala. 1999). 
"'Standing requires injury in fact' to the plaintiff.
Kid's Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 843 So. 2d
164, 166 (Ala. 2002). Further, the injury must be to a
'legally protected right.' Id."  Wyeth's brief, at 25-26.  A
plaintiff who alleges no such injury "'has no standing to sue
1050926
29
either on [its] own behalf or on behalf of a class.'" Kid's
Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 843 So. 2d 164, 167
(Ala. 2002)(quoting Ex parte Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
721 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Ala. 1998)).  Neither BCBSAL nor the
majority has identified any legally protected right of BCBSAL
allegedly violated by Wyeth, and I am unable to discern any
such right from the averments in BCBSAL'S complaint.  
BCBSAL 
alleges 
that 
it 
honored 
its 
contractual
obligations to its insureds by paying pharmacies for Duract at
the time the medication was dispensed to its insureds.  BCBSAL
does not claim that, after the medication was dispensed, it
had any legal interest in the medication or any right to
control the manner in which the medication was, or was not,
used. Although it alleges that it paid for Duract that was
unused because of the later withdrawal of that drug by Wyeth,
it does not explain how that withdrawal affected any of its
legal rights.  Instead, BCBSAL simply says that it wants its
money back.  In my opinion, more is required to allege an
injury to a "legally protected right."