Title: Wright v. Turner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S067882
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 2021

No. 24	
June 17, 2021	
207
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
Dennis L. WRIGHT,  
Personal Representative of the  
Estate of Martha L. Wright, Deceased,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
John A. TURNER,  
Freida Turner, and Sherri L. Oliver,
Defendants,
and
MUTUAL OF ENUMCLAW  
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 060403958) (CA A164003) (SC S067882)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 5, 2021.
Lisa T. Hunt, Law Office of Lisa T. Hunt, Lake Oswego, 
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
Also on the briefs was Rick J. Glantz, Glantz Law Group, 
LLC, Salem.
Thomas M. Christ, Sussman Shank LLP, Portland, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, filed the brief for amicus 
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, 
Duncan, Nelson, and Garrett, Justices.**
WALTERS, C. 
J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
______________
	
*   On appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Karin J. Immergut, 
Judge. 303 Or App 759, 466 P3d 682 (2020).
	
**  Flynn, J. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
208	
Wright v. Turner
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
209
	
WALTERS, C. 
J.,
	
This is the second appeal in a dispute between an 
insured and her insurance company over the limits of her 
Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage. Plaintiff’s policy 
includes a limit of $500,000 for damages “resulting from any 
one automobile accident.” In the first trial in this case, the 
jury found that plaintiff’s injuries resulted in damages of 
$979,540. In the second trial, the jury found that plaintiff 
was injured, not in one, but in two, separate “accidents,” and 
that it could not “separate the cause” of plaintiff’s injuries 
between those two accidents. Consequently, the trial court 
awarded plaintiff the full measure of her damages, minus 
offsets. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court 
had erred in its instructions to the jury and should have 
required the jury to apportion plaintiff’s damages between 
the two accidents. The Court of Appeals agreed with defen-
dant and reversed. Wright v. Turner, 303 Or App 759, 466 
P3d 682 (2020) (Wright III). For the reasons that follow, we 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the 
judgment of the trial court.
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
	
Plaintiff was a passenger in a truck driven by 
Lorenz. Plaintiff and Lorenz were travelling north on 
Interstate 5 when it began to hail and rain. During the 
storm, and while the truck was descending a steep hill, a 
sedan ahead of the truck, driven by Turner, spun out of con-
trol and collided with the front of the truck. The truck even-
tually came to a stop on the median strip of the highway, 
resting against a concrete barrier. The barrier blocked the 
truck’s door, so Lorenz climbed out of the window. Lorenz 
told plaintiff to remain inside the truck and went to check 
on Turner. Lorenz observed that Turner and his passenger 
both appeared to need medical attention, so she walked back 
to the truck and asked plaintiff to call 9-1-1. In an effort to 
make the call, plaintiff unbuckled her seatbelt and reached 
toward the driver’s side floorboard for Lorenz’s purse, which 
contained her cellphone. As soon as plaintiff did so, a third 
vehicle, driven by Oliver, struck the back of the truck. 
The impact pushed the truck into the sedan. Plaintiff was 
210	
Wright v. Turner
severely injured and received medical care, including multi-
ple spinal surgeries and therapy.
	
Plaintiff filed a personal injury claim for damages. 
She alleged that both Turner and Oliver had been negli-
gent and that the negligence of each had caused her inju-
ries and damages. She also alleged that Turner and Oliver 
were underinsured and that, as a result, she was entitled to 
UIM benefits from her own insurance company, defendant 
Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance. Eventually, plaintiff set-
tled with Turner and Oliver for a total of $175,000, and the 
case was dismissed as to them.
	
Plaintiff proceeded with her UIM claim. Defendant 
conceded that Turner and Oliver had been negligent, and the 
only issue put before the jury was the issue of the amount of 
damages plaintiff had incurred. After the jury returned its 
verdict, plaintiff submitted a proposed judgment awarding 
her the full amount of the damages that the jury determined 
she had incurred—$979,540—less the $175,000 plaintiff 
had recovered from Turner and Oliver. Defendant objected, 
arguing that plaintiff’s policy limits were $500,000 for inju-
ries “resulting from any one automobile accident,” and the 
court had not yet decided whether one or two accidents had 
occurred and, therefore, whether one or two policy limits 
applied. Defendant also argued that, if there were two acci-
dents, the jury would need to decide what damages were 
attributable to each accident. The trial court entered a judg-
ment awarding plaintiff the full amount of her damages, 
less the $175,000, and defendant appealed.
	
The Court of Appeals determined that, as a mat-
ter of law, the facts indicated that only one accident had 
occurred, and reversed. Wright v. Turner, 253 Or App 18, 
289 P3d 309 (2012) (Wright I). The court reasoned that, “ 
‘[i]f 
 
cause and result are so simultaneous or so closely linked in 
time and space as to be considered by the average person 
as one event, courts adopting the cause analysis uniformly 
find a single occurrence occurred.’ 
” Id. at 34 (quoting United 
Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Baggett, 209 Cal App 3d 1387, 1394, 258 
Cal Rptr 52 (Cal App 1989) (alterations in Wright I). Applying 
that test, the Court of Appeals concluded that the record 
in Wright I was insufficient to support a determination of 
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
211
multiple “accidents” for purposes of plaintiff’s UIM policy 
and that the trial court had therefore erred in failing to 
apply the single accident policy limit of $500,000. Id. at 38.
	
This court reversed. Wright v. Turner, 354 Or 815, 
322 P3d 476 (2014) (Wright II). We began by explaining that, 
because the UIM policy language at issue was required by 
statute, and the statute used the term “accident,” the issue 
of whether there was more than one “accident” was properly 
framed as one of legislative intent. Id. at 820-21; see also Fox 
v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 327 Or 500, 506, 964 P2d 997 
(1998) (explaining that, where a policy provision is required 
by statute, “we attempt to determine the legislature’s inten-
tion in enacting [the] statute rather than the parties’ con-
tractual intention in entering into the insurance contract”). 
After examining the text, context, and legislative history of 
ORS 806.070, we concluded that:
“[T]he legislature intended that a factfinder consider the 
particular facts of each case and determine whether a per-
son’s injuries were incurred in one uninterrupted event, 
happening, or occurrence or whether an initial event, hap-
pening, or occurrence was interrupted in some way—such 
as by time or different causal act—permitting a factfinder 
to conclude that there was more than one distinct event, 
happening, or occurrence and therefore more than one 
‘accident.’ 
”
Wright II, 354 Or at 831. Because plaintiff had presented 
sufficient evidence to give rise to a jury question on the issue 
of whether there was one accident or two, we “remand[ed] 
[the] case to the trial court for that factual determination.” 
Id. at 833-34.
	
On remand, the parties disagreed about the scope of 
the issues that were properly in front of the trial court. The 
trial court concluded that the liability of Turner and Oliver 
and the amount of damages that plaintiff had suffered had 
been determined in the first trial and that nothing in this 
court’s decision in Wright II had disturbed those findings. 
The court explained, however, that, pursuant to this court’s 
opinion in Wright II, the question whether there was one 
accident or two was a question for the jury. If the jury were 
to conclude that two accidents occurred, the court ruled that 
212	
Wright v. Turner
the jury should also decide how to apportion plaintiff’s dam-
ages between them.
	
The parties also disagreed about how exactly 
the jury should be told to conduct that “apportionment.” 
Plaintiff argued that the jury should be asked whether it 
was possible to apportion the damages, and, only if the jury 
determined that apportionment was possible, should it be 
required to find the amount of damages caused by each acci-
dent. Plaintiff explained that her witnesses would testify 
that each accident was a substantial factor in causing all 
of her damages, and if the jury agreed, then she should be 
awarded her damages in full. Defendant argued that the 
jury should not be permitted to decide that it was impossible 
to apportion the damages between accidents; instead, the 
jury should be required to make a finding as to the amount 
of damages caused by each accident. The court agreed with 
plaintiff and the case proceeded to trial.
	
On the question of the apportionment of plaintiff’s 
injuries, the court instructed the jury that:
	
“If you find that the events of April 16, 2004 constitute 
two accidents, you will be asked to determine whether 
plaintiff’s injuries can be apportioned between the two 
accidents. You will first be asked if the injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff in the two accidents are indivisible. In 
other words, can you, the jury, divide the injuries plaintiff 
suffered in the two accidents. If you find that you cannot 
separate the cause of plaintiff’s injuries in any way so you 
can assign a percentage of injury to each accident, then the 
injuries are indivisible.”
The court next instructed that:
	
“If you find that the events of April 16, 2004 consti-
tute two accidents and that plaintiff’s injuries can be 
apportioned, you must then determine what percentage of 
Plaintiff’s injuries was caused by the first accident involv-
ing Plaintiff’s vehicle and the Turner vehicle and the sub-
sequent accident involving the Oliver vehicle. If answering 
this question, you will need to determine what percentage 
of Plaintiff’s injuries was caused by each accident. Your 
percentages must add up to 100 percent.”
The court also provided the following instructions on 
causation:
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
213
“CAUSATION—‘SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR’
	
“Many factors may operate either independently or 
together to cause injury. In such a case, each may be a 
cause of injury even though the others by themselves would 
have been sufficient to cause the same injury.
	
“If you find that the defendant’s act or omission was a 
substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff, you 
may find that the defendant’s conduct caused injury even 
though it was not the only cause. A substantial factor is an 
important factor and not one that is insignificant.
“MULTIPLE CAUSATION
	
“Many factors may operate either independently or 
together to cause injury. In such a case, each may be a 
cause of the injury even though the others by themselves 
would have been sufficient to cause the same injury. If you 
find that Mr. Turner or Ms. Oliver’s act or omission was a 
substantial factor in causing the injury to the plaintiff, you 
may find that Mr. Turner or Ms. Oliver’s conduct caused 
the injury even though it was not the only cause.”
Finally, the court instructed on the burden of proof, telling 
the jury that plaintiff had the burden to prove that her inju-
ries were indivisible and that, if the jury found that they 
were not, then defendant had the burden to prove “what per-
centage is assigned to each collision.”
	
Filling out the special verdict form that the court 
provided, the jury found that two accidents had occurred and 
that plaintiff’s injuries could not be apportioned between 
them. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment for 
plaintiff awarding her the total damages that she sought, 
less amounts that she already had recovered—$804,540.00.
	
Defendant appealed. Defendant argued that the 
trial court had erred when it instructed the jury that, if it 
found that it could not “separate the cause of plaintiff’s inju-
ries,” then the injuries were “indivisible” and apportionment 
between the two accidents was not required. Defendant 
argued that, to give effect to plaintiff’s policy limits, appor-
tionment between the two accidents was necessary and 
could affect the amount that plaintiff was entitled to recover. 
For example, defendant explained, if $250,000 in damages 
were attributable to one accident and $730,000 in damages 
214	
Wright v. Turner
were attributable to the other, then plaintiff would be able 
to recover $250,000 for the first accident but, because the 
damages for the second accident would exceed the $500,000 
limit, she would be able to recover only $500,000 for the 
second, for a total recovery of $750,000. In that scenario, 
plaintiff would recover less than the $804,540 that plaintiff 
would be entitled to recover if the damages were not appor-
tioned. Defendant also argued that the trial court had erred 
in instructing the jury that defendant had the burden to 
prove the apportionment of damages between the accidents.
	
The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and 
reversed. Wright III, 303 Or App at 760. The court began by 
addressing the parties’ arguments concerning the burden 
of proof. Id. at 764-65. The court explained that the gen-
eral rule in Oregon is that “the initial burden of proving 
coverage is on the insured seeking coverage and that the 
insurer has the burden of proving whether any policy exclu-
sions apply.” Id. at 765. Thus, for purposes of determining 
whether a party has the burden of proof on the issue of how 
many accidents occurred and, in turn, how the damages 
should be apportioned between two accidents, the ques-
tion was whether a limit of liability provision that caps the 
amount of damages an insured may recover was more akin 
to a grant of coverage or a policy exclusion. Id. In answer-
ing that question, the court explained that every motorist’s 
insurance policy is required by statute to provide a mini-
mum level of UIM coverage,1 so it would interpret the “limit 
of liability” provision in plaintiff’s policy in accordance with 
the legislature’s intent. Id. at 765-66.
	
Specifically, the court noted that ORS 742.502(1) 
requires motor vehicle insurance policies, such as the policy 
	
1  ORS 742.502(1) provides that “[e]very motor vehicle policy that insures 
against a loss that a natural person suffers and that results from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury or death arising out of owning, maintaining, or 
using a motor vehicle,” must provide uninsured motorist coverage. Additionally, 
ORS 742.502(2)(a) provides that a “motor vehicle bodily injury policy must have 
the same limits for uninsured motorist coverage as for bodily injury liability cov-
erage unless a named insured in writing elects lower limits,” and that the same 
limits apply to underinsurance coverage.
	
ORS 806.070, in turn, provides that an insurance policy must provide for 
payment of at least “$25,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person in 
any one accident.”
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
215
at issue in this case, to provide uninsured motorist (UM) 
coverage. Id. at 766-67. That coverage “ 
‘must have the same 
limits for uninsured motorist coverage as for bodily injury 
liability coverage unless a named insured in writing elects 
lower limits.’ 
” Id. at 766 n 3 (quoting ORS 742.502(2)(a)). As 
to the limits on that coverage, ORS 742.504(7)(a) provides 
that “ 
‘the limit of liability stated in the declarations as appli-
cable to ‘each accident’ is the total limit of the company’s 
liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained 
by two or more persons as the result of any one accident.’ 
” 
Id. at 766 n 4 (quoting ORS 742.504(7)(a)). Analyzing those 
provisions together, the court concluded that the “limit of 
liability” provision in the policy was more akin to a grant of 
coverage than an exclusion. Id. at 767. The court explained 
that the general purpose of the UIM provisions is “to pro-
vide coverage for recovery of damages sustained as a result 
of ‘any one accident;’ 
” therefore, “any statutory minimum or 
maximum placed on the amount of recovery does not funda-
mentally change that those statutes are properly viewed as 
a grant of coverage for purposes of allocating the burden.” 
Id. at 768. Thus, the court concluded, the insured bears the 
burden of proving that a loss came within the scope the lim-
its of liability set out in the policy. Id.
	
As to the issue of whether the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that it could find that the damages 
could not be apportioned, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that, because the burden was on plaintiff to prove apportion-
ment, that necessarily meant that the trial court had erred 
in instructing the jury that it was not required to apportion 
the damages per accident. Id. Thus, the court reversed and 
remanded for the purpose of having a jury determine “how 
much in damages should be apportioned between the two 
accidents with plaintiff bearing the burden of apportioning 
the damages per accident.” Id. at 769.
	
Plaintiff requested, and we allowed, review.
II.  THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
	
Here, not only do the parties dispute how to analyze 
the underlying legal questions, they also dispute whether 
those issues are properly before this court. Plaintiff and 
216	
Wright v. Turner
amicus curiae, Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA), 
argue that, because defendant conceded, in the first trial, 
that Turner and Oliver were liable for plaintiff’s dam-
ages and did not ask the jury to apportion fault, the sec-
ond trial was not the time to conduct such apportionment.2 
Specifically, plaintiff and OTLA contend that, if defendant 
wished to have the jury apportion responsibility between 
tortfeasors, it would have had to ask the jury to conduct a 
comparative fault analysis. Further, they submit, even if 
causation, rather than comparative fault, were the correct 
means of apportionment, that too had already been deter-
mined. Because both Turner and Oliver had been held lia-
ble for plaintiff’s injuries, it had necessarily been estab-
lished that the conduct of each was a cause of those injuries. 
Plaintiff and OTLA point out that defendant has not chal-
lenged the liability of either driver at any point in these 
proceedings.3
	
Defendant does not take issue with plaintiff’s 
analysis of the underlying liability of Turner and Oliver; 
instead, defendant argues that the issue here is not one of 
tort liability, but of contract terms. Defendant contends that, 
after the liability of the drivers was determined, contrac-
tual questions remained: It was still necessary to determine 
whether there was one accident or two and, if there were two 
accidents, the amount of damages caused by each. Defendant 
insists that, in answering those questions, the jury should 
have been instructed that plaintiff was required to prove the 
amount of damages per accident and that, without a finding 
	
2  Plaintiff also argues that the apportionment issues were not properly before 
the trial court because, in Wright II, this Court’s remand was for the limited pur-
pose of determining whether there was one accident or two. We have considered 
plaintiff’s argument on the scope of our remand and reject it. We do so without 
further discussion because the procedural posture in which this case reaches us 
is unique, and we do not believe our analysis would benefit bench or bar. 
	
3  Plaintiff’s argument concerning the proper burden of proof also tracks 
plaintiff’s argument that issues pertaining to the underlying liability of Turner 
and Oliver are no longer before this court. Plaintiff asserts that, “because no 
issue of comparative fault or the cause of Ms. Wright’s injuries w[as] raised for 
this Court’s consideration,” those theories could not be pursued on remand and 
the Court of Appeals could not place the burden on plaintiff to prove those issues. 
Because we reject plaintiff’s argument that the issue of apportionment was not 
properly before this court, we decline to consider plaintiff’s argument that, for 
that reason, the Court of Appeals was incorrect in placing the burden on plaintiff 
to prove apportionment. 
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
217
on that factual question, plaintiff was entitled to recover no 
more than the policy limit for one accident—$500,000.
	
For the reasons that follow, we disagree with both 
parties. Plaintiff is incorrect in her argument that the 
underlying tort liability of the negligent drivers is determi-
native here; the question is how plaintiff’s UIM policy limits 
apply. And defendant is incorrect in its argument that, to 
apply those limits, the jury was required to apportion plain-
tiff’s damages between the two accidents. The trial court 
did not err in the instructions it gave on the issue at hand—
whether plaintiff’s injuries “result[ed] from any one automo-
bile accident.”
III.  ANALYSIS
A.  The underlying liability of the drivers does not determine 
the limits of plaintiff’s UIM benefits.
	
We begin with plaintiff’s argument that, because 
the liability of Turner and Oliver was conceded by defen-
dant in the first trial, no issue, except the number of acci-
dents, remained for the second. Plaintiff contends that 
defendant’s concession that both Turner and Oliver were 
negligent and that their negligence caused plaintiff’s inju-
ries is determinative. She asserts that because defendant 
did not ask the jury in either trial to determine the com-
parative fault of those tortfeasors and, in fact, objected to 
a jury instruction on comparative fault, there is no legal 
basis for apportioning damages between them. Plaintiff also 
argues that, even if damages could be apportioned based 
on causation, defendant’s concession that the negligence of 
both Turner and Oliver were causes of her injuries elimi-
nates the need for further inquiry. As background for those 
arguments, we begin with a brief discussion of relevant tort 
 
principles.
	
We begin with the common-law concept of causation. 
“Causation in Oregon law refers to causation in fact, that 
is to say, whether someone examining the event with-
out regard to legal consequences would conclude that the 
allegedly faulty conduct or condition in fact played a role in 
its occurrence.” Sandford v. Chev. Div. Gen. Motors, 292 Or 
590, 606, 642 P2d 624 (1982). In cases in which a plaintiff 
218	
Wright v. Turner
shows that “two tortfeasors acted concurrently to bring 
about” the plaintiff’s injury, this court permits a jury to hold 
each tortfeasor liable for those injuries, provided that the 
negligence of each was a “substantial factor” in causing the 
injuries. Joshi v. Providence Health System, 342 Or 152, 162, 
149 P3d 1164 (2006). In McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 
270 Or 375, 418, 528 P2d 522 (1974), for example, plaintiff 
alleged that two pharmaceutical companies had negligently 
failed to warn about the potential dangers of a medication. 
We explained that the “respective liability of multiple defen-
dants depends on whether the negligence of each was a sub-
stantial factor in producing the complained of harm.” Id. 
The plaintiff was not required to show that each defendant’s 
negligence was sufficient, on its own, to produce the harm; 
instead, the test was whether each defendant’s negligence 
substantially contributed to the harm. Id.
	
We turn next to the concept of comparative fault, 
which is a creature of statute. Under Oregon’s comparative 
fault statutes, “[w]hen a trier of fact determines that multi-
ple defendants were negligent and that the conduct of each 
was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s harm, the trier of fact 
is then required to determine the relative fault of the defen-
dants and to apportion the plaintiff’s damages between 
them on that basis.” Lasley v. Combined Transport, Inc., 351 
Or 1, 13, 261 P3d 1215 (2011) (citing ORS 31.605). Under 
those statutes, “the liability of each defendant for damages 
awarded to plaintiff shall be several only and shall not be 
joint,” and the damages recoverable from each defendant 
is based on the percentage of fault as found by the trier of 
fact. ORS 31.610(1)-(2). Comparative fault is different than 
comparative causation.4 With comparative fault, the “trier of 
fact is required to compare the degree to which each defen-
dant deviated from the standard of care and is therefore 
‘blameworthy’ 
” and to express that departure as a percent-
age, which is then applied to apportion damages. Lasley, 351 
Or at 13. Oregon’s comparative fault statutes do not “call 
for apportioning damages by quantifying the contribution 
	
4  In Sandford, this court noted that, in negligence cases involving two defen-
dants, some courts had stated that “the allocation of damages is to reflect relative 
causation.” 292 Or at 600. In Sandford, we rejected the “comparative causation” 
approach under Oregon’s comparative fault statutes. Id. at 600-03. 
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
219
of several causes that had to coincide to produce the injury.” 
Sandford, 292 Or at 606.
	
Those principles applied in plaintiff’s underlying 
action against Turner and Oliver. The liability of each was 
conceded and is no longer in dispute. See Wright II, 354 Or at 
833 (noting that the question of whether Turner and Oliver 
could be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries is not at issue; 
“they have been” held liable). That does not mean, however, 
that there was no need for a second trial to determine the 
limits of the UIM benefits to which plaintiff was entitled. 
The parties agree that, under Wright II, a jury trial was 
required to determine whether there was one accident or 
two. They part ways, however, as to whether and to what 
extent the tortfeasors’ liability affected the question of 
whether the jury was permitted or required to apportion 
plaintiff’s damages at that trial, and they also disagree as 
to the instructions that should have been given. To provide 
context for those arguments, we turn to a discussion of the 
statutes that governed UM and UIM coverage in Oregon at 
the time the policy at issue in this case was in effect.5
	
UM coverage was defined by former ORS 742.500(1) 
(2003) as:
“coverage within the terms and conditions specified in ORS 
742.504 insuring the insured, the heirs or legal represen-
tative of the insured for all sums which the insured or they 
shall be legally entitled to recover as damage for bodily 
injury or death caused by accident and arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehi-
cle in amounts or limits not less than the amounts or limits 
prescribed for bodily injury or death under ORS 806.070.”
Next, former ORS 742.502(1) (2003) required every motor 
vehicle insurance policy “insuring against loss suffered by 
any natural person resulting from liability imposed by law 
for bodily injury or death arising out of ownership, main-
tenance, or use of a motor vehicle” to provide uninsured 
	
5  ORS 742.502 and ORS 742.504 were amended in 2015. See Or Laws 2015, 
Ch. 5 (SB 411). Plaintiff’s policy in this case was effective from December 12, 
2003, to June 12, 2004, so the changes to those statutes do not govern the policy 
at issue here. We refer to the statutes which governed the policy at the time that 
the policy was in effect.
220	
Wright v. Turner
motorist coverage. Additionally, former ORS 742.502(2)(a) 
stated that “[u]ninsured motorist coverage larger than the 
amounts required by ORS 806.070 shall include underinsur-
ance coverage for damages or death caused by accident and 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle that is insured for an amount that is less than the 
insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.” Thus, former ORS 
742.502 required that every motor vehicle policy include 
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. And, under 
former ORS 742.502(2)(a), UIM coverage was triggered 
when the insured suffered damages caused by an acci-
dent with an underinsured motorist, and an underinsured 
motorist “is a motorist who is insured for an amount that is 
less than the policy limits of the insured’s uninsured motor-
ist coverage.” Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 344 Or 196, 
218, 179 P3d 633 (2008) (construing third sentence of for-
mer ORS 742.502(2)(a) (2003)); see also former ORS 742.502 
(2)(a) (2003) (“Uninsured motorist coverage larger than the 
amounts required by ORS 806.070 shall include underinsur-
ance coverage for damages or death caused by accident and 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle that is insured for an amount that is less than the 
insured’s uninsured motorist coverage.” (Emphasis added.)).6
	
In this case, it is uncontested that plaintiff’s UIM 
coverage was triggered. In her tort claim against Turner 
and Oliver, plaintiff alleged that those two defendants had 
engaged in negligent conduct that resulted in her bodily 
injury. When defendant decided not to challenge Turner and 
Oliver’s liability, defendant was, essentially, conceding that 
plaintiff had suffered damages that were “caused by acci-
dent and arising out of” the use of a motor vehicle. Former 
ORS 742.500(1). Defendant also has never contested that 
Turner and Oliver were underinsured—their policy limits 
were less than plaintiff’s own policy limits.7 Thus, in the 
	
6  Since ORS 742.502 and ORS 742.504 were amended in 2015, determining 
whether coverage is triggered may now require a different analysis. 
	
7  The trial court ruled below that there was “no dispute” that Turner and 
Oliver were liable and that both were underinsured because they each had 
liability insurance limits that were less than plaintiff’s UM insurance limits. 
Defendant, correctly, has not challenged that ruling and has never disputed 
that Turner and Oliver’s own liability limits were lower than plaintiff’s UM 
 
limits. 
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
221
first trial, there was no dispute that plaintiff’s UIM cover-
age was triggered.
	
In addition, the benefits that plaintiff’s UIM policy 
provides are uncontested. Former ORS 742.504 (2003) set 
out the required provisions of uninsured and underinsured 
motorist (UM and UIM) coverage. Specifically, former ORS 
742.504 stated that every such policy shall provide coverage 
“which in each instance is no less favorable in any respect 
to the insured * 
* 
* than if the following provisions were set 
forth in the policy.” Former ORS 742.504(1) required such 
policies to cover “all sums which the insured * 
* 
* shall be 
legally entitled to recover * 
* 
* from the owner or operator 
of an uninsured vehicle because of bodily injury sustained 
by the insured caused by accident and arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured vehicle.”8 
See also Vogelin v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 346 Or 
490, 492, 213 P3d 1216 (2009) (“ORS 742.504 establishes the 
minimum policy terms for coverage.”).
	
But determining that coverage has been triggered 
and the benefits it provides are different determinations 
than the determination of whether an insured’s policy places 
limits on the recovery of those benefits and what those lim-
its are. Bergmann v. Hutton, 337 Or 596, 604, 101 P3d 353 
(2004) (“The terms of a policy include limits on the insur-
er’s liability; the terms of the coverage do not.” (Emphasis 
in original.)). The UM and UIM statutes anticipate that 
UM and UIM coverage and benefits will be subject to policy 
limits. For example, former ORS 742.500(1) defined “[u]nin-
sured motorist coverage” as coverage defined by former ORS 
742.504 “in amounts or limits not less than the amounts 
or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death under ORS 
806.070.” See also Mid-Century Ins. Co., 344 Or at 208 (“ORS 
742.500(1) presumes that an insurer will provide unin-
sured motorist coverage only up to stated limits, and sets 
minimum limits on that coverage.”). ORS 806.070, in turn, 
	
8  Plaintiff notes that ORS 742.504(2)(j)(A) now includes a definition of 
 
“[s]ums that the insured * 
* 
* is legally entitled to recover,” which is “the amount 
of damages that * 
* 
* [a] claimant could have recovered in a civil action from the 
[at-fault driver] at the time of the injury after determination of fault or compara-
tive fault and resolution of any applicable defenses.” Former ORS 742.504 (2003) 
did not include that definition. 
222	
Wright v. Turner
provides for minimum limits of coverage for insurance pol-
icies in accordance with Oregon’s Financial Responsibility 
Law.9 Former ORS 742.502(2)(a) also governed policy lim-
its and provided that a “motor vehicle bodily injury liability 
policy shall have the same limits for uninsured motorist cov-
erage as for bodily injury liability coverage unless a named 
insured in writing elects lower limits.” Finally, we note that 
the policy limit at issue here is written in terms that mirror 
the wording of former ORS 742.504(7)(a):
	
“[t]he limit of liability stated in the declarations as 
applicable to ‘each person’ is the limit of the insurer’s lia-
bility for all damages because of bodily injury sustained 
by one person as the result of any one accident and, subject 
to the above provision respecting each person, the limit of 
liability stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each 
accident’ is the total limit of the company’s liability for all 
damages because of bodily injury sustained by two or more 
persons as the result of any one accident.”
(Emphases added.)10
	
That background explains why this court decided, 
in Wright II, that a second trial was required to deter-
mine the limits of defendant insurer’s liability for plain-
tiff’s damages. In the first trial, the jury determined the 
total sum that plaintiff was entitled to recover from the 
 
tortfeasors—$979,540. Plaintiff had UIM insurance that 
covered that sum—”all sums which the insured * 
* 
* shall 
be legally entitled to recover * 
* 
* from the owner or oper-
ator of an uninsured vehicle because of bodily injury sus-
tained by the insured caused by accident and arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of [an underinsured 
or] uninsured vehicle.”11 See former ORS 742.504(1)(a). But 
	
9   That is true for both former ORS 806.070 (2003) and the current statute.
	
10  In Wright II, this court cited to the “each accident” limit and its use of the 
phrase “as the result of any one accident” without focusing on the application of 
that limit when bodily injury is sustained by “two or more persons.” Wright II, 
354 Or at 821. The statute also permits an “each person” policy limit for dam-
ages because of bodily injury sustained by one person “as the result of any one 
accident,” and that may have been the more appropriate citation. The parties’ 
arguments do not address whether there could be a difference in the meaning of 
the phrase “as the result of any one accident” depending on the number of persons 
sustaining bodily injury, and we also do not address that issue. 
	
11  Plaintiff notes that ORS 742.504(2)(j)(A) now includes a definition of 
 
“[s]ums that the insured * 
* 
* is legally entitled to recover,” which is “the amount 
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
223
that was true only up to the limits of the policy. The second 
trial was necessary to determine those limits, and plaintiff 
is mistaken in her position that defendant’s concession as 
to Turner’s and Oliver’s liability made that determination 
unnecessary. Plaintiff recognizes that Turner’s and Oliver’s 
liability did not determine the number of accidents and that 
the number of accidents was a question for the jury in the 
second trial. As we explained in Wright II, the concept of 
tortfeasors’ legal liability is distinct from the question of 
whether one or two accidents occurred. 354 Or at 832-33. 
But in deciding the limits on the UIM benefits that plaintiff 
was entitled to recover, the number of accidents was not the 
only question that remained. Plaintiff’s recovery was lim-
ited to $500,000 for damages “resulting from any one auto-
mobile accident,” and the fact that both Turner and Oliver 
were liable for plaintiff’s damages did not decide whether 
her damages “resulted from” one or two accidents. The lia-
bility of Turner and Oliver established that they acted neg-
ligently and that their negligent conduct caused plaintiff’s 
injuries, but it did not necessarily establish that all of plain-
tiff’s damages resulted from more than one of the accidents 
that occurred. The question of whether Turner and Oliver 
engaged in negligent conduct that caused injury to plain-
tiff is certainly related to the question of whether plaintiff’s 
damages were caused by more than one accident, but the 
two questions are not precisely equivalent and the answers 
are not necessarily the same. It was factually possible that 
the accident involving Turner caused different injuries than 
did the accident involving Oliver. Plaintiff does not convince 
us that defendant was not entitled to a jury determination 
on that issue, and we therefore decline to affirm the judg-
ment on that basis.
B.  The jury was correctly instructed on the questions neces-
sary to determine the UIM policy limits.
	
We turn, then, to defendant’s argument that the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury when it permitted 
of damages that * 
* 
* [a] claimant could have recovered in a civil action from the 
[at-fault driver] at the time of the injury after determination of fault or compara-
tive fault and resolution of any applicable defenses.” Former ORS 742.504 (2003), 
however, does not include that definition. 
224	
Wright v. Turner
the jury to decide that the cause of plaintiff’s injuries could 
not be separated. Defendant contends that the trial court 
erred in failing to inform the jury that it must appor-
tion damages between the two accidents. In determining 
whether it was an error to give a particular instruction, we 
do not view that instruction in isolation. Instead, “we read 
the instructions as a whole to determine whether they state 
the law accurately.” State v. Woodman, 341 Or 105, 118, 138 
P3d 1 (2006).
	
As noted, plaintiff’s policy limits her recovery to 
$500,000 for damages “resulting from any one automobile 
accident,” and that wording mirrored, and was governed by, 
former ORS 742.504(7)(a). Although the parties do not cen-
ter their arguments on the plain meaning of that text, it 
is there that we must begin. When we consider what the 
phrase “resulting from any one automobile accident” means, 
“we attempt to determine the legislature’s intention in 
enacting that statute rather than the parties’ contractual 
intention in entering into the insurance contract.” Fox, 327 
Or at 506; see also Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 323 Or 291, 299-
300, 918 P2d 95 (1996) (explaining that, where a statutory 
provision controls a UM policy provision, this court resolves 
the question by applying its methodology for interpreting 
statutes).
	
We think it obvious that the legislature used the 
phrase “as the result of any one accident” to refer to dam-
ages “caused” by any one accident. “[R]esult” means “to pro-
ceed, spring, or arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion.” 
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1937 (unabridged ed 
2002). A “consequence” is “something that is produced by 
a cause or follows from a form of necessary connection or 
from a set of conditions: a natural or necessary result.” Id. at 
 
482-83. To determine whether something is the result of 
something, then, one looks to whether something is “pro-
duced” or “caused” by it. We therefore understand the phrase 
“resulting from any one accident,” to impose a limit on the 
recovery of damages that are “caused” by any one accident.
	
The trial court apparently had the same under-
standing because it instructed the jury using causation 
concepts. The court instructed the jury to decide whether it 
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
225
could “separate the cause of plaintiff’s injuries in any way 
so you can assign a percentage of injury to each accident.”12 
The court instructed that, if the jury found that plaintiff’s 
injuries could be apportioned, then it should “determine 
what percentage of [p]laintiff’s injuries was caused by the 
first accident * 
* 
* and the subsequent accident.” And, the 
court gave the jury the following instruction about what it 
means to “cause” injury:
	
“Many factors may operate either independently or 
together to cause injury. In such a case, each may be a 
cause of the injury even though the others by themselves 
would have been sufficient to cause the same injury. If you 
find the Mr. Turner or Ms. Oliver’s act or omission was a 
substantial factor in causing the injury to the plaintiff, you 
may find that Mr. Turner or Ms. Oliver’s conduct caused 
the injury even though it was not the only cause.”
	
Defendant’s only objection to those instructions at 
trial and on appeal is that the jury should not have been 
permitted to decide that it could not separate the cause of 
plaintiff’s injuries. Put differently, defendant argues that 
the jury should not have been instructed that it could find 
that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by both accidents or 
tortfeasors. Defendant states two bases for that argument. 
First, defendant contends that, under ORS 31.610, liabil-
ity in Oregon is several only. Defendant apparently asserts 
that, because the liability of Turner and Oliver could not be 
joint, plaintiff’s injuries must be separable. Second, defen-
dant seems to argue that it is legally or factually impossible 
for all of plaintiff’s damages to be the “result of” more than 
one accident.
	
Neither argument is convincing. As to the first, we 
have explained that the underlying liability of the negligent 
drivers and the sums they each could be required to pay is 
	
12  The complete instruction was as follows: 
	
“If you find that the events of April 16, 2004 constitute two accidents, you 
will be asked to determine whether plaintiff’s injuries can be apportioned 
between the two accidents. You will first be asked if the injuries suffered by 
the plaintiff in the two accidents are indivisible. In other words, can you, 
the jury, divide the injuries plaintiff suffered in the two accidents. If you 
find that you cannot separate the cause of plaintiff’s injuries in any way so 
you can assign a percentage of injury to each accident, then the injuries are 
indivisible.”
226	
Wright v. Turner
no longer at issue. The current question is the how the limit 
on plaintiff’s UIM benefits is to be determined. The answer 
to that question does not depend on whether one or both 
tortfeasors could have been required to pay all of plaintiff’s 
damages or only a portion of them; instead, it depends on 
whether plaintiff’s injuries were caused by one or both acci-
dents. If the question were whether both Turner and Oliver 
could have been held individually liable for all of plaintiff’s 
damages or how those damages would have been appor-
tioned between them, then we would apply Oregon’s compar-
ative negligence statutes. As explained, those statutes would 
require that plaintiff’s damages be apportioned between the 
two tortfeasors based on relative fault and would make each 
tortfeasor severally liable for his or her percentage of the 
whole of plaintiff’s damages. But plaintiff’s claims against 
Turner and Oliver have been resolved and those tortfeasors’ 
relative liability is not at issue here. Accordingly, the fact 
that, under the comparative fault statutes, the liability of 
Turner and Oliver would be several rather than joint is not 
a factor in our interpretation of the UIM limits that are now 
before us. We reject defendant’s first argument.
	
Defendant’s second argument seems to be that it 
is legally or factually impossible for all of plaintiff’s dam-
ages to be the “result of” more than one accident and that, if 
plaintiff cannot prove which damages resulted from which 
accident, her claim fails for lack of necessary evidence. 
Again, defendant is mistaken. Oregon law recognizes that 
are instances in which “ 
‘two causes concur to bring about 
an event.’ 
” Joshi, 342 Or at 161 (quoting W. Page Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 266, § 41 (5th ed 
1984)). In McEwen, for example, the plaintiff suffered reti-
nal bleeding as a result of her ingestion of drugs manufac-
tured by two different drug manufacturers over a period of 
time. This court explained that the negligence of both man-
ufacturers could be a cause of the indivisible harm that the 
plaintiff suffered:
	
“The respective liability of multiple defendants depends 
upon whether the negligence of each was a substantial fac-
tor in producing the complained of harm. If both Syntex 
and Ortho were negligent and their negligence combined 
to produce plaintiff’s injuries, then the negligence of Ortho 
Cite as 368 Or 207 (2021)	
227
was concurrent with that of Syntex and does not insulate 
Syntex from liability. This is true although the negligent 
omissions of each defendant occurred at different times 
and without concerted action. Nor is it essential to Syntex’s 
liability that its negligence be sufficient to bring about 
plaintiff’s harm by itself; it is enough that Syntex substan-
tially contributed to the injuries eventually suffered by 
Mrs. McEwen.”
McEwen, 270 Or at 418 (internal citations omitted).
	
When read as a whole, the instructions in this case 
made clear that the jury was to decide the cause of plain-
tiff’s injuries under those settled principles of causation. 
The instructions informed the jury that “[m]any factors may 
operate either independently or together to cause injury,” 
and “[i]n such a case, each may be a cause of the injury even 
though the others by themselves would have been sufficient 
to cause the same injury.” The court told the jury that it 
“may find that Mr. Turner or Ms. Oliver’s conduct caused 
the injury even though it was not the only cause.” And the 
court instructed that if the jury found that it could not “sep-
arate the cause of plaintiff’s injuries in any way so you can 
assign a percentage of injury to each accident, then the inju-
ries are indivisible.” Finally, the court instructed that, if the 
jury found that plaintiff’s injuries could be apportioned, it 
should assign a percentage to each accident based on the 
amount of damages caused by each accident.
	
Thus, under settled principles of causation, the jury 
was permitted, but not required, to find that both accidents 
caused plaintiff’s injuries. In this case, the jury found that 
it could not “separate the cause” of plaintiff’s injuries and 
that her injuries resulted from the two accidents that the 
jury found had occurred. Juries will not reach the same con-
clusion in every case involving two accidents. Accidents can 
occur days apart and can cause different injuries resulting 
in easily distinguished damages. For instance, an accident 
on one day could cause injury to a plaintiff’s head; an acci-
dent months later could cause injury to her foot. In that 
instance, a jury could separate the cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries, and, if it did so, a $500,000 policy limit would apply 
to the damages that the jury found “resulted from” each 
accident. But, as this case and McEwan illustrate, that will 
228	
Wright v. Turner
not always be the case. The law permits a jury to decide, as 
a matter of fact, that a plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the 
concurrence of two accidents.13 
	
We conclude that the trial court did not err in 
instructing the jury that if it found that two accidents 
occurred, it must determine whether it could “separate the 
cause” of plaintiff’s injuries, and if it found that it could 
not, that plaintiff’s injuries were indivisible. The trial court 
was not required to instruct the jury that it must apportion 
plaintiff’s damages between the two accidents that the jury 
concluded had occurred.
IV.  CONCLUSION
	
We conclude that the trial court correctly instructed 
the jury that it could find, as a matter of fact, the number of 
accidents that had occurred and whether the cause of plain-
tiff’s injuries could be separated between them.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
	
13  This case does not require that we analyze in any depth the meaning of the 
term “accident” and whether that term refers to the negligent act, the collision, 
or the injury that caused the plaintiff’s damages. Here, the jury instructions on 
causation did not make such distinctions, defendant did not object to the jury 
instructions on the basis that such distinctions were necessary, and defendant’s 
argument in this court does not depend on such distinctions. The fact that the 
case was tried without making such distinctions may explain plaintiff’s argu-
ment equating the question of whether the negligent acts of Turner and Oliver 
were both a cause of plaintiff’s injuries with the question of whether plaintiff’s 
injuries were caused by both accidents. Still, we think that plaintiff’s argument 
is legally incorrect for the reasons that we have given. In a tort action, where 
the actions of two tortfeasors result in damages, there will generally be no need 
to determine how many “accidents” occurred, and both tortfeasors may be held 
liable for the plaintiff’s injuries without regard to the number of accidents or the 
injuries caused by each. When those issues arise, as they do here, the fact of the 
tortfeasors’ liability does not necessarily determine the number of accidents or 
the damages caused by each.