Title: School Bd. of the City of Norfolk v. Wescott
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961739
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
1 Lacy, Hassell, 
Keenan, and Koontz, JJ. 
 
SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
v.   Record No. 961739 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                  September 12, 1997 
CELESTINE WESCOTT 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
Luther C. Edmonds, Judge 
 
 
Celestine Wescott was employed as a security guard at 
Granby High School by the School Board of the City of Norfolk 
(the School Board) during the 1994-95 school year.  On November 
16, 1994, Michael J. Caprio, the principal of Granby High 
School, suspended Wescott pending final action on his 
recommendation that her employment be terminated.  Following an 
administrative hearing, the deputy superintendent of schools 
concurred in Caprio's recommendation and, on December 15, 1994, 
the School Board approved Wescott's termination, effective 
November 17, 1994. 
 
 Wescott filed a bill of complaint against the School 
Board seeking reinstatement with full benefits and back pay.  
After an ore tenus hearing, the trial court ruled that the 
action of the School Board in discharging Wescott was arbitrary 
and capricious and ordered the School Board to pay Wescott "all 
back pay, allowances and benefits for the remainder of the 
school year, 1994-95."  We awarded the School Board an appeal 
and, because we conclude that the action of the School Board 
                     
     
1Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on July 1, 1997. 
 
 
 
 
2 
was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by 
substantial evidence, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter judgment for the School Board. 
 
I. 
 
Wescott had been employed as a security guard in the 
Norfolk School System "on and off" for approximately 19 years. 
She had been assigned to Maury High School prior to her 
transfer to Granby High School in 1994.  Her annual classified 
personnel contract with the School Board provided that she 
would work "such hours as the school board may designate and 
shall perform such duties . . . as are deemed necessary" and 
that the School Board could dismiss her "for just cause."  
 
Wescott's annual performance reviews were favorable, 
although at least two of the reviews contained comments or 
concerns regarding absences from work.  Wescott had been absent 
13 days in 1990-91, 18.5 days in 1991-92, 22 days in 1992-93, 
and 49.5 days in the 1993-94 school year.  The absences were 
caused by family illness, personal illness, or court 
appearances.  The School Board did not question Wescott's 
reasons for these absences, and they were considered "approved" 
absences.  
 
 James B. Slaughter, the principal while Wescott was 
assigned to Maury High School, told Wescott of his concern 
regarding her absences.  Wescott testified that when she met 
with the principal, he told her "how much he needed [her] in 
 
 
 
 
3 
the building . . . .  He was very concerned about [her] father 
being ill and concerned about [her] taking days out, but he  
knew that [she] had to take them because [her father] was ill." 
 In a March 1994 letter to Wescott, Slaughter acknowledged that 
"[r]egrettably" her father's health had necessitated some of 
her absences, but he again expressed his concern over her 
"level of attendance" which he had discussed with her "on 
several occasions."  Slaughter supported Wescott's transfer to 
Granby High School in the spring of 1994. 
 
In the fall of 1994, Michael J. Caprio became the 
principal of Granby High School.  Wescott had not worked for 
Caprio prior to this time.  On October 5, Caprio met with 
Wescott to discuss her absences from work.  On that date, 
Wescott had been absent for 7 of the 20 days school had been in 
session.  Caprio summarized the meeting in a letter to her in 
which he stated that they needed to "get together and formulate 
a plan of action so that we can assist you in improving your 
attendance at Granby High School."  
 
During a second conference on October 14, Caprio reviewed 
Wescott's attendance records for previous years with her.  
Wescott testified that she explained that the reasons for all 
of her prior absences were properly documented, but Caprio told 
her that if she was absent one more time, she was "going to be 
terminated."  Apparently, no plan of action was formulated at 
that meeting, but in an October 14 letter to Wescott referring 
 
 
 
 
4 
to "our conference" on that date, Caprio stated that he hoped 
Wescott understood how her absences impacted her job as a 
security guard, that he was pleased with her job performance, 
and that, although he remained concerned over her absences to 
date, "I trust that this attendance problem has been resolved 
at this meeting."    
 
When Wescott reported for work on November 16, 1994, 
Caprio gave her a memorandum written by him, asked her to 
remove her Granby jacket, and told her to leave the building. 
The memorandum referred to the prior conferences and letters 
regarding Wescott's absences and the impact of the absences on 
the security program at the school.  It went on to point out 
that since the October 14 conference, Wescott was absent on 5 
more occasions, bringing her total absences to 12 days of the 
first 47 school days.  Based on this record, Caprio concluded 
that "no significant improvement in your attendance has been 
evident."  The memorandum stated that Caprio was suspending 
Wescott without pay immediately and recommending to the 
superintendent that she be terminated.  The memorandum also 
informed her that she had seven days to contact the deputy 
superintendent to appeal Caprio's recommendation. 
 
Wescott appealed Caprio's recommendation, and a hearing 
was held in accordance with school board policy.  Wescott, her 
representative Malcolm Staples, Caprio, and the head of 
personnel for the school system were present at the hearing 
 
 
 
 
5 
conducted by Deputy Superintendent J. Frank Sellew.  Wescott's 
representative presented documentation of her absences and 
argued that she should not be discharged for excessive 
absenteeism.  Caprio responded that Wescott's absences 
"crippled" the security program at the school and interfered 
with the "safe and ordinary conduct of the school."  Caprio 
also stated that Wescott had been warned about the consequences 
of her continued absences. 
 
 In a letter dated November 30, 1994, Sellew informed 
Wescott that he supported Caprio's recommendation.  This 
recommendation was subsequently adopted by the School Board at 
its December 15, 1994 meeting. 
 
II. 
 
The standard of review which a trial court must apply in 
considering a challenge to a school board's exercise of the 
supervisory authority granted it by Article VIII, Section 7 of 
the Virginia Constitution is well established.  
 
[A] school board's decision 'will not be disturbed by 
the courts unless the board acted in bad faith, 
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in abuse of its 
discretion, or there is no substantial evidence to 
sustain its action.' 
 
Bristol Virginia School Board v. Quarles, 235 Va. 108, 119, 366 
S.E.2d 82, 89 (1988)(quoting County School Board of 
Spotsylvania County v. McConnell, 215 Va. 603, 607, 212 S.E.2d 
264, 267 (1975)).  In this case, the trial court set aside the 
decision of the School Board on the sole ground that it was 
 
 
 
 
6 
arbitrary and capricious.  This conclusion rested on the trial 
court's finding that, after the School Board "granted" all of 
Wescott's "applications for sick leave requests," it discharged 
her and justified the discharge by claiming that Wescott 
"abused sick leave or annual leave policy."    
 
A review of the record shows, however, that the School 
Board neither claimed that Wescott abused the sick leave or 
annual leave policy nor based its discharge decision on an 
abuse of that policy.
2  The stated reason for firing Wescott 
was not that she had abused her "granted" sick leave, but that 
her continued "excessive absenteeism" "compromised the security 
and safety of the students and staff at Granby High School,"  
had a "crippling effect" on the security program, and "plac[ed] 
the Norfolk School Board's number one goal in serious 
jeopardy."  Furthermore, the School Board asserted that Wescott 
had been warned "about the consequences of further absences" 
                     
     
2The school board's leave policies are not part of this 
record; however, in his November 16, 1994 letter to Wescott, 
Caprio stated that while she had exhausted her allocated sick 
leave for the year as of that date, she had one remaining day 
of personal leave available for the remainder of the 1994-95 
school year. We note that in her bill of complaint, Wescott 
sought a determination of whether the School Board "abrogated" 
its contract; however, Wescott did not argue at trial or on 
appeal that, because at the time of her dismissal, she had not 
exhausted the number of leave days to which she was entitled 
for the 1994-95 school year, the dismissal was a breach of 
contract.  Cf. McConnell, 215 Va. at 603, 212 S.E.2d at 265 
(teacher brought breach of contract action against school 
board).  Nor did she argue that dismissal prior to her 
exhaustion of allocated leave was an arbitrary or capricious 
act.  
 
 
 
 
7 
and had shown "no significant improvement" in attendance 
following discussions regarding the need for such improvement. 
 
We turn to the record to determine whether it supports the 
reasons for termination advanced by the School Board.  The 
record reflects that security in Norfolk's high schools is a 
significant concern to the School Board and administration.  To 
insure an effective security program, high schools in the 
system are required to have four security guards regularly in 
attendance.  Continuity in the security staff is important to 
the success of the security program.  Wescott herself testified 
that security guards were required to be familiar with the 
school building; to develop a rapport with the students; and to 
know the students, including those with disciplinary problems 
or physical or mental conditions.  Although there was a "pool" 
of substitute security guards who could be contacted in the 
event a regular guard was absent, the pool was limited and 
served all 13 schools in the system.  Deputy Superintendent 
Sellew testified that "sometimes you get one and sometimes you 
don't" and that the substitute guards generally do not know the 
student body.  This, in Sellew's opinion, "really does hamper 
the safety and security of the operation within the school."   
 
The record is also replete with instances where the need 
for consistent attendance by security guards was explained to 
Wescott.  Wescott was told more than once of the impact her 
absence had on the security program.  School administrators 
 
 
 
 
8 
told her of their concern over her absenteeism and expressed a 
desire to work with Wescott to address the problem.  Caprio's 
decision to suspend Wescott and recommend her termination was 
made only after at least two discussions with her in 1994, 
including a review of her attendance record which showed a 
continuing increase in the number of days absent each school 
year.  During these discussions, Wescott was informed that if 
she was absent one more time, she would be terminated.  
Following the second discussion on October 14, she was absent 
an additional 5 days, bringing the total to 12 absences in the 
first 47 days of the 1994-95 school year.  
 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Wescott was 
treated differently than other classified personnel employed by 
the School Board.  In discharging Wescott, the School Board 
followed the normal procedures for appeal and review of the 
principal's recommendation.
3
 
On appellate review of the trial court's decision, we must 
accept the trial court's findings of fact as true unless they 
are without support in the record.  Quantum Dev. Co., Inc. v. 
Luckett, 242 Va. 159, 161, 409 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1991).  Here, 
the record does not support the trial court's finding that the 
School Board's justification for terminating Wescott was that 
                     
     
3The trial court also held that Wescott was denied due 
process, and the School Board assigned error to that holding. 
However, Wescott conceded on appeal that she was not denied due 
process.  
 
 
 
 
9 
she abused sick leave or annual leave policy; however, it does 
support the School Board's position that she was fired because, 
after repeated counseling and warnings, her continued excessive 
absenteeism compromised the security program at Granby High 
School. 
 
Actions are defined as arbitrary and capricious when they 
are "willful and unreasonable" and taken "without consideration 
or in disregard of facts or law or without determining 
principle."  Black's Law Dictionary 105 (6th ed. 1990).  In 
Johnson v. Prince William County School Board, 241 Va. 383, 404 
S.E.2d 209 (1991), we noted that an act was arbitrary and 
capricious if the school board "departed from the appropriate 
standard in making its decision."  Id. at 389 n.9, 404 S.E.2d 
at 212 n.9. 
 
Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the School 
Board's decision to discharge Wescott was arbitrary and 
capricious.  Under the terms of the contract of employment, the 
School Board retained the right to terminate Wescott for just 
cause.  We conclude that the reasons given for the School 
Board's termination decision constituted just cause and that 
the termination decision was supported by substantial evidence. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter final judgment in favor of the School Board. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.