Title: NATHAN KLOOSTER V CITY OF CHARLEVOIX
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140423
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 2011

FILED MARCH 10, 2011 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
NATHAN KLOOSTER, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 140423 
 
CITY OF CHARLEVOIX, 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
CAVANAGH, J. 
This case involves the General Property Tax Act (GPTA)1 and two particular 
circumstances in which a conveyance of property may or may not permit a taxing 
authority to “uncap” and reassess the value of that property.  Specifically, we granted 
leave to appeal to address whether a “conveyance” as that term is used in MCL 
211.27a(3) must be by means of a written instrument and whether, under MCL 
211.27a(7)(h), petitioner’s property was uncapped for purposes of property-tax 
                                              
1 MCL 211.1 et seq. 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
 
 
 
2
reassessment by either the death of the other joint tenant in January 2005 or the creation 
of a subsequent joint tenancy in September 2005.  Klooster v Charlevoix, 486 Mich 932 
(2010).  We hold first that a “conveyance” for purposes of MCL 211.27a does not require 
a written instrument.  Second, we hold that while the January 2005 termination of the 
joint tenancy caused by the death of a cotenant was within the joint-tenancy exception 
created by MCL 211.27a(7)(h) and was thus not a transfer of ownership that uncapped 
the property, the September 2005 conveyance from petitioner to himself and his brother 
as joint tenants did uncap the property, because the conveyance did not fall within the 
joint-tenancy exception.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
hold that respondent, the city of Charlevoix, properly issued its 2006 notice of 
reassessment and that the Tax Tribunal reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong 
reason. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts are undisputed.  In 1959, James and Dona Klooster acquired title to the 
subject property in the city of Charlevoix and held it as tenants by the entirety.  On 
August 11, 2004, Dona quitclaimed her interest in the property to James, leaving James 
as the sole owner.  On that same day, James quitclaimed the property to himself and his 
son, petitioner Nathan Klooster, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.  On 
January 11, 2005, James died, leaving petitioner as the sole property owner by operation 
of law.  On September 10, 2005, petitioner quitclaimed the property to himself and his 
brother, Charles Klooster, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. 
In 2006, the assessor for the city of Charlevoix issued to petitioner and Charles 
 
 
 
3
Klooster a notice of assessment, taxable valuation, and property classification, indicating 
that, because of a transfer of ownership, the property’s taxable value had been reassessed 
using the true cash value of the property.  The notice did not state whether the 
termination of the joint tenancy caused by the death of petitioner’s father in January 2005 
or the September 2005 creation of the joint tenancy between petitioner and his brother 
constituted the transfer of ownership.  As a result of the reassessment, the taxable value 
of petitioner’s property increased from $37,802 to $72,300. 
Petitioner appealed unsuccessfully to the city’s board of review.  Petitioner then 
appealed to the Tax Tribunal.  The Tax Tribunal affirmed the reassessment, ruling that 
the transfer of ownership to petitioner by virtue of his father’s death was a conveyance 
for purposes of the GPTA.  Additionally, the Tax Tribunal ruled that the joint-tenancy 
exception from MCL 211.27a(7)(h) did not apply to the January 2005 transfer because 
petitioner was not an original owner or an already existing joint tenant before the August 
2004 joint tenancy was created.  The Tax Tribunal did not rule on the September 2005 
conveyance. 
Petitioner appealed as of right in the Court of Appeals, claiming that the transfer 
of ownership caused by his father’s death was not a conveyance, and that even if it had 
been, petitioner would have qualified for the MCL 211.27a(7)(h) exception from 
uncapping.  The Court of Appeals reversed the tribunal, determining that a “conveyance” 
requires a transfer of title by a written instrument, and thus James’s death and the 
resulting transfer of fee title to petitioner by operation of law did not constitute a transfer 
of ownership under the GPTA that would uncap the property.  Klooster v Charlevoix, 286 
Mich App 435, 441-443; 781 NW2d 120 (2009).  We granted respondent’s application 
 
 
 
4
for leave to appeal.  Klooster, 486 Mich at 932-933.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
“In the absence of fraud, review of a decision by the Tax Tribunal is limited to 
determining whether the tribunal erred in applying the law or adopted a wrong principle; 
its factual findings are conclusive if supported by competent, material, and substantial 
evidence on the whole record.”  Mich Bell Tel Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 445 Mich 470, 
476; 518 NW2d 808 (1994).   
Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.  
Brown v Detroit Mayor, 478 Mich 589, 593; 734 NW2d 514 (2007).  The primary goal of 
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, focusing first on the 
statute’s plain language.  Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 
119 (1999).  “The words of a statute provide ‘the most reliable evidence of its 
intent . . . .’”  Id., quoting United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 
L Ed 2d 246 (1981).  When construing a statute, a court must read it as a whole.  People v 
Jackson, 487 Mich 783, 791; 790 NW2d 340 (2010).   
III.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
 
Resolving this case requires that we examine the January 2005 and September 
2005 changes in the ownership of petitioner’s property to determine whether respondent 
properly reassessed the property under the GPTA.  We begin our analysis by briefly 
reviewing Proposal A and the GPTA before turning to the joint-tenancy exception and 
the specific conveyances at issue. 
 
 
 
5
A.  PROPOSAL A AND THE GPTA 
In 1994, voters passed Proposal A, amending article 9, § 3 of the Michigan 
Constitution to limit the annual increase in property tax assessments and to authorize 
enabling legislation.  The purpose of Proposal A was to limit tax increases on property as 
long as it remains owned by the same party, even though the actual market value of the 
property may have risen at a greater rate.  Toll Northville Ltd v Northville Twp, 480 Mich 
6, 12; 743 NW2d 902 (2008).  The Michigan Legislature was charged with determining 
the specifics needed to give effect to Proposal A’s mandate.  See Const 1963, art 9, § 3 
(providing for the reassessment of a parcel’s value when ownership has been transferred 
“as defined by law”) (emphasis added).  The 1995 amendments of the GPTA2 fixed the 
cap on assessment increases at the lesser amount of either 5 percent of the assessed value 
of the property for the previous year or the increase in the rate of inflation from the 
previous year.  MCL 211.27a(2).  After certain “transfer[s] of ownership” occur, 
however, property becomes uncapped and thus subject to reassessment based on actual 
property value.  MCL 211.27a(3).3   
The GPTA defines “transfer of ownership” as a “conveyance of title to or a 
present interest in property, including the beneficial use of the property, the value of 
                                              
2 1994 PA 415. 
3 MCL 211.27a(3) provides: “Upon a transfer of ownership of property after 1994, the 
property’s taxable value for the calendar year following the year of the transfer is the 
property’s state equalized valuation for the calendar year following the transfer.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
 
 
6
which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest.”4  MCL 211.27a(6) provides a 
nonexhaustive list of examples of transfers of ownership, including conveyances by deed 
or by land contract and conveyances to or distributions from trusts.  See MCL 
211.27a(6)(a) through (j).  From the definition of “transfer of ownership,” however, MCL 
211.27a(7) excludes 17 specific transfers and conveyances, including the one found in 
MCL 211.27a(7)(h), regarding the creation and termination of certain joint tenancies.   
B.  THE JOINT-TENANCY EXCEPTION:  MCL 211.27a(7)(h) 
The joint-tenancy exception from the definition of “transfer of ownership” 
provides that a transfer of ownership does not include 
[a] transfer creating or terminating a joint tenancy between 2 or more 
persons if at least 1 of the persons was an original owner of the property 
before the joint tenancy was initially created and, if the property is held as a 
joint tenancy at the time of conveyance, at least 1 of the persons was a joint 
tenant when the joint tenancy was initially created and that person has 
remained a joint tenant since the joint tenancy was initially created.  A joint 
owner at the time of the last transfer of ownership of the property is an 
original owner of the property.  For purposes of this subdivision, a person is 
an original owner of property owned by that person’s spouse.  [MCL 
211.27a(7)(h).] 
While this is not the simplest provision to understand at first reading, a careful 
deconstruction reveals its plain meaning.  We begin by noting that MCL 211.27a(7)(h) 
establishes the requirements for excluding three types of conveyances from the definition 
of “transfer of ownership”:  (A) the termination of a joint tenancy, (B) the creation of a 
joint tenancy where the property was not previously held in a joint tenancy, and (C) the 
                                              
4 MCL 211.27a(6). 
 
 
 
7
creation of a successive joint tenancy.5   
 
Before examining two requirements of the joint-tenancy exception, we must first 
take particular care to properly construe the terms “transfer of ownership” and “original 
owner.”  Additionally, when applying the joint-tenancy exception it is essential to focus 
on the particular conveyance that qualifies as the “conveyance at issue,” especially if—as 
here—the parcel has been the subject of numerous conveyances, one or more of which 
may qualify as a transfer of ownership that uncaps the property.  We discuss each of 
these terms in turn. 
1.  “TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP” 
 
For purposes of applying the joint-tenancy exception, the terms “transfer of 
ownership” and “uncapping event” are largely synonymous.  The GPTA provides that 
“[u]pon a transfer of ownership of property . . . , the property’s taxable value for the 
calendar year following the year of the transfer is the property’s state equalized valuation 
for the calendar year following the transfer.”  MCL 211.27a(3) (emphasis added).  
Therefore, a transfer of ownership allows reassessment of the property based on its state 
equalized value, lifting the cap on the rate of increase provided by MCL 211.27a(2).  A 
transfer of ownership thus uncaps the property.  Conversely, any transaction listed in 
MCL 211.27a(7) is not a transfer of ownership that uncaps the property. 
                                              
5 See corresponding parts IV(A) through (C) of this opinion for discussions of these three 
types of conveyances under MCL 211.27a(7)(h).   
 
 
 
8
2.  “ORIGINAL OWNER” 
 
To determine who is an “original owner of the property” within the narrow context 
of the joint-tenancy exception, one must first identify the most recent transfer of 
ownership that uncapped the property and then determine who owned the property as a 
result of that uncapping conveyance.  The joint-tenancy exception provides that “[a] joint 
owner at the time of the last transfer of ownership . . . is an original owner” and that 
“[f]or purposes of this subdivision, a person is an original owner of property owned by 
that person’s spouse.”  MCL 211.27a(7)(h).  There are thus three possibilities for who 
may constitute an “original owner” under the joint-tenancy exception:  (1) a sole owner at 
the time of the last uncapping event,6 (2) a joint owner at the time of the last uncapping 
event,7 and (3) the spouse of either a sole or joint owner of the property at the time of the 
conveyance at issue (i.e., the conveyance that may uncap the property).  See id.  
3.  CONVEYANCE AT ISSUE 
 
The “conveyance at issue” is either the creation or the termination of a joint 
                                              
6 While the statute does not specifically provide that a sole owner may be an original 
owner, this obvious result must follow, otherwise only a joint owner or the spouse of an 
owner could ever be considered an “original owner” for purposes of applying MCL 
211.27a(7)(h). 
7 In the instant case, for example, the most recent uncapping event before the two 2005 
conveyances at issue would have been in 1959, when James and Dona Klooster acquired 
title to the property, had Proposal A been in effect.  Because James and Dona held the 
property in a tenancy by the entirety, they were “joint owner[s] at the time of the last 
[uncapping event]” and were thus “original owner[s] of the property.”  
 
 
 
9
tenancy that may or may not uncap the property for reassessment purposes.8  The 
conveyance at issue, therefore, is not the preceding uncapping event used to determine 
who is an original owner of the property.  If the conveyance at issue is the creation of a 
joint tenancy, it is important to determine whether the property is being conveyed from a 
previous joint tenancy or some other type of ownership estate when applying MCL 
211.27a(7)(h).  If the conveyance at issue is the termination of a joint tenancy, however, 
whether the joint tenancy being terminated is a successive joint tenancy is irrelevant 
under the MCL 211.27a(7)(h) analysis.  At the termination of a joint tenancy, the identity 
of ownership before the creation of the joint tenancy is only relevant under the original-
ownership requirement to ensure that the continuity of original ownership remains 
uninterrupted.   
 
The conveyances at issue here, therefore, are the January 2005 and September 
2005 conveyances because these are the conveyances that may or may not have uncapped 
the property. 
4.  THE ORIGINAL-OWNERSHIP AND CONTINUOUS-TENANCY 
REQUIREMENTS OF MCL 211.27a(7)(h) 
 
The first sentence of MCL 211.27a(7)(h) establishes two requirements for 
satisfying the joint-tenancy exception, which we label to simplify analysis as the 
“original-ownership requirement” and the “continuous-tenancy requirement.”  The 
original-ownership requirement excludes “transfer[s] creating or terminating a joint 
                                              
8 See MCL 211.27a(7)(h) (referring to “[a] transfer creating or terminating a joint 
tenancy”).  The term “conveyance at issue” is not used in the statute, but we employ it 
here to assist in remaining focused on the pertinent conveyance when, as here, property 
has been conveyed multiple times. 
 
 
 
10
tenancy between 2 or more persons if at least 1 of the persons was an original owner . . . 
before the joint tenancy was initially created” from being considered a “transfer of 
ownership.”  MCL 211.27a(7)(h).  This requirement examines ownership of the property 
both before and after the conveyance at issue to ensure that continuity of original 
ownership bridges the transfer.   
 
The continuous-tenancy requirement provides that “if the property is held as a 
joint tenancy at the time of conveyance, at least 1 of the persons was a joint tenant when 
the joint tenancy was initially created and that person has remained a joint tenant since 
the joint tenancy was initially created.”  Id.  Because of the conditional language “if the 
property is held as a joint tenancy at the time of conveyance,” this requirement applies 
only to conveyances terminating a joint tenancy and conveyances creating a successive 
joint tenancy.9  Because it pertains to the continuous tenancy of at least one of the joint 
tenants from the time a particular joint tenancy was created until the time of its 
termination, the continuous-tenancy requirement is entirely retrospective.   
IV.  APPLYING THE JOINT-TENANCY EXCEPTION 
 
All parties agree that the August 2004 conveyance from the father, James 
Klooster, to himself and petitioner as joint tenants with rights of survivorship was not an 
uncapping event because MCL 211.27a(7)(h) excludes such conveyances from the 
definition of “transfer of ownership.”  Because James did not hold the property in a joint 
tenancy before creating the joint tenancy with petitioner, the continuous-tenancy 
                                              
9 By using the term “successive joint tenancy,” we refer only to transfers conveying 
property from one joint tenancy directly into another joint tenancy. 
 
 
 
11
requirement of MCL 211.27a(7)(h) was inapplicable.  Under the original-ownership 
requirement of MCL 211.27a(7)(h), James Klooster “was an original owner of the 
property before the [August 2004] joint tenancy was initially created.”  James acquired 
the status of an original owner as a result of the 1959 conveyance to James and Dona 
because the 1959 conveyance was the most recent “transfer of ownership” that uncapped 
the property.10  Put simply, under the joint-tenancy exception, an original owner may 
convey property into a joint tenancy without uncapping the property, provided the 
original owner is also a cotenant in the resulting joint tenancy. 
 
We turn now to conveyances under the GPTA. 
A.  TERMINATIONS OF JOINT TENANCIES 
 
When petitioner’s father died in January 2005, the joint tenancy terminated by 
operation of law, vesting petitioner with sole ownership.  We first examine whether the 
change in the nature of the ownership of the property occasioned by the death of the only 
other joint tenant is even a conveyance, as that term is used in the GPTA.   
1.  CONVEYANCES UNDER THE GPTA 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the vesting of sole ownership was not a 
conveyance because there was no written instrument.  Klooster, 286 Mich App at 442.  
This was error.  As we will explain, the termination of a joint tenancy occasioned by the 
                                              
10 We of course recognize that Proposal A was not enacted until 1994, well after the 1959 
conveyance.  Under Proposal A, however, the 1959 conveyance would have qualified as 
a transfer of ownership because, as the deed indicates, neither James nor Dona owned the 
property before purchasing it from Althea Ward. 
 
 
 
12
death of the only other joint tenant is a conveyance under the GPTA and does not require 
a written instrument beyond that which initially created the joint tenancy.11   
 
When one of only two joint tenants dies, an estate in land passes by operation of 
law to the survivor.  This Court has described a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship 
as a joint life estate with a dual contingent remainder that vests the fee simple in 
whichever cotenant outlives the others.  Albro v Allen, 434 Mich 271, 274-275; 454 
NW2d 85 (1990).  A contingent remainder is “[a] remainder that is either given to an 
unascertained person or made subject to a condition precedent.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
(9th ed), p 1405.  The contingent remainder is thus created simultaneously with the 
creation of the joint tenancy with rights of survivorship and “‘waits patiently’ for 
possession.”  Id., quoting Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future 
Interests (2d ed), p 73.  In the case of a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, the 
contingency is surviving the cotenants, and at the moment of death, the decedent’s 
interest in the property passes to the survivor or survivors.  Albro, 434 Mich at 274-275.  
When there is only one remaining joint tenant, the contingent remainder vests in the 
survivor a fee simple in the property.  See id.  
 
The interest that passes to the last survivor in a joint tenancy is likewise a 
conveyance under the GPTA.  The GPTA defines “transfer of ownership” as a 
“conveyance of title to or a present interest in property, including the beneficial use of the 
property, the value of which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest.”  MCL 
                                              
11 As we will discuss, however, a conveyance will not constitute a transfer of ownership 
under the GPTA if excluded under MCL 211.27a(7)(a) through (q). 
 
 
 
13
211.27a(6) (emphasis added).  While the statute uses the word “conveyance,” it does not 
define it, and we may therefore consult a dictionary.  Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs 
v Mich Prop & Cas Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).  The 
relevant dictionary definitions of “conveyance” include (1) “[a] voluntary transfer of a 
right or of property” and (2) “[t]he transfer of a property right that does not pass by 
delivery of a thing or merely by agreement.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed).12  Under 
the first definition, in the case of a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, the 
“voluntary transfer of a right or of property” occurs when the joint tenancy is voluntarily 
created, transferring to the cotenants a joint life estate that gives the immediate right to 
possess and use the property as well as the last survivor’s right to be vested with a fee 
simple.  See Albro, 434 Mich at 274-275.  The conveyance occasioned by the death of the 
only other cotenant fits the second definition as well, because the vesting of a fee simple 
at the moment of death in the last surviving cotenant is a “transfer of a property right that 
does not pass by delivery of a thing . . . .”  Therefore, the interest that passes to the last 
survivor in a joint tenancy is a conveyance under the GPTA. 
 
In holding that there was no conveyance absent a writing, the Court of Appeals 
erred by relying on the act-specific definitions of a “conveyance” in MCL 565.3513 and in 
                                              
12 We recognize that the definitions of “conveyance” include the document itself.  See 
definition 4 in Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed).  However, we believe that a document 
such as a deed is a memorialization of the property interest being conveyed, not the 
conveyance itself, under the GPTA. 
13 MCL 565.35 provides, in relevant part.  “The term “conveyance,” as used in this 
chapter, shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing, by which any estate or 
interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged or assigned . . . .” 
 
 
 
14
McMurtry v Smith, 320 Mich 304, 307; 30 NW2d 880 (1948).  Klooster, 286 Mich App 
at 441-442.  First, the definition of “conveyance” in MCL 565.35 is limited by the 
language “as used in this chapter,” and MCL 211.27a is not in chapter 565 of the 
Michigan Compiled Laws.14  Second, McMurtry involved the recording of a supplement 
to a plat, and it was thus appropriate for the McMurtry Court to rely on the definition of 
“conveyance” in the statutory predecessor of MCL 565.35 because from its inception and 
regardless of where in the statutes it has been compiled, the chapter at issue has embraced 
the recording statutes, and the recording of interests in real property necessarily includes 
the use of some written instrument.15  Neither of these definitions of “conveyance,” 
however, mandates the conclusion that there can be no conveyance without a writing 
under the GPTA. 
 
Other examples of transfers of ownership in MCL 211.27a illustrate that the 
definition of “conveyance” in MCL 565.35 is inconsistent with the meaning of 
“conveyance” in the GPTA.  Conveyances to a trust, distributions from a trust, and 
conveyances by intestate succession do not require any written instrument at the time of 
the transfer, yet all are transfers of ownership that will uncap property.  See MCL 
                                              
14 In the statute’s first incarnation, “this chapter” referred to chapter 65 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1846.  The provision remained the same through numerous compilations and 
eventually was compiled in the first part of chapter 565 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 
specifically MCL 565.1 through 565.49.  It is not completely clear whether “this chapter” 
now refers to all of chapter 565 or only that portion corresponding to chapter 65 of the 
Revised Statutes of 1846. 
15 See 1929 CL 13309, designated in the 1948 Compiled Laws and subsequent 
compilations as MCL 565.35. 
 
 
 
15
211.27a(6)(c), (d) and (f).  Therefore, the plain text of MCL 211.27a indicates that the 
Legislature did not intend that conveyances must be effected by means of a written 
instrument for purposes of the GPTA. 
 
In sum, therefore, we conclude that the vesting of a fee simple in the last surviving 
cotenant of a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship is a “conveyance” for purposes of 
the GPTA and requires no additional writing beyond that which created the joint tenancy.  
Whether this conveyance is a transfer of ownership that uncaps the property is a separate 
issue.   
2.  THE JANUARY 2005 CONVEYANCE 
 
The GPTA defines “transfer of ownership” as a “conveyance of title to or a 
present interest in property, including the beneficial use of the property, the value of 
which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest.”  MCL 211.27a(6).  Unless an 
applicable exception exists, the interest that vests in the last survivor in a joint tenancy 
with rights of survivorship would constitute a transfer of ownership because the fee 
simple that vests in the survivor is a “conveyance of title . . . , the value of which is 
substantially equal to the value of the fee interest.”  Id. 
 
With regard to terminations of joint tenancies, MCL 211.27a(7) provides that a 
transfer of ownership does not include 
[a] transfer . . . terminating a joint tenancy between 2 or more persons if at 
least 1 of the persons was an original owner of the property before the joint 
tenancy was initially created and, if the property is held as a joint tenancy at 
the time of conveyance, at least 1 of the persons was a joint tenant when the 
joint tenancy was initially created and that person has remained a joint 
tenant since the joint tenancy was initially created. 
 
 
 
16
In this context, the conveyance at issue is the termination of the joint tenancy because 
that is the event that may or may not uncap the property.  In order for the termination of a 
joint tenancy to be exempted from uncapping, the original-ownership requirement 
mandates that at least one of the joint tenants in the joint tenancy being terminated was an 
original owner of the property before the joint tenancy was initially created.  And, under 
the continuous-tenancy requirement, at least one of the persons in the joint tenancy being 
terminated must have been “a joint tenant when the joint tenancy was initially created,” 
and that person must have “remained a joint tenant since the joint tenancy was initially 
created.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Here lies the critical point of contention in this case.  Petitioner argues that “when” 
refers to that point in time at which the joint tenancy was created—not before—and that 
because petitioner was a joint tenant as a result of the creation of the joint tenancy at that 
point in time, he satisfies the requirement.  Respondent argues that this use of “when” 
means that at least one of the persons in the joint tenancy must have also been a joint 
tenant in an immediately preceding joint tenancy.  Because the father held the property in 
sole ownership, respondent argues, neither petitioner nor his father were joint tenants 
“when the joint tenancy was initially created.”  Essentially, respondent argues that the 
joint-tenancy exception applies only to successive joint tenancies.16  Respondent thus 
reads “when” to mean “before.”  We disagree. 
                                              
16 Holding that the MCL 211.27a(7)(h) exception in the context of terminations applies 
only to successive joint tenancies would read an additional requirement into the statute 
and establish a pointless procedural mandate.  In the instant case, for example, under the 
erroneous successive-joint-tenancy interpretation, had James and Dona Klooster 
transferred the property from a tenancy by the entirety into a joint tenancy before creating 
 
 
 
 
17
 
The adverb “when” refers to a distinct point in or period of time.  See The 
American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982) (defining “when” as “[a]t 
the time that” and “during the time at which”).  “When” is not complete in itself, 
however, and requires some contextual referent to the event or period of time to which it 
applies.  As “when” is used in the joint-tenancy exception, it is not durational; it refers to 
the moment in time “when the joint tenancy was initially created . . . .” MCL 
211.27a(7)(h).  At that moment, each cotenant acquired the status of a joint tenant by 
virtue of the instrument creating the joint tenancy.  Had the Legislature meant to say 
“before,” it would have done so, as it did earlier in the joint-tenancy exception (i.e., “if at 
least 1 of the persons was an original owner of the property before the joint tenancy was 
initially created”).  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
We hold, therefore, that as applied to terminations of joint tenancies, the plain text 
of MCL 211.27a(7)(h) does not apply only to successive joint tenancies.  For purposes of 
applying the continuous-tenancy requirement of the joint-tenancy exception, a person 
who becomes a joint tenant as a result of a conveyance is “a joint tenant when the joint 
tenancy was initially created.”  We can now apply the joint-tenancy exception to the 
January 2005 conveyance. 
 
The vesting of the fee simple in petitioner that occurred as a result of the death of 
James Klooster met the original-ownership requirement of MCL 211.27a(7)(h) because 
James Klooster was a cotenant and “was an original owner of the property before the 
                                              
a successive joint tenancy between James and petitioner, the property would not have 
been uncapped by the death of James.  There is no indication that the Legislature 
intended to benefit only those taking such elaborate steps. 
 
 
 
18
joint tenancy was initially created.”  Because the property was held as a joint tenancy at 
the time of the conveyance, we must also apply the continuous-tenancy requirement that 
“at least 1 of the persons was a joint tenant when the joint tenancy was initially created 
and that person has remained a joint tenant since the joint tenancy was initially created.”  
As explained, because petitioner was a joint tenant “when” James initially created the 
joint tenancy in August 2004 and “remained a joint tenant since the joint tenancy was 
initially created”—until the joint tenancy terminated—the January 2005 conveyance was 
not a transfer of ownership under MCL 211.27a(7)(h). 
 
We therefore hold that the January 2005 conveyance did not uncap the property.  
As we will explain, however, the September 2005 conveyance was a transfer of 
ownership that did uncap the property.   
B.  CREATION OF A NONSUCCESSIVE JOINT TENANCY 
 
When petitioner conveyed the property to himself and his brother in September 
2005, the property went from a state of sole ownership into a new joint tenancy.  Before 
applying the joint-tenancy exemption to the September 2005 conveyance, however, we 
first address preservation of the issue.   
1.  PRESERVATION 
Our order granting leave to appeal asked the parties to address preservation of the 
September 2005 conveyance as a possible uncapping event.  See MCR 7.302(H)(4)(a) 
(limiting appeals to issues raised in an application “[u]nless otherwise ordered”); MCR 
7.316(A)(3) (allowing this Court to “permit the reasons or grounds of appeal to be 
amended or new grounds to be added”).   
 
 
 
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We note first that the fact of the September 2005 conveyance has always been part 
of the record on which this case was decided below and that the notice of reassessment in 
evidence was addressed to both petitioner and Charles Klooster.  That the Tax Tribunal 
and Court of Appeals chose to focus only on the January 2005 conveyance occasioned by 
the death of James Klooster does not remove these facts from evidence.  In addition, the 
preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering 
additional issues when “‘necessary to a proper determination of a case . . . .’”  Prudential 
Ins Co of America v Cusick, 369 Mich 269, 290; 120 NW2d 1 (1963), quoting Dation v 
Ford Motor Co, 314 Mich 152, 160-161; 22 NW2d 252 (1946).  Although this issue was 
not decided below, a party “should not be punished for the omission of the trial court.”  
Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 183; 521 NW2d 499 (1994).  
Lastly, an appellate court may uphold a lower tribunal’s decision that reached the correct 
result, even if for an incorrect reason.  See Mulholland v DEC Int’l Corp, 432 Mich 395, 
411 n 10; 443 NW2d 340 (1989); Peninsular Constr Co v Murray, 365 Mich 694, 699; 
114 NW2d 202 (1962). 
We therefore find it appropriate to consider the September 2005 conveyance as a 
possible uncapping event because the facts are properly before us, the parties briefed and 
argued the issue in this Court, and doing so is necessary to a proper determination of this 
case.   
2.  THE SEPTEMBER 2005 CONVEYANCE 
In September 2005, petitioner—who held the property in sole ownership as a 
result of the January 2005 vesting of the fee simple—conveyed the property to himself 
 
 
 
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and his brother as joint tenants.  In the context of the creation of a nonsuccessive joint 
tenancy, we need only consider the original-ownership requirement of MCL 
211.27a(7)(h) because, as previously discussed, the continuous-tenancy requirement 
applies only if the property was held in a joint tenancy at the time of the conveyance.  As 
applied to the creation of a nonsuccessive joint tenancy, the joint-tenancy exception 
provides that “[t]ransfer of ownership does not include . . . [a] transfer creating . . . a joint 
tenancy between 2 or more persons if at least 1 of the persons was an original owner of 
the property before the joint tenancy was initially created . . . .” 
The September 2005 conveyance was not excluded from the definition of “transfer 
of ownership” in MCL 211.27a(6) because, under the original-ownership requirement, 
petitioner was not an “original owner of the property before the joint tenancy was initially 
created.”  MCL 211.27a(7)(h).  As explained, the most recent event that would have been 
an uncapping event was the 1959 conveyance to petitioner’s parents, James and Dona 
Klooster.  Only James or Dona Klooster could qualify as an original owner until the time 
of the next uncapping event.  Because the August 2004 and January 2005 conveyances 
were excluded by MCL 211.27a(7)(h) from the definition of “transfer of ownership,” 
neither conveyance constituted an uncapping event and petitioner did not acquire the 
status of an original owner of the property.  See MCL 211.27a(6).  Because petitioner 
was not an original owner of the property before he initially created the joint tenancy 
with his brother, the September 2005 conveyance did not satisfy the joint-tenancy 
 
 
 
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exception of MCL 211.27a(7)(h).17  The September 2005 conveyance was therefore a 
transfer of ownership that uncapped the subject property. 
Therefore, respondent properly issued the notice of assessment, taxable valuation, 
and property classification in 2006 because of a transfer of ownership in 2005, and the 
Tax Tribunal reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason.   
C.  CREATION OF SUCCESSIVE JOINT TENANCIES 
Although not essential to resolving this case, we hope to provide some limited 
guidance by specifically addressing how MCL 211.27a(7)(h) would apply to the creation 
of a successive joint tenancy.  If the property was held in joint tenancy before the 
conveyance creating a successive joint tenancy, the original-ownership requirement 
mandates that there must have been an “original owner of the property” before the joint 
tenancy was initially created who is also a joint tenant in the successive joint tenancy.  
The continuous-tenancy requirement pertains to the immediately preceding joint tenancy 
and requires that at least one of the persons in the previous joint tenancy must have been 
“a joint tenant when the [previous] joint tenancy was initially created,” and that same 
person must have “remained a joint tenant since the [previous] joint tenancy was initially 
created.” 
                                              
17 We note, however, that both petitioner and Charles Klooster now qualify as original 
owners of the property for purposes of MCL 211.27a(7)(h) because each is a joint owner 
and “[a] joint owner at the time of the last transfer of ownership of the property is an 
original owner of the property.”  Because it uncapped the property, the September 2005 
conveyance was a “transfer of ownership” under MCL 211.27a(6). 
 
 
 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold first that a 
“conveyance” for purposes of MCL 211.27a need not be by means of a written 
instrument.  We hold also that while the January 2005 conveyance to petitioner of a fee 
simple was excluded by MCL 211.27a(7)(h) from the GPTA’s definition of “transfer of 
ownership,” the September 2005 conveyance from petitioner to himself and his brother in 
joint tenancy was not exempted from uncapping, and therefore respondent city of 
Charlevoix properly issued the notice of assessment, taxable valuation, and property 
classification in 2006.  Therefore, we reinstate the decision of the Tax Tribunal because it 
reached the correct result, albeit for an incorrect reason.  
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra