Title: McCorkle v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.
Citation: 175 So. 2d 480, 253 Miss. 169
Docket Number: 43408
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 1965

253 Miss. 169 (1965) 175 So. 2d 480 McCORKLE v. UNITED GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY, et al. No. 43408. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 24, 1965. Crawley &amp; Ford, Kosciusko, for appellant. *172 Brunini, Everett, Grantham &amp; Quin, George P. Hewes, III, Newt P. Harrison, Jackson; George J. Thornton, Kosciusko, for appellees. *173 BRADY, TOM P., J. This is an appeal from a final decree of the Chancery Court of Attala County, Mississippi, dismissing a bill of complaint and a bill for attachment filed by the appellant against the appellees, United Gas Pipe Line Company and Daulton P. May. The record reveals the following pertinent facts: On November 30, 1962, around 2:40 P.M., appellant was riding in a Chevrolet pickup truck driven by her husband in a southerly direction over U.S. Highway 51 a short distance south of the town of Vaiden, in Carroll County, Mississippi. Mississippi State Highway 35 intersects U.S. Highway 51 at approximately a sixty-nine degree angle, Highway 35 traverses in a southeasterly and northwesterly direction, and U.S. Highway 51 extends generally in a northerly and southerly *174 direction. Daulton P. May, employee, agent and servant of United Gas Pipe Line Company, a nonresident corporation incorporated in the state of Delaware, was operating a 1962 Chevrolet automobile likewise in a southerly direction over U.S. Highway 51 and was following the Chevrolet pickup truck driven by appellant's husband, C.M. McCorkle. The car driven by May collided with the McCorkle truck when May attempted to pass the truck, which also turned into the left lane in an effort to turn onto Highway 35. A thorough finding of facts and conclusions of law were filed by the learned chancellor in accordance with Mississippi Code Annotated section 1390 (1956). Oddly enough, it is only the appellees who, in their briefs, take any issue with the chancellor's findings of fact. The chancellor found that as one travels south over U.S. Highway 51, at or near the crest of an incline, there is a sign on the east side which reads: "Vaiden Corporate Limits Speed Limit 45 Miles Per Hour." On the west side of U.S. Highway 51, there is a second sign indicating that there is an intersection crossing Highway 51 south of this point, which is 767 feet away. The chancellor further found that, continuing south on said highway, there is another sign located on the west side thereof which reads: "JCT Miss. No. 35." This sign is located 358 feet north of the center of the intersection of Highways 51 and 35. The chancellor found that on the east side of Highway 51, approximately 233 feet north of the intersection of said highways, there is a sign as follows: "U.S. No. 51 North," and a traffic directional sign on the east side of Highway 51 which is 62 feet from the center of the intersection of the two highways. The chancellor found that the McCorkles, as they came up the incline and across the town boundary and began their decent toward the intersection some 700 feet or more away, were being followed by Daulton P. May *175 some two car lengths behind, at a speed of approximately thirty miles per hour. The chancellor held that May is an employee of United Gas Pipe Line Company as pipeline foreman; that Mr. McCorkle turned on the left turn signal light before starting to turn into the left lane in an attempt to make a left turn from Highway 51 onto Highway 35, in a manner in violation of the statutory requirements, in that he did not continue into the the intersection proper and pass the intersection of the median lines thereof and make his left turn after crossing the center line of Highway 35. An excellent and meticulous analysis of the testimony of all the witnesses was made by the chancellor, and we conclude that the chancellor was eminently correct in his determination of the facts as reflected in his opinion. After analyzing the various distances testified to by the numerous witnesses for the appellant and the appellees with reference to where the collision occurred, how far into the intersection or whether outside of the intersection, and the distance and location of the skidmarks of appellee May's car, the chancellor concluded from the testimony that after the collision the vehicles came to a stop less than one hundred feet north of the intersection, and that May was more than one hundred feet north of the intersection in the east or north passing lane when he commenced his initial effort to pass McCorkle. The chancellor held that: As a matter of fact, May testified that he saw the intersection sign. The chancellor further held: The court further held as follows: The court however also stated: The court stated: The court then concluded: The court concluded by ruling: There is only one error assigned, which is: While the findings of fact by the chancellor defy reasonable objection, we are forced to conclude that the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his determination of the rule of law to be applied in this case, and is contrary to law and equity. The legal principles which are involved in this case are controlled by the decisions in the following cases: Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964); Matthews v. Thompson, 231 Miss. 258, 95 So. 2d 438 (1957); Mississippi Power &amp; Light Co. v. Bradley, 220 Miss. 304, 70 So. 2d 611 (1954); Billups Petroleum Co. v. Entrekin, 209 Miss. 302, 46 So. 2d 781 (1950); Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502 (1944); Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944); Ross v. Louisville &amp; N.R.R., 178 Miss. 69, 172 So. 752 (1937); Thompson v. Mississippi Cent. R.R., 175 Miss. 547, 166 So. 353 (1936); Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9 (1935); Solomon v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732, 733 (1935); Keith v. Yazoo &amp; M.V.R.R., 168 Miss. 519, 151 So. 916 (1933); *180 Russell v. Williams, 168 Miss. 181, 150 So. 528 (1933); Public Serv. Corp. v. Watts, 168 Miss. 235, 150 So. 192 (1933); D'Antoni v. Albritton, 156 Miss. 758, 126 So. 836 (1930); Cumberland Telephone &amp; Telegraph Co. v. Woodham, 99 Miss. 318, 54 So. 890 (1910). The pertinent sections of Mississippi Code Annotated (1956), which have application to the case at bar, provide as follows: Section 8250. Horns and warning devices. (Hns. 1-3) It is obvious that the appellee, May, violated the provisions of Sections 8176(b) and 8185(b), and the learned chancellor so held. While the chancellor held that the provisions of Section 8250 have no application, it is obvious, nevertheless, that when the appellee, May, increased his speed instead of reducing it and then attempted to pass the McCorkle truck to the left within the prohibited one hundred feet of the crossing, his failure to sound the horn was also a negligent act. It can be determined logically that, after Mr. McCorkle saw appellee May in his rear view mirror and had turned on the left rear blinking light, indicating a left turn was imminent, appellee May hurridely and greatly increased the speed of his car so that, when Mr. McCorkle actually began his left turn, May's car was traveling so rapidly that he did not have time to do anything except apply his brakes and endeavor to steer his car around the McCorkle truck, and for this reason he failed to give an audible warning of his illegal speed and effort to pass within 100 feet of the intersection. Appellee May testified that he increased his speed from thirty miles per hour as he was approaching the intersection so that, after skidding 77 feet, when he struck the McCorkle truck he was traveling forty-five *182 miles per hour. This constitutes a continuous, unbroken act of negligence per se. We so held in Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream &amp; Creamery Co., 230 Miss. 634, 93 So. 2d 634 (1957), and also in Wilburn v. Gordon, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844 (1950). We have likewise held that a motorist who violates Section 8176, supra, is guilty of negligence proximately causing a collision as a matter of law. In the case of Moore v. Abdalla, supra, the defendant's automobile failed to stop or slow to a stop at the intersection stop sign, as required by the statute, but traveled through the intersection at a speed of approximately fifty miles per hour, and that the plaintiff's automobile entered the intersection at the unabated speed of approximately thirty miles per hour. The plaintiff recovered a verdict, but this Court, speaking through Justice Virgil Griffith, held that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and that said negligence contributed to the collision as a matter of law, stating as follows: (Hn 4) It is obvious that the appellee not only did not decrease his speed but actually increased it above the maximum speed limit of forty-five miles per hour since, by his own admission, after applying his brakes and skidding his tires a distance of 77 feet, he struck the McCorkle truck at a speed of forty-five miles per hour. It follows that the unlawful speed of May's car at the intersection proximately contributed to the collision. In Terry v. Smylie, 161 Miss. 31, 133 So. 662 (1931), we gave a summary which has application to the case at bar, stating: In Billups Petroleum Company v. Entrekin, supra, we pointed out that the "proximate contributing cause" means a substantial factor in producing an injury. In Gulf Refining Company v. Brown, supra, we held that the passing of a moving automobile within 100 feet, or traversing, an intersection or any railroad grade crossing in violation of Section 8185(b) 2, is negligence which proximately contributes to a collision as a matter *184 of law. Speaking through Chief Justice Harvey McGehee, the Court held: (Hns. 5, 6) It is apparent that we have repeatedly condemned as gross negligence, that which appellee May endeavored to do, the passing of a moving automobile within 100 feet of a bridge, viaduct or tunnel, or when *186 approaching within 100 feet or traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing, and have held such negligence is a proximate contributing cause of a collision as a matter of law. The chancellor's finding of fact and interpretation of the law thereunder is in conformity with this Court's decisions in the above noted decisions. It is in the second part of the chancellor's finding wherein the error occurs. The chancellor properly found that Mr. McCorkle was guilty of contributory negligence in beginning his left turn before he had crossed over the median of Highway 35 where it intersects Highway 51, but it was error for the chancellor to hold that the negligence of Mr. McCorkle was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The chancellor held that "the natural and continuous sequence of acts of May did not remain unbroken; they, however, were broken by McCorkle's turn into the left or north lane of travel and this was the efficient and intervening cause of the injury to Mrs. McCorkle and thereupon the sole proximate cause became the negligence of Mr. McCorkle in his attempt to get into the intersection before May collided with him or perhaps would turn back into his right lane of travel before the collision occurred." The cases are legion in which we have held that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. See Hankins v. Harvey, supra, and Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream &amp; Creamery Company, supra. The basic criteria for determining proximate cause have remained much the same since our decision in Cumberland Telephone &amp; Telegraph Company v. Woodham, supra, decided in 1910. The chancellor's opinion quotes a definition of proximate cause found in Thompson v. Mississippi Central Railroad, supra, which case, however, is clearly distinguishable on the facts from the case at bar. In that case we stated: The chancellor sagely found appellee May to have been guilty of negligence which proximately caused the injuries to the appellant. There is no basis, however, upon which the chancellor could conclude that May's negligence was broken by the negligence of Mr. McCorkle. May's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause to produce the injuries and without which the results would not have occurred. This is true because the turning of McCorkle at the intersection as he did was not an efficient intervening cause, inasmuch as the action of McCorkle might reasonably have been anticipated, as the chancellor so clearly held in his opinion, and therefore McCorkle's action will not interrupt the connection between the original cause of May's negligence and the injuries. Ross v. Louisville &amp; N.R.R., supra; Russell v. Williams, supra. The chancellor found that May passed two intersection signs before attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection. In the case at bar McCorkle, who was preceding May into the intersection, had the right-of-way in making a left turn at the intersection. May was under a duty not to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, as the chancellor properly held. Moreover, May ignored McCorkle's signals for a left turn, and also the statute which made it mandatory that he reduce the speed of his car upon approaching the intersection, but, to the contrary, he increased his speed in violation of the forty-five miles per hour speed limit. May was guilty of these acts of gross negligence, and the chancellor was eminently correct in holding that May should have foreseen that some injury would result, as a consequence *188 of his negligence, to the McCorkles or to himself. (Hn 7) It is a well established rule of law, long recognized by this Court, that the original negligence of one party will not be insulated if the occurrence of the intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated. In Ross v. Louisville &amp; N.R.R., supra, we held: The rule was reaffirmed in Billups Petroleum Company v. Entrekin, supra. Accordingly, in Matthews v. Thompson, supra, we held: See Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350 (1957); Continental Southern Lines v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211 (1953); Public Serv. Corp. v. Watts, supra. See also: Griffith Freight Lines v. Benson, 234 Ala. 613, 176 So. 370 (1937); Bankers &amp; Shippers Insurance Co. v. Blandon, 295 Mich. 324, 294 N.W. 697 (1940); Rodgers v. Blandon, 294 Mich. 699, 294 N.W. 71 (1940); Brown v. Raffety, 234 Mo. App. 620, 136 S.W.2d 717 (1940); Jinks v. Currie, 324 Pa. 532, 188 A. 356 (1936). *189 (Hn 8) From the foregoing it is clear that the chancellor was manifestly incorrect in holding that the act of Mr. McCorkle in turning left as he did was the sole proximate cause of the collision. In the case at bar there are certainly two different proximate causes of the accident which are blended or fused together. The basic error in the chancellor's legal determination was in holding that the natural and continuous sequence of acts of May did not remain unbroken, but were broken by McCorkle's turn into the left or north lane of travel at the intersection, and thereby the negligence of McCorkle became the sole proximate cause of the injury to Mrs. McCorkle. The chancellor overlooked the fact that McCorkle had the right-of-way, had given a left turn signal, and any motorist, including May, with reasonable judgment and caution, should have realized that a car preceding him, which had signaled a left turn, would probably turn left in the intersection to which both cars were approaching. Since the chancellor found that May should have reasonably anticipated that some injury to another would probably result from his attempt to pass under the circumstances, it must follow that McCorkle's act of turning was not an intervening, independent and efficient cause. (Hns. 9, 10) It is inescapable that May's failure to observe McCorkle's left turn signals, or his complete disregard for them, that May's failure to decrease the speed of his car when approaching the intersection but, to the contrary, increased the speed beyond the legal limits, that May's attempt to pass McCorkle's truck within the prohibited distance of 100 feet from the intersection, without any warning signal, after seeing the intersection markings and when he knew, as he so testified, that the crossing which he was approaching was a dangerous intersection, all constitute overwhelming proof of his negligence proximately causing the injuries received by Mrs. McCorkle, who was not guilty of any *190 negligence, as a guest in her husband's truck, and no negligence can be imputed to her. The appellees are guilty of negligence proximately causing the injuries not only under our statutes, but also at common law. The appellant is entitled to recover for the injuries inflicted upon her by the appellees. Therefore, the decree is reversed and judgment rendered here for the appellant, and the cause is remanded to the Chancery Court of Attala County for retrial on the question of damages only. Reversed and judgment entered for appellant and remanded only for determination of damages. All Justices concur.