Title: Partenfelder v. Rohde
Citation: 2014 WI 80
Docket Number: 2012AP000597
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 2014

2014 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP597   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Monica Ensley Partenfelder, 
          Plaintiff, 
Managed Health Services Insurance 
Corp./Healthcare  
Recoveries, Inc., 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
Scott Partenfelder, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
     v. 
Steve Rohde, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Soo Line Railroad Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual 
Insurance, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
Cyndi Krahn and John Krahn, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents, 
     v. 
Steve Rohde, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Soo Line Railroad Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
347 Wis. 2d 385, 830 N.W.2d 115 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 48 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 22, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy M. Witkowiak 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
 
2 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner, 
there were briefs by Timothy R. Thornton, Jonathan P. Schmidt, 
and Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, and William H. 
Frazier, Melinda A. Bialzik and Godfrey, Braun & Frazier, LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Timothy R. Thornton. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-respondents, there was 
a brief by Robert D. Crivello and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., 
Brookfield, and Victor C. Harding and Warhafsky, Rotter, 
Tarnoff, Bloch, S.C., Milwaukee, with oral argument by Robert D. 
Crivello. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Beth Ermatinger Hanan 
and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee, and Daniel Saphire, 
Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Association of American 
Railroads. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 80
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP597   
(L.C. No. 
2010CV4313 & 2011CV1010) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME 
COURT 
 
 
Monica Ensley Partenfelder, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
Managed Health Services Insurance  
Corp./Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
Scott Partenfelder, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Steve Rohde, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Soo Line Railroad Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual 
Insurance, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
Cyndi Krahn and John Krahn, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
FILED 
 
JUL 22, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
No.   2012AP597 
2 
Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Steve Rohde, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Soo Line Railroad Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed in 
part, affirmed in part, and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 relating to the 
applicability of federal preemption under the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act (FRSA). 
¶2 
The FRSA and its accompanying federal regulations 
normally preempt state law claims relating to train speed.  49 
U.S.C. § 20106 (2006).  However, there are exceptions.  One 
exception provides that regardless of the speed set by the 
federal regulations, federal preemption does not foreclose a 
lawsuit against a railroad for breaching the duty to slow or 
stop when confronted with a "specific, individual hazard."  See 
                                                 
1 Partenfelder v. Rohde, 2013 WI App 48, 347 Wis. 2d 385, 
830 N.W.2d 115, reviewing a decision of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Timothy M. Witkowiak, Judge. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
3 
 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675 n.15 (1993).  
The question in this case is whether a parade and the resultant 
parade traffic qualify for the "specific, individual hazard" 
exception to preemption. 
¶3 
The case stems from a tragic collision between a train 
and a minivan during a Memorial Day parade in the Village of Elm 
Grove.  Before the parade, the Elm Grove Police Department sent 
a letter to rail police officer Steve Rohde (Rohde) asking him 
to notify train conductors of potential hazards on the tracks 
near the parade.  Rohde passed along the information, and Soo 
Line Railroad Company (Soo Line) issued an order for train crews 
to sound the engine bell and look out for potential hazards at 
the Elm Grove crossings.  Unfortunately, a vehicle became stuck 
on the tracks, and while Elm Grove Police Officer John Krahn 
(Officer Krahn) and Scott Partenfelder (Scott) were trying to 
remove Scott's child from the car seat in the back of the 
vehicle, there was a collision in which the men were injured. 
¶4 
In 
two 
separate 
lawsuits 
that 
were 
eventually 
consolidated, Scott, Officer Krahn, and Officer Krahn's wife, 
along with their insurance companies, sued Soo Line, Rohde, and 
unknown insurance companies for negligence.  The plaintiffs 
contended that Soo Line should have issued an order for trains 
to go more slowly through the Elm Grove crossings because the 
potential increase in traffic was a specific, individual hazard.  
The defendants disagreed and asserted that the FRSA preempted 
the plaintiffs' claims.  Thus, the question for Wisconsin courts 
has been whether the Memorial Day parade falls under the 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
4 
 
"specific, individual hazard" exception to preemption.  See 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675 n.15. 
¶5 
We conclude the following. 
¶6 
First, the Elm Grove Memorial Day parade was not a 
"specific, individual hazard" because the parade created only a 
generally 
dangerous 
traffic 
condition. 
 
Imminence 
and 
specificity are crucial components of the specific, individual 
hazard exception to preemption.  See Armstrong v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (W.D. Tex. 
1994); Hightower v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 70 P.3d 835, 847 
n.21 (Okla. 2003).  While the parade traffic in general may have 
increased the likelihood of an accident, it did not create a 
specific hazard, nor did the mere increase in traffic present an 
imminent danger of a collision.  The parade traffic in this case 
is far afield of the paradigmatic specific, individual hazard of 
a child or vehicle stuck on the tracks in front of an oncoming 
train.  Therefore, we reverse that portion of the court of 
appeals decision that concluded that the Elm Grove parade was a 
specific, individual hazard.  In addition, we reverse the court 
of appeals decision to the extent that it alters the circuit 
court's dismissal of Rohde and to the extent that it alters the 
circuit court's decision to exclude evidence of Soo Line's prior 
notice of the parade, failure to issue a slow order, and failure 
to hit the brakes prior to seeing the vehicle on the tracks.  
See Hightower, 70 P.3d at 853-54. 
¶7 
Second, as Soo Line concedes, the vehicle on the 
tracks in front of the approaching train was a specific, 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
5 
 
individual hazard.  Thus, the question whether the train crew 
was negligent in responding to the vehicle stuck on the tracks 
remains, and we affirm that portion of the court of appeals 
decision that determined that the circuit court properly denied 
the defendants' summary judgment motion as it related to the 
claims regarding the train's reaction to the vehicle on the 
tracks.   
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶8 
In 2009 the Village of Elm Grove's annual Memorial Day 
Parade took place on May 25.  In anticipation of the parade, 
Sergeant Ryan A. Unger (Sergeant Unger) of the Elm Grove Police 
Department sent a letter dated May 6 to Steve Rohde, a member of 
the Canadian Pacific2 Rail Police.  The letter was titled 
"SPECIAL EVENTS NOTIFICATION" and said that Elm Grove would 
celebrate Memorial Day with a parade that would begin at 10:30 
a.m. and end around noon on Monday, May 25, 2009.  In the 
letter, Sergeant Unger stated that parade-related activities 
might increase pedestrian traffic into the afternoon.  The 
letter asked Rohde to notify the conductors "of the potential 
for pedestrian and vehicle hazards on the tracks" at the 
Watertown Plank Road and Legion Drive crossing and at the Juneau 
Boulevard crossing.  The letter did not ask for trains to be 
operated at reduced speeds. 
                                                 
2 Soo Line is a subsidiary of Canadian Pacific Railway 
Company. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
6 
 
¶9 
When Sergeant Unger did not hear back from Rohde, he 
sent an identical letter dated May 15 and followed up by calling 
Rohde on May 22.  Sergeant Unger claims that during the 
conversation, Rohde said that he placed a lookout order to 
conductors for train crossings in Elm Grove.3 
¶10 Rohde sent an email memo to inform dispatch4 that Elm 
Grove was having a Memorial Day parade and that the Elm Grove 
Police Department asked that train crews be notified about the 
parade.  One of dispatch's functions is to create a document 
called a Tabular General Bulletin Order (TGBO), which contains 
specific instructions for train operators and supersedes the 
                                                 
3 Rohde disputes Sergeant Unger's version of events and 
claims that he has no authority to place a lookout order; only 
the dispatch center in Minneapolis could place that order.  
There is also dispute as to whether Rohde said he would ask for 
the trains to slow down.  According to Sergeant Unger, Rohde 
said that he put out a lookout order advising conductors to 
decrease speeds and watch out for pedestrians.  Rohde maintains 
that he never told Sergeant Unger that he would ask conductors 
to decrease their speed.  In his email to dispatch, Rohde said 
only that the trains should sound their engine bells and be on 
the lookout for pedestrians. 
Mark Fiereck (Fiereck), a superintendent of transportation 
who oversees dispatch, testified at his deposition that after he 
received Rohde's email, he called Rohde and asked for contact 
information for someone involved with the Memorial Day parade.  
According to Fiereck, he eventually spoke with a woman who was 
involved with planning the parade, and when he asked her if she 
wanted the trains to reduce their speed, she responded that she 
wanted only that they look out for pedestrians and ring the bell 
continuously. 
4 A "train dispatcher" is "a railroad employee who directs 
the movement of trains within a division and coordinates their 
movement from one division to another with other dispatchers."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2424 (3d ed. 1986). 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
7 
 
general 
requirements 
based 
on 
unanticipated 
events 
or 
conditions.  The TGBO for the trains going through Elm Grove on 
the day of the parade said, "SOUND ENG BELL CONTINUOUSLY AND 
LOOKOUT FOR CROWDS OF PEOPLE WITHIN THESE LIMITS."  The TGBO 
listed the limits as milepost 94.5 and 96.0, an area that 
included the Juneau Boulevard crossing where the accident 
occurred. 
¶11 On May 25, 2009, Scott and Monica Ensley-Partenfelder 
(Monica) took their children to the Elm Grove Memorial Day 
parade.  Scott and Monica took separate vehicles because their 
three children and the children's bicycles did not all fit into 
one.  Scott was in front with the two older children; Monica was 
directly behind Scott in a 2000 Dodge Grand Caravan and had 
their 23-month-old son in her vehicle.  Travelling west on 
Juneau Boulevard, Scott and Monica approached the Juneau 
Boulevard railroad crossing.  There are two sets of tracks at 
the Juneau Boulevard crossing with 28 feet between them; trains 
going eastward travel on the westernmost tracks.  When Scott and 
Monica came to the crossing, traffic stopped abruptly. 
¶12 There are some inconsistencies in the accounts of what 
happened next.  Monica said that she and Scott had been stopped 
at the tracks for a minute to a minute and a half when the 
crossing gate began to lower and the bells began to sound.  She 
remembered that Scott was completely on the tracks and she was 
only partially on the easternmost tracks when the gate lowered 
onto the back of her van.  An eyewitness said that the crossing 
gate came down on the roof of Monica's van but that the van was 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
8 
 
still clear of the tracks.5  Monica could not back up because 
there was a car close behind her.  Monica said that traffic 
started moving again, and she followed Scott, who was able to 
drive clear of both sets of tracks. 
¶13 Officer Krahn was at his assigned post roughly 150 
feet west of the Juneau Boulevard crossing.  When Officer Krahn 
heard the railroad crossing bell, he went to check the crossing 
and saw that there was a minivan straddling the tracks.  Officer 
Krahn told the driver to move to an open gravel area to the 
right, but the right tire became stuck on the tracks.  Officer 
Krahn told the driver to accelerate, which caused the vehicle to 
spin so that it was parallel to the tracks.  The train crew 
applied the emergency brakes, but there was not enough track 
between the train and the vehicle for the train to stop before 
reaching the crossing.  Officer Krahn physically extracted 
Monica from the vehicle and pushed her away from the tracks.  
Monica informed Officer Krahn that her son was in the back of 
the car, but Officer Krahn was unable to unlock the van's door.  
At that point, Scott arrived and unlocked the door; he then 
leaned in to unbuckle his son from the car seat.  That is when 
the train struck the van.  Monica went to the van after the 
collision and found that miraculously, her son was unharmed.  
However, Officer Krahn and Scott were injured in the collision. 
                                                 
5 A claims representative for Canadian Pacific Railway 
Limited took measurements of the crossing and determined that 
the gate that came down on Monica's van was 22.5 feet to the 
east of the easternmost rail and 58.4 feet from the eastern rail 
of the tracks that the train was on. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
9 
 
¶14 Following the accident, Trooper Ryan J. Zukowski of 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Patrol——Technical 
Reconstruction 
Unit 
prepared 
a 
Reconstruction 
Report 
& 
Collision 
Analysis 
(Reconstruction Report) of the accident.  The Reconstruction 
Report discusses details related to Soo Line and the train that 
collided with Monica's van.  The Juneau Boulevard crossing is 
located at milepost 95.36, where the speed limit for a non-
expedited freight train is 50 miles per hour.  Between mileposts 
93.7 and 96.6 there is a "continuous quiet zone" where trains 
may not use engine horns or bells unless there is an emergency.  
However, on May 25, 2009, the TGBO for the train that hit 
Monica's vehicle at the Juneau Boulevard crossing required the 
crew to sound the bell continuously and look out for people 
between mileposts 96.0 and 94.5 between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.  As 
the train entered the bell requirement area, it was travelling 
at a speed of 42.5 miles per hour, less than the speed limit of 
50 miles per hour. 
¶15 The train's Event Data Recorder (Recorder) "records 
information surrounding the train's operator inputs as well as 
speed-related and location data."  The Recorder demonstrated 
that the train sounded the bell as required beginning at 
milepost 
95.965. 
 
The 
train 
collided 
with 
the 
van 
at 
approximately 44.8 miles per hour6 around 9:36 a.m.  The 
                                                 
6 The speed increase from 42.5 miles per hour to 44.8 miles 
per hour is a normal effect of emergency activation.  An 
engineer on the train stated that he applied the train's 
emergency brakes when he saw Monica's van move onto the tracks. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
10 
 
Reconstruction Report concluded that both Juneau Boulevard and 
the railroad grade crossing were maintained satisfactorily, and 
the surrounding roads had the proper signage.  The Elm Grove 
Police Department conducted an investigation of the crash and 
determined that the Soo Line train "was operating within Federal 
Railway Administration guidelines at the time of the event."7 
¶16 On March 24, 2010, Scott and Monica filed a complaint 
in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  On July 27, 2010, Scott and 
Managed Health Services Insurance Corp./Healthcare Recoveries, 
Inc. as an involuntary plaintiff (collectively, "Partenfelder 
plaintiffs"), filed an amended complaint against Soo Line 
Railroad Company, AA Insurance Company (a fictitious name for an 
unknown insurance company), and Rohde.8  The amended complaint 
alleged that Sergeant Unger's letter informed Rohde that 
increased parade traffic "would pose a unique local hazard" and 
asked Soo Line to take safety precautions.  The complaint 
alleged that the defendants' negligence caused the collision of 
the train with Monica's van and that Scott suffered various 
injuries and expenses.  In addition to the common law negligence 
                                                 
7 After reviewing materials from its investigation, the Elm 
Grove Police Department issued a press release that stated that 
Monica would receive a citation for violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.52(1)(i) (2009-10), which prohibits stopping "[w]ithin 25 
feet of the nearest rail at a railroad crossing."  In addition, 
the press release stated that Scott would be cited for operating 
a motor vehicle without a license contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.44(1) (2009-10). 
8 Although Monica was originally a plaintiff, she was not a 
party to the amended complaint, and the court allowed her to be 
voluntarily dismissed on November 18, 2010. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
11 
 
claim against all defendants, the complaint brought a safe place 
claim9 against Soo Line. 
¶17 On November 29, 2010, Soo Line and Rohde filed a joint 
answer to the amended complaint and asserted various affirmative 
defenses, one of which was that federal law preempted the claims 
in the complaint. 
¶18 On January 19, 2011, Officer Krahn and his wife, Cyndi 
Krahn 
(collectively, 
"Krahns"), 
and 
League 
of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities Mutual Insurance as an involuntary plaintiff 
(collectively, 
"Krahn 
plaintiffs") 
filed 
a 
complaint 
in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court against Soo Line, ABC Insurance 
Company (a fictitious name for an unknown insurance company), 
and Rohde.  The complaint alleged that the collision between the 
Soo Line train and Monica's vehicle was caused by Soo Line's 
negligence in failing to reduce the train's speed in response to 
the alleged specific, individual hazard of increased traffic.  
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 101.11(1) (2009-10) provides: 
Every employer shall furnish employment which 
shall be safe for the employees therein and shall 
furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for 
employees therein and for frequenters thereof and 
shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, 
and 
shall 
adopt 
and 
use 
methods 
and 
processes 
reasonably adequate to render such employment and 
places of employment safe, and shall do every other 
thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, 
health, safety, and welfare of such employees and 
frequenters.  Every employer and every owner of a 
place of employment or a public building now or 
hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair or 
maintain such place of employment or public building 
as to render the same safe. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
12 
 
The complaint also alleged that the Soo Line crew was negligent 
for failing to look out and stop for the specific, individual 
hazard of Monica's vehicle on the tracks and for failing to 
apply the brakes as soon as the crew saw the vehicle. 
¶19 Both cases were consolidated by a stipulation and 
order signed by all parties and filed on August 15, 2011.  The 
consolidated cases proceeded in the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court before Timothy M. Witkowiak, Judge. 
¶20 In filings dated October 3, 2011, Soo Line and Rohde 
moved for summary judgment against the Krahn plaintiffs and 
filed a supplemental brief in support of a summary judgment 
motion that Soo Line and Rohde had filed on February 11, 2011, 
against the Partenfelder plaintiffs.  In the briefs supporting 
the summary judgment motions, Soo Line and Rohde argued that the 
FRSA preempted all plaintiffs' claims.  After a hearing on 
November 8, 2011, Judge Witkowiak denied the summary judgment 
motions against all plaintiffs in a written order filed January 
19, 2012.  On February 15, 2012, in a decision on a motion for 
clarification, the circuit court dismissed Rohde from the 
lawsuit and prohibited evidence of Soo Line's notice of the 
parade, the failure to issue a slow order, and any failure to 
brake before seeing the Partenfelder vehicles.  The court 
reasoned: 
To hold [Rohde] liable for the injury that resulted 
from the "specific, individual hazard" identified by 
the Court is to impose a duty before the collision 
becomes imminent.  Permitting this case to proceed 
against Steve Rohde allows Plaintiffs to back-door a 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
13 
 
claim that is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety 
Act. 
¶21 In a subsequent written order on March 7, 2012, the 
court granted the motion for summary judgment as it related to 
Rohde and granted in part Soo Line's motion for summary judgment 
so that all claims relating to acts or omissions before the 
Juneau Boulevard crossing became visible to the crew were 
dismissed. 
¶22 Scott and the Krahns filed a joint notice of appeal on 
March 21, 2012.  On April, 4, 2012, Soo Line cross appealed 
those portions of the circuit court's order that were against 
Soo Line and that denied Soo Line's motions for summary 
judgment. 
¶23 In a published decision, a divided court of appeals 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the 
circuit court.  Partenfelder v. Rohde, 2013 WI App 48, 347 
Wis. 2d 385, 830 N.W.2d 115.  The court of appeals determined 
that the parade was a specific, individual hazard because it was 
a unique event that happened only once a year and "could cause 
an accident to be imminent."  Id., ¶¶37-38 (quoting Anderson v. 
Wis. Cent. Transp. Co., 327 F. Supp. 2d 969, 978 (E.D. Wis. 
2004)).  Therefore, the court reversed the circuit court's 
decision regarding preemption.10  Id., ¶38.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the portion of the circuit court's decision that 
determined that the plaintiffs stated a claim for relief 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals did not specifically address the 
claims against Rohde, but it appears as though the decision 
would allow those claims to be reinstated. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
14 
 
regarding the train crew's allegedly negligent response after 
seeing Monica's van on the tracks.  Id., ¶¶1, 39-40.  The 
dissent 
disagreed 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
on 
the 
preemption issue, reasoning that the parade presented only a 
"potential for danger" and was not a specific, individual 
hazard.  Id., ¶41 (Curley, P.J., dissenting in part, concurring 
in part). 
¶24 Soo Line petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 17, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 This court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo 
but benefits from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 
613 N.W.2d 102.  A court shall grant summary judgment if the 
record demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2011-12).  
"[W]hether federal preemption applies is a question of federal 
law that we review independently."  Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 
2009 WI 16, ¶13, 315 Wis. 2d 612, 760 N.W.2d 396 (citing Int'l 
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. U.S. Can Co., 150 
Wis. 2d 479, 487, 441 N.W.2d 710 (1989)); see Miller Brewing Co. 
v. DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 26, 33, 563 N.W.2d 460 (1997). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶26 The essential question in this case is whether the 
FRSA preempts claims that Soo Line should have slowed its trains 
because of the Memorial Day parade traffic.  The Supreme Court 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
15 
 
has outlined three instances in which preemption occurs: (1) 
when Congress expressly sets forth a law's preemptive effect; 
(2) when there is a reasonable inference that the subject matter 
of the law in question is in a field in which Congress intended 
federal law to have exclusive application; and (3) when state 
law conflicts with federal law.  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).  This case involves the FRSA's express 
preemption. 
¶27 The FRSA was created "to promote safety in every area 
of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and 
incidents." 
 
49 
U.S.C. 
§ 20101 
(2006). 
 
To 
facilitate 
uniformity, the FRSA expressly preempts state law in areas 
covered by the FRSA: 
Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad 
safety and laws, regulations, and orders related to 
railroad security shall be nationally uniform to the 
extent practicable.  A State may adopt or continue in 
force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad 
safety 
or 
security 
until 
the 
Secretary 
of 
Transportation 
(with 
respect 
to 
railroad 
safety 
matters), or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with 
respect to railroad security matters), prescribes a 
regulation or issues an order covering the subject 
matter of the State requirement.    
49 U.S.C. § 20106 (2006). 
¶28 FRSA preemption applies to state common law claims as 
well as statutory claims.  Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664.  
Although the FRSA expressly preempts state law in covered areas, 
it does provide an exception to preemption for "an essentially 
local safety or security hazard": 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
16 
 
A State may adopt or continue in force an additional 
or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to 
railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, 
or order—— 
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety or security hazard; 
(2) is 
not 
incompatible 
with 
a 
law, 
regulation, 
or 
order 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Government; and 
(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate 
commerce. 
49 U.S.C. § 20106 (2006) (emphasis added).  In addition to this 
exception in the text of the FRSA, there is an exception to 
preemption for state claims alleging that a railroad was 
negligent for failing to slow or stop a train in response to a 
"specific, individual hazard."11  Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675 
n.15. 
                                                 
11 Courts have come to different conclusions as to whether a 
"specific, individual hazard" is part of the "essentially local 
safety or security hazard" exception to preemption listed in 49 
U.S.C. § 20106 or whether it falls outside the scope of the 
FRSA.  See Myers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 52 P.3d 1014, 1026 n.43 
(Okla. 2002) (citing cases that disagree as to whether the 
essentially local safety or security hazard exception in 49 
U.S.C. § 20106 is distinct from specific, individual hazards).  
We conclude that a specific, individual hazard is separate from 
the statutory local safety or security exception to preemption.  
This view is supported by CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 
U.S. 658, 675 & n.15 (1993), where the Supreme Court determined 
that an excessive speed claim did not fall under the statutory 
"essentially local safety hazard" exception but suggested that a 
"specific, individual hazard" might place an excessive speed 
claim outside of FRSA preemption.  The parties in this case 
frame their arguments in terms of a "specific, individual 
hazard" exception; therefore, we will not address the elements 
of the "essentially local safety or security hazard" exception 
in 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (2006). 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
17 
 
¶29 The FRSA requires the Secretary of Transportation 
(Secretary) to "prescribe regulations and issue orders for every 
area of railroad safety supplementing laws and regulations."  49 
U.S.C. § 20103(a) (2006).  Acting through the Federal Railroad 
Administration, the Secretary promulgates regulations that set 
forth maximum train speeds depending on the track class.  See 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 673; 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.49(m), 213.9 (2008). 
¶30 Federal regulations under the FRSA preempt state law 
only if they cover the same subject matter as the state law; 
that is, state law is preempted "only if the federal regulations 
substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state 
law."  Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664 (citation omitted).  The 
Supreme Court has determined that 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) "cover[s] 
the subject matter of train speed with respect to track 
conditions . . . ."  Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675.  "Thus, if a 
train is involved in an accident while traveling under the 
maximum speed prescribed by § 213.9(a), a state law claim based 
on excessive speed is preempted."  Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 
975.   
¶31 However, as mentioned above, negligence claims based 
on a train's failure to slow or stop in the face of a "specific, 
individual hazard" fall outside preemption.  E.g., Easterwood, 
507 U.S. at 675 n.15; Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 975.  It is 
undisputed that the Soo Line train involved in the collision was 
travelling under the prescribed speed limit, and there is no 
allegation 
of 
any 
violation 
of 
federal 
regulations.  
Accordingly, Scott and the Krahns (collectively, "respondents") 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
18 
 
may pursue their claims that Soo Line should have slowed its 
trains in response to the parade traffic only if this court 
concludes that the Elm Grove Memorial Day parade was a specific, 
individual hazard that removed the claims from the ambit of 
preemption. 
A. Defining "Specific, Individual Hazard" 
¶32 The "specific, individual hazard" language originated 
in Easterwood where the Supreme Court considered whether the 
FRSA preempted a negligence claim based on a train's allegedly 
excessive speed.  Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 665, 675 n.15.  In 
Easterwood, a train struck and killed Thomas Easterwood as he 
was driving across a set of railroad tracks in Cartersville, 
Georgia.  Id. at 661.  His widow, the respondent, brought 
several claims against the railroad, including a claim for 
breaching the common law duty to operate the train at a safe 
speed.  Id.  The Court determined that "the speed limits must be 
read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding 
additional state regulation of the sort that respondent seeks to 
impose on petitioner."  Id. at 674.  The Court rejected the 
respondent's argument that a common law speed restriction falls 
under the "essentially local safety hazard" exception but 
suggested that the FRSA might not preempt speed claims based on 
specific, individual hazards: 
Petitioner is prepared to concede that the pre-emption 
of respondent's excessive speed claim does not bar 
suit for breach of related tort law duties, such as 
the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, 
individual hazard.  As respondent's complaint alleges 
only that petitioner's train was traveling too quickly 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
19 
 
given the "time and place," this case does not 
present, and we do not address, the question of FRSA's 
pre-emptive effect on such related claims. 
Id. at 675 & n.15 (internal citations omitted). 
¶33 Since Easterwood, courts have endeavored to define the 
parameters of the "specific, individual hazard" exception to 
preemption 
and 
generally 
have 
interpreted 
the 
exception 
narrowly.  Veit, ex rel. Nelson v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 
249 P.3d 607, 618 (Wash. 2011) (en banc).  A Wisconsin federal 
district court offered the following definition: 
Generally 
speaking, . . . a 
specific, 
individual 
hazard is a person, vehicle, obstruction, object or 
event which is not a fixed condition or feature of a 
crossing and cannot be addressed by a uniform, 
national standard.  See, e.g., Hightower, 70 P.3d at 
847.  A specific individual hazard is a unique 
occurrence which could cause an accident to be 
imminent rather than a generally dangerous condition.  
A commonly cited example is a child standing on a 
track.  "Factors such as general knowledge that a 
crossing 
is 
dangerous, 
traffic 
conditions, 
a 
crossing's accident history, sight distances, multiple 
crossings in close proximity, sun glare, a railroad's 
internal policies regarding speed, and inadequate 
signal 
maintenance 
are 
not 
specific, 
individual 
hazards."  Myers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 52 P.3d 1014, 
1028 (Okla. 2002). 
Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (footnotes omitted) (internal 
citations omitted).  The definition suggests that a specific, 
individual hazard: (1) is a unique,12 particular danger rather 
than a "generally dangerous condition"; (2) poses a danger of an 
imminent collision; and (3) "cannot be addressed by a uniform, 
                                                 
12 In this context, "unique" refers to occurrences that are 
unusual rather than one-of-a-kind. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
20 
 
national standard."  Id. (citation omitted).  These components 
of a specific, individual hazard are interrelated, and we 
discuss them in more detail below. 
¶34 To 
fall 
under 
the 
specific, 
individual 
hazard 
exception, the hazard must, as the name of the exception 
indicates, 
be 
a 
specific 
rather 
than 
a 
general 
danger.  
Armstrong, 844 F. Supp. at 1153 ("The 'specific, individual 
hazard' identified by the Easterwood court logically relates to 
the avoidance of a specific collision.").  In addition, the 
specific danger must pose the risk of an imminent collision.  
Hightower, 70 P.3d at 847 n.21 (citation omitted) (agreeing with 
courts that "have narrowly construed 'specific, individual 
hazard' as an 'avoidance of an imminent collision with a 
specific person or object'").  In keeping with the specificity 
requirement, a specific, individual hazard is something that is 
unique and could not have been taken into account by the 
Secretary when promulgating uniform, national standards.  See 
Myers, 52 P.3d at 1027; Armstrong, 844 F. Supp. at 1152-53 
(determining that a grade crossing without  an automatic gate or 
flashing lights in an area of heavy traffic was not a specific, 
individual hazard in part because the Secretary took those 
conditions into consideration). 
¶35 Relying on the Anderson definition quoted above in 
paragraph 33, the respondents attempt to characterize the parade 
as a unique "event" that "could cause an accident" with a parade 
attendee "to be imminent."  The respondents fail to consider 
Anderson's definition in its entirety.  The alleged hazard in 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
21 
 
this case is more appropriately characterized as a traffic 
condition rather than an event.13  The Memorial Day parade may 
have 
increased 
the 
danger 
of 
a 
collision 
generally 
by 
contributing to traffic congestion, but Anderson is clear that 
"generally dangerous condition[s]" and "traffic conditions" are 
not specific, individual hazards.  Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 
978. 
¶36 Moreover, the idea that a specific, individual hazard 
is something that "could cause an accident to be imminent," id. 
(emphasis added), does not mean that a specific, individual 
hazard is any hazard that could, in a cosmic sense, lead to an 
imminent danger of an accident.  Instead, that phrase must be 
considered in context: "A specific individual hazard is a unique 
occurrence which could cause an accident to be imminent rather 
than a generally dangerous condition."  Id. (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).  Thus, imminence is related to a particular 
danger.  Cf. Myers, 52 P.3d at 1027 n.45 (emphasis added) 
(agreeing with courts that "have concluded that the phrase 
specific, individual hazard was used in Easterwood to describe 
                                                 
13 In fact, both complaints allege that the traffic is the 
specific, individual hazard.  The Partenfelder plaintiffs' 
amended complaint alleges "that the pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic would pose a unique local hazard."  The Krahn 
plaintiffs' complaint alleges "that the increased pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic would pose a specific, individual hazard."  
Although the complaints allege that the parade attracted the 
traffic, they refer to the traffic as the hazard, not the 
parade. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
22 
 
the avoidance of an imminent collision with a specific person or 
object"). 
¶37 For example, if the Elm Grove Police Department had 
called Soo Line and said that there was a van stuck on the 
tracks several miles ahead of the train, the van would have been 
a specific, individual hazard that could have caused an accident 
to be imminent as the train approached.  The same is not true 
for traffic congestion.  Even as a train approaches a crowded 
crossing, there is no imminent danger of a collision if 
motorists and pedestrians are following the law.  Thus, even if 
an "event" can constitute a specific, individual hazard in some 
circumstances, neither the parade in this case nor its resultant 
traffic was such an event. 
¶38 Perhaps because no case has determined that an event 
like a parade is a specific, individual hazard, the respondents 
analogize to a case in which the court determined that an 
obstructed view was a specific, individual hazard.  Mo. Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1993).  The analogy 
is strained, and it is worth noting that at least one case that 
used 
the 
"event" 
language 
has 
specifically 
rejected 
the 
reasoning in Lemon.  Myers, 52 P.3d at 1027 n.45 (stating that 
although 
Lemon 
"may 
be 
justified 
in 
light 
of 
specific 
peculiarities in [its] fact pattern[]," the case did not 
"provide[] a sound rule of general applicability"). 
¶39 In Lemon, a train struck a vehicle and killed the 
driver at a railroad crossing where railroad cars were illegally 
parked to obstruct the view of both drivers and train operators.  
No. 
2012AP597 
 
23 
 
Lemon, 861 S.W.2d at 508-09.  In addition to the fact that 
illegally-parked train cars made the crossing less safe, the 
crossing also was unlit, had no warning device for drivers to 
alert them to a coming train, consisted of multiple tracks, was 
above the level of the road, and had a curved road leading to 
the tracks.  Id. at 510.  The train's engineer testified that he 
would have seen the driver's car sooner if the illegally-parked 
train cars had not been there.  Id. at 509-10.  The driver's 
estate, among others, brought several claims against the 
railroad including one for operating at an excessive speed.  Id. 
at 508.  The railroad appellants argued that the FRSA preempted 
the excessive speed claim.  Id. at 509. 
¶40 The court in Lemon determined that train cars that 
obstructed the train operator's view were parked in violation of 
an administrative code provision and that the engineer's 
"realization that his view of one side of the crossing was 
obstructed, coupled with his knowledge of this crossing, 
triggered a duty for [the engineer] to slow his train . . . ."  
Id. at 509-10.  The court noted that the illegally-parked train 
cars were not something that the Secretary of Transportation 
took into consideration when setting train speed limits and 
constituted a specific, individual hazard.  Id. at 510.  
Therefore, the excessive speed claim was not preempted.  Id. 
¶41 We agree with Myers that Lemon does not give a 
generally applicable rule.  Lemon's reasoning is suspect because 
it relies in part on the engineer's knowledge that a crossing 
had dangerous features.  See id.  But see Easterwood, 507 U.S. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
24 
 
at 675 (stating that "§ 213.9(a) should be understood as 
covering the subject matter of train speed with respect to track 
conditions, including the conditions posed by grade crossings"); 
Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (noting that general knowledge 
of a crossing's danger and the fixed features of crossings do 
not constitute a specific, individual hazard).  Moreover, Lemon 
came closer to falling within the specific, individual hazard 
exception than the present case because the hazard in Lemon was 
a specific obstruction that the Secretary could not have taken 
into account.  The railroad knew that the illegally-parked train 
cars would obstruct the view of approaching trains and vehicles, 
creating an imminent danger of a crash any time a train 
traversed the crossing while a car was approaching.  In 
contrast, the parade traffic is more aptly categorized as a 
generally dangerous condition because unlike the illegally-
parked train cars, the parade does not necessarily make the 
crossing less safe. 
¶42 In addition to citing cases that attempt to define 
Easterwood's 
"specific, 
individual 
hazard" 
exception, 
the 
respondents cite a pre-Easterwood case to argue that railroads 
have a duty to slow their trains when they know of a temporary 
and specific hazard.  See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Griffin, 566 
So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).  In Griffin, a train hit 
a child who tripped while trying to cross the railroad tracks.  
Id. at 1322.  There was evidence that the railroad and the 
engineer operating the train knew that children commonly crossed 
the tracks at the spot of the accident.  Id.  The court 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
25 
 
determined that the FRSA did not preempt claims relating to 
"specific tortious acts in the face of hazardous conditions."  
Id. at 1324.  Thus, on retrial, the jury was allowed to consider 
the fact that the railroad did not issue a slow order and that 
the engineer did not slow down or stop when he saw the children.  
Id. 
¶43 Based on Griffin, the respondents in this case suggest 
that the jury should be able to consider Soo Line's knowledge of 
the increased traffic due to the Memorial Day parade and its 
failure to issue a slow order.  However, the persuasive value of 
the opinion from a Florida court of appeals is minimal given the 
fact that the Supreme Court subsequently addressed the issue.  
Griffin is an outlier because it does not require that a 
collision between a train and a specific hazard be imminent 
before the specific, individual hazard exception applies.  We 
decline to follow the analysis in Griffin because it is no 
longer the applicable law. 
¶44 In a decision more analogous to the present case, a 
U.S. District Court in Mississippi determined that a railroad 
did not need to slow its trains based on knowledge that 
construction workers would be working near the tracks and 
frequently crossing the tracks.  Baker v. Canadian Nat'l/Ill. 
Cent. Ry. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 803, 814 (S.D. Miss. 2005).  The 
plaintiff argued that the railroad should have issued a slow 
order in response to the workers' activities.  Id. at 814 n.9.  
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim and concluded that 
"[i]t has been consistently emphasized that the kinds of 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
26 
 
conditions that could constitute a 'specific individual hazard' 
are limited to transient conditions that could lead to an 
imminent 
collision, 
such 
as 
a 
child 
standing 
on 
the 
railway . . . ."  Id. at 813.  Therefore, the fact that the 
workers had to cross the tracks frequently was not a specific, 
individual hazard because such activity took place at many 
sites.14  Id. at 814.   
¶45 Similarly, events might cause increased traffic around 
railroad crossings all over the country, and trains have no duty 
to slow down for potential hazards unless the danger is 
imminent.  See Bashir v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 
929 F. Supp. 404, 412 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff'd sub nom. 
Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 1997) (declaring that 
"a claim of failure to maintain a slow speed to avoid potential 
hazards is simply another way of claiming that the train was 
traveling at an excessive speed given the track type, location, 
and conditions, which Easterwood precludes as preempted."). 
                                                 
14 Respondents argue that Soo Line slows its trains when it 
knows that employees are working on the tracks and that it 
should do the same when it knows the public will be near the 
tracks.  The fact that Soo Line slows its trains when it knows 
that workers will actually be on the tracks does not give rise 
to a duty for Soo Line to slow its trains when there is traffic 
that might cause vehicles to become stuck on the tracks.  
Respondents also argue that because in years past, Soo Line had 
slowed down its trains, it knew that the parade was a specific, 
individual hazard.  However, because the specific, individual 
hazard exception asks whether a collision is imminent, Soo 
Line's past conduct is irrelevant.  A plaintiff cannot use a 
railroad's 
past 
voluntary 
act 
of 
caution 
to 
circumvent 
preemption. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
27 
 
B. Practical Concerns 
¶46 The court of appeals supported its determination that 
the parade was a specific, individual hazard by emphasizing that 
the parade occurred only once a year.  Partenfelder, 347 
Wis. 2d 385, ¶37.  Because the parade happens only once a year, 
the court reasoned that it was unique and not a generally 
dangerous condition like traffic related to frequent sporting 
events.  Id.  Nonetheless, the fact that the parade is an event 
that happens only once a year and "could cause an accident to be 
imminent" in a broad sense is not sufficient to place it under 
the specific, individual hazard exception. 
¶47 Under the analysis espoused by the court of appeals 
and the respondents, railroads would be captive to speculative 
letters alleging that yearly "events" could cause an imminent 
accident.15  It is not clear what standards railroads would have 
to use to make the determination when an event rises to the 
level of a specific, individual hazard.  Letters could come to 
the railroad asking for slow orders for events from birthday and 
graduation parties to family reunions, to races and marathons, 
all of which might happen only once a year.  However, traffic 
created by once-a-year events might not be appreciably different 
                                                 
15 Although it might seem clear, the concept of a unique 
event is far too manipulable to provide a workable standard.  
For example, if Elm Grove put on an Independence Day parade in 
addition to the Memorial Day parade, would each parade be a 
unique event?  It is unclear whether we would look at the broad 
categorization——parades——or at the underlying holiday or cause 
for celebration to determine uniqueness.  The same problem could 
arise with other themed events or concerts. 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
28 
 
from traffic due to regularly held events like concerts, plays, 
farmers' markets, or sporting events.  As Amicus Curiae 
Association of American Railroads points out, regular events 
might even attract more traffic than unique events.  Thus, to 
carve out an exception for parade traffic would be to poke an 
arbitrary hole in preemption.  It may be a small hole at first, 
but arbitrary holes are subject to expansion as litigants 
attempt to wedge their claims into the exception. 
¶48 If we were to accept the respondents' test, railroads 
would face the constant dilemma of either slowing their trains 
or 
risking 
prolonged 
litigation 
and 
potential 
liability. 
Furthermore, encouraging trains to fluctuate their speeds might 
be dangerous.   
The safest train maintains a steady speed.  Every time 
a train must slow down and then speed up, safety 
hazards, 
such 
as 
buff 
and 
draft 
forces, 
are 
introduced.  These kinds of forces can enhance the 
chance of derailment with its attendant risk of injury 
to employees, the traveling public, and surrounding 
communities. 
Track Safety Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 33992, 33999 (June 22, 
1998).  In fact, slowing a train down might not prevent an 
accident because "[t]he physical properties of a moving train 
virtually always prevent it from stopping in time to avoid 
hitting an object on the tracks regardless of the speed at which 
the train is traveling."  Id.   
¶49 The 
idea 
that 
increased 
traffic 
constitutes 
a 
specific, individual hazard is suspect in part because train 
crews may assume that drivers will stop safely rather than cross 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
29 
 
a track when a train is approaching.  See Van Gheem v. Chicago & 
N.W. R.R. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 231, 243, 147 N.W.2d 237 (1967).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.52(1)(i) (2009-10) prohibits drivers from 
stopping "[w]ithin 25 feet of the nearest rail at a railroad 
crossing."  Drivers must stop at the signal of a warning device 
at a railroad crossing and shall not cross the tracks when a 
train is approaching.  Wis. Stat. § 346.44 (2009-10).  Thus, 
even times of high traffic do not normally constitute a 
specific, 
individual 
hazard 
because 
traffic 
laws 
provide 
protection for motorists and facilitate the safe operation of 
trains.16  Unfortunately, occasional accidents occur.  Although 
our compassion extends to all involved in the collision in this 
case, we cannot allow our sympathies to alter our analysis.  The 
FRSA preempts state claims, and the parade in this case does not 
fit within the exception for specific, individual hazards.  To 
hold otherwise would disregard the FRSA's express preemption and 
create uncertainty and inefficiency for railroads. 
¶50 In sum, the parade and its attendant traffic do not 
constitute 
a 
specific, 
individual 
hazard; 
instead, 
the 
circumstances of this case presented only a general danger of 
traffic congestion.  A specific, individual hazard exists when 
there is a particular hazard that poses the risk of an imminent 
                                                 
16 Although slowing trains might prevent some accidents, 
"Prevention of grade crossing accidents is more effectively 
achieved through the use of adequate crossing warning systems 
and through observance by the traveling public of crossing 
restrictions and precautions."  Track Safety Standards, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 33992, 33999 (June 22, 1998). 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
30 
 
danger of a collision under circumstances that the Secretary 
could not have taken into consideration when promulgating 
uniform, national regulations.  Here, those circumstances did 
not arise until Monica's van was visible to the train crew.  
Therefore, the inquiry on remand must focus on the train crew's 
response once it saw Monica's van.  See Hightower, 70 P.3d at 
853-54 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (stating that when 
the FRSA preempts negligence claims, "evidence pertinent to such 
claims is likewise inadmissible when offered for purposes of 
proof of culpability").  
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶51 We conclude the following. 
¶52 First, the Elm Grove Memorial Day parade was not a 
"specific, individual hazard" because the parade created only a 
generally 
dangerous 
traffic 
condition. 
 
Imminence 
and 
specificity are crucial components of the specific, individual 
hazard exception to preemption.  See Armstrong, 844 F. Supp. at 
1153; Hightower, 70 P.3d at 847 n.21.  While the parade traffic 
in general may have increased the likelihood of an accident, it 
did not create a specific hazard, nor did the mere increase in 
traffic present an imminent danger of a collision.  The parade 
traffic in this case is far afield of the paradigmatic specific, 
individual hazard of a child or vehicle stuck on the tracks in 
front of an oncoming train.  Therefore, we reverse that portion 
of the court of appeals decision that concluded that the Elm 
Grove parade was a specific, individual hazard.  In addition, we 
reverse the court of appeals decision to the extent that it 
No. 
2012AP597 
 
31 
 
alters the circuit court's dismissal of Rohde and to the extent 
that it alters the circuit court's decision to exclude evidence 
of Soo Line's prior notice of the parade, failure to issue a 
slow order, and failure to hit the brakes prior to seeing the 
vehicle on the tracks.  See Hightower, 70 P.3d at 853-54. 
¶53 Second, as Soo Line concedes, the vehicle on the 
tracks in front of the approaching train was a specific, 
individual hazard.  Thus, the question whether the train crew 
was negligent in responding to the vehicle stuck on the tracks 
remains, and we affirm that portion of the court of appeals 
decision that determined that the circuit court properly denied 
the defendants' summary judgment motion as it related to the 
claims regarding the train's reaction to the vehicle on the 
tracks.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
No.  2012AP597.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  It is 
important that trains run on time, but it is more important that 
the people and property of the state be kept safe.   
¶55 The public safety of the residents of Wisconsin and 
our established tort law designed to promote public safety in 
Wisconsin do not necessarily conflict with federal standards 
under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), which "promote[s] 
safety in every area of railroad operations . . . ."1   
¶56 Like the court of appeals, I recognize that the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act does not fully replace or supersede 
Wisconsin's tort law, which protects the residents of the state 
from injury.2 
¶57 By its very terms, the Federal Railroad Safety Act 
does not completely preempt all claims arising from a motorist's 
collision with a train.  The text of the Act is evidence that 
Congress did not intend to preempt all claims based in part on 
the Federal Railroad Safety Act.  In areas long occupied by 
state law, there is a presumption against preemption "unless 
[preemption] was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."3 
                                                 
1 49 U.S.C. § 20101. 
2 Partenfelder v. Rohde, 2013 WI App 48, ¶¶29-33, 347 
Wis. 2d 385, 830 N.W.2d 115.   
3 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  
See also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
No.  2012AP597.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶58 Although the Federal Railroad Safety Act does not 
preempt all state claims related to railroad safety, it clearly 
preempts some. 
¶59 Section 20106 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act is 
entitled "Preemption."  A state's authority to regulate railroad 
safety is displaced when the Secretary of Transportation 
"prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject 
matter of the State requirement."4  The Federal Railroad Safety 
Act grants the Secretary of Transportation broad authority to 
prescribe regulations and issue orders for railroad safety.  
¶60 A state may adopt or continue in force an additional 
or more stringent law than provided in the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act as long as it "(A) is necessary to eliminate or 
reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard; (B) is 
not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United 
States 
Government; 
and 
(C) 
does 
not 
unreasonably 
burden 
interstate commerce."5 
¶61 The Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20106, 
authorizes States to adopt or continue in force more stringent 
requirements related to railroad safety as follows: 
(a) National uniformity of regulation.——(1) Laws, 
regulations, and orders related to railroad safety and 
laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad 
security shall be nationally uniform to the extent 
practicable. 
(2) A State may adopt or continue in force a law, 
regulation, or order related to railroad safety or 
                                                 
4 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2). 
5 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2). 
No.  2012AP597.ssa 
 
3 
 
security until the Secretary of Transportation (with 
respect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary 
of 
Homeland 
Security 
(with 
respect 
to 
railroad 
security matters), prescribes a regulation or issues 
an order covering the subject matter of the State 
requirement.  A State may adopt or continue in force 
an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or 
order related to railroad safety or security when the 
law, regulation, or order—— 
(A) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially 
local safety or security hazard; 
(B) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or 
order of the United States Government; and 
(C) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 
(b) Clarification regarding State law causes of 
action.——(1) 
Nothing 
in 
this 
section 
shall 
be 
construed to preempt an action under State law seeking 
damages for personal injury, death, or property damage 
alleging that a party—— 
(A) has failed to comply with the Federal standard of 
care established by a regulation or order issued by 
the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to 
railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security (with respect to railroad security matters), 
covering the subject matter as provided in subsection 
(a) of this section; 
(B) has failed to comply with its own plan, rule, or 
standard that it created pursuant to a regulation or 
order issued by either of the Secretaries; or 
(C) has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, 
or order that is not incompatible with subsection 
(a)(2). 
(2) This subsection shall apply to all pending State 
law causes of action arising from events or activities 
occurring on or after January 18, 2002. 
(c) Jurisdiction.——Nothing in this section creates a 
Federal cause of action on behalf of an injured party 
or confers Federal question jurisdiction for such 
State law causes of action.   
No.  2012AP597.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶62 The majority opinion recognizes that the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act does not preempt all tort claims against 
railroads,6 yet treats the "specific, individual hazard" as the 
only tort claim that survives preemption and addresses only the 
issue of whether a "specific, individual hazard" existed in the 
instant case, despite the plaintiffs' assertion that other tort 
duties apply.7   
¶63 On the contrary, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), the case the majority opinion 
cites for the "specific, individual hazard" exception, the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that preemption of an 
excessive speed claim under the Federal Railroad Safety Act 
"does 
not 
bar 
suit 
for 
breach 
of 
related 
tort 
law 
duties . . . . "8  A "specific, individual hazard" is not to be 
confused with the preemption exception in § 20106(a)(2)(A) for 
an "essentially local safety or security hazard."9 
¶64 Easterwood addressed whether a state wrongful death 
claim based on excessive train speed was preempted by federal 
regulations that set maximum allowable operating speeds for all 
freight and passenger trains for each class of track.  The 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶2. 
7 See Response Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents at 3-4, 23-24 (stating there are multiple tort law 
duties that will defeat federal preemption including, but not 
limited to, slowing for a "specific, individual hazard."). 
8 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675 n.15 
(1993). 
9 Dresser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 809 N.W.2d 713, 722 
(Neb. 2011). 
No.  2012AP597.ssa 
 
5 
 
United States Supreme Court reasoned that these speed limits 
were adopted only after the hazards posed by track conditions 
were taken into account and that thus, all state law claims for 
excessive speed were subsumed by the regulations.10   
¶65 A footnote in Easterwood noted that although the 
railroad was "prepared to concede" that the "pre-emption of 
[the] excessive speed claim [did] not bar suit for [its] breach 
of related tort law duties, such as the duty to slow or stop a 
train to avoid a specific, individual hazard," that issue was 
not presented and thus would not be decided by the Court.  
Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675-76.   
¶66 Wisconsin tort law's duty to exercise reasonable care 
can be violated even if the train speed limits set under federal 
law are being followed.  The claim in the instant case relates 
to a circumstance that is not a fixed condition or feature of 
the railroad crossing.  The local parade event could not have 
been taken into account by the Secretary of Transportation in 
the promulgation of uniform, national speed regulations under 
the Federal Railroad Safety Act.   The plaintiffs' claim in the 
instant case is based on a unique occurrence that was likely to 
result in a collision, namely large numbers of cars and people 
would be on the tracks at a particular annual local event of 
which the railroad had been given notice. 
¶67 I disagree with the majority opinion's implicit broad 
holding that the only state tort law claims that survive the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act are those that allege a "specific, 
                                                 
10 Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675. 
No.  2012AP597.ssa 
 
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individual hazard."  Such an interpretation is contrary both to 
the federal statute and to our state's interest in protecting 
tort victims. 
¶68 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP597.ssa 
 
 
 
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