Title: Brea v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11845
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 2015

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SJC-11845 
 
ELIS BREA  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
December 9, 2015. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts, 
Appeal from order of single justice.  Practice, Criminal, 
Interlocutory appeal, Complaint, Dismissal. 
 
 
 
Elis Brea appeals from a judgment of a single justice of 
this court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  A complaint charging Brea with 
distribution of heroin and conspiracy to violate the drug laws 
issued in the District Court.  Brea moved to dismiss the 
complaint prior to arraignment.  A judge in the District Court 
denied the motion and ruled that there was probable cause to 
issue the complaint.  Brea's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought 
relief from this ruling.1  We affirm. 
 
 
The case is before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a petitioner 
seeking relief from an interlocutory ruling of the trial court 
to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision 
cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse 
judgment in the trial court or by other available means."  Brea 
has not carried his burden under the rule.  He argues that 
arraignment would appear on his criminal record regardless of 
the outcome of the case, causing harm that cannot be remedied on 
appeal.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575 
(2013) (Juvenile Court judge has discretion to dismiss 
delinquency complaint before arraignment of juvenile).  He 
                     
 
1 Brea's arraignment has been stayed at his request pending 
the outcome of this case. 
2 
 
further argues that, even if the charges are resolved favorably 
to him, sealing of his record would be an inadequate remedy 
because even a sealed record "can form a cloud of prosecution."  
Commonwealth v. S.M.F., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 46 (1996).  These 
arguments are unavailing.  "The denial of a motion to dismiss in 
a criminal case is not appealable until after trial, and we have 
indicated many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to 
circumvent that rule.  Unless a single justice decides the 
matter on the merits or reserves and reports it to the full 
court, neither of which occurred here, a defendant cannot 
receive review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his 
motion to dismiss."  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 
1009 (2002), and cases cited.  We have recognized "[a] very 
limited exception . . . where, before a trial or a retrial, a 
defendant raises a double jeopardy claim of substantial merit," 
and "we have consistently rejected attempts to obtain 
interlocutory review as a matter of right under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, of denials of motions to dismiss on other bases that 
defendants have attempted to analogize to double jeopardy 
claims."  Soucy v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 1025, 1026 (2015), 
and cases cited.  We are not persuaded that Brea's claim in this 
case is in any way akin to a double jeopardy claim.  Simply put, 
he seeks immediate review of the judge's ruling that the 
complaint was founded on probable cause.  That this ruling was 
made before arraignment, rather than after, does not present an 
exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of our 
extraordinary superintendence powers.2  Were we to permit such an 
appeal to proceed, we would quickly be inundated with petitions 
from criminal defendants seeking interlocutory review of denials 
of their motions to dismiss simply because they filed their 
motions before arraignment rather than after.  Moreover, the 
"collateral consequences attendant to the pendency of criminal 
proceedings -- such as 'continued anxiety, community suspicion 
and other social and economic disabilities' -- do not 
necessarily render the regular appellate process inadequate."  
                     
 
2 We express no view as to whether the rule in Commonwealth 
v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575 (2013), should be extended to 
adult defendants, as to whether the judge properly ruled on the 
motion before arraignment, or as to the correctness of her 
ruling that the complaint was founded on probable cause.  We 
also note that Humberto H. was an appeal by the Commonwealth 
from an order dismissing a delinquency complaint; we did not 
have before us the question whether a juvenile has the right to 
an immediate interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to 
dismiss such a complaint. 
3 
 
Rosencranz v. Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 1011, 1012 (2015), quoting 
Esteves v. Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 1003, 1003-1004 (2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
 
Veronica J. White for the petitioner.