Title: State v. Chad A. Achterberg
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP003360-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 1996

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-3360-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Chad A. Achterberg, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAY 22, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.  Chad A. Achterberg (Achterberg) 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
which affirmed an order forfeiting his $500 bail on a misdemeanor 
charge.  The issue is whether a circuit court has discretion to 
enter a judgment on an order forfeiting bail absent a motion by 
the district attorney when the defendant appears within 30 days of 
the date of forfeiture.  We conclude that the circuit court has 
such discretion.  We also conclude that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in this case.  Accordingly, the decision 
of the court of appeals is affirmed.
1      
                     
     
1  The State of Wisconsin (State) argues that this court 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
2 
 
The facts are not in dispute.  Achterberg was found guilty 
upon the entry of a plea to a single count of a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 941.23 (1993-94),
2 carrying a concealed weapon.  At his 
initial appearance, Achterberg signed a signature bond which 
included a requirement that he appear at all scheduled court 
appearances.  Achterberg subsequently missed a trial date which 
resulted in the issuance of a bench warrant.  Achterberg then  
received a notice for a new court date scheduled for September 6, 
1994.  Bail was posted in the amount of $500.  Achterberg failed 
to appear for jury selection on September 6, 1994.  Pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 969.13(1),
3 the judge ordered his bail forfeited. 
(..continued) 
lacks jurisdiction over the issues raised in Achterberg's appeal. 
 The State contends that a Notice of Appeal must specify "the 
judgment or order appealed from."  Finally, the State claims that 
this 
record 
is 
absent 
of 
any 
written 
judgment 
regarding 
Achterberg's bail forfeiture.  
 
 
Achterberg properly appealed from a judgment of bail 
forfeiture.  The relevant document is entitled "Judgment & 
Certificate of Conviction" and is signed by the clerk of court.  
Included in the minutes of this document is the statement that the 
"ct refused to reinstate bail."  Here, the court's rulings 
regarding forfeiture of Achterberg's bail and the court's decision 
in response to the motion do constitute a judgment from which 
Achterberg can appeal.  Although the form of this document is 
unusual, it satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of this 
court. 
   
     
2  All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
unless otherwise indicated. 
     
3  Wisconsin Stat. §969.13 provides for the forfeiture of 
bail as follows: 
 
(1)  If the conditions of the bond are not complied 
with, the court having  jurisdiction over the 
defendant in the criminal action shall enter 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
3 
(..continued) 
an order declaring the bail to be forfeited. 
    
(2)  This order may be set aside upon such conditions 
as the court imposes if it appears that 
justice does not require the enforcement of 
the forfeiture. 
    
  (3)  By entering into a bond, the defendant and 
sureties submit to the jurisdiction of the 
court for the purposes of liability on the 
bond and irrevocably appoint the clerk as 
their agent upon whom any papers affecting 
their bond liability may be served.  Their 
liability 
may 
be 
enforced 
without 
the 
necessity of an independent action. 
    
(4)  Notice of the order of forfeiture under sub. (1) 
shall be mailed forthwith by the clerk to the 
defendant and the defendant's sureties at 
their last addresses.  If the defendant does 
not appear and surrender to the court within 
30 days from the date of the forfeiture and 
within such period the defendant or the 
defendant's sureties do not satisfy the court 
that 
appearance 
and 
surrender 
by 
the 
defendant at the time scheduled for the 
defendant's appearance was impossible and 
without the defendant's fault, the court 
shall upon motion of the district attorney 
enter judgment for the state against the 
defendant and any surety for the amount of 
the bail and costs of the court proceeding.  
Proceeds of the judgment shall be paid to the 
county treasurer.  The motion and such notice 
of motion as the court prescribes may be 
served on the clerk who shall forthwith mail 
copies to the defendant and the defendant's 
sureties at their last addresses. 
    
(5)  A cash deposit made with the clerk pursuant to this 
chapter shall be applied to the payment of 
costs.  If any amount of such deposit remains 
after the payment of costs, it shall be 
applied 
to 
payment 
of 
the 
judgment 
of 
forfeiture. 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
4 
 
At the time of his required appearance in Dane County on 
September 6, 1994, Achterberg was in custody on a traffic matter 
in Columbia County.  Achterberg informed the authorities in 
Columbia County that he needed to be in court in Dane County.  
Achterberg was unrepresented by counsel during these proceedings. 
 
On September 29, 1994, 23 days after the order forfeiting 
bail was entered, Achterberg returned to court and asked that, 
because of the above circumstances, bail be reinstated and 
returned to the individual who posted it.  The clerk of the 
circuit court in Dane County confirmed that someone from Columbia 
County had called on September 6, 1994, to inform the court that 
Achterberg was in custody in Columbia County and unable to appear. 
 Achterberg's attorney explained: 
My client was in jail at the time of that court date which 
led to the bench warrant and forfeiture of the bail 
money.  He was arrested on a traffic offense up in 
Columbia County . . . . It wasn't his fault that he 
wasn't here.  He was taken into custody on the warrant 
shortly after it was issued.  He's been in custody since 
September 6, and I think the missed court date was right 
around that time so it can't  be said that he neglected 
to come forward and address the matter in a timely 
fashion after he was released from custody in Columbia 
County. 
 
The district attorney declined to take a position on whether 
Achterberg's bail should be returned and left the decision up to 
the 
court. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
judge 
subsequently 
denied 
Achterberg's request for the return of his bail stating: 
 
Well, quite honestly . . . I might go along with your . 
. . request if this wasn't the second time.  If the 
defendant would have shown up on June 27th for jury 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
5 
selection, there would not have been a bench warrant at 
that time.  
 
 
I don't have a great deal of compassion for people who 
constantly miss their court dates.  It is . . . to me a 
sign of one's irresponsibility.  It is quite honestly a 
huge pain . . . for everybody involved.  We keep 
constantly . . . resetting and resetting and resetting. 
 Maybe that's why we need the number of criminal courts 
we do, [the] number of DA's and the number of public 
defenders because we are all here multiple times because 
of someone's lack of consideration of . . . our 
institutions and show up when they want to. 
 
 
So I will [not]
4 reinstate the bond.  The bond that was 
forfeited will remain forfeited. 
 
The court then entered judgment for the State on the order 
forfeiting Achterberg's $500 bail.  Achterberg appealed the 
decision of the circuit court arguing that the court lacked 
authority to enter judgment on the bail forfeiture because the 
district attorney had not filed a motion for judgment relying on 
Wis. Stat. § 969.13(4). 
 The court of appeals rejected 
Achterberg's argument and held that the language in the statute 
"upon motion of the district attorney" does not remove the court's 
authority to enter judgment on an order of bail forfeiture when 
justice so requires.  According to the court, the fact that the 
district attorney took no position on whether or not the bail 
forfeiture order should be enforced did not preclude the circuit 
court judge from deciding whether the bail should be returned.  
Achterberg now seeks review of the court of appeals' decision. 
                     
     
4 As the State points out in its brief, the circuit court 
judge erred by stating that he would reinstate the bond.  In 
actuality, the bond was not reinstated.  
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
6 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 969.13(1) states that a circuit court 
"shall enter an order declaring the bail to be forfeited" if the 
conditions of bond are not met.  Section 969.13(4) permits circuit 
courts to convert this order into a judgment for the bail amount 
under certain circumstances.  The relevant portion of subsection 
(4) states:   
If the defendant does not appear and surrender to the court 
within 30 days from the date of the forfeiture and . . . 
the defendant or the defendant's sureties do not satisfy 
the court that appearance and surrender by the defendant 
at the time scheduled for the defendant's appearance was 
impossible and without the defendant's fault, the court 
shall upon motion of the district attorney enter 
judgment for the state . . . for the amount of the bail 
. . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 969.13(4). 
 
Achterberg contends that the circuit court lacked authority 
to order his bail forfeited because the district attorney never 
made a motion.  According to Achterberg, an order forfeiting bail 
only becomes final "upon motion of the district attorney" as 
stated in Wis. Stat. § 969.13(4).    
 
Achterberg incorrectly frames the issue in terms of whether a 
circuit court has discretion to enter judgment forfeiting bail 
absent a motion by the district attorney. (emphasis added).  See 
Wis. Stat. § 969.13(4).  Section 969.13(4) only applies when a 
"defendant does not appear and surrender to the court within 30 
days from the date of forfeiture . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 969.13(4). 
 Subsection (4) is silent with respect to when a defendant does 
appear within 30 days.  Here, Achterberg returned to the court 23 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
7 
days after the date of his bail forfeiture.  Section 969.13, which 
deals with bail forfeiture, is silent as to this situation. 
 
Therefore, we reframe the issue as follows:  whether a 
circuit court has discretion to enter judgment on an order 
forfeiting bail absent a motion by the district attorney when the 
defendant appears within 30 days from the date of forfeiture.  
Whether circuit courts have such discretion under Wis. Stat. § 
969.13 is a question of law that we review without deference to 
the lower courts.  Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 193 Wis. 2d 35, 43, 
532 N.W.2d 130 (1995).   We conclude that the circuit court has 
such discretion.   
 
We reach this conclusion as a matter of logic.  We can 
discern only three possible interpretations to choose from when 
interpreting the silence of Wis. Stat. § 969.13.  The first is 
that the legislature intended circuit courts to comply with 
additional procedures when a defendant appears within 30 days.  
However, there is no rational basis for such a conclusion.  Had 
the legislature intended additional procedures to apply beyond 
those already in the statute, i.e., a motion by the district 
attorney, we assume that the legislature would have listed such 
procedures specifically.    
 
The second possible alternative is that the legislature 
intended the same procedures to apply when defendants appear 
before the court within 30 days.  Under this alternative, the 
district attorney would have to make a motion to forfeit bail 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
8 
whenever a defendant is before the court, regardless of whether 
the defendant returns within 30 days or after 30 days.  We reject 
this construction, however, because it renders the language "if a 
defendant does not appear . . . within 30 days" surplusage.  A law 
must be construed so that "no word or clause shall be rendered 
surplusage."  Mulvaney v. Tri State Truck & Auto Body, 70 Wis. 2d 
760, 764, 235 N.W.2d 460 (1975).     
 
The third possible alternative is that the legislature 
intended fewer procedures to apply when a defendant returns to the 
court within the 30 days provided for in Wis. Stat. § 969.13(4).  
Inasmuch as the only procedure required by subsection (4) is a 
motion by the district attorney, this alternative would remove 
that requirement.  We are compelled by a process of elimination to 
conclude that this interpretation is the only logical and 
reasonable result. 
 
In this case, Achterberg appeared 23 days after the date of 
forfeiture.  Achterberg had notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before the circuit court.  See  State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 
34, 381 N.W. 2d 300, (1986) ("Procedural due process requires that 
the State afford . . . [an individual] notice of the offense and 
an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.").   The district attorney decided not to take 
a position on whether the bail should be returned, leaving the 
decision to the court.  Circuit courts should not be foreclosed 
from entering judgment on orders for bail forfeiture when the 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
9 
defendant is properly before the court within 30 days of the date 
of forfeiture.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court 
had discretion to enter judgment on the order for Achterberg's 
bail forfeiture when Achterberg appeared before the court within 
23 days. 
 
We now turn to the second issue:  whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in entering judgment on 
Achterberg's bail forfeiture.
5 
 
In State v. Ascencio, 92 Wis. 2d 822, 829, 285 N.W.2d 910 
(Ct. App. 1979), we stated:  "The decision whether to set aside or 
modify the order is highly discretionary and is reviewable in the 
same manner that all discretionary acts are to be reviewed."   The 
test is not whether this court agrees with the ruling of the 
circuit court, but whether the lower court properly exercised its 
discretion.  State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 
(1983).   
 
Achterberg argues that his nonappearance at the second court 
date was "impossible and faultless" under Wis. Stat. § 969.13(4). 
 Achterberg contends that he did all that was required by the 
statute for return of the bail by returning to the court within 
                     
     
5  Achterberg asks this court to address a second issue which 
makes its first appearance in Achterberg's brief-in-chief.  The 
second issue is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in refusing to reinstate Achterberg's bail.  
Although we are not required to review this issue because it was 
not presented in Achterberg's Petition for Review, we choose to do 
so in our own discretion. 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
10 
the time called for by statute and satisfying the court that his 
appearance was impossible and his absence was not his fault as a 
result of his custodial status in Columbia County.  
 
 
In denying Achterberg's request for return of the bail, the 
circuit court stated:  "Well, quite honestly . . . I might go 
along with your . . . request if this wasn't the second time.  
[I]f the defendant [had] shown up on June 27 for jury selection, 
there would not have been a bench warrant at that time."  
 
In Burkes v. Hales, 165 Wis. 2d 585, 590-91, 478 N.W. 2d 37, 
39 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals discussed the scope of 
review of a circuit court's discretionary act: "It is enough that 
[the reasons for the court's conclusion] indicate to the reviewing 
court that the trial court `undert[ook] a reasonable inquiry and 
examination of the facts' and `the record shows that there is a 
reasonable basis for the . . . court's determination,'" (citing 
Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 326 N.W. 2d 727, 
732 (1982)). 
 
In the present case, the circuit court concluded that even 
though Achterberg might have made his second appearance had he not 
been arrested in Columbia County, the net effect of the two missed 
appearances signified Achterberg's irresponsibility.   
 
We conclude that the circuit court's explanation of its 
reasons for denying Achterberg's request for the return of his 
bail was adequate to establish that the court properly exercised 
its discretion.  Because we cannot say the result lacked a 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
11 
rational or reasonable basis, we affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 94-3360 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-3360-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Chad A. Achterberg, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  195 Wis. 2d 88, 537 N.W.2d 149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 22, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 29, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
ROBERT DE CHAMBEAU 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Patrick Donnelly, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Juliet 
M. Brodie, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general.