Title: Decker v. Harlan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992098
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
GLADYS JANET DECKER 
 
 
           OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v. 
Record No. 992098 
June 9, 2000 
 
THOMAS D. HARLAN, II, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
Wilford J. Taylor, Jr., Judge 
 
I. 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 15.2-1809 bars 
a plaintiff's tort claims against the City of Hampton, which 
operates the Hampton Coliseum, and its employee, a building 
mechanic assigned to work at that facility.  Code § 15.2-1809 
states in relevant part: 
 
"No city or town which operates any park, 
recreational facility or playground shall be liable 
in any civil action or proceeding for damages 
resulting from any injury to the person or from a 
loss of or damage to the property of any person 
caused by any act or omission constituting ordinary 
negligence on the part of any officer or agent of 
such city or town in the maintenance or operation of 
any such park, recreational facility or playground.  
Every such city or town shall, however, be liable in 
damages for the gross negligence of any of its 
officers or agents in the maintenance or operation 
of any such park, recreational facility or 
playground." 
 
II. 
 
Plaintiff, Gladys Janet Decker, filed her motion for 
judgment against the City of Hampton and its employee, Thomas 
D. Harlan, II.  Decker alleged that she sustained personal 
injuries when a refuse truck, operated by Harlan, collided 
with her van.  The defendants, relying upon Code § 15.2-1809, 
filed a plea of statutory immunity.  The circuit court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing, sustained the plea, and, 
among other things, entered a judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  Decker appeals. 
 
The following evidence was adduced at the evidentiary 
hearing.  On October 29, 1996, Decker was driving a van on 
Magruder Boulevard near its intersection with Semple Farm Road 
in the City of Hampton.  While she was in her van, stopped at 
a traffic light, a refuse truck operated by Harlan collided 
with Decker's van, injuring her. 
 
On the date of the accident, Harlan was employed as a 
building mechanic for the City of Hampton and the Hampton 
Coliseum.  The Hampton Coliseum is a facility "that hosts 
concerts, family shows, sports events, conventions, trade and 
customer shows, and meetings."  Harlan was required to remove 
"the staging set up from . . . previous event[s], totally 
clean the building, mark the floor and set up the tables and 
the chairs and the displays." 
 
A refuse truck was regularly used to remove trash that 
accumulated in the Coliseum.  The truck is owned by the City 
of Hampton and "assigned by the City to the . . . Coliseum."  
Harlan was required to remove the trash from the Coliseum by 
 
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transporting the trash in the refuse truck to a steam plant 
where the trash was incinerated. 
 
Harlan testified that on the evening when the accident 
occurred, he learned that the refuse truck that was assigned 
to the Coliseum was full.  He decided to drive the refuse 
truck to the steam plant and empty the trash because an event 
was scheduled to be held at the Coliseum the next day.  The 
accident happened while Harlan was driving the refuse truck to 
the steam plant. 
III. 
 
Decker argues that the circuit court erred in holding 
that Code § 15.2-1809 "shields both the City of Hampton and 
the employee driver from civil liability for negligence 
arising out of an accident, caused by a city employee while 
driving a truck loaded with trash on its way from a 
recreational facility to a steam plant, miles from the 
facility, where the activity giving rise to liability did not 
arise out of the maintenance or operation of the recreational 
facility."  Decker asserts that DePriest v. Pearson, 239 Va. 
134, 387 S.E.2d 480 (1990), supports her contentions.  We 
disagree with Decker's assertions. 
 
In DePriest, we considered whether a bus was a 
"recreational facility" within the meaning of Code § 15.1-291, 
the predecessor statute to Code § 15.2-1809.  The Henrico 
 
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County Department of Parks and Recreation sponsored a 
recreational trip to a retail establishment in Williamsburg 
for a group of citizens.  The Department of Parks and 
Recreation furnished one of its buses and a driver.  En route 
to the destination, the driver lost control of the bus, which 
overturned.  Two passengers who were injured in the accident 
filed separate actions against Henrico County and its bus 
driver.  The circuit court held, in each case, that the 
respective plaintiffs could not recover because former Code 
§ 15.1-291 barred the plaintiffs' claims against the County 
and its bus driver unless the operator of the bus was guilty 
of gross negligence.  DePriest, 239 Va. at 136, 387 S.E.2d at 
481. 
 
We disagreed with the circuit court in DePriest, and we 
held that Code § 15.1-291 did not bar the plaintiffs' claims 
because the bus was not a recreational facility within the 
meaning of the statute.  We observed that the bus driver's 
sole argument was that he was entitled to the benefit of 
former Code § 15.1-291 because he was operating a recreational 
facility at the time the bus overturned.  We stated, 
"[o]bviously, the county was not operating a 'recreational 
facility' when it was transporting passengers by bus to an 
outing in Williamsburg.  In these cases, the bus and Pearson's 
 
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use of it simply served as a means of transportation."  Id. at 
137, 387 S.E.2d at 481. 
 
Here, unlike the bus in DePriest, the Hampton Coliseum is 
a recreational facility within the intendment of Code § 15.2-
1809.  We have held that the statutory term "recreational 
facility" contained in Code § 15.2-1809 is unambiguous and 
means "a place for citizens' diversion and entertainment.  It 
is a place . . . where members of the public are entertained 
and diverted, either by their own activities or by the 
activities of others."  Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 
388, 392, 362 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1987). 
 
We must now consider whether Harlan's act of driving the 
refuse truck to the steam plant was a part of the "maintenance 
or operation" of the Coliseum within the intendment of Code 
§ 15.2-1809.  This inquiry is a mixed question of law and 
fact, and, therefore, the circuit court's conclusions are not 
binding on this Court.  See Wilder v. Attorney Gen., 247 Va. 
119, 124, 439 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1994); Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Gill, 224 Va. 92, 95, 294 S.E.2d 840, 841 (1982). 
 
As we have already stated, Harlan's job responsibilities 
required that he empty the refuse truck by driving it to a 
steam plant where the trash would be removed and incinerated.  
Joseph Tsao, director of the Hampton Coliseum, testified that 
the City could not operate the Coliseum unless the trash was 
 
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removed and that trash removal was "a part of the normal 
maintenance of the building."  A food festival was scheduled 
to be held at the Hampton Coliseum the day after the accident, 
and Harlan needed to empty the refuse truck in preparation for 
that event.  The refuse truck that Harlan was operating when 
the accident occurred was assigned to the Hampton Coliseum for 
the specific use of transporting trash, generated by events at 
the Coliseum, to the steam plant for incineration.  We hold 
that the removal of trash created by the use of the 
recreational facility was a necessary and essential aspect of 
the maintenance or operation of the Coliseum and, thus, Code 
§ 15.2-1809 bars Decker's claims.*
 
In view of our holding, we need not consider Decker's 
remaining arguments.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
                     
* Decker does not argue and, therefore, we do not consider 
whether Code § 15.2-1809 affords immunity to an employee of a 
city, such as Harlan. 
 
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