Title: Com. v. Holder
Citation: 705 S.W.2d 907
Docket Number: N/A
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 1986

705 S.W.2d 907 (1986) COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Movant, v. Billy HOLDER, Respondent. and COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Movant, v. Jerry BROWN and Finley Martin, Respondents. Supreme Court of Kentucky. January 16, 1986. As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 10, 1986. David L. Armstrong, Atty. Gen., K. Gail Leeco, Lloyd C. Vest, Asst. Attys. Gen., Frankfort, for movant. Robert J.W. Howell, Appellate Public Advocate, Covington, for respondent holder. G. Patrick Thompson, Brandenburg, for respondents Brown and Martin. VANCE, Justice. The question on appeal is the validity of a conviction of three defendants accused of the same offense and represented at trial by the same counsel when the trial judge failed to comply with RCr 8.30. RCr 8.30(1) provides: The respondents, Holder, Brown, and Martin were convicted of burglary and theft arising out of the unlawful entry of a building on the James Hall property, and the taking of personal property therefrom. Each defendant was sentenced to four years on each of the two counts. At trial each of the three defendants was represented by the same counsel. The trial judge did not comply with RCr 8.30(1) in that he did not explain to the respondents the possibility that a conflict of interest might arise, and he did not secure a statement from each defendant that despite the possibility of conflict, each respondent desired to be represented by the same attorney. In Trulock v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 620 S.W.2d 329 (1981), the Court of Appeals held that RCr 8.30 was designed to eliminate a case by case determination of prejudice arising from failure to comply with RCr 8.30 and that compliance with the rule was mandatory. Trulock was overruled by this court in Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 527 (1984), a case in which we said that the record failed to disclose any possible prejudice resulting from the joint representation. In Smith, supra, we followed the long-established rule that this court does not reverse for harmless error. RCr 9.24. Certainly the failure to comply with RCr 8.30 is harmless error when the record does not show even a possibility of prejudice resulting from joint representation of the accused. In this case, however, there is a possibility, perhaps even a likelihood, of prejudice to respondents from the joint representation. The respondent Holder gave out-of-court statements which admitted his guilt and also implicated the other defendants. Separate counsel would likely have explored the potential for a plea bargain for Holder based upon his plea of guilty and his agreement to testify against the other two respondents, whereas counsel in a joint representation of all three respondents could not ethically seek advantage for one at the expense of the other two. The respondents Brown and Martin claimed they were riding in an automobile and picked up Holder on the roadside, that they did not know he had stolen property in his possession, and that they had nothing to do with the theft. As such, their version of the events was diametrically opposed to the version given by Holder in his out-of-court confession. There is a built-in conflict of interest between defendants who are being tried jointly when one of them incriminates others who maintain their complete innocence. Apparently trial counsel believed that Holder would repudiate a portion of his confession and would exonerate the other two respondents at trial. That strategy backfired when it came to light that, unknown to counsel, police officers would testify that respondent Brown had also given an incriminating oral out-of-court statement, and when Holder stated to the court that his original confession implicating the other respondents was true. At the conclusion of all the evidence, counsel for respondents made the following statement: The Commonwealth contends counsel did not timely preserve the issue for review. The requirements of RCr 8.30 are specific and are relatively easy to comply with. RCr 8.30 places a duty of compliance squarely upon the trial judge. Our decision in Smith v. Commonwealth, supra, did not lessen the duty of a trial court to comply with the rule. It simply declined to reverse the conviction when there was no possibility of prejudice resulting from the failure to comply. When, as here, the trial court failed to comply with the simple requirements of RCr 8.30 and when, as here, the record demonstrates a conflict of interest between the respondents which could well have prejudiced the disposition of their cases, the judgment of conviction must be set aside. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. STEPHENS, C.J., and VANCE, GANT, AKER, and LEIBSON, JJ., concur. STEPHENSON, J., concurs in the result only. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because there is no prejudice to any of the defendants arising from the failure to comply with RCr 8.30. Consequently, there is no reversible error. Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 527 (1984), establishes what must be demonstrated in order to obtain a reversal based on a claim of improper joint representation. Holder did not suffer any prejudice resulting from the joint representation. He confessed to the crime. At the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress the confession, he told the court, the prosecution and defense that his confession was the truth. His confessions were corroborated by the facts of the burglary, the footprints leading from the scene to the dump, the tool boxes, hedge trimmer and clippers found in the freezer. Evidence against all the defendants was so overwhelming that the prosecutor opted against using the testimony of the juvenile co-conspirator because defense counsel stated he would have a conflict if the juvenile testified. Even in the defense counsel's belated argument and motion for a new trial, no conflict of interest was perceived, however, *910 until he learned of Brown's oral confession. The confession by Brown is no more prejudicial to Holder than his own confession which he has acknowledged as the truth. Brown cannot argue prejudice over his own confession. The fact that one defendant has implicated another does not create a situation of automatic reversal. Any problems relating to the totality of circumstances, did not arise because of the joint representation. Defense counsel never provided the trial judge with any adequate notice of potential conflicts until the very end of the trial. Defense counsel has an ethical obligation to advise the trial judge promptly when any conflict of interest arises during the course of the trial. Cuylver v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345, 347, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1716, 1717, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 345, 346 (1980). The trial judge is not required to initiate his own inquiry unless he knows or reasonably could know that a particular conflict exists. Defense counsel had a fair opportunity to examine any possible conflicts of interest prior to trial as shown by his comments regarding a potential conflict if his juvenile client testified. His failure to raise the issue on the record prior to trial allowed the trial judge to assume that there was no conflict. In my view, the defense waived any objection, pursuant to RCr 8.30, by failing to make a timely motion before the trial judge instead of waiting to do so at the end of the trial in a motion for a new trial. The defense is in the best position to know if there is a conflict or a possible conflict resulting from the representation of multiple defendants. This should be brought to the trial judge's attention immediately. The defendants were ably and competently represented. The joint representation did not hinder the defense from attempting to suppress the evidence from the freezer, the confession of Holder and the confession of Brown. Brown's oral confession was identical or very similar to Holder's written confession which defense counsel was already well aware of. There was no reversible error and I would affirm the convictions.