Title: Engweiler v. Board of Parole
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S054153
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2007

FILED: December 13, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CONRAD ENGWEILER,
LYDELL M. WHITE,
and LAYCELLE T. WHITE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
ROBERT O. LAMPERT,
and STAN CZERNIAK,
Defendants.
(USDC NO. CV 06-957, CV 02-1453, CV 02-630; SC S054153)
En Banc
On certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon dated October 19, 2006; certification accepted November 21, 2006.
Honorable Ancer L. Haggerty, Chief Judge.
Argued and submitted June 19, 2007.
Andy Simrin, Salem, argued the cause for plaintiffs.  With him on the brief was
Dennis N. Balske, Portland.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for
defendants.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
LINDER, J.
Certified questions answered.
LINDER, J.
This case is before the court on certified questions of Oregon law from the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon. (1)  The questions arise in each
of three habeas corpus cases pending before that court.  All three federal habeas
petitioners committed aggravated murder when they were juveniles under the age of 17. 
Each was prosecuted as an adult and, on conviction, sentenced to life imprisonment.  The
certified questions concern petitioners' statutorily eligibility for parole and the legal effect
of any administrative rules governing their potential parole eligibility.  The specific
questions that the federal court has certified to us are best understood in the context of
the statutes and administrative rules that give rise to them.  We therefore begin with that
background, and then turn to the certified questions and our answers.
I.  BACKGROUND
The questions that the federal court has certified to us arise because of
changes made to Oregon's laws punishing aggravated murder, as well as changes made to
Oregon's sentencing laws more generally, through the 1980s.  Before 1985, the
maximum penalty for aggravated murder was life imprisonment, with a mandatory
minimum sentence of either 20 or 30 years, depending on the particular form of
aggravated murder committed. (2)  Pursuant to ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1983), the Board
of Parole (the board) (3) was prohibited from releasing on parole any person convicted
of aggravated murder, except as provided in the statute providing those minimum terms. 
A juvenile 16 years of age or older who was alleged to have committed a criminal
offense could be remanded to the appropriate court for trial as an adult.  Former ORS
419.533 (1983), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373.  A juvenile so remanded and
convicted of aggravated murder was subject to the same penalty as an adult; no provision
exempted juveniles from the minimum term of incarceration required under ORS
163.105 (1983) or otherwise made juvenile aggravated murderers eligible for parole
before an adult would be.
Oregon voters reinstated the death penalty for aggravated murder through a
constitutional amendment and other enactments that became effective on December 6,
1984. (4)  As amended, ORS 163.105 (1985) made the potential punishment for
aggravated murder death, if the jury made the requisite statutory findings, or life
imprisonment with a minimum term of 30 years without the possibility of parole.  Or
Laws 1985, ch 3, § 1.  The statute governing the remand of juveniles to adult court was
changed as well.  The remand age was lowered to include juveniles 15 years or older at
the time of the offense, but remand was limited to juveniles who allegedly had committed
one of several enumerated felony offenses, including aggravated murder.  Or Laws 1985,
ch 631, § 1 (amending former ORS 419.533).  Finally, the death penalty enactments
included a statute that was new:  ORS 161.620.  Or Laws 1985, ch 631, § 9.  That statute
prohibited a trial court from imposing a death sentence or mandatory minimum sentence
on any remanded juvenile, but it made an exception for the mandatory minimum sentence
under ORS 163.105 if the juvenile committed aggravated murder at age 17.
Shortly after those changes took effect, the board modified its rules for
setting parole release dates for persons convicted of aggravated murder.  In particular, the
board deleted parole hearing procedures for persons convicted of aggravated murder
from division 30 of OAR chapter 255, which was (and remains) the set of rules that
governed parole release procedures for felony offenders generally.  See former OAR
255-30-012 (deleted May 31, 1985).  Simultaneously, the board created a new set of
rules -- division 32 -- that specifically addressed parole procedures for persons convicted
of aggravated murder.  Those rules -- both procedurally and substantively -- tracked the
mandatory minimum sentence required by ORS 163.105(1) (1985).  Under OAR
255-32-005 (1985), the rules required that an aggravated murderer receive a "prison term
hearing" under the procedures provided in division 30 of the rules.  OAR 255-32-010(1)
(1985) identified the "minimum period of confinement for a person convicted of
Aggravated Murder as defined by ORS 163.105(1) [(1985)]" to be 30 years.  Thus, for
persons convicted of aggravated murder, the rules did not provide for a proceeding in
which a parole date would be determined until after the inmate had served the minimum
term of confinement imposed pursuant ORS 163.105(1) (1985).  In effect, the rules did
not anticipate the need to do so for any person convicted of aggravated murder.  No
board rule specifically addressed juveniles convicted of aggravated murder or made any
other provision for them.
A few years later, another legislative change to Oregon's sentencing laws
took place, one that also has bearing on the questions before us.  Effective November 1,
1989, the legislature abolished Oregon's indeterminate sentencing system and replaced it
with a so-called "sentencing guidelines" scheme.  See generally Or Laws 1989, ch 790. 
Before that change, Oregon had used a "parole matrix system" for determining the actual
length of an offender's incarceration.  See Hamel v. Johnson, 330 Or 180, 185-86, 998
P2d 661 (2000) (explaining parole matrix system).  Under the matrix system, for any
particular offender, the trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence of a specified
maximum duration, and the board determined the actual duration of imprisonment by its
parole release decision.  In contrast, under the sentencing guidelines system that came
into force in 1989, trial courts are charged with imposing a determinate sentence for most
felony convictions.  That sentence is based on a presumptive term determined pursuant to
a set of legislatively approved guidelines, from which a sentencing court has limited
discretion to deviate.  The inmate then serves the sentence that the trial court imposes,
without eligibility for release on parole.  See State ex rel Engweiler v. Cook, 340 Or 373,
380-82, 133 P3d 904 (2006) (discussing former parole matrix system and current
sentencing guidelines scheme).  The sentencing guidelines system thus eliminated any
kind of release on parole for persons subject to its provisions.  Consistently with that
change, the board amended its parole "matrix" rules -- i.e., division 30 -- to apply only to
an inmate "whose crime was committed prior to November 1, 1989."  OAR
255-30-010(1) (1989).
By late 1989, then, the board's rules had undergone two significant
modifications.  First, in response to the enactment of the death penalty provisions, the
board had removed aggravated murder from division 30, which contains the "matrix"
rules by which parole release dates are set for felony offenses generally; aggravated
murder instead became subject to a separate set of rules set out in division 32.  Second, in
response to the new determinate sentencing guidelines scheme, the board expressly
limited its parole authority under division 30 to felony offenses committed before
November 1, 1989.  Neither set of rules contained different provisions for juveniles
convicted of aggravated murder.  Instead, all persons convicted of aggravated murder,
including juveniles under the age of 17 at the time of their offense, were subject to
division 32, which was written with a built-in assumption that all persons convicted of
aggravated murder were required to serve a 30-year minimum sentence under ORS
163.105(1) (1989).
That was the state of the board's rules when each of the three federal habeas
petitioners -- Conrad Engweiler, Lydell M. White, and Laycell T. White (referred to
individually by last name, or collectively as petitioners) -- committed their crimes of
aggravated murder.  Engweiler committed aggravated murder in 1990.  He was 15 years
old at the time.  The Whites, who are brothers, jointly committed aggravated murder in
1993.  They, too, were 15 years old at the time of their crimes.  All three juveniles were
tried as adults, convicted of aggravated murder, and sentenced (Engweiler in 1994 and
the Whites in 1995) to life imprisonment without a minimum sentence -- that is, to life
with the possibility of parole. (5)
In 1999, the board promulgated new rules as part of division 32 to establish
procedures and standards by which the board would consider whether and when to grant
parole to juvenile aggravated murderers (the "JAM" rules). (6)  The board then applied
those rules to petitioners.  In Engweiler's case, the board entered an order that gave him a
480-month prison term and a corresponding "murder review date" of February 22, 2030;
the board further ordered that a "murder review hearing" would be scheduled for him in
December 2029.  The effect of that order is that the board has not established an initial
parole date for Engweiler.  Engweiler v. Board of Parole, 340 Or 361, 371, 133 P3d 910
(2006) (Engweiler II).  The board has, however, determined that, after 480 months,
Engweiler will be eligible for consideration for parole and it has scheduled further
proceedings for review.  Id.; State ex rel Engweiler, 340 Or at 383.  In each of the
Whites' cases, the board imposed a prison term of "life," thus effectively determining that
they should be denied release on parole.  The board further ordered, however, that each
of the Whites "may petition the board for a murder review hearing after serving 40
years."
All three petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the board's orders
administratively and by seeking state appellate court review of them.  Petitioners since
have filed for habeas corpus relief in federal district court, which, as we have described,
led to that court's certification of three questions to this court.  We turn to those
questions.
II.  DISCUSSION
A. The first certified question
The first certified question asks:
"Whether ORS 144.110(2)(b), 163.105(1) and 161.620[ (7)]
combined to create a situation in which certain juveniles (ages 15-16)
convicted of aggravated murder were not entitled to the possibility of
parole for crimes committed after October 31, 1989 and prior to April 1,
1995." (8) 
The question arises because the cited statutes, at least at first blush, were
potentially inconsistent in their terms.  ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1989) provided, in part, that
"[t]he board shall not release a prisoner on parole who has been convicted of murder
defined as aggravated murder under the provisions of ORS 163.095, except as provided
in ORS 163.105."  In turn, as already described, other than a sentence of death, the only
sentence that ORS 163.105(1) (1989) authorized for aggravated murder was life with a
minimum term of 30 years without possibility of parole.  Neither statute, by its terms,
made any exception for juveniles who committed aggravated murder.  ORS 161.620
(1989), on the other hand, precluded the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence
on any juvenile convicted of an adult crime, except for a juvenile who committed
aggravated murder at age 17.  Specifically, the statute provided: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a sentence imposed
upon any person remanded from the juvenile court under ORS 419.533
shall not include any sentence of death or life imprisonment without the
possibility of release or parole nor imposition of any mandatory minimum
sentence except that a mandatory minimum sentence under ORS
163.105(1)(c) shall be imposed where the person was 17 years of age at the
time of the offense."
ORS 161.620 (1989).
The answer to the apparent tension in the statutes lies in the first sentence
of ORS 161.620 (1989). (9)    It declares that ORS 161.620 (1989) precludes
imposition of any mandatory minimum sentence on a juvenile (except for one who was
17 when he or she committed aggravated murder) "[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law."  The function of a "notwithstanding" clause is straightforward.  It operates as an
exception to whatever follows.  Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or 172, 178, 864 P2d
368 (1993) (function of a notwithstanding clause is to operate as "an exception to the
provisions of law referenced in the clause").  That means, in this instance, that the terms
of ORS 161.620 (1989) prevailed over "any other provision of law."  In other words, the
notwithstanding clause made it irrelevant that ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1989) and ORS
163.105(1) (1989) each mandated a minimum sentence of 30 years without possibility of
parole for any person convicted of aggravated murder and made no exception for persons
who were juveniles under the age of 17 when they committed their crime.
It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the first question is "no."
ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1989), ORS 163.105(1) (1989), and ORS 161.620 (1989) did not
"combine[] to create a situation in which certain juveniles (ages 15-16) convicted of
aggravated murder were not entitled to the possibility of parole for crimes committed
after October 31, 1989 and prior to April 1, 1995."  Instead, ORS 161.620 (1989)
trumped the other two statutes by precluding imposition of the 30-year mandatory
minimum sentence otherwise authorized by ORS 163.105(1) (1989) for juveniles who
were under age 17 when they committed aggravated murder.  Consequently, petitioners
must be entitled to the possibility of parole.
B. The second certified question
The federal district court's second certified question asks:
"Whether, prior to promulgating its juvenile aggravated murder
(JAM) rules in 1999, the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
(Board) had any rules for establishing prison terms for juvenile offenders
(ages 15-16) convicted of aggravated murder committed after October 31,
1989 and prior to April 1, 1995, and if not, whether the Board had the
statutory authority to promulgate its JAM rules in 1999, establishing prison
terms for juvenile offenders (ages 15-16) convicted of aggravated murder
committed after October 31, 1989 and prior to April 1, 1995."
The question has two parts.  The first part asks if, before promulgating the
JAM rules, the board had any rules for establishing prison terms for juveniles convicted
of aggravated murder.  The second half asks, if not, whether the board had statutory
authority to adopt the JAM rules that it promulgated in 1999. 
As for the first half of the district court's question, the parties do not
disagree about what rules in fact were in existence when petitioners committed their
crimes.  Rather, the dispute is over the legal effect of those rules and whether any of them
correctly could be applied to petitioners.  We understand that to be the point of the first
part of the federal court's question.
Our answer is that, when petitioners committed their crimes, none of the
board's existing rules provided either procedural or substantive mechanisms to determine
whether and when to parole juvenile aggravated murderers.  The board had no such rules
in place until 1999, when it promulgated the JAM rules.  As described earlier, Engweiler
committed aggravated murder in 1990 and the Whites committed aggravated murder in
1993.  The pertinent rules in force on the date of their crimes were the 1989 versions of
division 30 (the parole matrix provisions for felony offenders generally) and division 32
(specific provisions governing parole of aggravated murderers) of OAR chapter 255.  By
1989, consistently with the enactment of Oregon's death penalty provisions, the board
had removed aggravated murder from the substantive provisions in division 30 and had
promulgated division 32, which specifically applied to aggravated murderers only. (10) 
Consistently with the sentencing guidelines provisions, the board also had amended
division 30 to apply only to persons who committed felonies before November 1, 1989. 
Petitioners thus did not come within the ambit of the division 30 rules, both because of
the crimes that they committed (aggravated murder) and the date on which they
committed them (after November 1, 1989).
Division 32, in contrast, potentially applied to petitioners, because it
purported to govern any person convicted of aggravated murder.  The problem, however,
is that division 32 contained no rule that fit petitioners' distinctive circumstance of being
juveniles who, because of ORS 161.620 (1989), could not be sentenced to a 30-year
minimum term of imprisonment for aggravated murder.  Specifically, OAR 255-32-005
(1989) provided:
"(1) A person convicted of Aggravated Murder under ORS 163.095
shall receive a prison term hearing under the provisions of Division 30 of
these rules.  A review date congruent with the minimum terms set forth in
255-32-010 shall be set rather than a parole release date.
"(2) Persons sentenced to death or life without the possibility of
release or parole shall not receive a prison term hearing."
(Emphasis added.)  In turn, OAR 255-32-010(1) (1989) provided:
"The minimum period of confinement for a person convicted of
Aggravated Murder as defined by ORS 163.105(1) shall be thirty (30)
years."
(Emphasis added.)  In effect, the 1989 rules tracked the 30-year minimum sentence under
ORS 163.105(1) (1989) by precluding any parole eligibility review and the setting of a
parole release date for aggravated murderers until they had served that mandatory
minimum sentence.  See generally Engweiler II, 340 Or at 371 (under the board's rules, a
murder "review date" does not establish the date on which an inmate is to be released on
parole, but instead determines when the inmate is entitled to further parole review).  The
board had no rule that similarly tracked ORS 161.620 (1989) by making an exception for
juveniles who were under age 17 when they committed aggravated murder, and who
therefore were entitled to parole consideration without first serving a minimum sentence. 
The rules that the board had in place as of the date of petitioners' crimes for persons
convicted of aggravated murder therefore did not fit petitioners' particular circumstances
and could not be applied to them.
On that last point, the parties agree.  In particular, petitioners agree that the
1989 provisions of division 32 could not be applied to them.  Petitioners maintain,
however, that nothing prevented the board from applying the general parole "matrix"
provisions of division 30, which remained in place for certain felony offenses generally,
including murder.  Petitioners assert that aggravated murder, as a more specific form of
murder, (11)  fit within those rules.  That argument fails, for at least two reasons.  First,
the board specifically removed aggravated murder from division 30 and made it the
subject of a special set of parole rules set forth in division 32.  Second, the board limited
division 30 to felonies committed before November 1, 1989.  Thus, by their terms,
neither set of rules applied to petitioners.  That fact does not mean that petitioners were
entitled to choose which nonapplicable rule they would nevertheless like to have applied
to them.  Rather, it means that the board's rules contained a void, one that the board filled
when it promulgated the JAM rules in 1999. (12)
We turn, then, to the second part of the second certified question -- whether
the board had the authority to promulgate the JAM rules.  The dispute on that point is not
whether the board had authority to promulgate some set of rules that would apply to
juvenile aggravated murderers.  On that score, petitioners and the board agree that the
board had such authority, either pursuant to the board's express statutory rulemaking
authority or because such authority must be implied to give effect to ORS 161.620
(1989), which requires that juvenile aggravated murderers under the age of 17 be eligible
for parole consideration. (13)  The dispute instead is whether the particular JAM rules
that the board promulgated in 1999 exceeded the board's authority.  We begin by
describing the provisions of the JAM rules that the board adopted in 1999.  We then
address petitioners' argument that certain provisions of those rules run afoul of what the
board is statutorily obligated to accomplish by rule.
As already described, the board made the JAM rules a part of division 32 of
OAR chapter 255, the rules that govern parole procedures for aggravated murderers more
generally.  In adopting the JAM rules, the board amended some of the preexisting
division 32 rules so that they govern "adult" offenders only, (14) and also added new
provisions to address juvenile offenders specifically.  As pertinent here, the JAM rules
require the board to hold an initial "prison term hearing" for juveniles convicted of
murder who were under age 17 at the time of the offense.  OAR 255-032-0005(4)
(1999).  At that hearing, the board sets "a review date * * * rather than a projected parole
release date."  Id.  Alternatively, the board may "deny parole" altogether.  OAR
255-032-0011(2) (1999).  If the board opts to set a review date, it does so based on a
parole release matrix that it adopted specifically for juvenile aggravated murderers who
are eligible for parole consideration.  Id. (cross-referencing Exhibit Pt-III).   Essentially,
that matrix establishes ranges of time periods that dictate whether and when a juvenile
aggravated murderer will be reviewed for parole eligibility and will receive a parole
release date.  At the low end, the matrix can result in a review date between 240 and 300
months.  Id.  At the high end, it can result in a "life" term, which is a denial of parole.  Id. 
The review date then triggers a schedule for further board review of the inmate's
institutional conduct and rehabilitation efforts, after which the board may establish a
parole release date  under the matrix or may set another review date at which it will
further review the inmate's conduct and rehabilitation efforts.  OAR 255-032-0011(6) -
(7) (1999); see also State ex rel Engweiler, 340 Or at 383 (so concluding).  If the board
denies parole, the inmate is not totally foreclosed from future parole consideration. 
Rather, after 480 months, the inmate may petition the board for further review, and then
may continue to do so periodically.  OAR 255-032-0011(5), (7) (1999).
Petitioners argue that the JAM rules exceed the board's statutory authority,
because they run afoul of ORS 144.780(1) (1997), which provided, in part:
"The [Advisory Commission on Prison Terms and Parole Standards]
shall propose to the board and the board shall adopt rules establishing
ranges of duration of imprisonment to be served for felony offenses prior to
release on parole.  The range for any offense shall be within the maximum
sentence provided for that offense." 
According to petitioners, the statute obligates the board to establish a "duration of
imprisonment" at a juvenile aggravated murderer's initial prison term hearing.  In
petitioners' view, the quoted phrase equates with a prison term based on a parole release
date.  As just outlined, the JAM rules do not permit setting an actual parole release date
at the initial prison term hearing.  Instead, under those rules, the board sets a "prison
term" that is coextensive with the "review date."  That prison term is not the functional
equivalent of one based on a parole release date, and it does not establish the actual
period of an inmate's incarceration.  See State ex rel Engweiler, 340 Or at 383 (a "prison
term" under the JAM rules does not establish a parole release date or otherwise set a
discrete term of imprisonment that the inmate will serve).  Rather, it triggers further
review that, depending on an inmate's conduct and rehabilitation efforts, may result in
setting a parole release date in the future.  Consequently, petitioners argue, the JAM rules
do not comport with the directive of ORS 144.780(1) (1997) because they do not require
the board to set a juvenile aggravated murderer's parole release date at the initial parole
hearing.
Petitioners misread that statute.  Its terms do not require the board, at an
initial prison term hearing, to establish the actual "duration of imprisonment" to be
served by an individual felony offender before his or her release on parole.  Instead, the
statute authorizes and directs the board to adopt "ranges" of duration of imprisonment to
be served for "felony offenses," ranges that are "within the maximum sentence provided"
for each offense.  The board is to do so through its rule-making authority.  In other
words, the statute requires the board to make the generally applicable policy choice of
deciding what ranges of incarceration should be served for particular crimes.  The statute
is not directed to the adjudicative process by which the board applies those ranges to an
individual offender -- that is, the statute is not directed to the process by which the board
determines whether and when to set a release date for that individual offender.
The board's JAM rules comply with that understanding of the statutory
directive.  They establish a matrix for aggravated murder committed by juveniles under
the age of 17, one that identifies "ranges of duration of imprisonment" based on the
circumstances of the offense and the offender.  Under the board's JAM rules, the board
follows a hearing process by which it either denies parole or, alternatively, sets a review
schedule pursuant to which it may eventually set a parole release date for the inmate. 
ORS 144.780(1) (1997) is not offended by that procedural choice on the board's
part. (15)
In sum, our answer to the first part of the second certified question is that
the board, before promulgating the JAM rules in 1999, did not have rules in place that it
correctly could apply to juveniles convicted of aggravated murder to determine whether
or when to release them on parole.  Our answer to the second part of the question is that
the board did not exceed its statutory authority in adopting the particular JAM rules that
it promulgated in 1999.
C. The third certified question
The third certified question asks:
"Whether the prison terms set by the Board under the 1999 JAM
rules for offenders (ages 15-16[)] convicted of aggravated murders
committed after October 31, 1989 and prior to April 1, 1995 are a
[mandatory] 'minimum' sentence that is prohibited in ORS 161.620." (16)
As we explain, we conclude that the prison terms established by the board under the
JAM rules are not "mandatory minimum sentences" within the meaning of ORS 161.620
(1989).
Regarding the federal court's third question, our decision in State v. Jones,
315 Or 225, 844 P2d 188 (1992), is dispositive.  In that case, this court interpreted the
phrase "mandatory minimum sentence" in ORS 161.620 (1989) to mean a minimum
period of incarceration that a trial court, by statute, is required to impose as part of an
offender's sentence.  Id. at 230.  In so holding, we emphasized that the purpose of ORS
161.620 is to give "trial judges flexibility in sentencing most remanded juveniles."  Id. 
We therefore interpreted the term "mandatory minimum sentence" to include any
sentence that a trial court is statutorily obligated to impose, regardless of whether the
board has authority later to override that sentence.  Id.
A prison term established under the JAM rules for a juvenile aggravated
murderer does not satisfy that meaning.  It is not imposed as part of the sentence ordered
by the trial court, pursuant to a statutory mandate or otherwise; instead, it is imposed
pursuant to the ranges established by board rule pursuant to the parole matrix specially
adopted for juvenile offenders.  A fortiori, the board's action in setting a prison term does
not fall within the literal meaning of "mandatory minimum sentence" in ORS 161.620
(1989).
Petitioners acknowledge as much.  They concede that a prison term
established by the board under the JAM rules "is not, technically speaking, a mandatory
minimum sentence[.]"  They argue, however, that it is the "functional equivalent" of a
mandatory minimum sentence because, under the matrix for juvenile aggravated
murderers, no inmate can receive a term of incarceration of less than 240 months.  The
question is not, however, whether the board-imposed prison term is the "functional"
equivalent of a mandatory minimum sentence, as that term is used in ORS 161.620
(1989).  The question is whether it is the legal equivalent.   The test of legal equivalency
is the correct one, because petitioners' theory requires that JAM rules impose what ORS
161.620 (1989) forbids.  Under our holding in Jones, the statute forbids only those
minimum terms that a sentencing court would otherwise be legally obligated to impose as
part of a juvenile offender's sentence.  A prison term imposed pursuant to the JAM rules
does not fall within that legal prohibition.
Our answer to the third certified question is therefore "no."  The prison
terms set by the board under the JAM rules are not "mandatory minimum sentences" that
are prohibited by ORS 161.620 (1989).
Certified questions answered.
1. See ORS 28.200 to 28.255 (describing certified question process); ORAP 12.20
(prescribing procedures for consideration of certified questions).  See generally Western
Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 811 P2d 627 (1991) (discussing
factors that court considers in exercising discretion to accept certified questions).
2. We describe here the penalty for aggravated murder immediately preceding the
1985 reinstatement of the death penalty.  See ORS 163.095 (1983) (aggravated murder
defined as murder under ORS 163.115 (1983) committed under specified aggravating
circumstances); ORS 163.105 (1983) (specifying minimum terms of imprisonment for
aggravated murder); ORS 163.115(3) (1983) (penalty for murder is life imprisonment). 
 The evolution of Oregon's murder statutes and the penalties for murder and aggravated
murder, including the anomalies that arose after Oregon's death penalty laws were
declared invalid in 1981, are more thoroughly described in State v. Shumway, 291 Or
153, 157-162, 630 P2d 796 (1981), and State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 399-403, 623 P2d
630 (1981).
3. The Board of Parole is now denominated the Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision.  See ORS 144.005(1) (creating Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision).
4. In the November 1984 General Election, voters enacted Article I, section 40, of
the Oregon Constitution (authorizing death as sentence for aggravated murder if the jury
makes the findings required by law; otherwise, the sentence is "life imprisonment with
minimum sentence as provided by law").  Or Laws 1985, vol 1, p vi.  At the same
election, voters amended other existing statutes and enacted some new provisions.  The
statutes governing aggravated murder and the authorized sentences have been
supplemented and amended numerous times since 1984.  We discuss only those changes
that bear on the questions before us.
5. Engweiler was initially sentenced to life imprisonment with a 30-year minimum
sentence, pursuant to ORS 163.105(1) (1989).  His appeal resulted in the Court of
Appeals decision holding that juveniles who commit aggravated murder while under the
age of 17 are not subject to the 30-year minimum sentence under ORS 163.105(1)
(1989).  State v. Engweiler, 118 Or App 132, 136, 846 P2d 1163 (1993) (Engweiler I). 
Engweiler's sentence was reversed and, on remand in 1994, he was sentenced to life
imprisonment without a minimum sentence.  The Whites were sentenced in 1995, after
Engweiler's appeal.  In addition, the district court record reveals that two other juveniles
are similarly situated to Engweiler and the Whites.  Evidently, then, a total of five
inmates are affected by the answers we give to the district court's questions.
6. Both the federal district court and the parties refer to those 1999 rules as the
"juvenile aggravated murder (JAM)" rules.  In the interest of consistency, we use that
same shorthand.
7. The question does not specify which versions of the statutes are at issue.  As
mentioned earlier, Engweiler committed aggravated murder in February 1990 and was
resentenced to an indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment in November 1994; the
Whites committed aggravated murder in August 1993 and were sentenced to
indeterminate sentences of life imprisonment in January 1995.  The substantive text of
the relevant statutes did not change in any significant respect during that full time period
-- i.e., between the date on which Engweiler committed aggravated murder and the date
on which the Whites were sentenced in 1995.  Thus, in answering the certified questions,
we discuss the 1989 versions of the statutes.
8. The beginning and ending dates in the certified questions reflect the effective date
of the sentencing guidelines, in 1989, and a 1995 amendment to ORS 161.620, which
deleted the phrase "where the person was 17 years of age at the time of the offense," and
thus made juveniles subject to the minimum sentences under ORS 163.105 for
aggravated murder.  See Or Laws 1995, ch 422, § 131y. 
9. The answer has been suggested before.  Engweiler initially received a 30-year
minimum sentence under ORS 163.105 (1989).  On appeal of his conviction, he
challenged that sentence in the Court of Appeals.  That court held that ORS 161.620
(1989) precludes imposition of the 30-year mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated
murder on juveniles who were under age 17 at the time of the crime.  Engweiler I, 118
Or App at 136.  This court denied review of that decision.  State v. Engweiler, 317 Or
486, 858 P2d 876 (1993).  More recently, when Engweiler pursued his challenges to the
board's order setting his prison term and murder review date, this court contrasted the
terms of ORS 163.105 (1989) with those of ORS 161.620 (1989) and observed:
"Accordingly, the only sentencing option available to the sentencing court in petitioner's
case was life imprisonment with the possibility of release or parole[.]"  State ex rel
Engweiler, 340 Or at 383.
10. Petitioners nevertheless argue that, when Engweiler committed his crimes,
exhibits to the board's rules continued to list aggravated murder as a category 7 or 8
offense for purposes of calculating parole release under the parole matrix system for
general felony offenders (i.e., division 30).  OAR ch 255, Ex A, Pts I &amp; II (1990).  That
continued reference was a holdover from the former rule and had been deleted by the
time the Whites committed their crimes.  See OAR ch 255, Ex A (1992), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/BOPPPS/docs/Rules/ExhA.pdf.  It therefore would not aid the
Whites.  In all events, petitioners have not demonstrated how that reference in the
exhibits, without more, had legal significance once aggravated murder had been removed
from the substantive provisions of the division 30 rules and had become the subject of
the division 32 rules.
11. See ORS 163.095 (1989) (defining aggravated murder as murder under
ORS 163.115 (1989) committed under specified aggravating circumstances).
12. Petitioners further point out that the board apparently used the matrix
provisions for murder in division 30 (as opposed to those in division 32 for aggravated
murder) to establish parole release dates for two other juvenile aggravated murderers,
Karl Kazor and Michelle Burks.  One answer to their argument is that Kazor and Burks
committed their aggravated murders in 1988, and thus fell within the time period to
which division 30 continues to apply.  Beyond that, as the board acknowledges, for a
while "the issue of how to deal with this category of juvenile aggravated murderers [was]
one that troubled" both the board and its lawyers.  Eventually, the board determined on
advice of counsel that it had misapplied the matrix provisions of division 30 to Kazor
and Burks.  That advice is consistent with our analysis.  Suffice it to say, the fact that the
board misapplied its rules to Kazor and Burks does not require it to continue to do so for
other juvenile offenders.
13. In promulgating its JAM rules, the board expressly relied on the then
current versions of ORS 144.110(2)(b), ORS 163.105(1), and ORS 144.780 (i.e., the
1997 versions of those statutes); the board also relied on the 1994 version of ORS
161.620.  See also ORS 144.050 (which, from 1959 to the present, has authorized the
board to establish rules applicable to parole).
14. Compare OAR 255-32-005(1) (1989) (requiring board to set review date
congruent with minimum term in OAR 255-32-010 (1989), and OAR 255-32-010(1)
(1989) (identifying minimum period of confinement for persons convicted of aggravated
murder as 30 years pursuant to ORS 163.105), with OAR 255-32-0005(1) (1999), and
OAR 255-32-0010(1) (1999).
15. Petitioners also argue that the JAM rules are "inconsistent" with ORS
161.620 (1989) because the ranges under the JAM matrix effectively impose a
"mandatory minimum sentence" on juvenile aggravated murderers.  That argument is
addressed by the answer to the third certified question, below.
16. The certified question omits the word "mandatory," although ORS 161.620
(1989), which was set out in full earlier in this opinion, prohibited the imposition of any
"mandatory minimum sentence" on a juvenile who committed aggravated murder while
under age 17.  We therefore answer the question with that clarification.   See Western
Helicopter Services , 311 Or at 370 (this court may, in its discretion, modify or clarify
certified question).