Title: State v. Jackson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP002119-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 2023

2023 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2119-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Larry L. Jackson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 841, 967 N.W.2d 311 
 (2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 20, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 30, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Frederick A. Bechtold and Frederick A. Bechtold 
Attorney at Law, LLC, Minnesota. There was an oral argument by 
Frederick A. Bechtold.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Eric M. Muellenbach, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Eric M. Muellenbach, assistant attorney 
general.  
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Melinda A. Swartz and 
the Law Office of Melinda Swartz, LLC, Milwaukee, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Association of criminal Defense Lawyers.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 3 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP2119-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF004698) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Larry L. Jackson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JAN 20, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   A defendant is entitled to 
a Machner1 hearing if his postconviction motion sufficiently 
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and the record fails 
                                                 
1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979).  A Machner hearing is "[t]he evidentiary hearing to 
evaluate 
counsel's 
effectiveness, 
which 
includes 
counsel's 
testimony to explain his or her handling of the case."  State v. 
Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶31, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334.    
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
2 
 
to conclusively demonstrate that he is not entitled to relief.  
See State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶37, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974 
N.W.2d 432. 
 
Although 
one 
of 
Larry 
Jackson's 
three 
postconviction claims met both of these requirements, the 
circuit court2 denied his motion without a hearing and the court 
of appeals affirmed.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand to the circuit court with instructions to hold a Machner 
hearing regarding that claim. 
I 
¶2 
In 2015, Richard King was shot and killed in front of 
a duplex on North 60th Street in Milwaukee.  Jackson was 
subsequently charged with first-degree intentional homicide and 
possession of a firearm by a felon.   
¶3 
King and his wife, C.W., lived in the duplex along 
with their upstairs neighbors Gerald Tucker and his wife, 
Tiffany.  The two couples did not get along, and on the day of 
the homicide, King was upset with Gerald over some broken glass 
he found near his car.  King and his friend Andre Dorsey 
confronted Gerald and Tiffany with a gun.  The tension was 
momentarily defused, however, when the Tuckers' kids came 
outside.  According to Gerald, after getting inside, Tiffany 
called their friend Jackson and asked him to come over.  Later 
on, King confronted Gerald again after he stepped outside to 
smoke a cigarette.  Dorsey, who was now standing off to the 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
3 
 
side, saw a man with a medium complexion who he later identified 
as Jackson walk up to Gerald.  The two whispered to each other 
and then entered the front of the duplex.  Moments later, Dorsey 
heard gunshots and saw King fall to the ground.  He then saw a 
hand with a light complexion pointing a gun through a crack in 
the doorway fire two shots in his direction.  After the shooting 
stopped, C.W. saw a young African American man with a dark 
complexion run past her ground floor window.  She was never able 
to positively identify him.   
¶4 
Gerald was arrested as a suspect in the homicide.  
While he was in custody, he told police that he did not know who 
shot King.  Months later, he identified Jackson as the shooter 
after learning that police had recovered the murder weapon.  
That weapon, a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol, belonged to 
Jackson's friend, Joe Brown, and was matched by ballistics 
experts to a bullet and several casings found at the scene.  At 
trial, Brown testified that he loaned the gun to Jackson on the 
day of the shooting.  Jackson returned thirty to forty-five 
minutes later with rubber gloves and the gun, which had some 
bullets missing.  The two men boiled the gloves to destroy any 
evidence.  After changing his clothes, Jackson left.  The two 
men met up the next day and Jackson allegedly confessed to being 
involved in a shooting, although he did not mention King or the 
Tuckers by name.  Brown's friend, Anthony Boone, testified that 
he had once seen Jackson at Brown's house standing outside of 
the bathroom with what appeared to be a bag of clothes, but gave 
conflicting accounts as to when that occurred.   
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
Jackson's defense at trial focused on his alleged 
alibi: that he was at his mother's house on the evening of the 
homicide.  The only defense witness was Jackson's mother, Carol.  
She testified that she remembered the night well, and that she 
knew Jackson stayed at her house all night because her alarm 
system would have gone off if any of the doors to the house were 
opened. 
¶6 
The jury found Jackson guilty of both charges, and he 
filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  In it, Jackson contended that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to contact two potential alibi witnesses 
or call them at trial.  Those two witnesses, Jackson's ex-
girlfriend, JaNikka Marsh, and his sister, Crystal Jackson, 
submitted affidavits stating that they were with Jackson the 
evening of the homicide, that they were not contacted by trial 
counsel, and that they would have testified at trial if they 
were called to do so.  We discuss Marsh's and Crystal's specific 
factual 
claims 
in 
further 
detail 
below. 
 
Jackson's 
postconviction motion also contended that trial counsel was 
ineffective in two additional respects: for failing to interview 
his mother or prepare her to speak to detectives or testify, and 
for incorrectly advising Jackson that the law required him to 
testify first.   
¶7 
The circuit court denied Jackson's postconviction 
motion without a hearing.  Regarding trial counsel's failure to 
contact Marsh or Crystal, the court discounted their proffered 
testimony due to their preexisting relationship with Jackson and 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
5 
 
concluded that he had not sufficiently alleged deficient 
performance and that the record conclusively demonstrated that 
he was not prejudiced.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984) (setting forth the two requirements for an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, deficient performance 
and prejudice).  Additionally, the court held that Jackson's 
claim that counsel did not interview Carol or prepare her to 
speak to detectives or testify was conclusory, and that the 
record conclusively demonstrated Jackson was not entitled to 
relief on his claim that counsel incorrectly advised him that 
the law required him to testify first.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  See generally State v. Jackson, 2020AP2119-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶23-29 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2021).  
II  
¶8 
When we review a decision denying a postconviction 
motion without a Machner hearing, we evaluate two issues de 
novo.  See Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶¶27-28.  First, we assess 
whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material and 
non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant 
to relief.  See id., ¶27.  Second, we determine whether the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief.  See id., ¶28.  If the defendant's motion 
alleges sufficient and non-conclusory facts which would entitle 
the defendant to relief and the record does not conclusively 
establish otherwise, then the circuit court must hold a Machner 
hearing.  See id., ¶¶37-38; see also State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
6 
 
53, ¶50, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 (citing State v. Allen, 
2004 WI 106, ¶14, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433).  Conversely, 
"[i]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the 
defendant 
to 
relief, 
or 
if 
it 
presents 
only 
conclusory 
allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the 
discretion 
to 
grant 
or 
deny 
a 
hearing." 
 
Ruffin, 
401 
Wis. 2d 619, ¶28 (citing Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9). 
III  
¶9 
Jackson's postconviction motion alleges that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to investigate or call 
alibi witnesses; (2) not interviewing Carol or preparing her to 
speak to detectives or testify; and (3) incorrectly advising him 
that the law required him to testify first.  Before analyzing 
whether Jackson is entitled to a Machner hearing on any of these 
claims, we review some general principles applicable to claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel and Machner hearings.  
A  
¶10 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has two 
prongs: deficient performance and prejudice.  See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687.  "To demonstrate deficient performance, a 
defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness 
considering 
all 
the 
circumstances."  State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶34, 383 Wis. 2d 
147, 914 N.W.2d 120.  In evaluating counsel's performance, we 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
7 
 
are highly deferential to counsel's strategic decisions, but 
counsel nevertheless "has a duty to reasonably investigate or to 
make 
a 
reasonable 
decision 
that 
renders 
particular 
investigations unnecessary."  Id., ¶¶34-35 (citing State v. 
Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶23, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695).  As 
for the prejudice prong, a defendant must show "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  State v. Guerard, 2004 
WI 85, ¶43, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 12 (citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694).  A "reasonable probability" in this context 
means "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id.   
¶11 With these general principles in mind, to determine 
whether Jackson is entitled to a Machner hearing, we must decide 
two questions.  First, does Jackson's motion allege sufficient 
material and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle 
him to relief?  See Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶27.  Because 
Jackson's motion alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, that 
means he must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy both the 
deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.  See 
Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, ¶50.  If we answer that first question 
in Jackson's favor, we move on to the second and ask——regardless 
of the sufficiency of his allegations——whether the record 
conclusively establishes that Jackson is not entitled to relief.  
See id.  In other words, does the record conclusively 
demonstrate either that Jackson's counsel's performance was not 
deficient or that he was not prejudiced?  See id.; see also 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
8 
 
Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶47.  Jackson is entitled to a Machner 
hearing only if we answer both of these questions in his favor.   
B  
¶12 We begin with Jackson's claim regarding two alibi 
witnesses, his then-girlfriend Marsh and his sister Crystal.  
According to Jackson's motion and the attached affidavits, he 
gave their names to his attorney but neither were contacted.  
Had they been contacted, both Marsh and Crystal stated they 
would have testified at trial that Jackson was at his mother's 
house at the time of the homicide. 
¶13 Marsh's affidavit states that on the day of the 
homicide, Jackson got off work at 4:30 p.m.  Jackson and Marsh 
picked up her children from daycare before 5:00 p.m. and got 
dinner.  They arrived at Jackson's mother's home sometime after 
5:00 p.m.  After they arrived, Jackson took a shower while 
Marsh, who was not feeling well, laid down for a nap.  After his 
shower, Jackson joined Marsh in bed.  Marsh slept until 9:30 
p.m. when Jackson woke up and the two scrambled to get Marsh to 
her job in time for the night shift.   
¶14 Crystal's affidavit corroborates parts of this account 
and provides additional details.  According to her affidavit, 
she was watching television at her mother's house on the evening 
of the murder.  When Marsh and Jackson arrived, Marsh was not 
feeling well and she and Jackson went to his room so she could 
nap.  According to Crystal, the couple stayed in the room until 
Jackson drove Marsh to work.  Both Marsh's and Crystal's 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
9 
 
affidavits place Jackson at his mother's home at the time King 
was killed.  
¶15 We have little trouble concluding that, if these facts 
are true, Jackson's motion sufficiently alleges a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Indeed, the State does not 
dispute that counsel's failure to contact these witnesses or 
potentially call them at trial would constitute deficient 
performance.  See also State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶41, 355 
Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786 ("[I]n a swearing match between two 
sides, counsel's failure to call two useful, corroborating 
witnesses, despite [potential bias as a result of] the family 
relationship, 
constitutes 
deficient 
performance." 
(quoting 
Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2012)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  And Jackson's motion sufficiently 
alleges prejudice as well because it explains that counsel 
failed to investigate Marsh and Crystal at all, let alone call 
them at trial.  See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶¶23-24 (explaining 
that a post-conviction motion contains sufficient facts when it 
alleges "the name of the witness (who), the reason the witness 
is important (why, how), and acts that can be proven (what, 
where, when)."); see also Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 
630-35 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that counsel's failure to 
contact or produce possible alibi witnesses at trial was 
constitutionally deficient performance and prejudicial). 
¶16 Rather than focus on the sufficiency of Jackson's 
allegations, the State argues that the record conclusively 
establishes that Jackson was not prejudiced for two reasons.  
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
10 
 
First, according to the State, weaknesses in Marsh's and 
Crystal's proposed testimony and inconsistencies with Jackson's 
mother's testimony mean that "neither [witness] could have 
provided Jackson with an alibi."  And second, "given the 
overwhelming evidence against Jackson, there is no reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceedings would have been 
different."   
¶17 As to the weaknesses and inconsistencies in testimony, 
the State contends that because Marsh was asleep at the time of 
the homicide, "she lacked personal knowledge of where Jackson 
was at the time [King] was shot."  The State also points out 
that Marsh's and Crystal's stories differ from Carol's testimony 
in two respects.  First, Marsh says she laid down for a nap 
before 6:00 p.m., but Carol testified that she had a serious 
argument with Marsh around 6:30 p.m.  Second, Crystal says that 
Marsh and Jackson stayed in their room the whole evening, 
whereas Carol testified that Jackson came in and out of the 
bedroom several times. 
¶18 The problem with these arguments is that, in assessing 
whether a defendant is entitled to a Machner hearing, we must 
assume that the factual claims made in support of the motion are 
true.  See State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶37, n.15, 284 
Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62.  That Marsh was asleep at the 
precise time of the murder or that Crystal's account may have 
conflicted with Carol's trial testimony might be reasons for a 
jury to discount their testimony.  But we cannot know, nor 
should we try to predict, how a jury might have weighed Marsh's 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
11 
 
and Crystal's credibility.  See id. at ¶42 ("The general rule is 
that 
credibility 
determinations 
are 
resolved 
by 
live 
testimony.").  Moreover, had Marsh and Crystal been contacted by 
counsel, counsel might have made a different decision about 
which alibi witness or witnesses to call at trial.  In any case, 
the jury would have had to determine what weight to give to 
their accounts and might ultimately have convicted Jackson 
anyway.  But the failure of trial counsel even to contact Marsh 
and Crystal is enough to "undermine [our] confidence in the 
outcome."  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
¶19 We also disagree with the State's assertion that the 
overwhelming 
evidence 
of 
Jackson's 
guilt 
conclusively 
establishes that he was not prejudiced.  See Ruffin, 401 
Wis. 2d 619, ¶40 (explaining that 
the record conclusively 
establishes that the defendant is not entitled to relief if it 
shows that there is "no reasonable probability that the outcome 
would have been different").  In fact, the State's case was not 
so overwhelming.  The State's best evidence of Jackson's 
involvement came from witnesses with serious credibility issues.  
Gerald Tucker, the primary witness against Jackson, was arrested 
as a suspect in the homicide and had the clearest motive to kill 
King given their argument earlier that night.  He told police on 
two occasions that he did not know the shooter and even claimed 
to have not seen the shooting.  He changed his story and 
identified Jackson as the shooter after serving a six-month 
sentence on a revocation of probation, and only when he learned 
the police had found the murder weapon.  This disclosure 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
12 
 
resulted in a second probation revocation for obstructing the 
investigation.  At trial, he testified that in exchange for his 
testimony, he hoped to reduce the 15-year sentence he was 
serving as a result of that revocation.   
¶20 Joe Brown, who said that Jackson confessed to him 
after he returned Brown's gun, was a felon with three prior 
criminal convictions facing state and federal charges with a 
potential sentence of 15 years to life in prison for possessing 
the murder weapon.  At trial, he acknowledged that he too hoped 
to minimize his time in prison by testifying against Jackson.  
And in exchange for cooperation in Jackson's case, the State 
ultimately dismissed the felon in possession of a firearm charge 
and federal prosecutors agreed to recommend a reduced sentence 
on his federal charge.   
¶21 Andre Dorsey identified Jackson as the person who went 
into the house with Gerald, but he was standing 15 feet away at 
the time of the shooting and said that he saw only the shooter's 
hand.  Moreover, he described the shooter's hand as having a 
light complexion but described Jackson as having a medium 
complexion.  Dorsey was also a felon with three prior criminal 
convictions and on the evening of the homicide a gun was found 
in his car.  Although he was arrested, he was not charged as a 
felon in possession of a firearm.   
¶22 The only witnesses who were not potentially involved 
in the shooting and whose credibility was not undermined by 
prior convictions or other potential criminal exposure were C.W. 
and Anthony Boone.  C.W. did not see the shooter.  Instead, she 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
13 
 
testified that she saw a man with a dark complexion run by the 
front window after the shooting, but she did not positively 
identify Jackson as that man when shown a photo array.  And 
although Boone testified that he saw Jackson at Joe Brown's 
house, he gave conflicting accounts as to when that occurred.  
Given these weaknesses in the State's case, and the existence of 
multiple alibi witnesses that were not investigated by defense 
counsel, let alone called to testify at trial, the record fails 
to conclusively establish that Jackson is not entitled to 
relief.  
¶23 In sum, Jackson's motion alleges sufficient material 
and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to 
relief 
on 
this 
claim. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
record 
fails 
to 
conclusively show that Jackson is not entitled to relief.  Had 
Marsh and Crystal been contacted by counsel, they may have 
testified, and 
the jury would have had to weigh their 
credibility, and perhaps that of Jackson's mother, against the 
State's witnesses, many of whom had credibility issues of their 
own.  Given that, we cannot say the record conclusively 
demonstrates that there is no reasonable probability of a 
different outcome.  As a result, the circuit court did not have 
discretion to deny Jackson a Machner hearing on this claim.  See 
Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶37.   
C  
¶24 Turning to Jackson's claim that counsel did not 
interview Carol or prepare her to speak to detectives or 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
14 
 
testify, we conclude that Jackson is not entitled to a Machner 
hearing.  That is because Jackson's motion is conclusory: it 
does not explain how counsel should have prepared her and what, 
if any, effect this might have had on her statements to 
detectives or her testimony.  See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
¶48 (explaining that a postconviction motion is conclusory if it 
"fail[s] to allege 'any factual assertions which would allow a 
court to meaningfully assess [the defendant's] claim.'" (quoting 
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 316, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996))).  
Without that information, Jackson's motion fails to allege 
sufficient material and non-conclusory facts that, if true, 
would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  See id. 
¶25 Jackson is likewise not entitled to a Machner hearing 
on his claim that his counsel was ineffective when she told him 
the circuit court would require him to testify first.  After the 
State rested, Jackson's counsel told the court that Jackson's 
mother and Jackson would testify, in that order.  When the 
circuit court questioned the order of witnesses, counsel 
responded "I know the Court's aware of the logistical issues we 
have with him. Let me just talk to him about that, about if it 
would be okay if he testifies first."  Jackson alleges that he 
then met with his counsel who told him "that the trial court was 
going to require him to testify before any of the other defense 
witnesses were called."    
¶26  Jackson is not entitled to a Machner hearing on this 
claim because he has not sufficiently alleged that counsel's 
performance was deficient.  See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
15 
 
¶63.  Although Jackson's motion alleges what counsel said 
regarding the order of witnesses, it fails to demonstrate that 
counsel's statement "was incorrect, much less unreasonable."  
See Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 984-85 (7th Cir. 
2002) (rejecting allegations of deficient performance because 
the advice of counsel that led the defendant to decide not to 
testify was neither incorrect nor unreasonable); see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (in order to show deficient 
performance, a defendant must allege "that counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.").  All that 
Jackson alleges his counsel told him was that the circuit court 
would require him to testify first.  But Jackson does not 
explain how that statement was incorrect.  Instead, Jackson 
asserts that the circuit court was required to allow him to 
testify in his preferred order under Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 
U.S. 605 (1972), because "there were no circumstances in his 
case where having the other defense witnesses testify first 
would have impeded the orderly progress of the trial."     
¶27 Counsel's statement was not unreasonable because the 
circuit court would not necessarily have violated Brooks by 
requiring Jackson to testify first.  After all, Brooks held only 
that a statute requiring a defendant to testify first or not at 
all violated the defendant's constitutional rights.  Id. at 612.  
And as numerous courts have concluded, Brooks does not restrict 
the wide latitude trial courts have in managing the presentation 
of evidence at trial on a case-by-case basis, including by 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
16 
 
"determin[ing] generally the order in which parties will adduce 
proof."  Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976); see 
also United States v. Singh, 811 F.2d 758, 762-63 (2d Cir. 
1987); United States v. Leon, 679 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1982).  
Although Jackson alleges that allowing him to testify in his 
preferred order would not have resulted in delay or otherwise 
"impeded the orderly progress of the trial," those are not the 
only circumstances in which it is permissible for a trial court 
to require a defendant to testify first.  See Singh, 811 F.2d at 
762-63 (upholding an order requiring the defendant to testify 
first to lay foundation for subsequent testimony).  Thus, even 
if everything alleged in Jackson's motion is true, it might 
still have been permissible for the circuit court to require him 
to testify first.  And in that case, counsel's performance would 
not have been deficient since her statement would have been 
accurate, or at least not unreasonable.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88.  Accordingly, the circuit court was correct to 
deny 
this 
part 
of 
Jackson's 
motion 
without 
a 
Machner 
hearing.  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶63. 
IV  
¶28 In sum, Jackson is not entitled to a Machner hearing 
on his claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
interview or prepare his mother to speak to detectives or 
testify and for incorrectly advising him that the law required 
him to testify first.  But on his claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate or call two alibi 
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
17 
 
witnesses, his motion alleges sufficient material and non-
conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, and 
the record fails to conclusively establish that he is not 
entitled to relief.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse 
in part the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court with instructions to grant Jackson a hearing on 
his alibi-witnesses claim. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
¶29 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.
No. 
2020AP2119-CR   
 
 
 
1