Title: People v. Gooden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85439
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2000

Opinion filed February 17, 2000.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Washington County found 
defendant, Steve Gooden, guilty of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11 (West 1996)) 
and aggravated criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1) (West 1996). 
Defendant received concurrent prison terms of 12 years. The appellate court 
affirmed the convictions and sentence. 296 Ill. App. 3d 205. We subsequently 
granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now 
affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
The State's Attorney of Washington County filed a criminal information 
against defendant on December 21, 1995, charging defendant with one count of 
home invasion. The information alleged that defendant had knowingly entered the 
dwelling of the victim, his ex-wife, without authority and had intentionally 
caused injury to the victim by striking her in the head with a gun. On that same 
date, an arraignment was held at which defendant pled not guilty to the charge. 
The circuit court set bail at $500,000 and further ordered that defendant was to 
have no contact with the victim. Defendant, unable to post bond, remained in the 
custody of the sheriff of Washington County.
The circuit court held a preliminary hearing in the matter on December 27, 
1995. At that proceeding, an investigator for the Washington County State's 
Attorney testified that he had interviewed the victim shortly after the 
occurrence at issue. She related to him that, on December 20, 1995, she had been 
asleep at her home between 7 and 7:30 p.m., when she was awakened by the sound 
of breaking glass. She arose to investigate and was eventually confronted by the 
defendant, who was armed with a shotgun. At first, defendant merely argued with 
the victim because he was upset that she had been seeing another man. As the 
argument escalated, defendant struck the victim in the chest with the butt of 
the shotgun. Defendant then asked the victim to get him something to drink, and 
she went into the kitchen to comply. Defendant followed her, and another verbal 
altercation ensued. Defendant again beat the victim, this time on her head and 
face, with both his fists and the butt and barrel of the shotgun.
Defendant and the victim then returned to the dining room and tried to 
converse once more. At this time, defendant became remorseful and told the 
victim that he would allow her to go to the hospital, and he put the shotgun 
down on the floor. He later changed his mind and took the victim into a bedroom 
where he removed a knife that he had on his belt. He then told the victim to 
remove her clothing. The victim attempted to dissuade defendant and told him to 
put down the knife. The victim ultimately removed her clothes, and defendant 
performed an act of intercourse on her. Eventually, defendant brought her back 
out to the dining room area, where more talking and arguing ensued. Defendant 
left the victim's residence after she persuaded him to let her go and to leave 
the ammunition of his shotgun with her.
The investigator told the court that several pieces of physical evidence had 
been found at both the victim's home and defendant's residence, including 
bedsheets, clothing, and a 12-gauge pump shotgun. According to the investigator, 
the victim had admitted to him that she had sexual relations with another man 
earlier on the day in question.
The record reveals that the circuit court docketed the case for trial during 
the weeks of April 22 and April 29, 1996. On April 4, 1996, defendant requested 
a continuance in the matter for the funding of a mental health expert. Defense 
counsel told the court that he had explained to defendant that defendant had the 
right to be tried in the matter within 120 days of his arrest, that defendant's 
request would toll the statutory period, and that, as a result of the request, 
defendant might not be tried until August. Defense counsel further stated that 
defendant "understands" these facts and "would agree to have this case continued 
to the August docket." Counsel then noted that "with the attended tolling of his 
rights there is another matter, and this is the State expressed to me this 
morning their inclination to add another offense-other Class X offenses-arising 
out of this incident."
The court then asked the State for its position with regard to the 
continuance. The assistant State's Attorney replied that he had no objection to 
the request. The court then explained to defendant, on the record, the effect 
that his request would have on his right to be tried within 120 days of his 
arrest, noting that the trial would be held during the week of August 19, 1996. 
Defendant stated that he understood, and the court granted the continuance.
The cause came before the court several weeks later for a hearing on the 
State's motion for discovery. Specifically, the State sought to have defendant 
produce a saliva sample for genetic testing purposes.
The State subsequently filed an amended criminal information in the case on 
July 26, 1996. The amended information contained the original home invasion 
charge as well as five additional charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the criminal sexual assault charges, arguing that the 
State did not bring him to trial on those charges within 120 days of his arrest. 
According to defendant, the 120-day speedy-trial period began to run on December 
21, 1995, the day of his arrest, because the State knew of the sexual assault 
charges at that time. The State maintained that the 120-day period did not apply 
to the criminal sexual assault charges because those charges were based on 
separate acts from the original home invasion charge. The State also pointed out 
that a motion to sever was an option. The State further related that the DNA 
testing in the case had not been completed until June 1996. Prior to that time, 
none of the DNA samples taken from the victim's apartment matched either the 
victim or the defendant. The circuit court denied defendant's motion to dismiss 
the sexual assault charges.
On August 20, 1996, the circuit court conducted a stipulated bench trial in 
the matter. The parties stipulated that the victim, if called to testify, would 
testify that defendant broke into her home armed with a shotgun. He proceeded to 
argue with the victim, striking her about the head and face with the weapon. The 
victim would also testify that defendant committed several acts of nonconsensual 
intercourse on her. Based on the parties' presentation of the stipulated facts, 
the court found defendant guilty of home invasion and one count of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault. The court dismissed the remaining counts of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault. Subsequently, the court denied defendant's post-trial 
motion and sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 12 years. Defendant 
appealed.
The appellate court affirmed. In so doing, the court held that defendant's 
speedy-trial rights were not violated because the sexual assault and home 
invasion charges arose from different acts and were not required to have been 
joined. Alternatively, the court held that defendant's 120-day term had been 
extended by the continuance that defendant had obtained from the circuit court. 
The appellate court also rejected defendant's request that he receive 
day-for-day good-conduct credit because the truth-in-sentencing law, under which 
he had been sentenced, violated the single subject clause of the Illinois 
Constitution.
ANALYSIS
Speedy Trial
Defendant maintains that the State violated his statutory right to a speedy 
trial when the State delayed charging him with aggravated criminal sexual 
assault until July 26, 1996. According to defendant, the sexual assault charges 
clearly arose from the same set of facts as the home invasion charge. Moreover, 
defendant points out that the State knew at time of his arrest for the home 
invasion charge that the victim had claimed that defendant had sexually 
assaulted her, yet the State did not charge him with that offense until 217 days 
later. For these reasons, defendant believes that reversal of his conviction for 
aggravated criminal sexual assault is mandated on speedy-trial grounds.
The State responds that it did not violate defendant's statutory right to a 
speedy trial with respect to the aggravated criminal sexual assault charges 
because those charges were not required to have been joined with the home 
invasion charge. Thus, according to the State, the 120-day statutory period for 
the criminal sexual assault charges began to run on the date that the charges 
were brought, i.e., July 26, 1996. The State insists that the 
speedy-trial act was not violated in this case because defendant was tried 
within 30 days of being charged with the assault.
As an initial matter, we note that the right to a speedy trial, guaranteed to 
a defendant under both the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the 
federal constitution (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 18 L. 
Ed. 3d 1, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967)), is fundamental. An additional statutory right 
can also be found in section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, 
which specifies periods of time within which an accused must be brought to 
trial. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 1996). Under section 103-5(a), every person in 
custody in this state for an alleged offense shall be tried within 120 days from 
the date the accused was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the 
accused. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1996). Section 103-5 implements the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial (People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101 (1982)), but the constitutional right and the statutory right are not 
coextensive (People v. Jones, 84 Ill. 2d 162 (1981)). Defendant does 
not raise any constitutional claims in this case; this appeal concerns only the 
extent of defendant's rights under the statute.
Defendant's argument is based upon a rule first announced by our appellate 
court in People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1981). The court held 
that
Defendant contends that, under this rule, it is immaterial whether the 
additional charges must be joined because the inquiry turns strictly on the 
State's knowledge at the time of the commencement of the prosecution and not on 
whether the charges are based on the same act for purposes of compulsory 
joinder, as the State insists.
Compulsory joinder requires that, in certain situations, the State bring 
multiple charges in a single prosecution unless the circuit court determines 
that the interests of justice require a separate trial. See 720 ILCS 5/3-3(c) 
(West 1996). The question in this case is whether the rule announced in 
Williams should be extended to situations in which the State is not 
required by statute to join the additional charge with the original charge. 
Contrary to defendant's contention, we believe that compulsory joinder 
principles are relevant to the issue of whether defendant's statutory right to a 
speedy trial was violated in this case. We acknowledge that our appellate court 
has taken different views on this question (compare People v. Hinkle, 
234 Ill. App. 3d 663, 667 (1992), with People v. Crowe, 195 Ill. App. 
3d 212, 215-16 (1990)) and that defendant's position on appeal finds support in 
several opinions. We, of course, are not bound by opinions of the appellate 
court, particularly when they conflict with our own precedent. As we will 
explain below, we believe it unwise to so extend the Williams rule 
because it would result in the State having to join charges not otherwise 
mandated by the statute to be joined.
Although this court has never addressed the question presented in this 
appeal, we have had occasion to consider the Williams rule in the 
recent past. In People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1 (1998), we emphasized 
the important interaction that exists between the speedy-trial provisions and 
the compulsory-joinder provision when additional charges are brought against a 
defendant who had been previously charged. See Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d  at 
12-13. We held, consistent with the opinion in Williams, that "[i]f the 
charges are required to be brought in a single prosecution, the speedy-trial 
period begins to run when the speedy-trial demand is filed, even if the State 
brings some of the charges at a later date." People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1998).(1) Given 
the fact that this court in Quigley recognized, and in fact relied 
upon, the interplay between compulsory joinder principles and speedy-trial 
principles in holding that the Williams rule applies in cases of 
compulsory joinder, we cannot conclude that compulsory-joinder principles are 
irrelevant to the question in this case. We therefore agree with the State the 
issue presented in this appeal turns upon the application of compulsory-joinder 
law.
Our compulsory-joinder statute provides 
that
Once a defendant 
has been prosecuted for an offense, the State is barred from prosecuting him or 
her for any other offense which, pursuant to section 3-3(b), should have been 
joined with the original prosecution. 720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(1) (West 1996). In 
enacting the compulsory-joinder provision, our legislature attempted to 
alleviate the fundamental unfairness that ensues when the State hold repeated 
trials for the same illegal conduct, a practice which had "troubled the 
conscience of the courts and the legislature." People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398, 411 (1965).
Nevertheless, the fact that multiple offenses 
arise from distinct, but related, acts in the course of single incident is 
irrelevant for purposes of compulsory joinder. People v. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1985) (and cases cited therein). Indeed, this court has 
acknowledged that "[t]here is no requirement of joinder where multiple offenses 
arise from a series of related acts." Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d  at 385, 
citing People v. Griffin, 36 Ill. 2d 430, 433-34 (1967). This is so 
because the compulsory joinder provision was not "intended to cover the 
situation in which several offenses-either repeated violations of the same 
statutory provision or violations of different provisions-arise from a series of 
acts which are closely related with respect to the offender's single purpose or 
plan." Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 3-3, Committee Comments-1961 at 102 
(Smith-Hurd 1972); see also Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d  at 385 (same). Thus, 
independent, overt acts that constitute different offenses are not required to 
be joined because they are not offenses "based on the same act." 
Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d  at 385.
Accordingly, because the home invasion and 
sexual assault charges in this case were based on separate acts, the compulsory 
joinder statute did not require the State to prosecute both offenses in the same 
proceeding. During oral argument, defendant's attorney stated that while the 
charges in this case were not required to be joined, she believed that a 
piecemeal prosecution of defendant would have been unfair. We disagree. As our 
appellate court has held, "[t]here is no fundamental unfairness in prosecuting a 
defendant in separate trials for similar statutory violations based on separate 
and distinct acts." People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App. 3d 516, 521 
(1990). In our view, defendant is attempting to enlarge the reach of the 
compulsory-joinder statute by way of the speedy- trial statute. Under 
defendant's theory, the speedy-trial act would compel the State to join charges 
that are otherwise not mandated to be joined under our compulsory-joinder 
statute. We will not interpret the speedy-trial act in such a way that the plain 
language of the compulsory-joinder statute is overridden. Thus, because the 
State was not required to join the offenses in this case, there is no reason to 
apply the speedy-trial term applicable to the home invasion charge to the sexual 
assault charges. Nevertheless, we will examine whether the State's decision to 
permissively join these charges thwarted, in any way, the purposes behind the 
speedy-trial act.
In People v. Stuckey, 34 Ill. 2d 521 
(1966), this court explained that the speedy-trial act operated to prevent the 
constitutional speedy-trial issue from arising in a case. The "evil intended to 
be prevented by the speedy trial provision is wrongful incarceration *** [and] 
is based upon the right of the individual to liberty." People v. 
Garcia, 65 Ill. App. 3d 472, 475 (1978), citing People v. Kidd, 
357 Ill. 133 (1934). As our appellate court has observed, the purpose of the 
120-day rule is to guarantee a speedy trial and not "to open a new procedural 
loophole which defense counsel could unconscionably use to obstruct the ends of 
justice." People v. George, 71 Ill. App. 3d 932, 934 (1979).
Defendant here was incarcerated for the offense 
of home invasion from December 21, 1995, until the filing of the amended 
information on July 26, 1996. From July 26, 1996, until the date of his trial, 
August 20, 1996, defendant was incarcerated for both the offense of home 
invasion and the offense of criminal sexual assault. We fail to see how 
defendant's right to a speedy trial with respect to the sexual assault charges 
was violated when defendant was tried on those charges within 30 days of their 
being filed. We must emphasize that the bulk of defendant's pretrial 
incarceration in this case was due to defendant's inability to post bond for the 
home invasion charge. Stated differently, defendant suffered less than 30 days 
of pretrial incarceration with respect to the sexual assault charges. Under 
these facts, defendant simply cannot maintain that he was denied a speedy trial 
on the sexual assault charges.
The record demonstrates that the delay which 
caused defendant's trial to be postponed until August was occasioned in April, 
when defendant requested a continuance for the appointment of a mental health 
expert. The State had no role in causing the original April trial date to be 
continued until August. Defendant, however, argues that the April continuance 
cannot be used to extend the speedy-trial term for the sexual assault charges 
because those charges were not in existence at the time he sought that 
continuance. We agree. However, it is precisely because those charges were not 
in existence at that time that we cannot say, as a matter of law, that 
defendant's speedy-trial rights with respect to those charges were violated. 
Defendant received a speedy trial with respect to the sexual assault charges. We 
must emphasize that had defendant not requested this continuance, his trial in 
April would have proceeded on the home invasion charge alone because the sexual 
assault charges had not been filed at that time. Moreover, if the original April 
trial date had not been delayed and trial had proceeded on the home invasion 
charge as scheduled, defendant still would have faced the prospect of being 
tried on the sexual assault charges sometime in the future because the charges 
were not subject to compulsory joinder. In light of these considerations, we 
hold that where the State chooses to join new charges after the filing of the 
original charges, the Williams rule is inapplicable.
That said, we believe, consistent with our 
opinion in Quigley, that the concerns that attend to the right to a 
speedy trial come into play in those cases where the later-filed charges are 
based on the "same act" as the original charges, i.e., in cases where 
the charges must be brought in a single prosecution. In other words, had the 
sexual assault charges been required under section 3-3(b) to have been joined, 
we would not allow the State to circumvent the original speedy-trial term. The 
later date could not be used by the State to "restart" the speedy-trial period, 
and any delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the 
defendant. The State would be required to bring defendant to trial on all of the 
charges within the original speedy-trial term or face dismissal of the new 
charges. In such cases, fairness dictates that those charges "relate back" to 
the date the original charges were filed.
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss, on speedy-trial grounds, the 
aggravated criminal sexual assault charges.
Truth-in-Sentencing
Defendant also contended in the appellate court 
that Public Act 89-404, which created the truth-in-sentencing law, was enacted 
by the General Assembly in violation of the single subject clause of the 
Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d). Because defendant was 
sentenced under the truth-in-sentencing law, he contended that his sentence was 
void. Defendant sought an order for the appellate court mandating that he 
receive day-for-day good-conduct credit, as was provided in the statute in 
effect prior to the enactment of Public Act 89-404. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 
1994). The appellate court denied defendant's request, holding that defendant 
could not assert such a challenge on direct appeal because the application of 
the laws was a matter outside the scope of the sentencing hearing. 296 Ill. App. 
3d at 211.
The State concedes that the appellate court's 
resolution of this issue conflicts with this court's decision in People v. 
Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). There, we held that defendants sentenced under 
the truth-in-sentencing provisions could challenge the enactment's 
constitutionality on direct appeal. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 6-8. 
Moreover, in Reedy, we agreed that Public Act 89-404 was enacted in 
violation of the single subject rule and was therefore unconstitutional. We 
further held that Public Act 90-592 (Pub. Act 90-592, eff. June 19, 1998), 
applying to offenses committed on or after June 19, 1998, served to cure the 
effect that the former act's invalidation had on the truth-in-sentencing law. 
Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 17-18. The State concedes that because the 
offenses at issue in this case took place prior to June 19, 1998, defendant is 
entitled to day-for-day good-conduct credit against his sentence. We therefore 
modify the judgment in this case accordingly.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the judgment of the 
appellate court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Defendant's 
convictions are affirmed, and the judgment of the circuit court of Washington 
County is affirmed as modified.
Appellate court judgment 
affirmed in part
and reversed in 
part;
circuit court judgment affirmed 
as modified.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:
The majority determines that the State's 
decision to "permissively join" the charges of aggravated criminal sexual 
assault to the original home invasion charge, some 217 days after defendant was 
taken into custody on the home invasion charge, did not thwart the purposes 
behind the speedy-trial act. I disagree.
Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1996)) implements the substantial 
right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, and 
therefore must be liberally construed. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8; U.S. 
Const., amend. VI; People v. Woolsey, 139 Ill. 2d 157, 165 (1990); 
People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1982). Indeed, this court has 
held that the purpose of that section should not be avoided by technical 
evasions, such as dismissing and refiling the same charges. People v. 
McAdrian, 52 Ill. 2d 250, 255 (1972); People v. Fosdick, 36 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1967); see also Woolsey, 139 Ill. 2d  at 170-71. In this 
same spirit, the appellate court held, in People v. Williams, 94 Ill. 
App. 3d 241, 248-49 (1981), that "[w]here new and additional charges arise from 
the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these 
facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to 
begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory 
limitation that is applied to the original charges."
The majority declines to "extend the 
Williams rule" to cases where the charges are not subject to compulsory 
joinder (slip op. at 6), ignoring the fact that Williams itself is not 
a case where compulsory joinder was involved. Although the defendants in 
Williams were tried in a single prosecution for having committed, in 
sequence, an unlawful restraint, a kidnaping, an aggravated battery, a sexual 
assault, and then further aggravated batteries and sexual assaults against the 
victim, the State was not required to join the various offenses because they did 
not arise from the same act. See People v. Mueller, 109 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1985). While the origins of the rule stated in 
Williams may indeed stem from the provisions of the compulsory joinder 
statute (see People v. King, 8 Ill. App. 3d 2, 5 (1972)), 
Williams focuses on knowledge by the State that new and additional 
charges arose from "the same facts as did the original charges" 
(Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248), rather than on whether "the several 
offenses *** are based on the same act," for compulsory joinder purposes (720 
ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 1996)). See People v. Hinkle, 234 Ill. App. 3d 663, 
667-68 (1992). Therefore, the majority's refusal to apply the Williams 
rule to cases where compulsory joinder is not required is, in reality, a 
rejection of the decision in Williams.
This implicit overruling of Williams is 
not supported by this court's decision in People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1 (1998), which cited the Williams rule with approval. The majority 
states that because Quigley recognized the interplay between compulsory 
joinder principles and speedy-trial principles in holding that the 
Williams rule applies in cases of compulsory joinder, compulsory 
joinder law must dictate the result in this case. Quigley mandates no 
such finding. While the majority correctly states that in Quigley this 
court relied upon the interaction between the compulsory joinder and 
speedy-trial principles, we did not have occasion to reach the scenario 
presented here, a speedy-trial violation arising from multiple charges which the 
State chose to try together, though it was not required to do so. Thus, contrary 
to the majority's holding herein, Quigley does not preclude the finding 
that speedy-trial violations can also originate in non-compulsory-joinder 
situations if the State, with knowledge of the facts at the commencement of the 
prosecution, chooses to bring multiple charges in a single 
prosecution.
Here, as in Williams, while the State 
chose to try defendant for multiple offenses in a single prosecution, the State 
was not required to do so. I agree with the majority that had the State chosen 
to prosecute these offenses separately, they would not be subject to the same 
speedy-trial limitation. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(e) (West 1996); Quigley, 
183 Ill. 2d  at 13-14. However, having known since the filing of the original 
home invasion charge that both that offense and the aggravated criminal sexual 
assault arose from "the same facts," and having elected to try both offenses in 
a single prosecution, the State may not seek to avoid the purpose of the 
speedy-trial statute through "technical evasion." See People v. Lyles, 
106 Ill. 2d 373, 411-12 (1985) (it is the prosecutor's duty to safeguard the 
constitutional rights of all citizens, including the defendant's).
The majority argues that defendant was not 
denied a speedy trial on the sexual assault charges, as he was tried on those 
charges within 30 days of their being filed. Sadly, this ignores the reality of 
the situation, i.e., that defendant had been in custody for over 200 
days on a charge "aris[ing] from the same facts" as the sexual assault charges, 
that the State had known "these facts at the commencement of the prosecution," 
and that defendant had not contributed to any delay with regard to the new and 
additional charges. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49. Because it had 
chosen to proceed on the home invasion charge alone, the State, and only the 
State, was responsible for the separation of charges and the long delay in 
filing the sexual assault charges. See People v. Williams, 2 Ill. App. 
3d 993 (1971) (upholding dismissal of new and additional attempted murder 
indictment based on same facts as original murder indictment, because defendant 
had been in custody for more than 120 days and was not responsible for any part 
of nine-month delay in filing the attempted murder indictment). Thus, to contend 
that defendant was tried on the sexual assault charges in a timely manner and 
that speedy trial considerations do not apply here is, in my opinion, patently 
wrong and tends to "circumvent the very protection the statute aimed to 
provide." Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 249.
The majority also wrongly concludes that 
applying the Williams rule to cases like the one at bar would compel 
the State to join charges that are otherwise not mandated to be joined under the 
compulsory joinder statute. The State retains the power to decide whether to 
join related offenses or to try them separately. However, if the State 
voluntarily joins offenses in a single prosecution, it must adhere to 
the speedy-trial rule as if those offenses were subject to compulsory 
joinder.
In the case at bar, if the State incurred 
problems obtaining evidence necessary to the prosecution of the aggravated 
criminal sexual assault charges, the State could have avoided a speedy-trial 
violation by prosecuting defendant in separate cases, or by applying for an 
additional period of time in which to obtain this evidence, as was its 
prerogative under section 103-5(c). However, the State took no action, despite 
its continuing burden to take the necessary steps to bring about a prompt trial 
in conformance with the provisions of the speedy-trial act. See 
Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 249. Thus, where only the State's 
tardiness in filing the new and additional charges of aggravated criminal sexual 
assault precluded commencement of prosecution on these charges within the 
original charge's speedy-trial term, the State violated defendant's rights under 
section 103-5. Therefore, because the charges of aggravated criminal sexual 
assault should have been dismissed by the circuit court, I would vacate 
defendant's conviction and sentence for that offense. In all other respects, I 
concur.
JUSTICES HEIPLE and RATHJE join in this partial 
concurrence and partial dissent.
1. 1We note that, in 
this case, defendant was not required to file a speedy-trial demand because he 
was in custody throughout the proceedings. In such cases, a demand is 
unnecessary, as the 120-day period begins to run automatically upon 
incarceration. Compare 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1996) with 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) 
(West 1996).This distinction, however, does not affect our analysis.