Title: Davis v. Henning
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 941971
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 1995

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting,
1 Lacy,  
Hassell, and Keenan, JJ. 
 
RICHARD F. DAVIS, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No.  941971 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                    September 15, 1995 
JOHN T. HENNING, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH  
 
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether a parcel of land is 
burdened by an easement which provides an adjacent parcel with 
access to a public road. 
 
In 1993, John T. Henning and David J. Cross filed a bill 
of complaint seeking to prohibit Richard F. Davis and Amelia D. 
Davis (collectively Davis) from using a dirt road that crosses 
their property.  Davis responded to the bill of complaint, 
asserting that he was entitled to use the road, relying on 
theories of express easement, implied easement by necessity, 
and implied easement based on prior use.  Following an ore 
tenus hearing, the trial court held that the property owned by 
Henning and Cross was not burdened with either an express or 
implied easement and entered an injunction prohibiting Davis 
from using the dirt road.  On appeal, Davis reasserts the same 
arguments regarding his easement claim. 
 
I. 
 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Beginning in 1972, 
Davis operated a business from a building located on the 
                     
    
1Justice Whiting participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
August 12, 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
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interior portion of a 7.103-acre tract owned by George J. 
Parker and his family.  In the course of his business, Davis 
used a dirt road which extended from the building to Parker 
Lane, a public right of way.  Through a series of transactions, 
the entire tract was sold to Parco Building Corporation 
(Parco).  In 1978, Parco sold a portion of the 7.103-acre tract 
back to Parker.  The portion sold contained the building and 
property utilized by Davis (the Davis parcel).  In 1980, Parco 
executed a deed of easement granting Parker, his heirs and 
assigns, the use of the dirt road to access Parker Lane from 
the Davis parcel.  Eleven days later, on July 22, 1980, Parker 
acquired the remainder of the 7.103-acre tract at a foreclosure 
sale.  In 1984, Parker transferred all of the 7.103-acre tract, 
except the Davis parcel, to Parker Road Associates.  The 
property conveyed by this transfer was ultimately purchased by 
Henning and Cross in 1988 (the Henning/Cross parcel).   
 
In 1982, Davis executed a contract for the purchase of the 
Davis parcel, agreeing to pay Parker the purchase price in 
monthly installments.  Through this contract and an indenture 
agreement, Davis acquired all of Parker's interest in the Davis 
parcel and Parker agreed to provide Davis with a good and 
marketable title to the property upon receipt of the entire 
purchase price.  Legal title to the Davis parcel has not been 
transferred to Davis and is currently held by Parker's estate. 
 Davis used and maintained the dirt road continuously prior to 
 
 
 
 
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this litigation. 
 
II. 
 
Davis first asserts that his right to use the dirt road 
arises from an express easement.  The parties agree that the 
easement created in the 1980 deed of easement from Parco to 
Parker was extinguished by the doctrine of merger when Parker 
acquired ownership of both the Davis parcel and the 
Henning/Cross parcel on July 22, 1980.  Davis claims, however, 
that a second express easement was reserved for the benefit of 
the Davis parcel over the Henning/Cross parcel in the 1984 deed 
from Parker to Parker Road Associates.  The language in the 
deed upon which Davis relies is as follows: 
 
This deed is made subject to . . . that certain easement 
of right of way granted to George J. Parker by deed of 
Parco Building Corporation, a Nevada Corporation, dated 
July 11, 1980 and duly of record in the Clerk's Office 
above mentioned in Deed Book 2026, at page 231. 
 
Henning and Cross maintain that this language does not create 
or reserve an easement, but merely puts the grantee on notice 
of existing encumbrances which may apply to the property. 
 
The source of disagreement over the effect of the deed 
provision is the interpretation of the phrase "subject to."  We 
have previously considered the phrase "subject to" and stated 
that it is generally a phrase of "qualification and notice" and 
that it "does not create affirmative rights."  S.L. Nusbaum & 
Co. v. Atlantic Virginia Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 679, 146 
S.E.2d 205, 209 (1966).  Such a general observation is not 
 
 
 
 
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dispositive of this case, however. 
 
In construing deeds, it is the duty of the court to 
"ascertain the intention of the parties, gathered from the 
language used, and the general purpose and scope of the 
instrument in the light of surrounding circumstances.  When 
such intention appears by giving the words their natural and 
ordinary meaning, technical rules of construction will not be 
invoked."  Hale v. Davis, 170 Va. 68, 71, 195 S.E. 523, 524 
(1938).  See also Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 710, 222 
S.E.2d 536, 539 (1976).  Similarly, in the absence of 
ambiguity, as here, parol evidence is inadmissible to determine 
the intent or meaning of the document.  See, e.g., Langman v. 
Alumni Ass'n of the Univ. of Virginia, 247 Va. 491, 498, 442 
S.E.2d 669, 674 (1994).  Finally, no specific words of art are 
necessary to create an easement.  Corbett v. Ruben, 223 Va. 
468, 471, 290 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1982).   
 
Applying these principles, we proceed to determine what 
the parties intended when they used the phrase "subject to" in 
the 1984 deed.  The fundamental issue to be resolved is whether 
the deed language was sufficient to bring an easement into 
existence or whether the language merely acknowledged the 
easement as a previously existing right burdening the servient 
tract being conveyed.  Under the circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that the language did not create a new easement. 
 
The language at issue in this deed is not the normal 
 
 
 
 
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"boiler plate" language utilized to put a buyer on notice of 
preexisting encumbrances which may apply to the land.  Because 
the 1984 deed again divided the 7.103-acre parcel and 
eliminated access to the public right of way from the Davis 
parcel, it is reasonable to assume that Parker, the grantor, 
intended to preserve a right of access for the interior parcel 
he retained.  To accomplish this, Parker used the following 
language:  "subject to . . . that certain easement of right of 
way granted to George J. Parker by deed . . . dated July 11, 
1980."  (Emphasis added).  The referenced easement is described 
as one previously created.  This language is consistent with 
acknowledging an existing right which is excepted from the 
transfer, thereby continuing an existing limitation on the 
grantee's fee simple ownership of the dirt road.  It is 
inconsistent with creating or recreating a right not in 
existence and reserving that right for the grantor's benefit.  
Cf. Corbett, 223 Va. at 471, 290 S.E.2d at 849 ("hereby create 
and establish" sufficient to create easement).   
 
Parker perhaps was unaware that the 1980 deed of easement 
was extinguished by merger when he acquired ownership of both 
the dominant and servient tracts; nevertheless, a mistaken 
belief cannot substitute for the requirement that the language 
evidence an affirmative intent to create new rights or reserve 
a new easement.  We look to what the words express, not what 
the grantor may have intended to express.  Browning v. 
 
 
 
 
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Bluegrass Hardware Co., 153 Va. 20, 26, 149 S.E. 497, 498-99 
(1929).  Accordingly, considering the language of the deed and 
the circumstances in existence at the time the deed was 
executed, we hold that the 1984 deed did not create an express 
easement in favor of the Davis parcel. 
 
III. 
 
Davis also argues that he is entitled to an implied 
easement by necessity across the dirt road.  We agree.  A right 
of way by necessity arises from an implied grant or implied 
reservation of an easement based on the common law presumption 
that a grantor of property conveys whatever is necessary for 
the beneficial use of the land conveyed and retains whatever is 
necessary for the beneficial use of the property retained.  
Fones v. Fagan, 214 Va. 87, 90, 196 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1973).  To 
establish an easement by necessity, a claimant must demonstrate 
that the severance of a parcel of land previously under common 
ownership created the need for access to a public right of way 
from one of the new parcels.  Reasonable need for the easement 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.  American Small 
Business Inv. Co. v. Frenzel, 238 Va. 453, 456, 383 S.E.2d 731, 
734 (1989). 
 
The record here clearly shows that both parcels were 
previously owned by Parker.  Furthermore, severance of the 
Henning/Cross parcel resulted in the need for access to Parker 
Lane from the Davis parcel.  The Davis parcel is bounded to the 
 
 
 
 
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west by the Henning/Cross parcel, to the south by a 6-lane 
limited access highway, and to the north and east by third-
party property.  Thus, the required elements of an implied 
easement by necessity are met. 
 
Nevertheless, Henning and Cross argue that an implied 
easement by necessity cannot be established in favor of Davis 
for two reasons.  First, they argue that the right to use the 
easement runs to the owner of the property and that neither 
Parker nor his estate have conveyed an interest in the easement 
to Davis.  The record shows, however, that Parker conveyed to 
Davis "all the right, title, and interest" which he had "in and 
to" the Davis parcel through the indenture executed in 1982.  
As a result, Davis is entitled to utilize an easement created 
for the benefit of the Davis parcel. 
 
Second, Henning and Cross assert that Davis' need to use 
the dirt road no longer exists.  In July 1993, Davis leased the 
Davis parcel to William R. Shepherd, Jr., the owner of an 
automobile dealership abutting the eastern boundary of the 
Davis parcel.  Pursuant to this lease, Davis conveyed all his 
rights to the Davis parcel to Shepherd, retaining only a right 
to inspect the property.  Henning and Cross argue that Shepherd 
can cross his own property to access a public right of way from 
the Davis parcel and that Davis can exercise his inspection 
rights by accessing the Davis parcel through Shepherd's 
property as well.  Thus, they conclude, an easement by 
 
 
 
 
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necessity fails because the necessity no longer exists.  Rhoton 
v. Rollins, 186 Va. 352, 363, 42 S.E.2d 323, 328 (1947).  
Henning and Cross, however, mischaracterize the access rights 
available to Davis. 
 
The terms of the lease do not provide the Davis parcel 
with any legal rights of access to a public right of way nor 
does Davis' right to inspect the parcel include a right to 
traverse Shepherd's property.  Furthermore, the lease contains 
rights of repossession should Shepherd fail to comply with its 
terms.  In light of Davis' residual interests in the property 
and the lack of an alternative method of ingress and egress, 
the need for access over the dirt road remains.  Therefore, we 
hold that an easement by necessity exists in favor of the Davis 
parcel across the Henning/Cross parcel.  This easement consists 
of the right to use the dirt road running from the Davis parcel 
to Parker Lane for purposes of ingress and egress.  We note, 
however, that this easement is limited to the benefit of the 
Davis parcel only.  See Robertson v. Robertson, 214 Va. 76, 81, 
197 S.E.2d 183, 187 (1973).   
 
IV. 
 
In light of this holding, we need not address Davis' other 
assignment of error.  Accordingly, we will affirm that portion 
of the judgment of the trial court holding that no express 
easement exists.  We will reverse that portion of the judgment 
holding that no implied easement exists, vacate the injunction, 
 
 
 
 
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and enter final judgment in favor of Davis. 
                                            Affirmed in part,
                                            reversed in part,
 
and final judgment.