Title: A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022AP001334
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2024

2024 WI 18 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP1334 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the adoption of M. M. C.: 
 
A. M. B., 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
T. G., 
          Appellant, 
     v. 
Circuit Court for Ashland County, the Honorable 
Kelly J. McKnight, presiding, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 30, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland  
 
JUDGE: 
Kelly J. McKnight   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., joined.  
DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
John R. Carlson, Carla J. Smith, Linda I. Coleman, and Spears, 
Carlson & Coleman, S.C., Washburn. There was an oral argument by 
Carla Jean Smith and John R. Carlson. 
 
 
 
2 
For the respondent, there was a brief filed by Lynn K. 
Lodahl, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Lynn K. Lodahl, assistant attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel R. Suhr, and 
Hughes & Suhr LLC, Chicago, IL, on behalf of Wisconsin Family 
Council.
 
 
2024 WI 18
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2022AP1334 
(L.C. No. 22AD2) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the adoption of M. M. C.: 
 
A. M. B., 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
T. G., 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Ashland County, the Honorable 
Kelly J. McKnight, presiding, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 30, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., joined.  
DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion.  
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Ashland County, Kelly J. McKnight, Judge. Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.  A creature of statute, 
adoption confers legal rights and duties on adopted children and 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
2 
 
their adoptive parents.  The legislature has made policy choices 
regarding the circumstances under which children may be adopted 
and by whom.  A.M.B. is the biological mother of M.M.C. and 
wishes to have her nonmarital partner, T.G., adopt M.M.C.  Under 
the adoption statutes, T.G. is not eligible to adopt M.M.C. 
because T.G. is not A.M.B.'s spouse.  A.M.B. and T.G. allege the 
legislatively drawn classifications violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in denying T.G. the right to adopt M.M.C. and in 
denying M.M.C. the right to be adopted by T.G.  Because the 
adoption statutes do not restrict a fundamental right or 
regulate a protected class, we consider whether any rational 
basis exists for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt 
a child.  Among other legitimate state interests, promoting 
stability 
for 
adoptive 
children 
through 
marital 
families 
suffices for the statutes to survive this equal protection 
challenge; therefore, we affirm the circuit court.1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Adoption Statutes 
¶2 
Wisconsin Stat. ch. 48, subchapter XIX, establishes 
legal adoption and specifies the circumstances under which a 
child may be adopted as well as who is eligible to adopt.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.81 (2021-22),2 a child who is present in the 
                                                 
1 The 
Honorable 
Kelly 
J. 
McKnight, 
Ashland 
County, 
presiding. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
3 
 
State of Wisconsin when the adoption petition is filed may be 
adopted under any of the following four scenarios:  (1) the 
parental rights of both parents have been legally terminated; 
(2) both parents are deceased; (3) the parental rights of one 
parent have been terminated and the other parent is deceased; or 
(4) "[t]he person filing the petition for adoption is the spouse 
of the child's parent with whom the child and the child's parent 
reside."3  § 48.81(1)-(4); Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶44, 
349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634.  Subsection (4) applies only if 
the child's other parent is deceased or his parental rights have 
been terminated.  § 48.81(4)(a)-(b).  Colloquially called the 
"stepparent" exception, this provision permits a stepparent to 
adopt his spouse's child while the spouse's parental rights 
remain intact.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.92(2). 
¶3 
The adoption statutes additionally identify three 
classifications of individuals who may adopt an eligible child:  
"A husband and wife jointly," "either the husband or wife if the 
other spouse is a parent of the minor," or "an unmarried adult."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(a)-(b).  The statutes do not allow two 
unmarried adults to jointly adopt a minor.  Nor do the statutes 
permit a nonmarital partner to adopt his partner's child.  
Omitting those categories of unmarried individuals from the list 
of eligible persons who may adopt means the law does not qualify 
them as adoptive parents.  "Under the doctrine of expressio 
                                                 
3 Two additional statutory criteria apply only to children 
who are born in, or citizens of, foreign jurisdictions, and are 
not relevant in this case.  Wis. Stat. § 48.81(5)-(6). 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
4 
 
unius est exclusio alterius, the 'express mention of one matter 
excludes other similar matters [that are] not mentioned.'"  
James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶18, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 
350 (alteration in original) (quoting FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass 
Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 N.W.2d 287); see 
also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012) ("[T]he principle that 
specification of the one implies exclusion of the other validly 
describes how people express themselves and understand verbal 
expression."). 
¶4 
The adoption subchapter also describes the legal 
effect of adoption on the child, the child's birth parents, and 
the child's adoptive parents.  Wis. Stat. § 48.92.  Upon entry 
of an order of adoption, all legal rights, duties, and "other 
legal consequences" of the relationships between the birth 
parents and the child are forever altered and "cease to exist."  
§ 48.92(2).  If, however, the adoptive parent is married to the 
child's 
birth 
parent, 
the 
adoption 
by 
the 
stepparent 
extinguishes 
the 
legal 
rights, 
duties, 
and 
"other 
legal 
consequences" only with respect to the birth parent who is not 
the spouse of the adoptive parent.  § 48.92(2).  
B.  Facts and Procedural History 
¶5 
A.M.B. 
is 
the 
biological 
mother 
of 
M.M.C. 
and 
maintains a cohabitating, nonmarital relationship with her male 
partner, T.G.  After more than a decade in a relationship with 
A.M.B., T.G. has become a father figure for M.M.C. and has 
assumed a variety of parental duties for her.  The parental 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
5 
 
rights of M.M.C.'s biological father have been terminated.  
Based on T.G.'s fatherly bond and relationship with M.M.C., T.G. 
filed a joint petition with A.M.B. to adopt M.M.C.   
¶6 
Prior to the adoption hearing, the county department 
of human services generated a "Home Study Report," which 
included a background check of T.G., a review of T.G.'s 
relationship with M.M.C., and an interview with M.M.C.  The 
interview with M.M.C. revealed she did not have a meaningful 
relationship with her biological father and views T.G. as her 
father.  The report concluded with a recommendation to grant the 
adoption.    
¶7 
On June 20, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on 
the adoption petition.  At the outset, the court raised concerns 
over its authority to grant the petition given the criteria for 
adoption under Wis. Stat. § 48.81, despite having determined the 
adoption would be in the best interests of the child, M.M.C.  
The circuit court cited this court's decision in Georgina G. v. 
Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994), which the 
circuit court summarized as precluding "an adoption to a third 
party who is not the spouse of the parent."  Because T.G. was 
not married to A.M.B., the circuit court determined T.G. was not 
statutorily eligible to adopt M.M.C. and denied the adoption 
petition.  
¶8 
A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the circuit court's decision, 
arguing that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.81 and 48.92(2) violate the equal 
protection rights of M.M.C. and T.G.  The state asked the court 
of appeals to affirm the denial of the adoption petition under 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
6 
 
Georgina G., 184 Wis. 2d 492, in which this court decided an 
earlier but substantially similar version of the governing 
statute4 did not violate the equal protection clause.  Because 
the court of appeals cannot "overrule, modify or withdraw 
language from a previous supreme court case[,]" Cook v. Cook, 
208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997), A.M.B. and T.G. 
petitioned this court for bypass of the court of appeals, which 
this court granted.5   
¶9 
The adoption statutes do not implicate a fundamental 
right under the United States or Wisconsin Constitutions, nor do 
the 
statutes 
affect 
a 
protected 
class 
of 
individuals.  
Accordingly, 
the 
statutory 
classifications 
establishing 
eligibility to adopt or to be adopted must be rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest in order to withstand A.M.B.'s 
challenge. 
 
Because 
a 
rational 
basis 
exists 
for 
the 
legislature's policy choice to preclude an adoption by the 
nonmarital partner of a birth parent, we hold the statutes do 
                                                 
4 After this court's decision in Georgina G. v. Terry M., 
184 Wis. 2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994), the legislature amended 
Wis. Stat. § 48.81 to explicitly state that the parental rights 
of only one biological parent must be terminated for a 
stepparent to adopt.  1997 Wis. Act 104, § 9.  The applicable 
statutes in this case are otherwise identical to the statutes 
analyzed in Georgina G. 
5 In their briefing, petitioners argued the circuit court 
erred in applying the statutory limits on adoption despite the 
legislative directive in Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1) that "the best 
interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of 
paramount consideration."  During oral argument, petitioners 
abandoned their statutory claim. 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
7 
 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause and we therefore affirm 
the circuit court's denial of the adoption petition. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 A.M.B. and T.G. bring a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the adoption statutes on equal protection 
grounds.  The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law this court reviews de novo.  Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, 
¶26, 370 Wis. 2d 1, 884 N.W.2d 484 (citing Aicher ex rel. 
LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 
2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849).  A party bringing a facial challenge to 
the constitutionality of a statute must show that the "State 
cannot enforce the law under any circumstances."  Id. (citing 
State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63).      
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶11 The 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
of 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "No state 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2.6  A.M.B. 
                                                 
6 Although petitioners bring their claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause and Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, they do not provide an independent argument under 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Instead, petitioners treat the two 
constitutional provisions as providing the same protections.  
"As a general principle, this court treats these provisions of 
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions as consistent with 
each 
other 
in 
their 
due 
process 
and 
equal 
protection 
guarantees."  Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶28, 370 Wis. 2d 1, 
884 N.W.2d 484; accord Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. 
Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶35, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678.  We 
do 
not 
address 
petitioners' 
claim 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution further.       
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
8 
 
and 
T.G. 
allege 
the 
adoption 
statutes 
are 
facially7 
unconstitutional because Wis. Stat. § 48.81 treats the children 
of single parents differently than children with two married 
parents and treats unmarried romantic partners differently than 
spouses.  Petitioners claim these classifications are arbitrary 
and not rationally related to a valid state interest.  
¶12 In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute under 
an equal protection analysis, the court first identifies the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶39, 
360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346.  We consider whether the 
statute 
implicates 
a 
fundamental 
constitutional 
right 
or 
"whether a suspect class is disadvantaged by the challenged 
legislation."  State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶12, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 
780 N.W.2d 90.  If either is true, the court generally8 applies 
strict scrutiny.  Id. 
                                                 
7 During oral argument, counsel for A.M.B. and T.G. 
described their challenge to the statutes' constitutionality as 
a hybrid claim comprising both as-applied and facial equal 
protection challenges.  She later argued the statutes could not 
be constitutionally applied under any circumstances.  Because 
A.M.B. and T.G. narrowed their claim to a facial challenge, we 
confine our analysis to the facial constitutionality of the 
challenged statutes.  
8 The 
existence 
of 
a 
fundamental 
right 
does 
not 
automatically trigger strict scrutiny.  "A law that implicates a 
fundamental right is not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny.  
Whether strict scrutiny applies sometimes depends on the degree 
to which the law burdens a fundamental right."  State v. Alger, 
2015 WI 3, ¶39 n.16, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (citation 
omitted). 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
9 
 
¶13 If a fundamental constitutional right is not at stake 
and a protected class is not disadvantaged by the statute, the 
court applies rational basis review.  A "relatively relaxed 
standard," rational basis review reflects the court's respect 
for the separation of powers and recognizes "the drawing of 
lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task 
and an unavoidable one."  Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 
U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam).  In applying rational basis 
review, 
the 
court 
will 
uphold 
the 
statute 
provided 
the 
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate 
government interest.  Blake, 370 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32.      
A.  Strict Scrutiny Does Not Apply 
¶14 The adoption "legislative scheme does not affect a 
fundamental right and is not based on a suspect classification."  
Georgina G., 184 Wis. 2d at 518.  In Georgina G., this court 
resolved a similar constitutional challenge to the adoption 
statutes, holding that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.81 and 48.92 did not 
violate the equal protection rights of a woman who wished to 
adopt her same-sex partner's child.  Id. at 519.  The court 
explained: 
 
The adoption statutes do not violate Annette's right 
to equal protection.  Annette is eligible to adopt a 
child "whose parental rights have been terminated."  
That is not the case here.  In addition, if Annette 
were married, she would be eligible to adopt the 
child(ren) of her spouse.  Again, that is not the case 
here.  The Wisconsin legislature has enacted a 
statutory scheme for adoption that balances society's 
interest 
in 
promoting 
stable, 
legally 
recognized 
families with its interest in promoting the best 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
10 
 
interests of the children involved.  The adoption 
proposed in this case does not fall within the 
confines of this constitutionally valid legislative 
scheme. 
Id. at 518-19.  T.G. is ineligible to adopt M.M.C. for the same 
reason Annette was ineligible to adopt her partner's child:  
T.G. is not married to M.M.C.'s mother.  The court's reasoning 
in Georgina G. was sound, and we decline to overturn that 
precedent.9   
¶15 The statutes do not implicate a fundamental right of 
either T.G. or M.M.C.  A fundamental right is "deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition."  Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted).  Petitioners 
                                                 
9 Petitioners ask this court to overturn Georgina G., which 
involved a same-sex couple legally prohibited from marrying at 
the time the opinion was issued.  184 Wis. 2d at 504 n.1.  This 
court has repeatedly recognized the importance of stare decisis 
to the rule of law; for this reason, we require a special 
justification to overturn precedent.  State v. Stephenson, 2020 
WI 92, ¶¶32-33, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819.  This court 
commonly considers whether a prior decision is "unsound in 
principle" when asked to overturn it.  Bartholomew v. Wis. 
Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 
91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.  After this court 
decided Georgina G., the United States Supreme Court declared a 
constitutional 
right 
of 
same-sex 
couples 
to 
marry.  
See 
generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).  That 
change in the law does not undermine this court's reasoning in 
Georgina 
G., 
which did 
not 
turn 
on 
the 
couple's 
sexual 
orientation.  
As 
the 
court 
in 
Georgina 
G. 
explained, 
"Wisconsin's adoption statutes do not discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation or gender.  Annette may not adopt Angel 
because Annette and Georgina are not married."  184 Wis. 2d at 
518.  Petitioners in this case fail to identify any developments 
in the law that undermine the court's decision in Georgina G. 
 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
11 
 
fail to identify any right deeply rooted in our history or 
tradition upon which the statutes intrude.   
¶16 As a preliminary matter, petitioners concede there is 
no fundamental right to adopt.  "Adoption proceedings, unknown 
at common law, are of statutory origin and the essential 
statutory requirements must be substantially met to validate the 
proceedings."  Tennessen v. Topel, 32 Wis. 2d 223, 229, 145 
N.W.2d 162 (1966); Eugene M. Haertle, Wisconsin Adoption Law and 
Procedure, 33 Marq. L. Rev. 37, 37 (1949).  This court 
previously recognized adoption as a "relatively recent statutory 
development," and not a practice traditionally protected by our 
society.  Georgina G., 184 Wis. 2d at 516.  The federal circuit 
courts that have addressed this question have uniformly held 
adoption is not a fundamental right.  E.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 
F.3d 146, 162 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Lofton v. Sec'y of 
Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 811-12 (11th Cir. 
2004); Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989). 
¶17 A.M.B. and T.G. argue the adoption statutes must 
withstand strict scrutiny because they implicate the fundamental 
right to marriage.  While marriage is undoubtedly a fundamental 
right, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), these statutes 
do not implicate that right.  The statutes do not compel10 A.M.B. 
and T.G. to marry, nor do the statutes prohibit them from 
                                                 
10 In their briefing, petitioners suggest the circuit court 
tried to force them to marry so that T.G. could adopt M.M.C.  
That is not accurate.  In denying the adoption petition, the 
court noted that if T.G. married A.M.B., T.G. would qualify to 
adopt M.M.C. because the statutory criteria would be met.  
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
12 
 
marrying.  The adoption statutes do not impose any impediment to 
marriage, unlike laws at issue in other cases in which the 
United States Supreme Court has declared statutory restrictions 
on marriage unconstitutional.  See, e.g., id. at 2 (holding a 
"scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages 
between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications 
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment");  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375-
77 (1978) (Wisconsin law barring marriage, without court 
approval, for individual "'having minor issue not in his custody 
and which he is under obligation to support by any court order 
or judgment'" violated the Fourteenth Amendment).  In contrast, 
the adoption statutes challenged by A.M.B. and T.G. do not 
"control the selection of one's spouse."  Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).   
¶18 Far from impeding marriage, the adoption statutes 
privilege the institution.  Historically, states have provided 
benefits to married couples while denying them to unmarried 
individuals.  "Indeed, while the States are in general free to 
vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, they have 
throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding 
list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.  
These aspects of marital status include:  taxation; inheritance 
and property rights; . . . [and] adoption rights . . . ."  
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669-70 (2015); Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. at 721 (internal citation omitted) ("Our Nation's 
history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
13 
 
crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking' that direct 
and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.").  As 
the United States Supreme Court has explained, the right to 
marry is fundamental——at least in part——because the state has 
historically provided benefits to married couples:  "The States 
have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage 
right by placing that institution at the center of so many 
facets of the legal and social order."  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 
670.  Privileging a married spouse with the opportunity to adopt 
a child does not in any way infringe the right to marry.      
¶19 Because adoption is not a fundamental right under our 
nation's history and tradition, and Wis. Stat. §§ 48.81 and 
48.92(2) do not infringe the right to marry, we next consider 
whether the statutes implicate a suspect classification.  The 
United States Supreme Court has identified distinctions based on 
race, national origin, and alienage as suspect classifications 
subject to strict scrutiny.  Milwaukee Cnty. v. Mary F.-R., 2013 
WI 92, ¶35, 351 Wis. 2d 273, 839 N.W.2d 581 (citing City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).11  
The classifications established under Wis. Stat. § 48.81 do not 
fit any of those categories.  "The Supreme Court has not 
recognized any new constitutionally protected classes in over 
four decades, and instead has repeatedly declined to do so."  
                                                 
11 In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court did not 
make marital status a protected class; rather, it extended the 
fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples.  576 U.S. at 
672. 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
14 
 
Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2015).  
Nothing in the Constitution supports elevating marital status to 
a protected class.  A legislative classification based on 
marital status simply does not rise to the level of a suspect 
classification.  See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53-54 
(1977); Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993).   
¶20 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.81 
constructs 
distinct 
classifications 
for 
whom 
may 
be 
adopted 
and 
establishes 
eligibility based on the child's parental status.  The statute 
in pertinent part provides:   
Who may be adopted.  Any child who is present in this 
state at the time the petition for adoption is filed 
may be adopted if any of the following criteria are 
met: 
(1) Both of the child's parents are deceased. 
(2) The parental rights of both of the child's 
parents with respect to the child have been 
terminated under subch. VIII or in another state 
or a foreign jurisdiction. 
(3) The parental rights of one of the child's 
parents with respect to the child have been 
terminated under subch. VIII or in another state 
or a foreign jurisdiction and the child's other 
parent is deceased. 
(4) The person filing the petition for adoption 
is the spouse of the child's parent with whom the 
child and the child's parent reside and either of 
the following applies: 
(a) The child's other parent is deceased. 
(b) The parental rights of the child's other 
parent with respect to the child have been 
terminated under subch. VIII or in another 
state or a foreign jurisdiction. 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
15 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.81(1)-(4). 
¶21 A child is not eligible for adoption if she has an 
existing legal relationship with one of her parents.  The 
statute provides but one exception to this rule:  a stepparent 
may adopt the child of his spouse if the child's other parent is 
either deceased or his parental rights have been legally 
terminated.  Wis. Stat. § 48.81(4)(a)-(b).  M.M.C. is not 
eligible for adoption because her legal relationship with A.M.B. 
remains intact and T.G. is not M.M.C.'s stepparent because he is 
not married to A.M.B. 
¶22 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.82(1) 
conditions 
a 
person's 
eligibility to adopt a child on the prospective adoptive 
parent's marital status.  The statute provides in full:  
(1)  The following persons are eligible to adopt 
a minor if they are residents of this state: 
(a) A husband and wife jointly, or either 
the husband or wife if the other spouse is a 
parent of the minor. 
(b) An unmarried adult. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(a)-(b).  T.G. is an unmarried adult and 
M.M.C. is a minor child with one unmarried legal parent, A.M.B.  
As an unmarried adult, T.G. may not adopt M.M.C. because he is 
not married to A.M.B. and therefore does not meet the 
requirements of eligibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(a). 
¶23 If T.G. adopted M.M.C., Wis. Stat. § 48.92(2) would 
extinguish A.M.B.'s parental rights.  Section 48.92 is titled 
"Effect of adoption" and subsection (2) states as follows:   
 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
16 
 
After 
the 
order 
of 
adoption 
is 
entered 
the 
relationship of parent and child between the adopted 
person and the adopted person's birth parents and the 
relationship between the adopted person and all 
persons whose relationship to the adopted person is 
derived 
through 
those 
birth 
parents 
shall 
be 
completely altered and all the rights, duties, and 
other legal consequences of those relationships shall 
cease to exist, unless the birth parent is the spouse 
of 
the 
adoptive 
parent, 
in 
which 
case 
those 
relationships shall be completely altered and those 
rights, duties, and other legal consequences shall 
cease to exist only with respect to the birth parent 
who is not the spouse of the adoptive parent and all 
persons whose relationship to the adopted person is 
derived through that birth parent.   
(Emphasis added).  Allowing the unmarried partner of a birth 
parent to adopt his partner's child with the parental rights of 
the 
birth 
parent 
intact 
would 
flout 
§ 48.92(2), 
which 
permanently ends all rights and duties belonging to a birth 
parent——unless the adoptive parent is married to the birth 
parent.     
¶24 The statutory criteria establishing eligibility to 
adopt or to be adopted do not involve any protected classes.  
Instead, Wis. Stat. § 48.81 conditions eligibility for adoption 
on whether a child retains a legal relationship with one of the 
child's parents, while Wis. Stat. § 48.82 conditions eligibility 
to adopt on an individual's marital status.  Neither of these 
classifications are suspect under an equal protection analysis, 
and the state retains broad discretion to establish legislative 
classifications provided they have a reasonable basis.  State v. 
Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶32, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851 
(citing State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
17 
 
(1989)). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 48.81, 
48.82, 
and 
48.92(2) 
collectively balance the interests of the state in ensuring a 
child eligible for adoption enjoys the stability of a marital 
family.  Because the statutes do not implicate a fundamental 
right or create a suspect classification, we apply rational 
basis review to the challenged statutes.12  
 
B.  The Statutory Classifications Have a Rational Relationship 
to the State's Interest in Promoting Stability for Adoptive 
Children. 
¶25 Under rational basis review, this court will uphold 
legislatively chosen classifications provided the legislature 
has "reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications 
that it draws."  State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶79, 308 
Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447 (citing McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 
130).  A classification "does not offend the Constitution simply 
because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety 
or because in practice it results in some inequality.'"  
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting 
Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).  In 
ascertaining the existence of a rational basis, the court is not 
                                                 
12 The 
adoption 
statutes 
do 
not 
infringe 
A.M.B.'s 
fundamental liberty interest in raising M.M.C.  See Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  A.M.B. may maintain her 
nonmarital relationship with T.G., and may allow T.G. to 
continue serving as a father figure for M.M.C.  The adoption 
statutes do not affect how A.M.B. chooses to raise her child, 
nor do they intrude on her constitutional right to direct the 
upbringing of M.M.C. free of governmental interference.  See 
Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 567-68, 348 N.W.2d 479 
(1984). 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
18 
 
limited to those grounds the legislature may have identified; 
rather, "it is the court's obligation to locate or to construct, 
if possible, a rationale that might have influenced the 
legislature 
and 
that 
reasonably 
upholds 
the 
legislative 
determination."  Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 
371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980).  
¶26 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
the 
significant 
societal 
benefits 
marriage 
provides.  
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 669.  The Obergefell Court explicitly 
acknowledged the significance of marriage for children in 
declaring, 
"[m]arriage . . . affords 
the 
permanency 
and 
stability important to children's best interests."  Id. at 668.  
Because marriage supplies these advantages, the state has long 
conferred benefits on married couples in return:  "[J]ust as a 
couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to 
support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material 
benefits to protect and nourish the union."  Id. at 669.  
Individual states "have throughout our history made marriage the 
basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, 
and responsibilities."  Id. at 670.  The Obergefell Court 
specifically included adoption rights among those a state may 
regulate based on marital status.  Id.  
¶27 The 
adoption 
statutory 
scheme 
creates 
reasonable 
eligibility criteria to promote the government's interest in 
children being adopted into stable, permanent home environments.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.81(1) permits a minor child to be adopted 
if both of her biological parents are deceased, while § 48.81(2) 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
19 
 
permits adoption if the parental rights of both parents have 
been terminated.  A child with one living parent may be adopted 
by the spouse of the child's parent.  § 48.81(4).  The state 
presented 
several 
justifications 
establishing 
a 
rational 
relationship between this legislative scheme and legitimate 
government 
interests, 
including 
the 
state's 
interest 
in 
promoting financial stability for adoptive children.  
¶28 The state has a legitimate interest in ensuring 
children are adopted into "safe and stable families."  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.01(1)(gg).  The state may achieve this goal by 
encouraging 
married 
couples 
to 
adopt 
children 
and 
the 
legislature recognized the essential link between marriage and 
the welfare of children in "The Family Code."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 765.001(1).  Marriage in the State of Wisconsin creates a 
legal bond between two persons who "owe to each other mutual 
responsibility and support."  § 765.001(2).  This legal bond 
creates a series of rights and obligations between the two 
individuals, dissolvable only by death or divorce.  Wisconsin 
law imposes on each spouse "an equal obligation" in accordance 
with financial ability "to contribute money or services or both 
which are necessary for the adequate support and maintenance of" 
the 
couple's 
"minor 
children 
and 
of 
the 
other 
spouse."  
§ 765.001(2).  The state deems "[t]he consequences of the 
marriage contract" to be "more significant to society than those 
of other contracts."  § 765.001(2).  Unlike a nonmarital 
relationship, the legal union between two individuals through 
marriage cannot be terminated impulsively or spontaneously; the 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
20 
 
law requires a court proceeding to terminate the contractual 
relationship.  If a child already has a legal parent, the state 
reasonably concludes it would be more beneficial for that child 
to be adopted into a marital family, rather than by an unmarried 
partner of the child's legal parent.  As the state argued in its 
brief, the fact that marriage requires legal proceedings to 
terminate provides "some level of assurance" the adoptive 
stepparent "will remain committed to the family unit and the 
child’s upbringing."     
¶29 A child joining a family with married parents enjoys a 
greater likelihood of a financially stable upbringing compared 
to a household with two unmarried parents.  In the event of a 
divorce, Wisconsin statutes create a presumption guaranteeing 
both marital partners leave the relationship on financially 
equivalent footing.  Wis. Stat. § 767.61(3).  This presumption 
"effectuates the policy that each spouse makes a valuable 
contribution to the marriage and that each spouse should be 
compensated for his or her respective contributions."  Steinke 
v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 380-81, 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985).  
Nothing comparable exists for unmarried couples.  If an 
unmarried partner decides to sever the relationship, he may 
freely leave without an equal division of financial assets, to 
the financial detriment of the remaining parent and the adoptive 
child.  Rational basis review is a "low bar" for the government 
to clear in an equal protection challenge.  
Tiwari v. 
Friedlander, 26 F.4th 355, 362 (6th Cir. 2022).  In this case, 
the state has met this burden because it is reasonable for the 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
21 
 
legislature to have concluded that a married couple would 
provide a more secure and financially stable home environment 
for adoptive children than an unmarried couple.   
 
¶30 While A.M.B. and T.G. may provide a safe, stable, 
healthy, and loving home for M.M.C., the judiciary is powerless 
to craft an exception to the adoption law on a case-by-case 
basis.  "A legislative classification satisfies rational basis 
review if any conceivable state of facts could provide a 
rational basis for the classification."  Alger, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 
¶50 (cleaned up).  Petitioners cannot overcome the rational 
basis for the classifications established in the adoption 
statutes.  Wisconsin has a legitimate interest in preferring the 
stability and security of a marital household for the upbringing 
of adopted children.  See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819.  The 
statute's classifications for whom may adopt a child reflects 
the state's interest in preferring stable and financially secure 
households for adoptive children.   
¶31 Petitioners argue the state draws an arbitrary and 
irrational distinction by permitting a single, unmarried adult 
to adopt a child but not a cohabitating, unmarried partner.  
Compare Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(b) with Wis. Stat. § 48.81(4).  We 
disagree.  The legislative classifications bear a rational basis 
because the state may reasonably prefer a child to be adopted by 
a single, unmarried adult rather than be placed in foster care 
or another impermanent living arrangement.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.01(1)(ag) (recognizing "that children have certain basic 
needs which must be provided for, including . . . the need for a 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
22 
 
safe and permanent family").  Because a child with one parent 
has 
permanency, 
the 
state 
has 
a 
legitimate 
interest 
in 
restricting adoption to the child's stepparent, who is more 
likely to provide a stable family and better outcomes for the 
child.  Allowing married couples to adopt but not unmarried 
couples is consistent with the "public policy" of the state "to 
promote the stability of marriage and family."  County of Dane 
v. Norman, 174 Wis. 2d 683, 689, 497 N.W.2d 714 (1993).   
¶32 By allowing married couples to adopt but not unmarried 
couples, the state provides a benefit to married couples not 
afforded to unmarried couples.  States "have throughout our 
history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of 
governmental 
rights, 
benefits, 
and 
responsibilities."  
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.  Precluding an individual from 
adopting his nonmarital partner's child merely makes marriage a 
basis for the adoption right, a classification rooted in our 
nation's history.  Limiting adoption to married couples and 
single adults is neither irrational nor arbitrary because the 
state has legitimate reasons for the legislative classifications 
established under Wis. Stat. § 48.81.  
¶33 Under rational basis review, the court does not judge 
the wisdom of the legislative classifications.  Tomczak v. 
Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 265, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  Instead, 
we must uphold the statute's classification if there exists some 
rationale to justify it.  Id.  In establishing eligibility to 
adopt or to be adopted, the legislature chose to prioritize the 
stability of marriage for adopted children with one parent, 
No. 
2022AP1334   
 
23 
 
while preferring an unmarried adoptive parent to impermanency 
for a child with no parents.  A rational basis exists for these 
legislative policy choices.  We hold that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.81 
and 48.92(2) do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because 
they serve the legitimate state interest in promoting the 
adoption of children into stable, marital families.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 The Supreme Court has declared, "equal protection is 
not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic 
of legislative choices."  F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 
U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  Because the legislative classifications 
restricting adoption do not infringe a fundamental right or 
affect a protected class, we consider only whether any rational 
basis exists for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt 
a child.  Because the state has a legitimate interest in 
promoting stability for adoptive children through marital 
families, petitioners' equal protection challenge to Wisconsin's 
adoption statutes fails. 
By the Court.——The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed.    
 
 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶35 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  For most 
of the history of the United States, constitutional-rights 
litigation occurred predominantly in state courts and centered 
on state constitutional rights.  Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect 
Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 
13 (2018).  It's no wonder why.  The individual rights protected 
by the United States Constitution did not originally apply to 
the states.  Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 
Pet. 243, 250-51 (1833).  Regardless, all individual rights 
protected under the Constitution originated from the guarantees 
of liberty embodied in state constitutional provisions.  Sutton, 
supra, at 11.  Even the practice of judicial review——the main 
vehicle by which citizens vindicate their liberties——originated 
in state courts.  Id. at 13.   
¶36 Invoking state constitutional rights, however, has 
been out of vogue for some time.  Such claims have sometimes 
been relegated to "second-tier status," id. at 9, and an 
afterthought in legal briefs.  Many commentators have noted the 
decline in the centrality of state constitutional claims as the 
United States Supreme Court federalized constitutional rights 
during the Warren Court era.  E.g., Clint Bolick, Principles of 
State Constitutional Interpretation, 53 Ariz. St. L.J. 771, 774-
75 (2021); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus——Constitutional Theory and 
State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 174-75 (1984).  Over the 
course of the twentieth century, and especially in the 1960s, 
the Court 
incorporated most federal constitutional rights 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
2 
 
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Sutton, 
supra, at 13.  As incorporation occurred, the Court also 
developed 
expansive——and 
novel——interpretations 
of 
the 
Constitution.  As Justice William Brennan put it, the Court 
"fundamentally 
reshaped 
the 
law 
of 
this 
land" 
by 
"nationaliz[ing] civil rights."  William J. Brennan Jr., The 
Bill 
of 
Rights 
and 
the 
States: 
The 
Revival 
of 
State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 535, 540 (1986) [hereinafter The Bill of Rights and the 
States].  As a result, the relevance of state constitutions 
appeared to fade.  Litigants stopped arguing their cases under 
state constitutions.  See Bolick, supra, at 778 (noting state 
courts cannot "address constitutional issues if litigators do 
not raise, preserve, and meaningfully develop them").  Some 
state courts interpreted their state constitutions in lockstep 
with 
the 
federal 
courts' 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Federal 
Constitution.  See generally, Sutton, supra, at 174 (defining 
"lockstepping" as "the tendency of some state courts to diminish 
their constitutions by interpreting them in reflexive imitation 
of 
the 
federal 
courts' 
interpretation 
of 
the 
Federal 
Constitution").  
¶37 In recent years, a newfound interest in asserting 
state constitutional rights has emerged, which, in theory, 
should benefit individual liberty.  State constitutional rights 
are just as important and worthy of protection as federal 
constitutional rights.  And this court has a duty to enforce the 
rights protected under the Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
3 
 
Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶23, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847 
(citing State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶18, 38, 252 Wis. 2d 
228, 647 N.W.2d 142) ("While we must follow the United States 
Supreme Court on matters of federal law, we have an independent 
responsibility 
to 
interpret 
and 
apply 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution."); King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 185 Wis. 2d 25, 59-
60, 517 N.W.2d 671 (1994) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).  
¶38 Not all arguments for enforcing state constitutional 
rights are rooted in text, history, and tradition; some stem 
from disappointment with the outcomes in certain United States 
Supreme Court decisions.  Negative reaction to the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts' reluctance to "innovate" new 
federal constitutional rights, Sutton, supra, at 15, triggered a 
resurgence of interest by litigants and legal commentators in 
asking state courts to fill the gap.  For example, in two famous 
law review articles, Justice William Brennan urged state courts 
to "step into the breach" created by the Court, William J. 
Brennan 
Jr., 
State 
Constitutions 
and 
the 
Protection 
of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 503 (1977), and argued 
that "activist intervention[s]" into democratic governance are 
less problematic when done by state courts.  Brennan, The Bill 
of Rights and the States, supra, at 551.  The pressure on state 
courts to intrude on the democratic process has intensified with 
the Court's landmark decisions in Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 
U.S. 684 (2019) (political gerrymandering), and Dobbs v. Jackson 
Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022) (abortion).   
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶39 Channeling the spirit of Justice William Brennan, 
Justice Rebecca Dallet argues this court should abandon its past 
practice of construing Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to provide substantially identical protections as 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶28, 
370 Wis. 2d 1, 884 N.W.2d 484 ("As a general principle, this 
court treats these provisions of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions as consistent with each other in their due process 
and equal protection guarantees.").  Instead, she invites 
litigants to ask this court to invent constitutional rights:  
"[T]he lack of settled case law [discussing Article I, Section 
1] should be encouraging to litigants.  It is up to us——judges, 
lawyers, and citizens——to give effect to the fundamental 
guarantees 
of 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1." 
 
Justice 
Dallet's 
concurrence, ¶59.  As a pivotal part of her call for activism, 
Justice Dallet claims this court has embraced a "pluralistic 
approach" to constitutional interpretation in which this court 
"balance[s] the majority's values against the values that should 
be protected from society's majorities."  Id., ¶53 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wis. Just. Initiative, Inc. v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 38, ¶117, 407 Wis. 2d 87, 990 
N.W.2d 122 (Dallet, J., concurring)).  Nothing could be further 
from the truth or more corrosive to our democratic form of 
government.   
¶40 It is not for judges to superimpose their values on 
the constitution.  The Wisconsin Constitution's text "is the 
very product of an interest balancing by the people," which 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
5 
 
judges cannot "conduct for them anew" in each case.  District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  The balance 
struck by the people of Wisconsin, as embodied in the 
constitution, "demands our unqualified deference."  New York 
State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26 
(2022).  What the constitution does not say is as important as 
what it says.  If the constitution itself does not bar 
majorities from passing certain laws, there is no lawful basis 
for judges to say otherwise.  Nothing in the constitution 
authorizes judges to void laws that violate some judges' sense 
of what ought to be.  There is a good reason jurists "seldom 
endorse[]" the views espoused by Justice Dallet openly:  They 
contradict "the basic democratic theory of our government."  
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review 44-45 (1980).          
¶41 Justice Dallet attempts to conceal her call for an 
antidemocratic power grab with the illusion of inclusive 
language.  She intimates that future generations must each 
decide for themselves what the constitution means in their time:  
"It is up to us——judges, lawyers, and citizens——to give effect 
to" 
the 
constitution's 
words 
today. 
 
Justice 
Dallet's 
concurrence, ¶59 (emphasis added).  When the president of 
Wisconsin's 
1848 
convention 
said 
"the 
pages 
of 
our 
constitution . . . abound[] in the declaration of those great 
principles which characterize the age in which we live," The 
Attainment of Statehood 883 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1928), he did 
not mean to characterize the constitution as an empty vessel 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
6 
 
into 
which 
each 
generation 
may 
pour 
its 
prejudices 
and 
aspirations.  He meant exactly what he said.  The new 
constitution embodied the values and principles of that time, 
and those principles were to remain fixed and endure throughout 
the ages:  "[The Wisconsin Constitution] abounds in the 
declaration of those great principles which characterize the age 
in which we live, and which, under the protection of Heaven, 
will——nay, must——guard the honor, promote the prosperity, and 
secure the permanent welfare of our beloved country."  Id.    
¶42 Justice 
Dallet 
ultimately 
advocates 
for 
the 
discredited "practice of constitutional revision" by a committee 
of four lawyers who happen to form a majority on the court.  
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 714 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Should a majority of this court——four lawyers——
decide to imbue the constitution with modern meanings divorced 
from the constitutional text and the history and traditions of 
this state, they will rob the people of Wisconsin of their most 
important liberty:  "the freedom to govern themselves."  Id.  
Although living constitutionalism is often couched in the 
rhetoric of flexibility and a purported need to adjust for a 
changing society, in practice it presents a grave threat to 
democracy by thwarting the people from passing legislation to 
accommodate changing views.  Living constitutionalism invites 
lawyers donning robes to decide all the important issues of the 
day, removing their resolution from the political process 
altogether and depriving the people of any say in such matters.  
"In practice, the Living Constitution would better be called the 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
7 
 
Dead Democracy."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 410 (2012).1   
¶43 Justice 
Dallet's 
invitation 
to 
reimagine 
the 
constitution's text with a so-called "pluralistic approach"2 
flies in the face of this court's established method of 
constitutional interpretation and should be rejected.3  As with 
statutory 
interpretation, 
the 
goal 
of 
constitutional 
interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of the constitutional 
text as it would have been understood by those who adopted it.  
Wis. Just. Initiative 407 Wis. 2d 87, ¶21; State ex rel. Weiss 
v. Dist. Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 195-96, 44 N.W. 967 (1890); State ex 
rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 184, 204 N.W. 803 (1925); 
B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. O'Brien, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324 
(1925); State ex rel. Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis. 
1849); State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Judges lack any 
                                                 
1 If nothing else, the idea of the living constitution is 
self-defeating.  A constitutional right that can be "redefined" 
by a majority of the court from time to time is a "guarantee 
that guarantees nothing at all."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 407 
(2012).  What the court gives, the court can just as easily take 
away.    
2 Justice Dallet's concurrence, ¶53.   
3 Although Justice Dallet implies her approach is the 
traditional interpretive method of this court, id., just last 
term this court rebutted that assertion and conclusively 
rejected her approach.  Wis. Just. Initiative, Inc. v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 38, ¶¶22 n.6, 23 n.7, 407 Wis. 2d 87, 
990 N.W.2d 122 ("The concurrence's open pining for the freedom 
to go beyond the meaning of constitutional language must be and 
is rejected.").   
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
8 
 
authority to "rewrite the Constitution to reflect the[ir] views 
and values."  State v. C. G., 2022 WI 60, ¶87, 403 Wis. 2d 229, 
976 N.W.2d 318; Wis. Just. Initiative, 407 Wis. 2d 87, ¶21; 
State v. Hoyle, 2023 WI 24, ¶88, 406 Wis. 2d 373, 987 N.W.2d 732 
(Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("Our founders did not establish a 
system of government where judges in our highest courts are 
unconstrained by the meaning of the law the people have enacted, 
free to import their own values into the Constitution.").  As 
stated by Justice Cassoday in 1890:   
It is no part of the duty of this court to make or 
unmake, but simply to construe this provision of the 
constitution. 
 
All 
questions 
of 
political 
and 
governmental ethics, all questions of policy, must be 
regarded as having been fully considered by the 
convention which framed, and conclusively determined 
by the people who adopted, the constitution, more than 
40 years ago.  The oath of every official in the state 
is to support that constitution as it is, and not as 
it might have been. 
Weiss, 76 Wis. at 208 (Cassoday, J., concurring).   
¶44 Constitutional interpretation focuses on the text of 
the constitution:  "The authoritative, and usually final, 
indicator of the meaning of a provision is the text——the actual 
words used."  Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶57, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.  Accordingly, "we look first to the 
plain meaning of the word[s] [of the constitution] in the 
context in which [they are] used."  Bd. of Ed. v. Sinclair, 65 
Wis. 2d 179, 182, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974).  This court has often 
consulted dictionaries contemporaneous with the text's adoption 
to help ascertain its meaning.  E.g., id.; Weiss, 76 Wis. at 212 
(Cassoday, J., concurring).  As in statutory interpretation, 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
9 
 
this court does not engage in a "hyper-literal approach."  Brey 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d 
417, 970 N.W.2d 1.  Instead, the text is "read[] [] reasonably, 
in context, and with a view of the provision's place within the 
constitutional structure."  Wis. Just. Initiative, 407 Wis. 2d 
87, ¶21 (citing Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 
67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35). 
¶45 The debates over a constitutional provision and the 
practices at the time of the provision's adoption also serve as 
guides in ascertaining the text's original public meaning.  Wis. 
Just. Initiative, 407 Wis. 2d 87, ¶21; Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d at 
182-83.  As explained in State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, "we must 
strive by all means within our jurisdiction to put ourselves in 
the place the constitution makers occupied,——look at the 
situation they had in view through the same vista they observed 
it, and then read out of the term the meaning they sought to 
embody in it."  160 Wis. 21, 81, 151 N.W. 331 (1915).          
¶46 Post-enactment 
construction 
of 
a 
constitutional 
provision by the other branches of government may also shed 
light on a provision's original public meaning.  Sinclair, 65 
Wis. 2d at 184; Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996); State ex rel. Kaul v. Prehn, 2022 WI 50, ¶49, 
402 Wis. 2d 539, 976 N.W.2d 821 (statutes enacted "immediately 
after 
the 
1848 
constitution 
was 
ratified[] 
reveal[ed] 
a 
circumscribed 
understanding 
of 
the 
Governor's 
appointment 
power").  Legislative or executive action is given more weight 
if the action occurred shortly after the adoption of the 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
10 
 
constitutional provision.  See Prehn, 402 Wis. 2d 539, ¶49.  
Moreover, an "uninterrupted practice . . . prevailing through a 
long series of years" provides additional evidence as to the 
text's meaning.  Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 237, 246 (1872).  
"Lawbreaking is none the less lawbreaking because it is 
grayheaded with age, but when the meaning of a doubtful clause 
is in question, the construction placed upon it by the fathers, 
and concurred in through long years without question, is 
strongly 
persuasive 
and 
frequently 
will 
be 
held 
to 
be 
controlling."  In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 602-
03, 124 N.W. 670 (1910) (citing State ex rel. Bashford v. Frear, 
138 Wis. 536, 120 N.W. 216 (1909)).  Failure to present this 
court with historical research may be "fatal" to a party's 
position.  Prehn, 402 Wis. 539, ¶44; Halverson, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 
¶26 (rejecting a claim under the Wisconsin Constitution because 
the party "provide[d] no textual or historical basis" for his 
argument). 
¶47 Any argument construing Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to protect an asserted right must be 
grounded 
in 
the 
constitution's 
actual 
text 
and 
history.  
"Certainly, states have the power to afford greater protection 
to 
citizens 
under 
their 
constitutions 
than 
the 
federal 
constitution does."  State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶56, 389 
Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 
117, 125 (1945)).  But it cannot simply be assumed that the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides more protection for an asserted 
right than the Federal Constitution:  "[T]he question for a 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
11 
 
state court is whether its state constitution actually affords 
greater protection.  A state court does not have the power to 
write into its state constitution additional protection that is 
not supported by its text or historical meaning."  Id.; Linde, 
supra, at 179.  This court has stated many times that "[i]n 
interpreting a constitutional provision, the court turns to 
three sources in determining the provision's meaning:  the plain 
meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional 
debates and the practices in existence at the time of the 
writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of 
the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law 
passed following adoption."  Craney, 199 Wis. 2d at 680 (first 
citing Polk Cnty. v. State Pub. Def., 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 
N.W.2d 389 (1994); and then citing State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 
122, 136–37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984)); see also Thomas ex rel. 
Gramling v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, ¶122, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 
N.W.2d 523 (citing State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶64 n.29, 264 
Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785); Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, 
¶30, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 (citation omitted); Wagner 
v. Milwaukee Cnty. Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, ¶18, 263 Wis. 
2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816 (citing State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 
WI 9, ¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526); Koschkee v. Taylor, 
2019 WI 76, ¶23, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (citation 
omitted); State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, ¶19, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 
N.W.2d 787 (citing State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶15, 341 Wis. 
2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460).  Litigants asserting a right under 
Article I, Section 1 must ground their arguments in those 
No.  2022AP1334.rgb 
 
12 
 
considerations——not policy or subjective moral judgments.  Our 
constitution and our commitment to a democratic form of 
government demand nothing less.   
¶48 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER 
and 
Justice 
BRIAN 
HAGEDORN 
join 
this 
concurrence.   
 
 
No.  2022AP1334.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶49 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority's conclusion that the adoption statutes, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 48.81 and 48.92(2), are rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest, and therefore do not violate M.M.C.'s or T.G.'s 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  For that reason, I join the majority opinion.   
¶50 I write separately to address petitioners' alternative 
equal protection challenge under Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Our 
constitution 
was 
written 
independently of the United States Constitution and we must 
interpret it as such, based on its own language and our state's 
unique identity.  When we do so, there are several compelling 
reasons why we should read Article I, Section 1 as providing 
broader protections for individual liberties than the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  We cannot simply assume——as petitioners seemingly 
did in this case——that these different constitutional provisions 
mean the same thing.  
I 
¶51 Since the earliest days of our state's history, we 
have embraced our role as the principal interpreters of our 
state constitution.  In Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. 
Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 785 (1855), Justice Abram Smith said "The 
people then made this constitution, and adopted it as their 
primary law.  The people of other states made for themselves 
respectively, constitutions which are construed by their own 
appropriate functionaries.  Let them construe theirs——let us 
construe, and stand by ours."  And we have repeatedly declared 
No.  2022AP1334.rfd 
 
2 
 
that it is our duty to interpret our constitution independently 
of the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Ward, 
2000 WI 3, ¶59, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517; State v. 
Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶38, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142; 
State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶23, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 
847.  "Fulfilling our duty to uphold the Wisconsin Constitution 
as written could yield conclusions affording greater protections 
than those provided by the federal Constitution."  Halverson, 
395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶23. 
¶52 In fact, we have a long history of interpreting our 
constitution to provide greater protections for the individual 
liberties of Wisconsinites than those mandated by the federal 
Constitution.  For example, we concluded that the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantees the right to counsel at the state's 
expense in criminal cases more than 100 years before the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the same right in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  See Carpenter v. Dane County, 
9 Wis. 274, 278 (1859).  More than 40 years before Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961), we held that suppression was the 
appropriate remedy for unlawful searches and seizures under our 
constitution.  See Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 415, 193 N.W. 
89 (1923).  And we have also said that when police deliberately 
violate a criminal defendant's Miranda1 rights, our constitution 
requires that the evidence be suppressed, even if the Fourth 
Amendment doesn't require the same.  See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 
127, ¶2, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.  More recently, we have 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
No.  2022AP1334.rfd 
 
3 
 
endorsed the view that "[t]he Wisconsin Constitution, with its 
specific 
and 
expansive 
language, 
provides 
much 
broader 
protections for religious liberty than the First Amendment."  
Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶66, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 
768 N.W.2d 868. 
¶53 As these examples illustrate, we have recognized 
greater protections for individual liberties in our constitution 
because 
it 
is 
meaningfully 
different 
than 
the 
federal 
Constitution. 
 
"All 
of 
the 
differences 
in 
our 
state 
constitutions are not accidents of draftsmanship.  Some of these 
differences reflect differences in our tradition."  Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 966 
(1982).  The Wisconsin Constitution reflects the unique features 
of our state and its laws, our history, and the "distinctive 
attitudes of [our] state's citizenry."  See Developments in the 
Law——The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1324, 1359-61 (1982).  We must consider these 
differences——both 
textual 
and 
contextual——as 
part 
of 
the 
pluralistic approach to state constitutional interpretation we 
have applied previously.  See Wis. Justice Initiative v. Wis. 
Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 38, ¶117, 407 Wis. 2d 87, 990 
N.W.2d 122 
(Dallet, 
J., 
concurring) 
("We 
should 
analyze 
the . . . Wisconsin constitution['s] text and history carefully, 
but we should also be guided by precedent, context, historical 
practice and tradition, and the need to balance 'the majority's 
values against the values that should be protected from 
society's majorities'" (quoting another source)).     
No.  2022AP1334.rfd 
 
4 
 
II 
¶54 Even a cursory review of Article I, Section 1 of our 
constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that the 
clauses have different meanings.  Article I, Section 1 states, 
in its entirety: 
All people are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights: among these are life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  Compare this with the Fourteenth 
Amendment which provides in pertinent part that "No State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1.  
¶55 Aside from two shared words——"life" and "liberty"—— 
Article I, Section 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment are worded in 
dramatically different ways.  Article I, Section 1 protects more 
than the enumerated rights of "life, liberty, or property."  It 
declares unequivocally that all Wisconsinites have "inherent 
rights," a phrase that was written "to be broad enough to cover 
every principle of natural right, of abstract justice."  Black 
v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 226, 89 N.W. 522 (1902) (Marshall, J., 
concurring).  Whereas the Fourteenth Amendment's protections 
extend only to those rights "so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," the 
inherent rights contemplated by Article I, Section 1 are not so 
limited.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993).  Moreover, 
No.  2022AP1334.rfd 
 
5 
 
Article I, Section 1 begins with the clear and expansive 
declaration 
that 
all 
people 
are 
"born 
equally 
free 
and 
independent."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  As we said over a 
century ago, "[t]oo much dignity cannot well be given to that 
declaration."  State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 101, 114 N.W. 137 
(1907).  By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment contains a 
narrower guarantee of "equal protection of the laws."  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
¶56 These textual differences are unsurprising when we 
consider the divergent historical contexts in which the clauses 
were developed and adopted.  The language of Article I, Section 
1 is derived from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which 
stated:  
That 
all 
men 
are 
by 
nature 
equally 
free 
and 
independent and have certain inherent rights, of 
which, when they enter into a state of society, they 
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their 
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, 
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 1 (1776). 
¶57 That language, and the language it also inspired in 
the overwhelming majority of other states' constitutions,2 was "a 
statement 
of 
revolutionary, 
republican, 
egalitarian 
ideology . . . [b]ut 
it 
did 
not 
concern 
itself 
with 
the 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Vermont Const. ch. I, art. 1; Mass. Const. art. 
I; N.H. Const. art. I; see also Steven G. Calabresi, et al., 
Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 2018: What Rights 
Are Deeply Rooted in a Modern-Day Consensus of the States?, 94 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 49, 125 (2018) (noting that "[t]hirty-nine of 
the states——representing 78% of the states" have similar 
language in their state constitutions).   
No.  2022AP1334.rfd 
 
6 
 
Fourteenth Amendment era problems of the people being denied the 
equal protection of the laws[.]"  Robert F. Williams, A "Row of 
Shadows": Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its 
State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 Widener J. Pub. L. 
343, 349 (1993).  The Fourteenth Amendment wasn't ratified until 
twenty years after Wisconsin achieved statehood and nearly a 
century after virtually identical language first appeared in the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights.  Far from the "revolutionary" 
ideals that our Wisconsin Constitution protects, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was a pragmatic step in the aftermath of the Civil War 
to protect the rights of African Americans who had been freed 
from slavery.  See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Textualism and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1237, 1248 (2017).  The 
politics of 1868 would have been unrecognizable to the delegates 
to the 1848 Wisconsin constitutional convention, let alone the 
drafters of the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776.  In 
short, the leaders of different sovereigns adopted different 
language at different times in history to address different 
problems.  And for that reason, we should refrain from 
reflexively treating the language similarly.   
III  
¶58 Notwithstanding the many reasons to interpret our 
state constitution differently than the federal Constitution, 
litigants often overlook state constitutional claims, or fail to 
develop them fully.  This case is a perfect example.  Although 
petitioners argued that the adoption statutes at issue violate 
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, they offered 
No.  2022AP1334.rfd 
 
7 
 
little more than a citation to that section as support.  
Otherwise, the parties' briefs focused solely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment and federal precedent, and ignored the Wisconsin 
Constitution entirely.   
¶59 That omission is somewhat understandable.  Lawyers are 
surely more familiar with the extensive case law interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  By comparison, our case law regarding 
Article I, Section 1 is sparse.  But we must break this self-
perpetuating cycle whereby lawyers fail to develop state 
constitutional 
arguments 
because 
they 
lack 
clear 
legal 
standards, which further prevents courts from developing clear 
legal standards.  In a way, the lack of settled case law should 
be encouraging to litigants.  It is up to us——judges, lawyers, 
and citizens——to give effect to the fundamental guarantees of 
Article I, Section 1.  And in doing so, I agree with what 
Justice Dodge wrote more than 100 years ago, when he said that 
Article I, Section 1, should "not receive an unduly limited 
construction."  State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 
530, 533-34, 90 N.W. 1098 (1902) (internal quotations omitted).   
¶60 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and PROTASIEWICZ join this concurrence. 
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶62 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority that A.M.B.'s constitutional challenge merits rational 
basis review and that the challenged adoption statutes have a 
rational basis under the law.  Rational basis review presents a 
low bar for the state to clear.  We need only to conceive of a 
single rational connection between the statutes and a legitimate 
state interest in order for us to uphold the statutes' 
constitutionality.  Here it is rational for the legislature to 
connect marriage to relationship longevity, then relationship 
longevity 
to 
household 
stability, 
and 
finally 
household 
stability to the child's best interest.1  Because there is a 
conceivable logic behind those connections, the statutes have a 
rational basis. 
¶63 But in this case, the logical threads begin to shred 
under the weight of any sincere scrutiny.  Here, we are left 
with the inescapable fact that the legally rational statutes 
prevented an adoption that all agree would have been in A.M.B.'s 
best interest.  This incongruent outcome exemplifies the 
specious connection between the statutes and their stated goal 
of promoting a child's best interest.  At first glance the 
connection may seem neatly knitted together; however, closer 
inspection reveals nothing more than a fraying tangle of dubious 
assumptions, circular reasoning, and outdated values that fail 
to reflect the practical realities of modern family life.  I 
write separately to call out these three fraying threads that 
                                                 
1 See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1) ("In construing this chapter, 
the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be 
of paramount consideration."). 
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
2 
 
form an ever weakening connection between our adoption statutes 
and the goal of a child's best interest.  I urge the legislature 
to reform the adoption restrictions so that they truly support 
the best interest of every child. 
¶64 The first fraying thread connecting the adoption 
statutes to the best interest of a child is a set of dubious 
assumptions regarding the stability of marital families compared 
to non-marital families.  To be clear, the state has a 
legitimate 
interest 
in 
making 
sure 
that 
legal 
decisions 
involving a child are made based on the best interest of that 
child.  And there is no doubt that it is in a child's best 
interest to grow up in a safe and stable household.  However, 
conditioning adoption on the marital status of the child's 
parent and prospective adoptive parent reflects questionable 
assumptions about which types of households are stable, and 
which are unstable.  There are many different family structures 
that create stability for children, and the statute's one-size-
fits-all approach can actively work against the benefit of a 
child, as it did in this case.  
¶65 Children can and do thrive in families with single, 
unmarried, or married parents.2  This case is an excellent 
example of the second category.  T.G. has, by all accounts, 
demonstrated dedication and commitment to A.M.B. over the past 
                                                 
2 These former two categories are not rare, with 41% of 
children born to unmarried or single households between 2015 and 
2021. Robert Schoen, A Multistate Analysis of United States 
Marriage, Divorce, and Fertility, 2005-2010 and 2015-20: The 
Retreat from Marriage Continues, The Demography of Transforming 
Families 119, 119 (2023).  
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
3 
 
decade, and for her part A.M.B. reports that she views T.G. as a 
father figure.  There is no dispute that adoption would be in 
A.M.B.'s best interest. 
¶66 Moreover, children can and do struggle in households 
with married parents.  Married couples may, on average, stay 
together in the same household longer than unmarried parents, 
and that may look like stability from a thousand-foot-view.  But 
inside the home, the legal pressure for a married couple to stay 
together, the very thing that makes the household appear stable 
in a superficial sense, may sometimes lead to worse outcomes for 
children.  More than 20% of children have witnessed domestic 
violence within their lifetime, often resulting in long term 
harm to their development.  David Finkelhor et al. Violence, 
Abuse and Crime Exposure in a National Sample of Children and 
Youth, 124 Pediatrics 1, 5 (2009).  Even short of domestic 
violence, legally "stable" marriages may be rife with stressors 
for the children in those homes.  Bali Ram & Feng Hou, Changes 
in Family Structure and Child Outcomes: Roles of Economic and 
Familial Resources, 31 Pol'y Stud. J. 309, 312 ("[A] large body 
of research now exists that finds that children are not 
necessarily better off living with two biological parents who 
are in constant marital conflict.").  Even ignoring the 
challenges that may arise when a married couple remains 
together, marriage is hardly a guarantee of relationship 
stability given that divorce rates have continued to rise in the 
United States since the Civil War.  Lisa D. Pearce et al., The 
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
4 
 
Increasing Diversity and Complexity of Family Structures for 
Adolescents, 23 J. Rsch. on Adolescence 565, 592 (2018). 
¶67 In short, using marriage as a litmus test for 
household stability reflects suspect assumptions about which 
family structures create stability, and what it means for a 
household to be stable in the first place.  Marriage is treated 
as binary, where married parents check the stability box, 
unmarried parents do not, and all nuance is disregarded as 
insignificant.  In cases such as this where unmarried parents 
provide stability, there is no tolerance for any exception.  
And, as a result, children suffer. 
¶68 The second frayed thread linking the adoption statutes 
to the best interest of the child goal is little more than tail-
wagging-the-dog circular reasoning.  It goes like this: The 
state grants a "constellation of benefits" to married couples 
related to "taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of 
intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; 
hospital access; medical decision making authority," and more.  
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669-70 (2015).  The 
state then uses those benefits as justification to grant yet 
another benefit to married couples——here, adoption rights——
reasoning that because married couples are already well-
supported by the state, they are in a better position to receive 
the new benefit.  The connection between the granting of the 
benefit and the state's goals is thus substantially manufactured 
by the state, resulting in a spiral of ever-expanding benefits 
to married couples, leaving alternative family structures 
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
5 
 
further and further behind.  Perhaps the answer then is not to 
limit adoption benefits to married couples on the basis that the 
other benefits they receive make them "safe and stable,"3 but for 
the legislature to expand support for alternative family 
structures, making them even more "safe and stable," and (from 
the state's point of view) suitable for adopting children. 
¶69 The third unraveling thread is an outdated set of 
values positioning marriage as the moral center of family and 
society.  These values sometimes lurk beneath other seemingly 
neutral rationales for marital benefits (such as ensuring 
household stability), only surfacing occasionally as a reminder 
to us that they are still there.  Sometimes these values are 
front and center, serving as the main justification for a 
marriage-based distinction under the law. 
¶70 To explain what is fundamentally wrong with using this 
set of values to justify marriage-based laws, I turn to an 1888 
U.S. Supreme Court case, cited by the Court in Obergefell, that 
expounded on marriage as "the foundation of the family and of 
society, without which there would be neither civilization or 
progress."  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).  At the 
time those words were written, the following was true about the 
institution of marriage.  Coverture laws subordinated married 
women to their husbands' legal control, eliminating their legal 
and economic identities.  Christopher R. Leslie, Dissenting from 
History: The False Narratives of the Obergefell Dissents, 92 
Ind. L.J. 1007, 1014 (2017).  As a result, a married woman's 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(gg). 
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
6 
 
property, earnings, and labor automatically belonged to her 
husband.  Id.  In addition, there was no legal recourse for a 
married woman whose husband had sexually assaulted her, which 
would be true well into the 1970s in many states.  Id. at 1015.  
And neither married women nor unmarried women had the right to 
vote, to exercise civic influence in order to right these 
wrongs.  Furthermore, marriage was limited exclusively to 
heterosexual relationships.  And, marriages between people of 
differing races and ethnicities were widely banned.  In short, 
if marriage was the foundation of the family and of society in 
1888, there was something rotten at the core of that foundation. 
¶71 Times have changed, of course, but the justification 
that marriage is the moral core of society and the family is as 
weak as it ever was.  With only about half of U.S. adults in a 
marriage, 
first 
marriages 
beginning 
later 
in 
life, 
and 
increasing divorce rates over time, Americans are spending more 
and more of their adult lives unmarried.4  Unsurprisingly then, 
                                                 
4 See Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of Unmarried 
Parents, 
Pew 
Research 
Center 
(Apr. 
25, 
2018), 
https://perma.cc/RC6T-NFGE ("The growth in unmarried parenthood 
overall has been driven by several demographic trends.  Perhaps 
most important has been the decline in the share of people 
overall who are married.  In 1970, about seven-in-ten U.S. 
adults ages 18 and older were married; in 2016, that share stood 
at 50%. Both delays in marriage and long-term increases in 
divorce have fueled this trend.  In 1968, the median age at 
first marriage for men was 23 and for women it was 21. In 2017, 
the median age at first marriage was 30 for men and 27 for 
women.  At the same time, marriages are more likely to end in 
divorce now than they were almost half a century ago.  For 
instance, among men whose first marriage began in the late 
1980s, about 76% were still in those marriages 10 years later, 
while this figure was 88% for men whose marriages began in the 
late 1950s."). 
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
7 
 
nearly one third of children live in a single-parent home. 
Pearce et al., supra, at 592.  Yet many Americans still desire 
to create families.  Functional, stable families continue to 
form as alternative family structures proliferate and garner 
greater societal acceptance.  See Frank F. Furstenberg et al., 
Kinship Practices Among Alternative Family Forms in Western 
Industrialized Societies, 82 J. Marriage Fam. 1403 (2020).  The 
notion that marriage serves as the foundation of society is at 
best outdated, and at worst misogynistic.  It provides scant 
justification for laws that distinguish based on marital status.  
¶72 In sum, I agree that the adoption statutes have a 
rational basis given the low bar that the legal analysis 
requires.  But upon closer inspection, the connection between 
the adoption statutes and a child's best interest appears 
increasingly threadbare.  Remove the outdated, the questionable, 
and the merely self-perpetuating, and soon you are left with 
very little connection at all. 
 
No.  2022AP1334.jjk 
 
 
 
1