Title: Dykes v. Friends of the C.C.C. Road
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101630
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2012

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, 
and Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
DAVID S. DYKES, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 101630 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
January 13, 2012 
FRIENDS OF THE C.C.C. ROAD 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HIGHLAND COUNTY 
Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in concluding that a certain road traversing private 
land in rural Highland County is a public road.  The case was 
decided by the circuit court on stipulated facts and the 
appeal presents pure questions of law applied to these 
undisputed facts.  Accordingly, we apply a de novo standard of 
review.  Johnson v. Hart, 279 Va. 617, 623, 692 S.E.2d 239, 
242 (2010). 
BACKGROUND 
On March 17, 2009, Friends of the C.C.C. Road, an 
unincorporated association purporting to represent the general 
public, filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the Circuit 
Court of Highland County against David S. Dykes, John W. 
Burch, and Elizabeth H. Burch (collectively, "the property 
owners").  The complaint alleged that the property owners 
possessed three tracts of land in Highland County comprising 
over 500 acres through which ran a mostly gravel road known 
 
2 
locally as the "C.C.C. Road."  Asserting that the property 
owners "knew or should have known that the C.C.C. Road [is] a 
public road," the complaint alleged that they had blocked 
access to the road by the general public by erecting pole 
gates where this road intersects with Jackson River Road and 
Bratton McGuffin Trail, two nearby public roads.  Alleging 
that obstructing access to the C.C.C. Road with the pole gates 
violated Code § 33.1-345(3) (Class 1 misdemeanor to obstruct 
any road), the complaint sought an injunction requiring the 
property owners to remove the pole gates and take no further 
action to obstruct access to the road by the public. 
The property owners filed a joint answer on April 21, 
2009 in which they denied that the C.C.C. Road is a public 
road.  The answer expressly asserted that the road had not 
become public by operation of law under Code § 33.1-184 or as 
a result of an express or implied dedication and acceptance, 
and that there could be no prescriptive easement in favor of 
the general public to use the road.1 
                     
1 On brief, the parties address the application of Code 
§ 33.1-184, as well as the Byrd Road Act, 1932 Acts ch. 415 
(now codified in part at Code § 33.1-69), to the facts of this 
case.  Because the circuit court made no express ruling on the 
application of either law with respect to its ultimate 
determination that the C.C.C. Road is a public road, and 
neither law impinges on our analysis of the dispositive 
issues, we need not address them in this opinion. 
 
 
3 
On May 15, 2009, the parties filed an agreed stipulation 
of facts.  According to that stipulation, the C.C.C. Road was 
constructed by the Civilian Conservation Corps sometime in the 
late 1930s.2  Since its construction, the road has been used by 
the general public as a thoroughfare between the Jackson River 
Valley and the Back Creek Valley as well as for access to the 
George Washington National Forest.  Officers of the Highland 
County Sheriff's Office, the county surveyor, and the Bolar 
Volunteer Fire Department consider it as a public road and 
have used the road for at least 25 years for official 
purposes. 
In 1941, the Highland County Board of Supervisors noted 
the agreement of the then owner of the property where the 
C.C.C. Road intersected with a state road to maintain a gate 
and cattle guard at that intersection "and further agreed 
should he fail to do so, [the] State Highway Department may 
remove [the] gate and cattle guard."  However, no government 
record shows that the County has formally adopted the road 
into the County's road system, nor has the County ever 
                     
2 The Civilian Conservation Corps was a federal agency 
created by an act of the United States Congress "for the 
purpose of providing employment, as well as vocational 
training . . . through the performance of useful public work 
in connection with the conservation and development of the 
natural resources of the United States."  Civilian 
Conservation Corps Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-163, 50 Stat. 
319 (1937). 
 
4 
maintained or repaired the road.  Likewise, the road has not 
been adopted into the state road system by the Virginia 
Department of Transportation ("VDOT") and does not appear on 
the official VDOT map for the County. 
In 2001, an official of the Virginia Department of 
Forestry advised a landowner whose property is located along 
the C.C.C. Road that "emergency fire trails . . . established 
on private property, with the permission of the landowners, by 
the Civilian Conservation Corps . . . were never official 
state maintained roads, nor did the Commonwealth have legal 
easement to use them.  The trails belong to landowners on 
[whose property] they cross." 
Other nearby landowners who access their land along the 
C.C.C. Road favor the restriction of access to the road and 
have been provided with keys to the pole gates.  Keys to these 
gates also have been provided to the Sheriff's Office and a 
utility company, and keys have been offered to the Forestry 
Service. 
Although the case was initially set for trial, the 
parties filed memoranda of law in conjunction with the 
stipulated, undisputed material facts.  On March 2, 2010, the 
circuit court issued an opinion letter in which it stated that 
the C.C.C. Road could have become a public road by either of 
"[t]wo common law principles."  Relying on Bradford v. Nature 
 
5 
Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 294 S.E.2d 866 (1982), the court 
first opined that private roads could become public either 
through an express or implied dedication by the landowner and 
acceptance of that dedication by the government.3  There was no 
assertion of an express dedication of the C.C.C. Road as a 
public road by the landowners or their predecessors in title, 
and there are no facts which would support such an assertion 
in this case.  The circuit court concluded that even if there 
had been an implied dedication of the road by the various 
owners of the land over which it crossed, there was "[n]o 
indication or record of a public authority formally accepting 
dedication of the Road."  The court further noted that the 
notion of implied acceptance was not applicable to a rural 
road.  Thus, the court ruled that Friends of the C.C.C. Road 
"failed to prove that the Road is public . . . by a dedication 
and acceptance." 
The circuit court then undertook an analysis of whether 
the public could acquire a "right-of-way" by prescription.  
The court's analysis began with the recognition that "[t]he 
general public cannot acquire a right-of-way by prescription 
because the public as a whole lacks the requisite element of 
                     
3 A private road may also be acquired for public use 
through eminent domain, but clearly such was not the case 
here. 
 
 
6 
exclusiveness, which is a component of the factors necessary 
to give rise to a prescriptive easement."  To support this 
proposition, the court relied upon Burks Brothers of Virginia, 
Inc. v. Jones, 232 Va. 238, 246, 349 S.E.2d 134, 139 (1986), 
which involved an unsuccessful claim of a prescriptive 
easement in favor of the public over a trail also constructed 
on private property by the Civilian Conservation Corps.  The 
court concluded that Friends of the C.C.C. Road "failed to 
prove that the Road is public . . . by prescription."  
Nonetheless, the court concluded that Burks Brothers 
implicitly supported the possibility of a public right-of-way 
being created on private property through "recognition" by the 
government of a long and continuous use by the public, and 
thus that Friends of the C.C.C. Road had proven that the 
general public is entitled to unrestricted use of this road. 
On May 25, 2010, the circuit court entered a final order 
granting injunctive relief to Friends of the C.C.C. Road 
requiring the property owners to remove the pole gates and 
allow the general public to have access to the road.  Both 
parties entered objections to this order.  In an order dated 
December 10, 2010, we awarded the property owners an appeal 
from this judgment and also granted assignments of cross-error 
by Friends of the C.C.C. Road. 
 
7 
DISCUSSION 
The property owners principally assign error to the 
circuit court's judgment that, while there had been no 
dedication and acceptance or acquisition of a prescriptive 
easement in favor of the general public, the C.C.C. Road is 
nonetheless a public road or subject to a public right-of-way 
by virtue of long and continuous use by the public and 
recognition by the government of this fact.  Friends of the 
C.C.C. Road assign cross-error to the court's determination 
that the road has not become a public road by traditional 
principles of prescription or dedication and acceptance. 
We begin by addressing the issue raised by Friends of the 
C.C.C. Road that the circuit court erred in concluding that 
this road is not a public road under principles of dedication 
and acceptance.  As stipulated, there are no facts in the 
record indicating that the property owners or their 
predecessors in title ever made a formal offer to dedicate the 
C.C.C. Road to public use or of a formal acceptance of such 
offer by the government.  Thus, in this case for dedication 
and acceptance to apply, both actions would have to arise by 
implication.  In that regard, we have recently observed, 
"'[w]hile a dedication may be implied from the acts of the 
owner, these acts must be unmistakable to show the intention 
of the landowner to permanently give up his property.  This 
 
8 
Court has long recognized that what may amount to a dedication 
in an urban area will not serve the same purpose in a rural 
one.  This is because landowners in rural areas frequently 
allowed roads to be opened through their property without 
intending a dedication to the public.  Just as important, the 
government might not have any intention to accept the road and 
be responsible for its maintenance.  Thus, before a rural road 
can be dedicated, there must be a formal acceptance by the 
public.' "  Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Group, LLC, 282 Va. 
98, 106, 712 S.E.2d 468, 473 (2011) (quoting Bradford, 224 Va. 
at 198-99, 294 S.E.2d at 875). 
It is not disputed that the C.C.C. Road traverses private 
property in a rural area.  Because there can be no implied 
acceptance of an implied dedication of a rural road, and there 
is no evidence of a formal acceptance of the road in this 
case, the circuit court did not err in finding that there had 
been no dedication and acceptance of the C.C.C. Road as a 
public road. 
We turn now to the principal issue raised by the property 
owners in their appeal and the closely-related issue asserted 
in the first assignment of cross-error.  The property owners 
contend that the circuit court correctly concluded that there 
cannot be a prescriptive easement in favor of the general 
public to use a private road, but that it erred in finding 
 
9 
that the same effective result can be obtained by showing that 
the public's use of the private road has been "long and 
continuous" and has been "recognized" by the government.  
Friends of the C.C.C. Road maintains that even if the court 
erred in finding that a recognized long and continuous use of 
a private road creates a public right-of-way for its use, the 
court further erred in finding that a prescriptive easement 
could not accrue in favor of the general public. 
We may readily resolve the question whether a public 
easement or right-of-way may be acquired solely through long 
and continuous public use of a private road "recognized" by 
the government without a formal acceptance of the 
responsibility to maintain the road.  As we have previously 
noted, the circuit court correctly found that there had been 
no formal acceptance of an implied dedication of the C.C.C. 
Road as a public road by the Board of Supervisors of Highland 
County.  The 1941 acknowledgement by the Board of an agreement 
by a then owner of the property to maintain a gate and cattle 
guard where this road intersected a state road is clearly not 
a formal acceptance of the road as a public road.  The Board 
has never agreed to maintain the road as a public road would 
require.  Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that the 
long and continuous use of this road, coupled with a 
recognition of that use by the Board, supports the 
 
10 
determination that the road is a public road.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the circuit court relied upon another circuit 
court's decision which in turn relied upon Virginia Hot 
Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919).  That 
case, however, does not equate recognition of a long and 
continuous use of the road by the public with a formal 
acceptance by the appropriate governmental authority. 
In Virginia Hot Springs, we explained that the issue of 
whether there was a public right-of-way regarding the width of 
a particular road was "founded upon dedication and acceptance" 
of which long and continuous use by the public was merely part 
of the evidence of an implied dedication, and the recognition 
by the government was merely part of the evidence of an 
acceptance.  Id. at 428-29, 101 S.E. at 327-28.  Accordingly, 
we hold that the circuit court erred in finding that Friends 
of the C.C.C. Road had established that the road is public 
solely by virtue of its long and continuous use by the general 
public and recognition of that use by the County.  The law of 
this Commonwealth simply does not allow for a conversion of 
private property to public property solely by public use. 
Finally, we turn to the issue whether the public can 
claim a prescriptive easement over a private road, as Friends 
of the C.C.C. Road asserts.  The language of Burks Brothers 
alluded to by the circuit court to support the proposition 
 
11 
that such a prescription could arise is as follows:  
"[B]ecause . . . there was no evidence of long-continued use 
of the CCC trail by the general public, as distinguished from 
use by landowners, residents, and their guests, we do not 
agree with the trial court's conclusion that the general 
public has acquired a prescriptive right to use the CCC 
trail."  Burks Brothers, 232 Va. at 249, 349 S.E.2d at 141.  
This statement, however, is not conclusive on whether an 
easement in favor of the public can be acquired by 
prescription.  To the contrary, at most it simply makes clear 
that a necessary element for prescription was lacking because 
there was no evidence of prescriptive use of the putative 
easement by the claimants, that is, by the general public.  
Moreover, we are of opinion that the circuit court's broad 
interpretation of this single sentence is so contrary to the 
well-established law of this Commonwealth, that it cannot be 
sustained. 
In Commonwealth v. Kelly, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 632 (1851), 
we rejected the notion that under English common law mere use 
over a long period could result in the conversion of a private 
road into a public road by prescription, noting that "[e]ven 
in England there must be an intention to dedicate the road 
. . . of which the use is the evidence and nothing more."  Id. 
at 635.  And it cannot be inferred through use alone "that an 
 
12 
individual makes a gift of his property to the public from an 
equivocal act, which equally proves an intention to grant a 
mere revocable license[.]  The public is not injured by this 
view of the subject.  It has the accommodation of the road as 
long as the license continues, and after the license is 
revoked, the road may be made public if the public convenience 
requires it, by making compensation to the owner."  Id. at 
635-36.  We went on to affirm that there were distinctions 
between urban and rural areas as to what would be sufficient 
to prove a dedication and acceptance, but we were clear that 
in no case could a private road become public merely by an 
allegedly prescriptive use of it by many individuals over a 
long period of time.  Id. at 636-37. 
In many subsequent opinions we have been clear that to 
acquire an easement or right-of-way over a road by 
prescription, an essential element must be that the claimant 
is asserting the right to the exclusion of others.  See, e.g., 
Craig v. Kennedy, 202 Va. 654, 657-58, 119 S.E.2d 320, 322-23 
(1961).  Thus, "where the use of a way by persons owning 
property in the immediate area has been in common with the use 
of the roadway by members of the general public, the essential 
element of exclusiveness is lacking because the use of the 
roadway is dependent upon the enjoyment of similar rights by 
others, and no rights by prescription arise."  Ward v. Harper, 
 
13 
234 Va. 68, 71, 360 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1987); see also Rhoton v. 
Rollins, 186 Va. 352, 363, 42 S.E.2d 323, 328-29 (1947); 
Totten v. Stuart, 143 Va. 201, 203-04, 129 S.E. 217, 218 
(1925); Kent v. Dobyns, 112 Va. 586, 587-88, 72 S.E. 139, 139 
(1911).  In other words, mere use by the general public is not 
evidence of prescriptive use, but of a license by the owner 
permitting the use, and such evidence will defeat a claim by 
one individual, by a group, or by the general public asserting 
a prescriptive easement. 
While on occasion we have discussed the conversion of a 
private road into a public road by "prescription," it has 
always been clear in the context of those cases that the 
elements of prescription were being used to establish that an 
implied dedication of the property had been made.  As we 
explained in Board of Supervisors of Tazewell County v. 
Norfolk and Western Railway Company, 119 Va. 763, 773, 91 S.E. 
124, 128 (1916), "[w]hen the dedication is implied from the 
long and continuous use by the public for the prescriptive 
period of twenty years, and there has been acceptance by 
competent authority title to a right-of-way for a public road 
may be obtained by prescription."  (Second emphasis added.)  
Viewed in the light of this prior case law, the statement in 
Burks Brothers relied upon by the circuit court should be 
interpreted as meaning that "long-continued use" of a private 
 
14 
road can result in a "prescriptive" taking of the road if 
there is an affirmative act by competent authority of 
acceptance of the dedication the use implies.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the circuit court's ruling on this point was in 
error insofar as it would allow a traditional prescriptive 
easement to be created in favor of the general public, but its 
ruling that prescription had not been proven was nonetheless a 
correct result in light of its finding that there had been no 
acceptance. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court granting a permanent injunction to Friends of 
the C.C.C. Road and requiring the property owners to remove 
the pole gates and to allow the general public unrestricted 
access to the C.C.C. Road, and we will enter final judgment 
here for the property owners. 
Reversed and final judgment.