Title: State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001980-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 2018

2018 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1980-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Department of Natural 
Resources, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, Clean 
Wisconsin, Inc., Lynda A. Cochart, Amy Cochart, 
Roger D. DeJardin, Sandra Winnemueller, Chad 
Cochart and Kinnard Farms, Inc., 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 3, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents joined by A.W. BRADLEY 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner, there were briefs filed by Kevin M. 
LeRoy, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the briefs were 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Misha Tseytlin, solicitor 
general.  There was an oral argument by Kevin M. LeRoy. 
 
For the respondents Clean Wisconsin, Inc., Lynda A. 
Cochart, Amy Cochart, Roger D. DeJardin, Sandra Winnemueller, 
and Chad Cochart, there was a brief filed by Sarah Geers and 
Midwest Environmental Advocates, Madison, with whom on the brief 
were Katie Nekola and Clean Wisonsin, Inc., Madison.  There was 
an oral argument by Sarah Geers. 
 
 
2 
 
For the respondent Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, 
there was a brief filed by John S. Skilton and Perkins Coie LLP, 
Madison.  There was an oral argument by John S. Skilton. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1980-W 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Department of 
Natural Resources, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV, Clean 
Wisconsin, Inc., Lynda A. Cochart, Amy Cochart, 
Roger D. DeJardin, Sandra Winnemueller, Chad 
Cochart and Kinnard Farms, Inc., 
 
          Respondents. 
FILED 
 
APR 3, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of  
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for supervisory writ.   Granted; rights declared; 
and stay on appeal lifted. 
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   The Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources ("DNR") says its appeal in Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. 
DNR, 2016AP1688 ("Clean Wisconsin") is pending in the wrong 
district, and asks us to exercise our supervisory authority to 
shepherd it to the correct venue.  Because we agree with the 
DNR, we grant its petition for a supervisory writ and vacate the 
order of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals transferring venue for 
Clean Wisconsin from District II to District IV. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We accepted review because this case presents an 
important issue of first impression regarding the right of an 
appellant to select appellate venue under Wis. Stat. § 752.21(2) 
(2015-16).1 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
The dispute giving rise to this petition for a 
supervisory writ involves the DNR's decision to reissue a 
Wisconsin 
Pollutant 
Discharge 
Elimination 
System 
("WPDES") 
permit to Kinnard Farms, Inc. ("Kinnard Farms"), a dairy farm in 
Kewaunee County.  After a group of five individuals (led by 
Lynda 
A. 
Cochart, 
hereinafter 
the 
"Cochart 
Petitioners") 
contested the decision, an administrative law judge concluded 
the permit should issue, but only with the addition of two 
conditions to which Kinnard Farms objected.2  Kinnard Farms filed 
a petition with the DNR requesting removal of the conditions.  
The DNR initially denied the petition, but upon reconsideration 
found that "[n]either [of the conditions] may be imposed upon 
Kinnard [Farms] in this case, and therefore, these conditions 
will not be added to or modified into the WPDES Permit." 
¶4 
Clean Wisconsin, Inc. ("Clean Wisconsin") and the 
Cochart Petitioners each filed petitions seeking judicial review 
of the DNR's decision.  Clean Wisconsin filed in Dane County 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The nature of the conditions is not material to our 
analysis. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
3 
 
(the county of its residence), while the Cochart Petitioners 
filed in Kewaunee County (the county of their residence).  The 
Circuit Court for Dane County, as the court in which the first 
petition was filed, exercised its statutorily-granted discretion 
to consolidate the Kewaunee County case into the Dane County 
case.3  Subsequently, the Dane County Circuit Court entered 
judgment on the merits in favor of Clean Wisconsin and the 
Cochart Petitioners, restoring the contested permit conditions 
that the DNR had rejected.  We will refer to Clean Wisconsin and 
the Cochart Petitioners collectively as the "Administrative 
Petitioners" so that we may more conveniently distinguish their 
arguments from those of the Court of Appeals when they diverge. 
¶5 
The DNR appealed the circuit court's decision, and 
selected District II as the appellate venue.  A single court of 
appeals judge (sitting in District IV) issued an order, sua 
sponte, transferring venue from District II to District IV on 
August 31, 2016.  The judge, relying on Wis. Stat. § 752.21(1), 
wrote that District IV is the proper venue because it 
encompasses the circuit court that issued the judgment from 
which the DNR appealed.  The DNR moved for reconsideration.  It 
asserted that § 752.21(2) gave it the right to select appellate 
venue because Clean Wisconsin had designated the circuit court 
venue.  Sitting as a three-judge panel in District IV, the Court 
of Appeals denied the motion on September 29, 2016. 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Approximately two weeks later, the DNR petitioned this 
court for a supervisory writ requiring the Court of Appeals to 
transfer venue back to District II.  We stayed the appeal and 
asked the respondents for a response to the petition.  We 
subsequently ordered full briefing and argument. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Supervisory Writs 
¶7 
The authority to issue supervisory writs depends on 
the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to this court.  In 
relevant part, our constitution says: 
(1) The supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts. 
(2) The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over 
all 
courts 
and 
may 
hear 
original 
actions 
and 
proceedings. The supreme court may issue all writs 
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The supreme court may review judgments and orders 
of the court of appeals, may remove cases from the 
court of appeals and may accept cases on certification 
by the court of appeals. 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3.  We have previously observed that 
with the grant of jurisdiction come all the writs necessary to 
give it effect: 
The framers of the constitution appear to have well 
understood that, with appellate jurisdiction, the 
court took all common law writs applicable to it; and 
with superintending control, all common law writs 
applicable to that; and that, failing adequate common 
law writs, the court might well devise new ones, as 
Lord Coke tells us, as "a secret in law." 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
5 
 
Attorney Gen. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 515 (1874) 
(construing our original constitution4); see State v. Buchanan, 
2013 WI 31, ¶11, 346 Wis. 2d 735, 828 N.W.2d 847 ("As the court 
of original jurisdiction, we have discretion to issue a 
supervisory writ."); Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cty., 2011 WI 72, ¶74, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442 
(2011) (stating that "a supervisory writ is dedicated to the 
discretion of the court of original jurisdiction"). 
¶8 
"A supervisory writ is 'a blending of the writ of 
mandamus and the writ of prohibition.'"  Madison Metro. Sch. 
Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 95, ¶74 (citation omitted).  The court 
traditionally uses the writ of prohibition "to keep an inferior 
court from acting outside its jurisdiction when there [is] no 
adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise."  Id., ¶76 (internal 
marks and citation omitted).  The writ of mandamus, on the other 
hand, directs "a public officer to perform his plain statutory 
duties."  Id., ¶75 (citing Menzl v. City of Milwaukee, 32 
Wis. 2d 266, 
275-76, 
145 
N.W.2d 198 
(1966)). 
 
Thus, 
the 
                                                 
4 The original provision of the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution, 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3, read: 
The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided 
in 
this 
constitution, 
shall 
have 
appellate 
jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the 
state; but in no case removed to the supreme court 
shall a trial by jury be allowed.  The supreme court 
shall have a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, 
certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and 
to hear and determine the same. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
6 
 
supervisory writ "serves a narrow function:  to provide for the 
direct control of lower courts, judges, and other judicial 
officers who fail to fulfill non-discretionary duties, causing 
harm that cannot be remedied through the appellate review 
process."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  A supervisory writ 
is "an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is to be issued 
only upon some grievous exigency."  Id., ¶17 (internal marks and 
citation omitted). 
¶9 
A party may request a supervisory writ from this court 
by petition.5  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.71.  To justify the writ, 
a petitioner must demonstrate that:  "(1) an appeal is an 
inadequate remedy; (2) grave hardship or irreparable harm will 
result; 
(3) the 
duty 
of 
the 
trial 
court 
is 
plain 
and 
it . . . acted or intends to act in violation of that duty; and 
(4) the request for relief is made promptly and speedily."  
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶17 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
Our 
deliberation on whether to issue the writ "is controlled by 
equitable principles and, in our discretion, we can consider the 
                                                 
5 The requirement that an aggrieved party must first seek 
such a writ from the court of appeals is excused here, of 
course, because the writ, if granted, would lie against that 
court.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.71 ("A person seeking a 
supervisory writ from the supreme court shall first file a 
petition for a supervisory writ in the court of appeals under s. 
809.51 unless it is impractical to seek the writ in the court of 
appeals.  A petition in the supreme court shall show why it was 
impractical to seek the writ in the court of appeals or, if a 
petition had been filed in the court of appeals, the disposition 
made and reasons given by the court of appeals."). 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
7 
 
rights of the public and third parties."  Id. (internal marks 
and citation omitted). 
¶10 We 
will 
consider 
only 
the 
first 
three 
factors 
identified above——the respondents do not contest the timeliness 
of the DNR's petition, and we agree that filing within two weeks 
of the Court of Appeals' order 
denying the motion for 
reconsideration is, under these circumstances, unquestionably 
"prompt and speedy."  For the sake of analytical clarity, our 
opinion addresses the three factors in the following order.  We 
begin with whether the Court of Appeals will violate a plain 
duty to hear the DNR's appeal in the proper district if the 
venue-transfer order stands.  Then, we will consider whether an 
appeal would be an inadequate remedy.  And finally, we will 
determine whether the DNR will suffer grave hardship or 
irreparable harm if the writ does not issue. 
B.  Plain Duty 
1.  Existence of the Duty 
¶11 We start with determining whether the Court of Appeals 
has a plain duty to hear the DNR's appeal in the proper venue.  
A plain duty is one that is "clear and unequivocal and, under 
the facts, the responsibility to act [is] imperative."  Id., ¶22 
(internal 
marks 
and 
citation 
omitted). 
 
"[C]lear 
and 
unequivocal" does not require the duty to be settled or obvious.  
There may be a plain duty even when it involves "a novel 
question of law requiring harmonization of several statutory 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
8 
 
provisions."  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 95, 
¶84.6 
¶12 Appellate venue is governed by Wis. Stat. § 752.21, 
which provides, in toto: 
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), a judgment or 
order appealed to the court of appeals shall be heard 
                                                 
6 The dissent suggests this directive is at odds with State 
ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85, ¶81, 
363 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 165.  It asserts that this court 
"reaffirmed that the obligation of a judge to correctly apply 
the law 'is not the type of plain legal duty contemplated by the 
supervisory writ procedure.'"  Dissent, ¶64 (quoting Two Unnamed 
Petitioners, 363 Wis. 2d 1, ¶81).  The dissent overlooked that 
the court was speaking to categories of duties, not the clarity 
with which the law imposes them.  The court in Two Unnamed 
Petitioners was distinguishing between the court's general 
obligation to accurately apply the law to the facts of any given 
case, on the one hand, and on the other, those directives aimed 
at the court qua judicial tribunal, mandating how it is to carry 
out specific aspects of its work.  The former category contains 
those matters that are the subjects of appeals.  With respect to 
the latter, however, the court observed that supervisory writs 
"provide for the direct control of lower courts, judges, and 
other judicial officers who fail to fulfill non-discretionary 
duties, causing harm that cannot be remedied through the 
appellate review process."  Two Unnamed Petitioners, 363 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶81 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cty., 
2004 
WI 58, 
¶24, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110) 
(emphasis in original).  When the court is under an obligation 
to do its business in a specific manner, a supervisory writ can 
be a proper method of ensuring it does so.  That is why Two 
Unnamed Petitioners can comfortably co-exist with Madison Metro.  
The former addresses category, while the latter addresses 
clarity.  Consequently, a court's duty, even when it derives 
from the "harmonization of several statutory provisions," is 
still the proper subject of a supervisory writ so long as it 
falls into the proper category.  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2011 WI 72, ¶84, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 
N.W.2d 442. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
9 
 
in the court of appeals district which contains the 
court from which the judgment or order is appealed. 
(2) A judgment or order appealed from an action venued 
in a county designated by the plaintiff to the action 
as provided under s. 801.50(3)(a) shall be heard in a 
court of appeals district selected by the appellant 
but the court of appeals district may not be the court 
of appeals district that contains the court from which 
the judgment or order is appealed. 
¶13 The first subsection of Wis. Stat. § 752.21 contains 
the general rule controlling appellate venue.  The second 
subsection contains a specific rule, which applies only to the 
subset of cases in which the plaintiff designated venue in the 
circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a).  However, 
both the general and specific rules speak in mandatory terms.  
The general rule uses the mandatory "shall" in requiring the 
court to hear the appeal in the district encompassing the 
circuit from which the appeal is taken.7  The specific rule, when 
applicable, is no less mandatory in its requirement that the 
court hear the appeal in the district selected by the appellant.  
Thus, regardless of whether the general or specific rule 
determines venue, the court of appeals has no discretion with 
respect to where it must hear the appeal.  Further, the correct 
venue does not depend on uncertain factual developments or 
                                                 
7 "The general rule is that the word 'shall' is presumed 
mandatory when it appears in a statute."  Karow v. Milwaukee 
Cty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 
(1978) (citation omitted); Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. 
Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶32, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 N.W.2d 465 (stating 
that when construing a statute, "we presume that the word 
'shall' is mandatory" (citation omitted)). 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
10 
 
circumstances outside the contemplation of the statute.  Nor 
does the court of appeals have the option of not acting:  The 
appeal must be heard somewhere.  Therefore, the obligation to 
venue the appeal in the correct district is clear, unequivocal, 
and mandatory.  It is, therefore, a "plain duty" within the 
meaning of our supervisory writ jurisprudence. 
2.  Compliance with the Duty 
¶14 Whether the Court of Appeals acted consonantly with 
its plain duty when it transferred the DNR's appeal from 
District II to District IV depends on the requirements of three 
statutes, all of which have something to say about venue in this 
case.  The statute controlling appellate venue is Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.21, which we quoted above.  Then there is Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(3)(a), which governs circuit court venue.  And finally, 
there is Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3., which restricts venue 
eligibility for administrative appeals such as the one sub 
judice. 
¶15 We determine the meaning of these statutes by focusing 
on 
their 
text, 
context, 
and 
structure. 
 
"[S]tatutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute," and we 
give that language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-46 ("Context is important to 
meaning.  So, too, is the structure of the statute in which the 
operative language appears.  Therefore, statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . ."). 
 
In 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
11 
 
performing this analysis, we carefully avoid ascribing an 
unreasonable or absurd meaning to the text.  
Id., ¶46 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.").  We may also look to the 
statute's history where, as here, there has been a significant 
revision to the language in which we are interested.  Cty. of 
Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 
("'A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning 
analysis' because it is part of the context in which we 
interpret 
statutory 
terms." 
(citation 
omitted)). 
 
If 
we 
determine the statute's plain meaning through this methodology, 
we go no further.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("If the meaning 
of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry." 
(internal marks and citation omitted)).  See generally Daniel R. 
Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969 
(2017). 
a.  Applicability of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) 
¶16 The presenting question is whether the general or 
specific appellate venue rule of Wis. Stat. § 752.21 is 
operative in this case.  According to the express terms of that 
statute, the answer depends on whether the circuit court venue 
was "designated by the plaintiff" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(3)(a).  This statute, in turn, says that: 
Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c),[8] all actions 
in which the sole defendant is the state, any state 
                                                 
8 The exceptions mentioned here are not relevant to this 
case: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
12 
 
board or commission, or any state officer, employee, 
or agent in an official capacity shall be venued in 
the county designated by the plaintiff unless another 
venue is specifically authorized by law.[9] 
¶17 The Administrative Petitioners tell us that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(3)(a) cannot apply at all to these proceedings for two 
reasons.10  First, they say it applies to "actions," not "special 
proceedings" (like judicial review of administrative agency 
decisions).  And second, they say § 801.50(3)(a) cannot apply 
because they were "petitioners" in the circuit court, and the 
statute refers only to "plaintiffs." 
¶18 With respect to the first objection, it is true that 
§ 801.50(3)(a) refers only to "actions."  But that term 
encompasses "special proceedings" as well:  "Proceedings in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) All actions relating to the validity or invalidly 
of a rule shall be venued as provided in s. 227.40(1). 
(c) An action commenced by a prisoner, as defined 
under s. 801.02(7)(a)2., in which the sole defendant 
is the state, any state board or commission, or any 
state officer, employee, or agent in an official 
capacity shall be venued in Dane County unless another 
venue is specifically authorized by law. 
Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(b)-(c). 
9 As an "administrative arm" of the state, the DNR is the 
state for purposes of this venue provision.  See Metzger v. 
Dep't of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 131, 150 N.W.2d 431 (1967) 
(stating that the Wisconsin Department of Taxation is "a mere 
administrative arm of the state" and, thus, suit against the 
Department is an action against "the state" for sovereign 
immunity purposes). 
10 The Court of Appeals did not advance this argument in its 
brief. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
13 
 
courts are divided into actions and special proceedings," and 
"[i]n chs. 801 to 847, 'action' includes 'special proceeding' 
unless a specific provision of procedure in special proceedings 
exists."  Wis. Stat. § 801.01(1).  The rules of civil procedure 
apply to both types of proceedings:  "Chapters 801 to 847 govern 
procedure and practice in circuit courts of this state in all 
civil actions and special proceedings whether cognizable as 
cases at law, in equity or of statutory origin except where 
different 
procedure 
is 
prescribed 
by 
statute 
or 
rule."  
§ 801.01(2); 
Wagner 
v. 
State 
Med. 
Examining 
Bd., 
181 
Wis. 2d 633, 639, 511 N.W.2d 874 (1994) ("[W]hen a conflict 
occurs between the rules of civil procedure and ch. 227, the 
dictates of ch. 227 must prevail."); State ex rel. Town of 
Delavan v. Cir. Ct. for Walworth Cty., 167 Wis. 2d 719, 725, 482 
N.W.2d 899 (1992) ("As chs. 801 to 847 apply to special 
proceedings, sec. 801.58(7) necessarily applies to ch. 227 
judicial reviews, unless foreclosed by different procedure 
prescribed by ch. 227."). 
¶19 Therefore, in the absence of a contrary provision in 
chapter 227, it does not matter that the Administrative 
Petitioners commenced this case as a "special proceeding" rather 
than as an "action."  Nor is this the first time we have used 
Wis. Stat. § 801.50 in the specific type of special proceeding 
known as "judicial review."  See, e.g., Drow v. Schwarz, 225 
Wis. 2d 362, 367, 592 N.W.2d 623 (1999), as amended on denial of 
reconsideration (June 25, 1999) (§ 801.50 controlling venue in 
certiorari review proceeding); Aparacor, Inc. v. DILHR, 97 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 399, 407, 293 N.W.2d 545 (1980) (§ 801.50 controlling 
venue in judicial review proceeding); Johnson v. Berge, 2003 
WI App 51, ¶11 n.3, 260 Wis. 2d 758, N.W.2d 418 ("The trial 
court may consider whether to transfer the entire case to Dane 
County pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.52, or whether to transfer 
Johnson's Wis. Stat. ch. 227 claim to Dane County and itself 
resolve 
Johnson's 
other 
issues."). 
 
The 
Administrative 
Petitioners provided no authority for the proposition that 
§ 801.50(3) cannot apply to judicial review of an agency 
decision.  Nor did they even acknowledge our opinions in 
Aparacor, Inc. or Drow. 
¶20 The second objection gives us no reason to doubt the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) because the party 
denominations have no significance in this case.  It is standard 
practice to refer to the one who files the initiating document 
in a special proceeding (such as a petition for judicial review) 
as a "petitioner."  And that, by itself, has never ousted 
chapters 801 through 847 from their authoritative role.  See 
Wis. Indus. Energy Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, 
¶¶1, 13, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240 (applying Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 to petition for judicial review under both Wis. 
Stat. § 196.41 and Wis. Stat. § 227.52); Drow, 225 Wis. 2d at 
362-66 (applying Wis. Stat. § 801.50 even though parties were 
denominated as "petitioner" and "respondent"); Town of Delavan, 
167 Wis. 2d at 721 (holding that Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) applies 
in a ch. 227 judicial review; also applying Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61); Wis.'s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. DILHR, 104 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 640, 644, 312 N.W.2d 749 (1981) (applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.05(1) in case involving an underlying petition for 
review).  The Administrative Petitioners cite no authority for 
the proposition that this difference in nomenclature has any 
effect on the applicability of this statute.  Consequently, 
§ 801.50 applies to judicial review of an agency decision——but 
only so long as it does not contradict a relevant chapter 227 
provision. 
¶21 And that brings us to the third venue-related statute 
of interest.  The respondents say Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. 
conflicts 
with, 
and 
negates, 
a 
petitioner's 
ability 
to 
"designate" venue pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) by 
requiring that it file its petition in its county of residence.  
Specifically, § 227.53(1)(a)3. says that "[i]f the petitioner is 
a resident, the proceedings shall be held in the circuit court 
for the county where the petitioner resides."  This is important 
because, if the respondents are right, then the Administrative 
Petitioners could not have "designated" venue for the circuit 
court proceedings, which in turn would mean the general rule for 
appellate venue (Wis. Stat. § 752.21(1)) would apply, instead of 
the specific rule (§ 752.21(2)). 
¶22 The heart of the contest between the DNR and the 
respondents, therefore, lies in this question:  Does a plaintiff 
"designate" the county for circuit court venue even when Wis. 
Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. specifies which county that must be? 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
16 
 
b.  Does "Designate" Mean "Choose"? 
¶23 Each of the respondents' arguments circles back to a 
central theme:  The Administrative Petitioners cannot be 
understood to have "designated" a county for venue (within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a)) unless they had the 
ability to choose the county to designate.  And, they say, 
because Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. reduced their options to one 
(their county of residence), there was no choice to be made, and 
so they did no designating.  To resolve this issue, we must 
determine whether a plaintiff can "designate" venue even when 
there is only one county in which the matter may be filed. 
¶24 The operative sentence from Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) 
comprises, as everyone agrees, a rule of general applicability 
and an exception.  The general rule is that "all actions in 
which the sole defendant is the state . . . shall be venued in 
the county designated by the plaintiff."  § 801.50(3)(a).  That 
rule applies "unless another venue is specifically authorized by 
law."  Id.  The respondents say the exception is operative in 
this 
case 
because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.53(1)(a)3. 
represents 
"another venue . . . specifically authorized by law," thereby 
depriving the Administrative Petitioners of their choice of 
county.  The DNR, however, says the general rule remains in 
effect.  "Designating," it says, is not the same thing as 
"choosing," and § 227.53(1)(a)3. simply told the Administrative 
Petitioners which county to "designate." 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
17 
 
¶25 Our practice is to give words their natural meaning, 
and we often begin with respected dictionaries to find it.11  
Here, they are of little help.  The term "designate" is 
perfectly capable of carrying the meanings proposed by both the 
DNR and the respondents.  One definition says the word means 
"[t]o point out, indicate; to particularize, specify."  4 The 
Oxford English Dictionary 520 (2d ed. 1989) (first definition).  
So, as the DNR urges, "designated by the plaintiff" can be 
reasonably understood to mean "indicated or specified by the 
plaintiff," an act that does not necessarily require a choice.  
Even if the action must be filed in one specific county, the DNR 
says, the plaintiff still indicates or specifies that county 
when filing.  But "designated by the plaintiff" could equally 
well mean "chosen by the plaintiff," because "designate" can 
also mean "select."  Id. at 521 (fifth definition).  And if that 
is what the phrase means, then none of the Administrative 
Petitioners chose a county inasmuch as the choice was made by 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3.  Because the definitions are in 
equipoise, we will have to look elsewhere to determine whether 
"designate" must mean "choose." 
                                                 
11 "In construing a statute, the general rule is that all 
words and phrases should be construed according to common and 
approved usage unless a different definition has been designated 
by the statutes.  We may resort to a dictionary to ascertain the 
common and approved usage of a term not defined by the statute."  
In re Commitment of Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 404-05, 597 
N.W.2d 697 (1999); see Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45, 54 (stating 
that "[s]tatutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted 
meaning," 
and 
looking 
at 
The 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary to determine plain meaning of statutory text). 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
18 
 
¶26 The term "designate" entered our appellate and circuit 
court venue statutes at the same time via 2011 Wisconsin Act 61.  
So we next consider the text and structure of that act.  The 
entire purpose of the act was to change the treatment of venue 
in both the circuit and appellate courts when the state is the 
sole defendant, so it is brief and to the point.  The parts that 
interest us are §§ 2 and 3g, which provide in relevant part: 
Section 2.  752.21(2) of the statutes is created to 
read: 
752.21 (2) A judgment or order appealed from an action 
venued in a county designated by the plaintiff to the 
action as provided under s. 801.50(3)(a) shall be 
heard in a court of appeals district selected by the 
appellant but the court of appeals district may not be 
the court of appeals district that contains the court 
from which the judgment or order is appealed. 
Section 3g.  801.50(3) of the statutes, as affected by 
2011 Wisconsin Act 21, is renumbered 801.50(3)(a) and 
amended to read: 
801.50(3)(a) All Except as provided in this subsection 
pars. (b) and (c), all actions in which the sole 
defendant is the state . . . shall be venued in Dane 
County the county designated by the plaintiff unless 
another venue is specifically authorized by law. 
2011 Wis. Act 61, §§ 2, 3g ("Act 61"). 
¶27 "Designate," of course, appears in both § 2 (creating 
the new appellate venue provision) and § 3g (amending the 
circuit court venue provision).  If we viewed § 3g of the act in 
isolation, we could easily conclude that "designate" means 
"choose."  Before Act 61, a plaintiff suing the state was 
required to file his case in Dane County.  With the revision 
introduced by Act 61, however, he may file in any county he 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
19 
 
wishes.  Thus, he must necessarily choose which it will be, and 
"designate" is quite capable of describing that act.  But when 
we look at the act as a whole, which we are bound to do,12 we see 
that the act of choosing is assumed as a predicate to the act of 
designating. 
¶28 When the legislature used the term "designated" in the 
appellate venue section of the act (2011 Wis. Act 61, § 2), it 
juxtaposed it against the term "selected."  Whereas the 
plaintiff "designates" venue in the circuit court, the appellant 
"selects" venue in the court of appeals.  When the legislature 
uses different terms in the same act, we generally do not afford 
them the same meaning.  See Gister v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2012 WI 86, ¶33, 342 Wis. 2d 496, 818 N.W.2d 880 ("[W]here the 
legislature uses similar but different terms in a statute, 
particularly within the same section, we may presume it intended 
the terms to have different meanings." (brackets in original) 
(internal marks and citation omitted)); see Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
170 (2012) (defining canon of "Presumption of Consistent Usage" 
as requiring, inter alia, that "a material variation in terms 
suggests a variation in meaning").  So "designate" cannot mean 
"select" in the context of § 2 of Act 61. 
                                                 
12 Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; see Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 
(2012) (defining "Whole-Text Canon" as requiring that "[t]he 
text must be construed as a whole"). 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
20 
 
¶29 Unlike 
"designate," 
"select" 
does 
not 
carry 
a 
troubling multiplicity of definitions.  In its transitive verb 
form, it means one thing, and one thing only:  "[t]o choose."  
14 The Oxford English Dictionary 901 (2d ed. 1989).  These terms 
are not just in related statutes.  They are in the same act, the 
same section, and the same sentence.  And the words were chosen 
by the same legislature.  With this degree of specificity and 
particularity, we will not understand them to bear the same 
meaning.  Because "select" means "to choose," "designate" 
cannot.13 
                                                 
13 The Court of Appeals agreed the words "designate" and 
"select" must carry different meanings, but attempted to explain 
the distinction between them without identifying any substantive 
difference.  Its brief said: 
[I]n this interpretation the words do have different 
meanings:  "designate" is something that a plaintiff 
does in circuit court, while "select" is something 
that an appellant does in the court of appeals.  It is 
entirely reasonable that the legislature would choose 
two different words for these different acts, so as to 
avoid any potential confusion or commingling of the 
two concepts.  No further explanation is required to 
explain why different words were used. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
21 
 
¶30 This 
provides 
significant 
insight 
into 
what 
"designated" means in the context of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a).  
When the legislature uses a particular word more than once in an 
act, we understand it to carry the same meaning each time, 
absent textual or structural clues to the contrary.  State ex 
rel. Gebarski v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee Cty., 80 Wis. 2d 489, 
495, 259 N.W.2d 531 (1977) (stating that "there is a natural 
presumption that identical words used in different parts of the 
same act are intended to have the same meaning" (quoting Atl. 
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 
(1932)); see Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Const., Inc., 2010 WI 74, 
¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462 ("When the same term is 
used throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a reasonable 
deduction that the legislature intended that the term possess an 
identical meaning each time it appears."); DaimlerChrysler v. 
LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶29, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 ("It is a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Some further explanation would have been helpful.  This 
case turns on whether these words have distinct meanings, so 
understanding how they describe different concepts is essential 
to our analysis.  But the Court of Appeals tells us only that 
"designate" 
means 
"something," 
that 
"select" 
also 
means 
"something," and that they are different depending on the court 
in which they occur.  That's not much to go on, especially when 
the Court of Appeals, elsewhere in its brief, suggests the two 
actually mean the same thing:  "[T]he statutes at issue allow an 
appellant to have a choice of forum when the plaintiff has a 
choice of forum . . . ."  If both "designate" and "select" mean 
"choose," then the plaintiff in the circuit court and the 
appellant in the court of appeals are doing the exact same 
thing.  So the Court of Appeals has not, in fact, offered an 
explanation of how the act of "designating" differs from the act 
of "selecting." 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
22 
 
basic rule of construction that we attribute the same definition 
to a word both times it is used in the same statute . . . ."); 
Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 663, 539 N.W.2d 98 
(1995) ("[A]ttributing the same definition to a word both times 
it is used in the same statute follows another basic principle 
of statutory construction."); Scalia & Garner, supra ¶28, at 170 
(defining 
canon 
of 
"Presumption 
of 
Consistent 
Usage" 
as 
requiring, inter alia, that "[a] word or phrase is presumed to 
bear the same meaning throughout a text").  We see no textual or 
contextual reason to believe the legislature assigned the word 
"designate" one meaning with respect to § 2 of the act, and a 
different meaning in § 3g.  Thus, because "designate" does not 
mean "choose" in § 2, it cannot mean "choose" in § 3g either.14 
                                                 
14 The dissent says we should understand "designate" to mean 
"choose" because that's how the Legislative Reference Bureau 
understood it, and the Bureau forwarded its understanding of 
Act 61 (then 2011 S.B. 117) to members of the legislature.  See 
dissent, ¶59.  The dissent says the Bureau "explained that the 
bill 'permitted' plaintiffs to designate the county within which 
to bring an action."  Id.  Presumably, the dissent wishes us to 
analyze the statute as though the legislature had adopted the 
Bureau's language instead of the language upon which it actually 
voted.  Even if this substitution would justify the dissent's 
preferred construction (on which we express no opinion), there 
is nothing to suggest we should engage in this post hoc 
transformation of Act 61. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
23 
 
¶31 Therefore, when a plaintiff "designates" venue in the 
circuit court, it means he is specifying venue, not choosing it.  
The 
fact 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.53(1)(a)3. 
eliminates 
a 
plaintiff's choice of venue would be of some moment only if Wis. 
Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) speaks to the plaintiff's choice.  It does 
not.  The choosing, if there is any choosing to be done, takes 
place 
before 
the 
plaintiff 
designates 
venue; 
section 801.50(3)(a) is not cognizant at all of whether a choice 
preceded the designation.15  Because there is no conflict between 
                                                                                                                                                             
We can assume all legislators received the Bureau's memo.  
But we have no idea how many read it, or whether the Bureau's 
use of "permit" caught their attention or influenced their 
understanding of the bill, or whether (assuming it did) the 
Bureau's word-choice influenced their votes, and if it did, 
whether a majority of each chamber was persuaded to adopt the 
dissent's understanding of the language they enacted because the 
Bureau used the word "permit" in its memo.  So the dissent 
raises an interesting historical question (to which we will 
never know the answer), but it is a question that has nothing to 
do with the plain meaning of Act 61.  The same is true of the 
"Fiscal Estimate Narrative" to which the dissent refers in 
paragraph 60. 
The dissent says we would show greater respect for the 
legislators if we assumed the Bureau's memo changed their 
understanding of their own bill.  See dissent, ¶¶62-63.  That 
would seem an odd mark of respect.  We believe it is much more 
respectful to assume they are capable of adopting language that 
expresses their intent, and that they did not adopt the Bureau's 
language because they did not wish to. 
15 The dissent says the phrase "designated by the plaintiff" 
should have the same meaning in Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) as it 
does in § 801.50(2)(d).  Dissent, ¶54.  We have no occasion to 
construe paragraph (2)(d) today, and the dissent identified no 
construction thereof that is at odds with our understanding of 
paragraph (3)(a). 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
24 
 
§ 801.50(3)(a) and § 227.53(1)(a)3., we apply them both and 
conclude that even when the latter statute eliminates any 
opportunity to choose a county, the plaintiff still designates 
venue within the meaning of § 801.50(3)(a). 
¶32 This, however, is only one step in the process of 
understanding the interrelationship among the three venue-
related statutes.  When two or more petitions challenge an 
agency's decision, and when they are filed in different 
counties, Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. gives the circuit court 
authority to determine venue.  Therefore, we must decide whether 
the circuit court's exercise of that authority in this case 
caused Dane County to be "another venue . . . specifically 
authorized by law." 
c.  Other Authorized Venues 
¶33 As we have already seen, the plaintiff's designation 
controls venue in a case solely against the state, "unless 
another venue is specifically authorized by law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(3)(a).  There is, indeed, a law relevant to this case 
that 
can 
authorize 
a 
different 
venue——it 
is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.53(1)(a)3., albeit a different provision from the text 
discussed above.  This part of the statute says: 
If 2 or more petitions for review of the same decision 
are filed in different counties, the circuit judge for 
the county in which a petition for review of the 
decision was first filed shall determine the venue for 
judicial review of the decision, and shall order 
transfer or consolidation where appropriate. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
25 
 
¶34 This provision was operative in the circuit court 
because Clean Wisconsin and the Cochart Petitioners both filed 
petitions for judicial review of the same DNR decision, but in 
different counties.  So the statute gives the circuit court the 
authority to override the plaintiff's designation inasmuch as it 
specifically instructs the court to "determine the venue for 
judicial review of the decision."  And it grants the court 
authority to transfer or consolidate the cases to actualize that 
determination.  The court's discretion is broad here——it may 
transfer one of the cases so they are both pending in the same 
county; or it may transfer both cases to a third county, and it 
may consolidate the cases instead of allowing them to proceed as 
separate matters. 
¶35 Here, the circuit court consolidated the Cochart 
Petitioners' case into Clean Wisconsin's case, and left it 
venued in Dane County.  After consolidation, only the Clean 
Wisconsin petition remained, although it then included the 
Cochart Petitioners as parties.  See Seventeen Seventy-Six 
Peachtree Corp. v. Miller, 41 Wis. 2d 410, 414, 164 N.W.2d 278 
(1969) (stating that consolidation "contemplates only one action 
and one set of pleadings after consolidation"); E. Wis. Ry. & 
Light Co. v. Hackett, 135 Wis. 464, 472-73, 115 N.W. 376 (1908) 
(same); Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 309, 99 N.W. 909 
(1904) (stating that in consolidating cases, "[n]ecessarily, the 
first one properly commenced superseded the other"); Eau Claire 
Fuel & Supply Co. v. Laycock, 92 Wis. 81, 83, 65 N.W. 732 (1896) 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
26 
 
(stating that consequent upon an order of consolidation, "[t]he 
second action, under the circumstances, merged in the first"). 
¶36 By leaving the Clean Wisconsin petition pending in 
Dane County, the circuit court determined its venue, but only in 
the negative sense of not having ousted the designation already 
made.  So the question is whether not disturbing Clean 
Wisconsin's designation actually negates it.  On this point, the 
structure of Act 61 advances our understanding of its plain 
meaning.  The portion in which we are now interested says:  
"[A]ll 
actions 
in 
which 
the 
sole 
defendant 
is 
the 
state . . . shall be venued in the county designated by the 
plaintiff unless another venue is specifically authorized by 
law."  2011 Wis. Act 61 § 3g; Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a).  The 
sentence speaks of two possible venues.  It prescribes the 
"county designated by the plaintiff" as the general rule, and 
allows an exception only if there is another venue "specifically 
authorized by law." 
¶37 Because Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. authorizes the 
circuit court to determine venue, it holds out at least the 
possibility of "another venue."  However, it does not, of its 
own force, establish "another venue."  The phrase "another 
venue," of course, stands in opposition to the one designated by 
the plaintiff.  That is, if the plaintiff designates Dane 
County, "another venue" must be any county but that.  Here, the 
circuit court determined that Dane County would continue as the 
venue for the Clean Wisconsin case.  This is not "another 
venue," but the very same.  Although the circuit court could 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
27 
 
have determined another venue, it did not actually do so.  
Paragraph 801.50(3)(a) operates not on possibilities, but 
actualities.  If the circuit court had transferred venue to a 
county different from the one designated by Clean Wisconsin, 
there would have been "another venue" within the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 801.50(3)(a).  Thus, we conclude that "another venue is 
specifically authorized by law" only when venue is lawfully 
transferred to a county different from the one designated by the 
plaintiff.  Here, the circuit court did not transfer venue to a 
county different from the one Clean Wisconsin had designated; 
the venue remained as designated by Clean Wisconsin.  So Dane 
County cannot be "another venue." 
¶38 The respondents came to a different conclusion based, 
at least in part, on their understanding of the "unless" clause 
as it existed prior to Act 61.  However, their interpretation 
does not account for the significant change to the statute 
occasioned by Act 61.  Prior to Act 61, the relevant part of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3) said this:  "All actions in which the 
sole defendant is the state . . . shall be venued in Dane County 
unless another venue is specifically authorized by law."  
§ 801.50(3) (2009-10).  Contrary to the respondents' argument, 
Act 61 significantly changed the structure of the statute.  
Before the amendment, the main clause of subsec. 801.50(3) 
mandated venue in Dane County, while the "unless" clause held 
out the possibility that a law might make an alternative venue 
available.  Thus, the function of the "unless" clause (pre-Act 
61) was to potentially extend venue-eligibility to counties 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
28 
 
other than Dane.  It no longer serves that purpose.  By 
eliminating Dane County as the required venue, Act 61 made all 
counties potentially venue-eligible.  As a result, the "unless" 
clause no longer serves as a means of extending venue-
eligibility as it once did.  As discussed above, it now serves 
only as a mechanism by which to oust the plaintiff's venue 
designation.16 
d.  The Cochart Petitioners 
¶39 There is still the matter of the Cochart Petitioners.  
Their petition designated Kewaunee County, but they litigated in 
Dane County.  If their petition had arrived in Dane County 
Circuit 
Court 
via 
a 
simple 
transfer-of-venue 
order, 
the 
exception to the venue-designation rule might have become 
operative.  Dane County is "another venue" in relation to 
                                                 
16 The Court of Appeals essentially argues that we must give 
the "unless" clause the same meaning it had prior to Act 61.  
But when the legislature changes the structure of a statute, we 
must construe it anew.  See State ex rel. Dep't of Agric. v. 
Marriott, 237 Wis. 607, 625, 296 N.W. 622 (1941) ("[A]n amended 
statute is to be given the meaning that it would have had if it 
had read from the beginning as amended."); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(7) ("A revised statute is to be understood in the same 
sense as the original unless the change in language indicates a 
different 
meaning 
so 
clearly 
as 
to 
preclude 
judicial 
construction.").  The change to the structure and terms of Wis. 
Stat. § 801.50(3) (2009-10) so clearly changes the statute's 
meaning (as described, supra) that it is impossible to maintain 
the pre-Act 61 meaning of the "unless" clause. 
The dissent agrees with the Court of Appeals, but neither 
of them account for the significant structural changes wrought 
by Act 61.  See dissent, ¶¶6-9.  Nor do either of them offer any 
reason we should ignore those changes. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
29 
 
Kewaunee County, and if this hypothetical had come to pass, it 
would have been specifically authorized by law.  An appeal from 
that case may have engaged Wis. Stat. § 752.21(1), meaning the 
DNR may not have had its selection of appellate venue; the court 
of appeals may have been obliged to hear one of the appeals in 
District IV.  But the circuit court did not simply transfer the 
Cochart Petitioners' case——it consolidated it with the Clean 
Wisconsin case.  So there is no longer a Kewaunee County 
designation to compare against venue in Dane County.  And 
because the surviving case still bears Clean Wisconsin's 
designation, that is the point of reference in deciding whether 
the circuit court determined "another venue" within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a).  It did not.  So we must conclude 
that Clean Wisconsin's designation remains in effect for this 
case. 
¶40 That brings us back to venue for the appeal.  Because 
Clean Wisconsin designated the circuit court venue within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a), appellate venue must lie 
in "a court of appeals district selected by the appellant[,] but 
the court of appeals district may not be the court of appeals 
district that contains the court from which the judgment or 
order is appealed."  Wis. Stat. § 752.21(2).  The DNR selected 
District II, which is a permissible selection because District 
IV contains the Dane County Circuit Court.  Consequently, it is 
the court of appeals' plain duty to hear the DNR's appeal in 
District II. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
30 
 
C.  Inadequate Remedy 
¶41 Next, we determine whether an appeal would be an 
inadequate remedy.  We will not issue a supervisory writ when an 
appeal provides an adequate remedy.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶17; State ex rel. Lynch v. Cty. Ct., Branch III, 82 
Wis. 2d 454, 460, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978) (stating that a party 
must show that "ordinary remedies, by appeal or otherwise, are 
inadequate").  Sometimes appellate review in the normal course 
of events is inadequate for the simple fact that it comes after 
the proceeding has already occurred:  "The inadequacy of the 
remedy of appeal may arise from the fact that appeal would come 
too late for effective redress."  Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 461.  And 
sometimes an appeal is inadequate because even post-trial 
appellate review is so limited that the error is effectively 
insulated from correction.  This case implicates both varieties 
of inadequacy. 
¶42 We have previously recognized that trial court venue 
can present an issue requiring review before entry of final 
judgment.  The pathway to that review has varied over the years, 
and has depended largely on what our rules of civil procedure 
have said at the time.  For example, it was once possible to 
appeal a venue order before entry of final judgment.17  Under 
                                                 
17 W. Bank of Scotland v. Tallman, 15 Wis. 101, 101 (1862) 
("It is claimed by the respondents' counsel that the order 
[denying change of venue] was not appealable.  But we clearly 
think it is, upon the ground stated in the opinion of Justice 
Cole in the case of Oatman v. Bond."). 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
31 
 
that circumstance, we said mandamus was an inappropriate remedy 
because we could timely reach the issue via an appeal.  State ex 
rel. Johnson v. Washburn, 22 Wis. 95, 97 (1867) ("[B]ecause an 
order improperly refusing to change the place of trial is an 
appealable order, we deny the application for the writ in this 
case.").  But once interlocutory appeals of venue orders were no 
longer available as a matter of course, we concluded that 
mandamus could be a proper pathway for addressing improper 
venue.  In State ex rel. Spence v. Dick, 103 Wis. 407, 409, 79 
N.W. 421 (1899), we observed that "[u]nder the present statute 
regulating appeals from orders, however, orders changing the 
venue are not appealable."  Id. (citations omitted). This meant 
that "the reason of the decision in State ex rel. Johnson v. 
Washburn disappear[ed], and mandamus [became] an appropriate 
remedy."  Id.; see State ex rel. Arthur v. Proctor, 255 
Wis. 355, 357, 38 N.W.2d 505 (1949) ("[B]ecause an order denying 
a motion for change of venue was nonappealable under the 
statutes, mandamus was the proper remedy."); State ex rel. T. L. 
Smith Co. v. Super. Ct. of Dane Cty., 170 Wis. 385, 385, 175 
N.W. 927 (1920) (same). 
¶43 The lack of an appellate pathway in this case is 
analogous to Spence.  That is to say, our rules of appellate 
procedure do not give the DNR the right to appeal the Court of 
Appeals' venue order.  Strictly speaking, there is no right of 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
32 
 
appeal to this court at all.18  We are not, primarily, an error-
correcting tribunal,19 and we normally hear only those cases that 
present something more than just an error of law.  If the DNR 
must wait for the court of appeals to issue a decision on the 
merits, its error-correcting recourse would be a petition for 
review.  The criteria for granting such a petition, however, do 
not encompass correcting an appellate tribunal's simple error of 
law.20  And even though those criteria do not cabin our 
discretion, they fairly represent the most common reasons we 
grant review.  Therefore, a successful petition for review in 
this case would depend on a serendipitous confluence between 
(1) the venue error, and (2) a "plus" factor, such as we 
describe 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.62(1r) 
(criteria 
for 
granting review). 
¶44 Because a petition for review in this case would 
require a "plus" factor just to bring the venue issue before us, 
                                                 
18 "Supreme court review is a matter of judicial discretion, 
not of right . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r). 
19 The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
"primary 
function 
is 
error 
correcting"; "the supreme court's primary function is that of 
law defining and 
law development."  Cook v. Cook, 208 
Wis. 2d 166, 188-89, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). 
20 We generally do not review a case unless it presents a 
"real 
and 
significant 
question 
of 
federal 
or 
state 
constitutional 
law," 
or 
we 
see 
a 
need 
to 
"establish[], 
implement[] or chang[e] a policy within" our authority, or we 
need to "develop, clarify or harmonize the law," or the court of 
appeals' decision either conflicts with controlling authority or 
is in need of re-examination "due to the passage of time or 
changing circumstances."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r). 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
33 
 
it is a mechanism too chancy to constitute an adequate remedy.  
Faced with a similar conundrum, at least one other court came to 
the same conclusion.  In In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 
F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008), the Fifth Circuit considered whether 
to issue a writ of mandamus requiring transfer of venue on forum 
non conveniens grounds.  Id. at 308-09.  The court noted that 
interlocutory review of the district court's order was not 
available, and that a new trial following appeal from the final 
judgment 
would 
be 
possible 
only 
if 
the 
appellant 
could 
demonstrate it would have prevailed in the proper forum.  See 
id. at 318-19.  Consequently, the context of the venue question 
on post-trial appellate review would effectively shield it from 
resolution. 
 
The 
court 
concluded 
an 
appeal 
under 
those 
circumstances would be inadequate, and ordered a writ of 
mandamus requiring transfer of venue.  Id.; see In re Lloyd's 
Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Pearl Seas Cruises, LLC v. Lloyd's Register N. Am., Inc., 
136 S. Ct. 64 (mem.) (2015) (same); In re EMC Corp., 677 
F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same); In re Apple, Inc., 602 
F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 2010); In re Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 
347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying this analysis under 
the irreparable harm rubric). 
¶45 We conclude that a petition to review the court of 
appeals' eventual decision on the merits is an inadequate remedy 
to address the question of appropriate appellate venue.  Our 
review of that question should not depend on the existence of an 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
34 
 
additional "plus" factor that would support a petition for 
review. 
D.  Irreparable Harm 
¶46 Finally, we determine whether the DNR would suffer 
irreparable harm if this court denies the supervisory writ.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶17 (stating that a supervisory writ 
will issue only upon a showing of "grave hardship or irreparable 
harm" in its absence).  We conclude that it would——for largely 
the same reasons that make a petition for review an inadequate 
remedy. 
¶47 The legislature granted appellants in the DNR's 
procedural posture the right to select appellate venue.  It is 
nearly tautological to observe that losing a statutorily-granted 
right is a harm.  Losing the right with no means to recover it 
makes the harm irreparable.  As described above, a petition for 
review is an uncertain and ill-suited vehicle for addressing 
whether the court of appeals heard a case in the proper 
district.  Because the question would, therefore, be unlikely to 
receive appellate attention at all, the DNR would be left with 
no sure means by which to remedy the deprivation of its 
statutory 
right. 
 
That 
makes 
the 
loss, 
by 
definition, 
irreparable.  See, e.g., Proctor, 255 Wis. at 357 (concluding 
that petition for writ of mandamus is the proper procedure 
because the venue order is non-appealable); Super. Ct. of Dane 
Cty., 170 Wis. at 385 (same); Spence, 103 Wis. at 409 
(indicating that the denial of an "absolute" right to change of 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
35 
 
venue in a different county constituted "substantial damage," 
making mandamus appropriate). 
¶48 The dissent would conduct what it characterizes as a 
"mandatory harmless error analysis," dissent, ¶51, which would 
deny the appellant its statutorily-granted right unless the 
choice of venue is outcome-determinative.  The dissent says 
that, because District IV's judges are just as fair as the 
judges of any other district, the DNR cannot demonstrate the 
appeal would resolve differently if heard elsewhere.  See id., 
¶52.  So the dissent would make Wis. Stat. § 752.21(2) a dead 
letter.  If an appellant does not have the right to select venue 
unless it can demonstrate a panel's judges are "unfair," then 
this is just a species of recusal statute.  Functionally, that 
would mean the choice of venue lies with the court of appeals 
(as occurred here), not the appellant——an exceedingly odd 
outcome for a statute that says the exact opposite.  But we have 
no need or occasion to question the fairness of District IV's 
judges because § 752.21 is a venue selection statute, not a 
recusal statute.  We will not read it out of existence by 
recasting it as one. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶49 We conclude that the DNR has met the requirements for 
the issuance of a supervisory writ.  We, therefore, grant the 
petition for a supervisory writ and vacate the August 31, 2016, 
Court of Appeals order transferring the appeal in this case from 
District II to District IV.  The Court of Appeals shall hear the 
appeal in District II. 
No. 
2016AP1980-W   
 
36 
 
By the Court.—The petition for a supervisory writ is 
granted; the rights are declared as stated; and the stay on 
appeal is lifted. 
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority contravenes (1) the court's duty to undertake a 
mandatory harmless error analysis; (2) the statute's text; (3) 
the statutory history; (4) the legislative history; and (5) the 
meaning of "plain legal duty."  
¶51 First, the majority does not undertake a mandatory 
harmless error analysis as required by our case law.  See State 
v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶31-33, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 
N.W.2d 773 (justifying requiring the application of harmless 
error analysis to a statutory violation because the harmless 
error statute predated the statute that was violated).1   
¶52 No one court of appeals district is more fair than any 
other, and when the state is the appellant, it does not appear 
that any one court of appeals district is more convenient than 
any other.  Where, then, is the harm that justifies an expensive 
appeal in the instant case paid for by taxpayers when District 
IV is just as fair and arguably more convenient for the DNR than 
District II? 
¶53 This court is barred from picking and choosing when it 
will engage in a mandatory harmless error analysis and when it 
will not.  The court has explicitly declared that harmless error 
                                                 
1 See also State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶¶57-58, 378 
Wis. 2d 504, 
904 
N.W.2d 773 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("Apparently, hereafter, every statute enacted and every case 
decided after 1897 is subject to a mandatory harmless error 
analysis . . . ."); State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶47 n.12, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citing Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) and 
concluding:  "The harmless error rule, however, is an injunction 
on the courts, which, if applicable, the courts are required to 
address regardless of whether the parties do.").  
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
2 
 
"is an injunction on the courts, which, if applicable, the 
courts are required to address"2 and is mandatory for violations 
of statutes that were passed after 1897.3  The majority offers no 
explanation for failing to engage in a harmless error analysis 
in the instant case. 
¶54 Second, the majority's statutory interpretation is 
contrary to the statute's text.  "When the same term is used 
throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a reasonable 
deduction that the legislature intended that the term possess an 
identical meaning each time it appears."  Bank Mut. v. S.J. 
Boyer Const., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 
N.W.2d 462.  The phrase "designated by the plaintiff" appears 
twice in Wis. Stat. § 801.50.  In § 801.50(2)(d), the phrase 
appears in order to indicate that if none of the situations 
outlined in § 801.50(2)(a)-(c) applies directing venue to a 
particular county, "venue shall be in any county designated by 
the plaintiff."  In § 801.50(2)(d), the phrase "designated by 
the plaintiff" clearly contemplates a choice being made by the 
plaintiff.  The phrase should be given the same meaning in 
§ 801.50(2)(d)4 and § 801.50(3)(a).5 
                                                 
2 Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶47 n.12. 
3 Reyes Fuerte, 378 Wis. 2d 504, ¶31-33. 
4 "If the provisions under par. (a) to (c) do not apply, 
then venue shall be in any county designated by the plaintiff." 
5 "Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c), all actions in 
which the sole defendant is the state . . . shall be venued in 
the county designated by the plaintiff unless another venue is 
specifically authorized by law." 
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶55 Third, the majority opinion is contrary to the 
statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3).  In 2011, the 
statute was amended to change the default venue for actions in 
which the sole defendant is the state from Dane County to the 
venue "designated by the plaintiff."  However, the amended 
statute 
retained 
the 
language 
"unless 
another 
venue 
is 
specifically authorized by law," a phrase that appeared in the 
prior statute.  Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3) (2009-10) ("All actions 
in which the sole defendant is the state . . . shall be venued 
in Dane County unless another venue is specifically authorized 
by law.").   
¶56 Prior to the amendment, the phrase "unless another 
venue is specifically authorized by law" operated to direct 
Chapter 227 actions in which the state was the sole defendant to 
be venued in Dane County unless some other statute directed 
venue to be elsewhere.6  The majority flips the "unless" clause 
in Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3)(a) on its head.  Now, according to the 
majority, a plaintiff may designate the venue even if a 
particular venue is mandated by statute, and the "unless" clause 
means that there can be a lawful venue change after the case is 
filed. 
¶57 The majority claims that the analysis of the statutory 
history set forth above ignores "the significant structural 
                                                 
6 For example, Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3. provides:  "If 
the petitioner is a resident, the proceedings shall be held in 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
the 
county 
where 
the 
petitioner 
resides . . . ." 
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
4 
 
changes wrought by Act 61."  Majority op., ¶38 n.16.  The 
"significant structural changes" are of the court's own making, 
not the legislature's.  Did the legislature intend, by changing 
"shall be venued in Dane County" to "shall be venued in the 
county designated by the plaintiff" in Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3), 
to establish a framework wherein a plaintiff will practically 
never have a choice of venue,7 but appellants will almost always 
have a choice of venue?  This result appears absurd.   
¶58 It is much more likely that the legislature did not 
intend to create such a lopsided framework and instead intended 
to create a framework wherein an appellant's ability to choose 
the venue is necessarily tied to the plaintiff's having a choice 
of venue at the trial court level.  Interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.50(3)(a) to entail a choice of venue by a plaintiff 
accomplishes two objectives:  First, it avoids the absurd 
framework that the court now establishes.  Second, it does not 
disturb the meaning of the "unless" clause, which was not 
altered by the legislature's amendment. 
¶59 Fourth, the majority opinion is contrary to the 
statute's legislative history.  The Legislative Reference 
Bureau's analysis of 2011 S.B. 117, a document distributed to 
all legislators, explained that the bill "permitted" plaintiffs 
to designate the county within which to bring an action.  The 
                                                 
7 A review of the Wisconsin Statutes reveals that in many 
situations a statute directs that venue be in a particular 
county.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 801.50(2), 801.50(3)(b), 
801.50(3)(c), 227.40(1).   
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
5 
 
use of the word "permit" is telling.  The word "permits" 
contemplates a choice.  How can the Administrative Petitioners 
be said to have been "permitted" to designate venue when by 
operation of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)3., the Administrative 
Petitioners had but one choice——file their respective petitions 
in the county in which they reside?  The legislative history 
reflects a reciprocity of choice between a plaintiff and an 
appellant such that only if a plaintiff is allowed to choose 
venue in the circuit court will an appellant be allowed to 
choose venue on appeal.  
¶60 The Fiscal Estimate Narrative for 2011 S.B. 117, 
another 
document 
circulated 
to 
all 
lawmakers, 
explicitly 
described the operation of the bill as allowing plaintiffs to 
choose their venue under the statute. 
¶61 The majority faults a court's reliance on documents 
such as the Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of the bill 
and the Fiscal Estimate Narrative, suggesting that nobody has 
the slightest idea what impact these documents had on individual 
legislators and casting doubt on whether anyone reads the 
documents. 
¶62 Co-equal branches of government owe respect to each 
other.8  I do not join the majority in belittling the legislative 
                                                 
8 Courts presume that the legislature respects the work of 
the courts.  Thus, this court presumes that the legislature is 
aware of existing case law when it passes legislation, Czapinski 
v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2000 WI 80, ¶22, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 
613 N.W.2d 120 ("[T]he legislature is presumed to act with 
knowledge of the existing case law.").   
(continued) 
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
6 
 
branch, disparagingly portraying legislators as having little if 
any knowledge about the laws they enact. 
¶63 At a minimum, a court should presume that legislators 
are aware of the explanatory material the Legislative Reference 
Bureau must set forth in each bill.9  The legislature requires 
the Legislative Reference Bureau to draft the language of each 
and every bill to be introduced in the legislature and generate 
explanatory material for each bill in plain English, explaining 
the bill's impact and effect.10  Although explanatory material in 
a bill is not dispositive in a court's interpretation of a 
statute, the explanatory material required to be available to 
all legislators has been relied upon by this court in statutory 
interpretation.  The interpretation of a statute in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
This court respects the work of the legislature.  A 
judicial construction of a statute is entitled to more weight 
when the legislature has not acted to change that judicial 
construction, Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶52, 378 
Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759 (upholding a judicial interpretation 
of a statute because "the legislature had ample opportunity to 
act 
on 
or 
repeal 
the 
judicial 
interpretation 
of 
[a 
statute] . . . [b]ut the legislature did not act on or repeal 
the interpreted language"). 
It is, of course, one of the judicial branch's legal 
fictions to declare that the legislature is aware of existing 
case law when enacting legislation.  The court itself may not 
always be aware of its own existing case law when it decides a 
case.    
9 The Legislative Reference Bureau is required to prepare 
Prefatory Notes (Analysis to Bills) for each bill.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.92(1)(b)2.  For a description of the work of the Bureau, 
see Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Bill Drafting Manual 
2017-2018, ch. 4.  
10 Wis. Stat. §§ 13.92(1)(b)1., 13.92(1)(b)2. 
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
7 
 
explanatory note prepared by the legislative staff that drafted 
the text of the statute should not, in every instance, be 
totally ignored by a court.11  
¶64 Fifth and finally, the majority errs in its discussion 
of "plain legal duty."  Quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶22, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110, the majority acknowledges that "[a] plain duty is 
one that is 'clear and unequivocal and, under the facts, the 
responsibility to act [is] imperative.'"  Majority op., ¶11.  
The majority then concludes that "clear and unequivocal" and 
"the responsibility to act is imperative" do "not require the 
duty to be settled or obvious," quoting Madison Metropolitan 
School District v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2011 WI 72, 
¶84, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442.12  Majority op., ¶11.  The 
majority and Madison Metropolitan School District's defining of 
"plain duty" in this way is not supported by the case law.  In 
State ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, the court 
reaffirmed that the obligation of a judge to correctly apply the 
law "is not the type of plain legal duty contemplated by the 
supervisory writ procedure."  2015 WI 85, ¶81, 363 Wis. 2d 1, 
                                                 
11 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶69, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (positing a non-exhaustive list of various forms of 
history that have been helpful to courts in interpreting 
statutes).  
12 "'[C]lear and unequivocal' does not require the duty to 
be settled or obvious.  There may be a plain duty even when it 
involves 'a novel question of law requiring harmonization of 
several statutory provisions.'"  Majority op., ¶11 (citation 
omitted). 
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
8 
 
866 N.W.2d 165.  The Two Unnamed Petitioners court declared that 
for a duty to be plain, clear, and unequivocal, it must also be 
settled and obvious.  Id., ¶81 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶24).  To hold otherwise "would extend supervisory jurisdiction 
to a virtually unlimited range of decisions involving the 
finding of facts and application of law."  
Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶24.  How can the majority square this language 
from Kalal, which was reaffirmed in Two Unnamed Petitioners, 
with Madison Metropolitan School District?  I do not think it 
can. 
¶65 For these reasons, I dissent. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
No.  2016AP1980-W.ssa 
 
 
 
1