Title: Michael Duane Zack v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-1374
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1374 
____________ 
 
 
MICHAEL DUANE ZACK, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-201 
____________ 
 
 
MICHAEL DUANE ZACK, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 7, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Michael Duane Zack, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order of 
the trial court denying a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
 
 
- 2 -
Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying postconviction relief, and we deny 
relief on Zack’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS 
 
The underlying facts in this case are fully set forth in this Court’s decision 
on direct appeal.  See Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2000).  Zack murdered 
Ravonne Smith after a nine-day crime spree which began on June 4, 1996.  During 
his crime spree, Zack also murdered Laura Rosillo.  Additionally, he stole a 
vehicle, a rifle, a handgun, and money from other victims.  Zack killed Smith on 
June 13 after meeting her in a bar.  They smoked marijuana and went back to 
Smith’s house.  Immediately upon entering the house, Zack hit Smith with a beer 
bottle, pursued her down the hall to the master bedroom, and then sexually 
assaulted her.  Zack also pursued Smith throughout the house, beat her head 
against the bedroom’s wooden floor, and stabbed her in the chest four times with 
an oyster knife.  Afterwards, Zack cleaned the knife, put it away, and washed the 
blood from his hands.  He put Smith’s bloody shirt and shorts in her dresser 
drawer.  He took a television, a VCR, and Smith’s purse, and then left in Smith’s 
boyfriend’s car.  He attempted to pawn the television and VCR which led to his 
apprehension several days later.  Zack confessed to Smith’s murder.  He claimed 
 
 
- 3 -
that he and Smith had consensual sexual contact and that he attacked Smith only 
after she made a comment about his mother being murdered.    
At trial, defense counsel argued that Zack suffers from fetal alcohol 
syndrome (FAS) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and because of this,   
Zack was impulsive, under constant mental and emotional distress, and could not 
form the requisite intent to commit premeditated murder.  Zack testified in his 
defense, explaining what happened when he returned to Smith’s home with her on 
the night of the murder, that any sexual contact was consensual, and that he reacted 
as a result of comments she made about his mother.  The State was allowed to 
present evidence of collateral crimes, also called Williams1 Rule evidence, and 
presented the evidence of the Rosillo murder.  The State presented expert 
testimony regarding DNA evidence in order to identify blood found on both Smith 
and Rosillo’s clothes, as well as Zack’s clothing. 
The jury convicted Zack of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and robbery, 
and recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eleven to one.  The trial court 
sentenced Zack to death.  This Court affirmed Zack’s conviction and sentence on 
direct appeal.  See Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20, 25 (Fla. 2000).   
Zack’s registry counsel raised six issues in a motion for postconviction 
relief:  (1) whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the DNA 
                                          
 
1.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 
(1959). 
 
 
- 4 -
evidence and failing to request a Frye2 hearing; (2) whether the trial court erred in 
failing to sua sponte hold a Frye hearing; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective 
for calling Zack to testify without preparing him for cross-examination or 
explaining to him that he had a choice to testify or not; (4) whether the death 
penalty is disproportionate due to the possibility that Zack suffers from a possible 
brain dysfunction and mental impairment, both of which are in the same category 
as mental retardation, thereby prohibiting execution under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002); (5) whether trial counsel was ineffective in closing arguments to 
the jury; and (6) whether the sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  The trial court summarily denied issues two, four, 
and six, but held an evidentiary hearing on issues one, three, and five.   
At the evidentiary hearing, both Zack and his trial attorney, Elton Killam, 
testified.  The trial court denied all postconviction relief.  Zack appealed the trial 
court’s order and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.   
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Postconviction Relief 
 
Zack raises six issues for review of the trial court’s order denying 
postconviction relief.  He argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the DNA testimony presented by the State; that counsel was ineffective 
                                          
 
         2.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923).  
 
 
- 5 -
because he failed to prepare Zack to testify at trial; that counsel was ineffective 
because he made prejudicial remarks to the jury in the opening statement and 
closing argument; that the trial court erred in summarily denying claims raised in 
his motion for postconviction relief involving Zack’s right to a Frye hearing and 
the constitutionality of the death sentence under Atkins; that Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring; and that collateral counsel was 
ineffective.  We address each claim below, and deny relief.   
1. 
DNA Evidence 
 
Zack’s first claim is that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
challenge certain DNA evidence presented by the State.  There were two types of 
DNA evidence presented by the State:  Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) DNA 
evidence and Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms (RFLP) DNA evidence.  
Both types of DNA evidence were introduced to prove identity.  Zack argues that 
the PCR DNA evidence was inadmissible and that his trial counsel should have 
requested a Frye hearing and challenged the qualifications of the State’s expert.  
He contends that counsel failed to do so because he did not understand the science 
of DNA evidence. 
 
In a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the proponent must 
establish two things:  (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
 
 
- 6 -
U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.   
The State presented two expert witnesses who testified about DNA evidence, 
Tim McClure and Karen Barnes, both from Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement (FDLE).  According to these experts, the DNA evidence showed that 
Zack had Smith’s blood on him, and that Zack’s sperm was found in Smith’s body.  
In his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that he was not going to 
cross-examine the State’s expert witnesses about DNA, fingerprints, or blood 
spatters because he was not going to challenge that evidence.  At the close of trial, 
defense counsel reiterated that Zack did not challenge the DNA evidence.  At the 
postconviction hearing, Zack’s trial counsel stated that he did not challenge the 
evidence because he did not dispute Zack’s identity as the person who caused the 
death of the victim.  In fact, Zack confessed that he killed Smith, and he said they 
had consensual sexual contact.  The only issue at trial was the issue of intent. 
Zack argues that trial counsel should have requested a Frye hearing on the 
admissibility of the PCR DNA evidence, which would have resulted in the 
exclusion of this evidence.  Under Florida law, a Frye hearing is utilized in order to 
determine if an expert scientific opinion is admissible.  See Flanagan v. State, 625 
 
 
- 7 -
So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 1993).  Such opinion must be based on techniques that have 
been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and found to be 
reliable.  See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  However, Frye is only utilized where the 
science at issue is new or novel.  Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997). 
Zack relies on Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1997), to support his 
contention that PCR DNA testing is new or novel and is subject to Frye testing.  
The Murray decision was released several months prior to Zack’s trial.3  Zack also 
asserts that his trial counsel lacked any understanding of DNA evidence and had no 
idea that it should have been excluded.  The trial court, however, agreed with trial 
counsel’s assessment that because Zack admitted to sexual contact with Smith and 
admitted to causing her death, the DNA evidence did not prove any fact at issue in 
this case.  Based on this conclusion, the trial court concluded that trial counsel’s 
strategy was sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.   
A trial court’s resolution of a Strickland claim is a mixed question of law 
and fact.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 (“Ineffectiveness is . . . a mixed question 
of law and fact.”); Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).  Thus, we 
defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but review de novo the trial court’s legal 
conclusions.  See Stephens, 748 So. 2d at 1033.   
                                          
 
3.  Although PCR DNA testing was still being challenged in September and 
October 1997, when this case was tried, the PCR method of DNA testing is now 
generally accepted by the scientific community and is not subjected to Frye testing.  
See Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d 402, 404-5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).   
 
 
- 8 -
The factual findings indicate that trial counsel did not challenge the DNA 
evidence and that Zack conceded the fact that he had engaged in sexual contact 
with Smith and was responsible for her death.  Thus, the PCR and RFLP DNA 
evidence was offered to demonstrate facts that Zack did not dispute.  Trial counsel 
told the jury that he would not dispute this evidence because doing so would have 
served no purpose for the defense at trial.  Based on these facts, we agree with the 
trial court’s legal conclusion and find trial counsel’s strategy sound.  Trial 
counsel’s decision to not challenge the DNA evidence did not constitute deficient 
performance in this case.  
In addition, Zack has not shown that he suffered any prejudice from trial 
counsel’s decision not to challenge the DNA evidence.  Zack admitted to engaging 
in sexual contact with Smith and confessed to causing Smith’s death.  Thus, the 
facts supported by either type of DNA evidence were already established.  See 
Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 14 (“After he was arrested, Zack confessed to the 
Smith murder and to the Pope and Chandler thefts.”).  The issue at trial was Zack’s 
level of intent.  The PCR DNA evidence did not go to Zack’s level of intent.  
Therefore, the evidence did not undermine Zack’s defense.  Had this evidence been 
challenged, we are confident that the outcome of the trial would not have been 
affected.  We therefore deny relief on this claim. 
2. 
Preparation to Testify 
 
 
- 9 -
Zack argues that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare him to testify at 
trial and failed to inform him about what would occur during cross-examination.  
Zack contends that had he been adequately prepared and informed of the hazards 
of cross-examination, he would not have testified.  Zack stated that trial counsel 
gave him no choice but to testify, and that he was only told that he was going to 
testify after trial began.     
Trial counsel stated that he fully discussed the procedure of the trial with 
Zack.  According to trial counsel’s testimony, he discussed Zack’s version of the 
events, and the fact that Zack would have to take the stand and testify if he wanted 
to get his story into evidence so that it could be argued to the jury.  Prior to trial, he 
fully informed Zack about the necessity that he testify and that Zack completely 
understood that the State would cross-examine him.  He also advised Zack as to the 
specifics of what to expect while on the witness stand, and that Zack never 
indicated that he did not want to testify. 
As the trial court found, the trial record supported trial counsel’s statement 
that Zack never conveyed a desire not to testify.  In fact, Zack admitted at the 
postconviction hearing that he wanted the jury to hear his version of the events.  At 
the postconviction hearing, Zack also complained that he was cross-examined 
about the Rosillo murder.  However, there was no cross-examination about the 
 
 
- 10 -
Rosillo murder as trial counsel had successfully argued at trial that such 
questioning should not be permitted. 
The trial court made a specific finding on credibility and chose to accept 
Killam’s sworn testimony over Zack’s sworn testimony that he was not prepared to 
testify or to be cross-examined.  The trial court is in a superior position “to 
evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence based upon its observation of 
bearing, demeanor, and credibility of the witnesses.”  Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 
13, 16 (Fla. 1976); see Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1102 (1999).  However, it is our obligation to independently 
review the record and ensure that the law is applied uniformly in decisions based 
on similar facts and to ensure that the defendant’s representation is within 
constitutionally acceptable parameters.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 141 
(Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., concurring); Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1035 
(Fla. 1999) (“Based on the trial court’s findings of fact and our review of the 
record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusions as to both Strickland prongs and 
the ultimate finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).  Although Zack cites 
several cases in support of his claim, none involves a defendant who claims he or 
she was inadequately prepared to testify.  See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 384-88 (1986) (addressing the failure of defense counsel to request 
discovery); Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1991) (addressing the 
 
 
- 11 -
failure to conduct pretrial investigation), modified on other grounds, 939 F.2d 586 
(8th Cir. 1991); Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) 
(addressing the failure to interview potential self-defense witnesses); Nixon v. 
Newsome, 888 F.2d 112 (11th Cir. 1989) (addressing counsel’s failure to obtain a 
transcript of a witness’s testimony at a codefendant’s trial); Code v. Montgomery, 
799 F.2d 1481, 1483 (11th Cir. 1986) (addressing the failure to interview potential 
alibi witnesses).   
Furthermore, Zack’s own trial testimony does not support this claim.  Zack 
gave his version of the events during direct examination, and although he was 
argumentative during cross-examination, he did not deviate from his version of the 
events.  He told the jury that he was responsible for Smith’s death, but that he did 
not plan it.  He argued with the prosecutor when the prosecutor implied something 
other than what Zack had already stated.  Zack did not always answer “yes” and 
“no.”  His answers indicated a desire to explain himself.   
We accept the trial court’s finding of facts that defense counsel was a more 
credible witness and that Zack was adequately prepared to testify at trial.  We also 
find that Zack failed to establish that trial counsel was deficient in preparing him to 
testify at trial.  Additionally, even if counsel had inadequately prepared Zack to be 
cross-examined, Zack suffered no prejudice.  Zack complained about being 
inadequately prepared for cross-examination about the Rosillo murder, but the 
 
 
- 12 -
record indicates that the prosecutor did not cross-examine him about the Rosillo 
murder.  We defer to the factual findings made by the trial court and, based on 
these facts, conclude that Zack has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief on 
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in preparing him to testify at trial.  
3. 
Nixon/Cronic Claim 
 
 
Zack argues that trial counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt at trial 
without his permission, which violates the mandates of Nixon v. Singletary, 758 
So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000), and United v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  He also argues 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Nixon/Cronic claim on 
appeal.  The issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not properly 
raised in a 3.851 motion; rather, it is appropriately raised in a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  See Parker v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S187, S190, 30 Fla. L. 
Weekly S219 (Fla. Mar. 24, 2005) (“The proper method by which to raise a claim 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is by petition for writ of habeas 
corpus directed to the appellate court which considered the direct appeal.”) 
(quoting Ragan v. Dugger, 544 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)).   
We find no merit in Zack’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective.  Zack 
relies on this Court’s decision in Nixon v. Singletary, which held that Cronic rather 
than Strickland is the standard for assessing ineffectiveness of counsel when a 
defendant’s attorney concedes guilt to the crime charged without the defendant’s 
 
 
- 13 -
express consent.  Under Cronic, counsel’s deficiency is presumed.  See Nixon v. 
Singletary, 758 So. 2d  at 622.  However, the United States Supreme Court 
recently overruled the standard applied in Nixon and stated that a defendant’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel challenge based upon counsel’s concession of 
guilt to the crime charged, even without the defendant’s consent, must be evaluated 
under the standard set forth in Strickland.  See Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 
(2004).  Thus, in a case such as this, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
strategy to concede guilt was unreasonable.  See id.   
 
Because Zack confessed to the killing, trial counsel’s strategy was to dispute 
the intent element of first-degree murder.  Trial counsel made a strategic decision 
to discuss the evidence that was admitted at trial in an attempt to alleviate the 
damage it would cause if he ignored the evidence.  His goal was to get Zack a life 
sentence, which was a reasonable trial strategy.  In closing argument at trial, 
counsel agreed with the State’s argument concerning the messiness and evident 
brutality of the crime scene.  At the postconviction hearing, trial counsel stated that 
the word “brutality” was not equal to “premeditation,” and he wanted to show that 
the murders were the result of an unintended rage.  Trial counsel stated that he 
knew the crime scene photos would be shown, and those photos made the crime 
scene “look real bad” and they would not have made sense unless they were shown 
 
 
- 14 -
to have been created by a person who was not in control of his own impulses.  
Trial counsel stated that he wanted to maintain his credibility with the jurors.    
 
The trial court found that, taking all of counsel’s remarks in the context of 
the entire trial, counsel’s intent was to dilute the damaging testimony that the jury 
would hear.  We agree with the trial court’s findings, and conclude that there was 
no deficient performance.  “Failure to make the required showing of either 
deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.”  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.  Thus, relief on this claim is denied. 
4. 
Failure to Order Frye Hearing and Atkins Claim   
Zack next makes two claims.  He first argues that the trial court should have 
sua sponte ordered a Frye hearing on the issue of DNA evidence.  On this claim, 
we find that the trial court properly summarily denied relief.  Zack also argues that  
he is effectively mentally retarded and cannot be executed under Atkins.  We also 
find relief was properly denied on this issue. 
 
A. 
Frye Hearing. 
 
 
Zack argues that although defense counsel failed to request a Frye hearing 
on the issue of whether PCR DNA was generally accepted in the scientific 
community, the trial court should have conducted a hearing sua sponte.  Because 
counsel did not request a Frye hearing, this is simply a rewording of Issue 1 above. 
Zack argues that pursuant to Arnold v. State, 807 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), 
 
 
- 15 -
the failure to order a Frye hearing on new or novel scientific evidence is 
fundamental error.  Actually, Arnold states that the trial court needs to give all the 
parties an opportunity to be heard at a Frye hearing, and that the opposing party 
should be permitted to offer evidence in rebuttal.  Arnold does not address a trial 
court’s duty to sua sponte order a Frye hearing. 
 
We have considered and rejected Zack’s claim that a Frye hearing was 
necessary.  We will not reverse this conviction based on the trial court’s failure to 
order its own Frye hearing when we have determined that the admission of the 
disputed evidence was not prejudicial. 
 
B. 
Atkins Claim 
 
 
The evidence in this case shows Zack’s lowest IQ score to be 79.  Pursuant 
to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002), a mentally retarded person cannot 
be executed, and it is up to the states to determine who is “mentally retarded.”  
Under Florida law, one of the criteria to determine if a person is mentally retarded 
is that he or she has an IQ of 70 or below.  See § 916.106 (12), Fla. Stat. (2003) 
(defining retardation as a significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning 
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the 
period from conception to age eighteen, and explaining that “[s]ignificantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning” means performance which is two or 
more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test 
 
 
- 16 -
specified in the rules of the department); Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1041 
(Fla. 2000) (accepting expert testimony that in order to be found retarded, an 
individual must score 70 or below on standardized intelligence test). 
 
Zack does not dispute the facts in the record.  Zack argued at the Huff4 
hearing that although this Court did a proportionality analysis on direct appeal, it is 
unclear whether it considered all the factors that render Zack effectively mentally 
retarded.  As stated in our opinion on direct appeal, this Court reviewed the 
evidence of Zack’s brain damage and his mental age in considering mitigation.   
Postconviction counsel admitted there was no new evidence to support the 
argument that Zack is mentally retarded.  Additionally, at the postconviction 
hearing, the State pointed out that Zack’s mental health was explored at trial and 
nothing in the evidence offered at trial establishes that he is mentally retarded 
under the Florida statute.  The prosecutor stated that if there was any new or 
different evidence than that presented at trial, it should be explored in the 
evidentiary hearing.  Zack’s postconviction counsel offered no new or different 
evidence.   
 
In order to prevail on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Zack must establish that counsel was deficient in some regard.  Gaskin v. 
State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 (Fla.1999).  Zack has not done that.  In this claim, Zack 
                                          
 
 
4.   Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
- 17 -
alleges that he is mentally retarded, which is a bar to the imposition of the death 
penalty.  Such a claim falls under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and 
should be addressed pursuant to the procedures set forth in that rule.  Therefore, 
the trial court properly summarily denied relief on this claim, and we affirm the 
trial court’s denial. 
 
5. 
Ring claim 
Zack argues that Florida’s capital sentencing statute and his death sentence 
violate his constitutional rights under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  In 
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 
143 (Fla. 2002), this Court denied relief under Ring.  Subsequently, this Court has 
rejected postconviction challenges to section 921.141 that rely on Ring.  See, e.g., 
Gamble v. State, 877 So. 2d 706, 719 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting appellant’s similar 
claim that Florida’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring); Rivera 
v. State, 859 So. 2d 495, 508 (Fla. 2003); Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 877-78 
(Fla. 2003); Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); Chandler v. State, 848 
So. 2d 1031, 1034 n.4 (Fla. 2003); Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 788, 793 (Fla. 2003). 
This Court has also rejected claims that Ring requires aggravating 
circumstances be individually found by a unanimous jury verdict.  See Hodges v. 
State, 885 So. 2d 338, 359 n.9 (Fla. 2004); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 
654 (Fla. 2003); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003). 
 
 
- 18 -
Additionally, the jury found Zack guilty of first-degree murder, sexual 
assault, and robbery.  See Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 2000).  On appeal, 
this Court found ample evidence to support both of the felony convictions and to 
support the first-degree murder conviction based on the commission of these 
felonies and on premeditation.  Id. at 17-19.  This Court also found the aggravating 
factor that the murder was committed in conjunction with a robbery and sexual 
battery to be valid.  Id. at 25.  We have explained that a defendant is not entitled to 
relief under Ring where the aggravating circumstance that the murder was 
committed during the course of a felony was found and the jury unanimously 
found the defendant guilty of that contemporaneous felony.  See, e.g., Gamble v. 
State, 877 So. 2d at 719 (finding death sentence was not invalid under Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring where jury found defendant guilty of 
first-degree murder and the felony of armed robbery); Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 
455, 465 (Fla. 2003) (explaining that defendant was not entitled to relief under 
Ring where aggravating circumstances of multiple convictions for prior violent 
felonies and contemporaneous felony of sexual battery were unanimously found by 
jury); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 54 n.3 (Fla. 2003) (explaining that 
defendant was also convicted by jury of violent felonies of robbery and sexual 
battery, that murder was committed during course of burglary, and that death 
sentence could be imposed based on these convictions by the same jury); see also 
 
 
- 19 -
Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 119 n.79 (Fla. 2003) (attributing denial of relief on 
Apprendi/Ring claim to rejection of claims in other postconviction appeals, 
unanimous guilty verdicts on other felonies, and “existence of prior violent 
felonies”); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 2003) (stating that prior 
violent felony aggravator based on contemporaneous crimes charged by indictment 
and on which defendant was found guilty by unanimous jury “clearly satisfies the 
mandates of the United States and Florida Constitutions”). 
 
In regard to Zack’s claim of retroactivity, a majority of this Court has now 
concluded that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida under the test of Witt v. 
State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), to cases that are final.  See Johnson v. State, 30 
Fla. L. Weekly S297 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2005).  We therefore deny relief on this claim. 
6. 
Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
Zack also argues that his postconviction counsel was ineffective.  Under 
Florida and federal law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective 
collateral counsel.  This Court has stated that “claims of ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel do not present a valid basis for relief.”  Lambrix v. State, 
698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996); see also King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1245 
(Fla. 2002) (upholding the trial court’s denial of relief on the ineffective assistance 
of postconviction counsel claim because it did not state a valid basis for relief).  In 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the Supreme Court refused to extend 
 
 
- 20 -
a due process requirement for effective collateral counsel to situations where a 
state, like Florida, has opted to afford collateral counsel to indigent inmates.  Thus, 
Zack has failed to state a valid basis for relief, and we therefore deny relief on his 
claim that postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance.   
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Zack raises six claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  He argues 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim regarding the 
State’s racially motivated peremptory challenge during jury selection, that 
appellate counsel should have argued that the prosecutor made impermissible 
argument to the jury, that the State introduced nonstatutory aggravating factors, 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim on appeal 
regarding prejudicial and gruesome crime scene photos that were admitted into 
evidence, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes, and that 
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise on appeal the claim that the 
trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.  For the 
following reasons, relief on these claims is denied. 
 
1. 
Peremptory Challenges 
 
 
- 21 -
Zack argues ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on appellate 
counsel’s failure to raise the issue of two alleged racially motivated peremptory 
challenges.  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are properly 
raised in a habeas petition.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 
2000).  The criteria for proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel parallels 
the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  See Wilson v. 
Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985).  Thus, the Court must consider  
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1027 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Suarez v. 
Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190, 192-93 (Fla. 1988)).  “If a legal issue ‘would in all 
probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 
2d at 643 (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).  
Likewise, appellate counsel is not “necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a 
claim that might have had some possibility of success; effective appellate counsel 
need not raise every conceivable nonfrivolous issue.”  Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 
905, 908 (Fla. 2002).  
 
 
- 22 -
In this claim, both parties rely on Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 
1996), to explain the proper procedure for preserving a claim that a peremptory 
challenge is racially motivated.  In Melbourne, this Court explained that a party 
objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: 
(1) make a timely objection on that basis; (2) show that the venireperson is a 
member of a distinct racial group; and (3) request that the court ask the striking 
party its reason for the strike.  The burden then shifts to the proponent of the strike 
to present a race-neutral explanation.  If the explanation is facially race-neutral and 
the court believes that the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained.  
But even if the procedure is followed precisely, the issue is not preserved for 
appellate review if the party objecting to the challenge fails to renew the objection 
before the jury is sworn.  See Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Fla. 1997); 
Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1993).  By not renewing the objection prior to 
the jury being sworn, it is presumed that the objecting party abandoned any prior 
objection he or she may have had and was satisfied with the selected jury.  See 
Joiner, 618 So. 2d at 176 (“[C]ounsel’s action in accepting the jury led to a 
reasonable assumption that he had abandoned, for whatever reason, his earlier 
objection.  It is reasonable to conclude that events occurring subsequent to his 
objection caused him to be satisfied with the jury about to be sworn.”).   
 
 
- 23 -
Defense counsel objected at the time the State exercised its peremptory 
challenge, but when the jury was sworn, he made no objection to the final jury.  
The issue is therefore deemed abandoned.  Appellate counsel has no obligation to 
raise an issue that was not preserved for review and is not ineffective for failing to 
raise an unpreserved issue on appeal.  See Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051, 
1068 (Fla. 2003).  Because this issue was not preserved for review and appellate 
counsel does not have an obligation to raise this issue on appeal, appellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective.  We therefore deny relief on this claim. 
 
2. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Zack next alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise on 
appeal several issues involving prosecutor misconduct.  He alleges that the 
prosecutor referred to Zack as a liar, erroneously told the jurors they were acting 
on behalf of the community, and made inappropriate “golden rule” arguments.   
A. 
“Liar” 
 
It is “unquestionably improper” for a prosecutor to state that the defendant 
has lied.  Washington v. State, 687 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting 
O’Callaghan v. State, 429 So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1983)).  This is especially true in 
an instance where the defendant takes the stand in his own defense because the 
prosecutor’s reference to the defendant as a liar encroaches on the jury’s job by 
improperly weighing in with his or her own opinion of the credibility of the 
 
 
- 24 -
witnesses.  See, e.g., Gomez v. State, 751 So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).  
However, courts have held that where such commentary is supported by the 
evidence, there will be no reversal.  See, e.g., Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 107-08 
(Fla. 2003) (holding that where the evidence substantially proved the defendant’s 
deceitful actions, the prosecutor’s remarks calling into question the defendant’s 
veracity were nothing more than appropriate comments on the evidence).  In Craig 
v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 865 (Fla. 1987), this Court stated that when the prosecutor 
called the defendant a “liar” it was “somewhat intemperate.”  However, this Court 
also stated that when it can be understood that the name “liar” is made in reference 
to that person’s testimony, then the prosecutor is merely submitting to the jury a 
conclusion he has drawn from the evidence.  Id.   It is only when, viewed in the 
totality of the case, the prosecutor’s comments drift far afield from the evidence 
adduced at trial that they may constitute fundamental error.  Lugo, 845 So. 2d at 
101.   
This issue was preserved for review, and appellate counsel did not raise it on 
appeal.  In all probability, however, had this issue been raised, it would have been 
deemed meritless.  Thus, appellate counsel’s failure to raise this meritless issue 
cannot be deemed ineffective assistance.  See Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d at 908; 
Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643. 
 
 
- 25 -
The prosecutor’s comments refer to Zack’s testimony and the evidence at 
trial.  Zack testified on direct examination that he had lied in the past.  He was 
asked if he had problems stealing and lying and if he had lied to the jury about 
what happened with Smith.  Zack said, “No, I did not lie, and I did not lie to [the 
police].”  Defense counsel was dealing with this negative evidence up front so the 
prosecutor could not introduce it first.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked 
Zack if he was a convicted felon, admitted thief, and an admitted liar.  Zack 
responded that he was.  Zack again disputed the accusation that he was lying in this 
trial.   
In closing arguments for the guilt-phase trial, the prosecutor told the jurors 
to look at the evidence, that Zack testified, and that his testimony was to be 
considered the same as any other witness.  The prosecutor asked if Zack was 
straightforward and honest in answering the questions, whether he had self-
interest, and whether his testimony was consistent with the other evidence at trial.  
The prosecutor asked the jury to consider whether Zack had previously been 
convicted of a crime, and told them that Zack admitted to having committed five 
crimes.  He asked the jurors to assess the testimony of the other witnesses by the 
same considerations, i.e., to consider whether they were straightforward and 
whether their testimony was consistent with the other evidence.  The prosecutor 
then pointed to an inconsistency in the evidence and said that Zack did not tell the 
 
 
- 26 -
truth at one point.  He talked about lies in general, saying there is usually an 
element of truth in a lie.  He told the jurors to use their common sense and go 
through the evidence and pick out the truth.  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial 
saying that this was the second time the prosecutor made reference to the defendant 
as a liar.  The court denied the motion for mistrial, but told the prosecutor not to 
use the word “liar.”   
When considered in context, the prosecutor did not call Zack a liar; rather, 
he examined the totality of Zack’s testimony as well as the other evidence 
presented and drew a conclusion that he was lying.  The failure to raise this claim 
on direct appeal does not amount to deficient performance on the part of appellate 
counsel because the commentary was supported by the evidence and because the 
claim would have been unsuccessful on appeal.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 
2d at 643 (the failure of appellate counsel to raise what in all probability would be 
a meritless issue will not render appellate counsel's performance ineffective). We 
therefore deny relief on this claim.  
 
B. 
“Send a Message” Argument 
 
 
Zack next argues that the prosecutor’s admonition to the jury to act on  
behalf of the community amounts to an inappropriate send-a-message argument.  
An example of a classic send-a-message argument is the prosecutor telling the jury 
to send a message to other drug dealers, and deter drug dealers from bringing drugs 
 
 
- 27 -
into our communities and into our homes.  See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-
Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 1993).  The defendant in Sanchez-Sotelo argued 
that the admission of this evidence was reversible for three reasons:  first, it 
influenced the jury to convict the defendant based on broad policies against drugs 
and not based on the evidence of the case; second, the court gave no cautionary 
instruction to curtail the effect of the argument; and third, the evidence of guilt was 
“extremely thin.”  Id. at 211.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error because:  first, a prosecutor 
may appeal to the jury to act as the conscience of the community; second, the 
district court sufficiently instructed the jury to disregard the comments regarding 
women, children, and parents; and third, there was ample evidence produced at 
trial, so that the send-a-message comments did not cast serious doubt on the 
propriety of the jury’s verdict.  Id.  In this case, the prosecutor did not tell the jury 
to send a message to other defendants.  Rather, he told the jury to act on behalf of 
the community.  Furthermore, in light of the ample evidence produced at trial, we 
conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the objected-to comments 
contributed to the jury’s verdict.  Appellate counsel did not perform deficiently by 
failing to raise this claim. 
 
To the extent that the prosecutor’s comment can be considered a “conscience 
of the community” argument, relief is also denied.  In Smith v. State, 818 So. 2d 
 
 
- 28 -
707, 710-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), the district court considered the same type of 
argument.  The prosecutor told the jury:  “[Y]ou are citizens that speak on behalf 
of your community . . . . You are citizens that speak on behalf of your community 
in rendering a verdict in this case.”  Id.  While the district court found that the 
prosecutor approached the line of propriety and may have gone beyond, it 
concluded that the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial based on these comments 
was not an abuse of discretion.  Id.   The district court concluded that the reference 
to the jury speaking for the community did not permeate the closing argument, that 
it was near the end of the argument, and it was not repeated after the defense 
objected.  Thus, the court concluded, this isolated and limited comment would not 
appear to be so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial and thus a mistrial was not 
warranted.  See also Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2001) (finding prosecutor’s 
conscience of the community argument in penalty phase was not so prejudicial as 
to vitiate the entire trial and thus court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
request for mistrial; prosecutor’s reference to the term was isolated and he did not 
continue with the argument after the defense objected); Otero v. State, 754 So.2d 
765 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (concluding that impermissible conscience of the 
community argument did not warrant a reversal; argument was made at the very 
end of the State’s rebuttal argument and did not otherwise permeate the State’s 
closing argument). 
 
 
- 29 -
 
Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise an issue that is 
meritless.   
 
C. 
Sympathy in the Jury Room. 
 
 
Zack argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to claim reversible 
error on appeal because the prosecutor told the jury not to allow sympathy in the 
jury room and to decide the case only on the evidence.  This Court addressed the 
prosecutor’s comments in its opinion on direct appeal.  See Zack, 753 So. 2d at 24.  
In addressing whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the 
role of sympathy in the deliberative process, this Court refused Zack’s invitation to 
recede from the case law which was unfavorable to his argument.  Id. at 23.   
“[C]laims raised in a habeas petition which petitioner has raised in prior 
proceedings and which have been previously decided on the merits in those 
proceedings are procedurally barred in the habeas petition.”  Porter v. Crosby, 840 
So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 2003).  Thus, Zack is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
 
D. 
Golden Rule. 
 
 
Zack argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on 
appeal that the prosecutor made an improper “golden rule” argument.  A “golden 
rule” argument asks the jurors to place themselves in the victim’s position, to 
imagine the victim’s pain and terror, or to imagine how they would feel if the 
victim were a relative.  See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 812-13 (Fla. 2002).  
 
 
- 30 -
Zack argues that the prosecutor told the jurors to imagine themselves as the victim.  
In penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor systematically went through the 
aggravators.  When he got to heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the prosecutor told the 
jurors that the court would instruct them on what heinous means, what atrocious 
means, and what cruel means.  However, the prosecutor went on to define each 
term, and then argued that the specific evidence met those definitions.  The 
prosecutor argued: 
 
Did the defendant’s acts during the course of this murder show 
any conscience or compassion for a human being?  Does his acts show 
any pity for the victim?  Can any one of us imagine, except to look at 
the evidence, the terror that was coursing through the victim during 
her last few minutes of life?  Beaten down in her own home by a 
person that she extended trust to, clothes ripped off of her, thrown 
bleeding into her bed, raped in her bed, chased into another part of the 
house, caught, thrown to the floor, head slammed to the floor.  Look 
at this, ladies and gentlemen, and ask yourselves whether or not this is 
torture in the classic sense.   
Trial counsel made no objection to this argument.  If the prosecutor’s comments 
were error, it was not preserved for review and thus not cognizable on appeal.  See 
Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1997); Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 
895, 898 (Fla. 1996).  Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise an issue that has 
not been preserved for appellate review.   
The only exception to this procedural bar is where the prosecutor’s 
comments constitute fundamental error.  See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 
n.8 (Fla. 1998); Bonifay v. State, 680 So. 2d 413, 418 n.9 (Fla. 1996).  
 
 
- 31 -
Fundamental error is defined as the type of error which “reaches down into the 
validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been 
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 418 n.8 
(quoting Kilgore, 688 So. 2d at 898). 
 
The alleged “golden rule” comment was just one line made during the 
prosecutor’s discussion of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator.  That 
comment, while using the term “imagine,” does not rise to the level of fundamental 
error or “reach down into the validity of the trial itself.”  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 
604 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1992) (holding that comment by prosecutor during 
penalty phase closing argument that “it might not be a bad idea to look at [the 
knife] and think about what it would feel like if it went two inches into your neck” 
was improper, but it was not so egregious as to undermine jury’s 
recommendation).  We therefore deny relief on this claim. 
 
3. 
Nonstatutory Aggravation 
The defense’s theory at trial was that Zack has low impulse control and 
would lose control if someone pushed his “hot button.”  Zack presented expert 
evidence on this theory.  In rebuttal, the State presented Dr. Harry McClaren, who 
testified that Zack exhibited hatred toward women, not just low impulse control.  
Trial counsel objected to this testimony, and Zack now argues this amounted to the 
presentation of a nonstatutory aggravator.  Zack further argues that the admission 
 
 
- 32 -
of evidence relating to a nonstatutory aggravator is a constitutional error in light of 
the fact that the United States Supreme Court has upheld Florida’s statutory 
scheme, and the statutory scheme does not permit the introduction of nonstatutory 
aggravators.  Zack contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise this claim on appeal.   
The only matters that may be considered in aggravation are those set out in 
the death penalty statute.  See Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 846 (Fla. 2005) 
(citing Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 927 (Fla. 1994)).  Thus, initially the Court 
must determine if the trial court erred in admitting Dr. McClaren’s testimony about 
Zack’s hatred of women.  While relevant evidence should not be excluded merely 
because it points to the commission of a separate crime, it must be relevant to a 
material issue other than propensity or bad character.  See, e.g., Williams v. State, 
143 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1962).  Viewed in context, this testimony was offered in 
rebuttal to the defense, not as a nonstatutory aggravator. 
 
Zack’s reliance on Perry v. State, 801 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2001), is misplaced, as 
that case is distinguishable.  In Perry, as the first witness of the State’s penalty 
phase case, the State presented the testimony of the defendant’s ex-wife about 
numerous instances of domestic violence.  Id. at 90.  While the State alleged that 
defense counsel “opened the door” to this testimony during the guilt phase of the 
trial by claiming that the defendant was nonviolent, the record did not support this 
 
 
- 33 -
claim.  Id.  Thus, the ex-wife’s testimony regarding the defendant’s prior violent 
acts, all unrelated to the crime at issue and not offered in support of any 
aggravating circumstance, constituted impermissible nonstatutory aggravation, not 
“anticipatory rebuttal.”  Id.   
In contrast, here the State only presented Dr. McClaren’s testimony in 
rebuttal to the defense’s mitigation witnesses who testified about Zack’s low 
impulse control and the defense’s theory that Zack murdered the victim because 
his “hot button” had been pushed.  The record supports the conclusion that this was 
proper rebuttal testimony, not improper evidence of a nonstatutory aggravator.   
Even if the admission of this evidence was error, it was harmless.  State v. 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).  The prosecutor did not argue Zack’s 
alleged hatred of women in closing argument.  Additionally, the trial court 
properly instructed the jurors as to the aggravating factors they could consider.  
Thus, even if Dr. McClaren’s testimony was improperly admitted, any error would 
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 313-
14 (Fla. 1997) (holding that where prosecutor interjected a nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstance into the proceedings, the error was harmless because the 
prosecutor rephrased the improper question and did not argue this point in closing 
argument and because the instance of misconduct was isolated and the trial court 
properly instructed the jurors as to the aggravating factors they could consider). 
 
 
- 34 -
We therefore deny habeas relief on this claim. 
4. 
Gruesome and Prejudicial Photographs 
 
Defense counsel objected to the admission of certain photos of the victim by 
the prosecutor.  The court allowed two of the photos into evidence.  Counsel also 
objected to slides showing scenes from the Rosillo murder, and the trial court 
allowed three of these slides into evidence.  The photos and slides in question were 
used by the medical examiner when discussing the victims’ injuries and used to 
demonstrate similarities for purposes of Williams Rule evidence.  Admission of 
photographic evidence is within the trial court’s discretion, and a trial court’s 
ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of clear abuse.  See 
Wilson v. State, 436 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1983).  Zack now argues appellate counsel 
was ineffective for failing to argue this issue on appeal. 
In order to obtain relief on this claim, appellate counsel would have had to 
show that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs and that the admission 
of the photos was so prejudicial that the defendant should have a new trial.  Given 
the evidence in this case, including Zack’s confession, the photos that were 
admitted did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.  “The test for 
admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy rather than necessity.”  Pope v. 
State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1996); see also Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 
541, 549 (Fla. 1990) (“Photographs must only be excluded when they demonstrate 
 
 
- 35 -
something so shocking that the risk of prejudice outweighs [their] relevancy.”).  
There were only a limited number of photos that the medical examiner used during 
his testimony, and these photos were relevant to the issues addressed by the 
medical examiner.  We conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to raise this nonmeritorious issue on appeal.   
5. 
Williams Rule Evidence 
Zack next argues that despite proper objection at trial, appellate counsel 
failed to raise the issue regarding the improper use of the Williams Rule evidence 
to prove aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase.  This claim simply 
refashions a claim that was unsuccessfully raised on direct appeal.  On direct 
appeal, Zack argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes 
because these crimes were not sufficiently similar to the crimes charged, did not 
prove intent or disprove voluntary intoxication, were not inextricably intertwined, 
and became a feature of the trial.  Zack, 753 So. 2d at 16.  This Court held that the 
evidence was relevant as part of a prolonged criminal episode demonstrating 
Zack’s motive, intent, modus operandi, and the entire context from which this 
murder arose.  Id.  Zack does not challenge the admissibility of the Williams Rule 
evidence in his habeas claims; rather, he argues that the evidence was used 
excessively and inappropriately.  This claim reasserts the Williams Rule claim 
raised on direct appeal.  It is well recognized that a defendant may not couch a 
 
 
- 36 -
claim decided adversely to him on direct appeal in terms of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in an attempt to circumvent the rule that postconviction relief 
proceedings may not serve as a second appeal.  See Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 
1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995); see also Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) 
(“[H]abeas corpus petitions are not to be used for additional appeals on questions 
which . . . were raised on appeal or in a rule 3.850 motion . . . .”); Rutherford v. 
Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 645 (Fla. 2000) (holding that when a claim is actually 
raised on direct appeal, the Court will not consider a claim that appellate counsel 
was ineffective for failing to present additional arguments in support of the claim 
on appeal).  Thus, the Williams Rule claim is procedurally barred in this habeas 
proceeding. 
 
6. 
Prejudicial Evidence 
Zack next argues that a baseball cap introduced by the State was irrelevant 
and prejudicial because Zack’s identity was not in dispute, there were other items 
that the State could have used to establish identity, and the State should not have 
used the hat because the Confederate flag image on the hat portrayed Zack as a 
racist to the jurors.  Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the baseball 
hat.  He objected again when the prosecutor referenced Zack’s actions following 
the murder.  Zack now argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue this issue on appeal.   
 
 
- 37 -
A trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence, 
and such a determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  See 
Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660, 664 (Fla. 1994).  The trial court overruled the 
objection to the hat because it showed what Zack was doing after he took Smith’s 
boyfriend’s car, and the hat identified him as the person who walked into the pawn 
shop with Smith’s stolen property.  The pawn shop owner testified that the hat 
looked like the one Zack was wearing.  Because Zack has not shown an abuse of 
the trial court’s discretion, he has also failed to demonstrate that appellate counsel 
was ineffective for not arguing this meritless issue.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 
So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000). 
 
Zack also argues he was prejudiced when the trial court did not redact a 
portion of his statement to police in which he said he had been arrested “a million 
times” before.  Because there was no objection at trial to this statement, appellate 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise an unpreserved issue on 
appeal.  See Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051, 1066 (Fla. 2003).   
 
Because appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise what would 
have been a meritless issue with regard to the hat, and because the issue of whether 
the trial court should have redacted statements that Zack had previously been 
arrested was not preserved and not fundamental error, Zack is not entitled to 
habeas relief on this claim.   
 
 
- 38 -
CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the trial court’s order denying postconviction relief, and we deny 
relief on Zack’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County,  
Linda Lee Nobles, Judge - Case No. 96-2517-CFA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent