Title: Missouri National Education Ass'n v. Missouri Department of Labor & Industrial Relations
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC98412
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2021

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MISSOURI NATIONAL   
     ) 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., 
     ) 
     ) 
Respondents, 
     ) 
     ) 
v. 
     ) 
     ) 
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF     
     ) 
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL 
     ) 
No. SC98412 
RELATIONS, et al., 
  
     ) 
     ) 
Appellants, 
     ) 
     ) 
FERGUSON-FLORISSANT 
     ) 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,  
     ) 
     ) 
Defendants. 
     ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Joseph Walsh III, Judge 
This appeal concerns the constitutional validity of House Bill No. 1413, enacted in 
2018, which significantly altered many aspects of public labor relations in Missouri.  The 
circuit court found the challenged provisions of HB 1413 violated multiple provisions of 
the Missouri Constitution and permanently enjoined its operation and enforcement. 
Opinion issued June 1, 2021
2 
 
Specifically, the circuit court found, in part, the exemption of public safety labor 
organizations in section 105.503.2(1)1 creates a scheme that effectively disfavors non-
public safety labor organizations and violates public employees’ right to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, in violation of article I, 
section 29.  The circuit court also found the exemption of public safety labor 
organizations violates article I, section 2 of the Missouri Constitution, which guarantees 
equal protection, because the exemption makes little sense given the purported 
justifications for the different treatment.  This Court agrees the exemption violates article 
I, section 2. 
The circuit court further found the exemption of public safety labor organizations 
permeates throughout HB 1413.  As a result, it found the valid provisions of HB 1413 
were so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, this 
constitutionally invalid provision that it could not be presumed the legislature would have 
enacted those provisions without it.  This Court agrees.  Pursuant to section 1.140, RSMo 
2016, this Court is required to declare HB 1413 void in its entirety, rather than severing 
the offending provision.  The circuit court’s grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment, declaring HB 1413 void in its entirety and permanently enjoining the 
defendants from administering or enforcing any provision of HB 1413, is affirmed. 
 
 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2018, unless otherwise specified. 
3 
 
Background 
Prior to the General Assembly’s enactment of HB 1413, Missouri’s public labor 
law, codified in section 105.500, RSMo 2016, et seq., created a loose collective-
bargaining framework for public employees.  Including definitions, the entire law 
spanned five brief sections.  Section 105.510, RSMo 2016, provided, with certain 
exceptions,2 that “[e]mployees . . . of any public body shall have the right to form and 
join labor organizations and to present proposals to any public body relative to salaries 
and other conditions of employment through the representative of their own choosing.”  
An “exclusive bargaining representative” was designated or selected by a majority of 
employees in an appropriate unit as the representative of those employees.  Section 
105.500(2), RSMo 2016.  If issues arose concerning the appropriateness of bargaining 
units or majority representative status, the state board of mediation resolved the disputes.  
Section 105.525, RSMo 2016.  Public bodies were required to meet and confer with labor 
organizations:  
Whenever such proposals are presented by the exclusive bargaining 
representative to a public body, the public body or its designated 
representative or representatives shall meet, confer and discuss such 
proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment of the 
employees of the public body with the labor organization which is the 
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in a unit appropriate. 
Upon the completion of discussions, the results shall be reduced to writing 
and be presented to the appropriate administrative, legislative or other 
governing body in the form of an ordinance, resolution, bill or other form 
required for adoption, modification or rejection. 
 
                                              
2 Section 105.510, RSMo 2016, excluded police, deputy sheriffs, Missouri state highway patrol 
troopers, Missouri National Guard members, and all teachers of Missouri schools, colleges, and 
universities. 
4 
 
Section 105.520, RSMo 2016.  No right to strike was provided for public labor 
organizations.  Section 105.530, RSMo 2016. 
HB 1413 significantly altered many aspects of public labor relations in Missouri 
by repealing sections 105.500, 105.520, 105.525, 105.530,3 and 208.862 and enacting 21 
new sections.  Among its new provisions, HB 1413 requires labor organizations to adopt 
a constitution and bylaws and provide detailed reporting and annual filings.  Section 
105.533.  HB 1413 also mandates officers and employees of labor organizations file 
certain disclosures.  Section 105.535.  Public employees must annually authorize 
withholding labor organization dues and fees from their earnings.  Section 105.505.1.  
Annual authorizations are also required from public employees for the labor organization 
to use dues for political contributions or expenditures.  Section 105.505.2.  The bill 
further prevents supervisory employees from being included in the same bargaining unit 
as those they supervise and also disallows the same labor organization to represent both 
supervisory and non-supervisory employees.  Section 105.570.  In addition, HB 1413 
transforms the manner in which a labor organization is selected and retained.  A labor 
organization can gain recognition only through an election conducted before the state 
board of mediation, for a fee, by secret ballot with more than 50 percent of all public 
employees within the bargaining unit voting positively to certify the labor organization.4  
Section 105.575.1, .5, .8, .15.  Once certified, labor organizations must be recertified 
                                              
3 HB 1413 did not amend section 105.510. 
4 In other words, HB 1413 no longer permits voluntary recognition, and an election’s outcome is 
no longer determined by a majority of votes cast in the election. 
5 
 
every three years.  Section 105.575.12.  Finally, HB 1413 imposes additional limitations 
on the formation and coverage of labor agreements between public bodies and labor 
organizations.  Sections 105.580, 105.585. 
The revised provisions of sections 105.500 to 105.598 “apply to all employees of a 
public body, all labor organizations, and all labor agreements between such a labor 
organization and a public body.”  Section 105.503.1.  A “labor organization” is defined as 
any organization, agency, or public employee representation committee or 
plan, in which public employees participate and that exists for the purpose, 
in whole or in part, of dealing with a public body or public bodies concerning 
collective bargaining, grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours 
of employment, or conditions of work. 
 
Section 105.500(5).  A public body is defined as “the state of Missouri, or any officer, 
agency, department, bureau, division, board or commission of the state, or any other 
political subdivision or special district of or within the state” but excludes the department 
of corrections.  Section 105.500(6).   
HB 1413’s provisions, however, do not apply to “[p]ublic safety labor 
organizations and all employees of a public body who are members of a public safety 
labor organization” or to the department of corrections and its employees.  Section 
105.503.2.  The definition of a “public safety labor organization,” found in section 
105.500(8), is a labor organization that “wholly or primarily represent[s] persons trained 
or authorized by law or rule to render emergency medical assistance or treatment . . . and 
persons who are vested with the power of arrest for criminal code violations.” 
The day before HB 1413 was to go into effect, seven labor unions—Missouri 
National Education Association; Ferguson-Florissant National Education Association; 
6 
 
Hazelwood Association of Support Personnel; Laborers’ International Union of North 
America, Local Union No. 42; Miscellaneous Drivers, Helpers, Healthcare and Public 
Employees Union Local No. 610, International Brotherhood of Teamsters; International 
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148; and Service Employees International Union 
Local 1—(collectively, the “Labor Unions”) sued the state agencies authorized to 
implement and enforce HB 1413, the employers of the bargaining units represented by 
the Labor Unions, and the prosecutor5 who would enforce HB 1413’s criminal provisions 
(collectively, the “State”).  The Labor Unions are not public safety labor organizations 
and would be subject to all provisions of HB 1413.  The Labor Unions argued HB 1413 
violated provisions of the state constitution, namely the right to collective bargaining in 
article I, section 29; the equal protection provision of article I, section 2; and the right to 
freedom of speech and association in article I, sections 8 and 9.  The Labor Unions 
alleged the unconstitutional provisions of HB 1413 were not severable and that HB 1413 
should be declared unconstitutional in its entirety.  The circuit court preliminarily 
enjoined the State from administering or enforcing any provision of HB 1413. 
The Labor Unions moved for summary judgment, seeking to permanently enjoin 
the operation and enforcement of HB 1413.  The circuit court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the Labor Unions, finding, in large part, exempting public safety labor 
organizations from the provisions in HB 1413 violates constitutional protections.  It 
found the exemption could not be severed.  As a result, HB 1413 was declared void in its 
                                              
5 St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney Wesley Bell was named. 
7 
 
entirety, and the State was permanently enjoined from administering or enforcing any 
provision of it.  The State appeals.6  
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo.  Sofia v. Dodson, 601 
S.W.3d 205, 208 (Mo. banc 2020).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant 
establishes a lack of genuine issue regarding the material facts and entitlement to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 208-09.  This Court also reviews de novo a challenge 
to the constitutional validity of a statute.  Mo. State Conference of NAACP v. State, 607 
S.W.3d 728, 734 (Mo. banc 2020).  Although a statute is presumed valid, if it conflicts 
with provisions in the state constitution, this Court must find the statute invalid.  
Priorities USA v. State, 591 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Mo. banc 2020).  The challenger bears the 
burden of proving the statute’s constitutional invalidity.  Id. 
Analysis 
 
The State raises six points on appeal, contending the circuit court erred by finding: 
(1) HB 1413 violated article I, section 29; (2) HB 1413 violated article I, section 2; 
(3) HB 1413 violated article I, sections 8 and 9; (4) summary judgment to be appropriate; 
(5) HB 1413 to be facially invalid; and (6) severance was not appropriate.  As explained 
below, this Court finds the violation of article I, section 2 to be dispositive.  
 
 
                                              
6 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. 
8 
 
I. 
The exemption of public safety labor organizations in HB 1413 
violates article I, section 2 
 
Article I, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat employees shall 
have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing.”  This right applies to both private-sector and public-sector employees.  Indep.-
Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Mo. banc 2007).  The 
purpose of article I, section 29 is “to protect employees against legislation or acts which 
would prevent or interfere with their organization and choice of representatives for the 
purpose of bargaining collectively.”  Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Mo. banc 
1957), overruled on other grounds by E. Mo. Coal. of Police, Fraternal Ord. of Police, 
Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. banc 2012).  
The State argues the circuit court erred in finding HB 1413 violates article I, 
section 29 by infringing on public employees’ right to bargain “through representatives of 
their own choosing.”  This right equates to “employees hav[ing] complete freedom of 
choice to organize and choose their collective bargaining representatives.”  Quinn, 298 
S.W.2d at 417.  Inherent in this freedom of choice is that “[c]oercion from any source is a 
denial of this right and a direct infringement on it[.]”  Id.  Early cases interpreted 
employees’ right to “representatives of their own choosing” in the context of picketing in 
an attempt to cause an employer to pressure its employees to join a union.  E.g., Bellerive 
Country Club v. McVey, 284 S.W.2d 492, 500 (Mo. banc 1955) (noting “the right 
guaranteed to employees by Art. I, Sec. 29, Mo.Const.1945, ‘to organize and to bargain 
9 
 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing’ is a free choice, uncoerced by 
management, union, or any other group or organization”).   
The State contends provisions of HB 1413 promote employees’ free choice in 
union elections by mandating secret-ballot elections, periodic recertification, and 
absolute-majority votes.  Regardless of these purported benefits, those voting provisions 
apply to only non-public safety labor organizations because of section 105.503.2(1)’s 
exemption of public safety labor organizations.  Moreover, all other provisions in 
HB 1413, relating to topics ranging from annual authorizations to reporting and 
disclosure requirements, also apply only to non-public safety labor organizations.  The 
end result of exempting public safety labor organizations in HB 1413 is a myriad of 
requirements on all other labor organizations.   
To avoid the significant additional restrictions and requirements imposed by HB 
1413, a bargaining unit of employees not associated with public safety-related job 
functions would reasonably be pressured to be represented by a public safety labor 
organization that “primarily represent[s] persons trained or authorized by law or rule to 
render emergency medical assistance or treatment . . . and persons who are vested with 
the power of arrest for criminal code violations.”  See section 105.500(8).  Likewise, a 
bargaining unit of employees with public-safety related job functions would be 
incentivized to seek representation from a public safety labor organization.7  Logically, 
                                              
7 A labor organization could represent bargaining units comprised of employees from both public 
safety and non-public safety positions.  As an example, the Labor Unions point to Laborers’ 
International Union of North America, Local Union No. 42 and Miscellaneous Drivers, Helpers, 
Healthcare and Public Employees Union Local No. 610, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
10 
 
the framework of HB 1413 creates pressure to join a labor organization exempt from 
these requirements. 
The Labor Unions argue coercion of this nature in the decision of selecting a 
representative conflicts with the constitutional right of employees to bargain collectively 
“through representatives of their own choosing.”  Because it forces them to choose 
between representation by a labor organization saddled with additional restrictions and 
one without, they contend employees have lost their complete freedom of choice to 
organize and choose their collective bargaining representatives.  This Court need not 
resolve whether article I, section 29 would be violated by a collective-bargaining 
framework that provides a strong incentive to affiliate with one type of labor organization 
over another, for even if that were not the case, the bill violates the equal protection 
provision contained in article I, section 2.  
The Missouri Constitution guarantees its citizens the equal protection of the laws.  
Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 2.  This Court applies a two-step analysis for equal protection 
violation claims.  Amick v. Dir. of Revenue, 428 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Mo. banc 2014).  A 
court must first determine whether a fundamental right is at issue.  If there is no 
fundamental right at issue, “a court will apply a rational-basis review to determine 
whether the challenged law is rationally related to some legitimate end.”  Id.  There is no 
need to evaluate whether or to what extent the exemption for public safety labor 
                                              
as labor organizations that represent a combination of employees both in public safety and not in 
public safety positions, but neither primarily represents those in public safety positions. 
11 
 
organizations infringes upon fundamental rights because this exemption fails even the 
rational basis test. 
 
Under rational basis review, the party challenging the constitutional validity of the 
statute must overcome the presumption the statute has a rational basis “by a clear 
showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.”  Cosby v. Treasurer of State, 579 S.W.3d 202, 
209 (Mo banc. 2019) (citation omitted).  The Labor Unions have met that burden.  Each 
of the State’s proffered rational bases concerns public safety employees and the important 
work they perform.  Whether these might have sufficed had the exemption at issue 
protected public safety employees is not at issue, for it exempts only public safety labor 
organizations.   
HB 1413 defines public safety labor organizations as those labor organizations 
which “primarily”—but not necessarily exclusively—represent public safety employees.  
Section 105.503.2(1).  Accordingly, by definition, public safety labor organizations are 
not limited to public safety employees, nor do public safety labor organizations 
encompass representation of all public safety employees.  As a result, HB 1413’s public 
safety labor organization exemption does not apply to only or all public safety employees 
involved in collective bargaining.  Public safety employees represented by labor 
organizations that “primarily” represent other types of employees will not be protected by 
HB 1413’s exemption.  Rather, public safety employees will benefit from the exemption 
only so long as the labor organization that represents them “primarily” represents public 
safety employees.  As a result, despite the State’s arguments to the contrary, the type of 
labor organization, not the type of employee, creates the basis for the exemption.  
12 
 
 
Leaving aside that the exemption for public safety labor organizations supplies 
preferential status for certain labor organizations over others and not certain employees 
over others, there is no rational basis for protecting public safety employees from most—
if not all—of the new provisions in HB 1413.  In fact, the opposite is true.  For example, 
section 105.585(2) requires that every labor agreement expressly prohibit covered 
employees from going on strike.  While a rational basis would exist in some 
circumstances for including public safety employees given the importance of the work 
they do and the need to protect against interruptions in their service, HB 1413 and its 
exemption for public safety labor organizations protects those labor organizations—and 
only those labor organizations—from this requirement.   
Although the dissenting opinion correctly notes that public-sector labor laws may 
treat dissimilar types of public-sector employees differently if there is a rational basis for 
such a differentiation, the cases it cites reflect differential treatment based on job 
function.  Slip op. at 7-8.  There may well be situations in which this type of separate 
treatment can be rational,8 but that question does not apply here because HB 1413 
differentiates groups of employees based on their affiliation with other employees, 
regardless of job functions of those employees.  Although the dissenting opinion states 
that “public safety labor organizations represent different groups of employees than other 
                                              
8 Although police, deputy sheriffs, state highway patrol troopers, members of the Missouri 
National Guard, and teachers have been excluded from the public-sector labor law, section 
105.510, this different treatment turns on job function.  The dissenting opinion criticizes the 
Labor Unions for not commenting about whether the exemption for employees of the department 
of corrections violates the equal protection clause, slip op. at 4 n.1, but this question is not before 
the Court. 
13 
 
public-sector labor organizations,” slip op. at 5, this is not true, as is evident from how 
HB 1413 defines a “public safety labor organization.”  Again, pursuant to section 
105.500(8), a labor organization is classified as a “public safety labor organization” if the 
labor organization “primarily” represents those with public safety positions.  The 
composition of public safety labor organizations and non-public safety labor 
organizations may be, by definition, quite similar.  The distinction merely turns on 
whether those with public safety positions constitute a simple majority of the 
organization’s membership.  A labor organization composed of 51 percent public safety 
employees is similarly situated to a labor organization composed of 49 percent public 
safety employees.  HB 1413, however, would treat the two drastically different.  The 
dissenting opinion’s conclusion that the two classifications are not similarly situated is 
incorrect.  Distinctions noted by the dissenting opinion, such as public safety employees 
having lower turnover or higher unionization rates, slip op. at 5-6, are wholly irrelevant 
when those public safety employees may be in either a public safety labor organization or 
a non-public safety labor organization.  
These defects make it unnecessary to address the Labor Unions’ other arguments 
for, in themselves, they demonstrate each of the State’s asserted rational bases is neither 
rational nor an apparent basis for the provision.  Instead, the only effect (and, therefore, 
the only evident purpose) of the exemption for public safety labor organizations is to give 
preferential treatment to some labor organizations over others for some reason other than 
14 
 
those employees they represent.  Accordingly, this exemption violates equal protection 
and is invalid on that ground.9   
II. 
Severance of the exemption is inappropriate 
While maintaining that the exemption of public safety labor organizations is valid, 
the State urges this Court to sever this provision if it is found unconstitutional.  The 
Labor Unions argue that, because the exemption of public safety labor organizations 
reaches every other provision in the public labor law, HB 1413 should be declared void in 
its entirety.  
Severance is addressed in section 1.140, RSMo 2016, which provides that 
unconstitutional provisions of a statute should be severed from otherwise valid provisions 
unless: 
the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably 
connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be 
presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the 
void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, 
are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the 
legislative intent. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
The State reasons severance is appropriate pursuant to section 1.140, RSMo 2016, 
because the otherwise valid provisions of HB 1413 are not “so essentially and 
                                              
9 The State also contends summary judgment in favor of the Labor Unions is not appropriate 
because there are disputes over material facts.  The material facts at issue, according to the State, 
involve the extent of the burden imposed by each restriction in HB 1413 and the justifications for 
those restrictions.  Because this Court holds the exemption fails to pass the rational basis test, 
summary judgment was appropriate under article 1, section 2.  No factual dispute would alter 
this analysis. 
15 
 
inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon,” the exemption of public safety 
labor organizations “that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the 
valid provisions without” it.10  The Labor Unions note both the interrelated character of 
the exemption with other provisions of HB 1413 and evidence that the exemption for 
public safety labor organizations was adopted to secure passage of the entire law.11   
In fact, HB 1413 left the Missouri House of Representatives as a brief, two-page 
act focused on transparency in labor organizations.  It took its existing form in a Missouri 
Senate committee, but it left that committee without the exemption.  It was not until HB 
1413 was under consideration by the full senate that the exemption was added in a senate 
substitute.  The next day, the house passed the senate substitute, and the legislation went 
to the governor’s desk.   
Our caselaw wisely counsels against severance when severance would effectuate 
an outcome the legislature avoided.  For example, in Preisler v. Calcaterra, 243 S.W.2d 
62 (Mo. banc 1951), this Court found a statute limiting the right of watchers during 
                                              
10 The State also notes in Karney v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations, 599 S.W.3d 
157 (Mo. banc 2020), this Court previously severed a single provision of HB 1413.  Karney is 
distinguishable from the challenge here.  In Karney, five words—“and picketing of any kind”—
were severed from section 105.585(2) because the prohibition against “picketing of any kind” 
was too broad.  Id. at 166-67.  The severed language impermissibly violated public employees’ 
freedom of speech to picket about matters of public concern when that picketing did not impede 
the efficiency of public services.  Id. at 164.  The State urges this Court to use a scalpel, as was 
done to excise five words from HB 1413 in Karney, rather than a blunderbuss.  But unlike the 
isolated issue addressed in a single provision in Karney, the obstacle of the public safety labor 
organization exemption flows to all provisions of HB 1413. 
11 Amicus Curiae Missouri Fraternal Order of Police also argues HB 1413 would have failed 
without the exemption.  The Fraternal Order of Police, in its amicus brief arguing against 
severance, notes it actively lobbied against HB 1413 before the exemption was added and, had 
the exemption not been included, it and other first responders would have opposed HB 1413 
during the legislative process. 
16 
 
general elections in the city of St. Louis to the two largest parties, when no other area in 
the state was subject to such restriction, to violate constitutional provisions for equal 
rights and equal protection.  Id. at 64-65.  Faced with the prospect of severing a clause in 
the statute, the effect of which would be to allow all political parties to have watchers, 
this Court instead struck the entire statute because the original legislation clearly sought 
to limit that number of poll watchers to no more than two.  Id. at 66 (noting, “if the 
elimination of such clauses leaves the remaining portions of the statute so that they do not 
express the true legislative intent but are instead in conflict with it, the statute should not 
be upheld”).   
State ex rel. Transport Manufacturing & Equipment Co. v. Bates, 224 S.W.2d 996 
(Mo. banc 1949), provides another example.  In that case, this Court found a use tax 
excluding motor vehicles with a seating capacity of 10 passengers or more to be arbitrary.  
Id. at 1000-01.  Faced with the question of whether the invalid exemption infected the 
entire legislative act, this Court noted: 
The fact that the residue of an act remaining after a portion has been declared 
invalid may be complete in and of itself is not always sufficient to sustain it. 
If the invalid portion is so connected with the residue of the statute as to 
furnish the consideration for the enactment of the residue and as to warrant 
the belief that they were intended as a whole and that the Legislature would 
not have passed the part remaining had it known the other part would be held 
invalid, then the entire act must fall. 
 
Id. at 1001.  This Court ultimately determined it had “no power by construction to extend 
the scope of a taxing statute and make it applicable to those to whom the General 
Assembly never intended it should apply, thus taxing those whom the Legislature said 
shall not be taxed.”  Id.   
17 
 
The State’s argument in favor of severance of the exemption is illogical in that the 
result would make public labor law reform applicable to public safety labor 
organizations, which the legislature specifically excluded.  The exemption is not 
concerned with a singular provision or aspect of the bill; rather, it provides an exemption 
from the overall statutory scheme itself, which consists of approximately 20 sections.  
Even without giving weight to the late addition of the exemption in the legislative 
process, this Court refuses to sever the exemption and make this public labor reform law 
applicable to public safety labor organizations when the legislature contemplated this 
application and intentionally crafted section 105.503.2(1) to avoid such an outcome. 
This Court cannot say the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions of 
HB 1413 without this void one.  If the legislature desired to pass a scheme imposing 
reform provisions to all public labor organizations, it had the opportunity to do so.  But it 
did not; it specifically provided the reform provisions would not apply to public safety 
labor organizations.  This Court will not, by severance, leave in place legislation contrary 
to the legislature’s intent.  By its plain language, section 105.503.2(1) is essentially and 
inseparably connected with all other provisions of HB 1413; therefore, HB 1413 must be 
declared void in its entirety.   
The State also contends Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), 
supports severability of the public safety labor organization exemption.  In that case, the 
Supreme Court analyzed an exception in the law that provided that unwed United States-
citizen mothers, as compared with unwed United States-citizen fathers, could transmit 
citizenship through a reduced physical-presence requirement in the country for a child 
18 
 
born abroad.  Id. at 1686-87.  The Supreme Court found the exception violated equal 
protection principles.  Id. at 1698.  The Supreme Court subsequently addressed whether 
the shorter timeframe applicable to unwed United States-citizen mothers should be 
extended to unwed United States-citizen fathers and their children.  Id. at 1698-1700.  
Believing Congress would have preferred preservation of the longer physical-presence 
requirements in the law, the Supreme Court applied the longer timeframe to both unwed 
United States-citizen fathers and mothers alike instead of making the shorter timeframe in 
the exception more broadly applicable.  Id. 
Relying on Morales-Santana, the State urges this Court to sever the exemption of 
public-safety labor organizations and extend all of HB 1413’s reform provisions to both 
public safety and non-public safety labor organizations.  Morales-Santana referenced two 
considerations that should occupy a court in considering whether, if apprised of a 
constitutional infirmity, the legislature would have struck the exception or broadened the 
exception to cure the constitutional violation: (1) “the intensity of commitment to the 
residual policy” and (2) “the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that 
would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation.”  Id. at 1700 (quoting Heckler v. 
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984)).   
Assuming Morales-Santana applies to this case, its analysis is distinguishable 
from the result reached here.  There, the Supreme Court found Congress would have 
preferred the exception be abrogated.  Id.  In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court 
noted “[t]he primacy of [the general framework for the acquisition of citizenship at birth] 
in the statutory scheme [was] evident.”  Id. at 1686.   
19 
 
The State contends the many reform provisions in HB 1413 indicate the intensity 
of commitment to the residual policy of public labor reform.  The mere numerosity of 
reform provisions is insufficient to make it evident that across-the-board reform, 
applicable to every public labor organization in the state, was the driving force of 
HB 1413.  The legislature may have found reform important, but, of course, 
section 105.503.2(1) indicates the legislature did not believe the reform should apply to 
all public labor organizations.   
The State also argues complete abrogation of HB 1413 would cause the greatest 
possible disruption.  If this Court severed the exemption, public safety labor 
organizations would become subject to all requirements of HB 1413.  The problem with 
this result is that far more labor organizations would be burdened with restrictions than 
the legislature intended, which would cause great disruption to the statutory scheme.  
 
 
20 
 
Conclusion 
The exemption of public safety labor organizations violates principles of equal 
protection.  The exemption of public safety labor organizations permeates throughout 
HB 1413 and reaches all provisions.  The operation of this exemption forces this Court to 
declare HB 1413 void in its entirety rather than sever the offending provision.  The circuit 
court’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
 
Draper, C.J., Wilson, Breckenridge, JJ., and  
Stith, Sr.J., concur; Powell, J., dissents in separate  
opinion filed and Fischer, J., concurs in opinion of Powell, J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
MISSOURI NATIONAL   
 
     ) 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
Respondents,  
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
 
No. SC98412 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF      
     ) 
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL 
 
     ) 
RELATIONS, et al., 
  
 
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
Appellants,  
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
FERGUSON-FLORISSANT  
 
     ) 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,  
 
     ) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
Defendants.   
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
The exemption for public safety labor unions in House Bill No. 1413 does not 
violate Missouri Constitution’s equal protection provision found in article I, section 2.  
Because the public safety exemption is not unconstitutional, the exemption does not 
support invalidating HB 1413 and enjoining the bill from becoming law as the principal 
opinion concludes.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
2 
 
Background 
In 2007, this Court recognized the right to organize and engage in collective 
bargaining as guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution is endowed not only to private-
sector employees but also public employees, who had previously been exempted.  Indep. 
Nat. Educ. Ass'n v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Mo. banc 2007).  While 
extending these rights to public-sector employees, this Court acknowledged that, 
“[u]nquestionably, public employees are differently situated from private employees and 
are treated differently under the law.”  Id. at 133.  This Court articulated at least two reasons 
for this fundamental difference.  “The first is that many public employees—especially 
police and firefighters—are deemed essential to the preservation of public safety, health, 
and order.”  Id. (emphasis added).  “The second is that the economic forces of the 
marketplace—that limit, at least in theory, the extent to which employers can meet 
employee groups’ demands—do not constrain the public sector.”  Id.  “In the public sector, 
meeting the demands of employee groups is thought to infringe on the constitutional 
prerogative of the public entity’s legislative powers by forcing the entity to raise taxes or 
distribute public services in a manner inconsistent with the best judgment of the entity’s 
governing board.”  Id. 
In 2018, the United States Supreme Court delivered another landmark ruling in the 
area of public sector labor relations when it decided Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), and provided 
protections for public sector employees represented by unions.  The Court in Janus held 
3 
 
that withholding union dues from public employees who have not clearly and affirmatively 
consented to paying union dues violates the First Amendment.  Id. at 2486.   
In the context of these two significant court rulings, the General Assembly passed 
HB 1413 in 2018.  This extensive piece of legislation regulates non-public safety public-
sector labor organizations, specifically the manner and practice in which unions engage in 
collective bargaining with public entities and organize public employees.  HB 1413 
establishes new rules and protocols for public-sector union elections that provide 
protections for public employees’ rights, including those recognized by Janus.  Other 
provisions of the bill the terms of public-sector labor agreements to address the unique 
challenges and circumstances surrounding public-sector collective bargaining as this Court 
expressly identified in Independence.  Indep. Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d at 133. 
A group of non-public safety public-sector labor organizations (“Labor Groups”) 
filed suit seeking to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of HB 1413 before the bill took 
effect.  The Labor Groups challenged the constitutional validity of this comprehensive bill 
alleging HB 1413 violated the right to organize and collectively bargain, equal protection, 
and the right to freedom of speech and association as guaranteed by the Missouri 
Constitution.  After the circuit court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining 
enforcement of HB 1413, the Labor Groups moved for summary judgment.  Over the 
State’s opposition, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Labor 
Groups, finding HB 1413 unconstitutional, invalidating the bill, and permanently enjoining 
its enforcement.  The State appeals.  The principal opinion affirms the circuit court ruling 
speciously contending HB 1413 violates equal protection and justifies invalidating and 
4 
 
permanently enjoining this comprehensive public section labor organization bill from 
becoming law. 
Equal Protection Analysis 
HB 1413 is not unconstitutional as the principal opinion concludes.  The principal 
opinion contends the public safety union exemption in HB 1413 violates the Missouri 
Constitution’s equal protection provision found in article I, section 2.  Article I, section 2 
provides that a law may treat groups of people or entities differently, but it cannot treat 
similarly situated persons or entities differently without adequate justification.  Doe v. 
Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Mo. banc 2006).  The principal opinion incorrectly finds 
public safety unions and non-public safety unions are similarly situated entities and there 
is no rational basis for treating these two types of public-sector unions differently.1  There 
                                              
1 Public safety unions are not the only entities exempted from HB 1413.  The department 
of corrections, which currently employs more than 10,000 Missourians, and the labor 
organizations that represent these employees are also exempted from the regulatory 
framework of HB 1413.  “[P]ublic safety labor organization” is defined by HB 1413 as “a 
labor organization wholly or primarily representing” certain categories of trained 
employees. § 105.500 (8), RSMo Supp. 2018 (emphasis added).  “Labor organization” is 
defined as an organization in which “public employees participate and that exists for the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with a public body or public bodies concerning 
collective bargaining, grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.”  § 105.500 (5), RSMo Supp. 2018 (emphasis added).  
HB 1413 defines “public body” to exclude the department of corrections.  § 105.500 (6), 
RSMo Supp. 2018.  Accordingly, to be a labor organization governed by HB 1413, the 
group must deal with a public body, other than the department of corrections.  By 
definition, therefore, a labor organization that represents department of corrections 
employees is not a public safety labor organization but is also exempt from the regulations 
and protocols in HB 1413.  Curiously, the Labor Groups do not argue the department of 
corrections exemption violates the equal protection clause. 
5 
 
are, however, adequate justifications for treating these dissimilar labor organizations 
differently under the law.    
 
 “[T]o successfully raise an equal protection challenge, one first must show that he 
or she is similarly situated to those who he alleges receive different treatment.”  Coyne v. 
Edwards, 395 S.W.3d 509, 519 (Mo. banc 2013).  “The similarly situated standard is a 
‘rigorous one’ requiring proof that the two classes ‘were similarly situated in all relevant 
aspects.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Murray v. Sw. Mo. Drug Task Force, 335 S.W.3d 
566, 569 (Mo. App. 2011)).  The Labor Groups have not demonstrated that public safety 
unions and non-public safety unions are similarly situated in all relevant aspects.  As the 
principal opinion notes, HB 1413 establishes different rules of selection, participation, and 
governance for public-sector labor organizations versus public safety labor organizations 
through the public safety exemption.  Therefore, for purposes of determining whether these 
separate labor organizations are similarly situated, the analysis should turn to traits that 
affect union selection, participation, and governance.   
As defined by HB 1413, public safety labor organizations “wholly or primarily” 
represent men and women who serve as public safety officers.  § 105.500 (8), RSMo Supp. 
2018.  Other public-sector labor organizations may represent public safety employees, but 
if a labor organization “wholly or primarily” represents public safety officers, then it would 
be considered a public safety labor organization.  Therefore, by definition, public safety 
labor organizations represent different groups of employees than other public-sector labor 
organizations.  For example, public safety employees demonstrate lower rates of turnover 
than non-public safety employees.  This affects a public employer’s management practices 
6 
 
in hiring and promotion—one of the topics for which negotiation is restricted for non-
public safety organizations by HB 1413.  Additionally, unionization rates are higher among 
public safety employees than other public employees.2  The combination of lower turnover 
and higher union participation makes public safety labor organizations differently situated 
than non-public safety organizations with respect to the employees’ certification of their 
collective bargaining agreements.  These examples illustrate how selection, participation 
and governance may differ between public safety and non-public safety public-sector labor 
organizations.  Public safety unions, therefore, differ from non-public safety unions, and 
these differences highlight that these organizations are not similarly situated in all relevant 
aspects for an equal protection analysis of this legislation.  Differently situated entities may 
be treated differently without running afoul of article I, section 2. 
 
Even if both types of labor organizations were similarly situated, there is a rational 
basis for distinguishing between them.  Under rational basis review, a statute must be 
upheld if there is any “reasonably conceivable state of facts that . . . provide[s] a rational 
basis for the classification.” Kan. City Premier Apartments, Inc. v. Mo. Real Estate 
Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 160,170 (Mo. banc 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting FCC v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).  “Rational basis review is highly 
deferential, and courts do not question the wisdom, social desirability or economic policy 
underlying a statute.”  Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat’l Auto Sales N., LLC, 361 
                                              
2 Federal data show unionization is highest among “protective services” at 36.6 percent, 
compared to the national average of 10.8 percent for the year 2020.  U.S. BUREAU OF 
LABOR 
STATISTICS: 
UNION 
MEMBERS 
SUMMARY 
(2021),  
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
7 
 
S.W.3d 364, 378 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Comm. for Educ. 
Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 491 (Mo. banc 2009)).  “Instead, all that is required is that 
this Court find a plausible reason for the classifications in question.”  Id. (alteration 
omitted). 
Public-sector labor laws often treat different types of public-sector employees 
differently, both in Missouri and in other states around the country.  In Missouri, public 
school teachers historically were exempted from public-sector labor laws.  Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 223 S.W.3d at 134.  Other groups such as police and highway patrol officers have 
also been governed differently.  Id. at 134 n.2.  When the General Assembly enacted 
Missouri’s first public sector labor law in 1965, it established public-sector labor 
organization rules that exempted police, deputy sheriffs, highway patrolmen, members of 
the national guard, and teachers.  See §§ 105.500-.530, RSMo Supp. 1965.  This law, with 
some revisions, governed public-sector labor organizations until the passage of HB 1413, 
and these distinctions have persisted.  Our own Court has noted the distinction between 
police and firefighters and other public employees.  Indep. Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d at 133 
(“[M]any public employees—especially police and firefighters—are deemed essential to 
the preservation of public safety, health, and order.”).  HB 1413’s exemption of public 
safety labor organizations, therefore, is not an irrational anomaly.   
Labor laws elsewhere have also differentiated between groups of public-sector 
employees.  Wisconsin exempted public safety workers in its recent public-sector union 
reform bill.  Wisc. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2013).  
Other jurisdictions have distinguished between university faculty and other public 
8 
 
employees bargaining over workload, Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 
Cent. State Univ. Chapter, 526 U.S. 124, 125-27 (1999), TSA security screeners and other 
TSA employees, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Loy, 281 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65-66 
(D.D.C. 2003), aff’d, 367 F.3d 932 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and court security officers and other 
police officers, Margiotta v. Kaye, 283 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).  These 
laws have all survived rational basis review, as should the exemption for public safety labor 
organizations in HB 1413. 
This Court’s role is not to determine whether the solution raised by the legislature 
is perfectly suited to the problem it purports to solve; rather, as long as the reason for 
distinguishing between public safety and non-public safety unions is plausible, there exists 
a rational basis for treating these labor organizations differently under the law.  Kan. City 
Premier, 344 S.W.3d at 170.  Here, the distinctions between the public employees the 
separate labor groups wholly or primarily serve provides plausible explanations and 
justifications for the dissimilar regulatory framework for public safety and nonpublic safety 
labor groups and is not unconstitutional.3  Therefore, the exemption for public safety 
organizations does not violate equal protection as guaranteed by article I, section 2 and 
                                              
3  The principal opinion tacitly acknowledges the inherent distinctions between public 
safety employees and non-public safety employees by suggesting the exemption may 
satisfy equal protection review if it applied to public safety employees rather than public 
safety unions.  But under rational basis review, this Court’s role is not to judge the wisdom 
of the General Assembly’s decision to differentiate labor groups verses the employees they 
represent.  Overbey, 361 S.W.3d at 378.  Because public safety unions wholly or primarily 
represent public safety employees, there exists “a plausible reason for the classifications in 
question.”  Id. (alteration omitted).         
9 
 
does not support invalidating HB 1413 and enjoining the bill from becoming law as the 
principal opinion concludes.   
For those reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge