Title: PEOPLE OF MI V PRENTICE DEVELL WATKINS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120036
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2003

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________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 28, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120036  
PRENTICE DEVELL WATKINS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether the trial court erred in questioning the defendant at  
the degree hearing.1  The defendant pleaded guilty to charges  
of open murder and possession of a firearm during the  
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.  At the plea hearing,  
the trial court accepted the defendant’s plea after the court,  
pursuant to MCR 6.302(B)(3)2, advised the defendant that he  
1 467 Mich 868 (2002).  
2  
(B) An Understanding Plea. Speaking directly  
was waiving his trial rights, including the right to remain  
silent.
 Pursuant to MCR 6.302(D)(1), the court also  
established support for the finding that the defendant was  
guilty of these offenses.  
At the subsequent degree hearing held pursuant to MCL  
750.318, the court heard from other witnesses and, without  
objection, 
questioned 
the 
defendant 
to 
determine the  
appropriate degree of the murder.  The court ultimately found  
defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder. The Court of  
Appeals concluded that, although the trial court violated  
defendant’s right against compelled self-incrimination, US  
Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17, by calling him as a  
witness at the degree hearing, the error was harmless.  Thus,  
the Court of Appeals affirmed the first-degree felony-murder  
to the defendant, the court must advise the  
defendant 
and 
determine 
that 
the 
defendant  
understands:  
* * *  
(3) if the plea is accepted, the defendant 
will not have a trial of any kind, and so gives up 
the rights the defendant would have at a trial, 
including the right:  
* * *  
(h) to remain silent during the trial.  [MCR 
6.302.]  
2  
conviction.3  247 Mich App 14; 634 NW2d 370 (2001).  
Although we too affirm the first-degree felony-murder  
conviction, we reject the Court of Appeals conclusion that the  
trial court erred by calling defendant to testify at the  
degree hearing.  A defendant may invoke the privilege against  
compelled self-incrimination at any point during a plea  
proceeding, but the privilege is waived if not asserted. By  
invoking 
the 
privilege, the defendant risks losing the benefit  
of any plea bargain if the judge refuses to accept the plea.  
Because defendant simply complied with the judge’s request to  
testify and never asserted his right to remain free from  
compelled self-incrimination, he may not now claim error.  
I  
The opinion of the Court of Appeals provides this factual  
summary:  
On January 18, 1998, Allen Russell Stewart was 
shot in the back in his mother’s front yard and 
died the same day from his gunshot wound.  There  
were no eyewitnesses to the shooting, although the 
next-door neighbor recalled seeing two men standing 
by a tree shortly before Allen was shot, and stated 
that she heard the gunshot.  Allen’s mother, 
Charlene Stewart, also heard a loud noise at the 
time of the shooting and observed Allen staggering 
into her kitchen with blood on his head. Charlene  
said that after Allen was shot, she was unable to 
locate his wallet or several pieces of jewelry that 
he normally wore.  A police officer who responded 
to Charlene’s 911 call noticed that Allen had duct  
3 Defendant did not challenge his felony-firearm 
conviction.  
3  
 
 
 
tape on his wrists.  After a search of Allen’s room  
at his mother’s house, the officer found what 
appeared to be drug-trafficking paraphernalia and 
10.98 grams of crack cocaine with an estimated 
value of $1,000.  
The police subsequently received information  
that defendant may have been involved in the 
shooting.  A police detective traveled to Kentucky, 
where defendant was in jail on an unrelated charge, 
and interviewed defendant after he waived his  
Miranda2 rights. 
According to the detective, 
defendant initially denied any involvement in the 
shooting or that he had ever been to Michigan. 
During a third interview, defendant allegedly 
admitted that he and a friend, Ardell Robinson, 
went to the neighborhood to attend a party and sat 
on the hood of Allen’s car waiting for the party to 
begin.  Defendant claimed that Allen pushed him and 
his gun went off as he slipped and fell.  In a  
fifth interview, defendant allegedly told the  
detective that Robinson gave him a gun before they 
arrived in Allen’s neighborhood.  Defendant said  
that Robinson grabbed Allen, and when Allen broke 
away and approached defendant, he pulled his gun 
and it went off.  The detective claimed that  
defendant further admitted that he and Robinson  
discussed robbing someone.  
The prosecution charged defendant with open 
murder and felony-firearm. 
At a hearing on  
November 4, 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to both 
charges and claimed that he shot Allen after the 
two fought.  During the course of the plea hearing,  
the court informed defendant that by pleading 
guilty he was waiving his right to a jury trial and 
the right to remain silent at that trial.  
Defendant indicated his understanding of his rights 
and the consequences of his plea and waived his 
rights on the record.  
On November 8, 1999, the court held a degree 
hearing pursuant to MCL 750.318.3  At the hearing, 
the 
prosecution 
presented 
several 
witnesses, 
including Charlene Stewart, the police officer who 
responded to the scene following the shooting, and 
the detective who interviewed defendant. 
The  
prosecution also called a forensic pathologist who  
4  
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testified that Allen had scrapes on his forehead 
and face and died as a result of the gunshot wound. 
According to the pathologist, the bullet entered 
Allen’s back, traveled down through his body, 
perforating his aorta, and stopped in his thigh. 
After the prosecution and defense rested, the court 
called defendant as a witness, and he was  
questioned both by the court and the prosecution. 
Defense counsel did not object to the court calling 
defendant as a witness or to defendant’s testimony. 
During his testimony, defendant denied robbing 
Allen and continued to insist that the shooting 
occurred as the two fought.  
In an oral decision following the degree 
hearing, the trial court found that defendant  
planned to rob Allen and that the shooting could 
not have happened in the manner described by 
defendant.  The court then concluded that the  
killing constituted felony murder because it  
occurred during the course of a robbery.  
2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 
16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).  
3 MCL 750.318 provides in pertinent part:  
The jury before whom any person indicted for 
murder shall be tried shall, if they find such 
person guilty thereof, ascertain in their verdict, 
whether it be murder of the first or second degree; 
but, if such person shall be convicted by 
confession, the court shall proceed by examination 
of witnesses to determine the degree of the crime, 
and shall render judgment accordingly.  
[247 Mich App 14-19.]  
II  
A trial court’s authority to examine a defendant at a  
degree hearing following the hearing at which a guilty plea  
for open murder was accepted is a question of law, which we  
review de novo. People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116; 649 NW2d 30  
5  
 
(2002).  
III  
Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must  
question the defendant to ascertain whether there is support  
for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense to  
which he is pleading guilty.  To facilitate compliance with a  
defendant’s procedural rights, this Court adopted MCR  
6.302(D)(1), which provides:  
If the defendant pleads guilty, the court, by 
questioning the defendant, must establish support 
for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the 
offense charged or the offense to which the  
defendant is pleading.  
The court must also ascertain the degree of the offense  
after a defendant pleads guilty of open murder. MCL 750.318  
provides that if a defendant “shall be convicted by  
confession, the court shall proceed by examination of  
witnesses to determine the degree of the crime, and shall  
render judgment accordingly.”  Hence, on defendant entering a  
plea of guilty of open murder, a court must determine whether  
the defendant is guilty of either first- or second-degree  
murder as defined in MCL 750.316, 750.317.  
The scope of inquiry at a plea colloquy is a function of  
the questions posed by the court and the information offered  
by a defendant.  
[A court may] make whatever inquiry it deems 
necessary in its sound discretion to assure itself  
6  
 
 
the defendant is not being pressured to offer a 
plea for which there is no factual basis.  A  
defendant who withholds information by invoking the 
privilege against self-incrimination at a plea 
colloquy runs the risk the . . . court will find 
the factual basis inadequate.  [Mitchell v United  
States, 526 US 314, 324; 119 S Ct 1307; 143 L Ed 2d 
424 (1999).]  
The degree hearing is simply an extension of the plea  
hearing.
 At the plea hearing, the court questioned the  
defendant to determine whether there was a sufficient factual  
basis to support the guilty plea of open murder, and, at the  
degree hearing, the court questioned the defendant in order to  
fulfill its duty under MCL 750.318 to determine whether there  
was a factual basis to support a finding that defendant was  
guilty of first-degree murder or only second-degree murder.  
The Court of Appeals erred in its application of  
Mitchell, in which the United States Supreme Court concluded  
that an accused’s waiver of the right against compelled self­
incrimination did not waive the right to invoke the privilege  
at a sentencing proceeding.  The Court of Appeals relied on  
Mitchell and concluded that defendant did not, by waiving his  
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination at the plea  
hearing, waive that right for the purposes of the degree  
hearing, and that the trial court, therefore, erred in  
compelling defendant to testify at that hearing.  Mitchell is  
inapposite not only because a degree hearing is not akin to a  
sentencing proceeding, but also because the defendant in  
7  
   
 
Mitchell expressly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege at  
the 
sentencing 
hearing, 
whereas 
defendant 
voluntarily 
answered  
the trial court’s questions in the case at bar.  The right to  
be free from compelled self-incrimination is not self­
executing,4 and the Court of Appeals erred in suggesting that  
the trial court compelled defendant to incriminate himself.  
Because defendant never invoked his privilege against self­
incrimination, the right must be considered waived.  
IV  
We 
have 
reviewed defendant’s remaining claims and find no  
basis upon which to grant the defendant relief.  Therefore,  
although we reject the Court of Appeals conclusion that the  
trial court erred by calling the defendant to testify at the  
degree hearing, we affirm defendant’s first-degree felony­
murder conviction.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
4  
See People v Smith, 257 Mich 319; 241 NW 186 (1932) 
("In all cases where a personal privilege exists for a witness 
to testify or not, if such witness does testify without 
objection he will be deemed to have done so voluntarily.").  
8