Title: Griffith v. Stein, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 331, 2019 & 332, 2019
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
SEAN J. GRIFFITH,  
 
Objector Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SHIVA STEIN, derivatively on 
behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, 
Inc., and individually as a 
Stockholder of The Goldman Sachs 
Group, Inc., 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee, 
 
and 
 
LLOYD C. BLANKENFEIN, M. 
MICHELE BURNS, GARY D. 
COHN, MARK A. FLAHERTY, 
WILLIAM W. GEORGE, JAMES A. 
JOHNSON, ELLEN J. KULLMAN, 
LAKSHMI N. MITTAL, ADEBAYO 
O. OGUNLESI, PETER 
OPPENHEIMER, DEBORA L. 
SPAR, MARK E. TUCKER, DAVID 
A. VINIAR, MARK O. 
WINKELMAN, and THE 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., 
 
Defendants Below, 
Appellees. 
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§  Nos. 331, 2019 and 332, 2019 
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§  Court Below—Court of Chancery  
§  of the State of Delaware 
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§  C.A. No. 2017-0354-SG 
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       Submitted:  August 19, 2019 
 
 
 
 
        Decided:  August 29, 2019  
 
2 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the notice of interlocutory appeal and the documents 
attached thereto as well as the notice to show cause and responses, it appears to the 
Court that: 
(1) 
The objector below-appellant, Sean J. Griffith (“the Objector”), has 
filed two appeals from a Court of a Court of Chancery letter order, dated July 1, 
2019, awarding the Objector attorneys’ fees and costs under the corporate benefit 
doctrine (“Fee Order”).1  In appeal No. 331, 2019, he petitions this Court under 
Supreme Court Rule 42 to accept an interlocutory appeal.  In appeal No. 332, 2019, 
he asks this Court to accept the appeal under the collateral order doctrine.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we refuse the interlocutory appeal and dismiss the other 
appeal as duplicative.  
(2) 
The Fee Order arises from a direct and derivative action brought by a 
stockholder against certain directors of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman 
Directors”).  After the parties reached a settlement and sought the Court’s approval 
of the proposed settlement, the Objector filed objections.  The Court of Chancery 
did not approve the settlement,2 and the parties proceeded to oral argument on the 
                                                 
1 Stein v. Blankfein, 2019 WL 2750100 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2019). 
2 Stein v. Blankfein, 2018 WL 5279358 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2018). 
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Goldman Directors’ pending motion to dismiss.  The Court of Chancery granted in 
part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.3   
(3) 
The Objector filed a motion for $575,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs 
under the corporate benefit doctrine.  The Goldman Directors opposed the motion, 
arguing that a fee award of approximately $10,000 was appropriate.  The Court of 
Chancery concluded that the objection was helpful and benefitted Goldman, but 
noted that its conclusions in rejecting the settlement were not “entirely congruent” 
with the Objector’s arguments.4  The Court of Chancery determined that a fee award 
of $100,000 was equitable, plus $1,923.30 in costs.5 
(4) 
On July 11, 2019, the Objector filed an application for certification of 
an interlocutory appeal.  The Objector argued that the Fee Order determined a 
substantial issue of material importance because it resolved an issue that went to the 
merits of the case and the amount of the fee awarded could discourage other 
objectors from challenging poor settlements.  The Objector also suggested that if the 
fee award was considered a collateral issue, then it could be immediately appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine.  As to the Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria, the Objector 
contended that the Fee Order addressed a question of first impression—the 
appropriate fee for a successful, activist objector.  The Objector also argued that 
                                                 
3 Stein v. Blankfein, 2019 WL 2323790 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019). 
4 Stein, 2019 WL 2750100, at *2. 
5 Id. 
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there were conflicting trial court decisions on fee awards to objectors and that 
interlocutory review would serve considerations of justice.   
(5) 
The Goldman Directors opposed the application for certification.  They 
argued that the Fee Order did not determine a substantial issue of material 
importance because it was a collateral matter that did not decide the merits of the 
case.  As to the Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria, the Goldman Directors argued that the order 
did not decide a legal issue of first impression, but applied settled law for the 
determination of fee awards.  The Goldman Directors also contended that there was 
no conflict on a question of law and that interlocutory review would not serve 
considerations of justice. 
(6) 
On July 23, 2019, the Court of Chancery denied the application for 
certification.6   Applying the Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria, the Court of Chancery 
concluded that the Fee Order did not involve a question of law resolved for the first 
time in Delaware, but simply applied established principles of the corporate benefit 
doctrine.7  The Court of Chancery found that the fact that the application of the 
corporate benefit doctrine led to different fee awards in different cases did not mean 
there were conflicting trial court decisions on a question of law.8  As to the 
possibility that the Fee Order could discourage beneficial objections to settlements, 
                                                 
6 Stein v. Blankfein, 2019 WL 3311227 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2019). 
7 Id. at *2. 
8 Id.  
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the Court of Chancery decided that interlocutory review would serve considerations 
of justice, but that this factor was of “slight weight.”9    The Court of Chancery 
concluded that the likely benefits of interlocutory review did not outweigh the 
probable costs, such that interlocutory review was in the interest of justice.10   
(7) 
The Court of Chancery declined to address whether the Fee Order was 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine, leaving that issue to this Court.  These 
appeals followed.   
(8) 
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound 
discretion of the Court.11  In the exercise of our discretion and giving great weight 
to the Court of Chancery’s thoughtful analysis in denying the application for 
certification, this Court has concluded that the application for interlocutory review 
does not meet the strict standards for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42(b).  
The case is not exceptional,12 and the potential benefits of interlocutory review do 
not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an 
interlocutory appeal.13  We therefore refuse the interlocutory appeal in No. 331, 
2019. 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v). 
12 Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii). 
13 Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii). 
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(9) 
Turning to appeal No. 332, 2019, the Clerk issued a notice directing the 
Objector to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as duplicative of 
the interlocutory appeal.  The Objector was also directed to state the basis for his 
position that the Fee Order was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  In his 
response, the Objector argues that the Fee Order falls within the collateral order 
doctrine because it determines an issue independent of the underlying litigation, it is 
binding on a non-party, and it will have a substantial, continuing effect on 
stockholders and Delaware corporations outside of this State as it will discourage 
objections to unfair settlements.   The Goldman Directors disagree, arguing that the 
Fee Order simply reflects an exercise of discretion under settled principles and that 
the Objector’s speculation is not the type of important right to be reviewed under the 
collateral order doctrine. 
(10) The collateral order doctrine is characterized as “a common law 
recognition that certain collateral orders constitute final judgments.”14  Under the 
collateral order doctrine, “orders which a) determine matters independent of the 
issues involved in the proceeding itself, b) bind persons who are non-parties in the 
underlying proceeding, and c) have a substantial, continuing effect on important 
                                                 
14 Evans v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 19, 652 A.2d 574, 576 (Del. 1995). 
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rights are final and subject to immediate appellate review.”15  Having carefully 
considered the Fee Order and the parties’ positions, we conclude that the Fee Order 
does not fall within the collateral order doctrine.  The Fee Order, which awarded 
$100,000 of the $575,000 in attorneys’ fees sought by the Objector under the 
corporate benefit doctrine, does not have a substantial, continuing effect on an 
important right.  Appeal No. 332, 2019 is therefore duplicative of the interlocutory 
appeal in No. 331, 2019 and must be dismissed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the interlocutory 
appeal in No. 331, 2019 is REFUSED and the appeal in No. 332, 2019 is 
DISMISSED.  The filing fee paid by the appellant shall be applied to any future 
appeal he files from a final order entered in the case.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
                                                 
15 Beebe Med. Ctr. v. Villare, 2008 WL 2137860, at *1 (Del. May 20, 2008) (citing Gannett Co., 
Inc. v. State, 565 A.2d 895, 900 (Del. 1989)).