Title: Sanjari v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 20S03-1105-CR-268
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 2012

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
 
Nancy A. McCaslin 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
 
 
McCaslin & McCaslin 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Elkhart, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ian McLean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 20S03-1105-CR-268 
 
 
AMIR H. SANJARI, 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
 
STATE OF INDIANA , 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court, No. 20D06-0610-FC-35 
The Honorable David C. Bonfiglio, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A03-1007-CR-384 
_________________________________ 
 
February 16, 2012 
 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
 
For his failure to pay child support for his two daughters, accumulating a gross arrearage 
well in excess of $15,000, a jury found the defendant, Amir H. Sanjari, guilty of four offenses: 
two counts of nonsupport of a dependent child, each a class D felony, plus two additional counts 
of nonsupport of a dependent child while owing over $15,000 in child support, each a class C 
felony.  The trial court entered judgment only as to the two class C felonies.  The defendant ap-
pealed, raising several issues, and the Court of Appeals vacated one of the defendant's class C 
felony convictions but affirmed the trial court in all other respects.  Sanjari v. State, 942 N.E.2d 
134, 137, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  We granted transfer and now hold that Indiana Code Section 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Feb 16 2012, 2:48 pm
 
2 
35-46-1-5 permits a separate class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, 
but only one such offense may be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one 
or more of such children is $15,000 or more.  As to all other appellate issues, we summarily af-
firm the Court of Appeals.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).   
 
 
The defendant and his wife married in 1982 and had two children.  Their marriage was 
dissolved in Elkhart County, Indiana, in 2000, and the defendant was eventually ordered to pay 
$239 per week as child support to apply to both children, plus additional amounts for educational 
expenses and to reduce an accumulated support arrearage.  The defendant failed to regularly pay 
such "in gross" support payments1 and eventually ceased making the child support payments.  
The defendant was initially charged with two counts of class C felony nonsupport of a dependent 
child, one count for each child, because the total amount of unpaid support exceeded $15,000.  
The State later added two additional counts of class D felony nonsupport, one for each child.  
When initially charged, the defendant was more than $17,000 behind in support, but by the time 
his trial commenced the arrearage exceeded $56,000.  A jury found the defendant guilty of all 
four counts: a class C felony and a class D felony for each child.  The trial court entered judg-
ment only as to the two class C felonies, per Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-6, which provides 
that, notwithstanding guilty verdicts on separate counts charging both an offense and an included 
offense, a judgment and sentence "may not be entered against the defendant for the included of-
fense."  Ind. Code § 35-38-1-6.   
 
 
The defendant challenges the trial court judgment, contending that he was erroneously 
convicted for two class C felonies based upon "[a]n indivisible, 'in-gross' support order" requir-
ing "a specific sum of undivided support for his two daughters."  Appellant's Br. at 39–40.  The 
defendant argues that the two counts should have "merged" into one conviction under Indiana 
double jeopardy jurisprudence.  Id. at 40. 
 
 
The State contends that "a defendant may be subject to enhancement of multiple nonsup-
port offenses, provided that a discrete amount of unpaid support qualifying for the enhancement 
                                                 
1 An "in gross" support order is a court order to pay a single amount for the support of all depen-
dent children to whom support is owed. 
 
3 
be attributable to each enhanced count."  Appellee's Transfer Br. at 9.  In other words, the State 
argues that the statute allows for the enhancement of an underlying class D felony to a class C 
felony for every $15,000 in nonsupport arrears.  Thus, the State argues, "a defendant who fails to 
provide support for four children in the value of $60,000 may be prosecuted and punished for 
four class C felonies."  Id. at 10.   
 
 
Often discussed under the general rubric of Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence, we 
recognize "a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are separate and in 
addition to the protections afforded by the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause."  Spivey v. State, 
761 N.E.2d 831, 834 (Ind. 2002).  Among these are situations in which an "enhancement is im-
posed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which the defendant has been 
convicted and punished."  Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 56 (Ind. 1999) (Sullivan, J., con-
curring) (emphasis omitted).  This principle is reflected in the statutory provision prohibiting the 
entry of judgment and sentence on separate counts charging both an offense and an included of-
fense.  See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-6.  We generally consider claims of multiple sentencing en-
hancements as matters of statutory interpretation, Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 
2010), and there is a "general rule against double enhancements absent explicit legislative direc-
tion."  Mills v. State, 868 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. 2007); see also Nicoson, 938 N.E.2d at 663 
(stating that the general rule against double enhancement "remains intact").   
 
 
The statutory provision defining the criminal offense of nonsupport of a dependent child 
states in relevant part:  
 
A person who knowingly or intentionally fails to provide support to the person's de-
pendent child commits nonsupport of a child, a Class D felony.  However, the offense is a 
Class C felony if the total amount of unpaid support that is due and owing for one (1) or 
more children is at least fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000). 
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-5(a) (emphasis added).  This language establishes the class C felony as an 
enhancement of the Class D felony when the "total amount of unpaid support" equals or exceeds 
$15,000.  Because the second sentence begins "the offense," thus relating back to the class D fe-
lony defined in the first sentence, the class C felony has no independent meaning without the un-
derlying class D offense of "knowingly or intentionally fail[ing] to provide support."  See State 
v. Land, 688 N.E.2d 1307, 1310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (analyzing a previous version of Indiana 
 
4 
Code Section 35-46-1-5(a) and reaching the same conclusion), trans. denied.  Hence, the ele-
ments of the class C offense include the elements of the class D offense.  That offense is singular 
in nature penalizing the knowing or intentional "fail[ure] to provide support to the person's de-
pendent child" thus "commit[ing] nonsupport of a child."  Id. (emphasis added).  But that same 
offense may incur stiffer penalty—that is, it may be enhanced—if the unpaid support due and 
owing equals or exceeds $15,000.  See id.  The accumulation of support arrearage is not, in and 
of itself, a separate offense.  See Land, 688 N.E.2d at 1311 ("Our statute criminalizes the present 
act of failing to provide child support and enhances it if the amount due and owing at the time of 
the underlying act is in excess of $1[5],000.  Our statute does not criminalize the failure to pay 
past due support."). 
 
 
Before 1996, the criminal nonsupport statute provided only for a class D felony.  In 1996, 
the legislature then added the second sentence which read as follows: "However, the offense is a 
Class C felony if the amount of unpaid support that is due and owing is at least ten thousand dol-
lars ($10,000)."  P.L. 213-1996, sec. 4, 1996 Ind. Acts 2658.  Under this version, the amount 
"due and owing" is linked directly to the underlying offense, nonsupport of a dependent child.  
The Court of Appeals, in construing the language of the 1996 version of the statute, noted this 
distinction in State v. Moore, 688 N.E.2d 917, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).  In Moore, the State 
charged the defendant with multiple class C felonies based upon "the aggregate amount in ar-
rears for all of [Moore's] children."  Id.  The trial court dismissed the charges and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed because the support arrearage did not reach the minimum amount "with respect 
to any individual child."  Id.  In response to the State's argument that the arrearage should be ag-
gregated, the court stated:  
[T]he language of the statute does not support this construction.  [Indiana Code Section] 
35-46-1-5(a) makes only one reference as to whom the support is owed: "the person's de-
pendent child."  Since the legislature declined to mention the term "children" with regard 
to the Class "C" felony, it is not appropriate to incorporate the word here. 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 
 
In 2001 the legislature again amended the statute by inserting the words "total" and "for 
 
5 
one or more children."2  P.L. 123-2001, sec. 4, 2001 Ind. Acts 575.  The specification "for one or 
more children" thus made clear that the enhancement was not limited to the amount of arrearage 
"per child" but, instead, required the aggregation of the arrearage for all of a defendant's depen-
dent children.  The addition of the modifier "total" before "amount" similarly indicates that the 
General Assembly intended the defendant's entire support arrearage to be considered as one sin-
gle enhancing circumstance for purposes of elevating the offense from a class D to a class C fe-
lony.  The statute thus provides that a defendant will be subject to conviction for class C felony 
nonsupport if the amount owed, viewed as an aggregate of all of the defendant's unpaid support 
for all dependent children, is $15,000 or more.3   
 
We conclude that class C felony nonsupport of a dependent child under Indiana Code 
Section 35-46-1-5(a) is an enhancement of the class D offense under that same section.  The lan-
guage of the statute authorizes conviction for nonsupport of a dependent child as a class C felony 
only when the "total amount of unpaid support that is due and owing for one (1) or more child-
ren" is at least $15,000.  Ind. Code § 35-46-1-5(a).  We construe this to mean that the enhance-
ment from a D felony to a C felony is triggered by the existence of an aggregate support arrea-
rage totaling "at least fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000)," regardless of the number of children.  
Id.  In other words, the enhancement to a class C felony requires that every dollar over and above 
the $15,000 threshold will be included as the basis for the same class C felony.  Id.   
 
This very same factor, the existence of aggregate unpaid support of $15,000 or more, if 
used to enhance a conviction of nonsupport for one dependent child from a class D felony to a 
class C felony, may not also be used to enhance a second class D nonsupport conviction with re-
spect to another child without further punishing the defendant "for the very same behavior or 
harm" to which he is already subject to punishment by the first enhancement.  Richardson, 717 
                                                 
2 The minimum amount was also raised to $15,000.  P.L. 123-2001, sec. 4, 2001 Ind. Acts 575. 
 
3 In the present case, the defendant was charged and convicted of nonsupport of two children 
from the same marriage.  We acknowledge that criminal proceedings may be brought against a defendant 
for the nonsupport of multiple children who are not all born of the same marriage.  See, e.g., Gilliam v. 
State, 901 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (involving the failure to support eight children born of three 
different women), trans. not sought.  Because the issue is not presented in this case, we express no opi-
nion as to whether the amount for enhancement to a class C felony is to be aggregated only as to all de-
pendent children with the same mother or whether it should include all dependent children. 
 
6 
N.E.2d at 56 (Sullivan, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 834.  Our 
analysis and holding is not affected by whether a defendant was ordered to pay child support in a 
single regular sum applicable in aggregate to multiple children (so-called "in gross" support).   
 
 
The State's contention—that the amount of unpaid support need not be aggregated but 
may be attributed to individual dependent children and, if $15,000 or more per child, may war-
rant a separate class C felony enhancement for each such child—is not presented by the facts of 
this case.  The class C felony offenses charged here, and on which the jury was instructed and 
returned its verdict, did not segregate and identify different amounts of unpaid support totaling 
$15,000 or more for each child.  Based on the charges as expressed in the jury instructions, it is 
clear that the same behavior or harm ("total amount of support due and owing for one or more 
children is at least fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars," Appellant's App'x at 895, 897, 916, 
918) was used to enhance both of the defendant's D felony convictions to C felonies.  For future 
clarification, however, we do not consider the attribution of separate $15,000 portions of the ag-
gregate arrearage to separate dependent children a proper basis for seeking separate class C felo-
ny convictions as to each child.  Such a technique might avoid the statutory construction rule of 
Richardson and Spivey proscribing multiple punishments for the same behavior or harm.  But 
this prosecutorial maneuver would not satisfy the statutory basis for a class C felony nonsupport 
conviction, which requires that the aggregate, the "total" amount, of unpaid support for all of the 
defendant's dependent children, whether one or more, equal or exceed $15,000.   
 
 
In this appeal, the defendant has challenged the trial court's judgment imposing two class 
C felony convictions for nonsupport of a dependent child.  Finding the judgment to be erroneous, 
we vacate it and remand this case to the trial court to enter a new judgment on the jury verdicts, 
with the nonsupport conviction as to one child to be entered as a class D felony and the nonsup-
port conviction as to the other child, as enhanced by the accumulated arrearage totaling $15,000 
or more, to be entered as a class C felony, and to resentence the defendant accordingly.  As noted 
above, we summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on all other issues.   
 
 
7 
Conclusion 
 
 
The judgment of the trial court is vacated and this cause is remanded for the entry of 
judgment on the jury verdicts of guilt as follows: one class C felony as to the nonsupport appli-
cable to one of the dependent children and one class D felony as to the nonsupport of the other 
dependent child, and for a determination of the appropriate sentence for each conviction.   
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.