Title: In the Matter of Yaron Helmer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2019

In the Matter of Yaron Helmer Annotate this Case SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. In the Matter of Yaron Helmer (D-17-17) (080110)Argued October 10, 2018 -- Decided March 6, 2019RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. This disciplinary matter involves serious allegations that a private attorney engaged in unethical conduct and improperly influenced the prosecution of two individuals by the Cumberland County Prosecutor’s Office (CCPO). Certain aspects of the alleged behavior -- if proven -- would constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and violate Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.4(d). The prosecutor’s office, of course, has a preeminent role in the enforcement of criminal laws. Prosecutors, not private counsel, have significant discretionary authority about whether to pursue criminal charges and how to proceed. As a result, the Court must examine not only whether the allegations are supported but also who bore responsibility for certain conduct in question. National Freight, Inc. (NFI), was the victim of an alleged fraudulent scheme carried out by Trident, LLC. In March and April 2008, Trident passed NFI five bad checks that totaled $168,000. Trident went out of business in May 2008. Days later, NFI filed a civil lawsuit against Trident and its corporate principals. Several other creditors forced Trident into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy proceeding preempted the civil suit, which was dismissed. In June 2008, NFI’s security manager, James Matlock, signed criminal complaints against Trident’s principals. An assistant prosecutor reviewed the matter and declined to pursue charges. NFI then retained Helmer to act as a “middleman” between the company and the CCPO and persuade the office to prosecute. Helmer worked in the CCPO from 1985 through 1989 and served as the First Assistant Prosecutor in 1988 and 1989. Helmer contacted Assistant Prosecutor David Branco, then chief of the major crimes and organized crime bureau for the CCPO. The two had previously worked together at the Prosecutor’s Office and had become good friends. Branco discussed the NFI/Trident matter with Helmer, and Helmer urged Branco to pursue criminal charges. Branco assigned the case to G. Harrison Walters, a line prosecutor who had been with the office for three years and had little prior experience handling white collar cases. On May 27, 2009, Branco met with Helmer, Matlock, and NFI’s general counsel. Branco called Walters into the meeting while it was underway. Branco and Helmer ran and “dominated” the meeting, according to Walters. The following plan was agreed on: the CCPO would seek a sealed indictment against Trident’s principals; arrest them in New Jersey by surprise; 1 request high bail amounts; allege that the bail money represented the proceeds of a crime at a bail source inquiry; and arrange for the bail monies to be used as restitution for NFI. Had the plan worked, NFI, an unsecured creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, might have received payment for its losses outside of the bankruptcy process. Walters conducted no independent investigation of NFI’s allegations against Trident. In an email to Walters, Helmer sketched out ten criminal charges for an indictment, and Walters directed his secretary to draft a ten-count indictment that followed Helmer’s outline. Walters presented the case to the grand jury with Helmer as the sole witness. The grand jury indicted Trident and its principals on all ten proposed counts. The following day, a Superior Court Judge signed arrest warrants against the principals, which listed bail at “$150,000 Full Cash.” Branco admitted that a higher-than-standard bail amount was sought, among other reasons, “to get as close to the restitution amount as possible.” The plan fell apart when CCPO detectives refused to carry out the arrests. The trial court later dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The CCPO did not appeal. After an internal investigation, the CCPO fired Branco and suspended Walters for six weeks without pay. The CCPO also referred Helmer and Branco to the Office of the Attorney General and made a referral to the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) about Helmer, Branco, and Walters. The OAE filed a disciplinary complaint against Helmer. A special master concluded that the OAE failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Helmer violated the RPCs charged. A majority of the Disciplinary Review Board agreed with the dismissal of the RPC 3.4(g) charge but found that Helmer violated RPCs 8.4(a) and (d). The Court granted Helmer’s petition for review. ___ N.J. ___ (2018).HELD: In this case, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that respondent orchestrated the alleged misconduct, the OAE’s complaint must be dismissed. That said, the record highlights a series of troublesome practices and leaves a number of questions unanswered. The Court briefly addresses some of those areas to offer guidance to private practitioners and prosecutors.1. Pursuant to RPC 8.4(d), “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The broad language of the rule passes “constitutional muster” when narrowed “to particularly egregious conduct.” In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 632 (1982). When the rule is “the sole basis for discipline,” it applies only to conduct that “flagrantly violat[es] . . . accepted professional norms.” Ibid. (pp. 17-18)2. Victims can pursue restitution in both the civil and criminal arenas. One challenge practitioners face is to refrain from presenting or threatening “to present criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in a civil matter.” RPC 3.4(g). Heightened care is needed to navigate potential pitfalls in that area. In this case, though, the core issue is not whether private counsel could pursue restitution through the criminal process but rather the manner in which he sought to do so. Helmer’s conduct here pushed the envelope. Although he actively 2 encouraged a criminal prosecution and advocated for restitution for his client, to place primary responsibility on Helmer for what occurred overlooks the role and decision-making authority of the prosecution team. (pp. 18-19)3. The OAE faults Helmer at the outset for using special access to the CCPO to ask it to reconsider its initial decision to decline prosecution. After six months, unless the lawyer “participated personally and substantially” in the matter or “had substantial responsibility” over the matter as a public officer, it is not inappropriate for an attorney in private practice to make a presentation to his or her former office on behalf of a client. RPC 1.11(a)(1)-(2). The hearing also explored Helmer’s relationship with Branco. The Attorney General and county prosecutors can and do impose internal codes of ethics to govern such situations. Here, there is no evidence in the record that Helmer knew Branco had been told to recuse himself from Helmer’s cases. The Court stresses that half measures in this area can invite second-guessing and possible ethical challenges. (pp. 19-21)4. Much of the hearing focused on Helmer’s role in the charging decision, grand jury process, and the question of bail. As to the plan to charge and arrest two businessmen, the ultimate decisions rested with the prosecutors. It is not at all inappropriate for private counsel to make a presentation to the prosecutor’s office on behalf of a victim. The prosecutor represents the public and should independently assess the allegations presented. In this case, however, a line prosecutor conducted no follow-up investigation. The CCPO later disavowed what took place for good reason. Helmer made detailed recommendations in writing about what he thought the indictment should allege. The line prosecutor relied heavily on those suggestions to structure and draft the indictment. The Court cannot conclude from the record that Helmer improperly induced the line prosecutor to act. It is highly unusual for a victim’s attorney to appear as the sole witness before a grand jury. But the prosecutor, not private counsel, ultimately made the unorthodox decision to proceed in that way here. On the issue of bail, even if Helmer argued to the prosecutors that bail be set at an inappropriately high amount, for an inappropriate reason, the prosecution made that recommendation to the court, and the court ultimately accepted it. Woven into a number of the above allegations is the claim that Helmer manipulated an inexperienced line prosecutor. The advantage that comes with experience does not implicate ethical questions as long as counsel on both sides abide by the canons of professional responsibility. (pp. 21-26)5. The burden of proof in disciplinary matters is clear and convincing evidence. R. 2:15- 15(a). In addition, when a violation of RPC 8.4(d) is the sole basis for discipline, a particularly high level of proof is required. The proceedings in this matter did not follow best practices and were troubling in a number of respects. Nonetheless, the Court does not find clear and convincing evidence that Helmer’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(d). (pp. 26-27) The disciplinary charges are DISMISSED.JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON did not participate. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY D- 17 September Term 2017 080110 In the Matter of Yaron Helmer, an Attorney at Law. On an Order to show cause why respondent should not be disciplined. Argued Decided October 10, 2018 March 6, 2019 Steven J. Zweig, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Patricia B. Quelch argued the cause for respondent (Helmer, Conley & Kasselman, attorneys). CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. This disciplinary matter involves serious allegations that a privateattorney engaged in unethical conduct and improperly influenced theprosecution of two individuals by the Cumberland County Prosecutor’s Office.Certain aspects of the alleged behavior -- if proven -- would constitute conduct 1 prejudicial to the administration of justice and violate Rule of ProfessionalConduct (RPC) 8.4(d). Among other things, the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) asserts that theprivate attorney improperly influenced the criminal justice process when hehelped draft the indictment, testified before the grand jury, and tried tomanipulate the bail and arrest processes so that a high amount of bail would beposted and later paid as restitution to his client. The prosecutor’s office, of course, has a preeminent role in theenforcement of criminal laws. Prosecutors, not private counsel, havesignificant discretionary authority about whether to pursue criminal chargesand how to proceed. As a result, we must examine not only whether theallegations are supported but also who bore responsibility for certain conductin question. In this case, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence thatrespondent orchestrated the alleged misconduct, the OAE’s complaint must bedismissed. That said, the record highlights a series of troublesome practicesand leaves a number of questions unanswered. We briefly address some ofthose areas to offer guidance to private practitioners and prosecutors. 2 I. The decision of the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) ably reviewed thefacts at length. At its core, this disciplinary matter involved the followingissues. In 2008, respondent Yaron Helmer, an attorney in private practice whohad previously served in the Cumberland County Prosecutor’s Office (CCPO),was hired to represent National Freight, Inc. (NFI), a distribution company. NFI was the victim of an alleged fraudulent scheme carried out byTrident, LLC, a bottled water company. Trident’s corporate principalsincluded James Land, Jr., its chief executive officer, and Michael Pessiki, itspresident. In 2007, Trident and NFI executed a contract under which NFI agreed todeliver bottled water for Trident. Trident paid NFI more than $887,000 fordistribution services but, in March 2008, a $100,000 check from Trident toNFI bounced. Afterward, the parties agreed that Trident would make dailypayments of $17,000 for continued distribution services. NFI knew at the timethat Trident was struggling financially. Under the new arrangement, most ofTrident’s daily checks cleared. In April 2008, four more checks, totaling$68,000, bounced. Collectively, the five bad checks that Trident passedtotaled $168,000. 3 Trident went out of business in May 2008. Days later, NFI filed a civillawsuit against Trident, Land, and Pessiki. The complaint, as amended,alleged that NFI suffered $3 million in damages through breach of contract,unjust enrichment, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud. The suit claimedthat Trident was a shell company created to protect the assets of another entity,and that Land and Pessiki had conspired to defraud Trident’s creditors as thedefendants tried to sell off other assets at a profit. On May 16, 2008, NFI’s vice president of security, who was not anattorney, warned Trident that NFI would pursue a criminal prosecution ifTrident did not make NFI whole within twenty days. Several other creditorsforced Trident into involuntary bankruptcy on September 3, 2008. In both thecivil lawsuit and the bankruptcy proceedings, NFI sought to pierce thecorporate veil and pursue Land’s and Pessiki’s personal assets based on theirallegedly fraudulent acts. Because the bankruptcy proceeding preempted thecivil suit, the civil action was dismissed in May 2011. The bankruptcy wassettled in July 2012, and NFI received $89,223.15 -- roughly 3.5 percent of itsunsecured claim. In June 2008, NFI’s security manager, James Matlock, visited theVineland Police Department and reported that Land and Pessiki had given NFIfive checks that the bank returned for insufficient funds. Matlock also signed 4 criminal complaints against Land and Pessiki. An assistant prosecutor at theCCPO reviewed the matter and declined to pursue criminal charges becausethe dispute “appear[ed] to be a civil matter between two companies.” NFI then retained Helmer to act as a “middleman” between the companyand the Prosecutor’s Office and persuade the office to prosecute Land andPessiki for issuing bad checks. The retainer agreement, dated December 8,2008, noted that NFI hired Helmer because of his “unique background andcontacts in [Cumberland] County.” Helmer worked in the CCPO from 1985through 1989 and served as the First Assistant Prosecutor in 1988 and 1989. Under the agreement, NFI promised to pay Helmer a one-time fee of$10,000 and a percentage of any restitution payments made: “20% of the first$500,000.00 . . . plus 15% of any money in excess of $500,000.00 collected asrestitution paid by the Defendant(s) in the criminal matter.” Helmer contacted Assistant Prosecutor David Branco about the matter inDecember 2008. At the time, Branco was chief of the major crimes andorganized crime bureau for the CCPO. The two had previously workedtogether at the Prosecutor’s Office and had become good friends. The First Assistant at the time of Helmer’s referral later testified at thedisciplinary hearing. The First Assistant explained that, in response toconcerns raised by law enforcement officers, he had instructed Branco not to 5 handle any of Helmer’s cases “to avoid any appearance of impropriety” and tomaintain the office’s integrity. Branco described their conversationdifferently. He testified that the First Assistant only asked to be advised inadvance of any plea colloquy in cases that Branco resolved with Helmer. Branco discussed the NFI/Trident matter with Helmer, and Helmer urgedBranco to pursue criminal charges. Branco assigned the case to G. HarrisonWalters, a line prosecutor who had been with the office for three years and hadlittle prior experience handling white collar cases. On May 27, 2009, Branco met with Helmer, Matlock, and NFI’s generalcounsel. Branco called Walters into the meeting while it was underway.Branco and Helmer ran and “dominated” the meeting, according to Walters. The following plan was agreed on at the meeting: the CCPO would seeka sealed indictment against Land and Pessiki; arrest them in New Jersey bysurprise; request high bail amounts; allege that the bail money represented theproceeds of a crime at a bail source inquiry; and arrange for the bail monies tobe used as restitution for NFI. Under the plan, defendants would be requiredto post cash bail and would be offered Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI) if theyagreed to pay restitution as a condition. In essence, the plan was designed to obtain restitution for NFI throughthe arrests of Land and Pessiki. Had the plan worked, NFI, an unsecured 6 creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, might have received payment for itsbusiness losses outside of the bankruptcy process. Walters conducted no independent investigation of NFI’s allegationsagainst Trident. The following events took place instead. Two weeks after thegroup meeting, Helmer sent Walters an email dated June 11, 2009. Helmersuggested that the CCPO seek an indictment on June 17, 2009, before thecurrent, seasoned grand jury expired. In the email, Helmer outlined a briefnarrative summary for the grand jury presentation and noted that he wouldprovide more details to the grand jury “in accordance with our previousconversation.” Helmer also sketched out ten criminal charges for anindictment. Walters, in turn, directed his secretary to draft a ten-countindictment that followed Helmer’s outline. Walters presented the case to the grand jury on June 17, 2009 withHelmer as the sole witness. Walters testified that he would have preferred tocall Matlock, a former State Trooper and, by then, a former NFI employee.Matlock also testified and said that he would have been available as a witnesshad he been called. Walters checked with Branco who said that if Helmerwanted to testify, he could. Helmer appeared before the grand jury and claimed he testified as avictim advocate/navigator. He had previously spoken with certain employees 7 at NFI and reviewed information they supplied, but he did not conduct anindependent investigation. The grand jury indicted Trident, Land, and Pessiki on all ten proposedcounts, including second-degree charges of conspiracy, theft by deception,theft of services, and issuing bad checks. The following day, a Superior CourtJudge signed arrest warrants against Land and Pessiki, which listed bail at“$150,000 Full Cash.” Neither Land nor Pessiki had a criminal record or any history of flight.Branco testified that, at the time of the indictment, the standard amount of bailfor the crimes charged ranged from $35,000 to $75,000, with an option to postten percent. He admitted that the higher bail was sought, among other reasons,“to get as close to the restitution amount as possible . . . . [Y]ou have at least$168,000 of bad checks.” 1 At various times afterward, Walters, Branco, and Helmer discussed thearrest plan. Land and Pessiki, who lived outside New Jersey, would bearrested in Gloucester County on August 6, 2009, at a mediation session in thecivil lawsuit. They would then be lodged in the Cumberland County Jail.1 Under the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, it is extremely unlikely that a high bail would be set in a case like this today. Even at the time of the indictment, though, restitution was not a factor to consider in determining the appropriate amount of bail. See R. 3:26-1(a) (2009) (listing factors). 8 The plan fell apart when CCPO detectives refused to carry out thearrests, and the Chief of Detectives discussed the matter with the FirstAssistant. The First Assistant directed Walters to apply to reduce Land’s andPessiki’s bail and have them released on their own recognizance (ROR). Soonafter, a Superior Court Judge cancelled the arrest warrants and directed thatLand and Pessiki be released ROR. Land and Pessiki were arraigned on September 15, 2009. Waltersrepresented that the CCPO would support PTI -- despite multiple second-degree charges -- if Land and Pessiki agreed to make full restitution to NFI.As Walters later testified, “that was . . . part of the plan. It was trying to getthe swift resolution, trying to get it done.” After the arraignment, Helmer, onbehalf of NFI, requested that the CCPO seek restitution well beyond the valueof the bad checks. He claimed that NFI had incurred losses and expensesamounting to more than $1.8 million because of Trident’s conduct. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the indictment in December 2009because of Helmer’s allegedly improper involvement in the grand jury process.The trial court declined to dismiss at the time and noted, “I don’t see any caselaw that says . . . how it happened was inappropriate.” In August 2010, the trial court dismissed the indictment with prejudicebecause of the CCPO’s failure to produce the original bounced checks. The 9 CCPO disagreed with the court’s evidentiary ruling but did not appeal. Inletters to NFI and defense counsel, the CCPO explained that, “withoutequivocation or hesitation,” it “agrees, as a matter of professionalresponsibility, that the manner of presentation to the Grand Jury was notproper and shall not be sanctioned or condoned.” As to the merits, theProsecutor’s Office added, “Our best professional judgment is that there doesnot exist a good faith basis to prove a criminal case beyond a reasonabledoubt.” After an internal ethics investigation, the CCPO fired Branco andsuspended Walters for six weeks without pay. The CCPO also referred Helmerand Branco to the Office of the Attorney General, which declined to prosecute.In addition, the CCPO made a referral to the OAE about Helmer, Branco, andWalters. II. A. The OAE filed a disciplinary complaint against Helmer on March 20,2015. The detailed Complaint asserts that Helmer’s conduct violated threerules of professional conduct: RPCs 3.4(g), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d). RPC 3.4(g) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not present, participate inpresenting, or threaten to present criminal charges to obtain an improper 10 advantage in a civil matter.” The Complaint asserts multiple grounds for thecharged violation including Helmer’s entering into a retainer arrangement inwhich his fee was partly contingent upon payment of restitution; his meetingwith Branco, Walters, Matlock, and NFI’s general counsel to press for acriminal prosecution after a declination; Helmer’s participation in drafting theindictment; his testimony before the grand jury; and his influencing Brancoand Walters to seek high bail, have the indictment sealed, and arrest Land andPessiki during a civil mediation session. RPC 8.4(a) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer toviolate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.” RPC 8.4(d)states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conductthat is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The Complaint asserts thatHelmer’s “actions to collect money utilizing the criminal process on behalf ofNFI . . . would have impacted the administration of justice in the criminal,civil and bankruptcy cases.” A special master conducted extensive hearings at which Helmer, Branco,Walters, Matlock, the First Assistant of the CCPO, NFI’s general counsel,Land, multiple retired prosecutors, and others testified. After twelve days oftestimony and the introduction of more than 150 documents, the special master 11 concluded that the OAE failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence thatHelmer violated the RPCs charged. As to RPC 3.4(g), the special master concluded there was nothing wrongwith Helmer’s attempt to obtain restitution for his client in a criminal casewhile civil proceedings were ongoing. The special master relied on twosources for support: (1) the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, which protects therights of crime victims “[t]o be informed about available remedies” and “[t]obe compensated for their loss whenever possible,” see N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(h),(i) (2009); and (2) N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(f), which provides that an order ofrestitution in a criminal matter “shall not operate as a bar to the seeking ofcivil recovery by the victim based on the incident underlying the criminalconviction.” Taken together, the special master concluded, a crime victim maybe represented by counsel and simultaneously seek “both criminal restitutionand civil recovery for the same loss.” More pointedly, the special master found that the OAE did notdemonstrate how Helmer’s conduct could have given rise to an improperadvantage in a civil matter. The special master observed that the CCPO, notHelmer, indicted Land and Pessiki; that Helmer could not control the arrest orthe setting of bail; and that no advantage could have been gained in thebankruptcy proceeding in any event. 12 The special master viewed the charge under RPC 8.4(a) as “derivative ofthe RPC 3.4(g) charge.” The special master likewise concluded that thealleged violation of RPC 8.4(d) rested heavily upon the RPC 3.4(g) charge. Afinding of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, he noted,“entirely discounts the independent conduct of at least two prosecutors ” and“the involvement of several judges,” whom Helmer did not control. B. A majority of the DRB agreed with the special master’s dismissal of theRPC 3.4(g) charge but found that Helmer violated RPCs 8.4(a) and (d). Themajority opinion concluded that Helmer leveraged his forty years of experience in the criminal justice system, and his special access to members of the CCPO, couched in the retainer agreement as his “unique background and contacts in [Cumberland] County,” to manipulate the criminal justice system on behalf of NFI. Using the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights as a sword and a shield, and believing his actions would, thus, be beyond reproach, respondent orchestrated an improper scheme to obtain NFI’s desired monetary damages. He did so with the complicity of Branco and Walters, whom we do not view as “independent prosecutors.” Although the DRB agreed with the dismissal of the RPC 3.4(g) charge,the majority did not adopt the special master’s legal conclusions. In particular,the majority explained that a violation of RPC 3.4(g) requires proof of intent to 13 gain an improper advantage in a civil matter -- which the majority foundlacking. The DRB, however, did identify “several ethics 'red lights’” that Helmer“ran . . . in his representation of NFI”: pursuit of a criminal prosecution basedon the same alleged misconduct in the civil and bankruptcy proceedings, whichshould have prompted ethics concerns; use of special access to the CCPO;manipulation of an inexperienced assistant prosecutor; design of a plan tocharge and arrest individuals in order to convert a high bail into restitution;and “highly irregular” and “irresponsible” testimony before the grand jury. The majority concluded that Helmer “improperly orchestrated theprosecution of Land and Pessiki . . . to secure as much monetary compensationas possible for NFI, which was at the back of the line in the bankruptcyproceedings.” The DRB majority found that Helmer’s “manipulation of thesystem was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice” and violatedRPC 8.4(d). Helmer’s knowing recruitment of Branco and Walters into thescheme also violated RPC 8.4(a), in that the majority found that Helmerinduced them to violate RPC 8.4(d) “through the implementation of the plan.” A majority of the DRB voted to censure Helmer. Three members wouldhave found a violation of RPC 3.4(g) as well. Two members voted to dismissall of the charges and filed a dissent. 14 The dissent took issue with the OAE’s use of “colorful language” tosupport a “generalized conclusion of impropriety.” It found nothing improperabout NFI’s desire to pursue restitution and Helmer’s zealous advocacy. Thedissent also reviewed each of the ethics “red lights” discussed by the majorityand observed they “are not themselves supported by any specific Rule ofProfessional Conduct.” In the dissent’s view, the points were “substantivelywithout merit and unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.” Among other issues, the dissent noted the following: that Helmer didnot seek to go around the bankruptcy proceeding because any restitution paidby Land or Pessiki would come from personal funds; that no ethical principlebars a private attorney from contacting a former colleague many years afterthey served together; that seasoned attorneys routinely interact with lessexperienced assistant prosecutors and may benefit from their greater expertise;that Helmer’s advocacy for his client in meetings with prosecutors was notimproper; that hearsay testimony before the grand jury by a victim advocate isnot improper; and that the decision to seek high bail “was a decision of theCCPO,” and the decision to fix bail was the court’s. The dissent also notedthat no ethics rule prohibited Helmer’s contingent fee. In conclusion, the dissent did not find clear and convincing evidence of aviolation of RPC 8.4(a) or (d). For RPCs that lack precise guidelines -- like a 15 proscription against conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” -- thedissent recommended that “particular care should be taken” to determine aviolation. We granted Helmer’s petition for review. ___ N.J. ___ (2018). III. Helmer raises various challenges to the proceedings. He first levels anumber of constitutional charges and argues that RPCs 3.4(g), 8.4(a), and8.4(d) are void for vagueness, that they have been applied arbitrarily in a waythat results in selective enforcement against him, and that their applicationviolates protections guaranteed victims under Article I, Paragraph 22 of theState Constitution. Helmer also asserts that the DRB failed to give appropriatedeference to the special master’s findings, relied on testimony that was notcredible, and found that he violated a section of RPC 8.4(a) not charged in theComplaint. In addition, Helmer contends that individual acts that do notviolate the ethics rules cannot cumulatively violate them. Throughout theproceedings, Helmer has maintained that no discipline is warranted. The OAE counters each of the above arguments. It argues that theRPCs, both as written and as applied, raise no constitutional concerns. Itobserves that the special master made no credibility determinations. It alsocontends that the DRB appropriately considered Helmer’s conduct as a whole 16 in finding that he violated RPC 8.4(d). The OAE submits that Helmer shouldbe censured, consistent with the DRB’s recommendation. As noted earlier, the DRB did not find clear and convincing evidencethat Helmer violated RPC 3.4(g). The OAE did not file a cross-petition tochallenge that conclusion. Instead, in a footnote, the OAE “reserve[d] theright to address the factual sufficiency of the RPC 3.4(g) charge at oralargument.” Although the Court has the authority, on its own motion, “toreview any determination” by the DRB when disbarment has not beenrecommended, see R. 1:20-16(b), we decline to consider the RPC 3.4(g)allegation separately here. The relevant facts and theories are sufficientlyintertwined with the alleged violation of RPC 8.4(d), to which we now turn. IV. Pursuant to RPC 8.4(d), “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer toengage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” As thisCourt has explained, the broad language of the rule “takes on sufficientdefinition to pass constitutional muster” when its scope is narrowed “toparticularly egregious conduct.” In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 632 (1982). Whenthe rule is “the sole basis for discipline,” it applies only to conduct that“flagrantly violat[es] . . . accepted professional norms.” Ibid. 17 There are multiple strands to the charge that Helmer violated RPC8.4(d). We address them in turn. A. At the center of this matter are questions about efforts to obtainrestitution for NFI. No one disputes that a victim of an offense can seekrestitution through the court system. The rights of victims in this and otherareas are guaranteed by the State Constitution and statutory law. See State v.Tedesco, 214 N.J. 177, 195-96 (2013) (reviewing protections for crime victimsunder the Victim’s Rights Amendment, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22, and the CrimeVictim’s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to -38). Victims can pursue restitution in both the civil and criminal arenas. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b) expressly empowers judges to sentence defendants to payrestitution. Section (f) of that statute acknowledges that defendants can alsoseek to be made whole through the civil process. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(f) (notingthat an order of restitution in a criminal matter “shall not operate as a bar tothe seeking of civil recovery by the victim,” but the amount due shall bereduced to avoid double recovery); see also State v. DeAngelis, 329 N.J.Super. 178, 186 (App. Div. 2000). One challenge practitioners face is to refrain from presenting orthreatening “to present criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in a 18 civil matter.” RPC 3.4(g). Heightened care is needed to navigate potentialpitfalls in that area. In this case, though, the core issue is not whether private counsel couldpursue restitution through the criminal process but rather the manner in whichhe sought to do so. To be clear, it would be unacceptable -- and prejudicial tothe administration of justice -- for a private attorney to manipulate the criminalprocess by drafting charges, causing prosecutors to present them, and causingan inappropriately high bail to be set to serve as restitution for the attorney’sclient. In the unlikely event that might happen, it would amount to aperversion of the justice system. Helmer’s conduct here pushed the envelope, but we cannot concludefrom the record that he orchestrated or induced such a scheme. Although heactively encouraged a criminal prosecution and advocated for restitution forhis client, to place primary responsibility on Helmer for what occurredoverlooks the role and decision-making authority of the prosecution team. B. The OAE faults Helmer at the outset for using special access to theCumberland County Prosecutor’s Office to ask it to reconsider its initialdecision to decline prosecution. 19 Helmer left the CCPO in 1989 after having served there as the firstassistant prosecutor. RPC 1.11(a)(3) bars a former government attorney fromrepresenting a client whose interests are materially adverse to the formergovernment office. That limit extends for six months after the attorney leavesgovernment service. Ibid. After that time, unless the lawyer “participatedpersonally and substantially” in the matter or “had substantial responsibility”over the matter as a public officer, it is not inappropriate for an attorney inprivate practice to make a presentation to his or her former office on behalf ofa client. RPC 1.11(a)(1)-(2); see also Kevin H. Michels, New Jersey AttorneyEthics: The Law of New Jersey Lawyering 569-71 (2019). The hearing also explored Helmer’s relationship with Branco, the chiefof the major crimes and organized crime bureau for the CCPO. Helmer firstapproached Branco about the case, and the two discussed it on multipleoccasions. The two had previously been colleagues at the CCPO and had becomegood friends. The Attorney General and county prosecutors can and do imposeinternal codes of ethics to govern such situations. The ABA, for example,provides aspirational guidance for prosecutors in this area: “A prosecutor whohas a significant personal . . . relationship with another lawyer should notparticipate in the prosecution of a person who is represented by the other 20 lawyer, unless the relationship is disclosed to the prosecutor’s supervisor andsupervisory approval is given . . . .” ABA Criminal Justice Standards for theProsecution Function § 3-1.7(h) (4th ed. 2015). The record is not fully developed on this point. The First Assistant atthe time testified that he had instructed Branco not to handle any of Helmer’scases “to avoid any appearance of impropriety” and maintain the office’sintegrity. Branco testified he had only been asked to give advance notice ofplea colloquies in cases he resolved with Helmer. The special master made nofindings on the issue. In any event, there is no evidence in the record thatHelmer knew Branco had been told to recuse himself from Helmer’s cases. Half measures in this area can invite second-guessing and possibleethical challenges. When a prosecutor is recused from a private attorney’scases because of a significant personal, financial, professional, business,political, or other relationship, see ibid., the prosecutor should not participatein any aspect of a matter the attorney is handling. Likewise, if defense counselknows that a particular prosecutor is recused from a matter, counsel should notapproach the prosecutor to discuss the case in an official capacity. C. Much of the hearing focused on Helmer’s role in the charging decision,grand jury process, and the question of bail. The OAE asserts that Helmer 21 crafted the plan to charge and arrest two businessmen and arrange for them tobe required to post high bails for use as restitution. The record does notcontain clear and convincing evidence to support that claim. The principal plan took shape at a meeting on May 27, 2009 attended byBranco, Helmer, Matlock, NFI’s general counsel, and Walters -- who arrivedwhile the meeting was underway. Walters testified that Branco and Helmer“dominated” the meeting. Neither Walters, Branco, nor any other witnesstestified that Helmer orchestrated the scheme. Helmer claims he simplyadvocated for his client. The ultimate decisions rested with the prosecutors. Only they couldauthorize a grand jury presentation. Only they could petition the trial court foran arrest warrant and make a recommendation for bail. And only a judgecould sign the warrant and set bail. Those discretionary decisions, to be madein good faith, are not the responsibility of private counsel. It is not at all inappropriate for private counsel to make a presentation tothe prosecutor’s office on behalf of a victim. The prosecutor represents thepublic and should independently assess the allegations presented. If, in theprosecution’s judgment, further action is warranted, prosecutors and lawenforcement officers ordinarily conduct an independent investigation. At aminimum, prosecutors have an obligation to review evidence with care and 22 ensure early on that it satisfies the threshold requirement of probable cause. Indoing so, they may rely on summary investigative reports prepared by trainedofficers and investigators. In this case, however, a line prosecutor with little experience handlingwhite collar cases conducted no follow-up investigation. He did not subpoenaany documents or interview any witnesses. It appears that he proceeded to thegrand jury based on the representations of a private attorney. The CCPO laterdisavowed what took place for good reason. The OAE asserts that Helmer drafted the indictment. It would certainlybe inappropriate for an assistant prosecutor to outsource the drafting of anindictment to a private attorney who represented a client with an interest in theoutcome. The record instead reveals that Helmer made detailedrecommendations in writing about what he thought the indictment shouldallege. The line prosecutor relied heavily on those suggestions to structure anddraft the indictment. He relayed them to his secretary, who prepared theproposed charging document. We cannot conclude from the record thatHelmer improperly induced the line prosecutor to act. Hearsay testimony is permitted before the grand jury. See State v.Ingram, 230 N.J. 190, 207 (2017); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 , 363 (1956). In white collar cases, prosecutors routinely call investigators 23 who are familiar with the facts to testify. Of course, witnesses with firsthandknowledge can also be summoned. It is highly unusual for a victim’s attorney -- who lacks firsthandknowledge and, in this case, stood to gain if restitution was obtained throughthe criminal process -- to appear as the sole witness before a grand jury. Butthe prosecutor, not private counsel, ultimately made the unorthodox decision toproceed in that way here. NFI’s investigator, a former State Trooper, testifiedthat he would have been available, yet no one asked him. Helmer, who offeredto testify, appeared instead. The line prosecutor stated that he checked withhis supervisor who said that if Helmer wanted to testify, he could. To ensure that accurate and reliable information is presented to the grandjury, when witnesses with firsthand knowledge do not testify, the betterpractice is to call witnesses who have participated in an investigation orreviewed its results with care. The record also raises a question about grand jury secrecy. Proceedingsbefore the grand jury are conducted in secret. R. 3:6-7. In a departure fromthat principle, the line prosecutor admitted that he discussed the grand jury’svote with his supervisor and Helmer soon after the return of an indictment andafter it had been sealed. Helmer disputes that account in his brief and states 24 “[t]here was no post-presentation meeting.” If such a discussion took place, itwould have been improper. Finally, on the issue of bail, it is striking that the prosecution originally-- and in a manner not supported by Rule 3:26-1(a) (2009) -- recommendedhigh bail amounts in part “to get as close to the restitution amount aspossible.” The $150,000 full cash bail originally set in this matter also farexceeded the guidelines in place at the time. Supplement to AdministrativeDirective #9-05 (May 12, 2009). Once again, even if Helmer argued to theprosecutors that bail be set at an inappropriately high amount, for aninappropriate reason, the prosecution made that recommendation to the court,and the court ultimately accepted it. We cannot find that Helmer induced theprosecutors and the court to act. Woven into a number of the above allegations is the claim that Helmer, aformer prosecutor and seasoned defense attorney, manipulated aninexperienced line prosecutor. In our system, practiced defense attorneysroutinely interact with less experienced prosecutors, just as veteran prosecutorsoften work opposite less experienced counterparts. Both sides, of course, canseek guidance from colleagues, fellow counsel, or supervisors. The advantage 25 that comes with experience does not implicate ethical questions as long ascounsel on both sides abide by the canons of professional responsibility. 2 V. The burden of proof in disciplinary matters is clear and convincingevidence. R. 2:15-15(a). That standard calls for evidence that “'produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established,’ evidence 'so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue.’” [In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 (1993) (quoting In re Boardwalk Regency Casino License Application, 180 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div. 1981) (alterations in original)).]In addition, as noted above, when a violation of RPC 8.4(d) is the sole basisfor discipline, a particularly high level of proof is required -- evidence of aflagrant violation of accepted professional norms. Hinds, 90 N.J. at 632. The proceedings in this matter did not follow best practices and weretroubling in a number of respects. Nonetheless, we do not find clear andconvincing evidence that Helmer’s conduct met the high threshold described2 In discussing the conduct of the prosecutors who handled this matter, we make no specific findings against them. We recognize that they were not the subject of ethics charges and testified in the context of proceedings directed only against Helmer. 26 above and violated RPC 8.4(d). As a result, we need not address Helmer’sconstitutional challenges and other claims. For the reasons set forth above, we dismiss the disciplinary charges. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON did not participate. 27