Title: McCrae v. Wainwright
Citation: 422 So. 2d 824
Docket Number: 61865
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 1982

422 So. 2d 824 (1982)
James Curtis McCRAE, Petitioner,
v.
Couie L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent.
No. 61865.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 14, 1982.
Rehearing Denied December 16, 1982.
*825 Robert H. Dillinger of Stolba, Lumley &amp; Dillinger, St. Petersburg, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before the Court on McCrae's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution. Petitioner is now imprisoned under sentence of death pursuant to judgment and sentence affirmed by this Court in McCrae v. State, 395 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1041, 102 S. Ct. 583, 70 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1981). Petitioner raises three issues going to the legality of his judgment and sentence. The asserted grounds for relief are: (1) that the trial court committed fundamental error by not fully instructing the jury on the elements of the underlying felony in this felony murder case, (2) that petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective in that he did not raise the asserted fundamental error on appeal, and (3) that this Court violated petitioner's rights by receiving non-record information concerning appellants in pending capital appeals.
Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. The indictment was in two counts (though there was but one homicide), one charging premeditated murder and the other felony murder. The first count of the indictment read as follows:
The second count, charging felony murder, was worded as follows:
For the count charging petitioner with premeditated murder, the court instructed the jury in accordance with the standard jury instructions. With regard to the second count, charging felony murder, the court gave the following general felony murder instruction:
The instructions to the jury also included a reading of the indictment as set out above. The indictment was given to the jury, along with the forms for the verdict, to take with it into deliberations. The second count of the indictment, charging felony murder, specified the underlying felony and defined it in terms of its essential elements.
The trial court, in instructing the jury on the form of the verdict, advised that the jury could return a verdict as to the two counts collectively or individually. The court provided separate verdict forms for verdicts of (1) not guilty, (2) guilty on both count one and count two, (3) guilty on count one, (4) guilty on count two, and (5) guilty of lesser included offenses. The jury returned a verdict finding petitioner guilty as charged in count two, the felony murder count. The other verdict forms were left blank.
Petitioner argues that under State v. Jones, 377 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1979), and Robles v. State, 188 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1966), the trial court erred fundamentally in not instructing the jury on the elements of the underlying felony. Robles and Jones are based on the principle that a jury cannot properly find a defendant guilty of felony murder without knowing precisely what conduct constitutes the underlying felony. We find that the instruction was adequate and there was no fundamental error.
In Vasil v. State, 374 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1979), the defendant was charged with felony murder involving the crime of rape. On appeal, Vasil argued that the court had erred in failing to fully define the underlying felony of rape. The court charged the jury on felony murder and rape as follows:
In appealing his conviction to this Court the defendant argued that the above definition was not sufficient to inform the jury of the elements of the underlying felony of rape. In response to that argument the Court held that:
The same principle applies here.
In the instant case, the trial court failed to include an instruction on the elements of rape in its charge to the jury, but did announce to the jury the specific language contained in the second count of the indictment. As in Vasil, the jury was apprised of the essential elements of the underlying felony. Therefore the trial court complied substantially with Robles and Jones.
Since there was no fundamental error which would have mandated reversal on appeal, petitioner's second contention  that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the fundamental error on appeal  is also without merit. Under the standards announced in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981), petitioner has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
As his third ground for habeas corpus relief, petitioner asserts that this Court requested and received ex parte information concerning appellants in capital appeals during the time when his appeal was pending here. We considered and rejected this argument in Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000, 102 S. Ct. 542, 70 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1981). There we held that the allegations of receipt and consideration of such information by appellate judges, even if true, did not establish error which would entitle the petitioners to habeas corpus relief.
Having determined that petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief we deny the petition.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, SUNDBERG and McDONALD, JJ., dissent.