Title: STATE v STEWART
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12668
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 1974

No. 12668 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1974 - - STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - WILLIAM F L J L T O N STEWART, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas J . Beers, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Ronald W. Smith, County Attorney, argued, Havre, Montana For Respondent : Morrison, E t t i e n and Barron, Havre, Montana Robert D. Morrison argued, Havre, Montana Submitted: September 18, 1974 Decided: bCt 8 1 9 7 4 Filed: OCT 8 1974' M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. The respondent, William Fulton Stewart, was a r r e s t e d on March 16, 1973, f o r possession of dangerous drugs. Re- spondent made a motion t o suppress a l l evidence seized from h i s person a t the t i m e of h i s a r r e s t and a l l evidence discovered and seized a t h i s residence pursuant t o a search warrant. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t of H i l l County ordered t h 3 t a l l evidence obtained by e i t h e r search be suppressed. The S t a t e of Montana has appealed t h e suppression of t h e evidence obtained by t h e search incident t o respondent's a r r e s t . P r i o r t o March 16, 1973, resnondent ' s residence was placed under police surveillance on a t l e a s t e i g h t occasions. An i n f o r - mant had s a i d t h a t marijuana, a hash pipe, and o t h e r drug r e l a t e d paraphernalia could be found t h e r e ; t h e purpose of t h e s u r v e i l - lance was t o determine whether known drug users were frequenting t h e premises. Among known drug users who were seen a t respondent's residence during t h i s period were Dave Mariani and Harlan Swan. O n March 16, 1973, surveillance was broadened. That a f t e r - noon o f f i c e r s Robert Kurtz and James Doxtater went t o the Le Havre Inn and positioned themselves where they could view a l l t h e a c t i v i - t y of respondent a t t h e Westco Service S t a t i o n , h i s place of em- ployment. The o f f i c e r s were equipped with a twenty power s p o t t - ing scope and a p a i r of binoculars. Throughout t h i s period of surveillance p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n was paid t o t h e frequent v i s i t s of Mariani and Swan t o t h e s t a t i o n . They f i r s t came around 4:00 p.m., then between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., and again around 7:00 p.m. A f t e r t h e second v i s i t Mariani and Swan l e f t t h e s t a t i o n without t h e l a t t e r ' s pickup. A t t h i s time respondent went over t o the -2- pick-up, removed an object from the cab and placed it i n h i s pocket, and returned t o t h e s t a t i o n . Once i n s i d e t h e s t a t i o n , repondent removed t h e object from h i s pocket and picked some- thing out of it. When Mariani and Swan rejoined respondent a t 7:00 p.m., respondent again removed the object from h i s pocket and waved it i n t h e a i r . Officer Kurtz recognized t h e object a s a "baggie" containing a dark-colored substance. I m - mediately t h e r e a f t e r t h e t r i o were observed passing the "baggie" among themselves. Based upon these observations and o f f i c e r Kurtz I s f a m i l i a r i t y with marijuana i n r e s a l e form, t h e o f f i c e r s proceeded t o the s t a t i o n t o make a r r e s t s . The "baggier' was found i n respondent's r i g h t pocket and seized by o f f i c e r Doxtater. The contents of t h e "baggie" were l a t e r analyzed a s marijuana. The s o l e i s s u e is whether t h e r e was probable cause under t h e Fourth Amendment t o the United S t a t e s Constitution t o a r r e s t respondent without a warrant. A succinct statement of what c o n s t i t u t e s "probable cause" i s found i n Brinegar v. United S t a t e s , 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L.Ed. "In dealing with probable cause, however, a s t h e very name i m l i e s we d e a l with p r o b a b i l i t i e s . These a r e not tecRnicai; they a r e t h e f a c t u a l and practical con- d d e r a t i o n s of everyday l i f e on which reasonable and pru- dent men, not l e g a l technicians, a c t . The standard of proof i s accordingly c o r r e l a t i v e t o what must be proved. a he substance of a l l the d e f i n i t i o n s ' of probable cause ' i s a reasonable ground f o r b e l i e f of g u i l t . ' McCarthy v. De A r m i t , 99 Pa. S t . 63, 69, quoted with approval i n t h e C a r r o l l opinion, 267 U.S. a t 161. And t h i s 'means l e s s than evidence which would j u s t i f y con- demnation' o r conviction, a s Marshall, C . J . , s a i d f o r t h e Court more than a century ago i n Locke v. United S t a t e s , 7 Cranch 339, 348. Since ~ a r s h a l l ' s time, a t any r a t e , it has come t o mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause e x i s t s where ' t h e f a c t s and circumstances with- i n t h e i r [ t h e o f f i c e r s ' ] knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information [ a r e ] s u f f i c i e n t i n themselves t o warrant a man of reasonable caution i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t ' an offense has been o r is being committed. C a r r o l l v. United S t a t e s , 267 U.S. 132, 162." Applying these p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e case a t bar, we conclude t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t probable cause f o r respondent's a r r e s t . It should be noted t h a t t h i s case is not one i n which probable cause stands o r f a l l s with t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of an informant. Any usefulness the informant here may have had i n t h e beginning was long s i n c e d i s s i p a t e d by the subsequent chain of events. What probable cause does r e s t upon is good p o l i c e work by t h e o f f i c e r s . Consider t h e record: 1. The o f f i c e r s had established surveillance t o observe possible drug t r a f f i c a t respondent's place of employ- ment. 2. Known drug users were seen t h e r e several times. 3. Respondent was observed removing an object from t h e vehicle of one of these known drug users. 4. The object was recognized a s a "baggie" containing a dark-colored substance. 5. The "baggie" was passed around by respondent and t h e s e known drug users. 6. A t l e a s t one of t h e o f f i c e r s had p r i o r experience i n t h e drug f i e l d and knew t h a t "baggies" were commonly used a s receptacles f o r i l l i c i t drugs. I n view of the foregoing, it is our view t h a t the o f f i c e r s acted under a reasonable b e l i e f t h a t a crime was being com- mitted i n t h e i r presence. Accordingly, the order suppressing the evidence seized from respondent's person a t the time of h i s a r r e s t i s vacated and s e t aside and t h e cause i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings. .................................... Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: