Title: Howard v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100912
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., and 
Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ.∗ 
 
RONNIE LEE HOWARD 
 
v.  Record No. 100912 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
      MARCH 4, 2011 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the tolling 
provisions of Code § 19.2-243, the speedy trial statute, apply 
to a trial court order entered sua sponte continuing the 
defendant’s trial date. 
I. 
 
FACTS 
 
On March 3, 2008, Ronnie Lee Howard was indicted by the 
Grand Jury in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County for one 
count of credit card theft, Code § 18.2-192, and one count of 
breaking and entering, Code § 18.2-91.  The trial court set 
Howard’s trial for May 22, 2008.  On May 21, 2008, the trial 
court entered an order at its own “request” continuing the trial 
to July 3, 2008.  Howard did not object to this order. 
On July 3, the date set for trial, the Commonwealth moved 
for a continuance due to the absence of two witnesses scheduled 
to testify at trial.  Howard also asked for a continuance.  
                     
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011.  
Howard explained that he was unprepared for trial through no 
fault of his own but because he had not received certain 
discovery material held by the Roanoke City police department.  
Thus, Howard argued that his motion for continuance should be 
charged to the Commonwealth.  Howard’s counsel specified that 
his “client [did] not wish to waive his right to speedy trial 
because of [the continuance].” 
In a conversation with the trial court concerning the 
impact of a continuance on the speedy trial requirements of Code 
§ 19.2-243, the Commonwealth explained that 122 days had passed 
from the date of the indictment, but argued that the time period 
had been tolled from May 22 to July 3 because Howard did not 
object to the court-initiated continuance.  Howard responded 
that he was not required to object because the trial court had 
set the new trial date within the statutory time frame.  Counsel 
for the Commonwealth advised the trial court that because of his 
schedule the trial would have to be scheduled for some time 
after August 4, which was the end of the five-month period 
required by Code § 19.2-243 for commencing Howard’s trial absent 
any tolling.  Howard raised no objection to setting a trial date 
beyond August 4.  The trial was continued until August 14 “at 
the request of the Commonwealth.” 
 
On August 5, Howard filed a motion to dismiss alleging he 
had been confined continuously since his March 3 indictments 
 
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without a trial in violation of the speedy trial period set out 
in Code § 19.2-243.  Howard argued that neither of the 
continuances should be charged to him and that, not only had his 
right to a speedy trial as provided by Code § 19.2-243 been 
violated, his rights to a speedy trial as provided by the United 
States and Virginia Constitutions also were violated. 
Following a hearing on Howard’s motion to dismiss, the 
circuit court ruled that because Howard did not object to the 
first continuance, which was initiated by the court, the five-
month statutory time period for commencing Howard’s trial was 
tolled during that period, May 22 until July 3.  Accordingly, 
the circuit court denied Howard’s motion to dismiss the 
indictments and noted his exceptions to the ruling. 
The circuit court proceeded with the bench trial and found 
Howard guilty on both counts, sentencing him to thirteen years’ 
imprisonment and suspending eight years and six months of said 
sentence. 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in a published opinion, 
affirmed Howard’s convictions.  Howard v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. 
App. 417, 686 S.E.2d 537 (2009).  The Court of Appeals held that 
because Howard failed to object to the continuance order entered 
sua sponte by the trial court, the five-month speedy trial 
period was tolled from May 22 to July 3, 2008, and there was no 
speedy trial violation.  Id. at 424, 686 S.E.2d at 541.  Based 
 
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on this holding, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was 
unnecessary to consider whether the tolling provisions of the 
speedy trial statute applied to the second continuance.  Id. 
The Court of Appeals also held that Howard failed to 
preserve his claim of a speedy trial violation under the United 
States and Virginia constitutions and dismissed that claim 
pursuant to its Rule 5A:18.  Id. at 425, 686 S.E.2d at 541.  The 
Court of Appeals also declined to apply the ends of justice 
exception to that rule.  Id. at 425-26, 686 S.E.2d at 541-42.  
We awarded Howard an appeal. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. Statutory Claim 
 
Code § 19.2-243, the speedy trial statute, provides that if 
a defendant accused of a felony is continuously held in custody 
from the time he is indicted, if there was no preliminary 
hearing, he must be tried within five months of the date of the 
indictment.  The statute also provides that if the trial does 
not commence within the stated time period, the defendant “shall 
be forever discharged from prosecution” for the charged offense. 
Applying that provision to this case required that Howard’s 
trial commence no later than August 4, 2008, five months from 
the date he was indicted. 
 
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Circumstances will arise, however, that require and justify 
delay in the prosecution of a defendant.  Stephens v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 231, 301 S.E.2d 22, 26 
(1983)(“[W]hile in the orderly administration of justice some 
delay is unavoidable and some is essential to due process, 
courts must inquire into the reasons for the delay.”)  Paragraph 
4 of Code § 19.2-243 balances the interests of a defendant to be 
tried in a timely manner with such circumstances.  These 
provisions are generally referred to as the tolling provisions. 
As relevant here, paragraph 4 provides that calculation of the 
time period for commencing the trial will be tolled for time 
attributed to a continuance granted on a motion made by the 
defendant or his counsel, or time attributed to a continuance 
granted on a motion made by the Commonwealth in which the 
defendant or his counsel concurred or did not make a timely 
objection.  
 
In his first assignment of error, Howard argues that 
because no express language in the speedy trial statute 
addresses court-initiated continuances, the statute’s tolling 
provisions do not apply and, in any event, he was not required 
to object to the continuance because the court-initiated 
continuance did not extend the trial date beyond the five-month 
statutory time period.  We reject both of Howard’s arguments. 
 
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We have held on prior occasions that the specific 
circumstances identified in the statute as exceptions tolling 
the time for commencing the trial were “not meant to be all-
inclusive, but that others of a similar nature were implied.”  
Stephens, 225 Va. at 230, 301 S.E.2d at 25.  For example, in 
Wadley v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 803, 35 S.E. 452 (1900), we held 
that an injunction, entered by a federal court restraining a law 
officer from proceeding with the prosecution of a case and 
prohibiting the use of certain material as evidence, tolled the 
required statutory time period for commencing a criminal trial 
even though that exception was not included in the statute.  We 
stated that “[i]t would defeat rather than carry out the purpose 
of the enactment to give its language the narrow and technical 
meaning contended for” by the plaintiff.  Id. at 805, 35 S.E. at 
453.  Thus, in the absence of language specifically including a 
court-initiated continuance within the tolling provisions of the 
speedy trial statute, we must consider if such a continuance is 
of a “similar nature” to those contained in the statute. 
Once the initial trial date is set, every continuance 
postpones the trial date regardless of the reason for the 
continuance or the identity of the moving party.  This is true 
whether or not the postponement extends the trial date beyond 
the statutorily required date.  The provisions of paragraph 4 of 
Code § 19.2-243 relevant in this case clearly demonstrate that 
 
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in order to avoid the tolling provision, the defendant must be 
adverse to the granting of the continuance and must 
affirmatively express his objection even when a new trial date 
is set within the speedy trial time limits for the commencement 
of the trial.  Because a continuance entered by the court sua 
sponte has the same effect as a continuance entered at the 
request of the defendant or the Commonwealth, we conclude that a 
court-initiated continuance is of “a similar nature” and 
therefore is subject to the same requirements regarding 
objections as other continuances.  Stephens, 225 Va. at 230, 301 
S.E.2d at 25.  Consequently, Howard’s failure to object to the 
continuance initiated by the trial court that extended the date 
for trial from May 22 to July 3 resulted in tolling the five-
month time period for that 43-day period.  Accordingly, there 
was no error in the Court of Appeals’ judgment that Howard’s 
trial, commencing on August 14, was within the five-month period 
required by the speedy trial statute.1  
B. Constitutional Claim 
Howard’s final assignment of error asserts that the Court 
of Appeals erred in holding that he failed to preserve his claim 
                     
1 In his second assignment of error, Howard asserts that the 
Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider whether the speedy 
trial statute was tolled during the second continuance from July 
3 to August 14.  In light of our holding regarding the first 
assignment of error, we, like the Court of Appeals, need not 
address this issue. 
 
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that his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated and in 
refusing to apply the ends of justice exception under Rule 
5A:18.  Howard does not present any argument on brief to support 
his contention that the Court of Appeals erred in its 
determination that this constitutional issue was not preserved 
for appeal.  Rather, Howard’s argument is directed only to the 
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that failure to apply the ends of 
justice exception would not result in a miscarriage of justice 
based on a finding that Howard could show no prejudice from the 
short delay in the commencement of his trial.  Accordingly, we 
need not address whether Howard preserved his claims based on a 
constitutional violation.  Rule 5:27(d); Andrews v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 252, 699 S.E.2d 237, 249 (2010) (lack 
of an adequate argument on brief in support of an assignment of 
error constitutes a waiver of that issue.) 
Howard asserts that the Court of Appeals limited its 
analysis of Howard’s constitutional claims to the issue of 
prejudice and that such a limitation was error.  He argues that 
a showing of prejudice is not an affirmative requirement for 
establishing the denial of a federal constitutional right to a 
speedy trial.  Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973).  Howard 
also argues that because Code §§ 19.2-241 and 19.2-243, have 
been held to be a legislative interpretation of what constitutes 
a speedy trial, Stephens, 225 Va. at 229-30, 301 S.E.2d at 25, 
 
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no showing of prejudice is required to establish a violation of 
either the statutory speedy trial statute or Art. I, § 8 of the 
Virginia Constitution.  Thus, Howard contends that the Court of 
Appeals erred in declining to apply the ends of justice 
exception to his state and federal constitutional speedy trial 
claims.  
 
Determining whether the ends of justice exception should be 
applied requires the appellate court first to determine whether 
there was error as Howard contends and then “whether the failure 
to apply the ends of justice provision would result in a grave 
injustice.”  Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 678, 689, 701 
S.E.2d 407, 413-14 (2010) (citing Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 
Va. 14, 20, 613 S.E.2d 432, 434-35 (2005)). 
A claim of a violation of speedy trial rights under the 
federal constitution is resolved by the balancing of four 
factors – length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.  Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  As Howard properly 
contends, there is no requirement that prejudice be established, 
but evidence relating to these factors is considered, together 
with any other circumstances as may be relevant, and balanced in 
determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.  
Moore, 414 U.S. at 26. 
 
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In this case, as we discussed above, there was no speedy 
trial violation based on Code § 19.2-243.  Furthermore, as the 
Court of Appeals noted the time from Howard’s indictment to 
trial, without consideration of any tolling, was five months and 
12 days – a time period that, regardless of the statutory 
requirement, is not an unreasonable delay.  Furthermore, Howard 
acquiesced in much of that “delay” by not objecting.  And 
finally, Howard’s only assertion of prejudice was that he lost 
the opportunity to have the charges against him dismissed.  
Considering all the factors involved in determining whether 
there was a federal constitutional speedy trial violation, we 
conclude that no such violation occurred and, therefore, there 
is no basis for applying the ends of justice exception to this 
case. 
Similarly, Howard’s state constitutional claim is not 
sufficient to invoke the ends of justice exception.  Howard 
argues that determination of a violation of the state 
constitutional speedy trial provision, Art. I, § 8, does not 
require the same test as that applied to a claim of a federal 
constitutional speedy trial violation, and that the Virginia 
Constitution affords greater protection than the United States 
Constitution in this regard.  According to Howard, because 
prejudice is not an element of the speedy trial statute, Hudson 
v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 36, 41, 591 S.E.2d 679, 681-82 (2004), 
 
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and because that statutory scheme supplements the state 
constitutional provision, Stephens, 225 Va. at 229-30, 301 
S.E.2d at 25, prejudice should not be relevant to a 
determination of whether the Virginia constitutional provision 
is violated. 
Assuming without deciding whether the standard Howard 
proposes is correct, application of his standard would not 
support invoking the ends of justice exception in this case.  As 
stated above, the speedy trial statute was not violated in this 
case, and if, as Howard contends, the constitutional standard 
comports with the speedy trial statute, there is no violation of 
Art. I, § 8 of the Virginia Constitution. 
In summary, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err 
in finding that the period between May 22, 2008, and July 3, 
2008, was tolled pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Code § 19.2-243.  We 
also conclude that there is no basis to apply the ends of 
justice exception to allow consideration of Howard’s claim of a 
violation of his federal and state constitutional speedy trial 
rights.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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