Title: Commonwealth v. Kirkland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11667
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2023

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SJC-11667 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TAMIK KIRKLAND. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     November 7, 2022. - February 22, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Identification.  Evidence, Identification, 
Photograph, Expert opinion, Third-party culprit.  Witness, 
Expert.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  
Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, New trial, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 9, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Tina S. Page, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on September 26, 2016, was heard by 
Michael K. Callan, J. 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
Joseph G.A. Coliflores, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Tamik Kirkland, 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation for the death of Sheldon Innocent (victim), who 
was fatally shot at a Springfield barbershop.  The defendant was 
2 
 
also convicted on several related charges connected to the 
barbershop shooting and a subsequent altercation with police at 
a private residence in which the defendant shot a police officer 
who was trying to arrest him.1  The defendant now appeals from 
his convictions of murder in the first degree, armed assault 
with intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, as well as from 
the denial of his postconviction motion for a new trial. 
On appeal, the defendant raises three principal arguments.  
First, he argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because 
they failed to present expert testimony on the impossibility of 
the defendant matching eyewitness descriptions of the 
perpetrator due to his hairstyle.  Second, he asserts that they 
were ineffective for failing to present expert testimony on 
eyewitness misidentification, based on environmental factors and 
impermissibly suggestive photographic array procedures used by 
police.  Third, the defendant argues that the trial judge erred 
in excluding certain third-party culprit evidence on the basis 
that it did not provide a "substantial connecting link" between 
 
1 In addition to the conviction of murder, the defendant was 
convicted of three counts of armed assault with intent to 
murder, two counts of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, one count of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, two counts of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, and two counts of unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm, sawed off shotgun, or machine 
gun. 
3 
 
the third party and the victim's murder, and that the judge who 
denied his motion for a new trial (motion judge) erred in his 
evaluation of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, where the defendant presented additional third-party 
culprit evidence that was not presented at trial.  The defendant 
also argues that each of these errors should have entitled him 
to a new trial.  Finally, the defendant argues that he is 
entitled to a new trial pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
We discern no reversible error in our review of the 
defendant's direct appeal or the postconviction motion for a new 
trial.  Having thoroughly examined the record, we also conclude 
that there is no reason to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  Thus, we affirm the defendant's convictions and the 
denial of his postconviction motion. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that 
the jury could have found at the defendant's trial, reserving 
certain details for our discussion of the legal issues. 
 
At around noon on a balmy Saturday, April 30, 2011, Darryl 
King was giving the victim a haircut at a Springfield barbershop 
when the defendant, wearing a black sweatshirt with a hood 
("hoodie"), black T-shirt, jeans, and black gloves, walked 
backwards into the barbershop.  The hood was pulled "over his 
head," but King noticed that the defendant's hair was braided. 
4 
 
The defendant turned around, and King made eye contact with 
him, noticing his eyes were red.  King asked the man whether he 
wanted a haircut.  The defendant said nothing as he pulled out 
two firearms, one at a time, from the front pocket of the 
hoodie.  Seeing the guns, King said, in part, "Don't shoot me, 
man."  The defendant began shooting inside the barbershop at 
around 12:04 P.M.2  King was shot eleven times but survived.3  
The victim was shot four times and succumbed to his injuries. 
Rodney Ball, who was at a convenience store next door, 
heard the shots, left the store, and saw a Black man with 
medium-brown skin, standing five feet, seven inches to five 
feet, eight inches tall, in jeans and a black hoodie with the 
hood "on his head," leaving the barbershop and walking "briskly" 
towards Montrose Street.  Local and State law enforcement were 
dispatched to the barbershop and directed to look for a "suspect 
dressed in dark clothing," including a black hoodie, with a 
"slim build, running from the scene" down Montrose Street and 
toward Burr Street. 
 
2 ShotSpotter technology alerted Springfield police to the 
sound, detected as an acoustic "impulse sign," of gunshots in 
the vicinity of State and Montrose Streets at around 12:04 or 
12:05 P.M. 
 
3 King testified that the defendant first shot him seven or 
eight times and then returned to shoot him three more times. 
5 
 
The defendant entered a house on Burr Street through the 
back door and encountered Lekeanna Carter styling Carolyn 
Wright's hair in the living room.  A third woman, Linka 
Baulkman, and two infants -- Baulkman's and Carter's -- were 
also present.  The defendant was wearing a black hoodie with the 
hood off his head, black pants, and black gloves, and he was 
holding a cell phone and chrome-topped pistol.  Talking into the 
cell phone, he looked out the windows and asked about a car 
coming for him.  He then pulled a second black pistol from his 
waist area and hid it in a reclining chair.  He also asked 
Baulkman for a change of clothes, which she provided. 
Meanwhile, Carter and Wright fled upstairs with Carter's 
baby, leaving the defendant downstairs.  While they were 
upstairs, the defendant left the house and got into the open 
trunk of a gray Chevrolet Impala that had backed into the 
driveway.  As the driver attempted to leave, State and local law 
enforcement surrounded the vehicle.  The trunk opened and, at 
approximately 12:16 P.M., the defendant began shooting at 
police, hitting State police Trooper Stephen Gregorczyk in his 
bulletproof vest.  Police returned fire, wounding the defendant.  
Law enforcement then pulled the defendant, wearing dark-colored 
pants and sneakers, from the trunk and confiscated a Taurus 
pistol from him.  The defendant was taken into custody, 
transported to the hospital, and hospitalized for his injuries. 
6 
 
 
Police secured the Burr Street house and, after obtaining a 
search warrant, discovered a pair of black gloves and a black 
firearm -- later identified as a Ruger pistol -- stuffed 
"between the cushion and the armrest" of a reclining chair in 
the living room.  The Ruger had "no rounds in the weapon or in 
the magazine."4  Behind the recliner, police found "an item of 
black clothing on the floor" that matched the description of the 
black hoodie worn by the barbershop shooter.  Investigators also 
collected evidence from the driveway, including a pair of black 
jeans, a second pair of jeans, and Nike sneakers. 
A few hours after the shooting, police interviewed King in 
the hospital, took a statement from him, and showed him an array 
of eight frontal view photographs, from which he selected the 
defendant's photograph as the barbershop shooter.  This array 
was also shown to Ball, who selected two photographs, including 
one of the defendant, as "possibly" being the person he saw 
leaving the barbershop after he heard shots fired, but he was 
not entirely sure. 
Police also took a statement from, and conducted an array 
with, Wright that afternoon.  Wright was only "[fifty] percent" 
sure that she recognized, from the frontal view array, the 
 
4 Investigators also recovered two other firearms from the 
residence.  Neither of these weapons matched the ballistics 
evidence from the barbershop or the driveway. 
7 
 
defendant as the man with the gun inside the Burr Street house 
but identified him based on his eyes and confirmed the 
identification from a profile view array, this time also 
recognizing his "cornrow" hairstyle.  Carter also gave a 
statement to police that day, describing the man at the house as 
having dark skin and wide eyes.  At trial, she further recalled 
the defendant, the man she saw at the house, being average 
height and slim but with a bit of muscle. 
A State police ballistics expert conducted test firings 
with the Taurus pistol confiscated from the defendant and the 
Ruger pistol recovered from the reclining chair.  He then 
compared these firings with shell casings recovered from the 
barbershop and the driveway.  Certain shell casings from the 
barbershop matched the Ruger pistol, while others matched the 
Taurus pistol.5  Shell casings recovered from the driveway also 
matched the test firings from the Taurus pistol fired by the 
defendant while he was in the trunk of the car. 
 
5 The ballistics expert also testified that some bullet 
fragments recovered from the barbershop were "similar to the 
test firings from the Ruger pistol" but there were "not enough 
individual markings left . . . to identify them positively" as 
having come from that gun, though the fragments had "identical 
land and groove impressions to th[e] test firing from that Ruger 
pistol."  He reached the same conclusion of similarity for a 
different set of fragments vis-à-vis the Taurus pistol.  Defense 
trial counsel objected twice to the introduction of what they 
deemed "inconclusive findings," but the trial judge overruled 
both objections. 
8 
 
Samples from the Ruger pistol, black sweatshirt, and gloves 
recovered from the living room of the Burr Street house were 
submitted to the State police crime laboratory (crime lab) for 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.  Analysis of the interior 
of the gloves revealed a complex mixture of four profiles, 
including one major DNA profile that matched the defendant's 
profile.6  Analysis of "the interior cuffs and interior tag area 
from the sweatshirt" found in the living room also revealed "a 
complex mixture" of four profiles, including one major DNA 
profile that matched the defendant's.7  "No detectable human DNA 
was recovered from" the Ruger pistol.  The crime lab also tested 
for gunshot residue on the gloves and the black sweatshirt from 
the living room.8  The sweatshirt sleeves and front pocket tested 
positive for gunshot residue, as did the gloves. 
 
6 The DNA analyst testified that the odds of a match such as 
the defendant's occurring in a randomly selected unrelated 
individual were between one in 916.6 billion and one in 458.5 
trillion. 
 
7 The DNA analyst testified that the odds of a match such as 
the defendant's occurring in a randomly selected unrelated 
individual were between one in 2.157 quintillion and one in 
10.28 sextillion. 
 
8 The forensic scientist from the crime lab testified that 
she did not receive a second sweatshirt, found in the second-
floor bedroom of the Burr Street house, for testing.  A sample 
from this item was tested as part of postconviction proceedings, 
however, revealing a major DNA profile that did not match the 
defendant. 
9 
 
b.  Procedural history.  A grand jury indicted the 
defendant on sixteen separate counts, including murder in the 
first degree.9  Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress 
King's and Ball's identifications, arguing that the police used 
an "impermissibly suggestive identification procedure" by using 
a photograph of the defendant with a distinctive braided 
hairstyle different from the hairstyles of the men in the other 
photographs in the array; the witnesses were primed to identify 
the defendant as the barbershop shooter because the defendant 
had appeared in media reports "in the days leading up to the 
shooting" because of his escape from State prison; and the 
witnesses "had a limited opportunity to observe the assailant."  
After a three-day hearing, the judge, who was also the trial 
judge, denied the suppression motion, finding that the 
 
9 The indictments charged murder in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 1; home invasion in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 18C; 
armed assault with intent to murder in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b); assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon resulting in serious 
bodily injury in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i); 
unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a); unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, sawed off 
shotgun, or machine gun in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); 
unlawful possession of a large capacity weapon in violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); and unlawful possession of a large 
capacity feeding device in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  
The Commonwealth ultimately entered nolle prosequi on the 
indictments charging home invasion, unlawful possession of a 
large capacity weapon, and unlawful possession of a large 
capacity feeding device. 
10 
 
photograph of the defendant used in the police array was "not so 
singularly distinctive" that it was impermissibly suggestive and 
that mere exposure to the defendant's image in the media was not 
grounds for suppression. 
The defendant was tried before a Superior Court jury in May 
and June of 2013.  At trial, the defendant sought to introduce 
reasonable doubt by suggesting that he did not have cornrows as 
claimed by several eyewitnesses but that a third-party culprit 
did fit that description, and so the defendant could not have 
been the barbershop shooter.  Following trial, the jury 
convicted the defendant on all counts brought to trial, 
including murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation.  The trial judge sentenced the defendant to life 
in prison without parole on the murder conviction and numerous 
concurrent terms on the lesser crimes. 
The defendant timely appealed and was appointed 
postconviction counsel.  Following several unsuccessful motions 
and changes in postconviction counsel, the defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial, which was denied, after an evidentiary 
hearing, on September 27, 2021.10  The denial of that motion and 
his direct appeal were consolidated into this single appeal. 
 
10 On September 26, 2016, the defendant filed a pro se 
motion for a new trial, which he amended on May 22, 2017, and 
was granted further leave to supplement on January 19, 2018, 
 
11 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Where, as here, an appeal from the denial 
of a defendant's motion for a new trial has been consolidated 
with a direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the first 
degree, we review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth 
v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 805 (2018).  The defendant addresses 
three primary issues on appeal:  the impossibility of his having 
cornrows on the day of the murder, eyewitness misidentification 
based on several factors, and the existence of a third-party 
culprit.  He argues that trial counsel provided him with 
ineffective assistance and the trial and motion judges committed 
reversible errors.  We address each issue in turn. 
a.  Cornrows.  Several eyewitnesses who identified the 
defendant as the barbershop shooter and the man at the Burr 
Street house described him as having braided hair, specifically 
cornrows.  The defendant argues that trial counsel provided him 
with ineffective assistance by failing to introduce photographs 
showing him without cornrows in the weeks leading up to the 
barbershop murder and present expert testimony on hair growth.  
Having presented this argument in his motion for a new trial, he 
 
after receiving new appointed counsel on August 24, 2017.  The 
defendant also filed a motion for forensic and scientific 
testing analysis on July 6, 2018, which was denied on July 13, 
2018.  Appointed postconviction counsel was again replaced on 
October 12, 2018.  The defendant filed additional motions to 
pursue lines of investigation throughout 2019 and 2020, as well 
as a supplemental motion for a new trial on June 3, 2019. 
12 
 
also argues that the motion judge erred in denying him a new 
trial on these grounds. 
i.  Standard of review.  A.  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  When evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims in connection with the direct appeal of a conviction of 
murder in the first degree, "we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by asking whether there 
was error and, if so, whether the error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Don, 483 Mass. 697, 704 (2019).  This standard 
applies "even if the action by trial counsel does not constitute 
conduct 'falling measurably below that . . . of an ordinary 
fallible lawyer.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 
Mass. 799, 808-809 (2005). 
"In conducting this review, we 'accord tactical decisions 
of trial counsel due deference.'"  Don, 483 Mass. at 704-705, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 195, cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 923 (2003).  "Unless such a decision was manifestly 
unreasonable when made, we will not find ineffectiveness."  Don, 
supra at 705, quoting Evans, supra at 195-196.  "[O]nly strategy 
and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and skill in the 
criminal law would not consider competent" rise to the level of 
manifestly unreasonable (quotation and citation omitted).  
13 
 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017). 
 
B.  Motion for a new trial.  "'A motion for a new trial is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,' who may 
grant a new trial 'if it appears that justice may not have been 
done'" (alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 488 Mass. 
597, 600 (2021), quoting Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 672.  "We 
review a decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of 
discretion," ascertaining whether the denial "resulted from 'a 
clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives.'"  Jacobs, supra, quoting L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
"Where a judge conducts an evidentiary hearing, we 'accept 
the judge's findings where they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record'" (alteration omitted).  Jacobs, 488 
Mass. at 600, quoting Commonwealth v. Velez, 487 Mass. 533, 540 
(2021).  "When, as here, the motion judge did not preside at 
trial, we defer to that judge's assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses at the hearing on the new trial motion, but we regard 
ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to assess 
the trial record."  Jacobs, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 845 (2008). 
14 
 
We cannot say that trial counsel's decision not to 
introduce the photographs through lay testimony was manifestly 
unreasonable when it was made, and so the motion judge did not 
err in denying the motion for a new trial on this issue.  
Furthermore, any error in failing to call expert witnesses on 
hair growth did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
ii.  Lay testimony and photographs.  Two sets of 
photographs of the defendant are in question -- with Tiara 
Galbreath on April 10, 2011, and with Chelsea Blake on April 22, 
2011.  The photographs were taken at the State prison where the 
defendant was incarcerated and from which the defendant escaped 
on April 24, 2011.  At trial, defense counsel presented a letter 
to the judge from the defendant, discussing his disagreement 
with the decision not to introduce the Blake photographs11 to 
demonstrate that he did not have cornrows at least one week 
before the shootings. 
Defense counsel explained that they reached this decision 
after "a lot of back and forth" with the Commonwealth and 
discussion among themselves and with the defendant.  Were they 
 
11 At the evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial, 
Galbreath testified that she gave photographs to trial counsel 
in May or June of 2011, but trial counsel had no recollection of 
receiving photographs from Galbreath.  The only photographs the 
defense considered introducing at trial, therefore, were those 
of the defendant with Blake. 
15 
 
to introduce a photograph of Blake and the defendant taken at 
the prison, the Commonwealth wanted to raise the defendant's 
prison escape and opportunity to change his appearance in the 
eight days between the photograph and the shootings.  In 
response to the parties' positions at sidebar, the trial judge 
indicated that she was "not going to permit the photograph to be 
introduced absent permitting the Commonwealth to explain the 
circumstances under which it was taken and . . . what could have 
happened between April 22 and April 30."  Simply put, defense 
counsel did not want that information to come in and opted not 
to pursue that line of inquiry.12 
 
12 Nevertheless, defense counsel opened the door at trial to 
information about the escape by questioning one of the 
responding officers about the defendant having a warrant open 
for his arrest -- a line of questioning that the trial judge 
found not "necessary to ask . . . , in [her] opinion."  Defense 
counsel also repeatedly referenced the prison escape in their 
closing argument.  Even if we determined that these head-
scratching decisions rose to the level of error, such error was 
not likely to have influenced the jury's decision, especially 
considering the eyewitness, ballistics, and DNA evidence 
presented that tied the defendant to the barbershop shooting and 
the Commonwealth's inability to tie directly the defendant's 
prison escape to the theory that King's son had shot the 
defendant's mother, precipitating the defendant's escape to seek 
revenge. 
 
Any error made by trial counsel by not pursuing further 
lines of inquiry that reinforced the defendant's escape while 
potentially sowing some doubt as to what hairstyle he wore -- 
when such evidence already had been introduced and eyewitness 
testimony impeached on cross-examination -- did not, therefore, 
result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
16 
 
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial, 
one of the defendant's trial counsel testified to the many 
factors weighed when making this decision, including the 
concerns about the Commonwealth's potential treatment of the 
Blake photographs.  Trial counsel believed that to call Blake 
was to "open up Pandora's box," as they were "concerned that 
[she] knew details that could really hurt [the] defense."  They 
even alluded to these concerns at sidebar on the last day of 
trial. 
Counsel also testified that he and co-counsel "felt pretty 
good about the state of the evidence" they presented on the 
cornrows matter, which included a video from May 1, 2011 -- the 
day after the shootings -- of the defendant in the hospital, 
taken by a defense investigator, who also testified that he did 
not observe the defendant to have cornrows or braids of any kind 
that day, and the defendant's booking photographs, to argue that 
the defendant did not and could not have had cornrows on the day 
of the shootings.13 
 
13 Trial counsel called the Springfield police officer who 
took the defendant's booking photographs on May 6, 2011.  This 
officer testified that he had no idea what grooming or bathing 
the hospital had done for the defendant in the six days that he 
had been in the hospital at that point.  The pictures that the 
officer took, which were admitted as exhibits in evidence, show 
the defendant with some facial hair and his hair cut close to 
his head. 
17 
 
Although the defendant was clearly disappointed in his 
counsel's decision not to call Blake to the stand, "[t]he 
decision 'whether to call a witness is a strategic'" one, 
Jacobs, 488 Mass. at 602, quoting Commonwealth v. Morales, 453 
Mass. 40, 45 (2009), especially insofar as evaluating the 
witness's credibility and preserving the integrity of the 
defense, see Jacobs, supra.  In a sidebar discussion on the 
penultimate day of trial, defense counsel noted that, while the 
defendant wanted them "to call further witnesses on the issue of 
braids," they had discussed the issue and "made the decision, as 
experienced trial attorneys, to not present more evidence on 
this subject."  The trial judge confirmed that they had 
"reviewed all of the pros and cons with respect to calling 
additional witnesses and . . . discussed that thoroughly with 
[their] client." 
Where, as here, we can ascertain counsel's strategic and 
tactical reasons for not calling either Galbreath or Blake to 
the stand and introducing in evidence prison photographs of them 
with the defendant, we cannot say that trial counsel's decision 
was manifestly unreasonable.  See Jacobs, 488 Mass. at 603.  The 
motion judge properly denied, therefore, the motion for a new 
trial on this issue. 
iii.  Expert testimony.  "The decision to call, or not to 
call, an expert witness fits squarely within the realm of 
18 
 
strategic or tactical decisions," and so "we evaluate whether 
the decision was 'manifestly unreasonable' at the time it was 
made" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 
63 (2018).  At the evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new 
trial, the defendant called two expert witnesses:  Joy Talbot, a 
barber instructor for the Department of Correction and member of 
the State Board of Registration of Cosmetology and Barbering, 
and Frederick Smith,14 a previously licensed barber who was 
incarcerated with the defendant in State prison and cut his hair 
during this period.  Talbot testified that hair grows, at most, 
one-half inch per month, and cornrowing hair requires a hair 
length of at least one and one-half inches -- meaning hair cut 
with the shortest clipper attachment would require at least 
three months of growth before it could be cornrowed -- but that 
as little as one-half inch of hair is needed to attach cornrow 
extensions.  Talbot also testified that, when cornrows are 
removed, the hair may retain an indentation from the pattern. 
She examined the photographs of the defendant with 
Galbreath on April 10, 2011, and opined that, while "[i]t is 
very difficult to tell, because [the defendant's] type of hair 
would stretch a little bit," his hair was likely too short to be 
 
14 Because of later references to a potential third-party 
culprit, Trevin Smith, by the surname Smith, we refer to 
Frederick Smith as "Frederick." 
19 
 
cornrowed at that time.  As to the Blake photographs from April 
22, 2011, she thought the defendant's hair appeared "a little 
bit shorter," thus "it might be more difficult" to cornrow, but 
it was "hard to tell."  Finally, Talbot examined photographs of 
the defendant in his hospital bed on May 6, 2011.  She concluded 
that the defendant's hair was too short to cornrow at that 
point, yet she could not determine whether he recently had 
removed cornrows.  Furthermore, it was "hard to say" whether the 
defendant's hair could have had extensions, that it was "a 
little short, but not totally impossible," though removing 
extensions would "probably" result in patches of hair. 
Frederick testified that he cut the defendant's hair with 
the shortest clipper attachment, one-sixteenth of an inch, 
approximately every two weeks for "a few months" while they were 
incarcerated together, beginning sometime in 2010 or 2011.  From 
his perspective, the hair length needed to be "[a]t least three 
to four inches" to cornrow and that would have taken the 
defendant "[a]t least six months" to grow out, but Frederick 
also conceded that he did not know how to cornrow hair and could 
not recall when he last gave the defendant a haircut. 
The defendant argues that, had the jury heard Talbot and 
Frederick's testimony, they would have discredited King's 
identification of the defendant as the barbershop shooter, along 
with testimony from Wright, Gregorczyk, and Springfield police 
20 
 
Officer Patricia Capoza that the defendant had cornrows when 
they saw him at the Burr Street house.  The testimony of these 
expert witnesses is not the "smoking clippers" that appellate 
counsel makes it out to be, however; as the motion judge noted, 
neither Talbot nor Frederick was able to say definitively how 
long the defendant's hair was and, thus, whether he could have 
had cornrows on the day of the barbershop shooting. 
Furthermore, although trial counsel conceded that he and 
co-counsel did not investigate expert testimony "on whether the 
hair shown . . . was susceptible to braiding or cornrowing" and 
that such testimony "couldn't have hurt," the defense also 
presented video and photographic evidence from their 
investigator to counterbalance the Commonwealth's eyewitness 
testimony that the defendant had braids and was the barbershop 
shooter -- images that the Commonwealth conceded in their 
closing portrayed his hair as "extremely tight to his head," so 
tight "that you can see the outline of where the hair goes." 
At trial, defense counsel challenged the identification of 
the defendant as the barbershop shooter and as the intruder at 
the Burr Street house by cross-examining King, Wright, 
Gregorczyk, and Capoza about seeing a man with cornrows.15  For 
 
15 Defense counsel pointed out that King saw the defendant 
for only "a fraction of a second" prior to the shooting, at 
which point he tried to take cover, and Gregorczyk also only saw 
 
21 
 
example, defense counsel pointed out that, given that King was a 
barber, the shooter's hairstyle would have stood out to him.  
But many eyewitnesses provided details about the person they saw 
beyond his hairstyle -- details that ultimately corroborated 
their identification of the defendant as the shooter at the 
barbershop and as the individual who stashed a gun at the Burr 
Street house.  King recalled staring into the "red" eyes of the 
barbershop shooter -- a detail corroborated by Gonzalez, who 
stared into the defendant's "bloodshot" and "wide open" eyes 
while he was in the trunk of the Impala in the driveway.  Carter 
also testified that, inside the Burr Street house, she saw 
"[h]is whole face, mainly his eyes," which were "very big and 
bloodshot red,"16 and that she recognized the defendant from the 
 
the defendant for mere seconds in the trunk before he was shot.  
With regards to Wright, defense counsel attacked her 
credibility, drawing attention to conflicting statements in her 
police statement the day of the incident, her statement to the 
defense investigator one year later, and her statement to 
prosecutors two years after the incident.  As to Capoza, defense 
counsel pointed out that she was relying on her memory of events 
from two years prior, having been recently contacted by the 
Commonwealth to testify, and without the benefit of refreshing 
her recollection from her contemporaneous police report, which 
could not be located. 
 
16 Carter provided murky testimony as to the defendant's 
bloodshot eyes.  On cross-examination, defense counsel 
established that Carter did not include that detail in her April 
2011 statement to police, leading her to answer "no" to 
counsel's question, "So that wasn't true, was it?" 
22 
 
neighborhood, while Wright similarly recalled the defendant's 
"big and scary" eyes. 
Given the lack of conclusive testimony on the defendant's 
hairstyle offered by Talbot and Frederick at the evidentiary 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, the extent to which 
defense counsel challenged the evidence presented on the 
defendant's hairstyle at trial, and the extensive evidence 
connecting the defendant to the barbershop shooting, including 
the damning ballistics and DNA evidence, discussed infra, we 
"conclude that the proffered testimony would have been unlikely 
to have changed the jury's conclusion."  Don, 483 Mass. at 707.  
Talbot was unable to determine definitively that the defendant's 
hair was too short to cornrow or attach cornrow extensions, and 
Frederick neither knew how to cornrow nor could testify as to 
when he last cut the defendant's hair to establish its length on 
the day of the shootings.  Failing to call such experts, 
therefore, did not amount to "a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  See id. at 704. 
b.  Eyewitness identification.  The defendant next argues 
that trial counsel ineffectively assisted him by failing to 
present expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification in support of his motion to suppress King's 
identification of the defendant as the barbershop shooter, as 
evidence at trial, and in support of his proposed jury 
23 
 
instruction on the fallibility of eyewitness identification.  
The defendant claims that, had such testimony been presented in 
support of the motion to suppress, the evidence of King's 
identification of the defendant as the barbershop shooter would 
have been excluded from trial.17  In the alternative, the 
defendant argues that, even if the trial judge would still have 
denied the motion to suppress and admitted King's 
identification, an eyewitness identification expert's testimony 
would have impeached the reliability of King's identification 
before the jury. 
Specifically, the defendant argues that expert testimony 
would have called into the question the accuracy of King's 
identification based on (i) "impermissibly suggestive 
identification procedure[s]" used by the police when presenting 
King with a photographic array and (ii) various environmental 
conditions under which King saw the barbershop shooter that can 
lead to mistaken identification.  Having raised these arguments 
in his motion for a new trial and presented such testimony at an 
evidentiary hearing,18 the defendant further argues that the 
motion judge erred in denying a new trial on these grounds. 
 
17 The motion to suppress also addressed Ball's 
identification, but that is not at issue on appeal. 
 
18 The defendant called Dr. Deah Quinlivan, a tenured 
associate professor of psychology at Florida Southern College, 
 
24 
 
We review the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims "for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice."  Don, 483 Mass. at 704.  We also "review a decision on 
a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion" and "defer 
to that judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses at 
the hearing on the new trial motion" (citation omitted).  
Jacobs, 488 Mass. at 600.  Because the motion judge was not the 
trial judge, however, "we regard ourselves in as good a position 
as the motion judge to assess the trial record" (citation 
omitted).  Id. 
i.  Photographic array procedures.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant sought to suppress King's identification of him as the 
barbershop shooter, arguing that the array procedure was unduly 
suggestive because only the photograph of the defendant in the 
array featured a man with braided hair -- a photograph that had 
been circulated by the media to publicize the defendant's recent 
escape from prison.  At the motion for a new trial stage, the 
defendant also submitted that the police presented the 
photographs to the defendant in an impermissibly suggestive way 
by not adhering to the recommended double-blind, sequential 
procedure. 
 
with eighteen years of experience researching eyewitness 
identification. 
25 
 
A.  Distinctiveness.  In support of the motion to suppress 
and at trial, the defense called the Springfield police 
detective who developed the frontal view array.  The detective 
testified on standard photographic array procedures and the 
process that he used.  From the detective's perspective, the 
frontal view photograph of the defendant depicted him with 
"[s]hort black hair that's close to his head," and so he 
compiled seven other frontal view photographs that had the same 
hairstyle and "[v]ery similar forehead[s]," from a computer-
generated selection based on the defendant's age, race, 
ethnicity, skin color, height, and weight.19  The detective also 
noted that King would have signed a protocol form that contained 
a warning that some features shown in a photograph, such as 
hairstyle, may change. 
King testified, at both the motion to suppress hearing and 
at trial20 that, while he thought the shooter was wearing braids, 
he also saw the shooter's entire face, including his red eyes, 
and that he recognized him immediately as the defendant -- a 
young man he had seen on the news recently and who had grown up 
 
19 The detective did not, however, construct the profile 
view array that shows the defendant with a cornrow-like 
hairstyle and was unaware of the corresponding profile view 
photograph of the defendant and the hairstyle it would depict. 
 
20 The defense called King at the motion to suppress 
hearing, but he was the Commonwealth's witness at trial. 
26 
 
in the neighborhood.  The trial judge, denying the motion to 
suppress after an evidentiary hearing, determined that King made 
the identification "as a result of [his] proximity to the 
defendant on April 30 at the barbershop"; having seen the 
defendant's "facial features and braided hair," King 
"immediately recognized him as a person from the neighborhood 
who was a friend of his son's and also as the man who recently 
escaped from prison." 
On this point, that the photograph of the defendant in the 
array was unduly suggestive because he is the only person with 
braided hair, the proffered expert testimony would not have 
affected the trial judge's denial of the motion to suppress.  
The expert merely posited that King, as a Black barber, may have 
noticed the cornrows in the photograph better than, for example, 
a white police officer less familiar with hairstyles, especially 
culturally Black hairstyles.  Having reviewed the frontal view 
photographic array shown to King, we agree with the trial judge 
that the array is hardly suggestive; the defendant's "hair style 
is not distinctively different from the others," as the featured 
braids are barely, if at all, distinguishable from a short, 
close-to-the-scalp style.  See Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 
736, 756 (2008). 
We conclude that, even with such expert testimony, there 
was no likelihood that the trial judge would have suppressed 
27 
 
King's testimony, given King's emphasis on distinguishing 
physical traits of the shooter -- including his eyes, as well as 
his hair -- and King's prior familiarity with the defendant.  
See Commonwealth v. Thornley, 406 Mass. 96, 100 (1989) ("A 
witness's unequivocable testimony that he was not relying on a 
distinctive feature will considerably neutralize any 
suggestiveness in the photographic array").  Because the 
proffered expert testimony would not have changed the outcome of 
the motion to suppress King's identification, the evidence of 
King's identification of the defendant in the array as the 
barbershop shooter would still have gone to the jury. 
Furthermore, we cannot say that the failure of the 
defendant's trial counsel to call an expert witness to testify 
at trial as to the potential suggestiveness of the defendant's 
hairstyle in the photographic array was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion, see Don, 483 Mass. at 704, 
given King's identification of the defendant based on his facial 
features and familiarity from the neighborhood, as well as the 
physical evidence against the defendant, including the DNA on 
the gloves and sweatshirt and the gun recovered from the 
defendant in the trunk of the car that matched the ballistics 
evidence collected from the barbershop.  Any error, therefore, 
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Id. 
28 
 
B.  Presentation.  Defense counsel also elicited testimony, 
at both the motion to suppress hearing and at trial, from two of 
the State police troopers present for King's array-based 
identification to describe how the photographs were shown to 
King and how he made his selections.  The photographs were shown 
to King "one by one," during which he put four to the side.  
Then, he picked out two from the four, and finally, he selected 
the defendant's photograph as the person who shot him in the 
barbershop.21  While some of the troopers present knew the 
defendant, the troopers testified at the motion to suppress 
hearing and at trial that the trooper providing King with the 
photographs "had no knowledge of anybody in the photo arrays." 
This court has emphasized that "the absence of [a double-
blind] procedure" and "the choice of a simultaneous rather than 
a sequential display of photographs shall go solely to the 
weight of the identification, not to its admissibility."  
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 797, 798-799 
(2009).  In this case, while police did not conduct a strictly 
double-blind, sequential array, they did take precautions to 
 
21 At the motion to suppress hearing, one trooper testified 
that King said that the defendant's picture "mainly looked like 
the guy" who shot him and, "That's the kid -- that's the boy who 
shot me."  At trial, the other trooper corroborated this, 
testifying that King's comment that the defendant's photograph 
"mainly" looked like the barbershop shooter and that King also 
said, "Yeah, that's definitely the boy who shot me." 
29 
 
promote accuracy, on which they testified at the motion to 
suppress hearing.  On this point, therefore, additional expert 
testimony would not have changed the outcome of the motion to 
suppress, and King's identification would have still gone to the 
jury. 
Furthermore, we cannot say that failure to call an expert 
witness to testify at trial as to the potential suggestiveness 
of the array's presentation to King was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion.  See Don, 483 Mass. at 704.  
The array was not unduly suggestive, and there was more than 
ample evidence identifying the defendant as the barbershop 
shooter; thus, there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See id. 
ii.  Environmental conditions.  The defendant argues that, 
had trial counsel presented expert testimony on the 
environmental conditions (also referred to as estimator 
variables) that increase the likelihood of a mistaken 
identification, then King's identification of the defendant as 
the barbershop shooter would have been suppressed or, in the 
alternative, the testimony would have affected the jury's 
evaluation of King's identification at trial.  We are not 
persuaded. 
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the 
defendant's trial counsel challenged the accuracy of King's 
30 
 
identification based on these conditions -- his short exposure 
time to the shooter under extremely stressful conditions; the 
likelihood of his fixating on the weapons, as opposed to the 
face of the person holding them; and the risk of unconscious 
transference due to his familiarity with the defendant from the 
community and media reports of the defendant's recent escape 
from prison.  In his motion to suppress, the defendant argued 
that King "had a limited opportunity to observe the" barbershop 
shooter, given how quickly events unfolded and the shooter's 
face being at least partially obscured by the hoodie.  At the 
suppression hearing, defense counsel further elicited from King 
that he saw the defendant's face for just "[a] fraction of a 
second" prior to him pulling a gun on King.  Expert testimony on 
these factors would not have changed the outcome of the motion 
to suppress, as it did not bear on the admissibility of King's 
identification. 
At trial, defense counsel further attacked King's 
identification of the defendant as the shooter, both on cross-
examination and in closing argument.  They emphasized how King's 
recollection of the shooter's features was based on viewing his 
face, partially obscured by the hoodie over his head, again for 
a "fraction of a second," not to mention the lack of description 
of any physical features in King's statement to police.  Defense 
counsel also impeached King's credibility by pointing to various 
31 
 
pieces of testimony, such as what King said to the shooter, 
recognizing him from the community, and various clothing items 
worn by the shooter, that did not appear in his contemporaneous 
statement to police, as well as his contradictory testimony 
before the grand jury that the shooter was not wearing a black 
T-shirt in addition to the black hoodie. 
As to the expert testimony's potential effects at trial, 
the motion judge correctly noted that the testimony had the 
potential to be a double-edged sword for the defense, 
potentially helping the defendant's case on the one hand but 
hurting it on the other.  The various effects on the accuracy of 
identification due to stress, time, familiarity with the 
defendant, and the display of weapons would apply differently to 
different witnesses -- several of whom identified the defendant 
after observing him under different conditions with different 
levels of prior familiarity, or absence thereof. 
Most importantly, there was incredibly damning physical 
evidence unrelated to this expert's testimony, including 
ballistics evidence that connected the barbershop shooting to 
the firearm found in the possession of the defendant, the 
defendant's DNA found inside gloves that matched the description 
of the shooter's gloves, DNA found inside a sweatshirt that 
matched the shooter's sweatshirt, and the gunshot residue on the 
32 
 
gloves and the black sweatshirt.  In sum, overwhelming evidence 
identified the defendant as the barbershop shooter. 
Finally, at the time of trial, expert evidence on 
eyewitness identification was still being developed and was not 
commonly introduced at trial; defense counsel did not have the 
benefit of our opinion in Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 
367, 376 (2015) (Gomes I), which recognized evolving research on 
eyewitness testimony and incorporated it into our jurisprudence, 
albeit prospectively.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 478 Mass. 
1025, 1025-1026 (2018)(Gomes II).22  We, therefore, discern no 
error by trial counsel in failing to include the expert evidence 
proposed at the motion for a new trial.  We also emphasize that 
even if such evidence had been available and had been introduced 
at the time of trial, it was not likely "to have influenced the 
jury's conclusion," particularly given the ballistics and DNA 
evidence. 
c.  Third-party culprit evidence.  The defendant argues 
that the trial judge improperly excluded proffered evidence that 
a third-party culprit -- another man from the neighborhood, 
 
22 We also agree with the motion judge that Gomes II 
precludes a finding of ineffectiveness for failing to present 
expert evidence necessary to support the New Jersey eyewitness 
identification instruction.  As we explained in Gomes II, 478 
Mass. at 1026, "[a]n attorney who would make such an effort is 
worthy of commendation by the defense bar, but the attorney who 
does not can hardly be deemed incompetent." 
33 
 
Trevin Smith -- was the barbershop shooter.  He also argues that 
the motion judge, when presented with additional third-party 
culprit evidence, failed to properly consider it and erroneously 
denied the motion for a new trial on that ground.  We review 
each argument in turn. 
As this court has explained, "[a] defendant may introduce 
evidence that tends to show that another person committed the 
crime or had the motive, intent, and opportunity to commit it" 
(citation omitted).  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 800.  Indeed, 
"[w]e have given wide latitude to the admission of relevant 
evidence that a person other than the defendant may have 
committed the crime charged."  Id. at 800-801.  "If the evidence 
is 'of substantial probative value, and will not tend to 
prejudice or confuse, all doubt should be resolved in favor of 
admissibility.'"  Id. at 801, quoting Commonwealth v. Conkey, 
443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008).  
Nonetheless, 
"this latitude is not unbounded.  The limitations are 
twofold.  First, because the evidence is offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted -- that a third party is the 
true culprit -- we have permitted hearsay evidence that 
does not fall within a hearsay exception only if, in the 
judge's discretion, the evidence is otherwise relevant, 
will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and there 
are other substantial connecting links to the crime" 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
 
Silva-Santiago, supra.  "Second, the evidence, even if it is not 
hearsay, 'must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the 
34 
 
defense raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote or 
speculative.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 
22 (1996).  Because "the exclusion of third-party culprit 
evidence is of a constitutional dimension," we examine it 
independently.  Id. at 804 n.26.  If the evidence was improperly 
excluded, then we determine "whether the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Conkey, supra at 70. 
At trial, the defendant first sought to introduce testimony 
from Smith's long-time girlfriend, Karen Fuller,23 in support of 
a third-party culprit defense that Smith was the barbershop 
shooter.  After a voir dire of Fuller, the trial judge found 
that Fuller's testimony on what Smith was wearing (a black 
hooded sweatshirt), his hairstyle (braids), and seeing him in a 
car in the neighborhood on the same day as the barbershop 
shooting was "not enough of a substantial connecting link . . . 
to permit the introduction of third-party culprit evidence."  
The judge permitted Fuller to testify, however, as to "what she 
 
23 The defendant also initially intended to introduce 
testimony from two other witnesses, but one invoked her right 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and did not testify, and trial 
counsel opted not to call the other witness, a minor, and 
instead presented a stipulation. 
 
35 
 
did" on the day of the shootings "but not what . . . Smith said 
to her over the telephone."24 
The defendant asserts that the trial judge erred in her 
ruling.  Indeed, when denying the introduction of third-party 
culprit evidence, the trial judge conflated the "substantial 
connecting link" limitation required to admit a certain type of 
evidence -- otherwise inadmissible hearsay, see Silva-Santiago, 
453 Mass. at 801  -- with the general limitation on all 
proffered third-party culprit evidence -- that it "must have a 
rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and the 
evidence cannot be too remote or speculative," id., quoting 
Rosa, 422 Mass. at 22.  Quoting Rosa, however, the trial judge 
went on to say that the evidence was too speculative to prove 
that Smith was the barbershop shooter.  For example, she noted:  
"a black hoodie and jeans . . . is such a common urban outfit, 
especially on a Saturday.  That, you know, I could -- that's 
something I may wear on a Saturday." 
Although the trial judge erred in part of her reasoning, 
the defendant still presented, through Fuller's testimony, the 
evidence he sought to admit -- Smith's hairstyle (including a 
 
24 Fuller testified that, at around noon on the day of the 
shootings, Smith told her to drive her car, a gray Chevrolet 
Impala, to the Burr Street house, back into the driveway, open 
her trunk, and then wait for his cell phone call with further 
instructions.  She complied.  It is from this car's trunk that 
the defendant was apprehended. 
36 
 
photograph of Smith with braids, as he appeared on the day of 
the barbershop shooting); attire (black hooded sweatshirt); and 
whereabouts on the day of the shootings.  As to Smith's alleged 
"flight from the scene," the defense called the trooper who took 
Fuller's statements.  The trooper testified that Fuller 
described Smith as being "hot and sweaty" when she saw him on 
the day of the shootings.  The defense also argued their third-
party culprit theory at closing.  For these reasons, any error 
by the trial judge was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  
See Conkey, 443 Mass. at 70. 
The defendant also appeals from the denial of his motion 
for a new trial on these grounds, arguing that the motion judge 
misunderstood the significance of additional third-party culprit 
evidence presented for the first time at the postconviction 
stage:25 
"(i) Smith's statement to police containing details of 
Smith's flight to New York after the shootings; (ii) 
evidence of a shooting that occurred four days earlier in a 
location close to the barbershop; and (iii) evidence that 
witnesses at [the Burr Street house] lied about Smith's 
presence at the house close in time to the barbershop 
shooting."26 
 
25 On his motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that 
his trial counsel were ineffective for not presenting at trial 
certain additional evidence, discussed infra.  At this stage, 
however, he argues solely that the motion judge erred in 
evaluating that evidence as presented. 
 
26 The defendant also argues that the motion judge erred by 
considering the proffered third-party culprit evidence 
 
37 
 
 
For the reasons stated by the motion judge, we discern no 
error.  As the motion judge explained, Smith's statement to 
police "would have been more harmful than helpful to the 
defendant."  He directly implicated the defendant in the 
shootings, including providing support for a damaging theory 
that the defendant committed the barbershop shooting in 
retaliation for his mother having been shot a week prior.  
Furthermore, Smith's flight to Brooklyn and destruction of the 
cell phone he used to communicate with the defendant supported 
the Commonwealth's theory that he was implicated in directing 
Fuller to the Burr Street house to help the defendant flee -- 
just as much as, if not more than, it supported the defense's 
theory that he committed the barbershop shooting. 
The defendant also suggested in his motion for a new trial 
that evidence of a shooting that happened four days prior to the 
barbershop shooting and took place "approximately two blocks" 
away supported the defense that Smith was the third-party 
 
singularly and ignored its cumulative effect with expert 
testimony presented on the cornrows and eyewitness 
identification issues.  This argument has no merit, however, as 
the motion judge explicitly considered the cumulative effect of 
all asserted errors and the evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing on the motion, including the excluded third-
party culprit evidence, and determined that there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in this case 
given the weight of the evidence against the defendant.  Having 
discussed, supra, the overwhelming implications of the 
ballistics and DNA evidence against the defendant, we agree. 
38 
 
culprit.  Witnesses, including King, saw "a [B]lack male, 
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt . . . and jean[s]" firing at a 
vehicle and that he fled in "a silver car with Tennessee plates" 
that was later found parked next to the Burr Street house.  The 
police also recovered a pair of gloves similar to those found at 
the Burr Street house.  As the motion judge explained, however, 
none of this evidence implicated Smith in the barbershop 
shooting any more than it exonerated the defendant, whose DNA 
was found on the black gloves and a black hoodie recovered from 
the Burr Street house, where witnesses saw him after the 
barbershop shooting and police apprehended him. 
Finally, the defendant proffered statements made by Carter 
and Baulkman to demonstrate that they "lied about Smith's 
presence" at the Burr Street house.  The motion judge noted, 
however, that defense counsel successfully impeached Carter's 
testimony at trial, establishing that she "initially told police 
that Smith was not at" the Burr Street house but then testified 
on cross-examination that she saw him leave when she arrived 
that morning.  As to Baulkman, the motion judge found that the 
statement, from a person who did not testify at trial, also did 
not support the defendant's proffered third-party culprit 
defense that Smith committed the barbershop shooting.  We agree; 
in fact, at trial, the defendant established through Fuller's 
39 
 
testimony that Smith was in a car in Fuller's driveway at the 
time. 
Having reviewed the evidence presented on the motion for a 
new trial, we discern no error by the motion judge when he 
denied the motion after considering the proffered additional 
third-party culprit evidence at the postconviction stage. 
d.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no 
basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree or to order a new trial. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and the denial of the defendant's 
postconviction motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.