Title: Reed v. Humphreys
Citation: 373 S.W.2d 580
Docket Number: 5-3084
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 1963

373 S.W.2d 580 (1963) Augusta REED et al., Appellants, v. William F. HUMPHREYS, Appellee. No. 5-3084. Supreme Court of Arkansas. December 2, 1963. Rehearing Denied January 13, 1964. Mahony &amp; Yocum, El Dorado, for appellants. Spencer &amp; Spencer, El Dorado, for appellee. JOHNSON, Justice. This suit is for personal injuries resulting from a collision between an automobile and a truck. On December 11, 1959, appellee William F. Humphreys was one of two passengers in a car driven by Jimmy Clemons en route from Hampton to Calion. Clemons' car collided with the side of a tractor-trailer driven by appellant Augusta Reed, an employee of appellant C. F. Wright. Clemons was killed and the two passengers injured. Appellee filed suit against appellants in Calhoun Circuit Court. Judgment was given on a jury verdict of $4,000.00 for appellee, from which appellee appealed, Humphreys v. Reed, 234 Ark. 861, 355 S.W.2d 281, and on March 19, 1962, this court reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. On October 31, 1962, after a new trial, the jury returned a verdict for appellee for $30,000.00. In this case appellants have appealed from the judgment on the verdict. *581 The first point urged for reversal is that the trial court erred in excluding opinion testimony of the Arkansas State Police officer who investigated the collision. During direct examination, after testifying at length about the physical facts he found at the scene of the collision, the officer was asked, "From the physical facts that you found in your investigation, did you form an opinion as to the point of impact?" Appellee objected, and court sustained the objection, excluding this opinion testimony. We have had occasion to review admissibility of opinion testimony several times recently. Conway v. Hudspeth, 229 Ark. 735, 318 S.W.2d 137; Henshaw v. Henderson, 235 Ark. 130, 359 S.W.2d 436; Waters v. Coleman, 235 Ark. 559, 361 S.W.2d 268. In each of these cases this court applied the rule contained in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Barry, 172 Ark. 729, 290 S.W. 942, that, "The subject-matter of these questions did not call for the opinion of experts. The facts of the occurrence were not beyond the knowledge and experience of any ordinary man to understand and draw conclusions from them, when detailed by eyewitnesses. Therefore the expert testimony was not competent and the court did not err in so holding." The collision here in question was uncomplicated and there were photographs of the automobile, truck, and the scene of the accident, showing gouges and marks on and off the road, as well as testimony of witnesses who vividly described the conditions prevailing and the scene. The police officer's testimony conflicts in part with testimony of some of appellee's witnesses who arrived at the scene before the officer; however, virtually the only fact testified to by the officer not already clearly covered by testimony of witnesses for both appellee and appellants was the location of debris on the highway, which the officer testified about, in detail and at length. As was stated in the Waters case, supra, "The facts to be determined were not complicated. This was a relatively simple collision. Certainly there was no evidence to indicate that it was beyond the jury's ability to understand the facts and draw its own conclusions. The state of the record being thus, we find that the trial court erred in allowing appellee to resort to expert opinion." It follows, therefore, in the present case, that the trial court committed no error in excluding the police officer's opinion testimony. In so holding, we take this occasion to restate the rule so succinctly stated in Cahill v. Bradford, 172 Ark. 69, 287 S.W. 595, "Opinion evidence is not admissible when the fact is susceptible of being adequately exhibited to the jury in the ordinary way." Appellants next urge that the trial court erred in refusing to give their Instruction No. 14, which reads as follows: Appellants, in their answer, pleaded that appellee and Clemons, the driver, were engaged in a joint enterprise. In a recent case, Woodard v. Holliday, 235 Ark. 744, *582 361 S.W.2d 744, this court discussed joint enterprise, or joint venture, as follows: The testimony here relative to the three men traveling together is contained in the direct examination of Randall Kitchens, the other passenger, and appellant. Kitchens testified as follows: Appellee testified as follows: Appellants forcefully contend that the trial court erred in refusing to give the above quoted instruction which they urge presented appellants' theory of the case. In support of this contention appellants quote from Western Coal &amp; Mining Co. v. Moore, 96 Ark. 206, 131 S.W. 960, as follows: As brought out in the Woodard case, supra, joint enterprise requires both (1) common purpose, and (2) equality of control. In the case at bar, review of the testimony clearly reflects common purpose, but there is a total failure of evidence on the matter of equality of control. Failing thus to produce evidence essential to the establishment of joint enterprise, appellants were not entitled to the instruction offered. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in refusing to give such an instruction. Instructions are to be given on the evidence, not on the pleadings. We have examined very carefully the other instructions, offered or given, complained of by appellants and find no error. Affirmed.