Title: Bradbury v. Teacher Standards and Practices Comm.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44998
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 1999

Filed: April 8, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

LESLIE R. BRADBURY,

	Respondent on Review,

	v.

TEACHER STANDARDS AND PRACTICES COMMISSION,

	Petitioner on Review,

	and

STEVEN R. WELKER,

	Defendant.

(CC 93C-13251; CA A90766; SC S44998)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted November 3, 1998.

	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General, and Erika A. Hadlock Assistant Attorney
General.

	James M. Brown, Salem, filed the brief and argued the cause
for respondent on review.  

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**

	RIGGS, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

*	Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,

	Albin W. Norblad, Judge.

	151 Or App 176, 947 P2d 1145 (1997).

**	Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

	RIGGS, J.

	In this tort case, plaintiff appeals from a judgment
entered after the trial court dismissed his complaint as time-barred.  ORCP 21 A(9).  The issue is whether the trial court
erred in concluding that plaintiff's complaint alleges
defamation, which is governed by a one-year statute of
limitations.  ORS 12.120(2).  The Court of Appeals reversed. 
Bradbury v. Teacher Standards and Practices Comm., 151 Or App
176, 947 P2d 1145 (1997).  We affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

	Because this case is before us on a motion to dismiss,
we assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged in the
complaint and give plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, the benefit
of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. 
Downs v. Waremart, Inc., 324 Or 307, 309, 926 P2d 314 (1996).

	Plaintiff's complaint contains the following factual
allegations.  At all times relevant to this case, plaintiff was
employed as a public school superintendent.  Defendant Teacher
Standards and Practices Commission (TSPC) is a state agency that
licenses teachers and public school administrators.  In 1991,
TSPC received a complaint accusing plaintiff of sexual
involvement with a school district staff member.  Under ORS
342.176, TSPC is required to investigate such complaints.

	TSPC assigned defendant Welker to investigate the
complaint against plaintiff.  Welker began an investigation under
the direction and supervision of TSPC.  In November 1991, Welker
prepared a detailed report of the results of his investigation
and presented it to TSPC.  Welker reported that he found no
factual support for the allegation against plaintiff but
nevertheless believed that the allegation was true.  He also
provided details about a previously unreported allegation that
plaintiff had sexually assaulted a staff member in 1977.

	Based on Welker's report, TSPC drafted charges against
plaintiff and began proceedings to address those charges.  Copies
of Welker's report were mailed to plaintiff and to TSPC's 17
members.  After reviewing the report and receiving witness
statements, TSPC dismissed the charges against plaintiff on
January 31, 1992.

	Because the charges against plaintiff were dismissed,
Welker's report remained confidential under ORS 342.176(4).(1) 
Nevertheless, in June 1992, Welker gave a copy of the report to a
third party, who in turn gave copies to members of the school
board in plaintiff's district.  

	More than one year but less than two years later,
plaintiff sued TSPC, alleging that TSPC negligently supervised
Welker during and after his investigation and that, as a result,
Welker made public a report of the investigation that should have
been kept confidential, causing plaintiff damage.(2)  In addition
to the facts summarized above, plaintiff's complaint alleged:
"12.  ORS 342.176(4) required that all documents and
materials used in Welker's investigation and the
recommendation of TSPC's Executive Secretary be kept
confidential unless and until a final determination is
made by TSPC that the accused had violated statutory
provisions.  At all times material the charge against
plaintiff, Welker's investigation and any and all
related documents were confidential.
"13.  Before June 1, 1992, Welker furnished a copy of
his investigation report to a third party known to be
antagonistic toward plaintiff.
"* * * * *
"16.  Defendant TSPC was negligent in its supervision
of Welker in that while it knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, that Welker was
inexperienced as a TSPC investigator, that he had
formed opinions negative toward plaintiff and that he
was receiving requests from third parties for
information regarding his investigation, his report and
the action by TSPC, it failed to instruct Welker upon
the requirements of confidentiality and to observe
Welker's control of his investigative file to prevent
disclosure to third parties. 
"17.  As a consequence of TSPC's negligence plaintiff
was exposed to the foreseeable and unreasonable risk
that false information prepared in a manner and form
appearing official, credible and authentic and damaging
to plaintiff would be disclosed to third parties.
"18.  As the direct and proximate cause of TSPC's
negligence plaintiff has been subjected to loss of
public esteem, respect, goodwill and confidence and has
been disgraced and degraded."

Under ORCP 21 A(9), TSPC moved to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint as time-barred.  TSPC argued that, although presented
as a negligence action, plaintiff's claim in fact alleged
defamation, and the one-year statute of limitations for
defamation therefore applied.  The trial court agreed and
dismissed the action, relying on this court's opinion in Coe v.
Statesman-Journal Co., 277 Or 117, 560 P2d 254 (1977).  In Coe,
the plaintiff sought recovery of damages for the negligent
publication of false information about him.  The plaintiff argued
that, because the publication was negligent and not intentional,
his claim should be governed by the two-year statute of
limitations for negligence, not the one-year statute of
limitations for defamation.  This court disagreed and held that
the defamation statute of limitations applied to all actions for
defamation, even those based on negligent conduct.  In other
words, the plaintiff could not secure the benefit of a longer
statute of limitations merely by alleging that the defamatory act
was performed with a less culpable state of mind -- negligence --
than would be present in the case of intentional defamation.  Id.
at 120.

		In this case, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's dismissal.  First, the court concluded that "plaintiff's
claim against TSPC is a claim based on release of confidential
information and not defamation."  Id. at 181.  Second, the court 
concluded that, even if the underlying wrong of which plaintiff
complained was the release of defamatory statements by the
investigator, the complaint still should not be dismissed,
because, unlike in Coe, this was not a case in which a claimant
was "disguising the nature of his claim to avoid defamation's
one-year statute of limitation.  Rather, his action is best
understood as an action for negligent supervision * * *." 
Bradbury, 151 Or App at 183.

		As a preliminary matter, we emphasize that this case is
on review from the trial court's grant of TSPC's motion to
dismiss.  Accordingly, our review is limited to the pleadings.  
Our sole task on review is to determine whether the pleadings,
construed liberally, ORCP 12 A, fairly may be read to allege a
tort, other than defamation, to which a statute of limitations
longer than one year applies.  If so, the complaint is sufficient
to survive TSPC's motion to dismiss.

		TSPC argues that this case is governed by ORS
12.120(2), and suggests that our task simply is to construe the
language of that statute, which establishes the statute of
limitations for defamation claims.  ORS 12.120(2) provides:
		"An action for libel or slander shall be
commenced within one year."

TSPC is incorrect.  The appropriate inquiry is to determine
whether plaintiff's complaint only may be read as alleging
defamation, or whether the complaint reasonably may be read as
also alleging a tort or breach of duty other than defamation.  To
answer that question, we look only to plaintiff's complaint. 

		As noted, plaintiff's complaint alleges both negligent
supervision and a violation of a statutory duty of
confidentiality, whether or not it also may be read as alleging
defamation.  TSPC nevertheless argues that we must look to the
underlying wrong of which plaintiff complains.  According to
TSPC, that wrong is defamation.  If we do not look beyond
plaintiff's characterization of his action, TSPC argues, future
plaintiffs will be able to avoid the defamation statute of
limitations simply by suing supervisors for negligently allowing
their subordinates to commit defamation.  According to TSPC, that
result would gut the one-year limitation in ORS 12.120(2) and
contradict this court's holding in Coe.

		That argument aids TSPC in this case only if we agree
that plaintiff's complaint can only be read as alleging that
Welker's underlying tortious act was defamation.  We do not.  A
liberal reading supports plaintiff's contention that the
complaint alleges that Welker's wrongful act was a tortious
breach of the statutory duty to accord certain persons
confidentiality under ORS 342.176(4).  As noted, ORS 342.176(4)
provides that documents, materials, and reports used in TSPC
disciplinary investigations must be kept confidential unless and
until TSPC has determined that the person subject to the
investigation has committed a violation.  Plaintiff's complaint
alleges in paragraph 12 that Welker's report and other documents
were required to be kept confidential by ORS 342.176(4); in
paragraphs 13 and 14, the complaint alleges Welker gave a copy of
his confidential report to a third party who, in turn, gave it to
others; in paragraph 16, the complaint alleges that TSPC "failed
to instruct Welker upon the requirements of confidentiality and
to observe Welker's control of his investigative file to prevent
disclosure to third parties"; and in paragraphs 18 and 19, the
complaint alleges that plaintiff was damaged thereby.  Taken
together, those portions of the complaint allege both negligent
supervision and violation of ORS 342.176(4).  Because the
legislature has not specifically provided a statute of
limitations for claims alleging a tortious breach of ORS
342.176(4), such claims are governed by the two-year statute of
limitations contained in ORS 12.110(1).(3) 

		TSPC argues, however, that, because plaintiff alleged
that the substance of the charges in Welker's report was false as
well as confidential, his claim must be viewed as one for
defamation.  Specifically, TSPC directs us to paragraph 17 of
plaintiff's complaint, which states in part that "[a]s a
consequence of TSPC's negligence plaintiff was exposed to the
foreseeable and unreasonable risk that false information * * *
damaging to plaintiff would be disclosed to third parties." 
(Emphasis added.)  The fact that plaintiff insists that the
confidential statements were false, TSPC argues, means that his
complaint alleges damage to reputation from publication of false
information.  Under Coe, TSPC concludes, such complaints must be
raised in a defamation claim or not at all.  

		We disagree.  It is the nature of the conduct
complained of -- the predominant characteristic of the action --
that identifies the tort.  Lindemeier v. Walker, 272 Or 682, 684,
538 P2d 1266 (1975).  The predominant characteristic of the
conduct of which plaintiff complains is the release of
confidential information from a TSPC disciplinary investigation
in violation of ORS 342.176(4).  That statute does not
differentiate between true and false information from TSPC
investigations; all documents and materials used in such
investigations are to be kept confidential.  The duty of
confidentiality imposed by the statute can be violated by the
release of true information, false information, or a combination
of the two.

		Coe is not to the contrary.  There, the plaintiff
identified no breach of legal duty other than the duty not to
publish defamatory statements.  He argued that a different
statute of limitations should apply to negligent defamation than
applies to intentional defamation.  Coe, 277 Or at 119.  Here, by
contrast, plaintiff has alleged a breach of a distinct legal
duty, the duty of confidentiality contained in ORS 342.176(4).

		In sum, liberally construed, plaintiff's complaint
alleges a tort other than defamation.  The two-year statute of
limitations in ORS 12.110(4) applies to that claim.  Accordingly,
the complaint was sufficient to survive TSPC's motion to dismiss. 
Because we resolve the case on that basis, we need not address
the additional reasons for reversal presented in the Court of
Appeals' decision.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

1. 	ORS 342.176(4) provides:

		"The documents and materials used in the
investigation and the report of the executive director
are confidential and not subject to public inspection
unless [TSPC] makes a final determination that the
person charged has violated ORS 342.143 or ORS
342.175."

2. 	Plaintiff also sued Welker, seeking recovery for false
light invasion of privacy.  Welker confessed judgment and is not
a party to this appeal.

3. 	ORS 12.110(1) provides, in part:
"An action for * * * any injury to the person or
rights of another, not arising on contract, and not
especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be
commenced within two years * * *."