Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Terry L. Nussberger
Citation: 2006 WI 111
Docket Number: 2004AP002996-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: August 8, 2006

2006 WI 111 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2996-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Terry L. Nussberger, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Terry L. Nussberger, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST NUSSBERGER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
August 8, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 28, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Stephen 
D. Willett and Stephen D. Willett SC, Phillips, and oral 
argument by Stephen D. Willett. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by William 
J. Weigel and the Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison, and oral 
argument by William J. Weigel. 
 
 
2006 WI 111
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2996-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Terry L. Nussberger, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Terry L. Nussberger, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
AUG 8, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   Attorney 
Terry 
L. 
Nussberger 
has 
appealed from the recommendation of the referee, based upon the 
parties' stipulation both to the underlying facts and to the 
legal conclusion of a violation of SCR 20:1.2(d),1 that Attorney 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.2(d) provides:  Scope of representation. 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to 
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may 
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course 
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
2 
 
Nussberger's license to practice law in this state be suspended 
for a period of 60 days.  He has also objected to the statement 
of costs submitted by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) as 
being unreasonable and excessive. 
¶2 
Based upon our independent review of the record, 
including the parties' stipulation, we adopt the referee's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We also agree with the 
referee's recommendation that a 60-day suspension of Attorney 
Nussberger's license to practice law in Wisconsin is appropriate 
discipline, especially in light of Attorney Nussberger's prior 
discipline.  Finally, we reject Attorney Nussberger's objection 
to the OLR's statement of costs and decide that Attorney 
Nussberger should pay the full costs of this proceeding, which 
total $6056.62 as of May 11, 2006. 
¶3 
Attorney Nussberger was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1983.  He operates a solo, general practice in 
Ladysmith, 
and 
handles 
various 
types 
of 
cases 
from 
the 
surrounding counties.  He has also served as a family court 
commissioner for a number of years. 
¶4 
On March 29, 2003, Attorney Nussberger was publicly 
reprimanded with his consent in connection with two grievance 
investigations.  In both instances, Attorney Nussberger admitted 
violating 
SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
by 
submitting 
false 
disposition 
summaries and payment vouchers to the Office of the State Public 
                                                                                                                                                             
client to make a good faith effort to determine the 
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
3 
 
Defender (SPD).  Pursuant to SPD rules, appointed attorneys may 
not submit a disposition summary and payment voucher until the 
case has in fact reached disposition and counsel has completed 
the representation at that court level.  Despite having been 
explicitly warned about submitting these documents prematurely, 
for at least 12 postconviction/appellate cases in which he filed 
no-merit reports in the court of appeals, Attorney Nussberger 
submitted payment vouchers before the court of appeals took 
action on the no-merit report and relieved him of further 
representation of the defendant.  Thus, Attorney Nussberger 
obtained payment before he was authorized to do so under SPD 
rules by misrepresenting that the representation at the court of 
appeals level was complete.   
¶5 
Moreover, 
the 
disposition 
summaries 
submitted 
by 
Attorney Nussberger also indicated that he had advised the 
client of the right to file a petition for review in this court.  
This was false because the court of appeals had not yet acted on 
the no-merit report.  Thus, Attorney Nussberger could not have 
explained the effect of the court of appeals' decision and the 
defendant's options in light of that decision because there was 
no such decision at the time.  For the conduct alleged and 
admitted on both of the grievances, Attorney Nussberger was 
publicly reprimanded for his violations of SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶6 
In the present case, on November 16, 2004, the OLR 
filed a complaint alleging one count of violating SCR 20:1.2(d) 
due to Attorney Nussberger's suggestion to a client that they 
could obtain additional funds from the estate for which she was 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
4 
 
personal representative by Attorney Nussberger misrepresenting 
the amount of his fees incurred on her behalf.  Reserve Judge 
Timothy L. Vocke was appointed as referee.  
¶7 
Attorney Nussberger initially filed an answer that 
admitted some factual allegations, but denied violating SCR 
20:1.2(d).  Prior to the hearing before the referee, he 
subsequently withdrew the answer, and filed a stipulation and 
no-contest plea, in which he agreed that the referee could use 
the factual allegations of the complaint as the factual basis 
for a determination of misconduct, as alleged in the single 
count in the complaint.   
¶8 
Attorney Nussberger did not stipulate, however, to the 
level of discipline.  Consequently, Referee Vocke held a hearing 
as to the appropriate level of discipline.  In addition to 
testimony from Attorney Nussberger and the client, the referee 
also heard and considered character testimony from three 
witnesses.  The referee issued his report and recommendation on 
October 5, 2005.  
¶9 
Pursuant to the allegations of the complaint, as 
stipulated 
by 
Attorney 
Nussberger, 
the 
referee 
made 
the 
following 
findings 
of 
fact. 
 
L.R. 
was 
the 
personal 
representative for the estate of her mother.  L.R. retained 
Attorney Nussberger to handle the probate of the mother's 
estate.  
¶10 Prior to the mother's death, she had filed for 
bankruptcy.  The primary asset that remained was the estate's 
homestead exemption in the mother's home.  With the exception of 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
5 
 
some money that was to be paid to L.R.'s brother, the estate's 
assets were required to be turned over to the State of Wisconsin 
to repay the governmental assistance that the mother had 
received during her lifetime.  The mother's house was sold in 
December 2002.  
¶11 Around the time of the sale of the house, L.R. met 
with Attorney Nussberger regarding the estate.  At that meeting, 
Attorney Nussberger told L.R. that it was unfortunate that she 
would not be receiving any funds from the estate, other than the 
2 percent allowed to her as the personal representative's fee.  
L.R. asked about billing the estate for work that her husband 
had done to care for her mother's house while it was waiting to 
be sold.  Attorney Nussberger responded that she could not 
receive 
any 
additional 
payment 
beyond 
the 
personal 
representative's fee.  Attorney Nussberger suggested to L.R., 
however, that he could submit a billing statement regarding the 
estate that was higher than the amount of his fees he had 
actually earned and then split the extra money with L.R. 
¶12  L.R. 
was 
troubled 
with 
Attorney 
Nussberger's 
suggestion and contacted the Ladysmith Police Department.  The 
police arranged for L.R. to wear an electronic recording device 
at her next meeting with Attorney Nussberger on January 31, 
2003.   
¶13 According to the transcript of the audiotape of the 
meeting, which was entered into evidence without objection, 
after some initial discussion Attorney Nussberger raised the 
possibility of "trying to get a little bit extra."  He explained 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
6 
 
that, hypothetically, if the actual fee might be $1500, he could 
submit a bill for $2500, which he didn't think would raise any 
flags with the people reviewing the invoice.  After further 
discussion, Attorney Nussberger said that he would have to 
review the matter further.  He then stated that he would have to 
look at what his office's regular time was and how much he could 
potentially pad.   
¶14 L.R. ultimately filed a grievance with the OLR.  After 
receiving a copy of the grievance and the transcript of the 
January 31, 2003, meeting, Attorney Nussberger prepared a 
billing statement for his work on the estate.  The statement 
showed a total of 29 hours of work, which would have equaled a 
total fee of $3625.  The statement, however, indicated that 
Attorney Nussberger would honor his agreement to accept $2500 in 
full payment of his fees.  There is no claim that the hours set 
forth on Attorney Nussberger's statement were not legitimate.  
¶15 Based on these factual findings, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Nussberger had improperly suggested to L.R. that 
she 
could 
fraudulently 
obtain 
estate 
funds 
by 
Attorney 
Nussberger 
submitting 
an 
inflated 
invoice. 
 
The 
referee 
concluded that, by making this suggestion, Attorney Nussberger 
had counseled a client to engage in conduct that he knew to be 
criminal or fraudulent, in violation of SCR 20:1.2(d).  
¶16 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
the referee noted that there were a number of both aggravating 
and mitigating factors.    
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
7 
 
¶17 On the aggravating side, the referee found that 
Attorney Nussberger had been previously publicly reprimanded for 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
on 
multiple 
occasions 
that 
involved 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c).  This prior conduct was similar in nature to the 
conduct found in the present proceeding.  Moreover, Attorney 
Nussberger's meetings with L.R. occurred at a time when he was 
involved in the prior disciplinary investigation, which should 
have increased his resolve to avoid engaging in or suggesting 
illegal activity.  In addition, Attorney Nussberger's suggestion 
of inflating his invoice and splitting the extra money with the 
client was based upon Attorney Nussberger's profit motive.  
Finally, the referee noted that Attorney Nussberger's conduct 
harms the public reputation of lawyers, and in fact, had caused 
L.R. to hope that she never has to work with another attorney.  
¶18 On the mitigating side, the referee stated that, 
although Attorney Nussberger counseled L.R. to engage in 
fraudulent or criminal conduct, neither he nor his client took 
any action on that advice and no one lost any money.  The 
referee further noted that he believes Attorney Nussberger has 
demonstrated true remorse for his actions and has cooperated in 
the investigation, even to the point of pleading no contest.  
The referee also pointed to the fact that Attorney Nussberger 
has served, with competence and professionalism, as a family 
court commissioner.  Finally, the referee stated that Attorney 
Nussberger's actual bill for his work on the mother's estate was 
reasonable.  
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
8 
 
¶19 The referee ultimately concluded that a suspension was 
appropriate due primarily to the fact that Attorney Nussberger 
had discussed his plan with L.R. on two occasions.  Had he 
withdrawn his advice as inappropriate at the second meeting, the 
referee stated that he probably would have recommended a public 
reprimand.  However, giving the same advice the second time 
reflected a dishonest motive, rather than a mistake or an off-
the-cuff comment that was not adequately considered.  
¶20 On appeal, Attorney Nussberger argues that, since his 
suggested course of action was not carried out, there was no 
harm to the client or any other individual and thus, a 60-day 
suspension would be too severe.  Although Attorney Nussberger 
stipulated to the facts found by the referee and stated at oral 
argument that he was not challenging the referee's findings of 
fact, his brief and oral argument attempt to recast what had 
occurred.  He asserts that he never intended to keep any of the 
extra money and was simply attempting to help a "financially 
disadvantaged client" obtain more money out of her mother's 
estate because "nothing of significance would have otherwise 
come out of the estate."  Thus, he asserts that "[h]is 
punishment should be a reprimand because his bad acts had an 
inherent, moral good."   
¶21  Attorney Nussberger also attempts to characterize the 
situation as one in which he was "shooting from the hip" and 
attempting to give on-the-spot answers to quick questions from a 
client so as to "appease" the client.  Attorney Nussberger 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
9 
 
asserts that he is now more careful to reduce his words to paper 
so that he can make sure they are proper. 
¶22  The facts, as stipulated by Attorney Nussberger, do 
not correspond with the arguments he makes on appeal from the 
referee's report and recommendation.  The complaint, which 
Attorney Nussberger stipulated the referee could use as the 
factual basis for his no-contest plea, explicitly states that 
Attorney Nussberger raised the concept of inflating his bill in 
two meetings on two separate occasions, over a month apart.  
Indeed, paragraph seven of the complaint states that at the 
first meeting in December 2002 Attorney Nussberger told L.R. 
that he could submit a billing statement that was higher than 
the actual fees and split the extra money with her.  Moreover, 
at the disciplinary hearing, L.R. specifically testified that 
she had reviewed the allegations of the complaint and that she 
considered the complaint to be accurate. 
¶23  These facts support 
the 
referee's 
finding 
that 
Attorney Nussberger was the one who initiated this scheme and 
that he did so, at least to some degree, out of a profit motive.  
The facts also demonstrate that this was not an inadvertent, 
one-time remark made in response to a client who demanded an 
instant answer.  Attorney Nussberger had a whole month to 
reconsider his suggestion, but chose to repeat the idea of 
submitting an inflated bill.  Moreover, Attorney Nussberger's 
claim that he was simply 
trying 
to 
help 
a 
financially 
disadvantaged client is undercut by the fact that L.R. is a 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
10 
 
health care professional and a middle manager at a health care 
facility.   
¶24  While there ultimately may have been no financial 
harm to L.R. or to the State because Attorney Nussberger's plan 
was never completed, that does not mean that there was no harm 
caused by his conduct.  L.R. testified that the situation had 
caused her an immense amount of stress, had adversely impacted 
her trust for attorneys, and had led her to hope that she never 
needed to retain another attorney.  In addition to the harm to 
the client, his conduct also certainly harms the reputation of 
the profession generally. 
¶25  After reviewing the record and the briefs, we 
conclude that the referee's factual findings are amply supported 
by the record, including Attorney Nussberger's stipulation and 
no-contest plea, and we adopt them.  We also adopt the referee's 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Nussberger's 
conduct 
constituted 
counseling a client to engage in conduct that he knew was 
criminal or fraudulent, in violation of SCR 20:1.2(d). 
¶26  With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
the parties have not cited any factually similar cases involving 
a single violation of SCR 20:1.2(d).  We conclude that under the 
facts of this case, a 60-day suspension is required by the 
serious nature of the misconduct.  Attorney Nussberger counseled 
a client to engage in activity that, if completed, could have 
resulted in criminal charges.  This is not a case where the 
attorney was faced with responding to a client that wished to 
skirt the edge of the law.  Rather, it was Attorney Nussberger 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
11 
 
who initiated the scheme.  A reprimand, whether public or 
private, would unduly depreciate the seriousness of such 
misconduct.  
¶27 Moreover, 
in 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
we 
have 
frequently followed the concept of progressive discipline, 
especially in cases involving a pattern of similar misconduct.  
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Converse, 2006 
WI 4, ¶37, 287 Wis. 2d 72, 707 N.W.2d 530; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Guzikowski, 143 Wis. 2d 60, 61, 420 N.W.2d 
368 (1988).  Moreover, we have imposed progressive discipline 
when the conduct at issue in the current disciplinary proceeding 
occurred prior to the imposition of discipline in a prior 
proceeding.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Ray, 2004 WI 45, ¶¶4, 22, 270 Wis. 2d 651, 678 N.W.2d 246. 
¶28 As the OLR notes, this is not the first time that 
Attorney 
Nussberger 
has 
been 
disciplined 
for 
conduct 
demonstrating dishonesty.  At the time of the January 31, 2003, 
meeting with L.R. in this case, Attorney Nussberger was in the 
process of finalizing the agreement for the imposition of a 
public reprimand on the earlier grievances.  As noted above, 
those grievances related to misrepresentations that Attorney 
Nussberger made to the SPD relating to the completion of his 
representation of indigent criminal defendants that allowed him 
to obtain payment before he was entitled to do so.  Despite the 
fact that he was negotiating a public reprimand at the time, 
Attorney 
Nussberger 
nonetheless proceeded on 
two separate 
occasions with his improper suggestion to L.R.  This fact 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
12 
 
confirms the need for a sanction stronger than another reprimand 
in the present case. 
¶29 Finally, we address Attorney Nussberger's objection to 
the statement of costs submitted by the OLR.  Although Attorney 
Nussberger acknowledges that this court's general practice has 
been to assess the full costs of a disciplinary proceeding 
against the attorney being disciplined, he argues that the OLR's 
costs are excessive and unreasonable as a matter of law.   
¶30 Attorney Nussberger claims that the statement of costs 
submitted by the OLR does not adequately explain the hours 
expended by the OLR staff in prosecuting this case.  Therefore, 
he requests that the OLR's cost request be denied in its 
entirety. 
¶31 Alternatively, Attorney Nussberger asserts that, given 
his stipulation to the underlying facts and the conclusion of 
professional misconduct, the OLR's total counsel fees and 
disbursements of $4386.98 ($2718.20 pre-appellate costs and 
$1668.78 appellate costs) are excessive.  He asserts that the 
OLR should have spent no more than ten hours through the time of 
the referee's report and only four hours on appeal for both 
writing the appellate brief and participating in oral argument.  
Thus, he claims that the OLR should have incurred counsel fees 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
13 
 
of no more than $840.  He also states that he would consider 
total disbursements of no more than $310 to be reasonable.2 
¶32 In 
response, 
the 
OLR 
points 
out 
that 
Attorney 
Nussberger contested the complaint until two months prior to the 
scheduled trial date.  Only then did he stipulate to the 
underlying 
facts 
and 
plead 
no 
contest 
to 
violating 
SCR 
20:1.2(d).  Even after the stipulation, Attorney Nussberger 
continued to contest the level of discipline to be imposed, 
which required an in-person evidentiary hearing and a subsequent 
telephonic 
evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
It 
also 
required 
the 
preparation of post-hearing briefs on the sanction issue.  The 
OLR also notes that its letters to Attorney Nussberger's counsel 
transmitting its initial and supplemental statements of costs 
offered to provide a detailed itemization of the costs to 
Attorney Nussberger, but he never requested any such breakdown.  
In any event, in response to Attorney Nussberger's objection, 
the 
OLR 
has 
submitted 
an 
itemization 
of 
the 
time 
and 
disbursements it expended on this case.   
¶33 After 
reviewing 
the 
briefs 
and 
the 
OLR's 
documentation, we conclude that the costs submitted by the OLR, 
which, as of May 11, 2006, totaled $6056.62 through oral 
                                                 
2 Attorney Nussberger also makes a passing argument that 
imposing 
costs 
on 
an 
attorney 
who 
appeals 
a 
sanction 
recommendation in good faith is unconstitutional.  He cites no 
case law in support of this assertion and does not develop it 
adequately to allow a response.  Thus, we will not address the 
issue.  See Wisconsin Prof'l Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Lightbourn, 
2001 WI 59, ¶233, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807. 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
14 
 
argument, are reasonable under the circumstances of this case.  
It should be noted that $1669.64 of the total costs relate to 
the referee's fee and the court reporters' charges.  Attorney 
Nussberger's alternative cost proposal recognizes that such 
costs are reasonable and properly charged to him.  In addition, 
given the nature of the proceedings before the referee and the 
fact that there was a full appeal with oral argument, we believe 
that the OLR's counsel fees and disbursements of $4386.98 are 
justified.  We conclude that Attorney Nussberger's conduct 
necessitated the present disciplinary proceeding and that he 
should therefore bear the full costs of this proceeding. 
¶34 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Terry L. 
Nussberger to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a 
period of 60 days, effective September 11, 2006. 
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney Nussberger shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay those costs within that time, 
the license of Attorney Nussberger to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall remain suspended until further order of the court. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if he has not already done 
so, Attorney Nussberger shall comply with the provisions of SCR 
22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to 
practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
No. 
2004AP2996-D   
 
 
 
1