Title: State v. Matasek
Citation: 2014 WI 27
Docket Number: 2012AP001582-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2014

2014 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1582-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andrew J. Matasek, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
348 Wis. 2d 243, 831 N.W.2d 450 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 63  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 23, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 20, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Wolfgram 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Jeffrey J. Guerard and Ahmad & Guerard, LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Jeffrey J. Guerard. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Christine Remington, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kaitlin A. Lamb and 
Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public defenders, and Kelli S. 
Thompson, state public defender, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender. There was oral argument by Kaitlin A. 
Lamb. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 27
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP1582-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF57) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andrew J. Matasek, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
MAY 23, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment 
of the circuit court for Ozaukee County, Thomas R. Wolfgram, 
Judge.1  The defendant, Andrew J. Matasek, pled no contest to the 
manufacture or delivery of THC (tetrahydrocannabinols), contrary 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(h)2, 939.50(3)(h), 939.05 (2011-12).2 
                                                 
1 State v. Matasek, 2013 WI App 63, 348 Wis. 2d 243, 831 
N.W.2d 450.   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The conviction is not at issue.  Only expunction of 
the record pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is at issue.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 grants circuit courts discretion to 
order a record expunged.  
¶3 
The instant case requires this court to determine when 
a circuit court is to exercise its discretion to expunge a 
record.  The circuit court and the court of appeals held that 
the circuit court's decision whether to expunge an offender's 
record must be made at the time of sentencing.  In other words, 
the circuit court may order expunction or may deny expunction, 
but the circuit court must do so at the sentencing proceeding.   
¶4 
The 
defendant 
challenges 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion that the statute requires a circuit court to make its 
expunction decision at the sentencing proceeding.  
¶5 
The defendant argues that the statute allows a circuit 
court to delay the expunction decision until the offender's 
successful completion of the sentence.3   
                                                 
3 The non-party (amicus) brief of the Office of the 
Wisconsin State Public Defender advises the court that circuit 
courts across the state interpret Wis. Stat. § 973.015, the 
expunction statute, differently, some viewing the statute as 
allowing a circuit court to determine whether to expunge a 
record at the offender's successful completion of the sentence.  
The brief directs us to State v. Littlejohn, Case No. 2013CM1116 
(Milwaukee Cty. Cir. Ct., May 24, 2013); State v. Brenzier, Case 
No. 2012CF0225 (Eau Claire Cty. Cir. Ct., Jan. 31, 2013); State 
v. Hyde, Case No. 2012CF0127 (Adams Cty. Cir. Ct., Feb. 11, 
2013); State v. Griffith, Case No. 2013CM0082 (Calumet Cty. Cir. 
Ct., May 20, 2013); State v. Kenevan, Case No. 2013CF0024 (Dodge 
Cty. Cir. Ct., Mar. 25, 2013); and State v. Jones, Case. No. 
2013CM0180 (Waukesha Cty. Cir. Ct., Jun. 27, 2013).   
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
3 
 
¶6 
We disagree with the defendant and agree with the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  We interpret the phrase 
"at the time of sentencing" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 to mean that 
if a circuit court is going to exercise its discretion to 
expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised at the time 
of the sentencing proceeding.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.4 
                                                                                                                                                             
The non-party brief argues that affirming the decision of 
the court of appeals and eliminating the circuit court's option 
to expunge after the successful completion of the sentence 
changes the ground rules after the fact.  These offenders 
entered pleas and entered into plea agreements believing that 
the circuit court may validly defer the final call on expunction 
until a future date.  The non-party brief contends that 
affirming the court of appeals will provoke more litigation and 
undermine the credibility of the justice system.  According to 
the State, the circuit court's workload will not be expanded by 
our affirming the decision of the court of appeals.  The State 
argues that an offender has the right after this decision to 
challenge his sentence, including the circuit court's expunction 
decision. 
The question of the effect of a circuit court's having 
incorrectly deferred the discretionary expunction decision is 
not before us in the present case and we do not address it.    
4 The non-party (amicus) brief of the Office of the 
Wisconsin State Public Defender suggests that the circuit court 
can move the time of an expunction decision even without 
statutory 
authorization 
as 
an 
exercise 
of 
its 
inherent 
authority.  Non-Party Brief of Wis. St. Public Defender at 4-5.  
The parties do not address, and we do not address, whether a 
circuit court has inherent power to order expunction of a record 
when the circuit court cannot expunge the record under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015. 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
4 
 
I 
¶7 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review.  
At the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant was 
under 25 years of age; the defendant pled no contest and was 
found guilty; and the maximum sentence for the offense for which 
he was found guilty has a maximum period of imprisonment of six 
years or less.  The defendant thus fulfilled the initial 
requirements for expunction.5   
¶8 
After announcing that it would place the defendant on 
probation with one year of confinement as a condition of 
probation, the circuit court addressed the defense counsel's 
request that the circuit court withhold its decision on 
expunction until the defendant successfully completed his 
sentence.  The circuit court acknowledged that making an 
expunction decision later might be better procedure on policy 
grounds, but decided that the expunction statute clearly 
                                                                                                                                                             
In June 2009, the State Bar submitted Rule Petition 09-07 
to modify Chapter 72 of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules to 
authorize expunction under certain circumstances.  The court 
referred the subject of expunction to the Legislative Committee 
of the Wisconsin Judicial Conference for possible legislative 
action.  
Moreover, we do not address the issues addressed in State 
v. Hemp, 2014 WI App 34, 353 Wis. 2d 146, 844 N.W.2d 421, namely 
the obligation of the offender to petition the circuit court for 
expunction after successful completion of the sentence or the 
considerations a circuit court may weigh to grant or deny an 
offender's 
petition 
for 
expunction 
after 
the 
offender's 
successful completion of the sentence.     
5 See Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1)(a). 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
5 
 
restricted the circuit court to make its expunction decision at 
the sentencing proceeding.  
¶9 
The following exchange between the circuit court and 
the defense counsel ensued: 
THE COURT: . . . . [Defense counsel], I wish they'd 
write [the expunction] statute differently, because I 
think it might be appropriate for someone to be able 
to come back to the court that sentenced them four, or 
five, or six, seven years and say, here, see what 
happened to me.  I'm a good person.  This was just an 
anomaly.  But that's not the way the statute's 
written.  I wish it was.  And I've talked to . . . our 
representative to provide for something like that.  Or 
even later in the term of probation or the confinement 
period.  But that isn't the way the statute's written.  
Okay? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Well, your Honor, I have had 
courts —— 
THE COURT:  I know you have. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  —— interpret it that way. 
THE COURT:  Everyone has had it.  But until someone 
tells me I can do it differently I have to interpret 
the statute by what it says.  What it says is the 
court shall at the time of sentencing determine 
eligibility.  And that's the way I read it. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  But I think eligibility, your 
Honor, is different than necessarily ordering it at 
the end of a probationary period. 
THE COURT:  But I'm not sentencing him at the end of a 
probationary period unless it's revoked.  You know, 
why don't you appeal me, because I wish they'd change 
the statute or determine that I'm wrong.  I can't read 
it any other way than the way —— than what the words 
mean, okay? 
Because the penalty structure, the expungement statute 
applies. 
 
Could 
he 
benefit, 
absolutely. 
 
Any 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
6 
 
individual who is this age could benefit from a 
disposition which keeps it off his record. 
The next part is would society be harmed.  Yeah, they 
would in my opinion.  Because it would, in society's 
eyes, in this defendant's eyes, it would unduly 
depreciate the seriousness of what he's done.  It 
wouldn't reflect delivering two pounds of marijuana.  
It would send a contrary message to this defendant.  
It would send a contrary message to society.  And it 
would fail to put them on notice of what he's done 
here.  So I can't make that finding. 
Now, appeal me.  Okay?  Because if I'm wrong on that 
statute I think it's —— I'd love to be able to come 
back at the end of three, or four, or five years, or 
whatever it might be, and evaluate the person based on 
what I see then.  But the way I read the statute I 
have to evaluate him based on what he —— where he is 
right now.  And that's my evaluation as of today's 
date. . . . . 
. . . . 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  If I'm clear on what you're 
saying, your Honor, is you would consider leaving the 
expungement issue open for a number of years.  You 
simply don't believe that the statute allows you to do 
that? 
THE COURT:  I agree.  That's what I said. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 
THE COURT:  I would say I'd defer that determination 
of whether it's appropriate or not to the end of the 
probation.  But I don't think I can do that the way 
the statute's written. 
II 
¶10 The question posed is one of statutory interpretation.  
Statutory interpretation is ordinarily a question of law that 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
7 
 
this court determines independently but benefiting from the 
analysis of the circuit court and court of appeals.6 
¶11 The court has developed various tools of statutory 
interpretation that we shall use in the instant case. 
¶12 We interpret a statute by looking at the text of the 
statute.7  The statutory language is examined within the context 
in which it is used.8  Words are ordinarily interpreted according 
to their common and approved usage; technical words and phrases 
and others that have a particular meaning in the law are 
ordinarily interpreted according to their technical meaning.9  
Statutes are interpreted to give effect to each word and to 
avoid surplusage.10  The definition of a word or phrase can vary 
                                                 
6 DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, Inc., 2007 WI 27, ¶26, 
299 Wis. 2d 561, 729 N.W.2d 396. 
7 Klemm v. Am. Transmission Co., LLC, 2011 WI 37, ¶18, 333 
Wis. 2d 580, 798 N.W.2d 223.   
8 Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 
232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515 ("While it is true that 
statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute, it is also well established that courts must not look 
at a single, isolated sentence or portion of a sentence, but at 
the role of the relevant language in the entire statute."); 
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659 (contextual approach is not new); Klemm, 333 Wis. 2d 
580, ¶18 ("The statutory language is examined within the context 
in which it is used."). 
9 Klemm, 333 Wis. 2d 580, ¶18; see also Wis. Stat. § 990.01. 
10 See, e.g., Klemm, 333 Wis. 2d 580, ¶18; Pawlowski v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, n.14, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 
777 N.W.2d 67 (citing Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 
286 N.W.2d 817 (1980)) 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
8 
 
in different statutes or under different circumstances.11  When a 
word is used multiple times in the same enactment, we attribute 
the same meaning to the word each time.12 
¶13 Statutes are interpreted in view of the purpose of the 
statute.13  Moreover, words are given meaning to avoid absurd, 
unreasonable, or implausible results and results that are 
clearly at odds with the legislature's purpose.14   
                                                 
11 Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 
528, 271 N.W.2d 69, 73-74 (1978) ("The ultimate scope of a term 
capable of a broad or narrow meaning in the abstract must be 
determined by its context in a particular instance. The same 
word 
may 
receive 
a 
different 
construction 
in 
different 
statutes."); State v. Mentzel, 218 Wis. 2d 734, 740, 581 
N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1998) (the meaning of a word depends on the 
particular statute involved and the setting to which the statute 
applies). 
12 DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶29, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 
727 N.W.2d 311 (opinion clarified on denial of reconsideration, 
2007 WI 40, 300 Wis. 2d 133, 729 N.W.2d 212). 
13 State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶17, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 
N.W.2d 390 ("'Context and [statutory] purpose are important in 
discerning the plain meaning of a statute.' . . . We favor an 
interpretation that fulfills the statute's purpose.") (quoted 
source & citations omitted); Klemm, 333 Wis. 2d 580, ¶18 ("An 
interpretation that fulfills the purpose of the statute is 
favored over one that undermines the purpose."); Lagerstrom v. 
Myrtle Werth Hosp.-Mayo Health System, 2005 WI 124, ¶51, 285 
Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 201 (examining "legislative goals" to 
interpret a statute); Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587, ¶10 (courts need 
not adopt a literal or usual meaning of a word when acceptance 
of that meaning would thwart the obvious purpose of the 
statute); United Wis. Ins. Co. v. LIRC, 229 Wis. 2d 416, 425-26, 
600 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Fundamental to an analysis of 
any 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
the 
ascertainment 
and 
advancement of the legislative purpose."). 
14 Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587, ¶10; Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
¶32; Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶¶15, 18, 
32, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.  
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
9 
 
III 
¶14 We turn to the text of the statute.  The expunction 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1)(a), provides that when the 
offender is under the age of 25 at the commission of the offense 
and has been found guilty of violation of a law for which the 
maximum period of imprisonment is six years or less, a circuit 
court may order at the time of sentencing the expunction of a 
record 
upon 
the 
offender's 
successful 
completion 
of 
the 
sentence.   
¶15 Section § 973.015(1)(a) reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 
the commission of an offense for which the person has 
been found guilty in a court for violation of a law 
for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 
years or less, the court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence if the court determines the 
person will benefit and society will not be harmed by 
this disposition . . . (emphasis added). 
Section 973.015(2) reads in relevant part: 
A person has successfully completed the sentence if 
the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 
conditions of probation (emphasis added). 
¶16 First, the defendant argues that the discretion 
granted to the circuit court about whether to expunge a record 
extends to when the circuit court may expunge a record.  The 
defendant reasons that because the circuit court "may order at 
the time of sentencing that the record be expunged," it may also 
order the record expunged at some other time.     
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
10 
 
¶17 The defendant's interpretation in effect reads the 
statutory phrase "at the time of sentencing" out of the statute, 
thus rendering the phrase surplusage.  Such an interpretation 
does not comport with our approach to statutory interpretation.   
¶18 We read statutes to avoid surplusage.  We are to 
assume that the legislature used all the words in a statute for 
a reason.  "[E]very word appearing in a statute should 
contribute to the construction of the statute . . . ."15 
¶19 If we were to hold that the legislature intended that 
the circuit court's discretion whether to order expunction 
extends to when to order expunction, then the circuit court 
would have discretion to grant expunction at any time, rendering 
the phrase "at the time of sentencing" meaningless. 
¶20 Alternatively, if the legislature intended the circuit 
court to order expunction at the time of successful completion 
of the sentence, it could have added those words to the statute.  
"We should not read into the statute language that the 
legislature did not put in."16   
¶21 Furthermore, when we compare the expunction provisions 
of Wis. Stat. § 973.015 with the statute governing expunction of 
juvenile 
records, 
§ 938.355(4m), 
we 
see 
that 
when 
the 
legislature wanted to accomplish the result the defendant seeks 
in the present case, the legislature used different language. 
                                                 
15 Johnson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 672, 676, 251 N.W.2d 834, 
836 (1977). 
16 Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 
N.W.2d 635. 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
11 
 
¶22 With regard to expunction of juvenile records, the 
circuit court is not limited to expunging a juvenile's record at 
the time of sentencing.  Rather, a juvenile offender may 
petition the circuit court for expunction after the offender 
turns 17, and "the court may expunge the record if the court 
determines that the juvenile has satisfactorily complied with 
the conditions of his or her dispositional order and that the 
juvenile will benefit from, and society will not be harmed by, 
the expungement."  Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4m). 
¶23 For these reasons, we are not persuaded by the 
defendant's first justification of his interpretation.  
¶24 Second, the defendant argues that he was never given a 
sentence, and that consequently he was never subject to 
"sentencing" under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1)(a).  According to the 
defendant, he was placed on probation and sentence was withheld; 
thus, the words "at the time of sentencing" do not apply to his 
case.  The defendant argues that because he has never been 
subject to "sentencing," the circuit court still has discretion 
to expunge his record.   
¶25 In making the distinction between probation and 
sentencing, the defendant relies on statutes and our prior case 
law. 
¶26 The defendant correctly points to statutes that 
distinguish the phrase "a sentence" from a disposition "placing 
a person on probation." 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 973.043 and 973.045 are just two 
examples of statutes that specifically refer to a sentence and 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
12 
 
probation as two distinctly different dispositions for a 
criminal defendant.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.043(1) states:  "If a 
court imposes a sentence or places a person on probation for a 
crime 
under 
ch. 
943 
that 
was . . . " 
(emphasis 
added).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.045(1) similarly states:  "If a court 
imposes a sentence or places a person on probation, the court 
shall 
impose 
a 
crime 
victim 
and 
witness 
assistance 
surcharge. . . ." (emphasis added).   
¶28 The 
defendant 
contends 
that 
if 
the 
legislature 
intended probation to be a sentence, it would not have used the 
words "or probation" after the word "sentence."   
¶29 The defendant cites case law, including State v. Horn, 
226 Wis. 2d 637, 647, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999), in which the court 
distinguished a sentence and probation.  In Horn, the court 
stated that "probation itself is not generally a sentence" and 
that "probation is an alternative to sentencing."17  But the Horn 
court also recognized that probation is "closely related to 
sentencing as a possible criminal disposition"18 and that 
"whether a sentence is imposed and stayed, or withheld, the 
circuit court fully exercises its constitutional function to 
impose a criminal disposition."19      
¶30 The Horn case is instructive, as the defendant 
contends, about sentencing and probation, but we draw a 
                                                 
17 Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 647. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 649. 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
13 
 
different lesson from the case law than the defendant does.  
Rather, the case and the cases on which Horn relies teach that 
in some statutes and under some circumstances probation is not 
considered a sentence; in other statutes and under other 
circumstances probation is a sentence.   
¶31 The case law teaches that the words "sentence" and 
"sentencing" need not have the same meaning in every statute or 
under every circumstance.  "If anything is clear, it is that the 
word 'sentence' is not [clear]; the word is colored by the light 
with which it is viewed."20  
¶32 Furthermore, 
if 
we 
adopt 
the 
defendant's 
interpretation that the disposition of probation is not a 
"sentence," the expunction statute need not be interpreted as 
the 
defendant 
suggests. 
 
Instead, 
the 
statute 
could 
be 
interpreted to mean that because a probationer is never 
sentenced, the probationer can never receive expunction.  This 
would be an absurd result. 
¶33 The lesson learned from statutes and cases is that 
sometimes probation is distinct from a "sentence," and other 
times the words "sentence" and "sentencing" include probation. 
¶34 That 
the 
legislature 
intended 
"at 
the 
time 
of 
sentencing" in the expunction statute to include the disposition 
of probation becomes evident on reading subsection (2) of Wis. 
                                                 
20 State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217, ¶16, 277 Wis. 2d 400, 
690 N.W.2d 452 (listing different ways in which courts and 
statutes 
use 
the 
word 
"sentence" 
to 
refer 
to 
different 
dispositions). 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
14 
 
Stat. § 973.015 defining the phrase "successful completion of 
the sentence," a phrase used in § 973.015(1) to describe a 
prerequisite to expunction.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.015(2) 
provides in relevant part as follows:  
A person has successfully completed the sentence if 
the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 
conditions of probation. 
 
¶35 Clearly, the expunction statute envisions probation as 
included within the word "sentence" when the statute defines 
"successful completion of sentence" as including probation not 
having been revoked and the conditions of probation having been 
satisfied.   
¶36 It would be absurd to view the words "at the time of 
sentencing" used in Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1) of the expunction 
statute to exclude probation in light of the definition of 
"successful completion of sentence" in subsection (2) as 
including successful completion of probation.  We generally hold 
that when the legislature uses the same word multiple times in a 
statute the word has the same meaning each time.21  Thus 
§ 973.015 itself views probation as a sentence.   
¶37 Similarly, the statute governing probation, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09, treats probation as a sentence.  It refers repeatedly 
to the court ordering probation as "the sentencing court."  See 
                                                 
21 DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶29, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 
24, 
727 
N.W.2d 311 
(opinion 
clarified 
on 
denial 
of 
reconsideration, 2007 WI 40, 300 Wis. 2d 133, 729 N.W.2d 212). 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
15 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b), (bm), (d).  The probation statute is 
part of chapter 973 of the statutes, which is entitled 
"Sentencing."22  
¶38 The phrase "at sentencing" has been used in case law 
to describe the proceeding that determines an offender's 
disposition even when that disposition is probation.23  Indeed, 
the Judicial Benchbook places probation in the chapter "Options 
for Sentencing."24    
¶39 For 
these 
reasons, 
we 
are 
unpersuaded 
by 
the 
defendant's argument that "sentencing" for the purposes of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015 does not include probation. 
                                                 
22 Although the title of a statute is not part of the law, 
Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6), it may help in resolving statutory 
interpretation questions.  Wis. Valley Imp. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 101 N.W.2d 798 (1960).  
23 See State v. Martel, 2003 WI 70, ¶6, 262 Wis. 2d 483, 664 
N.W.2d 69 ("At sentencing, . . . [t]he circuit court withheld 
sentence and placed Martel on probation for 36 months . . . ."); 
State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶26, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 
N.W.2d 733 (holding that prosecutor's remarks "at sentencing" 
undermined plea agreement of probation); State v. Fernandez, 
2009 WI 29, ¶¶8, 22 n.20, 51, 316 Wis. 2d 598, 764 N.W.2d 509 
(interpreting Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(a), which lists factors 
for the circuit court to consider in awarding restitution 
damages, regarding circuit court findings "at sentencing," in a 
case involving a defendant ordered on probation); State v. 
Booth, 142 Wis. 2d 232, 418 N.W.2d 20 (1987) (holding that 
withholding 
of 
sentence 
and 
imposition 
of 
probation 
are 
functionally 
equivalent 
to 
sentencing 
for 
determining 
appropriateness of plea withdrawal). 
24 Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook at CR 38-7 to 38-14 (4th ed. 
2013).  The Judicial Benchbook notes that it should not be cited 
as legal authority. 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
16 
 
¶40 Third, 
the 
defendant 
argues 
that 
public 
policy 
supports his interpretation and that his interpretation comports 
with the purpose of the statute.   
¶41 We agree with the defendant, as did the circuit court, 
that there are policy reasons for permitting the circuit court 
to decide on expunction after the offender completes his or her 
sentence rather than at the time of sentencing.  The circuit 
court will probably be better positioned to weigh the benefit to 
the offender and the harm to society after (rather than before) 
the offender has successfully completed the sentence.   
¶42 Yet requiring the expunction decision to be made at 
the time of sentencing is not contrary to the purpose of the 
statute and does not produce an unreasonable or absurd result.  
The legislative purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is "to provide a 
break to young offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply 
with the law" and to "provide[] a means by which trial courts 
may, in appropriate cases, shield youthful offenders from some 
of the harsh consequences of criminal convictions."25   
¶43 This legislative purpose can be met by requiring the 
expunction decision to be made at the time of sentencing.  By 
deciding expunction at the time of sentencing, a circuit court 
creates a meaningful incentive for the offender to avoid 
reoffending.  If the legislature allows the circuit court to 
take 
the 
defendant's 
proffered 
"wait-and-see" 
approach, 
                                                 
25 State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 
N.W.2d 341 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
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offenders will be uncertain whether the circuit court will 
expunge the record and this uncertainty might provide a weaker 
incentive to an offender to complete his or her sentence 
successfully. 
¶44 In sum, a reasonable reading of the text of the 
expunction statute in view of the purpose of the statute is that 
the legislature included the words "at the time of sentencing" 
to limit the point in time at which the circuit court is to make 
a decision about expunction, and that the phrase "at the time of 
sentencing" means at the proceeding at which the circuit court 
announces the sanction.  
¶45 Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we 
are convinced that the statutory language restricts the time at 
which the circuit court may order expunction.  We interpret the 
phrase "at the time of sentencing" in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 to 
mean that if a circuit court is going to exercise its discretion 
to expunge a record, the discretion must be exercised at the 
sentencing proceeding.   
¶46 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  This interpretation conforms with the text, context, 
and legislative purpose of the expunction statute. 
¶47 By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2012AP1582-CR   
 
 
 
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