Title: Denice Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corporation
Citation: 2010 WI 50
Docket Number: 2007AP001253
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 2010

2010 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1253 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Denice Brunton, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Nuvell Credit Corporation, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 3 
Reported at: 316 Wis. 2d 313, 762 N.W.2d 685 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 24, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Stuart A. Schwartz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Walter R. Stewart, Ethan T. Miller, and W.R. Stewart & 
Associates, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Ethan T. Miller 
and Walter R. Stewart. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Ivan J. 
Hannibal, P. Jeffrey Archibald, and Archibald Consumer Law 
Office, Madison, and oral argument by Ivan J. Hannibal. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 50
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1253  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV4032) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Denice Brunton, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Nuvell Credit Corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 24,2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded to the circuit court to dismiss the action.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 reversing the circuit court's decision,2 
which granted summary judgment in favor of Nuvell Credit 
Corporation (Nuvell) and dismissed plaintiff Denice Brunton's 
(Brunton) action.  The dispositive issue in this case is whether 
under Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) (2007–08)3 Nuvell "appear[ed] and 
                                                 
1 Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2009 WI App 3, 316 Wis. 2d 
313, 762 N.W.2d 685. 
2 The Honorable Stuart A. Schwartz of Dane County presided. 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
2 
 
waive[d] the improper venue" such that dismissal of the action, 
which arose out of a consumer credit transaction, was not 
required.  We conclude that appearance and waiver under 
§ 421.401(2) require two actions:  (1) an appearance established 
by conduct recognized under the law as appearance and (2) waiver 
established by the defendant's knowledge of the proper venue and 
the intentional relinquishment of the right to proper venue.  
Nuvell appeared by responsive pleading, court appearances and 
litigating its defenses.  However, neither Nuvell's failure to 
raise the improper venue in its answer nor its other appearances 
in this action constituted an intentional relinquishment of the 
right to proper venue.  Because Nuvell did not both appear and 
waive the improper venue, the circuit court was required to 
dismiss the action when Nuvell raised the venue defect.  See 
§ 421.401(2)(b).  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On June 13, 2003, Brunton, a resident of Rock County, 
Wisconsin, bought a new car from Hesser Oldsmobile, Inc. 
(Hesser) a Rock County dealership.  On June 26, 2003, Brunton 
and Hesser entered into a 72-month installment sale contract.  
Nuvell 
subsequently 
purchased 
Brunton's 
installment 
sale 
contract from Hesser. 
¶3 
Brunton failed to make payments on the installment 
sale contract in August, September, October and November 2005.  
Nuvell initiated debt collection activities against Brunton in 
November 2005. 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
3 
 
¶4 
On December 16, 2005, Brunton filed suit against 
Nuvell in Dane County Circuit Court, alleging that Nuvell 
violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act by engaging in debt 
collection practices prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 427.104.  It is 
undisputed that this action arose out of a "consumer credit 
transaction" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 421.301(10).4  On 
February 2, 2006, Nuvell first appeared in the action and filed 
its answer, denying the allegations in Brunton's complaint.  
Over the next 14 months, the parties litigated the case in Dane 
County.5 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 421.301(10) states: 
"Consumer credit transaction" means a consumer 
transaction between a merchant and a customer in which 
real or personal property, services or money is 
acquired on credit and the customer's obligation is 
payable in installments or for which credit a finance 
charge is or may be imposed, whether such transaction 
is pursuant to an open−end credit plan or is a 
transaction involving other than open−end credit.  The 
term includes consumer credit sales, consumer loans, 
consumer leases and transactions pursuant to open−end 
credit plans. 
5 The litigation proceeded as follows:  February 21, 2006, 
Nuvell 
deposed 
Brunton 
and 
responded 
to 
Brunton's 
first 
discovery request.  April 25, 2006, Brunton deposed Nuvell's 
corporate designee.  May 9, 2006, Brunton deposed Nuvell 
employee, Joe Willis.  July 13, 2006, both parties appeared for 
a scheduling conference at the Dane County Circuit Court.  
October 9, 2006, both parties appeared for a second scheduling 
conference.  October 11, 2006, the circuit court issued an order 
setting a date for trial.  November 3, 2006, Brunton named its 
expert witnesses.  November 20, 2006, Nuvell moved to modify the 
pretrial order.  February 8, 2007, Brunton served Nuvell with a 
second discovery request.  February 14, 2007, Nuvell served 
Brunton with its first discovery request. 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
4 
 
¶5 
On May 23, 2006, in the midst of litigating the 
prohibited debt collection practices suit, Nuvell commenced a 
replevin action against Brunton in Rock County Circuit Court.  
Although 
the 
parties 
dispute 
the 
exact 
words 
that 
were 
exchanged, it is undisputed that at an August 9, 2006 scheduling 
conference 
in 
the 
Rock 
County 
action, 
Brunton's 
lawyer 
recognized that filing Brunton's action in Dane County instead 
of Rock County was problematic under Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2)(b) 
and raised this issue to Nuvell's counsel.  Brunton requested 
that Nuvell stipulate to transferring venue to Rock County, 
rather than her dismissing the Dane County action and re-filing 
in Rock County.  Nuvell refused to so stipulate, and Brunton did 
not take any further action regarding venue. 
¶6 
On 
February 27, 
2007, 
Nuvell 
moved 
for 
summary 
judgment dismissing Brunton's suit because Brunton's action 
arose out of a consumer credit transaction, which required venue 
in Rock County not in Dane County.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 421.401(2)(b), Nuvell argued that Brunton's action must be 
dismissed due to improper venue.  Brunton contended that the 
action should not be dismissed because Nuvell appeared and 
waived the improper Dane County venue. 
¶7 
The circuit court granted Nuvell's motion for summary 
judgment.  It concluded, relying on Kett v. Community Credit 
Plan, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999), and Village of 
Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 
190, that improper venue is a "jurisdictional" defect that 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
5 
 
cannot be waived and therefore whether Nuvell timely objected to 
the improper venue was irrelevant. 
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that by 
actively defending against Brunton's action for more than one 
year prior to moving to dismiss based on improper venue, Nuvell 
"appear[ed] and waive[d] the improper venue" within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2). 
¶9 
We granted review and now reverse. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶10 We review summary judgment decisions independently, 
employing the same methodology as the circuit court.  Blunt v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 2009 WI 16, ¶13, 315 Wis. 2d 612, 760 N.W.2d 
396 (citing Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶12, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 
750 N.W.2d 817).  Resolution of the question presented herein 
requires us to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2).  
"'The interpretation and application of a statute to an 
undisputed set of facts are questions of law that we review 
independently.'"  Estate of Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 
67, ¶10, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 N.W.2d 481 (quoting McNeil v. 
Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶7, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731 N.W.2d 273). 
B.  The Parties' Positions 
¶11 The parties offer competing interpretations of Wis. 
Stat. § 421.401(2).  Before examining the language of the 
statute, it is instructive to summarize each party's arguments. 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
6 
 
1.  Brunton's position 
¶12 Brunton argues that Wis. Stat. §§ 801.50 and 801.51, 
the general venue statutes, apply here instead of Wis. Stat. 
§ 421.401(2).  Section 801.51 permits any party to challenge 
venue on the grounds of noncompliance with § 801.50 "or any 
other statute designating proper venue."  Brunton contends that 
this language incorporates § 421.401, the Wisconsin Consumer 
Act's venue statute.  Section 801.51(1) requires a party to file 
a motion for a change of venue "[a]t or before the time the 
party serves his or her first motion or responsive pleading in 
the action."  Accordingly, Brunton argues that Nuvell waived its 
challenge to venue because Nuvell's answer—its first responsive 
pleading—failed to raise the issue of improper venue. 
¶13 Alternatively, Brunton argues that even if Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.51 does not apply, Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) permits waiver 
of the improper venue.  She contends we must construe waiver 
under § 421.401(2) as an implied waiver.  Under Brunton's 
implied waiver argument, the improper venue is waived unless a 
defendant raises an objection to improper venue at the outset of 
litigation (i.e., in a party's first motion or responsive 
pleading).  Because Nuvell failed to timely raise an objection 
to improper venue, Brunton argues Nuvell waived the improper 
venue.6 
                                                 
6 Brunton also raises an argument that Nuvell is equitably 
estopped from asserting its venue challenge.  "Because the 
argument is undeveloped and [Brunton] fails to cite to any 
authority in support of [her] position, we decline to address 
this argument."  See McEvoy v. Group Health Coop. of Eau Claire, 
213 Wis. 2d 507, 530 n.8, 570 N.W.2d 397 (1997). 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
7 
 
2.  Nuvell's position 
¶14 Relying on Kett, Nuvell argues that it did not appear 
and waive the improper venue because Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) 
requires an express waiver, and it did not expressly waive 
improper venue.  Nuvell contends that requiring an express 
waiver properly puts the onus on plaintiffs to file in the 
proper county instead of requiring defendants to cure improper 
venue by raising an objection at the outset of litigation. 
¶15 Nuvell further argues that an implied waiver is 
insufficient to constitute waiver under Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) 
in light of the Wisconsin Consumer Act's purpose, which is to 
protect consumers.  Nuvell notes that consumers will ordinarily 
be 
defendants 
in 
actions 
arising 
from 
consumer 
credit 
transactions.  Accordingly, an express waiver is necessary to 
protect consumer defendants from inadvertently waiving improper 
venue by failing to object to improper venue in the first 
responsive pleading. 
C.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
¶16 Interpretation of a statute requires us to determine 
what the statute means.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  Id., ¶45 (quoting Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  
Statutory language is read to give effect to every word, to 
avoid surplusage and to avoid absurd results.  Id., ¶46.  
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
8 
 
Further, statutory language is given its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45.  Plain meaning may be 
ascertained not only from the words employed in the statute, but 
also from the context in which the words are used.  Id., ¶46. 
¶17 In construing a statute, we favor a construction that 
fulfills the purpose of the statute over one that undermines the 
purpose.  County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶34, 315 Wis. 2d 
293, 759 N.W.2d 571.  "[A] plain-meaning interpretation cannot 
contravene 
a 
textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  While extrinsic sources 
are usually not consulted if the statutory meaning is plain, 
legislative history may be consulted "to confirm or verify a 
plain-meaning interpretation."  Id., ¶51. 
D.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 801.50 and 801.51 
¶18 Brunton urges us to apply Wis. Stat. §§ 801.50 and 
801.51, the general venue statutes, because she contends they 
apply to all venue challenges.  We disagree.  Section 801.50 
establishes venue generally in civil actions "[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided by statute."  § 801.50(2).  Section 801.51 
provides that challenges to improper venue "on the grounds of 
noncompliance with s. 801.50 or any other statute" be made "[a]t 
or before the time the party serves his or her first motion or 
responsive pleading in the action." 
¶19 We have previously decided that Wis. Stat. § 421.401 
is a "legislatively crafted exception to the general venue 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
9 
 
provision."  Kett, 228 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20.  That § 421.401 is a 
legislative exception to the more general venue provisions is 
confirmed by § 801.50(5m), which provides: 
Venue of an action arising from a consumer credit 
transaction, as defined in s. 421.301(10), shall be in 
any county specified in s. 421.401(1). 
¶20 Furthermore, 
a 
"canon 
of 
statutory 
construction 
provide[s] that where a general statute and a specific statute 
apply to the same subject, the specific statute controls."  
Rouse v. Theda Clark Med. Ctr., Inc., 2007 WI 87, ¶37, 302 
Wis. 2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 801.50, 801.51 
and 421.401 all apply to the same subject—venue.  Sections 
801.50 and 801.51 generally govern venue and challenges to 
improper venue in civil actions.  In contrast, § 421.401 
establishes venue for only two types of civil actions:  consumer 
transactions and consumer credit transactions.  § 421.401(1).  
Accordingly, § 421.401 is the more specific statute governing 
venue, and we conclude that it controls here. 
¶21 We further conclude that applying Wis. Stat. §§ 801.50 
and 801.51 to venue challenges in actions arising from consumer 
transactions would produce absurd results.  Under § 801.51, a 
timely motion for change of venue results in a transfer of venue 
to an appropriate county.  In contrast, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 421.401(2)(b), an improperly venued action arising from a 
consumer credit transaction must be dismissed, unless the 
defendant appears and waives the objection.  If § 801.51 applies 
to actions arising from consumer credit transactions, as Brunton 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
10 
 
contends, we fail to see when § 421.401(2)(b), mandating 
dismissal of an improperly venued action, would ever apply.  
Interpreting a 
statute so that portions of it have no 
application is an absurd result. 
¶22 We conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 801.50 and 801.51, the 
general venue statutes, do not apply to actions arising from 
consumer credit transactions.  Rather, the venue provision in 
Wis. Stat. § 421.401 applies.   
E.  Wisconsin Consumer Act Transactions 
¶23 Proper venues for a claim arising out of a consumer 
credit transaction are:  (1) the county where the customer 
resides or is personally served; (2) the county where collateral 
securing a consumer credit transaction is located; or (3) the 
county where the customer acquired the property that is the 
subject of the transaction or signed the document evidencing his 
or her obligation under the terms of the transaction.  Wis. 
Stat. § 421.401(1)(a)-(c). 
¶24 Brunton 
commenced 
this 
action 
in 
Dane 
County.  
However, proper venue is Rock County because that is where 
Brunton resides, where Brunton acquired the car, where the car 
is located and where Brunton signed the installment sale 
contract.  See Wis. Stat. § 421.401(1)(a)–(c).  Accordingly, the 
action was improperly venued in Dane County; the parties agree 
that Brunton should have filed this action in Rock County.  
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 421.401(2) addresses actions arising 
under the Wisconsin Consumer Act that are improperly venued.  
Section 421.401(2) states in relevant part: 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
11 
 
When it appears . . . that the county in which 
the action is pending under sub. (1) is not a proper 
place of trial for such action, unless the defendant 
appears and waives the improper venue, the court shall 
act as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in par. (b), if it appears 
that another county would be a proper place of trial, 
the court shall transfer the action to that county. 
(b) If the action arises out of a consumer credit 
transaction, the court shall dismiss the action for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, because Brunton's action arises 
out of a consumer credit transaction and was improperly venued, 
the circuit court was required to dismiss her action unless we 
conclude Nuvell "appear[ed] and waive[d] the improper venue."7 
1.  Purpose 
¶26 When the legislature states the purpose that underlies 
a statute, we are to interpret the statute in light of that 
purpose.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 421.102 
identifies 
the 
legislative 
purpose 
that 
drives 
consumer transaction statutes, i.e., Wis. Stat. chs. 421–27.  
Section 421.102 provides in relevant part: 
Purposes; rules of construction.  (1) Chapters 421 to 
427 shall be liberally construed and applied to 
promote their underlying purposes and policies.   
 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of chs. 
421 to 427 are: 
 
(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law 
governing consumer transactions; 
                                                 
7 Brunton does not dispute that if Nuvell did not waive its 
objection to improper venue, the circuit court was required to 
dismiss her action.  
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
12 
 
 
(b) 
To 
protect 
customers 
against 
unfair, 
deceptive, 
false, 
misleading 
and 
unconscionable 
practices by merchants; 
 
(c) To permit and encourage the development of 
fair and economically sound consumer practices in 
consumer transactions; and 
 
(d) To coordinate the regulation of consumer 
credit transactions with the policies of the federal 
consumer credit protection act.  
At the heart of each of the underlying purposes and policies of 
the Wisconsin Consumer Act is the protection of customers.  
Accordingly, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) in light of 
the stated legislative purpose of protecting customers.  See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49.  In this regard, paras. (2)(b), 
(2)(c) and (2)(d) are relevant to our interpretation of 
§ 421.401(2), 
in accordance with the legislature's stated 
purpose of protecting customers. 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 421.401(2) 
¶27 The prefatory language of Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2), 
when combined with para. (2)(b) states that an improperly venued 
consumer credit action must be dismissed unless the defendant 
appears and waives the improper venue.  There is authority for 
the conclusion that appearing in an action is a distinct 
requirement.  See Dauphin v. Landrigan, 187 Wis. 633, 636, 205 
N.W. 557 (1925).  In Dauphin, we explained that "[a]ppearance in 
the action and pleading in the action are distinct acts.  While 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
13 
 
the filing of an answer may operate as an appearance, appearing 
and pleading nevertheless remain two distinct things."  Id.  
¶28 For the reasons set out below, we also conclude that 
appearing 
in 
an 
action 
arising 
from 
a 
consumer 
credit 
transaction and waiving an improper venue are two distinct 
statutory requirements.  Both statutory requirements must be 
fulfilled before an improper venue will be permitted to stand.  
We so conclude because Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) joins the terms, 
"appears" and "waives" with the conjunction "and," thereby 
establishing two distinct requirements.  Further, separating 
"appears" from "waives" will best protect customers against 
unfair practices by merchants; will encourage merchants to 
develop fair consumer practices; and will promote the protection 
of unsophisticated consumers, which is a policy underlying the 
federal consumer credit protection act.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 421.102(2)(b)-(d).  We discuss "appears" and "waives" in turn. 
i.  Appears 
¶29 "The term 'appearance' is generally used to signify 
the overt act by which one against whom a suit has been 
commenced submits himself to the court's jurisdiction and 
constitutes the first act of a defendant in court."  McLaughlin 
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 
592, 594, 127 N.W.2d 813 (1964) (citing Dauphin, 187 Wis. at 
636; 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appearance § 1 (2009)).  "All persons who are 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
14 
 
parties to an action have a right to appear, either by attorney 
or in their own person."  2 Wis. Pl. & Pr. Forms § 16:8 (5th ed. 
2009) (citing Wis. Const. art. I, § 21(2); SCR 11.02(1)). 
¶30 There are a number of actions by which one may appear.  
"A party 'appears' in an action either formally, by serving and 
filing a notice of appearance or an answer or by making a motion 
that serves to extend the time to answer, or informally, by 
actively litigating the merits of an issue without raising any 
jurisdictional objection."  4 Am. Jur. 2d Appearance § 1 (2009).  
In City of Fond du Lac v. Kaehne, the court of appeals concluded 
that a party proceeding pro se in a civil action who sent a 
letter to the circuit court "appeared" in the action.  229 
Wis. 2d 323, 326, 599 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1999); see also 
L.R.E. v. R.E.J., 168 Wis. 2d 209, 216, 483 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 
1992) (concluding that pleading to the court, albeit by mail, 
constituted an appearance). 
¶31 Because it is relevant to the issue of appearance, we 
take this opportunity to discuss our decision in Kett.  First, 
we note that some of the principles established in Kett are 
applicable here, but we conclude that Kett's ultimate holding is 
distinguishable.  In Kett, Community Credit Plan improperly 
venued its replevin actions in Milwaukee County and obtained 
default judgments against the defendants.  Kett, 228 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶3.  Applying Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2), we held that the default 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
15 
 
judgments were invalid from the time of entry because the 
actions were commenced in Milwaukee County in violation of 
§ 421.401(1).  Id., ¶11.  Kett's holding is distinguishable 
because it was not interpreting § 421.401(2) to determine the 
meaning of "appears and waives the improper venue" as we are 
here.  Instead, in Kett, we interpreted the phrase "the court 
shall 
dismiss 
the 
action 
for 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction," 
§ 421.401(2)(b), 
which 
we 
explained 
could 
mean 
"personal 
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction or the competence of a 
court," Kett, 228 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 & n.12.  Further, Kett is not 
dispositive here because Kett involved default judgments.  Id., 
¶12.  A default judgment may be entered when a party fails to 
plead or otherwise appear in an action. See Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.02(3).  Accordingly, such a defendant necessarily could 
not have fulfilled the appearance requirement of § 421.401(2).  
However, a default judgment is not at issue here. 
¶32 To appear and to waive cannot be found in a single act 
and also provide the customer protection that the legislature 
sought to achieve.  See Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2).  For example, 
if a merchant files an action arising from a consumer credit 
transaction in an improper venue far from the home of the 
customer, the customer may write a letter to the judge before 
whom the action is pending, asking what will occur next.  The 
customer may do so without realizing that venue is improper, 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
16 
 
without realizing where the action should have been venued and 
without knowing that he has the right to have the action 
dismissed due to the improper venue.  Were that letter to 
constitute both an appearance and a waiver, a customer could 
lose the right to proper venue, together with the right to 
dismissal of the action, before the customer was aware of those 
rights. 
ii.  Waives 
¶33 The term, waives or waiver, functions differently in 
different circumstances.8  For example, under Wisconsin's rules 
of civil procedure, certain affirmative defenses are waived 
unless raised in the first responsive pleading or raised by 
motion made prior to answering.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2).9  
                                                 
8 There are 776 Wisconsin statutes that contain some form of 
the word "waive."  Our holding in this case is not intended to 
define waiver in every such statute as requiring the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.   
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.06 is a rule of civil procedure that 
has language similar to that found in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2).  
Section 801.06 states in relevant part: 
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter may, without a summons having been 
served upon a person, exercise jurisdiction in an 
action . . . over any person who appears in the action 
and waives the defense of lack of jurisdiction over 
his or her person as provided in s. 802.06(8). 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
17 
 
This is a statutorily defined waiver.  Although we are 
interpreting a statute, Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2), the legislature 
has not defined what acts constitute waiver under § 421.401(2). 
¶34 Waiver has been interpreted under common law in a 
number of circumstances that have required various showings 
depending on the context in which the claimed waivers arose.  
For example, the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right 
requires a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.  See State 
v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 204, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) 
(requiring a knowing, intentional and voluntary waiver of the 
right to counsel).  The Klessig standard is a high standard that 
involves an inquiry by the court before which the potential 
waiver is occurring to determine whether the parameters of 
waiver are met.  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶39, 263 Wis. 2d 
434, 666 N.W.2d 485. 
¶35 We recently discussed common law waiver in State v. 
Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  There we 
examined whether Ndina had waived his Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial.  Id., ¶2.  In so doing, we explained the 
distinction between forfeiture and waiver.  We noted that "cases 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Emphasis added.)  What constitutes an appearance and waiver 
under § 801.06, however, is not instructive here because 
§ 801.06 specifically references Wis. Stat. § 802.06(8), which 
establishes the acts that constitute waiver.  The Wisconsin 
Consumer Act provides no specifics in regard to what constitutes 
waiver under § 421.401(2). 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
18 
 
sometimes 
use 
the 
words 
'forfeiture' 
and 
'waiver' 
interchangeably[; however,] the two words embody very different 
legal concepts."  Id., ¶29.  "'Whereas forfeiture is the failure 
to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'"  
Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Rao v. 
WMA Sec., Inc., 2008 WI 73, ¶102, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 
220 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (explaining that "'waiver' is the 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right" and 
forfeiture is "a failure to timely assert a right"); State v. 
Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶¶62–63, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging the distinction 
between forfeiture and waiver); State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, 
¶11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (same).10 
                                                 
10 Accord Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004) 
("Although 
jurists 
often 
use 
the 
words 
interchangeably, 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right[;] waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right.") (internal quotations and citation omitted); 
Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging the distinction 
between waiver and forfeiture); United States v. Park Place 
Assocs., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 921 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); 
United States v. Clark, 535 F.3d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(same); Barnett v. Roper, 541 F.3d 804, 807 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(same); United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272 
(10th Cir. 2007) (same). 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
19 
 
¶36 Establishing that a party knew of the right at issue 
is essential to establishing waiver. 
[I]t must be shown by the party claiming a waiver that 
the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at 
the time knowledge . . . of the existence of his 
rights. . . .  Ignorance of a material fact negatives 
a waiver.  Waiver cannot be established by a consent 
given under a mistake of fact. 
Davies v. J.D. Wilson Co., 1 Wis. 2d 443, 467, 85 N.W.2d 459 
(1957) (quoting 56 Am. Jur. Waiver § 14).  Stated differently, a 
valid waiver that intentionally relinquishes a right must be 
done with actual knowledge of the right being waived. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Many other Wisconsin cases, which have persuasive value, 
have followed the forfeiture/waiver distinction drawn in Ndina.  
See, 
e.g., 
Tower 
Auto. 
Milwaukee, 
LLC 
v. 
Samphere, 
No. 
2009AP1043, unpublished slip op., ¶25 n.7, (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 9, 2010) ("While the parties and relevant case law use the 
word 'waiver,' we use the word 'forfeiture' consistent with the 
terminology adopted by Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶29."); Obriecht 
v. Law Offices of Lettenberger & Glasbrenner, S.C., No. 
2008AP3092, unpublished slip op., ¶18 n.7 (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 30, 2009) (noting that relevant precedent used the term 
"waiver" but relying on Ndina concluded "forfeiture" was the 
correct term); State v. Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117, ¶7 n.3, 320 
Wis. 2d 811, 772 N.W.2d 702 (noting that the parties' briefs 
used the terms forfeit and waive interchangeably, but following 
Ndina, the court concluded that forfeit was the more appropriate 
term); State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, ¶22 n.8, 320 Wis. 2d 
724, 772 N.W.2d 188 (noting that the parties use the term waiver 
to describe the failure to timely raise a defense, but, citing 
Ndina, concluded that forfeiture was the more appropriate term). 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
20 
 
¶37 We conclude that waiver under Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) 
requires the intentional relinquishment of a known right.11  The 
right being waived here is a defendant's right to proper venue, 
coupled with the right of dismissal if the case is not properly 
venued.  See Wis. Stat. § 421.401(1)(a)-(c); § 421.401(2)(b).  
Accordingly, to establish a valid waiver, it must be proved by 
the party claiming waiver that the defendant knew the place of 
proper venue and knew that he had the right to dismissal of the 
case when it was not properly venued. 
¶38 In addition to knowledge of the place of proper venue 
and the right to dismissal of an improperly venued action, a 
plaintiff must also prove that the rights to proper venue and 
dismissal of an improperly venued action were intentionally 
relinquished.  Intentional relinquishment may be demonstrated by 
                                                 
11 Our case law has consistently maintained this definition 
of waiver.  See Rao v. WMA Sec., Inc., 2008 WI 73, ¶102, 310 
Wis. 2d, 752 N.W.2d 220 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that the technical definition of waiver "is the intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right"); Milas v. Labor 
Ass'n of Wis., 214 Wis. 2d 1, 9–10, 571 N.W.2d 656 (1997) 
(noting that "[t]his court has defined waiver as the 'voluntary 
and intentional relinquishment of a known right'") (quoting Von 
Uhl v. Trempealeau County Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 32, 37, 146 
N.W.2d 516 (1966)); Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 137 Wis. 2d 
109, 128, 403 N.W.2d 747 (1987) (defining waiver as the 
"'intentional 
relinquishment of a known right'") (quoting 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Sheedy, 42 Wis. 2d 161, 166, 166 
N.W.2d 220 (1969)); Bank of Sun Prairie v. Opstein, 86 Wis. 2d 
669, 681, 273 N.W.2d 279 (1979) (same) (citing Hanz Trucking, 
Inc. v. Harris Bros. Co., 29 Wis. 2d 254, 264, 138 N.W.2d 238 
(1965)); Mansfield v. Smith, 88 Wis. 2d 575, 592, 277 N.W.2d 740 
(1979) (same); Swedish Am. Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. 
Koebernick, 136 Wis. 473, 479, 117 N.W. 1020 (1908) (same); 
Monroe Water Works Co. v. City of Monroe, 110 Wis. 11, 22, 85 
N.W. 685 (1901) (same). 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
21 
 
an express statement or by conduct.  Fraser v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 114 Wis. 510, 523–24, 90 N.W. 476 (1902); see also Estate of 
Ross 
v. 
Ross, 181 Wis. 125, 134, 194 N.W. 151 (1923).  
Intentional relinquishment by conduct occurs when a party's 
conduct is "so inconsistent with a purpose to stand upon one's 
rights as to leave no room for a reasonable inference to the 
contrary."  Fraser, 114 Wis. at 523–24.  Stated differently, a 
party intentionally relinquishes a known right by affirmative 
acts 
unambiguously 
demonstrating 
that 
his 
conduct 
is 
intentionally undertaken and meant to give up the right to 
proper venue. 
¶39 Applying these principles here, we conclude that a 
defendant may waive the improper venue by filing a written 
stipulation with the court or by oral stipulation made in open 
court and entered in the record, which demonstrates that the 
defendant is aware of his right to proper venue and that he 
intends to relinquish this right rather than having the action 
dismissed.  This establishes waiver by express statement.  We 
further conclude that a defendant may waive the right to proper 
venue by affirmative acts that unambiguously demonstrate that he 
knows the place of proper venue, as well as the right to 
dismissal of the improperly venued action against him, and that 
he nonetheless intends to relinquish such rights.  This 
establishes waiver by conduct. 
¶40 Our interpretation of "waives" is supported by the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2), which sets no time 
limitation for objections to venue.  That is, unlike Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
22 
 
§ 801.51, which limits the time during which a defendant may 
challenge venue thereunder, the Wisconsin Consumer Act's venue 
provision does not contain a time limit.  Moreover, § 421.401(2) 
states, "[w]hen it appears from the return of service of the 
summons or otherwise" that the venue is improper in an action 
arising from a consumer credit transaction, the court must 
dismiss the action unless the defendant appears and waives the 
defect in venue.  (Emphasis added.)  This language establishes 
that the issue of improper venue is to be addressed whenever it 
is raised by a defendant, not only when it is raised at the 
outset of litigation.  Accordingly, our interpretation correctly 
places the onus on plaintiffs, typically creditors, to properly 
venue an action or risk dismissal when the defendant brings the 
improper venue to the circuit court's attention. 
¶41 Although the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) 
of the Wisconsin Consumer Act supports our interpretation, we 
observe that the legislative history of the venue provision 
governing 
consumer 
credit 
transactions 
also 
supports 
our 
conclusion that objections to venue need not be made at the 
initial stage of the litigation.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶51.  The legislative history confirms that we properly rejected 
Brunton's assertion that improper venue is waived if not 
challenged in a defendant's answer or first responsive pleading.  
In 
1983, 
the 
legislature 
created 
the 
specialized 
venue 
provisions 
for 
actions 
arising 
from 
consumer 
credit 
transactions.  1983 Wis. Act 389; see Wis. Stat. § 425.501(2) 
(1983–84).  The language of § 425.501(2) explicitly required such 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
23 
 
venue challenges to be brought at the outset of litigation.  It 
stated: 
 
When, in any action under this chapter, it 
appears from the return of service of the summons or 
otherwise that the county in which the action is 
pending is not a proper place of trial of such action 
under this section, the court shall, on motion of a 
party or on its own motion, on the return day of the 
summons or prior to taking any other action on the 
case, determine the correctness of the venue.  If 
venue is correct the case shall continue.  If venue is 
not correct, the court shall dismiss the action unless 
the defendant appears and waives the improper venue.  
If the defendant does not appear and waive the 
improper venue, the court shall lack jurisdiction 
other than to dismiss the action. 
§ 425.501(2) (1983–84) (emphasis added). 
¶42 Then, in 1987, the legislature consolidated the venue 
provisions for actions arising from consumer credit transactions 
and consumer transactions in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2).  See 1987 
Wis. Act 208.  In 1987 Wis. Act 208, the legislature removed a 
portion of the venue provision; specifically, it removed the 
language requiring the court to determine whether venue was 
proper at the outset of the litigation.  We note that there have 
not been any changes to the language of § 421.401(2) since 1987.  
We conclude that it is reasonable to infer that with removal of 
the directive to consider venue at the outset of the litigation, 
the legislature intended that the issue of improper venue in 
actions arising from consumer credit transactions be considered 
whenever it is raised. 
¶43 Additionally, our conclusion that waiver under Wis. 
Stat. § 421.401(2) may be established by demonstrating a 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
24 
 
defendant's knowledge of the proper place of venue and the 
statutory right to dismissal of an action improperly venued and 
that he unambiguously intends to relinquish those rights 
furthers the purposes underlying the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  
See Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(b)-(c).  For example, were we not to 
require the intentional relinquishment of a known right to 
proper venue, a merchant could file an action in a locale far 
distant from a customer's residence, thereby making defense of 
the action very difficult.  The merchant could then ask the 
customer to agree to the venue by convincing the customer that 
it is customary to do so, or for some other reason that does not 
acknowledge the statutory right to dismissal of an improperly 
venued action.  If a customer did not know the place of proper 
venue or that he or she could demand dismissal of the action, 
the customer may sign such an agreement waiving the improper 
venue to his or her detriment. 
¶44 Our construction of the term "waives," requiring the 
intentional relinquishment of the known right to proper venue, 
coupled with the right to dismissal of the case when venue is 
improper, will discourage sharp practices by merchants and 
protect customers, thereby comporting with the legislature's 
specific instructions.  Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(b)-(c).   
¶45 Our construction is also in accordance with the 
policies underlying a federal consumer credit protection act, 
policies with which we are instructed to coordinate our 
interpretations of the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 421.102(2)(d).  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
25 
 
(FDCPA)12 is a federal consumer protection act contained in 15 
U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2006).13  Federal courts have interpreted 
claims of unfair debt collection practices "through the lens of 
the 
'least 
sophisticated 
debtor' 
or 
'least 
sophisticated 
consumer' standard.'"  Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 
1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).  "The 
basic purpose of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is to 
ensure that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as 
well as the shrewd."  Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d 
Cir. 1993).  In regard to various levels of sophistication, the 
United States Supreme Court has opined: 
The fact that a false statement may be obviously 
false to those who are trained and experienced does 
not change its character, nor take away its power to 
deceive others less experienced.  There is no duty 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 421.102(2)(d) directs us to coordinate 
our interpretations of the Wisconsin Consumer Act "with the 
policies of the federal consumer credit protection act" without 
specifically 
citing 
to 
the 
applicable 
federal 
law. 
 
We 
coordinate our interpretation of the Wisconsin Consumer Act with 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 
et seq. (2006).  We note that other cases have done so as well.  
See Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Wis., Inc. v. Hornik, 114 Wis. 2d 
163, 172–73, 336 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1983) (interpreting Wis. 
Stat. § 425.304 to coordinate with a provision of the FDCPA); 
Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 
1050 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j) 
to coordinate with a provision of the FDCPA). 
13 While, by its specific terms, the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 
et seq., applies only to actions by consumers against debt 
collectors, § 1692i(b), it has been interpreted such that courts 
are to examine collection practices in a fashion that will curb 
sharp practices by debt collectors and promote fairness to 
consumers.  E.g., Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 
1258 (7th Cir. 1994).  
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
26 
 
resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those 
with whom he transacts business.  Laws are made to 
protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. 
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 
(1937) (quoted in Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318). 
¶46 In Gammon, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit modified the "least sophisticated consumer" 
standard to the "unsophisticated consumer" to describe "the 
hypothetical consumer whose reasonable perceptions will be used 
to 
determine 
if 
collection 
messages 
are 
deceptive 
or 
misleading."  Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257.  It did so in order to 
continue to protect unsophisticated consumers while accounting 
for "unrealistic or peculiar interpretations of collection 
letters."  Id.  In applying the unsophisticated consumer 
standard, the Seventh Circuit concluded, "[t]he language in the 
collection letter [under review] appears to be cleverly drafted 
in order to insinuate what obviously cannot be stated directly."  
Id. at 1258.  In so doing, it focused on the unfairness that was 
present and was to be eliminated under federal law.  Id.  Our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
waiver 
described 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 421.401(2) as requiring the intentional relinquishment of the 
known right to proper venue coupled with the statutory right to 
dismissal of the case when venue is improper, is consistent with 
federal policy.  This is so because our interpretation will 
protect unsophisticated consumers by preventing them from 
inadvertently waiving the right to proper venue and dismissal of 
an action that is improperly venued. 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
27 
 
3.  Application of Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) 
¶47 We 
have 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 421.401(2) 
requires both appearance and waiver, demonstrating intent to 
relinquish the known right to proper venue, coupled with the 
known right to dismissal of the improperly venued action.  
Accordingly, we apply that standard to Nuvell to determine 
whether Nuvell appeared and waived the improper venue prior to 
its motion for summary judgment of dismissal. 
¶48 There is no dispute that Nuvell appeared in this case.  
Nuvell first appeared in the action on February 2, 2006, when it 
filed a notice of appearance and its answer. 
¶49 We conclude that Nuvell did not expressly waive the 
improper venue.  This is so because there was no written 
stipulation filed with the court or oral stipulation made in 
open court on the record stating that Nuvell intended to waive 
its right to proper venue.  As such, any waiver could have 
occurred only by conduct. 
¶50 Brunton contends that Nuvell's continued litigation of 
this action for over a year constitutes waiver.  We disagree.  
Continued litigation of an action does not unambiguously 
demonstrate an intention to relinquish the right to proper 
venue.  This is so because such conduct may also reasonably be 
interpreted 
as 
Nuvell 
defending 
itself 
against 
Brunton's 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
28 
 
lawsuit.14  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 (explaining that to 
be unambiguous requires being susceptible to only one reasonable 
interpretation). 
¶51 Brunton argues that Nuvell had the burden to challenge 
the improper venue once Nuvell knew of it.15  We are unpersuaded.  
There is no dispute that both parties knew that the action had 
been improperly filed in Dane County because on August 9, 2006, 
Brunton's lawyer raised the issue of improper venue with Nuvell 
at a scheduling conference in the Rock County action.  We 
conclude that it was Brunton who had the responsibility to 
properly venue her action.  Therefore, Nuvell's continued 
litigation may reasonably be interpreted as defending against 
the claims asserted in Brunton's lawsuit. 
                                                 
14 We note that Brunton argued that interpreting waiver to 
require the intentional relinquishment of the known right to 
dismissal of the case would sacrifice judicial economy by 
permitting a defendant to litigate an action, thereby leaving 
the door open to dismissal of the action and potential re-filing 
in the proper county of venue.  First, as we stated, the heart 
of the underlying purpose of Wis. Stat. § 421.102 is the 
protection of the consumer.  See supra ¶26.  This express 
directive from the legislature overrides any concerns of 
judicial economy.  Second, the statute of limitations in actions 
filed under the Wisconsin Consumer Act continues to run.  This, 
to some extent, preserves judicial economy.  For example, here 
the parties litigated this case for 14 months prior to dismissal 
due to improper venue.  However, the one year statute of 
limitations applicable here, see Wis. Stat. § 425.307(1), 
prevents Brunton from re-filing this action in the proper 
county, thereby avoiding duplicative efforts by the circuit 
courts. 
15 The action was venued in Dane County for nearly seven 
months after Brunton informed Nuvell that Dane County was not a 
proper venue for the action. 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
29 
 
¶52 When Nuvell refused to stipulate to Brunton's transfer 
of the action to Rock County so Brunton could avoid dismissal of 
the action, it was Brunton who chose to continue to disregard 
the venue defect of her own making and to risk dismissal of her 
lawsuit.16  Nuvell's refusal to stipulate to transferring venue 
to Rock County does not demonstrate its intention to waive the 
improper venue; rather, it may reasonably be interpreted as 
demonstrating Nuvell's intent to stand on its right to proper 
venue, including the right to have an improperly venued action 
against it dismissed. 
¶53 There is nothing in the record that establishes that 
Nuvell intentionally, by affirmative actions, relinquished its 
right to proper venue or its statutory right to dismissal of the 
improperly venued action.  Accordingly, we conclude Nuvell's 
conduct did not unambiguously demonstrate waiver of the improper 
venue, and, therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed this 
action. 
                                                 
16 Had Brunton dismissed the Dane County action and re-filed 
the action in Rock County when she raised the venue issue with 
Nuvell, Brunton would have had about four months to re-file her 
action in Rock County before the statute of limitations expired.  
Because Brunton waited for Nuvell to cure the defect she 
created, the statute of limitations bars her claim.  Although 
this outcome may seem harsh, typically actions arising under 
consumer credit transactions will be brought by merchants.  This 
statutory interpretation will encourage merchants to use fair 
credit collection practices and protect consumers, thereby 
promoting the purposes underlying the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  
Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(b)-(c). 
No. 
2007AP1253   
 
30 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 The dispositive issue in this case is whether under 
Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) Nuvell "appear[ed] and waive[d] the 
improper venue" such that dismissal of the action, which arose 
out of a consumer credit transaction, was not required.  We 
conclude that appearance and waiver under § 421.401(2) requires 
two 
actions: 
 
(1) 
an 
appearance 
established 
by 
conduct 
recognized 
under 
the 
law 
as 
appearance 
and 
(2) 
waiver 
established by the defendant's knowledge of the proper venue and 
the intentional relinquishment of the right to proper venue.  
Nuvell appeared by responsive pleading, court appearances and 
litigating its defenses.  However, neither Nuvell's failure to 
raise the improper venue in its answer nor its other appearances 
in this action constituted an intentional relinquishment of the 
right to proper venue.  Because Nuvell did not both appear and 
waive the improper venue, the circuit court was required to 
dismiss the action when Nuvell raised the venue defect.  See 
§ 421.401(2)(b).  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the action is remanded to the circuit court for 
dismissal. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1253.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.    (concurring)  This case 
is in an unusual posture.  In the instant case the consumer is 
the plaintiff, and the creditor is the defendant.  In many, if 
not in most, consumer credit cases the creditor is the 
plaintiff, seeking a remedy against a consumer who is the 
defendant.  
¶56 The rules adopted in the present case will apply in 
all cases, regardless of who is the plaintiff or defendant, and 
any interpretation of the statutes must promote the purposes and 
policies of the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  
¶57 I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause to the circuit court to dismiss the action.   
¶58 I reach this result even though the result seems harsh 
and at some level offends my sense of fairness.  But the result 
reached is, in my opinion, required by the statute.   
¶59 The sense of unfairness arises because Nuvell Credit 
Corporation 
(the 
defendant) 
knew 
that 
Brunton 
(the 
consumer/plaintiff) had brought the action in the wrong county.  
Nevertheless, Nuvell Credit continued to litigate the case in 
Dane County and then shouted, "Gotcha——wrong county!" only after 
doing so would end the consumer/plaintiff's case.  Nuvell Credit 
actively participated in the litigation in Dane County Circuit 
Court, including discovery, for more than a year before 
objecting to venue; while participating in the litigation Nuvell 
Credit did not advise the circuit court of the defect in venue; 
then Nuvell Credit sought dismissal of the action only after the 
No.  2007AP1253.ssa 
 
2 
 
statute of limitations had run against the consumer/plaintiff, 
making it impossible for her to refile the claim in the proper 
county.  Nuvell Credit's conduct seems "tricky" and wasteful of 
the circuit court's time, and means that the consumer/plaintiff 
never gets her day in court.   
¶60 The appearance is that Nuvell Credit unfairly relied 
on a "technicality" to prevent the consumer/plaintiff forever 
from getting a determination on the merits of her claim.  But 
the 
so-called 
"technicality" 
is 
a 
legislative 
enactment 
governing a court's jurisdiction, an enactment binding on the 
litigants and on the courts.  See Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, 
Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999).   
¶61 The sense of unfairness is mitigated somewhat by the 
fact that the consumer/plaintiff also knew that Dane County was 
the wrong venue, had the time to change the venue to Rock 
County, but did not act to change the venue.  
¶62 I agree with the majority opinion in many respects:  
This case is a statutory interpretation case arising under the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act, chapters 421 to 427 of the statutes.  
The decision turns specifically on the interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 421.401(2).  The legislature instructed the court how to 
interpret chapters 421 to 427 of the statutes.  Section 
421.101(1) instructs the courts to give a liberal construction 
and application to provisions of the Wisconsin Consumer Act to 
promote their underlying purposes and policies.  A basic purpose 
No.  2007AP1253.ssa 
 
3 
 
of the Wisconsin Consumer Act is "the protection of customers."  
Majority op., ¶26.1   
¶63 Section 421.401(2) requires dismissal of an action 
brought in the wrong county unless the defendant "appears and 
waives the improper venue."  The parties agree, as do the 
majority opinion and I, that the defendant in the present case 
"appeared."2   
¶64 The principal issue in the present case is what the 
word "waives" means in the statute.   
                                                 
1 "[T]he venue provision must be interpreted to protect 
consumers and favor their participation in the legal process.  
The legislature understood that consumers are likely to have 
limited resources, whereas creditors are more apt to have 
resources and be familiar with the law."  Kett v. Cmty. Credit 
Plan, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999). 
2 I have some other questions about the majority opinion but 
do not enumerate all of them.  For example, I think the majority 
speaks too broadly in stating at ¶32: "To appear and to waive 
cannot be found in a single act."  The accuracy of this 
generalization will depend on what is viewed as a single act.   
The Wisconsin Consumer Act, created by 1971 Wis. Act 239 
(published April 18, 1972), refers to "the federal consumer 
credit protection act."  Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(d) (emphasis 
added).  A federal Consumer Credit Protection Act was adopted a 
few years before the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  See Pub. L. 90-
321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601 et seq.).  The majority opinion relies on cases 
referring to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
which was adopted after the Wisconsin Consumer Act.  See Pub. L. 
95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et 
seq.).  No explanation is given for reliance on this later Act.  
See majority op., ¶¶41-43. 
The majority opinion at n.10 cites Tower Auto. Milwaukee, 
LLC v. Samphere, an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals, 
as precedent, contrary to court rules.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.23(3).   
No.  2007AP1253.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶65 The majority opinion determines that "waives" means 
"intentional[ly] relinquish[es] . . . the known right to proper 
venue"3 
and 
that 
this 
intentional 
relinquishment 
can 
be 
accomplished by an "express statement" or by conduct.4  According 
to the majority opinion, waiver by conduct "occurs when a 
party's conduct is 'so inconsistent with a purpose to stand upon 
one's rights as to leave no room for a reasonable inference to 
the contrary.'"  Majority op., ¶38.5 
¶66 I disagree that "waives" in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) 
includes waiver by conduct.6  Rather, I agree with Nuvell Credit 
that the meaning of "waives" in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) requires 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶36, 37, 38. 
4 Majority op., ¶38. 
5 I wonder whether the majority opinion's alternative way of 
expressing 
this 
thought——"affirmative 
acts 
unambiguously 
demonstrating that his conduct is intentionally undertaken and 
meant to give up the right to proper venue"——expresses a 
different test.  Majority op., ¶38.  
6 I also disagree with the majority opinion's application of 
its definition of conduct to the facts of the present case.  
The majority opinion concludes that although Nuvell Credit 
knew that the venue was improper and that it could get a 
dismissal of the action, its conduct of continuing litigation 
was merely "defending itself," not an intentional relinquishment 
of the known right to proper venue.  Majority op., ¶50.  If 
Nuvell Credit's conduct in the present case does not constitute 
an intentional relinquishment of the known right to proper 
venue, what conduct would be an intentional relinquishment of 
the known right to proper venue? 
If 
I 
were 
to 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
"conduct/waiver" approach, I would have to dissent.  In addition 
to filing an answer and appearing, Nuvell Credit participated in 
discovery.  I conclude that Nuvell Credit's conduct constitutes 
a waiver under the majority opinion's test.    
No.  2007AP1253.ssa 
 
5 
 
an express waiver of improper venue.  An express waiver is an 
affirmative expression in writing or by oral stipulation on the 
record in open court.  Such an affirmative expression must be 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.   
¶67 This interpretation of "waives" gives litigants and 
courts a rule as "bright line" as possible, one that will 
protect the consumer and discourage confusion and litigation 
about the collateral issue of waiver by conduct.  
¶68 This interpretation comports with the legislative 
statement of the purposes and policies of the Wisconsin Consumer 
Act.  The explicit legislative rule of construction is that the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act "shall be liberally construed and applied 
to promote [its] underlying purposes and policies."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 421.102(1).  The legislature stated the underlying purposes 
and policies of chapters 421 to 427 as follows in § 421.102(2): 
(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law 
governing consumer transactions; 
(b) To protect customers against unfair, deceptive, 
false, misleading and unconscionable practices by 
merchants; 
(c) To permit and encourage the development of fair 
and economically sound consumer practices in consumer 
transactions; and 
(d) To coordinate the regulation of consumer credit 
transactions with the policies of the federal consumer 
credit protection act.     
¶69 Express waiver promotes the legislative policy of 
"protect[ing] 
customers 
against 
unfair, 
deceptive, 
false, 
misleading and unconscionable practices by merchants."7  The 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(b). 
No.  2007AP1253.ssa 
 
6 
 
consumer/customer 
is 
often 
the 
defendant, 
is 
often 
unsophisticated about the law, and frequently represents himself 
or herself, without an attorney.  A requirement of express 
waiver protects the consumer against unwittingly relinquishing a 
right that the statute provides. 
¶70 Express waiver also serves the purposes to "simplify" 
and "clarify" the law governing consumer transactions8 and to 
"encourage the development of fair and economically sound 
consumer practices in consumer transactions."9  Express waiver is 
simpler and clearer than construing waiver by conduct and it 
encourages the fair and sound practice of clear and explicit 
communication of consumers' rights in Wisconsin. 
¶71 Nuvell Credit did not expressly waive its right to a 
proper venue in the present case.  Nuvell Credit did not execute 
an affirmative expression in writing or enter into an oral 
stipulation on the record in open court to waive improper venue.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
dismissing the present action.   
¶72 For the reasons set forth, I write separately to state 
what I consider the proper interpretation of "waives" in Wis. 
Stat. § 421.401(2).   
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(a). 
9 Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(c). 
No.  2007AP1253.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No. 
2007AP1253.mjg   
 
1 
 
¶74 MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I join the majority opinion's definition 
of "waiver" as used in Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2), which includes 
waiver by conduct.  However, I dissent because I would find that 
Nuvell's actions in this case did constitute waiver by conduct. 
¶75 Under § 421.401(2), a circuit court must dismiss an 
improperly venued action "unless the defendant appears and 
waives the improper venue."  The majority opinion rightly 
concludes that waiver in this statute is "the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right."  Majority op., ¶37.  This 
requires that the defendant (1) "knew the place of proper 
venue"; (2) "knew that he had the right to dismissal"; and (3) 
intentionally relinquished those rights.  Id., ¶¶37-38. 
¶76 The majority opinion is also correct that a party may 
intentionally relinquish its rights either expressly or by 
conduct.  Id., ¶38 (citing Fraser v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 114 
Wis. 510, 523-24, 90 N.W. 476 (1902); Estate of Ross v. Ross, 
181 Wis. 125, 134, 194 N.W. 151 (1923)).  A party intentionally 
relinquishes its rights through conduct when the party's actions 
are "so inconsistent with a purpose to stand upon one's rights 
as to leave no room for a reasonable inference to the contrary."  
Fraser, 114 Wis. at 523–24.  Over and over again, Wisconsin 
courts have recognized that waiver may be inferred as a matter 
of law from parties' actions; waiver need not be express.  See, 
e.g., Milas v. Labor Ass'n of Wisconsin, 214 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 
No. 
2007AP1253.mjg   
 
2 
 
571 N.W.2d 656 (1997).1  Black's Law Dictionary also makes clear 
that waiver may be either "express or implied."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1717–18 (9th ed. 2009).  "Waiver," then, is a term of 
art.  Unless the statutory or constitutional context clearly 
indicates otherwise, waiver in Wisconsin may be accomplished 
expressly or by conduct.2 
¶77 Whether waiver by conduct has occurred, however, will 
obviously depend upon the particular conduct in each case.  My 
parting of the ways with the majority occurs not with its 
statement of the law, but in its application of the law to the 
facts of this case.  In my view, the only reasonable inference 
                                                 
1 See also Hanz Trucking, Inc. v. Harris Bros. Co., 29 
Wis. 2d 254, 264–66, 138 N.W.2d 238 (1965); Estate of Ross v. 
Ross, 181 Wis. 125, 134-35, 194 N.W. 151 (1923); Pabst Brewing 
Co. v. Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 117-18, 105 N.W. 563 (1905). 
2 The concurrence concludes that the word "waives" in 
§ 421.401(2) does not include waiver by conduct; waiver may only 
be express, it suggests.  Concurrence, ¶66. 
The concurrence's analysis has nothing to do with the 
statute or case law, however.  It chooses this approach, 
ignoring the generally understood meaning of waiver, because it 
is a simple, "bright line" rule, and because it will better 
protect consumers.  See id., ¶¶67-70. 
None of these policy-oriented reasons justify changing the 
well-settled meaning of the word "waives"——a meaning surely 
known by the legislature when drafting this statute.  If the 
legislature 
wanted 
to 
allow 
only 
express 
waiver 
under 
§ 421.401(2), it could have said so.  The fact that it did not 
suggests that the legislature intended "waives" to have its 
ordinary, well-accepted meaning, which includes both express 
waiver and waiver by conduct.  See Grobarchik v. State, 102 
Wis. 2d 461, 467-68, 307 N.W.2d 170 (1981) (explaining that as a 
fundamental canon of statutory construction, we presume the 
legislature used technical terms or terms of art with their 
technical meaning). 
No. 
2007AP1253.mjg   
 
3 
 
that can be drawn from Nuvell's conduct is that it waived its 
right to object to venue. 
¶78 A brief overview of the timeline here will be helpful. 
¶79 Brunton filed this action in the Dane County Circuit 
Court on December 16, 2005.  Nuvell appeared and filed its 
answer on February 2, 2006, making no venue objection. 
¶80 On May 23, 2006, Nuvell commenced a replevin action 
against Brunton in Rock County based out of the same consumer 
credit transaction.  This, of course, was "a claim arising out 
of a . . . consumer credit transaction" under § 421.401(1), just 
like the suit at issue here. 
¶81 On August 9, 2006, Brunton's attorney made Nuvell 
aware that the current suit was venued in the wrong county under 
§ 421.401(2).  Brunton requested that Nuvell stipulate to 
transferring venue to Rock County, but Nuvell refused that 
request on August 11, 2006. 
¶82 Finally, on February 27, 2007, Nuvell moved for 
summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Brunton's suit because it 
was venued in Dane County instead of Rock County in violation of 
§ 421.401. 
 
Conveniently, 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
on 
Brunton's claim had expired just two months prior.3 
¶83 Thus, Nuvell litigated this suit for more than a year 
before raising its venue objections.  Nuvell may have known that 
                                                 
3 The one-year statute of limitations would have begun to 
run 
with 
the 
commission 
of 
the 
allegedly 
improper 
debt 
collection practices.  These occurred in November and December 
2005, so the statute of limitations would have expired in late 
2006. 
No. 
2007AP1253.mjg   
 
4 
 
venue was improper when filing the replevin action in May 2006, 
and indisputably knew that venue was improper in August 2006.  
Therefore, Nuvell knew the place of proper venue, knew it had 
the right to dismissal, and yet continued to actively litigate 
for at least six months, and perhaps as many as nine months.  I 
conclude that only one reasonable inference can be drawn from 
Nuvell's conduct: it intentionally relinquished its right to 
challenge venue.4 
¶84 For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals and respectfully concur in part, and 
dissent in part. 
 
 
                                                 
4 As the concurrence likewise queries, "If Nuvell Credit's 
conduct in the present case does not constitute an intentional 
relinquishment of the known right to proper venue, what conduct 
would . . . ?"  Concurrence, ¶66 n.6. 
No. 
2007AP1253.mjg   
 
 
 
1