Title: Boyer v. Pool
Citation: 280 S.W.2d 564
Docket Number: A-4762
State: Texas
Issuer: Texas Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 1955

280 S.W.2d 564 (1955) Bertie M. BOYER et al., Petitioners, v. J. C. POOL et al., Respondents. No. A-4762. Supreme Court of Texas. April 6, 1955. Rehearing Denied July 27, 1955. Bryan, Maxwell, Bryan &amp; Wilson (Stansell Bryan), Waco, P. M. Rice, Hamilton, L. Brann, Lubbock, for petitioners. *565 Abney, Hammett &amp; Lynch (J. V. Hammett), Lampasas, Truman E. Roberts, Hico, H. W. Allen, Hamilton, for respondents. WILSON, Justice. This is a contest to the probating of a will upon grounds of undue influence. The contestants secured a jury finding that the execution of the will had resulted from the exercise of undue influence. The trial court disregarded this verdict and entered judgment sustaining the probate, because, in its opinion, there was no evidence of undue influence. This judgment has been reversed and rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals. 268 S.W.2d 223. The only question presented is whether there is any evidence of undue influence. The test of undue influence is whether such control was exercised over the mind of the testator as to overcome his free agency and free will and to substitute the will of another so as to cause the testator to do what he would not otherwise have done but for such control. Scott v. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S.W. 1138; Curry v. Curry, Tex., 270 S.W.2d 208. The Court of Civil Appeals gives a fair summary of the testimony. This establishes in substance that the testator was eighty nine years old when he executed the will and subsequently died at the age of ninety three years; that there was friction, jealousy, and bad feeling between his daughters and the widow of a deceased son; that his daughters gave considerable thought and attention to the question of whether his son (deceased father of contestants) owed a debt to the testator which should be taken into consideration by the testator in drawing his will; that they discussed this question among themselves and with him at various times; and that there was general rivalry and jealousy between the daughters and their sister-in-law, the wife of the deceased son of the testator. There is testimony that the testator told his grandchildren (contestants) that he would provide for them while the will does not do that. The contestants established a confidential relationship, the opportunity, and a motive for undue influence and that during his last years the testator was virtually dependent upon his daughters, two of the principal beneficiaries. There is proof that the daughters made a daily charge for nursing their brother during his last illness, which indicates a grasping attitude by the daughters and a harsh and unnatural family relationship. Proof of this type simply sets the stage. Contestants must go forward and prove in some fashion that the will as written resulted from the daughters substituting their mind and will for that of the testator. Here the will and the circumstances raise suspicion, but it does not supply proof of the vital facts of undue influence the substitution of a plan of testamentary disposition by another as the will of the testator. The proof fails to show the circumstances under which the will was executed other than as set out by the Court of Civil Appeals from whose opinion we quote as follows [268 S.W.2d 228]: One factor to be considered is that the will was executed in a public place (court house) with no one present who is alleged to have used undue influence at that time. In Besteiro v. Besteiro, Tex.Com.App., 65 S.W.2d 759, 761, this Court said: See also Cameron v. Houston Land &amp; Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., 1948, 175 S.W.2d 468, error ref. w. o. m., and Naihaus v. Feigon, Tex.Civ.App., 1951, 244 S.W.2d 325, n. r. e. In fact it is not shown that any of the children had any knowledge that the will was being executed until afterwards. There is no evidence of the direct intervention of the will and mind of the daughters or of the dominance of the free will of the testator in the preparation and execution of the will so as to bring this case within Long v. Long, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034. The fact that the testator in his will adopted the daughter's version of the debt question does not prove that he did not do so of his own free will. There is no proof raising a fact issue that the testator did not make a free decision. Proof that the daughters were favored and that the contestants got nothing under the will is not proof that the daughters did in fact substitute their mind and will for the mind and will of the testator. Since witnesses were available to establish the facts surrounding the preparation and planning of the will, we must hold that the contestants have failed to prove their case. Proof of the planning and preparation of the will, where the witnesses are available, is the heart of an undue influence case. Respondents urge the case of Barksdale v. Dobbins, Tex.Civ.App., 1940, 141 S.W.2d 1035, error ref., in which the facts were very like the case at bar and in which a jury verdict of undue influence was sustained. The factual situations in undue influence cases are never the same. The distinction between proving undue influence by circumstantial evidence and merely raising a "bare suspicion" as in Burgess v. Sylvester, 143 Tex. 25, 182 S.W.2d 358, is not one which can be defined with certain limits, for the problem is essentially one of degree. In the case of Barksdale v. Dobbins, supra, there was evidence that the testator was mentally feeble and that his mental condition had deteriorated with age. In the case at bar there is no such testimony. A number of witnesses testified that testator was active and spry, drove his car under a limited driver's license, and in general took care of his own business. The only testimony which we can find in the record which might be contended as suggesting mental weakness was that of a neighbor, Gordon Nettleton, who had known testator a long time. It is: But when this testimony is fairly examined in its context it will not make a fact issue of mental weakness. Two medical witnesses testified for the proponents. The contestants offered no medical evidence of the testator's mental strength and condition. Dr. H. R. Nassour, Jr., testified that he was the physician and surgeon who had treated the testator for about four years before his last illness and through and including his last illness. He testified that his death was due to a general weakness brought on by a chronic kidney condition and hardening of the arteries; that hardening of the arteries generally sets in at the age of forty and continues progressively until death in most people and affects people differently. He testified as follows: Dr. R. A. Kooken testified that he had known the testator between fifteen and twenty years and had treated him at various times during the years between 1948 and 1951, which includes the period during which this will was drawn. He testified as follows: We have concluded that this medical testimony distinguishes the case at bar from *568 Barksdale v. Dobbins, supra. In that case there was testimony that the testator "had reached that age and part of life where he was easily influenced; had a mind like a child and was not capable of taking care of his business." [141 S.W.2d 1037.] There was testimony that the testator "`will sign anything anybody asks him to.'" Whenever the testator left his home he had to be accompanied. Also in that case the attorney who drafted the will testified as to its detailed preparation. In addition, in this case the testator offered an explanation for leaving out his grandchildren while in that case there was no explanation. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed. Costs are taxed against respondents. BREWSTER and SMITH, JJ., dissenting. HICKMAN, C.J., not sitting. SMITH, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Since this is a case wherein the petitioners contend that the respondents failed to produce any evidence to support the finding of the jury that petitioners exercised undue influence upon the testator, Jasper Pool, I find it necessary to depart from the usual procedure and quote at some length from the testimony. I realize that it is a tremendous burden to analyze the cold record in this Court and at the same time effectively bring out the true picture. This Court, in determining the only question before us, must necessarily remember that the jury is the best judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The jurors are the judges not only of the facts proved but also of the inferences to be drawn therefrom, provided that such inferences are not unreasonable. It is the duty of the jury to consider the evidence as a whole. It has the power to reject or accept all or any part of the testimony of any witness. When testimony is given which calls for an explanation and the adversary remains silent, the jury may take such silence into consideration in deciding the ultimate issue submitted. This being an "undue influence" case, the trial court defined "undue influence" as "the exercise of sufficient control over the will power and mind of the person, the validity of whose acts is brought in question, to destroy his free agency and to constrain him to do what he would not have done, if such control had not been exercised; on the other hand, if a person of his own volition and in the exercise of his own will and choice enters into a transaction, then he would not be laboring under undue influence." This definition was followed by one special issue: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that at the time of the making of the will in question herein on March 5, 1949, the said Jasper Pool was induced to make said will by the exercise of undue influence upon him by Mrs. Bertie Boyer and Mrs. Bessie Blake, or either of them?" No objection was made to the charge by either petitioners or respondents. With the charge of the court as a legal guide, the jury weighed all the evidence and answered the issue in the affirmative. Undue influence may be shown to be operative at the time of the execution of the will by showing facts and circumstances before and after execution thereof from which it might be inferred that the undue influence existed and operated at the time the will was executed. The activity of the proponent of a will may be shown solely by inference. Direct evidence connecting the proponent with the actual preparation of the will is not an absolute requirement to prove undue influence. The contestant is not required to prove that the proponent or beneficiary was present at the time of the execution of the will. For example, in the case of Scott v. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S.W. 1138, the proponent was in St. Louis when the will was signed in Ft. Worth. I am mindful of the fact that the majority is thoroughly familiar with these well-settled principles, however, I feel called upon to point up these *569 rules in view of the conclusion reached by the majority that the evidence merely raises a "bare suspicion", whereas, I have the opposite reaction in that it is my opinion that all the evidence, considered as a whole, supports the finding of the jury that our petitioners exercised undue influence upon the testator. Undue influence can be established by circumstantial, as well as direct evidence. This Court in the case of Long v. Long, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034, 1036, said: Of course, it is elementary that all evidence tending to support a jury's finding must be accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and if it can reasonably be supposed that the minds of reasonable men of ordinary intelligence might differ, either as to the weight to be given to the testimony, or to the deductions to be drawn therefrom, it is the duty of this Court to sustain the jury verdict. This Court should take into consideration another cardinal rule which must be put into play in determining the question of whether or not the circumstantial evidence produced in the mind of the jury a reasonable belief that undue influence was exercised. The rule I have in mind is that isolated pieces of evidence or circumstances cannot be used as a basis for a conclusion that such evidence does not prove that the beneficiaries (petitioners here) substituted their mind and will for the mind and will of the testator. One circumstance standing alone might be insufficient to show undue influence, but that is not the test. All circumstances shown by the evidence should be considered, and even though none of the circumstances standing alone would be sufficient to show undue influence, if when considered together they produce in the ordinary mind a reasonable belief that undue influence was exerted in the procurement of the will, they are sufficient to sustain such conclusion. Long v. Long, supra; Barksdale v. Dobbins, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 1035, 1038, 1039, writ refused. The Court in the case of Barksdale v. Dobbins, supra, said: In determining whether there is any evidence raising the issue of undue influence in this case, the Court should apply the rule that the testimony in its entirety must be considered in the light most favorable to respondents, disregarding any and all conflicts in such testimony, and indulging all inferences and intendments reasonably deducible from the evidence in favor of respondents and against petitioners. Turning to the record in this case I wish to relate some of the evidence. Mr. Pool was married one time. Mrs. Pool died in 1929. Sometime prior to 1929, they had executed mutual wills, and at her death all the property she possessed passed under the terms of the will to Mr. Pool. Mr. and Mrs. Pool were the parents of four children, Mrs. Boyer, Mrs. Blake, Ernest Pool and John Pool. The husband of Mrs. Boyer died in 1911. Mrs. Boyer then went to live with her father and mother and stayed there in the old home for approximately five years. She moved to Hamilton and in 1920 moved to Waco. In June, 1934, Mrs. Boyer returned to the old home and lived there with her father continuously until the date of his death in 1952. Mrs. Blake went to live in the home in 1945, and continued to live there until the death of Mr. Pool. *570 John Pool married in 1924. He and his wife lived in Hamilton County from 1924 to 1934. Their four children were born in Hamilton County. During their marriage, John bought the old Eidson place consisting of about 1,500 acres. They lost the place during the depression. After the loss of the Eidson place in 1930, John and his family moved to the old home place and lived with his father until March, 1934. Some of the respondents were born in the home of their grandfather; others on the "old Eidson place on the mountain nearby." Mrs. John Pool testified: John and his wife, Bessie, lived together as husband and wife for 23 years. They were divorced some two or three years before his death. After the divorce, John Pool returned to the old home and lived with his father from 1947 until his death in 1949. During this latter period, petitioners and John operated the farm together with other lands they rented from other persons. When John returned to the old home in 1947, he was possessed of some farm machinery and between $2,000 and $2,500 in cash. This represented his part of the property awarded him in the divorce decree. The inventory and appraisement of the John Pool estate listed no cash. It is significant that Jasper Pool, although he was the administrator of the John Pool estate, did not file a claim against the estate. However, the sisters filed claims for nearly the appraised value of the estate. While it is true that John worked the farm and helped increase the value of the Jasper Pool estate, the two sisters filed a claim for "waiting on John C. Pool from January 31 to February 25, 1949, at the rate of $10.00 per day being during the last sickness of said John Pool." The total claim was $260. This claim was allowed by the administrator. All this evidence points to the fact that these petitioners were using their old 89 year old father as a figurehead, so to speak. The majority opinion says that the evidence "indicates" a grasping nature. In my opinion, the evidence shows they were not only grasping in their nature, but they also got what they deliberately set out to get. They got all of John's individual estate as well as all his interest in the estate of his father and mother. Mrs. Bessie Blake presented and filed another claim for $514.05 against the John Pool estate and it was allowed in the sum of $514. (I don't know why the 5¢ was deducted.) The value of the estate was appraised at $862.50. Mrs. Blake is the petitioner who did not testify in the trial of this case. There is other evidence in the record which shows that Mr. Jasper Pool did not claim any debt against John Pool. Mrs. John Poole and all of the respondents testified that they had never heard of any debt until after the death of their father and that was the assertion of a debt by "Aunt Bessie." One of the boys testified: Louise Pool, one of the respondents, testified: Bessie Pool, mother of respondents, further testified: Such testimony, when considered in connection with the fact that Mr. Jasper Pool never claimed any debt, either by word or by act as administrator or otherwise than in the will, is affirmative proof that the statements in the will are without foundation in fact. Louise Pool testified that Aunt Bertie and Aunt Bessie brought up the old debt several times, but that her Grandfather did not mention the old debt at any time. The jury in effect answered this issue against the petitioners. The last will of Mr. Pool contains a bequest to Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake of $2,000 each, "because I think they deserve it." Mrs. Boyer testified that she claimed the money from the John Pool estate because "I think I am entitled to it." (Emphasis added). The will of John Pool mentions an "unfortunate business transaction". The petitioners were the only ones who constantly "brought up" an old debt as a result of the loss of the ranch and the goats. The petitioners did not mention this supposed old debt until after John's death. The will was executed only eight days after the death of John Pool and a few days after the petitioners broke up the conference between the grandfather and the children of John Pool. The petitioners exhibited a very hostile attitude towards the respondents and the mother, Bessie Pool. Billie Pool testified: Louise Pool testified to the following incident occurring on one of the visits: In this connection I quote from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals a statement of evidence that is in the record, as follows [268 S.W.2d 227]: The fact remains that Mrs. Jasper Pool died in 1929. Prior to her death, Mr. and Mrs. Pool had executed mutual wills. Upon her death the title to all property owned by her passed to Mr. Pool under the terms of the will. Mr. Pool lived for nearly 20 years without making a will which had the effect of disinheriting the grandchildren for whom, according to the evidence, he had the greatest love. I will say, too, that the separation of John and Bessie did not cause Mr. Pool to dislike Bessie. They continued their very cordial relations during the years. A conclusion could have easily been drawn by the jury that Mr. Pool had the fullest intention to provide for his grandchildren as well as the petitioners and their brother, Ernest. The evidence shows that the grandfather in order to talk to the grandchildren about their father's affairs and about what would happen to his property after his death, would have to take them away from the house and out of the presence of Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake. Another significant circumstance is the fact that John Pool stood by his father and returned to him to live and die. John was a veteran of World War I and was in the hospital at least on two different occasions for four to six months at a time and the government paid all expenses. Mr. Pool was not caused to pay one cent. The record is clear that had the petitioners promptly notified the grandchildren the same course would have been followed in the case of John's last illness. There was some reason the petitioners did not want these respondents around. The jury had the right to infer at least that petitioners were making every effort to obtain John's part of the property that he had helped accumulate. The grandchildren did not neglect their father and did not lose their love and respect for him. They visited their father and grandfather and the best family relationship existed until petitioners would intervene. It is significant that even though the petitioners called the mother of respondents vile names and threatened to kill her, these respondents, according to the record, never once abused the petitioners. The only thing they did was to take the gun away from one of the petitioners. Mr. Pool expressed great regret at this occurrence. He grieved to the extent that *573 he had to lie down. He wanted peace. He always told his grandchildren that they would be taken care of. Mrs. Boyer in her testimony referred to a conversation their grandfather had with these respondents about what they would get from the estate. Mrs. Boyer claimed that these grandchildren "had driven our Dad to his grave and would be glad we got our grandfather there." The record just doesn't support such charge and the jury found against petitioners. The disinheritance of these respondents is an unnatural act. There existed between this grandfather and these grandchildren, both before and after the signing of the will, that mutual bond of love and affection so often existing between a grandparent and grandchildren. Under the record in this case one would normally infer that the death of his son, John, would have strengthened the tie, but here we find the act of disinheritance on the eighth day following the death of John, the father of the respondents. The expressions of disinheritance contained in the last will of Mr. Pool run counter to the true relationship between Mr. Pool and his grandchildren. Getting back to the administration of the John Pool estate, I desire to make it clear that I do not contend there was collusion between Mr. Pool and the lady petitioners, but I am of the opinion that Mr. Pool was not fully aware of what was taking place, or that he was unable to withstand the demands of Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake. The same conclusion is inescapable with reference to the clause in Mr. Pool's will which reads: The fact that Mr. Pool went to the courthouse and requested persons to witness his will does not mean that he knew the contents of the will. I now consider the evidence concerning the extreme old age, general weakness and mental and physical infirmity which was offered so that the jury in this case could weigh his susceptibility to influence, and his power of resistance to such influence. In this connection it shall be my purpose to demonstrate from the evidence the unusual circumstances under which the will was prepared and executed. This development will include the complete silence of the attorney who prepared the will, and the failure of the petitioners to deny the testimony of respondents. The circumstances under which the will was signed demanded an explanation from the petitioners and their attorney. I cast no reflection upon the attorney. I infer from this record that he fully appreciated the sanctity of an oath and therefore remained silent. Be that as it may, when Mrs. Boyer testified that she did not "bring Mr. Pool to town" and that she learned later that a Mr. Edwards did so, but was not subpoened as a witness, although Mr. Edwards lived in the County, and when Mrs. Blake failed to testify, and when the attesting witnesses knew absolutely nothing about the preparation or contents of the will, and in view of all the testimony, circumstantially and otherwise, which cast a reasonable doubt as to the will expressing the true will and desire of Mr. Pool, the silence of the attorney spoke louder than words. We do not have a comparable situation to the case of Curry v. Curry, Tex., 270 S.W.2d 208, 212. In that case Mr. Curry, when asked to sign some papers, said: "`Hell no, I don't want to sign them, I would like to read them first.'" Here we have a man 89 years, 11 months and four days old running around the courthouse requesting people to sign his will. No one read it. They simply signed their names *574 as witnesses and testified that he was sound in mind in their opinion. Mrs. Boyer testified that from 1934 until his death in 1952, she took care of her father, cooked his meals and waited on him; that she did nursing duties "lots of times"; that one time he turned the car over; that she nursed him two weeks but did not charge him $10 per day like she did her brother John. The record shows that Mr. Pool died August 29, 1952, at the age of 93 years, four months and 28 days; that he died from "generalized arteriosclerosis", the immediate cause being chronic kidney condition resulting from such arteriosclerosis; that this is a progressive disease over a period of years, manifesting itself generally over the body and affecting the mind as well as the body; that the doctor removed a cancer from the face of Mr. Pool eight months before he died; Mr. Pool was treated by a doctor in February, 1948; September, 1948; October, 1948; April, 1949; September, 1950; October, 1950; December, 1950; February, 1951 and July, 1951. The doctors testified to the above facts. The majority quotes from the testimony of Dr. Nassour, but fails to quote the above testimony. The two doctors seem to have concentrated more on the question of mental incapacity than whether or not Mr. Pool was susceptible to undue influence. The trial court stated at one time in the course of the proceedings, and while one of the doctors was testifying: "We might observe here, gentlemen, that we are not trying this case on the theory that there was any mental incapacity. That is not raised by the pleadings. The only issue is that of undue influence and that only will be submitted to the jury." Dr. Nassour testified that he had known Mr. Pool about three years. He did not know of the family life. The sum and substance of his testimony is that Mr. Pool was of sound mind, except the last two or three days of his life. Dr. Kooken testified that he had known Mr. Pool fifteen or twenty years; that he did not know anything about his personal or family affairs; that he knew of no personal differences between him and his family. After testifying to the dates of examination of Mr. Pool, as stated above, the doctor further testified: The doctor testified that the daughters might have brought him (meaning to his office) but he usually came in the office by himself. Mr. Nettleton, a witness referred to in the majority opinion, testified: *575 As a matter of fact Mr. Pool's license was restricted. He was not completely blind but his vision was so bad that he was not allowed to drive a car on the highways. In regard to Mr. Pool's love for the grandchildren, Mr. Nettleton testified: One witness testified that "so far as him going to town he had to be brought to town." The petitioners claim that Jasper Pool attended to a great part of his business, and they cite the testimony of the witnesses, Dempster, Adams, Johnson, Rush and Nix. The witness Dempster did not testify to a single business transaction. The witness Adams testified that he paid his taxes, but that is the only business transaction that she could testify to. Nix did not testify to a single business transaction, other than Jasper Pool asked him to get him a driver's license. The witness Johnson testified to one business transaction during the three years prior to his death; that it was in regard to the sale of some cattle. Mr. Rush testified to only one item of business during the last three years of his life; that Mr. Pool came to his office to talk about an insurance policy; he talked for just a few minutes; Mr. Pool had no business; he had no cash when he died. There is no question but that Mr. Pool was of sound mind, but I believe the evidence of extreme old age, feebleness and senility and illness, rendered him susceptible to control, and that the jury verdict should be upheld. It requires less evidence in such a case as we have here than where the testator was a strong, vigorous person in full possession of all his mental faculties. See Brown v. Pridgen, 56 Tex. 124; Moore v. Horne, Tex.Civ.App., 136 S.W.2d 638, writ dismissed, judg. corr. This record shows that there is no reasonable basis for Mr. Pool, of his own volition, to disinherit his grandchildren. This Court said in the case of Curry v. Curry, supra: In that case this Court held in effect that no other probative circumstances existed because we said: "We are left, then, with this question: Will the sole fact that the defendant selected, advised and paid the attorney who prepared the deed support the legal conclusion that the deed was a product of undue influence? We hold that it will not." The majority quotes from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals wherein it is stated that both parties assumed in their briefs that the will of Jasper Pool was prepared by one of the attorneys for petitioners. In regard to this situation, I agree with the Court of Civil Appeals in its conclusion that In 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 156, p. 847 it is said: I admit that the burden of proof was with the contestants to prove undue influence. But this is not a question of burden of proof. Since the jury could conclude that Mr. Pool did not read the will, and since the attorney admits that he drew the will and did not in the face of the proof that the will was not read, and since such matters were peculiarly within the knowledge of the attorney, who participated in the trial of this case, it was not the burden of respondents to call the attorney as a witness. As said in the case of Craycroft v. Crawford, Tex.Com.App., 285 S.W. 275, 282, "Silence, under the conditions disclosed, in our opinion, had some probative force as pointing to undue influence for a source of the will * * * and as strengthening the unfavorable inferences which the jury may have drawn from the other facts and circumstances." Under all the circumstances in this case, the extreme old age, infirmity and weakness of Mr. Pool; the dependency of Mr. Pool on Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake for social comfort and peace of mind; the actions of the two petitioners; the conceded opportunity of the two ladies to exercise undue influence on account of their conceded relationship; their demonstrated ability to substitute their own will for the free agency of their father in that throughout they claimed a debt, owed by brother, John, that did not exist, and the fact they had intimate knowledge of Mr. Pool's affairs even to the extent of discussing with their father in 1945 the fact that he had not made a will since the death of their mother, and in that same conversation his statement about making a will, but did not make until 1949, eight days after the death of John; and the further fact, under all the circumstances, that the will was unjust, unreasonable and unnatural in its terms; and the fact of the silence of Mrs. Blake and Mrs. Boyer and their attorney regarding matters peculiarly within their knowledge, *577 and the grasping natures of Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake and their hostility toward the respondents, I am of the opinion that such constitutes some evidence of undue influence of sufficient probative force to raise the issue and required the trial court to submit such issue to the jury. See Long v. Long, supra; Barksdale v. Dobbins, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 1035, writ refused; Venner v. Layton, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W.2d 852, ref. n.r.e.; Moore v. Horne, supra; Scott v. Townsend, supra; Olds v. Traylor, Tex.Civ.App., 180 S.W.2d 511, writ refused; Goodloe v. Goodloe, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 493, 105 S.W. 533, writ refused. I respectfully disagree with the majority in its effort to distinguish the case of Barksdale v. Dobbins, supra. The majority admits that the case is "very like the case at bar." (Emphasis added.) The authorities recognize that no two cases are alike. Long v. Long, supra. While it is not necessary to show that the two cases are exactly alike, the cases are so strikingly similar, as I view them, that I feel it would be helpful to compare the facts in that case with the facts here. In that case the jury found that the will was procured through undue influence. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict denying probate of the will. The appeal was upon the ground of "insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury finding." The majority opinion puts emphasis on the fact that the testator offered an explanation for leaving out his grandchildren while in the Barksdale case the testator did not. I have answered this by pointing out that the evidence shows that the so-called debt did not exist. The claimed debt existed only in the minds of Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake. The jury could not, in my opinion, have answered the special issue in the affirmative if it had believed Mr. Pool claimed a debt. The jury had the right to believe that the claimed debt was never in the mind of Jasper Pool. Since Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake did not mention the matter of John's indebtedness until after John's death, and since Mrs. Boyer and Mrs. Blake were so familiar with their father's and John's affairs, and since the two had talked with their father in 1945 about his will (which was before John Pool had returned to the home of his father), and the will was executed immediately after John's death, it would appear that his death removed the last obstacle to the execution of the will desired by the two daughters, petitioners here. The trial court granted a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto in the present case. I contend that such action was erroneous. As this Court said in the case of Burt v. Lochausen, 151 Tex. 289, 249 S.W.2d 194: (a) In order "to sustain the action of the trial court in granting judgment non obstante veredicto, it must be determined that there is no evidence having probative force upon which the jury could have made the findings relied upon", and (b) "it was the jury's province to weigh all the evidence, to decide what credence should be given to the whole or to any part of the testimony of each witness." It is my considered opinion that the will involved in this case should not be admitted to probate. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be affirmed. BREWSTER, J., joins in this opinion.