Title: Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S185544
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 2012

1 
Filed 12/27/12 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S185544 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C060413 
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL  
) 
WORKERS UNION LOCAL 8, 
)  
Sacramento County 
 
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. 34-2008- 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
)  
00008682-CU-OR-GDS 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A supermarket owner sought a court injunction to prevent a labor union 
from picketing on the privately owned walkway in front of the only customer 
entrance to its store.  In response, the union argued that two statutory provisions 
— Code of Civil Procedure section 527.3 (the Moscone Act) and Labor Code 
section 1138.1 (section 1138.1) — prohibited issuance of an injunction under 
these circumstances.  The trial court denied relief, ruling that the supermarket 
owner had failed to satisfy section 1138.1‘s requirements for obtaining an 
injunction against labor picketing. 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  It held that the walkway fronting the 
supermarket‘s entrance was not a public forum under the California Constitution‘s 
provision protecting liberty of speech (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a)), and 
therefore the store owner could regulate speech in that area.  It further held that 
both the Moscone Act and section 1138.1, because they give speech regarding a 
labor dispute greater protection than speech on other subjects, violate the free  
 
 
2 
speech guarantee of the federal Constitution‘s First Amendment and the equal 
protection guarantee of the federal Constitution‘s Fourteenth Amendment.  This 
court granted the union‘s petition for review. 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the supermarket‘s privately owned 
entrance area is not a public forum under the California Constitution‘s liberty of 
speech provision.  For this reason, a union‘s picketing activities in such a location 
do not have state constitutional protection.  Those picketing activities do have 
statutory protection, however, under the Moscone Act and section 1138.1.  We do 
not agree with the Court of Appeal that the Moscone Act and section 1138.1, 
which are components of a state statutory system for regulating labor relations, 
and which are modeled on federal law, run afoul of the federal constitutional 
prohibition on content discrimination in speech regulations.  On this basis, we 
reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment and remand the matter for further 
proceedings. 
I.  FACTS 
Plaintiff Ralphs Grocery Company (Ralphs) owns and operates warehouse 
grocery stores under the name ―Foods Co.‖  One such store is located in a retail 
development in Sacramento called College Square, which also contains restaurants 
and other stores.  The College Square Foods Co store has only one entrance for 
customers.  A paved walkway around 15 feet wide extends outward from the 
building‘s south side, where the customer entrance is located, to a driving lane that 
separates the walkway from the store‘s parking lot, which also serves customers of 
other retail establishments within College Square. 
When the College Square Foods Co store opened in July 2007, agents of 
defendant United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (the Union) 
began picketing the store, encouraging people not to shop there because the store‘s 
employees were not represented by a union and did not have a collective 
 
3 
bargaining agreement.  The Union‘s agents, in numbers varying between four and 
eight, walked back and forth on the entrance walkway carrying picket signs, 
speaking to customers, and handing out flyers.  These activities generally occurred 
five days a week (Wednesday through Sunday) for eight hours a day.  The Union‘s 
agents did not impede customer access to the store.   
In January 2008, Ralphs notified the Union in writing of its regulations for 
speech at its Foods Co stores, including the one in College Square.  Those store 
regulations prohibit speech activities within 20 feet of the store‘s entrance and 
prohibit all such activities during specified hours and for a week before certain 
designated holidays.  The store regulations also prohibit physical contact with any 
person, the distribution of literature, and the display of any sign larger than two 
feet by three feet.  The Union‘s agents did not adhere to Ralphs‘s speech 
regulations.  In particular, they handed out flyers and stood within five feet of the 
store‘s entrance.  Ralphs asked the Sacramento Police Department to remove the 
Union‘s agents from the College Square Foods Co store, but the police declined to 
do so without a court order. 
In April 2008, Ralphs filed a complaint in Sacramento County Superior 
Court alleging that the Union‘s agents, by using the walkway fronting the College 
Square Foods Co store as a forum for expressive activity without complying with 
Ralphs‘s speech regulations, were trespassing on its property.  Among other forms 
of relief, Ralphs sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, 
and a permanent injunction barring the Union‘s agents from using the College 
Square Foods Co store property to express their views without complying with 
Ralphs‘s regulations prohibiting certain speech activities on its property. 
Although the trial court denied Ralphs‘s request for a temporary restraining 
order, it issued an order to show cause and set an evidentiary hearing on the 
application for a preliminary injunction.  In response, the Union argued that the 
 
4 
Moscone Act, as construed by this court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego 
County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1979) 25 Cal.3d 317 (Sears), barred the court 
from enjoining peaceful picketing on a privately owned walkway in front of a 
retail store entrance during a labor dispute, and that Ralphs was not able to satisfy 
section 1138.1‘s procedural requirements for injunctions against union picketing. 
On May 28, 2008, the trial court ruled that the Moscone Act violates the 
federal Constitution‘s First and Fourteenth Amendments because it favors labor 
speech over speech on other subjects.  In reaching that conclusion, the trial court 
found persuasive the reasoning of the federal Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Waremart Foods v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 2004) 354 F.3d 870 
(Waremart/N.L.R.B.).  Regarding section 1138.1, the trial court said it would have 
found that statute to be unconstitutional as well had it not considered itself bound 
by a California Court of Appeal‘s decision, Waremart Foods v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 145 (Waremart/United Food), 
which held that section 1138.1 does not violate the federal or state constitutional 
equal protection guarantees.  (Waremart/United Food was decided by the Third 
District Court of Appeal, which also decided this case.)  The trial court ordered 
that an evidentiary hearing be held under section 1138.1 to determine whether 
Ralphs was entitled to the requested injunctive relief. 
After conducting the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Ralphs‘s 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  The court found that Ralphs had ―failed to 
introduce evidence sufficient to carry its burden on any of the factors enumerated 
in section 1138.1.‖  In particular, the court found that ―[t]he evidence did not 
establish that the Union had committed any unlawful act, or that it had threatened 
to do so,‖ or ―that anything the [Union picketers were] doing would cause any 
‗substantial and irreparable injury‘ to the store property, or that public officers 
were unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection to plaintiff‘s property.‖  
 
5 
The court also found that Ralphs had ―failed to carry its burden of proof that its 
rules are reasonable time, place and manner restrictions within the guidelines of 
Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850.‖  Ralphs appealed. 
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court 
with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction.  The Court of Appeal stated 
that ―the entrance area and apron‖ of the Foods Co store ―were not designed and 
presented to the public as public meeting places,‖ and therefore did not constitute 
a public forum under the state Constitution‘s liberty of speech provision.  Because 
these areas did not constitute a public forum, the court concluded, Ralphs ―could 
limit the speech allowed and could exclude anyone desiring to engage in 
prohibited speech.‖  The Court of Appeal also concluded that both the Moscone 
Act and section 1138.1, because they give speech about labor disputes greater 
protection than speech on other issues, violate the federal Constitution‘s First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, as to section 
1138.1, it had reached a contrary result in Waremart/United Food, supra, 87 
Cal.App.4th 145, but it said it had there ―applied the rational relationship test 
because the plaintiff made no argument and presented no authority to apply the 
strict scrutiny test.‖ 
This court granted the Union‘s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Public Forum Under the State Constitution 
The California Constitution states:  ―Every person may freely speak, write 
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
this right.  A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.‖  (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a).)  It also guarantees the rights to ―petition government 
for redress of grievances‖ and to ―assemble freely to consult for the common 
 
6 
good.‖  (Id., art. I, § 3, subd. (a).)  Through these provisions, this court has held, 
our state Constitution protects speech in privately owned shopping centers.  
(Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 910 (Pruneyard).)  
A privately owned shopping center may constitute a public forum under the state 
Constitution because of ―the growing importance of the shopping center‖ 
(Pruneyard, at p. 907) ― ‗as a place for large groups of citizens to congregate‘ ‖ 
and ―to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered‖ there, and also because 
of ― ‗ ―the public character of the shopping center,‖ ‘ ‖ which is a result of the 
shopping center‘s owner having ― ‗ ―fully opened his property to the public‖ ‘ ‖ 
(id. at p. 910 & fn. 5).   
This court in Pruneyard stressed that ―those who wish to disseminate 
ideas‖ in shopping centers do not ―have free rein.‖  (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 
at p. 910.)  Pruneyard approvingly quoted the following remarks made by Justice 
Mosk in an earlier case:  ― ‗It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under 
consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the 
proprietor of a modest retail establishment.  As a result of advertising and the lure 
of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to 
take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there].  
A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing 
handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by 
defendant [shopping center] to assure that these activities do not interfere with 
normal business operations [citation] would not markedly dilute defendant‘s 
property rights.‘ ‖  (Pruneyard, at pp. 910-911, quoting Diamond v. Bland (1974) 
11 Cal.3d 331, 345 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) 
Our reasoning in Pruneyard determines the scope of that decision‘s 
application.  That reasoning is most apt in regard to shopping centers‘ common 
areas, which generally have seating and other amenities producing a congenial 
 
7 
environment that encourages passing shoppers to stop and linger, to leisurely 
congregate for purposes of relaxation and conversation.  By contrast, areas 
immediately adjacent to the entrances of individual stores typically lack seating 
and are not designed to promote relaxation and socializing.  Instead, those areas 
serve utilitarian purposes of facilitating customers‘ entrance to and exit from the 
stores and also, from the stores‘ perspective, advertising the goods and services 
available within.  Soliciting signatures on initiative petitions, distributing 
handbills, and similar expressive activities pose a significantly greater risk of 
interfering with normal business operations when those activities are conducted in 
close proximity to the entrances and exits of individual stores rather than in the 
less heavily trafficked and more congenial common areas.  Therefore, within a 
shopping center or mall, the areas outside individual stores‘ customer entrances 
and exits, at least as typically configured and furnished, are not public forums 
under this court‘s decision in Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899. 
Our conclusion is consistent with decisions by California‘s intermediate 
appellate courts.  We consider here, as examples, the decisions in Albertson’s, Inc. 
v. Young (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 106 (Albertson’s) and in Van v. Target Corp. 
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1375 (Van). 
Albertson’s concerned a supermarket in a Nevada County shopping center 
called Fowler Center, between Grass Valley and Nevada City.  (Albertson’s, 
supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 106, 110.)  The supermarket‘s owner sued six individuals 
who, for the purpose of gathering signatures on voter initiative petitions, had 
stationed themselves on the walkway immediately outside the supermarket‘s 
entrances.  The supermarket owner sought injunctive and declaratory relief to stop 
this expressive activity.  The trial court granted an injunction barring the 
defendants from coming onto the store‘s premises to solicit signatures on initiative 
petitions.  (Id. at p. 109.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that under the 
 
8 
state Constitution the walkway in front of the supermarket entrance was not a 
public forum.  (Id. at p. 110.)  It remarked that the grocery store ―does not invite 
the public to meet friends, to eat, to rest, to congregate, or to be entertained at its 
premises‖ (id. at p. 120), nor was the store or its entrance area ―a place where 
people choose to come and meet and talk and spend time‖ (id. at p. 121).   
In Van, two individuals brought class action lawsuits against Target 
Corporation, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., alleging that 
the defendant store owners had unlawfully prevented them from gathering 
signatures in front of their stores, many of which were in shopping centers.  (Van, 
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1378-1379.)  The plaintiffs sued as representatives 
of ―a class of individuals who gather voter signatures for initiatives, referenda and 
recalls and register voters for upcoming elections.‖  (Id. at p. 1379.)  They sought 
damages as well as declaratory, equitable, and injunctive relief.  (Ibid.)  The trial 
court denied relief, concluding that the areas in front of the entrances to individual 
stores located within shopping centers are not public forums for purposes of the 
state Constitution‘s liberty of speech provision.  (Id. at p. 1381.) 
The Court of Appeal in Van affirmed.  It concluded that ―neither 
respondents‘ stores themselves nor the apron and perimeter areas of the stores 
were comprised of courtyards, plazas or other places designed to encourage 
patrons to spend time together or be entertained.‖  (Van, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1388-1389.)  The court added that ―the evidence showed that the stores are 
uniformly designed to encourage shopping as opposed to meeting friends, 
congregating or lingering.‖  (Id. at p. 1389.)  The court concluded that the entrance 
and exit areas of the stores in question, which were located within shopping 
centers, ―lacked any public forum attributes.‖  (Id. at p. 1391.) 
We agree with these intermediate appellate decisions that to be a public 
forum under our state Constitution‘s liberty-of-speech provision, an area within a 
 
9 
shopping center must be designed and furnished in a way that induces shoppers to 
congregate for purposes of entertainment, relaxation, or conversation, and not 
merely to walk to or from a parking area, or to walk from one store to another, or 
to view a store‘s merchandise and advertising displays. 
That conclusion does not dispose of this case, however.  We consider next 
the extent to which state labor law, and particularly the Moscone Act and section 
1138.1, protect labor speech on private land in front of a business that is the 
subject of a labor dispute. 
B.  California’s Moscone Act and Section 1138.1 
First, we review the language of those statutes.  Next, we consider the 
extent to which they apply to labor picketing on private property in front of 
doorways used by customers to enter and exit a retail store.  Finally, we review the 
Court of Appeal‘s conclusion here that, because they give speech regarding labor 
disputes greater protection than speech on other topics, the Moscone Act and 
section 1138.1 violate the federal Constitution‘s First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  As we explain, we disagree with the Court of Appeal on that point. 
1.  The Moscone Act 
The California Legislature enacted the Moscone Act in 1975.  (Stats. 1975, 
ch. 1156, § 2, p. 2845.)  It was patterned after section 104 of title 29 of the United 
States Code, a federal statute that is part of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-115), which the United States Congress enacted in 1932.  The stated 
purpose of California‘s Moscone Act is ―to promote the rights of workers to 
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, picketing or 
other mutual aid or protection, and to prevent the evils which frequently occur 
when courts interfere with the normal process of dispute resolution between 
employers and recognized employee organizations.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, 
 
10 
subd. (a).)  It provides that certain activities undertaken during a labor dispute are 
legal and cannot be enjoined.  (Id., § 527.3, subd. (b).)  Those activities are: 
―(1) Giving publicity to, and obtaining or communicating information 
regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by 
advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any place where any person 
or persons may lawfully be, or by any other method not involving fraud, violence 
or breach of the peace. 
―(2) Peaceful picketing or patrolling involving any labor dispute, whether 
engaged in singly or in numbers. 
―(3) Assembling peaceably to do any of the acts specified in paragraphs (1) 
and (2) or to promote lawful interests.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (b).) 
Expressly excluded from the Moscone Act‘s protection, however, is 
―conduct that is unlawful including breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, the 
unlawful blocking of access or egress to premises where a labor dispute exists, or 
other similar unlawful activity.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (e).) 
2.  Section 1138.1 
Enacted by the California Legislature in 1999 (Stats. 1999, ch. 616, § 1, 
pp. 4343-4345), section 1138.1 was patterned after section 107 of title 29 of the 
United States Code; the federal provision is part of the federal Norris-LaGuardia 
Act.  Section 1138.1 prohibits a court from issuing an injunction during a labor 
dispute unless, based upon witness testimony that is given in open court and is 
subject to cross-examination, the court finds each of these facts: 
―(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless 
restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no 
injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat 
or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association, or 
 
11 
organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually 
authoriz[ing] those acts. 
―(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant‘s property will 
follow. 
―(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted 
upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by 
the granting of relief. 
―(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law. 
―(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant‘s 
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.‖  (§ 1138.1, subd. 
(a).) 
3.  Application to labor picketing at retail store entrances 
As mentioned earlier (see pp. 10-11, ante), the Moscone Act declares that 
certain specified activities during a labor dispute are legal and cannot be enjoined.  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (b).)  Among those activities are ―patrolling any 
public street or any place where any person or persons may lawfully be‖ (id., 
subd. (b)(1), italics added) and ―[p]eaceful picketing or patrolling‖ (id., subd. 
(b)(2)).  Our 1979 decision in Sears, supra, 25 Cal.3d 317, considered whether 
these provisions covered picketing on a privately owned walkway in front of a 
store‘s customer entrance, thereby exempting peaceful labor picketing of a 
targeted business from the laws of trespass.  Before discussing our resolution of 
that issue in Sears, however, it will be useful to review some of this court‘s earlier 
decisions. 
Since at least 1964, when this court decided Schwartz-Torrance Investment 
Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union (1964) 61 Cal.2d 766 
(Schwartz-Torrance), California law has protected the right to engage in labor 
 
12 
speech — including picketing, distributing handbills, and other speech activities 
— on private land in front of a business that is the subject of a labor dispute.  
In Schwartz-Torrance, this court considered whether the owner of a 
shopping center was entitled to an injunction barring peaceful union picketing in 
front of a bakery located in the shopping center.  We recognized that under 
California law a labor union has a right to engage in peaceful picketing on a 
private sidewalk in front of the business being targeted.  Although our opinion 
noted that labor picketing is a form of speech and cited decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court construing the freedom of speech guarantee of the federal 
Constitution‘s First Amendment (Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 769-
771), our holding ultimately was based not on federal constitutional law but on an 
analysis grounded in California labor law. 
In Schwartz-Torrance, we began by characterizing the issue presented as 
―one of accommodating conflicting interests:  plaintiff‘s assertion of its right to the 
exclusive use of the shopping center premises to which the public in general has 
been invited as against the union‘s right of communication of its position which, it 
asserts, rests upon public policy and constitutional protection.‖  (Schwartz-
Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 768.)  Considering first the union‘s interest, we 
stated that ―[p]icketing by a labor union constitutes an integral component of the 
process of collective bargaining . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 768.)  Citing Labor Code section 
923, we stated that ―[t]he Legislature has expressly declared that the public policy 
of California favors concerted activities of employees for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.‖  (Schwartz-Torrance, at p. 769.)  
Citing Penal Code section 552.1, we added that ―the Legislature has enacted this 
policy into an exception to the criminal trespass law.‖  (Schwartz-Torrance, at 
p. 769.)  Thus, we concluded, ― ‗the Legislature in dealing with trespasses . . . has 
specifically subordinated the rights of the property owner to those of persons 
 
13 
engaging in lawful labor activities.‘ ‖  (Ibid., quoting In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 
666, 668.)  ―Nor is the union‘s interest in picketing diminished,‖ we added, 
―because it may communicate its message at other, admittedly less advantageous, 
locations off plaintiff‘s premises.‖  (Schwartz-Torrance, at p. 770.) 
Turning to the property owner‘s interest, we said in Schwartz-Torrance that 
it ―emanates from the exclusive possession and enjoyment of private property.‖  
(Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 771.)  For land being used as a 
shopping center, however, the impairment of that interest resulting from peaceful 
labor picketing, was ―largely theoretical‖ in view of the ―public character of the 
shopping center.‖  (Ibid.)  Quoting the United States Supreme Court, we said:  
― ‗The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the 
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory 
and constitutional rights of those who use it.‘ ‖  (Ibid., quoting Marsh v. Alabama 
(1946) 326 U.S. 501, 506.)  Thus, the plaintiff property owner ―suffers no 
significant harm in the deprivation of absolute power to prohibit peaceful 
picketing upon property to which it has invited the entire public.‖  (Schwartz-
Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 771.)  We concluded in Schwartz-Torrance that 
the defendant union‘s interest in communicating its message through peaceful 
picketing outweighed the plaintiff shopping center owner‘s interest in preventing a 
―theoretical invasion of its right to exclusive control and possession of private 
property.‖  (Id. at p. 772.) 
After reviewing sister-state decisions cited by the parties in Schwartz-
Torrance, we summarized our holding in these terms:  ―[T]he picketing in the 
present case cannot be adjudged in the terms of absolute property rights; it must be 
considered as part of the law of labor relations, and a balance cast between the 
opposing interests of the union and the lessor of the shopping center.  The 
prohibition of the picketing would in substance deprive the union of the 
 
14 
opportunity to conduct its picketing at the most effective point of persuasion:  the 
place of the involved business.  The interest of the union thus rests upon the solid 
substance of public policy and constitutional right; the interest of the plaintiff lies 
in the shadow cast by a property right worn thin by public usage.‖  (Schwartz-
Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 774-775.) 
Five years later, we again considered issues concerning labor picketing on 
private property in front of a retail store‘s entrance in In re Lane (1969) 71 Cal.2d 
872 (Lane).  There, a labor union officer was convicted of two misdemeanor 
offenses for continuing to distribute handbills on a privately owned sidewalk in 
front of customer entrances to a supermarket after the store‘s owner insisted that 
he leave.  (Id. at pp. 872-874.)  The handbills urged customers not to patronize the 
supermarket because it advertised in newspapers owned by an individual with 
whom the union was engaged in a labor dispute.  (Id. at p. 873.)  On the union 
officer‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we granted relief, ordering that he be 
discharged from custody.  (Id. at p. 879.) 
Lane rested on our decision in Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766, 
and on the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Amalgamated Food Emp. 
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza (1968) 391 U.S. 308 (Logan Valley), 
which held that the freedom of speech guarantee of the federal Constitution‘s First 
Amendment protected peaceful labor picketing of a business that was located in a 
shopping center and employed nonunion workers.  (Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d at 
pp. 874-878.)  Concluding that Schwartz-Torrance and Logan Valley were 
consistent with each other, we stated in Lane:  ―In essence they hold that when a 
business establishment invites the public generally to patronize its store and in 
doing so to traverse a sidewalk opened for access by the public[,] the fact of 
private ownership of the sidewalk does not operate to strip the members of the 
public of their rights to exercise First Amendment privileges on the sidewalk at or 
 
15 
near the place of entry to the establishment.‖  (Lane, at p. 878.)  Although the 
supermarket in Lane was not located in a shopping center, we did not attach any 
significance to that fact. 
Three years later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972) 407 U.S. 551 (Tanner), 
the United States Supreme Court modified its view of the federal Constitution‘s 
protection for free speech activities on private property, holding that a privately 
owned shopping center could prohibit the distribution of handbills expressing 
political views unrelated to the business of the center.  The high court in Tanner 
distinguished its earlier decision in Logan Valley, supra, 391 U.S. 308, on the 
ground that the latter involved labor speech that was related to one of the 
businesses located in the shopping center.  (Tanner, at p. 563.)  Thereafter, in a 
case applying the high court‘s decision in Tanner, we noted that our decisions in 
Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766, and in Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d 872, were 
likewise distinguishable from Tanner as involving labor picketing of businesses 
with which the unions had a labor dispute.  (Diamond v. Bland, supra, 11 Cal.3d 
331, 334, fn. 3.) 
Four years after its 1972 decision in Tanner, supra, 407 U.S. 551, the 
United States Supreme Court extended the holding of that case to encompass 
labor-related speech, overruling its 1968 decision in Logan Valley, supra, 391 U.S. 
308.  (Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 507.)  Thus, the free speech guarantee of 
the federal Constitution‘s First Amendment, as currently construed by the nation‘s 
high court, does not extend to speech activities on privately owned sidewalks in 
front of the entrances to stores, whether or not those stores are located in shopping 
centers and whether or not the speech pertains to a labor dispute. 
In 1979, this court again considered the subject of labor speech on private 
property in a case involving a trial court‘s injunction prohibiting union picketing 
―on the privately owned sidewalks surrounding the Sears Chula Vista store even 
 
16 
though the picketing was peaceful and did not interfere with access to the store.‖  
(Sears, supra, 25 Cal.3d 317, 321 (plur. opn. of Tobriner, J.).)  In overturning the 
injunction, the three-justice lead opinion relied on California‘s Moscone Act.  The 
Sears plurality stated:  ―Although the reach of the Moscone Act may in some 
respects be unclear, its language leaves no doubt but that the Legislature intended 
to insulate from the court‘s injunctive power all union activity which, under prior 
California decisions, has been declared to be ‗lawful activity.‘ ‖  (Sears, at p. 323 
(plur. opn. of Tobriner, J.), italics omitted.) 
The plurality in Sears stated that the language of the Moscone Act‘s 
subdivision (b), ―although broad and sweeping in scope and purpose, leaves some 
doubt respecting its application to the present context.‖  (Sears, supra, 25 Cal.3d 
at p. 324 (plur. opn. of Tobriner, J.).)  That doubt centered on the provision 
declaring to be legal, and not subject to injunctive relief, the patrolling of ―any 
place where any person or persons may lawfully be.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, 
subd. (b)(2).)  The plurality found guidance in ―the concluding clause of [the 
Moscone Act‘s] subdivision (a),‖ providing that ― ‗the provisions of subdivision 
(b) . . . shall be strictly construed in accordance with existing law governing labor 
disputes with the purpose of avoiding any unnecessary judicial interference in 
labor disputes.‘ ‖  (Sears, at p. 325 (plur. opn. of Tobriner, J.), quoting Code Civ. 
Proc., § 527.3, subd. (a).)  This ―existing law governing labor disputes,‖ the Sears 
plurality explained, encompassed Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766, and 
Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d 872, decisions that had ―not been overruled or eroded in 
later cases‖ and that ―established the legality of union picketing on private 
sidewalks outside a store as a matter of state labor law.‖  (Sears, at p. 328 (plur. 
opn. of Tobriner, J.).) 
The Sears plurality then explained its conclusion about the proper 
construction of the Moscone Act:  ―As we noted earlier, subdivision (a) of the 
 
17 
Moscone Act requires the anti-injunction provisions of subdivision (b) to ‗be 
strictly construed in accordance with existing law governing labor disputes with 
the purpose of avoiding any unnecessary judicial interference in labor disputes.‘ ‖  
(Sears, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 329 (plur. opn. of Tobriner, J.).)  Construing 
subdivision (b) in accord with the holdings of Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 
Cal.2d 766, and Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d 872, which had established both ―the 
legality of peaceful picketing on private walkways outside a store‖ and ―the lack 
of necessity of judicial interference to protect any substantial right of the 
landowner,‖ the Sears plurality concluded that the Moscone Act‘s subdivision (b) 
―bars the injunction issued in the instant case.‖  (Sears, at p. 329 (plur. opn. of 
Tobriner, J.).)1 
4.  Validity under the federal Constitution 
In concluding that our state law‘s Moscone Act and section 1138.1 violate 
the federal Constitution, the Court of Appeal here relied on two United States 
Supreme Court decisions, Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley (1972) 408 
U.S. 92 (Mosley) and Carey v. Brown (1980) 447 U.S. 455 (Carey).  Those 
decisions are distinguishable, however, as both involved laws that restricted 
speech in a public forum; by contrast, neither the Moscone Act nor section 1138.1 
                                              
1  
In Sears, Justice Newman authored a separate opinion consisting of just 
two sentences:  ―I agree that the injunction order should be reversed, and I concur 
in nearly all of Justice Tobriner‘s reasoning.  He detects in the Moscone Act, 
however, certain ambiguities that to me do not seem to be confounding; and, 
unlike him, I do not believe that ‗the Legislature . . . intended the courts to 
continue to follow [all] principles of California labor law extant at the time of the 
enactment of section 527.3.‘  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 330.)‖  (Sears, supra, 25 
Cal.3d at p. 333 (conc. opn. of Newman, J.).)  Thus, in Sears Justice Newman 
apparently agreed with the plurality that under the Moscone Act, a labor union‘s 
peaceful picketing on a private sidewalk outside the entrance of a business that is 
the subject of a labor dispute is legal and may not be enjoined. 
 
18 
restricts speech, and the speech at issue here occurred on private property that is 
not a public forum for purposes of the federal Constitution‘s free speech guarantee 
(Hudgens v. NLRB, supra, 424 U.S. 507; Tanner, supra, 407 U.S. 551). 
In Mosley, a Chicago ordinance prohibited picketing ― ‗on a public way‘ ‖ 
near a primary or secondary school, while the school was in session, but the 
ordinance permitted peaceful picketing regarding a labor dispute at the school.  
(Mosley, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 92-93.)  The United States Supreme Court 
concluded that the ordinance violated the federal Constitution‘s equal protection 
guarantee.  Stating that ―the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or 
its content‖ (Mosley, at p. 95, italics added), the high court concluded that 
―[s]elective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, 
and may not be justified by reference to content alone‖ (id. at p. 96, italics added). 
In Carey, an Illinois statute made it illegal ― ‗to picket before or about the 
residence or dwelling of any person,‘ ‖ with an exception for ― ‗peaceful picketing 
of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute.‘ ‖  (Carey, supra, 447 U.S. 
at p. 457.)  Stating that ―in prohibiting peaceful picketing on the public streets and 
sidewalks in residential neighborhoods, the Illinois statute regulates expressive 
conduct that falls within the First Amendment‘s preserve‖ (Cary, at p. 460, italics 
added), the United States Supreme Court held the statute to be ―constitutionally 
indistinguishable from the ordinance invalidated in Mosley‖ (ibid).  The Illinois 
statute‘s constitutional flaw, the high court explained, was that it ―discriminate[d] 
between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of the 
demonstrator‘s communication‖ (ibid.). 
The effect of the high court‘s decisions in Mosley and Carey was to 
invalidate the challenged state and municipal laws, thus removing the general 
prohibition on picketing near schools in Mosley and the general prohibition on 
 
19 
picketing in residential neighborhoods in Carey.  (Mosley, supra, 408 U.S. at 
p. 94; Carey, supra, 447 U.S. at pp. 458-459; see Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Assn. (1983) 460 U.S. 37, 54 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.) [―In Mosley and 
Carey, we struck down prohibitions on peaceful picketing in a public forum.‖].)  
By contrast, invalidating here the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 would not 
remove any restrictions on speech or enhance any opportunities for peaceful 
picketing or protest anywhere, including the privately owned walkway in front of 
the customer entrance to the College Square Foods Co store.  This is because 
neither the Moscone Act nor section 1138.1 abridges speech. 
The high court‘s decisions in Mosley and Carey both involved speech on 
public streets and sidewalks, which are public forums under the federal 
Constitution‘s First Amendment.  Privately owned walkways in front of retail 
stores, by contrast, are not First Amendment public forums.  (Hudgens v. NLRB, 
supra, 424 U.S. 507, 520-521; Tanner, supra, 407 U.S. 551, 570.)  As the United 
States Supreme Court has said:  ―The key to [Mosley and Carey] was the presence 
of a public forum.‖  (Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., supra, 460 
U.S. at p. 55, fn. omitted.)  Because here the walkway in front of the College 
Square Foods Co store is not a First Amendment public forum, the holdings in 
Mosley and Carey do not apply. 
As further support for its conclusion that California‘s Moscone Act and 
section 1138.1 violate the federal Constitution‘s First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the Court of Appeal here cited the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Waremart/N.L.R.B., 
supra, 354 F.3d 870.  At issue there was a ruling by the National Labor Relations 
Board that a California supermarket‘s owner had violated the National Labor 
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)) when it prohibited union agents from 
distributing handbills to supermarket customers in the store‘s privately owned 
 
20 
parking lot.  In making that ruling, the board had concluded that under California 
law the supermarket owner did not have a right to exclude union representatives 
from its property.  (Waremart/N.L.R.B., at p. 872.)  The board‘s conclusion was 
based in part on our state‘s Moscone Act, as construed by this court in Sears, 
supra, 25 Cal.3d 317.  The federal appellate court disagreed with the board, 
holding that ―the union organizers had no right under California law to engage in 
handbilling on the privately-owned parking lot of WinCo‘s grocery store.‖  
(Waremart/N.L.R.B., at p. 876.)  Regarding the Moscone Act, the federal appellate 
court concluded, citing the United States Supreme Court‘s decisions in Mosley, 
supra, 408 U.S. 92, and in Carey, supra, 447 U.S. 455, that the act ―violates the 
First Amendment to the Constitution‖ insofar as it extends greater protection to 
speech regarding a labor dispute than to speech on other subjects.  
(Waremart/N.L.R.B., at pp. 874-875.) 
The analysis of the federal appellate decision in Waremart/N.L.R.B., supra, 
354 F.3d 870, failed to recognize, however, that, as we explained earlier, neither 
the Moscone Act nor section 1138.1 of our state law restricts speech.  
Waremart/N.L.R.B.‘s analysis also failed to recognize that the United States 
Supreme Court‘s decisions in Mosley, supra, 408 U.S. 92, and Carey, supra, 447 
U.S. 455, both involved laws restricting speech in a public forum, as opposed to 
the situation here, involving laws that do not restrict speech and are being applied 
on privately owned property that is not a public forum under the First Amendment.  
For these reasons, we do not consider Waremart/N.L.R.B. persuasive on the issues 
we address here. 
As this court has recognized, the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court discussing speech regulations ―do not require literal or absolute content 
neutrality, but instead require only that the [content-based] regulation be ‗justified‘ 
by legitimate concerns that are unrelated to any ‗disagreement with the message‘ 
 
21 
conveyed by the speech.‖  (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los 
Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 368; accord, Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National 
Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 867; DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. 
Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 877.)  The state law under which employees and 
labor unions are entitled to picket on the privately owned area outside the entrance 
to a shopping center supermarket is justified by the state‘s interest in promoting 
collective bargaining to resolve labor disputes, the recognition that union picketing 
is a component of the collective bargaining process, and the understanding that the 
area outside the entrance of the targeted business often is ―the most effective point 
of persuasion‖ (Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766, 774).  These 
considerations are unrelated to disagreement with any message that may be 
conveyed by speech that is not related to a labor dispute with the targeted 
business. 
Moreover, California‘s Moscone Act and section 1138.1, insofar as they 
protect labor-related speech in the context of a statutory system of economic 
regulation of labor relations, are hardly unique.  As we have seen (pp. 9-10, ante), 
both provisions are based on the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act.  The federal 
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; NLRA) likewise provides 
content-based protections for labor-related speech in private workplaces.  Under 
one of the NLRA‘s provisions, it is unlawful for an employer to interfere with 
employees‘ rights to form or join a union (29 U.S.C. § 158, subd. (a)(1)), and this 
provision has long been construed to protect an employee‘s right to speak for or 
against a union on the employer‘s premises, even though the employer may 
prohibit solicitations on other topics (Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB (1945) 324 
U.S. 793).  The NLRA expressly protects the right of employers to speak on the 
topic of unionization by providing that ―[t]he expressing of any views, argument, 
or opinion, or the dissemination thereof . . . shall not constitute or be evidence of 
 
22 
an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or 
force or promise of benefit.‖  (29 U.S.C. § 158, subd. (c).) 
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court support the proposition that 
labor-related speech may be treated differently than speech on other topics.  The 
high court‘s decisions regarding the legality of secondary boycotts provide an 
example.  In the labor context, the high court has upheld the constitutionality of 
the NLRA‘s prohibitions on secondary picketing (NLRB v. Retail Store Employees 
Union (1980) 447 U.S. 607) and secondary boycotts (International 
Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Allied Intl., Inc. (1982) 456 U.S. 212).  When the high 
court later held that a secondary boycott by civil rights activists was 
constitutionally protected speech, it distinguished the NLRA cases on the ground 
that ―[s]econdary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as 
part of ‗Congress‘ striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of 
expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to 
remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife.‘ ‖  (NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 912, quoting NLRB v. Retail Store 
Employees Union, at pp. 617-618 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) 
In another decision, which held that the NLRA does not preempt state court 
jurisdiction to determine whether a particular dispute over labor picketing should 
be enjoined, the high court did not suggest that special protections for labor speech 
would violate a federal constitutional rule mandating content neutrality in all 
speech regulation.  (Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego County District Council 
of Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180, 199.)  In that decision, the court also 
recognized that the NLRA may exempt certain union activity on private property 
from state trespass laws.  (Id. at p. 204.) 
Therefore, it is well settled that statutory law — state and federal — may 
single out labor-related speech for particular protection or regulation, in the 
 
23 
context of a statutory system of economic regulation of labor relations, without 
violating the federal Constitution. 
As we have mentioned (p. 9, ante), the Moscone Act‘s purpose is ―to 
promote the rights of workers to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining, picketing or other mutual aid or protection, and to prevent 
the evils which frequently occur when courts interfere with the normal process of 
dispute resolution between employers and recognized employee organizations.‖  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (a).)  As the United States Supreme Court has 
remarked, in regard to the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act (on which our state‘s 
Moscone Act was modeled), the congressional purpose was not only ―to protect 
the rights of [employees] to organize and bargain collectively,‖ but also to 
―withdraw federal courts from a type of controversy for which many believed they 
were ill-suited and from participation in which, it was feared, judicial prestige 
might suffer.‖  (Marine Cooks v. Panama S. S. Co. (1960) 362 U.S. 365, 369, fn. 
7.)  These legislative judgments provide a sufficient justification for the provisions 
of California‘s Moscone Act and section 1138.1 that single out labor-related 
speech for special protection from unwarranted judicial interference.   
For the reasons given above, we conclude that neither of the two state 
statutes at issue here — the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 — violates the 
federal Constitution‘s general prohibition on content-based speech regulation.   
SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION 
A private sidewalk in front of a customer entrance to a retail store in a 
shopping center is not a public forum for purposes of expressive activity under our 
state Constitution‘s liberty-of-speech provision as construed in Pruneyard, supra, 
23 Cal.3d 899.  On the private property of a shopping center, the public forum 
portion is limited to those areas that have been designed and furnished to permit 
and encourage the public to congregate and socialize at leisure. 
 
24 
California‘s Moscone Act and section 1138.1 afford both substantive and 
procedural protections to peaceful union picketing on a private sidewalk outside a 
targeted retail store during a labor dispute, and such union picketing may not be 
enjoined on the ground that it constitutes a trespass.  The Moscone Act and section 
1138.1 do not violate the federal Constitution‘s free speech or equal protection 
guarantees on the ground that they give speech regarding a labor dispute greater 
protection than speech on other subjects.   
The Court of Appeal‘s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
I write separately to address further the rights set forth in the Moscone Act 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3), to provide guidance to the lower courts and the parties 
on remand. 
As we explained in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District 
Council of Carpenters (1979) 25 Cal.3d 317 (Sears), the Moscone Act was a 
product of compromise.  Although drafted by union attorneys, it was modified at 
the behest of supporters of management.  (Sears, at p. 323.)  In particular, the bill 
was amended to provide that the act ―shall be strictly construed in accordance with 
existing law governing labor disputes,‖ and ―[i]t is not the intent of this section to 
permit conduct that is unlawful including breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, 
the unlawful blocking of access or egress to premises where a labor dispute exists, 
or other similar unlawful activity.‖  (Sen. Bill No. 743 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) § 2, 
as amended Aug. 26, 1975; see now Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subds. (a), (e).)  
Therefore, in determining the scope of the conduct that is lawful under the 
Moscone Act, it is necessary to consider not only the rights and limitations 
expressly set forth in the Act, but also ― ‗existing law.‘ ‖  (Kaplan’s Fruit & 
Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 77 (Kaplan’s Fruit).) 
It has long been established that labor is entitled to engage in peaceful 
picketing to advertise its grievances for the purpose of persuading others to labor‘s 
cause.  (Hughes v. Superior Court (1948) 32 Cal.2d 850, 854 [― ‗the right to picket 
 
2 
peacefully and truthfully is one of organized labor‘s lawful means of advertising 
its grievances to the public‘ ‖]; Lisse v. Local Union No. 31 (1935) 2 Cal.2d 312, 
319 (Lisse) [― ‗ ―the right by all legitimate means — of fair publication, and fair 
and oral or written persuasion, to induce others interested in or sympathetic to 
their cause‖ ‘ ‖].)  ―As it has ever been, the only legitimate objective of picketing 
thus continues to be the transmission of information to the public, so that the 
public may know the picketers‘ grievance and elect to support or reject it.‖  
(International Molders and Allied Workers Union v. Superior Court (1977) 70 
Cal.App.3d 395, 404.)   
It follows from these established principles, and is confirmed by the 
Moscone Act‘s legislative history, that labor activity with an objective other than 
communicating labor‘s grievances and persuading listeners exceeds the right to 
engage in peaceful picketing within the meaning of the Moscone Act.  (See Ops. 
Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 16257 (Aug. 4, 1975) Injunctions:  Labor Disputes (Sen. 
Bill No. 743) 5 Assem. J. (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) p. 9020 [―while it must be 
peaceful and truthful, picketing or other concerted action must also be conducted 
for a legal purpose, and however orderly the manner in which it is conducted, the 
illegality of its purpose provides a complete basis for injunctive relief‖].)  For 
example, ―picketing, wherein the persuasion brought to bear contains a threat of 
physical violence, is unlawful, and . . . the use of words and an aggregation of 
pickets which reasonably induce fear of physical molestation may properly be 
enjoined.‖  (Pezold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North 
America (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 120, 123.)  Labor actions need not, however, carry 
threats of violence or intimidation to fall outside the protection of the law.  Speech 
or conduct directed toward interference with the owner‘s business by means other 
than persuasion of patrons to labor‘s position also falls outside the rights 
enunciated in the case law.  (See Ops. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 16257, supra, 5 
 
3 
Assem. J. (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) p. 9021 [existing law permitted limitations on a 
labor organization‘s manner of use of a public sidewalk ―so that there is neither 
intimidation nor undue interference with its use by . . . customers‖].)  For example, 
patrolling a small area with more signs than reasonably required to publicize the 
dispute and communicate the picketers‘ ideas to patrons may have no purpose 
other than interfering with the owner‘s business.  Similarly, using large signs for 
the purpose of obscuring potential patrons‘ view of the owner‘s signs and displays, 
is not protected activity.  (See Pezold, supra, at p. 123 [―it would be stubbornly 
refusing to admit the obvious not to see in the activities of picketing on many 
occasions more than the mere expression of ideas‖]; see also Senn v. Tile Layers 
Protective Union (1937) 301 U.S. 468, 479 [Wisconsin‘s ―statute provides that the 
picketing must be peaceful; and that term as used implies not only absence of 
violence, but absence of any unlawful act. . . .  It precludes any form of physical 
obstruction or interference with the plaintiff‘s business‖]; M Restaurants, Inc. v. 
San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers (1981) 124 
Cal.App.3d 666, 676 [the activities authorized by the Moscone Act are similar to 
the activities authorized by Wisconsin‘s statute].) 
These principles also answer an issue we identified in Sears, supra, 25 
Cal.3d 317, in which we observed that ―a strict reading [of the Moscone Act] 
might appear to authorize picketing in the aisles of the Sears store or even in the 
private offices of its executives.‖  (Id. at p. 325.)  Labor is fully able to publicize 
its message near the entrances to a business; at that location, the picketers will 
cross paths with everyone who enters the business.  Communicating inside the 
business premises is not only unnecessary, but it would invariably interfere with 
the business activities being conducted inside and annoy and harass patrons.  
Therefore, although labor may conduct its activities at the entrance of the business, 
it may not enter the business to do so. 
 
4 
Labor is generally entitled to be at the entrance of a business because that is 
the most effective point to communicate its grievances with the business to 
potential patrons.  (Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery and 
Confectionery Workers’ Union (1964) 61 Cal.2d 766, 770-771.)  Labor may not, 
however, use the location in front of the business to communicate with a distant 
audience if the size of its signs or the volume of its speech thereby repel patrons 
from the business.  At the point at which the signs and the sound levels interfere 
with the business for reasons other than their persuasive message, the 
communication is no longer lawful.  Labor must share the space in front of the 
business with patrons, and may not unduly interfere with their ingress and egress, 
physically or through other means.  (Kaplan’s Fruit, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 78.) 
Finally, because the Moscone Act is to be construed ―with the purpose of 
avoiding any unnecessary judicial interference in labor disputes‖ (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 527.3, subd. (a)), conflicts between labor‘s exercise of its right to communicate 
and an owner‘s right to have those who engage in conduct that is not protected by 
the Moscone Act removed from its property will necessarily be addressed initially 
between the two opposing sides and, perhaps, by law enforcement.  (See Lab. 
Code, § 1138.1, subd. (a)(5) [a prerequisite to injunctive relief in a labor dispute is 
a showing ―[t]hat the public officers charged with the duty to protect 
complainant‘s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection‖].)  
A business owner will be in a superior position to recognize the impact that labor‘s 
conduct may have on its business, independent of the conduct‘s effect of 
persuading patrons.  For example, the owner will be familiar with its own 
promotional activities and will be aware of the impact that labor‘s signs, by virtue 
of their size, height, or location, will have on those activities.  An owner may also 
learn from its patrons how the labor action is affecting them.  Although business 
owners do not have a right in this context to unilaterally impose reasonable time, 
 
5 
place, and manner restrictions on speakers — the standard when the right to 
speech is based on the existence of a public forum — they may certainly 
articulate, before any labor action or on an ad hoc basis, rules and policies aimed 
at curbing labor conduct that exceeds the rights recognized by the Moscone Act.  
Labor must abide by the owner‘s rules and policies to the extent required to 
prevent unlawful interference with the business, despite the fact that the limits 
imposed by the owner may reduce labor‘s ability to communicate its message.  
Otherwise, the conduct will exceed the rights codified in the Moscone Act. 
We recognized in Lisse, supra, 2 Cal.2d 312, that ― ‗whether picketing is 
lawful or unlawful depends upon the circumstances surrounding each case . . . 
[and] upon the conduct of the parties themselves.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 321.)  A trial court 
must weigh all the evidence and determine whether the conduct of those engaging 
in labor speech is detrimental to the owner for reasons other than persuasion of 
listeners to the views of the speaker.  Although the owner‘s rules do not define the 
boundaries of what constitutes lawful labor conduct, the owner‘s experience and 
knowledge with respect to its business and the manner in which the labor conduct 
is affecting its business, all of which presumably form the basis for the owner‘s 
rules, will be relevant to the court‘s determination of whether the labor activity is 
interfering with the business in ways other than persuasion by labor‘s message.  If 
the evidence presented by the owner establishes such interference, labor‘s conduct 
will not be protected by the Moscone Act, and will constitute an unlawful trespass. 
Finally, our discussion concerns only the rights codified in the Moscone 
Act.  When labor interests engage in concerted activities on public property, they 
enjoy all of the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 
et seq.; NLRA)  And when they engage in speech in a public forum as recognized 
in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, they enjoy the 
same speech rights afforded others under the California Constitution, subject to 
 
6 
any restrictions imposed by federal labor law.  When, however, they engage in 
speech on private property that is not a public forum, as in this case, their rights 
arise from California statutory provisions, and the extent of their rights depends on 
the principles codified in those provisions.  Principles developed under the NLRA 
with respect to labor conduct on public property, or in the context of case law 
addressing speech in a public forum, cannot be applied to expand the right 
established by the Moscone Act to engage in conduct on private property.  If 
labor‘s conduct on private property exceeds the activities that are protected by the 
Moscone Act, its conduct will constitute an unlawful trespass, and may be 
excluded by the employer.  (See N.L.R.B. v. Calkins (9th Cir. 1999) 187 F.3d 
1080, 1094 [―To the extent that state law permits employers‘ exclusion of 
[concerted labor activities from private property], the NLRA does not mandate 
accommodation‖].) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
I join the court‘s opinion and write separately to provide additional context 
in support of the conclusion that the two statutory provisions at issue in this case 
— Code of Civil Procedure section 527.3 (the Moscone Act) and Labor Code 
section 1138.1 (section 1138.1) — do not violate the First or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  I also briefly discuss the scope of 
labor activity protected by the Moscone Act in response to the separate opinions of 
the Chief Justice and Justice Chin. 
I. 
In challenging the constitutionality of the Moscone Act and section 1138.1, 
Ralphs does not and cannot argue that its own freedom of speech is burdened.  
Rather, it seeks to assert the First Amendment rights of hypothetical third-party 
speakers who might like to speak on Ralphs‘s private property but whose right to 
do so is not protected by the Moscone Act or section 1138.1.  But invalidating 
those statutes would have no effect on the ability of such hypothetical third parties 
to speak; Ralphs may eject such speakers from its property under state trespass 
law whether or not the Moscone Act or section 1138.1 remains on the books.  (See 
maj. opn., ante, at p. 19 [―invalidating . . . the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 
would not remove any restrictions on speech or enhance any opportunities for 
peaceful picketing or protest‖].) 
The crux of Ralphs‘s First Amendment claim is not an improper denial of 
speech to anyone, but rather an allegation of content-based discrimination.  As 
 
2 
Justice Chin notes, the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 secure for ―labor 
picketers, but no one else, . . . the right to engage in speech activities on [Ralphs‘s] 
property.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn. by Chin, J., post, at p. 2.)  The surface appeal of this 
account of what the statutes do must be considered in the broader context of the 
statutes‘ historical origins.  As explained below, the Legislature enacted these 
statutes in order to restrain the role of courts in labor disputes and to promote 
dispute resolution through collective bargaining, not to burden non-labor speech or 
to express favoritism for labor speech over other speech.  So understood, the 
statutes are no different from a broad range of labor, employment, and economic 
regulations that arguably impinge on speech but pose no serious First Amendment 
concern. 
A. 
As today‘s opinion notes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9–11), the Moscone Act 
and section 1138.1 are almost identical to the corresponding provisions of the 
federal Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.  One of Congress‘s primary 
goals in enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 was to address the overuse of 
injunctions in labor disputes.  (See Koretz, Statutory History of the United States 
Labor Organization (1970) pp. 162–257 (Koretz); Frankfurter & Greene, The 
Labor Injunction (1930) pp. 199–228 (Frankfurter & Greene).)  One scholar 
estimates that federal and state courts issued at least 4,300 injunctions against 
labor protestors between 1880 and 1930.  (Forbath, The Shaping of the American 
Labor Movement (1989) 102 Harv. L.Rev. 1111, 1151.)  About 2,100 of these 
injunctions were issued during the 1920s alone, bringing the proportion of strikes 
met by injunctions to a high of 25 percent.  (Id. at p. 1227.)  As employers made 
increasing use of this tool to nip labor disputes in the bud, the labor injunction 
―assumed new and vast significance in [the] national economy.‖  (Frankfurter & 
Greene, supra, at p. 24.) 
 
3 
Many contemporary scholars and legislators were critical of this 
development.  They observed that labor injunctions were often unnecessary and 
overbroad; many of the activities enjoined were punishable independently as 
crimes or torts, and ―[t]he blanket wording of numerous [injunctions] frequently 
include[d] the residuum of conduct even remotely calculated to have effect in the 
dispute, but neither criminal nor tortious.‖  (Frankfurter & Greene, supra, at 
p. 105.)  Resort to injunctions meant that juries had no role in checking the 
exercise of judicial power.  (See Forbath, supra, 102 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 1180 [―the 
‗doing away‘ with juries was one of the chief attractions of equity over criminal 
law from the employer‘s perspective‖].)  In addition, injunctions were frequently 
issued ex parte, without notice, and upon an inadequate evidentiary foundation.  
(See Frankfurter & Greene, supra, at p. 200 [courts issued ―[t]emporary injunctive 
relief without notice . . . upon dubious affidavits‖]; id. at p. 106 [the language of 
injunctions was often ―stereotyped and transferred verbatim from case to case, 
without considered application by the court to the peculiar facts of each 
controversy‖]; S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8 (1932) [Rep. of U.S. 
Sen. Com. on Judiciary, on Sen. No. 935: ―[B]efore [the protestor] is given an 
opportunity to be heard, he is enjoined‖], reprinted in Koretz, supra, at p. 172 
(hereafter Senate Judiciary Report).) 
Employers‘ reliance on injunctions was particularly subject to abuse, the 
critics argued, because the injunctions could not preserve the status quo and 
suspended only the activities of the strikers:  ―[T]he suspension of strike activities, 
even temporarily, [could] defeat the strike for practical purposes and foredoom its 
resumption, even if the injunction [was] later lifted,‖ and ―[i]mprovident issue of 
the injunction [could] be irreparable to the defendant.‖  (Frankfurter & Greene, 
supra, at p. 201.)  Labor injunctions were also ―invoked by employers, police, and 
 
4 
the press to justify measures like arming strikebreakers or jailing pickets.‖  
(Forbath, supra, 102 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 1187.) 
The abuse and overuse of injunctive decrees presented serious risks for the 
judiciary.  Organized labor complained that courts were improperly engaged in 
―government by injunction.‖  (Koretz, supra, at p. 162 [―For nearly half a century 
organized labor battled against what it called ‗government by injunction‘ ‖]; 
Frankfurter & Greene, supra, at p. 200 [―[T]hose zealous for the unimpaired 
prestige of our courts have observed how the administration of law by decrees 
which through vast and vague phrases surmount law, undermines the esteem of 
courts upon which our reign of law depends.  Not government, but ‗government 
by injunction,‘ characterized by the consequences of a criminal prosecution 
without its safeguards, has been challenged.‖].)  The threat to judicial prestige and 
legitimacy was a major concern motivating Congress‘s enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.  (See Marine Cooks v. Panama S. S. Co. (1960) 362 U.S. 365, 
369, fn. 7 [Congress‘s purpose was ―to protect the rights of laboring men to 
organize and bargain collectively and to withdraw federal courts from a type of 
controversy for which many believed they were ill-suited and from participation in 
which, it was feared, judicial prestige might suffer‖]; Sen. Judiciary Rep., supra, at 
p. 25, reprinted in Koretz, supra, at pp. 192–193 [―The main purpose of these 
definitions is to provide for limiting the injunctive powers of the Federal courts 
only in the special type of cases, commonly called labor disputes, in which these 
powers have been notoriously extended beyond the mere exercise of civil 
authority and wherein the courts have been converted into policing agencies 
devoted in the guise of preserving the peace, to the purpose of aiding employers to 
coerce employees into accepting terms and conditions of employment desired by 
employers.‖].)  Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee warned that the power to 
make law through injunction, combined with the power to enforce that law 
 
5 
through findings of contempt, would result in ―judicial tyranny.‖  (Sen. Judiciary 
Rep., supra, at p. 18, reprinted in Koretz, supra, at p. 184.) 
In response to these concerns, Senator Shipstead introduced a bill on 
December 12, 1927 proposing to limit federal courts‘ jurisdiction over labor 
disputes.  (Sen. Judiciary Rep., supra, at p. 2, reprinted in Koretz, supra, at 
p. 169.)  Congress held extensive hearings on the subject, some ―upon application 
of attorneys representing corporations and organizations opposed to the 
enactment‖ of the legislation (id. at 3, reprinted in Koretz, supra, at p. 170), and 
various versions of the bill were vigorously debated.  (See Koretz, supra, at 
pp. 240, 242 [Remarks of Rep. Beck, Debate on H.R. No. 5315, 72d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1932), arguing that the proposed bill ―[would] do infinite harm to both 
classes, employer and employee, and . . . the innocent public,‖ and criticizing the 
bill for taking ―no account whatever of the motives and purposes with which a 
nation-wide strike or boycott can be commenced and prosecuted‖]; Sen. Judiciary 
Rep., supra, at p. 4, reprinted in Koretz, supra, at pp. 170–171 [noting that several 
versions of the bill were given ―adverse report[s]‖ by the Senate subcommittee]). 
But the proposed legislation steadily gained in popularity.  The House 
Judiciary Committee noted that ―[h]earings . . . held by congressional committees 
over a period of years and the facts adduced [had] brought about an almost 
unanimity of opinion that such powers of the Federal courts [had] been exercised 
to the detriment of the public welfare and [needed to] be curbed.‖  (H.R. Rep. 669, 
72d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1932) [Rep. of U.S. House Com. on Judiciary, on H.R. 
No. 5315], reprinted in Koretz, supra, at p. 193.)  In 1931, both political parties 
promised legislative reforms in their platforms.  (Koretz, supra, at p. 172.)  The 
proposed legislation ultimately passed by a vote of 363 to 13 in the House and 75 
to 5 in the Senate.  (Id. at p. 162.)  As enacted, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
reaffirmed that certain acts of labor organization were lawful (29 U.S.C § 104) and 
 
6 
divested federal courts of their equitable power to enjoin labor disputes except 
under certain limited circumstances and after following specified procedures (29 
U.S.C. § 107). 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act limits only the power of federal courts to issue 
injunctions.  After its enactment, many state legislatures passed ― ‗little Norris-
LaGuardia Acts‘ ‖ to place similar restraints on the injunctive powers of state 
courts.  (Messner v. Journeymen Barbers (1960) 53 Cal.2d 873, 895, fn. 4 (dis. 
opn. by Schauer, J.).)  California‘s Moscone Act was one such law.  ―The original 
bill, drafted by union attorneys, clearly sought to limit the injunctive jurisdiction 
of the superior court.  The act declared its purpose expressly:  to prevent ‗the evils 
which frequently occur when courts interfere with the normal processes of dispute 
resolution between employers and recognized employee organizations.‘ ‖  (Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1979) 25 Cal.3d 
317, 323 (Sears), quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (a).) 
As we noted in Sears, ―[t]he preamble to the Moscone Act identifies the 
procedural inequities which occur when the courts issue injunctions in labor 
disputes.  It states: [¶] . . .  [¶] ‗Equity procedure that permits a complaining party 
to obtain sweeping injunctive relief that is not preceded by or conditioned upon 
notice to and hearing of the responding party or parties, or that issues after hearing 
based upon written affidavits alone and not wholly or in part upon examination, 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses in open court, is peculiarly 
subject to abuse in labor litigation for each of the following reasons:  [¶] (a) The 
status quo cannot be maintained, but is necessarily altered by the injunction.  [¶] 
(b) The determination of issues of veracity and of probability of fact from the 
affidavits of the opposing parties which are contradictory and, under the 
circumstances, untrustworthy rather than from oral examination in open court, is 
subject to grave error.  [¶] (c) The error in issuing the injunctive relief is usually 
 
7 
irreparable to the opposing party.  [¶] (d) The delay incident to the normal course 
of appellate procedure frequently makes ultimate correction of error in law or in 
fact unavailing in the particular case.‘  (Stats. 1975, ch. 1156, § 1, p. 2845.)‖  
(Sears, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 323, fn. 2.) 
As ultimately enacted in 1975, the Moscone Act ―establishe[d] the legality 
of certain labor practices and limit[ed] the equity jurisdiction of the superior court 
to enjoin such practices.‖  (Sears, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 322.)  The statute‘s text is 
written expressly as a restraint on courts.  Subdivision (a) provides that ―the equity 
jurisdiction of the courts in cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall 
be no broader than as set forth in subdivision (b) of this section, and the provisions 
of subdivision (b) of this section shall be strictly construed in accordance with 
existing law governing labor disputes with the purpose of avoiding any 
unnecessary judicial interference in labor disputes.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, 
subd. (a).)  Subdivision (b) provides:  ―The acts enumerated in this subdivision, 
whether performed singly or in concert, shall be legal, and no court nor any judge 
nor judges thereof, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or 
preliminary or permanent injunction which, in specific or general terms, prohibits 
any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from doing any of the 
following:  [¶] (1) Giving publicity to, and obtaining or communicating 
information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, 
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any place where 
any person or persons may lawfully be, or by any other method not involving 
fraud, violence or breach of the peace.  [¶] (2) Peaceful picketing or patrolling 
involving any labor dispute, whether engaged in singly or in numbers.  [¶] 
(3) Assembling peaceably to do any of the acts specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) 
or to promote lawful interests.‖  (Id., § 527.3, subd. (b).) 
 
8 
Fifteen years later, the Legislature enacted section 1138.1, which codified 
the procedures that must be followed before an injunction will issue.  The court 
must find, among other things, that ―unlawful acts have been threatened and will 
be committed unless restrained‖; that ―substantial and irreparable injury to 
complainant‘s property will follow‖ in the absence of an injunction; and that ―the 
public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant‘s property are unable 
or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.‖  (Lab. Code, § 1138.1, subd. (a).) 
Importantly, the statutory restraints on labor injunctions do not leave 
employers without a remedy for unlawful activity.  Indeed, section 1138.1, 
subdivision (a)(5) requires the employer to show that ―the public officers charged 
with the duty to protect complainant‘s property are unable or unwilling to furnish 
adequate protection.‖  The existence of this requirement implies that the police are 
authorized to stop any ―unlawful acts‖ proscribed by the Moscone Act.  (See 
United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Superior Court (2000) 83 
Cal.App.4th 566, 578 [section 107 of title 29 of the United States Code, from 
which section 1138.1 was patterned almost verbatim, ― ‗was based upon a 
recognition of the fact that the preservation of order and the protection of property 
in labor disputes is in the first instance a police problem‘ ‖].)  In addition, if labor 
protestors are engaged in unlawful activity that causes the store to lose money, the 
employer may sue for damages.  Section 1138.1 simply limits one form of relief 
available to the employer based on the Legislature‘s judgment that court-issued 
injunctions are a poor method of resolving labor disputes. 
In sum, the Moscone Act and section 1138.1, like the federal statute they 
emulate, were enacted to remedy judicial practices that unfairly proscribed labor 
speech, not to favor labor speech over other types of expressive conduct.  
 
9 
B. 
In its brief, Ralphs contends that the statutes violate the principle of content 
neutrality because they ―discriminate in favor of labor speech by exalting labor 
over all other types of expressive activities.‖  (See also Waremart Foods v. NLRB 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) 354 F.3d 870, 874–875.)  But even if this were a proper 
characterization of the statutes, it is hardly obvious that they run afoul of the First 
Amendment.  The principal cases on which Ralphs relies — Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley (1972) 408 U.S. 92 and Carey v. Brown (1980) 447 U.S. 455 
— involved content-based prohibitions on speech in quintessential public forums.  
Outside the context of a public forum, the principle of content neutrality, though 
―frequently . . . identified as the First Amendment‘s operative core, is neither so 
pervasive nor so unyielding as is often thought.‖  (Fallon, Sexual Harassment, 
Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 S.Ct. 
Rev. 1, 2 (Fallon).)  Because ―large areas of communication still remain 
untouched by the First Amendment,‖ the principles governing the First 
Amendment‘s applicability to speech regulation cannot be reduced to any simple 
formula.  (Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience (2004) 117 Harv. L.Rev. 1765, 1800–1801 
(Schauer) [―the explanation for what is ultimately treated as covered by the First 
Amendment and what ultimately remains uncovered appears to be the result of a 
highly complex array of factors, some of which are doctrinal but many of which 
are not‖].) 
To begin with, the ―Supreme Court has explicitly recognized several 
categories [of speech] within which content-based regulation is sometimes 
permitted, often on a relatively ad hoc basis,‖ including commercial speech, adult 
speech, libel, broadcast media, speech of government employees, and student 
speech.  (Fallon, supra, 1994 S.Ct. Rev. at p. 23; see id. at pp. 23–26.)  The high 
 
10 
court has further held that some categories of speech, defined on the basis of 
content, are of such low value that they do not merit First Amendment protection.  
(Id. at p. 23 [―[o]bscenity, fighting words, and child pornography are well-known 
examples of generally unprotected categories‖].) 
Moreover, many laws that regulate speech based on its content have never 
been thought to trigger First Amendment concern.  For example, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission ―engages in pervasive content-based control over speech‖ 
in regulating securities:  it prohibits companies from making offers and 
advertisements without advance approval, regulates the statements candidates may 
make in proxy contests, and prohibits the transmission of accurate inside 
information from ―tipper‖ to ―tippee‖ in the insider trading context.  (Schauer, 
supra, 117 Harv. L.Rev. at pp. 1778–1779.)  Similarly, ―antitrust law restricts the 
exchange of accurate market, pricing, and production information, as well as limits 
the advocacy of concerted action in most contexts; yet it remains almost wholly 
untouched by the First Amendment.‖  (Id. at p. 1781, fns. omitted.)  ―[M]uch the 
same degree of First Amendment irrelevance holds true for the content-based 
regulation of trademarks, the pervasive and constitutionally untouched law of 
fraud, almost all of the regulation of professionals, virtually the entirety of the law 
of evidence, large segments of tort law, and that vast domain of criminal law that 
deals with conspiracy and criminal solicitation.‖  (Id. at pp. 1783–1784, fns. 
omitted.)  Nor does it violate the First Amendment for government to impose 
greater punishment for crimes in which the defendant selected the victim because 
of the victim‘s race or other protected status.  (Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 
U.S. 476, 487 [holding that penalty enhancement statute ―is aimed at conduct 
unprotected by the First Amendment‖]; In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 720–726 
[upholding hate crimes statute against First Amendment claim alleging content-
based discrimination].) 
 
11 
Scholars surveying this legal landscape have struggled to develop a 
coherent theory that explains why some regulations impinging on speech trigger 
First Amendment concern while others do not.  Professor Schauer interprets the 
case law to suggest that the state may criminalize ―speech [that] is face-to-face, 
informational, particular, and for private gain,‖ but not speech that is ―public, 
noninformational, and ideological [in] nature.‖  (Schauer, supra, 117 Harv. L.Rev. 
at pp. 1801, 1802.)  Further, he posits that the First Amendment‘s coverage in the 
civil context may be partly explained by the existence or absence of a sympathetic 
class of litigants or a well-entrenched regulatory scheme.  (Id. at pp. 1803–1807.)  
Whatever the merits of these views, it is apparent that ―the conceptual space 
covered by the First Amendment is [simply] too vast to yield to a general rule of 
content neutrality, a categorical prohibition of ad hoc balancing, or any other 
single formulation.‖  (Fallon, supra, 1994 S.Ct. Rev. at p. 22.) 
Most pertinent to the case before us, the Supreme Court has consistently 
rejected First Amendment challenges to content-based speech regulations in the 
context of labor relations.  As today‘s opinion explains, content-based protections 
for labor-related speech in private workplaces pervade the federal National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21–23.)  Under 29 United States 
Code section 158(a)(1), it is unlawful for an employer to interfere with employees‘ 
rights to form or join a union, and ―this provision has long been construed to 
protect an employee‘s right to speak for or against a union on the employer‘s 
premises, even though the employer may prohibit solicitations on other topics.‖  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21–22, citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB (1945) 324 
U.S. 793.)  The NLRA also protects the right of employers to speak on 
unionization by providing that ―[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or 
opinion, or the dissemination thereof . . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an 
unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force 
 
12 
or promise of benefit.‖  (29 U.S.C. § 158(c); see also Lab. Code, § 1155 [almost 
identical language applicable to agricultural employers].) 
Similarly, content-based prohibitions on labor-related speech pervade federal 
and state labor laws.  The NLRA makes it unlawful for a union or its agents to engage 
in speech that ―restrain[s] or coerce[s]‖ employees in their decision to unionize or 
bargain collectively (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)); ―to engage in, or to induce or encourage 
any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry 
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment 
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, 
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services‖ (id., § 158(b)(4)(i)); or 
to engage in speech that ―threaten[s], coerce[s], or restrain[s] any person‖ with the 
object of forcing someone to join a union or forcing someone to cease doing business 
with another person (id., § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A), (B)).  The NLRA also prohibits picketing 
whose object is to force an employer to recognize a union or to force employees to 
join a union.  (Id., § 158(b)(7).)  It further prohibits secondary picketing (NLRB v. 
Retail Store Employees Union (1980) 447 U.S. 607) and secondary boycotts 
(International Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Allied Intl., Inc. (1982) 456 U.S. 212) — 
prohibitions the high court has upheld on the ground that ―[s]econdary boycotts and 
picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part of ‗Congress‘ striking of the 
delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral 
employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in 
industrial strife.‘ ‖  (NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 912, 
quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, at pp. 617–618 (conc. opn. by 
Blackmun, J.).) 
Although these laws arguably favor or disfavor certain kinds of speech on the 
basis of content, they have never been held to violate the federal Constitution.  (See 
International Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Allied Intl., Inc., supra, 456 U.S. at p. 226 
 
13 
[―We have consistently rejected the claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in 
violation of § 8(b)(4) [of the NLRA] is protected activity under the First 
Amendment.‖]; Hudgens v. NLRB (1975) 424 U.S. 507, 521 [holding that the 
―constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this‖ 
and remanding to the National Labor Relations Board to determine in the first 
instance the proper accommodation between labor rights and private property rights]; 
NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co. (1969) 395 U.S. 575, 616–620 [holding that interests in 
fair and peaceful labor relations justify limited restrictions on employers‘ speech in 
the context of labor disputes]; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union Local 5 (1937) 
301 U.S. 468, 472 [holding that Wisconsin Labor Code provisions authorizing 
peaceful picketing and publicizing of labor disputes did not violate the due process 
clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].) 
Beyond the context of labor-management relations, many federal and state 
employment laws contain content-based speech protections — for example, 
whistleblower protections and antiretaliation provisions in civil rights laws.  (See, 
e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) [making it unlawful to retaliate against an employee who 
reports a violation of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act]; 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a) [protecting employees who report fraud or violations of securities law 
under the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley]; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) [protecting 
speech that reports or opposes status-based discrimination, harassment, or 
retaliation]; Lab. Code § 1102.5 [protecting disclosure of violation of state or 
federal law].)  Federal and state employment laws also contain content-based 
prohibitions on speech — for example, laws against racial, sexual, or other status-
based harassment.  (See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 [prohibiting status-based 
harassment]; Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System (1990) 21 Cal.4th 121, 130 
[holding that the Fair Housing and Employment Act prohibits the use of racist 
epithets in the workplace and does not constitute an improper prior restraint on 
 
14 
freedom of expression].)  In California, some laws compel speech based on 
content, including a provision of the Fair Housing and Employment Act that 
requires all employers with more than 50 employees to conduct trainings on 
prohibited discrimination.  (Gov. Code, § 12950.1; 22 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, 
§ 7288.0(b).)  Again, these laws have never been struck down on First or 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.  (See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993) 510 
U.S. 17 [upholding imposition of title VII liability for a broad category of sexually 
harassing speech that creates a hostile work environment].) 
Although there may be no single theory that can account for all of the First 
Amendment jurisprudence discussed above, much of it can perhaps be explained 
by a distinction between the economic conduct at issue and the expressive content 
of that conduct.  This distinction is easy to discern in, say, a law against price 
fixing.  Such a law prohibits certain kinds of speech based on content, but it does 
so because it is really targeting a certain kind of economic conduct.  Similarly, the 
Moscone Act protects certain kinds of speech (―Join our union!‖ or ―Non-union 
store:  don‘t shop here!‖).  But it does so because it aims to promote a certain kind 
of economic conduct — labor dispute resolution through collective bargaining — 
that the Legislature believes conducive to its public policy goals for the workplace 
and the economy.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (a) [Moscone Act aims ―to 
promote the rights of workers to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining, picketing or other mutual aid or protection, and to prevent 
the evils which frequently occur when courts interfere with the normal processes 
of dispute resolution between employers and recognized employee 
organizations‖].)  Viewed this way, the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 are not 
speech regulations but economic regulations that govern the relationship between 
labor and management.  Like a price-fixing statute, they fall outside the scope of 
First Amendment concern.  (Cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 389 
 
15 
[―[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against 
speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by 
telling the enemy the Nation‘s defense secrets), a particular content-based 
subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within 
the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech‖].) 
In sum, a vast array of federal and state employment and labor laws, many 
of which protect, prohibit, or even compel speech based on its content, has never 
been held to violate the federal Constitution.  The comprehensive regulatory 
regimes that govern employer-employee relations reflect careful balancing of the 
interests of labor and management within the context of a legislature‘s broad 
economic goals.  The Moscone Act and section 1138.1 are part of such a regime, 
and neither statute violates the First Amendment prohibition on content-based 
speech regulation. 
II. 
As to the scope of substantive rights set forth in the Moscone Act, I offer a 
few comments in response to the separate opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice 
Chin. 
Justice Chin points out that the NLRA does not compel an employer to 
allow nonemployee labor organizers onto its business premises unless its 
employees are otherwise inaccessible.  (Conc. & dis. opn. by Chin, J., post, at p. 4, 
citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB (1992) 502 U.S. 527, 539.)  This is true, but not 
particularly relevant to the scope of the Moscone Act.  As we explained in Sears, 
nothing in federal law ―confers on the employer an affirmative right to exclude 
union pickets unless such picketing constitutes an unfair labor practice.‖  (Sears, 
supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 332; see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich (1994) 510 
U.S. 200, 217, fn. 21 [―The right of employers to exclude union organizers from 
their private property emanates from state common law, and while this right is not 
 
16 
superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it.‖]; NLRB v. 
Calkins (9th Cir. 1999) 187 F.3d 1080, 1094 [―State trespass law that does not 
guarantee the right to exclude causes no conflict [with federal law], in that it does 
not prohibit federally protected conduct; instead, such law grants broader 
accommodation of protected conduct than is required by the federal labor law.‖].)  
Accordingly, our state law may, and does, grant labor organizers broader rights 
without conflicting with federal law. 
In her concurring opinion, the Chief Justice aims to provide guidance to 
lower courts and the parties in construing the rights secured by the Moscone Act.  
She quotes Pezold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North 
America (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 120, 123, for the proposition that ―picketing, 
wherein the persuasion brought to bear contains a threat of physical violence, is 
unlawful, and . . . the use of words and an aggregation of pickets which reasonably 
induce fear of physical molestation may properly be enjoined.‖  (Conc. opn. by 
Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., ante, at p. 2.)  This proposition is undoubtedly correct, since 
acts of physical violence and intimidation are unlawful under the Moscone Act.  
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (e) [―It is not the intent of this section to 
permit conduct that is unlawful including breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, 
the unlawful blocking of access or egress to premises where a labor dispute exists, 
or other similar unlawful activity.‖].) 
However, the remainder of the Chief Justice‘s analysis gives me pause.  
The Chief Justice proposes the principle that ―labor activity with an objective 
other than communicating labor‘s grievances and persuading listeners exceeds the 
right to engage in peaceful picketing‖ under the Moscone Act.  (Conc. opn. by 
Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., ante, at p. 2.)  Although this principle may be sensible in the 
abstract, I worry it will be difficult to apply in practice.  The Chief Justice 
suggests, for example, that ―patrolling a small area with more signs than 
 
17 
reasonably required to publicize the dispute‖ is not protected.  (Id. at p. 3.)  But if 
reasonableness is the test, then we must ask reasonable to whom?  Business 
owners are likely to argue that any labor activity that drives customers away is 
unreasonable.  Yet the fact that labor activity may dissuade customers from 
shopping at a store cannot alone be grounds for concluding that the activity 
unlawfully interferes with the operation of the business.  After all, that is often the 
whole point of the labor activity authorized by the Moscone Act.  And if 
customers are in fact driven away, how is a court to determine whether they were 
driven away out of sympathy with the protesters‘ cause, out of disgust with the 
protestors‘ cause, or out of a desire simply not to be hassled regardless of the 
protestors‘ cause?  Whether labor protestors have used ―more signs than 
reasonably required to publicize the dispute‖ would seem to turn on such difficult 
inquiries. 
The Chief Justice also suggests that signs larger than a certain size may be 
prohibited.  (Conc. opn. by Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., ante, at pp. 3, 4.)  But it is not 
clear how courts would determine what sign size would be permissible in various 
contexts.  While it may be true that large signs (what is large?) are not strictly 
necessary to convey the basic message of a labor protest, it is also true that larger 
signs are likely more effective in conveying that message.  At what point does a 
court say that the communicative value of a marginally more effective form of 
protest is outweighed by the incremental potential for interference with the 
business?  Answering this question becomes particularly difficult when a case 
involves nontraditional forms of protest designed to have an emotional impact on 
the intended audience.  For example, unions have protested what they consider to 
be unfair labor practices by staging mock funerals or inflating giant rat balloons 
near the entrance of the target establishment.  (See Rakoczy, On Mock Funerals, 
Banners, and Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 
 
18 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens 
Union Speech (2007) 56 Am. U. L.Rev. 1621, 1623.)  Again, while such tactics 
may not be necessary to convey protestors‘ basic message, they are likely more 
effective at capturing patrons‘ attention and creating a lasting impression. 
Of course, we can assign to ourselves and the lower courts the task of 
making case-by-case judgments as to what is ―reasonable.‖  The task would 
involve balancing labor‘s communication interests against management‘s 
economic interests in each case.  But such balancing, done under the auspices of 
construing a statute, seems to contemplate a rather substantial degree of ad hoc 
judicial policy-making.  Moreover, the balancing inquiry will, I fear, serve as a 
standing invitation for litigants to draw courts into the business of resolving labor 
disputes — which is precisely what the Legislature sought to prevent by passing 
the Moscone Act.  (See ante, at pp. 6–7.) 
In determining what is lawful protest activity under the Moscone Act, I believe 
courts should hew closely to the text of the Moscone Act itself.  The statute provides 
that the following activities ―shall be legal‖:  (1) ―[g]iving publicity to‖ the existence 
of a labor dispute by ―any . . . method not involving fraud, violence or breach of the 
peace‖; (2) ―[p]eaceful picketing or patrolling involving any labor dispute‖; and (3) 
―[a]ssembling peaceably‖ to do the activities outlined in paragraphs (1) and (2).  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (b).)  The statutory text contains several built-in 
limitations on legal protest activities:  The activities must be peaceful.  They must not 
involve fraud, violence, or breach of the peace.  And, as subdivision (e) provides, ―[i]t 
is not the intent of this section to permit conduct that is unlawful including breach of 
the peace, disorderly conduct, the unlawful blocking of access or egress to premises 
where a labor dispute exists, or other similar unlawful activity.‖  (Id., subd. (e).)  
Thus, the text of the Moscone Act itself defines what activities unlawfully interfere 
with the conduct of the business and proscribes such activities.  Courts should tightly 
 
19 
tether the ―lawfulness‖ inquiry to the statutory text in order to avoid the hazards of 
judicial policymaking and excessive involvement in labor disputes. 
Finally, the Chief Justice notes that a business ―owner will be familiar with its 
own promotional activities and will be aware of the impact that labor‘s signs, by 
virtue of their size, height, or location, will have on those activities.‖  (Conc. opn. by 
Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., ante, at p. 4.)  Because of that familiarity, the Chief Justice says, 
business owners ―may certainly articulate, before any labor action or on an ad hoc 
basis, rules and policies aimed at curbing labor conduct that exceeds the rights 
recognized by the Moscone Act.  Labor must abide by the owner‘s rules and policies 
to the extent required to prevent unlawful interference with the business, despite the 
fact that the limits imposed by the owner may reduce labor‘s ability to communicate 
its message.‖  (Id. at p. 5.) 
I am not sure what to make of this passage.  A business can certainly adopt 
whatever restrictions it deems best for its own interests.  But I do not see how ―rules 
and policies‖ adopted by a business owner carry any weight in resolving what 
activities are ―lawful‖ under the Moscone Act, beyond the weight of the evidence 
introduced by the business owner to demonstrate an unlawful interference with the 
business.  Any suggestion that courts should defer to restrictions imposed by a 
business owner or treat such restrictions as a starting point for assessing what is 
lawful finds no support in the Moscone Act.  The statute does not mention such 
restrictions or remotely hint that labor picketers must adhere to such restrictions.  
Although a business owner is entitled to introduce evidence that a labor protest is 
obstructing patrons‘ access or egress to the store or is otherwise fraudulent, violent, or 
disorderly, the fact that a business has codified its desired restrictions into a set of 
―rules and policies‖ has no independent bearing on the legal analysis. 
In sum, the text of the Moscone Act provides storeowners with important 
protections from unreasonable interference with their business operations.  Judicial 
 
20 
restraint — the very principle that the Legislature sought to enforce by passing the 
Moscone Act (see ante, at pp. 6–7) — counsels that courts, in determining what is 
lawful protest activity, should avoid ad hoc balancing and should instead evaluate the 
conduct at issue against the terms of the statute itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
I CONCUR:  
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the privately owned walkway in front of the 
customer entrance to the grocery store is not a public forum under Fashion Valley 
Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850 (Fashion 
Valley) and Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 5-9.)  I also agree that cases such as Van v. Target Corp. (2007) 
155 Cal.App.4th 1375 and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Young (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 106 
correctly allowed the store owners of those cases to bar speech activities on their 
premises.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8; see Fashion Valley, supra, at p. 880 (dis. 
opn. of Chin, J.).)  The majority opinion also implicitly reaffirms the correctness 
of a series of decisions holding that antiabortion protesters have no right to engage 
in speech activities on the privately owned parking lots and walkways of medical 
clinics that provide abortion services.  (Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Blythe 
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1641; Allred v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1386; 
Planned Parenthood v. Wilson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1662; Allred v. Shawley 
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1489; see Waremart Foods v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
354 F.3d 870, 876 (Waremart).) 
But I cannot agree with the majority‘s interpretation of the Moscone Act 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3) and Labor Code section 1138.1 (hereafter, collectively, 
the Moscone Act), and its conclusion that both provisions are constitutional.  (But, 
given the majority opinion, I do agree with the cautionary comments regarding the 
 
2 
scope of the Moscone Act in the Chief Justice‘s concurring opinion.)  These 
statutory provisions are probably constitutional on their face.  But the difficult 
questions are how they should be applied and whether they are valid as applied. 
When it denied injunctive relief, the trial court believed that the entrance to 
the store was a public forum under California law.  As the majority holds, the trial 
court erred in this respect.  It is not clear what the court would have done had it 
correctly found the property not to be a public forum.  What is clear is that the 
decision facing the trial court would have been quite different.  Rather than decide 
difficult statutory and constitutional questions in a vacuum — and rely primarily 
in so doing on old California cases decided under a legal landscape that is now 
obsolete (see Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 880 (dis. opn. of Chin, J.)) — 
we should instead remand the matter to the trial court to reconsider the matter with 
a correct understanding of California‘s public forum law.  Only on a concrete 
record following a trial court decision free of legal error should we attempt to 
decide the remaining questions. 
Allowing labor picketers to picket at the entrance to the grocery store — 
along with the majority‘s reaffirmation of the Court of Appeal decisions denying 
free speech rights to others on similar private property — means that labor 
picketers, but no one else, have the right to engage in speech activities on that 
property.  As applied to medical clinics, it apparently means, for example, that 
nurses can picket on clinics‘ parking lots and walkways — including, presumably, 
protesting against being required to aid in providing abortion services — but 
antiabortion protesters, and others with their own message, may not do so.  To 
 
3 
discriminate in this way based on the content of the speech, or who the speaker is, 
raises serious constitutional questions.1 
Today‘s opinion places California on a collision course with the federal 
courts.  As the majority recognizes, the Waremart court held that permitting labor 
speech, but not other speech, on private property would violate the United States 
Constitution as interpreted in Carey v. Brown (1980) 447 U.S. 455 (statute 
prohibiting picketing at private homes but excepting from the prohibition 
picketing involving a labor dispute is unconstitutional) and Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley (1972) 408 U.S. 92 (ordinance prohibiting picketing near 
schools but excepting from the prohibition picketing related to a labor dispute is 
unconstitutional).  (Waremart, supra, 354 F.3d at pp. 874-875.)  Although only the 
United States Supreme Court can definitively resolve the disagreement between 
the majority and the Waremart court, the Waremart court was not clearly wrong. 
The majority claims its interpretation of the Moscone Act is valid because 
the act does not limit free speech.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17-19.)  It is true that 
the Moscone Act, itself, does not limit speech.  But the Court of Appeal cases 
involving nonlabor speech at stores and medical clinics, which the majority 
purports to reaffirm, do limit speech.  Thus, the majority upholds content-based 
discrimination between labor and nonlabor speech, which presents the difficult 
constitutional question the Waremart court identified.  Additionally, the majority 
appears to find no constitutional violation because the Moscone Act merely 
                                              
1  
The plurality opinion in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. 
Council of Carpenters (1979) 25 Cal.3d 317, on which the majority heavily relies, 
did not consider this constitutional question or whether it should follow the 
precept that a court considering a statute that raises serious constitutional 
questions should strive to interpret that statute in a way that avoids any doubt 
concerning its validity.  (See Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 898.) 
 
4 
protects ―labor-related speech in the context of a statutory system of economic 
regulation of labor relations.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  Perhaps.  But on this 
incomplete record, it is not clear to me that the high court would permit content-
based discrimination on this ground.  At the least, before deciding this question, 
we should have before us the trial court‘s ruling incorporating the correct 
understanding that the property at issue is not a public forum.  We should know, 
and consider, exactly what economic or labor interests are actually at stake. 
Under federal law, labor organizers have no right to contact employees on 
private property ―unless the employees are otherwise inaccessible.‖  (Lechmere, 
Inc. v. NLRB (1992) 502 U.S. 527, 534 [interpreting the National Labor Relations 
Act].)  The record in this case indicates that to the left of the store entrance, as one 
faces it, is a courtyard area with benches that the shopping center maintains.  The 
point was not developed at trial, but it appears likely that this courtyard area is a 
public forum under the majority opinion in Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th 850.  
(I dissented in Fashion Valley, but I recognize that it now represents the law in 
California.)  If this is correct, labor picketers (and others) could present their 
message next to the store, meaning that neither the store nor its employees are 
inaccessible to anyone.  (See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, at pp. 529, 541 
[labor organizers had no right to enter private property to present their message 
when suitable public property was available nearby].)  Given the seemingly slight 
difference between picketing next to the store and at its entrance, it is far from 
clear to me that the high court would permit California to discriminate in this way 
between labor-related speech and all other speech. 
We should remand the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to 
remand it back to the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of this court‘s 
holding that the entrance walkway in front of the store is not a public forum.  
 
5 
Then, and only then, should we decide the remaining statutory and constitutional 
questions based on a full and concrete record. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Ralphs Grocery Company v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 8 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 186 Cal.App.4th 1078 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S185544 
Date Filed: December 27, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Loren E. McMaster 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Morrison & Foerster, Miriam A. Vogel, Timothy F. Ryan and Tritia M. Murata for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Littler Mendelson, William J. Emanuel and Natalie Rainforth for Employers Group, California Grocers 
Association and California Hospital Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jones Day, Willis J. Goldsmith, Amanda M. Betman, Craig E. Stewart; National Chamber Litigation 
Center, Inc., Robin S. Conrad and Shane B. Kawka for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Michael M. Berger and Matthew P. Kanny for California Retailers Association, 
California Business Properties Association and International Council of Shopping Centers as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Davis, Cowell & Bowe, Richard G. McCracken, Steven L. Stemerman, Elizabeth A. Lawrence, Andrew J. 
Kahn, Paul L. More, Sarah Grossman-Swenson for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
David L. Llewellyn, Jr., for the Missionary Church of the Disciples of Jesus Christ as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Judith A. Scott; Altshuler Berzon, Stephen P. Berzon, Scott A. Kronland and P. Casey Pitts for Service 
Employees International Union as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Lynn Rhinehart, James B. Coppess; Altshuler Berzon and Michael Rubin for American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Alan L. Schlosser for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Catherine L. Fisk for Labor Law Professors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S185544 – counsel continued 
 
Counsel: 
 
Reich, Adell & Cvitan and J. David Sackman for Korean Immigrant Workers Alliance as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
DeCarlo, Connor & Shanley and Daniel M. Shanley for Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor 
General, J. Matthew Rodriquez, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Louis Verdugo, Jr., Assistant Attorney 
General, Angela Sierra and Antonette Benita Cordero, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Miriam A. Vogel 
Morrison & Foerster 
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3500 
Los Angeles, CA  90013-1024 
(213) 892-5200 
 
Paul L. More 
Davis, Cowell & Bowe 
595 Market Street, Suite 1400 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 597-7200