Title: Montclair State University v. County of Passaic
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 6, 2018

Montclair State University v. County of Passaic Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Montclair State University (MSU) has attempted to create a third egress from its campus onto a county road. MSU consulted with both the County of Passaic, New Jersey (County) and the City of Clifton (City), ultimately satisfying most of their concerns about the project. When the County failed to respond to MSU’s permit applications, MSU filed this action, seeking a judgment declaring that no permit or local approval was required, or alternatively, an order compelling the County to issue all necessary permits. The trial court denied relief sought. Relying on Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142 (1972), the court reasoned that the parties had to exchange updated traffic studies, consult further, and appear before the local planning boards. Although MSU agreed to make more changes to its plan, the impasse remained. The principal point of contention was the design speed of the campus roadway, which the County and City claimed was unsafe. MSU declined to make the change proposed by the County and the City, relying on its experts’ conclusion that the road’s planned design speed and posted speed would be safe, and that the alternative design was unsafe. The matter returned to the trial court, which dismissed MSU’s complaint because MSU had not returned to the local planning boards to develop the record further. In reversing the trial court, the Appellate Division held MSU enjoyed a limited immunity but that Rutgers controlled here and prohibits MSU from exercising its power in an “unreasonable fashion.” The panel remanded the matter, instructing that the trial court determine whether MSU had adequately and reasonably consulted with the County and City. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that in circumstances such as were presented here, a judicial finding that the cited public safety concern has been reasonably addressed was a necessary additional requirement before a court could either compel local regulatory action or grant declaratory relief that the planned action is exempt from land use regulation. The appellate court did not specify what record warranted such a finding in every case. “Rather, the trial court should determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether it could make such a finding via a summary proceeding or whether a more fulsome proceeding is necessary.” Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) Montclair State University v. County of Passaic (A-16-17) (080084)Argued April 10, 2018 -- Decided August 6, 2018LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. This appeal raises substantive and procedural issues about the immunity from local zoning laws and regulation that Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142 (1972), recognized for a state university with respect to improvements on state-owned land. The Court reaffirms principles expressed in the Rutgers decision and addresses the application of those principles when the planned state agency activity is asserted to have a direct public safety impact affecting off- site land for which local governmental authorities have a responsibility to act in the public interest and could be potentially liable should a tort claim arise. Since 2004, plaintiff Montclair State University (MSU) has attempted to create a third egress from its campus onto a county road. MSU consulted with both the County of Passaic (County) and the City of Clifton (City), ultimately satisfying most of their concerns about the project. When the County failed to respond to MSU’s permit applications, MSU filed this action, seeking a judgment declaring that no permit or local approval was required, or alternatively, an order compelling the County to issue all necessary permits. The trial court denied the relief sought. Relying on Rutgers, the court reasoned that the parties must exchange updated traffic studies, consult further, and appear before the local planning boards. Although MSU agreed to make more changes to its plan, the impasse remained. The principal point of contention was the design speed of the campus roadway, which the County and City claimed was unsafe. MSU declined to make the change proposed by the County and the City, relying on its experts’ conclusion that the road’s planned design speed and posted speed would be safe, and that the alternative design was unsafe. The matter returned to the trial court, which dismissed MSU’s complaint because MSU had not returned to the local planning boards to develop the record further. MSU appealed. The Appellate Division panel concluded that the trial court “mistakenly exercised [its] discretion by . . . requiring the matter be heard by the municipal and county planning boards for development of a record.” 451 N.J. Super. 523, 530 (App. Div. 2017). Rather, the panel held that MSU enjoys a limited immunity but that Rutgers controls here and prohibits MSU from exercising its power in an “unreasonable fashion.” Id. at 530-31. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded the matter, instructing that the trial court determine whether MSU had adequately and reasonably consulted with the County and City. Id. at 533. The Court granted the City’s petition for certification. 231 N.J. 330 (2017). 1 HELD: First, under the qualified immunity addressed in Rutgers a state agency must be able to demonstrate both that the planned action is reasonable and that the agency reasonably consulted with local authorities and took into consideration legitimate local concerns. Second, although an otherwise immune state entity may not be compelled to submit to review before a planning board, when its improvement directly affects off-site property and implicates a safety concern raised by a local governmental entity responsible to protect public safety with respect to that off-site property, special judicial review and action is required. In circumstances such as are presented here, a judicial finding that the cited public safety concern has been reasonably addressed shall be a necessary additional requirement before a court may either compel local regulatory action or grant declaratory relief that the planned action is exempt from land use regulation. The Court does not specify what record warrants such a finding in every case. Rather, the trial court should determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether it could make such a finding via a summary proceeding or whether a more fulsome proceeding is necessary.1. Prior to Rutgers, the Court considered two cases that involved local assertions of municipal land use control of lands that had become subject to state authorities empowered to construct highway road projects. In City of Newark v. Turnpike Authority, the Court rejected the notion that the local governmental authority superseded the power granted to the State agency by the Legislature. 7 N.J. 377, 384 (1951). In Town of Bloomfield v. Highway Authority, a municipality sought a declaration that the State Highway Authority was subject to local land use controls. 18 N.J. 237, 238 (1955). The Court took into account that there were “widespread objections by local communities and residents . . . to the encroachments of new highways,” but found that they “must, in the public interest, give way to the greater good for the greater number.” Id. at 248. (pp. 16-20)2. In Rutgers, the Court was asked to consider the extent to which a municipality’s zoning ordinances could place limits on a housing expansion by a state university on its own lands, where the municipality claimed that the project would impact municipal resources and services. The Court rejected a “presumption of immunity” based exclusively on the superiority one governmental entity may have over another in hierarchy and settled on a case-by-case test that depends on “legislative intent . . . with respect to the particular agency or function involved,” to be divined from a number of factors. Id. at 152-53. In the application of its test, the Court determined that Rutgers, as a state university and instrumentality of the State, is entitled to a qualified immunity. Id. 153. The Court stressed that immunity came with caveats in its exercise. First, immunity from land use controls may not “be exercised in an unreasonable fashion so as to arbitrarily override all important legitimate local interests.” Ibid. Further, “even if the proposed action of the immune governmental instrumentality does not reach the unreasonable stage . . . , the instrumentality ought to consult with the local authorities and sympathetically listen and give every consideration to local objections, problems and suggestions.” (pp. 20-24)3. Rutgers identified a number of principles that would govern whether an entity is entitled to claim immunity from local land use regulation: “the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the 2 enterprise concerned[,] and the impact upon legitimate local interests.” Id. at 152-53. With respect to the specific project for which immunity is sought, Rutgers requires a two-fold analysis. First, the substantive action planned by the entity claiming immunity from local land use control must itself be reasonable. Id. at 153. That determination is distinct, yet not entirely disentangled from, the second condition required of a state governmental entity acting in furtherance of its statutory mission and claiming immunity from local land use control in connection with that action: The immune entity also has an obligation to respectfully hear and consider legitimate concerns raised by local authorities to minimize conflict between the two governmental authorities. Id. at 153-54. (pp. 24-25)4. MSU enjoys the qualified immunity from local land use controls recognized in Rutgers. The Court notes that the Appellate Division’s decision can be interpreted to have conflated the two parts of the Rutgers analysis into one and, for clarification’s sake, reaffirms the two parts to the analysis that must be applied on remand. Specifically, in order for the trial court to grant MSU the relief it seeks, it must first assess the inherent reasonableness of the MSU roadway plan in its entirety, including review of its off-site impact. Separately, the trial court must also assess whether MSU reasonably consulted and took into consideration the legitimate concerns of the local government entities. The trial court must address both components, and the Appellate Division’s instructions are modified accordingly. (pp. 26-29)5. A novel issue raised in this case is how and where public safety concerns factor into the Rutgers analysis. The Court recognizes as significant the public interest inherent in a local government entity’s reasonable concerns about the impact of an immune state entity’s internal actions affecting public safety on non-state public property. Where, as here, a public safety concern could affect local public property and the members of the public using that property, the Court is compelled to add an additional inquiry to the test articulated in Rutgers. A review by MSU and its experts asserting that it has reasonably addressed the public safety concern is not sufficient, standing alone. In circumstances presented here, where a facially legitimate public safety concern is raised about an immune entity’s planned improvement to lands, which would have a direct impact on non-state-owned property, the Court will require a showing by the immune entity that its planning has reasonably addressed the public safety concern. The Court will require a discrete judicial finding that MSU’s proposed action reasonably satisfies public safety concerns. Such a finding comes in addition to the otherwise typical review of an immune entity’s modification to its own property. A judicial finding is necessary to properly protect the general public and to fairly provide an independent judicial determination on which other public entities may rely. The Court leaves to the sound discretion of the trial court whether this matter may proceed along the lines of a summary proceeding or whether the taking of live testimony or receipt of other evidence is necessary. (pp. 29-34) AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 16 September Term 2017 080084MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.COUNTY OF PASSAIC and CITY OF CLIFTON, Defendants-Appellants. Argued April 10, 2018 – Decided August 6, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 451 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 2017). Marvin J. Brauth argued the cause for appellant City of Clifton (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys; Marvin J. Brauth, of counsel and on the briefs). Michael H. Glovin, Deputy County Counsel, argued the cause for appellant County of Passaic (William J. Pascrell, III, Passaic County Counsel, attorney; Michael H. Glovin, of counsel and on the brief). Antonio J. Casas argued the cause for respondent (Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, attorneys; Antonio J. Casas and Samuel G. Destito, of counsel and on the briefs). Peter G. Verniero argued the cause for amicus curiae Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (Sills Cummis & Gross, attorneys; Peter G. Verniero and James M. Hirschhorn, of counsel and on the brief, and Michael S. Carucci, on the brief). 1 Christopher A. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Christopher A. Edwards, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises substantive and procedural issues aboutthe immunity from local zoning laws and regulation that Rutgersv. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142 (1972), recognized for a state universitywith respect to improvements on state-owned land. Case law recognizes that a state higher educationalinstitution like MSU, statutorily vested with control over itsproperty, see N.J.S.A. 18A:64-7, has a form of immunity, orexemption, from local land use controls when it comes to the useand development of its own property. However, thatdiscretionary authority is not absolute: the freedom to actindependent of local land use control may not be exercised inunreasonable ways. In this matter, Montclair State University (MSU) commencedan action in the Law Division of the Superior Court, invokingjudicial authority over an impasse that had developed betweenMSU and local governmental authorities concerning improvementsto the intersection of a campus road with a Passaic County(County) road in the City of Clifton (City). MSU sought an 2 order either (1) directing the County to issue three permitsrelated to the intersection and affiliated roadway improvements;or, in the alternative, (2) declaring that state law exempts MSUfrom local permitting requirements or approval for its desiredroad improvements, regardless of whether a traffic signal isinstalled at the intersection. The trial court declined the requested relief and dismissedthe action; the court told MSU either to appear before the localplanning board to establish a record on the public safetyconcerns expressed by the local governmental authorities or toappeal. MSU appealed and the Appellate Division reversed thedismissal of the action and remanded for further proceedingsbefore the trial court. We granted the City’s petition for certification, seekingcorrection of the Appellate Division’s interpretive guidance onRutgers and clarification of that decision’s application incircumstances, as here, where local authorities have raisedpublic safety concerns. For the reasons that follow, we affirmwith modification the judgment of the Appellate Division. We now reaffirm principles expressed in the Rutgersdecision. Further, we address the application of thoseprinciples when the planned state agency activity is asserted tohave a direct public safety impact affecting off-site land forwhich local governmental authorities have a responsibility to 3 act in the public interest and could be potentially liableshould a tort claim arise. First, we clarify and hold that under the qualifiedimmunity addressed in Rutgers a state agency must be able todemonstrate both that the planned action is reasonable and thatthe agency reasonably consulted with local authorities and tookinto consideration legitimate local concerns. Meaningfulconsultation with appropriate local public authority is anecessary part, but consultation alone does not suffice toconclusively address the essential question about thereasonableness of the planned action. Second, we hold that when the otherwise immune stateagency’s improvement directly affects off-site property andimplicates a safety concern raised by a local governmentalentity responsible to protect public safety with respect to thatoff-site property, special judicial review and action isrequired. We continue to recognize that the state entity maynot be compelled to submit to review before a planning board.However, in circumstances such as are presented here, a judicialfinding that the cited public safety concern has been reasonablyaddressed through the planning for the state agency’simprovement shall be a necessary additional requirement before acourt may either compel local regulatory action or grant 4 declaratory relief that the planned action is exempt from landuse regulation. We do not intend to specify what record warrants such afinding in every case. Rather, the trial court shoulddetermine, on a case-by-case basis, whether it could make such afinding via a summary proceeding or whether a more fulsomeproceeding is necessary. I. A. Since 2004, MSU has attempted to create a third egress fromits Passaic County campus onto Valley Road, also known asPassaic County Road 621. MSU wants to relieve trafficcongestion on its campus roads and provide easier access ontoand off of the campus and its roadways. Specifically at issuehere, MSU wants to convert Yogi Berra Drive -- a campus road onstate property that intersects with Valley Road -- from aningress-only road to an ingress/egress road. MSU consulted with both the County and the City about theproject for almost six years. During that extended process, MSUsubmitted construction plans for review, retained experts tostudy traffic and safety concerns, and, ultimately, agreed tochange portions of its plan to address concerns raised by boththe County and the City. After conferring with both entities 5 over several years, MSU was able to satisfy most concerns aboutthe project. On April 7, 2014, MSU submitted permit applications to theCounty Engineer for the new egress. The first permitapplication was for a “right-of-way access permit/curb cutpermit,” that would allow MSU to relocate the access driveway toa new location, and to install 320 feet of “full height (raised)curbing.” The permit application indicates that the purpose ofthe work was to construct a new driveway and add a trafficsignal, and that the work would be located on Valley Road. Asecond permit application, asking for a storm drain connection,requested that the County allow MSU to connect a storm draininto the County’s existing system at Valley Road. Finally,consistent with an alternative plan for the access driveway, MSUsubmitted another application also for a “right-of-way accesspermit/curb cut permit,” allowing the University to relocate theaccess driveway to a new location and to install 130 feet of“full height (raised) curbing” alongside the county road. With respect to all of the permits, MSU asked for issuanceof approval either with or without the installation of a trafficlight to control the traffic on Valley Road as well as the entryand exit of traffic flowing between Valley Road and Yogi BerraDrive. The MSU Board of Trustees also adopted a resolution 6 committing to assume the cost and maintenance of a trafficsignal, if one were permitted. In its cover letter to the County Engineer that accompaniedthe permit applications, MSU recounted the extended history ofdiscussion, public comment, and negotiation with local officialsabout the project, as well as the changes that had been made toits plans as a result of those consultations. MSU sought astatement that its application was now complete, asserting thatthe University was exempt, under Rutgers, from seeking approvalfor the project from the City’s land use boards. When the County failed to respond to MSU’s permitapplications, MSU filed this action against the County on July29, 2014, seeking a judgment declaring that no permit or otherlocal approval was required, or alternatively, an ordercompelling the County to issue all necessary permits. The courtpermitted the City to intervene. On the return date of an order to show cause, the trialcourt denied MSU the relief sought. The court addressed thescope of the County’s authority over the proposed constructionon state land. Relying on Rutgers, the court reasoned that theparties must exchange updated traffic studies, consult further,and appear before the local planning boards. The court retainedjurisdiction in the event the parties could not reach aresolution. 7 The parties met and conferred. Although MSU agreed to makemore changes to its plans, the impasse over issuance of thepermits remained. The principal point of contention was the design speed ofthe campus roadway, which the County and City claimed wasunsafe. Yogi Berra Drive is built on an incline. The Countyand the City posited that the road curve should be altered andthat the road should have a thirty-five mile-per-hour designspeed with up to a twenty-five mile-per-hour posted speed. MSUdeclined to make that change, relying on its experts’ conclusionthat the road’s planned twenty mile-per-hour design speed andfifteen mile-per-hour posted speed would be safe, and that thealternative design was unsafe because it would encourage higheroperating speeds. Ultimately, the County refused to issue thepermits, despite MSU’s issuance of a revised plan that addressedmost of the County’s concerns, because it believed the roadwaydesign failed to meet applicable safety standards and becausethe City’s approval was necessary to locate a proposed trafficsignal on the roadway of Valley Road. MSU asked the trial court to relist the matter for issuanceof a decision. Over the City’s objection based on MSU’s failureto appear before City planning boards, the court heard thematter again on February 25, 2016. MSU argued that (1) it hadmet all requirements under Rutgers; (2) its revised plans 8 resolved the County’s and City’s safety concerns; and (3) theonly area on which the parties could not agree -- the design ofthe roadway -- concerned a project located entirely on MSU’sproperty and over which MSU had sole jurisdiction. The Countyand City argued that there were still safety issues due to theroadway design and the ability of cars descending Yogi BerraDrive at the intersection with the county road to maintaincontrol; that said, the County acknowledged that MSU had madethe project “safer” and had “accommodated” most of the CountyPlanning Board’s comments. The trial court dismissed MSU’s complaint for declaratoryand injunctive relief because MSU had not returned to the localplanning boards, as had previously been ordered, to develop therecord further. The trial court advised MSU that its optionswere either to appeal or “set something up so there can be arecord” concerning the roadway plans and MSU’s accommodations ofthe recommendations made by the County and the City. B. MSU appealed and argued that it was an abuse of discretionby the trial court to dismiss the complaint “without determiningwhether MSU met its obligation under Rutgers to act reasonablyand consult with the county and city,” and by mandating “thatMSU return to Clifton’s planning board for approval for anyreason, including, for the development of a record.” Montclair 9 State Univ. v. County of Passaic, 451 N.J. Super. 523, 530 (App.Div. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The AppellateDivision framed the question as whether known “limits [to] alocal government’s authority to regulate development of a stateuniversity’s property that was confined to its campus . . .apply to a state university’s construction of a roadway thatintersects with a county road.” Id. at 527. The panel reversed and remanded “for reinstatement ofplaintiff’s complaint and a trial, if necessary, for the judgeto determine whether MSU satisfied its obligation underRutgers.” Id. at 533. The panel concluded that the court“mistakenly exercised [its] discretion by . . . requiring thematter be heard by the municipal and county planning boards fordevelopment of a record.” Id. at 530. Rather, the panel heldthat MSU enjoys a limited immunity but that Rutgers controlshere and prohibits MSU from exercising its power in an“unreasonable fashion.” Id. at 530-31 (quoting Rutgers, 60 N.J.at 153). The panel explained, first, that a “difference of opinionas to the best method to address a local traffic safety concernalone . . . does not support a finding that the state universityacted unreasonably.” Id. at 532. Turning then to theconsultation that occurred, the panel emphasized that MSU “mustreasonably take local safety concerns into consideration when 10 formulating and executing its plans.” Ibid. However, the panelclarified that “[t]he determination of whether a stateuniversity has complied with its obligation to consult andconsider local concerns is a judicial function not conditionedupon consideration by a local zoning board.” Ibid.Accordingly, the panel remanded the matter to the trial courtwith the instruction that the court determine whether MSU hadadequately and reasonably consulted with the County and City.Id. at 533. We granted the City’s petition for certification. 231 N.J. 330 (2017).1 We also granted the motions of the Attorney Generalof New Jersey and of Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey(Rutgers), to appear as amici curiae in this matter. II. A. The City argues that, as a general matter, state agenciesenjoy an immunity from local control but not an absoluteimmunity. It asserts that Rutgers set forth a multi-part testfor a trial court’s use in disputes involving a state entity’sassertion of immunity from local land use and regulatorycontrols. According to the City, that test is as follows: when1 The County did not petition for certification but did move to participate. We allowed the County to file its Appellate Division brief and participate in oral argument. 11 a local governmental entity (1) raises an important localinterest, a court is required to assess (2) whether the stateagency invoking immunity is acting in an “unreasonable fashionso as to arbitrarily override all important legitimate localinterests,” (quoting Rutgers, 60 N.J. at 153), and (3) whetherthe state entity has consulted with, listened to, and considered“local objections,” (quoting Rutgers, 60 N.J. at 154). The City argues that the Appellate Division ignored theprong that addresses the reasonableness of the action byfocusing solely on the act of consultation with local agenciesand not considering reasonableness as a distinct query relatedto the proposed project and its effect. According to the City,the Appellate Division decision allows a state agency to moveahead with a project so long as the agency is satisfied with thereasonableness of its own proposal, without regard to a disputebetween state and local entities as to the project’s safety.The decision thereby grants the agency unfettered ability toimplement an unreasonable project, according to the City.Moreover, the City maintains that the panel’s approachforecloses judicial review of the state agency’s reasonablenessdecision. B. The County generally supports the City’s position. Itdistinguishes Rutgers from this case on the basis of the 12 County’s governmental powers. It also asserts that the safetyconcerns raised here are “different than the zoning regulationsraised” in Rutgers, limiting its applicability. The Countyposits that the design speed for the downhill travel on theroadway at issue, coupled with the “somewhat sharp turn at thebottom of the roadway at its connection with the Valley Road,”is a legitimate safety concern. The County expressed concernabout “how many vehicles could be stacking up at the newproposed . . . [i]ntersection at any particular time and howdangerous that stacking might be in relation to the vertical andhorizontal curvature of the roadway.” Finally, the County notesthat if MSU’s design moves forward as planned, and the County’ssafety concerns materialize, then the County could be exposed totort liability it “might be powerless to deny.” C. MSU argues that the Appellate Division correctly appliedRutgers when the panel remanded the case to the trial court.MSU suggests that the City misreads the Appellate Division’sdecision, which “expressly reject[ed] the notion that a stateuniversity can comply with the law without giving realconsideration to local concerns.” MSU asserts that in this matter there is substantialevidence that it listened to the City and the County andsubstantively addressed each issue, making significant changes 13 to its plans to accommodate most local concerns. It onlydeclined to redesign Yogi Berra Drive after its expertsconcluded that the original design was safe and that theproposed alternative could create an unsafe situation. Thus,MSU says it fully complied with Rutgers, as evidenced by itsmeaningful consultations with the City and County and itswillingness to make reasonable adjustments for safety concerns,despite a difference of opinion between the parties. D. Two amici support MSU in this matter. 1. The Attorney General asks this Court to hold, consistentwith Rutgers, that the trial court must “balance Statesovereignty with important legitimate local interests byemploying deferential consideration of whether [MSU] reasonablyconsulted” with the City and the County. As long as the State“hears local concerns and reasonably exercises its immunity inlight of those concerns,” the Attorney General asserts that,consistent with Rutgers, state sovereign immunity “permits aState project to go forward, even if local objection persists.” The Attorney General notes that state entities routinelyundertake projects that could touch on significant local issues.The Attorney General argues that the State must have immunityfrom local ordinances because “a shift in this well-established 14 balance” would undermine sovereign immunity and allow localentities to stall State projects with “years of objections,”effectively “giv[ing] the local entity an unfettered veto powerover the State project.” 2. Rutgers argues that although the Appellate Divisioncorrectly understood the Rutgers standard, the panel erred inremanding the case for further proceedings in the trial court.State institutions, according to Rutgers, must retain autonomyto improve facilities consistent with the best interest of theirstakeholders, including the public, so long as the institutionsprovide appropriate attention to communicated local concerns andland use requirements. Rutgers submits that the Rutgersdecision struck the appropriate balance. It urges us to reframethe standard as requiring that “a State university’s land usedeterminations w[ill] be upheld so long as the university had aninformed, rational basis for such determinations, after takinglocal objections or concerns into account.” In arguing that there is no procedural hearing requirement,Rutgers reasons that an arbitrary and capricious standard shouldgovern in this type of dispute.2 Consistent with that standard,2 Rutgers argues that although this case was properly brought in the Law Division because it originated as an action by MSU against the County, once the City intervened the case became 15 Rutgers asserts that a court should uphold a university’sproposed project if it falls on the spectrum of informed andrational decision-making. Finally, Rutgers acknowledges that areviewing court should consider the off-site impact on anadjoining municipality that relates to the development of stateland, but argues that, without “such an off-site impact, therecan be virtually no local objections to the proposed land use.” III. A. In the 1972 Rutgers case, relied on by all parties to thisaction, this Court considered the autonomy that a stateuniversity has from local land use regulation. In broaching theimmunity question in the setting of the then-only stateuniversity, with the added unique status of Rutgers due to itsinstitutional history, this Court noted that determining whichgovernmental entities “are immune from municipal land useregulations, and to what extent, is not . . . properlyreviewable directly in the Appellate Division as an appeal of state agency action. Rutgers maintains that, in the setting of appellate review of state agency action, the applicable standard reviews only for arbitrary and capricious action. Rutgers urges us to hold that land use disputes involving challenges to claims of immunity under Rutgers should generally follow the typical appellate path for judicial review of state agency action. 16 susceptible of [an] absolute or ritualistic answer.” 60 N.J. at 150. The issue of immunity from municipal land use controls hadarisen before for various types of governmental entitiesincluding state authorities, a county entity, and in an instanceof an inter-municipality conflict. Canvassing its prior caselaw where immunity from local land use control was at issue, id.at 151-52, the Court observed that no “absolute criteria” hadbeen adopted “as decisive,” id. at 151. Prior to Rutgers, this Court considered two cases thatinvolved local assertions of municipal land use control overlands that had become subject to state authorities empowered toconstruct highway road projects. In City of Newark v. Turnpike Authority, the City of Newarkbrought an action seeking “to enjoin [a] . . . grading contract,to prevent the construction of [a] portion of the turnpike inthe manner contemplated, [and] to have the Turnpike AuthorityAct declared unconstitutional.” 7 N.J. 377, 380 (1951). ThisCourt rejected the notion that the local governmental authoritysuperseded the power granted to the state agency by theLegislature, noting that the Turnpike Authority’s enabling actspecifically overrode all other general laws. Id. at 384. TheCourt added that 17 the idea that any and every municipality along the route of the proposed turnpike could effectively veto either its location or the manner of its construction by a withholding of consent is in direct conflict with the very concept of a turnpike designed to serve the best interests of the entire State and not merely those of particular localities. . . . The Legislature has broad and well established powers over municipalities, and its ability to provide for the superiority of the Authority over the city in the respects here involved is therefore beyond question. [Id. at 387 (citation omitted).] In Town of Bloomfield v. Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237,238 (1955), this Court more directly addressed a state entity’simmunity from local land use controls. There, a municipalitysought a declaration that the State Highway Authority “wassubject to local zoning and building regulations in the erectionof restaurants and gasoline stations at service areas along theParkway within the territorial limits of the Town.” Ibid. ThisCourt began its analysis by identifying the legal principlesunderlying sovereign immunity in that context. Id. at 241-43(citing Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Weehawken Township, 27 N.J. Super. 328, 333 (Ch. Div. 1953), rev’d 14 N.J. 570 (1954), for itscollection of cases supportive of view that “independent stateand bi-state authorities are generally immune from municipalordinances and other local regulations” (internal quotationmarks omitted)); see also Newark v. Tpk. Auth., 7 N.J. at 387;Interstate Bridge & Tunnel Comm. v. City of Jersey City, 93 N.J.18 Eq. 550, 553 (Ch. 1922) (“Municipalities are the creatures ofthe state and the powers given to them are always subject to beabridged or repealed by the sovereign who conferred them. . . .[T]he state, in the act creating the bridge and tunnelcommission . . . with all the powers appropriate and necessaryfor the proper performance of [its] duties, without anylimitation as to municipal control, overrode [the local code] tothe extent of nullifying its provisions so far as they requiredcompliance with them by the state.”). Finding that the Legislature had the clear power to“immunize its public Authorities from the provisions of localzoning and building restrictions,” the Court turned itsattention to whether the building of service areas was similarlyexempt from local zoning and building requirements. Bloomfieldv. Highway Auth., 18 N.J. at 244. Acknowledging the importanceof the Parkway as a state project on public land, and the“widespread” “belief” that the “need [for new highwayconstruction] is very urgent,” the Court concluded that thelegislation authorizing the highway construction “was intendedto and does immunize fully the Authority’s proper operationsfrom the restrictive provisions of the local zoning ordinances.”Id. at 248-49. The Court took into account that there were “widespreadobjections by local communities and residents . . . to the 19 encroachments of new highways and their untoward incidents.”Id. at 248. However, the Court perceived that a balancing ofinterests tipped in favor of the proposed State action: Such objections . . . are, of course, understandable and are to be sympathetically heard and fairly considered by the agency charged with the high responsibility of effectuating the public objective with due regard for individual rights. But these rights, valuable as they are, must, in the public interest, give way to the greater good for the greater number and where the agency has, within its statutory delegation, conscientiously selected the route of the highway and the sites of its incidental facilities, it is highly proper that the courts not intrude. [Id. at 248-49.] As those two cases reflect, when the issue of land usecontrols arose in the setting of a state institution of highereducation in Rutgers, this Court had highly relevant precedentconcerning challenges by local governmental entities to stateconstruction projects on state-owned land on which to rely. B. In Rutgers, we were asked to consider the extent to which amunicipality’s zoning ordinances could place limits on a housingexpansion by a state university on its own lands, where themunicipality claimed that the project would impact municipalresources and services. 60 N.J. at 144-50. Rutgers planned tobuild additional housing for student families on University- 20 owned land. Id. at 145. The location of the student-familycampus housing brought it within an area of Piscataway Townshipin which the local zoning ordinance, according to the Township,would have limited the married-student housing to 500 units but“allow[ed] unlimited housing facilities for unmarried students.”Id. at 146-47. Piscataway denied Rutgers building permits to constructunits in excess of the capped number. Id. at 147. Rutgers thensought a variance from the Board of Adjustment, which wasdenied. Ibid. Accordingly, Rutgers commenced an action in lieuof prerogative writs in the Law Division of the Superior Court,which ultimately resulted in a trial court order grantingRutgers’ motion for summary judgment. 113 N.J. Super 65, 66,71-73 (Law. Div. 1971). Among its arguments before the trialcourt, and the only one advanced before this Court, Rutgerscontended that, “as an instrumentality of the state, [it was]not subject to a local zoning ordinance.” 60 N.J. at 147. At the outset of its analysis, our Court acknowledged somegeneral “black letter law” according to which, [a]bsent a waiver expressed by, or necessarily inferred from, the language of a state statute, a state is not amenable to the zoning regulations of its political subdivisions[,] and [a] public corporation or authority created by the state to carry out a function of the state is not bound by local zoning regulations. 21 [Id. at 150 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).]However, the Court in Rutgers rejected a “presumption ofimmunity” based exclusively on the superiority one governmentalentity may have over another in hierarchy, see id. at 152 n.4,and settled on a test that depends on “legislative intent . . .with respect to the particular agency or function involved,” tobe divined from a number of factors, id. at 152. The factorsthe Court listed as the “most obvious and common” are the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned[,] and the impact upon legitimate local interests. [Id. at 153.]The Court emphasized the need for a case-by-case approach.Ibid. (“The point is that there is no precise formula or set ofcriteria which will determine every case mechanically andautomatically.”). That said, the Court acknowledged that therewould be circumstances in which the “broader public interest”would be “so important” as to necessitate immunity even whencompared with “local interests [that] may be great.” Ibid. In the application of its test, the Court determined thatRutgers, as a state university and instrumentality of the State,is entitled to a qualified immunity. Ibid. (explaining that in 22 “performing an essential governmental function for the benefitof all the people of the state, the Legislature would not intendthat [Rutgers’] growth and development should be subject torestriction or control by local land use regulation”). TheCourt stressed that the immunity being recognized came withcaveats in its exercise. First, the immunity is not“unbridled”; rather, the Rutgers Court instructed that immunityfrom land use controls may not “be exercised in an unreasonablefashion so as to arbitrarily override all important legitimatelocal interests.” Ibid.3 (citing Washington Township v. Villageof Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 584-86 (1958)). The Court alsoimposed a further requirement: [E]ven if the proposed action of the immune governmental instrumentality does not reach the unreasonable stage for any sufficient reason, the instrumentality ought to consult with the local authorities and sympathetically listen and give every consideration to local objections, problems and suggestions in order to minimize the conflict as much as possible. [Id. at 154 (citing Bloomfield v. Highway Auth., 18 N.J. at 248).] As applied to the facts in Rutgers, the Court concludedthat it “fail[ed] to see the slightest vestige of3 As an example, the Court posited that “it would arbitrary[] if the state proposed to erect an office building in the crowded business district of a city where provision for off-street parking was required, [and] the state [chose] not to make some reasonable provision in that respect.” Id. at 153-54. 23 unreasonableness [in the University’s planned action] as far asPiscataway’s local interests are concerned or in any otherrespect.” Ibid. The Court noted that Rutgers presented theproposal to local authorities via its variance application so aform of fulsome consultation with local authorities took place.Ibid. Further, the Court rejected the idea that Piscataway’sstated concern about the housing project’s impact on the fiscalresources of the community (specifically the need to build moreschools) could be considered “a legitimate local interest fromany proper land use impact point of view.” Ibid. The Courtviewed Rutgers’ planned action -- to promote the housing andwelfare of its students -- to be substantively reasonable andconsistent with its statutory charge. See ibid. The Courtconcluded that the Legislature “intended that the growth anddevelopment of Rutgers, as a public university for the benefitof all the people of the state, was not to be thwarted orrestricted by local land use regulations” and declared theUniversity, and specifically its proposed project, immune fromthe zoning restriction capping the number of units. Id. at 158. IV. A. Thus, Rutgers identified a number of principles that wouldgovern whether an entity is entitled to claim immunity fromlocal land use regulation. The Court counseled consideration of 24 “the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity,the kind of function or land use involved, the extent of thepublic interest to be served thereby, the effect local land useregulation would have upon the enterprise concerned[,] and theimpact upon legitimate local interests.” Id. at 152-53. With respect to the specific project for which immunity issought, Rutgers requires a two-fold analysis. First, thesubstantive action planned by the entity claiming immunity fromlocal land use control must itself be reasonable. Id. at 153.The determination as to whether the planned project satisfiesthe reasonableness standard is distinct, yet not entirelydisentangled from, the second condition required of a stategovernmental entity acting in furtherance of its statutorymission and claiming immunity from local land use control inconnection with that action: The immune entity also has anobligation to respectfully hear and consider legitimate concernsraised by local authorities to minimize conflict between the twogovernmental authorities. Id. at 153-54. That its response tolegitimate concerns may overlap with components of areasonableness assessment reveals the intertwined nature of theinquiries in some instances. B. 1. 25 Turning to the case before us, at the outset, we note thatMSU is an entity that clearly, in planning its alteration to itscampus roads in order to better serve its intra-campus traffic,was acting in an immune capacity, pursuant to its statutoryauthorization to control its property. Like Rutgers, MSU is astate university, and N.J.S.A. 18A:64-7 grants the Board ofTrustees of MSU with the powers, rights and privileges that are incident to the proper government, conduct and management of the college, and the control of its properties and funds and such powers granted to [it] or reasonably implied, may be exercised without recourse or reference to any department or agency of the State, except as otherwise provided by this article or applicable law.Similar language in the statute governing Rutgers was recognizedin the Rutgers decision as conferring broadly autonomousgovernmental powers. See Rutgers, 60 N.J. at 158. MSU, as an agency of the State, acts for the Stategenerally when, in furtherance of its overall statutoryeducational mission, it determines to improve its campus roads(specifically here, Yogi Berra Drive) to better manage intra-campus traffic concerns for its students, faculty, employees,and guests. The function involved fits squarely within itsstatutory mission and its specific authority. Moreover, thepublic interest to be served supports that the Legislatureintended for MSU to be free of local land use regulation in 26 managing its internal road system so long as there is noasserted impact on non-state-owned public property. For suchactions, MSU needs autonomy to act in the way that best servesits enterprise and its stakeholders, rather than to have to seeklocal land use entanglement, nay approval. In sum, MSU is a state entity that enjoys the qualifiedimmunity from local land use controls with respect to managementof its own land and property that was recognized in Rutgers. Wethus turn to review of the exercise of that immunity. 2. In this matter, we are in substantial agreement with thejudgment of the Appellate Division remanding this matter to thetrial court for further proceedings. However, we modify theinstruction given to the trial court on the required Rutgersanalysis and, generally, how the judicial proceedings should beconducted. Here the Appellate Division’s decision can be interpretedto have inadvertently conflated the two parts of the Rutgersanalysis into one. For clarification’s sake, we reaffirm thetwo parts to the analysis that must be applied on remand. In order for the trial court to grant MSU the relief itseeks, the court first must assess the inherent reasonablenessof the MSU roadway plan in its entirety. See Rutgers, 60 N.J.at 152-53. When an off-site impact to the improvement on state- 27 owned lands is asserted, review of the project must includereview of its off-site impact. A state entity must be able todemonstrate the reasonableness of its planned action ifchallenged, as well as when it solicits judicial authority tocompel coordinated action by a local governmental entity. Separately, the trial court must also assess whether MSUreasonably consulted and took into consideration the legitimateconcerns of the local governmental entities. As notedpreviously, consultation and consideration of important localconcerns is necessary but it does not answer the distinct firstquestion about the reasonableness of the project itself. Seeid. at 153-54. The consultation function is meaningful to theanalysis, not merely procedural. Ibid. We expect that any legislatively authorized State actionshould be able to satisfy, minimally, an examination forreasonableness to be a proper exercise of governmental action.Moreover, it is compatible with the expectation thatcoordination and cooperation between and among governmentalagencies, even when differentiated by hierarchy, is in thepublic’s best interest generally. See ibid.; cf. Garden StateFarms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 455 (1978) (noting same outsideof Rutgers immunity context). Thus, on remand, in addition tothe requirement set out below, the trial court must address bothcomponents to the analysis required under Rutgers, and the 28 Appellate Division’s instructions to the trial court aremodified accordingly. C. Public safety concerns require pause because they meritcareful consideration. The local governmental entities herecite public safety concerns and voice apprehension about theirability to fulfill their own duty of care to members of thepublic, traveling on or along the county road, who may neverhave occasion to enter upon MSU property but who may benegatively affected by MSU’s plan design and its effect on theintersection with the county road. How and where those concernsfactor into the Rutgers analysis is a novel issue with respectto our law on the qualified immunity recognized in this area. We recognize as significant the public interest inherent ina local government entity’s reasonable concerns about the impactof an immune state entity’s internal actions affecting publicsafety on non-state public property. In this instance, thepublic safety concerns were raised in connection withquestioning the adequacy of the planning for the proposedroadway alterations and their impact on- and off-site of MSUproperty. The safety issue focuses on drivers descending the inclineof Yogi Berra Drive (presently solely an ingress with trafficmoving only up the incline), with its planned curve and speed 29 limit, and members of the public traversing the intersectingcounty road who would be affected by the descending driversapproaching the intersection. The local governmental entitieshave raised, facially, an important and legitimate planningconcern about public safety. It is unlike the anticipatedfuture impact on a community like the issue raised in the caseconcerning construction of service areas along the Parkway,where municipal authorities expressed concerns about speculativeuntoward incidents arising from motorists stopping at a restarea located within the community’s borders. See Bloomfield v.Highway Auth., 18 N.J. at 248. In that case, the projectedfears were insufficient to rise to the level of a legitimatelocal concern to weigh against the authority and the immunityreposed in the Highway Authority. See id. at 248-49. Regarding persons traveling the interior of the campus, MSUbears responsibility for its roads under its statutoryauthority. However, there is a distinct duty owed by otherlocal governmental entities when a public safety concern couldaffect local public property and the members of the public usingthat property. In such situations, we are compelled to add anadditional inquiry to the test articulated in Rutgers. Simply put, a review by MSU and its experts asserting thatit has reasonably addressed the public safety concern is notsufficient, standing alone, to protect general public safety and 30 also the interests of the local governmental entities withregard to that local public safety concern. MSU is notlegislatively authorized to act on issues of public safety oncounty roads as part of its delegated tasks. Cf. Holgate Prop.Assocs. v. Township of Howell, 145 N.J. 590, 594-95, 600-01(1996) (noting environmental agency’s statutory authority overuse of composted “sludge-derived product” that preempted localofficials from enforcing zoning and soil removal ordinances);Township of Cedar Grove v. Sheridan, 209 N.J. Super. 267, 270,279-80 (App. Div. 1986) (addressing Commissioner of Departmentof Transportation’s statutory authority over installation oftraffic signal at state highway intersection despite oppositionby township and residents). Subject to the limitations contained in the Tort ClaimsAct, local governments owe a duty of care to the publicregarding their roadways and ancillary public lands. SeeN.J.S.A. 59:4-6 (providing for and addressing scope of plan ordesign immunity); Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Boroughof Medford Lakes, 90 N.J. 582, 599 (1982) (noting that plan ordesign immunity not dependent on showing of reasonableness ofdesign, but rather, in order to claim immunity, public entitymust show that alleged dangerous condition was subject togovernment approval or in accordance with approved standards).The local governments here specifically owe a duty of care to 31 the motorists and pedestrians at and around the county road’sintersection with Yogi Berra Drive.4 Accordingly, the entitiesare acting well within their scope of responsibility in raising,in good faith, what they claim is a public safety concern aboutthe proposed intersection alterations. In the circumstances presented here, where a faciallylegitimate public safety concern is raised about an immuneentity’s planned improvement to lands, which would have a directimpact on non-state-owned property, we will require a showing bythe immune entity that its planning has reasonably addressed thepublic safety concern. The local governments can argueotherwise regarding the improvement’s impact on off-site publicproperty and whether public safety concerns have been reasonablyaddressed, but the court will make the ultimate determination.We will require a discrete judicial finding that MSU’s proposedaction reasonably satisfies public safety concerns. Such afinding comes in addition to the otherwise typical review of animmune entity’s modification to its own property. A judicialfinding is necessary to properly protect the general public andto fairly provide an independent judicial determination on which4 While providing certain immunities, the Tort Claims Act,N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, will factor prominently for those governmental entities with respect to their responsibility in the event the current intersection is changed and an accident occurs. 32 other public entities, who will remain responsible for futureactivity at the changed intersection, may rely. We do not suggest that protracted trial proceedings arenecessary whenever a public safety claim is advanced as a reasonfor questioning immunity from local land use regulations. Inthe instant remand, we leave to the sound discretion of thetrial court whether this matter may proceed along the lines of asummary proceeding or whether the taking of live testimony orreceipt of other evidence is necessary. See, e.g., R. 4:67. Tobe clear, an immune entity is not to be subjected to arequirement of submission to planning board review or the like.We hold only that a public entity must show that its planninghas reasonably addressed public safety concerns identified bylocal governments as having a direct impact on non-state publicproperty and that a judicial finding as to the reasonableness ofthe public entity’s action with respect to public safety shallbe required. Accordingly, on the remand of this matter, we add that incircumstances such as these, a judicial finding shall berequired on the reasonableness of the planned MSU project,specifically as it affects public safety regarding theintersection with the county road. V. 33 The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed asmodified by this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. 34