Title: Kim v. Mel Cummins Bldg. Contractor, Inc.
Citation: 552 P.2d 1117
Docket Number: 5764
State: Hawaii
Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date: August 3, 1976

552 P.2d 1117 (1976) In the Matter of Thomas H. D. KIM and Alice H. Kim, Applicants-Appellees, v. MEL CUMMINS BUILDING CONTRACTOR, INC., Applicant-Appellant. No. 5764. Supreme Court of Hawaii. August 3, 1976. Rehearing Denied August 23, 1976. W. Patrick O'Connor, Barlow &amp; O'Connor, A Law Corporation, Honolulu, for applicant-appellant. Neil F. Hulbert, Hong, Wong &amp; Iwai, Honolulu, for applicants-appellees. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and KOBAYASHI, OGATA, MENOR and KIDWELL, JJ. KOBAYASHI, Justice. This is an appeal by Mel Cummins Building Contractor, Inc. (contractor) from the order of the circuit court denying contractor's motion to vacate or modify award of arbitrators and from the judgment of said court which incorporates the arbitrators' finding, determination and award. For reasons stated below, we affirm. The contractor contends that the arbitrators' award must be vacated for the following reasons: 1. the arbitrators' award is contrary to the evidence adduced, or lacks sufficient supportive evidences; and/or *1118 2. the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award, upon the subject matter submitted, was not made. At the outset we hold that the contractor cannot maintain his first contention for it does not fall within the provisions of HRS § 658-9. Section 658-9 provides as follows: In Mars Constructors, Inc. v. Tropical Enterprises, Ltd., 51 Haw. 332, 460 P.2d 317 (1969), we held as follows: The second contention of the contractor requires a more detailed consideration since the contention meets the provision of HRS § 658-9(4). The parties herein entered into two stipulations empowering the arbitrators, to-wit: The contractor contends that the arbitrators' powers were strictly limited to the second stipulation and that the first stipulation was not relevant and of no effect. We disagree. Clearly the second stipulation merely supplements the first stipulation and the arbitrators are given broad powers based on the two stipulations. The arbitrators filed the following "finding, determination and award": Both parties must agree in writing to REMEDY A. If this cannot be agreed upon, with no revisions, then REMEDY B is the alternate decision of the Arbitrators. REMEDY B: That the Contract be terminated with the following binding provision: Pursuant to HRS § 658-10, the owners thereafter, filed a motion for order modifying or correcting the award stating that "Remedy B of the award is imperfect in form in that it fails to specify when Contractor shall pay its share of the excess costs to owner. Clarifying the deficiency does not affect the merits of the controversy". The circuit court granted the motion by modifying paragraph (4) of Remedy B of the award by adding the following sentence: We are of the opinion that in the light of both stipulations and the findings, determination and award of the arbitrators, the arbitrators have not exceeded their powers and have not so imperfectly executed their powers so that a mutual, final, and definite award, upon the subject matter, was not made. In our opinion the provisions of the second stipulation do not restrict nor take precedence over the provisions of the first stipulation. The fact that the arbitrators failed to answer and follow the questions and provisions of the second stipulation does not mean that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers. Clearly, the provisions of the first stipulation granted the arbitrators broad powers to resolve the herein controversy and they were within their granted powers to formulate their own remedies so that a mutual, final, and definite award can be made. KIDWELL, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. My disagreement with the majority centers in the interpretation of the two stipulations. The majority concludes that the submission of the dispute to the arbitrators by the first stipulation empowered them to make the award in issue here, and that the second stipulation did not limit that power. I would read the instructions contained in the second stipulation as a constraint upon the powers granted in the first stipulation, so that the effort of the arbitrators to devise a remedy different from that upon which the parties agreed in the second stipulation was in excess of their powers. I would reverse the judgment and direct the entry of a judgment vacating the award.