Title: People v. Hager
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90115
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2002

Docket No. 90115-Agenda 10-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								ROBERT L. HAGER, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 29, 2002.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Robert L. Hager, filed a pro se post-conviction
petition in the circuit court of Kane County pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
2000)). The circuit court found defendant's petition to be "without
merit" and summarily dismissed the petition under section
122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000)).
The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's summary dismissal
of defendant's post-conviction petition but on different grounds.
The appellate court determined that defendant's petition was not
timely filed and, on that basis, affirmed the circuit court. 314 Ill.
App. 3d 951. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment
of the appellate court and remand the cause to that court for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	On March 12, 1991, a jury convicted defendant of five counts
of aggravated criminal sexual assault against two victims under 13
years of age. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12-14(b)(1) . On
December 19, 1991, defendant was sentenced by the circuit court
to two consecutive 40-year terms of imprisonment. Defendant
appealed his convictions and sentence. On January 18, 1994, the
appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded the
cause to the circuit court for resentencing. People v. Hager, No.
2-91-1477 (1994) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). Defendant did not file a petition for leave to appeal from this
decision.
	On April 15, 1995, the circuit court resentenced defendant on
his aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions. Defendant was
sentenced to two consecutive 35-year terms of imprisonment.
Defendant again appealed, arguing that the sentences were
excessive. On February 21, 1997, the appellate court affirmed
defendant's sentences. People v. Hager,  2-95-0821 (1997)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	On October 17, 1997, defendant filed in the circuit court the
pro se petition for post-conviction relief which is at issue in this
appeal. Defendant alleged in his petition that his right to due
process was denied because his "convictions resulted from
testimony by a purported child sex abuse expert who
misrepresented her qualifications." Although the petition reflects
that defendant's signature was notarized on September 26, 1997,
the notice and proof of service sections of the petition are undated.
Further, there is no postmarked envelope establishing when
defendant placed the petition in the mail. The petition was filed
with the circuit court on October 17, 1997. Thereafter, on
December 11, 1997, the circuit court summarily dismissed
defendant's petition, finding it to be "without merit." See 725
ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000) (authorizing the summary
dismissal of a noncapital post-conviction petition which is
"frivolous or is patently without merit").
	The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of defendant's
post-conviction petition but not on the basis that the petition was
patently without merit. Instead, the appellate court determined that
defendant's petition was not timely filed. In reaching this
conclusion, the appellate court examined the time limitations for
filing a post-conviction petition which are set forth in section
122-1(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000)). Section
122-1(c) provides:
			"(c) No proceedings under this Article shall be
commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a
petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a
petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the
defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the
sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than
45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant's
brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed)
or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is
sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the
delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence." 725
ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000).
	Citing to People v. Reed, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1009 (1999),
the appellate court first concluded that the 45-day time limit
described in section 122-1(c) applied only to cases which had
been directly appealed to the supreme court and, hence, was not
relevant to the question of the timeliness of defendant's petition.
The appellate court then noted that, between the remaining two
time limits contained in section 122-1(c), i.e., the six-month
period or the three-year period, section 122-1(c) dictates that the
period which results in the earliest date for filing the petition must
be used. The court then compared the different periods.
	The appellate court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that
the three-year limitations period would not have begun to run until
defendant's convictions were affirmed on appeal in 1997 because
only then would defendant's convictions have been final. 314 Ill.
App. 3d at 953, citing People v. Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1011 (2000).
The court next observed that there were two possible ways to
calculate the six-month time period set forth in section 122-1(c).
The six-month period could have started to run either after
defendant's first appeal, in 1994, or after defendant's second
appeal, in 1997. The appellate court reasoned that the deadline
which resulted from either of these two possibilities was sooner
than the deadline which resulted from applying the three-year
period. Accordingly, because section 122-1(c) dictates that the
earliest date be used, the court set the three-year period aside.
	The appellate court then held that the six-month limitations
period for defendant to file his petition for post-conviction relief
began to run following his first appeal, in 1994. The appellate
court determined that it did not matter if defendant was not
technically or finally "convicted" until February 1997, when the
appellate court affirmed the sentences imposed following the
remand. The appellate court recognized that the first appeal
resulted in the reversal of defendant's sentences and, therefore,
that a post-conviction petition filed after the first appeal could not
have addressed any constitutional issues relating to defendant's
sentences. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that
defendant could have raised nonsentencing issues, including the
issue raised in this case, in a post-conviction petition while "the
sentencing issue was being resolved in the trial court." 314 Ill.
App. 3d at 954.	Thus, according to the appellate court, a post-conviction petition, though limited to nonsentencing issues, could
have been filed following the first appeal in 1994. After reaching
this conclusion, the appellate court reiterated that section 122-1(c)
requires that the earliest deadline imposed by the various
limitations periods be used. Because a post-conviction petition
could have been filed after the first appeal in 1994, the appellate
court determined that the six-month time limit began to run in this
case at that time.
	The appellate court held that the deadline for defendant's
post-conviction petition was six months following the date on
which his petition for leave to appeal from the first appellate
decision was due. This deadline, according to the appellate court,
was August 8, 1994. 314 Ill. App. 3d at 954. Defendant's post-conviction petition was filed in the circuit court on October 17,
1997. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed defendant's
petition on timeliness grounds. The appellate court did not
consider the circuit court's holding that defendant's petition was
"without merit."
	This court subsequently granted defendant's petition for leave
to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	The principal question presented in this appeal is whether the
six-month limitations period described in section 122-1(c) of the
Act began to run in this case after defendant's first appeal, in
1994, or after his second appeal, in 1997. In our view, the six-month limitations period could not have started to run after
defendant's sentences were vacated in the first appeal.
	In People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483 (2000), this court held
that, as used in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the word
"conviction" is a term of art which means a final judgment that
includes both a conviction and a sentence. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d  at
488. On January 18, 1994, the appellate court vacated defendant's
sentences. Therefore, on that date, defendant did not stand
"convicted" for purposes of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
	The appellate court's conclusion that it was irrelevant that
defendant no longer had a "conviction" on January 18, 1994, is
incorrect. As its name suggests, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
provides a remedy only for those defendants who stand convicted.
The relief afforded by the Act is limited to a "person imprisoned
in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of
his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of
the State of Illinois or both." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS
5/122-1(a) (West 2000). In other words, a defendant who is not
"convicted" cannot file a post-conviction petition. Thus, even had
defendant wished to file a post-conviction petition following the
first appeal, he could not have done so; he simply had no
"conviction" to challenge. Because defendant had no "conviction"
after the first appeal, the six-month period found in section
122-1(c) could not have begun to run at that time. After
defendant's sentences were reversed by the appellate court in
January 1994, the limitations periods in section 122-1(c) did not
begin to run again until defendant was re-sentenced in the circuit
court on April 15, 1995. Accordingly, the appellate court erred in
holding that the six-month period began to run following
defendant's first appeal.
	Having concluded that the appellate court erred in its
application of the limitations period in section 122-1(c), we would
ordinarily remand this cause to that court with instructions to
determine the timeliness of defendant's post-conviction petition in
a manner consistent with our holding in the case at bar. However,
we may not instruct the appellate court to take that course of
action here.
	This court has recently held that the Act does not permit the
summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition during the first
stage of post-conviction review on the ground that the petition is
untimely. People v. Boclair, Nos. 89388, 89471, 89534 cons., slip
op. at 3-9 (August 29, 2002). The timeliness of the post-conviction
petition is a matter that is "left for the State to assert during the
second stage of the post-conviction proceedings." Boclair, slip op.
at 9. Therefore, on remand in this case, the appellate court may not
consider the timeliness of defendant's petition for post-conviction
relief. As defendant's post-conviction petition was summarily
dismissed by the circuit court pursuant to section 122-2.1(a)(2) of
the Act, the appellate court must limit its discussion to
determining whether, aside from its timeliness, defendant's
petition "is frivolous or is patently without merit" (725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000)).

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed. This cause is remanded to the appellate court to
determine whether the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing
defendant's post-conviction petition under section 122-2.1(a)(2)
of the Act.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.