Title: Brown v. Black
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992751
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PAULINE BROWN 
 
v.  Record No. 992751 
 
WILLIAM BLACK, ET AL. 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
 
September 15, 2000 
ELAINE HUGHES 
 
v.  Record No. 992752 
 
WILLIAM BLACK, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SUSSEX COUNTY 
James A. Luke, Judge 
 
I. 
 
 
In these consolidated appeals from two separate 
judgments, we consider whether the circuit court, which had 
not entered orders compelling discovery, erred in dismissing 
the plaintiffs' motions for judgment because of their failure 
to respond to the defendants' discovery requests. 
II. 
 
Pauline Brown and Elaine Hughes, represented by the same 
counsel, filed separate motions for judgment against William 
Black, National Railroad Passenger Corporation, d/b/a Amtrak, 
Paul Jones Elliott, Car Center, and CSX Transportation, Inc.  
The plaintiffs alleged that they were injured while traveling 
as passengers on the same train operated by Amtrak and that 
the defendants breached certain duties owed to them. 
 
In June 1998, defendants Black, Amtrak, and CSX 
Transportation propounded interrogatories to the plaintiffs in 
the separate actions.  Defendants Elliot and Car Center 
"joined" with the co-defendants in these discovery requests.  
The plaintiffs failed to respond to the discovery requests.  
In May 1999, defendants Black, Amtrak, and CSX Transportation 
filed motions "to compel answers to interrogatories, 
deposition of plaintiff, independent medical examination of 
plaintiff or in the alternative to dismiss plaintiff's motion 
for judgment with prejudice" in both actions. 
 
These defendants asserted in their motions that the 
plaintiffs failed to respond to certain interrogatories 
propounded to them, that the defendants' counsel "wrote to 
[plaintiffs'] counsel requesting answers to the 
interrogatories," and that in March 1999 "defendants' counsel 
wrote [plaintiffs'] counsel requesting dates for [the 
plaintiffs' depositions and independent medical 
examinations.]"  According to the allegations in the 
defendants' motions, even though plaintiffs' counsel replied 
that she would "get back shortly" to defendants' counsel, she 
failed to do so.  The defendants' counsel requested that the 
circuit court enter orders requiring the plaintiffs to comply 
with the discovery requests or, in the alternative, that the 
 
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court dismiss with prejudice the plaintiffs' motions for 
judgment. 
 
After the plaintiffs did not respond to the defendants' 
motions, the defendants gave the plaintiffs notice of a 
hearing.  At the hearing, the circuit court permitted 
defendants Elliott and Car Center to "join in" the motions.  
Counsel did not appear for either plaintiff.  However, a 
lawyer, who was apparently contemplating serving as new 
counsel for the plaintiffs in these actions, attended the 
hearing but specifically declined to be named as counsel of 
record for the plaintiffs.  The court ruled that it would 
dismiss both motions for judgment. 
 
The plaintiffs filed motions for reconsideration after 
the court had ruled, but before the entry of orders dismissing 
their motions for judgment.  Plaintiffs' counsel argued that 
Rule 4:12 authorizes a circuit court to dismiss a motion for 
judgment only if the plaintiff has failed to obey a discovery 
order.  The plaintiffs asserted that the circuit court should 
not have dismissed their motions for judgment because the 
court had not entered orders compelling discovery in their 
respective cases.  The circuit court concluded that the 
plaintiffs were derelict in the prosecution of their cases and 
declined to change its ruling.  Subsequently, the circuit 
 
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court entered orders dismissing the motions for judgment.  The 
plaintiffs appeal. 
III. 
 
 
Rule 4:12 states in relevant part: 
 
"(a) Motion for Order Compelling Discovery. — A 
party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and 
all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"(b) Failure to Comply With Order. — (1) 
Sanctions by Court in County or City Where 
Deposition Is Taken.  If a deponent fails to be 
sworn or to answer a question after being directed 
to do so by the court in the county or city in which 
the deposition is being taken, the failure may be 
considered a contempt of that court. 
"(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action Is 
Pending.  If a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 4:5(b)(6) or 4:6(a) to testify on behalf 
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery, including an order made under 
subdivision (a) of this Rule or Rule 4:10, the court 
in which the action is pending may make such orders 
in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
others the following: 
"(A) An order that the matters regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated facts shall be 
taken to be established for the purposes of the action in 
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the 
order; 
"(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient 
party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, 
or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in 
evidence; 
"(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order 
is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against 
the disobedient party; 
 
 
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. . . . 
 
 
"(d) Failure of Party to Attend at Own 
Deposition or Serve Answers to Interrogatories or 
Respond to Request for Inspection. — If a party or 
an officer, director, or managing agent of a party 
or a person designated under Rule 4:5(b)(6) or 
4:6(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to 
appear before the officer who is to take his 
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, 
or (2) to serve answers or objections to 
interrogatories submitted under Rule 4:8, after 
proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to 
serve a written response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 4:9, after proper service of 
the request, the court in which the action is 
pending on motion may make such orders in regard to 
the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under paragraphs (A), 
(B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this Rule. In 
lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to act or the 
attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the 
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust." 
 
"The failure to act described in this 
subdivision may not be excused on the ground that 
the discovery sought is objectionable unless the 
party failing to act has applied for a protective 
order as provided by Rule 4:1(c)." 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
The plaintiffs contend that even though Rule 4:12 grants 
a circuit court the authority to dismiss an action because of 
a party's failure to comply with discovery, such dismissal is 
appropriate only when that party has violated a court order 
compelling a party to comply with a discovery request.  The 
defendants respond that Rule 4:12(d) grants a circuit court 
 
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the authority to dismiss an action if a plaintiff fails to 
serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 4:8 
after proper service of the interrogatories and that "[t]he 
violation by a party of an order is not a condition precedent 
to the imposition of sanctions under Rule 4:12."  Continuing, 
the defendants say the dismissals were justified in these 
cases because the plaintiffs failed to respond to 
interrogatories filed more than a year before the dismissals, 
did not appear at the hearing on the motion to compel 
discovery, and had not pursued their respective causes of 
action with diligence for more than one year.  We disagree 
with the defendants' arguments. 
 
Rule 4:12(a) sets forth the procedure that a party must 
follow to obtain an order compelling discovery and permits a 
court to award attorney's fees and expenses.  Rule 4:12(b) 
enumerates the sanctions that a court may impose if a party 
"fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery."  
Thus, a party's failure to obey such an order is a 
prerequisite for the imposition of sanctions under paragraphs 
(A), (B), and (C) of Rule 4:12(b)(2). 
 
Rule 4:12(d) permits a circuit court to take the actions 
authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Rule 
4:12(b)(2) when a party acts or fails to act in the 
circumstances set forth in Rule 4:12(d).  As stated above, 
 
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however, those actions are only authorized when a party has 
failed "to obey an order to provide or permit discovery."  
Thus, we conclude that the limitation on the circuit court's 
power to impose sanctions specified in paragraphs (A), (B), 
and (C) of Rule 4:12(b)(2), that a party has failed to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, necessarily restricts 
the circuit court's exercise of those powers under Rule 
4:12(d). 
 
We also note that both Rule 4:12(b)(2) and Rule 4:12(d) 
provide that "the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure [to comply with 
discovery] as are just."  This language, which gives a circuit 
court broad discretion to tailor its sanctions to the 
particular conduct of a party in a given case, was not 
intended to confer upon a court the power to dismiss an action 
unless a party has violated an order compelling discovery.  
Neither Rule 4:12(b)(2) nor Rule 4:12(d) permits such a 
drastic sanction in the absence of the violation of an order 
compelling discovery. 
 
Our interpretation of Rule 4:12(b)(2) does not render 
meaningless the provisions in Rule 4:12(d).  Unlike Rule 
4:12(b)(2), Rule 4:12(d) specifically limits the discretion of  
circuit court to deny a request for sanctions for the 
proscribed conduct by providing that a circuit court may not 
 
7
excuse a party's failure to act unless that party has applied 
for a protective order as provided in Rule 4:1(C).  We further 
note that Rule 4:12 does not impose different requirements for 
obtaining sanctions based on the severity of a discovery 
violation, but uniformly subjects every failure to comply with 
an order compelling discovery to the circuit court's 
discretionary authority provided in that Rule. 
 
As the defendants have recognized, the federal courts, in 
interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 which is 
substantially similar to Rule 4:12, have held that federal 
district courts may dismiss an action for a party's failure to 
comply with discovery even though an order compelling 
discovery has not been entered.  See, e.g., Aziz v. Wright, 34 
F.3d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1994).  However, it is the 
responsibility of this Court to interpret our own Rules 
regarding pretrial procedures for the parties in the courts of 
this Commonwealth.  And, even though the federal courts' 
interpretations of their rules in some instances may be 
informative, those interpretations are not binding on this 
Court's interpretation of our Rules. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Rule 4:12(d), when read with 
the other provisions in Rule 4:12, authorizes a circuit court 
to dismiss a motion for judgment only when the plaintiff fails 
to comply with a court's order to provide or permit discovery.  
 
8
Therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing the 
plaintiffs' motions for judgment. 
IV. 
 
We will reverse the judgments of the circuit court, and 
we will remand these cases for further proceedings. 
Record No. 992751 — Reversed and remanded. 
Record No. 992752 — Reversed and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE LEMONS 
join, concurring. 
 
 
Because I believe the trial court abused its discretion 
under Rule 4:12, I concur in the result reached by the 
majority; however, I cannot subscribe to the majority’s 
interpretation of Rule 4:12(d).  Therefore, I write separately 
to discuss the analytical framework established by the plain 
language of Rule 4:12, in particular the relationship among 
subsections (a), (b)(2), and (d) of that rule. 
First, subsection (a) authorizes a party to move for an 
order compelling discovery if a deponent fails to answer a 
question; if a party fails to answer an interrogatory; or, if 
in response to a request for inspection, a party fails to 
respond that the inspection will be permitted or to permit the 
inspection.  For purposes of subsection (a), an evasive or 
incomplete answer is treated as a failure to answer.  Rule 
4:12(a)(3).  If the requesting party prevails on the motion to 
 
9
compel, the court may, depending on the relief requested in 
the motion, order the opposing party to answer a particular 
question or interrogatory, or provide additional information.  
However, the only sanction that the court may impose, if 
appropriate, is an award of expenses, including attorney's 
fees.  Rule 4:12(a)(4). 
Subsection (b)(2) provides that if a party fails to obey 
an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order 
made under subsection (a), a court may enter such orders as 
are just and may impose the sanctions enumerated in paragraphs 
(A), (B), (C), (D) and (E) of subsection (b)(2).  These 
paragraphs authorize sanctions such as directing that certain 
matters or facts shall be taken to be established; refusing to 
allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated 
claims or defenses; striking the pleadings, or some part of 
them; dismissing the action; or treating the failure to obey 
as a contempt of court. 
Finally, subsection (d) applies when a party fails to do 
one of the following: (1) appear for a deposition after being 
served with proper notice, (2) serve answers or objections to 
interrogatories after proper service of the interrogatories, 
or (3) serve a written response to a request for inspection 
after proper service of the request.  In these instances of a 
complete failure to respond, a court may make such orders as 
 
10
are just and may impose any of the sanctions enumerated in 
paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection (b)(2).  Subsection 
(d) further provides that a party’s failure to act in one of 
the enumerated instances is not excused on the basis that the 
discovery is objectionable unless the party failing to act has 
applied for a protective order under Rule 4:1(c). 
In finding that the trial court in the present cases 
erred in dismissing the motions for judgment filed by Pauline 
Brown and Elaine Hughes, the majority interprets subsection 
(d) of Rule 4:12 as implicitly containing a provision like 
that found in Rule 4:12(b)(2), specifically that a party must 
fail to obey an order providing or permitting discovery before 
the sanctions prescribed in subsections (b)(2)(A), (B), and 
(C) may be imposed.  Because the sanctions enumerated in these 
subsections are permitted under subsection (b)(2) only when a 
party has failed to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery, the majority reasons that the predicate provision 
of Rule 4:12(b)(2), i.e., prior issuance of an order 
compelling discovery, limits a trial court’s exercise of its 
powers under subsection (d) as well as under subsection 
(b)(2).  I do not agree. 
 
Subsection (a) of Rule 4:12 is implicated when a party 
provides only a portion of the information sought through 
discovery.  Subsection (b)(2) is invoked after a trial court 
 
11
issues an order to provide or permit discovery, including an 
order to compel pursuant to subsection (a), and that order is 
disobeyed.  However, the discovery problems addressed in 
subsections (a) and (b)(2) are different from those covered by 
subsection (d).  Subsection (d) applies when a party 
completely fails to respond to discovery requests, such as not 
appearing at a deposition after proper service or not 
responding at all to a set of interrogatories.  In those 
instances, a trial court has the discretion to make such 
orders as are just and to utilize the sanctions specified in 
paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection (b)(2) without 
first issuing an order compelling a party to attend a 
deposition, to serve answers or objections to interrogatories, 
or to serve a written response to a request for inspection.  
However, the majority’s construction of Rule 4:12(d) prevents 
a trial court from imposing any of the permitted sanctions 
directly upon a party’s complete failure to respond to 
discovery requests.  The majority reaches this result even 
though subsection (d) addresses the most egregious discovery 
abuses and provides that “the failure to act described in this 
subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the 
discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order . . . .” 
 
12
 
In interpreting court-adopted rules, courts should apply 
the same principles that govern statutory construction.  
Hanson v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 69, 77, 509 S.E.2d 543, 
546 (1999) (citing Green v. Lewis Truck Lines, Inc., 443 
S.E.2d 906, 907 (S.C. 1994)).  One of those principles is 
preserving the harmony of the entire scheme of a statute or 
rule.  However, the majority’s decision in this case ignores 
the “settled principle of statutory construction that every 
part of a statute is presumed to have some effect and no part 
will be considered meaningless unless absolutely necessary.”  
Sansom v. Board of Supervisors of Madison County, 257 Va. 589, 
595, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999).  Once the predicate requiring 
violation of an order regarding discovery is imported to 
subsection (d), that subsection is subsumed entirely into 
subsection (b)(2) and, consequently, rendered meaningless.  
Thus, I conclude that Rule 4:12(d) expressly provides for the 
use of the sanctions contained in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) 
of subsection (b)(2) upon a party's failure to attend a 
deposition, to serve answers or objections to interrogatories, 
or to serve a written response to a request for inspection, 
absent a prior order compelling such action.∗
                     
∗ As noted below, selection of the severity of the 
sanction imposed is a matter of discretion depending on the 
circumstances presented to the court. 
 
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This reading of the operation of Rule 4:12(d) comports 
with the manner in which federal courts have applied Rule 37 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The pertinent terms 
of both rules are essentially identical.  Federal courts have 
consistently interpreted subsection (d) of Rule 37 as 
authorizing a trial court to impose sanctions for the 
discovery abuses addressed in that subsection even though a 
party has not violated any prior court order regarding 
discovery.  See Aziz v. Wright, 34 F.3d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 
1994) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) allows court to 
dismiss action if party fails to appear for deposition; no 
motion to compel is required before such dismissal); Sigliano 
v. Mendoza, 642 F.2d 309, 310 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Dismissal is a 
proper sanction under Rule 37(d) for a serious or total 
failure to respond to discovery even without a prior order."); 
Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128, 1135 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rule 37 
sanctions are ordinarily imposed following violation of court 
order; only exceptions are situations involving Rule 37(c) and 
(d);  Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 611 
F.2d 32, 35 (3rd Cir. 1979) (direct order by court is not 
necessary predicate to imposing sanctions under Rule 37(d)); 
Robison v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37, 39 (10th Cir. 
1966) (sanctions under Rule 37(d) apply irrespective of 
whether court has ordered delinquent party to appear for 
 
14
deposition or to answer interrogatory); but see United States 
v. Certain Real Property Located at Route 1, Bryant, Alabama, 
126 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1997) (although Rule 37(d) does 
not require issuance of order compelling discovery before 
sanctions are authorized, “judicial interpretation of the 
rule” requires such order or motion to compel before default 
judgment may be imposed as a sanction). 
 
The structure of Rule 37 has been described as a system 
of "progressive discipline."  7 James Wm. Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 37.90 (3rd ed. 2000).  I believe 
that description is equally applicable to Rule 4:12.  Viewed 
in that manner, the function of subsection (d) in both rules 
becomes apparent. 
The misconduct at which subdivision (d) is directed 
consists of a party's complete failure to respond, by way 
of appearance, objection, answer, or motion for 
protective order, to a discovery request.  Such a 
complete failure strikes at the very heart of the 
discovery system, and threatens the fundamental 
assumption on which the whole apparatus of discovery was 
designed, that in the vast majority of instances, the 
discovery system will be self-executing. 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
Thus, if a party . . . does not appear for a 
properly noticed deposition, does not answer or object to 
interrogatories properly served, or does not make a 
written response to a proper request for production or 
inspection, the court may impose sanctions directly, 
without first issuing an order to compel discovery. 
 
Id.
 
 
15
Accordingly, I cannot conclude, as the majority does, 
that the dismissal of the motions for judgment pursuant to 
Rule 4:12(d) in the absence of a violation of an order 
compelling discovery was legal error.  Rather, I maintain that 
the trial court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s motions 
for judgment under Rule 4:12(d) based on the failure to 
respond to the defendants’ discovery requests should be 
reviewed pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.  See 
Rappold v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 246 Va. 10, 15, 
431 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1993) (trial court’s decision under Rule 
4:12 will not be reversed unless decision amounts to abuse of 
discretion).  In applying that standard, I adhere to the view 
that, when the most severe sanctions are imposed, one part of 
the inquiry is whether a trial court could have furthered the 
goals of discovery through less drastic measures.  See Wilson 
v. Volkswagen of America, 561 F.2d 494, 503-06 (4th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978) (trial court’s range 
of discretion is more narrow when imposing most severe 
sanction in range of sanctions available); Mutual Federal 
Savings & Loan v. Richards & Assoc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 
1989) (when trial court uses most severe sanction, court’s 
decision “is confronted head-on by the party’s rights to a 
trial by jury and a fair day in court”). 
 
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Applying that guiding principle, I am convinced that the 
trial court’s decision to dismiss the instant cases amounted 
to an abuse of discretion.  In the prayers for relief 
contained in the defendants’ motions, the defendants requested 
the trial court to order Brown and Hughes to answer 
interrogatories, to submit to depositions, and to undergo 
independent medical examinations, all to be completed within 
30 days.  In the alternative, they asked for dismissal of the 
cases with prejudice.  In ruling on the defendants' motions, 
the trial court declined to grant the primary relief requested 
in lieu of the far more severe sanction of dismissal.  
Considering not only that the trial court did not determine 
whether a less drastic sanction would have resolved the 
discovery abuse and at the same time furthered the goals of 
discovery, but also that it did not make any findings 
regarding whether the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith; to 
what extent, if any, the defendants had been prejudiced by the 
discovery delay; or whether plaintiffs had engaged in other 
discovery abuses, I would hold that the trial court abused its 
discretion by imposing the most severe sanction in these 
cases. 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur only in the 
judgment of the majority opinion. 
 
 
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