Title: Derrick Tyrone Smith v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-454
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
________________________ 
 
Nos. SC03-454 & SC05-100 
________________________ 
 
DERRICK TYRONE SMITH,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
 
DERRICK TYRONE SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 9, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Derrick Smith, a prisoner sentenced to death, appeals orders of the circuit 
court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.850 and petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  As explained below, we affirm 
the circuit court’s denial of relief and deny Smith’s petition. 
 
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I.  HISTORY OF THE CASE 
 
In November 1983, Smith was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death for 
the March 1983 murder of cab driver Jeffrey Songer.  In brief, Smith and his 
codefendant Derrick Johnson called a cab with the intent to rob the driver.  After 
the driver took them to the provided address and stopped the cab, all three exited 
the vehicle.  When Songer tried to flee, Smith fatally shot him. 
 
In Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 1986), we reversed Smith’s 
conviction and sentence of death, remanding the case for a new trial.  Upon retrial 
in May 1990, a jury again convicted him of capital murder, and the court sentenced 
him to death.  On direct appeal, we affirmed.  Smith v. State, 641 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1163 (1995).1 
 
Subsequently, Smith filed in circuit court an amended motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in 
which he raised numerous claims.2  After a Huff3 hearing, the circuit court issued 
                                        
 
1.  In the direct appeal following retrial, we addressed the following five 
issues and affirmed:  (1) whether the trial court violated appellant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel and self-representation; (2) whether the trial court 
conducted an adequate inquiry into an alleged discovery violation; (3) whether the 
trial court erred in admitting evidence of another robbery; (4) whether the trial 
court violated Smith’s constitutional right to confront witnesses by limiting cross-
examination of a witness; and (5) whether the death sentence was disproportionate.  
Smith, 641 So. 2d at 1320 n.2. 
 
2.  In summary, Smith raised the following claims:  (1)-(2) trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective regarding trial preparation and cross examination, and 
the State withheld material exculpatory evidence, presented false testimony, and 
 
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an order denying claims on which an evidentiary hearing was not ordered.  After 
the evidentiary hearing, the court denied all remaining claims. 
 
Smith appeals.  He also has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  We 
first address the issues raised on appeal and then the claims urged in the habeas 
petition. 
                                                                                                                              
knowingly misled the court; (3) newly discovered evidence rendered Smith’s 
conviction and sentence constitutionally unreliable; (4) the death sentence is 
arbitrary and capricious and violates state, federal, and international law; (5) 
postconviction counsel was ineffective; (6) the State’s failure to provide public 
records violated Smith’s due process and equal protection rights; (7)-(8) no reliable 
trial transcript exists, which denied Smith’s right to direct appeal; (9) the 
prohibitions against interviewing jurors denied Smith the effective assistance of 
postconviction counsel; (10)-(15) retrial counsel was ineffective during voir dire, 
because of a conflict of interest, and for failing to ensure Smith’s presence at 
critical stages of trial, to object to the State’s improper arguments at trial, and to 
obtain an adequate psychiatric evaluation, conduct an adequate background 
investigation, and present available mitigation; (16) Smith’s death sentence is 
fundamentally unfair, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
State’s improper use of nonstatutory aggravating factors; (17) the judge and jury 
relied on misinformation of constitutional magnitude in violation of Johnson v. 
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988); (18) cumulative procedural and substantive 
errors deprived Smith of a fair trial; (19) section 119.19, Florida Statutes (2000), 
and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 are unconstitutional facially and as 
applied; (20) the penalty phase jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted to Smith 
the burden of proving death was inappropriate; (21) the penalty phase jury 
instructions unconstitutionally diluted the jury’s sentencing responsibility; (22)-
(23) the statutory aggravator of murder committed in the course of robbery or its 
attempt is an unconstitutional automatic aggravator and is unconstitutionally 
vague; (24) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and 
as applied; (25) Smith’s due process rights were violated by the denial of access to 
the state attorney’s investigative notes; (26) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (27) Smith’s 
death sentence is invalid because the indictment did not charge the elements of the 
offense. 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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II. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Smith raises five claims in this appeal: (A) that the State withheld material 
and exculpatory evidence and knowingly presented false or misleading evidence; 
(B) that the circuit court erred in limiting the scope of the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing; (C) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during 
the guilt phase of trial; (D) that newly discovered evidence proves Smith’s 
innocence; and (E) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the 
penalty phase of trial.  Several of these issues contain subclaims.  We discuss each 
issue in turn below and affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief as to all of them. 
A.  The Brady and Giglio Claims 
 
Smith contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963) (holding that the state’s failure to provide defendant with favorable, 
material evidence violates due process), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972) (holding that a defendant’s due process right is violated when the State 
knowingly allows false, material testimony to be presented at trial).  We will 
address each alleged violation in turn. 
1.  Failure to Disclose 
 
Smith alleges the State violated Brady by failing to disclose favorable 
information contained in State documents related to the murder investigation.  
 
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“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must 
be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully 
or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 281-82 (1999). 
 
To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that the suppressed 
evidence is material.  The test for materiality is whether there exists a reasonable 
probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed 
information been used at trial.  Id. at 289, 296.  In other words, the question is 
whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in 
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Id. at 290 
(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). 
 
In this case, the circuit court was correct to deny relief on Smith’s Brady 
claims.  As we explain below, even those documents that meet the first two prongs 
of Strickler are not material; thus, the State’s failure to disclose them does not 
violate Brady. 
a.  Undisclosed Contact between Codefendant Johnson and Witness Jones 
 
Smith argues that the circuit court erred in determining that a document 
showing that Melvin Jones, an eyewitness to the murder, and Derrick Johnson, 
Smith’s codefendant, met in jail was not material under Strickler.  Smith claims the 
 
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document demonstrates that Jones and Johnson collaborated before trial to 
implicate Smith as the shooter.   
 
At retrial, Jones testified that as he walked home that evening, he witnessed 
the murder, and he identified Smith as the killer.  Jones and his wife lived within a 
block of the murder scene, and both testified that within a short time after the 
murder, Jones arrived home and told her he had witnessed it.  The previously 
undisclosed internal report shows that in September 1983, the prosecutor requested 
an investigation into whether Jones and Smith had any contact in jail.4  The 
prosecutor’s handwritten note reflected that the two were “never together” and that 
Johnson first saw Jones on July 11 in a holding cell before a preliminary hearing.  
At that time, Jones showed Johnson a map of the crime scene and said that he or it 
would help Johnson at trial. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court determined, and in fact the 
State conceded, that the first two prongs of the Strickler test were met.  That is, the 
State failed to disclose this evidence that could have been used for impeachment.  
The court, however, determined that Smith failed to show that this evidence casts 
the trial in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.  We 
agree. 
                                        
 
4.  Jones was arrested in June 1983 on bad check charges and other charges 
unrelated to the murder. 
 
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At most, Johnson’s statement acknowledging contact was of limited value to 
support a theory of collusion between Johnson and Jones.  First, the evidence from 
the evidentiary hearing and trial demonstrated that Johnson and Jones did not know 
each other before the murder and did not discuss the facts of the case during their 
brief meeting.  In fact, Johnson was so unnerved by the encounter with this 
stranger that he asked to be removed from the cell.  Further, the State did not 
provide Jones with a deal in exchange for his testimony.  In addition, at retrial, the 
defense challenged Jones’s credibility i
n light of his felony convictions and his 
efforts to make a deal in exchange for his testimony.   
 
Smith’s theory of defense was that he was not in the cab that night and that 
Jones and Johnson were lying.  The evidence at retrial, however, showed that on 
the day of the murder, Smith tried to sell a gun to Carolyn Mathis and later that 
evening told Regina Mathis that he was going to “hustle” some money because he 
had none.  Before going out on the night of the murder, Smith showed a gun to his 
friend James Matthews, who in turn showed it to his live-in girlfriend, Priscilla 
Walker.  Smith told Matthews he was going out to get some money that evening.  
Later that evening, Smith was at a nightclub, where Ernest Rouse saw him place a 
revolver under a turntable in the disc jockey booth and later retrieve it.  Jones and 
Johnson saw the handgun and saw Smith fire the fatal shot. 
 
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After the murder, in the early morning hours, Smith returned to his friends’ 
home and admitted to both Matthews and Walker that he had shot someone.  To 
Walker, he said that he shot a cab driver who would not give him any money.  He 
told Matthews he was scared and needed a place to stay.  Within twelve hours after 
the murder, Smith robbed two Canadian tourists, using a handgun.  Finally, 
Smith’s uncle testified that his revolver was missing.  The descriptions of the gun 
Smith had immediately preceding, during, and after the murder matched his 
uncle’s gun, which was missing.  In addition, a bullet from the victim was 
consistent with the bullets from Smith’s uncle’s ten-year-old box of bullets. 
 
Finally, Smith made a call from a restaurant telephone, and his fingerprint 
was found on the phone.  A request for a cab was made on that phone at 12:28 a.m. 
on March 21, 1983, and Smith and Johnson were seen entering the cab that arrived 
shortly thereafter.  Accordingly, the undisclosed evidence of a brief jail contact 
does not meet the materiality prong of Brady.   
b. Undisclosed Police Reports 
 
Smith argues that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose information 
in police reports and other documents and that the failure to disclose them 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Smith first alleges error 
regarding the State’s failure to disclose that Jones initially was listed as a suspect 
in the murder.  The evidence showed that Jones was so listed shortly after the 
 
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murder because he lived within a block of the crime scene and had outstanding 
warrants for his arrest.  We find that the evidence is neither exculpatory nor 
impeaching.  See Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 870 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting claim 
that “information contained in police files concerning other possible suspects and 
other criminal activity in the same neighborhood” was Brady material that had to 
be disclosed), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 961 (2004); Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 
620 (Fla. 2002) (“As noted by the State, the prosecution is not required to provide 
the defendant all information regarding its investigatory work on a particular case 
regardless of its relevancy or materiality.”).  Further, even if it should have been 
disclosed, it was not material under the Strickler.  The bases for Jones’s early 
listing as a “possible suspect” were known to Smith, and the jury was informed of 
them as well.  Failure to disclose this information does not undermine confidence 
in the outcome of the trial. 
 
Smith next argues that the State failed to disclose a police report 
demonstrating the police contacted Jones’s wife, Mellow Jones, in their house-to-
house canvassing of the neighborhood both immediately after the murder and a 
few hours later, with negative results each time.  He alleges that the report 
constituted valuable impeachment evidence.  This claim was not raised below and 
thus is not preserved for our review.  In his postconviction motion, Smith claimed 
generally that counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Mrs. Jones with police 
 
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reports.  He did not claim the documents were not disclosed or allege facts 
contained in them that would serve as impeachment.  The circuit court was correct 
to summarily dismiss this conclusory claim. 
 
Although Smith’s newly formulated claim is not preserved, we point out that 
the police report is neither exculpatory nor impeaching.  Contrary to Smith’s claim, 
the report does not contradict the testimony of either Mr. or Mrs. Jones. 
 
In his third subclaim regarding nondisclosure, Smith argues that the State 
failed to disclose a handwritten note of August 9, 1989, (after the first trial but 
before the retrial) on which he was entitled to question Jones at trial.  Written by a 
prosecutor in the first trial, the note indicates that Jones telephoned her, saying that 
to prevent him from reuniting with his wife, his daughter had recently falsely 
accused him of sexually abusing her several years before.  He feared arrest and 
wanted to take a polygraph and have his daughter take one as well.  We agree with 
the circuit court’s denial of this claim.  See Carroll, 815 So. 2d at 620 (stating that 
“prosecution is not required to provide the defendant all information regarding its 
investigatory work on a particular case regardless of its relevancy or materiality”).  
The note does not provide exculpatory evidence or impeachment material.  The 
note was not relevant either to the retrial or to Jones’s motivation to provide 
testimony.   
 
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Next, Smith asserts that the circuit court erred in determining that a 
prosecutor’s internal investigation synopsis dated April 4, 1983, did not have to be 
disclosed and was not material under Strickler.  In the document, the prosecutor 
summarized the testimony of David McGruder, a restaurant employee who saw 
Smith make a phone call and get in the cab.  The prosecutor noted that McGruder 
was unable to pick Smith out of a photopack.  We find that the State should have 
disclosed the document, but hold this evidence was not material.  See Young v. 
State, 739 So. 2d 553, 560 (Fla. 1999) (holding that information in state attorney’s 
notes of witness interviews constituted evidence favorable to defense subject to 
disclosure but was not material to Young’s murder conviction). 
 
When the prosecutor dictated his synopsis, the police had not yet shown 
McGruder a photopack actually containing Smith’s picture.  McGruder did not 
identify Smith’s picture until April 8.  That was the first photopack that included 
Smith’s picture.  Further, at retrial Smith impeached McGruder on his tardy 
photopack identification, and the jury heard McGruder’s confusing testimony 
regarding his uncertain identification of the photo. 
 
Finally, Smith argues that the State did not disclose a police report about 
Jones’s polygraph test, which Smith could have used to impeach Jones at trial. 5  
                                        
 
5.  Smith also claims on appeal that Johnson’s polygraph test constituted 
valuable impeachment evidence.  Smith did not make this claim in his 
postconviction motion, the circuit court did not address it, and it is not preserved. 
 
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The circuit court found that Smith did not rebut the State’s evidence that such a 
report was disclosed and further did not demonstrate that polygraph tests were 
admissible at trial as impeachment evidence.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 
787 (Fla. 2004) (“As for the polygraph tests, their results would not have been 
admissible at trial without the consent of both parties.”); Walsh v. State, 418 So. 2d 
1000, 1002 (Fla. 1982).  We agree with the circuit court that Smith failed to 
establish materiality. 
2.  Intentional Deception 
 
Smith next claims that in several instances the State intentionally deceived 
or misled the defendant and the trier of fact in violation of Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150.  
“To establish a Giglio violation, it must be shown that: (1) the testimony given was 
false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the statement was 
material.”  Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003).  The third prong of 
the test is not identical to the materiality prong of the Strickler test for a Brady 
violation.  Instead, on the issue of materiality or prejudice, the question is whether 
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
jury’s verdict.  In other words, the State has the burden to demonstrate that the 
false testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Smith argues that the prosecutor’s investigatory notes indicating that 
codefendant Johnson and eyewitness Jones once encountered each other in a 
 
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holding cell demonstrates that Jones and Johnson gave false testimony and that the 
State knew this and failed to correct it.  Smith alleges, however, that Jones gave the 
perjurious testimony in his deposition taken before the first trial and that both 
Jones and Johnson testified falsely at the first trial.  At retrial, however, neither 
Jones nor Johnson was questioned about even the possibility that they colluded on 
their testimony.  Smith has thus failed to show that any of the retrial testimony was 
false and that the State failed to correct it.  Accordingly, Smith’s Giglio claim is 
unsubstantiated and we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. 
 
In his second Giglio claim, Smith urges that the State allowed Jones to 
testify falsely at retrial regarding the deal Jones made with the State in exchange 
for his testimony and how much time he served as part of the deal.  First, as the 
circuit court correctly found, the claim was insufficiently pled.  Second, it is 
refuted by the record.  There is no evidence that the State gave Jones a deal 
regarding his unrelated felony charges to obtain his trial testimony, and Smith has 
not shown any of Jones’s testimony to be false.  Smith thus failed to establish the 
elements of a Giglio claim. 
 
Finally, Smith alleges that the circuit court failed to give cumulative 
consideration to his Giglio claims.  As explained above, Smith failed to 
demonstrate that any false or misleading testimony was given at retrial.  We find 
no error in the court’s cumulative error analysis. 
 
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B.  The Scope of the Evidentiary Hearing 
 
In his second issue on appeal, Smith contends that at the evidentiary hearing, 
the circuit court improperly precluded him from presenting “some evidence” on 
some of his Brady and Giglio claims and thus was unable to conduct a cumulative 
analysis.  This claim fails for two reasons.  First, Smith’s contention is vague and 
conclusory.  In his initial brief, Smith does not identify any evidence that was 
improperly excluded.  Nor does he specify any claim that the court wrongfully 
excluded from the evidentiary hearing.  Second, Smith fails to demonstrate that the 
circuit court erred in requiring the evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing to 
be related to the issues before it.  The circuit court summarily denied several of 
Smith’s postconviction claims and ordered an evidentiary hearing on others.  Later, 
the court expanded the number of claims set for hearing.  During the hearing, the 
court did not allow Smith to argue or present evidence regarding previously denied 
claims.  Smith has not demonstrated this to be error.  Accordingly, we deny relief 
on this issue. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Guilt Phase 
 
Smith’s third issue on appeal presents several claims that defense counsel 
provided ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of his trial.  To establish that 
counsel was ineffective, a defendant must cite specific acts or omissions of counsel 
that are “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
 
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the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984).  Second, the defendant must establish prejudice by “show[ing] that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694.  A reasonable 
probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  
Id.  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of law and 
fact subject to plenary review.  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (Fla. 
2000).  This Court independently reviews the trial court’s legal conclusions and 
defers to the trial court’s findings of fact.  We address below each of Smith’s 
ineffective assistance claims. 
1.  Undiscovered Witness 
 
Smith argues that the circuit court erred in determining that he was not 
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to locate witness Vincent Gibson, also referred 
to as Ventura Gibson.  He claims that Gibson’s testimony would have proven 
Jones’s eyewitness testimony was false.  Jones had told police that Gibson dropped 
him off near his home that night, and Jones then witnessed the murder as he 
walked home.  At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Gibson testified that he 
did not remember taking Jones home, that he did not take Jones home, and that he 
would not have taken Jones home that late at night.  Based on this testimony, the 
 
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circuit court found that Smith met the first prong of Strickland, but not the second.  
We hold that Smith failed to meet either prong of the standard. 
 
Gibson’s testimony does not prove Jones was not an eyewitness to the 
murder.  At best, his testimony calls into question Jones’s statement of how he 
arrived at the crime scene—a minor, collateral issue.  The fact that Jones lived 
within a block of the crime scene explains his presence there.  Accordingly, 
counsel’s failure to interview Gibson on this collateral matter does not constitute a 
serious error under Strickland. 
 
Further, Smith failed to establish prejudice.  Using Gibson’s equivocal 
testimony to impeach Jones on how he got to the crime scene would be of little 
value.  Jones told his wife that he had witnessed a murder when he arrived home 
shortly after the murder occurred.  In fact, because of the proximity of Jones’s 
home to the crime scene, the police conducting a neighborhood canvass for 
information came to Jones’s house shortly after the murder.  Further, Jones’s 
eyewitness testimony was not the only evidence placing Smith at the crime scene 
with a gun.  In fact, Smith admitted having shot the cab driver to friends within 
hours of committing the crime.  Accordingly, our confidence in the verdict is not 
undermined. 
 
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2. Bullet Lead Analysis 
 
Next, Smith alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge an 
FBI expert’s testimony regarding bullet lead compositional analysis and that 
counsel was unprepared because he did not obtain his own expert.6  We hold that 
the trial court correctly denied relief. 
 
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing amply demonstrated that 
Smith’s trial counsel hired an expert to examine the scientific evidence in question 
and to challenge it.  The expert, however, found no problems with the FBI 
analysis.  In addition, defense counsel himself researched the FBI’s scientific 
methodology.  Finally, Smith’s expert admitted at the postconviction hearing that 
no research, including his own, was available to challenge the FBI evidence at the 
time of retrial.  Accordingly, Smith failed to meet the first prong of the Strickland 
standard.   
3.  Miscellaneous Ineffectiveness Claims 
 
Smith makes several unrelated ineffectiveness claims.  Smith alleges that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to strike unnamed jurors for expressing bias in 
favor of imposing death upon conviction for first-degree murder and for failing to 
object to improper comments made by the State in its closing arguments.  We 
                                        
 
6.  At trial, the evidence was used to link the bullets for Smith’s uncle’s gun 
with the lead fragment found on the victim. 
 
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affirm denial of these conclusory claims.  Smith has presented neither facts nor 
argument to support the statements.   
 
Smith also alleges that defense counsel failed to adequately investigate two 
potential alibi witnesses, Smith’s friends Khan Campbell and James Hawkins, and 
did not call these witnesses based solely on a “feeling” that they would commit 
perjury.  This argument was not raised below and is therefore not preserved for 
appellate review. 
 
In his postconviction motion, Smith alleged the different claim that counsel 
was ineffective because he was “laboring under a conflict of interest when he 
refused to present alibi witnesses at trial.”  The circuit court denied the claim, 
holding that the issue could and should have been raised on direct appeal.  The 
court further held that the evidence demonstrated counsel’s decision not to call the 
witnesses was strategic in nature and that counsel acted pursuant to a court ruling.  
We agree.  Our review of the record reveals that the issue was thoroughly 
developed at retrial and therefore could have been raised on direct appeal.  Further, 
competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s determination that 
counsel’s decision not to call Campbell and Hawkins was both strategic and 
pursuant to court order.  The retrial court determined that under rule 4-3.3 of the 
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar counsel could not call these two witnesses. 
 
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Finally, Smith has failed to demonstrate any error.  Accordingly, his claim of 
cumulative error merits no relief. 
D.  The Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
 
In his next issue, Smith contends that the circuit court erred in denying his 
claim that newly discovered impeachment evidence establishes his innocence and 
he is entitled to a new trial.  For a conviction to be set aside based on a claim of 
newly discovered evidence, two requirements must be met.  First, to qualify as 
newly discovered, the evidence must not have been known at the time of trial by 
the court, the party, or counsel, and “it must appear that the defendant or his 
counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence.”  Jones v. State, 591 
So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 
1979)).  Second, the nature of the evidence must be such that on retrial it would 
probably produce an acquittal.  Id. at 915. 
 
Smith alleged in his postconviction motion that in 2000—ten years after his 
retrial—his counsel discovered Charles Hill, who would testify that Johnson, 
Smith’s codefendant, admitted killing the cab driver.  At the evidentiary hearing, 
Hill testified that two years after the first trial, he and Johnson were twice in the 
same prison.  On both occasions, Johnson confessed that he, not Smith, was the 
triggerman.  Hill also testified that he and appellant Smith had been friends since 
before the 1983 murder, that they shared a longtime group of friends, that he 
 
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repeatedly visited Smith in the Pinellas County jail over the years preceding the 
postconviction hearing, and that he was an intermediary between Smith and the 
mother of Smith’s child.   
 
The circuit court denied relief, finding that (a) Smith failed to show Hill’s 
testimony could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence, (b) Hill’s 
testimony was “unworthy of belief,” (c) Hill never explained why he waited until 
he was contacted by postconviction counsel fifteen years later to report the 
confession, (d) Johnson testified at the evidentiary hearing that he never came into 
contact with Hill in 1985 and never claimed to be the killer, and (e) the evidence 
showed that Hill and Johnson were at the same correctional facility for about five 
hours on one occasion and less than a day on the other, and this evidence 
contradicted Hill’s testimony that they were together for a week on each occasion. 
Finally, the court determined that even if Hill were credible, Hill’s testimony was 
insufficient to probably produce an acquittal. 
 
Each of the court’s factual findings is supported by the record.  In addition, 
the court found Hill’s testimony not credible.  This Court does not substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court on issues of fact when competent, substantial 
evidence supports the circuit court’s factual findings or on issues of witness 
credibility.  Windom v. State, 886 So. 2d 915, 921 (Fla. 2004) (“So long as its 
decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not 
 
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substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, 
on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence by the 
trial court.”).  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Smith’s newly 
discovered evidence claim. 
E. Ineffective Assistance in the Penalty Phase 
 
The trial court sentenced Smith to death after finding two aggravating 
factors (murder committed while attempting robbery and prior violent felony 
conviction) and one statutory mitigator (no significant criminal history).  During 
the penalty phase, defense counsel presented the testimony of Smith’s relatives,7 
two ministers, Smith’s defense counsel, and Smith himself.  Based on this 
testimony, the trial court also found nonstatutory mitigation regarding Smith’s 
record, background, and character. 
 
In his last appellate issue Smith argues that the circuit court was wrong to 
deny his claim that defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance 
by failing adequately to investigate, prepare, and present available mitigating 
evidence during the penalty phase of trial.  As explained above, to obtain relief on 
an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish a serious, professional 
                                        
 
7.  His brother and the aunt who raised him after his mother’s death testified 
before the jury, and his sister testified in the hearing held pursuant to  
Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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error or omission of counsel and demonstrate that as a result of the error, 
confidence in the result is undermined.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 
 
After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief, finding that 
neither prong of Strickland was satisfied and concluding that much of Smith’s 
proffered mitigation was cumulative or, if presented, would have carried little 
weight.  Further, counsel made a tactical decision not to present the remaining 
evidence. 
 
On appeal, Smith alleges that the first prong of Strickland is met by defense 
counsel’s testimony at the postconviction hearing that he did not know what he 
would have found, but he felt he “should have looked harder.”  Counsel’s 
statement alone, however, is insufficient to establish constitutionally deficient 
representation.  See Mills v. State, 603 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1992) (emphasizing 
that reasonableness is the standard for determining counsel’s competence and 
counsel’s statement that she should have investigated an issue was not persuasive); 
see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.”).  Smith has thus failed to meet the 
first prong of Strickland by failing to identify an error, much less a serious error 
committed by counsel. 
 
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Smith contends that if certain facts about his childhood and background had 
been presented in the penalty phase, the aggravating factors would have been 
“knocked out.”  He lists facts such as living in poverty before his mother’s death, 
his difficulty adjusting to life with his aunt afterwards, and his drug habit.  The 
record shows, however, that witnesses, including Smith, testified on each of these 
subjects; thus, any additional evidence would have been cumulative.  Other facts 
not presented, such as Smith’s recent breakup with his girlfriend at the time of the 
murder, would have carried little, if any, weight.  Finally, defense counsel testified 
that he specifically decided not to use the negative report of his mental health 
expert because it contradicted his strategy for presenting a positive picture of 
Smith.  This was a strategic decision.  See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 
(“Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees 
with trial counsel's strategic decisions. . . .  Moreover, strategic decisions do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.”); see also Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466, 471 
(Fla. 1997) (determining that counsel, whose strategy was to humanize defendant 
to jury, was not ineffective for not calling expert witness to testify to defendant's 
possible brain damage because expert also would testify defendant was extremely 
dangerous and would kill again).  We agree with the circuit court that neither prong 
 
- 24 - 
of the Strickland standard was met.  Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief on 
this issue. 
III.  THE HABEAS PETITION 
 
Smith has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he presents the 
following four issues: (1) whether this Court’s disposition of Smith’s direct appeal 
rests upon an error of fact; (2) whether the State failed to disclose pertinent facts 
regarding Smith’s direct appeal; (3) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise meritorious issues; and (4) whether Florida’s capital sentencing 
procedure violates Ring, 536 U.S. at 584.  We address each in turn  
below. 
A.  Error of Fact/Ineffective Assistance 
 
On direct appeal from Smith’s conviction and sentence, this Court addressed 
Smith’s claim that the trial court violated Smith’s constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel by failing to inquire into Smith’s November 6, 1989, letter in 
which he expressed dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel.  Smith, 641 So. 
2d at 1320.  We held that the trial court was not required to conduct a hearing 
because our examination of the letter revealed that Smith had not questioned the 
competence of defense counsel’s representation.  Id. at 1321 (citing Hardwick v. 
State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074-75 (Fla. 1988)).  
 
- 25 - 
 
In his petition, Smith now argues that in a prior letter to the retrial court he 
did question counsel’s competence.  He notes that the November 1989 letter 
referred to a prior letter and has attached what he claims is that letter.  He alleges 
that the prior letter was misfiled in another case pending against him at the time of 
retrial and that postconviction counsel located it in a district court appellate record.  
Smith further alleges that the newly found letter demonstrates that the appellate 
record was incomplete and thus this Court’s decision was based on an error of fact.  
This is incorrect.  Our prior decision was based on the letter that was of record.  
Any claim regarding this newly discovered letter is separate from the issue of the 
November 1989 letter and has no effect on our holding regarding it. 
 
Alternatively, Smith contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to locate this letter and raise a claim regarding it on appeal.  The 
requirements for establishing a claim based on ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel parallel the standards announced in Strickland.  The “[p]etitioner must 
show 1) specific errors or omissions which show that appellate counsel’s 
performance deviated from the norm or fell outside the range of professionally 
acceptable performance and 2) the deficiency of that performance compromised 
the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the fairness 
and correctness of the appellate result.”  Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 
1163 (Fla. 1985).  Under this standard, counsel cannot ordinarily be considered 
 
- 26 - 
ineffective for failing to raise issues that are procedurally barred because they were 
not properly raised during the trial court proceedings.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 
774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  Moreover, appellate counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on appeal.  See id.  
 
Assuming, without deciding, that this letter is genuine and was misfiled as 
Smith alleges, we deny the claim.  Our review of the letter reveals that Smith’s 
statements can best be characterized as generalized complaints that are simply 
insufficient to warrant any inquiry.  See Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 472, 477 (Fla. 
2003) (holding hearing unnecessary “where the defendant merely expresses 
dissatisfaction with his attorney”).  Because the issue lacks merit, appellate counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to raise it in the direct appeal.  In addition, appellate 
counsel has no duty to go beyond the record on appeal.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d 
at 646 (“Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to investigate 
and present facts in order to support an issue on appeal.  The appellate record is 
limited to the record presented to the trial court.”).  
B.  Failure to Disclose 
  
In his second issue, Smith alleges that he was deprived of due process in his 
direct appeal because of the State’s failure to disclose facts pertinent to his direct 
appeal.  These claims are procedurally barred because they were or should have 
been litigated on direct appeal or were or should have been brought in his 3.850 
 
- 27 - 
motion.  See Wright, 857 So. 2d at 874 (holding that habeas claims that “the State 
intentionally deceived this Court” regarding issues raised on direct appeal could 
have been presented on direct appeal or in 3.850 proceedings and “cannot be 
reconsidered in a petition for writ of habeas corpus”); Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 
So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992) (noting that “[h]abeas corpus is not a second appeal and 
cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues which could have been . . . or were 
raised on direct appeal”); see also Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579, 586 (Fla. 2001) 
(“This Court previously has made clear that habeas is not proper to argue a variant 
to an already decided issue.”).8  We address only one of the claims below because 
of Smith’s alternative argument. 
 
On appeal, we affirmed the retrial court’s determination that the State’s 
failure to inform Smith that his own witness, Larry Martin, had prior felony 
convictions was not a discovery violation.  Smith, 641 So. 2d at 1321.  We noted 
that Smith had not claimed the records were not available and stated that the State 
had no duty to prepare the defense’s case.  Id. at 1321-22.  Smith alleges that the 
United States Supreme Court overruled this conclusion in Banks v. Dretke, 540 
U.S. 668, 675-76 (2004), in which it stated that “[w]hen police or prosecutors 
conceal significant exculpatory or impeaching material in the State’s possession, it 
                                        
 
8.  Smith alleges that the State’s failure to disclose pertinent facts 
undermines our determination that the evidence of Smith’s commission of a 
robbery within hours after the attempted robbery was admissible and that Smith’s 
cross-examination of eyewitness Jones was not unconstitutionally limited. 
 
- 28 - 
is ordinarily incumbent on the State to set the record straight.”  In this case, 
however, the State did not “conceal” Martin’s prior convictions; they were a matter 
of public record.9  As we noted in our opinion, Smith never contended that the 
information about his witness was not readily available to him.  Accordingly, we 
deny relief on this claim. 
C.  Ineffective Assistance 
 
Smith next presents three claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  As stated previously, to obtain relief on such claims, Smith must establish 
deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Wilson, 474 So. 2d at 1163.   
 
First, Smith contends that appellate counsel failed on appeal to argue that the 
trial court erred by not conducting adequate Frye10 inquiries into the scientific 
evidence presented by FBI witnesses.  Trial counsel did not object to the testimony 
based on Frye, however, and appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise an unpreserved issue on appeal.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643. 
 
Also unpreserved for review is Smith’s allegation that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise Smith’s absence from the beginning of a motion 
                                        
 
9.  In fact, the record shows that defense counsel knew Martin had prior 
convictions; he just did not know how many. 
 
10.  See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding 
that to be admissible, expert testimony must be premised on principles or 
techniques generally accepted in the relevant scientific field).  Under Florida law, 
courts conduct a Frye hearing to determine whether expert scientific opinion 
evidence is admissible. 
 
- 29 - 
hearing and an in-chambers discussion regarding the parties’ seating arrangements 
at trial.  In addition, Smith’s absence in these instances does not constitute 
fundamental error.  See Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 738 ( Fla. 2005) (stating 
that the right to be present at crucial trial stages does not confer a right to be 
present at every conference at which an issue relevant to the case is discussed).  
Accordingly, the claim fails both prongs of Strickland. 
 
Smith next claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on 
appeal defense counsel’s refusal to call two alibi witnesses.  He further asserts that 
the trial court erred in refusing to allow the witnesses to testify.  The record shows 
that at retrial, Smith requested that his counsel present Khan Campbell and James 
Hawkins to testify.  Defense counsel immediately moved to withdraw, but the trial 
court denied the motion, stating that the decision to call alibi witnesses is strategic.  
During trial, however, the issue again arose.  Counsel explained that he was 
ethically constrained from presenting the witnesses.  Because of privileged 
information, he knew their testimony would be perjurious.11  The retrial court ruled 
that under rule 4-3.3 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar counsel was 
prohibited from calling the pair to testify.  It is clear that in refusing to present the 
                                        
 
11.  The retrial court sealed defense counsel’s written statement of the 
confidential information.  The postconviction court opened the document in 
determining Smith’s related claim in his 3.850 motion.  Defense counsel wrote in 
the document that Smith had revealed to him that Campbell and Hawkins were 
lying. 
 
- 30 - 
testimony, defense counsel acted pursuant to the retrial court’s express ruling.  
Smith provides scant legal argument for his position, contending only that Smith 
had a due process right to present the witnesses.  But Smith has no due process 
right to require his counsel to aid in the commission of a fraud upon the court by 
presenting perjurious testimony.  See DeHaven v. State, 618 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1993) (stating that defendant’s constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel does not include a right to require counsel to commit a fraud  
on the court).  Accordingly, Smith has failed to meet either prong of Strickland. 
D.  Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
 
Smith alleges that his death sentence is unconstitutional under Ring, 536 
U.S. at 584.  Smith’s retrial and sentencing were held in 1990.  This Court has held 
that Ring does not apply retroactively.  Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 
2005) (“We therefore hold that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida and 
affirm the denial of Johnson's request for collateral relief under Ring.”).  In 
addition, one of the aggravating factors in this case was prior violent felony 
conviction, a factor which does not require a jury finding.  Jones v. State, 855 So. 
2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003) (“Further, we note that one of the aggravators found was 
that Jones had a prior violent felony conviction, a factor which under Apprendi [v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)] and Ring need not be found by the jury.”).  
Accordingly, Smith is not entitled to relief. 
 
- 31 - 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of 
relief on Smith’s 3.850 motion and we deny Smith’s habeas petition. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Mark I. Shames, Judge - Case No. CRC 83-02653 CFANO 
And an Original Proceeding 
 
Martin J. McClain of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine V. 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent