Title: State v. William J. Church
Citation: 2003 WI 74
Docket Number: 2001AP003100-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2003

2003 WI 74 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3100-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
William J. Church,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 212 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 442, 650 N.W.2d 873 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 13, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O'Brien   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by James L. Fullin, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David 
J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 74 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3100-CR  
(L.C. No. 
96 CF 1408) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
William J. Church,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   The issue in this case is whether 
an increased sentence imposed upon the defendant following a 
successful appeal was presumptively vindictive, in violation of 
the defendant's right to due process, and, if so, whether the 
presumption was overcome by adequate, objective new factors in 
the record justifying the longer, post-appeal sentence.  Under 
the circumstances here, we conclude that the longer sentence 
violated due process. 
¶2 
In 1996, a jury found William Church guilty of five 
offenses: 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault, 
child 
sexual 
exploitation, delivery of a controlled substance, and two counts 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
2 
 
of child enticement.  Prior to sentencing, Church moved to 
dismiss 
one 
of 
the 
two 
counts 
of 
child 
enticement 
as 
multiplicitous, but the circuit court denied the motion.  The 
court imposed a 13-year prison term on the sexual assault count 
and 
withheld 
sentence 
on 
the 
remaining 
counts, 
ordering 
probation terms of various lengths, consecutive to the prison 
sentence but concurrent to each other.  Church appealed, again 
arguing 
that 
the 
two 
child 
enticement 
counts 
were 
multiplicitous. 
¶3 
The court of appeals agreed, and reversed one of the 
two child enticement counts.  However, instead of simply 
vacating the conviction and the order of concurrent probation on 
one count of child enticement, the court of appeals vacated all 
the sentences in the case and remanded for resentencing on the 
four remaining counts, citing State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 
330 N.W.2d 564 (1983).  On remand, the circuit court imposed 17 
years on the sexual assault count, a four-year increase, and 
reimposed the terms of probation on the remaining three counts.  
The court of appeals affirmed. 
¶4 
We conclude that resentencing on convictions that 
remain intact after an appellate court reverses and vacates one 
or more counts in a multi-count case is not always required.  
Where, as here, the vacated count did not affect the overall 
dispositional scheme of the initial sentence, resentencing on 
the remaining counts is unnecessary and therefore not required.  
Here, however, Church himself requested resentencing as a remedy 
for the multiplicity of the child enticement counts.  Upon 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
3 
 
resentencing, he received more than a reimposition of the 
original dispositional scheme.  We conclude that the increased 
sentence was presumptively vindictive, in violation of Church's 
right to due process, and that the presumption was not overcome 
by adequate, objective new factors in the record justifying the 
increase.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
William J. Church, age 39, from Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 
was charged in Dane County Circuit Court with five criminal 
counts: 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(d), 
sexual 
exploitation 
of 
a 
child 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1)(a), delivery of a controlled 
substance (tetrahydrocannabinols-THC) to a minor contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(h)(1), and two counts of child enticement 
contrary to Wis. Stat § 948.07 (1995-96).1 
¶6  All five counts stemmed from a calculated criminal 
episode in which Church arranged to take a 17-year-old boy from 
his church in Cedar Rapids to Wisconsin Dells, ostensibly for a 
brief 
vacation, 
but 
actually 
for 
purposes 
of 
sexual 
gratification.  En route to the Dells, Church and the victim 
checked into a motel in Madison.  There, Church gave the boy a 
marijuana cigarette and an alcoholic beverage laced with a 
prescription narcotic drug.  When the boy fell asleep, Church 
sexually assaulted him and photographed his genitalia.  The boy 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-1996 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
4 
 
awoke during an act of sexual contact by Church, went to the 
lobby, called his pastor's house and then the police.  A jury 
found Church guilty on all counts.   
¶7 
Before sentencing, Church moved to dismiss one of the 
two counts of child enticement on multiplicity grounds.  The 
motion was denied. 
¶8  At sentencing, the prosecution recommended a sentence 
totaling 33 years in prison.  The circuit court, the Honorable 
Sarah B. O’Brien, noted Church's educational background (some 
college), "solid employment history," stable family background, 
"strong circle of friends centering around his church," and lack 
of any criminal record. 
¶9  On the other hand, the circuit court expressed concern 
about Church's "deceitful" behavior and the premeditation of the 
offense, which the court characterized as "cold-blooded" and 
"pretty chilling."  The circuit court noted that Church had 
failed to take any responsibility for the offenses, and 
expressed concern about the "ample reason to suspect that Mr. 
Church would reoffend" based on evidence of his "grooming 
behavior" with this victim and other boys.  In this regard, the 
circuit court took note of a collection of photos of nude 
children and explicit notes in the defendant's handwriting that 
had been found at his home.  The circuit court sentenced Church 
to 13 years in prison on the second-degree sexual assault count.  
Sentence was withheld on the other counts in favor of probation 
terms as follows: ten years on the sexual exploitation count, 
six years on the delivery of THC count, and 24 years each on the 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
5 
 
two counts of enticement, all consecutive to the prison term but 
concurrent to each other. 
¶10 Church appealed on the multiplicity issue, and the 
court of appeals reversed one of the two counts of child 
enticement as multiplicitous.  State v. Church, 223 Wis. 2d 641, 
665, 589 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1998).2  Noting that its 
"disposition would not, in itself, affect the duration of 
Church's 
prison 
sentence 
or 
of 
his 
subsequent 
term 
of 
supervision," the court of appeals nevertheless concluded that 
it "must vacate all sentences imposed for each of Church's four 
remaining convictions, and remand for re-sentencing on one count 
each of second-degree sexual assault, child enticement, sexual 
exploitation of a child, and delivery of THC to a minor."  
Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 665-66 (citing Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 
146).  
¶11 On remand, the circuit court ordered an updated 
presentence investigation report (PSI).  The updated PSI 
indicated 
that 
Church 
had 
been 
incarcerated 
at 
Dodge 
Correctional Institution in Wisconsin from May to October of 
1997 and in the county jail in Titus, Texas, from October 1997 
through May 2000.  In May of 2000, Church was transferred back 
to Dodge Correctional.  
                                                 
2 We initially granted the State's petition to review the 
court of appeals' decision regarding the multiplicity of the two 
child enticement charges, but later dismissed the petition as 
improvidently granted after the State changed its position and 
conceded multiplicity.  See State v. Church, 2000 WI 90, 236 
Wis. 2d 755, 613 N.W.2d 848. 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 In July of 1998 and again in January of 1999, the 
Program Review Committee recommended that Church remain in Texas 
rather than transfer to another facility.  The PRC reported that 
while in Texas, Church was assigned as a kitchen trustee, 
attended church services, and had an "excellent" record of 
conduct.  During his four years of incarceration prior to 
resentencing, Church was not involved in any sex offender 
treatment programs. 
¶13 At the resentencing hearing, Dr. Margaret Alexander, 
Clinical Director of the Sex Offender Treatment Program at the 
Oshkosh Correctional Institution, testified that sex offender 
treatment in prison typically lasts for four years and is 
implemented as an inmate approaches his date of release.  Dr. 
Alexander explained the rationale for deferring sex offender 
treatment until the end of an inmate's sentence as follows: 
The idea is that they finish the program and make a 
transition back to the community without spending 
further time in [criminal] populations where some of 
the new found skills and habits would stand a large 
possibility of getting erased. 
¶14 Further 
testimony 
established 
that 
sex 
offender 
treatment is usually not appropriate until an offender is no 
longer in denial.  There was no evidence that Church would have 
been admitted into sex offender treatment during the four years 
of incarceration prior to his resentencing.  Sex offender 
treatment was not available at the Titus, Texas, facility.  
¶15 Church argued for the same prison sentence and 
probation that was previously imposed on the four counts that 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
7 
 
remained after his successful appeal.  For the first time, he 
expressed some remorse and a desire to seek treatment.  The 
prosecution again asked for a prison sentence totaling 33 years.  
The circuit court imposed a prison sentence of 17 years on the 
sexual assault count, an increase of four years, followed by the 
same probationary terms as originally imposed on the remaining 
three counts.  The circuit court justified the increase as 
follows: 
I feel that we are in exactly the same position we 
were in when Mr. Church sat before me almost four 
years ago . . . The offense remains just as serious, 
the character of the defendant has not changed in any 
way, the protection of the public remains a very 
serious concern.  The only thing that has changed is 
nearly four years have passed and Mr. Church . . . [has 
today] 
made 
his 
first 
step 
towards 
admitting 
responsibility 
and 
seeking 
help 
for 
his 
very 
significant problems. I feel that those four years 
have been wasted and that to impose the same sentence 
today would in effect give Mr. Church credit for 
spending the last four years without acknowledging his 
offense 
and 
without 
doing 
anything 
to 
obtain 
treatment.  
¶16 Church moved for sentence modification, which was 
denied.  He appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 
increased sentence.  State v. Church, 2002 WI App 212, 257 Wis. 
2d 442, 650 N.W.2d 873.  We granted Church's petition for 
review, and now reverse. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 Whether an increased sentence imposed upon a defendant 
after a successful appeal violates a defendant's right to due 
process under the federal and state constitutions is a question 
of law that we review de novo.  State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
8 
 
¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354 ("Due process determinations 
are questions of law that we decide de novo.").  See also State 
v. Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 142, 146 n.1, 560 N.W.2d 256 (1997)(de 
novo review of proper resentencing considerations); State v. 
Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 673, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985).  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶18 This case presents two issues for review: (1) whether 
the court of appeals was required to remand this case for 
resentencing on all remaining counts after reversing one of the 
multiplicitous child enticement counts; and (2) whether the 
circuit court's increased sentence was presumptively vindictive, 
in violation of Church’s right to due process, and, if so, 
whether the presumption was overcome by adequate, objective new 
factors in the record justifying the harsher sentence. 
A. Remand for Resentencing 
¶19 On the multiplicitous child enticement counts, Church 
received concurrent 24-year probation terms, consecutive to the 
prison term on the sexual assault count.  Rather than simply 
vacating one of the two counts of child enticement held to be 
multiplicitous and remanding for a corresponding amendment to 
the judgment of conviction, the court of appeals vacated all 
remaining sentences in the case and remanded for resentencing.  
Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 665-66.  The court of appeals cited this 
court's decision in Gordon as requiring resentencing on the 
surviving counts.  Id.  We disagree. 
¶20 In Gordon, the defendant was convicted and sentenced 
as 
follows: 
kidnapping, 
15 
years; 
robbery, 
eight 
years 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
9 
 
concurrent; burglary, eight years concurrent; and second-degree 
murder, 15 years consecutive.  Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 134-35.  
The defendant appealed, alleging that the conviction and 
sentence for kidnapping, which was the predicate felony for the 
second-degree murder conviction, violated double jeopardy.  Id. 
at 135.  We concluded that the conviction and sentence for 
kidnapping as well as second-degree murder predicated upon 
kidnapping violated double jeopardy, and vacated the kidnapping 
count.  Id.  at 146.  However, we also summarily vacated the 
sentences on the surviving counts: "The sentence for second-
degree murder, robbery, and burglary must also be vacated and 
the case remanded for resentencing on all charges." Id. (citing 
State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 290, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982); 
Robinson v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 343, 356, 306 N.W.2d 668 (1981); 
State v. Upchurch, 101 Wis. 2d 329, 335-36, 305 N.W.2d 57 
(1981); Ronzani v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 512, 520, 129 N.W.2d 143 
(1964)). 
¶21 We did not further explain in Gordon the circumstances 
under which a remand for resentencing is required when one or 
more counts in a multi-count case is vacated on appeal, leaving 
other counts intact.  It is clear, however, that the elimination 
on double jeopardy grounds of one of the four counts in Gordon 
disturbed the original sentence structure, which called for the 
defendant to serve a total of 30 years in prison.  The two 
eight-year sentences for robbery and burglary were concurrent, 
but the two 15-year sentences for kidnapping and second-degree 
murder were consecutive.  Vacating the kidnapping conviction and 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
10 
 
sentence upset the overall sentencing structure, frustrating the 
intent of the original sentence.  Remand for resentencing was 
necessary and appropriate, to allow for a restructuring of the 
remaining sentences to carry out the intent of the original 
dispositional scheme. 
¶22  Remand for resentencing in Gordon was supported by the 
precedent cited in the case.  In Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to two and one-half years 
for armed robbery and two years consecutive for concealing 
identity.  We held that concealing identity was not a separate 
offense, but, rather, a penalty enhancer, and therefore the two 
sentences for what was a single, enhanced offense, violated 
double jeopardy.  Id. at 283.  In ordering a remand for 
resentencing, we invoked our decision a year earlier in 
Robinson, 102 Wis. 2d at 356, which had also involved separate 
sentences for armed robbery and concealing identity: 
In Robinson this court said: 
"Accordingly, rather than attempting to infer at 
the appellate level what sentence the trial court 
would have imposed had it proceeded on the proper 
assumption that concealing identity aggravates armed 
robbery but does not stand as a separate substantive 
offense, we conclude that the trial court is the 
proper court to resentence the defendant under a 
correct application of the law.  We therefore vacate 
the judgment of conviction for concealing identity, 
vacate both sentences as imposed, and remand to the 
trial court for resentencing on the conviction of 
armed robbery, under circumstances where identity was 
concealed." 
Morris, 108 Wis. 2d at 290 n.5 (quoting Robinson, 102 Wis. 2d at 
356).   
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
11 
 
 
¶23  Similarly, in Upchurch, 101 Wis. 2d 329, we concluded 
that separate, consecutive one-year sentences for possession of 
a controlled substance and habitual criminality violated double 
jeopardy, because the repeater statute was a penalty enhancer, 
not a separate offense.  Id. at 335.  We remanded for 
resentencing on the single, enhanced offense in order not to 
frustrate the intent of the original sentence.  Id. at 336 
(holding that a contrary result would "tend to make the 
sentencing proceeding a game wherein a misstatement by the trial 
judge would result in a windfall to the defendant").  
¶24 Also, in Ronzani, 24 Wis. 2d 512, the defendant was 
convicted of attempted armed robbery and third-degree murder 
(then also known as felony murder), predicated upon the 
attempted armed robbery, and sentenced to 15 years on the felony 
murder count, and ten years consecutive on the attempted armed 
robbery count.  We concluded that the conviction and sentence on 
the attempted armed robbery count was error because attempted 
armed robbery was a lesser-included offense of third-degree 
felony murder predicated on the attempted armed robbery.  Id. at 
519.  We remanded for resentencing because the reversal of the 
attempted armed robbery count disturbed the structure of the 
overall sentence: 
We have determined to remand for resentencing because 
the original sentence of Ronzani for third-degree 
murder 
may 
reflect 
the 
trial 
court's 
erroneous 
conclusion that a consecutive sentence could also be 
given for the attempted armed robbery. 
Ronzani, 24 Wis. 2d at 520. 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
12 
 
¶25 We 
have 
never 
held, 
however, 
that 
remand 
for 
resentencing is always required, even where the vacated count in 
a multi-count case has no affect whatsoever on the overall 
sentence structure, as is the case here.  The court of appeals 
correctly noted our overstatement and under-explanation of the 
"Ronzani-Gordon" line of cases in Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670.   
The supreme court subsequently explained what it 
referred to as the "Ronzani-Gordon" line of cases in 
this way: 
The 
Ronzani-Gordon 
line 
of 
cases 
demonstrates that when a defendant is convicted 
of and sentenced for two offenses which are later 
held to be the same offense, and when one 
conviction and sentence is vacated on double 
jeopardy 
principles, 
the 
validity 
of 
both 
punishments is implicated, the sentences for both 
offenses are illegal, and resentencing on the 
valid conviction is permissible. 
State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 681, 360 N.W.2d 43 
 
(1985). 
 
However, this explanation apparently overlooks 
the fact that the court in Gordon used this rationale 
to invalidate not only the sentence on the conviction 
that was the "same offense" for double jeopardy 
purposes, but also the sentences on the other, 
separate offenses, the convictions of which were not 
involved in the double jeopardy challenge.  This 
analysis in Martin does not explain the reason for 
vacating the sentences on the convictions that are not 
involved in the double jeopardy challenge——there is 
nothing invalid or illegal about them. 
Church, 257 Wis. 2d, ¶14 n.7. 
 
¶26  A double jeopardy bar to one conviction and sentence 
in a multi-count case does not operate to invalidate the 
sentences on all the remaining counts, nor does it necessarily 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
13 
 
invalidate the sentence on the specific surviving parallel count 
which gave rise to the double jeopardy challenge.  The court of 
appeals was entirely correct that "there is nothing invalid or 
illegal" about the sentences on the counts that remain after a 
successful double jeopardy challenge.  Martin and the Ronzani-
Gordon line of cases hold that resentencing is procedurally and 
constitutionally permissible if the invalidation of one sentence 
on double jeopardy grounds disturbs the overall sentence 
structure or frustrates the intent of the original dispositional 
scheme.  Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 682.  Resentencing is 
unnecessary, and certainly not required, where, as here, the 
invalidation of one count on double jeopardy grounds has no 
affect at all on the overall sentence structure. 
¶27 As we have noted, however, Church himself requested 
resentencing as a remedy for the multiplicity of the child 
enticement counts.  He argued at resentencing for reimposition 
of the same overall sentence.  Instead, he received four more 
years in prison.  But for his successful appeal, Church would be 
serving a 13-year sentence.  Because of his successful appeal, 
he is now serving a 17-year sentence. 
B.  Vindictiveness/Due Process 
¶28  "To punish a person because he has done what the law 
plainly allows him to do is a due process violation 'of the most 
basic sort.'"  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 
(1982) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 
(1978)). 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
14 
 
¶29  In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), 
the United States Supreme Court held that "[d]ue process of law 
. . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for 
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no 
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial."  The Court 
further held that "since the fear of such vindictiveness may 
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to 
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process 
also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such 
a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge."  
Id. 
¶30  It is clear, then, that "[w]hile sentencing discretion 
permits consideration of a wide range of information relevant to 
the assessment of punishment," due process requires that "it 
must not be exercised with the purpose of punishing a successful 
appeal."  Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798 (1989)(citing 
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-725). 
¶31  To protect defendants against due process violations 
upon resentencing, the Supreme Court in Pearce adopted the 
following rule: 
In order to assure the absence of such a 
[vindictive] 
motivation, 
we 
have 
concluded 
that 
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a 
defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing 
so must affirmatively appear.  Those reasons must be 
based 
upon 
objective 
information 
concerning 
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant 
occurring after the time of the original sentencing 
proceeding.  And the factual data upon which the 
increased sentence is based must be made part of the 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
15 
 
record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the 
increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.  
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.  Because the defendant in each of the 
two cases at issue in Pearce had received a longer sentence 
after retrial without "any reason or justification" being 
offered "beyond the naked power to impose it," the Supreme Court 
concluded that the longer sentences violated due process.  Id. 
at 726. 
 
¶32  Justice White concurred in Pearce, stating he would 
"authorize an increased sentence on retrial based on any 
objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial 
judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding."  Id. 
at 757 (White, J., concurring).  This position departs somewhat 
from the Pearce majority, which appeared to limit the facts or 
information capable of justifying an increased sentence to 
"conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time 
of the original sentencing."  Id. at 726. 
¶33  The Pearce majority, however, also stated a bit more 
broadly elsewhere in its analysis that a court "is not 
constitutionally precluded . . . from imposing a new sentence, 
whether greater or less than the original sentence, in the light 
of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new 
light upon the defendant's 'life, health, habits, conduct, and 
mental and moral propensities.'"  Id. at 723 (quoting Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949)).  The difference between 
"conduct occurring after" and "events subsequent to" the 
original sentencing seems subtle, but in any event, Justice 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
16 
 
White clearly would have allowed a harsher sentence based upon 
any information not known to the trial judge at the time of the 
initial sentencing, whether it pertained to conduct or events 
occurring before or after the initial sentencing. 
¶34  Later decisions of the Supreme Court have amplified 
the Pearce holding.  In Goodwin, a case involving an allegation 
of prosecutorial rather than judicial vindictiveness, the Court 
characterized 
the 
Pearce 
rule 
as 
"a 
presumption 
of 
vindictiveness, 
which 
may 
be 
overcome 
only 
by 
objective 
information in the record justifying the increased sentence."  
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374.  The Supreme Court explained in 
Goodwin that the presumption is necessary because "[m]otives are 
complex and difficult to prove."  Id. at 373.  Because of this 
difficulty in proving that a harsher sentence was actually 
motivated by vindictiveness, the Court stated that "in certain 
cases in which action detrimental to the defendant has been 
taken after the exercise of a legal right, the Court has found 
it necessary to 'presume' an improper vindictive motive."  Id. 
¶35  In Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986), the Court 
clarified that Pearce did not necessarily limit the scope of the 
information capable of overcoming the presumption to "'conduct 
or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing 
proceedings.'"  Id. at 141 (quoting Wasman v. United States, 468 
U.S. 559, 572 (1984)).  The Court held in McCullough that 
"[t]his language . 
. 
. 
was never 
intended 
to describe 
exhaustively all of the possible circumstances in which a 
sentence increase could be justified. Restricting justifications 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
17 
 
for a sentence increase to only 'events that occurred subsequent 
to 
the 
original 
sentencing 
proceedings' 
could 
in 
some 
circumstances lead to absurd results."  Id.  The Court in 
McCullough found no due process violation in an increased 
sentence after retrial where, in the second trial, unlike in the 
first, there was evidence that the defendant had actually 
committed the crime rather than merely aided and abetted it.  
Id. at 143. 
¶36  The McCullough holding was based in large part on 
Wasman, in which the Court upheld an increased sentence after 
retrial based upon a new criminal conviction on an unrelated 
crime, where the new conviction was obtained after the first 
trial but arose out of conduct that occurred before the first 
trial.  The Court held that "[c]onsideration of a criminal 
conviction 
obtained 
in 
the 
interim 
between 
an 
original 
sentencing 
and 
a 
sentencing 
after 
retrial 
is 
manifestly 
legitimate."  Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569-70.  The Court also stated 
that "[t]here is no logical support for a distinction between 
'events' and 'conduct' of the defendant occurring after the 
initial sentencing insofar as the kind of information that may 
be relied upon to show a nonvindictive motive is concerned."  
Id. at 571-72.    
¶37 
The 
Court 
has 
also 
clarified 
that 
the 
Pearce 
presumption does not apply to every instance in which a 
defendant receives an increased sentence after successful post-
conviction proceedings.  Smith, 490 U.S. at 799.  Because 
automatic application of the presumption "may block a legitimate 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
18 
 
response to criminal conduct," the Court has applied it "only in 
cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness 
exists."  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373. 
¶38 Thus, in Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Pearce 
presumption does not apply to a longer sentence imposed after a 
trial where the defendant had first been convicted and sentenced 
on a negotiated guilty plea that was later reversed on appeal.  
Smith, 490 U.S. at 799.  The Court explained that "[w]hile the 
Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule of 
sweeping dimension, [] subsequent cases have made clear that its 
presumption of vindictiveness 'does not apply in every case 
where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on 
retrial.'"  Smith, 490 U.S. 799 (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 
475 U.S. 134, 138 (1986)).  Due process "is not offended by all 
possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, 
but only 
by 
those that 
pose a 
realistic 
likelihood of 
'vindictiveness.'"  Id. at 800 n.3 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 
417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)).  Furthermore, "a mere opportunity for 
vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the imposition of a 
prophylactic rule."  Id. (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384, and 
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357). 
¶39 More 
specifically, 
in 
Smith, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
explained the justification for and application of the Pearce 
presumption as follows: 
As we explained in Texas v. McCullough, "the evil the 
[Pearce] 
Court 
sought 
to 
prevent" 
was 
not 
the 
imposition of "enlarged sentences after a new trial" 
but "vindictiveness of a sentencing judge."  Ibid.  
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
19 
 
See also Chaffin v. Stynchombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 
(1973)(the Pearce presumption was not designed to 
prevent the imposition of an increased sentence on 
retrial "for some valid reason associated with the 
need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing 
process," but was "premised on the apparent need to 
guard 
against 
vindictiveness 
in 
the 
resentencing 
process"). 
 Because 
the 
Pearce 
presumption 
"may 
operate in the absence of any proof of an improper 
motive and thus . . .  block a legitimate response to 
criminal conduct," United States v. Goodwin, supra, 
457 U.S., at 373, we have limited its application, 
like that of "other 'judicially created means of 
effectuating 
the 
rights 
secured 
by 
the 
[Constitution],'" 
to 
circumstances 
"where 
its 
'objectives are thought most efficaciously served,'" 
Texas v. McCullough, supra, 475 U.S., at 138, quoting 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 487 (1976).  Such 
circumstances 
are 
those 
in 
which 
there 
is 
a 
"reasonable likelihood," United States v. Goodwin, 
supra, 457 U.S., at 373, that the increase in sentence 
is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of 
the sentencing authority.  Where there is no such 
reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the 
defendant to prove actual vindictiveness, see Wasman 
v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984). 
Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-800.3  Noting that "the relevant 
sentencing information available to the judge after [a guilty] 
plea will usually be considerably less than that available after 
trial," the Court in Smith held that resentencing after a 
                                                 
3 Additional cases in which the North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969), presumption has been held not to apply 
include: Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972)(holding 
that presumption of vindictiveness is inapplicable in a system 
which gave a convicted defendant the right to a trial de novo in 
another court); and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 
(1973)(holding that no presumption of vindictiveness arose when 
a second jury, on retrial following a successful appeal, imposed 
a higher sentence than a prior jury because a second jury was 
unlikely to have a "personal stake" in the prior conviction or 
to be "sensitive to the institutional interests that might 
occasion higher sentences"). 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
20 
 
defendant withdraws his guilty plea and is convicted at trial 
does not present a "reasonable likelihood" of vindictiveness so 
as to justify application of the Pearce presumption.  Id. at 
801.  The Court also noted that in this situation, the trial 
court is "not simply 'do[ing] over what it thought it had 
already done correctly,'" which might otherwise present a 
reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.  Id. at 801-02 (quoting 
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972)).  
 
¶40  Wisconsin case law on the propriety of imposing a 
longer sentence following successful post-conviction proceedings 
flows from State v. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d 461, 159 N.W.2d 577 
(1968), which predated, but in a sense anticipated, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Pearce.  In Leonard, this court concluded 
that  
[O]n resentencing following a second conviction after 
retrial, or mere resentencing, the trial court shall 
be barred from imposing an increased sentence unless 
(1) events occur or come to the sentencing court's 
attention 
subsequent 
to 
the 
first 
imposition 
of 
sentence which warrant an increased penalty; and (2) 
the court affirmatively states its grounds in the 
record for increasing the sentence.   
Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d at 473. 
¶41  The foundation for the Leonard rule, however, is not 
entirely clear.  The opinion recites case law from other 
jurisdictions but then says only that "[s]ix justices believe 
that 
until 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
spoken 
unequivocally on this issue the approach of Marano [v. United 
States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967)] is correct."  Leonard, 39 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
21 
 
Wis. 2d at 473.  The author of the opinion, Justice Wilkie, 
would have held that "any increase in sentencing constitutes a 
violation of the due-process and equal-protection guaranties of 
the United States Constitution."  Id.  Marano, from which the 
Leonard rule derives, does not elaborate any legal foundation 
for its holding.  Because Marano was a federal prosecution, 
however, we can assume that the decision was premised on federal 
constitutional principles.  This court has subsequently stated 
that the Leonard rule "[has] its basis in the due process clause 
of the state and federal constitutions [and] is designed to 
insure that the sentencing judge does not modify a criminal 
sentence for the purpose of penalizing a defendant who exercises 
his postconviction rights."  Grobarchik v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 
461, 473, 307 N.W.2d 170 (1981). 
¶42  A year after Leonard, the Supreme Court decided 
Pearce.  Subsequent Wisconsin case law has not reconciled the 
two cases with any clarity or consistency.  We have stated that 
the Leonard rule is both "substantially similar to" and "broader 
than" the Pearce rule, and also that the two rules are based on 
the same "purposes" and "due process rules."  Martin, 121 Wis. 
2d at 687. 
¶43  We have stated that Justice White's concurrence in 
Pearce is "more in accord" with Leonard.  Denny v. State, 47 
Wis. 2d 541, 545, 178 N.W.2d 38 (1970).  In State v. 
Stubbendick, 110 Wis. 2d 693, 698, 329 N.W.2d 399 (1983), we 
characterized Denny as "adopt[ing] Justice White's concurrence" 
in Pearce, even though Denny did not do so, and it would be odd 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
22 
 
for a state court to adopt a single-vote Supreme Court 
concurrence 
as 
authoritative 
on 
a 
matter 
of 
federal 
constitutional law.  In any event, the issue in Stubbendick was 
whether a circuit court may constitutionally impose an increased 
sentence after the defendant withdraws his no contest plea and 
goes to trial.  The Supreme Court subsequently concluded in 
Smith that the Pearce presumption does not apply in this 
situation, so that actual vindictiveness must be shown to 
establish a due process violation.  Smith, 490 U.S. at 799. 
¶44  In Grobarchik and Martin, we held that neither the 
Pearce nor the Leonard rule was applicable where "an initial 
sentence cannot be carried out because it was not authorized by 
law," and that in this situation, upon resentencing, "an 
increased sentence is permissible only when 'based upon a desire 
to implement the original dispositional scheme as manifested by 
the record in the first sentencing proceeding.'"  Carter, 208 
Wis. 2d at 149-50 (quoting Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 474, and 
Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 687). 
¶45  In Grobarchik, the original sentence on one count was 
invalid because of a defect in the circuit court's order of 
consecutive probation, in that the court had ordered the 
probation to commence on the defendant's release from prison as 
opposed to the completion of the imprisonment sentence (prison 
plus parole).  Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 474-75.  We concluded 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
correction 
of 
this 
error 
on 
resentencing, which operated to extend the period of supervision 
somewhat, was not subject to the Leonard or the Pearce rules.  
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
23 
 
Id. at 473-74.   Instead, we concluded that the resentencing was 
permissible because the court was motivated not by "malice or 
vindictiveness in an attempt to penalize the defendant for 
seeking a correction of his sentence," but by a "desire to 
implement its original dispositional plan."  Id. at 475. 
¶46  In Martin, the defendant had been convicted and 
sentenced to consecutive 17-year prison terms on armed robbery 
and second-degree felony murder predicated on the armed robbery.  
Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 671-72.  The back-to-back sentences were 
ordered concurrent to a four-year sentence the defendant was 
serving on a parole revocation.  The circuit court granted the 
defendant's post-trial motion to vacate the armed robbery count 
on double jeopardy grounds, and resentenced the defendant to 20 
years on the remaining second-degree murder count, consecutive 
to the parole revocation sentence, increasing his sentence on 
the murder but decreasing his total prison term from 34 to 24 
years. 
¶47  We declined to apply either Pearce or Leonard in 
Martin, and instead applied Grobarchik.  Id. at 687-88.  We 
concluded that "because the circuit judge resentenced the 
defendant to correct a prior invalid sentence, the circuit court 
correctly attempted to implement the original dispositional 
scheme 
reflected 
by 
the 
record 
in 
the 
first 
sentencing 
proceeding."  Id. at 688.  We further held that "[t]he new 
sentence was properly based on the record as initially compiled 
by the sentencing judge without any new evidence.  To encourage 
the judge at resentencing to exercise independent discretion is 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
24 
 
inconsistent with the purpose of implementing the original 
dispositional scheme and would open the door to potential 
vindictiveness in the resentencing process."  Id.           
¶48  Martin and Grobarchik, therefore, appear to establish 
a rule that where the resentencing occurs to correct a prior 
invalid sentence, an increased sentence on any of the remaining 
counts does not violate due process as long as the circuit court 
does not deviate from the original sentencing record and 
dispositional scheme.4  This rule is different from both Pearce 
and Leonard in that it disallows consideration of additional 
evidence 
and 
precludes 
application 
of 
new, 
independent 
sentencing discretion at resentencing.  Applying this rule here 
would require reversal.  At resentencing, the circuit court 
considered evidence outside the original sentencing record and 
                                                 
 
4 The scope and applicability of the rule established in 
State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985), and 
Grobarchik v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 461, 307 N.W.2d 170 (1981) were 
debated in this court's decision in State v. Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 
142, 560 N.W.2d 256 (1997).  In Carter, the defendant obtained 
resentencing after 
challenging certain 
information in his 
original 
presentence 
investigation 
report. 
This 
court 
distinguished Grobarchik and Martin, and concluded that the 
circuit court was entitled to "consider all information relevant 
about a defendant, including information about events and 
circumstances either that the sentencing court was unaware of at 
the initial sentencing or that occurred after the initial 
sentencing."  Carter, 208 Wis. 2d at 146.  This holding was 
reached in the context of a defendant's request to present 
additional, favorable information at resentencing.  The dissent 
in Carter took the position that the majority had "effectively 
overruled" Grobarchik and Martin.  Carter, 208 Wis. 2d at 162.  
Carter concerned the scope of a circuit court's inquiry upon 
resentencing, not the due process limitations on the circuit 
court's ability to increase a sentence upon resentencing.  
  
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
25 
 
evinced a clear intent to, and in fact did, depart from the 
original overall dispositional scheme.  The circuit court added 
four years to Church's sexual assault sentence, increasing not 
just the prison term on that count but his overall prison term 
as well. 
¶49  Applying either Leonard or Pearce also requires 
reversal, but applying Leonard would be problematic for a number 
of reasons.  At first blush, Leonard appears to create a strict 
bar against increased sentences on resentencing (except where 
the two requirements are met), whether after retrial or 
otherwise.  But while Leonard on its face applies to all 
resentencings, those following retrial "or mere resentencings," 
id., we have held that there are some resentencings that do not 
fall within the Leonard rule.  Grobarchik, Martin, and by 
implication the Ronzani-Gordon line of cases are not subject to 
the Leonard rule.  Grobarchik and Martin guard against due 
process/vindictiveness 
violations 
on 
resentencing 
not 
by 
requiring the circuit court to state objective new factors on 
the record, but by requiring the circuit court to stick to the 
original record and general overall sentence structure.  As we 
have noted, that did not occur here. 
 ¶50  Reconciling Leonard with Pearce is difficult for 
another reason: the circumstances under which a harsher sentence 
may be imposed are stated more broadly in Leonard than in 
Pearce, even in light of later Supreme Court case law explaining 
the Pearce presumption.   A longer sentence may be imposed under 
Leonard where "events occur or come to the sentencing court's 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
26 
 
attention subsequent to the first imposition of sentence which 
warrant an increased penalty," as long as the court states its 
reasons on the record.  Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d at 473 (emphasis 
added).  This appears to mean that events or conduct in 
existence and known to the prosecution but not brought to the 
circuit court's attention at the original sentencing hearing 
would 
be 
sufficient 
to 
justify 
a 
longer 
sentence 
on 
resentencing. 
¶51  In practical terms, then, the resentencing, which 
occurs only because the defendant has been successful on post-
conviction motion or appeal, can under Leonard become a second 
opportunity for the prosecution to persuade the judge to impose 
a harsher sentence based on information it could have presented 
the first time around, but did not.  This contradicts Pearce's 
central purpose, which is to prevent the resentencing process 
from becoming a vindictive exercise that penalizes a defendant 
who has succeeded in having his conviction or sentence set 
aside.  Our case law cannot provide less protection than federal 
due process law provides; at least some applications of the 
Leonard rule would be suspect under Pearce. 
¶52  We note also that the Leonard rule was expressly 
intended to apply "until the United States Supreme Court has 
spoken" on this issue.  Id.  There is now a significant body of 
Supreme Court case law on the due process implications of 
increased sentences.  The constitutionality of an increased 
sentence upon resentencing is determined by reference to Pearce 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
27 
 
and 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
cases 
elaborating 
on 
the 
Pearce 
presumption. 
¶53  As we have stated, Church's increased sentence would 
not comply with the rule of Martin-Grobarchik.  The circuit 
court evidently treated this resentencing as an opportunity to 
revisit the original sentence based upon updated information and 
argument.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the 
Pearce presumption is triggered.  Although Church was not 
resentenced after retrial, as in Pearce, the circumstances of 
this case created the same sort of likelihood of vindictiveness 
as to require application of the presumption. 
¶54  In this case, as in Pearce, the defendant received a 
longer 
sentence 
upon 
resentencing 
after 
successful 
post-
conviction proceedings.  The appeal in this case posed a direct 
challenge to a decision of the circuit court.  The circuit 
court's decision on multiplicity was reversed, the entire case 
was remanded, and the circuit court was essentially "'do[ing] 
over what it thought it had already done correctly.'"  Smith, 
490 U.S. at 801 (quoting Colten, 407 U.S. at 117); Goodwin, 457 
U.S. at 374, 383 nn. 5, 16 (quoting Colten).  Inherent in these 
circumstances is the "reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness" 
that the Pearce presumption is intended to protect against.  
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373.   
¶55  The Pearce presumption of vindictiveness can be 
overcome if "affirmative reasons" justifying the longer sentence 
appear in the record and if those reasons are "based upon 
objective information" regarding events or "identifiable conduct 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
28 
 
on the part of the defendant" subsequent to the original 
sentencing proceeding.  Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. 
¶56  The longer sentence in this case was premised on the 
passage of time: four years of incarceration had gone by, and 
Church was still (mostly) in denial and had not sought or 
received 
treatment. 
This 
does 
not 
constitute 
"objective 
information" of "identifiable conduct on the part of the 
defendant" subsequent to the original sentencing. It constitutes 
a subjective evaluation of the status of Church's rehabilitation 
at the time of resentencing, based not on any new facts but on 
the mere continued existence of the original facts. 
¶57  Church was in denial and untreated at the time of the 
original sentencing.  That he remained so four years later is 
not a new factor justifying a longer sentence after a successful 
appeal; it is merely a continuation of the status quo ante.  
Defendants who exercise their right to appeal often maintain 
their innocence.  To premise an increased sentence after a 
successful 
appeal 
on 
a 
defendant's 
continued 
denial 
of 
responsibility, without more, comes far too close to punishing 
the defendant for exercising his right to appeal. 
¶58  In addition, there is no evidence that Church refused 
any treatment opportunity while in prison.  Indeed, the evidence 
at the resentencing hearing established that sex offender 
treatment was not typically offered until the end of an inmate's 
prison term and was not available to Church during his first 
four years of incarceration. 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
29 
 
¶59  Accordingly, the circuit court's justification for the 
longer sentence here——that Church remained in denial and 
untreated four years into his prison term——was insufficient to 
overcome the Pearce presumption.5  Church's state of being in 
denial and untreated did not constitute a new factor, only a 
continuation of the same situation that existed at the time of 
the original sentencing. 
¶60 In sum, we conclude that resentencing on convictions 
that remain intact after one or more counts in a multi-count 
case is vacated is not always required.  Where, as here, the 
vacated count did not affect the overall dispositional structure 
of the original sentence, resentencing on the remaining counts 
is unnecessary.  We also conclude that the increased sentence 
imposed upon Church was presumptively vindictive under Pearce, 
and was not supported by objective new factors in the record 
justifying the increase.  Accordingly, the increased sentence 
violated Church's right to due process. 
By the court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
                                                 
 
5   We state for the record that the question here is not 
whether Church deserved a sentence longer than 13 years for 
these crimes.  Had the new sentence of 17 years, or perhaps even 
a longer term, been imposed as an initial matter, it easily 
would have withstood review as an appropriate exercise of 
discretion, given the severity of these offenses and the risk of 
recidivism, as fully explained by the circuit court.  See 
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 280-82, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971).   
  
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
01-3100-CR   
 
 
 
1