Title: Nisson v. TILLMAN ET UX
Citation: 213 Or. 133, 323 P.2d 329
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 1958

Affirmed March 26, 1958.
*134 Robert E. Jones, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. On the brief were Windsor, Jones &amp; Briggs, Portland.
Albert T. Kemmer, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
*135 Before PERRY, Chief Justice, and LUSK, WARNER and KESTER,[*] Justices.
AFFIRMED.
PERRY, C.J.
The plaintiff brought this action, setting forth the following allegations in her complaint:
The trial of the cause resulted in a judgment for plaintiff and against the defendants in the sum of $1250.00. From this adverse judgment the defendants have appealed.
On appeal, the defendants for the first time contend the complaint does not state a cause of action.
In Musgrave et ux v. Lucas et ux, 193 Or 401, 410, 238 P2d 780, we said:
Defendants, therefore, conclude that, since the complaint fails to allege the plaintiff was ignorant of the falsity of the representations, an element of a valid cause of action is missing.
1. It has been long established in this state that a complaint alleging fraud is sufficient if it alleges facts showing that (1) a material representation was made to the plaintiff and it was false; (2) the defendant making the representation knew it was false, or, in lieu thereof, defendant made the representation recklessly *138 without knowledge of its truth or falsity; (3) the representation was made with intent that the plaintiff should rely upon it and be deceived; (4) the plaintiff relied upon the representation and suffered injury. Palmberg v. City of Astoria, 112 Or 353, 228 P 107, 229 P 380, and cases cited therein.
2, 3. In "comprehensively" stating the elements of actionable fraud in the case of Musgrave et ux v. Lucas et ux, supra, and Conzelmann v. N.W.P. &amp; D. Prod. Co., supra, cited therein, we did not intend to state that each of these elements must be separately alleged. It is sufficient if the pleading as a whole may be said to contain each of these necessary elements. In the case before us, the plaintiff alleges she relied upon the representations. This in itself implies not only her right to rely upon the representations, but her ignorance of the falsity of the representations. The plaintiff's statement of reliance merely puts in issue as questions of fact her knowledge of the true facts which would prevent her reliance on the representations, or her right to rely upon them.
The defendants also contend that the "complaint, after attempting to allege a cause of action based on fraud, goes further and states the respondent rescinded the transaction." The basis of this contention apparently is that plaintiff must elect to either sue in damages at law or in equity to rescind, she cannot do both, and, therefore, no cause of action is stated.
4-6. One of the remedies open to a party who has been induced by fraudulent representations to become the purchaser of property is, upon discovery of fraud, to rescind the contract absolutely and sue in an action at law to recover the consideration parted with upon the fraudulent contract. Kruse v. Bush, 85 Or 394, 397, 167 P 308. See, also, Rayburn et al. v. Norton, 117 Or *139 328, 243 P 560; McCabe v. Kelleher, 90 Or 45, 50, 175 P 608; Hanna v. Hope, 86 Or 303, 308, 168 P 618. This, we think, is the theory of the complaint in this case. It alleges that plaintiff "rescinded the transaction" and demanded return of the purchase price, and asks for judgment in the amount of the money so paid. The fact that the plaintiff also sought general damages which he would not be entitled to recover in an action based on rescission does not affect the essential character of the pleading. The defendants could have challenged this claim either by a motion directed to the complaint or by objections to the introduction of evidence, but they did neither. The complaint states a cause of action in assumpsit.
The defendants also assign as error the refusal by the trial court to grant defendants' motion for an involuntary nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case.
7. Insofar as the representations made as to the A-1 card and the assumed name are concerned, we do not express any opinion of the right of the plaintiff to rely upon them under the facts of this case. It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove that all of the representations made were material and false, it is sufficient if one representation was material and false. There is no question but that the representations relating to the condition of the plumbing were false and this condition was known to the defendants. It is also self-evident that adequate plumbing in this day and age is a necessity for the operation of a restaurant and would be a material consideration in the purchase and sale of such an establishment.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
[*]  Resigned March 1, 1958.