Title: Derosso Landfill Company, Inc. v. City of Oak Creek
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP000440
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 1996

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-0440 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
DeRosso Landfill Company, Inc., and 
Gordon DeRosso, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of Oak Creek, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAY 13, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of 
Oak Creek, 191 Wis. 2d 46, 528 N.W.2d 468 (1995), reversing an 
order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, George A. Burns, 
Jr., judge.  The circuit court ordered a permanent injunction 
restraining the City of Oak Creek (the City) from interfering with 
DeRosso Landfill Company, Inc. and Gordon DeRosso (the plaintiffs) 
in their implementation of a plan, approved by the Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR), to fill with clean fill a 300,000-cubic-
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
2 
yard hole located on ten acres of land owned by Gordon DeRosso.
1  
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the 
permanent injunction. 
 
The issue presented for our review is whether a solid waste 
facility 
exempt 
from 
regulation 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 144.44(7)(g) (1993-94)
2 must nevertheless comply with a pre-
existing municipal ordinance prohibiting that facility from being 
opened.
3   
 
The circuit court concluded that in enacting Wis. Admin. Code 
§ NR 500.08(2)(a) pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g), the DNR 
has exercised authority vested in it by the legislature and has 
withdrawn the City's authority to regulate the proposed clean fill 
facility.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
statutory exemption merely restores the City's pre-existing 
authority to regulate the use of land within its borders.   
 
We agree with the circuit court's analysis of the statutes.  
For the reasons explained below we conclude that the City's 
                     
     
1  Clean fill consists of "clean soil, brick, building stone, 
concrete, reinforced concrete, broken pavement, and unpainted or 
untreated wood."  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 500.08(2)(a). 
     
2  Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references 
are to the 1993-94 volume of the Wisconsin Statutes.   
     
3  Section 11.09 of the Municipal Code of the City of Oak 
Creek 
prohibits 
the 
filling 
of 
land 
except 
in 
limited 
circumstances, none of which applies to the site in issue.  
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
3 
resolution and ordinance must yield before countervailing state 
legislation.   
 
I. 
 
For purposes of this review, the facts are not in dispute.  
In June 1989 the DNR ordered the plaintiffs to close and cap with 
two feet of foundry clay a 40-acre landfill in Oak Creek that had 
reached capacity.  In its closure order, the DNR also required the 
plaintiffs to submit a plan for the "abandonment" (restoration) of 
the "borrow source" (the land from which the clay would be 
excavated).  
 
The plaintiffs' borrow source site is a ten-acre parcel of 
land owned by Gordon DeRosso, zoned for industrial use and located 
east of Pennsylvania Avenue and immediately across the street from 
the landfill between Ryan Road and State Highway 100 in Oak Creek. 
 Excavations of clay from this site created a 300,000-cubic-yard 
hole which has filled with water, creating an artificial pond.  In 
complying with the DNR order to restore this site, the plaintiffs 
commenced negotiations with the DNR, which in November 1990 
culminated in the submission of a proposal to fill the site with 
clean fill.   
 
The City, however, objected.  Although the City had initially 
passed a resolution approving the use of the site as a clean fill 
repository and negotiated an agreement allowing the site to be 
filled with clean fill, the City was concerned that if the DNR 
alone regulated the filling of the site, the monitoring of 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
4 
materials placed there would be insufficient.  Therefore, in June 
1992 the City passed a resolution stating that because "the City 
of Oak Creek has environmental concerns regarding the proposed 
method of abandoning the borrow site," the site could not be 
filled with clean fill. 
 
At the same time, however, the DNR indicated that it was 
moving toward an approval of the plaintiffs' proposal.  In a 
letter sent to the City Attorney in July 1992, a DNR attorney 
stated that the plaintiffs' proposal, if properly implemented, 
would comply with DNR environmental regulations.
4  Although the 
DNR and the plaintiffs continued to negotiate over implementation 
matters such as how the site would be dewatered without adversely 
impacting the surrounding region, in June 1993 the DNR waste 
management engineer assigned to the plaintiffs' site stated in an 
affidavit that "[t]he DNR expects to issue final approval in the 
near future."  The DNR approved the plaintiffs' proposal on 
October 6, 1993.
5  
 
In the interim, the plaintiffs had brought suit in circuit 
court seeking a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction 
restraining the City from interfering with the proposed plan to 
fill the site with clean fill.  In December 1993, following a 
                     
     
4  The DNR indicated that it would have approved a proposal 
to either fill the borrow source with clean fill or to leave it as 
a pond. 
     
5  On October 11, 1993, the plaintiffs were permitted to 
supplement the record with a copy of the DNR order. 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
5 
hearing on the motion, the circuit court issued a memorandum 
decision stating that because Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g) authorized 
the DNR to exempt certain facilities from applying for local 
approvals, it stood to reason that those facilities need not 
comply with local approvals either.  "By providing that certain 
facilities may be exempted from local approval," stated the 
circuit court, "the legislature has clearly and expressly 
withdrawn municipal power to act as to exempt facilities" because 
"[a] city cannot prohibit what the state allows when the 
legislature has withdrawn municipal authority to act."  Because 
the DNR had exempted clean fill facilities from applying for local 
approvals, the circuit court held that "the City's resolution and 
ordinance are invalid as to the DeRossos' plan to fill the site 
with clean fill."   Consequently, the circuit court granted the 
plaintiffs' motion for an injunction. 
 
The City appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the 
order of the circuit court, concluding that exemption from the 
regulatory scheme under Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g) "merely leaves 
the parties--the operators and the localities--in the same 
position with respect to the exempt facilities as they would have 
been if that scheme did not exist."  DeRosso, 191 Wis. 2d at 59-
60.  "Rather than withdraw Oak Creek's power to regulate," the 
court of appeals reasoned, "the exemption merely restores Oak 
Creek's pre-existing authority to regulate the use of land within 
its borders." Id. at 60-61.  Because it determined that the City's 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
6 
resolution and ordinance did not conflict with the legislature's 
statutory scheme for regulating waste facilities, the court of 
appeals concluded that the City's prohibition of the plaintiffs' 
facility passed muster under the preemption test set forth in 
Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Madison EOC, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 395-
97, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984).  DeRosso, 191 Wis. 2d at 64-65.  It 
therefore reversed the circuit court.   
 
II. 
 
We first examine the powers of a local unit of government to 
regulate an issue of statewide concern.  The parties, the circuit 
court, the court of appeals and this court agree that the 
plaintiffs' proposed clean fill facility would be a solid waste 
facility and that the legislature has explicitly provided that 
regulation of solid waste facilities is a matter of statewide 
concern.
6   
 
Labelling a matter one of statewide concern does not, 
however, automatically void local regulation.  The court has 
frequently stated that a municipality may pass ordinances which, 
while addressed to local issues, concomitantly regulate matters of 
statewide concern.  Anchor, 120 Wis. 2d at 395-96; Wisconsin 
                     
     
6  Wisconsin Stat. § 144.445(5) states, in pertinent part: 
 
APPLICABILITY OF LOCAL APPROVALS.  (a) The establishment of 
facilities is a matter of statewide concern. 
 
 
Wisconsin Stat. §144.445(3)(c) defines "facility" as "a solid 
waste disposal facility or a hazardous waste facility."  
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
7 
Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 532-33, 271 N.W.2d 69 
(1978); see also Thomas P. Solheim, Conflicts Between State 
Statute and Local Ordinance in Wisconsin, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 840, 
847-48. 
 
Nevertheless, a municipality's ability to regulate matters of 
statewide concern is limited.  As the court stated six decades 
ago, "municipalities may enact ordinances in the same field and on 
the same subject covered by state legislation where such 
ordinances do not conflict with, but rather complement, the state 
legislation."  Fox v. Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 546, 275 N.W. 513 
(1937) (quoting Milwaukee v. Childs Co., 195 Wis. 148, 151, 217 
N.W. 703 (1928)).  Therefore, wrote the Fox court, where "'the 
state has entered the field of regulation, municipalities may not 
make regulation inconsistent therewith'" because "a municipality 
cannot lawfully forbid what the legislature has expressly 
licensed, 
authorized 
or 
required, 
or 
authorize 
what 
the 
legislature has expressly forbidden."  Fox, 225 Wis. at 545, 
(quoting Hack v. Mineral Point, 203 Wis. 215, 219, 221, 233 N.W. 
82 (1930)).  The principle announced in Fox "has been the rule in 
Wisconsin and still is" the rule when addressing the question of 
whether state legislation preempts a municipal ordinance.  Anchor, 
120 Wis. 2d at 397; see also Wisconsin Ass'n of Food Dealers v. 
City of Madison, 97 Wis. 2d 426, 433 n.7, 293 N.W.2d 540 (1980).   
 
Summarizing the court's preemption analysis, the Anchor court 
outlined four tests to determine when a state statute invalidates 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
8 
a local ordinance.  A municipal ordinance is preempted if (1) the 
legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to 
act; (2) it logically conflicts with state legislation; (3) it 
defeats the purpose of state legislation;
7 or (4) it violates the 
spirit of state legislation.
8  Should any one of these tests be 
met, the municipal ordinance is void.   
 
The question of whether a statute preempts a municipal 
ordinance raises a question of law which we review independently, 
benefitting from the analyses of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  In applying this state's analysis for determining the 
validity of a local regulation, we construe administrative rules 
in the same manner as statutes because administrative rules 
enacted pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect 
of law.  State ex rel. Staples v. DHSS, 115 Wis. 2d 363, 367, 340 
                     
     
7  In Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 
535-36, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978), for example, the court stated that 
"[e]ven assuming that" the ordinance and statute at issue did not 
constitute "logically conflicting legislation," the ordinance was 
nevertheless invalid because it frustrated the DNR's program of 
water 
resource 
management 
and 
therefore 
defeated 
a 
clear 
legislative purpose to vest the DNR with authority over the 
state's navigable waters. 
     
8  Pointing out that the state legislature had "adopted a 
complex and comprehensive statutory structure" regulating credit 
and lending as well as "a complete, all-encompassing plan" 
regulating savings and loan associations, Anchor Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v. Madison EOC, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 397, 399, 355 N.W.2d 234 
(1984), the court concluded that the Madison ordinance at issue 
"was contrary to the spirit" of the legislature's statutory 
structure and therefore void.  Id. at 402. 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
9 
N.W.2d 194 (1983); Law Enforcement Stds. Bd. v. Lyndon Station, 
101 Wis. 2d 472, 489, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).  
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
10 
 
III. 
 
We now turn to the issue of whether a solid waste facility 
exempt from local approvals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g) 
is nevertheless subject to local approvals such as the City's 
landfilling and excavation ordinance.   
 
The City concedes, as it must, that under DNR regulations 
enacted 
pursuant 
to 
authority 
conferred 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 144.44(7)(g), clean fill facility operators such as the 
plaintiffs need not apply for local approvals.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 144.44(7)(g) authorizes the DNR to exempt low-hazard waste 
facilities from regulation under §§ 144.43 to 144.47 when such 
regulation "is not warranted in light of the potential hazard to 
public health or the environment."  Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g)2.
9 
                     
     
9  Wisconsin Stat. § 144.44(7)(g) provides as follows: 
 
 
(g)  Exemption from regulation; low-hazard waste.  1.  
The department shall conduct a continuing review of the 
potential hazard to public health or the environment of 
various 
types 
of 
solid 
wastes 
and 
solid 
waste 
facilities.  The department shall consider information 
submitted by any person concerning the potential hazard 
to public health or the environment of any type of solid 
waste. 
 
 
2.  If the department, after a review under subd. 1., 
finds that regulation under ss. 144.43 to 144.47 is not 
warranted in light of the potential hazard to public 
health or the environment, the department shall either: 
 
 
a.  Promulgate a rule specifying types of solid waste 
that need not be disposed of at a licensed solid waste 
disposal facility. 
 
 
b.  On a case-by-case basis, exempt from regulation 
under ss. 144.43 to 144.47 specified types of solid 
waste facilities. 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
11 
In exercising this authority the DNR has promulgated a rule which 
exempts 
clean 
fill 
facilities 
from 
the 
regulatory 
scheme 
requiring, 
inter 
alia, 
local 
approvals 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 144.44(1m)(b).  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 500.08(2)(a).
10  
 
According to the City, this exemption simply acknowledges 
that clean fill facilities are not subject to the negotiation and 
arbitration procedure embodied in chapter 144 and applicable to 
most hazardous waste facilities.  Just because the facility is 
exempt from this application procedure, continues the City, does 
(..continued) 
 
 
c.  Authorize an individual generator to dispose of a 
specified type of solid waste at a site other than a 
licensed solid waste disposal facility.   
 
 
3.  The department may require periodic testing of solid 
wastes and impose other conditions on exemptions granted 
under subd. 2. 
     
10  With limited exceptions which are not applicable here, 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 500.08 exempts clean fill facilities from 
compliance with Wis. Admin. Code §§ NR 500 to 522.  Consequently, 
an applicant seeking DNR approval for a clean fill facility is 
exempt from Wis. Admin. Code § NR 512.06(1), which states that 
"[a]n applicant subject to s. 144.445, Stats. shall apply for all 
applicable local approvals specified by a municipality under s. 
144.44(1m)(b), Stats." 
 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 144.44(1m)(b) requires, in pertinent part, 
that "[p]rior to constructing a solid waste disposal facility or a 
hazardous waste facility, the applicant shall apply for each local 
approval required to construct the waste handling portion of the 
facility."  Wisconsin Stat. § 144.44(1m)(a) adopts the definition 
of a local approval set forth in Wis. Stat. § 144.445(3)(d) as 
including "any requirement for a permit, license, authorization, 
approval, variance or exception or any restriction, condition of 
approval 
or 
other 
restriction, 
regulation, 
requirement 
or 
prohibition imposed by a charter ordinance, general ordinance, 
zoning ordinance, resolution or regulation by a town, city, 
village, county or special purpose district . . . ."       
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
12 
not suggest that the plaintiffs are entirely exempt from local 
approvals.  Instead, reasons the City, the fact that clean fill 
landfills are exempt from licensing and regulation requirements 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 144.43 to 144.47 "actually underscores the 
fact that the regulatory field as it relates to exempt or clean 
fill landfills is left wide open for local municipalities."  Brief 
for Respondent at 27. 
 
The City argues that in promulgating a rule exempting clean 
fill facilities from the regulatory scheme authorized by §§ 144.43 
to 144.47--including the requirement that prospective land fill 
operators apply for local approvals--the DNR has returned 
jurisdiction 
and 
authority 
over 
such 
facilities 
to 
the 
municipalities.  As a consequence of the exemption, the City 
contends, municipalities are placed in the same position with 
respect to such facilities that they would have been in had the 
regulatory scheme inscribed in the statutes and regulations never 
existed.  As counsel for the City stated at oral argument, "what 
we have here is the removal of the State [DNR] from regulating the 
site, and what that does is leave open the subject matter for 
regulation by the local municipality." 
 
If a municipality cannot itself regulate a facility exempt 
from state regulation, insists the City, that municipality would 
paradoxically exercise less control over the siting of a 
comparatively innocuous clean fill facility than it would exercise 
over the siting of those more hazardous non-exempt facilities 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
13 
subject to the negotiation and arbitration procedure inscribed in 
chapter 144.  As the City points out, we have recently held that 
under this negotiation and arbitration procedure, a municipality's 
local approval requirements will ordinarily be set aside only if 
they are arbitrary and discriminatory on their face or in 
application.  Madison Landfills, Inc. v. Libby Landfill, 188 
Wis. 2d 613, 628, 524 N.W.2d 883 (1994).  Therefore, concludes the 
City, 
local 
approvals 
applicable 
to 
those 
less 
hazardous 
facilities exempted from the negotiation and arbitration procedure 
are entitled to at least as much deference as the Libby court 
extended to the local approvals required for non-exempt hazardous 
waste facilities.   
 
Furthermore, the City argues, its reading of the statutory 
and regulatory scheme comports with the legislature's recognition 
that local authorities have significant responsibility with 
respect to solid waste disposal sites.
11  "[I]t is our citizens," 
                     
     
11  In support of this claim, the City directs our attention 
to Wis. Stat. § 144.445(1)(f) relating to negotiation and 
arbitration of solid and hazardous waste facilities, which states: 
 
 
The legislature further finds that local authorities 
have the responsibility for promoting public health, 
safety, convenience and general welfare, encouraging 
planned and orderly land use development, recognizing 
the needs of industry and business, including solid 
waste disposal and the treatment, storage and disposal 
of hazardous waste and that the reasonable decisions of 
local authorities should be considered in the siting of 
solid waste disposal facilities and hazardous waste 
facilities.  
 
 
See also Wis. Stat. § 144.445(1)(e), which provides:  
 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
14 
stated counsel for the City at oral argument, "who are going to be 
most affected by the dust, the noise, the operation, the issue of 
contamination of the ground water, [and] what's going to happen 
when that water [in the landfill] is replaced."  While "these are 
all issues of local concern," argued counsel, if the plaintiffs' 
facility is not subject to local approvals, the local concerns 
"would be totally ignored" and the City "would be out of the 
picture completely." 
 
We acknowledge the importance of the City's local interests 
and share its concern with the protection of its residents.  Were 
those the only interests at stake in this case, we might well be 
compelled by our state constitution to reach a different result, 
since Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1) vests in municipalities the 
right to determine their local affairs and government.
12  But in 
(..continued) 
The legislature further finds that whenever a site is 
proposed for the solid waste disposal or the treatment, 
storage or disposal of hazardous waste, the nearby 
residents and the affected municipalities may have a 
variety of legitimate concerns about the location, 
design, construction, operation, closing and long-term 
care of facilities to be located at the site, and that 
these facilities must be established with consideration 
for the concerns of nearby residents and the affected 
municipalities.   
     
12  Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1) provides as follows: 
 
Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law may 
determine their local affairs and government, subject 
only to this constitution and to such enactments of the 
legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity 
shall affect every city or every village.  The method of 
such 
determination 
shall 
be 
prescribed 
by 
the 
legislature. 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
15 
this case the subject is of statewide concern and local control 
must yield when it meets any of the tests set forth in Anchor: (1) 
the 
legislature 
has 
expressly 
withdrawn 
the 
power 
of 
municipalities to act; (2) the local regulation logically 
conflicts with state legislation; (3) the local regulation defeats 
the purpose of state legislation; or (4) the local regulation 
violates the spirit of state legislation.  Anchor, 120 Wis. 2d at 
397.  Applying the Anchor tests, we conclude that the City's 
authority to regulate the plaintiffs' clean fill facility has been 
preempted.  
 
First, we conclude that the legislature has expressly 
withdrawn the power of municipalities to act.  By providing that 
certain facilities may be exempted from local approval, the 
legislature has clearly and expressly withdrawn municipal power to 
act as to exempt facilities such as the plaintiffs' site.  The 
plain language of the applicable DNR regulations requires this 
conclusion.  Furthermore, any other interpretation of the statute 
produces absurd results.  
 
The regulations, enacted pursuant to an express legislative 
grant of authority in Wis. Stat. §§ 144.44(7)(g), exempt clean 
fill facility operators from the requirement that they apply for 
local approvals.  If such operators need not even apply for local 
approvals, we fail to see how, as the City suggests, they could 
nevertheless be subject to them.  It is manifestly absurd to 
instruct a prospective land fill operator that it need not apply 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
16 
to a municipality for permission to open a facility while 
simultaneously stating that the same municipality's ordinances 
govern whether and under what conditions the facility can be 
opened and operated.
13   
 
We reject the position advanced by both the City and the 
court of appeals that the regulatory exemption inscribed in Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 500.08(2)(a) simply restores the City's pre-
existing authority to regulate within the same sphere.  The 
premise supporting this position is that an exemption from 
regulation is equivalent to the DNR's forfeiture of jurisdiction 
                     
     
13  It is true, as the City pointed out in its brief to the 
court, that the DNR waste management engineer assigned to the 
plaintiff's proposed site stated in a letter to the plaintiff's 
consulting firm that DNR approval "does not relieve [the 
plaintiffs] of the obligations to meet all other applicable 
federal, 
state 
and 
local 
permit, 
zoning 
and 
regulatory 
requirements."  Brief for Respondent at 20.  But as the same 
engineer also noted in his deposition in this case, "I am not a 
lawyer."  Conversely, counsel for the City, who of course is a 
lawyer, had written a letter of his own to the City's mayor and 
common council regarding the plaintiff's proposed facility stating 
that it was his "belief that a court would rule that the DNR's 
jurisdiction takes precedence over the City's jurisdiction" there. 
  
 
 
Were we to assign weight to these respective assessments of 
the legal issues at stake in this case, the scales would perforce 
tip against the City.  One might expect that a statement made by a 
lawyer against his client's own perceived interest with regard to 
the central legal issue in a case is entitled to more weight than 
a statement made by an engineer.  We do not, however, assign  
weight to either statement.  As we have recently stated, "a party 
should not be bound by any misunderstanding or misapprehension of 
the law" because "legal concessions, i.e., what is the applicable 
conclusion of law, is for the judiciary."  Fletcher v. Eagle River 
Hosp., Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 165, 179, 456 N.W.2d 788 (1990).  
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
17 
and authority.  As applied to the statute and regulations at issue 
in this case, this premise is incorrect.   
 
The DNR promulgated Wis. Admin. Code § NR 500.08(2)(a) 
pursuant to a statutory mandate that it "conduct a continuing 
review of the potential hazard to public health or the environment 
of various types of solid wastes and solid waste facilities."  
Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g)1.  If the DNR then concludes that 
regulation under Wis. Stat. §§ 144.43 to 144.47 "is not warranted 
in light of the potential hazard to public health or the 
environment," it is authorized to exempt from regulation specified 
types of solid waste facilities.  Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g)2.   
 
In making the determination that clean fill facilities do not 
pose significant hazards to health and are therefore entitled to 
an exemption under Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g), the DNR has not 
ceded jurisdiction or authority but has proactively exercised its 
authority to promulgate rules and regulations rendering that 
exemption effective.  By exempting clean fill facility operators 
from a negotiation and arbitration procedure that would ordinarily 
have allowed municipalities to participate in the siting process, 
the DNR has determined that the comparatively insignificant health 
risks those facilities pose render unnecessary the negotiation and 
arbitration procedure, which can be time-consuming and costly.
14 
                     
     
14  See Arthur J. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: 
Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in Wisconsin, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 
223, 269-70 (1983) (describing the negotiation and arbitration 
process as "long and very expensive" and noting that "it is not 
inconceivable that the whole process could take as long as three 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
18 
 
Although the City argues otherwise, there is nothing 
paradoxical about a legislative and regulatory scheme giving 
municipalities less authority to regulate comparatively innocuous 
waste facilities than they enjoy over more hazardous facilities 
posing 
greater 
risks 
to 
a 
municipality's 
residents 
and 
environment. 
 
Hence there is no conflict, as the City has suggested, 
between our decision in Libby, 188 Wis. 2d 613, and the decision 
we reach today.  In Libby, we held that the Waste Facility Siting 
Board, which is charged with overseeing the negotiation and 
arbitration process inscribed in chapter 144, could only veto 
local ordinances if they were arbitrary on their face or in their 
application.  Libby, 188 Wis. 2d at 628.   
 
But as the City itself admits in its brief, Libby "is 
factually distinguishable from this case because it dealt with a 
licensed 
and 
regulated 
landfill, 
which 
was 
subject 
to 
arbitration."  Brief for Respondent at 31.  Because the 
plaintiffs' proposed facility does not pose the same potential 
hazards as those facilities regulated by the procedure under 
review in Libby, it has been exempted from that procedure pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g).  Libby did not address this 
statutory exemption, and we see no reason to extend its holding 
(..continued) 
to four years before a license is issued for a new disposal 
site"); see also Peter J. Rudd & Dean Werner, Wisconsin's Landfill 
Negotiation/Arbitration Statute, Wis. Bar Bull., Nov. 1985, at 17 
(describing the negotiation and arbitration procedure).   
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
19 
regarding the negotiation and arbitration procedure to a facility 
exempt from that procedure.  
 
Finally, the DNR's continuing regulation of such facilities 
undermines the City's argument that the DNR has ceded the task of 
regulating such facilities to the municipalities in which they are 
located.  It is not correct, as counsel for the City suggested 
during oral argument, that as a consequence of Wis. Admin. Code NR 
§ 500.08(2)(a), 
the 
DNR 
has 
ceased 
regulating 
clean 
fill 
facilities.  Rather, the DNR has not only retained the power to 
regulate clean fill facilities but continues to exercise that 
power as well.   
 
As the circuit court pointed out, while Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
500.08(2)(a) exempts clean fill facility operators from most of 
the regulatory requirements embodied in chapter 144 and Wis. 
Admin. Code §§ NR 500 to 522, those facilities must still conform 
with the requirements of Wis. Admin. Code § NR 504.04(3) and (4), 
which prohibit solid waste disposal facilities from being sited in 
certain locations, including areas such as floodplains or areas 
where a facility might have an adverse effect on wetlands or a 
detrimental effect on groundwater.   
 
Moreover, 
the 
DNR 
order 
approving 
the 
plaintiffs' 
establishment of a clean fill facility itself contains numerous 
provisions regarding how that facility is to be constructed and 
operated.  The order requires the construction of lip berms and a 
drainage system designed to restrict overflowing water.  It 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
20 
specifies that materials only be placed in the landfill following 
inspection.  It requires the plaintiffs to keep a log recording 
every deposit into the landfill and to make that log available to 
DNR personnel upon demand.  It requires that a contact person be 
on call 24 hours a day so that the DNR might make unannounced 
inspections.  In his deposition, the DNR waste management engineer 
charged with overseeing the site estimated that such random 
inspections could take place almost weekly because there are so 
many sites in the vicinity of the plaintiffs' facility.   
 
In short, while the DNR may have exempted the plaintiffs' 
facility from the regulatory scheme inscribed in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 144.43 to 144.47, it has not, as both the City and the court of 
appeals suggest, DeRosso, 191 Wis. 2d at 61, thereby ceded 
authority over the facility and restored any pre-existing 
authority the City might have had to regulate the facility.  
Instead, the DNR has established an alternative regulatory scheme 
of its own designed to insure that the plaintiffs' facility does 
not compromise the integrity of the environment or the health of 
the City's residents.  In prohibiting the deposit of clean fill at 
the plaintiffs' site, the City not only thwarts the plaintiffs' 
plans, but also is in direct conflict with the DNR's own 
regulatory scheme.  We therefore conclude that the City's 
ordinance violates the first of the four tests enunciated in 
Anchor, 120 Wis. 2d at 397.   
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
21 
 
The City's ordinance also violates the third and fourth 
Anchor tests.  It defeats the purpose of state legislation and 
violates 
the 
spirit 
of 
the 
legislature's 
"complex 
and 
comprehensive statutory structure," Anchor, 120 Wis. 2d at 397, 
regulating waste. 
 
In its statement of findings accompanying Wis. Stat. § 
144.445 relating to negotiation and arbitration of solid and 
hazardous waste facilities, the legislature recognized that local 
authorities have responsibility for promoting public health, 
safety, convenience and general welfare and that the reasonable 
decisions of local authorities should be considered in the siting 
of solid waste disposal facilities.  Wis. Stat. § 144.445(1)(f); 
see also Wis. Stat. § 144.445(1)(e).  The City's brief places 
great emphasis on this legislative finding.  But this finding 
mandates that reasonable decisions of local authorities be 
considered in siting solid waste disposal facilities; the finding 
does not state that the decisions of local authorities are 
controlling.  Waste disposal sites, as we all know, are not 
popular in most communities, and public opposition often takes the 
form of exclusionary local regulations and ordinances.
15 
 
The legislature has attempted to ensure that local concerns 
be considered, while nevertheless recognizing the gravity of 
                     
     
15  See Mary Beth Arnett, Down in the Dumps and Wasted: The 
Need Determination in the Wisconsin Landfill Siting Process, 1987 
Wis. L. Rev. 543, 545-46; Harrington, supra, at 254. 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
22 
statewide concerns.  Another of the legislative findings, to which 
the City does not refer, is "that the availability of suitable 
facilities for solid waste disposal and the treatment, storage and 
disposal of hazardous waste is necessary to preserve the economic 
strength of this state and to fulfill the diverse needs of its 
citizens."  Wis. Stat. § 144.445(1)(d); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.445(1)(a) and (b).  Considering statewide needs as well as 
local needs, the legislature has empowered the DNR, a state 
agency, to act for the good of all the residents of the state.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 144.44(7)(g) insures that so long as the DNR 
determines that certain low-hazard waste facilities do not 
significantly jeopardize the environment or public health, their 
establishment should not be impeded by local rule or ordinance.   
 
Counsel for the City has expressed concern that "if the DNR 
alone regulates the filling of the borrow site . . . there will be 
insufficient monitoring of materials placed in the [landfill]."  
In light of the DNR's professed intention to monitor and regulate 
the operation of the plaintiffs' facility, this concern is not 
warranted and should not be allowed to obstruct a complex and 
comprehensive statutory structure regulating waste materials.   
 
Because the City ordinance at issue in this case violates the 
express letter, the purpose and the spirit of statutes addressing 
a matter of statewide concern, we conclude that state legislation 
has preempted the City's ordinance.
16  Accordingly we reverse the 
                     
     
16  In their petition for review and brief to the court, the 
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
23 
decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit 
court 
with 
directions 
to 
reinstate 
the 
permanent 
injunction. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with 
directions. 
(..continued) 
plaintiffs argue that even assuming arguendo that Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.44(7)(g) does not preempt the City from regulating the site 
when viewed as a proposed clean fill facility, the City is 
nevertheless preempted from regulating the site because of its 
simultaneous status as a borrow source used to cap a pre-existing 
solid waste facility.  Because that pre-existing solid waste 
facility is subject to DNR regulation, argue the plaintiffs, the 
borrow source site--and the restoration of the borrow source 
site--are subject to DNR regulation as well.  Because we conclude 
that the City's ordinance and resolution conflict with a DNR rule 
promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.44(7)(g), we need not 
address this argument.  
 
No. 94-0440 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-0440 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
DeRosso Landfill Company, Inc. and 
 
 
 
Gordon DeRosso, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
City of Oak Creek, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  191 Wis. 2d 46, 528 N.W.2d 468  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 13, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 9, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
GEORGE A. BURNS, JR. 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Hugh R. Braun, Beth A. Thorson and Godfrey, Braun & 
Hayes, Milwaukee and oral argument by Hugh R. Braun. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Lawrence J. Haskin, city attorney, Oak Creek.