Title: Schuiling v. Harris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121582
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 12, 2013

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM SCHUILING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 121582 
  
    
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   September 12, 2013 
SAMANTHA HARRIS 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a provision in an 
arbitration agreement designating a specified arbitrator is an 
integral part of the agreement, thereby rendering the agreement 
unenforceable upon the unavailability of the designee. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The facts are not in dispute.  In 2007, William Schuiling 
hired Samantha Harris as his full-time, live-in housecleaner.  
As a condition of her employment, Harris signed an arbitration 
agreement (“the Agreement”).  The Agreement consisted of a one-
page, pre-printed form under the heading “Brown Automotive 
Group” titled “Arbitration Agreement.”1  The Agreement provided 
in relevant part: 
 
This Agreement is entered into between 
William Schuiling & Brown’s Auto [sic] 
(“Employer”) and Samantha Harris 
(“Employee”).  
 
Employee enters into this Agreement in 
consideration of Employer’s promises herein 
contained and in consideration of 
Employer’s employment of Employee or, in 
the event Employee was already employed by 
                                                 
1 Schuiling owns Brown Automotive Group. 
 
2 
Employer at the time of the execution of 
this Agreement, Employee's continued 
employment by Employer. 
 
The parties hereby agree as follows: 
 
1.  Any and all claims, disputes or 
controversies arising out of or related to 
Employee's employment by Employer shall be 
resolved exclusively by arbitration 
administered by the National Arbitration 
Forum under its code of procedure then in 
effect.  The determination or award 
rendered therein shall be binding and 
conclusive upon the parties.  Any 
modification or a1teration of this 
Agreement shall be in writing and signed by 
the parties. 
 
2.  Except as provided in paragraph 3, 
the claims that the parties hereby agree to 
resolve by arbitration include any causes 
of action of any kind whatsoever, whether 
statutory or based on common law, at law or 
in equity, regardless of the relief or 
remedy sought, in tort, contract, by 
statute, or on any other basis, including 
but not limited to any and all claims, 
demands, rights, or causes of action 
arising out of Employee's employment with 
Employer or any employment contract . . . . 
 
5.  If any provision of this Agreement 
or any part of any provision is determined 
to be invalid or unenforceable in whole or 
in part for any reason, it shall be 
severable from the rest of this Agreement 
and shall not affect any other provision of 
this Agreement, all of which shall remain 
in full force and effect and be enforceable 
according to their terms. 
 
  
In 2011, Harris filed a 10-count complaint against 
Schuiling alleging multiple torts, statutory violations, and 
breach of contract.  Relying on the Agreement, Schuiling filed 
a motion to enforce arbitration under Code § 8.01-581.02(A).  
In an accompanying memorandum, Schuiling stated that the 
 
3 
National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) was no longer available to 
administer the arbitration and requested the circuit court to 
appoint a substitute arbitrator under Code § 8.01-581.03. 
Harris opposed the motion, arguing that the first 
enumerated paragraph of the Agreement exclusively designated 
NAF as the arbitrator.  Relying on several decisions of federal 
and other states’ courts, she contended the Agreement’s 
exclusive designation of NAF was an integral part of the 
Agreement.  Accordingly, she continued, the parties’ agreement 
to arbitrate was conditioned on NAF conducting the arbitration.  
She concluded that its unavailability, coupled with the 
Agreement’s failure to provide for the appointment of a 
substitute arbitrator, rendered the Agreement unenforceable. 
The circuit court agreed with Harris and entered an order 
denying the motion to compel arbitration.  We awarded Schuiling 
this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Code § 8.01-581.016(1). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In his first assignment of error, Schuiling asserts that 
the circuit court’s ruling pays insufficient deference to the 
General Assembly’s expressed public policy preference that 
arbitration agreements be enforced.  He argues that pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-581.01, arbitration agreements are presumed to be 
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable and Code § 8.01-581.02(A) 
requires the court to order the parties to such agreements to 
 
4 
proceed to arbitration.  Accordingly, he concludes, the court 
erred when it determined that it could not appoint a substitute 
arbitrator under Code § 8.01-581.03.2 
We have held that the statutory scheme enacted by the 
General Assembly favors the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.  TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., 263 Va. 
116, 122, 557 S.E.2d 199, 202 (2002).  However, that preference 
is not absolute.  There is no provision in the statutory scheme 
prohibiting the parties from agreeing to limit the scope of its 
operation.  See id. at 123, 557 S.E.2d at 202 (noting that both 
public policy “and the plain language of” the arbitration 
provision required arbitration) (emphasis added).3  The 
dispositive question in this case, then, is whether Schuiling 
and Harris limited their agreement to arbitrate by making it 
conditional upon NAF conducting the arbitration.  That question 
                                                 
2 Code § 8.01-581.03 provides in relevant part that 
[i]f the arbitration agreement provides a 
method of appointment of arbitrators, this 
method shall be followed.  In the absence 
thereof, or if the agreed method fails or 
for any reason cannot be followed, or when 
an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable 
to act and his successor has not been duly 
appointed, the court on application of a 
party shall appoint one or more 
arbitrators. 
3 The General Assembly has spoken in express terms when it 
intends to restrict the parties’ ability to form their 
preferred agreement.  See, e.g., Code § 11-4.1 (declaring any 
provision of a construction contract purporting to indemnify a 
party from liability arising from his own negligence “against 
public policy” and “void and unenforceable”). 
 
5 
is the subject of Schuiling’s second assignment of error, to 
which we now turn. 
The circuit court determined that the Agreement 
exclusively designated NAF as arbitrator, that the designation 
was an integral part of the contract, and that NAF’s 
unavailability rendered the whole Agreement unenforceable.  
Schuiling argues the Agreement’s severability clause evidences 
the parties’ intention to arbitrate their disputes irrespective 
of the NAF’s unavailability.  Conversely, Harris argues that 
NAF’s designation cannot be severed because it is integral to 
the Agreement. 
We review a circuit court’s interpretation of a contract 
de novo and “‘have an equal opportunity to consider the words 
of the contract within the four corners of the instrument 
itself.’”  Uniwest Constr., Inc. v. Amtech Elevator Servs., 280 
Va. 428, 440, 699 S.E.2d 223, 229 (2010) (quoting Eure v. 
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 
S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002)). 
The question for the court is what did the 
parties agree to as evidenced by their 
contract.  The guiding light in the 
construction of a contract is the intention 
of the parties as expressed by them in the 
words they have used, and courts are bound 
to say that the parties intended what the 
written instrument plainly declares. 
 
 
6 
Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 
(1984) (quoting Meade v. Wallen, 226 Va. 465, 467, 311 S.E.2d 
103, 104 (1984)).  We construe the contract as a whole, giving 
terms their ordinary meaning unless some other meaning is 
apparent from the context.  Virginian Ry. Co. v. Hood, 152 Va. 
254, 258, 146 S.E. 284, 285 (1929).  The various provisions are 
harmonized, giving effect to each when reasonably possible, and 
are construed considering the circumstances under which they 
were executed and the condition of the parties.  Id. 
A contract is either entire, meaning all its provisions 
are integral to the agreement of the parties, or severable.  
Eschner v. Eschner, 146 Va. 417, 422, 131 S.E. 800, 802 (1926); 
accord Budge v. Post, 544 F.Supp. 370, 381-82 (N.D. Tex. 1982).  
Thus, whether a provision is severable or integral is the same 
inquiry:  a provision integral to the parties’ agreement cannot 
be severed and one the parties intended to make severable is 
not integral.4  Accordingly, the analysis is identical:  “No 
precise or invariable rule can be laid down . . . for it is a 
question of construction as to the intention of the parties to 
                                                 
4 Compare Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 
220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (holding that a court may not sever 
an integral provision) and John R. Ray & Sons v. Stroman, 923 
S.W.2d 80, 87 (Tex. App. 1996) (citing Budge) (holding that the 
existence of a severability clause will not, alone, support the 
severance of an integral provision) with Jones v. GGNSC Pierre 
LLC, 684 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1167 (D.S.D. 2010) (holding that a 
severability provision may indicate that a provision was not 
integral). 
 
7 
be discovered in each case from the language employed and the 
subject matter of the contract.”  Eschner, 146 Va. at 422, 131 
S.E. at 802 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
accord Vega v. Chattan Assocs., 246 Va. 196, 199, 435 S.E.2d 
142, 143 (1993); see also Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 
A.3d 215, 220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (assessing the intent of 
the parties to determine whether provision was integral); Jones 
v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1167 (D.S.D. 2010) 
(assessing the intent of the parties to determine whether a 
provision was severable).  In addition, the court considers 
“the situation of the parties and the object they had in view 
at the time and intended to accomplish.”  O'Quinn v. Looney, 
194 Va. 548, 551, 74 S.E.2d 157, 159 (1953).5 
Relying on the language used by Schuiling and Harris in 
the Agreement, several factors support Schuiling’s position 
that the parties intended NAF’s designation as arbitrator to be 
                                                 
5 Many courts have adopted an “integral-versus-ancillary 
test” to determine whether Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., permits the appointment of a 
substitute arbitrator.  See Riley v. Extendicare Health 
Facilities, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) 
(collecting cases).  Although the parties contend the Act does 
not apply in this case, the integral-versus-ancillary test also 
turns on the intent of the parties when they formed their 
agreement.  Id. at 405.  Consequently, a determination of 
integral or ancillary, severable or not severable is the same 
determination:  did the parties intend the whole arbitration 
requirement to fail upon the unavailability of the designated 
arbitrator?  The parties’ choice to include or omit a 
severability clause may, depending on its scope, provide 
insight into their intention. 
 
8 
severed if unenforceable.  The first is the severability 
provision itself.  It permits severing not only whole 
provisions but “any part of any provision” “determined to be 
invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part for any reason,” 
without “affect[ing] any other provision of th[e] Agreement, 
all of which shall remain in full force and effect and be 
enforceable according to their terms.” 
We must give these expansive phrases their ordinary 
meaning.  Hood, 152 Va. at 258, 146 S.E. at 285.   “[F]or any 
reason” includes NAF’s unavailability.  “[A]ny part of any 
provision” includes the clause in the first enumerated 
paragraph designating NAF as arbitrator.  Nothing in the 
severability clause or any other language in the Agreement 
excludes NAF’s designation from the scope of the severability 
clause; nothing excludes NAF’s unavailability as a reason for 
severance. 
Second, as set forth in the first enumerated paragraph, 
the sole object of the one-page Agreement is to require 
arbitration of “[a]ny and all claims, disputes or controversies 
arising out of” Harris’s employment.  This arbitration 
requirement comprises the entire subject matter of the 
Agreement.  The Agreement contains no unrelated provisions, 
such as non-compete, non-disclosure, or non-solicitation 
provisions, that would survive failure of the arbitration 
 
9 
requirement.  It does not address salary, wages, or term of 
employment.  The only purpose for the Agreement is to require 
the parties to arbitrate any claims “arising out of or related 
to” Harris’ employment.  Consequently, a determination that 
NAF’s designation is not severable would defeat the entire 
Agreement.  Such an outcome is inconsistent with our obligation 
to consider the contract as a whole and harmonize its 
provisions, giving effect to each when reasonably possible.  
Hood, 152 Va. at 258, 146 S.E. at 285.6 
Third, Schuiling and Harris are presumed to know that Code 
§ 8.01-581.03 directs the circuit court to appoint an 
arbitrator when an arbitration agreement fails to appoint or 
provide for the appointment of an arbitrator, or when the 
appointed arbitrator fails to or is unable to act.  See 
Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge 
Bulkhead Groups A, B and C, 251 Va. 417, 429, 468 S.E.2d 894, 
901 (1996) (parties to an arbitration agreement are presumed to 
know the provisions of Virginia’s statutory scheme).  
                                                 
6 This construction is supported by the second enumerated 
paragraph, which specifically lists the claims the parties 
“agree to resolve by arbitration.”  (Emphasis added.)  It does 
not restrict arbitration to arbitration by NAF or make any 
reference to the designation in the preceding paragraph.  It 
makes clear that the parties’ agreement is that the listed 
causes of action will be resolved by arbitration, to the 
exclusion of other forms of resolution. 
 
10 
Nevertheless, they included no language expressing an intention 
to limit the court’s statutory authority. 
Finally, nothing in the Agreement reflects that the 
parties contemplated the contingency that collateral events 
might render NAF unavailable and intended the arbitration 
requirement itself to terminate if that contingency occurred.  
Mere inclusion of the word “exclusively” in NAF’s designation 
as arbitrator does not serve that purpose.  To the contrary, 
the word “exclusively” indicates nothing more than a 
designation of the single arbitrator to whose authority each 
party agreed to submit, presuming the designated arbitrator 
would be available when called upon. 
The inclusion of this particular severability clause, with 
its broad scope permitting the severance even of parts of 
provisions and for any reason, reflects that the parties 
intended NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator so long as it was 
available.  However, if its unavailability made its appointment 
unenforceable, the designation would be severed.  The absence 
of any provision for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator 
in such an event reflects nothing more than the parties’ 
presumed knowledge that Code § 8.01-581.03 provided the 
necessary mechanism.  Nothing in the Agreement reflects an 
intention that the statute should not apply. 
 
11 
In sum, while Virginia’s statutory scheme permits the 
parties to restrict the operation of Code § 8.01-581.03 in 
their agreement, they must state such an intention in express 
and unambiguous terms.  Otherwise, the statute must control.7 
                                                 
7 The decisions of federal and other states’ courts to the 
contrary cited by Harris are all distinguishable.  For example, 
the arbitration agreements in Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-
1772JLR, slip op. at 4 n.2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009), 
similarly provided that all claims “shall be resolved 
exclusively by arbitration administered by the National 
Arbitration Forum under its code of procedure then in effect.”  
However, the court noted that neither of the agreements 
contained a severability clause.  Id., slip op. at 20.  
Similarly, the Indiana Court of Appeals made no mention of a 
severability clause in Geneva-Roth Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 
956 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) or Apex 1 Processing, Inc. 
v. Edwards, 962 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and no 
consideration of the effect of one was included in its 
analyses. 
Although the arbitration agreement in Riley did include a 
severability clause, 826 N.W.2d at 411 n.8, it did not permit 
severance of “any part of any provision” “for any reason” as 
the severability clause in this Agreement does.  The court also 
acknowledged that “‘the mere fact parties name an arbitral 
service to handle arbitrations and specify rules to be applied 
does not, standing alone, make that designation integral to the 
agreement.’”  Id. at 410 (quoting Geneva-Roth, 956 N.E.2d at 
1200).  Its decision not to sever NAF’s designation was 
influenced by the reason for NAF’s unavailability, id., which 
is not one of the permissible considerations in our 
determination of whether the designation is severable or 
integral.  See Eschner, 146 Va. at 422, 131 S.E. at 802; 
O'Quinn, 194 Va. at 551, 74 S.E.2d at 159. 
There also was a severability clause in Green v. U.S. Cash 
Advance Ill., LLC, No. 12 C 8079, slip op. at 16 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 25, 2013).  However, the arbitration requirement in that 
case was only one of many provisions in a broad consumer loan 
agreement and the severability clause made no specific 
reference to it.  The court determined that failure of the 
arbitration requirement due to the unavailability of the 
designated arbitrator would not result in the failure of the 
parties’ entire agreement.  It distinguished cases in which the 
 
12 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Therefore, relying on the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the language of the Agreement, we conclude that 
NAF’s designation as arbitrator is not integral and is 
severable in order to give effect to the arbitration 
requirement, the sole purpose of the Agreement.  We reverse the 
order of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
contracts, like the Agreement here, were stand-alone 
arbitration agreements.  Id., slip op. at 15.