Title: In re J.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 363PA17-2
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-48 
No. 363PA17-2 
Filed 23 April 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: J.M. & J.M. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 22 
January 2020 by Judge Shamieka L. Rhinehart in District Court, Durham County. 
This matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 but determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
 
The Law Office of Derrick J. Hensley, PLLC, by Derrick J. Hensley, Esq., for 
petitioner-appellee Durham County Department of Social Services.  
 
Matthew D. Wunsche, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant father.  
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-father appeals from orders entered by the trial court terminating 
his parental rights to his daughter J.M. (Jazmin)1 and to his son J.M. (James). After 
careful review, we vacate the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights 
to Jazmin and affirm the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to 
James.  
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the minor children and for ease of 
reading. 
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I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
On 11 September 2015, Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
filed a juvenile petition alleging that twenty-three-month-old Jazmin and two-month-
old James were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. On the same day, DSS 
obtained nonsecure custody of the children, and the trial court approved DSS’s 
placement of the children with their maternal grandparents, who lived in New York 
but regularly visited Durham.   
¶ 3 
 
The juvenile petition alleged that the mother had previously claimed, but later 
denied, that respondent-father hit Jazmin, and that the family had received in-home 
services since March 2015 due to a finding of improper care based on the mother’s 
allegations. Months later, marks were observed on James’s neck when the mother 
took him to a well-baby checkup on 8 September 2015. James was sent to UNC 
hospitals for further testing, which revealed that James had healing fractures to his 
ribs, tibia, and fibula; bruising to his ear and tongue; subconjunctival hemorrhages; 
and excoriation under his chin. The mother told the following to DSS: (1) she 
witnessed respondent-father “flicking” James in the chin and punching James in the 
stomach; (2) she witnessed respondent-father excessively discipline Jazmin by hitting 
her with a back scratcher and hitting her in the face; (3) there had been domestic 
violence between respondent-father and herself in the presence of the children; (4) 
respondent-father smoked marijuana in the presence of the children; and (5) she had 
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not been forthcoming during the prior Child Protective Services investigation in 
February 2015. Additionally, the petition alleged James “had a history of poor weight 
gain due to . . . not being fed on a regular schedule[,]”and both the mother and 
respondent-father had mental health diagnoses.  
¶ 4 
 
In October 2015, respondent-father was arrested for child abuse related to 
James. In April 2017, respondent-father was convicted of felony child abuse inflicting 
serious injury upon James and sentenced to 92 to 123 months’ imprisonment. 
Respondent-father’s conviction was upheld on appeal. State v. Martin, 833 S.E.2d 
263, 2019 WL 5219970 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (unpublished), appeal dismissed and disc. 
review denied, 374 N.C. 750 (2020).  
¶ 5 
 
Prior to the criminal proceedings, the juvenile petition was heard on 12 July 
2016. In an adjudication, disposition, and permanency planning order entered on 21 
November 2016, the trial court adjudicated Jazmin to be a “seriously neglected” 
juvenile “due to inappropriate discipline by the father and inaction by the mother[,]” 
and it adjudicated James to be an abused juvenile in that respondent-father “inflicts 
on the child[ ] . . . serious physical injury by other than accidental means” and the 
mother “allows to be inflicted on the child[ ] . . . a serious physical injury by other 
than accidental means.” The trial court continued custody of Jazmin and James in 
DSS with their placement with their maternal grandparents, ceased reunification 
efforts with the parents, suspended the parents’ visitation with the children, and set 
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the primary permanent plan for the children as guardianship with a secondary plan 
for adoption.  
¶ 6 
 
The children’s mother relinquished her parental rights on 1 December 2016. 
Respondent-father appealed the adjudication, disposition, and permanency planning 
order on 21 December 2016.  
¶ 7 
 
In an opinion issued on 19 September 2017, the Court of Appeals: (1) affirmed 
the adjudication of James as an abused juvenile, given that “[t]he binding findings of 
fact establish[ed] that [James] sustained multiple non-accidental injuries and 
[r]espondent-father was responsible for the injuries[,]” In re J.M., 255 N.C. App. 483, 
495 (2017); (2) reversed and remanded the adjudication of Jazmin as a seriously 
neglected juvenile, holding that the trial court acted under a misapprehension of the 
law as “[t]he term ‘serious neglect’ pertains only to placement of an individual on the 
responsible individuals’ list and is not included as an option for adjudication in an 
abuse, neglect, or dependency action[,]” id. at 497; and (3) vacated the portion of the 
order relieving DSS from making further reunification efforts because the trial court 
failed to follow the statutory requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c) in the initial 
disposition order, id. at 500. This Court initially granted respondent-father’s petition 
for discretionary review on 7 December 2017, In re J.M., 370 N.C. 383 (2017), but 
later, on 8 June 2018, determined discretionary review was improvidently allowed. 
In re J.M., 371 N.C. 132 (2018).  
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¶ 8 
 
The trial court continued to conduct permanency planning review hearings 
while respondent-father’s appeals were pending, but DSS was unable to proceed with 
the Court of Appeals’ remand related to Jazmin while respondent-father’s petition for 
discretionary review to this Court was pending.  
¶ 9 
 
On 6 August 2019, the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) filed separate 
motions to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to Jazmin and James. The 
motion to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to Jazmin alleged grounds 
existed to terminate parental rights for neglect, willful failure to pay a reasonable 
portion of the cost of care, and willful abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 
(3), (7) (2019). The motion to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to James 
alleged grounds existed to terminate parental rights for neglect, willful failure to 
make reasonable progress, willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of 
care, and willful abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (7) (2019).  
¶ 10 
 
On 8 August 2019, the initial juvenile petition came back on for hearing in the 
trial court pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ remand related to Jazmin. The hearing 
was conducted over the course of 8, 9, and 12 August 2019. On 1 November 2019, the 
trial court entered adjudicatory and dispositional orders (the “remand orders”) that 
adjudicated Jazmin to be a neglected juvenile, continued her custody in DSS, 
suspended respondent-father’s visitation, and set the permanent plan for Jazmin as 
adoption with secondary plans for reunification or guardianship.  
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¶ 11 
 
Although the remand orders were entered on 1 November 2019, they were not 
served until 27 November 2019. On 9 December 2019, respondent-father filed timely 
notice of appeal from the remand orders to the Court of Appeals.2 See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1001(b) (2019).  
¶ 12 
 
Also on 9 December 2019, after respondent-father filed his notice of appeal 
from the remand orders, the GAL’s motions to terminate respondent-father’s parental 
rights to Jazmin and James came on for hearing. The termination hearing was 
conducted over the course of 9 and 10 December 2019, and the trial court entered 
separate orders terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to Jazmin and 
James on 22 January 2020. In one order, the court concluded grounds existed to 
terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to Jazmin pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (3), and (7), and it was in Jazmin’s best interests to terminate parental 
rights. In the other order, the trial court concluded grounds existed to terminate 
respondent-father’s parental rights to James pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–
(3) and (7), and it was in James’s best interests to terminate parental rights. 
Respondent-father appealed from both termination orders.  
II. 
Analysis 
                                            
2 Respondent-father’s notice of appeal included the names of Jazmin and James and 
the file numbers for both of their juvenile cases. However, before the appeal was docketed in 
the Court of Appeals, the trial court entered an order on 24 January 2020 that dismissed any 
appeal related to James because there were no appealable orders entered on 1 November 
2019 concerning James.  
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A. Termination of Parental Rights to Jazmin  
¶ 13 
 
On appeal from the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to 
Jazmin, respondent-father argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
proceed with termination of his parental rights while he appealed the remand orders. 
We agree the trial court exceeded the statutory limits placed on the trial court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction and hold the order terminating respondent-father’s 
parental rights to Jazmin is void.   
¶ 14 
 
“Subject matter jurisdiction is the indispensable foundation upon which valid 
judicial decisions rest, and in its absence a court has no power to act[.]” In re T.R.P., 
360 N.C. 588, 590 (2006) (citing Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90 
(1956)). “Because a court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to adjudicate 
the case before it, ‘a court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and can 
be raised at any time.’ ” In re L.T., 374 N.C. 567, 569 (2020) (quoting In re K.J.L., 363 
N.C. 343, 346 (2009)).  
¶ 15 
 
“In matters arising under the Juvenile Code, the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction is established by statute.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. at 345. Therefore, “the 
General Assembly can, within the bounds of the Constitution, set whatever limits it 
wishes on the possession or exercise of that jurisdiction, including limits on 
jurisdiction during a pending appeal.” In re M.I.W., 365 N.C. 374, 377 (2012).  
¶ 16 
 
As we explained in In re M.I.W., “[g]enerally, N.C.G.S. § 1-294 operates to stay 
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further proceedings in the trial court upon perfection of an appeal.” Id. However, 
“[g]iven the unique nature of the Juvenile Code, with its overarching focus on the best 
interest of the child[,]” and in recognition “that the needs of the child may change 
while legal proceedings are pending on appeal[,]” the General Assembly enacted a 
modified approach for juvenile cases in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003, which allows the trial 
court to continue to exercise jurisdiction and hold hearings pending disposition of an 
appeal, except that the trial court may not proceed with termination of parental 
rights under Article 11 of the Juvenile Code. Id. at 378–79. Specifically, the statute 
provides: 
(b) Pending disposition of an appeal, unless directed 
otherwise by an appellate court or subsection (c) of this 
section applies, the trial court shall: 
 
(1) Continue to exercise jurisdiction and conduct 
hearings under this Subchapter with the exception 
of Article 11 of the General Statutes; and 
 
(2) Enter orders affecting the custody or placement 
of the juvenile as the court finds to be in the best 
interests of the juvenile. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b) (2019).3  
¶ 17 
 
In In re M.I.W., we considered whether the trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over a motion to terminate parental rights that was filed while the 
                                            
3 Subsection (c) of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003 governs the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
pending disposition of an appeal of a termination order entered under Article 11 of the 
Juvenile Code, and it is irrelevant to the issues presented in this case.  
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parents’ appeals of a disposition order were pending. In re M.I.W., 365 N.C. at 376. 
In analyzing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b), we noted the difference between having 
jurisdiction and exercising jurisdiction:  
Exercising jurisdiction, in the context of the Juvenile Code, 
requires putting the court’s jurisdiction into action by 
holding hearings, entering substantive orders or decrees, 
or making substantive decisions on the issues before it. In 
contrast, having jurisdiction is simply a state of being that 
requires, and in some cases allows, no substantive action 
from the court. 
Id. at 379. We explained that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b) does not divest the court of 
jurisdiction in termination proceedings during an appeal but does unambiguously 
prohibit the trial court from exercising jurisdiction in termination proceedings while 
disposition of an appeal is pending. Id. at 375, 378–79. The “issuance of the mandate 
by the appellate court,” upon the conclusion of the appeal, “returns the power to 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction to the trial court.” Id. at 375. Accordingly, we 
affirmed the termination of parental rights in In re M.I.W. where the motion to 
terminate parental rights was filed during the pendency of the parents’ appeal, but 
the trial court did not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the termination motion 
until after the mandate in the appeal had issued and the period for the parents to 
petition for discretionary review had expired. Id. at 380.  
¶ 18 
 
Unlike In re M.I.W., the issue in the instant case is the trial court’s exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction to conduct the termination hearing pending the 
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disposition of respondent-father’s appeal from the remand orders in Jazmin’s case. 
Here, the GAL filed the termination motion on 6 August 2019. There was no appeal 
pending at that time. The remand orders adjudicating Jazmin to be a neglected 
juvenile were later entered on 1 November 2019, and respondent-father filed notice 
of appeal from the remand orders on 9 December 2019.4 Minutes after the notice of 
appeal was filed, the trial court commenced the termination hearing. It is evident 
that the trial court was aware respondent-father had filed notice of appeal from the 
remand orders, as the trial court indicated near the beginning of the termination 
hearing that the notice of appeal was in the court file. Nevertheless, the trial court 
continued with the termination hearing.  
¶ 19 
 
There is no question the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b) by 
exercising jurisdiction to conduct the hearing on the motion to terminate respondent-
father’s parental rights to Jazmin while disposition of his appeal from the remand 
orders was pending and by entering the order terminating respondent-father’s 
parental rights to Jazmin on 22 January 2020. Both DSS and the GAL agree that the 
trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b). The contested issue on appeal is the effect 
                                            
4 We take judicial notice that respondent-father’s appeal from the remand orders 
entered in Jazmin’s case was docketed and perfected in the Court of Appeals in file number 
COA20-153 on 2 March 2020, when the record on appeal was filed. See State v. Thompson, 
349 N.C. 483, 497 (1998) (“This Court may take judicial notice of the public records of other 
courts within the state judicial system.”). Once an appeal is docketed, the perfection of the 
appeal relates back to filing of notice of appeal. Swilling v. Swilling, 329 N.C. 219, 225 (1991).  
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of the violation.  
¶ 20 
 
Respondent-father argues the trial court’s exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction to conduct the termination hearing in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b) 
renders the order terminating his parental rights to Jazmin void. DSS concedes the 
issue and agrees with respondent-father that the termination order must be vacated. 
The GAL, however, argues respondent-father should be required to demonstrate 
prejudice resulting from the trial court’s erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, just as a 
showing of prejudice is generally required to prevail on claims that the trial court 
violated a statutory mandate. The GAL relies on this Court’s distinction between 
“having jurisdiction” and “exercising jurisdiction” in In re M.I.W. and this Court’s 
holding that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003 prohibits only the exercise of jurisdiction and does 
not remove jurisdiction. In re M.I.W., 365 N.C. at 379.   
¶ 21 
 
We decline to adopt the GAL’s position here. While we again acknowledge that 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b) does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction 
over the juvenile proceeding as a whole, we emphasize that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b) 
does constrain the trial court’s exercise of its subject matter jurisdiction in 
termination 
proceedings. 
Specifically, 
“the 
relevant 
statutory 
language 
unambiguously prohibits the trial court from doing . . . two things regarding 
termination proceedings while an appeal is pending: exercising jurisdiction and 
conducting hearings.” Id. at 378–79. “Where jurisdiction is statutory and the [General 
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Assembly] requires the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow 
a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the [c]ourt to certain limitations, an act of 
the [c]ourt beyond these limits is in excess of its jurisdiction.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 
at 590 (quoting Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 75 (1975). Here, respondent-father 
properly perfected his appeal, and with knowledge of that appeal, the trial court 
proceeded with a hearing for termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. 
Thus, the trial court clearly acted beyond the limitations statutorily placed on its 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
¶ 22 
 
When addressing appeals controlled by N.C.G.S. § 1-294, this Court has not 
assessed whether an appealing party was prejudiced by orders entered after a notice 
of appeal for civil cases. See generally Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 
581, 273 S.E.2d 247, 259 (1981). Rather, we have held that orders entered after the 
notice of the appeal “are void for want of jurisdiction.” Id. The GAL has not identified 
any case law or statutory language that compels us to conclude anything different in 
this case when addressing the jurisdictional limits under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b). 
¶ 23 
 
Here, where the trial court conducted the hearing on the motion to terminate 
respondent-father’s parental rights to Jazmin while the disposition of respondent-
father’s appeal from the remand orders in Jazmin’s case was pending, we hold the 
trial court acted in excess of the statutory limits on its subject matter jurisdiction set 
forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(b), and the resulting termination order is thus void. 
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Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s 22 January 2020 order terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights in Jazmin. 
B. Termination of Parental Rights to James  
¶ 24 
 
On appeal from the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to 
James, counsel for respondent-father has filed a no-merit brief on respondent-father’s 
behalf pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(e) (2020). Counsel identified three issues that 
could arguably support an appeal but also explained why he believed those issues 
lacked merit. Counsel also advised respondent-father of his right to file pro se written 
arguments on his own behalf and provided him with the necessary documents to do 
so. Respondent-father has submitted a pro se brief to this Court, but he did so some 
sixty days after the filing of the no-merit brief, making his brief untimely. Id. (“The 
appellant . . . may file a pro se brief within thirty days after the date of the filing of 
counsel’s no-merit brief.”). Nevertheless, because counsel did not precisely inform 
respondent-father of the deadline to file his pro se brief, see id. (“Counsel must inform 
the appellant in writing that the appellant may file a pro se brief and that the pro se 
brief is due within thirty days after the date of the filing of the no-merit brief.”), but 
instead only advised respondent-father to submit his pro se brief “immediately” if he 
intended to do so, we exercise our authority under N.C. R. App. P. 2 and consider 
respondent-father’s arguments.  
¶ 25 
 
Respondent-father spends a considerable portion of his pro se brief rearguing 
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the evidence which led to James’s removal from the home. Based on his own version 
of the facts, respondent-father denies any responsibility for James’s injuries, 
challenges James’s prior adjudication as an abused juvenile, and pleads for a second 
chance to parent James. We see no merit in respondent-father’s arguments. This 
Court’s role on appeal is not to reweigh the evidence. In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 510 
(2020) (citing In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 11 (2019)). Furthermore, the trial court’s prior 
adjudication of James as an abused juvenile and its findings of fact in support of the 
adjudication were upheld on appeal. In re J.M., 255 N.C. App. 483 (2017), disc. review 
improvidently allowed, 371 N.C. 132 (2018). The prior decision on appeal is binding 
as the law of the case. In re J.A.M., 375 N.C. 325, 332 (2020) (explaining that the 
Court’s prior decision on appeal from an adjudication of neglect “constitutes ‘the law 
of the case’ and is binding as to the issues decided therein” during a subsequent 
appeal of a termination order). 
¶ 26 
 
Respondent-father also challenges the trial court’s adjudication of grounds to 
terminate his parental rights to James under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3) and (7). 
Respondent-father presents few cognizable legal arguments, and he cites no authority 
in his brief to support his contentions. 
¶ 27 
 
This Court reviews the trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate 
parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 “to determine whether the findings are 
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 
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conclusions of law.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 
311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo 
on appeal.” Id. The adjudication of only one ground is necessary to terminate parental 
rights. Id. at 23. 
¶ 28 
 
Grounds exist to terminate parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3) if 
[t]he juvenile has been placed in the custody of a county 
department of social services, . . . and the parent has for a 
continuous period of six months immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition or motion willfully failed to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile 
although physically and financially able to do so.  
 
¶ 29 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2019). This Court has long recognized that “[a] 
parent is required to pay that portion of the cost of foster care for the child that is 
fair, just and equitable based upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.” In re Clark, 
303 N.C. 592, 604 (1981). Where a parent has the ability to pay some amount greater 
than zero but pays nothing, the parent has failed to pay a reasonable portion of the 
cost of care within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). See In re J.A.E.W., 375 
N.C. 112, 117–18 (2020).  
¶ 30 
 
In James’s case, the trial court concluded: 
[g]rounds exist to terminate [respondent-father’s] parental 
rights . . . to [James] under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) in that 
[James] was placed in the custody of DCDSS and for the 
six 
months 
preceding 
the 
filing 
of 
the 
petition, 
[respondent-]father willfully failed to pay a reasonable 
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portion of the cost of care for [James] although physically 
and financially able to do so.   
 
¶ 31 
 
In support of the conclusion, the trial court made findings regarding James’s 
placement in DSS’s custody and the cost of his care. The trial court also found that 
respondent-father was able to work while incarcerated and did in fact work various 
jobs while incarcerated; in the six months preceding the filing of the termination 
motion on 6 August 2019, respondent-father earned $60.78 from work and received 
$655.00 in deposits into his account from friends and family. Yet, respondent-father 
“contributed nothing whatsoever to the cost [of James’s] care” during the relevant six-
month period.  
¶ 32 
 
Respondent-father does not challenge the evidentiary basis for the trial court’s 
findings, and the findings are thus “deemed supported by competent evidence and are 
binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (citing Koufman v. 
Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991)).  
¶ 33 
 
We hold the trial court’s findings support the conclusion that grounds exist 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to 
James. “The trial court’s conclusion that one ground existed to terminate parental 
rights ‘is sufficient in and of itself to support termination of . . . parental rights[.]’ ” 
In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360, 367 (2020) (quoting In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 413). Therefore, 
we do not address the other grounds adjudicated by the trial court for termination.  
¶ 34 
 
Lastly, respondent-father asserts allegations of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel.  
Parents have a right to counsel in all proceedings dedicated 
to the termination of parental rights. Counsel necessarily 
must provide effective assistance, as the alternative would 
render any statutory right to counsel potentially 
meaningless. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of 
counsel, 
respondent 
must 
show 
that 
counsel’s 
performance was deficient and the deficiency was so 
serious as to deprive him of a fair hearing. To make the 
latter showing, the respondent must prove that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there 
would have been a different result in the proceedings.  
In re G.G.M., 2021-NCSC-25, ¶ 35. 
¶ 35 
 
Respondent-father contends his counsel was ineffective in that counsel 
allegedly failed to advise him of what he needed to do to regain custody of James, 
including the need for him to contribute to James’s cost of care while respondent-
father was incarcerated in order to avoid termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3). Respondent-father also faults counsel for allegedly informing the court 
that he consented to guardianship and for not challenging the primary permanent 
plan of guardianship with a secondary plan of adoption. Lastly, respondent-father 
contends counsel was ineffective to the extent counsel did not further pursue a second 
appeal of James’s adjudication as an abused juvenile following the trial court’s entry 
of the remand orders on 1 November 2019.  
¶ 36 
 
Respondent-father has not met his burden in this case to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel. As to respondent-father’s assertions of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel related to the adjudication of grounds for termination, even if respondent-
father’s allegations of deficient performance by counsel are true, he is unable to 
establish the required prejudice. See Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563 (“[I]f a reviewing court 
can determine at the outset that there is no reasonable probability that in the absence 
of counsel’s alleged errors the result of the proceeding would have been different, then 
the court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was actually deficient.”). 
As explained above, the trial court’s adjudication that grounds exist to terminate 
parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) was sufficient to support 
termination. Given that parents have an inherent duty to provide support for their 
children and ignorance of the duty does not excuse a parent’s failure to provide 
support, see In re S.E., 373 N.C. at 366, respondent-father has not established 
prejudice based on counsel’s alleged failure to advise him of his inherent duty to 
contribute to James’s cost of care. Additionally, to the extent respondent-father 
contends counsel was ineffective in failing to further pursue a second appeal in 
James’s case from the remand orders, respondent-father has not established deficient 
performance. Because the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 21 November 
2016 adjudication of James as an abused juvenile and only remanded the matter as 
to Jazmin’s case in In re J.M., 255 N.C. App. at 495, 497, James’s case was not before 
the trial court on remand, and there was nothing in the 1 November 2019 remand 
orders to be appealed in James’s case. There is no merit to respondent-father’s 
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ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, and, overall, we hold respondent-father’s 
pro se arguments are meritless. 
¶ 37 
 
In addition to reviewing respondent-father’s pro se arguments, we have 
independently reviewed the three issues identified in the no-merit brief submitted by 
respondent-father’s counsel under Rule 3.1(e). In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396, 402 (2019). 
Upon careful consideration of those issues in light of the entire record, we are 
satisfied that the trial court’s 22 January 2020 order terminating respondent-father’s 
parental rights in James was supported by competent evidence and based on proper 
legal grounds. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of respondent-father’s parental 
rights in James.  
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 38 
 
Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s 22 January 2020 order terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights in Jazmin, and affirm the termination of 
respondent-father’s parental rights in James. 
VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART. 
Justice BERGER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 
case.