Title: Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S51378
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 12, 2006

FILED: October 12, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
SCOTT THOMAS KELLAS,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
and CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION,
Petitioners on Review.
(CA A118362, SC S51378)
On petition for review filed April 28, 2004.*
Argued and submitted October 20, 2004.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on review.  With
her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General, and Denise Fjordbeck, Assistant
Attorney General.
Donald S. Upham, Portland, attorney for respondent on
review.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Riggs,*** De Muniz,**** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.*****
DURHAM, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
*190 Or App 331, 78 P3d 1250 (2003).
**Chief Justice when this case was argued.
***Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case
****Chief Justice when this case was decided.
*****Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
DURHAM, J.
This is a case of judicial review of administrative
rules.  Petitioner below (respondent on review) Kellas (1)
challenges the lawfulness of two administrative rules under ORS
183.400, which provides, in part, that "[t]he validity of any
rule may be determined upon a petition by any person to the Court
of Appeals[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  The Court of Appeals declined
to reach the merits of petitioner's arguments because it
concluded that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the rules
in question.  The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.  We
reverse.
We take the pertinent facts from the record and the
opinion of the Court of Appeals.  Petitioner is the father of an
adult son, Brian Kellas.  Police arrested and charged Brian with
robbery and burglary, among other charges.  Subsequently, Brian
executed and the court approved a security release agreement in
which Brian agreed that he would be on "house arrest" during the
pendency of his case.  That term of the agreement compelled Brian
to remain at his parents' home; it permitted him to leave the
home only if a parent accompanied him or if he left to attend to
his job, his classes, or to visit his health club.  Brian's house
arrest lasted for 311 days.
Brian pleaded guilty to robbery and burglary charges. 
The court sentenced him, among other conditions, to prison for 36
months on each offense, with 12 months of the burglary sentence
to run concurrently with the robbery sentence and the remaining
24 months to run consecutively to the robbery sentence, for a
total of 60 months.  The court committed Brian to the custody of
the Department of Corrections (DOC).  The DOC calculated Brian's
prison term, but did not give Brian credit against his prison
term for the 311 days that he spent on house arrest in compliance
with his pretrial security release agreement.
In refusing to grant time served credit to Brian for
the time he spent on house arrest, DOC relied on its
interpretation of two administrative rules:  OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) and OAR 291-100-0080.  The first is a rule that the
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has promulgated.  In a series
of administrative rules, the CJC has specified the length of a
term of incarceration that will result from a sentence imposed in
a judgment of conviction.  In general, the CJC rules distinguish
between a sentence of imprisonment and a probationary sentence. 
The rules also specify the number of "sanction units" that a
person sentenced to a term of incarceration must serve.  A day
spent in various kinds of custodial supervision, incarceration,
treatment or release programs may qualify as a "sanction unit." 
The CJC rules authorize sentencing judges, under specific
conditions, to impose sanction units as a part of a probationary
sentence.  OAR 213-005-0011(3).  OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) provides
that, if a court imposes sanction units as part of a probationary
sentence, then the offender must receive credit for each day of
satisfactory compliance with house arrest.  OAR 213-005-0012(2)
provides, in part:
"When sanction units are imposed as part of a
probationary sentence, the offender shall receive
credit for having served those sanction units as
follows:
"* * * * *
(d) HOUSE ARREST:  Each day of satisfactory
compliance with the requirements of house arrest equals
one (1) sanction unit if the offender satisfactorily
completes the house arrest."
However, the DOC asserted that OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) was
inapplicable to the sentence in Brian's case because the court
sentenced Brian to imprisonment, not a probationary sentence,
and, according to DOC, that rule applies only to probation.
The second rule is one of several rules that DOC has
adopted to aid that agency in determining the length of time that
it should incarcerate an inmate sentenced to its custody.  OAR
291-100-0080 provides, in part, that the DOC must grant credit to
an inmate for time spent in custody before sentencing, such as in
a county jail.  However, OAR 291-100-0080(7) provides:  "An
inmate will not receive time served credit for time spent on
house arrest or electronic monitoring."  DOC declined to grant
time served credit to Brian under that rule.
Petitioner filed this challenge under ORS 183.400 to
assert that the refusal of DOC to grant time served credit to
Brian for the period of his pretrial house arrest, pursuant to
the administrative rules discussed above, was unlawful under ORS
137.370(2).  That statute provides, in part:
"Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of
this section, when a person is sentenced to
imprisonment in the custody of the Department of
Corrections, for the purpose of computing the amount of
sentence served the term of confinement includes only:
"(a) The time that the person is confined by any
authority after the arrest for the crime for which
sentence is imposed[.]"
Petitioner argued that the trial court had confined Brian to his
parents' home prior to trial for 311 days and that ORS
137.370(2)(a) required DOC to grant time served credit for that
period of confinement.  Petitioner contended that OAR 213-005-0012(2)(d) and OAR 291-100-0080(7) were not valid because, among
other grounds, they conflicted with ORS 137.370(2)(a) and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  In connection with the equal protection
claim, petitioner asserted that he had a fundamental liberty
interest in associating with his son and that the DOC infringed
on that interest by maintaining its custody over Brian for 311
days longer than the law would permit.
DOC and CJC (collectively, the state) took no position
on whether petitioner had standing to challenge the two
administrative rules.  Instead, the state confined its dispute
with petitioner's rule challenge to the merits.  The Court of
Appeals raised the issue of petitioner's standing sua sponte. 
That court acknowledged that ORS 183.400 is broadly phrased and
appears to confer standing "without regard to whether a
petitioner has a personal stake in the validity of a particular
administrative rule."  Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 190 Or App
331, 334, 78 P3d 1250 (2003).  The court concluded, however,
that, notwithstanding the broad wording of ORS 183.400,
petitioner had to demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of
the rule challenge to "meet constitutional justiciability
requirements."  Id.  The Court of Appeals stated that
"a petitioner seeking to challenge a rule under ORS
183.400 must demonstrate that he or she has a legally
recognized interest at stake and that the relief sought
-- validation or invalidation of an administrative rule
-- would have a practical effect on that interest."
Id.  The court concluded that petitioner had failed to
demonstrate that invalidation of the challenged rules would have
a practical effect on petitioner or on his interest in
associating with his son.  Id. at 336.  Consequently, the court
held that petitioner had no standing to challenge the
administrative rules in question.  Id. at 337.
The Court of Appeals reached that conclusion by relying
on its opinion in Utsey v. Coos County, 176 Or App 524, 539-40,
32 P3d 933 (2001), in which the Court of Appeals elaborated on an
identical holding in a similar context. (2)
The state now petitions this court for review of the
Court of Appeals decision.  The state argues that the legislature
lawfully may authorize any person to seek judicial review to
challenge the validity of a governmental action, such as an
administrative rule, without a showing that the governmental
action or the court's decision will have a practical effect on
that person's individual rights or interests.  We granted review
and, for the reasons expressed below, conclude that, at least
within the context of the present controversy, the state's
argument is correct.
"Standing" is a legal term that identifies whether a
party to a legal proceeding possesses a status or qualification
necessary for the assertion, enforcement, or adjudication of
legal rights or duties. (3)  See Eckles v. State of Oregon, 306
Or 380, 383, 760 P2d 846 (1988) (discussing principle).  A party
who seeks judicial review of a governmental action must establish
that that party has standing to invoke judicial review.  The
source of law that determines that question is the statute that
confers standing in the particular proceeding that the party has
initiated, "because standing is not a matter of common law but
is, instead, conferred by the legislature."  Local No. 290 v.
Dept. of Environ. Quality, 323 Or 559, 566, 919 P2d 1168 (1996).
As noted, ORS 183.400(1) provides that "[t]he validity
of any rule may be determined upon a petition by any person to
the Court of Appeals[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  The statute imposes
no additional qualification for standing in this context.
The legislature's policy choice regarding standing in
ORS 183.400(1) is unambiguous.  The legislature intends by the
statute to authorize any person to invoke the judicial power of
the court to test the validity of every administrative rule under
existing statutory and constitutional law and, thus, to advance
the objective that all agency rulemaking shall remain within
applicable procedural and substantive legal bounds.  So
understood, petitioner satisfies the standing requirement that
ORS 183.400(1) identifies.  The remaining question is whether
some other source of law -- in this case, the Oregon Constitution
-- imposes any additional requirement or limitation regarding a
party's standing to challenge an administrative rule.  To address
that question, we examine first the scope of the constitutional
authority of the legislature to enact ORS 183.400(1) and, second,
the authority of an Oregon court, consistent with the conception
of the judicial power that we find in the Oregon Constitution, to
entertain a challenge to administrative rules under ORS
183.400(1).
The lawmaking authority of Oregon's legislature under
the Oregon Constitution is plenary, subject only to limits that
arise either from the Oregon Constitution or from a source of
supreme federal law.  We are aware of no qualification on the
legislature's authority in the Oregon Constitution that would
restrict the legislature from authorizing any member of the
public to initiate litigation concerning the validity of
administrative rules under a statute such as ORS 183.400(1).
The plenary lawmaking authority of the Oregon
legislature stands in marked contrast to the limitations that
pertain to lawmaking by the United States Congress.  For example,
in authorizing litigation in the courts of the United States,
Congress must respect the limitation in Article III, section 2,
of the United States Constitution, which provides that the
judicial power of the United States extends to the resolution of
"cases" or "controversies."  That clause has given rise to an
extensive body of federal law regarding the justiciability of
disputes in federal court.  See Lea Brilmayer, "The Jurisprudence
of Article III:  Perspectives on the 'Case or Controversy'
Requirement," 93 Harv L Rev 297 (1979) (reviewing federal
jurisprudence of justiciability); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., "Article
III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of
Federal Courts," 69 Notre Dame L Rev 447 (1994) (same).
The Oregon Constitution contains no "cases" or
"controversies" provision.  Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has determined that "the constraints of Article III do not
apply to state courts * * *."  Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 US 605,
617, 109 S Ct 2037, 104 L Ed 2d 696 (1989).  For that reason, we
cannot import federal law regarding justiciability into our
analysis of the Oregon Constitution and rely on it to fabricate
constitutional barriers to litigation with no support in either
the text or history of Oregon's charter of government.  As former
Justice Linde of this court has explained:
"In sum, rejecting premature or advisory
litigation is good policy, but rigid tests of
'justiciability' breed evasions and legal fictions.  It
is prudent to keep judicial intervention within
statutory or established equitable and common law
remedies.  It is not prudent to link a decision
declining adjudication to non-textual, self-created
constitutional barriers, and thereby to foreclose
lawmakers from facilitating impartial, reasoned
resolutions of legal disputes that affect people's
public, rather than self-seeking, interests. 
Requirements that rest only on statutory
interpretations can be altered to meet desired ends,
but change becomes harder once interpretations are
elevated into supposedly essential doctrines of
'justiciability.' * * *"
Hans A. Linde, "The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: 
Vive La Différence!," 46 Wm &amp; Mary L Rev 1273, 1287-88 (2005). 
See also Helen Hershkoff, "State Courts and the 'Passive
Virtues':  Rethinking the Judicial Function," 114 Harv L Rev
1833, 1905 (concluding that "the concerns that motivate federal
justiciability doctrine are not wholly applicable to the theory
or practice of state governance.").
We turn next to a consideration whether the Oregon
Constitution limits the authority of Oregon's courts to consider
a challenge to administrative rules under ORS 183.400(1).  As
noted, the Court of Appeals concluded in Utsey that Oregon courts
lack the power to decide any case unless the party invoking the
judicial power asserts a personal right or claims a personal
injury that a judicial decision will affect in a practical way. 
We note that this court's discussions of that question have not
always been consistent.  176 Or App at 539-40.  However, as we
shall demonstrate, it follows from the clear weight of authority
from this court that the standing element of ORS 183.400(1) poses
no obstacle to the lawful exercise of the judicial power by an
Oregon court.
Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution, provides in part:
"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in one
supreme court and in such other courts as may from time
to time be created by law."
This court recognized in Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or 345, 362, 97
P3d 1161 (2004), that the scope of the "judicial power" that
Article VII (amended), section 1, confers is not unlimited.  The
court observed that the history of that phrase did not permit a
"definitive conclusion regarding the scope of [that] power under
the Oregon Constitution" and that the "constitutional grant of
judicial power did not include the power to decide cases that had
become moot at some stage of the proceedings."  Id.  That holding
does not resolve the issue presented in this case, however. 
Here, the question is whether the legislature has the authority
to empower any citizen to act as a private attorney general to
enforce public rights.
The premise for the Utsey court's holding on that issue
is that the absence of personal stake in the rule challenge on
the part of petitioner prevents the court from exercising the
judicial power -- whatever its scope may be -- to address the
matter, thus elevating the practical effects criterion to a
jurisdictional component.  However, from the early days of
statehood to the present day, our cases undermine that view of
the judicial power.
In State v. Ware, 13 Or 380, 10 P 885 (1886), the
relator sought a writ of mandamus directing the Lane County clerk
to correct election notices that failed to state that the office
of circuit judge would be filled in the general election.  At
oral argument, a question arose as to whether the relator had a
sufficient interest in the matter to sustain the proceeding,
because the case concerned the enforcement of public, not
private, rights.  Id. at 382.  The relator had no special
interest distinct from that of other members of the community. 
In nonetheless deciding that the relator had an interest
sufficient to sustain his participation in the proceeding, this
court agreed that
"the decided weight of authority supports the
proposition that, where the relief is merely for the
protection of private rights, the relator must show
some personal or special interest in the subject-matter, since he is regarded as the real party in
interest, and his right must clearly appear. On the
other hand, where the question is one of public
right, and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party; and the relator, at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted,
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen, and as such is interested in
the execution of the law."
Ware, 13 Or at 382-83 (emphasis in original) (quoting High, Legal
Remedies § 431).
State ex rel. Durkheimer v. Grace, 20 Or 154, 158, 25 P
382 (1890), supports the same principle:
"[A]s the question at bar is one of public right, and
the object of the mandamus is to enforce the
performance of a public duty, the people being regarded
as the real parties in interest, it is not necessary
that the relators should show any special interest or
particular right to be affected by the result."
In Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect., 277 Or 447, 453-457, 
561 P2d 154 (1977), a case brought under the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), ORS 183.310 et. seq., the Nuclear and
Thermal Energy Council (now renamed the Energy Facility Siting
Council) admitted petitioner (Marbet) as an intervenor in
proceedings in which the council had recommended to the Governor
that he issue Portland General Electric Company (PGE) a site
certificate for the construction of two nuclear power plants. 
Marbet sought judicial review of the council's final order.  In a
cross-petition, PGE raised objections to the council's admission
of Marbet as a party to the proceedings.  Because the council's
decision resulted from a contested case, ORS 183.480 governed
judicial review.   At the time, ORS 183.480 provided, in part:
"(1) Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any
order or any party to an agency proceeding is entitled
to judicial review of a final order, * * *."
(Emphasis added.)
This court observed that the legislature, in conferring standing on "any party" admitted as such by the agency to its
proceeding, entitled the petitioner to judicial review without a
further showing of interest.  Marbet, 227 Or at 453.  This court
further noted that the legislature envisioned broad public
participation in the energy facility siting process itself. 
Former ORS 469.380 provided:  
"(2) The council may, by proper order, permit any
person to become a party complainant or defendant by
intervention who appears to have an interest in the
results of the hearing or who represents a public
interest in such results * * * ."
This court stated that ORS 469.380
"thus gives no greater procedural weight to an
intervenor's personal self-interest than to an interest 
that he shares with other members of the public. It
expresses the legislature's judgment that the important
decisions of public policy entrusted to the Energy
Facility Siting Council are not to be treated as a
dispute between opposing private interests."
Marbet, 277 Or at 453-54.  The Marbet court also concluded that,
in ORS 183.480(1), the legislature's conferral of standing on
those "aggrieved" by a final order in a contested case, "surely
includes one whom the agency itself, pursuant to a statutory
directive, has recognized to present an interest that the
legislature wished to have considered."  Id. at 457. (4)  
In holding that the petitioner was entitled to judicial
review of the council's final order under ORS 183.480, despite
his lack of an individualized self-interest in the outcome, this
court implicitly recognized that the Oregon Constitution does not
limit the legislature's power to deputize its citizens to
challenge government action in the public interest.  In fact, in
Marbet, this court held the case to be justiciable even though
its decision would have a practical effect only on the
respondent, PGE, and not on the petitioner, Marbet, who had
invoked the judicial power in the first place.
More recently, in Brian v. Oregon Government Ethics
Commission, 319 Or 151, 159, 874 P2d 1294 (1994) this court
reiterated its Marbet holding, stating that "a party to an agency
proceeding (other than the agency itself) has standing under ORS
183.480(1) to seek judicial review by that fact alone, without
further showing of interest." In that case, the petitioner, a
state representative, appealed from a decision of the Oregon
Government Standards and Practices Commission (commission), which
had rendered a decision exonerating the petitioner of alleged
ethics violations.  The petitioner was dissatisfied with
statements in the commission's final order.  The commission moved
to dismiss the petitioner's request for judicial review on the
ground that he was not "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the
final order within the meaning of ORS 183.480.  Id. at 155.  The
Court of Appeals dismissed on the ground that the petitioner's
lack of standing deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the
case.  The petitioner argued to this court that he had standing
pursuant to ORS 183.480 as a party to the commission's proceeding
and that, under the plain wording of the statute, "a 'party' need
not be 'adversely affected or aggrieved by an order' to be
'entitled to judicial review.'"  Id.  The commission agreed that
the petitioner was a party to the proceeding under the statute,
but argued that even a party has no "'standing * * * when the
action taken by the agency is favorable to the party * * * .'" 
Brian, 319 Or at 155-56.  After examining ORS 183.480, this court
reaffirmed its holding in Marbet and disavowed dictum from
another case, Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or 358, 723
P2d 298 (1986), to the extent that Cooper "suggests that a non-agency party must show any additional interest or adversity to
have standing." Brian, 319 Or at 159.
Outside the APA, this court has reaffirmed its view in
non-APA cases that statutory standing conferred in pursuit of any
permissible legislative interest is sufficient to meet any
constitutional requirement that might exist.  For example, Deras
v. Keisling, 320 Or 1, 3, 879 P2d 850 (1994), was an original
proceeding for judicial review of a ballot measure explanatory
statement brought pursuant to ORS 251.235. (5)  This court
determined that the petitioner had standing merely because he met
the broad statutory requirement of being "dissatisfied" with the
explanatory statement in question.  This court did not explore
whether the petitioner had a private interest different from that
of the general public that would be affected by the decision
regarding the proposed ballot measure, because the Oregon
Constitution does not require that inquiry.
Finally, in Oregon Newspaper Publishers v. Dept. of
Corrections, 329 Or 115, 988 P2d 359 (1999), a case brought under
ORS 183.400, the petitioners challenged administrative rules 
regarding the witnessing of executions of prison inmates.    This
court did not address whether the petitioners had concrete rights
that would be practically affected by the outcome of its
decision.  It simply noted that petitioners met the statutory
standing requirement of being "any person," reflecting this
court's understanding that the standing inquiry ended there.  Id.
at 118 n 1.
This court's cases from Ware to Oregon Newspaper
Publishers consistently have held that the legislature can
recognize the right of any citizen to initiate a judicial action
to enforce matters of public interest.  That statutory
recognition satisfied whatever constitutional requirement may
inhere in Article VII (amended), section 1.  The correct question
accordingly is not whether Article VII, section 1, requires a
personal stake in the proceeding.  Rather, the question is
whether the legislature has empowered citizens to initiate a
judicial proceeding to vindicate the public's interest in
requiring the government to respect the limits of its authority
under law.
In reaching its contrary conclusion in Utsey, the Court
of Appeals erroneously relied on decisions in which this court
discussed a practical effects requirement in the context of
distinguishable statutory standing requirements, such as those in
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, (6) ORS 28.010 to 28.160. 
See Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass'n v. White, 159 Or 99, 78 P2d 572
(1938) (action brought pursuant to Declaratory Judgment Act held
nonjusticiable on ripeness and lack of adversity grounds); Eacret
et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 121, 333 P2d 741 (1958) (plaintiffs had
no standing under Declaratory Judgment Act because wrong of which
they complained was "public in character"); Gortmaker v. Seaton,
252 Or 440, 443, 450 P2d 547 (1969) (plaintiff lacked standing
under Declaratory Judgment Act because a decision would not
affect his rights); Cummings Constr. v. School Dist. No. 9, 242
Or 106, 408 P2d 80 (1965)(plaintiffs failed to show entitlement
to declaratory judgment relief because they could not prove they
had any present legal rights against the defendant); Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or 93, 597 P2d 1232 (1979)(plaintiff
had standing under Declaratory Judgment Act because tax would
affect its interests in numerous ways).
We acknowledge that three recent decisions from this
court may have caused some confusion in the application of
statutes conferring standing on persons who do not assert a
personal interest in the outcome.  In People for Ethical
Treatment v. Inst. Animal Care, 312 Or 95, 99, 817 P2d 1299
(1991), and Brian, 319 Or at 156, this court suggested that a
reviewing court's inquiry into the standing of an entity seeking
judicial review may involve "certain constitutional
considerations" beyond an interpretation of legislative intent. 
This court decided PETA and Brian on statutory grounds, however. 
We cannot conclude that this court intended those statements to
constitute an authoritative statement of law about any possible
constitutional dimension to the standing inquiry.
In the third case, McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 909
P2d 846 (1996), resident taxpayers of a transportation district
challenged the constitutionality of a statute that involved light
rail funding.  The statute provided that, "[a]ny interested
person may petition the Supreme Court for a determination of the
constitutionality of any provision of sections 1 to 18 of this
Act * * *."  Or Laws 1995, ch 3, § 18(2) (Spec Sess).  The
regional entity responsible for the light rail project
intervened, challenging the petition on grounds of statutory and
constitutional standing.  In its decision, this court determined
first that petitioners satisfied the statutory requirement for
standing.  Turning separately to the justiciability analysis,
this court stated:
"There are two aspects to the analysis of
justiciability in this case. The first relates to the
standing inquiry:  will a decision have a practical
effect on the rights of the parties?  The second
relates to ripeness:  is this case brought
prematurely?"
McIntire, 322 Or at 433.  This court then noted:
"This court recently has reiterated the standard for a
justiciable controversy under Oregon law: 
'Under Oregon law, a justiciable controversy exists
when "the interests of the parties to the action are
adverse" and "the court's decision in the matter will
have some practical effect on the rights of the parties
to the controversy."  Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402,
405-06, 848 P2d 1194 (1993)' Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321
Or 174, 182, 895 P2d 765 (1995)"
McIntire, 322 Or at 433-34 (footnote omitted).  Brumnett and
Barcik were mootness cases in which this court did not
significantly address the distinct issue of standing.  McIntire
included a discussion of the practical effects requirement in the
context of the standing inquiry, when, in fact, this court always
has understood it to be an aspect of the mootness inquiry
(except, of course, if a statute itself requires that a decision
have a concrete impact on the rights of the person in order for
him or her to have standing).  The only pertinent inquiry into
standing that the statute in McIntire occasioned was whether the
petitioner was an "interested person."  A practical effects
requirement would have relevance to the standing issue in
McIntire only as an aspect of the petitioner's showing that he
was an "interested person."  The court's comments about practical
effects, in context, did not elevate that criterion to a
constitutional component of standing.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the standing
component in ORS 183.400(1) does not violate any limitation
imposed by the Oregon Constitution.  Petitioner satisfied that
requirement.  The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise
and dismissing the petition.  On remand, the Court of Appeals
must address the merits of the petition.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
1. In this opinion, we refer to Scott Thomas Kellas by his
designation in the proceeding below, "petitioner."
2. This court allowed review in Utsey but later dismissed
the petitions for review when the underlying controversy became
moot.  See Utsey v. Coos County, 335 Or 217, 65 P3d 1109 (2003)
(order dismissing petitions for review due to mootness).
3. Unlike the concepts of ripeness and mootness, which
inquire about whether litigation has occurred too soon or too
late (i.e., they ask the question "when?"), standing asks the
question "who?".  Elaborating on that point, Justice Antonin
Scalia has commented:  "In more pedestrian terms, [standing] is
an answer to the very first question that is sometimes rudely
asked when one person complains of another's actions: 'What's it
to you?'".  Antonin Scalia, "The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers," 17 Suffolk U L
Rev 881, 882 (1983).
4. For an application in the land use context of the
requirement that a petitioner be "adversely affected" or
"aggrieved" to petition for agency review, see Jefferson Landfill
Comm. v. Marion Co., 297 Or 280, 686 P2d 310 (1984) (concluding
that the petitioner was aggrieved because he was an "interested
person" under local county ordinance, had appeared before the
local body and testified on the merits, and the decision made was
contrary to the position he asserted).
5. ORS 251.235 (1993) provided in part that "[a]ny person
dissatisfied with an explanatory statement for which suggestions
were offered at the Secretary of State's hearing * * * may
petition the Supreme Court seeking a different statement and
stating the reasons the statement filed with the court is
insufficient or unclear." 
6. ORS 28.110 provides, in part:
"When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall
be made parties who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declaration * * *."
(Emphasis added.)