Title: Mid-South Milling Co., Inc. v. Loret Farms, Inc.
Citation: 521 S.W.2d 586
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 1975

521 S.W.2d 586 (1975) MID-SOUTH MILLING CO., INC., et al., Petitioners, v. LORET FARMS, INC., et al., Respondents. Supreme Court of Tennessee. March 10, 1975. Josiah Baker, Goins, Gammon, Baker &amp; Robinson, Chattanooga, Charles H. Warfield, Farris, Warfield &amp; Samuels, Nashville, for petitioners. Leonard R. Tanner, Jr., Walter E. Grantham, II, Tanner &amp; Jahn, Chattanooga, for respondents. HENRY, Justice. We are concerned with the matter of venue in a transitory action. Loret Farms, Inc. and Loret Mills, Inc., Tennessee corporations having their situs in Hamilton County, brought this action in *587 the Circuit Court at Chattanooga against Mid-South Milling Company, Inc. and Mid-South Milling Company, Inc., of Georgia, each of which has its principal office in Shelby County. The Circuit Judge sustained a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12.02, Tenn. R.Civ.P. The Court of Appeals reversed and we have granted certiorari and heard argument. The determinative question is whether the venue was in Hamilton or Shelby County. Loret Farms engages in the business of growing and selling broiler chickens, in Hamilton County, Tennessee and in various other areas which are located in Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia. Loret Mills engages in the business of manufacturing poultry feed in Hamilton County, principally for use in feeding broiler chickens. It supplied poultry feed to Loret Farms. Mid-South and its subsidiary, Mid-South of Georgia, are engaged in the preparation and sale of feeds and feed supplements and in the manufacturing of feeds. Sometime during the year 1969 Mid-South contacted Loret Mills and solicited orders for "55% poultry by-product meal". Pursuant to this solicitation and acceptance, meal was purchased by Loret Mills, mixed by that company into its blended feed ration which, in turn, was supplied to Loret Farms for use in its chicken growing business. The modus operandi on the ensuing purchases needs to be set forth in detail. a. This meal was produced or manufactured in Shelby County. b. The initial solicitation was made by Mid-South from Memphis to Loret Mills in Chattanooga. c. All orders were made by telephone from Chattanooga to Memphis. d. Drafts were drawn on a Chattanooga bank and honored by one in Memphis. e. Mid-South delivered the meal to Loret Mills in Chattanooga. f. The meal was mixed with other ingredients and processed in Chattanooga. g. The final product was put into use in Chattanooga. h. All representations with respect to the meal were made by telephone call. The complaint charged the defendants with various wrongdoings including selling and delivering meal of inferior and substandard quality, negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty. Defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds, all of which distill into the single proposition that the venue was improperly laid in Hamilton County. The Circuit Judge sustained the motion and dismissed the action. An appeal was perfected and, pursuant thereto, the Court of Appeals for the Western Section, (sitting in Knoxville) reversed and remanded. We are dealing with a transitory action. Such actions are governed by Sec. 20-401, T.C.A., which provides, in pertinent part: The original opinion of the Court of Appeals proceeded upon the assumption that this statute, in its present form, governed venue. A petition to rehear was filed pointing out that this code section resulted from a 1972 amendment, made after this cause of action arose, and vigorously insisting that the statute, as it existed at the *588 time the cause of action arose, should be applied.[1] In disposing of this contention the Court of Appeals said: We concur in this holding. As to the venue question, we adopt the pertinent parts of Judge Matherne's opinion in the Court of Appeals, as follows: Code Section 47-2-725 provides in part: Aside from the most excellent reasoning of the Court of Appeals, we think *590 the facts of this case, irrespective of its nature, bring this transitory action well within the ambit of Sec. 20-401 T.C.A. Petitioners, in an elaborate brief insist that "the only activity which took place in Hamilton County, Tennessee was tender of delivery." We disagree. The original solicitation was received and, therefore, consummated in Hamilton County. The orders were placed in Hamilton County; the meal was delivered to and processed in Hamilton County and placed in use or in transit for use there. The contract was completed in Hamilton County and its breach occurred there. In fact the essential contacts were basically in Hamilton County. Petitioners argue the unfairness of requiring it to bring its records, papers and documents all the way from Memphis to Chattanooga for trial. A trip from Chattanooga to Memphis, as we compute it, would involve the same mileage and the same difficulties. It all comes down to "whose ox is being gored." This is just one of the annoyances of doing business. Petitioners are in an entirely different factual and legal situation than that of the mail order houses and different rules apply. Petitioners attempt to analogize the "long arm statute" in support of their contentions and respondents would have us consider the line of cases bearing upon the question of the necessary contacts for a corporation to be considered as "doing business" in Tennessee. With utmost deference to able counsel, these are jurisdictional questions and are not here involved. It is undisputed and indisputable that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction of this controversy. Tennessee has only one circuit court court held by fifty-one circuit judges, in twenty-nine judicial circuits, and in ninety-five counties. A county does not have a circuit court. The State has a circuit court which sits in the various counties.[2] It, therefore, follows that we are necessarily dealing with venue and cases relating to jurisdiction have no relevance. Petitioner relies heavily on Darby v. Superior Supply Company, 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970). This case is inapposite. It deals with jurisdiction sought to be obtained over a non-resident defendant by the long arm statute.[3] The Court held that it was enacted with the intention to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause. Quite aside from this, Sec. 20-235 T.C.A. relates to the "transaction of business" whereas Sec. 20-401 fixes venue, in part, in the county "where the cause of action arose." Sec. 20-235 shows on its face that it is designed to enable the courts of Tennessee to take jurisdiction of persons unavailable to personal service. It is one thing to force a non-resident into Tennessee as a litigant, and quite another to determine in what division of one of our courts a citizen may be required to appear and answer. *591 We hold that the Circuit Court of Tennessee at Chattanooga is a proper place of venue for this action. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The costs in this Court are taxed against petitioner. FONES, C.J., and COOPER, BROCK and HARBISON, JJ., concur. [1] At the time this cause of action arose Sec. 20-401 read as follows: In all transitory actions, the right of action follows the person of the defendant, unless otherwise expressly provided. If the plaintiff and defendant both reside in the same county, such action shall be brought in the county of their residence. [2] It is imprecise to refer to any particular circuit court as being the circuit court of any given county. The court from which this action arose, precisely speaking, is "The Circuit Court of Tennessee for the Sixth Judicial Circuit at Chattanooga." In a more usable form it is, correctly speaking, "The Circuit Court of Tennessee at Chattanooga." Universally we refer to it as the Circuit Court of Hamilton County, a technically incorrect designation. Admittedly this is most technical but we deal with venue which is itself a procedural technicality. [3] Sec. 20-235 T.C.A.