Title: In re Rhodes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46736
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2000

FILED: OCTOBER 26, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
WILLIAM T. RHODES,
Accused.
(OSB 97-59; SC S46736)
	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Submitted on the record September 8, 2000.
	William T. Rhodes, Lake Oswego, filed a brief in propria
persona.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for two
years, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, a trial panel
of the Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had violated
DR 7-106(A) (prohibiting disregard of rulings of tribunal) and DR
1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to administration of
justice) by failing to comply with a document production order in
1993 and by failing to comply with a child support order in 1997. 
The trial panel also concluded that the accused violated DR 1-103(C) (requiring full and truthful responses to inquiries during
disciplinary investigation) by failing to reply to letters from
the Oregon State Bar (Bar) and the Local Professional
Responsibility Committee (LPRC).  The panel imposed a two-year
suspension. 
De novo review by this court is automatic.  ORS
9.536(2), (3).  The Bar has the burden of establishing alleged
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  We hold
that the Bar has established that the accused violated DR 7-106(A), DR 1-102(A)(4), and DR 1-103(C) and that the appropriate
sanction is a two-year suspension.
We find the following facts.  In 1993, a circuit court
held the accused in contempt for failing to produce documents
that the accused's wife had requested in connection with marital
separation proceedings.  In 1997, another circuit court held the
accused in contempt for failing to make child support payments. 
Despite the accused's assertion that he could not pay the
required amount, the court found that the accused's nonpayment
was willful, because he was not making the effort to earn the
income that he was capable of earning. (1)  
		In November 1996, the accused's former wife filed a
complaint against the accused with the Bar.  In December 1996,
the Bar sent the accused two letters notifying him of the charges
against him and requesting a response.  The Bar sent those
letters to the address for the accused on file with the Bar.  The
Bar received no response.  In January 1997, the Bar sent the
accused a third letter, by both certified and first class mail. 
No one claimed the certified letter, and no one returned the
first-class letter.
		In April 1997, the Multnomah County LPRC investigated
the matter.  The LPRC attempted to contact the accused by mailing
a letter to the address on file with the Bar.  The postal service
returned that letter marked "moved, left no address."  The LPRC
next sent a letter to the accused's parents' address, but
received no response.  The Bar also sent a letter to the
accused's parents' address in May 1997 and received no reply. 
The LPRC sent a certified and a first class letter to the
accused's parents' house in May 1997, and the accused's mother
accepted the certified letter.  The accused eventually contacted
the LPRC, which subpoenaed and deposed him in July 1997.  The
accused never contacted the Bar to discuss the alleged
violations.  He claims that he did not receive any of the letters
that the Bar and the LPRC had sent to the address on file with
the Bar, because he received mail only at his parents' address
after November 1996.  The accused admits, however, that he
continued to live at the address on file with the Bar and that he
did not notify the Bar of a change of address in November 1996.
The Bar alleged two causes of complaint against the
accused.  The first alleged that the accused violated DR 7-106(A)
and DR 1-102(A)(4) by failing to comply with court orders,
leading to the 1993 and 1997 contempt orders.  The second alleged
that the accused violated DR 1-103(C) by failing to cooperate
with the Bar and the LPRC during the disciplinary inquiry.  As
noted, the trial panel found that the accused had committed each
alleged violation and suspended the accused from the practice of
law for two years. 
DR 7-106(A) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
disregard * * * a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a
proceeding but the lawyer may take appropriate steps in good
faith to test the validity of such * * * ruling."  The Bar
alleges that, under principles of issue preclusion, the 1993 and
1997 contempt orders conclusively establish that the accused
disregarded the rulings of two trial courts and, therefore,
conclusively establish that the accused twice violated DR 7-106(A).
The accused disputes the validity of the 1993 and 1997
orders.  We agree with the Bar and the trial panel, however, that
that argument is unavailing in this proceeding.  The accused had
the opportunity to appeal those orders after the court entered
them, and he declined to do so.   
The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents the accused
from challenging the validity of the contempt orders in this
proceeding.  See Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility Dist., 318 Or
99, 103-04, 862 P2d 1293 (1993) (articulating issue preclusion
standard).  To adjudge the accused in contempt, the circuit
courts necessarily found that the accused acted "willfully."  See
ORS 33.015(2) (defining "[c]ontempt of court," in part, as
violation of court order, "done willfully").  The court in 1997
necessarily found willfulness by clear and convincing evidence. 
See ORS 33.055(11) (requiring proof of contempt by clear and
convincing evidence for imposition of remedial sanction other
than confinement).  The court in 1997 necessarily found
willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id. (requiring proof
of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for imposition of remedial
sanction of confinement).  Because the standard of proof in the
contempt proceedings was at least as high as the standard of
proof in this proceeding, the accused is precluded from
relitigating the ultimate fact of whether he willfully violated
the courts' orders.  Cf. In re Robert Neil Gygi, 273 Or 443, 541
P2d 1392 (1975) (refusing to give preclusive effect to civil case
ruling against lawyer in subsequent disciplinary proceeding,
because standard of proof in civil proceeding was only
preponderance of evidence).
A violation of DR 7-106(A) occurs when a lawyer
disregards a tribunal's ruling made in the course of a
proceeding, unless the lawyer's action amounts to "appropriate
steps in good faith to test the validity" of the ruling.  Here,
the 1993 and 1997 contempt orders establish that the accused
willfully violated court rulings on two occasions.  The accused
argues that his violations were not willful, but he does not
assert that his noncompliance constituted a good faith attempt to
test the validity of the orders.  We conclude that the Bar has
met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
the accused violated DR 1-706(A).
DR 1-102(A)(4) provides that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice."  Prejudice to the
administration of justice can result from multiple acts that
cause some harm or a single act that causes substantial harm.  In
re Haws, 310 Or 741, 748, 801 P2d 818 (1990).  Harm to the
administration of justice can occur when a lawyer impairs either
the substantive rights of a party or the procedural functioning
of a case.  In re Meyer (I), 328 Or 211, 214, 970 P2d 652 (1999).
The Bar argues that the accused's willful misconduct,
leading to the 1993 and 1997 contempt orders, prejudiced the
administration of justice by requiring the accused's former wife,
the district attorney, and the court system to expend substantial
resources addressing the accused's conduct.  The accused's
failure to comply with the child support order impaired his
former wife's substantive right to support and, the Bar alleges,
forced her to borrow money to support their children.  The
accused asserts that he did not harm his former wife, because he
paid her attorney fees associated with the 1993 contempt order
proceedings, and because she wrongfully borrowed money from the
children's trust fund to support herself and the children.  
The accused's contentions do not negate the prejudice
and harm that his conduct caused.  The court system and the
district attorney spent considerable time and resources dealing
with the accused's noncompliance.  We conclude that the accused's
conduct can be viewed either as multiple acts that caused some
harm or two individual acts that each caused substantial harm. 
The Bar has proved that the accused's conduct prejudiced the
administration of justice.  Therefore, we conclude that, by
violating the courts' two support orders, the accused violated DR
1-102(A)(4).
DR 1-103(C) provides:
"A lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to
inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the
exercise of any applicable right or privilege."
DR 1-103(C) requires full cooperation from a lawyer during a
disciplinary investigation.  In re Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 425,
939 P2d 39 (1997).  "Partial cooperation, such as responding only
when and if the matter escalates to an LPRC investigation,
reduces the extent of the violation but does not absolve a lawyer
from his or her obligation under the rule."  Id.
The Bar asserts that the accused's failure to respond
to letters from the Bar and the LPRC during late 1996 and early
1997 violated DR 1-103(C).  As noted, the accused contends that
he never received those letters.  The trial panel did not believe
that the accused's unforwarded mail simply accumulated in his
unopened mailbox.  The accused admits that he continued living at
the address to which the Bar had addressed the letters and that
he failed to notify the Bar of his new mailing address in
November 1996.  The accused cannot alter his mailing address
simply by ceasing to check his mailbox.  We are persuaded that
the accused did receive the Bar's and the LPRC's letters at his
residence.  Once he received the letters, DR 1-103(C) obligated
him to respond.  See Haws, 310 Or at 751 ("Obviously, * * * where
the accused fail[s] to respond at all [to Bar inquiries], he
violate[s] DR 1-103(C).").  
	The accused also asserts that he cooperated with the
LPRC by contacting its representative, requesting a subpoena, and
attending a deposition.  The accused did not remedy his failure
to respond to the Bar's or the LPRC's initial letters by
eventually cooperating with the LPRC.  See In re Vaile, 300 Or
91, 101, 797 P2d 52 (1985) (determining that DR 1-103(C) requires
response to Bar inquiries, in addition to cooperation with LPRC). 
We conclude that the accused's failure to respond to the letters
from the Bar and the LPRC violated DR 1-103(C).
To determine the appropriate sanction in a disciplinary
proceeding, we refer to the American Bar Association's Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA
Standards) and Oregon case law for guidance.  In re Stauffer, 327
Or 44, 66, 956 P2d 967 (1998).  The court first makes an initial
determination of the appropriate sanction by considering (1) the
duty violated, (2) the accused's mental state, and (3) the actual
or potential injury caused by the misconduct.  ABA Standard 3.0;
Meyer (I), 328 Or at 216.  The court may adjust the sanction in
light of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  ABA
Standard 3.0; Meyer (I), 328 Or at 216-17.  In determining the
appropriate sanction, the court also will examine the accused's
conduct in light of the court's prior case law.  Meyer (I), 328
Or at 217.
Here, the accused violated his duties to the legal
system, ABA Standards 6.1 and 6.2, and to the legal profession,
ABA Standard 7.0.  The evidence establishes that the accused
acted with knowledge in committing the violations.  See ABA
Standards at 7 (defining "knowledge" as "conscious awareness of
the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without
the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result"); In re Crist, 327 Or 609, 615-16, 965 P2d 1023 (1998)
(concluding that accused lawyer acted with knowledge when he
failed to respond to Bar inquiries).  His conduct caused
substantial actual injury to the legal system by wasting the
court's time and resources, to his family by increasing the cost
of litigation and depriving his children of support, and to the
Bar by increasing the costs of its investigation.  Suspension is
generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court
order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client
or party, or causes interference or potential interference with a
legal proceeding.  ABA Standard 6.22.
Several aggravating factors are present.  The accused
received two public reprimands for mishandling client funds and
neglecting a legal matter, and, therefore, has prior disciplinary
offenses.  ABA Standard 9.22(a).  He has shown a pattern of
misconduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(c).  He has committed multiple
offenses.  ABA Standard 9.22(d).  He has refused to acknowledge
the wrongful nature of his conduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(g). 
Finally, he harmed vulnerable victims -- his former wife and
children. (2)  ABA Standard 9.22(h).  There are no mitigating
factors.
We next consider our case law.  In Crist, 327 Or at
619, this court imposed a five-year suspension on an accused
lawyer who had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 1-103(C), and DR 6-101(B) (neglecting a legal matter).  In In re Bourcier, 322 Or
561, 571, 909 P2d 1234 (1996), the accused lawyer received a
three-year suspension for violating a number of rules, including
DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(C).  In In re Miles, 324 Or 218, 224,
923 P2d 1219 (1996), this court suspended an accused lawyer for
120 days for violating DR 1-103(C), even though the lawyer had
not violated any other disciplinary rules.
Given the accused's pattern of failing to comply with
his legal obligations and the harm that his conduct caused to his
family and to the legal system, we conclude that a two-year
suspension is appropriate.
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
two years, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.

1. 	As a result of that finding, the court sentenced the
accused to 90 days in jail and three years' probation.  In June
1998, after the Bar filed its complaint in this proceeding, the
court revoked the accused's probation, finding that the accused
had not made his support payments or complied with the other
conditions of his probation.  The accused has appealed the
court's decision to revoke his probation, but that appeal has no
bearing on this court's decision in this disciplinary proceeding.

2. 	The record demonstrates that the accused's refusal to
pay child support in 1994, contrary to the court's order, forced
his former wife to support herself and their children by
borrowing money from her friends, family, and church, and by
continuing to work, against her doctor's orders, while she
suffered from breast cancer.