Title: In Re Contested Election of Schoessler
Citation: 998 P.2d 818
Docket Number: 69048-1
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2000

998 P.2d 818 (2000) 140 Wash. 2d 368 In the Matter of the CONTESTED ELECTION OF Gary L. SCHOESSLER, Appellant. No. 69048-1. Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. Argued March 20, 2000. Decided April 20, 2000. *819 Foreman, Arch, Dodge &amp; Volyn, Robert Gray Dodge, Wenatchee, for Appellant. Russell J. Speidel, James M. Danielson, Kari Kube, Wenatchee, for Respondent. SMITH, J. Appellant Gary L. Schoessler seeks direct review of a decision of the Chelan County Superior Court which annulled and set aside his election as mayor of the City of Wenatchee. The trial court found Appellant was not eligible to hold that elective office because he did not satisfy the one year residence requirement of RCW 35 A. 12.030. We granted direct review. We affirm. The question presented in this case is whether Appellant Gary L. Schoessler satisfied the one-year residence requirement of RCW 35 A. 12.030 for eligibility to hold elective office as mayor of the City of Wenatchee, Washington. On July 26, 1999, Appellant Gary L. Schoessler filed a "Declaration of Candidacy" for mayor of the City of Wenatchee, a photocopy of which follows:[1] *820 On November 2, 1999, Appellant was elected mayor of the City of Wenatchee.[2] He was issued a certificate of election on November 23, 1999 by Evelyn L. Arnold, Chelan County Auditor.[3] On December 3, 1999, Dr. Sanford W. Brown and Reverend Kelvin B. Groseclose, registered voters in the City of Wenatchee, filed in the Chelan County *821 Superior Court an affidavit of error or omission under RCW 29.65.020 and a petition to contest the right of Appellant to be issued a certificate of election.[4] They claimed he was not eligible to hold elective office as mayor of the City of Wenatchee because he did not satisfy the one-year residence requirement of RCW 35 A. 12.030.[5] On December 27 and 28, 1999, the Honorable John E. Bridges presided over a hearing pursuant to chapter 29.65 RCW to determine whether to confirm or to annul and set aside the election of Appellant as mayor of the City of Wenatchee.[6] Appellant's business partner, Shawn Osborn, testified on direct examination concerning Appellant's claim of residence at their business address: . . . . . . . . On December 28, 1999, Judge Bridges rendered an oral decision and on January 7, 2000 filed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law (quoted in their entirety): 40. In July 1999, Mr. Schoessler asked his former wife, Ms. Patti Schoessler, *824 who resides at 32 Harrison Street in the City of Wenatchee, if he could use her address because he needed to be a resident of Wenatchee for at least one year. 58. The intent of Mr. Schoessler regarding his claimed residence in the City *825 of Wenatchee was not clear until after he filed his Declaration of Candidacy on July 26, 1999. 77. During the period from November 2, 1998, until late July 1999, Mr. Schoessler did not demonstrate an intention to establish *826 a present residence in the City of Wenatchee, Washington, as his home. 6. Traditional formulas require conjunction of physical presence and intention to remain permanently in the new location to bring about a change of residence. On January 7, 2000, Judge Bridges entered a judgment voiding the election of Appellant as mayor of the City of Wenatchee.[21] The trial court also granted Appellant's motion to stay enforcement of the judgment pending direct appeal to this Court.[22] On January 11, 2000, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court.[23] Review was granted on January 24, 2000.[24] Eligibility to hold elective office. No person shall be eligible to hold elective office under the mayor-council plan unless *828 the person is a registered voter of the city at the time of filing his declaration of candidacy and has been a resident of the city for a period of at least one year next preceding his election. Residence and voting within the limits of any territory which has been included in, annexed to, or consolidated with such city is construed to have been residence within the city. A mayor or councilman shall hold within the city government no other public office or employment except as permitted under the provisions of chapter 42.23 RCW. Appellant claims the burden of proof in an election contest should rest on the contestant to prove by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that a candidate is ineligible under RCW 35 A. 12.030 and that this ineligibility materially affected the outcome of the election.[25] He further claims that under this burden and standard of proof, the trial court erred with respect to 21 findings of fact and in concluding as a matter of law that Appellant did not satisfy the one-year residence requirement of RCW 35 A. 12.030.[26] In the alternative, Appellant claims the word "resident" under RCW 35 A. 12.030 is unconstitutionally vague so as to void the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[27] "It is well-established law that an unchallenged finding of fact will be accepted as a verity upon appeal."[28] This Court will review only findings of fact to which error has been assigned.[29] The challenged findings will be binding on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.[30] "Substantial evidence exists where there is a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding."[31] The findings of fact in this case identify six different addresses at which Appellant could have established his "residence" under RCW 35 A. 12.030.[32] Of these addresses, only three are within the city limits of Wenatchee: (1) 1350 Brown Street, Unit D; (2) 620 South Wilson Street; and (3) 611 North Wenatchee Avenue.[33] Finding of fact 90 indicates Appellant "resided at 1350 Brown Street, Unit `D,' within the city limits of the City of Wenatchee, continuously from August 2, 1999, to the present."[34] This finding is not challenged and thus is considered a verity. Appellant listed the Wilson Street address and the North Wenatchee Avenue address in his declaration of candidacy filed July 26, 1999.[35] On December 9, 1999, he signed under oath an affidavit stating: "In November 1998, I moved into a house owned by my brother-in-law, Michael D. Wood, located at 620 South Wilson in Wenatchee. I lived in that house until August 2, 1999 ...."[36] Finding of fact 48 indicates Appellant admitted at trial he never lived at 620 South Wilson Street despite his sworn affidavit and finding of fact 75 indicates he never lived at that address. Neither finding was challenged by Appellant. They are thus treated as verities. *829 Appellant now claims he lived exclusively at 611 North Wenatchee Avenue in Wenatchee from November 2, 1998 to August 2, 1999. He takes exception to findings of fact which state he "resided" approximately eight miles outside the city of Wenatchee at 3496 Marlette Place in Malaga, Washington during that period.[37] It is not disputed that Appellant was a resident of the City of Wenatchee for the three-month period from August 2, 1999 to November 2, 1999. But the real question in dispute in this case is whether Appellant was a resident of the City of Wenatchee for the nine month period from November 2, 1998 to August 2, 1999 to satisfy the one-year residence requirement under RCW 35 A. 12.030. The following chart illustrates the critical dates, the unchallenged finding of fact concerning residence, the challenged finding of fact concerning residence, and the disputed claim of residence by Appellant: In Lawrence v. City of Issaquah, appellant challenged the constitutionality of the one-year residence requirement under RCW 35 A. 12.030.[38] This Court concluded the requirement did not violate the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the fundamental constitutional right to travel and the First Amendment rights of political association and freedom of expression.[39] In upholding its constitutionality under the equal protection clause, this Court stated: Appellant nonetheless claims RCW 35 A. 12.030 is unconstitutional because the word "resident" in the statute is vague.[41] "A statute is void for vagueness if it is framed in terms so vague that persons `of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to ensure that citizens receive fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed, and to prevent the law from being arbitrarily enforced."[42] The prohibition against vague laws, however, is not absolute because some measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of language.[43] "Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language."[44] "Consequently, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which [that person's] actions would be classified as prohibited conduct."[45] RCW 29.01.140 defines the word "residence" by these words: "`Residence' for the purpose of registering and voting means a person's permanent address where he physically resides and maintains his abode...." Title 35A of the Revised Code of Washington, however, does not define the word "resident" as used in RCW 35 A. 12.030. In the absence of a statutory definition, this Court stated: Even if it is determined to be elastic, ambiguous and undefined, the word "resident" does not render RCW 35 A. 12.030 unconstitutionally vague. The Washington Constitution uses the word "residence" without defining it.[47] Unchallenged findings of fact also indicate Appellant had fair notice of the meaning of the word. Finding of fact 40 states that "In July 1999, Mr. Schoessler asked his former wife, Ms. Patti Schoessler, who resides at 32 Harrison Street in the City of Wenatchee, if he could use her address because he needed to be a resident of Wenatchee for at least one year." Finding of fact 41 states that "Mr. Schoessler asked Ms. Patti Schoessler to falsify information about his residency." The meaning of "resident" under RCW 35 A. 12.030 is measured against the purpose of the one-year residence requirement to allow "the candidate `to be exposed to the needs and problems of the people' of the particular city."[48] The meaning need not achieve "mathematical certainty" but depends upon either a narrow or broad construction of the term. In Dumas v. Gagner, this Court favored a broad construction of *831 the word "resides" under RCW 53.12.010(1) because of the strong public policy in favor of eligibility for public office and the unique facts of that case.[49] Appellant Sue Frost in the Dumas case physically resided in a house located on one of three contiguous lots which she owned and considered as one residential property. The lot on which her house was located was not in the commissioner district she was elected to represent,[50] but the two other lots were in the district she was elected to represent.[51] Although the lots were transected by a political boundary line, appellant relied in good faith, "[t]hrough no fault of her own," on the county auditor's erroneous assignment of precinct.[52] This Court concluded that, given the limited factual context presented in Dumas, a narrow construction of the word "resides" would not serve the purpose of the residence requirement under RCW 53.12.010(1)(a) in achieving geographic balance on the Port of Kennewick Commission.[53] Unlike Dumas, this case has no facts which would justify a broad construction of the word "resident" under RCW 35 A. 12.030. There is no claim of contiguity of the addresses. The address of 3496 Marlette Place in Malaga, Washington is approximately eight miles outside the city limits of Wenatchee.[54] Appellant did not exercise good faith compliance with the residence requirement when he asked his former wife to falsify information about his residence.[55] He also did not exercise good faith compliance when he filed a sworn affidavit on December 9, 1999 stating he lived at 620 South Wilson Street, but later admitted at trial he never lived at that address.[56] Under the facts in this case, the question arises whether any construction of "residence" under RCW 35 A. 12.030 would reasonably include a computer file server room at Appellant's business address at 611 North Wenatchee Avenue in Wenatchee, from which Appellant was seen emerging only one or several mornings during a ten-month period. Appellant argues the burden of proof of his nonresidence is upon the parties contesting the election and that they must overcome a presumption of eligibility for public office by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. While announcing a strong public policy in favor of eligibility, this Court has not directly addressed the burden of proof and standard of proof in an election contest. But RCW 29.65.050 relating to hearings in election contests states in part: (Emphasis added). By its plain language, this statute does not limit proofs simply to one party, although it provides for dismissal if the statement of the cause is "insufficient." The burden of proof in any case is typically on the plaintiff.[57] That being so, the party contesting an election under RCW 35 A. 12.030 bears the initial burden of proving a successful candidate did not satisfy the one-year residence requirement. In this case, the finding of fact is unchallenged that Appellant established his residence in Malaga, Washington in 1989. But the evidence that he changed his residence to a Wenatchee address before August 2, 1999 was in dispute and not established before the court trial. Petitioners Dr. Brown and Reverend Groseclose established by overwhelming evidence that Appellant did not satisfy the requirement of RCW *832 35 A. 12.030 for residence in the City of Wenatchee one year prior to November 2, 1999. We need not address the standard of proof in this case because of these unchallenged findings of fact determined by the trial court: Appellant was not a resident of the City of Wenatchee for a period of at least one year next preceding his election on November 2, 1999; 611 North Wenatchee Avenue is the address of Appellant's business CRCWNET in Wenatchee, Washington; the computer file server room at that address has dimensions of 15 feet by 20 feet; until July 1999, Appellant's residential telephone records, cellular telephone records and one of four electric utility bills were sent to his address in Malaga, Washington and not to an address in Wenatchee, Washington; until July 14, 1999, Appellant's driver's license and voter registration showed his address as Malaga, Washington and not Wenatchee, Washington; until July 1999, Appellant exercised visitation rights with his son, Cameron Schoessler, by transporting him or having others transport him to 3496 Marlette Place in Malaga, Washington; Chelan County Deputy Sheriff Ken Varichak testified that on April 2, 1999, Appellant stated his address was Malaga, Washington and not Wenatchee, Washington; Appellant's 1998 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return Form 1040, prepared and filed in 1999, showed his address as Malaga, Washington and not Wenatchee, Washington; Appellant's automobile insurance policy records and homeowner's insurance policy records indicated his address as Malaga, Washington and not Wenatchee, Washington; Jerry Isenhart and Jim Martin testified that in telephone conversations between January 1999 and June 1999, Appellant referred to his "home in Malaga"; and Ms. Joyce Davis, Tim Finnigan and Marcus Knemeyer gave testimony which provided a strong inference that Appellant lived in Malaga, Washington from November 2, 1998 to July 1999. Under these unchallenged findings of fact and our narrow construction of the word "resident," Dr. Brown and Reverend Groseclose established without question that Appellant was not a resident of the City of Wenatchee from November 2, 1998 to August 2, 1999. Appellant did not convince the trial court that he changed his residence from Malaga, Washington to Wenatchee, Washington before August 2, 1999. He relied upon his own testimony and that of his present wife, Ms. Jo Schoessler, his son Andrew Schoessler and business partner Shawn Osborn to establish his claim that he did not live in Malaga, Washington, but instead lived in Wenatchee, Washington.[58] Mr. Osborn may have observed Appellant several times in the morning looking "like he was pretty well tired or just woke up," but he never saw Appellant actually sleeping in the server room at 611 North Wenatchee Avenue in Wenatchee. Testimony of Appellant's current wife, Ms. Jo Schoessler, and his son, Andrew Schoessler, was inconsistent with unchallenged finding of fact 10 that on June 13, 1999 "Andrew Schoessler stated to Officer Paul Hughes of the Wenatchee Police Department that both his address and his father's address [was] 3496 Marlette Place, Malaga, Washington." Because of the narrow construction we apply to the word "resident" in this case, and the unchallenged findings of fact, we conclude the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that Appellant Gary L. Schoessler was ineligible to serve as mayor of the City of Wenatchee because he did not satisfy the residence requirement under RCW 35 A. 12.030 that he reside in the City of Wenatchee for one year prior to the election on November 2, 1999. Appellant was nine months short of satisfying that requirement. It was established without dispute that he did reside in the City of Wenatchee beginning August 2, 1999, only three months prior to the election on November 2, 1999. The trial court was correct in annulling and setting aside Appellant's election as mayor of the City of Wenatchee. The one-year residence requirement under RCW 35 A. 12.030 is stated by these words: "No person shall be eligible to hold elective office under the mayor-council plan unless *833 the person is a registered voter of the city at the time of filing his declaration of candidacy and has been a resident of the city for a period of at least one year next preceding his election." RCW 35 A. 12.030 is not unconstitutionally vague simply because the word "resident" is not defined. Its meaning need not achieve mathematical certainty but is measured against the purpose of RCW 35 A. 12.030 to allow a candidate to be exposed to the needs and problems of the people of a particular city. Unchallenged findings of fact establish that Appellant had fair notice and was aware of the meaning of the word "resident" and its significance to his eligibility for election to the office of mayor. The word "resident" lends itself to either a broad or narrow construction. There are no findings of fact in this case to justify a broad construction of the word. We therefore give the word a narrow construction. The question arises whether any construction of "resident" or "residence" under RCW 35 A. 12.030 would include a computer file server room at Appellant's business address at 611 North Wenatchee Avenue in Wenatchee, Washington. We think not. In this case, unchallenged finding of fact 63 indicates Appellant established his residence in Malaga, Washington in 1989. He established only that he changed his residence to 1350 Brown Street, Unit D, in Wenatchee, Washington on August 2, 1999. He did not, however, establish a change of his residence from the Malaga address to 611 North Wenatchee Avenue or any other address in Wenatchee, Washington before November 2, 1998, the date one year prior to the election on November 2, 1999. Petitioners Dr. Sanford W. Brown and Reverend Kelvin B. Groseclose by overwhelming evidence established before the trial court that Appellant was not a resident of any address in the City of Wenatchee from November 2, 1998 to August 2, 1999. The unchallenged findings of fact and a narrow construction of "resident" indicate Appellant was nine months short of satisfying the one-year residence requirement of RCW 35 A. 12.030. The trial court was correct in concluding as a matter of law that Appellant was ineligible to serve as mayor of the City of Wenatchee. We affirm the decision of the Chelan County Superior Court which annulled and set aside the election of Appellant Gary L. Schoessler as mayor of the City of Wenatchee. We set aside the stay of enforcement granted by the trial court and the temporary stay granted by the Supreme Court Commissioner, effective upon filing this opinion. GUY, C.J., JOHNSON, ALEXANDER, TALMADGE, SANDERS, IRELAND, and BRIDGE, JJ., concur. MADSEN, J., concurs in result only. [1] Clerk's Papers at 107. Appellant claims XXX-XXX-XXXX is his personal telephone number at 611 North Wenatchee Avenue in Wenatchee. Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Gary L. Schoessler at 36-37, December 23, 1999. [2] Clerk's Papers at 78. [3] Id. at 38. [4] Id. at 104-132. [5] Id. at 104, Affidavit of Error or Omission of Electors Sanford W. Brown and Kelvin B. Groseclose (RCW 29.65.020). [6] Id. at 8. [7] Report of Proceedings at 275, December 28, 1999. Appellant's business, CRCWNET (formerly Computer Resource Center) is located at 611 North Wenatchee Avenue, Wenatchee, Washington. [8] Clerk's Papers at 19 n. 1 (citing Lawrence v. City of Issaquah, 84 Wash. 2d 146, 524 P.2d 1347 (1974)). [9] Id. at n. 2 (citing State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wash. 2d 888, 902 n. 10, 969 P.2d 64 (1998)). [10] Id. at n. 3. [11] Id. at n. 4 (citing Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 444, 174 P.2d 790 (1946)). [12] Id. at 20 n. 5 (citing Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d at 445, 174 P.2d 790). [13] Id. at n. 6 (citing Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d at 444, 174 P.2d 790). [14] Id. at n. 7 (citing Dumas v. Gagner, 137 Wash. 2d 268, 283-284, 971 P.2d 17 (1999)). [15] Id. at n. 8 (citing Dumas v. Gagner, 137 Wash. 2d at 284, 971 P.2d 17). [16] Id. at n. 9 (citing Dumas v. Gagner, 137 Wash. 2d at 283-84, 971 P.2d 17). [17] Id. at n. 10 (citing Freund v. Hastie, 13 Wash. App. 731, 734, 537 P.2d 804 (1975), review denied, 86 Wash. 2d 1001 (1975)). [18] Id. at n. 11. [19] Id. at n. 12. [20] Id. at 8-21. [21] Id. at 25-27. [22] Report of Proceedings at 14-15, Court's Oral Decision, December 28, 1999. [23] Clerk's Papers at 6-7. [24] The record does not contain an order specifically granting direct review. However, the Supreme Court Commissioner on January 24, 2000 issued a ruling granting a temporary stay and setting an expedited briefing schedule for appeal. The Supreme Court Clerk considers this as an order granting direct review. [25] Brief of Appellant at 25-32. [26] Id. at 32-51. Appellant highlights findings of fact 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 39, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76 and 77 in his brief. [27] Id. at 51-54. [28] State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). [29] Id. at 647, 870 P.2d 313. [30] Id. [31] Id. at 644, 870 P.2d 313. [32] The six different locations are: (1) 1350 Brown Street, Unit D; (2) 620 South Wilson Street; (3) 611 North Wenatchee Avenue; (4) 3496 Marlette Place; (5) 1808 Rogers Drive; and (6) Appellant's boat on Lake Chelan. Clerk's Papers at 8, 10-11. [33] See id. at 8, 11. Two of the six addresses are 1808 Rogers Drive which is "outside the city limits of Wenatchee" (finding of fact 3) and 3496 Marlette Place in Malaga, Washington, which "is approximately eight miles outside the city limits of Wenatchee, Washington." (finding of fact 20). [34] Clerk's Papers at 18. [35] Id. at 107. [36] Id. at 14 (Emphasis added). [37] Brief of Appellant at 1. See findings of fact 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 39, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76 and 77. [38] 84 Wash. 2d 146, 147, 524 P.2d 1347 (1974). Former RCW 35 A. 12.030 (1967) provided in part: "No person shall be eligible to hold elective office under the mayor-council plan unless he shall have been a registered voter and resident of the city for a period of at least one year next preceding his election." Id. at 149, 524 P.2d 1347 (emphasis added). [39] Id. at 149-52, 524 P.2d 1347. [40] Id. at 150-51, 524 P.2d 1347. [41] Brief of Appellant at 51-54. [42] Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 117 Wash. 2d 720, 739-40, 818 P.2d 1062 (1991) (citations omitted). [43] Id. at 740, 818 P.2d 1062 (concluding that RCW 18.130.180(1) was not unconstitutionally vague even with its use of the uncertain term "moral turpitude"). [44] Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972) (quoted in Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 117 Wash. 2d at 740, 818 P.2d 1062). [45] City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash. 2d 22, 27, 759 P.2d 366 (1988). [46] Dumas v. Gagner, 137 Wash. 2d 268, 286, 971 P.2d 17 (1999) (interpreting the word "resides" as used in RCW 53.12.010(1)(a)) (citations omitted). [47] Const. art. 6, § 4. [48] Dumas v. Gagner, 137 Wash. 2d at 287, 971 P.2d 17 (citations omitted). [49] Id. at 283, 294, 971 P.2d 17. [50] Id. at 276-78, 971 P.2d 17 (distinguishing Lot One from Lots Five and Six). [51] Id. at 283, 971 P.2d 17. [52] Id. at 290, 294, 971 P.2d 17. [53] Id. at 287, 294, 971 P.2d 17. [54] See Clerk's Papers at 11, Unchallenged finding of fact 20. [55] See id. at 13, Unchallenged findings of fact 41. [56] See id. at 14, Unchallenged findings of fact 47 and 48. [57] 5 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 301.2 (4th ed.1999). [58] Brief of Appellant at 33-39.