Title: State of Florida v. Joseph Eugene McFadden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-1755
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1755 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,   
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JOSEPH EUGENE MCFADDEN,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 7, 2010] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
The State seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in McFadden v. State, 15 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), on the grounds that it 
expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of this Court in State v. Evans, 
770 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2000).1  The issue before this Court is whether Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(B) requires the State to disclose to a defendant 
an oral, unrecorded witness statement if that statement does not materially change 
                                          
 
1.  The State also asserts conflict with the decisions of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in both Burkes v. State, 946 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), and 
Olson v. State, 705 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), and the decision of the Third 
District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State, 545 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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a prior recorded statement previously provided to the defendant by the State.  We 
hold that, pursuant to Evans, rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) does not apply to such oral, 
unrecorded statements.  Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Joseph McFadden was charged with three felony counts arising out of an 
armed robbery that occurred on April 20, 2007.  At trial, the defense called 
McFadden‟s sister, who testified that there had never been a gun in the house she 
shared with McFadden.  McFadden, 15 So. 3d at 756.  It was the first time 
McFadden‟s sister had ever made this claim on record.  In fact, the only recorded 
statement McFadden‟s sister ever made regarding a gun, prior to testifying at trial, 
was during her deposition, when she merely stated that McFadden was not carrying 
a shotgun when he entered the house on the evening of the armed robbery.  In her 
deposition, she was not asked and made no claims regarding whether there had 
ever been a gun in the house, or whether she had ever reported a gun being in the 
house. 
The State, surprised by McFadden‟s sister‟s testimony at trial, called a 
sheriff‟s deputy on rebuttal to testify regarding a prior inconsistent verbal 
statement McFadden‟s sister had made.  See id.  The deputy testified that 
McFadden‟s sister had spoken with him on the day before the armed robbery to 
report her concern about a shotgun McFadden was keeping in their house.  Id.  The 
 
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defense immediately objected to this testimony, but the trial court overruled the 
objection and allowed the deputy to testify regarding this prior conversation.  Id.  
McFadden was ultimately convicted on all counts and received a life sentence. 
On appeal to the Fourth District, McFadden argued that the State had 
violated discovery required by rule 3.220(b)(1)(B), by not disclosing his sister‟s 
oral statement before trial.  The State argued that disclosure was unnecessary 
because the oral statement was never written or otherwise recorded and therefore 
was not subject to the disclosure requirements of the rule.  Id. at 757.  The Fourth 
District agreed with McFadden that the nondisclosure was a discovery violation, 
concluding that “the State‟s failure to disclose the substance of the detective‟s 
testimony was directly contrary to the purpose and spirit of [rule 3.220(b)(1)(B)].”  
Id.  The Fourth District explained that, accordingly, the trial court should have 
conducted a Richardson2 hearing to determine the effect of this discovery violation, 
and McFadden was granted a new trial.  See id. at 757-58.  The State sought 
review of the decision of the Fourth District in this Court. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) requires the State to disclose to the defendant “the 
statement of any person” who is a witness as defined by rule 3.220(b)(1)(A).  The 
types of statements subject to disclosure are defined as follows: 
                                          
 
2.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
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The term “statement” as used herein includes a written statement 
made by the person and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by 
the person and also includes any statement of any kind or manner 
made by the person and written or recorded or summarized in any 
writing or recording.  The term “statement” is specifically intended to 
include all police and investigative reports of any kind prepared for or 
in connection with the case, but shall not include the notes from which 
those reports are compiled[.]  
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B).3 
On its face, the rule does not include unrecorded oral statements.  
Additionally, this Court in Evans discussed the meaning of rule 3.220(b)(1)(B), 
and whether it applies to oral witness statements that have not been written or 
recorded:  
Courts construing rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) have determined that the 
State is not required to disclose to the defendant a witness‟s oral 
statement when such statement has not been reduced to writing or 
recorded in a manner prescribed by the rule.  See, e.g., Olson v. State, 
705 So. 2d 687, 690-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (stating that the clear 
implication of rule 3.220(b)(1)(B) is that witness statements “if not 
written or recorded, are not discoverable”); Johnson v. State, 545 So. 
2d 411, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (determining that State was not 
required to disclose to the defendant an oral, unrecorded statement 
made by a state witness to the prosecutor); Whitfield v. State, 479 So. 
2d 208, 215-16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (determining that witness‟s oral 
statements to prosecutor after suppression hearing were not 
discoverable, in part because such statements were not written or 
recorded); cf. Watson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1159, 1163-64 (Fla. 1994) 
(determining that oral statement made by State‟s expert witness was 
not discoverable, as it was not a “statement” as defined in rule 
3.220(a)(1)(ii) (1988), the predecessor to current rule 3.220(b)(1)(B)).  
 
                                          
 
3.  We review the district courts‟ construction of a procedural rule de novo.  
Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 975 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (Fla. 2008).  
 
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Evans, 770 So. 2d at 1180.  Acknowledging this settled interpretation of rule 
3.220(b)(1)(B), we recognized an exception in Evans that requires disclosure when 
“the oral statement materially alters a prior written or recorded statement 
previously provided by the State to the defendant.”  Id.  We explained that, 
ordinarily, “unlike failure to name a witness, changed testimony does not rise to 
the level of a discovery violation and will not support a motion for a Richardson 
inquiry.”  Id. at 1178 (quoting Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1984)).  
However, when a witness is “transformed from a witness who „didn‟t see anything‟ 
into an eyewitness—indeed, apparently the only eyewitness—to the [crime,] . . . 
the State‟s nondisclosure of the changes . . . was tantamount to failing to name a 
witness at all” and therefore warranted a Richardson hearing.  Id. at 1182. 
But the limited exception set forth in Evans is not applicable to this case, 
where the oral statement at issue occurred before McFadden‟s sister made any 
recorded case-related statements.  In fact, the prior oral statement to the deputy, 
which was never recorded in any manner, was made before the events underlying 
this case arose.  Moreover, the oral statement that McFadden kept a shotgun in the 
house was not a material departure from any recorded statement McFadden‟s sister 
had made and was certainly not a radical change in testimony, as was the basis for 
requiring disclosure in Evans.  Rather, in her deposition, McFadden‟s sister stated 
only that McFadden was not carrying a shotgun when he entered the house on the 
 
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evening of the armed robbery.  She made no claims regarding whether a gun had 
ever been present in the house.  And because the earlier oral statement was not 
inconsistent with anything McFadden‟s sister said in her deposition or in any other 
recorded statement, it did not “materially alter[] a prior written or recorded 
statement previously provided by the State to the defendant.”  Id. at 1180.  
Therefore, according to Evans, the State was not required to disclose the oral 
statement to McFadden.   
Florida district courts have repeatedly held, consistent with Evans, that rule 
3.220(b)(1)(B) does not require the State to disclose a witness‟s oral statement 
when that statement was not written or recorded.  See, e.g., Burkes, 946 So. 2d at 
37; Olson, 705 So. 2d at 691; Johnson, 545 So. 2d at 412.  “To do otherwise would 
require the prosecutor to record and disclose virtually any case[-]related 
conversation . . . .”  Burkes, 946 So. 2d at 37.  As the Fifth District has explained, 
when information from a witness is not a statement as defined by rule 
3.220(b)(1)(B), “the State [i]s under no obligation to disclose” the information if 
that information is “not Brady4 material and [i]s not a material alteration to an 
existing written or recorded statement previously provided by the State to the 
defendant.”  Id. at 36-37.  In such circumstances of nondisclosure by the State, “no 
                                          
 
4.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the State must 
disclose material information within the State‟s possession or control that tends to 
negate the guilt of the defendant).  
 
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discovery violation [has] occurred and, consequently, there [i]s no need to conduct 
a Richardson hearing.”  Id. at 37.  Likewise, we hold that no discovery violation 
occurred here; therefore, there was no need for the trial court to conduct a 
Richardson hearing.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Applying our precedent in Evans, we quash the decision of the Fourth 
District and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., dissenting with an opinion. 
PARIENTE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., dissenting. 
 
Common sense suggests that this case presents an issue of concern and 
raises many unanswered questions.  Mr. McFadden was charged with crimes which 
involved the use and possession of a firearm.  He presented a theory of self-defense 
that included a statement by his sister that a firearm had never been possessed 
within the residence where the crimes allegedly occurred.  Suddenly, in the midst 
of trial, the State surprisingly presented previously undisclosed statements through 
the testimony of a police officer, who was not only known but also conveniently 
 
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and immediately accessible to the State for the very purpose of impeaching the 
statements of the sister.  Moreover, on appeal, the State conceded that the 
prosecutor was aware of prior statements by the sister with regard to firearms, and 
when the sister testified that there had never been a firearm in the residence, the 
prosecutor instantly stated, “That opens the door.”  As a representative of the State 
of Florida, a prosecutor‟s interest is not simply to win cases but to ensure that the 
law is applied fairly and justly.  See Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1145 (Fla. 
2006) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  Thus, it is 
confounding that the State now asserts that there is nothing wrong with the 
situation that occurred during this trial.   
Regardless of whether the statement was revealed during rebuttal, common 
sense dictates that this type of statement should not be disclosed for the first time 
during trial in a courtroom without the trial court conducting an inquiry as to 
whether a discovery violation occurred.  This Court has consistently held that the 
chief purpose of the rules of discovery is to facilitate the truth-finding function of 
our justice system and to prevent trial by surprise or ambush.  See Scipio, 928 So. 
2d 1138 at 1144; State v. Evans, 770 So. 2d 1174, 1182 (Fla. 2000); Binger v. 
King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Fla. 1981); Kilpatrick v. State, 376 So. 
2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1979).   Accordingly, once a possible discovery violation is 
brought to the attention of the trial court, the court can properly exercise its 
 
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discretion only after it has made an adequate inquiry into all of the surrounding 
circumstances.  See Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla. 1971) (quoting 
Ramirez v. State, 241 So. 2d 744, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)); see also Sears v. 
State, 656 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing Lowery v. State, 610 So. 2d 
657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); D.R. v. State, 588 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)).  In 
holding that a harmless error analysis applies to the failure to conduct an adequate 
Richardson hearing, this Court noted that in the vast majority of cases, it is likely 
that an appellate court will be unable to determine from a cold record whether the 
error is harmless without the facts developed by a Richardson inquiry.  See State v. 
Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1019-1021 (Fla. 1995).  This is such a case.   
As noted by Judge Hazouri below,   
the error here was compounded by the failure of the trial judge to 
conduct a Richardson hearing.  When McFadden‟s counsel objected 
and asserted a discovery violation, the trial judge overruled the 
objection because he concluded the detective‟s testimony was rebuttal 
and, therefore, not subject to a discovery violation.  “There is neither a 
rebuttal nor impeachment exception to the Richardson rule.”  Elledge 
v. State, 613 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1993); see also Portner v. State, 
802 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing Elledge, 613 So. 2d 
at 436). 
McFadden v. State, 15 So. 3d 755, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (Hazouri, J., 
concurring specially) (footnote omitted).  The majority focuses on whether Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(B) requires the State to disclose oral, 
unrecorded witness statements if the statement does not materially change a prior 
 
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recorded statement previously provided to the defendant by the State.  This was not 
the basis for the trial court‟s ruling below.  The fundamental underpinnings of the 
majority‟s analysis rest on the assumption that this statement was never recorded.  
However, without an adequate inquiry by the trial court, it is impossible to 
establish whether this statement was, in fact, recorded in some form elsewhere, 
such as by the other officer who testified in the case.  Thus, it was necessary for the 
trial court to conduct a Richardson hearing to ascertain the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the statement to determine whether a violation 
occurred.     
Our system contains serious, fundamental flaws if we allow the State to play 
a disingenuous game of “hide the ball” without judicial inquiry into these actions.  
In my view, there are profound and concerning issues with the State possessing 
evidence that is damning to a defendant and not being required to disclose that 
evidence.  When a party faces trial, it is necessary to know whether a witness is 
going to provide ruinous and devastating evidence.  If we start down this path, 
parties will never know what statements they are required to produce.  Moreover, 
the decision of the majority foreshadows the inevitable and undesirable result that 
key statements will not be placed into writing or recorded as a means to avoid 
production through discovery.  It is the duty of the trial court to conduct hearings 
to ascertain and determine whether violations occur.    
 
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Accordingly, I must dissent and agree with the court below because the 
majority holds that a Richardson hearing was not required.   
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D08-2098 
 
 
(Martin County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Bureau 
Chief, Helen C. Hvizd and Myra J. Fried, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C. Geraghty, Assistant Public 
Defenders, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent