Title: Hill v. Cowan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90229
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2002

Docket No. 90229-Agenda 8-November 2001.
EUGENE HILL, Appellee, v. ROGER COWAN, Warden, Menard 
								Correctional Center, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 18, 2002.-Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing
December 2, 2002. 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of St.
Clair County granting a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eugene
Hill, an inmate at the Menard Correctional Center. In granting
Hill's petition, the circuit court held that the extended-term
sentencing provisions pursuant to which Hill was sentenced were
unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Because the circuit court's judgment declared
the sentencing statute invalid, the appeal was taken directly to our
court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). We now reverse.

BACKGROUND
	In May 1982, petitioner Eugene Hill pleaded guilty to the
offenses of attempted murder, rape, and armed robbery. The trial
court accepted his guilty pleas, convicted him of the offenses, and
subsequently imposed concurrent 50-year extended-term sentences
on each conviction. The court based the extended-term sentences
on its finding that the offenses were accompanied by
"exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2).
	Following imposition of sentence, petitioner moved to
withdraw his pleas of guilty and to vacate the judgments, which
motions were denied. The appellate court affirmed his convictions
and sentences (People v. Hill, No. 5-83-0573 (1985) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), and this court denied his
petition for leave to appeal. People v. Hill, 101 Ill. 2d 591 (1985).
His subsequent petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.) was denied,
and that denial was affirmed on appeal. People v. Hill, No.
5-91-0392 (1991) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23).
	Subsequently, in August 2000, petitioner initiated the instant
action under the Habeas Corpus Act (735 ILCS 5/10-101 et seq.
(West 2000)). He contended that he is entitled to immediate
release, because the extended-term portions of his sentences were
unconstitutional, in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
	The circuit court granted the petition. The court declared the
pertinent extended-term sentencing provisions to be
unconstitutional under Apprendi. Because petitioner had already
served three years more than the maximum nonextended term
sentences to which he could have been subjected, the court ordered
that he be discharged immediately. This appeal by the State
followed.

ANALYSIS
	In People v. Jackson, No. 91359 (April 18, 2002), this court
held that Apprendi-based sentencing challenges could not be
raised on direct appeal from a guilty plea. Jackson, slip op. at 7.
Although the instant case presents a different procedural posture,
we believe that the result we reach today is dictated by the
reasoning in Jackson. We need not repeat the entire analysis set
out in Jackson, but will briefly summarize the salient points that
supported our conclusion that a guilty plea waives Apprendi
concerns.
	In Jackson, we noted that the Supreme Court did not fashion
wholly new rights in Apprendi, but merely clarified the
applicability of the long-standing, well-established rights to a trial
by jury and to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson,
slip op. at 11. The Court held that these rights extended to all facts
necessary to establish the range of penalties potentially applicable
to the defendant. Jackson, slip op. at 7-8. In other words, a
defendant can only receive a sentence within the range of penalties
statutorily prescribed for the crime, all the elements of which he
has been proven guilty. The defendant has the right to demand that
he receive a trial by jury and that he be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of all elements of his crime.
	But as we observed in Jackson, by pleading guilty, a
defendant waives his rights to a jury trial and to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, slip op. at 8. A guilty plea is
intrinsically a relinquishment of the right to a trial, at which the
State would be put to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. There is no validity to the complaint that a defendant did
not "know" that he was waiving the right to have the State prove
enhancing factors beyond a reasonable doubt, because by pleading
guilty the defendant releases the State from proving anything
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, slip op. at 8-9. We do not
require the trial court to advise a defendant of all the elements of
the crime of which he stands accused before accepting a guilty
plea. See People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, 329-30 (1980). It is
sufficient that the court advise him of the nature of the crime; the
range of penalties to which he might subject himself by his plea;
his right to plead not guilty, if he so chooses; and that a guilty plea
would operate to waive his rights to a jury trial and to be
confronted with the witnesses against him. 177 Ill. 2d Rs.
402(a)(1) through (a)(4).
	In the instant case, as in Jackson, the underlying convictions
and sentences were based on a guilty plea. Unlike Jackson, in this
case petitioner has exhausted not only his direct appeal, but also
his post-conviction remedies. We find no reason to deviate in this
case from the holding of Jackson, and we hold that petitioner's
guilty plea forecloses him from raising an Apprendi challenge to
his sentences.
	Petitioner objects that such a holding would conflict with two
established principles of law. First, he notes that this court has
previously held that a defendant may challenge his sentence on
appeal from a guilty plea where the challenge goes to the court's
statutory authority to impose the sentence in question. Second, he
notes the rules that the constitutionality of a statute may be
challenged at any time and that unconstitutional statutes are said
to be void ab initio. He contends that notwithstanding his guilty
plea, his Apprendi-based arguments may be considered under
either of these two rules. We shall address these arguments in turn.
	It is true that a guilty plea does not waive an argument that the
court imposed a sentence beyond its statutory authority. See
People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409, 413 (1998); People v. Williams,
179 Ill. 2d 331, 333 (1997); People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 346 (1984). But a lack of statutory authority is not truly
defendant's argument in this case. If it were, it would be swiftly
brushed aside because the statutory scheme clearly did permit the
trial court to impose the sentences in question. See Ill. Rev. Stat.
1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (permitting court to impose
extended term upon finding that the offense was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty); par. 1005-8-2(2) (extended term for Class X felony is 30
to 60 years' imprisonment). It simply cannot be said that the trial
court imposed sentences for which it lacked statutory authority.
	Petitioner also argues that, although the statute did exist, it
was unconstitutional. This is the same, he contends, as having no
such statute at all, as unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio.
But this line of reasoning also falls short, not because of
procedural default (see People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 279
(2001) (constitutionality of a criminal statute may be assailed at
any time)); People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2000) (same),
but on its merits.
	The void ab initio doctrine only applies to statutes
unconstitutional on their face. As we explained in Jackson, the
statutes involved in this case-sections 5-5-3.2 and 5-8-2 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars.
1005-5-3.2, 1005-8-2, now codified at 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2,
5-8-2 (West 2000))-are not unconstitutional on their face.
	In our initial disposition of this case, we disposed of the void
ab initio argument by noting that we had upheld application of the
statutes in question in People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68 (2001).
However, on rehearing, petitioner protests that this reasoning does
not justify our result, because Ford involved section 5-8-2(a)(1)
of the Unified Code of Corrections, while the instant case involves
subsection (a)(2) of that statute. The point is valid. A statute need
not necessarily stand or fall unitarily; some subsections may be
constitutional and others not. See, e.g., McDougall v. Lueder, 389 Ill. 141, 155 (1945) (finding subsection 4(c) of the Community
Currency Exchange Act facially unconstitutional but upholding the
remainder of the statute). And the basis for our finding that there
was no Apprendi violation in Ford-the defendant had already been
found death-eligible at the time that the court imposed the
extended-term sentence-can only exist with respect to section
5-8-2(a)(1), which governs extended-term sentences for first
degree murder. A defendant cannot be found death-eligible with
respect to any other crime.
	Nevertheless, we find that section 5-8-2(a)(2) is not facially
unconstitutional. Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality, and courts must construe statutes in order to
uphold their constitutionality whenever reasonably possible.
Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309, 316 (2002). It is especially
difficult to successfully mount a facial challenge to a statute. The
fact that a statute may operate invalidly under some circumstances
is insufficient to establish facial invalidity; a statute is facially
unconstitutional only if " 'no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.' " (Emphasis added.) In re C.E.,
161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994), quoting United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100
(1987). Thus, so long as there exists a situation in which a statute
could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail.
	With respect to section 5-8-2(a)(2) of the Unified Code of
Corrections, there is such a situation. Consider a defendant who
commits a home invasion of a victim known to him to be over 60
years old. The defendant injures the victim when the victim arrives
home unexpectedly and the defendant strikes him once as he flees.
The defendant is charged with home invasion, a Class X felony
(720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 1998)), and also with aggravated
battery, with the specific aggravating factor being the age of the
victim (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(10)). He is found guilty of both
crimes. The circuit court rules that the aggravated battery
conviction merges into the home invasion conviction, but
sentences the defendant to an extended-term sentence based on the
victim's age (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2), 5-5-3.2(b)(4)(ii) (West
1998)).
	In this hypothetical, there would be no Apprendi violation.
See People v. Hopkins, 201 Ill. 2d 26 (2002) (finding no Apprendi
violation in an analogous fact pattern involving aggravated battery
and first degree murder). Apprendi merely requires the State to
prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt all facts underlying
the sentence imposed on the defendant. In the above hypothetical,
the jury has found all elements of the home invasion and-by the
guilty verdict on aggravated battery-the additional fact of the
victim's age. So, when the circuit court imposes an extended
sentence pursuant to section 5-8-2(a)(2) there is no Apprendi
violation, because all of the facts underlying the extended sentence
were proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
	Because a situation can be envisioned in which the statute can
be applied without running afoul of constitutional constraints, the
statute is not facially unconstitutional. C.E., 161 Ill. 2d  at 210-11.
Accordingly, the void ab initio doctrine does not apply to excuse
the waiver occasioned by petitioner's guilty plea in the instant
case.
	Since petitioner's facial challenge to the statute fails, can
petitioner as a final resort raise the narrower challenge that the
statute is unconstitutional as applied to him? Yes, but this
challenge is what petitioner's guilty plea forecloses. The statutory
scheme was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant because
by pleading guilty defendant waived the constitutional rights he
now seeks to invoke. In so holding, we note that we are using the
term waiver to signify the "voluntary relinquishment of a known
right," not as a shorthand for "procedural default by failing to
bring an error to the attention of the trial court." Petitioner cannot
now complain of a purported deprivation of rights which he
voluntarily and fully abandoned in the earlier proceedings. This is
analogous to the rule that one cannot complain of error which he
induced or in which he participated at trial. See, e.g., People v.
Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209 (2001); People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000) ("it is well established that 'an accused may not
ask the trial court to proceed in a certain manner and then contend
in a court of review that the order which he obtained was in
error' "), quoting People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992).
	Because petitioner's claims are either meritless or foreclosed
by his guilty plea, we need not discuss any remaining issues.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
reversed.



Reversed.
 
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:(1)
	There is no dispute that the extended-term provisions under
which Hill was sentenced are unconstitutional under Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348
(2000). The extended-term portion of Hill's sentence is therefore
void.  For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People
v. Jackson, No. 91359 (April 18, 2002), Hill's plea of guilty does
not foreclose him raising that issue. Accordingly, the judgment of
the circuit court should be affirmed, and Hill should be discharged
from State custody immediately.
	The justification employed by the majority to deny Hill relief
is no more sound here than it was when my colleagues first put it
forward in People v. Jackson, No. 91359. Illinois' extended-term
sentencing provisions are unconstitutional as applied to all
defendants save those who have been convicted of capital murder
and found death eligible. Because they are unconstitutional, they
are void ab initio. They do not have and never had any legal force
or effect. It is as if they never existed.
	Because the extended-term provisions never had any legal
effect, there was never any statutory authority for the extended-term sentence imposed on Hill. Where, as here, there is no
statutory authority for a sentence imposed by the trial court, the
sentence is void and may be attacked at any time, directly or
collaterally. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 510
(1998); People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).
	People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444 (2001), decided within the
last year, reiterated this point in circumstances directly analogous
to those before us today. We specifically held in that case that if a
trial court imposes an extended-term sentence that is not
authorized by law, the extended-term portion of the sentence is
void and is subject to attack in a collateral proceeding. Harvey,
196 Ill. 2d  at 447-48. The circuit court was therefore correct in
holding that Apprendi can be raised by defendants on collateral
review to challenge sentences imposed in cases which became
final before Apprendi was decided.
	Where a trial court imposes a sentence for which there is no
statutory authority, as the trial court did here, the fact that the
defendant chose to plead guilty does not foreclose him from
challenging the sentence. Indeed, the defendant is not only entitled
to contest the sentence, he may do so without first having to move
to have his guilty plea set aside. People v. Jackson, No. 91359, slip
op. at 15 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, Hill's plea of
guilty is not a bar to his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.(2)
	My colleagues attempt to meet this argument, as they did in
Jackson, by asserting that the void ab initio doctrine is
inapplicable where a statute is unconstitutional as applied, but not
unconstitutional on its face. The majority advanced no basis for
this distinction in Jackson and they offer none here.  They cannot.
There is none. See Jackson, No. 91359, slip op. at 15-16
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
	There is likewise no merit to the majority's claim that the
sentencing provisions cannot be deemed unconstitutional as
applied because Hill waived his rights when he pleaded guilty.
Slip op. at 4-5. The flaw in this argument is that it erroneously
equates the relinquishment of a constitutional right with the
absence of a constitutional violation. If the State has deprived a
defendant of a constitutional right, the violation exists whether the
defendant elects to challenge it or not. Waiver of the challenge
merely constrains the defendant's ability to obtain relief. It does
not eradicate the violation and it is not a limitation on the authority
of our court.
	Equally flawed is the majority's resort to analogies with the
rule regarding invited error. Contrary to my colleagues' view, Hill
cannot be said to have induced the unlawful extended-term
sentence imposed by the trial court when he pleaded guilty. When
Hill pleaded guilty he did not know and was not admonished that
he had the right to have the existence of the aggravating factors
tried by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt.  He
could not have known of these rights because Apprendi had not yet
been decided. Accordingly, this is not a situation where a
defendant is attempting to avail himself of error he helped create
or in which he knowingly acquiesced.
	The majority's analogy fails for another reason as well. If a
defendant invites or acquiesces in an unlawful sentence when he
pleads guilty, such invitation or acquiescence exists whether the
sentence is invalid because it is unconstitutional or invalid because
it is not authorized by statute. The cases are indistinguishable.
Accordingly, if we were to hold that a defendant's guilty plea
precludes him from challenging his sentence on the grounds that
it is unconstitutional, we would also be required to hold that a
guilty plea bars a defendant from challenging his sentence on the
grounds that it exceeds the trial court's authority. But that is not
the law. It is the exact opposite of the law.  Our court has
repeatedly held and recently reaffirmed that a plea of guilty does
not preclude a criminal defendant from challenging his sentence
where the basis for the challenge is that the sentence is void and
was beyond the trial court' statutory authority to impose. People
v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 280 (2001); People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331, 333 (1997).
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	The majority's invocation of the waiver doctrine is as
misplaced here as it was in People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286
(2002). As this court has recently and clearly stated:
		" 'Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is
clearly established that there was "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right ***." '
People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461,
1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938). Such waivers must not
only be voluntary, but must be ' "knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences." ' Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d  at 187, quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970)."
(Emphasis added.) People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 (2000).
It simply cannot be said that Hill knowingly relinquished his right
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when he had no notice, either
through the charging instrument or otherwise, that the "brutal and
heinous" element had to be submitted to the trier of fact. At the
time he pleaded guilty, Apprendi had not been decided. Under the
statutory scheme in place at that time, a finding of "brutal and
heinous" behavior could have, unconstitutionally, been made by
the judge.
	The majority cites People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, 329-30
(1980), for the proposition that before accepting a guilty plea we
do not require the trial court to advise a defendant of all elements
of a crime. Barker does not, however, stand for the proposition
that a defendant need not have notice of all the elements of a crime
in order for a subsequent guilty plea to be voluntary. In Barker we
only decided whether the trial court's admonishments were in
substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402. We never
reached the issue of notice. Indeed, this court held in Barker that
the charging instrument "adequately alleged the requisite intent to
kill" (Barker, 83 Ill. 2d at 329) and "intent to kill" was the element
that the defendant complained he had not been adequately
admonished of by the trial court. Thus, Barker had notice and that
case is inapposite to the case at hand. Simply put, in order for a
guilty plea to operate as a waiver of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of the elements of a crime or of facts enhancing the penalty,
a defendant, at minimum, must have notice of those elements or
enhancement factors.
 
 
1.      This dissent was filed when the majority opinion in this matter was
originally announced. However, by the time that opinion was modified
upon denial of rehearing, Chief Justice Harrison had retired from the
bench.

2.      Habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism for Hill to secure his
release. See Faheem-El v. Klincar, 123 Ill. 2d 291, 295 (1988). It is not,
however, the only sole means by which Hill could have contested the
extended-term portion of his sentence. Without deciding whether Hill
had the right to bring a successive petition under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000)) under the facts present
here, I note that he could also have sought relief under section 2-1401
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). 
Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d  at 447-48.