Title: United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S238544
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE 
AUBURN RANCHERIA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GAVIN C. NEWSOM, as Governor, etc., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S238544 
 
Third Appellate District 
C075126  
 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
34-2013-80001412CUWMGDS  
 
 
August 31, 2020 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kruger, and Fybel* concurred. 
 
                                        
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Justice Liu concurred. 
 
1 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE 
AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
S238544 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
This is a case about how California law applies to the 
delicate juncture of executive power, federalism, and tribal 
sovereignty.  Under the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA; 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.), the United States Secretary 
of the Interior (Interior Secretary) may permit casino-style 
gaming on certain land taken into federal trust for an Indian 
tribe, so long as the Governor of the state where the land is 
located concurs.  But nowhere in the California Constitution is 
the Governor granted explicit authority to concur in this 
cooperative-federalism scheme.  We must decide whether the 
Governor nonetheless has the authority to concur in the 
Interior Secretary’s determination to allow gaming on tribal 
trust land in California.1  
What we hold is that California law empowers the 
Governor to concur.  As amended in 2000, the California 
Constitution permits casino-style gaming under certain 
conditions on “Indian” and “tribal” lands — terms that 
                                        
1  
The action was brought against Governor Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr., who concurred in the Interior Secretary’s 
determination.  Because Governor Gavin C. Newsom has since 
assumed office, we have substituted him as the defendant and 
respondent.  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 368.5.)   
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
2 
encompass land where the Governor’s concurrence is required 
before casino-style gaming may occur.  Our decision is 
supported by the Governor’s historical practice of concurring 
under a variety of federal statutes, the legislatively enacted 
expectation that the Governor represent the state’s interests in 
negotiations or proceedings involving the federal government, 
and the absence of any explicit constitutional or statutory 
limits on the Governor’s power to concur in the Interior 
Secretary’s determination under IGRA.   
These markers of the legal terrain help us map a zone of 
twilight between the powers of the Governor and the 
Legislature.  But they also convey why legislative changes can, 
by bringing any implicit gubernatorial power to “its lowest ebb” 
in 
this 
domain, 
restrict 
or 
eliminate 
the 
Governor’s 
concurrence power.  (Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 343 
U.S. 579, 637 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.) (Youngstown).)  
Because the Legislature has imposed no such restriction, 
however, we conclude the Governor acted lawfully when he 
concurred in the Interior Secretary’s determination.  The Court 
of Appeal reached the same conclusion, so we affirm.   
I. 
 
The California Constitution specifically mentions casino-
style gaming, “federally recognized Indian tribes,” and lands 
that are “Indian” and “tribal” “in accordance with federal law.”  
(Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).)  As these provisions — like 
IGRA — were enacted against the backdrop of longstanding 
tribal efforts to establish casino-style gaming operations on 
land under their control, we begin with a survey of the relevant 
history. 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
3 
A. 
Long before this country’s founding, Indian tribes already 
existed as “self-governing sovereign political communities,” 
each with their own distinct lands.  (United States v. Wheeler 
(1978) 435 U.S. 313, 322–323.)  Tribes haven’t “possessed [] the 
full attributes of sovereignty” since the federal Constitution 
was signed, but they remain a “separate people, with the power 
of regulating their internal and social relations.”  (United 
States v. Kagama (1886) 118 U.S. 375, 381–382.)  Yet that 
power is bounded, too:  Under the Indian commerce clause of 
the United States Constitution, Congress possesses the 
“plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs” and to 
limit the powers that tribes otherwise possess.  (Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico (1989) 490 U.S. 163, 192.)  So 
the sovereignty of Indian tribes “is of a unique and limited 
character[:] It exists [] at the sufferance of Congress and is 
subject to complete defeasance” if and when Congress acts.  
(Wheeler, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 323.)    
These implicit contradictions have catalyzed conflicting 
expectations and struggles for power, with tribal gaming as a 
recurring flashpoint.  Gaming is a significant enterprise for 
Indian tribes — it “cannot be understood as . . . wholly 
separate from the Tribes’ core governmental functions.”  
(Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (2014) 572 U.S. 782, 
810 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).)  Gambling operations serve 
as a means for tribes “to assert their sovereign status and 
achieve economic independence.”  (Mason, Indian Gaming: 
Tribal Sovereignty and American Politics (2000) p. 4.)  It is 
partly symbolic:  “Gaming [] represents a stand for political 
independence as tribes assert their sovereign right to 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
4 
determine for themselves what they can control on tribal 
lands.”  (Ibid.)  But gaming also serves a practical function:  
Because of the limits placed on tribal governments’ ability to 
impose taxes, gaming “may be the only means by which a tribe 
can raise revenues.”  (Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal 
Courts (2004) 36 Ariz.St. L.J. 137, 169.)  In that sense, gaming 
operations are often essential to tribes’ economic self-
sufficiency.    
Yet from the start, federal and state governments sought 
to curtail gaming on Indian land.  (See Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, Hearing before House Com. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs on H.R. No. 964 and H.R. No. 2507, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess., at p. 158 (1987), written testimony of Sen. 
Reid [unless Indian gaming is regulated, “the hope for 
controlling organized crime in this country will be lost 
forever”].)  To prevent the perverse consequences some 
legislators believed would arise from such activities, Congress 
enacted legislation such as the Johnson Act of 1951 (15 U.S.C. 
§ 1175(a)), which outlawed the manufacture, possession, or use 
of gambling devices, and the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970 (18 U.S.C. § 1955), which made it a federal offense to 
engage in any for-profit gambling business that was prohibited 
under state law.    
Because of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs, 
states initially lacked the authority to regulate tribal gaming.  
But in 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280, which 
empowered six states — including California — to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over Indian land.  (18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326; 28 U.S.C. § 1360.)  When California 
sought to enforce its state gambling law — which permitted, 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
5 
subject to criminal penalties, gaming only when operated by 
certain charitable organizations with restrictions on prizes — 
against two Indian tribes, the tribes challenged the state’s 
power to do so.  The Supreme Court soon offered a partial 
answer to the question:  To what extent did states have 
jurisdiction to enforce their own laws against tribes?  Ruling in 
the tribes’ favor, the Court distinguished between laws that 
were “prohibitory” and those that were “regulatory”:  Although 
Congress had allowed states to enforce prohibitions on 
gambling against Indian tribes, it hadn’t bestowed states with 
“civil regulatory power over Indian reservations.”  (California 
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202, 210, 
208.)  Because California’s gambling law was regulatory in 
nature — “California regulates rather than prohibits gambling 
in general and bingo in particular” — the Court concluded that 
the state lacked the power to restrict tribal gaming.  (Id. at p. 
211.)  Following Cabazon, states couldn’t restrict or otherwise 
regulate Indian gaming operations unless they prohibited all 
gaming.  
B. 
Congress responded to Cabazon’s new strictures on state 
regulation of Indian gaming by enacting IGRA.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 2701 et seq.)  Following centuries of conflict over gaming 
between tribes, states, and the federal government, Congress’s 
purpose was to “balance the need for sound enforcement of 
gaming laws and regulations, with the strong Federal interest 
in preserving the sovereign rights of tribal governments to 
regulate activities and enforce laws on Indian land.”  (Sen.Rep. 
No. 100-446, 2d Sess., p. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News, p. 3075.)  To that end, IGRA divided 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
6 
gaming into three categories:  class I, class II, and class III.  
Class I gaming, those played for “prizes of minimal value,” 
would be regulated exclusively by Indian tribes.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(6).)  Class II gaming, which includes higher-stakes 
games such as bingo, was also under the control of Indian 
tribes, unless a state prohibited such gaming for any purpose.  
(25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(7)(A)(i), 2710.) 
This dispute concerns class III gaming.  All forms of 
gaming that aren’t covered by class I or class II gaming come 
within the ambit of class III — including casino-style games 
such as slot machines, roulette, and blackjack.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(8).)  Because class III gaming can be “a source of 
substantial revenue for the Indian tribes and a significant rival 
for traditional private sector gaming facilities,” its regulation 
“has been the most controversial part of [] IGRA and the 
subject of considerable litigation between various Indian tribes 
and the states.”  (Flynt v. California Gambling Control 
Commission (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1134.)  Before a 
tribe can conduct class III gaming, it must satisfy several 
requirements under IGRA — such as forming a tribal-state 
compact, in which the tribe and the state agree on issues 
surrounding tribal gaming operations.2 
                                        
2  
Class III gaming must also satisfy other requirements 
under IGRA:  It must be authorized by an ordinance or 
resolution adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe 
and the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission 
and located in a state that permits such gaming for any 
purpose by any person, organization, or entity.  These 
requirements are not at issue in this case.    
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
7 
IGRA also imposes additional requirements for Indian 
tribes wishing to conduct class III gaming on certain types of 
land.  The federal government has, throughout our nation’s 
history, adopted policies that have removed Indian tribes from 
their native reservations and radically reduced their land 
bases.  In an effort to rectify these past wrongs and to 
reconstitute these land bases, Congress enacted the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).  (25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.; 
see Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2019 ed.) 
§ 4.04(3)(a).)  The IRA allows the Interior Secretary to acquire 
and take land into trust for an Indian tribe.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 5108.)  Class III gaming on land taken into trust after 
October 17, 1988 — the date Congress enacted IGRA — may 
occur only under certain conditions set forth in the federal 
statute.  The condition at issue here requires that the Interior 
Secretary, “after consultation with the Indian tribe and 
appropriate State and local officials, . . . determine[] that a 
gaming establishment on [those] acquired lands would be in 
the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and 
would not be detrimental to the surrounding community.”  (25 
U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).)  “[T]he Governor of the State in which 
the gaming” will occur must also “concur[] in the [Interior] 
Secretary’s determination.”  (Ibid.)    
C. 
In 2002, the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians (the 
Enterprise Tribe) made a request culminating in the 
gubernatorial concurrence at the heart of this case.  The tribe 
sought for the Interior Secretary to acquire land in Yuba 
County in trust on the tribe’s behalf so the Enterprise Tribe 
could build a casino featuring class III gaming.  Before taking 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
8 
the land into trust, the Interior Secretary determined that the 
proposed venue was in the best interest of the tribe and wasn’t 
detrimental to the surrounding community.  In accordance 
with IGRA’s requirements, the Interior Secretary notified the 
Governor in 2011 and sought his concurrence in the 
determination. 
Nearly a decade after the Enterprise Tribe’s initial 
request, in 2012, the Governor concurred.  He explained that 
conducting class III gaming on that land would “directly 
benefit” a “large tribal population” of “more than 800 native 
Californians who face serious economic hardship.”  (Governor 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., letter to Interior Secretary Kenneth L. 
Salazar, Aug. 30, 2012.)  The casino would “create jobs and 
generate revenue for Yuba County,” which had “a 16% 
unemployment rate” at the time.  (Ibid.)  On the same day he 
sent his concurrence letter, the Governor executed a tribal-
state gaming compact between the state and the Enterprise 
Tribe.  A few months later, the Interior Secretary took the land 
into trust for the Enterprise Tribe.   
United Auburn Indian Community owns and operates 
the Thunder Valley Casino Resort, located about 20 miles from 
the proposed site of the Enterprise Tribe’s casino.3  Believing 
                                        
3  
The Enterprise Tribe’s casino resort, the Hard Rock 
Hotel & Casino Sacramento at Fire Mountain, has since 
opened.  (See McGough, Ready to ‘Rock’: Hard Rock Hotel & 
Casino Sacramento unveils opening date, Sac. Bee (Sept. 6, 
2019)  [as of 
Aug. 28, 2020]; all Internet citations in this opinion are 
 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
9 
that the Governor’s concurrence was unlawful under state law, 
United Auburn filed a petition for a writ of mandate and 
complaint for injunctive relief.  The Governor demurred to the 
complaint, arguing that the California Constitution and state 
statutes empowered him to concur in the Interior Secretary’s 
determination, and that his concurrence didn’t violate the 
separation of powers.  The superior court sustained the 
demurrer and entered judgment in the Governor’s favor.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It rejected each of United 
Auburn’s contentions:  that the Governor lacked the power to 
concur under California law, that the Governor’s concurrence 
was a legislative act that violated the separation of powers, 
and that the Governor exceeded his authority by entering into 
compact negotiations for land that hadn’t yet been taken into 
trust by the Interior Secretary.  (United Auburn Indian 
Community of the Auburn Rancheria v. Brown (2016) 4 
Cal.App.5th 36, 54.)  Shortly after that decision, a different 
appellate court held that the Governor lacked the authority to 
concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination.  (Stand Up 
for California! v. State of California (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 686, 
705.)  We granted review to resolve the split.   
II. 
 
Under IGRA, the Interior Secretary may allow class III 
gaming on land the federal government takes into trust for an 
Indian tribe after IGRA was enacted if she determines that 
gaming would be in the best interest of the tribe and would not 
                                                                                                           
 
archived by year, docket number, and case name at 
.)  
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
10 
be detrimental to the surrounding community.  But it is only 
with the concurrence of the Governor from the state where 
gaming would occur that IGRA allows the Interior Secretary’s 
decision to take effect.  (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).)  What IGRA 
does not resolve is whether the Governor has a legal basis to 
concur; gubernatorial power arises from state constitutional 
and statutory authority.  Although the Governor’s “concurrence 
(or lack thereof) is given effect under federal law, [] the 
authority to act is provided by state law.”  (Confederated Tribes 
of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1997) 110 F.3d 688, 
697.)  So we must determine whether California law empowers 
the Governor to concur.4    
A. 
The power of the Governor is rooted in our state 
Constitution and further structured by statutes that must 
themselves conform to constitutional constraints.  (See 
generally Cal. Const., art. V; Professional Engineers in 
California Government v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
989, 1041.)  A brief history of gambling in California helps 
inform the scope of the Governor’s power in the sphere of tribal 
gaming.  
                                        
4  
That IGRA requires the Governor’s concurrence before 
class III gaming can occur on certain trust lands arguably 
demonstrates a legislatively enacted expectation that state 
governors generally possess the concurrence power.  It’s 
unlikely that lawmakers would require governors to exercise a 
concurrence power they believed they lacked.  Regardless of 
what federal lawmakers believed, however, it is in California 
law that the Governor must find authority.  
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
11 
The California Constitution, as enacted in 1849, 
prohibited lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets.  (Cal. Const. 
of 1849, art. IV, § 27.)  And when the Penal Code was enacted 
in 1872, it prohibited several activities that fall within the 
ambit of gambling, including slot machines, roulette, and — 
whatever it means — hokey-pokey.5  (Pen. Code, §§ 330, 330a.)  
Over time, however, our supreme charter has been amended 
several times to loosen those prohibitions.  In 1933, for 
example, an amendment to the Constitution authorized the 
Legislature to allow horse races and horse race wagering.  (Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (b).)  In 1976, the Constitution was 
amended again to authorize the Legislature to permit bingo 
gaming for charitable purposes.  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, 
subd. (c).)  And a 1984 constitutional amendment “authorized 
the establishment of a California State Lottery.”  (Cal. Const., 
art. IV, § 19, subd. (d).)  These exceptions did not, however, 
encompass the casino-style gaming at issue in this case.  
Indeed, “[i]n 1984, the people of California amended our 
Constitution to state a fundamental public policy against the 
                                        
5  
Just about the only thing that’s clear about the term 
“hokey-pokey” is that it wasn’t a reference to the traditional 
children’s dance song.  Former Attorney General of California 
Frederick Howser acknowledged that hokey-pokey “cannot be 
defined by consulting any standard reference work,” and even 
“[e]xhaustive research” had failed to yield any mention of the 
illicit game.  (“Stud-Horse Poker” and “Hokey-Pokey” Are Illegal 
Card Games, Healdsburg Tribune (Mar. 28, 1947) p. 7.)  It 
appears to have been a variation on poker.  (See Singsen, 
Where Will the Buck Stop on California Penal Code Section 
330: Solving the Stud-Horse Poker Conundrum (1988) 11 
Hastings Comm./Ent. L.J. 95, 138–139.)   
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
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12 
legalization in California of casino gambling.”  (Hotel 
Employees & Restaurant Employees Internat. Union v. Davis 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 589; see Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. 
(e).)  What the Constitution was amended to convey is that 
“[t]he Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall 
prohibit, casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and 
New Jersey.”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).)    
That prohibition lasted until 2000.  That year, California 
voters 
enacted 
Proposition 
1A, 
which 
amended 
the 
Constitution to give the Governor authority “to negotiate and 
conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, 
for the operation of slot machines and [other class III gaming] 
by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in 
California in accordance with federal law.”  (Cal. Const., art. 
IV, § 19, subd. (f).)  Notwithstanding the Constitution’s general 
restriction on casino-style gaming, Proposition 1A allowed that 
type of gaming “to be conducted and operated on tribal lands 
subject to [tribal-state] compacts.”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, 
subd. (f).)   
The parties agree that Proposition 1A provides the 
starting point for our analysis.  They also agree that 
Proposition 1A doesn’t expressly grant the Governor the power 
to concur — it only authorizes him “to negotiate and conclude 
compacts . . . for the operation of slot machines and [other class 
III gaming].”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).)  Where they 
differ in their views is whether the ballot initiative’s language, 
context, and history, taken together, prohibit the Governor 
from concurring, and whether the Governor’s concurrence 
violates the separation of powers.  
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
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13 
B. 
The Governor’s initial argument is a sweeping one:  He 
contends that, although Proposition 1A doesn’t expressly grant 
the Governor the power to concur, it nevertheless “presupposes 
that the Governor possesses [that] power.”  Because 
Proposition 1A allows casino-style gaming “in accordance with 
federal law,” and because federal law — IGRA — is designed 
on the premise that state governors may concur in the Interior 
Secretary’s determination to allow gaming on that land, the 
Governor argues that the California Constitution implicitly 
bestows on him the power to offer the requisite concurrence 
under IGRA.  Under the Governor’s proposed interpretation of 
Proposition 1A, the California Constitution allows gaming to 
the full extent that federal law permits it — and no other 
provision of state law restricts such gaming.  But this precise 
argument, we conclude, lacks support in the language of 
Proposition 1A.  Gubernatorial powers aren’t limited to 
explicitly enumerated grants of authority.  But given the 
preexisting, constitutionally enshrined policy against casino-
style gaming in California, the Governor fails to demonstrate 
that the most reasonable reading of Proposition 1A’s phrase “in 
accordance with federal law” is one automatically allowing him 
to exercise any conceivable power that IGRA contemplates 
governors may exercise over gaming.  Nor does anything in 
IGRA’s text, structure, or history suggest Congress sought to 
use federal authority — assuming it was enough to preempt 
state law in this manner — to unilaterally grant governors the 
power to concur.  So Proposition 1A’s mere reference to federal 
law does not, by itself, bestow the Governor with the 
concurrence power.   
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14 
That Proposition 1A, by itself, falls short of granting the 
Governor the power to concur does not resolve the question 
before us.  Even in the absence of an express grant of 
authority, each branch of government possesses certain 
inherent and implied powers.  (See Spear v. Reeves (1906) 148 
Cal. 501, 504.)  We’ve often discussed such powers in the 
context of the judiciary — courts possess an inherent power “to 
admit and to discipline attorneys” (In re Attorney Discipline 
System (1998) 19 Cal.4th 582, 592) and “ ‘to punish [parties] for 
contempt’ ” (Burns v. Superior Court of City and County of San 
Francisco (1903) 140 Cal. 1, 4).  The Legislature can wield 
certain implied and inherent powers as well, such as the power 
to investigate (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Padilla 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 486, 499) and the “power to create any 
agency it wishes unless the power is denied it by the 
Constitution” (County of Sonoma v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation etc. Com. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 361, 375, fn. 4 (dis. 
opn. of Mosk, J.)).  Some of the powers that inhere to the 
executive arise by implication, too.  It’s “well settled,” for 
example, that an executive officer “may exercise . . . powers as 
are necessary for the due and efficient administration of 
powers expressly granted by statute” or “may fairly be implied 
from the statute granting the powers.”  (Dickey v. Raisin 
Proration Zone (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 810, italics omitted.)  The 
Governor’s implied powers include the authority to add a 
reasonable condition to a prisoner’s pardon or commutation.  
(Ex parte Kelly (1908) 155 Cal. 39, 41.)      
United Auburn contends that even if inherent and 
implied powers are within the ambit of the Governor’s 
authority, the power to concur in the Interior Secretary’s 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
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15 
determination isn’t among them.  Its argument is rooted in 
article IV, section 19, subdivision (e) of the California 
Constitution — which, as United Auburn characterizes it, 
“states a broad and far-reaching prohibition on [casino-style] 
gaming.”  According to United Auburn, the Governor may not 
concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class 
III gaming on Indian land taken into trust because California 
law prohibits class III gaming. 
That argument, however, overlooks the pivotal role 
Proposition 1A plays in the story of how California has 
regulated gaming.  That ballot initiative amended the 
California Constitution to allow casino-style gaming “by 
federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands” and “on 
tribal lands” in California, “in accordance with federal law.”  
(Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f), italics added.)  United 
Auburn first urges us to construe this language as referring 
only to land for which the Governor’s concurrence isn’t 
required to conduct class III gaming.  So according to United 
Auburn, the voters enacting Proposition 1A would have 
understood they were allowing for casino-style gaming on 
Indian reservations, as well as on land taken into trust before 
IGRA was enacted and certain land taken into trust after 
IGRA was enacted — on which casino-style gaming may take 
place without the Governor’s concurrence — but not on land 
taken into trust after IGRA’s effective date if the Governor’s 
concurrence is required for class III gaming on such land.    
That assertion clashes with the meaning of Indian land 
under federal law.  IGRA defines “Indian lands” to include “any 
lands title to which is [] held in trust by the United States for 
the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual.”  (25 U.S.C. 
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§ 2703(4)(B).)  When the federal government takes land into 
trust for an Indian tribe, therefore, that land necessarily 
becomes Indian land.  This definition of Indian land — which 
encompasses reservation land and tribal trust land, regardless 
of whether the Governor’s concurrence is required for gaming 
on the land — is supported by federal Indian law more 
generally.  (See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe 
(1991) 498 U.S. 505, 511 [“[No] precedent of this Court has 
ever drawn the distinction between tribal trust land and 
reservations”]; Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2019 
ed.) § 3.04(2)(c)(ii) [“The Supreme Court has [] held that tribal 
trust land is the equivalent of a reservation and thus Indian 
country”]; Rest., Law of American Indians (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
Mar. 13, 2018) § 15, subd. (a) [defining “Indian lands” to 
include “lands held by the United States in trust for an Indian 
tribe or individual members of an Indian tribe”].)  When 
construing initiatives such as Proposition 1A, we presume 
electors “to [have been] aware of existing laws and judicial 
construction[s] thereof” when they voted.  (In re Lance W. 
(1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11.)  Nowhere did Proposition 1A 
offer its own definition of “Indian lands” or “tribal lands.”  And 
Proposition 1A’s Voter Information Guide explained to voters 
that federal law regulated gaming on Indian land (Voter 
Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) analysis of 
Prop. 1A by Legis. Analyst, p. 4) — indeed, the text of the 
ballot proposition said it was allowing class III gaming “on 
Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law” (id., 
text of Prop. 1A, p. 90).  None of this bolsters the case for 
assuming that the terms “Indian lands” and “tribal lands” in 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
17 
Proposition 1A have a narrow, bespoke content different from 
their ordinary meaning under federal law.   
United Auburn then seeks to buttress its argument by 
offering a somewhat different definition of “tribal lands” and 
“Indian lands”:  land recognized as Indian land when IGRA 
was enacted, but not after.  This proposed interpretation of the 
terms pivots not on whether casino-style gaming would require 
the Governor’s concurrence, but instead on whether the Indian 
land was acquired after IGRA was enacted — irrespective of 
whether that land has become “Indian” or “tribal” land “under 
federal law” in the decades since IGRA’s effective date.   
That definition is also implausible.  The language of 
Proposition 1A offers no indication that voters enshrined in the 
Constitution the technical, inside-baseball distinction between 
gaming on federally designated Indian land before IGRA’s 
effective date (what United Auburn proposes to be true 
“Indian” or “tribal” lands), and after.  IGRA, for its part, allows 
class III gaming on certain land taken into trust for an Indian 
tribe after the statute’s effective date without the Governor’s 
concurrence, so long as the Governor executes a tribal-state 
compact.  (See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii) [casino-style 
gaming on “lands [] taken into trust as part of[:]  [¶]  (i) a 
settlement of a land claim”; “(ii) the initial reservation of an 
Indian tribe acknowledged by the [Interior] Secretary under 
the Federal acknowledgment process”; or “(iii) the restoration 
of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal 
recognition” does not require the Governor’s assent].)  Under 
United Auburn’s argument, however, Proposition 1A prohibits 
class III gaming from taking place even on these lands.  
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We are not persuaded.  United Auburn’s contention lacks 
support in the language of Proposition 1A, which explicitly 
empowers the Governor to negotiate and conclude compacts for 
class III gaming on “Indian lands . . . in accordance with 
federal law” and “permit[s]” class III gaming “on tribal lands 
subject to those compacts.”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. 
(f).)  Because Proposition 1A allows class III gaming on “Indian 
lands in California in accordance with federal law,” it makes 
little sense to interpret article IV, section 19 as prohibiting 
such gaming on certain trust lands — considered Indian lands 
under federal law — for which IGRA does not even require the 
Governor’s concurrence before class III gaming may occur.  
(Ibid.)  United Auburn’s interpretation would also cut against 
the cooperative-federalism scheme created by IGRA to permit 
class III gaming on Indian land.  We decline to create such a 
conflict between state and federal law where none exists.6  (See 
California ARCO Distributors, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 
(1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 349, 359 [“State and federal laws should 
be accommodated and harmonized where possible”]; Huron 
Cement Co. v. Detroit (1960) 362 U.S. 440, 446 [“[The Supreme] 
Court’s decisions [] enjoin seeking out conflicts between state 
and federal regulation where none clearly exists”].)  
What we find more persuasive is the most reasonable 
inference from Proposition 1A’s text and context:  The terms 
                                        
6  
United Auburn itself appears to abandon this proposed 
reading of “Indian lands” and “tribal lands” in its reply brief, 
reverting to its previous argument that “the voters [who 
enacted Proposition 1A] meant to facilitate gaming that 
required no concurrence.” 
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“Indian” and “tribal” lands — which appear in close proximity 
to the phrase “in accordance with federal law” — are best 
understood, as they are under federal law, to include Indian 
reservation land and all land the federal government has 
acquired in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes.  (Voter 
Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 
1A, p. 90.)  In the absence of any specialized definition of the 
terms 
within 
Proposition 
1A, 
the 
most 
reasonable 
understanding of voters’ purpose in enacting Proposition 1A is 
that they sought to permit casino-style gaming on all Indian 
land in accordance with federal law — notwithstanding the 
California Constitution’s general restriction on casino-style 
gaming.  (Compare Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e) with Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).) 
That Indian land encompasses reservation land as well 
as land taken into trust for Indian tribes bears on another of 
United Auburn’s arguments.  It points our attention to the fact 
that Proposition 1A empowers the Governor only “to negotiate 
and conclude compacts” for gaming on Indian land — not to 
concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination.  (Cal. Const., 
art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).)  Because compacting and concurring 
are distinct actions, United Auburn contends, the Governor’s 
authority to compact doesn’t imply his power to concur.   
We agree that the power to negotiate compacts with 
Indian tribes does not, by itself, imply the power to concur.  
But neither does Proposition 1A’s failure to expressly mention 
the power to concur imply any sort of limitation on the 
Governor’s inherent powers — including his power to concur.  
The ballot initiative amended the Constitution to bestow the 
Governor with the power “to negotiate and conclude compacts . 
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20 
. . for the operation of [casino-style gaming] . . . on Indian lands 
in California.”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).)  Because 
casino-style gaming cannot occur on some Indian lands — 
certain land taken into trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA 
was enacted — without the Governor’s concurrence, the power 
to negotiate compacts for class III gaming on those lands is 
consistent with the Governor exercising his inherent power to 
concur to allow class III gaming to occur on those lands.   
Suppose voters had limited the Governor’s compacting 
power to land on which casino-style gaming could occur 
without his concurrence.  One might then reasonably expect 
that the Proposition would have limited the Governor’s power 
to negotiate compacts only where the land in question was 
“reservation land,” land designated as “Indian land” before 
IGRA was enacted, or “Indian land not requiring a 
concurrence.”  Yet nothing close to this limitation appears in 
the language of Proposition 1A.  (Cf. City of Port Hueneme v. 
City of Oxnard (1959) 52 Cal.2d 385, 395 [a statute’s omission 
of a term used elsewhere “ ‘is significant to show’ ” a different 
intended purpose].)  What Proposition 1A’s language conveys 
instead is that the Governor’s power to negotiate and conclude 
compacts for class III gaming extends to all land that counts as 
“Indian” or “tribal” under federal law, with no intricate pre- or 
post-IGRA, concurrence or no concurrence proviso.  That the 
Governor has the power to negotiate and conclude compacts for 
class III gaming on “Indian” and “tribal” land thus 
demonstrates that article IV, section 19, subdivision (e)’s 
general ban on casino-style gaming doesn’t apply to gaming on 
land taken into trust after IGRA was enacted for which the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
21 
Governor’s concurrence is required.  (See Cal. Const., art. IV, 
§ 19, subd. (e).)   
Unable to ground its argument in the four corners of the 
ballot proposition, United Auburn seeks firmer footing in 
Proposition 1A’s ballot materials.  It explains that Proposition 
1A’s proponents advocated for passage of the ballot proposition 
“so we can keep the gaming we have on our reservations.”  
(Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) 
argument in favor of Prop. 1A, p. 6.)  United Auburn also 
contends that the primary motivation for Proposition 1A 
appears to have been to ratify 57 compacts that California had 
negotiated before 2000 — compacts for land on which gaming 
could occur without the Governor’s concurrence.  (Id., analysis 
of Prop. 1A by Legis. Analyst, pp. 4–5.)  And it calls our 
attention to a back-and-forth exchange between supporters and 
opponents of the initiative included in the ballot materials, in 
which proponents of Proposition 1A wrote:  “ ‘Proposition 1A 
and federal law strictly limit Indian gaming to tribal land.  The 
[opponents’] claim that casinos could be built anywhere [if 
Proposition 1A is enacted] is totally false.’ ”  (Id., rebuttal to 
argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7.) 
It’s true that ballot materials sometimes illuminate how 
we interpret voter initiatives.  (See People v. Valencia (2017) 3 
Cal.5th 347, 364.)  But these materials don’t support the 
weight United Auburn hoists onto them, and they don’t 
override our understanding of Proposition 1A’s language:  that 
class III gaming may occur on Indian land.  (See California 
Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 934 
(California Cannabis Coalition) [“we may consider extrinsic 
sources, such as an initiative’s ballot materials” only if “the 
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22 
provision[’s] intended purpose [] remains opaque” after 
analysis of its text].)  The Governor’s interpretation, too, fits 
with the maxim of Proposition 1A’s proponents:  That the 
proposed ballot initiative “ ‘strictly limit[s] Indian gaming to 
tribal land,’ ” and that “ ‘the claim[s] that casinos could be built 
anywhere is totally false.’ ”  (Voter Information Guide, Primary 
Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A, p. 
7.)  Class III gaming, after all, may occur only on reservation 
land or land the federal government has converted to Indian 
land by taking it into trust for an Indian tribe.  We 
acknowledge that the language included in these materials 
arguably supports the conclusion that the predominant 
rationale behind Proposition 1A was to allow Indian tribes to 
conduct class III gaming on land for which the Governor’s 
concurrence wasn’t required — including on land for which 
California had negotiated 57 compacts before 2000.  What the 
materials do not suggest, however, is that the most defensible 
account of Proposition 1A’s purpose was to allow casino-style 
gaming only on lands associated with those compacts.   
In response to this line of argument, the dissent invokes 
a private website, www.yeson1A.net, that Proposition 1A’s 
proponents cited in their rebuttal to arguments against the 
ballot proposition.  Because that website “equated ‘Indian 
lands’ and ‘tribal lands’ with ‘reservation lands,’ and indicated 
that tribal casinos would be limited to these lands,” the dissent 
contends, voters would have construed Proposition 1A to 
authorize casinos only on Indian reservations.  (Dis. opn., post, 
at p. 22, fn. 4.)  Not even United Auburn advances such a 
narrow construction of Proposition 1A — as we’ve explained, 
both definitions of “Indian” and “tribal” lands offered by United 
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23 
Auburn encompass some kinds of Indian trust land in addition 
to Indian reservations.  Taking account of a private website 
that showed up as a link in one of the ballot statements — 
even if there’s no particular evidence that many voters 
examined its contents — could conceivably make sense in light 
of how we consider appropriate extrinsic sources when the 
initiatives we interpret are unclear.  (See California Cannabis 
Coalition, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934.)  What makes less sense 
is to give outsized importance to its peculiar interpretation 
when there’s no particular logic or argument persuasively 
supporting its theory, and it goes beyond what the ballot 
materials themselves imply.  In any event, we parse the 
website differently.  The website’s homepage explained that 
“Prop 1A . . . simply allows federally-recognized California 
tribes to continue to have gaming on federally-designated 
tribal land, as provided by federal law” — and the very next 
sentence identified IGRA as the relevant federal law.  (Yes on 
1A, Proposition 1A . . . The California Indian Self-Reliance 
Amendment on the March 2000 State Ballot (Mar. 6, 2000) 
 [as of 
Aug. 28, 2020].)  The dissent cites a different portion of the 
website, but the point it conveys is the same:  It stated that 
“federal law strictly limits tribal gaming to Indian lands only” 
before explaining that Congress enacted “[t]he Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act . . . in 1988.”  (Yes on 1A, Proposition 1A: 
Answers 
to 
Common 
Questions 
(Mar. 
6, 
2000) 
 [as of 
Aug. 28, 2020].) 
Elsewhere the dissent suggests that Proposition 1A may 
have used “Indian lands” as a term of art — one referring to 
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24 
“reservation lands and after-acquired trust lands for which no 
concurrence is required.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 19.)  Like 
United Auburn, however, the dissent fails to persuasively 
explain why the “Indian lands” term of art would happen to 
encompass only those trust lands on which gaming may occur 
without the Governor’s concurrence, but not other trust lands 
which require the Governor’s concurrence for class III gaming.  
That federal law draws a line to distinguish “Indian lands” 
from other lands is not in dispute.  What that line fails to do is 
draw any distinction between lands where gaming may occur 
with or without a governor’s concurrence.  Instead, as we’ve 
explained, federal law defines all these lands as Indian land.  
(See Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2019 ed.) 
§ 3.04(2)(c)(ii).)  So whereas the dissent questions the 
transparency of Proposition 1A’s ballot materials (dis. opn., 
post, at p. 26), we read those materials to reiterate a consistent 
message as it’s relevant to this case:  Proposition 1A would 
allow class III gaming on all Indian land, as defined by IGRA.   
Nor have we any reason to conclude that our 
interpretation 
would “put[] 
gambling 
casinos right 
in 
everyone’s backyard,” as opponents of Proposition 1A warned.  
(Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) 
argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7.)  Amicus curiae North Fork 
Rancheria observes that the Interior Secretary has requested 
gubernatorial concurrences only 16 times nationwide in the 31 
years since IGRA was enacted, and state governors have 
concurred in only 10 of those determinations.  So in the subset 
of instances where the Interior Secretary agrees that land held 
in trust for a tribe may be used for gaming, the required 
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25 
gubernatorial concurrence further narrows where gaming may 
occur.7   
We find no reason to conclude from these ballot 
materials, from Proposition 1A’s language, or from any other 
                                        
7  
The dissent claims that our opinion allows “a single state 
official, the Governor,” to exercise the “consequential power” of 
allowing class III gaming on land taken into trust after IGRA 
was enacted.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 17–18.)  What this bold 
assertion seems to miss is that nothing in our opinion anoints 
the Governor Emperor of tribal gaming.  The dissent’s reading 
of our conclusion overlooks several pieces of an intricate jigsaw 
puzzle that must fall into place before class III gaming can 
occur on land taken into trust after IGRA’s effective date:  An 
Indian tribe must duly authorize casino-style gaming.  (25 
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A).)  A state must permit that type of 
gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.  
(Id., § 2710(d)(1)(B).)  The gaming must abide by the terms of a 
tribal-state compact.  (Id., § 2710(d)(1)(C).)  For land that 
doesn’t satisfy other conditions in IGRA, the Interior Secretary 
must determine that gaming would be in the best interest of 
the tribe and wouldn’t be detrimental to the surrounding 
community.  (Id., § 2719(b)(1)(A).)  And the Legislature 
remains free to restrict the Governor’s concurrence power if it 
so chooses.  (See ante, pp. 35–37.)  What our opinion does 
conclude is that the Governor may concur in the Interior 
Secretary’s determination to allow class III gaming — if (and 
only if) all the other necessary conditions for class III gaming 
are satisfied in this cooperative-federalism scheme.  Nowhere 
does the dissent persuasively justify its assumptions that 
article IV, section 19 of the California Constitution imposes a 
“flat prohibition of Nevada and New Jersey-style casinos” 
despite Proposition 1A’s explicit amendment of the state 
Constitution in 2000 to permit some class III gaming, or that a 
gubernatorial concurrence under IGRA is prohibited unless it’s 
expressly authorized.  (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 25–26.)           
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26 
provision of the California Constitution that the Governor is 
barred 
from 
concurring 
in 
the 
Interior 
Secretary’s 
determination to allow class III gaming on land taken into 
trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA was enacted.  What we 
find instead is that article IV, section 19, subdivision (f) — 
added to the California Constitution by Proposition 1A — 
allows class III gaming to occur “subject to [Governor-
negotiated] compacts” on all “Indian” or “tribal” lands.  
Included among these lands are those that require the 
Governor to concur before class III gaming is permitted.  To 
somehow find among these words a categorical rule against 
gubernatorial concurrences is to place on the constitutional 
provision’s delicate frame a weight it cannot bear.    
C. 
United Auburn also argues that separation of powers 
concerns cut against recognition of a concurrence power here.  
Even if the California Constitution — as amended by 
Proposition 1A — doesn’t prohibit the Governor from 
concurring in the Interior Secretary’s determination, United 
Auburn posits, the Governor lacks that power because 
concurring is a legislative function, not an executive one.  To 
find otherwise, claims United Auburn, infringes on the 
Legislature’s prerogatives.  That the language enshrined in the 
Constitution by Proposition 1A appears in article IV of the 
Constitution — a section that contains other legislative powers 
— underscores for United Auburn that concurrence is a 
legislative function.   
Although we endeavor to read constitutional provisions 
in context, the placement of a provision isn’t dispositive to our 
analysis.  Consider the constitutional provision authorizing 
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27 
this court to recommend (or decline to recommend) that an 
application for executive pardon or clemency be granted to a 
defendant who has been “twice convicted of a felony.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (a).)  That power — primarily judicial 
in nature — doesn’t become an executive one simply because it 
appears in article V of the Constitution, which contains 
executive functions.  So we decline to characterize the 
Governor’s concurrence as a legislative act simply because 
Proposition 1A added a provision to article IV of the California 
Constitution. 
Nor can we assume, as United Auburn’s argument 
presumes, that we can in every instance neatly disaggregate 
executive, legislative, and judicial power.  Treating these 
domains as entirely separate and independent spheres 
contrasts with the more nuanced treatment of these powers — 
and their frequent overlap — under our state constitutional 
system.  (See Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 45, 52 [“California decisions long have recognized that, 
in reality, the separation of powers doctrine ‘ “does not mean 
that the three departments of our government are not in many 
respects mutually dependent” ’ ”].)  Indeed, our Constitution’s 
history 
“strongly 
supports 
a 
flexible, 
nonformalist 
understanding of separation of powers in which the functions 
of the offices are fluid.”  (Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A 
Theory of California’s Separation of Powers (2004) 51 UCLA 
L.Rev. 1079, 1106; cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (2020) 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2226 (dis. opn. of 
Kagan, J.) [“[T]he separation of powers is, by design, neither 
rigid nor complete”].)  Rather than attempt to characterize the 
Governor’s concurrence power as a wholly legislative or 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
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28 
executive one, we construe the power as containing features 
that cut across both categories.    
That fact isn’t fatal to the Governor’s exercise of the 
concurrence power, for nothing in our separation of powers 
jurisprudence demands “ ‘a hermetic sealing off of the three 
branches of Government from one another.’ ”  (Hustedt v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 329, 338.)  We’ve 
instead recognized “that the three branches of government are 
interdependent,” and so government officials frequently 
perform — and are permitted to perform — actions that “may 
‘significantly affect those of another branch.’ ”  (Carmel Valley 
Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
287, 298.)  What the doctrine prohibits is “one branch of 
government [] exercising the complete power constitutionally 
vested in another” (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 
102, 117), or exercising power in a way “ ‘ “that undermine[s] 
the authority and independence of one or another coordinate 
[b]ranch” ’ ” (Carmel Valley, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 297).  So 
the question before us is whether concurring in the Interior 
Secretary’s determination unduly limits the role and function 
of the legislative branch.  
We begin our analysis, once again, with Proposition 1A.  
Although the constitutional amendment doesn’t expressly 
authorize the Governor to concur, it does allow casino-style 
gaming to occur on Indian land in accordance with federal law.  
Proposition 1A was significant because it amended the 
Constitution to signal a policy of greater openness toward 
casino-style gaming — which California had previously 
prohibited.  (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).)  When he 
concurs in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class 
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29 
III gaming on land taken into trust for an Indian tribe, 
therefore, the Governor acts consistently with the state’s policy 
toward gaming on Indian land, as established by voters.  He is 
not, as United Auburn would have us believe, engaging in 
“gubernatorial legislation.”   
That the Governor has historically been tasked with 
concurring — or declining to concur — under a variety of 
federal statutes also supports our conclusion that the 
concurrence power is an executive one.  (See In re Battelle 
(1929) 207 Cal. 227, 242.)  Since 1958, federal law has required 
gubernatorial consent before the secretary of a military 
department may order Army or Air National reservists to 
active duty.  (10 U.S.C. § 12301(b).)  The Migratory Bird 
Conservation Act, enacted in 1961, requires the Governor’s 
approval before land can be acquired from the migratory bird 
conservation fund.  (16 U.S.C. § 715k-5.)  Since 1970, the Clean 
Air Act has required the consent of the Governor before the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
may grant waivers to allow the construction of certain new 
source polluters.  (42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1)(A).)  The National 
Estuary Program, established in 1987, requires gubernatorial 
concurrence before the EPA Administrator may approve a 
conservation and management plan for an estuary.  (33 U.S.C. 
§ 1330(f)(1).)  And the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families Program, enacted in 1996, prohibits parents from 
receiving benefits if they are not employed or participating in 
community service unless the “chief executive officer of the 
State opts out.”  (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(l)(B)(iv).) 
The concurrence power isn’t a hollow one — the Governor 
has exercised it throughout our state’s history.  (E.g. California 
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30 
Society of Anesthesiologists v. Brown (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 
390, 395 [“Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger . . . exercised his 
discretion under federal law [42 C.F.R. § 482.52(c)(1) (2020)] 
[to opt] California out of the federal physician supervision 
Medicare reimbursement requirement”]; Fort Ord Reuse 
Authority, Media Release: Major Event in Completion of Early 
Transfer of Former Fort Ord Property (Aug. 12, 2008) 
<https://dtsc.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2019/04/ 
FORA_MediaRelease.pdf> [as of Aug. 28, 2020] [Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s concurrence in the transfer of 3,337 acres of 
land for economic reuse “provide[d] approval to begin a $100 
million privatized munitions and explosives cleanup program” 
under 
the 
Comprehensive 
Environmental 
Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 
et seq.]; U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., Rep. to the Ranking 
Minority Member, Com. on Commerce, H.R., Hazardous 
Waste: Information on Potential Superfund Sites (Nov. 1998), 
at pp. 350–352 [Governor of California declined to approve 
placement of three sites on the National Priorities List for 
hazardous waste cleanup under CERCLA]; Governor Pete 
Wilson, letter to Administrator Carol Browner, Nov. 17, 1993 
[concurring in the EPA Administrator’s conservation and 
management plan for an estuary under the National Estuary 
Program]; Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., letter to Doctor 
Robert M. White8 [approving a proposed management program 
                                        
8  
Governor 
Brown’s 
letter 
is 
available 
at: 
<https://books.google.com/books?id=By75Tpr47w4C&lpg=PA15
&dq=Combined%20CCMP%20%26%20Final%20EIS&pg=PA7#
v=onepage&q&f=false> [as of Aug. 28, 2020]. 
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31 
under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 
1451 et seq.].)  And although the Legislature has expressly 
authorized the Governor to concur under some of these 
schemes (see, e.g., Fish & G. Code, § 10680), it has remained 
silent regarding the Governor’s concurrence power under most 
of them.  Historical practice thus demonstrates that the 
Governor has the authority to concur in cooperative-federalism 
schemes 
such 
as 
IGRA 
without 
express 
legislative 
authorization, so long as the Governor’s concurrence is 
consistent with state law. 
United Auburn seeks to distinguish the Governor’s 
concurrence here by asserting that it “has massive land-use 
and tax-base consequences.”  The Governor’s concurrence 
causes the land taken into trust for an Indian tribe to no longer 
“be subject to California’s civil, criminal, and tax jurisdiction.”  
According to United Auburn, the pivotal role a concurrence 
plays in the Interior Secretary’s determination — and how that 
determination triggers these significant results — makes it 
unlawful for the Governor to exercise that power.     
United Auburn’s acute concern about the consequences of 
a gubernatorial decision is misplaced.  United Auburn is 
correct that taking land into trust for an Indian tribe causes 
that land to no longer be subject to state or local taxes.  (25 
U.S.C. § 5108.)  But because it is the Interior Secretary — not 
the Governor — who retains exclusive authority over whether 
to take land into trust (25 C.F.R. § 151.3 (2020)), it is not the 
Governor’s concurrence that carries with it that effect.  In any 
event, closer scrutiny demonstrates that the effect of the 
Governor’s concurrence under IGRA isn’t materially distinct 
from 
that 
under 
other 
cooperative-federalism 
schemes 
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32 
requiring his concurrence.  Consider the federal law requiring 
the United States Secretary of Energy to consult with and 
obtain the consent of the Governor of a state where land will be 
acquired for the purpose of disposing radioactive waste.  (42 
U.S.C. § 7916.)  Or the requirement that the Interior Secretary 
obtain a governor’s concurrence before acquiring land in 
national parks for the establishment of an airport.  (54 U.S.C. 
§ 101501(c)(2).)  These examples illustrate how gubernatorial 
decisions routinely trigger enormous consequences for local 
communities.  For these reasons, the consequences of the 
Governor’s 
concurrence 
in 
the 
Interior 
Secretary’s 
determination don’t affect the scope of his power, so long as his 
concurrence is consistent with state law.  
The concurrence power is also consistent with the 
Governor’s historic role as the state’s representative — a role 
he has held since before the California Constitution was 
enacted.  At the 1849 constitutional convention, delegates 
agreed that “it is a well[-]established principle” that the 
Governor ought to communicate directly with, and represent 
the state to, the federal executive branch.  (Browne, Report of 
the Debates in the Convention of California on the Formation 
of the State Constitution in September and October, 1849 
(1850) p. 277.)  The Legislature later codified the Governor’s 
station as “the sole official organ of communication between 
the government of this State and the government of . . . the 
United States” when it enacted Government Code section 
12012.  This provision, which readily demonstrates a 
legislatively enacted expectation that the Governor serve as 
the state’s representative to the federal government, bolsters 
the argument that the Governor is capable of playing a role in 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
33 
federal schemes that depend on the state government to convey 
an official position on behalf of the state of California.  (Cf. 
Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) 453 U.S. 654, 677 [“statutes 
[are] highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating” the scope 
of executive power, even in the absence of express 
constitutional authority].)   
Indeed, finding the Governor unable to concur in the 
Interior Secretary’s determination under IGRA would be in 
tension with his legislatively enacted authority under 
Government Code section 12012.  At oral argument, United 
Auburn conceded that the Governor’s executive power 
encompasses consulting informally with federal officials who 
seek his perspective on decisions that may affect the state.  
United Auburn nevertheless seeks to distinguish that 
correspondence from IGRA’s requirement that the Interior 
Secretary consult with and obtain the Governor’s concurrence 
before class III gaming may occur on land taken into trust for 
an Indian tribe after IGRA’s effective date.  Yet the Governor’s 
concurrence under IGRA is akin to analogous communications 
with the federal government in which he serves as the state’s 
representative — particularly when the federal officer with 
whom he communicates makes the discretionary decision to 
assign significant weight to the Governor’s views.  That 
Congress required the Interior Secretary to garner the 
concurrence of state governors, rather than leaving that 
decision to the Interior Secretary’s discretion, doesn’t by itself 
strip the Governor of power to serve as “the sole official organ 
of communication” between the state and the federal 
government.  (Gov. Code, § 12012.)      
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
34 
The resulting constitutional and statutory picture in this 
case reveals not only nuances about how California has chosen 
to conduct relations between the state and the federal 
government, but also the subtle shades depicting the precise 
limits of the respective powers of the Governor and the 
Legislature here.  Recall that the California Constitution and 
other state law once prohibited casino-style gaming.  (See Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e); Pen. Code, §§ 330, 330a.)  But in 
2000, voters amended the Constitution to allow that type of 
gambling under certain conditions.  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, 
subd. (f).)  In so doing, they bestowed certain powers on the 
Governor — the power to “negotiate and conclude compacts” 
for class III gaming “on Indian lands in California in 
accordance with federal law” — and other powers on the 
Legislature — the authority to ratify (or decline to ratify) those 
compacts.  (Ibid.)   
What the newly amended Constitution didn’t address, at 
least not expressly, was whether the Governor has the power 
to concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow 
class III gaming on certain land taken into trust for an Indian 
tribe after IGRA was enacted, or the division of authority 
between the executive and legislative branch over that task.  
Yet in the years since Proposition 1A was enacted, our 
Legislature has not — in contrast to the lawmaking bodies of 
other states (see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat., § 5-601(a), (c) 
[authorizing the Arizona Governor to negotiate and execute 
compacts but expressly prohibiting the Governor from 
concurring in the Interior Secretary’s determination]) — 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
35 
exercised its authority to enact legislation limiting the 
Governor’s power to concur.9 
In the absence of an express grant or denial of authority, 
we conclude that the Governor’s concurrence falls within a 
“zone of twilight in which he and [the Legislature] may have 
concurrent 
authority” 
and 
where 
legislative 
“inertia, 
indifference or quiescence” invites the exercise of executive 
power.  (Youngstown, supra, 343 U.S. at p. 637 (conc. opn. of 
Jackson, J.).)  By opening the door for class III gaming on 
“Indian” and “tribal” lands — some of which require a 
gubernatorial concurrence before class III gaming may occur — 
Proposition 1A put an end to California’s “flat prohibition of 
Nevada and New Jersey-style casinos” (dis. opn., post, at p. 25), 
thereby opening the door for the Governor to concur in the 
                                        
9  
Indeed, the Legislature has declined to restrict the 
Governor’s power to concur under IGRA despite being given 
the opportunity to do so.  Assembly Bill No. 1377 (2017-2018 
Reg. Sess.), introduced in February 2017, would’ve required 
the Governor to seek the Legislature’s approval before 
concurring in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow 
casino-style gaming on land taken into trust for an Indian tribe 
after IGRA was enacted.  The bill failed to pass before the end 
of the 2017–2018 regular session and died on January 31, 2018 
under article IV, section 10, subdivision (c) of the California 
Constitution.  (Assem. Bill No. 1377 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).)  
Although “[w]e have often said that mere legislative inaction is 
a ‘weak reed’ upon which to rest any conclusion about the 
Legislature's intent” (Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 
Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 217, 243), the Assembly’s consideration 
and rejection of Assembly Bill No. 1377 arguably demonstrates 
some measure of acquiesce by the Legislature in the 
Governor’s concurrence power.    
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
36 
Interior Secretary’s determination allowing gaming on those 
lands.  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).)  The Governor’s 
concurrence in that determination is consistent with his 
historic practice of concurring in a variety of cooperative-
federalism schemes, and his role as the state’s representative 
under Government Code section 12012.  So we find it 
consistent with Proposition 1A and our separation of powers 
jurisprudence to conclude that, despite the absence of specific 
legislative 
authorization, 
California 
law 
empowers 
the 
Governor to concur.  
That power, however, isn’t an indefeasible one.  Although 
our analysis of Proposition 1A and other state law supports the 
finding that the Governor has the power to concur, it also 
demonstrates that the legislative branch is capable of enacting 
legislation that would reduce the Governor’s concurrence 
power to “its lowest ebb.”  (Youngstown, supra, 343 U.S. at p. 
637 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.).)  The Legislature may, for 
example, 
require 
the 
Governor 
to 
obtain 
legislative 
authorization before concurring in the Interior Secretary’s 
determination — just as Proposition 1A requires the 
Legislature to ratify compacts that the Governor negotiates 
and concludes before they become effective.  (See Cal. Const., 
art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).)  Because neither the California 
Constitution nor other state law speaks directly to the 
Governor’s concurrence power under IGRA, California law is 
not inconsistent with this conclusion:  That the Legislature 
may restrict or eliminate the Governor’s implicit power to 
concur.  In the absence of state law creating such a limitation, 
however, we may not enact one on the Legislature’s behalf.  We 
conclude that current California law permits the Governor’s 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
37 
concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow 
class III gaming on Indian land taken into trust for an Indian 
tribe after IGRA was enacted.10   
III. 
United Auburn argues that even if the Governor 
generally has the power to concur, he lacks that power in this 
particular case.  Its argument relies on the Governor’s order of 
operations.  According to United Auburn, the California 
Constitution limits any gubernatorial power to negotiate and 
conclude compacts for class III gaming, and to concur in the 
Interior Secretary’s determination permitting gaming, to land 
designated as “Indian land” at the time of the compact 
negotiations.  Because the land at issue in this case hadn’t yet 
been taken into trust for the Enterprise Tribe when the 
Governor negotiated and concluded the compact to allow 
gaming, United Auburn contends that the Governor’s compact 
and concurrence were invalid.  
The language of our constitutional charter belies this 
argument.  By amending the Constitution to add article IV, 
                                        
10  
Because we conclude that the Legislature may restrict 
the Governor’s power to concur, we reject the argument of 
amicus curiae Picayune Rancheria:  that Congress has violated 
the anticommandeering doctrine by prohibiting other branches 
of government from constraining the Governor’s power to 
concur.  Our conclusion that California law, rather than 
federal law, empowers the Governor to concur also dispels 
United Auburn’s suggestion that IGRA “almost certainly run[s] 
afoul of the [Tenth] Amendment of the U.S. Constitution” by 
bestowing the Governor with the concurrence power.   
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
38 
section 19, subdivision (f), Proposition 1A empowered the 
Governor to negotiate and conclude compacts “for the operation 
. . . and for the conduct of [class III gaming] by federally 
recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California.”  Those 
requirements were satisfied here — when the Enterprise Tribe 
engaged in class III gaming, it did so on land the federal 
government had, by that point, designated as Indian land by 
holding it in trust for the Enterprise Tribe.  
Nothing in the Constitution restricts the Governor’s 
power to negotiate and conclude compacts to parcels 
designated “Indian land” at the time the negotiation happens.  
That there’s no such constraint makes sense in light of 
historical practice:  The 57 compacts negotiated and executed 
by California, which Proposition 1A ratified, allowed class III 
gaming to occur on land that hadn’t yet been taken into trust 
and didn’t otherwise constitute Indian land at the time of 
negotiation.  Indeed, the land ultimately taken into trust for 
United Auburn wasn’t yet Indian land when California and the 
tribe negotiated and concluded the compact for class III 
gaming on the tribe’s land.  (See City of Roseville v. Norton 
(D.D.C. 2002) 219 F.Supp.2d 130, 135–136.)  We decline to 
read into the Constitution a requirement that not only appears 
nowhere in its text but would also invalidate the gaming 
operations of Indian tribes across the state — including those 
of United Auburn.  
IV. 
For decades, California imposed on itself a categorical 
prohibition on casino-style gaming that surely restricted not 
only legislative authority, but gubernatorial power.  Yet as the 
wheel of time spun, voters placed their bets on a Constitution 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
39 
that regulated — rather than prohibited — casino-style (class 
III) gaming and empowered the Governor to negotiate and 
conclude compacts for casino-style gaming on Indian land in 
California.  In doing so, voters enacted Proposition 1A and 
changed the situation materially.  They amended state law to 
allow class III gaming on all “Indian” and “tribal” lands “in 
accordance with federal law.”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. 
(f).)  The Governor’s historical practice of concurring in a range 
of other cooperative-federalism schemes, and his longstanding 
and legislatively enacted role as the state’s representative to 
the federal government, demonstrate that he may concur in 
the Interior Secretary’s determination without violating the 
Legislature’s prerogatives. 
The Legislature nonetheless plays a robust role in 
responding to the use, and defining the scope, of executive 
power.  Nearly seven decades have passed since Justice 
Jackson emphasized that constitutions of separated powers 
“enjoin[] 
upon 
its 
branches 
separateness 
but 
interdependence” — “autonomy but reciprocity.”  (Youngstown, 
supra, 343 U.S. at p. 635 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.).)  And while 
the materials before us are not quite as “enigmatic as the 
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh” (id. 
at p. 634), they nonetheless require nuanced interpretation for 
us to discern how California’s Constitution allows executive 
and legislative prerogatives to coexist in the continuing story of 
its calibrated approach to tribal gaming.  Although lawmakers 
haven’t done so yet, they remain free to restrict or eliminate 
the Governor’s authority to concur.  That the Legislature has 
enacted no such law means the power to concur remains in the 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
40 
Governor’s hands.  As for the power that remains in our hands, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
FYBEL, J.* 
                                        
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
1 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE 
AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
S238544 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 
 
I respectfully dissent.  “In the case of a voters’ initiative 
statute . . . we may not properly interpret the measure in a 
way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should 
get what they enacted, not more and not less.”  (Hodges v. 
Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 114.)  This same 
principle applies when we interpret a legislative constitutional 
amendment approved by the voters.   
The outcome here turns on the interpretation of 
Proposition 1A, a ballot measure through which the electorate 
amended the state Constitution in 2000 to carve out a limited 
exception to the prevailing state policy against “casinos of the 
type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e).)  The majority holds that as 
amended by Proposition 1A to allow for gaming compacts 
between the state and individual Indian tribes, the state 
Constitution allows the Governor to concur with a federal 
determination that it would be appropriate to situate a 
gambling facility on certain off-reservation lands that may be 
placed into trust for a tribe by the federal government.  This 
concurrence represents the only authorization by a California 
state official that is absolutely required under federal law for 
sophisticated gaming, including slot machines and banked card 
games, to take place on these lands.  Whether the Governor 
possesses the power to concur is therefore an issue of great 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
2 
significance to the Indian tribes of this state that engage or 
want to engage in casino operations, not to mention anyone 
else interested in where gambling can occur within state 
boundaries.    
I would hold that the Governor lacks such a power.  The 
voters who approved Proposition 1A endorsed gaming 
compacts, and only compacts.  The measure is not properly 
read as authorizing concurrences as well.  An average voter 
would not have understood such a consequential power as 
implied 
or 
otherwise 
envisioned 
by 
Proposition 
1A’s 
authorization of gaming compacts, for reasons including the 
fact that the power to concur is not invariably or even normally 
necessary to effectuate the compacting power.  That 
Proposition 1A did not entail a power to concur becomes even 
more apparent when its provisions are read in legal and 
historical context and in the light cast by the relevant ballot 
materials.  These resources clarify why voters might have 
authorized tribal gaming at locations that do not require a 
concurrence but not at those sites where a concurrence is a 
prerequisite; and they confirm that Proposition 1A is best 
construed as striking such a balance.   
For these reasons, as elaborated below, it is my view that 
the court’s decision today recognizing a power to concur gives 
the voters who approved Proposition 1A quite a bit more — or 
depending on one’s perspective, less — than they bargained 
for.  I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings.   
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
3 
I.  BACKGROUND 
My understanding of what the state Constitution, as 
amended by Proposition 1A, does and does not allow derives 
from a review of federal and state law applicable to tribal 
gaming and how this body of law developed over time.  
A summary of these principles and events follows.    
Our state has long forbidden, limited, or regulated 
different forms of gambling.  (See Hotel Employees & 
Restaurant Employees Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 585, 591–594 (Hotel Employees).)  Well along in this 
history, in 1984 the electorate approved Proposition 37, which 
authorized a state lottery (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (d)) 
as an exception to the general prohibition on lotteries and 
lottery tickets that appears at article IV, section 19, 
subdivision (a) of the state Constitution.  Proposition 37 also 
added subdivision (e) to article IV, section 19 of the state 
charter (article IV, section 19(e)).  This provision announces, 
“The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit, 
casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New 
Jersey.”  This bar on casino gaming “was designed . . . to 
elevate statutory prohibitions on a set of gambling activities to 
a constitutional level.”  (Hotel Employees, at pp. 605–606.)  
A.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
Four years later, after the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202 upended state constraints on 
tribal 
gaming, 
Congress 
enacted 
the 
Indian 
Gaming 
Regulatory Act, or IGRA.  (Pub.L. No. 100-497 (Oct. 17, 1988) 
102 Stat. 2467, as amended & codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et 
seq., 18 U.S.C. § 1166 et seq.)  This law provides a framework 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
4 
through which Indian tribes can develop gaming operations in 
a manner that allows for the assertion of legitimate state 
interests that may be implicated by such activity.  (See 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1997) 
110 F.3d 688, 693 (Confederated Tribes).) 
1. The compact requirement for class III gaming 
IGRA recognizes three different tiers, or “classes” of 
gaming that may occur on Indian lands if the necessary 
prerequisites are satisfied.  “ ‘ “Class I” consists of social games 
for minimal prizes and traditional Indian games; “Class II” 
includes Bingo and similar games of chance such as pull tabs 
and lotto; “Class III” includes all games not included in Classes 
I or II.’ ”  (Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Ind. v. Wilson 
(9th Cir. 1994) 64 F.3d 1250, 1255–1256 (Rumsey Indian 
Rancheria).)   
Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of tribes.  (25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).)  Class II gaming 
on these lands is generally permitted if “located within a State 
that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, 
organization or entity (and such gaming is not otherwise 
specifically prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law),” and 
“the governing body of the Indian tribe adopts an ordinance or 
resolution which is approved by the” tribe’s chairperson.  (25 
U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A), (B).)  
Class III gaming, which includes slot machines and 
banked card games, is by far the most lucrative of the three 
gaming categories and “is subject to a greater degree of federal-
state regulation than either class I or class II gaming.”  (In re 
Indian Gaming Related Cases (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 1094, 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
5 
1097.)  Section 11 of IGRA provides that “Class III gaming 
activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities 
are” duly authorized by a tribe, “located in a State that permits 
such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or 
entity,” and “conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State 
compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.”  (25 
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A), (B), (C).)  “IGRA’s compact requirement 
grants States the right to negotiate with tribes located within 
their borders regarding aspects of class III tribal gaming that 
might affect legitimate State interests.”  (In re Indian Gaming 
Related Cases, 331 F.3d at p. 1097.)  Through this mechanism, 
“[t]he compacting process gives to states civil regulatory 
authority that they otherwise would lack under Cabazon, while 
granting to tribes the ability to offer legal class III gaming.”  
(Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton (9th Cir. 
2003) 353 F.3d 712, 716.)   
A compact between a tribe and a state may contain the 
parties’ agreement on matters such as the kinds of class III 
gaming that will occur, how this gaming will be regulated, and 
various other matters relevant to these operations.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(d)(3)(C).)  Compacts also require federal approval to 
become effective.  (Id., § 2710(d)(3)(B).)  A state that allows 
class III gaming must negotiate in good faith with a tribe that 
requests a gaming compact.   (Id., § 2710(d)(3)(A).)1  If a tribe 
                                        
1  
There is a split of authority regarding whether a state 
must engage in good faith negotiations concerning class III 
gaming if it allows any kind of class III game, or if a state must 
so negotiate only if it allows the specific class III game(s) that a 
tribe wants to pursue.  (Compare Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 
 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
6 
believes the state has failed to satisfy this responsibility, IGRA 
provides for a cause of action in federal court, enforceable 
against a state that has waived its immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
(25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 76.)  Through such an action, a 
tribe can obtain court intervention and mediation to help 
secure a compact.  (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i)–(vi).)  If these 
efforts fail to yield an agreement, IGRA directs the federal 
Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the 
Secretary) to impose “procedures” upon a state specifying how 
class III gaming by the tribe is to occur.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(d)(7)(b)(vii).)   
2. The concurrence requirement for gaming on certain 
after-acquired lands 
IGRA authorizes tribal gaming on “Indian lands,” defined 
as “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; 
and [¶] (B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by 
the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or 
individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to 
restriction by the United States against alienation and over 
which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.”  (25 
U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B); see also id., § 5108 [authorizing the 
Secretary to acquire land in trust for a tribe]; 25 C.F.R. 
§§ 151.10, 151.11 (2020) [articulating criteria to be considered 
by the Secretary in determining whether to place land into 
                                                                                                           
 
supra, 64 F.3d at p. 1258 with Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. 
State of Conn. (2d Cir. 1990) 913 F.2d 1024, 1030.) 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
7 
trust for a tribe].)2  But the statute generally prohibits class II 
and class III gaming on lands acquired by the federal 
government in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after 
October 17, 1988, the statute’s date of enactment.  (25 U.S.C. 
§ 2719(a).)  This proscription responds to concerns raised in 
Congress “about the possibility that tribal governments might 
acquire land in or near metropolitan areas on which they 
might open bingo or even casino facilities.”  (Boylan, 
Reflections on IGRA 20 Years After Enactment (2010) 42 
Ariz.St. L.J. 1, 9–10.)   
The statute provides for several exceptions that moderate 
the general rule prohibiting class II and class III gaming on 
“after-acquired” trust lands.  Among them, the prohibition does 
                                        
2  
A federal regulation promulgated in 2008 (Gaming on 
Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. 
29354 (May 20, 2008)) defines “reservation” as “(1) Land set 
aside by the United States by final ratified treaty, agreement, 
Executive Order, Proclamation, Secretarial Order or Federal 
statute for the tribe, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent; [¶] (2) Land of Indian colonies and rancherias 
(including rancherias restored by judicial action) set aside by 
the United States for the permanent settlement of the Indians 
as its homeland; [¶] (3) Land acquired by the United States to 
reorganize adult Indians pursuant to statute; or [¶] (4) Land 
acquired by a tribe through a grant from a sovereign, including 
pueblo lands, which is subject to a Federal restriction against 
alienation.”  (25 C.F.R. § 292.2 (2020).)  Prior to the 
promulgation of this regulation, the meaning of “reservation,” 
as used in the relevant provisions of IGRA, was less certain.  
(Compare Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton (10th Cir. 
2001) 240 F.3d 1250, 1267 with Exposing Truth about Casinos 
v. Kempthorne (D.C. Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 460, 465.)   
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
8 
not apply to trust lands that are “located within or contiguous 
to the boundaries of the reservation of the Indian tribe on 
October 17, 1988” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(a)(1)), or when “lands are 
taken into trust as part of — [¶] (i) a settlement of a land 
claim, [¶] (ii) the initial reservation of an Indian tribe 
acknowledged 
by 
the 
Secretary 
under 
the 
Federal 
acknowledgment process, or [¶] (iii) the restoration of lands for 
an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition” (id., 
§ 2719(b)(1)(B); see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 292.3–292.12 (2020)).  
These exceptions have been described as either “so obvious 
that they might be seen as merely technical corrections to the 
general 
definition 
of 
‘Indian 
lands’ ” 
or 
“relatively 
noncontroversial from a conceptual standpoint because they 
too have history behind them.”  (Jensen, Indian Gaming on 
Newly Acquired Lands (2008) 47 Washburn L.J. 675, 687 
(hereinafter Jensen).)  “[A]ll require, at least indirectly, 
demonstrating a strong link between the tribe and the land at 
issue . . . .”  (Id., at p. 688.)  Furthermore, “because these 
provisions deal with circumstances that are exceptional, they 
are less likely to be of general public interest” than the 
exception that depends on the existence and exercise of the 
power to concur.  (Ibid.) 
This additional exception involving the power to concur 
appears at section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA, which provides that 
tribal gaming may occur on land taken into trust by the federal 
government for a tribe after IGRA’s date of enactment if “the 
Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and 
appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other 
nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment 
on [the] newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
9 
the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be 
detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the 
Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be 
conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.”  (25 
U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).)  A positive two-part determination by 
the Secretary does not absolutely require a showing that the 
property involved is close to a tribe’s existing reservation 
lands, or that the tribe has a historical connection to the site, 
although these are among the facts considered by the 
Secretary in determining whether a gaming establishment 
would be in the best interest of the tribe and its members and 
whether it would or would not be detrimental to the 
surrounding community.  (25 C.F.R. §§ 292.16, 292.17, 
292.21(a) (2020); see also id., § 151.11(b) (2020) [identifying the 
location of off-reservation land proposed to be taken into trust 
for a tribe, relative to a tribe’s reservation, as a factor to be 
considered by the Secretary in deciding whether to take the 
land into trust].) 
Section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA, with its requirements of a 
two-part determination by the Secretary and a concurrence by 
the appropriate governor, “is Section 20’s only truly 
discretionary exception.”  (All, John McCain and the Indian 
Gaming “Backlash”: The Unfortunate Irony of S. 2078 (2006) 
15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 295, 302 (hereinafter All).)  Because 
the sequence described by section 20(b)(1)(A) “could apply to 
any tribe, it is by definition a broader exception than any of the 
mandatory exceptions” IGRA provides to the law’s general 
prohibition of gaming on after-acquired lands.  (All, at p. 303.)  
As one scholar has explained, this is the exception for “newly 
acquired lands most likely to have broad application — and 
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most likely therefore to generate public discussion and, for 
some, dismay.”  (Jensen, supra, 47 Washburn L.J. at p. 688.)   
Although IGRA is the source of the concurrence 
procedure, whether an individual state governor has the power 
to concur is a matter of state law.  (Confederated Tribes, supra, 
110 F.3d at p. 697.)  And in contrast with IGRA’s provision of a 
cause of action when a state does not engage in good faith 
compact negotiations, nothing within the statute allows a tribe 
to seek judicial review of a Governor’s refusal to issue a 
concurrence.  Thus, the concurrence requirement “essentially 
provides veto power to the Governor of the State in which the 
land [proposed as a site for gaming operations] is located.”  
(Sheppard, Taking Indian Land into Trust (1999) 44 S.D. 
L.Rev. 681, 687.)   
B.  Proposition 5 
The enactment of IGRA did not quell the debates in this 
state over tribal gaming.  “Despite IGRA’s negotiation and 
compact framework, several unresolved conflicts . . . developed 
between the State of California and Indian tribes surrounding 
class III gaming and, especially, gaming devices in casinos.”  
(Hotel Employees, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 596.)   
Proposition 5, an initiative measure appearing on the 
November 1998 ballot, was designed to better define the 
parameters for tribal gaming within the state.  This measure 
included a model gaming compact that, if requested by a tribe, 
was to be promptly approved by the Governor as a ministerial 
matter.  (Gov. Code, § 98002, subd. (a).)  The model compact 
authorized class III card games and certain slot machines, so 
long as the payouts drew from a “players’ pool” funded by 
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player wagers.  (Id., § 98004.)  Another provision within 
Proposition 5 authorized the Governor to negotiate gaming 
compacts with terms different from those contained in the 
model compact and to reach agreement with tribes on such 
compacts.  (Gov. Code, § 98002, subd. (b).)  Nothing within 
Proposition 5 expressly conferred a power to concur upon the 
Governor.   
Proposition 5 passed, but that victory was short-lived.  
We determined in Hotel Employees that the proposition’s model 
compact authorized gaming that the state Constitution 
precluded as representative of “casinos of the type currently 
operating in Nevada and New Jersey.”  (Cal. Const., art. IV, 
§ 19, subd. (e).)  On that basis, we concluded that the vast 
majority of the initiative, including its model compact, was 
invalid and unenforceable.  (Hotel Employees, supra, 21 Cal.4th 
at p. 615.)  We held that only the initiative’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity for certain claims brought in federal 
court — part of section 98005 of the Government Code — was 
severable from the invalid portions of Proposition 5 and 
survived.  (Hotel Employees, at pp. 614–615.)   
C.  Proposition 1A 
Within weeks of our decision in Hotel Employees, 
overwhelming majorities in both the Senate and the Assembly 
voted to place Proposition 1A before the electorate at the 
March 2000 primary election.  Through Proposition 1A, voters 
were asked to decide whether to add a new subdivision (f) to 
article IV, section 19 of the state Constitution (article IV, 
section 
19(f)), 
providing 
in 
part 
that notwithstanding 
constitutional constraints on gaming, “the Governor is 
authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to 
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ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot 
machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking 
and percentage card games by federally recognized Indian 
tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal 
law.”  (Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) 
text of Prop. 1A, p. 90 (Voter Information Guide).)   
Coincident with Proposition 1A’s placement on the ballot, 
then-Governor Gray Davis negotiated gaming compacts with 
57 tribes.  (In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, supra, 331 F.3d 
at pp. 1105–1106.)  None of these compacts required a 
concurrence.  The Legislature promptly ratified the compacts 
(Stats. 1999, ch. 874, § 1, pp. 6257–6260), which authorized 
forms of class III gaming (e.g., banked card games) that were 
not permitted under the model compact found within 
Proposition 5.   
Because of the constitutional prohibition on gaming, 
however, these negotiated compacts would become effective 
only if Proposition 1A passed.  Which it did:  Proposition 1A 
was approved by voters at the March 2000 primary election.   
D.  Factual and Procedural Background 
The Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians (the 
Enterprise Tribe) was federally recognized as a sovereign 
Indian tribe in 1915.  In June 2002, the Enterprise Tribe asked 
the federal government to take approximately 40 acres of off-
reservation land into trust for the tribe.  This parcel is in Yuba 
County, near the community of Olivehurst.  It is situated 
approximately 36 miles by car from where the Enterprise Tribe 
maintains its core governmental functions.  The Enterprise 
Tribe subsequently confirmed that the purpose of the proposed 
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trust acquisition was to host a class III gaming facility.  The 
tribe supported its application for a casino with documentation 
of the economic benefits that would accrue to the tribe and the 
surrounding community if the casino project went forward.   
In September 2011, the Secretary issued a favorable two-
part determination pursuant to section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA.  
The Secretary concluded that gaming on the parcel would be in 
the best interest of the Enterprise Tribe and would not be 
detrimental to the surrounding community or to neighboring 
tribes.  The Secretary also found that the Enterprise Tribe had 
a “significant historical connection” to the site.   
The Secretary requested that then-Governor Jerry Brown 
concur in this determination.  The Governor issued his 
concurrence in August 2012.  In 2013, the Secretary took the 
land into trust for the tribe for the purpose of gaming.   
On behalf of the state, the Governor negotiated a 
compact for class III gaming with the Enterprise Tribe.  The 
proposed compact was submitted to the Legislature for 
approval.  The Legislature failed to ratify the agreement, 
however, and it died by its own terms in 2014.  The Enterprise 
Tribe invoked IGRA’s judicial failsafe, arguing that the 
Legislature’s inaction amounted to a failure by the state to 
proceed in good faith.  The federal district court rejected the 
state’s assertion of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment as inconsistent with the waiver appearing at 
section 98005 of the Government Code.  (Estom Yumeka Maidu 
Tribe v. California (E.D.Cal. 2016) 163 F.Supp.3d 769, 776–
777.)  The court concluded that the state had not met its 
burden of showing it had negotiated in good faith.  (Id., at p. 
786.)  It ordered the parties to conclude a compact within 60 
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days. 
 
(Id., 
at 
pp. 
786–787; 
see 
also 
25 
U.S.C. 
§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).) 
Neither this order nor subsequent mediation led to a 
compact.  In August 2016, the Secretary issued secretarial 
procedures for the conduct of class III gaming on the parcel.  
The Enterprise Tribe’s casino property — the Hard Rock Hotel 
& Casino Sacramento at Fire Mountain — has since opened at 
the Olivehurst site.  
Plaintiff United Auburn Indian Community of the 
Auburn Rancheria operates the Thunder Valley Casino Resort 
in Lincoln, California.  This casino is located within 25 miles of 
the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Sacramento at Fire Mountain.  
United Auburn asserts that the new casino will siphon 
business away from its facility, with negative economic 
consequences for the tribe.  In this lawsuit, United Auburn 
contends that as a matter of state law, the Governor lacks the 
power to concur in the Secretary’s two-part determination.  
The superior court rejected United Auburn’s argument, as did 
the Court of Appeal.  (United Auburn Indian Community of 
Auburn Rancheria v. Brown (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 36, 42.) 
E.  Other Litigation 
While this case was pending before us, we granted review 
in another matter that also presents the question whether the 
Governor has the power to concur.  In Stand Up for California! 
v. State of California (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 686 (Stand Up!), the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that the Governor 
lacked such authority, at least given the specific facts as 
alleged in that case.   
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In Stand Up!, the Governor issued a concurrence in 
connection with an off-reservation casino proposed by the 
North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians and negotiated a 
compact for gaming operations by the tribe.  The off-
reservation land where the casino would be situated was then 
taken into trust by the federal government.  Unlike here, the 
Legislature ratified the compact that the Governor had 
negotiated.  But the compact was made subject to a voter 
referendum (Proposition 48) at the November 2014 election, at 
which time it was rejected by the voters.  (See Stand Up!, 
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 691–694 [recounting these events].) 
All three justices on the Stand Up! panel concluded that 
under the circumstances, the Governor lacked the authority to 
concur with the Secretary’s two-part determination.  Justice 
Smith, emphasizing that voters had rejected the gaming 
compact the Governor had negotiated, determined that “it 
would be perverse to find the Governor has an implied 
authority based on an express power [to compact] that the 
state has finally decided not to exercise, after protracted 
consideration by the Governor, the Legislature, and the 
voters.”  (Stand Up!, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 700.)   
Concurring and dissenting in Stand Up!, Justice Detjen 
focused on the fact that a concurrence had been issued and a 
compact had been negotiated before the federal government 
acquired the land in trust for the tribe.  She explained, 
“Because the land was not held in trust at the time the 
Governor negotiated the announced compact, the Governor was 
not negotiating a compact for gaming on Indian lands and, 
thus, exceeded any authority granted by Proposition 1A.”  
(Stand Up!, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 715 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
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Detjen, J.).)  Because the concurrence related to what Justice 
Detjen regarded as an improper exercise of the compacting 
power, it too was invalid.  (Id., at pp. 710, 718–719 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Detjen, J.).) 
Also concurring and dissenting, Justice Franson took the 
position that regardless of whether a gaming compact has or 
has not been approved, the state Constitution, as amended by 
Proposition 1A, does not grant the Governor the power to 
concur.  Regarding Proposition 1A, he explained, “[E]xpanding 
Indian gaming to off-reservation locations was and is a 
controversial issue of public policy with a wide range of 
consequences for Californians.  It is implausible that the 
average voter would have understood the controversy was 
being resolved by an undisclosed, implied grant of the 
authority to concur.”  (Stand Up!, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 
723 (conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J.).)3    
II.  DISCUSSION 
“ ‘In construing constitutional and statutory provisions, 
whether enacted by the Legislature or by initiative, the intent 
of the enacting body is the paramount consideration.’ ”  
(Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 505.)  We construe the 
language of a measure approved by the electorate as it would 
                                        
3  
Justice Franson’s concurring and dissenting opinion in 
Stand Up! used “the phrase ‘off-reservation casinos’ to mean 
casinos located on ‘after-acquired trust land’ for which the 
Secretary of the Interior’s . . . two-part determination and the 
Governor’s concurrence is required before casino-type gambling 
may proceed at that location.”  (Stand Up!, supra, 
6 Cal.App.5th at p. 722, fn. 1 (conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J.).) 
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be understood by an average voter.  (People v. Adelmann (2018) 
4 Cal.5th 1071, 1080 [“ ‘[t]he particularized meaning of words 
in complex, legislatively enacted statutes has little bearing on 
the interpretation of words in an initiative, which we construe 
according to their ordinary meanings as understood by ‘the 
average voter’ ”]; see also Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 894, 902; Wallace v. Zinman (1927) 200 Cal. 585, 592.)  
This general rule whereby we construe words as carrying their 
normal, everyday meanings is subject to an exception when it 
appears that voters would have understood a term as having a 
special or technical meaning in its specific context.  (Steinhart 
v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1318; Kaiser v. 
Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538.)  We also presume that the 
average voter is aware of existing law, but this presumption is 
“not conclusive.”  (Santos v. Brown (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398, 
410.)   
A. Article IV, Section 19(f) Does Not Confer a 
Power To Concur 
As added by Proposition 1A, article IV, section 19(f) 
carves out a limited exception to the general prohibitions on 
lotteries and casino gaming that appear elsewhere in the same 
section of the state Constitution.  Article IV, section 19(f) 
provides, in full, “Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and 
any other provision of state law, the Governor is authorized to 
negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the 
Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the 
conduct of lottery games and banking and percentage card 
games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in 
California in accordance with federal law.  Accordingly, slot 
machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card 
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games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on 
tribal lands subject to those compacts.” 
As Justice Franson determined in his concurring and 
dissenting opinion in Stand Up!, an average voter would not 
have understood this language as giving the Governor the 
power to concur.  Article IV, section 19(f) speaks only of 
compacts to be ratified by the Legislature, not gubernatorial 
concurrences.  This cannot be regarded as an inadvertent 
oversight.  By giving or withholding a concurrence, a governor 
exercises veto power over the application of section 20(b)(1)(A) 
of IGRA, the broadest and perhaps most controversial of the 
exceptions to the general prohibition against gaming on after-
acquired tribal lands.  (All, supra, 15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 
p. 304; Jensen, supra, 47 Washburn L.J. at p. 688.)  Given how 
federal courts have construed Government Code section 98005, 
recognizing a power to concur means that a determination by a 
single state official, the Governor, imposes upon the state an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith for class III gaming on 
property associated with a positive two-part determination by 
the Secretary.  In fact, the Governor’s concurrence is the only 
authorization by the state that is absolutely necessary for a 
casino offering this kind of gaming to open at such a site.  The 
facts of this case demonstrate as much — the Hard Rock Hotel 
& Casino Sacramento at Fire Mountain has become 
operational without the Legislature ever having ratified a 
compact, with secretarial procedures for the conduct of gaming 
having been imposed upon the state instead.  Nothing within 
article IV, section 19(f) reasonably conveys that it gives the 
Governor such a consequential power.  (Cf. In re Christian S. 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 782 [“We are not persuaded the 
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Legislature would have silently, or at best obscurely, decided 
so important and controversial a public policy matter and 
created a significant departure from the existing law”].) 
Nor is the existence of a power to concur somehow 
implied by Proposition 1A’s authorization of gaming compacts.  
The Governor’s involvement with a compact is “of a 
qualitatively different nature from his concurrence in the 
Interior Secretary’s discretionary ‘best-interests’ waiver of 
§ 2719’s general gaming prohibition.”  (Keweenaw Bay Indian 
Community v. U.S. (6th Cir. 1998) 136 F.3d 469, 477.)  Under 
IGRA, compacts and concurrences are distinct acts with 
different consequences.  (See Keweenaw Bay, at p. 475 [“the 
existence of a valid, approved compact does not eliminate other 
statutory requirements, in this case, conformity with § 2719”].)  
Class II gaming can occur on off-reservation lands pursuant to 
a concurrence, without the need for a gaming compact.  And 
compacts can be completed and ratified even if the Governor 
lacks the power to concur, provided that they authorize only 
class III gaming operations on trust lands acquired on or 
before October 17, 1988, or on after-acquired trust lands for 
which no concurrence is required.  These are in fact the most 
common kinds of gaming compacts; as previously mentioned, 
not one of the compacts directly before the voters at the March 
2000 primary election required a concurrence to become 
effective.   
In short, a voter in the March 2000 primary election 
would not have understood Proposition 1A’s authorization of 
gaming compacts as subsuming an implied power to concur.  
By authorizing compacts but not concurrences, Proposition 1A 
struck a balance.  The measure permitted a relatively broad 
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array of class III tribal gaming (at least compared to what was 
previously allowed) on reservation lands and after-acquired 
trust lands for which no concurrence is required, but it did not 
open the door to the most open-ended and potentially 
controversial category of class III casino developments, those 
requiring the exercise of the concurrence power.   
B. The Ballot Materials for Proposition 1A Do Not 
Support a Power To Concur 
The ballot materials associated with Proposition 1A 
provide additional indications that the voters who approved 
that measure did not intend to confer the power to concur.  
Where, as here, a constitutional amendment has been 
approved by the voters, “the ballot summary and arguments 
and analysis presented to the electorate in connection with a 
particular measure may be helpful in determining the probable 
meaning of uncertain language.”  (Amador Valley Joint Union 
High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 
208, 245–246.)  Nothing within the voter pamphlet for the 
March 2000 primary election explained to voters that 
Proposition 1A would give the Governor the power to concur.  
To the contrary, through such silence and the affirmative 
representations of the measure’s proponents, these materials 
suggested that Proposition 1A would not pave the way for class 
III casinos on after-acquired trust lands through section 
20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA. 
Beginning with the Legislative Analyst’s analysis of the 
measure, this description never raised the possibility that 
Proposition 1A could lead to off-reservation gaming that 
requires a concurrence.  The analysis addressed Proposition 5, 
our Hotel Employees decision, and the gaming compacts with 
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57 tribes that would become effective if Proposition 1A passed 
and the federal government gave its approval.  (Voter 
Information Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 1A by Legis. 
Analyst, pp. 4–5.)  The analysis also explained that Proposition 
1A “amends the State Constitution to permit Indian tribes to 
conduct and operate slot machines, lottery games, and banked 
and percentage card games on Indian land.  These gambling 
activities could only occur if (1) the Governor and an Indian 
tribe reach agreement on a compact, (2) the Legislature 
approves the compact, and (3) the federal government approves 
the compact.”  (Voter Information Guide, analysis of Prop. 1A 
by Legis. Analyst, p. 5.)  By failing to include a concurrence 
among the prerequisites for class III gaming, this analysis 
conveyed that the measure authorized only gaming operations 
for which no concurrence is required.  
The arguments by proponents of Proposition 1A that 
appeared within the spring 2000 ballot pamphlet carried a 
similar message.  The argument in favor of Proposition 1A 
advised that voter approval was necessary to preserve tribal 
gaming where it was currently being conducted:  “We are 
asking you to vote YES on Proposition 1A so we can keep the 
gaming we have on our reservations.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 1A, p. 6.)  This 
argument also explained, “Prop 1A has been put on the March 
ballot to . . . establish clearly that Indian gaming on tribal 
lands is legal in California.”  (Ibid.)  In response to opponents’ 
arguments that “[c]asinos won’t be limited to remote locations” 
(Voter Information Guide, argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7) 
and “Indian tribes are already buying up prime property for 
casinos in our towns and cities” (ibid.), proponents quoted a 
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former field investigator for the National Indian Gaming 
Commission as saying, “ ‘Proposition 1A and federal law 
strictly limit Indian gaming to tribal land.  The claim that 
casinos could be built anywhere is totally false’ ” (Voter 
Information Guide, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A, p. 
7), and repeated an economist’s assertion that ‘‘ ‘[t]he majority 
of Indian Tribes are located on remote reservations and the 
fact is their markets will only support a limited number of 
machines’ ” (ibid.). 
At oral argument, counsel for the Governor characterized 
at least the first of these responses as “clever” and technically 
correct.  But when reviewing a ballot argument for insight into 
voter intent, the question is not whether a party to the debate 
earns points for artful wordplay.  What matters instead is how 
an argument contributed, if at all, to a voter’s understanding of 
the measure to which it pertains.  Here, an average voter 
would have understood these responses as addressing the 
opponents’ assertion that if Proposition 1A passed, casinos 
could crop up in towns and cities across the state.  The 
responses imparted to an average voter that this claim was 
false, and that the casinos authorized by Proposition 1A would 
be situated on “ ‘remote reservations’ ” (Voter Information 
Guide, supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7), or 
at least where tribes were “ ‘located’ ” (ibid.).  By implication, 
these responses corroborated what an average voter already 
would have gleaned from the proposition’s text: that the 
measure did not confer the power to concur.  For as has been 
explained, if the Governor does have this power, it can open 
the door to gaming facilities situated on any land within the 
state that the federal government has found suitable for 
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gaming and agrees to take into trust for a tribe — decisions 
that do not strictly demand that the property be close to an 
existing reservation or that the tribe have a historical 
relationship to the proposed trust land.4  
                                        
4  
Similarly, 
on 
www.yeson1A.net, 
a 
website 
that 
Proposition 1A’s proponents directed voters toward in the 
ballot materials (Voter Information Guide, supra, rebuttal to 
argument against Prop. 1A, p. 7), the most pertinent 
explanation of the measure’s effect on where tribal gaming 
could take place equated “Indian lands” and “tribal lands” with 
“reservation lands,” and indicated that tribal casinos would be 
limited to these lands.  The website included the following 
exchange:  “Q. How would the number of casinos be limited 
under the compact and would the passage of Prop 1A allow 
Indian tribes to build casinos outside of tribal lands?  [¶]  
A. There are several clear limitations:  First, existing federal 
law strictly limits tribal gaming to Indian lands only.  The 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) passed by Congress in 
1988, mandates that Indian casinos can only be located on 
tribal reservation lands.  [¶]  Second, under the recent tribal-
state compact signed by the Governor, a California tribe is 
specifically prohibited from operating more than two casinos 
on their reservation.  [¶]  Third, the economic reality will 
continue to limit the number of Indian casinos in our state.  In 
most areas where Indian gaming is economically viable, the 
local tribes already have a casino.  Most non-gaming tribes are 
located too far from population centers, in remote areas where 
an Indian casino simply would not be practical.  In Nevada, 
casinos are legal everywhere but you can drive for miles 
through that state without seeing a casino in non-urban areas 
because the market to support them does not exist.”  (Yes on 
1A, Proposition 1A: Answers to Common Questions (Mar. 6, 
2000)  
[as of Aug. 28, 2020], italics added; this citation is archived by 
year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.)  Regardless of whether 
 
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All in all, I agree with Justice Franson’s conclusion in 
Stand Up! that Proposition 1A cannot properly be construed as 
giving the Governor the power to concur.  As he recapped, after 
an exhaustive analysis of the issue, “First, the text of 
Proposition 1A plainly omits the power to concur in the 
Secretary’s two-part determination.  Second, an implied grant 
of that power is not necessary under the principles of 
California law that govern necessary implications.  Third, the 
wording of Proposition 1A and the materials in the ballot 
pamphlet did not inform the average voter that approving 
Proposition 1A would grant the Governor the power to concur 
or, more generally, would grant the Governor the authority to 
either veto or approve a proposed off-reservation casino.  
Fourth, expanding Indian gaming to off-reservation locations 
was and is a controversial question of public policy with a wide 
range of consequences, and it is implausible that the average 
voter would have understood that Proposition 1A granted the 
Governor an implied authority to concur and thereby allowed 
off-reservation casinos.  The controversy should not be resolved 
by implication when the voters were not informed that such an 
                                                                                                           
 
Proposition 1A actually limited casinos to reservation lands, as 
opposed to reservation lands and a limited array of off-
reservation lands where no concurrence would be required for 
the institution of casino operations, this description of where 
casinos could appear if Proposition 1A passed is more 
consistent with an interpretation of the measure as not 
encompassing a power to concur than it is with the majority’s 
construction of the constitutional amendment as authorizing 
the more open-ended siting of casinos in the state.   
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implication existed.”  (Stand Up!, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 
767 (conc. & dis. opn. of Franson, J.).)  
C. The Arguments for Recognizing a Power To 
Concur Are Unpersuasive 
The most weighty argument in favor of the majority’s 
interpretation of Proposition 1A derives from the use of the 
term “Indian lands” within article IV, section 19(f)’s 
authorization of compacts for gaming “by federally recognized 
Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with 
federal law.”  As previously observed, IGRA provides a 
framework for tribal gaming on “Indian lands,” which the 
statute defines as “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian 
reservation; and [¶] (B) any lands title to which is either held 
in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe 
or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject 
to restriction by the United States against alienation and over 
which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.”  (25 
U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B).)  This definition leads to an argument 
in favor of recognizing a power to concur that proceeds as 
follows: Proposition 1A authorizes compacts for gaming on 
“Indian lands”; IGRA supplies a broad definition of “Indian 
lands”; an average voter would have understood Proposition 1A 
as authorizing compacts for casinos located on any such lands; 
therefore, article IV, section 19(f) incorporates an implied 
power to concur, because a concurrence is necessary for class 
III gaming operations on certain after-acquired Indian lands.   
I find this argument unpersuasive.  First, it is unclear at 
best that an average voter would have understood “Indian 
lands,” as that term is used in article IV, section 19(f), as 
carrying the technical meaning assigned to it by section 4 of 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
26 
IGRA.  Article IV, section 19(f) uses “Indian lands” 
interchangeably with another term, “tribal lands,” that 
appears nowhere in the federal statute.  A voter could have 
regarded this use of different phrasing as communicating that 
Proposition 1A did not embrace the definition IGRA attaches to 
one, and only one, of these terms.  Second, even assuming that 
voters did understand “Indian lands” within Proposition 1A as 
invoking IGRA’s definition of this term, article IV, section 19(f) 
does not say that gaming may occur on any or all of these 
lands.  Instead, this provision allows the Governor to 
“negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the 
Legislature” through which certain specified forms of gaming 
may occur on Indian lands, and repeats that this gaming may 
occur “on tribal lands subject to those compacts.”  Without any 
reference to a power to concur, an average voter would have 
understood article IV, section 19(f) as envisioning class III 
gaming only on those “Indian lands” or “tribal lands” on which 
a compact, and a compact alone, provides sufficient state 
authorization for the institution of gaming operations.  
The majority also claims that the Governor possesses the 
“inherent power to concur to allow class III gaming.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 20.)  But this bold assertion is exactly that — 
mere assertion.  The majority nowhere explains why the 
Governor possesses such inherent authority in a sphere 
controlled by the state Constitution’s flat prohibition of Nevada 
and New Jersey-style casinos and its specification of a limited 
exception for tribal gaming.  These provisions of article IV, 
section 19 establish that the Governor has no such inherent 
power.  That which is not authorized by article IV, section 19(f) 
remains forbidden by article IV, section 19(e).  And as I have 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
27 
explained, neither the text nor the context of article IV, section 
19(f) supports an interpretation of this provision as authorizing 
the Governor to concur.  In light of article IV, section 19(e)’s 
broad prohibition of Nevada and New Jersey-style casinos, this 
conclusion resolves the question before us.  The electorate that 
approved Proposition 1A was not required to go further and 
explicitly deny the Governor the power to concur in order to 
prevent its exercise.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 19–20, 35–37.)   
To draw from Justice Franson’s concurring and 
dissenting opinion in Stand Up! one final time, “The initiative 
process functions best when voters are (1) informed that the 
initiative addresses a controversial issue with a wide range of 
impacts for Californians and (2) told how the initiative resolves 
that controversial issue.  When voters are so informed, courts 
can ‘give effect to the voters’ formally expressed intent, without 
speculating about how they might have felt concerning subjects 
on which they were not asked to vote.’  (Ross v. RagingWire 
Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 930 . . . .)”  
(Stand Up!, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 722–723 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Franson, J.).)  Today’s decision does not advance the 
goal of transparency.  Proposition 1A’s text and ballot 
materials 
emphasized 
legislative 
approval 
for 
gaming 
compacts, they did not disclose the existence of the power to 
concur, and they did not portray the proposition as opening the 
door to off-reservation gaming to the extent that concurrences 
can.  Under the circumstances, it is a mistake to conclude that 
the voters who approved the measure intended to give the 
Governor the power to concur. 
 
 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
28 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Legislative constitutional amendments, like initiatives, 
provide concrete examples of direct democracy in action.  
Courts must review the electorate’s handiwork carefully.  If we 
give voters more or less than what they approved, our 
interpretations can sow cynicism and distrust of the process.   
To accurately capture the intent behind a measure 
approved by the electorate, we must appreciate how average 
voters genuinely would have understood what was put before 
them.  Realistically, the average voter at the March 2000 
election would not have understood article IV, section 19(f) as 
going beyond its plain language regarding compacts and also 
giving the Governor the power to concur.  Such a voter would 
not have locked into article IV, section 19(f)’s reference to 
“Indian lands,” consulted IGRA, and concluded that even 
though the constitutional amendment did not mention a power 
to concur, it necessarily contemplated casinos that could exist 
only through the exercise of such a power.  And such a voter 
would not have understood Proposition 1A, with its focus on 
legislatively ratified compacts, as nevertheless allowing a 
casino to be built on off-reservation land such as that involved 
here even without a compact, so long as the Governor 
concurred and other prerequisites were met. 
Voters clearly have the power to authorize tribal gaming 
on off-reservation trust lands to a greater extent than they did 
with Proposition 1A.  But by all indications, they chose a path 
that steps out of the shadow of the general state policy against 
Nevada and New Jersey-style casinos only so far as to allow 
class III gaming on those lands where no gubernatorial 
concurrence is required.  Where the majority sees twilight, I 
UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN 
RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 
 
 
29 
see a series of decisions by the electorate — first prohibiting 
certain kinds of casino operations, then relaxing this 
restriction to a limited degree — to which we must defer.  
Because I believe that today’s decision gives voters something 
different from what they bargained for, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
I Concur: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion United Auburn Indian Community of the Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 4 Cal.App.5th 36    
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S238544  
Date Filed:  August 31, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior   
County:  Sacramento 
Judge:  Eugene L. Balonon    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Bingham McCutchen, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas F. Gede and Colin C. West for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Snell & Wilmer, Sean M. Sherlock, Todd Lundell and Jenny Hua for Stand Up For California! as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Fredericks Peebles & Morgan and Michael A. Robinson for Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Office of Frank Lawrence, Frank R. Lawrence, Zehava Zevit; Forman & Associates, George Forman, 
Jay B. Shapiro and Margaret Rosenfeld for the Mooretown Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California and 
Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Community as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor General, Sara 
J. Drake, Assistant Attorney General, William P. Torngren and Timothy M. Muscat, Deputy Attorneys 
General, Max Carter-Oberstone, Deputy State Solicitor General, and Janill L. Richards, Principal State 
Deputy Solicitor General, for Defendant and Respondent.   
 
Dentons US, Charles A. Bird, Matthew G. Adams; Maier Pfeffer Kim Geary & Cohen, Michael S. Pfeffer 
and John A. Maier for the Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria, California as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Maier Pfeffer Kim Geary & Cohen, John A. Maier; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Danielle 
Spinelli, Christopher E. Babbitt, Jonathan A. Bressler and Claire Chung for North Fork Rancheria of Mono 
Indians as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.   
 
 
   
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Thomas Gede 
Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP 
One Market Street, Spear Tower 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
(415) 442-1000 
 
Michael J. Mongan 
State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3920