Title: Williams v. Ditto
Citation: 601 So. 2d 482
Docket Number: 1910489
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 1992

601 So. 2d 482 (1992)
Hubert Morris WILLIAMS and Nerlandia Virginia Rojas Williams
v.
James D. DITTO, et al.
1910489.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 19, 1992.
Stuart E. Smith of Bell Richardson, P.A., Huntsville, for appellants.
Walter Allen Davis, Huntsville, for appellee Ditto.
Jay E. Emerson, Jr., of Higgs &amp; Emerson, Huntsville, for appellees ERA Rosenblum Realty Co. and Lynn McKinley.
Michael E. Brodowski and Andrew Dalins, Huntsville, for appellee State Nat. Mortg. Corp.
Roger L. Bates of Tingle, Sexton, Murvin, Watson &amp; Bates, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees Collateral Mortg. Ltd. and Darlene Sullivan.
*483 SHORES, Justice.
Hubert Morris Williams and his wife, Nerlandia Virginia Rojas Williams, purchased a house and real estate in Morgan County, Alabama; the house was found to have structural defects. They sued the sellers and the real estate agents involved in the sale. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, except one negligence claim. The summary judgment was made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P. The purchasers appeal from the summary judgment for the defendants. We affirm.
The Williamses sued the sellers, James D. Ditto and his wife, Diane J. Ditto; two mortgage companies; the Williamses' real estate agency; and the real estate company involved in the sale and financing of the residence.[1] The complaint alleged suppression of material facts, Alabama Code 1975, § 6-5-102; fraud, deceit, mistake, and negligence; and violation of the Alabama Real Estate License Law, § 34-27-1 et seq.
The Dittos raised the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations, contributory negligence, and release. The Dittos also filed a counterclaim against the Williamses, alleging abuse of process, and they filed a third-party complaint against Don Kennedy House Moving, Inc., and Don Kennedy, alleging breach of contract in the repair of structural defects in the residence.
Following discovery, all defendants moved for a summary judgment. The Williamses filed a brief in opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The judge entered an order on the motions, dismissing all claims against all defendants except for the negligence claim against the Dittos for failure to properly repair the structural defects. The order read as follows:
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment for the defendants on all claims save the negligence claim. Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P., sets forth a two-tiered standard for determining whether to enter a summary judgment. In order to enter a summary judgment, the trial court must determine: 1) that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and 2) that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a summary judgment was properly entered, the reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Turner v. Systems Fuel, Inc., 475 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala.1985); Ryan v. Charles Townsend Ford, Inc., 409 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 1981). Rule 56 is read in conjunction with the "substantial evidence rule" (§ 12-21-12, Code 1975), for actions filed after June *485 11, 1987. See Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). In order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present "substantial evidence," i.e., "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
We have carefully examined the record in this case. Applying Alabama law, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed on the authority of Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Ray v. Montgomery, supra; Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1987).
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  ERA Rosenblum Realty Company and Lynn McKinley; Collateral Mortgage, Ltd., and Darlene Sullivan; and State National Mortgage Corporation.