Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Dennis J. Ryan
Citation: 2009 WI 39
Docket Number: 2007AP002629-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2009

2009 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2629-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against , Dennis J. Ryan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Dennis J. Ryan, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RYAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 29, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 39
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2629-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Dennis J. Ryan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis J. Ryan, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 29, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee, Attorney Judith Sperling-Newton.  Based on a 
comprehensive 
stipulation 
between 
the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Dennis J. Ryan, the referee found 
that Attorney Ryan had committed six violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  As jointly requested in the 
stipulation, the referee recommended that Attorney Ryan be 
publicly reprimanded for his professional misconduct and that he 
be ordered to pay $8,000 in restitution to a former client's 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
2 
 
parent, who had paid Attorney Ryan's requested fee.  The referee 
went beyond the stipulation in recommending that Attorney Ryan 
be required to provide a detailed billing to another former 
client, G.S., and that the OLR supervise Attorney Ryan's 
practice for a period of two years.  Neither party has appealed 
from the referee's report and recommendation.  Thus, our review 
proceeds under SCR 22.17(2).1 
¶2 
Having 
independently 
considered 
the 
matter, 
we 
determine that a public reprimand is an appropriate level of 
discipline for Attorney Ryan's misconduct.  We agree that 
Attorney Ryan should be required to pay the recommended 
restitution and to provide a detailed billing to G.S.  While we 
agree with the referee's recommendation that the OLR should 
supervise Attorney Ryan for a period of two years, we modify and 
clarify the scope of that supervision.  Finally, we determine 
that Attorney Ryan should be required to pay the full costs of 
this disciplinary proceeding, which were $2,530.18 as of 
November 25, 2008. 
¶3 
Attorney Ryan was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin 
in 
September 
1995. 
 
He 
practices 
as 
a 
sole 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides as follows:  Review; appeal. 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
3 
 
practitioner in Madison.  He has not previously been the subject 
of professional discipline. 
¶4 
This disciplinary proceeding involves two separate 
grievances, one involving Attorney Ryan's representation of M.H. 
and 
one 
involving 
the 
representation 
of 
G.S. 
 
Both 
representations involved defending individuals charged with or 
convicted of a crime. 
¶5 
The facts set forth below are taken from the referee's 
report and recommendation, which in turn relied on the parties' 
stipulation.  We note that the stipulation, entered after the 
filing of an amended complaint and prior to a scheduled 
disciplinary hearing, expressly provided that Attorney Ryan 
understood the misconduct allegations against him, that he 
understood 
the 
ramifications 
of 
the 
stipulated 
level 
of 
discipline, that he understood his right to contest the OLR's 
allegations, that he was entering the stipulation knowingly and 
voluntarily, that he was admitting the misconduct charged by the 
OLR, and that he was assenting to the level of discipline sought 
by the OLR. 
¶6 
The first five counts of misconduct involve Attorney 
Ryan's representation of M.H., who was himself an attorney.  In 
April 2004 M.H. was found guilty of four separate criminal 
offenses in a federal prosecution.  While M.H. was awaiting 
sentencing, 
the 
federal 
district 
court 
imposed 
"Special 
Administrative Measures" ("SAMs") on M.H.'s confinement.  The 
SAMs, 
among 
other 
things, 
restricted 
M.H.'s 
ability 
to 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
4 
 
communicate with persons outside the facility where he was being 
held. 
¶7 
In early 2005 Attorney Ryan initiated contact by 
telephone with M.H.'s father.  This telephone contact was not 
solicited by M.H., his parents, or anyone acting on their 
behalf.  At the time of this telephone communication, Attorney 
Ryan had no existing relationship with M.H. or with any member 
of M.H.'s family.  During the initial telephone conversation, 
Attorney Ryan told M.H.'s father that he had gone to the same 
law school as M.H. and was available and willing to provide 
legal representation to M.H. and/or M.H.'s family members.  As a 
result of additional contacts between Attorney Ryan and M.H.'s 
parents, in late March or early April 2005 M.H. agreed to retain 
Attorney Ryan. 
¶8 
On April 6, 2005, the federal district court sentenced 
M.H. to a total of 480 months of imprisonment.  Apparently on 
the day of sentencing, M.H. filed a pro se notice of appeal from 
his convictions.  On April 7, 2005, M.H. sent a letter to 
Attorney Ryan, requesting him to assist M.H. with his appeal and 
with the removal of the SAMs. 
¶9 
At some point over the next several weeks, Attorney 
Ryan told M.H.'s parents that he would represent M.H. and would 
require a fee of $10,000.  M.H.'s father subsequently paid that 
amount to Attorney Ryan.  Attorney Ryan has stated that he 
considered the $10,000 to be a flat fee, but he never prepared a 
written fee agreement regarding his representation of M.H. or 
the nature of the fee. 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
5 
 
¶10 Attorney Ryan did very little to further M.H.'s 
interests.  He did not visit M.H. in prison.  Although Attorney 
Ryan did speak with M.H. by telephone, he did so on just one 
occasion, July 15, 2005.  On that same date, M.H.'s mother sent 
an e-mail to Attorney Ryan stating she wished to terminate the 
relationship, 
requesting 
an 
accounting 
of 
his 
time, 
and 
demanding a refund of the $10,000 that M.H.'s father had sent to 
Attorney Ryan.  On September 19, 2005, M.H. himself sent a 
letter to Attorney Ryan, in which he stated that Attorney Ryan's 
assistance was no longer necessary since M.H. was preparing his 
own appellate briefs.  M.H.'s letter further requested that 
Attorney Ryan refund $8,000 to his father.  M.H. sent another 
letter on December 5, 2005, again asking for a refund of $8,000.  
Attorney Ryan refused, however, to refund any portion of the 
$10,000. 
¶11 During the few months that Attorney Ryan was engaged 
to represent M.H., he did not enter an appearance on M.H.'s 
behalf in any federal court.  He did not prepare any briefs or 
pleadings on M.H.'s behalf and did not even provide a written 
analysis of M.H.'s appeal.  It appears that the extent of 
Attorney Ryan's efforts on M.H.'s behalf was to conduct some 
legal research regarding the SAMs imposed on M.H., although he 
did not take any formal action seeking to remove or even modify 
them. 
¶12 On the basis of these facts, Attorney Ryan stipulated 
that he had committed five counts of professional misconduct.  
In particular, the referee found that by making an unsolicited 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
6 
 
telephone call to M.H.'s father, Attorney Ryan had impermissibly 
initiated personal contact with a prospective client's family 
member, in violation of former SCR 20:7.3(c).2  Second, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Ryan had failed to act with 
reasonable diligence, thereby violating SCR 20:1.3,3 by failing 
to advance M.H.'s interests either on his appeal or in his 
challenge to the SAMs imposed on his confinement.  Next, the 
                                                 
2 Effective July 1, 2007, substantial changes were made to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, SCR Chapter 20.  See S. Ct. Order 04-07, 2007 WI 4, 
293 Wis. 2d xv, 726 N.W.2d Ct.R-45 (eff. July 1, 2007); and 
S. Ct. 
Order 
06-04, 
2007 
WI 
48, 
297 
Wis. 2d xv, 
730 
N.W.2d Ct.R.-29 (eff. July 1, 2007).  Because most of the 
conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2007, unless 
otherwise indicated, all references to the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2007. 
Former SCR 20:7.3(c) provided: 
 
A lawyer shall not initiate personal contact, 
including telephone contact, with a prospective client 
for the purpose of obtaining professional employment 
except in the following circumstances and subject to 
the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraph (d): 
 
(1)  If the prospective client is a close friend, 
relative or former client, or one whom the lawyer 
reasonably believes to be a client. 
 
(2)  Under the auspices of a public or charitable 
legal services organization. 
 
(3) Under the auspices of a bona fide political, 
social, 
civic, 
fraternal, 
employee 
or 
trade 
organization whose purposes include but are not 
limited to providing or recommending legal services, 
if the legal services are related to the principal 
purposes of the organization. 
3 SCR 20:1.3 states that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
7 
 
referee found that Attorney Ryan's demand for a $10,000 flat fee 
without advancing M.H.'s interests had constituted the charging 
of an excessive fee, in violation of former SCR 20:1.5(a).4  In 
addition, Attorney Ryan's failure to explain the nature of his 
proposed fee and the legal services that he would render in 
exchange for that fee violated former SCR 20:1.5(b).5  Finally, 
                                                 
4 Former SCR 20:1.5(a) provided: 
 
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.  The factors 
to be considered in determining the reasonableness of 
a fee include the following: 
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services; 
 
(4) the 
amount 
involved 
and 
the 
results 
obtained; 
 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client 
or by the circumstances; 
 
(6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; 
 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
5 Former SCR 20:1.5(b) stated, "When the lawyer has not 
regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee 
shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, 
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the 
representation." 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
8 
 
the referee determined that by failing to refund any portion of 
the $10,000 fee after his representation had been terminated, 
when he had not earned a fee of that amount, Attorney Ryan had 
violated former SCR 20:1.16(d).6 
¶13 The second grievance against Attorney Ryan was filed 
by 
G.S., 
who 
paid 
$1,500 
to 
Attorney 
Ryan 
for 
legal 
representation in two pending criminal cases.  As was the case 
in the representation of M.H., Attorney Ryan did not prepare any 
written fee agreement. 
¶14 Attorney Ryan did represent G.S. at a jury trial in 
the first case.  After being found guilty at that trial, G.S. 
then pled no contest to the misdemeanor charges in the other 
case. 
¶15 G.S. 
subsequently 
terminated 
Attorney 
Ryan's 
representation and requested a detailed billing of the work 
Attorney Ryan had performed on his cases.  Attorney Ryan did not 
provide the billing or otherwise respond to G.S.'s request. 
¶16 With 
respect 
to 
this 
grievance, 
Attorney 
Ryan 
stipulated, and the referee found, that the failure to respond 
                                                 
6 Former SCR 20:1.16(d) provided as follows: 
 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
9 
 
to G.S.'s request for a detailed billing of Attorney Ryan's work 
had violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(3).7 
¶17 Based on these findings of misconduct, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Ryan be publicly reprimanded, as 
requested in the stipulation.8  She stated that she had 
considered the seriousness of the misconduct, the need to 
impress that seriousness upon Attorney Ryan, the need to protect 
the public and the courts from repetition of the misconduct by 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) (effective July 1, 2007) states that a 
lawyer "shall promptly respond to a client's request for 
information concerning fees and expenses." 
8 After learning of the stipulation between the OLR and 
Attorney Ryan, G.S. filed a motion, based upon SCR 22.09(2), 
seeking an opportunity to submit a response to the stipulation.  
The motion is denied.  Although SCR 22.09(2) does allow a 
grievant to submit a written response to the director of the OLR 
when a stipulation for a consensual reprimand is reached without 
the initiation of a full disciplinary proceeding before this 
court, that rule does not apply to the present case, where the 
stipulation was reached after the initiation of a formal 
disciplinary proceeding and after a referee had been appointed.  
Under the current version of the rules, a grievant is not 
considered a party to a disciplinary proceeding before this 
court and does not have standing to file independent motions and 
submissions, absent leave of this court to intervene.  SCR 21.12 
("A grievant is not a party to a misconduct or medical 
incapacity 
proceeding 
brought 
by 
the 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation.").  In a disciplinary proceeding, the OLR represents 
the interests not only of the grievant, but of the general 
public and the judicial system of this state.  The motion filed 
by G.S., however, raises an important question as to whether 
there should be some procedure in the rules whereby grievants 
may comment on stipulations between the OLR and a respondent 
attorney that are executed after a disciplinary proceeding has 
been initiated.  The court appreciates G.S.'s interest in this 
matter and will raise the issue of a potential comment procedure 
for grievants in such situations with the OLR staff and the 
board of administrative oversight. 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
10 
 
Attorney Ryan, and the need to deter other attorneys from 
similar misconduct.  She also stated that no aggravating factors 
had been brought to her attention.  On the other side of the 
equation, she noted as mitigating factors Attorney Ryan's lack 
of prior discipline and his interest in making restitution. 
¶18 The referee also recommended that Attorney Ryan pay 
restitution to M.H.'s father in the amount of $8,000 by July 1, 
2009.  This restitution payment was also part of the parties' 
stipulation. 
¶19 In addition to the provisions of the stipulation, the 
referee recommended that this court impose two additional 
requirements on Attorney Ryan.  The first requirement was that 
Attorney Ryan provide the detailed billing statement to G.S. 
that he had requested around the time he had terminated Attorney 
Ryan's services. 
¶20 The 
second 
requirement 
relates 
to 
the 
OLR's 
supervision of Attorney Ryan.  Prior to issuing her report and 
recommendation, the referee conducted a telephone conference 
with Attorney Ryan and the OLR's retained counsel.  At that time 
the referee asked Attorney Ryan to prepare a plan to avoid 
similar problems in the future.  She also asked the OLR whether 
it would be willing to supervise Attorney Ryan's practice. 
¶21 Attorney Ryan responded to the referee's request by 
means of an August 15, 2008, e-mail message, which the referee 
has attached to her report and has made part of the record.  
Attached to the message was a sample fee agreement letter that 
Attorney Ryan said he had begun to use.  In the e-mail Attorney 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
11 
 
Ryan gave the impression that he had previously not been 
particularly concerned about setting forth the financial terms 
of a representation and that he had begun using a written fee 
agreement in order to protect himself when a client became 
dissatisfied with the outcome Attorney Ryan could achieve.  He 
stated, "The necessity, as with any agreement or contract, comes 
in safeguarding yourself when dissatisfaction erupts."  Attorney 
Ryan also stated that, given the fact that he had "worked alone 
and in the hardest areas of criminal law for a dozen years," he 
saw no point in being subjected to any form of supervision by 
the OLR.  His e-mail concluded with the following passage: 
I apologize if the tone of this email is less than one 
who is suitably meek and contrite.  In spite of all 
the second guessing and alarms, I know the work I do 
each day is beyond the reach of most of my peers.  
That, sadly, is the unseen part of my practice and 
myself. 
¶22 The OLR submitted a response, in which, without giving 
an advisory opinion on the sample fee agreement, it offered some 
general cautions about the use of "non-refundable" advance fees.  
The OLR also indicated that it would be willing to supervise 
Attorney Ryan's practice, if directed to do so by this court. 
¶23 Based on these interactions, the referee included a 
second additional recommendation.  Specifically, the referee 
recommended that the OLR supervise Attorney Ryan for a period of 
two years in the following ways: 
(1) Attorney Ryan must promptly submit to OLR all fee 
agreement letters and all trust account or client 
records that the OLR requests; and 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
12 
 
(2) The OLR should "ensure that respondent [Attorney Ryan] 
is at all times in compliance with the Supreme Court 
Rules." 
¶24 Our review of a referee's report and recommendation 
occurs under the following standards of review.  We affirm the 
referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, 
¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We review the referee's 
conclusions of law, however, on a de novo basis.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 
Wis. 2d 662, 
636 
N.W.2d 718. 
 
Finally, 
we 
determine 
the 
appropriate level of discipline given the particular facts of 
each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but 
benefiting from it.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶25 In the present case, we determine that the referee's 
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and we adopt them.  
We also adopt the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney 
Ryan committed each of the six counts of professional misconduct 
alleged by the OLR. 
¶26 We now turn to the referee's recommendations regarding 
the appropriate level of discipline, the obligations to Attorney 
Ryan's prior clients, and the supervision of Attorney Ryan's 
practice by the OLR.  With respect to the level of discipline, 
we conclude that a public reprimand is appropriate in these 
circumstances.  We note that we have imposed a public reprimand 
on an attorney with a prior private reprimand who had charged an 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
13 
 
unreasonable fee, had failed to refund an unearned portion of an 
advance fee, and had failed to act with reasonable diligence.  
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ward, 2005 WI 9, 278 
Wis. 2d 1, 691 N.W.2d 689.  In addition, although in the context 
of a reciprocal discipline matter, we have also imposed a public 
reprimand on an attorney who had made uninvited solicitations 
for legal work to an individual whose physical or mental state 
was such that the person could not exercise professional 
judgment in employing a lawyer.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Whiting, 2003 WI 124, 265 Wis. 2d 407, 667 N.W.2d 355 
(imposing discipline reciprocal to that imposed in Illinois 
under SCR 22.22).  While these cases may not contain the exact 
same facts as Attorney Ryan's situation, they provide support 
for imposing a public reprimand in this case, especially in 
light of the fact that Attorney Ryan has not previously been the 
subject of professional discipline and has stipulated to his 
professional misconduct. 
¶27 There are no disputes or questions about the referee's 
recommendations that Attorney Ryan pay $8,000 in restitution to 
M.H.'s father and that he provide detailed billing information 
to G.S.  The restitution payment to M.H.'s father was expressly 
included in the parties' stipulation.  Although the billing 
information requirement was not explicitly mentioned, Attorney 
Ryan did admit that he had violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) by not 
providing billing information to G.S. when requested to do so.  
Moreover, Attorney Ryan has not appealed from this portion of 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
14 
 
the referee's report.  We determine that both of these 
requirements are appropriate in this case.  
¶28 We next consider the referee's recommendation that the 
OLR should supervise Attorney Ryan's practice.  The second 
portion of the referee's recommendation in this regard asks us 
to order the OLR to "ensure that respondent [Attorney Ryan] is 
at all times in compliance with the Supreme Court Rules."  We 
think this is overly broad and would impose an unreasonable 
burden on the OLR.  In order to "ensure" compliance with all 
ethical rules at all times, the OLR would almost need to station 
a representative in Attorney Ryan's office to monitor his 
conduct. 
¶29 Moreover, 
several 
of 
the 
primary 
shortcomings 
identified in this disciplinary proceeding involve the specific 
issue of fees, including the establishment of a reasonable fee, 
the communication of that fee to the client, the calculation of 
that fee and the assessment of its reasonableness, and the 
return of unearned fees.  We therefore conclude that the OLR's 
supervision should relate to that specific part of Attorney 
Ryan's practice. 
¶30 Although Attorney Ryan has not appealed from this 
portion of the referee's recommendation, we note that his August 
15, 
2008, 
e-mail 
to the referee did argue against any 
supervision by the OLR.  Attorney Ryan contended that since 
privately retained clients are a small portion of his practice 
and since he has "worked alone and in the hardest areas of 
criminal defense for a dozen years now," there is no need for 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
15 
 
any supervision of any part of his practice.  The facts of this 
case and some of the comments in his e-mail indicate otherwise.  
Attorney Ryan made uninvited solicitations for legal work to a 
family clearly experiencing emotional turmoil and then argued 
that he should keep a $10,000 payment from that family when he 
had performed very little work.  His e-mail further acknowledged 
that in the past he had, at least to some extent, left his 
clients in the dark about financial matters because he had been 
embarrassed to discuss those issues.  He gave the impression 
that he had begun using written fee agreements in order to 
safeguard himself from clients who become dissatisfied by an 
adverse result.  While complying with this court's rules 
regarding fee agreements and the business side of the practice 
of law will have the added benefit of making it easier for 
attorneys to resolve fee-related disputes, one of the primary 
purposes of those disciplinary rules is to protect clients and 
prospective clients, many of whom are not sophisticated about 
financial matters and are in a vulnerable state when seeking 
legal representation.  Since Attorney Ryan's e-mail indicates 
that he does not fully appreciate or comprehend this fact, we 
conclude that some supervision of the financial aspect of his 
practice is appropriate.  We modify the wording of the referee's 
recommendation, however, to clarify the OLR's and Attorney 
Ryan's responsibilities. 
¶31 We also note that, although not in effect at the time 
of Attorney Ryan's conduct in this case, the current version of 
SCR 20:1.5 requires that, except for representations where it is 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
16 
 
reasonably foreseeable that the total cost of the representation 
will not exceed $1,000 and except for situations where the 
attorney will charge a regularly represented client on the same 
basis or rate as in the past, the scope of the representation 
and the basis or rate of the attorney's fee and expenses for 
which the client will be responsible must be communicated to the 
client in writing either before or within a reasonable time 
after 
commencing 
the 
representation. 
 
SCR 
20:1.5(b)(1).9  
Moreover, where the total cost of the representation is more 
than $1,000, a lawyer must also communicate in writing to the 
client the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer.  SCR 20:1.5(b)(2).10  Solely oral fee 
agreements 
are 
therefore 
no 
longer 
an 
option 
in 
most 
circumstances.  In addition, the rule and the comments thereto 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) (effective July 1, 2007) states: 
The scope of the representation and the basis or 
rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will 
be responsible shall be communicated to the client in 
writing, before or within a reasonable time after 
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer 
will charge a regularly represented client on the same 
basis or rate as in the past.  If it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the total cost of representation to 
the client, including attorney's fees, will be $1000 
or less, the communication may be oral or in writing. 
Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or 
expenses shall also be communicated in writing to the 
client. 
10 SCR 20:1.5(b)(2) (effective July 1, 2007) provides, "If 
the total cost of representation to the client, including 
attorney's fees, is more than $1000, the purpose and effect of 
any retainer or advance fee that is paid to the lawyer shall be 
communicated in writing." 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
17 
 
address a lawyer's obligations or suggested practices when there 
are subsequent changes in the basis or rate of the fee or 
expenses 
or 
when 
a 
fee 
estimate 
becomes 
substantially 
inaccurate.  The reader should consult the rule and the comments 
thereto for specific information.  It is sufficient in this 
context to note that the failure to provide adequate written fee 
information, when required by the rule, constitutes misconduct 
and subjects an attorney to professional discipline. 
¶32 Finally, we determine that Attorney Ryan should pay 
the full costs of this disciplinary hearing.  We note that 
Attorney Ryan did not file any objection to the OLR's statement 
of costs.  We conclude that the amount of those costs, $2,530.18 
as of November 25, 2008, is reasonable. 
¶33 IT IS ORDERED that Dennis J. Ryan is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Dennis J. Ryan shall provide to G.S. a detailed 
billing of the legal work performed on behalf of G.S. 
¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for a period of two years 
from the date of this order, Dennis J. Ryan shall provide 
promptly to the Office of Lawyer Regulation, upon request, any 
and all fee agreements, trust account records, billing records, 
written or electronic communications with clients or prospective 
clients regarding fees or costs, and related materials. 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent he has not 
already done so, Dennis J. Ryan shall pay restitution to M.H.'s 
father in the amount of $8,000 by July 1, 2009.  If restitution 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
18 
 
to M.H.'s father is not paid within the time specified and 
absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the 
restitution amount within that time, the license of Dennis J. 
Ryan to practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended until 
further order of this court. 
¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Dennis J. Ryan shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs are not 
paid within the time specified and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Dennis J. Ryan to practice law in Wisconsin shall be 
suspended until further order of the court.  
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that restitution to M.H.'s 
father is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation. 
 
No. 
2007AP2629-D   
 
 
 
1