Title: LEITHEISER v MONT STATE PRISON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12282
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 1973

No. 12282 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A H A R O L D H . LEITHEISER , Claimant and Respondent, M O N T A N A STATE PRISON, Employer, and INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Sid G. Stewart, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Harris, Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana. Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana. Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. For Respondent: Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great F a l l s , Montana. Jack L. Lewis argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: December 1, 1972 PER CURIAM: I n t h i s cause a motion t o dismiss the appeal was f i l e d by respondent on the ground t h a t appellants f a i l e d t o perfect t h e i r appeal within the time permitted by s t a t u t e . The record discloses: O n February 3 , 1972, the d i s t r i c t court of Powell County entered judgment i n favor of the claimant and respondent, Harold H. Leitheiser, reversing an order denying compensation the I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board. February 7, 1972, notice of entry of judgment was mailed t o counsel f o r de- fendants and appellants, Montana State Prison and the I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board (hereinafter called appellants). O n February 7, 1972, appellants f i l e d exceptions t o the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law. O n February 8, 1972, appellants mailed a motion f o r a new t r i a l t o the opposing attorneys and t o the d i s t r i c t court, which motion was f i l e d on February 9, 1972. Under Rule 5(b), M. R.Civ.P., the service of the motion f o r a new t r i a l was complete upon mailing. The motion f o r a new t r i a l did n o t contain a notice of hearing and no hearing was held. March 2, 1972, the d i s t r i c t court c l e r k mailed a notice t o appellants t h a t t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l was denied. O n April 20, 1972, appellants mailed notice of appeal t o t h e d i s t r i c t court f o r f i l i n g . This notice of appeal was received and f i l e d by the d i s t r i c t court c l e r k on April 21, 1972. The b r i e f s of the l i t i g a n t s indicate a c o n f l i c t i n t h e i r interpretation and application of the Montana Rules of Appellate C i v i l Procedure, W e w i l l therefore discuss b r i e f l y the pertinent code provisions and precedent applicable i n t h i s case. Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., provides: "(a) FILING THE NOTICE O F APPEAL, A n appeal s h a l l be taken by f i l i n g a notice of appeal i n che d i s t r i c t court. Failure of an appellant t o take any s t e p other than the timely f i l i n g of a notice of appeal does not a f f e c t the v a l i d i t y of the appeal-, but i s ground only f o r such action a s the supreme court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. I r The f i n a l sentence of Rule 4(a), M.R..App.Civ.P., i s identical t o a provision of Rule 3(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 9 ~ o o r e ' s Federal Practice 5 203.10, summarizes the application given t h i s provision. It s t a t e s i n part: h he notice of appeal i s f i l e d with the clerk when i t i s received into h i s custody and control. Since timely f i l i n g of the notice i s held t o be essential to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the precise time that the notice was f i l e d can be of overwhelming importance." 9 ~ o o r e ' s Federal Practice 5 204.02, states i n part: "Discussion of the time for appeal must begin by directing attention t o a host of cases holding with unanimity that unless an appeal i s timely taken the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction t o hear it. Although that holding i s not as logically compelling as it once was, the necessity for pro- viding a precisely ascertainable point of time a t which l i t i g a t i o n comes to an end strongly militates against i t s overthrow. A s the Committee Note ac- companying Rule 3 admonishes: " ' ~ u l e 3 and Rule 4 combine t o require that a notice of appeal be f i l e d with the clerk of the d i s t r i c t court within the time prescribed for taking an appeal. Because the timely f i l i n g of a notice of appeal i s "mandatory and jurisdictional", United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220,224 (1960), compliance with the provisions of those rules i s of the utmost importance. t 11 This application of the f i l i n g rule has been followed consistently by t h i s Court. State v. Wibaux County Bank, 85 Mont. Reid v. District Court , M o n t . 693; McVay v. McVay, 128 Mont. 31, 270 P.2d 393; Jackson v. Tinker, M o n t . Y P.2d , 29 St.Rep. 1070. W e therefore find it i s well established i n t h i s s t a t e that failure t o comply with the f i l i n g rule on appeal creates a jurisdictional defect which t h i s Court w i l l ' a l t e r only on most extenuating circumstances, which do not appear here. Appellants here, from their b r i e f , appear t o be i n agreement with our holdings as to the jurisdictional nature of the appellate f i l i n g require- ment. Their contention involves the application of Rule 5 , M.R. App. Civ. P . , . i n light of Rule 59(d), M,R.Civ.P., i n arriving a t a determination of: (1) H o w many days did the appellants have within which t o f i l e ? (2) When did t h i s time period begin t o run and, conse- quently, when did it expire? Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., i s e s s e n t i a l l y a reenactment of former section 93-5606, R.C.M. 1947, with a change from f i f t e e n days t o ten days i n the self-executing provision f o r denial of post judgment motions. I n pertinent p a r t , Rule 59(d) provides: 1 I I f the motion i s not noticed up f o r hearing and no hearing i s held thereon, it s h a l l be deemed denied a s of the expiration of the period of time [I0 days] within which hearing i s required t o be held under t h i s Rule 59. " In the i n s t a n t case the motion f o r a new t r i a l was served on February 8 , 1972. That motion did not contain a notice of hearing, and no hearing was held. Under Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., t h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l was automatically denied ten days a f t e r service on February 18, 1972. S t a t e ex r e l . Sinko v. D i s t r i c t Court, 64 Mont. 181, 208 P. 952; State ex r e l . King,v..District Court, 107 Mont. 476, 86 P.2d 755; Gilreath v. D i s t r i c t Court, 127 Mont. 431, 265 P.2d 651; Green v. D i s t r i c t Court, 126 Mont. 176, 246 P.2d 813. The f a c t that the d i s t r i c t court c l e r k mailed a l e t t e r dated March 2, 1972, which s t a t e d : "Pleased ( s i c ) be advised t h a t the Court on t h i s date denied the Motion f o r N e w T r i a l f i l e d by you on February 9 , 1972." i s of no l e g a l e f f e c t . The d i s t r i c t court was without j u r i s - d i c t i o n t o grant o r deny a motion f o r a new t r i a l on March 2, - 1972. B y operation of the self-executing provision of Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., the motion f o r a new t r i a l was "deemed denied" ("deemedf1 i n t h i s construction has been held t o be synonymous with "consideredr', "determined", o r "adjudged") on Febuary 18, 1972. The t i m e i n which notice of appeal must be f i l e d with the J i s c r i c t court i s s e t f o r t h i n Rule 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P. When the appealing party i s an agency of the s t a t e of Montana, a s a r e ap- pellants here, s i x t y days from service of notice of entry of judg- ment a r e allowed i n which t o f i l e . This r u l e a l s o makes provision for suspension of the running of the sixty day f i l i n g time in the event of f i l i n g of various enumerated post judgment motions. Concerning the suspension of f i l i n g time, Rule 5, M,R.App.Civ.P., provides i n pertinent part: 1' The running of the time for f i l i n g a notice of appeal i s suspended as to a l l parties by a timely motion f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court by any party pursuant t o the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure hereafter enumerated i n t h i s sentence, and the f u l l time for appeal fixed by t h i s rule commences to run and i s t o be computed from mailing by the clerk of notice of the entry of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion under such rules: * * 9~ (4) denying a motion for a new t r i a l under Rule 59.'' Under appellants' proposed interpretation of t h i s rule their sixty day allotted period i n which t o f i l e an appeal was suspended by their motion for a new t r i a l and did not commence t o run again u n t i l March 3 , 1972, the day they received the l e t t e r from the clerk of the d i s t r i c t court, rather than on February 19, 1972, the day a f t e r t h e i r motion for a new t r i a l was deemed denied under the self-executing provision of Rule 59 (d) , M.R. Civ, P. Appellants' interpretation i s not: correct. ~ ~ p e l l a n t s ' misconstruction of Rule 5, M,R.App.Civ. P., apparently results from a failure to take into account the interacting and applicable provisions of Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P.. I' The reference in Rule 5 , M.R.App,Civ.P., t o the time being com- puted from mailing by the clerk of notice" applies i n cases wherein the court holds a hearing on a motion or a c t s on a motion prior t o the ten day self-executing denial provision of Rule 59(d), M.R,Civ.P. However, once the self-executing denial of a motion under Rule 59(d) becomes effective, any subsequent order by the d i s t r i c t court concerning that motion is outside the d i s t r i c t court's jurisdiction and, consequently, n u l l , void, and without effect. Appellantsf proposed construction of Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ. P., would result i n an untenable situation wherein it would be possible for an unlimited extension of the time for appeal. D i s - t r i c t courts would be placed i n the position of being required t o issue orders concerning motions over which they no longer had j u r i s d i c t i o n and which were already denied. Judgments of the d i s t r i c t courts would not become f i n a l and would be subject t o appeal u n t i l s i x t y days a f t e r such time, i f ever, the d i s t r i c t court issued such a n u l l , void, and e x t r a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l order. This would be contrary t o the e f f e c t and operation of Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P., and Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., and Montana precedent. Accordingly, we hold appellantsf time f o r f i l i n g t h i s appeal commenced running a s of February 18, 1972, and expired s i x t y days t h e r e a f t e r , on April 18, 1972. It i s r e g r e t t a b l e t h a t t h i s Court must impose t h i s r u l e i n a case involving so narrow a time margin; however, an exception f o r one would ul- timately become an exception for a l l , and an exception of one day would ultimately become an exception indefinitely. This appeal was not timely taken and i s dismissed.