Title: State v. Petruzello
Citation: 250 N.W.2d 682
Docket Number: 11782
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1977

250 N.W.2d 682 (1977) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Angelo PETRUZELLO, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11782. Supreme Court of South Dakota. February 17, 1977. William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., John P. Guhin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent. Steve Jorgensen, Willy, Pruitt, Matthews &amp; Jorgensen, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant. WOLLMAN, Justice. Defendant was found guilty by a jury on two counts of distributing a controlled substance. On appeal he contends that the trial court erred (1) by not granting defendant a preliminary hearing on the charge contained in the amended information, (2) by commenting in the presence of the jury on the effectiveness of the cross examination of one of the state's witnesses, and (3) by permitting the state to question defendant about his prior use of drugs. We affirm. Defendant was originally charged with two counts of distributing marijuana. He was bound over to circuit court for trial after a preliminary hearing. Defendant was to be arraigned on the morning of trial. At that time the state was given permission to file an amended information charging defendant with having distributed tetrahy drocannabinol (THC). Defendant's objection to the filing of the amended information and his request for a preliminary hearing on the two counts contained therein were denied. Defendant exercised his statutory right to a twenty-four hour delay *683 before pleading to the amended information. SDCL 23-35-14. SDCL 39-17-88 provides: SDCL 39-17-53 provides: SDCL 39-17-57 provides in part: * * *" Defendant relies upon the case of State v. Anderson, 60 S.D. 187, 244 N.W. 119, in support of his contention that he was entitled to a preliminary hearing on the charges contained in the amended information. We do not read the Anderson case as requiring that result, however, for in that case defendant was originally charged with grand larceny, was bound over on a charge of receiving stolen property, and was then informed against in circuit court on a charge of grand larceny. The situation in the instant case is more akin to those cases in which it was held that the amended information did not set forth a new charge. State v. Martin, 85 S.D. 587, 187 N.W.2d 576; Fanning v. State, 85 S.D. 246, 180 N.W.2d 853; State v. Brown, 84 S.D. 201, 169 N.W.2d 239. As indicated above, marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinol are both hallucinogenic substances, the distribution of which, with narrowly drawn statutory exceptions, is unlawful. The state's expert witness testified that all marijuana contains THC. See also State v. Murphy, S.D., 234 N.W.2d 54; Cassady v. Wheeler, Iowa, 224 N.W.2d 649. Although apparently there is a synthetic form of THC, we do not understand defendant to contend that the state charged him with the distribution of such form of THC or that he was misled to believe that he was being so charged.[1] We conclude, then, that the amended information charged no new offense and that the trial court did not err in allowing it to be filed. Whether defendant would have been entitled to a continuance to prepare to defend on the amended charge in addition to *684 the statutory delay that he availed himself of, we need not decide.[2] Defendant's next contention concerns a remark made by the trial court during the cross-examination of one of the state's expert witnesses. After defense counsel had asked the witness a series of questions about the accuracy of the test for THC, the deputy state's attorney interjected: This gratuitous comment by the trial court was, of course, highly improper and constituted a serious lapse in judicial deportment. On the other hand, defense counsel took no exception to the trial court's remark, when even the gentlest remonstrance should have been sufficient to awaken the trial court to the realization of its error. In the absence of any such objection or any request for a curative instruction, and in view of the fact that counsel was promptly directed to continue his cross-examination, we conclude that the trial court's remark, however ill advised and inappropriate, did not constitute reversible error. State v. Ross, 47 S.D. 188, 197 N.W. 234; State v. Rief, 53 S.D. 438, 221 N.W. 53; State v. Shea, 58 S.D. 210, 235 N.W. 648; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 389 S.W.2d 478; DeLeon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 862; Annot. 62 A.L.R.2d 166. Defendant offered the defense of alibi and took the stand in his own behalf. After testifying about his place of birth, schooling, and pre-trial occupation as an elementary school teacher in the Tabor, South Dakota, school system, defendant testified in response to a question from his counsel concerning a course on drug abuse, that: Defendant then went on to testify in support of his alibi defense. On cross-examination the state's attorney asked defendant, "Now, is it your testimony that you've got some special knowledge about drugs that you were teaching a drug-abuse class?" to which defendant answered: Over defendant's objection, the state's attorney was permitted to ask defendant, "Have you ever used drugs?" to which defendant answered, "I tried marijuana." The trial court then sustained defendant's objection to the state's follow-up question concerning the number of times that defendant had tried marijuana. Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error for the court to permit the state *685 to question him about prior drug use, citing the rule that evidence of the commission of other offenses similar to the one charged is not generally admissible in the prosecution of narcotics violations. See 25 Am.Jur.2d, Drugs, Narcotics and Poisons, § 46. This is in accord with the general rule that evidence of other offenses is inadmissible to show commission of the crime charged. See, e. g., State v. Pickering, S.D., 217 N.W.2d 877; State v. McCreary, 82 S.D. 111, 142 N.W.2d 240; State v. Norman, 72 S.D. 168, 31 N.W.2d 258; State v. Hanks, 55 S.D. 63, 224 N.W. 946; State v. Mitchell, 61 S.D. 147, 246 N.W. 635, and State v. Runyan, 49 S.D. 406, 207 N.W. 482. The state argues, however, that defendant had placed his character in issue by "attempting to paint himself as a sturdy and informed crusader against drug misuse and certainly not one who would engage in the sale of drugs." We conclude that the state's analysis of defendant's testimony is, if somewhat hyperbolic, essentially correct. The only possible relevance of defendant's testimony on direct examination was to lead the jury to believe that because defendant was one who had lectured on the dangers of drugs he perforce would not have committed the offenses charged and hence must have been at the places alleged in his alibi defense. Certainly that portion of defendant's answer on cross-examination that indicated that he had left New York to get away from drugs was not responsive to the question and must have been intended to reinforce the implication in defendant's testimony on direct examination that he knew of the dangers of drug use and therefore would not distribute drugs. Thus the trial court did not err in permitting the state to question defendant about his own use of drugs in order to rebut the image that he had attempted to establish that he was not one who would commit the type of offense charged, for as we recognized in State v. McCreary, supra, once a defendant has given evidence of his good character, the state may introduce evidence of his bad character. See 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 340; McCormick on Evidence, §§ 190-191 (2d ed. 1972). The Kansas Supreme Court recently said with respect to testimony of a similar nature: We believe that the same rationale applies to defendant's testimony in the instant case. See also Jackson v. State, Alaska, 509 P.2d 278; Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 329 A.2d 844; State v. Allen, S.C., 224 S.E.2d 881; State v. Frayer, 17 Utah 2d 288, 409 P.2d 968.[3] The judgment of conviction is affirmed. All the Justices concur. [1] Ch. 158, § 42-12, Laws of 1976, effective April 1, 1977, would amend SDCL 39-17-57(12) to read: "Tetrahydrocannabinol other than that which occurs in marijuana in its natural and unaltered state". As amended, subsection (12) is apparently intended to include only the synthetic form of THC. [2] Although we have discussed defendant's contention on its merits, we note that he did not move to set aside the amended information in accordance with SDCL 23-36-1(5). [3] Defendant has called our attention to the recent case of State v. Ivory, Iowa, 247 N.W.2d 198. That case is inapposite, however, for there the defendant did not testify in a manner that tended to place her character in issue.