Title: State v. Hamilton
Citation: 217 Neb. 734, 351 N.W.2d 63
Docket Number: 795, 796
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1984

351 N.W.2d 63 (1984) 217 Neb. 734 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Charles J. HAMILTON, Appellant. No. 83-795. Supreme Court of Nebraska. June 22, 1984. *64 Paul Korslund of Everson, Noble, Wullschleger, Sutter, Sharp, Korslund &amp; Willet, Beatrice, for appellant. Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and Bernard L. Packett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, for appellee. KRIVOSHA, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ. *65 BOSLAUGH, Justice. The defendant, Charles J. Hamilton, was convicted of first offense driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor and sentenced to probation for a period of 9 months. The county court also fined Hamilton $100 and suspended his driver's license for a period of 60 days. Upon appeal to the district court the judgment was affirmed. The assignments of error relate to jury instructions given and refused by the county court. The record shows that at about 1 a.m. on February 17, 1983, Hamilton, while operating his pickup truck, crossed the centerline of the highway and collided with an oncoming semitrailer truck. Hamilton, suffering from facial lacerations and a concussion which he received in the accident, was taken to a hospital. While at the hospital, Hamilton was arrested by Gage County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Cripe, who had reason to believe that Hamilton was intoxicated. A breath test conducted at the sheriff's office shortly after the arrest disclosed that Hamilton's blood alcohol level was .213 percent. Hamilton filed a motion to suppress the results of the breath test, alleging that the test had been obtained in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-669.09 (Reissue 1978). After an evidentiary hearing the motion to suppress was overruled. No error is assigned and no issue was raised in the district court as to the ruling on the motion to suppress. The result of the breath test was admitted without objection at the trial in the county court. Section 39-669.09 provides: (Emphasis supplied.) Hamilton contends that his request to have an additional blood test performed was refused by the deputy sheriff. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the deputy sheriff testified that Hamilton asked him at the time of the arrest at the hospital, "I can't just take a blood test here and get it over with?" The deputy sheriff replied, "No, you'll have to come to the sheriff's office for a breath test." The deputy sheriff testified that defendant made no other request for an additional test. Hamilton's daughter testified regarding the request made by Hamilton as follows: The defendant testified as follows: Defendant was released to his family on bond shortly after the breath test. Defendant further testified: In overruling the motion to suppress, the county court stated that "although [the defendant] would have preferred to have a blood test over a breath test, [he] did not request a second test.... [H]e was advised of his rightexcuse me, he was advised of his obligation to take a breath test and ... the state did nothing to keep him from getting a second test if he wanted to do it." Hamilton contends that it was error for the county court not to instruct the jury that if it found that the deputy sheriff had refused Hamilton's request for an additional test, then the results of the breath test conducted by the deputy sheriff should be disregarded. The court did instruct the jury that any refusal by the deputy sheriff of a request for an additional test was to be considered as bearing upon the weight and credibility to be accorded the breath test. Neither the requested instruction nor the one given was correct. Whether a law enforcement officer refused a request for a second test is not a question for the jury, but it is a foundational requirement for the admission of evidence as to results of a breath test. The jury may not consider the question of an alleged refusal once the trial court has determined that all foundational requirements for admission of the results of the breath test have been met. In State v. West, 217 Neb. 389, 401, 350 N.W.2d 512, 520 (1984), we held that requirements for the admissibility of the results of a urine test are foundational and are not a question for the jury. We said: In a criminal case the proper method to challenge the admissibility of evidence as to the results of a chemical test for intoxication is to file a motion to suppress. See, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-822 and 29-823 (Reissue 1979); State v. Bevins, 198 Neb. 761, 255 N.W.2d 284 (1977). In the present case Hamilton filed a motion to suppress the results of the breath test. The court found that the deputy sheriff had not denied a request by Hamilton for a second test. The findings of fact by the trial court on a motion to suppress will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly wrong. State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 330 N.W.2d 462 (1983). The record supports the finding of the trial court on the motion to suppress. The instruction given by the trial court, although erroneous, was harmless error. The situation is similar to that in State v. West, supra 217 Neb. at 402, 350 N.W.2d at 521: "West received an instruction far more favorable than he was entitled to receive ...." In the present case the jury was instructed that it could consider any refusal of the deputy sheriff as bearing upon the weight and credibility to be given the breath test. In the present case the instruction was more favorable to Hamilton than a proper instruction. A defendant may not predicate error on an instruction that is more favorable to him than is required by law. Stump v. State, 132 Neb. 49, 271 N.W. 163 (1937). There being no error, the judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. CAPORALE, J., participating on briefs.