Title: Wesley Kire Pullum v. Peggy Kent Pullum and the Estate of James W. Kelly
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1090675
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2010

REL:09/24/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
____________________
1090675
____________________
Wesley Kire Pullum
v.
Peggy Kent Pullum and the Estate of James W. Kelly
Appeal from Geneva Circuit Court
(CV-08-85)
BOLIN, Justice.
Wesley Kire Pullum appeals from a summary judgment in
favor of Peggy Kent Pullum and the estate of James W. Kelly.
We affirm.
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2
Facts and Procedural History
John Pullum owned 160 acres of land in Geneva County.
John had two children, Wesley Pullum and Daisy Pullum Mills.
John subsequently married Peggy Kent.  On March 26, 2007, John
instructed his attorney, James W. Kelly, to prepare a warranty
deed, conveying 20 acres of the 160 acres to Peggy.  The 20-
acre parcel included John and Peggy's homestead.  The deed
described the land as:
"The S 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of the NE 1/4
of Section 16, Township 2, Range 25, Geneva County, Alabama,
containing 20 acres more or less."  The deed was recorded in
the probate office.
On September 17, 2007, John and Peggy signed a deed
prepared by Kelly conveying 80 acres of the 160 acres to
Daisy.  That same day, John and Peggy signed another deed
prepared by Kelly, conveying 80 acres of the land to Wesley.
The deed to Wesley described the land as the "S 1/2 of the NE
1/4 of Section 16, T2N, R25E, Geneva County, Alabama."  Kelly
prepared a deed for Daisy and one for Wesley.  Daisy delivered
Wesley's deed to Wesley, and Wesley's wife later recorded the
deed. 
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3
On October 24, 2007, John and Peggy instructed Kelly to
file a corrective deed regarding their conveyance to Wesley.
The corrective deed provided as follows:
"S ½ of the NE 1/4 of Section 16, T2N, R25E,
Geneva County, Alabama.  LESS AND EXCEPT: The S ½ of
the SW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section 16, Township 2,
Range 25, Geneva County, Alabama, containing 20
acres, more or less.
"....
"It is agreed and understood that this deed is
a correction deed executed for the purpose of
correcting that certain description in that certain
deed executed by John Paul Pullum and wife, Peggy
Kent Pullum to Wesley Kire Pullum, II, on September
17, 2007. It was not the intent for the grantors to
deed to Wesley Kire Pullum the homestead of John
Paul Pullum and wife, Peggy Kent Pullum.  It is
further agreed and understood that the description
in the deed executed on September 17, 2007, was a
clerical error and that John Paul Pullum and wife,
Peggy Kent Pullum intended for Peggy Kent Pullum to
retain fee simple title to the 20 acres less and
excepted from the above describe real estate."
The corrective deed was recorded.  John died and was survived
by Peggy and his children, Daisy and Wesley.  Kelly died and
his law office was closed.
On July 10, 2008, Wesley filed a petition to quiet title
to the 20 acres against Peggy.  In his petition, Wesley
alleged that he was the rightful owner of the 20 acres of land
on which John and Peggy's homestead was located.  On August 8,
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4
2008, Peggy filed an answer.  On February 19, 2009, Peggy
filed a third-party complaint against Kelly's estate, alleging
that Kelly had failed to exclude the 20 acres from the
conveyance to Wesley and that she was entitled to compensation
from Kelly's estate for the 20 acres.  On March 31, 2009,
Kelly's estate filed an answer and a counterclaim against both
Peggy and Wesley.  Kelly's estate sought reformation of the
deed to correct the mistake in the legal description of the
property in Wesley's original deed.  On April 15, 2009, Peggy
filed a counterclaim against Wesley, seeking reformation of
the original deed.  
On July 6, 2009, Kelly's estate filed a motion for a
summary judgment.  Attached to the motion was an affidavit
from Kelly's former legal assistant that provided that she had
made a clerical error and had failed to omit the 20 acres from
the conveyance to Wesley and that John had expressed his
intent that the 20 acres be conveyed to his wife, Peggy.  She
stated that Kelly had instructed her to prepare a corrective
deed and that the corrective deed include a statement of the
intent of both grantors to exclude the 20 acres from the
conveyance to Wesley.  In response, Wesley filed his own
1090675
5
affidavit and an affidavit from Daisy.  Wesley's affidavit
provided that  Daisy delivered a deed to him in September 2007
and that a dispute over timber on the land led to his
discovery that a corrected deed had been filed.  Daisy's
affidavit provided that Peggy and John signed the deed
conveying land to Wesley, which had been prepared by Kelly
with aid of his legal assistant.  On October 12, 2009, Peggy
joined the summary-judgment motion filed by Kelly's estate. 
On October 22, 2009, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Peggy and Kelly's estate.  The trial
court concluded that John and Peggy did not intend to give
Wesley the 20 acres of land that included their homestead and
that it was a scrivener's error that had included the 20 acres
in the conveyance to Wesley, who did not participate in the
transaction conveying the 80 acres to him by mistake.  The
trial court stated: "In all equity and good conscience the
deed shall be reformed to correct the scrivener's mistake so
as to exclude the 20 acres previously conveyed to Peggy
Pullum.  It would be unconscionable not to correct the
mistake."   Wesley timely appealed. 
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6
Standard of Review
"Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. 'A
motion for summary judgment is granted only when the
evidence demonstrates that "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.' Reichert v. City of
Mobile, 776 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 2000). We apply
'the same standard as that of the trial court in
determining whether the evidence before the court
made out a genuine issue of material fact.'  Bussey
v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988);
System Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Boykin, 683 So. 2d
419, 420 (Ala. 1996). In order to defeat a properly
supported motion for a summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must present substantial evidence
that creates a genuine issue of material fact.
'Substantial evidence' is 'evidence of such weight
and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise
of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.' West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989)."
Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168, 1176-77 (Ala.
2003).  
Analysis
Wesley argues that a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether the unilateral revocation in the
corrected deed of the 20-acre interest conveyed to him by the
original deed was valid.  He also argues that the corrected
deed was invalid under the parol evidence rule.  Last, Wesley
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7
argues that the trial court erred in basing its ruling on
unconscionability.  
It is well settled in property law that equity may act to
reform a deed if the deed does not accurately reflect the
intent of the parties.  One ground for reformation of a
written instrument is mutuality of mistake. 
 
"'Mistake 
of 
fact 
is 
a 
well-
recognized ground for interposition of a
court of equity. 13 Am.Jur.2d Cancellation
of Instruments § 31 (1964). Where it
appears that by a mutual mistake of all
parties the instrument does not conform to
or express their intention or agreement, as
where by mistake some material part of the
instrument is omitted or the deed is drawn
to convey a different interest or a greater
or lesser estate than was agreed upon,
relief may be had in equity against the
other party to the conveyance or his
privies. 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds §§ 155, 158
(1965).
"'Although a deed in terms expresses
the intention of the parties, if there is
a material mistake as to the property to
which those terms apply, such as to its
identity, situation, boundaries, title,
amount, value, and the like, a court of
equity 
may 
grant 
appropriate 
relief.
Goodrich v. Lathrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29 P. 329
(1892).'"
Long v. Vielle, 549 So. 2d 968, 971 (Ala. 1989)(quoting Palmer
v. Palmer, 390 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Ala. 1980)).  
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8
"[W]hen a writing through mutual mistake of the parties,
or mistake of one of the parties, and fraud or deception on
the part of the other, or mistake of the scrivener who drew
the contract for the parties, contains substantially more or
less than the parties intended or the intention of the parties
is not expressed 'due to inapt language' it will be reformed
to express the true intention of the parties." Atlas Assur.
Co., Ltd., of London, England v. Byrne, 235 Ala. 281, 282, 178
So. 451, 452 (1938).  Alabama views scrivener's errors as
mutuality of mistake, and such errors are subject to
reformation. Sherman v. Woerner Magnolia Farms, Inc., 565 So.
2d 601, 604 (Ala. 1990).  A party seeking to have an
instrument reformed must produce clear and convincing evidence
that the instrument does not express the intent of the
parties.  Pinson v. Veach, 388 So. 2d 964 (Ala. 1980).  "[T]he
parol evidence rule is no impediment when one seeks to reform
a conveyance because of mutual mistake."  West v. Law, 577 So.
2d 445, 446 (Ala. 1991); § 8-1-2, Ala. Code 1975.  Generally,
a unilateral mistake is not a ground for reformation.
American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 270 Ala. 17, 115 So. 2d
470 (1959).  Reformation is authorized when there is fraud or
1090675
9
inequitable conduct on the part of the other party to the
contract.  Id.  
In Gallups v. Kent, 953 So. 2d 393 (Ala. 2006), a husband
and wife executed a deed conveying property to George and
Retha Gallups.  The husband died and the wife executed a
corrective deed purporting to reform the original deed to
George and Retha to exclude Retha as a grantee.  Years later,
a declaratory-judgment action was filed to determine whether
Retha's heirs owned any interest in the property.  The trial
court determined that Retha's heirs had an ownership interest.
This Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, stating:
"The purpose of a correction deed is to confirm the
title conveyed by the original deed -- typically by
correcting an error in the description of the
property.  A grantor cannot use a correction deed to
unilaterally 
terminate 
or 
revoke 
an 
interest
conveyed by the original deed."
Gallups, 953 So. 2d at 395.
Gallups is distinguishable from the present case because
in that case only one of the grantors executed the corrective
deed, and because the conveyance in Gallups was based on
consideration.  This Court has addressed reformation based on
conveyances that were intended as gifts.  In Stone v. Hale, 17
Ala. 557 (1850), the father conveyed, in trust, land to his
1090675
10
daughter (a married woman) for life and the reminder to her
children.  The father's instructions were to draft the trust
instrument so as to secure the property to the daughter free
of the debts and control of her husband, but by mistake the
attorney failed to include such words.  One of the husband's
judgment creditors  sought to attach the property.  The Court
held that equity would act to reform the trust instrument to
reflect the father's intent.  There was a similar result in
Whitehead v. Brown, 18 Ala. 682 (1851), where the father, who
intended to convey property to his daughter, free and clear of
her husband's debt, failed to do so, and the Court held that
the deed was entitled to reformation as against the husband's
creditors.      
In Berry v. Sowell, 72 Ala. 14 (1882), a father conveyed
a house and land to his married daughter, reciting only love
and affection as consideration.  The husband's name was not on
the deed, and the deed did not exclude the husband's marital
rights.  Later, one of the husband's creditors sought to
attach the property to pay the husband's debts.  The Court
held that the deed was subject to reformation because there
was proof that the husband bought the property and paid a part
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11
of the price with moneys belonging to the wife, who conveyed
it to her father, under an oral agreement between the three
that the property should be conveyed to the wife (daughter) as
an equitable separate estate, and that it had not been
properly conveyed due to a mistake on the part of the
draftsman. 
Although this Court has not expressly addressed the issue
whether the general rule precluding reformation on the basis
of a unilateral mistake when a deed is given in exchange for
consideration is applicable when the deed is given as a gift
and the grantor seeks reformation, other courts have.  Those
courts have reasoned that because gifts are unilateral in
nature, then only a unilateral mistake is likely; thus, deeds
conveying property as a gift may be reformed because of a
unilateral mistake on the part of the grantor.  The Kentucky
Supreme Court has stated: 
"[W]here property is conveyed as a gift, the
transaction is by its very nature unilateral, and
the 
grantee's 
intent 
or 
conduct 
(other 
than
acceptance) plays no part in fixing the rights of
the parties. Mutuality of mistake as the basis of
relief need only be established when there is a
mutuality of obligation, as in a contractual
relationship." 
Twyford v. Huffaker, 324 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Ky. 1958). 
1090675
12
The Court of Appeals of Indiana has explained:
"When 
a 
deed 
is 
exchanged 
in 
a 
contractual
relationship, both the grantor and grantee are
obligated to perform in some type of fashion, which
creates the opportunity for a mutual mistake to
occur.  Whereas, when a deed is given as gift, the
grantor is the only party with an obligation, and,
thus, only a unilateral mistake is likely to occur."
Wright v. Sampson, 830 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
"It is a well-settled general rule that equity will
reform a voluntary instrument of conveyance at the suit of the
donor when the instrument does not express the donor's intent
in making the gift."  Kemna v. Graver, 630 S.W.2d 160, 161
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).  "[Where] [t]he grantee has given nothing
for the conveyance[] he is deprived of nothing; and he cannot
complain if the mistake [in a deed] is corrected."  Tyler v.
Larson, 106 Cal. App. 2d 317, 319-20, 235 P.2d 39, 41 (1951).
"And although a mutual mistake of the parties is required in
most instances, if a settlor of a trust receives no
consideration for the creation of the trust, a unilateral
mistake on his part is sufficient."  Brinker v. Wobaco Trust,
610 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980). See also D.M. v.
D.A., 885 P.2d 94 (Alaska 1994)(recognizing that, if the deed
was a gift, then the donor need prove by clear and convincing
1090675
13
evidence that she did not intend to transfer the interest she
transferred and what specific interest she did intend to
convey); Snyder v. Peterson, 62 Wash. App. 522, 814 P.2d 1204
(1991)(recognizing 
the 
"unilateral 
gift 
exception" 
to
reformation); Yano v. Yano, 144 Ariz. 382, 697 P.2d 1132
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)(holding that a grantor's unilateral
mistake was a sufficient ground for reformation of voluntary
conveyances);  Davidson v. Lane, 566 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978)("[A] court of equity will reform a voluntary
conveyance, made without consideration, to reflect the
intention of the grantor."); Nelson v. Harris, 32 N.C. App.
375, 232 S.E.2d 298 (1977)(holding that the grantor of a
conveyance for which no consideration was given is entitled to
reformation when the deed, as a result of the grantor's
unilateral mistake, fails to express the actual intent of the
parties); Westcott v. Westcott, 259 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1977)("Insofar as voluntary conveyances are concerned,
they are unilateral and the court has the power to reform the
deed to express the intentions of the grantor even though,
strictly speaking, the mistake is not mutual."); Gray v. Gray,
233 Ark. 310, 344 S.W.2d 329 (1961)(recognizing  that a court
1090675
14
of equity has the inherent power to grant relief by
reformation of a voluntary conveyance to express the intention
of the grantor); Jonas v. Meyers, 410 Ill. 213, 225, 101
N.E.2d 
509, 
515 
(1951)("Many 
jurisdictions, 
however, 
recognize
an exception to the general rule and hold that the donor-
grantor of a voluntary conveyance, or his heirs or successors
in title, may have reformation as against a grantee, on the
ground of mistake and in such case mutuality of mistake is not
essential, it being immaterial that the grantee was not
cognizant thereof."); Laundreville v. Mero, 86 Mont. 43, 51,
281 P. 749, 750 (1929)("The reason for the rule is that when
one accepts the bounty of another he may not be heard to say,
as against the donor, that something else should have been
given.  The grantor, not having received any consideration for
the conveyance, is accorded the privilege of changing his mind
and may not be compelled to make a gift previously intended
and of which he has since repented, when no rights of others
have intervened."); Lyon v. Balthis, 24 Ohio App. 57, 60, 155
N.E. 815, 816 (1926)("[W]here the conveyance is purely
voluntary, we hold the rule of law to be that if the
conveyance represents a mere gift as distinguished from a sale
1090675
15
the donor is ordinarily entitled to reformation on account of
his own mistake, regardless of whether the mistake was shared
in by the donee."); Schrieber v. Goldsmith, 39 Misc. 381, 384,
79 N.Y.S. 846 (1902)("Indeed the transaction between the
mother and daughter was, in effect, a gift from the former to
the latter, and in such a case a mistake of the donor in
giving more than she intended at the time to give is
sufficient to justify a decree for reformation."); and
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 40 Ga. 11, 15 (1869)("The fair
construction of this latter provision would seem to be, that
as between purchasers for a valuable consideration and that
grantor, the mistake must be mutual.  But as the Court is not
authorized in any case to relieve volunteers against mistakes
by reforming the conveyance, it can hardly be a fair
construction to say that the mistake must have been known to
them at the time the deed was executed, before the grantor can
be relieved by reforming a voluntary conveyance, executed by
him, on account of mistake.").
In short, although the general rule of equity is that
reformation 
will 
not 
lie 
(in 
the 
absence 
of 
fraud,
inequitable conduct by the other party, or knowledge by one
1090675
No one disputes that the original deed to Wesley and the
1
corrective deed were intended as a gift.  The language in both
deeds is as follows: "That in consideration of Ten Dollars and
other valuable consideration to the undersigned grantor
(whether one or more), in hand paid by the grantee herein, the
receipt whereof is acknowledged, we, JOHN PAUL PULLUM and
wife, PEGGY KENT PULLUM, (herein referred to as  grantor,
whether one or more), do hereby grant, bargain, sell and
convey subject to the life estate reserved herein unto WESLEY
KIRE PULLUM, II (herein referred to as grantee, whether one or
more), the following described real estate, situated in Geneva
County, Alabama ...." See also Snyder v. Peterson, 62 Wash.
App. 522, 529 n. 7, 814 P.2d 1204, 1208 n. 7 (1991)("[A]ny
nominal consideration accompanied by 'love and affection' is
sufficient to justify reformation of a deed.'").
16
party of the other party's mistake) unless mutuality of
mistake is shown, many courts recognize an exception to this
general rule with respect to a voluntary conveyance, holding
that a deed may be reformed on the request of the grantor of
a voluntary conveyance on the basis of unilateral mistake
alone. Based on our caselaw, and the support from other
jurisdictions cited above, we now hold that where a grantor
seeks to reform a deed based on a unilateral mistake and that
deed was voluntary, equity will act to reform the deed.   This
1
view is also consistent with the Restatement, which states: 
"A donative document, 
though 
unambiguous, 
may 
be
reformed to conform the text to the donor's
intention if it is established by clear and
convincing evidence (1) that a mistake of fact or
law, whether in expression or inducement, affected
specific terms of the document; and (2) what the
1090675
"[Section 8-1-2 and § 35-4-153] enact
2
into statutory law, in general terms, the
law of reformation of instruments long
existent. One principle, embodied in these
general terms, and particularly applicable
to the case before us, is thus stated: '...
where "through mistake a written agreement
contains substantially more or less than
the parties to it intended, or, from
ignorance 
or 
want 
of 
skill 
in 
the
draftsman, the object and intention as
contemplated by the agreement is not
expressed in the written instrument by
reason of the use of inapt expressions,
equity will interpose and reform the
agreement."'"
17
donor's intention was. In determining whether these
elements 
have 
been 
established 
by 
clear 
and
convincing evidence, direct evidence of intention
contradicting the plain meaning of the text as well
as other evidence of intention may be considered."
2 Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative
Transfers § 12.1 (2003). The requirement of clear and
convincing evidence in the Restatement is consistent with our
holding in Pinson v. Veach, supra, regarding the reformation
based on mutual mistake.
   
We recognize that Wesley argues that the corrective deed
was invalid under the parol evidence rule.  As noted in our
earlier discussion, this Court has held that parol evidence is
admissible to reform a deed based on mutual mistake. See § 8-
1-2, Ala. Code 1975.    Now that we have held that a court can
2
1090675
City of Oneonta v. Sawyer, 244 Ala. 25, 26, 12 So. 2d 82, 83
(1943) (quoting West End Savings Bank v. Goodwin, 223 Ala.
185, 187, 135 So. 161, 162 (1931)).  
18
reform a deed that has been given to a grantee as a gift upon
a showing that the grantor made a unilateral mistake, we see
no impediment in allowing evidence of the grantor's intention
that contradicts the plain meaning of the text, as well as
other evidence of intention, this approach being consistent
with our caselaw allowing parol evidence in matters involving
mutual mistake (see West v. Law, supra) and also consistent
with the above-quoted view of the Restatement.
We must now address whether the trial court erred in
granting Peggy and Kelly's estate's summary-judgment motion.
In support of their motion, they filed the affidavit of
Kelly's former legal assistant.  The legal assistant stated
that she had made a clerical error in failing to omit the 20
acres from the deed conveying the property to Wesley because
the grantors did not intend to convey the 20 acres to Wesley.
In response, Wesley submitted his own affidavit and an
affidavit of his sister, Daisy.  Wesley's affidavit stated
that Daisy delivered a deed to him in September 2007 and that
a dispute over timber on the deeded land led to his discovery
1090675
"'An unconscionable ... contractual provision is defined
3
as a ... provision "such as no man in his sense and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair
man would accept on the other."'"  Southern United Fire Ins.
Co. v. Howard, 775 So. 2d 156, 163 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Layne
v. Garner, 612 So. 2d 404, 408 (Ala. 1992)). 
19
that a corrected deed had been filed.  Daisy's affidavit
stated that Peggy and John signed the deed conveying land to
Wesley that had been prepared by Kelly with the aid of his
legal assistant.  Nothing in the affidavits filed by Wesley
contradicts the evidence presented by Peggy indicating that
Peggy and John never intended to give Wesley the 20 acres on
which their homestead was located and that the mistake was a
unilateral mistake on their part.
Last, Wesley argues that the trial court found that the
original deed, which included the 20 acres, was unconscionable
and that the trial court erred in reforming the deed based on
unconscionability.   He cites several cases discussing the
elements of unconscionability.   Although the trial court uses
3
the word "unconscionable" in its order, the  trial court
appears to have been attempting to convey the idea that in
reforming the deed it was providing equitable relief.  It
should be noted that courts have occasionally referred to
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20
inequitable conduct as unconscionable.  See, e.g., Wyeth, Inc.
v. Blue Cross & Blue  Shield of Alabama, [Ms. 1050926, January
15, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2010)(discussing the
argument that the word "unjust" in the phrase "unjust
enrichment" is referring to "in equity and good conscience");
Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 2006)(discussing
wrongful conduct as unconscionable conduct).  Nothing in the
trial court's order, taken in context, indicates that the
trial court found that the original deed was unenforceable as
unconscionable.   
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.   
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Parker,
Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.