Title: Cuff v. Department of Public Safety Standards
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055649
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2008

FILED: December 18, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
PAUL D. CUFF,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
STANDARDS AND TRAINING,
Respondent on Review.
(DPSST 114352; CA
A132424; SC S055649)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 18, 2008.
Daryl S. Garrettson, of
Garrettson, Gallagher, Fenrich and Makler, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and
filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was Patricia
Bridge Urquhart, Portland.
Erin C. Lagesen, Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of
Appeals and the order of the Department of Public Safety Standards and Training
are affirmed.
*Appeal from order of the
Department of Public Safety Standards and Training.  217 Or App 292, 175 P3d
983 (2007).
GILLETTE, J.
In this administrative law case, petitioner,
a county public safety officer, seeks review of an order of the Department of
Public Safety Standards and Training (DPSST) that revoked his certification as
a corrections officer on the ground that he failed to meet minimum moral
fitness standards.  On judicial review, the Court of Appeals affirmed DPSST's
action.  Cuff v. Department of Public Safety Standards, 217 Or App 292,
175 P3d 983 (2007).  We allowed review and now affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals.  
The facts are not in dispute. 
Petitioner is a corrections officer for Washington County.  At the time of the
events that eventually resulted in the revocation of his certification,
petitioner was employed in the county's transport division, driving inmates
into and out of the county in a commercial-sized bus.  In January 1999,
petitioner was subjected to a routine drug-screening urinalysis and tested
positive for marijuana use.  When confronted with the results of the test,
petitioner initially denied using illegal drugs.  However, during the ensuing
investigation, petitioner admitted purchasing marijuana once and then using the
drug off duty nearly every day for a month before the test.  In March 1999, the
county fired petitioner.  
Petitioner's union, the Washington
County Police Officers' Association, contested petitioner's firing by filing a
grievance under the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the
county.  That collective bargaining agreement required the employer to provide
counseling to an employee after a positive drug test and denied the employer the
right to discipline the employee unless the employee had previously tested
positive for drug use or had refused treatment.  The case was arbitrated.  The
arbitrator agreed with petitioner and ordered that he be reinstated.  The
county refused to reinstate petitioner and the union then filed a proceeding on
petitioner's behalf with the Employment Relations Board (ERB).  Before the ERB,
the county argued that reinstatement would violate public policy.  ERB
disagreed and ordered the county to reinstate petitioner.
This court ultimately upheld that ERB
decision in Washington Cty. Police Assn. v. Washington Cty., 335 Or 198,
63 P3d 1167 (2003).  The court rejected the county's argument that ORS 181.662
(1999), the public safety officer certification revocation statute in effect when
the county fired petitioner, constituted a clear statement of public policy
against the continued certification of public safety officers who have used
controlled substances, including marijuana.  Id. at 206.  In so holding,
the court observed that whether petitioner could have had his certification as
a public safely officer revoked for his conduct was not the issue; rather, the issue
was only whether petitioner should be reinstated, and ORS 181.662 (1999) did
not speak to that question.  Id.  And, in any event, the court stated,
ORS 181.662 (1999) did not permit revocation of a public safety officer's
certification for drug use unless the officer had been convicted of a crime
based on such use.(1) 
Id.  For those reasons, the court did not agree that ORS 181.662 (1999)
defined a clear public policy against the continued certification of a public
safety officer who had not been convicted of any offense, much less establish a
clear public policy on the separate question of such an officer's
reinstatement.  Id.  Based on this court's decision in Washington Cty.,
the county reinstated petitioner in June 2003.  
Meanwhile, in October 1999, the
legislature amended the certification revocation statute, adding a provision
that permits revocation of a public safety officer's certification on a finding
that: 
"The public safety officer or instructor
does not meet the applicable minimum standards, minimum training or the terms
and conditions established under ORS 181.640(1)(a) to (d)."(2)
ORS 181.622(1)(c).  ORS 181.640, in turn, directed (and
continues to direct) DPSST and the Board on Public Safety Standards and
Training (BPSST) to promulgate rules establishing minimum standards for, among
other things, moral fitness.(3) 
And, pursuant to that directive, BPSST adopted OAR 259-008-0010(6),(4)
which provides, in part:
"(6) Moral Fitness (Moral Character).  All
law enforcement officers must be of good moral fitness.
"(a) For purposes of this standard, lack of
good moral fitness means conduct not restricted to those acts that reflect
moral turpitude but rather extending to acts and conduct which would cause a
reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the individual's honesty,
fairness, respect for the rights of others, or for the laws of the state or the
nation."
In January 2004, seven months after
the county reinstated petitioner, DPSST notified petitioner that it intended to
revoke his certification as a public safety officer on the ground that he
failed to meet minimum moral fitness standards under OAR 259-008-0010.  In
particular, DPSST relied on the facts that petitioner used illegal drugs in
December 1998 and January 1999 and that he lied during the investigation into
his conduct.
Petitioner requested and was provided
an administrative hearing.  After the hearing, which was held in December 2004,
the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) issued a proposed order that would
have held that DPSST had not proved that petitioner lied during the
investigation (although he initially lied to his supervisors), but that
petitioner's off-duty drug use in December 1998 and January 1999 demonstrated
that petitioner lacked moral fitness, and that that lack of moral fitness was a
sufficient basis for revoking petitioner's certification.  In making those proposed
findings, the OAH declined to consider evidence relating to petitioner's
conduct and job performance after the period of marijuana use and the ensuing
investigation, ruling that evidence of petitioner's later conduct was not
relevant to the only issues to be resolved at the hearing, viz., whether
petitioner had consumed marijuana in December 1998 and January 1999 and whether
he was dishonest during the investigation.  The OAH further reasoned that,
because the case involved a revocation, petitioner's current fitness was not at
issue.  Based on the foregoing, the OAH concluded that petitioner's certification
should be revoked.
Petitioner filed exceptions to that
proposed order, arguing, among other things, that evidence of petitioner's
conduct after the period of marijuana use in January 1999 was relevant to the
proceeding insofar as the moral fitness standard, properly understood, was an
on-going standard of continued fitness.  The OAH eventually issued a corrected
proposed order, but that order did not address petitioner's concern that the OAH
erroneously failed to consider petitioner's conduct after January 1999.  
After reviewing the corrected
proposed order, DPSST issued a final order in January 2006 revoking
petitioner's certification.  In that order, DPSST directly addressed
petitioner's argument that his conduct after the January 1999 drug use was
relevant to whether petitioner lacked moral fitness.  DPSST explained that it
had considered all the evidence in the record in assessing whether petitioner
lacked moral fitness, including petitioner's evidence of his subsequent
conduct:
"Pursuant to OAR 259-008-0010(5) (1999),
DPSST determines whether an officer possesses the requisite moral fitness by
conducting 'a thorough background check.'  Past acts are the only possible
basis for that determination.  [Petitioner], himself, admitted that his [1998-99]
conduct fell below the standard of moral fitness required of a public safety
officer. * * *
"In light of [OAH's] initial evidentiary
ruling, and subsequent decision to treat evidence of [petitioner's] current job
performance as an offer of proof, DPSST reviewed and considered th[at]
evidence.  Even under such an analysis, [petitioner's] current job performance
fails to persuade DPSST that [petitioner] no longer lacks moral fitness. 
[Petitioner] is not able to 'unring the bell' of his past unlawful conduct and
judgmental errors by the evidence presented on his behalf during the hearing.  
"Contrary to [petitioner's] assertions,
persuasive and substantial evidence exists in the record that [petitioner's]
behavior may have impacted the public's perception and the agency's confidence
in [petitioner's] ability to perform competently.  * * *  As [one witness]
indicated, [petitioner's] substance abuse problem may be the subject of
rehabilitation, but rehabilitation would not alter the fact that [petitioner],
as a sworn law enforcement officer, repeatedly violated the law by unlawfully
purchasing and using controlled substances.  Abiding by and upholding the laws
which officers enforce is a core value.  The core values are reflected in the
agency's rules, the law enforcement Code of Ethics, and Washington County's
zero-tolerance approach to drugs.  * * *  These values are reflected in DPSST's
standards.
"These factors were sufficient for DPSST
and [petitioner's supervisors] to have substantial doubts about [petitioner's]
honesty, fairness, respect for the rights of others, or for the laws of the
state.  These parties concluded that [petitioner's] conduct was prejudicial to
the administration of justice in that [petitioner] broke the very laws he had
sworn to uphold and that [petitioner's] off-the-job behavior adversely
reflected on his fitness to perform as a law enforcement officer.  DPSST finds
substantial evidence in the record to determine that [petitioner's] unlawful purchase
and repeated unlawful use of controlled substances is sufficient, independent
of any untruthfulness, to justify revocation of his certifications as a law
enforcement officer.
"* * * * *
"DPSST is persuaded that [petitioner's]
conduct would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about
[petitioner's] respect for the laws of the State of Oregon, given the finding
that [petitioner] committed approximately thirty (30) unlawful acts over a
period of approximately thirty (30) days.  This blatant disrespect for the laws
of Oregon amounts to a lack of good moral fitness, which all corrections
officers must possess."
DPSST then revoked petitioner's certification.
Petitioner sought judicial review of DPSST's
order by the Court of Appeals.  In that court, petitioner raised five
assignments of error, only one of which petitioner pursues in this court, viz.,
that DPSST did not have authority to revoke his certification based on his
1998-99 conduct because the statute and regulation in effect at the time of
that conduct did not authorize certification revocation on that basis, and the
legislature did not intend ORS 181.662(1)(c) and OAR 259-008-0070(3)(c) (lack
of good moral fitness is discretionary basis for denying or revoking
certification) to apply retroactively.(5) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed DPSST's decision to revoke petitioner's
certification, concluding that, notwithstanding the fact that the text of ORS
181.662(1)(c) does not indicate that the legislature intended that statute to
be retroactive, the statute is "remedial" in nature and, therefore,
has retroactive effect.  Cuff, 217 Or App at 298.  For that reason, the
Court of Appeals concluded that DPSST did not err in revoking petitioner's
certification based on conduct that occurred in 1998 and 1999.  Id. at
300.  As noted, we allowed petitioner's request for review.
We begin our analysis by rejecting
the premise of both petitioner's argument and the Court of Appeals' analysis, viz.,
the assumption that ORS 181.662(1)(c) is "retroactive."  As discussed
above, ORS 181.662 provides, in part:
"(1) The Department of Public Safety
Standards and Training may   * * * revoke the certification, of any * * *
public safety officer * * * based upon a finding that:
"* * * * * 
"(c) The public safety officer * * * does
not meet the applicable minimum standards, minimum training or the terms and
conditions established under ORS 181.640(1)(a) to (d)."
As a matter of simple grammar, the key phrases of those
provisions are worded in the present tense.  That is, the statute gives DPSST
the present authority to revoke a public safety officer's certification
based on the public safety officer's present failure to "meet the
applicable minimum standards" established under ORS 181.640(1)(a) to (d). 
The plain wording of that statute does not support an interpretation that DPSST
has authority to revoke a public safety officer's certification because that
officer failed to meet minimum standards at some point in the past.  ORS
181.662(1)(c) is not, by its terms, retroactive.  
In addition, the minimum standards
for moral fitness that DPSST established by rule under ORS 181.640(1)(a) to (d)
are not themselves retroactive.  Again, as noted above, OAR 259-008-0010(6)
sets out the minimum standard for moral fitness, providing, in part:  
"(a) For purposes of this standard, lack of
good moral fitness means conduct not restricted to those acts that reflect
moral turpitude but rather extending to acts and conduct which would cause a
reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the individual's honesty,
fairness, respect for the rights of others, or for the laws of the state or the
nation."
That regulation also is worded to require consideration of a
public safety officer's present fitness.  By defining conduct
demonstrating a lack of good moral fitness to include conduct that "would
cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts" about, among other
things, the public safety officer's respect for the law, the focus of OAR 259-008-0010(6)(a)
is on an officer's conduct that would cause a reasonable person to have present
substantial doubts about that officer's fitness.  OAR 259-008-0010(6)(a),
by its terms, likewise is not retroactive.  
The only remaining question thus is whether
it somehow was impermissible for DPSST to consider petitioner's December 1998
and January 1999 drug use in evaluating petitioner's present moral fitness.  In
considering the propriety of an agency's action in a contested case,(6)
this court examines whether the agency acted "[o]utside the range of
discretion delegated to the agency by law" or "[o]therwise in
violation of a constitutional or statutory provision."  ORS
183.482(8)(b)(A) and (C).  
We first observe that it is difficult
to conceive of any viable way to evaluate a person's present moral fitness
without considering the person's past conduct.  A person's "past actions
are relevant to his present character and fitness."  In re Beers,
339 Or 215, 224, 118 P3d 784 (2005) (bar admission case; citing In re Fine,
303 Or 314, 322, 736 P2d 183 (1987) (person's past acts bear on his present candor,
credibility and trustworthiness)).  Moreover, nothing in the text of either ORS
181.662(1)(c) or OAR 259-008-0010(6) expressly limits in any way the temporal
scope of the evidence that DPSST may consider in evaluating an officer's present
fitness.  It is indisputable that, had petitioner purchased and used illegal
drugs every day for a month in the more recent past, that conduct would be
sufficient grounds for revocation of his certification.  
In addition, context demonstrates
that DPSST is expected to consider all relevant evidence in making its
determination.  ORS 181.662(1) requires DPSST to provide notice and a hearing
under ORS 181.661 in the event it decides to deny, suspend, or revoke an
officer's certification.  ORS 181.661, in turn, requires such hearings to be
conducted in accordance with ORS 183.415 and ORS 183.417, that is, in
accordance with the standards for contested case hearings.  In a contested case
hearing, "[i]rrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence shall be
excluded," but "[a]ll other evidence of a type commonly relied upon
by reasonably prudent persons in conduct of their serious affairs shall be
admissible."  ORS 183.450(1).  Although it might be argued that evidence
of petitioner's purchase and use of illegal drugs in December 1998 and January
1999 is less relevant than evidence of more recent conduct would be, we
cannot conclude that it is irrelevant to DPSST's determination of
petitioner's present moral fitness.  That is, evidence of petitioner's past
conduct is "of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons
in conduct of their serious affairs" and, therefore, DPSST acted within
its discretion in relying on it.  
Petitioner, nonetheless, insists that
it is impermissibly "retroactive" to consider evidence of conduct
that was not grounds for revocation when he committed it.  That argument might
be persuasive if petitioner plausibly could contend that he did not have any
reason to believe that his conduct in purchasing and using illegal drugs in
December 1998 and January 1999 fell below minimum standards for public safety
officers at the time that he committed it.  Petitioner cannot do so, however. 
As DPSST noted in its order revoking petitioner's certification, petitioner
himself admitted that that conduct did not meet minimum fitness standards for a
law enforcement officer at the time that it occurred.  
Nothing in the text or context of ORS
181.662(1)(c) or OAR 259-008-0010(6) precludes DPSST from considering, in a
certification revocation proceeding, any and all conduct that bears on
petitioner's current moral fitness as a law enforcement officer, whenever that
conduct occurred.  That is the only issue before us.  We therefore cannot say
that DPSST violated any provision of law in considering evidence of petitioner's
December 1998 and January 1999 drug use.  It follows that DPSST's order must be
affirmed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and
the order of the Department of Public Safety Standards and Training are
affirmed.
1. Petitioner
had not been charged with or convicted of any crime based on his purchase or
use of marijuana.  
2. The
relevant subsections of ORS 181.662 were renumbered in 1999, so that the
certification revocation provisions at issue now are located at ORS
181.662(1).  In addition, ORS 181.662 has since been amended in other ways that
do not bear on our analysis in this case.  We also note that, shortly after the
legislature amended ORS 181.662 to add paragraph (1)(c), BPSST adopted a
corresponding change to the administrative rule governing certification
revocation, making a public safety officer's failure to meet minimum moral
fitness standards a discretionary ground for revoking his or her
certification.  OAR 259-008-0070(3)(c).
3. ORS
181.640(1)(a) provides:
"In accordance with any applicable
provision of ORS chapter 183, to promote enforcement of law and fire services
by improving the competence of public safety personnel and their support
staffs, and in consultation with the agencies for which the Board on Public
Safety Standards and Training and Department of Public Safety Standards and
Training provide standards, certification, accreditation and training:
"(a) The department shall recommend and the
board shall establish by rule reasonable minimum standards of physical,
emotional, intellectual and moral fitness for public safety personnel and
instructors."
4. At
the time that petitioner committed the drug use that led to his firing in 1999,
the regulation was numbered as OAR 259-008-0010(5).    
5. In
addition to his argument in this court, petitioner argued in the Court of
Appeals that DPSST's reliance on ORS 181.662(1)(c) and OAR 259-008-0070(3)(c)
violated his state and federal constitutional rights not to be subject to ex
post facto laws; that there was not substantial evidence in the record to
support DPSST's conclusion that petitioner lacked good moral fitness; that
DPSST erred in finding that petitioner failed to meet the minimum standards of
moral fitness; and that DPSST's interpretation of its governing statutes and
regulations to permit revocation of petitioner's certification based on his
drug use created a conflict with the collective bargaining laws of the state
and infringed on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Employment Relations Board. 
The Court of Appeals rejected those arguments without discussion.  Cuff,
217 Or App at 295 n 2.  Petitioner does not challenge that aspect of the Court
of Appeals' decision in this court. 
6. Under
ORS 181.662(1), when DPSST determines that denial, suspension or revocation of
a public safety officer's certification is appropriate, DPSST is required to
provide the officer with notice and an opportunity for a hearing
"consistent with the provisions of ORS 181.661."  ORS 181.661, in
turn, provides that the notice and opportunity for a hearing be provided
"in accordance with ORS 183.415 and 183.417," which set out procedures
for notice and hearings in contested cases.