Title: Michelson v. Michelson
Citation: 520 P.2d 263
Docket Number: 9816
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: March 15, 1974

520 P.2d 263 (1974) Judith M. MICHELSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack T. MICHELSON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 9816. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 15, 1974. Sutin, Thayer &amp; Browne, Irwin S. Moise, Norman S. Thayer, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant. Botts, Botts &amp; Mauney, Gerald R. Cole, Graham E. Evans, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee. MONTOYA, Justice. Plaintiff Judith M. Michelson (appellee) filed an action for divorce from defendant Jack T. Michelson (appellant) on August 23, 1972. In addition to asking for a divorce, appellee sought custody and support for the children of the parties, division of the community property, alimony and attorney's fees. Before the trial, a stipulation was entered into settling the matters involving custody of the children and their support. The court approved the stipulation and, at the trial, a divorce was granted to appellee. The only issues litigated at the trial were the ownership and distribution of the property, alimony and award of attorney's fees. After a decree was entered, this appeal followed. Appellant challenges the correctness of certain findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the trial court, which are stated in his brief in chief as follows: FINDINGS OF FACT: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: *265 The appellant then argues the following points upon which he relies for reversal of the decree, which read: Briefly stated, the appellant is only appealing those portions of the final decree reading as follows: There is no question but that the court in a divorce action is authorized by our statutes to Section 22-7-6, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. (as applicable herein prior to 1973 amendment). Under § 22-7-13, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. (also as applicable herein prior to amendment), similar authority is contained: It is likewise the duty of the court to divide equally the property of the community. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 70 N.M. 11, 369 P.2d 398 (1962); Sands v. Sands, 48 N.M. 458, 152 P.2d 399 (1944). We also held in the former case that the trial court had power to grant alimony in a "reasonable sum" and, on appeal, we only examine the evidence to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion in fixing an amount which was contrary to all reason. We also held in Sloan v. Sloan, 77 N.M. 632, 426 P.2d 780 (1967), that there is no fixed rule by which the amount of permanent alimony can be determined, since each case must be decided upon its relevant facts in the light of what is fair and reasonable. Keeping the foregoing principles in mind, we now consider the issues raised in this appeal. Some of the important factors to be considered in a determination of the amount of alimony to be awarded are the needs of the wife, her age, health and the means to support herself, the earning capacity and the future earnings of the husband, the duration of the marriage, and the amount of property owned by the parties. In the instant case, the trial court found or concluded that there was a community interest in Sunbell Corporation due to work and effort of appellant, a community interest in the Rushfair partnership and the home due to use of community credit and the work and effort of the parties in the home. It also found that other community property existed. After so concluding, the trial court stated: The court then concluded, because no substantial property was being awarded the wife, that "two hundred thousand dollars constitutes a reasonable sum of money to be paid by the husband to the wife in a single sum as alimony." The findings of the trial court, or its conclusions, do not advise us what the extent of the community interest is in Sunbell Corporation, or what the extent of the community interest might be in the Rushfair partnership, or even in the home. As pointed out in Sands v. Sands, supra, the community property of the parties must be divided equally. We can only speculate what portion of the $200,000.00 represents appellee's share of the community property, since no finding was made as to what the community property was. We do know that appellant was awarded all the community property except a portion of the household furnishings and an automobile. It is thus apparent that the $200,000.00 award is not only alimony but is intended to be an award in lieu of appellee's share of the community property of the parties. This does not permit a review to the basic questions presented in this appeal, namely, what, if any, is the community interest of appellee in Sunbell Corporation, in the Rushfair properties, and in the home. All we have is a conclusion by the court that it would not equal $200,000.00 if the tax ramifications are taken into account. Are we *267 then in a position to say whether there was an abuse of discretion in awarding that amount? Certainly an important factor in determining an award of alimony is the amount of property distributed to the wife as her share of the community interest. Upon its distribution it becomes her sole and separate property. What will her needs be after that distribution? How can we determine if there was error in the determination of the interest of each party in the community property when we do not know its extent, except that appellee's share is less than $200,000.00? We allude to those matters to point out the impossibility of a meaningful review under such circumstances. The same reasoning applies to a review of the amount of attorney's fees allowed, leading to a determination of whether or not there has been an abuse of discretion in the award. In Mora v. Martinez, 80 N.M. 88, 90, 451 P.2d 992, 994 (1969), we quoted with approval from Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d 246, 249 (10th Cir.1965), and said: See also State ex rel. State Highway Department v. Bruskas, 85 N.M. 634, 515 P.2d 559 (1973). In view of the foregoing and after a careful review of the entire record, the pertinent findings, conclusions and provisions of the final decree, we feel that the findings of fact here fail to aid this court in making an adequate review of this case. The case is, therefore, reversed and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed and the entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is so ordered. McMANUS, C.J., and STEPHENSON, J., concur.