Title: Lynch v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 970278
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 1998

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and  
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
EDWIN W. LYNCH, JR.,  
                                              OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 970278 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                            January 9, 1998 
COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION  
COMMISSIONER, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
F. Bruce Bach, Judge 
 
 
The issue in this sequel to a condemnation proceeding 
involves a landowner's liability for refund of that amount of the 
sum previously deposited with the court by the condemning 
authority and withdrawn by the landowner that exceeded the amount 
of the subsequent award. 
 
The Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner (the 
Commissioner) planned to take 9.270 acres of a larger tract of 
approximately 75 acres owned by Edwin W. Lynch, Jr., in Fairfax 
County for the improvement of Interstate Route 95.  The 75 acres 
was subject to a deed of trust then held by Dominion National 
Bank of Virginia, later by First Union Bank of Virginia, Dominion 
Bank's successor in title.  Both banks are referred to herein as 
the lienholder.  The deed of trust secured the payment of Lynch's 
$3,500,000 obligation to the bank and in pertinent part provided 
that: 
 
 
Borrower or Grantor shall appear in and prosecute 
any such [condemnation] action or proceeding unless 
otherwise directed by Lender in writing. . . .  The 
proceeds of any award, payment or claim for damages 
. . . in connection with any condemnation or other 
taking, whether direct or indirect . . . are hereby 
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender[.] 
 
 
 
. . . Unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree 
in writing, any application of proceeds to principal 
shall not extend or postpone the due date of the 
[monthly installment payments of principal and 
interest] or change the amount of such installments. 
 
 
Because the Commissioner desired immediate possession of the 
9.270 acres and his evaluation of the land taken was $1,016,755, 
he deposited that sum with the clerk of the circuit court under 
the provisions of Code § 33.1-120.
1  The Commissioner also 
executed and recorded a certificate of take naming Lynch as the 
owner of the property. 
 
Lynch then took advantage of Code § 33.1-124, which 
authorized him to petition the court to order the withdrawal of 
these funds.  His petition alleged that he and Dominion Bank were 
the only parties entitled to receive the funds and that the bank 
had agreed to release its lien on the property taken "through a 
Deed of Partial Release."  In a withdrawal order requested by 
Lynch, the court ordered the deposited funds to be paid to Lynch 
in care of his attorney, who was directed to "use such funds as 
are necessary . . . to satisfy the Deeds of Trust . . . currently 
owing on the property."  The order also provided that if the 
award was less than the deposited funds, judgment for the excess 
amount of the deposit shall be entered for the Commissioner 
against "any person [who] has been paid any greater sum than that 
to which he is entitled as determined by the award." 
 
Upon demand by the lienholder, Lynch endorsed the clerk's  
November 26, 1990, check of $1,016,755, "[p]ay to order of 
                     
    
1Code § 33.1-120 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he 
Commissioner shall pay . . . to the clerk . . . such sum as [the 
Commissioner] shall estimate to be the fair value of the land 
taken . . . before entering upon, or taking possession of, such 
land [prior to filing a condemnation proceeding]." 
Dominion Bank for credit to account of Edwin W. Lynch, Jr."  The 
proceeds of the check were applied by the lienholder in partial 
discharge of the obligation secured by its deed of trust. 
 
In December 1991, the Commissioner filed a condemnation 
petition naming Lynch as the only defendant.  Lynch filed an 
answer and grounds of defense in which he asserted that the offer 
to purchase "was grossly inadequate."   
 
Following a trial before a condemnation commission, the 
commission fixed the value of the land taken at $740,000 with no 
damages to the residue.  Over Lynch's objection, the court 
confirmed the commission's report and entered judgment against 
Lynch for $276,755, the difference between the amount of the 
deposit and the amount of the award.  We awarded Lynch an appeal, 
reversed the judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial 
because of errors in the exclusion of certain evidence.  Lynch v. 
Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 247 Va. 388, 394, 442 S.E.2d 388, 
391 (1994). 
 
At the new trial, a different condemnation commission fixed 
the value of the land taken at $451,000 with no damages to the 
residue.  The court confirmed the commissioners' report but 
retained jurisdiction to resolve a dispute concerning the 
identity of the "person, firm or corporation (if any) which must 
refund the excess [of $565,755 representing the amount by which 
the deposit exceeded the commissioners' award] and against which 
judgment should be entered pursuant to [Code] § 33.1-128."  
 
At the same time, the court ordered the lienholder to be 
joined as a party to the action "for the purpose of determining 
[the lienholder's] liability to return excess condemnation 
proceeds pursuant to [Code] § 33.1-128."  Following argument and 
submission of memoranda, in a written opinion, Judge Richard J. 
Jamborsky ruled that since Lynch had withdrawn the amount of the 
deposit, he, not the lienholder, became liable to the 
Commissioner for the repayment of the excess under the provisions 
of Code § 33.1-128.  Later, Judge F. Bruce Bach entered an order 
in conformity with Judge Jamborsky's opinion.  Lynch appeals. 
 
Code § 33.1-128 provides in pertinent part: 
 
 
In the event of an award in a condemnation 
proceeding being of a lesser amount than that deposited 
with the court, the Commissioner shall recover the 
amount of such excess and, if any person has been paid 
a greater sum than that to which he is entitled as 
determined by the award, judgment shall be entered for 
the Commissioner against such person for the amount of 
such excess. 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
Well-settled rules of statutory interpretation guide us in 
determining whether Lynch is liable for payment of the excess 
deposit. 
 
 
If language is clear and unambiguous, there is no 
need for construction by the court; the plain meaning 
and intent of the enactment will be given it.  School 
Board of Chesterfield County v. School Board of the 
City of Richmond, 219 Va. 244, 250, 247 S.E.2d 380, 384 
(1978).  When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, 
general rules of construction of statutes of doubtful 
meaning do not apply.  Id. at 250-51, 247 S.E.2d at 
384.  Therefore, when the language of an enactment is 
free from ambiguity, resort to legislative history and 
extrinsic facts is not permitted because we take the 
words as written to determine their meaning. 
 
Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 
 
 
Lynch contends that there is no ambiguity in the language of 
the quoted portion of Code § 33.1-128 and that the withdrawal 
order "tracks" this language.  We agree.  Therefore, under the 
principles articulated in Brown, we do not consider Lynch's 
extended discussion of (1) whether he "received" the proceeds of 
the check, or (2) the differing statutory language governing 
eminent domain proceedings which expressly refers to an "owner" 
and the statute under consideration which refers to "any person 
[who] has been paid."  We simply apply the statute and order as 
written and determine whether Lynch "has been paid" the deposit. 
 
The Commissioner and the lienholder maintain that Lynch was 
paid because he received the deposit.
2  Lynch responds that he 
has not been "paid" within the meaning of the statute and order 
for the following reasons.   
 
First, Lynch asserts he was not "paid" because in the deed 
of trust he assigned the "deposit" to the lienholder.  We will 
assume, but not decide, that Lynch is correct in his contention 
that the earlier-quoted language of the deed of trust encompassed 
an alleged assignment of any deposit as well as any later award 
in a condemnation action.  However, Lynch also reasons that this 
"assignment operates as a complete divestiture of all rights from 
the assignor and vests those rights in the assignee."  We do not 
agree. 
 
The deed of trust provided that Lynch "shall appear in and 
                     
    
2 On appeal, the Commissioner contends that the lienholder was 
also "paid" within the meaning of the statute.  We do not consider 
the Commissioner's argument that the lienholder thus became 
jointly and severally liable with Lynch to the Commissioner for 
the excess deposit.  The record does not indicate that this 
argument was asserted in the trial court, Rule 5:25, and the 
Commissioner did not assign cross-error to the action of the court 
in entering judgment solely against Lynch, Rule 5:18. 
prosecute any such [condemnation] action or proceeding unless 
otherwise directed by Lender in writing."  The lienholder never 
directed "otherwise," and, in fact, Lynch did "appear in and 
prosecute" the action.  His "prosecution" included his filing a 
petition to withdraw the deposit.  Indeed, at Lynch's request the 
court ordered the deposit "disburse[d]" to him.  Thus, the 
alleged assignment did not divest Lynch of all rights in the 
deposit. 
 
Next, Lynch argues that he was not "paid" any money.  He 
reasons that  
 
 
[a]lthough the Clerk's check was made payable to 
him, [he] had no power to cash the check and no control 
or discretion as to how to apply the proceeds.  It must 
be remembered that pursuant to the Payment Order . . . 
the check was disbursed in care of Lynch's attorney, 
who was ordered to "use such funds as are necessary, if 
any, to satisfy or partially satisfy the Deeds of Trust 
. . . currently owing on the property." 
 
Lynch concludes that because the withdrawal order required his 
counsel to use the funds to satisfy the lienholder's deed of 
trust, he was "a mere conduit whose only role was to endorse the 
check -- the real payee was the [lienholder]."  We disagree. 
 
If the language of the deed of trust gave Lynch no right to 
these proceeds, as he apparently contends, then he need not have 
petitioned for an early withdrawal and thus subjected himself to 
possible liability for a refund of the excess.  Moreover, if the 
lienholder exercised its right under the deed of trust to require 
Lynch to petition for such withdrawal, as he contends, then on 
his motion, the court could have protected him from liability for 
payment of any possible excess. 
 
Lynch was the payee of the check and the order only required 
his attorney to "use such funds as are necessary, if any, to 
satisfy or partially satisfy" Lynch's deed of trust.  The 
attorney could have negotiated with the lienholder for a 
proration of the deposit between Lynch and the lienholder, based 
on the value of the property taken in relation to the residue of 
the land still covered by the deed of trust.  And, if they could 
not agree, under the provisions of Code § 33.1-124, Lynch could 
have petitioned the court for a hearing to resolve this issue and 
to give him appropriate protection against liability for a return 
of any excess deposit ultimately paid by Lynch to the lienholder. 
 
In pertinent part, Code § 33.1-l24 states that "if the 
record in the proceeding discloses any . . . dispute as to the 
persons entitled to such distribution [of the deposit] or to any 
interest or share therein, the court shall direct such 
proceedings as are provided by [Code] § 25-46.28 for the 
distribution of awards."  Code § 25-46.28 provides in part that 
"[i]f it appears to the court that there exists a controversy 
among claimants to the fund . . ., the court shall enter an order 
setting a time for hearing the case and determining the rights 
and claims of all persons entitled to the fund or to any interest 
or share therein."   
 
These statutory provisions, coupled with Rule 3:9A, 
authorized Lynch to petition the court to join the lienholder as 
a party and petition the court either to order the check made 
payable to the lienholder or make specific provisions for the 
lienholder's liability for refund of any excess withdrawal.
3  
Lynch filed no such petition; in fact, he simply requested that 
the court enter the withdrawal order which imposed liability for 
the excess upon anyone to whom the excess was "paid."  And we are 
of opinion that under the circumstances of this case, Lynch was 
the person who was "paid" within the meaning of the statute and 
order. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court 
correctly imposed liability upon Lynch for payment of such 
excess.  Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgment. 
 
Affirmed. 
                     
    
3 As pertinent, Rule 3:9A provides: 
 
 
A person who is subject to service of process may be 
joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any 
of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest.