Title: In Re Estate of Briscoe
Citation: 293 So. 2d 6
Docket Number: 47438
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 1974

293 So. 2d 6 (1974) In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Mrs. Sallie S. BRISCOE, Deceased. Howard C. BRISCOE et al., Proponents/Appellants, v. James Upton BRISCOE et al., Contestants/Appellees. No. 47438. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 8, 1974. Hugh L. Bailey, Winona, for proponents/appellants. J.W. Kellum, Sumner, for contestants/appellees. PATTERSON, Justice: This appeal arises from the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Carroll County. There upon an issue of devisavit vel non a jury verdict was returned against the will of Mrs. Sallie S. Briscoe. The only question submitted to the jury was whether Mrs. Sallie Briscoe was mentally competent to execute the will on March 16, 1964. The jury's verdict was a *7 tacit finding by it that the testatrix was mentally incompetent on the above date and thus unable to make the will. This verdict, presently challenged as being against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, brings into focus all of the evidence and particularly that favorable to the contestants so this Court might determine if the verdict is supported by evidence or reasonable inference, and if so, whether it is overwhelmed by the evidence of the proponents. The proponents of the will authenticated it and its previous admission to probate by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses. They then rested their case, whereupon the contestants undertook the burden of proving the incapacity of the testatrix. We note, as did the chancellor, there were two witnesses who testified that Mrs. Briscoe was mentally incompetent on March 16, 1964, the date of the will. Undoubtedly these witnesses were Mrs. Ruby Pullen and Mrs. Bonnie Briscoe, daughters-in-law of the testatrix, whose husbands had preceded their mother in death. They are also the mothers of some of the contestants to the will. Mrs. Pullen testified that she had known the testatrix for many years and that she was in the family from 1934 when she married Carl Briscoe, until his death in 1960, and thereafter saw Mrs. Briscoe frequently, including the year 1964. She testified that the testatrix died in 1968 at the age of eighty-three. From this we observe the testatrix was seventy-nine years of age at the time the will was executed. The record unveils the following characteristics of Mrs. Briscoe, as related by Mrs. Pullen: She also stated with regard to the demeanor of the testatrix: She was then asked: Finally, she was asked: On cross-examination we note the following testimony: Mrs. Bonnie Briscoe testified that she was a frequent visitor in the home of the testatrix, including the year 1964. In response to questions concerning the physical and mental condition of the testatrix she stated: Her testimony terminated with the following: This is the total of the evidence directed to the mental incapacity of the testatrix. The opinion of each of these witnesses directed to mental incapacity was obviously based upon the infirmities of advancing age rather than upon any abnormal conduct indicative of mental aberration. We conclude that the opinions of mental incapacity are of little evidentiary value for the reason they are not supported by any facts as a basis for the witnesses' conclusion. Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455, 49 So. 2d 713 (1951), and Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741 (1881). While it is true that a jury may consider the testimony of one witness and disregard that of another and that the sheer number of witnesses is not the proper criterion for the evaluation of evidence, nevertheless the virtually uncontroverted testimony of competent witnesses may not be completely disregarded. We observe that the subscribing witnesses to the will testified favorably to the mental capacity of Mrs. Briscoe on the date of the will's execution and that her personal physician gave evidence that she was mentally competent, as did other long-time friends and business associates. A fair study of this record reveals evidence of testamentary capacity to make a will so great that it overwhelms the inferences of incapacity that might be drawn from the witnesses of the contestants. We are reluctant to set aside the verdict of a jury, but are constrained to do so when the evidence simply will not support a verdict. Lewis v. Lewis, 241 Miss. 83, *9 129 So. 2d 353 (1961), and Fortenberry v. Herrington, 188 Miss. 735, 196 So. 232 (1940). Reversed and rendered. RODGERS, P.J., and INZER, SMITH and BROOM, JJ., concur. [1] The word "sitter" is explained by other testimony as referring to an attendant of the testatrix.