Title: Smith v. Brown
Citation: 213 So. 2d 374
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 1968

213 So. 2d 374 (1968)
Hattie Robinson SMITH
v.
Demarias Stevens BROWN.
4 Div. 218.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 13, 1968.
Rehearing Denied August 22, 1968.
*375 W. G. Hardwick and Jere C. Segrest, Dothan, for appellant.
J. Robt. Ramsey, Dothan, for appellee.
KOHN, Justice.
This suit was filed in the circuit court of Houston County, in equity, by Demarias Stevens Brown against Hattie Robinson Smith for the purpose of establishing a boundary line between their property, invoking the jurisdiction of the court under Title 13, § 129 and Title 47, § 3, Code of Alabama, 1940.
Submission for final decree was on the amended complaint, answer of the respondent, and testimony taken before the official court reporter of Houston County, Alabama, on June 26, 1962. Thereafter, on October 14, 1964, the lower court established as the true line that claimed by complainant. Appellant (respondent) appeals from the decree of the circuit court establishing the boundary line.
There are basically two issues for our determination: (1) Whether the decree of the lower court correctly established the true boundary line between the two lots; and (2), has respondent acquired by adverse possession any of the land lying north of said true line. The strip of land which is in dispute measures approximately 15 × 75 feet across the northern side of respondent's lot. A rough map is provided to assist in a proper understanding of the case.
*376 
*377 The testimony was taken by deposition and not in open court. We, therefore, must examine and form our own judgment as to its probative force without any presumption in favor of the findings of the lower court. W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. Cobb, 266 Ala. 146, 94 So. 2d 763.
Complainant alleges in her bill that she is the owner of the following described real estate:
Complainant further avers that respondent, Hattie Robinson Smith, is the owner of, and is in possession of a house and lot on East Troy Street in Dothan, Alabama, described as follows:
However, the deed by which respondent acquired the lot in question contained the following description:
Complainant's bill further avers in Paragraph Five:
The issue giving rise to this suit is thus clearly evident. Are the 89 foot east and west boundaries of respondent's property to be measured from the north side of the sidewalk on East Troy Street, or do the 89 *378 foot lines encompass the sidewalk and a part of East Troy Street? A study of the history of respondent's chain of title convinces us that the latter is the correct interpretation.
The lot presently owned by respondent was, for a time prior to 1920, owned by Alto L. Barnes. On February 25, 1920, Barnes conveyed that parcel of property to Mrs. E. J. Robinson by warranty deed. The deed contained the following description of the lot:
On August 31, 1925, Mrs. Robinson conveyed the lot to R. E. Robinson by warranty deed with the following description:
This latter description has remained in substantially identical form through several mesne conveyances to the present owner, Hattie Robinson Smith. The source of the dispute in this suit is readily apparent from a comparison of the two foregoing descriptions of the same piece of property with the enclosed plat of the property.
The 1920 deed from Barnes to Mrs. E. J. Robinson described the lot beginning at a point on the southern boundary of the lot presently owned by complainant and measuring in an easterly direction 75 feet, then southerly 89 feet, then westerly 89 feet, then northerly 89 feet to the point of beginning. The 1925 deed from Mrs. E. J. Robinson to R. E. Robinson described the same lot beginning at the purported southern boundary of that lot, i.e., the north side of Troy Street excluding the sidewalk, and running northerly 89 feet, etc.
Barnes testified that at the time he sold the lot to Mrs. E. J. Robinson in 1920, Troy Street was not as wide as it is now, that it was a dirt street or alleyway at that time, and was approximately 15 feet wide. It appears from this evidence that the lot now owned by respondent was 89 feet deep at the time Barnes sold it to his grantee, but that the subsequent widening of Troy Street and construction of a sidewalk reduced the depth of the lot considerably. This factor was apparently overlooked by the draftsman who prepared the deed when Mr. E. J. Robinson later sold the property in 1925, and the description of the lot as being 89 feet deep has been erroneously carried forward through several subsequent sales of the lot in question. Although the exact date of the widening of Troy Street *379 nowhere appears in the record, from the testimony of Barnes, it was apparently accomplished between the time he sold the lot, February 20, 1920, and October 31, 1925.
A qualified surveyor, M. J. Steensland, was employed by complainant to survey the property in question and prepare a plat to indicate the true boundary between the lots of complainant and respondent. His survey, completed on October 8, 1958, was based on the abstract of complainant's lot and showed the true boundary to be as contended by complainant. This was the line adopted by the court below as being the true boundary line between the two lots.
A surveyor employed by respondent, Horace Adams, found the true line to be as claimed by respondent. However, he admitted that his survey was based entirely on the description contained in respondent's deed, that he did not use an abstract of respondent's lot in conducting his survey, nor did he attempt to determine the south boundary line of the complainant's lot through use of a deed or abstract to such property of complainant.
We are satisfied from the evidence presented that the true boundary line between the lots involved here was correctly determined by the decree of the trial court, and that the plat prepared by Steensland accurately establishes the boundary between the land of the two parties.
We now turn to the question of whether appellant has acquired title to any of the land north of the true boundary line by adverse possession.
The disputed strip of land extends approximately 15 to 16 feet into the property of appellee, and runs along the entire northern boundary of appellant's lot. Evidence indicates that at the time appellant purchased her lot in 1943, her husband erected a fence along what they considered to be the northern boundary of their property. They did not use a survey in constructing this fence, but merely made their own measurements, relying on the 89 foot depth stated in her deed, excluding the sidewalk running parallel to Troy Street. Although there is some confusion in the testimony, it appears that portions of the fence fell into disrepair and the fence posts were replaced by other posts in 1946. However, the replacement posts were not placed in the same positions as the old posts, but rather, were placed in such a fashion that the fence ran at an angle to the claimed northern boundary of appellant's property and, beginning at the northwest corner post, trailed off in a southeasterly direction, the northeast corner being relocated some 13 feet south of its original position. Then too, the northwestern corner of the fence was actually some 5 to 6 feet east of the true western line of appellant's lot. However, all of the property included in the rebuilt fence was also included in the old fence. It is thus readily apparent that the fence, as it was ultimately situated, in no way defined the limits of appellant's property as set forth in her deed. Although there is some question from the evidence whether appellant is claiming the entire strip purportedly defined in her deed, or whether she is merely claiming that portion of the land south of the fence, it is clear that appellant was in possession of the portion of the land south of the fence from the time of its construction in 1943 until this suit was filed in 1954, thus providing ample time for acquisition of title by adverse possession, provided the other requirements are met. Appellant testified that the area was used as a garden for raising vegetables and flowers, that chickens were also kept there, and that the area was also used as a yard, the land being located to the rear of her house. The difficulty facing us, is in trying to determine whether her possession was adverse to appellee.
There are many decisions of this court dealing with the problem of adverse possession between coterminous land owners. The very early cases of this court strictly *380 applied the "subjective intent" rule which looks to the intention of the possessor as the controlling factor. This line of cases holds that unless the possessor has actually formed an intention to hold the strip, even though it is beyond the true line, the possessor's position is not adverse. Brown v. Cockerell, 33 Ala. 38; Alexander v. Wheeler, 69 Ala. 332; Davis v. Caldwell, 107 Ala. 526, 18 So. 103; Hess v. Rudder, 117 Ala. 525, 23 So. 136, 67 Am.St.Rep. 182; Ashford v. McKee, 183 Ala. 620, 62 So. 879. The rule is stated with great clarity in Hess v. Rudder, as follows:
This rule, however, was modified by later cases and in the case of Smith v. Cook, 220 Ala. 338, 124 So. 898, this court crystalized this modification and stated very precisely the modified rule which still prevails in this State.
In the present case, the testimony was confused and contradictory. This is certainly true of appellant. On cross-examination, she testified as follows:
Appellant stated that she did not employ an attorney to examine the title at the time she purchased the property. She testified that she did not claim to have purchased or acquired any of the property north of her own.
On redirect, in answer to a series of leading questions by her attorney, appellant testified that at the time she purchased her property, she intended to take the 89 feet called for in the deed.
Then, on recross-examination, appellant testified as follows:
On further redirect examination, appellant testified as follows:
Although this testimony is contradictory, in that appellant stated that she intended to claim all of the property south of the fence by whatever means necessary and at the same time she did not intend to take any of the appellee's lot, we must bear in mind that the appellant was a woman of a limited sixth grade education and was, therefore, likely to be confused by the questions of the attorneys. With this in mind, along with the rule from Smith v. Cook, supra, which holds that there is a presumption that a claim is adverse where the possessor builds a fence claiming it to be a line fence with knowledge by the other party, we hold that the appellant's possession of the land up to the fence was hostile and adverse.
In the case of Sylvest v. Stowers, 276 Ala. 695, 166 So. 2d 423, the appellant who had erected a fence as a line fence under a mistake of fact as the true boundary, stated on cross-examination, he would have helped move the fence if he had known what the true line was. In that case the court rejected the contention of the appellee that this was an admission of the absence of the intention to claim to the fence, and stated as follows:
In the present case we feel that the appellant has established that her claim was adverse and that she has acquired title to the property up to the fence.
The decree appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for rendering a decree not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.