Title: State of Florida v. Thomas Knight, Etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-1415
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
Nos. SC01-1415 & SC02-1106 
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
THOMAS KNIGHT N/K/A ASKARI ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
____________
THOMAS KNIGHT N/K/A ASKARI ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., ETC.,
Respondent.
[August 21, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
The State appeals a trial court order vacating Askari Muhammad's death
sentence and granting a new sentencing proceeding pursuant to Muhammad's
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion.  Muhammad cross-appeals the
1.  Muhammad was on death row for the murders of Lillian and Sydney
Gans.  See Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).  Prior to changing his
name, Muhammad was known as Thomas Knight.
-2-
denial of his claim that he is entitled to have his conviction for first-degree murder
vacated and also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed
below, we reverse the portion of the trial court's order vacating Muhammad's death
sentence.
I.  PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
The facts in this case are set forth in this Court's opinion on direct appeal. 
See Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 1986) (Muhammad I).  Briefly
stated, Muhammad, who was awaiting execution on death row,1 fatally stabbed
Department of Corrections (DOC) guard James Burke on the afternoon of October
12, 1980.  Muhammad was charged with Burke's murder.  Before trial,
Muhammad's motion to proceed pro se was twice denied by two separate judges,
who later recused themselves from the case.  Muhammad's first trial ended in
mistrial.  When Muhammad renewed his motion to proceed pro se, a third judge
allowed him to represent himself.  The jury found Muhammad guilty as charged and
Muhammad waived his right to a jury recommendation in the penalty phase.  The
trial court sentenced Muhammad to death, finding nothing in mitigation and three
2.  On direct appeal, Muhammad's appellate counsel raised five claims: (1)
the trial court erred in finding Muhammad competent to stand trial as it had
insufficient facts upon which to find him competent; (2) the trial court erred in
allowing Muhammad to represent himself at trial without first determining his
competence to waive assistance of counsel and to represent himself; (3) the trial
court erred in excluding Muhammad from presenting any evidence of his insanity at
trial because he refused to be examined by court-appointed psychiatrists in
violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution; (4) the trial court erred in finding as aggravating factors that
Muhammad was under sentence of imprisonment when he committed the murder
and that he had a conviction for a prior felony; (5) the trial court erred in failing to
consider in mitigation evidence of Muhammad's mental status. 
3.  Noting that Muhammad had combined and rearranged many of the
eighteen claims presented to the trial court, this Court summarized the fifteen
claims:
Of the eighteen claims presented in his 3.850 motion,
Muhammad seeks review of the trial court's rejection of the following
-3-
aggravating circumstances: the defendant was under sentence of imprisonment, he
had been convicted of a prior capital felony, and the murder was heinous, atrocious
or cruel.  See Muhammad I, 494 So. 2d at 972.  On direct appeal, this Court
affirmed Muhammad's judgment and sentence.2  Id. at 976.  The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Muhammad v. Florida, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
In February of 1989, Muhammad filed his 3.850 motion with eighteen claims,
each of which was summarily denied by the trial court.  See Muhammad v. State,
603 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1992) (Muhammad II).  On appeal of the trial court's order,
Muhammad sought review of fifteen rejected claims.3  Id.  This Court 
fifteen: 1) that summary denial was erroneous and the trial court erred
in failing to either identify or attach the portion of the record that
refutes each claim; 2) that Muhammad's rights were violated because
no reliable transcript of the trial exists and critical records were not
included in the record on direct appeal; 3) that Muhammad was denied
effective assistance of counsel in violation of Faretta[ v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975)]; 4) that Muhammad was denied due process and
equal protection because the appointed mental health expert failed to
conduct a professionally competent evaluation and this in turn caused
counsel to render ineffective assistance; 5) that Muhammad was
denied effective assistance of counsel by the court's order that defense
counsel not present an insanity defense; 6) that Muhammad's rights
were abrogated because he was forced to undergo criminal judicial
proceedings although he was not legally competent; 7) that the death
sentence was unreliable because Muhammad was not competent to
waive his sentencing jury yet the penalty proceedings were not
conducted before an advisory jury; 8) that Muhammad was denied his
rights as a pro se defendant at both the guilt and penalty phases of the
trial; 9) that state misconduct throughout the guilt and penalty phases
denied Muhammad's right to a fundamentally fair and reliable capital
trial and sentencing determination; 10) that the trial court's denial of
Muhammad's motions for change of venue and for individual,
sequestered voir dire deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial
jury; 11) that Muhammad was indicted by a biased grand jury; 12) that
the trial court erred in failing to consider Muhammad's mental
deficiencies as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and in
considering nonstatutory aggravating factors; 13) that the trial court
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof with regard to the
appropriateness of a sentence of life imprisonment; 14) that the jury
and judge improperly considered the victim's character and "victim
impact" information; and 15) that the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
aggravating circumstance was applied without articulation or
application of a meaningful narrowing principle in violation of
Maynard[ v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)].
Muhammad II, 603 So. 2d at 488-89 (footnotes omitted). 
-4-
affirmed the trial court's summary denial of all of Muhammad's claims except one,
4.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-5-
and remanded on a limited issue regarding Muhammad's Brady4 claim:
[W]e agree with Muhammad that summary denial was improper as to
the State's alleged failure to disclose exculpatory employee statements
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, (part of claim 9).  Gorham v. State,
521 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1988).  In summarily denying this claim, the trial
court stated that "this is an issue that should have been raised on direct
appeal."  However, some claims arising under Brady are proper in a
rule 3.850 motion.  Demps v. State, 416 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1982).  In
this case, Muhammad alleges that despite his repeated requests for
discovery the State suppressed exculpatory statements of prison
employees who witnessed the offense.  He further alleges that the State
insisted that it had no such statements, when in fact there were such
employee statements.  Muhammad contends that these statements
contained exculpatory information regarding his mental state at the
time of the offense, and that he was denied his right to effectively
cross-examine witnesses against him based on the statements. 
Because the trial court believed that this point was inappropriate to a
rule 3.850 proceeding, it did not address the merits of whether the
alleged Brady violation would require a new trial.  Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court's ruling on the alleged Brady violation and
remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Muhammad II, 603 So. 2d at 489-90.
After a protracted exchange of pleadings concerning public records
requests, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim on June 12
and 13, 2000.  At the hearing, the defense introduced several exhibits relating to
alleged Brady evidence.  In particular, Muhammad introduced various documents
that were apparently part of the Department of Corrections (DOC) investigatory file
5.  Muhammad introduced the testimony of twelve individuals.  Louis E.
Turner, a DOC investigator at the time of the Burke murder and the author of the
letter to the prosecutor, testified and authenticated that a number of documents
appeared to be from his investigatory file on the case.  Leonard Ball, Edward
Sands, and Ed Sobach were officials with FSP and DOC who testified as to the
state of the files in the Burke murder as well as the possible location of documents
that appeared to be missing from the investigatory files.  Darrell Brewer, who
worked for FSP as a guard at the time of the murder, testified that Muhammad's
eyes were open wide when he observed him shortly after the murder.  Arthur Jones,
Lenson Hargrave, and Boyd McCaskill were inmates that saw Muhammad around
the time of the crime.  They each testified as to their observations of Muhammad
around the time of the crime.  However, none had previously shared their
observations with the State.  Brad Fisher was a clinical forensic psychologist, who
had examined Muhammad.  He testified that the June 2, 1981, letter and attached
statements would have been useful in diagnosing Muhammad's potential mental
-6-
on Burke's murder.  The documents included employee and inmate statements that
were taken during the course of the investigation.  Among these documents was a
letter dated June 2, 1981, from L. E. Turner, an investigator with DOC, to the
prosecutor in the case, Thomas Elwell.  In the letter, Turner indicated that he had,
at Elwell's request, reinterviewed and received the statements of Florida State
Prison (FSP) personnel who had the closest contact with Muhammad immediately
following the murder of Officer Burke.  Attached to the letter were seven typed
unsigned, undated, and unattributed statements.  Additionally, at the evidentiary
hearing, Muhammad introduced testimony from a number of witnesses, including
several witnesses that testified as to the import of the June 2, 1981, letter and its
attached statements.5
illness and would have supported mitigation.  Reed Replogle was Muhammad's
standby counsel at the time of his trial.  He testified that he had no contact with
Muhammad during the trial and he alleged that the judge had given him specific
orders not to approach the defendant.  Stephen Bernstein was Muhammad's
counsel before he elected to proceed pro se.  Bernstein testified that he and
Muhammad differed on trial strategy in that he wanted to present an insanity
defense but Muhammad refused.  Bernstein had also examined the Brady material
and he said it would have been useful in preparing for guilt phase and penalty phase
issues.  Bill Salmon testified as an expert on defense in the State of Florida.  He
opined that the alleged Brady material would have been useful at each stage of the
trial.
-7-
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order dated May 8,
2001, which found that Muhammad was entitled to a new sentencing hearing, and
denied all other requested relief.
II.  3.850 MOTION
A. State's Appeal
Initially, we would note that the scope of our previous remand was narrow.
Specifically, we remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the State
failed "to disclose exculpatory employee statements in violation of Brady v.
Maryland."  Muhammad II, 603 So. 2d at 489.  Accordingly, the trial court
recognized that much of the evidence that Muhammad introduced at the evidentiary
hearing and the arguments associated therewith were not germane to the issue at
hand.  In fact, given the large amount of additional information that was introduced,
it was unclear from the evidentiary hearing and from the trial court's order which
-8-
evidence Muhammad was alleging was Brady evidence.  At oral argument,
Muhammad identified the documents that his Brady claim was premised on: the
June 2, 1981, letter from Turner and the statements attached to it. 
The State is required to disclose to the defense evidence in its possession or
control that is favorable to the accused or that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The defendant must prove three elements to establish a Brady
claim: "[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence has been suppressed
by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued." 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So.
2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  In assessing the prejudice element of a Brady claim, a
court should determine whether the favorable evidence could "reasonably be taken
to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict."  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435
(1995); see also Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 2000). 
Furthermore, in reviewing whether prejudice has ensued, "[t]he question is not
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a
6.  Although we remanded for the trial court to determine whether the State
failed to disclose employee statements in violation of Brady, the materials that the
trial court relied on in its order granting relief encompassed information that was not
suppressed by the State because it was either not in the State's possession or
because it was, in fact, generated by the defense by way of deposition.  For
example, in a portion of the order, the trial court stated:
The information cited by Defendant as newly discovered
centers around observations by inmates and guards of Defendant's
demeanor at or near the time of the crime as evidence of his mental
state.  Just hours after the incident, inmates were interviewed (the
interviews were later transcribed), and the correctional officers
involved completed incident reports detailing their involvement in the
event.  Defendant argues that the statements made during the
interviews and in the incident reports would have enabled him to show
that he was not functioning normally at the time this event occurred.
For example, at the evidentiary hearing, Defendant put on a
number of witnesses who testified that Defendant appeared not to be
in his right mind just before and after the murder.
After referring to the evidentiary hearing testimony of one correctional officer and
two inmates, who described Muhammad's appearance at the time of the murder, the
trial court stated that Muhammad was arguing "that had this information been
disclosed to him, it would have drastically affected his trial strategy and
preparation, and the outcome of the proceedings would have been different."
Although the testimony of the correctional officer could conceivably be
matched to one of the unattributed statements attached to the June 2, 1981, letter,
the trial court's order did not do so.  Moreover, the two inmates testified
specifically that they had not relayed their observations to anyone until just before
the evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, because they had never shared their
observations with the State, it is unclear how the inmate's observations could be
-9-
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90.
The trial court's order does not analyze Muhammad's claim according to the
three elements necessary to prove a Brady claim.6  Moreover, it is not clear from
considered Brady evidence.
Moreover, in another portion of the order, the trial court states that the
"information relied upon by Defendant appears only in depositions, incident
reports, and interviews, which were not made part of the official court record. 
Thus, the sentencing court could not have known of its existence unless brought to
its attention by either side."  Although the "depositions, incident reports, and
interviews" are not referred to with any specificity, the evidentiary hearing
demonstrated some incident reports and taped interviews had been turned over to
Muhammad's counsel, Bernstein, who then turned his files over to Muhammad
when he was allowed to proceed pro se.  Moreover, the depositions, although not
identified with any specificity, would appear to be ones taken by Bernstein before
he withdrew as counsel.  These depositions were also apparently turned over to
Muhammad, as he made references on the record that would indicate he was
utilizing them.  This information was clearly not suppressed by the State because it
was prepared by Muhammad's counsel and was apparently in Muhammad's
possession.
7.  In general, the evidentiary hearing demonstrated that the passage of time
has had somewhat of a debilitating effect on the determination of what information
that State and Muhammad had in their respective possession at the time of trial.
-10-
the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing that the State suppressed the letter
and its attached statements, either willfully or inadvertently.  Bernstein,
Muhammad's attorney before he elected to proceed pro se, testified that he did not
recall the letter or its attached statements and that he probably would have
remembered receiving such documents because he would have turned them over to
mental health experts.  However, Bernstein also acknowledged that he had forgotten
receiving other documents that the State could prove had been turned over.7
Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that the State had either willfully or
8.  In fact, in reviewing the contradictory nature of the statements it is
difficult to say definitively that the statements satisfy the first prong of Brady,
namely that they are favorable to the accused as either exculpatory or impeaching. 
For example, one statement cited by Muhammad in his brief described
Muhammad's facial expression as "it appeared to say I've done something terrible,
his eyes appeared to be stretched at an unusual size."  However, the same statement
notes that Muhammad "appeared as if he had nothing to worry about . . . . [His]
facial expression showed no regrets and no remorse."  Another describes
Muhammad as "looking down at Officer Burke with a blank expression on his
face."  However, the same individual also stated that "[a]t no time did [Muhammad]
appear not to know what was happening or where he was at, his response to all
orders given to him were responded to without question or delay."
-11-
inadvertently suppressed the letter and its attached statements, we would still hold
that Muhammad has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced and thus, his claim
fails under the third prong of the Brady test.  At best, the seven unattributed,
unsigned, and undated statements contain limited and conflicting information
regarding Muhammad's state of mind around the time of the murder.8  Moreover,
although the descriptions of Muhammad in the statements were unsigned, they were
consistent with the descriptions given by FSP personnel who were deposed by
Bernstein.  Thus, as the State notes, the information contained in the allegedly
suppressed employee statements was cumulative to information from employee
depositions.  The record reflects that those depositions were turned over to
Muhammad, yet he did not use them to present any mental mitigation.  Under these
circumstances, no likelihood that Muhammad would have used the similar and
-12-
cumulative information in the June 2, 1981, letter and its attachments to argue
mental mitigation has been established.  In addition, there has been no
demonstration that the allegedly withheld documents contained any information not
already disclosed to Muhammad by other means.  Therefore, because Muhammad
did not suffer any prejudice from the alleged withholding of the letter and its
attached statements, the trial court erred in ordering a new penalty phase.
B. Muhammad's Appeal
Muhammad's cross-appeal is closely related to the issues appealed by the
State.  Namely, Muhammad alleges that the evidence of the letter and employee
statements requires his conviction to be vacated.  Muhammad argues that the lower
court did not consider the impact of this evidence upon the guilt phase with regard
to issues such as whether he would have pursued an insanity defense and whether
he was competent to proceed pro se.
Although our opinion in Muhammad II indicated that the trial court had not
addressed the merits of "whether the alleged Brady violation would require a new
trial," Muhammad II, 603 So. 2d at 490, the nature of the documents that were
presented on remand would not require either a new sentencing phase or a new trial. 
Thus, we agree with the trial court's denial of guilt phase relief.  Even if the
documents in question were suppressed by the State, they would not have
9.  Muhammad claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
following claims: (1) Muhammad's Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated when the court instructed his standby counsel not to provide him with
assistance; (2) Muhammad's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated because he was not present at critical stages of the proceedings and
the trial court engaged in ex parte communications with the State during these
absences; (3) Muhammad was denied access to a law library to prepare his
defenses; (4) the trial court's failure to grant Muhammad's motions for change of
venue and individual sequestered voir dire deprived Muhammad of his right to a fair
and impartial jury in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution; (5) Muhammad was indicted by a biased grand jury
in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
-13-
provided any novel information that would have had any impact on guilt phase
issues.  We previously concluded, after explaining in some detail in Muhammad's
direct appeal, that the trial court properly found that Muhammad was (1) competent
to stand trial, (2) competent to proceed pro se, and (3) competent to withdraw the
notice of intent to raise an insanity defense.  Muhammad I, 494 So. 2d at 974-76. 
Nothing contained in the alleged Brady documents causes us to question these
conclusions.  As we recognized, Muhammad "conducted his defense as well as any
layman could be expected to do."  Id. at 976.  Therefore, the lower court properly
denied relief regarding the guilt phase.
III.  HABEAS
In the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Muhammad asserts five claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 9  As his first claim, Muhammad argues
-14-
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise any issues on appeal
regarding the alleged limitations put on the participation of Muhammad's standby
counsel, Fredrick Replogle (Replogle).  At the evidentiary hearing on Muhammad's
3.850 motion, Replogle adopted an affidavit that had been submitted with
Muhammad's previous 3.850 motion.  The affidavit alleged that Replogle did not
consult with Muhammad during the trial, did no investigation, was totally unaware
of Muhammad's background, and had been ordered by the trial judge not to
consult with Muhammad.
Appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness is appropriately raised in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000). 
In order to grant habeas relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel,
this Court must determine the following:
[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and,
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the
correctness of the result.
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So.
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  "The defendant
has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the
10.  On appeal, this Court held that the trial court appropriately found that
Muhammad was competent to proceed pro se and waive his right to counsel. 
Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969, 974 (Fla. 1986).  Thus to the extent that any
of Muhammad's habeas petition claims can be construed as an attack on the trial
court's decision to allow Muhammad to proceed pro se, his claims are procedurally
barred.  See Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) ("[H]abeas corpus
petitions are not to be used for additional appeals on questions which . . . were
raised on appeal . . . .").
11.  Specifically, the trial court stated: "If you have any questions during the
course of the trial, I know you have not used Mr. Replogle of the Public Defender's
Office much in the past, but if you have any questions, Mr. Replogle is present to
assist you."  When Muhammad asked the judge to clarify Replogle's role, the judge
responded, "If you have any questions about legal proceedings that are going on in
the courtroom, you may ask Mr. Replogle a question.  That seems clear enough,"
to which Muhammad responded, "Okay, Your Honor."  The next day, Muhammad
objected "to the Court's offer that I use Mr. Replogle because if I'm not mistaken,
this Court entered an order appointing the office of the Public Defender as standby
counsel, not assistance of counsel."  While lacking some clarity, Muhammad's
-15-
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based."  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at
1069.  Moreover, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
pursue a meritless claim.  See Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 263, 266-67 (Fla.
1996).10 
At the outset, Muhammad's characterization of the facts involved with the
participation of his standby counsel are incorrect.  Despite Muhammad's claim that
standby counsel was not permitted to assist him, at the start of the trial, the court
specifically informed Muhammad of Replogle's presence in the courtroom and told
Muhammad that if he needed assistance, Replogle was available.11  Moreover,
objection was apparently based on his desire to make it clear that he did not
acquiesce to the trial court's offer to use Replogle in the role of standby counsel.
-16-
before the jury was instructed, the following discussion on Muhammad's decision
not to utilize Replogle took place:
MR. REPLOGLE: I have offered to assist the defendant in reviewing
the instructions.  Could we, perhaps, go into the library to do that
rather than back to the holding cell?
COURT: You have consistently refused the Court's offer of Mr.
Replogle's assistance.  I don't want to force anything upon you.
MR. MUHAMMAD: Your honor, I want to go on the record as
understanding the Court.  I [sic] have entered an order denying my
request for assistance of counsel.  I want the record to reflect, it is my
understanding that the Court entered an order appointing Mr. Replogle
as standby counsel in this case.  Mr. Replogle, he asked that did I
want him to assist me in reviewing these instructions, and I stated to
him that it was not necessary, that if he wanted to review these
instructions, he is welcome to do so.  However, I don't want to
intimate in any way that Mr. Replogle is assistant [sic] of counsel
because Mr. Replogle has not assisted me in this cause.
COURT: I understand, that's what I wanted to record.  Mr. Replogle,
under those circumstances, I don't think that you should.  Mr.
Muhammad, I have asked Mr. Replogle to be here as standby counsel
in the event that you cannot proceed.
MR. MUHAMMAD: Yes, sir.
COURT: I also asked him to be here in the event that you needed
some legal jury [sic] and that he would provide that, upon your
request, only upon your request, in that I didn't because of our
previous concerns about this that you have a right to represent
yourself.  The Court in no way is forcing counsel upon you.  As a
12.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
-17-
result, if you request it, Mr. Replogle assisting you in going over those
jury instructions, he indicated to me that he is willing to do so, but
without your request, I ask Mr. Replogle to remain in his seat away
from you so it does not appear that you are represented by counsel or
that he is participating in any way.
Thus, it is clear from the record that Muhammad did not want to appear to
have acquiesced to the limited role that his standby counsel was performing.  
Moreover, the court took seriously Muhammad's desire not to insinuate that
Replogle was providing him any assistance.  Muhammad's decision to not avail
himself of his designated standby counsel, even though he was aware Replogle was
available, was his own, and not the trial judge's decision.  In McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168 (1984), the United States Supreme Court stated:
First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control
over the case he chooses to present to the jury.  This is the core of the
Faretta[12] right.  If standby counsel's participation over the
defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or
substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to
control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the
defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded.
Second, participation by standby counsel without the
defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's
perception that the defendant is representing himself.  The defendant's
appearance in the status of one conducting his own defense is
important in a criminal trial, since the right to appear pro se exists to
affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy.
13.  The Supreme Court also recognized that excessive involvement of
standby counsel in front of the jury "will destroy the appearance that the defendant
is acting pro se.  This, in turn, may erode the dignitary values that the right to self-
representation is intended to promote and may undercut the defendant's
presentation to the jury of his own most effective defense."  Id. at 181-82. 
14.  In a footnote, Muhammad's brief indicates that he was not present for
the excusal of two jurors and that he was also absent when the manner of
conducting voir dire was decided.  However, Muhammad has not identified with
any specificity how he was absent for the excusal of the jurors and no such
absence is apparent on the face of the record.  Moreover, the record also clearly
-18-
Id. at 178 (footnote omitted).13
In the instant case, Muhammad's remark that he "did not want to intimate"
that Replogle was providing him with any assistance demonstrates that Muhammad
did not want Replogle's assistance and he wanted to make sure that there was no
insinuation or appearance that Replogle was in any way acting as his counsel.  Any
limitation that the trial court put on standby counsel was apparently based on
Muhammad's repeatedly stated desire that he be allowed his right to self-
representation unimpeded.  Therefore, Muhammad is not entitled to relief on this
claim.  
ABSENCE FROM PROCEEDINGS
Next, Muhammad claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise on appeal the issue of two alleged incidents of ex parte communications
with the State, which occurred during the penalty phase of Muhammad's trial. 14 
reflects that the manner of voir dire was determined at an October 11, 1982,
hearing.  Not only was Muhammad present at this hearing, it was conducted after
he had been allowed to proceed pro se and he was able to offer objections to and
arguments against the State's proposed method of conducting voir dire.
15.  Immediately after Muhammad was finished presenting his closing
argument, the record reflects that the trial court stated:
Thank you.  Take the defendant out first, the evidence and arguments
of counsel, I find that the State has established at least several of the
aggravating circumstances that are required by the law of the State of
Florida with regard to the imposition of the death penalty beyond and
to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt.  I have found that the
defendant has elected not to present any evidence of testimony with
regard to any mitigating circumstances.  I have searched my mind and
the record to find, during the course of the proceeding, that I cannot
find that there are any mitigating circumstances.  I have listened to the
defendant's arguments through today and find that he has failed to
mention, during his argument, any mitigating circumstances in this
matter.  On the other hand, I believe that the Court's responsibility in a
matter like this is a grave one and a responsibility that cannot be hastily
entered into.  As a result, I have requested a presentence investigation
to be independently prepared for the Court to review to determine
where there exists any basis for any mitigating circumstances in this
case.  At the conclusion of the presentence investigation and the filing
of this Court, I will schedule a sentencing proceeding.
-19-
The first ex parte communication that Muhammad alleges occurred took place
during the sentencing phase when the record reflects that Muhammad may have
been removed from the courtroom before a presentencing investigation (PSI) was
ordered.15  Muhammad's second allegation of ex parte communication stems from
16.  Muhammad's argument suggests that he was not present at multiple
sidebar discussions.  However, he only identifies one instance with any specificity. 
During the pronouncement of sentence, after the court announced that it found no
statutory mitigation and sentenced Muhammad to death, the following colloquy
took place:
MR. HEBERT:  May we approach the Bench, Your Honor?
THE COURT:  Yes.
                                              * * *
(Side-bar conference between the Court, Mr. Hebert and Mr. Elwell
without reporter)
                                              * * *
THE COURT:  For the record, the State Attorney's Office indicates
that although there are no statutory mitigating circumstances, the court
also can consider other outside mitigating circumstances. The Court
finds no other outside mitigating circumstances.
MR. HEBERT:  Thank you, Your Honor.
-20-
a sidebar conference while the court was delivering its sentencing announcement.16
We disagree with Muhammad's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. 
Notably, Muhammad was physically present in the courtroom in both instances and
the record does not reflect that Muhammad was actually removed from the
courtroom in the first instance.  On neither occasion did Muhammad object to
being excluded from the process, even though he was present in the courtroom and
would have had the opportunity to do so.
-21-
Nevertheless, even if we were to conclude Muhammad was absent in both
instances, we would deem these absences harmless.  Muhammad claims his case is
akin to Proffit v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1255-1256 (11th Cir. 1982), where
the Eleventh Circuit determined that a defendant's absence during a pretrial hearing
was harmful error.  However, the defendant in Proffitt was absent from the entire
hearing, at which the State and defense were offering arguments on court-ordered
psychiatric reports.  Id. at 1257.  The Eleventh Circuit refused to find the
defendant's absence harmless, in part because if the defendant had been present he
could have informed his attorney and doctors that he was taking antipsychotic
medication during the time he was being observed for the preparation of the
reports.  Id. at 1260-61.  In the instant case, the alleged absences were of a much
more brief duration than that which occurred in Proffitt and, while he may have
been briefly absent from proceedings, Muhammad was present in the courtroom
and would have understood from the context that he either should object or present
arguments.  Assuming he was taken from the courtroom in the first instance,
Muhammad's absence from the brief portion of the trial where the judge ordered the
PSI was harmless.  In the second instance, even if Muhammad was absent from the
sidebar, the court implicitly presented Muhammad an opportunity to respond by
explaining what had occurred during the sidebar.  Given Muhammad's ineffectual
17.  Indeed, before he elected to proceed pro se, Muhammad was
specifically and repeatedly warned that he was likely to encounter problems
investigating his case and doing legal research because of the circumstances of his
incarceration.  At a pretrial hearing in January of 1981, the judge told Muhammad:
"You are incarcerated, you are charged with the killing of a man who was in charge
of your incarceration. . . .  [I]t is not physically possible for you, because of your
incarceration to do the legal research someone should do for you."  The judge also
suggested Muhammad would be "well advised to accept Mr. Bernstein's
representation" and said that Muhammad would likely need a lawyer to "get law
-22-
penalty phase argument and failure to present any mitigation, his presence on either
occasion would not have served the purpose that the defendant's presence would
have served in Proffitt. 
Because the result of either alleged absence was harmless, appellate counsel's
decision not to appeal this issue is not "of such magnitude as to constitute a serious
error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally
acceptable performance."  Pope, 496 So. 2d at 800.
ACCESS TO LAW LIBRARY
Next, Muhammad alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise a claim based on the facts surrounding limits on Muhammad's access to the
prison law library.  We disagree.  The facts associated with this case necessarily
limited Muhammad's options for defense because there was no issue of identity. 
Moreover, Muhammad had chosen the additional self-imposed limitation of waiving
any reliance on an insanity defense and electing to proceed pro se.17  Before trial,
books" and for the lawyer's knowledge to prepare a defense.
At the June 7, 1982, Faretta hearing, the trial court again explained to
Muhammad that he would not be free of restrictions, that he would not have the
same ability to conduct investigations and research as an attorney who was not
incarcerated, and would be subject to severe difficulties as a pro se defendant.
18.  In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the United States Supreme
Court held that a prison regulation impinging on inmates' constitutional rights "is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."  Id. at 89 (stating
-23-
Muhammad filed a "Motion to Use Law Library" arguing that he should be allowed
to physically go and use the law library.  At a hearing on the motion, Muhammad
explained that he had requested to use the law library at FSP from 1 a.m. to 3 a.m.,
but the prison superintendent had not replied to his request.  For the record, the
trial court asked Muhammad if he was denied all access to the FSP law library, and
Muhammad explained that he could request materials from the law library, but he
could not go to the law library in person.  At the hearing, the court asked
Muhammad what legal materials he had been denied, and Muhammad replied that
he had requested a case from the Atlantic Reporter, but the library did not have the
Atlantic Reporter.  Muhammad did not refer to any other requested material and
said that the law library should have to get a copy of the material in question
because of his incarcerated status.  Ultimately, Muhammad's motion was denied.
Clearly, FSP was under no obligation to grant Muhammad's request for
physical access to the law library in the middle of the night.18  However, we do not
that "[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration").  In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme Court
held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law."  Id. at 828.  However, in Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996), the Supreme Court considered the application of Bounds and
Turner to Arizona inmates who were in "lockdown."  Id. at 361.  The Court noted
that the inmates in lockdown were the most dangerous and violent prisoners in the
Arizona prison system.  Id.  The district court found that lockdown prisoners were
"routinely denied physical access to the law library," id. at 347, and "routinely
experience[d] delays in receiving legal materials or legal assistance, some as long as
16 days."  Id. at 362.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that the district court
had erred in failing to accord adequate deference to prison authorities, and that "so
long as [delays in receiving legal materials or assistance] are the product of prison
regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such delays are not
of constitutional significance, even where they result in actual injury."  Id. at 362.
The procedure used by FSP to allow Muhammad access to the law library is
similar to the procedure in Arizona that was tacitly approved by the United States
Supreme Court.  See id. at 361.  On its face, FSP's policy of not allowing inmates
like Muhammad, who was charged with murdering a FSP employee, to have
physical access to the library would appear to be reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest, i.e., the safety of employees.
-24-
need to reach whether FSP's policy provided adequate access to the law library,
because Muhammad has failed to show any prejudice from the policy.  Muhammad
was given access to the legal materials in the library by request.  The only legal
material that Muhammad could identify that was not given to him under FSP's
policy was a copy of an unspecified case in the Atlantic Reporter, which was
unlikely to have law relevant to Florida and would not have assisted Muhammad in
-25-
preparing his defense.  Therefore, Muhammad's appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal.
CHANGE OF VENUE AND METHOD OF VOIR DIRE
Next, Muhammad argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a claim on direct appeal regarding change of venue and individualized voir dire
of members of the jury pool.  In selecting the jury, the trial court utilized a hybrid
method of jury selection whereby the court would ask if any member of the jury
had heard anything about the case, to which the members would respond simply
affirmatively or negatively.  Those who responded affirmatively were then sent out
and individualized voir dire was conducted with those members.
With regard to when a change of venue is necessary to protect a defendant's
rights, the Court has provided the following test:
The test for determining a change of venue is whether the general state
of mind of the inhabitants of a community is so infected by knowledge
of the incident and accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived
opinions that jurors could not possibly put these matters out of their
minds and try the case solely on the evidence presented in the
courtroom.
Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 284 (Fla. 1997) (quoting McCaskill v. State, 344
So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 1977)).  When a motion for change of venue is filed a trial
court should evaluate "(1) the extent and nature of any pretrial publicity; and (2) the
-26-
difficulty encountered in actually selecting a jury." Id. at 285.  Furthermore, the
existence of pretrial publicity in a case does not necessarily lead to an inference of
partiality or require a change of venue; rather, pretrial publicity must be examined
with attention to a number of circumstances, including (1) when the publicity
occurred in relation to the time of the crime and the trial; (2) whether the publicity
was made up of factual or inflammatory stories; (3) whether the publicity favored
the prosecution's side of the story; (4) the size of the community exposed to the
publicity; and (5) whether the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges
in seating the jury.  See Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 913 (Fla. 2001); Rolling,
695 So. 2d at 285.  Furthermore, decisions on a motion for a change of venue are
firmly within the trial court's discretion and will not be overturned on appeal absent
a palpable abuse of discretion.  Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Fla. 2000). 
In the postconviction context where the defendant is claiming that trial
counsel was somehow ineffective with regard to venue, a court can examine
counsel's performance for deficiency and, when assessing the prejudice prong of
Strickland:
[T]he defendant must, at a minimum "bring forth evidence
demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court
would have, or at least should have, granted a motion for change of
venue if [defense] counsel had presented such a motion to the court." 
Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 961 (11th Cir. 2000); see also
-27-
Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541, 545 (Fla. 1990) (concluding
that counsel was not ineffective for failing to renew the motion for
change of venue because it was a tactical decision and because "it is
most unlikely that a change of venue would have been granted because
there were no undue difficulties in selecting an impartial jury").
Wike v. State, 813 So. 2d 12, 18 (Fla. 2002).
In the instant case any omission by appellate counsel in failing to present an
issue regarding venue on appeal is not "of such magnitude as to constitute a serious
error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally
acceptable performance."  Pope, 496 So. 2d at 800.  Although there may have been
some publicity surrounding the murder of Officer Burke, an independent review of
the record demonstrates that there was no difficulty in seating the jury.  Under these
circumstances, the trial court's decision to deny Muhammad's various motions for
change of venue and select the jury in Bradford County does not amount to a
"palpable" abuse of discretion.  See Kearse, 770 So. 2d at 1124.  Therefore, any
deficiency in failing to raise this issue on appeal does not appear to be so serious or
substantial that appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue fell outside the range of
professionally acceptable performance.
With regard to the issue of individual voir dire, Muhammad's argument is
without merit.  The reason that Muhammad requested individual voir dire was to
prevent members of the venire from tainting others with any knowledge of the case. 
-28-
The selection process that the trial court utilized, which allowed the judge to test for
previous knowledge of the case without tainting the jury pool, addressed
Muhammad's concerns.  Under these circumstances, appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise this claim.
ALLEGED GRAND JUROR BIAS
Next, Muhammad claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise an issue regarding the alleged bias of the grand jury that indicted him.   Before
trial, Bernstein filed a motion to abate the indictment because several of the
individuals on the grand jury were allegedly employed by the Department of
Corrections or had been employed by the Department of Corrections, or had close
relatives who were employed by the Department of Corrections.  In Rogers v.
State, 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987), this Court rejected an appellant's claim that a
member of his grand jury was biased, because "[e]ven assuming arguendo that this
grand juror was biased and participated in returning the indictment, the petit jury's
subsequent guilty verdict rendered any resulting error presumptively harmless."  Id.
at 531; see also Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 941-42 (11th Cir. 1986). 
Therefore, even if Muhammad's grand jury was biased, the fact that he was
subsequently convicted by the petit jury would render any error in allowing biased
members on the grand jury presumptively harmless.  Moreover, there was ample
19.  We acknowledge that, although the trial court's order does not provide a
basis for Brady relief and our remand was on this narrow basis, the order does
demonstrate that the judge undoubtedly believed there was mitigating evidence that
had not been considered, and that this mitigating evidence might have influenced his
decision to impose the death penalty.  However, Muhammad has not demonstrated
a valid legal claim on this matter.
-29-
evidence to show probable cause to indict Muhammad for the charge in question. 
Thus, regardless of potential bias by the grand jury, probable cause existed to
indict Muhammad on this charge even by a non-biased grand jury.  Cf. Cummings
v. State, 715 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 1998) (holding that there was no error in failure
to dismiss indictment where defendant argued the indictment was based on perjured
testimony because there was other sufficient evidence showing probable cause to
indict).  Therefore, we deny relief on this claim.
IV.  CONCLUSION
In sum, we affirm the portion of the trial court's order denying the motion to
vacate Muhammad's conviction, but reverse the portion of the trial court's order
vacating Muhammad's death sentence and remand with directions that
Muhammad's death sentence be reinstated, and we deny the petition for writ of
habeas corpus.19
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and
BELL, JJ., concur.
-30-
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Two Cases
A Notice of Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford
County, 
Chester B. Chance, Judge - Case No. 80-341-CFA
and An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney
General, Miami, Florida,
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and Respondent
Heidi E. Brewer, Registry Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Petitioner