Title: DENISE MARIE FOX V. HON. DONNA L. DELAHANTY, JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION EIGHT AND, THOMAS C. MINA,
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2010-SC-000274-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2010

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . DENISE MARIE FOX AND sUyrQMr Courf of 2010-SC-000274-MR MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : NOVEMBER 18, 2010 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED DQT ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NO . 2010-CA-000155-MR JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 09-CI-504206 HON . DONNA L. DELAHANTY, JUDGE APPELLEE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION EIGHT THOMAS C . MINA REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Denise Marie Fox appeals as a matter of right from an order of the Court of Appeals denying her petition for a writ of prohibition against Jefferson Family Court Judge Donna L. Delahanty. Fox seeks the writ to prevent Judge Delahanty from enforcing an order awarding temporary custody of her child, P.F., to the father, Real Party in Interest, Thomas C. Mina, and to prohibit Judge Delahanty from declining to exercise ongoing custody jurisdiction . In support of a writ, Fox argues : (1) that the trial court failed to follow the Court of Appeals' mandate by not giving her immediate custody of P .F. after it vacated the family court's award of custody to Mina; (2) that Mina improperly L filed his second custody petition under a new case number ; (3) that by reversing the family court's custody order the Court of Appeals had, in effect, entered a new child custody award, and since Mina's second motion was filed within two years of that adjudication, two affidavits were required pursuant to KRS 403.340(2), and the single affidavit filed by Mina in his second petition was therefore insufficient ; and (4) the family court acted erroneously in declining ongoing jurisdiction in favor of New York . For the reasons stated below, we affirm the Court of Appeals . I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Fox and Mina are the parents of P.F., who was born in 1999 . Fox and Mina were never married, and their relationship ended shortly after the pregnancy began . After the child was born, Fox was awarded sole custody of the child. In 2005, Mina filed a petition for custody in Jefferson Family Court. The petition was treated by the court as a motion to modify custody under KRS 403.340. Mina, however, did not file an affidavit in support of the custody modification as required by KRS 403.350. Proofwas taken, whereupon the court rendered a judgment awarding sole custody to Mina . Following the family court's judgment awarding sole custody to Mina, Fox appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals . The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment upon the grounds that Mina's petition for a modification of custody was unsupported by an affidavit as required by KRS 403.350. See Fox v. Mina, 2007 WL 2745375 (Ky. App. 2007) . We granted Mina's petition for discretionary review and remanded for the Court of Appeals to reconsider the case in light of our decision in Coffman v . Rankin, 260 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2008) . 4n remand the Court of Appeals determined that Coffman did not affect the outcome of the case, and again reversed the Jefferson Circuit Court's decision and "remand[ed] the matter for further proceedings." The Court of Appeals gave no specific instructions for the circuit court to follow upon remand . See Fox v . Mina, 2009 WL 1025102 (Ky. App. 2009) . The Court did, however, state as follows : Given the nature of the claim and the evidence presented in support thereof, we are very reluctant to set aside the judgment on appeal . The case law and statutory requirements are, however, clear, unambiguous and subject to but one interpretation, i.e., that an affidavit must accompany the motion to modify custody and that such requirement is jurisdictional . Nevertheless, we are confident that on remand the Jefferson Circuit Court will fashion a remedy best suited to protecting [the child's] welfare. Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment on appeal . Id . at *3. We denied Mina's second petition for discretionary review . Immediately thereafter, Mina filed a second custody petition in Jefferson Family Court, which included a request for temporary custody and a request that Jefferson Family Court decline jurisdiction over any further child custody decision in favor of New York, where P.F . has resided with her father since 2006, and which has, accordingly, become her home state pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. See KRS 403.800, et seq. Mina's motion to modify custody was supported by a single affidavit, which is all that is required if the petition for modification is filed more than two years after the custody decision or is for a temporary custody order . See KRS 403.350; cf . KRS 403.340(2) (requiring at least two affidavits if the modification is of a decree entered less than two years prior) . On December 18, 2009, the family court entered an order awarding Mina temporary custody pending its decision on whether to decline jurisdiction or until further orders of the court. On January 25, 2010, Fox filed this petition for a writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeals seeking to prevent the family court from enforcing its temporary custody award to Mina . While the writ petition was pending the family court entered an order declining jurisdiction in favor of New York, where P.F. has resided with Mina since 2006. Fox subsequently amended her writ petition seeking to prohibit the family court from declining jurisdiction over the ongoing custody proceedings . On March 18, 2010, the Court of Appeals entered an order denying Fox's petition, both as to enforcement of the temporary order and the family court's declining of ongoing custodyjurisdiction . This appeal followed . II . STANDARD OF REVIEW "Relief by way of prohibition or mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and we have always been cautious and conservative both in entertaining petitions for and in granting such relief . This careful approach is necessary to prevent short-circuiting normal appeal procedure and to limit so far as possible interference with the proper and efficient operation of our circuit and other courts . If this avenue of relief were open to all who considered themselves aggrieved by an interlocutory court order, we would face an impossible burden of nonappellate matters." Bender v. Eaton, 343 S .W.2d 799, 800 (Ky . 1961) . "A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted." Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) . The merits of a writ of prohibition will not be considered and the petition denied if the party requesting the writ cannot first demonstrate a minimum threshold showing of harm and lack of redressability on appeal . The St . Luke Hospitals, Inc . v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Ky. 2005) . III . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FAIL TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Fox's principal argument in support of a writ is that the trial court failed to follow the mandate of the Court of Appeals following the reversal of the original child custody award . According to Fox, upon vacating the original award, the implied mandate of the decision was that custody of P.F . was to be immediately restored to her. Appeals' opinion contained no specific instruction to the trial court that custody was to be restored to Fox. The remand was simply for nonspecific "further proceedings ." Moreover, contrary to a mandate to return custody to Fox, as previously noted, the Court of Appeals stated "Given the nature of the claim and the evidence presented in support thereof, we are very reluctant to set aside the judgment on appeal . . . . Nevertheless, we are confident that on remand the Jefferson Circuit Court will fashion a remedy best suited to protecting [P.F .'s] welfare." Thus, if anything, the mandate of the Court of Appeals was that the trial court "fashion a remedy best suited to protecting P.F.'s welfare ." Mina's immediate filing of a second child custodypetition (albeit under a second case number), which included a request for temporary custody. In awarding Mina temporary custody, the trial court made a finding that this would be in the child's best interest . Fox cites us to no authority which prevents the family court from entertaining and ruling upon Mina's motion for temporary custody under the second case number . "certain special cases" class of our writ jurisprudence . As we explained in Bender . We disagree with the underlying premise of this argument . The Court of As it turned out, the trial court was assisted in fashioning a remedy by Notwithstanding the foregoing, Fox argues that her case falls into the [W]e find that in certain special cases this Court will entertain a petition for prohibition in the absence of a showing of specific great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration . It may be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing that if it fails to act the administration of justice generally will suffer the great and,irreparable injury . Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801 . In Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, we emphasized the rarity of this class, stating: "[b]ut these `certain special cases' are exactly that - they are rare exceptions and tend to be limited to situations where the action for which the writ is sought would violate the law, e.g. by breaching a tightly guarded privilege or by contradicting the requirements of a civil rule." 151 S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2004) (footnote omitted) . Application of the special cases rule, however, does not alter the fact that the trial court is not acting erroneously, and, moreover, its awarding of temporary custody of the child to Mina does not result in "[a] great and irreparable injury" to the administration of justice. Fox is accordingly not entitled to relief under this argument . IV. FOX IS NOT ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PROHIBITION UPON THE GROUNDS THAT RESPONDENT FILED HIS SECOND CUSTODY MOTION UNDER A NEW CASE NUMBER Fox's alternative basis for a writ is that there was a procedural defect in Mina's second child custody action because he filed it under a new case number rather than seeking custody under the original case number . She suggests that she is entitled to relief because the family court entered a temporary order under the new case number, the custody decision is therefore interlocutory and may not be appealed. However, beyond doubt, the same interlocutory order would have been entered if Mina had instead filed an amended petition in the original case and requested temporary custody. Thus, that the temporary child support order was entered under a new case number is irrelevant for purposes of whether Fox is entitled to a writ . Accordingly, Fox is not entitled to writ relief under this argument . V. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT MODIFY CUSTODY IN ITS OPINION REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL RULING Fox also contends that she is entitled to writ relief because the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's original custody award, in effect, amounted to a modification of custody and, therefore, because Mina was seeking to modify a custody determination made within two years, pursuant to KRS 403.340(2), he was required to file two affidavits, rather than one, in support of the modification . Again, this argument is based upon an unsound premise . The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's original determination because Mina had failed, in his initial motion, to comply with the requirement that a petition to modify custody under KRS 403.350 must be supported by at least one affidavit. True enough, KRS 403.340(2) requires that a petition to modify custody filed within two years of a child custody determination be supported by at least two affidavits . Nevertheless, in its decision reversing the trial court's original custody award, the Court of Appeals did not, as previously stated, make a custody determination so as to bring the case within the two affidavits rule . Rather, the court's holding was limited to a determination that Mina had failed to comply with the one affidavit requirement contained in KRS 403.350 in his original petition - a jurisdictional defect which required reversal . It made no custody determination upon the merits, and, if it had, would have remanded for the trial court to enter such an actual modification . As such, this argument is without merit. VI . THE FAMILY COURT'S DECLINING OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT ENTITLE FOX TO WRIT RELIEF In connection with his second petition for a change of custody (and temporary custody), Mina also moved for the family court to decline jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 403.834 because the child's home state is now New York . As explained, the trial court awarded Mina temporary custody pending its decision upon this issue . While Fox's initial petition for a writ was pending in the Court of Appeals, the family court entered an order declining jurisdiction in favor of New York, where P.F. has resided since 2006 and which is, accordingly, her current home state. See KRS 403.800(7) . Fox has appealed the trial court's decision declining jurisdiction, and that litigation remains pending before the Court of Appeals. Fox therefore has an adequate remedy by appeal . As such, this argument fails to satisfy the Hoskins test . Accordingly, Fox is not entitled to relief under this argument . VII . CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals opinion denying Fox's petition for a writ of prohibition against Judge Delahanty is affirmed . All - sitting. All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Robert C . Bishop P O Box 788 Elizabethtown, Kentucky 42702-0788 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Judge Donna Lee Delahanty Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division 8 700 W. Jefferson Street, Rm . 220 Louisville, Kentucky 40202 COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST : Roger Dale Warren 600 West Main Street Suite 300 Louisville, Kentucky 40202-2949