Title: Flickinger v. King
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022-0458
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2023

Rel: April 21, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0721 
_________________________ 
 
Daniel Flickinger  
 
v.  
 
Lawrence Tracy King and King Simmons Ford & Spree P.C. 
 
 
 
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-21-226) 
 
COOK, Justice. 
In 2020, Daniel Flickinger, an attorney in Birmingham, posted a 
message on his personal Facebook social-media page in which he 
SC-2022-0721 
2 
 
appeared to reference the death George Floyd, which occurred while 
Floyd was being arrested and was recorded. The social-media post, along 
with an allegedly "counterfeit" social-media "profile," was later shared 
with Flickinger's supervising attorney at his law firm by Lawrence Tracy 
King, an attorney with the Birmingham law firm of King Simmons Ford 
& Spree, P.C. ("the King law firm"). Shortly thereafter, Flickinger was 
forced to resign. Flickinger's post was also shared by members of a 
"private" Facebook group, who then posted a series of offensive comments 
about him both personally and professionally.  
Flickinger sued King and the King law firm ("the King 
defendants"), asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and 
tortious interference with a business relationship. The King defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss Flickinger's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
Ala. R. Civ. P., and that motion was granted by the Jefferson Circuit 
Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's judgment 
and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
Facts and Procedural History  
At the time of the events underlying the present lawsuit, Flickinger 
SC-2022-0721 
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had been employed as a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope & 
McMeekin, P.C. ("WPM"), for approximately 11 years. According to 
Flickinger, during the course of his career with WPM, he had been active 
on various social-media platforms and had often posted "conservative 
political and cultural commentary" on those platforms. Flickinger 
maintained that, when he posted such commentary, he always did so in 
his "personal capacity" and that he never "listed his place of employment 
on his personal social media profiles or in conjunction with his personal 
social media posts."   
It is undisputed that, in June 2020, Flickinger posted the following 
message on his personal Facebook page, apparently regarding the death 
of George Floyd: 
"Things I think about: If I were a seven-time felon, with my 
most recent prison stint stemming from robbing and holding 
a pregnant woman at gunpoint in her home, would I choose to 
die 
in 
a 
fentanyl 
and 
methamphetamine 
numbed 
strangulation if it meant being worshipped in a nationwide 
funeral and my family receiving millions of dollars? Purely 
hypothetical." 
 
 
On June 9, 2020, Flickinger received a telephone call from his 
supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, during which Wainwright 
revealed that King had contacted him regarding Flickinger's social-media 
SC-2022-0721 
4 
 
post. Wainwright asked that Flickinger meet with him the following day. 
According to Flickinger, shortly after speaking with Wainwright, he 
received a "cryptic tweet" from the King law firm's Twitter social-media 
account -- @KingSimmonsPC -- that contained a "large eyes emoji" along 
with one of Flickinger's posts from several days earlier on his personal 
Facebook page.1  
The next day, June 10, 2020, Flickinger met with the partners of 
WPM. Although, according to Flickinger, the WPM partners at the 
meeting admitted that they "did not understand social media" and were 
"not on social media," they expressed that they were very concerned 
about the public connection between his social-media post and their law 
firm, and, according to Flickinger, one partner asked: "How could you do 
this to us?"  
After Flickinger asked the WPM partners numerous times for a 
copy of the actual images sent to them by the King defendants, Flickinger 
says, "the managing partner … permitted [Flickinger] to view his phone, 
 
1This was the first and only correspondence that Flickinger alleges 
that he received from the King defendants, and he contends that at no 
point did the King defendants inform him that they had contacted WPM.   
   
SC-2022-0721 
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which depicted an image that was generated, manufactured, sent, 
published, and/or distributed by Lawrence T. King and King Simmons 
Ford Spree, P.C. containing a counterfeit social media profile using 
[Flickinger's] professional credentials that [Flickinger] had never used in 
conjunction with personal social media posts." (Emphasis added.) 
According to Flickinger, the allegedly "counterfeit" social-media profile 
contained a professional photograph "appropriated" from WPM's Web 
site that, he said, he had never used on any of his personal social-media 
platforms as well as the name of Flickinger's employer, which, he 
maintains, he had "never advertised or shared in conjunction with any of 
his personal social media posts."   
According to Flickinger, digitally merged with this "counterfeit" 
social-media profile were additional social-media posts appropriated 
from his personal social-media platforms that were critical of the mass 
nationwide violence that had been going on in the wake of George Floyd's 
death.  Additionally, offensive comments about his initial social-media 
post about George Floyd's death had been added to that "counterfeit" 
profile to make it appear that third persons were commenting directly on 
the social-media post. Those comments included statements that 
SC-2022-0721 
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Flickinger was a "racist" and that WPM was "a business that supports 
racism."   
Flickinger was then told that the WPM partners had had 
discussions with King about the King defendants' "ability and 
willingness to control the distribution of the false and defamatory images 
favorably for WPM." At the conclusion of the meeting, Flickinger was 
informed that either he must resign or WPM would pursue "other [more 
punitive] options."  Flickinger resigned. 
After Flickinger resigned, the WPM partners informed him that 
they had spoken on the phone with King a second time and that King had 
told them again about the King defendants' "ability and willingness to 
control the distribution of the false and defamatory images favorably for 
WPM." The very next day, the following "tweet" appeared on the 
@KingSimmonsPC Twitter page:  
"We represent a lot of hurt workers across Alabama, & spar 
w/lots of great defense lawyers.  Those @ [WPM] (2 of whom 
I've know for well over 34 years) are as diligent, fair, upright, 
honest, & ethical as are found anywhere.  Felt like saying it.  
#RESPECT." 
 
Additionally, a Facebook page belonging to an individual who Flickinger 
alleges is a "co-conspirator" with the King defendants contained the 
SC-2022-0721 
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following message: 
"Now that [Daniel Flickinger] has been erased, I want to say 
that the firm he worked for has a great reputation in town and 
they are honest, professional, kind people.  Good for them for 
such a fast and definitive response." 
 
Flickinger subsequently discovered that the King law firm's Twitter 
page contained "tweets" allegedly authored by the King defendants 
"gloating over the employment termination of private citizens solely on 
the basis of citizens expressing thoughts and opinions with which [the 
King defendants] disagreed." For example, Flickinger noticed that, before 
the events underlying the present action occurred, the following post 
appeared on the @KingSimmonsPC Twitter page regarding the 
employment termination of a different person: 
"5/12/2020: Here's a white guy that got fired by his law firm 
employer.  He wouldn't wear a mask in a 'ghetto store' and 
bragged about his guns and ammo.  What a turd…" 
In addition, Flickinger alleges that he later discovered that 
members of a 1,500-plus member "private" Facebook group named 
"CALLING OUT ALABAMA BUSINESSES THAT SUPPORT RACISM" 
had been posting the following statements accusing him of being a 
"racist" and accusing WPM of being a "business that supports racism": 
• "Calling Out Alabama Businesses That Support Racism… So 
SC-2022-0721 
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[Daniel Flickinger] is a lawyer!  Who knows what kinda 
ethical damage he's done?!  He works at Wainwright, Pope, 
McMeekin, P.C." 
• "I went to school for years with this asshole… Racist condones 
running over protestors a few posts down…" 
• "….DEFINITELY email [Daniel Flickinger's] firm.  Firms are 
firing people left and right for being racist scumbags (and 
rightfully so)" 
• "Ugly inside and out" 
• "What a f***ing piece of s**t" 
According to Flickinger, King was a member of this "private" Facebook 
group, something that King now denies. 
As a result of this conduct, Flickinger filed suit against the King 
defendants. In his second amended complaint, Flickinger alleged claims 
of defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a 
business relationship. It does not appear that Flickinger averred that the 
content of his social-media post itself was doctored; instead, he averred 
that the image sent to his employer is actionable because it was falsely 
made to appear as if he was posting from an account linked to his place 
of employment. He also alleged that the false and defamatory statements 
added to the image (that is, the comments by others) were actionable. As 
a "direct result of false and defamatory materials generated, 
SC-2022-0721 
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manufactured, sent, published and/or distributed by Defendants among 
the partners of WPM," Flickinger alleged that he was constructively 
discharged.   
 
The King defendants filed a motion to dismiss in which they alleged 
that Flickinger's "claims do not contain the necessary elements for any of 
those causes of action and thus the Complaint, on its face, must be 
dismissed," asserting that attributing Flickinger's own statements from 
his personal Facebook page to him was not defamatory. They also argued 
that Flickinger's tortious-interference claim was due to be dismissed 
because, they said, they never intended for his employment with WPM to 
be terminated and there was nothing wrongful about their decision to 
truthfully share the content of Flickinger's Facebook post with WPM. 
Finally, the King defendants argued that Flickinger's invasion-of-privacy 
claim was due to be dismissed because, they said, the social-media 
statements attributed to him were not "false" and were not "publicized."  
 
In his response to their motion, Flickinger disputed that he had 
failed to satisfy the elements of his claims. Specifically, Flickinger 
disputed the King defendants' assertion that they did not intend to bring 
about the termination of his employment by sharing his Facebook post 
SC-2022-0721 
10 
 
with WPM. In support of his response, Flickinger argued that various 
tweets from the @KingSimmonsPC Twitter page "gloatingly revel in the 
employment termination of American citizens, who … expressed personal 
opinions that ran afoul of [the King defendants'] self-described 
'progressive,' political orthodoxy." 
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.2 Following that 
hearing, the trial court entered a judgment in which it stated: 
"In his Complaint, [Flickinger] asserts claims for defamation, 
invasion of privacy/false light, [and] tortious interference .… 
All of these claims have their genesis in the fact that 
[Flickinger] was terminated from his at-will employment as 
an associate attorney at a law firm for making a social [media] 
post on his personal social media account. … The Complaint 
makes clear that [Flickinger] knowingly and purposefully 
made the social media post. The Complaint also makes clear 
that [Flickinger] was an associate attorney at the law firm at 
the time he made the social media post. Finally, the 
Complaint makes clear that [Flickinger] was terminated from 
his employment with the law firm for making the social media 
post while he was an associate attorney at the law firm. 
 
"This lawsuit states no claims against [Flickinger's] former 
law firm; i.e., there is no allegation that the law firm illegally 
terminated [Flickinger] from his employment. Rather, this 
suit seeks to advance tort claims against third-parties who are 
alleged to have linked the fact that [Flickinger] made the 
social media post to the fact that [Flickinger] was an 
associate attorney with the law firm, which resulted in the 
 
2A transcript of the hearing was not included in the record on 
appeal.  
SC-2022-0721 
11 
 
termination of [Flickinger's] employment at the firm. 
 
"Because [Flickinger's] Complaint acknowledges that all of 
the above facts are true, none of the counts in the Complaint 
states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 
Mooneyham v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So. 
2d 200, 203 (Ala. 2001) ('It is well established that truth is an 
absolute defense against a defamation claim. Because 
Mooneyham's 
defamation 
claim 
alleges 
a 
truthful 
communication, he cannot prevail even if we accept his 
allegations as true. Therefore, the trial court properly 
dismissed this claim against the defendants.') (internal 
citations omitted); Borden v. Malone, 327 So. 3d 1105, 1112 
(Ala. 2020) ('a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to 
state a claim based on an affirmative defense when the 
allegations of the complaint, on their face, show that the 
defense bars recovery'); Regions Bank v. Plott, 879 So. 2d 239, 
24 (Ala. 2004) ('unlike defamation, truth is not an affirmative 
defense to a false-light [invasion-of-privacy] claim; rather, 
"falsity" is an element of the plaintiff's claim, on which the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof'); Bosarge v. Bankers Life 
Co., 541 So. 2d 499, 501 (Ala. 1989) ('Bosarge cannot complain 
because Bankers Life notified his clients that he was no longer 
a full-time associate of Bankers Life. That was obviously a 
truthful notification, because Bosarge had been terminated as 
an agent for Bankers Life.') …." 
 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court granted the King defendants' 
motion and dismissed Flickinger's claims with prejudice. Shortly 
thereafter, Flickinger filed a postjudgment motion that was denied. He 
now appeals. 
Standard of Review 
"'On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a 
SC-2022-0721 
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presumption of correctness. The appropriate 
standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. 
Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the 
complaint are viewed most strongly in the 
pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could 
prove any set of circumstances that would entitle 
her to relief. In making this determination, this 
Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but only whether she may 
possibly prevail. We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff 
to relief.' 
 
"Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (citations 
omitted)." 
Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Healthsouth Corp., 979 So. 2d 784, 791 (Ala. 
2007) (emphasis added).   
Discussion 
On appeal, Flickinger argues that the trial court erred by 
dismissing his case at the pleading stage and resolving what he says were 
"highly disputed factual contentions injected by [the King defendants] 
purporting to defend their motives and the reason behind [his] 
employment termination." Flickinger's brief at 26. As explained in more 
detail below, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed 
Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims but should not 
SC-2022-0721 
13 
 
have dismissed his tortious-interference claim.  
I. Defamation 
First, Flickinger contends that he has pleaded actionable 
defamation in the present case. According to Flickinger, the images 
"curated and distributed" by the King defendants contained "false and 
defamatory statements" that, "when considered in the societal context of 
the unhinged Summer 2020 cultural climate," indicate "that [he] 
conducted his legal profession in a racist manner." Flickinger's brief at 
28. The King defendants contend, however, that the trial court properly 
dismissed this claim because, they say, linking Flickinger's publicly 
viewable photograph from WPM's Web site as a means of identifying him 
as the one who posted the social-media post at issue is not defamatory.  
In Alabama, the elements of a cause of action for defamation are: 
"'"1) [A] false and defamatory statement concerning the 
plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that statement 
to a third party; 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on 
the part of the defendant; and 4) either actionability of the 
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of 
special harm caused by the publication of the statement."'" 
Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence, 224 So. 3d 173, 186 (Ala. 2016) (quoting Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 872 So. 2d 833, 840 (Ala. 2003), quoting 
in turn McCaig v. Talladega Publ'g Co., 544 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. 1989)).  
SC-2022-0721 
14 
 
 
The trial court cited Mooneyham v. State Board of Chiropractic 
Examiners, 802 So. 2d 200, 201-04 (Ala. 2001), in dismissing Flickinger's 
defamation claim on the basis that he had not satisfied the first element 
(falsity). In Mooneyham, a licensed chiropractor was investigated by the 
State Board of Chiropractic Examiners for violations of various laws, 
rules, or regulations applicable to the chiropractic profession. Following 
the investigation, the Board revoked the chiropractor's license and 
ordered him to pay a fine. It then shared the results of its investigation 
with certain third parties, including the State of Florida and the 
Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards.  
Almost two years later, the chiropractor obtained a reversal of the 
Board's determination. He then filed suit against the Board and some of 
its members in which he alleged, among other things, that the Board's 
decision to publish the findings of its investigation to third parties 
constituted defamation. The Board and the other individual defendants 
moved to dismiss the chiropractor's complaint, and the trial court granted 
their motion. 
On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the chiropractor's 
defamation claim. In support of its holding, this Court stated: 
SC-2022-0721 
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"We are particularly interested in [the chiropractor's] 
allegations that the Board found him guilty of four violations 
of Alabama's professional code of conduct for chiropractors. 
We note that [the chiropractor] alleged as a fact that the 
Board's adjudication of his disciplinary matter occurred 
before the time when he alleges certain members of the Board 
authorized communications to third parties notifying those 
third persons of the conclusion and result of the Board's 
proceedings against him. 
 
"[The chiropractor's] complaint indicates that he has 
essentially pleaded that the Board communicated accurate 
and 
true 
information 
-- 
at 
the 
time 
the 
alleged 
communications were authorized and at the time they were 
made, the Board had made its ruling and that ruling had not 
yet been reversed by the Montgomery Circuit Court. It is well 
established that truth is an absolute defense against a 
defamation claim. Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 
So. 2d 1280, 1289 (Ala. 1993); Foley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 491 So. 2d 934, 937 (Ala. 1986); and Liberty Loan 
Corp. of Gadsden v. Mizell, 410 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. 1982). 
Because [the chiropractor's] defamation claim alleges a 
truthful communication, he cannot prevail even if we accept 
his allegations as true. Therefore, the trial court properly 
dismissed this claim against the defendants." 
 
802 So. 2d at 203 (emphasis added).  
Unlike in Mooneyham, here, Flickinger alleged in his complaint 
that the King defendants had shared a "counterfeit" social-media profile 
that appeared to show that Flickinger was making a controversial 
political statement on behalf of WPM. Although Flickinger does not 
dispute that the statement in the post that was shared was his and was, 
SC-2022-0721 
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therefore, truthful, he pleaded that the remainder of the post -- coupled 
with the "counterfeit" social-media profile -- falsely associated his 
political views with WPM.  
The affirmative association of a potentially incendiary social-media 
post with the employer of the writer of the post could be relevant to a 
reader and would certainly be relevant to the employer. In fact, one of 
WPM's partners admitted to Flickinger that he "did not understand 
social media" and was not "on social media." It would be reasonable to 
conclude that he believed that readers of the post might make this false 
association. Thus, under these circumstances, we agree with Flickinger 
that the nature of this social-media post was in fact "false." 
 However, our caselaw makes clear that it is not enough for a 
statement to be "false," it must also be "defamatory." This Court has 
previously stated that "'[t]he test to be applied [by the court] in 
determining the defamatory nature of an imputation is that meaning 
which "would be ascribed to the language by a reader or listener of 
ordinary or average intelligence, or by a 'common mind.'"'" Finebaum v. 
Coulter, 854 So. 2d 1120, 1128 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted). Writings 
-- or, in this case, screenshots depicting images of writings -- can be 
SC-2022-0721 
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"defamatory" if they "'"tend[] to harm the reputation of another so as to 
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons 
from associating or dealing with him."'" Blevins v. WF Barnes Corp., 768 
So. 2d 386, 389-90 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (citations omitted).  
Additionally, "'"any false and malicious publication, when 
expressed in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, is a libel [if it] … 
tends to bring an individual into public hatred, contempt or ridicule …."'" 
Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 19 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted). 
Finally, if the depictions "employed in the allegedly libelous publication 
are understood to impute dishonesty or corruption to an individual, they 
are actionable." Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 927 (Ala. 1992). 
Here, Flickinger does not dispute that the social-media post at the 
heart of this lawsuit was in fact written by him. He also does not allege 
that the content of that post was manipulated in any way before it was 
shared with the partners at WPM.  
In order to adequately allege a claim of defamation, Flickinger must 
allege that the false association -- i.e., that in making that post he was 
doing so as a representative of his law firm -- is what brought him "into 
public hatred, contempt or ridicule" or "imput[ed] dishonesty or 
SC-2022-0721 
18 
 
corruption" to him. Nowhere in his second amended complaint, however, 
does Flickinger allege that the "counterfeit" social-media profile 
associated with the post generated such outrage and hatred. Instead, it 
was the content of his post that he alleges generated such outrage and 
hatred. Thus, under these circumstances, Flickinger has failed to 
demonstrate that the "counterfeit" social-media profile associated with 
the post at issue amounted to defamation.  
However, in his complaint Flickinger also points to other 
statements about him that were posted by members of the "private" 
Facebook group that he alleges were defamatory, including a statement 
that he was a racist. Although Flickinger appears to concede that the 
King defendants did not author any of these statements, he nevertheless 
alleges that the King defendants conspired with the creators of the 
"private" Facebook group to make such statements and then transmitted 
them to WPM.   
Flickinger argues that, given the intense social unrest in June 
2020, there is even greater reason to construe these allegations as raising 
valid defamation and conspiracy claims.  In support of his contention, 
Flickinger cites Gibson Bros. v. Oberlin College, 187 N.E.3d 629 (Ohio 
SC-2022-0721 
19 
 
Ct. App. 2022), in which the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a defamation 
judgment in favor of a plaintiff bakery against Oberlin College based on 
the fact that college employees had distributed flyers created by nonparty 
students that labeled the bakery as a "RACIST establishment with a 
LONG ACCOUNT OF RACIAL PROFILING AND DISCRIMINATION" 
at a 200-300 person protest held shortly after an incident involving the 
arrest of a black Oberlin student who was subdued by a bakery employee 
after the employee had witnessed the student shoplifting. Id. at 639. In 
support of its holding, the Ohio Court of Appeals emphasized the 
importance of the broader societal context of the ongoing campus tension 
over "racial injustice" that served to amplify the reputational harm to the 
bakery and the force of the false accusations of racial profiling against 
the bakery. Id. at 645. 
In response, the King defendants contend that accusing someone of 
being a racist is nothing more than an opinion and is, therefore, not 
actionable. Specifically, they argue that a false and defamatory 
statement must be a statement of fact and that, therefore, the expression 
of an opinion cannot be deemed "'actionable defamation.'" Williams v. 
Marcum, 519 So. 2d 473, 477 (Ala. 1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting the 
SC-2022-0721 
20 
 
trial court's order). Although the King defendants acknowledge that our 
appellate courts have not squarely addressed the question whether 
accusing someone of being "racist" can be defamatory, they note that, in 
Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1985), this Court 
held that a reference to a gay man as being "queer as a three-dollar bill" 
did not amount to defamation.  
Further, the King defendants provide many pages of citations to 
decisions from other jurisdictions that hold that a statement regarding 
whether someone is "racist" or "supports racism" is a statement of opinion 
and is thus not actionable as defamation. See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman, 
855 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that calling someone a racist "is 
not actionable unless it implies the existence of undisclosed, defamatory 
facts"); Cummings v. City of New York, No. 19-cv-7723(CM)(OTW), Feb. 
4, 2020 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (holding 
that reference to plaintiff as racist does not have a "precise meaning 
capable of sustaining a defamation action"); Jorjani v. New Jersey Inst. 
of Tech., No. 18-cv-11693, Mar. 12, 2019 (D.N.J. 2019) (not reported in 
Federal Supplement) (recognizing that an allegation of racism alone is 
not actionable but that, if a statement falsely implies that someone is 
SC-2022-0721 
21 
 
engaging in specific acts, such as making racist statements or refusing to 
employ a person of a certain race, it may be defamatory); and Squitieri v. 
Piedmont Airlines, Inc., No. 3:17CV441, Feb. 16, 2018 (W.D.N.C. 2018) 
(not reported in Federal Supplement) (holding that statements indicating 
that the plaintiff is racist are "clearly expressions of opinion that cannot 
be proven as verifiably true or false"); see also 3 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The 
Law of Torts § 572 (2d ed. 2011) ("'[R]acist' is sometimes said to be mere 
name-calling and not actionable in some contexts[; however,] the term 
can be actionable where it plainly imputes acts based on racial 
discrimination."); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 200 (2017). 
In the present case, third parties calling Flickinger a racist in 
response to his statement amounts to nothing more than the expression 
of their opinions. The third-party statements identified in Flickinger's 
complaint and quoted earlier in this opinion do not indicate or imply that 
Flickinger committed racially discriminatory acts, which, as the caselaw 
above indicates, could change the analysis of the issue.3 Although we 
 
3We note briefly that, although other alleged posts by members of 
the "private" Facebook group alleging that Flickinger had a history of 
committing professional-ethics violations might well be actionable, see 
Tanner v. Ebbole, 88 So. 3d 856, 857-68 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (affirming 
defamation judgment in favor of plaintiff tattoo artist when defendants 
SC-2022-0721 
22 
 
should not be understood as condoning the casual use of such a powerful 
label, in the present case, the third parties' use of the term "racist" is not 
actionable as Flickinger's claims are currently pleaded. The language in 
some of the other posts about Flickinger made by members of the 
"private" Facebook group, while ill-considered, are likewise not 
actionable defamatory statements. In Logan, this Court stated: 
"'Our manners, and with them our law, have not yet 
progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy 
in the form of tort damages for all intended mental 
disturbance. Liability of course cannot be extended to every 
trivial indignity. There is no occasion for the law to intervene 
with balm for wounded feelings in every case where a flood of 
billingsgate is loosed in an argument over a back fence. The 
plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be 
hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts 
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is still, in 
this country at least, such a thing as liberty to express an 
unflattering opinion of another, however wounding it may be 
to his feeling; and in the interest not only of freedom of speech 
but also of avoidance of other more dangerous conduct, it is 
still very desirable that some safety valve be left through 
which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless 
steam.'" 
 
466 So. 2d at 124 (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts 54-55 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 
displayed false statements suggesting the plaintiff's methodology 
violated best health and safety practices), the statements pleaded in 
Flickinger's complaint and quoted above speculate about whether 
Flickinger's behavior was ethical but do not actually state that he has 
committed any professional-ethics violations.     
SC-2022-0721 
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Because Flickinger has failed to demonstrate that the posts at issue 
constitute defamatory statements, he has failed to meet the first element 
for a defamation cause of action. We, therefore, need not address the 
remaining elements of such a claim and conclude that the trial court 
properly dismissed this claim.  
II. Tortious Interference 
Next, Flickinger contends that the trial court erred in dismissing 
his tortious-interference claim. The elements of a prima facie tortious- 
interference claim include: "(1) the existence of a protectible business 
relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3) to which the defendant 
was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant intentionally interfered; 
and (5) damage." White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5, 
14 (Ala. 2009). 
Historically, Alabama has recognized the employer-employee 
relationship as a type of "protectible business relationship" underlying a 
tortious-interference claim. See generally Gross v. Lowder Realty Better 
Homes & Gardens, 494 So. 2d 590, 593 (Ala. 1986) (noting that 
interference with an employer-employee relationship can form the 
underlying basis for a tortious-interference cause of action); and James 
SC-2022-0721 
24 
 
S. Kemper & Co. Se. v. Cox & Assocs., Inc., 434 So. 2d 1380, 1386 (Ala. 
1983) (same).  
Here, it is undisputed that Flickinger was employed by WPM and, 
thus, that a protectible employer-employee relationship existed. It is also 
undisputed that the King defendants were aware of this relationship 
because they were the ones who reached out to Flickinger's supervising 
attorney and shared the Facebook post at issue with him. They were also 
strangers to that relationship because neither King nor the King law firm 
have any affiliation with WPM. Finally, it is undisputed that Flickinger 
has suffered damage because he has lost his job. 
What is disputed, however, is whether Flickinger adequately 
alleged that the King defendants "intentionally interfered" with his 
employer-employee relationship with WPM. Flickinger points to two 
"tweets" that the King defendants allegedly made, gloating about the 
firing of other private citizens and about his discharge from WPM, along 
with a direct message that was sent to him from the King law firm 
Twitter account the night before his employment was terminated in 
support of his contention that the King defendants "intentionally 
interfered" with that relationship.  Flickinger asserts that these 
SC-2022-0721 
25 
 
allegations alone sufficiently plead a claim that the King defendants 
intentionally interfered with his employer-employee relationship with 
WPM.  
Relying on this Court's decision in S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 
So. 2d 72 (Ala. 2006), the King defendants argue, however, that to 
sufficiently plead an allegation of intentional interference a plaintiff 
must allege that the defendant "coerced" a third party into acting against 
the plaintiff.  According to the King defendants, like in Saint James 
School, there is nothing in this case indicating that they "coerced" WPM 
into terminating Flickinger's employment. Instead, they contend that 
they merely "alerted" WPM to Flickinger's Facebook post that had been 
shared on the "private" Facebook page and that they were acting with 
the best interests of WPM in mind. They also emphasize that at no point 
did they suggest that WPM confront Flickinger about his post or take any 
disciplinary action against him in light of that post. According to the King 
defendants, their only motivation in sharing this information was to 
protect WPM from being falsely labeled as a racist business. In support 
of these contentions, the King defendants point to affidavits filed by WPM 
partners that the King defendants submitted in support of a motion to 
SC-2022-0721 
26 
 
change venue in which those WPM partners state that the King 
defendants did not ask that Flickinger's employment be terminated.4  
The King defendants' reliance on Saint James School in support of 
its contention here is misplaced.  In White Sands Group, supra, this 
Court specifically overruled older opinions, including Saint James 
School, that required a party asserting a tortious-interference claim to 
make "a showing of fraud, force, or coercion." 32 So. 3d at 14. 
Additionally, contrary to the King defendants' contentions, Flickinger 
has asserted allegations in his complaint that would support an inference 
of intent to interfere with his employer-employee relationship with WPM, 
at least at the pleading stage. We also cannot ignore the fact that the 
termination of Flickinger's employment occurred almost immediately 
 
4The affidavits cited by the King defendants are not properly before 
this Court.  The trial court did not convert the motion to dismiss into a 
summary-judgment motion -- something that would have required notice 
and compliance with the requirements of Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.  In fact, 
the trial court did not even indicate that it considered the affidavits.  
Thus, we do not consider the affidavits. The King defendants argue that 
we can consider them because they were appended to the mandamus 
petition previously filed in this action (concerning venue), and they cite 
Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 280 Ala. 586, 196 So. 2d 702 (1967), in 
support of their position. However, Alabama Power was decided before 
the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted and concerned a 
unique procedural posture (presuit discovery).  It is of no precedential 
value in this case and is contrary to current Alabama law.   
SC-2022-0721 
27 
 
after WPM was contacted by King. See, e.g., Thomas v. Williams, 21 So. 
3d 1234 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (reversing judgment dismissing 
intentional-interference claim when firing of employee occurred soon 
after phone call from defendant to employer). Based on the foregoing, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Flickinger's tortious-
interference claim. 
III. Invasion of Privacy 
Flickinger next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his 
invasion-of-privacy claim. This Court has defined the tort of invasion of 
privacy as the "'intentional wrongful intrusion into one's private 
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, 
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.'" Rosen v. 
Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So. 2d 735, 737 (Ala. 2001) (quoting 
Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (Ala. 1995)). The 
tort of invasion of privacy consists of four limited and distinct wrongs: 
"'(1) intruding into the plaintiff's physical solitude or 
seclusion; (2) giving publicity to private information about the 
plaintiff that violates ordinary decency; (3) putting the 
plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in 
the public eye; or (4) appropriating some element of the 
plaintiff's personality for a commercial use.'" 
 
Saint James School, 959 So. 2d at 90 (quoting Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So. 
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28 
 
2d 700, 701 (Ala. 1997)). Each of these categories has distinct elements, 
and each category "'establishes a separate privacy interest that may be 
invaded.'" Regions Bank v. Plott, 897 So. 2d 239, 243 (Ala. 2004) (quoting 
Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Colo. App. 1998)).  
 
Flickinger argues that the King defendants invaded his privacy (1) 
by putting him in a false position or "false light" in the public eye and (2) 
by appropriating some element of his personality for a commercial use. 
We will address each argument in turn.  
First, a party may be subjected to liability under a false-light 
invasion-of-privacy claim when that party 
"'"gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places 
the other before the public in a false light … if  
"'"'(a) the false light in which the other was 
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and  
"'"'(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in 
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized 
matter and the false light in which the other would 
be placed.'"'" 
Regions Bank, 897 So. 2d at 244 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
This Court has explained that a party "gives publicity" to a matter by 
showing that false and highly offensive material has been communicated 
SC-2022-0721 
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"'to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially 
certain to become one of public knowledge.'" Butler, 871 So. 2d at 13 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1977)) 
(emphasis added).  
 
In his second amended complaint, Flickinger alleged that the King 
defendants and their coconspirators in the "private" Facebook group 
"deliberately created, manufactured, and published, shared, 
and/or distributed images falsely and maliciously describing 
the Plaintiff in his professional capacity and/or as a corporate 
representative of his former employer as a 'racist,' 'a business 
that supports racism,' a person who has advocated for running 
over protestors, and as a lawyer who has committed ethics 
violations among a group of at least 1,500 people for the stated 
purpose of 'eras[ing]' the Plaintiff or to pressure Plaintiff's 
former employer into terminating the Plaintiff's employment 
relationship." 
 
However, we cannot say that publication of statements to this "private" 
group would make those statements essentially "public knowledge."  In 
fact, as the King defendants point out, 1,500 is a tiny fraction of the 
population of Jefferson County. They further note that, since being fired 
from WPM, Flickinger himself has publicized this dispute on other social-
media platforms. Moreover, with regard to the statements made by 
members of the "private" Facebook group that Flickinger was a "racist," 
we cannot say that those statements, in these circumstances, are "highly 
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offensive." Under these circumstances, Flickinger failed to allege a claim 
of invasion of privacy based on "false light."5 
 
With regard to commercial appropriation, this Court has previously 
stated: 
"Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C, states that liability 
for this wrong arises when one's name or likeness is 
'appropriated' by another to the other's 'use or benefit.' 
Comment d to this section states, in part: 
 
"'No one has the right to object merely because his 
name or his appearance is brought before the 
public, since neither is in any way a private matter 
and both are open to public observation. It is only 
when the publicity is given for the purpose of 
appropriating to the defendant's benefit the 
commercial or other values associated with the 
name or the likeness that the right of privacy is 
invaded.'" 
 
Schifano v. Greene Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178, 181 (Ala. 
1993). To illustrate, in Schifano, patrons of a dog-racing park were 
photographed as they sat in a section of the park that could be reserved 
 
5We should not be understood as holding that publicizing a matter 
to only 1,500 persons is never sufficient to support a false-light invasion-
of-privacy claim.  Compare Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 13 (Ala. 
2013) (noting that distributing a handbill to a "large" number of people 
might satisfy the publicity requirement). However, at least in this 
context, publishing matters to this "private" Facebook group regarding a 
plaintiff living in the metro Birmingham area did not make those matters 
essentially "public knowledge." 
SC-2022-0721 
31 
 
by interested groups. The park printed the photograph in an advertising 
brochure. The patrons in the photograph were not identified by name. 
The photograph was taken by a camera mounted on a tripod in full view 
of, and only a few feet from, the patrons being photographed.  
 
The patrons sued the park, alleging invasion of privacy based on 
commercial appropriation of their likenesses. The trial court entered a 
judgment for the park.  
As the quote above indicates, this Court, quoting the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. d, noted that "'[i]t is only when the publicity 
is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the 
commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that 
the right of privacy is invaded.'" Schifano, 624 So. 2d at 181. Because 
there was "no unique quality or value in the [patrons'] likenesses that 
would result in commercial profit to the [p]ark simply from using a 
photograph that included them," id., this Court concluded that the 
patrons could not prevail. 
In his second amended complaint, Flickinger alleged: 
"[T]he Defendants maliciously appropriated misleadingly 
manipulated elements of the Plaintiff's personal likeness for 
the commercial purpose of pressuring Plaintiff's former 
employer into terminating its business relationship with the 
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Plaintiff. Defendants further maliciously appropriated and 
misleadingly manipulated elements of the Plaintiff's personal 
likeness for the commercial purpose of flexing their power and 
influence within the Alabama workers' compensation bar to 
serve as the political and ideological gatekeepers of those who 
may earn a living practicing workers' compensation defense 
law while also practicing fundamental First Amendment 
freedoms of speech and thought." 
 
Other than accusing the King defendants of "maliciously" and 
"misleadingly" appropriating his "personal likeness for the commercial 
purpose of pressuring [his] former employer into terminating its business 
relationship" with him and "for the commercial purpose of flexing their 
power and influence within the Alabama workers' compensation bar," 
Flickinger does not otherwise allege any "unique quality or value in [his 
social-media presence] that would result in commercial profit to" the 
King defendants. Id. at 181. Thus, under these circumstances, Flickinger 
has failed to allege that his privacy was invaded in this way.  
Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly dismissed 
Flickinger's invasion-of-privacy claim. 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment 
insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy 
claims. However, we reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it 
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33 
 
dismissed Flickinger's tortious-interference claim, and we remand the 
cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.