Title: Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101837
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2011

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
HOME PARAMOUNT PEST CONTROL 
COMPANIES, INC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 101837 
  
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 4, 2011 
JUSTIN SHAFFER, ET AL. 
  
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Robert J. Smith, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a “non-compete” 
provision in an employment agreement is overbroad and therefore 
unenforceable. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Justin Shaffer was an employee of Home Paramount Pest 
Control Companies, Inc. (“Home Paramount”).  In January 2009, he 
signed an employment agreement containing the following 
provision (“the Provision”): 
The Employee will not engage directly or 
indirectly or concern himself/herself in any 
manner whatsoever in the carrying on or 
conducting the business of exterminating, pest 
control, termite control and/or fumigation 
services as an owner, agent, servant, 
representative, or employee, and/or as a member 
of a partnership and/or as an officer, director 
or stockholder of any corporation, or in any 
manner whatsoever, in any city, cities, county or 
counties in the state(s) in which the Employee 
works and/or in which the Employee was assigned 
during the two (2) years next preceding the 
termination of the Employment Agreement and for a 
period of two (2) years from and after the date 
upon which he/she shall cease for any reason 
whatsoever to be an employee of [Home Paramount]. 
 
2 
 
In July 2009, Shaffer resigned from Home Paramount.  Soon 
thereafter and within the two-year period set forth in the 
Provision, he became employed by Connor’s Termite and Pest 
Control, Inc. (“Connor’s”). 
In September 2009, Home Paramount filed an amended verified 
complaint asserting that Shaffer’s employment by Connor’s 
violated the Provision and alleging, among other things, breach 
of contract by Shaffer and tortious interference with contract 
by Connor’s.  The defendants filed a plea in bar to these 
claims, asserting that the Provision is overbroad and therefore 
unenforceable.  After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court 
granted the plea in bar and dismissed the relevant counts of the 
amended complaint.  The remaining counts then were nonsuited and 
we awarded Home Paramount this appeal.1 
II. ANALYSIS 
The enforceability of a provision that restricts 
competition is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. US Investigations Servs., Inc., 
270 Va. 246, 249, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005).  It is enforceable 
if it “is narrowly drawn to protect the employer’s legitimate 
business interest, is not unduly burdensome on the employee’s 
ability to earn a living, and is not against public policy.” Id.  
                                                 
 
1 The nonsuited claims are not within the scope of this 
appeal. 
 
3 
The employer bears the burden of proving each of these factors.  
Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491, 493, 561 S.E.2d 
694, 695 (2002).  When evaluating whether the employer has met 
that burden, we consider the “function, geographic scope, and 
duration” elements of the restriction.  Simmons v. Miller, 261 
Va. 561, 581, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001).  These elements are 
“considered together” rather than “as three separate and 
distinct issues.”  Id. 
Home Paramount asserts that the circuit court erred by 
focusing on the language of the Provision prohibiting Shaffer 
from “engag[ing] indirectly or concern[ing] himself . . . in any 
manner whatsoever” in pest control “as an owner, agent, servant, 
representative, or employee, and/or as a member of a partnership 
and/or as an officer, director or stockholder of any 
corporation, or in any manner whatsoever.”  By doing so, Home 
Paramount argues, the court took those words out of context and 
gave undue weight to the function element of the enforceability 
analysis to the exclusion of the geographic scope and duration 
elements.  Home Paramount contends the geographic scope was 
relatively narrow and the duration was one commonly accepted for 
such provisions, so those elements compensate for the breadth of 
the function element, making the Provision as a whole no broader 
than necessary to protect its legitimate business interests.  We 
disagree. 
 
4 
We have consistently assessed the function element of 
provisions that restrict competition by determining whether the 
prohibited activity is of the same type as that actually engaged 
in by the former employer.  For example, in Blue Ridge 
Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 389 
S.E.2d 467 (1990), the employer was a medical equipment vendor.  
We upheld a provision that prohibited employees from “open[ing] 
or be[ing] employed by or act[ing] on behalf of any competitor 
of [the] [e]mployer which renders the same or similar services.”  
Id. at 370, 389 S.E.2d at 468.  However, that provision included 
explicit language allowing employees to “work[] in the medical 
industry in some role which would not compete with the business” 
of the employer.  Id. at 371, 389 S.E.2d at 468.  We noted that 
“the former employees are not forbidden from working in any 
capacity for a medical equipment company, or from selling any 
type of medical equipment.  They are only prohibited ‘from 
working in the medical industry in some role which would . . . 
compete with the business’ ” of the employer.  Id. at 373, 389 
S.E.2d at 469 (emphasis in original). 
We upheld a similar provision in Advanced Marine 
Enterprises, Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 
(1998).  In that case, the employer provided marine engineering 
services and included in its employment agreement a provision 
prohibiting its employees from “rendering competing services to” 
 
5 
any customer of the employer for whom the employee had performed 
services during the period of his employment.  Id. at 111, 501 
S.E.2d at 151.  We noted that the provision “does not contain a 
blanket prohibition against working for a competitor.  Instead, 
[it] merely prohibits an employee . . . from ‘rendering 
competing services to’ ” the former employer’s customers.  Id. 
at 119, 501 S.E.2d at 155. 
By contrast, we held that a broader provision was 
unenforceable in Simmons.  It prohibited former employees from 
“directly or indirectly own[ing], manag[ing], control[ing], 
be[ing] employed by, participat[ing] in, or be[ing] connected in 
any manner with ownership, management, operation, or control of 
any business similar to the type of business conducted by” the 
former employer.  261 Va. at 580, 544 S.E.2d at 678.  We 
concluded the provision was “considerably broader than” the 
former employer’s business activity, which was limited to the 
importation of a single, “particular brand of cigars grown and 
manufactured in the Canary Islands.”  Id. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 
678. 
Likewise, we held the provision to be unenforceable in 
Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East, 262 Va. 33, 546 S.E.2d 424 
(2001).  That provision also prohibited any employee from 
“directly or indirectly own[ing], manag[ing], operat[ing], 
control[ing], be[ing] employed by, participat[ing] in, or 
 
6 
be[ing] associated in any manner with the ownership, management, 
operation or control of any business similar to the type of 
business conducted by” the former employer, namely the 
“design[], manufacture[], [sale] or distribut[ion of] motors, 
motor drives or motor controls.”  Id. at 36, 546 S.E.2d at 425.  
The functional limitation was too broad because the former 
employer dealt solely with specialized brushless motors.  Id. at 
37-38, 546 S.E.2d at 426. 
In Omniplex World Services, we observed that valid 
provisions prohibit “an employee from engaging in activities 
that actually or potentially compete with the employee’s former 
employer.”  270 Va. at 249, 618 S.E.2d at 342 (emphasis added).  
But a former employee may find new employment with his former 
employer’s competitor in which he engages exclusively in 
activities that do not compete with the former employer.  See 
Blue Ridge Anesthesia, 239 Va. at 373, 389 S.E.2d at 469 (noting 
the unenforceability of a provision prohibiting employment that 
competed with any branch of the former employer’s operations 
when the former employee had no connection to some of those 
branches).  When a former employer seeks to prohibit its former 
employees from working for its competitors in any capacity, it 
must prove a legitimate business interest for doing so.  Modern 
Env’ts, 263 Va. at 495, 561 S.E.2d at 696.  
 
7 
In this case, the Provision is akin to those we found 
unenforceable in Simmons and Motion Control.  On its face, it 
prohibits Shaffer from working for Connor’s or any other 
business in the pest control industry in any capacity.  It bars 
him from engaging even indirectly, or concerning himself in any 
manner whatsoever, in the pest control business, even as a 
passive stockholder of a publicly traded international 
conglomerate with a pest control subsidiary.  The circuit court 
therefore did not err in requiring Home Paramount to prove it 
had a legitimate business interest in such a sweeping 
prohibition. 
Home Paramount protests that this rule of law invites 
circuit courts to do what the court did in this case, to 
contemplate various “hypothetical job duties” including 
bookkeeping, vehicle maintenance, and janitorial services.  But 
Home Paramount invited the circuit court to contemplate such 
hypotheticals when it drafted a provision that prohibits former 
employees from working for competitors in any capacity.  Because 
Home Paramount did not confine the function element of the 
Provision to those activities it actually engaged in, it bore 
the burden of proving a legitimate business interest in 
prohibiting Shaffer from engaging in all reasonably conceivable 
activities while employed by a competitor. 
 
8 
Home Paramount also argues that the circuit court erred in 
failing to consider its evidence of Shaffer’s academic training 
and work experience – for example, that Shaffer had a bachelor’s 
degree in entomology and had no experience in bookkeeping, 
vehicle maintenance, or janitorial service.  This evidence, Home 
Paramount contends, would have eliminated these hypothetical job 
duties from the scope of the court’s consideration.  The 
argument that the scope of the function element could be altered 
by extrinsic and extraneous evidence to mean something narrower 
than its clear language is without merit.  Home Paramount has 
not argued that the Provision is ambiguous and that recourse to 
parol evidence was required to interpret it.  Home Paramount 
thus was limited to adducing evidence to prove that the language 
it chose furthered its legitimate business interests, did not 
unduly burden Shaffer’s ability to earn a living, and was not 
contrary to public policy.  See Simmons, 261 Va. at 580-81, 544 
S.E.2d at 678. 
Although we weigh the function element of a provision that 
restricts competition together with its geographic scope and 
duration elements,2 the clear overbreadth of the function here 
cannot be saved by narrow tailoring of geographic scope and 
duration.  Accordingly, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
                                                 
 
2 Neither Shaffer nor Connor’s has objected to these 
elements of the Provision. 
 
9 
judgment that the Provision was overbroad and therefore 
unenforceable. 
Citing Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 
171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989),3 Home Paramount also argues that 
“[i]t has been settled law for more than 20 years that similar 
language of Home Paramount’s non-compete agreement is not overly 
broad and is enforceable.”  Home Paramount thereby suggests that 
the doctrine of stare decisis compels us to uphold the Provision 
in this case.  We disagree. 
Stare decisis “is not an inexorable command.”  McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3063 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 577 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It “was 
never meant to prevent a careful evolution of the law.  Stare 
decisis, pushed to extremes, would mean the law, once stated by 
the courts, could never be changed by the courts.”  Selected 
Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 276, 355 S.E.2d 579, 588 
(1987) (Poff, J., dissenting). 
Without such change, we would be compelled 
to ignore our duty to develop the orderly 
evolution of the common law of this Commonwealth.  
Indeed, this Court’s obligation to reexamine 
critically its precedent . . . enhance[s] 
confidence in the judiciary and strengthen[s] the 
importance of stare decisis in our jurisprudence.  
                                                 
 
3 Home Paramount is the successor-in-interest to the 
prevailing party in this 1989 case. 
 
10 
Although we have only done so on rare occasions, 
we have not hesitated to reexamine our precedent 
in proper cases and overrule such precedent when 
warranted. 
 
Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 253, 492 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1997).  
One condition warranting a departure from precedent is where the 
law has changed in the interval between the earlier precedent 
and the case before us.  See Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 81-82, 
372 S.E.2d 608, 609-10 (1988).  Then “[w]e have a duty . . . to 
acknowledge when our later decisions have presented an 
irreconcilable conflict with [the earlier] precedent.”  Newman 
v. Erie Ins. Exch., 256 Va. 501, 509, 507 S.E.2d 348, 352-53 
(1998). 
 
We acknowledge that the language of the provision we upheld 
in Paramount Termite is identical to the Provision.  However, we 
have incrementally clarified the law since that case was decided 
in 1989.  In the intervening twenty-two years, we have gradually 
refined its application beginning with Blue Ridge Anesthesia and 
continuing through Advanced Marine Enterprises, Simmons, Motion 
Control Systems, and ultimately Omniplex World Services in 2005.  
Therefore, to the extent that Paramount Termite conflicts with 
any portion of our holding today, Paramount Termite is 
overruled. 
Finally, Home Paramount argues the circuit court erred in 
failing to consider its evidence that Shaffer actually breached 
 
11 
the Provision by soliciting its customers.  However, the 
threshold question is whether the Provision is enforceable.  
Since the circuit court determined that the Provision cannot be 
enforced, the issue of its actual breach was not reached.  To 
the extent that Home Paramount argues its evidence of actual 
solicitation proved it had a legitimate business interest in 
prohibiting Shaffer from engaging in the same activity for 
Connor’s that he engaged in during the course of his employment 
by Home Paramount, such evidence would have been relevant if the 
function element in the Provision had been confined to barring 
such activity.  Because we have found the circuit court did not 
err in ruling the Provision unenforceable, Home Paramount’s 
evidence of Shaffer’s actual breach was not relevant. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
 
 
The test for determining the validity of a non-compete 
agreement was the same when this Court, in 1989, decided 
Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 
922 (1989), as it is today.  Applying this test, we held in 
Paramount that the non-compete agreement at issue was valid.  
The non-compete agreement at issue in this case, involving the 
 
12 
very same company and business interests, is identical to the 
one we upheld in Paramount, as the majority acknowledges.  The 
majority nevertheless rejects Paramount as controlling authority 
in this case, and, indeed, overrules it.  Adherence to the 
doctrine of stare decisis, in my opinion, demands otherwise. 
 
In overruling Paramount, the majority in effect penalizes 
the eminently and uniquely justified reliance of this Virginia 
business upon this prior precedent in ordering its affairs after 
prevailing in the prior case.  As Montesquieu cautioned, were 
judicial opinions "to be the private opinion of the judge, 
people would then live in society, without exactly knowing the 
nature of their obligations."  1 Charles de Secondat, Baron de 
Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws 165 (J. V. Prichard ed., Thomas 
Nugent trans., G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. 1914) (1752).  With today's 
decision, the majority fails to give due respect and deference 
to a basic tenet of stare decisis, which is that "in a well 
ordered society it is important for people to know what their 
legal rights are, not only under constitutions and legislative 
enactments but also as defined by judicial precedent, and when 
they have conducted their affairs in reliance thereon they ought 
not to have their rights swept away by judicial decree."  Myers 
v. Moore, 204 Va. 409, 413, 131 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1963).  "For it 
is an established rule to abide by former precedents," 
Blackstone explained, "where the same points come again in 
 
13 
litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice even and 
steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion."  
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *69.* 
 
I therefore must dissent, agreeing with Justice Compton in 
Newman v. Erie Ins. Exch., 256 Va. 501, 510, 507 S.E.2d 348, 353 
(1998) (Compton, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 
321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)) that 
"[f]requent overruling of an appellate court's decisions tends 
to bring adjudications of the tribunal 'into the same class as a 
restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.' "  
 
                                                 
 
* Judge Kelsey, with our Virginia Court of Appeals, put it 
well when he wrote: "By insisting upon a deep respect for stare 
decisis, the blueprints for the judiciary sought to siphon off 
decisionmaking power from those who, at a given moment, occupy 
the bench and then redistribute that power along a 
multigenerational line of jurists."  D. Arthur Kelsey, The 
Architecture of Judicial Power: Appellate Review & Stare 
Decisis, Virginia Lawyer (Oct. 2004, at 17).  See also The 
Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (explaining that the judiciary 
would be self-policing through adherence to precedents).