Title: BARBARA SUE SARABIA V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2006-SC-000079-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2007

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. Q 6;Vixyxrtttr f~Xixxf of ~R 2006-SC-000079-MR 11 )1 1 i~= BARBARA SUE SARABIA APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE NOS . 01-CR-00022 AND 02-CR-00617 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : NOVEMBER 1, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Because her court-appointed lawyer refused to follow her direction to call experts to testify about battered woman syndrome in her upcoming murder trial, Barbara Sue Sarabia asked the trial court to order her lawyer to obey Sarabia's direction or, alternatively, for the trial court to appoint her, a new lawyer . The trial court declined the request, and Sarabia argues on appeal that this denial violated her constitutional right of personal choice to direct her own defense . Sarabia also argues on appeal that her right to testify at trial about her personal theory of defense was impermissibly abridged when the trial court failed to intercede on its own volition when Sarabia's lawyer abruptly ended Sarabia's discussion about post- traumatic stress disorder. We affirm the trial court on both issues because we hold that a lawyer exercising professional judgment has the general authority to control these matters of trial strategy and tactics . I. FACTS . Sarabia shot and killed her husband, Valentine . About three months before the shooting, Valentine had been arrested for assaulting Sarabia and had spent about a week in jail . Apparently, he had also abused her on other occasions . Shortly after being released from jail, Valentine moved out of the marital residence and into a new residence, which he shared with some friends, at least some of whom were eyewitnesses to the shooting . Although Sarabia was indicted for murder two months after the shooting, her case did not come to trial for nearly four years . Events delaying the trial included evaluations of Sarabia's competency to stand trial ; several continuances, including some in response to suggestions from a retired lawyer, who acted as Sarabia's personal advisor and who tried unsuccessfully to be appointed her guardian ad litem ; and the successive withdrawal of court-appointed lawyers . Sarabia had expressed to the trial court distrust in each of the two former court- appointed lawyers and had made frequent complaints about their performance, as well as the performance of the local legal aid office . Following the withdrawal of the second lawyer, the trial court appointed a third lawyer, who ultimately tried the case . Sarabia informed the trial court in several pretrial hearings of her dissatisfaction with her third lawyer's handling of the case . During a pretrial conference, Sarabia expressed her particular frustration with her third lawyer's refusal to call certain expert witnesses at the upcoming trial to testify about battered woman syndrome . In response to Sarabia's insistence that Dr . Peter Schilling, a psychologist, be called to testify about battered woman syndrome, her lawyer responded to the trial court that she would not be calling Dr . Schilling at trial because, in her professional judgment, his testimony would be devastating to Sarabia's defense, especially since she would be required to disclose Dr . Schilling's written reports to the Commonwealth . The lawyer stated that if Sarabia wished to call Dr. Schilling as a witness, she should have told him the truth about what happened . The trial court informed Sarabia that she had made her record concerning her desire to present these witnesses and even indicated that Dr. Schilling could testify by avowal .' The trial court refused to replace the lawyer and declined to order the lawyer to present the battered woman syndrome evidence . Instead, the trial court assured Sarabia of her lawyer's experience and professional knowledge and urged her to trust and cooperate with her lawyer, stating that the lawyer was trying to act in her best interest as a parent would for a child . Although the trial court mentioned the possibility of Sarabia representing herself, the trial court did not recommend it, nor did Sarabia seek to represent herself . At trial, Sarabia admitted to having killed her husband . Trial testimony then focused on self-defense and Sarabia's mental state . Dr . Schilling did not testify by avowal . Although this was perhaps not an ideal analogy to describe the attorney/client relationship, the trial court, nonetheless, made the point in terms that Sarabia and others might easily comprehend that the lawyer would seek to promote the client's best legal interests rather than every expressed wish of the client. The Commonwealth sought to prove that Sarabia killed her husband, not out of fear, but out of anger or jealousy . The Commonwealth brought out that sometime before their separation, Sarabia helped Valentine apply for his green card ; but he failed to show her a letter approving the application . The Commonwealth also showed that Sarabia had attempted in vitro fertilization in an unsuccessful attempt to become pregnant in the months before the shooting, and Valentine had told her that he had impregnated another woman . Meanwhile, Sarabia had become intimate with another man . The Commonwealth also presented testimony of Sarabia's cousin, who had received a letter from Sarabia while she was in jail awaiting trial, asking him to fabricate a story about why Sarabia was in her husband's neighborhood with a gun on the evening of the shooting . Sarabia testified in her own defense . She and various family members described for the jury her history of physical abuse by Valentine, by previous husbands, and by her father . Sarabia and her witnesses also described her impoverished and unstable childhood, her frequent moves, her alcoholic father, and her mentally ill mother . Sarabia presented no expert testimony about battered woman syndrome . Much of Sarabia's testimony and that of other witnesses concerned the events surrounding the evening in which she killed Valentine . Sarabia stated that she had not gone to Valentine's residence with the intent of killing him, but she had wanted to reason and talk with him . She took a gun along for protection . She stated that Valentine grabbed for the gun, which prompted her to start shooting . When her lawyer asked her why she had thought Valentine was trying to attack her and why she shot at him eight times, Sarabia replied, " I suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder ." The lawyer then interrupted her answer with "that's enough of that" and proceeded to show her photographs of the victim's bullet wounds . Sarabia's lawyer urged the jury in closing to consider the alternatives to a murder conviction, ranging from an outright acquittal based on self-defense to a conviction on various lesser-included offenses .3 The jury convicted Sarabia of murder and recommended thirty years' imprisonment . The trial court held a separate post-trial hearing before final sentencing to determine if she met the victim-of-domestic-violence exemption from the violent offender statues. 4 Before this post-trial hearing, Sarabia's trial lawyer asked permission In addition to instructing the jury on the self-protection privilege, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the various degrees of homicide, which are identified in KRS 507.010 as including murder, first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide . The elements of these offenses are set forth in KRS 507.020-.050 . KRS 439.3401 provides, in pertinent part, that : A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense or Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B felony who is a violent offender shall not be released on probation or parole until he has served at least eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed. This section shall not applyto a person who has been determined by a court to have been a victim of domestic violence or abuse pursuant to KRS 533.060 with regard to the offenses involving the death of the victim or serious physical injury to the victim . The provisions of this subsection shall not extend to rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first degree by the defendant. KRS 533.060 provides, in pertinent part, that , When a person has been convicted of an offense or has entered a plea of guilty to an offense classified as a Class A, B, or C felony and the commission of the offense involved the use of a weapon from which a shot or projectile may be discharged that is readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, the person shall not be eligible for probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, except when the person establishes that the person against whom the weapon was used had previously or was then engaged in an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 against either the person convicted or a family member as defined in KRS 403.720 of the person convicted. If the person convicted claims to be exempt from this statute because that person was the victim of to withdraw, citing Sarabia's lack of cooperation . The trial court granted the motion and appointed a fourth lawyer, who represented Sarabia through the rest of the trial court proceedings . .Dr . Schilling testified in the post-trial hearing about battered woman syndrome, , as did a professor of sociology who focused on battered woman issues . Dr. Schilling testified about how victims of domestic violence might perceive the need to kill their abusive spouse to protect themselves . He opined that although Sarabia and Valentine lived apart at the time of the shooting, any contact between them after Valentine assaulted Sarabia could have aroused fear . Dr. Schilling also explained how domestic violence victims often lie and become manipulative because they are fearful and distrustful of others . He explained how Sarabia's lying to him was actually consistent with such a diagnosis . Sarabia herself also testified at the hearing, stating that Valentine had threatened her and raped her less than a week before she shot him . The trial court found a sufficient connection between the history of domestic violence and the killing of Valentine to exempt Sarabia from the provisions of the violent KRS 403.720 defines domestic violence as follows : domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720, the trial judge shall conduct a hearing and make findings to determine the validity of the claim and applicability of this exemption . The findings of the court shall be noted in the final judgment . "Domestic violence and abuse" means physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple ; "Family member" means a spouse, including a former spouse, a parent, a child, a stepchild, or any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree ; and "Member of an unmarried couple" means each member of an unmarried couple which allegedly has a child in common, any children of that couple, or a member of an unmarried couple who are living together or have formerly lived together. offender statute . The trial court did not probate Sarabia . It sentenced her in accordance with the jury's recommendation . ll . ANALYSIS . A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Order Counsel to Present Expert Evidence on Battered Woman Svn_ drome or to Appoint NewCounsel . Sarabia has not cited any controlling authority recognizing a constitutionally protected personal right of a defendant to compel the defendant's appointed lawyer to adopt a particular line of defense or call a particular witness contrary to the lawyer's professional judgment . We recognize, of course, the firmly established and personal right of the criminal defendant to testify in her or his own behalf at trial . Sarabia cites cases concerning whether a defendant is competent to waive an insanity defenses to argue that the trial court should have conducted a hearing to determine if she was competent to make her own choice about whether to present a battered woman syndrome defense . We decline Sarabia's invitation to adopt a rule that thrusts the trial court into the role of resolving attorney-client control disputes . The trial court in the case before us did not err when it refused to convene a competency hearing and rule on whether Sarabia's strongly held views about the defense of her case should prevail over the professional judgment of her lawyer. And while we do not regard as utterly frivolous Sarabia's desire to present evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome, the ultimate decisions about the choice of witnesses and the choice of lines of defense Jacobs v. Commonwealth , 870 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1994); Dean v. Commonwealth , 777 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1989) ; overruled on othergrounds by Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003). represent significant strategic and tactical trial decisions best left in the lawyer's general control. Furthermore, a defendant does not have the right to an appointed lawyer of the defendant's choice, nor does the defendant have the right to insist upon a new lawyer because the defendant does not like the appointed lawyer's approach on matters of strategy.' For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision . Given the lack of authority for mandating that counsel present the type of evidence demanded by Sarabia, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to order trial counsel to present expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome, nor do we find error in the trial court's decision not to appoint new counsel . B . The Trial Court Did Not Err in Not Ordering Counsel to Allow Defendant to Continue to Speak Regarding "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ." Sarabia contends that in order to allow her to present her own defense of the case, the trial court should have interceded on its own volition to instruct Sarabia's lawyer to allow Sarabia to have her say to the jury about both post traumatic stress disorder and battered woman syndrome . Again, doing so would have been an See Foley v . Commonwealth , 17 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Ky . 2000) (stating in case on appeal from collateral attack involving allegations of ineffective assistance, that "[d]ecisions relating to witness selection are normally left to counsel's judgment") ; overruled in part on other grounds by Stopher v. Conliffe , 170 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Ky. 2005) . That said, we note, nevertheless, that even in matters of trial strategy where the lawyer's professional judgment necessarily prevails, "[a] lawyer may conclude that, on balance, it is better to go against his best professional judgment, and in accordance with a client's strongly felt views, than run the risk of a breakdown in lawyer-client communications that would be even more likely to preclude a successful defense . Indeed, where the client's preference is not based on a misunderstanding of law or an inability to understand why the lawyer favors an alternative tactic, and that preference does not require the lawyer to forsake `meaningful adversary testing' of the prosecution's case, a lawyer may find justification for following that preference in the client's position as the person who `will bear the personal consequences of the conviction ."' Wayne R . LaFave, Jerold H . Israel & Nancy J . King, 3 Criminal Procedure § 11 .6 (Counsel's control over defense strategy) (2d ed . 1999) (footnotes omitted) . LaFave at § 11 .4 (Choice of counsel) (2d ed . 1999) . impermissible intervention by the trial court to control the defense's strategy or tactics-8 Thus, we can find no fault in the trial court's handling of this issue . II . CONCLUSION . For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed . All sitting . All concur. In State v. Garcia , 513 P.2d 394 (N .M . 1973), the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected an appellant's argument on direct appeal that the trial court had failed to protect his rights by allowing criminal defense counsel to present evidence which, apparently, had a negative effect on the case, stating that: "It is true that a trial court has the duty to protect the essential rights of an accused . However, this does not require, or even permit, the trial court to direct the strategy or tactics to be followed in the presentation of defendant's case . It is the trial court's duty to be impartial and judicious, and this position is totally inconsistent with any attempt on the court's part to control the tactics or strategy of a litigant in the presentation of his case ." /d. at 397. (citation omitted) . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Rebecca D. DiLoreto Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D. Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky Jeffrey A . Cross Criminal Appellate Division Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601