Title: DAVIS v. CMS CONTINENTAL NATURAL GAS, INC
Citation: 2001 OK 33, 23 P.3d 288, 72OBJ1479
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2001

DAVIS v. CMS CONTINENTAL NATURAL GAS, INC Annotate this Case DAVIS v. CMS CONTINENTAL NATURAL GAS, INC 2001 OK 33 23 P.3d 288 72 OBJ 1479 Case Number: 94787 Decided: 04/17/2001 Modified: 05/07/2001 Mandate Issued: 05/11/2001 WHITNEY DAVIS, a Minor, and TIFFANY DAVIS, a Minor, by and through their Mother and Next Friend, BRENDA DAVIS, Plaintiffs/Appellants v. CMS CONTINENTAL NATURAL GAS, INC., Defendant/Appellee APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA Honorable Carolyn Ricks, Trial Judge ¶0 While employed by the defendant/appellee, CMS Continental Natural Gas, Inc. [Continental Gas/employer], Thomas Davis [father/employee] was killed as he worked on a natural gas compressor. Workers' compensation benefits were awarded. Subsequently, the plaintiffs/appellants, Whitney and Tiffany Davis through their mother, Brenda Davis [collectively, Davis], filed a tort action pursuant to 40 O.S. 1991 §178, alleging that a defective blow-down valve caused their father's death. Relying on the exclusivity provision, 85 O.S. 1991 §12, of the Workers' Compensation Act, 85 O.S. 1991 §1 , et seq., Continental Gas filed a motion for summary judgment which was sustained by the trial court, Honorable Carolyn Ricks. We hold that: 1) although generally inapplicable to accidental work-related injuries, 40 O.S. 1991 §178 remains applicable to those occupations exempted from the Workers' Compensation Act; and 2) the immunity afforded employers under 85 O.S. 1991 §12 extends to accidental personal injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment. Because Davis concedes that he cannot establish that his injuries resulted from the employer's wilful and wanton conduct, we hold that the employee's exclusive recovery lies within the confines of the Workers' Compensation Act. AFFIRMED. David L. Thomas, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellants Angela K. Jones, F. Thomas Cordell, Jr., Chickasha, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. KAUGER, J.: [23 P.3d 289] ¶1 We retained this cause to consider whether the exclusivity provision, 85 O.S. 1991 §12 , UNDISPUTED FACTS ¶2 On June 18, 1997, Thomas Davis [father/employee] was killed in a work related accident while on the premises of the defendant/appellee, CMS Continental Natural Gas, Inc. [Continental Gas/employer]. The employee died instantly when a blow-down valve assembly, attached to a natural gas compressor package, blew apart. ¶3 Davis filed suit on September 23, 1999, seeking recovery pursuant to 40 O.S. 1991 §178. Although the petition contains allegations of the employer's negligence and wilful and wanton actions evincing a reckless disregard for the employee's safety, Davis concedes that it lacks evidence of the employer's wilful and wanton conduct. I. ¶4 TITLE 40 O.S. 1991 §178 REMAINS APPLICABLE IN THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ARENA TO THOSE OCCUPATIONS EXEMPTED FROM THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT. ¶5 Continental Gas asserts that 40 O.S. 1991 §178 was implicitly repealed in 1915 with the enactment of the Workers' Compensation Act. We disagree.[23 P.3d 291] ¶6 Under 40 O.S. 1991 §178 , an employee injured in the workplace and exercising due care and diligence, may sue an employer for negligence based on defective machinery or appliances. Section 178 has been considered in eight5 cases since the passage of the original workers' compensation regime. In none of those cases did the Court reach the issue of repeal by implication. However, in Roberts v. Barclay, 1962 OK 38, ¶20, 369 P.2d 808 , the Court refused to allow an employee injured through negligence to maintain a cause of action against his employer under §178. The Roberts Court relied on an Illinois case indicating that the enactment of Illinois' respective Workers' Compensation Act had "amended" a similar statutory provision. ¶7 Implicit in the Roberts holding is a determination that, although inapplicable to the facts presented in the cause, §178 retained legal viability. Nevertheless, Roberts also stands for the proposition that, in the workers' compensation arena, an employee may not utilize 40 O.S. 1991 §178 as grounds for recovery if the employers' actions are negligent. ¶8 There are a number of occupations excluded from workers' compensation coverage.6 Repeal by implication is not favored and all statutory provisions must be given effect unless an irreconcilable conflict exists.7 Therefore, we determine that although 40 O.S. 1991 §178 is inapplicable to those professions falling within the confines of the Workers' Compensation Act where an employee's injury is accidental, the statute retains viability in relation to those occupations exempted from workers' compensation coverage. II. ¶9 THE IMMUNITY AFFORDED EMPLOYERS UNDER 85 O.S. 1991 §12 EXTENDS TO ACCIDENTAL PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. THE EMPLOYEE'S CONCESSION THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE EMPLOYER'S WILFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT PRECLUDES RECOVERY IN TORT. ¶10 Davis argues that tort recovery is available pursuant to 40 O.S. 1991 §178 because the blow-down value which caused the employee's injury was defectively designed. Continental Gas asserts that the tort action is barred by the exclusivity provision, 85 O.S. 1991 §12 , of the Workers' Compensation Act. Under the facts presented, we agree that the tort action is barred. [23 P.3d 292] ¶11 Section 118 Section 11 has been amended since the date of injury. Nevertheless, because the quoted language is identical to that of the 1996 statute, references are to the current version. of the Workers' Compensation Act makes employers liable for scheduled compensation for the disability or death of an employee resulting from an "accidental personal injury." As defined, "injury or personal injury" means "only accidental injuries."9 The exclusivity provision, 85 O.S. 1991 §12 , provides that the liability prescribed in §11 liability for accidental injury shall be exclusive and in place of all other employer liability. ¶12 The statutory language makes it clear10 that the Legislature intended that accidental injuries should fall within the confines of the Workers' Compensation Act and that an employer's liability for these injuries would be exclusive under 85 O.S. 1991 §12 . ¶13 Nevertheless, we note that a large number of courts have determined that their respective workers' compensation regimes will not bar an employee's claim for injuries arising from an employer's deliberate, wilful or intentional acts.11 In jurisdictions where [23 P.3d 294] the statutory language is similar to Oklahoma's, there is a split of authority on what conduct will support a tort action against an employer for intentional conduct. Some courts limit recovery to the so called "true intentional torts" situations where the employer intended the act and intended the injury.12 Under this standard an employer is deemed to have intended an injury if the employer had knowledge an incident was certain to occur and wilfully disregarded that knowledge.13 ¶14 Other jurisdictions rely on a "substantial certainty test" and determine that if the employer intended the act that caused the injury or knew the injury was substantially certain to occur from the act, the employer has committed an intentional tort.14 Under the "substantial certainty" [23 P.3d 295] standard, intent is not limited to desired consequences. It is broader than a hope or purpose to bring about physical results. Rather, if the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain to occur, intent is inferred.15 Nevertheless, establishing that an employer has acted in a manner resulting in an employee's injuries being substantially certain presents a formidable barrier to recovery in tort. Employer negligence is insufficient for a finding of substantial certainty required to strip the employer from the exclusive remedies offered by the Workers' Compensation Act. At the very least, the employee must establish an employer's intentional conduct engaged in with the knowledge that the employee's serious injury or death is a substantial certainty.16 ¶15 Although Davis' petition filed in the trial court contains allegations of the employer's negligence and wilful and wanton actions evincing a reckless disregard for the employee's safety, Davis conceded in the response to the motion for summary judgment that there is no evidence of the employer's wilful and wanton conduct.17 Further, his allegations concerning the defective design and installation of the blow-down valve are premised on the employer's negligence.18 Therefore, we need not determine whether an employer [ 23 P.3d 296 ] may act with such reckless disregard19 of the known facts as to be subject to tort liability independent of the Workers' Compensation Act.20 In this case, we hold that nothing is presented which would allow, under any standard, the employee's recovery outside that provided under the Workers' Compensation Act. CONCLUSION ¶16 The immunity afforded employers under 85 O.S. 1991 §1221 extends to accidental personal injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment. Davis concedes that he cannot establish that his injuries resulted from the employer's wilful and wanton conduct. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the employee,22 we determine that summary judgment was proper. AFFIRMED. ¶17 WATT, V.C.J., LAVENDER, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. concur. ¶18 HARGRAVE, C.J., HODGES, OPALA, JJ. concurring in judgment. FOOT