Title: Joseph v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1741
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1741 
____________ 
 
MARLIN L. JOSEPH, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
February 10, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
Marlin Joseph appeals two first-degree murder convictions 
and two corresponding sentences of death.1  For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm Joseph’s convictions and sentences of 
death. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On January 18, 2018, Marlin Joseph was indicted for two 
counts of first-degree murder with a firearm related to the deaths of 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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Kaladaa Crowell and her 11-year-old daughter, Kyra Inglett.2  The 
incident in this case occurred on December 28, 2017.  The evidence 
presented at trial established that at that time, Joseph resided in a 
home in West Palm Beach with his mother, Robin Denson; 
Denson’s girlfriend, Crowell; Crowell’s daughter, Kyra; and Joseph’s 
three brothers, Parice Joseph, Patrick Joseph, and Cordarius 
Joseph.3  Also staying at the home at the time was Joseph’s eight-
year-old daughter, Kamare Canty, and Jeshema Tarver, Denson’s 
goddaughter. 
Earlier in the day, an incident occurred between Kyra and 
Kamare.  Kamare asked Kyra and Jeshema to sit on her back 
because it was hurting.  Kamare then told Kyra and Jeshema to get 
off her back because they were hurting her, but Kyra had trouble 
getting off Kamare.  Jeshema testified at trial that another incident 
had occurred on December 23, 2017 (two days before Christmas 
and five days before the shootings), and she heard Joseph yelling to 
 
2.  Joseph was also indicted for felon in possession of a 
firearm, which charge was bifurcated for trial. 
 
3.  For clarity, Marlin Joseph’s brothers will be referred to by 
their first names because they share the same last name as Joseph. 
 
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Denson about Kyra saying she “ha[d] one more time to make [him] 
mad or to bother, she needs to leave my daughter alone.” 
Later in the day on December 28, 2017, Parice and Patrick 
picked Denson up at the end of her workday, and Denson went 
grocery shopping before returning home.  Present in the home when 
they arrived were Joseph, Crowell, Kyra, Kamare, Cordarius, and 
Jeshema.  Joseph helped bring in the groceries and then was 
reading his Bible in the room he shared with Patrick, and Cordarius 
and the girls (Kamare, Kyra, and Jeshema) were sitting on the 
couch in the living room.  The girls were laughing, talking, and on 
their phones.  Crowell was folding clothes in the room she shared 
with Denson.  After Denson arrived home, she had a conversation 
with Joseph in the living room area about a text message he 
received from Crowell, who was still in her room.  During this 
conversation, Joseph brought up Kamare’s mother asking whether 
she was coming to pick Kamare up.  Denson testified that Joseph 
was not upset but was being disrespectful about Kamare’s mother.  
Joseph started using expletives in reference to Kamare’s mother, 
and Denson told him to calm down because she did not want the 
kids to hear that kind of language.  After the conversation with 
 
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Joseph, Denson walked outside to the porch where Parice and 
Cordarius were.  Cordarius was outside the home waiting for his 
girlfriend to pick him up.  Denson took Cordarius aside, and they 
went to the sidewalk in front of the home while Parice stayed on the 
porch. 
Jeshema went to take a shower, and she heard arguing 
between Joseph and Crowell.  Jeshema heard Joseph say to 
Crowell, “Why is your daughter [Kyra] being mean to my daughter 
[Kamare], she didn’t do anything wrong.”  Jeshema exited the 
shower after hearing three loud bangs.  She heard Crowell 
screaming and crying, asking for someone to call 911.  Jeshema 
then heard another bang.  She opened the bathroom door, and 
Kamare told her Crowell and Kyra had been shot.  Jeshema walked 
out to blood all over the floor and Crowell flat on her face.  Jeshema 
and Kamare went into Kyra’s room and hid under the bed.  Kamare 
called 911 using Joseph’s phone. 
Parice heard gunshots while sitting on the front porch.  He 
saw Kyra run outside, looking backwards.  Joseph came outside 
after Kyra.  Parice tackled Joseph because he was scared after 
hearing the gunshots.  Parice saw Joseph with a gun in his hand.  
 
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Parice attempted to get the gun from Joseph but was unsuccessful.  
Parice saw Joseph run back into the home while Kyra was lying on 
the walkway.  Parice ran to go check on Denson and Cordarius 
down the street.  Joseph exited the home again and drove off in 
Crowell’s car.  Parice testified at trial that he did not see anyone 
shoot Crowell or Kyra, but he also saw Joseph with a gun a couple 
of days prior.  Besides Joseph, Parice did not see anyone else with a 
gun. 
While outside, Denson and Cordarius also heard gunshots 
coming from inside the home, and Cordarius told Denson to run.  
Cordarius saw Kyra come outside and fall to the ground.  Cordarius 
did not see Joseph chasing Kyra.  Denson ended up on the ground 
in her neighbor’s yard; Patrick later picked her up off the ground.  
Patrick was crying and told Denson that Crowell had been shot.  
Denson went to the front of the home and saw Kyra on the 
sidewalk.  Kyra was not moving but was breathing.  Denson ran 
inside with Parice and saw Crowell on the floor in between the living 
room and dining room area.  Denson checked for a pulse, but 
Crowell was unresponsive.  Denson did not see Parice, Patrick, or 
 
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Cordarius with a gun.  She also did not see Joseph with a gun and 
did not see him at all during the incident. 
Joseph was the only person not at the scene when police 
arrived.  Officer Ryan Forbes, the first responding officer, arrived at 
the scene and saw Kyra on the sidewalk with a gunshot wound to 
her head.  She was breathing but would not talk back to him.  
Officer Forbes went inside to find a lifeless Crowell on the ground.  
Unlike Crowell, Kyra showed signs of life when police and medical 
personnel arrived—she had a pulse and was breathing.  Kyra was 
transported to the hospital but died hours later.  She never 
regained consciousness from the time police found her at the crime 
scene to when she died.  Crowell and Kyra each died from gunshot 
wounds.  Five spent cartridge casings were found outside the home, 
and four spent casings were found inside the home.  The State’s 
firearms expert opined that the casings were fired from the same 
firearm.  A firearm was never found. 
The medical examiner testified concerning his autopsies of 
Crowell and Kyra.  Crowell sustained several gunshot wounds to 
various parts of her body—the back of her right hand (defensive 
wound), her belly, left calf, chest, the back of her head, and 
 
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forehead.  The wound to Crowell’s forehead was fatal; the bullet 
broke her skull and destroyed her brain.  Kyra also sustained 
several gunshot wounds to various parts of her body—left buttock, 
lower back, the side of her head, and the back of her head.  The 
wound to the back of Kyra’s head was fatal; the bullet entered the 
back of her head and exited her forehead, damaging her skull and 
brain. 
Later that night, Denson, Parice, Patrick, and Cordarius went 
to the police station to give statements.  Detective Paul Creelman, 
the lead detective in this case, interviewed Denson, Parice, and 
Cordarius; and Parice and Cordarius identified Joseph as the 
shooter.  Joseph’s family members recanted in their trial testimony 
regarding their prior statements to the police.  However, the State 
introduced Parice’s and Cordarius’ identifications of Joseph as the 
shooter through Detective Creelman’s testimony.  Specifically, 
Detective Creelman testified, “Cordarius told me that his brother, 
Marlin Joseph, had shot Kyra.”  Detective Creelman also testified 
that “Parice told me his brother, Marlin Joseph,” was the shooter.  
Joseph was later found in Lake Worth and taken into custody on 
January 2, 2018. 
 
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On February 24, 2020, a jury found Joseph guilty of first-
degree murder with a firearm on both counts.  The penalty phase of 
the trial began the same day with the same jury.  The State 
presented two witnesses—Joseph’s then-probation officer and a 
latent print examiner.  Through these witnesses, the State 
introduced evidence of Joseph’s prior conviction for battery on a 
child.  The defense called 15 witnesses, most of whom were lay 
witnesses. 
On February 26, 2020, the jury rendered unanimous verdicts 
recommending a penalty of death on both counts of first-degree 
murder with a firearm, determining the aggravating factors 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  The jury found that the 
State had established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of 
the following aggravating factors: (1) Joseph was previously 
convicted of a felony and was on felony probation; (2) Joseph was 
previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to another person; (3) the first-degree 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and 
(4) the first-degree murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated (CCP) manner.  As to Kyra, the jury also found a fifth 
 
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aggravator—the victim was a person less than 12 years of age.  The 
jury found no mitigating circumstances. 
A Spencer4 hearing was held on October 16, 2020, and 
sentencing occurred on November 19, 2020.  The trial court 
followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Joseph to death.  
The trial court found four aggravating factors that applied to both 
counts: (1) Joseph was previously convicted of a felony and under 
sentence of imprisonment or on felony probation (moderate weight); 
(2) Joseph was previously convicted of another capital felony or a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence (great weight); (3) the 
first-degree murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(great weight); and (4) the first-degree murder was committed in a 
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (great weight).  The trial 
court found an additional aggravator for the charge related to 
Kyra—the victim of the first-degree murder was a person less than 
12 years of age (great weight). 
The trial court considered and found as proven one of the 
three statutory mitigators proffered by Joseph—Joseph had no 
 
 
4.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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significant history of prior criminal activity (little weight).  The trial 
court further found seven nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Joseph’s 
family background (little weight); (2) Joseph was a good employee 
with an excellent work ethic as well as a talented football player 
who exhibited this work ethic on and off the field (little weight); 
(3) Joseph was a caring and attentive parent (moderate weight); 
(4) Joseph had the support of his family (little weight); (5) Joseph 
regularly attended church and was a devout Christian (little 
weight); (6) Joseph suffered from a delusional disorder of a 
persecutory type (little weight); and (7) Joseph had a low IQ (little 
weight). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In this direct appeal, Joseph raises the following 15 claims: 
(1) the trial court’s denial of a motion to exclude witness testimony; 
(2) the State’s impeachment of its own witnesses; (3) the admission 
of out-of-court statements identifying Joseph as the shooter; (4) the 
admission of testimony concerning a statement Joseph made to his 
mother about one of the victims; (5) the trial court’s denial of a 
motion to dismiss charges; (6) the trial court’s denial of a motion to 
interview jurors; (7) the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty 
 
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scheme in light of this Court’s decision in Lawrence v. State, 308 
So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020); (8) the trial court’s imposition of the death 
penalty without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating factors were sufficient to justify death and outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances; (9) the trial court’s finding of HAC; 
(10) the trial court’s finding of CCP; (11) the proportionality of 
Joseph’s death sentence; (12) the constitutionality of Florida’s death 
penalty statute; (13) improper prosecutorial comments during 
penalty-phase closing argument; (14) the alleged failure of the jury 
to follow the law in the penalty phase; and (15) cumulative error.  
This Court also considers (16) whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support Joseph’s two murder convictions.5 
 
5.  We do not further address Claims 8 and 12 because we 
have repeatedly rejected these arguments.  See Bush v. State, 295 
So. 3d 179, 214 (Fla. 2020) (concluding that the defendant was not 
entitled to relief on his claim that Florida’s death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently narrow the class of 
individuals eligible to receive the death penalty); Newberry v. State, 
288 So. 3d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers v. State, 285 
So. 3d 872, 878-79 (Fla. 2019)); see also Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886 
(holding that “the sufficiency and weight of the aggravating factors 
and the final recommendation of death” are not elements and “are 
not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”).  
Further, as to Claims 7 and 11, we do not review the proportionality 
of Joseph’s sentence of death.  See Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 
 
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A.  Motion to Exclude Witness Testimony (Claim 1) 
Joseph first argues that the trial court erroneously denied his 
motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s firearms witness, 
Omar Felix.  Joseph’s motion was based on an alleged discovery 
violation due to the expert witness being disclosed the day before 
trial.  Because the trial court properly conducted a Richardson6 
inquiry and its actions pursuant to that inquiry were proper, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Joseph’s motion to exclude.7 
On February 13, 2020, the day before trial, the State filed a 
supplemental witness list naming Omar Felix, a firearms expert, as 
an expert witness.  The State also filed a firearms report as 
supplemental discovery.  The report indicated that nine 9mm Luger 
caliber Winchester cartridge cases had been submitted to Felix for 
 
544, 551-52 (Fla. 2020) (receding from the judge-made requirement 
to review the comparative proportionality of death sentences). 
 
6.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
7.  We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine for an 
abuse of discretion.  Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1056 (Fla. 
2012). 
 
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forensic analysis.  The report’s conclusion was that the cartridge 
cases were identified to have come from the same unknown firearm. 
The first day of jury selection, Joseph filed a motion to 
exclude, specifically seeking to exclude Felix from testifying because 
of the State’s discovery violation and resulting prejudice to him.  
During jury selection, Joseph brought the motion to the trial court’s 
attention, arguing that a Richardson hearing needed to be held and 
that he was prejudiced by the late discovery.  Joseph moved for the 
appointment of a firearms expert, and the trial court granted 
Joseph’s motion.  Joseph also deposed Felix during this time.  After 
the jury had been sworn but before opening statements, the trial 
court held a hearing on Joseph’s motion to exclude.  The following 
exchange occurred: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  . . . I got a firearms expert 
approved, we did JAC stuff, you issued an order allowing 
me to get a firearms expert and I got a firearms expert 
and we sent him the report and the firearms expert said 
you don’t need an firearms expert.  This is not firearms, 
this is tool mark identification. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  So your firearm expert is not an 
expert in tool markings as well. 
. . . . 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We were told that the 
firearms expert is not a tool mark expert.  A firearms 
expert can be a tool mark expert but not visa versa, and 
 
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our firearms expert was not a tool mark expert and we 
can’t find any tool mark expert -- 
THE COURT:  Do you want to use Mr. Omar Felix? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No, I do not want to use Mr. 
Omar Felix.  Although he seems a very nice man, I want 
to tear him apart if he goes to trial if this doesn’t get 
granted.  So, what I did was I had my investigator call the 
JAC and see whether or not we can find, they have a list 
of tool mark experts.  They don’t. 
THE COURT:  Okay. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  He contacted somebody in 
Orlando who used to be a tool mark expert who is retired 
and is far, far away and never coming back to a 
courtroom and said he does not know of any tool mark 
experts in Florida or anywhere.  So I can’t find a tool 
mark expert, and the question here, no where up to the 
13th, which is the day before we started jury selection, 
was there anything about a firearms expert, anything 
about tool marks, anything about anything.  I took it 
upon myself to attempt to find out what I needed to know 
about a tool mark expert to properly prepare . . . . 
 
The trial court then went on to conduct a Richardson inquiry.  The 
State explained why it did not turn over the evidence until the day 
before trial: 
What happened is Detective Creelman and myself, 
we were going through the evidence.  I asked Detective 
Creelman, who was the lead detective in this case, I said 
where is my firearms report?  And he said, this would 
have been after hours on the 12th of this month.  And he 
said, well, I’m not at the office but when I get back 8:30 
the following day, which would have been the 13th, he 
said it’s on the server, I’ll get it to you and send it to [you] 
from the server, and that morning at about 8:35 I 
received an email from him, or a text, indicating that he 
thought that he had sent the casings over, he realized 
 
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that he had forgotten, he thought he had sent them over 
earlier.  I said, well, can you get, can you contact PBSO 
Lab and see if they can get them done today.  He 
retrieved the evidence from West Palm Beach Police 
Department’s evidence department and he went over to 
PBSO lab and contacted, I believe it was Mr. Yateman, it 
went up the chain to see if they would be able to examine 
the casings the same day and get a report the same day, 
and because we didn’t have a gun, because we don’t have 
a gun, Judge, he said all this entails is me looking at all 
nine casings. 
. . . . 
And see if they were fired from the same gun, so 
yes, I’m able to do it today.  And I put them on notice 
that same day. 
 
The trial court found that a Richardson violation occurred but 
that it was inadvertent, noting that the State turned the evidence 
over as soon as it knew about it.  The trial court then said it needed 
to decide whether the violation was trivial or substantial but did not 
make an express finding.  The trial court asked the State why the 
violation would not prejudice Joseph.  The following exchange 
occurred: 
[STATE]:  These casings have been in evidence 
since the date the homicide occurred, Judge, and the 
Defense was aware that they were in evidence that date.  
They have been aware all along that there has never been 
a gun located in this case.  Realistically, Judge, if there 
was some concern about whether or not nine shell 
casings that were collected were all fired by the same 
gun, they had an opportunity to retain a tool expert or a 
firearms expert to determine, well, first of all, do these 
 
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casings even match?  So it’s not that it’s, it’s new 
evidence, Judge, that I just realized is related to the case.  
They’ve been, they were collected on the same day as the 
homicides, so they were on notice that these casings were 
in evidence so this is not something that’s new.  The only 
thing that is new is they were examined on the 13th. 
THE COURT:  And that they potentially were fired 
from the same versus a different gun. 
[STATE]:  And, I’m sorry, yes, Judge, and that they 
were potentially fired from the same gun. 
THE COURT:  I think that’s his -- all right.  Is there 
any other evidence in the case to suggest there may have 
been multiple guns? 
[STATE]:  No, not from the State, Judge. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  And all of, from all of your 
witnesses is there any indication that -- 
[STATE]:  I can tell you, Judge, that based on what 
I anticipate the witnesses are going to say, that there was 
one gun that was seen in this defendant’s hand when he 
shot Kaladaa Crowell and Kyra Inglett.  There was one 
gun.  I do not anticipate, based on what I know from 
interviewing these witnesses, based on their statements 
to the police right after this happened, there wasn’t some 
other person who was unrelated to the family members 
that was on the property.  The defendant was the one 
that was seen with the gun and one gun. 
THE COURT:  All right.  And after the shots were 
fired, are there any witness testimony or any evidence to 
indicate that another gun was ever used or shot or fired 
around the same time? 
[STATE]:  No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  So the other evidence seems 
to suggest that there was only one gun used in both of 
these homicides. 
[STATE]:  Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  So all of, all what this does is 
confirm witness testimony. 
[STATE]:  That’s exactly what it does, yes. 
 
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THE COURT:  Okay.  So let me turn to the Defense.  
What is the prejudicial effect?  How did this impact your 
ability to prepare for trial? 
. . . . 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  What if my firearms expert 
who examines it says, no, they weren’t from the same 
gun.  What the Court’s asking me to do is accept their 
firearms expert as being correct.  That’s why I asked for 
an expert to try to analyze it.  I will tell the Court that on 
December 20th, 2019, we went down to the West Palm 
Beach Police Department and looked at all of the 
evidence, and at that point we saw that there were search 
warrants for the laptops or whatever they were, at which 
point we asked about it in court and the State gave us 
the contents of it.  I don’t believe it’s my responsibility to 
ask the State why they didn’t test their evidence. 
. . . . 
Your Honor, what the State has just confirmed is 
that they want this evidence to confirm their other 
evidence, which is clearly highly prejudicial to me 
because if I knew they were going to do that, I would 
have done something beforehand and if I got an expert 
that said, yep, they’re the same -- 
THE COURT:  Does it change the theory of your 
case?  The theory of your Defense? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, yeah, yes, it 
would, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  How so? 
. . . . 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I’m not 
agreeing with the State’s facts of how many shooters 
there was who did the shooting. 
 
The trial court denied the motion to exclude, finding the 
Richardson violation did not prejudice Joseph’s trial preparation.  
The trial court indicated that Felix’s testimony would only 
 
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corroborate expected witness testimony.  The trial court also stated 
that it would give the defense time to find an expert and would 
make accommodations, noting that it could not imagine the defense 
would be unable to find an expert in two weeks. 
At trial, before the State called Felix to the stand, defense 
counsel told the trial court that the defense still had not found a 
tool mark expert.  Defense counsel renewed the defendant’s 
objection and asked the trial court to exclude Felix as a witness.  
The trial court overruled the objection.  The trial court then 
reiterated its ruling from the Richardson hearing.  Felix went on to 
testify that the casings were fired from the same unknown firearm.  
Joseph cross-examined Felix extensively.  During this cross-
examination, Felix was asked about a database known as the 
National Integrated Ballistic Information Network.  The trial court 
cut off this line of questioning, finding it not relevant, and asked 
defense counsel to move on. 
“A Richardson hearing is required when there is a possible 
discovery violation in order to flesh out whether there has indeed 
been a discovery violation.”  Landry v. State, 931 So. 2d 1063, 1065 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  “Where exclusion of evidence . . . is sought 
 
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because of a discovery violation, Richardson holds that the trial 
court’s discretion can be properly exercised only after an adequate 
inquiry is made into three areas: (1) whether the discovery violation 
was willful or inadvertent; (2) whether it was trivial or substantial; 
and (3) whether it had a prejudicial effect on the opposing party’s 
trial preparation.”  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 321 (Fla. 
2007).  When a trial court conducts a Richardson hearing, “[t]his 
Court will review the record to determine if the inquiry was properly 
made and if the trial court’s actions pursuant to the inquiry were 
proper.”  Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134, 160 (Fla. 2012). 
Here, the record shows that the trial court conducted an 
adequate Richardson inquiry.  The trial court first determined that 
the State’s disclosure of its firearms expert and firearms report was 
a discovery violation due to the State not disclosing this information 
until a day before trial.  The trial court next determined that the 
State’s discovery violation was inadvertent, and the record supports 
this finding.  The State told the trial court that the cartridge casings 
had been in evidence since the day of the murders, but after going 
through the evidence with Detective Creelman on the eve of trial, it 
realized there was no firearms report because Detective Creelman 
 
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forgot to send the casings to the lab for analysis.  The State had the 
casings analyzed the same day it discovered there was no firearms 
report and then filed a supplemental list of witnesses and Felix’s 
firearms report later that day.  There is no record evidence that the 
State willfully delayed analyzing the cartridge casings and 
generating a firearms report.  The trial court then said it needed to 
determine whether the State’s violation was trivial or substantial, 
but it did not make an explicit finding.   
The trial court finally determined that the State’s discovery 
violation did not have a prejudicial effect on Joseph’s trial 
preparation.  “Prejudice in this context means procedural prejudice 
significantly affecting the opposing party’s preparation for trial.”  
McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 321.  “[T]he defense is procedurally 
prejudiced if there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant’s 
trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different 
had the violation not occurred.”  State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 
1020 (Fla. 1995).  “Trial preparation or strategy should be 
considered materially different if it reasonably could have benefited 
the defendant.”  Id.  A court’s analysis of procedural prejudice 
“considers how the defense might have responded had it known 
 
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about the undisclosed piece of evidence and contemplates the 
possibility that the defense could have acted to counter the harmful 
effects of the discovery violation.”  Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 
1149 (Fla. 2006). 
The trial court properly ruled that the State’s discovery 
violation did not procedurally prejudice Joseph.  The trial court first 
turned to the State and asked why its discovery violation would not 
prejudice Joseph.  Once the State provided its reasons—that the 
cartridge casings had been in evidence since the crimes and that 
Felix’s testimony would merely corroborate other expected 
testimony—the trial court then asked the defense how Felix’s 
testimony impacted its ability to prepare for trial.  Defense counsel 
said the defense would have retained its own firearms expert who 
could testify that the cartridge casings did not come from the same 
firearm.  However, even if the defense had been able to retain their 
own expert to contradict Felix’s testimony, there is no reasonable 
possibility that the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would 
have been materially different.  Felix’s testimony would not have 
changed the defense’s theory of the case, which was that Joseph 
was not the shooter.  Felix’s testimony did not involve the identity of 
 
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the shooter; it was merely corroborative of other witness testimony.  
Therefore, Joseph’s theory that he was not the shooter would be 
just as plausible after Felix’s testimony as it was prior to its 
admission into evidence.  See Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 713 
(Fla. 2002) (concluding that the State’s discovery violation did not 
materially hinder the defendant’s trial preparation where the 
defense’s theory of the case was just as viable after the challenged 
testimony as it was prior to the introduction of the testimony).  
There was no evidence suggesting there was more than one gun or 
more than one shooter involved in these crimes.  The trial court also 
gave defense counsel time to find a firearms expert and an 
opportunity to depose Felix.  Further, even if the trial court 
erroneously denied Joseph’s motion to exclude, any error was 
harmless.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).  
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
B.  The State’s Impeachment of its Own Witnesses (Claim 2) 
Joseph next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 
State to improperly impeach its own witnesses at trial.  Joseph 
argues that the State attempted to impeach each member of 
Joseph’s family with purported inconsistent statements, but Joseph 
 
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fails to identify any specific instances of improper impeachment in 
the argument section of his initial brief.  In his reply brief, Joseph 
identifies one instance, which we briefly address.  We conclude that 
even if this issue has been properly presented, it is without merit. 
During the trial testimony of Robin Denson (Joseph’s mother), 
the State inquired about a conversation Denson had with Joseph 
immediately before the shootings.  Specifically, Denson testified 
that she had a conversation with Joseph when she got home from 
work but that it was not about the incident between Kyra and 
Kamare.  Denson further testified that Joseph was not upset and 
was not being disrespectful to her but towards Kamare’s mother.  
Denson testified that she remembered going to the police station 
and speaking with Detective Creelman shortly after the murders.  
The State asked about a specific statement Denson made to 
Detective Creelman: “You said that Marlin [Joseph] kept going on 
and on.”  Defense counsel objected on hearsay and improper 
attempted impeachment grounds, arguing that a proper predicate 
must be laid for a prior inconsistent statement.  The trial court 
found that the State did lay a proper predicate and overruled the 
objection but noted that the State needed to confront Denson with 
 
- 24 - 
the prior inconsistent statement and ask her if she ever made a 
different statement.  The State then asked Denson whether she said 
something to Detective Creelman about her conversation with 
Joseph that was different from what she said on the stand.  Denson 
said she was testifying as to what she remembered from over two 
years ago.  The State then impeached Denson with her prior 
inconsistent statements to Detective Creelman that Joseph was 
upset because Kyra and Kamare got into a disagreement and was 
being disrespectful. 
Pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2017), “[a]ny 
party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the 
credibility of a witness.”  Specifically, a party may impeach a 
witness by “[i]ntroducing statements of the witness which are 
inconsistent with the witness’s present testimony.”  § 90.608(1), 
Fla. Stat.  In order to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent 
statement, “the prior statement must be both (1) inconsistent with 
the witness’s in-court testimony, and (2) the statement of the 
witness.”  Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 383 (Fla. 2014).  Prior 
statements are deemed inconsistent only if they directly contradict 
or are materially different from testimony during trial.  Id.  “Before a 
 
- 25 - 
witness can be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, the 
proper foundation must be laid.”  Pasha v. State, 225 So. 3d 688, 
713 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 569 (Fla. 
2004)).  “Prior to questioning a witness about the contents of a 
previous inconsistent statement, counsel must call to the witness’s 
attention the time, place, and person to whom the statement was 
allegedly made.”  Pearce, 880 So. 2d at 569-70.  “Further, a trial 
court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be upheld absent 
an abuse of discretion.”  Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 373. 
Here, contrary to Joseph’s argument, Denson testified at trial 
inconsistent with the sworn statement she gave to the police on the 
night of December 28, 2017, in which she stated that Joseph was 
upset because Kyra and Kamare got into a disagreement and was 
being disrespectful.  At trial, Denson denied that Joseph was upset 
or disrespectful during their conversation on the night of the 
shootings.  The State also laid the proper predicate by asking 
Denson if she remembered giving a statement to Detective Creelman 
at the police station shortly after the murders before confronting 
 
- 26 - 
her with the statement.  Accordingly, the State did not improperly 
impeach Denson, and we deny relief on this claim.8 
C.  Out-of-Court Identifications of Joseph (Claim 3) 
Joseph argues that the trial court erroneously admitted 
Detective Creelman’s testimony regarding out-of-court statements 
made by Cordarius and Parice that identified Joseph as the shooter.  
Specifically, Joseph argues that the identifications were hearsay 
because Cordarius and Parice provided in-court testimony and did 
not testify inconsistently at trial.  However, because Cordarius’ and 
Parice’s out-of-court identifications were not hearsay and were 
admissible as statements of identifications pursuant to section 
90.801(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2017), we conclude that the trial 
court did not err in admitting Detective Creelman’s testimony. 
 
8.  We also find Joseph’s argument that the trial court never 
found the witnesses’ testimony affirmatively harmful or never 
declared the witnesses to be adverse without merit.  See Morton v. 
State, 689 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 1997) (“In 1990, section 90.608 
was amended to remove the necessity of showing that one’s own 
witness had become adverse. . . . [Section 90.608] now permits a 
party to impeach its own witness by introducing prior inconsistent 
statements without regard to whether the witness’s testimony is 
prejudicial.”), receded from on other grounds by Rodriguez v. State, 
753 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2000). 
 
- 27 - 
“Admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed on 
appellate review unless there is an abuse of discretion.”  Tundidor v. 
State, 221 So. 3d 587, 598 (Fla. 2017).  “However, the question of 
whether a statement is hearsay is a matter of law and is subject to 
de novo review on appeal.”  Id. (quoting Cannon v. State, 180 So. 3d 
1023, 1037 (Fla. 2015)).  Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”  § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017).  Section 90.801(2)(c) 
provides an exception to the hearsay rule: “A statement is not 
hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the 
statement is . . . [o]ne of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person.”  § 90.801(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017).  An “out-of-
court statement of identification is admissible in court to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted, e.g., to prove that the person identified 
was the person who committed the act.”  Charles W. Ehrhardt, 
Florida Evidence § 801.9, at 992-93 (2017 ed.).  “Section 
90.801(2)(c) recognizes that an identification made shortly after a 
 
- 28 - 
crime, accident, or event is more reliable in most situations than 
identifications made at a later time.”  Id. at 993.  “In addition to the 
testimony of the person who made the prior identification, section 
90.801(2)(c) makes admissible the testimony of a witness who was 
present at the time of the identification so long as the person 
making the identification testifies during the trial and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the identification.”  Id. at 996. 
Here, Cordarius and Parice gave prior sworn statements to the 
police on the night of the shootings identifying Joseph as the 
shooter.  At trial, the State offered Cordarius’ and Parice’s out-of-
court identifications of Joseph as the shooter through the testimony 
of Detective Creelman, who was present at the time of the 
identifications.  Specifically, Detective Creelman testified that he 
interviewed Cordarius on the night of the incident and that 
“Cordarius told [him] that his brother, Marlin Joseph, had shot 
Kyra.”  Detective Creelman also testified that he interviewed Parice 
on the night of the incident and that “Parice told [him] his brother, 
Marlin Joseph,” was the shooter.  The trial court allowed Detective 
Creelman’s testimony regarding the out-of-court identifications 
under section 90.801(2)(c)’s hearsay exception. 
 
- 29 - 
Our decision in Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2002), is 
instructive.  In Evans, we concluded that the testimony of two 
police officers that two eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the 
person who shot the victim was admissible as a hearsay exception 
under section 90.801(2)(c) where the two eyewitnesses testified at 
trial and were subject to cross-examination concerning their 
identification of the defendant as the shooter.  Id. at 1094; see also 
Polite v. State, 41 So. 3d 935, 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding that 
the State properly elicited testimony about two out-of-court 
identifications through the police where the State asked the 
identifying witness on direct examination if she had identified the 
robber and given the police his name), quashed on other grounds, 
116 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 2013). 
Cordarius’ and Parice’s out-of-court identifications qualify as 
an exception to hearsay under section 90.801(2)(c).  Cordarius and 
Parice were eyewitnesses to the crimes and specifically identified 
Joseph as the shooter on the night of the shootings in their 
statements to Detective Creelman.  See Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 
451, 460 (Fla. 2006) (stating that section 90.801(2)(c) applies to 
statements of identification made by a witness to a crime); Charles 
 
- 30 - 
W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 801.9, at 994-95 (stating that 
section 90.801(2)(c) “does not specify when or where the 
identification must be made” but that the identification “should be 
made near the time the declarant perceived the individual 
identified”).  Further, both Cordarius and Parice testified at trial 
and were subject to cross-examination concerning their 
identifications.  See § 90.801(2)(c), Fla. Stat.  Accordingly, because 
Cordarius’ and Parice’s out-of-court identifications were not hearsay 
and were admissible as statements of identifications pursuant to 
section 90.801(2)(c), we deny relief on this claim. 
D.  Testimony Concerning Joseph’s Statements About One of 
the Victims (Claim 4) 
 
Joseph next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted 
Jeshema Tarver’s testimony that she first heard Joseph yelling 
about Kyra “two days ago,” referring to a prior incident that 
occurred on December 23, 2017 (two days before Christmas and 
five days before the shootings).  Specifically, Joseph argues this 
testimony was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and involved no prior 
bad act or collateral crime.  However, because the testimony was 
 
- 31 - 
relevant to proving motive, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting Jeshema’s testimony. 
“A trial court’s determination that evidence is admissible will 
not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion.”  
Kirkman v. State, 233 So. 3d 456, 467 (Fla. 2018).  “That discretion, 
however, is limited by the rules of evidence.”  Id. (quoting Hudson v. 
State, 992 So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008)).  “The prerequisite to the 
admissibility of evidence is relevancy.”  Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 
277, 291 (Fla. 2009).  “Under Florida law, all relevant evidence, 
defined as that tending to prove or disprove a material fact, is 
admissible unless otherwise provided by law.”  Morris v. State, 219 
So. 3d 33, 42 (Fla. 2017). 
Here, after Jeshema testified concerning the argument she 
heard between Joseph and Crowell while in the shower, she 
indicated that this was not the first time she heard Joseph yelling 
about Kyra.  Jeshema testified that she heard Joseph yelling about 
Kyra on December 23, 2017 (two days before Christmas and five 
days before the shootings).  At that time, Joseph told his mother 
that Kyra had one more time to make him mad or to bother and 
that Kyra needed to leave Kamare alone. 
 
- 32 - 
Jeshema’s testimony was relevant to show Joseph’s motive for 
committing the murders.  We have explained that “evidence may be 
admitted in a criminal case if it is relevant as to the motive for the 
crime involved.”  State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 365 (Fla. 
2000).  Jeshema’s testimony about what she heard Joseph tell 
Denson provided a reason for Joseph’s eventual aggression towards 
Crowell and Kyra—Joseph was upset with Kyra because she kept 
bothering his daughter, Kamare.  Joseph’s statement to Denson 
that Kyra had one more time to make him mad, when coupled with 
testimony that Kyra and Kamare got into an argument on the day of 
the murders, is highly probative.  Kyra and Kamare’s argument on 
the day of the murders served as the “one more time” to make 
Joseph mad, explaining why he killed Kyra and Crowell that night.  
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
E.  Denial of Motion to Dismiss Charges (Claim 5) 
Joseph further argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss charges, which alleged constitutional violations 
occurred while Joseph received treatment at Treasure Coast 
Forensic Treatment Center.  Specifically, he asserts that Treasure 
Coast’s staff, in training him to be competent, violated his 
 
- 33 - 
constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  However, as 
argued by the State, Joseph’s claim is vague, conclusory, and lacks 
specificity.  Joseph fails to provide facts to support his claims of the 
alleged constitutional violations.  Accordingly, we deny relief on this 
claim. 
F.  Denial of Motion to Interview Jurors (Claim 6) 
Joseph argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 
to interview jurors.  “A trial court’s decision on a motion to interview 
jurors is reviewed pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.”  
Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 519 (Fla. 2009).  “The trial court 
does not abuse its discretion in denying motions to interview jurors 
based on juror bias or misconduct where there is no indication of 
bias or misconduct in the record.”  Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 
739-40 (Fla. 2011).  Further, in order to be entitled to interview 
jurors, Joseph must present “sworn allegations that, if true, would 
require the court to order a new trial because the alleged error was 
so fundamental and prejudicial as to vitiate the entire proceedings.”  
Johnson v. State, 804 So. 2d 1218, 1225 (Fla. 2001).  Here, Joseph 
alleged that a prospective juror had a conversation with Robin 
 
- 34 - 
Denson (Joseph’s mother) after the juror was excused from the 
venire panel.  In this conversation, the juror said the entire jury 
panel discussed the case among themselves, disregarding the trial 
court’s instructions.  The juror also said all of the prospective jurors 
had already made up their minds in wanting to sentence Joseph to 
death.  The trial court denied Joseph’s motion, finding there was 
insufficient evidence to support the need for juror interviews or to 
show that the verdict may be subject to challenge.  The trial court 
did not find Denson’s statements reliable because Denson never 
brought this to the trial court’s attention yet brought other matters 
to the court’s attention.  The trial court also found Denson’s 
statements not reliable because they were not supported by the 
prospective juror who spoke to the trial court and attorneys about 
the concerns she had sitting on the case before being excused.  
Because the allegations in Joseph’s motion would not constitute 
sufficient grounds to support a new trial, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to interview 
jurors. 
 
 
 
- 35 - 
G.  HAC Aggravator (Claim 9) 
Next, Joseph argues that there is insufficient evidence to 
support the HAC aggravator.  We disagree.  The HAC aggravator 
applies to murders that are both “conscienceless or pitiless and 
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.”  Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 
110, 134 (Fla. 2001).  The focus is “on the means and manner in 
which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances 
surrounding the death.”  Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1211-12 
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 849-50 (Fla. 
2002)).  Gunshot murders can qualify as HAC if the events 
preceding the death “cause the victim fear, emotional strain, and 
terror.”  Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 488 (Fla. 2015).  To 
support HAC, “the evidence must show that the victim was 
conscious and aware of impending death.”  King v. State, 130 So. 3d 
676, 684 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 
1261 (Fla. 2004)).  “However, the victim’s perception of imminent 
death need only last seconds for this aggravator to apply.”  Gonzalez 
v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1162 (Fla. 2014). 
In applying this aggravator, the trial court found the following 
as to Crowell: 
 
- 36 - 
Here, the Defendant shot Kaladaa Crowell in her 
home while her child was present.  Although the medical 
examiner testified that he could not conclusively opine 
based on examining the body the exact sequence of the 
gunshots, he did opine that at least one of the shots to 
the head was fatal and would have rendered Kaladaa 
Crowell unconscious immediately.  However, the State 
presented testimony that Jeshema Tarver heard multiple 
gunshots as she was showering.  She also heard Kaladaa 
Crowell begging for help and for someone to call 911 after 
she heard the first round of gunshots.  Jeshema got out 
of the shower and while getting dressed, heard a final 
shot.  There was no testimony that Kaladaa ever spoke 
another word after the sound of that last shot. 
This series of events clearly establishes that 
Kaladaa Crowell was alive after being shot multiple times, 
as she was heard begging for help and for someone to call 
911.  Based on Jeshema’s testimony, and the testimony 
of the medical examiner that one of the gunshot wounds 
to the head would have rendered Kaladaa unconscious 
immediately, it is reasonable to conclude that Kaladaa 
Crowell received her fatal gunshot wound last.  This 
evidence establishes that Defendant fired multiple shots 
into her body, and that she laid there begging for help.  
Moments passed, and when Defendant realized she still 
was not dead, he delivered the final shot killing her.  
Kaladaa thus was well aware of her impending death, 
and the act of the final shot was conscienceless and 
pitiless. 
 
We conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding as to Crowell.  The evidence showed that 
Crowell sustained several gunshot wounds to different parts of her 
body—back of right hand, belly, left thigh, left calf, chest, back of 
head, and forehead.  The gunshot wound to Crowell’s forehead was 
 
- 37 - 
fatal, breaking her skull and destroying her brain.  Despite the 
medical examiner being unable to determine the order of the 
gunshots, Jeshema’s testimony established that Crowell was alive 
after being shot multiple times and that she received her fatal 
gunshot wound last.  Specifically, Jeshema testified that she heard 
three gunshots while showering and then heard Crowell screaming, 
crying, and asking for someone to call 911.  Jeshema then heard 
another shot and did not hear anything from Crowell after this shot.  
The medical examiner testified that the gunshot wound to Crowell’s 
forehead would have rendered her unconscious immediately. 
The evidence presented also indicated that Crowell endured 
physical pain, emotional strain, fear, and terror before being killed.  
The medical examiner testified that each gunshot individually 
would have caused pain to Crowell if she was conscious.  This 
testimony, coupled with Jeshema’s testimony, established that 
Crowell experienced pain from the nonfatal gunshot wounds that 
preceded the fatal shot.  While it is unclear how much time passed 
between the nonfatal shots and the fatal shot, “the victim’s 
perception of imminent death need only last seconds for [the HAC] 
aggravator to apply.”  Allred v. State, 55 So. 3d 1267, 1280 (Fla. 
 
- 38 - 
2010).  As further evidence that Crowell was conscious and aware 
of impending death, the medical examiner testified that the gunshot 
wound on the back of Crowell’s right hand was indicative of a 
defensive wound.  See Hall v. State, 107 So. 3d 262, 276 (Fla. 2012) 
(“[W]hen a victim sustains defense-type wounds during the attack, 
it indicates that the victim did not die instantaneously and in such 
a circumstance HAC was proper.”).  Further, immediately prior to 
the murder, Joseph and Crowell were arguing about Kyra being 
mean to Kamare, so Crowell was aware Kyra was home and in 
danger.  See Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1163 (finding competent, 
substantial evidence to support the HAC aggravator where one of 
the victims, aware of her impending death, knew that her children 
were probably also in grave danger). 
Next, as to Kyra, the trial court found the following: 
Kyra Inglett was in her home when Defendant shot 
her mother multiple times.  Undoubtedly, Kyra heard her 
mother crying and begging for help as she laid on the 
floor.  Having just seen this, Kyra fled from her home.  
She was looking back as Defendant was chasing her 
down.  Defendant’s own brother tried to stop the attack 
but was unsuccessful.  Defendant then shot Kyra five 
(5) times.  Kyra was aware of her impending death.  There 
can be nothing more terrifying for a child than knowing 
that someone has just shot their mother multiple times 
and now was coming after them.  There is no doubt that 
 
- 39 - 
this panic-stricken little girl experienced a level of terror 
that no child or no one should ever have to endure. 
 
Here, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial 
court’s finding of the HAC aggravator as to Kyra.  The evidence 
showed that Kyra sustained several gunshot wounds to different 
parts of her body—left buttock, lower back, right side of head, and 
back of head.  The gunshot wound to the back of Kyra’s head was 
fatal, damaging her skull and brain.  Unlike Crowell, there is no 
evidence indicating Kyra was still alive after the first gunshot and 
thus suffered any physical pain.  But a finding of HAC does not 
require the victim to undergo physical torture; mental torture is 
sufficient.  See, e.g., Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1162 (“[T]he HAC 
aggravating circumstance will apply in cases where the victim is 
terrorized before being shot or endures fear and emotional strain or 
the infliction of mental anguish.”). 
Here, the circumstances preceding Kyra’s death caused her 
fear, emotional strain, and terror.  The evidence demonstrated that 
Kyra was inside the home at the time Crowell was shot.  Testimony 
from Denson placed Kyra in the living room, and Crowell’s body was 
found between the living area and dining room.  Therefore, it can be 
 
- 40 - 
reasonably inferred that Kyra saw Joseph shoot her mother or, at 
minimum, heard the gunshots directed at her mother.  See Heyne 
v. State, 88 So. 3d 113, 122-23 (Fla. 2012) (finding competent, 
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the 
five-year-old victim experienced fear and terror prior to her death 
where she witnessed her mother and father being murdered).  
Parice also testified that after he heard gunshots coming from 
inside the house, he saw Kyra run outside, looking backwards, and 
Joseph was running after her with a gun.  This evidence leaves no 
doubt that Kyra was aware of her impending death.  Accordingly, 
Joseph is not entitled to relief on this claim.9 
 
9.  Given our conclusion that competent, substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s HAC finding, Joseph’s argument that the 
jury should not have been instructed on the HAC aggravator and 
Joseph’s argument that the trial court erroneously assigned great 
weight to the HAC aggravator necessarily fail.  See Colley v. State, 
310 So. 3d 2, 15 n.10 (Fla. 2020) (“Given our conclusion on the 
sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial court’s finding, we 
necessarily reject Colley’s argument that the court erred by 
instructing the jury on the HAC aggravator.”); Jean-Philippe v. State, 
123 So. 3d 1071, 1082 (Fla. 2013) (“[O]nce a trial court finds that 
an aggravating circumstance has been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the weight to be given ‘is within the discretion of 
the trial court, and it is subject to the abuse of discretion 
standard.’ ” (quoting Bright v. State, 90 So. 3d 249, 261 (Fla. 
2012))). 
 
- 41 - 
H.  CCP Aggravator (Claim 10) 
Joseph also argues that the trial court erred in finding that the 
CCP aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  To prove 
the CCP aggravator, the court must find that 
the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection 
and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a 
fit of rage (cold); that the defendant had a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal 
incident (calculated); that the defendant exhibited 
heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the 
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification. 
 
Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007).  The CCP 
aggravator may be proven by demonstrating such facts as 
(1) “advance procurement of a weapon,” (2) “lack of resistance or 
provocation,” and (3) “the appearance of a killing carried out as a 
matter of course.”  Id. (quoting Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 
277 (Fla. 1988)). 
 
Here, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial 
court’s finding of the CCP aggravator as to both Crowell and Kyra.  
Joseph armed himself with a firearm, as evidenced by Parice’s 
testimony that he saw Joseph with a gun a couple of days prior to 
the murders.  See Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98 (“In a number of 
cases, we have cited the defendant’s procurement of a weapon in 
 
- 42 - 
advance of the crime as indicative of preparation and heightened 
premeditated design.”).  Further, there is no record evidence 
suggesting Joseph killed Crowell and Kyra out of frenzy, panic, or 
rage.  Denson testified that, on the day of the murders, Joseph, 
Kyra, and Crowell were all present in the home when she got home 
from work.  Joseph was in his room reading the Bible, Kyra was 
sitting on the couch in the living room, and Crowell was in her room 
folding laundry.  Denson did testify that Joseph was being 
disrespectful towards Kamare’s mother (who was not there) during 
a conversation Denson had with Joseph immediately prior to the 
murders.  However, Denson explicitly testified that Joseph was not 
upset during this conversation.  There is also no evidence of 
provocation from either Crowell or Kyra.  Rather, the evidence 
indicates that all things were normal at the house that night.  
Joseph was in his room reading the Bible and, when he was ready 
to carry out his plan, he confronted Crowell and shot her.  Joseph 
then chased Kyra out of the house and shot her. 
As to heightened premeditation, in addition to the 
procurement of a weapon in advance of the crime, Joseph was 
heard on December 23, 2017 (two days before Christmas and five 
 
- 43 - 
days before the murders) yelling to Denson about Kyra saying she 
had one more time to make him mad and that she needed to leave 
his daughter alone.  That “one more time” incident occurred on the 
day of the murders.  Joseph had time to consider his plan before 
carrying it out.  Joseph did not confront Crowell or Kyra 
immediately after getting home from work.  Joseph was in his room 
reading the Bible while Crowell was in her room folding laundry, 
and Kyra was in the living room on the couch.  When he was ready, 
Joseph then confronted Crowell about the incident between Kyra 
and Kamare.  Out of the nine people present in the home on the 
night of December 28, 2017, Joseph targeted Crowell and then 
Kyra.  Joseph shot Crowell and Kyra multiple times.  The evidence 
also showed that Joseph could have left both victims alive but, 
instead, he decided to murder them.  See Turner v. State, 37 So. 3d 
212, 226 (Fla. 2010) (“We have held that CCP exists where, as here, 
a defendant has ample opportunity to leave, but instead decides to 
murder the victim.”).  Testimony presented at trial demonstrated 
that Crowell was still conscious after the first round of shots and 
was heard screaming and asking someone to call 911.  Joseph, 
upon seeing Crowell still alive, could have left the crime scene.  But 
 
- 44 - 
he instead delivered a fatal shot to Crowell’s forehead.  Joseph 
again had the chance to flee after killing Crowell.  He was tackled by 
his brother on the way out of the house and still proceeded to chase 
Kyra and shoot her multiple times, including a fatal shot to the 
back of the head.  Only after this did Joseph flee in Crowell’s 
vehicle.  The evidence of Joseph’s actions sufficiently supports 
heightened premeditation. 
Lastly, “[a] pretense of legal or moral justification is ‘any 
colorable claim based at least partly on uncontroverted and 
believable factual evidence or testimony that, but for its 
incompleteness, would constitute an excuse, justification, or 
defense as to the homicide.’ ”  Campbell v. State, 159 So. 3d 814, 
831 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 245 (Fla. 
1999)).  The evidence in the present case showed no pretense of 
legal or moral justification for the killing, and Joseph does not 
argue that the murder was justified. 
Moreover, given the other weighty aggravators found in this 
case, even if the CCP aggravator were invalid, there is no reasonable 
possibility that an absence of this one aggravator would have 
resulted in a different sentence.  See Hall v. State, 246 So. 3d 210, 
 
- 45 - 
215 (Fla. 2018) (concluding that an error in finding the existence of 
CCP was harmless because “Hall has significant and weighty 
aggravation beyond the invalidated CCP aggravator”).  Accordingly, 
we deny relief on this claim.10 
I.  Prosecutor’s Penalty-Phase Comments (Claim 13) 
Joseph challenges a number of prosecutorial comments made 
during penalty-phase closing argument and argues that the trial 
court erred in denying his motions for mistrial directed at those 
comments.  Because the prosecutor’s comments were proper, or if 
improper not so prejudicial as to vitiate Joseph’s entire trial, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Joseph’s motions for mistrial during the State’s penalty-phase 
closing argument. 
 
10.  Given our conclusion that competent, substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s CCP finding, Joseph’s argument 
that the trial court erroneously assigned great weight to the CCP 
aggravator necessarily fails.  See Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 23, 58 
(Fla. 2018) (“In reviewing the finding of an aggravating 
circumstance, ‘[i]t is not this Court’s function to reweigh the 
evidence to determine whether the State proved each aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—that is the trial court’s 
job.’ ” (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997))). 
 
- 46 - 
Joseph first challenges the prosecutor’s comment that Joseph 
did not care about jail: “[T]here is no question that he understood 
the criminality.  It’s just he didn’t care.  Didn’t care.  He was on 
probation, ladies and gentlemen.  You heard the probation officer 
say that any crime can violate you.  Still doesn’t.  Doesn’t care 
about jail.  That’s why that punishment is not appropriate.”  
Defense counsel objected to this comment, and the trial court 
sustained the objection.  After the trial court denied Joseph’s 
subsequent motion for mistrial, he requested a curative instruction 
to be read in the alternative, which the trial court agreed to give.  
This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for 
an abuse of discretion, where a defendant contemporaneously 
objects, and the trial court sustains the objection and gives a 
curative instruction.  Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 949-50 (Fla. 
2017).  “ ‘A motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is 
necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.’  In 
other words, ‘[a] motion for a mistrial should only be granted when 
an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.’ ”  Smiley v. 
State, 295 So. 3d 156, 169 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Morris, 219 So. 3d 
at 44). 
 
- 47 - 
The State’s comment that Joseph did not care about jail was 
made in the context of mitigating circumstances.  Specifically, the 
State was arguing that Joseph’s capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was not substantially impaired.  The State 
noted the fact that Joseph did not turn himself in, evading police 
for five days before being caught.  It further noted that Joseph was 
on probation and that he was instructed on the conditions of 
probation.  The State argued that Joseph’s willingness to commit a 
new law violation and flee showed that he did not care about jail, 
and therefore, life imprisonment was an inappropriate punishment.  
Joseph objected and argued that the fact that he did not care about 
jail is not a proper aggravating circumstance. 
While improper, this comment alone was not so prejudicial as 
to vitiate the entire trial.  For one, the comment was brief and 
isolated.  See Truehill, 211 So. 3d at 949 (finding that a brief 
“partners in crime” comment did not deprive the defendant of a fair 
and impartial trial or materially contribute to the conviction); 
Fletcher v. State, 168 So. 3d 186, 209 (Fla. 2015) (denying relief 
where the prosecutor’s “send a message” comment, although 
 
- 48 - 
improper, was iterated only three times, all at roughly the same 
time).  And two, the trial court sustained Joseph’s objection and 
gave his requested curative instruction, informing the jury that the 
fact that Joseph did not care about jail is not a proper aggravating 
circumstance to be considered.  See, e.g., Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 
613, 621-22 (Fla. 2001) (holding that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial for the prosecutor’s 
comments, where the trial court sustained the objection and gave 
curative instructions).  Accordingly, in light of the entire record at 
the penalty phase, this brief and isolated comment was not so 
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, and the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Joseph’s motion for mistrial directed 
at this comment. 
Joseph next challenges the following comment: “When that 
gets turned in, ladies and gentlemen, this doesn’t happen unless 
she [the trial judge] thinks it should.”  Joseph objected to this 
comment, but the trial court did not rule on the objection.  
However, the trial court did rule on Joseph’s motion for mistrial 
directed at this comment.  When a trial court does not rule on a 
defendant’s objection but simply denies the defendant’s motion for 
 
- 49 - 
mistrial, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard to the 
trial court’s ruling on the motion for mistrial.  See Poole v. State, 
997 So. 2d 382, 391 n.3 (Fla. 2008). 
This comment was made in the context of the State’s broad 
argument that, based on the evidence, jury instructions, 
aggravating factors, and mitigating circumstances, the correct and 
proportionate sentence was death.  Specifically, the State was 
referring to the fact that the jury makes a recommendation of death 
and that it is the trial court who ultimately decides whether to 
impose a sentence of death.  See § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2017).  
Joseph objected and argued that the prosecutor’s comment 
diminished the jurors’ roles. 
The prosecutor’s comment did not diminish the jurors’ roles 
and was not improper.  Although perhaps stated ineloquently, it is 
true that a jury’s recommendation of death “doesn’t happen” unless 
the trial court “thinks it should.”  See Delgado v. State, 162 So. 3d 
971, 981 (Fla. 2015) (“[R]egardless of the jury’s recommendation, 
the trial judge must conduct an independent analysis of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” (quoting Phillips v. 
State, 39 So. 3d 296, 305 (Fla. 2010))).  Before imposing a sentence 
 
- 50 - 
of death, a trial court must first consider each aggravating factor 
unanimously found by the jury and all mitigating circumstances.  
See § 921.141(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2017).  And, even if the jury 
recommends a sentence of death, the trial court can still impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment.  See id. 
Any potential issue of the State’s comment diminishing the 
jurors’ roles was assuaged by the trial court’s instruction 
immediately after Joseph’s objection, as well as the State’s 
comments following the instruction.  The trial court informed the 
jury that the court was the one who imposes the final sentence but 
that it would weigh the jury’s recommendation very heavily.  The 
State then essentially restated what the trial court just said—that 
the trial court would consider the jury’s recommendation of death, 
weigh the recommendation with everything else, and ultimately 
decide whether to impose a sentence of death.  Because the State’s 
comment was a correct, albeit imprecise, statement of the law and 
because any potential harm was cured by the trial court’s 
instruction and the State’s subsequent comments, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Joseph’s motion for mistrial 
directed at this comment. 
 
- 51 - 
Joseph’s final challenge is directed at the following comment: 
“And the person that committed them has provided no mitigation 
worthy to allow him to live out his days in jail . . . .”  Joseph 
objected to this comment, but the trial court did not rule on the 
objection.  The trial court did, however, rule on Joseph’s motion for 
mistrial after doing a read-back of the transcript.  As with the 
previous comment, this Court’s standard of review of the trial 
court’s denial of the motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion.  See 
Poole, 997 So. 2d at 391 n.3. 
This comment was made at the end of the State’s closing 
argument.  The State was arguing that a recommendation of death 
was appropriate because the murders in this case were different.  It 
then made the mitigation comment.  Joseph objected and argued 
that the State commented on his right to remain silent. 
The State did not comment on Joseph’s right to remain silent.  
Rather, the State was referring to the defendant’s burden to prove 
mitigating circumstances.  Bright v. State, 299 So. 3d 985, 1000 
(Fla. 2020) (“This Court has held that a mitigating circumstance 
exists where it is established by the greater weight of the 
evidence.”).  The trial court noted that the prosecutor was 
 
- 52 - 
commenting on the fact that no mitigation had been presented.  The 
prosecutor actually stated that Joseph had not presented any 
“mitigation worthy to allow him to live out his days in jail.”  The 
State was not saying Joseph failed to present any mitigation 
evidence whatsoever; it was saying Joseph had failed to present 
mitigation sufficient to warrant a life sentence rather than a death 
sentence.  Because this was not a comment on Joseph’s right to 
remain silent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Joseph’s motion for mistrial directed at this comment.  Accordingly, 
we deny relief on this claim. 
J.  Jury’s Failure to Follow the Law (Claim 14) 
Joseph argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the 
jury acted out of emotion, misapprehension, or outright refusal to 
follow the law or the trial court’s instructions in the penalty phase 
of the trial.  Specifically, Joseph focuses on the fact that the jury 
deliberated for only two hours and found no mitigating 
circumstances.  We agree with the State that there is no factual 
basis to support Joseph’s claim.  See Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 23, 
52 (Fla. 2018) (“[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, [this 
Court] presume[s] that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions.”).  
 
- 53 - 
Accordingly, because this claim is unsupported by the evidence, we 
deny relief on this claim. 
K.  Cumulative Error (Claim 15) 
Joseph argues that numerous errors in this case, when 
considered cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial and due 
process.  “[W]here the alleged errors urged for consideration in a 
cumulative error analysis are individually ‘either procedurally 
barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also 
necessarily fails.’ ”  Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 818 (Fla. 
2016) (quoting Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1015 (Fla. 2009)).  
None of Joseph’s alleged errors have merit.  Further, Joseph does 
not identify any particular errors that cumulatively deprived him of 
a fair trial.  See Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 75 (Fla. 2005) 
(concluding that the defendant did not articulate his cumulative 
error claim in a manner upon which this Court could afford relief 
where he simply referred to the “sheer number and types of errors 
involved” in his trial).  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
L.  Sufficiency of the Evidence (Claim 16) 
“In appeals where the death penalty has been imposed,” 
regardless of whether the defendant raises the sufficiency of the 
 
- 54 - 
evidence as an issue on appeal, “this Court independently reviews 
the record to confirm that the jury’s verdict is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.”  Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952, 
966-67 (Fla. 2008); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5). 
Here, while most of the State’s evidence is circumstantial and 
Joseph’s mother and brothers, who were eyewitnesses to the 
murders, recanted in their testimony at trial, there is competent, 
substantial evidence to support Joseph’s two first-degree murder 
convictions.  First, Jeshema testified that while she was in the 
shower, she heard Joseph and Crowell arguing and then heard 
three loud bangs, and Crowell screaming and crying out for help.  
Further, Parice testified that he heard gunshots and then saw Kyra 
running out of the house, looking backwards as she ran.  Parice 
then saw Joseph come outside with a gun and tried to tackle him.  
No one else was seen with a gun that night.  Detective Creelman 
testified as to Parice’s and Cordarius’ statements made on the night 
of the murders.  Specifically, Detective Creelman testified that 
Parice told him that Joseph was the shooter, and Cordarius told 
him that Joseph shot Kyra.  Joseph was also the only person 
present at the home that night who was not at the crime scene 
 
- 55 - 
when police arrived—he was seen leaving in Crowell’s car after Kyra 
and Crowell were shot.  And already we have explained that 
Joseph’s actions—including arming himself in advance, specifically 
targeting Crowell and Kyra and shooting them without any 
provocation—demonstrate not just premeditation but heightened 
premeditation. 
The State also provided a motive for the murders.  On 
December 23, 2017 (two days before Christmas and five days before 
the incident), Jeshema testified that she heard Joseph yelling to 
Denson about Kyra saying that Kyra had one more time to make 
him mad or to bother and that she needed to leave Kamare alone.  
On the day of the murders, Kyra and Kamare got into an argument 
before lunch.  That night, immediately before gunshots were heard, 
Joseph was heard arguing with Crowell, asking her why Kyra was 
being mean to his daughter. 
The medical examiner’s testimony showed that both Kyra and 
Crowell sustained multiple gunshot wounds to various parts of their 
bodies.  Both victims incurred fatal gunshot wounds to the head.  
Accordingly, competent, substantial evidence supports Joseph’s two 
first-degree murder convictions. 
 
- 56 - 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm Joseph’s convictions for first-degree murder and his 
sentences of death. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from 
proportionality review requirement in death penalty direct appeal 
cases), I can only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, 
Cheryl Caracuzzo, Judge 
Case No. 502017CF012413AXXXMB 
 
Fredrick R. Susaneck of Levine & Susaneck, P.A., West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rhonda 
Giger, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee