Title: Pardo v. State
Citation: 596 So. 2d 665
Docket Number: 78318
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 1992

596 So. 2d 665 (1992)
James Antonio PARDO, etc., Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 78318.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 26, 1992.
Clayton R. Kaeiser of Kaeiser &amp; Potolsky, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.
*666 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Anita J. Gay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.
BARKETT, Justice.
We have for review State v. Pardo, 582 So. 2d 1225 (Fla.3d DCA 1991), in which the district court certified express and direct conflict with Kopko v. State, 577 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), and certified the following question of great public importance:[1]
582 So. 2d  at 1228. In addition to the certified question and conflict, we also find the district court's opinion conflicts with the Fourth District's decision in State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and our decision in Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1985).
James Antonio Pardo is charged with seven counts of capital sexual battery on a child seven years of age.[2] Pursuant to subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1989), the State filed notices of intent to rely on hearsay statements made by the child victim to nine separate individuals.[3] After conducting a hearing as provided by the statute, the court found the statements of three witnesses sufficiently reliable to be admissible.[4] However, the court also found that the State intended to call the child to testify at trial and that the child had the ability to testify fully concerning all the elements of the alleged crimes. The court concluded that it was required to exclude the hearsay statements under the authority of Kopko v. State, 577 So. 2d 956, 962 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), which held that, even though the criteria of section 90.803(23) are satisfied, where the child is able to testify fully regarding the circumstances of the alleged abuse, hearsay statements regarding the abuse are inadmissible prior consistent statements. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the hearsay statements excluded. The district court suggested that the trial court was entitled to disregard Kopko, and in any event, determined that the holding in Kopko was inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, and therefore quashed the trial court's order.
Initially, we note that the district court erred in commenting that decisions of other district courts of appeal were not binding on the trial court. This Court has stated that "[t]he decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by this Court." Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980). Thus, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts. Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985). The purpose of this rule was explained by the Fourth District in State v. Hayes:
333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (footnote and citations omitted).[5] Consequently, the trial court in this case was bound by the Fifth District's decision in Kopko.
On the merits, we find that a child victim's hearsay statement which qualifies for the statutory exception in section 90.803(23) may be admissible in evidence when the child is able to testify fully at trial notwithstanding its characterization as a prior consistent statement.
Section 90.803(23) provides in relevant part:
§ 90.803(23)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added).
Pardo argues, in reliance on the Fifth District's decision in Kopko, that where the child is able to testify fully, admission of the child's prior consistent statements would contravene the established rule of evidence that prior consistent statements of a witness are inadmissible to corroborate or bolster the witness's trial testimony. See, e.g., Van Gallon v. State, 50 So. 2d 882, 882 (Fla. 1951); Wise v. State, 546 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 554 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1989); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 472, at 349-350 (1957).
Although Pardo's argument has merit, his position runs counter to the plain language of the statute. Section 90.803(23) clearly envisions the admission of a child victim's hearsay statement despite its characterization as a prior consistent statement. As this Court has stated many times, it is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation. E.g., Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 798-99, 78 So. 693, 694-95 (1918). We therefore agree with the court below that the language of section 90.803(23) is unambiguous and plainly provides that, if reliable, a child victim's hearsay statement is not excludable per se as hearsay, or as a prior consistent statement, even though the child testifies fully at trial.
However, we also agree with the court below that this is not the end of the inquiry. As that court stated:
582 So. 2d  at 1228 (emphasis added). Thus, although the admission of a child victim's hearsay statement is not excludable as hearsay or as a prior consistent statement *668 under the statute, the admission of the statement is subject to the balancing test found in section 90.403.[6]
Cast in this light, the district courts' decisions in Kopko and Pardo are not totally at odds. Both courts recognize that repetitious admission of prior consistent statements creates special concerns in the prosecution of criminal cases. The courts simply approach the problem from different perspectives. The Kopko court created a categorical rule of exclusion which fails to account for the plain language of the statute, while the Pardo court took account of the mechanism which already existed in the Florida evidence code for excluding the needless or prejudicial presentation of cumulative evidence.
Of course, the same concerns embodied in section 90.403 are those which underlie the common law rule against prior consistent statements. As Wigmore explained:
4 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1124 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (emphasis added). The propriety of the rule was also noted by the First District in Allison v. State:
162 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (emphasis added). Finally, as the court in Kopko stated:
577 So. 2d  at 960 (emphasis added).
Consequently, a trial court must weigh the reliability and the probative value of a child victim's hearsay statement against the danger that the statement will unfairly prejudice the defendant, confuse the issues at trial, mislead the jury, or result in the presentation of needlessly cumulative evidence. In weighing these concerns, the courts will be able to balance the rights of criminal defendants with those of the child victims that the statute seeks to protect.
Accordingly, we approve in part and quash in part the opinion of the court below, disapprove the Fifth District's opinion in Kopko, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
[1]  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
[2]  § 794.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1989).
[3]  They were the victim's mother, the victim's elementary school counselors, North Miami Police Department Detective Quartiano, Rape Treatment Center Doctor Karen Simmons, State Attorney Children's Center interviewer Merci Restani, Mental Health Counselor Dawn Bralow, Rape Treatment Center worker Karen Weissman, Child Assault Program worker Terry Vazquez, and Doctor Raquel Bild-Libbin.
[4]  Merci Restani, Dawn Bralow, and Dr. Bild-Libbin.
[5]  See generally Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Among and Within Florida's District Courts of Appeal, 18 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 143, 155-160 (1990).
[6]  Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in relevant part:

Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.