Title: Ricky D. Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc
Citation: 2002 WI 30
Docket Number: 2000AP001397
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 2002

2002 WI 30 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1397 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ricky D. Stephenson, Individually and as 
Personal Representative for the Estate of Kathy 
M. Stephenson,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Universal Metrics, Incorporated, American Family 
Mutual Insurance Company and West American 
Insurance Company  
 
Defendants, 
John H. Kreuser and Sentry Insurance, A Mutual 
Company,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 128 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 450, 630 N.W.2d 767 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 28, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 3, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by James M. Fredericks and Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by James M. Fredericks. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Michael 
L. Bertling and McLario, Helm & Bertling, S.C., Menomonee Falls, 
and oral argument by Michael L. Bertling. 
 
 
 
2
 
2002 WI 30 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-1397 
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 4772) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ricky D. Stephenson, Individually and as  
Personal Representative for the Estate of  
Kathy M. Stephenson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Universal Metrics, Incorporated, American  
Family Mutual Insurance Company and West  
American Insurance Company  
 
          Defendants, 
 
John H. Kreuser and Sentry Insurance, A  
Mutual Company,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 28, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is a review of a 
published opinion of the court of appeals, Stephenson v. 
Universal Metrics, 2001 WI App 128, 246 Wis. 2d 450, 630 
N.W.2d 767, which affirmed an order of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Victor Manian, Judge.  The court of appeals held 
No. 
00-1397 
 
2 
 
 
that when an individual indicates to a bartender that he will 
drive an intoxicated person home, thereby allowing the bartender 
to serve the intoxicated person more alcohol, that individual 
assumes a legal duty to drive the intoxicated person home.  The 
court of appeals held that, pursuant to the duty, when the 
individual who agrees to drive subsequently does not drive the 
intoxicated person home, that individual can be held liable for 
any injury or damage caused by the intoxicated person's driving.  
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
held 
that 
immunity 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035 (1997-98)1 does not apply in such a case. 
¶2 
In this case, Ricky Stephenson, individually and on 
behalf of the estate of his wife, Kathy Stephenson, (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as "Stephenson") brought suit against 
Universal Metrics, Inc., ("UMI") and against John Kreuser for 
wrongfully causing Kathy's death.  Kathy was killed in an 
automobile collision with Michael Devine, who was intoxicated at 
the time of the crash.  Earlier in the evening, Kreuser had 
indicated to a bartender that he would drive Devine home from a 
UMI employee party.  Based on that assurance, the bartender 
provided more alcohol to Devine.  Kreuser later decided not to 
drive Devine home. 
¶3 
Kreuser filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 
against him, arguing that he could not be held liable for the 
injuries caused by Devine's drunk driving.  The circuit court 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
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3 
 
 
denied Kreuser's motion and, on appeal, the court of appeals 
upheld the circuit court's ruling.  Kreuser then petitioned this 
court for review, which we granted.  We now reverse the court of 
appeals' decision and hold that Stephenson's claim against 
Kreuser should have been dismissed. 
I 
¶4 
On the evening of December 4, 1998, UMI sponsored a 
social gathering for its employees at the Silver Spring Country 
Club ("the Country Club") in Menomonee Falls.  The gathering 
included dinner, an awards presentation, and cocktails.  Michael 
Devine and John Kreuser were both employees of UMI, and both 
attended the party.  Devine and Kreuser drove separately to the 
event. 
¶5 
UMI provided each attendee with two vouchers, which 
were each redeemable for either an alcoholic or a non-alcoholic 
beverage.  Once the vouchers were used, additional beverages had 
to be purchased individually by the attendee.  The Country Club 
provided a bartender who served the beverages. 
¶6 
At about 8:30 that evening, Kreuser and his wife were 
talking with another couple at the bar when Kreuser overheard 
the bartender ask Devine if he had a ride home.  When Kreuser 
turned to look, he saw Devine make a motion with his head, 
suggesting that Kreuser would be responsible for driving Devine 
home.  Kreuser indicated to the bartender that he would, in 
No. 
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4 
 
 
fact, give Devine a ride home.2  Once Kreuser agreed that he 
would drive Devine home, the bartender served Devine several 
                                                 
2 The parties disagree over the precise manner in which 
Kreuser expressed his agreement.  In his deposition, Kreuser 
testified that he merely nodded his head to the bartender: 
Q: Okay. After hearing the bartender ask Mike Devine 
whether he had a ride home, what did you do? 
A: I had just turned to see what was going on, more or 
less, and Mike had made a motion like I was it. 
Q: All right. And he made a motion with his head? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So you interpreted his motion to be a signal to the 
bartender to you that you were his ride home? 
A: Uh-huh. 
. . . 
Q: And . . . the bartender was looking at him when he 
did that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what did you do in response to that? 
A: I just nodded my head. 
Q: To who? 
A: To the bartender. 
Q: And by nodding your head you were indicating to the 
bartender that you were going to give him a ride 
home, correct? 
A: Yes. 
However, the bartender, Marge Kubowski, remembered having a 
short conversation with Kreuser.  At a criminal inquest into the 
deaths of Devine and Stephenson conducted by the Waukesha County 
District Attorney, Kubowski testified: 
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more drinks.  Kreuser saw Devine take the drinks back to the 
table where Devine had eaten dinner. 
¶7 
Between 9:00 and 9:15 p.m., Kreuser saw Devine again.  
Kreuser was chatting with several people when Devine approached 
                                                                                                                                                             
A: . . . [A]t one point [Devine] came up to the bar 
and ordered a beer, and that is when I noticed that 
he had too much to drink and I couldn't serve him. 
Q:  . . . Do you recall at that point expressing 
concern that he should not drive, or he should get 
a ride? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: How did you express, did you verbalize that? 
A: Yes, I did, more than once. 
Q: And did you get any response from anybody? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: From who? 
A: A guy [Kreuser] that was standing by the bar that 
was standing next to this particular guy [Devine] 
that was not getting anything else to drink. 
Q: What kind of response did you receive? 
A: He acted like I was kidding at first, you know.  He 
kind of chuckled back.  And I said, "I'm being very 
serious.  This man needs a ride home.  He cannot 
leave this country club in this condition."  And he 
said, "Don't worry, I'll give him a ride."  And I 
said, "Are you sure?"  And he said, "I promise I'll 
give him a ride home." 
Despite this factual disagreement, Kreuser concedes that at that 
point in time, he had agreed to drive Devine home.  For the 
purposes of our review, we are only concerned with the 
agreement; the actual manner in which Kreuser communicated his 
agreement is immaterial. 
No. 
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6 
 
 
him.  Devine told Kreuser that the bartender had cut him off.  
Devine then asked Kreuser to buy him a drink.  In his 
deposition, Kreuser stated that it was evident at that time that 
Devine had been drinking, but Devine was not intoxicated to the 
point where he was stumbling or slurring his speech.  Kreuser 
declined to buy Devine a drink and Devine did not persist.  This 
was the last time Kreuser talked to Devine that evening and 
Kreuser does not remember seeing Devine at the party after that. 
¶8 
Kreuser and his wife left the party at about 10:00 
that evening.  As they were leaving, Kreuser decided not to give 
Devine a ride home.3  Kreuser did not attempt to locate Devine, 
                                                 
3 In his deposition, Kreuser acknowledged that he made a 
conscious choice not to drive Devine home: 
Q: At some point that evening you decided not to give 
him a ride home, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And I understand from reading testimony at the 
inquest that basically your wife felt it was 
somebody 
else's 
turn; 
is 
that 
an 
accurate 
statement? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that was based upon the fact that you had done 
it twice before and she was involved in that twice 
before? 
A: Exactly. 
. . . 
Q: When did you decide not to give him a ride home? 
A: I believe when we left. 
. . . 
No. 
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7 
 
 
and he failed to tell Devine or anyone else that he did not 
intend to give Devine a ride home.  There is no evidence, 
however, that shows whether Devine left the party before or 
after Kreuser. 
¶9 
At approximately 10:40 p.m., Devine was driving his 
own vehicle when he crossed the centerline of the highway and 
struck another vehicle, which was driven by Kathy Stephenson.  
Both Devine and Kathy Stephenson died as a result of injuries 
they suffered in the collision.  The State Crime Laboratory 
measured Devine's blood alcohol concentration at 0.338 g/dl——a 
level considerably over Wisconsin's legal limit.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 340.01(46m), 346.63(1)(b). 
¶10 Ricky Stephenson, on his own behalf and as the 
representative for Kathy's estate, brought suit against UMI, 
UMI's insurers (West American Insurance and American Family 
Mutual Insurance), 
Kreuser, 
and Kreuser's 
insurer (Sentry 
Insurance).  Stephenson alleged several causes of action, 
including that UMI had failed to control Devine's conduct, that 
UMI had failed to properly supervise Devine, that UMI had 
voluntarily assumed a duty to see that Devine had a safe way to 
get home, and that Kreuser had voluntarily assumed a duty to 
drive Devine home. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q: Did you look for [Devine] anywhere at that point to 
communicate that to him? 
A: No. 
No. 
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8 
 
 
¶11 Both UMI and Kreuser moved for summary judgment.  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment to UMI and its insurers, 
holding 
that 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035 
and 
Greene 
v. 
Farnsworth, 188 Wis. 2d 365, 525 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1994), UMI 
was immune from liability.  The circuit court denied Kreuser's 
motion, however.  Applying the framework of Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 324A (1965) laid out by the court of appeals in 
Gritzner v. Michael R., 228 Wis. 2d 541, 598 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. 
App. 1999),4 the circuit court held that Kreuser could be held 
liable for Devine's actions. 
¶12 Stephenson and Kreuser both appealed, and the court of 
appeals bifurcated the issues.  In one appeal (not at issue in 
the present case) the court of appeals held that the circuit 
court properly dismissed 
Stephenson's 
claims 
against 
UMI.  
Stephenson 
v. 
Universal 
Metrics, 
2001 
WI 
App 
173, 
247 
Wis. 2d 349, 633 N.W.2d 707, pet. for review filed (No. 00-
1947).  In that same case, the court of appeals found that there 
was a question of fact regarding whether Kreuser had acted 
within the scope of his employment, and reversed the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment on that issue.  Id. at ¶17. 
¶13 In the appeal at issue in the present case, the court 
of appeals held that, pursuant to this court's decision in 
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 
                                                 
4 Not long after the circuit court's ruling, this court 
affirmed, in relevant part, the court of appeals' decision in 
Gritzner.  Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 
611 N.W.2d 906. 
No. 
00-1397 
 
9 
 
 
N.W.2d 906, Kreuser had assumed a legal duty to drive Devine 
home and could therefore be held liable for injuries proximately 
caused by Devine.  The court of appeals also held that Kreuser 
was not immune from liability under § 125.035. 
¶14 On review of that issue, we reverse the holding of the 
court of appeals.  Although we agree that this case fits the 
framework of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, we hold that 
under the facts of this case, Kreuser's liability is precluded 
both by § 125.035 and by public policy.  We therefore hold that 
Kreuser's motion for summary judgment should have been granted. 
II 
¶15 We begin by examining the question of Kreuser's duty.  
In any negligence claim, the first element that must be proven 
by the plaintiff is that some duty of care existed on the part 
of the defendant.  Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶¶19-20 (citing Miller 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 260, 580 N.W.2d 233 
(1998); 
Rockweit 
v. 
Senecal, 
197 
Wis. 2d 409, 
418, 
541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995)).  Whether such a duty exists is a question of 
law, which this court reviews de novo.  Coffey v. City of 
Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 531, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). 
¶16 In determining whether a 
duty exists, 
Wisconsin 
follows the approach of the dissent in the well-known Palsgraf 
decision.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 
1928); see also Schilling v. Stockel, 26 Wis. 2d 525, 531, 133 
N.W.2d 335 (1965); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 
Wis. 176, 182, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).  Under that approach, every 
No. 
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10 
 
 
person owes a duty to the world at large to refrain from conduct 
that could cause foreseeable harm to others, even though the 
identity of the person harmed has not been established at the 
time of the conduct.  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 419-20.  A person 
is negligent when he or she fails to exercise "ordinary care"——
the amount of care which a reasonable person would use under 
similar circumstances.  Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶22 (citing Wis 
JI-Civil 1005); Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 231, 234 
N.W. 372 (1931).  Thus, when determining the existence of a 
duty, the primary question we ask is not whether the defendant 
has a duty to take (or refrain from) certain actions, but 
whether 
the 
defendant's 
actions 
(or 
lack 
thereof) 
were 
consistent with the general duty to exercise a reasonable degree 
of care under the circumstances.  Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶25. 
¶17 It is against this backdrop that we must decide 
whether Kreuser had a duty to drive Devine home.  Specifically 
at issue is whether the framework of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 324A should be used to determine if liability exists.  
Section 324A states, in relevant part: 
 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to 
render 
services 
to 
another 
which 
he 
should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the 
third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if 
 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases 
the risk of such harm, or 
 
No. 
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(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the 
other to the third person, or 
 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the 
other or the third person upon the undertaking. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1967). 
¶18 In support of using the rule in § 324A, Stephenson 
relies heavily on this court's holding in Gritzner.  In that 
case, this court applied the framework of Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 324A to a situation where an adult agreed to watch 
another person's child.  In Gritzner, we held that defendant 
Roger Bubner could be held liable when his girlfriend's son, 
ten-year-old 
Michael 
R., 
sexually 
assaulted 
four-year-old 
Tara G.  Bubner had voluntarily agreed to watch Tara and then 
left Tara alone and unsupervised with Michael.  Gritzner, 2000 
WI 68, ¶57.  At the time, Bubner knew that Michael had 
previously engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with other 
children, including Michael's own half-sister.  We held that a 
reasonable jury could have found that Bubner failed to exercise 
reasonable care, and that such a failure increased the risk of 
physical harm to Tara.  Under these circumstances, we held that 
Bubner could be liable for failing to control Michael.  Id. 
¶19 Stephenson argues that the facts of the present case 
are analogous to those in Gritzner.  We agree, and we conclude 
that the facts of this case fit the § 324A framework.  In the 
present case, Kreuser gratuitously undertook to drive Devine 
home, which Kreuser recognized as necessary for the protection 
of other persons or property.  When Kreuser decided not to drive 
No. 
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12 
 
 
Devine home, a reasonable jury could have found that Kreuser 
failed to exercise reasonable care, and that such a failure 
increased the risk of harm to other persons and property.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. 
¶20 Kreuser argues that the comparison to Gritzner is 
inappropriate because Gritzner was principally an in loco 
parentis case, which primarily involved the obligations of an 
adult entrusted with the care of a minor child.  We disagree 
with that characterization.  A plain reading of Gritzner shows 
that we explicitly recognized that either the doctrine of in 
loco parentis or the rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 324A could be used to find Bubner liable for failing to 
control Michael.  Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶¶71-72.  The fact that 
this court used the in loco parentis doctrine does not lessen 
the fact that we also found the § 324A framework appropriate. 
¶21 Kreuser also argues that the circuit court and the 
court of appeals ignored the fact that Wisconsin has expressly 
chosen not to adopt the framework of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 314-324.  See Dixson v. Wis. Health Org. Ins. Corp., 
2000 WI 95, ¶42, 237 Wis. 2d 149, 612 N.W.2d 721 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting); Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶22; Schuster v. 
Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 238 & n.3, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988).  
Kreuser contends that in this case, the lower courts went 
against 
Wisconsin's 
longstanding 
negligence 
principles 
by 
finding a duty pursuant to a "special relationship" between 
No. 
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13 
 
 
Kreuser and Devine where none should have existed.  Schuster, 
144 Wis. 2d at 238 n.3. 
¶22 Although Kreuser is correct that we have not expressly 
adopted the Restatement formulation for the voluntary assumption 
of duty, Kreuser fails to note that in the same sentence in 
Dixson, we have stated that at times we have found it 
appropriate to consider and rely on some of those same 
Restatement provisions in our analysis.  Dixson, 2000 WI 95, 
¶21.  Most notably, we have applied the framework of Restatement 
§ 324A a number of times.  See, e.g., Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, 
¶¶55-57; Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 48 Wis. 2d 305, 313-14, 179 N.W.2d 864 (1970); see also 
Wulf v. Rebbun, 25 Wis. 2d 499, 503-04, 131 N.W.2d 303 (1964). 
¶23 As this court has applied it, the framework of § 324A 
comports with Wisconsin's principles of negligence law.  The 
basic principle of duty in Wisconsin is that a duty exists when 
a 
person 
fails 
to 
exercise 
reasonable 
care——when 
it 
is 
foreseeable that a person's act or omission may cause harm to 
someone. 
 
A.E. 
Inv. 
Corp. 
v. 
Link 
Builders, 
Inc., 
62 
Wis. 2d 479, 483, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974).  As we pointed out in 
Wulf v. Rebbun, however, "[A]lthough one may have no duty to 
perform an act, if he attempts to do something to another even 
although gratuitously he must exercise reasonable care."  Wulf, 
25 Wis. 2d at 503.  That is, liability may be imposed on a 
person who has no duty to act when that person gratuitously 
No. 
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14 
 
 
undertakes to act, then acts negligently.  Am. Mut. Liab. Ins., 
48 Wis. 2d at 314. 
¶24 Using the § 324A framework in Gritzner, we held that a 
reasonable jury could have found that Bubner's agreement to 
watch Tara and his subsequent failure to do so combined to 
demonstrate a failure to exercise reasonable care.  Likewise, 
under the circumstances of the present case, Kreuser's agreement 
to drive Devine home, coupled with Kreuser's later decision not 
to drive Devine home, could be viewed as a failure to exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances.  Thus, we hold that the 
circumstances of this case do comport with the § 324A structure. 
III 
¶25 Despite our holding that the framework of § 324A is 
appropriate, we are convinced that the defenses raised by 
Kreuser are also applicable.  Kreuser raises two defenses to the 
imposition of liability in this case.  First, Kreuser argues 
that Wis. Stat. § 125.035 immunizes him from liability because 
he procured alcohol for Devine.  Second, Kreuser argues that 
public policy should preclude liability in these circumstances.  
Under the specific facts of this case, we find both arguments 
persuasive.  We address each argument in turn. 
A 
¶26 We focus first on the question of whether Kreuser is 
immune from suit under Wis. Stat. § 125.035.  This is a question 
of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.  State ex 
No. 
00-1397 
 
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rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶6, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶27 Our ultimate goal in interpreting a statute is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature.  Hull v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis.2d 627, 641, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998).  
To determine the intent of the legislature, we first look at the 
statute's plain text.  Id.  Here, § 125.035(2) provides that: 
 
A person is immune from civil liability arising out of 
the act of procuring alcohol beverages for or selling, 
dispensing or giving away alcohol beverages to another 
person. 
¶28 This section of the statute describes two general 
activities that immunize a person from civil liability: the 
"procurement" 
of 
alcohol 
for 
another, 
and 
the 
"selling, 
dispensing or giving away" of alcohol to another.  We think it 
is clear that Kreuser did not "sell, dispense or give away" 
alcohol to Devine.  However, Kreuser's purposeful action did 
allow the bartender to serve Devine more alcohol.  This makes 
the issue of whether or not Kreuser "procured" alcohol for 
Devine a closer question, and we concentrate our analysis there. 
¶29 This court has had the opportunity to interpret the 
term "procure" in the past.  In Miller v. Thomack, 210 
Wis. 2d 650, 661, 563 N.W.2d 891 (1997), we construed the term 
"procure" as it relates to § 125.035(4), an exception to the 
immunity statute at issue in the present case.  This subsection 
permits civil suits against those who procure alcohol for 
minors, and those who sell, dispense, or give alcohol to minors. 
No. 
00-1397 
 
16 
 
 
¶30 In Miller, we noted that the statutes and legislative 
history were silent regarding the definition of "procure."  Id.  
Therefore, we looked to the word's common definition for 
guidance.  Id. at 661-62.  Under one dictionary definition, we 
found that to "procure" did not mean merely to "give" or to 
"provide something."  Rather, "procure" was defined as to "cause 
to happen or to be done," to "bring about" or to "effect."  Id. 
at 662 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
1809 (1961)).  We noted that this definition necessarily 
encompassed a wider variety of activities than merely giving or 
providing. 
¶31 We also looked at how the word "procure" has been used 
by courts in other jurisdictions and by Wisconsin courts in 
other contexts.  Id. at 662-65.  For instance, in one Wisconsin 
jury instruction discussing criminal liability of a party to a 
crime, we noted that "'[p]rocure means to obtain by any means; 
to bring about . . . .'"  Id. at 663 (citing Vogel v. State, 138 
Wis. 315, 332, 119 N.W. 190 (1909)).  Regarding the drafting and 
execution of a will, we held that "'"procure" is "to initiate," 
"to instigate," or "to cause a thing to be done."'"  Id. (citing 
In re Estate of Kamesar, 81 Wis. 2d 151, 165, 259 N.W.2d 733 
(1977)).  We also noted that other jurisdictions had adopted 
similar definitions.  Id. at 664.  We came to the conclusion 
that although words such as "furnish" and "provide" are similar 
to "procure," the term "procure" encompasses a greater range of 
actions.  Id. at 665. 
No. 
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17 
 
 
¶32 Our decision was reinforced by the language of 
§ 125.035(4)(a), 
where 
the 
legislature 
listed 
"procure" 
separately from "sell, dispense or give away."  Id. at 665 n.13.  
We noted that the term "procure" would be extraneous if it 
merely meant the same as "sell, dispense or give away."  
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(a); Miller, 210 Wis. 2d at 665 n.13.  
Since we presume that the legislature does not add extraneous 
language to a statute, we must also presume that the term 
"procure" has a different meaning than the other terms listed in 
the statute. 
¶33 In Miller, we went on to hold that even if a person 
only contributes money, but does so with the intent of bringing 
about the purchase of alcohol, that person is "procuring" 
alcohol under the meaning of § 125.035(4).  Id. at 667.  We 
emphasized that the mental state of the procurer was important.  
By requiring that the procurer intend that the funds be used to 
purchase alcohol, liability can be closely limited to those whom 
the legislature intended to be culpable.  Id. at 669.  In 
keeping with the legislative intent of § 125.035(4) to broadly 
proscribe acts that lead to underage drinking, we also held that 
no further affirmative act beyond contributing money was 
required.  Id. at 667-68. 
¶34 The court of appeals took a similarly broad view of 
procurement in Greene v. Farnsworth, 188 Wis. 2d 365.  In that 
case, the court ruled that § 125.035(2) provided the defendants 
immunity from a civil conspiracy action when the defendants 
No. 
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"encouraged, advised, and assisted" the tortfeasor to drink 
alcohol.  Id. at 370.  In particular, the court of appeals noted 
that (1) the text of the statute immunizes persons from civil 
liability for acts arising out of the procurement of alcohol; 
and (2) that allowing a conspiracy action in a drunk driving 
case creates "an exception so great that it would swallow the 
nonliability rule," and could even create liability for taverns, 
social hosts, and drinking companions.  Id. at 372. The 
legislature clearly did not intend so great an exception, given 
its pronouncement in § 125.035(2), and the court of appeals 
concluded that imposing liability under such circumstances was 
more appropriately left to the legislature.  Id. at 372-73. 
¶35 Turning back to the present case, we think that the 
basic principles of Miller and Greene are applicable.  First, 
the 
language 
in 
§ 125.035(2), 
like 
the 
language 
in 
§ 125.035(4)(a), lists "procuring" separately from "selling, 
dispensing or giving away" alcohol.  As we noted in Miller about 
subsection (4), the inclusion of "procure" in subsection (2) 
would be extraneous if it merely meant the same thing as "sell, 
dispense or give away."  Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2).  This leads us 
to the conclusion that "procure" has a different meaning than 
the other terms listed. 
¶36 Furthermore, we think that the dictionary definition 
we adopted in Miller for subsection (4) applies equally well to 
subsection (2).  This definition of "procure" is not limited to 
merely "giving," but is more akin to "bringing about" or 
No. 
00-1397 
 
19 
 
 
"causing to happen."  It follows that "procure" not only has a 
different definition than "sell, dispense or give away," but 
also has a somewhat broader definition. 
¶37 Under the facts of the present case, we conclude that 
Kreuser's actions fall within the definition of "procure."  
Kreuser was aware that the bartender was not going to serve 
alcohol to Devine unless the bartender knew that someone would 
be driving Devine home.  When asked, Kreuser agreed to be that 
driver.  With Kreuser's agreement, the bartender was then free 
to serve Devine more alcohol.  Had it not been for Kreuser's 
purposeful actions, the bartender would not have given more 
alcohol to Devine.  Under the specific facts presented here, 
Kreuser brought about Devine's acquisition of more alcohol——
"procuring" 
the 
alcohol 
for 
Devine 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
§ 125.035(2). 
¶38 Holding 
that 
Kreuser's 
actions 
fit 
within 
the 
definition of procurement keeps with the legislative intent of 
§ 125.035(2).  In contrast to subsection (4)(a), where the 
legislature created a clear and specific prohibition on acts 
that allow minors access to alcohol, in subsection (2) the 
legislature made a clear grant of immunity to those persons who 
furnish alcohol to other adults.  This intent was recognized by 
the court of appeals in Greene, and we agree with that 
interpretation.  Greene, 188 Wis. 2d at 370.  In subsection (2), 
the legislature established the general rule of immunity, which 
effectively 
focuses 
responsibility 
(excluding 
the 
explicit 
No. 
00-1397 
 
20 
 
 
exceptions in subsections (3) and (4)) on the drinker of the 
alcohol, and not on the one who provides it. 
¶39 The only exceptions made by the legislature to the 
general rule of nonliability are when one person forces another 
to drink alcohol, Wis. Stat. § 125.035(3); misrepresents that a 
beverage does not contain alcohol, id.; or provides alcohol to a 
minor, id. § 125.035(4).  It is not this court's role to read a 
new exception into the statute where it does not exist. 
¶40 With that said, we recognize that this case is a 
tragic one——a case for which Stephenson justifiably feels that 
there should be some recourse.  However, with regard to 
negligent acts that occur because of a person's intoxication, 
the legislature has expressed its intent to focus liability on 
the person who drinks the alcohol and not on the person who 
furnishes it or brings about its acquisition.  The legislature 
is well within its power to modify the statute and extend 
liability to persons in circumstances similar to Kreuser's.  We, 
however, feel that we cannot do so without overstepping our 
bounds.  Given the legislature's pronouncement in § 125.035 and 
the common definition of "procure," we must hold that Kreuser is 
immune from liability under § 125.035(2). 
B 
¶41 We next address Kreuser's public policy argument.  
Even though all persons owe a general duty of care to the world 
at large, we have recognized that in certain circumstances, 
public policy may require a finding of nonliability.  Rockweit, 
No. 
00-1397 
 
21 
 
 
197 
Wis. 2d at 
425. 
 
The 
public 
policy 
question 
arises 
independently of the question of whether or not a duty exists.  
A.E. Inv. Corp., 62 Wis. 2d at 484.  Whether public policy 
precludes liability in a given case is a matter of law, which is 
decided by this court de novo.  Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶27.  
Here, despite the fact that we find that a duty exists under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, we agree with Kreuser's 
argument that that public policy also precludes a finding of 
liability in this case. 
¶42 The application of public policy considerations is a 
function of the court.  Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541.  Even if a 
plaintiff is able to establish all of the elements of a 
negligence claim, public policy considerations may dictate 
against a finding of liability.  Gritzner, 2000 WI 68, ¶26.  The 
assessment of public policy does not necessarily require a full 
factual resolution of the cause of action by trial.  Miller v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, 219 Wis. 2d 250, 265, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998); 
Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541-42 (citing Hass v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. 
Co., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 326-27, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970)).  This court 
can, and has, decided such public policy questions on demurrer.  
Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541. 
¶43 When determining whether or not to limit a defendant's 
tort liability on public policy grounds, this court has 
identified a number of factors that must be considered.  
Recovery against a negligent tortfeasor can be denied on the 
grounds of public policy when (1) the injury is too remote from 
No. 
00-1397 
 
22 
 
 
the negligence; (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion 
to the tortfeasor's culpability; (3) in retrospect it appears 
too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought 
about 
the 
harm; 
(4) 
allowing 
recovery 
would 
place 
too 
unreasonable a burden upon the tortfeasor; (5) allowing recovery 
would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or 
(6) allowing recovery would have no sensible or just stopping 
point.  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 426; Colla v. Mandella, 1 
Wis. 2d 594, 598-99, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).  Although this type 
of public policy analysis is a function of the court, Coffey, 74 
Wis. 2d at 541, here we think it is also appropriate to look at 
the aforementioned factors in light of relevant legislative 
enactments.  If one or more of these factors so dictates, the 
court may refuse to impose liability in a case.  In assessing 
the present case, we conclude that several of the public policy 
factors apply and that they preclude liability against Kreuser.5 
¶44 First, the injury sustained in this case is wholly out 
of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability.  Devine, after he 
became inebriated, posed a certain amount of risk regardless of 
whether or not someone agreed to drive him home.  Even if 
Kreuser did assume a duty to drive Devine home, Devine still 
maintained control over his own actions at the party that night.  
                                                 
5 We address the second, fourth, and sixth factors because, 
in our opinion, they are the strongest reasons for not imposing 
liability, and are sufficient to support our conclusion.  We do 
not concede, however, that the remaining three factors support 
the imposition of liability. 
No. 
00-1397 
 
23 
 
 
As illustrated by the facts of this case, there was no evidence 
to show who left the party first.  Devine could have left the 
party before Kreuser, a situation which might not have been 
preventable even through reasonable efforts on Kreuser's part.  
When Devine decided to go home, he could have sought out 
Kreuser, but he also very easily could have driven home himself 
without letting Kreuser know that he had left.  At the point 
where Devine makes this decision, Kreuser's blameworthiness is 
minimal and the potential harm that could be caused by Devine's 
intoxicated driving is wholly out of proportion to Kreuser's 
culpability. 
¶45 The disparity is more drastic when viewed in light of 
the state's current immunity laws.  If Kreuser were a social 
host who had served alcohol to Devine, there is little question 
that he would be immune from suit——a legislative judgment that 
those who serve or dispense alcohol should not be culpable for 
the torts of those served.  It defies common sense to hold 
someone in Kreuser's position liable while immunizing someone 
who serves or even encourages alcohol consumption. 
¶46 Second, to allow recovery in a situation such as this 
would put too unreasonable a burden upon the tortfeasor.  Even 
if Kreuser had assumed a duty to drive Devine home, Kreuser 
could not reasonably have been expected to maintain the amount 
of control over Devine necessary to prevent Devine from ever 
leaving on his own to drive.  The unreasonableness of this 
proposition is again highlighted by the fact that there is no 
No. 
00-1397 
 
24 
 
 
evidence that shows whether Devine left the party before or 
after Kreuser did.  Assuming that Devine left before Kreuser, 
Stephenson's position would be, essentially, that Kreuser should 
have been able to prevent it from happening.  This is simply 
unrealistic.  Once Kreuser agreed to drive Devine home, Kreuser 
would have had either to follow Devine around all night, or 
perhaps have kept Devine confined or tied up somewhere in order 
to 
prevent 
Devine 
from 
wandering 
off 
without 
Kreuser's 
knowledge.  For an agreement that can be made, as Kreuser 
suggests, by a simple nod of the head, this burden is simply too 
excessive. 
¶47 Third, to allow recovery under these circumstances 
potentially allows the law of negligence to enter a field that 
has no sensible or just stopping point.  As was evident in the 
present case, it is difficult to determine the point at which 
the person who agrees to drive actually assumes the duty.  Is a 
nod of the head enough to impose a responsibility to exercise 
control over the intoxicated person for the rest of the night?  
Is a wink sufficient? 
¶48 What happens if conditions change?  Would there ever 
be circumstances under which someone who agrees to drive for an 
intoxicated person could back out of such an agreement?  What if 
an emergency arose that required the driver to leave?  What if 
the driver were to get sick?  Could a designated driver ever 
transfer the responsibility?  What if the intoxicated person was 
to become disorderly, or assaulted someone?  Could the person 
No. 
00-1397 
 
25 
 
 
who agrees to drive be subject to liability for any of the 
intoxicated person's other negligent acts? 
¶49 There could also be effects on those outside of 
designated drivers.  If the intoxicated person calls a cab and 
the cab driver is late, prompting the intoxicated person to 
drive——can the driver be held liable?  If a company agrees to 
help arrange rides home from a company function, can they be 
held liable?  Will finding liability in this case allow 
liability to be extended to party guests who are faced with 
allowing a clearly intoxicated person to drive home?  If no one 
steps forward and agrees to drive, can they all be held liable? 
¶50 These are only a few examples of the extent to which 
liability might be carried.  If we were to hold Kreuser liable 
under these circumstances, the possibilities for expanding 
liability would simply have too much potential to grow out of 
control, and would also threaten to run counter to the 
legislative enactments regarding immunity.6 
                                                 
6 The dissent characterizes our analysis here as a "parade 
of horribles" and dismisses it as "not the facts of the present 
case."  Dissent op. at ¶¶76-77, 79.  In doing so, the dissent 
ignores the fundamental nature of the sixth public policy 
factor.  When analyzing a cause of action under the sixth 
factor, we must determine if there will be a sensible point at 
which a line can be drawn if liability is imposed in the present 
case.  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 426, 541 N.W.2d 742 
(1995).  This analysis presupposes that we anticipate the extent 
of liability in future cases.  Under the dissent's reasoning, 
the possibility of opening up negligence law to a field where 
there is no just or reasonable stopping point would essentially 
never be an appropriate reason to deny liability. 
No. 
00-1397 
 
26 
 
 
¶51 Finally, we give significant weight to the fact that 
the production, sale, distribution, vending, and consumption of 
alcoholic beverages are highly regulated by the legislature.  
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 68.02(1)-(2), 
68.03(5), 
100.30(2)(am)1., 
125.01-.70, 134.77, 135.066, 139.01-.26, 167.32(4), 346.93-.935, 
350.08, 
406.102(3m), 
944.36, 
947.04 
(1999-2000). 
 
Since 
Wisconsin's 
territorial 
days, 
the 
legislature 
has 
been 
extensively involved in the decision of whom to hold accountable 
for the negligent actions of an inebriated person.  Farmers Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 355-63, 117 N.W.2d 347 
(1962) (containing an appendix which outlines the history of 
alcohol liability legislation); see also Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 
Wis. 2d 627, 636-37, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).  In its current 
form, this regulation includes the legislature's pronouncement 
in § 125.035, which generally immunizes from civil liability 
those who procure, sell, dispense, or give away alcohol.  Given 
this history and the current state of the law, we are reluctant 
to create liability where the legislature has not expressed that 
there should be any.  We think that it is more appropriate that 
the legislature decide whether or not someone who agrees to 
drive an intoxicated person home should be an exception to the 
legislature's general policy of holding the intoxicated persons 
themselves liable for injuries they cause. 
IV 
¶52 In 
conclusion, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
framework 
of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A applies to the facts of 
No. 
00-1397 
 
27 
 
 
this case.  However, we also hold that under the facts of this 
case, both Wis. Stat. § 125.035 and public policy concerns 
prevent Kreuser from being held liable.  Therefore, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and hold that Kreuser's 
motion for summary judgment should have been granted. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  00-1397.dss 
 
1 
 
¶53 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (concurring).   This tragic case 
raises important questions about liability for harm caused by 
drunk drivers.  I agree with the majority’s conclusion that 
§ 324A of the Restatement applies to the analysis of "designated 
driver" liability.  I also agree with the majority’s conclusion 
that public policy considerations operate to preclude designated 
driver liability here.  The case for statutory immunity is 
weaker, 
however, 
because 
the 
designated 
driver’s 
alleged 
liability in this case does not stem from his "procurement" of 
alcohol 
for 
the 
drunk 
driver——immunized 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2)——but from his failure to drive the drunk 
home. 
¶54 Kathy Stephenson’s husband does not appear to be 
arguing that John Kreuser’s agreement to drive Michael Devine 
home from the company holiday party contributed to Devine’s 
drunkenness in such a way as to be a cause in fact of her death.  
I suspect it would be difficult to determine the causal effect 
of the extra drinks the bartender served Devine after Kreuser 
agreed to drive him home. 
¶55 The statute immunizes against "civil liability arising 
out of the act of procuring alcohol . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.035(2). 
 
I 
agree 
that 
Kreuser’s 
assumption 
of 
responsibility for driving Devine home could be viewed as a form 
of "procurement" under the statute, in the sense that it kept 
the drinks coming when they otherwise would have been cut off.  
Kreuser’s liability, however, is not premised on his role as a 
No.  00-1397.dss 
 
2 
 
"procurer" of alcohol for Devine; it is premised on his failure 
to perform a voluntary undertaking under § 324A. 
¶56 As the majority notes, § 324A provides that one who 
"undertakes, 
gratuitously 
or 
for 
consideration, to 
render 
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for 
the protection of a third person" is liable for the negligent 
performance of that undertaking if: 
 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases 
the risk of harm, or 
 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the 
other to the third person, or 
 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the 
other or the third person upon the undertaking. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1967). 
¶57 This case falls within the first of these possible 
theories of liability, in that the designated driver’s failure 
to fulfill that role increased the risk that the drunk he had 
agreed to drive home would get behind the wheel himself and hurt 
someone.  It is conceivable that another "designated driver" 
scenario——where the drinking is done entirely in reliance on the 
ride home——might fall within the third theory of liability under 
§ 324A.  In such a case, it might be possible to prove a causal 
link between the ultimate harm and the drunk driver’s reliance 
on the designated driver’s undertaking.  But I do not understand 
the plaintiff to be making that argument here, and to do so 
risks coming up against the statute's immunity.  So, while I 
agree with the majority’s analysis of the term "procurement" for 
purposes of statutory immunity under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2), I 
No.  00-1397.dss 
 
3 
 
do not think it is applicable to the type of liability asserted 
in this case. 
¶58 Considerations of public policy, however, operate to 
preclude liability under § 324A, for the reasons thoroughly 
articulated by the majority opinion.  Wisconsin has statutorily 
immunized those who provide, procure or sell alcohol from 
liability for harm caused by people who drink too much.  Where 
those who provide the means of intoxication are statutorily 
immune, it seems entirely disproportionate and unduly burdensome 
to hold designated drivers liable at common law, considering 
their relative culpability.  An injured person’s recourse is 
against the drunk driver, not those who provide the drinks or 
fail to drive him home.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I agree with Part I of the majority opinion, the order of the 
circuit court, and the decision of the court of appeals.  All 
impose liability on Kreuser for failing to keep his promise to 
drive an intoxicated driver home.  However, I disagree with 
Parts II and III of the majority opinion, which relieve Kreuser 
of liability for breaking his promise. 
 
I 
¶60 This is the case of a good Samaritan gone bad.  The 
majority opinion imposes liability on Kreuser because he 
"gratuitously undertook to drive Devine home . . . for the 
protection of other persons or property.  When Kreuser decided 
not to drive Devine home, a reasonable jury could have found 
that Kreuser failed to exercise reasonable care, and that such a 
failure increased the risk of harm to other persons and 
property."  Majority op at ¶¶19 and 24.  I agree with the 
majority opinion on this issue.  Kreuser is liable for breaking 
his promise.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1967). 
 
II 
¶61 I disagree with the majority opinion that Kreuser is 
immune 
from 
liability 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) 
as 
a 
procurer 
of 
alcoholic 
beverages 
for 
Devine.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 125.035(2) 
immunizes 
against 
the 
"civil 
liability arising out of the act of procuring alcohol."   
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶62 This case is about Kreuser's failure to keep a promise 
to drive Devine home, a promise to keep this dangerous 
intoxicated person off the road.  Kreuser's negligence in 
failing to keep the promise increased the risk of an immediate 
and foreseeable harm.   
¶63 Kreuser cannot be immunized from liability for his 
broken promise by Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2), which immunizes a 
person against civil liability for procuring alcoholic beverages 
for another.  By using Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) in the present 
case to immunize Kreuser for liability arising out of his broken 
promise to be the designated driver, the majority opinion 
expands 
the 
immunity 
statute 
far 
beyond 
its 
clear 
and 
unambiguous scope.  The immunity statute does not apply in the 
present case because imposing liability on Kreuser for breaking 
his promise is unrelated to and outside of the clear and 
unambiguous scope of this immunization statute. 
 
III 
¶64 I 
also 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
application of public policy considerations to relieve Kreuser 
of liability.  
¶65 I conclude that relieving a person of liability to a 
victim when the person deliberately fails to keep his or her 
promise to be a designated driver is contrary to this state's 
public 
policy. 
 
Our 
public 
policy 
is 
that 
people 
who 
deliberately fail to keep their promises are liable, when the 
failure to keep a promise has such foreseeable, immediate, and 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
3 
 
tragic consequences.  Furthermore, this state's public policy is 
to reduce death and injury on our roads caused by drunk drivers 
by encouraging people not to drink and drive, by imposing 
stringent criminal penalties on people who do drink and drive, 
by imposing civil liability on those whose negligence is a 
substantial factor in causing injury, and by encouraging the use 
of designated drivers.   
¶66 The majority opinion appears to conclude that of the 
six public policy factors to be considered, three factors point 
to imposing liability on Kreuser.  In contrast, I apply the same 
six public policy considerations to the facts of the present 
case and conclude that none of them points to relieving Kreuser 
of liability in this case.   
¶67 (1) The majority opinion does not discuss whether the 
injury was directly caused by Kreuser's negligence.  Legal 
responsibility is limited to those causes that are closely 
connected with the result and of such significance that 
liability is justified.7  Conduct is causal if it is "a 
substantial factor in producing the injury."8  A substantial 
factor is conduct that "has such an effect in producing the harm 
as to lead the trier of fact . . . to regard it as a cause, 
                                                 
7 W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 264 
(5th ed. 1984). 
8 Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 607, 617, 292 
N.W.2d 630 (1980). 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
4 
 
using that word in the popular sense."9  Several substantial 
factors can exist, all contributing to the same result.10  
¶68 Kreuser's negligence may not have been the sole factor 
or even the primary factor in causing the injury, but under the 
law it need only be a substantial factor.  Kreuser's negligence 
was in fact a substantial factor in causing the injury.  The 
negligence of others also contributed to causing the injury, and 
these persons have been named as co-defendants in this lawsuit.  
That others might have contributed to the injury does not 
absolve Kreuser of liability for the injury directly caused by 
his negligence.11 
¶69 Because I conclude that Kreuser's negligence was a 
direct and substantial factor in causing the injury, I further 
conclude that this policy consideration points to imposing 
liability on Kreuser.   
¶70 (2) The majority opinion concludes that the injury is 
too wholly out of proportion to Kreuser's culpability in 
deliberately failing to keep the promise to drive an intoxicated 
person home.  Majority op. at ¶¶44 and 45.  I disagree.   
¶71 The concurrence asserts that it is disproportionate 
and unduly burdensome to hold a designated driver liable when 
those who procure the alcoholic beverages are immune from 
liability.  The concurrence then concludes that only the 
                                                 
9 Id. at 617-18. 
10 Id. at 618. 
11 Wis JI——Civil 1500 and comments (1999); W. Page Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 268 (5th ed. 1984). 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
5 
 
intoxicated driver should be held liable to the victim.  The 
concurrence mistakenly attributes causal negligence solely to 
the intoxicated driver, "irrespective of the other causes which 
necessarily contributed to the result."12 
¶72  Wisconsin's comparative negligence rules are designed 
to 
impose 
liability 
in 
relation 
to 
each 
party's 
causal 
negligence in bringing about the injury.13  The relative 
culpability of each person is weighed against the relative 
culpability of the 
others, 
including 
the 
accident-causing 
tortfeasor, here the intoxicated driver.14  The trier of fact, 
the judge or jury, allocates responsibility among those who 
caused the injury.  That the legislature has immunized the 
procurer of alcoholic beverages from liability and that the 
intoxicated driver is causally negligent and liable do not, and 
should not, absolve Kreuser of liability for his culpability in 
breaking his promise.  Such absolution is inconsistent with a 
liability system based upon the idea of comparative fault. 
¶73 The issue in the present case is who should bear the 
risk of loss, the innocent victim injured by the intoxicated 
driver, or the designated driver who broke his promise to drive 
the intoxicated driver home?  As between these two parties, I 
conclude that the risk of loss should be on the person who broke 
                                                 
12 Michael 
K. 
McChrystal, 
Seat 
Belt 
Negligence: 
The 
Ambivalent Wisconsin Rules, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 539, 547 (1985). 
13 Id. at 547-48. 
14 Id. at 547-48. 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
6 
 
his promise and whose negligence was a substantial factor in 
causing the victim's injury.  
¶74 In the present case, Kreuser's culpability for failing 
to keep his promise is significant.  Kreuser could have 
reasonably foreseen that his failure to keep his promise could 
result in death or serious injury.  Kreuser's liability is not 
disproportionate 
to 
his 
culpability. 
 
Thus, 
this 
policy 
consideration also points to imposing liability on Kreuser. 
¶75 (3) The majority opinion does not discuss whether in 
retrospect it is highly extraordinary to conclude that the 
negligence of allowing an intoxicated driver to drive would 
bring about the harm of the intoxicated driver killing or 
injuring another driver, a passenger, or a pedestrian.  I 
conclude that it is not highly extraordinary to reach this 
conclusion and that this policy consideration again points to 
imposing liability on Kreuser.  
¶76 (4) The majority opinion states that allowing recovery 
would place too unreasonable a burden on Kreuser.  Majority op. 
at ¶46.  The majority parades its "horribles": an alleged 
promisor who may have merely nodded his head in agreement to 
take an intoxicated driver home but who may not have intended to 
assume such a responsibility; an alleged promisor who might not 
be able to stop the intoxicated driver from leaving alone.  But 
the facts of the present case are not one of the horribles 
posed.  Kreuser expressly promised to drive Devine home and then 
deliberately failed to keep the promise.  Majority op. at ¶6 
n.2, ¶8 n.3.  Imposing liability on Kreuser does not mean 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
7 
 
liability would be imposed under the very different fact 
situations proffered by the majority opinion's horribles. 
¶77 The horribles seem to raise issues of proof and the 
availability of defenses.  Courts know how to deal with disputes 
about whether a promise was made, and courts can determine the 
validity of defenses on a case-by-case basis.  Thus, I again 
conclude that this policy consideration points to imposing 
liability on Kreuser. 
¶78 (5) The majority opinion does not discuss whether 
allowing recovery would be likely to open the way to fraudulent 
claims.  Fraudulent claims are not likely if the present claim 
is recognized.  Thus, I once again conclude that this policy 
consideration points to imposing liability on Kreuser. 
¶79 (6) The majority opinion concludes that allowing 
recovery under the circumstances of this case potentially allows 
the law of negligence to enter a field that has no sensible or 
just stopping point.  Again the majority opinion engages in a 
parade of horribles: an alleged promisor who may have nodded his 
head in agreement to take an intoxicated driver home; an alleged 
promisor who could not stop the intoxicated driver from leaving 
on his own; a taxi company who fails to keep a promise; and 
multiple promisors, none of whom keeps the promise.   
¶80 Once again, these horribles are not represented by the 
facts of the present case.  The facts of this case offer a good 
place to start imposing liability on a designated driver who 
deliberately breaks his promise.  This case may also turn out to 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
8 
 
provide a sensible and just stopping point for imposing 
liability on a designated driver.  
¶81 When other distinguishable fact situations arise such 
as those the majority opinion poses, the court can determine 
whether liability is appropriate under those circumstances.  
Thus, I conclude once more that this policy consideration points 
to imposing liability on Kreuser.  
¶82 The majority opinion ultimately falls back on the 
argument that allowing recovery in the present case contravenes 
the legislature's prerogative to determine who shall be held 
accountable for the distribution, vending, or consumption of 
alcoholic beverages.  Majority op. at ¶51.  This argument is 
unpersuasive because, as I stated previously, this case does not 
involve liability for the distribution, vending, or consumption 
of alcoholic beverages.  This case involves liability when a 
promisor fails to keep a promise to drive an intoxicated driver 
home. 
¶83 For the reasons set forth, I do not join Parts II and 
III of the majority opinion relieving Kreuser of liability 
arising out of his broken promise.   
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  00-1397.ssa 
 
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