Title: Zuppo v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 208, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTHONY ZUPPO, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 208, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0101004412 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
Submitted:  September 10, 2002 
Decided:  October 4, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
James A. Bayard, Jr., Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for appellant. 
 
 
William M. Kelleher, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam 
 
2
 
 
In February 2002, a Superior Court jury convicted Appellant Anthony 
Zuppo of Second Degree Assault, Offensive Touching, Second Degree Rape, Third 
Degree Assault, Harassment, five counts of Non-Compliance with Bond 
Conditions, and three counts of Aggravated Act of Intimidation.  At trial, Zuppo 
requested to proceed pro se.  Because Zuppo’s request came during trial, the judge 
denied it on the basis that to do so would disrupt the proceedings.  Zuppo appeals 
from that decision.   
We conclude that based upon the series of events leading up to Zuppo’s 
request, Zuppo’s interest failed to outweigh the State’s interest in ensuring the 
integrity and efficiency of the trial.  Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 
Superior Court.   
I 
 
In September 2000, Wendy Reynolds and Anthony Zuppo began dating and 
they moved in together quickly thereafter.  According to Reynolds’ testimony at 
trial, Zuppo became violent and controlling.  Zuppo would not allow her to leave 
the house without him, and he often referred to her derogatorily.  On one particular 
occasion, Zuppo pinned her to the couch and beat her.  Reynolds considered 
leaving after the beating but, instead, forgave Zuppo.  Shortly thereafter, according 
to Reynolds, Zuppo raped her.  Zuppo maintains that she consented.   
 
3
Reynolds attempted to move out the evening following the alleged rape but 
claimed Zuppo choked her and threatened to shoot her.  Reynolds reported these 
incidents to the police.  The police arrested Zuppo for Terroristic Threatening and 
Offensive Touching.  As a condition of Zuppo’s release on bond, a Justice of the 
Peace Court ordered Zuppo to have no contact with Reynolds. 
Despite the no contact stipulation, Reynolds testified at trial that Zuppo tried 
contacting her at work a matter of days after his release.  Reynolds also testified 
that Zuppo made a harassing phone call to her place of residence.  Zuppo denied 
making the harassing phone call.  A Wilmington Police Officer testified that he 
traced the call from Reynolds’ residence to a gas station near Zuppo’s residence.   
The day after the phone call to Reynolds’ residence, Reynolds and Zuppo 
attempted reconciliation.  Reynolds again moved in with Zuppo.  The police, 
however, then arrested Zuppo for violation of bail conditions.  For reasons known 
only to her, Reynolds posted Zuppo’s bail and accompanied him to Pennsylvania 
for one week.  In Reynolds’ own words, however, “the abuse started right away.”1  
Inexplicably, Reynolds, sporting a clearly visible black eye, married Zuppo while 
in Pennsylvania. 
The marriage failed to resurrect the relationship.  One evening, shortly after 
arriving back in Delaware, Zuppo and Reynolds engaged in an argument that 
                                                 
1 Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief at 45. 
 
4
culminated in Zuppo attacking Reynolds.  Reynolds claimed she picked up a 
kitchen knife in self-defense.  Zuppo remained undeterred.  He pressed on, 
knocked her backwards and grabbed her wrist.  Zuppo then tried to rip the knife 
from Reynolds and in the process he cut her hand to the bone.  Finally, Reynolds 
called the police and told them about everything Zuppo had done to her.  She did 
so “[b]ecause [she] thought if [she] stayed much longer that he really would kill 
me.”2  At the time of trial, Reynolds’ hand had been operated on twice, and she 
appeared to face a serious, long-term disability.   
On the second day of trial, Zuppo asked the court to “reassign counsel.”3  
The court denied the request.  Zuppo then asked to proceed pro se.  The State 
requested that the trial judge make the proper inquiry before Zuppo would be 
permitted to proceed pro se.  The trial judge informed Zuppo of the risks of 
proceeding pro se.  The State then asked the trial judge to deny the request on the 
basis that it was untimely – coming after one witness already testified and a second 
was near the end of cross-examination – and because the granting of the request 
would prejudice the State.  The trial judge denied Zuppo’s request to proceed pro 
se explaining that because the matter arose mid-trial, the trial judge had greater 
discretion in making a ruling.  Further, the trial judge noted that due to its mid-trial 
                                                 
2 Id. at 52. 
3 Id. at 60. 
 
5
timing, such a request, if granted “does have a tendency to disrupt the 
proceedings.”4   
II 
 
The right to represent oneself in a criminal proceeding is fundamental.  It is 
protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article 
I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution.5  As an issue of constitutional dimension, we 
review de novo the trial judge’s denial of Zuppo’s request to proceed pro se.6 
 
The role of the trial judge when entertaining a motion to proceed pro se is to 
(a) determine if the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his 
right to counsel and (b) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in going forward 
without the assistance of legal counsel.7  Even if the above two steps are taken, 
however, the right to represent one’s self is not absolute.8  For instance, the right to 
self-representation is not a license to disrupt the criminal calendar, or a trial in 
progress.9  After a trial has begun, the right of self-representation may be curtailed, 
and the trial judge considering the motion must weigh the legitimate interests of 
the defendant against the prejudice that may result from the potential disruption of 
                                                 
4 Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief at 65a-66. 
5 Stigars v. State, Del. Supr., 674 A.2d 477, 479 (1996); Hooks v. State, Del. Supr., 416 A.2d 
189, 197 (1980) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L. Ed. 
2d 562, 566 (1975)); Snowden v. State, Del. Supr., 672 A.2d 1017, 1020 (1996). 
6 Stigars, 674 A.2d at 479.   
7 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; Briscoe v. State, Del. Supr., 606 A.2d 103, 107-108 
(1992). 
8 Payne v. State, Del. Supr., 367 A.2d 1010, 1015-1017 (1976). 
9 See Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
6
proceedings already in progress.10  The United States Supreme Court has noted that 
even at the trial level, the government’s interest in ensuring integrity and efficiency 
of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own 
lawyer.11   
 
In this case, Zuppo, citing Pitts v. Redman,12 a case never addressed and 
applied by this Court but arguably persuasive nonetheless, suggests that the trial 
judge erred because “[t]he record does not reflect a clear balance by the trial court 
of the prejudice to the defendant versus the potential disruption of the trial.”13  In 
Pitts, a state prisoner sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court of Delaware.  
The presiding judge held that denying a defendant’s request to proceed pro se 
would not violate his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when the 
defendant made the request on the third day of trial.14  The presiding judge also 
stated that the state court trial judge’s failure to mention expressly the timeliness of 
the request as a reason for denying it did not constitute error because the record 
adequately revealed the state trial judge’s concerns.15  “Though his reasons were 
only partially articulated on the record, the basis for the judge’s decision was 
                                                 
10 United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1996). 
11 See Martinez v. Court of Appeals of California, 528 U.S. 152, 162, 120 S. Ct. 684, 691, 145 
L. Ed. 2d 597, 607 (2000).  
12 776 F. Supp. 907, 916 (D. Del. 1991). 
13 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 11, Zuppo v. State (No. 208, 2002).   
14 Pitts, 776 F. Supp. at 916.   
15 Id. at 919. 
 
7
apparent and the denial of Pitts’ pro se request was entirely justified.”16  Thus, 
assuming that Zuppo contends that the trial judge must detail and reconcile the two 
competing interests of the defendant and the State, Pitts does not require that kind 
of detail to demonstrate a “clear balance by the trial court of prejudice to the 
defendant versus the potential disruption of the trial.”  It is sufficient that the 
record reflect clear findings and logical reasoning underlying the ruling denying 
the request. 
 
The trial judge here discussed on the record the relevant balancing of the 
competing interests inherent in Zuppo’s mid-trial request to proceed pro se.  
Specifically, the judge noted that disruption would likely result if he granted the 
motion.17  Further, the record suggests that the trial judge implicitly weighed the 
competing interests with care: 
THE PROSECUTOR:  I guess I would only ask the 
Court to address what Judge Roth set out, that it is a 
discretionary decision at this point, and that not only 
would he get less-effective representation, which is 
something the Court should consider, but it would have 
detrimental impact on the proceedings at this time 
because it is an untimely request. 
 
THE COURT:  I think the Court does have greater 
discretion … to deny a request when it does come up 
during a trial, because it does have a tendency to disrupt 
the proceedings.  I think in this case, I don’t think you’re 
prepared to examine witnesses, and I’m not inclined, 
                                                 
16 Id.  
17 Appendix to Appellant’s Opening Brief at 66. 
 
8
under these circumstances on the second day of trial, 
measured from when the evidence was introduced, I’m 
not inclined to grant your request.18 
 
In addition, the trial judge also specifically addressed Zuppo’s interests in wishing 
to proceed pro se: 
THE DEFENDANT:  What is hurting me, I’ve got notes 
with respect to Mr. Bayard, because he’s a public 
defender, but I have, you know, a private attorney that 
has his own firm that is telling me things that should be 
brought up to light to help me, and then I have Mr. 
Bayard saying that’s not going to help… 
 
… 
 
THE COURT:  I think you’re upset.  I think this decision 
on your part has been one that was only made this 
morning, or you may have been thinking about after 
yesterday.  You know, you’ve heard the evidence that’s, 
you know, been coming in from [] witnesses.  I think it 
upset you.19 
 
Based on a record that we deem to reflect adequately a clear and logical 
basis for the trial judge’s reasoning, we conclude that the trial judge properly 
determined that Zuppo’s interest in proceeding pro se failed to outweigh the 
State’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial. 
The trial judge properly denied Zuppo’s motion to proceed pro se and the 
judgments of conviction in the Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
                                                 
18 Id. at 65a-66. 
19 Id. at 65-66. 
 
9
oc: 
Clerk of the Court 
c: 
Hon. James T. Vaughn 
 
James A. Bayard, Jr. 
 
William M. Kelleher 
 
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