Title: State v. Angelia D.B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP003104
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-3104 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Interest of Angelia D.B., a Person Under 
the Age of 18: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Angelia D.B., 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert A. Haase 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Bradley, J. joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general  with whom 
on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by John D. Lubarsky, state public defender.   
 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of 
Angelia D.B., a Person 
Under the Age of 18: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Angelia D.B., 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, Wisconsin, Robert A. Haase, Circuit Court Judge.   
Reversed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  Angelia D.B. was charged with 
carrying a concealed weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.12 and 
941.23 (1993-94), after a school liaison police officer found a 
nine-inch knife hidden in her clothing.  The Circuit Court for 
Winnebago County, Judge Robert A. Haase, suppressed the knife 
and all derivative evidence obtained from Angelia D.B., because 
it concluded that the search violated her state and federal 
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  The state appealed these orders, and the court of 
appeals certified two questions for our review. 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
2 
¶2 
First, in determining the reasonableness of a search 
conducted in a public school by a police officer in conjunction 
with school authorities, is the proper Fourth Amendment standard 
the less stringent “reasonable grounds” standard set forth in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), or the general 
standard of “probable cause”?  Second, was the search conducted 
by the police school liaison officer in the instant case 
reasonable under the circumstances?  We hold that the T.L.O. 
reasonable grounds standard applies to a search conducted on 
school grounds by a police officer at the request of, and in 
conjunction with, school authorities.  Because the search of 
Angelia D.B. was reasonable under this standard to insure the 
safety of the students and school officials, we reverse the 
orders of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
¶3 
On October 12, 1995, a Neenah High School student 
informed the assistant principal, David Rouse, that he had 
observed a knife in another student’s backpack earlier that day. 
The informant also indicated that the other student might have 
access to a gun.  Rouse called Officer Dan Dringoli, a City of 
Neenah police officer and school liaison officer on duty at 
Neenah High School at the time.  After arriving at Rouse’s 
office, Dringoli interviewed the informant, who repeated what he 
had observed and identified the other student by her first name, 
Angelia.  When Rouse checked the computer and determined 
Angelia’s last name, the student said he believed her to be the 
person.  Dringoli then went to Angelia D.B.’s classroom with 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
3 
Dean of Students Mark Duerwaechter, who entered the classroom 
and escorted Angelia D.B. to the hallway outside. 
¶4 
Dringoli identified himself and informed Angelia D.B. 
that they had received information that she may be carrying a 
knife or gun.  While in the hallway, Dringoli conducted a brief 
pat down search of her jacket and pants and had Angelia D.B. 
search her backpack while he observed.  No weapons were 
discovered.  Angelia D.B. then accompanied Dringoli back to his 
office, where another police officer, Corporal Radtke, was 
present.  Before returning to Dringoli’s office, Duerwaechter 
searched Angelia D.B.'s locker as authorized by school policy, 
but did not discover any weapons. 
¶5 
After Angelia D.B. denied that she possessed any 
weapons, Dringoli informed her that he was going to check her 
further.  Angelia D.B. first removed her jacket for Dringoli to 
search.  When he did not find a weapon in her jacket, Dringoli 
lifted up the bottom of her shirt to reveal her waistband.  
Dringoli then observed two inches of a brown knife handle tucked 
in her waistband by her right hip.  After Dringoli removed the 
nine-inch knife, which was locked in an open position, Dringoli 
informed Angelia D.B. that she was under arrest and advised her 
of her Miranda rights. 
¶6 
The 
State 
filed 
a 
juvenile 
delinquency petition 
charging Angelia D.B. with carrying a concealed weapon, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.12 and 941.23.  Seeking to suppress the use 
of the knife as evidence, Angelia D.B. argued to the circuit 
court that Officer Dringoli's search of her person, specifically 
his lifting of her shirt, was highly intrusive and required a 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
4 
showing of probable cause.  Because the search was based solely 
on the informant's allegation without further corroboration, 
Angelia D.B. further asserted that Dringoli's search was not 
supported by probable cause.  The circuit court granted Angelia 
D.B.'s motions to suppress the knife and all derivative 
evidence, ruling that the search of her person was unreasonable 
under all the circumstances.
1  The State appealed.  The court of 
appeals certified this appeal for our review on July 17, 1996. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
The reasonableness of a search is a constitutional 
question 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
reviews 
independently, 
benefiting from the analysis of the lower court.  Isiah B. v. 
State, 176 Wis. 2d 639, 646, 500 N.W.2d 637, cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 231 (1993).  We will uphold the circuit court's findings 
of evidentiary and historical fact as they relate to whether the 
search was reasonable, unless they are against the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Griffin, 131 
Wis. 2d 41, 62, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 868 
(1987). 
¶8 
Because the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article 
I, 
sec. 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
are 
                     
1  On November 6, 1995, the circuit court entered two orders 
to suppress evidence in this case.  In the first order, the 
court suppressed the knife removed from Angelia D.B.'s person.  
In the second order, the court suppressed all derivative 
evidence following the removal of the knife from Angelia D.B.'s 
person, including but not limited to her statement on October 
12, 1995.  Both suppression orders were based on the circuit 
court's conclusion that the search and seizure of the knife were 
not reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
5 
substantially similar,
2 we conform the law of search and seizure 
under the Wisconsin Constitution to that developed by the United 
States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment to prevent the 
confusion caused by differing standards.  State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 
2d 153, 172-73, 388 N.W.2d 565, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 
(1986). 
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS 
¶9 
In 
this 
case, 
we 
are 
asked 
to 
determine 
the 
appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a 
search of a student on school grounds by a police officer at the 
request of, and in conjunction with, school authorities.  
Specifically, the question is whether such a search is governed 
by the reasonable grounds standard set forth in T.L.O. or the 
general standard of probable cause. 
¶10 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution proscribe 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  As indicated by the text of 
                     
2  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
 
Article I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
6 
these provisions, the constitutionality of a government search 
is measured by its reasonableness.  Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995).  In measuring 
the reasonableness of a search, the search's "intrusion on the 
individual's Fourth 
Amendment 
interests" must 
be balanced 
"against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."  
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 
(1989)(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).  
In most cases, a search is not considered reasonable unless it 
is conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon a showing of 
probable cause.  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.  Nonetheless, "a 
warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all 
government searches; and when a warrant is not required . . ., 
probable cause is not invariably required either."  Acton, 115 
S. Ct. at 2390-91 (1995). 
¶11 As the T.L.O. Court made clear, "[w]here a careful 
balancing 
of 
governmental 
interests 
and private 
interests 
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth 
Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of 
probable cause, [the Supreme Court has] not hesitated to adopt 
such a standard." 469 U.S. at 341; see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that at time of search and seizure on 
the street, officer had reasonable grounds to believe person was 
armed and dangerous); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 881 (1975)(brief traffic stops by roving patrol in border 
area were subject to reasonable suspicion standard); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976)(routine 
stops at permanent check-points to check for smugglers and 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
7 
illegal aliens may be made without individualized suspicion); 
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (discretionary spot checks by police 
must be based on at least articulable and reasonable suspicion 
that motorist is unlicensed or vehicle is unregistered).  
¶12 We begin our analysis by reviewing the leading United 
States Supreme Court decision on individual searches of students 
in public schools. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court evaluated the 
appropriate standard of reasonableness to apply to a search of a 
high school student's purse conducted by a school official.  469 
U.S. at 331.  After a teacher discovered the student smoking in 
the lavatory, in violation of a school rule, an assistant vice 
principal searched the student's purse for cigarettes.  Id. at 
328.  The search revealed cigarettes, marijuana, and other 
evidence implicating the student in drug dealing.  Id.  The 
student moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, 
arguing that the assistant principal's search violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 329. 
¶13 The 
T.L.O. 
Court 
recognized 
that 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
prohibition 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures 
applied 
to 
searches 
conducted 
by 
public 
school 
officials as well as by police officers.  The Court, however, 
dispensed with the warrant and probable cause requirements in 
the public school context when the search was conducted by 
school authorities.  The Court maintained that to impose warrant 
requirements on school administrators "'would unduly interfere 
with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary 
procedures [that are] needed,' and 'strict adherence to the 
requirement that searches be based on probable cause' would 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
8 
undercut the 'substantial need of teachers and administrators 
for freedom to maintain order in the schools.'"  469 U.S. at 
340, 341 (citations omitted). 
¶14 In addition, the Court emphasized that the state has a 
substantial 
interest 
in 
maintaining 
a 
safe 
and 
proper 
educational environment in its schools and, therefore, is 
permitted to exercise a degree of supervision and control that 
could not 
be 
exercised 
over free 
adults. 
 
"[A] 
proper 
educational 
environment 
requires 
close 
supervision 
of 
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against 
conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an 
adult."  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. ¶14 The 
Court, 
however, 
acknowledged that schoolchildren do not lose all legitimate 
expectations of privacy once they enter onto school grounds.  
Specifically, the Court recognized that schoolchildren have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in bringing various personal, 
noncontraband items to school such as school supplies, purses, 
keys, and necessary items for personal hygiene and grooming.  
Id. at 339. 
¶15 Because the Fourth Amendment requires all searches and 
seizures 
to 
be 
reasonable, 
determining 
the 
standard 
of 
reasonableness to apply to a specific class of searches requires 
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the 
search entails."  Id. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).  In the school setting, the 
student's expectations of privacy, therefore, must be balanced 
against the interest of school officials in maintaining a safe 
and orderly learning environment.  Id. at 339. 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
9 
¶16 In balancing the student's legitimate expectation of 
privacy and the school's need to maintain a safe and proper 
educational environment, the Court concluded that teachers and 
school officials do not need a warrant or probable cause before 
searching a student who is under their authority.  Id. at 340-
41.  "Rather, the legality of a search of a student should 
depend 
simply 
on 
the 
reasonableness, 
under 
all 
the 
circumstances, of the search."  Id. at 341.  To determine the 
reasonableness of a search of a student, the Court established 
the following twofold inquiry: first, the action must be 
"justified at its inception"; and second, the search, as 
actually conducted, must be "reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place."  Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20). 
¶17 Applying this test, the T.L.O. Court held that the 
search of the student's purse was reasonable, given that a 
teacher had reported seeing the student smoking in the lavatory 
in violation of school rules and that the student denied doing 
so.  Id. at 344-45.  The Court, however, limited its holding to 
searches carried out by school authorities, noting that "[t]his 
case does not present the question of the appropriate standard 
for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school 
officials 
in 
conjunction 
with or 
at 
the 
behest of law 
enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that 
question."  Id. at 341, n.7. 
¶18 Because 
the 
Court 
in 
T.L.O. 
expressly 
reserved 
judgment on this question, lower courts since T.L.O. have 
applied different standards to searches conducted by law 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
10
enforcement officials in conjunction with school officials, 
depending on the extent of police involvement.  In situations 
where school officials initiate the search or police involvement 
is minimal, most courts have held the reasonable grounds 
standard to apply.  See Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 191-92 (8th 
Cir. 1987)(applying the reasonable grounds standard where a 
school official acted in conjunction with a liaison officer in 
response to a report of stolen items); People v. Alexander B., 
270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 343-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)(applying the 
reasonable grounds standard where a school official initiated an 
investigation and requested police to detain a group of students 
and search for a weapon); J.A.R. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1242, 1243 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)(applying the reasonable grounds 
standard where a liaison officer conducted a search of a student 
after a school official had initiated the investigation). 
¶19 The reasonable grounds standard has also been applied 
in cases involving school police or liaison officers acting on 
their own authority.  See In re S.F., 607 A.2d 793, 794 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992)(applying the reasonable grounds standard to a 
search conducted by a plainclothes police officer for the school 
district); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill.), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1692 (1996)(applying the reasonable grounds 
standard to a search conducted by a police liaison officer 
"conducting a search on his own initiative and authority").  But 
see A.J.M. v. State, 617 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993)(holding that a school resource officer must have probable 
cause to conduct a search). 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
11
¶20 Notably, the probable cause standard is consistently 
applied where outside police officers initiate a search or where 
school officials act at the behest of law enforcement agencies. 
 See e.g., State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251, 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1997)(applying the probable cause standard where two police 
officers providing security at a school dance conducted a search 
on their own initiative with only minimal contact with school 
officials); F.P. v. State, 528 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988)(applying the probable cause standard where an outside 
police officer investigating an auto theft initiated the search 
of a student at school). 
¶21 Courts in some jurisdictions have analyzed Acton as 
well as T.L.O. to determine whether special needs exist to 
justify a departure from the usual Fourth Amendment standards of 
probable cause and a warrant within a public school context.  
See e.g., People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 318 (applying both 
the T.L.O. and the Acton tests to determine the appropriate 
standard of reasonableness); Tywayne H., 933 P.2d at 254-55 
(1997) (applying both the T.L.O. and the Acton tests to 
determine 
whether 
a 
departure 
from 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
requirements of probable cause and a warrant was reasonable in 
police pat down of student); State v. Barrett, 683 So. 2d 331, 
338 (La. Ct. App. 1996)(applying the Acton three-prong test to 
evaluate the reasonableness of a random drug search); Picarella 
v. Terrizzi, 893 F. Supp. 1292, 1301 (M.D. Pa. 1995)(applying 
the Acton three-prong test to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
search and seizure where school suspected student was victim of 
child abuse). 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
12
¶22 The Acton three-prong test balances the interests of 
the state against the expectation of privacy of the individual 
by examining these factors: (1) the nature of the privacy 
interest upon which the state’s interest intrudes; (2) the 
character of the search; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the 
governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the means for 
meeting it.  Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-94.  Although the tests 
set forth in both T.L.O. and Acton assessed whether the special 
needs of schools justified a departure from the traditional 
Fourth Amendment requirements of probable cause and a warrant, 
the nature of the special needs considered in those cases were 
notably 
different. 
 
In 
Acton, 
the 
Court 
assessed 
the 
reasonableness of a district-wide drug testing program for 
student athletes in light of that district's serious problem 
with student drug use.  In T.L.O., however, the Court considered 
whether a search by school officials of an individual student 
suspected of violating established school rules was reasonable  
 in light of the school's substantial interest in maintaining a 
proper educational environment.  Because the facts of the 
instant case similarly concern an individualized search of a 
student on school grounds, we find the two-prong test set forth 
in T.L.O. to be more appropriate in this case. 
¶23 Angelia 
D.B. 
argues, 
however, 
that 
the 
T.L.O. 
reasonable grounds standard should not apply to school searches 
conducted by police officers, regardless of the involvement of 
school officials.  She bases her distinction on the adversarial 
relationship that exists between police officers and criminal 
suspects.  Citing Justice Powell's concurring opinion in T.L.O., 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
13
Angelia D.B. maintains that the duties of police officers and 
school officials are inherently different. 
 
The special relationship between teacher and student 
also distinguishes the setting within which school 
children operate.  Law enforcement officers function 
as adversaries of criminal suspects.  These officers 
have 
the 
responsibility 
to 
investigate 
criminal 
activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our 
laws and facilitate the charging and bringing of such 
persons 
to 
trial. 
 
Rarely 
does 
this 
type 
of 
adversarial 
relationship 
exist 
between 
school 
authorities 
and 
pupils. 
 
Instead 
there 
is 
a 
commonality of interests between teachers and their 
pupils.  The attitude of the typical teacher is one of 
personal responsibility for the student's welfare as 
well as for his education.   
 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349 (Powell, J., concurring). 
¶24 We agree that there are inherent differences between 
the roles of police officers and school officials which make the 
reasonable grounds standard inapplicable to searches conducted 
by police officers acting independently of school officials.  A 
police investigation that includes the search of a public school 
student, when the search is initiated by police and conducted by 
police, usually lacks the "commonality of interests" existing 
between teachers and students.  See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349 
(Powell, J. concurring).  But when school officials, who are 
responsible for the welfare and education of all of the students 
within the campus, initiate an investigation and conduct it on 
school grounds in conjunction with police, the school has 
brought the police into the school-student relationship. 
¶25 Angelia D.B. cites Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 56, as an 
example of our refusal to lower the probable cause standard for 
police searches, even though we permitted searches by another 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
14
type of state official under a reasonable grounds standard.  In 
Griffin, we held that a probation officer may conduct a 
warrantless search of a probationer's residence if the officer 
has reasonable grounds to believe that the probationer has 
contraband.  Id. at 46.  We declined to impose the probable 
cause standard in that situation, because we recognized that the 
nature of probation places limitations on the liberty and 
privacy rights of the probationer.  Id. at 45.  We refused to 
extend this exception to warrantless searches conducted by the 
police.  Id. at 56. 
¶26 Our reasoning in Griffin, however, does not require 
imposition of the probable cause standard here.  In Griffin, we 
considered the nature of the relationship between probation 
officers and probationers.  We concluded that the special needs 
of the probation system, to promote rehabilitation and to 
protect the public, permitted an exception to the warrant 
requirement for searches by probation agents.  131 Wis. 2d at 
54-55.  We also recognized that probationers’ expectations of 
privacy were not the same as the expectations of persons not on 
probation.  Id. at 55. 
¶27 The Griffin rationale takes into account the same type 
of considerations 
as we 
do 
here, 
when we 
consider the 
constitutional standard for searches in public schools.  We 
recognize the special needs of public school officials to 
maintain a safe environment, free of disruption and conducive to 
learning.  Public school children have a lesser expectation of 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
15
privacy at school.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., 
concurring); Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (students' Fourth 
Amendment rights affected by "schools' custodial and tutelary 
responsibility for children"). 
¶28 Further, while we expressly declined to grant police 
the right to undertake a warrantless search in Griffin, it was 
the police who conveyed the original suspicion of weapons 
possession to the probation officer.  Also in that case, police 
accompanied 
the 
probation 
officer 
to 
the 
probationer’s 
apartment, where the search took place.  In this case, in 
contrast, the investigation was initiated at the request of 
school officials.  The investigation continued in conjunction 
with school officials. Further, Angelia D.B. was suspected of 
possessing a dangerous weapon within a public high school.  
Unlike a dangerous weapon located within a residence, a 
dangerous weapon within a school setting poses a significant and 
imminent threat of danger to school staff and to the other 
students compelled to be there. 
¶29 In Wisconsin, school attendance is compulsory, with 
certain exceptions, until age 18.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 118.15, 
115.82 (1995-96).  School officials not only educate students 
who 
are 
compelled 
to 
attend 
school, 
but 
they 
have 
a 
responsibility to protect those students and their teachers from 
behavior that threatens their safety and the integrity of the 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
16
learning process.
3 
 With the growing incidence of violence and 
dangerous weapons in schools, this task has become increasingly 
difficult.  See, e.g., Isiah B., 176 Wis. 2d at 650 (Bablitch, 
J., concurring)(providing statistics on the percentage of high 
school 
students 
carrying 
weapons); 
18 
U.S.C.A. 
§ 
922 
(q)(1)(F)(In 1994, Congress recognized that "the occurrence of 
violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in the 
quality of education in our country.").  See also, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUST., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. DELINQ. PREVENTION, Juvenile Offenders 
and Victims: 1996 Update On Violence, 7 (Feb. 1996)("Almost half 
of high school students reported weapons in their schools in 
1993.").
4  As a result, many school officials have sought the 
                     
3  In California, for example, the state constitution 
provides that "All students and staff of public primary, 
elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the 
inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and 
peaceful."  See People v. Alexander B., 270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 
(citing 
Article 
I, 
section 
28, 
subd.(c), 
California 
Constitution). 
4  The presence of weapons in schools not only greatly 
increases the chances of serious injury, but fear of weapons 
among classmates significantly undermines the ability to attend 
and concentrate on classwork. See U.S. v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 
115A S. Ct. 1624, 1663 (1995)(Breyer, J., dissenting)("Congress 
expressly found in 1994 that 'parents may decline to send their 
children to school' in certain areas 'due to concern about 
violent 
crime 
and 
gun 
violence.')(citing 
18 
U.S.C.A. 
§ 
922(q)(1)(E)(Nov. 1994 Supp.)).  In a statement before the 
Senate subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 
137 (1993), Willie L. Jude, Jr., Principal, James Madison High 
School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, testified that during the 1992-93 
school year, approximately one-half of the student expulsions 
from Milwaukee public schools were gun-related, and students 
between the ages of 13 and 16 accounted for more than 70% of the 
cases, cited in Sen. Bill Bradley, Violence in America, 10 St. 
John's J. Legal Comment 43, 49 n.12 (1994). 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
17
assistance of school liaison officers in enforcing rules and 
maintaining order in public schools.  See Jamaal Abdul-Alim, In 
Oconomowoc Schools, Officer Is Liaison To Student Community, 
Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, Waukesha ed., June 10, 1997, at 2 
(reporting that principal sees police/school liaison officer as 
a law enforcement resource for students and faculty alike; one 
liaison officer estimated that Wisconsin has 80 police/school 
liaison officers statewide). 
¶30 That is the nature of the case before us.  Officer 
Dringoli was on duty as a school liaison officer for Neenah High 
School.  He became involved in this investigation only after 
school officials requested his assistance and, throughout the 
course of the investigation, he acted in conjunction with school 
officials on school grounds.  Although the record is not clear 
as to Dringoli's specific duties, we may reasonably infer that 
where a law enforcement official has an office in the school, 
one of the official's responsibilities as a school liaison 
officer is to assist school officials in maintaining a safe and 
proper educational environment.  Because the report of a knife 
on school premises posed an imminent threat of danger to 
students and teachers, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Dringoli conducted the search of Angelia D.B. in conjunction 
with school officials and in furtherance of the school's 
objective to maintain a safe and proper educational environment. 
                                                                  
 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
18
¶31 Were we to conclude otherwise, our decision might 
serve to encourage teachers and school officials, who generally 
are untrained in proper pat down procedures or in neutralizing 
dangerous weapons, to conduct a search of a student suspected of 
carrying a dangerous weapon on school grounds without the 
assistance of a school liaison officer or other law enforcement 
official.  While the T.L.O. Court adopted the less stringent 
reasonable grounds standard in part because of the need of 
teachers 
to 
"maintain 
swift 
and 
informal 
disciplinary 
procedures,"  469 U.S. at 340, 341, it could be hazardous to 
discourage school officials from requesting the assistance of 
available trained police resources.  Even in Terry, the Court 
recognized that it would be unreasonable to require that police 
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their 
duties.  Terry, 362 U.S. at 23.  See also, Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 
at 255 (the nature and immediacy of the government's concern in 
ridding school grounds of weapons is of great importance).  The 
proper 
standard 
for 
the 
constitutional 
reasonableness 
of 
searches conducted on public school grounds by school officials, 
or by police working at the request of and in conjunction with 
school officials, should not promote unreasonable risk-taking.  
See, e.g., J.A.R. v. State, 689 So. 2d at 1243 ("[t]he fact that 
the school official prudently asked a law enforcement officer to 
assist in this search does not increase the level of suspicion 
needed to perform a pat-down of a student to determine if he or 
she possesses a dangerous weapon."). 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
19
¶32 Teachers and school officials are trained to educate 
children and to provide a proper learning environment.  Law 
enforcement officials, on the other hand, receive specialized 
training on how best to disarm individuals without subjecting 
themselves or others to danger.  When faced with a potentially 
dangerous situation beyond their expertise and training, school 
officials must be allowed "a certain degree of flexibility" to 
seek the assistance of trained law enforcement officials without 
losing the protections afforded by the reasonable grounds 
standard.  See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.  We therefore find it 
permissible for school officials who have a reasonable suspicion 
that a student may be in possession of a dangerous weapon on 
school grounds to request the assistance of a school liaison 
officer or other law enforcement officials in conducting a 
further investigation. 
¶33 Although T.L.O. did not address this question, we 
conclude that an application of the T.L.O. reasonable grounds 
standard, and not probable cause, to a search conducted by a 
school liaison officer at the request of and in conjunction with 
school officials of a student reasonably suspected of carrying a 
dangerous weapon on school grounds is consistent with both the 
special needs of public schools recognized in T.L.O. and with 
decisions by courts in other jurisdictions.   
REASONABLENESS OF THE SEARCH 
¶34 The case before us involved two separate searches 
conducted by Officer Dringoli.  The initial search was a quick 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
20
pat down of Angelia D.B.'s coat and pants.  Due to the nature of 
the allegations by the eyewitness student-informant, Angelia 
D.B. concedes that this search was reasonable.  At issue in this 
case, however, is whether the second search, a more thorough 
search of Angelia D.B.'s coat and person within Dringoli's 
office, was reasonable.  Weighing the gravity of a knife within 
the school concealed on a student's person, and the state's 
substantial 
interest 
in 
maintaining 
a 
safe 
and 
proper 
educational 
environment 
against 
the 
student's 
legitimate 
expectation of privacy, we find the search here reasonable. 
¶35 In reaching this conclusion, we apply the two-prong 
test of T.L.O.  First, the search must be reasonable at its 
inception; and second, the search as actually conducted must be 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the 
interference 
in 
the 
first 
instance. 
 
The 
Court 
further 
explained: 
[A] search of a student by a teacher or other school 
official will be 'justified at its inception' when 
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
search will turn up evidence that the student has 
violated or is violating either the law or rules of 
the school.  Such a search will be permissible in its 
scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related 
to 
the 
objectives 
of 
the 
search 
and 
are 
not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of 
the student and the nature of the infraction. 
Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted). 
¶36 In 
applying 
this 
test, 
Dringoli 
must 
have 
had 
reasonable grounds to suspect that Angelia D.B. possessed a 
knife in violation of the law or school rules for his search of 
her to be justified at its inception.  Dringoli conducted the 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
21
search of Angelia D.B. after being informed that a student had 
observed her in possession of a knife.  See State v. Michael G., 
748 P.2d 17, 20 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)(finding that a student who 
witnesses a crime by another student and reports it to school 
officials is presumed to be reliable); S.C. v. State, 583 So. 2d 
188, 192 (Miss. 1991)("Absent information that a particular 
student informant may be untrustworthy, school officials may 
ordinarily accept at face value the information they supply."). 
 Under these circumstances, Dringoli had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that Angelia D.B. possessed a knife.  The search was 
justified at its inception. 
¶37 Next, we consider whether the scope of the search was 
reasonable.  "[A] search will be permissible in its scope when 
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of 
the search and are not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."  
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
¶38 As 
part 
of 
the 
investigation 
of 
the 
student 
informant's allegations, Dringoli initially conducted a brief 
pat down search of Angelia D.B.'s pants and jacket in the 
hallway.  The Dean of Students, Mark Duerwaechter was present.  
Dringoli then asked the student to search her own backpack.  
After these efforts disclosed no weapon, Dringoli requested that 
Angelia D.B. accompany him back to his office.   Duerwaechter 
conducted a locker search, but found no weapon.  Entering the 
office, Dringoli, in the presence of Corporal Radtke, informed 
Angelia D.B. that he was going to conduct a more thorough 
search.  Dringoli first searched her coat and then lifted up the 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
22
bottom of her shirt to expose her waistband.  After Dringoli 
observed a knife tucked into Angelia D.B's waistband and then 
removed it from her person, the search stopped. 
¶39 Throughout this investigation, Officer Dringoli was 
searching for a knife that a student reportedly observed in 
Angelia D.B.'s possession earlier that day.  Angelia D.B. does 
not allege, nor does the record indicate, that Dringoli was 
searching for anything but the knife that the informant claimed 
to be in her possession.  Further, Dringoli limited his search 
only to areas where Angelia D.B. could reasonably conceal a 
weapon.  We, therefore, find that the measures employed by 
Dringoli were reasonably related to the objective of determining 
whether Angelia D.B. had a knife in her possession on school 
grounds. 
¶40 We also conclude that the search was not excessively 
intrusive in light of Angelia D.B's age and gender, and the 
nature of the infraction.  Angelia D.B. is female and was almost 
sixteen years old at the time of the search.  She was suspected 
of possessing a dangerous weapon within a public school.  
Because Dringoli lifted her shirt only high enough to observe 
Angelia D.B.'s waistline, this search was a relatively minor 
intrusion when compared to the nature of the infraction - 
possession of a dangerous weapon on school grounds.   
¶41 Since 
we 
conclude 
that 
Dringoli's 
search 
was 
reasonable under the circumstances, we hold that the circuit 
court erred in suppressing the knife and all derivative 
evidence.  Accordingly, the orders of the circuit court are 
 
 
No. 95-3104 
 
23
reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The orders of the circuit court are reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
 
No.  
   
 
1 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
the 
search 
was 
constitutional and that the evidence should not be suppressed.  
¶43 I write separately because I conclude, as the State 
argued, that the officer possessed probable cause (the highest 
standard required by law) to detain Angelia D.B and that the 
search incident to that detention was reasonable.  A well-
accepted constitutional ground exists to support this search.  
It is therefore unnecessary for resolution of this case for the 
court to reach out to adopt a new lower standard to support the 
search.
5  
¶44 The court should rarely if ever make a difficult and 
important constitutional determination in a case in which such a 
determination is unnecessary.
6  As a general rule, we should form 
constitutional rules only when, and only so far as, necessary to 
resolve actual controversies.  In this case especially, when the 
                     
5  See State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 866, 549 N.W.2d 
218 (1996)(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring), 
affirmed 
on 
other 
grounds 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997); State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 
410, 441, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1993)(Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
6  In the following cases the court has stated, and 
followed, the rule that it will not reach a constitutional issue 
when the resolution of a controversy does not require it.  City 
of Franklin v. Crystal Ridge, Inc., 180 Wis. 2d 561, 573 n.8, 
509 N.W.2d 730 (1994); Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 
Wis. 2d 593, 612-13, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987); S.B. v. Racine 
County, 138 Wis. 2d 409, 412, 406 N.W.2d 408 (1987); Labor & 
Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 
177 (1984); Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 
N.W.2d 47 (1981). See also L.L.N. v. Clauder, No. 95-2084, 
concurrence at 1, dissent at 7 (collecting cases) (S. Ct. May 
23, 1997). 
 
 
No.  
   
 
2 
facts support probable cause and the case law is sparse and 
inconsistent about standards other than probable cause, I think 
the court errs by reaching out and trying to formulate an all-
encompassing rule. 
¶45 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶46 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this opinion.