Title: AKHTAR v VAN DE WETERING
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-010
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 1982

No. 81-10 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 M. IQBAL AKHTAR, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS . JOHN E. VAN DE WETERING et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Boschert and Boschert, Billings, Montana Rosemary Boschert argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: LeRoy H. Schramm argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: December 1, 1981 Decided: 3 1982 Filed: MAR 3 - 1 9 8 2 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. M. Iqbal Akhtar initiated this action following denial of his tenure at Eastern Montana College (EMC). He sought reinstatement with tenure and backpay, claiming violations of sections 49-3-101(1)(2) and 49-3-201, MCA; W i - . of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S2000c; and equal protection rights secured by Article 11, Section 4, of the Constitution of the State of Montana and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The District Court found the denial of Dr. Akhtar's tenure ap- plication resulted from the defendants' exercise of academic judgment and did not discriminate against Dr. Akhtar either individually or as a member of a class. From that decision, Dr. Akhtar appeals. Appellant is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics of EMC, where he has taught since his appoint- ment there in September 1975. He is a naturalized citizen of the United States and a former citizen of Lyallpur, Pakistan. Akhtar received his PhD degree in agricultural economics from Texas A & M University in 1967. Prior to his appointment at EMC appellant taught one year at Middle Stand State University and one semester at Idaho State University. Appellant applied for tenure according to the faculty contract procedure in October 1978. He submitted his application to the unit rank and tenure committee. After consideration, the committee made a positive recommendation to the college rank and tenure committee. On or about January 15, 1979, Robert McRae, Dean of the Liberal Arts School, forwarded an unfavorable recom- mendation regarding the appellant's tenure application to the College Rank and Tenure Committee and a copy of that recommendation to Larry W. Jones, Academic Vice-President. The College Rank and Tenure Committee sent a favor- able recommendation regarding appellant's tenure application to the academic vice-president on or about March 1, 1979. The academic vice-president forwarded appellant's application with the academic vice-president's negative recommendation to President John Van de Wetering on or about March 28, 1979. The president informed appellant of his decision not to award tenure on April 17, 1979. On May 1, 1979, the president received a letter from Professor Harry Gaghan, Chairman of the Department of Social Sciences, on behalf of the department, requesting the president to reconsider his decision and protesting the use of the student evaluation instrument. The president requested a reevaluation of appellant's application excluding the student evaluation test from consideration. On May 16, 1979, Dean McRae submitted his reevalu- ation of appellant's application to Vice-President Jones, indicating Dean McRae's recommendation remained unfavorable. On May 17, 1979, the vice-president submitted his reevaluation to the president which reaffirmed his negative recommendation. The president then reaffirmed his denial of tenure to appellant. Several issues are before this Court: 1. May appellant's claim of denial of due process rights properly be heard on appeal? 2. If so, was appellant denied guaranteed due p r o c e s s when he was denied t e n u r e ? 3. Was a p p e l l a n t denied equal p r o t e c t i o n g u a r a n t e e s i n t h a t he was t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y t h a n o t h e r s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d c a n d i d a t e s f o r t e n u r e and promotion a t EMC? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o r e c e i v e i n t o evidence and hear testimony on p l a i n t i f f I s E x h i b i t No. 25, a r e p o r t from an a p p e a l s committee i n t h e t e n u r e m a t t e r of Dr. Jerome Hurley? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w t h e testimony of Maury Evans r e g a r d i n g union a c t i v i t i e s of Dr. Akhtar and o t h e r f a c u l t y ? 6. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w t h e r e b u t t a l testimony of Dr. J a y K i r k p a t r i c k ? Respondents argue a p p e l l a n t ' s due p r o c e s s c l a i m may n o t p r o p e r l y be heard on appeal s i n c e it was n o t r a i s e d a t t n e t r i a l c o u r t . An i s s u e which is p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e t o t h e Supreme C o u r t is u n t i m e l y and c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d on a p p e a l . Northern P l a i n s v. Board of N a t u r a l Resources ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . , 594 P.2d 297, 36 St.Rep. 666. The q u e s t i o n b e f o r e u s , t h e n , is whether a p p e l l a n t r a i s e d t h e due p r o c e s s i s s u e below. A p p e l l a n t ' s complaint a l l e g e s v i o l a t i o n s of s e c t i o n s Title , & c / - 49-3-101(1)(2) and 49-3-201, MCA; 5 of t h e C i v i l R i g h t s Act of 1964; and t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n g u a r a n t e e s of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s and A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4, of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e S t a t e of Montana. The complaint was never amended and makes no r e f e r e n c e t o due p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n s . A p p e l l a n t does, however, r e f e r t o due p r o c e s s exten- s i v e l y i n both h i s t r i a l b r i e f and h i s proposed c o n c l u s i o n s of law. And, t h e D i s t r i c t Court s t a t e s i n its Finding of F a c t No. 9: " P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h a t he was d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t i n regard t o s a i d t e n u r e a p p l i c a t i o n and t h a t he was n o t accorded t h e same p r o t e c t i o n and due p r o c e s s t h a t was accorded o t h e r f a c u l t y members . . . " W e f i n d t h i s a s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n of t h e presence of t h e due p r o c e s s i s s u e a t t h e t r i a l l e v e l t o c o n s i d e r it on a p p e a l . A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s h i s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s were v i o l a t e d because (1) he was n o t g i v e n adequate n o t i c e and h e a r i n g p r i o r t o t h e d e n i a l of h i s t e n u r e a p p l i c a t i o n , and ( 2 ) t h e d e c i s i o n t o deny t e n u r e was a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s and founded on a v i o l a t i o n of a p p e l l a n t ' s e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n r i g h t s . The f i r s t q u e s t i o n t o be a n s w e r e d i s w n e t h e r a p p e l l a n t had a p r o p e r t y or l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t which is accorded due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 17, of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Board of Regents v. Roth ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Schend v. Thorson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 5, 549 P.2d 809; R e i t e r v. Yellowstone County ( 1981) , Mont . , 627 P.2d 845, 38 St.Rep. 686. Only i f such an i n t e r e s t is e s t a b l i s h e d , may t h e q u e s t i o n of whether due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n s have been v i o l a t e d be c o n s i d e r e d . A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h e d e n i a l of h i s t e n u r e r e q u e s t v i o l a t e s a l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t by imposing a stigma on him which i m p a i r s h i s freedom t o o b t a i n o t h e r employment. H e makes no claim of f a l s e or defamatory s t a t e m e n t s being p u b l i c i z e d about him i n connection w i t h h i s t e n u r e evalu- a t i o n b u t grounds h i s c l a i m on t h e s o l e f a c t t e n u r e was denied. I n Roth, s u p r a , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court considered t h e c a s e of an untenured u n i v e r s i t y t e a c h e r h i r e d f o r a f i x e d one-year term. S t a t e s t a t u t e provided t e n u r e s t a t u s was a v a i l a b l e only a f t e r four y e a r s of year-to-year employment. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Roth claimed d e n i a l of h i s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s because he was g i v e n no n o t i c e o r h e a r i n g p r i o r t o h i s n o n r e t e n t i o n . The Court found Roth had n o t been denied a l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t because t h e s t a t e had n o t imposed any stigma on him which d e p r i v e d him of o t h e r employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s nor had it impinged h i s "good name, r e p u t a t i o n , honor or i n t e g r i t y . " 408 U.S. a t 573, 92 S.Ct. a t 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 559. More r e c e n t l y i n Bishop v. Wood ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 426 U . S . 341, 9 6 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684, a permanently employed policeman was d i s c h a r g e d without a p r e t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g . He claimed a due p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n because of a c i t y o r d i n a n c e which l i m i t e d t h e g r o u n d s f o r d i s c h a r g e o f permanent employees t o i n e f f i c i e n c y , n e g l i g e n c e , u n f i t n e s s or f a i l u r e t o perform d u t i e s . The Court s a i d t h e f a c t t h a t an employee's d i s c h a r g e made him less a t t r a c t i v e t o o t h e r employers was n o t a l o n e a d e p r i v a t i o n of a l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t . While t h e f a c t a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t r e c e i v e t e n u r e a t EMC w i l l n o t b e n e f i t him i n h i s p u r s u i t of o t h e r employment, it does n o t p l a c e such a stigma on him a s t o d e p r i v e him of a l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t . A p p e l l a n t a l s o c l a i m s a p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . Roth, s u p r a , s e t s o u t a g u i d e t o determining such an i n t e r e s t . I n Koth, t h e Court held: ". . . To have a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n a b e n e f i t , a person c l e a r l y m u s t have more t h a n an a b s t r a c t need or d e s i r e f o r it. H e m u s t have more t h a n a u n i l a t e r a l e x p e c t a t i o n of it. He m u s t , i n s t e a d , have a l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m of e n t i t l e m e n t t o it . . . " 408 U.S. a t 577, 92 S.Ct. a t 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 561. The s o u r c e of a n e n t i t l e m e n t e s t a b l i s h i n g a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t may be found i n s t a t e law o r i n r u l e s and under- s t a n d i n g s e x i s t i n g between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and h i s employer. Koth, 408 U . S . a t 577, 92 S.Ct. a t 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 561. I n R o t h ' s companion c a s e , P e r r y v. Sindermani ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 4 0 8 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, a t e a c h e r had t a u g h t i n t h e Texas s t a t e c o l l e g e system f o r t e n y e a r s under a s e r i e s of one-year c o n t r a c t s . When, f o l l o w i n g h i s p u b l i c d i s a g r e e m e n t s with c o l l e g e p o l i c i e s , h i s c o n t r a c t was n o t renewed, t h e t e a c h e r brought an a c t i o n claiming t h e d e c i s i o n i n f r i n g e d h i s r i g h t t o freedom of speech and denied him p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s . The Court found t h a t , even w i t h o u t a formal c o n t r a c t u a l t e n u r e p r o v i s i o n , a p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t may e x i s t through a de f a c t o t e n u r e agreement promulgated by r u l e s and u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of s t a t e o f f i c i a l s . The Court a l s o noted t h e l i k e l i h o o d of t h e e x i s t e n c e of such a de f a c t o agreement is g r e a t e r where no e x p l i c i t t e n u r e system e x i s t s . 408 U . S . a t 602, 92 S.Ct. a t 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 580. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t , having t a u g h t t h e r e q u i s i t e number of y e a r s and o b t a i n e d t h e academic rank of a s s i s t a n t p r o f e s s o r , he h a s s a t i s f i e d t h e o b j e c t i v e requirements f o r t e n u r e a t EMC and t h e r e b y has s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t l e m e n t t o t e n u r e t o r e q u i r e due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n s . Appellant r e l i e s p r i m a r i l y on McLendon v. Morton (W.Va. 1 9 7 8 ) , 249 S.E.2d 919, i n which an a s s i s t a n t pro- f e s s o r a t a community c o l l e g e sought a w r i t of mandamus claiming she was denied due process in the college's deci- sion not to grant her tenure. The college's tenure regula- tions required the rank of assistant professor, six years of teaching service and full-time employment status in order to be eligible to apply for tenure. The further criterion for obtaining tenure, according to the regulations, was teaching competence . The West Virginia court consiaered whether the claimed property interest was a unilateral expectation or an entitlement. It noted that existing rules or understandings between the institution and the individual could give rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement and held that satisfac- tion of the basic eligibility standards to apply for tenure gave a sufficient entitlement to require due process protec- tion. 249 S.E.2d at 925. In adopting its position, the West Virginia court recognized it was establishing a rule more restrictive than that of the United States Supreme Court and that it was guided by its distinctive state constitutional due process provision, 249 S.E.2d at 922. That provision states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law and the judgment of his peers." West Virginia Constitution, Article 111, Section 10. As was established by this Court in Schend v. Thorson, supra, the question is one of whether a right has become vested. Only then is it protected by due process. This Court found there that a probationary police officer had no property right under Montana law and could have none until confirmation of his position as a permanent employee. "The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person nas already acquired in specific benefits." Roth, - 408 U.S. at 576, 92 S.Ct. at 2708, 33 L.Ed.2d at 560. The policies of Eastern Montana College required faculty members applying for tenure to present evidence showing excellence in teaching, research and public service. Given this requirement beyond the quantitative standards required for eligibility, we find that a protected right to tenure did not vest with appellant's eligibility alone. His satisfaction of the quantitative requirements simply en- titled him to consideration for tenure but did not, on its own, establish an entitlement sufficient to constitute a protected property interest. Appellant also cites as sources of his claimed property interest the 1975-1977 faculty contract, which was extended through 1978, the codification of rank and tenure matters and the "traditional and promulgated policy of the institution." The faculty contract sets out the rules and criteria for tenure; the codif icat-ion clarifies the contract tenure provisions; and the policy to which appellant refers is the "Final Report on Promotion and Tenure for 1977-78" issued to the faculty by EMC President Van de Wetering. Among other things, the report refers to the primary responsibility of faculty colleagues in the faculty renewal review process. In essence, appellant argues that with the existence of these tenure procedures and policies he acquired a pro- tected property interest in them. Appellant relies on three cases to support this claim: Hillis v. Meister (.l971), 82 N.M. 474, 483 P.2d 1314; Abramson v. Board of Regents University of Hawaii ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 56 Haw. 680, 548 P.2d 253; and O f s e v i t v. T r u s t e e s of t h e C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y and C o l l e g e , e t a l . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 148 Cal.Rptr. 1, 21 Cal.3d 763, 582 P.2d 88. T h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s a r e n o t p e r s u a s i v e i n t h i s i n s t a n c e . H i l l i s , s u p r a , i n t e r p r e t e d t h e t e a c h i n g c o n t r a c t between an a s s i s t a n t p r o f e s s o r and E a s t e r n N e w Mexico U n i v e r s i t y . The c o u r t found t h a t through t h e c o u r s e of conduct of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e f a c u l t y handbook had become p a r t of t h e i r c o n t r a c t . The c o u r t d i d n o t c o n s i d e r whether t h e c o n t r a c t c o n s t i t u t e d a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . I n Abramson, s u p r a , t h e Supreme Court of Hawaii found t h a t t h e p u b l i s h e d t e n u r e p o l i c y of an e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u - t i o n might be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e employment c o n t r a c t of a p r o b a t i o n a r y f a c u l t y member. The c o u r t found, however, t h e t e n u r e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e f a c u l t y handbook had no f o r c e of law because t h e r e had been no showing of compliance w i t h t h e rule-making procedures of t h e s t a t e ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedure a c t i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n s . The c o u r t a l s o found t h a t none of t h e w r i t t e n p o l i c i e s of t h e u n i v e r s i t y provided a s s u r a n c e of continued employment s o a s t o e s t a b - l i s h a p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . The Supreme Court of C a l i f o r n i a , i n O f s e v i t , s u p r a , found t h a t a f a c u l t y member had been improperly denied reappointment a t San F r a n c i s c o S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y on t h e b a s i s of h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s F i r s t Ainendment r i g h t s . Although t h e c o u r t found t e a c h e r s were e n t i t l e d t o enforcement of t h e r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s adopted by a board of e d u c a t i o n because t h e y were i n e f f e c t p a r t of t h e t e a c h i n g c o n t r a c t , it made no f i n d i n g of a c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . Through t h e s e c a s e s a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s which have been adopted by an i n s t i t u t i o n of higher e d u c a t i o n a r e i m p l i e d l y o r e x p r e s s l y p a r t of a f a c u l t y member's employment c o n t r a c t and, a s such, a r e t h e s o u r c e of h i s claimed p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t . A s a p p l i e d t o t h i s c a s e , a p p e l l a n t ' s argument r a i s e s t h r e e q u e s t i o n s : Were t h e c o d i f i c a t i o n and t h e p r e s i d e n t ' s s t a t e m e n t p a r t of t h e f a c u l t y c o n t r a c t ? lrjere t h e c o n t r a c t procedures followed? I f n o t , does t h e c o n t r a c t e s t a b l i s h a p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t ? T h i s Court r e c e n t l y held t h a t an employee handbook d i s t r i b u t e d a f t e r an employee is h i r e d does n o t become p a r t of t h a t employee's employment c o n t r a c t . G a t e s v. L i f e of Montana I n s u r a n c e Co. ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - Mont . - , 638 P.2d 1063, 39 St.Rep. 16. Gates claimed her employment c o n t r a c t had been breached because p r o v i s i o n s of t h e employee handbook had n o t been followed. T h i s Court found t h e handbook c o n s t i t u t e d a u n i l a t e r a l s t a t e m e n t of company p o l i c i e s . The handbook terms were n o t bargained f o r and t h e r e was no meeting of t h e minds. The Court a l s o found t h e handbook was n o t p a r t of G a t e s ' c o n t r a c t when s h e was h i r e d and d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t because t h e r e was no new and independent c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r its terms. G a t e s , 638 P.2d a t 1066, 39 St.Rep. a t 19. The c o d i f i c a t i o n on which a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s was d r a f t e d by t h e Rank and Tenure Committee s p e c i f i c a l l y t o c l a r i f y b o t h t h e f a c u l t y c o n t r a c t and handbook. The document was a p p r o v e d by t h e Coalition/Administration Committee a s n o t i n c o n f l i c t with t h e c o n t r a c t or handbook. The document also was specified as the operating manual for the Rank and Tenure Committee, limited to reference and informational use and subject to future contract negotiations. Although the codification is by its nature a pseudo-extension of the contract, using the Gates rationale, it is not part of the contract. The faculty contract specifies a procedure for grant- ing tenure which is set out below: "The procedure for granting tenure shall be as follows: "(1) A committee of the appropriate adminis- trative unit, which shall include tenured faculty members, if available, and including the Administrative Unit Head, shall recommend to the Rank and Tenure Committee the names of those eligible members of the unit whom they consider to be qualified for tenure. The recommendation of the appropriate administra- tive unit committee shall be completed no later than December 1, and by that date the appropriate administrative unit committee shall notify in writing the eligible faculty members who have not been recommended for tenure and the committee shall send a copy of the notice to the President, but the applications of all eligible faculty members shall. be forwarded to the Rank and Tenure Committee. "(2) The College Rank and Tenure Committee shall review all tenure applications received from the units and shall, by March 1, submit its recommendations (positive or negative) to the Academic Vice President. " (3 ) Those recommendations which are approved by the President shall be submitted to the Board of Regents for final action. Upon Board of Regents approval, the affected faculty members shall be awarded tenure effective with the commencement of the next academic year . "(4) No faculty member shall be awarded tenure solely because the aforesaid proce- dures were not followed. The President shall have the right to act independently if the committee(s) fail to act within the time limit specified. " The primary breach of procedure claimed by appellant is an unfavorable recommendation which was forwarded by the Dean of the Liberal Arts School to the academic vice- president out of proper sequence. Appellant argues that according to the procedure, the dean's letter should have been forwarded to the College Rank and Tenure Committee and then, together with a11 recommendations, to the academic vice-president. Instead, the academic vice-president received the dean's unfavorable recommendation and, only later, received the committee's favorable review. The sequence to which appellant refers, however, is specified not in the contract document but in the codifi- cation. Assuming arguendo that the codification was part of the contract, we still find no breach. The codification provision regarding the deans states: "The Rank and Tenure Committee will then request the respective deans to examine each applicant's package by December 15, and make a written recommendation on each one." Here, the dean made the requested recommendation to the committee and sent a copy of his recommendation to the academic vice-president. The codification did not restrict or preclude the dean's action, and we find no breach of appellant's contract procedure. The president's statement, which appellant contends is a "published policy" and therefore part of his contract, was made May 2 3 , 1977 via a memorandum entitled Final Report of Promotion and Tenure for 1977-78. The report included a statement of the basis upon which the president reviewed promotion and tenure cases that year. The president acknowledged the importance of the recommendation of the candidate's department colleagues in these matters and stated: "It would be inappropriate for me to interfere with that recommendation for other than procedural reasons except under extraordinary circumstances." This statement was made at a time of flux in the bMC administration when the college had no administrative vice- president and President Van de Wetering was the only administrative step in the process. The statement also was made before the contract codification was completed. The statement was not intended to be or presented as a strict and on-going policy and given the context in which it was made cannot logically be construed as such. Regardless of the title given to the statement, however, we find the president's action not contradictory to it. In fact, the circumstances the president faced here were extraordinary. No reasonable construction of the president's statement could infer an intent to procedur ally ignore the recommendations of members of the administration in all cases. President Van de Wetering testified that ordinarily the tenure applications he received had consistent recommendations. Here, he was faced not only with inconsistent recommendations but also with a tie-vote that necessitated his final determination contradict with the recommendations of two of the four reviewing bodies. Given this situation, the president requested both the dean and the vice-president to reevaluate Dr. Akhtar's applica- tion excluding the student evaluation. Their recommendations remained the same. The president then considered all the information before him and determined that Dr. Akhtar should not receive tenure. We find the president's actions did not contradict his statement nor did they breach appellant's contract. T h i s Court r e c e n t l y h e l d , i n Keiser v. Board of Regents ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont . , 630 P.2d 194, 38 St.Rep. 674, t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s of a tenured p r o f e s s o r ' s employment c o n t r a c t which set o u t s a l a r y and c o n t r a c t term were t e n u r e d along w i t h academic rank. The C o u r t ' s concern t h e r e was c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e employment c o n t r a c t which g r a n t e d Dr. Keiser "continuous t e n u r e . " The C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was based, i n p a r t , on a two-fold purpose of t e n u r e : academic freedom and economic s e c u r i t y . Keiser is n o t , however, a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e b e f o r e us. There, Dr. Keiser had been g r a n t e d t e n u r e . Her p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n t h a t t e n u r e c l e a r l y had v e s t e d and t h e q u e s t i o n t o be r e s o l v e d was what t e n u r e c o n s i s t e d o f . Here t h e q u e s t i o n is an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t one--whether a p r o t e c t e d r i g h t h a s v e s t e d . Dr. Akhtar a p p l i e d f o r t e n u r e a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e according t o t h e formal t e n u r e procedures. Those p r o c e d u r e s provided f o r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e t e n u r e a p p l i c a n t a t t h e time of a p p l i c a t i o n on t h e b a s i s of e x c e l l e n c e i n t e a c h i n g , r e s e a r c h and p u b l i c s e r v i c e , and community s e r - v i c e . The procedures d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a l e g a l expectancy i n continued employment b u t r a t h e r set o u t a means by which a d i s c r e t i o n a r y d e c i s i o n would be made. W e f i n d no p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t r e q u i r i n g due p r o c e s s h e r e . A p p e l l a n t s p e c i f i e s a s e r r o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o adopt a p p e l l a n t ' s proposed c o n c l u s i o n of law number seven which s t a t e s respondents' conduct v i o l a t e d A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4, of t h e Montana S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n i n t h a t a p p e l l a n t was t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y t h a n o t h e r s i m i - l a r l y s i t u a t e d c a n d i d a t e s f o r t e n u r e and promotion a t EMC. While n e i t h e r p a r t y s p e c i f i c a l l y argues t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n i s s u e on a p p e a l , it a p p e a r s t o be merged i n t h e o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b e f o r e us. For t h a t reason, w e w i l l c o n s i d e r it h e r e . The Board of Regents has general. c o n t r o l and super- v i s i o n of t h e Montana u n i v e r s i t y system i n c l u d i n g a d u t y t o a p p o i n t both p r e s i d e n t and f a c u l t y f o r each i n s t i t u t i o n . S e c t i o n 20-25-301(1)(11), MCA. The p r e s i d e n t of an i n d i - v i d u a l i n s t i t u t i o n , i n t u r n , i s charged w i t h t h e immediate c o n t r o l and management of t h a t u n i t . S e c t i o n 20-25-305 ( 1) , MCA . The t e n u r e system is among t h e procedures maintained under t h i s a u t h o r i t y . T h e r e f o r e , a c t i o n s by t h e p r e s i d e n t and t h e Board of Regents r e g a r d i n g t e n u r e a r e s t a t e a c t i o n s , and a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e t e n u r e p r o c e s s would r e s u l t i n an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e n i a l of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n . U.S. Const., Amend. X I V , S e c t i o n 1; Mont. Const., A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 4. A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s he was d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t i n t h a t he was t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from o t h e r t e n u r e c a n d i d a t e s because a d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d of e x c e l l e n c e was a p p l i e d t o h i s t e n u r e e v a l u a t i o n t h a n t o o t h e r s . I n s u p p o r t of h i s c l a i m , a p p e l l a n t p o i n t s most s p e c i f i c a l l y t o comparisons of h i s and o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s ' p u b l i c a t i o n r e c o r d . S i n c e h i s employment a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e , a p p e l l a n t had pub- l i s h e d one a r t i c l e . Two c a n d i d a t e s who had p u b l i s h e d no a r t i c l e s w h i l e a t EMC were g r a n t e d t e n u r e . W e a g r e e w i t h t h e Fourth C i r c u i t which found t h a t " n o t e v e r y d i f f e r e n c e i n promotion t r e a t m e n t - - p a r t i c u l a r l y a d i f f e r e n c e n o t i n r e s o l v i n g q u e s t i o n s of primary f a c t s b u t i n e v a l u a t i n g f a c t s - - r i s e s t o t h e l e v e l of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e p r i v a t i o n e i t h e r under e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n or due p r o c e s s . " Clark v. Whiting ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 607 F.2d 634, 638. I n C l a r k , an a s s o c i a t e p r o f e s s o r claimed he was denied e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n because d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s were used i n evalu- a t i n g h i s promotion q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t h a n were used i n p a s s i n g on promotions of o t h e r f a c u l t y members. A t EPIC t h e e v a l u a t i o n of t e n u r e c a n d i d a t e s was made i n t h r e e b a s i c a r e a s : t e a c h i n g , r e s e a r c h and p u b l i c s e r v i c e , and community s e r v i c e . P u b l i c a t i o n was one of a number of f a c t o r s considered i n t h e p r o c e s s . Dean McRae t e s t i f i e d t h a t he e v a l u a t e d a l l e i g h t t e n u r e c a n d i d a t e s using t h e b a s i c c r i t e r i a of t e a c h i n g , r e s e a r c h and s e r v i c e and a t t e m p t e d t o m e a s u r e t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e i n e a c h c a t e g o r y i n a t l e a s t a p a r t i a l l y q u a n t i f i a b l e manner. Because of t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of some s u b j e c t i v i t y i n t h e p r o c e s s , t h e dean t e s t i f i e d he made a c o m p o s i t e f o r e a c h c a n d i d a t e and t h e n r e e v a l u a t e d t h e m a t e r i a l s submitted t o him. He t h e n developed a rank o r d e r of t h e c a n d i d a t e s i n which Dr. Akhtar ranked e i g h t h . P r e s i d e n t Van de Wetering t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t e n u r e e v a l u a t i o n s demanded a weighing and b a l a n c i n g of a l l t h e a r e a s of c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a l l t h e c a n d i d a t e s . Although t h e r e was s h a r p disagreement among a p p e l l a n t ' s c o l l e a g u e s , t h e f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n was t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o f e s s i o n a l performance d i d n o t meet t h e o v e r a l l p r o f e s s i o n a l academic s t a n d a r d s needed t o g r a n t t e n u r e . The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h e d e n i a l of t e n u r e was n o t a r b i t r a r y b u t was an e x e r c i s e of academic judgment. I t a l s o found no evidence had been p r e s e n t e d which i n d i c a t e d t h e d e n i a l r e s u l t e d from d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o r t h a t t h e proce- d u r e s followed were intended t o p e n a l i z e a c e r t a i n c l a s s . W e a g r e e . The s t a t e h a s a s t r o n g i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e q u a l i t y and academic freedom of its h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n system. The t e n u r e p r o c e s s s e r v e s t h a t d u a l purpose, and e v a l u a t i n g a number of a r e a s of performance p r o v i d e s a broad b a s i s f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Absent an a r b i t r a r y or d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t r e a t m e n t of a p p e l l a n t ' s t e n u r e a p p l i c a t i o n , w e can f i n d no d e n i a l of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n . A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o r e c e i v e i n t o evidence and hear testimony on h i s E x h i b i t No. 25, a r e p o r t from an a p p e a l s committee i n t h e t e n u r e m a t t e r of Dr. Jerome Hurley. W e d i s a g r e e . The evidence was r e f u s e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r l a c k of r e l e v a n c e . Appellant a r g u e s t h e evidence was r e l e v a n t i n t h a t it would have shown " a p a t t e r n of proce- d u r a l e r r o r , t h e p r e j u d i c e and t h e f a c t u a l e r r o r t h a t t a i n t e d [ h i s ] t e n u r e p r o c e s s from t h e beginning ." E v i d e n c e which h a s "any t e n d e n c y t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e of any f a c t t h a t is of consequence t o t h e d e t e r - m i n a t i o n of t h e a c t i o n more probable or l e s s probable t h a n it would be without t h e evidence" is r e l e v a n t . Rule 4 0 1 , Mont . R. Evid . Here, t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a t t e r n of p r o c e d u r a l e r r o r which a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s would have been shown by t h e evidence was n o t a t i s s u e . The a p p e a l s committee whose r e p o r t t h e a p p e l l a n t o f f e r e d was n o t i n e x i s t e n c e d u r i n g Dr. A k h t a r ' s t e n u r e e v a l u a t i o n . Whether t h e academic v i c e - p r e s i d e n t a c t e d impermissibly i n t h e t e n u r e a p p l i c a t i o n p r o c e s s of a d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l under a d i f f e r e n t c o n t r a c t i n a d i f f e r e n t academic year is n o t r e l e v a n t t o h i s a c t i o n s i n a p p e l l a n t ' s t e n u r e e v a l u a t i o n . A p p e l l a n t a l s o c l a i m s t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o allow t h e testimony of Maury Evans r e g a r d i n g union a c t i v i t i e s of Dr. Akhtar and o t h e r f a c u l t y . T h i s evidence t o o was r e f u s e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s i r r e l e - v a n t . A p p e l l a n t made an o f f e r of proof through t h e testi- mony of Maury Evans t h a t one member of E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e f a c u l t y who a p p l i e d f o r t e n u r e a t t h e same t i m e Dr. Akhtar d i d was an a c t i v e member of t h e AAUP, t h e c o l l e g e ' s f a c u l t y o r g a n i z a t i o n , and its n e g o t i a t i n g team; he r e s i g n e d from t h e n e g o t i a t i n g team s h o r t l y b e f o r e he a p p l i e d f o r t e n u r e which he was g r a n t e d ; Dr. Akhtar, who remained a c t i v e i n h i s union, was n o t g r a n t e d t e n u r e . A p p e l l a n t claimed i n t h e o r i g i n a l complaint a v i o l a - t i o n of s e c t i o n 49-3-201, MCA, which r e q u i r e s e v a l u a t i o n and promotion of s t a t e and l o c a l government o f f i c i a l s be made "on t h e b a s i s of m e r i t and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s without regard t o . . . p o l i t i c a l i d e a s . . . I' I t is a p p a r e n t t h a t c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l i d e a s could be i n f e r r e d from union a c t i v i t y , and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e o f f e r e d evidence was r e l e v a n t t o a f a c t a t i s s u e . The o f f e r e d t e s t i m o n y , however, would have shown o n l y t h a t Maury Evans r e s i g n e d from h i s p o s i t i o n on t h e union n e g o t i a t i n g team, n o t from t h e AAUP, p r i o r t o h i s t e n u r e ap- p l i c a t i o n and t h a t he was g r a n t e d t e n u r e . Had t h e evidence been a d m i t t e d , it would have shown t h a t one union member was g r a n t e d t e n u r e and another was n o t . W e a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g . R e s p o n d e n t s s p e c i f y a s c r o s s - e r r o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o admit Dr. J a y K i r k p a t r i c k ' s testimony r e g a r d i n g a s t a t e m e n t a t t r i b u t e d t o him by Dr. Akhtar. During Dr. Akhtar 's d i r e c t examination, t h e f o l l o w i n g exchange took p l a c e : "Q. A f t e r you were denied t e n u r e , d i d J a y K i r k p a t r i c k make any s t a t e m e n t s a s t o r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e n i a l ? "A. Yes Ma'am, a t one o c c a s i o n he s a i d t h a t , oh Dr., he is a f i n e f e l l o w . I l i k e h i m very much, but he h a s been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e wrong people. Another o c c a s i o n , he s a i d t h a t i f i n p o l i t i c s you a r e caught on t h e wrong end of t h e f e n c e , t h a t ' s what you g e t , and t h a t ' s e x a c t l y what he g o t . " No o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d a t t h a t t i m e t o e i t h e r t h e q u e s t i o n o r t h e answer. L a t e r i n t h e t r i a l K i r k p a t r i c k was c a l l e d by respon- d e n t s i n r e b u t t a l t o A k h t a r ' s testimony. I n t h a t c o n t e x t , r e s p o n d e n t s ' counsel q u e s t i o n e d K i r k p a t r i c k r e g a r d i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t Akhtar a t t r i b u t e d t o Kir k p a t r i c k : "Do you r e c a l l having a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Mr. Akhtar?" A p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d claiming K i r k p a t r i c k ' s testimony was l i m i t e d t o r e b u t t a l and Akhtar had n o t t e s t i f i e d about any c o n v e r s a t i o n between Akhtar and K i r k p a t r i c k . Following an o v e r r u l i n g of t h e o b j e c t i o n , r e s p o n d e n t s ' c o u n s e l a s k e d K i r k p a t r i c k whether he had a c o n v e r s a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e d e c i s i o n t o deny Akhtar t e n u r e . K i r k p a t r i c k answered t h a t he had such a c o n v e r s a t i o n with a p e r s o n a l f r i e n d of Akhtar and a l o c a l v e t e r i n a r i a n . A t t h a t p o i n t t h e c o u r t asked K i r k p a t r i c k whether t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n involved Akhtar . When Kir k p a t r i c k responded that Akhtar nad not been present, the court sustained appellant's previous objection. The source of this issue is appellant's reference to statements by Kirkpatrick which is set out above. No objection was made to appellant's statement when it was made. Therefore, this Court will not determine error. Green v. Green (1978), 176 Mont. 532, 579 P.2d 1235; Dieruf v. Gollaher (1971), 156 Mont. 440, 481 P.2d 322. Appellant's attribution of statements to Kirkpatrick, in fact, did not indicate to whom they were made. The question then becomes whether Kirkpatrick's offered testimony was properly within the scope of rebuttal. Respondents argue Kirkpatrick would have testified that the context of the statement appellant attributed to him was a discussion of appellant's adherence to tne no-research, no-publication philosophy of a faction of the EMC faculty. In that context, according to respondents, Kirkpatrick would have testified he had discussed his disappointment with appellant's research and publication record. Nhile respondents carefully set out this argument in their brief, they made no such offer to the District Court. in the absence of an offer of proof to the District Court, tnis Court will not review the ruling. Tague v. John Caplice Co. (1903), 28 Mont. 51, 72 P. 297; Trogdon v. Kanson Sheep Co. (1914), 49 Mont. 4, 139 P.% 792; Runkle v. Burlington Northern (1980), - Mont . , 613 P.2d 982, 37 St.Rep. 995. Affirmed. / Justice We concur: '%u*-&.4% Chief Justice n &norable Robert M. Holter, District Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Sheehy / M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d i s s e n t i n g : I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t from t h e majority opinion. I do n o t t a k e i s s u e with t h e f a c t s a s they a r e set f o r t h i n t h e majority opinion. However, they need t o be supplemented. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a c t s set f o r t h i n t h e majority opinion, it is important t o note t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t , M. I q b a l Akhtar, signed a c o n t r a c t f o r t h e school year 1978-79. O n May 23, 1977, t h e p r e s i d e n t of Eastern Montana College issued a memorandum containing tenure policy. That document provided, i n p a r t : "By long t r a d i t i o n , t h e primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r tenure decisions must r e s t with one's colleagues i n h i s department f o r they a r e b e s t q u a l i f i e d t o judge t h e probationary f a c u l t y member and t o a s s e s s h i s r o l e i n t h e plans f o r t h e f u t u r e of t h e department. The AAUP 'Red- book' upon which much of t h e C o l l e c t i v e Bargain- ing Contract has been based s t a t e s c l e a r l y , page nine, 'Statement on Procedural Standards i n t h e Renewal o r Non-renewal of Faculty Appoint- ment', t h a t 'Faculty s t a t u s and r e l a t e d m a t t e r s a r e primarily a f a c u l t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Any recommendation regarding renewal of tenure should be reached by t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f a c u l t y group i n accordance with procedures approved by t h e f a c u l t y . ' The 'Redbook' f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t 'The conscientious judgment of t h e candi- d a t e ' s departmental autonomy i n p r o f e s s i o n a l judgments i s t o p r e v a i l . ' (p.12) I t would be inappropriate f o r me t o i n t e r f e r e with t h a t recommendation f o r o t h e r than procedural reasons except under extraordinary circumstan- ces." (Emphasis added.) - The a p p e l l a n t was denied tenure although he received a favorable recommendation from t h e c o l l e g e "rank and tenure committee." Under t h e previously announced policy such a c t i o n would only be taken where it appeared t o t h e p r e s i d e n t t h a t "extraordinary circumstances" e x i s t e d f o r overriding t h e committee's recommendation. The e f f e c t of such an announced policy was t h e s u b j e c t of discussion by t h i s Court i n Gates v. L i f e of Montana Insurance Co. (1982), 39 St.Rep. 16, and Nye v. Department of Livestock (1982), 39 St.Rep. 49. I n Gates, t h e employer had promulgated c e r t a i n personnel p o l i c i e s subsequent t o t h e time t h e employee was hired. The Court held such promulgated p o l i c i e s were n o t p a r t of t h e employment c o n t r a c t , b u t t h e employee was e n t i t l e d t o t h e b e n e f i t of those p o l i c i e s . The following excerpt i s taken from t h e Court's opinion: "The circumstances of t h i s case a r e t h a t t h e employee entered i n t o an employment c o n t r a c t terminable a t t h e w i l l of e i t h e r p a r t y a t any time. The employer l a t e r promulgated a hand- book of personnel p o l i c i e s e s t a b l i s h i n g cer- t a i n procedures with regard t o terminations. The employer need not have done s o , b u t presum- ably sought t o secure an o r d e r l y , cooperative and l o y a l work f o r c e by e s t a b l i s h i n g uniform p o l i c i e s . The employee, having f a i t h t h a t she would be t r e a t e d f a i r l y , then developed t h e peace of mind associated with job s e c u r i t y . I£ t h e employer has f a i l e d t o follow i t s own -- - -- p o l i c i e s , t h e peace of m i n d o f --- i t s employees is s h a t t e r e d and an i n j u s t i c e i s done. - -- -- "We hold t h a t a covenant of good f a i t h and f a i r dealing was implied i n t h e employment c o n t r a c t t o t h e appellant. There remains a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t which precludes a summary judgment, i.e., whether t h e respon- dent f a i l e d t o a f f o r d a p p e l l a n t t h e process required and i f s o , whether t h e respondent thereby breached t h e covenant of good f a i t h and f a i r dealing." G a t e s , 39 St.Rep. a t 20. (Emphasis added.) The crux of Gates i s t h a t , once an employer has announced a p o l i c y , t h e employer must follow t h e policy even though it i s n o t p a r t of t h e employment c o n t r a c t . W e held t h a t "good f a i t h and f a i r dealing" mandates such a process. I n Nye, - a s t a t e employee was promoted and then fired. One i s s u e on appeal w a s whether a claim f o r "wrongful discharge" could lie. This Court held t h a t employment p o l i c i e s must be followed and t h a t f a i l u r e t o do so may render t h e employer liable f o r t h e t o r t of "wrongful discharge." The employee involved was s u b j e c t t o "termination a t w i l l . " The following excerpts a r e taken from t h e Court's r e c e n t opinion: "The determination of whether t h e cause of a c t i o n a r i s e s rests upon whether an u n f a i r o r u n j u s t i f i e d termination was i n v i o l a t i o n of public policy. "Policy 3-0130 s t a t e s t h a t 'when p u n i t i v e d i s c i p l i n e i s necessary, j u s t cause, docu- mentation of f a c t s and due process a r e re- quired. ' "We f i n d t h a t t h e Department of Livestock f a i l e d t o apply its own r e g u l a t i o n s t o Margaret Nye, and t h e r e f o r e v i o l a t e d public policy." Nye, 39 St.Rep. a t 53-54. W e held i n Nye - t h a t an employer, who f a i l s t o follow its own employment p o l i c i e s , may be l i a b l e f o r wrongful discharge. Gates and - Nye, taken together, have expanded t h e Montana law p e r t a i n i n g t o employer-employee r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The law enunciated i n t h e s e two cases c o n t r o l s t h e outcome of Akhtar v. Eastern Montana College. The record i n t h e case before us i s devoid of evidence which could c o n s t i t u t e "extraordinary circumstances." Under t h e employment policy a r t i c u l a t e d by t h e c o l l e g e p r e s i d e n t on May 23, 1977, "extraordinary circumstances" provide t h e only b a s i s f o r overriding a recommendation of t h e rank and tenure committee. Here, t h e recommendation of t h e committee was not followed, and no extraordinary circumstances were shown . Although t h i s a p p e l l a n t sought tenure and w a s denied, t h e r e s u l t of t h e process was t o terminate h i s s e r v i c e s . The case cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from Gates -- and Nye. - I would remand t h i s case t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o implement t h e e x i s t i n g c o l l e g e employment p o l i c i e s and make appropriate I j o i n i n t h e d i s s e n t o f