Title: State v. Vance Ferron
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003425-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3425-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Vance Ferron,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  214 Wis. 2d 268, 570 N.W.2d 883 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 26, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter Naze 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
 Steinmetz and Crooks, J.J., join 
 
Dissented: 
Geske, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
 Geske, J. joins in part. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Jane Krueger Smith, Oconto Falls. 
 
No.  96-3425 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  96-3425-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Vance Ferron,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed as 
modified. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Ferron, 214 Wis. 2d 
268, 570 N.W.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1997), which reversed a judgment 
of the Circuit Court for Brown County, Peter J. Naze, Judge.  
The circuit court denied the defendant Vance Ferron's (Ferron) 
request to strike a juror for cause after the challenged juror 
said he "would certainly try" and "probably" could set aside his 
opinion that a criminally accused defendant who was truly 
innocent would take the stand and testify on his or her own 
behalf. 
¶2 
There are three issues before us on review.  First, we 
consider the standard of review which appellate courts should 
employ upon review of a circuit court determination that a 
prospective juror can be impartial.  Second, we apply that 
No.  96-3425 
 
2 
standard to the facts of this case to determine whether the 
circuit court committed an error of law by failing to strike the 
challenged juror for cause.  Finally, we reply to the State's 
invitation to overrule our recent decision in State v. Ramos, 
211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997). 
¶3 
Contrary to the court of appeals' decision, we hold 
that the appellate courts should overturn a circuit court's 
determination that a prospective juror can be impartial only 
where the juror's bias is manifest.  A juror's bias can 
appropriately be labeled as "manifest" whenever: (1) the record 
does not support a finding that the prospective juror is a 
reasonable person who is sincerely willing to put aside an 
opinion or prior knowledge; or (2) the record does not support a 
finding that a reasonable person in the juror's position could 
set aside the opinion or prior knowledge. 
¶4 
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we 
conclude that the record does not support a finding that the 
prospective juror at issue was a reasonable person who was 
sincerely 
willing 
to 
put 
aside 
his 
opinion 
or 
bias.  
Accordingly, we hold that Ferron was deprived of his statutorily 
defined right to due process of law when he was compelled to use 
one of his peremptory challenges, as provided by Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.03 (1993-94),1 to correct the circuit court's error. 
                     
1 All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 version 
unless otherwise noted. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 972.03 provides in pertinent part: 
No.  96-3425 
 
3 
¶5 
Because we discern no sound reason either in law or 
public policy to do so, we also decline the State's invitation 
to overrule our decision in Ramos.  Therefore, we modify the 
decision of the court of appeals and, as modified, we affirm 
that decision. 
¶6 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On November 
21, 1995, the State of Wisconsin (State) filed a criminal 
complaint charging Ferron and a codefendant, Timothy Nelson 
(Nelson), with party to the crime of burglary, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 943.10(1)(a) and 939.05.  The case was later set 
for jury trial, where Ferron and Nelson were to be tried as 
codefendants.  On March 26, 1996, the voir dire examination 
began. 
¶7 
The circuit court posed the first questions to the 
jury panel.  Following these preliminary queries, Christopher 
Froelich (Froelich), counsel for Ferron, asked a series of 
questions to determine whether the prospective jurors could 
serve impartially.  Attorney Froelich's questions were followed 
by the remarks and inquiries of codefendant Nelson's counsel, 
William Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald).  The voir dire examination by 
Fitzgerald produced the following exchange between the court, 
                                                                  
972.03  Peremptory challenges.  Each side is entitled 
to only 4 peremptory challenges except as otherwise 
provided in this section. . . . If there is more than 
one defendant, the court shall divide the challenges 
as equally as practicable among them; and if their 
defenses are adverse and the court is satisfied that 
the protection of their rights so requires, the court 
may allow the defendants additional challenges. . . . 
No.  96-3425 
 
4 
Fitzgerald, and prospective jurors James Metzler (Metzler) and 
M.C. Clark (Clark):2 
 
MR. FITZGERALD:  . . . I'm going to argue that the 
State hasn't provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Nelson is guilty of anything. 
 
Now, keeping that in mind, I may instruct Mr. Nelson 
that I don't think that he has to take the witness 
stand.  And what I wonder is would any of you think to 
yourself, well, you're saying the State's case is 
lousy, but you didn't even have your guy testify so 
what does that make your case?  Yes, Mr. Metzler. 
 
JUROR JAMES METZLER:  Well, if your client is 
innocent, why wouldn't he take the stand? 
 
MR. FITZGERALD:  Becauses [sic] the constitution 
doesn't say he has to. 
 
JUROR JAMES METZLER:  Well, if he's innocent, why 
wouldn’t he go up there and tell us he's innocent? 
 
MR. FITZGERALD:  Well, without getting into a long 
exchange about the constitutional rights that we all 
have, I can only tell you that the Court will instruct 
you that a defendant has the absolute right to decline 
to talk to the jury, to talk to the police, to talk to 
people investigating the crime, and that it might be 
my advice to him he need not take the stand.  And is 
your questioning an indication that you would hold 
that against him? 
 
JUROR JAMES METZLER:  I think I may. 
 
MR. FITZGERALD:  You think you may. 
 
THE 
COURT: 
 
Ladies 
and 
gentlemen, 
here's 
the 
instruction.  A defendant in a criminal case has the 
absolute constitutional right not to testify.  The 
defendant's decision not to testify must not be 
                     
2 These exchanges during the voir dire examination appear in 
the transcript of proceedings dated March 26, 1996.  See Record 
on Appeal 39 (Jury Trial March 26-27, 1996).  
No.  96-3425 
 
5 
considered by you in any way and must not influence 
your verdict in any manner.  Is there anyone here who 
cannot follow or would not follow that instruction? 
 
JUROR M.C. CLARK:  I would wonder, like he said, why, 
you know, if he had nothing to hide? 
 
THE COURT:  I understand. 
 
JUROR M.C. CLARK:  Why he would do that? . . . 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  Let's get back to the question 
of the defendant not testifying.  I'll read it again. 
 A defendant in a criminal case has the absolute 
constitutional right not to testify.  A defendant's 
decision not to testify must not be considered by you 
in any way and must not influence your verdict in any 
manner. 
 
And I think Mr. Metzler's reaction is a common 
reaction.  You can't deny that but that's not the law. 
 That may be the reaction you come into the courtroom 
[with], but as I said before, we have to set aside 
those personal beliefs or opinions that we have that 
conflict with the law that I'm going to give you.  The 
question is, is there any one of you who cannot follow 
the law that I've just read to you? 
 
JUROR JAMES METZLER:  Well, I would have a hard time 
believing that he was innocent if he didn't take the 
stand and tell me he wasn't [sic] innocent.  That's 
just my own belief. 
 
THE COURT:  Well, I understand that, sir.  And I said 
you're certainly entitled to that belief, and you're 
not the only person with that belief.  But the United 
States Constitution and the Constitution of the State 
of Wisconsin give every person the right not to 
testify and the right that [sic] cannot be held 
against them if they choose not to do so.  That's a 
right that you have, that I have, everybody has, 
including the defendants.  So we have to honor that 
right. 
 
The question is your opinion so strong or your belief 
so strong you're not willing to set those aside for 
No.  96-3425 
 
6 
the purpose of this case and follow the law that I've 
given you? 
 
JUROR JAMES METZLER:  Well, I would certainly try to 
set it aside. 
 
THE COURT:  Miss Clark? 
 
JUROR M.C. CLARK:  I would try to set it aside, but 
I'm not sure I could completely set that aside if that 
would be in the back of my mind that they didn't take 
the stand.  That would be kind of back there knowing 
that, you know 
 
THE COURT:  Well, obviously, if you're in there and 
the person hasn't taken the stand, we can't make you 
draw a blank. 
 
JUROR M.C. CLARK:  Right. 
 
THE COURT:  The thing you have to do is not use that 
against the defendant.  You have to decide the case on 
the evidence as it comes out in the courtroom, not 
things that didn't happen.  That's the point.  Can you 
do did [sic] that? 
 
JUROR M.C. CLARK:  I'm not so sure I could. 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Metzler, can you? 
 
JUROR JAMES METZLER:  Probably. 
 
THE COURT:  You don't think you could, Miss Clark? 
 
JUROR M.C. CLARK:  I certainly would try, but it would 
be, you know, I guess still it would always be there. 
 I would try. 
 
THE COURT:  Counsel? 
 
MR. FITZGERALD:  Well, I guess I feel we're getting 
low on jurors, but I would move to relieve Mr. Metzler 
and Miss Clark. 
 
THE COURT:  I'm not removing Mr. Metzler.  He said he 
could do this.  I'm concerned about Miss Clark. 
No.  96-3425 
 
7 
¶8 
The circuit court continued to question Clark to 
determine if she could set aside her feelings.  When Clark 
ultimately stated that she "would have a hard time that they 
didn't testify," the court excused her and proceeded with the 
voir dire examination accordingly.  Following the examination, 
Ferron used one of his two peremptory strikes to remove Metzler 
from the jury panel.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (limiting Ferron's 
challenges to 2 in this case). 
¶9 
On March 27, 1996, Ferron was convicted of party to 
the crime of burglary.  On appeal, Ferron argued that the 
circuit court committed reversible error when it refused to 
strike Metzler for cause, because Metzler exhibited a bias 
against defendants who decline to testify.  According to Ferron, 
the circuit court's action compelled him to exercise one of his 
statutorily granted peremptory challenges to correct the court's 
error, thereby depriving him of his right to due process under 
state law.  The State asserted that Metzler did not exhibit a 
manifest bias, and that the circuit court's determination should 
therefore be upheld. 
¶10 The court of appeals held that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to strike 
Metzler for cause because his answers revealed that he was not 
indifferent as required by Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).3  See Ferron, 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.08(1) provides in pertinent part: 
805.08  Jurors. (1) QUALIFICATIONS, EXAMINATION.  The court 
shall examine on oath each person who is called as a 
juror to discover whether the juror is related by 
blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney 
No.  96-3425 
 
8 
214 Wis. 2d at 276.  The court of appeals also held that the 
circuit court failed to follow the directive in Nyberg v. State, 
75 Wis. 2d 400, 249 N.W.2d 524 (1977), that a motion to strike a 
juror for cause must be granted whenever the court reasonably 
suspects that circumstances outside the evidence will influence 
the juror.  See id.  Because these errors compelled Ferron to 
use one of his peremptory strikes to correct the circuit court's 
error, the court of appeals held that Ferron's right to due 
process 
had 
been 
violated, 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment, and remanded for a new trial in accordance with Ramos, 
211 Wis. 2d 12. 
¶11 On December 16, 1997, this court granted the State's 
petition for review.  With substantial modifications to its 
reasoning, we now affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
I. 
¶12 We first consider the standard of review which 
appellate courts should employ upon review of a circuit court 
determination that a prospective juror can be impartial.  The 
parties agree that "[t]he question of whether a prospective 
juror is biased and should be dismissed from the jury panel for 
cause is a matter of the circuit court's discretion."  Ramos, 
211 Wis. 2d at 15 (quoting State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 666, 
482 N.W.2d 99 (1992)).  They disagree, however, as to the 
                                                                  
appearing in the case, or has any financial interest 
in the case, or has expressed or formed any opinion, 
or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case.  If 
a juror is not indifferent in the case, the juror 
shall be excused. . . . 
No.  96-3425 
 
9 
appropriate standard to be employed upon review of the circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
decision. 
 
A 
determination 
of 
the 
appropriate standard of review is a question of law.  Therefore 
we review this question independently and without deference to 
the decision of the court of appeals.  See Wyss v. Albee, 193 
Wis. 2d 101, 109, 532 N.W.2d 444 (1995). 
¶13 As mentioned, the court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court's failure to strike Metzler for cause constituted 
reversible error for two reasons.  First, the court concluded 
that "[t]he trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
failing to follow the directive in § 805.08(1), STATS., to excuse 
a juror who is not indifferent . . . ."  Ferron, 214 Wis. 2d at 
276.  Although the parties disagree as to the court of appeals' 
ultimate conclusion on this matter, they do not disagree over 
the court of appeals' use of Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) to reach 
that result. 
¶14 The court of appeals also held that the circuit 
court's failure to follow "the Nyberg requirement that a motion 
to remove for cause be granted when the court reasonably 
suspects that circumstances outside the evidence will influence 
the juror,"  id., constituted reversible error.  It is the court 
of appeals' reliance upon Nyberg, 75 Wis. 2d 400, which serves 
as the primary catalyst to the parties' arguments before this 
court. 
¶15 According to the State, the "reasonable suspicion" 
language set forth in Nyberg, 75 Wis. 2d at 404, is dictum.  The 
appropriate standard of review is set forth in State v. Louis, 
No.  96-3425 
 
10
156 Wis. 2d 470, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990), which indicates that an 
appellate court may overturn the circuit court's denial of such 
motions only when the juror's bias is "manifest." 
¶16 Ferron disagrees, and concludes that appellate courts 
must undertake a two-step analysis upon review of determinations 
of juror impartiality.  According to Ferron, the party seeking 
to overturn the circuit court's determination must establish: 
(1) that the challenged juror exhibited a manifest bias in 
accordance with Louis; and (2) that the record evidences grounds 
to reasonably suspect that the juror could not set the bias 
aside in accordance with Nyberg.  Ferron contends that this case 
involves only the second issue: whether Metzler could set aside 
his admitted bias against defendants who choose not to testify. 
 Therefore, Ferron asserts that the court of appeals applied the 
proper standard of reviewone of "reasonable suspicion." 
¶17 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the 
State and therefore reject Ferron's interpretation of the case 
law.  We begin by examining the "reasonable suspicion" language 
upon which Ferron relies. 
A. 
¶18 In Nyberg, the defendant argued on appeal from his 
conviction of delivery of a controlled substance that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by not 
striking three jurors for cause because of bias shown at the 
voir dire examination.  See Nyberg, 75 Wis. 2d at 402-403.  The 
court noted first that to require dismissal of a prospective 
juror for cause, there must be more than a suggestion of 
No.  96-3425 
 
11
partialitythe appropriate question for a panel member is 
whether the prospective juror believes that he or she can decide 
the case fairly on the evidence.  See id. at 404 (citations 
omitted). 
¶19 The Nyberg court went on to state that "[a] trial 
court must honor challenges for cause whenever it may reasonably 
suspect that circumstances outside the evidence may create bias 
or appearance of bias."  Id. at 404 (emphasis added) (citing 
Nolan v. Venus Motors, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 215, 223, 218 N.W.2d 507 
(1974)).  Because the "[p]anel members were dismissed . . . 
because they believed they could not decide the case fairly on 
the evidence," the Nyberg court upheld the circuit court's 
discretionary act.  See id. at 405. 
¶20 The "reasonable suspicion" language upon which Ferron 
relies finds its roots in Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 
Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956).4  In Kanzenbach, we 
stated: 
                     
4 As mentioned, the Nyberg court actually cited Nolan for 
the proposition that courts must honor challenges for cause when 
they have a reasonable suspicion of juror bias.  In turn, 
however, Nolan cited Kanzenbach as the source of the language 
and stated the language itself somewhat differently.  See Nolan 
v. Venus Motors, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 215, 223, 218 N.W.2d 507 
(1974) (stating that the circuit court "should" honor challenges 
for cause upon a reasonable suspicion of juror bias). 
It is also worth noting that Nolan explicitly rejected the 
argument that a party's reasonable suspicion that a juror is or 
may be partial compels a circuit court to strike that juror for 
cause.  See id. at 221-22.  Although this conclusion weakens 
Ferron's position in this case, it admittedly does not address 
Ferron's precise argument: that a court's reasonable suspicion 
of juror bias compels the court to strike that juror for cause. 
No.  96-3425 
 
12
 
The trial judge has a wide discretion in determining 
the qualifications of the jurors.  He was satisfied 
that these jurors were competent and fair.  We cannot 
hold that in these instances his rulings abused a 
sound discretion nor does the verdict lead us to a 
suspicion that prejudice towards the defendants on the 
part of any juror actually existed.  However, because 
it preserves the appearance as well as the reality of 
an impartial trial, it is a good rule for the trial 
judge to honor challenges for cause whenever he may 
reasonably suspect that circumstances outside the 
evidence may create bias or an appearance of bias on 
the part of the challenged juror. 
Id. at 626-27 (emphasis added). 
¶21 Thus, a review of our case law reveals that the Nyberg 
language upon which Ferron relies underwent the following 
metamorphosis: it began as "a good rule" for circuit court 
judges to follow, see id., evolved into a principle which 
"should" be followed, see Nolan, 64 Wis. 2d at 223, and 
ultimately took the shape of an affirmative and mandatory 
command to circuit court judges in this state.  See Nyberg, 75 
Wis. 2d at 404.5 
¶22 Today we send the "reasonable suspicion" language back 
to its place of origin.  In so doing, we are mindful that this 
is not the first time that the Nyberg language has been employed 
by litigants seeking to overturn determinations of juror 
impartiality.  See, e.g., Booker v. Israel, 566 F. Supp. 868, 
869 (E.D. Wis. 1983); State v. Gesch, 163 Wis. 2d 993, 996-97, 
                     
5 Even this final interpretation of Nyberg's language may be 
unwarranted.  We note that the sentence following the disputed 
Nyberg language referred to the language as a "guideline."  See 
Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 405, 249 N.W.2d 524 (1977).  
No.  96-3425 
 
13
473 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 
N.W.2d 99 (1992). 
¶23 As we have done in the past, see, e.g., Kanzenbach, 
273 Wis. at 627, we caution and encourage the circuit courts to 
strike prospective jurors for cause when the circuit courts 
"reasonably suspect" that juror bias exists.  Our recommendation 
does not require, however, that an appellate court overturn the 
circuit court's assessment of a prospective juror's impartiality 
whenever the appellate record presents a reasonable suspicion 
that circumstances outside the evidence will influence the 
juror.  See, e.g., Gesch, 163 Wis. 2d at 997 ("Nyberg does not 
compel the creation of broad, general rules.").  To demand 
compliance with such a rigid standard would be to undermine the 
circuit court's discretion during voir dire examinations. 
¶24 Because the Nyberg court inappropriately expanded our 
prior jurisprudence, that portion of the opinion which states 
that "[a] trial court must honor challenges for cause whenever 
it may reasonably suspect that circumstances outside the 
evidence may create bias or appearance of bias," see Nyberg, 75 
Wis. 2d at 404, is hereby overruled.6  We now proceed to 
elucidate the proper standard of review. 
                     
6 Because 
Nolan 
merely 
suggested 
that 
circuit 
courts 
"should" follow the reasonable suspicion guideline, we adhere to 
that decision.  See Nolan, 64 Wis. 2d at 223. 
No.  96-3425 
 
14
B. 
¶25 It is a well-settled principle of law in this state 
that a determination by a circuit court that a prospective juror 
can be impartial should be overturned only where the prospective 
juror's bias is "manifest."  See, e.g., State v. Messelt, 185 
Wis. 2d 254, 269, 518 N.W.2d 232 (1994); Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 
478-79; Hammill v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 404, 416, 278 N.W.2d 821 
(1979); State v. Delgado, 215 Wis. 2d 16, 25, 572 N.W.2d 479 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
¶26 The United States Supreme Court has frequently ruled 
to the same effect.  See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 
1031-32 (1984); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723-24 (1961); Holt 
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910); Ex Parte Spies, 123 
U.S. 131, 179-80 (1887); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
155-57 (1878). 
¶27 We see no reason to depart from this accepted standard 
of review.7  The requirement that juror bias or circuit court 
error be "manifest" before it is overturned is appropriate 
                                                                  
Ferron also argues that State v. Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393, 
489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992) involved the specific issue in 
this casewhether an admittedly biased juror can set aside that 
biasand employed the "reasonable suspicion" standard in doing 
so.  We disagree.  Traylor involved assertions of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to move to strike certain 
jurors for cause.  See id. at 397-401.  It fails to mention, 
much less apply, a "reasonable suspicion" standard. 
7 Contrary to Ferron's assertions, the determination of 
juror impartiality does not require a two-step approach.  A 
juror's ability to set aside his or her bias is, as the State 
contends, "part and parcel" of the manifest bias inquiry.  
No.  96-3425 
 
15
because the circuit court has the opportunity to observe the 
prospective juror's attitude and disposition during the voir 
dire examination.  To the contrary, the appellate courts which 
attempt to make their own assessments of a prospective juror's 
impartiality must do so from the cold, typewritten words of an 
appellate record.  See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 156-57 ("[T]he 
manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more 
indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. 
 That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the 
record.").  As we have stated, adoption of the "reasonable 
suspicion" standard advocated by Ferron would do away with the 
circuit court's broad discretion in this area of law. 
C. 
¶28 We acknowledge that "[i]mpartiality is not a technical 
conception.  It is a state of mind.  For the ascertainment of 
this 
mental 
attitude 
of 
appropriate 
indifference, 
the 
Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not 
chained to any ancient and artificial formula."  United States 
v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936).  Nevertheless, we are 
persuaded to further clarify the manifest bias standard because 
we recognize that our recent decision in Ramos compels the 
circuit courts to more carefully scrutinize challenges for 
cause.  See generally Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12 (holding that the 
use of a peremptory challenge to correct a circuit court's error 
of law for failure to strike a juror for cause is adequate 
grounds for reversal). 
No.  96-3425 
 
16
¶29 Accordingly, we hold that a prospective juror's bias 
is "manifest" whenever a review of the record: (1) does not 
support a finding that the prospective juror is a reasonable 
person who is sincerely willing to put aside an opinion or prior 
knowledge; or (2) does not support a finding that a reasonable 
person in the juror's position could set aside the opinion or 
prior knowledge. 
¶30 Adopting this approach serves two purposes.  With a 
focus on prospective jurors' subjective willingness to set aside 
their biases, the first prong of this approach accounts for the 
circuit court's superior position to assess the demeanor and 
disposition of prospective jurors.  The second prong allows the 
appellate courts to determine whether under the particular 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
voir 
dire 
examination, 
no 
reasonable juror could put aside the bias or opinion which is 
revealed by the record.  See, e.g., Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 667 
(concluding that prospective jurors who are related to a state 
witness by blood or marriage to the third degree must be struck 
from the jury panel on the basis of implied bias). 
II. 
¶31 Having clarified 
the 
appropriate 
standard 
to be 
employed upon review of a circuit court's determination that a 
prospective juror can be impartial, we apply that standard to 
the facts of this case.  As we have stated, "[t]he question of 
whether a prospective juror is biased and should be dismissed 
from the jury panel for cause is a matter of the circuit court's 
discretion."  Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 15 (citation omitted).  
No.  96-3425 
 
17
"This court will find an erroneous exercise of discretion if a 
circuit court's discretionary decision is based on an error of 
law."  Id. at 16. 
¶32 In Wisconsin, a juror who "has expressed or formed any 
opinion, or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case" must 
be struck from the panel for cause.  Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).  
"If a juror is not indifferent in the case, the juror shall be 
excused."  Id.  We have previously stated that "[e]ven the 
appearance of bias should be avoided."  Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 
478. 
¶33 In this case, a review of the relevant dialogue 
between 
the 
court, 
counsel 
for 
the 
defendants, 
and 
the 
prospective jurors will illustrate that the circuit court 
committed an error of law by failing to strike Metzler for 
cause. 
¶34 The relevant voir dire examination in this case began 
with Attorney Fitzgerald's questions regarding possible bias 
based on the defendant's choice not to testify.  Metzler 
responded, "Well, if your client is innocent, why wouldn't he 
take the stand?"  In reply, Fitzgerald informed Metzler of a 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to elect not to 
testify. 
¶35 Apparently unpersuaded, Metzler again asked, "Well, if 
he's innocent, why wouldn't he go up there and tell us he's 
innocent?"  This answer led Fitzgerald to offer a more detailed 
explanation of a criminal defendant's right to decline to 
testify on his own behalf.  When asked again whether Metzler 
No.  96-3425 
 
18
would hold his bias against Ferron, Metzler responded, "I think 
I may." 
¶36 At this point, the court stepped in to inform the 
prospective 
jurors 
of 
a 
criminal 
defendant's 
"absolute 
constitutional right not to testify" which "must not be 
considered by you in any way and must not influence your verdict 
in any manner."  Following a brief exchange with prospective 
juror M.C. Clark, the court instructed the jury panel on the law 
a second time. 
¶37 Despite the court's detailed instructions, Metzler 
continued to express his belief that criminal defendants who 
elect not to testify on their own behalf are guilty of 
wrongdoing.  He added, "Well, I would have a hard time believing 
that he was innocent if he didn't take the stand and tell me he 
wasn't [sic] innocent.  That's just my own belief." 
¶38 Although Metzler later stated that he "would certainly 
try to set [his bias] aside," the record indicates that the 
circuit court was not satisfied with this answer, and continued 
to question Metzler regarding his ability to serve as an 
impartial juror.  Metzler's final response indicated that he 
"[p]robably" could set his bias aside. 
¶39 In all, 
the discussion 
regarding 
Ferron's 
Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination produced four 
pages of dialogue in the record, which included two instructions 
on the law from defense counsel and four instructions from the 
court.  Yet in the end, the most the circuit court was able to 
ascertain as to Metzler's willingness to set aside his obvious 
No.  96-3425 
 
19
bias against defendants who choose not to testify on their own 
behalf was "[p]robably." 
¶40 We emphasize that questions as to a prospective 
juror's sincere willingness to set aside bias should be largely 
left to the circuit court's discretion.  There are no magical 
words that need be spoken by the prospective juror, and the 
juror need not affirmatively state 
that he 
or she can 
"definitely" set the bias aside.  Suffice it to say that without 
the appropriate follow-up questions by the circuit court, a 
juror's final word of "probably" is insufficient to indicate a 
sincere willingness to set aside his or her bias against parties 
who choose to exercise their constitutional rights.8 
¶41 Indeed, that Metzler's explicit bias was hinged upon 
Ferron's 
Fifth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
be 
free 
from 
self-
incrimination is of considerable importance in this case.  As 
the United States Supreme Court has stated, the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination: 
 
reflects a complex of our fundamental values and 
aspirations, and marks an important advance in the 
development of our liberty.  It can be asserted in any 
proceeding, 
civil 
or 
criminal, 
administrative 
or 
judicial, 
investigatory 
or 
adjudicatory, 
and 
it 
protects against any disclosures which the witness 
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal 
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might 
                     
8 For example, an appropriate follow-up question in these 
instances would be, "Will you follow the law?"  If the juror 
gives an answer which indicates a less-than sincere willingness 
to put aside all biases and apply the law in that particular 
case, that juror must be struck from the panel for cause. 
No.  96-3425 
 
20
be so used.  This Court has been zealous to safeguard 
the values which underlie the privilege. 
Kastigar 
v. 
United 
States, 
406 
U.S. 
441, 
444-45 
(1972) 
(footnotes omitted).  Although we do not decide the issue, our 
decision in this case may have been differentgiven the same 
recordhad Metzler exhibited a bias which did not conflict with 
such an essential constitutional right.9 
¶42 During voir dire examinations, the circuit courts are 
advised to establish a thorough record which sets forth the 
court's rationale for denying a motion to strike a juror for 
cause.  The circuit courts are also advised to err on the side 
                     
9 The dissents by Justice Geske and Justice Bradley both 
stress the importance of this case and forcefully contend that 
we have removed the discretion of the trial judges in this 
state.  See generally Justice Geske's dissent; Justice Bradley's 
dissent.  We disagree, and emphasize that the circuit courts 
retain wide discretion in this area of law.  The prospective 
juror's responses in this case were simply insufficient to 
indicate a sincere willingness to abide by the United States 
Constitution in deciding Ferron's fate. 
To this same end, both dissents argue that we give the 
circuit courts no guidance as to what will be deemed sufficient 
responses by prospective jurors during voir dire examinations.  
See Justice Geske's dissent at 2 ("The majority gives no 
guidance to trial judges as to where their discretion ends."); 
Justice Bradley's dissent at 5 ("The majority opinion leaves 
circuit courts and appellate courts with no guidance as they 
venture to guess what this majority will deem sufficient in 
future cases.").  In doing so, the dissents are internally 
inconsistent. 
Adopting a standard in this case, or giving extensive 
"guidance" to the circuit courts would do away with their 
discretiona result which the dissents emphatically disavow.  We 
decline to set forth a definitive test which draws the line 
between those answers which are acceptable and those which are 
not because, quite frankly, there is no such test. 
No.  96-3425 
 
21
of striking prospective jurors who appear to be biased, even if 
the appellate court would not reverse their determinations of 
impartiality.  See, e.g., Kanzenbach, 273 Wis. at 627.  Such 
action will avoid the appearance of bias, and may save judicial 
time and resources in the long run. 
¶43 We pause to note the inherent difficulties with voir 
dire examinations.  In attempting to ascertain the sincerity of 
a prospective juror's willingness to set aside an opinion, bias 
or prior knowledge, circuit courts should refrain from badgering 
the prospective juror, or from giving the appearance that it is 
doing so.10  Even the appearance of such assertiveness by the 
court is likely to alter the demeanor, inflection and answers 
which that particular panel member, and others around him or 
her, may give to voir dire questions. 
¶44 Because Metzler's lack of sincere willingness to set 
aside his bias illustrates that he was not "indifferent in the 
case" as required by Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1), we conclude that 
the circuit court committed an error of law, and thereby 
erroneously exercised its discretion, in denying the motion to 
strike Metzler for cause.  See, e.g., State v. Zurfluh, 134 
Wis. 2d 436, 439, 397 N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that 
the circuit court's failure to follow statutory direction 
constitutes an error of law, and an erroneous exercise of 
discretion).  Before determining the appropriate remedy for such 
                     
10 We emphasize that there is no evidence in this record to 
suggest that the circuit court engaged in such conduct.  
No.  96-3425 
 
22
an error of law, we first address the State's request to 
overrule our recent decision in Ramos. 
III. 
¶45 In Ramos, we held that the use of a peremptory 
challenge to correct a circuit court error for failure to strike 
a juror for cause is adequate grounds for reversal because it 
arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a statutorily granted 
right.  See Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 24-25.  For various reasons 
which we need not examine in detail, the State asks this court 
to "reconsider" that decision.  We decline to do so. 
¶46 Put simply, the ink has yet to dry on our decision in 
Ramos.  Were we to overrule Ramos, we find it no great leap of 
faith to suggest that public confidence in the judiciary would 
be diminished.  Moreover, both parties in this case appear to 
agree that bench and bar alike have attempted to familiarize 
themselves with Ramos, and have taken steps to comply with its 
holding.  In a society which depends upon the rule of law, 
reliance upon judicial decisionmaking forms the centerpiece of 
our legal culture.  
¶47 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, 
"[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, 
fosters 
reliance 
on 
judicial 
decisions, 
and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process."  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991). 
No.  96-3425 
 
23
¶48 "[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare decisis 
demands special justification."  Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 
203, 212 (1984).  The State provides no "special" or compelling 
justification to overturn our decision.  Instead, it repeats 
much of the argument it presented in Ramos, and even asks the 
court to reconsider the rationale set forth in the Ramos 
dissent. 
¶49 The path upon which the State would have us travel is 
uncertain and precarious.  By adhering to our decision in Ramos, 
we choose a path which may not always lead to infallible 
results, 
but 
which 
certainly 
provides 
more 
stable 
and 
predictable footing for the future. 
IV. 
¶50 Because Ferron was compelled to use one of his 
statutorily granted peremptory challenges to correct the circuit 
court's error of law, his conviction must be reversed, and the 
cause remanded for a new trial in accordance with our decision 
in Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12.  Therefore, the decision of the court 
of appeals is modified as to its use of an inappropriate 
standard of review, and as modified, the decision is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified, and as modified, affirmed. 
 
 
No. 96-3425.wab 
 
1 
¶51 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring).   I join the 
majority opinion, and write only to answer the dissenting 
opinions of Justice Geske and Justice Bradley.  
¶52 Both dissents take the position that the response of 
juror Metzler of “probably” was good enough.  It was not good 
enough when taken in context.  
¶53 The issue to which the juror was asked to respond was 
whether he would afford the defendant the rights due him under 
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Thus, his answer 
was, in reality, “I probably will grant the defendant his rights 
under the Fifth Amendment.”  That is not the juror’s choice.  He 
must afford the defendant his rights under the Constitution.  He 
either will or he won’t, not “probably;” that term connotes the 
potential that he will not.   
¶54 Further exacerbating the issue is that the juror’s 
response did not appear in a vacuum.  His response of “probably” 
came only after a number of colloquies between counsel for the 
defendant, the circuit court, and the juror.  These colloquies 
are well documented in the majority opinion, but they include 
statements from juror Metzler such as “ Well, if your client is 
innocent, why wouldn’t he take the stand?”; “Well, if he’s 
innocent, why wouldn’t he go up there and tell us he’s 
innocent?”; “I think I may.” (in response to a question of 
whether he would hold the defendant’s failure to take the stand 
against the defendant); “Well, I would have a hard time 
believing that he was innocent if he didn’t take the stand and 
No. 96-3425.wab 
 
2 
tell me he wasn’t [sic] innocent.”; “Well, I would certainly try 
to set it aside.”; and then, “Probably.” 
¶55 The circuit court, at the conclusion of all this, 
stated:  “I’m not removing Mr. Metzler.  He said he could do 
this.”  The court, respectfully, was in error.  Mr. Metzler did 
not say he could do this.  He said, “Probably.”  Following what 
preceded this, it was not good enough.   
¶56 We are not here dealing with whether a juror can 
accept the court’s instructions on some mundane area of the law. 
 We are dealing with fundamental rights.  The majority’s 
conclusion is absolutely correct.    
¶57 I am authorized to state that Justice Donald W. 
Steinmetz and Justice N. Patrick Crooks join this concurrence. 
 
 
No. 96-3425.jpg 
 
1 
¶58 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Dissenting).   I join Part I of 
Justice Bradley's dissent.  I write separately to express my 
deep 
concern 
that 
the 
majority 
has 
substantially 
and 
inappropriately restricted the circuit court's discretion during 
the voir dire process.  In almost every serious felony case, 
honest prospective jurors express concerns about the heinous 
factual allegations, the presumption of innocence, a prior 
record, other acts testimony, a defendant's option not to 
testify, evaluating a police officer's testimony in the same 
manner as other witnesses, or the victimization of a child, 
elderly or disabled person.  We encourage trial judges to 
explore those fears, biases, and natural reactions with the 
members of the prospective jury panel.  Few people can honestly 
tell the court that they are bothered by some of these factors 
in the case and then absolutely, without equivocation, reassure 
the judge that they are certain they can disregard their 
concerns.  Most honest people can only commit that they will do 
their best to be fair.  The trial judge must then, based upon 
his or her own assessment of that person's sincerity and ability 
to be fair, decide whether that person is qualified to sit on 
that particular case. 
¶59 Judge Naze conducted just such a discussion and 
assessment here.  He concluded, based upon what he heard and 
observed, that the juror could be fair.  The majority disagrees 
with Judge Naze's assessment.  Instead, the majority concludes 
that Mr. Metzler, whom none of us on this court ever heard or 
observed, maintained a manifest bias and could not be a fair 
No. 96-3425.jpg 
 
2 
juror.  Exchanges like the one between Judge Naze and juror 
Metzler occur in Wisconsin courtrooms every day.  Trial judges, 
in both civil and criminal cases, routinely make the type of 
assessment that Judge Naze did here.  Whether any of us on this 
court may have made the same discretionary call as Judge Naze is 
not relevant to our discussion.  That judgment call belonged to 
the trial judge in the courtroom and not to us in the supreme 
court conference room reading bare words on a transcript. 
¶60 In this opinion the majority has, in effect, told the 
circuit courts that appellate courts are in a better position to 
make this judgment call.  The majority gives no guidance to 
trial judges as to where their discretion ends.  Because of this 
decision, the court of appeals must now assume the new task of 
looking at the answers of prospective jurors on cases which have 
already been tried, to reach an appellate court assessment of 
whether a juror should have been struck for cause.  This court 
should have left that discretion where it belongsin the hands 
of the trial judges. 
 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
1 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting). 
 
What I want to stress is the importance of this case. 
 I think that this is the most important case that I 
have ever had.  I haven't been a lawyer forever, about 
15 years at this, but this is by far the most 
important case I've ever had.  This case affects not 
only criminal cases, but it affects civil cases.  
We're talking about the finality of verdicts. 
¶62 As noted by the assistant attorney general at oral 
argument, the important issue in this case affects the finality 
of verdicts.  In addressing the issue of the appropriate 
standard of appellate review of a circuit court's determination 
that a prospective juror can be impartial, the majority 
concludes that the manifest bias standard should be applied.  
While I agree with the standard adopted by the majority, as it 
acknowledges a circuit court's more advantageous position for 
evaluating a voir dire, I believe the majority errs in the 
application of the standard in this case. 
I. 
¶63 An appellate court may overturn a circuit court's 
determination of juror impartiality only where a review of the 
record shows that a juror's bias is "manifest."  See State v. 
Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 478-79, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990).  In 
interpreting this language, the majority adopts the test for 
manifest bias offered by the State.  That test indicates that 
manifest bias will not exist where the record shows that a 
prospective juror is a reasonable person who is sincerely 
willing to put aside an opinion or prior knowledge and that a 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
2 
reasonable person in the juror's position could set aside the 
opinion or prior knowledge. 
¶64 While I agree with the test adopted by the majority, I 
disagree with the court's application of that test here.  In 
reversing the circuit court, the majority claims that the record 
does not indicate that the challenged juror in this case, 
Metzler, was sincerely willing to put aside his potential bias 
against a defendant that does not testify.  However, this is not 
a case where the record indicates that a potential juror refused 
to put aside a procedural bias.  This is also not a case where 
the circuit court ignored counsel's concern about a potential 
juror.  Rather, this is a case where, based on extensive 
questioning, legal instruction, and first-hand assessment of 
Metzler's comments, the circuit court determined that the juror 
was willing to put aside his bias. 
¶65 In 
exercising 
appellate 
review 
over 
decisions 
effectively 
requiring 
a 
credibility 
determination 
of 
a 
prospective juror, this court must acknowledge that a cold 
record cannot adequately convey indicia of sincerity.  The 
reason for this is simple: you cannot talk sincerity, you 
communicate sincerity.  Appellate review of the record by and 
large is limited to a review of the talk.  The communication 
available for the circuit court to assess includes seeing the 
body 
language, 
hearing 
the 
inflection, 
experiencing 
the 
hesitancy, pauses, or certainty of the statement. 
¶66 The record indicates that Metzler expressed doubts 
about the defendant's motivations in failing to testify.  In 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
3 
response, defense counsel and the circuit court instructed the 
voir dire pool on the defendant's constitutional rights.  The 
circuit court then asked if Metzler was "willing to set those 
[doubts] aside for the purpose of this case and follow the law?" 
Metzler replied, "Well, I would certainly try to set it aside." 
¶67 After 
further 
questioning 
of 
another 
prospective 
juror, the court advised that "[t]he thing you have to do is not 
use that against the defendant.  You have to decide the case on 
the evidence as it comes out in the court room, not things that 
didn't happen.  That's the point.  Can you do did [sic] that?"  
Metzler responded, "Probably."  When defense counsel asked the 
court to remove Metzler from the jury pool, the court stated, 
"I'm not removing Mr. Metzler.  He said he could do that." 
¶68 Based on this colloquy, and focusing particularly on 
Metzler's use of the word "Probably," the majority determines 
that Metzler maintained a manifest bias against the defendant.  
In so doing, the majority violates its own test.  The majority 
emphasizes that evaluating a prospective juror's sincerity is 
best left to the circuit court and declares that there are no 
magical words or "affirmative[] state[ments]" that a juror need 
make to indicate impartiality, and that there is no "definitive 
test which draws the line between those answers which are 
acceptable and those which are not . . . ."  Majority op at 19, 
20 n.9.  Yet, based on one word, "Probably," the majority 
reverses the circuit court's first-hand evaluation of the 
prospective juror's ability to judge the defendant impartially. 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
4 
¶69 In reaching this conclusion, the majority requires 
that which it disclaims—a definitive affirmative statement 
indicating that the potential juror is able and willing to set 
aside any bias against a defendant who does not testify.  Yet, 
faced with a daunting and legalistic question like, "Can you put 
aside all bias," I submit that the average voir dire participant 
will respond with a qualified affirmative instead of the 
unambiguous declaration that the majority seems to require. 
¶70 The majority asserts that Metzler's response that he 
"probably" could base his decision solely on the evidence leaves 
the court with an equivocation.  The majority concludes that the 
response is "insufficient to indicate a sincere willingness to 
set aside his or her bias. . . ."  Majority op. at 19.  Such a 
conclusion is incorrect.  Contrary to the majority's discomfort 
with Metzler's "probably," no precedent of this court indicates 
that "probably" is unacceptable equivocation. 
¶71 Our jurisprudence is replete with examples in which we 
rely on a standard of probability: we make arrests, issue 
warrants and commit individuals to mental institutions upon a 
showing of probable cause; the opinion of an expert founded upon 
a reasonable degree of probability is a sufficient basis upon 
which to award millions of dollars in complex cases.  Yet, the 
majority disparages a juror's use of "probably," and on that 
basis elevates its assessment of a prospective juror's sincerity 
above that of the circuit court. 
¶72 In an attempt to narrow the scope of its conclusion, 
the majority makes its result dependent upon the Fifth Amendment 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
5 
right against self-incrimination, even going so far as to state 
that "our decision in this case may have been different—given 
the same record—had Metzler exhibited a bias which did not 
conflict with such an essential constitutional right."  Majority 
op. at 20.  While I acknowledge the importance of the Fifth 
Amendment, the majority's reliance upon it to justify its result 
in this case appears to be an arbitrary exercise.  It precludes 
circuit courts from eliciting any guidance whatsoever from the 
majority analysis which could serve to explain why the majority 
overrules the circuit court's decision in this case.11 
¶73 The 
majority 
opinion 
leaves 
circuit 
courts 
and 
appellate courts with no guidance as they venture to guess what 
this majority will deem sufficient in future cases.  Compounding 
this lack of direction is the severity of the consequences if 
they guess incorrectly—jeopardizing the finality of verdicts. 
¶74 The circuit courts and appellate courts are left to 
wonder if the word "probably" is sufficient.  Initially, 
discussion in the majority opinion seems to suggest it would not 
be sufficient.  Yet, the opinion subsequently equivocates and 
                     
11  The majority confuses this point, alleging that the 
dissents are internally inconsistent.  The majority also 
mistakenly equates a call for guidance with a request for a 
bright-line rule.  I espouse no bright-line "magic" words.  
Quite to the contrary, I continue to strongly believe that the 
circuit courts are best left to assess the sincerity of a 
prospective juror.  However, if the majority is going to take 
the ill-advised tactic of usurping the circuit court's entirely 
acceptable decision in this case, then the majority must provide 
our courts with some sort of guidance by which to examine future 
cases. 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
6 
suggests it "may" be sufficient if there is no conflict with 
"such a constitutional right."  Courts will be left to wonder: 
why should a Fifth Amendment constitutional right be elevated 
above and considered more essential than other constitutional 
rights? 
¶75 In 
holding 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
up 
for 
special 
treatment in the voir dire analysis solely to justify the 
court's errant conclusion, the majority opinion ignores the more 
encompassing fundamental constitutional right with which this 
case really deals—the defendant's right to a fair trial.  
Because 
courts 
must 
act 
to 
preserve 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial, whether the alleged bias 
against the defendant is based on personal attributes such as 
race or on legal attributes such as the defendant's invocation 
of the Fifth Amendment, exaltation of the Fifth Amendment 
considerations 
over 
other 
aspects 
of 
the 
fair 
trial 
constitutional guarantee appears, and is, arbitrary.   
¶76 The majority also missteps when it concludes that it 
is in a better position than is the circuit court to assess a 
prospective juror's credibility and sincerity.  We should 
reserve imposing our own view of the record to those cases where 
the circuit court's interpretation has no support in the record 
or where the circuit court ignores its duties.  Accordingly, I 
dissent from the majority's conclusion that the circuit court as 
a matter of law erroneously exercised its discretion. 
II. 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
7 
¶77 Additionally, I note that this court is again faced 
with reversing a conviction based on State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 
12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997).  The court takes this action not 
because the defendant has demonstrated that the jury impaneled 
in his criminal case was anything other than fair and impartial, 
but rather because of Ramos' ruling that the "trial court's 
failure to dismiss the challenged juror for cause effectively 
deprived [the defendant] of the right to exercise all seven of 
his statutorily granted peremptory challenges."  Ramos, 211 Wis. 
2d at 24. 
¶78 As the dissent in Ramos succinctly noted, statutory 
peremptory challenges exist not to allow defendants to randomly 
shuffle a jury pool in their favor, but rather to ensure the 
impaneling 
of 
an 
impartial 
jury 
as 
a component of our 
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial.  See Ramos, 211 Wis. 
2d at 33 (Crooks, J. dissenting)(citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 
U.S. 42, 57 (1992) and Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988)).  
When a defendant exercises a peremptory challenge to strike a 
juror who should have been excused by the court for cause, the 
defendant also acts to ensure that an unbiased trier of fact 
considers the case. 
¶79 However, under Ramos, even where the defendant has 
failed to establish that a jury panel was anything other than 
fair and impartial, the defendant's conviction must be reversed 
if the defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge to 
excuse a juror who should have been excused for cause.  See 
Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 24-25.  Such a result seems contrary to a 
No. 96-3425.awb 
 
8 
significant body of Wisconsin case law.  See State v. Traylor, 
170 Wis. 2d 393, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992); Bergman v. 
Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900); Pool v. Milwaukee 
Mechanics' Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 69 N.W. 65 (1896); Carthaus v. 
State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891). 
¶80  Although Ramos is a recent decision of this court, its 
rationale is no more correct today than it was one year ago when 
it was decided.  While I agree that the doctrine of stare 
decisis deserves great weight in our jurisprudence, it seems 
incongruous to refuse to reconsider the decision solely on stare 
decisis grounds when, as noted above, Ramos itself disregarded a 
line of precedent spanning over a century in reaching its 
conclusion. 
 
While 
I 
acknowledge 
that 
it 
is 
currently 
controlling 
authority, 
I 
continue 
to 
believe 
Ramos 
was 
incorrectly decided. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that JANINE P. GESKE, J. 
joins Part I of this opinion.