Title: Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96-646
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2000

1Due to the amendment to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050, the
style of this case has been changed accordingly.
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC96646
____________
AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 3.851, 3.852, AND 3.993 AND FLORIDA RULE OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.0501
[July 12, 2001]
CORRECTED OPINION
HARDING, J.
This Court has engaged in exhaustive efforts to balance the concerns of
fairness and justice with the need for finality in postconviction proceedings in 
death penalty cases.  During that process, we believe that a consensus has been
reached as to the essential ingredients necessary to balance these competing
concerns.  Although we have not had the case management resources to provide
information regarding the average length of capital postconviction proceedings,
anecdotal evidence demonstrates and this Court has recognized that the time for
2 See, e.g., Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 255 n.4 (Fla. 1999); Jones v.
State, 740 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1999).  See also Cook v. State, No. SC94134 (Fla.
June 28, 2001) (Wells, C.J., concurring); Rose v. State, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S210,
S216 (Fla. April 5, 2001) (Wells, C.J., concurring); Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d
618, 627 (Fla. 2000) (Harding, C.J, concurring).  
3  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.  
2
resolving these matters has been excessive.2
After thoroughly considering the numerous concerns and issues raised in
response to this Court’s proposed amendments to rules 3.851 (Collateral Relief
After Death Sentence Has Been Imposed and Affirmed on Direct Appeal), 3.852
(Capital Postconviction Public Records Production), and 3.993 (Forms Related to
Capital Postconviction Records Production) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, we amend rule 3.851 as reflected in appendix A to this opinion.3  We
are hopeful that the new rule will allow future capital postconviction proceedings to
be resolved within two years from the time the case becomes final, thereby
eliminating the months and years of needless delay that we have seen in the past.  
In recent years, we have found that cases are being resolved more
expeditiously, due in large part to the implementation of this Court’s requirements
for quarterly reports from the chief judges to the Chief Justice on the status of
capital postconviction cases, the Court’s requirement of mandatory training for
judges handling capital cases, the Court’s adoption of rule 3.852 (“Capital
4 See § 27.710, Fla. Stat. (2000) (“Registry of attorneys applying to represent
persons in postconviction capital collateral proceedings; certification of minimum
requirements; appointment by trial court”).
 .
3
Postconviction Public Records Production”), and the development of registry
counsel.  These improvements notwithstanding, there is still more that needs to be
done.  Four components are essential to a balanced capital postconviction system. 
First, a capital defendant facing execution must be promptly provided competent4
postconviction counsel charged with the responsibility of investigating the facts 
and circumstances of the case and researching the applicable law in order to
present all postconviction claims in a timely manner.  Second, in order for
postconviction counsel to effectively carry out this responsibility, counsel must be
given reasonable time and adequate resources.  Third, postconviction counsel must
have timely access to all information concerning the defendant’s case, especially
public records from investigating and prosecuting agencies.  Fourth, there must be
active and reasonable judicial oversight of the postconviction process to ensure 
that the defendant’s claims are timely investigated and fairly and efficiently
processed once presented.  Pursuant to the changes we adopt today, in addition to
the continued support of the above components, the Court is confident that we can
obtain the goal of achieving a prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of capital
4
postconviction proceedings.   
Although we have incorporated several of the features of our original
proposals into current rule 3.851, we have determined that a procedure that would
begin the capital postconviction process concurrently with the direct appeal
process cannot be adopted at this time.  This is because of the continued
application of certain public records exemptions to capital postconviction
defendants which would impede the efficacy of our original proposed procedure
by precluding collateral counsel from investigating potential postconviction claims
in a timely manner.
I.  BACKGROUND
In developing our original proposals, we considered the proposed
amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 submitted by the
Supreme Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases (the Morris
Committee), which was charged with developing a case management plan for
capital postconviction relief and recommending amendments to the existing capital
postconviction procedures.  See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure 3.851, 3.852 & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 2000).  We also were
guided by the “dual-track” concept for capital postconviction proceedings
5  Ch. 2000-3, § 5, at 11, Laws of Fla. 
5
contained in the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 (DPRA).5  
Our original proposals were designed to create a “dual-track” system similar
to that contained in the DPRA.  See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure 3.851, 3.852 & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2000); see also
Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 3.852 & 3.993, 772
So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. 2000).  They were intended to “eliminate those capital
postconviction procedures that have historically created unreasonable delays in the
process, while still maintaining quality and fairness.” Id. at 489; see also 772 So. 2d
at 533.  The proposed rules were designed to promote the prompt and efficient
processing of capital cases in a fair, just, and constitutionally sound manner while at
the same time effectuating the Legislature’s intent, as expressed in the DPRA, to
reduce unnecessary delays in capital cases by beginning the capital postconviction
process as early as possible after the imposition of a sentence of death and setting
time limits for certain actions to be taken.  See 772 So. 2d at 489.
 Under our original proposed amendments, fifteen days after the death
sentence is imposed collateral counsel would be appointed under rule 3.851 and 
the public records production process would begin under rule 3.852.  An initial
motion for postconviction relief must be filed with the trial court within 180 days
6 See § 119.07(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (exempting “active criminal
investigative information”); § 119.07(3)(l), Fla. Stat. (1999) (exempting records
prepared by an agency attorney exclusively for civil or criminal litigation until the
conclusion of litigation); § 119.011(3)(d)(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) (providing that
criminal investigative information is considered “active” while such information is
directly related to pending prosecutions or appeals) (emphasis added).
6
after this Court issues its mandate on direct appeal.  Under the original scheme,
counsel would begin a meaningful investigation of potential postconviction claims
and all public records issues would be resolved well before the motion for
postconviction relief was due to be filed in the circuit court.  We noted, however,
that if public records exemptions that do not end until the conviction and sentence
become final on direct appeal6 remained in place, counsel could be precluded from
effectively investigating potential postconviction claims in a timely manner.  Thus,
in order to ensure that the proposed scheme functioned as intended, we asked the
Florida Legislature to address these exemptions.  See 772 So. 2d at 491.  When the
regular legislative session ended with the exemptions as applied to capital cases
intact, the Court proposed revised rules.  See Amendments to Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure 3.851, 3.852 & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 2000) (published
order). 
After reviewing the numerous comments filed and hearing oral argument on
both our original and revised proposals, we postponed amending the rules until we
7  See ch. 2000-3, § 20, at 23, Laws of Fla. (requesting that the Court study
the issue).  
7
could thoroughly consider a number of critical issues and concerns, a number of
which we address below.  See 772 So. 2d at 533-34. 
II.  FILING OF RULE 3.851 MOTION IN THIS COURT
First, as requested by the Legislature,7 we have considered the feasibility of
requiring capital postconviction motions to be filed directly in this Court and have
determined that such a change in procedure at this time would only serve to further
delay the postconviction process.  We have reviewed the Oklahoma procedures
which require that capital postconviction actions be brought in the appellate, rather
than in the trial, court ninety days from the date the last brief is filed on direct
appeal.  22 Okla. Stat. §1089 (2000).  However, after reviewing the Oklahoma
procedures, we believe that the large number of inmates on Florida’s death row
militates against adopting such a system in this state.
Oklahoma currently has approximately 126 death-row inmates, while Florida
currently has 373.   Requiring that rule 3.851 motions be filed in this Court would
present the Court with a large increase in original proceedings.  The filing of 
original postconviction pleadings with this Court would require considerable 
time and additional resources.  We do not determine that this procedure would
8  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850, 3.851.
9  See §§ 119.07(3)(b), 119.07(3)(l ), Fla. Stat. (2000).
8
enhance the disposition of these cases in a fair, just, and constitutionally sound
manner. 
Moreover, the new rules at issue here are the logical refinement of well-
established, long-standing rules of procedure providing for the filing of capital
postconviction motions in the trial court.8  In contrast, the significantly different
procedures that would be necessary if we were to require rule 3.851 motions to be
filed in this Court most certainly would meet with new challenges and uncertainties
that could take years to resolve.  Finally, not only would this complete change in
procedure result in new delays in the postconviction process, it necessarily would
further delay the adoption of new rules because we would essentially have to begin
the rule-amendment process anew and seek further committee input and public
comment.
III.  RULE OF DISCOVERY TO OVERRIDE EXEMPTIONS
 
Next, we decline to adopt a rule of discovery that, despite the continued
existence of the public records exemptions at issue here,9 would require 
production of records prior to a conviction and death sentence becoming final on
direct appeal.  We have given much consideration to the Solicitor General’s
9
suggestion that this Court has “inherent” authority to adopt such a rule.  However,
since its inception in 1996, see In re Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure--Capital Postconviction Public Records Production, 683 So. 2d 475
(Fla. 1996), Florida’s capital postconviction discovery rule--rule 3.852--has been
based on the broad public records production authorized under chapter 119.  See
Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.852 (Capital Postconviction
Public Records Production) & Rule 3.993 (Related Forms), 754 So. 2d 640, 643
(Fla. 1999) (adopting rule 3.852 as a discovery rule for public records production
ancillary to capital postconviction proceedings); see also In re Amendment to
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure–Capital Postconviction Public Records
Production, 683 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1996) (adopting first version of rule based on
public records production). 
The public records exemptions at issue here have been interpreted to end
upon the conviction and sentence becoming final on direct appeal, see State v.
Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1990), and have functioned in harmony with our
current capital postconviction rules, and, as rule 3.852 has progressed, in most
cases have allowed for timely records production under the current one-year time
period.  Therefore, we decline to adopt a rule of discovery that could be seen as an
attempt to override these legislatively created exemptions.  Rather, we defer to the
10
Legislature to make the policy decision as to whether to retain the exemptions as
they apply to capital defendants or remove them in order to allow for the adoption
of a dual-track system as originally proposed.  See art. I, § 24(c), Fla. Const.
(authorizing the Legislature to provide by general law for the exemption of records
otherwise accessible by the public, provided that the law states with specificity the
public necessity justifying the exemption and the exemption is no broader than
necessary to accomplish the stated purpose); see also Kight v. Dugger, 574 So. 2d
1066, 1068 (Fla.1990) (explaining that the Legislature has the constitutional power
to regulate disclosure of public records); State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d at 326
(recognizing that only the Legislature can create exemptions to chapter 119).  
IV.  AMENDMENTS
Rather than adopting an entirely new rule, we have decided to amend current
rule 3.851 to incorporate several of the proposals that have been suggested to the
Court.  The most significant changes are addressed below. 
Appointment of Counsel
In order to ensure the prompt appointment of postconviction counsel, we
have added subdivision (b).  This provision requires the appointment of counsel
upon the issuance of mandate from this Court on direct appeal.  
Preliminary Procedures
11
We have added subdivision (c)(1), entitled Judicial Assignment, which
provides for the assignment of a qualified judge within thirty days after the mandate
issues on direct appeal.  Consistent with this change, we also amend Florida Rule
of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4) to reflect the same.  Additionally, in order to
provide constant oversight into the postconviction process, we have also added
subdivision (c)(2), entitled Status Conferences.  This provision requires the
assigned judge to conduct a status hearing not later than ninety days after the
assignment of the case, and at least every ninety days thereafter until the evidentiary
hearing has been completed or the motion has been ruled on without a hearing. 
These status conferences will permit the timely resolution of public records issues
and other preliminary matters and will provide better case management to ensure the
appropriate disposition of these cases.  We recognize that the requirements for
status conferences may be onerous for trial judges that already have overburdened
calenders.  Yet, we emphasize that there is a need for placing capital postconviction
cases in a priority status to effectuate the prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of
these matters.
Contents of An Initial Motion
After considering all the comments filed addressing an adequately pled 
initial motion, we believe that the requirements contained in subdivision (e),
10  Ch. 2000-3, § 8(2), at 15, Laws of Fla.
12
Contents of Motion, are sufficient to put the parties and trial court on notice as to
what constitutes a sufficiently pled initial motion.  We also believe that the
information that must be included in an initial motion under subdivision (e), together
with the information that must be disclosed at the case management conference
under subdivision (f)(5), is sufficient to allow the State to prepare for an evidentiary
hearing. 
Under subdivision (e)(1)(D), the motion must include “a detailed allegation of
the factual basis for any claim for which an evidentiary hearing is sought.”  
Significantly, subdivision (e) contains all the requirements that were contained in
section 8(2) of the DPRA10 and the Morris Committee’s proposal for a “fully pled”
motion, except for the requirement that the motion include any documents
supporting the claim, a list of witnesses and their affidavits or a proffer of their
testimony.  Under subdivision (f)(5), a case management conference must be held
within ninety days after the state files its answer.  At that conference, both parties
must disclose all documentary exhibits that will be offered at the evidentiary
hearing; provide an exhibit list that includes all exhibits; and exchange a witness list
with the names and addresses of any potential witnesses.  Expert witnesses also
must be designated and copies of any expert reports must be provided.  Thus,
13
prior to the case management conference, the detailed allegations in the motion will
provide the state with notice of the facts underlying claims for which an evidentiary
hearing is sought; and, at the case management conference, the state will receive all
documents or exhibits supporting the claims as well as a witness list.  We believe
these two provisions will allow both parties to adequately prepare for the
evidentiary hearing.
Evidentiary Hearings
Amended rule 3.851, as did our proposals, requires that an evidentiary
hearing be held on claims identified in an initial motion as requiring a factual
determination.  We have considered the comments in opposition to this requirement
but continue to believe that “[i]n light of the large number of summary denials of
initial motions which the Court has been compelled to reverse under the current
rules . . . this change will reduce unwarranted delay in many cases.”  772 So. 2d at
489.
In contrast to the evidentiary hearing requirement for initial motions, under
subdivision (f)(5)(B) we have left it up to the trial court to determine whether an
evidentiary hearing should be held on a successive motion.  Consistent with rule
11  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(d) provides that if the motion,
files, and records conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the
postconviction motion shall be denied without a hearing.  See also Valle v. State,
705 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 1997) (recognizing that a movant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing unless the motion and record conclusively show that the movant
is entitled to no relief);  Roberts v. State, 568 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1990) (stating
that where the trial court denies a motion for postconviction relief without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, the motion and the record must conclusively
demonstrate that the defendant is entitled to no relief).
12  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
14  See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 678 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1996) (reversing
summary denial of second motion for postconviction relief and remanding for
evidentiary hearing on newly discovered evidence involving recanted testimony);
Swafford v. State, 679 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996) (reversing summary denial of third
motion for postconviction relief and remanding for evidentiary hearing on Brady
claim); Scott v. State, 657 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1995) (reversing summary denial of
third motion for postconviction relief and remanding for evidentiary hearing on
newly discovered Brady claims); Johnson v. Singletary, 647 So. 2d 106, 111 (Fla.
14
3.850(d),11 under new subdivision (f)(5)(B), “if the [successive] motion, files, and
records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the
motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing.”  Although evidentiary
hearings on factually based claims contained in successive motions are not
automatically required under the new rule, we encourage trial courts to liberally
allow them on timely raised newly discovered evidence claims, and Brady12 or
Giglio13 claims.  This will avoid possible delays caused by the need to remand
successive motions for factual development of such claims.14
1994) (reversing summary denial of second motion for postconviction relief and
remanding for evidentiary hearing on newly discovered evidence consisting of 
affidavits stating that deceased inmate had confessed to killings).
15
V.  PROCEDURES  AFTER DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Neither our original nor our revised proposals contained procedures to be
followed after a death warrant is signed.  In our July 14, 2000, opinion, we asked
the Morris Committee to further study the need for such procedures.  See 772 So.
2d at 534.  In its September 29, 2000, report, the Committee concluded that a
provision addressing the procedure to be followed after a death warrant is signed
would provide needed guidance to trial judges and therefore recommended that
such a provision be added to proposed rule 3.851.  The Committee pointed out
that, since the courts do not schedule executions and do not regulate the time from
the date the warrant issues until the prisoner is scheduled to be executed, the new
provision must be flexible enough to accommodate these variables.  With those
realities in mind, the Committee recommends the following general concepts to be
included in the new subdivision:  
(1) Proceedings after a death warrant has been
issued shall take priority over all other cases.
(2) The time limits of rule 3.851 and any other rule
shall not apply to restrict the trial court.
(3) Proceedings in the trial court shall be 
16
scheduled expeditiously considering the time limitations imposed by
the date of execution and the time required for appellate review and
that a stay of execution be granted only as a last resort.
(4) Provisions for venue shall be suspended on
motion after a death warrant has been issued.  Venue shall
be determined by the trial court considering the
availability of witnesses or evidence, time limitations
imposed by the date of execution, the security issues
involved in the individual case, and any other factor
determined by the trial court.
(5) The trial court shall electronically transmit a
copy of any final order to the Supreme Court of Florida.
(6)  The record on appeal shall be immediately
delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
(7) The defendant’s presence should not be
required except for the evidentiary hearing.
However, since the Morris Committee did not offer proposed language
implementing its recommendations, we have not included them in the amended rule. 
We now ask the Morris Committee to work with the Criminal Procedure Rules
Committee to draft a new subdivision incorporating these recommendations. The
committees should file a joint report with proposed rules with the Clerk of this
Court by January 1, 2002.  Until such time as we adopt the new procedures, new
subdivision (h) of rule 3.851, entitled “After Death Warrant Signed,” makes clear
that the time periods provided for under the new rule must be expedited after a
15  See In re Amendment to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule
2.050(b)(10), 688 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1997).
16  See In re Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rule 3.112
Minimum Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases, 759 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1999)
(adopting minimum standards for conflict counsel).
17
death warrant is signed.  See also rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) as amended herein, providing
that if warrant is signed the trial court shall expedite time periods in accordance with
subdivision (h).
VI.  OTHER STEPS TO IMPROVE CAPITAL 
POSTCONVICTION PROCESS
As we explained in our prior opinion, there are a number of other steps we
have taken or are considering that will greatly improve the capital postconviction
process.  See 772 So. 2d at 534.  This Court already has mandated a training
course on capital cases for circuit judges who preside over those cases15 as well as
minimum standards for conflict counsel in capital cases.16   In our last opinion in
this case, we asked the Morris Committee to consider the need for a statewide
roster of judges qualified to preside over capital cases and are now considering the
Committee’s recommendation that such a roster should be developed.  See id.  We
also are considering proposed amendments to new rule 3.112 which would extend
the standards to include public defenders, collateral counsel, and private counsel
who handle capital cases.  See In re Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal
17  Since the current version of rule 3.851 will continue to apply to motions
pending on the effective date of these amendments, both versions of the rule should
be published by The Florida Bar and in West Group’s Florida Rules of Court with
a notation that unless otherwise indicated in the rules, the current rule applies to
motions pending on the effective date of the amendments.
18
Procedure-Rule 3.112 Minimum Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases,
SC90635 (oral argument held  December 1, 2000).  In connection with these
proceedings, we recently adopted new Rule of Judicial Administration 2.070(i)
which requires the chief judge of each circuit to enter an administrative order
developing and implementing a circuit-wide plan to expedite the preparation of
transcripts in all capital trials and capital postconviction proceedings.  See 772 So.
2d at 534-35.  We believe these changes together with the amendments we adopt
today will eliminate much of the delay in our capital postconviction process while at
the same time promoting quality and fairness in the system. 
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we amend Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 as
reflected in appendix A to this opinion.17  We also amend Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.050 as reflected in appendix B to this opinion.  Additions to the
rules are indicated by underlining; deletions are indicated by strike-through type.
The amendments shall become effective October 1, 2001, at 12:01 a.m., and shall
apply to all motions filed on or after that date.  Motions pending on that date are
19
governed by the version of rule 3.851 in effect immediately prior to that date.
Interested parties shall have thirty days from the date of this opinion in which to file
comments.  We do not adopt the previously proposed amendments to Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.852 and 3.993.  The current versions of those rules
shall remain in effect.
We would like to thank Governor Bush, former Speaker Thrasher, the
Morris Committee, the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, and the many other
interested persons and organizations who filed comments and participated in oral
argument.  We have considered each of the comments and suggestions.  The
Criminal Procedure Rules Committee will continually evaluate the rules governing
capital postconviction proceedings and may propose changes as it sees fit in
accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.130(c).
It is so ordered.
SHAW, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which SHAW and
PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J.,
concurs.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THESE AMENDMENTS.
20
WELLS, C.J., concurring.
I concur with the majority because I believe that these rules will advance the
goal of the fair, effective, and efficient processing of capital postconviction cases. 
I write separately to underscore my suggestion that the Legislature squarely
confront the public records issue.
Public records production continues to be a significant problem in the
processing of these capital postconviction cases.  Substantial time continues to be
consumed in the circuit courts while decisions are made regarding what records
must be produced and the boundaries of that production.  I conclude that in order
to effectively reduce the time associated with public records production, there must
be changes to chapter 119, Florida Statutes, which would facilitate and delineate
public records production.  I would respectfully suggest that the Legislature study
this problem area and consider changes to chapter 119, taking into consideration
this Court’s decisions in Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal
Corp, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S268 (Fla. April 26, 2001); Halifax Hosp. Medical Center
v. News-Journal Corp., 724 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1999); State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324
(Fla. 1990); and Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Associates, 379 So.
2d 633 (Fla. 1980), and article 1, section 24(c), Florida Constitution.
21
Defendants, the State, and the courts would benefit from a statute
specifically designating what records are to be produced and what records are
exempt from production under the provisions of the Florida Constitution. 
Obviously, documents covered by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), must
be produced in accord with the requirements of the United States Constitution as
determined by the United States Supreme Court.
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurring.
I write separately to express both a caution and an optimism about our
exhaustive efforts to reform the postconviction process in death penalty
jurisprudence.  First, the caution to note that with today’s revisions we appear to
have reached the outer limits of our authority to restrict the constitutional process
under habeas corpus for catching serious mistakes in capital cases.  In other
words, we must be mindful that there are limits to how far we can go in restricting a
capital defendant’s access to the courts to present a claim that a serious mistake
was made in his conviction or capital sentence.  
Indeed, in Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 59 (Fla. 2000), in dealing
with our continuing efforts at postconviction reform, we then cautioned:
While this Court will continue such efforts, we are also mindful that
our primary responsibility is to follow the law in each case and to
22
ensure that the death penalty is fairly administered in accordance with
the rule of law and both the United States and Florida Constitution.
That caution bears repeating here.  The reality is that few, if any, of the numerous
postconviction decisions finding major errors in capital convictions and sentences
in Florida would have occurred if a strict one-year limitation had been rigidly
enforced.  Those decisions demonstrate that the discovery of major flaws based
upon new evidence, Brady claims, or the recantations of witnesses, does not
always conveniently occur in that brief time span.  If fewer errors are to be found in
the future let us hope that it will be because the thoroughness of the  process
allowed fewer errors, and not because of the expiration of an arbitrary deadline.
HABEAS CORPUS
In our response to demands to speed up the process while seemingly never
being able to satisfy the competing interests, we must be constantly mindful that we
are dealing with a Constitution, and an express right to the writ of habeas corpus
set out therein.  We must also be mindful of the fact that we are acting at a time
when access to the federal courts on postconviction claims has been severely
curtailed so that a proceeding in the state courts is essentially “the only game in
town.”  We are it.
Traditionally, postconviction rights have been asserted through use of the
constitutionally guaranteed writ of habeas corpus, the Great Writ.  The Great Writ
23
has been placed in Florida’s Constitution as an ultimate safeguard against human
error.  Of course, there is no time limitation on the invocation of this writ, and its
suspension is forbidden.  However, in order to insure the orderly and efficient
processing of postconviction claims under the writ of habeas corpus, we have
enacted a procedural rule to guide the process.  In such rule, we originally imposed
a time limitation of two years for the filing of such claims, with a proper exception
for certain claims that could not reasonably be discovered and advanced within the
two-year period.  
We have also held that counsel will be provided for indigent defendants in
postconviction proceedings only in limited instances.  See Graham v. State, 372
So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979).  Because of our especial concern in capital cases,
however, we have consistently refused to allow a capital defendant to be executed
unless that defendant was provided access to counsel-assisted postconviction
proceedings.  See Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 326, 326 (Fla. 1999) (“We
acknowledge we have a constitutional responsibility to ensure the death penalty is
administered in a fair, consistent and reliable manner. . . .”).  Similarly, the
Legislature has provided resources to see that all capital defendants have
reasonable access to counsel-assisted postconviction proceedings.  As a
consequence, this Court has consistently refused to delay executions where
24
reasonable access to counsel has been provided and all reasonable claims have
been considered and properly denied.
REDUCED TIME FOR CAPITAL CLAIMS
When the Legislature acted to provide counsel and resources in capital
postconviction proceedings, this Court took the dramatic step of cutting in half the
two-year time allowed for postconviction claims in capital cases.  While it would
not ordinarily make sense to provide less time for the most serious of cases, while
providing twice the time in less serious misdemeanor and felony cases, we acted in
specific reliance on the Legislature’s providing counsel in capital postconviction
proceedings.  At the same time, however, we openly cautioned that because our
reduction of the time for filing claims was expressly premised on the provision of
competent counsel with adequate resources, we would have to reconsider this
decision if adequate resources were not provided.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 
Court Commentary (1993) (“In the event the capital collateral representative is not
fully funded and available to provide proper representation for all death penalty
defendants, the reduction in the time period [for seeking relief under this rule]
would not be justified and would necessarily have to be repealed, and this Court
will forthwith entertain a petition for the repeal of the rule.”).  Since that time we
have worked constantly and diligently, with the assistance of the Legislature, to 
25
see that a fair and efficient, and adequately resourced, system for capital
postconviction proceedings is put in place.  Today’s revisions are the culmination
of those efforts.
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS AND VIGILANCE
Despite concerns about our limitations on habeas corpus, there is also
considerable cause for optimism in considering how far we have come with the
help of the Legislature in providing a fair process and adequate resources for
capital postconviction proceedings.  For example, it appears that a consensus has
now been reached among all those involved as to certain essential ingredients
without which a fair and efficient system for capital postconviction proceedings
cannot survive.  It is critically important that all now are vigilant in seeing that these
essential prerequisites are assured in every capital postconviction proceeding:
First, as this Court has recognized for many years, it is essential that a capital
defendant facing execution be promptly provided with competent postconviction
counsel who shall be charged with the responsibility of investigating the facts and
circumstances of the case, and researching the law, in order to determine the
existence of any legal reasons why the defendant’s conviction or sentence should
be set aside.
26
Second, postconviction counsel must be provided with reasonable time and
adequate resources to carry out her responsibilities.
Third, postconviction counsel must have timely access to all information,
including especially public records from investigating and prosecuting agencies,
concerning the case.
Fourth, there must be active and reasonable judicial oversight of the
proceedings to see that the claims are fairly and efficiently processed in a
postconviction proceeding.
By our vigilance in paying strict attention to these four essential prerequisites,
confidence in the outcome of postconviction proceedings should be assured.  On
the other hand, neglect of any of the four will surely place the proceedings at risk. 
We must never lose sight of the important values being balanced in death
penalty proceedings.  On the one hand society has invoked the ultimate sanction of
death because an innocent life has been taken by the defendant under especially
egregious circumstances.  On the other hand that same society cautions that “death
is different” and extraordinary safeguards must be taken to insure that only those
whose guilt is certain and that are truly deserving of the forfeiture of life are
ultimately put to death.  We in the courts have the major responsibility for insuring
27
that these values are properly reflected and balanced in our procedures and
oversight of the death penalty process.  
As noted above, there is much reason for optimism.  Counsel and resources
are now available institutionally and through court-appointment, and public records
discovery has been organized in a coherent and efficient manner.  In addition, the
Legislature, in enacting legislation for DNA testing, has sent out a strong signal that
all available safeguards should be utilized to insure that no one who may be
innocent of the crime or not deserving of the punishment be executed.  All involved
must now pull together to insure the system works and strikes the proper balance.
SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring.
I concur in the adoption of this rule because I believe that the requirement of
an evidentiary hearing and case management monitoring are two significant steps
that will enhance the post-conviction process by literally cutting years off of  the
litigation of these claims without compromising the fairness of the process. 
We have also placed requirements on specificity in pleading.  However, the ability
of post-conviction counsel to file a detailed allegation of the factual basis for any
28
claim for which an evidentiary hearing is sought and the ability of post-conviction
counsel to be prepared for an evidentiary hearing to be held in a timely manner after
the filing of the post-conviction motion will depend, in large part, on the timely
disclosure of public records and the resolution of public records issues before the
post-conviction motion is filed.  
My major concern is whether we have provided realistic time limits for the
trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing after the post-conviction motion has been
filed.  In this proposed rule an evidentiary hearing must be held no later than nine
months after the State files its answer and as soon as seven months.  When we had
initially proposed this rule last April, we had envisioned a modified dual-track
system where public records discovery would be ongoing during the time the case
was on direct appeal.  See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
3.851, 3.852 and 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 (Fla. 2000).  As we stated at that time:
Our proposal will allow collateral counsel adequate time to evaluate all
potential postconviction claims, including ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, which oftentimes only become apparent after this Court's
decision on direct appeal.  In addition, according to the statements of
several attorneys and judges who appeared at oral argument, the
requests for public records and the litigation that follows is the single
biggest cause for delay in the current system.  Under our proposed
rules, the issue of public records should be resolved well before the
postconviction motion is due to be filed in the circuit court.
29
Id. (emphasis supplied).
I acknowledge that in this proposed rule, we have slightly increased the time
in which an evidentiary hearing must be held from our previous proposed 3.851 rule
on which we have sought comment.  However, because there will not be a period
of years during which public records issues can be resolved, it is essential for our
proposed system to work properly that the status conferences in the year between
appointment of counsel and the filing of the post-conviction motion be
productively used to resolve public records requests and that the State cooperates
in making sure that all requests are timely complied with. 
I  lastly concur fully in Justice Anstead's observations as to the essential
ingredients for our post-conviction process to be expeditious without sacrificing
fairness: 1) competent counsel; 2) reasonable time and adequate resources; 3)
timely access to all information, especially public records, and 4) active and
reasonable judicial oversight.  
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.   
 
Original Proceeding - Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
Honorable Stan R. Morris, Chairperson, Supreme Court Committee on
Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases (The Morris Committee), Gainesville,
Florida; Honorable Philip J. Padovano, Judge, First District Court of Appeal,
30
Tallahassee, Florida; Honorable O. H. Eaton, Jr., Chair, The Florida Bar Criminal
Procedure Rules Committee,  Sanford, Florida;  John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive
Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; Honorable Scott J. Silverman,
Chair, Rules of Judicial Administration Committee, Miami, Florida;  Robert R.
Wills, Immediate Past Chair of the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; and Honorable Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and
Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Division
Director, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioners
Charles Canady, General Counsel, Reginald J. Brown, Deputy General Counsel,
and Martin P. McDonnell, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, for 
Honorable Jeb Bush, Governor of the State of Florida; Arthur I. Jacobs, General
Counsel, Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, Fernandina Beach, Florida;
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and Todd
G. Scher, Litigation Director, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida;  Gregory
C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, Northern Region, Andrew Thomas, Chief
Assistant CCRC, Northern Region, and Timothy P. Schardl, Special Assistant
CCRC, Northern Region, of the Law Offices of Mark E. Olive, P.A., Tallahassee,
Florida; John P. Moser and Michael P. Reiter, Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida; Roger R. Mass, Executive Director,
Commission on Capital Cases, Tallahassee, Florida; Nancy A. Daniels, Public
Defender, and W. C. McLain, Michael J. Minerva and Chet Kaufman, Assistant
Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, and Bennett H.
Brummer, Public Defender, and Christina A. Spaulding, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, for the Florida Public 
Defender Association, Inc.; Cary Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary 
Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, Chief, Capital Crimes Division, Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida; Gerard T. York, Assistant General
Counsel for the Department of State, Tallahassee, Florida; Helene E. Marks, Legal
Counsel to Richard Ake, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County,
Tampa, Florida; Harvey Ruvin, Clerk, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida;
Michael R. Ramage, General Counsel to the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, Tallahassee, Florida; Thomas E. Warner, Solicitor General, and T.
Kent Wetherell, II, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General,
Tallahassee, Florida; Lawrence J. Fox, Chair, Judy A. Gallant, Staff Attorney, and
Elisabeth Semel, Director of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.;
31
Robert Augustus Harper and Steven Brian Whittington, Robert Augustus Harper
Law Firm, P.A., of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen Krosschell of Goodman & Nekvasil, P.A., ,
Clearwater, Florida,  
Responding
Tom Feeney,  Johnnie B. Byrd, Jr., and John Dudley Goodlette, Tallahassee, Florida
for John E. Thrasher, former Speaker, House of Representatives, 
Amicus Curiae
32
APPENDIX A
Rule 3.851. Collateral Relief After Death Sentence Has Been Imposed And
Affirmed on Direct Appeal
(a) Scope. This rule shall apply to all motions and petitions for any type of
postconviction or collateral relief brought by a prisoner in state custody who has been
sentenced to death and whose conviction and death sentence have been affirmed on
direct appeal.  It shall apply to all postconviction motions filed on or after October 1,
2001.  Motions pending on that date are governed by the version of this rule in effect
immediately prior to that date.
(b)  Appointment of Postconviction Counsel.
(1)  Upon the issuance of mandate affirming a judgment and sentence of death
on direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida shall at the same time issue an order
appointing the appropriate office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel.
(2)  Within 30 days of the issuance of mandate, the Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel shall file a notice of appearance in the trial court or a motion to withdraw
based on a conflict of interest or some other legal ground.
(3) Within 15 days after Capital Collateral Regional Counsel files a motion to
withdraw, the chief judge or assigned judge shall appoint new postconviction counsel.
(c)  Preliminary Procedures.
(1)  Judicial Assignment.  Within 30 days of the issuance of mandate affirming
a judgment and sentence of death on direct appeal, the chief judge shall assign the
case to a judge qualified under the Rules of Judicial Administration to conduct capital
proceedings.
(2)  Status Conferences.  The assigned judge shall conduct a status hearing not
later than 90 days after the judicial assignment, and shall hold status conferences at
least every 90 days thereafter until the evidentiary hearing has been completed or the
motion has been ruled on without a hearing. The attorneys, with leave of the trial
33
court, may appear by telephone at such status conferences.  Such requests shall be
liberally granted.  Pending motions, disputes involving public records, or any other
matters ordered by the court shall be heard at the status conferences.
(3) Prisoner’s Presence Not Required. The prisoner’s presence shall not be
required at any hearing or conference held under this rule, except at the evidentiary
hearing on the merits of any claim and at any hearing involving conflict with or
removal of collateral counsel.
(4) Duties of Defense Counsel and Prosecuting Attorney.  Within 45 days of
appointment of postconviction counsel, the defendant's trial counsel shall provide to
postconviction counsel all information pertaining to the defendant's capital case which
was obtained during the representation of the defendant. Postconviction counsel shall
maintain the confidentiality of all confidential information received.  Within 45 days of
appointment of postconviction counsel, the state attorney's office that prosecuted the
defendant shall provide to the postconviction counsel copies of all pretrial and trial
discovery and all contents of the state's file, except for information that the
prosecuting attorney has a legal right under state or federal law to withhold from
disclosure.
(bd) Time Limitation.
(1) Any rule 3.850 motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of
death shall be filed by the prisoner within 1 year after the judgment and sentence
become final. For the purposes of this rule, a judgment is final:
(A) on the expiration of the time permitted to file in the United States
Supreme Court a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the Supreme Court of
Florida decision affirming a judgment and sentence of death (90 days after the opinion
becomes final); or
(B) on the disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court, if filed.
(2)  No motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed beyond
the time limitation provided in subdivision (d)(1) unless it alleges that
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
34
movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence, or
(B)  the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established
within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply
retroactively, or
(C)  postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion.
(23) All petitions for extraordinary relief in which the Supreme Court of Florida
has original jurisdiction, including petitions for writ of habeas corpus, shall be filed
simultaneously with the initial brief filed on behalf of the death-sentenced prisoner in
the appeal of the circuit court's order on the rule 3.850initial motion for
postconviction relief filed under this rule.
(34) The time limitation in subdivision (bd)(1) is established with the
understanding that each death-sentenced prisoner will have counsel assigned and
available to begin addressing the prisoner's postconviction issues within 30 days after
the judgment and sentence become final.  Should the governor sign a death warrant
before the expiration of the time limitation in subdivision (bd)(1), the Supreme Court
of Florida, on a defendant's request, will grant a stay of execution to allow any
postconviction relief motions to proceed in a timely and orderly manner. Furthermore,
this time limitation shall not preclude the right to amend or to supplement pending
pleadings under these rules.
(45) An extension of time may be granted by the Supreme Court of Florida for
the filing of postconviction pleadings if the prisoner's counsel makes a showing of
good cause for counsel's inability to file the postconviction pleadings within the
1-year period established by this rule.
(5) To the extent that they are not inconsistent with this rule, the provisions of
rule 3.850 remain applicable to postconviction or collateral relief.
(6) This rule will govern the cases of all death-sentenced prisoners whose
convictions and sentences become final after January 1, 1994.
(e)  Contents of Motion.
35
(1)  Initial Motion.  A motion filed under this rule is an initial
postconviction motion if no state court has previously ruled on a postconviction
motion challenging the same judgment and sentence.  An initial motion and
memorandum of law filed under this rule shall not exceed 75 pages exclusive of the
attachments.  Attachments shall include but are not limited to the judgment and
sentence. The motion shall be under oath and shall include:
(A) a statement specifying the judgment and sentence under attack and
the name of the court that rendered the same;
(B) a statement of each issue raised on appeal and the disposition
thereof;
(C) the nature of the relief sought;
(D) a detailed allegation of the factual basis for any claim for which an
evidentiary hearing is sought; and
(E) a detailed allegation as to the basis for any purely legal or
constitutional claim for which an evidentiary hearing is not required and the reason
that this claim could not have been or was not raised on direct appeal.
The memorandum of law shall set forth the applicable case law supporting the
granting of relief as to each separately pled claim.  As to claims that were raised on
appeal or should have or could have been raised on appeal, the memorandum shall
contain a brief statement as to why these claims are being raised on postconviction
relief.
(2)  Successive Motion.  A motion filed under this rule is successive if a state
court has previously ruled on a postconviction motion challenging the same judgment
and sentence.  A successive motion shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
attachments, and shall include:
(A)  all of the pleading requirements of an initial motion under
subdivision (e)(1);
(B)  the disposition of all previous claims raised in postconviction
proceedings and the reason or reasons the claim or claims raised in the present motion
36
were not raised in the former motion or motions;
(C) if based upon newly discovered evidence, Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), or Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the following:
(i)  the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all 
witnesses supporting the claim;
(ii)  a statement that the witness will be available, should an 
evidentiary hearing be scheduled, to testify under oath to the facts 
alleged in the motion or affidavit;
(iii)  if evidentiary support is in the form of documents, copies 
of all documents shall be attached, including any affidavits obtained; 
and
(iv)  as to any witness or document listed in the motion or 
attachment to the motion, a statement of the reason why the witness 
or
document was not previously available.
(cf) Hearing Requirement. Before ruling on any rule 3.850 motion filed by a
death-sentenced prisoner, the trial court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether an
evidentiary hearing is required.Procedure; Evidentiary Hearing; Disposition.
(1) Filing and Service. All pleadings in the postconviction proceeding shall
be filed with the clerk of the trial court and served on the assigned judge, opposing
party, and the attorney general. Upon the filing of any original court paper in the
postconviction proceeding, the clerk of the trial court shall determine that the assigned
judge has received a copy. All motions other than the postconviction motion itself shall
be accompanied by a notice of hearing.
(2) Duty of Clerk.  Upon the filing of a motion for postconviction relief,
the clerk of the trial court shall immediately forward the motion and file to the assigned
judge.
(3) Answer.
(A) To Initial Motion.  Within 60 days of the filing of an initial
37
motion, the state shall file its answer. The answer and accompanying memorandum of
law shall not exceed 75 pages, exclusive of attachments and exhibits. The answer shall
address the legal insufficiency of any claim in the motion, respond to the allegations of
the motion, and address any procedural bars.  As to any claims of legal insufficiency or
procedural bar, the state shall include a short statement of any applicable case law.
(B)  To Successive Motion.  Within 10 days of the filing of a
successive motion, the state shall file its answer.  The answer shall not exceed 25
pages, exclusive of attachments and exhibits.  The answer shall specifically respond to
each claim in the motion and state the reason(s) that an evidentiary hearing is or is not
required.
(4) Amendments.  A motion filed under this rule may be amended up to 30
days prior to the evidentiary hearing upon motion and good cause shown.  The trial
court may in its discretion grant a motion to amend provided that the motion sets forth
the reason the claim  was not raised earlier and attaches a copy of the claim sought to
be added. Granting a motion under this subdivision shall not be a basis for granting a
continuance of the evidentiary hearing unless a manifest injustice would occur if a
continuance was not granted.  If amendment is allowed, the state shall file an amended
answer within 20 days after the amended motion is filed.
(5)  Case Management Conference; Evidentiary Hearing.
(A) Initial Postconviction Motion.  No later than 90 days after the
state files its answer to an initial motion, the trial court shall hold a case management
conference.  At the case management conference, both parties shall disclose all
documentary exhibits they intend to offer at the evidentiary hearing, provide an exhibit
list that includes all such exhibits, and exchange a witness list with the names and
addresses of any potential witnesses.  All expert witnesses shall be so designated with
copies of all expert reports attached.  At the case management conference, the trial
court shall:
(i) schedule an evidentiary hearing, to be held within 90 days,
on claims listed by the defendant as requiring a factual
determination; and
(ii) hear argument on any purely legal claims not based on
38
disputed facts.
(B)   Successive Postconviction Motion.  Within 30 days after the
state files its answer to a successive motion for postconviction relief, the trial court
shall hold a case management conference.  At the case management conference, the trial
court also shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing should be held and hear
argument on any purely legal claims not based on disputed facts.  If the motion, files,
and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the
motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing.  If the trial court determines that
an evidentiary hearing should be held, the court shall schedule the hearing to be held
within 60 days.  If a death warrant has been signed, the trial court shall expedite these
time periods in accordance with subdivision (h) of this rule.
(C) Extension of Time to Hold Evidentiary Hearing. The trial court
also may for good cause extend the time for holding an evidentiary hearing for up to 90
days.
(D) Procedures After Evidentiary Hearing.  Immediately following
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court shall order a transcript of the hearing which shall
be filed within 30 days.  Within 30 days of receipt of the transcript, the court shall
render its order, ruling on each claim considered at the evidentiary hearing and all other
claims raised in the motion, making detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect to each claim, and attaching or referencing such portions of the record as
are necessary to allow for meaningful appellate review.  The order issued after the
evidentiary hearing shall resolve all the claims raised in the motion and shall be
considered the final order for purposes of appeal.  The clerk of the trial court shall
promptly serve upon the parties and the attorney general a copy of the final order, with
a certificate of service.
(5)  Mental Health Expert. If the defendant intends to offer expert
testimony of his or her mental status, the state shall be entitled to have the defendant
examined by its own mental health expert.  If the defendant fails to cooperate with the
state’s expert, the trial court may, in its discretion, proceed as provided in rule 3.202(e).
Reports provided to either party by an expert witness shall be disclosed to opposing
counsel upon receipt.
(6)  Rehearing.  Motions for rehearing shall be filed within 15 days of
the rendition of the trial court's order and a response thereto filed within 10 days
39
thereafter.  The trial court's order disposing of the motion for rehearing shall be
rendered not later than 15 days thereafter.
(dg) Incompetence to Proceed in Capital Collateral Proceedings.
(1) A death-sentenced prisoner pursuing collateral relief under this rule 3.850 or
rule 3.851 who is found by the court to be mentally incompetent shall not be proceeded
against, subject to the limitations in subdivision (d)(3).if there are factual matters at
issue, the development or resolution of which require the prisoner’s input. However,
Aall collateral relief issues that involve only matters of record and claims that do not
require the prisoner's input shall proceed in collateral proceedings notwithstanding the
prisoner's incompetency.
(2) Collateral counsel may file a motion for competency determination and an
accompanying certificate of counsel that the motion is made in good faith and on
reasonable grounds to believe that the death-sentenced prisoner is incompetent to
proceed. The motion and certificate shall replace the signed oath by the prisoner that
otherwise must accompany a rule 3.850 motion filed under this rule.
(3) If, at any stage of a postconviction proceeding, the court determines that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that a death-sentenced prisoner is incompetent
to proceed and that factual matters are at issue, the development or resolution of which
require the prisoner's input, a judicial determination of incompetency is required.
(4) The motion for competency examination shall be in writing and shall allege
with specificity the factual matters at issue and the reason that competent consultation
with the prisoner is necessary with respect to each factual matter specified. To the
extent that it does not invade the lawyer-client privilege with collateral counsel, the
motion shall contain a recital of the specific observations of, and conversations with,
the death-sentenced prisoner that have formed the basis of the motion.
(5) If the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a
death-sentenced prisoner is incompetent to proceed in a postconviction proceeding in
which factual matters are at issue, the development or resolution of which require the
prisoner's input, the court shall order the prisoner examined by no more than 3, nor
fewer than 2, experts before setting the matter for a hearing.  The court may seek 
input from the death-sentenced prisoner's counsel and the state attorney before
40
appointment of the experts.
(6) The order appointing experts shall:
(A) identify the purpose of the evaluation and specify the area of inquiry
that should be addressed;
(B) specify the legal criteria to be applied; and
(C) specify the date by which the report shall be submitted and to whom it
shall be submitted.
(7) Counsel for both the death-sentenced prisoner and the state may be present
at the examination, which shall be conducted at a date and time convenient for all
parties and the Department of Corrections.
(8) On appointment by the court, the experts shall examine the death- sentenced
prisoner with respect to the issue of competence to proceed, as specified by the court
in its order appointing the experts to evaluate the prisoner, and shall evaluate the
prisoner as ordered.
(A) The experts first shall consider factors related to the issue of whether
the death-sentenced prisoner meets the criteria for competence to proceed, that is,
whether the prisoner has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether the prisoner has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the pending collateral proceedings.
(B) In considering the issue of competence to proceed, the experts shall
consider and include in their report:
(i) the prisoner's capacity to understand the adversary nature of the
legal process and the collateral proceedings;
(ii) the prisoner's ability to disclose to collateral counsel facts
pertinent to the postconviction proceeding at issue; and
(iii) any other factors considered relevant by the experts and the
court as specified in the order appointing the experts.
41
(C) Any written report submitted by an expert shall:
(i) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation;
 
(ii) describe the evaluative procedures, techniques, and tests used in
the examination and the purpose or purposes for each;
(iii) state the expert's clinical observations, findings, and opinions on
each issue referred by the court for evaluation, and indicate specifically
those issues, if any, on which the expert could not give an opinion; and
(iv) identify the sources of information used by the expert and
present the factual basis for the expert's clinical findings and opinions.
(9) If the experts find that the death-sentenced prisoner is incompetent to
proceed, the experts shall report on any recommended treatment for the prisoner to
attain competence to proceed. In considering the issues relating to treatment, the
experts shall report on:
(A) the mental illness or mental retardation causing the incompetence;
(B) the treatment or treatments appropriate for the mental illness or mental
retardation of the prisoner and an explanation of each of the possible treatment
alternatives in order of choices; and
(C) the likelihood of the prisoner attaining competence under the treatment
recommended, an assessment of the probable duration of the treatment required to
restore competence, and the probability that the prisoner will attain competence to
proceed in the foreseeable future.
(10) Within 30 days after the experts have completed their examinations of the
death-sentenced prisoner, the court shall schedule a hearing on the issue of the
prisoner's competence to proceed.
(11) If, after a hearing, the court finds the prisoner competent to proceed, or,
after having found the prisoner incompetent, finds that competency has been restored,
the court shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed with a postconviction
42
motion. The prisoner shall have 60 days to amend his or her rule 3.8503.850 motion
only as to those issues that the court found required factual consultation with counsel.
(12) If the court does not find the prisoner incompetent, the order shall contain:
(A) findings of fact relating to the issues of competency;
(B) copies of the reports of the examining experts; and
(C) copies of any other psychiatric, psychological, or social work reports
submitted to the court relative to the mental state of the death-sentenced prisoner.
(13) If the court finds the prisoner incompetent or finds the prisoner competent
subject to the continuation of appropriate treatment, the court shall follow the
procedures set forth in rule 3.212(c), except that, to the extent practicable, any
treatment shall take place at a custodial facility under the direct supervision of the
Department of Corrections.
(eh)  After Death Warrant Signed.
The time periods provided for under this rule shall be expedited after a
death warrant has been signed.
Court Commentary
1993 Adoption. This rule is consistent with the recommendation of the 
Supreme Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases, which was
created because of the substantial delays in the death penalty postconviction relief
process. The committee was created because of the inability of the capital collateral
representative to properly represent all death penalty inmates in postconviction relief
cases and because of the resulting substantial delays in those cases.  That committee
recognized that, to make the process work properly, each death row prisoner should
have counsel available to represent him or her in postconviction relief proceedings. 
The committee found that one of the major problems with the process was that the
triggering mechanism to start or assure movement of the postconviction relief
proceedings was the signing of a death warrant.  In a number of instances, the courts
43
were not aware of the problems concerning representation of a defendant until a death
warrant was signed.  In other instances, the committee found that, when postconviction
relief motions had been filed, they clearly had not moved at an orderly pace and the
signing of a death warrant was being used as a means to expedite the process.  The
committee recommended that specific named counsel should be designated to
represent each prisoner not later than 30 days after the defendant's judgment and
sentence of death becomes final.  To assure that representation, the committee's report
noted that it was essential that there be adequate funding of the capital collateral
representative and sought temporary assistance from The Florida Bar in providing pro
bono representation for some inmates.
There is a justification for the reduction of the time period for a capital prisoner
as distinguished from a noncapital prisoner, who has two years to file a postconviction
relief proceeding. A capital prisoner will have counsel immediately available to represent
him or her in a postconviction relief proceeding, while counsel is not provided or
constitutionally required for noncapital defendants to whom the two-year period
applies.
In the event the capital collateral representative is not fully funded and available to
provide proper representation for all death penalty defendants, the reduction in the time
period would not be justified and would necessarily have to be repealed, and this Court
will forthwith entertain a petition for the repeal of the rule. In this context, it is important
to emphasize that the governor agrees that absent the circumstance where a competent
death-sentenced individual voluntarily requests that a death warrant be signed, no death
warrants will be issued during the initial round of federal and state review, provided that
counsel for death penalty defendants is proceeding in a timely and diligent manner. This
Court agrees that the initial round of postconviction proceedings should proceed in a
deliberate but timely manner without the pressure of a pending death warrant.
Subdivision 3.851(b)(4) above addresses concerns of The Florida Bar and The Florida
Bar Foundation.
The provisions of the present rule 3.851 providing for time periods where a
60-day warrant is signed by the governor are abolished because they are unnecessary if
the guidelines are followed. The proceedings and grounds for postconviction relief
remain as provided under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which include, as
one of the grounds, the opportunity for a defendant to present newly discovered
evidence in accordance with Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992), Jones v.
State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991), and Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.
1989).
1996 Amendment. Subdivision (c) is added to make the Court's decision in
44
Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993), applicable to all rule 3.850 motions filed by a
prisoner who has been sentenced to death. Florida Rule of Judicial Administration
2.071(b) allows for telephonic and teleconferencing communication equipment to be
utilized "for a motion hearing, pretrial conference, or a status conference."
Teleconferencing sites have been established by the Department of Management
Services, Division of Communications at various metropolitan locations in the state.
The "Shevin Study" examined, at this Court's request, the issue of delays in capital
postconviction relief proceedings and noted that travel problems of counsel cause part
of those delays. The Court strongly encourages the use of the new telephonic and
teleconferencing technology for postconviction relief proceedings that do not require
evidentiary hearings, such as the hearing required under subdivision (c) of this rule.
Only the attorneys need be involved in a hearing held under subdivision (c) of this rule;
attendance of the postconviction defendant is not required.
2001 Amendment.   Several new procedures are added to rule 3.851.  New
subdivision (b), Appointment of Postconviction Counsel, is added to ensure
appointment of postconviction counsel upon the Supreme Court of Florida’s issuance
of mandate on direct appeal.  New subdivision (c), Preliminary Procedures, provides
for, among other things, the assignment of a qualified judge within 30 days after
mandate issues on direct appeal and status conferences every 90 days after the
assignment until the evidentiary hearing has been completed or the motion has been
ruled on without a hearing.  These status conferences are intended to provide a forum
for the timely resolution of public records issues and other preliminary matters.  New
subdivision (f), Procedure; Evidentiary Hearing; Disposition, sets forth general
procedures.  Most significantly, that subdivision requires an evidentiary hearing on
claims listed in an initial motion as requiring a factual determination.  The Court has
identified the failure to hold evidentiary hearings on initial motions as a major cause of
delay in the capital postconviction process and has determined that, in most cases,
requiring an evidentiary hearing on initial motions presenting factually based claims will
avoid this cause of delay.  See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
3.851, 3.852 and 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 (Fla. 2000).
45
46
APPENDIX B
Rule 2.050. Trial Court Administration
(a) (No Change)
 
(b) Chief Judge.
  
(1) (No Change)
  
(2) (No Change)
(3) (No Change)
  
(4) The chief judge shall assign judges to the courts and divisions, and
shall determine the length of each assignment. All judges shall inform the chief judge of
any contemplated absences that will affect the progress of the court's business. If a
judge is temporarily absent, is disqualified in an action, or is unable to perform the
duties of the office, the chief judge or the chief judge's designee may assign a
proceeding pending before the judge to any other judge or any additional assigned
judge of the same court. The chief judge may assign any judge to temporary service for
which the judge is qualified in any court in the same circuit. If it appears to the chief
judge that the speedy, efficient, and proper administration of justice so requires, the
chief judge shall request the chief justice of the supreme court to assign temporarily an
additional judge or judges from outside the circuit to duty in the court requiring
assistance, and shall advise the chief justice whether or not the approval of the chief
judge of the circuit from which the assignment is to be made has been obtained. The
assigned judges shall be subject to administrative supervision of the chief judge for all
purposes of this rule. When assigning a judge to hear any type of postconviction or
collateral relief proceeding brought by a defendant who has been sentenced to death,
the chief judge shall assign to such cases the judge who presided over the original
proceeding if that judge is active or otherwise available to serve unless otherwise
directed by the supreme courta judge qualified to conduct such proceedings under
subdivision (b)(10) of this rule. Nothing in this rule shall restrict the constitutional
powers of the chief justice of the supreme court to make such assignments as the chief
justice shall deem appropriate.
47
  
(5) (No Change)
  
(6) (No Change)
 
 
(7) (No Change)
  
(8) (No Change)
  
(9) (No Change)
  
(10) (No Change)
(c) (No Change)
 
(d) (No Change)
 
(e) (No Change)
 
(f) (No Change)
 
(g) (No Change)
 
(h) (No Change)