Title: Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87895, 87910
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 16, 2000

Docket Nos. 87895, 87910 cons.-Agenda 17-January 2000.
JOHN HILLS et al., Appellees, v. BRIDGEVIEW LITTLE 								LEAGUE ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed November 16, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	On July 30, 1990, plaintiff John Hills was attacked and beaten
while coaching first base for a Little League baseball team. His
attackers, Ted Loy, George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were,
respectively, the manager and assistant coaches for the opposing
team, which was sponsored by defendant Bridgeview Little
League Association (Bridgeview). The attack occurred during a
Little League baseball tournament hosted by defendant Justice
Willow Springs Little League (Justice).
	After the attack, John Hills and his wife, plaintiff Patricia
Hills, sued the Loys in the circuit court of Cook County, seeking
damages for John Hills' personal injuries and for Patricia Hills'
loss of consortium. Plaintiffs also sued Bridgeview and Justice,
alleging that Bridgeview negligently failed to supervise and
control the Loys, and that Justice negligently failed to protect John
Hills from the attack. The Loys defaulted.(1) A jury found against
Bridgeview and Justice, apportioning fault pursuant to section
2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West
1994)) equally between the two. The trial judge did not permit the
jury to include the Loys in the apportionment of fault. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 306 Ill.
App. 3d 13. We granted Bridgeview's and Justice's petitions for
leave to appeal and consolidated the cases for review.
BACKGROUND

	At trial, John Hills testified that, in the summer of 1990, he
was the first base coach on an all-star Little League baseball team
sponsored by the Lemont Little League Association. The players
on the team were 14-year-olds. In July 1990, the Lemont team
entered a Little League baseball tournament sponsored by Justice.
To enter the tournament, the Lemont team payed a fee of $125 and
posted a surety bond. The entrance fee was paid by the Lemont
team's manager, Ray Chadorowski.
	On July 30, 1990, as part of the regular tournament schedule,
the Lemont team played a game against an all-star Little League
team sponsored by Bridgeview. According to Hills, approximately
40 people were in attendance at the game. Hills stated that the
Lemont and Bridgeview teams had played each other earlier in the
tournament without incident and that, prior to July 30, he had
never heard anything negative about the Bridgeview coaches or
manager. Hills exchanged "hellos" in the parking lot with the
manager of the Bridgeview team, Ted Loy, before the game began.
As the teams took the field, Hills sensed no problems with
anyone's behavior and had no indication that anything was out of
the ordinary.
	The playing field on which the July 30 game was held was
one of two adjacent baseball fields located in the middle of a
residential neighborhood in Willow Springs. The playing field was
completely surrounded by a chain link fence approximately six
feet high. Behind home plate, the fence rose higher, forming a
protective backstop. Behind this backstop was an elevated booth
or platform with a small public address system. An announcer sat
in this booth during the game.
	The areas where the teams sat during the games, the dugouts,
were inside the fence that surrounded the field and were
themselves protected by chain link fencing. The dugout on the first
base side of the field had one opening that was approximately 10
feet from first base.	During the game, the Bridgeview team
occupied the first base dugout and the Lemont team occupied the
dugout near third base. While their respective teams were batting,
the first base coaches from each team stood in a designated area
between first base and the Bridgeview dugout known as the
coach's box and directed the players who safely reached first base
to stop or to keep running. Bridgeview's first base coach was Ted
Loy's nephew, 16-year-old George Loy, Jr.
	Hills testified that, during the first inning, in an attempt to
influence the first base umpire's calls, George Loy, Jr., began
gesturing and yelling "safe, safe, safe" as the Bridgeview players
crossed first base. The Lemont team called time-out. A conference
was held among the home plate umpire, Scott Van Wagner, the
first base umpire, Ed Jalovec, and the Bridgeview and Justice
managers and coaches. During the conference, Van Wagner told
the Bridgeview coaches to stop trying to influence the first base
umpire's calls. Play resumed.
	Hills testified that nothing unusual happened during the
second inning. However, during the third or fourth inning, while
Hills was in the coach's box at first base, Bridgeview assistant
coach George Loy, Sr., began shouting at Hills from the
Bridgeview dugout. According to Hills, George Loy, Sr., began
yelling such things as "Hey you four eyed M-Fer, I'm going to
kick your ass." Hills, who was facing the playing field, turned
around and said, "What did you say?" Loy said, "You heard me,"
and began swearing again. Hills stated that he asked Loy, "For
what?" Loy replied, "For what happened earlier in the first
inning." Hills said, "You got to be kidding," and told Loy to
"Forget about it, leave it go, it's only a kid's game, let it lie." Loy
responded, "No way, I'm coming after you." According to Hills,
Loy repeated similar statements at least four or five times during
the third and fourth innings. Prior to the fifth inning, Hills told Ray
Chadorowski and Harry Keeler, Lemont's third base coach, that
George Loy, Sr., was yelling and swearing at him. Keeler asked
Hills if he wanted to continue coaching first base. Hills said that
he did.
	During the fifth inning, George Loy, Sr., again swore at Hills.
Hills ignored Loy and did not turn around. During the sixth inning,
Hills' team scored several runs and took the lead in the game. Loy
continued swearing, but he was now angrier and his voice was
louder. Hills stated that, during this time, anyone who was in the
Bridgeview dugout would have heard the swearing and shouting.
Hills also stated that the first base umpire, who was standing in the
field between first and second base, would have been able to hear
the swearing. Hills stated that neither the first base umpire nor the
Bridgeview manager, Ted Loy, told George Loy, Sr., to stop
yelling and swearing. Hills acknowledged, however, that he never
complained to Ted Loy, the first base umpire, or the home plate
umpire about George Sr.'s behavior. Hills further stated that,
despite the shouting and swearing, he was not nervous, he never
thought that George Loy, Sr., was going to come out of the dugout
and attack him, and that he "didn't really feel threatened at all."
	At the end of the sixth inning, Hills bent down to pick up a
scorebook that he had set on the ground near first base. Hills
testified that, while he was bent over, he was suddenly hit in the
back of the head and knocked to the ground on his hands and
knees. Unable to see his attackers, Hills was then punched in the
face and hit several times in the side and back. Hills struggled to
get up and was again hit in the face and side. As Hills got to his
feet, he was punched again. Hills stated that, at this point, he saw
both George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., attacking him. George
Loy, Jr., then dug his thumb into Hills' eye and tried to rip it out.
After Hills was punched again in the body and face, there was a
"lull" in the attack.
	Hills testified that, during the "lull," he staggered in the
direction of the fence that surrounded the playing field. He then
saw George Loy, Sr., rushing toward him. Hills tried to protect
himself but was unable to prevent Loy from punching him in the
face and breaking his nose. George Loy, Sr., then punched Hills a
couple more times. After this, there was another "lull" in the
attack.
	Hills stated that he was in a daze and was feeling his broken
nose when he heard someone yell, "Oh, my God, look out, he's got
a bat." Hills then saw, out of the corner of his eye, George Loy, Jr.,
swinging a baseball bat at his knees. Hills said that he was able to
sidestep the blow so that the bat struck him on the inner side of the
left knee. Hills then fell to the ground. Hills stated that the next
thing he remembered was John O'Neill, a parent of one of the
Lemont players, telling him to stay down and not to move. Hills
could not recall being taken to the hospital or being treated in the
emergency room. As a result of the attack, Hills suffered serious
injuries and was hospitalized for five days.
	Patricia Hills, John Hills' wife, testified that she attended the
game between Bridgeview and Lemont with her nephew, Michael
Putrow, and her mother, Clare Masterson. Patricia sat in the
bleachers near the Lemont team, on the third base side of the
playing field. Patricia estimated that approximately 20 people were
seated in the Lemont bleachers. Patricia testified that the Lemont
team had participated in a tournament sponsored by Justice in
1989 without incident. Patricia further stated that, prior to the
game on July 30, 1990, she had not heard anything negative about
the Bridgeview manager or coaches and that she had never seen a
physical fight between coaches at a Little League baseball game.
	According to Patricia, nothing unusual happened during the
game until the sixth inning. During the sixth inning, Patricia saw
George Loy, Sr., who was yelling, quickly move four to five feet
out of the Bridgeview dugout toward her husband, gesture with his
hands "in a threatening manner," and then return to the dugout.
Patricia stated that she saw George Loy, Sr., come out of the
dugout at least four times during the sixth inning. She also saw her
husband, who had his back to the Bridgeview dugout, gesture with
the back of his hand to indicate "get away from me, or just like
leave me alone." Unable to make out what George Loy, Sr., was
yelling, Patricia told her nephew, Michael Putrow, to go over to
the first base side of the field and find out what Loy was saying to
her husband. Patricia stated that, despite the fact that George Loy,
Sr., was yelling and gesturing, she did not believe that he was
actually going to try and beat her husband.
	As the sixth inning ended, Patricia saw her husband bend
down to pick up his scorebook. As he did so, George Loy, Sr., left
the Bridgeview dugout and knocked him down. Stunned, Patricia
jumped to her feet and started running to the first base side of the
field, going around the fence that surrounded the playing area.
Patricia stated that it took her 30 seconds to run from the third
base bleachers to the first base side of the field. As she was
running, Patricia saw George Loy, Sr., punch her husband all over
his body.
	When she got to the first base side of the field, Patricia stood
behind the fence that surrounded the playing field and screamed
for help. She saw the first base umpire, who was standing between
first and second base, look at her husband and then turn and walk
away. She also saw the home plate umpire and the game
announcer turn and look toward her, but not respond. Patricia then
saw Ted Loy, the Bridgeview manager, come out of the dugout
and start beating and kicking her husband. George Loy, Jr., the
first base coach for Bridgeview, then joined the attack and tried to
gouge out John Hills' eye. The Bridgeview players then emptied
the dugout and began milling around the Loys and John Hills.
	Patricia stated that, after the attack had been going on for
about three minutes, Harry Keeler, the third base coach for
Lemont, came over, grabbed hold of George Loy, Sr., and pulled
him away from John Hills. While Keeler was holding George Loy,
Sr., there was a "lull" in the attack for approximately one minute.
	Patricia stated that, during the "lull," she asked her husband
if he was okay, but he was disoriented and did not respond. While
still trying to get a response from her husband, Patricia noticed
George Loy, Jr., sneak behind Keeler and pull Keeler's jacket up
over his head, pinning Keeler's arms. George Loy, Sr., now free
from Keeler's grasp, ran over to John Hills and punched him in the
nose.
	Patricia stated that she then saw the home plate umpire, Scott
Van Wagner, trying to get the Bridgeview players under control
and move them back into their dugout. Patricia estimated that six
minutes passed between the time she first screamed for help and
the time Van Wagner came down to the first base area. Patricia
further stated that she had not heard any announcements over the
public address system and did not see the first base umpire
intervene in the attack in any way. After George Loy, Sr., punched
John Hills five or six more times, someone other than the umpires,
Patricia was not sure who, again pulled George Loy, Sr., away.
There was then another "lull" in the attack of approximately a
minute.
	Patricia testified that, during the lull, she was screaming and
watching her husband struggle to stay standing. She saw Ted Loy
sneaking back into the dugout, avoiding the home plate umpire,
and acting "as if he really hadn't done anything." She then saw
George Loy, Jr., running toward her husband with a baseball bat.
Patricia yelled, "Oh, my God, he's going to kill him now," and
then screamed to her husband, "Watch out, he's got a bat." Patricia
saw her husband get hit with the bat on the side of the knee and
then fall to the ground. George Loy, Jr., then ran away. According
to Patricia, John Hills was not beaten after he received the blow to
his knee.(2) Patricia stated that, after her husband was on the ground,
she started running to a concession stand, which was located
behind right field, to phone for an ambulance. While she was
going to get help, Patricia saw a man who said he lived "right
behind the thing" and who said he would run to his house and
make the call. As Patricia was returning to her husband, she heard
the sirens of emergency vehicles coming to the field. Patricia
stated that she was away from her husband for one or two minutes.
She also stated that the police station was located within a few
blocks of the playing field. No evidence was offered as to who
actually phoned for the ambulance and police.
	Other witnesses testified to the events surrounding the attack.
Michael Putrow, plaintiffs' nephew, was 13 years old in July 1990.
Putrow testified that, during the third inning, while he was sitting
in the third base bleachers, he saw George Loy, Sr., come out of
the dugout, yelling and waving his fist. During the sixth inning,
George Loy, Sr., became more irate and came out of the dugout to
within three feet of John Hills. Neither Ted Loy nor the umpires
told George Loy, Sr., to stop yelling and swearing. At the end of
the sixth inning, George Loy, Sr., attacked Hills from behind and
began punching and kicking him. Ted Loy and George Loy, Jr.,
then joined in the attack. According to Putrow, the first base
umpire saw the attack begin, turned, and then walked away. Also,
according to Putrow, the home plate umpire did not come down to
the first base area until after John Hills had been struck with the
bat. Putrow stated that he saw his aunt, Patricia Hills, run to phone
for an ambulance. According to Putrow, the ambulance and police
arrived 20 to 25 minutes later. Putrow also stated that the entire
attack, including the "lulls," lasted about 10 minutes.
	Clare Masterson, Patricia Hills mother, offered testimony
which generally corroborated plaintiffs' testimony. Rebecca
DeVerdier, who was 15 years old at the time of the attack and who
was sitting in the third base bleachers, also generally corroborated
plaintiffs' testimony. DeVerdier stated that she believed the entire
attack lasted from 10 to 15 minutes.
	Harry Keeler, Lemont's third base coach, also testified at trial.
Keeler stated that he did not hear any of the Loys say anything
rude or threatening to John Hills prior to the attack. Keeler also
stated that John Hills did not approach him during the game and
tell him that George Loy, Sr., was shouting and swearing. Keeler
was also unaware of anyone complaining to the umpires about
George Sr.'s conduct before the attack.
	Keeler testified that, when the sixth inning ended, he was
walking back to the dugout on the third base side of the field when
he heard one of the Lemont players say, "Look at Mr. Hills."
Keeler turned around and saw George Loy, Sr., on top of John
Hills, "swinging wildly." Keeler told Ray Chadorowski to "keep
the kids in the dugout." Keeler then ran over to first base, tackled
George Loy, Sr., grabbed him, and dragged him over to the fence
that surrounded the field.
	Keeler asked George Loy, Sr., what was going on and, after
a few moments, asked if he had calmed down. Keeler felt Loy's
body relax. Assuming that the attack was over, Keeler released
Loy. Keeler stated that someone then hit him on the left side of the
head. George Loy, Sr., then turned around, pulled Keeler's jacket
over his head, and started punching him. Keeler stated that he
somehow managed to get Loy away from him and that things then
"calmed down for a second or two." Keeler then saw George Loy,
Jr., hit John Hills with a baseball bat.
	Keeler estimated that the entire attack on John Hills lasted
between three and four minutes. He also estimated that the police
arrived five to seven minutes after the attack began. Keeler stated
that he did not see the umpires intervene in the attack but that he
also "wasn't really paying attention to what they were doing."
	Scott Van Wagner testified that he was 23 years old in the
summer of 1990 and that he was the volunteer, home plate umpire
for the July 30 game. Van Wagner stated that, prior to the attack,
he did not notice any threats, yelling or other improper conduct by
any of the coaches or players. Also, before the attack, no one
complained to him about the conduct of George Loy, Sr.
	Van Wager testified that, after the sixth inning ended, he
turned around to speak to the announcer behind the home plate
backstop. After a few minutes, either the announcer, or someone
in the area of the announcer, said there was a fight going on. Van
Wagner turned, saw what he believed to be a fight near first base,
and ran down to that area. Contradicting Patricia Hills' testimony,
Van Wagner stated that he grabbed George Loy, Sr., who was
rolling on the ground with John Hills, picked him up, and carried
him to the dugout. He also called out to other adults to phone for
the police.
	As soon as Van Wagner put George Loy, Sr., in the dugout,
he turned around and saw George Loy, Jr., standing over John
Hills with a baseball bat. Harry Keeler was also standing nearby.
Van Wagner stated that he ran after George Loy, Jr., who said,
"I'm done," and then threw the bat away. Van Wagner picked up
George Loy, Jr., and carried him to the dugout. According to Van
Wagner, the police arrived less than five minutes later.
	Van Wagner stated that he did not see the first punches
thrown at John Hills and did not see whether Ted Loy joined in the
first part of the attack. Van Wagner also did not see Keeler grab
George Loy, Sr. According to Van Wagner, if Keeler grabbed
George Loy, Sr., he would have had to have done so before Van
Wagner first turned around.
	Larry Laduca corroborated Van Wagner's testimony about
restraining George Loy, Jr., after John Hills was struck with the
baseball bat. Laduca stated that he managed one of the baseball
teams sponsored by the Justice Willow Springs Little League. At
the time of the attack, Laduca was watching a Little League game
that was taking place on the field adjacent to the Bridgeview and
Lemont game. Laduca stated that, as he was watching the other
game, he heard one of the "Willow Springs mothers" near the
concession stand yelling that there was fight. Laduca ran over to
the field on which the Bridgeview and Lemont game was being
played and went through a gate in the outfield fence. As he
reached the first base area, Laduca saw John Hills lying on the
ground. He also saw Van Wagner running after George Loy, Jr.,
who was holding a baseball bat. Van Wagner told Laduca to "Get
to the dugout and don't let anyone out." Laduca went to the dugout
and saw members of the Bridgeview team crying and saying that
"all they wanted to do was play baseball and we have to go and put
up with this." According to Laduca, Van Wagner brought George
Loy, Jr., into the Bridgeview dugout. All three Loys were then
kept in the dugout until the police arrived.
	Ed Jalovec, the first base umpire, testified via videotape
evidence deposition. Jalovec stated that he could not recall if he
had been paid to umpire the July 30 game or if he had volunteered.
In contradiction to plaintiffs' witnesses, Jalovec stated that he did
not see the beginning of the attack on John Hills, and that the
attack was over quickly. Jalovec stated that he was facing the
playing field as the inning of the attack was ending. After the last
out was made, Jalovec turned toward the first base foul line. At
that time, according to Jalovec, John Hills was already on the
ground and the Bridgeview coaches and manager were in the
Bridgeview dugout. Hills' wife and another coach from Lemont
then came running over to Hills. Jalovec stated that he did not see
anyone strike Hills with a bat and that he saw no further attacks on
Hills after he turned toward first base.
	Joseph Kalafut testified that he was the announcer and
scorekeeper at the July 30 game and that he was a member of
Justice's governing board. Kalafut explained that the Justice
Willow Springs Little League is a nonprofit corporation with a
volunteer board of 8 to 10 persons. Justice owned the playing field
on which the game was held, as well as a concession stand and a
second, smaller baseball field adjacent to the first.
	Kalafut explained that Justice held a baseball tournament at
the end of July to give some of the children additional playing
experience since their regular baseball season ended in the
beginning of July. The tournament also generated revenue for
Justice, with money being made through the sale of concessions of
food such as hot dogs and soda pop. The tournament was run by
the Justice board members and parent volunteers. The $125
entrance fee charged to the teams was used to pay for trophies that
each team received, for food that the players and umpires were
given after the games, and possibly for the services of the umpires.
Any profit left over from the entrance fee was "nominal." During
a tournament, Justice would have both paid and volunteer umpires.
In 1990, paid umpires received $5 to $10 a game. No admission
fee was charged to people who came to watch the games.
	Kalafut stated that, at the July 30 game, he was seated on the
elevated announcer's platform behind the fence in back of home
plate. At some point during the game, between innings, Kalafut
was talking to the home plate umpire when he noticed two men
near first base "engaged in a struggle of some sort." Kalafut told
the umpire that he thought there was "a problem going on down
there." Kalafut left the booth and immediately went down to the
first base area. According to Kalafut, when he got to the first base
area, John Hills was on the ground and the attack was over.
Kalafut stated that he did not make any announcement to stop the
fighting when he first became aware of it because he did not
believe it was a "positive thing" to announce that there was a fight
in front of the children and adult spectators.
	Bridgeview board members Ronald Mizwicki and Gregory
Klein testified regarding the Bridgeview organization and its
relation to the Loys. Mizwicki stated that Bridgeview was an
unincorporated, nonprofit association whose goals were to teach
its players good sportsmanship and how to play Little League
baseball. The Bridgeview governing board consisted of a
president, a vice-president, a secretary, a treasurer and an
equipment manager. The board and team managers were
volunteers. In 1990, Mizwicki was the acting president of
Bridgeview. Mizwicki stated that he appointed Ted Loy to be the
manager of the team that attended the July 30 game after Loy
volunteered to take the position. Mizwicki also stated that, prior
to appointing Ted Loy manager, he had never heard anything
negative about him. Loy had managed for Bridgeview in the past
without incident and, as far as Mizwicki knew, he had a good
reputation in the community. Volunteer managers were difficult to
find and, when Ted Loy volunteered to manage the 1990 team,
Mizwicki accepted.
	Mizwicki acknowledged that Ted Loy represented Bridgeview
at the July 30 game, as none of the board members were in
attendance. However, Ted Loy, and other team managers, did not
run Bridgeview or set its policies. Mizwicki stated that Ted Loy
selected George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., as his assistant
coaches and that he had the authority to do so under Bridgeview's
rules. Mizwicki further stated that Bridgeview managers were
expected to conduct themselves properly at all games and that they
were expected to supervise and control the conduct of their players
and coaches during games.
	Gregory Klein generally corroborated Mizwicki's testimony.
Klein stated that, when the Bridgeview board learned of Ted Loy's
attack on John Hills, the board barred him from the Little League.
Because George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were not members
of Bridgeview, the board could not take any action against them.
	Following the attack on John Hills, plaintiffs filed a complaint
in the circuit court of Cook County against the three Loys,
Bridgeview and Justice. As ultimately amended, plaintiffs'
complaint alleged a theory of direct negligence against
Bridgeview, specifically, that Bridgeview was negligent in failing
to supervise and control its coaches and manager. In addition, the
complaint alleged that Justice was negligent in failing to protect
John Hills from the attack. The complaint also alleged that the
Loys struck and injured John Hills. On June 5, 1995, the trial court
entered an order of default against the Loys for failure to answer
or otherwise plead.
	After the evidence at trial was heard, the jury was instructed
that Ted Loy, George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., had defaulted
and that all of plaintiffs' allegations had been admitted against
them. The jury was also instructed on plaintiffs' theories of
liability with respect to Bridgeview and Justice and was told that
Bridgeview and Justice had a duty to exercise ordinary care for the
safety of John Hills.
	The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiffs, awarding
John Hills $632,710 and Patricia Hills $125,000. The jury
apportioned fault equally between Bridgeview and Justice
pursuant to section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994)). The trial judge did not permit the
jury to include the Loys in the apportionment of fault. Thereafter,
the trial judge denied Bridgeview's and Justice's motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
	On appeal, both Bridgeview and Justice challenged the
findings of negligence and the trial judge's decision to exclude the
Loys from the apportionment of fault. With respect to Bridgeview,
the appellate court acknowledged that one generally has no duty
to control the conduct of another to prevent him harming a third
party, but concluded that a "special relationship" existed in the
case at bar which imposed an affirmative duty upon Bridgeview to
control the actions of George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr. The
appellate court reasoned that Bridgeview, through the person of
Ted Loy, stood in a master-servant relationship with George Loy,
Sr., and George Loy, Jr., and that Bridgeview had an affirmative
duty, in accordance with section 317 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (Restatement (Second) of Torts §317 (1965)), to control
the conduct of the assistant coaches to prevent them from
intentionally harming John Hills. The appellate court concluded
that this duty arose "once the beatings began and two one-minute
lulls followed." 306 Ill. App. 3d at 20. The court also determined
that there was sufficient evidence to show that Bridgeview, acting
through Ted Loy, had breached its duty to control its servants and
that this breach of duty was a proximate cause of plaintiffs'
injuries.
	With respect to Justice, the appellate court acknowledged that,
in the absence of a special relationship, a landowner generally has
no duty to protect lawful entrants from criminal attacks by third
parties. The appellate court concluded, however, that Justice and
John Hills stood in a special relationship of "business invitor and
invitee." The appellate court further determined that the attack on
John Hills was foreseeable to Justice once it "began and two one-minute breaks occurred" and that imposing a duty to protect upon
Justice would not be unduly burdensome. 306 Ill. App. 3d at 22.
Therefore, the appellate court concluded that Justice had a duty to
protect John Hills from the Loys' attack. In addition, the appellate
court determined that there was sufficient evidence to show that
Justice breached its duty to protect and that this breach of duty was
a proximate cause of John Hills' injuries. 306 Ill. App. 3d at 23.
	The appellate court also concluded that the circuit court did
not err in excluding the Loys from the apportionment of fault. The
appellate court reasoned that section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994)) applies only to
actions based on negligence and not those based on intentional
torts. 306 Ill. App. 3d at 21. Accordingly, the appellate court held
that the trial judge did not err in denying Bridgeview's and
Justice's post-trial motions.
	We granted Bridgeview's and Justice's petitions for leave to
appeal and consolidated the cases for review. We permitted the
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief in
support of plaintiffs and Little League, Inc., to file an amicus
curiae brief in support of defendants.
ANALYSIS
Bridgeview Little League Association
	To succeed in an action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove
facts that establish the existence of a duty, a breach of the duty,
and an injury to the plaintiff which was proximately caused by the
breach. Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 374 (1974). Bridgeview
initially contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it did not have
an affirmative duty to control any of the Loys. Whether a duty
exists is a question of law. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital &amp;
Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 (1987).
	Generally, one has no affirmative duty to control the conduct
of another to prevent a criminal attack on a third party. Estate of
Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 119 Ill. 2d 496, 503
(1988); Geimer v. Chicago Park District, 272 Ill. App. 3d 629,
632 (1995); Restatement (Second) of Torts §315 (1965). The
common law recognizes an exception to this rule when a "special
relationship" exists between the actor and the one whose conduct
is to be controlled. Estate of Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d  at 503;
Restatement (Second) of Torts §315(a) (1965). The general rule
that one has no affirmative duty to control others in the absence of
a special relationship has been, and continues to be, much debated
among legal commentators. See, e.g., D. Dobbs, Law of Torts, ch.
21, at 854 nn. 4-8 (2000) (listing representative literature
discussing affirmative duties). Neither Bridgeview nor plaintiffs
have asked us to abandon or modify the general, no-affirmative-duty rule or the special relationship doctrine.
	Plaintiffs maintain that a relationship of master and servant
existed between Bridgeview and George Loy, Sr., and George Loy,
Jr. According to plaintiffs, this master-servant relationship was a
special relationship which, under the theory of liability set forth in
section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, imposed an
affirmative duty upon Bridgeview to exercise reasonable care to
control the conduct of George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., to
prevent them from intentionally harming John Hills.
	Section 317 provides:
			"Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
			A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so
to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his
employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
				(a) the servant
					(i) is upon the premises in possession of the
master or upon which the servant is privileged to
enter only as his servant, or
					(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
				(b) the master
					(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his servant, and
					(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control."
Restatement (Second) of Torts §317 (1965).
	Plaintiffs contend that Bridgeview falls under the rationale of
section 317 based upon the following reasoning. (1) Bridgeview's
manager at the July 30 game, Ted Loy, was an agent of
Bridgeview. (2) Because of the position and supervisory authority
given to Ted Loy by the Bridgeview organization, he may be
considered the "master" for purposes of establishing the notice and
ability to control requirements of section 317. (3) George Loy, Sr.,
and George Loy, Jr., were servants of Bridgeview. (4) The
remaining criteria of section 317 were met under the facts of this
case. Specifically, the assistant coaches were on premises they
were privileged to enter because they were servants of Bridgeview,
Ted Loy knew or should have known of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising control, and Ted Loy knew or should
have known that he had the ability to control the coaches.
	We address each step in plaintiffs' reasoning in turn.
Was Ted Loy an Agent of Bridgeview?
	Bridgeview expressly conceded both before and during trial
that Ted Loy was their agent during the game. Bridgeview has not
taken a different position on appeal.
Was Ted Loy the "Master" for Purposes of Establishing the
Notice and Ability to Control Requirements of Section 317?
	While Bridgeview concedes that Ted Loy was its agent during
the game, it argues that it is wrong to focus upon Ted Loy in
determining whether Bridgeview, as an institution, knew of the
necessity and had the ability to exercise control over George Loy,
Sr., and George Loy, Jr. According to Bridgeview, the relevant
inquiry in the case at bar is not what Ted Loy knew or did but,
rather, what the members of the Bridgeview board knew and did.
In other words, according to Bridgeview, the "master," for
purposes of establishing the notice and ability to control
requirements of section 317, is the Bridgeview board, not Ted
Loy.
	Bridgeview further emphasizes, and plaintiffs concede, that
the members of the Bridgeview board had no knowledge that any
of the Loys had attempted to attack or intimidate opposing coaches
on any occasion prior to July 30, 1990. Ted Loy in particular had
managed for Bridgeview before July 30 without incident and, as
far as the board knew, had a good reputation in the community.
Moreover, none of the board members were present at the July 30
game. Thus, according to Bridgeview, without a board member
present at the game, and without any indication that a board
member needed to attend, the board did not have the opportunity
or knowledge necessary to exercise control over any of the Loys,
as required under section 317. Therefore, no affirmative duty
could be imposed.
	The question of who must have notice of the need to control,
and who must have the ability to control, arises in this case
because of the nature of plaintiffs' claim against Bridgeview.
Plaintiffs are not attempting to recover against Bridgeview for the
physical harms caused by George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr.,
under principles of respondeat superior. To succeed under
respondeat superior, plaintiffs would have to establish that the
assault on John Hills was committed by the Loys within the scope
of their agency or employment. Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 405 (1996). Plaintiffs have admitted that this was not the
case.
	Rather than attempting to recover under respondeat superior
for the physical harms caused by the Loys, plaintiffs have claimed
that Bridgeview was "directly" negligent in failing to supervise
and control the assistant coaches. To establish this claim of direct
negligence, plaintiffs do not have to show that the attack on John
Hills was committed within the scope of the Loys' agency or
employment. Lancaster v. Norfolk &amp; Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1985); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§317, Comment a, at 125 (1965). Plaintiffs must, however,
establish that Bridgeview had an affirmative duty to control the
Loys and that this duty was breached. In particular, pursuant to
section 317, plaintiffs must show that Bridgeview knew or had
reason to know of the need to control the Loys, that it knew or had
reason to know that it had the ability to control the Loys, and that
it negligently failed to act on that information."But there is an
obvious difficulty with speaking of [a corporation] in this
connection. A corporation is not a human being; 'its' knowledge
is the knowledge of particular employees. The question is
therefore what level of employee need be informed [of the need to
control] to make the corporation liable ***. Oddly, we can find
little in the tort cases or commentary on this question, maybe
because 'direct negligence' is important only in those cases, which
apparently are rare, where an employee commits a tort not in
furtherance of his employer's business; in any other case
respondeat superior provides a simpler route to establishing the
employer's liability." Lancaster, 773 F.2d  at 820.
	We do not agree with Bridgeview's contention that a member
of the Bridgeview board must have been aware of the need to
control the Loys before an affirmative duty to control could arise.
In the case at bar, Bridgeview board members Ronald Mizwicki
and Gregory Klein both testified that, as manager of the
Bridgeview team, Ted Loy had general supervisory authority over
his players and coaches. Part of Ted Loy's responsibilities as
manger included making sure that his players and coaches engaged
in good sportsmanship and that they adhered to Bridgeview's rules
and guidelines regarding behavior during games. Ted Loy was
given these responsibilities, according to Mizwicki, precisely
because Bridgeview board members could not themselves attend
the games on a regular basis. Because the board specifically
entrusted Ted Loy with the general supervisory authority over the
team players and coaches, we hold that Ted Loy was the
"responsible agent" (Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 820) of Bridgeview,
and that he may be considered the "master" for purposes of
establishing the notice and ability to control requirements of
section 317. See Kigin v. Woodmen of the World Insurance Co.,
185 Ill. App. 3d 400, 403 (1989) (an individual who had "overall
supervisory and managerial authority" over a youth campground
owned by a "fraternal organization" was considered to be that
organization for purposes of establishing the notice and ability to
control requirements of section 317); see also Illinois Steel Co. v.
McFadden, 196 Ill. 344, 349 (1902) (a superintendent at a steel
mill was a "vice-principal" of the steel company (thus barring
application of the fellow servant rule) and his decision to do "work
in a dangerous manner" was the decision of the company for the
purpose of establishing the company's negligence); 27 Am. Jur. 2d
Employment Relationship §§409 through 412 (1996). Therefore,
if Ted Loy knew of the need to control and had the ability to
control, and if the remaining criteria of section 317 are satisfied,
then it may be said that Bridgeview had an affirmative duty to
control the conduct of George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr.
	Bridgeview briefly asserts that once Ted Loy joined the attack
on John Hills he abandoned his responsibility to supervise the
assistant coaches and so completely departed from the scope of his
agency that Bridgeview cannot be held liable for his inaction in
failing to control the assistant coaches. Bridgeview does not cite
any authority in support of this argument. Accordingly, we
consider it waived. 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Saldana v. Wirtz
Cartage Co., 74 Ill. 2d 379, 386 (1978) (when an appellant seeks
reversal, " 'theories not pursued nor advanced with citation of
authorities are deemed waived' [citations]").
	Before addressing the remainder of plaintiffs' argument
regarding the existence of an affirmative duty, we offer a point of
clarification. At times in their brief to this court, plaintiffs assert
that Bridgeview, acting through the assistant coaches, George Loy,
Sr., and George Loy, Jr., had an affirmative duty to control Ted
Loy. This is incorrect. Under Illinois law, an affirmative duty to
control the conduct of another will arise only if a special
relationship exists between the actor and the party whose conduct
is to be controlled. The only special relationship that has been
alleged in the instant case is one of master-servant. On the record
before us, there is no basis for holding that George Loy, Sr., or
George, Loy, Jr., had supervisory authority over Ted Loy. Thus,
even if George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., are considered
agents of Bridgeview, they cannot be considered "responsible
agents" or "masters" for purposes of section 317. Therefore,
Bridgeview had no affirmative duty, acting through George Loy,
Sr., or George Loy, Jr., to control Ted Loy.(3)
Were George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., Servants of
Bridgeview?
	Section 317 requires a master-servant relationship between
the actor and the party whose conduct is to be controlled. The
Restatement uses the term "servant" in a particular fashion,
drawing a distinction between the general term "agent" and the
more specific term "servant." See Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§1, 2 (1958); see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Civil, No. 50.10 (3d ed. 1995) ("The term 'agent' is broader than
either 'servant' or 'employee.' A servant or employee is an agent,
but one may be an agent although he is neither servant nor
employee"). The Restatement defines a servant as a type of agent
"employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or
is subject to the right to control by the master." (Emphasis added.)
Restatement (Second) of Agency §2(2), at 12 (1958). Although the
right to control the physical conduct of the person giving services
most often determines whether the relationship of master and
servant exists, the right to control may be attenuated. Restatement
(Second) of Agency §220, Comment d, at 487 (1958). In addition,
a number of other factors may play a role in establishing the
master-servant relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency §220
(1958). Ultimately,"[t]he relation of master and servant is one not
capable of exact definition" (Restatement (Second) of Agency
§220, Comment c, at 486 (1958)), and it is generally left to the
trier of fact to determine whether the relationship exists
(Restatement (Second) of Agency §220, Comment c, at 486-87
(1958)). See also Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, 319-20
(1942) ("The question as to whether or not the relationship of
master and servant exists is dependent upon certain facts and
circumstances. These facts include the question of the hiring, the
right to discharge, the manner of direction of the servant, the right
to terminate the relationship, and the character of the supervision
of the work done. Unless these facts clearly appear, the
relationship cannot become purely a question of law").
	In the circuit court in the case at bar, plaintiffs did not argue
that George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were servants of
Bridgeview, as that term is used in the Restatement. Plaintiffs did
assert, however, that the assistant coaches were agents of
Bridgeview and that, as such, Bridgeview had a duty to control
their actions. Bridgeview disputed this assertion and argued before
the jury that the assistant coaches were not its agents. At the close
of evidence, the jury was given Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Civil, No. 50.05, which states, in pertinent part, that "[i]f you find
that one person has the right to control the actions of another at a
given time, you may find that the relation of principal and agent
exists, even though the right to control may not have been
exercised." (Emphasis added.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Civil, No. 50.05 (3d ed. 1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil 3d). By
returning a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the jury implicitly
determined that George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., met this
definition of agency.
	On appeal, Bridgeview does not argue that the evidence
offered at trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding of
agency. Nor does it argue that the jury's finding of agency, as
defined in IPI Civil 3d No. 50.05, is insufficient to establish a
master-servant relationship. Accordingly, any such argument is
waived. 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7) ("Points not argued are waived").
Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we will assume that George
Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were servants of Bridgeview.
Were the Remaining Criteria of Section 317 Met?
	Section 317 requires, as a condition of imposing an
affirmative duty to control, that the servant subject to control be
upon premises "in possession of the master" or upon "which the
servant is privileged to enter only as [the master's] servant." There
is no dispute that this condition was met in the case at bar. The
baseball field on which the Bridgeview-Lemont game was played
and on which the attack took place was not open to the general
public. George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were allowed in the
dugouts and on the field only because they were Bridgeview's
assistant coaches.
	Section 317 also requires, as a condition of imposing an
affirmative duty to control, that the master know or have reason to
know "of the necessity and opportunity" to control the servant.
The parties dispute what type of notice Ted Loy must have had
regarding the need to control the assistant coaches before the duty
to control could arise. Citing to cases discussing a parent's
affirmative duty to control a child, Bridgeview argues that specific
instances of prior misconduct by George Loy, Sr., and George Loy,
Jr., were required before any duty to control could be imposed.
See, e.g., Bishop v. Morich, 250 Ill. App. 3d 366, 370 (1993) (to
establish that parents negligently failed to control a child to
prevent an intentional tort, plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that
parents "were aware of specific instances of prior conduct
sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was
likely to occur"); see also F. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence
Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 778, 812 (1953) (and cases cited
therein) (discussing the master's affirmative duty to control his
servants and noting that before the duty will be imposed "[i]t must
be shown *** that the likelihood of [acts done entirely on the
servant's own account] had been brought home to the master, e.g.,
by a showing that the acts had occurred so persistently that the
master knew or should have known of them"). Because there was
no evidence of prior assaults or physical attacks by any of the
Loys, Bridgeview argues that it had no notice of the need to
control and that no affirmative duty to control could be imposed.
	Plaintiffs, in contrast, argue that prior incidents of misconduct
are not required before the duty to control may be imposed.
According to plaintiffs, the proper focus in determining whether
the master has sufficient notice of the need to control is on the
time immediately preceding the attack, not "days, weeks, or
months" before. Plaintiffs further argue that George Sr.'s swearing
and gesturing was sufficient to put Ted Loy on notice that an
attack was forthcoming and, therefore, that there was a need to
control the assistant coaches.
	Under either standard of notice proposed by the parties in this
case, it is clear that, prior to the commencement of the attack on
John Hills, Ted Loy did not have notice that George Loy, Sr., or
George Loy, Jr., would intentionally harm John Hills. There was
no evidence offered at trial that George Loy, Sr., or George Loy,
Jr., had any violent propensities, that they had ever committed a
previous assault on any person, or that Ted Loy knew of any
violent tendencies on their part. Moreover, the witnesses at trial
who viewed the attack uniformly testified that they were
"surprised," "shocked" and "stunned" when the attack on John
Hills began. No witness stated that he or she foresaw the attack
approaching. Most important, both John Hills and Patricia Hills
testified unequivocally that, despite the swearing and gestures,
they did not believe that George Loy, Sr., was going to physically
assault John Hills. Under ordinary negligence standards,
" ' "[f]oreseeability means that which is objectively reasonable to
expect, not merely what might conceivably occur." ' " (Emphasis
omitted.) American National Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. National
Advertising Co., 149 Ill. 2d 14, 29 (1992), quoting Genaust v.
Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 466 (1976), quoting Winnett v.
Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 12-13 (1974). In addition, "[s]erious crimes
are generally unforeseeable because they are different in nature
from what employees in a lawful occupation are expected to do."
Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 405 (1996). Given the
record before us, there is no basis for holding that Ted Loy knew
or should have known, before the attack began, that the assistant
coaches were going to intentionally harm John Hills.
	Citing to Shortall v. Hawkeye's Bar &amp; Grill, 283 Ill. App. 3d
439 (1996), plaintiffs argue in the alternative that, even if Ted Loy
did not know of the need to control George Loy, Sr., and George
Loy, Jr., before the attack began, he must have known of the need
to control after the assault had started. See Shortall, 283 Ill. App.
3d at 443 ("A criminal attack by a third person is reasonably
foreseeable *** when a serious physical altercation has already
begun"). The appellate court below agreed with this reasoning,
concluding that Ted Loy knew of the need to control "once the
beatings began and two one-minute lulls followed" and that an
affirmative duty to control the assistant coaches arose after the
attack began.(4) We disagree.
	Section 317 requires more than that the master be aware of the
need to control before the duty to control will arise. The master
must also know or have reason to know that he has "the ability to
control his servant." The "ability to control" requirement of
section 317 does not mean that Ted Loy had to be able to
physically restrain the assistant coaches before a duty to control
could be imposed. "There is no duty to control another's conduct
at the risk of the actor" (F. Harper &amp; P. Kime, The Duty to Control
the Conduct of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886, 888 (1934)) and
plaintiffs do not argue that Ted Loy was required to physically
intervene in the assault. Nevertheless, the term "control" is used
in section 317 "in a very real sense." 43 Yale L.J. at 891. Under
section 317, "the essential basis of liability [is] the practical
opportunity for effective control arising from the general master-servant relationship and from the connection between the
dangerous conduct and the employment." (Emphasis added.) F.
James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev.
778, 812 n.183 (1953).
	Section 317 is addressed primarily to the most common form
of master-servant relationship, that of employer and employee. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §317, Comment b, c, at 125-26
(1965) (giving examples of a factory owner and a railroad
company's duty to control their employees). In a situation such as
that presented here, where it is alleged that a master has a duty to
intervene in an ongoing criminal attack committed by its servants,
there is a theoretical justification for imposing a duty to control
upon the master, when the master is an employer and the servant
is a paid employee. Because an employer controls an employee's
salary, an employer has economic leverage and, hence, a measure
of actual control over an employee. During an ongoing assault, an
employer may use that economic leverage, and exercise his
authority as master, by verbally threatening to discipline, demote
or discharge an employee if he or she does not stop the assault.
Arguably, even in the heat of an attack, an employee may pause
when threatened with the loss of his livelihood or a portion
thereof. Imposing a duty to control on the employer in such a
situation is thus, generally speaking, warranted. See, e.g., Sunseri
v. Puccia, 97 Ill. App. 3d 488, 494 (1981) (owner of a restaurant
and lounge potentially liable for failing to act in any manner to
terminate altercation in which employee bartender participated).
	In the case at bar, however, George Loy, Sr., and George Loy,
Jr., were not paid employees of Bridgeview. They were volunteers.
Unlike an employer, a master of a volunteer has no inherent
economic leverage or control over that volunteer. Further,
volunteers typically provide their services for reasons other than
their own, personal benefit. In the instant case, for example,
George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., may have agreed to act as
assistant coaches solely as a favor to Ted Loy. If such were the
case, a verbal threat by Ted Loy to "discipline" or "fire" the
assistant coaches would have been worthless as an effective means
of control.
	Plaintiffs point out that, under the Restatement, "one who
volunteers services without an agreement for an expectation of
reward may be a servant of the one accepting such services."
Restatement (Second) of Agency §225 (1958). Plaintiffs contend
that the volunteer status of the assistant coaches should not affect
the resolution of this case. However, plaintiffs have not explained,
under the facts of this case, what effective means of control Ted
Loy could have utilized, in his capacity as master, to constrain the
volunteer assistant coaches once the attack began. In the absence
of any evidence of an effective means of control available to Ted
Loy and, therefore, to Bridgeview, it would be "tantamount to
imposing strict liability" (Estates of Morgan v. Family Counseling
Center, 77 Ohio 284, 298, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1323 (1997)) to
require Bridgeview to control the conduct of the volunteer
assistant coaches. We decline to impose that standard of liability
upon Bridgeview.
	The appellate court below erred when it concluded, without
analysis or qualification, that the volunteer assistant coaches were
subject to sufficient control after the assault began to establish
Bridgeview's liability pursuant to section 317. There is no
authority to support such a holding and it is at odds with the
requirement of actual control set forth in section 317.
	On this record, we hold that the volunteer relationship
between Bridgeview and George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr.,
lacked sufficient elements of control to bring that relationship
within the purview of section 317. Accordingly, we conclude that
Bridgeview had no affirmative duty to control the assistant
coaches to curtail the criminal attack. Because Bridgeview, acting
through Ted Loy, had no affirmative duty to control George Loy,
Sr., or George Loy, Jr., the trial judge erred in denying
Bridgeview's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Justice Willow Springs Little League
	Like Bridgeview, Justice initially contends that the circuit
court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict because it did not have an affirmative duty to protect John
Hills from the attack committed by the Loys. Whether a duty
exists is a question of law. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital &amp;
Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 (1987).
	Plaintiffs' argument regarding the affirmative duty owed by
Justice is narrow. Plaintiff's argument is limited to the contention
that Justice had a duty to protect John Hills from "the attacks made
upon him." In other words, plaintiffs maintain that Justice had an
affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to protect John Hills
from reasonably foreseeable attacks by other coaches who were on
the playing field during the game. Given the scope of plaintiffs'
argument, we express no opinion on whether Justice had an
affirmative duty in other contexts, such as an affirmative duty to
protect coaches from spectators or other individuals not on the
playing field or an affirmative duty to protect the children on the
playing field from foreseeable attacks.
	Generally, a possessor of land owes no duty to protect lawful
entrants from criminal attacks by third parties. Rowe v. State Bank,
125 Ill. 2d 203, 215-16 (1988); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§314 (1965); see also Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 52 (1991)
(" '[the] imposition of a general duty to anticipate and guard
against the negligence of others would place an intolerable burden
on society' "), quoting Dunn v. Baltimore &amp; Ohio R.R. Co., 127 Ill. 2d 350, 366 (1989) . This general rule, like the general rule that
one has no duty to control the conduct of another, has been much
debated. Compare R. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
Legal Stud. 151 (1973), with J. Adler, Relying Upon the
Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the
Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or
Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 867; see also D. Dobbs, Law of
Torts, ch. 21, at 854 nn. 4-8 (2000) (listing representative
literature). Neither Justice nor plaintiffs have asked us to abandon
or modify the general, no-affirmative-duty rule.
	The common law recognizes an exception to the rule that a
landholder owes no duty to protect entrants from criminal attacks
where the landholder and the entrant stand in a special relationship
with each other that warrants imposing such a duty. Rowe, 125 Ill.
2d at 215-16; Restatement (Second) of Torts §314A (1965). The
existence of a special relationship does not, by itself, impose a
duty upon the possessor of land to protect lawful entrants from the
criminal acts of third parties. Before a duty to protect will be
imposed it must also be shown that the criminal attack was
reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d  at 215-16. In
addition, whether a duty exists will depend upon a "consideration
of the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden to guard
against it, and the consequences of placing that burden upon the
defendant." Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d  at 227-28.
	 Illinois courts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts
recognize four categories of special relationships that may give
rise to a duty to protect an individual from criminal attack. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §314A (1965). Three of these
special relationships, i.e., common carrier and passenger,
innkeeper and guest, and custodian and ward, have no bearing on
this case. A fourth special relationship recognized by the
Restatement is set forth in detail in section 344 and is relevant to
the resolution of the case at bar. Section 344 provides:
			"Business Premises Open to Public: Acts of Third
Persons or Animals
			A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for
entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to
members of the public while they are upon the land for
such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the
accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third
persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to
exercise reasonable care to
			(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely
to be done, or
			(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to
avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it."
Restatement (Second) of Torts §344 (1965).
	The rationale for recognizing the special relationship set forth
in section 344 differs from the rationale governing the other well-established special relationships, i.e., common carrier-passenger,
innkeeper-guest and custodian-ward, that may give rise to a
common law duty to protect individuals from third-party attacks.
With respect to these latter relationships, it has been said that
"since the ability of one of the parties to provide for his own
protection has been limited in some way by his submission to the
control of the other, a duty should be imposed upon the one
possessing control (and thus the power to act) to take reasonable
precautions to protect the other one from assaults by third parties
which, at least, could reasonably have been anticipated." Kline v.
1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483
(D.C. Cir. 1970). In contrast, the common law generally "refuse[d]
to recognize such a special relationship between the commercial
landowner and his patron since the patron had not placed himself
under sufficient control of the landowner to warrant imposition of
liability." M. Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection:
Landowner's Liability for Failure to Protect Patrons from
Criminal Attack, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 736 (1979).
	Nevertheless, in recent years, a large number of courts have
recognized a special relationship between a business that is open
to the public and its customers which may give rise to a duty on
the part of the business to protect its patrons from third-party
attacks. Part of the reason for recognizing this special relationship
is that, generally speaking, commercial establishments are well
positioned "to know the extent of crime on the premises *** to
take measures to thwart it and to distribute the costs" associated
with providing security. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd.
Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 903 (Tenn. 1996); 21 Ariz. L. Rev.
at 747-48. A more important reason for recognizing the special
relationship, however, focuses on the action taken by a landholder
who opens his premises to the public for business purposes and
upon the nature or character of a business open to the general
public.
	As the Restatement notes, there are situations in which a
landholder, "as a reasonable man, is required to anticipate and
guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of
others. [This situation may arise] where the [landholder's] own
affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable
high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, which a
reasonable man would take into account." Restatement (Second)
of Torts §302B, Comment e, at 90 (1965). When a landholder
opens his premises to the public for business purposes, he must
recognize the risk that has been created:
		"[P]laces to which the general public are invited might
indeed anticipate, either from common experience or
known fact, that places of general public resort are also
places where what men can do, they might. One who
invites all may reasonably expect that all might not
behave, and bears responsibility for injury that follows the
absence of reasonable precaution against that common
expectation." Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 391, 485 A.2d 742, 745 (1984).
See also McClung, 937 S.W.2d  at 897 (and authorities cited
therein) (noting that modern courts have been willing to hold that
businesses have a duty to protect patrons from foreseeable third-party attacks, in part, "as a result of the prevalence of violent
crimes at commercial establishments").
	Thus, generally stated, it is the nature of the business which
the landholder conducts on his premises that determines whether
the business stands in a special relationship with its customers that
may impose a duty to provide security or protection from third-party attacks. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §344, Comment
f , at 226 (1965) ("If the place or character of his business, or his
past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate
careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to
take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient
number of servants to afford a reasonable protection"); see also
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal. 4th 666, 680 n.8,
863 P.2d 207, 216 n.8 (1993) (noting that the character of some
business establishments open to the public, such as a parking
garage or an all-night convenience store, creates " ' "an especial
temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct" ' [citations]"
that helps give rise to, and affects the scope of, the duty to protect).
	In the case at bar, plaintiffs' argument regarding Justices'
liability is based exclusively upon the existence of a special
relationship between Justice and John Hills and upon the existence
of an affirmative duty on the part of Justice to protect John Hills
from the Loys' criminal attack. Plaintiffs do not contend that
Justice stood in a special relationship with John Hills because the
Justice playing field was open to the public for business purposes,
or because Justice, by hosting a Little League baseball game,
created dangerous conditions that attracted crime. Instead, citing
to Hill v. Charlie Club, Inc., 279 Ill. App. 3d 754 (1996), plaintiffs
maintain that Justice and John Hills stood in a special relationship
because they were, respectively, a "business invitor and invitee."
	Plaintiffs observe that a "person is a business invitee on the
land of another if (1) the person enters by express or implied
invitation; (2) the entry is connected with the owner's business or
with an activity conducted by the owner on the land; and (3) the
owner receives a benefit." Charlie Club, Inc., 279 Ill. App. 3d at
759. Plaintiffs point out that the Lemont team, including John
Hills, received a written invitation to participate in the baseball
tournament and that the tournament was conducted as an
organized activity on Justice's land. Plaintiffs further observe that
the Lemont team paid a $125 entrance fee to participate in the
tournament and that if the fee had not been paid John Hills would
not have been allowed upon the playing field. Plaintiffs
acknowledge that the entrance fee was used to pay for trophies,
food for the teams, and other incidentals. Plaintiffs stress,
however, that Justice admitted that some "nominal" profit was left
from the entrance fees following these expenditures. Plaintiffs
argue, therefore, that Justice received a benefit from John Hill's
presence on the field and that he was a business invitee. Thus,
according to plaintiffs, Justice and John Hills stood in a special
relationship with one another and the general rule that a landholder
has no duty to protect lawful entrants from third-party attacks does
not apply.
	Although neither plaintiffs nor Justice mentions this fact, we
note that there is a split in our appellate court regarding the
definition of the special relationship that may impose upon
landholders the duty to protect lawful entrants from third-party
attacks. One line of appellate decisions describes the special
relationship as it is expressed in section 344 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, holding that the special relationship arises when
the possessor of land holds the premises open to the public for
entry for business purposes. See, e.g., Loomis v. Granny's Rocker
Nite Club, 250 Ill. App. 3d 753, 758 (1993); Hayes v. O'Donnell,
76 Ill. App. 3d 695, 697 (1979) (a business open to the public,
such as a tavern, has an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps
to protect its patrons against the misconduct of third parties). A
second line of decisions, however, states the rule as plaintiffs in
the case at bar do, singling out as the dispositive question whether
the possessor of land receives a benefit from the lawful entrant.
See, e.g., Charlie Club, Inc., 279 Ill. App. 3d at 759. To determine
which line of appellate decisions describes the special relationship
correctly, we look to this court's decision in Rowe v. State Bank,
125 Ill. 2d 203, 215-16 (1988).
	In Rowe, this court for the first time stated that a possessor of
land may have a duty to protect lawful entrants from criminal
attacks "where the parties are in a position of *** business invitor
and invitee." Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d  at 216. In support of this statement,
the court cited to Jacobsma v. Goldberg's Fashion Forum, 14 Ill.
App. 3d 710 (1973), O'Brien v. Colonial Village, Inc., 119 Ill.
App. 2d 105 (1970), and W. Keeton, Prosser &amp; Keeton on Torts
§33, at 201-02 (5th ed. 1984). Jacobsma, which concerned
whether a duty of care was owed to a customer in a clothing store
who was injured while attempting to stop a shoplifter, relied upon
O'Brien in its duty analysis. Jacobsma, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 714. At
issue in O'Brien was whether a complaint against a shopping
center stated a cause of action for injuries resulting from a criminal
assault against a patron that took place in the center's parking lot.
In holding that the shopping center could not be charged with a
duty to protect based upon the facts alleged in the complaint, the
O'Brien court described the rule recognized in section 344 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts: "[t]here is a duty of an owner or
occupier of land, which the public is invited to patronize, to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for
anticipated use; and there may be circumstances which extend this
responsibility to protect a patron against a criminal attack by a
third person." O'Brien, 119 Ill. App. 2d at 106-07, citing
Annotation, Private Person's Duty and Liability for Failure to
Protect Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10
A.L.R.3d 619, 630 (1966). See also W. Prosser &amp; W. Keeton,
Torts §33, at 202 n.89 (5th ed. 1984) (citing cases involving
business establishments open to the public).
	When this court in Rowe used the term "business invitee" to
describe the special relationship that may give rise to the duty to
protect entrants from criminal attack, the court was unquestionably
referring to the special relationship as described by O'Brien and,
more generally, by section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Indeed, if the court in Rowe had understood the term
"business invitee" to mean simply those invited onto the premises
by the landholder for some benefit to the landholder, then the
outcome of Rowe would have been different. Rowe holds that a
landlord does not stand in a special relationship with a tenant for
purposes of establishing a general duty to protect the tenant from
foreseeable criminal activity on the landlord's premises. Rowe,
125 Ill. 2d  at 216, citing Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1979) (landlord owes no general duty to protect
tenants from foreseeable criminal activity); Phillips v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 89 Ill. 2d 122, 126 (1982) (same). Because a
landlord receives a benefit from his or her tenants, those tenants
are "business invitees" as plaintiffs use that term. Thus, Rowe
necessarily would have been decided differently had the court
employed the term "business invitee" as plaintiffs in the case at
bar do.
	Rowe establishes that the proper description of the special
relationship that may give rise to a landholders' duty to protect an
entrant from criminal assault is stated in section 344 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. We are not persuaded to abandon
this position in favor of a special relationship which is focused
primarily on the benefit received by the landholder from the
entrant. Such a relationship does not, as plaintiffs suggest, provide
a satisfactory basis for departing from the general rule that there is
no duty to protect an entrant from criminal attack. For example,
under plaintiffs' reasoning, Justice would have had no special
relationship with John Hills and, hence, no duty to protect John
Hills from the Loys' assault, if the game and the assault had taken
place during the little league's regular season and a tournament
entrance fee had not been charged. This would be so despite the
fact that the risk of criminal conduct created by Justice would be
completely identical to the risk created when Justice hosted the
July 30 tournament game. It makes little sense to base a special
relationship that may impose a duty to protect solely on the
presence or absence of an item, a tournament entrance fee, that has
no relation to the question of whether Justice created conditions
that gave rise to "a recognizable high degree of risk of harm"
(Restatement (Second) of Torts §302(b) (1965)) by criminal
attack.
	Section 344 states what is widely regarded as the appropriate
test for establishing the special relationship between a possessor
of land and an entrant that may give rise to an affirmative duty to
protect the entrant from third-party attacks. See, e.g., D. Dobbs,
Law of Torts, ch. 21, at 876 (2000) ("The rule today [regarding the
affirmative duty to protect entrants from third-party attacks] is
usually generalized to include all landowners who open their land
to the public for business"); McClung, 937 S.W.2d  at 898 (listing
cases); but see Scott v. Harper Recreation, Inc., 444 Mich. 441,
448, 506 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1993) ("a merchant is not ordinarily
required to protect customers from the criminal acts of third
persons"). We adhere to the special relationship described in
section 344 today.
	Under the rule established in Rowe and section 344 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, we find no special relationship
giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect in the case before us.
The playing field on which the attack on John Hills took place was
not a business open to the general public. The only people
permitted on the field at the time of the game were the two teams
and the umpires. Indeed, as was noted previously in our discussion
regarding defendant Bridgeview, plaintiffs have affirmatively
argued that the Loys were privileged to enter the playing field only
because of their status as Bridgeview's manager and coaches.
	The dissenting justice concludes that the general rule that a
landowner has no affirmative duty to protect entrants from
criminal attack should be set aside with respect to Justice.
According to the dissent, violence in youth sports has become so
commonplace that, as a matter of public policy and for social
considerations, this court should recognize that Justice had an
affirmative duty to protect John Hills from the Loys' criminal
attack. Plaintiffs have at no time, either in the circuit court or on
appeal, made the argument advanced by the dissent. Indeed, during
the proceedings before the circuit court, plaintiffs repeatedly stated
that they were not arguing for the recognition of any new special
relationship or new basis for avoiding the no-affirmative-duty rule
but, instead, were relying upon the well-established "business
invitor-invitee" relationship recognized in Illinois case law.
Because of this strategic choice, plaintiffs made no attempt to
establish that criminal assaults by coaches and managers are
common events at Little League baseball games. There is no
evidence in the record, either in the form of written studies or oral
testimony, regarding the number or type of violent attacks
committed by coaches at Little League baseball games or other
youth sporting events in Illinois or elsewhere. The only general
statement regarding incidents of violence in this record comes
from plaintiff Patricia Hills, who stated that, with the exception of
the Loys' assault, she had never seen one Little League coach
physically attack another. Since there is no evidence of record to
support the conclusion that youth coaches and managers in Illinois
are, as a group, prone to commit criminal attacks and since
plaintiffs do not argue that there is such evidence, we decline to
impose an affirmative duty to protect upon the host of youth
athletic events on that basis.
	The appellate court erred when it concluded that a special
relationship existed between Justice and John Hills. Because the
Justice playing field was not open to the general public for
business purposes, Justice did not stand in a special relationship
with John Hills. As noted, plaintiffs have not alleged that any
other special relationship existed between Justice and John Hills
or that there is any other basis for imposing a duty to protect upon
Justice. Accordingly, we conclude that Justice did not have an
affirmative duty to protect John Hills from the criminal attack of
another coach. Therefore, the circuit court erred in denying
Justice's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Section 2-1117
	In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not address
defendants' contention that the circuit court erred in excluding the
Loys from the apportionment of fault under section 2-1117 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994)).
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts are reversed.
	Judgments reversed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	I would affirm the appellate court's judgment and allow the
jury's verdict to stand. 
	In reversing as to Bridgeview, the majority focuses on the
element of forseeability. In my colleagues' view, Bridgeview did
not know and should not have been expected to realize, before the
attack began, that the team's assistant coaches would intentionally
harm John Hills. My colleagues, however, are not the appropriate
arbiters of that question. Forseeability is normally a question for
the jury. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 13 (1974). In this case, a
special interrogatory was presented to the jury which asked:
			"Did the Bridgeview Little League Association, through
any of its agents, know or should have it in the exercise of
ordinary care have [sic] known that the initial attack
and/or further attacks would occur?"
	The jury answered this question in the affirmative. There is no
basis for second-guessing its judgment. Ted Loy was
unquestionably Bridgeview's agent, and George Loy's
extraordinarily abusive language and conduct should have alerted
him that violence loomed. But he did nothing. Even after the
assault began, he did nothing.
	It is not true, as the majority suggests, that Ted was powerless
to act. While he may not have had any economic leverage over his
assistants, he could have threatened to strip them of their authority
as his volunteer assistants, he could have admonished them to
desist, he could have asked game officials to intervene. But again,
he did none of those things. Instead, he "sneaked away" and then
later joined in the attack on Hills himself. Under these
circumstances, it was entirely proper for the jury to hold
Bridgewater liable for what happened to Hills.
	There is likewise no merit to the majority's decision to strip
plaintiffs of their verdict against Justice, the host and sponsor of
the tournament and owner of the premises where the tournament
took place. We have specifically held that a landowner may have
a duty to protect others from criminal activity by third persons on
its property where a special relationship exists between the parties,
such as the relationship between a business invitor and invitee.
Rowe v. State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 215-16 (1988). Such a
relationship existed here.
		My colleagues' attempt to recast the meaning of Rowe is
unpersuasive. The case does hold that the simple relationship
between a landlord and a tenant is not a special one imposing a
duty to protect against the criminal acts of others. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d  at 216. That holding, however, merely clarifies that the
particular relationship between a landlord and tenant presents a
special case which is treated differently under Illinois law.
Contrary to the majority's view, nothing in Rowe suggests that a
person who conducts business on land he possesses is liable only
to members of the general public and not those, such as John Hills
and his players, who have paid a fee for the right to be there.
	By differentiating between members of the general public and
tournament entrants such as Hills and his team, the majority's
analysis produces an anomalous result. Under the majority's view,
Bridgeview might owe a duty to spectators who came to watch the
tournament and buy refreshments and souvenirs, but it would
never have an obligation to those who were actually on the field
participating in the games, no matter how egregious the
circumstances.
	By any reasonable standard, game participants should be
afforded more protection than the general public, not less. The
players and their coaches are the center of events such as this.
They are what everyone else comes to see. It is their actions that
stir the crowds. It is what they do that generates enthusiasm or
derision. As such, they are far more likely than members of the
general public to be subject to serious abuse and attack.
	Amicus Little League, Inc., asserts that "[f]or the most part,
Little League baseball does not attract the least savory elements of
the communities in which it thrives" and that "the likelihood of
injury stemming from participant violence is minuscule in this
setting." The matter before us belies such claims Indeed, to deny
the substantial risks now faced by players and their coaches is to
deny everyday experience. Anyone who has ventured beyond the
confines of the courthouse knows what sport, even amateur sport,
has become. On the best days, it is inspirational. On its worst days,
and the day Hills was beaten was surely one of those, it is a
reflection of how uncivil and violent our society can be. In the heat
of competition, otherwise sensible adults can lose all sense of
proportion. Tempers flare. Mayhem can spread in an instant.
	The unhappy truth is that violence in youth sports has become
commonplace. The era of friendly pickup games and sandlot ball
where kids made the rules and adults seldom meddled has passed.
Accounts of fistfights, beatings and even homicides involving
parents, coaches and officials at children's sporting events are
appearing in the media with ever-increasing frequency. Special
Report: Out of Control, Sports Illustrated Magazine (July 24,
2000). In these times, we do a disservice when we say that
defendants such as Justice owe no duty to plaintiffs such as John
Hills.
	A court's determination of duty should reflect the policy and
social requirements of the time and community. Curtola v. Village
of Niles, 154 Ill. 2d 201, 215 (1993). I believe that public policy
and social considerations of these times and of our community
require that property owners who sponsor youth athletic
tournaments on their premises do more than just look away when
the physical well-being of tournament participants is threatened.
When a player or coach is attacked, as Hills was here, they should
at least be required to pick up the phone and summon law
enforcement officials. Justice's agents, the umpires and field
announcer, could have managed that easily and without risk or
expense to themselves.
	Requiring such an inconsequential burden to be placed on
landowners who sponsor youth athletic tournaments will not
imperil playing opportunities for children or inhibit the ability of
youth organizations such as the Little League to function. To the
contrary, by providing an incentive for landowner/sponsors to take
responsibility for what occurs at their events, it should improve the
quality and popularity of youth sporting events by facilitating a
safer and more secure playing environment.
	I cannot see how amicus Little League, Inc., the national
supervisory organization for Little League baseball, can possibly
take issue with such a result. When the Bridgeview Little League
coaches beat John Hills into unconsciousness and the Justice
Willow Springs Little League's agents took no action to stop them,
they violated every principle of fair play, good sportsmanship and
responsible citizenship. Their conduct has no place in athletics,
especially youth athletics. Little League, Inc., should have done
everything in its power to disavow what happened here. Instead,
it sought and was granted leave to appear before our court and
argue that its local affiliates be spared from the jury's verdict.
 	By adopting Little League, Inc.'s position and overturning the
jury's verdict against Bridgeview and Justice Willow Springs
Little League, my colleagues have chosen to look the other way
just as Ted Loy and Justice looked the other way while Hills was
being beaten. No good can come of this, as the jury here well
understood. By exonerating Bridgeview and Justice, the court has
placed its imprimatur on what happened to Hills. The thousands
of individuals who so generously donate their time to organized
youth athletics in Illinois would do well to consider the position in
which this has left them. For all practical purposes, it is now open
season on volunteer coaches. They should forgot about watching
the base runners or the catcher's signals. From now on, they had
better just watch their backs.
1.      1The Loys took no action to challenge the default judgment in the
circuit court, were not parties before the appellate court and are not
involved in this appeal.

2.      2The appellate court below stated that George Loy, Jr., "beat Hills
with a baseball bat for about 10 to 15 minutes" (306 Ill. App. 3d at 16-17). This statement is incorrect.

3.      3There is no legal basis upon which Bridgeview can be held liable for
the physical harms caused by Ted Loy. Bridgeview cannot be held liable
for the physical harms caused by Ted Loy under respondeat superior
because the attack on John Hills was admittedly outside the scope of
Ted Loy's agency. Further, because no representatives of the
Bridgeview organization, other than the Loys, were present at the game,
and because no one from Bridgeview was aware of any violent
propensities on the part of Ted Loy, there is no means by which
Bridgeview could have known of the need to control Ted Loy. Notably,
the jury in this case was not instructed that Bridgeview cannot be held
liable for the physical harms caused by Ted Loy.

4.      4Under their reasoning, the appellate court erred in not remanding the
cause to the circuit court. According to the appellate court, Bridgeview,
acting through Ted Loy, had a duty to control George Loy, Sr., and
George Loy, Jr., which arose only sometime after the attack on John
Hills began. Thus, Bridgeview could not be liable for the injuries to
John Hills that occurred during the initial portion of the attack. The jury
was never instructed that Bridgeview's liability was limited in this way.
Remand to the circuit court would therefore have been appropriate.