Title: State v. Douglas D.
Citation: 2001 WI 47
Docket Number: 1999AP001767-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2001

2001 WI 47 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1767-FT 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Interest of Douglas D.,  
a person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Douglas D.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 32 
Reported at:  232 Wis. 2d 559, 608 N.W.2d 438 
(Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 3, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Oconto 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard Delforge 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence. 
 
 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs and oral argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
2 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carol W. 
Medaris and Wisconsin Council on Children & Families, Madison, 
Adam Culbreath and National Center for Youth law, Oakland, 
California, and Laval S. Miller-Wilson and Juvenile Law Center, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Juvenile Law Center 
and National Center for Youth Law. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jon G. 
Furlow, Christine Cooney Mansour and Michael Best & Friedrich 
LLP, Madison, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
2001 WI 47 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1767 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Douglas D.,  
a person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Douglas D.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a court of 
appeals decision, In the Interest of Douglas D.:  State v. 
Douglas D., No. 99-1767-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 14, 1999), which affirmed a judgment by the Circuit Court 
for Oconto County, Judge Richard D. Delforge.  The circuit court 
found that the content of an eighth-grade creative writing 
assignment authored by the petitioner, Douglas D. (Douglas), a 
minor, constituted a threat against Douglas's English teacher.  
Based on this finding, the court adjudicated Douglas delinquent 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
2 
for violating the disorderly conduct statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 947.01 (1997-98).1  
¶2 
Douglas now petitions this court to reverse the court 
of 
appeals 
decision, 
which 
affirmed 
his 
delinquency 
adjudication.  In doing so, he presents two issues for review:  
(1) 
Can 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute 
be 
construed 
to 
criminalize purely written speech, even if the speech does not 
cause a disturbance?  (2) If so, is his speech protected by the 
First Amendment,2 thus barring the State from prosecuting him for 
disorderly conduct?   
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Douglas actually challenges the court of appeals decision 
on this issue under both the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, applicable to the states under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in pertinent part 
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech."  44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 
n.1 (1996).  Article I, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in pertinent part that "[e]very person may freely 
speak, write and publish his [or her] sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no 
laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of 
speech or of the press."  Despite the differences in language 
between these provisions, we have found no differences in the 
freedoms that they guarantee.  County of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., 
Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 388, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).  For this 
reason, and due to the lack of Wisconsin caselaw applying 
Article I, Section 3 to facts similar to those at issue, we rely 
exclusively upon First Amendment precedent in this opinion.  
However, all such precedent and the conclusions that we draw 
therefrom apply with equal force to Article I, Section 3. 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
3 
¶3 
We conclude that purely written speech, even written 
speech that fails to cause an actual disturbance, can constitute 
disorderly conduct as defined by § 947.01; however, because 
Douglas's speech falls within the protection of the First 
Amendment, the State nonetheless is barred from prosecuting 
Douglas for disorderly conduct.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
This case arises from events that occurred while 
Douglas was an eighth-grade student at an Oconto County public 
school.  On October 7, 1998, Douglas's English teacher, who 
commonly referred to herself in class as "Mrs. C," gave Douglas 
a creative writing assignment to complete during class.  Mrs. C 
instructed Douglas to begin writing a story, which later would 
be passed on to a series of three other students, each adding to 
Douglas's work.  But other than entitling the assignment "Top 
Secret," Mrs. C provided no limit regarding the topic on which 
Douglas was to write.  
¶5 
Rather than beginning his assignment, Douglas visited 
with some friends and disrupted the class.  Therefore, Mrs. C 
sent Douglas into the hall to complete his assignment.   
¶6 
At the end of the period, Douglas returned to class 
and handed his work to Mrs. C.  A few minutes later, Mrs. C read 
what Douglas had written: 
 
 
There one lived an old ugly woman her name was 
Mrs. C that stood for crab.  She was a mean old woman 
that would beat children sencless.  I guess that's why 
she became a teacher. 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
4 
 
 
Well one day she kick a student out of her class 
& he din't like it.  That student was named Dick. 
 
 
The next morning Dick came to class & in his coat 
he conseled a machedy.  When the teacher told him to 
shut up he whiped it out & cut her head off. 
 
 
When the sub came 2 days later she needed a 
paperclipp so she opened the droor.  Ahh she screamed 
as she found Mrs. C.'s head in the droor. 
¶7 
Mrs. C believed this story to be a threat that if she 
disciplined Douglas again, Douglas intended to harm her.  As a 
result, she became frightened and, after dismissing Douglas's 
class as scheduled, notified the school assistant principal of 
the incident. 
¶8 
Upon learning of the incident and observing that Mrs. 
C was very upset, the assistant principal called Douglas into 
his office.  Douglas apologized for the story, stating that he 
did not intend it to be interpreted as a threat.  The assistant 
principal then imposed on Douglas an in-school suspension.   
¶9 
After 
Douglas served 
his 
suspension, 
the 
school 
readmitted him to classalbeit with a different English teacher. 
 However, on November 19, 1998, the police filed a delinquency 
petition against Douglas, alleging that by submitting a "death 
threat" to Mrs. C, Douglas had engaged in "abusive conduct under 
circumstances 
in 
which 
the 
conduct 
tends 
to 
cause 
a 
disturbance," thus violating the disorderly conduct statute, 
§ 947.01.   
¶10 On March 11, 1999, the circuit court held a fact-
finding hearing regarding the delinquency petition.  After 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
5 
hearing testimony from Douglas, Mrs. C, the assistant principal, 
and an employee of the Oconto County Department of Human 
Services, the court explained that pursuant to § 947.01, the 
petitioner has the burden to prove two elements:  (1) the 
juvenile engaged in abusive "conduct," which can include "either 
physical acts or language"; and (2) the juvenile's conduct 
occurred under circumstances that tend to cause a disturbance.  
Applying this standard to the facts, the court first found that 
Douglas had communicated a "direct threat" to Mrs. C.  This 
threat, 
the 
court 
concluded, 
constituted 
abusive 
conduct 
unprotected by the First Amendment.  Second, the court found 
that Douglas's conduct provoked a disturbance:  it caused Mrs. C 
to become upset.  Based on these findings, the court ruled that 
Douglas was guilty of disorderly conduct.  Accordingly, it 
ordered that he be placed on formal supervision for one year. 
¶11 Douglas raised two arguments on appeal.  First, he    
argued that the delinquency adjudication based on the content of 
his school creative writing assignment violates his First 
Amendment right to free speech.  Second, he contended that even 
if such an adjudication does not violate the First Amendment, 
§ 947.01 
criminalizes "conduct" and, 
therefore, 
cannot be 
construed to criminalize purely written speech.  For these 
reasons, Douglas requested that the court of appeals reverse his 
adjudication. 
¶12 The court of appeals rejected Douglas's arguments and 
affirmed the circuit court ruling.  Douglas D., unpublished slip 
op.  Addressing Douglas's first argument, the court explained 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
6 
that "true threats" are among the categories of speech that 
receive limited or no constitutional protection.  Id. at 4-5.  
Further, 
the 
court 
discerned 
"no 
material 
difference 
in 
connotation between the phrase[s] 'true threat' and 'direct 
threat.'"  Id. at 5 n.5.  Thus, deferring to the circuit court's 
finding that Douglas's story constituted a "direct threat," the 
court of appeals ruled that the First Amendment does not protect 
Douglas's speech.  Id. at 6.  Regarding Douglas's second 
argument, the court held that the term "conduct," as used in 
§ 947.01, applies to "both acts and (unprotected) words."  Id.  
Hence, the court held that the State properly prosecuted Douglas 
pursuant to § 947.01 for the content of his story.  Id. at 7.   
¶13 Douglas subsequently filed a petition to this court 
for review of the court of appeals decision.  On February 22, 
2000, this court granted review. 
II 
 
¶14 We 
first 
review 
whether 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute, § 947.01, can be construed to criminalize purely 
written speech, even if the speech does not cause a disturbance. 
 This presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which this 
court reviews de novo.  See Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake 
Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 
384, 612 N.W.2d 709.   
¶15 Section 947.01 provides:  "Whoever, in a public or 
private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, 
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 
under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
7 
provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor."  To 
prosecute a defendant for a violation of this statute, the State 
has the burden to prove two elements.  First, it must prove that 
the defendant engaged in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, 
boisterous, unreasonably loud, or similar disorderly conduct.  
See State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497, 514, 164 N.W.2d 512 
(1969).  Second, it must prove that the defendant's conduct 
occurred under circumstances where such conduct tends to cause 
or provoke a disturbance.  Id.  Under both elements, "[i]t is 
the combination of conduct and circumstances that is crucial in 
applying the statute to a particular situation."  State v. 
Maker, 48 Wis. 2d 612, 616, 180 N.W.2d 707 (1970).   
A 
¶16 Douglas first argues that "conduct," as used in 
§ 947.01, does not include speech unless such speech is 
intertwined with physical action.  In support of his argument, 
Douglas cites R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), 
and Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497, for the general rule that the 
government cannot regulate the content of speech.  He further 
explains that Wisconsin courts have adhered to this rule.  On 
one hand, Wisconsin courts consistently have struck down 
legislation that criminalizes speech protected by the First 
Amendment.3  On the other hand, there is no published Wisconsin 
                     
3 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 
466 N.W.2d 861 (1991) (striking down city ordinance, which 
prohibited hindering or preventing police from discharging 
duties); State v. Dronso, 90 Wis. 2d 110, 279 N.W.2d 710 (Ct. 
App. 1979) (striking down statute that prohibited intentionally 
annoying phone calls).  
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
8 
opinion in which a court has upheld a conviction under § 947.01 
for speech alone.  In light of this precedent, Douglas argues, 
the State has recognized that it constitutionally is barred from 
convicting a person based solely on the content of his or her 
speech.  
¶17 We reject this argument.  To be sure, "[t]he First 
Amendment 
generally 
prevents 
government 
from 
proscribing 
speech . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed."  
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.  However, "it is well understood that 
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under 
all circumstances."  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
571 (1942).  Some categories of speech are "likely to produce a 
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that 
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."  
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).  These 
categories include:  "fighting words," Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568; 
speech that incites others into imminent lawless action, 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); obscenity, Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); libel and defamatory speech, New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and "true 
threats," Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  As the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
explained, 
such 
speech 
"constitute[s] 'no essential part of any exposition of ideas.'" 
 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 385 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
 Despite its verbal character, this speech essentially is a 
"nonspeech element of communication."  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 
(quotations omitted).  In this sense, it is analogous "to a 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
9 
noisy sound truck:  Each is . . . a mode of speech . . . ; both 
can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of 
itself, a claim upon the First Amendment."  Id. (citation and 
quotation 
omitted). 
 
Accordingly, 
states 
can 
regulate, 
consistent 
with 
the 
First 
Amendment, 
these 
unprotected 
categories of speech.4  
¶18 The right to regulate, however, does not give a state 
unbridled discretion.  To survive constitutional scrutiny, a 
state must narrowly tailor any regulation that limits the 
content of unprotected speech unaccompanied by conduct. 
¶19 On one hand, the regulation must not be overbroad.  
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Gooding 
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), in which it reviewed a Georgia 
statute that provided in pertinent part:  "Any person who shall, 
without provocation, use 
to 
or of 
another, 
and in his 
presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to 
cause a breach of peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 
 Id. at 519 (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6303 (1933)).  After 
examining cases in which the statute had been applied, the Court 
concluded that the statute had not been limited in application 
to criminalize only unprotected speech; in some circumstances, 
the statute had been applied to criminalize protected speech 
that merely offended its listeners.  Id. at 524.  The Court then 
explained:  
                     
4 Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) 
(holding that commercial speech is afforded only a "limited 
measure of protection"). 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
10
 
The 
constitutional 
guarantees 
of 
freedom 
of 
speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or 
language 
not 
within 
narrowly limited 
classes of 
speech.  Even as to such a class, however, because the 
line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and 
speech 
which 
may 
legitimately 
be 
regulated, 
suppressed, or punished is finely drawn, in every case 
the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in 
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the 
protected freedom.  In other words, the statute must 
be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to 
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible 
of application to protected expression.   
Id. at 521-22 (citations and quotations omitted).  Applying this 
standard, 
the 
Court 
struck 
down 
the 
statute 
as 
being 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. at 528.  In doing so, the 
Court made clear that state regulation of speech may not be so 
broad as to criminalize not only unprotected speech, but also 
speech that enjoys the protection of the First Amendment. 
 
¶20 On the other hand, the regulation must not be 
"underbroad."  The United States Supreme Court addressed this 
concern in R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377.  In that case, the Court 
analyzed a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance, which banned persons 
from: 
 
plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol, 
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, 
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi 
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to 
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. 
Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 
(1990)).  As construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, this 
ordinance applied only to "fighting words," one category of 
unprotected speech.  Id. at 381.  However, the ordinance 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
11
prohibited only one particular type of "fighting words":  
"'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.'"  Id. at 391. 
 In analyzing this regulation, the Court explained that although 
the 
government 
may 
regulate, 
consistent 
with 
the 
First 
Amendment, certain categories of speech, it may not regulate 
such speech "based on hostilityor favoritismtowards the 
underlying message expressed."  Id. at 386.  Because the St. 
Paul ordinance discriminated against fighting words expressing a 
particular viewpoint, the Court held that the ordinance was 
unconstitutionally "underbroad."  Id. at 391-96; see also id. at 
401-02 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that 
under the Court's "underbreadth" doctrine, states generally must 
take an all-or-nothing approach to limiting unprotected speech). 
Thus, as illustrated by this holding, a state generally may not 
regulate 
so 
narrowly 
as 
to 
criminalize 
only 
particular 
viewpoints within a larger proscribable category of speech.5 
 
¶21 Turning to the regulation at issue in this case, it is 
clear that § 947.01, if applied to speech alone, would not 
suffer from the infirmities that the Supreme Court described in 
Gooding and R.A.V..  First, § 947.01 is not overbroad.  As this 
court repeatedly has held, "[t]he language of the disorderly 
conduct statute is not so broad that its sanctions may apply to 
                     
5 In other words, state regulation must be "content-
neutral."  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-30 (2000). 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
12
conduct protected by the constitution."6  Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 
509; see also State v. Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 664, 188 N.W.2d 
449 (1971) (citing Zwicker as holding that "this court rejected 
the contention that the Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute 
                     
6 In her concurring opinion, Chief Justice Abrahamson 
disputes whether this court can authoritatively construe a 
potentially facially overbroad statute so as to prevent the 
statute from being rendered unconstitutional.  Concurrence at 
¶¶53-57.  She is correct that "'[a] statute is overbroad when 
its language, given its normal meaning, is so sweeping that its 
sanctions may be applied to constitutionally protected conduct 
which the state is not permitted to regulate.'"  State v. 
Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 374, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998) (quoting 
Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 407 N.W.2d 533 
(1987)).  However, she fails to take notice of the adjunct rule 
that "[s]tatutes that are challenged as overbroad may be 
preserved if a limiting and validating construction of the 
statute's language is readily available."  Id. at 378; see also, 
e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) 
(holding that facially overbroad statutes or ordinances can 
withstand constitutional attack if they are authoritatively 
construed by the state supreme court to punish only speech 
unprotected by the First Amendment); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 
518, 522 (1972) ("the statute must be carefully drawn or be 
authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech") 
(emphasis added);  Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) 
(examining statute "as authoritatively interpreted" by the state 
supreme court); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 
(1963) 
(noting 
that 
courts 
must 
analyze 
statutes 
"as 
authoritatively construed"); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1, 4-6 (1949) (noting that the Court considers statutes and 
ordinances as construed). 
Moreover, we cannot discern why she spends the vast 
majority 
of 
her 
concurrence 
criticizing 
the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that § 947.01 
can 
punish 
only 
constitutionally 
unprotected speech, yet she writes in her concurrence to State 
v. A.S. that she is bound by this conclusion.  2001 WI 48, ¶42, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
 This court heard oral arguments regarding this case and A.S. on 
the same day, and we have released these cases together as 
companion cases.  
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
13
[i]s so unnecessarily broad as to invade the area of protected 
freedoms"); Maker, 48 Wis. 2d at 615-16 (quoting Zwicker).  
Thus, the statute's sanctions cannot be applied directly to 
speech protected by the First Amendment.  Second, § 947.01 is 
not underbroad.  Section 947.01 prohibits all unprotected speech 
that is likely to cause "substantial intrusions which offend the 
normal sensibilities of average persons or which constitute 
significantly abusive or disturbing demeanor in the eyes of 
reasonable persons."7  Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 508.  It does not 
proscribe certain viewpoints within a category of unprotected 
conduct while leaving related viewpoints within the same 
category of speech outside its scope.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that the First Amendment does not inherently bar the 
State from applying § 947.01 to unprotected speech, even if the 
unprotected speech is purely written speech. 
 
¶22 Although to date this court has not reviewed a case in 
which a defendant was convicted under § 947.01 based solely on 
the content of his or her speech, we have construed "disorderly 
conduct" 
to proscribe 
some 
categories 
of 
constitutionally 
unprotected speech.  In Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 440, 41 N.W.2d 
                     
7 While considering the legislation that later was enacted 
as § 947.01, the Legislative Council's Judiciary Committee 
explained the scope of the disorderly conduct statute as 
follows:  "The words 'violent, abusive, indecent, profane, 
boisterous, unreasonably loud . . . conduct' give certainty to 
the crime while at the same time being broad in scope.  On the 
other hand, they are not broad enough to take care of every 
situation generally considered to be disorderly."  5 Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal 
Code 208 (1953). 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
14
642 (1950), this court examined the scope of the 1947 version of 
the disorderly conduct 
statute, Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 348.35,8 to 
determine whether the statute could be construed to punish a 
union leader for inciting striking union members to resist a 
police officer.  In arguing that case, the union leader 
contended that the statute only reached language; it could not 
be stretched to criminalize acts alone.  Id. at 444.  We 
rejected this argument, explaining that "[t]he words of the 
statute must be read in the disjunctive, that is, they make it 
an offense to use such language or to engage in disorderly 
conduct tending to the result described."  Id.  Thus, we 
concluded that the statute could be interpreted to apply to 
disorderly physical acts.  Id.  However, in doing so, we made 
clear that the statute also could be applied to speech, 
unaccompanied by physical acts.  Id.   
 
¶23 This court suggested a similar interpretation in Lane 
v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965).  The issue in 
Lane in part was whether the trial court properly denied the 
defendant police officer's motion for a directed verdict in a 
false imprisonment tort case where the officer arrested the 
plaintiff for violating a disorderly conduct ordinance based on 
the plaintiff's statement that he thought the officer was a 
                     
8 Section 348.35 (1947) provided in pertinent part:  "Any 
person 
who 
shall 
engage 
in 
any 
violent, 
abusive, 
loud, 
boisterous, 
vulgar, 
lewd, 
wanton, 
obscene 
or 
otherwise 
disorderly conduct tending to create or provoke a breach of the 
peace or to disturb or annoy others, whether in a public or a 
private place [is guilty of disorderly conduct.]" 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
15
"son-of-a-bitch," but where there was evidence suggesting that 
the officer had provoked the statement.  Id. at 69-71.  In 
coming to our conclusion that the trial court had properly 
denied the motion, we explained that the disorderly conduct 
ordinance at issue was: 
 
similar in import to that portion of sec. 947.01[], 
Stats., entitled "Disorderly Conduct," which makes it 
a 
misdemeanor 
for 
a 
person 
to 
engage 
"in . . . abusive, 
indecent, 
[or] 
profane . . . 
conduct . . ." in a public or private place.  The 
underlying reason for disorderly conduct statutes and 
ordinances proscribing abusive language is that such 
language tends to provoke retaliatory conduct on the 
part of the person to whom it is addressed that 
amounts to breach of the peace.  Calling another 
person a "son-of-a-bitch" under charged circumstances 
might well constitute abusive language which is likely 
to have that result. 
Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).  Like the 
analysis in Teske, this language indicates that under certain 
circumstances, § 947.01 can be applied to speech alone. 
 
¶24 This interpretation comports with the language and 
purpose of § 947.01to root out conduct that unreasonably 
disturbs the public peace.  See Maker, 48 Wis. 2d at 614-15 
(explaining 
considerations 
underlying 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute).  To be certain, § 947.01, like the laws at issue in 
Teske and Lane, is not a blanket proscription of certain words. 
 By contrast, it is a recognition of the fact that in some 
circumstances words carry with them proscribable nonspeech 
elements.  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386.  For example, "unreasonably 
loud" speecheven if the words themselves are protected by the 
First Amendmentcarries with it the nonspeech element of 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
16
excessive volume.  Similarly, "abusive" speech carries with it 
the nonspeech element of an express or implied threat or 
challenge to fight.  These nonspeech elements constitute the 
proscribed "conduct" under § 947.01.  And it is these elements 
that, consistent with the First Amendment, can be punished under 
§ 947.01.9 
 
¶25 Pursuant 
to 
this 
understanding 
of 
§ 947.01, 
we 
conclude that the State is not barred from convicting Douglas 
for the content of his story merely because his story consisted 
of purely written speech.  However, the State still has the 
burden to prove that Douglas's speech is constitutionally 
unprotected "abusive" conduct, within the punitive reach of 
§ 947.01. 
B 
¶26 Douglas also contends that his speech, even if it is 
an 
otherwise 
punishable 
threat, 
did 
not 
occur 
under 
circumstances where such speech would cause or provoke a 
"disturbance" under § 947.01.  Citing Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 
508, Douglas explains that this court has defined "disorderly 
conduct" as conduct which has a tendency to "menace, disrupt or 
                     
9 Because, as explained above, conduct must be examined in 
light of all the surrounding circumstances, conduct that is 
protected by the First Amendment under one set of circumstances 
may be prosecutable under different circumstances.  For example, 
political speech generally is protected by the First Amendment 
and, thus, falls outside the scope of § 947.01.  However, 
shouting political speech over a megaphone in a residential area 
at 2:00 a.m. likely would be deemed prosecutable disorderly 
conduct.    
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
17
destroy public order."  Pursuant to this definition, Douglas 
argues, § 947.01 requires more than conduct that may cause 
personal discomfort in others.  Applying this reasoning to the 
facts at hand, Douglas thus contends that because there is no 
evidence that his story caused anything more than personal 
discomfort in Mrs. C, he cannot be punished for disorderly 
conduct. 
¶27 Douglas is correct insofar as he indicates that not 
all 
conduct 
which 
causes 
personal 
discomfort 
in 
others 
necessarily falls within the ambit of disorderly conduct.  This 
court has held as much: 
 
[Section 947.01] does not imply that all conduct which 
tends to annoy another is disorderly conduct.  Only 
such conduct as unreasonably offends the sense of 
decency or propriety of the community is included.  
The statute does not punish a person for conduct which 
might possibly offend some hypercritical individual.  
The design of the disorderly conduct statute is to 
proscribe substantial intrusions which offend the 
normal sensibilities of average persons or which 
constitute 
significantly 
abusive 
or 
disturbing 
demeanor in the eyes of reasonable persons. 
Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 508.  Thus, we agree that § 947.01 
requires more than mere offensive speech or behavior.    
 
¶28 However, we cannot agree with Douglas's contention 
that threatening a public school teacher while in school is not 
the type of conduct that tends to cause or provoke a 
disturbance.  School violence is all too prevalent in our 
schools today.  See State v. Angelia D.B., 211 Wis. 2d 140, 157, 
564 N.W.2d 682 (1997) (noting the "growing incidence of violence 
and dangerous weapons in schools"); Isiah B. v. State, 176 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
18
Wis. 2d 
639, 
662, 
500 
N.W.2d 
637 
(1993) 
(Bablitch, 
J., 
concurring) (citing numerous articles supporting the proposition 
that "problems in our public schools have turned deadly"); 
Bureau of Just. Stats., U.S. Dep't of Just., & Nat'l Ctr. for 
Educ. Stats., U.S. Dep't of Educ., Indicators of School Crime 
and Safety, 1999 (1999) (providing a litany of statistics 
regarding the frequency of school violence).  Concomitantly, the 
threat of violence intrudes our children's places of learning.  
See Office of Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, U.S. Dep't of 
Just., Juvenile Offenders and Victims:  1999 National Report 68 
(1999) (noting that in Wisconsin in 1997, five percent of high 
school students carried a weapon to school on at least one 
occasion); Bureau of Just. Stats., U.S. Dep't of Just., & Nat'l 
Ctr. for Educ. Stats., U.S. Dep't of Educ., Indicators of School 
Crime and Safety, 1999 vii (1999) (noting that in 1997 
approximately seven to eight percent of students reported being 
threatened with a weapon).  Our children consequently often must 
learn in an environment of fear,10 in which education suffers:  
"Violence in schools makes teaching difficult and inhibits 
student learning.  In addition, unsafe school environments 
expose students who may already be at risk for school failure to 
other failure-related factors such as physical and emotional 
harm."  Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., U.S. Dept. of Educ., The 
                     
10 "For many school-age children . . . fear is a realistic 
response to conditions in and around their schools." Shay 
Bilchik, Office of Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, U.S. Dep't 
of Just., From the Administrator, Juv. Just. Bull. 1 (Apr. 
1998).  
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
19
Condition of Education 80 (1999).  For these reasons, the public 
has become increasingly concerned with serious student threats 
of violence.  Cf. id.  With this in mind, we cannot imagine how 
a student threatening a teacher could not be deemed conduct that 
tends to menace, disrupt, or destroy public order.  See Lovell 
v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("In light of the violence prevalent in schools today, school 
officials are justified in taking very seriously student threats 
against faculty or other students."). 
¶29 It makes no difference under § 947.01 whether, as 
Douglas asserts, alleged disorderly conduct actually causes a 
disturbance.  State v. Givens, 28 Wis. 2d 109, 116, 135 N.W.2d 
780 (1965).  Rather, the conduct only need be the type of 
conduct that tends to disturb others. Id. (quoting 5 Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal 
Code 208 (1953) ("The question is not whether a particular 
person was disturbed or annoyed but whether the conduct was of a 
kind which tends to disturb or annoy others.")).  Simply because 
a listener exhibits fortitude in the face of a threat is no 
reason to allow the threat to go unpunished.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the fact that Douglas's story did not cause an 
actual disturbance is irrelevant to the present inquiry.  It is 
enough that Douglas conveyed his story to Mrs. C under 
circumstances where such conduct tends to cause or provoke a 
disturbance.   
 
 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
20
III 
¶30 We next must consider whether Douglas's story is 
protected by the First Amendment, thus falling outside the 
bounds of conduct prosecutable under § 947.01.  The circuit 
court ruled that Douglas's story "is not the type of activity 
that is allowed under . . . the First Amendment."  However, the 
court supported this ruling only with its conclusory finding 
that "[t]here is no question that this [story] is a direct 
threat to the teacher."11  Assuming arguendo that the circuit 
court correctly found that Douglas's story is a "threat" to Mrs. 
                     
11 Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, this is the only 
finding of fact that the circuit court made to support its 
conclusion that Douglas's speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment.  To be sure, the dissent suggests that there are 
numerous other "facts" in the record.  However, the dissent does 
not state what these facts might be.  Instead, while ostensibly 
recognizing the statutory mandate that juvenile records remain 
confidential, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.78 
("Confidentiality 
of 
records"), the dissent inserts blank lines that it presumably 
hopes will indicate relevant facts that somehow dictate the 
outcome in this case.  See dissent at ¶¶86, 91-93.  In doing so, 
the 
dissent 
not 
only 
acknowledges 
that 
it 
relies 
on 
impermissible, inadmissible, and possibly non-existent evidence, 
but it invites others to speculate what that evidence may be.   
Moreover, even if such facts exist and are relevant and 
admissible, there is no evidence that any such facts were 
presented to the circuit court during the fact-finding hearing 
on this matter.  And even if we assume arguendo that the circuit 
court was aware of these alleged facts at the time of the fact-
finding hearing, we nonetheless must take notice that there is 
no evidence that the circuit court relied on these facts as a 
basis for its ruling.   
It should go without saying that courts are bound to decide 
cases based on the facts before them.  We find it unfortunate 
that the dissent does not deem itself bound by this imperative. 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
21
C, this finding did not warrant the court to make the logical 
jump to conclude that Douglas's story necessarily constitutes a 
"true threat," unprotected by the First Amendment. 
A 
¶31 Contrary to the court of appeals holding, Douglas D., 
unpublished slip op. at 3 n.3, for purposes of First Amendment 
analysis, a "threat" is very different from a "true threat."  
"Threat" is a nebulous term that can describe anything from 
"[a]n expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, evil, 
or punishment" to any generalized "menace."  The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1868 (3d ed. 1992). 
 Under such a broad definition, "threats" include protected and 
unprotected speech.  Thus, states cannot enact general laws 
prohibiting all "threats" without infringing on some speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  By contrast, "true threat" is 
a constitutional term of art used to describe a specific 
category of unprotected speech.  State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 
¶17, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; see also Watts, 394 U.S. 
at 707-08.  This category, although often inclusive of speech or 
acts that fall within the broader definition of "threat," does 
not include protected speech.  See United States v. Miller, 115 
F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997); Perkins, 2001 WI 46, at ¶17.  
Therefore, states may, consistent with the First Amendment, 
prohibit all "true threats."   
¶32 Wisconsin prohibits true threats that occur under 
circumstances where such conduct tends to cause or provoke a 
disturbance by means of the § 947.01 prohibition on "abusive" 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
22
conduct.  "Abusive" conduct is conduct that, at least in part, 
is "injurious, improper, hurtful, offensive, [or] reproachful." 
Black's Law Dictionary 11 (6th ed. 1990); see also The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 8 (3d ed. 1992) 
(defining "abusive" in part as "[c]haracterized by abuse"; 
defining "abuse" in part as "[i]nsulting or coarse language").  
True threats clearly fall within the scope of this definition.  
Consequently, if Douglas's story constitutes a true threat, the 
State properly could prosecute him for violating the § 947.01 
prohibition on "abusive" conduct. 
B 
 
¶33 We 
thus 
must 
determine 
whether 
Douglas's 
story 
constitutes a true threat.  The question of whether particular 
conduct constitutes a true threat is an issue of fact, typically 
best left for the finder of fact.  Perkins, 2001 WI 46, at ¶48. 
However, if the conduct unquestionably is protected by the First 
Amendment, a court may dismiss the charge as a matter of law.  
Id.   
¶34 As this court explained in Perkins, a true threat is a 
statement that, in light of all the surrounding circumstances,  
 
a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener 
would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of 
a purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished from 
hyperbole, 
jest, 
innocuous 
talk, 
expressions 
of 
political views, or other similarly protected speech.12 
                     
12  We recognize that there may be instances where true 
threats are conveyed by means other than pure speech.  For this 
reason, the terms "speaker" and "listener" should be broadly 
construed to encompass all conveyors and recipients of true 
threats. 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
23
 It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability 
to carry out the threat.       
Id. at ¶29.13  Some factors that courts and juries should 
consider when applying this test include, but are not limited 
to:   
 
how the recipient and other listeners reacted to the 
alleged threat, whether the threat was conditional,14 
                                                                  
We 
further 
note 
that 
the 
"reasonable 
speaker" 
and 
"reasonable listener" are not to be misconstrued as omniscient 
persons, aware of every fact potentially existing at the time of 
the speech.  The "reasonable speaker" and "reasonable listener" 
are limited in knowledge to the facts readily available to the 
actual speaker and/or the actual listener at the time of the 
speech at issue. 
13  Contrary to the contentions in the concurrences by Chief 
Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch, this test does not 
require specific intent.  As explained in State v. Perkins, 2001 
WI 46, ¶29, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, the true-threat 
test applies "an objective reasonable person standard," based on 
reasonable foreseeability, not intent.  This standard does not 
legally or logically require a finding of specific——i.e., 
subjective——intent.  Further, we note that the vast majority of 
federal appellate courts and state supreme courts to have 
considered the issue rejected the argument that true threats 
require specific intent.  See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 
164 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Whiffen, 121 
F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 
76, 81 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 
777, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 
1059, 1066 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 
146, 149 (6th Cir. 1992); People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1233-34 
(Colo. 1999) (en banc); In the Interest of R.T., No. 00-CK-0205, 
2001 WL 170927, at *4 (La. Feb. 21, 2001).   
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
24
whether [the threat] was communicated directly to its 
victim, whether the maker of the threat had made 
similar statements to the victim on other occasions, 
and whether the victim had reason to believe that the 
maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in 
violence. 
Id. at ¶31 (citation omitted). 
¶35 In the present case, Douglas argues that his story was 
not a true threat because it did not express an "unequivocal, 
unconditional and specific expression[] of intention immediately 
to inflict injury."   United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 
1027 (2d Cir. 1976).  He contends that his story is a fictional, 
third-person creative writing assignment, which should receive 
full protection under the First Amendment.  
¶36 Conversely, the State contends that Douglas's story is 
a true threat.  According to the State's argument, the first two 
paragraphs of Douglas's story closely parallel the events that 
had taken place immediately before Douglas began his assignment: 
 a teacher named Mrs. C removed a male student from her class.  
                                                                  
14 This is not to suggest that ambiguous or conditional 
language cannot constitute a true threat.  See United States v. 
Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The use of 
ambiguous language does not preclude a statement from being a 
threat."); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th 
Cir. 1990) ("Most threats are conditional; they are designed to 
accomplish something; the threatener hopes that they will 
accomplish it, so that he won't have to carry out the threats.  
They 
are 
threats 
nonetheless." 
(citation 
omitted)).  
Additionally, "[t]he fact that a threat is subtle does not make 
it less of a threat."  United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 
F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation and quotation 
omitted); see also United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 50 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (holding that the jury must consider the reasonable 
connotations of speech in determining whether the speech is a 
"true threat"). 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
25
The next two paragraphs, the State contends, convey the threat: 
 when the teacher disciplined the student the following day, the 
student used a machete to cut off the teacher's head.  Further, 
the State attributes great weight to the fact that Douglas 
handed his story directly to Mrs. Cthe subject of his 
threatrather than, for example, reading it in jest to his 
friends.  In light of these circumstances, the State argues that 
Douglas's threat to Mrs. C is direct and clear:  If she 
disciplines him again, he intends to injure her.  Thus, the 
State argues that Douglas's story expresses a true threat. 
¶37 Applying the Perkins test set forth above, while we 
believe that Douglas's story is crude and repugnant, we 
nonetheless must reject the State's argument.  To be sure, Mrs. 
C testified that Douglas's story frightened her.  Further, 
Douglas conveyed his message directly to Mrs. C, the alleged 
victim of the threat.  However, there is no evidence that 
Douglas had threatened Mrs. C in the past or that Mrs. C 
believed Douglas had a propensity to engage in violence. 
¶38 Moreover, Douglas wrote his story, pursuant to Mrs. 
C's request, in the context of a creative writing class.  In 
such a class, teachers and students alike should expect and 
allow more creative licensebe it for better or, as in this 
case, for worsethan in other circumstances.  Had Douglas penned 
the same story in a math class, for example, where such a tale 
likely would be grossly outside the scope of his assigned work, 
we would have a different case before us.   
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
26
¶39 But in the context of a creative writing class, 
Douglas's story does not amount to a true threat.  First, the 
story does not contain any language directly addressed from 
Douglas to Mrs. C.  Rather, it is written in the third person, 
with no mention of Douglas.  Second, Douglas's story contains 
hyperbole and attempts at jest.  It jokes that the "C" in "Mrs. 
C" is short for "crab."  In addition, it suggests that Mrs. C is 
so mean that she beats children and speculates that, for this 
reason, she became a teacher.  Third, Mrs. C explained to 
Douglas that in this particular assignment, he merely was to 
begin writing a story that other children would complete.  Thus, 
Douglas could have expected another student to end his grisly 
tale as a dream or otherwise imagined event.  Under these 
specific circumstances, Douglas's story is protected by the 
First Amendment.15   
                     
15 As noted above, the dissent suggests that numerous other 
"facts" support its conclusion that Douglas's story was a true 
threat.  Whatever these facts may be, there is no evidence that 
Mrs. C or any other person was aware of any of these purported 
facts at the time of Douglas's alleged threat.   
However, unswayed by the dearth of evidence supporting its 
position, the dissent hypothesizes its own "evidence."  See, 
e.g., dissent at ¶93 ("Even if Mrs. [C.] had been unaware of 
Douglas's entire history and prior delinquency determination, 
she was certainly cognizant of his discipline problems in class 
and his frequent truancy."); id. at ¶109 ("There is a very good 
chance, however, that Mrs. [C.]——at least after she talked with 
[the 
vice 
principal]——knew 
something 
of 
Douglas's 
troubles . . . or that she had her own reasons for being afraid 
of him.").  This "evidence" is unsupported by the record.  But 
more disconcertingly, this "evidence" is the product of judicial 
speculation, which clearly exceeds the proper scope of the 
present review. 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
27
¶40 We do not doubt that the story was a result of 
Douglas's anger at having been removed from class.  Further, we 
sympathize with Mrs. C; she was justified in feeling offended.  
And 
we 
firmly 
believe 
that 
the 
school 
took 
appropriate 
disciplinary action against Douglas.   
¶41 However, a thirteen-year-old boy's impetuous writings 
do not necessarily fall from First Amendment protection due to 
their offensive nature.  As the Supreme Court explained: 
 
To many, the immediate consequence of this [First 
Amendment] freedom may often appear to be only verbal 
tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.  These 
are, however, within established limits, in truth 
necessary side effects of the broader enduring values 
which the process of open debate permits us to 
achieve. . . .  We cannot lose sight of the fact that, 
in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying 
instance 
of 
individual 
distasteful 
abuse 
of 
a 
privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly 
implicated. 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).  With this in 
mind, we conclude that Douglas's story, although we find it to 
be offensive and distasteful, unquestionably is protected by the 
First Amendment.  Our feelings of offense and distaste do not 
allow us to set aside the Constitution.16  We therefore hold as a 
                     
16 We recognize that public opinion regarding protected 
freedoms may wax and wane over time.  However, courts should not 
easily be swayed by public opinion, particularly in matters of 
constitutional rights.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
observed:  "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, 
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and 
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts."  West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 638 (1943).   
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
28
matter of law that Douglas's story cannot be prosecuted under 
§ 947.01. 
IV 
¶42 By no means should schools interpret this holding as 
undermining 
their 
authority 
to 
utilize 
their 
internal 
disciplinary procedures to punish speech such as Douglas's 
story.  Although the First Amendment prohibits law enforcement 
officials from prosecuting protected speech, it does not 
necessarily follow that schools may not discipline students for 
such speech.  
¶43 To be sure, students do not shed their First Amendment 
rights at the schoolhouse gate.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  Thus, like law 
enforcement officials, educators may not punish students merely 
for expressing unpopular viewpoints.  See id. at 509.   
                                                                  
Unfortunately, the dissent seems willing to sidestep these 
legal principles.  In its seeming urgency to satisfy public 
opinion and convince the majority of this court and this state 
that Douglas's conduct must be removed from First Amendment 
protection, the dissent cites as support everything from FBI 
symposium publications to magazine articles to myriad newspaper 
headlines.  However, as Justice Crooks' concurring opinion aptly 
notes, the dissent scarcely cites the stuff of judicial import——
the Constitution and those cases and statutes that interpret it. 
  
Ever 
conscious 
of 
the 
principles 
undergirding 
the 
Constitution, this court must not succumb to public pressure 
when deciding the law.  Headlines may be appropriate support for 
policy arguments on the floor of the legislature, but they 
cannot support an abandonment in our courthouses of the 
constitutional principles that the judiciary is charged to 
uphold. 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
29
¶44 However, the First Amendment "must be 'applied in 
light 
of 
the 
special 
characteristics 
of 
the 
school 
environment.'"  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
266 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).  Unlike other 
instruments of the State, schools are entrusted with a unique 
role in our societyto mold our children into responsible and 
wise adult citizens.  See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493 (1954) (describing schools as "the principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values").  This "educational 
mission" is not limited to academics.  See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).  Rather, it also 
entails many other responsibilitiesadviser, friend, counselor, 
and, all too often, parent-substitute.  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565, 594 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).  Pursuant to 
these responsibilities, educators must inculcate in our children 
"the habits and manners of civility."  Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 
U.S. at 681 (citation omitted).  
¶45 While the "fundamental values of 'habits and manners 
of civility' essential to a democratic society must, of course, 
include tolerance of divergent . . . views, even when the views 
expressed may be unpopular," they also include society's 
countervailing interest in teaching our children the boundaries 
of socially acceptable methods of discourse.  Id.  For this 
reason, in the school context, schools may limit or discipline 
"conduct . . . which for any reasonwhether it stems from time, 
place, or type of behaviormaterially disrupts classwork or 
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
30
others."17  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  Hence, under some 
circumstances, schools may discipline conduct even where law 
enforcement officials may not.  Cf. Angelia D.B., 211 Wis. 2d at 
155 (holding that "inherent differences" between police officers 
and educators warrant different legal standards for searches and 
seizures). 
¶46 Under the circumstances in the present case, we hold 
that the school had more than enough reason to discipline 
Douglas for the content of his story.  Although the story is not 
a true threat, it is an offensive, crass insult to Mrs. C.  
Schools need 
not 
tolerate 
this type 
of 
assault to the 
sensibilities of their educators or students.  The First 
Amendment does not compel "teachers, parents, and elected school 
officials to surrender control of the American public school 
system to public school students."  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
V 
                     
17 Further, schools may discipline student speech that is, 
for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, or inadequately 
researched.  Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260, 271 (1988).  While few people likely question this 
authority, it is important to note that even this type of 
disciplinebe it correcting a typographical error, having a 
student rewrite a particular assignment, or the likeinfringes 
to some extent upon otherwise protected speech.  Nevertheless, 
when examined in light of the special characteristics of the 
school 
environment, 
this 
speech, 
like 
speech 
that 
more 
dramatically interferes with a school's educational mission, may 
be disciplined without contravening the First Amendment. 
No. 
99-1767 
 
 
31
¶47 In sum, we reemphasize that we share the public's 
concern regarding threats of school violence.  Society need not 
tolerate true threats.  Such speech, even if purely written, can 
and should be prosecuted under the disorderly conduct statute, 
§ 947.01.  However, under the particular facts of this case, the 
speech at issue fails to rise to the level of a true threat.  
Douglas's story, though repugnant and insulting, falls within 
the protection of the First Amendment.  As such, it may not be 
punished as disorderly conduct. 
¶48 However, we also recognize that "it is a highly 
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the 
use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse."  Bethel 
Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 683.  Thus, although we hold that 
Douglas's story is not a true threat and, therefore, cannot be 
punished under § 947.01, we nonetheless believe that the school 
properly disciplined Douglas.   
¶49 This case reinforces our belief that while some 
student conduct may warrant punishment by both law enforcement 
officials and school authorities, school discipline generally 
should remain the prerogative of our schools, not our juvenile 
justice system.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
1 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that Douglas D.'s 
creative writing essay is protected by the First Amendment and 
may not be punished as criminal conduct.  I do not, however, 
join the majority opinion in its expansion of the disorderly 
conduct statute, Wis. Stat. § 947.01.  By interpreting the 
statute to criminalize the content of speech alone, that is, 
speech unaccompanied by any disorderly conduct, the majority 
opinion engages in an unwarranted judicial rewrite of a fifty-
year-old statute.18 
¶51 The majority opinion concludes that the disorderly 
conduct statute can punish the content of speech alone, even 
though no published case supports such an application of the 
statute.19  So that this statutory interpretation will not run 
                     
18 This novel application of the disorderly conduct statute 
also arises in a companion case, In the Interest of A.S.: State 
v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  I note, 
however, that the rationale put forth in A.S. for applying the 
disorderly conduct statute to the content of speech alone 
differs from the rationale offered in this case. 
19 See majority op. at ¶¶3, 14.  The majority opinion goes 
on to express some apparent doubt about this holding when it 
explains that "'abusive' speech carries with it the nonspeech 
element of an express or implied threat or challenge to fight.  
These nonspeech elements constitute the proscribed 'conduct' 
under § 947.01."  Majority op. at ¶24. 
I fail to see the nonspeech element of a written threat.  
The majority opinion apparently believes that the content of 
speech may be treated the same way as the volume of the speech, 
which is a nonspeech element.  It is a semantic sleight of hand 
to suggest that the content of unprotected speech transforms 
that speech into conduct. 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
2 
afoul of First Amendment constitutional guarantees, the majority 
opinion judicially rewrites the statute, narrowing the phrase 
"abusive conduct" to include true threats, unprotected by the 
First Amendment, while excluding from the reach of the statute 
speech that may be abusive but is nonetheless protected by the 
First Amendment.  This strained reading of the disorderly 
conduct statute is troubling, for three reasons. 
¶52 First, the lack of a clear fit between the language of 
the disorderly conduct statute and speech unprotected by the 
First Amendment shows that the disorderly conduct statute is 
overbroad when used to punish the content of speech alone.  By 
its plain language, the disorderly conduct statute criminalizes 
abusive or otherwise disorderly conduct that tends to provoke a 
disturbance.  The majority defines the term "abusive" as 
"injurious, improper, hurtful, offensive, [or] reproachful," and 
notes that true threats "fall within the scope of this 
definition."  See majority op. at ¶32. 
¶53 But speech that falls within the definition of 
"abusive" and is provocative or unsettling may nonetheless be 
protected by the First Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
explained this aspect of the First Amendment in Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949), as follows: 
 
[A] function of free speech under our system of 
government is to invite dispute.  It may indeed best 
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger.  Speech is 
often provocative and challenging.  It may strike at 
prejudices 
and 
preconceptions 
and 
have 
profound 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
3 
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an 
idea.  That is why freedom of speech, though not 
absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship 
or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear 
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that 
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or 
unrest.  (Citations omitted.) 
¶54 Applying the plain language of the disorderly conduct 
statute to the content of speech alone renders the statute 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  "A statute is overbroad when its 
language, given its normal meaning, is so sweeping that its 
sanctions may be applied to constitutionally protected conduct 
which the state is not permitted to regulate. . . .  The 
essential vice of an overbroad law is that by sweeping protected 
activity within its reach it deters citizens from exercising 
their protected constitutional freedoms, the so-called 'chilling 
effect.'"20  
¶55 Applying the broadly worded disorderly conduct statute 
to the content of speech alone would run afoul of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's holding in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 
U.S. 130 (1974).  In Lewis, the Court struck down a conviction 
under a city ordinance that made it unlawful "to curse or revile 
or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with 
reference" to a police officer performing his duties.  The Court 
held that it was immaterial that the words used by the appellant 
might have been constitutionally unprotected under a properly 
drawn statute or ordinance.  The Court declared the ordinance 
                     
20 Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 407 N.W.2d 
533 (1987) (citation omitted).  See also State v. Janssen, 219 
Wis. 2d 362, 374, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998). 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
4 
facially overbroad because it would criminalize all vulgar and 
offensive speech, including speech protected by the First 
Amendment.21 
¶56 Yet instead of acknowledging that the statute, as 
applied to the content of speech alone, is unconstitutionally 
overbroad, the majority simply relies on this court's conclusion 
in State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497, 164 N.W.2d 512 (1969), that 
the disorderly conduct statute is not overbroad.  See majority 
op. at ¶21.  Zwicker, however, involved protected speech 
intertwined with conduct, whereas this case represents the first 
published case in which the statute has been applied to punish 
solely the content of speech.  Zwicker does not help the 
majority opinion under these novel circumstances.22 
¶57 Having stated in conclusory fashion that the statute 
is not overbroad, the majority opinion then judicially narrows 
the scope of the statute.  It holds that when applied to the 
content 
of 
speech 
alone, 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute 
                     
21 See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) 
(concluding that the Georgia courts' authoritative construction 
of a "breach of the peace" statute swept too broadly and was 
therefore unconstitutional); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 
(1965) (holding that a "disturbing the peace" statute was 
unconstitutionally broad). 
22 The majority opinion's reliance on Lane v. Collins, 29 
Wis. 2d 66, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965), and Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 
440, 41 N.W.2d 642 (1950) is also misplaced.  The ordinance at 
issue in Lane was directed to abusive language and was not 
challenged on constitutional grounds. 
In Teske, the picketers, swearing and cursing, pushed 
officers against a train and forced their way through the cordon 
formed by officers.  Teske involved conduct. 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
5 
criminalizes only speech that is not protected by the First 
Amendment.  This court has rejected this kind of rewriting of a 
statute, stating: "[A] construction which by its very language 
limits the statute's application to speech and conduct that is 
not protected by the First Amendment is both impractical and 
constitutionally suspect. . . .  'The problem with that solution 
is that it simply exchanges overbreadth for vagueness.'"23  By 
construing the disorderly conduct statute in a way that simply 
exchanges 
overbreadth for 
vagueness, 
the majority opinion 
infringes on protected forms of expression.24 
¶58 Second, in light of the legislature's enactment of 
numerous statutes expressly criminalizing specific kinds of 
                     
23 Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 382 n.13 (declining to adopt a 
limiting construction of a flag desecration statute) (quoting 
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-29, at 1031 
(2d ed. 1988)). 
See also State v. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, ¶38, 235 Wis. 2d 
306, 611 N.W.2d 684 (declining to rewrite a statute prohibiting 
dissemination of harmful material to minors in a way that would 
render it constitutional when applied in the context of the 
Internet); State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 139-140, 589 N.W. 
2d 370 (1999) (declining to rewrite a child pornography statute 
to avoid the unconstitutional result of placing the burden of 
demonstrating lack of scienter on the defendant). 
24 "The danger posed by a vague law is that officials 
charged with enforcing the law may apply it arbitrarily or the 
law may be so unclear that a trial court cannot properly 
instruct the jury as to the applicable law."  Bachowski, 139 
Wis. 2d at 406-07 (quoting State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 
173, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983)). 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
6 
threats,25 it is hard to accept the State's position that a 
disorderly conduct statute that has been on the books for over 
fifty years without being applied to the content of speech alone 
has suddenly metamorphosed into an anti-threat statute.  Yet the 
majority opinion accepts the State's theory, forgetting that 
"[d]efining the contours of laws subjecting a violator to 
criminal penalty is a legislative, not a judicial function."26  
¶59 Third, even if I agreed with the majority's conclusion 
that the disorderly conduct statute criminalizes the content of 
speech alone, the statute should not be used to prosecute true 
threats in the absence of a specific intent to threaten.  I 
conclude that a specific intent is required under the First 
Amendment.27  This criminal intent element is absent from the 
                     
25 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 940.201 (threat to witnesses); 
940.203 (threat to judge); 940.205 (threat to Department of 
Revenue employee); 940.207 (threat to Department of Commerce or 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development 
employee); 
940.45 
(intimidation of victims); 943.30 (threat to injure or accuse of 
crime); 943.31 (threats to communicate derogatory information); 
947.012 (phone calls with intent to threaten); 947.015 (false 
bomb threat). 
26 Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d at 177. 
27 See Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 411 (noting that the 
requirements of intent and "no legitimate purpose" in the 
harassment 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 947.013, 
satisfied 
constitutional requirements, since these elements "make clear 
that protected expression is not reached by the statute"). 
See also State v. Perkins, 2000 WI 46, ¶29 n.20, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  In Perkins, this court did not 
need to address whether specific intent is required by the First 
Amendment.  The statute at issue in that case required an intent 
to threaten.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.203(2). 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
7 
disorderly conduct statute.28  In the absence of a specific 
intent requirement, today's novel expansion of the disorderly 
conduct statute infringes, in my opinion, on protected forms of 
expression. 
¶60 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
                     
28 The legislature has included a specific intent element in 
many of the anti-threat statutes.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.203(2)(a) (requiring an intentional threat with knowledge 
that the individual is a judge or family member); 940.205(2)(a) 
(requiring an intentional threat with knowledge that the 
individual is a Department of Revenue employee or family 
member); 
946.03(1)(c)-(d) 
(requiring 
the 
intent 
that 
the 
government be overthrown).  But see Wis. Stat. §§ 940.43 
(statute does not address intent or knowledge); 940.45 (same). 
The Model Penal Code sets forth a mens rea requirement for 
the offense of disorderly conduct.  See II Model Penal Code and 
Commentaries § 250.2 at 324 (1980) (requiring as an element of 
the offense that a person act "with purpose to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof"). 
The Commentary to the Model Penal Code explains this mens 
rea requirement as follows: 
Perhaps the most important general limitation on the 
scope of the offense [of disorderly conduct] is the 
required culpability.  The Model Code demands more 
than that a person act in a manner offensive to the 
community.  . . .  Conviction cannot be had merely on 
proof that the actor should have foreseen the risk of 
public annoyance or alarm.  This limitation of the 
offense to those who are consciously indifferent to 
the 
public peace 
and 
tranquility 
identifies the 
ultimate evil at which this provision is aimed and 
eliminates many abusive applications to which older 
disorderly conduct statutes were susceptible. 
 
II Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 250.2 at 328-29 
(1980) (citation omitted). 
99-1767-FT.ssa 
 
8 
 
No. 99-1767-FT.wab 
 
1 
¶61 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring).  In State v. 
Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, the crime 
charged required that the speaker's intent to threaten was an 
element of the crime.  I joined that opinion because that 
element was present.  However, here the crime charged does not 
require intent as an element.   
¶62 In the present case, we are dealing with speech, and 
only speech, not conduct.  We must tread carefully as we skirt 
perilously close to First Amendment protections.  Accordingly, 
when dealing with speech alone in the context of a crime that 
does not require intent, I would adopt a test that focuses on 
both the subjective intent of the speaker and the perspectives 
of a reasonable listener.   
¶63 In particular, I would adopt the following test.  A 
"true threat" is not a statement of hyperbole, jest, political 
dissent, or other similarly protected speech.  Rather, a "true 
threat" is a statement that is intended to convey, and does 
convey to a reasonable listener, a serious expression of an 
intent to inflict harm.  In making this determination, the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the statement must 
be considered, including what was said, how it was said, by whom 
and to whom, and in what context.  From the perspective of the 
speaker, the focus is on the speaker's subjective intent.  It is 
not necessary that the speaker actually intended to carry out 
the threat or that the speaker had the actual ability to carry 
out the threat; it is only necessary that the speaker intended 
to convey a serious expression of an intent to inflict harm.  
No. 99-1767-FT.wab 
 
2 
From the perspective of the listener, the focus is on whether an 
objectively reasonable listener would perceive the statement as 
a serious expression of an intent to inflict harm. 
¶64 Because the story written by Douglas does not come 
within the definition of either test of "true threat," I 
respectfully concur. 
 
99-1767-FT.awb 
 
1 
¶65 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority's First Amendment analysis and its conclusion that the 
speech in this case is not a true threat, but is rather speech 
subject to First Amendment protection.  However, the majority 
unnecessarily 
applies Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 947.01 
and 
erroneously 
concludes that the speech at issue would otherwise constitute 
disorderly conduct.   
¶66 The statutory discussion is not warranted because the 
majority's First Amendment conclusions, alone, require reversal 
of the court of appeals.  Moreover, I disagree with the 
conclusion the majority draws in its application of the statute. 
 I do not believe that Douglas D.'s conduct in writing the 
fictional story constitutes disorderly conduct.  Accordingly, I 
do not join in the majority's application of § 947.01 to the 
facts at hand. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this concurring opinion.  
 
99-1767-FT.npc 
 
1 
¶68 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    (concurring).  I agree with 
the test for true threats in the majority opinion, the 
application thereof, and, the resulting reversal of the court of 
appeals' decision.  I write separately, however, to emphasize 
that our decision today should not be interpreted, by anyone, as 
imposing a limitation upon a school's ability to discipline its 
students.   
 
[B]y and large, "public education in our Nation is 
committed 
to 
the 
control 
of 
state 
and 
local 
authorities," and that federal courts should not 
ordinarily "intervene in the resolution of conflicts 
which arise in the daily operation of school systems." 
 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 
(1969), noted that we have "repeatedly emphasized 
 . . . the comprehensive authority of the States and 
of school officials  . . . to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools."  
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (also quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 
(1968)).  This quotation applies to state courts as well as 
federal courts.   
¶69 A school can, and should, discipline a student for 
speech and conduct that is inappropriate and disruptive, and in 
no way adds to the school's educational mission.  This is 
particularly true here, where the setting is an elementary 
school.   
 
[T]he potential "verbal cacophony" of a public forum 
can be antithetical to the delicate "custodial and 
tutelary" environment of an elementary school.  The 
cultivation of the "habits and manners of civility" 
that [Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 
(1986)] held "essential to a democratic society," can 
99-1767-FT.npc 
 
2 
require a level of parent-like guidance that has no 
place in a public forum. 
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F.3d 1530, 1539 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (other citations omitted).  
¶70 I also write separately to express my concerns with 
the dissenting opinion.  I have two overriding concerns.  First, 
I am concerned with the dissent's reliance upon matters that are 
not in the record, including information about Douglas D. and 
his family, as well as letters, articles and reports from 
various sources regarding school violence.  This court has not 
taken, and cannot take, judicial notice of much of this 
information.  "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject 
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (a) generally known 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (b) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 902.01(2).  Moreover, we have established that where a court 
or a party desires to take judicial notice of a matter, notice 
should be given to the parties or the adversary, "so as to 
afford them an opportunity of consulting the same sources or of 
producing others."  State v. Barnes, 52 Wis. 2d 82, 88, 187 
N.W.2d 845 (1971) (quoting Fringer v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 
373, 132 N.W.2d 565, 133 N.W.2d 809 (1965)).  "A party is 
entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to 
the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the 
matter noticed."  Wis. Stat. § 902.01(5).  Without such a 
99-1767-FT.npc 
 
3 
procedural safeguard, matters that are actually in dispute may 
be relied upon as if they were established fact. 
¶71 Along a similar vein, the dissent relies upon non-
legal materials as if they were legal authority.  Here, the law—
—the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions, 
related 
statutes, and the cases interpreting them——provides sufficient 
authority to decide this case.  The dissent's dependence upon 
non-legal material, which may not be accurate or reliable, 
undermines 
the 
dissent's 
conclusions, 
and 
the 
public's 
perception that this court relies upon sound legal principles.  
¶72 My second concern with the dissent is that it implies 
that the majority has suppressed relevant information.  The 
information the dissent apparently refers to, using blanks and 
brackets, 
is 
from 
confidential 
material——specifically, 
a 
dispositional report——contained in Douglas D.'s juvenile record. 
 There is nothing to indicate that the report was relied upon by 
the circuit court, or the court of appeals, in reaching the 
decision we review today.   
¶73 A juvenile's record is confidential, and should remain 
so, in most instances.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.78.  The 
dispositional report is not prepared until a juvenile has been 
adjudged delinquent.  Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1).  The dispositional 
report is prepared for the dispositional hearing, much like a 
pre-sentence report is prepared prior to sentencing in an adult 
criminal proceeding.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.15.  Here, the 
circuit court judge reached the decision at issue before 
receiving 
this 
report——indeed 
even 
before 
scheduling 
the 
99-1767-FT.npc 
 
4 
dispositional hearing——and thus could not have relied upon the 
dispositional report.  The dissent's suggestion that the circuit 
court judge relied upon an earlier dispositional report, 
prepared in connection with an entirely separate proceeding (see 
¶98), in reaching his decision here is nothing short of 
speculation.  
¶74 The authority of schools to discipline students for 
behavior that is inappropriate and disruptive is not limited by 
our opinion today.  However, that authority should not be 
improperly bolstered by referring to confidential material and 
relying upon questionable authority not in the record, as is 
done by the dissent.  For these reasons, I respectfully concur 
with the majority. 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence.  
 
 
 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
1 
¶76 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (dissenting).   This case comes 
to the court against a disturbing backdrop of school violence.  
Over the past eight years, American education has endured an 
unprecedented outbreak of shooting incidents and other violence 
at schools across the United States.  Parents, teachers, school 
administrators, and students have become hauntingly familiar 
with 
such 
names 
as 
Grayson, 
Kentucky 
(2 
deaths, 
1993); 
Lynnville, 
Tennessee 
(2 
deaths, 
1995); 
Blackville, 
South 
Carolina (3 deaths, 1995); Redlands, California (1 death, 1995); 
Moses Lake, Washington (3 deaths, 1996); Bethel, Alaska (2 
deaths, 1997); Pearl, Mississippi (2 deaths, 1997); West 
Paducah, Kentucky (3 deaths, 1997); Jonesboro, Arkansas (5 
deaths, 
1998); 
Edinboro, 
Pennsylvania 
(1 
death, 
1998); 
Fayetteville, Tennessee (1 death, 1998); and Springfield, Oregon 
(2 deaths, 1998), all of which occurred before the incident in 
this case and all of which preceded the 15 deaths at Columbine 
High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999.29  A number of these 
shooting deaths were perpetrated by boys between 12 and 14 years 
of age. 
¶77 Most schools have responded to the specter of violence 
with additional planning and precaution.  In 1998, United States 
Attorney General Janet Reno and Secretary of Education Richard 
W. Riley asked school principals and teachers to make sure that 
                     
29 Julie Underwood et al., School Safety: Working Together 
to 
Keep 
Schools 
Safe 
at 
http://www.keepschoolssafe.org/school.html 
(last 
visited 
Apr. 
26, 2001). 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
2 
"every school in this nation has a comprehensive violence 
prevention plan in place."  Letter from Richard W. Riley and 
Janet Reno, to Principal and Teachers (Aug. 22, 1998) (a letter 
widely distributed to schools throughout the nation), reprinted 
in Critical Incident Response Group, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The 
School 
Shooter: 
A 
Threat 
Assessment 
Perspective 
(1999) 
[hereinafter The School Shooter].  The two cabinet officers 
warned against "over labeling"——that 
is, stigmatizing all 
children who display danger signs.  Nevertheless, they put 
school officials on alert to prepare for contingencies and watch 
for trouble.   
¶78 Teachers and students are now encouraged to report all 
threats so that they can be evaluated, because the ability to 
act on early warning signs has repeatedly headed off additional 
tragedy.30 
¶79 School officials must contemplate not only those 
troubled youngsters who may precipitate a violent episode but 
also students who may act as copycats.  In addition, they must 
prepare for the bomb threats that may appear as aftershocks to 
incidents of school violence.  Having a clear obligation to 
                     
30 See Amanda Bower, Scorecard of Hatred, Time, Mar. 19, 
2001, at 31-32.  The article offers thumbnail sketches of 20 
incidents of violence or potential violence since Columbine, 
several of which were "foiled" when students or teachers 
reported students who signaled lethal intentions.  The events 
described in In the Interest of A.S., 2001 WI 48, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___, also occurred after the Columbine tragedy, 
but they were not included in the Time article. 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
3 
protect students and teachers, school officials may not safely 
assume that any school is immune from danger. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 
¶80 In July 1999, the FBI's National Center for the 
Analysis of Violent Crime convened a national symposium on 
school violence.  The symposium led to publication of The School 
Shooter, a valuable resource to help school officials and others 
assess the seriousness of student threats.  This threat 
assessment manual makes the point that: 
 
All threats are NOT created equal.  However, all 
threats should be accessed [sic] in a timely manner 
and decisions regarding how they are handled must be 
done quickly. 
 
. . . .  
 
Threat assessment seeks to make an informed 
judgment on two questions: how credible and serious is 
the threat itself?  And to what extent does the 
threatener appear to have the resources, intent, and 
motivation to carry out the threat? 
The School Shooter, supra, at 5.   
¶81 The report explains that threats are made for a 
variety of reasons: 
 
A threat may be a warning signal, a reaction to 
fear of punishment or some other anxiety, or a demand 
for attention.  It may be intended to taunt; to 
intimidate; to assert power or control; to punish; to 
manipulate or coerce; to frighten; to terrorize; to 
compel someone to do something; to strike back for an 
injury, injustice or slight; to disrupt someone's or 
some institution's life; to test authority, or to 
protect oneself.  The emotions that underlie a threat 
can 
be 
love; 
hate; 
fear; 
rage; 
or 
desire 
for 
attention, revenge, excitement, or recognition. 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
4 
Id. at 6.   
¶82 The report categorizes threats as direct threats, 
indirect threats, veiled threats, and conditional threats.31  It 
suggests that there are three levels of threats ranging in 
severity from low to high.  Id. at 8-9.  The first task for 
officials is to assess the threat itself.   
¶83 The report also proposes a four-pronged assessment 
model, based upon the "totality of the circumstances," for 
assessing the threatener.  The four prongs are listed as 
follows: 
 
Prong One: 
Personality of the student 
 
Prong Two: 
Family dynamics 
 
Prong Three: 
School dynamics and the student's role in 
those dynamics 
 
Prong Four: 
Social dynamics 
Id. at 10-14. 
 
¶84 The analysis in The School Shooter is useful in 
reviewing this case.  The publication states unequivocally that 
"[a]ll aspects of a threatener's life must be considered when 
evaluating whether a threat is likely to be carried out."  Id. 
at 10. 
DOUGLAS D. 
                     
31 The majority opinion acknowledges that ambiguous or 
conditional language may constitute a threat.  It implies that, 
in appropriate circumstances, such a threat may constitute a 
"true threat."  Majority op. at ¶34 n.12.  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
5 
¶85 The record before this court reveals much more about 
Douglas D. than the majority has disclosed.  This information is 
highly relevant to how persons who knew Douglas and his 
background reacted to his alleged threat. 
¶86 In October 1998, 13-year-old Douglas D. was a troubled 
young man.  He was [                                 ].  He had 
[                           ].  He had developed a pattern of 
skipping school and [                       ].  On [          ], 
he was adjudicated delinquent for [                    ].  This 
adjudication occurred in [    ] 1998.32 
¶87 Douglas began a new school term on August 24, 1998.  
His eighth-grade English teacher, Mrs. [C.], was starting her 
first full year of teaching.  Mrs. [C.], who was known to her 
students as Mrs. C., had disciplinary problems with Douglas. 
¶88 On Monday, October 5, 1998, Mrs. [C.] commenced a 
creative writing project in her English class.  She asked each 
student to write a story.  After reviewing the stories, Mrs. 
[C.] was to give each story to another student who would add to 
it, then to a third student, and finally to a student who would 
finish the story.  Douglas was not given this assignment until 
Wednesday, October 7, because he was absent from class on Monday 
and Tuesday.   
                     
32 See majority op. at ¶30 n.11 and concurring op. of 
Justice Crooks at ¶¶72-73.  It is more than ironic that this 
court is formulating constitutional principles about freedom of 
speech while suppressing highly relevant information upon which 
others have relied. 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
6 
¶89 "Doug refused to start the story," Mrs. [C.] later 
testified.  "He wanted to talk and visit with his friends and 
disrupt the class."  Mrs. [C.] said that Douglas "was disrupting 
the other students in the class, continually talking . . . and 
making gestures and saying funny things . . . and clowning 
around."  Consequently, Mrs. [C.] sent him out into the hallway 
to work on the assignment. 
¶90 When Douglas returned to class, he gave Mrs. [C.] his 
story.  She "panicked" when she saw what he had written.  "He 
wrote that he was going to cut my head off with a machete," she 
said. 
 
"I 
had . . . never 
received 
anything 
like 
that 
before. . . . I felt my life was in danger."  
¶91 Immediately 
after 
class, 
Mrs. 
[C.] 
called 
vice 
principal [              ] to explain the situation.  [The vice 
principal] read the story and considered it a veiled threat. "In 
my opinion the paper rose to the level of threatening one of our 
staff members," he said at trial.33  
¶92 [The vice principal] promptly notified [        ], the 
juvenile caseworker for the Oconto County Department of Human 
Services who had been assigned to Douglas as a result of [    ]. 
 [The caseworker] did not interview Douglas until the following 
day, however, because Douglas had run away.  When Douglas was 
                     
33 On cross examination, [the vice principal] said he viewed 
the story as a veiled threat: "There were several points that 
came very close to home, to reality, and that in turn threatened 
Mrs. [C.]. . . . I believe if a student . . . is allowed to go 
unchecked with this sort of a threat, it can be a threat to all 
of the staff members."   
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
7 
taken into custody, he was placed in secure detention.  [The 
caseworker] said at trial that Douglas admitted to him that the 
"Mrs. C." in his story was Mrs. [C.].  Shortly thereafter, in a 
different proceeding, [the caseworker] recommended to the court 
that [             ].  
¶93 These are the facts.  All these facts were known to 
Judge 
Delforge 
before 
trial 
because 
of 
Douglas's 
prior 
delinquency proceeding in front of the same judge, which 
included [                 ].34  There is explicit discussion of 
Douglas's prior delinquency in the trial record.  Even if Mrs. 
[C.] had been unaware of Douglas's entire history and prior 
delinquency determination, she was certainly cognizant of his 
discipline problems in class and his frequent truancy.  Plainly, 
[the vice principal] had knowledge of Douglas's juvenile record. 
¶94 At trial, Douglas denied that his story mentioning 
"Mrs. C." was directed at Mrs. [C.], although at one point he 
blurted out, "I was meaning it for her," before he corrected 
himself.  He admitted he "wasn't happy she kicked me out in the 
hall," but he claimed under oath that he wasn't really sure if 
Mrs. [C.] went by the name of "Mrs. C."  "I never really heard 
her be called that," he testified.   
                     
34 The dispositional report prepared after the court's 
finding of delinquency in this case summarizes Douglas's family 
history.  The report states that it is summarizing the family 
history because a prior dispositional report, prepared for the 
same judge in Douglas's earlier adjudication of delinquency, 
fully recounts the juvenile's family history.  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
8 
¶95 At the conclusion of the trial the circuit judge made 
the following determination: 
 
[T]here is absolutely no social value achieved by the 
juvenile's 
conduct 
in 
completing 
an 
assignment . . . that makes a direct threat to his 
teacher.  That is not the type of activity that is 
allowed either under the First Amendment or any other 
right that a student has in a classroom. . . .  
 
There is no question that this is a direct threat to 
the teacher. . . . It's not the type of action that 
we're going to allow in our classrooms. 
The court found that Douglas's writing "did cause and provoke a 
disturbance as Mrs. [C.] was very upset at receiving" and 
reading Douglas's story.  The court said there was no other way 
it could view Douglas's story than "as a direct threat to his 
teacher, Mrs. [C.].  Mrs. C and Mrs. [C.] are one in the same."  
¶96 The threat assessment analysis in The School Shooter 
tends to 
substantiate 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determinations, 
particularly when the focus is placed upon Douglas, the 
"threatener."  For instance, The School Shooter lists many 
factors to consider in evaluating a student under Prong One of 
its threat assessment test: Personality Traits and Behavior.  
Some of these factors include: 
 
(1) Low tolerance for frustration; (2) "Injustice 
Collector" (The student nurses resentment over real or 
perceived injustices.); (3) Narcissism (The student is 
self-centered, lacks insight into others' needs and/or 
feelings, 
and 
blames 
others 
for 
failures 
and 
disappointments.); 
(4) 
Exaggerated 
Sense 
of 
Entitlement; (5) Exaggerated or Pathological Need for 
Attention; 
(6) 
Externalizes 
Blame 
(The 
student 
consistently refuses to take responsibility for his or 
her own actions and typically faults other people, 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
9 
events 
or 
situations 
for 
any 
failings 
or 
shortcomings.); (7) Anger Management Problems; (8) 
Inappropriate Humor; (9) Change of Behavior; (10) 
Unusual Interest in Sensational Violence; and (11) 
Behavior Appears Relevant to Carrying Out a Threat. 
The School Shooter, supra, at 17-21 (numerals added and factors 
omitted).  
¶97 Some of the factors to consider under Prong Two of the 
threat assessment test, Family Dynamics, include: 
 
(1) Turbulent Parent-Child Relationship (The student's 
relationship 
with 
his 
parents 
is 
particularly 
difficult or turbulent.  This difficulty or turbulence 
can be uniquely evident following a variety of 
factors, including recent or multiple moves, loss of a 
parent, addition of a step parent, etc.  He expresses 
contempt for his parents and dismisses or rejects 
their role in his life.  There is evidence of violence 
occurring within the student's home.); (2) Lack of 
Intimacy (The family appears to lack intimacy and 
closeness.  The family has moved frequently and/or 
recently.). 
Id. at 21 (numerals added and factors omitted). 
 
¶98 Mrs. [C.], [the vice principal], [the caseworker], and 
Judge Delforge all had first-hand knowledge of Douglas D.  Judge 
Delforge had a full report on Douglas's family history before 
the trial in this case because of the prior proceedings dealing 
with Douglas.  Consequently, it is not unreasonable to believe 
that Judge Delforge and the other principal figures in this case 
considered many of the factors enumerated in the threat 
assessment manual as each of them evaluated Douglas's conduct.  
Most of the listed factors are applicable to Douglas's case.  It 
is manifest that the teacher, the vice principal, the juvenile 
caseworker, the assistant district attorney, the circuit judge, 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
10
and the court of appeals took Douglas's story seriously and 
considered it to be a threat to Mrs. [C.]. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶99 In State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d, decided today, we assert that courts have viewed "the 
question whether an alleged statement constitutes a true threat, 
unprotected by the First Amendment, as an issue of fact for the 
fact finder unless a court can determine that the evidence is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the defendant's 
conviction under the statute."  Perkins, 2001 WI 46 at ¶48 
(citations omitted).  A circuit court's findings of fact shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
witnesses.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).35 
¶100 To get around this deference to the circuit court, the 
majority concludes that Douglas's story "unquestionably is 
protected by the First Amendment . . . [and as a matter of law] 
cannot be prosecuted under § 947.01."  Majority op. at ¶41.  
                     
35 When a jury renders its verdict: 
No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a 
matter of law to support a verdict . . . shall be granted 
unless the court is satisfied that, considering all 
credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
motion is made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
finding in favor of such party. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1).  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
11
Even so, the majority opinion opens a second front by quibbling 
with 
some 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
common-sense 
factual 
determinations.36 
¶101 The majority's analysis is confusing.  As a result, it 
is not clear what impact the court's decision will have on 
safety and discipline in Wisconsin schools.  Because I do not 
believe that Douglas's story is "unquestionably" protected by 
the First Amendment or that this court has satisfactorily 
justified its reversal of Douglas's delinquency determination, I 
respectfully dissent. 
TRUE THREATS 
¶102 This case is part of a trilogy of decisions in which 
the court has wrestled with the doctrine of "true threats."  In 
State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶29, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___, the court examines true threats in the context of a 
specific threat statute criminalizing "pure speech."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 940.203(2).  The court concludes that a true threat is 
determined using an objective reasonable person standard.  "A 
true threat is a statement that a speaker would reasonably 
                     
36 The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence is for the trier of fact.  In reviewing the 
evidence to challenge a finding of fact, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding.  
Reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence can support a 
finding of fact and, if more than one reasonable inference 
can be drawn from the evidence, the inference which 
supports the finding is the one that must be adopted.  
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d, 493, 504, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) 
(quoting Bautista v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 218, 223, 191 N.W.2d 725 
(1971)).  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
12
foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious 
expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished from 
hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views 
or other similarly protected speech."  Perkins, 2001 WI 46 at 
¶29.  The court explains that it is not necessary that the 
speaker have the ability to carry out the threat and that, in 
evaluating whether a statement is a true threat, the court must 
consider the totality of the circumstances.  Id.  The court then 
lists some of the factors that may be considered in assessing 
both the threat itself and the relevant circumstances. 
¶103 The second case, In the Interest of A.S., 2001 WI 48, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, and this third case attempt to 
apply the new true threat test to delinquency proceedings in 
which the alleged acts of delinquency are alleged violations of 
the disorderly conduct statute, Wis. Stat. § 947.01.  In A.S., 
the juvenile challenged his delinquency petition, arguing that 
the petition sought to punish protected speech and, in any 
event, his speech did not constitute a violation of the 
disorderly conduct statute.  Here, Douglas challenged the 
constitutionality of the court's determination at trial that the 
product 
of 
his 
"creative 
writing" 
constituted 
disorderly 
conduct.  The opinions in this case and A.S. are intended not 
only to flesh out the meaning of "true threats" but also to 
clarify when a true threat amounts to disorderly conduct under 
the statute. 
¶104 The court's serious objective in this case does not 
yield a clear analysis.  The majority opinion correctly 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
13
dispatches the argument that speech cannot be prosecuted as 
disorderly conduct.  Majority op. at ¶25.  It eloquently 
concludes that "we cannot imagine how a student threatening a 
teacher [in the classroom] could not be deemed conduct that 
tends to menace, disrupt, or destroy public order."  Id. at ¶28. 
But then it abandons this good work in an unpersuasive 
application of the law.   
¶105 The majority faults the circuit judge for using the 
phrase 
"direct 
threat" 
several 
times, 
rather 
than 
the 
judicially-approved label of "true threat":  "Assuming arguendo 
that the circuit court correctly found that Douglas's story is a 
'threat' to Mrs. C," the majority writes, "this finding did not 
warrant the court to make the logical jump to conclude that 
Douglas's 
story 
necessarily 
constitutes 
a 
'true 
threat,' 
unprotected by the First Amendment."  Majority op. at ¶30.   
¶106 In 
determining 
that 
Douglas's 
writing 
did 
not 
constitute a true threat, the majority must be saying that 
Douglas's story is not "a statement that a [writer] would 
reasonably foresee that a [reader] would reasonably interpret as 
a serious 
expression of 
a 
purpose 
to inflict 
harm, as 
distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions 
of political views or other similarly protected speech." 
Unfortunately, the majority fails to explain with laser-like 
analysis how the circuit court went astray. 
¶107 According to this court's new test, the circuit court 
was expected to apply an objective reasonable person standard.  
It was also expected to put Douglas's story in the proper 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
14
context and to consider the totality of the circumstances. 
Hence, looking backward, the question the circuit court faced 
was whether a speaker or writer in Douglas's position (a 13-
year-old boy, already an adjudicated delinquent, who had clashed 
with his teacher about discipline matters in the past and who 
was angry because his teacher had sent him out into the hall 
during an English class) would reasonably foresee that a 
listener or reader in the teacher's position (a new teacher, 
beginning her first full year of teaching in a public school, in 
a national environment of apprehension about school violence, 
who is handed a crude piece of fiction that insults teachers, 
names and criticizes her thinly-veiled fictional equivalent, 
draws a parallel to a disciplinary incident in which the teacher 
was involved moments before, and then implies that the student 
will cut off her head with a machete because he is angry at her 
discipline) would reasonably interpret the writing as a serious 
expression of a purpose to inflict harm (actual injury, 
intimidation, 
or 
fear 
of 
injury, 
thereby 
disrupting 
her 
emotional 
tranquility 
and 
her 
ability 
to 
teach 
in 
the 
classroom), as opposed to hyperbole and exaggeration or jest 
that would make a person smile at the student's imagination and 
cleverness. 
¶108 It is quite wrong for this court to sift through the 
factual circumstances, minimizing the factors that are present 
and emphasizing factors that are not there.  Douglas's story 
named "Mrs. C."  The circuit court found that Mrs. C. and Mrs. 
[C.] were one in the same.  Thus, the majority has no business 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
15
referring to Mrs. [C.] as "the alleged victim of the threat."  
Majority op. at ¶37.  Douglas handed the story directly to Mrs. 
[C.] and Mrs. [C.] became frightened.  The direct communication 
is noteworthy.  These facts are far more important than the fact 
that Douglas had apparently not threatened Mrs. [C.] in the 
past.   
¶109 The majority argues that "there is no evidence 
that . . . Mrs. C believed Douglas had a propensity to engage in 
violence."  Majority op. at ¶37.  There is a very good chance, 
however, that Mrs. [C.]——at least after she talked with [the 
vice principal]——knew something of Douglas's troubles with the 
law, or that she had her own reasons for being afraid of him.  
These are reasonable inferences.  The majority also errs in 
speculating that "Douglas could have expected another student to 
end his grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined event."  
Majority op. at ¶39.  Attributing this high-minded motivation to 
Douglas is inconsistent with the circuit court's findings.  
Speculation of this sort is at odds with an appellate court's 
traditional methodology in reviewing a circuit court's findings 
of fact.  We have repeatedly said that "we will not reverse the 
circuit court's findings of fact, that is, the underlying 
findings of what happened, unless they are clearly erroneous."  
State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985); 
see also State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 266, 558 N.W.2d 379 
(1997). 
¶110 The 
essence 
of 
the 
majority's 
opinion 
is 
that 
Douglas's story should be given First Amendment protection 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
16
because it was a piece of fiction "in the context of a creative 
writing class."  Majority op. at ¶39.  The majority complains 
that the story does not contain language in which Douglas 
personally addresses a threat to Mrs. [C.].37  Rather, it is 
written in the third person.  Of course, in third-person 
fiction, the writer is not an actor; the writer stands apart 
manipulating the characters such as "Dick" and "Mrs. C." to do 
his bidding.  The writer is thus capable of conveying a threat 
through the words and actions of his characters.  Commentators 
have noted the importance of recognizing veiled threats in 
preventing 
school 
violence. 
 
See 
Kelly 
A. 
Zinna, 
After 
Columbine: 
A 
Schoolplace 
Violence 
Prevention 
Manual 
56-57 
(1999); John Nicoletti et al., Violence Goes to School: Lessons 
Learned from Columbine 42-44 (1999). 
¶111 The majority is also impressed by Douglas's hyperbole 
(beheading by machete instead of homicide by handgun) and his 
jest (Mrs. C. "stood for crab").  Majority op. at ¶39.38  But the 
majority undermines its position by acknowledging that the 
result might have been different had Douglas penned the same 
story in a math class.  It forgets that an English class is not 
                     
37 Once again, the story was handed directly to Mrs. [C.].  
38 There is a line between sarcasm and jest.  They are not 
equivalent 
and 
may 
derive 
from 
substantially 
different 
motivations.  In my view, it would not be clearly erroneous for 
a fact finder to conclude that a story about a student beheading 
a teacher with a machete as retribution for the teacher's 
discipline of the student was something other than "playful," 
"amusing," "frolicsome," or "witty," words normally associated 
with "jest."  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
17
the only place in school where a student can engage in creative 
writing, for example, in study hall, the library, or the 
cafeteria. 
¶112 At first blush, Douglas's use of a machete rather than 
a gun appears to take his story into pure fiction.  A machete 
attack is seemingly implausible.  Inherent in the majority's 
analysis is the notion that the depiction of a machete in the 
story as opposed to a firearm is too "creative" to constitute a 
true threat.  Unfortunately, the reality is that while this case 
was pending, a man attacked and injured nine people at a 
Winterstown, Pennsylvania school with a machete.39  In November 
1996, a 15-year-old student at Vancouver Technical Secondary 
School in British Columbia attacked a 14-year-old with a 
machete.  The victim was slashed three times across the back and 
had nine tendons in his wrists severed as he tried to protect 
himself.40  These are only two of a number of relatively recent 
machete incidents, several of which involved students.41  The 
                     
39 Peter Jackson, Machete Attack at School Injures 3 Adults, 
6 Children, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 3, 2001, at A1.  
40 See Jim Hutchison, Is Your Child Safe at School? at 
http://www.readersdigest.ca/mag/1997/09/think_01.html 
(last 
visited Apr. 26, 2001). 
41 Numerous incidents in recent years in this country have 
involved machetes.  See Charles A. Radin, Anti-Gang Group Faces 
Growing Problems, B. Globe, June 1, 1998, at C12 (youth severely 
injured in machete attack by gang members); Beth Daley, Mass. 
Schools Pressed to Oust Unruly Students, B. Globe, Jan. 6, 2000, 
at A1 (describing arrest of high school junior for accumulating 
weapons, including machete); Jennifer Ackerman-Haywood & Lisa 
Johnson, Teen Suspended for Machete in Car, Grand Rapids Press, 
Apr. 12, 2000, at B2 (high school student suspended from school 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
18
                                                                  
for carrying a machete in the trunk of his car); Denise Zoldan, 
Weapons: Violence in Collier County's Schools, Naples Daily News, 
July 25, 1999, http://www.naplesnews.com/today/local/d232005a.htm 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2001) (describing how a fifth-grade 
student threatened a third-grade student with a machete "because 
the third-grader called him fat"); Maria Elena Fernandez, School 
Violence: 'We're Tired of Feeling Unsafe'; D.C. Teens, Others  
Question Security, Wash. Post, May 5, 1998, at B1 (listing 
weapons confiscated in Washington, D.C. schools, including a 
machete); Peter Larsen, Columbine High Shooting Conjures Memories 
of Close Call in O.C. School, Orange County Reg., Apr. 26, 1999, 
at A14 (detailing foiled plot by three students to take their 
shop class hostage with a machete and two pistols); Ellen 
O'Brien, 'A Sense of Innocence was Lost' Jonesboro Buries 
Shooting Victims and Tries to Heal, B. Globe, Mar. 28, 1998, at 
A1 (noting that boys who killed five people at Jonesboro in 1998 
stockpiled weapons in a stolen van, including machetes); Jules 
Crittenden & Joe Chojnacki, Columbine's Legacy Lingers; Schools 
Still Struggle to be Vigilant, B. Herald, Feb. 6, 2000, at 22 
(teen reported by fellow students for "love" of weapons, 
including machete with which he hit them); Diane Smith, Irving 
Mother and Officials Grapple with Gang Shooting, Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, Sept. 7, 1997, at 1 (listing incidents of gang violence 
including a machete attack in which "a man's arms and back were 
severely hacked"); Tom Topousis, Schools Chief Calls for War on 
Violence, Wants Statewide Campaign Against Escalating Assaults, 
The Record (Northern New Jersey), Apr. 13, 1994, at A1 (citing 
teacher saying "she saw a student attacked repeatedly with a 
machete"). 
 
See also Daryl Nerl, Liberty High Student is 6th Charged 
with Violence Threats, Allentown Morning Call, June 6, 1998, at 
B6 (student threatens teacher, saying: "You know what's in my 
head, a machete to slice you up with.").  According to the news 
account, the student was charged by authorities with making a 
threat to the teacher.  Id. 
 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
19
machete appears to be a particularly lurid weapon for inflicting 
injury.42  In short, there is no reason to dismiss the 
seriousness of a threat merely because it involves use of a 
machete. 
¶113 In February 2000, a large group of people attended a 
meeting about school safety in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma, where four 
students had been shot in a violent incident two months earlier. 
A teenage student was called upon to demonstrate the problem of 
weapons at school.  According to the newspaper report: 
 
The teen-ager standing on stage . . . in short 
sleeves and jeans looked like he had nothing to hide--
until he pulled a knife from his pocket. 
 
And then came a machete.  And another.  He drew a 
handgun from a front pocket, and three more from his 
waistband.  He reached down his baggy pants leg and up 
came a rifle. 
 
By the time Chris Dorn's pockets were empty, an 
arsenal lay before the high school sophomore.  And the 
audience of school, police and emergency officials had 
a better idea of what they face in their efforts to 
keep schools safe. 
Kelly Kurt, Lesson in School Safety: Teen Produces Arsenal from 
Clothing, The Daily Oklahoman, Feb. 23, 2000, at 8D.  This news 
                     
42 In an article discussing the prevalence of weapons among 
today's youth, the author quoted numerous teens describing their 
personal choice in weapons.  One teen said: "When I was growing 
up I used my fists.  I had my first gun at nine or ten.  My 
favorite was a .45——compact and with a kick that's unheard of.  
Then I packed machetes——three foot long.  You haven't seen fear 
until you've pulled a machete on someone."  Sandy Close, Weapons 
of Choice on the Street——The Mouth, God, the Machete, July 11, 
1996, 
at 
www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/2.14/960711-weapons. 
html (last visited October 13, 2000, but article no longer 
accessible).  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
20
story dispels the notion that a student could not "conceal" a 
machete. 
¶114 In The School Shooter, the National Center for the 
Analysis of Violent Crime discusses "leakage."  "Leakage" 
occurs, according to the report, "when a student intentionally 
or 
unintentionally 
reveals 
clues 
to 
feelings, 
thoughts, 
fantasies, attitudes, or intentions that may signal an impending 
violent act."  The School Shooter, supra, at 16.   
 
These clues can take the form of subtle threats, 
boasts, innuendoes, predictions, or ultimatums.  They 
may be spoken or conveyed in stories, diary entries, 
essays, poems, letters, songs, drawings, doodles, 
tattoos, or videos. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
An example of leakage . . . could be recurrent 
themes of destruction or violence appearing in a 
student's writing or artwork.  The themes may involve 
hatred, prejudice, death, dismemberment, mutilation of 
self 
or 
others, 
bleeding, 
use 
of 
excessively 
destructive weapons, homicide, or suicide.  Many 
adolescents are fascinated with violence and the 
macabre, and writings and drawings on these themes can 
be a reflection of a harmless but rich and creative 
fantasy life. 
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).43 
¶115 Macabre writings may reflect a harmless fantasy life. 
 Then again, they may be a true threat.  The facts are best 
determined by fact-finders on the scene, not appellate judges. 
                     
43 In Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. 2001), 
the 
Supreme 
Judicial 
Court 
of 
Massachusetts 
affirmed 
a 
determination of delinquency based upon a drawing that depicts a 
student pointing a gun at his teacher. 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
21
FUTURE UNCERTAINTY 
¶116 The majority concludes that Douglas's story, although 
"offensive and distasteful, unquestionably is protected by the 
First Amendment."  Majority op. at ¶41.  Having made this 
determination, the majority should provide reasonable guidance 
to school officials, law enforcement authorities, and the courts 
about how to deal with future threats in a school setting.  For 
instance, if Douglas had written essentially the same story, 
including passages regarded as "jokes," but had "Dick" use a 
concealed Colt .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun to terminate 
Mrs. [C.], would the court have reached the same result?  
Suppose Douglas's story had unmistakably alluded to one or more 
of his eighth-grade classmates, making them Dick's target, in 
place of his teacher.  Would the court have reached the same 
result?  What makes the threat in A.S. a "true threat" as 
opposed to the threat here? 
¶117 To reassure school authorities, the majority announces 
an important principle of constitutional law.  It writes that 
the First Amendment prohibits law enforcement officials from 
prosecuting protected speech but does not prohibit school 
officials from disciplining the same protected speech.  Majority 
op. at ¶42.44   
¶118 The proposition that protected speech may lose its 
protection when uttered in a different context of time or place 
                     
44 The scope of discipline here must contemplate suspension 
and expulsion from school.  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
22
is well understood.  The proposition that speech uttered in the 
exact same context——same speaker, same words, same time, same 
place——is fully protected by the First Amendment against some 
state action but not against other state action, is less 
established. 
 
To 
give 
speech 
a 
dual 
character 
(protected/unprotected) depending upon who is seeking to punish 
it or how severe the punishment may be, will eliminate certainty 
in the law and create a chilling effect upon both speech and 
discipline. 
¶119 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Supreme Court stated that: 
"First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to 
teachers and students.  It can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."  Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 506.  At the same time, the Court emphasized "the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of 
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the school."  
Id. at 507.   
¶120 The Court distinguished the students' use of black 
armbands in Tinker——"direct, primary First Amendment rights akin 
to 'pure speech'"——from "aggressive, disruptive action."  Id. at 
508.  The Court then stated: 
 
A student's rights . . . do not embrace merely the 
classroom hours.  When he is in the cafeteria, or on 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
23
the playing field, or on the campus during the 
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on 
controversial subjects . . . if he does so without 
"materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the 
requirements 
of 
appropriate 
discipline 
in 
the 
operation of the school" and without colliding with 
the rights of others.  But conduct by the student, in 
class or out of it, which for any reason——whether it 
stems 
from 
time, 
place, 
or 
type 
of 
behavior——
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of 
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee 
of freedom of speech. 
Id. at 512-13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 
¶121 Since 1969, the Court appears to have stepped back 
somewhat from the position set out in Tinker.  In Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988), the 
Court said that the First Amendment rights of students in public 
schools "'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings.'"  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
They must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment."  Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
 The Court said bluntly: "A school need not tolerate student 
speech 
that 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
its 
'basic 
educational 
mission,' even though the government could not censor similar 
speech outside the school."  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 
(citation omitted). 
 
¶122 These Supreme Court decisions appear to draw a 
distinction between First Amendment rights in public schools and 
First Amendment rights elsewhere, implying that the First 
Amendment treats speech in public schools different from speech 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
24
outside public schools because of the special educational 
environment in public schools.   
 
¶123 The majority opinion asserts that some speech in 
public schools is protected from criminal prosecution but may be 
suppressed by rules and punished through internal school 
discipline.  When?  Are school officials expected to know the 
answer by instinct?  The majority's untested thesis deserves 
authority and additional discussion. 
AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS 
¶124 "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience."45  With these words, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
summed up his view that the law is not permanent, fixed, and 
unchangeable; rather, it evolves over time to reflect practices 
and events from the present and past.  In an earlier article, 
Holmes wrote that, "The secret root from which the law draws all 
the juices of life," is in fact "considerations of what is 
expedient for the community."46   
¶125 Holmes appears to have applied his dynamic legal 
philosophy in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), a 
case in which the Court sustained the conviction of two 
defendants for violations of the Espionage Act, in part for 
circulating 
printed 
leaflets 
urging 
young 
men 
to 
resist 
conscription.  Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court: 
                     
45 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881) 
(based upon 1880 Lowell Lectures).  
46 Gary J. Aichele, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Soldier, 
Scholar, Judge 111 (1989).  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
25
 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular 
would have been within their constitutional rights.  
But the character of every act depends upon the 
circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect 
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic. . . . The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances 
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present 
danger 
that 
they 
will 
bring 
about 
the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.  It is a question of proximity and degree.  
When a nation is at war many things that might be said 
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort 
that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as 
protected by any constitutional right. 
Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 
¶126 In conceiving his memorable aphorism of the man 
falsely shouting "fire" in a theater, Holmes was writing in the 
shadow of sensational events.  In December 1876, 295 people 
perished in a fire at a Brooklyn theater.  In December 1881, 850 
people died in a fire at a theater in Vienna.  In December 1903, 
602 people died at the Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago.  In 
January 1908, 170 people were killed in a fire at the Rhoads 
Theater in Boyertown, Pennsylvania.47  Three years before the 
Schenck decision, the Tremont Theatre in Boston, Holmes's 
hometown, was burned.48  A year before the Schenck decision, fire 
                     
47 See 
Fires: 
 
1835-1949 
at 
http://www.swishweb.com/ 
Disasters/Fires/disaster01f.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2001).  
48 Tremont Theatre Burned: Old Boston Playhouse and "Daddy 
Long-Legs" Suffer $75,000 Loss, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1916, at 
12. 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
26
destroyed Dane Hall at Harvard University, where Holmes went to 
school.49  Fires made up several of the gravest catastrophes in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  They were 
regarded with real fear.  Moreover, news reports in 1917 and 
1918 suggested that German terrorists and sympathizers were the 
source of an outbreak of serious fires in the United States 
after this country entered the war.50  Holmes's theater aphorism, 
then, appears to be an accurate reflection of contemporary 
concerns. 
¶127 Today our country is consumed by the outbreak of 
violence in public schools.  Threats of violence in schools must 
be taken seriously.51  Almost inevitably these threats produce 
fear among students and teachers.  They inflict harm and impair 
                     
49 Students Risk Lives, Save Shells at Fire, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 4, 1918, at 6. 
50 6 The N.Y. Times Index No. 3, at 137 (1918); 6 The N.Y. 
Times Index No. 2, at 143 (1918); 6 The N.Y. Times Index No. 1, 
at 156-57 (1918); 5 The N.Y. Times Index No. 4, at 139-41 
(1917); 5 The N.Y. Times Index No. 3, at 131 (1917); 5 The N.Y. 
Times Index No. 2, at 152 (1917); 5 The N.Y. Times Index No. 1, 
at 161-62 (1917).  
51 "In light of the violence prevalent in schools today, 
school officials are justified in taking very seriously student 
threats against faculty and students."  Lovell v. Poway Unified 
Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
27
the atmosphere for learning.  Sometimes they create panic.52  
"Panic" is the word Justice Holmes used in Schenck.  "Panic" is 
the reaction Mrs. [C.] described when she received Douglas's 
story.  The potential for panic suggests an alternative analysis 
that the parties and the courts in this case have not explored. 
¶128 Threats of violence against students, teachers, or 
administrators in schools "are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly 
outweighed 
by 
the 
social 
interest 
in 
order 
and 
morality."  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
                     
52 This court has previously recognized the epidemic of 
school violence and the panic that it can create in school 
officials, teachers, and students.  See In the Interest of Isiah 
B., 176 Wis. 2d 639, 650-51, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993) ("Our holding 
is an example of adaptation of constitutional principles to a 
modern crisis.  As noted by the Supreme Court in [New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, (1985)], the presence of dangerous weapons 
in schools is a recent and extremely serious problem.  On 
February 12, 1993, a Milwaukee Sentinel article indicated that 
37% of male, Wisconsin high school students carry weapons.  The 
article also indicated that '35% of the weapons . . . carried 
were guns, 49% knives or razors, [and] 16% clubs, bats[,] . . . 
pipes or other weapons.'"); id. at 651 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting) ("Safety in the schools is a matter of 
utmost concern and growing urgency.  The facts of this case 
illustrate the very real dangers to which modern-day students are 
exposed and the serious obstacles school officials confront in 
keeping school environments safe and conducive to learning."); 
id. at 662 (Bablitch, J., concurring) ("The problems in our 
public schools have turned deadly, and students, teachers and 
administrators have real and justifiable fears concerning their 
schools.  'School children are inflicting violent harms upon each 
other at an alarming rate.'") (citations omitted).  Justice 
Bablitch's concurrence went on to cite numerous articles for the 
proposition that violence in schools is a major problem.  Id. at 
663 (Bablitch, J., concurring).  
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
28
(1942).  They "materially disrupt classwork," Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 513, and therefore are not "immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech."  Id. 
¶129 I am influenced in these views by society's reaction 
to terrorism and air piracy.  No person should expect to benefit 
from a "true threat" analysis if he or she jokes at an airport 
about hijacking an airplane or carrying bombs or weapons onto a 
plane.  See United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th 
Cir. 1975), in which the court said: "The legislative history 
[of 49 U.S.C., Sec. 1472(m)(1)] makes clear that Congress was 
concerned with the prankster as well as with the individual 
acting out of malice, and has decreed that the conveyance of 
such false information is no joking matter."   
¶130 Intentional bomb scares also fall outside protected 
speech.  As the Supreme Court of Louisiana said in State of 
Louisiana, In the Interest of RT.:  
 
Words which by their very utterance may cause alarm, 
public disruption, or constitute a signal to prompt 
unlawful action fall within the principle of the false 
cry 
of 
"fire" 
in 
a 
crowded 
theater 
and 
are 
characterized 
as 
verbal 
acts 
unprotected 
by 
constitutional prohibitions against restraint of free 
speech. . . . We have no trouble concluding that the 
state has a legitimate interest in criminalizing 
apparently 
serious, 
albeit 
false, 
bomb 
threats, 
notwithstanding that the crime is committed through 
the medium of speech.  The First Amendment does not 
protect criminal activity, even when carried out with 
words. 
In the Interest of RT., ___ So.2d ___, 2001 WL 170927 at 3 n.5 
(La. 2001) (citation omitted). 
99-1767-FT.dtp 
 
29
 
¶131 Because of the epidemic of violence in public schools, 
threats against students, teachers, and administrators in a 
school 
setting 
should 
not 
be 
afforded 
First 
Amendment 
protection.  Based upon a "falsely shouting fire in a theatre" 
or "panic" analysis, school threats are incendiary per se.  
Whether these threats also violate some criminal statute depends 
upon the evidence in each situation. 
CONCLUSION 
¶132 Having carefully reviewed the facts and record in this 
case, I am persuaded that the circuit court's determination of 
delinquency should be affirmed.  The two elements of disorderly 
conduct were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because the 
majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.