Title: Raben v. Dittenber
Citation: 230 Neb. 822, 434 N.W.2d 11
Docket Number: 257
State: Nebraska
Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 1989

434 N.W.2d 11 (1989) 230 Neb. 822 Pete RABEN, Appellant, v. Herman E. DITTENBER, Appellee. No. 87-257. Supreme Court of Nebraska. January 13, 1989. *12 Michael J. Javoronok, of Holtorf, Kovarik, Nuttleman, Ellison, Mathis &amp; Javoronok, P.C., Gering, and R.M. Van Steenberg, of Van Steenberg, Brower, Chaloupka, Mullin &amp; Holyoke, P.C., Scottsbluff, for appellant. Clark G. Nichols, of Winner, Nichols, Douglas, Kelly &amp; Arfmann, P.C., Scottsbluff, for appellee. BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, and SHANAHAN, JJ., and JAMES MURPHY, District Judge. WHITE, Justice. This appeal arises from a civil action in the district court for Scotts Bluff County for damages for property damage and personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff-appellant in a motor vehicle accident. On October 29, 1984, at approximately 5 p.m., the defendant, Herman E. Dittenber, was driving his Mercury Grand Marquis automobile south on Nebraska Highway 29 in Sioux County from Harrison toward Mitchell. His wife, Marcella, was in the car seat beside him and her mother, Margaret Sleager, was in the back seat. The plaintiff, Pete Raben, driving a White Freightliner cab-over-engine pulling a potbellied stock trailer filled with cattle, was also traveling south on Highway 29, some distance *13 behind the defendant's car. Charles Quay was following directly behind the plaintiff in a similar truck also owned by Raben. About 7 miles north of Mitchell, the defendant slowed to make a left turn at the intersection of Highway 29 and a county road. Approximately 200 yards north of the intersection, the plaintiff pulled his truck into the left-hand lane to pass the defendant's vehicle. The defendant turned left, and the two vehicles collided. In February and March of 1987, the case was tried before a jury. At the close of all the evidence, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, stating that "reasonable minds could not differ in that the negligence of the plaintiff was, if not the sole cause of this accident, was far and away a proximate cause, and that that negligence was the cause of the accident." This appeal followed. Plaintiff assigns three errors, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in directing a verdict for the defendant at the close of all the evidence; (2) in limiting the plaintiff's evidence concerning the condition of the intersection; and (3) in refusing to excuse passing at an intersection, when the intersection was not marked and the roadway was marked with a dotted line indicating that passing was permitted. (Citations omitted.) Mantz v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 228 Neb. 447, 450-51, 422 N.W.2d 797, 801 (1988). The evidence adduced at trial shows that the plaintiff was in violation of Neb. Rev.Stat. § 39-625(1)(b) (Reissue 1988) when he attempted to pass the defendant within 100 feet of the intersection at the scene of the accident. Section 39-625(1) states that "[n]o driver shall overtake and pass another vehicle or drive to the left of the center of the roadway whenever: ... (b) He approaches within one hundred feet of or traverses any intersection or railroad grade crossing." Clark Bilt, Inc. v. Wells Dairy Co., 200 Neb. 20, 24, 261 N.W.2d 772, 775 (1978). In Hegarty v. Campbell Soup Co., 214 Neb. 716, 335 N.W.2d 758 (1983), the trial court initially denied the admission into evidence of a safety ordinance which defendant contended the plaintiff had violated and was relevant on the issue of contributory negligence. Later, the trial court determined that the ordinance was relevant and sustained the defendants' motion for a new trial on the ground that the court had erred in failing to admit the ordinance. This court, finding that the negligence of the defendant's driver was the proximate cause of the accident, held that the failure to admit or instruct upon the ordinance was harmless error. In so holding, we stated: "Failure to comply with the directives of the ordinance could only be evidence of contributory negligence to be considered by the jury in connection with other evidence bearing upon the issue. A failure to comply with the ordinance would not constitute contributory negligence per se." Hegarty, supra at 721, 335 N.W.2d at 762, citing Clark Bilt, Inc. v. Wells Dairy Co., supra. *14 Piper v. Hill, 185 Neb. 568, 177 N.W.2d 509 (1970), involved the issue of whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence when he violated Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-757 (Reissue 1968) when he left his vehicle on the improved or maintained travel portion of the highway. We held that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence by violating the statute. This court observed: Piper v. Hill, supra at 571-72, 177 N.W.2d at 512. As the above principles of law enumerate, violations of safety regulations such as § 39-625(1)(b), standing alone, are not sufficient to sustain a directed verdict. The violation is mere evidence of negligence, and the weight of that evidence is for consideration by the trier of fact. Therefore, is there sufficient evidence as a matter of law showing that plaintiff's negligence was more than slight in comparison with the defendant's negligence and, as such, the proximate cause of the accident? See, Lynn v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 225 Neb. 121, 403 N.W.2d 335 (1987); Bonnes v. Olson, 197 Neb. 309, 248 N.W.2d 756 (1976). Giving the plaintiff the benefit of every inference, and resolving every controverted fact in his favor, the record shows the following. Though the trial court restricted evidence on the condition of the intersection, an issue which will be addressed below, there is evidence which shows that the plaintiff was unaware of the fact he was attempting to pass at an intersection. Trooper George Siders of the Nebraska State Patrol, the officer who investigated the accident, testified on behalf of the plaintiff that this was the first intersection in 16 miles to travelers coming from the north and that the centerline continued to be marked by a dotted line in the middle of the road, indicating freedom to pass as long as the road was clear ahead. He further stated that there were no signs to indicate the existence of an intersection in the area. Plaintiff also argues that because the markings on the pavement indicated freedom to pass while the statute on passing at an intersection prohibited it, there is a conflict in the law and his action should therefore be excused. We note that the plaintiff has not introduced evidence of a regulation explaining the significance of lane markings, nor is there statutory authority for specific lane markings. It is a well-settled rule in Nebraska that state courts can take judicial notice of general rules and regulations established and published by federal agencies under authority of law. Bohy v. Abbott, 154 Neb. 139, 47 N.W.2d 95 (1951); Keyser v. Allen, 149 Neb. 449, 31 N.W.2d 309 (1948); Powell v. Anderson, 147 Neb. 872, 25 N.W.2d 401 (1946). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 84-906.05 (Reissue 1987) states: That section provides support for holding that this court will take judicial notice of general rules and regulations established and published by Nebraska state agencies under authority of law. Pursuant to Neb. Rev.Stat. § 39-698 (Reissue 1988), the Nebraska Department of Roads appears to have adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (1978), published by the *15 U.S. Department of Transportation. 411 Neb.Admin.Code § 001.01 (1986). The law governing lane markings and defining the significance of the markings is set forth in the manual. The Nebraska Department of Roads has failed to file a copy of the manual with the Secretary of State as required by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 84-902 (Reissue 1987), which provides in pertinent part, "Each agency shall file in the office of the Secretary of State a certified copy of the rules and regulations in force and effect in such agency." Not only was the trial court not supplied with a certified copy of an original regulation on file with the Secretary of State, indeed, there appear to be no regulations on file for the secretary to certify. Although this court cannot say as a matter of law that there was a conflict between a statute and an agency regulation because of the defect in the record, common sense dictates that the issue of the markings at the intersection could have affected the plaintiff's awareness of whether he was approaching an intersection, and is a factor for consideration by the jury in determining the weight of the plaintiff's negligence. The record also indicates there is considerable dispute on whether the defendant had operated his left turn indicator prior to making the left turn. The plaintiff contends that the defendant never turned on his left turn signal. On direct examination, he testified as follows: On cross-examination: In corroboration, Quay testified for the plaintiff that the defendant had failed to signal: On cross-examination: Both Marcella Dittenber and Margaret Sleager, passengers in the defendant's car, said "no" when asked if they recalled whether or not the defendant had any turn signals on. In rebuttal, the defendant testified that he put on his signal 200 yards prior to the intersection and that he knew it was on because it was his habit to turn it on. Further, the defendant produced an expert who had examined the left and right rear taillights on the defendant's car. Based on his observation of the filaments in the bulbs, the witness concluded that the defendant's left turn indicator was on at the time of the impact. However, on cross-examination, defendant's expert admitted that the deformities in the filaments, which were the bases for his conclusion that the left turn indicator was on, could have been created by residual heat from the brake lights left over after the bulb had been turned off, thereby leading to the inference that the left-hand turn signal had not been operating at the time of the impact. There was also evidence in the record showing the defendant's negligence. Trooper Siders testified as to an admission made by the defendant at the time of the accident: Yet, the defendant stated on cross-examination that he never saw the trucks. Also, despite the fact that his car was equipped with three mirrors, defendant admitted that he only looked in the center rearview mirror and did not look in either the left or right rearview mirror or over his left shoulder to see if the way was clear. The record indicates too many areas of factual conflict to say as a matter of law that the plaintiff's negligence was more than slight in comparison with the defendant's negligence or that the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. With regard to plaintiff's second and third assignments of error, they relate to a motion heard by the court on February 27, 1987, outside of the presence of the jury. The plaintiff made an offer of proof: (Emphasis supplied.) The court rejected the offer of proof and ruled that it would limit the argument and restrict the evidence *17 on the issue of "whether passing at an intersection should be evidence of negligence when the intersection is not marked and a dotted line indicates passing is permitted." We agree with plaintiff's characterization of the issue. As mentioned above, violation of § 39-625 is evidence of negligence, but that still leaves unanswered the question of how much negligence should be attributed to that violation. This question goes directly to the determination of what weight the evidence should receive. "In our judicial system, it is entirely within the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and resolve the resulting conflicts." Brewer v. Case, 192 Neb. 538, 543, 222 N.W.2d 823, 827 (1974). Clearly, from an evidentiary standpoint not all violations of a statute are negligent to the same degree. For example, suppose the plaintiff had attempted to pass the defendant at an intersection which had been preceded by a sign marking a no-passing zone or dangerous intersection, with a solid yellow line painted on the middle of the road and a flashing caution light. It is obvious that one who passed at the intersection under these conditions would be more negligent than the plaintiff in the case at bar. When the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant after allowing the admission into evidence of the violation of the statute and, at the same time, restricting the admission of evidence concerning the circumstances relating to that violation, it was tantamount to saying that the plaintiff was negligent per se or, in other words, that the violation of a statute, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a directed verdict. This is in direct contradiction with the authorities cited above and is not the law in Nebraska. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision sustaining defendant's motion for a directed verdict and overrule the objection on the offer of proof. This cause is to be remanded for retrial, and the court will allow argument and evidence on the condition of the intersection. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.