Title: State v. Kimball
Citation: 135 S.E.2d 568, 261 N.C. 582
Docket Number: 217
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 1964

135 S.E.2d 568 (1964) 261 N.C. 582 STATE v. William D. KIMBALL. No. 217. Supreme Court of North Carolina. April 8, 1964. *569 T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen., and Richard T. Sanders, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. Howard B. Arbuckle, Jr., Charlotte, for defendant appellant. SHARP, Justice. G.S. § 148-45(a) makes it unlawful for any prisoner serving a sentence in the State prison system to escape or attempt to escape, and provides varying penalties for misdemeanants and felons. By Chapter 681 *570 of the Session Laws of 1963, the legislature added subsection (b) as follows: This section, while providing the same penalties listed in subsection (a) creates a new and distinct offense which can only be committed by a work-release prisoner or a convicted defendant temporarily on parole. The indictment in this case follows the language of subsection (a), but the evidence discloses a violation of subsection (b). However, the defendant did not move for the nonsuit to which he was entitled for this fatal variance. State v. Hicks, 233 N. C. 31, 62 S.E.2d 497. Upon the argument here, defendant moved in arrest of judgment for that he had been indicted under G. S. § 148-45(a) but tried under G.S. § 148-45(b). A motion in arrest of judgment must be based on defects appearing on the face of the record proper. It may not be used after verdict as a substitute for a motion for nonsuit to dismiss the action because of a variance between the indictment and proof or for want of sufficient evidence to support the verdict. State v. Reel, 254 N.C. 778, 119 S.E.2d 876; State v. McKnight, 196 N.C. 259, 145 S.E. 281. Therefore, the motion in arrest of judgment is overruled. The defendant assigns as error the following portion of his Honor's charge: By voluntarily going to Gastonia without permission defendant was, on his own statement, guilty of a violation of G.S. § 148-45(b). However, he was indicted for a breach of G.S. § 148-45(a). Therefore, his Honor committed error by peremptorily instructing the jury to find defendant guilty if it found the facts to be as all the evidence tended to show. The evidence, if true, did not establish his guilt as charged. Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty. Aside from the fundamental error in the quoted instruction, its form impels the following observation: Where the uncontradicted evidence, if true, establishes a defendant's guilt as a matter of law, the court may instruct the jury to return a verdict of guilty if it finds such evidence to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 195 N.C. 657, 143 S.E. 185. In such instance the approved form of instruction is that it would be the jury's duty to return a verdict of guilty as charged if the State has satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that all the evidence in the case is true (or that the facts in the case are as all the evidence tends to show); otherwise, it would be its duty to return a verdict of not guilty. State v. Baker, 229 N.C. 73, 48 S.E.2d 61; State v. Taylor, 236 N.C. 130, 71 S.E.2d 924; Cf. State v. Gibson, 245 N.C. 71, 95 S.E.2d 125; State v. Hayden, 224 N.C. 779, 32 S.E.2d 333. The credibility of the evidence is always for the jury and the judge may never declare that all the evidence *571 tends to show any fact beyond a reasonable doubt. G.S. § 1-180. For the error in the charge there must be a new trial. However, the solicitor will no doubt desire to take a nol pros in this case and to prosecute defendant for the offense of which the evidence tends to establish his guilt. New trial.