Title: Sch. Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11536
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11536 
 
SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF LEXINGTON  vs.  MARK ZAGAESKI. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.      March 4, 2014. - July 14, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, &  
Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Arbitration, Judicial review, Authority of arbitrator, Award, 
School committee.  Education Reform Act.  Statute, 
Construction. School and School Committee, Arbitration, 
Termination of employment.  Public Employment, Termination. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 27, 2012.  
 
 
Motions to vacate and to affirm an arbitration award were 
heard by Bruce R. Henry, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Geoffrey R. Bok (Colby C. Brunt with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Daniel S. O'Connor (Laura Elkayam with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Stephen J. Finnegan & Michael J. Long, for Massachusetts 
Association of School Commitees, Inc. & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
Ira Fader for Massachusetts Teachers Association, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, the plaintiff, the school 
committee of Lexington (school committee), appealed a decision 
by a Superior Court judge confirming an arbitrator's award 
reinstating a teacher, Mark Zagaeski, after the school district 
superintendent had terminated his employment for conduct 
unbecoming a teacher.  We granted the plaintiff's application 
for direct appellate review.  This case presents an issue left 
unresolved by this court in School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 
435 Mass. 223 (2001).  We must determine the scope of authority 
granted to an arbitrator by G. L. c. 71, § 42 (teacher dismissal 
statute), to reinstate a teacher who was dismissed for conduct 
that the arbitrator found constituted, at least nominally, a 
valid basis for dismissal.1   
 
We conclude that in light of the stated purposes of the 
Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 (Reform Act or Act), 
of which the teacher dismissal statute is a part, the arbitrator 
exceeded the scope of his authority by awarding reinstatement of 
Zagaeski on the basis of the "best interests of the pupils" in 
 
1 General Laws c. 71, § 42 (teacher dismissal statute), 
provides in part that a teacher who has served in a school 
district for at least three consecutive school years may not be 
dismissed except for "inefficiency, incompetency, incapacity, 
conduct unbecoming a teacher, insubordination or failure on the 
part of the teacher to satisfy teacher performance standards 
developed pursuant to [G. L. c. 71, § 38,] or other just cause." 
 
                     
3 
 
the district, despite having found that the school district 
carried its burden to show facts amounting to conduct unbecoming 
a teacher.  See G. L. c. 69, § 1, as appearing in St. 1993, 
c. 71, § 27; G. L. c. 71, § 42.  We reverse the decision of the 
Superior Court judge and vacate the arbitration award.2 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.3  Zagaeski's dismissal from his 
position at the Lexington public schools arose from a series of 
incidents that took place prior to the spring of 2011.4  By that 
time, Zagaeski had been employed by the Lexington school 
district (school district) since 2000 as a physics teacher.5  
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by the Massachusetts 
Teachers Association in support of Zagaeski and the amicus brief 
filed by the Massachusetts Association of School Committees, 
Inc., and the Massachusetts Association of School 
Superintendents in support of the Lexington School Committee. 
 
 
3 A reviewing court is bound by the facts found by the 
arbitrator.  School Comm. of Lowell v. Robishaw, 456 Mass. 653, 
660-661 (2010).  Accordingly, we summarize the facts leading up 
to Zagaeski's dismissal based on the facts found in the 
arbitrator's award. 
 
 
4 Zagaeski's dismissal was based on six separate instances 
of conduct that the school district found to constitute conduct 
unbecoming a teacher.  Because the arbitrator concluded that the 
school district had carried its burden to establish that only 
one of these incidents constituted, at least nominally, conduct 
unbecoming a teacher, we address only that incident.  
 
 
5 Zagaeski earned his doctorate in cellular biophysics in 
1981.  Following postdoctoral work, he was employed as a teacher 
for six years at a private school.  He began working at 
Lexington High School in 2000.  He took a leave of absence from 
the fall of 2002 to the fall of 2004 to work in private 
industry.  He returned to Lexington High School in the fall of 
2004 and worked there continuously until his termination in 
June, 2011.  
                     
4 
 
Until 2011, Zagaeski's teaching evaluations had been uniformly 
positive, and he had never been disciplined by the district.  He 
was commended by classroom observers for creating a classroom 
environment in which students felt comfortable asking questions 
and were engaged in the learning process.   
 
At Lexington High School, Zagaeski taught an integrated 
math and physics class for students who tended to be at-risk 
academically and had struggled in math and science classes in 
the past.  Many of these students also faced behavioral issues 
and some had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and 
other learning challenges.  In order to engage this student 
population, Zagaeski developed a teaching style that was less 
hierarchical.  He encouraged collaboration and a more relaxed 
classroom atmosphere.  The arbitrator found that, as a result, 
"the students had a more familiar relationship with Dr. Zagaeski 
than they would have with a teacher following a more traditional 
teaching style" and that "[Zagaeski] was more flexible with 
boundaries than another teacher might have been."  However, 
Zagaeski's nontraditional boundaries eventually caused problems.   
 
In April, 2011, a seventeen year old female student in 
Zagaeski's class was disappointed with the grade she was then 
receiving and asked Zagaeski, in front of her classmates, 
whether there was any way she could "pay . . . for a better 
grade."  A male student in the class asked, "You mean short of 
5 
 
sexual favors?"  Rather than correcting the male student for 
making a comment encouraging the trade of sex for grades, 
Zagaeski chose to engage in the dialogue himself.  "Yes, that is 
the only thing that would be accepted," he stated.  Students in 
the classroom laughed, and Zagaeski continued by saying, "Don't 
be ridiculous" and told the female student that the only way to 
raise her grade would be better work.  He then encouraged her to 
come after school for extra help if she had questions.  
 
Two days later, the female student did go to Zagaeski's 
classroom after school for extra help.  Zagaeski was in his 
classroom assisting a second female student in setting up 
equipment for laboratory work that she would be doing that 
afternoon.  The first female student again asked Zagaeski, 
"[C]an't I just pay you for a better grade?"  Zagaeski 
responded, "Well, no . . . you know that the only thing that I 
would accept is a sexual favor."  The second female student 
exclaimed, "Dr. Z!" and laughed.  However, the first female 
student made a complaint to her guidance counselor about 
Zagaeski's comments, which the arbitrator determined was a 
result of the student feeling troubled by the comments.    
 
Following the student's complaint, the school principal 
commenced an investigation, which was then taken up by the 
central administration.  Zagaeski was provided with written 
notice that an investigation had commenced into allegations of 
6 
 
sexual harassment against him, and he was placed on 
administrative leave.  The assistant superintendent then 
interviewed a number of staff members and students.  He also 
arranged for an investigative interview of Zagaeski, which was 
attended by the assistant superintendent, counsel for the school 
district, union counsel for Zagaeski, and the president of the 
teacher's union.   
 
Following the interview, Zagaeski came to understand that 
the allegations against him were quite serious.  He then wrote a 
letter to the assistant superintendent expressing remorse and an 
intent to improve his classroom approach.  In the letter he 
admitted to "the weakness of an appropriate boundary between 
myself and my students" and the "need to create much clearer 
guidelines, not only for the students in my classroom, but for 
my own behavior towards students as well."  He also stated, 
"Allowing . . . sexually inappropriate comments in the class to 
go unchallenged, and even to take part in that banter myself is 
completely out of line . . . ."    
 
Subsequently, the district superintendent reviewed 
Zagaeski's letter and his personnel file and was briefed by the 
assistant superintendent regarding the investigative interview 
and other interviews that the assistant superintendent had 
conducted with students and staff.  The superintendent 
thereafter provided Zagaeski with formal notice of the 
7 
 
district's intent to dismiss him from employment and of his 
right to meet with the superintendent to provide additional 
information on his own behalf.  Zagaeski requested such a 
meeting, which he attended with counsel.  Also present at the 
meeting were the superintendent and assistant superintendent, 
counsel for the school district, a representative from the 
Massachusetts Teachers Association and the president of the 
teacher's union.   
 
Soon thereafter, the superintendent informed Zagaeski in 
writing that he was dismissed from his position.  The dismissal 
was based on six separate instances of conduct found to 
constitute conduct unbecoming a teacher.  The dismissal letter 
also stated that any one of the instances alone would have been 
sufficient to justify his dismissal.  
 
b.  Arbitration award.  Pursuant to his rights under the 
teacher dismissal statute, Zagaeski timely filed an appeal from 
the school district's dismissal decision, which, as mandated by 
the statute, resulted in arbitration proceedings.  See G. L. 
c. 71, § 42, par. 4.  Based on undisputed evidence and 
Zagaeski's testimony at the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator 
concluded that the school district had carried its burden to 
establish only one of its six bases for dismissal of Zagaeski, 
specifically Zagaeski's admission that, "in response to a female 
student's inquiry as to whether she 'could just pay . . . for a 
8 
 
higher grade' [he] responded, "No.  The only thing I would 
accept is a sexual favor."   
 
Regarding this conduct, the arbitrator found that although 
it was intended only as a joke, it rose to the level of sexual 
harassment as defined in the school committee's "Policy 
Prohibiting Harassment."6  The arbitrator further found that even 
though the comments by Zagaeski were not intended to be taken in 
earnest, objectively they were inappropriate comments for a 
teacher to make to a student.  Furthermore, the comments had the 
subjective effect of offending the student or making her 
sufficiently uncomfortable to lodge a complaint with her 
guidance counselor.  Therefore, the arbitrator found that these 
comments created a hostile or offensive educational environment 
for the female student.   
 
Nevertheless, the arbitrator went on to find that this 
instance of sexual harassment was "relatively less egregious" 
and that the two comments regarding the trade of sex for grades, 
 
6 As reflected in the arbitrator's decision, the policy 
provides, in part:  "Harassment is defined as any communication 
or conduct that is sufficiently serious to limit or deny the 
ability of a student to participate in or benefit from the 
educational program . . . .  It includes . . . any communication 
. . . such as jokes . . . that offends or shows disrespect to 
others based upon . . . color [or] gender . . . ."  It further 
provides:  "While all types of harassment are prohibited, sexual 
harassment requires particular attention . . . .  In addition to 
the above examples, other sexually oriented conduct, whether it 
is intended or not, that is unwelcome and has the effect of 
creating . . . [an] educational environment that is hostile, 
offensive, intimidating or humiliating . . . may constitute 
sexual harassment . . . ."   
                     
9 
 
separated by two days, could be viewed as "one isolated 
instance" of sexual harassment.  Thus the arbitrator concluded 
that Zagaeski's conduct constituted a "relatively minor and 
isolated" violation of the harassment policy, which only 
"nominally" constituted conduct unbecoming a teacher.  The 
arbitrator further found that in light of Zagaeski's strong 
performance throughout his employment, it would be in the best 
interests of the pupils in the district that he be retained as a 
teacher.  Therefore, the arbitrator issued an award reinstating 
Zagaeski with full back pay, less two days of unpaid suspension, 
which was the most severe discipline for which the school 
district would have had "just cause," according to the 
arbitrator.  
 
c.  Superior Court decision.  Following the issuance of the 
arbitration award, the school committee filed a complaint and 
application to vacate the arbitration award in the Superior 
Court on the bases that the arbitrator had exceeded his 
statutory authority in modifying the punishment imposed by the 
school district and that the arbitrator's award violated public 
policy.  Zagaeski filed a counterclaim and application to 
confirm the award.   
 
Under the teacher dismissal statute, judicial review of an 
arbitration award is limited to the grounds set forth in G. L. 
c. 150C, § 11.  See G. L. c. 71, § 42, par. 6.  One such ground 
10 
 
is if the arbitrator "exceeded [his or her] powers or rendered 
an award requiring a person to commit an act or engage in 
conduct prohibited by state or federal law."  G. L. c. 150C, 
§ 11 (a) (3).  The Superior Court judge, referencing existing 
uncertainty in the case law surrounding the precise scope of an 
arbitrator's authority under the teacher dismissal statute to 
reduce or alter the disciplinary penalty imposed by a school 
district, concluded that the arbitrator had not exceeded his 
authority in issuing the award.  The judge stated that although 
he was inclined to follow the reasoning of Justice Cordy's 
plurality opinion in Geller in support of a conclusion that the 
arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his authority, the judge 
was given pause by a footnote in the opinion, which states in 
relevant part, "This is not the case of an arbitrator finding a 
teacher to have engaged in minor misconduct that, however, 
nominally fit within a category on which dismissal could be 
based.  In such circumstances, an arbitrator's finding that the 
conduct did not rise to the level of misconduct contemplated by 
the statute as a ground for dismissal is one that would likely 
lie within the scope of his authority."  Geller, 435 Mass. at 
231 n.7 (Cordy, J., concurring).  Therefore, because the 
arbitrator's award in this case tracked precisely the footnote 
in Geller in concluding that Zagaeski's conduct only "nominally" 
constituted conduct unbecoming a teacher, the judge concluded 
11 
 
that the arbitrator's award was not in excess of his statutory 
authority.7  
 
Consequently, the judge denied the school committee's 
motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted Zagaeski's 
application to confirm.  The school committee appealed from the 
decision of the Superior Court and filed an application for 
 
7 The judge further concluded that the arbitration award did 
not constitute a violation of public policy.  We have recognized 
that an arbitrator may exceed the scope of his or her authority 
in awarding reinstatement of an employee where the award 
violates public policy.  See Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ., 
460 Mass. 844, 848 (2011).  The requirements for establishing 
that such an award is contrary to public policy are three-fold:  
(1) the conduct in issue violates a well-defined and dominant 
public policy set forth in statutory or judicial sources, (2) 
the conduct in issue is integral to the employee's duties, and 
(3) the award itself violates public policy because the 
employee's conduct is of the sort that requires dismissal.  
School Comm. of Lowell v. Robishaw, 456 Mass. 653, 664 (2010).  
Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 
430 Mass. 601, 604-605 (2000).  Because we conclude that the 
arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority on other grounds, 
we need not reach this argument.  However, we do acknowledge 
that there is a well-defined and dominant public policy 
prohibiting teacher-on-student sexual harassment and that 
Zagaeski's conduct, undertaken in the classroom setting, was 
integral to the performance of his employment duties.  See G. L. 
c. 151C, § 2 (g) (sexual harassment of student is unfair 
educational practice); G. L. c. 214, § 1C (granting right to be 
free from sexual harassment in school); 603 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 26.07(2) (2012) (requiring public schools to strive to prevent 
sexual harassment and to respond promptly to reports of its 
occurrence).  See also School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 
Mass. 223, 238 (2001) (Ireland, J., concurring in the result), 
quoting Massachusetts Highway Dep't v. American Fed'n of State, 
County, and Mun. Employees, Council 93, 420 Mass. 13, 17 (1995) 
(teacher's repeated infliction of physical abuse on students in 
school was misconduct that "goes 'to the heart of a worker's 
responsibilities'"); Massachusetts Highway Dep't, supra. 
                     
12 
 
direct appellate review.  We granted the school committee's 
application, and we reverse.    
 
2.  Standard of review.  As a general matter, "a reviewing 
court is strictly bound by an arbitrator's factual findings and 
conclusions of law, even if they are in error."  School Comm. of 
Lowell v. Robishaw, 456 Mass. 653, 660 (2010), quoting School 
Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 
753, 758-759 (2003) (Pittsfield).  This strict standard of 
review is highly deferential to the decision of an arbitrator, 
and it reflects a strong public policy in the Commonwealth in 
favor of arbitration.  Pittsfield, supra at 758.  See Geller, 
435 Mass. at 228 (Cordy, J., concurring); Bureau of Special 
Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 430 Mass. 601, 604 
n.4 (2000), quoting Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots 
Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir. 1988) ("An 
arbitrator's result may be wrong; it may appear unsupported; it 
may appear poorly reasoned; it may appear foolish.  Yet it may 
not be subject to court interference").  Such strong public 
policy arises in part from a general recognition that 
arbitration has long served as an effective means of resolving 
labor disputes without resort to the courts.  Pittsfield, supra.  
Therefore, in order to protect the efficiency that arbitration 
affords in resolving these disputes, the Legislature often 
strictly limits the circumstances in which a court may vacate an 
13 
 
arbitral award -- lest arbitration become merely an intermediate 
step between a dispute and litigation in court.  Id. 
 
In the education context, the Reform Act replaced de novo 
review of teacher dismissal decisions by the Superior Court with 
mandatory arbitration in order to "depoliticize[] and 
streamline[]" the teacher dismissal process.  See Geller, 435 
Mass. at 225 n.1 (Cordy, J., concurring); 1992 House Doc. No. 
5750, at 2 (letter from Governor William Weld accompanying first 
draft of Reform Act).  Compare G. L. c. 71, § 42, as appearing 
in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44, with G. L. c. 71, § 42, as amended 
through St. 1988, c. 153, §§ 4-6.  The Reform Act provided for 
limited judicial review of arbitration awards by reference to 
G. L. c. 150C, § 11.  See St. 1993, c. 71, § 44.  However, a 
reviewing court must vacate an arbitration award under the 
circumstances set forth in G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a), including if 
the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority in granting the 
award.  G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3).  School Comm. of Lowell v. 
Vong Oung, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 698, 704 (2008), quoting Board of 
Higher Educ. v. Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, NEA, 62 Mass. App. 
Ct. 42, 47 (2004) (under teacher dismissal statute, "[t]he 
question whether an arbitrator exceeded his or her authority is 
always subject to judicial review").   
 
Ordinarily, where arbitration is mandated by the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the scope and limits of the 
14 
 
authority of the arbitrator are ascertained by reference to the 
terms of the agreement.  School Comm. of Chicopee v. Chicopee 
Educ. Ass'n, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 364 (2011) (Chicopee).  
Indeed, judicial deference to arbitrators' awards stems in part 
from a recognition that the parties bargained for and agreed 
that an arbitrator would serve as a neutral third party in 
interpreting the written agreement between the parties, whether 
it be a commercial contract or a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Geller, 435 Mass. at 229-230 (Cordy, J., 
concurring).  In such circumstance, an arbitrator may be 
uniquely qualified to interpret the "law of the shop."  Id.  
However, in a case such as this, where arbitration is mandated 
by statute, the exclusive source of the arbitrator's authority 
is the statute itself.  G. L. c. 71, § 42.  Chicopee, supra at 
365 (observing that in Geller, both Justice Cordy's concurrence 
and Justice Cowin's dissent agreed with this proposition).  See 
Geller, 435 Mass. at 230 n.5 (Cordy, J., concurring).  Id. at 
240 (Cowin, J., dissenting).  Consequently, courts are as well, 
if not better, positioned to interpret the "law of the land" in 
the form of the statutes of the Commonwealth.  Geller, supra 
229-230 (Cordy, J., concurring), and cases cited.  Therefore, 
judicial review of the arbitrator's interpretation of the 
authorizing statute, particularly regarding the scope of the 
arbitrator's authority under the statute, is "broader and less 
15 
 
deferential" than in cases of judicial review of an arbitrator's 
decision arising from the interpretation of a private agreement.  
Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ., 460 Mass. 844, 856-857 (2011), 
citing Geller, supra at 229 (Cordy, J., concurring). 
 
We conclude that in light of the stated purposes of the 
Reform Act, of which the teacher dismissal statute is a part, 
combined with the specific language of the teacher dismissal 
statute itself, the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his 
authority by awarding reinstatement of Zagaeski.  See G. L. 
c. 69, § 1, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 27; G. L. c. 71, 
§ 42, pars. 5-6. 
 
3.  Statutory scheme.  The statutory scheme governing 
teacher dismissals set forth in G. L. c. 71, § 42, was enacted 
as part of the Reform Act, which brought broad-based changes to 
the funding and governance structure of the public education 
system in Massachusetts.  Geller, 435 Mass. at 225 n.1 (Cordy, 
J., concurring).  See generally St. 1993, c. 71.  In enacting 
this statute, the Legislature declared it a "paramount goal" to 
provide a public education system of "sufficient quality" to 
afford all children the opportunity to participate in, and 
contribute to, the political, social, and economic life of the 
Commonwealth.  G. L. c. 69, § 1, as appearing in St. 1993, 
c. 71, § 27.  The Legislature further identified four specific 
policy goals the Reform Act was intended to ensure:  "(1) that 
16 
 
each public school classroom provides the conditions for all 
pupils to engage fully in learning as an inherently meaningful 
and enjoyable activity without threats to their sense of 
security or self-esteem, (2) a consistent commitment of 
resources sufficient to provide a high quality public education 
to every child, (3) a deliberate process for establishing and 
achieving specific educational performance goals for every 
child, and (4) an effective mechanism for monitoring progress 
toward those goals and for holding educators accountable for 
their achievement."  Id.  
 
In furtherance of these purposes, the Reform Act made 
several changes to the statutory scheme governing teacher 
dismissals, including shifting from school committees to 
principals and superintendents the responsibility for dismissing 
teachers, mandating that teachers' appeals from dismissal 
decisions proceed directly to arbitration, and providing for 
limited review of an arbitrator's award, rather than de novo 
review of the dismissal decision, in Superior Court.  Compare 
G. L. c.  71, § 42, as amended through St. 1988, c. 153, §§ 4-6, 
with G. L. c. 71, § 42, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44. 
 
According to the teacher dismissal statute as enacted in 
1993, school officials may not dismiss a teacher with 
17 
 
"professional teacher status"8 except for "inefficiency, 
incompetency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher, 
insubordination or failure on the part of the teacher to satisfy 
teacher performance standards . . . or other just cause."  G. L. 
c. 71, § 42, par. 3.  If a teacher elects to appeal a dismissal 
decision to an arbitrator, the burden is on the school district 
to prove that its dismissal decision was based on one of the 
grounds set forth in the statute.  G. L. c. 71, § 42, par. 5.   
 
The statute further provides the standard by which the 
arbitrator must review the school district's decision.  
Specifically, the statute states:  "In determining whether the 
district has proven grounds for dismissal consistent with this 
section, the arbitrator shall consider the best interests of the 
pupils in the district and the need for elevation of performance 
standards."  Id.    
 
Finally, the statute sets forth the range of remedies an 
arbitrator may grant to a teacher upon a finding that the 
 
8 Under § 41 of G. L. c. 71, a teacher who has served in the 
public schools of a school district for the three previous 
consecutive years is afforded "professional teacher status," and 
is entitled to the procedural and substantive employment 
protections set forth in G. L. c. 71, § 42.  Zagaeski was a 
teacher with professional teacher status at the time of his 
dismissal.  
 
                     
18 
 
dismissal decision was "improper under the standards set forth 
in this section."9  G. L. c. 71, § 42, par. 6. 
 
4.  Discussion.  The school committee argues in part that 
the arbitrator exceeded the scope of authority set forth in the 
teacher dismissal statute by modifying the punishment imposed by 
the school district despite having found that the school 
district carried its burden to show conduct unbecoming a 
teacher.  The school committee contends that the arbitrator here 
found that Zagaeski's conduct constituted conduct unbecoming a 
teacher because it is the facts found and the manner in which 
they are described by the arbitrator, not the label ascribed to 
the conduct, that is dispositive.  See Geller, 435 Mass. at 231 
(Cordy, J., concurring).  The arbitrator found Zagaeski's 
conduct to be "obviously . . . inappropriate," in violation of 
 
9 We reject Zagaeski's argument that the remedial language 
contained in paragraph six of the teacher dismissal statute is 
the source of the arbitrator's authority.  The provision states 
in part, "Upon a finding that the dismissal was improper under 
the standards set forth in this section, the arbitrator may 
award [equitable remedies]."  Plainly, this is a reference back 
to the standards by which a school district may dismiss a 
teacher and according to which an arbitrator must review a 
decision.  G. L. c. 71, § 42, pars. 3, 5, 6.  This provision 
does not authorize the arbitrator to alter any disciplinary 
penalty he or she finds to be "improper" according to the 
dictionary definition of "improper" and without reference to the 
substantive standards set forth in paragraphs three and five of 
the statute.  Furthermore, the range of equitable remedies 
available enables an arbitrator to make a teacher whole if the 
school district is found to have failed to carry its burden to 
show a valid basis for dismissal.  The range of remedies does 
not imply complete discretion of the arbitrator to impose a 
different punishment that he or she prefers.  
                     
19 
 
the school district's sexual harassment policy, subjectively 
offensive, and of the sort to create a "hostile educational 
environment."  Thus, the arbitrator described the conduct in a 
manner establishing that Zagaeski's comments constituted conduct 
unbecoming a teacher even though the arbitrator concluded that 
the conduct only "nominally" rose to that level.10  Id. at 231 & 
nn.6-7 (Cordy, J., concurring).   
 
The school committee further argues in favor of the 
interpretation of the statute set forth in Justice Cordy's 
concurrence in Geller.  See 435 Mass. at 231, 234 (Cordy, J., 
concurring).  Specifically, the school committee argues that 
once an arbitrator concludes that the school has proved one of 
the grounds upon which the statute permits dismissal, the 
arbitrator is not authorized then to impose a lesser punishment 
than that selected by the school.  See id.  According to the 
school committee, footnote seven in Justice Cordy's concurrence 
could then be understood to mean that only in a circumstance 
 
10 Prior to the Reform Act, comments alone, without other 
physical conduct, were recognized as sufficient to constitute 
"conduct unbecoming a teacher."  See MacKenzie v. School Comm. 
of Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 616 (1961).  Although the Reform Act 
made significant changes to the teacher dismissal statute, it 
preserved "conduct unbecoming a teacher" as a permitted ground 
for dismissal of a teacher.  Compare G. L. c. 71, § 42, as 
appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44, with G. L. c. 71, § 42, as 
amended through St. 1988, c. 153, §§ 4-6.  Where the Legislature 
reenacts statutory language following a judicial interpretation 
of it, the Legislature is presumed to accept that 
interpretation.  Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bell, 428 Mass. 108, 110 
(1998), and cases cited. 
                     
20 
 
where the conduct at issue is so minor that it does not, in 
substance, constitute conduct unbecoming a teacher or another 
enumerated ground permitting dismissal does the arbitrator have 
the authority to alter the punishment imposed by the school.  
See id. at 231 n.7 (Cordy, J., concurring).  The school 
committee contends that here, the conduct found by the 
arbitrator was sufficiently egregious to constitute in 
substance, not merely in name, conduct unbecoming a teacher.   
Therefore the arbitrator's decision does not fall into the 
narrow exception for "nominal" conduct contemplated in Justice 
Cordy's concurrence in Geller.  See id.   
 
Zagaeski argues, however, that the language of the teacher 
dismissal statute in fact permits an arbitrator to adjust the 
discipline imposed upon a teacher even after finding that the 
conduct rises to the level of one of the grounds for which 
dismissal is permitted by the statute.  Specifically, Zagaeski 
contends that the language of G. L. c. 71, § 42, par. 6, 
contemplates the adjustment of a disciplinary penalty by the 
arbitrator in that it states, "Upon a finding that the dismissal 
was improper under the standards set forth in this section, an 
arbitrator may award back pay, benefits, reinstatement, and any 
other appropriate non-financial relief or any combination 
thereof" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 71, § 42, par. 6.  Zagaeski 
argues that the finding that dismissal is "improper" may arise 
21 
 
from the arbitrator's conclusion that the school district failed 
to carry its burden to show conduct permitting dismissal, or it 
may arise from the arbitrator's independent conclusion that 
dismissal was excessive in light of the nature of the misconduct 
found to have occurred.  Further, Zagaeski argues that the 
arbitrator cannot have exceeded his authority by considering 
Zagaeski's past performance as a teacher in determining that his 
dismissal would not be in the best interest of the students in 
the district because the dismissal statute mandates that the 
arbitrator engage in such an inquiry.  G. L. c. 71, § 42, 
par. 5.   
 
a.  Scope of arbitrator's authority to alter discipline 
imposed by school district.  The teacher dismissal statute does 
not grant the arbitrator the discretion to adjust the discipline 
selected by the school district to the extent Zagaeski 
maintains.  The purpose of the Reform Act was not to enhance the 
employment rights of public school teachers.  See G. L. c. 69, 
§ 1, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 27.  Rather, the stated 
purposes of the Reform Act express a concern for the increased 
accountability of educators and the improvement of the quality 
of education provided in public schools.  Id.  Further, the Act 
eliminated the teacher tenure system, and its reforms to the 
teacher dismissal statute were intended to "depoliticize and 
streamline" the teacher dismissal process.  St. 1993, c. 71, 
22 
 
§ 44.  1992 House Doc. No. 5750, at 2 (letter from Governor 
William Weld accompanying first draft of Reform Act).     
 
To be sure, the Act preserved certain employment 
protections for public school teachers who achieve professional 
teacher status, and it replaced the phrase "good cause" with 
"just cause" in the catchall provision of the teacher dismissal 
statute.  Compare G. L. c. 71, § 42, as amended by St. 1993, 
c. 71, § 44, with G. L. c. 71, § 42, as amended through St. 
1988, c. 153, §§ 4-6.  See Geller, 435 Mass. at 233 n.9 (Cordy, 
J., concurring) (describing use of the phrase "just cause" as 
ensuring that dismissals under the catchall provision were 
limited to serious misconduct).  However, these changes were 
intended to serve as a means of furthering the Act's central 
goal of enhancing the quality of the Commonwealth's public 
schools, not as an end in themselves.  See Atwater, 460 Mass. at 
846, 854.  The Act affords some measure of employment protection 
for teachers to enable schools to attract and retain excellent 
educators while still ensuring that principals and 
superintendents can act swiftly in making critical staffing 
decisions in the schools for which they are responsible.  See 
id.; Davis v. School Comm. of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 362 
(1940) ("Manifestly one of the most important duties involved in 
the management of a school system is the choosing and keeping of 
proper and competent teachers").  The Legislature's decision to 
23 
 
shift dismissal decisions to principals and superintendents and 
away from school committees, combined with the Governor's stated 
goal of "depoliticizing" the teacher dismissal process, 
indicates that the statute was intended to ensure that teachers 
were dismissed only for valid reasons.  However the Legislature 
did not necessarily intend for arbitrators to have broad 
discretion to adjust disciplinary decisions based on misconduct 
that the school had carried its burden to establish.   
 
Our decisions prior to the Reform Act help to shed light on 
the balance the Act was intended to achieve between empowering 
school officials to manage the teaching staff effectively while 
providing some measure of protection to professional status 
teachers.  Specifically, cases prior to the Reform Act expressed 
concern over teacher dismissal decisions by school committees 
that were based on "personal hostility, ill will or political 
animosity" such that the school's stated grounds for dismissal 
were nothing more than pretext.  MacKenzie v. School Comm. of 
Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 619 (1961).  See Kelley v. School Comm. 
of Watertown, 330 Mass. 150, 151 (1953) (reorganization of 
school administration was "subterfuge" and undertaken in bad 
faith to enable school committee to demote and replace 
petitioner); Sweeney v. School Comm. of Revere, 249 Mass. 525, 
529-530 (1924) (school committee voted to eliminate position of 
24 
 
principal not on good faith need to conserve resources but due 
to disagreement with principal's political views). 
 
Similar concerns animate footnote seven in Justice Cordy's 
concurring opinion in Geller, 435 Mass. at 231 n.7.  Justice 
Cordy concluded that the teacher dismissal statute does not 
permit an arbitrator to override a school district's decision to 
dismiss a teacher if the arbitrator finds that the school has 
proved conduct amounting to one of the grounds permitting 
dismissal.  Id. at 231.  However, Justice Cordy acknowledged 
that at the same time, the statute would permit an arbitrator to 
override a school district's dismissal decision if the 
misconduct in issue is so minor that it does not, in substance, 
constitute the sort of misconduct for which the statute permits 
dismissal.  Id. at 231 n.7.   
 
Consequently, if an arbitrator finds that the school 
district has labeled a teacher's conduct "conduct unbecoming a 
teacher" when the conduct does not, in substance, truly rise to 
that level, or that the school district has used that label 
merely as a pretext to dismiss the teacher based on personal, 
political, or other unauthorized bases, the arbitrator is 
empowered to vacate the punishment imposed by the school 
district.  Thus, the statutory directive requiring arbitrators 
to consider the best interests of the pupils and the need to 
elevate performance standards in reviewing whether the school 
25 
 
district carried its burden to show conduct permitting dismissal 
is intended in part to prevent politically motivated dismissal 
decisions.  Indeed, the standards governing the arbitrator's 
review are likely intended to serve as a direct reminder to the 
arbitrator of the purposes underlying the Reform Act and the 
proper considerations for a school district to undertake in its 
dismissal decisions.  See Geller, 435 Mass. at 235. 
 
In this case, however, there is no indication in the record 
before us that the grounds on which Zagaeski was dismissed were 
mere pretext or that his misconduct was so minor that it did not 
in substance constitute one of the enumerated bases on which the 
statute permits dismissal.  Therefore, Justice Cordy's 
observation in footnote seven in Geller regarding "minor" 
misconduct, and the concerns expressed in early case law 
regarding political dismissals based on "subterfuge," are not 
implicated here. 
 
Public school teachers hold a position of special public 
trust.  Perryman v. School Comm. of Boston, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 
346, 349 (1983) ("There are certain forms of employment which 
carry a position of trust so peculiar to the office and so 
beyond that imposed by all public service that conduct 
consistent with this special trust is an obligation of the 
employment").  Dupree v. School Comm. of Boston, 15 Mass. App. 
Ct. 535, 538 (1983).  They are responsible for more than 
26 
 
teaching basic academic skills.  See Geller, 435 Mass. at 238-
239 (Ireland, J., concurring in the result) ("a teacher's 
responsibilities include the maintenance of a safe environment 
that is conducive to . . . students' growth").  As we recently 
acknowledged, "[s]tudents must be able to trust that they will 
be safe in the presence of their teachers and coaches.  They 
must be able to rely on their teachers and coaches to exercise 
sound judgment and maintain appropriate boundaries, even when 
they themselves may be unable to do so."  Atwater, 460 Mass. at 
852 (quoting underlying arbitration award).  The creation of a 
hostile learning environment through sexual harassment, whether 
verbal or physical, can be detrimental to the well-being of 
students who experience such harassment in part because it may 
unreasonably interfere with their education.  See G. L. c. 151C, 
§ 1 (e).  Moreover, citizens of this Commonwealth, including 
public school students, have a constitutional right to be free 
from gender-based discrimination, which includes certain forms 
of sexual harassment.  Art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, as amended by art. 106 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution.  O'Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 
693 (1987) (concluding that sexual harassment can violate rights 
secured under art. 1).  Numerous statutory enactments also make 
clear the importance of protecting children from sexual 
harassment in school.  See G. L. c. 151C, § 2 (g) (sexual 
27 
 
harassment of student in any program or course of study in 
educational institution is unfair educational practice); G. L. 
c. 214, § 1C (granting right to be free from sexual harassment 
as defined in G. L. cc. 151B and 151C); 603 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 26.07(2) (requiring public schools to strive to prevent sexual 
harassment and to respond promptly to reports of its 
occurrence).  Zagaeski's conduct undermined these policies, as 
well as one of the central purposes of the Reform Act:  to 
ensure an educational setting that safeguards, rather than 
warps, a child's self-esteem.  See G. L. c. 69, § 1, as 
appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 27.   
 
Of additional concern, teachers are in part responsible for 
instilling core constitutional values in students in preparation 
for their participation as citizens in a democracy.  See Dupree, 
15 Mass. App. Ct. at 539.  A teacher who models sexually 
harassing behavior in front of public school students as if it 
is all in good fun undercuts our constitutional value of freedom 
from gender discrimination.  See O'Connell, 400 Mass. at 693.  
Indeed, students who witness a teacher engage in such conduct 
may come to believe that such conduct is acceptable in an 
academic or professional setting.  See Dupree, supra at 538, 
quoting Faxon v. School Comm. of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 534 
(1954) ("As role models for our children [teachers] have an 
'extensive and peculiar opportunity to impress [their] attitude 
28 
 
and views' upon their pupils").  Inculcation of those sorts of 
values by teachers is not acceptable in our public schools.   
 
The Reform Act specifically vested in principals the power 
to dismiss teachers, subject to review and approval by 
superintendents, in order to raise the accountability of school 
officials for the success of their schools.  See St. 1993, 
c. 71, § 44.  See also Pittsfield, 438 Mass. at 760; Higher 
Educ. Coordinating Council/Roxbury Community College v. 
Massachusetts Teachers' Ass'n/Mass. Community College Council, 
423 Mass. 23, 29 n.6 (1996); 1992 House Doc. No. 5750, at 2.  We 
have long-recognized decisions regarding teacher employment as 
central to effective school management.  See Higher Educ. Coord. 
Council, supra at 28-29; School Comm. of W. Springfield v. 
Korbut, 373 Mass. 788, 794-795 (1977); Davis, 307 Mass. at 362.  
Although undoubtedly a difficult decision, the superintendent 
undertook a thorough investigation, determined that Zagaeski 
engaged in conduct unbecoming a teacher, and dismissed him on 
that ground.  This determination was within the superintendent's 
statutory authority and was not unwarranted in light of the 
broader implications of Zagaeski's conduct and the purposes 
underlying the Reform Act.  See G. L. c. 69, § 1; G. L. c. 71, 
§ 42. 
 
b.  Best interests of the pupils in the district and the 
need to elevate performance standards.  We further acknowledge 
29 
 
that the teacher dismissal statute does authorize the arbitrator 
to engage in a substantive review of dismissal decisions insofar 
as it requires arbitrators to consider the "best interests of 
the pupils in the district and the need for elevation of 
performance standards."  See G. L. c. 71, § 42, par. 5.  To 
conclude otherwise would render the statutory mandate that the 
arbitrator undertake these considerations effectively 
meaningless.  See Geller, 435 Mass. at 242-243 (Cowin, J., 
dissenting).  However, we disagree that this statutory language 
authorizes an arbitrator to draw on a teacher's past performance 
to override a dismissal decision based on a teacher's conduct 
having threatened the safety and welfare of his or her students.  
If a teacher's past performance could be used as a basis on 
which an arbitrator could award reinstatement -- because, as 
here, the arbitrator concluded it was in the students' best 
interests to have high performing teachers -- then the "need for 
elevation of performance standards" and the "best interests of 
the pupils" would come to mean the same thing.  However, the 
statute should not be construed to render one of the two 
standards governing the arbitrator's review as redundant of the 
other.  School Comm. of Brockton v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 
393 Mass. 256, 262 (1984), quoting 2A C. Sands, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973) ("[A] statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to all its 
30 
 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous").  
 
The distinct meanings of these two standards can be 
ascertained by reference to the other provisions of the teacher 
dismissal statute and the stated purposes of the Reform Act.  
See Saccone v. State Ethics Comm'n, 395 Mass. 326, 334-335 
(1985) (statutes should be construed to constitute "harmonious 
whole"; otherwise their purpose may be defeated [citation 
omitted]).  When the Legislature enacted the Reform Act, it 
identified the importance of safeguarding students' "sense of 
security or self-esteem" in the classroom as distinct from, 
though equally as important as, the establishment and 
achievement of specific educational performance goals.  G. L. 
c. 69, § 1, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 27.  This 
distinction between safety and well-being on one side and 
academic achievement on the other is also mirrored in the 
enumerated grounds on which a school district may dismiss a 
professional status teacher.  In one category, a school district 
may dismiss a teacher for performance-based reasons including 
"inefficiency," "incompetency," or failure to satisfy 
performance standards.  G. L. c. 71, § 42, par. 3.  In the other 
category, a school district may dismiss a teacher for conduct 
that jeopardizes the well-being of students or the proper 
functioning of the school community, including "conduct 
31 
 
unbecoming a teacher," "insubordination," or "incapacity."  Id.  
Therefore, the standards by which the arbitrator must review a 
dismissal decision should be construed in light of this same 
distinction.   
 
Where the teacher conduct in issue is performance-based, 
the arbitrator should consider the school district's decision 
primarily in light of the need to raise performance standards.  
However, when the conduct in issue has jeopardized the safety or 
self-esteem of students in the classroom setting, the arbitrator 
should consider the best interests of the pupils primarily in 
light of the pupils' interest in a safe learning environment.  
Here, the arbitrator permitted the pupils' interest in the 
academic success of their school to override their interest in a 
safe, supportive classroom environment.  This determination was 
in excess of the arbitrator's authority because it had the 
effect of nullifying one of the stated purposes of the Reform 
Act.  The Legislature cannot have intended a teacher's past 
academic performance to be used to justify reinstatement of a 
teacher found to have engaged in conduct that created a hostile 
learning environment for certain students.  See Commonwealth v. 
Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 409 (2013) (statutes may not be 
interpreted so as to yield absurd results).  Despite Zagaeski's 
apparent success as a classroom teacher, that "track record" 
should not be used to conclude that it is in the "best 
32 
 
interests" of students to reinstate a teacher who was found to 
have violated the school's sexual harassment policy.11  By 
awarding reinstatement of Zagaeski based on an interpretation of 
the "best interests of the pupils" to mean the same thing as 
"the need to elevate performance standards," the arbitrator's 
award overrode the superintendent's decision on an unauthorized 
basis and runs contrary to the core purposes of the Reform Act 
and the high standards of conduct the public expects from its 
teachers. 
 
11 Although a teacher's length of service and past 
performance may be considered as factors mitigating against 
dismissal under the rubric of "just cause" in collective 
bargaining agreements, and the Reform Act replaced the phrase 
"good cause" with "just cause" as an enumerated basis on which a 
teacher may be dismissed, the teacher dismissal statute does not 
permit an arbitrator to engraft an additional just cause 
analysis onto each of the grounds enumerated in the statute on 
which dismissal may be based.  See St. 1993, c. 71, § 44.  See 
also School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 231, 233 
& n.9 (2001) (Cordy, J., concurring).  A plain reading of the 
teacher dismissal statute makes clear that a school district may 
dismiss a teacher for any of the enumerated bases "or other just 
cause" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 71, § 42.  Therefore, the 
statute implies that dismissal based on any of the enumerated 
grounds would be just cause, and "other just cause" stands alone 
as an additional ground upon which dismissal may be based.  The 
phrase "other just cause" does not permit a reduction in the 
penalty imposed for conduct constituting one of the other 
enumerated grounds.  See Geller, supra at 232-233 & n.9 (Cordy, 
J., concurring).  This interpretation of the statute comports 
with a long history of judicial interpretation of similarly 
worded provisions in collective bargaining agreements.  Id. at 
232 & n.8 (Cordy, J., concurring), and cases cited.  
Consequently, the fact that the Reform Act replaced "other good 
cause" with "other just cause" as a basis for dismissal, without 
further change to the text of the provision, is not sufficient 
to indicate a legislative intent to import an additional just 
cause analysis into the other grounds permitting dismissal.  
                     
33 
 
 
5.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order of 
the Superior Court confirming the arbitrator's award is vacated, 
and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an 
order vacating the arbitration award. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (dissenting).  The arbitrator's decision, fairly 
read, reflects his conclusion that the plaintiff, the school 
committee of Lexington, did not carry its burden of proving that 
the defendant, Mark Zagaeski, engaged in the serious misconduct 
necessary to establish "conduct unbecoming a teacher," one of 
six enumerated grounds on which a teacher with professional 
status can be dismissed under G. L. c. 71, § 42.  Instead, based 
on all of the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing, he 
determined that Zagaeski's isolated episode of inappropriate 
behavior, while fitting nominally within that statutory 
category, was only minor in nature.  This was a determination 
well within the scope of the arbitrator's authority.  Hence, I 
respectfully dissent, parting company as I do with the court's 
independent assessment of the facts as found, its determination 
that the conduct at issue could not be deemed anything other 
than the requisite serious misconduct warranting dismissal, and 
its conclusion that, by reinstating Zagaeski, the arbitrator 
exceeded the scope of his authority.  To the extent that the 
arbitrator imposed alternative discipline upon Zagaeski, 
however, I agree that he exceeded the scope of his authority.  
While the school authorities did not satisfy the statutory 
requirements when dismissing Zagaeski, it is solely within their 
purview whether other discipline instead should be imposed.  I 
2 
 
would accordingly remand the matter.  See School Dist. of 
Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 224 (2001) (Geller). 
 
1.  Statutory framework.  General Laws c. 71, § 42, 
delineates the circumstances under which teachers who have 
attained professional status can be dismissed, as well as the 
scope of arbitrators' review of such dismissals.  Three 
paragraphs of the statute are particularly relevant here.  I 
begin with an analysis of these paragraphs, informed by the 
somewhat unsettled case law construing them, including both 
Justice Cordy's concurring opinion and Justice Cowin's 
dissenting opinion in Geller, supra.1  See Atwater v. 
Commissioner of Educ., 460 Mass. 844, 858 n.11 (2011). 
 
General Laws c. 71, § 42, third par., enumerates six 
grounds on which a teacher with professional status may be 
dismissed:  inefficiency, incompetency, incapacity, conduct 
unbecoming a teacher, insubordination, failure to satisfy 
performance standards, "or other just cause."  General Laws 
c. 71, § 42, fifth par., allocates to the district the burden of 
proving one of these grounds, and provides that, "[i]n 
determining whether the district has proven grounds for 
     1 No opinion in School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 
223 (2001) (Geller), garnered a majority.  Justice Cordy 
authored a concurring opinion, with whom Chief Justice Marshall 
and Justice Sosman joined.  Justice Ireland wrote a separate 
opinion, concurring in the result, with which Justice Cordy also 
joined.  Justice Cowin dissented, and was joined by Justice 
Greaney and Justice Spina.    
                     
3 
 
dismissal . . . , the arbitrator shall consider the best 
interests of the pupils in the district and the need for 
elevation of performance standards."  
 
If, in making such a determination, the arbitrator 
concludes that the district failed to carry its burden of 
proving an enumerated ground for dismissal, thereby rendering 
the dismissal "improper under the standards set forth in [G. L. 
c. 71, § 42,]" the sixth paragraph of the statute authorizes the 
arbitrator to award certain remedies to the teacher, namely, 
"back pay, benefits, reinstatement, and any other appropriate 
non-financial relief or any combination thereof."2 
 
As the court recognizes, the question regarding an 
arbitrator's authority to reinstate a teacher who has been found 
to have engaged in conduct only nominally constituting an 
enumerated ground for dismissal remains unresolved after Geller, 
supra.  This reflects in no small measure the deep division in 
the Geller court as to the arbitrator's proper role, represented 
by Justice Cordy's and Justice Cowin's opposing opinions.  
Although neither opinion is entirely consonant with my own view 
of the statute, both recognize, as I do, that the school 
district does not satisfy its burden of proving the propriety of 
the discipline imposed simply by showing facts that could 
     2 The arbitrator may not, however, award "punitive, 
consequential, or nominal damages, or compensatory damages other 
than back pay, benefits or reinstatement."  G. L. c. 71, § 42, 
sixth par. 
                     
4 
 
conceivably amount to an enumerated ground for dismissal, 
without regard to the gravity of the act said to have occurred.  
Rather, under both Justice Cordy's and Justice Cowin's 
interpretations of the statute, the arbitrator is assigned the 
duty to determine whether the facts adduced in fact establish 
"serious misconduct" warranting dismissal on an enumerated 
ground.  See Geller, supra at 231 n.7 (Cordy, J., concurring); 
Geller, supra at 241 (Cowin, J., dissenting).  In other words, 
not all conduct that a school district may see fit to 
characterize as constituting an enumerated ground for dismissal 
will in fact rise to the level of serious misconduct that the 
Legislature envisioned would justify terminating a teacher who 
has attained professional status.  It is the statutorily 
appointed role of the arbitrator to determine whether proven 
conduct does indeed rise to that level.   
 
Indeed, that only "serious misconduct" will constitute an 
enumerated ground for dismissal is implied by the Legislature's 
insertion, in the 1993 amendment, of a new category of "other 
just cause," and its simultaneous deletion of "other good cause" 
as a ground for dismissal.  See St. 1993, c. 71, § 44.  As 
Justice Cordy observed in Geller, supra at 233 n.9, "[i]t is 
reasonable . . . to conclude from the substitution of the word 
'just' for 'good' that the Legislature intended to limit the 
broad range of conduct that had previously been considered as 
5 
 
warranting dismissal in this catchall category, to serious 
misconduct."3   
 
According to Justice Cordy's view, however, once an 
arbitrator determines that a school district has proved "serious 
misconduct" amounting to an enumerated ground for dismissal, 
"the arbitrator does not have the authority to judge whether 
discharge is an excessive penalty for the violation committed."  
Id. at 232 (Cordy, J., concurring).  The arbitrator is 
"preclude[d] . . . from conducting a further 'just cause' 
analysis (e.g., weighing the teacher's prior record against the 
misconduct for the purpose of justifying a different sanction) 
     3 Although the court asserts that the purpose of the 
Education Reform Act of 1993 (Reform Act), which amended G. L. 
c. 71, § 42, was not to enhance the employment rights of public 
school teachers, ante at  , there is also nothing to suggest 
that the amendment was intended to diminish the rights of 
teachers with professional status.  If anything, insofar as the 
shift from a "good cause" to a "just cause" standard imposed a 
higher burden on schools, the Reform Act in fact provided 
greater protection to teachers with professional status, by 
limiting the circumstances under which they could be dismissed.  
See Geller, supra at 233 n.9 (Cordy, J., concurring), and cases 
cited (explaining that "good cause" had been understood to mean 
"any ground which is put forward [by the supervising authority] 
in good faith and which is not arbitrary, irrational, 
unreasonable, or irrelevant to the . . . task of building up and 
maintaining an efficient school system," whereas "just cause" 
suggests "substantial misconduct which adversely affects the 
public interest" [citations omitted]).  Compare G. L. c. 71, 
§ 42, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44, with G. L. c. 71, 
§ 42, as amended through St. 1988, c. 153, §§ 4-6.      
 
 
Due regard for employment rights is hardly at odds with the 
stated purposes of the Reform Act to which the court refers, 
namely, to increase the accountability of educators and to 
improve the quality of education provided in public schools.  
See G. L. c. 69, § 1, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 27. 
                     
6 
 
once he has found that one of the enumerated grounds for 
dismissal has been proved."  Id. at 234. 
 
Justice Cowin, on the other hand, would have concluded that 
the statute authorizes an arbitrator to determine "both whether 
the grounds [for dismissal] alleged by the school district have 
occurred and, if so, whether such grounds warrant dismissal."  
Id. at 241 (Cowin, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Cowin, 
assessing whether the proven grounds warrant dismissal, or 
merely a less severe penalty, is not only within the 
arbitrator's discretion, but required by the statutory directive 
that arbitrators consider "the best interests of the pupils in 
the district and the need for elevation of performance 
standards."  See G. L. c. 71, § 42, fifth par.; Geller, supra at 
242-243 & n.2 (Cowin, J., dissenting). 
 
I agree with Justice Cowin that G. L. c. 71, § 42, 
authorizes an arbitrator to assess whether the facts found 
warrant dismissal.  In my view, it is within the scope of an 
arbitrator's authority to determine both whether the conduct 
alleged by the school district in fact occurred, and, if it did, 
to decide whether such conduct "r[o]se to the level of [serious] 
misconduct contemplated by the statute as a ground for 
dismissal."  Geller, supra at 231 n.7 (Cordy, J., concurring).  
In performing the latter task of determining whether the 
district has proved grounds for dismissal, the statute requires 
7 
 
the arbitrator to take into account "the best interests of the 
pupils in the district and the need for elevation of performance 
standards."  G. L. c. 71, § 42, fifth par.   
 
The Legislature has provided for meaningful review by 
accredited professional arbitrators, see G. L. c. 71, § 42, 
fourth par., of decisions made by school authorities to 
terminate teachers with professional status.  This review is to 
assure that such decisions are based only on the serious 
misconduct that the statute details and, of necessity, 
encompasses both a determination of what occurred and a 
contextualized assessment of its gravity.  The credentialed 
arbitrator is thus tasked not only with finding facts, but also 
with weighing those facts in conjunction with the mandatory 
student-interest and performance criteria, see G. L. c. 71, 
§ 42, fifth par., to ascertain whether dismissal is warranted.  
An arbitrator who does this, and concludes that dismissal was 
not in fact substantiated, does not thereby overstep his bounds 
and usurp the role of school authorities.  Rather, in so doing, 
the arbitrator fulfills his or her statutorily mandated duty of 
discerning whether the district sustained its burden of proving 
an enumerated ground for dismissal.4     
     4 Of course, there may be situations in which an 
arbitrator's reinstatement of a teacher, after finding that the 
school district had not sustained its burden, would violate 
public policy, an independent ground to vacate an arbitrator's 
award.  See Massachusetts Highway Dep't v. American Fed'n of 
                     
8 
 
 
Unlike Justice Cowin, however, I do not believe that the 
statute empowers arbitrators to impose alternative penalties on 
teachers, short of dismissal, that the arbitrator perceives to 
be more proportional to the severity of the misconduct he or she 
determined to have occurred.  The sixth paragraph of the statute 
sets out the actions that arbitrators are authorized to take if 
they conclude that dismissal was "improper."  Those actions are 
remedial in nature, and are limited to awarding "back pay, 
benefits, reinstatement, and any other appropriate non-financial 
relief or any combination thereof"; the statute makes no express 
provision for the exercise of an arbitrator's own judgment in 
choosing an ostensibly fair punishment.  See G. L. c. 71, § 42, 
sixth par.  The statute thus contemplates that an arbitration 
hearing will have one of two outcomes:  either the arbitrator 
will determine that the district carried its burden, upholding 
its dismissal decision, or the arbitrator will find that the 
district did not carry its burden, reversing the district's 
decision and awarding the teacher some form of relief.  Should 
the school district's dismissal decision be reversed, it remains 
solely within the purview of the district to determine whether 
State, County & Mun. Employees, Council 93, 420 Mass. 13, 16-19 
(1995).  The court does not rely on public policy grounds here, 
and indeed, "[n]o public policy requires that a teacher be fired 
in these circumstances."  Geller, supra at 247 (Cowin, J., 
dissenting).   
                                                                  
9 
 
other discipline should then be imposed.  See G. L. c. 71, 
§ 42D.   
 
In sum, I believe that it is the proper function of the 
arbitrator to find and weigh the facts, and subsequently either 
to reverse or to uphold a school district's dismissal decision, 
but not to reduce the punishment imposed by the school.  I now 
turn to a discussion whether the arbitrator here acted within 
the scope of his authority.  
 
2.  Arbitrator's finding that Zagaeski committed "nominal" 
misconduct.  In substantial reliance on footnote 7 of Justice 
Cordy's concurring opinion in Geller, supra, the arbitrator 
found, based on the undisputed facts,5 that the school district 
did not meet its burden of proving an enumerated ground for 
dismissal.  Footnote 7 states, 
 
"We note that the arbitrator found [the 
teacher's] actions to constitute serious misconduct 
('totally inappropriate,' 'unacceptable,' which 
     5 Zagaeski was the only witness at the arbitration hearing; 
neither the seventeen year old female student who brought 
Zagaeski's comments to the school's attention nor other 
witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the underlying events 
testified.  In addition to Zagaeski's uncontradicted testimony 
(which "provided important context regarding what was going on 
and being said immediately before, during, and after he made the 
comments in question to the [seventeen] year old student,") the 
arbitrator had before him a letter that Zagaeski had written 
during the investigation to the assistant superintendent as well 
as other statements he and his counsel made to the district's 
representatives during that period.  The arbitrator stated, "To 
meet its burden of persuasion, the school district in this 
proceeding has relied entirely upon what it asserts are facts as 
admitted to by Dr. Zagaeski himself."  
 
                     
10 
 
'cannot be condoned'), a finding consistent with the 
evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing.  This is 
not the case of an arbitrator finding a teacher to 
have engaged in minor misconduct that, however, 
nominally fit within a category on which dismissal 
could be based.  In such circumstances, an 
arbitrator's finding that the conduct did not rise to 
the level of misconduct contemplated by the statute as 
a ground for dismissal is one that would likely lie 
within the scope of his authority." 
 
Geller, supra at 231 n.7 (Cordy, J., concurring).  The 
arbitrator quoted this footnote in its entirety and used it to 
frame his discussion of the import of Zagaeski's comments.  At 
the outset of his opinion, the arbitrator set forth a standard 
of review that incorporated language from this footnote, noting 
that both parties' briefs cited that standard as governing the 
matter before him.6  
 
The arbitrator began his analysis by noting, rightly, that 
Zagaeski's comments to the student regarding trading sexual 
     6 Although "the parties [cannot] properly authorize the 
arbitrator to act beyond his statutory authority in any event," 
Geller, supra at 230 n.5 (Cordy, J., concurring), the standard 
of review that the arbitrator set forth nonetheless sheds light 
on the manner in which he undertook to analyze the facts at 
hand.  According to that standard,  
 
 
"[I]f the arbitrator finds that the school 
district has proven one of the six specifically listed 
grounds for dismissal, and has proven that the 
misconduct was serious rather than only minor in 
nature, then the arbitrator must uphold the 
termination decision, unless the arbitrator makes 
specific and detailed findings that the 'best interest 
of the pupils in the district . . .' warrant the 
retention of the teacher notwithstanding the serious 
misconduct which has occurred."  (Emphasis supplied.)   
 
                     
11 
 
favors for grades "obviously were inappropriate if taken 
literally" and were inconsistent with the school district's 
policy against sexual harassment.  And, indeed, it goes without 
saying that any insinuation that good grades are available for 
barter, particularly in exchange for sexual favors, would be 
wholly improper and have no place in the classroom.   
 
But the arbitrator went on to make nuanced findings that 
situated the exchange within the context of the "obviously 
absurd joke" that the student had made to Zagaeski several days 
before about paying him for a better grade, and another 
student's comment about sexual favors, to which Zagaeski had 
responded, "Don't be ridiculous."  When the student again 
reiterated her "ridiculous request" a couple days later, 
Zagaeski "responded with a joking comment of his own," as a way 
of referring to the recent exchange, something he considered to 
be "like an inside joke" with the student.     
 
Given the jesting context in which the remarks were made, 
Zagaeski's lack of actual intent to solicit sexual favors from 
the student, and the one-time nature of his behavior, the 
arbitrator determined that Zagaeski's words essentially amounted 
to "one ill-advised set of interrelated, joking comments, made 
in response to ill-advised jokes initiated by his students," and 
therefore only "nominally" fit within the category of conduct 
unbecoming a teacher.  However, the arbitrator did not, as the 
12 
 
court states, conclude that the school district had carried its 
burden of establishing one of the six enumerated grounds for 
dismissal.  To the contrary, the arbitrator concluded that, 
"[g]iven the relatively minor, and isolated character of Dr. 
Zagaeski's misconduct, and his proven excellence as a teacher 
over the course of his decade of work in the Lexington Public 
Schools, the district has not proven grounds for 
dismissal . . ." (emphasis supplied).  As the Superior Court 
judge observed, "[t]he arbitrator's findings regarding 
Zagaeski's conduct appear to fit precisely within the scenario 
set out by Justice Cordy in footnote 7 of [Geller, supra]."7   
 
The court acknowledges that this question, regarding an 
arbitrator's authority to reinstate a teacher after finding that 
he committed only nominal misconduct, was left open by Geller, 
supra, but does not provide a direct answer.  It instead engages 
in its own assessment of the facts and concludes that, 
notwithstanding the arbitrator's determination that Zagaeski 
engaged in only nominal and isolated misconduct, it is not 
     7 Even if the arbitrator misapprehended the holding of 
Geller, supra, his interpretation -- which the Superior Court 
judge tracked -- was a reasonable one, particularly given the 
fractured nature of the court's opinion in that case.  And even 
assuming that his interpretation was erroneous, "[a]bsent proof 
of one of the grounds specified in G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a), a 
reviewing court is 'strictly bound by the arbitrator's factual 
findings and conclusions of law, even if they are in error.'"  
Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ., 460 Mass. 844, 848 (2011), 
quoting School Comm. of Lowell v. Robishaw, 456 Mass. 653, 660 
(2010). 
 
                     
13 
 
possible that the conduct at issue was anything other than 
serious, and, as such, the arbitrator acted outside of his 
authority in "adjusting" the school's disciplinary decision.  In 
so doing, the court inappropriately substitutes its own judgment 
for that of the arbitrator.   
 
The court appears to share the school committee's 
conviction that Zagaeski's very utterance of the words to the 
student itself suffices to establish serious misconduct.  But  
words alone are only a piece of human communication.  Words 
shorn of context, taken only literally, are at a far remove from 
language embedded in circumstance.  In any attempt to understand 
an event after the fact, establishing who said what generally 
will only begin to reveal what actually happened.  Indeed, 
determining what actually happened, and the gravity of what 
actually happened, is precisely what this arbitrator was called 
upon to do and did.  It is not for us to substitute our view for 
his. 
 
Given my view that the statute authorizes the arbitrator to 
assess whether the facts as found warrant dismissal, and keeping 
in mind the "well-settled principle of law that arbitration 
awards are subject to a narrow scope of review," School Comm. of 
Chicopee v. Chicopee Educ. Ass'n, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 364 
(2011), I cannot accept the court's analysis or conclusion in 
14 
 
this regard.8  I would instead squarely hold that where, as here, 
an arbitrator determines that the misconduct at issue was of a 
minor or nominal nature and, as such, did not constitute the 
serious misconduct necessary to satisfy an enumerated ground for 
dismissal, he acts well within the scope of his authority when 
concluding that the district has not sustained its burden of 
     8 Although arbitrators' factual findings are "not open for 
our review," School Comm. of Lowell v. Robishaw, supra at 664, 
the arbitrator's determination here that Zagaeski's isolated 
instance of improper joking with a student constituted minor 
misconduct, only nominally "conduct unbecoming a teacher," is, 
in any event, supported by the record, particularly when 
compared to conduct that has been deemed to fit the rubric of 
conduct unbecoming a teacher in other cases.  For example, in 
Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ., supra at 849-850, the 
arbitrator found that the teacher invited a student to his house 
and while there, "inappropriately touched [her], touching her 
back, reaching down her shirt, and touching her buttocks in a 
sexual manner as well as hugging the student in an attempt to 
restrain her from leaving."  In addition, the teacher "made 
numerous attempts" to contact the student via electronic mail 
and telephone, through her friends, and by following her vehicle 
and visiting her home, which the arbitrator labeled "serious" 
misconduct.  Id. at 850, 852. 
 
 
Similarly, in Geller, supra at 226-227 & n.3, the 
arbitrator found that the teacher, who had received a warning 
from school authorities prior to his dismissal, engaged in 
"unacceptable" conduct over the course of seven months, 
culminating in three separate incidents involving the use of 
physical force against students.  Quite unlike here, the 
arbitrator in that case "found facts and described those facts 
in a manner that clearly establishe[d the teacher's] conduct to 
be 'conduct unbecoming a teacher.'"  Id. at 231.  
 
 
Thus, both these cases involved a pattern of serious 
misconduct over a prolonged period of time, distinguishable from 
the isolated and quite dissimilar nature of the misconduct at 
issue in this case. 
 
                     
15 
 
proving grounds for dismissal.  See G. L. c. 71, § 42, fifth 
par.   
 
Far from an arbitrary substitution of the arbitrator's own 
judgment for that of the school district, such a determination 
amounts to a conclusion that the dismissal was "improper," as 
per G. L. c. 71, § 42, sixth par.  Upon such a finding of 
impropriety, the arbitrator is empowered to "award back pay, 
benefits, reinstatement, and any other appropriate non-financial 
relief or any combination thereof."  G. L. c. 71, § 42, sixth 
par.  Thus, I believe that the arbitrator here did not exceed 
his authority in reinstating Zagaeski, particularly in light of 
his clear reliance on footnote 7 of Justice Cordy's concurrence 
in Geller, supra, which essentially provided a roadmap for his 
decision.  I would therefore leave intact the reinstatement 
award here.9 
 
3.  Arbitrator's consideration of "best interests of the 
pupils in the district and the need to elevate performance 
standards".  General Laws c. 71, § 42, fifth par., instructs 
arbitrators to "consider the best interests of the pupils in the 
     9 Whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in 
reinstating Zagaeski is the central issue that the parties 
dispute in the case, and, as I have explained, I would hold that 
he did not.  Because, however, as discussed supra, I do not 
believe that the statute empowers arbitrators to impose 
alternative discipline short of dismissal, I would hold that the 
arbitrator lacked authority to order two days of unpaid 
suspension, and remand to the Superior Court for entry of an 
order that the arbitrator's decision be revised accordingly. 
  
                     
16 
 
district and the need for elevation of performance standards" in 
determining whether the school district has proved grounds for 
dismissal.  The court decouples this consideration into two 
separate criteria, applicable to different enumerated grounds 
for dismissal, in a manner that I believe is not supported by 
the statutory language and will prove unworkable in practice.   
 
The court breaks the six enumerated grounds warranting 
dismissal, set forth in G. L. c. 71, § 42, third par., into two 
categories of misconduct, namely, "performance-based" misconduct 
on the one hand, and misconduct that "jeopardize[s] the safety 
or self-esteem of students in the classroom setting"  on the 
other.  Ante at  .  The category of misconduct at issue, the 
court holds, determines whether the arbitrator is to consider 
"the need to raise performance standards," or "the best 
interests of the pupils primarily in light of the pupils' 
interest in a safe learning environment" in determining whether 
the school district has proved grounds for dismissal.  Ante at  
.  The court concludes that the arbitrator here exceeded his 
authority by applying the former criterion, where the conduct at 
issue fell into a category demanding application of the latter.   
 
By dividing the six enumerated grounds into two classes of 
misconduct, the court creates an artificial distinction that is 
not borne out by the statute.  The statute simply enumerates the 
grounds warranting dismissal in one unbroken list, and provides 
17 
 
generally that "the arbitrator shall consider the best interests 
of the pupils in the district and the need for elevation of 
performance standards."  See G. L. c. 71, § 42, third & fifth 
pars.  It does not direct arbitrators to cabin their 
consideration of these factors depending on the type of 
misconduct determined to have occurred. 
 
Moreover, it is far from clear that, in practice, 
"performance-based" conduct is readily distinguishable from 
misconduct that "has jeopardized the safety or self-esteem of 
students in the classroom setting."  Neither is it evident that 
misconduct grouped in the latter category, including misconduct 
bearing the somewhat indeterminate label of "conduct unbecoming 
a teacher," will in fact jeopardize students in such a manner.10  
 
     10 Indeed, it is difficult to see how the conduct at issue 
in MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 616 
(1961), which the court cites, ante at   -- a teacher's 
muttering the words "son of a bitch" to the superintendent at a 
meeting of school personnel -- "jeopardized the safety or self-
esteem of students in the classroom setting."  In cases such as 
MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, supra, it is not clear 
whether the court's formulation directs arbitrators to consider 
"the need to raise performance standards" or "the best interests 
of the pupils primarily in light of the pupils' interest in a 
safe learning environment." 
 
 
In any event, MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, supra, 
was decided prior to the Legislature's enactment of the Reform 
Act in 1993, which amended the statutory scheme governing the 
dismissal of teachers.  See St. 1993, c. 71, § 44.  Under the 
old version of the statute, teacher dismissal was measured 
against a "good cause" standard, rather than the "just cause" 
benchmark that currently prevails.  Compare G. L. c. 71, § 42, 
as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44, with G. L. c. 71, § 42, 
as amended through St. 1988, c. 153, §§ 4-6.   The court cites 
                     
18 
 
 
In any event, the court's conclusion that the arbitrator 
here put undue weight on "the pupils' interest in the academic 
success of their school" simply misconstrues the arbitrator's 
findings.  Ante at  .  As an initial matter, the arbitrator's 
weighing of the mandatory student-interest and performance 
criteria was not necessary to his decision, as he found that the 
school district had not sustained its burden of proving an 
enumerated ground for dismissal because the misconduct at issue 
was minor, not serious.  After so finding, the arbitrator went 
on to state that, "[e]ven if Dr. Zagaeski's words toward [the 
student] were characterized as serious rather than a minor act 
of conduct unbecoming a teacher (which is not the view of this 
arbitrator), . . . the district has not proven grounds for 
dismissal because the best interests of the pupils in the 
district and the need for elevation of performance standards 
warrant the retention of Dr. Zagaeski."    
 
Instead of "permitt[ing] the pupils' interest in the 
academic success of their school to override their interest in a 
safe, supportive classroom environment," as the court suggests, 
this case as providing an example of "conduct unbecoming a 
teacher" that has persisted through the amendment.  Ante at  .  
To my mind, however, the question whether the conduct at issue 
in the pre-amendment case of MacKenzie v. School Comm. of 
Ipswich, supra, would constitute "just cause" for dismissal 
under the amended version of G. L. c. 71, § 42, is not free from 
doubt.  See Geller, supra at 233 n.9 (Cordy, J., concurring) 
(Legislature's substitution of "just cause" for "good cause" 
demonstrates intent to restrict conduct justifying dismissal to 
"serious misconduct"). 
                                                                  
19 
 
the arbitrator properly treated the statutory criteria as 
interconnected.  The arbitrator noted the "rapport" that 
Zagaeski had developed with his students over the course of the 
school year, as well as the atmosphere of "mutual respect" that 
he had cultivated in his classroom, in part through the use of 
humor and a less hierarchical approach to teaching.  Zagaeski 
"tried to create a culture of comfort in which the students 
would feel safe and at ease" and "developed a teaching style 
designed to meet the students at the level they understood, in 
an environment that made them comfortable and helped them to 
achieve academically." This teaching style contributed to 
Zagaeski's "record of impressive accomplishment in helping a 
relatively challenged group of students to achieve success."  
 
Therefore, in light of Zagaeski's "proven excellence as a 
teacher over the course of his decade of work in the Lexington 
Public Schools," the arbitrator concluded that "the best 
interests of the pupils and the need for elevation of 
performance standards warrant the retention of Dr. Zagaeski."  
In so doing, the arbitrator acted within his authority by 
considering in an integrated manner the two factors that G. L. 
c. 71, § 42, fifth par., mandates be taken into account. 
 
In sum, I would hold that the arbitrator was authorized to 
conclude, as he did, that Zagaeski had not engaged in the 
serious misconduct necessary in the first instance to establish 
20 
 
the statutory ground of conduct unbecoming to a teacher, that 
consideration of the mandatory best-interest and performance 
factors led to the same result, and that the school district had 
therefore failed to carry its burden of proving a ground 
warranting dismissal.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent.