Title: Elkins v. Super. Ct.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S139073
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 6, 2007

1
Filed 8/6/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JEFFREY ELKINS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S139073 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A111923 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA 
)  
COSTA COUNTY,  
) 
 
) 
 
Respondent; 
)  
Contra Costa County 
 
)  
Super. Ct. No. MSD01-05226 
MARILYN ELKINS, 
) 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Petitioner Jeffrey Elkins represented himself during a trial conducted in 
marital dissolution proceedings instituted by his wife, Marilyn Elkins (real party in 
interest), in the Contra Costa Superior Court.  A local superior court rule and a 
trial scheduling order in the family law court provided that in dissolution trials, 
parties must present their case by means of written declarations.  The testimony of 
witnesses under direct examination was not allowed except in “unusual 
circumstances,” although upon request parties were permitted to cross-examine 
declarants.  In addition, parties were required to establish in their pretrial 
declarations the admissibility of all exhibits they sought to introduce at trial.   
Petitioner’s pretrial declaration apparently failed to establish the evidentiary 
foundation for all but two of his exhibits.  Accordingly, the court excluded the 34 
 
2
remaining exhibits.  Without the exhibits, and without the ability through oral 
testimony to present his case or establish a foundation for his exhibits, petitioner 
rested his case.  As the court observed, the trial proceeded “quasi by default,” and 
the court’s disposition of the parties’ property claims demonstrated that the court 
divided the marital property substantially in the manner requested by petitioner’s 
former spouse.   
Petitioner challenges the local court rule and trial scheduling order on the 
grounds that they are inconsistent with the guarantee of due process of law, and 
that they conflict with various provisions of the Evidence Code and the Code of 
Civil Procedure.  Respondent court counters that the promulgation of the rule and 
order comes within its power to govern the proceedings before it, and that its rule 
and order are consistent with constitutional and statutory provisions. 
We need not reach petitioner’s constitutional claim because, as applied to 
contested marital dissolution trials, the rule and order are inconsistent with various 
statutory provisions.1  As we explain below, we reach this conclusion because, 
pursuant to state law, marital dissolution trials proceed under the same general 
rules of procedure that govern other civil trials.  Written testimony in the form of a 
declaration constitutes hearsay and is subject to statutory provisions governing the 
introduction of such evidence.  Our interpretation of the hearsay rule is consistent 
with various statutes affording litigants a “day in court,” including the opportunity 
to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues, ordinarily through 
the oral testimony of witnesses testifying in the presence of the trier of fact.  
Although we are sympathetic to the need of trial courts to process the heavy 
case load of dissolution matters in a timely manner, a fair and full adjudication on 
                                              
1  
Our conclusion does not affect hearings on motions.   
 
3
the merits is at least as important in family law trials as in other civil matters, in 
light of the importance of the issues presented such as the custody and well-being 
of children and the disposition of a family’s entire net worth.  Although 
respondent court evidently sought to improve the administration of justice by 
adopting and enforcing its rule and order, in doing so it improperly deviated from 
state law.   
Subsequent to the trial (and our grant of review) in the present case, 
respondent incorporated much of its trial scheduling order into regularly adopted 
and published local rules of court.  As of January 1, 2007, respondent’s local rules 
were amended to provide that although declarations still are required from each 
witness in a dissolution trial, litigants have the option of calling witnesses for 
direct examination in addition to filing declarations.2  This amendment does not 
render petitioner’s case moot, because the prior rule and order were enforced 
against petitioner.  In addition, the amended rules still require the admission into 
evidence of hearsay declarations, a practice inconsistent with the Evidence Code.   
In addressing the issues raised by petitioner, we also exercise our inherent 
authority to ensure the orderly administration of justice and to settle important 
issues of statewide significance.  (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110; 
In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 593; Konig v. Fair Employment & Housing 
Com. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 743, 745-745, fn. 3; Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
                                              
2  
The local rule effective January 1, 2007, is similar to the trial scheduling 
order except that, in addition to the required declarations, it permits parties to 
present live testimony limited to the scope of the material in the declaration 
(Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, Local Rules, rule 12.8 F.1.a), italics added).  The 
rule also provides that “[a]ny required evidentiary foundation (including 
stipulations) for admission of the proposed exhibits shall be completely set forth in 
the declaration(s), as all rulings will be based on the declarations alone.”  (Id., 
rule 12.8 F.5., italics added.)   
 
4
246, 253, fn. 4.)  In addition to providing guidance to the trial courts, our 
discussion highlights the unusual burdens and restrictions that have been imposed 
upon family law litigants at the local level in response to increasing case loads and 
limited judicial resources.  We observe that this problem may merit consideration 
as a statewide policy matter, and suggest to the Judicial Council that it establish a 
task force for that purpose.   
I 
Marilyn and Jeffrey Elkins were married on April 20, 1980.  They had one 
child, who was born in 1991.  After Marilyn subsequently instituted marital 
dissolution proceedings, the issue of date of separation was bifurcated and tried 
first.  Property issues were to be tried on September 19, 2005.   
The matter proceeded subject to a local rule of court providing that at trials 
in dissolution matters, “[d]irect examination on factual matters shall not be 
permitted except in unusual circumstances or for proper rebuttal.  The Court may 
decide contested issues on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties 
without live testimony.”  (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, Local Rules, former 
rule 12.5(b)(3), eff. July 1, 2005.)  In addition, the rule provided that “[s]ubject to 
legal objection, amendment, and cross-examination, all declarations shall be 
considered received in evidence at the hearing.”  (Ibid.)  Under the rule, a party’s 
failure to file responsive pleadings, including declarations, in the time prescribed 
by the rules authorized the court to “permit the matter to proceed as a default,” or 
order a continuance and impose a monetary sanction on the “untimely party.”  (Id., 
former rule 12.5(b)(4).)   
A trial scheduling order (TSO or order) imposed additional restrictions and 
sanctions.  Like the rule, it ordered that all direct testimony at trial be presented 
prior to trial in the form of declarations “filed in lieu of oral direct testimony, 
 
5
subject to cross-examination.”  Indeed, even if a party’s witness refused to sign a 
declaration, the party was required to file an unsigned declaration.   
Under the TSO, the parties were ordered to file initial declarations executed 
by themselves and by their witnesses 10 court days prior to trial, along with trial 
briefs.  The order provided that the declarations were to “explain” the appended 
complete set of trial exhibits, and that “[a]ny required evidentiary foundation for 
admission of the proposed exhibits shall be completely set forth in the 
declaration(s).”   
Sanctions for failure to comply with the TSO were severe.  “Failure to 
provide initial declarations may result in there being no direct testimony on that 
issue and issue sanctions may result.  Failure to file a trial brief indicates to the 
court that no cases are being relied on by that side.  Failure to provide a 
declaration because a witness refused to sign it shall not excuse the filing of [any] 
unsigned declarations.”  (Italics added.)   
The TSO directed the parties to file responsive declarations and exhibits 
five court days prior to trial, along with any objections to exhibits, as well as 
responsive briefs and any demands for the production of declarants for the purpose 
of cross-examination.  The TSO concluded with the following warning:  “Failure 
to comply with these requirements will constitute good cause to exclude evidence 
or testimony at trial and/or to make adverse inferences or findings of fact against 
the non-complying party.”   
Marilyn, who was represented by counsel, filed her declaration, exhibits, 
and trial brief on September 2, 2005, and her responsive declaration on 
September 8, 2005.  Jeffrey, who was not represented by counsel, filed his trial 
brief and declaration on September 2, 2005.  He failed to attach his exhibits, 
however, and his binder of 36 exhibits was not delivered to the court and to 
opposing counsel until one court day prior to the date set for trial.   
 
6
According to Marilyn’s declaration, the issues to be determined at trial 
included (1) valuation and disposition of the family home; (2) Jeffrey’s right to 
reimbursement for postseparation improvements to the home; (3) the 
characterization and division of a multimillion-dollar litigation settlement awarded 
to Jeffrey’s business; (4) the amount of Jeffrey’s income from specified sources; 
(5) the characterization and division of assets withdrawn by Jeffrey from 
community accounts; (6) division of a retirement account held in Marilyn’s name; 
(7) the status of certain property declared to be the separate property of Marilyn; 
(8) division of the contents of a joint safe deposit box; and (9) Marilyn’s attorney 
fees.  The issue of child support was reserved, and the parties waived spousal 
support.   
The matter came on for trial.  Counsel for Marilyn objected to all but two of 
Jeffrey’s exhibits because, contrary to the TSO, Jeffrey’s declaration failed to refer 
to the exhibits or offer a basis for their admission into evidence.  The court had not 
received its copy of Jeffrey’s declaration or exhibits when trial began, forcing it to 
review Jeffrey’s copy on the bench.  Marilyn’s counsel announced he would not 
cross-examine Jeffrey if the court sustained counsel’s objection to Jeffrey’s 
exhibits, and asserted that Jeffrey therefore was “not entitled to offer any further 
evidence.”   
When Jeffrey explained that the procedure he had followed was the same 
he had engaged in at the trial of the bifurcated issue of the date of separation, the 
court admonished Jeffrey that he had misunderstood the objection raised by 
Marilyn’s counsel.  The court explained:  “In order to get a document admitted 
into evidence under the trial scheduling order . . . it says that the evidentiary basis 
and foundation for each exhibit must be set forth in the declaration so the other 
side can object to see, you know, if exhibits have an evidentiary basis or not.  And 
[Marilyn’s counsel is] saying that those exhibits don’t have any foundation in your 
 
7
declaration.  [¶]  So if you can point me to the foundations in your declarations, 
then we — we’ll dispose of that argument quickly[.]  If not those — those exhibits 
that don’t have an evidentiary foundation will be stricken.”  (Italics added.) 
The court provided a “typical example of what I’m talking about with 
foundation,” noting that Jeffrey’s proposed exhibit No. 5 was not referred to in 
Jeffrey’s declaration, “[s]o there’s no way of knowing what this document is 
without any testimony — direct testimony saying what this is or what it purports to 
[be].”  (Italics added.)  Jeffrey attempted to explain that his exhibit No. 5 “refers to 
an accounting given to my wife — given by my wife to me, and this document is 
in relation to that.”   
The court responded:  “I understand that.  I’ve already reviewed your 
declaration.  Tentatively, I am going to rule in favor of [Marilyn].  I’m going to 
allow you at one of the breaks that we have so as not to disrupt the flow right now 
to rethink your argument and give me the specific evidentiary foundations for 
these documents, but I don’t see it in your declaration.  Particularly, the one we 
were specifically taking about, Exhibit 5, I don’t see any specific reference to it in 
your declaration.  There’s a general reference to a general category.”  (Italics 
added.)  Jeffrey responded:  “Your Honor, there are no specific references in any 
document.”  The court, after asking Jeffrey not to interrupt, continued:  “There’s a 
general reference, and under that general category, arguably, every document 
that’s ever been filed in this case would be generally referred to, but what’s 
required under the trial scheduling order are the specific evidentiary foundations 
so that I can rule on them.  [¶]  There being no evidentiary support for [Jeffrey’s 
exhibits] with the exception of Exhibit 3 and 12 [to which counsel for Marilyn had 
not objected because the foundation for the evidence appeared in Jeffrey’s 
declaration], the objections will be sustained tentatively subject to further 
argument after the morning break.”  (Italics added.)  No such break ensued.   
 
8
Marilyn’s declaration and exhibits were admitted into evidence, and she 
rested her case.  Counsel for Marilyn objected to any consideration of the 
proposed order filed by Jeffrey because the filing of that document was untimely 
under the TSO.   
The court stated its understanding, based upon Jeffrey’s declaration, that 
Jeffrey did not wish to cross-examine Marilyn and that he consented to a 
dissolution of the marriage.  Jeffrey stated he was resting his case.  The court 
confirmed that Jeffrey had withdrawn his request to cross-examine Marilyn, and 
Jeffrey added that he also wished to withdraw his request to cross-examine expert 
witness Eggers.  The court stated:  “Well, before you rest, I’m assuming you 
would like to admit into evidence your declaration,” but Jeffrey stated he did not 
wish to do so.  Accordingly, Jeffrey’s declaration was not admitted into evidence.  
Without providing the anticipated “morning break,” the court invited closing 
argument.  Although observing that the trial was proceeding “quasi by default, so 
to speak,” the court stated that both parties still should address the subjects of “the 
furniture lists” and the contents of the safe deposit box.  Counsel for Marilyn 
responded that those issues had been settled by stipulation prior to trial.   
Jeffrey confirmed the stipulations and further offered to relinquish his 
interest in the family home and in his automobile.  The court responded that 
Jeffrey’s offer was too drastic and that the court would permit him to reconsider, 
stating that the court would “render a decision along the lines of [counsel for 
Marilyn’s] proposed order after trial, despite your request here, because that was 
not what was before me to be tried today.  And so the tenor of what you’ve just 
said is in contrast to the declaration that you submitted to me that I prepped on, 
your trial brief . . . .”   
Jeffrey responded that he was not referring to the proposed order he had 
submitted prior to trial.  He declared:  “My concern is that I came into the trial 
 
9
with the intent of presenting my position, and I’m being cut out of that completely 
with only reliance on two exhibits which are — no way can defend my position.  
So I might as well give up my position and leave it to the best well-being of my 
family.”  (Italics added.)   
The court responded that Jeffrey would be well advised to secure legal 
counsel, and that the exclusion of Jeffrey’s exhibits would not lead to an order 
depriving him of his interest in the family home, referring again to the proposed 
order submitted prior to trial by Marilyn’s counsel.  Jeffrey responded:  “Your 
Honor, if you take a spreadsheet and you add up and deduct everything that 
[counsel for Marilyn] is asking for, I am left with nothing.  Zero dollars.  Zero 
house.  Zero car.  Nothing.  So what’s the difference?”   
The court took the matter under submission.  Marital status was terminated, 
and additional issues were reserved for future trial.  The court asked the parties to 
decide by the end of the week whether to submit a settlement agreement 
(presumably reflecting Jeffrey’s last-minute waiver of any interest in the 
community property) or instead to ask the court to rule upon the proposed orders 
that were submitted to the court prior to trial.  Apparently the parties selected the 
latter option; on October 3, 2005, the court filed a final disposition of the property 
issues still reflecting Jeffrey’s half-interest in the family home.  The order noted 
the parties’ stipulation concerning child custody and visitation and the court’s 
reservation of jurisdiction over the matter of child support.  By further stipulation, 
the parties waived spousal support, and the court’s jurisdiction over that issue was 
terminated.  The community interest in Marilyn’s retirement account was divided, 
and the court resolved the additional property issues identified in Marilyn’s 
declaration in a manner substantially reflecting the order proposed by Marilyn.   
Jeffrey filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition in the Court of 
Appeal.  He asserted that there was no statutory authority for the local rule and 
 
10
order preventing the parties from presenting the direct examination of witnesses 
and requiring the evidentiary foundation for proposed exhibits to be established in 
a declaration filed well in advance of trial.  He further argued that the local rule 
and order established a system of “trial by declaration” that violated due process 
principles and placed an “unreasonable burden” on litigants.  Jeffrey’s petition 
also contended that the sanctions established by the rule and order were 
inconsistent with the policy favoring trial on the merits, and that their enforcement 
by the trial court constituted an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of the 
judgment that resolved the parties’ community property dispute.   
The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition.  We subsequently 
granted petitioner’s petition for review and ordered the Contra Costa County 
Superior Court to show cause why the challenged local rule and trial scheduling 
order should not be deemed invalid for the reasons stated in the petition for writ of 
mandate or prohibition.3  Prior to hearing oral argument, this court requested and 
received briefing on the question whether the local rules and order conflicted with 
the hearsay rule.  (Evid. Code, § 1200.)  
                                              
3  
Thereafter, we invited and received amicus curiae briefs from the Family 
Law Section of the Contra Costa Bar Association, the California Association of 
Certified Family Law Specialists, and the Northern and Southern California 
Chapters of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, who were joined in 
their brief in support of petitioner by the Los Angeles County Bar Association, the 
Los Angeles County Bar Association Family Law Section, the Orange County Bar 
Association, the Honorable Donald B. King, Justice of the First District Court of 
Appeal (Retired), the Honorable Sheila Prell Sonenshine, Justice of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal (Retired), the Honorable J.E.T. Rutter, Judge of the 
Orange County Superior Court (Retired), and the Honorable Richard Denner, 
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court (Retired).   
 
11
II 
A 
As respondent court asserts, trial courts possess inherent rulemaking 
authority as well as rulemaking authority granted by statute.  (Rutherford v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 (Rutherford); Code Civ. Proc, 
§§ 128, 177, 575.1; Gov. Code, § 68070.)  “It is . . . well established that courts 
have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well 
as inherent power to control litigation before them.  [Citation.] . . .  ‘. . . That 
inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all 
proceedings connected with pending litigation . . . in order to insure the orderly 
administration of justice.  [Citation.]’ ”  (Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 967.) 
The scope of a court’s inherent rulemaking authority has been discussed in 
various decisions (see, e.g., Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 967-968), and the 
outer limits of such authority are clear.4  A trial court is without authority to adopt 
local rules or procedures that conflict with statutes or with rules of court adopted 
by the Judicial Council, or that are inconsistent with the Constitution or case law.  
(Rutherford, supra, at pp. 967-968; see also Hall v. Superior Court (2005) 133 
Cal.App.4th 908, 916-918.)  As provided in Government Code section 68070, 
subdivision (a):  “Every court may make rules for its own government and the 
government of its officers not inconsistent with law or with the rules adopted and 
prescribed by the Judicial Council.”  (Italics added; see also 2 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Courts, § 204, p. 272; id. (2006 supp.) § 204, pp. 87-88.)  
                                              
4  
In speaking of the limits of a trial court’s authority, we note that 
constitutional issues concerning separation of powers between the judicial branch 
and the legislative branch are not involved in the present case.  (See, e.g., Superior 
Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45.)   
 
12
In sum, local courts may not create their own rules of evidence and procedure in 
conflict with statewide statutes. 
Reviewing courts have not hesitated to strike down local court rules or 
policies on the ground they are inconsistent with statute, with California Rules of 
Court promulgated by the Judicial Council, or with case law or constitutional law.  
Appellate decisions have invalidated local rules or restricted their application in 
many areas of affected litigation, including dissolution actions,5 litigation under 
the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Gov. Code § 68600 et seq.) (fast track 
litigation),6 complex litigation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400 et seq.),7 and 
general civil litigation.8  We also have disapproved rules and procedures adopted 
                                              
5 
In Hogoboom v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 653, 656, for 
example, the reviewing court invalidated a trial court rule imposing its own family 
law mediation fee in addition to fees specifically established by statute.  In 
McLaughlin v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 473, 481, the reviewing 
court held that a local rule denied due process of law in purporting to permit a 
custody mediator to make a written recommendation to the court without 
providing a factual basis and without facing cross-examination.   
6 
See Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 655 (local 
courts cannot shorten the statutory notice period or alter standards for production 
of evidence for summary judgment hearings); Hock v. Superior Court (1990) 221 
Cal.App.3d 670, 673-674 (invalidating local fast track rule under which counsel 
could not be substituted subsequent to trial setting conference without court’s 
approval).   
7  
See First State Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 324, 336 
(invalidating trial court’s case management order that prohibited filing motions for 
summary judgment absent compliance with various nonstatutory conditions).   
8  
See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1086 (local 
rule authorizing granting motion for summary judgment based solely on the 
absence of opposition was inconsistent with applicable statute); Pacific Trends 
Lamp & Lighting Products, Inc. v. J. White, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1131, 
1135-1136 (local rule improperly required parties to “meet and confer” prior to 
filing motion for new trial; sanctions for violation of local rule were inconsistent 
with statutory procedure); Sierra Craft, Inc. v. Magnum Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
13
by the Courts of Appeal (see People v. Pena (2004) 32 Cal.4th 389, 400), as well 
as rules adopted by the Judicial Council.  (See People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 
950, 963.) 
A common theme in the appellate decisions invalidating local rules, and 
one that also appears in the present case, is that a local court has advanced the 
goals of efficiency and conservation of judicial resources by adopting procedures 
that deviated from those established by statute, thereby impairing the 
countervailing interests of litigants as well as the interest of the public in being 
afforded access to justice, resolution of a controversy on the merits, and a fair 
proceeding.  
In Lammers v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1309, for example, a 
local court rule governing family law proceedings required the parties to file a 
timely request that the court review the case file prior to a hearing on a contested 
matter.  In order to avoid obvious constitutional issues, the reviewing court refused 
to endorse the trial court’s view that the local rule relieved the court of the 
obligation to read the case file at all when the request to do so was untimely.  The 
Court of Appeal explained that “a measure implemented for the sake of efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page)  
64 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1255-1256 (local rule improperly permitted grant of 
summary judgment on grounds inconsistent with statute); Kalivas v. Barry 
Controls Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1158 (Kalivas) (local rule governing 
summary judgment requiring that parties file joint statement of disputed and 
undisputed facts was invalid because it was inconsistent with statute); Wells Fargo 
Bank v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 918, 922-923 (invalidating local 
rule requiring “extensive” or “complicated” motions for summary judgment to be 
specially set under notice period shorter than that established by statute); St. 
Vincent Medical Center v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1030, 1033-
1034 (invalidating trial-setting-conference order shortening time for exchange of 
expert witness lists to less than what was provided by statute).   
 
14
cannot jeopardize the constitutional integrity of the judicial process [citation].  In 
other words, court congestion and ‘the press of business’ will not justify depriving 
parties of fundamental rights and a full and fair opportunity to present all 
competent and material evidence relevant to the matter to be adjudicated.”  (Id. at 
p. 1319.)9 
This court made similar observations in Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 
Cal.4th 469 (Garcia), involving fast track litigation.  (Gov. Code § 68600 et seq.)  
We concluded a trial court was without authority to dismiss an action for failure to 
comply with local fast track rules, because such a dismissal contravened a statute 
establishing that sanctions for failure to comply with these rules should fall on 
counsel, and not on the party, if counsel was responsible for the failure to comply.  
(Garcia, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 471.) 
We rejected the trial court’s argument that such power to dismiss was 
essential to serve the goal of reducing delay in litigation.  We pointed out that the 
Trial Court Delay Reduction Act did not elevate delay reduction over the right of a 
litigant to present his or her case to the court, nor was delay reduction favored over 
deciding cases on the merits.  “ ‘Cases filed in California’s trial courts should be 
resolved as expeditiously as possible, consistent with the obligation of the courts 
                                              
9  
See Lokeijak v. City of Irvine (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 341, 342 
(disapproving a local court policy discouraging the filing of motions for summary 
judgment because, according to the local courts, the statutory procedure was 
“unduly time consuming”); Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1532 
(trial court’s policy of referring summary judgment motions to a referee did not 
comport with statute; “ ‘[e]fficiency is not more important than preserving the 
constitutional integrity of the judicial process’ ”); see also Mediterranean 
Construction Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 257, 
265 (trial court erred in declining to hear oral argument on a motion for summary 
judgment; reviewing court urged trial courts not to “elevate judicial expediency 
over [a statutory] mandate”).   
 
15
to give full and careful consideration to the issues presented, and consistent with 
the right of parties to adequately prepare and present their cases to the courts.’  
[Citation.]  Thus, in establishing delay reduction programs, the Legislature 
recognized competing public policy considerations and ‘attempt[ed] to balance the 
need for expeditious processing of civil matters with the rights of individual 
litigants.’  [Citation.]”  (Garcia, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 479-480.) 
B 
Although some informality and flexibility have been accepted in marital 
dissolution proceedings, such proceedings are governed by the same statutory 
rules of evidence and procedure that apply in other civil actions (with exceptions 
inapplicable to the present case).  The Family Code establishes as the law of the 
state — and superior courts are without authority to adopt rules that deviate from 
this law — that except as otherwise provided by statute or rule adopted by the 
Judicial Council, “the rules of practice and procedure applicable to civil actions 
generally . . . apply to, and constitute the rules of practice and procedure in, 
proceedings under [the Family Code].”  (Fam. Code, § 210; In re Marcus (2006) 
138 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017; In re Marriage of Mallory (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 
1165, 1170; cf. Fewel v. Fewel (1943) 23 Cal.2d 431, 438-439 (conc. opn. of 
Traynor, J.) (Fewel); see also 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) 
Husband and Wife, § 99, pp. 152-154; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: 
Family Law (The Rutter Group 2007),  ¶¶ 13:80, 13:81, pp. 13-22-13.23; 
Samuels & Mandabach, Practice Under the Cal. Family Code (Cont.Ed.Bar 2007 
ed.) §§ 16.3-16.5, pp. 745-746.) 
The rule and order that were applied in the present case called for the 
admission of declarations in lieu of direct testimony at trial.  It is well established, 
however, that declarations constitute hearsay and are inadmissible at trial, subject 
to specific statutory exceptions, unless the parties stipulate to the admission of the 
 
16
declarations or fail to enter a hearsay objection.  (Evid. Code, § 1200; Lacrabere v. 
Wise (1904) 141 Cal. 554, 556-557 (Lacrabere); see also Estate of Fraysher 
(1956) 47 Cal.2d 131, 135; Fewel, supra, 23 Cal.2d at pp. 438-439 (conc. opn. of 
Traynor, J.); Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. McGrath (2005) 128 
Cal.App.4th 1093, 1107; Windingo Mills v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. 
(1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 586, 597; Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 
479, 484-485 (Reifler); In re Estate of Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 805.)  
The law provides specific exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay 
evidence (see, e.g., Evid. Code, § 1220 et seq.), including those governing the 
admission of affidavits or declarations.  For example, in the marital dissolution 
context, Family Code section 2336 requires various items of proof of fact to be 
submitted to the court in support of a default judgment and requires such proof to 
be in the form of an affidavit.  (Fam. Code, § 2336, subd. (a).)  But there is no 
general statutory exception to the hearsay rule for contested marital dissolution 
trials.  On the contrary, the existence of a specific statutory exception for default 
judgments, where an adversary proceeding is waived or forfeited, only serves to 
support the general rule that hearsay declarations are inadmissible at contested 
marital dissolution trials.  
Another statutory exception to the hearsay rule permits courts to rely upon 
affidavits in certain motion matters.  (Code Civ. Proc, § 2009.)10  Although 
affidavits or declarations are authorized in certain motion matters under Code of 
                                              
10  
Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 provides: “An affidavit may be used 
to verify a pleading or a paper in a special proceeding, to prove the service of a 
summons, notice, or other paper in an action or special proceeding, to obtain a 
provisional remedy, the examination of a witness, or a stay of proceedings, and in 
uncontested proceedings to establish a record of birth, or upon a motion, and in 
any other case expressly permitted by statute.”  (Italics added.)  
 
17
Civil Procedure section 2009, this statute does not authorize their admission at a 
contested trial leading to judgment.  As this court explained in Lacrabere, supra, 
141 Cal. 554, Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 “has no application to the 
proof of facts which are directly in controversy in an action.  It was not intended to 
have the effect of changing the general rules of evidence by substituting voluntary 
ex parte affidavits for the testimony of witnesses.  The section only applies to 
matters of procedure — matters collateral, ancillary, or incidental to an action or 
proceeding — and has no relation to proof of facts the existence of which are 
made issues in the case, and which it is necessary to establish to sustain a cause of 
action.”  (Lacrabere, supra, at pp. 556-557, italics added; see also Fewel, supra, 
23 Cal.2d at p. 438 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.) [“The fact that section 2009 permits 
[the admission of affidavits] ‘upon a motion’ does not mean that the issues in a 
contested case may be determined and a judgment rendered on the basis of written 
statements of parties not before the court”]; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice 
Guide: Family Law, supra, ¶ 13:106, p. 13-30.) 
The same point was emphasized in Reifler, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 479.  In 
that case the Court of Appeal considered a challenge to a Los Angeles Superior 
Court policy of adjudicating long-cause hearings on postjudgment motions in 
marital dissolution matters solely on the basis of affidavits.  The reviewing court 
acknowledged that affidavits ordinarily are excluded as hearsay, but concluded 
Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 provides a hearsay exception that grants a 
trial court discretion to decide motions on the basis of affidavits — even when 
facts are controverted — but only so long as the controverted facts do not require 
factfinding resulting in a judgment.  (Reifler, supra, at pp. 484-485.)  The court 
expressed no doubt that hearsay was inadmissible at a contested marital 
dissolution trial.   
 
18
A recent decision by this court demonstrates the limited application of 
Code of Civil Procedure section 2009, and also illuminates the policy underlying 
application of the hearsay rule when questions of credibility arise, as they certainly 
do in dissolution trials.  (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717 (Johnson).)  In 
Johnson, we concluded that at a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence 
in a criminal case (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the prosecution cannot carry its burden 
by submitting affidavits in lieu of live testimony.  The pertinent statute, Penal 
Code section 1538.5, did not provide for such a procedure, and the historic 
practice long had been to require oral testimony.  (Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 
pp. 726, 728.) 
Moreover, as we explained in Johnson, “allowing a prosecutor to oppose a 
suppression motion with written affidavits in lieu of live testimony would be 
inconsistent with the trial court’s vital function of assessing the credibility of 
witnesses.”  (Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.4th. at p. 729, fn. 8; see id. at p. 726.)  A 
suppression motion “presents issues as to which the credibility of witnesses often 
is of critical significance” (id. at p. 731), and the witness’s personal presence and 
oral testimony is significant because it “ ‘enable[s] the trier of fact to consider the 
demeanor of the witness in weighing his testimony and judging his credibility.’ ” 
(Id. at p. 733.)   
We also observed in Johnson that, unlike a pretrial suppression motion, the 
motions referred to in Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 are on “preliminary or 
ancillary procedural matters” that historically have been decided on the basis of 
affidavits alone, whereas it is well settled that section 2009 does not change the 
rules of evidence.  (Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 730.)  Quoting Lacrabere, 
supra, 141 Cal. 554, we confirmed that section 2009 “ ‘has no relation to proof of 
facts the existence of which are made issues in the case, and which it is necessary 
 
19
to establish to sustain a cause of action.’ ” (Johnson, supra, at p. 730, italics 
added.)   
We conclude that respondent’s rule and order are inconsistent with the 
hearsay rule to the extent they render written declarations admissible as a basis for 
decision in a contested marital dissolution trial.  As we shall discuss, our 
conclusion is consistent with fundamental principles established in other statutes.  
All relevant evidence is admissible, including evidence bearing on the issue of 
witness credibility (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 351), and the oral testimony of witnesses 
supplies valuable evidence relevant to credibility, a critical issue in many marital 
dissolution trials.  Permitting oral testimony rather than relying upon written 
declarations also is consistent with the historically and statutorily accepted 
practice of conducting trial by means of the oral testimony of witnesses given in 
the presence of the trier of fact.  (See Evid. Code, §§ 711, 780; Code of Civ. Proc., 
§§ 2002, 2005.)  The conclusion we reach also permits us to avoid the difficult 
question whether the local rule and order violate petitioner’s right to due process 
of law, “[m]indful [as we are] of the prudential rule of judicial restraint that 
counsels against rendering a decision on constitutional grounds if a statutory basis 
for resolution exists.” ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 1178, 1190.)  This rule directs that “if reasonably possible, statutory 
provisions should be interpreted in a manner that avoids serious constitutional 
questions.”  (Id. at p. 1197.) 
As noted, evidence bearing on the issue of credibility of witnesses comes 
within the basic rule that all relevant evidence is admissible, except as specifically 
provided by statute.  (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 351.)  Describing a party’s fundamental 
right to present evidence at trial in a civil case, Witkin observes:  “One of the 
elements of a fair trial is the right to offer relevant and competent evidence on a 
material issue.  Subject to such obvious qualifications as the court’s power to 
 
20
restrict cumulative and rebuttal evidence [citation], and to exclude unduly 
prejudicial matter [citation], denial of this fundamental right is almost always 
considered reversible error.  [Citations.]”  (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) 
Presentation at Trial, § 3 pp. 28-29, italics added.)  Ordinarily, parties have the 
right to testify in their own behalf (Guardianship of Waite (1939) 14 Cal.2d 727, 
730), and a party’s opportunity to call witnesses to testify and to proffer 
admissible evidence is central to having his or her day in court.  (Kelly v. New 
West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 677; see Spector v. Superior 
Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 839, 843, 844.) 
As stated by an appellate court in 1943 with reference to a trial court’s 
refusal to permit a witness to testify in a marital dissolution matter: “We are fully 
cognizant of the press of business presented to the judge who presides over the 
Domestic Relations Department of the Superior Court . . . , and highly commend 
his efforts to expedite the handling of matters which come before him.  However, 
such efforts should never be directed in such manner as to prevent a full and fair 
opportunity to the parties to present all competent, relevant, and material evidence 
bearing upon any issue properly presented for determination.  [¶]  Matters of 
domestic relations are of the utmost importance to the parties involved and also to 
the people of the State of California. . . .  To this end a trial judge should not 
determine any issue that is presented for his consideration until he has heard all 
competent, material, and relevant evidence the parties desire to introduce.”  
(Shippey v. Shippey (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 174, 177, italics added.) 
Oral testimony of witnesses given in the presence of the trier of fact is 
valued for its probative worth on the issue of credibility, because such testimony 
affords the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.  
(Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 64.)  A witness’s demeanor is “part of the 
evidence” and is “of considerable legal consequence.”  (People v. Adams (1993) 
 
21
19 Cal.App.4th 412, 438; see Meiner v. Ford Motor Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 
127, 140-141 [“[O]ne who sees, hears and observes [a witness] may be convinced 
of his honesty, his integrity, [and] his reliability . . . because a great deal of that 
highly delicate process we call evaluating the credibility of a witness is based on 
. . . ‘intuition’ ”].) 
The testimony of witnesses given on direct examination is afforded 
significant weight at trial in ascertaining their credibility; cross-examination does 
not provide the sole evidence relevant to the weight to be accorded their 
testimony.  “In a contested hearing, the precise words and demeanor of a witness 
during direct as well as cross-examination bears on the credibility and weight the 
trier of fact accords the witness’s testimony.  Moreover, observation of a witness 
on direct is important to the planning and execution of effective cross-
examination.”  (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1513-
1514.) 
Ordinarily, written testimony is substantially less valuable for the purpose 
of evaluating credibility.  (Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 269 
[“Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue . . . written submissions 
are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision”]; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. 
Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 414 [“ ‘it’s pretty difficult to weigh 
credibility without seeing the witnesses’ ”].)  “A prepared, concise statement read 
by counsel may speed up the hearing, but it is no substitute for the real thing.  Lost 
is the opportunity for the trier of fact and counsel to assess the witness’s strengths 
and weaknesses, recollection, and attempts at evasion or spinning the facts . . . . [¶] 
. . . [W]ith a scripted statement, prepared and agreed to by one party in advance, 
comes the passage of time and with that lapse may come the party’s unyielding 
acceptance of the script.  Lost to cross-examination is the opponent’s ability to 
 
22
immediately test and dissect adverse testimony.”  (Denny H. v. Superior Court, 
supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514, italics omitted.)   
The historical pattern of a trial as an oral examination of witnesses in the 
presence of the trier of fact rather than an exchange of written declarations is 
reflected in Evidence Code section 711, which provides that “[a]t the trial of an 
action, a witness can be heard only in the presence and subject to the examination 
of all the parties to the action, if they choose to attend and examine.”  (Italics 
added.)  Also in conformity with the historical form of a trial, Evidence Code 
section 780 directs the trier of fact to evaluate witness credibility by, among other 
methods, observing the witness’s demeanor “while testifying” as well as his or her 
“attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the giving of 
testimony.”  (Italics added.)  
Although Code of Civil Procedure section 2002 provides that the testimony 
of a witness may be taken by affidavit,11 deposition,12 or oral examination, 
deposition testimony is admissible at trial only as prescribed by certain statutes not 
at issue in the present case.  Moreover, affidavits (a term including declarations 
made under oath), as explained, constitute hearsay and are inadmissible at trial in 
the absence of stipulation or lack of objection, or as otherwise provided by law.   
The only remaining means recognized in Code of Civil Procedure section 
2002 for taking the testimony of a witness is oral examination.  In a provision that 
again reflects the historical form of the adversary trial in which live witnesses are 
                                              
11 
An affidavit constitutes a “written declaration under oath, made without 
notice to the adverse party.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2003.)   
12  
A deposition constitutes “a written declaration, under oath, made upon 
notice to the adverse party, for the purpose of enabling him to attend and cross-
examine.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2004; see Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: 
Family Law, supra, ¶ 13:125, pp. 13-34-13-35 [use of discovery at trial].)  
 
23
examined in the presence of the parties and the finder of fact, oral examination is 
defined as “an examination in presence of the jury or tribunal which is to decide 
the fact or act upon it, the testimony being heard by the jury or tribunal from the 
lips of the witness.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2005, italics added.)13  
In sum, consistent with the traditional concept of a trial as reflected in 
provisions of the Evidence Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, we conclude 
that respondent’s rule and order calling for the admission and use of declarations 
at trial conflict with the hearsay rule. 
C 
Respondent contends courts have authority to adopt nonstatutory 
exceptions to the hearsay rule and that prior decisions approve of such exceptions 
in marital dissolution matters.  Cases cited in support of the latter proposition, 
however (see, e.g., Reifler, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 479), conclude that statutory 
authorization, namely Code of Civil Procedure section 2009, exists for deciding 
motion matters in marital dissolution proceedings on the basis of declarations.  As 
                                              
13  
Marilyn, real party in interest, contends “sworn declarations of witnesses 
present at the trial and available for cross-examination are not hearsay . . . .”  
Marilyn reasons that when a declaration is properly sworn, the declarant becomes 
a witness who “testifies” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 
2002, and at least as long as the declarant is present at the hearing, the declaration 
does not fall within Evidence Code section 1200’s prohibition on hearsay 
evidence.  We agree with the court in Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. 
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, which rejected a similar argument that an affidavit 
itself constitutes “testimony” at a hearing.  (Id. at p. 731 [“Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2002 cannot be used to read into every other statutory use of the word 
‘testimony’ a license to use affidavits or deposition transcripts for all the same 
purposes as oral examination”].)  Moreover, as petitioner points out, Marilyn’s 
theory would authorize courts to adopt a system of trial by declaration in any civil 
action, despite the restrictions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 and the 
hearsay rule.   
 
24
we have explained, this statute does not authorize the introduction of hearsay 
evidence at a contested trial.  Respondent has not offered any persuasive argument 
in support of its claim that an individual local court may adopt a hearsay exception 
applicable solely to marital dissolution trials despite state law providing that 
marital dissolution proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the 
ordinary rules governing civil trials, except as specified by statute.  (Fam. Code, 
§ 210.)14   
Respondent relies upon this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Brown & 
Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947 (Brown & Yana) for the proposition that courts have 
discretion not to hold a full evidentiary hearing in contested family law matters.  
Respondent’s reliance is misplaced, as we shall explain. 
When parties have been unable (privately or through mediation) to agree on 
custody, “the court shall set the matter for hearing on the unresolved issues.”  
(Fam. Code, § 3185, subd. (a).)  It is undisputed that such a hearing is an ordinary 
adversarial proceeding leading to a “final judicial custody determination.”  (Brown 
& Yana, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 959; see id. at pp. 955-956; Montenegro v. Diaz 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 256; see also In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
25, 31-32.)  But once a judgment has been entered in the custody matter, a post-
judgment motion or request for an order to show cause for a change in custody, 
based upon an objection to the custodial parent’s plan to move away, requires an 
evidentiary hearing only if necessary — that is, only if the moving party is able to 
make a prima facie showing that the move will be detrimental to the child or has 
identified “a material but contested factual issue that should be resolved through 
                                              
14  
The same statutory provision defeats respondent’s claim that English 
tribunals historically resolved marital dissolution actions in courts of equity, in 
which declarations assertedly served as the primary basis for factfinding.   
 
25
the taking of oral testimony.”  (Brown & Yana, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 962; see id. 
at p. 959.)   
Our decision in Brown & Yana, supra, 37 Cal.4th 947, did not suggest 
litigants must make a prima facie showing of some kind in order to be entitled to 
proceed to trial.  Nothing we said undermines the requirement that at a contested 
marital dissolution trial, prior to entry of judgment, the court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the disputed issues, at which the usual rules of evidence 
apply.  Indeed, we explained that a trial court had authority to deny a full 
evidentiary hearing in Brown & Yana in part because the custody issue already 
had been fully litigated and the resulting judgment therefore was entitled to 
substantial deference in the absence of a showing of a significant change of 
circumstances.  (Id. at pp. 955-956, 959-960; see Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 
Cal.3d 531, 535 [change of circumstances requirement is based upon res judicata 
principles]; In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 38.)  Nor did we 
discuss Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 or the hearsay rule in that case.15 
Respondent also refers to Evidence Code section 765 as authority to admit 
hearsay declarations as a means of presenting the testimony of witnesses under 
direct examination.  That statute provides in pertinent part:  “The court shall 
                                              
15  
Respondent also cites County of Alameda v. Moore (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 
1422.  In that case, the court determined that the informality of family law 
proceedings had gone too far when disputed factual matters in a district attorney’s 
child support hearing were determined upon the mere unsworn statements of 
counsel.  Although the court referred to local rules applicable to family law 
motions and contested trials under which declarations could be admitted in 
evidence (id. at p. 1427 & fn. 5), the court did not consider Evidence Code section 
1200, Code of Civil Procedure section 2009, or Family Code section 210, 
provisions the court, of course, lacked authority to disregard.  County of Alameda 
v. Moore, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1422, is disapproved to the extent it is 
inconsistent with our opinion in the present case.  
 
26
exercise reasonable control over the mode of interrogation of a witness so as to 
make interrogation as rapid, as distinct, and as effective for the ascertainment of 
the truth, as may be, and to protect the witness from undue harassment or 
embarrassment.”  (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a).) 
This provision never has been interpreted as affording a basis for 
disregarding the statutory rules of evidence or working a fundamental alteration in 
the nature of a trial.  Respondent’s argument would prove too much; under its 
analysis, Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 would be unnecessary, because 
Evidence Code section 765 (a recodification of former Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2044, enacted in 1872) would confer authority to conduct any hearing or 
trial on the basis of affidavit evidence. 
Respondent contends Evidence Code section 765 should be interpreted to 
afford trial courts the authority to require declarations in lieu of oral direct 
examination of witnesses, because assertedly similar language in rule 611(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.) has been interpreted to supply such 
authority to the federal courts.  (See In re Adair (9th Cir. 1992) 965 F.2d 777, 
779.)  Respondent does not claim, however, that federal procedure includes 
provisions similar to Code of Civil Procedure section 2009, permitting affidavits 
in certain types of proceedings not leading to judgment, nor does respondent 
compare the rules of evidence and procedure we have discussed in the previous 
section of this opinion with the rules applicable in federal district courts.  
(Compare also Fed. Rules Evid., rule 807, 28 U.S.C. [granting courts authority to 
admit reliable hearsay in the court’s discretion].) 
Respondent claims that if we conclude that declarations should be excluded 
as hearsay in contested marital dissolution trials, our decision will overturn settled 
practice and cause serious disruption.  It does not appear, however, that 
respondent’s description of settled practice is accurate.  As is evident from our 
 
27
consultation of treatises and practice manuals, it is well settled that the ordinary 
rules of evidence apply in marital dissolution trials.   
“The same rules of evidence apply at trial in a marital action as in civil 
actions generally.  Thus, facts must be established by admissible evidence, and 
objections must be properly stated and based on the Evidence Code or other 
applicable statutes or court rules.  . . .  [¶]  A litigant has a right to present 
evidence at trial and, although the court can exclude otherwise admissible 
evidence because it is unduly time-consuming, prejudicial, confusing, or 
misleading, outright denial of the right to present evidence is error.  [Citations.]  
The court’s discretion to exclude oral testimony entirely . . . does not apply to 
trials.”  (Samuels & Mandabach, Practice Under the California Family Code, 
supra, § 16.5, pp. 745-746.)  The same source recognizes that some courts 
nonetheless attempt to place special restrictions upon the introduction of evidence, 
noting that “[t]raditionally, trial judges have often regarded trials in marital actions 
as somehow less important than other civil litigation.  This attitude has been both 
recognized and strongly criticized by appellate courts.  [Citations.]”  (Id., § 16.10, 
p. 748; see also 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Husband and Wife, § 99, 
pp. 152, 154 [provisions governing civil trials apply unless otherwise specified by 
statute or Judicial Council rule, including the rules of evidence].)  Another practice 
manual explains:  “At a contested trial, affidavits are not competent evidence; 
though made under oath, they are hearsay . . . .”  (Hogoboom & King, Cal. 
Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, ¶ 13:106, p. 13-30; see also id., ¶ 13:81, p. 13-
22.1.)   
Commenting upon Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Fewel, supra, 
23 Cal.2d 431, and this court’s decision in Lacrabere, supra, 141 Cal. 554, 
respondent asserts we have limited the admissibility of declarations only when 
there is no opportunity for cross-examination.  Although our decisions indeed have 
 
28
noted the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, more broadly they 
have interpreted Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 as applying solely to 
hearings on motions, and not to a trial of issues leading to a judgment.  (See 
Lacrabere, supra, 141 Cal. at pp. 556-567; see also Fewel, supra, 23 Cal.2d at pp. 
438-439 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.).)  Respondent also claims the opportunity for 
cross-examination satisfies the policy underlying the hearsay rule.  As we have 
explained, however, in addition to allowing a party to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, the hearsay rule assures that the witness will appear in the presence of 
the trier of fact on direct examination, thereby further aiding it in evaluating the 
witness’s demeanor and determining his or her credibility.   
Marilyn contends that the distinction between hearings on motions (at 
which Reifler, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 479 permits the introduction of hearsay 
evidence) and trials is illusory in the context of marital dissolution proceedings 
and should not be the basis for our decision in the present case.  As she asserts, in 
many instances the family court retains jurisdiction over marital dissolution 
matters for an extended period, responding to repeated motions for interim rulings 
and for modification of orders.  Yet we have drawn a distinction between hearings 
at which a judgment is entered, and hearings on postjudgment motions.  A 
postjudgment motion for modification of a final child custody order, for example, 
requires the moving party to demonstrate a significant change of circumstances 
warranting departure from the judgment.  (Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at p. 256.)  A presumption exists that the judgment is correct and should not be 
disturbed — a presumption that would not be well founded were the judgment to 
be based upon hearsay (unless admitted into evidence upon stipulation of the 
parties).  Marilyn fails to support her claim that, for the purpose of the hearsay 
rule, there is and should be no procedural or substantive distinction between 
motions and trials in the context of marital dissolution proceedings. 
 
29
D 
Marilyn claims petitioner forfeited any claim challenging respondent’s rule 
barring oral examination of witnesses on direct examination, because he did not 
object on that basis.  We do not agree that petitioner forfeited his claim.  It should 
have been evident to the trial court that petitioner’s inability to proceed stemmed 
both from the local rule precluding direct testimony and the order governing the 
admissibility of evidence.   
In any event, even if petitioner failed to preserve his claim with respect to 
the prohibition on oral examination of witnesses, he certainly objected to the 
exclusion of nearly all of his evidence for noncompliance with the court’s trial 
scheduling order.  The trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning petitioner by 
excluding the bulk of his evidence simply because he failed, prior to trial, to file a 
declaration establishing the admissibility of his trial evidence.  The sanction was 
disproportionate and inconsistent with the policy favoring determination of cases 
on their merits.   
Although authorized to impose sanctions for violation of local rules (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 575.2, subd. (a)), courts ordinarily should avoid treating a curable 
violation of local procedural rules as the basis for crippling a litigant’s ability to 
present his or her case.  As the court declared in Kalivas, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th 
1152, in the absence of a demonstrated history of litigation abuse “[a]n order 
based upon a curable procedural defect [including failure to file a statement 
required by local rule], which effectively results in a  judgment against a party, is 
an abuse of discretion.”  (Id. at p. 1161.)   
This court made a similar point in Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 
in which an attorney failed to file opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
within the time prescribed by local rules.  We concluded that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to consider the tardy opposition.  (Id. at p. 30.)  “ ‘Judges 
 
30
. . . generally prefer to avoid acting as automatons and routinely reject requests by 
counsel to function solely in a ministerial capacity.  Rigid rule following is not 
always consistent with a court’s function to see that justice is done.  Cognizant of 
the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits [citations], 
judges usually consider whether to exercise their discretion in applying local court 
rules and frequently consider documents which have been untimely filed.’ ”  (Id. 
at pp. 28-29, italics added.)16   
Even under the fast track statute, a demanding efficiency scheme that does 
not apply in family law matters (Gov. Code, §§ 68608, subd. (a), 68609, subd. 
(b)), the preference for trying cases on the merits prevails.  For example, in 
Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, the reviewing court 
held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing, in reliance upon a local 
fast track rule, to reopen discovery.  “Strict adherence to these delay reduction 
standards has dramatically reduced trial court backlogs and increased the 
likelihood that matters will be disposed of efficiently, to the benefit of every 
litigant.  [Citation.]  Here, the trial court’s orders promote judicial efficiency by 
maintaining strict time deadlines.  [¶]  But efficiency is not an end in itself.  Delay 
reduction and calendar management are required for a purpose: to promote the just 
resolution of cases on their merits.  [Citations.]  Accordingly, decisions about 
                                              
16  
Terminating sanctions such as an order granting summary judgment based 
upon procedural error “ ‘have been held to be an abuse of discretion unless the 
party’s violation of the procedural rule was willful [citations] or, if not willful, at 
least preceded by a history of abuse of pretrial procedures, or a showing [that] less 
severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the procedural rule.  
[Citations.]’ ”  (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1215; Security Pacific Nat. Bank v. Bradley (1992) 
4 Cal.App.4th 89, 97-98 [“Sanctions which have the effect of granting judgment to 
the other party on purely procedural grounds are disfavored.  [Citations.]”].) 
 
31
whether to grant a continuance or extend discovery ‘must be made in an 
atmosphere of substantial justice.  When the two policies collide head-on, the 
strong public policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing 
policy favoring judicial efficiency.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1246.)  The fast track rules were 
not intended to override the strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on the 
merits when possible (Garcia, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 479), and we see no basis for 
disregarding the same strong public policy in marital dissolution actions.17   
In the present case, the trial court applied the sanction provision of its local 
rules in a mechanical fashion without considering alternative measures or a lesser 
sanction, resulting in the exclusion of all but two of petitioner’s 36 exhibits.  Had 
the court permitted petitioner to testify, he could have provided some foundation 
for his exhibits.  In applying the local rule and order mechanically to exclude 
nearly all of petitioner’s evidence — and proceeding, in the words of the trial 
court, “quasi by default” — the trial court improperly impaired petitioner’s ability 
to present his case, thereby prejudicing him and requiring reversal of the 
judgment.18 
                                              
17  
To demonstrate the harshness of respondent’s application of its rule and 
order, we recall that under the fast track statutes, the burden of sanctions may not 
be imposed upon the client if it was the attorney who was responsible for violating 
the fast track rules.  (Gov. Code, § 68608, subd. (b); Garcia, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
pp. 481-482.)  Under the fast track scheme, had Jeffrey been represented and had 
his counsel been responsible for making the mistakes attributed to Jeffrey, the trial 
court would not have been authorized to impose what amounted to issue sanctions 
affecting the merits of Jeffrey’s case.   
18  
Respondent claims its efforts to assist petitioner were rejected, pointing to 
its offer to allow him to reconsider his position at a break in the court proceedings.  
But the court never announced a break, and the record supports our view that at 
best the court merely offered petitioner an opportunity to demonstrate that his 
declaration actually complied with the rule and order by providing a foundation in 
that document for the admission of his exhibits.   
 
32
III 
Respondent claims “[f]irst and foremost” that efficiency and the 
“expeditious resolution of family law cases” support its rule and order.  It also 
seeks to justify these requirements on the theory that they serve to reduce rancor 
and “adversarial confrontation between estranged spouses,” and to assist the many 
self-represented litigants in the family law courts by “giving them direction as to 
how to prepare for trial, how to frame issues properly, and how to provide 
evidentiary support for their positions and . . . avoid being ‘blindsided’ by the 
adverse party.”   
That a procedure is efficient and moves cases through the system is 
admirable, but even more important is for the courts to provide fair and accessible 
justice.  In the absence of a legislative decision to create a system by which a 
judgment may be rendered in a contested marital dissolution case without a trial 
conducted pursuant to the usual rules of evidence, we do not view respondent’s 
curtailment of the rights of family law litigants as justified by the goal of 
efficiency.  What was observed three decades ago remains true today:  “While the 
speedy disposition of cases is desirable, speed is not always compatible with 
justice.  Actually, in its use of courtroom time the present judicial process seems to 
have its priorities confused.  Domestic relations litigation, one of the most 
important and sensitive tasks a judge faces, too often is given the low-man-on-the-
totem-pole treatment.”  (In re Marriage of Brantner (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 416, 
422.)   
Moreover, the amicus curiae briefs we have received strongly dispute 
respondent’s assertion that its rule and order promote efficiency, reduce rancor or 
costs, promote settlement, or aid unrepresented litigants.  In their brief, the 
Northern and Southern California Chapters of the American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers (Academy) argue that the local rule and order only increase 
 
33
the burden on the trial courts and further strain limited judicial resources, because 
it is more time consuming for the court to examine lengthy declarations than it is 
to listen to testimony, leaving courts “with two options:  (1) spend more time than 
they have available at court to read the lengthy materials, or (2) just give the 
written materials a cursory review, and rule by ‘guesstimate.’  This is not a choice 
favored by litigants, lawyers, or judicial officers.”   
The same brief characterizes as an “absurdity” respondent’s claim that the 
rule and order help self-represented litigants by describing in detail how they must 
prepare for trial.  On the contrary, the brief claims, “[t]he burdens created by the 
local court rule and [order] are so onerous that they overwhelm most attorneys, let 
alone self-represented litigants.”  According to the Academy’s brief, the rule and 
order restrict access to justice by increasing the cost of litigation.  The brief points 
to the added costs of preparing exhaustive declarations of all potential witnesses, 
including an evidentiary foundation for all proposed exhibits, and taking the 
deposition of nonparty witnesses in the event they refuse to prepare a declaration. 
The Family Law Section of the Contra Costa County Bar Association 
commissioned a professional survey of family law practitioners in the county, and 
the great majority of those surveyed were decidedly critical of the rule and order, 
including the successor to the order at issue in the present case, believing the order 
did not increase judicial efficiency and, along with their clients, questioning 
whether courts have the time to read the voluminous binders of declarations and 
exhibits required by the rule.  A substantial majority of family law attorneys in the 
county also reported finding the rule and order inordinately time consuming, 
difficult, and costly to comply with.19   
                                              
19  
The Association of Certified Family Law Specialists (ACFLS) filed a brief 
generally supporting petitioner’s contentions.  The ACFLS’s brief also pointed to 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
34
Respondent suggests its rule and order encourage settlement by “apprising 
both sides, well in advance of trial, of the facts that will be presented.”  Local 
attorneys reported, however, that unfortunately the rule and order have not aided 
settlement, because parties take extreme positions in their declarations, causing an 
increase in animosity and a diminished likelihood of settlement.  The various 
amici curiae, including local practitioners, confidently claim that any increase in 
settlements achieved by the rule and order occur because litigants generally cannot 
afford the substantial added litigation costs created by compliance with the rules.   
We are most disturbed by the possible effect the rule and order have had in 
diminishing litigants’ respect for and trust in the legal system.  The Contra Costa 
survey confirmed that litigants believed the rule and order deprived them of the 
essential opportunity to “tell their story” and “have their day in court,” and felt the 
rule and order caused the lawyers who drafted the declarations to be the persons 
testifying, not themselves.  “Members uniformly report that their clients are 
stunned to be told that they will not get to tell their story to the judge,” and express 
“shock, anxiety and outrage” along with the belief that “they had been denied their 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page)  
specific difficulties caused by respondent’s order and rule.  “With [respondent’s] 
imposition of a discovery cut-off before any judicially supervised settlement, a 
litigant is forced to either forego potentially necessary depositions or [incur] 
unnecessary expense.  This creates a larger schism in the ever-widening two-tiered 
justice system — that for litigants who can afford to opt out of the public court 
system and retain private judges who do not impose unreasonable and arbitrary 
deadlines and that for those who cannot afford to do so.”  Further, the ACFLS 
complains that respondent’s deadlines are very difficult to meet.  For example, a 
party’s notice of intent to call the opposing party as a witness, along with a 
description of “the testimony the party expects to elicit,” is due the same day the 
initial declarations are due.  (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, Local Rules, rule 
12.8 F.1.a) & b), eff. Jan. 1, 2007; ibid., eff. July 1, 2006.)   
 
35
right to have their case heard by a judicial officer.”  Overwhelmingly, practitioners 
criticized the rule and order for creating what their clients understood to be a lesser 
standard of justice for family law litigants. 
A recent statewide survey reflects a similar concern with court procedures 
that do not permit family law litigants to tell their story, a circumstance reported 
by litigants to diminish their confidence in the courts.  (Judicial Council of Cal., 
Admin. Off. of Courts, Rep. on Trust and Confidence in the California Courts 
(2006) Phase II, pp. 31-36 [self-represented litigants “express[ed] frustration that 
they did not have a chance to fully explain their side of the story to the judge”; 
“public trust and confidence in the courts . . . will continue to be negatively 
affected [by] procedures [that] do not permit [litigants] to tell their story at some 
length and in their own words”].) 
We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital 
dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a 
substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by 
counsel.  (See Judicial Council of Cal., Rep on Statewide Action Plan for Serving 
Self-Represented Litigants (2004) Executive Summary, p. 2 [80% of the cases 
have at least one unrepresented party by the time of disposition].)  In its 2006 
report, the Judicial Council estimated that “although family and juvenile cases 
represent 7.5 percent of total filings, they account for nearly one-third of the trial 
courts’ judicial workload . . . .”  (Judicial Council of Cal., Ann. Rep. (2006), p. 26, 
italics added.)   
In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their 
efforts to streamline family law procedures.  But family law litigants should not be 
subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with 
other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trial 
proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute.  It is at least 
 
36
as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a 
judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a 
parent’s future involvement in his or her child’s life, dividing all of a family’s 
assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.  The same judicial 
resources and safeguards should be committed to a family law trial as are 
committed to other civil proceedings.   
Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform 
their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not 
been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their 
difficulties by adopting procedures that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead 
should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources.  (See 
Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin, § 5.30(c).)  As stated in the advisory committee comment 
to the California Standards for Judicial Administration: “It is only through the 
constant exertion of pressure to maintain resources and the continuous education 
of court-related personnel and administrators that the historic trend to give less 
priority and provide fewer resources to the family court can be changed.”  (Advis. 
Com. com., Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin, foll. § 5.30(c).)   
Courts must earn the public trust.  (See Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 10.17, 
subd.(b)(5)(A) & (B).)  We fear that respondent’s rule and order had the opposite 
effect despite the court’s best intentions.20   
                                              
20  
We recommend to the Judicial Council that it establish a task force, 
including representatives of the family law bench and bar and the Judicial Council 
Advisory Committee on Families and the Courts, to study and propose measures 
to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital dissolution 
proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-
represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of 
new rules of court establishing statewide rules of practice and procedure for fair 
and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
37
IV 
The judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal summarily denying the 
petition for writ of mandate or prohibition is reversed, and the matter is remanded 
to that court with directions to issue a writ in terms consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page)  
postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-
represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for 
laypersons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be 
afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court.   
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I agree that the superior court’s local rule and trial scheduling order were 
inconsistent with statutory provisions of the Evidence Code and Code of Civil 
Procedure, particularly the hearsay rule of Evidence Code section 1200.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 15-28.)  I also agree the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding petitioner’s exhibits; because the rule and order were inconsistent with 
state law, enforcing these invalid measures to exclude virtually all of a party’s 
evidence was necessarily an abuse of discretion.  But given the existence of the 
local rule and order at the time of trial, I would not conclude that the trial judge 
acted arbitrarily or unduly “mechanically” in excluding petitioner’s evidence.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.)  The trial court excused one breach of the order 
(petitioner’s late submission of his exhibits) and explained to petitioner the other 
(failure of petitioner’s declaration to establish the foundation for his exhibits).  
The court then offered petitioner an opportunity to cure the violation, an 
opportunity petitioner, for whatever reason, did not pursue.  Despite petitioner’s 
sudden offer to give up his interest in the family home, moreover, the court 
ordered his interest preserved.  In my view, the trial court’s rule and order, rather 
than the particular actions of the court in this case, are to blame for the exclusion 
of petitioner’s evidence. 
Finally, while I join the majority in recommending that the Judicial Council 
study ways for trial courts to balance efficiency and fairness in dissolution 
proceedings (maj. opn., ante, at p. 36, fn. 20), I find it unnecessary to join the 
 
2 
majority’s policy critique of the Contra Costa County rule and order (id. at pp. 32-
36).  The court properly holds the local rule and order invalid because they 
conflict with state statutes, not because they are poor policy.  The criticisms 
voiced by family law practitioners, although important, would be better considered 
by the Judicial Council or the Legislature than by this court.  As we have sound 
statutory grounds for holding the local rule and order invalid, I would leave the 
weighing of competing policy, at least in the first instance, to other institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Elkins v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S139073 
Date Filed: August 6, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: Barry Baskin 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Garrett C. Daily for Petitioner 
 
Law Offices of Marjorie G. Fuller, Marjorie G. Fuller and Shara Beral Witkin for Southern California 
Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Northern California Chapter of the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Los Angeles County Bar Association, Los Angeles County Bar 
Association Family Law Section, Orange County Bar Association, Honorable Donald B. King, Honorable 
Sheila Prell Sonenshine, Honorable J.E.T. Rutter and Honorable Richard Denner as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Petitioner. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Horvitz & Levy, David S. Ettinger; Eisenberg and Hancock and Jon B. Eisenberg for Respondent. 
 
Fancher & Wickland, Paige Leslie Wickland; Harkins & Sargent and Daniel S. Harkins for Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
Fox and Bank, Ronald S. Granberg, Dawn Gray, Linda Seinturier, Kathryn Fox, Brigeda D. Bank; and 
Stephen Temko for Association of Certified Family Law Specialists as Amicus Curiae upon the request of 
the Supreme Court. 
 
Lee C. Pearce for the Family Law Section of the Contra Costa County Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 
upon the request of the Supreme Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Garrett C. Daily 
2915 McClure Street 
Oakland, CA  94609 
(510) 465-3920 
 
Jon B. Eisenberg 
Eisenberg and Hancock 
1970 Broadway, Suite 1200 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 452-2581 
 
Paige Leslie Wickland 
Fancher & Wickland 
155 Montgomery Street, Suite 1400 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 398-4210