Title: Ex parte Nancy Lillian Worley. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: State of Alabama v. Nancy Lillian Worley)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1090631
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 10, 2010

REL: 09/10/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1090631
_________________________
Ex parte Nancy Lillian Worley
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  State of Alabama
v.
Nancy Lillian Worley)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-07-475;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1879)
LYONS, Justice.
A Montgomery County grand jury indicted Nancy Lillian
Worley, the former Secretary of State of Alabama, on charges
1090631
Effective January 1, 2007, these provisions have been
1
amended and renumbered.  The substance of § 17-1-7(b) can now
be found in § 17-17-4; what was formerly § 17-1-7(c) can now
be found unchanged in § 17-17-5.  See Act No. 2006-570, Ala.
Acts 2006.  
2
of felony violations of § 17-1-7(b), Ala. Code 1975, and
misdemeanor violations of § 17-1-7(c), Ala. Code 1975,1
stemming from a letter she wrote to employees of the Office of
Secretary of State, when she was secretary of state, seeking
their vote and support in her campaign for reelection to that
office.  Worley filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.  The
trial court granted the motion in part and entered a judgment
dismissing the felony charges against Worley, holding that
because the misdemeanor statute, § 17-1-7(c), specifically
addressed campaign practices involving subordinates, the more
general felony statute, § 17-1-7(b), was not applicable.  The
trial court also concluded that the State had overreached by
attempting to charge misdemeanor offenses as felony offenses.
A portion of the trial court's order is based on its
conclusion that the State's evidence could not establish both
felony charges and misdemeanor charges.  The State appealed
the trial court's judgment to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's
1090631
3
judgment.  State v. Worley, [Ms. CR-06-1879, November 13,
2009] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).  Worley then
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari; we granted
certiorari review as to whether the State invited the trial
court's error by making a proffer of the evidence before
trial.  We reverse and remand.  
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Worley was the Secretary of State for the State of
Alabama from 2002 to 2006.  She sought reelection to that
office in the November 2006 general election, but she was
defeated.  In March 2007, a Montgomery County grand jury
returned a 10-count indictment against Worley.  The charges
stemmed from a letter Worley had mailed to five employees of
the secretary of state's office during the 2006 Democratic
primary campaign.  For each employee who received a letter,
the State filed two charges against Worley--one count charging
her with a felony violation of § 17-1-7(b) and one count
charging her with a misdemeanor violation of § 17-1-7(c).
Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 of the indictment, the felony
charges, alleged:  
"The Grand Jury of said County charge that, before
the finding of this Indictment, Nancy Lillian
1090631
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted in Worley:  "In Act
2
No. 2006-570, Ala. Acts 2006, effective January 1, 2007, the
Alabama Legislature recodified § 17-1-7(b) as § 17-17-4, Ala.
Code 1975.  That statute now provides:  'Any person who
attempts to use his or her official authority or position for
the purpose of influencing the vote or political action of any
person shall be guilty, upon conviction, of a Class C
felony.'"  ___ So. 3d at ___ n.4.  
4
Worley, alias Nancy Worley, whose name is otherwise
unknown to the Grand Jury, did attempt to use her
official authority or position, to-wit:  the
Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, for the
purpose of influencing the vote or political action
of any person, to-wit: [name of recipient of
letter], by soliciting:  financial contributions,
placement of a bumper sticker on a vehicle,
'door-to-door' 
activities, 
'telephone 
bank'
activities, 
'letter 
writing' 
activities,
'fundraising' activities, the obtaining of a 'yard
sign, and/or the providing of 'clerical' assistance,
in violation of Section 17-1-7(b) [now § 17-17-4] of
the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity
of the State of Alabama."
Section 17-l-7(b), Ala. Code 1975, at the time relevant
to these charges, provided:2
"No person shall attempt to use his or her official
authority or position for the purpose of influencing
the vote or political action of any person.  Any
person who violates this subsection (b) shall be
guilty of a felony and punishable by a fine not to
exceed 
ten 
thousand 
dollars 
($10,000) 
or
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period
not to exceed two years, or both."
Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 of the indictment, the
misdemeanor charges, alleged:
1090631
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted in Worley:  "In Act
3
No. 2006-570, Ala. Acts 2006, effective January 1, 2007, the
Alabama Legislature recodified § 17-1-7(c) as § 17-17-5, Ala.
Code 1975.  The language of the statute remained unchanged."
___ So. 3d at ___ n.5.  
5
"The Grand Jury of said County further charge that,
before the finding of this Indictment, Nancy Lillian
Worley, alias Nancy Worley, whose name is otherwise
unknown to the Grand Jury, an officer or employee of
the State of Alabama, to-wit:  the Secretary of
State for the State of Alabama, did solicit a
political 
campaign 
contribution 
from 
another
employee, to wit:  [name of recipient of letter],
who worked for the said Nancy Lillian Worley in a
subordinate 
capacity, in violation of Section
17-1-7(c) [now § 17-17-5] of the Code of Alabama,
against the peace and dignity of the State of
Alabama."
Section 17-1-7(c), Ala. Code 1975, at the time relevant
to these charges, provided, in relevant part:3
"No person in the employment of the State of
Alabama, a county, or a city whether classified or
unclassified, shall use any state, county, or city
funds, 
property 
or 
time, 
for 
any 
political
activities.  Any person who is in the employment of
the State of Alabama, a county, or a city shall be
on approved leave to engage in political action or
the person shall be on personal time before or after
work and on holidays.  It shall be unlawful for any
officer or employee to solicit any type of political
campaign contributions from other employees who work
for the officer or employee in a subordinate
capacity.  It shall also be unlawful for any officer
or employee to coerce or attempt to coerce any
subordinate employee to work in any capacity in any
political campaign or cause.  Any person who
violates this section shall be guilty of the crime
of trading in public office and upon conviction
1090631
6
thereof, shall be fined or sentenced, or both, as
provided by Section 13A-10-63."
Worley sent the following letter to the five employees
named in the indictment on her campaign letterhead:  
"Dear [name of employee],
"Working together, we have been able to achieve MANY
successes in the Secretary of State's Office over
the past three years.  We have also faced several
challenges, yet our office is stronger today, more
productive, 
more 
service-oriented, 
and 
more
respected than ever before!  THANK YOU!
"You have probably heard by the state government
'grapevine' that I am running for re-election, but
I want to ask for your support and your vote in the
June 6, 2006, Democratic Primary Election.  In 2003,
when I entered the Secretary of State's Office, I
requested that we not discriminate against anyone
because of his/her politics, race, religion, social
status, etc.  Thus, if you choose to support another
candidate, you have every right to make that
decision without any problems from me.
"I am enclosing an envelope on which you may
volunteer, request a yard sign, etc.; however, you
may also choose to destroy this envelope.  You will
be given the same professional respect you have
previously been given if you choose the latter.
"I will be honored if you will attach the enclosed
bumper sticker to your vehicle's bumper or rear
window.  If you need additional bumper stickers,
please call my home/campaign number ... and leave a
message.
"Thank you again for your hard work to make the
Secretary of State's Office one of the best in state
government -- in Alabama and throughout the nation.
1090631
7
"Sincerely yours,
"/s/ Nancy L. Worley
"Nancy L. Worley"  
Included in the envelope with Worley's letter were a
campaign bumper sticker and a pledge envelope on which the
recipient could indicate whether he or she wished to support
the 
campaign 
with 
financial 
contributions 
and/or 
participation
in such activities as fund-raising, letter writing, and
working a telephone bank.  
Worley filed a motion to dismiss all the charges against
her.  The trial court held a hearing on Worley's motion to
dismiss at which the parties presented arguments and at which
the State outlined for the court the evidence it expected to
present at trial.  The trial court then allowed the State to
file a written response to Worley's motion to dismiss.  After
the State filed its response, the trial court held a second
hearing at which it stated that it would be dismissing the
five felony charges.  On July 16, 2007, the trial court
entered a judgment dismissing the five felony charges.  The
trial court stated, in pertinent part:
"Nancy Worley, former Secretary of State, was
indicted on multiple misdemeanor and felony counts.
1090631
8
Both the misdemeanors and felonies arose from the
same act, the mailing of a campaign solicitation
letter ....  The letter itself is unremarkable and
is typical of the solicitations which proliferate in
an election year.  The letter seeks financial
contributions in addition to help with Worley's
re-election campaign.  She promised no retribution
against those who chose to support her opponent and
enclosed a bumper sticker.  
"The crux of the criminal case is that this
letter was mailed to employees within the Secretary
of State's office.  Alabama law expressly seeks to
insulate 
civil 
servants 
from 
the 
political
machinations of their superiors.  Ala. Code §
17-1-7(c) (recodified by Act 2006-570 at Ala. Code
§ 17-17-5) states in pertinent part:
"'It shall be unlawful for any officer or
employee to solicit any type of political
campaign 
contributions 
from 
other 
employees
who work for the officer or employee in a
subordinate capacity.  It shall also be
unlawful for any officer or employee to
coerce or attempt to coerce any subordinate
employee to work in any capacity in any
political campaign or cause.'  Ala. Code §
17-1-7(c) (recodified by Act 2006-570 at
Ala. Code § 17-17-5).
"This section is the only explicit mention of
subordinate civil servants in the statute at issue.
Violation of this section is a misdemeanor.  
"The State, however, elected to also indict
Worley under § 17-1-7(b):
"'Any person who attempts to use his or her
official authority or position for the
purpose 
of 
influencing 
the 
vote 
or
political action of any person shall be
guilty, upon conviction, of a Class C
1090631
9
felony.'  Ala. Code § 17-1-7(b) (recodified
by Act 2006-570 at Ala. Code § 17-17-4).
"The State overreached by trying to turn the
mailing of the letter from a misdemeanor into a
felony.  It is beyond cavil that had the letter not
been sent to subordinates, no criminal liability
would have attached.  How could it?  The letter is
no different from the sort mailed by candidates of
every stripe in every campaign.  Yet, the law which
prohibits mailing the letter to a subordinate
expressly imposes a misdemeanor penalty.  If the
State is correct, then any incumbent candidate who
mails such a letter, stating his office, to any
citizen is guilty of a felony because the felony
law, subsection (b), makes no distinction between
citizens and civil servants.  If the transgression
is mailing the letter to a subordinate, and it is,
the only law declaring such conduct illegal is the
misdemeanor statute."
II. Analysis
On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State
argued that, although the trial court's order had been couched
in terms of statutory construction, the trial court in effect
made a pretrial determination that the evidence submitted by
the State in opposition to Worley's motion to dismiss--
evidence the State averred it expected to present at trial--
could not establish the elements required to prove the felony
charges against Worley.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment of dismissal of the felony
charges.  Worley contended in her petition for a writ of
1090631
10
certiorari that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
conflicted with prior decisions of this Court dealing with the
doctrine of invited error.  
Worley contends that the State invited the trial court's
reliance on the evidence it offered in opposition to the
motion and thus cannot argue that the trial court's judgment
should be reversed based on the trial court's conclusion that
that evidence was insufficient.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
described the State's position before it as follows: 
"The State argues that the trial court erred
when it dismissed the felony charges because, it
says, '[a] jury could reasonably determine, from the
evidence that the State expects to present at trial,
that Worley was guilty of both the felony and
misdemeanor 
offenses arising from her actions
towards the employees of the Secretary of State's
Office.'  (State's brief, at pp. 18-19.)  The State
further argues that, although the trial court's
order 
was 
couched 
in 
terms 
of 
statutory
construction, the trial court had actually made a
pretrial determination that the State's proposed
evidence did not fall within the parameters of the
felony statute.  Thus, the State continues, the
trial court erroneously foreclosed the State from
the opportunity to present its evidence to the jury
so that the jury could determine whether the State's
evidence established the elements of the felony
charges."
___ So. 3d at ___. 
1090631
11
It is undisputed that the State injected in both its
written response to Worley's motion to dismiss and at the
hearings held on that motion a proffer of the evidence it
intended to offer at trial.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
held:
"The difficulty with the trial court's analysis is
that it was based almost entirely on the court's
examination of the evidence it understood the State
would offer at trial and on its determination that
that evidence did not fit within the elements of the
felony statute.  Thus, the trial court's dismissal
of the felony charges was a pretrial fact-based
determination of the evidence the court believed
that the State might or might not have presented at
trial.  That fact-based pretrial determination was
made in error."
___ So. 3d at ___. 
Worley states in her petition for the writ of certiorari:
"The Appeals Court treated this point ...,
finding that the State's overall opposition to the
motion to dismiss, and the State's argument that its
evidence would be sufficient to prove violations of
the felony statute, were sufficient to preserve the
argument (which the State never made below) that the
trial court was barred from considering the facts on
motion to dismiss."
Petition, at 6 (second emphasis added).  Worley asserts that
the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with Archer
Western Contractors, Ltd. v. Benise-Dowling & Assocs., 33 So.
3d 1216, 1219 (Ala. 2009) ("'A party may not avail himself of
1090631
12
error, if any, into which he has led the court; that is called
invited error.'" (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Humphres, 293 Ala. 413, 418, 304 So. 2d 573, 577 (1974))).  
The Court of Criminal Appeals held: 
"Worley sought dismissal of the felony counts on the
ground that the State had improperly charged her
with felony offenses even though, she argued, the
alleged 
improper 
actions 
constituted 
only
misdemeanor offenses.  In order to reach its
determination that the felony counts were due to be
dismissed, the trial court evaluated the evidence
the State intended to present at trial, and it
concluded that all Worley's conduct fell within the
parameters of the misdemeanor statute.  Although the
trial court couched its analysis in terms of
statutory construction, the trial court truly made
a pretrial determination as to the sufficiency of
the evidence, and such a determination is not
permitted by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure
or by Alabama caselaw.  Therefore, the trial court
should have permitted the State to present to the
jury all the evidence it had to offer toward proving
both the felony charges and the misdemeanor charges.
At the conclusion of the State's case, Worley will
have the opportunity to make a motion for a judgment
of acquittal challenging any alleged deficiencies in
the State's attempt to prove a prima facie case, and
the trial court can then properly enter a ruling on
the sufficiency of the State's evidence.  The trial
court erred when it dismissed the felony counts
against Worley."
___ So. 3d at ___.  The Court of Criminal Appeals did not say
that the State's proffer of evidence was sufficient; rather,
1090631
13
the court said that the trial court's ruling, based on nothing
more than the State's proffer, was premature. 
In its brief to this Court, the State argues:
"Simply put, Worley's argument begs two questions:
"1. How else could the State have rebutted
her claim for dismissal that her conduct
did not fall within the felony statute (C.
47-48) 
in 
the 
trial 
court 
without
attempting to show that her conduct did, in
fact, fall within that statute?
"2. When the trial court erroneously held
that Worley's conduct did not fall within
the felony statute, how else could the
State have obtained review of that error
without again arguing--on appeal--that her
conduct did, in fact, fall within that
statute?
"The State did precisely what was required to
obtain appellate review of the trial court's error--
it argued, in response to Worley's motion to
dismiss, that its evidence supported both the felony
and misdemeanor charges--and, on appeal, it argued
that the trial court erred in granting that motion
to dismiss because the evidence supported both
charges.  This, Worley would have this Court
believe, is invited error."
State's brief, at 22 (second emphasis added).  
We do not agree with the State's position.  The State
should have argued to the trial court that the appropriate
time for it to consider Worley's motion to dismiss would have
been at the conclusion of the State's case, not before the
1090631
14
trial, and that, moreover, when the time to consider the
motion did come, the motion should be denied for the following
reasons, thereby setting forth the proffer.  Instead, the
State proceeded immediately to a discussion of the evidence it
expected to be presented at trial, without advising the trial
court that its proffer was premature and that it would be
error for the trial court to rely on it.  
We conclude that the State invited the error of which it
now complains when it laid out for the trial court the
evidence it expected to offer in opposition to Worley's motion
without informing the court that it would be premature for it
to consider that evidence.  The Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment because the trial court
weighed the evidence at the pretrial stage, apparently in
response to the State's invitation to do so, not because the
evidence supported the charges.  Therefore, the Court of
Criminal Appeals' judgment is due to be reversed.  On remand,
the Court of Criminal Appeals should evaluate the trial
court's judgment of dismissal in light of the evidence
submitted by the State in opposition to Worley's motion to
dismiss.  The trial court evaluated the evidence the State
1090631
15
expected to offer against Worley at the State's invitation to
do so; the Court of Criminal Appeals should do likewise.
Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeals should consider the
substantive issues of statutory interpretation that led the
trial court to dismiss the felony charges against Worley in
the context of the State's proffer of evidence before the
trial court. 
III. Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals,
and we remand the cause to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion in the context of the evidence
proferred by the State, including a consideration of the
merits of the State's argument that the trial court erred in
dismissing the felony charges against Worley and a substantive
consideration of the questions of statutory interpretation
that led the trial court to dismiss the felony charges. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Parker, Murdock,
and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Bolin, J., recuses himself.