Title: Ibar v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-522, SC12-2619
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2016

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-522 
____________ 
 
PABLO IBAR,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2619 
____________ 
 
PABLO IBAR,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
 JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 4, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Pablo Ibar appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate 
his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under Florida 
 
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.   
 
In this case, there was a lack of physical evidence connecting Ibar to the 
triple murders.  Ibar’s DNA was not found on a blue t-shirt recovered from the 
crime scene which was allegedly used to partially cover the face of the perpetrator 
whom the State claimed to have been Ibar.  Ibar never confessed to the crime as he 
steadfastly proclaimed his innocence, presented an alibi as to his whereabouts, and 
has always maintained his innocence.   
The crux of the State’s case was a grainy video of the murders taken by a 
video surveillance camera installed in the home of Casmir Sucharski, who was one 
of the victims.  Ibar was identified as one of the perpetrators from photographs 
distilled from this videotape.  Consequently, identification was key. 
 Initially, Ibar was tried with codefendant Seth Penalver, but the first trial 
ended with a hung jury.  Thereafter, Penalver, in a separate trial, was convicted of 
committing these murders and sentenced to death.  This Court reversed Penalver’s 
murder convictions based on numerous errors,  Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 
1137-38 (Fla. 2006), and Penalver was acquitted on retrial.  An essential part of 
Penalver’s defense was the assertion that he was not the subject in the videotape 
and in support of this he utilized an expert in forensic anthropology.  In Ibar’s trial, 
Ibar’s private defense attorney, Kayo Morgan, failed to present a facial 
 
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identification expert or forensic anthropologist despite Ibar’s request and his 
defense lawyer’s agreement to do so.  At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, 
Ibar’s attorney, who detailed a litany of personal and professional issues that were 
occurring at the time of trial, testified that he did not understand “why [he] failed 
in this absolutely critical feature of the case” in not having a facial identification 
expert testify, among other failings.  
As this record bears out, there was simply no excuse for the numerous 
deficiencies and failures of Ibar’s defense attorney.  None of the failures can be 
attributed to strategic moves nor could remotely constitute acceptable conduct for 
an attorney defending a first-degree murder charge with the death penalty being 
sought.  Under any definition of “deficient performance,” Morgan could not be 
deemed to be functioning as defense counsel must perform to fulfill his or her 
crucial obligations to the defendant under the Sixth Amendment.  While there were 
numerous deficiencies in performance, the most salient was the failure of trial 
counsel to present a facial identification expert to explain the physical differences 
between Ibar and the perpetrator alleged to have been him in the video, and to 
demonstrate that the quality of the images were so poor that they were inadequate 
to make a reliable identification.  As we more fully explain, Ibar has established 
prejudice, given the relatively weak case against Ibar with no physical evidence 
linking him to the crime, the critical role of his identification derived from the 
 
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video, and the errors we previously identified in Ibar’s direct appeal.  Simply put, 
we cannot and do not have confidence in the outcome of this trial.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief and remand for a new 
trial. 
BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are set forth in Ibar’s direct appeal of his first-degree 
murder convictions and sentences of death: 
 
On August 25, 1994, Pablo Ibar and Seth Penalver were 
charged with three counts of first-degree murder, one count of 
burglary, one count of robbery, and one count of attempted robbery.  
Penalver and Ibar were initially tried together.  The first jury trial 
ended with a hung jury.  Ibar and Penalver were eventually tried 
separately.  Both Ibar and Penalver were ultimately convicted and 
sentenced to death. 
 
 
On Sunday, June 26, 1994, a Palm Beach County police officer 
discovered a Mercedes SL convertible on fire on a road twelve miles 
south of South Bay.  The car was registered to Casmir Sucharski, 
owner of a nightclub called Casey’s Nickelodeon.  The officer who 
discovered the car notified the Miramar Police Department.  A 
Miramar police officer went to Sucharski’s home to tell him that his 
car had been found.  The officer knocked on the door and received no 
answer.  He stuck his card in the door and left. 
 
 
The next morning, Monday, June 27, 1994, Marie Rogers’ 
mother reported her missing to the Broward County Sheriff’s 
Department.  Rogers had gone to Casey’s Nickelodeon on Saturday, 
June 25, 1994, with her friend, Sharon Anderson, and did not return 
home.  Deputy Christopher Schaub went to Casey’s Nickelodeon and 
learned that Sucharski left the club early Sunday morning with Rogers 
and Anderson.  Schaub then went to Sucharski’s residence.  
Anderson’s car was in the driveway but no one answered the door.  
Schaub found a Miramar Police Department business card in the door 
 
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and a blue T-shirt on the porch.  He peered inside and saw three 
bodies. 
 
 
The police identified the individuals found in the residence as 
Sucharski, Rogers, and Anderson.  All three died of gunshot wounds.  
Because Sucharski had recently installed a video surveillance camera 
in his home, there was a videotape of the actual murders.  The tape 
revealed that on Sunday, June 26, 1994, at 7:18 a.m., two men entered 
through the back sliding door of Sucharski’s home.  The intruder 
alleged to be Ibar initially had something covering his face, but he 
eventually removed it.  The other intruder, alleged to be Seth 
Penalver, wore a cap and sunglasses, which were never removed, and 
carried a firearm.  The videotape showed that one of the intruders had 
a Tec–9 semiautomatic handgun with him when he entered the home.  
The other intruder displayed a handgun only after he went into 
another room and left the camera’s view.  At one point, the intruder 
alleged to be Penalver hit Sucharski with a Tec-9 in the face, knocked 
him to the floor, and beat him on the neck, face, and body.  This 
attack on Sucharski lasted for nearly twenty-two minutes.  The man 
later identified as Ibar shot Sucharski, Rogers, and Anderson in the 
back of the head.  The intruder alleged to be Penalver then shot 
Anderson and Sucharski in the back. 
 
 
During this time, the intruders searched Sucharski’s home.  
They rummaged through the home and entered the bedrooms and the 
garage.  Sucharski was searched and his boots removed.  Sucharski 
struggled and was repeatedly hit by both intruders.  The intruders 
were seen putting things in their pockets.  The State presented 
evidence that Sucharski kept ten to twenty thousand dollars in cash, 
carried a gun, and owned a Cartier watch.  The watch was not found 
and Sucharski’s gun holster was empty. 
 
 
Police took frames from the videotape and produced a flyer that 
was sent to law enforcement agencies.  Three weeks after the murders, 
the Miramar police received a call from the Metro-Dade Police 
Department informing them that they had a man in custody on a 
separate and unrelated charge who resembled the photo on the flyer.  
The man in custody at the Metro-Dade Police Department was Pablo 
Ibar.  Ibar was interviewed by Miramar investigators.  He told police 
he lived with his mother, and that on the night of the murders he had 
 
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been out with his girlfriend, whom he called both Latasha and 
Natasha. 
 
 
Ibar actually lived with several friends in a rented home on Lee 
Street in Hollywood, Florida.  One of his roommates was Jean 
Klimeczko.  Klimeczko initially identified Ibar and Penalver as the 
men on the videotape.  Klimeczko told police that early on the 
morning of the murders, Ibar and Penalver rushed into the Lee Street 
home, grabbed a Tec-9 that was kept at the house, and left.  At the 
second trial, however, Klimeczko had no memory of his earlier 
statements.  Other witnesses who had given earlier statements to 
police that the men in the photo looked like Ibar and Penalver also 
denied making identifications. 
 
 
The jury found Ibar guilty on each charge.  
Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 457-58 (Fla. 2006) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 
549 U.S. 1208 (2007).  After a penalty phase with a jury recommendation of death, 
the trial court sentenced Ibar to death concluding that the aggravators outweighed 
the mitigators.  Id.   
 
On direct appeal,1 we outlined the evidence against Ibar: 
                                          
 
 
1.  Ibar raised the following claims on direct appeal: 
 
(1) whether certain out-of-court statements were “statements of 
identification” as contemplated by section 90.801(2)(c), Florida 
Statutes (1995); (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting witness 
testimony for the purpose of impeaching that testimony; (3) whether 
the trial court erred in admitting the transcript of testimony given by a 
deceased witness in a prior trial; (4) whether the trial court erred in 
allowing the State to introduce hearsay evidence and certain expert 
testimony; (5) whether the trial court erroneously precluded the 
admission of evidence regarding third-party motive and animosity and 
reputation evidence; (6) whether the trial court erred in allowing the 
admission of evidence regarding a live lineup; (7) whether the 
 
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In addition to the statements of [Roxana] Peguera, [Marlene] Vindel, 
[Maria] Casas, and [Jean] Klimeczko identifying Ibar, which Ibar 
concedes was proper as impeachment evidence but not substantive 
evidence, there were other witnesses and items of evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that Ibar was one of the perpetrators of 
this triple homicide.  First, there was a videotape of the murders.  The 
perpetrator identified as Ibar removed his disguise and his face was 
visible on the videotape.  This videotape was played for the jury.  
Gary Foy, one of Sucharski’s neighbors, testified that he saw two men 
leaving in Sucharski’s Mercedes-Benz.  He stated that he did not get a 
good look at the driver of the car, but he got a good look at the 
passenger.  Foy identified Ibar as the passenger in the Mercedes. 
Klimeczko testified that at some point both Penalver and Ibar came to 
the residence on Lee Street in a big, black, shiny new car.  Although 
[Ian] Milman denied that he had ever positively identified Ibar as the 
person in the still photograph made from the videotape, he did say that 
the person in the photograph resembled Ibar.  Moreover, the trial 
judge admitted as substantive evidence Milman’s grand jury 
testimony in which he positively identified Ibar.  [Melissa] Munroe’s 
statement placing Ibar and Penalver together during the weekend of 
the murder was also admitted as substantive evidence.  On the issue of 
identification, the jury also heard evidence from Kimberly San and 
David Phillips that placed Ibar and Penalver in the Mercedes.  Both 
Peguera and her mother testified that the person in the photograph 
resembled Ibar.  We conclude that any error in admitting some of 
these identification statements as substantive evidence rather than as 
impeachment evidence was harmless error.   
 
Id. at 463.  Significantly for our analysis in this case, we found error in allowing 
certain identification testimony to be admitted in evidence but concluded that it 
was “harmless.”  Having concluded that there was no reversible error demonstrated 
                                          
 
integrity of the trial was affected by references to certain evidence 
denying Ibar due process; [and] (8) whether the death penalty in this 
case violates the Florida and Federal Constitutions.  
 
Id. at 459.   
 
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on appeal, we affirmed Ibar’s convictions of first-degree murder and his sentences 
of death.  Id. at 457. 
 
Ibar thereafter filed his initial motion for postconviction relief, raising claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, due process violations including Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and a claim under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002).2  Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Ibar 
postconviction relief.  In addition to appealing the denial of relief, Ibar filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and for extraordinary relief. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Ibar claims that his guilt-phase counsel provided ineffective assistance as a 
result of numerous deficiencies in performance and asserts that the deficiencies 
resulted in prejudice.  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated in 
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984).  “[T]he test when assessing the actions of trial counsel is not how, 
in hindsight, present counsel would have proceeded.”  Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 
664, 671 (Fla. 2010).  To succeed on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, a 
defendant must establish two criteria: 
                                          
 
 
2.  Ibar raised a claim under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which 
has now been applied in Florida by the United States Supreme Court in Hurst v. 
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  Because we are granting a new trial, we need not 
address this claim. 
 
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First, counsel’s performance must be shown to be deficient.  
Strickland[, 466 U.S. at 687].  Deficient performance in this context 
means that counsel’s performance fell below the standard guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  When examining counsel’s 
performance, an objective standard of reasonableness applies, id. at 
688, and great deference is given to counsel’s performance.  Id. at 
689.  The defendant bears the burden to “overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  This Court has made clear that “[s]trategic 
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”  See 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  There is a 
strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. 
 
 
Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the 
defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a 
reliable result.  [Id.] at 689.  A defendant must do more than speculate 
that an error affected the outcome.  Id. at 693.  Prejudice is met only if 
there is a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Both deficient performance 
and prejudice must be shown.  Id. 
 
Id. at 671-72. 
 
 
Ineffective assistance claims are examined under a mixed standard of review 
because the performance and prejudice elements of Strickland present mixed 
questions of law and fact.  Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672.  Postconviction courts hold a 
superior vantage point with respect to questions of fact, evidentiary weight, and 
observations of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.  See Cox v. State, 966 
So. 2d 337, 357-58 (Fla. 2007).  As a result, this Court defers to the postconviction 
court’s factual findings so long as those findings are supported by competent, 
 
- 10 - 
substantial evidence.  See Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672.  However, this Court reviews 
the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo.  Id.  Deficiency and prejudice 
are mixed questions of law and fact, so this Court reviews those findings de novo.  
Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 349 (Fla. 2014). 
In his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Ibar identifies numerous 
deficiencies, particularly in that trial counsel failed to procure a facial 
identification expert.3  The unrefuted testimony as to the reasons for these multiple 
failures came from Ibar’s own defense lawyer, Kayo Morgan.  Although we do not 
simply accept trial counsel’s concession that he was deficient in performance, the 
details of his testimony overwhelmingly bear this out.  
As to the issue of facial identification experts, Morgan recalled that Dr. 
Iscan, Penalver’s expert witness, testified at Ibar and Penalver’s joint trial that the 
                                          
 
 
3.  Ibar also claims that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to: (1) 
procure Dr. Mehmet Iscan to testify that Penalver could not be reliably identified 
in the surveillance video; (2) procure the assistance of an eyewitness identification 
expert to demonstrate the unreliability of Gary Foy’s identification of Ibar; (3) 
introduce testimony from a civil engineer that the perpetrator was two and one half 
to three and one half inches shorter than Ibar; (4) effectively investigate and 
prepare alibi witnesses; (5) procure and utilize a private investigator; (6) elicit from 
Detective Manzella that the Tec-9 from the Lee Street home did not match the 
ballistics of the murders; (7) interpose all necessary objections to the inadmissible 
trial testimony of Mimi Quinones, Maria Casas, Marlene Vindel, Roxana Peguera, 
George McEvoy, and Gary Foy; and (8) seek instructions limiting the jury’s 
consideration of out-of-court statements and prior testimony to impeachment and 
directing the jury to cautiously evaluate all eyewitnesses’ identification testimony 
and identifying factors to consider in determining reliability of identification.   
 
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facial features of the individual in the video did not comport with the same 
indicators of Penalver, and consequently, Dr. Iscan was unable to make a definitive 
identification that the perpetrator in the video was Penalver.  Morgan testified that 
prior to the joint trial, Dr. Iscan told him that it was even less likely that Ibar was 
the perpetrator.  During the joint trial, counsel for Penalver requested Morgan to 
stay away from Dr. Iscan, and Morgan honored that request. 
 
After the joint trial resulted in a hung jury, Morgan became involved with a 
drug addict who became pregnant with his child.  Although Morgan was sick with 
reoccurring bouts of pneumonia and other complications, he dedicated himself to 
the woman.  Morgan’s personal life impacted his practice.  In January 1999, during 
the time of jury selection in Ibar’s case, Morgan was charged with aggravated 
battery on the woman.  Morgan was in emotional and physical pain, suffering from 
extreme duress, and “was not there” mentally.  As Morgan explained during the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, his whole concern was the woman, her plight, 
and the health of their child.   
 
In defending Ibar, Morgan knew it was of upmost importance for the defense 
to draw issues with the witness identification infirmities.  From the beginning, 
Morgan knew it was incumbent upon him to have a forensic anthropologist or a 
facial identification expert, which was “vital” to attack the unreliability of the 
identification.  Recognizing that Dr. Iscan’s testimony “had to be” in Ibar’s case, 
 
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Morgan attempted to have Dr. Iscan meet with Ibar, but Dr. Iscan was out of the 
country.  Morgan recalled consulting with two other forensic anthropologists, but 
they were unable to work for indigent fees.  Ibar told Morgan that he wanted a 
“forensic thing,” but, despite Morgan’s understanding of the critical nature of such 
evidence, Morgan talked Ibar out of it.   
 
In January 1999, per Morgan’s request, Barbara Brush entered her 
appearance as Ibar’s second-chair and penalty phase counsel.  Morgan intended for 
Brush to take some of the load off of him.  As a result, Brush participated in the 
trial every day unless she was covering for Morgan elsewhere.  Delegating the 
garnering of expert witnesses to Brush, Morgan instructed Brush that the defense 
needed forensic anthropologist Dr. Anthony Falsetti.  On January 31, 2000, less 
than three months before Ibar’s separate trial was to begin, Morgan faxed Brush a 
note which said as follows: 
We spoke about getting monies approved for experts.  Here are three 
we can start with. . . .  We will also need the anthropol[o]gist, [Dr.] 
Falsetti, who can establish discrepancies in the culprit and Ibar. . . .  
As usual I have put my back to the wall.  We need to move ASAP. 
 
Defense counsel obtained an order that provided payment for expert fees to Dr. 
Falsetti and listed Dr. Falsetti as a potential witness.  While Morgan denied having 
any contact with Dr. Falsetti himself, Brush’s billing statement reveals that about a 
month after the fax, Brush had a twelve-minute telephone conference with Dr. 
Falsetti.  No other contact was apparently made.    
 
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Despite this limited contact with Dr. Falsetti, Morgan understood that 
presenting Dr. Falsetti’s perspective to the jury was “vital”—the “heart of the 
case”—that he did not understand how he did not “perfect” the participation of Dr. 
Falsetti at Ibar’s trial, that he “failed in this absolutely critical feature of the case,” 
and that not having a forensic expert was a “significant omission” and not a 
strategic decision.  Moreover, Morgan did not inform the judge about the extent of 
his sickness or about all of the problems in his life in seeking a continuance.  
Morgan concluded that he was “defective” in his representation of Ibar. 
 
In April 2000, Ibar’s separate trial commenced.  Morgan suffered from 
recurring bouts of pneumonia, breathlessness, depression, recurring sinusitis, 
bronchitis-like asthma, fatigue, insomnia, nausea, and fluctuating weight.  
Morgan’s medical problems worsened as Ibar’s trial progressed.  In addition, 
Morgan was involved in a custody situation regarding his daughter, and Morgan 
wanted to focus on saving his daughter’s mother from her plight.  Morgan claimed 
he could not withdraw from the case because of a promise he made to Ibar’s 
mother. 
 
Morgan acknowledged that during his opening statement he told the jury 
they would see significant distinctions between the perpetrator and Ibar, including 
differences with their hairlines and eyes and that Ibar had a cut on his eye which 
was not seen in the video.  Morgan explained that his mind was not fully working 
 
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throughout Ibar’s trial, that he conducted poor cross-examinations, that he looked 
for shortcuts, and that it was difficult to concentrate.  After the jury rendered its 
verdict, Morgan was hospitalized.  He did not attend Ibar’s sentencing.   
 
Dr. Falsetti testified at the evidentiary hearing that in 2000, facial 
recognition was accepted in Florida courts for the comparisons of photographs of 
an unknown to a known on a case-by-case basis by anthropologists and 
anthropometrists.  Dr. Falsetti was certain that he did not consult in Ibar’s case in 
2000 and that he never received any material from either Morgan or Brush relating 
to the case.  Dr. Falsetti stated that had he been contacted then, there would have 
been no reason why he would not have been willing to provide his services on 
identification issues. 
 
Facial identification expert Raymond Evans testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that his work in facial identification is based upon scientific principles and 
is accepted as a valid and reliable scientific discipline within the scientific 
community—and was so recognized in 2000.  Evans explained that because poor 
images have some resemblances to a referenced image, lay persons—who are 
generally unable to factor in discoloration, distortion, or other factors—may be 
lulled into believing that the images have to be depicting the same person. 
 
Evans found the crime scene images distilled from the surveillance 
videotape had very poor quality and lighting and very low resolution.  Evans 
 
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maintained that the images were not adequate to make a reliable identification.  In 
comparing the facial proportions of Ibar with the perpetrator alleged to have been 
him, Evans found discrepancies with their respective jaw lines, right eyebrows, the 
width of the mouths, and dorsal ridge shape.  Although he was not able to 
completely exclude Ibar because of general similarities, Evans opined that it is not 
possible to conclude that the perpetrator and Ibar are the same person because of 
the noted differences. 
Deficiency 
 
Ibar claims that his trial counsel were deficient for failing to procure a facial 
identification expert or forensic anthropologist to establish the difficulty in being 
able to positively identify Ibar as one of the perpetrators in the crime surveillance 
video and photo distillations and to show the physical discrepancies between Ibar 
and the perpetrator.  After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that trial 
counsel Morgan was deficient for failing to present a facial identification expert to 
challenge the State’s charge that Ibar was the perpetrator seen in the videotape 
committing the murders at the Sucharski residence.4  This videotape, and the 
                                          
 
 
4.  Ibar did not call second-chair counsel Brush to testify at the evidentiary 
hearing.  As Brush dealt with Dr. Falsetti, we acknowledge the possibility that 
Brush’s testimony could have provided insight into the circumstances surrounding 
Dr. Falsetti to support a finding that the decision made was “sound trial strategy.”  
See Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1269 (Fla. 2007).  However, the relationship 
between Morgan and Brush was such that Brush acted under Morgan’s direction 
and it was clear that Morgan was ultimately responsible to ensure that Dr. Falsetti 
 
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images distilled therefrom, were instrumental to the State’s case.  Even as early as 
the investigation, the police questioned numerous people who knew Ibar and 
showed them photographs created from the video to determine whether they 
identified the person in the photo as somebody who resembled Ibar.  The jury 
watched the video—which was of very poor quality—and heard about countless 
improper lay witness identifications of Ibar based on these images.  While defense 
counsel objected to this type of identification evidence being used as substantive 
evidence, a point to which we generally agreed on direct appeal, defense counsel 
did not present other substantive evidence to challenge this important piece of 
evidence, even though he knew it was successfully used in Ibar’s codefendant’s 
trial.  See Ibar, 938 So. 2d at 463 (holding that the trial court erred in allowing 
several prior identifications to be considered as substantive evidence). 
 
Testimony from an expert on the subject matter of facial identification was 
certainly admissible.  Dr. Iscan testified on behalf of Penalver in the joint trial 
which lead to a hung jury, and in Penalver’s separate trial after the defendants were 
                                          
 
would testify at Ibar’s trial.  Further, based on the billing statement, Brush’s only 
contact with Dr. Falsetti was a brief telephone conversation.  As Dr. Falsetti 
testified, Dr. Falsetti kept consultation records when he received materials and was 
asked for an opinion.  As it pertained to Ibar, he did not have any consultation 
records and never rendered an opinion regarding whether or not the person in the 
photograph is consistent with Ibar. 
 
- 17 - 
severed from each other, after which Penalver was acquitted.  Dr. Iscan, referring 
to the same video at issue in this case, testified that  
because of the poor quality of the video and the lighting conditions, he 
could not reach a positive conclusion about whether the individual in 
the video was Penalver.  Dr. Iscan noted that there were discrepancies 
in the lower half of the face which led him to lean to a conclusion that 
the individual on the tape was not Penalver.   
 
Penalver, 926 So. 2d at 1125-26 (footnote omitted).  Morgan, Ibar’s trial counsel, 
who was suffering from significant personal issues at the time of trial, was 
certainly aware of the importance of Dr. Iscan’s expert testimony.  In comparing 
Ibar to Penalver, Dr. Iscan told Morgan that it was even less likely that Ibar was 
one of the perpetrators. 
 
Ibar presented an alibi defense at trial, which was that he was not at the  
Sucharski residence at the time of the murders; instead, the defense presented that, 
at that time, he was with Tonya Quinones in her home.  The calling of a facial 
identification expert, therefore, would not have been inconsistent with Ibar’s alibi.  
Gary Foy’s identification of Ibar as the passenger in Sucharski’s vehicle leaving 
Sucharski’s home on the morning of the murders was strong evidence presented by 
the State to suggest that Ibar was one of the perpetrators inside of the home at the 
time of the murders.5  Challenging the video by way of a facial identification 
                                          
 
 
5.  We note that Foy was impeached with his prior statement to the police 
that he “didn’t pay that close of attention” when he drove by Sucharski’s home, 
 
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expert to point out problems with the video and the purported identifications of 
Ibar was necessary in the face of Foy’s testimony. 
 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Morgan’s performance fell below 
the standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  We emphasize that in 
conducting our review of Morgan’s performance we do not rely on his admission 
that he was defective but rather on his complete failure to pursue the important 
defense that Ibar was not the perpetrator of the crime through discrediting the 
videotape and the State’s evidence as to that identification.  See Harris v. Dugger, 
874 F.2d 756, 761 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A]dmissions of deficient performance by 
attorneys are not decisive.”).  Ibar has therefore “overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 
strategy.’ ”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 
101 (1955)). 
Prejudice 
 
Having found that Morgan was deficient, we must decide whether Ibar has 
shown that there is a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  See id. at 694.  
Prejudice is not determined by a “more likely than not” standard but rather is 
                                          
 
that his tinted windows were rolled up at the time, that he was looking into the 
vehicle from an angle, and that the sun was behind them. 
 
- 19 - 
expressed in terms of undermining confidence in the outcome.  See Porter v. 
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009); see also Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865, 873 
(Fla. 2013); Jennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101, 1113 (Fla. 2013); Alcorn v. State, 
121 So. 3d 419, 425 (Fla. 2013).  We conclude that Ibar has met this burden.   
Raymond Evans, Ibar’s postconviction expert, opined that the crime scene 
images were not adequate to make a reliable identification due to the lack of 
quality of the images created from the videotape.  Finding discrepancies in the 
facial proportions of Ibar with that of the perpetrator alleged to have been him, 
Evans opined that it is not possible to conclude that the perpetrator and Ibar are the 
same person.  This type of testimony could have been extremely powerful to 
undercut the State’s reliance on the videotape. 
 
Moreover, there was a lack of any DNA or physical evidence linking Ibar’s 
involvement to the murders.  The videotape reveals that the perpetrator, alleged to 
have been Ibar, at one point removed a t-shirt that had been partially covering his 
face.  See Ibar, 938 So. 2d at 458 (“The intruder alleged to be Ibar initially had 
something covering his face, but he eventually removed it.”); State v. Ibar, No. 
94CF13062 (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. Ct. Aug. 28, 2000) (Sentencing Order at 3) (noting 
that Ibar “was observed on the videotape, removing a shirt that had been partially 
covering his face”).  This t-shirt was later discovered on Sucharski’s porch and was 
tested for DNA.  Notably, although the shirt contained blood, hair, and cellular 
 
- 20 - 
material on the collar, none of the evidence obtained from the shirt was consistent 
with Ibar’s DNA.  In fact, Ibar was excluded as the source of the DNA derived 
from small amounts of blood obtained from the t-shirt cutting, the hairs taken from 
the t-shirt were not consistent with Ibar’s hair standards, and there was no match 
between a partial profile and Ibar as to the cellular material of the t-shirt’s collar 
and the left and right underarm.   
 
While identification of Ibar as the perpetrator was the crux of the State’s 
case, on direct appeal we held that the trial court “erred in allowing several of the 
identification statements to be considered as substantive evidence.”  Ibar, 938 So. 
2d at 463.  Specifically, at trial the State called police investigators to testify that 
Roxana Peguera, Marlene Vindel, Maria Casas, and Jean Klimeczko had 
previously confirmed the identity of the person in a photograph—created from the 
video surveillance tape—as Ibar.  Id. at 459-60.  We concluded that these prior 
identifications should not have been admitted as substantive evidence, but that the 
errors were harmless.  Id. at 460-64.  In our harmless error analysis, we first relied 
on the fact that the videotape of the murders was played for the jury, and we 
referred to properly admitted identifications of Ibar based on the images.  Id. at 
463.  Our harmless error analysis would have undoubtedly been different in this 
case had the surveillance videotape and images been challenged by a facial 
identification expert at trial. 
 
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There are also similarities between Ibar and Penalver’s case, where we 
reversed Penalver’s convictions of three counts of first-degree murder and death 
sentences, and remanded for a new trial because he was denied a fair trial by the 
prejudicial admission of irrelevant and inadmissible evidence repeatedly elicited by 
the State over objections.  Penalver, 926 So. 2d at 1138.  We reasoned that there 
was little evidence offered against Penalver: 
 
While the State presented circumstantial evidence regarding 
Penalver’s involvement in the crime, only two pieces of direct 
evidence tying Penalver to the murders were presented: a 
photographic still taken from a grainy videotape depicting a person 
alleged to be Penalver who was attired in a cap and sunglasses that 
concealed his face; and a statement allegedly made by Penalver to 
another inmate that he had a chance of being acquitted because he did 
not remove his mask.  In light of the scant evidence connecting 
Penalver to this murder and the consequent importance of identifying 
the individual depicted on the videotape in sunglasses and hat, we 
conclude that the improperly admitted evidence and the State’s 
suggestion that the defense tampered with or suborned perjury by an 
identification witness meet the cumulative error requirements outlined 
above and require reversal. 
 
Id.  We also expressed that there was no physical evidence tying Penalver to the 
murders.  Id. at 1125.  Penalver later was acquitted in his retrial. 
 
Similarly, “[i]n light of the scant evidence connecting” Ibar “to this murder 
and the consequent importance of identifying the individual depicted on the 
videotape,” alleged to have been Ibar, see id. at 1138, we conclude that trial 
counsel’s deficiency, in failing to procure a facial identification expert, undermines 
 
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our confidence in Ibar’s trial.6  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief.7 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we reverse the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief.  Ibar is entitled to a new trial. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, J., concurs. 
LEWIS, J., dissents. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
QUINCE, J., dissenting. 
 
 
I agree that Morgan’s performance was deficient, but based on Ibar’s failure 
to establish prejudice, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant 
                                          
 
 
6.  Because Ibar is entitled to postconviction relief based solely on this 
subclaim, we do not consider the other several trial counsel deficiencies raised by 
Ibar, see supra at n.2. 
 
 
7.  Because we vacate Ibar’s first-degree murder convictions and sentences 
of death and remand for a new trial, we do not address Ibar’s remaining claims 
raised in his appeal of the denial of postconviction relief (claim of violations under 
Brady and that the State failed to preserve the camera and VHS recorder), or those 
contained in his habeas petition (claim that our harmless error analysis on direct 
appeal was constitutionally inadequate, that we failed to address Ibar’s Sixth 
Amendment claim, and claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). 
 
- 23 - 
relief on Ibar’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on Morgan’s 
failure to procure a facial identification expert.   
In order to establish prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable 
probability that ‘but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”  Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).  While a reasonable 
probability need not be “more likely than not,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, the 
likelihood of a different result must be “substantial, not just conceivable.”  
McQuitter v. State, 103 So. 3d 277, 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Harrington 
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)).  I conclude that Ibar has not met this burden. 
While the majority is concerned that some lay witness identifications were 
improperly admitted, the jury’s verdict was also based on the proper and 
compelling trial testimony of Gary Foy.  Foy maintained that he saw two men 
leaving in Sucharski’s vehicle, following behind him out of the neighborhood.  Foy 
got a good look at the passenger who was staring directly at him.  Foy described 
having “real good eye contact,” and identified Ibar as the passenger in Sucharski’s 
vehicle.  Additionally, the State played for the jury the videotape of the murders in 
which the perpetrator removed a blue t-shirt to expose his face.  Jurors were able to 
decide for themselves whether Ibar was the perpetrator in the video.  While the 
 
- 24 - 
majority is concerned that the DNA from the blue t-shirt was not a match for Ibar, 
the jury was not.  Instead, the jury convicted Ibar.  Even if Morgan had secured a 
different expert, the probability of a different outcome at trial is not substantial. 
The majority notes that none of the experts involved in this case could 
identify Ibar as the perpetrator in the State’s videotape with absolute certainty.  
None of the experts could exclude Ibar as a potential match either.  The expert 
witness with whom Morgan spoke after Penalver’s trial, Dr. Iscan, only told 
Morgan that in his opinion, Ibar was less likely than Penalver to be one of the 
perpetrators in the video.  Dr. Falsetti, the expert Morgan failed to retain at trial, 
did not opine as to whether the perpetrator in the video could be Ibar.  Given the 
low quality of the video, none of the experts could have offered a conclusive 
opinion as to the perpetrator’s identity that might have had a substantial effect on 
the outcome at trial. 
Although Ibar’s postconviction expert Raymond Evans opined that it was 
impossible to say with certainty that Ibar and the perpetrator are the same person, 
Evans further testified that he could not completely exclude Ibar as a potential 
match because of the general similarities between them and the low quality of the 
videotape.  Evans described Ibar and the perpetrator as having similar bilateral 
asymmetrical eyebrows and cheek bone widths.  When Evans’ description of the 
discrepancies is considered against his description of the similarities between Ibar 
 
- 25 - 
and the perpetrator, the likelihood that the outcome of Ibar’s trial may have been 
different is only conceivable, not substantial.  Furthermore, the trial court found 
Ibar failed to establish that there was any generally accepted scientific field of 
facial identification at the time of his trial.  It is unclear how Morgan’s securing 
such an expert could have made a difference in the outcome at trial. 
The majority is also concerned that this Court’s harmless error analysis on 
direct appeal regarding the improper identification statements would have been 
different had Morgan secured a facial identification expert at trial.  While the 
majority may be correct, whether this Court would have made a different 
determination on appeal has no bearing on prejudice.  Prejudice is concerned only 
with a reasonable probability of a different “result of the proceeding,” which Ibar 
has failed to demonstrate.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.   
Finally, the majority cites to Penalver’s case for the proposition that “scant 
evidence” connects Ibar to this murder.  See supra (quoting Penalver, 926 So. 2d at 
1138).  However, this Court was discussing Penalver, not Ibar, in the quoted 
language.  Id.  Unlike Ibar, Penalver was not identified by Foy.  There was “a 
wealth of evidence that connected Ibar to this crime and indicated that he was one 
of the intruders captured on videotape at the scene of the murders.”  Ibar v. State, 
938 So. 2d 451, 463, 466 (Fla. 2006).  Therefore, the probability of a different 
 
- 26 - 
outcome had Morgan retained a facial identification expert is only conceivable at 
best. 
Ultimately, Ibar asks this Court to find a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel retained a facial 
identification expert.  Because the trial court found that Morgan failed to establish 
the existence of any generally accepted scientific field of facial identification, 
whether he retained such an expert seems to make little difference in Ibar’s case.  
Ibar has not shown that an expert could have excluded him as a potential match for 
the perpetrator.  Ibar has only shown that trial counsel’s failure creates a 
conceivable probability that the outcome could have been different.  A conceivable 
chance of a different outcome does not rise to the requisite level of reasonable 
probability and is insufficient to warrant a finding of prejudice under Strickland. 
Although I agree that trial counsel was deficient, I would affirm the trial 
court’s denial of Ibar’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because Ibar has 
not demonstrated prejudice under Strickland.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Jeffrey Richard Levenson, Judge - Case No. 061994CF013062B88810 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Benjamin Samuel Waxman of Robbins, Tunkey, Ross, Amsel, Raben & Waxman, 
P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,  
 
for Appellee/Respondent