Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John R. Maynard
Citation: 2009 WI 106
Docket Number: 2008AP000417-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2009

2009 WI 106 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP417-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John R. Maynard, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
John R. Maynard, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MAYNARD 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 29, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 106
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP417-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John R. Maynard, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John R. Maynard, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 29, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the recommendation of Referee 
Michael Ash that Attorney John R. Maynard's professional 
misconduct warrants a 90-day suspension of his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin and that he bear the costs of these 
disciplinary proceedings.1  The Office of Lawyer Regulation's 
                                                 
1 Because 
Attorney 
Maynard's 
appeal 
was 
dismissed 
as 
untimely, the court reviews the matter pursuant to SCR 22.17(2): 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
2 
 
(OLR) four-count disciplinary complaint alleged Attorney Maynard 
failed to notify his former law firm of payments for legal 
services that he received and deposited in his personal account.  
The complaint also alleged Attorney Maynard made false and 
misleading communications when he failed to identify his "of 
counsel" status when he used law firm stationery and when he 
represented on a postal application that he was a principal of 
the law firm.  The referee concluded the OLR proved three of the 
four counts charged in the disciplinary complaint. 
¶2 
We approve and adopt the referee's findings and 
conclusions.  We determine the seriousness of Attorney Maynard's 
misconduct warrants a 90-day suspension of his law license.  By 
his misconduct, Attorney Maynard has demonstrated dishonesty 
contrary to his professional obligation as a lawyer.  We further 
conclude Attorney Maynard shall bear the costs of these 
disciplinary proceedings. 
¶3 
Attorney Maynard was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1973 and works in Cedarburg.  He has not previously 
been subject to attorney discipline. 
¶4 
These disciplinary proceedings arise from Attorney 
Maynard's billings and payments received for services he 
                                                                                                                                                             
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
The court permitted the parties to file briefs, but did not hold 
oral argument. 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
3 
 
performed as a shareholder with his former law firm from 
August 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006.  On August 1, 2005, 
Attorney Maynard joined with Attorneys Bruce McIlnay, James 
Button, and James Schmitt in the law firm of Maier, McIlnay, 
Schmitt & Button, Ltd.  Soon after, the firm became known as 
Maynard, McIlnay, Schmitt & Button and used the acronym of MMSB 
or MMS&B.  The referee found that the individuals understood the 
firm 
to 
be 
a 
corporation 
and 
regarded 
one 
another 
as 
shareholders.  The referee found that when Attorney Maynard 
became a shareholder at MMS&B, he entered a highly fluid, 
rapidly changing, and perhaps confusing situation with little 
discussion among the other shareholders regarding their rights 
or obligations to the firm.  The firm's shareholders testified 
generally that the money received from clients was "firm 
income"; the question of how the money would thereafter be 
divided was never discussed.   
¶5 
The 
referee 
found 
the 
shareholders 
intended 
to 
practice law in an arrangement through which expenses were to be 
incurred and paid by the corporate entity and revenues were to 
be paid to and distributed by that entity.  The referee found: 
In particular, [Attorney] Maynard did understand that, 
during the period of his association with the Firm, 
invoices for legal services were to be transmitted 
under 
the 
Firm's 
name, 
and 
paid 
to, 
and 
then 
distributed 
by 
the 
Firm, 
to 
its 
creditors 
and 
shareholders, in a manner to be determined. 
¶6 
Attorney Maynard's compensation plan was similar to 
the other shareholders' plans, consisting of a draw plus a 
monthly bonus.  On or about January 1, 2006, Attorney Maynard's 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
4 
 
monthly compensation was substantially reduced.  When Attorney 
Maynard announced in the spring of 2006 he would be leaving the 
firm, he was offered, and agreed to, the opportunity to remain 
with the firm "of counsel."  The referee found that despite the 
absence of a formal signed agreement, from at least July 1, 
2006, until the final parting of ways in February 2007, Attorney 
Maynard and the firm both understood he was no longer a 
shareholder but was to have "of counsel" status.   
¶7 
As of July 2006 there remained some open matters on 
which Attorney Maynard had worked as a shareholder but had not 
yet been billed.  From July 2006 through October 2006 Attorney 
Maynard transmitted invoices to three clients for legal services 
he had rendered while he was a shareholder.  The invoices all 
stated, "PLEASE MAIL YOUR PAYMENT TO: MMS&B, P.O. BOX 253, 
GRAFTON, WI 53024 IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED."  
¶8 
Without informing anyone connected with the law firm, 
Attorney Maynard applied for a post office box, inscribing the 
form with "John R. Maynard Principal" as the applicant and 
"MMS&B" as the name to which the box number was to be assigned.  
The address he gave for the box holder was apparently that of 
his personal residence.  Other firm members did not know 
Attorney Maynard had opened this post office box.  The referee 
found the invoices were misleading in that they indicated MMS&B 
would be receiving the money, while only Attorney Maynard knew 
of and had access to the post office box.  
¶9 
In response to the misleading invoices he sent, 
Attorney Maynard personally received and deposited into his 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
5 
 
personal 
checking 
account 
payments 
from 
clients 
totaling 
$7,776.84.  Attorney Maynard did not inform the firm he had 
received these funds and the firm did not receive any of these 
funds.  The firm did not learn of the post office box or of 
Attorney Maynard's receipt of the funds until much later as a 
result of its own efforts.  
¶10 One check that Attorney Maynard received had been made 
out to the firm.  Although no longer a shareholder but "of 
counsel," he endorsed the check and kept the proceeds.  He had 
no express authority from the firm to do so; he made the 
endorsement and kept the money without the firm's knowledge.  
The referee found that by his testimony, Attorney Maynard 
acknowledged and understood the money billed for the work he 
performed as a shareholder was firm income to be divided among 
all the shareholders after the payment of overhead.  The referee 
concluded that by receiving the funds for services performed 
while a shareholder, but not notifying the firm about the 
receipt of those funds and not delivering those funds to the 
firm or at least to a trustee, the court, or an arbiter, 
Attorney Maynard violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1),2 as charged 
in Count 1. 
                                                 
2 Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) (effective July 1, 2004, through 
June 30, 2007) provided: 
 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
6 
 
¶11 The referee rejected Attorney Maynard's argument that 
because the funds were not "client funds" they were not subject 
to SCR 20:1.15.  The referee found nothing in the language of 
SCR 20:1.15 or in any case law that so narrowly limits the scope 
of SCR 20:1.15(d).  The referee specifically found the express 
language of SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) broad enough to cover the 
circumstances in this case.   
¶12 The referee also rejected Attorney Maynard's claimed 
defense that he was drastically underpaid by the firm and that 
the clients he served were his clients.  The referee concluded 
there was no way to determine from the record what amount of 
revenue Attorney Maynard pocketed should ultimately have been 
distributed to him had he not intercepted it.  The referee said 
that while some, or perhaps all, of the money should ultimately 
have gone to Attorney Maynard as he apparently believed, this 
would not have excused his misconduct.  The referee found it was 
principally Attorney Maynard's misconduct that kept the issue 
from ever being confronted or appropriately resolved. 
¶13 In 
addition, 
the 
referee 
determined 
that 
by 
representing on a postal application form that Attorney Maynard 
was a "principal" at the firm when he was not, and by sending 
invoices to clients with the firm's letterhead and directing 
them to send money to an ostensible firm's post office box to 
                                                                                                                                                             
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive. 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
7 
 
which only he had access, Attorney Maynard falsely indicated to 
clients that the invoices originated with the firm and that 
payments would go to the firm, without disclosing that he was no 
more than "of counsel" with the firm.  The referee concluded 
that by this conduct, Attorney Maynard made false and misleading 
communications about himself and his legal services, violating 
former SCR 20:7.1(a)3 and former SCR 20:7.5(a),4 as charged in 
Count 2.  
¶14 The referee determined, however, that the facts failed 
to support a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b),5 as charged in Count 3.  
                                                 
3 Former SCR 20:7.1(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided, in pertinent part: 
 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading 
communication 
about 
the 
lawyer 
or 
the 
lawyer's 
services.  A communication is false or misleading if 
it: 
 
(1) contains a material misrepresentation of fact 
or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement 
considered 
as 
a 
whole 
not 
materially 
misleading; . . . . 
4 Former SCR 20:7.5(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided: 
 
A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or 
other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.  
A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private 
practice if it does not imply a connection with a 
government agency or with a public or charitable legal 
services 
organization 
and 
is 
not 
otherwise 
in 
violation of Rule 7.1. 
5 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects; . . . ." 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
8 
 
Count 3 alleged that by knowingly and willingly furnishing false 
information to the United States Postal Service when applying 
for a post office box, Attorney Maynard committed a federal 
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).6  The referee 
concluded this federal statute requires the offending statement 
to be "materially false."7  While finding Attorney Maynard's use 
of the term "Principal" to be false and misleading, the referee 
concluded that materiality had not been proven beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt. 
 
The 
referee 
doubted 
an 
individual's 
inaccurate description of his relationship with a law firm would 
ever be regarded by the postal service as "material."  The OLR 
does not challenge the referee's conclusions as to Count 3. 
¶15 Next, the referee found that at the time of the 
communications, Attorney Maynard was not a principal and would 
have known, as most lawyers would, that in context "principal" 
would be taken to mean a person who had controlling authority or 
                                                 
6 The postal service form Attorney Maynard used stated, 
"Warning:  The furnishing of false or misleading information on 
this form or omission of information may result in criminal 
sanctions. . . . 18 U.S.C. 1001." 
7 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) provides: 
 
§ 1001.  Statements or entries generally 
 
(a) . . . [W]hoever, in any matter within the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
executive, 
legislative, 
or 
judicial branch of the Government of the United 
States, knowingly and willfully-- 
 
. . .  
 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement or representation; or . . .  
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
9 
 
a leading position with the firm.  The referee found that given 
Attorney Maynard's "of counsel" status, his use of the term 
"principal" was deceptive and misleading.  The referee concluded 
that Attorney Maynard's billing scheme involved dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c)8 
as charged in Count 4.  Attorney Maynard does not challenge this 
determination. 
¶16 Based on these findings, the referee determined a 90-
day license suspension was warranted, together with costs.9  The 
referee said 
that 
Attorney Maynard's misconduct reflected 
dishonesty which "seems obvious to everyone except [Attorney] 
Maynard" and Attorney Maynard remained unrepentant and defiant.  
The referee also considered that Attorney Maynard's previous 
record was unblemished and he had fully cooperated with the OLR.  
In addition, the referee considered that the money involved was 
not alleged to have been more than $7,776.84.  The referee found 
the misconduct did not harm any clients or threaten the 
administration of justice. 
¶17 Attorney Maynard challenges the referee's findings and 
conclusions with respect to Counts 1 and 2.  He also contends 
the recommended sanction is excessive.  While acknowledging his 
conduct "if viewed in isolation," is a violation of SCR 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
9 As of December 22, 2008, the OLR reported costs of 
$11,313.75. 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
10 
 
20:1.15(d) because he failed to transmit the funds, he asserts 
the rules permit him to hold the disputed portion of the funds 
until the dispute is resolved, thus relieving him of any 
wrongdoing.  See SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) ("If a dispute arises 
regarding the division of the property, the lawyer shall hold 
the disputed portion in trust until the dispute is resolved.")   
¶18 Attorney 
Maynard 
argues 
that 
an 
action 
for 
an 
accounting is the proper mechanism to resolve the dispute 
between the former partners.  He nonetheless acknowledges he did 
not file suit for an accounting before exercising self-help.  He 
admits the firm had an interest in the funds, but says his 
actions were justified because the firm unilaterally cut him off 
from the monies to which he was entitled.  He says his legal 
research led him to believe he had the right to keep the funds.  
He claims that if an accounting action determines he is owed the 
funds, he could not be charged with an ethics violation.  He 
contends this court and the OLR should not insert themselves 
into matters involving a civil dispute among members of a law 
firm.   
¶19 Attorney Maynard further contends the term "principal" 
has various meanings, including a "main participant in a given 
situation."  He argues there is no evidence any person was 
deceived by his use of the firm's letterhead without identifying 
his "of counsel" status.  Also, he claims, there was no 
indication he was required to use the words "of counsel" in 
sending out his bills.  He asserts that another attorney with 
the firm sent out a bill in November 2006, more than four months 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
11 
 
after MMS&B ceased to exist, and the bill failed to identify 
Attorney Maynard as "of counsel."   
¶20 A referee's findings of fact will not be overturned 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  We independently review a referee's legal 
conclusions.  Id.  Also, it is our independent responsibility to 
determine appropriate discipline.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 WI 39, ¶74, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 
N.W.2d 894.  We must consider the seriousness of the misconduct, 
as well as the need to protect the public, the courts, and the 
legal system from repetition of misconduct, to impress upon the 
attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and to deter other 
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, ¶78, 279 
Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.   
¶21 Attorney Maynard's arguments fail to demonstrate the 
referee's findings and conclusions are erroneous.  We agree with 
the referee that SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) applies to the circumstances 
in this case.  Attorney Maynard does not point to any evidence 
that he held the disputed funds in trust as permitted by SCR 
20:1.15(d)(3), instead, as the referee found, of depositing them 
into his personal account.  Attorney Maynard does not challenge 
the fact that by directing clients to send money to an 
ostensible firm's post office box to which only Attorney Maynard 
had access, he falsely indicated to clients that the invoices 
originated with the firm and that payments would go to the firm.  
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
12 
 
He does not dispute that as a result of his billing scheme, he 
received $7,776.84 for work he performed while a shareholder 
with the firm without notifying the firm, and that he deposited 
the funds into his personal checking account.  Attorney 
Maynard's allegations regarding other firm members' conduct do 
not relieve him of his ethical obligations.   
¶22 Under the circumstances, we conclude the referee's 
recommended sanction is appropriate.  We acknowledge Attorney 
Maynard has never been previously disciplined and has fully 
cooperated with the OLR's investigation.  We disagree, however, 
with his contention that this matter is simply a dispute between 
former law partners regarding an accounting of client fees.  
Attorney Maynard does not seriously dispute the referee's 
finding that the firm, not Attorney Maynard, had the right to 
receive and the obligation to distribute fairly the proceeds at 
issue.  While the dispute over the distribution of firm revenue 
may have served as Attorney Maynard's motivation, his actions 
were inconsistent with resolving that dispute.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against O'Neil, 197 Wis. 2d 224, 539 
N.W.2d 881 
(1995) 
(attorney engaged in dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, and misrepresentation by retaining and failing to report 
to his law firm legal fees he received for professional 
services). 
¶23 The referee reasonably found it was primarily Attorney 
Maynard's deceptive actions that kept the dispute from being 
confronted or appropriately resolved.  The referee aptly noted, 
"I know of no legal doctrine or 'law of necessity,' and have not 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
13 
 
been pointed to any, that excuses lawyers for dishonesty."  
While considering both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
the referee was reasonably concerned with Attorney Maynard's 
failure to acknowledge the seriousness of his misconduct.  
Attorney 
Maynard's 
conduct 
has 
demonstrated 
dishonesty 
incompatible with his professional obligations as a lawyer.  The 
referee's findings justify a sanction sufficient to impress upon 
Attorney Maynard the seriousness of his misconduct, and to deter 
others from engaging in similar misconduct.10  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 2008 WI 112, ¶23, 314 
Wis. 2d 33, 754 N.W.2d 501.  The referee has not recommended 
restitution. 
 
The 
OLR 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
referee's 
recommendation; therefore, we do not address the issue of 
restitution.  We approve and adopt the referee's findings, 
conclusions, and recommended 90-day suspension.   
¶24 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John R. Maynard to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 90 days, 
effective February 1, 2010. 
¶25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 90 days of the date 
of this order John R. Maynard pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If costs are not paid 
within the time specified and absent a showing of his inability 
to pay the costs within that time, John R. Maynard's license to 
                                                 
10 As the referee observed, "Whatever ambiguities were in 
his situation, the deviousness and dishonesty apparent in his 
conduct should not be met by a mere scolding."   
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
14 
 
practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further 
order of the court.  
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent he has not 
yet done so, John R. Maynard shall comply with SCR 22.26 
regarding the duties of a person whose license to practice law 
in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
 
No. 
2008AP417-D   
 
 
 
1