Title: McMillan v. Tate
Citation: 260 So. 2d 832
Docket Number: 46629
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 1972

260 So. 2d 832 (1972) Willie McMILLAN v. Mrs. Charlie TATE. No. 46629. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 17, 1972. Thomas L. Booker, Bobby F. Sanders, Philadelphia, for appellant. Laurel G. Weir, Alford &amp; Mars, Philadelphia, for appellee. INZER, Justice: This is an appeal by Willie McMillan from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Neshoba County awarding appellee Mrs. Charlie Tate $15,000 as damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision. We affirm. The only assignment of error on appeal is that the trial court was in error in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss the suit against him for the want of jurisdiction. The record in this case reflects that appellee filed her suit against appellant on April 17, 1970, and appellant was served with process. On September 16, 1970, appellant filed a motion for a bill of particulars. Appellee furnished the bill of particulars and on October 27, 1970, appellant filed a motion for time to plead or answer. The next day he filed an answer and a motion to dismiss the suit for the want of jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss alleged that the circuit court did not have the jurisdiction of this cause for the reason that the automobile collision occurred on a road on the Indian reservation and the appellant was a Choctaw Indian, who resided on the reservation as a member of the tribe. It was alleged that only the Indian Court has jurisdiction to try the suit against him. Insofar as the record reflects appellant did not offer any proof in support of his motion and it was *833 overruled by the court. A motion is at issue without further pleading and the allegations thereof do not amount to any proof of the facts therein stated. Harvey v. State, 218 So. 2d 9 (Miss. 1969). In the absence of any proof in support of the motion we cannot put the trial court in error for overruling the same. Appellant contends in his brief that the trial court overruled his motion without giving him the opportunity to offer any proof in support thereof. However, there is nothing in the record to support this statement and on appeal our review is restricted to the matters and things that appear in the record. In absence of proof to support the motion, we do not reach the question of whether there is any merit in the contention that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over appellant. In any event the trial court was correct in overruling the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction for the reason that appellant entered his appearance and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by filing a motion for a bill of particulars, a motion for time to plead, and an answer before raising the question relative to the jurisdiction of the court. While an individual or corporation may appear specially for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he must do so before filing any other pleadings. Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So. 2d 785 (1964). By filing the aforementioned pleadings appellant entered his appearance and the court acquired jurisdiction over his person. After such an appearance, a party is precluded from denying the jurisdiction of the court over his person, but if the court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, it cannot be given jurisdiction by waiver or consent. Here the suit was an in personam action and the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. By his appearance appellant waived any claim to the lack of jurisdiction over his person. Maupin v. Dennis, 252 Miss. 496, 175 So. 2d 130 (1965); Carney v. Moore, 130 Miss. 658, 94 So. 890 (1923). For the reasons stated, this case should be and is affirmed. Affirmed. RODGERS, P.J., and JONES, BRADY and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. RODGERS, Presiding Justice (concurring). I am in agreement with the majority opinion as to the end result of this case; however, I am compelled to express my opinion on the issue of state court jurisdiction of Indians within the State of Mississippi. I think we should go further and leave no doubt that the state court has jurisdiction of cases involving all citizens of Mississippi, including Indians. The Treaty at Doak's Stand on October 18, 1820 and another treaty on January 20, 1825 began the cession of land by the Choctaw Indians to the United States in which an agreement was made that the Choctaw tribe would move west of the Mississippi River and in which individual Choctaws desiring to remain in Mississippi could own their own land. Finally, the Treaty at Dancing Rabbit Creek was made between the Choctaws and the United States on September 27, 28, 1830, which was considered to be the treaty existing between the parties. The parts of that treaty found in Hutchinson's Mississippi Code (1798-1848), Chapter 5, Indians, Art. 11, p. 121, which are pertinent to this case are as follows: As can be determined by the language of the Treaty, the Choctaws, as a tribe, agreed to remove from Mississippi. The Choctaws who elected to remain in Mississippi did so not as a nation or tribe, but as individual landowners and as citizens of this state. Prior to the Treaty at Dancing Rabbit Creek, but subsequent to the treaties of 1820 and 1825, the Mississippi Legislature passed the following acts: In the case of Fisher v. Allen, 2 How. 611 (1837), this Court held that the tribal laws and customs were abolished and that the laws of Mississippi were extended over the Indians in January, 1830. In the case of Newman v. Doe, 4 How. 522 (1840) this Court said: This Court said in Land v. Land, Sm. &amp; M.Ch. 158 (1843): The United States Supreme Court pointed out in Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 7 S. Ct. 75, 30 L. Ed. 306 (1886) that a specific act by the United States Congress on March 3, 1881, conferred jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to try all questions of difference arising out of previous stipulations with the Choctaw Nation. The case was to determine the amount of compensation, if any, which was due the Choctaw Nation as a result of the failure of the United States to live up to its obligations under the Dancing Rabbit Treaty of 1830. In deciding this issue the United States Supreme Court made the following observation: Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledged the fact that no Choctaw tribe, as such, remained in Mississippi. Sections 1321 and 1322, Indians, 25 U.S.C.A. (1968) giving the states, not having jurisdiction, consent to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes do not apply to the case at bar. This is true because Mississippi has had jurisdiction *836 since 1830, and because there are no "Indian tribes" as such within this state; nor is there any "Indian country" or "Indian Reservation" within this state. "Indian tribe" is defined as "... any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of self-government; ..." Indians, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301, p. 116 (1968). As stated, the "Choctaw tribe" was moved west of the Mississippi River as a result of the treaties of 1820, 1825 and 1830. The remaining Choctaws became citizens of the State of Mississippi by remaining in Mississippi of their own choice. In Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 83 S. Ct. 426, 9 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1963), the United States Supreme Court said: See also James v. Davro Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155 (1937). An example of the necessity of state consent to federal jurisdiction is Section 5970, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1952), which reads as follows: The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma held that where Congress has relinquished its superior power over Indians and their property located within a state, the Indians and their property become subject to state court jurisdiction. Bagby v. United States, 53 F.2d 260 (10th Cir., 1931), aff. 60 F.2d 80 (10th Cir., 1932). In Luigi Marre Land &amp; Cattle Co. v. Roses, 139 Cal. App. 474, 34 P.2d 195 (1934) the District Court of Appeals of California held that the fact that Indians are a party to a suit does not necessarily exclude state court jurisdiction. The Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934, 48 Stat. at L. 984, does not apply to Choctaw Indians in Mississippi, because the last paragraph of said act defines Indian as one of Indian descent living in a tribe then under federal jurisdiction. The Choctaw Indians remaining in Mississippi after the Treaty at Dancing Rabbit Creek of 1830 are not members of an Indian tribe, and they were not under federal jurisdiction at the time of the passage of said act. *837 This is another reason why we should affirm the holding of the Circuit Court: There is grave doubt that Section 1322, Indians, 25 U.S.C.A., Ch. 15 (1968) is constitutional, if it is intended to apply to the Indians located in Mississippi. Article I, Section VIII, Clause 17, U.S. Constitution, requires that in order to exercise exclusive legislative jurisdiction over lands purchased within a state, such jurisdiction must be assumed with the consent of the state in which the land purchased is situated. Moreover, it will be readily observed that the organization of a civil and criminal jurisdiction for the benefit of certain citizens in a state is in effect the organizing of a state within an existing state. This procedure is contrary to Article IV, Section III, Clause 1, U.S. Constitution: Finally since the Choctaw Indians who remained in Mississippi became citizens with all the rights and responsibilities of other citizens of Mississippi, an effort on the part of the Federal Government to set up a trial court to exercise jurisdiction over these Indians, as a tribe, is clearly in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution since non-Indian citizens are also entitled to due process of law. The Indian tribe left Mississippi and was firmly established in Oklahoma. The Choctaw Indian tribe is no longer a Mississippi tribe; therefore, to suggest that Mississippi citizens, who are non-Indian, should be required to pursue their claim for injury in an Indian court is unreasonable and, in my judgment, such a law is unconstitutional. SUGG, J., concurs.