Title: State v. Miller
Citation: 363 N.C. 96
Docket Number: 309A08
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2009

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANDRE LEVERN MILLER
No. 309A08
FILED: 20 MARCH 2009
Drugs–constructive possession–proximity to drugs–identifying documents in room
The evidence of possession of a controlled substance by constructive possession
was sufficient where defendant was found within touching distance of the crack cocaine and his
identity documents were in the same room.  Although defendant did not have exclusive control
of the premises, the only other individual in the room was not near any of the cocaine; the
circumstances permit a reasonable inference that defendant had the intent and capability to
exercise control and dominion over the cocaine in the room.
Justice BRADY dissenting.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 191 N.C.
App. ___, 661 S.E.2d 770 (2008), reversing and remanding a
judgment entered 15 February 2007 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in
Superior Court, Forsyth County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 19
November 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Stanley G. Abrams,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Paul F. Herzog for defendant-appellee.
EDMUNDS, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether the evidence
presented at defendant’s trial for possession of a controlled
substance was sufficient to support a finding of guilt based upon
the theory of constructive possession.  When the evidence showed,
among other things, that defendant was found within touching
distance of the crack cocaine in question and defendant’s
identity documents were in the same room, we conclude that the
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1 The record is subject to interpretation as to whether the
contraband was in plain view.  As detailed in the body of this
opinion, we consider evidence in the light most favorable to the
State.
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. 
Accordingly, we reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
At trial, the State presented evidence that on 8
December 2005, Winston-Salem Police Detective R.J. Paul obtained
a search warrant for the residence at 1924 Dacian Street after
citizen complaints and resulting surveillance revealed heavy
vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the area.  Later that day, a
Winston-Salem Police Special Enforcement Team entered the
residence, commanding everyone to get on the floor.  The officers
found several individuals in the living room.  Defendant, who was
sitting on the corner of a bed in an adjoining room, slid to the
floor as officers entered.  While he was on the floor,
defendant’s head lay between one to four feet from the bedroom
door.  Another individual in the bedroom remained seated in a
chair about eight feet from the door.
Detective Paul entered the bedroom and recovered a
small white rocklike substance from the end of the bed where
defendant had been sitting.1  In addition, Detective Paul
recovered a plastic bag containing several small white rocks from
behind the open bedroom door, about two feet from where defendant
had been lying on the floor.  Later testing revealed that all the
material recovered from the bedroom was crack cocaine weighing a
total of 1.3 grams.  Defendant’s birth certificate and
state-issued identification card were found on a television stand
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in the bedroom, along with several small plastic jewelry bags. 
An officer testified that cocaine is normally packaged in some
type of plastic bag and that plastic jewelry bags are sometimes
used.
Two of defendant’s children lived at 1924 Dacian with
their mother, Alicia Johnson.  Testifying on behalf of defendant,
Johnson stated that defendant did not live in the house and was
there at the time of the search because he was preparing to pick
up the children from school.  She further testified that the
furnishings in the bedroom where defendant was sitting when the
police entered belonged to her and that the crack cocaine found
in the room with defendant also was hers.  However, she had not
been at the residence when police executed the search warrant.
Defendant was tried for possessing cocaine with the
intent to sell and deliver, in violation of N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(a)(1); maintaining a place to keep a controlled
substance, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 90-108(a)(7); and attaining
the status of habitual felon, as defined in N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1. 
At the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court allowed
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of maintaining a place
to keep a controlled substance, but denied defendant’s motion to
dismiss the possession charge.  After defendant presented
evidence, the court denied his renewed motion to dismiss the
possession charge.  The jury found defendant guilty of simple
possession of cocaine and attaining habitual felon status, and
the trial court sentenced him to 107 to 138 months imprisonment.
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Defendant appealed.  In a divided opinion, the Court of
Appeals reversed, applying a totality of the circumstances test
to find that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conclusion that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine. 
Miller, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 661 S.E.2d at 773.  The dissenting
judge contended that the evidence was sufficient to support
defendant’s conviction.  Id. at ___, 661 S.E.2d at 774-75 (Tyson,
J., dissenting).  The State appealed as of right on the basis of
the dissent.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in
the State’s favor.  State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 28-29, 460
S.E.2d 163, 168 (1995).  Any contradictions or conflicts in the
evidence are resolved in favor of the State, State v. Malloy, 309
N.C. 176, 179, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983), and evidence
unfavorable to the State is not considered, State v. Parker, 354
N.C. 268, 278, 553 S.E.2d 885, 894, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114,
153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002).  The trial court must decide “‘only
whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element
of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator
of the offense.’”  State v. Turnage, 362 N.C. 491, 493, 666
S.E.2d 753, 755 (2008) (quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65,
73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996)).  “‘Substantial evidence is
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’”  Id. (quoting Crawford, 344 N.C. at
73, 472 S.E.2d at 925).  When the evidence raises no more than a
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suspicion of guilt, a motion to dismiss should be granted.  State
v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 488-89, 501 S.E.2d 334, 343 (1998). 
However, so long as the evidence supports a reasonable inference
of the defendant’s guilt, a motion to dismiss is properly denied
even though the evidence also “permits a reasonable inference of
the defendant’s innocence.”  State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145,
567 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2002).
The State prosecuted defendant upon the theory that he
constructively possessed crack cocaine.  A defendant
constructively possesses contraband when he or she has “the
intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over” it. 
State v. Beaver, 317 N.C. 643, 648, 346 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1986). 
The defendant may have the power to control either alone or
jointly with others.  State v. Fuqua, 234 N.C. 168, 170-71, 66
S.E.2d 667, 668 (1951).  Unless a defendant has exclusive
possession of the place where the contraband is found, the State
must show other incriminating circumstances sufficient for the
jury to find a defendant had constructive possession.  State v.
Matias, 354 N.C. 549, 552, 556 S.E.2d 269, 271 (2001).
Our cases addressing constructive possession have
tended to turn on the specific facts presented.  See, e.g.,
Butler, 356 N.C. at 143-44, 147-48, 567 S.E.2d at 138-39, 141
(finding constructive possession when the defendant acted
suspiciously upon alighting from a bus; hurried to a taxicab and
yelled “let’s go” three times; fidgeted and ducked down in the
taxicab once in the back seat, then exited the taxicab at the
instruction of police officers and walked back to the bus
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terminal without being told to do so, drawing officers away from
the taxicab; and drugs were recovered from under the driver’s
seat of the taxicab approximately ten minutes later when the cab
returned from giving another customer a ride); Matias, 354 N.C.
at 550-52, 556 S.E.2d at 270-71 (finding constructive possession
when officers, after smelling marijuana emanating from a passing
automobile occupied by the defendant and three others, recovered
marijuana and cocaine stuffed between the seat pad and back pad
where the defendant had been seated, and an officer testified the
defendant was the only occupant who could have placed the package
there); State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 569-70, 313 S.E.2d 585,
588-89 (1984) (finding sufficient other incriminating
circumstances when cocaine and other drug packaging paraphernalia
were found on a table beside which the defendant was standing
when the officers entered the apartment, the defendant had been
observed at the apartment multiple times, possessed a key to the
apartment, and had over $1,700 in cash in his pockets); State v.
Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 736-38, 208 S.E.2d 696, 697-98 (1974)
(finding constructive possession when the defendant was absent
from the apartment when police arrived but a search of the
bedroom that the defendant and his wife occupied yielded men’s
clothing and marijuana in a dresser drawer, with additional
marijuana found in the pocket of a man’s coat in the bedroom
closet); State v. Allen, 279 N.C. 406, 408, 412, 183 S.E.2d 680,
682, 684-85 (1971) (finding constructive possession when, even
though the defendant was absent from the apartment at the time of
a search, heroin was found in the bedroom and kitchen; the
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defendant’s identification and other personal papers were in the
bedroom, public utilities for the premises were listed in the
defendant’s name; and a witness testified that the defendant had
provided heroin to him for resale).  These and other cases
demonstrate that two factors frequently considered are the
defendant’s proximity to the contraband and indicia of the
defendant’s control over the place where the contraband is found.
Here, police found defendant in a bedroom of the home
where two of his children lived with their mother.  When first
seen, defendant was sitting on the same end of the bed where
cocaine was recovered.  Once defendant slid to the floor, he was
within reach of the package of cocaine recovered from the floor
behind the bedroom door.  Defendant’s birth certificate and
state-issued identification card were found on top of a
television stand in that bedroom.  The only other individual in
the room was not near any of the cocaine.  Even though defendant
did not have exclusive possession of the premises, these
incriminating circumstances permit a reasonable inference that
defendant had the intent and capability to exercise control and
dominion over cocaine in that room.
The Court of Appeals majority found this evidence
insufficient, relying in part on the absence of evidence that
defendant appeared nervous or made any observed motion to hide
anything.  ___ N.C. App. at ___, 661 S.E.2d at 773.  However,
proper application of the standard of review focuses our analysis
on the evidence that the State did present in these highly fact-
specific cases, not on evidence that a reviewing court thinks the
State should have presented.  In other words, absence of evidence
is not evidence of absence.  Viewing the evidence admitted here
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in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that sufficient
evidence was presented from which a reasonable mind could
conclude that defendant constructively possessed cocaine. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
to dismiss.  The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
REVERSED.
2  Detective R.J. Paul of the Winston-Salem Police
Department testified that there were six individuals, “[g]ive or
take a few,” at 1924 Dacian Street when the raid occurred.  From
the video footage taken that day by law enforcement, which was
entered into evidence as State’s Exhibit One, it appears that at
least seven adults and at least two children were inside the
residence.  According to the Forsyth County Tax Administration
Office the residence at 1924 Dacian Street has 1176 square feet
of living space. 
No. 309A08 State v. Miller
Justice BRADY dissenting.
Today’s majority opinion dangerously turns a blind 
eye to our well-established precedent setting out the law of
constructive possession.  The evidence the State presented
against defendant was grossly insufficient to establish a charge
of possession of cocaine, and therefore, the trial court should
have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Because the majority
decision leads our constructive possession jurisprudence down a
perilous road of guilt by mere proximity without substantial
corroboration, I respectfully dissent.
BACKGROUND
On 8 December 2005, a team of seven or eight law
enforcement officers with the Special Enforcement Team (SET) of
the Winston-Salem Police Department raided the residence located
at 1924 Dacian Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, in
execution of a search warrant.  Upon entering the small, single
family residence, law enforcement officers found at least six
adults inside.2  In a bedroom in the front left corner of the
residence they discovered Andre Miller (defendant) with another
adult male.  The record does not contain the exact dimensions of
the bedroom, but it was estimated by law enforcement that the
foot of the bed was approximately three feet from the door to the
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3  Alicia Johnson, the lessee of 1924 Dacian Street during
the events in question, testified at trial that when the bedroom
door was open, it came within two to three inches of the bed’s
mattress.
4  The small plastic bag found behind the door, the plastic
jewelry bags found on the entertainment center, and the white,
rock-like substance found on the bed can all be seen in State’s
Exhibit One, as well as an image of defendant’s State of North
Carolina Identification Card.  As the State admitted during oral
arguments, the “rock” of cocaine found on the bed was not
discovered in a “small corner cut from a plastic bag” as
erroneously noted in the Court of Appeals opinion.
5  The trial court, Court of Appeals majority opinion, Court
of Appeals dissenting opinion, and State’s counsel at oral
arguments incorrectly refer to defendant’s North Carolina
Identification Card as his driver’s license.  The State
reluctantly admitted to this error during oral arguments, as it
was clearly apparent in State’s Exhibit One.
room.3 Defendant was sitting on the corner of the bed, near the
door, when the SET team entered the residence.  The other
individual was sitting in the chair next to the bed at that time. 
SET officers ordered everyone in the residence to lie on the
ground and defendant followed these orders without hesitation or
protest.  After the SET team secured the residence and handcuffed
defendant, detectives with the Winston-Salem Police Department
entered 1924 Dacian Street to seize evidence.  In the bedroom
where defendant was found law enforcement seized a plastic bag,
containing what was later determined to be cocaine, located in a
corner behind the open bedroom door; empty plastic jewelry bags
between a television and a DVD player on an entertainment center;
and one small pellet of a white, rock-like substance, about the
size of a BB, among the disheveled sheets and comforter of the
unmade bed.4  Defendant’s North Carolina Identification Card5 and
birth certificate were found on the entertainment center.
Additionally, eighty-five dollars in United States currency was
found on defendant’s person.
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On 1 May 2006, the Forsyth County Grand Jury returned
true bills of indictment charging defendant with (1) maintaining
a place to keep a controlled substance in violation of N.C.G.S. §
90-108(a)(7); (2) possessing cocaine with the intent to sell and
deliver in violation of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1); and (3) attaining
the status of habitual felon in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1. 
During trial, after the close of the State’s evidence, defendant
moved to dismiss all charges.  At this time the presiding trial
judge, the Honorable Catherine C. Eagles, granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss the charge of maintaining a place to keep a
controlled substance.   
During defendant’s case-in-chief, Alicia Johnson, the
lessee of 1924 Dacian Street on 8 December 2005 and mother of
defendant’s two children, testified.  Her testimony reflected
that defendant did not live at 1924 Dacian Street and was at her
residence on the day in question because she had asked him to
pick up their children from school while she went Christmas
shopping.  She further stated that the controlled substances were
found in her personal bedroom and belonged to her, not defendant. 
At the close of evidence defendant again renewed his motion to
dismiss the possession charge, which was denied.  The jury
returned a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of
possession of cocaine and of being an habitual felon.  
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed his possession conviction after finding that “[v]iewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to
support a finding of constructive possession of cocaine
sufficient to survive [defendant’s] motion to dismiss.”  State v.
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Miller, __ N.C. App. __, 661 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2008).  The case is
before this Court on the basis of a dissent at the Court of
Appeals.  
ANALYSIS
As noted by several legal scholars and this Court, the
law of possession is a morass of confusion and inconsistency. 
See State v. McNeil, 359 N.C. 800, 807-08, 617 S.E.2d 271, 276
(2005) (quoting Nat'l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67
(1914)(stating that “‘there is no word more ambiguous in its
meaning than [p]ossession.  It is interchangeably used to
describe actual possession and constructive possession which
often so shade into one another that it is difficult to say where
one ends and the other begins.’” (quoting Nat’l Safe Deposit Co.
V. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) (alteration in original))); 1
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.1(e), at 432 (2d
ed. 2003)(“The word ‘possession’ is often used in the criminal
law without definition, which perhaps reflects only the fact that
it is ‘a common term used in everyday conversation that has not
acquired any artful meaning.’”) (citation omitted); and Charles
H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in
Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 Va. L. Rev. 751, 751
(1972) (“[Possession cases] have engendered such conceptual
confusion and given rise to so many conflicting rulings ‘that for
the practitioner the problems are difficult to understand and
apparently for the courts impossible to master.’”) (citation
omitted).  Instead of clarifying existing law, or simply
following this Court’s well-established precedent, the majority’s
decision attempts to erase current jurisprudence by allowing any
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questionable circumstance to qualify as substantial evidence of
constructive possession.   
“When considering a motion to dismiss, the trial
court’s inquiry is limited to a determination of ‘whether there
is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense
charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the
offense.’”  State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145, 567 S.E.2d 137,
139 (2002) (quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472
S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (emphasis added)).  “To be substantial,
the evidence need not be irrefutable or uncontroverted; it need
only be such as would satisfy a reasonable mind as being
‘adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Id. (quoting State v.
Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581, 548 S.E.2d 712, 721 (2001)).
While a trial court should view the evidence and every
reasonable inference in the light most favorable to the State,
the standard of substantial evidence requires more than “a
suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the
offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of
it.”  In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 656-57, 260 S.E.2d 591, 602
(1979) (citing State v. Guffey, 252 N.C. 60, 62-63, 112 S.E.2d
734, 735-36 (1960)).  If the evidence fails to rise above this
threshold, “the motion for nonsuit should be allowed. . . . even
though the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong.’”  Id.
at 657, 260 S.E.2d at 602 (citations omitted).
To convict defendant of possession of cocaine under a
constructive possession theory, the State is required to present
substantial evidence that defendant had the “‘intent and
capability to maintain control and dominion over’ the narcotics.” 
State v. Matias, 354 N.C. 549, 552, 556 S.E.2d 269, 270 (2001)
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(quoting State v. Beaver, 317 N.C. 643, 648, 346 S.E.2d 476, 480
(1986)).  To do so, the State must show either that (1) defendant
had “‘exclusive possession of the place where the narcotics
[were] found’”; or (2) that “‘other incriminating circumstances’”
existed tending to show that defendant constructively possessed
the narcotics found.  Id. at 552, 556 S.E.2d at 271 (citations
omitted).  This is no insignificant hurdle for the State to
clear, and in this case the State stumbled and fell flat on its
face.  Yet, the majority still affirms the trial court’s denial
of defendant’s motion to dismiss, even though the State failed to
produce substantial evidence to support the possession charge. 
In the case sub judice, as both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals concluded, there was no substantial evidence
that defendant had “exclusive possession of the place where the
narcotics were found.’”  Id.  Therefore, any analysis of whether
substantial evidence exists to support the possession charge
should be limited to an inquiry of whether “‘other incriminating
circumstances’” were present and were substantial enough to tie
defendant to the controlled substance to show that he had the
intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over it. 
Id.
Examples of incriminating circumstances from this
Court’s case law are numerous, and the majority outlines several
in its analysis.  From this recitation, the majority concludes
that “proximity to the contraband and indicia of the defendant’s
control over the place where the contraband is found” are
“frequently considered” in determining what constitutes an
incriminating circumstance in a constructive possession case.  In
the past, this Court has used these factors in this manner in
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6  Defendant’s North Carolina State Identification Card was
never introduced as evidence at trial; however, it was clearly
displayed in State’s Exhibit One and was shown to the jury in
that video.  Notably, the North Carolina State Identification
Card, issued less than five months before the events in question,
did not list 1924 Dacian Street as defendant’s address.
cases involving alleged constructive possession; however, today
the majority’s expansive ruling in this case boldly stretches
beyond the imagination of any of our prior cases.  The majority
improvidently asserts that defendant’s proximity to the drugs
found at 1924 Dacian Street, coupled with the fact that his North
Carolina Identification Card6 and birth certificate were found in
the same room are sufficient to conclude he constructively
possessed the cocaine.  This scintilla of unconvincing evidence
hardly establishes constructive possession.   
First, the majority’s use of proximity evidence to
establish an incriminating circumstance is dangerously thin. 
While proximity to narcotics is always a factor in constructive
possession cases, it has never been the only factor, as
illustrated by the very cases the majority relies upon.  Until
today, evidence of more culpable conduct was always needed for
this Court to find that a defendant constructively possessed a
controlled substance.  When the State can show no more than that
a “defendant had been in an area where he could have committed
the crimes charged,” there is no substantial evidence.  State v.
Minor,  290 N.C. 68, 75, 224 S.E.2d 180, 185 (1976).  To consider
a charge brought on this basis is to ask this Court to “sail in a
sea of conjecture and surmise.  This we are not permitted to do.” 
Id.  It has always been understood that more than mere proximity
is needed to prove a theory of constructive possession. 
 In every case the majority cites there is ample
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evidence of incriminating circumstances in addition to evidence
of defendant’s proximity to narcotics.  In State v. Butler, the
defendant’s suspicious behavior and his concerted effort to evade
law enforcement officers provided incriminating evidence along
with proximity evidence showing that the defendant was observed
reaching into an area where narcotics were soon discovered.  356
N.C. at 147-48, 567 S.E.2d at 141.  In the instant case,
defendant displayed no suspicious behavior and followed all
instructions given to him by law enforcement.  The majority
counters that this absence of suspicious behavior is not
“evidence of absence,” but the majority misses the point and
sidesteps the issue.  Something more than proximity is needed to
prove an incriminating circumstance, and the record contains no
substantial evidence that suggests anything incriminating beyond
defendant’s proximity to the controlled substances by his mere
presence in the bedroom.
The majority next relies upon Matias, but again ignores
that additional factors, combined with proximity evidence, were
considered to conclude that incriminating circumstances existed. 
354 N.C. at 552-53, 556 S.E.2d at 271.  In Matias, the defendant
was a passenger in a vehicle that had the distinct odor of
marijuana and contained rolling papers and marijuana seeds.  Id.
at 552, 556 S.E.2d at 271.  Thus, this Court ruled that a jury
could reasonably determine the defendant at least had knowledge
that narcotics were in the vehicle.  Id.  This evidence was
offered in addition to proximity evidence showing that the
defendant was the only individual in the vehicle who was able to
hide a bag of cocaine between a crease in the seat cushions where
it was later discovered.  Id.   
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7  In dismissing the charge of maintaining a place to keep a
controlled substance, the trial judge noted that the constructive
possession charge was primarily being allowed to go before the
jury due to the evidence of cocaine found among the bed sheets. 
As to the bag of cocaine found behind the door, the trial judge
stated, “The other cocaine was behind the door.  I mean, it could
have been there for weeks.”  This statement indicates that the
trial judge did not view the bag of cocaine behind the door as
substantial evidence to support the possession charge.  Why the
majority chooses to do so now is beyond my understanding.
Matias is markedly different from the instant case in
that it cannot be shown here that defendant even had constructive
knowledge that the narcotics were in the bedroom at 1924 Dacian
Street.  Video footage of the crime scene, shot immediately
following the raid, reveals that the narcotics were not in plain
view.  The small BB-sized pellet of rock cocaine was seized from
among the light-colored sheets of a disheveled bed, and the small
plastic bag containing cocaine was found on the floor in a dark
corner behind an open door.  As the trial judge perceptively
stated, this bag “could have been there for weeks.”7 
Furthermore, there were at least five other adults in the
residence when the items were discovered.  To conclude that
defendant constructively possessed these objects, let alone even
knew they were in the room, is mere conjecture and speculation. 
Under these circumstances defendant’s proximity to the controlled
substances means absolutely nothing in relation to the State’s
theory of constructive possession.
Next, the majority mistakenly relies upon State v.
Brown to bolster its incriminating circumstances argument.  310
N.C. 563, 569-70, 313 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1984).  Again, in Brown,
evidence of incriminating circumstances was much stronger.  In
its opinion, this Court specifically found that “there [were]
circumstances other than defendant’s proximity to the contraband
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materials which tend[ed] to buttress the inference” that the
defendant committed the crime charged.  Id. at 569, 313 S.E.2d at
589 (emphasis added).  The narcotics recovered in Brown were in
plain view of the defendant; the defendant possessed a key to the
residence; and law enforcement officers discovered over seventeen
hundred dollars in United States currency on the defendant’s
person.  Id. at 568-70, 313 S.E.2d at 588-89.  No similar
circumstances exist in this case.  The State could not present
any physical evidence or witness testimony indicating that
defendant had visited 1924 Dacian Street at any time other than
the date in question.  Furthermore, law enforcement recovered a
mere eighty-five dollars from defendant’s person.  Logic and
common sense dictate that this meager amount of currency is not
indicative of someone who is dealing in controlled substances. 
During oral argument, the State’s counsel was questioned on this
point and conceded that if significant amounts of currency had
been seized from defendant, the prosecutor would have run this
evidence up the flagpole before the jury. 
Lastly, the majority attempts to use State v. Baxter,
285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E.2d 696 (1974), and State v. Allen, 279 N.C.
406, 183 S.E.2d 680 (1971), as examples of similar situations in
which proximity and indicia of control were sufficient to show
incriminating circumstances.  Both are critically distinguishable
from the present case.  In Baxter, the State presented evidence,
which included men’s clothing found in dresser drawers containing
marijuana and a man’s jacket with marijuana in its pocket, that
was sufficient to show the defendant occupied the bedroom in
which the narcotics were seized.  285 N.C. at 736-38, 208 S.E.2d
at 697-98.  In Allen, the defendant’s United States Uniform
Services identification card and several other papers bearing the
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defendant’s name were found in the residence; public utilities
for the residence were listed in the defendant’s name; and a
sixteen year old witness testified that he had obtained heroin
from the residence pursuant to the defendant’s directions.  279
N.C. at 408, 183 S.E.2d at 684-85.  No similar evidence can be
found in the present record to justify a finding of incriminating
circumstances.  No personal effects belonging to defendant were
found at the residence, and the State could offer no other proof,
aside from physical presence, to suggest defendant had any
control over the premises at 1924 Dacian Street.
When evidence of incriminating circumstances are
lacking, as they are in the case sub judice, this Court has
repeatedly rejected theories of constructive possession.  For
example, in Minor, the defendant helped plant a garden and
occupied an abandoned residence for a short time near a field
where marijuana was cultivated.  290 N.C. at 72-73, 224 S.E.2d at
183-84.  Law enforcement found a container in the residence
labeled with the defendant’s name.  Id. at 72, 224 S.E.2d at 183. 
When the defendant was arrested, two wilted marijuana leaves were
found in the car in which he had been a passenger.  Id. at 72,
224 S.E.2d at 183-84.  This Court found that under these facts
alone, the State had presented insufficient evidence to prove
constructive possession of marijuana and ruled the defendant’s
motion to dismiss should have been granted.  Id. at 74-75, 224
S.E.2d at 185.  
In State v. McLaurin, the defendant was convicted of
possession of drug paraphernalia under a constructive possession
theory.  320 N.C. 143, 144, 357 S.E.2d 636, 637 (1987).  Law
enforcement searched the defendant’s residence pursuant to a
search warrant and found drug paraphernalia which contained
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traces of cocaine, throughout the house.  Id.  In a crawl space
beneath the dwelling, law enforcement found three marked one
hundred dollar bills that were used in a previous drug
transaction.  320 N.C. at 145, 357 S.E.2d at 637.  The defendant
admitted to living in the residence, and photographs of her were
found inside the house along with her Medicaid card.  Id. 
However, the defendant did not have exclusive control over the
premises, leading this Court to conclude that “because there was
no evidence of other incriminating circumstances linking her to
[the seized paraphernalia], her control was insufficiently
substantial to support a conclusion of her possession of the
seized paraphernalia.”  320 N.C. at 147, 357 S.E.2d at 638.
In the instant case, there is even less evidence of
incriminating circumstances than in Minor and McLaurin, yet the
majority still insists that the State’s evidence is substantial
enough to maintain a charge of constructive possession.  Never
before has this Court so conjured up incriminating circumstances
in order to justify a conviction under a constructive possession
theory.  The majority offers the fact that defendant was in
someone else’s bedroom, with another individual, where cocaine
and plastic jewelry bags were discovered to support this
conviction.  As previously set out, proximity to narcotics alone
has never before been enough to establish an incriminating
circumstance, and it should not be enough here.  
Because it is well established that proximity to
narcotics alone cannot substantiate a finding of constructive
possession, the majority uses the fact that defendant’s North
Carolina State Identification Card and birth certificate were
found in the bedroom with the narcotics to show indicia of his
control over the room.  This is not substantial evidence.  There
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8  In fact, the record reveals that defendant was scheduled
to pick up two of his children from school on the afternoon of
the raid.  Identification is often required to pick up children
from school.  Driver’s licenses, state-issued identification
cards, uniform service identification cards, birth certificates,
and/or passports are the forms of identification normally
associated with establishing an individual’s actual identity.   
exist many innocent, plausible explanations of why defendant had
two forms of identification with him while he was visiting 1924
Dacian Street and why these documents were in the room where
defendant was found.8  Additionally, these identification
documents were found on top of an entertainment center near the
door to the bedroom, not tucked away in a drawer or filing
cabinet.  In today’s society who does not, as a matter of course,
carry an identification card?  Furthermore, how is the presence
of a certificate of live birth evidence of an incriminating
circumstance?  To say this qualifies as incriminating, and is
thus substantial evidence of defendant’s possession of cocaine,
is setting sail on the “sea of conjecture and surmise” this Court
has avoided in the past.  Minor, 290 N.C. at 75, 224 S.E.2d at
185.
Furthermore, no other circumstance at the residence
suggests defendant had the “‘intent and capability to maintain
control and dominion over’” the controlled substances.  Matias,
354 N.C. at 552, 556 S.E.2d at 270. (citation omitted).  None of
defendant’s personal items, save his two identification
documents, were discovered.  No men’s clothing, shoes, or
toiletry items were found in the residence.  No medicines
prescribed to defendant were located.  No photographs of
defendant were retrieved.  No utility bills, cable bills,
telephone bills, lease agreements, or insurance policies for the
residence bore defendant’s name, and no mail was found addressed
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to defendant at 1924 Dacian Street.  No substantial evidence of
any nature was introduced at trial to tie defendant to 1924
Dacian Street.  To the contrary, defendant’s North Carolina State
Identification Card, which the majority relies upon, had been
issued only five months earlier and listed 1309 Oak Street,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, as defendant’s address.  Moreover,
Alicia Johnson, the lessee of the premises, testified that
defendant did not live at 1924 Dacian Street.  Johnson further
testified that the cocaine was found in her personal bedroom and
belonged to her.
I realize that the majority scoffs at the glaring
absence of substantial evidence in this case and pens the phrase,
“absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.”  This defies
legal analysis, much less logic.  The nexus of this entire case
turns upon whether there was insufficient evidence to maintain a
charge of constructive possession.  The very legal definition of
insufficient evidence is the absence of evidence.  For the
majority to suggest that the absence of evidence is irrelevant
exceeds the farcical in legal analysis.  
In the end, the only meaningful evidence we have
linking defendant to the cocaine at 1924 Dacian Street is that he
was found sitting on an unmade bed where a small, BB-sized pellet
of crack cocaine was also discovered.  Thus, the real question
is, “Has the State established that defendant was aware of the
‘rock-like substance’ found on the bed?”  The State  presented no
evidence of defendant’s awareness, other than mere proximity, and
as established above, mere proximity alone is insufficient.  At
best, that defendant was found sitting on a bed in someone else’s
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9  The majority implies that the fact that two of
defendant’s children resided at 1924 Dacian Street adds weight to
its analysis of incriminating circumstances.  The record shows
that the residence belonged to the children’s mother, and that
defendant did not have authority or control over the premises.  I
fail to see why a finding that defendant’s two children resided
at 1924 Dacian Street incriminates defendant, and I do not
believe it should have any bearing upon the analysis.
bedroom where cocaine was found is suspicious.9  But our law is
clear that a defendant cannot be convicted on suspicion alone. 
Substantial evidence must be presented before a jury can even
consider if, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant possessed
cocaine.  Without this required substantial evidence the trial
court must grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  In re Vinson,
298 N.C. at 656-57, 260 S.E.2d at 602; see N.C.G.S. § 15A-1227
(2007). 
The majority’s decision today effectively nullifies the
substantial evidence requirement in constructive possession
cases, thereby giving the State free reign to prosecute anyone
who happens to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.  The
majority’s annihilation of the substantial evidence requirement
essentially swings open the door for prosecutors to charge, try,
and convict individuals across North Carolina of possession of
controlled substances or other contraband on the basis of mere
proximity.  This has never been the law in this State, and it
should not be so now.  This unprecedented, unjustified, and
unfounded expansion of the law strains credulity and dangerously
exposes our citizens to prosecutorial overreaching at the expense
of personal liberty.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.
As I conclude the State presented insufficient evidence
that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine discovered by
law enforcement officers, I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly notes that “unless a defendant
has exclusive possession of the place where contraband is found,
the State must show other incriminating circumstances sufficient
for the jury to find a defendant had constructive possession.” 
Here, it is uncontroverted that defendant did not have exclusive
possession of the apartment or even the bedroom in which the
cocaine was discovered.  Thus, the State was required to provide
evidence of other incriminating circumstances to show that
defendant constructively possessed the cocaine.  This the State
failed to do.  The majority identifies only two factors in
support of its conclusion that the State produced substantial
evidence of defendant’s possession of the cocaine:  (1)
defendant’s proximity to the cocaine; and (2) the presence of
defendant’s birth certificate and identification card on top of a
television stand.  I do not agree with the majority that
defendant’s mere proximity to the cocaine, which was not in plain
view, or the presence of his birth certificate and identification
card, which were in plain view and, in fact, showed defendant
lived elsewhere, constituted sufficiently incriminating
circumstances to permit more than a mere suspicion of defendant’s
guilt.  See State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430,
433 (1988) (stating that “a motion to dismiss should be allowed
where the facts and circumstances warranted by the evidence do no
more than raise a suspicion of guilt or conjecture since there
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would still remain a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt”). 
I therefore respectfully dissent.  
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.