Title: A.R.A. v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 170199
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2018

PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Mims, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ., and  
Russell, S.J. 
 
A.R.A.1 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 170199 
STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH 
 
 
 
March 1, 2018 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 
AND JAMES CITY COUNTY 
Randolph T. West, Judge Designate 
 
 
A.R.A. appeals from a final order denying her petition to expunge a felony arrest record.  
The trial court declined to expunge the record on the basis that the existence of this record does 
not and may not cause A.R.A. a manifest injustice.  We conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying A.R.A.’s petition.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment below and 
remand for entry of an order expunging A.R.A.’s felony arrest record. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2014, A.R.A. was charged with a felony, assault and battery of a law enforcement 
officer, under Code § 18.2-57.  She was also charged with two misdemeanors:  falsely 
identifying oneself to law enforcement, in violation of Code § 19.2-82.1, and public swearing or 
intoxication, in violation of Code § 18.2-388.  The charges stemmed from her behavior after she 
drank to excess.  Before A.R.A.’s arraignment, the Commonwealth’s Attorney amended the 
charge to disorderly conduct, in violation of Code § 18.2-415.  A.R.A. pled guilty to the 
disorderly conduct charge.  The trial court found her guilty of the offense, and imposed a $200 
fine, with six months in jail, suspended, conditioned on three years of “good behavior, keeping 
                     
1 We employ the petitioner’s initials.  A published opinion employing her full name 
would be counterproductive to the object of the expungement petition. 
2 
the peace, obeying this order and paying fines and costs.”  The Commonwealth withdrew the 
remaining misdemeanor charges by nolle prosequi.  A.R.A. has no criminal history separate from 
this event.  She went on to graduate from college with a 3.8 grade point average. 
In 2015, A.R.A. filed a petition seeking to expunge the records of both her felony arrest 
and the withdrawn misdemeanor charges.  At a hearing on the petition, A.R.A. testified that she 
currently works for a large media company and would like to work in the field of children’s 
entertainment.  She described the field as competitive.  She also has contemplated obtaining an 
M.B.A. or a law degree to advance her career.  She is aware of the character and fitness 
requirements to sit for the bar exam and the necessary disclosure to law schools of an applicant’s 
prior charges and convictions. 
Before her current employment, A.R.A. completed several internships to build her 
resume.  A.R.A.’s disclosure of her criminal history delayed the start date for one of her 
internships.  She further testified that she interned with a foundation and is interested in 
obtaining a permanent position at the foundation.  To intern with this foundation, she had to 
undergo a background check that required the disclosure of all charges and convictions.  She 
explained that she decided not to apply for several volunteer programs that work with children 
because she knew she would have to disclose her record.  A.R.A.’s fear is that the positions she 
is applying for are very competitive and that her arrest record might serve as a disqualifier.  She 
explained that she did not want her career to suffer and did not want the arrest record “to define 
[her] as a person today.” 
The Commonwealth did not dispute A.R.A.’s evidence concerning her career interests or 
her interest in volunteer work.  It chiefly argued that A.R.A. was ineligible for expungement. 
3 
The circuit court agreed that the misdemeanor arrests for falsely identifying oneself to 
law enforcement and public swearing or intoxication should be expunged.  The court held that 
the felony arrest, however, should not be expunged because “the continued existence and 
possible dissemination of information relating to the arrest of Petitioner on this charge does not 
cause and may not cause circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice to the Petitioner.”  
In its discussion from the bench, the court focused on the facts surrounding the arrest. 
ANALYSIS 
Virginia law permits a person charged with a criminal offense to seek the expungement 
of police and court records relating to a criminal charge if the person has been acquitted or a 
“nolle prosequi is taken or the charge is otherwise dismissed.”  Code §§ 19.2-392.2(A)(1) and 
(2).  The dispositive question in this case is whether the petitioner established that the continued 
existence and possible dissemination of a felony arrest record would constitute an actual or a 
potential “manifest injustice,” the statutory standard set forth in Code § 19.2-392.2(F). 
I. 
THE FELONY CHARGE WAS “OTHERWISE DISMISSED.” 
The “threshold determination to be made by the trial court on considering any petition for 
expungement . . . is whether the petitioner has a right to seek expungement of those records 
under an applicable provision of Code § 19.2-392.2(A).”  Daniel v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 
523, 530, 604 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2004).  The trial court did not address this point of law.  We 
conclude that A.R.A.’s felony arrest record qualifies as a charge that was “otherwise dismissed” 
under Code § 19.2-392.2(A), and, therefore, she is eligible to seek expungement. 
In Dressner v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 1, 736 S.E.2d 735 (2013), we reasoned that when 
a criminal charge is amended to a separate and unrelated charge, and the elements of the 
amended charge are not subsumed within the original charge, the petitioner occupies “the status 
4 
of innocent” with respect to the original charge.  As such, the petitioner qualifies “under the 
expungement statute as a person whose charge has been ‘otherwise dismissed.’”  Id. at 7, 736 
S.E.2d at 738 (citation omitted).  In contrast, if the petitioner was charged with a felony and is 
convicted of a lesser-included misdemeanor, the petitioner does not occupy the “status of 
innocent” for purposes of expungement.  Necaise v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 666, 669, 708 
S.E.2d 864, 866 (2011). 
A.R.A. was charged with felony assault and battery, and the Commonwealth amended the 
charge to misdemeanor disorderly conduct.  “An offense is not a lesser-included offense of a 
charged offense unless all its elements are included in the offense charged.”  Commonwealth v. 
Dalton, 259 Va. 249, 253, 524 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2000).  A person is guilty of disorderly conduct 
under Code § 18.2-415 when: 
with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, 
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
 
A.  In any street, highway, public building, or while in or on a 
public conveyance, or public place engages in conduct having a 
direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person or persons 
at whom, individually, such conduct is directed. 
 
The common law crime of assault required an attempt or offer committed with an intent to inflict 
bodily harm coupled with the present ability to inflict such harm.  Hardy v. Commonwealth, 58 
Va. (17 Gratt.) 592, 600-01 (1867).  The common law tort of assault could be completed if the 
tortfeasor engaged in actions intended to place the victim in fear of bodily harm and created a 
well-founded fear in the victim.  Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 16, 574 S.E.2d 258, 261 
(2003).  Over the years, Virginia has merged the common law crime and tort of assault.  Today, a 
criminal assault occurs when either set of elements is proved.  Carter v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
44, 46-47, 606 S.E.2d 839, 841 (2005). 
5 
Each statute contains an element that is not found in the other.  Therefore, disorderly 
conduct is not a lesser included offense of felony assault and battery of a police officer.  As a 
consequence, the felony assault charge was “otherwise dismissed” under Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A)(2), and A.R.A. is eligible to seek expungement of that record. 
II. 
THE PETITIONER’S UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE CONTINUED 
EXISTENCE AND POSSIBLE DISSEMINATION OF HER ARREST RECORD COULD 
CONSTITUTE A “MANIFEST INJUSTICE.” 
A. 
When a petitioner “occupies the status of innocent,” the facts of the alleged crime 
are irrelevant to the resolution of the expungement petition. 
 
As noted above, under our decision in Dressner, the petitioner “occupies the status of 
innocent.”  Id. at 7, 736 S.E.2d at 738.  Revisiting the underlying facts of the alleged crime 
cannot be reconciled with this holding.  A petitioner in this circumstance cannot simultaneously 
occupy the status of innocent and be required to prove her actual innocence of a crime the 
Commonwealth declined to prosecute. 
The purpose of a criminal trial is to prove factual guilt or innocence and to impose 
punishment.  The purpose of expungement is to determine whether to expunge certain records.  
The focus of the expungement hearing ought to be on the impact of an existing record, not a 
retrial of a charge the Commonwealth elected not to prosecute.  See Code § 19.2-392.1 
(statement of policy stating General Assembly’s finding that “arrest records can be a hindrance 
to an innocent citizen’s ability to obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit.”); Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(F) (hearing can be held to determine whether “the continued existence and possible 
dissemination of information relating to the arrest of the petitioner causes or may cause 
circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice to the petitioner.”). 
For these reasons, we conclude that the manifest injustice standard in this instance is 
forward-looking, rather than backward-looking.  The inquiry turns on whether the continued 
6 
existence of the record will or may cause the petitioner a manifest injustice in the future.  The 
inquiry is not backward-looking with respect to the facts of the alleged crime.  There is an 
appropriate symmetry to this conclusion.  A petitioner may not seek to adduce facts at an 
expungement hearing to prove his innocence, Daniel, 268 Va. at 531, 604 S.E.2d at 448.  The 
converse ought to hold true:  the Commonwealth may not introduce facts to establish the 
petitioner’s guilt of an offense in an expungement hearing when the Commonwealth elected not 
to prosecute the petitioner for a particular offense.2 
B. 
The standard of review. 
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny expungement under Code  
§ 19.2-392.2(F) under an abuse of discretion standard.  The scope of that discretion, however, is 
restricted by the forgiving standard that the statute sets forth.  The statute provides that the 
petition should be granted if the petitioner, who bears the burden of proof, can establish that “the 
continued existence and possible dissemination of information relating to the arrest of the 
petitioner causes or may cause circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice to the 
petitioner.”  Code § 19.2-392.2(F). 
The phrase “manifest injustice” appears in a number places in the Code.  See Code § 
8.01-692 (requiring a court to deny in forma pauperis status to frivolous inmate litigators unless 
the court “determines that it would be manifest injustice to deny in forma pauperis status”); Code 
§ 15.2-2136(4), Code § 15.2-3207; Code § 15.2-3525(6); Code § 15.2-3806(6), and Code § 
15.2-3906 (all allowing a special court overseeing certain local government matters to “make an 
                     
 
2 Our holding is limited to the circumstance, like the one here and the one we addressed 
in Dressner, where the Commonwealth has elected to proceed on a charge other than the one for 
which the petitioner was arrested.  We express no opinion as to whether a petitioner similarly 
“occupies the status of innocent” for purposes of expungement following a successful 
suppression motion or speedy trial dismissal. 
7 
appropriate order which will control the subsequent conduct of the case unless modified before 
or during the trial or hearing to prevent manifest injustice”); Code § 19.2-296 (permitting 
withdrawal of a guilty plea to correct “manifest injustice”); Code § 20-60.6 and Code § 
63.2-1917 (allowing a party to challenge a child support enforcement order “on the grounds that 
he did not receive the notice and enforcement of the order would constitute manifest injustice”); 
Code § 20-107.1(B) (barring spousal support on the grounds of adultery unless “the court 
determines from clear and convincing evidence, that a denial of support and maintenance would 
constitute a manifest injustice”); Code § 32.1-174.1(B) (compelling a court to order forfeiture of 
a bond or escrow account upon revocation of a permit for the construction of waterworks, 
“unless the court finds the forfeiture would result in manifest injustice”); Code § 46.2-410.1(A) 
(permitting a petition for review of the suspension of a driver’s license in cases of a manifest 
injustice).  None of the statutes that employ the language “manifest injustice” contain the phrase 
“causes or may cause circumstances” which constitute a manifest injustice.3  By employing the 
word “may,” the General Assembly plainly signaled that a petitioner need not show actual 
prejudice.  Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  Instead, the statute contemplates expungement when a 
petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility of a manifest injustice. 
In the “Statement of Policy” for the chapter of the Code governing expungement, the 
General Assembly found that “arrest records can be a hindrance to an innocent citizen’s ability to 
obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit.”  Code § 19.2-392.1.  A citizen who 
                     
 
3 Rule 5:25 and Rule 5A:18 contain an exception to the requirement of a 
contemporaneous objection, the “ends of justice” exception.  Although the phrase “ends of 
justice” is similar to the phrase “manifest injustice,” there is a key difference:  the rules do not 
contain the “may” language found in the expungement statute.  Moreover, the purpose animating 
these rules also differs.  The “ends of justice” exception has been applied sparingly to, among 
other things, prevent gamesmanship and discourage poor advocacy.  Those concerns do not 
apply to the expungement statute. 
8 
occupies the status of innocent should not face the prospect of hindrance in employment, housing 
or credit from a government arrest record.  A reasonable possibility of a hindrance to obtaining 
employment, an education, or credit can thus serve as a basis for a finding of manifest injustice. 
Although the “manifest injustice” standard is permissive, it does not open wide the door 
of expungement to all comers.  Accordingly, trial courts possess limited discretion to deny such 
petitions.  A person with a lengthy unexpungeable criminal record will generally stand on a 
different footing with respect to showing a possible “manifest injustice.”  For such a person, 
even if an isolated arrest record is expunged, the remaining criminal history remains available to 
prospective employers and others.  It makes little sense to compel overburdened law enforcement 
agencies to devote time to redacting records when the exercise will yield no tangible benefit to 
the petitioner.  In addition, fantastical or exaggerated assertions of a potential adverse impact on 
career prospects, credit, housing, or social standing will not suffice to show the potential for a 
manifest injustice. 
C. 
A.R.A. established that the continued existence of the arrest records may cause 
circumstances which constitute a manifest injustice. 
 
An abuse of discretion . . . can occur in three principal ways: when 
a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is 
not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered 
and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no 
improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those 
factors, commits a clear error of judgment. 
 
Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 
(2011). 
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying A.R.A.’s petition for 
expungement.  First, the trial court cited from the bench the facts surrounding A.R.A.’s arrest.  
As explained above, A.R.A.’s actual guilt or innocence was irrelevant under these circumstances.  
9 
A.R.A. occupies the status of innocent with respect to the felony arrest.  Accordingly, to the 
extent the trial court gave significant weight to such an irrelevant or improper factor, the court 
abused its discretion.  Beyond this, given the limited discretion Code § 19.2-392.2(F) affords 
trial courts, we hold that A.R.A. established her entitlement to expungement. 
We acknowledge that, so far, A.R.A. has been able to complete her education and find 
employment in the field of her choice.  Those facts simply demonstrate that she has not shown 
actual adverse effects on her employment up to this point.  But the statute is broader.  It 
contemplates expungement when the continued existence or dissemination of the record “may 
cause circumstances” that constitute a manifest injustice.  Code § 19.2-392.2(F). 
A.R.A. testified that she has worked in and expects to continue working in a competitive 
field.  At least some of these employers require background checks.  She expressed a reasonable 
fear that she could be denied a job or advancement on the basis of her felony arrest record.  She 
has declined to apply for volunteer positions involving work with children because of this arrest 
record.  She also expressed an interest in attending law school and investigated the requirements 
for law school admission and for obtaining a law license in Virginia and California.  It is possible 
that law schools and the bar more generally would entirely discount the existence of such an 
arrest record.  The fact remains, however, that an applicant’s character and fitness are relevant 
considerations.  The uncontested facts establish a reasonable possibility that a felony arrest 
record would hinder her career or her educational opportunities, and have hindered the pursuit of 
her volunteer interests. 
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying A.R.A.’s petition for 
expungement.  Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
 
10 
CONCLUSION 
 
We will reverse and remand for entry of an order expunging A.R.A.’s felony arrest 
record. 
Reversed and remanded.   
CHIEF JUSTICE LEMONS, concurring in the result. 
 
 
I find myself agreeing with parts of the majority opinion and parts of the dissenting 
opinion.  Whatever dissonance that may cause is tracked to the source of the conflict. 
 
The General Assembly has provided a “Statement of Policy” in Code § 19.2-392.1 that 
states as follows: 
The General Assembly finds that arrest records can be a hindrance 
to an innocent citizen's ability to obtain employment, an education 
and to obtain credit. It further finds that the police and court records 
of those of its citizens who have been absolutely pardoned for crimes 
for which they have been unjustly convicted can also be a hindrance. 
This chapter is intended to protect such persons from the 
unwarranted damage which may occur as a result of being arrested 
and convicted. 
 
 
As if to underscore the strength of this public policy statement, the General Assembly has 
provided criminal sanctions in Code §19.2-392.3 for unlawful disclosure of expunged records 
and in Code § 19.2-392.4 against employers, educational institutions and agencies of state and 
local governments concerning the requirement of answers to questions about certain arrest 
records or “criminal charges.” 
 
The “Statement of Policy” seeks to remediate certain disabilities befalling “an innocent 
citizen’s ability to obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit.”  Further, it seeks to 
“protect such persons from the unwarranted damage which may occur as a result of being 
arrested and convicted.” 
 
11 
 
Clearly, the public policy of the Commonwealth is strongly asserted by the General 
Assembly and repeated in Code §19.2-392.2(F) where the General Assembly directs that: 
If the court finds that the continued existence and possible 
dissemination of information relating to the arrest of the petitioner 
causes or may cause circumstances which constitute a manifest 
injustice to the petitioner, it shall order expungement of the police 
and court records. 
 
The juxtaposition of “may” and “shall” as governing action verbs in the same sentence, 
contributes to the tension.*  Ordinarily, the directory language of “shall” admits of no discretion.  
When the language of direction is joined with the very low level of proof required -- “may cause 
. . . manifest injustice to the petitioner,” -- the balance is tipped in favor of the petitioner. 
 
I find myself in agreement with the majority’s observation that the General Assembly did 
not require proof of actual prejudice; rather, it requires a far lower level of proof, namely, a 
reasonable possibility of manifest injustice.  In that respect, as noted by the majority, the thrust 
of the statutory scheme is “forward-looking” rather than “backward-looking.”  This petitioner is 
not required “to prove her actual innocence of a crime the Commonwealth declined to 
prosecute.”  However, embracing that principle does not require exclusion of the facts relating to 
the charge which illuminate the context.  In this regard, I agree with the dissent that evidence of 
the circumstances of the arrest simply cannot be irrelevant to the inquiry. 
 
It is abundantly clear that the manifest injustice anticipated by this Code provision relates 
to “ability to obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit.”  With no other criminal 
record and no duty to prove actual prejudice, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner “may” be  
 
                     
 
∗ In subsection (F) there are five iterations of the term “shall” and three of the term 
“may.” 
 
12 
hindered in gaining employment in certain fields she has expressed interest in pursuing, such as 
admission to law school and the practice of law. 
 
Justice Kelsey opens his dissent by reference to the old adage that “bad facts make bad 
law.”  Surely, this observation has stood the test of time and rings true.  Unfortunately, in this 
case the facts are filtered through a statutory scheme that somewhat muddles legislative intent. 
Nonetheless, I concur in the result reached by the majority because I conclude that, by whatever 
means and proof employed, the General Assembly intended generous application of this 
remedial statute, and the trial court abused its discretion by concluding otherwise. 
 
 
JUSTICE KELSEY, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, dissenting. 
 
I. 
Often dismissed as a mere cliché, “the old adage that ‘bad facts’ make ‘bad law’”1 
sometimes carries more meaning than any legal dissertation ever could.  The “bad facts” in this 
case are bad, so to speak, only because their emotive appeal contorts the legal analysis.  In all 
other respects, the facts start off poorly but end quite well:  A young college student, during a 
regrettable drunken episode, gets arrested for felony assault and battery of a law enforcement 
officer.  The prosecutor later drops the charge down to misdemeanor disorderly conduct.  The 
student subsequently expresses genuine regret, pleads guilty, receives alcohol counseling, 
graduates with honors, gets a great job, and now looks forward to a bright future.  This early 
chapter of her life no doubt ended with a lesson learned. 
                     
 
1 Synchronized Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Prav Lodging, LLC, 288 Va. 356, 370, 764 S.E.2d 
61, 68 (2014) (Koontz, S.J., dissenting); see also Virginian-Pilot Media Cos. v. Dow Jones & 
Co., 280 Va. 464, 477, 698 S.E.2d 900, 907 (2010) (Lemons, J., dissenting); Shankle v. Spahr, 
121 Va. 598, 610, 93 S.E. 605, 608 (1917). 
13 
The legal saga, however, is more complicated.  The student, referred to as “A.R.A.” by 
the majority, filed an expungement petition seeking to remove all police and court records 
related to her felony arrest.  The records she sought to expunge would include a police report 
stating that, while intoxicated, she “grabbed [the officer’s] groin” during her arrest, J.A. at 47; an 
arrest warrant issued by the officer, see id. at 5-6; a “Virginia Criminal Record” report 
identifying the charge, see id. at 11; and a court conviction order reflecting a nolle prosequi of 
the felony charge as part of a plea agreement, see id. at 9-10. 
The circuit court received evidence showing that A.R.A. has an impressive future ahead 
of her.  She graduated with honors from the College of William & Mary with a 3.8 grade point 
average.  Since her arrest in January 2014, A.R.A. has worked for several prestigious 
organizations.  No evidence suggested that A.R.A. has ever been fired, turned down for a job, 
held back from an expected promotion, denied any further educational opportunities, or denied 
credit.  To be sure, no employer or potential employer has even intimated that her arrest would in 
any way limit her employability.  Her only basis for believing that something along these lines 
might one day happen are her factually insupportable fears. 
Under Code § 19.2-392.2(F), a circuit court can only grant an expungement petition for a 
felony arrest if it “finds that the continued existence and possible dissemination of information 
relating to the arrest of the petitioner causes or may cause circumstances which constitute a 
manifest injustice . . . .  Otherwise, it shall deny the petition.”  Sitting as factfinder, the circuit 
court found “that the continued existence and possible dissemination of information relating to 
the arrest of [A.R.A.] on this charge does not cause and may not cause circumstances which 
constitute a manifest injustice,” and thus, denied the petition with regard to A.R.A.’s felony 
arrest.  J.A. at 16. 
14 
II. 
A. 
The majority contends that the circuit court erred because, in its oral statements from the 
bench, the court “focused on the facts surrounding the arrest.”  Ante at 3.  The majority holds that 
this focus was an abuse of judicial discretion as a matter of law because a circuit court cannot 
consider the circumstances of an arrest when a petitioner seeks to expunge an arrest record.  I 
find this newly discovered axiom to be as unpersuasive as it is unprecedented. 
1. 
The majority’s reasoning rests on the faulty assumption that Code § 19.2-392.2 is only 
“forward-looking,” not “backward-looking with respect to the facts of the alleged crime.”  Ante 
at 5-6.  Relying heavily on this premise, the majority holds that the facts of the alleged crime 
must not be considered because they are legally “irrelevant.”  Ante at 8-9.  Nothing in the statute, 
however, expressly or implicitly says as much, and I see no reason why this assumption is or 
should be true. 
Suppose that a man is arrested for a violent act of child sexual abuse.  At his preliminary 
hearing, the accused offers irrefutable evidence of his innocence that promptly results in a nolle 
prosequi of the charge.  If he later petitions the court for expungement, how could any court turn 
a blind eye to the facts of the alleged crime and treat them as “irrelevant”?  Ante at 8-9.  To the 
wrongfully accused man, the most important fact is that he had nothing to do with it.  How could 
that be irrelevant? 
If I turn the hypothetical around, the point remains the same.  Suppose that a violent child 
abuser, after confessing to the crime, nonetheless is discharged from criminal liability solely 
because the prosecutor inadvertently scheduled the trial one day beyond the Speedy Trial Act 
15 
deadline.2  Or, suppose he goes to trial but is acquitted because “the constable . . . blundered,”3 
and, as a consequence, irrefutable evidence of guilt was suppressed.  The acquitted pedophile in 
either hypothetical later seeks an expungement so that he can get a job working with school 
children.  I think that the public would be surprised to learn that, in deciding whether to expunge 
his arrest record, a court could take no account whatsoever of the circumstances surrounding his 
arrest.  It would seem equally perplexing that the court could not consider any evidence tending 
to support or defeat the validity of the charged offense. 
The judicial blinders of this “forward-looking” assumption, ante at 5, makes us 
vulnerable to Jeremy Bentham’s trenchant criticism that “jurisprudence may be defined” in 
aberrant cases as “the art of being methodically ignorant of what everybody knows.”  John F. 
Dillon, The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America (quoting Jeremy Bentham & M. 
Dumont, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence: Extracted from the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham, 
Esq. 6 n.* (1825) (translating Dumont’s original French into English)), in 1 Readings on the 
History and System of the Common Law 241, 241 (Roscoe Pound & Theodore F.T. Plucknett 
eds., 3d ed. 1927).  That criticism stings here because an expungement order is designed to make 
sure that no one ever knows the real truth.  Before issuing such an order, therefore, an 
expungement court should at least find out what exactly it is that the petitioner seeks to hide 
from the public and factor that into its discretionary decision to grant or deny the petition. 
2. 
The majority’s response to this point serves to underscore it.  Anticipating the logical 
reach of its “forward-looking” thesis, ante at 5, the majority says in a footnote that its “holding is 
                     
 
2 The Speedy Trial Act, Code § 19.2-243, requires that an accused “be forever discharged 
from prosecution for [an] offense if no trial” takes place within certain time limits. 
 
3 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). 
16 
limited to the circumstance” in which the prosecutor elected not to “proceed on a charge . . . for 
which the petitioner was arrested.”  Ante at 6 n.2.  Having given this limitation, the majority 
thereafter “express[es] no opinion as to whether a petitioner similarly ‘occupies the status of 
innocent’ for purposes of expungement following a successful suppression motion or speedy trial 
dismissal.”  Ante at 6 n.2. 
While I appreciate the effort to cabin today’s holding by disavowing its inevitable logical 
consequences,4 I do not understand how the majority’s proviso could possibly work.  How could 
a petitioner who has obtained a nolle prosequi of his charge “occup[y] the status of innocent,” 
ante at 6 n.2., but not a petitioner who has obtained a dismissal of his charge with prejudice over 
a prosecutor’s objection?  Is the former more innocent than the latter? 
If so, would it matter that the prosecutor moved to nolle prosequi the charge after the trial 
court granted a suppression motion rendering otherwise irrefutable evidence of guilt inadmissible 
at trial?  What if the prosecutor moved to nolle prosequi the charge only upon realizing that the 
speedy-trial deadline had just expired?  If the majority’s distinction is truly distinct, then it fails 
to explain why the petitioner who obtains a nolle prosequi of his charge after a successful 
suppression or speedy-trial motion would “occup[y] the status of innocent,” ante at 6 n.2, while 
the petitioner who obtains a dismissal of his charge under the same circumstances would not. 
3. 
Anchoring its reasoning on a false equivalence, the majority contends that just as “[a] 
petitioner may not seek to adduce facts at an expungement hearing to prove his innocence . . . . 
                     
 
4 Generally speaking, I do not deny the virtue of this response to some jurisprudential 
excesses.  See John T. Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, in 
Appellate Judicial Opinions 30, 30 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974) (“Gradual erosion of the 
authoritative force of a questionable precedent is . . . often accomplished by the courts’ refusal to 
extend the precedent by analogy to situations not within its exact letter.”). 
17 
the Commonwealth may not introduce facts to establish the petitioner’s guilt.”  Ante at 6 (citation 
omitted).5  That logic does not follow. 
The reason a petitioner cannot challenge a final conviction is that his guilt has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the expungement statute is not a vehicle for collaterally 
attacking a final conviction.  When the Commonwealth seeks to inform the expungement court 
of the facts surrounding the arrest, including facts that establish the petitioner’s guilt, it does so 
to bolster the legitimacy of the arrest, not to collaterally attack the petitioner’s acquittal.  “I’m 
not trying to get into the merits of the case,” the circuit court in this case correctly explained, 
“but she was arrested for a felony.”  J.A. at 66.  It made sense to the circuit court, as it does to 
me, that the Commonwealth should be allowed to show how and why the petitioner was arrested 
and to show the probable-cause basis for the arrest.  There is no good reason that this information 
should be considered irrelevant to the question whether any trace of the arrest should be 
obliterated by an expungement. 
The primary decision from which the majority draws the principle that the facts 
underlying an arrest are irrelevant, Dressner v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 1, 736 S.E.2d 735 
(2013), says nothing of the sort.  In Dressner, the petitioner was arrested for marijuana 
possession.  The general district court amended the charge to reckless driving, to which the 
petitioner pled guilty.  Id. at 3-4, 736 S.E.2d at 736.  The petitioner later sought, and a circuit 
court denied, an expungement of the marijuana charge.  Id. at 4, 736 S.E.2d at 736. 
                     
 
5 The majority cites Daniel v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 523, 531, 604 S.E.2d 444, 448 
(2004), in support of this proposition.  See ante at 6.  In Daniel, however, we merely held that the 
petitioner could not “assert his innocence of the original criminal charge” by demanding “an 
evidentiary hearing . . . to determine whether [he] was actually innocent of” that charge.  Id. at 
530-31, 604 S.E.2d at 448.  We did not mention, much less rule on, the question whether a 
petitioner can introduce facts of the alleged crime in support of his expungement petition or 
whether the Commonwealth can do the same in opposition to the petition. 
18 
Because the marijuana charge was “otherwise dismissed,” we reversed and held that the 
presumptively innocent petitioner was eligible to file an expungement petition.  Id. at 6, 736 
S.E.2d at 737.  Our narrow holding focused on the question whether the petitioner could file an 
expungement petition — not whether the circuit court had no choice but to grant the 
expungement petition under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  We specifically distinguished the 
eligibility issue from the “next step” in the analysis, which was whether the petitioner had proved 
that failing to expunge the records related to her arrest may cause her to suffer a manifest 
injustice.  Id. at 7-8, 736 S.E.2d at 738.  That issue was uncontested because the circuit court had 
already found that the petitioner had “demonstrated the existence of manifest injustice through 
her loss of employment as a result of a background check that revealed the possession of 
marijuana charge.”  Id. at 8, 736 S.E.2d at 738. 
Nothing in Dressner mentions the scope of a circuit court’s discretion when applying the 
manifest-injustice standard.  That was not the issue on appeal.  Nor was it much of an issue in the 
circuit court.  Even so, the majority opinion repeatedly lifts a single phrase from Dressner — 
“the status of innocent,” ante at 3-5, 6 n.2, 8-9 — in support of its “forward-looking” judicial 
gloss on the expungement statute, ante at 5.  That expressive phrase supported Dressner’s 
holding that a petitioner whose charge was “otherwise dismissed” was presumptively innocent 
for purposes of having the right to file an expungement petition.  See Dressner, 285 Va. at 6-7, 
736 S.E.2d at 737.  But the phrase had nothing at all to do with defining the boundaries of 
discretion governing a circuit court’s determination of manifest injustice. 
4. 
In short, I think it is perfectly reasonable for a court to review the facts underlying an 
arrest for which a petitioner seeks an expungement when nothing in the statute says otherwise.  
19 
After all, a “special circumstance” underlying an arrest “might warrant expungement” to the 
extent it raises a serious “doubt whether there was any foundation whatsoever for [the 
petitioner’s] arrest and thereby may . . . heighten [the petitioner’s] interest in having the record 
expunged.”  Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ga. 1993) (applying a statutory balancing 
test in deciding whether an expungement petition should be granted).  Considering the 
circumstances of the alleged crime is not, as the majority suggests, an attempt to repudiate a 
petitioner’s success in obtaining a dismissal of the charge.  In proffering the facts underlying an 
arrest, the Commonwealth is not seeking to repudiate an acquittal or anything else.  It is the 
petitioner who seeks to repudiate her arrest by requesting an expungement. 
B. 
Unimpeded by the majority’s “forward-looking” tunnel vision, ante at 5, I would view 
the circuit court’s decision and the factual circumstances underlying it through the lens of the 
governing standard of review.  Appellate courts review expungement decisions (sometimes 
called expunction, sealing, or set-aside orders) under an abuse-of-discretion standard.6  A 
foundational aspect of the judicial architecture, the abuse-of-discretion standard “presupposes 
‘that, for some decisions, conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly 
                     
 
6 See, e.g., Bell v. State, 217 So. 3d 962, 963 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016); R.J.Z. v. People, 
104 P.3d 278, 280 (Colo. App. 2004); Hechinger v. State, No. 516, 1997, 1998 Del. LEXIS 90, 
at *4-5 (Del. Feb. 27, 1998) (unpublished); VFD v. State, 19 So. 3d 1172, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009); Meinken, 426 S.E.2d at 879-80; State v. R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Minn. 2012); 
State v. Cavaricci, 834 P.2d 406, 408 (Nev. 1992); Howrey v. State, 46 P.3d 1282, 1284 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds, 2012 Okla. Sess. Laws 183, § 2 
(codified as amended at Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 18(5) (2012)); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 
310, 317 (Pa. 2014); Ex parte Vega, 510 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. App. 2016); Horgan v. Sandy 
City, 283 P.3d 1079, 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 2012); George L. Blum, Annotation, Judicial 
Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult Under Statute, 69 A.L.R.6th 1, § 2 (2017) 
(“A trial court’s ruling on a petition for expunction is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.”). 
20 
the same facts — yet still remain entirely reasonable.’”  Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564, 
790 S.E.2d 493, 499 (2016) (citation omitted).  “This bell-shaped curve of reasonability 
governing our appellate review rests on the venerable belief that the judge closest to the contest 
is the judge best able to discern where the equities lie.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
The expungement statute states that the circuit court “shall deny the petition” unless the 
court finds that not expunging the records “may cause circumstances which constitute a manifest 
injustice.”  Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  The operative language creates a probabilistic equation using 
the first two variables of Judge Learned Hand’s formula:  the probability of the harm multiplied 
by “the gravity of the resulting” harm.  United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 
(2d Cir. 1947).  In most cases, including this one, there is no demonstrably right or wrong 
answer.  Instead, it is simply a judgment call.7 
I accept that the word “may” in Code § 19.2-392.2(F) suggests an uncertain prediction.  
Something that may happen also may not happen.  When the forecast is in equipoise — with as 
much chance of the thing happening as not — a “may” probability still exists.  One could even 
say that a 1-in-100 probability also means that the thing predicted “may” happen, albeit at a 
weak, but still measurable, level of certitude.  The only thing we know for certain is that 
anything less than a 100% probability — the level at which the thing “shall” surely happen — 
can be included, at least as a strictly linguistic matter, in a “may” forecast. 
                     
 
7 I do not believe the majority’s conclusion is strengthened by the statutory juxtaposition 
of “may” and “shall,” ante at 11, with the latter tipping the scales in favor of granting 
expungements.  There are two relevant “shalls” in Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  Both add equal weight 
to either side of the “may” fulcrum.  If the circuit court makes the “may” discretionary finding, 
the court “shall” order expungement.  Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  But the opposite is equally true:  
“Otherwise, it shall deny the petition.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus the “shall” weight rests on 
both sides of the “may” seesaw.  It does not favor either side.  Instead, the command aspect of 
the statute depends entirely on a discretionary “may” judgment call. 
21 
It is unclear where in the 1% to 99% range of confidence the majority pegs its conclusion 
that A.R.A. “established her entitlement” to an expungement issued in the first instance by an 
appellate court.  Ante at 9.  I offer no criticism for that lack of clarity, however, because I too 
find it quite impossible to give the word “may” a precise meaning.  But whatever threshold of 
probability the word was meant to have in this context, I do not believe that the legislature 
intended to drop the “may” probability into the realm of wholly speculative, insubstantial 
possibilities. 
The phrase “manifest injustice” is often used synonymously with the phrase “miscarriage 
of justice.”  See, e.g., Harris v. DiMattina, 250 Va. 306, 318, 462 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1995) (stating 
that “the application of a new law” must not “constitute a miscarriage of justice” or “manifest 
injustice”).  A similar standard governs procedural defaults.  Under Rules 5:25 and 5A:18, if an 
appellant fails to preserve an argument in the trial court that he wishes to make on appeal, he 
generally forfeits the argument unless the “ends of justice” compel the appellate court to ignore 
the waiver.  So, too, when a criminal defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment, a 
trial court may grant the request only “to correct manifest injustice.”  Code § 19.2-296. 
In this context, “[t]he term ‘manifest’ is defined as being ‘synonymous with open, clear, 
visible, unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident, and self-evident.  In evidence, that 
which is clear and requires no proof; that which is notorious.’”  Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 
292 Va. 603, 616, 791 S.E.2d 556, 562 (2016) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).8  In 
                     
 
8 We have found manifest injustice under Rule 5:25 “in very limited circumstances” 
under the ends-of-justice exception.  Williams v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 25, 28, ___ S.E.2d 
___, ___ (2017) (citation omitted).  The appellant must show that the “exception is necessary to 
avoid a grave injustice or the denial of essential rights.”  Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 
220, 688 S.E.2d 185, 190 (2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Williams, 294 Va. 
at 28-29, ___ S.E.2d at ___.  Under Rule 5A:18, the Court of Appeals uses the same standards in 
22 
other words, a “manifest injustice amounts to an obvious miscarriage of justice,” id. (citation 
omitted), and denotes a grave, intolerable wrong of such severity that the judicial conscience 
simply cannot bear to leave it unaddressed. 
C. 
Applying the statutory formula to the facts of this case — with “may” requiring 
something greater than a speculative, insubstantial possibility and “manifest injustice” requiring 
a grave, intolerable wrong — I cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying A.R.A.’s requested expungement of her felony arrest. 
My disagreement turns on the majority’s view that the expungement statute “restrict[s]” 
the circuit court’s discretion by employing a “forgiving standard.”  Ante at 6.  That is only half 
right.  There is nothing forgiving about the manifest-injustice standard, as no doubt a multitude 
of criminal defendants who have experienced the unforgiving nature of procedural default 
principles would attest.  See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 25, 28-29, ___ S.E.2d 
___, ___ (2017) (rejecting an ends-of-justice argument under Rule 5:25 because there was no 
showing of a “manifest injustice”).  What the majority really means to say is that the “may” 
prediction is forgiving.  I grant that interpretation.  But even if I assumed in A.R.A.’s case that 
every one of her fears might one day come true, none of them compels (as opposed to merely 
permits) a reasonable jurist exercising sound discretion to find that they constitute a manifest 
injustice. 
A.R.A. said that she has “contemplated” the possibility of attending law school and that 
the applications for bar admission typically require a statement of past criminal charges and 
                     
deciding whether to apply the ends-of-justice exception.  See Commonwealth v. Bass, 292 Va. 
19, 27, 786 S.E.2d 165, 169 (2016). 
23 
convictions.  Ante at 2; see J.A. at 31, 39.  Perhaps so.  But A.R.A. has presented no evidence to 
show that her un-expunged records on a subsequently dismissed charge would prohibit her 
admission either to law school or to any state bar.  The majority appears willing to silently take 
judicial notice that both scenarios could occur and that either would be a manifest injustice.  I 
would not take judicial notice of either scenario9 — but if I were to do so, the judicially-noticed 
source of common knowledge would have to explain why I have never heard of an individual 
denied admission either to law school or to the bar based solely on the presence of an arrest 
record for a subsequently dismissed charge. 
A.R.A. suggested a similar faux-manifest-injustice scenario in her testimony that the start 
date at her Disney ABC job was “delayed” because of a “disclosure of her criminal history.”  
Ante at 2.  After receiving her application, Disney ABC responded:  “Congratulations! . . .  [T]his 
letter confirms our offer of employment . . . .  Congratulations and welcome to the team!”  J.A. at 
70.  A routine background check for this job took longer than anticipated, so A.R.A.’s start date 
was delayed “for about a week to 10 days.”  Id. at 34.  Despite A.R.A.’s testimony, no other 
evidence suggested that the delay was caused by the records related to A.R.A.’s arrest rather than 
her conviction.  If one could draw any inference from these facts, it should be the opposite 
conclusion because the Disney ABC application never asked whether A.R.A. had ever been 
arrested.  It only asked if she had been convicted.  See id. at 48.  The application itself thus 
implied that Disney ABC was unconcerned about mere arrests. 
                     
9 “A court may take judicial notice of a factual matter not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (1) common knowledge or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”  Va. R. Evid. 2:201(a).  “A 
party is entitled upon timely motion,” moreover, “to an opportunity to be heard as to the 
propriety of taking judicial notice.”  Va. R. Evid. 2:201(c). 
 
24 
The majority assumes that Disney ABC delayed A.R.A.’s start date to investigate the 
records related to her arrest rather than to her conviction.  But no evidence substantiates this 
assumption, as Disney ABC referred only to the “pending . . . status of [A.R.A.’s] background 
check” because A.R.A. “disclosed something.”  Id. at 72.  Even if there were any evidence of the 
cause of the delay, I do not see how a short delay in a start date constitutes a manifest injustice.  
All the more, I do not understand how an appellate court could declare that a circuit court abused 
its discretion in failing to hold that a delayed start date constitutes a manifest injustice. 
III. 
In sum, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying A.R.A.’s expungement 
petition for her felony arrest.  A reasonable jurist could, and in this case did, find that A.R.A. 
failed to establish that “the continued existence and possible dissemination of information 
relating to the arrest of the petitioner causes or may cause circumstances which constitute a 
manifest injustice.”  Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  A.R.A.’s predictions of future harm were too 
speculative, the magnitude of the harm too underwhelming, and the circumstances of her arrest 
too unsympathetic to warrant the de novo appellate relief that the majority gives her. 
I respectfully dissent.