Title: Corey Smith v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-703
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 2009

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-703 
____________ 
 
COREY SMITH,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 19, 2009] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of first-degree 
murder and a sentence of death as well as convictions for a number of other 
offenses.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm both the convictions and the death sentence. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In December 2000, Corey “Bubba” Smith and seven other individuals were 
indicted by a Miami-Dade County grand jury in a seventeen-count indictment for 
crimes committed in connection with the John Doe organization.  Smith was 
alleged to be the leader of the group and named in fourteen counts of the 
indictment, including conspiracy to engage in a criminal enterprise, engaging in a 
criminal enterprise, conspiracy to traffic in marijuana, conspiracy to traffic in 
cocaine, five counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of Leon Hadley, Cynthia 
Brown, Jackie Pope, Angel Wilson, and Melvin Lipscomb, four counts of 
conspiracy to commit murder, and second-degree murder for the death of Marlon 
Beneby. 
The John Doe organization had been the subject of a joint state and federal 
task force.1  The task force surveillance included pen registers on several phones, 
followed by wiretaps on the phones of Smith and his second-in-command, Latravis 
Gallashaw.  The wiretaps recorded calls on Gallashaw’s cell phone (which was 
registered to Smith) and Smith’s landline at his residence.  These wiretap 
recordings and transcripts of the recordings were admitted into evidence at Smith’s 
trial. 
The state criminal conspiracy count was based on the operation of the John 
Doe organization, a criminal enterprise that processed, packaged, and distributed 
powder and crack cocaine and marijuana in the Liberty City area of Miami-Dade 
County over a six-year period from July 1994 through January 1999.  At its peak, 
                                          
 
1.  In addition to the state indictment, members of the John Doe organization 
were also charged with federal crimes.  Smith was convicted on federal RICO 
charges, various drug-related charges, and federal firearms violations. 
 
 
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the John Doe organization operated seven “holes,” locations where they distributed 
drugs.  The holes had two different names, John Doe and No Fear, to keep people 
from knowing that all of them belonged to one organization.  The group also 
packaged their drugs in different colored bags to confuse the police and others 
about the extent of the John Doe enterprise. 
Smith’s trial took place in October 2005, with jury selection and the guilt 
phase of trial lasting over thirty days.  The State called eighty-four witnesses.  The 
defense called one witness, the attorney who had represented Smith on a previous 
first-degree murder charge in the death of Dominique Johnson.  Smith did not 
testify.   
The court ordered additional courtroom security for the trial, including a 
second magnetometer (metal detector) on the seventh floor of the courthouse and 
required potential jurors, attorneys, and spectators to pass through the 
magnetometer before entering the courtroom.  Two armed police officers searched 
all individuals, including jurors, who entered the hallway outside the courtroom.  
Multiple armed police officers were stationed inside and outside the courtroom.  
Smith was required to wear a stun belt.  Spectators had to present photo 
identification before being admitted to the courtroom. 
During jury selection, Smith’s mother Willie Mae Smith was asked to leave 
the courtroom when the rule was invoked.  When the mother passed the seventy 
 
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potential jurors assembled in the hallway she said, “God bless you and have a 
blessed day.”  When this remark was reported to the court the next day, the judge 
questioned the jurors about the mother’s comment and whether it would have an 
effect on their ability to be fair to Corey Smith.  Many of the venire members did 
not hear the comment at all.  Of those who did hear it, only a few expressed any 
concerns about the comment or felt it would affect their decision-making.  In light 
of these responses by the venire, the court denied the defense’s motion to have the 
panel stricken.  The court entered a written order that Smith’s mother was not to 
have contact with the jurors, not to enter the building unless called as a witness, 
and not to come within 1000 feet of the building. 
The State’s witnesses during the guilt phase of trial fell into three categories:  
(1) professional witnesses such as police officers and investigators, crime scene 
technicians, medical examiners, and forensic experts; (2) witnesses who provided 
legal identification of the homicide victims or who had personal knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding the various homicides and acts of violence; and (3) 
members of the John Doe organization or Smith’s associates who connected him to 
the homicides and the drug enterprise.  Because Smith’s trial involved a number of 
separate charges, the facts regarding each will be discussed separately below, 
including the facts pertinent to Smith’s appellate claims.  These facts were 
developed through witness testimony and evidence presented at trial. 
 
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Drug Enterprise and Organization 
A number of witnesses who had been involved in John Doe testified about 
the organization and operation of the seven drug holes.  According to their 
testimony, Smith was the head of John Doe, Latravis Gallashaw was the second-in-
command, and Julian Mitchell was the third.  Smith started out as a member of the 
Lynch Mob, a drug group that predated John Doe in the same neighborhood.  The 
leader of this group was Mark Roundtree, who had both a friend and mentor 
relationship with Smith.  Smith opened his own drug hole across the street from his 
mother’s house on Northwest 58th Street and 15th Avenue in 1994.  Smith 
engaged in intimidation and violence to take over other drug spots or to run 
competitors out of business. 
Each drug hole employed a number of workers, including a “bombman” 
who sold the drugs, a “watchout” who looked out for the police and marketed the 
drugs by yelling slogans to potential customers, a “gunman” who kept the peace 
and enforced the rules, and a “street lieutenant” who dropped off drugs and 
collected money.  In addition, John Doe also employed “tablemen” who processed 
and packaged the drugs for street sale, “turnover lieutenants” who tracked the 
money to provide a count for paying the workers, and “enforcers” or “hit men” 
who carried out the group’s violence.  The employees worked regular shifts at their 
jobs and were paid in cash by the lieutenants. 
 
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Various witnesses and documentary evidence also revealed a type of 
accounting system through tally sheets which enabled John Doe to keep track of 
how much and what kind of drugs were sold and how much money was collected 
and paid out.  Letter codes were used to indicate the type of drug and the size of 
the bags.  Witnesses also testified that workers at the drug holes were permitted to 
buy guns that they might be offered by individuals and pay for them with John Doe 
money.  The guns were kept by the workers at the holes.  However, the workers 
had to get special permission to buy machine guns, which were stashed in a special 
location and not kept by the general drug hole workers. 
When a drug unit officer attempted to conduct a controlled buy at the 
residence of Antonio Allen in September 1998, Allen was alerted when the 
officer’s radio made a transmission.  Allen was arrested with over 500 bags of 
cocaine, a .380-caliber semiautomatic gun with a four-inch barrel, and $922 in 
cash.  Allen admitted the possession of these items.  In September 1998, the 
wiretap revealed that a sack of narcotics was going to be delivered to the residence 
of Charles Clark.  The search produced over 100 bags of crack cocaine, $846 in 
cash, two handguns and ammunition, and rubber bands for bundling cash.  The 
task force executed search warrants for various residences of John Doe members in 
late October and early November of 1998.  The search of Smith’s mother’s 
residence revealed two homemade grenades in the attic, a 9-millimeter pistol in 
 
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Smith’s room, various boxes of ammunition, magazines, and clips, a bullet-proof 
vest, a loaded derringer in the mother’s bedroom along with $850, drug residue in 
the kitchen, and a copy of the police report in the Johnson case in the nightstand of 
Smith’s bedroom.  The search of the home of Todra Smith and William Austin, 
Smith’s sister and brother-in-law, uncovered several bricks of marijuana, hundreds 
of small bags of marijuana, a loaded 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, a .25-
caliber pistol and magazine, and a variety of drug paraphernalia.  The search of 
Latravis Gallashaw’s house uncovered various paraphernalia for processing and 
packaging cocaine, including scales and thousands of empty bags for packaging, 
tally sheets of packaging and sales, two bricks of marijuana, rock and powder 
cocaine, empty kilo wrappers in the garbage, and $16,000 in cash.  The search of 
the residence that Smith shared with his girlfriend Crystal Boyd uncovered a radio 
frequency detector to detect bugs or wires, a phone guard that was supposed to 
detect wiretaps, a diamond-studded Rolex watch, $500 in cash in Smith’s shorts 
pocket, a bag containing $185,724 in cash bundled with rubber bands, an AK-47 
drum that can hold up to 75 rounds of ammunition, and a small amount of 
marijuana.  In November 1998, a search of the Steady Mobbin’ Car Wash2 on 
Northwest 17th Avenue uncovered a number of weapons in a locked storage room, 
                                          
 
 
2.  The car wash was the “hang out” for members of John Doe and did not 
actually operate as a car wash. 
 
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including a .357 handgun, a Mac-10 semiautomatic handgun, a Rueger Mini-14 
rifle, and a Mac-90 rifle.  There was also a ski hat in the storage room.   
On December 11, 1998, the John Doe “hitmen” Jean Henry, Julius Stevens, 
and Eric Stokes did a drive-by shooting of the Northwest 98th Street residence of 
Patricia Harvey, who is related to Anthony Fail.  There were a number of adults 
and children at the residence that day, as they were celebrating the “Soul Bowl” 
football game between Miami Northwest High School and Jackson High School.  
There were thirty-seven bullet holes in the front of the Harvey house and other 
bullets struck the trees in front of the house.  Two of the bullets actually went 
through the Harvey house and struck a duplex behind it. 
Based on this shooting, the crime suppression team of the Metro Dade police 
conducted surveillance of the residence of Eric Stokes and Jean Henry at 1255 
Northwest 100th Terrace.  The officers observed black males getting into two 
different vehicles at this location.  The officers observed that the individuals in 
each car were armed.  A white station wagon containing Julian Mitchell and Eddie 
Harris traveled to the west and led the officers on a high-speed chase for about ten 
minutes.  The officers observed items being thrown from the vehicle.  The chase 
ended at a Costco Warehouse approximately sixty blocks away.  Eric Stokes, Jean 
Henry, and Julius Stevens left in a blue LeSabre and fled at a high speed.  The 
three men abandoned their vehicle and then fled on foot.  The police officers were 
 
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able to arrest them after being alerted by a resident on 74th Street that the men 
were running through his house.  The police found a loaded .44-caliber Colt pistol 
in a holster and a blue Dickie shirt that had been dumped over a fence as the men 
fled on foot.  The police got court authorization for a search of the house on 
Northwest 100th Terrace.  In Stokes’ bedroom, the police found a 9-millimeter 
assault rifle and a bullet-proof vest.  In Stevens’ bedroom, they found a total of 
$23,000 in cash and ammunition.  A small amount of marijuana debris was found 
in the kitchen and living room.  Numerous boxes of ammunition of different 
calibers were found in a garbage can. 
In January 1999, the task force executed warrants for the residences of Julius 
Stevens and Ketrick Majors.  In Stevens house, the search uncovered a number of 
boxes of ammunition and loose rounds, tally sheets, a triple-beam scale, a bullet-
proof vest, a ski mask, and small bags of cocaine.  In Major’s house, the search 
uncovered empty bags for packaging drugs, an AK-47 magazine and clip, six 
boxes of ammunition, a box of .22-caliber long rifle rounds, and a ski mask. 
Leon Hadley Murder 
Testimony showed that Leon Hadley was shot and killed on the morning of 
August 21, 1995, outside a store on the corner of 14th Avenue and 61st Street in 
Miami-Dade County.  Hadley suffered six gunshot wounds, with a fatal wound to 
his head.  His wounds did not show stippling that would indicate that he was not 
 
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shot at a close distance.  Eleven shell casings and one live round were found at the 
murder scene.  Hadley had a preexisting gunshot wound to his right leg and had a 
cast on his leg.  Based on witness statements, a BOLO issued for a dark, late model 
vehicle with a black male driver. 
Various witnesses testified about the relationship between the defendant 
Smith and Hadley and what they knew about Hadley’s murder.  These witnesses 
included Julian Mitchell, Carlos Reynolds, Phil White, Eric Mitchell, Anthony 
Fail, Antonio Allen, and Herbert Daniels, all members of John Doe, and Smith’s 
girlfriend Tricia Geter.  Hadley had been an enforcer for a drug organization that 
predated John Doe.  Hadley’s younger brother Eric operated a drug hole just 
around the corner from the first drug hole that Smith opened.  Smith was 
concerned that Eric was “short stopping” potential customers, i.e., taking 
customers away from the John Doe hole.  Smith forced Eric to close his hole.  
Hadley confronted the members of the Lynch Mob about this situation and it 
appeared to be resolved. 
However, a short time later Hadley got into a fight with Keevon Rolle at a 
Lynch Mob birthday celebration in the neighborhood.  When Hadley pursued Rolle 
as he left the area of the fight, Rolle pulled out a gun and shot Hadley in the leg.  A 
few days later, Hadley confronted members of the Lynch Mob who were sitting on 
the corner of Northwest 61st Street and 14th Avenue outside the store.  Hadley 
 
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warned them not to sit there when his leg healed because he planned to “spray up 
the corner” and kill Lynch Mob members.  Shortly after this, Smith and two other 
individuals were spotted walking through an alley in the area one night and 
wearing all black clothes, which was indicative of “going to war” or going to kill 
someone.   
Phil White testified that he witnessed Smith and Kelvin Cook shoot Hadley.  
Smith had shown up at White’s house early on the morning of Hadley’s shooting.  
Smith was driving a dark burgundy Delta 88.  Smith and Cook were both dressed 
in black and had black ski masks or “scullies.”  Smith had an Uzi-type gun and 
Cook had an AK-47 rifle.  Smith enlisted White to help him find Hadley.  Smith 
stated that he had a dream that Hadley had killed him.  The trio drove around for 
thirty to forty-five minutes before they spotted Hadley on the corner at the store.  
Smith stated his intent to kill Hadley and changed seats with White in the car.  
White was actually driving the vehicle when the shooting took place.  White 
observed Smith put on a ski mask, jump out of the car, and shoot Hadley.  When 
Smith’s gun jammed, Cook began shooting.  After the shooting, the trio picked up 
Smith’s car and drove both vehicles to a warehouse.  They wiped down the vehicle 
used in the shooting and removed its tag. 
Tricia Geter also testified about the bad blood between Hadley and Smith.  
Smith told Geter that Hadley had threatened to kill him and that he was going to 
 
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kill Hadley first.  Smith left Geter’s house early in the morning on the day that 
Hadley was killed.  When Smith returned, he appeared nervous and had abrasions 
on his knee and elbow.  He told Geter that he “did it” and described how his gun 
had jammed during the shooting.  Geter testified that Smith called his mother and 
Roundtree to tell them about the shooting as well.  Geter stated that Smith was 
“well-feared” after killing Hadley and took over the area that had been controlled 
by Hadley.  Geter also testified that she had been approached by Smith before the 
instant trial.  Smith wanted Geter to testify that he had been home with her on the 
morning that Hadley was shot.  Anthony Fail also testified that Smith felt 
threatened by Hadley and had admitted that he had killed Hadley along with Cook 
and that White was the driver of the car. 
Mark Roundtree had previously been convicted for Hadley’s murder and 
sentenced to life.  Various individuals testified that they either saw Smith make 
payments to Roundtree’s family on a weekly basis after he was arrested or they 
were ordered to give money to Roundtree’s family when the family came to the 
drug holes.  Herbert Daniels overheard Smith and Roundtree talking about 
Hadley’s murder at one point.  Smith told Roundtree, “You didn’t do it; why are 
you worried?”  Antonio Allen testified that Smith told him that Roundtree took the 
blame for Hadley’s murder.  Tricia Geter testified that Smith paid for Roundtree’s 
attorney and sent his mother Willie Mae Smith to the trial to bring back reports 
 
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about the proceeding.  Anthony Fail testified that Smith stated that Roundtree had 
nothing to do with Hadley’s murder. 
Roundtree gave inconsistent statements about his involvement in Hadley’s 
shooting.  In a statement made in April 1996, Roundtree totally denied any 
involvement.  However, the polygraph operator noted deception in Roundtree’s 
negative response to the question, “Do you know who shot Hadley?”  Sometime 
during the investigation of John Doe, Detective Frank Alphonso learned that 
Roundtree might be innocent of Hadley’s murder and interviewed him about the 
incident in December 2000.  The sole witness against Roundtree also recanted her 
trial testimony that Roundtree had shot Hadley. 
After Roundtree had exhausted all appeal and postconviction proceedings 
regarding his conviction for Hadley’s murder, Roundtree gave another statement in 
January 2001.  Roundtree stated that Smith told him that Smith, Cook, and White 
were in the car together, and had shot Hadley.  After having a brief discussion with 
Detective Alphonso, Roundtree amended his statement and said that he had also 
been in the car and had shot Hadley with an AK-47, which was consistent with the 
forensic evidence about the shooting. 
In July 2004, Roundtree apparently changed his story again.  This statement 
is the subject of one of Smith’s claims on appeal and will be discussed more fully 
in the analysis of that issue below.  This time Roundtree stated that he had not been 
 
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in the car and had not shot Hadley.  He explained that he made this up to make 
himself a better witness for the State at Smith’s trial in hopes of receiving a 
reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony.  Pursuant to a postconviction 
motion, Roundtree’s murder conviction and sentence were vacated in December 
2004.  Roundtree pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hadley’s murder, based on 
his admission that he tried to locate Hadley for Smith.  Roundtree was sentenced to 
nine years in prison, with credit for time served, and was released. 
Jackie Pope Murder 
Jackie Pope, a thirty-six-year-old deaf man who served as a watch out for 
John Doe, was shot to death because he gave a deposition about the New Year’s 
Eve 1997 shooting of Miami police officer Ricky Taylor.  Various witnesses 
testified that lots of people in the neighborhood were shooting their guns in 
celebration of the new year.  Taylor was the passenger in a marked police vehicle 
that was patrolling the neighborhood.  He was shot from a third floor balcony of an 
apartment building at 1370 Northwest 61st Street, which was one of the John Doe 
drug hole locations known as the “dormitories.”  Officer Taylor had a penetrating 
wound to the left side of his head at the hairline, but survived the shooting.  The 
crime scene technician recovered hundreds of casings from the scene.  Charlie 
Brown, a member of John Doe, was identified as the individual who shot Officer 
 
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Taylor.  Brown pled guilty to the shooting and was sentenced to thirty years in 
prison. 
Jackie Pope was shot sixteen times after midnight on March 31, 1998, in the 
vicinity of 14th Avenue and 62nd Street.  A firearms expert from the Miami-Dade 
Police Department testified that the casings from the scene and projectiles from the 
body indicated that Pope had been shot by two guns.  The medical examiner 
testified that three of the gunshot wounds to Pope’s torso were lethal because they 
did extensive damage to his organs, including his lungs, heart, spleen, liver, left 
kidney, and intestines.  There was no stippling of the wounds that would indicate 
Pope was shot from a close range. 
Carlos Walker testified that he found out that Jackie Pope was a witness 
against Charlie Brown several weeks before Pope was shot.  Smith showed Walker 
Pope’s deposition, in which Pope stated that he saw Brown shooting from the third 
floor of the building when Officer Taylor was shot.  Walker described Smith as 
being very angry about Pope’s deposition.  Tricia Geter testified that Smith told 
her that Brown had shot the police officer on New Year’s Eve.  She also said Smith 
told Brown to turn himself in because the police kept hitting the John Doe holes in 
search of Brown and it was hurting business.  Smith promised to get an attorney 
for Brown.  Anthony Fail testified that Smith discussed Brown’s case with him and 
told him about a deposition in which Jackie Pope “snitched” on Brown.  Fail 
 
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testified that Smith offered him $25,000 to kill Pope.  Charles Clark testified that 
he saw Pope shortly before he was shot.  Clark also saw several of the John Doe 
hitmen in the same vicinity, including Eric Stokes, Jean Henry and Julius Stevens.  
Clark then saw Pope being summoned to the alley where the hitmen were sitting.  
A short time later he heard a series of shots from the alley.  Later, Clark saw 
Pope’s body in that same area.  At the penalty phase of trial, Detective Alphonso 
testified that Julius Stevens had admitted that he and Eric Stokes shot Jackie Pope.  
Stevens had also stated that he shot Pope because Smith ordered him to shoot him 
because Pope had served as a witness on Charlie Brown’s case. 
Cynthia Brown Murder 
Cynthia Brown died from asphyxia after being smothered by a pillow in a 
room at the Tradewinds Motel at 4525 Southwest 8th Street.  Brown checked into 
the hotel with her boyfriend Chazre Davis on the evening of July 23, 1998, and her 
body was found at midday the next day.  Brown’s and Davis’s prints were found 
on a mirror in the motel room.   
The medical examiner testified that Brown had petechial hemorrhages in her 
eyes, inside her upper lip, and on her epiglottis.  Brown had small abrasions under 
her left nostril and on her upper lip.  Her lungs were full of fluid due to pulmonary 
edema.  She also had postmortem cuts on the left side of her neck.  The bed pillow 
had small smears of blood on the right side from Brown’s face, which was 
 
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consistent with the small abrasions on her face.  The medical examiner stated that 
all of these findings were consistent with death from asphyxia caused by being 
smothered with the bed pillow.  Toxicology showed that Brown had both cocaine 
and alcohol in her body at the time of death.  However, both the medical examiner 
and the forensic toxicologist testified that the levels were not life-threatening and 
Brown did not die from an overdose. 
During cross-examination, the defense asked the medical examiner about 
autoerotic asphyxia and if the victim could have died from this rather than being 
smothered by a pillow.  When the defense asked the medical examiner to explain 
autoerotic asphyxia, the State objected and the court sustained that objection.  The 
court ruled that the defense could ask the medical examiner if it applied in this 
case, but would have to call its own expert to explain this.  The medical examiner 
opined that it was possible but unlikely that the victim in this case died during a 
sex act.  The defense’s inability to question the medical examiner more thoroughly 
on this topic is one of Smith’s claims in this appeal.  The legal propriety of this 
limitation will be discussed in the analysis of that issue below. 
Brown was the sole witness against Smith in the murder of Dominique 
Johnson, a nineteen-year-old drug seller who was shot to death in the early 
morning hours of November 7, 1996, at Northwest 12th Parkway and 62nd Street.  
Johnson was shot twice in his arms and once through his temple.  The gun was one 
 
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to three inches away when Johnson was shot in the head.  Johnson was transported 
from the scene and pronounced dead at the hospital.  No gunshot residue was 
found on Johnson’s hands, indicating that he did not fire a gun.  While several 
people apparently witnessed Johnson’s shooting, only Cynthia Brown came 
forward and identified Smith to the police. 
Smith was scheduled to be tried for Johnson’s murder on July 28, 1997.  
David Waksman, the prosecutor in Johnson’s case, testified in the instant trial that 
he had to dismiss the charges against Smith when Brown was discovered dead less 
than a week before the Johnson trial.  Waksman testified that Brown was the 
State’s sole witness in the Johnson case. 
At Smith’s trial in the instant case, Shaundreka Anderson, who worked with 
Johnson at a rival drug hole, testified that she saw Smith and Johnson arguing over 
money earlier in the day on which Johnson was shot.  Smith approached Anderson 
that night and wanted to know where Johnson was.  Smith had a Glock 9 gun in his 
hand.  Smith entered the drug hole where Johnson was located and Anderson heard 
shots.  Anderson found Johnson after he was shot.  At the scene, Cynthia Brown 
told Anderson that she knew who killed Johnson because she had been standing 
behind a pole when it occurred.  Anderson told Brown to mind her own business 
and advised her not to talk.  Anderson testified that she was approached by a 
number of individuals who said that Smith wanted to see her.  Smith offered her 
 
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$2500 to help him.  A few days later, Anderson gave a statement to the police in 
which she falsely identified another individual as Johnson’s shooter.  Anderson 
was so fearful for her safety that she cut off her dreadlocks and shaved her head as 
a disguise.  She also left the area. 
Demetrius Jones testified that he overheard a heated argument between 
Smith and Johnson and looked out of his bedroom window to see Smith pull a gun 
out of his waistband.  Jones heard multiple shots and saw Johnson on the ground. 
Within seconds Brown approached him and said she saw who shot Johnson.  Jones 
also advised Brown to keep silent for her safety.  Neither Jones nor Anderson 
remained at the scene to talk to the police, but Brown did.  After Smith was 
charged with Johnson’s murder, Jones agreed to “help” Smith with his case and 
gave a deposition to the state attorney in which he lied about Smith’s involvement.  
Jones also admitted that he lied to Smith’s defense attorney about the Johnson 
murder.  After Jones gave his deposition and Smith was awaiting trial, Jones did 
not have to work and was given money from the drug holes. 
 
Several witnesses testified that Smith wanted to get rid of the only witness 
who was going to testify against him in the Johnson murder case.  Anthony Fail 
overheard a conversation between Smith and his mother about how to kill a woman 
without shooting her.  They discussed poison and strangulation.  Fail also testified 
that Smith offered him $50,000 to kill Brown.  However, Smith was adamant that 
 
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he did not want Brown shot and that he did not want the evidence leading back to 
him.  Smith told Fail that the “junkie bitch had to go,” referring to Brown.  Fail did 
not agree to kill Brown because of this limitation and because he was on house 
arrest and could not move freely about the community.  Fail testified that Smith put 
aside $20,000 to pay Brown’s boyfriend for killing her.  Herbert Daniels overheard 
a conversation between Smith and Brown’s boyfriend Davis shortly before Brown 
was killed.  Daniels heard Davis ask Smith what he wanted him to do about 
Brown.   
Carlos Walker testified that Smith talked to him about Brown “snitching” on 
him.  Smith claims that there was a discovery violation by the State relating to 
Walker’s testimony.  This is discussed in more detail below.  Smith told Walker 
that Brown had to “come up dead for him to win his trial.”  Walker also heard 
Smith telling Davis to either suffocate or strangle Brown because he did not want 
bullets, casings, or other evidence at the scene.  Walker admitted that he lied to 
both Smith’s defense attorney and the prosecutors at his deposition when he said 
that Smith never discussed the Johnson case with him.  Walker said he lied out of 
fear for his life.  He said “look what happened to Jackie Pope.” 
Tricia Geter testified that Demetrius Jones had been paid by Smith’s friend 
Peggy King to testify on Smith’s behalf at the Johnson murder.  Geter also testified 
that Smith asked her if she could obtain pure heroin that could be given to Brown 
 
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to kill her.  Smith stated that he was going to take Brown’s life because she was 
trying to take his.   
 
After Brown was killed, Smith told Julian Mitchell that he had to have her 
killed in order to win his case and now they “wouldn’t be able to take him.”  The 
day after the Johnson case was dismissed, Walker heard Smith say that the State 
could not hold him and that Davis had handled his business.  Geter testified that 
she saw Davis seeking payment from Smith after Brown was killed. 
Detective Alphonso testified that he discovered a copy of a deposition and 
the police report from the Johnson case in the nightstand of Smith’s bedroom when 
he executed a search warrant based on the John Doe investigation.  The police 
report was introduced to prove Smith’s knowledge that Brown was the witness 
against him and his motive for wanting her killed.    The trial court denied the 
defense’s hearsay objection to the admission of the report, finding that the report 
was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted in it, i.e., that Smith shot 
Johnson.  However, the court did agree to redact certain parts of the report.  The 
defense originally refused the court’s offer of a limiting instruction to explain how 
the jury should consider the report.  Five days later, the defense asked the court for 
a limiting instruction and asked that the whole report, rather than the redacted 
version, be admitted.  There was a sidebar discussion of the wording of the limiting 
instruction and the jury was instructed.  The admission of the police report is one 
 
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of Smith’s claims on appeal.  The nature of the report and the instruction given is 
more fully discussed in the analysis of that issue below. 
Angel Wilson Murder 
Angel Wilson was shot multiple times with a semiautomatic assault rifle 
while she was driving her car down 69th Street in the early morning hours of 
December 1, 1998.  A witness saw someone in a dark older model car with tinted 
windows pull up beside Wilson’s vehicle and heard multiple shots.  A number of 
witnesses saw or heard the dark vehicle speeding away from the shooting.  
Witnesses also heard a series of multiple shots in rapid succession.  Seventeen 
shell casings were recovered from the scene.  The bullets entered the driver’s side 
of the vehicle and struck Wilson sixteen times.  Six of these wounds were fatal.  
The bullet wounds also caused extensive tissue damage, ripping off Wilson’s left 
breast and part of her ankle.  She was also struck by metal fragments as the bullets 
pierced her vehicle.  She died on the scene from massive internal injuries.  The 
medical examiner testified that Wilson’s lungs were “peppered” with pieces of the 
projectiles that fragmented in her body.  A home in the vicinity was also struck by 
bullets that pierced the front door and struck an inside wall. 
Wilson was not the intended victim of this shooting.  Her boyfriend Anthony 
Fail was being sought by members of John Doe who intended to kill him.  Wilson 
and Fail were together in Wilson’s car just before the shooting when they arrived 
 
- 22 -
at the home of Fail’s stepbrother James Harvey.  Harvey testified that on the night 
of Wilson’s murder a car occupied by John Doe members Julius Stevens, Eric 
Stokes, Jean Henry, and “Eddie Bow”3 drove by his residence ten or eleven times.  
When Fail and Wilson arrived at Harvey’s house, Harvey warned them about the 
car.  Fail sent Wilson home because he feared for her safety.  Fail learned the next 
morning that Wilson had been shot to death.  At the penalty phase of trial, 
Detective Alphonso testified that Julius Stevens admitted that he and Eddie Harris 
had shot Wilson. 
Carlos Walker testified that Eddie Harris borrowed his Grand Marquis on 
the day of Wilson’s murder.  The car was returned by Harris and Eric Stokes the 
next day and they warned Walker that he should “lay low” with this car.  Shots 
were fired at Walker the next time he drove his car and his toe was blown off. 
Various witnesses described the history between Fail and John Doe that led 
to these events.  Fail testified that he met Smith in 1996 after Fail was released 
from prison.  Smith had taken over Fail’s drug hole on 61st Street during Fail’s 
incarceration.  Initially, Smith and Fail worked out an arrangement about the drug 
hole—Fail would receive money from the operation of the hole and was given 
permission to get drugs and money from the hole.  However, this arrangement 
ended when Smith ordered John Doe workers to cut Fail off.  Fail had heated 
                                          
 
 
3.  Harvey did not know the real name of this individual.   
 
- 23 -
arguments with both Latravis Gallashaw and Smith about being cut off.  Fail 
responded by robbing John Doe holes and shooting at the holes.  Fail and his 
friends were also shot at by John Doe members. 
Julian Mitchell, Charles Clark, Eric Mitchell, Antonio Allen, Tricia Geter, 
and Herbert Daniels each related the same account of a falling out between Smith 
and Fail over money, which resulted in Fail robbing the John Doe holes.  Mitchell 
was given instructions to watch out for Fail and to kill him.  Daniels was instructed 
to look for Fail and actually rode up and down the block looking for Fail on the 
day Wilson was killed.  Mitchell was instructed by Smith and others to shoot Fail 
on sight.  Allen heard Smith discuss the Fail problem with Julius Stevens at the 
Steady Mobbin' Car Wash.  Geter heard Smith instruct Stevens to deal with Fail 
because he had been robbing his drug holes.  According to Mitchell, the shooters 
were amused by a television report on the morning after Wilson’s murder that 
named Fail as a suspect in her shooting. 
Mitchell and Fail also described a shooting that occurred outside the Foxy 
Lady Club at 79th Street and 17th Place in June 1998.  In a purported gesture to 
end the dispute with Fail and his friends, Gallashaw gave Fail money to go out 
clubbing.  Fail and his friends ended up at the Foxy Lady Club that night.  While 
they were leaving the club, someone began shooting at them.  Fail’s companion 
Kenwan Maynard was killed.  Mitchell testified that he drove a number of John 
 
- 24 -
Doe individuals to a night club where Fail had been spotted.  These individuals had 
machine guns and opened fire on someone outside the club.  Maynard had seven 
gunshot wounds from a high-velocity weapon.  Police recovered multiple casings 
from semiautomatic assault rifles.  Based on eyewitnesses to the shooting, the 
police put out a BOLO for a large dark four-door vehicle with three males in ski 
masks and armed with weapons.  The State filed a Williams rule4 notice about the 
Foxy Lady Club shooting.  The evidence was introduced to prove that John Doe 
was looking for Fail and intended to shoot him. 
Melvin Lipscomb Manslaughter 
Melvin Lipscomb, a twenty-two-year-old customer of John Doe, was killed 
in the early morning hours of August 27, 1996, at 1527 Northwest 58th Street.  The 
testimony showed that Lipscomb sustained eleven gunshot wounds, including three 
fatal shots to the head and one to his chest.  At least one of the head wounds was at 
close range.  Lipscomb also had scrapes on the right side of the face, right elbow, 
and right knee, indicative of falling to the pavement.  Lipscomb was found face 
down on the pavement.  Toxicology reports indicated that Lipscomb had alcohol 
and cocaine in his system at the time he was shot. 
Various witnesses testified that Lipscomb was standing in line at the 58th 
Street drug hole, across the street from Smith’s mother’s house.  Lipscomb 
                                          
 
 
4.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959). 
 
- 25 -
apparently broke the drug hole rules by talking loudly.  He also got into an 
argument with Antonio Godfrey, who was a gunman at this drug hole.  Godfrey 
fired his gun at Lipscomb and chased him down the stairs and across the street.  
Julian Mitchell testified that he was the lieutenant at the hole the night that 
Lipscomb was killed.  Mitchell saw Godfrey chasing Lipscomb and saw him shoot 
Lipscomb in Smith’s yard across the street from the drug hole.  He also testified 
that Smith advised Godfrey to lie low in order to avoid the police.  Tricia Geter 
testified that Smith told her about Lipscomb’s murder.  Smith heard someone 
calling his name and pleading outside his house.  When Smith came outside, his 
workers told him that Lipscomb had “disrespected the hole.”  Smith responded to 
“do his ass” and Godfrey shot him. 
Marlon Beneby Manslaughter 
Marlon Beneby died in the hospital on August 21, 1998, from complications 
of a gunshot wound to his upper back on July 23, 1998.  Beneby was shot once in 
the back, and the bullet lodged in the fourth and fifth cervical vertebrae, causing 
him to become a quadriplegic.  When Beneby arrived at the hospital he was able to 
communicate, but unable to move.  He also had abrasions and some blunt force 
injuries.  Necrosis spread from his spinal cord to his brainstem and he lost the 
ability to breathe in the first week after the shooting.  He developed severe 
bronchitis in his lungs. 
 
- 26 -
 
Beneby worked as a “bombman” for John Doe.  Herbert Daniels, Eric 
Mitchell, Carlos Walker, Antonio Allen, and Danny Dunston all testified that 
Beneby was suspected of selling his own drugs at the John Doe hole.  When 
confronted about this, Beneby blamed the tablemen Dunston and Jeffrey Bullard 
for supplying these drugs.  When Latravis Gallashaw found out that Beneby was 
“stealing from the table” by selling his own drugs at the John Dole hole, he shot 
Beneby.  Walker testified that he saw the argument between Beneby and 
Gallashaw on the night of the shooting.  Walker heard a shot, saw Beneby on the 
ground, and saw Gallashaw hide a gun in his waistband.  After the shooting, 
Walker heard Beneby say, “I know I was wrong for what I did.  I don’t want to 
die.”  Tyree Lampley, who was not a member of John Doe, saw Gallashaw shoot 
Beneby with a 9-millimeter gun.  Allen testified that he heard the shot as he was 
riding up on his bicycle and then saw Beneby on the ground.  Allen also admitted 
that he helped move Beneby from the front yard of the house to the sidewalk and 
helped clean up the blood in the yard.  The John Doe members who were present 
agreed to act as if Beneby had been riding Allen’s bike when he was shot in a 
drive-by.  The officers and emergency personnel who responded to the shooting 
testified that it appeared as if someone had tried to wash away blood from the 
scene. 
 
- 27 -
Charles Clark testified that Gallashaw admitted to him that he had shot 
Beneby.  Mitchell also testified that during the time that Beneby was in the hospital 
Gallashaw attempted to pay Beneby to be quiet about the shooting.   
Smith was convicted of the first-degree murders of Hadley, Pope, Brown, 
and Wilson; four counts of conspiracy to commit murder (Hadley, Brown, Pope, 
and Fail), two counts of manslaughter (Lipscomb and Beneby), RICO conspiracy, 
racketeering, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine and cannabis. 
A motion hearing was conducted on February 7, 2005, at which the court 
considered the defense’s motion for a new trial, various motions in limine, and 
challenges to the death penalty and death penalty instructions.  As a basis for its 
motion for a new trial, the defense raised an issue relating to the State’s alleged 
nondisclosure of Mark Roundtree’s July 2004 statement in which he stated that he 
had previously implicated himself in the Hadley murder so that he could be a 
witness against Smith at this trial.  Smith raises this as a claim in his appeal.  It is 
discussed in more detail in the analysis of that issue below.  The State explained 
that it had no report of a July statement by Roundtree, that Roundtree had given a 
number of inconsistent statements to the police and the defense was aware of these 
statements, that Roundtree had not been called as a witness and did not provide any 
evidence that was relied upon to prove Smith’s participation in Hadley’s murder, 
and that the defense had informed the jury at trial that Roundtree had been 
 
- 28 -
convicted of Hadley’s murder.  The court denied the defense’s motion for a new 
trial.  The court granted the State a protective order to prohibit the defense from 
asking why the prosecutors had not filed charges against State witnesses who had 
admitted their involvement in a number of murders.  The court ruled that the 
defense was free to ask whether charges had been filed and to argue this as a 
mitigating factor to the jury.   
The penalty phase took place in February 2005 and lasted three days.  The 
State presented several family members who either read or made victim impact 
statements.  The medical examiner who examined the body of Cynthia Brown 
testified about the process of asphyxiation by smothering.  The State also asked the 
court to take judicial notice of Smith’s contemporaneous convictions for violent 
felonies in this case.  The defense presented testimony from Smith’s attorney in the 
federal conviction, the testimony of several State witnesses who had admitted their 
participation in murders, Detective Alphonso, who testified about Julius Stevens’ 
admissions to the Pope and Wilson murders, the defendant’s mother, Willie Mae 
Smith, who testified about the violent deaths and injuries that had occurred in 
Smith’s life, and the individual who took the various sworn statements of 
Roundtree about the Hadley murder.  The State presented Detective Alphonso and 
Tricia Geter as rebuttal witnesses.  
 
- 29 -
The jury recommended life sentences for the murders of Hadley and Pope 
and death sentences for the murder of Brown by a vote of ten to two and the 
murder of Wilson by a vote of nine to three. 
No additional evidence or argument was presented through a Spencer 
hearing,5 and Smith elected not to address the court.  However, both sides 
presented written sentencing memoranda to the court.  The court followed the 
jury’s recommendations as to sentencing, imposing life sentences for the murders 
of Hadley and Pope and death sentences for the murders of Brown and Wilson. 
In the Brown murder, the trial court found three aggravating factors:  (1) 
Smith had a previous conviction of another capital felony or a felony involving the 
use of violence, based on the contemporaneous first-degree murder convictions, 
the manslaughter convictions, and the conspiracy to commit murder convictions; 
(2) the murder was committed to hinder or disrupt the lawful exercise of a 
governmental function or the enforcement of laws because Brown was killed to 
prevent her testimony against Smith in the Johnson murder case; and (3) the 
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP).  The trial court gave great 
weight to these aggravating factors.  The sentencing order discusses three statutory 
mitigating factors:  (1) lack of significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (3) Smith’s age at the time of the 
                                          
 
 
5.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
- 30 -
murder.  However, the court assigned little weight to these statutory mitigators, 
explaining that there either was no evidence to support the mitigator or the 
evidence presented actually refuted it.6  The trial court also considered a number of 
nonstatutory mitigating factors relating to Smith’s background and family, 7 which 
were given little or some weight.  
In the Wilson murder, the trial court found three aggravating factors:  (1) 
Smith was previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the 
use of violence based on his contemporaneous convictions of first-degree murder, 
manslaughter, and conspiracy to commit murder; (2) the murder was committed 
for pecuniary gain based on the fact that Wilson was killed when her car was 
ambushed by members of the John Doe gang who were trying to kill her boyfriend 
Anthony Fail to protect the drug enterprise; and (3) the murder was committed in a 
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
                                          
 
 
6.  The sentencing order noted that Smith had been convicted by the same 
jury of thirteen other felonies, including multiple counts of murder, manslaughter, 
and conspiracy.  The order stated that “[t]here is no evidence presented to establish 
[the extreme mental or emotional disturbance] mitigator.”  Moreover, the evidence 
presented actually refuted this mitigator.  Finally, the order noted that there was no 
evidence presented that Smith’s age (mid-twenties) had any impact on his thought, 
actions, or motivations.  Thus, the court concluded that “this mitigator [did not 
carry] any significance beyond the mere fact of [Smith’s] chronological age.” 
 
7.  The nonstatutory mitigation included that Smith was raised in a crime 
infested neighborhood and a gang-controlled community; was a good family man; 
exhibited good behavior during trial; was exposed to chronic violence while 
growing up; and graduated from high school. 
 
- 31 -
justification, based on the careful, prearranged plan to commit this execution-style 
murder.  The trial court assigned great weight to each of the aggravating factors.  
The trial court considered the same statutory mitigators as in Brown’s murder (lack 
of significant history of prior criminal activity, extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance, and the age of the defendant), but assigned them little weight for the 
same reasons as stated above.  The trial court also found the same nonstatutory 
mitigators regarding Smith’s background and family as in Brown’s murder.  The 
trial court also considered the fact that Smith did not shoot Wilson himself and 
never intended for Wilson to be killed, but gave this little weight in light of the 
overwhelming evidence that Smith ordered the execution of Fail and Wilson was 
killed as a result of this plan. 
 
In both cases, the trial court found that “the aggravating circumstances 
clearly and convincingly outweigh the mitigating factors” and imposed death 
sentences for both Brown’s and Wilson’s murders.  The court imposed upward 
departure sentences on the noncapital charges based on the following factors:  
Smith’s leadership role in a criminal organization; Smith had committed crimes in 
order to impede his prosecution for conduct in an underlying arrest; Smith was not 
amenable to rehabilitation; the murders of Wilson and Brown were CCP; and 
Smith had committed multiple murders and manslaughter.  The court imposed 
consecutive thirty-year sentences for RICO conspiracy, RICO racketeering, 
 
- 32 -
conspiracy to traffic in marijuana, conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, and conspiracy 
to commit the murders of Hadley, Brown, Pope, and Fail.  The court imposed 
consecutive fifteen-year sentences for the manslaughter of Lipscomb and Beneby. 
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
In his appeal to this Court, Smith raises nine issues.  He claims that (1) the 
security measures ordered by the trial court were prejudicial and violated his right 
to a fair trial; (2) the trial court erred in striking the jury panel that had been 
exposed to the out-of-court comment by Smith’s mother; (3) the trial court erred in 
permitting a member of the John Doe organization to testify about the meaning of 
terms in the recorded conversations; (4) the trial court erred in admitting into 
evidence a police report concerning the Johnson murder that was found in Smith’s 
bedroom; (5) the trial court erred in limiting defense cross-examination of three 
State witnesses; (6) the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after the State 
solicited the medical examiner’s opinion on an improper hypothetical question 
after two defense objections to this hypothetical question had been sustained; (7) 
the trial court erred in denying a new trial based on the State’s failure to disclose a 
witness statement that was materially favorable to the defense; (8) the trial court 
erred in not holding a hearing to determine whether the State failed to disclose that 
a witness would testify inconsistently with his deposition and to determine whether 
the defense was prejudiced by this failure; and (9) the trial court erred in not 
 
- 33 -
granting a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct.  In addition to considering 
Smith's arguments on appeal, this Court reviews the record to confirm that 
sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict of guilt in the first-degree murders 
and the proportionality of the death sentences imposed.  See Fla. R. App. P. 
9.142(a)(6).  We address each claim in turn below. 
Security Measures 
 
Smith contends that a number of security measures utilized during his trial 
prejudiced him.  He specifically focuses on the following measures:  a large 
number of security personnel were present in and around the courtroom, including 
law enforcement officers who were armed; a second magnetometer was used 
outside the courtroom; parties coming to the end of the hallway where the 
courtroom was located, including jurors, were searched; attorneys were searched in 
front of the jurors; Smith had to wear a stun belt throughout the proceedings; those 
entering the courtroom had to show photo identification during parts of the trial; 
and several witnesses testified in red jail jumpsuits.   
 
Generally, a judge has discretion when determining the manner in which to 
ensure security and safety for those in the courtroom and may be reversed only for 
abuse.  See Hellum v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary-Leavenworth, 28 F.3d 903, 907 
(8th Cir. 1994).  We find that, given the magnitude and nature of this case, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the security measures that Smith 
 
- 34 -
contends prejudiced him.  The security measures were justified based on the 
allegations in the indictment and the testimony at trial.  As the trial court noted 
during a sidebar discussion of the security measures, at least one witness was 
allegedly killed because she was going to testify against Smith at his trial.  Further, 
testimony showed that Smith had been able to contact people while he was 
incarcerated and to give orders relating to his business.  Additionally, there were 
several incidents in which spectators made threats to members of the prosecution 
team or intimidated witnesses, even if not overtly.   
Smith first argues that the jury was prejudiced by the large number of 
security personnel present in and around the courtroom, including law enforcement 
officers who were armed.  We disagree.  The presence of added guards was 
justified due to the nature of the case, i.e., it involved organized criminal activity in 
which a number of individuals were killed or injured for interfering with the 
organization.  Further, one of the State’s witnesses had recognized a courtroom 
spectator who was a killer.  In United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1533 (8th 
Cir. 1995), the court employed a large number of security personnel in the 
courtroom and searched the defense attorneys within the view of the jurors.  The 
court found the enhanced security to be justified because “each of the nine 
defendants in this case was charged with participating in an extraordinarily violent 
criminal enterprise with a history of conflict with law enforcement.”  Moreover, in 
 
- 35 -
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986), where four extra guards were 
present in the courtroom, the United States Supreme Court stated that the presence 
of officers during a trial would not necessarily make the jury think that the 
defendant is guilty, rather that “the officers are there to guard against disruptions 
emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges 
do not erupt into violence.  Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer 
anything at all from the presence of the guards.”   
Smith next argues that the presence of a second magnetometer and the 
searches of bags may have influenced the jury negatively.  However, “additional 
security personnel and the use of metal detectors are even less prejudicial [than  
physical restraints] because of ‘the wider range of inferences that a juror might 
reasonably draw’ from their use.”  Hellum, 28 F. 2d at 908 (quoting Holbrook, 475 
U.S. at 569).  Thus, courts across the country have approved of the use of metal 
detectors.  See, e.g., State v. Aguilar, 352 N.W.2d 395, 396 (Minn. 1984) 
(authorizing the use of metal detectors and searches of people entering the 
courtroom).  This type of security measure is a part of our daily experience and 
cannot be deemed prejudicial.   
Smith also argues that he was prejudiced when his defense attorneys were 
“wanded” in front of the jury.  However, where the jurors in Smith’s trial were 
themselves being searched and wanded, they would not be surprised or prejudiced 
 
- 36 -
to see the defense attorneys subjected to similar measures.  See Aguilar, 352 
N.W.2d at 397 (holding that the defendant was not prejudiced when the jurors saw 
him being searched where the jurors themselves had been frisked).   
 
Smith further argues that the jury was prejudiced because he had to wear a 
stun belt during trial and that the use of this stun belt implied his guilt.  A trial 
judge has discretion when it comes to the issue of whether or not to restrain the 
defendant.  See Elledge v. State, 408 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 1981).  The record 
clearly reflects that although the trial court found the belt necessary because of the 
magnitude of the case, it also found that Smith could not be prejudiced by its use 
because it was not visible to anyone, including the judge.  It is true that while 
restraints are sometimes necessary, a defendant generally has the right to appear 
free from restraint while in front of the jury.  See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
344 (1970).  However, we have held that the use of a stun belt is allowed because it 
is less visible than the alternative of shackles.  See Weaver v. State, 894 So. 2d 
178, 195 (Fla. 2004).  Because the stun belt was not visible, Smith appeared free 
from restraint and, as a result, he was not prejudiced. 
 
Smith also argues that it was wrong to require observers to show photo 
identification before being permitted to enter the courtroom.  This procedure was 
not put into place until one of the State witnesses claimed to recognize a courtroom 
spectator as a “known killer” and feared for his safety.  Requiring spectators to 
 
- 37 -
identify themselves when a witness fears for his life is within the discretion of the 
trial judge.  See Resnick v. State, 319 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) 
(“[W]hen a judge is so advised of pending potential violence, he has the inherent 
authority and the duty to invoke such security as under existing circumstances 
appears to be reasonably necessary for the protection, not only of the judge, but of 
all lawfully before the Court.”). 
 
Finally, Smith argues that he was prejudiced by the “theatrical presentation” 
of several State witnesses in jail jumpsuits and handcuffs.  The trial court found no 
prejudice to the defense and if prejudicial to anyone, it was the State, which was 
presenting convicted felons as its witnesses.  The State argues that it was 
abundantly clear from the witnesses’ testimony that they were prisoners, and 
security measures for these prisoners had nothing to do with the defendant.  We 
agree.  Reason and common human experience dictate that a witness who testifies 
that he is currently incarcerated might be dressed in prison garb.  Moreover, there 
were additional safety concerns related to many of the State witnesses because they 
were prisoners.  Their appearance in red jumpsuits would alert everyone that they 
were inmates if there was an attempted escape from custody. 
Because Smith fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion 
in imposing these security measures and also fails to demonstrate prejudice, relief 
is not warranted on this claim. 
 
- 38 -
Failure to Strike Jury Panel 
 
Smith next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike 
the entire jury panel based on prejudice caused by the comment, “God bless you 
all.  Have a blessed day,” that was made by Smith’s mother to them as she was 
leaving the courtroom during jury selection.   
 
When Smith’s mother was leaving the courtroom during jury selection, she 
made a statement to the seventy venire members in the hallway.  According to 
those who heard the comment, the mother stated to the entire group, “God bless 
you all.  Have a blessed day.”  When this was brought to the trial court’s attention 
the following day, the court individually questioned several jurors about the 
incident and learned that several jurors had been discussing the matter at lunch that 
day.  The court then individually questioned the jurors who might have been 
discussing the incident.  Attorneys for both sides then requested individual voir 
dire of the jury venire and as a result, the court decided to question all of the 
members of the venire in small groups about the incident.  The attorneys were also 
permitted to inquire of the jurors.  After questioning the entire jury panel in small 
groups, the defense moved to have the entire panel struck based on the comment 
being viewed as inappropriate and made by a family member to influence the jury.  
The defense argued that the comment would have a negative influence on whoever 
heard it and result in prejudice to Smith.  The trial court denied the motion to strike 
 
- 39 -
the entire panel, but issued an order that Smith’s mother not set foot in the 
courtroom until she was called as a witness and have no conversation with any 
jurors or potential jurors.   
 
A trial court has discretion to determine what remedy is required when a 
comment is made to the jurors outside the presence of the court.  See Hutchinson v. 
State, 882 So. 2d 943, 956 (Fla. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Deparvine v. 
State, 955 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2008); Street v. State, 636 So. 2d 1297, 1301 (Fla. 
1994).  The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a showing of 
bias or prejudice to the defendant.  See United States v. Hernandez, 921 F. 2d 
1569, 1578 (11th Cir. 1991).  The record demonstrates that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s motion to strike the entire jury venire.  The 
trial court acted appropriately by questioning the jury panel to determine who had 
heard the comment and whether the comment would affect their ability to be 
impartial.  Moreover, the comment made to the jurors did not disclose evidence or 
facts not presented at trial and did not even constitute an opinion about the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.  See, e.g., Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 956 (involving 
a restaurant patron who approached the jurors and told them that she hoped they 
would hang the defendant); Street, 636 So. 2d at1301 (involving a person who 
passed the jury in the hallway and muttered “guilty”).   
 
- 40 -
 
Accordingly, Smith fails to demonstrate that any of the jurors on the venire 
exhibited actual bias and as a result that he was prejudiced.  None of the jurors who 
served on Smith’s jury stated that the comment would affect their ability to rule 
fairly in his case.  In fact, a number of jurors were struck from the venire based on 
their failure to report the juror discussions related to the mother’s comments.  
Additionally, the prospective jurors who voiced problems about the mother’s 
comments were actually struck for cause.  Therefore, we find no merit to this 
claim. 
Meaning of Terms in Recorded Conversations 
Smith contends that the trial court erred by permitting John Doe gang 
member Julian Mitchell to interpret code terms used in the phone conversations of 
John Doe members that were intercepted by the wiretap and recorded.  Smith’s 
specific claims are that (1) Mitchell did not qualify to offer his lay opinion 
regarding the meaning of the terms used in the conversations; and (2) he was never 
qualified as an expert in the area that he testified about.  On the other hand, the 
State argues that the claim is procedurally barred because it was not preserved for 
appellate review.  The State also argues in the alternative that the claim is without 
merit.  We agree. 
The State introduced all of the intercepted conversations into evidence 
through both recordings and transcripts.  To help the jury make sense of these 
 
- 41 -
conversations, State witness Mitchell was asked to interpret the conversation after 
the recording was played.  Before testifying about the tapes, Mitchell testified that 
he had listened to the recordings of each of the intercepted calls four or five times 
prior to trial and had reviewed the transcripts of the calls for accuracy as well.  
Mitchell was called to the stand on the morning of Wednesday, November 24, 
2004.  He testified until the court recessed at 4:00 p.m. and the judge released the 
jury for the Thanksgiving holiday.  During this entire day of testimony, the defense 
never objected to Mitchell’s offering opinion testimony or not being an expert 
witness.  At a sidebar discussion at the end of proceedings on Wednesday 
afternoon, the court told the State that this wiretap evidence was repetitive and 
only one more hour would be permitted when the trial resumed the next Monday.  
It was when court resumed on Monday, November 29, and Mitchell took the stand 
again that the defense voiced an objection to Mitchell’s testimony.  The defense 
argued that Mitchell was “assuming facts not in evidence” and that he had not been 
qualified as an expert in the field in which he was being asked to give an opinion.  
The court overruled the objection.  Later, the defense objected to Mitchell 
summarizing some of the calls and that this method of testifying violated the best 
evidence rule.  The State explained that it was summarizing the calls because the 
court had given them a limited amount of time to present this testimony.  The court 
overruled both objections. 
 
- 42 -
The record demonstrates that Smith never objected to Mitchell’s testimony 
on the basis of improper lay witness opinion or the predicate of reliability.  
Accordingly, these claims cannot be considered on appeal.  See Steinhorst v. State, 
412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982) (“[I]n order for an argument to be cognizable on 
appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, 
exception, or motion below.”).  Also, with regard to the other belated objections 
raised by Smith, these claims are also not properly preserved because defense 
counsel permitted Mitchell to testify without objection for an entire day of trial, 
only objecting to his testimony when court resumed after the holidays. 
Even if the claims based on the belated objections were properly preserved 
for appellate review, we find that these claims are without merit.  Florida’s 
Evidence Code provides that a lay witness may testify in the form of opinion when 
the witness cannot otherwise accurately communicate what he or she perceived so 
long as the opinion will not mislead the trier of fact and the opinion is not one that 
requires special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.  § 90.701, Fla. Stat. 
(2005).  Section 90.702 governs opinion testimony by expert witnesses and 
provides that a witness can be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, or training.  § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2005).  Whether a witness is qualified 
as an expert is largely a matter of discretion for the trial court.  See, e.g., Ramirez 
v. State, 542 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1989) (“The determination of a witness's 
 
- 43 -
qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the 
trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.”).  
While counsel must elicit from the witness the part of the witness’s background 
that qualifies him as an expert, counsel need not formally proffer the witness as an 
expert to the court.  See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 702.1, at 687 
(2007 ed.). 
Mitchell clearly had both knowledge and experience regarding the codes.  In 
fact, the State established in direct questioning that Mitchell used these codes on a 
daily basis in conversations and especially in phone conversations “to keep the 
police from knowing our business.”  Mitchell had already testified at length earlier 
in the trial about the operation and organization of John Doe.  His testimony about 
the John Doe gang was completely substantiated by the testimony of numerous 
other John Doe witnesses.  Moreover, the other witnesses confirmed that Mitchell 
was third in the command structure of John Doe.  Additionally, John Doe member 
Eric Mitchell independently testified about the codes used by John Doe in phone 
conversations to indicate the various types and quantities of drugs.  These codes 
were the same as Julian Mitchell’s interpretation of the taped conversations. 
Moreover, courts have held that law enforcement officers and others may 
testify about codes used by drug dealers to thwart detection.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Brown, 872 F.2d 385, 392 (11th Cir. 1989) (approving testimony by co-
 
- 44 -
defendant and special agent about meaning of terms “paper,” “candy,” “dresses,” 
certain numbers, “the full house,” and certain real estate terms in intercepted 
conversations in drug prosecution).  In Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 891-92 
(Fla. 2000), we held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting an 
experienced dealer of crack cocaine to testify as an expert regarding the identity 
and approximate weight of the rocky substance in a bag.  Furthermore, police 
officers have testified as expert witnesses regarding the street language in the drug 
culture and explained to the jury their interpretation of the words used, which 
occurred in contexts in which their normal lexicographical meanings would be 
illogical and meaningless.  See Daniels v. State, 381 So. 2d 707, 709-10 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1979), aff’d, 389 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1980); Slater v. State, 356 So. 2d 69, 71 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1978).  Accordingly, we find this claim not preserved for appellate 
review and to be without merit. 
Admission of Police Report 
Smith claims that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a 
police report regarding Dominique Johnson’s killing.  The State introduced the 
report through Detective Frank Alphonso, who had investigated the Johnson 
killing.  Detective Alphonso had recovered a copy of this report from the 
nightstand in Corey Smith’s bedroom in his mother’s house when a search warrant 
related to the John Doe drug investigation was executed.  The report included 
 
- 45 -
information about Cynthia Brown coming forward as a witness to the shooting and 
the fact that she had identified Smith as the shooter.  When the State attempted to 
enter the report into evidence, defense counsel objected that the report was full of 
hearsay.  The State agreed to redact portions of the report and reiterated that the 
part it wanted admitted was that Cynthia Brown had identified Smith as the shooter 
and was planning to testify against him at trial, which gave Smith motive for 
killing Brown.  The court held that the report was admissible for this purpose but 
other portions of the report were hearsay that were not relevant for this purpose 
and should be redacted.  We agree. 
 
The Florida Evidence Code defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005).  If an out-
of-court statement is not offered to prove the facts contained in the statement, it is 
not hearsay.  However, even where an out-of-court statement is offered for a 
purpose other than proving the truth of its contents, the statement is only 
admissible when the purpose for which the statement is being offered is a material 
issue in the action.  See Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 915 (Fla. 2000).  A 
statement may be offered to prove a variety of things besides its truth, including to 
show motive or knowledge.  See id.; Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988, 997 (Fla. 
1997). 
 
- 46 -
In the instant case, the State did not introduce the report to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted, i.e., that Smith killed Johnson, but to show that Smith had 
knowledge about Brown being a witness against him and this gave him a motive to 
have her killed.  Similar to Foster, where we held that an out-of-court statement 
could be offered to prove knowledge of the statement, which was a material issue 
in the case, the police report in this case clearly goes to the material issues of 
knowledge and motive in Brown’s murder.  The trial court reiterated numerous 
times and gave a limiting instruction that the police report was being introduced to 
prove Smith’s motive and knowledge and not that Smith killed Johnson.  This is 
also similar to Escobar where the defendant’s own hearsay statement was admitted 
to show motive.  Based on the Florida Evidence Code and applicable case law, we 
conclude that the police report was not hearsay because it was not admitted to 
prove that Smith killed Dominique Johnson.  Rather, it was admitted to prove 
Smith’s knowledge and motive in the Brown killing, both of which were relevant 
issues.  Therefore, the report was properly admitted. 
Limiting Defense Cross-Examination 
Smith claims that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court limited his 
cross-examination of three witnesses:  Anthony Fail, Demetrius Jones, and medical 
examiner Dr. Emma Lew.  As to Fail and Jones, Smith claims that the court 
improperly restricted his questions about uncharged crimes they had committed.  
 
- 47 -
As to Dr. Lew, Smith argues that he was limited in his questioning about autoerotic 
asphyxia. 
Anthony Fail 
Anthony Fail was a member of the John Doe organization.  On direct 
examination, he testified that he was currently incarcerated on two life sentences, 
plus a thirty-year sentence with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum; had eight prior 
felony convictions; had no plea agreements with either the state or federal 
prosecutors; had agreed to testify because the victim Wilson had been his 
girlfriend; and had been involved in the drug business for a number of years and 
had engaged in various acts of violence.  
On cross-examination, defense counsel was able to elicit that Fail had hurt, 
shot, and beat up people for the defendant.  The State objected when defense 
counsel started to question Fail about his involvement in specific violent acts 
unrelated to those that were the subject of Smith’s trial.  The court held that 
defense counsel was not permitted to inquire about these unrelated uncharged 
crimes because they were not relevant to this proceeding or the witness’s 
testimony.  However, defense counsel was able to elicit that Fail sold drugs and 
that he was a murderer for hire for the defendant.  Moreover, defense counsel was 
able to question Fail at length about another incident in which he shot a companion 
in the back of the head and how the fees for a murder for hire are negotiated.  
 
- 48 -
Through questioning, defense counsel repeatedly made the point that Fail was a 
murderer for hire and got paid to kill.  Only when defense counsel persisted in 
asking how many people had Fail killed, even after he responded “not many,” did 
the court sustain the State’s objection and restrict the questioning.   
Demetrius Jones 
On direct examination, Jones testified that he had been selling and using 
drugs for more than ten years; he was currently incarcerated for fifteen years; he 
had eleven previous felony convictions stemming from six different cases; he had 
plea agreements with both the federal government and the State of Florida, which 
required him to testify truthfully at this trial; and he had agreed to lie for Smith 
about the Johnson shooting and perjured himself in his deposition.   
 
On cross-examination, defense counsel was able to elicit that Jones had not 
been charged in the indictment in this case; had never been indicted for any drug 
offenses in federal court; was incarcerated for carjacking; had lied to a police 
officer about his name and went to prison under an alias; had committed perjury 
with regard to his plea bargain with the State; had made prior inconsistent 
statements in his deposition; and had removed a gun, money, and drugs from 
Johnson after he was shot but before the police arrived.  When defense counsel 
began to inquire about the factual basis of Jones’ convictions, the trial court 
sustained the State’s objection and explained that defense counsel could not ask 
 
- 49 -
questions about the nature of the charges when impeaching the witness with his 
prior convictions.  The court further held that defense counsel could inquire about 
Jones’ plea bargains related to his testimony and his bias for his testimony.   
Dr. Emma Lew 
Dr. Lew was the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Cynthia 
Brown’s body and testified at trial.  On direct examination, Dr. Lew testified that 
Brown had died from asphyxiation, which can be caused by a number of different 
mechanisms such as smothering, strangulation, drowning, carbon monoxide 
poisoning, and positional constriction of the airway.  Dr. Lew discounted all of 
these mechanisms except smothering based on the crime scene evidence and 
Brown’s body.  Dr. Lew stated that the evidence was consistent with Brown being 
smothered with a bed pillow.   
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Lew if it was possible that 
Brown died from asphyxiation while having sex with her face in a pillow.  Dr. Lew 
responded this was unlikely as the person would start flailing to get her breath and 
to get the other person off of her.  Defense counsel then asked if both people were 
drunk and using drugs could she be placed in a position where she might be 
asphyxiated during sex.  Dr. Lew responded that it was unlikely because she would 
 
- 50 -
not have had her underpants on if she died during sex.8  Defense counsel also 
asked whether the underwear could have been placed back on the body after she 
died in order to cover up the scene.  Dr. Lew responded that if that were the case 
they did not do a good job as there was no evidence of activity on the bed, Bro
was covered up with the bed clothes when she was found, and a bloody pillow w
found under her head.  Defense counsel further asked if it was possible that Brown 
could have had a heart attack after having sex and using cocaine and the other 
person staged her body when he realized she was dead.  Dr. Lew stated it was 
possible and was consistent with the evidence.  Defense counsel then asked 
whether sex could be described as a violent activity.  Dr. Lew responded that you 
usually are not holding your breath during sex.  Defense counsel then responded 
but are not there people who try to limit their breathing during the sex act.  The 
State objected that to this question as irrelevant, speculative, and not based on the 
evidence, which was sustained.  Then defense counsel asked if there was such a 
thing as autoerotic asphyxia.  Dr. Lew said yes there is such a thing.  When defense 
counsel asked Dr. Lew to explain this to the jury, the State objected as to relevancy 
and the court sustained that objection.  The trial court held that defense counsel 
could ask Dr. Lew if it autoerotic asphyxia applied in this case but could not ask 
Dr. Lew to explain the asphyxia.  The court told defense counsel that it could call 
wn 
as 
                                          
 
 
8.  A forensic biologist from the Miami-Dade Police Forensic Crime Lab 
testified that the rape kit from Brown showed no semen.   
 
- 51 -
its own expert on this matter.  Defense counsel never called Dr. Lew or any other 
expert as a defense witness to testify about autoerotic asphyxiation. 
The Florida Evidence Code provides that “[c]ross-examination of a witness 
is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the 
credibility of the witness.”  § 90.612(2), Fla. Stat. (2005).  The credibility of a 
witness may be attacked “by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a 
crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year 
under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved 
dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.”  § 90.610(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2005).  A trial judge has wide discretion to impose reasonable limits on 
cross-examination.  See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Geralds v. 
State, 674 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. 1996); Jones v. State, 580 So. 2d 143, 145 (Fla. 
1991).  A judge’s determination to allow or disallow questioning in that regard is 
not subject to review unless the determination is clearly erroneous.  See Sanders v. 
State, 707 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1998). 
We conclude that the trial court did not improperly restrict cross-
examination of Fail or Jones.  In fact, the trial court’s holdings are entirely 
consistent with the law because questioning about the underlying facts of a 
conviction is not allowed.  Defense counsel was not permitted to inquire into the 
nature of the witnesses’ prior convictions.  See Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 576 
 
- 52 -
(Fla. 2005); Cummings v. State, 412 So. 2d 436, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). 
However, defense counsel was permitted to question their veracity and their bias.   
Moreover, the record shows that defense counsel was able to extensively 
question Dr. Lew about the cause of Brown’s death.  Through his questioning, 
counsel was also able to call into question the manner of death as homicide.  He 
was able to explore his death during sex scenario fairly extensively.  In fact, the 
only restriction was not being able to ask Dr. Lew to explain what autoerotic 
asphyxia involves.  We conclude that the trial court’s determination to disallow 
this questioning was not an abuse of discretion because defense counsel’s 
questioning went beyond the scope of cross-examination.  Additionally, the 
defense was free to either call Dr. Lew as a defense witness or to call another 
expert to explain autoerotic asphyxia more fully.  We find no merit to Smith’s 
claims regarding the questioning of Fail, Jones, and Dr. Lew. 
Medical Examiner Opinion Testimony 
During redirect questioning, the State asked the medical examiner a 
hypothetical question relating to Brown’s death.  The State asked the following 
hypothetical:  
Let’s assume for a moment that a woman named Cynthia is a material 
witness in a homicide case. 
Assume the defendant in that homicide case hired her boyfriend to kill 
her.  Further assume, for the purpose of this hypothetical, Doctor, that 
the defendant in this homicide case did not want bullets involved.  
 
- 53 -
Assume the defendant in the homicide case that hires the boyfriend 
does not want bullets involved because he does not want it to come 
back to him.  And assume also that he wants her strangled or 
suffocated. 
Assume the lady, the material witness, Cynthia, was taken to a hotel 
by a boyfriend -- by her boyfriend and assume the boyfriend places a 
pillow over her face and assume she struggles to get her breath, to get 
the pillow off of her face, but died from asphyxia, from a lack of 
oxygen. 
Are your findings, Doctor Lew, consistent with that hypothetical? 
 
Defense counsel objected to the question as being compound, confusing, and 
narrative, which the court sustained.  The State then presented the same 
hypothetical set of facts but omitted the name of the witness.  The State asked, 
“Based on your training and expertise and analysis of that hypothetical, are the 
physical findings of asphyxia consistent with that scenario?”  The defense objected 
that it was not a proper basis for this expert’s opinion, which the court sustained.  
The State then asked the expert witness to assume the facts in the second 
hypothetical and whether those facts were consistent with asphyxia as a cause of 
death and homicide.  The witness replied in the affirmative.  Defense counsel did 
not object to this last question but instead moved for a mistrial, which the court 
denied.   
Smith claims that this hypothetical question was erroneous and the trial court 
erred by not granting his motion for a mistrial.  Section 90.704, Florida Statutes 
(2007), permits an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible facts or data made 
 
- 54 -
known to the expert outside the courtroom.  Section 90.705(1) permits the expert to 
testify without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data.  Thus, an expert 
may express an opinion and base the opinion on facts of which the expert does not 
have personal knowledge without the use of a hypothetical question.  The Florida 
Evidence Code does not prohibit counsel from using a hypothetical question and 
permits counsel to decide whether to do so. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida 
Evidence § 704.2, at 755-56 (2007 ed.). 
 
While the Florida Evidence Code does not specify the manner in which a 
hypothetical question can be used, Florida courts have established a number of 
guidelines.  A hypothetical question must be based on facts that are supported by 
evidence which has been introduced at trial.  See North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. 
Johnson, 538 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).  In framing the question, counsel 
may rely on the evidence introduced during trial in the light most favorable to his 
theory.  Therefore, the question may be based on a fact in dispute as long as there 
is evidence in the record to support the fact.  See Autrey v. Carroll, 240 So. 2d 474, 
476 (Fla. 1970); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 222 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1969). 
 
In the instant case, defense counsel’s objections to the State’s first 
hypothetical question were as to the form of the question itself—that it was in a 
narrative form and compound—not that the State’s hypothetical question was 
 
- 55 -
based on facts not in evidence.  The defense’s objection to the second version of 
the hypothetical was, “This is not a proper basis for this expert’s opinion.”  The 
court sustained that objection.  But defense still did not object that the question 
assumed facts not supported in the evidence.  Defense counsel never objected to 
the third question. 
 
This exchange involved the way the question was being asked, not whether 
the hypothetical itself could be asked.  Thus, the trial court sustained defense 
counsel’s objection to the form of the question, not to the fact that the question 
could be asked if properly phrased, which the State did on its final try, and to 
which defense counsel did not object.  Instead, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial “based on the improper and inappropriate hypothetical question that had to 
do exactly with the facts of the case they asked of a witness that they knew could 
not give such an opinion.”  The trial court denied the defense motion for a mistrial.  
The standard of review applied to motions for mistrial is abuse of discretion.  See 
Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 576 (Fla. 2005).  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.  In fact, a proper hypothetical 
question must be based on the facts of the case that have been presented at trial.  
Further, it is entirely permissible for an expert to give an opinion based on a 
hypothetical question.  Therefore, a mistrial was not appropriate because the 
 
- 56 -
question and answer were not improper.  Smith is not entitled to relief on this 
claim. 
Disclosure of Witness Statement 
 
Smith contends that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on 
the nondisclosure of a new oral statement made by Mark Roundtree in July 2004.  
Prior to the penalty phase, the State filed an amended discovery exhibit, which 
revealed that Roundtree made statements to polygraph operator George Slattery in 
July 2004.  In this statement, Roundtree denied committing the murder of Leon 
Hadley (a murder he was convicted of in September 1996 and given a sentence of 
life in prison), stated that Smith killed Hadley, and revealed that Roundtree had 
previously implicated himself in Hadley’s homicide so that he could serve as a 
witness at Smith’s trial and possibly garner some sentencing concession. 
Based on this disclosure, Smith filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that 
the State had committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), 
by failing to disclose this statement before trial.  The State asserts that the 
statement was not Brady material, but if the State had a duty to disclose it, there 
was no prejudice to Smith’s defense by its late disclosure. 
Under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s due process rights when it fails 
to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defendant and is material to either his 
guilt or the sentence imposed.  This includes both exculpatory evidence and 
 
- 57 -
impeachment evidence.  The evidence is material “if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
Mark Roundtree was listed as a State witness in the guilt phase of Smith’s 
trial.  However, Roundtree was never called to testify by the State or the defense.  
Roundtree made several statements about the Hadley murder prior to Smith’s trial.  
Copies of these statements were disclosed to the defense before Smith’s trial.  In 
his April 1996 statement, Roundtree denied any involvement in the Hadley murder 
and stated that he did not know who had shot Hadley.  Slattery reported that the 
polygraph indicated deception in Roundtree’s negative response to the question 
“do you know who shot Leon Hadley.”  On January 25, 2001, Roundtree gave two 
more statements to Slattery.9  At that time, Roundtree had been convicted of the 
                                          
 
 
9.  Slattery testified during the penalty phase that he had conducted the later 
interviews with Roundtree at the request of the City of Miami Police Department 
because they were concerned that they had convicted the wrong person for 
Hadley’s murder.  During his penalty phase testimony, Detective Alphonso 
testified that during the investigation of the John Doe organization for the federal 
case, he learned through interviews that Roundtree might be innocent of Hadley’s 
murder.   Around the same time, Detective Alphonso learned that the sole 
eyewitness against Roundtree in the Hadley case had recanted her testimony as to 
Roundtree’s guilt.  Hadley’s first-degree murder conviction for Hadley’s killing 
was vacated pursuant to a postconviction motion on December 20, 2004.  
Roundtree plead guilty to conspiracy to commit Hadley’s murder and was 
 
- 58 -
Hadley murder and had completed all appeal and postconviction proceedings.  In 
the first statement on January 25, 2001, Roundtree stated that Smith had told him 
about the Hadley shooting and Smith had admitted that he, Phil White, and Kelvin 
Cook were in the car and participated in Hadley’s shooting.  Roundtree then 
stopped his statement to Slattery in order to speak to Detective Alphonso.  
Roundtree then made a second statement, in which he stated that he had also been 
in the car during the Hadley shooting and had shot Hadley with an AK-47.  
Roundtree made another oral statement in July 2004, in which he disavowed 
being in the car during the Hadley shooting.  Roundtree explained that he had said 
he was involved in the murder in order to make himself a better State witness for 
Smith’s trial in hopes of getting a reduced sentence.  The July 2004 statement was 
not exculpatory to Smith as Roundtree still maintained that Smith had admitted 
shooting Hadley. 
The trial court heard argument on the defense motion for a new trial on 
February 7, 2005, before the penalty phase commenced.  The State explained that 
there had not been a written statement or report regarding Roundtree’s July 2004 
statement to Slattery.  The State argued that Roundtree had given multiple prior 
inconsistent statements regarding the Hadley murder, that the defense always knew 
about these other statements, and that the defense had told the jury that Roundtree 
                                                                                                                                        
sentenced to nine years with credit for the time he had served.  Roundtree was 
released from prison in December 2004. 
 
- 59 -
had been convicted of Hadley’s murder.  The State also noted that Roundtree was 
never called as a witness in Smith’s case.  Instead, the State had relied on the 
testimony of Phil White, the driver of the car during Hadley’s shooting, and 
Smith’s own admissions to Tricia Geter about his involvement in Hadley’s murder.  
Despite defense counsel’s argument that Roundtree’s July 2004 statement would 
have supported the defense theory that the State witnesses were liars who were 
perjuring themselves to secure favorable treatment from the State, the court ruled 
that another inconsistent statement from Roundtree was not significant.   
We conclude that Roundtree’s July 2004 statement does not meet the Brady 
materiality standard.  There is no reasonable probability that had this new 
statement, which was not exculpatory to Smith and had been preceded by multiple 
prior inconsistent statements by the same person, been disclosed to the defense the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  Thus, our confidence in the 
outcome of the proceeding has not been undermined. 
However, we still must consider whether the State’s failure to disclose this 
new statement constituted a violation of Florida’s discovery rules and, if so, 
whether the violation “materially hindered the defendant’s trial preparation or 
strategy.”  Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1150 (Fla. 2006) (quoting State v. 
Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995)).  This analysis does not focus on 
 
- 60 -
whether the discovery violation would have made a difference in the verdict, but 
whether the defense was procedurally prejudiced.  Id. 
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b), the prosecutor has an 
obligation to provide discovery.  Rule 3.220(j) imposes a continuing duty to 
disclose.  These rules of criminal procedure provide in pertinent part: 
(b) Prosecutor’s Discovery Obligation. 
 
(1) Within 15 days after service of the Notice of Discovery, the 
prosecutor shall serve a written Discovery Exhibit which shall 
disclose to the defendant and permit the defendant to inspect, copy, 
test, and photograph the following information and material within the 
state's possession and control: 
(A)  a list of the names and addresses of all 
persons known to the prosecutor to have information that 
may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense 
thereto . . . . 
. . . . 
(B) The statement of any person whose name is 
furnished in compliance with the preceding subdivision.  
The term “statement” as used herein includes a written 
statement made by the person and signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by the person and also includes any 
statement of any kind or manner made by the person and 
written or recorded or summarized in any writing or 
recording. . . . 
. . . . 
(j) Continuing Duty to Disclose.  If, subsequent to compliance 
with the rules, a party discovers additional witnesses or material that 
the party would have been under a duty to disclose or produce at the 
time of the previous compliance, the party shall promptly disclose or 
 
- 61 -
produce the witnesses or material in the same manner as required 
under these rules for initial discovery. 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1), (j). 
 
However, the failure to disclose Roundtree’s July 2004 to the defense did 
not materially hinder Smith’s trial preparation or strategy.  At trial, defense counsel 
was able to raise questions as to the veracity of the witnesses who testified against 
Smith, was able to elicit that various witnesses had perjured themselves by lying in 
their deposition testimony, and was able to show that some witnesses were 
testifying as part of a plea agreement.  Further, even if Smith had called Roundtree 
as a witness on the basis of the July 2004 statement, Smith would have had an 
unreliable witness who now claimed that Smith, and not Roundtree, killed Hadley, 
and who had given various inconsistent statements about the murder.  Further, 
Roundtree’s admission that he was willing to lie and implicate himself in a murder 
in order to get a reduced sentence does not prove that the other witnesses were 
lying at Smith’s trial.  In fact, at trial Smith did use Roundtree’s conviction to 
suggest that several witnesses were lying about Smith’s involvement in Hadley’s 
murder in order to get Roundtree released. 
This is quite different from Scipio, where the medical examiner investigator 
materially recanted his prior statement about finding a gun under the victim’s 
body.  The defense in Scipio intended to rely heavily on the investigator’s 
testimony to support its theory of self-defense.  Had the defense in Scipio been 
 
- 62 -
informed about this change in testimony, it could have pursued a different theory 
of defense.  Here, the undisclosed statement was not an alteration that impeded the 
defense trial strategy or preparation.  Thus, Smith was not entitled to a new trial on 
this basis. 
Disclosure of Inconsistent Testimony 
 
Smith asserts that the trial court erred in not conducting a Richardson10 
inquiry when State witness Carlos Walker testified inconsistently with his 
deposition.  The State contends that the claim was not preserved for review; that 
Smith has not shown a discovery violation; and that if there was a discovery 
violation, the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As discussed above, the State has a continuing obligation to disclose the 
statement of any person who has “information that may be relevant to any offense 
charged or any defense thereto.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1).  Carlos Walker was 
listed as a State witness and actually testified for the State during the guilt phase of 
trial.  In his pretrial deposition by the defense, Walker stated that he never talked to 
Smith about the Johnson case.  On direct examination by the State, Walker 
admitted that he lied in his deposition because he was afraid of retaliation by 
Smith.  Walker stated that he saw Smith with Jackie Pope’s deposition “and looked 
what happened to him.”  Walker then testified that Smith told him that Cynthia 
                                          
 
 
10.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).   
 
- 63 -
Brown had been “snitching” on him about the Johnson murder and “she got to 
come up dead for him to win trial.”  Walker also overheard Smith discussing 
Brown with Julius Stevens, Eric Stokes, and Latravis Gallashaw.  In this 
conversation, Smith told the trio that he wanted Brown to “come up dead in order 
for him to win the trial.” 
Walker also testified about a meeting he observed between Smith and 
Chazre Davis at Smith’s house regarding Brown.  Smith stated that he wanted 
Brown to be “smothered or strangled” and that he did not want any bullets or shell 
casings or other evidence on the scene.  Smith offered Davis nine ounces of 
powder cocaine to kill Brown.  Walker also testified that Smith bragged about 
Brown’s murder at a party celebrating the dismissal of the Johnson murder charges 
against him; Smith bragged that the State “couldn’t hold him” and stated that Davis 
“handled his business.”  
The defense did not object to this testimony by Walker.  Instead, the defense 
moved for a mistrial when the State’s direct examination was finished.  The 
defense argued that the State had called Walker to the stand without informing the 
defense that Walker had lied in his deposition.  The State responded that the 
defense knew what the issues were and also had Walker’s prior statement to the 
police that was consistent with his trial testimony.   The court told the defense to 
“impeach him while you can” and denied the motion for a mistrial.  
 
- 64 -
Walker gave three statements prior to trial.  In his initial statement to the 
police, he implicated Smith in the murders of Brown and Pope.  In his deposition 
taken by the defense, Walker denied knowing about any involvement by Smith in 
the murders.  Walker apparently made another statement to the State sometime 
before trial in which he told the prosecutor that he had lied in his deposition and 
would testify consistent with his initial statement.  The State never disclosed this 
fact to the defense, a discovery violation under rule 3.220(1) (b), (j). 
When a discovery violation is brought to a trial court’s attention, the court 
may conduct a Richardson hearing to inquire about the circumstances surrounding 
the State’s violation of the discovery rules and examine the possible prejudice to 
the defendant.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).  In the past, the 
court’s failure to a conduct a Richardson hearing was per se reversible error.  In 
State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995), this Court concluded that 
“there are cases . . . where a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defense was not prejudiced.”  When the reviewing court makes such a 
determination, then the discovery violation is deemed harmless and reversal is not 
warranted.  Id. 
This Court recently clarified the nature of the harmless error inquiry when a 
discovery violation occurs.  See Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2006).  The 
inquiry is whether the violation “materially hindered the defendant’s trial 
 
- 65 -
preparation or strategy.”  Id. at 1150 (quoting Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1020).  The 
analysis is not whether the jury’s verdict would have been different, but rather 
whether the defense was procedurally prejudiced.  Id.  “[O]nly if the appellate 
court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally 
prejudiced by the discovery violation can the error be considered harmless.”  
Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1021. 
The State contends that this issue was not properly preserved by Smith at 
trial because defense counsel moved for a mistrial rather than objecting because of 
the discovery violation.  However, Florida courts have concluded that a motion for 
a mistrial can preserve a discovery violation claim if the motion reasonably 
informs the court of the nature of the complaint.  See Raffone v. State, 483 So. 2d 
761 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).  There are no exact “magic words” or phrases which 
must be used by the defense in order to necessitate the inquiry; only the fact that a 
discovery request has not been met.  Copeland v. State, 566 So. 2d 856, 858 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1990); In re F.R., 539 So .2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).  In support of 
the motion for a mistrial in the instant case, the defense argued that the State 
“should have noticed in advance of the perjury so that we could at least find out 
what was going on.”  This was adequate to inform the court that a discovery 
violation had occurred and prompt an inquiry into the circumstances and whether 
 
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the defense was prejudiced.  Thus, we conclude that the claim was preserved 
below. 
Next, the State argues that no discovery violation occurred.  We do not 
agree.  When the defense moved for a mistrial, the State responded that the defense 
knew what the issues were and had possession of Walker’s prior statement to the 
police that was consistent with his trial testimony.  In its brief to this Court, the 
State notes that several pretrial statements by Walker were disclosed to the defense 
and the defense has not identified any statement by Walker that was not disclosed 
to the defense.  However, the trial record clearly indicates that the State had prior 
knowledge that Walker intended to recant his deposition testimony (in which he 
disavowed any conversations with Smith about the Johnson case and any 
knowledge about Smith’s involvement in Brown’s murder).  As soon as the 
prosecutor began questioning about the Johnson case, she asked Walker to explain 
his deposition testimony and why he had lied.  The fact that Walker’s recantation 
of his deposition testimony was not reduced to writing did not relieve the State of 
its continuing discovery obligation as to this witness.  The State committed a 
discovery violation “when it failed to disclose to [Smith] a material change in the 
State [witness’s] deposition statement.”  Scipio, 928 So. 2d at 1145. 
However, our examination of the record reveals that the defense was not 
procedurally prejudiced by this discovery violation.  The defense theory as to 
 
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Brown’s murder was that her death was not a homicide, but the result of either a 
heart attack or stroke caused by cocaine use or asphyxiation during sex.  While 
Walker’s testimony was antithetical to this theory, he was only one of many 
witnesses who testified about Smith’s plans to have Brown murdered.  Anthony 
Fail testified that he overheard Smith and his mother discussing various ways to 
kill Brown, including poison and strangling; that Smith offered him $50,000 to kill 
Brown and was emphatic that she not be shot and there not be any evidence that 
could lead back to Smith; and that Smith put aside $20,000 to pay Brown’s 
boyfriend Davis after he killed her.  Herbert Daniels testified that he heard Smith 
talk to Brown’s boyfriend about the killing and the method.  Tricia Geter testified 
that Smith asked her if she could acquire pure heroin to give Brown in order to 
make her heart stop and stated his intent to kill Brown.  Julian Mitchell testified 
that after Brown was killed Smith stated that he had to have Brown killed.  Even if 
the defense knew that Walker was not going to testify consistent with his 
deposition but in line with these witnesses, which is what Walker did, the defense 
would not have devised a different trial strategy.  Thus, we conclude “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery 
violation” and the error was harmless.  Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1021. 
Prosecutorial Comments 
 
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Smith contends that his trial was fundamentally flawed by the cumulative 
effect of prosecutorial misconduct by virtue of allegedly improper comments and 
arguments made by the prosecutor throughout the trial.  Smith also claims that the 
trial court erred in not granting him a new trial based on this prosecutorial 
misconduct.  While the State acknowledges that Smith objected to these 
prosecutorial comments at trial, it notes that he never asked the court to consider 
their cumulative effect in his motion for new trial and only cited two of the 
comments in that motion.   
 
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for new trial is abuse of 
discretion.  See Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla. 1999).  A new trial is 
only required for prosecutorial misconduct where “it is reasonably evident that the 
remarks may have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict of guilt than it 
would have otherwise done.”  Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 984 (Fla. 1999); 
accord Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 64 (Fla. 2005). 
 
Smith cites six instances of improper comments or arguments by the 
prosecutors as the basis of this claim.  We note that the defense’s objections to all 
of these comments were sustained by the court, that the defense did not request a 
curative instruction from the court as to most of the comments, and that only two 
of the six prosecutorial comments were cited by Smith in his motion for a new 
trial. 
 
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In voir dire questioning of a jury panel, the prosecutor described the case as 
involving a “drug war” between the members of John Doe and another group and 
stated that shootings and homicides had occurred between the groups.  The court 
sustained the defense objection to these statements, agreeing with the defense that 
there was no mention of rival groups in the indictment.  Although the court 
acknowledged that evidence of drug wars and rival groups might come out in the 
trial, the court ruled that it was inappropriate for the State to discuss this with the 
jurors at this point.  The court denied the defense motion for a mistrial.  The court 
also denied the defense’s motion the following morning to strike the entire panel. 
 
Despite the court’s ruling that it was improper for the State to describe the 
circumstances of the case as involving drug wars, the indictment actually uses 
similar terms.  In two of the conspiracy counts, the indictment describes 
Dominique Johnson as a “rival drug dealer” who was shot and killed by Smith and 
states that Marlon Beneby was shot “over a dispute concerning the profits from 
drug sales.”  In describing the John Doe enterprise, the indictment states that the 
enterprise “used violence and threats of violence  . . . to retaliate against rival drug 
organizations.”  Thus, the prosecutor’s characterization of the facts of the case was 
not improper. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial clearly established that John 
Doe engaged in “drug wars” with rival groups.  As noted in the sentencing order, 
 
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several witnesses described the relationship between Fail and Smith as a war and 
Angel Wilson as an innocent victim of that war.  Several witnesses also described 
the group “going to war” with rival groups.  Thus, even if the prosecutor’s 
comments were improper, there was no prejudice to Smith based on the extensive 
evidence that confirmed the prosecutor’s description of the crimes.  
During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor described a series of 
“rules” purportedly established and enforced by Smith.11  The court sustained the 
defense’s objection to these comments.  However, the defense never asked for any 
other relief based on this comment, such as a curative instruction or a mistrial.  The 
trial court properly sustained the objection to the comment and Smith received all 
of the relief that he requested.  
During direct examination by the State, Detective Alphonso testified about 
the execution of a number of search warrants on the residences of John Doe 
members, including the November 1998 search of the home of Smith’s sister Todra 
and her husband William Austin, who was a tableman for John Doe.   In addition 
to drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, and ammunition, the search produced a 
clipping about Cynthia Brown’s murder from a July 1997 newspaper.  Detective 
Alphonso testified that it appeared that someone had saved the clipping.  The court 
                                          
 
 
11.  The prosecutor made the following statement:  “If you compete with me 
you will be killed.  If you steal from me you will be killed.  And above all, if you 
snitch on me you will be killed.” 
 
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did not allow the State to admit the clipping into evidence, ruling that its probative 
value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  The prosecutor characterized the 
clipping as a “souvenir in the kitchen.”  The court sustained the defense’s objection 
to this comment, but denied its motion for a mistrial.  However, at the defense’s 
request, the court instructed the jury to disregard the word souvenir.   This 
prosecutorial comment was not included as a basis for the defense’s motion for a 
new trial. 
The hypothetical question to the medical examiner was fully discussed 
above.  As noted in that analysis, the State did not repeatedly ask a question that 
the court had ruled improper.  The court had ruled on the form of the question; it 
did not rule that the question could not be asked.  Thus, there was no improper 
prosecutorial conduct relating to this question. 
Smith does not specify what “numerous” improper comments the prosecutor 
made during closing argument, citing only that the prosecutor improperly vouched 
for the lead investigator in the Brown murder.12  Thus, it is impossible to 
                                          
 
 
12.  At one point the prosecutor stated that if law enforcement wanted to 
frame Smith for Brown’s murder, they could have done a better job and built a 
more persuasive case.  Although the court sustained the defense objection to these 
comments, the comments were in direct response to the defense’s closing argument 
that the medical examiner and the toxicologist in Brown’s case had given in to 
pressure from law enforcement to conclude that Brown was murdered rather than 
to find her death was accidental.  Thus, the prosecutor did not improperly “vouch” 
for law enforcement, but was instead responding to the defense’s claims that Smith 
was framed by law enforcement.  
 
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determine if there is any merit to this part of Smith’s claim.  Furthermore, the 
courts of this state allow attorneys wide latitude to argue to the jury during closin
argument.  
g 
See Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 984 (Fla. 1999); Breedlove v. 
State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982).  Logical inferences may be drawn, and counsel
is allowed to advance all legitimate arguments.  
 
See Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 984; 
Breedlove, 413 So. 2d at 8.  
Finally, Smith cites to the guilt phase closing argument when the prosecutor 
argued that “nobody knows better, who killed Leon Hadley, than Mr. Smith.”  The 
trial court sustained the defense’s objection that this was an improper comment on 
Smith’s right to remain silent.  However, the jury was instructed that it could not 
consider Smith’s decision not to testify.13 Because the trial court recognized the 
error, sustained the defense’s objection, and gave a curative instruction, we review 
this claim by determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a 
mistrial.  See Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 547 (Fla. 1999).  A motion for 
mistrial “should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant 
                                          
 
 
13.  The court instructed the jury: 
 
The defendant exercised a fundamental right by choosing not to 
be a witness in his case.  You must not view this as an admission of 
guilt or be influenced in any way by his decision.  No juror should 
ever be concerned that the defendant did or did not take the witness 
stand to give testimony in this case. 
 
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receives a fair trial.”  Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997).  This isolated 
comment “was not so prejudicial as to require reversal.”  Id.   
 
Smith argues that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on the 
cumulative effect of improper prosecutorial comments during his trial.  However, 
as noted above, most of the comments that Smith complains about were not 
improper.  The improper comments were isolated and did not involve the type of 
egregious comments that would require a new trial.  Moreover, the court reduced 
any prejudice from these comments by sustaining the defense’s objections and 
instructing the jury to disregard the comments.  See Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 984.  
Finally, Smith only cited two of these comments as a basis for a new trial, the drug 
wars comment and the hypothetical question to the medical examiner.  There is no 
merit to the hypothetical question claim, and the drug wars comment alone did not 
warrant a new trial.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct because these remarks 
would not “have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict of guilt than it 
would have otherwise done.”  Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 984.  Thus, Smith was not 
entitled to a new trial on this basis. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Smith has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, but this Court has 
a mandatory obligation to review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in 
 
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which a sentence of death has been imposed.  See Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 
184 (Fla. 2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (“In death penalty cases, whether or 
not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an issue presented for 
review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, remand for the 
appropriate relief.”).  “In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question 
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”   Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006) 
(quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)). 
We conclude that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to 
support Smith's convictions for the first-degree murders of Brown and Wilson. The 
State presented evidence that Smith solicited the murder of Brown in order to 
eliminate her as witness against him in another murder case and that Smith 
admitted his involvement in numerous statements after Brown’s murder.  The State 
also presented evidence that Brown died from asphyxia caused by being smothered 
with the bed pillow and did not die from a drug overdose. 
The State also presented evidence that Smith ordered his subordinates to kill 
Anthony Fail because he was robbing Smith’s drug holes, that there was an earlier 
unsuccessful attempt to shoot Fail, and that Wilson was shot by accident in a 
second attempt to kill Fail.  Multiple bullets were fired at Wilson’s vehicle from 
 
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another vehicle that sped away from the scene.  Wilson died from numerous 
gunshot wounds that caused massive trauma to her body.   
Based on a review of the evidence presented in this case, a “rational trier of 
fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime[s] beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Simmons, 934 So. 2d at 1111 (quoting Bradley, 787 So. 2d at 
738).  Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Smith's convictions. 
Proportionality of Death Sentence 
Although not argued by Smith, the State asserts that the death sentence is 
proportional in this case.  This Court has explained that “a proportionality review 
is inherent in this Court’s direct appellate review and the issue is considered 
regardless of whether it is discussed in the opinion or raised by a party.”  Patton v. 
State, 878 So. 2d 368, 380 (Fla. 2004).  The Court has described its 
“proportionality review” as involving “a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality 
review to consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with 
other capital cases.  It is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.”  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990); 
accord Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991).  Instead, this Court must 
look to the nature of and the weight given to the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  For purposes of proportionality review, this Court accepts the 
 
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jury’s recommendation and the trial judge’s weighing of the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence.  See Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1999). 
 
Here, the jury recommended the death sentence for the murders of Angel 
Wilson and Cynthia Brown.  The trial court found three aggravating circumstances 
in the Brown murder:  prior violent felony convictions, that the murder was 
committed to disrupt the lawful exercise of a government function, and CCP, all of 
which were given great weight.  The trial court found three statutory mitigating 
factors (lack of significant history of prior criminal activity, extreme disturbance, 
and the age of the defendant at the time of the murder), which were given little 
weight.  The trial court also considered a number of nonstatutory mitigating 
factors, which were given little weight, except for Smith’s good family 
relationships, which were given some weight. 
In the Wilson murder, the trial court found three aggravating factors:  prior 
violent felony convictions, pecuniary gain, and CCP, all of which were given great 
weight.  The trial court found the same three statutory mitigators as in Brown’s 
murder and assigned them little weight.  The trial court also found the same 
nonstatutory mitigators as in Brown’s murder and gave them the same weight.  The 
trial court also considered the fact that Smith did not actually shoot Wilson and 
never intended for her to be killed, but gave this little weight in light of the 
overwhelming evidence that Smith ordered the execution of Fail and Wilson was 
 
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killed as a result of that plan.  In both cases, the trial court found that “the 
aggravating circumstances clearly and convincingly outweigh the mitigating 
factors” and imposed death sentences for both murders. 
 
The State cites three cases to support its argument that the death sentence is 
proportionate in this case.  However, the State notes that the facts of the instant 
case are so outrageous that is difficult to find a factually comparable case.  In 
Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1997), this Court affirmed a death sentence 
for a defendant who orchestrated and participated in the murder of a victim who 
was targeted for his antidrug efforts in the community.  In Koon v. State, 513 So. 
2d 1253 (Fla. 1987), and Lara v. State, 464 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1985), this Court 
affirmed death sentences in witness elimination murders.  Lara involved the same 
three aggravating circumstances as the instant case.  However, Lara involved no 
mitigating factors. 
 
In the instant case, not only was Smith convicted of murdering Brown and 
Wilson, for which he received death sentences, but also was convicted of 
murdering Hadley and Pope, for which he received life sentences.  Furthermore, 
Smith’s motivation for the violence and murders was to safeguard his lucrative 
drug enterprise.  The two women who were the victims for which Smith was 
sentenced to death were not involved in the drug business.  One was trying to “do 
the right thing” by testifying about the shooting of another man over a money 
 
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- 79 -
dispute.  The other was on her way home to avoid drug-related violence that had 
been threatened and was brutally murdered because her boyfriend was “at war” 
with Smith.  Under the facts of this case, we find the death sentences to be 
proportionate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, we find no merit to most of Smith’s claims 
of error.  In those instances where error did occur, we conclude that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s convictions 
of first-degree murder and his sentences of death. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and 
LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Scott M. Bernstein, Judge – Case No. F00040026A 
 
Teresa Mary Pooler, Miami, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee