Title: State v. Bokenyi
Citation: 2014 WI 61
Docket Number: 2012AP002557-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2014

2014 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2557-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
William F. Bokenyi, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 349 Wis. 2d 528, 835 N.W.2d 292 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Polk 
 
JUDGE: 
Molly E. GaleWyrick  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
PROSSER, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., 
dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Suzanne 
L. Hagopian, assistant state public defender, and oral argument 
by Suzanne L. Hagopian. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 61
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2557-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF200) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
William F. Bokenyi, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Bokenyi, 
No. 2012AP2557-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 18, 
2013), which reversed the judgment and order of the Polk County 
Circuit Court1 sentencing William F. Bokenyi ("Bokenyi") to 
prison and denying his motion for postconviction relief. 
¶2 
Bokenyi 
contends 
that, 
even 
though 
the 
State 
recommended a term of imprisonment which was consistent with the 
plea 
agreement, 
the 
State 
nonetheless 
materially 
and 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Molly E. GaleWyrick presided. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
2 
 
substantially breached that agreement by implying that the court 
should impose a longer sentence.  Bokenyi asserts that the 
prosecutor's 
comments 
during 
the 
sentencing 
hearing 
were 
inconsistent with the plea agreement. 
¶3 
Bokenyi also argues that he received ineffective 
assistance from his trial counsel, because counsel failed to 
object to the State's material and substantial breach of the 
plea agreement, and that his counsel also failed to consult with 
him as required under State v. Sprang, 2004 WI App 121, 274 
Wis. 2d 784, 683 N.W.2d 522. 
¶4 
The State argues that the prosecutor's comments during 
the sentencing hearing did not constitute a material and 
substantial breach of the plea agreement.  Alternatively, the 
State 
contends 
that 
Bokenyi's 
defense 
attorney 
was 
not 
ineffective for failing to object and asks this court to 
overrule Sprang. 
¶5 
We conclude that the prosecutor's comments during the 
sentencing hearing did not constitute a material and substantial 
breach of the plea agreement.  As a result, we need not address 
Bokenyi's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective, nor 
must we consider the State's request that Sprang be overruled.  
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On August 1, 2010, Bokenyi was involved in a domestic 
dispute with his wife, Sherri Bokenyi ("Sherri").  After Bokenyi 
returned home from a poker game, Sherri informed Bokenyi that 
she would be leaving the following day to spend a week caring 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
3 
 
for her elderly mother.  Upon hearing this news, Bokenyi became 
upset and threatened to kill both Sherri and the couple's ten-
year-old son. 
¶7 
In response to Bokenyi's threat, Sherri locked both 
herself and her son in a bedroom.  Bokenyi, having armed himself 
with two kitchen knives, followed Sherri to the bedroom door and 
stated, "open the door, you fucking bitch."  Sherri briefly 
opened the door, and upon seeing the knives barricaded herself 
in the room and called the police. 
¶8 
Officer Daniel Peters ("Officer Peters") responded to 
Sherri's call.  On approaching the door to the apartment, 
Officer Peters heard Bokenyi shouting.  Officer Peters knocked 
on the door and stated, "Police, open the door."  Bokenyi 
responded, "Fuck you, you're going to have to come in and kill 
me."  Despite his comment, Bokenyi did open the door, and 
Officer Peters observed him holding two knives.  Officer Peters 
stated, "Police[,] get on the floor and drop the knives."  
Bokenyi responded to Officer Peters' command by stating, "Fuck 
you" and slamming the door.  As Officer Peters called for back-
up, he heard Bokenyi shout, "Fuck you, I'm going to kill you 
woman." 
¶9 
Officer Peters was then joined at the scene by several 
other officers, including Deputy Nathan Ferris ("Deputy Ferris") 
and Sergeant Michael Stoffel ("Sergeant Stoffel").  The officers 
together kicked in the door and entered Bokenyi's apartment.  
Upon entering, the officers once again commanded Bokenyi to drop 
the knives he was holding.  When Bokenyi began walking toward 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
4 
 
the officers, Deputy Ferris deployed his Taser.  The Taser had 
no apparent effect on Bokenyi, and he continued to advance 
toward the officers.  Sergeant Stoffel then fired at Bokenyi 
with his service pistol, striking Bokenyi.  Bokenyi was 
subsequently transported to Regions Hospital in St. Paul, 
Minnesota. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶10 On August 5, 2010, the State filed a criminal 
complaint alleging ten counts against Bokenyi.  The complaint 
alleged 
one 
count 
of 
first-degree 
reckless 
endangerment, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1) (2009-10),2 a Class F felony; 
two counts of felony intimidation of a victim, contrary to 
§ 940.45(1), Class G felonies; one count of failing to comply 
with an officer's attempt to take a person into custody, 
contrary to § 946.415(2), a Class I felony; three counts of 
attempted battery of a peace officer, contrary to §§ 940.20(2) 
and 939.32, attempts to commit Class H felonies; one count of 
disorderly conduct as an act of domestic abuse, contrary to 
§§ 947.01 and 968.075(1)(a), a class B misdemeanor; one count of 
resisting an officer, contrary to § 946.41(1), a Class A 
misdemeanor; and one count of negligent handling of a weapon, 
contrary to § 941.20(1)(a), a Class A misdemeanor. 
¶11 On 
August 
31, 
2010, 
Bokenyi 
made 
his 
initial 
appearance, received a copy of the criminal complaint, and 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
5 
 
requested a timely preliminary hearing.  The court set bail at 
$25,000 cash. 
¶12 On September 9, 2010, the court held Bokenyi's 
preliminary hearing.  The court heard testimony from Sherri and 
Officer Peters regarding the incident.  At the conclusion of the 
testimony, the court found probable cause and bound Bokenyi over 
for trial.  The State filed an information which alleged the 
same ten counts against Bokenyi as charged in the criminal 
complaint.  Bokenyi was then immediately arraigned on the 
information, and pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect to all the charges.3 
¶13 On September 30, 2011, Bokenyi pled guilty to three of 
the ten charges against him, pursuant to a plea agreement.  As 
part of the plea agreement, Bokenyi pled guilty to one count of 
first-degree 
reckless 
endangerment, 
one 
count 
of 
felony 
intimidation of a victim, and one count of failing to comply 
with an officer's attempt to take a person into custody.  In 
exchange for Bokenyi's pleas, the State agreed to dismiss and 
read in the remaining counts for sentencing purposes and limit 
its sentencing recommendation to "the high end range of the 
PSI."  The court accepted Bokenyi's pleas, adjudged him guilty, 
and ordered a presentence investigation report ("PSI"). 
                                                 
3 Bokenyi was subsequently assessed by a mental health 
professional, who concluded both that he was competent to stand 
trial, and that he was able to "appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct and was able to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law at the time of the commission of the 
criminal offenses for which he is charged." 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
6 
 
¶14 On December 5, 2011, the PSI was filed with the 
circuit court.  On the reckless endangerment count, the PSI 
recommended three to four years of initial confinement, to be 
followed by three to four years of extended supervision.  On the 
failure to comply with a police officer and victim intimidation 
counts, the PSI recommended that the court withhold sentence and 
impose probation terms of three and five years, respectively.  
The PSI recommended that the probation terms be concurrent with 
one another, but consecutive to the sentence on the reckless 
endangerment count. 
¶15 On January 23, 2012, the court held a sentencing 
hearing.  Prior to offering argument on the sentence, the 
prosecutor read aloud a letter to the court from Sherri, the 
victim.  Sherri's letter stated, in part:  
Myself and our son . . . are afraid for the day 
[Bokenyi] will get let out because we are unsure of 
what he would be capable of doing.  I prefer that we 
could live fearlessly while our son . . .  [who is] 
only 11 is growing and in school. 
¶16 Following the reading of the letter, the State 
proceeded to make its sentencing argument.  The State structured 
its argument around the sentencing factors found in McCleary v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971), and State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  The State 
began by reiterating the seriousness of Bokenyi's convictions: 
The three convictions that he is being sentenced 
on today [are] a first[-]degree reckless endangerment, 
a 12 and a half year felony, and intimidation of a 
victim, a 10 year felony[,] and failure to comply with 
a law enforcement officer, a 3 and a half year felony.  
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
7 
 
I think the felony classifications obviously indicate 
the extreme seriousness of these offenses that night.  
But to be honest, I don't think they really do them 
justice in terms of how serious this was. 
¶17 The State noted that, given Bokenyi's history of 
"homicidal thoughts or ideations" toward his family, the fact 
that the three felonies were "very serious crimes" did not 
reflect the seriousness of what "might have happened that 
night . . . ." 
¶18 The State then addressed Bokenyi's character.  The 
State noted Bokenyi's similar behavior during a prior incident, 
wherein police were forced to shoot him when he refused to drop 
a loaded shotgun.  The State also discussed Bokenyi's seeming 
lack of remorse and the fact that he seemed "to have absolutely 
no clue as to the impact that this offense has had on his wife 
and child." 
¶19 The State further noted that there was a need to 
protect the public from Bokenyi, stating: 
[T]here's the need to protect the public or the 
public's interest in rehabilitation of the defendant 
and I think this overwhelmingly comes down to the 
protection of the public interest.  The protection of 
the public, being Sherry [sic] Bokenyi and their son. 
They have a right, as she says in her letter, to live 
fearlessly while their son is growing up and in 
school. She has a right to live not in fear that 
Mr. Bokenyi, when he gets out, is going to come 
looking for her and to finish what he's attempted at 
least one other time before. 
¶20 Finally, the State noted some troubling behavior that 
Bokenyi had exhibited since his arrest: 
What is again perhaps the most frightening for me 
is to read an incident report from the Polk County 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
8 
 
Jail 
on 
February 
11th 
of 
2011. 
 
A 
jailer . . . indicates that on the above date [she] 
was doing med pass in the maximum part of the jail.  
Inmate Bokenyi came out for the evening meds and [she] 
asked him how he was doing.  He stated okay, but he 
was still here and that he could not wait for the time 
that he was out of here so he could quote "shoot up 
some cops" end quote.  [The jailer] asked him why he 
would do that.  He said they all deserved it.  And 
making conversations with him [she] stated that 
wouldn't he rather just get out and enjoy being out 
then risk coming back in.  He stated that next time he 
would not be coming back, and he would also shoot 
anyone who got in his way while he was shooting at the 
cops.  There is an absolute necessity to protect the 
public from William Bokenyi. 
¶21 The State concluded its argument with a sentencing 
recommendation that was, in fact, at the "high end range" of the 
PSI.  Specifically, regarding the reckless endangerment count, 
the State recommended a term of imprisonment of eight years, 
consisting of four years of initial confinement to be followed 
by four years of extended supervision.  The State further 
recommended that the court withhold sentence on the remaining 
counts and impose probation.  The State recommended five years 
of probation on the victim intimidation count and three years on 
the failure to comply with an officer count.  The State 
recommended that both probation terms be served concurrently 
with one another but consecutive to the sentence for the 
reckless endangerment count.  All of the State's recommendations 
fell within the ranges recommended in the PSI. 
¶22 Counsel for Bokenyi began his sentencing argument by 
stating "[w]ell, your Honor, it's hard to disagree with a lot of 
what [the State] has said here.  [The State] laid out exactly I 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
9 
 
think the facts that really establish and confirm . . . that Mr. 
Bokenyi is someone who suffers from severe mental illness."  
Bokenyi's 
attorney 
then 
detailed 
Bokenyi's 
mental 
health 
treatment history.4  Bokenyi's counsel further argued that he had 
low risk factors for recidivism and was both educated and 
employable.  In light of these considerations, Bokenyi's counsel 
asked the court to impose a sentence of 18 months of initial 
confinement, 
followed 
by 
a 
lengthy 
period 
of 
extended 
supervision. 
 
Further, 
counsel 
recommended, 
at 
Bokenyi's 
request, that Bokenyi be placed in a mental health facility as a 
condition of his extended supervision in order to ensure that he 
would not be a danger to himself or others on his release. 
¶23 The court then sentenced Bokenyi to concurrent prison 
terms which were longer than that recommended by the State.  On 
the reckless endangerment count, the court imposed a term of 
imprisonment of twelve years and six months, with seven years 
and six months of initial confinement to be followed by five 
years of extended supervision.  On the intimidation of a victim 
count, the court imposed a sentence of ten years, with five 
years of initial confinement to be followed by five years of 
extended supervision.  On the failure to comply with an officer 
count, the court imposed a sentence of two years, with one year 
of initial confinement to be followed by one year of extended 
supervision. 
                                                 
4 Counsel did concede, however, that Bokenyi remained 
criminally responsible for his actions. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
10 
 
¶24 On September 10, 2012, Bokenyi filed a postconviction 
motion, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 809.30(2)(h). 
 
In 
his 
postconviction motion, Bokenyi argued that the State breached 
the plea agreement in three ways during its sentencing argument.  
First, Bokenyi contended that the State breached the plea 
agreement 
when 
the 
prosecutor 
commented 
that 
the 
felony 
classifications did not do justice to the seriousness of 
Bokenyi's crimes.  Second, Bokenyi argued that the State 
breached the plea agreement when the prosecutor repeated 
statements from the victim's letter to the court during his 
sentencing argument.  Third, Bokenyi argued that the State 
breached the plea agreement when the prosecutor recounted the 
jail incident report in a manner suggesting that the sentence 
recommended as part of the plea agreement was insufficient. 
¶25 Bokenyi conceded that he had forfeited his right to 
directly challenge the State's alleged breaches, but argued that 
his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object and 
for failing to confer with Bokenyi regarding the alleged 
breaches.  See Sprang, 274 Wis. 2d 784, ¶¶28-29.  Bokenyi 
requested that he be resentenced before a new judge and that the 
court order a Machner hearing on his ineffectiveness claim.  See 
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
¶26 On November 5, 2012, the court held a hearing on 
Bokenyi's postconviction motion.  Bokenyi's trial counsel 
testified at the hearing that the reason he had not objected to 
the prosecutor's comments was because he did not believe that 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
11 
 
the State had breached the plea agreement during its sentencing 
argument.  Counsel testified that his strategy at the sentencing 
hearing was to use the "bad facts" of the case, which counsel 
testified were "well-known to everybody," to try and argue in 
favor of mental health treatment and against a lengthy prison 
sentence.  Counsel further testified that he had read the 
hearing transcript and while "prosecutors say things every day 
in sentencing arguments that I don't agree with, . . . I didn't 
see it as being any kind of secret code to anyone that the court 
shouldn't follow the plea agreement."  
¶27 After counsel's testimony, the court heard argument on 
Bokenyi's postconviction motion.  Bokenyi argued that, although 
the State "technically" complied with the plea agreement and 
much of what the prosecutor discussed was "fair game," the three 
instances referenced in his brief were material and substantial 
breaches of the plea agreement and a new sentencing hearing was 
required. 
¶28 The State argued that none of the statements discussed 
by Bokenyi constituted a material and substantial breach of the 
plea agreement.  The State argued that the seriousness of a 
given offense is a factor to be considered on sentencing under 
McCleary and Gallion, and that the prosecutor's discussion of 
the felony classifications for the offenses did not relate to 
the maximum penalties that could be imposed.  See McCleary, 49 
Wis. 2d 263; Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535. The State further argued 
that the prosecutor's reference to the victim's letter was 
entirely appropriate and, contrary to Bokenyi's assertion, did 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
12 
 
not "covertly" communicate a higher sentencing recommendation.  
Finally, the State argued that the prosecutor had read the 
jailer's report verbatim and used Bokenyi's own words to 
illustrate 
his 
conduct, 
neither 
of 
which 
undermined 
the 
sentencing recommendation. 
¶29 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Bokenyi's 
request 
for 
postconviction relief.  The court first noted that, had counsel 
contemporaneously objected, it likely would have overruled the 
objection.  The court then concluded, relying on State v. 
Liukonen, 2004 WI App 157, 276 Wis. 2d 64, 686 N.W.2d 689, and 
State v. Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d 317, 479 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 
1991), that the prosecutor's comments at the sentencing hearing 
did not constitute a material and substantial breach of the plea 
agreement. 
¶30 With respect to the first alleged breach, the court 
agreed with the State and concluded that the prosecutor was "not 
talking about the 26 years not doing justice to the crimes. He's 
talking about . . . the A through I classification system not 
doing justice to how serious the conduct was in this particular 
case." 
¶31 With respect to the second alleged breach, the court 
conceded that the better practice would have been to have 
someone other than the prosecutor read the victim's letter 
aloud, but the court nonetheless concluded that the prosecutor 
was entitled to reference the victim's letter during his 
argument.  The court stated "Wisconsin has a tradition . . . of 
putting great emphasis on victim's rights" and that "there's 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
13 
 
penalties if we violate victim's rights."  The court concluded 
that restating the victim's wishes "without augmenting them in 
some fashion, without increasing them in some way" did not 
constitute a material and substantial breach of the plea 
agreement. 
¶32 Finally, with respect to the third alleged breach, the 
court concluded that the prosecutor was permitted to bring 
relevant negative information to the court's attention.  The 
court noted that the prosecutor brought relevant positive 
information 
to 
the 
court's 
attention 
as 
well, 
including 
Bokenyi's education, work history, and lack of drug or alcohol 
dependency. 
 
As 
a 
result, 
the 
court 
denied 
Bokenyi's 
postconviction motion. 
¶33 On November 15, 2012, Bokenyi appealed.  Before the 
court of appeals, Bokenyi again argued that the State had 
materially and substantially breached the plea agreement, and 
that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to 
object to the breach or consult with Bokenyi. 
¶34 The State raised substantially the same arguments 
before the court of appeals as it had before the circuit court. 
¶35 On June 18, 2013, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court and remanded the case for resentencing before a 
new judge.  Bokenyi, No. 2012AP2557-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶1.  The court of appeals concluded that the prosecutor's 
sentencing argument materially and substantially breached the 
plea agreement, and that Bokenyi's trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object.  Id. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
14 
 
¶36 On July 9, 2013, the State petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted on December 6, 2013. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶37 "The terms of [a] plea agreement and the historical 
facts of the State's conduct that allegedly constitute a breach 
of a plea agreement are questions of fact."  State v. Williams, 
2002 WI 1, ¶5, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 (citing State v. 
Wills, 193 Wis. 2d 273, 277, 533 N.W.2d 165 (1995)).  "An 
appellate court reviews the circuit court's findings of fact 
under the clearly erroneous standard of review." Id.; see also 
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). 
¶38 Whether the State's conduct "constitutes a material 
and substantial breach of a plea agreement is a question of law 
that we review de novo."  State v. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, ¶10, 274 
Wis. 2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945 (citing Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶5; Wills, 193 Wis. 2d at 277). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶39 "Plea agreements are 'an essential component of the 
administration of justice.'"  Deilke, 274 Wis. 2d 595, ¶11 
(quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)).  
"Once a plea agreement has been reached and a plea made, a 
defendant's 
due 
process 
rights 
require 
the 
bargain 
be 
fulfilled."  Id. (citing Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶37; State 
v. Matson, 2003 WI App 253, ¶16, 268 Wis. 2d 725, 674 
N.W.2d 51).  "It is well established, however, that the 
sentencing court is not in any way bound by or controlled by a 
plea agreement between the defendant and the state."  State v. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
15 
 
McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 128, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990) (citation 
omitted). 
¶40 Further, "[n]ot all conduct that deviates from the 
precise terms of a plea agreement constitutes a breach that 
warrants a remedy."  Deilke, 274 Wis. 2d 595, ¶13 (citing State 
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 290, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).  "In 
order for a court to vacate a plea agreement, the breach [of the 
plea agreement] must be material and substantial."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  "A material and substantial breach of a 
plea agreement is one that violates the terms of the agreement 
and defeats a benefit for the non-breaching party."  Id., ¶14 
(citations omitted). 
¶41 It is axiomatic that "[a] prosecutor who does not 
present the negotiated sentencing recommendation to the circuit 
court breaches the plea agreement."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶38 (citation omitted); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262.  
In the case at issue, however, it is undisputed that the 
prosecutor's ultimate sentencing recommendation of four years of 
initial 
confinement 
followed 
by 
four 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision and a five-year probation term was consistent with 
the plea agreement, because it was within the "high end range" 
of the sentence suggested in the PSI. 
¶42 Bokenyi 
nonetheless 
argues 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
materially and substantially breached the plea agreement by 
making 
comments 
that 
undermined 
his 
recommendation 
and 
implicitly encouraged the judge to impose a sentence that was 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
16 
 
longer than agreed upon, that is, longer than the "high end 
range" of the PSI. 
¶43 It is certainly true that "'[e]nd runs' around a plea 
agreement are prohibited."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶42 
(citing State v. Hanson, 2000 WI App 10, ¶24, 232 Wis. 2d 291, 
606 N.W.2d 278).  "The State may not accomplish by indirect 
means what it promised not to do directly, and it may not 
covertly convey to the trial court that a more severe sentence 
is warranted than that recommended."  Id. (quoting Hanson, 232 
Wis. 2d 291, ¶24; citing Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 322). 
¶44 It bears noting, however, that a prosecutor may not 
"agree to keep relevant information from the sentencing judge."  
Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶43 (citing State v. Neuser, 191 
Wis. 2d 131, 
139, 
528 
N.W.2d 49 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995)). 
 
"At 
sentencing, pertinent factors relating to the defendant's 
character and behavioral pattern cannot be immunized by a plea 
agreement between the defendant and the State."  Id. (citing 
Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980)). 
¶45 Thus, while a prosecutor at a sentencing hearing must 
walk "a fine line," id., ¶44 (citing Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d 291, 
¶27), "[a] prosecutor may convey information to the sentencing 
court that is both favorable and unfavorable to an accused, so 
long as the State abides by the plea agreement."  Id. 
¶46 Bokenyi contends that at the sentencing hearing the 
State 
stepped 
over 
that 
"fine 
line" 
and 
materially 
and 
substantially breached the plea agreement in three respects.  
First, Bokenyi argues that the prosecutor's comment that the 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
17 
 
felony classifications did not do justice to the seriousness of 
Bokenyi's offenses was a breach of the plea agreement.  Second, 
Bokenyi contends that the prosecutor's discussion of the 
victim's letter was a breach of the plea agreement.  Finally, 
Bokenyi asserts that the prosecutor's comments regarding the 
jail incident report constituted a breach of the plea agreement. 
¶47 In 
the 
following 
analysis 
we 
address 
Bokenyi's 
arguments.  We reject each of these arguments and conclude that 
the prosecutor did not materially and substantially breach the 
plea agreement. 
A. Felony Classifications 
¶48 Bokenyi argues that the prosecutor materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement when, after reciting 
the maximum penalties applicable to Bokenyi's convictions, he 
stated, "I think the felony classifications obviously indicate 
the extreme seriousness of these offenses that night.  But to be 
honest, I don't think they really do them justice in terms of 
how serious this was." 
¶49 As an initial matter, we note that a discussion of the 
seriousness of the defendant's conduct, even in "harsh terms," 
is entirely appropriate.  Liukonen, 276 Wis. 2d 64, ¶10 (citing 
Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 319-20, 325).  In fact, we have stated 
that probation is presumed to be the appropriate disposition of 
a given case unless the circuit court makes findings indicating 
that "confinement is necessary to protect the public, the 
offender 
needs 
correctional 
treatment 
available 
only 
in 
confinement, 
or 
[probation] 
would 
unduly 
depreciate 
the 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
18 
 
seriousness of the offense."  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44 
(citing Bastian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 240, 248-49 n.1, 194 
N.W.2d 687 (1972)).  Thus, because the State needed to overcome 
the presumption of probation in arguing for a sentence at the 
"high end range" of the PSI, the State was compelled to address 
why a prison term was warranted. 
¶50 The prosecutor in the case at issue explicitly tied 
his sentencing argument to the sentencing factors discussed in 
Gallion.  He also explicitly stated that his discussion of the 
maximum penalties and felony classifications went to the 
"seriousness" or "gravity" of Bokenyi's offenses. 
¶51 In attempting to overcome the presumption in favor of 
probation, the maximum penalties associated with a particular 
crime are clearly relevant information.  The State is therefore 
free to discuss them, so long as that discussion does not 
undermine the plea agreement.  See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324 
(citation omitted) (noting that "[a] plea agreement which does 
not allow the sentencing court to be apprised of relevant 
information is void as against public policy"). 
¶52 Bokenyi concedes that the prosecutor was free to 
recite the maximum penalties and further concedes that he was 
permitted to discuss the seriousness of Bokenyi's offenses.  In 
coupling his recitation of the maximum penalties with his 
comment regarding the classifications, however, Bokenyi contends 
that the prosecutor covertly suggested that the agreed upon 
sentence was insufficient given Bokenyi's conduct.  In making 
this 
argument, 
Bokenyi 
asserts 
that 
Wisconsin's 
felony 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
19 
 
classification system exists only to specify the maximum 
penalties for a given offense, and so a reference to the 
classification of a crime is essentially the same as a reference 
to the maximum penalty applicable to that crime.  We disagree. 
¶53 Bokenyi is correct that the classification system 
exists to ensure the imposition of more serious penalties for 
more serious crimes.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.50(2).  The structure 
of the classification system, however, reflects the gravity of 
the crimes.  As the Legislative Council notes following § 939.50 
state: "[T]he Act classifies the criminal offenses based on the 
degree 
of 
actual 
or 
potential 
harm 
involved 
in 
their 
commission."  Legislative Council Note, 1977, Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.50.  The fact that more serious crimes generally warrant 
more serious penalties is without question.  It is also 
generally understood that within that structure there is room 
for a court to exercise its discretion.  See Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶17.  In fact, it is incumbent upon a court to 
create a record "detailing the reasons for selecting the 
particular sentence imposed" and stating why it is appropriate.  
Id., ¶24.  Finally, the State did not recommend a sentence 
anywhere close to the maximum allowable penalties. 
¶54 In light of these considerations, we conclude that the 
prosecutor's comment regarding the felony classification system 
referred to the seriousness of Bokenyi's conduct in this 
particular case as it related to the crimes charged and 
overcoming the presumption of probation.  Thus, the prosecutor 
did not imply that the court should disregard the State's 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
20 
 
sentencing recommendation and instead impose a sentence at or 
near the maximum allowable for Bokenyi's offense. 
¶55 In sum, the prosecutor discussed the seriousness of 
Bokenyi's offenses as a proper factor for the court to consider 
at sentencing.  See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44.  The felony 
classification discussion was one way to communicate the State's 
position regarding the seriousness of the offenses.  This 
prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement, either explicitly 
or implicitly, by emphasizing the seriousness of the crimes 
committed by the defendant.  See Liukonen, 276 Wis. 2d 64, ¶10.  
The plea agreement called for the prosecutor to recommend a 
sentence consistent with the "high end range" of the PSI.  The 
high end called for a significant prison sentence.  Thus, under 
the plea agreement, the prosecutor was obliged to argue that 
this was a serious offense that warranted prison time. 
¶56 Our conclusion is in accord with the circuit court's 
finding at the postconviction hearing that "[the prosecutor is] 
not talking about the 26 years not doing justice to the crimes. 
He's talking about . . . the A through I classification system 
not doing justice to how serious the conduct was in this 
particular case."5  We agree with the circuit court.6 
                                                 
5 Judge GaleWyrick presided over both the sentencing and 
postconviction hearings, and so was personally present for the 
prosecutor's sentencing argument. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
21 
 
¶57 Thus, the prosecutor's emphasis on the seriousness of 
Bokenyi's crimes, considered in the full context of his 
sentencing 
argument, 
did 
not 
constitute 
a 
material 
and 
substantial breach of the plea agreement. 
B. Victim's Letter 
¶58 Bokenyi next argues that the prosecutor materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement when he referenced the 
victim's letter in his sentencing argument.  Bokenyi concedes 
that the initial reading of the victim's letter was not a 
breach, but instead argues that the prosecutor's subsequent 
reference to the letter during his argument was a material and 
substantial breach of the plea agreement.  Bokenyi's argument, 
however, fails to acknowledge how very important victims' rights 
are within our criminal justice system.  A crime victim has the 
right to express his or her views at sentencing and that need 
not be kept in a vacuum.  Wis. Stat. § 972.14(3)(a).  Commentary 
on and consideration of the victim's recommendations by counsel 
and the court may be warranted.  The victim holds a special 
place within the public, and the need to protect the public is 
certainly a factor for the circuit court's consideration. See 
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44. 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 In reviewing a circuit court's decision on ineffective 
assistance of counsel "this court will not exclude the circuit 
court's articulated assessments of credibility and demeanor, 
unless they are clearly erroneous."  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 
40, ¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citing State v. Thiel, 
2003 WI 111, ¶23, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305). 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
22 
 
¶59 The Wisconsin Constitution declares that "[t]his state 
shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, 
dignity and respect for their privacy."  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 9m.  Among the crime victim rights secured by the Wisconsin 
Constitution is "the opportunity to make a statement to the 
court at disposition" of a criminal case.  Id. 
¶60 The legislature has similarly declared an intent "to 
ensure that all victims . . . of crime are treated with dignity, 
respect, courtesy and sensitivity," and that their rights "are 
honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors 
and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protections 
afforded criminal defendants."  Wis. Stat. § 950.01. 
¶61 In accordance with this stated intent, crime victims 
are entitled by statute to "confer with the district attorney 
concerning the prosecution of the case and the possible outcomes 
of the prosecution, including potential plea agreements and 
sentencing recommendations."  Wis. Stat. § 971.095(2).  Further, 
"[a]fter a conviction, if the district attorney knows of a 
victim of a crime to be considered at sentencing, the district 
attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to contact that person 
to inform him or her of the right to make or provide a 
statement" to the court.  Wis. Stat. § 972.14(3)(b).  In fact, 
if a prosecutor fails to comply with the Crime Victim Rights 
Act, he or she can be fined.  Wis. Stat. § 950.11. 
¶62 Before pronouncing sentence, the circuit court is also 
required by statute to "inquire of the district attorney whether 
he or she has complied" with the requirements of the crime 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
23 
 
victim rights laws.  Wis. Stat. § 972.14(2m).  The court is 
further required to "determine whether a victim of a crime 
considered at sentencing wants to make a statement to the 
court."  Wis. Stat. § 972.14(3)(a).  "If a victim wants to make 
a statement, the court shall allow the victim to make a 
statement in court or to submit a written statement to be read 
in court."  Id.  The statute does not specify any particular 
party to read the statement.  In fact, the sole limitation on 
the victim's statement is that it be "relevant to the sentence."  
Id.  Again, if a judge does not ensure compliance with the 
victims' rights statutes, the judge can be fined.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.11. 
¶63 Thus, victims' rights play an important role within 
our criminal justice system.  In the case at issue, not only was 
it proper for the victim's letter to be read, the law required 
that it be read.  Wis. Stat. § 972.14(3)(a); State v. Harvey, 
2006 WI App 26, ¶42, 289 Wis. 2d 222, 710 N.W.2d 482.  The court 
was required to consider "'the gravity and nature of the 
offense, including the effect on the victim'" in crafting an 
appropriate sentence.  State v. Naydihor, 2004 WI 43, ¶78, 270 
Wis. 2d 585, 678 N.W.2d 220 (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original).  The law does not preclude acknowledgment or 
commentary regarding the victim's wishes, and it does not 
prohibit the prosecutor from reading the victim's letter to the 
court. 
¶64 Because victim rights compliance is essential to the 
sentencing hearing and the factors that a court must weigh in 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
24 
 
exercising its discretion, consideration of and commentary 
regarding the victim's wishes may be relevant and appropriate at 
the sentencing.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.14(3)(a); Williams, 249 
Wis. 2d 492, 
¶¶42-43 
(citations 
omitted) 
(stating 
that 
a 
prosecutor may not "agree to keep relevant information from the 
sentencing judge").  A prosecutor's reference to a victim's 
letter will not automatically operate as a breach of the plea 
agreement.  In fact, a victim's wishes may often come to bear in 
considering the need to protect the public. 
¶65 Bokenyi argues, however, that the prosecutor went 
beyond reciting the victim's wishes and instead adopted them as 
his own.  Bokenyi asserts that the victim's request that she and 
her son be allowed to "live fearlessly" while her 11-year-old 
son "is growing and in school" was, in effect, a request for a 
seven-year initial confinement period.  Although the victim 
never requested any specific sentence, Bokenyi reasons that "in 
school" meant until the son turned 18 years old.  Bokenyi argues 
that when he repeated the victim's request during his sentencing 
argument, the prosecutor implied that the judge should sentence 
Bokenyi to an initial confinement period longer than the four 
years recommended in the PSI.  We reject this argument. 
¶66 As discussed, the plea agreement called for the State 
to make a recommendation "at the high end range of the PSI."  
The PSI recommended a sentence of three to four years of initial 
confinement, followed by three to four years of extended 
supervision and a three- to five-year probation term.  The State 
in 
fact 
recommended 
a 
sentence 
of 
four 
years 
initial 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
25 
 
confinement, followed by four years of extended supervision and 
probation on the other counts.  Thus, the State's recommendation 
was consistent with the "high end range" of the PSI and was 
therefore consistent with the plea agreement.7 
¶67 As the circuit court noted during the postconviction 
hearing, the prosecutor was entitled to reference the victim's 
letter to the court.  The court further concluded that restating 
the victim's wishes "without augmenting them in some fashion, 
without increasing them in some way" did not constitute a 
material and substantial breach of the plea agreement.  We 
agree. 
¶68 The prosecutor's statement does not translate into a 
request for a longer sentence.  The prosecutor used the letter 
as a way to illustrate "the need to protect the public" from 
Bokenyi, a proper factor for consideration at sentencing.  See 
Gallion, 
270 
Wis. 2d 535, 
¶44. 
 
Further, 
the 
prosecutor 
recommended a term of imprisonment of eight years, that being 
four years of initial confinement to be followed by four years 
of extended supervision.  The recommendation was consistent with 
the "high end range" of the PSI, consistent with the terms of 
                                                 
7 Notably, the State's recommended sentence was also longer 
than would have been required to keep Bokenyi under supervision 
through his son's 18th birthday.  While we recognize that the 
sentence would not necessarily have kept Bokenyi incarcerated 
for the duration of that period, extended supervision serves as 
a real and substantial deterrent, given that any misconduct by 
Bokenyi during his extended supervision period could result in 
his return to prison.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(8). 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
26 
 
the plea agreement, and seemingly consistent with the victim's 
wishes. 
¶69 It was incumbent on both the court and the prosecutor 
to ensure compliance with the victims' rights statutes.  The 
victim did not make a specific sentencing recommendation, other 
than to reasonably request that she and her son be allowed to 
feel safe while her son was in school.  As a result, the 
victim's wishes were not necessarily at odds with the State's 
sentencing recommendation.  In fact, the State's recommendation 
of imprisonment for eight years could actually result in Bokenyi 
being in prison or under supervision for significantly longer 
than eight years.8 
¶70 Thus, considering the totality of the prosecutor's 
argument, we do not conclude that the State materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement when it referenced the 
victim's letter.9 
C. Post-Custody Behavior 
                                                 
8 Defendants are advised at the time of sentencing that the 
amount of time he or she must actually serve in prison may be 
extended as provided in Wis. Stat. § 302.113(3), and that 
because of such extensions the person "could serve the entire 
bifurcated sentence in prison."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(8)(a)4.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 302.113(3) provides that, if an inmate 
"violates any regulation of the prison or refuses or neglects to 
perform 
required 
or 
assigned 
duties," 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections may extend the inmate's term of confinement. 
9 Further, even if we accepted Bokenyi's reading of the 
prosecutor's reference to the letter, a defendant is entitled to 
resentencing only if a breach is not "merely a technical 
breach."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶38. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
27 
 
¶71 Bokenyi also argues that the prosecutor materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement when he referred to a 
jail incident report as "most frightening."  Bokenyi claims that 
the prosecutor's editorial comment undercut the negotiated 
recommendation.  Bokenyi's argument fails because the incident 
report is relevant information for a court to consider when 
addressing the need to protect the public.  The comment was not 
an effort to urge the court to impose a sentence on the 
defendant beyond that being recommended by the State. 
¶72 "At sentencing, pertinent factors relating to the 
defendant's character and behavioral pattern cannot be immunized 
by a plea agreement between the defendant and the State."  
Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶43 (citing Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 
285).  "[P]lea agreements where the prosecution agrees not to 
reveal information that is relevant to sentencing are against 
public policy and will be rejected by the courts."  Id., ¶63 
(citing Grant v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 243 N.W.2d 186 
(1976)). 
¶73 Further, 
"nothing 
prevents 
a 
prosecutor 
from 
characterizing a defendant's conduct in harsh terms, even when 
such characterizations, 
viewed in isolation, might appear 
inconsistent with the agreed-on sentencing recommendation."  
Liukonen, 276 Wis. 2d 64, ¶10 (emphasis in original).  The 
prosecutor must simply refrain from making "comments that 
suggest the prosecutor now believes the disposition he or she is 
recommending pursuant to the agreement is insufficient."  Id., 
¶11. 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
28 
 
¶74 For example, in Ferguson the defendant pled guilty to 
having sexual contact with a minor, pursuant to a plea 
agreement.  166 Wis. 2d at 319.  The plea agreement provided 
that the State would recommend imposed and stayed sentences on 
the two charges, 20 years probation, and two consecutive six-
month county jail terms as a condition of probation.  Id.  At 
the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor described the offenses as 
"the most perverted of all perverted sex acts" and stated, "this 
is the sickest case that I have seen or read about.  If I refer 
to this defendant as 'sleaze,' I think that would be giving him 
a compliment."  Id. at 319-20.  Because the prosecutor also made 
the agreed upon sentencing recommendation, however, the court of 
appeals concluded that the prosecutor's remarks did not amount 
to a breach of the plea agreement in spite of the greater than 
normal "vitriol" displayed by the prosecutor.  Id. at 325. 
¶75 Similarly, in Naydihor, the defendant pled guilty to 
injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, pursuant to a plea 
agreement.  270 Wis. 2d 585, ¶3.  The plea agreement provided 
that the State would recommend probation but "retain[] a free 
hand on the conditions of that probation."  Id.  At the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the 
defendant as a "danger" and a "threat to the community."  Id., 
¶13.  The prosecutor also discussed the devastating impact that 
the crime had had on the victim, who had been confined to a 
wheelchair by the incident.  Id.  This court concluded that 
because "[t]he information the prosecutor discussed constituted 
no 
more 
than 
pertinent 
behavioral 
characteristics 
and 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
29 
 
aggravating factors relevant to sentencing," the prosecutor's 
comments were not a material and substantial breach of the plea 
agreement.  Id., ¶27. 
¶76 By contrast, in Liukonen, the court of appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
prosecutor's 
sentencing 
argument 
did 
constitute 
a 
material 
and 
substantial 
breach 
of 
a 
plea 
agreement.  In Liukonen, the defendant was charged with four 
robberies using a handgun.  276 Wis. 2d 64, ¶2.  The defendant 
pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement.  Id., ¶3.  In 
exchange for the defendant's pleas, the prosecutor agreed to 
limit his sentence recommendation to a total of 17 years of 
incarceration.  Id.  At the sentencing hearing, however, the 
prosecutor stated that he had reflected on the facts of the case 
and had concluded that his sentence recommendation gave the 
defendant "'a tremendous break from the system.'"  Id., ¶15.  
Despite the fact that the prosecutor also made the agreed upon 
recommendation, the court of appeals determined that such a 
comment "'implicitly suggests that [the prosecutor] has changed 
[his] mind about [his] recommendation.'"  Id. (quoting Williams, 
249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶71 (Wilcox, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part)).  The court of appeals determined that such a comment 
was a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement.  
Id., ¶17. 
¶77 In the case at issue, the prosecutor in no way 
undermined or distanced himself from a recommendation at the 
"high end range" of the PSI.  The prosecutor's quotation of the 
jail 
incident 
report 
supplied 
the 
court 
with 
relevant 
No. 
2012AP2557-CR   
 
30 
 
information which the prosecutor explicitly tied to a proper 
sentencing factor: the "need to protect the public from William 
Bokenyi." 
The 
prosecutor's 
comment 
that 
the 
report 
was 
"frightening" was, at most, an editorial comment akin to those 
made in Ferguson and Naydihor.  Further, immediately after 
discussing the jail incident report, the prosecutor explicitly 
endorsed a sentence that comported with the plea agreement.  The 
prosecutor in the case at issue in no way expressed second 
thoughts about the agreement with the defendant, nor did he 
express any indication that he thought the defendant was getting 
an undeserved "break" from the system, as in Liukonen.  If 
anything, counsel should feel the compunction to advise the 
court of relevant information regarding the defendant's conduct. 
¶78 Thus, 
in 
the 
case 
at 
issue, 
the 
prosecutor's 
discussion of the jail incident report did not materially and 
substantially breach the plea agreement. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶79 We conclude that the prosecutor's comments during the 
sentencing hearing did not constitute a material and substantial 
breach of the plea agreement.  As a result, we need not address 
Bokenyi's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective, nor 
must we consider the State's request that Sprang be overruled.  
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶80 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Prosser's dissent.  I write to point out that this 
review should be dismissed as improvidently granted,1 and that if 
review is granted, the prosecutor materially and substantially 
breached the plea agreement.   
¶81 The majority opinion does not decide the issue that 
was the subject of the State's petition for review, and the 
State conceded in its petition for review that "although it 
disagree[d] with the court of appeals' resolution" of "whether 
the 
prosecutor's 
sentencing 
argument 
breached 
the 
plea 
agreement," the issue of whether the prosecutor materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement "standing alone, 
likely would not warrant supreme court review."2 
I 
¶82 The State sought review, asking this court to decide 
whether State v. Sprang, 2004 WI App 121, ¶2, 274 Wis. 2d 784, 
683 
N.W.2d 522, 
a 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision, 
should 
be 
overturned.   
                                                 
1 "In the end, this review is more about error correction 
than law development and more about the significance of 
undisputed facts than about a need to clarify the law."  State 
v. Gajewski, 2009 WI 22, ¶11, 316 Wis. 2d 1, 762 N.W.2d 104 (per 
curiam). 
See also Nedvidek v. Kuipers, 2009 WI 44, ¶4, 317 
Wis. 2d 340, 766 N.W.2d 205 (dismissing petition for review as 
improvidently granted "because the issues for which we took the 
case do not present any novel questions or lead to the 
development of the law"). 
2 State's Petition for Review and Appendix at 4.   
No.  2012AP2557-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶83 Sprang concluded that it is "tantamount to entering a 
renegotiated plea agreement without [the defendant's] knowledge 
or consent" if defense counsel fails to consult with the 
defendant 
about 
counsel's 
decision 
not 
to 
object 
to 
a 
prosecutor's sentencing remarks that breach a plea agreement.3 
¶84 The majority opinion does not address the Sprang 
issue.  Rather, the only issue the majority opinion addresses is 
the application of the test set forth in State v. Williams, 2002 
WI 1, ¶¶38, 43-44, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733, to determine 
whether the prosecutor's remarks at sentencing materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement.  
¶85 The parties, the majority opinion, the court of 
appeals, the circuit court, Justice Prosser's dissent, and I 
agree that the test set forth in Williams is the correct test to 
apply in the present case.  According to the Williams test, 
prosecutors must balance two duties:  (1) the duty to present 
all relevant information to the sentencing court; and (2) the 
duty to honor the plea agreement.  "A prosecutor may convey 
information to the sentencing court that is both favorable and 
unfavorable to an accused, so long as the State abides by the 
plea agreement."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶44.  
¶86 I agree with the State's assessment that the petition 
for review in the present case should not have been granted to 
decide the sole issue of the propriety of the prosecutor's 
                                                 
3 State v. Sprang, 2004 WI App 121, ¶29, 274 Wis. 2d 784, 
683 N.W.2d 522. 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
remarks. 
 
I 
would 
therefore 
dismiss 
the 
petition 
as 
improvidently granted. 
II 
¶87 Because the court is unwilling to dismiss the matter, 
I write to agree with the decision of the court of appeals that 
the prosecutor's sentencing remarks materially and substantially 
breached the plea agreement.4  A prosecutor's "impl[ying] that 
[the defendant] should receive a harsher sentence" is a material 
and substantial breach of the plea agreement.5 
¶88 I have examined all three of the prosecutor's comments 
at issue in the instant case and conclude, as did the court of 
appeals and Justice Prosser's dissent, that the prosecutor 
implied to the sentencing court that the defendant deserved a 
harsher sentence than that recommended in the plea agreement, 
thus materially and substantially breaching the plea agreement.  
Accordingly, I dissent.  
¶89 The implications of the prosecutor's comments at 
sentencing are at issue here.  The three comments made by the 
prosecutor at sentencing are as follows. 
¶90 After the prosecutor recited the maximum penalties in 
the sentencing agreement, the prosecutor stated: 
                                                 
4 State v. Bokenyi, No. 2012AP2557, unpublished slip op., 
¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. June 18, 2013). 
5 State v. Liukonen, 2004 WI App 157, ¶17, 276 Wis. 2d 64, 
686 N.W.2d 689.  
The Williams test prevents commentary from "implicitly 
conveying the message that [the prosecutor] was questioning the 
wisdom of the plea agreement."  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, 
¶39, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733. 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
I think the felony classifications obviously indicate 
the extreme seriousness of these offenses that night. 
But to be honest, I don't think they really do them 
justice in terms of how serious this was. 
¶91 The prosecutor read the victim's letter at sentencing 
and commented on the letter as follows: 
[T]here's the need to protect the public or the 
public's interest in rehabilitation of the defendant 
and I think this overwhelmingly comes down the 
protection of the public interest.  The protection of 
the public, being Sherry [sic] Bokenyi and their son.  
They have a right, as she says in her letter, to live 
fearlessly while their son is growing up and in 
school.  She has a right to live not in fear that Mr. 
Bokenyi, when he gets out, is going to come looking 
for her and to finish what he's attempted at least one 
other time before. 
¶92 The prosecutor editorialized on the "jail incident 
report" as follows:   
What is again perhaps the most frightening for me is 
to read an incident report from the Polk County 
Jail . . . . [The defendant threatened] to "shoot up 
some 
cops" . . . and . . . anyone 
who 
got 
in 
his 
way . . . . There is an absolute necessity to protect 
the public from William Bokenyi. 
¶93 The defendant argues that these comments insinuate 
that 
the 
plea 
agreement's 
recommended 
sentence 
would 
be 
insufficient. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
responds 
that 
the 
defendant's argument fails because the prosecutor has imparted 
relevant information for a court to consider.  Majority op., 
¶¶44, 51, 71.  The majority opinion emphasizes relevance, not 
the prosecutor's duty to honor the plea agreement by effectively 
communicating that the prosecutor believed the plea agreement's 
recommended sentence was appropriate.6     
                                                 
6 See Liukonen, 276 Wis. 2d 64, ¶16. 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶94 I appreciate that often there may be a "fine line" 
between conveying relevant information and breaching the plea 
agreement.7  Nevertheless I conclude that in the instant case 
each comment separately and the three comments together implied 
that the prosecutor believed the defendant deserved a sentence 
harsher than the plea agreement's recommended sentence.  Thus, 
the prosecutor materially and substantially breached the plea 
agreement. 
¶95 I would add to the court of appeals decision and 
Justice Prosser's dissent the admonition that because "[t]he 
reality is that plea bargains have become . . . central to the 
administration of the criminal justice system . . . and ours 'is 
for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,'"8 
prosecutors, defense counsel, and circuit courts must carefully 
and wholly fulfill their respective responsibilities in the plea 
agreement process. 
¶96 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and would remand 
the cause for a new sentencing hearing. 
¶97 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
7 See Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶44. 
8 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting 
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)). 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶98 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The issue in 
this case is whether the prosecutor materially and substantially 
breached the plea agreement when he made statements that implied 
that the sentencing recommendation was too lenient.  The 
majority concludes that the prosecutor did not undercut the plea 
agreement when he stated that the felony classifications of the 
crimes charged did not do the offenses justice, when he endorsed 
the victim's statement that arguably called for a longer term of 
confinement than the prosecutor agreed to recommend, and when he 
characterized Bokenyi's threats to shoot police officers as "the 
most frightening for me."  Because I conclude that the 
prosecutor materially and substantially breached the plea 
agreement, and Bokenyi's counsel provided ineffective assistance 
in failing to object to the breach, I respectfully dissent. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶99 William 
Bokenyi 
(Bokenyi) 
was 
charged 
with 
ten 
offenses stemming from an incident in which he threatened to 
kill his wife and son while he was wielding two knives.  Seven 
of the ten offenses were felonies.  Fourteen months later, 
Bokenyi pled guilty to first-degree recklessly endangering 
safety, a Class F felony (Count 1),1 intimidating a victim, a 
Class G felony (Count 3),2 and failing to comply with an 
officer's attempt to take a person into custody, a Class I 
felony (Count 4).3  All other offenses were dismissed but read in 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1). 
2 Wis. Stat. § 940.45(1). 
3 Wis. Stat. § 946.415(2). 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
for purposes of sentencing.  Bokenyi also had a prior conviction 
for first-degree recklessly endangering safety as well as a non-
violent federal felony.  
¶100 Bokenyi's pleas were part of a plea bargain in which 
the State agreed that its sentencing recommendation "would be 
capped . . . at the high end range of the PSI [Pre-Sentence 
Investigation]." 
¶101 Bokenyi committed his offenses on August 1, 2010.  He 
entered his plea on September 30, 2011.  Because Bokenyi was in 
custody from the date of his offenses, he was entitled to 
receive 14 months of credit on any sentence of confinement he 
received as of the date of his plea.  Every day from the date of 
his plea through the date of his sentence added another day of 
sentence credit. 
¶102 The parties and the court agreed upon a PSI.  It 
arrived on December 5, 2011.  Sentencing was then set for 
January 23, 2012.  Consequently, Bokenyi was entitled to 540 
days of credit against his sentence on the day he was sentenced. 
¶103 It 
is 
impossible 
to 
know 
what 
the 
prosecutor 
anticipated in terms of a PSI sentencing recommendation.  The 
maximum period of "imprisonment" for the three felonies that 
Bokenyi pled to was 26 years.  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(f)-(g), 
(i).  This translates into a maximum period of confinement of 14 
years.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6m.-7., 9. 
¶104 The PSI recommended three to four years of initial 
confinement, plus many years of extended supervision.  Four 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
years of confinement was less than one-third of the maximum 
confinement that the court could impose. 
¶105 Under the plea bargain, the prosecutor was bound to 
recommend no more than four years of initial confinement.  But 
if the court imposed four years of initial confinement (365 x 4 
= 1460 days), the defendant would be released from confinement 
in 920 days (1460 - 540 = 920), a little more than two and a 
half years after he was sentenced. 
¶106 There is no dispute that the prosecutor's explicit 
recommendation complied with the plea agreement; that is, he did 
not ask for more than four years of initial confinement. 
¶107 The question is whether he breached the plea agreement 
by implying in his sentencing remarks that this four-year 
recommendation was too lenient——that the defendant should 
receive a longer sentence. 
CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
¶108 The seminal case on a prosecutor's obligation to keep 
his part of a plea bargain is Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257 (1971).  "[P]lea bargaining," the Court said, "is an 
essential component of the administration of justice."  Id. at 
260.  "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said 
to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must 
be fulfilled."  Id. at 262. 
¶109 Santobello was not a unanimous opinion because the 
justices 
disagreed 
about 
the 
defendant's 
remedy 
for 
a 
prosecutor's breach.  But all justices agreed that the breach of 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
a plea agreement requires a remedy.  Justice Douglas observed 
that lower courts "have uniformly held that a prisoner is 
entitled to some form of relief when he shows that the 
prosecutor 
reneged 
on 
his 
sentencing 
agreement 
made 
in 
connection with a plea bargain."  Id. at 266 (Douglas, J., 
concurring).  Justice Marshall concluded that a defendant "must 
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea," id. at 267 (Marshall, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), when the prosecutor 
breaches the plea agreement. 
¶110 This court has summed up the law: A defendant "has a 
constitutional right to the enforcement of a negotiated plea 
agreement."  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶37, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 
637 N.W.2d 733 (footnote omitted).  Inasmuch as this basic 
principle is beyond dispute, the question becomes whether a 
prosecutor's comments constitute a breach.   
¶111 At sentencing, "[t]he State must balance its duty to 
convey relevant information to the sentencing court against its 
duty to honor the plea agreement."  Id., ¶44.  A prosecutor may 
not undercut an express sentencing recommendation by insinuating 
that it is too lenient.  See id., ¶42; State v. Ferguson, 166 
Wis. 2d 317, 322, 479 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991) (citation 
omitted) (stating that a prosecutor may not "convey a message to 
the trial court that a defendant's actions warrant a more severe 
sentence than that recommended").  Implying that a sentencing 
recommendation is insufficient is a material and substantial 
breach because it "defeats the benefit for which the accused 
bargained."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶38 (footnote omitted). 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶112 Thus, I agree completely with paragraph 43 of the 
majority opinion: 
 
It is certainly true that "'[e]nd runs' around a 
plea 
agreement 
are 
prohibited." 
 
Williams, 
249 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶42 (citing State v. Hanson, 2000 WI App 
10, ¶24, 232 Wis. 2d 291, 606 N.W.2d 278).  "The State 
may not accomplish by indirect means what it promised 
not to do directly, and it may not covertly convey to 
the trial court that a more severe sentence is 
warranted than that recommended."  
Id. (quoting 
Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d 291, ¶24; citing Ferguson, 166 
Wis. 2d at 322). 
¶113 A 
defendant 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
relief 
from 
a 
prosecutor's comments or conduct at sentencing unless a breach 
of the plea agreement is material and substantial.  Williams, 
249 
Wis. 2d 492, 
¶38. 
 
"[W]hether 
the 
State's 
conduct 
constitutes a breach of a plea agreement and whether the breach 
is material and substantial are questions of law."  Id., ¶2. 
¶114 When a prosecutor violates the principles discussed 
above in paragraph 112, that violation constitutes a material 
and substantial breach of the plea agreement. 
THE SENTENCING HEARING 
¶115 I turn now to the sentencing hearing.  When the court 
reviews a sentencing transcript to determine whether there was a 
material and substantial breach of the plea agreement, it 
examines the whole proceeding.  Id., ¶46.  The court closely 
examines the sentencing transcript to determine whether the 
prosecutor was faithful to the bargain.   
¶116 Circuit Judge Molly E. GaleWyrick began the sentencing 
hearing by listing Bokenyi's convictions and the dismissed 
charges: 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
Mr. Bokenyi was convicted on September 30, 2011 of 
Count 1, first degree reckless endangering safety.  
That is a Class F felony.  It's punishable by 12 years 
and 6 months in prison, divided 7.5 in and 5 out.  
Count 3 is intimidate a victim, use or attempted 
force.  This is a Class G felony.  It is punishable by 
imprisonment not to exceed 10 years.  It's 5 in and 5 
out.  And Count 4 failure to comply with an officer.  
That's a Class I felony, punishable by 3.5 years in 
prison.  1.5 in and 2 out.  There were additional 
counts which were read-in for purposes of sentencing.  
Count 2 is another count of intimidate a victim, use 
or attempt of force.  Counts 5 through 7, battery to 
law 
enforcement 
officer/firefighter. 
 
Count 
8, 
disorderly conduct.  Count 9 resisting or obstructing.  
Count 10 endangers safety with a dangerous weapon. 
Shortly after the judge read the charges, the prosecutor read a 
letter from Sherri Bokenyi (Sherri), the defendant's wife and 
the principal victim of his crimes: 
 
To Judge GaleWyrick, to whom it may concern.  It 
has been a long wait for this day, yet I'm still 
nervous and scared.  I want Bill to serve time due to 
him that justifies his behavior.  But also I want him 
to get help while he is in prison.  Myself and our son 
[MB], are afraid for the day Bill will get let out 
because we are unsure of what he would be capable of 
doing.  I prefer that we could live fearlessly while 
our son MB only 11 is growing and in school.  Thank 
you.  [Sherri] Bokenyi. 
¶117 The prosecutor then described the offense.  He 
described how Bokenyi had two knives in his hands when officers 
arrived and how he slammed the door when the officers told him 
to drop the knives and get on the floor.  The prosecutor 
described how the officers heard Bokenyi yell that he was going 
to kill his wife and how the officers had to shoot Bokenyi 
because he would not comply with their orders to drop the 
knives.  The prosecutor recounted Sherri's testimony about how 
Bokenyi asked repeatedly whether Sherri or their son should die 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
first.  He then described how Bokenyi's son dialed 911, and he 
commented that the child would have to live with the memory of 
that event for the rest of his life. 
¶118 All this was permissible.  The prosecutor needed to 
support his recommendations by establishing the gravity of the 
offenses.  The description of the incident demonstrated the 
severity of the crimes for which Bokenyi was being sentenced.  
Had the prosecutor stopped there, this would be an easy case.  
However, 
the 
prosecutor 
went 
on 
to 
make 
three 
errors.  
Especially when these errors are considered together——considered 
cumulatively——they constitute a material and substantial breach 
of the plea agreement. 
COMMENTS ABOUT THE CRIMES' SEVERITY 
¶119 The prosecutor's first breach of the plea agreement 
occurred when he described the severity of the crimes as 
follows: 
 
The three convictions that [Bokenyi] is being 
sentenced 
on 
today 
is 
a 
first 
degree 
reckless 
endangerment, a 12 and a half year felony, and 
intimidation of a victim, a 10 year felony and failure 
to comply with a law enforcement officer, a 3 and a 
half year felony.  I think the felony classifications 
obviously indicate the extreme seriousness of these 
offenses that night.  But to be honest, I don't think 
they really do them justice in terms of how serious 
this was. 
 
This was a man who had history and I think it's 
backed up not only from the PSI but in what Mr. 
Smestad has provided.  A history of homicidal thoughts 
or ideations about killing his wife and killing his 
son.  And I believe, it's the state's contention that 
he was intent on carrying out that ideation that night 
and if not for law enforcement's interceding, it may 
well have been carried out. 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
 
So although these are three felonies and these 
are very serious crimes, I don't think to be honest 
with you that they even come close to telling what 
could have happened that night and what might have 
happened that night and just in and of itself the 
seriousness of what did happen that night.  It's all 
exacerbated by this all happening in front of this 
couple's child.  He was I believe 10 at the time when 
this happened.  He's now 11. 
¶120 These paragraphs are significant in several ways. 
¶121 The prosecutor repeated the offenses and the penalties 
for the offenses, even though the court had gone over the same 
information moments earlier.  He repeated the maximum period of 
"imprisonment."  Then he said that "the felony classifications 
obviously indicate the extreme seriousness of these offenses."  
But, "I don't think they [e.g., the three felony convictions] 
really do . . . justice in terms of how serious this was." 
¶122 After describing Bokenyi's homicidal thoughts about 
"killing his wife and son," the prosecutor again offered his 
opinion that "although these are three felonies and these are 
very serious crimes, I don't think . . . that they [e.g., the 
three felony convictions] even come close to telling what could 
have happened that night." 
¶123 No doubt the prosecutor is permitted to point out the 
seriousness of crimes, and no doubt the prosecutor is entitled 
to focus the court's attention on the future.  But is the 
prosecutor entitled to convey the view that the defendant's 
conduct was more grievous than what is reflected in the crimes 
to which the defendant pled guilty, especially when that view is 
connected with concern about the future? 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶124 Here, when the prosecutor listed the maximum terms of 
imprisonment and then immediately stated that the felony 
classifications do not sufficiently indicate the seriousness of 
the offenses, he implied that Bokenyi deserved longer sentences 
than the maximum sentences for the three counts to which he 
pled. 
¶125 In State v. Liukonen, 2004 WI App 157, ¶¶15-17, 276 
Wis. 2d 64, 686 N.W.2d 689, the court of appeals determined that 
a prosecutor materially and substantially breached a plea 
agreement when he suggested that the defendant deserved a more 
stringent sentence than the plea agreement provided.  In 
Liukonen, the prosecutor stated that "even if the Court goes 
along with the proposed sentence recommendation, I think [the 
defendant] will be getting a tremendous break from the system, 
but it has been agreed to . . . ."  Id., ¶15.  Similarly, in the 
present case, the prosecutor implied that he thought the plea 
agreement was too lenient by suggesting that the felony 
classifications of the charges do not do justice to Bokenyi's 
offenses. 
¶126 Unlike the majority, I do not believe the prosecutor 
was merely communicating the State's position about the serious 
nature of the offenses.  See majority op., ¶55.  Nor do I agree 
with 
the 
majority's 
discussion 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
observations about the prosecutor's comments.  See majority op., 
¶56.  The circuit court said, "[The prosecutor is] not talking 
about the 26 years not doing justice to the crimes.  He's 
talking about . . . the A through I classification system not 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
doing justice to how serious the conduct was in this particular 
case."  What is the difference?  The classification system deals 
with a range of penalties, and the prosecutor indicated in some 
manner that the system's penalty structure was "not doing 
justice to how serious the conduct was in this particular case."  
If the system's classification structure is not adequate, how 
can a sentence of confinement of less than a third of the 
maximum authorized by the system be adequate? 
¶127 Although prosecutors must walk a fine line as they 
make arguments at sentencing, Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶44, 
the line here is clear: a prosecutor may not suggest that the 
defendant's conduct was in some way more serious than the 
charges to which he pled.  Such a suggestion implies that the 
plea agreement is insufficient——a suggestion that constitutes a 
material and substantial breach. 
THE COMMENTARY ON THE VICTIM'S LETTER 
¶128 The 
prosecutor 
breached 
the 
plea 
agreement 
by 
endorsing the victim's statement that he had read earlier in the 
hearing: 
 
Finally, there's the need to protect the public 
or the public's interest in rehabilitation of the 
defendant and I think this overwhelmingly comes down 
to the protection of the public interest.  The 
protection of the public, being [Sherri] Bokenyi and 
their son.  They have a right, as she says in her 
letter, to live fearlessly while their son is growing 
up and in school.  She has a right to live not in fear 
that Mr. Bokenyi, when he gets out, is going to come 
looking for her and to finish what he's attempted at 
least one other time before. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶129 In her letter, Sherri mentioned that her son was 11 
years old.  The prosecutor repeated the child's age in the 
previously quoted passages.  The idea that Sherri has a right to 
live without fear while her son is in school suggests that she 
has a right to live without fear until her son turns 18——the age 
at which students traditionally finish high school.  Thus, by 
agreeing with Sherri, the prosecutor suggested that Bokenyi 
should be confined for roughly seven years, a suggestion that 
undermines 
the 
recommendation 
of 
four 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement.   
¶130 It must be remembered, once again, that if the 
defendant received only four years of initial confinement, he 
would be scheduled for release in a little more than two and a 
half years.  I am unable to agree with the majority that the 
prosecutor's recommendation of four years confinement was 
"seemingly consistent with the victim's wishes," majority op., 
¶68, inasmuch as the victim specifically asked to "live 
fearlessly while our son M.B.[,] only 11[,] is growing and in 
school."   
¶131 The victim expressed fear in her letter "for the day 
Bill will get let out."   
¶132 Thus, when the prosecutor said, "They have a right, as 
she says in her letter, to live fearlessly while their son is 
growing up and in school," he was impliedly asking for more than 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
two and a half years of additional confinement.4  When the 
prosecutor referred to "when he gets out," he was not expressing 
his confidence in extended supervision. 
¶133 The majority dismisses the implication and effect of 
the prosecutor's statements by emphasizing victims' rights.   
¶134 While victims' rights are unassailably important, they 
do not eclipse the rights of defendants.  The Wisconsin 
Constitution protects victims' rights, but it also explicitly 
states, "Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted 
pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused 
which may be provided by law."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m.  Thus, 
Santobello and its progeny continue to require prosecutors to 
fulfill promises made pursuant to plea agreements.  See 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262.  In fact, the advent of victims' 
rights laws infuses plea bargains and prosecutor conduct at 
sentencing with greater importance because a victim's statement 
or recommendation might conflict with the plea agreement.  Thus, 
the prosecutor must take care to avoid endorsing a victim's 
statement that is inconsistent with a plea agreement.  In 
addition, it may be prudent for someone other than the 
prosecutor to read a victim's statement, especially in cases 
                                                 
4 The majority agrees with the circuit court's determination 
that the prosecutor was permitted to reference the victim's 
statement without augmenting it.  Majority op., ¶67.  However, 
the prosecutor did not merely reference the statement; he agreed 
with it.  Even absent augmentation, it is impermissible for a 
prosecutor to agree with a victim's statement that contradicts a 
plea agreement. 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
where the victim explicitly or implicitly makes statements 
contrary to the plea agreement.5 
INCIDENT AT POLK COUNTY JAIL 
¶135 The prosecutor's final error arose when he discussed 
an incident that occurred seven months before Bokenyi entered 
his plea and almost one year before the sentencing hearing.  The 
prosecutor stated: 
What is again perhaps the most frightening for me 
is to read an incident report from the Polk County 
Jail 
on 
February 
11th 
of 
2011. 
 
A 
jailer . . . indicates that on the above date I was 
doing med pass on the maximum part of the jail.  
Inmate Bokenyi came out for the evening meds and I 
asked him how he was doing.  He stated okay, but he 
was still here and that he could not wait for the time 
that he was out of here so he could quote "shoot up 
some cops" end quote.  I asked him why he would do 
that.  He said they all deserved it.  And making 
conversations with him I stated that wouldn't he 
rather just get out and enjoy being out then [sic] 
risk coming back in.  He stated that next time he 
would not be coming back, and he would also shoot 
anyone who got in his way while he was shooting at the 
cops.  There is an absolute necessity to protect the 
public from William Bokenyi. 
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
5 Although the circuit court concluded that it was not a 
material and substantial breach for the prosecutor to read the 
victim's statement, the court did note:  
Now in hindsight it would have been more appropriate 
for us to have brought the victim witness coordinator 
into court to read this statement or someone else 
other than the prosecutor.  I'll take responsibility 
for that.  I should have seen the potential for that 
being misunderstood or mischaracterized, and should 
have asked that some other person read it. 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
¶136 Reference to the jail incident came not long after the 
prosecutor said that Bokenyi had a history "of homicidal 
thoughts or ideations about killing his wife and killing his 
son."  Then he added: 
[M]any 
of 
his 
issues 
with 
his 
mental 
health . . . arise 
out 
of 
suicidal 
and 
homicidal 
ideations, both in regard to his wife and in regard to 
his son.  He talks about having visions of slitting 
their throats . . . .  [Mrs. Bokenyi] has a right to 
live not in fear that Mr. Bokenyi, when he gets out, 
is going to come looking for her and to finish what 
he's attempted at least one other time before. 
¶137 The jail incident broadened the defendant's threats 
from his family to the police, and it enhanced a recurrent theme 
in the PSI. 
¶138 Immediately after reference to the jail incident, the 
prosecutor made his recommendation: 
On Count 1 the state requests a sentence of 8 
years.  4 of initial confinement and 4 of extended 
supervision. 
On Count 3 state's requesting withheld sentence 
and for 5 years probation consecutive to Count 1. 
And on Count 4 the state is requesting for a 
withheld sentence, he be placed on probation for 3 
years, consecutive to Count 1, concurrent with Count 
3, with all the conditions laid out on page 3 of the 
PSI. 
¶139 There 
is 
an 
unsettling 
incongruity 
between 
the 
prosecutor's statements about multiple frightening incidents and 
the need to protect the public, on the one hand, and the 
recommendation of only four years of initial confinement, on the 
other.  The discussion of the jail incident came after a 
description of the heinous crime, after a discussion of a past 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
incident in which Bokenyi threatened his wife and police with a 
firearm in Ashland, and after a description of Bokenyi's 
homicidal thoughts and mental issues.  
¶140 Thus, the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation did 
not come with a bang, with a crescendo; it came with a whimper. 
¶141 It is true that a prosecutor must demonstrate why 
probation is not appropriate and why a period of confinement is 
justified.  See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶44, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 
678 
N.W.2d 197 
(citations 
omitted) 
(internal 
quotation marks omitted) (stating that the court should impose 
"the 
minimum 
amount 
of 
custody 
or 
confinement 
which 
is 
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the 
offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant" and 
"should consider probation as the first alternative").  However, 
in the present case, there were more than enough negative facts 
to support the recommended sentence without the prosecutor 
characterizing the jail incident as "the most frightening."  It 
was not necessarily improper for the prosecutor to mention the 
jail incident, but in the context in which this argument 
appears——right before the recommendation of four years of 
initial 
confinement——it 
undercuts 
the 
prosecutor's 
recommendation. 
¶142 The majority quotes Grant v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 
448, 243 N.W.2d 186 (1976), for the proposition that it is 
against public policy for prosecutors to agree not to discuss 
information 
relevant 
to 
sentencing. 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶72.  
However, there is no allegation or suggestion that the defendant 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
asked 
the 
prosecutor 
to 
refrain 
from 
bringing 
relevant 
information to the court's attention in this case.  Instead, the 
defendant argues that the prosecutor's characterization of the 
jail incident as "the most frightening for me" breached the plea 
agreement.  I agree.   
¶143 As a practical matter, if the prosecutor had known 
about the jail incident at the time of plea negotiations, he 
probably should have included in the plea agreement the fact 
that he planned to mention the incident at sentencing.   
¶144 After the parties concluded their arguments at the 
sentencing hearing, the circuit court said, "I agree with the 
state that this is a very serious crime.  It's a Class F felony 
but that doesn't do it justice."  (Emphasis added.)  On Count 1, 
the court sentenced Bokenyi to seven years and five months6 of 
initial confinement and five years of extended supervision 
concurrent with Counts 3 and 4.  On Count 3, the court sentenced 
Bokenyi to five years of initial confinement and five years of 
extended supervision concurrent with Counts 1 and 4.  On count 
4, Bokenyi received a sentence of one year of extended 
supervision concurrent with Counts 1 and 3. 
¶145 Whether the court was influenced by the prosecutor's 
breach is not relevant to this analysis; it is important only 
that the prosecutor materially and substantially breached the 
plea agreement.  Given that there was a breach, I turn to 
whether Bokenyi's counsel was ineffective for failing to object. 
                                                 
6 The court later amended the judgment of conviction to 
sentence Bokenyi to seven years and six months of initial 
confinement and five years of extended supervision. 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
17 
 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
¶146 Ordinarily, to prove that counsel was ineffective, a 
defendant must demonstrate: (1) that his attorney rendered 
deficient 
performance; 
and 
(2) 
that 
counsel's 
deficient 
performance resulted in prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Although a defendant must normally 
prove prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, when a prosecutor materially and substantially 
breaches a plea agreement, the court presumes prejudice.  State 
v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 281-82, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997).  
Consequently, Bokenyi needed to prove only that his counsel was 
deficient to prevail in this case.  To prove deficient 
performance, 
"the 
defendant 
must 
show 
that 
counsel's 
representation 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
¶147 At the hearing on Bokenyi's postconviction motion, the 
attorney who represented Bokenyi at sentencing testified that he 
did not believe the prosecutor breached the plea agreement.  
When an attorney fails to notice that the prosecutor has 
materially and substantially breached the plea agreement, his 
conduct falls below what is objectively reasonable.  Therefore, 
I 
conclude 
that 
Bokenyi's 
counsel 
provided 
ineffective 
assistance and would remand the case for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
¶148 The prosecutor made a very effective, very powerful 
argument.  In most circumstances, his argument would have been 
welcome and entirely appropriate.  In this case, however, the 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
18 
 
prosecutor entered into an ill-advised plea bargain in which he 
ceded his sentencing recommendation prerogatives to the writer 
of the PSI.  When the writer recommended a relatively light 
sentence, the prosecutor faced a serious dilemma.  The reality 
of his dilemma cannot be ignored. 
¶149 Nonetheless, plea agreements are not to be taken 
lightly.  When the State agreed to limit its sentencing 
recommendation to the upper range from the PSI in exchange for 
Bokenyi's guilty pleas, it was required to uphold its end of the 
bargain.  The State's implicit suggestions that the sentencing 
recommendation was too lenient constituted a material and 
substantial breach of the plea agreement, and Bokenyi's counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to it. 
¶150 I take no pleasure in this dissent because in many 
ways I identify with the prosecutor.  The problem is that if the 
prosecutor's comments here are approved as being consistent with 
the obligations of the plea agreement, future defendants will 
not be able to rely on the benefits they bargained for.   
¶151 The integrity of the criminal justice system must be 
preserved. 
¶152 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶153 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2012AP2557-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
1