Title: State v. Charles W. Mark
Citation: 2006 WI 78
Docket Number: 2003AP002068
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2006

2006 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2068 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Charles W. Mark: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Charles W. Mark, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 62 
Reported at: 280 Wis. 2d 436, 701 N.W.2d 598 
(Ct. App. 2005–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 10, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Glenn L. Cushing, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2006 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2068  
(L.C. No. 
2002CI2) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Charles W. Mark: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles W. Mark, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Charles W. Mark (Mark) seeks 
review of a court of appeals' opinion1 affirming in part and 
reversing in part a circuit court decision to admit four 
statements Mark had made to his parole officer at his Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 State v. Mark, 2005 WI App 62, 280 Wis. 2d 436, 701 N.W.2d 
598.   
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
2 
 
ch. 980 (2003-04)2 commitment hearing.  Mark challenges the court 
of appeals' holding that only two of the four challenged 
statements should have been excluded pursuant to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,3 because 
he claims that all four statements were both compelled and 
incriminating, as well as being testimonial.  See State v. 
Zanelli (Zanelli II), 223 Wis. 2d 545, 589 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 
1998).  In addition, Mark challenges the court of appeals' 
determination that the circuit court properly excluded evidence 
concerning the conditions of his probation as not relevant to a 
determination of whether Mark is a sexually violent person 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). 
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand this case for further proceedings.  In doing so, we 
conclude 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) 
grants 
a 
ch. 
980 
respondent the same rights at his or her ch. 980 commitment 
trial as a defendant is entitled to in a criminal case.  We hold 
that in order for a statement to be properly excluded under the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.   
3 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part, "No person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ."  
U.S. Const. amend. V. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in relevant part, "No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."  
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
3 
 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as applied 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clause, it must be testimonial, compelled, and incriminating.  
We further determine that while an individual has a prepetition 
or prearrest right against self-incrimination, that right is 
ordinarily not self-executing and must be invoked.  Therefore, 
we withdraw any language to the contrary in State v. Zanelli 
(Zanelli I), 212 Wis. 2d 358, 569 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1997).  
Finally, we conclude that the conditions of Mark's probation are 
irrelevant to the determination of whether or not he is a 
sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) and 
were therefore properly excluded by the circuit court.   
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Mark was 
convicted in 1994 of three counts of sexually assaulting a 
child, and sentenced to eight years of confinement, followed by 
two 15-year terms of probation, to be served consecutively to 
the confinement, but concurrently to one another.  Mark was 
released on parole in May 1999 but his parole was revoked in 
June 2000 and he was sent back to prison to serve the rest of 
his confinement.  On June 28, 2002, just before his scheduled 
release, the State of Wisconsin (State) filed a petition 
alleging 
that 
Mark 
was 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).   
¶4 
At trial, the State offered into evidence four 
statements made by Mark to his parole officer.  The first two 
were handwritten, signed admissions by Mark that he had violated 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
4 
 
the terms of his parole.  Each was written on a form, at the top 
of which provided: 
PROBATIONER/PAROLEE/OFFENDER I have been advised that 
I must account in a truthful and accurate manner for 
my whereabouts and activities, and that failure to do 
so is a violation for which I could be revoked.  I 
have also been advised that none of this information 
can be used against me in criminal proceedings. 
¶5 
In his first statement, dated September 8, 1999, Mark 
described his contact with a woman he met at church.  According 
to the report, Mark talked with this woman on her porch, and 
watched her fold her underclothes and breastfeed her baby.  In 
the statement, Mark also admitted to telephoning the woman 
twice.  This conduct violated the rules of Mark's supervision, 
which prohibited him from having a relationship with a woman 
without permission.   
¶6 
In Mark's second written report, dated April 28, 2000, 
Mark described an incident involving a woman living next door to 
him in his hotel.  The report began "I screwed up big," and 
described entering his neighbor’s room without permission, and 
upon finding her in the bathroom, trying to forcibly gain 
entrance to that room for about five or ten minutes, while she 
yelled "get out of here" about three times.  Mark’s statement 
claimed that he only wanted to see his neighbor naked, and that 
he reported the incident because the woman threatened to call 
the police.  Mark verbally reported the incident to his parole 
officer on April 25, 2000, after which an apprehension request 
was issued.  Mark voluntarily turned himself into police that 
same day.  Although his parole had not yet been revoked 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
5 
 
formally, Mark was in police custody at the time he made his 
written statement regarding the hotel incident.  Mark's parole 
was subsequently revoked as a result of this incident. 
¶7 
In addition to his two written statements, two oral 
statements Mark made to his parole officer were also entered 
into evidence at his ch. 980 commitment trial.  In the first, 
made approximately two weeks after his written description of 
the hotel incident with his neighbor in her bathroom, Mark 
admitted that his real motivation had been to have sex with his 
neighbor.  In the second, in a Violation Investigation Report 
dated February 18, 2000, Mark’s parole officer noted that Mark 
had orally admitted to prior sexual activity with his stepson——
conduct for which Mark had already been charged and convicted in 
1994. 
¶8 
At Mark's ch. 980 hearing, the circuit court allowed 
into evidence the four statements Mark made to his parole 
officer.   
¶9 
At the time of his commitment hearing, Mark had begun 
to serve his concurrent 15-year terms of probation.  At trial, 
Mark sought to introduce evidence regarding the conditions of 
his probation, including the rules of supervision to which he 
would be subjected.  The circuit court denied Mark's request 
and, instead, granted the State's motion in limine asking the 
court to prohibit "any evidence, direct or indirect, concerning 
any probation or parole supervision, conditions of confinement, 
or other restrictions, which could be imposed on the respondent 
in the future, on the grounds that such evidence is irrelevant 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
6 
 
and inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.02."  At trial, Mark was 
allowed to establish that he was on probation and would be for 
15 years, but was not permitted to produce evidence as to the 
conditions of his probation supervision.  A jury found Mark to 
be a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). 
¶10 On appeal, Mark challenged the admission of the four 
statements, and the exclusion of the conditions of his probation 
supervision. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
statements concerning the woman on her porch and the sexual 
activity with his stepson were properly admitted into evidence 
at 
Mark's 
ch. 
980 
commitment 
trial, 
as 
they 
were 
not 
incriminating under the definition employed in Zanelli II, and 
therefore did not properly fall within the Fifth Amendment 
privilege.  The court of appeals further concluded that the 
written and oral statements regarding the incident in the hotel 
room were incriminating under the Zanelli II definition, and 
remanded the case to the circuit court for a determination of 
whether the statements were also compelled, and should therefore 
be properly excluded under the Fifth Amendment, and also for a 
harmless error analysis if there was compulsion.  The court of 
appeals also held that the circuit court properly excluded 
evidence of the conditions of Mark's probation as not relevant 
to the determination of whether or not Mark was a sexually 
violent person under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  Mark petitioned 
this court for review.   
 
 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
7 
 
II 
¶11 The State argued at the court of appeals that Mark 
waived the right to raise the issue of the admissibility of his 
statements, since he did not object at the circuit court to the 
admission of such statements.  See State v. Mark, 2005 WI App 
62, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 436, 701 N.W.2d 598.  Although we generally 
decline to address issues raised for the first time on appeal, 
we have the authority to do so.  See State v. Moran, 2005 WI 
115, ¶31, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884.  Because both the 
State and the defendant have asked us to clarify the issues 
raised on appeal, we will address them here. 
A 
¶12 Whether Mark's statements to his parole officer should 
have been excluded from his ch. 980 commitment trial, pursuant 
to Mark's Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
against 
self-incrimination, 
involves 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law which this court reviews de novo, although benefiting 
from the analysis of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
State v. Lombard (Lombard I), 2004 WI 95, ¶17, 273 Wis. 2d 538, 
684 N.W.2d 103.  We also review, de novo, the application of 
constitutional principles to established facts.  See State v. 
Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987). 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
8 
 
¶13 Mark 
reasons 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) 
grants 
individuals who are the subject of a ch. 980 petition the same 
rights as those available to a defendant in a criminal case.  
Therefore, it is Mark's position that, just as criminal 
defendants are protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination, the statements Mark made 
to his parole officer are prohibited from being introduced at 
his ch. 980 trial.  Mark urges this court to adopt a rule that a 
compelled statement may never be used against a defendant at a 
ch. 980 commitment trial.4   
¶14 It is the State's position that the court of appeals 
correctly relied on Zanelli II in holding that Mark's statements 
must be both compelled and incriminating in order to gain the 
protections 
of 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
While 
the 
State 
                                                 
4 Part 
of 
Mark's 
argument 
on 
appeal 
is 
that 
both 
psychologists who testified for the State of Wisconsin (State) 
relied on the statements at issue in this case in making their 
determination of Mark's potential for future sexual violence.  
However, as the United States Supreme Court stated in United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, "[t]he privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental 
trial right of criminal defendants.  Although conduct by law 
enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that 
right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial."  United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)(emphasis 
added)(citations omitted).  Therefore, the State argues that the 
psychologists could use his statements in their assessments of 
Mark's likelihood to reoffend as the assessments were made 
before his ch. 980 commitment hearing, and not "at trial."  We 
do not find it necessary to address that issue here, since we 
are satisfied that under the circumstances presented in this 
case, the correct framework for analysis is one that determines 
whether 
the 
statements 
were 
testimonial, 
compelled, 
and 
incriminating.  
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
9 
 
acknowledges that Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) grants Mark the same 
rights at trial as a defendant in a criminal case, the State 
maintains that the Fifth Amendment only protects statements that 
are both compelled and incriminating.   
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(1m) provides: "[a]t the trial 
to determine whether the person who is the subject of a petition 
under s. 980.02 is a sexually violent person, all rules of 
evidence in criminal actions apply.  All constitutional rights 
available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding are available 
to the person."  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).5   
¶16 Among the rights granted a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, "[n]o person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
                                                 
5 Justice Butler's concurrence/dissent all but ignores these 
statutory provisions.  Justice Butler's concurrence/dissent, 
¶¶51-2.  There is no discussion of the fact that under our 
statute "[a]t the trial . . . all rules of evidence in criminal 
actions apply," and that the "constitutional rights available to 
a defendant in a criminal proceeding are available to the 
person" 
who 
is 
the 
subject 
of 
a 
ch. 
980 
petition.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m). 
 
His 
opinion 
relies 
heavily 
on 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court (Allen v. Illinois, 
478 U.S. 364 (1986)) and the Illinois Supreme Court (People v. 
Allen, 481 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1985)) which reviewed and applied an 
Illinois statute that did not include any provisions similar to 
the above cited language from § 980.05(1m).  It is also 
noteworthy that the Illinois statute did not include the right 
to remain silent among the rights accorded a person alleged to 
fall within the provisions of the Sexually Dangerous Persons 
Act.  Justice Butler's concurrence/dissent, ¶59 (citing Allen, 
478 U.S. at 371).   
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
10 
 
himself. . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. V.6  As the United States 
Supreme Court noted in Minnesota v. Murphy: 
It has long been held that this prohibition not only 
permits a person to refuse to testify against himself 
at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but 
also "privileges him not to answer official questions 
put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, 
formal 
or 
informal, 
where 
the 
answers 
might 
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."   
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (citing Lefkowitz 
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).  It is also well-established 
in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that "[t]he Fifth Amendment 
prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating."  
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 
189 (2004)(citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896)).  
In other words, when a defendant seeks to exclude prior 
statements based upon his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, he 
or she must first establish that the statements at issue are 1) 
testimonial; 2) compelled; and 3) incriminating.  See id.  
Therefore, we reject Mark's argument that the mere fact that a 
                                                 
6 In his brief, Mark notes that Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution contains the same prohibition.   
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
11 
 
statement is compelled requires it be excluded from a ch. 980 
commitment trial.7   
¶17 It is Mark's further contention that the statements at 
issue regarding the hotel bathroom incident are, on their face, 
compelled as he was in custody at the time they were made, and 
he was required to report truthfully to his parole officer, or 
face possible revocation.  Therefore, Mark believes that remand 
to the circuit court for determination of whether there was 
compulsion is unnecessary.   
¶18 Although 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
recognized police custody as "[a] well-known exception to the 
general rule" that an individual must assert his Fifth Amendment 
"privilege rather than answer if he desires not to incriminate 
himself," a defendant's custody status alone is not sufficient 
to determine whether the statements were, in fact, compelled.  
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429.   
¶19 We next consider the scope of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege in the context of Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  There are three 
Wisconsin cases that have addressed the applicability of various 
                                                 
7 Mark relies on several authorities (Minnesota v. Murphy, 
465 U.S. 420 (1984); State ex rel. Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, 
257 Wis. 2d 40, 654 N.W.2d 438; State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 
821, 419 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 
225, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977)) to argue that a compelled statement 
by a probationer may not be used for any evidentiary purpose in 
a criminal prosecution, and therefore, in a ch. 980 trial.  Yet 
Mark misstates the holdings in those cases by suggesting that 
compulsion alone is sufficient to exclude a statement from a 
criminal 
prosecution. 
 
A 
statement 
must 
be 
testimonial, 
incriminating, and compelled to be excluded from a criminal 
prosecution by virtue of the Fifth Amendment.   
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
12 
 
aspects of the Fifth Amendment privilege in regard to a ch. 980 
trial reviewing Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  We will examine each 
in turn.   
¶20 In Zanelli I, the court of appeals considered the 
right of the petitioner to exclude the testimony of a state 
psychologist 
to 
the 
effect 
that 
Zanelli 
had 
refused 
to 
participate in the psychologist's prepetition evaluation of him.  
Zanelli I, 212 Wis. 2d at 369.  Noting that "'[t]he Fifth 
Amendment protects a person from compelled self-incrimination at 
all times, not just upon 
arrest 
or 
during 
a 
custodial 
interrogation,'" the court of appeals concluded that Zanelli's 
right to remain silent would be violated if the prosecution were 
allowed to comment on his prearrest silence unless he chose to 
testify.  Id. at 371-72 (citing State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 
236, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982)).   
¶21 In Zanelli II, petitioner challenged the admissibility 
of statements he had made to his probation officers and to a 
police officer.  Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 567.  Zanelli argued 
that "his statements to probation officers were compelled by the 
threat of loss of liberty associated with both the presentence 
investigative process and probation supervision."  Because the 
court of appeals concluded that the statements at issue were not 
incriminating, in the sense that they could not be used to 
"incriminate 
him 
in 
a 
pending 
or 
subsequent 
criminal 
prosecution," it deemed them not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment, and therefore properly admitted by the circuit court.  
Id. at 550, 568.   
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
13 
 
¶22 In Lombard I, this court considered "whether a person 
such as Lombard is entitled to receive Miranda warnings prior to 
being interviewed by a State evaluator in regard to whether a 
ch. 980 petition should be filed."  Lombard I, 273 Wis. 2d 538, 
¶16.  Petitioner contended that he was entitled to "Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) warnings prior to his pre-petition 
evaluation with the State's psychologist in regard to whether a 
ch. 980 petition should be filed."  Id., ¶2.  Noting that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) plainly contains the language "at the 
trial," the Lombard I court held that "such constitutional 
rights would apply at Lombard's ch. 980 trial," but not in his 
prepetition evaluation.  Id. 
¶23 In its analysis, the Lombard I court cited both 
Zanelli I and Zanelli II with approval.  Lombard I noted that 
Zanelli I was correct in its conclusion that "a person subject 
to a pre-petition evaluation has the right to remain silent 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m)," 
but 
cautioned 
that 
"Lombard's claim that Zanelli I supports his position that 
Miranda warnings are required prior to a pre-petition interview 
is too great a stretch."  Lombard I, 273 Wis. 2d 538, ¶40.   
¶24 Examining Zanelli I in light of the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Murphy, we now conclude that the 
language in Zanelli I sweeps too broadly in declaring that 
"'[t]he Fifth Amendment protects a person from compelled self-
incrimination at all times. . . .'"  Zanelli I, 212 Wis. 2d at 
371 (citing Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d at 236).  While we agree with the 
Zanelli I court that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
14 
 
incrimination 
extends 
to 
prearrest 
silence 
and 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) gives ch. 980 respondents the same 
constitutional rights as criminal defendants at trial, Murphy 
reaffirms the general rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
must be asserted in all but "certain well-defined situations."  
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429.  
¶25 In Murphy, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution 
prohibit 
the 
introduction 
into 
evidence 
of 
incriminating admissions Murphy made during a meeting with his 
probation officer.  Id. at 422.  The Court began its analysis by 
stating that: 
a witness protected by the privilege [against self-
incrimination] may rightfully refuse to answer unless 
and until he is protected at least against the use of 
his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom 
in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a 
defendant. . . .  Absent such protection, if he is 
nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are 
inadmissible 
against 
him 
in 
a 
later 
criminal 
prosecution. 
Id. at 426 (citing Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 78).  The Court went 
on to note that: 
the general obligation to appear and answer questions 
truthfully 
did 
not 
itself 
convert 
[] 
otherwise 
voluntary statements into compelled ones.  In that 
respect, Murphy was in no better position than the 
ordinary witness at a trial or before a grand jury who 
is subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated 
to answer on the pain of contempt, unless he invokes 
the privilege and shows that he faces a realistic 
threat of self-incrimination.  The answers of such a 
witness to questions put to him are not compelled 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
15 
 
witness is required to answer over his valid claim of 
the privilege.   
Id. at 427.  Therefore, the mere fact that an individual is 
required to appear and report truthfully to his or her probation 
(or parole) officer is insufficient to establish compulsion.   
 
¶26 After examining the case law on what constitutes 
compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he answers of such a 
witness to questions put to him are not compelled within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is required to 
answer over his valid claim of the privilege."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Therefore, the Court reasoned, cases addressing this 
issue, "taken together, 'stand for the proposition that, in the 
ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes 
disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government 
has not "compelled" him to incriminate himself.'"  Id. (citing 
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976)).  Thus, "a 
witness confronted with questions that the government should 
reasonably expect to elicit incriminating evidence ordinarily 
must assert the privilege rather than answer if he desires not 
to incriminate himself."  Id. at 429.  If, however, the witness 
chooses to answer, "his choice is considered to be voluntary 
since he was free to claim the privilege . . ." with only a few 
well-established exceptions to the general rule.  Id. 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
16 
 
¶27 Therefore, in a prepetition or prearrest situation, in 
order for an individual to effectively invoke his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights against self-incrimination, he or she must 
ordinarily assert the privilege.8  We hereby withdraw any 
language in Zanelli I that conflicts with the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Murphy. 
B 
¶28 In order to evaluate the applicability of the Fifth 
Amendment to the individual statements Mark seeks to exclude, we 
must 
first 
determine 
whether 
each 
of 
the 
statements 
is 
incriminating.  Since a statement made by a probationer or 
parolee to his or her probation/parole officer may be admissible 
                                                 
8 The Court in Murphy explained the penalty exception to the 
general rule as follows: 
The general rule that the privilege must be 
claimed when self-incrimination is threatened has . . 
. 
been 
deemed 
inapplicable 
in 
cases 
where 
the 
assertion of the privilege is penalized so as to 
"foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and . . . 
compe[l] . . . incriminating testimony."  Garner v. 
United States, 424 U.S., at 661. . . . 
. . . .  
There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for 
concluding that if the state, either expressly or by 
implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege 
would lead to revocation of probation, it would have 
created the classic penalty situation, the failure to 
assert the privilege would be excused, and the 
probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and 
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434-35 (footnote omitted). 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
17 
 
in a subsequent criminal proceeding, it is appropriate to apply 
the Fifth Amendment analysis to the statements at issue here.  
See Murphy, 456 U.S. at 440.9  We again note that the ch. 980 
commitment hearing for Mark, while a civil proceeding, involved 
the same rights as those available to a defendant in a criminal 
case.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  If a statement is not 
incriminating, we need not reach the issue of whether the 
statement 
was 
compelled, 
as 
statements 
must 
be 
both 
incriminating and compelled in order to fall within the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.10  See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189.  
¶29 In 
Zanelli 
II, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
defined 
"incriminating" as such "statements [that] could incriminate 
[one] in a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution. . . ."  
Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 568.  Mark argues that the court of 
appeals' reliance on the definition of incriminating in Zanelli 
II is inappropriate in light of a footnote in the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 
(1980), which suggests a different definition, although in 
regard to the term "incriminating response." 
                                                 
9 "Because he had not been compelled to incriminate himself, 
Murphy could not successfully invoke the privilege to prevent 
the information he volunteered to his probation officer from 
being used against him in a criminal prosecution."  Id. at 440.   
10 As both the defendant and the State concede that all of 
the statements at issue are testimonial, we need not establish 
that element of the test. 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
18 
 
¶30 In Innis, the United States Supreme Court considered 
the meaning of "interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona.11  
Innis, 446 U.S. at 297.  In a footnote, the Court articulated 
what it believed constituted an incriminating response by 
stating: 
"[b]y 
'incriminating 
response' 
we 
refer 
to 
any 
response——whether 
inculpatory 
or 
exculpatory——that 
the 
prosecution may seek to introduce at trial."  Id. at 302 n.5 
(emphasis in original).  The flaw in Mark's argument is that the 
Innis 
definition 
of 
"incriminating 
response" 
necessarily 
contemplates the use of statements by the prosecution in a 
criminal trial.  In such circumstances, it is reasonable to 
infer that any statement of the defendant that the prosecution 
might seek to admit would have the tendency to incriminate or 
inculpate the defendant.  The same cannot be said in a ch. 980 
civil commitment trial, where the object of the proceeding is to 
determine the likelihood the defendant will commit a future act 
of sexual violence, not to convict him of a crime.  Outside of 
the criminal context, the rationale behind the Innis definition 
loses its force.  Therefore, for purposes of a ch. 980 trial, we 
conclude that the definition of incriminating adopted by the 
court of appeals in Zanelli II is the appropriate one. 
                                                 
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
19 
 
¶31 We first consider Mark's oral admission to his parole 
officer concerning his sexual activity with his stepson.  
Because this conduct related to the offenses for which Mark was 
already charged and convicted, we conclude, as did the court of 
appeals, that it could not subject Mark to future criminal 
prosecution.  We, therefore, agree with the court of appeals 
that the statement was properly admitted by the circuit court.   
¶32 Next, we turn to Mark's written statement concerning 
his interactions with the woman from his church.  Although such 
contact was a violation of the rules of his parole, the conduct, 
in and of itself, was not criminal in nature.  Therefore, as it 
could not subject Mark to a future criminal prosecution, but 
could merely be used against him in a parole revocation 
proceeding, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
statement 
was 
not 
incriminating.  We agree with the court of appeals' decision 
that the statement was properly admitted at Mark's ch. 980 
trial. 
¶33 Finally, we turn to the two statements——one written, 
one oral——concerning the hotel bathroom incident.  In the 
written statement, Mark admitted to entering his neighbor's 
hotel room without permission, and upon finding her in the 
bathroom, trying to forcibly gain entrance to that room against 
her protestations.  In the oral statement, Mark indicated that 
his motivation in the hotel bathroom incident was to have sex 
with his neighbor.  Again, we agree with the court of appeals 
that the admissions could serve as the basis for one or more 
possible charges such as the charge of attempted sexual assault. 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
20 
 
As the statements, themselves, appear to be admissions upon 
which criminal charges could be based, we remand the case for a 
determination of whether there was compulsion.  As the court of 
appeals noted, "[a]t a minimum, the written statement could 
subject Mark to prosecution for disorderly conduct under 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01."  Mark, 280 Wis. 2d 436, ¶28.  Since the 
statements could subject Mark to future criminal prosecution, 
they were incriminating. 12  See Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 568.   
                                                 
12 While the written statement contains information which 
could incriminate Mark in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
heading on the statement leads us to remand the case for a 
determination of whether there was compulsion, and for review of 
all of the circumstances, including those that relate to 
immunity.  Supra, ¶4.   
The concurrence of Justice Roggensack, which is based on 
this court's holding in Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, claims that the 
written statement was not incriminating, since the heading on 
the statement granted Mark limited use immunity.  Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence, ¶45.   
In Evans, we noted, however, that the limited use immunity 
discussed therein only applies where the statement is given "in 
response to questions by a probation or parole agent or at a 
probation or parole revocation hearing, which questions are 
prompted by pending charges or accusations of particular 
criminal activity. . . ."  Evans, 77 Wis 2d at 235.  Prior to 
the 
taking 
of 
testimony, 
upon 
remand, 
concerning 
the 
circumstances surrounding the giving of the written statement by 
Mark, it is impossible to determine whether the conditions 
required for a grant of limited use immunity ever existed.   
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
21 
 
¶34 We conclude that the statements involving the incident 
at the hotel require us to remand the matter to the circuit 
court, in order to determine whether those statements were 
compelled.  If the circuit court determines that either or both 
statements were compelled, and thus should have been excluded 
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the court must also engage in a 
harmless error analysis.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
295 (1991).13   
                                                                                                                                                             
Evans requires "timely objection in criminal proceedings," 
permits the use of such statements for purposes of impeachment 
or rebuttal, at least where a defendant testifies to matters 
directly contrary to what is stated in the excluded statement, 
and discusses the possibility of a charge of perjury where such 
statement is inconsistent with a statement previously made.  Id.    
It is premature, in this case, to assess the applicability of 
Tate, 257 Wis. 2d 40, Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, or Evans, 77 
Wis. 2d 225. 
13 Mark also makes a separate argument that the statements 
should be prohibited merely by applying the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment without reference to his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  We decline to reach this issue, as we 
agree with the court of appeals that "with respect to the use of 
a defendant's involuntary statements in criminal cases, the 
rights conferred by the due process clause and the Fifth 
Amendment are coextensive."  Mark, 280 Wis. 2d 436, ¶33.  See 
also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)("The [due process 
clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment secures against state 
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees 
against federal infringement——the right of a person to remain 
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of 
his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such 
silence.").  
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
22 
 
III 
¶35 The second issue before this court is whether the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in excluding 
evidence of the conditions of Mark's probation supervision from 
his ch. 980 commitment trial.  In most cases, the exercise of a 
circuit court's discretion is reviewed under a deferential 
standard.  State v. Richard G.B., 2003 WI App 13, ¶7, 259 Wis. 
2d 730, 656 N.W.2d 469.  However, as this case involves the 
court's 
construction 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) 
and 
related 
provisions, we are presented with a question of law which we 
review de novo.  Id. 
¶36 We 
have 
consistently 
held 
that 
statutory 
interpretation "'begins with the language of the statute. . . 
.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).  
In construing a statute, we give the statutory language "its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id. (citations omitted).   
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, Mark asks this court to find a right to remain 
silent in a ch. 980 trial under Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
whether 
or 
not 
exclusion 
of 
his 
statements is mandated under the Fifth Amendment.  Because he 
raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we decline to 
address the issue.  See State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 243 
n.16, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998) (this court will ordinarily not 
consider an argument not raised in the circuit court); State ex 
rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 634, 579 N.W.2d 698 
(1998) (this court will ordinarily not consider an argument not 
raised in the court of appeals).  
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
23 
 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.01(7) defines "sexually violent 
person" as:   
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense, 
has 
been 
adjudicated 
delinquent 
for 
a 
sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty 
of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or 
illness, and who is dangerous because he or she 
suffers from a mental disorder that makes it likely 
that the person will engage in acts of sexual 
violence. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7)(emphasis added).  "Mental disorder," in 
turn, "means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to 
engage in acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2).  
Finally, "likely" is defined in the statutes as "more likely 
than not."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(1m).   
¶38 Mark contends that the circuit court's exclusion of 
evidence concerning the conditions of his probation supervision 
constituted error, as the conditions (such as degree of 
supervision) are relevant in regard to his future dangerousness, 
which is an element in the statutory definition of a sexually 
violent person.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).   
¶39 There have been two recent court of appeals' decisions 
addressing similar issues to those raised by Mark.  In State v. 
Lombard (Lombard II), the court of appeals determined that the 
circuit court had not erred when, during a ch. 980 trial, it 
refused to answer the jury’s question which asked whether 
Lombard would remain under supervision, even if the jury was to 
find he was not sexually violent.  State v. Lombard (Lombard 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
24 
 
II), 2004 WI App 52, ¶6, 271 Wis. 2d 529, 678 N.W.2d 338.  The 
circuit court's refusal was based upon its conclusion that such 
evidence was irrelevant to the jury’s task, which was to 
determine whether Lombard was still a sexually violent person.  
In order to answer that question, the jury had to decide whether 
Lombard had a mental disorder that made it substantially 
probable that he would engage in future acts of sexual violence.  
Id., ¶16.  Because it concluded that the question of Lombard's 
supervision in the absence of a ch. 980 commitment was 
irrelevant to the question before the jury, the court of appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised 
its 
discretion when the court refused to answer the jury's question.  
Id., ¶21.   
¶40 Additionally, in State v. Thiel, the court of appeals 
determined that an independent examiner’s recommendation that a 
ch. 980 committee be placed on supervised release did not 
provide 
the 
probable 
cause 
necessary 
to 
warrant 
a 
full 
evidentiary hearing as to whether the committee was still a 
"sexually violent person" under § 980.01(7).  State v. Thiel, 
2004 WI App 140, 275 Wis. 2d 421, 685 N.W.2d 890.  The court of 
appeals rejected Thiel’s argument that the recommendation for 
supervised release constituted strong evidence that he was no 
longer sexually violent under chapter 980, stating: 
By the plain language of the statute, the 
question at the probable cause hearing is not whether 
the individual is substantially probable to engage in 
acts of sexual violence if placed on supervised 
release or even if discharged from commitment; the 
statute draws no such distinction.  Rather, the 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
25 
 
question at the probable cause stage is simply whether 
it is substantially probable that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence without regard to 
any specific restrictions, supervision or time frame.  
It is a black-and-white determination——it is either 
substantially probable that the person will engage in 
acts of sexual violence or it is not. 
Id., ¶17. 
¶41 The decision in Thiel lends support to our conclusion 
that the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) makes the 
existence of a mental disorder——not any extrinsic factors——the 
first step in determining dangerousness and the substantial 
probability of the person engaging in future acts of sexual 
violence.  Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, 
upholding 
the 
circuit 
court’s 
exclusion 
of 
the 
conditions of Mark’s probation supervision from his chapter 980 
trial because, under the terms of § 980.01(7), such evidence was 
irrelevant in determining whether he was a "sexually violent 
person." 
IV 
¶42 In conclusion, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand this case for further proceedings.  In doing 
so, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) grants a ch. 980 
respondent the same rights at the ch. 980 commitment trial as a 
defendant is entitled to in a criminal case.  We hold that in 
order for a statement to be properly excluded under the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as applied to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clause, it must be testimonial, compelled and incriminating.  We 
further determine that while an individual has a prepetition or 
No. 
2003AP2068   
 
26 
 
prearrest 
right against 
self-incrimination, 
that 
right is 
ordinarily not self-executing and must be invoked.  Therefore, 
we withdraw any language to the contrary in Zanelli I, 212 Wis. 
2d 358.  Finally, we conclude that the conditions of Mark's 
probation are irrelevant to the determination of whether or not 
he 
is 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) and were therefore properly excluded by 
the circuit court.   
By the court.  The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP2068.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶43 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   Charles 
W. Mark (Mark) made four statements that are examined in this 
appeal.  The majority opinion remands two of the statements to 
the circuit court to determine whether they were compelled.  
Majority op., ¶¶2, 33.  I write because I conclude that there is 
no reason to remand the statement Mark wrote on his parole 
report form because that statement cannot be used against him in 
a criminal proceeding and therefore it is not incriminating.  
Accordingly, I would remand to the circuit court only Mark's 
oral statement to his parole agent to determine whether it was 
compelled, and I join the majority opinion in all aspects not 
inconsistent with this concurrence.  
¶44 The parole report form on which Mark reported his 
efforts to gain entry to a neighboring woman's bathroom contains 
the following pre-printed representation by the State:  "I have 
been advised that . . . none of this information can be used 
against me in criminal proceedings."  The majority opinion does 
not give this statement proper effect.  See majority op., ¶33 
n.12.  In my view, the State's representation is dispositive of 
whether Mark's written statement is incriminating within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.   
¶45 The State may require a parolee to truthfully report 
his conduct as a condition of probation, but not without a grant 
of immunity that limits its use.  State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 
225, 235, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977).  As we explained in Evans where 
testimony from a probationer was sought, "The state may, 
No.  2003AP2068.pdr 
 
2 
 
however, compel a person's testimony if he is protected by a 
grant 
of 
immunity 
that 
renders 
the 
compelled 
testimony 
inadmissible against the witness in a criminal prosecution."  
Id.  In my view, the representation by the State that Mark's 
statements on the parole report form will not be used in any 
subsequent criminal prosecution afforded Mark limited immunity 
as a condition to Mark's accurate reporting of his activities 
while on parole.  As we explained in Evans, statements by a 
probationer or parolee may be given a type of immunity from 
prosecution:   
Because the defendant here was not made aware 
that any statements he made could not be used against 
him in a subsequent criminal proceeding arising out of 
the same fact situation . . . this case must be 
returned 
to 
the 
Department 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
conducting a revocation hearing if the Department so 
desires.  At that time the defendant may be properly 
advised with respect to the limited use immunity 
herein declared. 
Id. at 236.  The State did what we suggested in Evans by the 
representation it made to Mark on the parole report form:  it 
granted limited use immunity for his statement.  In so doing, 
the State removed the possibility of Mark's statement being used 
in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 
¶46 Additionally, 
in 
order 
for 
testimony 
to 
be 
incriminating under the terms of the Fifth Amendment, it must be 
possible to use either the statement, or information obtained as 
a result of the statement, in a subsequent criminal prosecution 
of the person making the statement.  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial 
Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 178-79 (2004).  As the 
United States Supreme Court has explained: 
No.  2003AP2068.pdr 
 
3 
 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony 
that is incriminating . . . and protects only against 
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could 
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to 
other evidence that might be so used. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The statement Mark made to his parole 
agent cannot be incriminating because he was required to 
truthfully report his activities on the parole report form and 
the State represented to Mark that his statement would not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.   
¶47 Therefore, while I agree with the majority opinion's 
conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) grants a potential ch. 
980 committee the same rights at trial that a criminal defendant 
has at a criminal trial, majority op., ¶2, and that State v. 
Zanelli, 223 Wis. 2d 545, 589 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(Zanelli II) requires the exclusion of evidence in a ch. 980 
trial only if the evidence is testimonial, incriminating and 
compelled, majority op., ¶2, I disagree with the conclusion of 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
Mark's 
written 
statement 
is 
incriminating.  See majority op., ¶33. 
¶48 If Mark's statement is to be excluded from his ch. 980 
trial, according to the standard set out in Zanelli II and 
adopted 
by 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
the 
statement 
must 
be 
incriminating, as well as testimonial and compelled.  Use of a 
statement in a ch. 980 trial does not make the statement 
incriminating, as the court of appeals explained: 
The fact that such statements can be used in a ch. 
980, Stats., case does not mean that the statements 
could incriminate him in a pending or subsequent 
criminal prosecution as ch. 980 is a civil commitment 
proceeding, not a criminal proceeding. 
No.  2003AP2068.pdr 
 
4 
 
Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 568.  Furthermore, the immunity 
granted to Mark on the parole report form prevents use of the 
statement in a criminal prosecution.  Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 235.  
Therefore, 
remanding Mark's 
written 
statement 
for further 
circuit 
court 
determination 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
aforementioned conclusions of Zanelli II and the majority 
opinion's adoption of those criteria for the exclusion of 
evidence at a ch. 980 trial.  Accordingly, because I would 
remand to the circuit court only Mark's oral statement to his 
parole agent, I respectfully concur.  
¶49 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶50 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (Concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(1m) provides, in 
relevant part, that "[a]ll constitutional rights available to a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding are available to the person" 
who is the subject of a sexually-violent-person petition under 
§ 980.02.  The majority concludes that this provision "grants a 
ch. 980 respondent the same rights at his or her ch. 980 
commitment trial as a defendant is entitled to in a criminal 
case."  Majority op., ¶2.  Since a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding has a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the majority reasons that any statements by a 
defendant which are 1) testimonial; 2) compelled; and 3) 
incriminating must be excluded at a ch. 980 commitment trial.  
Majority op., ¶¶28, 42.  The majority defines "incriminating" as 
"statements [that] could incriminate [one] in a pending or 
subsequent criminal prosecution. . . ."  Majority op., ¶29 
(citing State v. Zanelli, ("Zanelli II") 223 Wis. 2d 545, 568, 
589 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1998).  Applying that definition to the 
ch. 980 proceeding, the majority remands two of the four 
statements at issue it determines to be incriminating to the 
circuit court to determine whether those statements were 
compelled.  Majority op., ¶¶30-34.  
¶51 I respectfully disagree with the majority's analysis 
as well as its conclusion.  I conclude that the majority first 
misapplies Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) to provide for constitutional 
protections that do not exist in a ch. 980 proceeding, and then 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
2 
 
mischaracterizes 
Zanelli 
II 
to 
develop 
a 
definition 
of 
"incriminating" which is not grounded in the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and which is inconsistent 
with the definition provided by the United States Supreme Court 
in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980).   
¶52 I conclude that statements made to a parole agent 
would be admissible in a civil ch. 980 proceeding, and that a 
proper application of the Fifth Amendment privilege in such a 
proceeding would result in the exclusion of testimonial, 
compelled, incriminating statements at a subsequent criminal 
proceeding only.  I would thus admit all four statements in the 
ch. 980 proceeding against Mark, but bar their admission in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.  I would also adhere to the 
definition of "incriminating" set forth previously by the United 
States Supreme Court.  I therefore concur in part, and dissent 
in part from the court's decision and mandate.1   
I 
¶53 The Wisconsin Legislature has provided persons being 
tried to determine whether they are sexually violent with all 
constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m). 
 
In 
doing 
so, 
the 
legislature has not spelled out how those rights should be 
applied at a ch. 980 proceeding.   
¶54 At issue in this case is how the Fifth Amendment 
should 
be 
applied 
to 
ch. 
980 
respondents 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
                                                 
1 I join Part III of the majority opinion. 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
3 
 
Constitution 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part, 
that 
"[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself."  U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis 
added).  The majority, in applying Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m), 
apparently reads this provision in conjunction with the statute 
to mean that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to 
ch. 980 proceedings, thereby allowing a person subject to a ch. 
980 proceeding to refuse to answer any questions that may be 
used to incriminate the person in a future criminal case.  The 
majority then applies the label "self-incrimination" to ch. 980 
proceedings, instead of applying the constitutional right that 
is protected.  The constitutional right that is protected is 
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against 
himself in any criminal case, and not merely that no person is 
compelled to be a witness against himself.   
¶55 This court has recognized that ch. 980 proceedings are 
not criminal trials, but are civil proceedings that authorize 
the civil commitment of persons previously convicted of a 
sexually violent offense, who currently suffer from a mental 
disorder that predisposes them to commit such acts.  State v. 
Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 294, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  The purpose 
of civil commitment "is to treat the individual's mental illness 
and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness."  
Id. at 308 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 
(1983)).  The court has specifically held that "ch. 980 was not 
enacted to punish convicted sex offenders but rather to protect 
public safety and treat sexually violent persons."  State v. 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
4 
 
Carpenter, 
197 
Wis. 2d 252, 
274, 
541 
N.W.2d 105 
(1995).  
Consequently, ch. 980 trials are not criminal cases, and as 
such, the Fifth Amendment does not preclude the use of compelled 
incriminating statements in ch. 980 proceedings, so long as 
those 
statements 
are 
not 
used 
in 
subsequent 
criminal 
proceedings.  The Fifth Amendment precludes such use in criminal 
cases only.2  See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) ("Allen 
I"); State v. Lombard, 2004 WI 95, ¶¶42-43, 273 Wis. 2d 538, 684 
N.W.2d 103.  The grant of constitutional rights available to a 
defendant in a criminal prosecution to respondents in a ch. 980 
proceeding does not alter the fundamental character of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
The 
statute 
cannot 
be 
construed 
to 
confer 
nonexistent constitutional rights.3 
                                                 
2 I do not mean to suggest that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege cannot be asserted in a civil proceeding.  It has 
"long been recognized in Wisconsin that a person may invoke the 
fifth amendment in a civil case in order to protect himself [or 
herself] from the use of such evidence against him [or her] in a 
subsequent criminal action . . . ."  Molloy v. Molloy, 46 
Wis. 2d 682, 687, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970) (citation omitted).  
However, "[a]ssertion of the fifth amendment does not itself 
result 
in 
the 
right 
to 
remain 
silent 
in 
the 
face 
of 
interrogation during the course of civil proceedings.  '[T]he 
pendency of criminal proceedings does not by itself excuse a 
witness 
of 
his 
obligation 
to 
give 
testimony 
in 
civil 
proceedings.  Some nexus between the risk of criminal conviction 
and the information requested must exist.'"  B & B Investments 
v. Mirro Corp., 147 Wis. 2d 675, 686, 434 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 
1988) (citation omitted).  The Fifth Amendment privilege is 
protected by precluding the use of any compelled statements in 
subsequent criminal proceedings. 
3 This does not render Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) superfluous.  
Properly applied, that statute would ensure that any compelled 
statements used during a ch. 980 proceeding cannot be used 
against the respondent in any future criminal proceeding.   
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
5 
 
¶56 I would follow the lead of the Illinois Supreme Court 
and 
conclude 
that 
there 
is 
no 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination in sexually-dangerous-person proceedings.  See 
People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 103, 481 N.E.2d 690 (1985) 
("Allen II").  There, the court noted that since treatment, not 
punishment, 
is 
the 
aim 
of 
the 
statute, 
the 
legislative 
determination that the proceedings are civil in nature was 
eminently reasonable.  Id. at 100-01.  The court reasoned that 
"the state has a substantial interest in treating as well as 
protecting the public from sexually dangerous persons," and that 
its substantial interest would be almost totally thwarted by a 
strict application of the privilege.  Id. at 102-03.  As the 
court so aptly put it, "[i]f a defendant is allowed to refuse to 
answer questions during a psychiatric interview then it would be 
nearly impossible for the State to determine whether or not the 
defendant was sexually dangerous."  Id. at 103. 
¶57 The persuasive analysis of the Illinois court is 
certainly 
applicable 
here. 
 
Our 
sexually-dangerous-persons 
provisions, like those in Illinois, are also civil in nature.  
Our statute's purpose, as in Illinois, is to provide treatment 
and to protect the public from sexually-dangerous persons.  
While this case involves statements made to a parole agent as 
opposed to a psychiatrist, to allow a person to refuse to 
truthfully and accurately account to his or her agent the 
person's whereabouts and activities would similarly frustrate 
the purposes of the sexually-dangerous-person provisions by 
making it more difficult to determine if the person was sexually 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
6 
 
dangerous.  It makes perfect sense to require a potential 
committee to communicate with probation and parole agents and 
psychiatrists as part of the process in determining whether the 
person is dangerous and in need of treatment.  We should 
encourage procedures that lead to a proper determination of 
dangerousness, not frustrate them. 
¶58 The Illinois court was mindful of the problems 
associated with allowing a person who might be sexually 
dangerous to refuse to answer questions which might incriminate 
him or her as a means of protecting that person's Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination 
in 
future 
criminal proceedings.   Id. at 103.  The court concluded that to 
allow even a limited privilege "would unduly frustrate the 
purposes of the sexually dangerous persons provisions by making 
it nearly impossible to identify sexually dangerous persons."  
Id.  Accordingly, citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468-69 
(1981), 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
statements 
made 
to 
a 
psychiatrist in a compulsory examination under the sexually-
dangerous person provisions may not be used against him in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.  Id. at 104.  "Consequently, 
defendants must answer all questions at such examinations 
regardless of the possible incriminatory nature of the answers."  
Id.   
¶59 The United States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed 
the procedure approved by the Illinois Supreme Court.  Allen I, 
478 U.S. 364.  The nation's high court noted that Illinois had 
expressly provided that proceedings under the act were civil in 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
7 
 
nature.  Id. at 368.  The Court determined that the state had 
disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for treatment of 
those it commits, and established a system under which committed 
persons could be released permanently or conditionally.  Id. at 
370.  The Court indicated that in Illinois, the "proceedings 
under the Act are accompanied by procedural safeguards usually 
found in criminal trials[,]" including the right to counsel, the 
right to demand a jury trial, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and a burden of proof upon the state beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 371.  Yet, the court concluded that 
the proceedings under the Act were not "criminal" within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id. at 374.   
¶60 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the Illinois Supreme 
Court ruled that a person whom the state attempts to commit 
under the Act is protected from use of the compelled answers in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.  Id. at 368.  Thus, "[w]hat we 
have 
here . . . is 
not 
a 
claim 
that 
petitioner's 
statements . . . might be used to incriminate him in some future 
criminal proceeding, but instead his claim that because the 
sexually-dangerous-person proceeding is itself 'criminal,' he 
was entitled to refuse to answer any questions at all."  Id.  In 
approving the Illinois court's handling of the case, the Court 
concluded that: 
[t]his Court has never held that the Due Process 
Clause of its own force requires application of the 
privilege against self-incrimination in a noncriminal 
proceeding, where the privilege is protected against 
his compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case.  
We decline to do so today.   
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
8 
 
Id. at 374.                        
¶61 I agree with the approach taken by the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Allen II, and approved by the United States 
Supreme Court in Allen I.  Our statute provides a person facing 
commitment with all constitutional rights available to a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, no more and no less.  There 
is 
no 
constitutional 
privilege 
against 
compulsory 
self-
incrimination available to a defendant in a sexually-dangerous-
person proceeding, as the proceeding is civil, not criminal, so 
long as any compelled statements are precluded from use in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.  By excluding statements made 
in anticipation of a ch. 980 proceeding to a probation and 
parole agent in subsequent criminal actions against the person, 
the 
privilege 
against 
compulsory 
self-incrimination 
is 
protected.4  I would not, as an alternative means of protecting 
the privilege in some potential future prosecution, allow a 
defendant to refuse to provide the very answers that would 
enable a court to determine whether he or she should be 
committed as a sexually-dangerous person.  The State of 
Wisconsin has a substantial interest in treating the person's 
                                                 
4 If the State had decided to forego a ch. 980 commitment 
proceeding and instead initiate new criminal charges against 
Mark, then the use and derivative use immunity rule would apply 
to both revocation proceedings and the new criminal charges.  
See State ex rel. Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, ¶¶17-22, 257 
Wis. 2d 40, 654 N.W.2d 438; State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 234, 
252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 825, 
831, 419 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987).  As he was not charged with 
any new crimes as a result of his statements, that rule is not 
applicable or necessary to ch. 980 proceedings if we adopt the 
Illinois procedure.    
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
9 
 
mental illness and protecting that person and society from his 
or her future dangerousness.  Accordingly, I would admit all 
four statements in the ch. 980 proceeding against Mark, but bar 
their admission in subsequent criminal proceedings. 
II 
¶62 The majority defines "incriminating" as "statements 
[that] could incriminate [one] in a pending or subsequent 
criminal prosecution. . . ."  Majority op., ¶29 (citing Zanelli 
II, 223 Wis. 2d at 568.  In doing so, the majority inadvertently 
mischaracterizes Zanelli II by taking the language out of 
context in providing the above definition when, in fact, the 
Zanelli II court was saying something else.  The actual language 
taken from Zanelli II is as follows: 
Zanelli 
never 
specifies 
the 
statements 
he 
is 
challenging and has not set forth any facts to 
establish that he was compelled to choose between 
giving answers that would incriminate him and risking 
revocation of his conditional liberty.  A review of 
the record reveals that Coffey, Miller, and Porter 
testified regarding the 1977 and 1991-92 matters for 
which Zanelli had already been convicted, so such 
statements 
could 
not 
subject 
Zanelli 
to 
future 
criminal prosecution.  Further, any statements about 
Zanelli's background, including his employment and 
family, could not, by themselves, incriminate Zanelli 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution.  The fact that 
such statements can be used in a ch. 980, Stats., case 
does not mean that the statements could incriminate 
him in a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution as 
ch. 980 is a civil commitment proceeding, not a 
criminal proceeding.  See State v. Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d 252, 270-72, 541 N.W.2d 105, 112-13 (1995). 
Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 568 (emphasis added).  
¶63 Zanelli II cited this court's decision in Carpenter 
when it stated that ch. 980 proceedings were civil, not 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
10 
 
criminal.  Carpenter, in turn, cites to the analysis in Allen I 
in determining that the principal purposes of ch. 980 are the 
protection of the public and the treatment of convicted sex 
offenders who are at risk to offend, and not punishment.  
Carpenter, 
197 
Wis. 2d at 
270-72. 
Accordingly, 
instead of 
creating a new definition for "incriminating," the Zanelli II 
court was merely applying Allen I in determining why no 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies to ch. 
980 civil 
proceedings. 
 
A 
new definition 
for 
the 
word 
"incriminating" can be discerned only by adding words to what 
was written by the court and deleting a portion of the sentence, 
and that has the effect of altering the meaning.  I instead view 
Zanelli 
II 
as 
being 
consistent 
with 
Part 
I 
of 
this 
concurring/dissenting opinion, and not creating a new definition 
for the term "incriminating." 
¶64 As the majority notes, "incriminating response" has 
already been defined by the United States Supreme Court.  
Majority op., ¶30.  "By 'incriminating response' we refer to any 
response——whether 
inculpatory 
or 
exculpatory——that 
the 
prosecution may seek to introduce at trial."  Innis, 446 U.S. at 
302 n.5 (emphasis in original).  The Court continued by quoting 
Miranda in the footnote to explain its meaning: 
No distinction can be drawn between statements which 
are direct confessions and statements which amount to 
"admissions" of part or all of an offense. The 
privilege against self-incrimination protects the 
individual 
from 
being 
compelled 
to 
incriminate 
himself in any manner; it does not distinguish 
degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely 
the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between 
inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
11 
 
merely "exculpatory". If a statement made were in 
fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be 
used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely 
intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often 
used to impeach his testimony at trial or to 
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under 
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. 
These statements are incriminating in any meaningful 
sense of the word and may not be used without the 
full warnings and effective waiver required for any 
other statement. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966). 
¶65 I see no reason to deviate from the definition 
provided by our high court in Innis.  That definition is 
perfectly consistent with the Fifth Amendment, which, after all, 
provides that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to 
be a witness against oneself.  Compelling a person to give 
information and then seeking to use that information in a trial 
against that person, whether that information was inculpatory or 
exculpatory, is the same as compelling a person to be a witness 
against oneself.  We must be ever mindful that the privilege to 
be applied is not the label (compulsory self-incrimination), but 
the constitutional provision itself (to not be a witness against 
oneself in a criminal proceeding).  I would not do damage to the 
Fifth Amendment privilege by redefining it, particularly when 
the privilege does not apply to ch. 980 civil proceedings.  
Zanelli II does not redefine "incriminating" or "incriminating 
response;" it merely adopts Carpenter, which in turn adopts 
Allen I.  I would do the same, and avoid satellite litigation on 
what constitutes "incriminating response" down the road.    
 
 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
12 
 
III 
¶66 I conclude that statements made to Mark's parole agent 
are admissible in his civil ch. 980 proceeding, and that a 
proper application of the Fifth Amendment privilege in such a 
proceeding would result in the exclusion of testimonial, 
compelled, incriminating statements at a subsequent criminal 
proceeding only.  I would thus admit all four statements in the 
ch. 980 proceeding against Mark, but bar their admission in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.  I would also adhere to the 
definition of "incriminating" set forth previously by the United 
States Supreme Court.  I therefore concur in part, and dissent 
in part from the court's decision and mandate. 
       
 
No.  2003AP2068.lbb 
 
 
 
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