Title: Warren v. Meisner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000567-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2020

2020 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP567-W 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Milton Eugene Warren, 
          Plaintiff-Petitioner-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael Meisner, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 11, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
Karl Hanson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-petitioner-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Robert N. Meyeroff, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument 
by Robert N. Meyeroff. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Robert G. Probst, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Robert G. Probst. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin State 
Public Defender by Joseph N. Ehmann, regional attorney manager; 
with whom on the brief was Kelli S. Thompson, state public 
defender. There was an oral argument by Joseph N. Ehmann. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee.  
 
 
2020 WI 55 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP567-W 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF2123) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Milton Eugene 
Warren, 
 
          Plaintiff-Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael Meisner, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Milton Eugene 
Warren, seeks review of an unpublished order of the court of 
appeals denying his petition for habeas corpus.1  He filed the 
habeas petition after first unsuccessfully seeking Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Warren v. Meisner, No. 2019AP567-W, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019). 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
2 
 
§ 974.06 (2017-18)2 postconviction relief in the circuit court.3  
In both the habeas petition and the postconviction motion, Warren 
averred ineffective assistance of counsel for alleged errors 
taking place after conviction by the failure to raise a claim that 
his trial counsel was ineffective.   
¶2 
Presented with Warren's postconviction motion, the 
circuit court concluded that Warren had sought relief in the wrong 
forum.  Pursuant to State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 
833 N.W.2d 146, it determined that rather than filing his 
postconviction motion in the circuit court, Warren should instead 
have filed a habeas petition in the court of appeals. 
¶3 
Following 
the 
circuit 
court's 
direction, 
Warren 
subsequently filed a habeas petition in the court of appeals.  The 
court of appeals denied the petition, concluding that Warren did 
not follow the correct procedural mechanism.  Specifically, it 
determined that he should have filed an appeal of the circuit 
court's denial of his postconviction motion rather than a habeas 
petition. 
¶4 
Warren contends that the circuit court and court of 
appeals decisions leave him effectively without a forum for 
resolution of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that 
the proper forum for the claim is in the circuit court.  Further, 
he asserts, and the State agrees, that language from Starks should 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Honorable Karl R. Hanson, Rock County Circuit Court, 
presided. 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
3 
 
be withdrawn because it contradicts the established framework for 
determining the proper forum for his claim. 
¶5 
We reaffirm that the Knight/Rothering4 framework remains 
the correct methodology for determining the appropriate forum for 
a criminal defendant to file a claim relating to the alleged 
ineffectiveness of counsel after conviction.  Both Knight and 
Rothering premised their decisions on the forum in which the 
alleged ineffectiveness took place.  Applying this framework, we 
conclude that the circuit court is the appropriate forum for 
Warren's claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for 
failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel claim.  Further, we 
withdraw paragraph four of Starks because it is contradictory to 
this conclusion.  Additionally, to the extent language in 
paragraphs 30-31, 34-35, and throughout Starks contradicts our 
conclusion in this case, it is also withdrawn.  Finally, we also 
modify paragraph 41 of Starks.   
¶6 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the court of appeals with directions. 
I 
¶7 
Warren was convicted after a jury trial of three drug 
related offenses——possession with intent to deliver more than 50 
grams of heroin, possession of THC as a second or subsequent 
offense, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  Following 
his conviction, and with the assistance of counsel, Warren appealed 
                                                 
4 See State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992); 
State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 
N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam). 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
4 
 
his judgment of conviction.  He pursued a direct appeal without 
first filing in the circuit court a motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30.5 
¶8 
Thus, rather than pursuing a remedy in the circuit court 
through a motion for postconviction relief, Warren filed a notice 
of appeal from his judgments of conviction, proceeding directly to 
the court of appeals.  He raised two issues before the court of 
appeals.  First, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his convictions.  Second, he asserted that the circuit 
court erred by excluding evidence related to prior bad acts that 
Warren wished to use to impeach a witness.   
¶9 
The court of appeals rejected these arguments and 
affirmed Warren's judgments of conviction.  State v. Warren, No. 
2016AP936-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 20, 2017) 
(per curiam).  Warren petitioned for review in this court, which 
was denied. 
                                                 
5  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h): 
The person shall file in circuit court and serve on the 
prosecutor and any other party a notice of appeal or 
motion seeking postconviction or postdisposition relief 
within 60 days after the later of the service of the 
transcript or circuit court case record.  The person 
shall 
file 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction 
or 
postdisposition relief before a notice of appeal is 
filed unless the grounds for seeking relief are 
sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised.  
A postconviction or postdisposition motion under this 
section may not be accompanied by a notice of motion and 
is made when filed.  A notice of appeal filed under this 
section shall conform to the requirements set forth in 
s. 809.10. 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
5 
 
¶10 Subsequently, Warren filed a postconviction motion in 
the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06.6  Although 
neither the original nor an amended postconviction motion is in 
the record in this case, the circuit court characterized the 
arguments made as a contention "that Warren's appellate counsel 
was ineffective for not raising a claim for the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel." 
¶11 The circuit court denied Warren's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
postconviction motion.  It premised its determination on Starks, 
observing that "[i]n the case at bar, the procedural posture is 
nearly identical to that in Starks."  The relevant distinction 
that arises from Starks, according to the circuit court, is that 
between "appellate counsel" and "postconviction counsel."  Because 
the circuit court opined that "[t]his is a case that involves a 
claim for the ineffective assistance of an appellate attorney, as 
that appellation is determined [in Starks,]" it concluded that 
Warren's claim should be brought in the first instance in the court 
of appeals. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(1) provides: 
After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy 
provided in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in custody 
under sentence of a court or a person convicted and 
placed with a volunteers in probation program under s. 
973.11 claiming the right to be released upon the ground 
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. 
constitution or the constitution or laws of this state, 
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the 
maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to 
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the 
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
6 
 
¶12 Following the denial of this postconviction motion in 
the circuit court, Warren filed a petition for habeas corpus, often 
referred to as a Knight7 petition, in the court of appeals.  Again, 
Warren alleged that his counsel on direct appeal "performed 
deficiently by failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness."  
State ex rel. Warren v. Meisner, No. 2019AP567-W, unpublished order 
at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019). 
¶13 The court of appeals denied Warren's habeas petition 
without ordering a response.  Observing that "Warren's writ 
petition makes no mention of the postconviction motion proceedings 
that followed his direct appeal," it determined that "[t]o the 
extent Warren seeks relief from the order denying the motion, his 
remedy lies not by writ, but by appeal of that order.  A petition 
for supervisory writ is not a substitute for an appeal."  Id. 
(citing State ex rel. Dressler v. Cir. Ct. for Racine Cty., 163 
Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991)).  Warren moved 
for reconsideration, which the court of appeals denied, and he 
subsequently petitioned for review in this court. 
II 
¶14 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' order 
denying Warren's petition for habeas corpus.  In our review, we 
are asked to determine the appropriate forum when a defendant 
asserts ineffective assistance of counsel for errors that take 
                                                 
7 "Habeas petitions to the court of appeals alleging 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are often referred to 
as 'Knight petitions.'"  State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 WI 
38, ¶27 n.11, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805; see Knight, 168 
Wis. 2d 509. 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
7 
 
place after conviction by the failure to raise the ineffectiveness 
of trial counsel.  This is a question of law reviewed independently 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  See State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 WI 38, ¶16, 354 
Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805. 
III 
¶15 We begin by setting forth the development of our case 
law regarding the proper forum for claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel resulting from alleged errors that take place after 
conviction.  Subsequently, we apply this case law to the facts of 
this case.  We finally discuss the remedy to which Warren is 
entitled. 
¶16 This court has previously stated that the traditional 
rule "has been that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
premised on errors occurring before the circuit court should be 
pursued in the circuit court and claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel premised on errors occurring before the appellate court 
should be pursued in the court of appeals."  Id., ¶25 (citing State 
v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶32, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334).  
This framework began its development in the seminal case of State 
v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). 
¶17 In Knight, the defendant alleged that his attorney on 
appeal provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise certain 
arguments before the court of appeals.  Id. at 513.  The court 
addressed what was at that time a question of first impression in 
Wisconsin:  "the proper procedure by which a defendant may assert 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
8 
 
a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel . . . ."  
Id. at 514. 
¶18 Resolving this question, the Knight court concluded 
"that to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, a defendant should petition the appellate court that heard 
the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus."  Id. at 520.  In arriving 
at this determination, the court focused on the fact that "[t]he 
appellate court will be familiar with the case and the appellate 
proceedings."  Id. at 521.  The appellate court is therefore "a 
more appropriate and better suited forum than is the circuit court 
to determine whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient 
and prejudiced the defendant's appeal."  Id. 
¶19 The court of appeals added an additional piece to the 
Knight framework in State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 
Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).  In 
Rothering, the defendant alleged "the failure of postconviction 
counsel to bring a postconviction motion before the trial court to 
withdraw his plea and raising the issue of ineffective trial 
counsel."  Id. at 679.   
¶20 Just as the court in Knight focused on where the alleged 
ineffectiveness occurred, the Rothering court similarly focused 
its analysis.  "In choosing the appellate court as the appropriate 
forum for addressing allegations of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, an admittedly close call, the supreme court [in 
Knight] sought to pick the forum where the allegedly ineffective 
conduct occurred."  Id.  Indeed, where ineffectiveness is alleged 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
9 
 
in the court of appeals, it is the appellate court that "has 
familiarity with the case and appellate proceedings."  Id.   
¶21 In Rothering, unlike in Knight, "[t]he allegedly 
deficient conduct is not what occurred before [the court of 
appeals] but rather what should have occurred before the trial 
court by a motion filed by postconviction counsel."  Id.  It is 
the circuit court, and not the court of appeals, that possesses 
the necessary background in such a case.  Id. at 679-80 (explaining 
that the court of appeals "does not have any familiarity with the 
claims of ineffective trial counsel and whether the plea should be 
withdrawn as they were never raised in [the court of appeals]").   
¶22 The court of appeals thus concluded that "a Knight 
petition is not the proper vehicle for seeking redress of the 
alleged deficiencies of postconviction counsel."  Id. at 679.  
Instead, "a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel should be raised in the trial court either by a petition 
for habeas corpus or a motion under § 974.06, Stats."  Id. at 681. 
¶23 The key distinction the Rothering court drew was between 
"appellate" counsel and "postconviction" counsel.  Id. at 678; 
Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶32.  It offered some guidance in 
distinguishing 
between 
the 
two, 
observing 
two 
"principal 
manifestations of appellate representation:" briefing and oral 
argument.  Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 678-79 (quoting Watson v. 
United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1057 (D.C. 1987)).  However, the 
court of appeals also recognized "that often postconviction 
counsel and appellate counsel are the same person."  Id. at 678 
n.4. 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
10 
 
¶24 This 
court 
indicated 
that 
it 
was 
applying 
the 
Knight/Rothering framework in Starks, 349 Wis. 2d 274, ¶4.  In 
Starks, the defendant filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction 
motion with the circuit court, "alleging that the attorney who 
handled his appeal was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims."  Id., ¶2. 
¶25 At the outset of its opinion, the Starks court observed 
what it termed a "procedural problem."  Id., ¶4.  Specifically, it 
stated: 
Starks's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, which was filed 
with the circuit court, alleged ineffective assistance 
of postconviction counsel.  However, the attorney who 
represented him after his conviction did not file any 
postconviction motions and instead pursued a direct 
appeal.  He was thus not Starks's postconviction counsel 
but was rather his appellate counsel.  This is 
significant because claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel must be filed in the form of a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus with the court of appeals.  
By bringing his claim in the circuit court, Starks 
pursued his case in the wrong forum. 
Id. (citing Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 520). 
¶26 Following this court's decision in Starks, both Starks 
and the State moved for reconsideration.  As explained in a 
concurrence to the denial of the motion for reconsideration: 
Both parties took issue with the court's discussion in 
the above-quoted paragraph 4.  Both parties contended 
that on the facts of the case, Starks was correct in 
challenging the effectiveness of postconviction counsel 
and thus correct in filing his § 974.06 motion in the 
circuit court.  Correspondingly, both parties contended 
that this court's characterization of Starks's motion as 
a challenge to the effectiveness of appellate counsel 
was incorrect and its assertion that Starks should have 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
11 
 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court 
of appeals was thus mistaken. 
State v. Starks, 2014 WI 91, ¶21, 357 Wis. 2d 142, 849 N.W.2d 724 
(denying reconsideration) (Prosser, J., concurring).8 
¶27 The court denied the motion for reconsideration.  It 
further declined to withdraw the language from its original opinion 
in Starks.   
¶28 In the present case, in analyzing whether Warren had 
properly filed his motion in the circuit court, the circuit court 
observed the dissonance between the Knight/Rothering framework and 
Starks:  "Whereas the Rothering court found that an appellate 
attorney who fails to file a postconviction motion is nonetheless 
postconviction counsel——at least as to the decision to not file 
the postconviction motion——the Starks court found just the 
opposite."  Following its reading of Starks, the circuit court 
thus determined that "[t]he Supreme Court in Starks overruled the 
Court of Appeals' holding in Rothering as to when an attorney is 
                                                 
8 In addition to this argument, the parties raised two 
additional issues on reconsideration.  First, Starks argued that 
the court should "reconsider its assessment of his substantive 
claims 'because that assessment conflicts with controlling and 
apparently overlooked legal standards.'"  State v. Starks, 2014 WI 
91, ¶24, 357 Wis. 2d 142, 849 N.W.2d 724 (denying reconsideration) 
(Prosser, J., concurring).  Second, the State asserted that 
paragraph 41 of the Starks opinion should be modified because it 
relied on case law that had been superseded by statute.  Id., ¶25; 
see State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶41, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 
N.W.2d 146. 
The first of these arguments has no bearing on the issues 
before us in this appeal and accordingly will not be addressed 
further.  Modification of paragraph 41 of the Starks opinion is 
addressed infra at ¶¶41-43. 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
12 
 
considered appellate counsel" and accordingly concluded that 
Warren's claim was filed in the wrong forum. 
¶29 This case now presents the court with an opportunity to 
examine this language of Starks and in essence revisit one of the 
issues presented on reconsideration. 
IV 
¶30 We turn next to apply the framework created by the above-
cited case law to the facts of this case. 
¶31 As a starting point, there is much agreement between the 
parties.  Neither party seeks to alter the longstanding 
Knight/Rothering framework or questions its continued vitality.  
Further, the parties agree that the circuit court is the proper 
forum for Warren's claim.   
¶32 We agree with the parties on both of these points.  
First, we reaffirm that the Knight/Rothering framework remains the 
correct methodology for determining the appropriate forum for a 
criminal defendant to file a claim relating to the alleged 
ineffectiveness of counsel after conviction.   
¶33 Both Knight and Rothering premised their decisions on 
the forum in which the alleged ineffectiveness took place.  In 
Knight, the court noted that "[t]he appellate court will be 
familiar with the case and the appellate proceedings[,]" so it is 
a better forum for determining questions of the ineffectiveness of 
appellate counsel.  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 521.  Likewise, in 
Rothering the court observed that the court of appeals "does not 
have any familiarity with the claims of ineffective trial counsel" 
and is ill-suited to address "the conduct of postconviction counsel 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
13 
 
and issues which were never preserved for appeal."  Rothering, 205 
Wis. 2d at 679. 
¶34 Such an approach makes eminent sense.  The circuit court 
reviews allegations of conduct that took place (or should have 
taken place) before the circuit court, and an appellate court 
examines allegations of conduct that took place (or should have 
taken place) before it.  This division of labor allows each court 
to play to its strengths and to answer questions applying its 
unique expertise.  See Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 521 (explaining that 
an appellate court is "better suited . . . than is the circuit 
court to determine whether appellate counsel's performance was 
deficient and prejudiced the defendant's appeal" because "[t]hese 
determinations involve questions of law within the appellate 
court's expertise and authority to decide de novo"). 
¶35 Perhaps some of the confusion that appears to have arisen 
regarding this framework is due to the nomenclature that decisions 
have used describing "appellate counsel" and "postconviction 
counsel."  Indeed, these two terms often refer to the same person.  
Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 678 n.4. 
¶36 Rather than a determination of "who" committed the 
error, we think it clearer to focus the inquiry on "where" the 
alleged ineffectiveness occurred.  If the acts or omissions that 
constitute alleged ineffective assistance of counsel took place in 
the circuit court, then the circuit court is the proper forum for 
such claims to be filed in the first instance.  Likewise, alleged 
errors occurring in an appellate court are best addressed in the 
appellate court where the alleged error occurred. 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
14 
 
¶37 Certain language in Starks contradicts this framework, 
and we hereby withdraw paragraph four of that opinion because it 
is inconsistent with our determination in the present case.  See 
Starks, 349 Wis. 2d 274, ¶4.  Specifically, the Starks court 
labeled an attorney who "did not file any postconviction motions 
and instead pursued a direct appeal" as "appellate counsel."  Id.  
Therefore, it determined that the claim should have been filed in 
the form of a petition for habeas corpus in the court of appeals.  
Id. 
¶38 Additionally, the State cautions that some language in 
paragraphs 30-31 and 34-35 of Starks may also be interpreted to 
overrule the Knight/Rothering framework because it refers to 
Starks's challenge as one to his appellate counsel rather than 
postconviction counsel.  To the extent that language in these 
paragraphs and any other language throughout Starks contradicts 
our holding today, the language cannot stand and is also withdrawn. 
¶39 The Starks court's determination that the defendant's 
challenge was to "appellate counsel" was incorrect under the 
Knight/Rothering framework, which we reaffirm in the present case.  
The claim of ineffectiveness made in Starks was that counsel was 
ineffective "for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims."  Id., ¶2.  That is, Starks alleged that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to file a motion for postconviction 
relief and seek a Machner hearing.9  This is an error of omission 
                                                 
9 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979). 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
15 
 
that took place in the circuit court.  The time for filing this 
motion was prior to the filing of a notice of appeal, and such a 
Machner hearing would have taken place before the circuit court. 
¶40 Nothing in the Starks opinion provides any indication 
that the court intended to modify the Knight/Rothering framework.10  
As stated above, such a framework remains the law.  Thus, we 
withdraw paragraph four in Starks. 
¶41 We diverge briefly from the issues as presented by the 
parties.  The State Public Defender, as amicus, asks us to withdraw 
language from paragraph 41 in Starks.  In the interest of avoiding 
confusion, we grant this request.  See Starks, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 
¶41.   
¶42 At paragraph 41, the Starks court wrote, "A defendant 
may file a § 974.06 motion only after he has 'exhausted his direct 
remedies[,] which consist of a motion for a new trial and [an] 
appeal.'"  Id. (quoting Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381, 
195 N.W.2d 837 (1972)).  The State Public Defender contends that 
this language incorrectly implies that Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
litigation is available only after a person has taken a direct 
appeal. 
                                                 
10 See Starks, 357 Wis. 2d 142, ¶49 (denying reconsideration) 
(Prosser, J., concurring) ("In any event, no one on the court 
disputes the basic correctness of the holdings in Knight and 
Rothering as to where to file a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel or a 
§ 974.06 motion challenging the effectiveness of postconviction 
counsel, for not challenging, or deficiently challenging, the 
alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel."). 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
16 
 
¶43 An examination of the relevant statutes confirms that 
amicus is correct.  The language in the 1972 Peterson decision, on 
which Starks relies, was superseded by a statutory amendment 
enacted in 1977.  See § 130, ch. 187, Laws of 1977.  This amendment 
changed the language of Wis. Stat. § 974.06 to provide:  "After 
the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 
has expired," a postconviction motion pursuant to § 974.06 may be 
filed.  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1).  As this statute provides that a 
§ 974.06 motion may be filed after the time for direct appeal has 
expired, and the ability to file such a motion is not tied to a 
direct appeal actually being taken, we withdraw the sentence in 
paragraph 41 of Starks that suggests otherwise. 
¶44 Returning to the parties' issues at hand, we next apply 
the Knight/Rothering framework.  We agree with the parties that 
the proper forum for Warren's claim is in the circuit court.  As 
the circuit court stated, Warren argued that his counsel after 
conviction "was ineffective for not raising a claim for the 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel."   
¶45 The alleged error is one of omission (failing to file a 
motion for postconviction relief) that took place in the circuit 
court.  Had Warren's attorney on appeal raised a claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective, a Machner hearing would have been 
requested in the circuit court.  No proceedings in the court of 
appeals would have immediately resulted had counsel filed a motion 
for postconviction relief.  The alleged error thus occurred prior 
to the filing of the notice of appeal.  Pursuant to the established 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
17 
 
and now reaffirmed Knight/Rothering framework, the proper forum 
for such a claim is the circuit court.   
¶46 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court is the 
appropriate forum for Warren's claim that postconviction counsel 
was ineffective for failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel 
claim.  
V 
¶47 Having determined that the proper forum for Warren's 
claim is the circuit court, we turn next to the proper remedy. 
¶48 "Habeas corpus is essentially an equitable doctrine, and 
a court of equity has authority to tailor a remedy for the 
particular facts."  State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 
288, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977).  In fashioning a remedy here, we seek 
to fulfill three goals.  First, Warren's claim must be heard on 
the merits.  As analyzed above, the circuit court erroneously 
dismissed Warren's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion due to the now-
withdrawn language in Starks.  The State agrees that Warren is 
entitled to his day in court.  
¶49 Second, we must respect the fact that it is the court of 
appeals' decision we are reviewing and not the circuit court's.  
Although the circuit court's decision is essential to our analysis, 
that decision is not before us——this is a writ case, separate and 
distinct from Warren's criminal case.  See State ex rel. Fuentes 
v. Wis. Ct. App., Dist. IV, 225 Wis. 2d 446, 450, 593 N.W.2d 48 
(1999) ("Although a habeas corpus petition normally arises out of 
criminal proceedings, it is a separate civil action founded upon 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
18 
 
principles of equity.").  This case, as it comes to this court, 
originated at the court of appeals. 
¶50 Third, we must make clear that Warren's initial Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 motion was properly filed.  This is important in 
relation to Warren's rights to federal habeas review.  Indeed, a 
"properly filed" postconviction motion tolls the one-year 
limitations period for a federal habeas petition:  "The time during 
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 
limitation under this subsection."  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see 
State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶24 n.5, 290 
Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900. 
¶51 Keeping in mind these three goals, we remand the case to 
the court of appeals with directions to remand to the circuit court 
for Rock County to construe the habeas petition as a Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 postconviction motion.11  This remedy provides Warren with 
                                                 
11 Our precedent indicates that this court has the authority 
to construe Warren's Knight petition as a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion and transfer it to the appropriate court.  See State ex 
rel. L'Minggio v. Gamble, 2003 WI 82, ¶25, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667 
N.W.2d 1 (construing petition for habeas corpus as petition for 
certiorari and transferring to circuit court); bin-Rilla v. 
Israel, 
113 
Wis. 2d 514, 
523-24, 
335 
N.W.2d 384 
(1983) 
(transferring a 
habeas petition challenging conditions of 
confinement that was filed in the court of appeals to the circuit 
court because "the circuit court is better suited than the court 
of appeals or this court to process this petition"). (continued) 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
19 
 
a determination on the merits of his claim in the circuit court 
and acknowledges that this case originated in the court of appeals.  
We determine further that Warren's original Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion in the circuit court was properly filed. 
¶52 In sum, we reaffirm that the Knight/Rothering framework 
remains the correct methodology for determining the appropriate 
forum for a criminal defendant to file a claim relating to the 
alleged ineffectiveness of counsel after conviction.  Both Knight 
and Rothering premised their decisions on the forum in which the 
alleged ineffectiveness took place.  Applying this framework, we 
conclude that the circuit court is the appropriate forum for 
Warren's claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for 
failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel claim.  Further, we 
withdraw paragraph four of Starks because it is contradictory to 
this conclusion.  Additionally, to the extent language in 
paragraphs 30-31, 34-35, and throughout Starks contradicts our 
conclusion in this case, it is also withdrawn.  Finally, we also 
modify paragraph 41 of Starks.     
                                                 
See also Wis. Stat. § 807.07(2) ("If the tribunal from which 
an appeal is taken had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and 
the court to which the appeal is taken has such jurisdiction, the 
court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was 
commenced in the good faith and belief that the first named 
tribunal possessed jurisdiction, allow it to proceed as if 
originally commenced in the proper court and shall allow the 
pleadings and proceedings to be amended accordingly; and in all 
cases every court where objection to its jurisdiction is sustained 
the cause shall be certified to some court having jurisdiction, 
provided it appears that the error arose from mistake."). 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
20 
 
¶53 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the court of appeals with directions.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals with directions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2019AP567-W   
 
 
 
1