Title: Davis v. Montevallo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022-0911
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2023

Rel: January 13, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210016 
_________________________ 
 
Ed Davis 
 
v.  
 
City of Montevallo 
 
 
 
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court 
(CV-2017-000495) 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
Employer-employee relationships sometimes sour and lead to 
claims that one side or the other has breached a contract.  Occasionally, 
1210016 
2 
 
we have held that an employee handbook created the contract that was 
breached.  We have reached that result only when -- as here -- the 
handbook's text required it.  In this case, Ed Davis sued the City of 
Montevallo ("the City") in the Shelby Circuit Court, claiming that the 
City was in breach of contract because, in terminating his employment 
with the City, it failed to follow certain discharge procedures set out in 
an employee handbook it had issued to him.  The City responded by 
arguing it was not required to follow the handbook's procedures because 
Davis was an at-will employee.  After entertaining motions for summary 
judgment from both sides, the trial court ruled in favor of the City.  Davis 
now appeals.  We reverse the judgment and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In May 1998, the Montevallo Recreation Board Number Two ("the 
Golf Board"), which administered the Montevallo Golf Course ("the Golf 
Course") on behalf of the City, hired Davis to manage the Golf Course.   
In December 2007, Davis received a copy of the City's Employee 
Handbook ("the Handbook").  Shortly after receiving the Handbook, 
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Davis signed an acknowledgment of receipt and acceptance of its terms, 
which reads: 
"I acknowledge having been given a City of Montevallo 
Personnel Handbook and have been asked to carefully read it.  
I have been informed that I may ask my supervisor any 
questions that I do not understand.  I understand that 
nothing in this Handbook can be interpreted to be a contract 
for employment for any specified period of time or to place a 
limitation on my freedom or the City's freedom to terminate 
the employment relationship at any time.  I also understand 
that the City retains the freedom to change the Policies and 
Procedures with the approval of the Mayor and City Council." 
 
The Handbook has been amended over the years, and it was last 
amended in 2014.  
In July 2015, the City issued an ordinance dissolving the Golf Board 
and assuming direct and exclusive responsibility for the administration 
of the Golf Course and its employees.  The ordinance gave Davis the 
opportunity to remain employed with the City on an "at-will" basis, under 
the direct supervision of the City's Mayor.  
That August, Mayor Hollie Cost determined that Davis had 
violated several provisions of the Handbook.  As a result, she terminated 
Davis's employment.  The City later concluded that, under the Handbook, 
Davis would not receive payment for his accrued leave and personal time.   
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Davis sued the City, claiming that the City had breached its 
contract with him by failing to follow certain discharge procedures in the 
Handbook when it terminated his employment.  The City answered 
Davis's complaint and later moved for summary judgment. Davis then 
filed his own motion for partial summary judgment.  The trial court 
granted the City's motion and denied Davis's.  Davis timely appealed. 
Standard of Review 
 
"We review the trial court's grant or denial of a summary-judgment 
motion de novo, and we use the same standard used by the trial court to 
determine whether the evidence presented to the trial court presents a 
genuine issue of material fact."   Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
952 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala. 2006).  A motion for summary judgment should 
be granted only when the evidence demonstrates that "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Ala. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see 
also Reichert v. City of Mobile, 776 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 2000).  To defeat 
a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must present 
substantial evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact.  See 
Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168 (Ala. 2003).  Substantial 
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evidence is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons 
in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence 
of the fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of 
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). 
Analysis 
 
This case presents two issues: (1) whether the City was bound to 
follow the procedures provided in the Handbook when it terminated 
Davis's employment and (2) if so, whether the City followed those 
procedures.  Resolution of these issues turns on the language of the 
Handbook, which we examine below.  That examination requires us to 
hold that the City was contractually bound to follow the Handbook's 
discharge procedures.  But, because the trial court has not yet addressed 
the factual issue of whether the City followed those procedures, we 
remand the case for the court to make that determination.  
A. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
We begin by considering whether, as a matter of law, the Handbook 
created a unilateral contract between Davis and the City.  Davis argues 
that, based on a reasonable reading of the Handbook, it did.  We agree.  
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"[T]he rule is well settled in Alabama that an employee contract at 
will may be terminated by either party with or without cause or 
justification."  Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 
(Ala. 1987).  That is, either party may terminate an at-will employment 
relationship for a good reason, a wrong reason, or for no reason at all.  Id.  
But, regardless of an employer's reason for terminating the relationship, 
"[t]his Court has recognized that an employee handbook can represent a 
binding contract obligating an employer to satisfy certain conditions 
precedent to dismissing an employee."  Harper v. Winston Cnty., 892 So. 
2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004).  
To determine whether an employee handbook constitutes an offer 
to create a unilateral contract, we apply a three-part test.  Hoffman-La 
Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735.  First, the language in the handbook must be 
"specific enough to constitute an offer."  Id.  Second, "the offer must have 
been communicated to the employee by issuance of the handbook, or 
otherwise."  Id.  And third, "the employee must have accepted the offer 
by retaining employment after he has become generally aware of the 
offer."  Id.   
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No one disputes that the second and third requirements are 
satisfied here; the parties' sole disagreement is whether the language of 
the Handbook was specific enough to constitute an offer.  That inquiry is 
objective: "'Whether a proposal is meant to be an offer for a unilateral 
contract is determined by the outward manifestations of the parties, not 
by their subjective intentions.'"  Id. at 731 (citation omitted).  A handbook 
containing discharge procedures is thus specific enough to constitute an 
offer when the parties' outward manifestations are "clear enough that an 
employee … could reasonably believe that, as long as he worked within 
the guidelines set out in the handbook, he would not be terminated until 
all procedures set out in the handbook had been followed."  Id. at 736-37 
(footnote omitted).  
We thus turn to the language of the Handbook.  Article 1 states that 
its "rules, regulations, and other administrative provisions for personnel 
administration are established for the information and guidance of all 
concerned," but also states that "[t]he rules herein established shall apply 
to all regular full-time, part-time, and classified employees of the City."  
Article 9 then specifies that "[t]he following procedures shall be followed 
1210016 
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when the Department Head or Mayor proposes to … dismiss a regular, 
classified employee."1  
Under Article 9, the City must first provide "written notice" that 
"shall advise the employee" of several aspects of what it calls a 
"Determination Hearing."  The City must notify the employee that (1) "a 
Determination Hearing will be held and the date, time and place of such 
hearing"; (2) "the Determination Hearing will be held to consider the 
charges against the employee and the intent of the disciplinary action 
being taken against the employee"; and (3) "at the Determination 
Hearing the employee may be accompanied by anyone of his choosing and 
will be afforded the opportunity to respond to the charges orally or in 
writing."  
Once the employee receives "written notice setting forth the charges 
against him/her and the intent of the disciplinary action,"2 the City has 
 
1It is undisputed that Davis was a "regular, classified employee," 
which the Handbook defines as persons who "are appointed/discharged 
based on recommendation by the Department Head and approved by the 
Mayor and City Council."  
 
2It was suggested at oral argument that, because these provisions 
guarantee procedures relating to "charges" against an employee, no at-
will employee could reasonably believe that they apply to him.  But this 
 
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five working days to conduct a Determination Hearing, during which "the 
evidence against the employee shall be explained and the employee shall 
be afforded opportunity to respond orally or in writing."  The Mayor then 
has three working days from the conclusion of the hearing to issue her 
decision, which "shall be promptly delivered to the employee."  That 
decision must advise the employee (1) "[o]f the decision"; (2) "[o]f the date 
on which the discipline to be imposed, if any, is to become effective"; and 
(3) "[if] the decision is to … dismiss the employee, that the employee has 
a right to appeal such action" in writing within five working days of the 
employee's receipt of the decision, according to appellate procedures also 
included in Article 9.  If the employee fails to appeal within that time, 
"all rights to appeal are extinguished."   
Article 9 also applies to employees, such that the tenure "of every 
employee shall be conditioned on satisfactory conduct of the employee 
 
argument confuses procedural and substantive guarantees.  For 
instance, if an employer guarantees each employee a monthly statement 
of income earned by that employee, that guarantee applies even when the 
statement reads: "$0.00."  Likewise, a guarantee of notice of charges 
against an employee is not empty or illusory just because the employer 
could state to its at-will employee: "There are no charges."  This is 
especially true when, as here, such notice is a step along the path to other 
procedural guarantees, like an appeal.  
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and continued satisfactory performance of assigned duties and 
responsibilities."  And it is "the duty of each employee to maintain high 
standards of conduct, cooperation, efficiency, economy and performance 
in work for the City."   
The Handbook's pervasive use of "shall" demonstrates that the 
discharge procedures in Article 9 are binding.  See Ex parte Brasher, 555 
So. 2d 192, 194 (Ala. 1989) ("The word 'shall' … usually indicates that the 
requirement is mandatory."); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 11 at 112 
(Thomson/West 2012) ("Mandatory words impose a duty; permissive 
words grant discretion.").  And the mandatory meaning of "shall" here is 
made clear by examining it alongside the Handbook's use of "may."  See 
Ex parte Mobile Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 61 So. 3d 292, 294 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2010) ("Ordinarily, the use of the word 'may' indicates a 
discretionary or permissive act, rather than a mandatory act.").  For 
instance, Section 4 of Article 9 provides a list of disciplinary actions that 
"may be implemented by the Department Head or his/her designee, or 
the Mayor."  (Emphasis added.)  One such disciplinary action is demotion: 
"An employee may be demoted from his/her existing position for cause 
1210016 
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after consultation of the Mayor."  (Emphasis added.)  That is, the Mayor 
has discretion to demote or not.  But, "[i]n such event, the procedure set 
forth below in Article 9, Section 5 shall be followed, and any such 
demotion shall not be subject to the grievance procedure set forth in 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE SECTION."  (Capitalization in original; 
emphasis added.)  The Handbook's precise use of mandatory and 
permissive language demonstrates that the City knowingly chose to draft 
some provisions that are binding and others that are nonbinding.  The 
use of "shall" in the discharge procedures in Article 9 thus indicates that 
the City was bound to follow them. 
An employee, faced with such exhaustive, mandatory language, 
"could reasonably believe that, as long as he worked within the guidelines 
set out in the handbook, he would not be terminated until all procedures 
set out in the handbook had been followed."  Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 
2d at 736-37 (footnote omitted).  While the Handbook was "established 
for the information and guidance of all concerned," it strains common 
sense to read its step-by-step procedures as a nonbinding "mere general 
statement of policy," and a reasonable employee would not do so.  Id. at 
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734.  Accordingly, the Handbook was specific enough to constitute an 
offer.   
The City makes several arguments in the alternative that it was 
nonetheless not bound to follow the discharge procedures in the 
Handbook.  Each of these arguments is unavailing.   
1. The Fact that Davis's Employment Remained At-Will 
The City argues that there could not have been a contract with 
Davis because he was undisputedly an at-will employee.  But whether 
the relationship was at-will is irrelevant to whether the City had to follow 
certain procedures if it decided to terminate his employment.  That is, 
the reason for terminating an employment relationship is distinct from 
the means used to terminate that relationship.  An employer and an 
employee are free to contract regarding procedures that each will follow 
when terminating the relationship without also agreeing to terminate 
that relationship only for just cause.  Indeed, the Handbook's language 
suggests that it was drafted to achieve this result.  It states: "The 
following are examples of causes that shall be sufficient cause for 
reprimand, suspension, demotion or dismissal."  Although it qualifies its 
list of causes for discharge as a nonexclusive list of "examples," it does 
1210016 
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not likewise qualify the procedures for discharge.  Cf. Campisi v. Scoles 
Cadillac, Inc., 611 So. 2d 296, 299 (Ala. 1992).  Our decision today thus 
leaves untouched our longstanding rule "that an employee contract at 
will may be terminated by either party with or without cause or 
justification." Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 728.  But, at the same 
time, we emphasize that, where the language of an employee handbook 
sufficiently provides, "an employee handbook can represent a binding 
contract obligating an employer to satisfy certain conditions precedent to 
dismissing an employee."  Harper, 892 So. 2d at 351. 
2. Whether the City Disclaimed the Existence of a Contract 
The City next contends that the Handbook could not have created 
a contract because, it says, the acknowledgment that Davis signed after 
receiving the Handbook contained language that unambiguously 
disclaimed that the Handbook was a contract.  As the City notes, an 
employer that "does not wish the policies contained in the employee 
handbook to be construed as an offer for a unilateral contract ... is free to 
so state in the handbook."  Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 734.  Nor 
can a handbook that expressly disclaims the existence of a contract 
"reasonably be construed to constitute a unilateral contract of 
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employment, as a matter of law."  Abney v. Baptist Med. Ctrs., 597 So. 
2d 682, 683 (Ala. 1992).   
 
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly held that no contract exists when 
the employee handbook contains an unambiguous disclaimer of a 
contract.  In McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 484 So. 2d 398 
(Ala. 1986), our Court held that an offer did not exist when the employees 
signed an acknowledgment stating that "'[t]his Handbook and the 
policies contained herein do not in any way constitute, and should not be 
construed as a contract of employment between the employer and the 
employee, or a promise of employment.'"  Id. at 400.  This Court later 
spotlighted the disclaimer from McCluskey as an exemplar of the kind of 
unambiguous statement that an employer should make "if the employer 
does not wish the policies contained in an employee handbook to be 
construed as an offer for a unilateral contract." Hoffman-La Roche, 512 
So. 2d at 734.  And in Abney v. Baptist Medical Centers, this Court held 
that an employer had successfully disclaimed a contract by providing that 
"'[t]he policies in this booklet are not an expressed or implied contract of 
employment.'"  597 So. 2d at 682 (emphasis omitted).  Accordingly, if the 
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City is correct that the acknowledgment disclaims any contract 
whatsoever, then the acknowledgment would knock out Davis's claim.  
 
But the disclaimer at issue here bears little resemblance to the 
sweeping disclaimers in McCluskey and Abney.  The text of the signed 
acknowledgment does not disclaim the existence of any contract.  Rather, 
it uses qualifying language to disclaim only certain kinds of contracts.  
The acknowledgment first states that "nothing in this handbook can be 
interpreted to be a contract for employment for any specified period of 
time."  (Emphasis added.)  The qualifying language "for any specified 
period of time" indicates that the City sought to disclaim a contract for a 
certain duration of employment -- not any contract affecting the terms of 
the employment relationship.  And this Court has refused to find "'the 
indefinite nature of the time period for performance to be a bar to 
enforcement of a unilateral contract.'"  Stinson v. American Sterilizer 
Co., 570 So. 2d 618, 621 (Ala. 1990) (quoting Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 
2d at 734).  This language is thus not probative of whether a contract to 
follow the Handbook's discharge procedures exists.  
The acknowledgment also states that the Handbook cannot be 
interpreted to "place a limitation on [Davis's] freedom or the City's 
1210016 
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freedom to terminate the employment relationship at any time."  If this 
provision is read in isolation from the Handbook to which it refers, it 
could be understood to mean that, at the drop of a hat, the City could 
discharge Davis as its employee with no or minimal notice.  But "'we 
must examine the [text] as a whole and, if possible, give effect to each 
section.'"  City of Pinson v. Utilities Bd. of Oneonta, 986 So. 2d 367, 371 
(Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 309 
(Ala. 2005)).  And "'[t]he provisions of a text should be interpreted in a 
way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.'"  State ex rel. 
Allison v. Farris, 194 So. 3d 214, 219 (Ala. 2015) (quoting Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law at 180).  When we read the "place a limitation" 
statement in conjunction with the procedures the City promised to use to 
terminate the employment relationship, it is clear that the 
acknowledgment reserves merely the parties' right to terminate the 
relationship according to the Handbook's provisions at any time.  Because 
the City need not give up its "freedom to terminate the employment 
relationship at any time" in order to follow the Handbook's discharge 
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procedures, sound interpretation precludes us from reading those 
procedures out of the contract.3   
If the City wanted to disclaim a contract outright, it easily could 
have.  The simplest way would have been to adopt the disclaimer used in 
McCluskey and reiterated in Hoffman-La Roche.  But the City chose to 
disclaim only a contract for a certain duration or a contract that altered 
the at-will nature of the employment relationship, neither of which the 
Handbook's discharge procedures affect.  The acknowledgment thus does 
not disclaim those procedures as contractually binding.  
3. Whether the City's Promise Was Illusory 
Finally, the City contends that the Handbook is not a contract 
because the City reserved the right to change its terms unilaterally when 
it provided in the acknowledgment that "the City retains the freedom to 
change the Policies and Procedures with the approval of the Mayor and 
City Council."  But when an at-will employee continues employment after 
receiving a handbook with procedural guarantees, "'the employer is 
 
3The City suggested at oral argument that Article 9 might still be 
relevant to the extent that it applies to a class of non-at-will employees.  
But the City did not make that argument below and has not identified 
any evidence in the record suggesting that such a class of non-at-will 
employees exists.  
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bound by those policies insofar as they have accrued to an employee for 
performance rendered while they were in effect and have not been 
excluded or modified by another valid contractual arrangement.'"  
Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735 (quoting Langdon v. Saga Corp., 
569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)).  Consequently, "[t]he ability to 
later modify handbook provisions does not justify a disregard of currently 
valid provisions."  Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Ala. 1997).  
Rather, "'[l]anguage in the handbook itself may reserve discretion to the 
employer in certain matters or reserve the right to amend or modify the 
handbook provisions.'"  Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735 (citation 
omitted). 
The City points out that this Court has occasionally refused to 
recognize the existence of a contract when an employer retains the right 
to unilaterally change its procedures.  See, e.g., Harper, 892 So. 2d at 
351-52; Stinson, 570 So. 2d at 621-22.  Thus, the City argues, its right to 
change the Handbook's procedures precludes any inference that those 
procedures are binding.  But, in Harper and Stinson, any promises made 
in the handbook proved to be illusory because the handbook's language 
left the employer free to unilaterally deviate from the handbook's 
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provisions.  See Harper, 892 So. 2d at 351 ("'The working rules and 
conditions set [out] herein are a guide and may vary slightly with the 
occasion as all problems vary.'"); Stinson, 570 So. 2d at 621 ("'Because of 
the great variety of the situations which may arise …, [the Company] 
reserves the right to make decisions related to employment in a manner 
other than as provided in this handbook.'"); cf. Campisi, 611 So. 2d at 300 
("'Individual circumstances may dictate varying courses of action, the 
important thing is to be fair and even handed.'" (emphasis added in 
Campisi)).  It was thus unreasonable for the employees in those cases to 
believe that the employer was offering to be bound by the handbook's 
provisions or that the employer would not terminate the relationship 
except according to those provisions.  
The right to deviate from a handbook's discharge procedures -- 
which the employers in Harper and Stinson expressly reserved -- is 
different from the right to amend or modify such procedures, which is all 
the City reserved here.  Unlike the language in the handbooks in Harper 
and Stinson, the acknowledgment by Davis indicated that the City 
retained the "freedom to change the Policies and Procedures with the 
approval of the Mayor and City Council."  That is not the same as the 
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right to unilaterally deviate from written "Policies and Procedures" at 
any time as circumstances may dictate.   Because "[t]he ability to later 
modify handbook provisions does not justify a disregard of currently valid 
provisions," Graham, 702 So. 2d at 1219, the Handbook "may be 
characterized … as follows: 'I promise I will not dismiss you … without 
exhausting specified procedures[] unless I change this policy before you 
are discharged.'"  Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735 (quoting H. 
Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice 150 (1984)).  The City's 
right to change the Handbook thus does not render it unenforceable as a 
contract.4    
B.  Davis's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
 
4The City also cites Mack v. Arnold, 929 So. 2d 480 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2005), a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals.  We are, of course, not 
bound by Mack.  But we find the City's use of it unpersuasive in any 
event.  First, the analysis on which the City relies is dicta.  As the Court 
of Civil Appeals made clear in the opinion, even if the employee had a 
winning contractual argument, he was always due to lose because the 
employer whom he sued -- the county sheriff -- was an officer of the State 
and therefore cloaked with State immunity.  Id. at 484 n.2.  Second, the 
county's modification right was immaterial to the central merits question 
in Mack -- whether the sheriff "entered into an employment contract with 
[the employee] by indicating that he would follow the termination 
procedures in the personnel manual."  Id. at 483. 
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Davis filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue  
whether the City followed the procedures found in the Handbook.  The 
court below did not reach the merits of Davis's motion for summary 
judgment because it held that the Handbook did not create a unilateral 
contract.  Because we hold instead that the Handbook created a 
unilateral contract, the issue whether the City followed the procedures 
remains unresolved.  We decline to consider that issue and leave it for 
the trial court to consider in the first instance on remand.    
Conclusion 
We reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City.  
The Handbook was an offer for a unilateral contract, which Davis 
accepted by continuing his employment with the City.  Because the 
Handbook constitutes a unilateral contract, we reverse the trial court's 
denial of Davis's motion for partial summary judgment and direct the 
trial court on remand to determine whether, in fact, the City violated the 
Handbook's terms.  
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
Bolin, Shaw, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion. 
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Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise and Bryan, JJ., join. 
 
 
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
I concur in reversing the judgment because the way in which the 
City of Montevallo ("the City") frames this case is untenable. Below and 
on appeal, the City has framed the issue as whether the City's Employee 
Handbook ("the Handbook") created a contract. The Handbook did, for 
the reasons in the main opinion.  
The real issue here is what the terms of that contract were -- 
specifically, whether the Handbook's termination provisions were part of 
that contract. They ultimately were not, for reasons I will explain. But I 
cannot vote to affirm on that basis, because it has not been argued by the 
City here or below. Due process dictates that it is generally improper to 
affirm on a substantive basis relied on by neither the appellee nor the 
trial court. Cf. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health 
Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003). On the other hand, 
I cannot fully concur in the main opinion, because its angle of response 
to the City's all-or-nothing position leads to a position that I believe 
cannot be sustained. 
Under Alabama common law, at-will employment has two essential 
aspects: The employer may terminate it (1) at any time and (2) without 
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cause. See Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 35 (Ala. 1991) 
("Employees at will ... can be terminated by their employer[] at any time, 
with or without cause or justification."). Moreover, the "at any time" 
aspect necessarily implies that "an employee at will can be discharged ... 
without prior notice," id.  
Here, the Handbook's termination provisions are irreconcilable 
with both aspects of at-will employment. First, the provisions foreclose a 
right of the City to terminate at any time because they require 
pretermination notice-and-hearing procedures. Necessarily, those 
procedures require time and thus prevent the City from terminating at 
any time, i.e., immediately and without prior notice.  
Second, the termination provisions are incompatible with a right to 
terminate without cause. As quoted by the main opinion, the provisions 
fundamentally and pervasively presume that the proposed termination 
is based on "charges" -- i.e., cause. On this point, the main opinion tries 
to thread the needle by positing that the provisions' guarantees have a 
procedural aspect and a substantive aspect. See ___ So. 3d at ___ n.2. On 
that view, the termination procedures are still required even though no 
"charges" are needed. The problem is that, without any "charges," the 
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25 
 
procedures here simply cannot be satisfied: There is nothing to "consider" 
at the Determination Hearing, there is no basis for "disciplinary action," 
there is nothing for the employee to "respond to," and there is nothing to 
show by "evidence against the employee." And there is no point in the 
subsequent procedural guarantee of an appeal, because there is no basis 
for an underlying termination decision, nor any basis for asserting error 
on appeal. The particular termination procedures here are simply 
nonsensical without the requirement of cause; it is thoroughly embedded 
in them. And these provisions are not like a requirement of a monthly 
income statement, which does not presume that the content of the 
statement will be a positive number. Rather, these provisions are like the 
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, whose procedural guarantee 
of "due process of law" presumes that its substantive object -- "life, liberty, 
[and] property" -- has real, nonillusory content. 
Therefore, the Handbook's termination provisions necessarily 
rendered Davis's employment not at-will -- absent a disclaimer. There 
was a disclaimer here, of course; the question is its effect. 
The acknowledgment disclaimer provided: "[N]othing in this 
Handbook can be interpreted … to place a limitation on … the City's 
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26 
 
freedom to terminate the employment relationship at any time." That 
language expressly or implicitly incorporated both aspects of at-will 
employment. It expressly asserted the City's right to terminate "at any 
time." And "at any time" necessarily implied "without cause," because it 
meant that the City could terminate before any cause arose. 
Hence, the termination provisions and the acknowledgment were 
in direct conflict. Whereas the termination provisions would fully entomb 
at-will employment, the acknowledgment would fully revive it. The main 
opinion attempts to harmonize the two terms by positing that the City 
did not give up its freedom to terminate at any time, only its freedom to 
terminate without pretermination procedures. But as I have explained, 
the freedom to terminate at any time is precisely what the procedures 
would foreclose. Procedures cannot occur in a timeless world of legal 
abstraction; they require time.5 
 
5To be fair, a similar attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable seems 
to have been present in an unnecessary passing comment in this Court's 
seminal case. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 
735 & n.4 (Ala. 1987) ("[A] unilateral offer made by [an] employer may be 
characterized ... as follows: 'I promise I will not dismiss you without cause 
(or without exhausting specified procedures) unless I change this policy 
before you are discharged.'" "Thus, in a very real sense, the employee is 
still an employee 'at-will.' He may still be dismissed for any reason, good 
 
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27 
 
Accordingly, in my view, there is no way to reconcile the 
termination 
provisions 
with 
the 
acknowledgment. 
Under 
the 
irreconcilability canon of interpretation, the two knocked each other out 
of the handbook. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 189-90 (Thomson/West 2012). Without 
a contractual provision on point, the general rule of at-will employment 
applied. See Howard v. Wolff Broad. Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 310-11 (Ala. 
1992). Thus, Davis's employment remained at-will. 
Importantly, this result obtains because the acknowledgment 
specifically contradicted the Handbook's termination provisions. Unlike 
in many prior cases, as the main opinion explains, the acknowledgment 
did not generally disclaim that the Handbook was a contract. Moreover, 
unlike 
a 
unilateral 
right to 
deviate 
from 
a 
handbook, the 
acknowledgment's provision of a unilateral right to amend the Handbook 
did not render its requirements illusory. Notably, in recognizing that 
deviation/amendment 
distinction, 
the 
main 
opinion 
implicitly 
disapproves this Court's contrary dicta in Harper v. Winston County, 892 
 
or bad, as long as the provisions found in the company handbooks are 
followed ...." (citation omitted)). 
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28 
 
So. 2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004) ("If the employer reserves in the employee 
handbook the right to change policies unilaterally, its reservation 
operates as a disclaimer to negate any inference that the handbook 
constitutes an enforceable contract."). 
To summarize: Davis's employment is at-will, not because the 
Handbook is not a contract, but because the specific at-will provisions of 
the acknowledgment and the specific termination provisions of the 
Handbook are irreconcilable such that they cancel each other out. If the 
City had so framed its argument, perhaps the result would have been 
different. At least my vote would have been. 
 
 
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29 
 
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent. Alabama is a right-to-work state and 
employment is at-will; this means that "an employee contract ...  may be 
terminated by either party with or without cause or justification." 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987). 
However, under certain limited conditions, "an employee handbook can 
represent a binding contract obligating an employer to satisfy certain 
conditions precedent to dismissing an employee." Harper v. Winston 
Cnty., 892 So. 2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004). But, "if the employer does not wish 
the policies contained in an employee handbook to be construed as an 
offer for a unilateral contract, he is free to so state in the handbook." 
Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 734. Here, the employer did just that.  
The City of Montevallo ("the City") hired Ed Davis to manage the 
Montevallo Golf Course. Several years later, Davis received a copy of the 
City's Employee Handbook ("the Handbook"). The Handbook contained 
an acknowledgment, which Davis signed, stating in pertinent part:  
"I understand that nothing in this Handbook can be 
interpreted to be a contract for employment for any specified 
period of time or to place a limitation on my freedom or the 
City's freedom to terminate the employment relationship at 
any time. I also understand that the City retains the freedom 
1210016 
30 
 
to change the Policies and Procedures with the approval of the 
Mayor and City Council."  
 
The plain language of the acknowledgment disclaims both the creation of 
any contract and the placement of any limitation on the City's freedom to 
terminate Davis's employment. Utilizing any rules of grammar, canons 
for interpreting contracts, or the common usage of the relevant words and 
phrases yields the same result: the employer and employee are free to 
terminate their relationship at any time for any reason.  
However, the main opinion seizes upon the phrase "for any specified 
period of time" in the acknowledgment, arguing that the City's concerns 
were merely durational. I disagree. First, disclaiming a contract "for any 
specified period of time" does not imply a contract "for no specified period 
of time." Additionally, the quoted provision is immediately followed by 
language maintaining the City's freedom "to terminate the employment 
relationship at any time" and to change the Handbook's procedures 
without the consent or knowledge of the employee. Read as a whole, the 
acknowledgment conforms with established Alabama law6 and fully 
 
6We have consistently held that including an unambiguous 
disclaimer or acknowledgment in a handbook is sufficient to avoid the 
creation of a contract. See McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 
 
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31 
 
removes any cause of action an employee might have against the City 
occasioned by any provisions in the Handbook in its totality. Although in 
isolation the durational language may be construed ambiguously, that 
ambiguity fades when it is read, as we must read it, in the context of the 
entire provision. Having read and signed the acknowledgment, Davis 
could not reasonably interpret the Handbook as creating a contract to 
establish a cause of action against the City for failing to follow the 
Handbook's termination procedures.7 
Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that the acknowledgment 
preempted only contracts of specific duration, the City was still free to 
deviate 
from 
the 
Handbook's 
termination 
procedures. 
The 
acknowledgment's language on this point is clear, straightforward, and 
direct, stating that "nothing in this Handbook can be interpreted … to 
place a limitation on my freedom or the City's freedom to terminate the 
 
484 So. 2d 398 (Ala. 1986); Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 734; Abney 
v. Baptist Med. Ctrs., 597 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1992); and Ex parte Beasley, 
712 So. 2d 338 (Ala. 1998).  
 
7The City's ordinance promulgated in 2015 disposes of any lingering 
doubt Davis may have harbored regarding his employment status. That 
ordinance explicitly stated that Davis was an at-will employee, 
specifically abrogating any contractual obligation that might have bound 
the City to follow the procedures in the Handbook. 
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32 
 
employment relationship at any time." The main opinion concludes that 
this provision preserves the parties' right to terminate the employment 
relationship at any time, but only pursuant to the Handbook's 
procedures. But, that is not what the acknowledgment says. Adding 
language not included in the acknowledgment to impose the Handbook’s 
provisions related to termination appears to be based on the principle 
that "'[t]he provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that 
renders them compatible, not contradictory.'" State ex rel. Allison v. 
Farris, 194 So. 3d 214, 219 (Ala. 2015) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 27 at 180 
(Thomson/West 2012). However, rather than resolving a contradiction, 
the main opinion creates one to animate and apply the Handbook’s 
procedures to prevent at-will termination of employment. The term "any 
time" is unambiguous and would include periods before and during the 
termination proceedings. If an employee cannot be terminated during 
those times, then that is inherently a limit on the City's freedom to 
terminate employment "at any time," directly contradicting the 
acknowledgment. I see no need for such a strained interpretation of such 
clear language.  
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33 
 
 
Reading the acknowledgment as a whole and interpreting its 
provisions with an eye toward compatibility, the acknowledgment 
disclaims the Handbook's creation of any contract or any limitation on 
the City's freedom to terminate the employment relationship. Although 
the Handbook's procedures provide guidance on the method of 
termination, the City, per the terms of the acknowledgment, is not bound 
by them. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court 
granting the City's motion for a summary judgment.  
 
Wise and Bryan, JJ., concur.