Title: Anthony C. Moore, Appellant vs. State of Missouri, Respondent.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC90918
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: December 7, 2010

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
ANTHONY C. MOORE,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
 
  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90918 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
The Honorable Bryan L. Hettenbach, Judge 
 
Opinion issued December 7, 2010 
 
 
Anthony Moore was late in filing his Rule 29.15 motion. He contends that his 
appellate counsel for his direct appeal abandoned him by not timely telling him that the 
mandate from his appeal had been issued. The State argues that appellate counsel has no 
duty to provide timely notification. Pursuant to Rule 30.24(b), the clerk of the appellate 
court sent Moore notice of the mandate being entered, and he does not refute receiving 
that notice. The judgment of the motion court dismissing his untimely Rule 29.15 motion 
is affirmed.1  
 
                                                 
1 After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. MO. CONST. art. V, sec. 10.  
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I. Background
 
Moore was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 
two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At the sentencing 
proceedings, the judge informed Moore of his right to seek post-conviction relief under 
Rule 29.15. The judge explained that there are three bases for filing a Rule 29.15 motion 
to set aside the sentences: (1) if they violate the constitution or laws of the United States 
or of Missouri; (2) if the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentences; or (3) if the 
sentences exceeded the maximum allowed by law. Further, the judge told Moore that if 
he appealed, the Rule 29.15 motion would be due 90 days after the mandate from the 
court of appeals issued. Moore asked what form he should use to file the motion, and the 
judge instructed him to use Criminal Procedure Form 40, which could be obtained at the 
department of corrections. Moore indicated that he understood his right to file the motion.  
After the court of appeals affirmed the conviction, it issued its mandate October 
16, 2008. See State v. Moore, 264 S.W.3d 657 (Mo. App. 2008). Moore filed his Rule 
29.15 motion 218 days later. Along with the motion, he filed a letter and an affidavit 
from the attorney who represented him on direct appeal. The appellate attorney’s 
affidavit stated that she told Moore in a letter mailed March 13, 2009, that the mandate 
had been issued in his direct appeal. The letter reminded him of the 90-day deadline to 
file a Rule 29.15 motion but acknowledged that the deadline, January 14, 2009, had 
passed two months ago. The appellate attorney recommended that if Moore wished to 
seek post-conviction relief, he should file a Rule 29.15 motion as soon as possible. Moore 
did not file his Rule 29.15 motion until May 22, 2009, more than two months later.  
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The court dismissed the Rule 29.15 motion for being untimely. This appeal 
follows.  
II. Standard of Review  
Review of a Rule 29.15 judgment is limited to a determination of whether the 
motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 
29.15(k). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire 
record, there is a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. McFadden v. 
State, 256 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Mo. banc 2008).  
III. Analysis  
 
Moore claims that the motion court erred in dismissing his Rule 29.15 motion 
because his appellate counsel for his direct appeal failed to timely inform him of the 
mandate’s issuance, which excused his tardy filing. His claim relies on prior cases in 
which courts have held that, due to third-party interference, the untimely filing was 
excused. See McFadden, 256 S.W.3d 103; Nicholson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 369 (Mo. banc 
2004); Spells v. State, 213 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. App. 2007).  
As Moore was instructed by the trial court, Rule 29.15(b) requires that the post-
conviction motion be filed within 90 days after the date the court of appeals issues its 
mandate affirming the judgment or sentence. The original motion must give the court 
notice that movant seeks post-conviction relief. Bullard v. State, 853 S.W.2d 921, 922-23 
(Mo. banc 1993). Legal assistance is not required for the original motion. Id. at 923. If 
the motion is filed by an indigent self-represented movant, the court will appoint counsel. 
Rule 29.15(e). The appointed counsel will have the opportunity to file an amended 
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motion that alleges sufficient facts and all claims for relief. Id.  
If the movant fails to file the motion within the 90-day time limit, there is a 
complete waiver of the right to seek Rule 29.15 relief and a complete waiver of all claims 
that could be raised in the post-conviction motion. Rule 29.15(b); see also Gehrke v. 
State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Mo. banc 2009) (noting that a claim that could have been 
raised in a Rule 29.15 motion but was not cannot be raised in a petition for habeas 
corpus). While the rule does not carve out exceptions that excuse late filings, court 
decisions have created two: (1) when post-conviction counsel abandons the movant; and 
(2) when rare circumstances outside the movant’s control justify late receipt of the 
motion. McFadden, 256 S.W.3d at 108-09.  
Under the first exception, abandonment traditionally excuses a late filing in two 
situations: (1) when post-conviction counsel fails to file an amended motion and the 
record shows the movant was deprived of meaningful review of the claims; or (2) when 
post-conviction counsel files an untimely amended motion. Gehrke, 280 S.W.3d at 57. A 
third type of abandonment occurs when post-conviction counsel’s overt actions prevent 
the movant from filing the original motion timely. See McFadden, 256 S.W.3d at 109 
(post-conviction counsel, despite promising to file movant’s pro se motion, failed to do 
so timely).  
There was no abandonment in this case. Abandonment has been found to occur 
when post-conviction counsel improperly acts or fails to act to the movant’s detriment. 
See Gehrke, 280 S.W.3d at 57; McFadden, 256 S.W.3d at 109. Moore’s complaint is 
directed toward his appellate counsel, who he says abandoned him by failing to timely 
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inform him when the mandate was issued. However, appellate counsel has no duty to 
represent a movant in post-conviction relief filings. There is nothing in the record that 
indicates appellate counsel agreed to inform Moore when the mandate was issued. 
Further, appellate counsel has no obligation to notify the defendant of his post-conviction 
rights under Rule 29.15 or of the mandate’s issuance.  
The judicial branch is already obligated to inform the defendant of such 
information. Under Rule 29.07(b), the trial court must conduct a post-sentencing hearing 
in which it questions the defendant concerning the effectiveness of trial counsel. The 
court must also advise the defendant of the right to proceed under Rule 29.15. Here, the 
transcript indicates that the trial court informed Moore of his right to file a Rule 29.15 
motion by using Criminal Procedure Form 40 within 90 days of the appellate court 
mandate’s issuance. Moore indicated in open court that he understood those rights.  
Under Rule 30.24(b), the clerk of the appellate court has the duty to inform the 
appellant of the mandate’s issuance by sending a copy of the mandate for the appellant to 
the department of corrections. The appellate docket sheet reflects an entry that the 
mandate was sent October 16, 2008. It is presumed that the clerk of the appellate court 
sent a copy of the mandate to Moore, and he does not refute that he received it.  
The second judicially created exception to Rule 29.15 occurs, “in very rare 
circumstances . . .  [in which] our courts have found an improper filing, caused by 
circumstances beyond the control of the movant, justified a late receipt of the motion by 
the proper court.” McFadden, 256 S.W3d at 108; see Nicholson, 151 S.W.3d at 371 
(motion that was timely filed in the improper venue must be transferred to the proper 
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venue as if it were filed there originally); Spells, 213 S.W.3d at 701-02 (a motion was 
timely where the movant sent it to the court’s previous address and the post office 
received it before the deadline for filing a Rule 29.15 motion). There were no rare 
circumstances in this case that justify Moore’s failure to prepare and send the original 
motion before the expiration of 90 days. 
The motion court’s dismissal of the original motion was not clearly erroneous.2 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
Price, C.J., Wolff, Breckenridge 
 and Fischer, JJ., concur; Stith, J.,  
concurs in separate opinion filed;  
Teitelman, J., concurs in the opinion  
of Stith, J.  
                                                 
2 Moore also argues that the motion court erred in dismissing the motion because it had no 
“jurisdiction” over the untimely motion. Relying on Webb ex rel. J.C.W. v. Wyciskalla, 275 
S.W.3d 249 (Mo. banc 2009), Moore asserts that the time limits in Rule 29.15 amount to 
restrictions on “authority,” not “jurisdiction.” This assertion is correct. However, there is no 
significance to the motion court’s use of improper terminology in its judgment dismissing the 
motion. The motion court was correct in dismissing the untimely motion because, under Rule 
29.15(b), the court had no “authority” to hear the case.  
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SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
ANTHONY C. MOORE,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
 
  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90918 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
 
) 
 
Concurring Opinion 
I concur because Mr. Moore has failed to show that he is entitled to post-
conviction relief on these facts.  I write separately to note that where counsel 
affirmatively has told the client that counsel will take responsibility for a matter, then the 
client has the right to rely on that statement, as this Court recognized in McFadden v. 
State, 256 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Mo. banc 2008).  As the principal opinion notes, 
McFadden found ineffective assistance where post-conviction counsel did not timely file 
movant’s pro se motion despite promising to do so.  This was so even though, absent 
counsel’s voluntary undertaking to do so, movant would have been obligated to file his 
post-conviction motion himself.  Id.  Having undertaken to file the motion for movant, 
counsel was obligated to complete that task. 
Here, Mr. Moore similarly argues that counsel undertook to inform him when the 
mandate was issued by the appellate court but failed to do so.  If the record supported this 
argument, then he would be entitled to relief.  This is so even though, as the principal 
opinion notes, Missouri’s rules do not impose a requirement on counsel to inform a client 
about the issuance of the mandate in the usual case.  That is because, once counsel 
undertakes such an obligation, then a defendant had a right to rely on counsel to complete 
the undertaking.  The failure to do so violates Missouri’s ethical rules.   
Rule 4-1.3, “Diligence,” states: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  Comment 4 to Rule 4-1.3 explains what this means 
when a lawyer-client relationship is coming to an end: 
4.   Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 4-1.16, a 
lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a 
client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the 
relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has 
served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client 
sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a 
continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about 
whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the 
lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose 
the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to 
do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative 
proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client, the lawyer should 
advise the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing 
responsibility for the matter. See Rule 4-1.4(b). Whether the lawyer is 
obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the 
representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 4-
1.2.  
 
Rule 4-1.3, Comment 4 (emphasis added).   
Rule 4-1.2 allows a lawyer to define the scope of representation of a client.  Rule 
4-1.4 requires a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
 
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matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter 
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation. Comment 1 then states: 
1. Reasonable communication between the client and the lawyer is 
necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. 
Rule 4-1.4(a)(1) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of the matter, such as significant 
developments affecting the timing or the substance of the 
representation.  
 
Rule 4-1.4, Comment 1 (emphasis added). 
Together, these rules mean that if an attorney has undertaken to inform his or her 
client about a deadline, then the attorney has an ethical obligation to fulfill that 
undertaking. Where, as here, failure to comply with that deadline about which counsel 
undertook to inform the client resulted in the client’s forfeiture of his right to seek post-
conviction relief, that failure constitutes ineffective assistance. 
Here, however, Mr. Moore failed to present evidence that counsel specifically 
undertook to inform him of when the mandate issued; rather, counsel merely apologized 
for not doing so.  Moreover, so far as the record shows Mr. Moore was aware of the fact 
that the mandate had issued through the notice sent by the court clerk and was aware of 
the significance of this date through the information provided by the court at the time of 
sentencing.  
The facts adduced by Mr. Moore are insufficient to show that his counsel 
undertook to inform him when the mandate issued and, therefore, are insufficient to 
 
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support his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing in that duty.  For this reason, I 
concur.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
    
       LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
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