Title: Ex parte International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Bell Carr, Jr., et al v. International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051084
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2007

REL: 03/23/2007 Ex parte IRMCO
REL: 05/11/2007 as modified on denial of rehearing
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051084
_________________________
Ex parte International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a
IRMCO et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Bell Carr, Jr., et al.
v.
International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO et
al.)
(Fayette Circuit Court, CV-03-152)
LYONS, Justice.
1051084
2
International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO
and 47 other corporate defendants in the proceeding below
("the petitioners") petition this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate its order
denying the petitioners' motions to dismiss the claims against
them, or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. We grant
the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural Background
On November 13, 2003, Bell Carr, Jr., and approximately
320 other former employees at a manufacturing plant operated
by Arvin Industries d/b/a Arvin-Meritor, Inc.  (hereinafter
"the plaintiffs"), sued Arvin-Meritor and six individual
defendants, also former employees at the plant, where
automotive mufflers were manufactured. The complaint alleged
that up until the closing of the plant in May 2002, the
plaintiffs suffered harm from "exposure to toxic and dangerous
chemicals" that were flushed from the manufacturing machines
and eventually circulated into a large pit, which the
plaintiffs were responsible for draining and cleaning. In
addition to these seven defendants, the original complaint
1051084
3
fictitiously named 40 other defendants in the caption and in
the body of the complaint.
On May 6, 2005, approximately three years after their
last exposure to the chemicals, the plaintiffs filed their
first amended complaint, seeking to add 64 new named
defendants, including the petitioners, in place of the
fictitiously 
named 
defendants 
(hereinafter 
"the 
new
defendants"), 113 new plaintiffs, as well as additional
fictitiously 
named 
defendants. 
The 
amended 
complaint
reasserted the five claims asserted in the original complaint,
but only against the seven original defendants. The first
amended 
complaint 
also 
alleged 
claims 
of 
negligence,
wantonness, 
liability 
under 
the 
Alabama 
Extended
Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, civil conspiracy, and the
tort of outrage, but only against the new defendants. 
On June 14, 2005, the new defendants removed the case to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28
U.S.C. § 1453. The district court remanded the five original
claims against the seven original defendants to the Fayette
Circuit Court because they did not fall within the CAFA. The
1051084
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) states that "the term
1
'mass action' shall not include any civil action in which --
... all of the claims in the action arise from an event or
occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and
that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State ...."
4
district court also determined that the claims in the amended
complaint against the new defendants did not relate back under
Alabama law and did not constitute what it referred to as an
"interstate case of national importance." Accordingly, the new
claims asserted and the parties added in the amended complaint
fell within the exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA
in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I),  and the district court
1
also remanded the remaining claims to the Fayette Circuit
Court.
Upon remand, the new defendants filed motions to dismiss,
or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment, on the ground
that the claims asserted against them in the amended complaint
did not relate back to the date of the filing of the original
complaint and are thus barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. See § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975. The trial court
conducted a hearing and denied the motions. The new defendants
sought a certification to file a permissive appeal under Rule
5, Ala. R. App. P., but the trial court denied the request for
1051084
5
the certification. The petitioners then filed this petition
for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
"'"[M]andamus 
is 
a 
drastic 
and
extraordinary writ that will be issued only
when there is: (1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court." Ex parte Horton, 711 So. 2d
979, 983 (Ala. 1998). "Subject to certain
narrow exceptions ..., the denial of a
motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary
judgment is not reviewable by petition for
writ of mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 761 (Ala.
2002)(citing Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d
681, 684 (Ala. 2000)).'
"Ex parte Alloy Wheels Int'l, Ltd., 882 So. 2d 819,
821-22 (Ala. 2003)." 
Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916 So. 2d 594, 596-
97 (Ala. 2005). This Court has recognized an exception to the
general rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or a
motion for a summary judgment is not reviewable by mandamus;
that exception applies when the motion the trial court has
denied was filed by a newly joined defendant asserting a
statute-of-limitations defense based on the plaintiff's
failure to state a cause of action against the defendant, who,
1051084
6
in the original complaint, was fictitiously named. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Stover, 663 So. 2d 948, 951-52 (Ala. 1995).
Discussion
The petitioners claim that the plaintiffs failed to meet
the requirements of fictitious-party practice found in Rule
9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that, therefore, the claims in the
amended complaint and the addition of the new defendants do
not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint
under Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, they argue,
those 
claims 
are 
barred 
by 
the 
two-year 
statute 
of
limitations. 
The 
petitioners further 
contend that 
the
plaintiffs did not act with due diligence in identifying the
fictitiously named defendants before they filed their original
complaint. We address, first, the threshold issue: whether the
original complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action
against the fictitiously named defendants to support the
relation-back of the new claims in the amended complaint.
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"(h) Fictitious Parties. When a party is
ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so
alleges in the party's pleading, the opposing party
may be designated by any name, and when that party's
true name is discovered, the process and all
1051084
7
pleadings and proceedings in the action may be
amended by substituting the true name." 
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., allows a plaintiff to assert
claims against a fictitiously named defendant who is
subsequently substituted and named, and those claims will
"'relate back to the date of the original complaint if the
original 
complaint 
adequately 
described 
the 
fictitiously 
named
defendant and stated a claim against such a defendant.'" Ex
parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531, 535 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Fulmer v.
Clark Equip. Co., 654 So.2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995) (emphasis
added)). See also Clay v. Walden Joint Venture, 611 So. 2d
254, 255 (Ala. 1992) ("[T]he plaintiff must state a cause of
action against the fictitiously named party in the body of the
original complaint.").
The plaintiffs cite Johnson v. City of Mobile, 475 So. 2d
517, 518-19 (Ala. 1985), for the proposition that rules of
pleading "'are to be construed liberally to effect the purpose
of the rules, and, under the rule of liberal construction,
every reasonable intendment and presumption must be made in
favor of the pleader.'" Citing Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P., and
Waters v. Jolly, 582 So. 2d 1048, 1056 (Ala. 1991), the
1051084
8
plaintiffs further contend that the pleading need only set
forth a short, plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, the purpose of which is to give
the defendant adequate notice of the claims against it.  We
agree with the plaintiffs that the purpose of notice pleading
is to provide defendants adequate notice of the claims against
them. The same notice-pleading rule applies to fictitious-
party pleading. See, e.g., Stover, 663 So. 2d at 952 ("'Any
count in a complaint which would state a cause of action under
our liberal notice pleading rules would also state a cause of
action against a fictitious party. One need not state with
more particularity a cause of action against an unknown party
as compared to a named party.'") (quoting Columbia Eng'g
Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So. 2d 955, 960 (Ala. 1983)). The
pertinent question, in this case, is whether the plaintiffs'
original complaint would have provided the fictitiously named
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them.
A complaint stating a claim against a fictitiously named
defendant must contain sufficient specificity to put that
defendant on notice of the plaintiff's claim if it were to
read the complaint. See Phelps v. South Alabama Elec. Coop.,
1051084
9
434 So. 2d 234, 237 (Ala. 1983) ("'There were no allegations
in the body of the complaint charging that the "designer,
manufacturer, assembler, distributor, or seller" of the hoist
was negligent.' ... Thus, there was virtually no way for the
defendant to be put on notice by the original complaint that
it might be a party to that suit.") (holding that the
complaint did state a cause of action against the fictitiously
named defendant and discussing and distinguishing Walden v.
Mineral Equip. Co., 406 So. 2d 385, 389 (Ala. 1981)). In other
words, merely naming the fictitious party in the style and/or
body of the complaint is insufficient; the complaint must
describe the actions that form the basis of the cause of
action against the fictitiously named defendant. See Stover,
663 So. 2d at 951-52 ("In order to state a cause of action
against a fictitiously named defendant in the body of the
original complaint, the complaint  must contain a description
of wrongdoing on the part of the fictitiously named
defendant.") (quoting Columbia Eng'g Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429
So. 2d at 960).  Likewise, in Phelps, the Court distinguished
Columbia Engineering, in which the Court held that the
complaint did not state a cause of action against one of the
1051084
10
fictitiously named defendants. In Phelps, this Court noted,
"In Columbia Engineering, supra, the opposite result was
reached because there was no allegation of what the
engineering company did, but only that the 'wrongful conduct'
of the defendant resulted in injury to the plaintiff."  434
So. 2d at 237 (emphasis added).
The original complaint stated five separate causes of
action: 
workers' 
compensation, 
co-employee 
liability,
misrepresentation, suppression and concealment, and deceit.
Each count specifically named the defendant or defendants
against whom that count was directed, but no count even
mentioned the fictitiously named defendants. One of the
paragraphs describing the fictitiously named defendants
states: "References to 'defendants' in this complaint will be
understood to include fictitious party defendants." Even
though the plaintiffs never alleged any of the counts directly
against the fictitiously named defendants, they claim that
because the paragraphs describing the fictitiously named
defendants incorporated those unknown defendants in all
references to "defendants," each count that seeks relief
1051084
11
against "defendants" implicitly incorporates the fictitiously
named defendants. 
This argument is inconsistent with the plain language of
the plaintiffs' original complaint. Of the five counts in that
complaint, 
only 
the 
counts 
alleging 
misrepresentation,
suppression and concealment, and deceit stated a claim not
against a specifically named defendant or defendants, but
against the more general "defendants." The claims seeking
workers' compensation and alleging co-employee liability
sought relief against specific defendants. Each of the five
counts, however, specifically identified the individual
defendants against whom the count was directed. The complaint
cannot be read to invoke the fictitiously named defendants
every time the word "defendants" was used in describing a
count simply because the word "defendants" was used to
describe the individual defendants specifically named in each
count. That is not to say, however, that the original
complaint wholly failed to state a cognizable cause of action
against any of the fictitiously named defendants. 
The 
plaintiffs' 
original 
complaint 
includes 
the
fictitiously named defendants in the caption as well as in the
1051084
Despite our efforts, we can find no reference in the
2
original complaint, other than this one, to an injury
resulting in death, although it is altogether possible that
one of the approximately 320 plaintiffs named in the original
complaint brought a claim for an injury resulting in death.
12
body. Paragraphs 4 and 5 describe the "fictitious party
defendants" as "persons, firms, or corporations, whether
singular or plural, who or which caused or contributed to
cause death to the plaintiff's decedent[ ] ... or who by their
2
acts, 
omissions, 
negligence, 
or 
wantonness, 
jointly,
severally, or separately caused or contributed to cause the
occurrence complained of herein." The original complaint
asserts factual allegations against the fictitiously named
defendants only in two paragraphs. Paragraph 12 states, in
pertinent part, as follows:
"[T]he pit itself required cleaning at least two (2)
times a year during the period of the operation of
the plant. This cleaning would be accomplished, on
orders of the defendants Norman Bobb, John Gary, Ron
Goodwin, Todd Morgan, Nina Butler, and/or Richard
Estes, and/or fictitious party defendants 1 through
40, by the pit being drained and then cleaned by
hand 
by 
employees 
from 
various 
other 
plant
departments ...."
(Emphasis added.) Likewise, paragraph 14 of the original
complaint further describes  facts relevant to the cleaning of
the pit sufficient to implicate the fictitiously named
1051084
13
defendants 
under 
the 
broad 
construction 
of 
the 
word
"defendants." The original complaint contains no other
description of any wrongful acts or omissions by the
fictitiously named defendants. 
Taken together with the claims of negligence and/or
wantonness asserted against the fictitiously named defendants
in the first amended complaint, these factual allegations
adequately describe acts that form the basis of a cause of
action against the fictitiously named defendants -- namely,
that they ordered the pit to be drained and cleaned by hand --
and thus they comply with the notice-pleading requirement in
Stover. However, the cause of action described here supports
only claims of negligence and/or wantonness in the context of
their co-employees' ordering the plaintiffs to drain and clean
the pit by hand. The complaint states no additional facts
involving the fictitiously named defendants that would give
them adequate notice of other claims of negligence or
wantonness stemming from other acts or omissions.  From the
documents submitted by the petitioners in support of their
petition for a writ of mandamus it appears that the 64 new
defendants substituted in the amended complaint for the
1051084
[substituted page 14]
fictitiously named defendants are all corporate defendants.
Further, it appears that the five additional claims asserted
against the new defendants are all claims arising out of a
products-liability cause of action, having nothing to do with
co-employees' ordering the plaintiffs to drain and clean the
pit by hand. 
Neither the new defendants nor the added causes of action
fall within the narrow cause of action asserted in the
original complaint against the fictitiously named defendants.
Therefore, they do not relate back to the filing date of the
original complaint. The plaintiffs, however, in their response
to the petition, contend that some of their claims nonetheless
survive, because, they say, those claims fall within a six-
year statute of limitations. See § 6-2-34, Ala. Code 1975.
That issue, however, is not before us; our mandamus review
extends to reviewing the denial of motions for a dismissal or
for a summary judgment that asserted a statute-of-limitations
defense only as to fictitious-party practice. See Stover, 663
So. 2d at 951-52. The extent to which the amended complaint,
filed within six years of the events made the basis of the
action but not within two years thereof, states claims not
1051084
[substituted page 15]
barred by the two-year statute of limitations is a question
not before us. However, all claims governed by a statute of
limitations that require the application of the doctrine of
relation back under fictitious-party practice to survive are
due to be dismissed. 
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's order denying the motions to
dismiss, or for a summary judgment, and we remand the case for
further proceedings, including a determination of the extent
to which any claims are timely, without the availability of
the relation-back doctrine.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.