Title: Hunter v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 279, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DANIEL HUNTER,
)
)  No. 279, 2000
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for New Castle County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  Case No. 9904014932
)  Cr.A. No. IN99050355
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  June 19, 2001
Decided:  August 22, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and STEELE, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Bernard J. O’Donnell and Nicole Marie Walker (argued), Office of Public
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Peter Veith, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
STEELE, Justice:
2
Daniel Hunter appeals the Superior Court’s order that denied his motion to
suppress cocaine police seized from him during a pat-down search.  Following a
bench trial, the trial judge found Hunter guilty of trafficking in cocaine and
possession with intent to delivery and sentenced him to six years at Level V.1
Hunter filed a timely notice of appeal.  Hunter argues that a police officer violated
his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when
the officer detained him solely on the basis of an outdated and invalid arrest
warrant and then frisked him and ultimately seized cocaine from his trouser pocket.
Hunter argues that reliance upon the outdated warrant cannot supply the probable
cause necessary for a constitutionally valid arrest, search and seizure.  Hunter
further argues that the trial judge erred by placing on him the burden of
establishing that a challenged warrantless search and seizure violated his
constitutional rights.  Because we find the police officer’s warrantless search to be
reasonable, we conclude that the trial judge did not err when he denied Hunter’s
motion to suppress and we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
                                          
1 According to Hunter, yet unsupported by the record, he was also tried, convicted and sentenced
for carrying a concealed deadly weapon and resisting arrest.
3
I
The facts are not in dispute.2  In December 1997, Officer Michael F.
Rodriguez, a Wilmington Police detective assigned to the federal Drug
Enforcement Agency, began investigating Corey Medley, a friend of Hunter’s, for
trafficking in cocaine.  Although his investigation of Medley had begun in
December 1997, by April 2000, Rodriguez still had not located Medley.  Sometime
during his investigation, Rodriguez learned from an informant that Hunter and
Medley were friends.  While investigating Hunter as a possible lead to find
Medley, Rodriguez learned that Hunter had an outstanding arrest warrant for
failing to appear in Municipal Court for a traffic offense.
On April 20, 2000, Rodriguez learned from his partner that Medley, now a
federal fugitive, might be at Hunter’s house in Middletown.  At approximately
noon, Rodriquez drove to Hunter’s house and began surveillance.  Rodriguez
watched two individuals, whose identity he could not determine, leave the house,
get into a car and drive in a direction towards Newark.  Rodriguez followed the car
to Newark where he watched the two individuals enter a restaurant.  Rodriguez
followed them but did not immediately see them when he scanned the crowd.  He
then noticed the two coming out of a bathroom together.  At that time, he identified
                                          
2 This conclusion alone resolves any contention that where the trial judge placed the burden on
the Motion to Suppress had any real significance to the outcome in this case.
4
the two as Medley and Hunter.  Rodriquez placed Medley under arrest on a federal
warrant and told him to place his hands on the wall.  Rodriguez told Hunter that he
was under arrest for the Municipal Court warrant and told him to place his hands
on the wall.
Rodriguez testified that as he was holding Medley and radioing his partner,
who was outside the restaurant, he saw Hunter remove his hand from the wall and
place it in his “cargo pants’” right pocket.3  Rodriguez removed Hunter’s hand
from the pocket and placed it back on the wall.  Fearing that Hunter might possess
a weapon, Rodriguez testified that he:
conducted a frisk of that pocket.  I frisked, pushed, securing it.  When
I did, I heard a crunch as if it was plastic bags.  I felt chunky
substances inside.  Based on my training and experience, I know that
cocaine is often cooked into crack cocaine….  So with that, I reached
in and removed it.  There were two plastic bags and each contained a
white chunky substance.4
By removing what ultimately proved to be cocaine from Hunter’s pocket,
Rodriguez had seized the cocaine for the purpose of this Motion to Suppress.  He
then finished the process of arresting Medley and Hunter.  Rodriguez later learned
that the outstanding warrant on which he arrested Hunter had been cleared
sometime before the arrest.  Rodriguez testified that while he had inquired about
                                          
3 This Opinion assumes the reader understands that “cargo pants” means trousers with large,
deep pockets about thigh level on each leg as well as traditional pockets.
4 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-21 (emphasis added).
5
Hunter sometime between December 1997 and February 1998, he had not inquired
further between February 1998 and April 20, 2000, the date of the arrest, to
determine whether the warrant for Hunter remained valid.  Rodriquez explained
that he had not inquired further to determine the warrant’s validity because
Medley, not Hunter, was the subject of his investigation.  Both parties agree that at
the time of the seizure complained of, the arrest warrant was outdated and invalid.
II
Hunter argues that the trial judge erred by placing the burden on him to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that Rodriguez violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.  The State argues that the trial judge applied the correct burden,
citing State v. Thomason5 for the broad proposition that on a motion to suppress,
the defendant bears the burden of establishing that a challenged search and seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment.  When there are no issues of fact in dispute, this
Court reviews de novo the trial judge’s alleged errors in formulating and applying
the law.6  Despite some arguable earlier confusion in the Delaware case law over
which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence seized
during a warrantless search, the rule in Delaware should now be clear.  The State
                                          
5 Del. Super. Cr. A. No. IN90-07-0002, Goldstein, J. (March 14, 1994) Mem. Op. at 5.
6 Jones v. State, Del. Supr., 745 A.2d 856, 860 (1999).
6
bears the burden of proof.7  As such, any statement by the trial judge that placed
the burden of proof on Hunter would be incorrect.  This mere passing misstatement
of law, however, does not affect our analysis of the trial judge’s ultimate
determination to deny the motion because the applicable law when applied to the
undisputed facts here leads us to conclude that Rodriguez conducted a reasonable
warrantless search and thus did not violate Hunter’s constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures.
III
The trial judge’s evaluation of whether the police had probable cause to
arrest or reasonable suspicion to approach Hunter is a mixed question of law and
fact.  To the extent that we examine the trial judge’s legal conclusions, we review
the trial judge’s determinations for errors in formulating or applying legal
precepts.8  To the extent the trial judge’s decision is based on factual findings, we
review to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings
and to determine whether those findings were the result of a logical and orderly
deductive process.9
                                          
7 See McAllister v. State, Del. Supr., No. 222, 2000, Holland, J. (July 31, 2001 (ORDER); see
also Floudiotis v. State, Del. Supr., 726 A.2d 1196 (1999); Mason v. State, Del. Supr., 534 A.2d
242 (1987); State v. Prouse, Del. Supr., 382 A.2d 1359 (1978); Young v. State, Del. Supr., 339
A.2d 723 (1975).
8 Downs v. State, Del. Supr., 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (1990).
9 Dupont v. Dupont, Del. Supr., 216 A.2d 674, 680 (1996).  Again, the facts here are not
disputed.
7
At a hearing to suppress the cocaine Rodriguez seized from Hunter, Hunter
argued that Rodriguez violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he relied upon
an outdated and invalid arrest warrant to support his decision to stop Hunter.
Hunter argued that reliance upon the outdated arrest warrant could not supply the
probable cause required to make the arrest valid.
The State argued that because Rodriguez relied on the outdated arrest
warrant in good faith, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should have
applied.  In the alternative, the State argued that Hunter’s hand movement towards
his pants’ pocket served as an intervening event, providing Rodriguez with
probable cause to frisk Hunter and thereby remove the taint of the outdated and
invalid warrant.
The trial judge found it unnecessary to address the State’s arguments;
instead, the trial judge admitted the cocaine “absent a valid arrest warrant as
discovered pursuant to a lawful protective detention and pat-down based on the
officer’s reasonable and articulable suspicion that Hunter was armed and
dangerous.”10  He based his decision primarily on the “automatic companion” rule,
which provides that “[a]ll companions of the arrestee [(here Medley)] within the
immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the officer, are
                                          
10 State v. Hunter, Del. Super., I.D. No. 9904014932, Gebelein, J. (Apr. 10, 2000) Mem. Op. at
4.
8
constitutionally subjected to the cursory ‘pat-down’ reasonably necessary to give
assurance that they are unarmed.”11  He then stated that even if the automatic
companion rule is inapplicable, the limited search was nonetheless valid because,
given the facts in this case, Rodriguez “believed it was necessary to pat-down
Hunter for the protection of himself and the other restaurant patrons.”12
While the trial judge’s decision arguably relied primarily on the automatic
companion rule, our conclusion in this case does not rest on that rule.  Instead, we
conclude that the record supports the trial judge’s determination that Rodriquez
conducted a reasonable warrantless search of Hunter based upon the fact that
Rodriguez “believed it was necessary to pat down Hunter for the protection of
himself . . . ” and that while the officer did not have a valid arrest warrant, he did
have a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that Hunter could be armed.
Therefore, the trial judge correctly concluded that Rodriguez could conduct a
“lawful protective detention and pat down.”13
While executing a valid arrest warrant for Medley, Rodriguez seized
command of the situation in a crowded restaurant by placing Medley and Hunter
against the wall.14  Rodriguez knew Medley and possibly Hunter to be a drug
                                          
11 United States v. Berryhill, 9th Cir., 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (1971).
12 State v. Hunter, at 11.
13 Id.
14 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981).
9
dealer.  Based on his experience, he knew drug dealers often carry weapons.15
Rodriquez was outnumbered two to one.  When Rodriguez saw Hunter reach for
his pocket, he grabbed Hunter’s hand.  Not knowing whether Hunter possessed a
weapon, Rodriguez patted down Hunter’s large, deep, cargo pocket.
Simultaneously with the movement to feel for weapons (a “securing push”) he felt
what he recognized, based on his experience as a narcotics agent, to be consistent
with packaged chunks of crack cocaine.16  Hunter’s movement in reaching for his
pocket in this situation gave Rodriguez a reasonable basis to pat him down.  The
trial judge found it significant, and we agree, that the officer’s pat down search
went only to the one pocket to which the furtive motion was directed and,
therefore, not beyond the reasonable parameter of a legitimate search for weapons.
In the course of the reasonably restrictive pat down search, without further
invasion of Hunter’s person, Rodriguez simultaneously discovered through a
sensory stimulating touch (hearing a crunch, feeling chunks), evidence consistent,
in his experience, with possession of contraband.  At that point Rodriguez was
compelled to seize what his senses and experience led him to believe to be
                                          
15 See Hovington, at 832 (citing Michigan, at 702).
16 In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), the Supreme Court created the “plain feel”
exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Any time an officer frisking a suspect feels an object
whose character as contraband is immediately apparent to the officer’s touch from outside the
suspect’s clothing, the officer may seize the object.
10
contraband and he did so.  Given the totality of the circumstances, Rodriguez’s
actions were reasonable.17
Conclusion
The trial judge’s findings are based on undisputed facts, and his legal
conclusion that the police officer properly conducted a limited, reasonable search
for his own protection which resulted in the discovery and seizure of contraband is
rationally based on those facts and legally correct.  Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
                                          
17 Id. at 833.