Title: State v. Shata
Citation: 2015 WI 74
Docket Number: 2013AP001437-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2015

2015 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1437-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Hatem M. Shata, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 356 Wis. 2d 326, 855 N.W.2d 491) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 21, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, ABRAHAMSON, J.J., dissent. (Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Nancy Noet, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was Brad Schimel, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Amelia L. 
Bizzaro and Bizzaro Law LLC, Milwaukee. Oral argument by Amelia 
L. Bizzaro. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Stacy Taeuber on behalf 
of the University of Wisconsin Law School, Immigrant Justice 
Clinic. Oral argument by Stacy Taeuber. 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP1437-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF1757) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Hatem M. Shata,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court's2 judgment of conviction and 
order denying Hatem Shata's ("Shata") post-conviction motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea to one count of possession with intent 
to deliver marijuana, as party to a crime.  
                                                 
1 State v. Shata, No. 2013AP1437-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 2014). 
2 The Honorable Timothy G. Dugan presided. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Shata argues that the circuit court erred by denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  He argues that he 
should be allowed to withdraw his plea on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356 (2010).  
¶3 
Specifically, Shata argues that, under Padilla, his 
trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him 
that 
he 
would 
be 
subject 
to 
"mandatory" 
deportation 
if 
convicted.3  Although trial counsel did inform Shata that he 
faced a "strong chance" of deportation if convicted, Shata 
argues that this advice was deficient because trial counsel 
should have told him that "his conviction would absolutely 
result in deportation."  Shata argues that immigration law 
clearly provides that he would have been subject to mandatory 
deportation upon conviction.  Shata argues that this deficient 
performance prejudiced him because he would have insisted on 
going to trial had he known that the guilty plea would subject 
him to mandatory deportation.  He argues that deportation has 
                                                 
3 In his brief, Shata argues that his deportation is 
"mandatory" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  However, the 
Supreme Court has described deportation under that statute as 
"presumptively mandatory."  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
368-69 (2010).  That statute does not state that deportation is 
"mandatory."  Rather, it states that certain aliens "shall, upon 
the order of the Attorney General, be removed . . . ."  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(intro.).  The Attorney General has some discretion to 
prevent deportation.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-64.  Further, as 
we will explain later, the United States Department of Homeland 
Security exercises prosecutorial discretion as to which aliens 
it will seek to deport. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
3 
 
been his primary concern throughout this case because he has 
lived in the United States for 22 years and does not want to be 
separated from his children and wife, who live in New Jersey.  
¶4 
The State argues that the circuit court correctly 
denied Shata's post-conviction motion because his trial counsel 
did provide effective assistance.  The State argues that Shata's 
attorney did not perform deficiently.  The State contends that 
under Padilla, Shata's attorney was merely required to inform 
him that he was at risk of being deported if convicted.  The 
State argues that Shata's attorney went above and beyond that 
requirement by telling Shata that he faced a "strong chance" of 
deportation.  The State argues that Shata's conviction made him 
"deportable" but did not make his deportation an absolute 
certainty.  The State also argues that, if Shata's counsel 
performed deficiently, Shata was not prejudiced thereby.  The 
State argues that Shata would have pled guilty even if he had 
been told that deportation was an absolute certainty upon 
conviction.  Alternatively, the State argues that this court 
should remand the matter to the circuit court for a hearing on 
the issue of prejudice.  
¶5 
We conclude that Shata is not entitled to withdraw his 
guilty plea because he did not receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Specifically, Shata's attorney did not perform 
deficiently.  Shata's attorney was required to "give correct 
advice" to Shata about the possible immigration consequences of 
his conviction.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  Shata's attorney 
satisfied that requirement by correctly advising Shata that his 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
4 
 
guilty plea carried a "strong chance" of deportation.  Shata's 
attorney was not required to tell him that his guilty plea would 
absolutely result in deportation.  In fact, Shata's deportation 
was not an absolute certainty.  Executive action, including the 
United States Department of Homeland Security's exercise of 
prosecutorial 
discretion, 
can 
block 
the 
deportation 
of 
deportable aliens.4  Because Shata's trial counsel did not 
perform deficiently, we do not address the issue of prejudice. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Shata is an Egyptian foreign national and is not a 
United States citizen.  He has been living in the United States 
since approximately 1991.  In December 2011 he opened a coffee 
shop called the Sphinx Café, located in Milwaukee.  
¶7 
On April 18, 2012, the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's Office filed a criminal complaint charging Shata with 
one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, as 
party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(h)3., 
939.50(3)(g), and 939.05 (2011-12).5  
¶8 
According to the complaint, investigators obtained a 
warrant to search the Sphinx Café after receiving information 
that a substantial amount of marijuana was being stored there.  
On February 16, 2012, shortly before executing the search 
                                                 
4 "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or 
national of the United States."  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
5 
 
warrant, investigators conducted surveillance of the Sphinx 
Café.  While conducting surveillance, a detective saw Shata 
carry a large cardboard box from the Sphinx Café and place it in 
the trunk of a car parked on the street.  Shata was accompanied 
by one of his employees, Amanda Nowak ("Nowak").  Shortly 
thereafter, Shata returned to the Sphinx Café and Nowak drove 
away in the car.  Law enforcement officers subsequently 
conducted a traffic stop of the car.  Nowak consented to a 
search of the car, and officers found 2,319 grams (approximately 
five pounds) of marijuana inside of the box that Shata had 
placed in the trunk.  Also on February 16 investigators executed 
the search warrant.  A search of Shata's person revealed 2.9 
grams of marijuana and 1.7 grams of cocaine, which he claimed 
were for personal use.  
¶9 
The complaint further alleged that Nowak and Shata 
confessed to selling marijuana.  Specifically, Shata confessed 
to selling marijuana through the Sphinx Café in order to support 
his family.  Nowak told investigators that Shata let his 
marijuana supplier store marijuana at the Sphinx Café, sometimes 
up to 20 pounds.  Nowak also told investigators that Shata sold 
marijuana and that he would front marijuana to her, she would 
sell it, and then she would give the sale proceeds to Shata.  
¶10 On May 2, 2012, Shata made an initial appearance and a 
signature bond was set.  On May 15 the circuit court held a 
preliminary hearing.  Shata waived his right to a preliminary 
examination and was bound over for trial.  The State then filed 
an information and provided a copy to Shata, who waived a 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
6 
 
reading and pled not guilty.  The information charged Shata with 
the same count that was in the complaint.  
A. The Plea Hearing 
¶11 On October 5, 2012, Shata appeared in court for a pre-
trial hearing that turned into a plea hearing.  Shata's 
attorney, James Toran ("Attorney Toran"), informed the court 
that Shata "doesn't want to be deported."  Attorney Toran asked 
the court to adjourn the trial date so that he could "deal with" 
the immigration consequences that Shata could face if convicted.  
The court denied the request for an adjournment but offered to 
schedule another pre-trial hearing.  The court passed the case 
to allow Attorney Toran to confer with Shata and the State.  
¶12 After a discussion off the record, the parties 
appeared before the court again.  The State described a plea 
agreement to the court.  Specifically, if Shata pled guilty, the 
State would recommend two years of initial confinement followed 
by two years of extended supervision, imposed and stayed for 24 
months of probation.  As a condition of probation, the State 
would recommend 12 months of confinement in the House of 
Corrections.  The maximum penalty that Shata faced was "a fine 
not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or 
both."  Wis. Stat. §§ 939.50(3)(g), 961.41(1m)(h)3.  Shata faced 
a "term of confinement in prison" not to exceed five years.  
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)7.  
¶13 After confirming that the State accurately described 
the plea agreement, Attorney Toran told the court that he had 
informed Shata "that there's a potential he could be deported."  
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
7 
 
MR. TORAN:  And [Shata] is——I did inform him of 
the potential that he's——Are you a United States 
citizen? 
THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
MR. TORAN:  He's not a United States citizen, 
that there's a potential he could be deported. 
THE COURT:  All right.  And, Mr. Shata, is that 
your understanding as well? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.  
Shata then stated that he wished to enter a guilty plea. 
¶14  The court then explained to Shata the maximum 
penalties he faced upon conviction and that, as a convicted 
felon, he would be barred from possessing a firearm and would be 
barred from voting in any election until his civil rights are 
restored.  The circuit court next informed Shata of the possible 
immigration consequences of his plea: 
THE COURT:  I'll also advise you that if you're 
not a citizen of the United States that a plea of 
guilty or no contest for the offense with which you 
are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion 
from admission to this country, or the denial of 
naturalization under federal law.  And you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
After the circuit court explained the elements of the offense 
charged, Shata pled guilty.  
¶15 The circuit court then noted that Shata had signed a 
plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form that contained the 
same immigration warning.6  
                                                 
6 The plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form states, 
inter alia, that: "I understand that if I am not a citizen of 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
8 
 
THE COURT:  Sir, I have before me a document 
entitled a plea questionnaire, waiver of rights form, 
and an addendum, and there are signatures at the 
bottom of each.  Did you sign those documents? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Did you go over the forms with your 
lawyer? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Do you understand everything on those 
forms? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Are all of your answers truthful? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.  
. . .  
THE COURT:  Are you satisfied with your lawyer's 
representation? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
¶16 The court then confirmed with Attorney Toran that he 
discussed the plea questionnaire with Shata. 
THE COURT:  Mr. Toran, have you gone over the 
plea questionnaire, waiver of rights forms with your 
client? 
MR. TORAN:  Yes, I have. 
THE COURT:  Satisfied he understands all the 
rights he'll be giving up by entering his plea? 
                                                                                                                                                             
the United States, my plea could result in deportation, the 
exclusion of admission to this country, or the denial of 
naturalization under federal law."  Shata and Attorney Toran 
signed the form on October 5, 2012, the date of the plea and 
sentencing hearing.  
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
9 
 
MR. TORAN:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Satisfied the plea is being made 
freely, voluntarily, and intelligently? 
MR. TORAN:  Yes. 
¶17 The court then accepted the guilty plea, "find[ing] 
that the defendant is entering his plea freely, voluntarily, and 
intelligently, with full understanding of the nature of the 
offense charged, the maximum possible penalties, and all the 
rights 
he'll 
be 
giving 
up 
by 
entering 
his 
plea 
of 
guilty . . . ."  The court subsequently found Shata guilty and 
entered a judgment of conviction.  At the end of the plea 
hearing, 
the 
court 
decided 
not 
to 
order 
a 
presentence 
investigation and scheduled a sentencing hearing.7 
B. The Sentencing Hearing 
¶18 On November 16, 2012, the circuit court held a 
sentencing hearing.  The State argued that Shata deserved one 
year of conditional jail time as a condition of probation 
because of his "lack of a prior [criminal] record," his 
"character," and the facts of the case.  The State argued that 
Shata "manipulate[ed] and use[d]" his co-defendant, Amanda 
Nowak, who was 17 years of age at the time.  The State argued 
that "it's . . . disgusting that [Shata] would use his influence 
as a boss and [Nowak's] age and get her wrapped up into this."  
The State also noted the danger of violence associated with 
                                                 
7 The circuit court wanted to schedule the sentencing 
hearing for October 31, 2012, but due to Attorney Toran's 
schedule, the court set the hearing for November 16. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
10 
 
sales of illegal drugs.  However, because Shata did "appear to 
be remorseful" and had no prior criminal record, the State felt 
that "probation is appropriate."  
 
¶19 At the sentencing hearing, Attorney Toran recommended 
that the court "impose and stay a prison sentence, place [Shata] 
on probation, and . . . allow his probation to be transferred to 
the State of New Jersey and . . . impose condition time but stay 
that as well."  Attorney Toran noted that Shata had recently 
moved with his wife and children to New Jersey and that he 
returned from there to Milwaukee for every court appearance, 
demonstrating Shata's good character.  Attorney Toran also noted 
that he tried to arrange for a deferred prosecution, "but the 
State was not amenable to doing so, and [Shata is] very, very 
concerned about being deported out of this country."  Attorney 
Toran argued that his recommended sentence was appropriate 
because Shata has a college degree, is an entrepreneur, has a 
supportive family, and is "kind of a patsy kind of guy" and "is 
not a major player."  Attorney Toran also noted that Shata had 
potential 
employment 
opportunities 
in 
New 
Jersey, 
was 
financially destitute, and had lost over $300,000 in the 
restaurant business.  
 
¶20 The court noted that its sentence would be based on 
the arguments of counsel as well as society's interest in 
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation.  The court stated 
that Shata's offense is "serious" and that illegal drugs are 
"destroying the lives of individuals" and have a "big impact 
throughout the community."  The court also stated that Shata was 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
11 
 
"taking advantage of other people."  The court noted that 
although Shata had no prior criminal record and had a supportive 
family, "the community needs to be protected from someone who's 
dealing this quantity of drugs."  The court then sentenced Shata 
to five years of imprisonment consisting of one year of initial 
confinement in prison and four years of extended supervision.  
The court allowed the extended supervision to be transferred to 
New Jersey.  Although the court did not follow either party's 
recommendation, it did impose one year of confinement, as the 
State recommended pursuant to the plea agreement. 
C. Shata's Plea Withdrawal Motion and Hearing 
¶21 About four months later, on March 15, 2013, Shata 
filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  In 
his motion, he argued that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because Attorney Toran failed to inform him "that 
federal law required he be deported following his conviction."  
Shata argued that Attorney Toran should have told him "that he 
was subject to mandatory deportation because the offense 
involved more than 30 grams of marijuana."  Shata alleged that 
Attorney Toran "informed him that he did not have to worry about 
any immigration consequences because he would be receiving 
probation, 
and 
[Immigration 
and 
Customs 
Enforcement] 
only 
initiated deportation proceedings for aliens serving prison 
terms."  However, despite that allegation, Shata noted that 
Attorney Toran stated at the plea hearing that "'there's a 
potential he could be deported.'"  Shata also complained that 
the circuit court "did not inform [him] that his conviction 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
12 
 
would necessarily subject him to deportation proceedings.  The 
court merely stated that his plea 'may' result in deportation."  
¶22 On May 31, 2013, the circuit court held a Machner 
hearing on Shata's postconviction motion.8  Attorney Toran 
testified that he had informed Shata of the potential for 
deportation if convicted.  Attorney Toran testified that he had 
used 
the 
word 
"potential" 
and 
did 
not 
tell 
Shata 
that 
deportation was "mandatory."  He also testified that he "advised 
[Shata] prior to the plea that he may be deported, that there's 
a strong chance that he could be deported . . . ."  Attorney 
Toran testified that he "knew [pleading guilty] would subject 
[Shata] to deportation."  But Attorney Toran "didn't know 
[deportation] was mandatory."  Attorney Toran testified that he 
"didn't research the immigration consequences in terms of 
whether or not it was mandatory."  He also stated that he had 
not researched the federal immigration statutes.  However, he 
explained that he was familiar with Padilla, 559 U.S. 356.  He 
also 
testified 
that 
he 
had 
"asked 
a 
number 
of 
federal 
prosecutors about whether or not the impact of pleading to this 
charge would subject [Shata] to deportation, and they said it 
could, everyone used the word 'it could.'"  Attorney Toran also 
explained that he had tried to have the charge amended so that 
Shata could avoid the possibility of deportation, but the State 
was unwilling to amend the charge.  Attorney Toran testified 
                                                 
8 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979). 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
13 
 
that he had advised Shata to plead guilty because they had "no 
defense," Shata confessed to the crime, and the State would 
recommend probation if he pled guilty.    
¶23 Shata testified next.  He stated that he would not 
have pled guilty if he had known that he would be subject to 
mandatory deportation upon conviction.  He testified that 
Attorney Toran "didn't say a strong chance" of deportation 
existed.  To the contrary, Shata testified that Attorney Toran 
"promised [him] to get probation" and told Shata that "if you 
get probation, you're not going to be deported."  Shata further 
testified that he received a letter from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services that ordered him to appear before an 
immigration judge.9  
¶24 The circuit court found that the testimony of Attorney 
Toran was more credible and that counsel had informed Shata of a 
strong likelihood of deportation if convicted.  It found "the 
testimony of Mr. Toran to be credible under the circumstances, 
                                                 
9 This letter does not appear in the record.  Further, the 
United States Immigration and Naturalization Services ceased to 
exist in 2003.  The record, however, does contain "Page 1 of 3" 
of a U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") "Immigration 
Detainer——Notice of Action," which was signed on November 23, 
2012.  A checked box on the form indicates that the DHS 
"[i]nitiated an investigation to determine whether this person 
is subject to removal from the United States."  An unchecked box 
on the form indicates that the DHS had not "[i]nitiated removal 
proceedings and served a Notice to Appear or other charging 
document."  Another unchecked box on the form indicates that the 
DHS had not "[o]btained an order of deportation or removal from 
the United States for this person." 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
14 
 
that he did advise Mr. Shata, unlike Padilla, that there was a 
strong likelihood that he would be deported."  The circuit court 
also stated, "I don't find that Mr. Toran told Mr. Shata that he 
would be getting probation and would go back to New Jersey and 
nothing would happen."  
¶25 The circuit court concluded that Shata had not 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court held that 
Attorney Toran did not perform deficiently.  The circuit court 
distinguished Padilla explaining that "even the language in 
Padilla is not that it's mandatory that you'll be deported, but 
that it's presumptively mandatory, and the difference between 
the strong likelihood and presumptive deportation, I don't think 
that there's necessarily a significant difference."  The circuit 
court also held that Shata failed to prove that he was 
prejudiced.  It stated, "I don't find Mr. Shata's testimony to 
be credible today that he would've gone to trial under any 
circumstance had he known that removal, deportation was a 
presumptive mandatory."  The court also noted that "[t]here 
appears to be some discretion" as to whether Shata will be 
deported and that "[i]t appears at least no one has presented 
factually that the law is that he will, in fact, automatically 
be deported."  Accordingly, the circuit court denied Shata's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and issued a written order to 
that effect on July 15, 2013. 
D. The Court of Appeals' Decision 
¶26 On July 15, 2014, the court of appeals, in a split 
decision, reversed the circuit court's judgment of conviction 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
15 
 
and order denying postconviction relief.  The majority concluded 
that Shata received ineffective assistance of counsel.  First, 
the majority held that Attorney Toran, by informing Shata that 
he faced a strong likelihood of deportation if convicted, "was 
deficient when he failed to provide Shata with complete and 
accurate information about the deportation consequences of his 
plea."  State v. Shata, No. 2013AP1437-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶28 (Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 2014).  The majority reasoned that 
"the deportation consequences for conviction of Shata's offense, 
like the consequences of Padilla's, were in fact dramatically 
more serious than 'a strong likelihood.'"  Id.  The majority 
also held that this deficiency prejudiced Shata.  Id., ¶¶29-33.  
¶27 Judge Brennan dissented.  She reasoned that "[t]rial 
counsel not only complied with Padilla's requirement that he 
inform Shata 'whether his plea carries a risk of deportation,' 
see [Padilla], 559 U.S. at 374, trial counsel went one better 
and advised Shata not only that there was a 'risk' of 
deportation, but that there was a strong one."  Id., ¶38 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  Judge Brennan also concluded that 
Shata suffered no prejudice because he "fail[ed] to show that it 
would have been a rational decision for him to reject a plea 
with a probation recommendation."  Id., ¶49 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  
¶28 On August 14, 2014, the State filed a petition for 
review, which we granted on December 18, 2014. 
II. STANDARD FOR PLEA WITHDRAWAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
16 
 
¶29 "In general 'a circuit court should freely allow a 
defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for any fair 
and just reason, unless the prosecution [would] be substantially 
prejudiced.'"  State v. Lopez, 2014 WI 11, ¶2, 353 Wis. 2d 1, 
843 N.W.2d 390 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 2007 
WI 96, ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In contrast, "the general rule [is] that a 
defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea after 
sentencing must prove manifest injustice by clear and convincing 
evidence."  State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶29, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 
819 
N.W.2d 749 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citations 
omitted).  
Ineffective assistance of counsel is one type of manifest 
injustice.  See State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶49, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482.  
¶30 "The clear and convincing standard for plea withdrawal 
after sentencing, which is higher than the 'fair and just' 
standard before sentencing, 'reflects the State's interest in 
the finality of convictions, and reflects the fact that the 
presumption of innocence no longer exists.'"  Id., ¶48 (quoting 
State 
v. 
Cross, 
2010 
WI 
70, 
¶42, 
326 
Wis. 2d 492, 
786 
N.W.2d 64).  "The higher burden 'is a deterrent to defendants 
testing the waters for possible punishments.'"  Id. (quoting 
State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379–80, 534 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. 
App. 1995)).  "Disappointment in the eventual punishment does 
not rise to the level of a manifest injustice."  Id., ¶49 
(citing Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d at 379).  
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
17 
 
¶31 "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and law."  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, 
¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citations omitted).  "We 
will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  Id. (citation omitted).  "Findings of fact 
include 'the circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct 
and strategy.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305) (quotation marks omitted).  
"Moreover, this court will not exclude the circuit court's 
articulated assessments of credibility and demeanor, unless they 
are clearly erroneous."  Id. (citing Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 57, 
¶23).  "However, the ultimate determination of whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective is a question of law, which we review 
de novo."  Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶32 "Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
guarantee 
criminal 
defendants 
the 
right 
to 
counsel."  Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶20 (citing U.S. Const. 
amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7).  "The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)) (quotation marks 
omitted).  
¶33 "Whether a convicted defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a two-part inquiry."  Id., ¶21 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  "First, the defendant must prove 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient." 
 
Id. 
(citing 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
18 
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  "Second, if counsel's performance 
was deficient, the defendant must prove that the deficiency 
prejudiced the defense."  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687).  To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must prove both deficient performance and 
prejudice.  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  If a 
defendant fails to prove deficient performance, a reviewing 
court need not consider whether the defendant was prejudiced.  
Id., ¶36; State v. Franklin, 2001 WI 104, ¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 582, 
629 N.W.2d 289 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).10 
¶34 Prior to Padilla state courts and federal courts of 
appeals almost universally held that defense counsel's failure 
to 
advise 
a 
criminal 
defendant 
of 
possible 
immigration 
consequences of a conviction does not provide a basis for an 
ineffective assistance claim.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364-65 & 
n.9; Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 
1109 & nn.8-9 (2013).  These courts reasoned that "collateral 
                                                 
10 A defendant must make a sufficient proffer in order to be 
entitled to a hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  "[T]he circuit court has the discretion to deny the 
postconviction motion without a Machner hearing 'if the motion 
fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a question of fact, 
presents 
only 
conclusory 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief.'"  State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶43, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 
717 N.W.2d 111 (emphasis added in Roberson) (quoting State v. 
Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 555 n.3, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 
1998)).  A defendant is not "automatically entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing no matter how cursory or meritless the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim might be."  Curtis, 218 
Wis. 2d at 555 n.3. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
19 
 
matters, i.e., those matters not within the sentencing authority 
of the state trial court," are outside the scope of counsel's 
duties under the Sixth Amendment.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364-65 & 
n.9.  
¶35 The Supreme Court in Padilla parted ways with that 
precedent by holding "that counsel must inform her client 
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation."11  Id. at 374.  
The Court explained: 
When 
the 
law 
is 
not 
succinct 
and 
straightforward . . . , a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences. But when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear. 
Id. at 369 (footnote omitted). 
¶36 In the present case, Shata and the State agree that 
his conviction clearly made him deportable.  The issue of 
whether Shata's trial counsel performed deficiently hinges on 
whether he gave Shata correct advice regarding the possibility 
of being deported.  We will first provide background on Padilla 
                                                 
11 The Supreme Court noted that it has  
never 
applied 
a 
distinction 
between 
direct 
and 
collateral 
consequences 
to 
define 
the 
scope 
of 
constitutionally "reasonable professional assistance" 
required under Strickland[ v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 689 (1984)].  Whether that distinction is 
appropriate is a question we need not consider in this 
case because of the unique nature of deportation. 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
20 
 
and relevant immigration law.  Second, we will summarize the 
parties' arguments.  Third and finally, we will determine 
whether 
Shata's 
trial 
counsel 
performed 
deficiently 
under 
Padilla.  Because we conclude that Shata failed to prove 
deficient performance, we do not address prejudice. 
A. Padilla and Background Immigration Law 
¶37 "The landscape of federal immigration law has changed 
dramatically over the last 90 years."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.  
"While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses 
and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent 
deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the 
class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges 
to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation."  Id.  
¶38 By passing the Immigration Act of 1917, "[f]or the 
first time in our [nation's] history, Congress made classes of 
noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American 
soil."  Id. at 361 (citation omitted).  Although the Act 
"authorized 
deportation 
as 
a 
consequence 
of 
certain 
convictions," it included a procedure, known as a judicial 
recommendation against deportation ("JRAD"), which allowed a 
sentencing judge in a state or federal prosecution to make a 
recommendation that a noncitizen defendant not be deported.  Id.  
A JRAD forbade deportation and was binding on the executive 
branch.  Id. at 361-62.  "Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no 
such creature as an automatically deportable offense.  Even as 
the class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained 
discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-case 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
21 
 
basis." 
 
Id. 
at 
362. 
 
"Although 
narcotics 
offenses . . . provided a distinct basis for deportation as 
early as 1922, the JRAD procedure was generally available to 
avoid deportation in narcotics convictions."  Id. (footnote 
omitted) (citation omitted).  
¶39 "However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our 
law.  Congress first circumscribed the JRAD provision in the 
1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and in 1990 Congress 
entirely eliminated it[.]"  Id. at 363 (footnote omitted) 
(citation omitted).  "In 1996, Congress also eliminated the 
Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from 
deportation[.]"  Id. (citation omitted).   
Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed 
a removable offense after the 1996 effective date of 
these 
amendments, 
his 
removal 
is 
practically 
inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited 
remnants 
of 
equitable 
discretion 
vested 
in 
the 
Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens 
convicted of particular classes of offenses. 
Id. at 363-64 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b).  "Subject to limited 
exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an 
offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance."  Id. 
at 364 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1228).  
¶40 The Supreme Court in Padilla stated that "[t]hese 
changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the 
stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction.  The importance of 
accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has 
never been more important."  Id. at 364.  Accordingly, the Court 
"conclude[d] 
that 
advice 
regarding 
deportation 
is 
not 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
22 
 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel."  Id. at 366.  
¶41 Before determining the scope of an attorney's duty to 
give advice regarding deportation, the Court explained that the 
deficient-performance prong of Strickland "is necessarily linked 
to the practice and expectations of the legal community: 'The 
proper 
measure 
of 
attorney 
performance 
remains 
simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.'"  Id. at 
366 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  The Court noted that 
"[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view 
that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation."  Id. at 367-68 (collecting authorities).  
¶42 The Court also noted that "[i]mmigration law can be 
complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own.  Some members 
of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in 
either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in 
it."  Id. at 369.  "There will, therefore, undoubtedly be 
numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a 
particular plea are unclear or uncertain.  The duty of the 
private practitioner in such cases is more limited."  Id.  
¶43 The Court then explained the scope of an attorney's 
duty to give advice regarding deportation.  "When the law is not 
succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending 
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences."  Id.  "But when the deportation consequence is 
truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
23 
 
advice is equally clear."  Id.  Ultimately, the Court "[held] 
that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a 
risk of deportation."  Id. at 374.  
¶44 In Padilla Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras who had 
been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more 
than 40 years, pled guilty to transporting a large amount of 
marijuana in his tractor-trailer in Kentucky.  Id. at 359.  His 
offense made him "deportable" from the United States.  Id. at 
359 & n.1.  Padilla filed a postconviction motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, arguing that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel.12  Id. at 359.  He claimed that his trial counsel 
told him that he would not be deported because he had lived in 
the United States for such a long time.  Id.  
¶45 The Supreme Court determined that "[t]his is not a 
hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of 
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the 
removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, 
and his counsel's advice was incorrect."  Id. at 368-69.  The 
Court reasoned that "the terms of the relevant immigration 
statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the 
removal consequence for Padilla's conviction."  Id. at 368 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).  
¶46 The relevant federal statute provided: 
                                                 
12 It appears that Padilla moved to withdraw his plea post-
sentencing.  See Com. v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 
2008), rev'd and remanded sub nom, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356 (2010). 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
24 
 
Any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or 
attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, 
the United States, or a foreign country relating to a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of 
title 21), other than a single offense involving 
possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana, is deportable. 
8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
"Any 
alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the 
order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is" 
convicted of such an offense.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (intro.).  
¶47 The Court explained that "Padilla's counsel could have 
easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for 
deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which 
addresses 
not 
some 
broad 
classification 
of 
crimes 
but 
specifically commands removal for all controlled substances 
convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession 
offenses."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368.  "Instead, Padilla's 
counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would 
not result in his removal from this country."  Id.  
B. The Parties' Arguments 
¶48 The State argues that Shata's trial counsel, Attorney 
Toran, did not perform deficiently.  The State contends that 
Shata's deportation is not inevitable.  The State contends that, 
because the relevant immigration statute made Shata "deportable" 
upon conviction, Padilla required Attorney Toran to inform Shata 
"whether his plea carries a risk of deportation."  Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 374.  The State argues that Attorney Toran complied with 
and, in fact, exceeded the requirements of Padilla by telling 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
25 
 
Shata 
that 
his 
conviction 
carried 
a 
"strong 
chance" 
of 
deportation.  The State contrasts that advice with the false 
assurance that Padilla received from his attorney that he would 
not be deported.  The State relies on several cases in which 
courts held that Padilla requires counsel to inform a defendant 
that a conviction for a deportable offense carries a risk of 
deportation.  See Com. v. Escobar, 70 A.3d 838 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2013); Chacon v. State, 409 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); 
Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607 (R.I. 2011).13  
¶49 For example, in Escobar the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court held that Padilla requires counsel to inform an alien 
criminal defendant that a drug-related conviction carries a 
"risk" of deportation.  In that case, Israel Escobar pled guilty 
to possession with intent to deliver cocaine and was sentenced.  
Escobar, 70 A.3d at 840.  After the federal government began 
deportation proceedings against him, he sought to withdraw his 
plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id.  He 
argued that his attorney performed deficiently by failing to 
advise him that "deportation would, in fact, result from his 
plea, and not just that deportation was likely to result."  Id. 
¶50 The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that Escobar's 
trial counsel did not perform deficiently by advising him that 
his guilty plea would "likely" result in deportation.  Id. at 
842.  The court noted that the Supreme Court in Padilla held 
                                                 
13 In each of these cases, the defendant moved post-
sentencing to withdraw his plea. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
26 
 
that "when the deportation consequence is truly clear, 'the duty 
to give correct advice is equally clear.'"  Id. at 841 (emphasis 
added in Escobar) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369).  The court 
rejected the notion "that giving 'correct' advice necessarily 
means counsel, when advising Escobar about his deportation risk, 
needed to tell Escobar he definitely would be deported."  Id. 
Although 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) made Escobar "deportable" 
upon conviction, "whether the U.S. Attorney General and/or other 
personnel would necessarily take all the steps needed to 
institute and carry out Escobar's actual deportation was not an 
absolute certainty when he pled."  Id.  "Given that Escobar did 
know deportation was possible, given that counsel advised him 
there was a substantial risk of deportation, and given that 
counsel told Escobar it was likely there would be deportation 
proceedings instituted against him, we find counsel's advice 
was, in fact, correct."  Id.  Although the Padilla Court stated 
that 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) made Padilla "eligible for 
deportation" 
and 
that 
"his 
deportation 
was 
presumptively 
mandatory," the Supreme Court and that statute did not announce 
"a guarantee that actual deportation proceedings are a certainty 
such that counsel must advise a defendant to that effect."  Id. 
at 842. 
¶51 The Escobar court "acknowledge[d] that parts of the 
Padilla opinion contain language arguably supporting the notion 
that plea counsel in some cases may have a duty to provide a 
rather certain indication of deportation."  Id.  "For example, 
at one point, the Padilla court agreed competent counsel would 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
27 
 
have told Padilla he was 'subject to automatic deportation.'"  
Id. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360).  "At another point, the 
[Padilla] 
court 
indicated 
the 
instant 
deportation 
statute 
'commands' deportation for virtually all drug convictions."  Id. 
(quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368).  "The opinion likewise 
observes 
that 
deportation 
for 
certain 
convictions 
is 
'practically inevitable.'"  Id. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
363-64).  
¶52 Nevertheless, the Escobar court concluded that  
the [Padilla] court's overall emphasis was that the 
deportation 
statute 
in 
question 
makes 
most 
drug 
convicts subject to deportation in the sense that they 
certainly become deportable, not in the sense that 
plea counsel should know and state with certainty that 
the 
federal 
government 
will, 
in 
fact, 
initiate 
deportation proceedings. 
Id.  The court reasoned that, "[u]ltimately, when announcing its 
holding, the Padilla court opined, '[W]e now hold that counsel 
must inform [the] client whether [the] plea carries a risk of 
deportation.'"  Id. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374).  The 
court held that Escobar's trial attorney complied with Padilla 
by informing him that "his plea carried a risk of deportation."  
Id.  "In fact, counsel told Escobar deportation proceedings were 
likely."  Id. 
¶53 On the other hand, Shata argues that Attorney Toran 
performed deficiently.  Shata argues that Attorney Toran was 
required, under Padilla, to tell him that "his conviction would 
absolutely result in deportation."  Shata contends that "[t]here 
is no difference between Padilla's attorney, who affirmatively 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
28 
 
gave her client bad advice, and Shata's attorney, who told him 
there was a 'strong chance' he would be deported when it was 
actually inevitable."  According to Shata, Attorney Toran gave 
him "misinformation" because "[t]here is a difference between a 
'strong chance' and an 'absolute certainty.'"  He notes that the 
Supreme Court in Padilla stated that "constitutionally competent 
counsel would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction for 
drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation."  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.  He also relies on several cases in 
which courts interpreted Padilla as requiring counsel to inform 
an alien defendant that a conviction for a deportable offense 
would necessarily result in deportation.  See State v. Mendez, 
2014 WI App 57, 354 Wis. 2d 88, 847 N.W.2d 895; see also United 
States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2011); Salazar v. 
State, 361 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App. 2011); State v. Sandoval, 249 
P.3d 1015 (Wash. 2011) (en banc).  
¶54 For example, in Mendez, Ivan Mendez moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea to maintaining a drug trafficking place.14  
Mendez, 354 Wis. 2d 88, ¶1.  In support of his motion he argued 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
"attorney failed to inform him that conviction of this charge 
would subject him to automatic deportation from the United 
States with no applicable exception and no possibility of 
                                                 
14 The court of appeals' opinion did not state whether 
Mendez moved to withdraw his guilty plea before or after being 
sentenced. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
29 
 
discretionary waiver."  Id. (citations omitted).  Mendez's trial 
attorney "'basically' reiterated the general warning on the plea 
questionnaire, that 'a conviction may make [the defendant] 
inadmissible or deportable.'"  Id., ¶4 (alteration in original).  
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that this advice constituted 
deficient performance.  Id., ¶¶9-10.  
¶55 The court of appeals in Mendez rejected Chacon, on 
which the State relies in the present case.  Id., ¶¶13-14.  In 
Chacon the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the defendant's 
attorney did not perform deficiently by advising him that upon 
being convicted for two deportable offenses "he 'would very 
likely be deported and wouldn't be able to come back.'"  Id., 
¶13 (quoting Chacon, 409 S.W.3d at 536).  In Mendez the court of 
appeals stated, "We reject Chacon.  Its holding is contrary to 
Padilla's plain statement that 'when the deportation consequence 
is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally 
clear.'"  Id., ¶14 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369).  "In 
addition to being bad law, Chacon is distinguishable from 
Mendez's case, because while Chacon's lawyer at least told 
Chacon that deportation was 'very likely,' Mendez's lawyer gave 
only the same unclear warning that appears in the generic plea 
questionnaire, that the plea 'could result in deportation.'"  
Id., ¶14.  
C. Whether Shata's Trial Counsel Performed Deficiently 
¶56 "To demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant 
must show that his counsel's representation 'fell below an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness' 
considering 
all 
the 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
30 
 
circumstances." 
 
Carter, 
324 
Wis. 2d 640, 
¶22 
(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  "In evaluating the reasonableness 
of 
counsel's 
performance, 
this 
court 
must 
be 
'highly 
deferential.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  
"Counsel enjoys a 'strong presumption' that his conduct 'falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" 
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  "Indeed, counsel's 
performance need not be perfect, nor even very good, to be 
constitutionally 
adequate." 
 
Id. 
(citing 
 
Thiel, 
264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶19).  Because we determine that Shata's trial 
counsel 
did 
not 
perform 
deficiently, 
we 
do 
not 
address 
prejudice. 
¶57 The Supreme Court in Padilla stated that "when the 
deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369 
(emphasis added).  Shata and the State agree that his conviction 
clearly made him deportable.  The parties disagree, however, as 
to whether Shata's trial counsel gave correct advice. 
¶58 At the outset, we note that the advice that Shata 
received is far better than the advice that Padilla received.  
"Padilla's counsel provided him false assurance that his 
conviction would not result in his removal from this country."  
Id. at 368 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Supreme Court determined 
that "[t]his is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The 
consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined from 
reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively 
mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect."  Id. at 368-
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
31 
 
69 (emphasis added).  In contrast, Shata received correct 
immigration advice.  Shata's trial counsel, Attorney Toran, 
correctly told Shata that his conviction carried a "strong 
chance" of deportation.15  Accordingly, we disagree with Shata's 
contention that the advice he received is "no differen[t]" than 
the incorrect legal advice that Padilla received.  
¶59 Although a controlled substance conviction makes an 
alien 
"deportable," 
8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), 
such 
a 
conviction will not necessarily result in deportation.  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Escobar correctly noted that 
whether immigration "personnel would necessarily take all the 
steps needed to institute and carry out [an alien's] actual 
deportation [i]s not an absolute certainty . . . ."  Escobar, 70 
A.3d at 841.  For example, prosecutorial discretion and the 
current administration's immigration policies provide possible 
avenues for deportable aliens to avoid deportation.16  In fact, 
                                                 
15 Shata appears to have dropped his assertion that Attorney 
Toran never told him that his guilty plea carried a strong 
chance of deportation.  In any event, the circuit court found 
that Attorney Toran told Shata that his guilty plea carried a 
"strong likelihood" of deportation, and that finding is not 
clearly erroneous. 
16 Since at least the 1960s, the federal executive branch 
has gone back and forth in adopting and rescinding policies 
regarding deferred action on deportation.  See Texas v. United 
States, No. CIV. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *7 & n.12 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 16, 2015).  On June 15, 2012, the United States 
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") adopted the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program, which provided 
relief from deportation for certain aliens who entered the 
United States before age 16.  Id. at *4.  On June 5, 2014, the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is a 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
32 
 
the executive branch has essentially unreviewable prosecutorial 
discretion with respect to commencing deportation proceedings, 
adjudicating cases, and executing removal orders.  Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482-85 (1999).  
¶60 Indeed, the secretary of the United States Department 
of Homeland Security ("DHS") recently explained that the DHS, 
which is "responsible for enforcing the nation's immigration 
laws," 
"must 
exercise 
prosecutorial 
discretion 
in 
the 
enforcement of the law."  Jeh Charles Johnson, Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants, 
at 
2 
(Nov. 
20, 
2014) 
(emphasis 
added), 
available 
at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo
_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. 
 
"Due 
to 
limited 
resources, 
DHS . . . cannot respond to all immigration violations or remove 
all persons illegally in the United States."  Id.  "DHS may 
exercise prosecutorial discretion at any stage of an enforcement 
proceeding."  Id.  "In the immigration context, prosecutorial 
discretion should apply not only to the decision to issue, 
serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear,17 but also to a broad 
                                                                                                                                                             
component of DHS, expanded the DACA program to provide relief to 
more aliens.  Id. at *5-6.  On November 20, 2014, DHS adopted 
the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans ("DAPA") program, 
which provided relief from deportation for certain undocumented 
aliens who have a child who is a United States citizen or lawful 
permanent resident.  Id. at *6-7.  In February 2015 the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued 
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the implementation of the 
2014 DACA expansion and the DAPA program.  Id. at *62.  The 
court did not enjoin the original 2012 DACA program.  Id.  
17 A "notice to appear" initiates a removal proceeding.  8 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
33 
 
range of other discretionary enforcement decisions, including 
deciding" "whether to settle [or] dismiss . . . a case" and 
"whether 
to 
grant 
deferred 
action . . . or 
a 
stay 
of 
removal . . . ."  Id.  Deportation is not mandatory for a felony 
conviction.  Rather, certain aliens, including those convicted 
of a felony, are generally "prioritized for removal" unless, 
"based on the totality of the circumstances," the alien "should 
not . . . be an enforcement priority."  Id. at 5-6.  Relevant 
factors include an alien's "length of time in the United States" 
and "family or community ties in the United States."  Id. at 6.  
Because deportation is not an absolutely certain consequence of 
a conviction for a deportable offense, Padilla does not require 
an attorney to advise an alien client that deportation is an 
absolute certainty upon conviction of a deportable offense, 
including a controlled substance offense.  Escobar, 70 A.3d at 
841-42. 
¶61 In fact, the Padilla Court never stated that Padilla 
would absolutely be deported.  The Padilla Court stated that 
"the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, 
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for 
Padilla's conviction."  Padilla 559 U.S. at 368 (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).  The clear removal consequence was that 
Padilla was "eligible for deportation."  Id.  Two sentences 
later, 
the 
Court 
stated 
that 
Padilla's 
deportation 
was 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 1229(a). 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
34 
 
"presumptively mandatory."  Id. at 369.  Thus, the Court meant 
that Padilla clearly was deportable under that immigration 
statute, not that he clearly would be deported.  Escobar, 70 
A.3d at 842.  Shata emphasizes that the Padilla Court stated, 
"[w]e agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel 
would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution 
made him subject to automatic deportation."  Padilla, 559 U.S. 
at 360.  However, by "subject to automatic deportation," the 
Court meant that Padilla was automatically deportable upon 
conviction, not that he would be automatically deported.  As the 
Court explained later, a conviction for drug trafficking 
automatically makes an alien deportable because the Attorney 
General has "limited" discretion to cancel removal of an alien 
with such a conviction.  See id. at 363-64 (explaining that 
"removal is practically inevitable" if "a noncitizen has 
committed a removable offense" because the Attorney General has 
"limited" discretion to cancel removal of such an alien).  The 
Padilla Court did not require that counsel advise that the DHS 
would necessarily initiate and prosecute a removal proceeding 
against Padilla and enforce a removal order against him because 
that was far from certain.  Rather, the Court's "overall 
emphasis was that the deportation statute in question makes most 
drug convicts subject to deportation in the sense that they 
certainly become deportable, not in the sense that plea counsel 
should know and state with certainty that the federal government 
will, in fact, initiate deportation proceedings."  Escobar, 70 
A.3d at 842.  
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
35 
 
¶62 Likewise, the Supreme Court's ultimate holding in 
Padilla recognized that Padilla's deportation was not an 
absolute certainty.  The Padilla Court ultimately "[held] that 
counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk 
of deportation."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added).  
The Court did not hold that an attorney must inform an alien 
client 
that 
a 
conviction 
for 
a 
deportable 
offense 
will 
absolutely result in deportation.  The Court did not require an 
attorney to use any particular words, such as "inevitable 
deportation," 
or 
to 
even 
convey 
the 
idea 
of 
inevitable 
deportation.  See Chacon, 409 S.W.3d at 537 ("Padilla does not 
require that counsel use specific words to communicate to a 
defendant the consequences of entering a guilty plea.  Rather, 
it requires that counsel correctly advise his client of the risk 
of deportation so that the plea is knowing and voluntary.").  
¶63 The Padilla Court did not require that criminal 
defense lawyers function as immigration lawyers or be able to 
predict what the executive branch's immigration policies might 
be now or in the future.  Immediately before announcing the 
scope of a criminal defense attorney's duty to provide advice 
regarding deportation, the Court noted that "[i]mmigration law 
can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own.  Some 
members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal 
charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be 
well versed in it."  Id. at 369.  Accordingly, "the Court 
appears to acknowledge [that] thorough understanding of the 
intricacies of immigration law is not 'within the range of 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
36 
 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'"  Id. at 
385 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687).  "[R]easonably competent attorneys should know that it is 
not appropriate or responsible to hold themselves out as 
authorities on a difficult and complicated subject matter with 
which they are not familiar," such as immigration law.  Id. 
(Alito, J., concurring).  
¶64 Instead of requiring criminal defense attorneys to 
essentially serve as immigration lawyers for their alien 
clients, 
Padilla 
continued 
the 
longstanding 
practice 
of 
Strickland by requiring counsel to act "'reasonabl[y] under 
prevailing professional norms.'"  Id. at 366 (majority opinion) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) ("'The proper measure of 
attorney 
performance 
remains 
simply 
reasonableness 
under 
prevailing professional norms.'").  The Court further explained 
that "[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the 
view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation." 
 
Id. 
at 
367 
(emphasis 
added) 
(collecting 
authorities).  The Court did not conclude that prevailing 
professional norms require attorneys to inform alien clients 
that convictions for deportable offenses will absolutely result 
in deportation.  See id. 
¶65 The Padilla Court suggested that an attorney would 
give reasonably competent advice by providing a warning similar 
to the one that Wis. Stat. § 971.08 requires a circuit court to 
give: that an alien's conviction may result in deportation.  The 
Padilla Court noted that "many States require trial courts to 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
37 
 
advise defendants of possible immigration consequences."  Id. at 
374 n.15.  The Court cited to Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (2005-06), 
among similar statutes from other States.  Id.  The Court 
explained 
that 
these 
statutes 
were 
"significant" 
to 
its 
conclusion that an attorney must "inform her noncitizen client 
that he faces a risk of deportation."  Id. at 373-74 & n.15 
(emphasis added).  
¶66 In fact, we have previously stated that "by enacting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c) 
& 
(2), 
Wisconsin 
codified 
the 
protections contemplated in Padilla, but placed the duty to warn 
on the circuit court, rather than solely on the attorney."  
Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34 n.12 (emphasis added).  That 
statute, upon which the Padilla Court relied, provides:  
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, 
it 
shall . . . [a]ddress 
the 
defendant 
personally and advise the defendant as follows: "If 
you are not a citizen of the United States of America, 
you are advised that a plea of guilty or no contest 
for the offense with which you are charged may result 
in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this 
country or the denial of naturalization, under federal 
law."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) (2005-06) (emphasis added).  The 
legislature adopted § 971.08(1)(c) in 1985.  See 1985 Wis. Act 
252.  
¶67 Accordingly, if Shata's position were correct, then an 
alien defendant would receive inconsistent immigration warnings 
when pleading guilty or no contest.  The alien's attorney, 
according to Shata, would be required to tell the alien that a 
conviction will absolutely result in deportation.  However, the 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
38 
 
circuit court would warn the defendant pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 that a conviction may result in deportation.  Under 
Shata's logic, if an alien defendant wants to enter a plea, the 
circuit court would essentially have to act as an immigration 
lawyer, because to ensure that the plea is knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary, the court would have to determine whether defense 
counsel gave correct immigration advice.  Thus, under Shata's 
logic, 
in 
order 
to 
ensure 
that 
his 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, the circuit court should have told 
him that he absolutely would be deported upon conviction and 
that his counsel's advice was incorrect.  Circuit courts are not 
required to inform aliens that they absolutely will be deported 
upon conviction.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  Moreover, if 
an attorney were to give the advice that Shata argues is 
required, the attorney may, in fact, be giving wrong advice.  In 
light of the Padilla Court's reliance on § 971.08, and in light 
of 
our 
view 
in 
Negrete 
that 
this 
statute 
codified 
the 
protections of Padilla, we conclude that Padilla did not require 
Shata's 
attorney 
to 
tell 
him 
that 
his 
conviction 
would 
absolutely 
result 
in 
deportation. 
 
Shata's 
argument 
is 
inconsistent with § 971.08.  In fact, unlike Padilla's attorney 
whose advice was absolutely incorrect, Shata's attorney gave him 
advice that there was a "strong chance" of deportation, which 
was absolutely correct.  Correct advice is not deficient. 
¶68 In addition to creating advice from counsel that is 
inconsistent with the circuit court's immigration warning, if we 
were to accept Shata's argument, a defendant like Shata would 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
39 
 
always be in a position to complain that counsel was ineffective 
whether he was deported or not.  Allow us to further explain how 
Shata's conclusions would open the door for any alien to seek 
postconviction relief regardless of deportation.  Shata argues 
that if deportation proceedings are subsequently brought against 
a defendant, like Shata who pled pursuant to an agreement, the 
defendant should be entitled to withdraw the plea in order to 
avoid deportation even though that defendant entered the plea 
knowing that there was a "strong chance" of deportation.  Such a 
defendant would be able to enjoy the benefits of a plea 
agreement——such as the State's agreement to reduce, dismiss or 
agree not to file charges and recommendation for a more lenient 
sentence——and later seek relief if deportation proceedings are 
commenced even though the defendant knew that there was a 
"strong chance" of deportation. 
¶69 On the other hand, a defendant who, like Shata, is 
warned that there is a "strong chance" of deportation could 
gamble by pleading guilty pursuant to an agreement reached with 
the State.  Seemingly then, if deportation proceedings were not 
brought against the defendant, then the defendant could complain 
that he should have gone to trial with the hope of receiving a 
more beneficial verdict from a jury.  In other words, Shata 
could also complain, if not deported, that he gave up his right 
to a trial because he was told that he faced a "strong chance" 
of deportation.18   
                                                 
18 Perhaps deportation may not come because a sentence 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
40 
 
¶70 Similarly, consider a defendant who is told that he 
will absolutely be deported upon conviction and so he proceeds 
to trial instead of accepting a plea offer.  If that defendant 
is convicted, but is not then deported, should that defendant be 
allowed postconviction relief because he asserts that if he had 
not received that advice, he would have taken the State's plea 
bargain offer instead of proceeding to trial?  A defendant in 
those circumstances very well could have given up a beneficial 
plea 
agreement 
due 
to 
counsel's 
advice 
that 
mandatory 
deportation would occur.  As can been seen, Shata's argument 
seems to hinge on whether a defendant is deported, instead of 
whether the defendant knew that he was pleading to an offense 
for which he could face deportation, exclusion from admission, 
or denial of naturalization.  Thus, Shata's argument would 
entitle him to relief whether he pleads or goes to trial and 
whether he is deported or not.  Padilla did not create such an 
impossible scenario for the State, counsel, the defendant, or 
the courts.  
¶71 Shata's position——that his attorney was required to 
tell him that "his conviction would absolutely result in 
deportation"——is unworkable and untenable.  That advice would be 
                                                                                                                                                             
imposed affects deportation, because the DHS has prosecutorial 
discretion, or perhaps because a change in policy affecting 
deportation occurs.  How certain must counsel be of the 
likelihood 
that 
deportation 
will 
occur, 
considering 
the 
immigration legal landscape and changing executive branch or 
administration policies regarding deportation? 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
41 
 
incorrect because a defense attorney does not control and cannot 
know with certainty whether the federal government will deport 
an alien upon conviction.  If we were to adopt Shata's position, 
the unintended consequence may be that an alien defendant could 
be essentially precluded from ever pleading guilty or no contest 
to a crime.  Why would the State make a plea bargain offer to 
such a defendant knowing that it could almost always be 
withdrawn?  If we adopted Shata's position, then an alien might 
not ever be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
plead or even decide to proceed to trial.  Padilla requires 
advice to be correct and, unlike in Padilla, the advice that 
Shata received was actually correct.  Shata's arguments fail 
because the advice that he received——that there was a "strong 
chance" of deportation——was correct and accurate and he entered 
a 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary 
plea 
with 
that 
understanding.   
¶72 The case law on which Shata relies is likewise 
distinguishable.  For example, the attorneys in Bonilla and 
Sandoval rendered assistance that Padilla clearly condemned.  
The attorney in Sandoval gave wrong advice by telling his client 
that he would not be deported upon conviction when, in fact, he 
was deportable.  Sandoval, 249 P.3d at 1020.  That advice was 
identical to the advice that Padilla received, and the Padilla 
Court held that such incorrect advice constitutes deficient 
performance.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69.  In Bonilla the 
attorney failed to mention anything to the defendant about 
possible immigration consequences of a conviction.  Bonilla, 637 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
42 
 
F.3d at 984.  The Padilla Court held that an attorney must 
inform an alien client of possible immigration consequences of a 
conviction.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369-71.19  In Mendez defense 
counsel advised the defendant that "'a conviction may make [the 
defendant] 
inadmissible 
or 
deportable.'" 
 
Mendez, 
354 
Wis. 2d 88, ¶4 (alteration in original).  In Salazar defense 
counsel advised the defendant that there was "a possibility" of 
deportation upon conviction.  Salazar, 361 S.W.3d at 101.  By 
contrast, Shata's attorney provided correct advice about the 
immigration consequences of his plea, telling Shata that there 
was a "strong chance" of deportation upon conviction.  
¶73 Bonilla 
is 
further 
distinguishable 
because 
the 
defendant in that case moved to withdraw his plea pre-
sentencing, so the Ninth Circuit applied the "fair and just" 
standard for pre-sentencing plea withdrawal.  Bonilla, 637 F.3d 
at 983.  By contrast, because Shata moved to withdraw his plea 
post-sentencing, we must apply the higher "manifest injustice" 
standard.  See Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶29.  
¶74 The cases on which the State relies are much more 
persuasive and, unlike the cases cited by Shata, the cases cited 
by the State analyzed Padilla in-depth.  See Chacon, 409 S.W.3d 
                                                 
19 The Padilla Court rejected an argument, put forth by the 
United States as amicus curiae, "that Strickland applies to 
Padilla's claim only to the extent that he has alleged 
affirmative misadvice."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369-71.  Unlike 
the attorney in Padilla, Shata's attorney provided correct 
advice. 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
43 
 
at 533-37; Escobar, 70 A.3d at 840-42.  Those courts correctly 
noted that a conviction for a deportable offense will not 
necessarily result in deportation.  See Chacon, 409 S.W.3d at 
534, 536-37; Escobar, 70 A.3d at 841-42.  As a result, those 
courts correctly held that counsel was not required to advise 
the defendants that they would necessarily be deported upon 
conviction.  See Chacon, 409 S.W.3d at 536-37; Escobar, 70 A.3d 
at 841-42.  The courts correctly determined that the attorneys 
gave correct advice, as required by Padilla, by advising the 
defendants that deportation was "likely" or "very likely."  See 
Chacon, 409 S.W.3d at 537 ("very likely"); Escobar, 70 A.3d at 
842 ("likely").  Shata received similar and correct advice, that 
there 
was 
a 
"strong 
possibility" 
or 
"strong 
chance" 
of 
deportation.  
¶75 We also disagree with Shata's argument that Attorney 
Toran 
performed 
deficiently 
by 
not 
reading 
the 
relevant 
immigration statutes.  The Padilla Court did not hold that an 
attorney must read those statutes in order to avoid performing 
deficiently.  Rather, the Padilla Court focused on the advice 
that was given and concluded that the advice was deficient 
because it was contrary to the clear language of the relevant 
immigration statutes.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69.  
Although 
Attorney 
Toran 
did 
not 
specifically 
read 
the 
immigration statutes, he asked several federal prosecutors 
whether Shata could be deported upon conviction.  Attorney Toran 
also sought to have the State offer deferred prosecution or 
amend the charge to an offense that carried no risk of 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
44 
 
deportation, but the State was unwilling to do so.  Further, 
Attorney Toran informed the court at both the plea hearing and 
sentencing hearing that Shata was concerned that he would be 
deported.  Attorney Toran testified at the Machner hearing that 
he "know[s] the case Padilla v. Kentucky . . . ." Nowhere in 
Padilla did the Court state that not specifically reading the 
immigration statutes is the equivalent of giving misadvice.  
Most importantly, Attorney Toran gave correct advice when he 
told Shata that the guilty plea carried a "strong chance" of 
deportation.  
¶76 Under these circumstances, Attorney Toran did not 
perform 
deficiently 
when 
advising 
Shata 
of 
the 
risk 
of 
deportation.  This advice is significantly different than 
counsel's deficient advice in Padilla.  While the advice given 
in Padilla was that the defendant would not face deportation, 
the advice given to Shata was correct.  Attorney Toran is not 
deficient for giving correct advice to Shata, even if Shata 
ultimately is deported.  If we were to conclude that counsel was 
deficient for giving this advice, it would place a defendant 
like Shata in the position of being able to second-guess a plea 
decision, even when that decision was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  
¶77 The bottom line is that an attorney's advice must be 
adequate to allow a defendant to knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily decide whether to enter a guilty plea.  See Wofford 
v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations 
omitted) ("Because [a guilty plea] is valid only if made 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
45 
 
intelligently and voluntarily, an accused who has not received 
reasonably effective assistance from counsel in deciding to 
plead guilty cannot be bound by his plea.").  Attorney Toran 
"adequately advised [Shata] of the risk of deportation so as to 
allow [him] to make a knowing and voluntary decision to plead 
guilty."  See Chacon, 409 S.W.3d at 537.  In addition to 
Attorney Toran's advice, the plea questionnaire and the circuit 
court's immigration warning helped to ensure that Shata entered 
his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  See 
Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610, 613-14.  Shata understood the court's 
admonition that he could be deported upon conviction.  He 
accepted the plea agreement, entered the plea, and was sentenced 
to one year of confinement as the State recommended.  He did not 
see fit to complain until about four months later, on March 15, 
2013, after he received a letter from the DHS.  
¶78 We withdraw any language in Mendez, 354 Wis. 2d 88, 
that suggests that Padilla requires an attorney to advise an 
alien client that a conviction for a deportable offense will 
necessarily result in deportation.  The remainder of Mendez 
retains precedential value.  See State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, 
¶7 & n.3, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶79 We conclude that Shata is not entitled to withdraw his 
guilty plea because he did not receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Specifically, Shata's attorney did not perform 
deficiently.  Shata's attorney was required to "give correct 
advice" to Shata about the possible immigration consequences of 
No. 
2013AP1437-CR   
 
46 
 
his conviction.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  Shata's attorney 
satisfied that requirement by correctly advising Shata that his 
guilty plea carried a "strong chance" of deportation.  Shata's 
attorney was not required to tell him that his guilty plea would 
absolutely result in deportation.  In fact, Shata's deportation 
was not an absolute certainty.  Executive action, including the 
United States Department of Homeland Security's exercise of 
prosecutorial 
discretion, 
can 
block 
the 
deportation 
of 
deportable aliens. Because Shata's trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently, we do not address the issue of prejudice. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶80 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010), the United States Supreme 
Court determined that defense counsel should have informed his 
client "that his conviction for drug distribution made him 
subject to automatic deportation," and that counsel's failure to 
do so constituted deficient performance.   
¶81  This case involves the same type of crime and the same 
immigration statute at issue in Padilla.  It should have the 
same result.   
¶82 Yet, 
rather 
than 
employing 
a 
straightforward 
application 
of 
Padilla, 
the 
majority 
conducts 
a 
lengthy 
analysis, making several missteps along the way.  I focus here 
on two errors of substantial consequence. 
¶83 First, the majority lowers the professional standard 
for 
Wisconsin 
attorneys 
below 
that 
required 
by 
national 
standards and the United States Supreme Court.  It contends that 
when a client is concerned about immigration consequences of a 
plea, his attorney need not even look at the statute governing 
the immigration consequences before providing advice.  It 
states: "we [] disagree with Shata's argument that Attorney 
Toran 
performed 
deficiently 
by 
not 
reading 
the 
relevant 
immigration statutes."  Majority op., ¶75. 
¶84 Second, in maintaining that an attorney provides 
effective assistance by advising a client with the same language 
that 
a 
court 
uses 
in 
a 
plea 
colloquy, 
the 
majority 
misunderstands Padilla's holding and conflates the court's 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
obligations under the Fifth Amendment with the obligations of an 
attorney under the Sixth Amendment.  
¶85 Together these errors severely undermine the standards 
for attorney conduct set forth in Padilla.  The probable result 
is that clients will be left with only vague and incomplete 
advice about the immigration consequences of entering a plea.  
Because I am confident that clients deserve more and recognize 
that Wisconsin attorneys must do better, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶86 The majority's position that an attorney need not even 
look at the statute governing the immigration consequences at 
issue before providing advice is untenable.  Despite defense 
counsel's awareness that Shata was "very concerned" about 
deportation, the majority "disagree[s] with Shata's argument 
that Attorney Toran performed deficiently by not reading the 
relevant immigration statutes."  Majority op., ¶75.   
¶87 An attorney's failure to read the statute governing 
the immigration consequences of a plea after his client has 
indicated 
that 
deportation 
is 
a 
great 
concern 
is 
a 
quintessential example of deficient performance.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has explained, "an attorney's ignorance of 
a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his 
failure 
to 
perform 
basic 
research 
on 
that 
point 
is 
a 
quintessential 
example 
of 
unreasonable 
performance 
under 
Strickland."  Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014).  
¶88 Strickland v. Washington provides that in determining 
whether an attorney's performance is deficient, "[t]he proper 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms."  466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  
The standard of conduct set by the majority is neither 
prevailing nor a recognized professional norm. 
¶89 The United States Supreme Court sets the standard for 
performance: it requires an attorney to be familiar with the 
governing immigration statute before determining how to advise a 
client.   
¶90 In discussing the same statute at issue in this case, 
the Padilla Court observed that "the terms of the relevant 
immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in 
defining the removal consequences for Padilla's conviction."  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368.  It stated that "Padilla's counsel 
could have easily determined that his plea would make him 
eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the 
statute."  Id.  Given the clarity of the law, the Court 
determined that the alleged failure of Padilla's attorney to 
correctly inform him of the immigration consequences of a plea 
was deficient performance.  Id. at 369.  In essence, an attorney 
must read the statute and convey the information it contains to 
the client.  
¶91 National 
standards 
for 
attorney 
conduct 
likewise 
support the need for attorneys to investigate the governing 
immigration law before providing immigration advice.   
¶92 An 
examination 
of 
deficient 
performance 
"is 
necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal 
community."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.  Accordingly, "prevailing 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is 
reasonable."  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
¶93 Standard 4-6.3 of the American Bar Association's 
Standards 
for 
Criminal 
Justice, 
Prosecution 
and 
Defense 
Functions (4th ed. 2015), states that "[d]efense counsel should 
investigate and be knowledgeable about sentencing procedures, 
law, 
and 
alternatives, 
collateral 
consequences 
and 
likely 
outcomes,  . . .  and advise the client on these topics before 
permitting the client to enter a negotiated disposition." 
¶94 Likewise, 
standard 
14-3.2 
of 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 
(3d ed. 1999), requires attorneys to investigate the law before 
advising defendants about pleas.  The commentary advises that 
"defense counsel should be active, rather than passive, taking 
the initiative to learn about rules in this area rather than 
waiting for questions from the defendant."  Id. at 126-27.  
Because the immigration consequence of a guilty plea may well be 
a client's greatest priority, "counsel should be familiar with 
the basic immigration consequences that flow from different 
types of guilty pleas, and should keep this in mind in 
investigating law and fact and advising the client."  Id. at 
127.   
¶95 The performance standard set by the United States 
Supreme Court and the national standards convey the same 
message: before advising a non-citizen client on whether to 
accept a plea, attorneys must investigate the immigration law 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
implicated by the plea.  The most basic investigation is to read 
the governing immigration statute.   
¶96 By suggesting that an attorney need not look at and be 
familiar with the specific governing statute, the majority's 
standard fails the Strickland test.  It is simply unrecognizable 
as a "prevailing professional norm."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. 
¶97 Nevertheless, the majority transforms what would be 
deficient performance elsewhere into acceptable professional 
conduct here.  It puts its stamp of approval on the conduct of 
Wisconsin attorneys who give substandard legal advice.  This is 
especially troublesome in an area of law that has such 
significant and life altering consequences for their clients and 
the clients' families.   
II 
¶98 A cornerstone of the majority's analysis rests on its 
erroneous contention that attorneys provide effective assistance 
when they advise clients with the same language that a court 
uses in a plea colloquy.  It states: "[t]he Padilla Court 
suggested that an attorney would give reasonably competent 
advice by providing a warning similar to the one that Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 requires a circuit court to give: that an alien's 
conviction may result in deportation."  Majority op., ¶65 
(emphasis in original).   
¶99 This analysis reveals both a serious misunderstanding 
of Padilla's holding and conflates the court's obligations under 
the Fifth Amendment with the obligations of an attorney under 
the Sixth Amendment.  I address each in turn. 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
A 
¶100  Padilla addressed the same type of crime at issue in 
this case and its holding clearly stated what advice should have 
been given to Shata.  However, the majority appears to 
misunderstand the holding. 
¶101 Padilla instructs: "constitutionally competent counsel 
would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution 
made him subject to automatic deportation."  559 U.S. at 360. It 
explained that "[t]his is not a hard case in which to find 
deficiency: the consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be 
determined from reading the removal statute."  Id. at 368-69.  
The Court described the governing immigration statute as 
"succinct, 
clear, 
and 
explicit 
in 
defining 
the 
removal 
consequences [of a controlled substances conviction]."  Id. at 
368. 
¶102 Padilla set forth a test for determining the amount of 
advice 
a 
defense 
attorney 
needs 
to 
provide. 
 
When 
the 
immigration consequences are clear, as here, the consequences 
must be clearly conveyed to the client, and when they are not, 
more general advice is sufficient:  
When 
the 
law 
is 
not 
succinct 
and 
straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need 
do no more than advise a noncitizen client that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences.  . . . when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear.   
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
Id. 
 
Because 
Padilla 
conclusively 
established 
that 
the 
immigration consequences of a controlled substances offense are 
clear, Shata should have been given more than general advice.1 
¶103 Yet, the language in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 that the 
majority deems sufficient provides only general, equivocal 
information:  
 
If you are not a citizen of the United States of 
America, you are advised that a plea of guilty or no 
contest for the offense with which you are charged may 
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to 
this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal law.   
Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  This warning is equivalent to the warning 
that Padilla permits when the law is not clear.  The majority's 
suggestion that this warning necessarily fulfills an attorney's 
Padilla obligations ignores the Court's directive that such a 
warning is unacceptable when more specific advice is available, 
and ignores Padilla's determination that more specific advice is 
available when the defendant pleads to a controlled substances 
crime. 
                                                 
1  Any question about the possible exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion is answered by a recent memo from the Department of 
Homeland Security.  It lists aggravated felonies, such as 
illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, as "Priority 1" 
and states "[a]liens described in this priority represent the 
highest priority to which enforcement resources should be 
directed."  Jeh Charles Johnson, Polices for the Apprehension, 
Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants, at 3 (Nov. 20, 
2014), 
available 
at 
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosec
utorial_discretion.pdf (emphasis added).  Once Shata entered his 
plea, it appears his deportation fate was sealed. 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶104 In an attempt to explain why it does not follow 
Padilla, the majority insists that this case is different 
because unlike Padilla's attorney, Shata's attorney did not 
provide incorrect advice.  Majority op., ¶58.  This distinction 
reveals 
a 
further 
misunderstanding 
of 
Padilla's 
holding.  
Padilla directly stated that its holding was not limited to 
affirmative misadvice from counsel.  559 U.S. at 370.  It 
explained that a contrary holding would lead to "absurd 
results": "First, it would give counsel an incentive to remain 
silent on matters of great importance, even when answers are 
readily available. . . . Second, it would deny a class of 
clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary 
advice on deportation even when it is readily available."  Id. 
at 370-71.  The majority's disregard for the warning required by 
Padilla in favor of a general warning in a plea colloquy 
illustrates its misunderstanding of that case. 
B 
¶105 Additionally, 
the 
majority's 
suggestion 
that 
the 
court's warning pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.08 should be the 
same as an attorney's advice during plea negotiations conflates 
the distinct roles served by attorneys and the courts. 
¶106 The 
majority 
repeatedly 
asserts 
that 
attorneys' 
immigration warnings should match the court's colloquy. For 
example, in response to Shata's argument that his attorney 
should have provided more information, the majority states, "if 
Shata's position were correct, then an alien defendant would 
receive inconsistent immigration warnings when pleading guilty 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
or no contest."  Majority op., ¶67.  The majority even suggests 
that if an attorney were to offer more advice, the court would 
have to as well: it states "[if Shata was correct then] the 
circuit court should have told [Shata] that he absolutely would 
be 
deported 
upon 
conviction 
. . . . Shata's 
argument 
is 
inconsistent with § 971.08."  Id.   
¶107 The majority's insistence that the court and a defense 
attorney give matching warnings fails to recognize that they 
undertake different roles in relation to a defendant's choice to 
enter a plea.  Defense counsel's role, as dictated by the Sixth 
Amendment, is to assist the defendant in deciding whether to 
enter the plea.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370 (referring to "the 
critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of the 
advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement").   
¶108 The court plays a more limited role under the Fifth 
Amendment of ensuring that the plea is knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary. See Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect 
of Plea Colloquy Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring 
Successful Padilla Claims, 121 Yale L. J. 944, 954 (2012).  As 
the United States Supreme Court has explained, a judge "cannot 
investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or 
participate in those necessary conferences between counsel and 
accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of 
the confessional."  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932); 
see also United States v. Batamula, No. 12-20630 (5th Cir. June 
2, 2015) ("the Supreme Court has long contrasted the unique and 
critical 
obligations 
of 
defense 
counsel 
during 
the 
plea 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
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bargaining process with the far more limited role of a district 
court to ensure a minimally valid guilty plea"). 
¶109 Precedent clearly establishes that although the role 
of an attorney and the role of a court overlap, they are not 
equivalent: 
A district court's duty to ensure a knowing and 
voluntary plea arises from the Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee of due process and thus affords defendants a 
right distinct from the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel. 
While 
we 
have 
recognized the inter-relationship between the two 
amendments in the context of guilty pleas, we have 
never suggested that the sufficient protection of one 
right 
automatically 
corrects 
any 
constitutional 
deficiency of the other.  
United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Lang, 121 Yale L. J. at 
948 ("these two protections serve complementary but distinct 
functions in our constitutional structure——neither can replace 
the other"). 
¶110 The Supreme Court has been clear that the inquiry into 
whether an attorney has provided effective assistance of counsel 
is different from the inquiry into whether a plea is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary: 
The [Padilla] Court made clear that "the negotiation 
of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel." It also rejected the argument 
made by petitioner in this case that a knowing and 
voluntary plea supersedes errors by defense counsel. 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012); see also Lafler 
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012) ("An inquiry into 
whether the rejection of a plea is knowing and voluntary, 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
however, is not the correct means by which to address a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
¶111 Consistent with that guidance, courts have declined to 
conclude that the generic warning in a plea colloquy rescues 
inadequate advice from defense attorneys.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 728 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[A] 
district court's admonishments are 'irrelevant' in determining 
whether error has occurred under the first Strickland prong."); 
Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 255 (finding that a trial court's general 
admonishment concerning immigration consequences could not cure 
misadvice by counsel, unless specific); Ortega-Araiza v. State, 
331 P.3d 1189, 1196 (Wyo. 2014) ("We find that the district 
court's generic advisement could not compensate for defense 
counsel's failure to adequately advise his client as required by 
Padilla.");  Hernandez v. State, 124 So. 3d 757, 763 (Fla. 2012) 
("[A]n equivocal warning from the trial court . . . cannot, by 
itself, remove prejudice resulting from counsel's deficiency."); 
State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 1020-21 (Wash. 2011) ("[T]he 
guilty plea statement warnings . . . cannot save the advice that 
counsel gave."); State v. Favela, 311 P.3d 1213, 1214 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2013) ("judicial statements made during the plea colloquy 
about the immigration consequences of a plea do not cure 
counsel's deficient representation"). 
¶112 By suggesting that the warning in Wisconsin's plea 
colloquy 
statute 
is 
sufficient 
to 
fulfill 
an 
attorney's 
responsibility under Padilla, the majority ignores Padilla's 
holding:  when the relevant immigration statute is clear, as 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
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here, "constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him 
that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation."  559 U.S. at 360.   
¶113 The 
majority's 
suggestion 
likewise 
rings 
hollow 
because it fails to recognize the difference between the 
defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  It conflates the 
role of an attorney with the role of the court.  The infirmity 
of the majority's suggestion is exacerbated because it comes at 
a time when "the importance of accurate legal advice for 
noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important."  
Id. at 364.  
III 
¶114 In contrast to the majority, I conclude that Padilla 
requires more than what the defense attorney did in this case.  
As discussed above, under Padilla, the amount of information an 
attorney must provide to a non-citizen client regarding the 
immigration consequences of a plea is dependent upon how clear 
the law is: 
When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as 
it is in many of the scenarios posited by Justice 
Alito), a criminal defense attorney need do no more 
than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences. But when the deportation consequence is 
truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear. 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. 
¶115 Padilla explicitly held that the law setting forth the 
immigration 
consequences 
of 
a 
conviction 
relating 
to 
a 
controlled substance is clear: "[8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)] 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
specifically commands removal for all controlled substances 
convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession 
offenses."  Id. at 368.  Given the clarity of the law, 
"constitutionally competent counsel would have advised [Padilla] 
that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation."  Id. at 360. 
¶116 In this case, Shata faced a charge of possession with 
intent to deliver marijuana, as party to a crime.  The state 
offered to recommend a short sentence if Shata pled guilty to 
that crime.  The plea implicated the same immigration statute 
that was at issue in Padilla.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
("Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted 
of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the 
United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance . . . , 
other 
than 
a 
single 
offense 
involving 
possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, 
is deportable.").   
¶117 Because the same statute and immigration consequences 
applied to Shata that applied to Padilla, Padilla's holding 
applies as well.  "[C]onstitutionally competent counsel would 
have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made 
him subject to automatic deportation."  Id. at 360.  Yet that is 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
not the advice that he gave.  Instead, Shata's attorney informed 
him only that there was a "strong chance" of deportation. 2 
¶118 Advising a client that there is a "strong chance" of 
deportation is not equivalent to advising that the client is 
"subject to automatic deportation."  The court of appeals 
addressed this issue in State v. Mendez, 2014 WI App 57, 354 
Wis. 2d 88, 847 N.W.2d 895.  There, Mendez sought to withdraw 
his plea, asserting that his counsel had been deficient by 
failing to tell him the clear deportation consequences of a 
plea.  At the hearing, his attorney testified that he did not 
tell Mendez that he would be deported, instead he basically 
reiterated the general warning on the plea questionnaire that a 
conviction may make Mendez inadmissible or deportable.  Id., ¶4.   
¶119 In response to Mendez' motion, the State cited Chacon 
v. State, 409 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (as it does here).  
Id., ¶13.  In Chacon, the Missouri court of appeals determined 
that an attorney's advice to a client that he "would very likely 
                                                 
2 In this case the circuit court made a finding of fact that 
Shata's attorney told him that "there was a strong likelihood 
that he would be deported."  This appears to be an error.  A 
review of the record reveals that the attorney never used those 
words.  At the plea hearing he told the judge he had informed 
Shata "that there's a potential he could be deported." Likewise, 
on direct examination at the Machner hearing, the attorney 
stated that he did not use the word "mandatory" in informing 
Shata of the deportation consequences; the word he used was 
"potential."  Then, on cross-examination, the attorney revised 
his statement: "I advised him prior to the plea that he may be 
deported, that there's a strong chance that he could be 
deported."  Neither the attorney nor Shata ever testified that 
the attorney used the phrase "strong likelihood." 
 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
be deported and wouldn't be able to come back" was sufficient.  
After observing Chacon's holding, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
stated explicitly: "We reject Chacon. Its holding is contrary to 
Padilla's plain statement that 'when the deportation consequence 
is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally 
clear.'"  Id., ¶14 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369).  In other 
words, informing a client that deportation is "very likely" is 
not good enough when deportation is presumptively mandatory.   
¶120 I 
agree 
with 
the 
Mendez 
court 
that 
advising  
"deportation is very likely" is not the same as advising 
"deportation is presumptively mandatory."  It does not convey 
the same degree of certainty.  Like the advice given in Mendez 
and Padilla, the advice given to Shata did not meet the 
prevailing 
professional 
norm 
and 
constituted 
deficient 
performance. 
¶121 I turn next to the second part of the Strickland test: 
whether that deficiency prejudiced Shata.  466 U.S. 668.  In 
this case, the circuit court determined that there was no 
prejudice as a result of the advice that Shata received.  It 
explained "I don't find Mr. Shata's testimony to be credible 
today that he would've gone to trial under any circumstance had 
he known that removal, deportation was a presumptive mandatory."   
¶122 The circuit court's analysis of prejudice misses the 
mark.  The test for prejudice when an attorney fails to advise a 
client about immigration consequences is distinct from other 
scenarios.  It is not whether the defendant would have gone to 
trial had the defendant received the adequate advice.  Rather, 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
the test "in determining whether deficient counsel prejudiced a 
noncitizen defendant's plea deal is whether 'a decision to 
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances.'"  Mendez, 354 Wis. 2d 88, ¶12 (quoting Padilla, 
559 U.S. at 372).   
¶123 This test recognizes that the ability to remain in the 
United States may be more important to a defendant than the 
length of a potential sentence.  The desire to avoid deportation 
can dramatically affect a rational noncitizen's decision to 
accept or reject a plea offer.   
¶124 Therefore, under Padilla's test, a defendant can show 
prejudice by establishing that it would have been rational to 
reject a plea offer in hopes of obtaining a different plea offer 
that would not result in deportation, even if doing so exposes 
him to a longer sentence.  As Mendez acknowledges, "an alien 
defendant might rationally be more concerned with removal than 
with a term of imprisonment.'"  Mendez, 354 Wis. 2d 88, ¶16 
(quoting United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 
2011), abrogated in part on other grounds by Chaidez v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013)).  Such a defendant might 
rationally choose to risk a lengthier prison sentence in 
exchange for another plea offer to an amended charge that does 
not carry automatic deportation consequences.  Indeed, "[i]n 
numerous post-Padilla cases, courts have concluded that despite 
the benefit of a great reduction in the length of the potential 
prison sentence, a rational noncitizen defendant might have 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
rejected a plea bargain and risked trial for the chance of 
avoiding deportation."  Mendez, 354 Wis. 2d 88, ¶16. 
¶125 An objective standard is applied to the determination 
of whether it would be rational to reject a plea bargain.  See 
Bonney v. Wilson, 754 F.3d 872, 884 (10th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir. 2012); Pilla v. 
United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012); Zemene v. 
Clarke, 768 S.E.2d 684, 692 (Va. 2015).   
¶126 Here, in addition to failing to consider whether a 
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational, 
the circuit court's discussion of what it thought Shata would 
have done reveals that it took a subjective approach to the 
prejudice analysis.  Accordingly, the court erred in both 
employing the wrong test and in applying a subjective standard. 
¶127 Under the objective standard we consider the totality 
of the circumstances.  In its brief prejudice analysis, however, 
the circuit court focused solely on the risk Shata would have 
faced had he gone to trial: "the risk [Shata] ran had this 
matter gone to trial and more adverse facts came out, that the 
Court wasn't necessarily aware of at the time of sentencing, the 
sentence could've been much longer and a more significant period 
of incarceration or imprisonment which may ultimately reflect 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
upon a presumptive mandatory removal."3  A prejudice analysis 
should not be so limited. 
¶128 Mendez stressed that a defendant facing potential 
deportation may show that his decision to reject a plea offer 
would have been rational without showing that he would likely 
have succeeded at trial.  It provides guidance by listing 
factors 
to 
consider 
in 
assessing 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances.  In determining prejudice, the court must 
consider the length of time a defendant has lived in the United 
States in comparison to the length of time lived in another 
country, whether he has married a United States citizen and has 
a child here, and whether he has a reason to fear harm upon 
returning to his country: 
Mendez has lived in the United States since he was 
fourteen years old, longer than he ever lived in 
Mexico, and is married to a United States citizen here 
with whom he has a young child—also a United States 
citizen. He also asserted at the hearing that he fears 
retribution by his codefendant's family should he be 
deported to Mexico.  Under Padilla, a court's analysis 
of prejudice must take those factors into account in 
measuring whether, properly informed of the automatic, 
irreversible, and permanent deportation consequences 
of his plea, Mendez might rationally have rejected the 
plea bargain in favor of trial despite the risk of 
four and one-half years of initial confinement. 
Mendez, 354 Wis. 2d 88, ¶12.   
                                                 
3 The 
circuit 
court's 
suggestion 
that 
the 
length 
of 
incarceration 
would 
have 
affected 
whether 
removal 
was 
presumptively mandatory was also in error.  Although the length 
of incarceration is a factor for determining deportation based 
on general crimes, it is not a factor in determining whether an 
individual is deportable for having committed a crime relating 
to a controlled substance.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
19 
 
¶129 Here, the circuit court applied the wrong test and 
failed to consider circumstances relevant to a prejudice 
determination.  Given this failure, a remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings on the issue of prejudice is 
required.  
IV 
¶130 In sum, the majority erroneously holds that attorneys 
need not even look at the statute governing the applicable 
immigration consequence and that attorneys need not give any  
more advice than that contained in a plea colloquy.  These 
holdings defy precedent. 
¶131 The Padilla court well understood that effective 
assistance of counsel during the plea stage is critical. 
Padilla, 599 U.S. 356; see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406; Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).  It emphasized that accurate 
legal advice about deportation consequences has never been more 
important and that it often is the most critical consideration 
for noncitizens:  
The 
importance 
of 
accurate 
legal 
advice 
for 
noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more 
important. . . . [D]eportation is an integral part——
indeed, sometimes the most important part——of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants 
who plead guilty to specified crimes.  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364. 
¶132 For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that 
Shata's attorney's performance was deficient.  Because the 
circuit court failed to employ the proper test and apply the 
correct standard for prejudice caused by inadequate immigration 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
20 
 
advice during the plea stage of trial, the correct course of 
action is to remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
to address the issue of prejudice.   
¶133 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶134 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
No.  2013AP1437-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1