Title: Bell v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 011777
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
EDWARD NATHANIEL BELL 
 
v.  Record No. 011777  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JUNE 7, 2002 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WINCHESTER 
Dennis L. Hupp, Judge 
 
 
A jury convicted Edward Nathaniel Bell of the 1999 
capital murder of Sergeant Ricky Lee Timbrook, a law 
enforcement officer with the Winchester Police Department, 
when such killing was for the purpose of interfering with 
the performance of Sergeant Timbrook’s official duties.1  At 
the conclusion of the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial, 
the jury recommended that Bell be sentenced to death on the 
capital murder conviction, finding that there is a 
probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence 
in the future that would constitute a continuing serious 
threat to society.  See Code § 19.2-264.2.  After reviewing 
a post-sentence report prepared pursuant to Code § 19.2-
264.5, the circuit court sentenced Bell in accordance with 
the jury verdict. 
                     
1 Bell was also convicted of the use of a firearm in 
the commission of murder, possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute, and possession of a firearm while possessing 
cocaine.  He was sentenced to imprisonment for terms of 3 
years, 10 years, and 5 years, respectively, for these 
convictions, which are not the subject of this appeal. 
Bell now appeals that conviction and his sentence of 
death.  After considering the issues raised by Bell and 
conducting our mandated review pursuant to Code § 17.1-
313(C), we find no error in the judgment of the circuit 
court and will affirm Bell’s conviction of capital murder 
in violation of Code § 18.2-31(6) and the imposition of the 
death penalty. 
I. FACTS 
 
We will state the evidence presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party before the trial court.  Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 
Va. 307, 313, 541 S.E.2d 872, 877, cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 122 S.Ct. 621 (2001); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 
625, 632, 499 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1067 (1999); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 329, 
468 S.E.2d 98, 101, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996).  In 
doing so, we accord that evidence all inferences fairly 
deducible from it.  Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 
349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 
A. GUILT PHASE 
 
On the evening of October 29, 1999, Sergeant Timbrook 
and two probation and parole officers were working together 
in a program known as Community Oriented Probation and 
Parole Services.  One aspect of Sergeant Timbrook’s 
 
2
responsibilities was to assist the probation officers in 
making home visits to individuals on probation or parole.  
On that particular evening, these three individuals were 
patrolling in an unmarked car in Winchester and were, among 
other things, searching for Gerrad Wiley, who was wanted 
for violating the terms of his probation. 
 
The officers went to Wiley’s residence on Woodstock 
Lane in Winchester several times that evening to no avail.  
Just before midnight, when they returned to Wiley’s 
residence for the sixth time, they saw an individual 
standing in a grassy area between a trash dumpster and an 
apartment building.  As one of the probation officers and 
Sergeant Timbrook exited the vehicle and approached that 
individual, who was later identified as Daniel Charles 
Spitler, another person, who had “dipped behind in the 
shadows,” began running away.  Sergeant Timbrook pursued 
that individual while calling for assistance on his radio. 
 
Spitler identified the individual who ran from 
Sergeant Timbrook as Bell.  Spitler testified that, on the 
evening in question, he was in the area of Woodstock Lane 
for the purpose of obtaining cocaine from Wiley.  After no 
one answered his knock on the door of Wiley’s residence, 
Spitler started walking down a nearby alley where he 
encountered Bell.  Spitler did not tell Bell that he wanted 
 
3
cocaine, but, according to Spitler, Bell “put his hands on 
[Spitler] like to pat [him] down to check and see if 
[Spitler] had a wire on [him].”  During that encounter, 
Sergeant Timbrook and the two probation officers arrived in 
the unmarked vehicle. 
When the vehicle’s headlights illuminated Spitler and 
Bell, Spitler started walking toward the headlights, but 
Bell stepped into the shadows of a building.  Spitler 
identified Sergeant Timbrook as one of the individuals who 
emerged from the vehicle.  According to Spitler, Bell then 
started running away and Sergeant Timbrook chased after 
him, yelling “We have one running.  Stop.”  Spitler lost 
sight of Bell and Sergeant Timbrook when they ran behind a 
building, but Spitler testified that he heard a shot soon 
thereafter. 
 
Sergeant Timbrook chased Bell along several streets 
and down an alley between two houses located at 301 and 303 
Piccadilly Street.  These houses were separated by a fence 
approximately two or three feet in height.  As Sergeant 
Timbrook started to climb over the fence, a shot rang out.  
A police officer, Robert L. Bower, who had responded to 
Sergeant Timbrook’s radio call for assistance, described 
the incident in this manner: 
 
4
 
[A]s [Sergeant Timbrook] started to cross over, I took 
my eyes off of him, and directed it toward the 
subject.  I noticed it stopped.  And, I saw a, what 
appeared to be a left shoulder as it stopped.  All I 
could was . . . it was like a black material. . . . As 
soon as I saw it stop, I looked back at [Sergeant] 
Timbrook to say something, at which time I heard the 
shot.  And, I saw [Sergeant] Timbrook falling. 
 
Sergeant Timbrook’s body was found lying on the ground 
with his feet close to the fence and his upper torso 
leaning against a wall.  His gun was still in its holster.  
Sergeant Timbrook was transported to a local hospital where 
he was pronounced dead.  The cause of death was a single 
gunshot wound above his right eye, caused by a bullet which 
was fired from a distance of between six and eighteen 
inches. 
 
Brad Triplett, one of the probation officers who had 
been patrolling with Sergeant Timbrook that evening, ran in 
a parallel direction during part of Sergeant Timbrook’s 
pursuit of Bell.  At one street intersection, he saw 
Sergeant Timbrook running after the “same dark[ly] dressed 
figure” who had originally fled from Sergeant Timbrook.  
Triplett described that person’s clothing as a “dark black 
type of jumpsuit, nylon material,” with “reflective like 
stripes on the jacket.”  Several times during the pursuit, 
Triplett heard Sergeant Timbrook yelling, “Stop running.  
Police.”  He also heard the gunshot. 
 
5
 
The police searched the area for the suspect 
throughout the night by securing a perimeter around the 
neighborhood where the shooting had occurred and by using a 
helicopter equipped with a heat-sensitive “Forward Looking 
Infrared” camera and a spotlight.  At one point during the 
search, Officer Brian King spotted an individual lying on 
the back steps of a house located at 305 Piccadilly Street.2  
King stated that the person was wearing a dark colored 
jacket with reflective strips on the sleeves that “li[t] up 
like a Christmas [t]ree” when he shined his flashlight on 
the individual.  The person then stood up and disappeared 
behind a bush. 
 
Emily Marlene Williams, who lived at 305 Piccadilly 
Street, testified that she heard the gunshot on the evening 
in question and about five minutes later heard a “crash” in 
the basement of her house.  After she told the police about 
the noise in her basement, the police evacuated her and her 
family from their home.  The following morning, the police 
discovered Bell, a Jamaican national, hiding in a coal bin 
in the basement of the Williams’ residence.  He was wearing 
a “LUGZ” black nylon jacket and a black beret cap with a 
gold pin.  The jacket had reflective stripes on the 
                     
2 The shooting occurred in the area between 301 and 303 
Piccadilly Street. 
 
6
sleeves.  Spitler identified both of these items of 
clothing as those that Bell had been wearing on the evening 
when Sergeant Timbrook was shot.  Before Bell was 
transported from the Williams’ residence to the police 
department, a gunshot residue test was administered to 
Bell’s hands and the recovered particles were subsequently 
identified as gunshot primer residue. 
 
During a search of the backyard of the Williams’ 
residence the day after Bell was apprehended, a deputy 
sheriff found a pearl-handled, Smith and Wesson .38 Special 
double action revolver.  The gun was located under the edge 
of a porch on the Williams’ house and was covered with 
leaves and twigs.  Forensic testing established that this 
handgun fired the bullet that killed Sergeant Timbrook.  
Forensic testing of DNA that was recovered by swabbing the 
grips, butt, trigger, and trigger guard of this revolver 
could not eliminate Bell as a co-contributor of that DNA, 
which was consistent with a mixture of DNA from at least 
three individuals. 
 
When questioned by the police after his arrest, Bell 
admitted that he had been on Woodstock Lane when “a white 
guy” allegedly began bothering him for information.  Bell 
said that when a car drove up and a man got out of the car, 
he “was scared” and ran.  He said he did not know who was 
 
7
chasing him or why, and that when he heard a shot fired, he 
hid in the basement of the house where he was later 
discovered.  Bell denied having a gun.  However, while Bell 
was confined in jail awaiting trial, he told another inmate 
that he shot Sergeant Timbrook, threw the gun underneath a 
porch, and then broke into a house and changed clothes in 
the basement. 
 
Justin William Jones testified that, around nine 
o’clock on the evening of the shooting, he saw Bell in the 
vicinity of Piccadilly Street.  According to Jones, Bell 
showed him a revolver and asked if Jones knew of anyone who 
wanted to buy a weapon.  Jones identified the pearl-
handled, .38 caliber revolver introduced at trial as the 
same weapon that Bell had shown him. 
 
The evening Sergeant Timbrook was shot was not the 
first encounter between Timbrook and Bell.  Sergeant 
Timbrook had arrested Bell for carrying a concealed weapon 
in May 1997.  The following year, in September 1998, 
Sergeant Timbrook was present during the execution of an 
Immigration and Naturalization Service order to detain 
Bell.  Eight months later, Sergeant Timbrook assisted in 
executing a search warrant at Bell’s home.  Bell was 
present during that search.  In the summer of 1999, one of 
Bell’s friends heard Bell state, as Sergeant Timbrook drove 
 
8
by in a vehicle, “Somebody needs to bust a cap in his ass.”  
Another of Bell’s acquaintances testified that she heard 
Bell say that he would like to see Sergeant Timbrook dead, 
and that if he ever came face to face with Sergeant 
Timbrook, he would shoot Sergeant Timbrook in the head 
because he knew that Sergeant Timbrook wore a bullet-proof 
vest. 
B. PENALTY PHASE 
 
During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth presented 
evidence regarding Bell’s criminal history.  Several law 
enforcement officers testified about incidents involving 
Bell.  A police officer from Jamaica provided information 
about Bell’s commission of the crimes of assault and 
destruction of property in 1985.  In 1997, an officer with 
the Winchester Police Department found a .38 caliber 
handgun concealed in the trunk of a car being driven by 
Bell.  The serial number of the gun had been filed off.  An 
officer with the West Virginia State Police stated that 
when he stopped Bell for speeding in 1999, Bell gave him a 
false name.  When the officer started to arrest Bell and 
place him in handcuffs, Bell ran away into a cornfield.  
Another West Virginia law enforcement officer found five 
.38 caliber rounds of ammunition on Bell’s person during a 
“stop and frisk” in 1999.  Finally, two employees of the 
 
9
jail where Bell was confined while awaiting trial testified 
that Bell had threatened them. 
 
Another witness, Billy Jo Swartz, testified about an 
incident in 1997 when Bell grabbed her head and slammed it 
into his car.  He also held a gun to her head.  During the 
same incident, Bell got into a fight with his pregnant 
girlfriend and knocked her to the ground.  Swartz further 
stated that she had seen Bell with illegal drugs.  Other 
witnesses likewise testified about buying illegal drugs 
from Bell. 
Members of Sergeant Timbrook’s family described their 
relationship with him and the effect that his death has had 
on the family.  His wife was pregnant with their first 
child when Sergeant Timbrook was killed.  The only evidence 
that Bell introduced during the penalty phase was from his 
sister and father.3
II. ANALYSIS 
A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR WAIVED  
 
Bell assigned 28 errors on appeal, which he has 
reduced to 16 questions presented.  However, he failed to 
brief several assignments of error.  Thus, those alleged 
                     
3 We will summarize additional facts and material 
proceedings when necessary to address specific issues. 
 
 
10
errors are waived, and we will not consider them on appeal.4  
Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 413, 508 S.E.2d 57, 60 
(1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999). 
B. PRETRIAL AND GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
1. SPEEDY TRIAL 
                     
4 Bell failed to brief the following assignments of 
error, as numbered in his opening brief: 
No. 1: trial court erred by refusing to move Bell’s 
trial to a different county; 
No. 2: trial court erred by refusing to permit Bell to 
request expert assistance ex parte while failing to require 
the Commonwealth to provide notice of the expert assistance 
it was seeking; 
No. 3: trial court erred by denying Bell’s request for 
an expert to investigate his possible brain damage; 
No. 5: trial court erred by denying a Bill of 
Particulars as to the Commonwealth’s basis for alleging 
that Bell would be a continuing threat to society and for 
the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of the 
Commonwealth’s capital murder statutes; 
No. 8: trial court erred by refusing to exclude 
evidence of gunshot residue found on Bell’s hands; 
No. 13: trial court erred by refusing to allow Bell to 
question prospective jurors concerning their views about 
race; 
No. 16: trial court erred by refusing to give Bell 
additional peremptory challenges during jury selection; 
No. 21: trial court erred when it struck juror Haines 
for cause; 
No. 24: trial court erred by permitting the 
Commonwealth to introduce evidence that was relevant only 
to Bell’s future dangerousness in the community at large; 
No. 25: that portion of this assignment of error in 
which Bell claims that the trial court erred by failing to 
ensure that the jury was adequately instructed at the 
penalty phase of his trial; and 
No. 27: trial court erred by refusing to permit Bell 
to question individuals providing victim impact evidence at 
the sentencing proceeding. 
 
11
 
Bell claims that his statutory and constitutional 
rights to a speedy trial were violated.  He was held in 
custody continuously from October 30, 1999, the date of his 
arrest, until his trial commenced on January 16, 2001.  
During that time, two delays occurred that Bell asserts 
should not be attributed to him in determining whether his 
speedy trial rights were violated.  We do not agree. 
 
On December 20, 1999, the City of Winchester General 
District Court found probable cause and certified Bell’s 
capital murder charge to a grand jury.  The grand jury 
subsequently indicted Bell for the capital murder of 
Sergeant Timbrook.  During a hearing on February 18, 2000, 
Bell and his counsel agreed to a trial date of May 30, 2000 
and waived Bell’s right to a speedy trial.  Bell 
acknowledges on brief that the period between February 18, 
2000, and May 30, 2000, should not be included in any 
speedy trial calculation. 
 
The first delay that Bell claims should not be 
attributed to him occurred when one of his trial attorneys 
moved for leave to withdraw as counsel for Bell.  Bell’s 
remaining counsel asked for a continuance of the trial 
date.  At a hearing on May 22, 2000, the circuit court 
granted the motions, appointed an attorney to replace the 
one withdrawing from Bell’s defense team, and continued the 
 
12
trial to September 11, 2000.  As reflected in the colloquy 
between the court and Bell at that hearing and in the 
court’s written order, the court explained to Bell that the 
continuance was based on his motion and that, therefore, 
the additional time until his new trial date would be 
excluded from the calculation regarding whether he was 
tried within the time frame required by Code § 19.2-243.  
Bell indicated that he understood and agreed that the 
continuance granted at his request constituted a waiver of 
his right to a speedy trial. 
 
Bell now argues that the withdrawal of one of his 
trial counsel forced him to choose between waiving his 
speedy trial rights or proceeding to trial with only one 
attorney.  However, the record unequivocally reflects that 
Bell expressly asked for the continuance resulting in the 
first delay.  Thus, the time attributable to that 
continuance is subtracted from the total time that elapsed 
from the finding of probable cause and the commencement of 
his trial.  See Code § 19.2-243; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
259 Va. 654, 669, 529 S.E.2d 769, 777, cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 981 (2000). 
 
The second delay about which Bell complains involves 
his request for an independent expert to examine the DNA 
evidence.  At the time that he moved for appointment of the 
 
13
expert, Bell also asked for a continuance of the trial date 
in order for his expert to have sufficient time to conduct 
tests.  There had been a delay in receiving the results of 
the Commonwealth’s DNA testing.  In an order dated August 
17, 2000, the circuit court approved the appointment of an 
independent expert to examine the DNA evidence on behalf of 
the defendant and granted the motion for a continuance.  
Over the defendant’s objection, the court attributed this 
second delay to Bell for purposes of determining his speedy 
trial rights.  The court reasoned that, because the 
Commonwealth’s DNA test results were inconclusive, Bell’s 
request for additional testing was a matter of trial 
tactics and that, therefore, Bell’s decision on how to 
proceed prompted the delay.  Bell’s trial was then set for 
January 16, 2001. 
 
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the 
second delay was attributable to Bell.  As the court noted, 
Bell chose to ask for another continuance in order to 
obtain additional testing of the DNA evidence after 
learning that the results of the Commonwealth’s testing 
showed that the DNA profile was consistent with a mixture 
of DNA of at least three individuals.  His alternative 
course at that juncture would have been to proceed to trial 
in September and attempt to use the Commonwealth’s evidence 
 
14
to exculpate himself.  Having made a decision involving 
trial strategy that necessitated another continuance, Bell 
cannot now complain about that delay or attribute it to the 
Commonwealth. 
Upon excluding the time attributable to both 
continuances at issue when calculating Bell’s speedy trial 
rights under Code § 19.2-243, we conclude that Bell’s trial 
commenced within the five-month period required by that 
statute.  Thus, Bell’s statutory right to a speedy trial 
was not violated. 
 
Bell also asserts an infringement of his Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial.  Some of the factors to 
assess in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional 
right to a speedy trial has been violated are the “[l]ength 
of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”  
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); accord Fowlkes 
v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 763, 766, 240 S.E.2d 662, 664 
(1978).  Upon considering these factors, we find no 
violation of Bell’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.  We have already addressed the reasons for the 
disputed delays and concluded that those delays were 
attributable to or acquiesced in by Bell.  Furthermore, he 
has not demonstrated in this record any prejudice resulting 
 
15
from those delays.  Thus, the circuit court did not err in 
denying Bell’s motion to dismiss the indictment for the 
alleged violation of his speedy trial rights. 
2. VIENNA CONVENTION 
 
Before his trial, Bell filed a motion to suppress 
evidence and to dismiss the indictment because of an 
alleged violation of his rights under Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna 
Convention), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 
6820.  After hearing testimony from two police officers, 
the court denied Bell’s motion.  On appeal, Bell asserts 
that the circuit court erred by refusing to suppress his 
statement to the police because he made that statement 
before he was advised of his rights to consular notice and 
assistance under the Vienna Convention.5
 
James G. Prince, an investigative sergeant with the 
Winchester Police Department, was one of the two law 
enforcement officers who transported Bell to the Winchester 
Police Department after he was apprehended in the basement 
of the Williams’ home.  Soon after their arrival at the 
police department, Bell told Prince that he was born in 
                     
5 In contrast to his original motion, Bell does not 
assert on appeal that the circuit court erred in refusing 
to dismiss the indictment.  See Rule 5:17(c). 
 
 
16
Jamaica and had been in the United States for approximately 
seven years.  The other police officer present with Prince 
then read Bell his Miranda rights, after which Bell 
answered questions for approximately 30 minutes.6  Shortly 
after the questioning ended, Prince advised Bell that, 
because he was a Jamaican national, his consulate would be 
advised of his arrest.  According to Prince, Bell 
immediately stated that he did not want anyone to contact 
the Jamaican consulate.  Prince explained to Bell that it 
was a “mandatory notification.” 
 
On October 31, 1999, at 10:16 P.M. and 10:21 P.M., 
David Sobonya, a captain with the Winchester Police 
Department, faxed a notification to the Consulate of 
Jamaica in Washington, D.C., advising that Bell had been 
arrested by the Winchester Police Department.  Sobonya 
indicated that he was not aware of any response by the 
Consulate of Jamaica to the faxed notifications.  When 
asked why there had been a 36-hour delay in making this 
notification, Sobonya candidly admitted that it was just an 
oversight.  He also acknowledged that he, Prince, and the 
other police officer who questioned Bell had attended 
                     
6 Bell’s statement was recorded on audio-tape and 
played for the jury at trial.  A transcript of the tape 
recording was introduced into evidence. 
 
17
training regarding law enforcement’s responsibilities as to 
foreign nationals who are arrested in this country. 
 
Bell now argues that his rights under the Vienna 
Convention were violated in three respects: (1) he was not 
advised of his right to communicate with his consulate, (2) 
he was not advised of the police department’s obligation to 
notify his consulate until after he made his statement to 
the police, and (3) there was an inordinate delay in 
notifying his consulate that he had been arrested.  Relying 
on the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 
27), he posits that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention 
creates an individual right to consular notification and 
access, that a showing of prejudice is not necessary to 
establish a violation of that article, and that the LaGrand 
court decided the question of appropriate remedies when a 
violation occurs.  Bell also asserts that this Court is 
“bound” to apply the ICJ’s decision in LaGrand and that the 
only remedy that would vindicate the violation of his 
rights under Article 36 is a new trial in which his 
statement to the police is suppressed.  We do not agree 
with Bell’s position and hold that the circuit court did 
not err in denying the motion to suppress Bell’s statement. 
 
18
 
First, we conclude that any rights that Bell has under 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention were not violated.  
That article provides in subsection (1)(b) that “competent 
authorities . . . shall, without delay, inform the consular 
post of the sending State” when one of its nationals is 
arrested or detained pending trial, and shall also “inform 
the person concerned without delay of his rights under this 
sub-paragraph.”  The record in this case demonstrates that 
the Winchester Police Department complied with the 
requirements of this subsection.  Prince advised Bell that 
the Consulate of Jamaica would be notified of Bell’s arrest 
and that notification, in fact, occurred within 
approximately 36 hours after Bell was taken into custody. 
 
The provisions of Article 36 do not mandate immediate 
notification, nor do they necessarily require consular 
notification before an arrestee is advised of Miranda 
rights and agrees to waive those rights by answering 
questions.  Instead, Article 36 simply requires that the 
notification be made “without delay.”  Thus, we conclude 
that the lapse of 36 hours was not unreasonable.  Cf. 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) 
(probable cause finding within 48 hours of warrantless 
arrest generally satisfies requirement that judicial 
officer make probable cause determination promptly).  
 
19
Notably, the delay in the LaGrand case that prompted the 
ICJ to find that the United States had breached its 
obligations under Article 36 to the LaGrand brothers and to 
the Federal Republic of Germany was more than 16 years.  In 
fact, the United States did not notify the LaGrand brothers 
of their right to consular access until after the 
completion of proceedings for post-conviction relief.  
Given the fact that Bell objected to any notification being 
sent to his consulate, we likewise find no violation of 
Article 36 arising from the fact that Prince did not 
expressly advise Bell of any rights he may have under this 
article. 
Second, we conclude that the ICJ, contrary to Bell’s 
assertion, did not hold that Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention creates legally enforceable individual rights 
that a defendant may assert in a state criminal proceeding 
to reverse a conviction.  Instead, the ICJ stated that 
“Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which, 
by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be 
invoked in [the ICJ] by the national State of the detained 
person.”  LaGrand Case (F.R.G v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 
___ (June 27) (emphasis added).  The ICJ also held that if 
the United States should fail in its obligation under 
Article 36, then the United States should allow review of 
 
20
the conviction and sentence by taking into account the 
violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention.  
However, the ICJ recognized that the “obligation can be 
carried out in various ways” and that “[t]he choice of 
means must be left to the United States.”  LaGrand Case 
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ___ (June 27). 
 
This acknowledgement by the ICJ reflects the fact 
that, in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary, 
procedural rules of a forum State govern the implementation 
of a treaty in that State.  Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 
375 (1998) (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 
723 (1988); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 
486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988); Societe Nationale Industrielle 
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern 
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)).  This principle 
is also evident in the provisions of Article 36(2).  That 
subsection provides that “[t]he rights referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving 
State,” provided that those “laws and regulations . . . 
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which 
the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” 
 
In criminal proceedings in the receiving State, i.e., 
the United States, a harmless error analysis is routinely 
 
21
used when deciding whether to suppress a defendant’s 
statement made as a result of a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  See, e.g., 
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372 (1972); United 
States v. Ping, 555 F.2d 1069, 1077 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); United States v. Carter, 804 
F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lemon, 550 
F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir. 1977).  The same analysis should 
apply when a defendant seeks to suppress a statement 
because of an alleged violation of rights conferred 
pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.  Thus, in 
the present case, even if Bell’s rights under Article 36 
were violated because the police questioned him prior to 
advising him of his rights to consular notice and access, 
we conclude that any such error was harmless.  The evidence 
of Bell’s guilt, as already summarized in this opinion, is 
overwhelming.  Furthermore, Bell has not alleged, much less 
demonstrated, any prejudice resulting from the fact that 
approximately 36 hours elapsed before his consulate was 
notified of his arrest, nor has he asserted that he would 
not have answered the police officers’ questions if he had 
first been advised of his right to communicate with his 
 
22
consulate.  Bell, after all, objected to his consulate 
receiving notice of his arrest. 
 
Finally, even if Article 36 creates legally 
enforceable individual rights, it does not provide – 
explicitly or otherwise – that a violation of those rights 
should be remedied by suppression of evidence.  See United 
States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 956 (2000); United States v. Chaparro-
Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125-26 (C.D. Ill. 1999), 
aff’d, 226 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 
(2000).  Such a remedy is generally not available when a 
fundamental right is not implicated.  Id.  The language of 
Article 36 does not create a fundamental right comparable 
to the privilege against self-incrimination.  Id.  Thus, 
Bell’s claim that the alleged violation of his rights under 
Article 36 should be remedied by suppressing his statement 
to the police finds no support in the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention. 
3. SEARCH OF VEHICLE 
 
On November 11, 1999, Arthur Edward Clarke advised the 
Winchester Police Department that he had seen Bell exiting 
a 1997 Chevrolet Cavalier automobile on the morning before 
Sergeant Timbrook was shot.  Clarke stated that Bell got 
out of the car, walked behind an apartment building located 
 
23
on Woodstock Lane, and proceeded down an alley.  Bell did 
not live at that apartment complex.  When Clarke called the 
police in November, the vehicle was still parked at the 
same apartment building, which was managed by Clarke.  
Clarke connected Bell with the vehicle and the shooting of 
Sergeant Timbrook after another tenant told Clarke that 
Bell’s girlfriend had tried to break into the vehicle. 
While arranging to have the vehicle towed to the 
police department, the police learned that the vehicle was 
not registered to Bell.  At about the same time, the police 
also received information from a finance company holding a 
lien on the automobile’s title that the vehicle had been 
stolen from an “Impound Lot” in Front Royal and needed to 
be taken to the police department so the lienholder’s 
repossession agent could pick up the vehicle.  The 
lienholder subsequently gave the Winchester Police 
Department permission to search the automobile.  Using keys 
found in Bell’s possessions when he was arrested, the 
police gained access to the vehicle and, while searching 
it, found three .38 caliber Federal Hydra-Shok bullets in a 
black nylon cartridge case.  The bullets were similar to 
the one that killed Sergeant Timbrook.7
                     
7 A search of Bell’s home uncovered an empty box of the 
same brand and caliber cartridges. 
 
24
The owner of the vehicle, Michael Carter Johnson, 
testified that he never gave Bell permission to drive his 
automobile.  However, Johnson acknowledged that the vehicle 
had been impounded and that his girlfriend had retrieved 
the vehicle from the impoundment lot.  The girlfriend 
admitted that she loaned Bell the automobile on two 
occasions.  The first time, Bell returned the vehicle, but 
he did not do so the second time, despite her repeated 
requests. 
 
Bell moved to suppress the introduction of the 
evidence seized during the search of the vehicle.  The 
circuit court denied the motion, finding that Bell lacked 
standing to object to the search of the automobile.  On 
appeal, Bell argues that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle because he had been driving it, had 
the keys in his possession, and had parked it in a private 
parking lot, leaving it locked with his belongings inside.  
We do not agree. 
 
Bell bore the burden of proving that he had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle so as to 
confer standing to challenge the search.  Barnes v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 135, 360 S.E.2d 196, 200 (1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988).  He did not carry that 
burden.  Bell did not own the vehicle, and he did not 
 
25
establish that he was authorized to have the car in his 
possession when it was searched.  See United States v. 
Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (unauthorized 
driver of rental car had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1157 
(1995); United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th 
Cir. 1981) (“person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to 
a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a 
private repository for his personal effects”).  Bell had 
left the vehicle parked at an apartment building where he 
did not live.  At the time of the search, the lienholder 
was in the process of repossessing the vehicle and gave the 
police consent to conduct the search.  Thus, we conclude 
that the circuit court correctly denied Bell’s motion to 
suppress.  He lacked the requisite standing to challenge 
the search of the vehicle. 
4. GRAND JURY 
 
Bell contends that the circuit court erred by refusing 
to dismiss the indictment because the grand jury was 
exposed to prejudicial information.  On the day that the 
grand jury indicted Bell, flyers containing information 
about Sergeant Timbrook’s death, his family, and a 
scholarship fund for his unborn child were posted on some 
of the doors to the courthouse.  Bell asserts that the 
 
26
grand jurors could not have avoided seeing these flyers 
when they entered the courthouse and were therefore biased 
against him. 
 
We find no merit in this argument.  Bell’s contention 
that the grand jurors were somehow influenced to indict him 
because of these flyers is pure speculation.  The flyers 
did not even mention Bell.  Furthermore, the general 
district court’s finding of probable cause at the 
preliminary hearing and the petit jury’s subsequent guilty 
verdict demonstrate that there was probable cause to charge 
Bell and that he was in fact guilty as charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 
66, 70 (1986).  Thus, we conclude that the circuit court’s 
denial of Bell’s motion to dismiss the indictment because 
of the presence of these flyers in the courthouse was not 
error. 
5. JURY SELECTION 
 
Bell contends that the circuit court erred in refusing 
to strike three jurors for cause.  As we have stated on 
many occasions, a trial court is in the superior position, 
because that court sees and hears each prospective juror’s 
responses to questions during voir dire, to determine 
whether a prospective juror would be prevented from or 
impaired in performing the duties of a juror in accordance 
 
27
with the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.  Green 
v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115-16, 546 S.E.2d 446, 451 
(2001) (citing Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 510, 
537 S.E.2d 866, 875 (2000), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 41 
(2001); Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 
S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 (2000); 
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 234, 427 S.E.2d 394, 
402, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993)).  Thus, we give 
deference to a trial court’s determination whether to 
exclude a juror for cause.  262 Va. at 115, 546 S.E.2d at 
451.  And, we will not disturb a trial court’s refusal to 
exclude a juror for cause unless that decision constitutes 
manifest error.  Id. at 116, 546 S.E.2d at 451 (citing 
Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 263, 
269 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997); Roach v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 343, 468 S.E.2d 98, 109, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 192, 200, 402 S.E.2d 196, 200, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
902 (1991)).  Guided by these principles, we will examine 
each of the jurors about whom Bell complains. 
(a) Juror Golding 
 
Bell assigns error to the circuit court’s denial of 
his motion to strike juror Golding for cause.  However, the 
court later excused this juror because she could not 
 
28
arrange for child care during the trial.  Bell did not 
object to the court’s decision, which moots this assignment 
of error.8
(b) Juror Patton 
 
Bell objected to the seating of juror Patton because, 
when asked whether he had formed an opinion about the guilt 
or innocence of Bell, this juror initially answered, “Not 
sure really.  Kind of do and kind of don’t.”  After this 
initial response, juror Patton was asked the following 
series of questions: 
MR. FISCHEL [Bell’s attorney]:  Mr. Patton, you seemed 
to indicate that you might have formed an opinion 
about the ultimate question about whether or not Mr. 
Bell is guilty of this offense from what you learned 
from the media; is that correct? You are uncertain? 
 
MR. PATTON:  Kind of uncertain.  I mean, I read brief 
bites of it.  Remember it being in the news a year 
ago. 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  Let’s assume that whatever news source 
[you] received reported what they got very accurately, 
do you think that either the City Police or the 
Prosecutor[’]s Office or the Defense, through us, gave 
them all of the information they have about the case? 
 
MR. PATTON:  I don’t guess. 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  Would you think that is unlikely? 
 
MR. PATTON:  I don’t know. 
 
                     
8 Apparently, neither Bell nor the Commonwealth 
realized that juror Golding was excused from the jury panel 
since they both argued the merits of this assignment of 
error. 
 
29
MR. FISCHEL:  If you heard more in this trial than was 
reported in the papers, could you fairly and 
impartially assess that information to determine 
whether or not Mr. Bell is guilty? 
 
MR. PATTON:  I suppose. 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  You do agree, I think you said, that 
there is a presumption of innocence? 
 
MR. PATTON:  I guess.  I wouldn’t be here. 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  That is your purpose? 
 
MR. PATTON:  Right. 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  And, you understand that first there has 
to be evidence, and then instructions and then a 
decision? 
 
MR. PATTON:  Right. 
 
THE COURT:  You have heard the Judge ask you and tell 
you that the fact that [Bell] has been arrested and 
indicted, that is not evidence? 
 
MR. PATTON:  Right. 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  That is no more powerful than the 
newspaper articles? 
 
MR. PATTON:  Right. 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  That is the reason we are all here. 
 
MR. PATTON:  Right. 
 
*  *  * 
 
MR. FISCHEL:  The point is:  A few moments ago you 
gave us a maybe, maybe not answer?  But, in analyzing 
the questions that I just asked you: Can you now tell 
us more clearly whether you really have formed an 
opinion about Mr. Bell’s guilt or innocence? 
 
[MR.] PATTON:  To be honest with you, about a year ago 
is when I gave that any thought.  Other than that, I 
 
30
really haven’t thought about it. The only way I knew 
about the case was from the  paper.  I had an opinion 
about it, but I don’t know all of the circumstances.  
I can’t remember all of the circumstances.  To be 
honest with you, I think I can listen to both sides 
before I get an opinion.  If that is what you are 
trying to get. 
 
 
Upon considering juror Patton’s voir dire as a whole 
and not just isolated statements, see Green, 262 Va. at 
116, 546 S.E.2d at 451, we conclude that he could sit as a 
fair and impartial juror.  Thus, the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to strike this juror for 
cause. 
(c) Juror Estep 
 
The morning after Sergeant Timbrook was shot, juror 
Estep’s mother called him at college, where he was studying 
criminal justice, and told him about the incident.  She 
also sent him newspaper clippings about it.  One of Estep’s 
best friends was a correctional officer and worked where 
Bell was being detained.  In a telephone conversation with 
his friend, Estep inquired whether his friend had seen 
Bell.  The friend indicated that he had, but Estep and his 
friend did not discuss Bell or the case any further. 
 
When questioned about the conversation, Estep stated, 
“It wasn’t as if I called him and was picking his brain to 
see what he knew.”  Estep acknowledged that his interest in 
criminal justice “sparked [his] interest” in this case, but 
 
31
he stated that his career goal to work as a law enforcement 
officer or an insurance company investigator would not 
affect his ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror.  
When asked to describe his view of somebody who would 
commit an offense such as the one at issue, Estep stated, 
“I wouldn’t say madman.  You know, just kind of your 
Hollywood type that you would see in the movies.” 
 
In denying Bell’s motion to strike juror Estep for 
cause, the circuit court made the following findings: 
THE COURT:  I do think Mr. Estep has given candid and 
forthright responses.  I think this is the type of 
case which is going to interest any number of people 
for a lot of reasons.  It is a big case, if you want 
to put it that way.  It is the type of thing that 
citizens who are interested in the affairs of the 
community would, indeed, be interested in for any 
number of reasons. 
 
Mr. Estep has particular interest. 
 
 
And, 
 
that is he is a criminal justice major and I 
understand why it would be of interest for him. That 
is the circumstances and the people involved. 
 
He did indicate that he, when he first heard 
about it he had a preconceived notion of what the 
defendant would be like.  He also readily acknowledged 
that preconceived notion could be wrong.  And, the way 
I read it, he really didn’t give much weight to that 
preconceived notion at all.  I suppose any time you 
are reading about a set of circumstances of which you 
are not personally involved, or about people that you 
do not know, all of us form some sort of notion about 
what happened or something about the people involved.  
That can be readily dispelled. 
 
 
32
That is the way I read Mr. Estep.  He 
acknowledged those things, but he also indicated 
through his responses, that he understands his 
responsibilities as a juror and that he can hear the 
case and decide the case fairly and impartially. 
 
Just because he has particular interest in this 
field doesn’t disqualify him.  And,[from] his 
responses, the question he asks his friend about Mr. 
Bell was fairly benign and did not go into any 
details. 
 
So, I don’t see how that really prejudices him. 
 
We agree with these conclusions.  And, the record 
supports the court’s findings.  Thus, the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike juror Estep. 
6. VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
In a multifarious argument, Bell asserts that the 
circuit court erred when it refused to allow Bell to 
conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors, denied 
his motion to prohibit the use of leading questions during 
voir dire, restricted the questions that Bell’s counsel 
could ask prospective jurors, and used leading questions 
with regard to matters relevant to prospective jurors’ 
impartiality.  We find no merit in any of these assertions. 
First, Bell does not have a constitutional right to 
individual voir dire.  Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 
292, 300, 513 S.E.2d 642, 647 (citing Stewart, 245 Va. at 
229, 427 S.E.2d at 399), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999).  
Here, the circuit court permitted extensive questioning of 
 
33
the prospective jurors with regard to the factors listed in 
Code § 8.01-358, and those questions were sufficient to 
preserve Bell’s right to a fair and impartial jury.  Thus, 
the court did not err in refusing to allow individual voir 
dire. 
Bell next contends that the circuit court improperly 
rehabilitated prospective jurors Battaile, Anderson, Loy, 
Wood, Janelle, Funkhouser, and Haines.  Initially, we note 
that juror Loy was excused for cause without objection by 
Bell, and that Bell did not object to the seating of jurors 
Battaile, Anderson, Wood, and Funkhouser.  Thus, any claim 
on appeal regarding those jurors is waived.  See Rule 5:25. 
Jurors Janelle and Haines were struck for cause over 
Bell’s objection.  Janelle had stated that she could not 
impose the death penalty under any circumstances.  Haines 
had given inconsistent responses to several questions with 
regard to not only whether she could consider imposing the 
death penalty but also whether she had formed an opinion 
about Bell’s guilt or innocence.  However, Bell’s 
assignment of error does not challenge the merit of the 
court’s decision to strike these two jurors.9  Instead, he 
                     
9 Notably, Bell assigned error to the court’s decision 
to strike juror Haines for cause, but that is one of the 
assignments of error Bell failed to brief.  See footnote 4, 
supra. 
 
34
attacks the court’s alleged use of leading questions.  But, 
we do not find any objection by Bell to the court’s 
questions during the voir dire of Janelle and Haines.  See 
Rule 5:25.  Furthermore, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not ask improper leading questions of these two jurors.  
The court, as well as counsel, struggled to ascertain the 
jurors’ positions on certain issues because of their 
repeated inconsistent answers. 
Finally, Bell claims that the court erred by 
sustaining objections to the following questions:  (1) 
whether the jurors had any thoughts about what natural life 
would mean if serving a life sentence or whether there is 
anything about natural life rather than death that would 
make it a lighter sentence; (2) whether any juror would be 
disturbed if Bell decided not to introduce any evidence; 
(3) whether there are any crimes for which only a death 
penalty is appropriate; and (4) whether the jurors 
believed, without any hesitation or doubt, that Bell is 
presumed to be innocent.  We conclude that the court 
properly refused to allow Bell to ask these particular 
questions because they were confusing and called for 
speculation by the jurors.  See Mueller v. Commonwealth, 
244 Va. 386, 400, 422 S.E.2d 380, 389-90 (1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993).  Bell had no right to 
 
35
propound any question he wished.  LeVasseur v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).  The circuit court 
explained the relevant legal principles, asked appropriate 
questions to ensure that the jurors understood those 
principles and could apply them to the case, and afforded 
Bell a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether 
jurors could “stand indifferent in the cause.”  Code 
§ 8.01-358. 
7. RACIAL COMPOSITION OF VENIRE 
Bell assigns error to the circuit court’s denial of 
his motion to strike the jury array and impanel a new 
venire.  He claims that, because there were only two Black 
individuals in the venire of 50 people, while the Black 
population of Winchester is 10.5 percent of the total 
population, he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
select a jury from a representative cross-section of the 
community.  The circuit court denied Bell’s motion because 
he failed to show that there had been a systematic 
exclusion of Black members of the community from the 
venire.  Instead, the court found that the jury selection 
system was random. 
Systematic exclusion of a “distinctive group in the 
community” must be shown in order to establish that a 
 
36
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair jury selection 
system has been violated.  Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 
341, 347, 385 S.E.2d 50, 53 (1989) (citing Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1074 (1990).  As the court correctly held, Bell did 
not establish a systematic exclusion of any distinctive 
group in the community.  Thus, we conclude that the court 
did not err in denying Bell’s motion. 
8. EVIDENCE OF OTHER SUSPECTS 
Bell’s defense theory rested on his claim that three 
people were involved in the chase during which Sergeant 
Timbrook was shot:  Bell, Sergeant Timbrook, and an 
unidentified gunman.  Thus, he proposed to question some of 
the police officers about other suspects who were 
investigated by asking what the police were told and what 
they did as a result of that information.  Bell claimed 
that he was not offering this testimony for the truth of 
the assertions but to determine what the police did with 
the information that they gathered about other potential 
suspects.  The circuit court refused to allow this type of 
questioning because it would have elicited responses based 
on hearsay. 
Although Bell did not proffer any testimony but only 
advised the court as to the nature of the questions he 
 
37
wished to ask, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion 
that any question requiring a police officer to state what 
he was told regarding other possible suspects would elicit 
hearsay.  The court, however, advised Bell that he could 
present evidence about other suspects so long as it was 
admissible under the rules of evidence, and that he could 
ask whether blood samples taken from those suspects had 
been tested.  We also note that Bell did establish that 
Captain Sobonya had received both oral and written 
information about other suspects.  Only when Bell asked 
Sobonya about the basis for having issued a “look out” for 
a certain vehicle did the court sustain the Commonwealth’s 
hearsay objection.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not err in refusing to allow Bell to elicit 
hearsay testimony about other suspects from police 
officers. 
9. EVIDENCE OF BELL’S PRIOR POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 
 
Over Bell’s objection, the Commonwealth introduced 
evidence during the guilt phase of the trial that Sergeant 
Timbrook had arrested Bell in May 1997 for carrying a 
concealed weapon and that Bell had been convicted of that 
charge.  Bell did not object to admission of the fact that 
Sergeant Timbrook had previously arrested Bell on a 
misdemeanor charge and that Bell had been convicted of the 
 
38
charge, but he objected to the specific charge being 
identified.  The Commonwealth offered this evidence to 
establish Bell’s motive for killing Sergeant Timbrook; 
namely, that if Sergeant Timbrook had apprehended Bell in 
possession of the .38 caliber revolver, Sergeant Timbrook 
could have charged him with a felony because it would have 
been Bell’s second firearms offense, and that such a charge 
would have adversely affected Bell’s pending appeal 
regarding deportation.10
 
Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it tends to 
prove any relevant element of the offense charged, such as 
motive, or the conduct and feeling of the accused toward 
the victim.  See, e.g., Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 
220, 230, 421 S.E.2d 821, 828 (1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 933 (1993).  The evidence regarding the concealed 
weapon charge and conviction was relevant to the 
Commonwealth’s theory of motive and was therefore 
admissible for that purpose.  The circuit court instructed 
the jury that it could consider the evidence only as 
                     
10 Bell had been convicted for the offense of carrying 
a concealed weapon in August 1997.  Consequently, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service commenced 
administrative proceedings to determine whether Bell could 
remain in the United States.  After several hearings in the 
immigration court, Bell was scheduled for a removal 
proceeding on November 5, 1999.  That proceeding never took 
place because he was arrested on the present charge. 
 
39
evidence of Bell’s intent or motive.  Thus, we conclude 
that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
this evidence. 
10. UNIFORMED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN THE COURTROOM 
 
Bell contends that the circuit court erred by denying 
his motion to prohibit law enforcement officers from 
wearing their uniforms when attending the trial as 
spectators.  The court did not actually deny his motion in 
full.  Instead, the court ruled that any officer involved 
in the trial as a witness, bailiff, or security guard could 
wear a uniform.  The court further held that it would not 
prevent any officer who was on duty from coming into the 
courtroom while in uniform.  However, the court recognized 
that if too many officers attended the trial as spectators 
while in uniform, it could create “an oppressive 
atmosphere.”  So, the court stated that it would address 
that situation if and when it occurred.  Apparently, no 
such problem ever developed because Bell never raised an 
objection that too many uniformed officers were spectators 
in the courtroom.  Therefore, we find no error in the 
court’s ruling on this issue. 
C. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
1. APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT TO TESTIFY 
 REGARDING CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 
 
 
40
 
Bell assigns error to the circuit court’s denial of 
his motion for appointment of a correctional specialist as 
an expert to provide testimony regarding the conditions of 
confinement under which Bell would be housed if he were 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life.  Bell claims 
that he needed this expert to review information about 
Bell, to assess his likelihood of being a future danger in 
prison, and to testify concerning the correctional systems 
used in a maximum security prison to manage inmates and 
prevent acts of violence. 
 
Recognizing that this Court has rejected the relevancy 
of this type of evidence, see Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 
S.E.2d at 893; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 S.E.2d at 653, 
Bell, nevertheless, urges this Court to reexamine this 
issue because, in his view, our rulings are inconsistent 
with decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
because trial courts in Virginia are not consistently 
following the decisions in Cherrix and Burns.  Bell asserts 
that evidence concerning the prison conditions in which he 
would serve a life sentence is relevant not only in 
mitigation and in rebuttal to the Commonwealth’s evidence 
of future dangerousness, but also to his “future 
adaptability” to prison life.  A jury, argues Bell, cannot 
assess a defendant’s likelihood of adjusting to life in 
 
41
prison if evidence describing the conditions of confinement 
is excluded from the jury’s consideration.  According to 
Bell, the “common thread” running through the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court in Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 
U.S. 154 (1994); and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000), is “the Court’s recognition that many inmates who 
would be dangerous if released are not dangerous when 
confined to the ‘structured environment’ of prison.” 
 
In Skipper, the defendant sought to introduce 
testimony from two jailers and a “regular visitor” to the 
jail regarding the defendant’s good adjustment during the 
time he had spent in confinement.  476 U.S. at 3.  The only 
question before the Supreme Court was “whether the 
exclusion from the sentencing hearing of the testimony [the 
defendant] proffered regarding his good behavior during the 
over seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial deprived 
[the defendant] of his right to place before the sentencer 
relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment.”  Id. at 4.  
In holding that the trial court’s exclusion of this 
evidence impeded the sentencing jury’s ability to fulfill 
its task of considering all relevant evidence concerning 
the character and record of the defendant, the Court 
specifically stated that it was not "hold[ing] that all 
 
42
facets of the defendant’s ability to adjust to prison life 
must be treated as relevant and potentially mitigating.”  
Id. at 7 n.2. 
 
The Supreme Court, in Williams, found that the 
defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in 
part, because counsel failed to introduce evidence at 
sentencing from two prison officials who described the 
defendant “as among the inmates ‘least likely to act in a 
violent, dangerous or provocative way.’ ”  529 U.S. at 396.  
Counsel also failed to introduce evidence at sentencing 
from two experts who had testified at trial for the 
prosecution.  In their trial testimony, they had opined 
that there was a “high probability” that the defendant 
would pose a continuing threat to society.  Id. at 368-69.  
Those experts, however, also surmised that the defendant 
would not pose a danger to society if kept in a “structured 
environment,” but the defendant’s counsel failed to elicit 
that opinion at sentencing.  Id. at 371. 
 
Finally, in Simmons, the issue was whether the Due 
Process Clause requires a sentencing jury to be informed 
that a defendant is parole ineligible when that defendant’s 
future dangerousness is at issue.  512 U.S. at 163-64.  
Reiterating that a “defendant’s character, prior criminal 
history, mental capacity, background, and age are just a 
 
43
few of the many factors . . . that a jury may consider in 
fixing appropriate punishment[,]” the Court concluded that 
“there may be no greater assurance of a defendant’s future 
nondangerousness to the public than the fact that [the 
defendant] never will be released on parole.”  Id.
 
Contrary to Bell’s assertion, our decisions in Cherrix 
and Burns are not inconsistent with these three cases.  To 
use Bell’s term, the “common thread” in these cases is that 
evidence peculiar to a defendant’s character, history and 
background is relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry 
and should not be excluded from a jury’s consideration.  
This includes evidence relating to a defendant’s current 
adjustment to the conditions of confinement.  As the Court 
stated in Skipper, “a defendant’s disposition to make a 
well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is 
itself an aspect of . . . character that is by its nature 
relevant to the sentencing determination.”  476 U.S. at 7.  
But, as we had already stated, “[e]vidence regarding the 
general nature of prison life in a maximum security 
facility is not relevant to that inquiry, even when offered 
in rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness.”  Burns, 
261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893. 
 
While we do not dispute that Bell’s “future 
adaptability” in terms of his disposition to adjust to 
 
44
prison life is relevant to the future dangerousness 
inquiry, Bell acknowledged on brief that the individual 
that he sought to have appointed has been qualified 
previously as an expert in prison operations and 
classification.  The testimony that Bell sought to 
introduce through the expert concerned the conditions of 
prison life and the kind of security features utilized in a 
maximum security facility.  That is the same kind of 
evidence that we have previously rejected as not relevant 
to the future dangerousness inquiry.  See Burns, 261 Va. at 
340, 541 S.E.2d at 893; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 S.E.2d 
at 653.  Nor is such general evidence, not specific to 
Bell, relevant to his “future adaptability” or as a 
foundation for an expert opinion on that issue.  Thus, we 
conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying 
Bell’s motion.  Bell failed to show a ”particularized need” 
for this expert.  Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 462, 
544 S.E.2d 299, 305, cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 122 
S.Ct. 481 (2001).  In light of the inadmissibility of the 
evidence that Bell sought to introduce through the expert, 
he also failed to establish how he would be prejudiced by 
the lack of the expert’s assistance.  See id. 
2. EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
 
45
 
Bell contends that the admission of evidence regarding 
unadjudicated criminal conduct during the penalty phase of 
his trial violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment 
and deprived him of life without due process of law.  We 
have previously decided this issue adversely to Bell’s 
position.  See, e.g., Lenz, 261 Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 
303; Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 S.E.2d 
114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 536, 450 S.E.2d 365, 371 (1994), 
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995); Satcher, 244 Va. at 
228, 421 S.E.2d at 826; Stockton, 241 Va. at 210, 402 
S.E.2d at 206; Watkins, 238 Va. at 352, 385 S.E.2d at 56.  
Bell presents no compelling reason why we should depart 
from our prior rulings. 
3. EVIDENCE REGARDING EXECUTION PROCEDURE 
 
Bell contends that the circuit court’s denial of his 
motion to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the 
Commonwealth’s methods of execution violated his rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  He also 
contends that the court erred by refusing to prohibit death 
penalty proceedings because the imposition of the death 
penalty as currently applied in Virginia does not comport 
with evolving standards of decency. 
 
46
We have already ruled that execution of prisoners by 
electrocution does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Ramdass 
v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 419, 437 S.E.2d 566, 569 
(1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 
(1994), cert. denied after remand, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995); 
Stockton, 241 Va. at 215, 402 S.E.2d at 209-10; Martin v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 439, 271 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980); 
Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 743-44, 109 S.E. 582, 
587 (1921).  While this Court has not specifically 
determined whether execution by lethal injection likewise 
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the basis 
of Bell’s motion and the affidavit evidence he proffered in 
support of the motion allege that the Commonwealth’s  
current procedures for administering a lethal injection as 
a means of execution pose substantial and unwarranted risks 
of subjecting a prisoner to extreme physical pain and 
suffering during the execution.  This is the same type of 
allegation that this Court rejected when upholding the 
constitutionality of death by electrocution.  See Martin, 
221 Va. at 439, 271 S.E.2d at 125.  See also Ramdass, 246 
Va. at 419, 437 S.E.2d at 569.11  Without more, we conclude 
                     
11 One of the affidavits proffered by Bell regarding 
electrocution was from Dr. Harold Hillman.  In a similar 
 
47
that Bell was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
this issue.  See Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 144 (Ga. 
2001) (recognizing lethal injection as reflective of 
“societal consensus that the ‘science of the present day’ 
has provided a less painful, less barbarous means for 
taking the life of condemned prisoners”). 
 
Furthermore, pursuant to the provisions of Code 
§ 53.1-234, Bell has the right to choose whether his 
execution will be by lethal injection or by electrocution.  
Because Bell has that choice and we have already ruled that 
execution by electrocution is permissible under the Eighth 
Amendment, it would be an unnecessary adjudication of a 
constitutional issue to decide whether lethal injection 
violates the Eighth Amendment.  See Bissell v. 
Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397, 400, 100 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1957).  We 
decline to do so, and likewise cannot say that the circuit 
court erred in denying Bell’s motion for an evidentiary 
hearing to decide the constitutionality of lethal injection 
as a method of execution.  Thus, we find no error in the 
court’s denial of Bell’s motion. 
                                                             
affidavit submitted in Ramdass, Dr. Hillman stated that 
execution by lethal injection, if properly performed, is 
substantially less painful than execution by electrocution. 
(That particular affidavit was not individually cited in 
our opinion in Ramdass, but it was included in the joint 
appendix, pp. 1265-71, filed with the appeal in that case.) 
 
48
4. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEATH PENALTY 
AS APPLIED IN VIRGINIA 
 
 
Bell asserts several reasons why the death penalty is 
unconstitutional as applied in Virginia.  We have 
previously rejected his arguments:  (1) future 
dangerousness predicate is unreliable and vague - rejected 
in Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 355, 551 S.E.2d 
620, 626 (2001), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 2002 U.S. 
LEXIS 3356 (May 13, 2002); (2) use of unadjudicated 
criminal conduct violates requirement of heightened 
reliability - rejected in Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 
S.E.2d at 826; (3) unconstitutional for trial court to use 
pre-sentence report that contains hearsay evidence - 
rejected in Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at 647; and 
(4) Virginia’s appellate review of death penalty cases 
violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause - 
rejected in Lenz, 261 Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 304.  Bell 
has provided no compelling reason why we should depart from 
these precedents. 
5. JURY QUESTION REGARDING EARLY RELEASE 
 
In accordance with our decision in Yarbrough v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 374, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (1999), 
the circuit court instructed the jury that “[t]he words 
‘imprisonment for life’ mean imprisonment for life without 
 
49
possibility of parole.”  During the penalty phase 
deliberations, the jury inquired, “Understanding that 
imprisonment for life means no possibility of parole, is 
there any other way to be released from prison?”  
Recognizing that geriatric release is not available to a 
defendant convicted of capital murder, the court’s proposed 
answer was, “No.  Not when the Defendant has been convicted 
of capital murder.” 
 
Bell agreed with this response, but the Commonwealth 
objected because there could be other ways for a defendant 
convicted of capital murder to be released early, such as 
by an act of executive pardon or clemency.  To answer the 
question truthfully would therefore require that the jury 
be informed about such things, argued the Commonwealth.  
Concluding that the Commonwealth’s position was correct, 
the court told the jurors that they “would have to rely on 
the evidence that they heard, and the instructions already 
presented in deciding the punishment.”  In the circuit 
court’s view, a truthful answer to the jury’s question 
would have opened the door to matters that were speculative 
and inappropriate for the jury to consider. 
 
Bell argues that the circuit court erred by not 
answering the jury’s question and instructing that other 
forms of early release are not available to defendants 
 
50
convicted of capital murder.  He contends that the question 
indicated that the jurors were speculating about whether, 
despite the instruction that life means life without 
parole, Bell could still receive some form of early 
release.  He claims that this speculation, which remained 
unresolved, caused the jury to impose the death penalty 
instead of life imprisonment.  Thus, Bell argues that his 
sentence of death was rendered in violation of Virginia 
law, see Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 373, 519 S.E.2d at 616, his 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171, and his rights to 
a fair and reliable sentencing determination under the 
Eighth Amendment, id. at 172-73 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 
However, Bell acknowledges that the court’s proposed 
response to the jury’s question was not accurate.  Even 
though a defendant convicted of capital murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for certain 
forms of early release, such as geriatric release under 
Code § 53.1-40.01, an act of executive pardon or clemency 
is still available for such a defendant.  Bell, 
nevertheless, argues that the circuit court had a duty to 
fashion an appropriate response to the jury’s question and 
suggests that such a response would have been that “a life 
sentence for Bell would permit no parole, no community 
 
51
supervision, no early release program, or any other credits 
that would reduce the mandatory imprisonment.”  Recognizing 
that even this answer does not address the possibility that 
the jury was concerned about release by an act of executive 
pardon or clemency, Bell suggests that the court should 
also have told the jury not to concern itself with anything 
else. 
 
We agree that, when a principle of law is materially 
vital to a defendant in a criminal case, a trial court 
cannot merely refuse a defective instruction, but must 
correct the instruction and then give it in the proper 
form.  Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 
S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973), cited in Fishback v. Commonwealth, 
260 Va. 104, 117, 532 S.E.2d 629, 635 (2000).  The issue in 
this case is not whether the circuit court failed to 
correct a defective instruction.  Instead, we must decide 
whether the court’s answer to the jury’s question was, in 
fact, defective.  Stated differently, the issue is how the 
jury’s question in this case should have been answered “so 
that [the jury could be] properly informed and [could] 
render a fair trial to both parties while preserving . . . 
the separation of” the judicial branch’s function of 
assessing punishment and the executive branch’s function of 
 
52
administering the punishment.  Fishback, 260 Va. at 113-14, 
532 S.E.2d at 633. 
 
To address this issue and the response that Bell now 
puts forward as a proper answer to the jury’s question, we 
must first examine our decision in Fishback.  There, the 
question was whether a defendant convicted of a non-capital 
felony was entitled to have the jury instructed that parole 
has been abolished in Virginia for offenses committed after 
January 1, 1995.  260 Va. at 108, 532 S.E.2d at 630.  We 
answered that question affirmatively.  Id. at 115, 532 
S.E.2d at 634.  In addition, we also concluded that, 
“because Code § 53.1-40.01 is in the nature of a parole 
statute, where applicable juries shall also be instructed 
on the possibility of geriatric release pursuant to that 
statute.”  Id. at 115-16, 532 S.E.2d at 634. 
 
To clarify our new rule, we further stated that 
 
the task of the trial courts will require only that 
instructions with regard to the abolition of parole be 
tailored to the facts of a particular case.  Thus, 
when a defendant’s age and the permissible range of 
punishment for the offense in question totally negate 
the applicability of Code § 53.1-40.01, the jury will 
be instructed that the defendant is not eligible for 
parole in accordance with Code § 53.1-165.1.  In those 
cases where geriatric release is a possibility, then 
the jury will be instructed in accordance with the 
applicable provisions of Code § 53.1-40.01 along with 
the instruction that parole is otherwise abolished. 
 
 
53
Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634.  Implicit in this holding is 
the recognition that fairness to both the defendant and the 
Commonwealth requires that jurors be told that, despite the 
abolition of parole, certain defendants still qualify for 
geriatric release.  But when a defendant does not qualify 
for geriatric release, the jury need only be informed that 
the defendant is not eligible for parole. 
 
In the present case, Bell’s conviction of capital 
murder totally negated the possibility of geriatric release 
under Code § 53.1-40.01.  Thus, pursuant to our direction 
in Fishback, the jury was instructed that Bell was not 
eligible for parole, i.e., that life means life without the 
possibility of parole.  As we stated in Fishback, geriatric 
release is in the nature of parole, and thus, when a 
defendant does not qualify for geriatric release, an 
instruction that a defendant is not eligible for parole is 
correct, and nothing more is required in order to have 
“truth in sentencing.”  Id. at 113, 532 S.E.2d at 632.  
Hence, the jury in this case was properly instructed with 
regard to the abolition of parole, and when it asked 
whether there is any other way to be released from prison, 
the court properly referred the jury to its prior 
instructions. 
 
54
 
With regard to the issue of sentencing credits under 
Code § 53.1-202.2, we recognized in Fishback that a 
defendant’s eligibility for this type of early release 
remains dependent upon the prisoner’s conduct and 
participation in various programs established by the 
Department of Corrections, and on the executive branch’s 
subjective assessment of that conduct and participation.  
Id. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634.  Thus, a jury could not, 
without engaging in speculation, factor the possibility of 
sentencing credits into its determination of an appropriate 
sentence.  Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634.  For that reason, 
we held that juries are not to be instructed with regard to 
sentencing credits available under Code § 53.1-202.2.  Id.
 
Unlike the defendant in Fishback, Bell’s conviction of 
capital murder precludes the possibility of his earning 
sentencing credits.  Thus, the reasons underlying our 
conclusion in Fishback that juries are not to be instructed 
about sentencing credits do not apply to Bell’s situation.  
However, because the nature of Bell’s conviction negates 
the applicability of Code §§ 53.1-202.2 and –202.3, just as 
with geriatric release, we conclude that the circuit 
court’s instructions were correct and that, in response to 
the jury’s question, the court again properly referred to 
its prior instructions. 
 
55
 
This leaves only the question whether the jury should 
have been advised about the availability of early release 
through an act of executive pardon or clemency.  Even Bell 
does not advocate inclusion of that information in 
responding to the jury’s question.  Instead, he argues that 
the circuit court should have instructed the jury that 
geriatric release and sentencing credits are not available 
to him and that the jury should not concern itself with 
anything else.  Bell’s suggested response highlights the 
anomaly presented by the jury’s question in this case. 
 
If the jury had inquired about a specific form of 
early release, such as geriatric release, then the court 
could have answered that question accurately and dispelled 
any possible speculation by the jury.  Here, however, the 
question was general and could not have been accurately 
answered without telling the jury about executive clemency 
or pardon.  Yet, we have never allowed a jury to have that 
information because of the potential for jury speculation 
resulting in a harsher sentence than would otherwise be 
warranted.  See Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 372, 519 S.E.2d at 
615. 
So, the only response that would have comported with 
our precedent was to instruct the jurors that geriatric 
release and sentencing credits were not available to Bell 
 
56
and that they should not concern themselves with anything 
else.  Yet, that kind of response would have suggested that 
there is some other form of early release still available 
to Bell and would have, in fact, invited the jury to 
speculate.  See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 170 (trial court’s 
admonishment that jury should not consider parole and that 
parole was not a proper issue for the jury to consider 
“actually suggested that parole was available but that the 
jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this 
fact”).  Such speculation is “inconsistent with a fair 
trial both to the defendant and the Commonwealth.”  
Fishback, 260 Va. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. 
 
Given the nature of the jury’s question, we conclude 
that the circuit court did not err when it responded by 
directing the jury to rely on the evidence that it had 
heard and the instructions that had been given.  Any other 
answer would either have been inaccurate or have led to 
further speculation by the jury.  The instruction that 
imprisonment for life means life without the possibility of 
parole was correct under our holdings in Yarbrough and 
Fishback.  Nothing more was required in this case.  Thus, 
Bell’s rights under our case law, the Due Process Clause, 
and the Eighth Amendment were not violated. 
6. STATUTORY REVIEW 
 
57
 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we are required to 
determine whether the death sentence in this case was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other 
arbitrary factors.  Bell asserts only that, because of the 
circuit court’s alleged errors previously argued by him, 
his sentence of death was based on arbitrary factors.  Our 
review of the record does not disclose any evidence to 
suggest that the imposition of the death penalty in this 
case was based on or influenced by any passion, prejudice, 
or other arbitrary factor.  We also do not believe that any 
of the circuit court’s alleged errors, which we have 
already separately addressed, created an atmosphere of 
passion or prejudice that influenced the sentencing 
decision. 
 
We are also required by the provisions of Code § 17.1-
313(C)(2) to determine whether Bell’s sentence of death is 
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.”  In accordance with Code § 17.1-313(E), we have 
accumulated the records of capital murder cases reviewed by 
this Court, including not only those cases in which the 
death penalty was imposed, but also those cases in which 
the trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and the 
defendant petitioned this Court for an appeal.  See Whitley 
 
58
v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 81, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).  To comply with the statutory 
directive that we compare this case with “similar cases,” 
we have focused on cases in which a law enforcement officer 
was killed and that killing was for the purpose of 
interfering with the performance of official duties, and in 
which the death penalty was imposed based upon the future 
dangerousness predicate.  Based on our review, we conclude 
that Bell’s sentence of death is not excessive or 
disproportionate to sentences generally imposed in this 
Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to Bell’s 
murder of Sergeant Timbrook.  While our review encompasses 
all capital murder cases presented to this Court for review 
and is not limited to selected cases, see Burns, 261 Va. at 
345, 541 S.E.2d at 896-97, we cite the following cases as 
examples:  Royal v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 110, 458 S.E.2d 
575 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1097 (1996); Eaton v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991); Delong v. Commonwealth, 234 
Va. 357, 362 S.E.2d 669 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 
(1988); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 352 S.E.2d 
342, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987); Evans v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 114 (1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985). 
 
59
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we find no error in the 
judgment of the circuit court or in the imposition of the 
death penalty.  We also perceive no reason to commute the 
sentence of death in this case.  Thus, we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
60