Title: Mikolich v. State Ind. Acc. Com.
Citation: 212 Or. 36, 318 P.2d 274
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 1957

Reargued October 2, 1957.
Affirmed October 23, 1957.
Motion for attorney's fees October 31, 1957.
Allowed in part November 20, 1957.
Gerald C. Knapp, Assistant Attorney General, *37 Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, and Ray H. Lafky, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.
W.A. Franklin argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Anderson, Franklin, O'Brien &amp; Hanlon, Portland.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the defendant, State Industrial Accident Commission, from a judgment order of the circuit court which remanded this cause to the defendant commission and directed it to
As just indicated, the plaintiff is the widow of one Frank J. Mikolich. The latter was an employee of Wolfard Motor Company on February 19, 1952, when, in the course of his employment, he sustained an injury which eventually led to the institution of this proceeding. Both Mikolich and his employer were contributors to the State Industrial Accident fund. After Mikolich had filed a claim, he was awarded compensation by an order of the commission for temporary disability. Following the entry of the order the commission provided Mikolich with medical and hospital attention. He underwent surgery four times while the medical profession undertook to remedy his condition. He was in hospitals upon two additional occasions. These efforts, which extended over a period of close to three years, failed their purposes and Mikolich's *38 condition deteriorated. Then he was attacked by monocytic leukemia and, a month later, that is, on February 11, 1955, died. Within sixty days of the death, the plaintiff filed a claim for compensation benefits as widow, which was rejected by a commission order that gave the following reasons:
The plaintiff filed an application for a rehearing which was denied June 13, 1955. Thereupon she instituted this proceeding. The issues were tried by a jury which returned a verdict reading as follows:
We see from the second division of the verdict that the jury found that Mikolich was permanently totally disabled as the result of the accident which befell him on February 19, 1952. ORS 656.208 provides that if an injured workman, who is subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law, dies during the period of permanent total disability, his widow shall receive the benefits for which that section of our laws makes provision. Since the jury made the finding just mentioned, the *39 court, in the challenged judgment, granted the plaintiff judgment for the appropriate sums.
The defendant presents two assignments of error which assert that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motions for an involuntary nonsuit and for the entry of judgment non obstante veredicto.
ORS 656.274(4) says:
ORS 656.208 reads:
Without attempting to be exhaustive, we take note of the fact that ORS 656.274(4) is applicable only in instances in which (1) the injured workman had filed a claim; (2) the workman died "as the result of the accidental injury"; and (3) the death occurred "before the commission has entered an order terminating compensation for total temporary disability." Upon the other hand, 656.208 imposes no requirement  at least no express requirement  that the workman file *40 a claim, and it is not concerned with the cause of the death. It is applicable only if the injured workman died during the period of permanent total disability. It is more selective than 656.274(4) as to the dependents who may claim death benefits.
We have mentioned the fact that, at the time of Mikolich's death, the order which deemed him temporarily totally disabled was still in effect. No order had been made by the defendant commission which adjudged Mikolich permanently totally disabled. The crucial issue presented by the appeal is this: Is it essential to a claim filed by a widow for the benefits rendered available by ORS 656.208 that the commission have made an order during the workman's lifetime which adjudged him permanently totally disabled. The issue thus presented by this appeal is one of first impression in this jurisdiction.
In her complaint, the plaintiff resorted to a twofold theory. The first was that the accident which her husband sustained "hastened and accelerated" his death. In embracing that theory, the plaintiff evidently deemed that a causal relationship existed between the accident and the death. That theory presumably was based upon ORS 656.274(4), which, as we have seen, employs these words: "before the commission has entered an order terminating compensation for temporary total disability." The second theory was that her husband's death occurred while he was "permanently and totally disabled as the result of said accident."
During the trial in the circuit court the following occurred:
The plaintiff's brief says:
Appellant's proposition I reads as follows:
Appellant's proposition II follows:
The foregoing makes it clear that the plaintiff advances in this court no contention that her husband's death resulted from the injury which he sustained while in the employ of the Wolfard Motor Company. Therefore, ORS 656.274(4), quoted in a preceding paragraph, can afford the plaintiff no relief.
The plaintiff contends, however, that her claim is governed by ORS 656.208 which we have quoted, and which says:
shall receive the death benefits for which that section makes provision. As we have seen, the commission had not ruled during Mikolich's lifetime that he was or was not permanently totally disabled. However, the *42 record contains substantial evidence indicating that before leukemia attacked him, Mikolich's status was that of permanent total disablement. The jury evidently accepted the evidence as reflecting the truth.
Before giving attention to the plaintiff's argument that Mikolich died during "the period of permanent total disability" and that, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to the compensation benefits which ORS 656.208 renders available to the widows of injured workmen who die in that period, we shall take note of the following sections of our laws:
ORS 656.282, which is mentioned in the first subdivision of 656.284, above quoted, follows:
The sections of our laws which govern judicial review of the rulings of the commission are ORS 656.286, 656.288 and 656.290, the first of which reads as follows:
ORS 656.288 provides:
The commission admits that the plaintiff, after the death of her husband, timely filed a claim for widow's benefits and that it was in proper form to present her contention that her husband died while permanently totally disabled. The claim was rejected upon the ground that "the condition causing the death of said Frank J. Mikolich on February 11, 1955, was not the result of the accidental injury of February 19, 1952." Following the rejection, an application for a rehearing, as required by ORS 656.284, was filed by the plaintiff with the commission and it, too, was rejected. At that juncture this proceeding was instituted. The commission presents upon appeal the contention that a widow of a workman, who sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, is not entitled to the benefits rendered available by ORS 656.208 unless the commission, during the workman's lifetime, entered an order which adjudged him permanently totally disabled.
Although the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Law was enacted more than two score years ago, the issue now before us has never previously presented itself in this court. It has not been similarly a stranger to other courts. The English act, which was enacted in 1906, was the progenitor of American legislation. Not many years had to pass in England before the problem now before us appeared before the courts of *44 that land. One of the decisions by the English courts which has been much cited is Harper v. Dick, Kerr &amp; Co., 90 LJ (KB) 1313, 124 LT 438, 13 BWCC 250. Harper, the workman in that case, sustained an injury in a way that was contested. The judge [county court] who heard Harper's claim decided for the defendants on the ground that Harper had failed to establish that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. Harper appealed but died before the appeal was heard, and thereupon the appeal was abandoned. The widow, however, commenced fresh proceedings on her own account. Her claim, which came before the same judge who had ruled against Harper, was dismissed on the ground that the question as to the cause of the injury had been settled once and for all, and that the court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the widow's application. The widow appealed. The Master of the Rolls [Lord Sterndale], after stating the above facts, reversed, and in so doing declared:
*45 It will be observed that the decision just cited was based largely upon Tucker v. Oldbury District Council, 2 KB 317, 5 BWCC 296. In that case, the claim was filed by the dependents of a deceased workman who had himself presented no claim. In an effort to defeat the dependents' claim, the defendant offered a purported admission by the workman that the cause of his disability was not an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court held that, since the dependents have a direct statutory right against the employer, the proffered evidence was not admissible. The following English decisions are in harmony with the two just mentioned: Williams v. Vauxhall Colliery Co., 2 KB 433, 9 WCC 120; Howell v. Bradford &amp; Co., 104 LT 433, 4 BW 203; Manton v. Cantwell, AC 781, 13 BWCC 55.
The decision in Laird v. State of Vermont Highway Department, 112 Vt 67, 20 A2d 555, is especially valuable because of its exhaustive and carefully reasoned nature. In that case, one Laird, a watchman in the employ of the defendant, was found lying in the snow near the gate of the defendant's premises. The immediate cause of his disabilities was a cerebral hemorrhage. From that time until his death, eight months later, he remained totally disabled. He filed a claim for compensation. A hearing was held upon the claim, and an award in his favor was reversed upon appeal [by the defendant] by the Supreme Court of Vermont in Laird v. State of Vermont Highway Department, 110 Vt 195, 3 A2d 552, upon the ground that the evidence failed to show that the injury occurred in the course of Laird's employment. Before the decision was announced Laird died. After his death his widow filed a claim for compensation. The defendant met her claim with a contention that the decision by the Vermont *46 Supreme Court was conclusive upon her and estopped her from prosecution of her claim. The commissioner ruled that the rights of dependents to benefits were derivative and stood on no higher ground than those of the workman. Compensation was denied. The widow appealed. In determining the appeal, the court stated that all of the questions presented "come down to the ultimate question of whether the decision in the Willis Laird case is a bar to the proceeding brought by the present claimant." In answering in the negative, the decision reviewed the case law upon the subject. It concluded in this way:
The basic elements of the problem before us have been many times before the Supreme Court of Washington. McFarland v. Department of Labor and Industries, *47 188 Wash 357, 62 P2d 714  a leading case  holds that in proceedings to obtain a widow's pension it may be shown that the workman, at the time of his death, was in fact laboring under "permanent total disability." Prior to his death, McFarland [the workman in that case] was engaged in extra hazardous work and during its course sustained an injury. The defendant agency recognized his claim to compensation. It made provision for his time loss and granted him medical aid. August 28, 1931, the claim was closed by order of the supervisor. From that order and award McFarland appealed to the joint board of the department upon the ground that he was suffering a total disability, either temporary or permanent. The board reversed the order of the supervisor and made an additional allowance for time loss. Thereupon the claim was again closed. Still later, McFarland, claiming that by reason of aggravation of the injury, he was totally and permanently disabled, petitioned the joint board for a rehearing. Upon rehearing the board sustained the supervisor's second closing of the claim. Upon appeal to the superior court, McFarland was awarded an allowance of $840 for 28 additional degrees of permanent partial disability. His claim that he was permanently totally disabled was, therefore, impliedly rejected. No appeal was taken from that judgment. A few months later McFarland died. Following the death, McFarland's widow filed an application for a widow's pension under a statute similar to ORS 656.208. The supervisor, and subsequently the joint board, denied the application. Upon appeal to the superior court, the orders just mentioned were reversed and the widow was allowed a pension. The agency thereupon appealed. We now quote from the decision:
Thus the court faced the very problem which now has come to our court. In resolving that issue in favor of the widow and thereby affirming the superior court, the decision took note of one of its previous cases, *49 Beels v. Department of Labor and Industries, 178 Wash 301, 34 P2d 917, and, concerning it, said:
In coming to its conclusion, the court declared that, since Beels, the injured workman in the Beels case, had never made a claim for compensation, and yet his widow was permitted to apply successfully for a pension, "there must be equal, if not stronger, reason for permitting McFarland's widow for proceeding with her claim."
It added:
The challenged judgment was affirmed and the agency order was reversed. The result was followed in Noland v. Department of Labor and Industries, 43 Wash2d 588, 262 P2d 765.
*50 Since the McFarland decision relied on the Beels case, we turn to the latter for the reasons which prompted the decision. In the Beels case, the court said:
An examination of the many Washington decisions indicates that the court has consistently adhered to the Beels decision.
In Ek v. Department of Labor and Industries, 181 Wash 91, 41 P2d 1097, the court held that the widow was barred by the fact that the rejection of the claim filed by the workman was a final judgment which was binding on the then claimant, Charles Ek. The court cited no authorities except the Beels case and distinguished it on the ground that in that case there was no judgment to bar further action. It will be remembered that in the subsequent McFarland case the court explicitly mentioned that the decedent husband had become permanently totally disabled subsequent to the decision upon his status.
In Purdy and Whitfield v. Department of Labor and Industries, 12 Wash2d 131, 120 P2d 858, the competency of some evidence which was offered by the claimants depended upon whether or not they derived *51 right or title by, through or from the deceased. We now quote:
Then the court limited the Ek decision to the proposition that
Any thought that the Ek case was limited to its particular problem was dispelled by the case of Barlia v. Department of Labor and Industries, 23 Wash2d 126, 160 P2d 503, in which the widow was denied right to the greater benefits provided by a statute enacted subsequently to her husband's injury but prior to his death. The court said it was following its usual rule that a statute is presumed to operate prospectively. As for the McFarland and similar cases, the court said:
Other decisions by the Washington court follow: Hiatt v. Department of Labor and Industries, 48 Wash2d 843, 297 P2d 244; Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department of Labor and Industries, 48 Wash2d 553, 295 P2d 310; Ramsay v. Department of Labor and Industries, *52 36 Wash2d 410, 218 P2d 765; Russell v. Department of Labor and Industries, 194 Wash 565, 78 P2d 960. All of those decisions are in harmony with the principles which were employed in the McFarland, Beels, Noland and Purdy cases.
The above analysis of the Washington decisions appears to warrant the observation that the traditional distinction between "independent" and "derivative" rights and the consequences which normally flow from a determination that rights were or were not independent has not been the basis for the results reached in that state.
From Linder v. City of Payette, 64 Ida 656, 135 P2d 440, which was based upon the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act, we quote the following:
The following is taken from Carroll v. State of Minnesota Department of Social Security, 242 Minn 70, 64 NW2d 166:
In O'Esau v. E.N. Bliss Co., 186 App Div 556, 174 NYS 739, affd. without opinion 227 NY 597, 125 NE 921, the court, in construing a statute which provided the right to compensation
held that the widow was not barred when her husband had not properly filed his claim.
In Pardeick v. Iron City Engineering Co., 220 Mich 653, 190 NW 719, the court held the widow was not barred by the failure of her husband to make a claim. That result was based on the construction of a statute which was similar to the New York statute.
In Wray v. Carolina Cotton and Woolen Mills Co., 205 NC 782, 172 SE 487, the court held that a mother was not barred when her son, the injured employee, had not filed a claim within the statutory period. The North Carolina statute provided:
In Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va 403, 83 SE2d 728, the court came to the conclusion that the dependent was barred, whether her rights were independent or derivative, by a statute which was identical to the North Carolina statute.
And, finally, in Price v. Burlington Refrigerator Express Co., 131 Neb 567, 269 NW 425, the court, in dicta, said that the widow was barred by the failure of her husband to bring his claim during his life. The court analogized the case to other cases holding the widow was barred when the injured workman accepted a lump sum settlement, or elected to sue for damages at common law, or, in the absence of fraud, signed a release for an injury.
We find, therefore, that in four jurisdictions the widow is not barred when her deceased husband had failed to file his claim; the reason being either that the wife has a new, original claim or the language of a particular statute. In two jurisdictions we find that the widow is barred, the reason being that her right is treated as derived from her husband or the language of a particular statute. We have seen that in the Wray case and in the Winston case the statutes were substantially identical, yet the courts construed them differently and came to opposite results.
An occasional decision, such as Nyberg v. Little Falls Black Granite Co., 202 Minn 86, 277 NW 536, which recognizes that the dependent's rights are independent of those of the injured workman, takes the view that in the enforcement of the right the dependent's proceeding is merely a continuation of the injured workman's. In the case at bar, that point of view would not help the defendant commission.
*55 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, § 64.10, cites the decisions of which we have taken notice and many others to support the following principles:
Schneider, Workmen's Compensation, Vol 9, Perm Ed, § 1901, declares:
We will review the authorities no further. It will be recalled that one section of our Workmen's Compensation Act (ORS 656.206) defines the term "permanent total disability" as that term is employed in the section (ORS 656.208) to which plaintiff has resorted. ORS 656.206 says:
That is the definition. It is simple and its meaning unmistakable. It does not qualify its import by employing any qualifying clause, such as "provided the commission entered, during the lifetime of the workman, an order which adjudged him permanently disabled." If a workman's injury cost him his eyesight or both feet, but the commission failed to enter an order that he was permanently totally disabled, surely no one would deny the widow the benefit of ORS 656.208. Accordingly, the statute contains no demand that the widow should be able to point to a finding made by the commission prior to the workman's death which established his permanent total disablement. Decisions such as the one entered in the McFarland case demonstrate the validity of the conclusion just expressed. And let us bear in mind that the Washington decisions were hammered out upon the anvil of experience by a court which was confronted many times by issues similar to the one at bar.
*57 We will not concern ourselves further with the vagaries of statutory construction, but will examine the authority for the contention that the widow has a new, original right.
We have noticed that in the majority of jurisdictions an adverse decision on the merits of a claim, presented by the employee while he was alive, did not bar a dependency claim under the doctrine of res adjudicata, since the parties and rights involved are different and the dependent is not in privity with the injured employee as to the rights assured him.
The Washington decisions seem to indicate that the doctrine of res adjudicata is of little help in actually deciding cases. In cases involving the question of whether a statute is applicable, the death benefits are there treated as being derived or as having arisen at the time of the injury. In cases involving the failure of the workman to file his claim and in those involving the competency of certain evidence, the widow's claim is treated as independent.
It is therefore clear, we believe, that, although the courts generally deem the widow's rights independent of those of her deceased husband, the cases are decided with an eye to providing a reasonable answer to the problem presented by each case, rather than pursuant to any formula stemming from the doctrine of res adjudicata. It is an explicit policy of the Oregon act that the commission should withhold final settlement until everything possible has been done to restore the workman to health. Because the temporary total disability benefits are, roughly, comparable to the permanent total disability benefits, there is no incentive for an injured workman to seek a quick decision on the question of whether he is temporarily totally disabled or permanently totally disabled. A holding that *58 the "period of permanent total disability" must be determined by the commission before death would hamper this policy by creating an urgent necessity for an early decision.
Such an interpretation would also make possible, and even require, continuous litigation; that is, if the claim is rejected at one moment in the injured workman's struggle to regain health, he might feel impelled to present it again and again when he felt that his condition was becoming worse. Further, such an interpretation would provide the basis for disagreement and acrimony between people in serious trouble. It would be to the workman's benefit to remain under temporary total disability and thereby receive medical and hospital treatment, but the wife's interests would be promoted if he were deemed permanently totally disabled. An injured workman, who was concerned with his family and their maintenance after his death, would be anxious to have an order entered by the commission adjudging him permanently totally disabled, and, in order to gain an entry of that kind, might be impelled to make a poor settlement for himself, thereby depriving him of medical attention which, if given, might have restored him to a sound condition.
For the above reasons and for the further one that the available authority supports the result, we hold that the widow may show that her husband was, in fact, permanently totally disabled as a result of his injury in the period immediately before death.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
McALLISTER, J., dissents.
*59 Anderson, Franklin, O'Brien &amp; Hanlon, Portland, for respondent.
Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, Gerald C. Knapp and Ray H. Lafky, Assistant Attorneys General, Salem, for appellant.
MOTION ALLOWED IN PART.
ROSSMAN, J.
This cause is before us again, this time upon a petition filed by the plaintiff for the allowance to her of an attorney fee in the sum of $750 for the services *60 which her counsel performed. The motion cites ORS 656.292 and, unlike the one filed in King v. State Industrial Accident Commission, this day decided by us, is unaccompanied with a bill of particulars. We assume that compensation is sought only for legal services performed in this court. In the King case, in awarding compensation for counsel's services, we depended in part upon the schedule of minimum fees and charges promulgated by the Oregon State Bar.
A glance at the opinion filed in this case will show that the issues which confronted counsel were no less difficult than those that were resolved in the King case. Counsel for the plaintiff in this case made an appearance before this court and filed a worthy brief. They also delivered two arguments before the court. The second was expressly requested by this court and had as its subject matter issues to which counsel were expressly requested to give attention. No new brief was presented in connection with the second argument. Based upon the aforementioned minimum schedule of fees, counsel for the plaintiff should be awarded an attorney fee of $500. We realize that the attorneys for the plaintiff in this case performed effective services for their client and secured for her an amount of compensation which may be large. For the reasons expressed in King v. State Industrial Accident Commission, we think that we are not justified in awarding a sum larger than $500. Such will be the award. It will be "in addition to the compensation." The quoted words were taken from ORS 656.292.