Title: State v. Stephenson
Citation: 291 So. 2d 767
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: February 18, 1974

291 So. 2d 767 (1974) STATE of Louisiana v. Pete STEPHENSON, Jr. No. 53988. Supreme Court of Louisiana. February 18, 1974. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. Robert F. Fleming, Jr., Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant. DIXON, Justice. Defendant was tried under a bill of information charging him with attempted murder. He was convicted after a trial by jury and was sentenced to serve eight years at hard labor. Defendant appeals, relying on four perfected bills of exceptions. *768 Bill of Exceptions No. 1 This bill was reserved when the trial court overruled an objection to the jury venire panel, there being only thirty-six available jurors out of fifty-six on the petit jury venire list. The trial judge had excused twelve members of the venire who had served on a jury three days before the instant case was tried. Defendant contends that such prior service is not a sufficient reason to excuse members of a venire, and that the action infringed upon his right to trial by jury. C.Cr.P. 418 provides in pertinent part: C.Cr.P. 783 provides: Official Revision Comment (b) to this article states: Defendant fails to show that any special class was systematically excluded, or that he was deprived of a trial before an unbiased jury because of the defect alleged. The defendant was not compelled to accept an obnoxious juror as a result of the ruling. Cf. State v. Jugger, supra. The accused has no right to a trial by any particular jury or juror, but only to a trial by a competent, impartial jury. State v. Preece, 270 So. 2d 850 (La.1973); State v. Boutte, 255 La. 605, 232 So. 2d 288 (1970). There is no showing that the trial judge abused his discretion. This bill is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 This bill was reserved during voir dire examination of the jurors. After the State had completed its examination of four veniremen it tendered them to the defendant so that he could conduct his examination of them. The defendant then moved to have the State either accept or challenge the jurors before the defense examined them. The motion was denied and this bill was taken. C.Cr.P. 786 provides: C.Cr.P. 788 provides: These provisions clearly contemplate that there shall be one voir dire examination of a juror participated in by the enumerated parties, and that upon completion of that examination the State is required to accept or challenge first. Cf. State v. Sheppard, 263 La. 379, 268 So. 2d 590 (1972). The State is not required to accept or challenge until the completion of the voir dire examination, and such an examination is not completed until the court, the district attorney and defense counsel have completed asking their questions. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 This bill pertains to the denial of a motion for a mistrial. The motion was grounded on the fact that defense counsel had been forced to object to hearsay evidence on several occasions. In each instance defendant's objection was sustained, and the witness admonished. It does not appear that any substantive evidence came in via hearsay. Although repeated deliberate attempts to elicit hearsay testimony by the prosecution may provide grounds for a mistrial under C.Cr.P. 775, such a situation is not before us now. The trial court sustained the objection of the defendant in each instance complained of. He has no grounds for further complaint. This bill is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 This bill was reserved to the denial of a motion for a new trial grounded on the verdict being contrary to the law and the evidence and prior bills of exceptions. We have reviewed the prior bills reserved and found them to be without merit. The trial judge stated in his per curiam that the verdict was justified by the law and the evidence. State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928). As such, this allegation presents nothing for our review. State v. Crockett, 262 La. 197, 263 So. 2d 6 (1972). For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. SUMMERS, J., concurs in result and assigns reasons. SUMMERS, Justice (concurring). The reference in the Court's opinion to the case of State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928), is an effort to approve the doctrine that a judge can determine, according to his own judgment, whether the verdict of the jury was justified by the evidence. This effort of the Court is contrary to the explicit provisions of Article XIX, Section 9, of the Constitution providing: See also dissents or concurrences in State v. Jones, 288 So. 2d 48 (La.1974); State v. Pellerin, 286 So. 2d 639 (La.1973); State v. Gilbert, 286 So. 2d 345 (La.1973); State v. Ferdinand, 285 So. 2d 530 (La.1973); State v. Triplett, 285 So. 2d 532 (La.1973); State v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536 (La.1973); State v. Lee, 281 So. 2d 123 (La.1973); State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485 (La.1973); State v. Dimopoullas, 260 La. 874, 257 So. 2d 644 (1972); State v. Andry, 260 La. 79, 255 So. 2d 81 (1971). The principle embodied in our constitution was brought about in England by the eloquence of Lord Erskine *770 and other eminent jurists. Concisely stated, my theory of the constitutional mandate is that where a criminal case is tried by a jury, since it is the sole judge of the law and the facts, or before the judge alone where a jury may be waived, an acquittal is final, however reached or why, even if corruptly reached; and likewise a conviction, even if unjust, is final, without remedy of appeal on the question of guilt or innocence. Only the rulings of the judge on questions of law is subject to reversal by the Court on appeal for error committed to the prejudice of the convicted felon. The State has no right of appeal upon acquittal to correct errors occurring in the course of the trial. Thus the trial judge has no authority to direct a verdict of not guilty. Nor can he pass on the sufficiency of the evidence which might serve the same purpose. To do so is to trespass upon the exclusive prerogative of the jury. The concept is not novel in Louisiana. Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 (1911); Goldman v. State, 75 Md. 621, 23 A. 1097 (1892); Foxwell v. State, 146 Md. 90, 125 A. 893 (1924); Jessup v. State, 117 Md. 119, 83 A. 140 (1912); Smith v. State, 169 Md. 474, 182 A. 287 (1936). Although granting of new trials to correct what may be considered an unjust and unwarranted verdict may be acceptable to the common law system, to permit such a review by the trial judge on the question of guilt or innocence unquestionably dilutes the authority of Article XIX, Section 9, of the Constitution. The principles which underlie the spirit of Article XIX, Section 9, have been often stated and are assembled in 92 Md.L.Rev. 34, 49, 50 (1943). John Milton, who in his Defense of the People of England, after speaking of the King's power in his Courts and through his judges, adds: and Alexander Hamilton who, in Croswell's Case in New York in 1803, advances three propositions on this subject: and, Dillon's Law and Jurisprudence (1895), at page 125: On this note I rest for a while in this effort to adhere to what I consider to be the letter and spirit of our constitution. Fortunately no harm is done in this decision. The Court's expressions on the subject are mere dicta. I concur in the result only.