Title: The Florida Bar v. Michelle Erin Berthiaume
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-1786
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1786 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant,  
 
vs. 
 
MICHELLE ERIN BERTHIAUME, 
Respondent. 
 
[November 3, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee‘s report recommending that Michelle Erin 
Berthiaume be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from the 
practice of law for ten days.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  
We approve the referee‘s findings of fact.  For the reasons discussed herein, we 
disapprove the referee‘s recommendation that Berthiaume be found not guilty of 
violating Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4(c).  We find that she is guilty of 
violating the rule.  We approve the referee‘s other recommendations as to guilt.  
We disapprove the referee‘s recommended sanction of a ten-day suspension and 
instead impose a ninety-one-day suspension. 
 
 
2 
FACTS 
The Florida Bar filed a disciplinary complaint alleging that Respondent 
Berthiaume violated the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by serving a fraudulent 
subpoena on a bank.  A referee was appointed.  After holding hearings, in which 
the referee considered testimony and evidence, the referee submitted a report to the 
Court with the following findings and recommendations. 
On September 25, 2004, Respondent signed and served by United States 
mail a document entitled ―Subpoena Duces Tecum‖ on Pelican Bank.  The 
purported subpoena directed the bank to produce the records of Respondent‘s 
client, specifically seeking information regarding checks that the client had written 
to Respondent from the client‘s account at the bank.  Previously, the bank had not 
honored the checks.  The fraudulent subpoena stated:  ―If you fail to produce these 
records and the above requested information as described, you may be held in 
contempt of court, punishable by a fine or incarceration or both.‖  There was no 
pending case and the purported subpoena was not authorized by law.  The bank 
refused to honor the false subpoena, and a lawyer for the Bank filed a Bar 
complaint regarding Respondent‘s conduct. 
 
The referee found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was 
responsible for the language in the fraudulent subpoena, including the language 
 
 
3 
threatening incarceration and contempt.  Respondent designed the purposefully 
misleading subpoena to cause the bank to produce the records, even though she did 
not have any legal authority for the subpoena.  Further, Respondent knowingly and 
deliberately sent the false subpoena. 
Based on these factual findings, the referee recommended finding 
Respondent guilty of violating Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice).  The referee accurately noted that all 
members of the legal profession must conduct themselves responsibly and 
professionally to preserve the integrity of our system.  As the referee stated, it is 
unacceptable for a member of The Florida Bar to knowingly and deliberately 
utilize a fraudulent subpoena to threaten a third party with incarceration or mislead 
them to produce documents. 
The referee recommended that Respondent be found not guilty of the alleged 
violations of rules 4-4.1 (in the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person), 4-4.4 
(in representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial 
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or knowingly use 
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person), and 4-
 
 
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8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation). 
In recommending a sanction, the referee relied on Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 6.22, ―Abuse of the Legal Process‖ (suspension is 
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule, and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or causes interference or potential 
interference with a legal proceeding), and 7.2, ―Violations of Other Duties Owed 
as a Professional‖ (suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system). 
The referee did not find any factors in aggravation.  With regard to 
mitigating factors, the referee found Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions 9.32(a) (absence of a prior disciplinary record), 9.32(f) (inexperience in 
the practice of law),1 9.32(g) (character or reputation), and 9.32(j) (interim 
rehabilitation).  In addition, the referee noted that Respondent has provided pro 
bono representation to disadvantaged individuals through Florida Rural Legal 
Services.  The referee stated that if Respondent did not have the mitigating factor 
                                          
 
 
1.  Respondent had been practicing law for approximately four years when 
she committed the misconduct.  The referee found that most of Respondent‘s 
practice had been in criminal law matters, so she was not experienced in civil 
matters. 
 
 
5 
of pro bono service, the recommended sanction would have been more severe.  
Further, subsequent to the misconduct, Respondent twice submitted to a voluntary 
LOMAS review.  She also participated in the Professionalism Workshop and 
Ethics School courses.   
The referee recommended the sanction of a ten-day suspension and awarded 
costs to the Bar in the amount of $13,528.92.   
The Bar sought review of the referee‘s report.  The Bar challenges the 
referee‘s recommendations that Respondent be found not guilty of violating rule 4-
8.4(c) and that a ten-day suspension is the appropriate sanction.  Respondent filed a 
cross-petition challenging the referee‘s report.  Respondent asserts that various 
rulings by the referee prevented her from presenting her case in defense and that 
the appropriate sanction is a public reprimand. 
ANALYSIS 
I.  Respondent Asserts that the Referee Erred by Ruling Against Respondent 
on Several Issues, Which Prevented Respondent From Presenting Her Case. 
 
 
As for the first issue on review, Respondent claims that the referee erred by 
ruling against Respondent‘s requests to depose witnesses and introduce evidence 
allegedly showing that the Bar failed to abide by the Rules Regulating the Florida 
Bar.  Respondent argues that the rulings prohibited her from mounting a proper 
defense in the disciplinary proceeding. 
 
 
6 
 
Respondent‘s fundamental argument is that the referee did not permit her to 
take certain depositions.  Pursuant to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-7.6(f)(2), 
―[d]iscovery shall be available to the parties in accordance with the Florida Rules 
of Civil Procedure.‖  In civil cases and in Bar disciplinary cases, trial courts‘ and 
referees‘ decisions regarding discovery are discretionary and are only reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion.  See Fla. Bar v. Lobasz, 64 So. 3d 1167, 1171 (Fla. 2011); 
Vega v. CSCS Int‘l, N.V., 795 So. 2d 164, 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).  In this case, 
the record shows that the referee did not abuse her discretion when she decided not 
to allow Respondent to take the depositions. 
The referee repeatedly allowed Respondent to present her argument that the 
Bar engaged in misconduct.  The referee considered Respondent‘s repetitious 
allegations, even when the same arguments were presented in different forms (i.e., 
a motion to dismiss, an amended motion for affirmative defenses).  The mere fact 
that the referee ruled against Respondent does not demonstrate that the referee 
erred or prohibited Respondent from presenting a defense.  In fact, the record 
shows just the opposite—the referee permitted Respondent to repeatedly present 
these arguments.  In her report, the referee discussed the issues and even stated that 
―this has been a lengthy prosecution‖ and that a ―large amount of time was spent in 
this proceeding dealing with multiple challenges by Respondent to the authority of 
 
 
7 
The Florida Bar to prosecute Respondent.‖  Report of Referee at 12.  Thus, 
Respondent was not prevented from presenting a defense before the referee. 
Next, Respondent continues to assert that in a previous proceeding, the Bar‘s 
Designated Reviewer had a conflict of interest and should not have been permitted 
to present the investigation to the initial grievance committee and the Board of 
Governors.  However, Respondent‘s current argument is meritless.  In that initial 
case, the parties agreed to a dismissal without prejudice.  As that case was jointly 
dismissed by the Bar and Respondent, and thereafter a different grievance 
committee considered the investigation, Respondent has already been provided 
with the appropriate relief.  Any possible taint or bias that might have created a 
conflict during the first proceeding was removed.  In addition, as Respondent made 
these arguments before the referee, she was not prevented from presenting her 
defense. 
Further, the Bar served its complaint in the initial case against Respondent in 
February 2007.  This is the case that was dismissed without prejudice ―so that a 
new grievance committee could be assigned the case for a new, taint free 
investigation.‖  Report of Referee at 12.  Despite Respondent‘s current assertions, 
the Bar was specifically authorized to bring a second case against Respondent.  
The Bar did not violate the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by bringing another 
 
 
8 
case, in September 2008, against Respondent that included new allegations of 
misconduct.  As Respondent had agreed that the first case could be dismissed 
without prejudice, she is mischaracterizing the history of the proceedings by 
claiming that the Bar was not authorized to bring the second case.  Also, 
Respondent made these arguments before the referee, so her instant claim that she 
was prevented from presenting a defense is without merit. 
In addition, Respondent asserts that a question by a member of the second 
grievance committee, Andrew Epstein, showed bias and prejudice that warranted 
the recusal of the entire grievance committee.  Epstein had asked a witness about 
the nature of her relationship with Respondent, stating that his inquiry went to the 
issue of the witness‘s possible bias.  Respondent has repeatedly raised this 
allegation of bias and prejudice.  She sought to have Epstein recuse himself.  He 
did not.  She asked the second grievance committee to be recused.  It did not.  The 
chair of the grievance committee did not grant her additional request for recusal.  
Before the referee, Respondent raised this claim again, moving to dismiss the Bar‘s 
complaint, arguing that the grievance committee and Epstein should have recused 
themselves.  The referee denied her motion.  She then recast these arguments in the 
form of an Answer and Affirmative Defenses, raising the issue as a defense that the 
Bar engaged in misconduct.  The referee considered her various arguments and 
 
 
9 
ruled on them.  Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion to amend her affirmative 
defenses, which the referee denied.  Despite the referee‘s repeated consideration 
and rulings on this very issue, Respondent then sought to depose certain people, 
including Epstein.  The referee ruled against Respondent and did not permit her to 
conduct the depositions.  Courts have authority to control discovery in all aspects 
in order to prevent harassment and undue invasion of privacy.  S. Fla. Blood 
Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), approved, 500 So. 
2d 533 (Fla. 1987).  The record clearly shows that the referee allowed Respondent 
to present her arguments repeatedly.  The record suggests that the referee denied 
Respondent‘s request to take the depositions in order to control the case and move 
forward. 
Accordingly, for the above reasons, we conclude that the referee did not 
engage in an abuse of discretion by denying Respondent‘s request to take the 
depositions.  We further conclude that Respondent was not prevented from 
presenting a defense in the proceedings. 
II.  Whether Respondent Should be Found Guilty of Violating Rule 4-8.4(c). 
 
As for the second issue, the Bar challenges the referee‘s recommendation 
that Respondent be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  The 
 
 
10 
Bar asserts that the referee should have recommended finding Respondent guilty of 
violating rule 4-8.4(c) because she knowingly sent an unauthorized subpoena to the 
bank that was clearly misleading and designed to obtain the bank‘s records of a 
client. 
The referee found that Respondent sent a document titled ―Subpoena Duces 
Tecum‖ to the bank.  The document directed the bank to produce the financial 
records of Respondent‘s client, even though Respondent did not have authority to 
request the records.  Respondent asserts that she made a mistake and that the 
document was not intended to look like a subpoena.  However, the document 
plainly stated:  ―If you fail to produce these records and the above requested 
information as described, you may be held in contempt of court, punishable by a 
fine or incarceration or both.‖  It also contained the phrase ―civil action.‖  The 
referee stated: 
I find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent is 
responsible for including language threatening incarceration and 
contempt in the purported subpoena which was clearly designed to 
cause the Bank to produce the records without legal authority.  The 
language in the purported subpoena was clearly misleading.  
Respondent knowingly and deliberately sent the purported subpoena 
with the offending language.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Report of Referee at 3.  Respondent signed this fraudulent subpoena when she 
knew that she did not have a case pending against her client. 
 
 
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Although the referee made these factual findings, she recommended that 
Respondent be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  
Respondent argues that the referee is supported in recommending that she is not 
guilty because the Bar did not prove that Respondent engaged in fraud.  This 
argument is misguided because there is no requirement that fraud must be proven 
to show that a respondent violated the rule.  In fact, conduct involving any element, 
such as dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation, can result in a violation of rule 4-
8.4(c). 
In Florida Bar v. Forrester, 818 So. 2d 477, 481 (Fla. 2002), the Court 
approved the referee‘s recommended finding of a violation of rule 4-8.4(c) for a 
respondent who had engaged in misrepresentation but not fraud.  During a 
deposition, Forrester made an intentional misrepresentation concerning the location 
of an exhibit when asked whether she had it.  Although Forrester accurately 
replied, ―I'm not seeing it,‖ Forrester‘s answer was intentionally misleading 
because she knew the document was located by her briefcase and she deliberately 
failed to disclose that information to opposing counsel.  Forrester engaged in an 
intentional misrepresentation, not fraud, and was found guilty of violating rule 4-
8.4(c). 
 
 
12 
Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Nicnick, 963 So. 2d 219, 223-24 (Fla. 2007), 
Nicnick deliberately and knowingly concealed a signed settlement agreement 
(involving child support arrearages) from opposing counsel.  Nicnick‘s misconduct 
was intentional, and his failure to share the purported settlement agreement with 
opposing counsel constituted a deceitful act.  By its very nature, the act of 
omission demonstrated by concealing a relevant document is deceptive.  As in 
Forrester, the Court in Nicnick did not refer to fraud.  In Nicnick, the Court spoke 
of deception, 963 So. 2d at 224, and approved the referee‘s recommendation that 
Nicnick be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c). 
Although the Bar did not seek to prove that Respondent engaged in fraud, 
the facts, record, and case law show that Respondent is guilty of violating rule 4-
8.4(c) due to her intentional misrepresentation and deceitful conduct.  See, e.g., 
Fla. Bar v. Miller, 863 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2003) (finding respondent violated rule 4-
8.4(c) by deliberately concealing that he was aware of the existence of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission‘s first notice of client‘s right to sue, where 
the respondent‘s intentional failure to disclose a crucial piece of evidence was not 
treated as ―fraud‖).  Respondent engaged in deceit and misrepresentation by 
deliberately crafting and mailing the fraudulent subpoena that was ―clearly 
designed to cause the bank to produce the records without legal authority.‖  Report 
 
 
13 
of Referee at 3. 
The Court has repeatedly stated that the referee‘s factual findings must be 
sufficient under the applicable rules to support the recommendations as to guilt.  
See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005).  In this case, the 
referee‘s factual findings do not support the recommendation of not guilty.  
Accordingly, we disapprove the referee‘s recommendation that Respondent be 
found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).  Because the record and the referee‘s 
findings show that Respondent ―knowingly and deliberately sent the purported 
subpoena with the offending language,‖ which was ―clearly designed to cause the 
bank to produce the records without legal authority,‖ and thus ―clearly misleading‖ 
(Report of Referee at 3), we find Respondent guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).2 
III.  Whether the Referee’s Recommended Discipline Should be Approved. 
 
As for the third issue, The Florida Bar challenges the referee‘s 
recommended sanction of a ten-day suspension, arguing that the appropriate 
                                          
 
2.  In Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1999), the Court 
stated that ―in order to satisfy the element of intent it must only be shown that the 
conduct was deliberate or knowing.‖  Id. at 1252; see also Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 
So. 2d 76, 81 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Barley, 831 So. 2d 163, 169 (Fla. 2002).  The 
motive behind the respondent‘s action is not the determinative factor; rather, the 
issue is whether the respondent deliberately or knowingly engaged in the activity 
in question.  Thus, to find a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), intent can be proven by 
establishing that the respondent deliberately or knowingly engaged in the activity 
in question.  In the current case, the Report of Referee and the record show that 
Respondent had the requisite intent. 
 
 
 
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sanction is a ninety-one-day suspension.  In reviewing a referee‘s recommended 
discipline, this Court‘s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the 
referee‘s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court‘s responsibility to 
order the appropriate sanction. Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 
1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  However, generally speaking this Court 
will not second-guess the referee‘s recommended discipline as long as it has a 
reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions.  Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
On review, we find Respondent guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).  In addition, 
we approve the referee‘s recommendation that she be found guilty of violating rule 
4-8.4(d).  In considering violations of rules 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d), we have 
explicitly stated that ―basic, fundamental dishonesty . . . is a serious flaw, which 
cannot be tolerated [because] ‗[d]ishonesty and a lack of candor cannot be 
tolerated by a profession that relies on the truthfulness of its members.‘‖  Fla. Bar 
v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Korones, 752 So. 
2d 586, 591 (Fla. 2000)); see also Fla. Bar v. Head, 27 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2010).  
Respondent has engaged in serious misconduct—she abused the subpoena power, 
which is a power of the court, for her personal investigation.  Such dishonest 
conduct demonstrates the utmost disrespect for the court and is destructive to the 
 
 
15 
legal system as a whole. 
In Forrester, discussed above, Forrester engaged in misrepresentation and 
was guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).  Thus, her misdeeds and Respondent‘s 
misconduct are similar.  Forrester knowingly and intentionally removed and 
concealed a document for a period of time during a deposition.  Although Forrester 
was given more than one opportunity to return the document, she did not do so 
until she was confronted by opposing counsel.  The Court imposed a sixty-day 
suspension, followed by one year of probation.  By comparison, Respondent‘s 
misconduct is significantly more serious than Forrester‘s behavior.  Respondent 
abused the subpoena power for her personal investigation into someone‘s private 
finances.  She sought to deceive the bank so it would provide her with the financial 
records of her client, when she had no authority to seek this confidential 
information.  Because Respondent‘s misconduct is more egregious than 
Forrester‘s, she merits a more substantial sanction than Forrester‘s sixty-day 
suspension. 
 
In Nicnick, discussed above, Nicnick was guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) for 
deliberately and knowingly concealing a signed settlement agreement from 
opposing counsel.  The Court imposed a ninety-one-day suspension.  Respondent‘s 
misconduct is as serious as Nicnick‘s concealment of a document.  Respondent 
 
 
16 
created and mailed a fraudulent subpoena to the bank.  A subpoena is backed by 
the authority of the court to enforce the commands of the subpoena.  Courts 
enforce lawful subpoenas through their contempt powers.  Creating a false 
subpoena commanding compliance usurps the judicial prerogative and violates the 
sanctity of court proceedings.  Respondent‘s misrepresentation and deceit, which 
violated rules 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d), warrant the same sanction imposed in Nicnick, 
a ninety-one-day suspension.3 
We find that the referee‘s recommended sanction of a ten-day suspension 
does not have a reasonable basis in existing case law.  See Nicnick; Forrester.  We 
disapprove the recommended sanction and, based on case law, conclude that a 
ninety-one-day suspension is the appropriate sanction. 
 
 
                                          
 
3.  Respondent asserts that her pro bono work and the three other mitigating 
factors (absence of a prior disciplinary record; inexperience in the practice of law; 
and interim rehabilitation) demonstrate that the appropriate sanction is a public 
reprimand.  Her argument is misguided in relying so heavily on these mitigating 
factors.  The Court has stated that an attorney‘s character and good works do not 
operate ―as a credit‖ against misconduct, Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So. 2d 689 
(Fla. 2000), and that ―[p]rior commendable acts cannot exonerate an attorney‖ 
from discipline, Florida Bar v. Korones, 752 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2000).  Further, since 
Respondent had only been practicing law for four years when she engaged in this 
misconduct, the absence of a disciplinary record is not remarkable. 
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we approve the referee‘s findings of fact and award of costs.  
We disapprove the referee‘s recommendation that Respondent be found not guilty 
of violating rule 4-8.4(c).  We find Respondent guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c).  
We approve the referee‘s other recommendations as to guilt.  Further, we 
disapprove the referee‘s recommendation of a ten-day suspension.  Michelle Erin 
Berthiaume is hereby suspended from the practice of law for ninety-one days.  The 
suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that 
Berthiaume can close out her practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  
If Berthiaume notifies this Court in writing that she is no longer practicing and 
does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an 
order making the suspension effective immediately.  Michelle Erin Berthiaume 
shall fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3–5.1(g).  Further, 
Berthiaume shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until 
she is reinstated. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Michelle Erin 
Berthiaume in the amount of $13,528.92, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
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CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Henry Lee Paul, Assistant 
Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
G Michael Keenan of G. Michael Keenan, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent