Title: PLUMMER DEV. v. Prairie State Bank
Citation: 248 Kan. 664, 809 P.2d 1216
Docket Number: 65303
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 1991

809 P.2d 1216 (1991)
248 Kan. 664
PLUMMER DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellant,
v.
PRAIRIE STATE BANK, Appellee.
No. 65303.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
April 15, 1991.
*1218 William L. Fry, of Fry, White, Birch &amp; Reeves, P.A., Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellant.
Michael G. Coash, of Bond, Bond &amp; Coash, El Dorado, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.
ABBOTT, Justice:
Plummer Development, Inc., (PDI) appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Prairie State Bank (Bank). PDI's suit against the Bank alleged wrongful setoff of its bank account. It also alleged conversion and bad faith and requested actual and punitive damages.
PDI raises four issues on appeal, two of which contend that factual issues remain and thus summary judgment was premature. PDI also raises an argument that does not appear to be relevant to this case, that a personal account cannot be set off against a corporate debt. PDI finally contends it cannot get a fair trial in Butler County.
When the Bank filed its first motion for summary judgment, PDI responded, but failed to set forth in separately numbered paragraphs corresponding to movant's memorandum whether each factual contention is controverted, as required by Supreme Court Rule 141 (1990 Kan.Ct.R. Annot. 110). Although PDI did attach an affidavit by the owners of PDI, it was over 50 pages in length and PDI failed to make precise references to pages, as required by Supreme Court Rule 141.
The Bank moved for an order deeming its statement of facts to be uncontroverted for failure to comply with Rule 141. The trial court held that PDI did not comply with Rule 141 and gave it until May 11, 1990, to file a response that complied with Rule 141. PDI filed an additional document entitled "Plaintiff's Additional Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." In this response, PDI did have numbered paragraphs that corresponded with the Bank's motion, but it contained no reference to any evidentiary documents for some of the paragraphs; instead, PDI referred to other pleadings. In the few paragraphs that did refer to evidentiary documents, the references were again vague, such as: "See depositions of the Plummers and their Affidavits, along with the Depositions of defendant's officers." (There were no depositions in the record at trial and there are none on appeal. The depositions were from a previous case and, apparently, were six inches thick.)
At the hearing on summary judgment, the trial court said that PDI had had two chances to comply with Rule 141, and the court was unwilling to give it a third chance. The trial court held the second response was not in compliance with Rule 141, and, thus, PDI "is deemed to have admitted all of the uncontroverted contentions of fact set forth in the Memorandum of the Defendant." The trial court held: "[T]he court further finds that in accordance with said facts, the court hereby grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff and hereby adopts as its own the uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law set forth in the Defendant's motion and supporting memorandum."
On appeal, PDI does not argue that the trial court erred in holding that it failed to comply. Instead, PDI completely ignores *1219 this and argues that some of the uncontroverted facts are controverted.
"Where the appellant fails to brief an issue, that issue is waived or abandoned." Bazine State Bank v. Pawnee Prod. Serv., Inc., 245 Kan. 490, 495, 781 P.2d 1077 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2173, 109 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1990). Had PDI argued the trial court erred, it would have made little difference. Rule 141 provides:
"The motion may be deemed submitted by order of the court upon expiration of twenty-one (21) days, or expiration of the court ordered extended period, after filing and service on opposing counsel of the brief or memorandum of moving party notwithstanding the failure of the opposing party to comply with paragraph (b), supra. In such cases the opposing party shall be deemed to have admitted the uncontroverted contentions of fact set forth in the memorandum or brief of moving party. In determining a motion for summary judgment the judge shall state the controlling facts and the legal principles controlling the decision in accordance with Rule 165." 1990 Kan.Ct.R.Annot. 110-11.
This court has frequently upheld trial court decisions to deem the movant's facts uncontroverted for the respondent's failure to comply. For instance, in Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 738 P.2d 1246 (1987), the plaintiff's response to a motion for summary judgment contained only general references to the entire trial transcript. This court upheld the trial court's ruling that the opposing party was deemed to have admitted the uncontroverted facts, saying that the rule vests discretion on the trial court,
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. PDI was given ample opportunity to comply.
On appeal, PDI may not controvert these facts which were deemed uncontroverted. PDI is bound by the uncontroverted facts presented by the Bank. We will, however, consider legal issues based on these uncontroverted facts.
Franklin and Julia Plummer, sole shareholders of PDI, were involved in two cases *1220 prior to this one. The Plummers were sued by Alan Mason in Butler County District Court for fraud in connection with another corporation. A jury awarded Mason $11,800. Then, the Plummers (individually and not as a corporation) attempted to sue Prairie State Bank in federal court on what amounts to the same cause of action as is asserted by the corporation in this suit. The federal court granted summary judgment for Prairie State Bank, saying that some of the Plummers' claims were frivolous.
In this case, the trial court adopted the Bank's uncontroverted statement of facts as follows:
PDI argues that whether the Bank was justified in accelerating is a controverted fact. PDI argues that the trial court ignored evidence on point.
Whether acceleration of PDI's debt was proper is a conclusion based on facts rather than a fact itself, so this court may review *1222 the uncontroverted facts and determine if the trial court reached a conclusion that is supported by them.
Included in the uncontroverted facts are the relevant part of the notes, which provide that the borrower will be in default under any of the following conditions:
The remedies section of the note provides that in the event of default, the Bank may accelerate the note.
In essence, the argument made by the Bank and adopted by the trial court is that First American Products, Inc.'s debt was in default, the Plummers were guarantors of that debt and were in default on the guarantee, the Plummers were sole shareholders of PDI, and the Plummers could not be located; therefore, the Bank acted in good faith. The Plummers are unable to point to any evidence to the contrary. The only "legal" argument they make is that the Bank did not act in good faith. A reasonable lender in the Bank's position would be justifiably worried. The action taken was in good faith. PDI has no facts in the record showing why the acceleration was not justified.
K.S.A. 9-1206 provides: "Any bank shall have the right to set off any obligation or claim which it has, when the same is matured against any depositor."
PDI argues the Bank improperly set off a corporate obligation against a personal account. The argument is irrelevant to this case. This case is a suit by the corporation for the setoff of its account against its indebtedness. The rule of law PDI relies on is not applicable to the facts of this case.
PDI did not assert a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary relationship at trial, nor does it explain on appeal how a fiduciary relationship is relevant. The general rule is the failure to present an issue to the trial court precludes raising the issue on appeal. Kansas Dept. of Revenue v. Coca Cola Co., 240 Kan. 548, 552, 731 P.2d 273 (1987).
PDI did request a change in venue. It filed an affidavit by the Plummers asserting that it could not get a fair trial before Judge Jaworsky. Judge Jaworsky had observed, as a spectator, part of a previous suit against Mr. Plummer. PDI was of the opinion that rulings by Judge Jaworsky would be in error because he was prejudiced against the Plummers. It also asserted that because its attorney was a Wichita lawyer, i.e., because he was from out of the county, it could not get a fair trial.
In a memorandum, the trial court denied the motion "for the reason verbally stated by the Court into the record which is incorporated herein by reference." There previously had been a hearing on this motion *1223 at which the trial court orally stated its reasons for denying the motion. PDI has not included a transcript of this hearing in the record on appeal.
"The burden is upon the appellant to designate a record sufficient to present its points to the appellate court and to establish claimed error." Dickinson, Inc. v. Balcor Income Properties Ltd., 12 Kan. App.2d 395, 399, 745 P.2d 1120 (1987), rev. denied 242 Kan. 902 (1988).
Further, even if PDI had designated the record, it could not prevail on this point. K.S.A. 60-609(b) provides that the party must state "reasons other than the disqualification of the judge." PDI did not request the judge to recuse himself. The only other reason stated by PDI was that it believes it cannot get a fair trial. PDI's argument on this issue is only one sentence in length and is a conclusion, with no facts asserted to support it. No legal authority is cited. Based on the record before us, the argument is without merit.
Affirmed.