Title: Jad v. Pld
Citation: 259 A.2d 381
Docket Number: N/A
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 1969

259 A.2d 381 (1969)
J. A. D., Defendant Below, Appellant,
v.
P. L. D., Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
October 8, 1969.
Howard T. Ennis, Jr., Georgetown, for appellant.
Robert W. Tunnell and Karl Haller, of Tunnell &amp; Raysor, Georgetown, for appellee.
WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal by the defendant husband from a judgment of divorce granted on the ground of incompatibility pursuant to 13 Del.C. § 1522(12). The sole contention of the husband is that the evidence did not justify the finding of incompatibility.
*382 Incompatibility as a ground for divorce is set out in § 1522(12) as follows:
The basic argument of the husband in this appeal is that the difficulties of these spouses arise from the attitudes of the wife alone, and do not stem from a "reciprocal conflict of personalities". Of necessity, therefore, we must define this expression.
As was noted in H. v. H., Del.Sup., 253 A.2d 500 (1969) and Doran v. Doran, Del. Super., 245 A.2d 434 (1968), there is no statutory counterpart of § 1522(12) elsewhere. In the other jurisdictions which have adopted incompatibility as a ground for divorce, i. e., Alaska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Virgin Islands, the statutes specified only "incompatibility" or "incompatibility of temperament" as the ground, without further definition, leaving it to their courts to define the term. See Hughes v. Hughes, Okl., 363 P.2d 155 (1961); Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214, 114 P.2d 91 (1941); Burch v. Burch (3 Cir.), 195 F.2d 799 (1952); Paddock v. Paddock (9 Cir.), 240 F.2d 926, 16 Alaska 427; Annotation, 58 A.L.R.2d 1218.
While we do not find the phrase "reciprocal conflict of personalities" in any other statute, it is apparent that this terminology, as well as other recognizable language in § 1522(12), was taken by the drafters from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Hughes v. Hughes, Okl., 363 P.2d 155 (1961). There, the meaning of incompatibility as a ground for divorce was defined as follows:
When § 1522(12) is compared with the above passage of the Hughes case, it becomes obvious, we think, that the drafters took the basic language of our statute from that decision. We assume therefrom *383 that the General Assembly intended to adopt the concept of actionable incompatibility as developed to that point in the Hughes case and its progenitor Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, Okl., 345 P.2d 888 (1959).
In Rakestraw[1] the Court adopted the viewpoint of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on the subject, as expressed in the leading case of Burch v. Burch (3 Cir.), 195 F.2d 799 (1952):
And in Burch, the Court summarized the Danish concept of incompatibility, which apparently had been carried over into the Virgin Islands Divorce Law which, in turn, was obviously the original progenitor of incompatibility as a ground for divorce in this country.[2] The Court there stated:
This background throws light on the intended meaning of "rift and discord" and "reciprocal conflict of personalities" as those terms are used in § 1522(12). We assume that, in adopting those terms, the General Assembly was aware of the case law which gave rise to them. Therefore, without attempting to paraphrase them, we accept and endorse the above statements from the Hughes and Burch cases as definitive of the meaning of those terms in our statute.
Now, to apply the foregoing tests to the facts of this case:
These parties were married in November, 1949. Their first few years of marriage were relatively happy, and two children were born during this period. The first serious trouble between them began in 1964 or 1965. The personalities of the parties are opposite. The wife is an introvert; the husband an extrovert. Their tastes in relaxation are also opposites. The husband has a strong sexual drive, and has accused the wife of coldness. The husband socially engages in heated and emotional arguments with guests to the occasional embarrassment of the wife.
*384 Fundamentally, however, the basic conflict between these two persons related to financial affairs. The wife is of a saving and frugal nature, while the husband is expansive and not adverse to debt to indulge his wants. The wife worked and turned over her paycheck to the husband for deposit in a joint savings account. He, however, spent her pay and falsified an account showing the deposits made. The husband also borrowed money and forged the wife's name to two notes. When this came to light the wife arranged to take care of the finances herself, but the husband again borrowed, forging her name. The husband's employment record was erratic and he lied to the wife. Finally, the wife's belief in the trustworthiness and honesty of the husband was destroyed and she forced him to live apart.
The husband testified that there is nothing in his wife's personality which would prevent him from living with her happily; that he still loves her and wants to preserve the marriage.
Under these circumstances, we think there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that this marriage had been destroyed beyond possibility of reconciliation by "rift or discord produced by reciprocal conflict of personalities." It is of no significant consequence that the defendant husband now says that he feels no incompatibility on his part. Under the guidelines we have adopted, there can be only one kind of incompatibility  mutual and bilateral. This is inherent in the term. There cannot be a one-sided incompatibility. To paraphrase the Burch case, it is inconceivable that the wife's personality in the instant case does not conflict with that of the husband if his conflicts with hers. It takes two to make a conflict. If there is a "conflict of personalities", both must conflict; and the conflict thereby becomes "reciprocal".
The judgment below is affirmed.
[1]  In Rakestraw, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma departed from certain views it had expressed in Chappell v. Chappell, Okla., 298 P.2d 768 (1956) to the effect that one spouse may be incompatible without the other spouse also being incompatible and contributing to the state of incompatibility existing between them. See 345 P.2d  at 890. Therefore, the Chappell case, upon which the defendant here places reliance, is of little assistance to us.
[2]  The Virgin Islands was the first American jurisdiction to adopt incompatibility as a ground for divorce in 1921. This was followed by New Mexico in 1933, Alaska in 1935, Oklahoma in 1953, and Delaware in 1968.