Title: State v. Nathaniel Harvey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-89-01
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 2003

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The prosecutor s office in Middlesex County represented the State in Harvey s two capital murder trials. The Supreme Court reversed Harvey s first conviction and death sentence. Judge Glenn Berman presided over the retrial that resulted in Harvey being convicted again and also receiving the death sentence. The Supreme Court thereafter affirmed that conviction and sentence. While Harvey s direct appeal from his second death sentence was pending, Judge Berman resigned from the bench to become prosecutor of Middlesex County. The Attorney General superseded then-Prosecutor Berman and assigned two deputy attorneys general to handle Harvey s present PCR petition, which was filed in 1999. Because the attorney who had served as Harvey s retrial counsel is now a Superior Court judge sitting in Middlesex County, the matter was transferred to Union County. After discovery directives, Harvey amended his petition to add a claim that the State mishandled a bloody quilt and blanket that it had confiscated from a previous suspect. Harvey asserts that the State turned over those articles to their owner before the defense had the opportunity to conduct certain tests. At some point, the State notified the PCR court and defense counsel that an assistant prosecutor from Middlesex County, Thomas Kapsak, would replace one of the deputy attorneys general as co-counsel. Kapsak had worked on Harvey s first trial. Harvey s counsel objected, arguing that it was improper to designate an attorney from the prosecutor s office when that office was the focal point of charges of misconduct. Counsel also suggested that Kapsak was the official responsible for returning the quilt and blanket. Although expressing the belief that no basis existed for the objections, the Attorney General removed Kapsak from the case. In his place, the Attorney General appointed Janet McClure, Middlesex County s deputy first assistant prosecutor as special deputy to represent the State. In deputizing McClure, the Attorney General s office indicated that she would answer directly to it and not to anyone within the prosecutor s office. Defense counsel objected to McClure s involvement, noting that she is a subordinate of the former Judge Berman, and also that she is in the same office as those who are the subject of Harvey s claims of misconduct. The trial court granted Harvey s motion to disqualify McClure. The judge explained that the basis for the disqualification was the status of Judge Berman as the prosecutor of Middlesex County, and that the participation of prosecutors from that office created an appearance of impropriety. The Supreme Court granted the State s motion for leave to appeal and stayed the PCR proceeding. In July 2002, Glenn Berman ceased serving as Middlesex County Prosecutor and returned to the bench of the Superior Court. HELD: Harvey s allegation of prosecutorial misconduct does not require the disqualification of attorneys from the Middlesex County prosecutor s office. 1. Judge Berman s return to the bench removes the factual underpinning to much, if not all, of the trial court s determination. That change in position has rendered moot any conflict that might have arisen because of Berman s prior status as prosecutor. The Court expresses no opinion concerning that aspect of the PCR court s decision. (pp. 8-9) 2. Harvey argues that Berman s change in position does not eliminate the broader conflict question. He asks that the Court give heightened scrutiny to any potential conflict within the context of this capital proceeding. The Court reaffirms its belief that the responsibilities of prosecutors include faithful adherence to all protections accorded defendants. And, prosecutors must be particularly careful to fulfill their responsibilities in capital cases. However, the evaluation of an actual or apparent conflict is highly fact specific. The asserted conflict must have some reasonable basis, and must be something more than a fanciful possibility. (pp. 9-10) 3. The Court notes that there is no specific claim of misconduct against McClure. Nor has there been any finding of impropriety against any other attorney within the prosecutor s or Attorney General s office who may have worked on Harvey s petition thus far. At bottom, Harvey seeks to disqualify a whole agency by asking us to presume that neither McClure nor any person working under her is capable of independently evaluating his petition. In view of Berman s change in position, the high-level ranking of McClure within the prosecutor s office, and the lack of any suggestion of misconduct on her part, the Court finds no compelling rationale to require the disposition requested by Harvey. (pp. 10-14) 3. Defendants frequently allege one or more forms of prosecutorial misconduct in these circumstances. A rule that required the disqualification of an entire prosecutor s office because of allegations against one or two of its members likely would lead to significant disruptions within the criminal justice system. The negative effects of such a rule would be far in excess of its positive consequences to this or future defendants. Nor is it mandated under existing jurisprudence. (pp. 14-16) The PCR court s disqualification order is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE VERNIERO s opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 6, 2002 Decided January 15,2003 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Union County. Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Eric V. Kleiner, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Kleiner and Carol J. Garcia, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. We granted leave to appeal, 171 N.J. 439 (2002), to resolve a narrow question related to defendant s petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). The petition stems from a previous capital-murder conviction for which defendant received a death sentence. It alleges, among other things, that the prosecutor s office in Middlesex County had engaged in misconduct by destroying evidence that might have aided the defense. That allegation, although broadly framed, focuses most specifically on one assistant prosecutor. Its merit is not before us. The sole issue at this juncture is whether the bare assertion of prosecutorial misconduct is sufficient to disqualify the entire prosecutor s office from representing the State in connection with defendant s petition. We hold that a blanket disqualification is not required. . . . . You claim that your new co-counsel has just been sworn in as a Deputy Attorney General. . . . Is she still handling matters in the MCPO? Does Ms. McClure . . . still have her checks being signed by the MCPO? Does Ms. McClure have a professional relationship with and/or contact with the investigators assigned previously to this file by MCPO? Under the circumstances, the defense still objects to this attempt by the [deputy attorneys general] to utilize a member of the MCPO as co-counsel for the [State]. [Assistant Prosecutor] Kapsak and MCPO Deputy First Assistant Julia McClure are both subordinates of MCP Glenn Berman. That is a conflict. . . . Your continued attempts to place a high level MCPO prosecuting attorney as co-counsel only serves to have a MCPO insider with access to all evidence that pertains to this case, and it gives the MCPO investigators who are already parties to claims of prosecutorial misconduct direct access to a co-counsel from the same office (MCPO). The [Attorney General s] act of changing Ms. McClure s title to [special deputy attorney general] is cosmetic and ceremonial window dressing and nothing more. The PCR court granted defendant s motion to disqualify McClure. The court explained in an oral opinion: [The] [u]nderlying basis for the motion brought by the defense is that the Middlesex County Prosecutor, Prosecutor Berman, . . . did, as Judge Berman, preside over the trial of the defendant at Harvey II. . . . . [W]hat concerns me with respect to this application is . . . [the] appearance [of conflict] as opposed to any actual impropriety. . . . . Looking at Mr. Berman now as prosecutor, and viewing him sitting at the other table, I have, I think, the same concern I would have . . . if he was on the defense side. I am I am concerned that . . . the appearance of impropriety exists. There is a concern, I m not sure how strong a concern it is, that Mr. Berman himself would be called to testify perhaps at a PCR hearing. That may be more remote than the fact that other people from that office may wind up testifying, which is probably a more realistic possibility. Because I feel that there is that appearance . . . that his participation in the case would be improper, I am compelled to conclude that the appearance in this case of anyone from the Middlesex County Prosecutor s Office, as members of that staff, carries with it the same appearance [of impropriety]. Consistent with that opinion, the court entered a written order barring McClure and all other attorneys within the prosecutor s office from representing the State. It did not address specifically whether the Attorney General s supersession of Berman had removed any potential conflict. The court later clarified its order to prohibit only county attorneys from working on the matter and not investigators. The State moved before this Court for leave to appeal the trial court s decision. As noted, we granted that motion and subsequently stayed the underlying PCR proceeding (which, at that juncture, was steeped in on-going discovery issues) while we considered this appeal. The State informed us in July 2002 that Glenn Berman had ceased serving as prosecutor, having returned to the bench as a Superior Court judge that same month. Bruce J. Kaplan replaced Berman and is Middlesex County s current prosecutor. Along those same lines we anticipate that McClure, as a senior member of the prosecutor s staff, will have an unencumbered ability to investigate all allegations thoroughly. Moreover, the PCR court ultimately will evaluate defendant s complete petition, performing its customary function as a neutral judicial body. The court s evaluation will occur only after it accords defendant the protections traditionally available in a PCR proceeding, within the framework of the adversarial process. Under those circumstances, the extraordinary relief sought by defendant is not warranted. We reasoned similarly in State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (Marshall III), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S. Ct. 140, 139 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1997). The prosecutor s office in Ocean County had tried that capital case on the State s behalf. Thereafter, the Attorney General represented the State in connection with the defendant s PCR petition. The petition raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The director of the Division of Criminal Justice, an arm of the Attorney General s office, had been a high-level subordinate of Ocean County s prosecutor during the period relevant to the defendant s claims. Id. at 284-85. On those facts, the defendant argued before this Court that the presence of the prosecutor s former subordinate within the Attorney General s office should have precluded that office from participating in the adjudication of his petition. Ibid. We rejected that argument. Id. at 285. We stated that, without more, [t]he fact that defendant alleges misconduct in prior proceedings cannot entitle him to disqualify counsel for the State. Ibid. The result in Marshall III was consistent with our rejection of an earlier disqualification motion made by the same defendant. In that application, the defendant sought to bar the county prosecutor from representing the State in a remand hearing to explore alleged discovery violations. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 176-77 (1991) (Marshall I), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S. Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993). The defendant argued that because that office would be seeking to vindicate its prior work on his file, a disqualification order was necessary. The trial court disagreed and we affirmed, citing the trial court s statement that [i]t s not a situation that seems to call for a disqualification of the Prosecutor. It s not a situation in which the Prosecutor has this type of nefarious interest such as . . . [a] personal financial stake in the outcome of the case or something of that nature. I suppose in a sense you could always argue the Prosecutor has an interest in the outcome of any case, but this is not that type of situation in which the Prosecutor has that type of interest. [Id. at 176.] Urging a contrary conclusion in this case, defendant emphasizes the likelihood that Kapsak will be called to testify before the PCR court. That prospect does not itself disqualify the prosecutor s office from representing the State. State v. Irizarry, 271 N.J. Super. 577, 599-600 (App. Div. 1994) (finding that defendant s intention to call certain members of prosecutor s office to testify at penalty phase of capital proceeding did not bar entire office from prosecuting case); see also Riboni v. District Court, 586 P.2d 9, 11 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (predicting deleterious impact on system if opposing counsel were permitted unfettered option of removing any prosecutor who has personal knowledge of any material fact in case ). We also note that as of November 12, 2002, the prosecutor s office in Middlesex County employed a total of forty-seven attorneys. The office is large enough to permit McClure, if she deems it necessary, to wall off Kapsak and other potential witnesses as she investigates defendant s petition with assistance from other county personnel. In addition, as indicated in the State s brief, the parameters of a future evidentiary hearing are not yet known. Thus, at this interlocutory stage, Kapsak s status as a material witness is unconfirmed. An appearance of impropriety is determined not from the perspective of the attorney involved but from the public s vantage. In re Opinion 653, supra, 132 N.J. at 130. From that perspective, we are persuaded that McClure s involvement poses little or no risk to the integrity of the process. At bottom, defendant seeks to disqualify a whole agency by asking us to presume that neither McClure nor any person working under her is capable of independently evaluating his petition. In view of Berman s change in position, the high-level ranking of McClure within the prosecutor s office, and the lack of any suggestion of misconduct on her part, we find no compelling rationale to require defendant s requested disposition. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE VERNIERO s opinion. NO. A-89 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Law Division, Superior Court, Union County STATE OF NEW JERSEY Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED January 15, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Peter G. Verniero CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY