Title: State v. Magett
Citation: 2014 WI 67
Docket Number: 2010AP001639-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2014

2014 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1639-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Erick O. Magett, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 344 Wis. 2d 518, 822 N.W.2d 736 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2014  
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant   
 
JUDGE: 
George S. Curry   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Andrew R. Hinkel.    
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Eileen W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
  
 
 
2014 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP1639-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2007CF44) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Erick O. Magett, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   This 
fact-intensive 
case 
focuses on the second phase of a bifurcated criminal trial in 
which the defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect (NGI).  The defendant, Erick Magett 
(Magett), was found guilty of a felony in the first phase of the 
trial.  The jury was expected to determine whether the defendant 
met his burden on his NGI plea in the second phase.  Under 
circumstances that will be explained, the Grant County Circuit 
Court, George S. Curry, Judge, dismissed Magett's NGI plea 
before commencement of the second phase in which the jury was to 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
2 
 
determine Magett's "responsibility" for the crime.  We review 
here an unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming 
the defendant's conviction.  The issues presented may be stated 
as follows. 
¶2 
First, 
did 
the 
circuit 
court 
apply 
the 
wrong 
substantive law by requiring the defendant to produce expert 
testimony to carry his burden in the responsibility phase of a 
bifurcated criminal trial in which the issue was whether the 
defendant was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect? 
¶3 
Second, did the circuit court err when it ruled that 
the defendant was not competent to testify as to his mental 
condition in the responsibility phase of a bifurcated criminal 
trial in which the issue was whether the defendant was not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect? 
¶4 
Third, did the circuit court err in dismissing the 
defendant's NGI plea before the responsibility phase of the 
trial, after the defendant indicated that he would not produce 
any 
evidence 
of 
his 
mental 
disease 
or 
defect 
in 
the 
responsibility phase except: (1) his own testimony that he 
"blacked out" for a few seconds when he punched a corrections 
officer; and (2) a video of the battery, both of which had been 
presented to the jury during the guilt phase of the trial? 
                                                 
1 State v. Magett, No. 2010AP1639-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
3 
 
¶5 
Fourth, if the circuit court made any errors with 
respect to the responsibility phase of the defendant's trial, 
were the errors harmless? 
¶6 
We reach the following conclusions.   
¶7 
First, as a general rule, a defendant is not required 
to present expert testimony to prove the elements of his NGI 
defense.  State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 666, 370 N.W.2d 240 
(1985).  Ordinarily, the defendant will offer expert testimony.  
He may also offer testimony by lay witnesses as well as his own 
testimony.  As a practical matter, a defendant should offer 
evidence to supplement his own testimony because a defendant who 
testifies in the responsibility phase of his trial without 
corroboration is likely to be viewed as self-serving inasmuch as 
the purpose of his defense is to escape responsibility for his 
already established criminal conduct.  In only an exceptional 
case with extraordinary facts may a defendant carry his burden 
in the responsibility phase of a criminal trial by relying 
solely on his own testimony. 
¶8 
Second, a defendant is competent to testify as to his 
mental condition in the responsibility phase of a criminal 
trial.  However, a lay defendant does not have an unlimited, 
categorical right to give opinion testimony on the issue of 
mental disease or defect. 
¶9 
Third, a court should normally permit a defendant to 
offer his evidence in the responsibility phase of a trial before 
the court rules on his NGI defense.  By allowing the defendant 
an opportunity to offer all his evidence, the court ensures that 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
4 
 
any 
dismissal2 
or 
directed 
verdict 
is 
informed 
by 
full 
consideration of the defendant's position, conforms to Wis. 
Stat. § 805.14(1) and (3) or (4) (2009-10),3 and reduces the 
procedural grounds for appeal.  There will not be many cases 
where the defendant's position is so bereft of merit that the 
court can conclude that there is no jury question as a matter of 
law before the defendant presents his evidence. 
¶10 Fourth, we conclude here that the evidence to support 
the defendant's NGI defense was insufficient as a matter of law, 
so that any errors by the circuit court in refusing to allow the 
trial to proceed to the responsibility phase were harmless.  We 
conclude that no reasonable jury would have determined that the 
defendant had a mental disease or defect that caused him to lack 
substantial capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
¶11 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision 
to uphold the defendant's conviction. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                                                 
2 The circuit judge referred to the dismissal of Magett's 
NGI plea as a "directed verdict," but, as will be explained 
below, the judge's action is more appropriately characterized as 
a dismissal because, although Magett testified and offered all 
his evidence in the guilt phase, he was not allowed to reoffer 
"all evidence" in the responsibility phase.  Therefore, this 
opinion will refer to the rejection of Magett's NGI defense as a 
dismissal unless the opinion is quoting one of the parties or 
referring to their arguments. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
5 
 
¶12 This case arises out of an incident at the Wisconsin 
Secure Program Facility (WSPF) in Boscobel in Grant County.  The 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
describes 
WSPF 
as 
"Wisconsin's most secure facility," designed to manage and 
control "inmates who demonstrate serious behavioral problems in 
other settings."  See Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, Wis. 
Dep't 
of 
Corr., 
http://doc.wi.gov/families-visitors/find-
facility/wisconsin-secure-program-facility (last visited 
July 
10, 2014).  "Inmates transferred to WSPF have earned their way 
to this facility because of behaviors exhibited in alternate 
sites.  They have jeopardized the safety and security of the 
facility, staff, and/or other inmates."  Id.   
¶13 Erick O. Magett was an inmate at WSPF on January 20, 
2007.  Magett, then 41, had a long criminal history before he 
was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide in 1990 and 
sentenced to life in prison. 
¶14 The events that led to the charge in this case were 
set in motion by Magett's frustrations with his access to health 
care.  In August 2005 Magett slipped in the shower and began 
complaining of pelvic pain.  Magett testified that he had X-rays 
taken in October 2006.  Although a medical technician told 
Magett that he had a fractured left pelvis, the prison doctor 
disagreed and informed Magett that there was no fracture.  
Magett 
expressed 
frustration 
about 
the 
level 
of 
medical 
treatment he was receiving and wrote the warden to say, "I do 
not want to put my hands on your officers, but if this keep 
[sic] going on, somebody going [sic] to end up getting hurt."  
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
6 
 
He also told the prison psychiatrist that he knew it would be 
wrong to take out his frustrations about the lack of medical 
treatment on the officers. 
¶15 Magett's statements about hurting officers led WSPF to 
place him on restrictions.  Before WSPF allowed Magett to 
receive his meals, it required him to sit down with his legs 
crossed, put his head against the back wall, and place his hands 
behind his back.  Magett claimed that as a result of a fractured 
pelvis, he could not cross his legs when sitting down.  Because 
Magett would not sit in the required position, WSPF withheld his 
meals.  Magett claimed that WSPF refused to give him his meal on 
several occasions4 and that he was unable to resolve the issue 
through written or oral complaints.  Therefore, on January 20, 
2007, Magett decided to cover the camera in his cell because he 
knew that obscuring the camera would attract attention and 
eventually lead to a team of officers forcibly removing him from 
his cell.  WSPF assembled a show-of-force team to extract Magett 
from his cell, and the team members suited up in protective 
equipment consisting of helmets and padded jumpsuits.  It was 
during the extraction of Magett from his cell that Magett 
committed the battery that gave rise to this case.   
¶16 Before the show-of-force team entered Magett's cell, 
both the team's supervisor and the team's leader asked Magett if 
                                                 
4 There is some confusion about how many meals Magett 
actually missed.  At his sentencing hearing, Magett's attorney 
said that Magett received no food for two days prior to the 
incident on January 20, 2007, and also went without food for 
three days after. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
7 
 
he would come out voluntarily.  Magett refused.  In preparation 
for the cell extraction, and unbeknownst to the show-of-force 
team, Magett spread hand cream on his cell floor to slow the 
officers down.  He claimed that the purpose of the hand cream 
was to hinder the officers and prevent them from hurting him.  
Magett put his mattress on the ground and stood on it so that he 
would not slip on the lubricated floor.  Then he removed his 
shirt and assumed a "boxer stance" with raised fists as he 
waited for the team to enter. 
¶17 As the team entered the cell, Magett's ingenuity with 
the hand cream caused several officers to lose their footing.  
Magett punched the officers in the helmet area as they struggled 
toward him.  In the brief period of chaos, one of Magett's 
punches caused a cut on Officer Jeremy Caya's (Officer Caya) 
chin.  Magett later testified (in the guilt phase of his trial) 
that during the incident, he "pretty much blacked out."  When 
asked to clarify what he meant by "blacked out," Magett 
responded, "It was like I'm just gone."  He insisted that he did 
not remember hurting Officer Caya, but he did remember the 
officers taking him out of his cell.  The alleged "blackout" 
lasted from the time the officers came into the cell until the 
time they restrained him against the cell wall——an interval of a 
few seconds.  Corrections officers videotaped the incident, and 
the jury saw the tape several times during the guilt phase of 
the trial. 
¶18 Although Magett claimed not to remember hitting 
Officer Caya, he did seem to remember swinging his fists at the 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
8 
 
corrections officers.  The following exchange occurred during 
Magett's direct examination by his attorney: 
Q: And when [the corrections officers] came in, what 
did you do? 
A: I swung. 
Q: And why were you swinging your fists? 
A: Because they were swinging at me. 
Q: All right.  And were you trying to hurt them? 
A: No, I wouldn't try to hurt nobody. 
Magett went on to testify that he blacked out, and his attorney 
questioned him about how the corrections officers were hitting 
him.  Magett testified that an officer was hitting him between 
his legs, that an officer was trying to break his wrist, and 
that an officer was choking him.  Just a few questions later, 
Magett's attorney asked him what he remembered after the 
officers came through his cell door.  Magett responded, "Not 
much."  On cross-examination, Magett claimed that the officers 
punched him in the testicles five or six times. 
¶19 Because he caused a cut on Officer Caya's chin, Magett 
was charged with battery by a prisoner contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.20(1).5  Magett entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty 
by reason of mental disease or defect and requested that the 
                                                 
5 "Any prisoner confined to a state prison or other state, 
county or municipal detention facility who intentionally causes 
bodily harm to an officer, employee, visitor or another inmate 
of such prison or institution, without his or her consent, is 
guilty of a Class H felony."  Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
9 
 
court appoint Dr. Jonathan Lewis (Dr. Lewis), a psychologist, to 
perform a mental examination.6 
¶20 During Dr. Lewis's psychological evaluation, Magett 
claimed that he was having auditory hallucinations, which began 
two weeks prior to the psychological evaluation.  Dr. Lewis's 
review of Magett's past records from mental health officials 
indicated that Magett "showed no symptoms of thought disorder or 
other psychotic features," although he had some complaints of 
anxiety and depression and was diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder.  Magett and Dr. Lewis also discussed the 
cell extraction incident, and Magett told Dr. Lewis that he had 
                                                 
6 When a defendant enters an NGI plea, "the court may 
appoint 
at 
least 
one 
physician 
or 
at 
least 
one 
psychologist . . . to examine the defendant and to testify at 
the trial."  Wis. Stat. § 971.16(2).  The appointed physician or 
psychologist prepares a report, which is used as follows: 
[A]ny physician or psychologist appointed under sub. 
(2) shall file a report of his or her examination of 
the defendant with the judge, who shall cause copies 
to be transmitted to the district attorney and to 
counsel for the defendant.  The contents of the report 
shall 
be 
confidential 
until 
the 
physician 
or 
psychologist has testified or at the completion of the 
trial.  The report shall contain an opinion regarding 
the ability of the defendant to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform 
the defendant's conduct with the requirements of law 
at the time of the commission of the criminal offense 
charged . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 971.16(3).  "If the defendant wishes to be examined 
by a physician, psychologist or other expert of his . . . own 
choice, the examiner shall be permitted to have reasonable 
access to the defendant for the purposes of examination."  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.16(4). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
10 
 
not eaten for five days before the offense.  As mentioned 
earlier, Magett's attorney clarified at the sentencing hearing 
that Magett had not eaten for two days before the incident.  
Magett said that "he knew that not coming out of his cell, and 
striking the officer were wrong but felt he was justified 
because of the poor attention to his problem with getting 
food . . . ."  Dr. Lewis concluded: 
If Mr. Magett's account is to be credited he 
participated in the assault of the correctional 
officer knowingly as a way of attracting attention to 
his frustration and difficulties with not receiving 
any food for a period of 5 days.  His description 
indicates that his behavior was purposeful and well 
considered, and was not in response to any disorder 
perception of reality due to mental illness. 
 . . . . 
Absent 
indication 
of 
significant 
psychiatric 
illness, and given the disparity between his accounts 
of 
why 
the 
alleged 
offense 
occur[red] 
and 
the 
information in records of contacts with Mr. Magett at 
about the time, there is no basis for concluding that 
he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
acts nor that he was unable to conform his behavior to 
the requirements of the law.  Therefore it is my 
recommendation to the court that his plea of Not 
Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease or Defect not be 
endorsed. 
¶21 When Dr. Lewis determined that Magett did not have a 
mental disease or defect, Magett attempted to find a new expert 
to do a private evaluation.  Whatever the opinion of the second 
expert, Magett chose not to introduce it into evidence. 
¶22 During the guilt phase of the trial on February 5, 
2008, the jury found Magett guilty of battery by a prisoner.  
While the jury was deliberating, the court inquired about the 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
11 
 
evidence 
that 
the 
defendant 
intended 
to 
present 
at 
the 
responsibility phase, and defense counsel responded that Magett 
would testify that "he was out of it" and would show the video 
of the cell extraction again.  After the jury returned a guilty 
verdict, the court again asked——outside the jury's presence——
what evidence the defense would present.  The following exchange 
took place: 
THE COURT: Okay, the jury has found the defendant 
guilty, so that takes us to Phase 2.  Now, I 
understood before we went out . . . that you weren't 
going to offer any evidence, [defense counsel]? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No evidence at all? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just . . . my client's testimony. 
THE COURT: From? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: As what happened. 
THE COURT: Okay, then how are you going to meet your 
burden? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, . . . he doesn't need a 
physician to determine whether he has a mental 
disease.  It's a question for the jury to determine, 
not for a doctor to authorize. 
THE COURT: . . . I don't think that's the case law.  I 
just got done reading the Leach case again and you 
have to have some evidence. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The evidence is what my client 
testified to. 
THE COURT: You have to have medical evidence. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't think it says that. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
12 
 
THE COURT: You need to have some evidence that he has 
a mental disease or defect.  Otherwise, . . . how can 
the jury just speculate? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, at the time of the incident 
he said he blacked out.  He doesn't have any 
remembrance of what happened.  I think that fits the 
definition—— 
THE COURT: Of what? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Memory.  He had a loss of memory. 
THE COURT: That's not a mental disease or defect. 
¶23 Magett's attorney went on to argue that Magett's 
blacking out and loss of memory fit the definition of mental 
disease or defect and that she had nothing to offer but the 
defendant's prior testimony to this effect.7  The court responded 
that the jury already heard Magett's testimony and the defense 
needed something more to show mental disease or defect.  The 
court summarized the elements of an NGI plea and said, "You have 
to have evidence first of all of mental disease, and second of 
all you have to have testimony that he's unable to conform his 
behavior."  Later, the court stated that "a doctor has to make 
the second part of the analysis."  Giving a hypothetical, the 
court declared: 
Even if he can testify that he suffered from, let's 
say, schizophrenia, he still would have to have a 
doctor to come in and say that at the time of this 
incident, that affected his ability to know the 
difference and appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct and conform it to the requirements of the law.  
                                                 
7 When the judge told Magett's attorney that she needed some 
evidence, she responded, "The evidence is what my client 
testified to."  Thus, the defense suggested that its only 
evidence was the testimony from the guilt phase of the trial. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
13 
 
And without a doctor coming in for the second 
part, . . . I don't think you can meet your burden. 
With no other evidence to consider, the court stated: 
Your client's not competent to testify as to 
whether or not he lacks substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law.  He 
doesn't have that capacity.  He doesn't have the 
expertise to say that. . . .  So unless you're going 
to produce some evidence to this jury, . . . I'm going 
to have to direct verdict for the State on that 
issue. . . .  I thought you were going to probably 
call Dr. Lewis as a defense witness and bring out 
something in his report.  And then [the prosecutor] 
would cross examine it, because . . . Dr. Lewis didn't 
back up this mental disease and defect.  And he came 
to the opposite conclusion that he . . . did have the 
ability to understand what he was doing was wrong.  So 
there's just no evidence to sustain that plea.  As far 
as I can tell, you're not going to produce any 
evidence; therefore, if you're not going to produce 
any evidence, I don't have any choice but to find that 
no reasonable juror could conclude on . . . any basis 
that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or 
defect, much less that he lacked substantial capacity 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
conform it to the requirements of the law as a result 
of the mental disease or defect. 
¶24 Magett's attorney responded that neither the appointed 
expert nor Magett's own privately obtained expert had testimony 
favorable to Magett, so there would be no expert testimony to 
support the defense in the responsibility phase of the trial.  
The court decided not to allow Magett to introduce any more 
evidence because, based on defense counsel's description of the 
evidence, the court determined that "no evidence that is going 
to be produced . . . could give a reasonable juror the ability 
to conclude that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or 
defect."  Following that, the court "conclude[d] as a matter of 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
14 
 
law that the defendant [was] unable to meet his burden of proof 
on the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect . . . ."  The court then entered judgment in accordance 
with the verdict and found Magett guilty of battery by a 
prisoner. 
¶25 Magett filed an appeal alleging that the circuit court 
erred in denying him the right to proceed to the second phase of 
the bifurcated trial.  State v. Magett, No. 2010AP1639-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012).  The 
court of appeals did not decide whether the circuit court erred 
in ending the trial after the guilt phase and instead held that 
any error was harmless.  Id.  The court of appeals noted that 
this case presents an unusual circumstance in which the defense 
introduced all its evidence in the guilt phase of the bifurcated 
trial.  Id., ¶15.  Because the defense had no new evidence 
relating to Magett's mental state, the court's refusal to hear 
the evidence in the second phase did "not undermine [the court 
of appeals'] confidence in the outcome."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Given that the defense would produce no new evidence, 
and the evidence admitted in the guilt phase of the trial was 
insufficient 
to 
prove 
mental 
disease 
or 
defect 
by 
a 
preponderance, the court of appeals concluded that any error by 
the circuit court was harmless.  Id., ¶¶19-20. 
¶26 Magett petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on March 11, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
15 
 
¶27 Magett challenges the circuit court's determination 
that expert testimony is required to prove mental disease or 
defect in the responsibility phase of the trial and that Magett 
was not competent to testify about his own mental health.  
Normally, the admissibility of evidence, including expert 
testimony, is within the circuit court's discretion.  Brown 
Cnty. v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, ¶37, 286 Wis. 2d 278, 706 
N.W.2d 269; State v. Sharp, 180 Wis. 2d 640, 649, 511 N.W.2d 316 
(Ct. App. 1993).  However, a circuit court erroneously exercises 
its discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard.  Shannon 
R., 286 Wis. 2d 278, ¶37; Sharp, 180 Wis. 2d at 649.  "[W]hether 
the circuit court applied the correct legal standard . . . is a 
question of law that we review de novo."  State v. Kramer, 2001 
WI 132, ¶17, 248 Wis. 2d 1009, 637 N.W.2d 35 (citation omitted). 
¶28 Magett also challenges the circuit court's decision to 
grant a "directed verdict" before he presented evidence in the 
responsibility 
phase 
of 
the 
trial. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.14(1): 
No motion challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence as a matter of law . . . shall be granted 
unless the court is satisfied that, considering all 
credible evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
the motion is made, there is no credible evidence to 
sustain a finding in favor of such party. 
When a circuit court follows the proper procedure to dismiss a 
case or direct a verdict, an appellate court will uphold the 
decision unless the circuit court "was clearly wrong."  Leach, 
124 Wis. 2d at 665 (citation omitted).  Although an appellate 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
16 
 
court will uphold a circuit court's substantive decision in 
these circumstances unless it is clearly wrong, the question of 
whether the circuit court has the authority to dismiss a case or 
direct a verdict before the defendant has an opportunity to 
present his evidence in the responsibility phase of a trial "is 
a question of law that this court reviews de novo."  See State 
v. Melton, 2013 WI 65, ¶22, 349 Wis. 2d 48, 834 N.W.2d 345 
(citing State v. McClaren, 2009 WI 69, ¶14, 318 Wis. 2d 739, 767 
N.W.2d 550). 
¶29 Finally, we must consider whether any error by the 
circuit court was harmless.  The harmless error inquiry is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Weborg v. 
Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶43, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191.  The 
harmless error rule in Wis. Stat. § 805.18 applies to criminal 
proceedings via Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  State v. Harvey, 2002 
WI 93, ¶39, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  An error is 
harmless unless "the error complained of has affected the 
substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside 
the judgment, or to secure a new trial."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(2).  Thus, the harmless error inquiry is whether it is 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have come to the 
same conclusion absent the error.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 
(citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).  The 
alternative wording of the test is whether it was "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶47, 301 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
17 
 
Wis. 2d 642, 
734 
N.W.2d 115 
(citations 
omitted) 
(internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
¶30 In conducting a harmless error analysis, a reviewing 
court will have greater confidence in the circuit court's 
decision when the evidence that was not subject to error 
strongly supported the outcome and when the erroneously excluded 
evidence was peripheral.  Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶32, 
246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶31 Magett alleges that the circuit court applied the 
wrong substantive law and that the court erred in preventing 
Magett from presenting his evidence in the responsibility phase 
of the trial.  Magett also contends that the errors were not 
harmless.  We address Magett's claims below, but we begin with a 
brief discussion of bifurcated trials and the definition of 
mental disease or defect in Wisconsin. 
A. The Bifurcated Trial and the Definition of Mental Disease or 
Defect 
¶32 We note at the outset that a criminal defendant's 
right to an NGI defense is a statutory right that is not 
guaranteed 
by 
either 
the 
United 
States 
or 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions.  Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992) 
(citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968)) ("[W]e 
have not said that the Constitution requires the States to 
recognize the insanity defense."); State v. Burton, 2013 WI 61, 
¶9, 349 Wis. 2d 1, 832 N.W.2d 611 ("[D]efendants do not have a 
fundamental right to an insanity plea . . . ."); State v. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
18 
 
Francis, 2005 WI App 161, ¶1, 285 Wis. 2d 451, 701 N.W.2d 632 
("Neither the federal constitution nor our state constitution 
confers a right to an insanity defense or plea.").  Nor does 
either constitution guarantee a right to a bifurcated trial.  
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967) ("Two-part jury 
trials are rare in our jurisprudence; they have never been 
compelled 
by 
this 
Court 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
constitutional 
law . . . ."); 
State 
ex 
rel. 
La 
Follette 
v. 
Raskin, 
34 
Wis. 2d 607, 625, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967) (noting that the Supreme 
Court of the United States "has not compelled a two-part trial 
as a matter of constitutional law or as a matter of federal 
procedure"); see also § 1, ch. 221, Laws of 1911 (repealing 
bifurcation for an "insanity" defense, which suggests a unitary 
trial is not unconstitutional). 
¶33 This case relates to the bifurcated trial described in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.15 and 971.165.  A bifurcated criminal trial 
consists of two phases: (1) the guilt phase; and (2) the 
responsibility phase.  When a criminal defendant pleads not 
guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the 
jury hears evidence relating to the defendant's guilt in the 
first phase of the trial, and if the jury finds the defendant 
guilty, the trial proceeds to the second phase.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.165(1)(a).  In the second phase, the jury considers 
whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time 
of the crime and whether, "as a result of mental disease or 
defect 
the 
person 
lacked 
substantial 
capacity 
either 
to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or conform his 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
19 
 
or her conduct to the requirements of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.15(1). 
¶34 The responsibility phase described above has evolved 
over time and has now become close to a civil trial. 
¶35 The history of NGI trials is instructive.  Wisconsin 
has recognized an insanity defense since statehood.  Wis. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 148, § 13 (1849).8  In 1878, as part of a general 
revision of the statutes, the legislature separated the insanity 
determination (or responsibility) phase of a criminal trial from 
the "main case" and directed that the responsibility phase be 
tried first.  Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 191, §§ 4697-99 (1878).9  This 
                                                 
8 The 1849 Revised Statutes provided:  
When any person, indicted for an offence, shall 
on trial be acquitted by the jury by reason of 
insanity, the jury, in giving their verdict of not 
guilty, shall state that it was given for such cause; 
and thereupon, if the discharge or going at large of 
such insane person shall be considered by the court 
manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the 
community, the court may order him to be committed to 
prison, or may give him into the care of his friends, 
if 
they 
shall 
give 
bonds 
with 
surety 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court, conditioned that he shall 
be well and securely kept, otherwise he shall be 
discharged. 
Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 148, § 13 (1849). 
9 Wisconsin Rev. Stat. ch. 191, § 4697 (1878) says that when 
a defendant pursues an insanity defense with an NGI plea:  
[T]he court shall order a special plea, setting up and 
alleging such insanity, to be filed on his behalf, 
with the plea of not guilty, and the special issue 
thereby made shall first be tried, by the jury 
selected and sworn to try said cause; and, if such 
jury shall find, upon such special issue, that such 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
20 
 
procedure lasted until the 1911 session of the legislature when 
the separation was discontinued.  § 1, ch. 221, Laws of 1911.10 
¶36 In 
1967 
this 
court 
reinstalled 
bifurcation 
but 
required the guilt phase to precede the responsibility phase.  
See Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d at 623, 627.  The legislature codified 
Raskin's bifurcation procedure in Wis. Stat. § 971.175 (1969-
70).  See Burton, 349 Wis. 2d 1, ¶46 (citing § 63, ch. 255, Laws 
of 1969).  The legislature has since recodified bifurcation in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.165 but "maintained 'the basic bifurcated trial 
                                                                                                                                                             
accused person was so insane, at the time of the 
commission of such alleged offense, they shall, also, 
find him not guilty of such offense, for that 
reason . . . . 
The Report and Explanatory Notes of the Revisers of the 
Statutes, Accompanying the Bill to Revise the General Laws of 
Wisconsin explained why the insanity defense was revised in 
1878: 
[The insanity defense] is a difficult and complicated 
question in all cases, and its consideration and 
decision 
should 
not 
be 
further 
complicated 
and 
confused with the mass of evidence in the main case, 
but should be specially considered and decided upon 
its own merits.  This is fully provided for by special 
plea.  It is to be filed with the general issue and is 
to be tried first.  It is needless to have two juries 
and much more expensive. 
Report and Explanatory Notes of the Revisers of the Statutes, 
Accompanying the Bill to Revise the General Laws of Wisconsin, 
submitted to the Legislature of 1878, 314 (1878). 
10 The 1911 revision of the statute kept much of the same 
language as the 1878 version, but it required a unitary rather 
than a bifurcated trial.  The 1911 version of the statute 
provided that the NGI issue "shall . . . be tried . . . and 
determined by the jury with the plea of not guilty . . . ."  
§ 1, ch. 221, Laws of 1911 (first two ellipses in original). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
21 
 
procedure 
with 
its 
sequential 
order 
of 
proof 
as 
first 
established in Raskin.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Murdock, 2000 WI 
App 170, ¶23, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 N.W.2d 175); see 1987 Wis. 
Act 86. 
¶37 As the bifurcation procedure evolved, so did the 
burden of proof for showing mental disease or defect.  Before 
this court reinstalled bifurcation in 1967, the state had to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not 
have a mental disease or defect.  See State v. Esser, 16 
Wis. 2d 567, 588, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962); see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 957.11 (1967).11  For many years, the state had to prove that 
the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect under a 
version of the M'Naghten12 definition of mental disease or 
                                                 
11 "[I]f the jury finds that the defendant was insane or 
feeble-minded or that there is reasonable doubt of his sanity or 
mental responsibility at the time of the commission of the 
alleged crime, [the jury] shall find the defendant not guilty 
because insane or feeble-minded."  Wis. Stat. § 957.11(1) 
(1967). 
12 M'Naghten's Case was an English decision in which the 
House of Lords determined that a defendant is insane if, "at the 
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the 
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was 
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing 
what was wrong."  State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 575 & n.19, 
115 N.W.2d 505 (1962) (citing M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. 
Rep. 718 (H.L.); 10 Cl. & Fi. 200, 210-11).  Wisconsin's version 
of the M'Naghten rule stated that insanity was "such abnormal 
mental condition, from any cause, as to render the accused at 
the time of committing the alleged criminal act, incapable of 
distinguishing between right and wrong and so unconscious at the 
time of the nature of the act which he is committing . . . ."   
Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 268, 126 N.W. 737 (1910). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
22 
 
defect.  See Esser, 16 Wis. 2d at 597; see also M'Naghten's 
Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.); 10 Cl. & Fi. 200.  However, 
the tide began to turn when this court decided to give the 
defendant the choice to take on the burden to prove mental 
disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence under the 
less stringent American Law Institute (ALI) definition13 of 
insanity.  State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 427, 143 N.W.2d 
458 (1966). 
¶38 The ALI definition is less rigorous than the M'Naghten 
version "both because it permits a finding of insanity upon an 
additional ground, and because it requires a lack of substantial 
capacity and does not imply that a total lack of capacity is 
required."  Esser, 16 Wis. 2d at 596. When the legislature 
codified Raskin in 1969, it adopted a new standard and also 
shifted the burden to the defendant to prove mental disease or 
defect by a preponderance of the evidence.  § 63, ch. 255, Laws 
of 1969.  The definition of "mental disease or defect" that 
applies to this case is almost identical to the ALI definition: 
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time 
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect the 
person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or conform his or her conduct 
                                                 
13 "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect 
he 
lacks 
substantial 
capacity 
either 
to 
appreciate 
the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law."  Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) 
at 66 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (brackets in original). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
23 
 
to the requirements of law."  Wis. Stat. § 971.15(1).  While the 
statutes do not define "mental disease or defect," the Wisconsin 
criminal jury instructions provide a definition: "Mental disease 
or 
defect 
is 
an 
abnormal 
condition 
of 
the 
mind 
which 
substantially affects mental or emotional processes."  Wis JI——
Criminal 605 (footnote omitted). 
¶39 The history of trials involving NGI pleas demonstrates 
that 
the 
current 
responsibility 
phase 
has 
undergone 
a 
transformation from a criminal proceeding to something close to 
a civil trial.  As already noted, the defendant has the burden 
of proof to show mental disease or defect by the greater weight 
of the credible evidence, the same burden imposed for most 
issues in civil trials.  See Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis. 2d 15, 26, 
104 N.W.2d 138 (1960) (noting that the proof required to carry 
the burden "in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be 
based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence").  In the 
responsibility phase, a judge may grant a motion to dismiss the 
NGI defense or direct a verdict in favor of the state if the 
defendant cannot produce sufficient evidence to show mental 
disease or defect.  See Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 663.  In contrast, 
the judge may not direct a verdict against a criminal defendant 
in a criminal trial because it is up to the jury to find whether 
the state has proven all essential elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 19, 517 
N.W.2d 149 (1994).  Also, because the responsibility phase is 
not a criminal proceeding, the defendant need obtain only a 
five-sixths verdict on the issue of mental disease or defect to 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
24 
 
carry his burden.  State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 396-97, 418 
N.W.2d 804 (1988). 
¶40 Considering the elements of civil procedure in the 
responsibility phase, "it is demonstrably evident that the 
responsibility phase is not a part of a 'criminal' trial."  Id. 
at 395.  The civil hues of the responsibility phase, coupled 
with the fact that bifurcation and the NGI plea are statutory in 
nature, not constitutional, remove the proceeding from the 
exacting demands of criminal proceedings and leave it in a 
category of its own.  See id. at 394-97. 
B. Expert Testimony in the Responsibility Phase of a Bifurcated 
Trial 
¶41 Magett argues that the court erred in requiring expert 
testimony to prove mental disease or defect and in stating that 
the defendant is not competent to testify regarding his own 
mental health.  Although expert testimony may be helpful to a 
defendant in the responsibility phase of the trial, "[a] 
favorable expert opinion is not an indispensable prerequisite to 
a finding of mental disease or defect."14  Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 
666. 
                                                 
14 "From a purely technical standpoint, one could argue that 
because the jury is not bound by medical definitions or labels, 
Wis. [Stat.] § 971.15 does not require such an opinion or even 
an expert diagnosis of any particular disability."  9 Christine 
M. Wiseman & Michael Tobin, Criminal Practice & Procedure 
§ 17:40, at 549 (Wisconsin Practice Series, 2d ed. 2008) (citing 
State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 666, 370 N.W.2d 240 (1985)).  
However, from a practical standpoint, if a defendant were to try 
to carry his burden in the responsibility phase of the trial 
without offering an expert's opinion, he would risk a motion for 
dismissal or for a directed verdict from the prosecution.  Id. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
25 
 
¶42 Leach is consistent with other cases that have 
determined that "expert testimony is required only if the issue 
to be decided by the jury is beyond the general knowledge and 
experience of the average juror."  State v. Perkins, 2004 WI App 
213, ¶16, 277 Wis. 2d 243, 689 N.W.2d 684 (quoting State v. 
Whitaker, 167 Wis. 2d 247, 255, 481 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1992)).  
In Perkins, the court determined that no expert was required to 
testify as to a rape victim's mental illness or deficiency.  
Id., ¶¶19-20.  The victim's caregiver testified that the victim 
could not carry on an intelligible conversation, could not 
remember things earlier in the day, and needed constant 
supervision because of her mental issues.  Id., ¶22.  The court 
noted that no statute required expert testimony on the victim's 
mental condition, and no Wisconsin precedent existed on the 
issue.  Id., ¶¶19-21.  The lay testimony about the victim's 
mental issues was sufficient to allow a jury to determine that 
she had a mental deficiency, and the matter was within the 
common understanding of the jury.  Id., ¶¶21, 23. 
¶43 Thus, 
where 
the 
issue 
is 
within 
the 
common 
understanding of a jury, as opposed to technical or esoteric, 
and when lay testimony speaks to the mental illness, expert 
testimony, though probative, may not be required.  Id., ¶¶20, 
23.  This is not to say that expert testimony is never required 
in the responsibility phase of a trial; however, there are 
instances in which lay testimony will be enough to satisfy the 
defendant's burden of proof. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
26 
 
¶44 In the present case, it is at least conceivable that 
Magett could have carried his burden with lay testimony.  For 
example, he could have had relatives or people who spent 
substantial amounts of time with him testify that he had lapses 
in consciousness in which he seemed unable to appreciate what he 
was doing and could not remember the episodes afterward.  
Whether expert testimony is required in a given case is a 
discretionary decision left to the circuit court.  See State v. 
Kandutsch, 2011 WI 78, ¶23, 336 Wis. 2d 478, 799 N.W.2d 865; cf. 
State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 267-68, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993).  
However, the circuit court must examine the facts, apply the 
correct legal standard, and reach a rational conclusion.  
Kandutsch, 336 Wis. 2d 478, ¶23; Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d at 268.  A 
circuit court should also discuss its reasoning for its decision 
to require expert testimony.  See Kandutsch, 336 Wis. 2d 478, 
¶23; cf. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d at 268.  In this case, it appears 
that the circuit court cited Leach for the principle that Magett 
had 
to 
have 
"a 
doctor . . . come 
in" 
to 
present 
expert 
testimony, a proposition that Leach does not support.  There 
will be instances in which medical testimony is required if the 
defendant is to have any chance of carrying his burden, but this 
is not always the case.  Therefore, the circuit court erred in 
declaring that expert testimony was required, but the error was 
harmless. 
¶45 Magett was found guilty in a criminal trial.  His NGI 
defense was to be presented in a second phase of the trial at 
which he had the burden of proof.  The law on NGI procedure is 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
27 
 
statutory, not constitutional.  An error related to statutory 
procedure is more likely to be harmless when there is strong 
evidence to support the outcome and when the error does not 
affect a constitutional right.  Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶32. 
¶46 Although 
expert 
testimony 
is 
not 
required, 
the 
defendant must present evidence to allow the jury "to make the 
affirmative determination of mental disease or defect."  Leach, 
124 Wis. 2d at 666.  In Leach, the defendant claimed that, among 
other 
things, 
evidence 
of 
his 
"peculiar 
look" 
prior 
to 
committing the crime and evidence of a head injury provided 
sufficient evidence to send the question of mental disease or 
defect to the jury.  Id. at 665-67.  The defendant's 
psychiatrist and a psychologist testified that they could not 
determine whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect.  
Id. at 665.  The court determined that a "strange look" does not 
have "any probative value of mental state or condition."  Id. at 
667.  In addition, the defendant's inability to remember certain 
details was insufficient to demonstrate mental disease or defect 
because 
"[e]pisodic 
amnesia, 
the 
inability 
to 
remember 
committing a crime, is not evidence of mental disease or mental 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
28 
 
defect."15  Id. at 657 n.2, 667.  After the defendant presented 
his evidence in the responsibility phase of the Leach trial, the 
court properly granted dismissal in favor of the state on the 
issue of mental disease or defect because no reasonable juror 
could conclude that he had a mental disease or defect or "that 
he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct."  Id. at 652, 667. 
¶47 Although an NGI defense does not require expert 
testimony, it is highly unlikely that a defendant's own 
testimony, standing alone, will be sufficient to satisfy the 
                                                 
15 "Amnesia is most clearly and simply defined as 'loss of 
memory.'  It is an inability to recall events known to have 
occurred within the presence of the patient or events of which 
the patient would have knowledge, but for the amnesia."  
Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Amnesia as Affecting Capacity to 
Commit Crime or Stand Trial, 46 A.L.R.3d 544, 550 (1972).  
Episodic amnesia occurs when a defendant "cannot remember a 
criminal act subsequent to its commission" and is often 
associated with overconsumption of alcohol.  Chad J. Layton, 
Comment, No More Excuses: Closing the Door on the Voluntary 
Intoxication Defense, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 535, 558 (1997) 
(citing Jackson v. State, 253 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1979)).  The aversion to considering episodic amnesia as 
evidence of mental disease or defect appears well-founded 
because defendants may easily pretend to have amnesia.  See 
James E. Tysse & Thomas L. Hafemeister, Amnesia and the 
Determination of Competency to Stand Trial, 25 Dev. Mental 
Health L. 65, 67 (2006) (footnote omitted) ("Amnesia is complex 
and varied, but because amnesia is relatively easily feigned and 
can be advantageous to the person claiming amnesia, it is likely 
that many amnesia claims are fabricated."). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
29 
 
burden of proof.16  Leach is particularly informative here 
because of the factual similarities to the present case.  Like 
the defendant in Leach, Magett claims that his loss of memory is 
evidence of mental disease or defect.  Leach is very clear that 
such a momentary lapse in memory does not evince mental disease 
or defect.  Id. at 667.  Perhaps recognizing that Leach presents 
a formidable obstacle to his defense, Magett altered his 
argument slightly.  In his brief to this court, Magett claimed 
that it was not merely a loss of memory, but also a loss of 
consciousness. 
¶48 We understand Magett's argument to be that a loss of 
consciousness means that Magett was unaware of the incident as 
it was occurring——that he never consciously experienced it.  
Therefore, he does not remember it, and in his state of 
unconsciousness, he did not have substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or to conform his 
conduct to the law.  Arguably, if he were experiencing only 
episodic amnesia, Magett could have been conscious and could 
have had substantial capacity to understand the wrongfulness of 
his conduct and to conform his behavior to the law but would not 
                                                 
16 See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.2(c), 
at 588 (2d ed. 2003) (footnote omitted) ("Lay testimony is 
unlikely to be sufficient either in effectively presenting an 
insanity defense or in rebutting such a defense.").  Thus, lay 
witnesses may testify, but "a persuasive case is unlikely to be 
made on lay testimony alone."  Id., § 8.3(b), at 603 (footnote 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This is even more 
true when the defendant's testimony is the only defense 
evidence. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
30 
 
remember it.  The problem is that Magett's testimony for either 
unconsciousness or episodic amnesia would be the same——that he 
did not remember the incident.  Based on that testimony, there 
would be a chance that Magett's inability to remember was due to 
lack of consciousness and a roughly equal chance it was due to 
episodic 
amnesia. 
 
Thus, 
Magett 
cannot 
prove 
his 
own 
unconsciousness by his testimony alone.  To allow the jury to 
deliberate on that issue based only on Magett's testimony would 
be akin to asking the members of the jury to flip a coin.  There 
must be more for the jury to consider. 
¶49 Similar to the defendant in Leach, Magett claims that 
a look in his eyes revealed a mental disease or defect.  While 
the eyes may be windows to the soul,17 their transparency does 
not accurately reveal a person's mental well-being.  Thus, 
Magett's change in visage, even if it were visible on the video, 
is not probative evidence of his mental health.  Even if the 
court had ruled that expert testimony was not necessary for 
Magett to carry his burden, there is little doubt that the court 
would have determined Magett's evidence to be insufficient to 
prove mental disease or defect as a matter of law, and thus the 
outcome would not have been different. 
                                                 
17 The idea that the eyes are windows to the soul is 
attributed to Cicero.  See Alexis Tadié, Sterne's Whimsical 
Theatres of Language: Orality, Gesture, Literacy 50 (2003);  
Cicero, Cicero's Tusculan Disputations 35 (Andrew P. Peabody 
trans., 1886).  Cicero was a "Roman statesman, orator, essayist, 
and letter writer."  "Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106-43 B.C.)," in 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 143, 143 (Robert Audi 
ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
31 
 
¶50 Magett's burden at the responsibility phase of the 
trial was to produce enough evidence to prove——by the greater 
weight of the credible evidence——that he had a mental disease or 
defect and that, as a result, he lacked substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  From the 
discussion between the judge and defense counsel, it is clear 
that Magett did not have enough evidence to carry his burden.  
Moreover, the court knew that the State had substantial evidence 
that Magett did not have a mental disease or defect and did not 
lack substantial capacity to control his conduct. 
¶51 The voluminous evidence against Magett is relevant to 
a harmless error analysis.  Prior to missing any meals, Magett 
wrote the warden threatening that someone would get hurt if 
Magett did not get the medical treatment that he wanted.  The 
letter demonstrates that Magett was thinking about hurting 
someone before the incident.  Magett prepared for the incident 
by spreading cream on the floor and standing on his mattress to 
give himself the upper hand in the fight.  Perhaps most 
detrimental to Magett's NGI plea is Dr. Lewis's determination 
that "there is no basis for concluding that [Magett] was unable 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts nor that he was 
unable to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law."  
The court knew that Dr. Lewis was prepared to testify for the 
State. 
¶52 Magett is essentially claiming that he consciously 
prepared for an altercation but was not conscious for the few 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
32 
 
seconds during which he committed the criminal act of battery by 
a prisoner.  He claims to remember an officer hurting his wrist 
and choking him; he claims to remember officers hitting him in 
the testicles; he clearly remembers swinging at the officers.  
Yet his powers of recollection fail him for the instant during 
which he struck Officer Caya.  Magett clings to the notion of a 
fortuitous blackout as proof of mental disease or defect.  Even 
if a court were to accept the claim of a blackout, Magett did 
not have enough evidence to carry his burden.  Testimony that he 
was unconscious because he did not remember the incident is not 
enough to prove mental disease or defect by the greater weight 
of the credible evidence as a matter of law.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the circuit court would have dismissed Magett's 
mental disease or defect defense even if he had been permitted 
to present all his testimony in the responsibility phase of the 
trial. 
C. A Defendant's Competency to Testify in the Responsibility 
Phase of a Bifurcated Trial 
¶53 Magett also argues that the circuit court erred when 
it determined that Magett was not competent to testify to his 
own mental health.  Although the court said that Magett was not 
competent to testify, it seems more likely that the court meant 
to say that Magett was not qualified to testify to more than a 
description of his mental condition——that he was not qualified 
to give an expert opinion that he had a mental disease or 
defect.  If the circuit court held such a view, it would relate 
back to the court's belief that Magett was required to present 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
33 
 
expert testimony.  The court stated, "Your client's not 
competent to testify as to whether or not he lacks substantial 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct . . . .  
He doesn't have the expertise to say that." 
¶54 The value and credibility of Magett's projected 
testimony was highly suspect, but he was "competent" to give 
that 
testimony 
and 
should 
not 
have 
been 
precluded 
from 
testifying in the responsibility phase of the trial, if at all, 
unless and until his testimony entered into the realm of expert 
opinion. 
¶55 Stated differently, "Every person is competent to be a 
witness except as provided by ss. 885.16 and 885.17 or as 
otherwise provided in these rules."  Wis. Stat. § 906.01.  
However, the Judicial Council, which presented this rule to the 
Supreme Court in 1973, observed in a note that judges may 
determine sufficiency and juries retain their role of assessing 
the weight and credibility of the evidence.  Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d Ri, R157-58 (1973).   
¶56 Because there is no exception in Wis. Stat. § 906.01 
for defendants who have entered an NGI plea,18 Magett was 
competent to testify.  This does not mean, however, that his 
testimony alone was "sufficient" to raise a question for the 
jury.  As the Judicial Council Committee noted, judges retain 
the ability to assess sufficiency of evidence.  Id. 
                                                 
18 "[P]roof of mental deficiency ordinarily has the effect 
of reducing the weight to be given to testimony rather than 
keeping the witness off the stand."  Kenneth S. Broun, 1 
McCormick on Evidence § 62 (7th ed. 2013). 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
34 
 
¶57 It also does not mean that Magett would have had no 
limits on what he could say. 
¶58 In 2008 at the time of Magett's trial, Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.01 provided that: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, 
the witness's testimony in the form of opinions or 
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences 
which are rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue. 
When the rule was adopted as part of the rules of evidence, the 
Judicial Council Committee's Note asserted that "the rule is 
applicable when the witness is not testifying as an expert.  The 
rule does not allow the lay witness to testify when the subject 
of his testimony requires expertise."  Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d at R205 (emphasis added). 
¶59 A few months after the new rules took effect, this 
court decided Simpson v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 605, 609, 215 
N.W.2d 435 (1974), in which it said: 
The general rule in Wisconsin is that the 
admission of opinion evidence rests largely in the 
discretion of the trial court.  York v. State, [45 
Wis. 2d 550, 559, 173 N.W.2d 693 (1970)].  The opinion 
testimony of lay witnesses has been admitted in 
evidence on many subjects. . . .  However, the fact 
that lay witnesses' opinion testimony on the issue of 
insanity has been sanctioned, does not mean that these 
cases stand for the proposition that a lay witness 
categorically has the right to give opinion testimony 
on the issue of insanity. 
¶60 A defendant who gives a lay opinion as to his own——
presumably, temporary——insanity at the time of his crime is not 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
35 
 
likely to be very credible unless he is supported by other lay 
and especially expert witnesses.  The defendant has the burden 
of proof, he is subject to cross-examination, and his testimony 
may be rebutted by the state's witnesses, including the state's 
experts.  Thus, there should normally be little concern about a 
defendant's opinion that he has a mental disease or defect and 
lacks the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law.  Nonetheless, no "lay witness categorically has the right 
to give opinion testimony on the issue of insanity."  Simpson, 
62 Wis. 2d at 609 (emphasis added). 
¶61 In this case, even if the circuit court had ruled that 
Magett was competent to testify and Magett had opined that he 
was afflicted with a mental disease or defect temporarily when 
he committed the crime, the circuit court would have been 
justified in dismissing Magett's mental disease or defect 
defense because Magett did not have sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that he had a mental disease or 
defect.  Therefore, the court's errors in requiring Magett to 
produce medical testimony and in determining that Magett was not 
competent to testify did not affect Magett's substantive rights 
under the facts of this case.  The circuit court's errors were 
harmless. 
D. The Timing of the Dismissal 
¶62 At the conclusion of the guilt phase but before the 
responsibility phase, the circuit court decided "to direct 
verdict for the State."  The court made this decision before the 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
36 
 
defendant 
was 
able 
to 
introduce 
any 
evidence 
in 
the 
responsibility phase of the trial because the court determined 
that the evidence, which the judge had seen during the guilt 
phase, was insufficient to prove mental disease or defect as a 
matter of law.  Magett contends not only that the directed 
verdict was improper but also that——because of the timing——it 
was not a "directed verdict" at all. 
¶63 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 805.14(3)-(4) 
provide 
for 
two 
possible motions challenging the sufficiency of evidence before 
a verdict: (3) a motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's 
evidence,19 and (4) a motion for directed verdict or dismissal at 
the close of all evidence.20  Under subsec. (3), the proper time 
to move for dismissal on grounds of insufficiency of the 
evidence is at "the close of plaintiff's evidence in trials to 
the jury."  Wis. Stat. § 805.14(3).  This is what happened in 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(3) provides: 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence in trials to 
the jury, any defendant may move for dismissal on the 
ground of insufficiency of evidence. If the court 
determines 
that 
the 
defendant 
is 
entitled 
to 
dismissal, the court shall state with particularity on 
the record or in its order of dismissal the grounds 
upon which the dismissal was granted and shall render 
judgment against the plaintiff. 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(4) provides: 
In trials to the jury, at the close of all 
evidence, any party may challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence as a matter of law by moving for directed 
verdict or dismissal or by moving the court to find as 
a matter of law upon any claim or defense or upon any 
element or ground thereof. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
37 
 
Leach——Leach presented all his evidence in the responsibility 
phase of the trial——even though the court said that "the court 
directed a verdict."  Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 652.  The circuit 
court in this case also referred to a "directed verdict" even 
though a directed verdict under subsec. (4) is to be entered 
only "at the close of all evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 805.14(4) 
(emphasis added). 
¶64 Magett argues that the circuit court's action was not 
a directed verdict but, rather, more like a summary judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  However, that statute requires the 
moving party to serve the motion for summary judgment 20 days 
before the hearing, and it is clear that the procedure for 
summary judgment was not followed in this case.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08. 
¶65 Magett 
raises 
valid 
points. 
 
A 
circuit 
court 
ordinarily must hear all the evidence of the party against whom 
a dismissal motion is directed before dismissing a matter for 
insufficient evidence.  Technically, a circuit court must hear 
"all evidence" before directing a verdict.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.14(4).21  However, the unusual posture of this case, which 
allowed the circuit court to assess all the defendant's NGI 
evidence before the commencement of the responsibility phase, 
places the circuit court's action in legal liminality——somewhere 
                                                 
21 Allowing the defendant an opportunity to offer all his 
evidence ensures that any dismissal or directed verdict is based 
on full consideration of the defendant's position, conforms to 
Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1) and (3) or (4), and reduces the 
procedural grounds for appeal. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
38 
 
between a proper and improper grant of a motion to dismiss at 
the close of the "plaintiff's" evidence.  Under the statute, a 
court may dismiss if "considering all credible evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom the motion is made, there is no credible 
evidence to sustain a finding in favor of such party."  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.14(1).  Here, the circuit court was able to consider 
all credible evidence, and if it were not for the timing, the 
dismissal unquestionably would have been proper.  In short, it 
was not clearly wrong to conclude that Magett had insufficient 
credible evidence.  Whether the timing of the dismissal was an 
error is another matter.  Because any error in the timing was 
harmless, however, we note only that it is preferable, fairer, 
and more judicious to allow a defendant to put on his evidence 
in the responsibility phase before dismissing the NGI defense. 
¶66 Even if the dismissal or "directed verdict" was 
premature, we confidently conclude that the timing of the 
dismissal did not affect the outcome of the case.  As discussed 
above, Magett's evidence was insufficient to prove that he had a 
mental disease or defect as a matter of law.  Therefore, 
assuming that the circuit court's dismissal was erroneously 
premature, the error was harmless. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶67 We reach the following conclusions.   
¶68 First, as a general rule, a defendant is not required 
to present expert testimony to prove the elements of his NGI 
defense.  Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 666.  Ordinarily, the defendant 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
39 
 
will offer expert testimony.  He may also offer testimony by lay 
witnesses as well as his own testimony.  As a practical matter, 
a defendant should offer evidence to supplement his own 
testimony 
because 
a 
defendant 
who 
testifies 
in 
the 
responsibility phase of his trial without corroboration is 
likely to be viewed as self-serving inasmuch as the purpose of 
his defense is to escape responsibility for his already 
established criminal conduct.  In only an exceptional case with 
extraordinary facts may a defendant carry his burden in the 
responsibility phase of a criminal trial by relying solely on 
his own testimony. 
¶69 Second, a defendant is competent to testify as to his 
mental condition in the responsibility phase of a criminal 
trial.  However, a lay defendant does not have an unlimited, 
categorical right to give opinion testimony on the issue of 
mental disease or defect. 
¶70 Third, a court should normally permit a defendant to 
offer his evidence in the responsibility phase of a trial before 
the court rules on his NGI defense.  By allowing the defendant 
an opportunity to offer all his evidence, the court ensures that 
any 
dismissal 
or 
directed 
verdict 
is 
informed 
by 
full 
consideration of the defendant's position, conforms to Wis. 
Stat. § 805.14(1), and (3) or (4), and reduces the procedural 
grounds for appeal.  There will not be many cases where the 
defendant's position is so bereft of merit that the court can 
conclude that there is no jury question as a matter of law 
before the defendant presents his evidence. 
No. 
2010AP1639-CR 
 
40 
 
¶71 Fourth, we conclude here that the evidence to support 
the defendant's NGI defense was insufficient as a matter of law, 
so that any errors by the circuit court in refusing to allow the 
trial to proceed to the responsibility phase were harmless.  We 
conclude that no reasonable jury would have determined that the 
defendant had a mental disease or defect that caused him to lack 
substantial capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
¶72 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision 
to uphold the defendant's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶73 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion says it is doing one thing but does another.     
¶74 First, the majority opinion professes to use the 
standard in State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 666, 370 N.W.2d 240 
(1985), regarding expert testimony for the responsibility phase 
of a bifurcated trial but instead converts it into a vague and 
unmanageable standard of its own fashioning.  Whereas Leach 
clarifies that no expert testimony is needed and lay testimony 
alone is sufficient to prove mental disease or defect, the 
majority opinion declares, without citation to any authority, 
that "[i]n only an exceptional case with extraordinary facts may 
a defendant carry his burden in the responsibility phase of a 
criminal trial by relying solely on his own testimony."  
Majority op., ¶7.  The majority opinion does not explain what 
makes cases "exceptional" or facts "extraordinary."  
¶75 Second, the majority opinion professes to merely 
address the "timing" of the directed verdict, when in fact it 
addresses the ability of a defendant to offer any evidence, 
specifically his own testimony, to show mental disease or 
defect.  In the instant case, the circuit court heard no 
testimony on the defendant's alleged mental disease or defect. 
The entire second phase of the trial was precluded by the 
circuit court's sua sponte moving and granting its own motion 
for a directed verdict in favor of the State.  Defense counsel 
did not appear to understand that the circuit court was 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
preparing to grant a directed verdict on its own motion in favor 
of the State. 
¶76 Perhaps the defendant would have been unable to meet 
his burden to prove that he was not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect, but how could the circuit court know without 
giving the defense attorney the opportunity for a full and 
proper proffer?  Perhaps the defendant would not have persuaded 
the jury, but that is not the appropriate test for precluding 
the defendant's testimony.   
¶77 Finally, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
deprivation of a defendant's right to present evidence and his 
own testimony is not preferable, not fair, and not judicious.  
The majority opinion proclaims "that it is preferable, fairer, 
and more judicious to allow a defendant to put on his evidence 
in the responsibility phase before dismissing the NGI defense."  
Majority op., ¶65.  Curiously, given the choice, the majority 
opinion opts to endorse the less preferable, less fair, and less 
judicious procedure here.      
¶78 The majority opinion holds that the errors that led to 
the circuit court's blanket exclusion of the defendant's 
testimony through a directed verdict prior to the presentation 
of the defendant's evidence were harmless and "did not affect 
[the defendant's] substantive rights under the facts of this 
case."  Majority op., ¶61.  In so doing, the majority opinion 
fails to confront the true nature of a circuit court's error in 
preemptively preventing a defendant from testifying at the 
responsibility phase of a bifurcated trial.   
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
I 
¶79 Contrary to applying Leach, as it professes to do, the 
majority opinion adds and invents new components to the standard 
announced in Leach, making it almost impossible for a defendant 
to make a sufficient proffer absent expert testimony.   
 
¶80 The holding in Leach is clear that lay testimony alone 
is sufficient to show mental disease or defect:  "A favorable 
expert opinion is not an indispensable prerequisite to a finding 
of mental disease or defect."  Leach, 124 Wis. 2d at 666. 
 
¶81 The majority opinion first properly states the law 
that there is no requirement for expert testimony in mental 
disease or defect cases, citing State v. Perkins, 2004 WI App 
213, 277 Wis. 2d 243, 689 N.W.2d 684: 
[W]here the issue is within the common understanding 
of a jury, as opposed to technical or esoteric, and 
when lay testimony speaks to the mental illness, 
expert 
testimony, 
though 
probative, 
may 
not 
be 
required.  
Majority op., ¶43. 
 
¶82 Indeed, 
Perkins 
asserts 
that 
"requiring 
expert 
testimony . . . represents an extraordinary step, one to be 
taken only when unusually complex or esoteric issues are before 
the jury."  Perkins, 277 Wis. 2d 243, ¶16 (emphasis added, 
internal quotation marks & quoted source omitted). 
¶83 The majority opinion turns Leach and Perkins on their 
heads, stating that the requirement of expert testimony is the 
norm, not the exception: 
[I]n only an exceptional case with extraordinary facts 
may a defendant carry his burden in the responsibility 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
phase of a criminal trial by relying solely on his own 
testimony. 
Majority op., ¶7. 
¶84 For the proposition that expert testimony is generally 
required for the responsibility phase of trial, the majority 
opinion offers no citation.  Perkins and Leach stand for the 
contrary proposition of law. 
 
¶85 The majority opinion asserts that instances where 
expert 
testimony 
is 
not 
required 
are 
"exceptional" 
or 
"extraordinary," but Leach and Perkins recognize that they are 
the baseline rule.  No expert testimony is necessary for a jury 
to make a determination of mental disease or defect under the 
statutes1 or under Leach. 
 
¶86 The majority opinion provides no guidance as to when 
expert testimony is required or whether it was required in the 
instant case to avoid a directed verdict.  I would follow Leach 
and Perkins and not switch to the vague and unmanageable 
standard the majority opinion fashions. 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.165 
governs 
procedures 
for 
defendants who plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect and does not require any medical or expert testimony.   
The jury instruction for mental disease or defect, which 
was never given in the instant case, states the difference 
between the legal standard and the standard used by medical 
professionals for mental disease or defect: 
The term "mental disease or defect" identifies a legal 
standard that may not exactly match the medical terms 
used by mental health professionals.  You are not 
bound by medical labels, definitions, or conclusion as 
to what is or is not a mental disease or defect to 
which the witnesses may have referred. 
Wis JI——Criminal 605 at 2. 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
II 
 
¶87 The majority opinion phrases the issue of the directed 
verdict granted by the circuit court prior to any testimony as 
an issue of "timing."2  Yet denying the right of the defendant to 
testify is not an issue of mere "timing."  Rather, it implicates 
the fundamental principle that the defendant should be allowed 
to put on evidence, especially his own testimony.3 
¶88 In the instant case, the circuit court sua sponte 
directed the verdict in favor of the State "before the defendant 
was able to introduce any evidence in the responsibility phase 
of the trial . . . ."  Majority op., ¶62 (emphasis added).   
¶89 The majority opinion justifies this exclusion by 
stating that the facts of the instant case "allowed the circuit 
court to assess all the defendant's NGI evidence before the 
commencement of the responsibility phase . . . ."  Majority op., 
¶65.  Yet, the circuit court had no way of knowing exactly what 
the defendant would have testified to in the second phase of 
trial.  When asked what evidence the defendant would put on, 
defense counsel stated "the evidence I have is my client's 
testimony."  Nevertheless, we do not know what a jury might have 
concluded after hearing the defendant in the responsibility 
phase of trial. 
                                                 
2 See majority op., ¶62. 
3 Cf. "A defendant's opportunity to conduct his own defense 
by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself 
as a witness."  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987); Wis. 
Const. Art. I, § 7. 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶90 The majority opinion even speaks out against the 
anomalous and unfair procedure created by the circuit court's 
directed verdict in the instant case prior to hearing any 
testimony by either the defendant or the State.  See majority 
op., ¶65.  Nevertheless the majority opinion affirms the circuit 
court's procedure and result. 
III 
¶91 I agree with the majority opinion that the circuit 
court erred in deciding that the defendant was incompetent to 
testify.  Majority op., ¶¶53-54.  I cannot agree, however, that 
the circuit court's directed verdict without hearing the 
defendant's testimony constituted harmless error.  Indeed, I am 
unconvinced that harmless-error analysis is the appropriate 
test. 
¶92 Once a statutory right is implicated, procedural due 
process applies, and the defendant is entitled to proper notice 
and hearing congruent to the defendant's interest, the state's 
interest, and the value of the additional safeguard.  See 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
¶93 The majority opinion simply assumes that a harmless-
error analysis applies in the instant case after noting that the 
circuit court committed several errors.4  Due process may require 
a different test when a defendant is prevented from testifying 
outright.  The majority opinion does not consider whether the 
error to exclude totally a defendant's testimony at the 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶29. 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
responsibility phase of trial should be subject to harmless-
error analysis at all.   
¶94 The issue of whether there was error and whether the 
harmless-error analysis applies when a circuit court entirely 
excludes a defendant's testimony on the grounds of competency is 
before this court in the context of a criminal trial in State v. 
Nelson, 2014 WI ___, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.  The 
majority opinion in Nelson asserts that although error is 
assumed when a criminal defendant is barred from testifying, 
such error is reviewed under a harmless-error analysis.5  As I 
note in my dissent in Nelson,6 such a standard is inappropriate 
for evaluating the error in the present case that so strongly 
impugns the fairness of the proceeding and whose effect on the 
trial cannot be quantified. 
IV 
 
¶95 I write additionally to comment on the majority 
opinion's place in what appears to be a troubling development in 
several of this court's recent criminal cases: The court 
assumes, 
without 
deciding, 
that 
error 
occurred 
and 
then 
concludes that the assumed error was harmless.  See, e.g., State 
v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___ (assuming 
error in barring the defendant from testifying, but concluding 
that a harmless error test applies and that the error in 
excluding the testimony was harmless); State v. Rocha-Mayo, 2014 
                                                 
5 State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶23, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___N.W.2d ___. 
6 Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶72 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
WI 57, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___ (assuming error in 
admitting 
evidence 
of 
a 
preliminary 
breath 
test 
and 
in 
permitting faulty jury instruction, but holding that any error 
is harmless); State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶41, 350 
Wis. 2d 138, 
834 
N.W.2d 362 
(assuming 
error 
in 
admitting 
potential confrontation clause violation but holding that any 
violation was harmless). 
¶96 By repeatedly assuming error and concluding that the 
error is harmless, this court fails to determine whether any 
systemic problems exist and fails to provide adequate guidance 
to litigants, the circuit courts, and the court of appeals 
regarding important day-to-day practices and procedures. 
¶97 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2010AP1639-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1