Title: Ex parte William Keith Robey. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: William Keith Robey v. Alabama Department of Corrections) (Montgomery Circuit Court: CV-13-309; Criminal Appeals : CR-12-1967). Writ Denied. No Opinion.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1130618
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2014

Rel: 05/16/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1130618
____________________
Ex parte William Keith Robey
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: William Keith Robey
v.
Alabama Department of Corrections)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-13-309;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-12-1967)
PARKER, Justice.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
1130618
Stuart, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., concurs specially.
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MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
Because the rules under which the Alabama Department of
Corrections 
("ADOC") 
operates 
its 
work-release 
program 
are 
not
inconsistent with the statute that authorizes that program, I
concur in denying William Keith Robey's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 
In 1997, while he was driving under the influence of
alcohol, "Robey's vehicle swerved across the dividing line of
the road and into the lane of oncoming traffic." Ex parte
Robey, 920 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Ala. 2004). Robey was convicted
of reckless murder and reckless assault for causing the death
of his girlfriend and injuring another motorist in the ensuing
accident. In 2013 he petitioned the Montgomery Circuit Court
for a writ of certiorari to order ADOC to consider him for the
work-release program. The circuit court denied the petition;
the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, by an unpublished
memorandum. Robey v. Alabama Dep't of Corr. (No. CR-12-1967,
Feb. 7, 2014), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (table). 
Before the circuit court and on appeal, Robey raises a
question of law whether an administrative rule in the ADOC
Classification Manual ("the manual") conflicts with the
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statute that authorizes the promulgation of such rules.
Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Alabama Republican
Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004).
"The provisions of a statute will prevail in any case of
a conflict between a statute and an agency regulation." Ex
parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589 So. 2d 208, 210 (Ala. 1991). Robey
argues that an ADOC rule is in conflict with § 14-8-2(a), Ala.
Code 1975, which provides as follows:
"The [Department of Corrections] is authorized to
adopt regulations and policies permitting the
commissioner [of Corrections] to extend the limits
of the place of confinement of an inmate, as to whom
there is reasonable cause to believe he will know
his trust, by authorizing him, under prescribed
conditions, to leave the confines of that place
unaccompanied by a custodial agent for a prescribed
period of time to work at paid employment ....
Inmates shall participate in paid employment at the
discretion of the [Department of Corrections]."
The ADOC rule at issue bars certain inmates from being
considered for work release, which is known as the "minimum-
community custody level" of confinement. Among those barred
are inmates convicted in "[h]omicide cases, past or present.
Inmates 
convicted 
of 
vehicular 
homicide, 
manslaughter
involving DUI or otherwise, are not barred. However, if the
nomenclature of the conviction is 'murder', they are
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ineligible" for the work-release program. § 5.4.6.1 of the
manual.
Robey claims that the manual is fatally inconsistent with
the statute that authorizes its promulgation. "'A regulation
... which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the
statute[] is a mere nullity.'" State v. Maddox Tractor &
Equip. Co., 260 Ala. 136, 141, 695 So. 2d 426, 430 (1953)
(quoting Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner 
of 
Internal
Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936)). As authority for the
proposition that the rule in the manual is inconsistent with
the statute, Robey cites Hill v. State, 594 So. 2d 246 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992), which cites, in turn, Hendking v. Smith, 781
F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986).
Hill held that "the classification scheme adopted by the
Alabama prison system to determine the custody status of
prisoners 'is not arbitrary and capricious, but 
reasonable 
and
appropriate.'" 594 So. 2d at 248 (quoting Hendking, 781 F.2d
at 852). Hendking found reasonable under the Equal Protection
Clause 
an 
inmate-classification 
scheme 
that 
permitted
murderers to qualify for  minimum-community status but that
excluded sex offenders. 781 F.2d at 851-52.
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Robey argues that the holding in Hendking that a
classification permitting murderers to qualify for minimum
custody is reasonable is inconsistent with the current rule
that murderers may not qualify for minimum-community status.
The Hendking court reasoned that prison officials could
reasonably find that sex offenders have an antisocial
propensity that could express itself at any time in the
community, whereas, apart from professional killers, "few
people commit more than one murder in a lifetime." 781 F.2d at
852. Thus, allowing murderers to work in the community while
prohibiting sex offenders from doing so was "reasonable and
appropriate." Id.
Hendking did not hold, however, that prison officials are
required to allow murderers to be eligible for minimum-
community status. Currently in Alabama both murderers and sex
offenders are ineligible for the work-release program. ADOC's
grading of work-release classifications by the seriousness of
the inmate's offense is not inherently "arbitrary and
capricious." The inclusion of murderers at one time in
minimum-community status and their current exclusion does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause; that decision simply
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falls within the discretion granted to ADOC "to extend the
limits of the place of confinement of an inmate."
Further, Robey does not raise an equal-protection
challenge as was raised in Hendking. He argues instead that
the rule in the manual is inconsistent with the statute. The
rule, however, that excludes prisoners convicted of murder
from eligibility for the work-release program falls 
within 
the
discretion permitted ADOC by the statute, regardless of
whether at an earlier time such offenders might have been
considered eligible for the work-release program.  
1
Because the work-release classification Robey challenges
is not out of harmony or in conflict with § 14-8-2(a), the
authorizing statute, I concur in denying his petition for a
writ of certiorari.
Robey may apply to the ADOC Commissioner of Corrections
1
for an exception to the classification that prohibits him from
participating in the work-release program. The commissioner
"has full over-ride authority of any criteria in this manual
that is not otherwise directed by law." Manual, § 2.1.
7