Title: Commonwealth v. Rollins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11583
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11583 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN K. ROLLINS. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 4, 2014. - October 30, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Obscenity, Child pornography.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, 
Double jeopardy, Freedom of speech and press.  Due Process 
of Law, Sentence.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, 
Duplicative convictions, Double jeopardy, Argument by 
prosecutor.  Evidence, Photograph, Relevancy and 
materiality, Opinion. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Holyoke Division of 
the District Court Department on May 7, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before Laurie MacLeod, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ines McGillion for the defendant. 
 
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In this case, we are asked to identify the 
proper unit of prosecution for the possession of child 
pornography pursuant to G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  The defendant, 
John K. Rollins, was charged with six counts of possessing child 
pornography with each count premised on one or two distinct 
photographs culled from a single cache on the defendant's 
computer.  A Hampden County jury returned guilty verdicts on 
each count and a District Court judge sentenced the defendant to 
consecutive and concurrent terms in a house of correction. 
 
We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate 
review and conclude that where the offending photographs come 
from a single cache and the defendant is charged with possessing 
them at the same point in time, the statutory structure 
contemplates only a single unit of prosecution.  Accordingly, 
the entry of six separate convictions and sentences constituted 
multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the 
defendant's constitutional and common-law rights to be free from 
double jeopardy. 
 
While double jeopardy principles bar multiple convictions 
and sentences, they do not bar the Commonwealth from prosecuting 
the possession of multiple photographs through separate counts, 
each premised on a single photograph, as a single photograph is 
sufficient to support a conviction.  Accordingly, assuming the 
sufficiency of the evidence on any or all of the multiple 
3 
 
counts, we would ordinarily vacate the convictions and remand 
this case to the trial judge for the entry of a judgment of 
conviction and resentencing on only one count.  However, because 
we conclude that numerous errors occurring at trial created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, we vacate the 
convictions and remand for a new trial.1 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could 
have found them, reserving certain details for our analysis of 
the issues raised on appeal.  In late December, 2009, the 
defendant brought his computer to a computer repair shop in 
Holyoke seeking repairs.  As the technician, Joshua Charland, 
worked on the computer, the image of a young girl in a bikini 
appeared on the computer's monitor.  The defendant stated that 
the image was a photograph of his daughter.  Once Charland 
completed his work on the computer, he returned it to the 
defendant and reported the image to Holyoke police Officer James 
Bartolomei. 
 
Two days later, the defendant returned to the computer 
repair shop and asked Charland for further repairs to the 
computer.  The defendant explained that he had attempted to 
erase the computer's hard drive and reinstall the operating 
system, following which, the "mouse" stopped working.  Charland 
                                                          
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
4 
 
requested the defendant's personal information so that he could 
contact him when the computer was ready.  Charland, sensing that 
"something was up," then used forensic recovery software to 
search the defendant's computer for deleted files.  During the 
course of his search, Charland discovered approximately 1,200 
images, including photographs depicting nude and scantily clad 
young girls, which he recovered to a "flash drive." 
 
Officer Bartolomei was once again notified, prompting him 
to visit the computer repair shop, view the images on the flash 
drive, and confiscate the defendant's computer.  Officer 
Bartolomei then telephoned the defendant, informed the defendant 
that he had taken the computer, and requested that the defendant 
come to the police station for questioning.  The defendant 
returned to the shop, where he learned that Charland had 
discovered what he believed to be child pornography on the 
computer.  The defendant remarked that the images were probably 
placed there by a friend. 
 
The following day the defendant was interviewed by two 
detectives.  During the interview, the defendant explained that, 
after unintentionally stumbling across a Web site depicting 
child pornography a few months prior, he began conducting a 
secret and independent investigation into child pornography on 
the Internet.  The defendant averred that it was his intention, 
on completion of the investigation, to deliver the "proof" to 
5 
 
the Chicopee police department.  At the conclusion of the 
interview, the defendant confirmed his ownership of the computer 
in police custody and consented to a search of its contents. 
 
The defendant's computer was then transferred to a forensic 
computer examiner at the New England State Police Information 
Network (NESPIN).  Using specialized software, the examiner 
conducted a forensic examination of the computer and discovered 
deleted files in the unallocated space of the computer's hard 
drive.  He then recovered and transferred 6,094 images to a 
digital video disc (NESPIN disc) that he provided to the Holyoke 
police department. 
 
Detective David Usher of the Holyoke police department 
reviewed approximately 1,200 of the images on the NESPIN Disc 
and then printed twelve photographs -- each depicting either 
nude or scantily clad young girls.  On May 7, 2010, the 
Commonwealth filed a six-count criminal complaint against the 
defendant.  Each count charged him with the possession of child 
pornography on December 30, 2009, in violation of G. L. c. 272, 
§ 29C (§ 29C), and each was premised on distinct photographs 
recovered from the defendant's computer. Specifically, counts 
one through five were each premised on a separate, single 
photograph culled from the twelve that Detective Usher printed 
from the NESPIN disc, while count six was premised on two 
photographs culled from those twelve. 
6 
 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the 
defendant knowingly downloaded the charged photographs, 
including the defendant's statement to the Holyoke police that 
he downloaded them in a purported effort to assist law 
enforcement in the eradication of child pornography.  The 
Commonwealth introduced the seven charged photographs and five 
uncharged photographs through the testimony of Detective Usher.  
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defense moved for a 
directed verdict based primarily on the Commonwealth's failure 
to establish possession.  The judge denied the defendant's 
motion.  The defense then rested, and the jury heard closing 
arguments. 
 
The jury were then provided with six verdict slips.  
Attached to each slip for counts one through five was a single 
image.  By contrast, two images were attached to the slip for 
count six.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on all six counts.  
On counts one, two, and three, the defendant was sentenced to 
three concurrent terms of two and one-half years in a house of 
correction.  On counts four, five and six, the defendant was 
sentenced to an additional three concurrent terms of two and 
one-half years in a house of correction to commence upon the 
defendant's completion of his sentences on counts one, two, and 
three. 
7 
 
 
We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate 
review, wherein he contended that, inter alia, his convictions 
were duplicative and the errors occurring at trial raised a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  We agree. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Duplicative convictions.  The double 
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Massachusetts common law preclude the 
imposition of multiple punishments for the commission of a 
single crime.  Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 534 
(2012).  Our jurisprudence defines "multiple punishments" as 
those "in excess of what a Legislature intended to be the 
punishment for a particular offense."  Commonwealth v. Selavka, 
469 Mass. 502, 509-510 (2014), quoting Aldoupolis v. 
Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 272 (1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 
(1983).  Accordingly, the starting point for our analysis is to 
ask what "unit of prosecution" the Legislature intended as the 
punishable act for violations of § 29C.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rabb, 431 Mass. 123, 128 (2000). 
 
This "inquiry requires us to look to the language and 
purpose of the statute[], to see whether [it] speak[s] directly 
to the issue of the appropriate unit of prosecution, and if [it] 
do[es] not, to ascertain that unit, keeping in mind that any 
ambiguity that arises in the process must be resolved, under the 
rule of lenity, in the defendant's favor."  Id.  Similarly, we 
8 
 
are mindful of the general rule that "criminal statutes must be 
construed strictly against the Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. 
Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 523-524 (2005).  With this framework 
in place, we turn to the statute at issue, which criminalizes 
the knowing possession of child pornography. 
 
The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
 
"Whoever knowingly purchases or possesses a negative, 
slide, book, magazine, film, videotape, photograph or other 
similar visual reproduction, or depiction by computer, of 
any child whom the person knows or reasonably should know 
to be under the age of [eighteen] years of age and such 
child is . . . depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture 
or setting involving a lewd exhibition of the unclothed 
genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person is 
female, a fully or partially developed breast of the child; 
with knowledge of the nature or content thereof shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not more 
than five years or in a jail or house of correction for not 
more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not less 
than $1,000 nor more than $10,000, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment for the first offense, not less than five 
years in a [S]tate prison or by a fine of not less than 
$5,000 nor more than $20,000, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment for the second offense, not less than [ten] 
years in a [S]tate prison or by a fine of not less than 
$10,000 nor more than $30,000, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment for the third and subsequent offenses." 
 
G. L. c. 272, § 29C (vii). 
 
The Commonwealth correctly observes that the singular tense 
employed by the Legislature in § 29C demonstrates that a single 
offending photograph is sufficient to support a conviction of 
possession of child pornography.  It does not necessarily 
follow, however, that each photograph supports its own unit of 
prosecution where they are collectively possessed at a single 
9 
 
point in time, as the mere use of singularity in a statute is 
not, in and of itself, controlling.  See G. L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth 
("Words importing the singular number may extend and be applied 
to several persons or things . . .").  Thus, the statute 
prohibits both the possession of a single photograph as well as 
the possession of multiple photographs. 
 
Because the plain language of the statute is, at best, 
ambiguous as to the appropriate unit of prosecution,2 we examine 
the proposed penalty scheme through the lens of the rule of 
lenity.  See Rabb, 431 Mass. at 128.  We observe initially that, 
as a logical consequence of the Commonwealth's construction of 
the statute, the defendant in this case, a first-time offender, 
was essentially sentenced to five years in a house of 
correction.   Yet, the statute's penal framework provides that a 
first-time offender only may be imprisoned for a maximum of 
either two and one-half years in a house of correction or, 
alternatively, five years in a State prison.  G. L. c. 272, 
§ 29C.  The punishments also grow progressively more severe on 
                                                          
 
2 The Legislature will often insert qualifying, if not 
explicit, language signaling its view that each violative act 
may warrant separate punishment.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 143, 
§ 94 (a) ("Whoever violates any provision of the state building 
code . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, 
or both, for each such violation.  Each day during which a 
violation exists shall constitute a separate offense" [emphasis 
added]).  Aside from the tiered penalty scheme for subsequent 
offenders, no such language is employed in G. L. c. 272, § 29C 
(§ 29C). 
10 
 
convictions of subsequent offenses.  For example, for second and 
third offenses, a defendant faces minimum State prison terms of 
five and ten years, respectively.  Id. 
 
Notwithstanding this tiered framework, the Commonwealth 
proposes that a first-time offender who downloads one hundred 
violative photographs to the same location at the same time may 
be sentenced to one hundred consecutive five-year State prison 
terms -- that is, 500 years -- in State prison, whereas a 
similarly situated defendant who purchases a magazine containing 
one hundred offending images could, apparently, be sentenced to 
only a maximum of five years in State prison.  The prospect of 
imposing what are essentially life prison terms for first 
offenses risks nullifying the tiered penalty framework created 
by § 29C.  See Flemings v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
431 Mass. 374, 375-376 (2000) ("If a sensible construction is 
available, we shall not construe a statute to make a nullity of 
pertinent provisions or to produce absurd results").  We doubt 
that the Legislature intended to produce such an anomalous 
result, and absent evidence to the contrary, we decline to 
conclude that it did. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that there is evidence to the 
contrary in the legislative purpose statement in St. 1997, 
c. 181, which inserted § 29C into the General Laws.  It reads 
that statement as evincing a clear legislative intent to protect 
11 
 
individual children from exploitation and victimization.  St. 
1997, c. 181, § 1 (2) ("each time such material is viewed the 
child is harmed").  As such, urges the Commonwealth, the proper 
course is to treat possession of child pornography in the same 
manner as other crimes of violence, which generally follow a 
victim-based approach in terms of unit of prosecution.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 686-687 (2000) 
("We have implicitly approved the imposition of consecutive 
sentences for crimes of violence committed against multiple 
victims because the appropriate 'unit of prosecution' for such 
crimes is the person assaulted or killed, not the underlying 
criminal act").  We do not read the purpose statement so 
narrowly. 
 
Although the purpose statement does reflect concern for the 
protection of individual children, the Legislature also found 
"that the [C]ommonwealth has a compelling interest in outlawing 
the possession of any materials which sexually exploit children 
in order to protect the privacy, health and emotional welfare of 
children and society as a whole" (emphasis added).  St. 1997, 
c. 181, § 1 (6).  The significance of this finding is bolstered 
by the Legislature's placement of § 29C in a chapter devoted to 
"Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency and Good Order."  
Such a placement is indicative of the Legislature's intent to 
"punish[] the defendant for conduct offensive to society, as 
12 
 
distinct from punishing the defendant for the effect of that 
conduct on particular victims."  Commonwealth v. Botev, 79 Mass. 
App. Ct. 281, 287 (2011). 
 
Considering the purpose statement in conjunction with these 
other statutory provisions, we understand § 29C to be aimed at 
eradicating the harmful societal effects posed by the 
circulation of child pornography, including, but not limited to, 
the harm caused to the individual children depicted therein.  
Accordingly, we reject the Commonwealth's victim-based approach 
to determining the appropriate unit of prosecution for 
possession of child pornography, concluding instead that a 
conduct-based approach is more in keeping with the broad intent 
of the statute and the tiered punishment framework that it 
erects.3 
 
In identifying the conduct underlying each unit of 
prosecution for possession of child pornography, we find useful 
analogies in other types of possession cases.  See, e.g., Rabb, 
                                                          
 
3 The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion 
in State v. Sutherby, 165 Wash 2d 870 (2009) (en banc).  In that 
case, the statute criminalizing child pornography also included 
a legislative purpose statement suggesting concern regarding the 
abuse and exploitation of children.  However, as with § 29C, 
that legislative purpose statement did not clearly identify the 
victims as the units of prosecution.  Sutherby, 165 Wash. 2d at 
882 n.4.  As in this case, it was "clear that the proscribed 
conduct [was] the possession of child pornography" and, as such, 
the proper unit of prosecution was "one count per possession of 
child pornography, without regard to the number of images 
comprising such possession or the number of minors depicted in 
the images possessed" (emphasis in original).  Id. at 879, 882. 
13 
 
431 Mass. at 129-132.  In Rabb, we noted "various considerations 
for identifying when separate quantities of drugs exist to 
justify two or more charges:  'Generally, courts which have 
considered the issue [of multiple prosecutions under controlled 
substance statutes] have determined that separate convictions 
for possession of the same type of controlled substance [with an 
intent to distribute] will not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause if the possessions are sufficiently differentiated by 
time, location, or intended purpose.'"  Id. at 130, quoting 
Rashad v. Burt, 108 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 1075 (1998).  See Commonwealth v. Beacon Distribs., 
Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 574-575 (1982) (indictment alleging 
twenty counts of possessing obscene films in same place at same 
time alleged single offense). 
 
We conclude that similar considerations control the unit of 
prosecution in this case.4  Thus, a defendant's possession of a 
                                                          
 
4 The logic of extending these considerations to possession 
of child pornography is supported by the reasoning of United 
States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 589 (2012).  Although the Federal analogues to § 29C 
employ different language and sentencing schemes, the statute at 
issue in Chiaradio criminalized the possession of "one or more" 
matters containing depictions of child pornography -- a standard 
not markedly different from § 29C.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) (2012).  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, finding no "inkling that Congress intended to 
allow prosecutors to divide simultaneous possession by a single 
individual of several matters containing child pornography into 
multiple units of prosecution, . . . [held] that the plain 
language of [§] 2252(a)(4)(B) memorializes Congress's intent . . 
14 
 
single cache of one hundred offending photographs in the same 
place at the same time gives rise to a single unit of 
prosecution pursuant to § 29C.5  The imposition of multiple 
punishments for such a singular possession is contrary to the 
defendant's guaranty against double jeopardy.  See Kuklis v. 
Commonwealth, 361 Mass. 302, 308 (1972) ("it was not the 
legislative intent that a defendant should be punished for both 
possession of a drug and being present where the drug was kept, 
where the two charges involve the same time and place, and the 
identical mass of a single drug").  Importantly, the meaning of 
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes is not limited to 
consecutive sentences, but extends also to concurrent sentences 
and multiple convictions.  Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 
395-396 (1981).   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
. that one who simultaneously possesses a multitude of forbidden 
images at a single time and in a single place will have 
committed only a single offense."  Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274. 
 
5 To the extent the Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. 
Dingle, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 274 (2008), in support of multiple 
sentences for first-time offenders, that case is distinguishable 
on its facts.  We do not, therefore, opine on the question posed 
in that case whether the possession of distinct formats of child 
pornography enumerated in § 29C (photographs, computer discs, 
and a computer hard drive) could constitute distinct units of 
prosecution if found in the same location at the same time.  See 
id. at 282-283.  Nor do we opine whether the Commonwealth could, 
in another case, distinguish units of prosecution for possession 
of child pornography of the same format by establishing 
different periods of possession.  The Commonwealth did not make 
such an argument in this case. 
15 
 
 
Yet, double jeopardy principles do not necessarily extend 
to simultaneous prosecutions.  See United States v. Pires, 642 
F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2011) (double jeopardy clause of Federal 
Constitution does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions 
for same offense, so long as no more than one punishment is 
eventually imposed).  As such, the Commonwealth may elect to 
prosecute a single violation of § 29C by way of multiple counts.6  
See, e.g., Beacon Distribs., Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 575 
(Commonwealth entitled to proceed on twenty-count indictment 
even though possession of twenty obscene films at issue 
constituted single offense).  Should that procedure result in 
multiple guilty verdicts for the same offense, the duplicative 
convictions must be vacated and merged into a single conviction 
for sentencing purposes.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 
184, 191-192 (2013) (within judicial discretion to vacate either 
of duplicative convictions); United States v. Chiaradio, 684 
F.3d 265, 284 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 589 (2012) 
                                                          
 
6 Such an election may raise certain concerns.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Hrycenko, 417 Mass. 309, 316-317 (1994) 
(convictions reversed where Commonwealth's identically worded 
indictments rendered it impossible to determine basis of jury's 
acquittals and convictions); Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 
387, 395 n.10 (1981) (noting that Commonwealth may have to 
choose between charges where "necessary to protect the 
substantial rights of the defendant"); Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 
358 Mass. 672, 677-678 (1971) (expressing disapproval of 
repetitious and overlapping indictments where fewer will 
suffice). 
16 
 
(directing judge to merge duplicative convictions of possession 
of child pornography). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with six 
counts of possession of child pornography -- each premised on 
photographs contained in the same cache at the same time -- and 
the jury returned guilty verdicts on each of those six counts.  
The imposition of six convictions and sentences for the 
defendant's singular act of possession violated the guaranty 
against double jeopardy.  See Jones, 382 Mass. at 395-396.   
Accordingly, were we to hold that any of those convictions could 
stand, the appropriate remedy would be to vacate the duplicative 
convictions and remand for resentencing on the remaining count.  
Yet, as we explain below, a retrial is the appropriate remedy in 
this case. 
 
b.  First Amendment protection regarding counts one through 
three.7  The defendant appeals his convictions on counts one 
through three on grounds that the photographs underlying each 
count were protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and were insufficient to support a conviction under 
§ 29C.  Specifically, the defendant asserts that one of the 
photographs did not exhibit the nudity required by § 29C and, 
                                                          
 
7 The defendant has not challenged counts four and five on 
the grounds of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or sufficiency. 
17 
 
even if it did, none of the three photographs exhibited 
lewdness. 
 
Where, as here, a defendant charged with possessing child 
pornography seeks the cloak of First Amendment protection, we 
undertake a de novo review of the challenged images.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 42-43 (2014); Commonwealth v. 
Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 303 (2012).  Although it is 
clear that "depictions of nudity, without more, constitute 
protected expression," it is equally clear that States retain 
the authority to criminalize the possession of lewd exhibitions 
of nude minors.  Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-114 (1990).  
Section 29C accomplishes the latter, but does not define 
lewdness.  In determining whether a particular image constitutes 
a "lewd exhibition," we have looked to the criteria articulated 
in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 
1986), aff'd, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
856 (1987) (Dost factors), specifically: 
"1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on 
the child's genitalia or pubic area; 
 
"2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually 
suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated 
with sexual activity; 
 
"3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or 
in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 
 
"4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or 
nude; 
 
18 
 
"5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or 
a willingness to engage in sexual activity; [and] 
 
"6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to 
elicit a sexual response in the viewer." 
 
 
These factors, while neither comprehensive nor dispositive, 
provide important guidance and should be applied in a manner 
that furthers the legislative intent underlying § 29C.  Rex, 469 
Mass. at 45.  In particular, we note the Legislature's concern 
over the "wrongful invasion of a child's right to privacy" and 
the "permanent record of an act or acts of sexual abuse and 
exploitation of a child," and "that such material is used to 
break the will and resistance of other children."  St. 1997, 
c. 181, § 1 (1)-(3).  We now review the three disputed 
photographs, keeping in mind that "[a] visual depiction need not 
involve all of the Dost factors in order to be deemed lewd."  
Rex, supra. 
 
Trial exhibit 6 (count one) is a photograph of two fully 
nude girls standing close together.  The girl on the left is in 
a sexually suggestive pose with her hands on her head, back in a 
severe arch, and torso jutting forward and touching the girl on 
the right.  The girl on the right has a coy smile, suggesting a 
willingness to engage in sexual activity.  Her right and left 
hands are placed on the buttocks and undeveloped breast, 
respectively, of the girl on the left.  The image is pixelated 
and embellished with sporadic text, but is clear enough that 
19 
 
part of each girl's genital area is visible.  The placement of 
the text draws the viewer's attention to the girls' genital 
areas.  Given the nudity, posing, and touching, it is apparent 
that the picture is designed to elicit a sexual response in the 
viewer. 
 
Trial exhibit 7 (count two) is a photograph of two wet, 
nude girls in a bathtub.  Although the genitals are not exposed, 
we disagree with the defendant's assertion that the image lacks 
the requisite nude exposure.  The viewer can see the partially 
developed breasts of the girl on the right and the side of the 
buttock of the girl on the left.  As was aptly observed in 
Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 305, these girls are "well past 
the age of the 'Coppertone girl.'"  The girl on the left is 
smiling, holding soap bubbles, and standing with her knees bent, 
back arched forward, and buttocks jutting out.  The girl on the 
right is sitting and making a kissing face with her head pressed 
against the torso of the girl on the left.  The posing and 
facial expressions suggest a sexual coyness that, we conclude, 
is designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. 
 
Trial exhibit 8 (count three) is a photograph of a fully 
nude girl.  She is facing the viewer, but standing in front of a 
mirror such that her backside is visible as well.  Although the 
image is grainy, her buttocks, undeveloped breast, and genital 
area are visible to the viewer.  She is smiling with one hand 
20 
 
covering her mouth and one arm unnaturally twisted behind her 
back.  The placement of the mirror and the twisted arm render 
the girl's buttocks the focal point of the image.  The pose is 
suggestive of either mischief or domination and thus seems 
designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. 
 
It is evident that these photographs go beyond the mere 
depiction of nudity.  Contrast Rex, 469 Mass. at 47-48.  The 
first two images depict children who are touching each other 
while donning sexually suggestive poses and facial expressions.  
The third image, depicting a child unnaturally posed in front of 
a full-length mirror, exposing both sides of her entirely naked 
body, creates precisely the type of permanent record of invasion 
and exploitation that the Legislature sought to eradicate 
through the enactment of § 29C.  See St. 1997, c. 181, § 1 (2).  
Consequently, these photographs are not entitled to protection 
under the First Amendment, and the judge could properly have 
determined that the evidence on counts one through three was 
sufficient for their submission to the jury. 
 
c.  Duplicity of count six.  The defendant next contends, 
for the first time on appeal, that his conviction on count six 
must be vacated as duplicative.  This argument is not sound.  
"Duplicity is the charging of several separate offenses in a 
single count."  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 421 Mass. 547, 553 n.10 
(1995), quoting R.M. Kantrowitz & R. Witkin, Criminal Defense 
21 
 
Motions § 9.7 (1991).  Compare Commonwealth v. Fuller, 163 Mass. 
499, 499-500 (1895) (quashing as duplicative single indictment 
charging multiple acts of adultery), with United States v. 
Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1995) (attacks on evidence 
underlying single possession charge do not sound in duplicity). 
 
The Commonwealth submitted two photographs to the jury in 
support of a single charge of possession of child pornography.  
As we explain today, the possession of those two photographs 
formed part of the same unit of prosecution.  The Commonwealth 
is free to charge the possession of multiple images under a 
single count on the theory that any of those images may be 
sufficient to support the conviction.  See Beacon Distribs., 
Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 575.  Thus, there is no duplicity 
problem here.  See Valerio, 48 F.3d at 63. 
 
Nonetheless, when the Commonwealth elects to proceed in 
this manner, it runs the risk of violating the rule articulated 
"in Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 511 (1982), . . . 
that if the evidence presented to the jury would warrant a 
conviction on one ground, but not on another, and it is 
impossible to tell on which ground the jury relied, the verdict 
must be set aside on appeal" (citations omitted).  Chambers v. 
Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 49, 51-52 (1995).  See Hrycenko, 417 
Mass. at 316-317.  Here, the first photograph submitted by the 
Commonwealth on count six, exhibit 11A, depicts a young girl 
22 
 
inserting a power drill into her mouth.  None of the body parts 
enumerated in § 29C is visible to the viewer.  Conversely, in 
the second photograph, exhibit 11B, the same young girl is 
depicted nude holding the same power drill. 
 
The Commonwealth casts exhibit 11A as mere relevant context 
for the lewdness of the power drill, and concedes that its 
possession does not violate the statute, whereas exhibit 11B 
"was clearly the image upon which the complaint was issued."  
This argument is contrary to the record.  Detective Usher 
specifically testified that he premised the complaint on both 
photographs, which he contrasted with the five remaining 
photographs printed and introduced for context.  The jury were 
simply provided with two photographs attached to a single 
verdict slip, but were never instructed that exhibit 11B was the 
only charged photograph.  Accordingly, we conclude that the more 
reasonable inference was that the Commonwealth was proceeding on 
both photographs. 
 
The jury were given neither specific unanimity instructions 
nor special verdict slips.  Cf.   Commonwealth v. Accetta, 422 
Mass. 642, 646 (1996) ("where there is evidence of separate 
incidents, each of which could warrant a guilty verdict, the 
jury must be instructed that specific unanimity is required at 
least as to one incident. . . .  In addition, we would expect in 
such a case that any guilty verdict would be accompanied by an 
23 
 
indication on the verdict slip of the theory or theories on 
which the jury based that verdict").  We are left with no way of 
discerning whether the jury premised their guilty verdict solely 
on the basis of exhibit 11A, which the Commonwealth concedes 
would have been plainly insufficient to support a conviction 
pursuant to § 29C.  Consequently, the conviction on count six 
must be set aside.8 
 
d.  Trial errors and ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Last, the defendant contends that an amalgamation of improper 
admissions of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, improper 
testimony by Detective Usher, improper closing argument by the 
prosecutor, and inadequate jury instructions deprived him of a 
fair trial.  The defendant also maintains that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  "[W]hen the claim of 
ineffectiveness is predicated, as it is here, on counsel's 
failure to object to something that occurred at trial, the 
standard for evaluating the ineffectiveness claim is not 
significantly different from the substantial risk standard that 
is applicable to our review of the underlying, unpreserved 
error."  Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686 (2002), S.C., 
444 Mass. 72 (2005). 
                                                          
 
8 If the Commonwealth includes several photographs that it 
alleges are lewd in a single count, which it is entitled to do, 
the jury's verdict must clearly record the specific photographs 
that the jury unanimously agreed were violative of the statute 
in order to ensure proper appellate review. 
24 
 
 
On the morning of the first day of trial, the Commonwealth 
disclosed for the first time its intention to introduce five 
uncharged photographs as a "representative sample" of the 
approximately 1,200 images that Detective Usher viewed on the 
NESPIN disc.  Defense counsel objected to the introduction of 
these items as cumulative, prejudicial, and irrelevant.  The 
judge opined that the images could show absence of mistake, 
pattern of conduct, or modus operandi.  Following a review of 
about 200 of the approximately 1,200 images that Detective Usher 
had reviewed, the judge concluded that the Commonwealth could 
introduce the sample photographs so long as a proper foundation 
was laid for their representative character. 
 
At trial, Detective Usher explained that the NESPIN disc 
contained more than 6,000 photographs and that he had viewed 
approximately 1,200 of those photographs.  He then printed seven 
for charging purposes and five as an "average sample of what 
other photos were on that dis[c]."  These five "representative" 
photographs were then introduced as exhibits 12A through 12E. 
 
"Whether evidence is relevant in any particular instance, 
and whether the probative value of relevant evidence is 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, are questions within the 
sound discretion of the judge."  Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 
798, 807 (1990).  It is the defendant's contention that the 
admission of the representative photographs constituted an abuse 
25 
 
of that discretion.  The Commonwealth counters that the 
admission of the photographs was relevant to the defendant's 
intentional or knowing possession of child pornography. 
 
The defendant has the better of the arguments on this 
point.  To the extent the judge relied on the reasoning of 
Commonwealth v. Darby, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2011) 
(unpublished), in accepting the Commonwealth's theory, that 
reliance was misplaced.9  In Darby, the defendant stipulated that 
the representative video recordings were, in fact, child 
pornography.  Id.  By comparison, here, the Commonwealth 
concedes that the representative photographs did not contain 
nudity and, thus, were not child pornography as defined by 
§ 29C.  We fail to see how the possession of legal photographs 
is probative of the defendant's knowing or intentional 
possession of illegal photographs. 
 
This is particularly true where, as here, the jury viewed a 
videotaped interview of the defendant stating that he 
intentionally downloaded the images.  Accordingly, it is highly 
unlikely that the jury would have used the representative sample 
as evidence in rebuttal of a mistake defense.  Conversely, there 
                                                          
 
9 Defense counsel, having lost on her initial objection to 
the admission of these photographs, did not object when they 
were individually offered in evidence.  Although the 
Commonwealth contends that these failures to object may have 
been strategic, any such strategy would have been manifestly 
unreasonable.  See Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 591, 598-599 
(2012). 
26 
 
was a substantial risk that the jury would use the photographs 
as evidence of the bad character of the defendant, as several of 
the photographs depicted young girls, while not nude, posed in 
highly sexualized positions even more provocative than the nude 
images underlying the charges.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Prashaw, 57 
Mass. App. Ct. 19, 25-26 (2003) (prejudicial error to admit 
sexually suggestive photographs not probative of guilt). 
 
The prejudice arising from this error was compounded by the 
improper testimony of Detective Usher.  Despite only viewing 
approximately 1,200 of the more than 6,000 images on the NESPIN 
disc, Detective Usher testified, without objection, that the 
five representative photographs were an "average sample of what 
other photos were on that dis[c]."  Detective Usher then opined, 
on cross-examination, that he "could have charged [the 
defendant] with many counts" but "decided after six counts, that 
would be enough." 
 
Essentially, the jury were left to form the unfounded 
conclusion that the defendant would be fortunate to be convicted 
on only six counts -- regardless of whether those six 
convictions corresponded precisely to the images that Detective 
Usher selected for each count.  This theme continued during the 
Commonwealth's closing argument, when the prosecutor offered his 
own view regarding the purpose of § 29C: 
27 
 
"[W]hen the Legislature made a law making child 
pornography, possession of child pornography, illegal, 
. . . they noted, every time someone possesses and looks at 
those pictures, that child is harmed.  And that is why the 
statute was done.  With that in mind, I would ask you to 
look at all the evidence that you have in front of you, to 
consider all the testimony you heard, and when you do, I'd 
suggest you'll find the defendant guilty on all six 
counts." 
 
 
We have repeatedly warned that, in "closing argument, 
'[l]awyers shall not and must not misstate principles of law.'" 
Commonwealth v. Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 367 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 557 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 
806 (1986).  Moreover, prosecutors especially must take care to 
limit their closing "to the evidence and fair inferences that 
can be drawn from the evidence," Commonwealth v. Kelly, 417 
Mass. 266, 270 (1994), and to avoid interjecting personal 
opinions or playing to the emotions of the jury, Commonwealth v. 
Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987).  Although a judge may 
"inform a jury about the legislative purpose of a statute," even 
then, he or she must do so accurately.  Commonwealth v. 
Brunelle, 361 Mass. 6, 12 (1972). 
 
As indicated above, the prosecutor's selective reading of 
the legislative findings painted an incomplete, and thus 
inaccurate, picture of the legislative intent.  It was also not 
particularly probative of whether the defendant possessed child 
pornography.  Cf. United States v. Norton, 639 F.2d 427, 429 
(8th Cir. 1981) (prosecutor's "testimony" during closing 
28 
 
argument regarding purpose of Federal gun control act not 
relevant to defendant's possession of gun).  Rather, it invited 
the jury to gloss over the question of possession as to the 
photographs that formed the bases of the six counts and to 
convict the defendant based on their sympathy for those harmed 
by each viewing.  Although the judge instructed the jury that 
the closing arguments were not evidence, she did not provide a 
curative instruction targeted at the prosecutor's erroneous 
explication of the legislative history.  See Commonwealth v. 
Coren, 437 Mass. 723, 731-733 (2002). 
 
The judge's instruction on lewdness was also insufficient.  
The judge instructed the jury, without objection, that "to prove 
that there was a lewd exhibition of the unclothed genitals, 
pubic area, or buttocks, or, if a female, her fully or partially 
developed breast, I will inform you that the term 'lewd' under 
our statutes and case law means 'indecent or offensive.'  That's 
the definition of 'lewd.'"  By contrast, the judge had 
previously informed counsel that she would include an 
instruction that "proof that an image contains nudity, alone, is 
not sufficient for a conviction."  When the judge omitted this 
language, defense counsel should have lodged an objection. 
 
It is, of course, true that "judges are not required to 
deliver their instructions in any particular form of words, so 
long as all necessary instructions are given in adequate words."  
29 
 
Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 878 (1987).  The precise 
contours of the instruction can and should be informed by the 
physical evidence, testimony, and other conduct of the trial 
that precede it.  The Sullivan case is a comparable example.  
There, the Appeals Court found no error in the trial judge's 
failure to give a "mere nudity is not enough" instruction where 
the judge recited the Dost factors and instructed the jury that 
certain uncharged photographs introduced by the Commonwealth 
were: 
"only to be used . . . to determine whether [the defendant] 
intended to download this particular photograph, and 
whether that is the absence of mistake or inadvertence, and 
may be used . . . secondly to go to his knowledge of what 
he was downloading.  But it . . . should not be used at all 
for evidence of bad character or whether the other pictures 
were appropriate or not." 
 
Sullivan, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 308-310.  The Dost factors were 
not included in the instructions in this case. 
 
Here, in view of the prejudicial evidence, testimony, and 
argument presented by the Commonwealth at trial, the judge was 
required to do more than simply instruct the jury that lewd 
means "indecent or offensive."10  The judge seems to have agreed, 
                                                          
 
10 We are mindful that Instruction 7.540 of the Criminal 
Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court 
(Possession of Child Pornography) was not available until 
January, 2013, after the trial in this case.  The model 
instruction provides, in relevant part:  "Proof that an image 
contains nudity is not alone sufficient for a conviction.  The 
image must be of a person engaged in (an activity) (one of the 
activities) specified in the second element."  The instructions 
30 
 
but inadvertently omitted an instruction that "nudity, alone, is 
not sufficient."  As in Sullivan, that omission alone was not 
enough to render the instructions inadequate.  The instructions 
were rendered inadequate by the concomitant lack of a limiting 
instruction and a practical roadmap -- such as the Dost factors 
-- to aid the jury in discerning whether the stated definition 
of lewdness had been satisfied. 
 
In sum, the Commonwealth used photographs not violative of 
the statute to suggest to the jury that the NESPIN disc 
contained thousands of images that were, at minimum, reflective 
of the defendant's bad character, if not criminally 
pornographic.  The testimony of Detective Usher, along with the 
misleading soliloquy on legislative intent by the prosecutor, 
invited the jury to draw adverse conclusions regarding the 
defendant's culpability for harms extending well beyond the 
evidence presented at trial.  The jury instructions were too 
feeble to cleanse the trial of the unfairness wrought by the 
Commonwealth in this case.  For all these reasons, we hold that 
the errors at trial gave rise to a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
then define "lewd" as "indecent or offensive," and offer the 
factors articulated in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 
832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987), as a guide to aid the jury in 
determining whether that definition has been met. 
31 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction are vacated, 
the verdicts are set aside, and the case is remanded to the 
District Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.