Title: City of Wichita v. Lucero
Citation: 255 Kan. 437, 874 P.2d 1144
Docket Number: 69,839
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 1994

255 Kan. 437 (1994)
874 P.2d 1144
CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant,
v.
JAMES LUCERO, Appellee.
No. 69,839

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 27, 1994.
Sharon L. Chalker, assistant city attorney, argued the cause, and Gary E. Rebenstorf, city attorney, was with her on the briefs for appellant.
Alice L. Knetsch, of Law Offices of S.A. (Tim) Scimeca, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
*438 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, C.J.:
This is an appeal by the City of Wichita (City) from the district court's ruling that the mandatory minimum fine provision for repeat offenders, as set forth in § 5.66.055(b) of the Code of the City of Wichita, is unconstitutional. This appeal is taken upon a question reserved by the City pursuant to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-3602(b)(3).
The facts are not in dispute. James Lucero was arrested on December 2, 1992, for violating § 5.66.055(a)(1) of the Code of the City of Wichita. The ordinance makes it unlawful for any person to intentionally interfere with or obstruct the conduct of a lawful business. The defendant was arrested while participating in a pro-life demonstration at a women's clinic located in Wichita.
On February 18, 1993, the defendant appeared pro se before the Wichita Municipal Court and was found guilty of violating § 5.66.055(a)(1). He was ordered to pay the mandatory minimum fine of $250, serve six months in jail, and pay court costs. On February 25, 1993, the defendant appealed his conviction to the Sedgwick County District Court. On April 19, 1993, the defendant, who again appeared pro se, was found guilty in a jury trial of violating the ordinance.
On April 20, 1993, the defendant was sentenced by the district court. During sentencing, Assistant City Attorney Sharon Chalker informed the court of the defendant's prior conviction under the same ordinance. The City recommended that the defendant be fined the mandatory minimum fine of $250 and be placed on six months' probation with credit for time served. The City further recommended that the defendant be required to perform community service in lieu of paying the fine if the court found the defendant indigent. The court examined the defendant as to his assets, employment, and possible indigency. The defendant denied having any assets or employment. The court then proceeded to sentence the defendant, stating:
The journal entry signed by the trial judge provides in pertinent part:
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
The City appealed and states the question on appeal as follows:
The Code of the City of Wichita § 5.66.055, entitled "Interference with the conduct of a lawful business," provides:
During sentencing, the court was advised that the defendant had one prior conviction under the same ordinance and therefore was subject to a mandatory minimum fine of not less than $250 under § 5.66.055(b)(2) of the ordinance. Based upon its determination that the defendant was indigent, the court paroled the defendant outright rather than sentencing the defendant to perform community service in lieu of the fine as authorized for indigent defendants under § 5.66.055(c).
We now turn to the question reserved for appeal. In doing so, we are somewhat handicapped in that the trial judge made his apparent determination that to require this defendant to pay the mandatory fine would violate his constitutional rights sua sponte without meaningful explanation of the ruling. The issue of the constitutionality of § 5.66.055 was not raised by either party in the trial court. The trial judge made his ruling without any notice to or argument from counsel for the parties. In addition, the trial judge failed to provide any legal reasoning in support of his ruling and failed to explain or clarify just what he considered unconstitutional about the ordinance. As a result, this court, along with counsel, is left to speculate as to the basis for and rationale behind the court's ruling.
Counsel for the State argues (1) that there is nothing unconstitutional about mandatory sentences, including fines, or mandatory increased penalties for habitual offenders and (2) that the court had discretion under § 5.66.055(c) to sentence the defendant to perform community service in lieu of the mandatory fine. Counsel for the defendant argues primarily that the trial court was correct because § 5.66.055(a) is unconstitutionally vague, thereby violating defendant's due process rights, and in addition that the ordinance is subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and violates the First Amendment right of free speech.
At the outset, it is deemed appropriate to set forth certain basic principles applicable to our consideration of this appeal. As to our standard of review, we are being asked to interpret the constitutionality of § 5.66.055 of the Code of the City of Wichita. Interpretation *442 of an ordinance is a question of law. See Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. 512, 515, 837 P.2d 381 (1992). "When determining a question of law, this court is not bound by the decision of the district court." Memorial Hospital Ass'n Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 668, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986).
The general principles and guidelines to be followed in considering the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance have been enumerated many times. In Moody v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 237 Kan. 67, 697 P.2d 1310 (1985), we stated:
The first argument asserted by the City is based upon the assumption that the trial court may have concluded that the imposition of a harsher penalty for repeat offenders was unconstitutional. While it appears to us that the trial court's decision was based primarily on the defendant's status as indigent, we have no way of being absolutely certain why the judge ruled as he did. Under the circumstances, we will consider both of the arguments and alternatives advanced by the City.
The ordinance now before the court is a self-contained mandatory habitual offender ordinance. The ordinance provides for graduated minimum fines which progress from $250 for a second conviction to $2,500 for an eleventh and all subsequent convictions. In addition, the imposition of the fine is not only mandatory, but subsection (c) provides "the court shall not waive, remit, suspend, parole or otherwise excuse the payment" of the minimum fine. However, the ordinance does provide that the court may *443 order performance of community service in lieu of the fine if the defendant is determined to be indigent and financially unable to pay the fine. The court apparently rejected the community service option and presumably concluded that the mere imposition of harsher penalties for repeat offenders was unconstitutional. In doing so the court stated the ordinance violated "due process of law as set out in [Sections] 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution [Bill of Rights]."
While this case affords this court the first opportunity to examine a self-contained habitual offender city ordinance, similar type statutes have been previously examined and found constitutional. Self-contained habitual offender statutes and city ordinances create a special legal category for repeat or habitual offenders. Generally, habitual offender statutes impose a harsher penalty against those individuals with repeat criminal offenses. Like the instant city ordinance under review, habitual offender statutes increase the severity of the penalty in proportion with the number of convictions an individual has for commission of similar criminal acts. This type of legal category or status has long been recognized by this court as a legitimate basis for the imposition of tougher penalties. In State v. Adams, 89 Kan. 674, 677, 132 Pac. 171 (1913), this court held: "Former conviction of crime is a sufficient basis for the classification of offenders with respect to the severity of the punishment they shall receive."
In State v. Woodman, 127 Kan. 166, 171, 272 Pac. 132 (1928), this court noted: "[I]t is a salutary provision of law that criminals whom the law's discipline has hitherto failed to reform by prior conviction and punishment should form a class to be more severely punished than first offenders." And, in State v. Lohrbach, 217 Kan. 588, 591, 538 P.2d 678 (1975), the court described the purpose and philosophy behind recidivist or habitual offender statutes:
*444 This court on numerous occasions has examined and upheld the constitutionality of self-contained habitual offender statutes. In State v. Miles, 233 Kan. 286, 662 P.2d 1227 (1983), the defendant was convicted for possession of both marijuana and heroin, in violation of the Kansas Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4127a (Ensley 1980), the defendant's heroin conviction was elevated from a class C to a class B felony due to a prior heroin conviction. The defendant maintained that the enhancement was improper, arguing that his prior conviction in the state of Iowa was not in violation of Kansas law, and thus not a prior conviction as set forth in 65-4127a. In rejecting the defendant's flawed interpretation of the statute, the court again recognized the validity of imposing harsher penalties for repeat offenders:
In State v. Salyer, 196 Kan. 32, 410 P.2d 248 (1966), the court examined a statute which elevated a misdemeanor offense to a felony based upon prior convictions. The court stated:
In the present case, if the trial court's ruling was based upon the increased nature of the penalty for subsequent violations of *445 the ordinance, its determination was clearly erroneous. The ordinance does not violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights or the United States Constitution for such reason.
We now turn to what we perceive as the more probable basis for the trial court's decision. From the language used by the judge, it appears that he was concerned about the constitutionality of an ordinance (or statute) that would inflict a mandatory fine upon an indigent defendant who had no apparent means of paying the fine. The trial court not only accepted the jury's verdict of guilty but also imposed a sentence of 90 days and a fine of $250 as specified in the statute. This leads us to the conclusion that the court's concern was with the indigent status of the defendant rather than the mandatory increases in the minimum fine for repeat offenders.
Is an ordinance which requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum fine or community service in lieu thereof, against an indigent defendant, in violation of the Kansas Constitution? We hold that it is not.
While this issue has never been reviewed directly by the Kansas appellate courts, there are at least three United States Supreme Court decisions which provide guidance on the question.
In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221, 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983), the Court considered the question of whether the 14th Amendment prohibited a state from revoking an indigent defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years' probation after a plea of guilty to a burglary charge. As a condition to the defendant's probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay both a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. When the defendant was unable to pay the restitution and fine, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced him to serve the remaining period of the probationary period in prison.
In concluding that the trial court erred in automatically revoking the defendant's probation, the Court held:
In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 28 L. Ed. 2d 130, 91 S. Ct. 668 (1971), the defendant was fined $425 and, because he was unable to pay the fine due to his indigency, was committed to prison on the basis of a state statute. In essence, the statute converted a fine into a prison sentence based solely on defendant's indigency status. In holding that the statute was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the court stated: "`[T]he Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.'" 401 U.S.  at 398. The Court went on to state, however, "that our holding today does not suggest any constitutional infirmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a fine who refused or neglects to do so." 401 U.S.  at 400.
One year preceding the Tate decision, the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether an indigent defendant could be held in confinement longer than the maximum term allowed by statute for failure to pay the fine imposed during sentencing. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586, 90 S. Ct. 2018 (1970), the defendant was sentenced to the maximum term of one year in jail and fined $500 and $5 court costs for petty theft. The issue under review involved examination of a state statute which permitted the continued confinement of the defendant beyond the maximum term allowed by statute for failure to pay the fine. The statute allowed the defendant to "work off" the fine at a rate of $5 per day, thereby having the potential of increasing the defendant's *447 imprisonment by 101 days beyond the maximum period allowed by statute.
In ruling that the state statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held:
....
Finally, and pertinent to our question under review, the Court stated:
Although the foregoing cases do not directly answer the issue before this court, they do address substantive questions which directly affect our decision here. First, the United States Supreme Court has held that imposition of a fine against an indigent defendant is allowable and that to deny the State authority to enforce such judgments would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause. "[N]othing we now hold precludes a judge from imposing on an indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum penalty prescribed by law." Williams, 399 U.S.  at 243. And, secondly, the Court has held that before a court may revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine, the court must inquire into and determine whether the defendant made a "sufficient bona fide" effort to pay the fine. However, even in the instance where an indigent defendant has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay a fine, "if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State's interest in punishment and deterrence," the court may *448 imprison an indigent probationer who has failed (due to no fault of his or her own) to pay a fine. Bearden, 461 U.S.  at 672.
Although this court has not examined a case which deals directly with the rule of law stated in Bearden, we have recognized the impact of Bearden's ruling. In State v. Higgins, 240 Kan. 756, 732 P.2d 760 (1987), the court was faced with a dispute over the right of the trial court to parole a defendant from the payment of extradition costs assessed as court costs. The court relied upon Bearden in observing:
In State v. Duke, 10 Kan. App.2d 392, 699 P.2d 576 (1985), the defendant appealed from an order of the trial court which revoked his probation for failure to pay fines and make restitution, which were conditions of his probation. After discussing Bearden, the court stated:
*449 K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4610(c), which sets forth the conditions of probation or suspended sentence, is instructive and provides in pertinent part:
....
Finally, our research has located only one case which has examined the question of whether community service was a viable alternative to a mandatory minimum fine. In Johnson v. State, 495 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Dist. App. 1986), the full opinion of the court reads:
The imposition of a fine, costs, and order of restitution against an indigent criminal defendant is not inherently unconstitutional. However, before an indigent defendant may be incarcerated for failure to pay a fine, costs, or restitution it must be shown not *450 only that the defendant is indigent but that the defendant has willfully refused to make such payment or has failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to legally acquire the resources to pay. If an indigent defendant cannot make such payments despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence, such as community service.
The ordinance now before us provides, as an alternative to the mandatory fine, that the court may order an indigent defendant to perform community service. We conclude that the ordinance provides a sufficient alternative method of punishment as contemplated by Bearden and is not unconstitutional when applied to indigents such as the defendant here. The trial court erred in finding that § 5.66.055 of the Code of the City of Wichita was unconstitutional as to this defendant. The ordinance does not violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, nor does it violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
We now turn to the defendant's contention that the city ordinance violates his rights to due process and is unconstitutional because of vagueness. In support of his argument, the defendant contends that the language in section (a)(1) of the City's ordinance, which makes intentional conduct "that causes an obstruction to or interference with" the use of property as a lawful business a criminal violation, is so vague and indefinite that a person cannot determine what conduct is prohibited.
At the outset, we repeat certain familiar principles and rules relating to constitutional attacks on statutes or ordinances based upon assertions that the ordinance is vague and indefinite. Those rules were recently outlined in City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 788 P.2d 270 (1990), as follows:
Additional rules are set forth in State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984), where we stated:
*452 With the foregoing rules in mind, we now turn to the issue of whether Wichita City Code § 5.66.055(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague on its face.
The defendant contends that the ordinance fails to adequately define or list what types of conduct constitute either an "interference" or "obstruction" with the free and uninterrupted operation of a lawful business. The defendant argues that the vaguely written ordinance will necessarily require individuals to guess as to what types of conduct are prohibited by the ordinance. The defendant also maintains that the ordinance infringes upon First Amendment interests, causing a "chilling effect."
At the outset, we note that the trial judge apparently found no problem with the language the defendant now asserts is vague and indefinite. The trial court not only accepted the jury's verdict but found the defendant guilty of violating § 5.66.055(a) and further imposed the mandatory $250 fine under subsection (b)(2). If the trial court had concluded the ordinance itself was unconstitutionally vague, it would not have found the defendant guilty and imposed sentence. It appears the court's only concern as to constitutionality was based upon the mandatory nature of the fine as it related to the defendant's status as an indigent.
For convenience, we repeat the relevant language of the ordinance that the defendant claims is unconstitutionally vague. It reads:
A quick review of the facts of this case indicate that the defendant was arrested for "sitting in front of the door, blocking entry and exit and shouting threats at or in" the clinic in violation of § 5.66.055(a)(1). This type of conduct is clearly prohibited by the plain language of the ordinance, which proscribes any interference or obstruction "which prevents the free and uninterrupted ingress, *453 egress, or regress therein, thereon and thereto." As noted earlier, a statute or ordinance will not be declared void for vagueness "where it uses words of commonly understood meaning." Reed v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 253 Kan. 602, 617, 860 P.2d 864 (1993).
The defendant contends that the ordinance fails to define what types of conduct constitute a prohibited "interference" or "obstruction" to a lawful business. However, this court has stated that such sufficiency in a criminal statute is not necessary if the general statement of the offense is written in "plain legal parlance, well defined by judicial interpretation, and in language commonly understood by persons of average intelligence." State v. Ashton, 175 Kan. 164, 169, 262 P.2d 123 (1953). The term "interfere" has been defined as: "To check; hamper; hinder; infringe; encroach; trespass; disturb; intervene; intermeddle; interpose." Black's Law Dictionary 814 (6th ed. 1990). The term "obstruct" is defined as:
Suffice it to say we find the terms "interference" and "obstruction" as used in this ordinance are not vague and uncertain in meaning, but on the contrary are well-defined, with a generally understood meaning. While the ordinance may be imprecise, we conclude that it gives a clear and sufficient warning as to the conduct proscribed. The defendant's arguments that the ordinance in question is so vague that it deprives him of constitutional due process is wholly without merit.
The defendant also asserts that the ordinance creates a chilling effect on his First Amendment rights to free speech. Although this was not a basis for the trial court's ruling, we will briefly consider the argument.
Under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, a private property owner cannot be subjected to another's free speech rights unless the privately owned property has assumed "to some significant degree the functional attributes of public *454 property devoted to public use." Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547, 33 L. Ed. 2d 122, 92 S. Ct. 2238 (1972). As such, private citizens do not have an unqualified right to participate in free speech and assembly on privately owned property. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-19, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976). Private citizens do, however, have protected First Amendment rights on public streets and sidewalks. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198-99, 32 L. Ed. 2d 653, 92 S. Ct. 1842 (1972).
The ordinance now under review does not purport to regulate speech, but instead regulates unlawful conduct on property owned, operated, or controlled by a private individual or corporation. Furthermore, the defendant has failed to present any evidence which would demonstrate that the privately operated clinic in this case has assumed the "functional attributes of public property devoted to public use." Central Hardware, 407 U.S.  at 547. As there is no evidence that the clinic has taken on the status of a public forum, the defendant is not afforded First Amendment protections for his illegal conduct on privately owned property. His arguments in this respect are also without merit.
We have carefully reviewed all of the arguments of both parties and hold that § 5.66.055 of the Code of the City of Wichita is not unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution and of the United States Constitution. The trial court erred in finding the ordinance violated this defendant's constitutional rights.
The appeal is sustained, and the case is remanded with directions to resentence the defendant. If the court finds that the defendant is still indigent, then he should be sentenced in accordance with subsection (c) of the ordinance to perform an appropriate amount of community service.