Title: Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S262081
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SAEED FARKHONDEHPOUR et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S262081 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B277750, B279009 and B285904 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC372362 
 
 
July 21, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Guerrero concurred. 
 
Justice Groban filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice 
Kruger concurred. 
 
 
1 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
S262081 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
We granted review to address apparent conflicts in the 
Courts of Appeal concerning (1) whether a party in default has 
standing to file a motion for a “new trial” asserting legal error 
relating to calculation of damages and (2) whether a trial court 
may award treble damages and attorney’s fees under Penal 
Code section 496, subdivision (c)1 in a case involving, not 
trafficking of stolen goods, but instead, fraudulent diversion of 
a partnership’s cash distributions.  The Court of Appeal below 
answered “yes,” and “no,” respectively.   
We answer yes to both questions — and hence affirm the 
appellate court’s judgment in the first respect, and reverse it in 
the second.  As we will explain, the standing conclusion is 
supported by the statutory scheme as construed by well-
reasoned prior appellate decisions and considerations of judicial 
economy.  Likewise, the second conclusion — that treble 
damages and attorney’s fees are available under section 496(c) 
when, as here, property “has been obtained in any manner 
constituting theft” — is compelled by the statute’s unambiguous 
words and our obligation to honor them.  If, as the Court of 
Appeal below determined, such remedies are problematic as a 
 
1  
Hereinafter 
section 
496(c). 
 
Future 
undesignated 
statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.   
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
matter of policy, the Legislature can be expected to amend the 
statute accordingly.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURE  
We set forth the facts and procedural background, as 
recited in the Court of Appeal’s decision below (Siry v. 
Farkhondehpour (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109–1113 (Siry)), 
with minor adjustments.   
In 
1998, 
Moe 
Siry, 
Saeed 
Farkhondehpour 
(Farkhondehpour), and Morad Neman (Neman) formed the “241 
E. 5th Street Partnership” to renovate and lease space in a 
mixed-use building in downtown Los Angeles.  The partnership 
agreement named one general partner — 416 South Wall Street, 
Inc. (of which Farkhondehpour was president) — and four 
limited partners — Siry Investment, L.P. (hereinafter plaintiff), 
the 
1993 
Farkhondehpour 
Family 
Trust 
(of 
which 
Farkhondehpour was trustee), the Neman Family Irrevocable 
Trust (of which Neman was trustee), and the Yedidia 
Investment Defined Benefit Plan Trust (of which Neman was 
also trustee).  The agreement divided the partnership’s cash 
distributions as follows:  Plaintiff was to receive 39.60 percent; 
the Farkhondehpour Family Trust, 29.70 percent; the Neman 
Family Irrevocable Trust, 19.80 percent; and the Yedidia 
Defined Benefit Plan Trust, 9.90 percent.  A separate entity, 
Investment 
Consultants, 
LLC 
(hereinafter 
Investment 
Consultants), was responsible for acting as property manager, 
making the required cash distributions, and overseeing the 
renovations.   
 
In 2003, Farkhondehpour, 416 South Wall Street, and 
Neman (hereinafter defendants) created an entity named DTLA 
and required the building’s tenants to pay their rent to DTLA.  
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
Defendants then began to improperly divert rental income away 
from the limited partnership and into DTLA.  Farkhondehpour 
and Neman also commenced charging personal and other non-
partnership expenses to the partnership.  The net effect of these 
actions was to direct Investment Consultants to underpay 
plaintiff its cash distributions.  Farkhondehpour and Neman 
ensured that plaintiff remained unaware of the underpayments 
by misrepresenting to plaintiff the building’s rental income and 
the partnership’s expenses, effectively lying to plaintiff about 
what its cash distributions should have been.   
A.  Plaintiff’s Lawsuit, First Trial, and Reversal 
 
In June 2007, plaintiff sued defendants and the entities 
over which they were trustees for underpaying plaintiff and 
improperly diverting the partnership’s rental income to their 
own coffers.2   
 
The matter proceeded to a jury trial in October 2009.  At 
that time, plaintiff’s operative second amended complaint 
sought (1) dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership; 
(2) an accounting; (3) damages for breach of the agreement; and 
(4) damages for breach of fiduciary duty.  The jury found for 
plaintiff, awarding actual damages of $242,975 and punitive 
 
2  
As the Court of Appeal below mentioned, “this was the 
second lawsuit arising out of the partnership.  In 2003, 
Farkhondehpour and Neman sued [plaintiff] for breach of a 
different agreement” — and plaintiff “cross-claimed for 
underpayment of cash distributions from the partnership.  After 
an arbitrator rejected Farkhondehpour’s and Neman’s claims, 
[plaintiff] settled its remaining cross-claims in 2007, with the 
requirement that Farkhondehpour and Neman provide an 
accounting (and, if warranted, a redistribution) of the 
partnership’s profits.”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110, 
fn. 2.)   
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
damages of $1.1 million against Farkhondehpour and $2 million 
against Neman.  The trial court denied a subsequent motion for 
a new trial, but reduced the punitive damages awards to 
$728,925 against each Farkhondehpour and Neman.   
 
In late 2012, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment 
because the special verdict form submitted to the jury did not 
require the jury to specify whether Farkhondehpour and Neman 
were liable to plaintiff individually or as trustees of the various 
trusts.  (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (Dec. 12, 2012, 
B223100, B234655) [nonpub. opn.].)  The court explained that 
this defect rendered the verdict “hopelessly ambiguous” because 
“who is liable [was] key” — and hence remanded the matter for 
retrial.  (Ibid.)   
B.  Issuance of Terminating Sanctions on Remand 
 
On remand, plaintiff propounded two rounds of discovery 
on defendants — in late 2013, and again in early 2014.  
Defendants failed to adequately respond to the discovery or to 
the trial court’s subsequent orders directing them to do so 
without objection.   
 
In 2015, plaintiff served defendants with notices that it 
was seeking $4 million in punitive damages against each of 
them.  Plaintiff subsequently moved for terminating sanctions 
based on defendants’ steadfast refusal to respond to plaintiff’s 
discovery requests or to obey the trial court’s multiple orders 
compelling responses.  At that time, plaintiff’s operative fifth 
amended complaint sought (1) compensatory damages for 
breach of the partnership agreement, breach of an oral contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
duty, and fraud;3 (2) punitive damages; (3) treble damages 
pursuant to section 496(c); and (4) attorney’s fees under that 
same statute.  Plaintiff’s demands for treble damages and 
attorney’s fees were new — those remedies had not been sought 
in connection with the first trial.   
 
Defendants opposed the motion with extensive briefing 
and nearly 1,700 pages of exhibits.  The court held two hearings 
and eventually issued a written order striking defendants’ 
answers and entering their default.   
C.  Default Prove-up and Entry of Judgment 
 
Plaintiff filed more than 2,000 pages of documents in 
anticipation of the hearing at which it would prove its damages.  
In mid-2016, the trial court issued an order finding that plaintiff 
had “met its evidentiary burden as to all claims.”  The court 
entered default judgment against defendants, awarding 
plaintiff (1) actual compensatory damages, with interest, of 
$956,487; (2) treble damages of $2,869,461 pursuant to section 
496(c); (3) punitive damages of $4 million (plus $1 against only 
416 
South 
Wall 
Street); 
(4) attorney’s 
fees 
totaling 
$4,010,008.97; and (5) costs of $187,109.13 — for a total of 
$12,023,067.10.   
D.  Motion for a New Trial and Ensuing Reduction 
of Damages 
 
Defendants filed a motion for “new trial” (or, more 
precisely, in this setting, a new judgment hearing) premised on 
several grounds.  Among other things, and as pertinent now, 
defendants argued that the trial court had awarded excessive 
damages and erred by (1) affording treble damages under 
 
3  
Plaintiff later dismissed its breach of contract and aiding 
and abetting claims.   
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
section 496(c); (2) miscalculating the treble damages award; 
(3) granting a constitutionally excessive amount of punitive 
damages; (4) allowing plaintiff to collect both treble damages 
and punitive damages, rather than requiring plaintiff to elect 
between them; and (5) permitting attorney’s fees under section 
496(c).   
 
The trial court partially denied and partially granted 
defendants’ motion.  As a threshold matter, the court ruled that 
defendants had standing to move for a new trial despite the 
entry of default against them.  On the merits, the court ruled 
that it had properly awarded treble damages and attorney’s fees 
under section 496(c), but had miscalculated the treble damages 
award.  Similarly, the trial court concluded that its punitive 
damages award was constitutionally excessive, and that 
plaintiff must choose to collect either treble damages or punitive 
damages.   
 
Plaintiff filed a notice electing to collect treble damages, 
rather than punitive damages.  Thereafter, the trial court 
entered an amended judgment against defendants, jointly and 
severally, awarding plaintiff (1) actual compensatory damages, 
with interest, of $956,487; (2) another $1,912,974, reflecting 
trebling pursuant to section 496(c); (3) attorney’s fees totaling 
$4,010,008.97; and (4) costs of $187,109.13 — for a total of 
$7,066,579.10.  
E.  The Court of Appeal’s Decision 
 
Defendants appealed from the original default judgment 
and from the amended judgment, challenging the trial court’s 
award of treble damages and attorney’s fees under 496(c).  
Plaintiff 
cross-appealed 
from 
the 
amended 
judgment, 
challenging defendants’ standing, as parties in default, to file a 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
motion for a new trial asserting legal error relating to 
calculation of damages.  As noted, the appellate court below 
ruled for defendants — finding they had standing, and that 
section 496(c) is inapplicable in this setting.  We granted review 
to address apparently conflicting Court of Appeal decisions 
concerning those two issues.4   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standing to Move for a New Trial To Contest 
the Amount of the Default Judgment 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 657 provides that a “party 
aggrieved” may ask the trial court to vacate a verdict (or “other 
decision”) and grant “a new or further trial” for any of seven 
listed “causes . . . materially affecting” the moving party’s 
“substantial rights.”  As pertinent here, subdivision 5 identifies 
“[e]xcessive . . . damages,” subdivision 6  addresses a “verdict or 
other decision [that is] against law,” and subdivision 7 specifies 
“[e]rror in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party 
making the application.”  The Court of Appeal framed the issue:  
“[M]ay a ‘party’ in default move for a new trial when, by virtue 
of the default, there was no trial in the first place?”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129.)   
 
As the appellate court below recognized, a party who is in 
default is barred from further participation in the proceedings, 
 
4  
Thereafter 
the 
“Neman 
parties” 
(Morad 
Neman, 
individually and as former trustee of the Neman Family 
Irrevocable Trust, and the Yedidia Investments Defined Benefit 
Plan) filed in this court a notice of nonappearance.  The notice 
recited that weeks before we granted review of the Court of 
Appeal decision below, the Neman parties settled with plaintiff 
and would file no further briefs in this matter, nor appear at oral 
argument in this court.  
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
and hence from “ ‘except[ing] to’ ” any error during the prove-up 
hearing itself.  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129, citing 
Christerson v. French (1919) 180 Cal. 523, 525; Devlin v. Kearny 
Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385 
(Devlin); and Forbes v. Cameron Petroleums, Inc. (1978) 
83 Cal.App.3d 257, 262.)  Yet, as the Court of Appeal also 
observed, a “plaintiff still bears the burden of proving its 
entitlement to damages to the court.”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129, italics added, citing Barragan v. 
Banco BCH (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 283, 302, and Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 585, subd. (b).)  Correspondingly, the appellate court noted, in 
this setting the trial court “acts as a ‘gatekeeper,’ not a rubber 
stamp,” and remains obligated to ensure that a plaintiff has 
established entitlement to damages under “(1) the relevant 
statute, contract, or legal doctrine, and (2) the well-[pleaded] 
allegations in its operative complaint.”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.)   
 
The appellate court below also explained that entry of 
default “does not entirely render a defaulting defendant persona 
non grata.”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129.)  Even a 
defaulting defendant who has no right to participate at a prove-
up hearing nevertheless may appeal the resulting default 
judgment on grounds that a damages award “(1) ‘is so 
disproportionate to the evidence as to suggest that the verdict 
was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption’ (Uva v. Evans 
(1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 356, 363), (2) ‘is so out of proportion to the 
evidence that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court’ 
([id., at p. 364]), or (3) is ‘contrary to law’ (see Lasalle v. Vogel 
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127, 139 [defaulting party may appeal 
refusal to set aside verdict on these grounds].”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1129–1130.)   
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
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Accordingly, the appellate court reasoned, because it is 
established that “a defaulting defendant can appeal a default 
judgment” on the three grounds listed above, there is “ ‘no 
reason to preclude [defendants] from seeking a new trial (or, 
more precisely, a new judgment hearing)’ ” on those same 
grounds.  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130, italics added, 
quoting Don v. Cruz (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 695, 704 (Don) 
[citing and applying Code Civ. Proc., § 657 subd. 6]; see also 
Misic v. Segars (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1154 (Misic).)  The 
Siry court observed:  “Allowing a defaulting party to bring 
excessive damages based on errors in law to the trial court’s 
attention in a new trial motion puts those potential errors before 
the court with greater familiarity with the case, does so in a 
manner likely to yield a faster result, and may thereby 
altogether obviate the need for an appeal.”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130; see also Don, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 705.)   
 
Although some of our older cases articulated a broad rule 
that a defaulting defendant is out of court and may not move for 
a new trial (see Howard Greer Custom Originals v. Capritti 
(1950) 35 Cal.2d 886, 888–889, and cases cited), in Carney v. 
Simons (1957) 49 Cal.2d 84, we declined to employ such 
preclusive language.5  Thereafter, in Shroeder v. Auto Driveway 
 
5  
The Court of Appeal below observed that in Carney v. 
Simons, supra, 49 Cal.2d 84, we departed “from Howard Greer’s 
sweeping language when it held that a new trial motion is 
appropriate in many different situations ‘except possibly in the 
case of default judgments . . . where there may be the question 
of the right of the moving party to make any objection to the 
judgment.’ ”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130, quoting 
Carney, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 90.)  The Court of Appeal below 
reasoned that because defaulting defendants may appeal the 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, we foreshadowed the determination 
reached by the appellate court below.  We held that a party may 
not “challenge [a] damage award on appeal[] without [first 
making] a motion for a new trial” — and that to conclude 
otherwise would “unnecessarily burden the appellate courts 
with issues which can and should be resolved at the trial level.”  
(Id., at p. 919.)   
 
Efficiency and prudent allocation of judicial resources 
counsel us to apply the same reasoning in the circumstances of 
this case, and to agree with the Court of Appeal below that 
defendants’ challenges to the damages awarded in the original 
and amended default judgments are properly viewed as 
“[e]rror[s] in law” under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, 
subdivision 7.  As noted, that provision addresses “[e]rror in law, 
occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the 
application.”  In context, it is reasonable to view (as apparently 
the Court of Appeal did) the prove-up hearing as constituting 
the “trial” for purposes of this statutory provision.  Although, as 
the appellate court below implicitly acknowledged, defendants 
did not (and, because they were in default, could not) voice, at 
that prove-up hearing, any “except[ion]” (ibid.) to the trial 
court’s alleged legal errors regarding damages and attorney’s 
fees, for reasons of judicial economy defendants may be seen as 
having the right to move for a new trial under that subdivision.  
Quite simply, it would waste resources to require an appellate 
court to resolve an issue that can and should be resolved at the 
 
damages award of a default judgment in the three 
circumstances delineated above, they have the ‘right . . . to make 
an[] objection to the judgment’ and thus, under Carney, may also 
move for a new trial in those same circumstances.”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130.)   
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
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11 
trial court level.  (Don, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 705 [“It 
would be anomalous to hold that the trial court has the power to 
grant a new trial where a fairly contested trial has resulted in 
an award which is excessive as a matter of law, but may not do 
so where the excessive award results from an ex parte 
proceeding”]; cf. In re Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582 
[although Pen. Code, § 1181 (the criminal procedure counterpart 
to Code Civ. Proc., § 657) does not list asserted “ineffective 
assistance of [trial] counsel” as a ground for a new trial motion, 
“in appropriate circumstances justice will be expedited” by 
“presenting the issue of counsel’s effectiveness to the trial court 
as the basis of a motion for new trial,” and the trial court had 
authority to entertain a motion for new trial on such grounds].)   
 
Plaintiff’s other challenges to this conclusion were 
properly addressed and rejected in the appellate court’s opinion 
below.  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1130–1131.)  For 
present purposes, we find it useful to briefly address plaintiff’s 
observation that some Court of Appeal decisions, most notably 
Brooks v. Nelson (1928) 95 Cal.App. 144, 147–148 and Devlin, 
supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at pages 385–386, have asserted that a 
defaulting defendant may not file a motion for new trial under 
any circumstances.  Yet both Brooks and Devlin are 
distinguishable:  The former never squarely addressed the new 
trial motion issue; and the latter’s discussion amounts to 
problematic dictum.  (See Misic, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1154 [Devlin’s “dictum . . . ‘is unsupported by any recent 
authority, and is believed to be incorrect’ ”].)  Moreover, and in 
any event, as the Court of Appeal below explained, those and 
other 
such 
decisions 
are 
distinguishable 
for 
another, 
fundamental reason:  They “did not consider the rationale . . . 
that there is no reason to deprive the trial court of the power to 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
consider challenges to the excessiveness or legal propriety of 
damages when those very same issues can undoubtedly be 
raised on appeal.”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131.)   
 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal, applying Code of Civil 
Procedure section 657, subdivision 7, determined that 
defendants’ challenges to the damages awarded in the original 
and amended default judgment raised, and constituted, 
“[e]rror[s] in law” that were properly brought to the court’s 
attention via defendants’ motion to vacate the trial court’s 
decision and to grant a new trial / judgment hearing.  (Siry, 
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1131–1132.)6  We agree, and now 
proceed to address the substance of the key alleged legal errors.   
 
6  
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s 
“recalculation of treble damages reduced what was effectively 
quadrupled damages down to treble damages; the court’s 
reduction of the punitive damages award was grounded in . . . 
constitutional law defining when such damages become so 
excessive as a matter of law as to deny a defendant due process; 
and the court’s ruling that [plaintiff] must elect between treble 
and punitive damages involved construction of the law.  (Cf. 
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 507 
[only trial court may sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ in evaluating the 
amount of damages].)”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 1131–1132.)   
In a footnote appended to the above passage, the appellate 
court addressed what it viewed as a misstatement made by the 
trial court regarding the applicable subdivision of Code of Civil 
Procedure section 657.  Namely, the Court of Appeal observed 
that the trial court cited that section’s subdivision 5 as the 
ground for its decision to reassess damages, whereas the 
appellate court concluded that the trial court’s reasoning 
showed that it meant to invoke section 657, subdivision 7.  (Siry, 
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132, fn. 11.)   
Like the Court of Appeal below (see Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129, fn. 10), we decline to address the 
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B.  Propriety of the Default Judgment’s Treble 
Damages and Attorney’s Fees Awards 
 Section 496, subdivision (a) (section 496(a)) defines the 
criminal offense of what is commonly referred to as receiving 
stolen property.  As amended in 1972 (Stats. 1972, ch. 963, § 1, 
p. 1739), it provides in relevant part:  “Every person who buys 
or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been 
obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing 
the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, 
withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any 
property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen 
or obtained,” is subject to incarceration.7   
 Section 496(c), similar to some provisions in other 
statutory schemes,8 articulates a right to special civil remedies 
 
damages calculation issues that plaintiff has raised in its briefs, 
or whether it is appropriate to reinstate the original judgment.  
In this regard we note that the damages issues presented by 
plaintiff substantially intersect with those that we may address 
in Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2021) 
64 Cal.App.5th 549, review granted September 1, 2021, 
S269608.   
7  
The subdivision continues, in two final sentences added in 
1992:  “A principal in the actual theft of the property may be 
convicted pursuant to this section.  However, no person may be 
convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the 
same property.”  (§ 496(a), as amended by Stats. 1992, ch. 1146, 
§ 1, p. 5374 [the 1992 amendment also redesignated former 
subds. 1–5 to be subds. (a)–(e)].)  The statute’s subdivision (b) 
addresses a variation of the offense applicable to swap meet 
vendors and is not relevant in this litigation.   
8  
As the Court of Appeal below observed (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137), three prominent statutes provide for 
both treble damages and attorney’s fees upon a showing of a 
predicate violation.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16750, subd. (a) 
[Cartwright Act (state antitrust laws)]; Bus. & Prof. Code, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
when a violation of section 496(a) has occurred.  Subdivision (c), 
as also amended in 1972, states that any person who has been 
injured by a violation of section 496(a) “may bring an action for 
three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by 
the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”   
 As explained below, three prior Court of Appeal decisions 
have addressed section 496(c) and the issues implicated in the 
present proceeding.   
1.  Bell v. Feibush — Finding Section 496(c) Applies 
in the Context of a Loan Scam  
 In Bell v. Feibush (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1043–1044 
(Bell), the defendant induced the plaintiff to loan him more than 
$200,000 “based on the false pretense he owned [a specific 
trademark] and he needed the money to settle a lawsuit over his 
interests in” a related enterprise.  But these representations 
were lies, and the asserted enterprise “a scam.”  (Id., at p. 1044.)  
 
§ 17082 [Unfair Practices Act]; Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a) [Unruh 
Civil Rights Act].)  Numerous other statutes do the same.  (E.g., 
Pen. Code, § 593d, subd. (f)(2) [governing tampering with cable 
video systems]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5330, subds. (a)(2) & (d) 
[willful release of confidential information or records].)  Still 
other statutes, as the appellate court also noted, provide for 
treble damages, without mentioning attorney’s fees.  (E.g., Civ. 
Code, § 1719, subd. (a)(2) [passing checks with insufficient 
funds]; id., § 3345 [“actions brought by, on behalf of, or for the 
benefit of senior citizens or disabled persons . . . to redress 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of 
competition”]; Gov. Code, § 12651, subd. (b) [False Claims Act]; 
Lab. Code, § 230.8, subd. (d) [actions concerning retaliation for 
engaging in “child-related activities” protected by statute].)   
 
As observed post, footnote 10, and in part II.B.5, other 
jurisdictions 
also 
have 
enacted 
statutory 
provisions 
substantially similar to section 496(c), providing “civil theft” 
remedies of treble damages and attorney’s fees.   
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When the plaintiff “asked for her money back, [the defendant] 
gave . . . a ‘litany of excuses’ and never repaid her.”  (Ibid.)   
 Following the defendant’s abuse of discovery, the trial 
court entered a default judgment against him for breach of 
contract, fraud, and treble damages under section 496(c).  On 
appeal the defendant challenged the treble damages award, 
observing that he had not been convicted in a criminal 
proceeding of violating section 496(a).  The appellate court 
concluded, in a preliminary holding that is not challenged in the 
present case, that a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to 
recovery of treble damages under section 496(c).  (Bell, supra, 
212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1044–1047.)  In the course of its 
discussion, the court in Bell stated that although it found “no 
ambiguity or uncertainty in section 496(c),” its construction was 
also “consistent with the statutory purpose expressed in the 
legislative history.”  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1046.)  
That history was aptly described in Bell as follows: 
 
“ ‘Penal Code section 496 was amended in relevant part in 
1972.  Prior to the amendment, the statute did not apply to those 
who sold stolen property; it applied only to those who purchased, 
received, withheld or concealed it.  Nor did it include the 
language currently found in subdivision (c), which permits any 
party injured by a violation of subdivision (a) to bring a civil 
action for damages.  This language was added by Statutes 1972, 
chapter 963, section 1, pages 1739–1740.  It was the result of 
Senate Bill No. 1068 (1972 Reg. Sess.).  The bill was introduced 
at the request of the California Trucking Association, with the 
goal of eliminating markets for stolen property, in order to 
substantially reduce the incentive to hijack cargo from common 
carriers.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1068 
(1972 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 26, 1972.)  Yet while an early 
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16 
version of the bill limited the plaintiffs who may bring civil 
actions to public carriers injured by the knowing purchase, 
receipt, concealment, or withholding of stolen property (Sen. Bill 
No. 1068 (1972 Reg. Sess.) as amended in Senate, May 30, 1972), 
the bill was subsequently amended to expand the class of 
potential plaintiffs to include “[a]ny person who has been 
injured by” the knowing purchase, receipt, concealment or 
withholding of stolen property.  (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill 
No. 1068 (1972 Reg. Sess.) June 26, 1972.)  Moreover, that same 
amendment included the sale of knowingly stolen property 
within its prohibitions, and allowed any person injured by the 
sale of knowingly stolen property to bring a civil action.  In other 
words, it is apparent that the statute, as enacted, broadly allows 
anyone injured by the sale of knowingly stolen property to bring 
a civil action against the seller, in order to reduce thefts by 
eliminating the market for stolen goods.’ ”  (Bell, supra, 
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047, quoting Citizens of Humanity, LLC 
v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1, 17–18,  
disapproved on another ground in Kwikset Corp. v. Superior 
Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 337, fns. omitted in Bell.)   
In connection with the 1972 amendment of section 496(c), 
there was a national effort, led by Alan Bible, a United States 
Senator from Nevada, to address the “$16 billion cost that 
American businesses pay yearly for property crime thievery” 
and encourage other states to follow “California[’s] . . . 
approach” by adopting “treble-damage civil remed[ies].”9  
 
9  
Senator Bible Urges Governors to Push for State Laws to 
Control Fencing:  Asks Support for Justice Department Local-
State-Federal Law Enforcement Effort, Transport Topics 
(Dec. 25, 1972), reprinted in Senate Report No. 93-276, 1st 
Session, pages 44–45, (1973); see Kossen, Sen. Bible Moves in on 
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17 
Various states did so, employing, as in section 496(c), similarly 
broad language, affording treble damages and attorney’s fees to 
“the owner” or “any person” upon a showing of criminal conduct 
constituting theft.10    
 
Big Peddlers of Stolen Goods, San Francisco Examiner (May 13, 
1973) page 28 (noting recent “parallel” legislation in California).  
See generally An Analysis of Criminal Redistribution Systems 
and Their Economic Impact on Small Business, Senate Select 
Committee on Small Business, Staff Report No. 85-141, 92d 
Congress, Second Session (1972) , pages 13–18 (identifying and 
analyzing state statutes concerning stolen property and 
fencing); Blakey & Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribution of Stolen 
Property: The Need for Law Reform (1976) 74 Mich. L.Rev. 1511, 
1604 & fn. 482 (noting that “[t]he concept of treble damages,” 
which originated in Roman criminal law, is employed in federal 
antitrust statutes — and proposing model legislation to be 
enacted in each state, imposing such civil liability upon proof of 
the elements of a criminal violation).   
10   
These statutes are, of course, not identical to ours — yet 
they are, for present purposes, substantially similar.  For 
example, Colorado Revised Statutes section 18-4-405, as 
amended in 1973 (Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 154, § 1, p. 536), 
provides, regarding “[a]ll property obtained by theft,” that “the 
owner may recover . . . three times the amount of the actual 
damages . . . and reasonable attorney fees.”  See also, e.g., 
Connecticut General Statutes section 52-564 (“Any person who 
steals any property of another, or knowingly receives and 
conceals stolen property, shall pay the owner treble his 
damages”)]; Florida Statutes section 772.11(1) (“Any person who 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has been 
injured in any fashion by reason of any violation of [criminal 
statutes, including theft, and dealing in stolen property] has a 
cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and 
. . . reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs in the trial and 
appellate courts”); Michigan Compiled Laws section 600.2919a 
(allowing “a person damaged” to recover treble damages and 
attorney’s fees for theft-related offenses concerning property); 
Ohio Revised Code section 2307.61(A)(1)(b)(ii) & (A)(2) (allowing 
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 Regarding California’s statute, the court in Bell 
summarized:  “This history shows the Legislature believed the 
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions was not enough to reduce 
thefts.  The means to reduce thefts, the Legislature concluded, 
was to dry up the market for stolen goods by permitting treble 
damage recovery by ‘any person’ injured by the knowing 
purchase, receipt, concealment, or withholding of property 
stolen or obtained by theft.  Requiring a criminal conviction 
under section 496(a) . . . before an injured person could recover 
treble damages would not advance the stated goal because civil 
recovery would be limited to those instances in which law 
enforcement authority decided to initiate and complete 
prosecutions.”  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047.)   
 The appellate court in Bell next addressed whether section 
496(a)’s broad phrase, “any manner constituting theft,” includes 
theft of funds by false pretense.  In holding that it does, the court 
examined the defendant’s policy argument that “awarding [the 
plaintiff] treble damages under section 496(c) would ‘open[] the 
door to any collecting creditor to claim that a breach of contract 
action constitutes a fraud, and in turn constitutes a theft, under 
[section 496(a)].’ ”  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047.)  The 
court responded:  “Section 496(a) extends to property ‘that has 
 
“a property owner” to recover treble damages and attorney’s fees 
upon proof of a criminal act of theft); South Carolina Code 
section 16-13-181 (allowing “[a]ny person” who has been injured 
or suffered damages because of a violation of the statutory crime 
of receiving or possessing stolen goods or other property to be 
awarded treble damages and attorney’s fees); Utah Code section 
76-6-412(2) (“Any individual who violates [the statute 
criminalizing receiving stolen property] is civilly liable for three 
times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees”).   
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19 
been obtained in any manner constituting theft.’  Penal Code 
section 484 describes acts constituting theft.  The first sentence 
of section 484, subdivision (a) states:  ‘Every person who shall 
feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal 
property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate 
property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall 
knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent 
representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, 
labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures 
others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile 
character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit 
and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or 
property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of 
theft.’  (Italics added.)  Section 484 thus defines theft to include 
theft by false pretense.  (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 
255, fn. 4.)”  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.)11   
 
11  
The court added:  “Penal Code section 532 also defines 
criminal fraud ‘in terms nearly identical to [section] 
484[,subdivision] (a)’ and ‘provides that these acts are 
punishable “in the same manner and to the same extent” as 
larceny.’  (2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) 
Crimes 
Against 
Property, 
§ 48, 
p. 76.)”  (Bell, 
supra, 
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.)   
 
Relatedly, we have observed that “embezzlement,” which 
is defined as “the fraudulent appropriation of property by a 
person to whom it is intrusted” (§ 503), “is a recognized form of 
theft within the meaning of section 496.”  (People v. Kunkin 
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 250, fn. 7; see also, id., at p. 250 [§ 496’s 
“broad language,” targeting property “ ‘obtained in any manner 
constituting theft,’ ” is “intended to include property which has 
been obtained not only by theft by larceny (i.e., stealing) but also 
by such other forms of theft as embezzlement”].)  Moreover, as 
we have explained, the term “theft” in section 496 includes forms 
of theft listed “in the general theft statute (Pen. Code, § 484), 
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 The court in Bell continued, observing that “[i]n 1927, the 
Legislature consolidated the separate common law crimes of 
larceny, embezzlement, and theft by false pretense in Penal 
Code section 484, subdivision (a).  [Citation.]  The forerunner of 
Penal Code section 496, Penal Code former section 496bb, was 
added by statute in 1935, after this consolidation. . . .  Thus, 
when the Legislature enacted section 496(c), it presumably 
understood that the phrase ‘a violation of subdivision (a)’ would 
include theft by false pretense.”  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1048, italics added, fn. omitted.)  The court in Bell concluded 
that on the facts presented, “[t]he evidence established that [the 
defendant] violated section 496(a) not only by receiving property 
from [the plaintiff] by false pretense, but also by withholding 
that property when she asked for it back.”  (Id., at p. 1049.)12 
 
i.e., theft committed by means of larceny, embezzlement, or false 
pretenses.”  (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 863 (Allen); 
see also People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 648 
[embezzlement is proscribed in both § 503 and in § 484, subd. 
(a)].)  Section 496(a) expressly targets property “obtained in any 
manner constituting theft” (italics added) — and there is no 
reason to conclude that this broad phrase should be viewed as 
excluding theft by embezzlement.  Consistently with this view, 
we observe, the federal district court decisions in Allure Labs., 
Inc. v. Markushevska (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 2019) 606 B.R. 51, 55 
(Allure), and Otte v. Naviscent (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 2021) 624 B.R. 
883, 910–913 (Otte), both applied the statute in the context of 
underlying embezzlement.  Finally, we observe that whereas 
section 
514 
articulates 
the 
criminal 
punishment 
for 
embezzlement, section 496(c) provides the civil remedies for the 
same.   
12  
In other words, the court in Bell observed, the defendant 
in that case violated section 496(a) in alternative ways.  
Unpublished federal decisions have interpreted this aspect of 
Bell as requiring a showing of “additional conduct” — for 
example, conduct such as taking steps to conceal or withhold 
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Finally — and again, relevant to the issues in the current 
litigation — the Court of Appeal in Bell addressed the 
defendant’s contention that permitting recovery of treble 
damages under section 496(c) would be “contrary to public policy 
and permit[] litigants to circumvent limitations on remedies.”  
(Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.)  The court rejected the 
argument, responding:  “Our decision to affirm the default 
judgment is based on straightforward statutory interpretation.  
Section 496(a) extends liability to ‘[e]very person who buys or 
receives any property that has been stolen or that has been 
obtained in any manner constituting theft.’  (Italics added.)  
Penal Code section 484, subdivision (a) describes the acts 
constituting theft to include theft by false pretense, which is the 
 
embezzled funds.  (Grouse River Outfitters Ltd. v. NetSuite, Inc. 
(N.D.Cal., Sept. 12, 2016, No. 16-cv-02954-LB) 2016 WL 
5930273, pp. *13–*15 (Grouse River) [theft by false pretense]; 
Agape Family Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Gridiron (C.D.Cal., May 30, 
2018, No. 5:15-cv-1465-ODW-SP) 2018 WL 2540274, pp. *4–*5 
[breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion].)  At oral 
argument both parties appeared to agree with the view 
expressed in these cases.  We need not, and do not, decide 
whether this reading of the statute is correct.  We observe, 
however, that subsequent federal decisions have criticized, and 
refused to follow, Grouse River and Agape.  (See  Allure, supra, 
606 B.R. 51, 63 [observing that Grouse River and Agape 
misconstrued the decision in Bell by reading the statute to 
impose “as a prerequisite to recovery,” a novel “ ‘additional 
conduct’ requirement” not found in the statutory language]; 
accord, Otte, supra, 624 B.R. 883, 910 [implicitly agreeing with 
Allure that § 496 imposes no such requirement].)  Ultimately the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on review 
of the district court’s decision in Grouse River, held the district 
court erred by dismissing the plaintiff’s section 496(c) claim, and 
by requiring a showing of “ ‘additional conduct’ ” related to that 
claim.  (Grouse River Outfitters, Ltd. v. Oracle Corp. (9th Cir. 
2021) 848 Fed. Appx. 238, 243, fn. 4.)   
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22 
consensual but fraudulent acquisition of property from its 
owner.  [Citation.]  [The defendant] was found liable for fraud, 
i.e., for the fraudulent acquisition of property (money) from its 
owner ([the plaintiff]).  ‘Anything that could be the subject of a 
theft can also be property under section 496.’ ”)  (Bell, supra, 
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.)   
 
The appellate court acknowledged the defendant’s 
“concerns about the potential consequences of our interpretation 
of section 496(c)” but stressed:  “[I]t is the task of the Legislature 
to address those policy concerns.”  (Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1049.)   
2.  Lacagnina v. Comprehend Systems, Inc. — 
Finding Section 496(c) Inapplicable Concerning 
Claimed Theft of Labor in an Employment 
Compensation Dispute 
 The next Court of Appeal decision concerning section 
496(c), Lacagnina v. Comprehend Systems, Inc. (2018) 
25 Cal.App.5th 955 (Lacagnina), arose in the employment 
context.  That case concerned a terminated employee who 
successfully sued his former employer for, among other things, 
breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, seeking lost salary compensation, commissions, 
and other disputed compensation.  The employee also claimed 
treble damages and attorney’s fees under section 496(c), 
asserting “theft” of his “labor.”  (Lacagnina, at p. 970.)  After a 
jury returned a verdict for the employee, the trial court granted 
a nonsuit concerning the statutory claim.  Upon the employee’s 
appeal, the reviewing court affirmed, finding section 496(c) 
inapplicable on the facts presented.  The court reasoned that 
although section 496(a) defines personal property to include 
“money,” it makes no reference to “labor,” which “is not ‘property’ 
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23 
as that term is used in the Penal Code” (Lacagnina, at p. 969);13 
and merely because “labor may be the object of a ‘theft’ does not 
transform it into ‘stolen property.’ ” (Lacagnina, supra, 
25 Cal.App.5th at p. 969.)14   
 
13  
As the appellate court wrote:  “ ‘[T]he Penal Code defines 
property to include “both real and personal property” and 
further defines personal property to include “money, goods, 
chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt.”  (§ 7, subds. 
(10), (12).)’  (People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858. 871.)  The 
statutory definition makes no reference to labor or other 
services.  Nor is there any indication of any intent to use the 
term ‘property’ in section 496 more broadly than the definition 
of the same term already provided by the Penal Code.  ‘ “ ‘[W]hen 
the Legislature uses a term of art, a court construing that use 
must assume that the Legislature was aware of the 
ramifications of its choice of language.’ ”  [Citation.]’ ”  
(Lacagnina, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 969, italics added.)  
14  
In the latter respect the Court of Appeal rejected the 
employee’s reliance on the general theft statute, section 484 
(quoted ante, pt. II.B.1.) to support a broad construction of the 
term “property.”  The appellate court reasoned that although 
that statute provides a broad definition of theft that includes 
taking “ ‘by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, 
. . . money, labor or real or personal property . . .’ (§ 484, subd. 
(a), italics added)[,] [t]he italicized language appears in a clause 
codifying the common law crime of theft by false pretense, which 
includes defrauding another person of labor by false or 
fraudulent representation.”  (Lacagnina, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 969.)  But, the court reasoned, the section “defines theft, 
not property” — and the fact “that labor may be the object of a 
‘theft’ does not transform it into ‘stolen property.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
“Indeed,” the court continued, “we find it significant that while 
section 484 refers to labor, section 496 does not.  The difference 
in language between the two statutes, which are found in the 
same statutory scheme, is further evidence that the Legislature 
did not intend ‘property’ as that term is used in section 496 to 
include ‘labor’; otherwise, it would not have used different terms 
in the two statutes.”  (Ibid.)  The court concluded:  “The 
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24 
 Addressing 
and 
distinguishing 
Bell, 
supra, 
212 Cal.App.4th 1041, the Lacagnina court noted that the 
employee failed to “cite any reported case, nor have we been able 
to identify one, in which a court has deemed labor or services a 
form of ‘property’ that can be stolen, as distinct from personal 
property, whether tangible or intangible.”  (Lacagnina, supra, 
25 Cal.App.5th at p. 970.)   
 After finding section 496(c) inapplicable on the facts 
presented, the appellate court proceeded to address, in dictum, 
alternative bases for its holding.  (Lacagnina, supra, 
25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 970–971.)  First, citing an unpublished 
federal district court decision, it asserted that even assuming 
“labor” qualifies as property under the statute, the statute 
would require that any such labor have already been “ ‘stolen’ at 
the time [the defendant] allegedly defrauded him out of the 
disputed commission.”  (Id., at p. 971, citing Grouse River, supra, 
2016 WL 5930273, at p. *14.)  That assertion appears to be 
erroneous.15  Second, the court proceeded, in dictum within 
 
Legislature showed in section 484 that it knows how to refer to 
‘labor’ as an object of ‘theft’ when it wishes to do so, but it did 
not use that term in section 496.  It follows that labor does not 
constitute ‘stolen property’ within the meaning of that statute.”  
(Lacagnina, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 970.)   
 
The present case does not pose whether wage theft might 
give rise to a claim for treble damages under section 496(c).  We 
express no view concerning whether Lacagnina correctly 
distinguished between the theft of labor or services and the theft 
of other intangible property. 
15   
As observed ante, footnote 7, the final sentences of section 
496(a) provide:  “A principal in the actual theft of the property 
may be convicted pursuant to this section.  However, no person 
may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft 
of the same property.”  This language, which was added in 1992, 
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25 
dictum, to address policy issues that had been alluded to five 
years earlier by the court in Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th 1041.  
Presaging the view elaborated by the Court of Appeal decision 
now under review, the opinion in Lacagnina asserted that 
“significant adverse consequences would likely follow . . . [i]f 
every plaintiff in an employment or contract dispute could also 
seek treble damages and attorney’s fees on the ground that the 
defendant received ‘stolen property.’ ”  (Lacagnina, supra, 
25 Cal.App.5th at p. 972.)  The court expressed concern that 
 
was designed to address difficulties of prosecution in the 
circumstance in which a thief steals property and then keeps it 
until after the statute of limitations has run.  (See Allen, supra, 
21 Cal.4th 846, 858, citing and quoting 4 Stats. 1992, ch. 1146, 
§ 2, p. 5375.)  In Allen we characterized the resulting statutory 
language as “authoriz[ing] a conviction for receiving stolen 
property even though the defendant also stole the property, 
provided he has not actually been convicted of the theft.”  (Allen, 
at p. 857.)  So viewed, the statutory language is inconsistent 
with the assertion in Lacagnina’s dictum that section 496(a) 
contemplates that property must already have been stolen when 
it comes into the defendant’s hands.   
 
Neither, we observe, does more recent federal authority 
support Lacagnina’s dictum.  Granted, when Lacagnina was 
filed, the cited federal district court’s unpublished decision 
construed the statute as requiring a showing that when the 
property in question comes into the defendant’s hands, it must 
already have the character of having been stolen.  But, as 
alluded to earlier, on review of the district court’s decision in 
Grouse River, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit appears to have disapproved such a reading of the 
statute.  (Grouse River Outfitters, Ltd. v. Oracle Corp., supra, 
848 Fed. Appx. 238, 242–243.)  Nor have other federal district 
courts, in well-reasoned decisions, mentioned any such asserted 
requirement in the course of applying section 496 and 
permitting treble damages and attorney’s fees in analogous 
“theft of funds” circumstances.  (See Allure, supra, 606 B.R. 51, 
63–66; Otte, supra, 624 B.R. 883, 911–913.)   
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26 
“such claims would become the rule rather than the exception, 
parties would more frequently assert claims for ‘theft’ in run-of-
the-mill commercial disputes, and cases would be harder to 
settle” — and the court articulated doubt that “the Legislature 
contemplated, much less intended, those consequences when it 
enacted section 496[(c)].”  (Ibid.)   
3.  Switzer v. Wood — Finding Section 496(c) Applies 
to Claims of Fraud and Breach of Contract in the 
Joint Venture / Limited Liability Corporation 
Context  
 In Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116 (Switzer), 
the third and most recent Court of Appeal decision prior to the 
one under review, the appellate court found section 496(c) 
applicable in the setting we face in the present litigation — an 
equity income sharing dispute between joint venture / limited 
liability business partners.  As in the opinions rendered in Bell 
and Lacagnina, the Switzer court also acknowledged and 
addressed the policy implications of its statutory interpretation.   
 In Switzer, the parties were business partners who sold 
medical devices.  The plaintiff sued his partner and a related 
entity alleging, among other things, breach of contract, fraud, 
and breach of fiduciary duty concerning distribution of equity 
income funds.  The plaintiff also sought the civil remedies 
afforded by section 496(c), treble damages, and attorney’s fees.  
A jury found by special verdict for the plaintiff and awarded 
money damages, but the trial court declined to award additional 
remedies under the statute.  Consistent with the closing dictum 
in Lacagnina, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at page 972, the trial court 
reasoned that even though the plaintiff appeared entitled to 
such remedies under the words of section 496(c), “the 
Legislature could not have intended to apply the treble damage 
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27 
remedy to wrongful conduct committed in the context of a joint 
venture or preexisting business relationship where ordinary 
fraud and breach of contract remedies would be available.”  
(Switzer, 
supra, 
35 
Cal.App.5th 
at 
pp. 119–120 
[so 
characterizing the trial court’s ruling]; see also id., at p. 124 
[quoting the trial court].)   
 The Court of Appeal reversed.  It observed, as had the Bell 
court, that the language of section 496(c) “is clear and 
unambiguous.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 126.)  “All 
that is required for civil liability to attach under section 496(c), 
including entitlement to treble damages, is that a ‘violation’ of 
. . . section 496[(a)] is found to have occurred.  [Citation.]  
A violation may be found to have occurred if the person engaged 
in the conduct described in the statute.”  (Ibid.)  The Switzer 
court noted that although section 496(a) “covers a spectrum of 
impermissible activity relating to stolen property, the elements 
required to show a violation of [that section] are simply that 
(i) property was stolen or obtained in a manner constituting 
theft, (ii) the defendant knew the property was so stolen or 
obtained, and (iii) the defendant received or had possession of 
the stolen property.”  (Switzer, supra, at p. 126.)  
 The Switzer court also observed that “[a] violation of 
section 496(a) may, by its own terms, relate to property that has 
been ‘stolen’ or ‘that has been obtained in any manner 
constituting theft . . . .”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 126.)  Like the opinion in Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at page 
1048, the appellate court looked to the general theft statute, 
section 484, subdivision (a) (quoted ante, pt. II.B.1.) for the 
definition of what constitutes a theft.  The Switzer court 
highlighted (1) Bell’s “ ‘straightforward [conclusion of] statutory 
interpretation’ ” that the “theft [of funds] by false pretenses” 
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proved in that case established a violation of section 496(a) and 
triggered treble damages under section 496(c) (Switzer, supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 127), and (2) Bell’s admonition that “ ‘policy 
concerns’ ” about inappropriate circumvention of traditional 
limits on civil remedies constituted an issue that “would have to 
be addressed to the Legislature.”  (Switzer, supra, at p. 127.)   
 The appellate court in Switzer determined that the same 
result was appropriate on the facts and claims before it.  The 
court reasoned:  “[I]t is undisputed that the jury specifically and 
unequivocally found all the factual elements necessary to 
establish that [the defendants] had engaged in conduct 
constituting a violation of section 496(a).”  (Switzer, supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 127.)  Specifically, the court determined, 
the jury found “that (i) [the defendants] obtained by theft 
property [funds] belonging to [the plaintiff], and concealed or 
withheld such property and/or aided in concealing or 
withholding such property from [the plaintiff]; (ii) [the 
defendants] knew the property was obtained by theft at the time 
they received, withheld, concealed, or aided in concealing or 
withholding the property from [the plaintiff]; and (iii) [the 
defendants’] violation of section 496(a) caused [the plaintiff] to 
suffer actual damage, loss, or harm.”  (Switzer, at pp. 127–128.)  
The court concluded:  “These explicit findings of fact by the jury, 
which [were not] challenged on appeal, clearly establish 
violation(s) of section 496(a).”  (Id., at p. 128.)  Accordingly, 
“under the plain and literal terms of section 496(c), [the 
plaintiff] was entitled to an award of three times his actual 
damages . . . .”  (Ibid.)   
 The court in Switzer next addressed the defendants’ 
argument “that section 496(c) should not be applied in a literal 
manner because the Legislature could not have intended to 
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extend the statutory treble damage remedy into the context of 
an ordinary business dispute where traditional remedies for 
breach of contract, fraud and conversion were available.”  
(Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 128.)  The defendants 
asserted that “despite the clear and unambiguous wording of the 
statutory provision,” a “narrower construction” — such as one 
confining treble damages “to theft crimes involving common 
carriers’ cargo” — “should be adopted to avoid absurdity.”  
(Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that pursuant 
to fundamental principles of statutory interpretation, under 
which a court “ ‘ “look[s] to the intent of the Legislature as 
expressed by the actual words of the statute” [citation], “giving 
them a plain and commonsense meaning” ’ ” (ibid.), the statute’s 
“ ‘ “clear and unambiguous” ’ ” language left “ ‘ “no need for 
construction,” ’ ” and the court would “ ‘ “not speculate that the 
Legislature meant something other than what it said” ’ ” or 
“ ‘ “rewrite a statute to posit an unexpressed intent.” ’ ” (Ibid., 
italics added.)    
 The Court of Appeal acknowledged a narrow exception to 
these standard principles of statutory construction exists when 
it can be determined that honoring statutory language “would 
frustrate the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole or 
otherwise 
lead 
to 
absurd 
results.” 
 
(Switzer, 
supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 129, citing California School Employees 
Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340.)  And yet, 
the court observed, this limited exception “requires much more 
than showing that troubling consequences may potentially 
result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a 
different approach would have been wiser or better.  (In re D.B. 
[(2014)] 58 Cal.4th [941,] 948 . . . .)  Rather, ‘[t]o justify 
departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the 
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results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could 
not have intended them.’  (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 948.)  Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the 
absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used 
most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else 
we violate the separation of powers principle of government.  
[Citation.]  We do not sit as a “super-legislature.”  [Citation.]’ ”  
(Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 129.)   
 The appellate court concluded that its understanding of 
section 496(c)’s words was not “absurd at all, much less so 
absurd in its results that we would be permitted to disregard its 
literal wording.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 129.)  
“The wording of the statute makes no exception for cases 
involving preexisting business relationships, nor does it limit 
applicability to violations involving common carriers or truck 
cargo, and we are not at liberty to insert such omitted terms into 
the statute.”  (Id., at pp. 129–130.)   
 The court in Switzer surmised that in light of the language 
chosen, the Legislature “apparently believed that any violation 
of section 496(a),” if proved, “would warrant the availability of 
treble damages.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 130.)  
The court explained:  “The creation of an enhanced civil remedy 
for any person injured by the theft-related criminal offenses 
defined in the statute is certainly not absurd or unreasonable.  
Considering the nature of the offense described by the statute 
and the apparent goal of deterring such theft-related conduct, 
the provision as literally written of an enhanced civil remedy to 
‘any person’ injured by that particular offense constituted a 
reasonable legislative policy decision.  The fact that the treble 
damage remedy may come into play where (as here) the parties 
were in a preexisting business relationship in which the 
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31 
remedies at law have traditionally been limited (e.g., for fraud, 
conversion, or breach of contract) — while arguably a valid 
policy argument — manifestly falls short of establishing the 
absurdity exception.  In the final analysis, we are unable to 
conclude that the results produced by a literal reading of the 
statute would be ‘so unreasonable the Legislature could not 
have intended them.’  (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 948 . . . .)  In other words, the potential results of following 
the unambiguous literal wording of section 496(c) are not so 
absurd or unreasonable that we would be justified to override 
its plain meaning.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 130.)   
 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the recurrent policy 
concerns that had first been voiced in Bell, and elaborated upon 
on in Lacagnina, regarding the potential consequences of its 
interpretation of section 496(c).  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 130.)  Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded, “it is the 
task of the Legislature to address those policy concerns.’ ”  (Ibid., 
quoting Bell, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049, italics in 
original.)  The court added:  “Of course, as always “[t]he 
Legislature . . . remains free to amend [the statute] if the 
language it has enacted is now understood to create unintended 
consequences.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 130.)   
 The appellate court next confronted the defendants’ 
assertion that the legislative history (partially set out in Bell, 
supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1041, and described ante, pt. II.B.1.) 
supported a contrary understanding of the statute.  In rejecting 
that view, the court stressed the provision’s  amendment history 
and that it was designed, not solely to deter theft, but also to 
provide a new civil remedy to those who have been injured by a 
violation of the statute.  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 
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32 
p. 131.)16  In the former respect, the court emphasized, the 
original 1972 bill was written broadly to authorize “ ‘any 
person’ ” injured by a violation of the section to be awarded 
treble damages (and attorney’s fees); it was later amended to 
limit those civil remedies to “for-hire carriers”; but that version 
was “short-lived” — within a few weeks the original broad 
version was restored, to read as it does now.  (Switzer, supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 131.)   
 The court summarized:  “As the above outline of the 
legislative history makes clear, although [the 1972 bill] may 
have been briefly amended during the legislative committee 
process to have a narrower remedial focus (i.e., for-hire carriers), 
the Legislature ultimately restored the wording giving a treble 
damage remedy to ‘any person’ who was injured by a violation 
of section 496.  Therefore, because the Legislature clearly 
approved and endorsed the broader scope of the civil remedy as 
provided in current section 496(c), we conclude the legislative 
history does not support [the defendants’] contention that 
section 496(c) was intended to have a narrow focus that would 
apply only to common carriers or to situations involving theft in 
the cargo industry.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 132.)   
 
16  
In this regard, the appellate court observed, although 
“deterrence of theft” was one goal of the legislation, “another 
purpose . . . was expressly stated in the analysis provided by the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary”:  “ ‘[E]stablish[ing] a civil 
remedy for persons who have been injured by another’s 
purchase, concealment, sale, or withholding of property where 
such person knows the property has been stolen.’ ”  (Switzer, 
supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 131–132, quoting Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1068 (1972 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 26, 1972, p. 1.)   
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Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
plaintiff was entitled under section 496(c) to an award of treble 
damages.  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 132.)  In the 
unpublished part of its opinion, the appellate court reversed the 
trial court’s denial of the motion for attorney’s fees under that 
same statute, and directed the trial court to issue a new order 
awarding attorney’s fees.   
4.  The Appellate Decision Below   
 In this matter, the Court of Appeal framed the issue as 
whether section 496(c) authorizes treble damages when, as here, 
“the underlying conduct did not involve trafficking in stolen 
property, but rather the improper diversion of a limited 
partnership’s 
cash 
distributions 
through 
fraud, 
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1133.)  The court characterized the three 
appellate decisions described above as reflecting different 
“approaches to the issue” of section 496(c)’s applicability.  (Siry, 
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1133.)  It then explained:  “We chart 
yet a different path in ruling that treble damages are not 
available under [section 496(c)] in cases where the plaintiff 
merely 
alleges 
and 
proves 
conduct 
involving 
fraud, 
misrepresentation, conversion, or some other type of theft that 
does not involve ‘stolen’ property.”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1134, italics added.)  In other words, as the court later 
explicated, it determined that section 496(c) applies generally 
when there is evidence that “property” has been the subject of 
theft — but the statute does not apply in “theft-related tort 
cases” (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.5th at p. 1136) involving fraud, 
misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty.   
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34 
 Before commencing its statutory construction analysis, 
the appellate court below presented a general overview of 
statutory interpretation, during which it quoted various truisms 
from past decisions of this court.  It began:  “The ‘first task’ of 
any court ‘in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the 
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ ”  (Siry, 
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1134, quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair 
Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386 
(Dyna-Med).)  The appellate court acknowledged that a statute’s 
language usually provides “ ‘ “the most reliable indication of 
legislative intent.” ’ ”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1134.)  
Yet, the appellate court noted, the “ ‘ “plain meaning” rule does 
not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal 
meaning of a statute comports with its purpose.’ ”  (Id., at 
p. 1135, quoting Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 
735 (Lungren).)   
 Next, the appellate court noted, in our own decisions we 
have “refused to ‘ “presume that the Legislature intends, when 
it enacts a statute, to overthrow long-established principles of 
law unless such intention is clearly expressed or necessarily 
implied.” ’ ”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1135, quoting 
Brodie v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1313, 
1325 (Brodie), and citing Van Horn v. Watson (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
322, 333 (Van Horn).)  Moreover, as the Court of Appeal 
observed, we have remarked, “ ‘[i]t is doubtful that the 
Legislature would . . . institute[] . . . significant change through 
silence.’ ”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1135, quoting 
Riverside County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 
646–647 (Stiglitz), and citing In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
768, 782 (Christian S.).)  Applying these principles, the 
appellate court reasoned that allowing section 496(c) “to 
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35 
authorize an award of treble damages whenever a plaintiff 
proves (or, in the case of a default, sufficiently alleges) any type 
of theft — whether it be fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, 
or breach of fiduciary duty — by which the defendant obtains 
money or property would institute [such] a ‘significant change’ 
[through silence].”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1135.)   
 The Court of Appeal proceeded to elaborate on various 
grounds for its conclusion.  First, it reasoned, a literal and broad 
reading of the statute “would transmogrify the law of remedies” 
for the torts of fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, and breach 
of fiduciary duty.  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1135.)  The 
court noted that the traditional damages remedy for these torts 
has been limited to the amount of actual damages caused by the 
perpetrators.  (Ibid.)  Affording treble damages in such settings, 
the appellate court asserted, “would all but eclipse these 
traditional damages remedies.”  (Id., at p. 1136.)   
 Second, the Court of Appeal reasoned, construing section 
496(c) to apply in theft-related tort cases would impliedly and 
effectively “repeal the punitive damages statutes.”  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136.)  The court observed that normally a 
plaintiff seeking greater than compensatory damages must 
meet strict standards applicable to punitive damages — i.e., 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the defendant “ ‘guilty 
of oppression, fraud, or malice.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Civ. Code, 
§ 3294, subd. (a).)  Yet, the appellate court asserted, if section 
496(c) applied to these torts, “a plaintiff could obtain treble 
damages merely by proving the tort itself by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136.)   
 Third, the appellate court asserted, because section 496(c) 
authorizes attorney’s fees in addition to treble damages, 
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36 
recognizing its application in the present setting (as the court in 
Switzer did in closely analogous circumstances) would, in effect, 
authorize fee shifting “in nearly every tort case involving fraud, 
misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty, thereby creating 
a gaping exception to the general rule against such fee shifting.”  
(Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136, fn. 12.)   
 Fourth, the appellate court turned to the same legislative 
history recounted earlier, analyzed by the Bell and Switzer 
courts — yet drew the opposite conclusion.  The court focused on 
the history’s recitation of “discussions about how best to achieve 
the ‘goal of eliminating markets for stolen property, in order to 
substantially reduce the incentive to hijack cargo from common 
carriers.’ ”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136.)  It implicitly 
acknowledged that the 1972 bill initially was written broadly, 
subsequently was narrowed, and then ultimately reverted to the 
present broad phrasing.  Still, the appellate court reasoned, the 
Legislature’s “focus never strayed from drying up the market for 
stolen goods” (id., at p. 1137), and thus, the court could not “infer 
any legislative intent” to effectuate the “significant change” that 
would result if the statute were construed to afford treble 
damages (ibid.).  Indeed, the appellate court said, the 
“Legislature’s silence” concerning such intent “is even more 
deafening when contrasted with other statutes that speak with 
a much clearer voice” when “creating the extraordinary remedy 
of treble damages.”  (Ibid.)  In view of all this, the appellate court 
determined, it could not “presume that our Legislature intended 
to so significantly alter the universe of tort remedies without 
saying anything about its desire to do so.”  (Ibid.)   
 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal concluded that section 
496(c)’s “language sweeps more broadly than its intent,” and 
hence must be understood, despite its unambiguous words, to 
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withhold “the remedy of treble damages for torts not involving 
stolen property.”  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137.)  The 
appellate court acknowledged that this conclusion conflicts with 
the decisions in Bell and especially Switzer, but explained that, 
in its view, the present case presents a situation in which 
perceived “legislative intent” (to maintain traditional remedies 
for torts involving fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of 
fiduciary duty) “trump[s] [the] statute’s plain language.”  (Ibid.)  
And so, the court explained, the “narrower intent” that it 
attributed to the Legislature “is controlling” and applies here.  
(Ibid.)   
 The court further determined that in light of its reading of 
section 496(c), not only are treble damages unavailable in this 
setting, but correspondingly, the statute provides no basis for 
the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.  (Siry, supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138.)   
5.  Our Understanding of Section 496(c) as Applied 
Here 
 Viewing the issue independently as a matter of law, we 
endorse the analysis of Bell and Switzer — even though, at the 
same time, we acknowledge that some of the policy 
considerations highlighted in those cases, and elaborated upon 
by the appellate court below, give pause.  Fundamentally, we 
agree with the conclusions of Bell and Switzer that section 496(c) 
is unambiguous, and that read together with sections 496(a) and 
484, and in conformity with our standard approach to 
interpretation (e.g., Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 
183, 190), section 496(c) must be understood as yielding the 
understanding attributed to it in those decisions:  A plaintiff 
may recover treble damages and attorney’s fees under section 
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38 
496(c) when property has been obtained in any manner 
constituting theft.   
 We also find that section 496(c) applies concerning the 
conduct at issue in the present case.  The unambiguous relevant 
language covers fraudulent diversion of partnership funds.  
Defendants’ conduct falls within the ambit of section 496(a):  
They “receive[d]” “property” (the diverted partnership funds) 
belonging to plaintiff, having “obtained” the diverted funds “in 
[a] manner constituting theft.”  (Ibid.)  Defendants also  
conceal[ed]” or “withh[e]ld[]” those funds (and/or aided in 
concealing or withholding them) from plaintiff.  (Ibid.)  They did 
all of this “knowing” the diverted funds were “so . . . obtained.”  
(Ibid.)   
 We pause to elaborate on these points, and, specifically, 
criminal intent under the statute.  Because this litigation comes 
to us upon default judgment, defendants are deemed to have 
admitted all material allegations, including the allegation that 
defendants committed theft.  Although we are not asked here to 
determine whether plaintiff would have been able to prove theft, 
we observe that not all commercial or consumer disputes 
alleging that a defendant obtained money or property through 
fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of a contractual promise will 
amount to a theft.  To prove theft, a plaintiff must establish 
criminal intent on the part of the defendant beyond “mere proof 
of nonperformance or actual falsity.”  (People v. Ashley (1954) 
42 Cal.2d 246, 264.)  This requirement prevents “ ‘[o]rdinary 
commercial defaults’ ” from being transformed into a theft.  (Id., 
at p. 265.)  If misrepresentations or unfulfilled promises “are 
made innocently or inadvertently, they can no more form the 
basis for a prosecution for obtaining property by false pretenses 
than can an innocent breach of contract.”  (Id., at p. 264.)  In this 
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39 
case, the record appears consistent with a conclusion that 
defendants acted not innocently or inadvertently, but with 
careful planning and deliberation reflecting the requisite 
criminal intent.   
 Defendants’ violation of section 496(a) caused plaintiff to 
suffer actual damage, loss, or harm.  (See Switzer, supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 127–128.)  In these circumstances, 
plaintiff qualifies under section 496(c) as “[a]ny person who has 
been injured by a violation of subdivision (a)” — and hence is 
entitled to “bring an action for three times the amount of actual 
damages, if any . . . and reasonable attorney’s fees.”  Finally, as 
the court in Switzer also observed, this construction and 
application of the statute cannot be avoided under the so-called 
“absurdity exception.”17  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 129.) 
 
17  
That doctrine, if apt here, would arguably permit a court 
to decline to honor section 496(c)’s words, and instead construe 
the provision as the Court of Appeal ultimately did — to 
withhold, rather than to afford, treble damages and attorney’s 
fees in this setting.  Yet, as the Court of Appeal below implicitly 
acknowledged, section 496(c) is not susceptible to such a 
narrowing construction on the basis of an absurdity exception 
analysis because, for the reasons well articulated by the court in 
Switzer (described ante, pt. II.B.3.), reading section 496(c)’s 
words to give them full effect would not “frustrate the manifest 
purpose of the legislation as a whole or otherwise lead to absurd 
results.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 129.)  Indeed, as 
the court in Switzer concluded, in light of “the offense described 
by [section 496(a)] and the apparent goal of deterring such theft-
related conduct, the provision” as written — affording an 
enhanced civil remedy to “any person” who is injured by a 
violation — may be said to “constitute[] a reasonable legislative 
policy decision.”  (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 130, 
italics added.)  In any event, it cannot be said that such an 
understanding of the statute as written would reflect an “absurd 
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 As noted earlier, in reaching its contrary determination 
the appellate court quoted selected language from our decisions 
concerning 
statutory 
interpretation. 
 
(Siry, 
supra, 
45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1134–1135.)  Yet, as we shall explain, 
these fundamental statutory construction truisms do not, in the 
present circumstances, support the Court of Appeal’s ultimate 
conclusion.   
 To begin with, Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 1386, 
quoted by the Court of Appeal concerning the need to ascertain 
the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of 
the law, concerned ambiguous statutory language — and hence 
is distinguishable from the present litigation.  Similarly, and 
most significantly, although the appellate court below cited 
Lungren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 725, in support of the 
proposition that a court may properly inquire whether a literal 
meaning of a statute comports with its purpose, close review of 
that decision reveals that, in fact, we simply evaluated 
constitutional language that was subject to two alternate 
constructions, and endorsed the interpretation that avoided 
problematic internal inconsistencies within the overall scheme.  
In neither of these cases did we do anything similar to what the 
appellate court below proposes we do here — construe otherwise 
clear and unambiguous standalone language so as to withhold, 
rather than afford, that which its full and natural words 
provide.   
 
or unreasonable” legislative policy determination.  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  The parties cite no decision, and we are aware of none, 
finding the absurdity exception applicable on facts such as those 
at issue here.   
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41 
 Likewise, although the appellate court below cited cases 
such as Brodie, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 1325, in support of the 
proposition that courts should be very reluctant to infer 
legislative intent to overthrow long-standing principles of law 
(and thereby significantly alter traditional limits on remedies in 
the face of legislative silence on that issue, or absent clearly 
expressed legislative intent to do so), Brodie and related 
decisions are inapt in the current circumstances.  In Brodie, 
contrasted with the present case, we faced statutory language 
that reflected a latent ambiguity.  On one hand, the Legislature 
clearly intended to modify a discrete aspect of the workers’ 
compensation law.  Yet the statute was silent regarding whether 
the Legislature intended also to effectuate a corresponding 
broader 
change 
that 
would 
overthrow 
long-established 
apportionment principles.  In that setting, and in the face of 
ambiguity concerning the intended scope of the change to the 
statute, we invoked the traditional rule, declining to presume 
legislative intent to bring about such a major change in the face 
of silence — and we concluded, after reviewing the relevant 
legislative history, that only the limited, and not any 
monumental, change was intended.  (Brodie, supra, 40 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1325–1332.)  By contrast, the words of section 496(c) 
present no ambiguity, and the statutory construction issue 
before us today poses no interpretive challenge analogous to 
that in Brodie or related cases such as Stiglitz, supra, 60 Cal.4th 
624, 646–647, Van Horn, supra, 45 Cal.4th 322, 333, and 
Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th 768, 782.   
 As observed earlier, the Court of Appeal characterized the 
present circumstances as reflecting legislative “silence” 
concerning the scope of treble damages and attorney’s fees 
remedies created by section 496(c), and it asserted that, in 
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42 
comparison, the Legislature has spoken with appreciably more 
clarity in the course of enacting seven other statutes in which it 
has afforded such remedies.  (Siry, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1137.)  Ultimately it appears that the appellate court 
discerned authority to give the statute a narrow cast, divorced 
from its words — based largely on the assertion that the 
Legislature has not spoken with similar or requisite clarity here.  
And yet our review of the statutes does not reveal support for 
any such distinction.18   
 Although the appellate court below articulated policy 
concerns that affording remedies flowing from section 496(c)’s 
language would generally and expansively allow remedies 
beyond those traditionally afforded at law for fraud, conversion, 
or breach of contract, these policy issues have not been hidden 
from the Legislature’s attention, nor are they new.  As observed 
ante, footnote 10, broadly applicable analogous “enhanced civil 
remedies” statutes akin to section 496(c), also allowing recovery 
 
18  
Addressing, as representative, the most prominent three 
of the other statutes, we observe:  Neither Business and 
Professions Code section 16750, subdivision (a) (providing treble 
damages and attorney’s fees for violations of the Cartwright Act, 
articulating our state’s antitrust laws), nor Business and 
Professions Code section 17082 (specifying treble damages and 
attorney’s fees for violations of the Unfair Practices Act), nor 
Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a) (establishing treble 
damages and attorney’s fees for the violation of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act), contains any special legislative intent language, in 
the process of creating those remedies.  Nor do any of these 
statutes reference provisions to which such special remedies 
apply in order to clarify, limit, or narrow the scope of the causes 
of action as to which those remedies are available.  Likewise, 
none of the other statutes cited by the appellate court (see ante, 
fn. 8) appear to contain any such clarifying, limiting, or 
narrowing language.   
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43 
of treble damages and attorney’s fees upon a showing of criminal 
theft, have been enacted in other jurisdictions.  Likewise, 
although some out-of-state decisions have, similarly to 
Lacagnina, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 955, construed their own 
statutes as not applying in factual circumstances different from 
those in the present case,19 courts of those jurisdictions also 
have found their statutes do apply in factual circumstances like 
those we face here — in which funds were obtained or withheld 
in a manner constituting theft.  Indeed, courts of other states 
have so construed their statutes even in the face of policy-based 
admonitions against unduly expanding such remedies.   
 
19  
See, e.g., In re Dorland (Bankr. D.Colo. 2007) 374 B.R. 
765, 780 (declining to award treble damages and attorney’s fees 
under the Colorado statute (quoted ante, fn. 10) because the 
plaintiff failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all 
of the elements of theft — specifically, intent to deprive one 
permanently of the use or benefit of funds); Merslich v. 
Schnellenberger (Fl.Ct.App. 1991) 578 So.2d 725, 725 (trial court 
properly exercised discretion in declining to award treble 
damages under the Florida statute (described ante, fn. 10) when 
the plaintiff failed to prove the requisite mental state on a claim 
arising from the defendant’s fraudulent transfer of funds); 
Hoffenblum v. Hoffenblum (Mich. App. 2014) 863 N.W.2d 352, 
360 (trial court properly exercised discretion in declining to 
award children treble damages under Michigan statute 
(described ante, fn. 10) on conversion claim against father, 
arising from his unlawful withdrawal of money from their trust 
accounts, when father’s conduct was undertaken on advice of his 
financial advisor); see generally Annotation, What is “Intent to 
Deprive” Sufficient to Establish Liability for Civil, or Statutory, 
Theft (2018) 35 A.L.R.7th 1 (focusing primarily on decisions 
applying the Connecticut statute (quoted ante, fn. 10), and 
revealing that Connecticut courts, as well as others applying 
similar “civil theft” statutes, have in numerous contexts found 
the “intent to deprive” element unsatisfied, and hence have 
refused to award treble damages).   
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
Cases construing Colorado Revised Statutes, section 18-4-
405 (quoted ante, fn. 10) in circumstances like those we face here 
are particularly illuminating.  An early decision expressed 
policy concerns about subjecting “every trustee, bailee, broker, 
or other fiduciary to treble damages and attorney fees,” thus 
“supplant[ing] common law conversion claims” — and saw this 
as a result the state legislature “could not have contemplated or 
intended.”  (Itin v. Bertrand T. Ungar, P.C. (Colo.App. 1998) 978 
P.2d 142, 145.)  But on review the Colorado Supreme Court, in 
Itin v. Ungar (Colo. 2000) 17 P.3d 129, disagreed.  It held that 
although the statute, like ours, had been triggered by trucking 
industry interests (id., at p. 134, fn. 8), under the provision’s 
broad wording, the plaintiff was properly awarded such 
remedies stemming from the illegal diversion of funds.  (Id., at 
p. 135; accord, e.g., Rhino Fund, LLLP v. Hutchins (Colo.App. 
2008) 215 P.3d 1186, 1194 [rejecting assertion that the 
“economic loss rule” “ ‘abrogate[s] a legislatively created scheme 
designed to extend a civil remedy to those harmed by alleged 
criminal activity’ ”]; see also Tisch v. Tisch (Colo.App. 2019) 439 
P.3d 89, 103–105 [defendant’s appropriation of company funds 
for personal use triggered treble damages for civil theft].)   
 
Most recently, the Colorado Supreme Court held that its 
statute applies even in the context of an employee’s breach of 
contract — there, by improperly taking confidential proprietary 
information from his employer.  (Bermel v. BlueRadios, Inc. 
(Colo. 2019) 440 P.3d 1150.)  The court observed that “[t]he 
availability of treble damages and attorney fees for civil theft 
reflects the legislature’s displeasure with the proscribed conduct 
and its desire to deter it” (id., at p. 1157), and stressed, “it is not 
this court’s place to substitute the judiciary’s policy judgments 
for those of the General Assembly” (id., at p. 1158).  To the 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
contrary, the state supreme court said:  “Because the 
legislature’s intent to provide a statutory remedy to victims of 
theft is plain from the face of the statute, no contrary statutory 
provision is before us, and there has been no allegation that the 
statute is unconstitutional, we are without any basis in law to 
limit the remedy it provides” (id., at p. 1159).  The Colorado high 
court reached these determinations over dissenting objections 
that doing so violates the “economic loss rule” and “dramatically 
expands [the plaintiff’s] contractual remedies and establishes a 
precedent that [may] inappropriately allow many future 
contract claims to be asserted as civil theft claims, in pursuit of 
otherwise unavailable treble damages and attorney fees 
awards.”  (Id., at p. 1160 (dis. opn. of Gabriel, J.).)20  
 As noted ante, part II.B.1–3, the same policy issues 
addressed in Colorado over the course of more than two decades 
 
20  
Accord, see, e.g., Discovery Leasing v. Murphy (Conn.App. 
1993) 635 A.2d 843, 847 (applying the Connecticut statute 
(quoted ante, fn. 10), and finding that plaintiff established a 
prima facie case of conversion of investment funds and statutory 
theft of funds); In re Hamama (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 1995) 182 B.R. 
757, 758 (under the Michigan statute (described ante, fn. 10), 
debtor who improperly withdrew money from employee’s bank 
account was liable for statutory treble damages); New Properties 
v. Newpower (Mich.App. 2009) 762 N.W.2d 178, 189–190 (also 
under the Michigan statute, corporate investors were entitled to 
treble damages from a real estate business defendant who 
embezzled and transferred funds for its own use); Department of 
Agriculture v. Appletree Marketing, LLC (Mich. 2010) 779 
N.W.2d 237, 240–242 (also under the Michigan statute, finding 
treble damages appropriate regarding a defendant who 
wrongfully spent trust funds on his own debts and failed to remit 
funds).  Accord, Zinn v. Zinn (Fla.Ct.App. 1989) 549 So.2d 1141, 
1142 (implicitly applying the Florida statute (quoted ante, 
fn. 10), and affirming an award of treble damages based on “civil 
theft” concerning investment funds). 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
also have been highlighted in the published opinions in Bell, 
Lacagnina, and Switzer.  Our Legislature is the appropriate 
body to address whether section 496(c) should be altered in light 
of our appellate courts’ repeated constructive focus on these and 
related policy issues.  As alluded to earlier, and especially in 
light of the underlying legislative and case law history, any 
question we might harbor about how to properly balance such 
policy issues “manifestly falls short of establishing the absurdity 
exception” (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 130) and leaves 
us with no room to decline to honor the words, as written, of 
section 496(c).   
 
Although defendants and the Court of Appeal below insist 
the Legislature was primarily concerned with the theft of cargo, 
as we have observed, “statutory prohibitions ‘often go beyond 
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal 
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.’ ”  (Smith 
v. LoanMe, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 199.)  Moreover, as noted 
ante, part II.B.1., during the amendment process for the 1972 
bill the Legislature expressly removed narrowing language (that 
would have limited coverage to “for-hire carriers”) and replaced 
it with the present broad language, “[a]ny person.”  In analogous 
circumstances concerning this same scheme, we have observed, 
“[W]e cannot read [that limitation] back into the resulting 
statute.”  (Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 863.)   
 For the reasons articulated above, we decline to agree with 
the Court of Appeal’s statutory construction analysis or 
conclusion.  We will not “ ‘ “speculate that the Legislature meant 
something other than what it said,” ’ ” and “ ‘ “rewrite [the] 
statute to posit an unexpressed intent.” ’ ”  (Switzer, supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 128; compare Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 615 [describing the very limited 
circumstances in which a court has “authority to rewrite a 
statute in order to preserve its constitutionality”].)   
 Perhaps the Legislature will see fit to consider the statute 
anew in light of the elaborated criticisms set forth in the Court 
of Appeal opinion below, and amend section 496(c) in line with 
the short-lived narrowed version that the Legislature briefly 
considered in 1972 before again broadening its scope to read as 
it does now.  In this respect, the Court of Appeal’s decision below 
may usefully assist and prompt the Legislature.   
In the meantime, however, although “ ‘[w]e are not 
unmindful of [the] policy concerns about the potential 
consequences of our interpretation,’ ” it is and remains “ ‘the 
task of the Legislature to address those policy concerns.’ ”  
(Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 130, italics omitted, 
quoting Bell, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.)   
III.  CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION  
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed to the extent 
it recognized and confirmed defendants’ standing to move for a 
new trial — more precisely, a new judgment hearing — on the 
ground that the trial court committed errors in law when 
awarding and calculating damages.  The same judgment is 
reversed to the extent the appellate court declined to read 
section 496(c)’s words in their full and natural manner, by 
construing that subdivision to withhold, rather than afford, 
treble damages and attorney’s fees when, as here, property “has 
been obtained in any manner constituting theft.”  (§ 496(a).) 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
 
We remand to the Court of Appeal for proceedings 
consistent with our opinion.  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
1 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
S262081 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Groban 
 
I concur with the majority opinion’s holdings.  I write 
separately to address the Court of Appeal’s concern that, if read 
too broadly, Penal Code section 4961 could “transmogrify the law 
of remedies” in a wide range of tort or breach of contract cases 
alleging that the defendant improperly obtained, diverted, 
received, or withheld the plaintiff’s money.  (Siry Investment, 
L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1135; 
accord, Lacagnina v. Comprehend Systems, Inc. (2018) 25 
Cal.App.5th 955, 972 (Lacagnina) [noting the possibility of 
“significant adverse consequences” if parties could assert claims 
for treble damages under § 496 “in run-of-the-mill commercial 
disputes”].)  I believe it important to note that the majority 
opinion’s interpretation of section 496 will not allow for the 
recovery of treble damages in all, or even most, consumer or 
commercial disputes involving tort or breach of contract claims, 
for the reasons explained below.   
This matter comes to us upon a default judgment in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  Defendants were deemed to have admitted all 
material allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and were not 
permitted to challenge whether plaintiff has adequately proved 
a violation of section 496, subdivision (a) on appeal.  (See Steven 
M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
2 
813, 823.)  Given this procedural posture, the majority opinion 
rightly does not analyze in depth the elements required to 
establish a violation of section 496, subdivision (a) — a violation 
of which is required to obtain treble damages under section 496, 
subdivision (c).     
The majority opinion nevertheless recognizes important 
limitations on the scope of section 496.  At a minimum, a 
plaintiff must prove that a “theft” has occurred to establish a 
violation of section 496, subdivision (a).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
38; see id. at pp. 37–38 [“A plaintiff may recover treble damages 
and attorney’s fees under section 496(c) when property has been 
obtained in any manner constituting theft” under section 496, 
subdivision (a)]; see also § 496, subd. (a) [prohibiting persons 
from “buy[ing] or receiv[ing] any property that has been stolen 
or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft”].)  
Section 484 defines “theft,” in part, as “feloniously steal[ing]” or 
“knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent 
representation or pretense, defraud[ing]” a person of money or 
property.  (Italics added.)  Thus, to establish a theft, a plaintiff 
must show an intent to steal.  (People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 
246, 263–264 (Ashley).)  “The intent to steal or animus furandi 
is the intent, without a good faith claim of right, to permanently 
deprive the owner of possession.”  (People v. Davis (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 301, 305.)  A defendant’s good faith but erroneous belief 
in the truth of his or her misrepresentation or that the 
defendant has a right or claim to the property taken “ ‘negates 
the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft.’ ”  (People 
v. Kaufman (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 370, 388, quoting People v. 
Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938; see also People v. Marsh 
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 732, 737 [trial court erred in refusing to admit 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
3 
reports from scientists and doctors to show the defendants’ good 
faith belief in their false representations that their machines 
cured medical ailments].) 
As the majority opinion rightly observes, a mere 
unfulfilled promise or misrepresentation of fact is insufficient to 
establish an intent to steal.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 39.)  “[T]he 
defendant’s intent must be proved in both instances by 
something more than mere proof of nonperformance or actual 
falsity.”  (Ashley, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 264.)  “This requirement 
prevents ‘ “[o]rdinary commercial defaults” ’ from being 
transformed into a theft.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 38 quoting 
Ashley, at p. 265.)  “If misrepresentations or unfulfilled promises 
‘are made innocently or inadvertently, they can no more form 
the basis for a prosecution for obtaining property by false 
pretenses than can an innocent breach of contract.’ ”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 39, quoting Ashley, at p. 264.)  Moreover, the 
testimony of a single witness that the defendant obtained the 
money or property through a false promise or representation 
must be corroborated.  (Ashley, at p. 259; see also § 532, subd. 
(b).) 
In Ashley, we held that the evidence supported the jury’s 
finding that the defendant had the requisite felonious intent to 
steal.  (Ashley, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 267.)  The defendant 
“deliberately set out to acquire the life savings” of multiple 
unsophisticated elderly victims by stating that the loaned 
money would be used for an ambitious theater project, when in 
fact the money was almost immediately used to cover the 
expenses of defendant’s failing corporation.  (Ibid.)  The fact that 
the “money acquired was needed and used for the running 
expenses of the corporation within a short time of its receipt” 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
4 
indicated that the defendant never intended to acquire or build 
the promised theater.  (Ibid.)  In contrast, the evidence in People 
v. Hartley (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 620 did not support a finding 
that the defendant had the requisite felonious intent to steal, 
even though the defendant acknowledged that he made an 
implied promise to pay a fare upon entering a cab and did not 
do so.  (Id. at p. 628.)  As the court explained, the evidence did 
not show that the defendant entered the cab intending to renege 
on his promise to pay; instead, the defendant “decided not to pay 
because of his frustration with the driver and [his] suspicion 
that the driver was trying to inflate the fare.”  (Id. at p. 629.)  
Thus, “his failure to pay the driver was akin to a transaction-
gone-bad or, in the words of Ashley, ‘ “[o]rdinary commercial 
default[].” ’ ”  (Hartley, at pp. 630–631.)   
Consistent with these cases, several courts have recently 
concluded that a section 496 claim for treble damages in a civil 
action cannot be maintained where the defendant lacked the 
requisite felonious intent.  In GEC US 1 LLC v. Frontier 
Renewables, LLC (N.D.Cal., Sept. 7, 2016, No. 16-CV-1276 YGR) 
2016 WL 4677585, for example, the complaint alleged that the 
defendants improperly asserted control and ownership over a 
joint venture.  (Id. at p. *1.)  But, since the complaint also 
alleged that the defendants believed themselves to be the proper 
owners of the joint venture, the court concluded that they lacked 
the requisite felonious intent to steal.  (Id. at p. *9.)  The court 
explained that “allowing this claim to proceed on these 
allegations would sanction the use of the penal code to redress 
ordinary business disputes over ownership interests — an 
untenable result.”  (Ibid.)  The court in Lacagnina similarly 
explained that “an essential element of a section 496 violation is 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
5 
the defendant’s knowledge that the property was stolen” and 
doubted that “a dispute over unpaid commissions and other 
compensation qualifies.”  (Lacagnina, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 971; accord, Gillette v. Stater Bros. Markets, Inc. (C.D.Cal., 
Sept. 23, 2019, No. EDCV19-1292JVS (KKx) 2019 WL 8017735, 
p. *9 [allegation that the defendants “ ‘[k]ept [plaintiff’s] pay for 
themselves’ ” was not sufficient to state a claim for theft since 
there was no indication that the defendants obtained the wages 
by false pretenses or knew them to be obtained by false 
pretenses].)   
There may be other relevant limitations on establishing a 
theft in a civil case seeking treble damages under section 496.  
Some federal courts have concluded that “[a] cause of action for 
civil theft cannot lie where a plaintiff receives legitimate 
services based on mutual agreement to pay for those services.”  
(Alvarez v. Adtalem Education Group, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Dec. 16, 
2019, No. 19-cv-04079-JSW) 2019 WL 13065378, p. *5 [no 
section 496 claim where students received an education in 
exchange for their tuition payments, even though university 
misrepresented postgraduate employment rates].)  Several out-
of-state decisions have declined to award treble damages under 
their similar theft statutes because the defendant lacked an 
intent to permanently deprive the plaintiff of the use or benefit 
of the money or property at issue.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 43, fn. 
19.)  Further, as noted in the majority, two federal decisions 
have held that a plaintiff must show additional conduct beyond 
the underlying theft to obtain treble damages under section 
496 — though these decisions have been criticized on appeal and 
not followed by other federal courts.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20–
21, fn. 12; cf. People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 857 [noting 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
6 
that the first sentence of a 1992 amendment to § 496 “authorizes 
a conviction for receiving stolen property even though the 
defendant also stole the property,” which suggests that theft 
alone may enable § 496 liability in the civil context]; Bell v. 
Feibush (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1049 [raising the issue of 
whether the second sentence of the 1992 amendment, which 
bars dual convictions of the theft itself and the receipt of stolen 
property, operates to bar “ ‘double recovery’ ” in the civil 
context].) 
Again, we are not called upon in this matter to determine 
the precise elements necessary to establish a theft in a civil case 
seeking treble damages under section 496, or even whether 
plaintiff would have been able to prove these elements had he 
not obtained a default judgment.  I nevertheless do not believe 
the majority opinion’s holding will create a sea change in the 
law.  If, as a result of the majority opinion’s holding, most 
consumer or commercial transactions could now be transformed 
into a “theft” case seeking treble damages — including, for 
example, every conceivable type of claim premised upon wage 
and hour laws, false advertising laws such as the unfair 
competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) or 
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), 
warranty laws such as the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty 
Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.), or real estate or mortgage lending 
disputes — I might find such a result to be contrary to 
legislative intent.  But I do not believe it is likely that section 
496 will apply in most cases concerning consumer or commercial 
transactions, and I do not read the majority’s opinion to suggest 
otherwise.  And, as the majority notes, if the Legislature finds 
the treble damage remedy to be problematic where it does apply, 
SIRY INVESTMENT, L.P. v. FARKHONDEHPOUR 
Groban, J., concurring 
 
7 
the Legislature may amend the statute accordingly.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 1–2.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     GROBAN, J. 
 
I Concur: 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 45 Cal.App.5th 1098 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S262081 
Date Filed:  July 21, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Stephanie M. Bowick and Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Gregory D. Hagen and 
Robert Cooper for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Steven P. Scandura and Steven P. Scandura as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Knickerbocker Law Firm, Richard L. Knickerbocker; and Mohammad 
Fakhreddine for Defendant and Appellant Saeed Farkhondehpour. 
 
Fisher & Wolfe, David Fisher; Greines Martin Stein & Richland, 
Robert A. Olson and Edward L. Xanders for Defendant and Appellant 
Morad Neman. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Robert Cooper 
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP 
555 South Flower Street, 29th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 330-8950 
 
Richard L. Knickerbocker 
Knickerbocker Law Firm 
2425 Olympic Boulevard, Suite 4000W 
Santa Monica, CA 90404 
(310) 260-9060 
 
Mohammad Fakhreddine 
Law Office of Mohammad Fakhreddine 
1601 Pacific Coast Highway, Suite 290 
Hermosa Beach, CA 90254 
(310) 698-0804