Title: Carol Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli,, et als.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-24-03
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 2004

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff, Carol Tarr, began working for Mack Auto Mall in late July 1994 as a finance and insurance manager. She worked there until July 1995, when she left, allegedly because of sexual harassment in the workplace. At trial, Tarr described the extensive and pervasive sexual harassment that she endured from a group of particularly offensive male employees during the course of her employment. She asserted that although Grimaldi, the general manager, heard much of the abusive conduct, he made no effort to stop it. In fact, Tarr testified that Grimaldi himself had made inappropriate comments to her on more than one occasion. She stated that the constant abuse made her feel extremely uncomfortable, prompting her to quit in July 1995. She returned a short time later because she needed the job and because her immediate supervisor, who also had been the subject of sexual harassment, assured her that the situation would improve. When it did not, Tarr left again, in April 1996. Tarr s testimony at trial was corroborated by various witnesses, including her immediate supervisor and two other co-workers. Defendant, Bob Ciasulli, was the sole owner of the Auto Group dealerships. Tarr presented limited evidence of his direct involvement with the management of Mack Auto Mall. Specifically, Tarr testified that Ciasulli held monthly meetings attended by all sales personnel. In addition, Tarr s immediate supervisor testified that she telephoned Ciasulli directly when her immediate supervisor was not able to resolve an issue. Finally, a former manager at the auto mall testified that Ciasulli once directed him to fire a salesperson following allegations of sexual harassment. At the close of Tarr s case, the trial court dismissed her emotional distress claims. The court ruled that the elements of emotional distress are the same in both discrimination cases and in tort cases, and that the evidence that Tarr was temporarily upset was insufficient to establish her claim. In addition, at the close of all the evidence, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Ciasulli, individually, and Auto Group. The case was submitted to the jury solely against Tarr s employer, Mack Auto Mall. In answer to special interrogatories, the jury found that Tarr had been the victim of sexual harassment in the workplace, but that she had suffered no economic loss. The trial court concluded that Tarr was entitled to attorney fees as a prevailing party because the jury found in her favor on the sexual harassment and hostile workplace claims. Tarr appealed the dismissals of her emotional distress damages claim and of her complaint against Auto Group. All three defendants cross-appealed from the order awarding counsel fees. In a reported decision, the Appellate Division reversed the order dismissing the emotional distress damages and the complaint against Ciasulli individually. The panel remanded for a determination of Ciasulli s individual liability, ordered a new trial on damages, both compensatory and punitive, and affirmed the orders dismissing the complaints against Auto Group and awarding counsel fees to plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted certification, and granted amicus curiae status to the National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey. HELD : In a hostile work environment and sexual harassment case brought under the Law Against Discrimination, a victim of discrimination may obtain redress for mental anguish and embarrassment, without limitation to severe emotional or physical ailments, and plaintiff in this case presented sufficient evidence of emotional distress damages to submit that issue to the jury; the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff s complaint against the owner of the Auto Group inasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish that he had aided and abetted the employees in their sexual harassment of her; to be considered a prevailing party under the Law Against Discrimination for purposes of entitlement to counsel fees, a party must receive some affirmative relief in the form of damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief. 1. To prevail on a common law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe. Our courts have long recognized emotional distress damages as a component of various intentional torts and breach of contract claims. (pp. 7-8) 2. The Legislature amended the LAD to authorize recovery of emotional distress damages for discrimination claims. Emotional distress claims and damages need not be supported by expert testimony. Rather, claims for emotional distress of varying degrees have been recognized where a wrong is willful. A cause of action asserting discrimination is willful rather than negligent. (pp. 8-12) 3. The purpose of the LAD is to eradicate discrimination in the workplace. Underlying the LAD s expansive language advocating the elimination of discrimination is also the directive that victims of discrimination be compensated for economic and noneconomic injuries attributable to an employer s discriminatory conduct. (pp. 12-13) 4. The Legislature intended victims of discrimination to obtain redress for mental anguish, embarrassment, and the like, without limitation to severe emotional or physical ailments. Given the breadth of individual and societal harms that flow from discrimination and harassment, to limit the LAD s application to only those cases in which the victim suffered serious psychological harm would be contrary to its remedial purpose. It is the harasser s conduct, not the plaintiff s injury, that must be severe or pervasive. (pp. 13-15) 5. Compensatory damages for emotional distress, including humiliation and indignity resulting from willful discriminatory conduct, are remedies that require a far less stringent standard of proof than that required for a tort-based emotional distress cause of action. Thus, in discrimination cases, which by definition involve willful conduct, the victim may recover all natural consequences of that wrongful conduct, including emotional distress and mental anguish damages arising out of embarrassment, humiliation, and other intangible injuries. Thus, that portion of the Appellate Division s judgment remanding for a new trial on damages is affirmed. (p. 15) 6. In order to hold an employee liable as an aider or abettor under the LAD, a plaintiff must show that the party whom the defendant aids performs a wrongful act that causes an injury; the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; and the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. Applying those factors, the Court concludes that Tarr failed to present evidence that Ciasulli aided and abetted the employees in their sexual harassment of her. At best, the record discloses that Ciasulli, as the supervisor in the network of auto dealerships, negligently supervised his employees, which is insufficient to find substantial assistance to wrongdoers to impose individual liability under the LAD. Thus, the Court affirms the trial court s dismissal of the complaint against Ciasulli. (pp. 15-19) 7. A plaintiff who is awarded some affirmative relief by way of an enforceable judgment against defendant or other comparable relief through a settlement or consent decree is a prevailing party under the LAD. Moreover, a plaintiff who is awarded nominal damages is a prevailing party under the LAD. In the case of nominal damages, however, whether to award minimal attorney s fees or no fees at all is left to the discretion of the trial court. (pp. 20-22) Judgment of the Appellate Division remanding to the trial court for a new trial on damages is AFFIRMED. Judgment of the Appellate Division imposing individual liability on Ciasulli is REVERSED. Judgment of the Appellate Division affirming the award of counsel fees to plaintiff is REVERSED and REMANDED for RECONSIDERATION of the award of attorney s fees. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins. Justice LaVecchia would not lessen the proof requirements for compensatory damages in the absence of textual support in the LAD for a lesser standard of proof than that which the Court established in Taylor v. Metzger for the common law tort of infliction of emotional distress committed in a harassment setting. While recognizing that the Court expanded the test for intentional infliction of emotional distress where that cause of action was based on discriminatory conduct and joined with causes of action for discrimination under the LAD, Justice LaVecchia believed that the Court had not altered the basic requirement that only severe distress will sustain an award of compensatory damages. Justice LaVecchia, however, joins in the Court s reversal of the Appellate Division s judgment that imposed individual liability on Ciasulli, and further concurs in the Court s conclusion that to recover attorney s fees as a prevailing party under the LAD, our courts should employ the same standard as that used for such claims under 42 U.S.C.A. 1988. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES ZAZZALI and ALBIN join in JUSTICE WALLACE s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOB CIASULLI and BOB CIASULLI'S MACK AUTO MALL, INC., Defendants-Appellants, and BOB CIASULLI AUTO GROUP, INC., MONMOUTH HONDA JEEP EAGLE, PATRICK GRIMALDI, JOHN DESANTIS, STEVEN FUENTAS, JOSEPH ANGELINI and JOHN DOE ONE THROUGH TEN, Defendants. Argued March 2, 2004 Decided August 9, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 360 N.J. Super. 265 (2003). Resa T. Drasin and Bradley M. Wilson argued the cause for appellants (Woehling &amp; Freeman and Nowell Amoroso Klein Bierman, attorneys). Ronald L. Lueddeke argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Lueddeke and Lynda Lee, attorneys). Kathleen A. Dunnigan submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (Dwyer &amp; Dunnigan, attorneys; Ms. Dunnigan, Frederic J. Gross and Nancy E. Griffin, on the brief). JUSTICE WALLACE delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves claims of hostile work environment and sexual harassment under New Jersey s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bob Ciasulli (Ciasulli) and various of his wholly-owned corporations and their employees. Prior to trial, all defendants were dismissed except for Ciasulli, Bob Ciasulli Auto Group (Auto Group), and Bob Ciasulli s Mack Auto Mall, Inc. (Mack Auto Mall). At trial, the court dismissed plaintiff s claim for emotional distress damages and the claim against Ciasulli individually. The jury found Mack Auto Mall liable for sexual harassment in the workplace, but did not find that plaintiff suffered any damages. Despite her failure to prove damages, the court awarded attorney fees to plaintiff as a prevailing party. The Appellate Division reversed in part, and affirmed in part. Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 265 (2003). We granted certification, 178 N.J. 29 (2003), and granted amicus curiae status to the National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (amicus). We now affirm in part, and reverse in part. We hold that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of emotional distress damages to submit that issue to the jury, that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint against Ciasulli, and that to be considered a prevailing party under the LAD for purposes of entitlement to counsel fees, a party must receive some affirmative relief in the form of damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief. [Id. at 440.] This Court affirmed the damage award, similarly relying on the 1990 amendment to the LAD authorizing emotional distress damages, and rejected the defendant s contention that expert testimony or independent corroborative evidence was necessary to support the award of emotional distress damages. Rendine, supra, 141 N.J. at 312. [Tarr, supra, 360 N.J. Super. at 276-77.] Our dissenting colleagues invoke Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1998), to reach a contrary conclusion concerning the standard of proof for emotional distress damages under the LAD. There, the Court found sufficient evidence of workplace discrimination for plaintiff to proceed on her claim of LAD racial discrimination. Further, the Court clarified the test for an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action as set forth in Buckley, id. at 508-09, and found that the plaintiff s evidence was sufficient to support that cause of action as well, id. at 521. There was no need for the Court to address the issue we face today because the evidence . . . relevant to [the] plaintiff s claim of emotional injury would overlap, if not duplicate, that proffered to establish her LAD claim. Id. at 509. Here, plaintiff s claim is limited to her proofs under the LAD, and if she prevails, she may recover attorney fees that are not available for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This Court noted long ago that [g]iven the breadth of individual and societal harms that flow from discrimination and harassment, to limit the LAD s application to only those cases in which the victim suffered, or could have suffered, serious psychological harm would be contrary to its remedial purpose. Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 609. It is the harasser s conduct, not the plaintiff s injury, that must be severe or pervasive. Id. at 610. In sum, we are satisfied that compensatory damages for emotional distress, including humiliation and indignity resulting from willful discriminatory conduct, are remedies that require a far less stringent standard of proof than that required for a tort-based emotional distress cause of action. We hold that in discrimination cases, which by definition involve willful conduct, the victim may recover all natural consequences of that wrongful conduct, including emotional distress and mental anguish damages arising out of embarrassment, humiliation, and other intangible injuries. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the Appellate Division s judgment remanding for a new trial on damages. [Id. at 111-12, 113 S. Ct. at 573, 121 L. Ed 2d at (internal citations omitted) (first alteration in original).] The Court held that a party who receives only nominal damages is still deemed to be a prevailing party in the context of awarding attorney s fees under 42 U.S.C.A. 1988. Id. at 113, 113 S. Ct. at 574, 121 L. Ed 2d at ___. However, the Court also concluded that the nominal damages bear on the propriety of fees awarded under 1988, id. at 114, 113 S. Ct. at 574, 121 L. Ed 2d at ___, because the degree of the plaintiff s overall success goes to the reasonableness of a fee award, ibid., 113 S. Ct. at 574, 121 L. Ed 2d at ___ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There, the plaintiffs received one dollar in damages and the Court affirmed the denial of attorney s fees, observing that [a] plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal damages is the type of prevailing party that is entitled to no [attorney s] fee[s] at all. Id. at 115, 113 S. Ct. at 575, 121 L. Ed 2d at ___. The Court concluded that there must be a relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the fee award. Id. at 115-16, 113 S. Ct. at 575, 121 L. Ed 2d ___ (quoting Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 438, 103 S. Ct. at 1941, 76 L. Ed 2d at ___). We are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court and hold that a plaintiff who is awarded some affirmative relief by way of an enforceable judgment against defendant or other comparable relief through a settlement or consent decree is a prevailing party under N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1 of the LAD. Moreover, in our view, a plaintiff who is awarded nominal damages is a prevailing party under the LAD. In the case of a nominal damages award, however, we leave to the discretion of the trial court whether to award minimal attorney s fees or no fees at all. CAROL TARR, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOB CIASULLI and BOB CIASULLI S MACK AUTO MALL, INC., Defendants-Appellants, and BOB CIASULLI AUTO GROUP, INC., MONMOUTH HONDA JEEP EAGLE, PATRICK GRIMALDI, JOHN DESANTIS, STEVEN FUENTAS, JOSEPH ANGELINI and JOHN DOE ONE THROUGH TEN, Defendants. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring in part and dissenting in part. This appeal requires us yet again to interpret the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 49 (LAD). Specifically, we must determine whether the LAD carries its own standard of proof for an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress caused by sexual harassment in the workplace. In my view, such a LAD claimant must demonstrate entitlement to damages for infliction of emotional distress caused by sexual harassment under the proof requirements set forth in our decision in Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1998). In the absence of textual support in the LAD for a lesser standard of proof than that which we established in Taylor for the common law tort of infliction of emotional distress committed in a harassment setting, I would not lessen the proof requirements for compensatory damages. I. The cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which we first recognized as part of our common law in Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Society, 111 N.J. 355 (1988), was reformulated for the specific context of harassment claims under LAD in Taylor, supra, 152 N.J. at 508-21. Taylor squarely brought before the Court the standard to be applied to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress where that cause of action is based on discriminatory conduct and joined with causes of action for discrimination under the LAD. Writing for the Court, Justice Handler expanded the test for intentional infliction of emotional distress articulated in Buckley, supra, which required a plaintiff to establish intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe. 111 N.J. at 366. See footnote 1 Our expansion of Buckley in Taylor was manifest; See footnote 2 however, we did not alter the basic requirement that only severe distress will sustain an award of compensatory damages under our common law, and mentioned specifically that the plaintiff in Taylor both sought medical treatment for [her] emotional anguish and claimed to suffer harm that was both severe and enduring. Id. at 515. Although we did not hold that a claim for compensatory damages for emotional distress arising in the context of a LAD discrimination claim specifically required expert or medical corroboration as a matter of law, we held that that the plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence to permit[] a rational factfinder to conclude that she suffered severe emotional distress. Ibid. Cf. Rendine v Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 312-13 (1995) (citing Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that LAD claim for emotional distress damages, like analogous federal civil rights claims, does not require, as matter of law, expert testimony to corroborate claimant s alleged emotional distress)). In my view, the majority s decision renders Taylor, which post-dated the 1990 LAD amendments that the majority and the Appellate Division find to be so persuasive, a nullity. In Taylor, Justice Handler painstakingly analyzed the circumstances in which a plaintiff brings both a claim of discrimination under the LAD and a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and both claims arise from the same discriminatory conduct. It is curious that our Court would have gone to such lengths to canvass decisions from around the country concerning claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on discrimination if one of the very causes of action then before it, a discrimination claim under the LAD, subsumed the entire analysis. The Court s careful analysis in Taylor is now inoperative in that the majority holds that the LAD authorizes a standard for obtaining compensatory damages for emotional distress that is far below that articulated in Taylor. As demonstrated below, this case is indistinguishable from, and should be controlled by, our holding in Taylor. II. Plaintiff s seven-count Complaint included three counts against Bob Ciasulli Mack Auto Mall, Inc. (Mack): Count I for hostile work environment created by sexual harassment and discrimination, in violation of the LAD; Count II for constructive discharge based on sexual harassment and discrimination, in violation of the LAD; and Count VII for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each count demand[ed] judgment against [Mack] as follows: (1) Compensatory Damages[;] (2) Punitive Damages[;] (3) Equitable relief to the fullest extent permitted by the LAD; (4) Costs of Suit; (5) Attorney s Fees to the fullest extent permitted by the LAD and the law; (6) Lawful Interest; [and] (7) Such other relief as the Court deems equitable and appropriate. Before trial, Mack filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Count VII for common law intentional infliction of emotional distress, and to compel discovery concerning the nature of plaintiff s asserted emotional trauma. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss Count VII. See footnote 3 Thus, we note that the common law emotional distress claim was dismissed from plaintiff s action, and she proceeded to trial only on Counts I and II. The ensuing jury trial spanned nearly two weeks. During trial, there was ample testimony concerning the outrageously hostile and discriminatory environment at Mack s place of business, which both the majority, ante at ___ (slip op. at ___), and the Appellate Division have well detailed. Tarr, supra, 360 N.J. Super. at 268-70. The vivid portrayal of an abusive environment that plaintiff endured in the workplace was fairly described by the Appellate Division as despicable, insulting, reprehensible, crude, gross, demeaning, and contemptible[.] Id. at 270. Despite that portrayal, plaintiff s testimony respecting her response . . . was not extensive. Although she apparently had mental health care after leaving Mack . . ., she chose not to offer expert testimony. She testified only to her acute embarrassment and humiliation, [caused by one co-worker s] remarks in the presence of persons not employed by the dealership, [that] made her turn beet red and want to crawl under my desk. The jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff was the victim of sexual harassment, including that the working environment was intimidating, hostile and abusive. However, the jury did not award any compensatory damages to plaintiff, based on its determination that she suffered no past or future lost earnings as a result of defendant s sexual harassment. Therefore, no punitive damages were awarded. Tarr, supra, 360 N.J. Super. at 267; see generally N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13c (stating that punitive damages are available only if compensatory damages, rather than nominal damages, have been awarded). The trial court did award plaintiff attorney s fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1, concluding that because plaintiff had proved a sexually harassing hostile workplace, she was a prevailing party despite her failure to prove damages. Tarr, supra, 360 N.J. Super. at 267. In a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1(a), plaintiff again raised the issue of compensatory damages for emotional distress, asserting that 1990 amendments to the LAD created a lower threshold for obtaining compensatory damage for emotional distress. The trial court denied plaintiff s motion, ruling from the bench, in relevant part, as follows: [T]he [1990] amendments . . . I interpret pretty clearly as not expanding the types of damages that somebody can have, but basically recognizing that an employee would have damages that might reasonably flow from an act of discrimination that could be compensable and that could be the subject of compensatory damages. What are the purposes of compensatory damages? Compensatory damages are intended to make a litigant whole for a loss, no more, no less. Compensatory damages are not intended to punish a litigant for the wrongdoing but rather to make a party whole. Really, the plaintiff did not testify as to any other types of loss. * * * * The Legislature never intended to create a new form of damages not recognized in common law, but [it] did intend to codify the availability of damages that were normally available to the plaintiff as a function of common law in a personal injury type of action, tort or contract. The reason is that you have to remember why they did what they did in 1990, and that was to respond to the Shaner[ v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433 (1989)] decision which raised, in effect, almost like as an afterthought the question of whether or not damages that are recognized at common law should be the prime focus of [the LAD]. So I m not saying that emotional distress damages have to be proven by expert testimony, although that would be preferable, or that the plaintiff has to show that she sought treatment or anything for it. But she has to testify as to something that is related to the incident in question and it has to be something more than just sort of a passing problem. And that s what happened in this case was that she made a passing reference to crying in the car and there was basically no testimony to indicate that that was related to the incident in question or to other problems or that it was substantial, that it was significant or that it caused her any continuing emotional distress. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court on the issue of compensatory damages for emotional distress by relying on Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 316-17 (Ch. Div. 1970), in which a chancery court awarded nominal damages to a plaintiff based on racial discrimination, and Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 412 (1973), in which this Court affirmed an incidental award [to the plaintiff] for pain and suffering recommended by a Hearing Examiner with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (Division) and adopted by the Division Director. From those earlier decisions, the Appellate Division extrapolated that a plaintiff does not have to prove severe and substantial emotional harm to reach the jury on compensatory damages for emotional distress in the context of the LAD. Id. at 276-77. It found that the 1990 amendments to the LAD confirmed the authority of Gray and Zahorian. Id. at 273. We granted defendants petition for certification. 178 N.J. 29 (2003). III. Persons seeking redress under the LAD either may file a complaint (1) with the Division or (2) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, by jury trial if requested. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13. Pursuant to the LAD, [a]ll remedies available in common law tort actions shall be available to prevailing parties. These remedies are in addition to any provided by this act or any other statute. Ibid. (emphasis added). Those two sentences mandate that for LAD claims, in addition to the equitable remedies available to courts and the Division under N.J.S.A. 10:5-17, prevailing parties also may seek traditional tort remedies. Plaintiff s thesis is that that language in N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 expresses a legislative intent to lower, in LAD actions, the proof standard that otherwise would apply in a common law tort action to obtain compensatory damages for emotional distress caused by discriminatory conduct. However, that theory is not supported by text, legislative history, or prior decisional law. That statement encapsulates the twin purposes of the 1990 amendments: (1) to overrule our holding in Shaner that LAD claimants were not entitled to a jury trial for LAD causes of action; and (2) to reject our dicta in Shaner that monetary awards were a secondary, rather than co-equal, form of remedy under the LAD. CAROL TARR, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BOB CIASULLI and BOB CIASULLI S MACK AUTO MALL, INC., Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED August 9, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY Justice LaVecchia DISSENTING OPINION BY