Title: Darling v. Kansas Water Office
Citation: 245 Kan. 45, 774 P.2d 941
Docket Number: 62,249
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 1989

245 Kan. 45 (1989)
774 P.2d 941
DAVID DARLING, et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
KANSAS WATER OFFICE, Appellant/Cross-Appellees, and DAVID DARLING, et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
JOSEPH F. HARKINS, et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
No. 62,249

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 26, 1989.
David D. Plinsky, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the briefs for appellants/cross-appellees.
Patricia E. Riley, of Weathers &amp; Riley, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Wesley A. Weathers, of the same firm, was with her on the briefs for appellees/cross-appellants.
Linda J. Fund, staff attorney, was on the brief amicus curiae for the Kansas Department of Administration.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
Plaintiffs herein were classified employees of the Kansas Water Office (KWO). In 1984, the Kansas Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 501 (L. 1984, ch. 285), which changed plaintiffs' jobs from being in the classified service of the Kansas Civil Service Act, K.S.A. 75-2925 et seq., to being unclassified and directed their termination. Plaintiffs were terminated and appealed their terminations to the Civil Service Board, which held it had no jurisdiction as plaintiffs were no longer classified employees. Plaintiffs appealed the Board's action to the district court (Case No. 84-CV-876) and filed a separate action against *46 Joseph F. Harkins, as Director of the Kansas Water Office, the State of Kansas, and the Kansas Water Office (Case No. 84-CV-1212). The district court consolidated the two actions. Summary judgment was granted in favor of plaintiffs with the court holding the statutes involved were unconstitutional (K.S.A. 74-2614 and 74-2614a) and directing that plaintiffs be reinstated with back pay. Defendants appeal from said determination and plaintiffs cross-appeal from the district court's denial of their request for attorney fees.
Some background information is necessary to understand the extraordinary action taken by the legislature herein. The KWO was under pressure to develop a state water plan. The former director of the KWO was asked to resign and defendant Harkins was appointed to the position in 1982. Harkins' primary responsibility was the preparation of the state water plan. As time passed and no water plan was produced, the pressure on Harkins increased. On January 24, 1984, Harkins appeared before a Senate committee. He advised the committee that having classified employees as the professional staff involved in the preparation of the plan limited his flexibility and hindered preparation of the water plan. In response thereto, Senate Bill No. 501 was enacted. Section 1 of the bill amended existing K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 74-2614 as follows (changes are indicated by marked deletions and italics):
New Section 2 of the bill, later codified as K.S.A. 74-2614a, provides:
The bill became law on March 15, 1984. By letter dated March 15, 1984, the 17 KWO employees declassified by the bill, including plaintiffs herein, were notified by Director Harkins that they were terminated from state service effective April 14, 1984. Ten of the 17 were rehired into unclassified positions and retained their civil service rights as specified by K.S.A. 74-2614a. Plaintiffs Hess, Sheets, and Kostecki applied for and were denied new employment with the KWO in unclassified positions. Thus, all employees terminated by Senate Bill No. 501, except the six plaintiffs and one other person, were reappointed to unclassified positions at the KWO. In addition to the rehirings, KWO Director Harkins hired, by June 18, 1984, seven new employees into professional positions with the KWO. Thus, no new positions were created and none were deleted  the staff positions affected by the bill remained at 17.
As of March 15, 1984, plaintiffs' positions and work history with the KWO may be summarized as follows:
(1) David Darling had been employed by the State in classified service since 1968 and was employed by KWO as a Hydrologist IV.
(2) John Henderson had been employed by the State in classified service since 1970. He was employed by KWO as a Hydrologist V.
(3) Larry Hess had been employed by the State in classified service since 1970. He was employed in the KWO as a Hydrologist III.
(4) Donald Kostecki had been employed by the State in classified service since 1968. He was employed in the KWO as a Hydrologist IV.
(5) Clydeen Logan had been employed by the State in classified service since 1971. She was employed by KWO as an Engineering Technician II.
*48 (6) Larry Sheets had been employed by the State in classified service since 1966. He was employed in the KWO as a Hydrologist III.
The case arises on a unique set of facts. A handful of employees in a specific state agency were singled out by the legislature to be stripped of their rights under the Kansas Civil Service Act and terminated. Any or all could be rehired by the agency with a grandfathering in of their prior rights under the Act. This action was taken as a convenience to the agency's director so that he could have greater flexibility in operating his office. No compelling need or emergency situation was given by anyone as a justification for the action. Harkins has indicated in his deposition that termination through the civil service procedure was difficult and time consuming, and that the statute was beneficial as it gave him the flexibility he desired.
The district court held that the 1984 amendment to K.S.A. 74-2614 and all of K.S.A. 74-2614a (codifications of Senate Bill No. 501) were constitutionally impermissible as being violative of plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights and as a denial of equal protection.
Under the Kansas Civil Service Act, a permanent classified civil service employee is entitled to various procedural and substantive safeguards in the event of a dismissal, demotion, or suspension, including: (1) prior notice; (2) a written statement setting forth the reasons for the intended action; (3) an opportunity to respond in writing, in person, or both, to a representative of the appointing authority; (4) a responsive written decision by the appointing authority; and (5) the right to appeal from any adverse decision to the Civil Service Board for a full evidentiary hearing; and, thereafter, the right to an administrative appeal from any adverse decision to a state district court. See K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 75-2949.
Defendants concede that a classified state employee has a property right in continued employment cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:
Defendants contend, however, that Senate Bill No. 501 lawfully terminated that right in plaintiffs, and, thus, the same was not in existence when plaintiffs were terminated.
States are under no obligation to create property rights in their employees' employment through enactment of civil service legislation. However, once a state has elected to do so, due process rights attach.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985), it is stated:
Before proceeding further, it should be emphasized that the case before us does not involve elimination of a state agency, reduction of positions authorized for a state agency, consolidation of two agencies into one, transfer of functions from one agency to another, or any other situation involving elimination of particular positions. Further, this action does not involve the State's right to declassify a position prospectively, effective only as to employees to be hired in the future. Had Senate Bill No. 501 declassified the positions without the mandatory terminations and grandfathering in, to existing employees, their civil service rights, the case herein would not be before us.
If the defendants' position is correct that the State can selectively declassify and terminate free of civil service requirements, then the whole concept of civil service is a sham. There is no real protection afforded by the civil service act. This may be likened to a university entering into a lifetime contract with a popular football coach and, after a losing season, declaring the coach legally dead.
Defendants further argue that due process was afforded by the legislative process. The plaintiffs could have appeared before the appropriate legislative committees and expressed their opposition to the proposed legislation. Redress for enactment of the legislation could only be at the ballot box. This is illogical in the framework of the facts herein. The district court adequately disposed of this contention as follows:
The district court's reference to the David Darling affidavit needs some explanation. It is stated therein that plaintiffs were discouraged from discussing with the legislators their views in opposition to the bill. Defendant Harkins is said, in essence, to have reminded them that he held the keys to any rehiring and to have inferred that any expression of opposition to the bill would be remembered.
In holding that Senate Bill No. 501 violated plaintiffs' substantive due process rights, the district court reasoned:
We agree with the district court's analysis and conclusion. We hold that the district court did not err in holding Senate Bill No. 501 (K.S.A. 74-2614a and 1984 amendments to K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 74-2614) to be unconstitutional as violative of plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights.
The district court further held Senate Bill No. 501 unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. By virtue of our holding on the due process issue, it is unnecessary to consider defendants' claims of error relative to the district court's determination on this alternate ground.
We turn now to the issue raised in the cross-appeal. The final two paragraphs of the district court's memorandum decision state:
Plaintiffs contend that this denial of attorney fees constituted an abuse of discretion as they were the prevailing parties in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) action and, accordingly, should be awarded attorney fees.
An interesting question arises as to whether the relief granted by the district court was in a § 1983 action. Nowhere in the district court's 21-page opinion is there any reference to § 1983. The only reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) is in the previously quoted paragraph. The district court had two consolidated cases before it. The first (84-CV-876) was an appeal from an adverse decision of the Civil Service Board. Through the Civil Service Board, plaintiffs were seeking all the relief they ultimately received from the district court  reinstatement from wrongful terminations and back pay. Certainly § 1983 was not involved therein. The second action (84-CV-1212) was a multifaceted petition requesting the court to grant the requested relief of *53 reinstatement and back pay on alternate theories of: (1) a declaratory judgment that Senate Bill No. 501 was unconstitutional; (2) a § 1983 action premised on violation of due process; (3) impairment of contract; (4) mandamus; and (5) injunction.
In its preliminary description of the matter before it, the district court's opinion states:
The district court held Senate Bill No. 501 to be unconstitutional based upon violations of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection. No order in mandamus or for injunctive relief was entered. Viewed in its entirety, the district court's decision appears to have been essentially a declaratory judgment holding Senate Bill No. 501 unconstitutional.
Another factor should also be considered. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
We have held that, in certain circumstances, a state agency should be considered a "person" under § 1983 in state court. In Gumbhir v. Kansas State Board of Pharmacy, 231 Kan. 507, 513, 646 P.2d 1078 (1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1103 (1983), we discussed whether a state agency should be considered a "person" in a § 1983 action and concluded:
In Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 241 Kan. 13, 21, 735 P.2d 222 (1987), we said:
State agencies, therefore, are considered "persons" under § 1983 where injunctive relief is involved. In the case before us, no injunctive relief was obtained.
The action herein was essentially between an employer and its employees over allegedly wrongful terminations of employment. The key element in obtaining the relief requested (reinstatement and back pay) was a judicial declaration that Senate Bill No. 501 was unconstitutional. The requested relief of reinstatement and back pay logically flowed from this determination as plaintiffs' terminations were thus rendered improper. Plaintiffs requested additional relief under § 1983 for damages to reputation and for emotional distress which was not granted.
Under the totality of the circumstances herein, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of attorney fees.
The judgment is affirmed.