Title: Richard v. HP Hood & Sons, Inc.
Citation: 243 A.2d 910
Docket Number: N/A
State: rhode-island
Issuer: rhode-island Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1968

243 A.2d 910 (1968) Henry L. RICHARD v. H.P. HOOD &amp; SONS, INC. No. 255-Appeal. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 1, 1968. Charles A. Hirsch, William G. Grande, Providence, for plaintiff. Stephen F. Mullen, Providence for defendant. PAOLINO, Justice. This case is before us on the plaintiff's appeal from a judgment entered by the superior court on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant on counts of negligence and breach of implied warranty respectively. The pertinent facts are as follows. At approximately 7:30 a.m. on April 23, 1965, a deliveryman from defendant milk company delivered six half-gallon bottles of milk to plaintiff's home. Within a reasonable time thereafter, plaintiff placed these bottles on the top shelf of his refrigerator. At approximately 8 p.m. that evening, plaintiff, who lacked fingernails, took one of these full bottles from his refrigerator and attempted to open the same by twisting the paper cap which covered the bottle's top. As he did so, a piece of glass pierced the cap and cut the third finger of his left hand necessitating an operation on the same. In his complaint plaintiff alleged in the alternative that his injury was caused by defendant's negligence or breach of its implied warranty under G.L. 1956, § 6A-2-315, as amended, that such bottle of milk would be fit for human consumption.[1] In his charge to the jury, the trial justice stated: Prior to reaching its verdict the jury returned for further instructions on the law as it was explained by the trial justice with regard to the alleged breach of warranty. The trial justice instructed the jury as follows: At approximately 3:50 p.m., the trial justice, without the knowledge of counsel, sent a note to the foreman of the jury asking him if he believed the jury to be anywhere near ready to report with a verdict. The foreman answered, "Hopefully." At approximately 5 p.m., the jury returned with its verdict for defendant on both of the aforesaid counts. The plaintiff bases his appeal on the following three contentions. He maintains that the trial justice committed reversible error in charging the jury that a finding of contributory negligence would be a defense to his action for consequential damages under the theory of breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; that the trial justice committed reversible error by sending, without the knowledge of counsel, a note to the jury foreman asking him if he believed the jury to be anywhere near ready to report with a verdict; and that the trial justice's instruction: constituted reversible error.[2] We consider first the question of whether the trial justice erred in instructing the jury that a finding of contributory negligence would be a defense to plaintiff's claim under the theory of breach of implied warranty for a particular purpose. The plaintiff argues in the alternative that contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim based upon breach of warranty and that even if it were, there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the trial justice instructing the jury on it. We will consider these alternative arguments in the order raised. In his brief plaintiff quotes the following portions of the trial justice's charge as constituting error. The plaintiff's counsel took specific objection to the aforesaid language stating that *913 As Prosser has stated in 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, at 838: We have examined those cases dealing with the question before us and are in accord with Prosser's conclusion at pages 838-840, as follows: It is our opinion that there is merit in plaintiff's contention that the trial justice erred in charging the jury as he did. When *914 the portions of the charge quoted by plaintiff in his brief are taken in the context of the entire charge it becomes clear that the trial justice's charge is vague and ambiguous. While it may be argued that the instruction by the trial justice to the jury to was no more than a direction to consider the possibility that plaintiff may have engaged in an "abnormal use of the product," it was equally susceptible to the interpretation that plaintiff's failure to ascertain a defect in the bottle or to take precautions against its possible existence would bar his recovery. Since it is our opinion that the charge might reasonably yield the latter construction, it is, of course, objectionable. Prosser, supra. What he should have instructed the jury was that recovery should be denied if they found that twisting the cap of the milk bottle constituted an abnormal use of the product. If that had been his charge, there could have been no doubt in the minds of the jury as to the meaning it intended to convey. In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the plaintiff's remaining contentions. The plaintiff's appeal is sustained, and the judgment appealed from is reversed. ROBERTS, Chief Justice (concurring). I conru on the ground that in an action based on the breach of an implied warranty, contributory negligence is not a defense; and accordingly the jury should not be charged in language which questions whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, but rather in language which questions whether he engaged in an abnormal use of the product. POWERS, J., not participating. [1] "6A-2-315. Implied warranty: Fitness for particular purpose. Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the sellers' skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. As to foodstuffs or drinks sold for human consumption in sealed containers, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose, and such warrants shall extend from the seller and the manufacturer or packer of such goods to the person or persons described in § 6A-2-318 of this chapter." [2] Plaintiff indicates in his brief that he is not pressing the denial of his motion for a new trial on appeal. [3] Pritchard v. Liggett &amp; Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.1965); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.1962), affirming 198 F. Supp. 78; Crane v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754; Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr 814; Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633; Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309; Brockett v. Harrell Bros., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897; see Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199. See also Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568. But see Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407; Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568. 26 Cal. Rptr. 276; Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir.1965); Hansen v. Firestone Tire &amp; Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.1960). [4] Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir.1962); Hitchcock v. Hunt, 28 Conn. 343; Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 290 Pac. 395; Cedar Rapids &amp; I.C. Ry. &amp; Light Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 203 Ill. App. 424, aff'd, 280 Ill. 386, 117 N.E. 461: Frier v. Proctor [sic] &amp; Gamble Distrib. Co., 173 Kan. 733, 252 P.2d 850; Topeka Mill &amp; Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964; Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786; Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557; Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861; Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71; Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W.2d 124; Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570. 214 A.2d 18; Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &amp; Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769; Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., 281 N.Y. 474. 24 N.E.2d 131; Bates v. Fish Bros. Wagon Co., 50 App. Div. 38, 63 N.Y. Supp. 649; Bruce v. Fiss, Doerr &amp; Carroll Horse Co., 47 App. Div. 273. 62 N.Y. Supp. 96; Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668; Pauls Valley Milling Co. v. Gabbert, 182 Okla. 500, 78 P.2d 685; McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Nicholson, 17 Pa. Super. 188; Tex-Tube, Inc. v. Rockwall Corp., 379 S.W.2d 405. [5] Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.1964). See also Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir.1963); Rasmus v. A.O. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958).