Title: Schuler v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 31S00-1703-LW-134
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2019

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134 
Kevin Andrew Schuler 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v– 
State of Indiana  
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Decided: October 18, 2019 
Appeal from the Harrison Superior Court, No. 31D01-1308-MR-508 
The Honorable Vicki L. Carmichael, Special Judge 
On Direct Appeal   
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur.   
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 18 2019, 12:15 pm
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Per curiam.  
After remand in Schuler v. State, 112 N.E.3d 180 (Ind. 2018), the trial 
court entered a revised order sentencing Kevin Andrew Schuler to life 
imprisonment without parole (“LWOP”) for his conviction for murder 
and to sixty-five years for felony murder. Schuler appeals the revised 
order and argues the LWOP sentence must be vacated because the trial 
court impermissibly relied on non-statutory aggravating circumstances. 
Finding no error, we affirm.  
Facts and Procedural History 
The facts are set out in greater detail in Schuler. Briefly stated, the 
evidence showed Schuler and Austin Scott broke into the home that 
Asenath Arnold shared with Gary Henderson, Scott fatally stabbed 
Henderson, and Schuler intentionally killed Arnold during a burglary of 
the home. Specifically,          
Schuler punched Arnold and she stumbled back to her bed. 
Schuler then took the singletree [a wooden bar normally used 
to hold horses together] and struck Arnold on top of her head. 
Arnold prayed and pleaded with Schuler for her life. 
According to Scott, Schuler swung the singletree with two 
hands “like a sledgehammer,” striking Arnold at least twice 
and as many as four times.  
Id. at 184 (quoting St. Ex. 30-4 at 47:53-52:00). Although Scott stabbed 
Arnold in the face, Schuler would later tell police, “I’m almost positive I 
killed her.” Id. (quoting Tr. Vol. 2 at 250). Arnold’s head was significantly 
disfigured in the attack, and an autopsy revealed Arnold died from 
multiple blunt force injuries and sharp force injuries to the head. Id.  
 Schuler pled guilty to Count 1, the murder of Arnold, and Count 2, the 
felony murder of Henderson, and in exchange the State agreed to dismiss 
its request for the death penalty and instead to request LWOP. The parties 
agreed the court alone would determine whether to impose LWOP or a 
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term of years. Id. at 185. After a hearing, the court orally stated its reasons 
for sentencing Schuler to LWOP on Count 1 and sixty-five years on Count 
2 to be served consecutively. Id.  
Schuler raised four issues in his first appeal. We affirmed on the first 
three issues but on the fourth remanded for a clearer sentencing statement 
that satisfies Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995). On remand, the 
trial court issued a revised order sentencing Schuler to LWOP on Count 1 
and sixty-five years on Count 2. Schuler appeals the revised order.   
Discussion and Decision  
This Court reviews a sentencing order for an abuse of discretion. 
Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 190. An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly 
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, 
or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. 
Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs if, 
among other things, the reasons given by the sentencing court are 
improper as a matter of law. Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 190. This Court 
presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders its 
decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence. Id. at 189.   
Indiana’s statute requires only one listed aggravating circumstance for 
imposition of an LWOP sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(a). But in 
determining whether to impose LWOP, the trial court must limit the 
aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those specified in 
the statute. Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 191. The court may not consider non-
statutory aggravating circumstances when imposing LWOP. Holsinger v. 
State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ind. 2001).      
Schuler acknowledges the trial court “did properly find and consider 
the charged statutory aggravator,” Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 5, the 
intentional killing of Arnold during a burglary. But he argues the court 
erred by also considering the following as non-statutory aggravating 
circumstances: (1) the Presentence Investigation Report’s risk assessment, 
(2) that Schuler’s “participation in this crime was not minor,” (3) that “two 
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innocent victims were killed,” and (4) that “there is no excuse or 
justification for those killings[.]” Revised Sentencing Order.  
The revised order clearly states, “The aggravating factor the Court 
relies on in sentencing the Defendant is the intentional killing of Asenath 
Arnold while committing a Burglary.” It adds that “the aggravating factor 
significantly outweighs the only mitigating factor in this case,” Schuler’s 
lack of a significant criminal history. The court’s repeated use of 
“aggravating factor” (singular) indicates it relied on only one aggravating 
circumstance—the one Schuler acknowledges the court properly 
considered. And nothing in the revised order shows otherwise.    
In Schuler’s first appeal we rejected his argument that the trial court 
abused its discretion by considering the risk assessment and treating it as 
an aggravating circumstance. Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 189. That holding is 
the law of the case, and Schuler identifies no extraordinary circumstances 
warranting a different result here. See Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 990 
(Ind. 2003).    
The trial court did not find a non-statutory aggravator by noting 
Schuler’s “participation in this crime was not minor.” That language could 
explain either how the court weighed the intentional-killing aggravator or 
why the court was not finding as a mitigating circumstance that “[t]he 
defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person, 
and the defendant’s participation was relatively minor.” I.C. § 35-50-2-
9(c)(4); accord Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 60 n.61 (Ind. 1998) (“[T]he 
trial court did consider all the mitigation evidence presented by Wisehart, 
but found none of the circumstances to be mitigating,” where trial court 
had found, among other things, that “the defendant's participation was 
not minor.”), reh’g denied. Finding that Schuler’s participation was “not 
minor” was particularly appropriate after Schuler’s counsel argued at the 
sentencing that Schuler did not intentionally kill Arnold and that Scott 
was charismatic and manipulative, was more culpable than he admitted to 
police, and tried to shift blame away from himself and onto Schuler. (Tr. 
Vol. 7 at 133-40.) 
Finally, there is no error in the revised order’s statement that “two 
innocent victims were killed, and there is no excuse or justification for 
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those killings[.]” Because the court was also imposing a term of years for 
the felony murder of Henderson, reference to the number of victims was 
appropriate. See Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1259 (Ind. 2008) 
(“Consecutive sentences reflect the significance of multiple victims.”); 
Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (same), trans. 
denied. Moreover, the statute includes as mitigating circumstances, among 
others, that the victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct and 
“[a]ny other circumstances appropriate for consideration.” I.C. § 35-50-2-
9(c). The references to “innocence” and lack of “excuse or justification” 
simply underscore that the court found no mitigating circumstance other 
than Schuler’s lack of a significant criminal history. 
Concluding the revised order does not rely on non-statutory 
aggravating circumstances to impose LWOP, we affirm.  
All Justices concur.  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T 
Brent Westerfeld 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Andrew J. Borland 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Andrew A. Kobe 
Deputy Attorney General 
Jesse R. Drum 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana