Title: Baker v. PoolService Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052371
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2006

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
DOUGLAS B. BAKER, AS PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE  
OF VIRGINIA GRAEME BAKER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record Number 052371  
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 3, 2006 
POOLSERVICE COMPANY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher and Marcus D. Williams, Judges 
 
Douglas B. Baker, personal representative of the estate of 
Virginia Graeme Baker, appeals from the judgments1 of the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County, which sustained the demurrer of 
Poolservice Company (“Poolservice”) and the plea in bar of 
Hayward Pool Products, Inc. (“Hayward”) in a wrongful death 
action filed by Baker, and dismissed the case with prejudice.  
At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred as to 
either judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm the judgments of the trial court. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
The facts underlying this case are tragic: Seven-year-old 
Virginia Graeme Baker (“Virginia”) drowned on June 15, 2002 
after becoming pinned underwater by suction to the drain cover 
of an outdoor spa.  A few days before a party, the owners of the 
                                                 
1 Judge Thacher presided over the hearing and issued the 
order regarding Poolservice’s demurrer.  Judge Williams presided 
over the hearing and issued the order regarding Hayward’s plea 
in bar.  We will refer to the actions of both judges as that of 
the “trial court.” 
 
2
spa hired Poolservice to perform routine annual maintenance and 
cleaning of the spa and its adjoining pool, and to determine why 
the spa was “not working to [its] full functional capacity.”  In 
the course of this maintenance, Poolservice returned the spa’s 
pump to its normal working condition by eliminating a clog 
created by hair and other foreign matter.  Poolservice’s repair 
work did not involve the drain cover and it was not hired to 
perform a safety inspection of the spa or to retrofit any of its 
parts. 
Douglas B. Baker filed a wrongful death action as 
Virginia’s personal representative against Poolservice and 
Hayward, the manufacturer of the drain cover used in the spa.  
Baker’s amended motion for judgment alleged negligence and 
willful, wanton and reckless misconduct against Poolservice.  
Baker also alleged a breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability; breach of implied warranty of fitness; 
negligence; and willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct against 
Hayward. 
Poolservice filed a demurrer asserting that the amended 
motion for judgment “fail[ed] to state [claims] for which relief 
can be granted” as it sought to impose duties on Poolservice to 
“retro-fit an existing spa or hot tub which it neither 
manufactured, installed or sold” and to “initiate campaigns for 
safety.”  At the hearing on Poolservice’s demurrer, Baker 
 
3
acknowledged “[t]here’s no specific case on point” that would 
impose “a duty upon a repair person to advise the owner of a 
danger.”  Baker also conceded that Poolservice was not negligent 
in its performance of the actual repairs of the spa: “they 
didn’t breach the contract.  They did exactly what the contract 
called for.  They fixed the pump.” 
The trial court sustained Poolservice’s demurrer in an 
order issued August 19, 2005.  In its bench ruling, the trial 
court explained it did so because it “could find no authority 
whatsoever that imposes upon a repair person a duty to warn.” 
Hayward filed a plea in bar to the amended motion for 
judgment, asserting the five-year statute of repose in Code 
§ 8.01-250 barred Baker’s action because the drain cover was 
manufactured and installed more than five years prior to 
Virginia’s death.2  At the evidentiary hearing on the plea in 
bar, argument centered on whether the flat drain cover 
manufactured by Hayward was “an ordinary building material which 
would fall within the protections of the Statute of Repose, or 
whether it was machinery, equipment, or some other related 
article which would not enjoy the benefit of the Statute of 
                                                 
2 The drain cover was manufactured in 1989 and installed in 
the spa on or prior to 1991, when the current property owner 
took possession. 
 
4
Repose.”3  On August 25, 2005, the trial court entered an order 
granting Hayward’s plea in bar and dismissed the claims against 
it with prejudice.  From the bench, the trial court explained 
that 
[t]he characteristics of this drain cover would 
indicate that it is fungible and interchangeable with 
other similar products.  And while it looks like it’s 
portable and so forth, it appears that it is part and 
parcel of the filtration system that is in the Jacuzzi 
spa. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence is unequivocal that the 
manufacturer of this drain cover does nothing but 
simply package it and then sell it to distributors 
who, in turn, resell it to installers and contractors 
who then would incorporate it into a finished Jacuzzi 
spa.  There appear to be no particular instructions 
for a particular project that may go with it . . . . 
The Supreme Court [of Virginia] has indicated that 
ordinary building materials do enjoy the benefit of 
the Statute of Repose in Code § 8.01-250, and the 
evidence would seem to indicate that this would be 
such an ordinary building material under the current 
standards set by our court.  And accordingly, it would 
appear also that as an ordinary building material, 
that it is subject to the Statute of Repose, and 
therefore, the Plea in Bar should be granted. 
 
 
We awarded Baker this appeal. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Baker assigns error to the judgments of the trial court 
sustaining Poolservice’s demurrer, granting Hayward’s plea in 
bar, and dismissing Baker’s claims with prejudice.  We address 
each ruling in turn. 
                                                 
3 Baker agreed at the plea in bar hearing that the spa was 
an improvement to the real property, but contended that the 
spa’s drain cover was not itself an improvement. 
 
5
A. 
Poolservice’s Demurrer 
 
Baker argues the trial court erred in sustaining 
Poolservice’s demurrer because the amended motion for judgment 
pled claims against Poolservice for breaching two legal duties: 
(1) “a duty not to create or exacerbate a risk of physical harm 
in the course of making repairs to the spa” and (2) “a duty to 
make use of the company’s superior knowledge to warn the 
homeowners about that risk.” 
 
Baker contends Poolservice breached the former duty when it 
repaired the pump system in the spa, thereby “increas[ing] the 
risk of suction entrapment and consequent physical injury beyond 
the level of risk that existed before the repairs were made.” 
 
Citing § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,4 Baker 
contends “a repairman who makes [a] requested repair[,] but 
whose work nevertheless creates or exacerbates a dangerous 
condition is liable for injuries that result from the dangerous 
                                                 
 
4 Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: 
One who undertakes . . . to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection 
of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to 
the third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care  
increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by 
the other to the third person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of the reliance 
of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking. 
 
6
condition.”  Baker posits that because Poolservice knew that a 
“fully-functioning pump would increase the risk of suction 
entrapment” in the spa, it breached its duty “not [to] make 
repairs that it knew would increase the risk of entrapment.” 
 
Baker claims that Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 358 (1979), in which the Court 
applied § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,5 recognizes 
that a repairman is subject to liability for physical injuries 
resulting from “knowingly return[ing] property to its owner in a 
dangerous condition [without] warn[ing] the owner about that 
condition.”  Baker also claims that under Hegwood v. Virginia 
Natural Gas, Inc., 256 Va. 362, 505 S.E.2d 372 (1998), 
Poolservice had a legal duty to “warn the occupants of the 
                                                 
5 Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
states: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a 
chattel for another to use is subject to liability to 
those whom the supplier should expect to use the 
chattel with the consent of the other or to be 
endangered by its probable use, for physical harm 
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for 
which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if 
the supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel 
is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for 
which it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for 
whose use the chattel is supplied will realize 
its dangerous condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform 
them of its dangerous condition or of the facts 
which make it likely to be dangerous. 
 
7
premises of the known dangerous defect,” the risk of suction 
entrapment. 
 
Poolservice responds that the trial court did not err in 
sustaining its demurrer because Poolservice had none of the 
duties Baker alleged.  Poolservice contends its repairs “did 
nothing beyond returning the spa to its normal operating 
condition” and “did not alter the product to make it more 
dangerous [or] increase the risk of harm.”  Poolservice 
distinguishes the case at bar from the principle espoused in 
§ 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, because unlike 
situations where repair work created a dangerous condition, 
Poolservice’s repairs merely restored the spa to its original 
and intended operating condition.  Poolservice likewise asserts 
that it did not create the dangerous condition because any 
danger from the functioning spa “existed long before Poolservice 
ever serviced” it. 
 
Poolservice also argues the duty Baker seeks to impose on 
repairmen to warn individuals of product defects would 
“transform the repairer into the insurer of products 
manufactured by others[,] a position which has no support under 
Virginia law.”  And it asserts that Featherall and § 388 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts are inapplicable because “the 
repairs performed by Poolservice did not render the product 
dangerous” and Featherall applied § 388 only in the context of 
 
8
the manufacturer of a product.  Poolservice distinguishes 
Hegwood based on the utility work involving an inherently 
dangerous substance, as compared to the “variety of services on 
pools and spas” that it, as a maintenance company, provides.  We 
agree with Poolservice. 
 
“A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged in 
pleadings, not the strength of proof.”  Glazebrook v. Board of 
Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003) 
(citations omitted).  We are thus called upon to determine 
whether the “amended motion for judgment alleged sufficient 
facts to constitute a foundation in law for the judgment 
sought.”  Hubbard v. Dresser, Inc., 271 Va. 117, 122, 624 S.E.2d 
1, 4 (2006).  On appeal, we undertake this review using a de 
novo standard, accepting “as true all facts properly pleaded in 
the bill of complaint and all reasonable and fair inferences 
that may be drawn from those facts.”  Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 
554, 587 S.E.2d at 591. 
 
Virginia law does not impose upon Poolservice the legal 
duties Baker alleged in his amended motion for judgment.  While 
no decision has been cited by the parties or located by this 
Court determining the extent to which § 324A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts may be applicable as a matter of Virginia law, 
it is clear that even if the doctrine there set forth were 
 
9
deemed to be applicable in the Commonwealth, it would not apply 
to the situation presented in the case at bar. 
Baker admits that Poolservice was not negligent in 
performing the repairs on the spa.  Poolservice did precisely 
what the homeowners hired it to do: return the spa to its 
normal, working condition.  Poolservice thus did not create an 
unsafe condition through its repairs because any allegedly 
unsafe condition existed when the spa operated as intended, and 
had been present since the spa was manufactured and installed.  
Returning the spa to its normal, working condition is not a 
basis of liability for a repairman absent a specific undertaking 
to do otherwise, which is wholly absent in this case. 
 
Baker’s reliance on Featherall and § 388 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to argue Poolservice owed a duty to warn is 
similarly misplaced.  In Featherall, we applied § 388 in the 
context of a manufacturer’s duty to warn of latent defects in a 
product.  219 Va. at 962, 252 S.E.2d at 366.  We observed “[t]he 
duty to warn stems from the view that the manufacturer should 
have superior knowledge of his product.”  Id.  This principle 
has no application in this case because Poolservice was not the 
manufacturer of the spa or any of its component parts.  Nor was 
it hired to perform any work associated with the drain cover. 
 
The principle espoused in Hegwood is also distinguishable 
from the legal duty Baker seeks to impose on Poolservice.  In 
 
10
Hegwood, a gas utility worker restored the gas supply to a home, 
checked the gas-fired appliances throughout the house, and shut 
off supply to two appliances that were not working properly.  
Even though the repairman warned the resident of the unsafe 
condition and placed warning tags on the appliances to prevent 
them from being turned on, one or both of the appliances were 
turned on by an unidentified individual, causing carbon monoxide 
poisoning.  Hegwood, 256 Va. at 365-66, 505 S.E.2d at 374-75.  
The Court held: 
[W]hen a company has actual knowledge of a dangerous 
defect in a customer’s equipment or appliance, it has 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to shut off the 
service to such equipment or appliance.  The company 
also has a duty to warn the occupants of the premises 
of the known dangerous defect. 
 
Id. at 369, 505 S.E.2d at 377 (citations omitted). 
 
Unlike the repair work provided by Poolservice, the utility 
serviceman’s check of the gas-fired appliances in Hegwood was a 
general safety check performed as part of the utility’s 
resumption of services supplying natural gas, an inherently 
dangerous substance, to the resident.  The warning given by the 
serviceman was part of a duty the utility assumed in the 
performance of the general safety check.  In contrast, the spa 
owner requested Poolservice only to perform seasonal maintenance 
and did not hire Poolservice to perform a general safety check 
of the spa, or to perform any work on the drain cover.  
 
11
Poolservice competently performed the requested repair work and 
returned the spa to its normal functioning capacity and was 
under no duty to warn of any potential dangers unrelated to its 
specific undertaking.  Poolservice assumed no duties outside the 
parameters of those for which it had been contracted. 
 
Baker’s amended motion for judgment thus failed to allege 
any cognizable theory under which Poolservice had any duty that 
could create liability for Virginia’s death.  Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in sustaining Poolservice’s demurrer. 
B. 
Hayward’s Plea in Bar 
 
Baker also contends the trial court erred in granting 
Hayward’s plea in bar because it found Baker’s action was barred 
by the five-year statute of repose in Code § 8.01-250.  The 
statute provides, in relevant part: 
No action to recover for . . . bodily injury or 
wrongful death, arising out of the defective and 
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property 
. . . shall be brought against any person performing 
or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, 
supervision of construction, or construction of such 
improvement to real property more than five years 
after the performance or furnishing of such services 
and construction. 
 
The limitation prescribed in this section shall 
not apply to the manufacturer or supplier of any 
equipment or machinery or other articles installed in 
a structure upon real property . . . . 
 
 
Baker contends that under the statute’s plain language, 
Code § 8.01-250 is inapplicable to claims, such as his, against 
manufacturers of defectively-designed products that are 
 
12
installed in improvements to real property.  Baker further 
contends the Court’s “extra-statutory ‘ordinary building 
materials’ doctrine” does not follow the text of Code § 8.01-250 
and has caused considerable confusion.  Consequently, Baker 
urges the Court to reconsider the “ordinary building materials” 
doctrine applied in Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum 
Co., 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985), and later cases, which 
Baker asserts has expanded the provisions of Code § 8.01-250 to 
persons not expressly covered by the text of the statute. 
 
In the alternative, Baker argues that even under the 
Court’s “ordinary building materials” doctrine, Code § 8.01-250 
does not apply to Hayward.  Baker asserts the Cape Henry Towers 
line of cases affords manufacturers the benefit of Code § 8.01-
250 “when the product at issue has been designed, not by the 
manufacturer itself, but by a member of the class of defendants 
identified in the statute.”  In so much as “Hayward alone, 
without any input from the architect or engineer of the spa, 
designed the flat drain cover” at issue here, Baker contends the 
ordinary building materials doctrine does not cover Hayward. 
 
In addition, Baker asserts the Cape Henry Towers line of 
cases affords manufacturers the benefit of Code § 8.01-250 when 
the product at issue is “‘incorporated into’ the structure of an 
improvement to real property [as opposed to] merely [being] 
affixed to a structure.”  Baker distinguishes “Hayward’s drain 
 
13
cover[, which] was not a structural component of the spa; 
[instead,] the spa was a freestanding, completed structure 
before the drain cover was attached to its floor.” 
 
Hayward responds that the trial court properly applied Code 
§ 8.01-250 and this Court’s decisions in Cape Henry Towers and 
its progeny, to determine the drain cover was an “ordinary 
building material” and thus covered by the statute of repose.  
It contends that Baker’s limited interpretation of Code § 8.01-
250 would require this Court to “overrule or radically restrict” 
two decades of this court’s jurisprudence interpreting the 
statute.  Furthermore, Hayward claims “from Cape Henry Towers 
forward, the Court has consistently held that manufacturers of 
‘ordinary building materials’ are part of the ‘class of 
defendants’ protected by the statute of repose.”  Hayward thus 
asserts the trial court did not err in finding the statute of 
repose applied to Hayward because the drain cover was a fungible 
component, mass-produced as a generic material to be included in 
swimming pools and spas and was therefore an ordinary building 
material.  We agree with Hayward. 
 
“A plea in bar is a defensive pleading that reduces the 
litigation to a single issue, which if proven, creates a bar to 
the plaintiff’s right of recovery.”  Cooper Industries, Inc. v. 
Melendez, 260 Va. 578, 594, 537 S.E.2d 580, 590 (2000) (quoting 
Kroger Co. v. Appalachian Power Co., 244 Va. 560, 562, 422 
 
14
S.E.2d 757, 758 (1992); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 480, 
468 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1996)).  The party asserting the plea in 
bar bears the burden of proof.  Id.  When, as here, the trial 
court heard evidence ore tenus and the trial court decided the 
issue rather than submitting it to a jury, the trial court’s 
“findings are entitled to the weight accorded a jury verdict, 
and these findings should not be disturbed by an appellate court 
unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
them.”  Id. at 595, 537 S.E.2d at 590. 
 
Our jurisprudence applying Code § 8.01-250 traces back over 
two decades, from shortly after the General Assembly enacted the 
statute in its present form.  The arguments now advanced by 
Baker as to the construction of Code § 8.01-250 were analyzed 
and rejected in Cape Henry Towers.  229 Va. at 600-03, 331 
S.E.2d at 479-81.  We have approved the ordinary building 
materials doctrine in three unanimous decisions since Cape Henry 
Towers: Grice v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp., 236 Va. 305, 374 
S.E.2d 17 (1988); Luebbers v. Fort Wayne Plastics, Inc., 255 Va. 
368, 498 S.E.2d 911 (1998); and Cooper Industries. 
 
Under the principle of stare decisis, we reject Baker’s 
argument that the Court should not follow its well-settled 
approach to examining whether a particular material falls within 
the protections provided by Code § 8.01-250.  The doctrine of 
stare decisis “plays a significant role in the orderly 
 
15
administration of justice by assuring consistent, predictable, 
and balanced application of legal principles.  And when a court 
of last resort has established a precedent, after full 
deliberation upon the issue by the court, the precedent will not 
be treated lightly or ignored, in the absence of flagrant error 
or mistake.”  Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 
355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987).  What we said nearly a century ago 
in Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 112 S.E. 757 (1922), is as valid 
now as when it was written: 
It is to the interest of the public that there should 
be stability in the laws by which they regulate their 
conduct.  It may be that this [C]ourt, as at present 
constituted, would not, as an original proposition, 
have construed [the statute] as it was construed in 
the cases cited, but the construction of statutes 
ought not to vary with every change in the personnel 
of the appellate court.  The construction was a fair 
and reasonable one, made after full deliberation by 
courts of very able judges, for whose opinion and 
judgment we entertain the highest respect.  [T]his 
construction [has been] repeated three times by a 
unanimous court . . . and cannot now be repudiated by 
this [C]ourt. 
 
Id. at 169, 112 S.E. at 760.  We see no flagrant error or 
mistake in the ordinary building materials doctrine and 
consider it part of the settled jurisprudence of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The Cape Henry Towers line of cases recognizes that the 
statute applies to “those who furnish ordinary building 
materials, which are incorporated into construction work outside 
 
16
the control of their manufacturers or suppliers.”  Luebbers, 255 
Va. at 372, 498 S.E.2d at 913 (quoting Cape Henry Towers, 229 
Va. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480).  The equipment exclusion 
contained in the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-250 is 
distinguished from ordinary building materials on the 
ground that “unlike ordinary building materials, . . . 
equipment [is] subject to close quality control at the 
factory and may be made subject to independent 
manufacturer’s warranties, voidable if the equipment 
is not installed and used in strict compliance with 
the manufacturer’s instructions.” 
 
Id. (quoting Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 
480).  Based on these principles, we held in Cape Henry Towers 
that “exterior wall panels used in the construction of 
condominium units were ordinary building materials and not 
equipment within the meaning of Code § 8.01-250.”  Id.  And in 
Grice, we held that “an electrical panel box and its component 
parts received from the manufacturer without instructions for 
their use and installation were ordinary building materials and 
not equipment within the meaning of the statute.”  236 Va. at 
308-09, 374 S.E.2d at 18-19.  Most recently, we held in 
Luebbers, that steel panels, braces, and vinyl liners used in 
the construction of a swimming pool were ordinary building 
materials and not equipment under Code § 8.01-250.  In Luebbers, 
we explained that the pre-fabricated structural component 
materials were “clearly fungible . . . . [i]ndividually, these 
items served no function other than as generic materials to be 
 
17
included in the larger whole and are indistinguishable, in this 
context, from the wall panels we addressed in Cape Henry 
Towers.”  255 Va. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913. 
 
The evidence before the trial court clearly supported the 
finding that the drain cover at issue is indistinguishable from 
the materials found to be ordinary building materials in our 
prior cases.  Baker does not contest that the spa to which the 
drain is affixed was an “improvement to real property” under 
Code § 8.01-250.  Hayward mass-produced the drain cover for 
installation into swimming pools and spas.  It sold the drain 
cover primarily, if not exclusively, to distributors.   Hayward 
had no role designing the swimming pools and spas into which the 
drain covers were installed, nor did it participate in the 
installation of the drain cover.  The drain cover was as much 
incorporated into the spa as an improvement to real estate as 
were the wall covers in Cape Henry Towers and the pool liner in 
Luebbers.  Indeed, the drain cover in the case at bar is 
indistinguishable from the fungible component parts of the 
swimming pool found to be ordinary building materials in 
Luebbers. 
Here, as in Cape Henry Towers, the material[] 
manufactured by [Hayward] and incorporated into the 
finished [spa is] clearly [a] fungible component of 
that [spa].  Individually, [the drain cover] served no 
function other than as generic material[] to be 
included in the larger whole and [is] 
indistinguishable, in this context, from the wall 
 
18
panels we addressed in Cape Henry Towers.  As such, 
these materials were ordinary building materials and 
not “equipment” within the meaning of Code § 8.01-250. 
 
Luebbers, 255 Va. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913. 
 
 
Lastly, we reject Baker’s claim that Code § 8.01-250 only 
applies to manufacturers “when the product at issue has been 
designed, not by the manufacturer . . . but by” an individual 
who “perform[ed] or furnish[ed] the design, planning, surveying, 
supervision of construction, or construction of” the improvement 
to real property.  All of the products we have found to be 
ordinary building materials in the Cape Henry Towers line of 
cases were designed by someone other than the designer of the 
improvement into which those products were incorporated.  Thus, 
Code § 8.01-250 applies to manufacturers even when the 
manufacturer, rather than a person identified in the statute, 
designs the ordinary building material in question. 
 
As a fungible component part of an improvement to real 
property, the drain cover is “ordinary building material” and is 
not excluded from the protection of Code § 8.01-250 as 
“equipment or machinery or other articles.”  Hayward is thus 
entitled to the protection of the statute of repose.  
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in granting 
Hayward’s plea in bar. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
19
 
The trial court did not err in sustaining Poolservice’s 
demurrer because Baker’s amended motion for judgment alleged 
Poolservice owed duties that are not recognized in Virginia law.  
Similarly, the trial court did not err in granting Hayward’s 
plea in bar because Baker’s motion for judgment was filed after 
the expiration of the five-year period provided in Code § 8.01-
250.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments of the trial 
court sustaining Poolservice’s demurrer, granting Hayward’s plea 
in bar, and dismissing the claims against both parties with 
prejudice. 
Affirmed.