Title: Matter of the Petition of Delaware State Housing Authority
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 221, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PETITION OF DELAWARE 
STATE HOUSING AUTHORITY 
FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION 
§ 
§  No. 221, 2007 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 18, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 25, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 25th day of May 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Petitioner Delaware State Housing Authority (“DSHA”) has filed a 
petition in this Court requesting the issuance of a writ of prohibition,1 which would 
prohibit the Superior Court from requiring DSHA to provide one of its tenants, 
Luciel Howell, with a DSHA rental unit in Kent County pending the Superior 
Court’s decision on her petition for a writ of certiorari.  DSHA also has requested a 
stay of the Superior Court’s order pending this Court’s decision on the petition for 
a writ of prohibition.2  Howell has filed a response in opposition to DSHA’s 
petition for a writ of prohibition and a response in opposition to DSHA’s motion 
for a stay.3  We conclude that a writ of prohibition is inappropriate under the 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 43. 
2 By order dated May 9, 2007, the Superior Court denied DSHA’s motion for a stay. 
3 On May 21, 2007, the Justice of the Peace Court of the State of Delaware filed a motion to 
intervene. 
 
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circumstances of this case.  Accordingly, the petition for a writ of prohibition is 
DISMISSED and the motion for a stay is DENIED as moot.  
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in October 2006, DSHA instituted summary 
possession proceedings in the Justice of the Peace Court (the “J.P. Court”) on the 
ground that Howell, a tenant at the Clark’s Corner public housing complex in 
Harrington, Delaware, had violated her lease.  In February 2007, the J.P. Court 
determined that Howell’s lease should be terminated.  On appeal, a three-judge 
panel of the J.P. Court affirmed the decision to terminate and awarded possession 
of the unit to DSHA.  A writ of possession issued on February 22, 2007.  The J.P. 
Court denied Howell’s subsequent motions to stay and for reargument.  Her appeal 
to the Court of Common Pleas was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  In the 
interim, DSHA placed a new family in the unit. 
 
(3) 
Howell filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Superior Court 
alleging irregularities in the J.P. Court proceedings that resulted in the termination 
of her lease.  The Superior Court granted the J.P. Court an extension of time in 
which to transcribe the tapes of the hearings and issued a briefing schedule on the 
petition, with the reply brief due on or before June 8, 2007.  In its April 25, 2007 
order requiring DSHA to provide Howell with housing pending its decision on her 
petition for a writ of certiorari, the Superior Court stated its intention to decide this 
matter “as efficiently as possible,” indicating that, barring any unforeseen 
 
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circumstances, it will render its decision no later than mid-June.  In response, 
DSHA filed a petition for a writ of prohibition and a motion for a stay in this 
Court.  DSHA argues that the Superior Court’s order unfairly requires DSHA to 
violate federal law by placing Howell in a rental unit that already has been 
assigned to another family and exceeds the proper jurisdiction of the Superior 
Court.  
 
(4) 
 A writ of prohibition is the legal equivalent of the equitable remedy 
of injunction and may be issued to prevent a trial court from exceeding the limits 
of its jurisdiction.4  Because prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, this Court is 
reluctant to grant such a writ unless the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction is 
“manifestly apparent” on the record.5  Like a writ of mandamus, a writ of 
prohibition will not issue if the petitioner has another adequate remedy at law.6 
 
(5) 
DSHA’s petition fails to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction to 
issue an extraordinary writ.  We do not find the Superior Court’s alleged lack of 
jurisdiction to require DSHA to provide Howell with housing pending its decision 
on her petition for a writ of certiorari to be “clear and unmistakable.”7  The 
Superior Court has jurisdiction to decide the petition for a writ of certiorari.  It also 
possesses the inherent authority, albeit limited, to position the parties before it to 
                                                 
4 In re Hovey, 545 A.2d 626, 628 (Del. 1988). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 629. 
 
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minimize prejudice to them prior to a decision on the merits.  Finally, we do not 
find it persuasive, on the record before us, that DSHA has no option but to violate 
federal law by obeying the Superior Court’s order.     
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that DSHA’s petition for a writ of 
prohibition is DISMISSED and its motion for a stay is DENIED as moot.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
8 The Justice of the Peace Court’s motion to intervene also is denied as moot.