Title: Connolly v. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Citation: 487 P.2d 1050, 79 Wash. 2d 500
Docket Number: 41653
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 1971

79 Wn.2d 500 (1971) 487 P.2d 1050 CHARLES B. CONNOLLY, Respondent, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Appellant. No. 41653. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. August 12, 1971. Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and William M. Gingery, Assistant, for appellant. Barrett White, for respondent. *501 HUNTER, J. This is an appeal by the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of Washington from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, reversing the department's decision to revoke the motor vehicle driver's license of the defendant, Charles B. Connolly, for 6 months under the "Implied Consent" statute, RCW 46.20.308, by reason of his failure to submit to a chemical test of his breath following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The sole issue in this case revolves around the failure of the arresting officers to advise the defendant that, in addition to the "chemical tests" of his breath administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer, he has a right to tests administered by any qualified person of his own choosing as provided in RCW 46.61.506. The pertinent part of the implied consent statute, as related to this appeal, is as follows: (Italics ours.) RCW 46.20.308(1). *502 It is the contention of the department that this additional warning by the arresting officers is not a condition precedent to revocation; that to hold otherwise would be adding another element, which is not presently in the statute, essential as grounds for revocation of a defendant's driver's license by reason of his failure to take the test, and that the material elements essential for a revocation are as follows: They also contend that these are the only elements, in the arresting officers' report to the department, essential to a revocation of a defendant's driver's license under the statute, RCW 46.20.308(3), and that again these are the only elements mentioned under the statute within the scope of the administrative hearing when requested by the defendant. RCW 46.20.308(4). [1-3] We disagree with this rationale of the department. The language of the statute, as contended by the defendant, is clear and unambiguous, and in mandatory language in the conjunctive: (Italics ours.) RCW 46.20.308(1). This language must be considered in context with the remainder of the statute, and with the statute in its entirety. In re Estate of Bracken, 56 Wn.2d 17, 351 P.2d 151 (1960); DeGrief v. Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 297 P.2d 940 (1956). To consider this additional warning in isolation, unrelated to the remainder of the statute, would render the language meaningless and superfluous. The fundamental *503 rule of statutory construction requires that language within a statute must be construed to have a meaning and purpose, and that it not be rendered superfluous. Kasper v. Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 420 P.2d 346 (1966). Groves v. Meyers, 35 Wn.2d 403, 213 P.2d 483 (1950). The department argues, however, that the purpose of the warning seems clear, that its use be limited to a criminal action. It states the following in its brief: The department, by this argument, admits a test taken without giving the additional warning as to the right of the defendant to take additional tests, would render the test inadmissible in a criminal action. It would be incongruous to say the people, in passing this legislation, intended that a person's license be revoked for 6 months for the failure to take a test which, if taken, could not be used as evidence against him in a criminal action to prove his intoxication while driving a motor vehicle on a public highway. A like conclusion was reached in a recent Ohio case. There, under a similar statute, the prosecuting attorney conceded that the result of a chemical test conducted without the accused person being advised of his right to an additional test, as provided for by statute, would be suppressible upon his prosecution for driving while intoxicated, but contended that the warning was not required for the revocation of the driver's license of the accused. In Couch v. Rice, 23 Ohio App.2d 160, 161, 261 N.E.2d 187 (1970), it was said: (Italics ours.) The trial court was correct in holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to have additional tests administered pursuant to the statute invalidates the department's revocation of the defendant's driver's license for failure to submit to a chemical test of his breath or blood as provided in RCW 46.20.308. The judgment is affirmed. HAMILTON, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HALE, NEILL, STAFFORD, SHARP, and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.