Title: State v. Michael Brandt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001489-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1489-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Michael Brandt,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 121, 582 N.W.2d 433 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 8, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 25, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
S. Michael Wilk 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Michael J. Fitzgerald, Dean A. Strang and Fitzgerald & 
Strang, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Dean A. Strang. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1489-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael Brandt,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Michael 
Brandt, seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's refusal to allow him to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.1  Brandt contends that he did not 
understand 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
charges 
because 
the 
plea 
questionnaire prepared by his attorney incorrectly listed the 
elements of those crimes.  In essence, Brandt argues that the 
circuit court violated the Wis. Stat. § 971.08 plea procedure by 
its failure to demonstrate at the plea hearing that Brandt 
understood the nature of the crimes.  Because we conclude that 
Brandt has failed to make a prima facie showing that the circuit 
court violated the Wis. Stat. § 971.08 plea procedure, we affirm 
the court of appeals. 
                     
1 State v. Brandt, 220 Wis. 2d 121, 582 N.W.2d 433 (Ct. App. 
1998) (affirming order and judgment of Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, S. Michael Wilk, Judge). 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
2 
¶2 
In March of 1994, Brandt was charged with two counts 
of forgery, two counts of uttering, and one count of theft by 
fraud arising out of a loan he obtained and checks he signed 
under a false identity.  See Wis. Stat. § 943.38(1)(a) (1995-
96);2 § 943.38(2); § 943.20(1)(d).  In July of 1996, after being 
bound over for trial, Brandt entered into a plea agreement where 
he consented to plead guilty to one count each of forgery and 
uttering and to the one count of theft by fraud.  The State 
agreed to dismiss the other two counts but retained the right to 
read in those counts for purposes of sentencing.  Nothing in the 
plea agreement limited the type or length of sentence the State 
could recommend.   
¶3 
Brandt’s attorney completed a plea questionnaire on 
the morning of the plea hearing.  His attorney read the 
questionnaire to Brandt who then signed it.  As an addendum to 
the 
standard 
questionnaire, 
Brandt's 
attorney 
penned 
the 
elements of the crimes.  The record is unclear whether Brandt's 
attorney discussed this addendum with Brandt as well.  However, 
on this addendum Brandt's attorney listed the elements of 
similar but different crimes than those to which Brandt agreed 
                     
2 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
3 
to plead guilty.3  The morning pre-hearing conference between 
Brandt and his attorney lasted for about thirty minutes. 
¶4 
That afternoon Brandt appeared before the circuit 
court to plead guilty to the three charges.  Because his 
attorney had a jury trial at the same time, another member of 
the attorney's firm represented Brandt at the plea hearing.  
According to the affidavit Brandt made for post-conviction 
purposes, shortly before the plea hearing began the substitute 
attorney gave him the addendum with the incorrect elements of 
the crimes listed on it.  Brandt signed that document as an 
indication that he understood the nature of the crimes.   
¶5 
During the plea hearing, Brandt's substitute attorney 
informed the circuit court that a plea questionnaire had been 
completed.  The circuit court noted each one of the three 
crimes, indicated the maximum penalty allowed by law, and asked 
for Brandt's plea.  The circuit court then confirmed that the 
                     
3 Under Count One of the complaint, Brandt agreed to plead 
guilty to 
forging 
a loan 
application.  
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.38(1)(a).  However, the attorney's handwritten paper 
applied the law to forging a check rather than a loan 
application.   
Similarly, under Count Two of the complaint, Brandt agreed 
to plead guilty to Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) ("Theft by fraud"). 
 The 
handwritten 
paper 
however 
listed 
the 
elements 
of 
§ 943.20(1)(c) ("Theft by one having an undisputed interest in 
property from one having superior right of possession").  
Compare Wis JI-Criminal § 1453 with Wis JI-Criminal § 1450.  
Finally, while Brandt agreed under Count Five of the complaint 
to plead guilty to uttering a forged check, the handwritten 
paper instead listed the elements of possessing a forged check 
with the intent to utter.  See § 943.38(2); compare Wis JI-
Criminal § 1492 with Wis JI-Criminal § 1493. 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
4 
State would be dismissing the other two counts of the complaint 
but that it would still read in those counts for purposes of 
sentencing.  Brandt indicated that he understood this to be the 
agreement. 
¶6 
Next the circuit court inquired briefly about the plea 
questionnaire, asking Brandt whether he had signed the form and 
understood it.4  Brandt responded that he both signed and 
understood the questionnaire.  The circuit court questioned 
Brandt on various items relating to his mental state and his 
ability to freely and voluntarily plead guilty to his crimes.   
¶7 
After these questions, the circuit court turned to a 
detailed examination of Brandt's understanding of the three 
crimes.  In contrast to the plea questionnaire, the circuit 
court’s colloquy accurately described the elements of the 
crimes.  Beginning with the forgery count, the circuit court 
inquired as follows: 
 
THE COURT:  You understand that by pleading 
guilty to Count One, forgery, you are admitting you 
committed each of the elements of that crime, which 
are as follows. 
First, that the document in the case was a 
writing by which legal rights or obligations are 
created or transferred. 
                     
4 In total the circuit court's questions relating to the 
plea questionnaire were as follows: 
THE COURT:  You signed a plea questionnaire and 
waiver of rights form; is that correct? 
BRANDT:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Did you read it and understand it 
before you signed it? 
BRANDT:  Yes, Your Honor. 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
5 
Second, that the writing was an application for a 
loan. Also, that you falsely wrote the name of Bruce 
Baca on the application for the loan. 
And, finally, that you falsely made the writing 
with the intent to defraud. Do you understand that 
you, by pleading guilty, you are admitting you 
committed all the elements of that crime? 
 
BRANDT:  Yes, Your Honor. 
The circuit court then made similar inquiries into the other two 
counts, describing the elements of each crime and applying them 
to the facts of Brandt's case.  In all cases Brandt stated that 
he understood the crimes to which he was pleading guilty.  
Nowhere in its explanation of and inquiry into the elements of 
the crimes did the circuit court refer to the plea questionnaire 
or addendum.  Rather the circuit court conducted this part of 
the plea colloquy independently of the plea questionnaire. 
¶8 
After addressing Brandt's understanding of each of the 
crimes, the circuit court next examined his understanding of the 
rights he waived by pleading guilty.  Finally, the circuit court 
discussed with Brandt his conversations with his lawyer and 
asked if he had any "questions now about the [plea questionnaire 
he] signed or about [his] plea of guilty to each of [the] 
charges."  Brandt stated that he did not. 
¶9 
The circuit court then turned to Brandt's attorney and 
verified that the attorney had discussed the charges with 
Brandt, sought the attorney's assurance that Brandt understood 
the consequences of pleading guilty, and sought a stipulation 
that the complaint provided a sufficient factual basis for the 
crimes.  Brandt's attorney assured the circuit court that 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
6 
Brandt’s plea was knowing and voluntary and that the complaint 
did provide a sufficient factual basis for accepting his plea. 
¶10 Before accepting his guilty plea, the circuit court 
again asked if Brandt had any questions about his plea or its 
consequences or disagreed in any way with the statements his 
attorney had just made.  Hearing no question or disagreement 
from Brandt, the circuit court then concluded that he was freely 
and voluntarily pleading guilty to the three crimes and accepted 
his guilty pleas. 
¶11 Some months later the court sentenced Brandt.  That 
sentence included ten years of prison, a consecutive ten years 
of probation with an imposed and stayed seven years of 
imprisonment, and a $7500 fine.  Shortly after the court imposed 
sentence, Brandt indicated that he intended to seek post-
conviction relief and later moved the circuit court to withdraw 
his guilty pleas.   
¶12 Brandt's motion claimed that his pleas were not 
knowingly and voluntarily given because of the discrepancy 
between the elements 
of 
the 
crimes 
listed 
on 
the 
plea 
questionnaire addendum and those given at the plea hearing.  He 
contended that this discrepancy caused him to not understand the 
actual crimes to which he was pleading guilty.  In support of 
his motion, Brandt attached affidavits from himself, his 
attorney, and his attorney's partner who had represented him at 
the plea hearing.   
¶13 Brandt's attorney averred that although he prepared 
the plea questionnaire and discussed it with Brandt, he did not 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
7 
realize that in the addendum he had incorrectly listed the 
elements of the crimes.  His partner averred that he did not 
read or review the plea questionnaire prior to the plea hearing, 
although he had assured the circuit court at that hearing that 
he had done so.  Finally, Brandt averred that he and his 
attorney went through the plea questionnaire "very quickly" on 
the morning of the plea hearing and that he "did not pay close 
attention" to the circuit court's colloquy.  In sum, Brandt 
contended that he did not appreciate the difference between what 
had appeared on the plea questionnaire addendum and what the 
circuit court told him in the afternoon. 
¶14 The circuit court concluded that Brandt had knowingly 
and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas based on its lengthy 
and constitutionally adequate colloquy with him.  The circuit 
court reasoned that it was not required to make an investigation 
of the handwritten addendum to ascertain whether that addendum 
outlined different crimes than those discussed with a defendant 
in open court.  Brandt appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed.   
¶15 The court of appeals concluded that Brandt's pleas 
were knowingly and voluntarily given because the circuit court's 
colloquy, not having relied on the incorrect plea questionnaire 
addendum, indicated that Brandt understood the substance of his 
pleas and appreciated their consequences.  State v. Brandt, 220 
Wis. 2d 121, 134-36, 582 N.W.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1998).  However, 
the court of appeals cautioned that a different outcome would 
have resulted had the circuit court relied upon the plea 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
8 
questionnaire to outline the crimes to which Brandt agreed to 
plead guilty.  Id. at 136.  
¶16 To successfully withdraw his plea, Brandt initially 
must make a prima facie showing that the circuit court violated 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 when it failed to demonstrate on the record 
that Brandt understood the elements of the crimes to which he 
pled.5  State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 140-41, 569 N.W.2d 
577 (1997); State v. Dugan, 193 Wis. 2d 610, 617, 534 N.W.2d 897 
(Ct. App. 1995).  Determining whether he made such a showing 
requires this court to apply a given set of facts to the 
appropriate legal standard.  This application is a question of 
law that we review independently of the legal determinations of 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  See Van Camp, 213 
Wis. 2d at 139; State v. Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d 823, 831, 
416 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1987). 
                     
5 In addition to making a prima facie showing that the 
circuit court violated Wis. Stat. § 971.08, Brandt must also 
allege that he did not know or understand the information that 
the circuit court should have provided at the plea hearing.  
State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 140-41, 569 N.W.2d 577 
(1997); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 275, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986); State v. James, 176 Wis. 2d 230, 237, 500 N.W.2d 345, 
348 (Ct. App. 1993).  Even after demonstrating both items, 
Brandt would not automatically be entitled to relief.   
The State is then given the opportunity to show by clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
defendant 
nevertheless 
knowingly entered the plea.  State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 
864, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275.  
Because we conclude that Brandt did not overcome his initial 
burden of demonstrating a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08, we do not consider the other elements of this test. 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
9 
¶17 For a plea to satisfy the constitutional standard, a 
defendant 
must 
enter 
it 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-
43 (1969).  This means, in effect, that by pleading guilty 
defendants must understand both the constitutional rights they 
are relinquishing as well as the nature of the crimes to which 
they are pleading.  Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 
(1976); Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 140.  
¶18 In enacting Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08 
the 
legislature 
created 
a 
statute 
that 
procedurally 
implements 
this 
constitutional mandate.  The statute provides in relevant part:  
 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
 
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine 
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  A defendant's understanding of the nature 
of the charge must “include an awareness of the essential 
elements of the crime.”  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267.   
¶19 In Bangert, we suggested various methods that a 
circuit court might use to satisfy this statutory obligation: 
 
First, the trial court may summarize the elements of 
the crime charged by reading from the appropriate jury 
instructions or from the applicable statute.  Second, 
the trial judge may ask defendant's counsel whether he 
explained the nature of the charge to the defendant 
and request him to summarize the extent of the 
explanation, including a reiteration of the elements, 
at the plea hearing.  Third, the trial judge may 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
10
expressly refer to the record or other evidence of 
defendant's knowledge of the nature of the charge 
established prior to the plea hearing. . . . A trial 
judge may also specifically refer to and summarize any 
signed 
statement 
of 
the 
defendant 
which 
might 
demonstrate that the defendant has notice of the 
nature of the charge. 
Id. at 268.  This list is not exhaustive and does not require an 
extensive 
verbal 
colloquy 
with 
every 
defendant. 
 
See 
Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d at 826-27; but see State v. Hansen, 
168 Wis. 2d 749, 756, 485 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1992).  A circuit 
court is given discretion to tailor the colloquy to its style 
and to the facts of the particular case provided that it 
demonstrates on the record that the defendant knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently entered the plea.  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 267-68; Hansen, 168 Wis. 2d at 756. 
¶20 Brandt’s argument hinges entirely on two facts:   (1) 
the plea questionnaire6 and the plea colloquy described different 
crimes; and (2) the circuit court 
did not 
notice 
this 
inconsistency and clarify the matter with Brandt.  Importantly, 
his objection does not lie in the plea colloquy itself.  He 
readily admits that, taken in isolation, the plea colloquy 
adequately 
demonstrated that 
he knowingly 
and 
voluntarily 
entered guilty pleas.  However, Brandt argues that because of 
the errant plea questionnaire’s existence, the plea colloquy can 
only be viewed in conjunction with the plea questionnaire.  
                     
6 Hereafter, we will use the term “plea questionnaire” to 
refer to both the actual plea questionnaire and the attached 
addendum.  
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
11
¶21 It is uncontroverted that the elements set forth in 
the plea questionnaire failed to advise Brandt of the nature of 
the crimes to which he 
was pleading 
guilty. 
 However, 
dereliction in that regard need not automatically result in a 
defective plea.  If the circuit court satisfactorily shows that 
the defendant understands “the nature of the crime at the time 
of the taking of the plea” no error will result.  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 269; State v. Nichelson, 220 Wis. 2d 214, 218, 582 
N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶22 Brandt does not dispute that a circuit court is under 
no obligation to require the completion of a plea questionnaire. 
 Nevertheless, he suggests that once a circuit court requires 
the completion of a plea questionnaire, it is then also 
obligated to insure that the questionnaire is accurate.  We 
disagree.   
¶23 A circuit court has significant discretion in how it 
conducts a plea hearing.  Within its discretion, a circuit court 
may incorporate into the plea colloquy the information contained 
in the plea questionnaire, relying substantially on that 
questionnaire to establish the defendant’s understanding of the 
crime.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 269.  That a circuit court may 
do so does not mean that it must do so.  We are satisfied that a 
circuit court may also do what the circuit court did in this 
case:  order the completion of a plea questionnaire but then 
conduct its colloquy disregarding in whole or in part that 
questionnaire.  There is nothing constitutionally or statutorily 
onerous about such an action.  
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
12
¶24 Where, as here, a circuit court ignores the plea 
questionnaire in its colloquy concerning the elements of the 
crimes, the adequacy of that colloquy rises or falls on the 
circuit court’s discussion at the plea hearing.  In such cases, 
the adequacy or deficiency of the plea questionnaire is not at 
issue because it does not constitute the basis on which the plea 
is accepted. 
¶25 The circuit court’s actions in this case are to be 
distinguished from those cases where the circuit court relies on 
the information in the plea questionnaire to demonstrate that 
the defendant understood the elements of the crimes.  See 
Hansen, 168 Wis. 2d at 756; Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d at 827.  
In such cases, because the plea questionnaire is the underlying 
basis on which the plea is accepted, the sufficiency of the 
questionnaire drives the sufficiency of the plea.  If the relied 
upon part of the questionnaire is deficient, so too is the plea 
taken in reliance of that part of the questionnaire.  However in 
this case, when the circuit court discussed the elements of the 
crimes with Brandt, it did so without reliance on the plea 
questionnaire.   
¶26 This court is therefore left to consider only the 
adequacy of the plea colloquy itself.  As even Brandt himself 
concedes, the record compels a conclusion that the circuit 
court’s plea colloquy easily satisfied the constitutional and 
statutory requirements.  That is, the circuit court established 
at the plea hearing that Brandt understood the nature of the 
crimes to which he pled guilty. 
No. 97-1489-CR 
 
13
¶27 In sum, Brandt has failed to make a prima facie 
showing that the circuit court violated the Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
requirement that a defendant’s plea be made voluntarily with an 
understanding of the nature of the crimes.  Because the circuit 
court did not rely on the incorrect information in the 
questionnaire, it did not have an obligation to verify the 
accuracy of that information.  Instead, the circuit court 
conducted a personal colloquy with Brandt describing the correct 
elements of the crimes and insuring that he understood the 
nature of the crimes.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit 
court properly denied Brandt’s motion to withdraw his pleas and 
affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
1