Title: Tony R. Smith and Smith & Weems Investments, LLC v. Slack Alost Development Services of Alabama, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080069
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2009

REL: 6/26/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1080069
____________________
Tony R. Smith and Smith & Weems Investments, LLC
v.
Slack Alost Development Services of Alabama, LLC
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-07-900322)
____________________
1080074
____________________
Jerry E. Hazel
v.
Slack Alost Development Services of Alabama, LLC
2
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-07-900310)
STUART, Justice.
These consolidated appeals arise from two separate
breach-of-contract actions filed in the Baldwin Circuit Court
by Slack Alost Development Services of Alabama, LLC ("Slack
Alost"), 
against 
individuals 
who 
failed 
to 
close 
on
condominiums they had contracted to purchase in Slack Alost's
Bel Sole development in Gulf Shores.  In the underlying action
in appeal no. 1080069, Slack Alost sued Tony R. Smith and
Albert Weems, who is not a party to the appeal, for failing to
complete their condominium purchase, and in the underlying
action in appeal no. 1080074, Slack Alost sued Jerry E. Hazel
for failing to complete his condominium purchase.  On August
19, 2008, the trial court entered a summary judgment against
Weems and awarded Slack Alost $166,424.  That same date, it
also entered a summary judgment against Hazel and awarded
Slack Alost $120,522.  Smith and Smith & Weems Investments,
LLC, which provided earnest money in the form of a letter of
credit on behalf of Weems, and which was added as an
indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
now appeal the summary judgment entered against Weems, and
1080069, 1080074
At his deposition, Weems testified that the signature and
1
initials purporting to be Smith's do not, in fact, match
Smith's writing, and Weems further speculated that they were
added to the contract by somebody in the office of the real-
estate agent who handled the sales transaction. 
3
Hazel appeals the judgment entered against him.  We dismiss
the appeal filed by Smith and Smith & Weems Investments in
appeal no. 1080069, and we reverse the judgment entered
against Hazel in appeal no. 1080074.
I.
On July 22, 2005, Slack Alost and Weems entered into a
preconstruction contract whereby Weems agreed to purchase unit
901 in the Bel Sole condominium development for $820,000.  The
contract also identified Tony Smith as a purchaser and
contains his purported signature and initials alongside
Weems's signature and initials.  Smith, however, denies
signing or initialing the contract; he alleges that his
signature and initials were forged.   The contract contained
1
provisions requiring the purchasers to provide, within 15
days, an earnest-money deposit in the form of an irrevocable
standby letter of credit in an amount equal to 20% of the
purchase price, or $164,000, and authorizing Slack Alost to
draw upon that letter of credit for the full amount if the
1080069, 1080074
4
purchasers failed to complete the purchase.  In compliance
with this provision, a letter of credit from AmSouth Bank in
that amount was delivered to White Sands, Inc., the escrow
agent identified in the contract.  The letter of credit was
applied for by and issued on behalf of Smith & Weems
Investments, LLC, a limited liability company of which Smith
and Weems are the only two members.  Smith testified in his
deposition that both his and Weems's signatures are required
on any contract entered into by Smith & Weems Investments.  
On November 17, 2005, Slack Alost and Hazel entered into
a preconstruction contract whereby Hazel agreed to purchase
unit 302 in the Bel Sole condominium development for $590,000.
This contract was similar in all material respects to the
contract entered into by Weems, and it required Hazel to
provide, within 15 days, an earnest-money deposit in the form
of an irrevocable standby letter of credit in an amount equal
to 20% of the purchase price, or $118,000, and authorized
Slack Alost to draw upon that letter of credit for the full
amount if Hazel failed to complete his purchase.  AmSouth Bank
thereafter issued a letter of credit in that amount on behalf
of Hazel and delivered it to the escrow agent, White Sands.
1080069, 1080074
5
On January 19, 2007, Slack Alost sent a letter to Weems
and 
Smith 
and 
another 
to 
Hazel 
informing 
them 
that
construction on Bel Sole was near completion and asking them
to schedule a closing on their respective units sometime
during the week beginning Monday, February 5, and ending
Friday, February 9, 2007.  When none of the parties took any
action to schedule the closings, Slack Alost scheduled Weems
and Smith's closing for April 2, 2007, and Hazel's closing for
April 5, 2007, and notified the parties by letter of the
scheduled closings.  Slack Alost alleges that it was ready,
willing, and able to close on the two units on those dates;
however, neither Weems or Smith nor Hazel appeared for their
scheduled closings.  Slack Alost therefore took the position
that Weems, Smith, and Hazel were in default and requested
that White Sands draw upon the respective standby letters of
credit and disburse the proceeds to Slack Alost as provided in
the sales contracts in the event the purchaser defaulted.
White Sands responded that it would disburse the proceeds only
with the written consent of all the parties or pursuant to a
court order.
1080069, 1080074
6
On May 15, 2007, Slack Alost sued Hazel, alleging that he
breached his contract to purchase unit 302, and, on May 17,
2007, Slack Alost filed a separate action against Weems and
Smith alleging that they breached their contract to purchase
unit 901.  Both actions also named White Sands as a defendant
and sought injunctive relief against it based on its refusal
to draw on the letters of credit.  Slack Alost subsequently
moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 19(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P., to add Smith & Weems Investments as a party in the case
against Weems and Smith based on the fact that it was the
entity named in the standby letter of credit issued by AmSouth
Bank.  That motion was granted and, due to the similar
allegations in the two complaints filed by Slack Alost, the
trial court consolidated the two cases for discovery purposes.
In September 2007, Regions Bank –– the successor to
AmSouth Bank –– notified White Sands that the letters of
credit issued on behalf of Hazel and Smith & Weems Investments
would expire on November 16, 2007, and November 28, 2007,
respectively, and that it was not renewing those letters of
credit.  On October 12, 2007, Slack Alost moved the trial
court to issue an injunction requiring White Sands to draw on
1080069, 1080074
The contract between Weems and Slack Alost included a
2
provision stating that "[a]ll obligations of purchaser
hereunder, where there may be more than one purchaser, shall
be joint and several."  Thus, regardless of whether Smith is
ultimately found to have also signed the contract, Weems is
liable for all the obligations under the contract.
7
both letters of credit and to deposit the proceeds with the
court.  White Sands joined in that motion and, on November 14,
2007, the motion was granted.  The letters of credit were
subsequently drawn upon and the proceeds were deposited with
the court.
On June 24, 2008, Slack Alost filed separate motions
seeking summary judgments against Hazel and Weems.  Slack
Alost did not move for a summary judgment against Smith or
Smith & Weems Investments.  On August 19, 2008, the trial
court granted both motions and, after adding an appropriate
amount for prejudgment interest, entered a judgment against
Hazel for $120,522 and against Weems for $166,424.   The trial
2
court also directed the circuit court clerk to disburse to
Slack Alost the funds previously deposited with the court.
Hazel, Weems, Smith, and Smith & Weems Investments moved the
trial court to reconsider its judgments; however, those
motions were denied.  Hazel then filed his notice of appeal,
1080069, 1080074
This Court remanded the cases for the entry of a Rule
3
54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., certification, and, in response, the
trial court certified its summary judgments as final.
8
and Smith and Smith & Weems Investments filed a separate
notice of appeal.   Weems is not a party to that appeal.   
3
II.
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004).
III.
We first consider Hazel's appeal from the summary
judgment entered against him (appeal no. 1080074).  Hazel
argues that he never received an offering statement as
1080069, 1080074
9
required by the Alabama Uniform Condominium Act, § 35-8A-101
et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and that he was accordingly entitled
to cancel the contract he had entered into to purchase unit
302 without penalty.  Section 35-8A-408 provides:
"(a) A person required to deliver an offering
statement pursuant to section 35-8A-402(c) shall
provide a purchaser of a unit with a copy of the
offering statement and all amendments thereto before
conveyance of that unit, and not later than the date
of any contract of sale.  Unless a purchaser is
given the offering statement more than seven days
before execution of a contract for the purchase of
a unit, the purchaser may cancel the contract, or
rescind the conveyance if a conveyance has already
occurred, within seven days after first receiving
the offering statement.
"(b) If a purchaser elects to cancel a contract
or conveyance pursuant to subsection (a), he may do
so by hand-delivering notice thereof to the offeror
or by mailing notice thereof by prepaid United
States mail to the offeror or to his agent for
service of process.  Cancellation is without
penalty, and all payments made by the purchaser
before cancellation shall be refunded promptly.
"(c) If a person required to deliver an offering
statement pursuant to section 35-8A-402(c) fails to
provide a purchaser to whom a unit is conveyed with
that offering statement and all amendments thereto
as required by subsection (a), the purchaser, at the
purchaser's option and in lieu of any rights to
damages or other relief, is entitled to receive from
that person an amount equal to five percent of the
sales price of the unit at anytime prior to the
expiration of six months from the date of conveyance
of the unit, plus five percent of the share,
proportionate to his common expense liability, of
1080069, 1080074
10
any indebtedness of the association secured by
security interests encumbering the condominium."
In conjunction with the construction of the Bel Sole
condominium development, Slack Alost produced an offering
statement dated July 1, 2005, and an amended offering
statement dated January 5, 2007.  Hazel alleges that Slack
Alost failed to deliver either of these offering statements to
him and that he did not receive them until after Slack Alost
commenced this litigation.  He further alleges that,  pursuant
to § 35-8A-408, he rescinded his contract to purchase unit 302
by a letter from his attorney to Slack Alost dated April 30,
2007.  
Slack Alost, however, argues that Hazel not only received
an offering statement when he signed the sales contract for
unit 302, but he also specifically initialed and dated
paragraph 15 of that contract, which provides that the
"[p]urchaser acknowledges receipt of a copy of the offering
statement with respect to the unit and the condominium
prepared in accordance with the Alabama Uniform Condominium
Act ... and purchaser represents that purchaser has read and
is familiar with the provisions thereof."  Moreover, Slack
Alost submitted to the trial court in conjunction with its
1080069, 1080074
11
motion for a summary judgment the following deposition
testimony of Hazel's in which he admitted initialing paragraph
15:
"Q.
When you got –– when you signed Plaintiff's
Exhibit 17, the pre-construction contract for
unit 302, were you provided with a copy?
"A.
Of the contract?
"Q.
Yes.
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
What other documents were you provided?
"A.
Did I provide?
"Q.
What other documents were you provided?
"A.
Oh, that I was provided?  None that I know of.
"Q.
Okay.  Did you read the contract before you
signed it?
"A.
No, sir.
"Q.
Okay.  Did you understand when you signed it
you were responsible for the contents of the
contract and having read it and know what it
said?
"A.
Yes, sir.  Yes, sir.
"Q.
Is it your contention in this lawsuit and here
under oath that you never received a copy of
the offering statement for this project?
"A.
I never received one that I know of, and let me
preface that by saying I have everything that I
1080069, 1080074
12
ever got on Bel Sole in a file at home just
like I have everything that I got from Island
Towers and Legacy Key in a file.  There was no
offering statement.  I did get an offering
statement with Island Towers.  I did not get
one from Bel Sole.
"....
"Q.
You initialed, on November 10th, 2005, a
statement acknowledging your receipt of the
offering statement for Bel Sole, correct? 
"A.
Yes, sir, I initialed it.
"Q.
Okay.  And your initial is –– you understood to
be 
recognition, 
by 
anybody 
reading 
this
contract, that you had received that offering
statement?
"A.
Yes, sir."
Thus, in spite of the fact that he acknowledges signing a
contract specifically indicating that he did receive the
original offering statement, Hazel now maintains that he did
not actually receive that offering statement, offering as
evidence the fact that he cannot find it in his files.
Ultimately, however, whether Hazel received the original
offering statement is immaterial to the resolution of this
appeal because there is no evidence in the record indicating
that Hazel received the January 5, 2007, amended offering
statement, which, under § 35-8A-408(a), Slack Alost was also
1080069, 1080074
We note that the Commissioners' Commentary to § 35-8A-408
4
indicates that the issuance of an amended offering statement
does not automatically give the purchaser another seven-day
window in which to rescind the contract.  Whether an amended
offering statement has that effect depends upon whether the
amendments are material or merely technical.
13
required to provide Hazel.  See Commissioners' Commentary to
§ 35-8A-408 ("Subsection (a) requires that each purchaser be
provided with both the offering statement and all amendments
thereto prior to the time that the unit is conveyed.  If there
is a contract for the sale of the unit, these documents must
be provided not later than the date of the contract.  The
section makes clear that any amendments to the offering
statement prepared between the date of any contract and the
date of conveyance must also be provided to the purchaser.").4
When asked at his deposition if he had ever received an
offering statement from Bel Sole at his deposition, Hazel
stated: "I never received one that I know of ....  I did not
get one from Bel Sole."  Although Slack Alost has submitted
evidence indicating that Hazel did, in fact, receive the July
1, 2005, offering statement, it has submitted no evidence
indicating that Hazel received the January 5, 2007, amended
offering statement.  A genuine issue of material fact
therefore exists on this point, and the summary judgment
1080069, 1080074
14
entered against Hazel is due to be reversed for that reason
and the case remanded.  Accordingly, we need not consider the
other arguments raised by Hazel in his appeal.
IV.
We next consider the appeal filed by Smith and Smith &
Weems Investments (appeal no. 1080069).  After that appeal was
filed, Slack Alost moved this Court to dismiss the appeal,
arguing, first, that Smith and Smith & Weems Investments
lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment entered against
Weems because they were not a party to it and, second, that
the summary judgment they sought to appeal was a nonfinal
judgment because there was still an outstanding claim against
Smith.  For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.
As a matter of procedure, this Court routinely remands
causes to the trial court on the basis that the judgment being
appealed is not a final judgment if the appellant is seeking
review of a judgment that failed to resolve all the claims
asserted in that action, unless the trial court has expressly
invoked Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., so as to make that
judgment final.  Foster v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605,
609-10 (Ala. 1984).  Accordingly, on February 2, 2009, this
1080069, 1080074
Rule 54(b) provides, in part:
5
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment."
15
Court remanded the cause for the trial court to determine
whether (1) to make the judgment entered against Weems final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.;  (2) to adjudicate
5
the remaining claim against Smith, thus making the judgment
entered against Weems final and appealable; or (3) to take no
action, in which case the appeal filed by Smith and Smith &
Weems Investments (no. 1080069) would be dismissed as being
from a nonfinal judgment.  On February 17, 2009, the trial
court entered an order certifying the judgment entered against
Weems as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).
"If a trial court certifies a judgment as final pursuant
to Rule 54(b), an appeal will generally lie from that
judgment."  Baugus v. City of Florence, 968 So. 2d 529, 531
(Ala. 2007) (emphasis added).  The exception to that rule is
that this Court will not consider an appeal from a judgment
1080069, 1080074
16
certified as final under Rule 54(b) if it determines that the
trial court exceeded its discretion in concluding that there
is "no just reason for delay."  Rule 54(b); see also
Centennial Assocs., Ltd. v. Guthrie, [Ms. 1080015, April 17,
2009] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2009) ("Although the order
made the basis of the Rule 54(b) certification disposes of the
entire claim against Guthrie, thus satisfying the requirements
of Rule 54(b) dealing with eligibility for consideration as a
final judgment, there remains the additional requirement that
there be no just reason for delay.  A trial court's conclusion
to that effect is subject to review by this Court to determine
whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in so
concluding.").  This Court has previously held that a trial
court exceeds its discretion in this area when the claim or
claims that remain pending in the trial court present issues
that are "intertwined" with the issues presented in the claim
certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).  See, e.g., Howard
v. Allstate Ins. Co., [Ms. 1071215, November 21, 2008] ___ So.
3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008) ("It would accordingly be contrary to
the interests of justice to adjudicate these remaining claims
against Gonzales and Elizondo separately from the claims
1080069, 1080074
17
against 
the 
other 
defendants; 
the 
common 
issues 
are
intertwined."). 
In the instant case, it is apparent that at least some of
the issues presented in the still pending claim against Smith
are the same as the issues presented in the appeal now brought
by Smith and Smith & Weems Investments.  Weems and Smith are
business partners accused of breaching the same real-estate
contract, and, as Hazel did, Weems and Smith have both argued
that Slack Alost never presented them with the original
offering statement or the amended offering statement for the
Bel Sole condominium development, in violation of § 35-8A-408.
In Centennial Associates, Ltd., we stated that "'[i]t is
uneconomical for an appellate court to review facts on an
appeal following a Rule 54(b) certification that it is likely
to be required to consider again when another appeal is
brought after the [trial] court renders its decision on the
remaining claims or as to the remaining parties.'" ___ So. 3d
at ___ (quoting 10 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2659 (1998)).  Repeated appellate
review of the same underlying facts would be a probability in
this case, and, in light of this Court's stated policy
1080069, 1080074
Because we are dismissing the appeal filed by Smith and
6
Smith & Weems Investments as being from a nonfinal judgment,
we need not consider Slack Alost's argument that that appeal
is also due to be dismissed based on Smith's and Smith & Weems
Investments' alleged lack of standing.
18
disfavoring appellate review in a piecemeal fashion, see
Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 363
(Ala. 2004), we accordingly hold that the trial court exceeded
its discretion in certifying the judgment entered against
Weems as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).  Appeal no. 1080069 is
therefore dismissed.  
6
V.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
Slack Alost and against Hazel in appeal no. 1080074.  However,
because Hazel has demonstrated that there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether he was provided the amended
offering statement for Bel Sole as required by § 35-8A-408,
the judgment entered against him is hereby reversed and the
cause remanded to the trial court.
In 
appeal 
no. 
1080069, 
Smith 
and 
Smith 
& 
Weems
Investments appeal the summary judgment entered by the trial
court in favor of Slack Alost and against Weems.  However,
because the trial court has not entered a judgment on a
1080069, 1080074
19
similar claim Slack Alost has asserted against Smith in the
same action, which claim is based upon essentially the same
facts and raises many of the same issues, the trial court
exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment entered
against Weems as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).  Accordingly,
appeal no. 1080069 is hereby dismissed. 
1080069 –– DISMISSED.
1080074 –– REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., concur in the result.
1080069, 1080074
See main opinion, note 6.
7
20
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion.  I
write separately to address appeal no. 1080069.
The main opinion dismisses appeal no. 1080069 because it
concludes that the trial court's judgment was not appropriate
for certification under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., given the
"intertwined" nature of the issues adjudicated as to Albert
Weems and the issues in the still pending claim against Tony
Smith.  The main opinion declines, however, to address the
Rule 54(b) issue as it relates to Smith & Weems Investments,
LLC ("the LLC").  I therefore write separately in the hope of
warding off a subsequent judgment that does not include an
adjudication of the claims against the LLC.  
In short, I do not see how the LLC could not be an
appropriate party -– with "standing"  –- to file an appeal in
7
the present case.  This is a case in which the trial court
ordered the bank to pay into court the proceeds of the letter
of credit and, subsequently, ordered those same proceeds paid
to Slack Alost Development Services of Alabama, LLC ("Slack
Alost").  The LLC was and is the "applicant" for the letter of
1080069, 1080074
See, e.g., Fisher v. Dakota Cmty. Bank, 405 F. Supp. 2d
8
1089 (D.N.D. 2005) (juxtaposing the interests of the
"applicant" and the "beneficiary" of a letter of credit, on
the one hand, and that of the bank/"issuer," on the other
hand, and explaining that, in a dispute over whether payment
was due on the letter, "if the applicant won, the issuer would
not have to make payment and, if the beneficiary won, the
issuer would make payment, but would then be able to recover
what it paid from the applicant" and ultimately concluding
that the bank/issuer was not merely a "nominal party" for
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction).  Here, the LLC
vigorously opposed the motion for a summary judgment in the
trial court, arguing that the condition for payout on the
letter of credit, contractual default by Weems, had not
occurred.
21
credit.  As such, it must reimburse the bank for anything paid
as a result of a court order regarding that letter.  It
therefore has the most direct financial stake in whether the
letter of credit had to be paid into court and, in turn,
whether the proceeds were to be paid over to Slack Alost or
are to be available for refund to the bank.  
8
The LLC's stake in this matter is so obvious that Slack
Alost, itself, petitioned the trial court to add the LLC as a
party defendant.  As Slack Alost concedes in its brief to this
Court, Slack Alost "requested that the trial court join [the
LLC] as a real party in interest pursuant to [Ala. R. Civ. P.]
19(a), since [the LLC] was the applicant for the letter of
credit that served as the earnest money deposit for the
1080069, 1080074
22
purchase contract."  The fact that the LLC was not the
particular defendant found in the summary-judgment order to
have a direct contractual liability to Slack Alost is
immaterial.  The facts remain (1) that the LLC had a direct
financial interest that was adversely affected by the orders
of the trial court in this case providing for the payout on
the letter of credit and the disbursement of those proceeds
eventually to Slack Alost, all of which became a proper
subject of appeal in conjunction with the entry of the summary
judgment in appeal no. 1080069; and (2) that the LLC was, in
fact, a formal party to the action in which the summary
judgment was entered and that summary judgment was adverse to
its interests and, as a final judgment in that action,
necessarily constituted a final adjudication against the LLC.
Although the trial court purported to limit its summary
judgment in appeal no. 1080069 to the rights of Slack Alost
and Weems, thereby at first glance leaving the rights and
duties of the LLC unadjudicated and reserved for another day,
the court-ordered payout and disposition of the letter-of-
credit proceeds would have prejudiced the LLC's rights as the
applicant for the letter.  Indeed, it would have defeated the
1080069, 1080074
Regardless of whether this Court facilitated such a
9
certification with its previous remand, it is clear to me that
the partial summary judgment entered by the trial court in
appeal no. 1080069 was not appropriate for Rule 54(b)
certification and that this is a jurisdictional matter that we
should now act to correct.
23
very purpose for which it was necessary to join the LLC as a
party in the first place:  to avoid a judgment that would
dispose of its interests without its being able to participate
in the judicial proceedings resulting in that judgment (which,
of course, includes any appeal necessary as a result of any
error by the trial court) and thereby have the due-process
opportunity to protect its interests.9
The motion filed by Slack Alost seeking the addition of
the LLC as a real party in interest specifically explains that
it was necessary to add the LLC as a party because the LLC was
the "applicant" for the letter of credit and therefore had an
interest in the fact that "Slack Alost ha[d] filed a motion
for preliminary injunction seeking an order requiring that the
standby letter of credit be drawn upon and the proceeds paid
into court."  Clearly, therefore, the summary judgment that
has been entered by the trial court is the very judgment for
1080069, 1080074
24
which the LLC was added as a party.  As the motion of Slack
Alost also explained:
"[T]he potential exists for the absence of [the LLC]
as a party to impair Slack Alost's ability to
protect its interest.  In the alternative, the
absence of [the LLC] as a party may create a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations with respect to
the material issues applicable to Slack Alost's
motion for a preliminary injunction order."
Again, that motion seeking a preliminary injunction was
concerned with the initial payout of the letter of credit,
something that, together with the disbursement to Slack Alost,
has now been made final by the very summary judgment at issue
in this appeal.  
Thus, I submit that the present situation as to the LLC
goes beyond the type of circumstances in which this Court
commonly has said that a Rule 54(b) certification is
inappropriate –- i.e., where the interests of the excluded
party are "intertwined" with those of the party before us on
appeal thereby giving rise to the possibility of inconsistent
results.  Here, the interests of the LLC are not just
"intertwined"; it is the LLC's very interests that are, in
effect, being adjudicated and disposed of without the LLC's
having any ability to appeal the judgment that accomplishes
1080069, 1080074
25
this.  For this reason, Rule 54(b) certification was
inappropriate, there is no final appealable judgment in appeal
no. 1080069, and dismissal is the correct result.
Cobb, C.J., concurs.