Title: P. v. Hammer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S104303
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2003

1
Filed 5/29/03 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
S104303 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 4/1 D037349 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
JEFFREY G. HAMMER, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCN 109385 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
Penal Code section 667.61, known as the “One Strike” law, requires imposition 
of a sentence of 25 years to life in prison if a person is convicted of one of the sexual 
offenses listed in subdivision (c) of the statute and certain other triggering 
circumstances are found to exist.  (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds., (a), (c), (d) & (e).)1  
One of the triggering circumstances is that the person previously has been convicted 
“of an offense specified in subdivision (c).”  (Id., subd. (d)(1).)  The list of offenses 
set forth in subdivision (c) includes the following:  “(7) A violation of subdivision (a) 
of Section 288, unless the defendant qualifies for probation under subdivision (c) of 
Section 1203.066.”  In this case, defendant previously was convicted in 1988 of a 
violation of section 288, subdivision (a), but in that prior proceeding defendant 
qualified for, and was granted, probation.  More than 10 years later, defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding of new specified offenses under the One Strike 
                                             
 
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.   
 
2
law, including new violations of section 288, subdivision (a).  The question presented 
is whether the prior conviction of the earlier section 288, subdivision (a) charge, as to 
which defendant qualified for probation, subjects defendant to sentencing under the 
One Strike law for his present offenses.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the 1988 
prior constituted such a qualifying prior conviction, and upheld sentencing under the 
One Strike law.  We conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be 
affirmed.   
I 
 
In 1985, defendant Jeffrey G. Hammer married J. and adopted her then-four-
year-old daughter, M.  In 1988, while J. was pregnant with their younger daughter K., 
defendant forced M., who was then six or seven years of age, to orally copulate him 
on several occasions.  J. learned of these incidents, and on the basis of that conduct 
defendant subsequently was charged and convicted in 1988 of a violation of section 
288, subdivision (a).  Upon sentencing for that conviction, defendant qualified for and 
received probation, which he subsequently completed successfully.  In 1991, 
defendant and Jean divorced.   
 
In 1997, defendant and Jean reconciled and defendant moved back into the 
home with J., M., and K., who was then nine years of age.  Thereafter, on separate 
occasions in August 1998 and December 1999, defendant molested K. — rubbing 
lotion on her breasts and twisting her nipples in the earlier incident, and attempting to 
force her to orally copulate him in the later incident.   
 
After the December 1999 incident, defendant’s actions were reported to the 
police, and defendant was arrested.  He was charged with committing, among other 
crimes, violations of section 288, subdivisions (a) (lewd acts upon a child under the 
age of 14 years) and (b)(1) (forcible lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 years) 
against K.  The People also alleged that defendant’s prior 1988 conviction for 
violating section 288, subdivision (a), operated to enhance defendant’s current 
 
3
sentence under three separate statutory schemes.  First, the People asserted, the 1988 
prior conviction qualified as a triggering circumstance within the meaning of the One 
Strike law, section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (c)(7), and (d)(1), thereby subjecting 
defendant to a sentence of 25 years to life in prison for each qualifying current 
offense.  Second, the People asserted, the 1988 prior conviction qualified as a felony 
conviction within the meaning of the “Habitual Sexual Offender” law, section 667.71, 
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)(4), thereby subjecting defendant to a sentence of 25 
years to life in prison for each qualifying current offense.  Finally, the People 
asserted, the 1988 prior conviction constituted a “serious” prior felony under section 
667, subdivision (a), thus subjecting defendant to a five-year sentence enhancement.2   
 
Defendant was convicted by a jury in the present proceeding on two counts 
(counts two and four of the information) of committing lewd acts upon a child under 
the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)) and one count (count one of the information) of 
committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 years by use of force (§ 288, 
subd. (b)(1)).3   
 
Defendant admitted the prior conviction allegations, and the trial court 
sentenced him to 55 years to life in prison.  The sentence was calculated as follows:  
(i) on count one (the section 288, subdivision (b)(1) charge), a term of 25 years to life 
was imposed under both the One Strike law, section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (c)(7) 
and (d)(1) and the Habitual Sexual Offender law, section 667.71, subdivisions (a), (b) 
and (c)(4); (ii) on count four (one of the two section 288, subdivision (a) charges), a 
consecutive term of 25 years to life was imposed under both the One Strike law 
                                             
 
2 
The People at trial did not seek to invoke the sentence-doubling provisions of 
the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)) — but see post, part III.   
3  
In addition, defendant was convicted of one count of assault, a violation of 
section 240. 
 
4
(§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c)(7), & (d)(1)) and the Habitual Sexual Offender law 
(§ 667.71, subds. (a), (b) & (c)(4)); and finally (iii) a consecutive five-year 
enhancement was imposed under section 667, subdivision (a).4  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence.   
 
The principal issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court properly 
based the 25-years-to-life terms imposed for counts one and four in part upon the One 
Strike law, section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (c)(7), and (d)(1), in light of the 
circumstance that defendant qualified for (and indeed was granted) probation 
following his prior 1988 conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a).   
II 
A 
 
The One Strike law, section 667.61, requires a sentence of 25 years to life in 
prison whenever a defendant (1) is convicted of a current offense specified in 
subdivision (c),5 and (2) either “one or more of the circumstances specified in 
subdivision (d)”6 or “two or more of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e)” 
                                             
 
4  
The trial court imposed, but stayed, additional terms for the other section 288, 
subdivision (a) count and for the assault count (see ante, fn. 3).   
5  
Subdivision (c) reads in full:  “This section shall apply to any of the following 
offenses:  [¶]  (1)  A violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 261.  [¶]  
(2) A violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 262.  [¶]  (3) A violation 
of Section 264.1.  [¶]  (4) A violation of subdivision (b) of Section 288.  [¶]  (5) A 
violation of subdivision (a) of Section 289.  [¶]  (6) Sodomy or oral copulation in 
violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of 
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.  [¶]  (7) A 
violation of subdivision (a) of Section 288, unless the defendant qualifies for 
probation under subdivision (c) of Section 1203.066.”  
6  
Subdivision (d) provides in relevant part:  “The following circumstances 
shall apply to the offenses specified in subdivision (c):  [¶]  (1) The defendant has 
been previously convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c), including an 
offense committed in another jurisdiction that includes all of the elements of an 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
5
are present.7  (§ 667.61, subd. (a).)  The law expressly divests trial courts of authority 
to avoid these severe sentences: it provides that courts are barred from exercising their 
traditional discretion to “strike” any of the triggering circumstances specified in the 
One Strike law.  (Id., subd. (f).)   
 
There is no controversy in this case concerning the first requirement — 
conviction in the present case of at least one of the offenses listed in section 667.61, 
subdivision (c).  As defendant concedes, this condition is satisfied by virtue of the 
present conviction on the section 288, subdivision (b)(1) count (forcible lewd conduct 
upon a child under the age of 14 years), and, additionally, the two convictions in the 
present case on the section 288, subdivision (a) counts (nonforcible lewd conduct 
upon a child under the age of 14 years), as to which defendant was not qualified for 
probation.  (§ 667.61, subd. (c)(4) & (7); see § 1203.066, subd. (a)(5).)   
 
The issue before us solely concerns whether defendant committed those 
qualifying present offenses under circumstances specified in the One Strike law, 
triggering a sentence of 25 years to life in prison.   
                                                                                                                                            
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
offense specified in subdivision (c). . . .”  Other “circumstances” enumerated in 
subdivision (d), but not alleged in the case before us, include various offense-specific 
triggering factors, such as the circumstance that the present offense involves certain 
forms of kidnapping, or infliction of aggravated mayhem, or torture, or burglary.   
7  
Subdivision (e), listing “circumstances [that] apply to the offenses specified in 
subdivision (c),” includes as offense-specific triggering factors that the present 
offense involves certain forms of kidnapping, burglary, infliction of great bodily 
injury, use of a dangerous or deadly weapon or firearm, multiple victims, tying or 
binding of the victim or another person, or administering of a controlled substance to 
the victim by force, violence, or fear.  A defendant who is convicted of a current 
offense specified in subdivision (c), but with only one of the triggering factors set 
forth in subdivision (e) and no other triggering factors under section 667.61, is to be 
sentenced to imprisonment of 15 years to life.  (§ 667.61, subd. (b).) 
 
6
 
Section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), of the One Strike law mandates a sentence 
of 25 years to life when a defendant commits a qualifying offense after he or she “has 
been previously convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c), including an 
offense committed in another jurisdiction that includes all the elements of an offense 
specified in subdivision (c).”  (Italics added.)   
 
The specific question before us is whether, in light of defendant’s 1988 prior 
conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a), as to which he qualified for 
probation, “defendant has been previously convicted of an offense specified” in 
section 667.61, subdivision (c).   
 
Section 667.61, subdivision (c), which as noted above is specifically referred to 
and incorporated in section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), provides in relevant part:  
“This section shall apply to any of the following offenses:  [¶] . . . [¶] (7) A violation 
of subdivision (a) of Section 288, unless the defendant qualifies for probation under 
subdivision (c) of Section 1203.066.”  (Italics added.)   
B 
 
As we recently observed in People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105 (Acosta), in 
which we construed other aspects of the One Strike law:  “ ‘[O]ur fundamental task 
. . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.  
[Citation.]  We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and 
commonsense meaning.  [Citation.]  We do not, however, consider the statutory 
language “in isolation.”  [Citation.]  Rather, we look to “the entire substance of the 
statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . .  
[Citation.]”  [Citation.]  That is, we construe the words in question “ ‘in context, 
keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . . ’  [Citation.]”  
[Citation.]  We must harmonize “the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by 
considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework 
as a whole.”  [Citations.]’ ”  (Acosta, supra, 29 Cal.4th 105, 112, quoting People v. 
 
7
Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 (Murphy).)  As in Acosta, “[t]hese familiar 
principles guide our interpretation of the sentencing provisions at issue here.”  
(Acosta, supra, 29 Cal.4th 105, 112.)   
 
Defendant, stressing what he terms the “plain meaning” of the “literal 
language” of section 667.61, subdivisions (c)(7) and (d)(1), asserts that “[o]rdinarily a 
violation of subdivision (a) of section 288 would be included in [the One Strike] 
list — however, the Legislature carved out an exception.  If the defendant was eligible 
for probation, then a violation of subdivision (a) of section 288 does not fall under the 
harsh provisions of section 677.61.”  (Italics added.)  Concluding that “the language is 
clear on its face,” defendant asserts that pursuant to the exception set out in section 
667.61, subdivision (c)(7), his 1988 prior conviction for violating section 288, 
subdivision (a) does not constitute a qualifying offense under the One Strike law, 
because he was eligible for (and indeed was granted) probation in that prior case.   
 
The People, citing as well the statutory language, and also claiming adherence 
to the literal words of the provision, argue the opposite conclusion.  The People assert 
that, as required by section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), defendant was indeed 
“previously convicted of an offense specified in” section 667.61, subdivision (c) — 
namely, a violation of section 288, subdivision (a) — and they argue that defendant’s 
eligibility for probation for that conviction does not change or diminish the 
circumstance that defendant was in fact convicted of that offense in 1988.  In other 
words, the People suggest that the limitation found in section 677.61, subdivision 
(c)(7) — “unless the defendant qualifies for probation under subdivision (c) of section 
1203.066” — applies only to the current offense and simply has no application when 
determining the existence of a qualifying prior conviction under section 667.61, 
subdivision (d)(1).   
 
This reading of the statute, the People assert, is confirmed by the Legislature’s 
use of the present tense phrase, “qualifies for probation,” in section 667.61, 
 
8
subdivision (c)(7).  The People argue that if the Legislature intended to exempt from 
sentencing under the One Strike law prior violations of section 288, subdivision (a) 
for which the defendant “qualified” for probation, it would have clearly said so.  That 
it did not, the People argue, substantiates the Legislature’s intent to count, as predicate 
felonies under the One Strike law, prior section 288(a) convictions for which the 
defendant formerly qualified for probation.   
 
As we shall explain in part II.C, in our view the language of the statute read as 
a whole — although perhaps not providing a conclusive or definitive answer to the 
issue before us — strongly supports the People’s proposed interpretation.  Moreover, 
even if we assume that the statutory language is ambiguous, as we shall further 
explain in part II.D.3 we conclude that the legislative history and purpose of the One 
Strike law overwhelmingly supports the interpretation urged by the People and 
adopted by the lower courts.   
C 
 
We begin by examining the language of the statute. 
 
Section 667.61, subdivision (c), defines the present “offenses” to which the 
One Strike law applies.  Subdivision (c)(7) includes in that group of offenses a 
violation of section 288, subdivision (a), but makes a violation of section 288, 
subdivision (a) subject to One Strike treatment only if the defendant does not qualify 
for probation after being convicted of that offense.  In short, the exception serves to 
remove some violations of section 288, subdivision (a) from the category of present 
offenses to which the One Strike law applies.   
 
The purpose of section 667.61, subdivision (d), is to define some of the 
additional circumstances that will subject a defendant who is convicted of one of the 
present qualifying offenses to a 25-years-to-life sentence under the One Strike law.  
Section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1) sets out the following as a triggering circumstance:  
“The defendant has been previously convicted of an offense specified in subdivision 
 
9
(c), including an offense committed in another jurisdiction that includes all the 
elements of an offense specified in subdivision (c).”  (Italics added.)  The italicized 
terms suggest that the intended focus of the triggering circumstance described in 
section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), is upon the existence of a prior conviction of a 
particular offense — and not upon events or circumstances extraneous to the offense 
itself.  Probation eligibility following conviction of an offense is not a part or element 
of the offense itself.   
 
The focus of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), upon conviction of an 
“offense” set out in subdivision (c) is perhaps clearest with respect to the subsection’s 
application to “an offense committed in another jurisdiction.”  By providing that such 
a conviction constitutes a triggering offense if it “includes all of the elements of an 
offense specified in subdivision (c),” the Legislature apparently intended to count a 
prior foreign conviction as a qualifying triggering offense without regard to whether 
the defendant was eligible for probation following conviction of the prior foreign 
offense.  This understanding, in turn, informs the proper interpretation of the 
corresponding phrase in section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1), “previously convicted of 
an offense specified in subdivision (c).”  There is no reason to believe that the 
Legislature intended to impose greater conditions upon the use of an otherwise 
qualifying prior conviction of a California offense, as compared with a corresponding 
qualifying prior conviction of a foreign offense.   
 
This analysis would support the People’s view that by referring in section 
667.61, subdivision (d)(1), to a prior conviction of an “offense specified in 
subdivision (c),” the Legislature was focussing upon the substantive offenses listed  
as defined in the relevant statutory provisions  and that section 667.61, subdivision 
(d)(1), includes any prior violation of section 288, subdivision (a), whether or not, at 
the time of the prior conviction, the defendant was eligible for probation.   
 
10
D 
1 
 
We begin this part of our analysis by reviewing the statutory landscape of 
which the One Strike law, section 667.61, is part.   
 
First, as noted above, Penal Code section 288 has for decades criminalized 
lewd conduct committed on a minor who is under 14 years of age.  (See People v. 
Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442-445.)  Subdivision (a) of that section addresses 
nonforcible lewd conduct; subdivision (b)(1) addresses forcible lewd conduct.  Both 
subdivisions call for state prison sentences of three, six, or eight years.   
 
Second, Penal Code section 1203.066 — enacted more than a decade before 
the Legislature adopted the One Strike law — generally requires prison sentences and 
bars probation for those who are convicted of violating section 288 and related 
offenses.  (See § 1203.066, subd. (a).)  As we recounted in People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 
Cal.3d 984, 993-997 (Jeffers), however, the Legislature was motivated by various 
policy considerations to enact a limited exception to the general bar on probation.  
Accordingly, subdivision (c) of section 1203.066 provides that if the defendant is the 
victim’s “relative” or “member of the victim’s household,” and if other conditions are 
met, a trial court may exercise discretion to grant probation to a defendant convicted 
of violating section 288, subdivision (a).8   
                                             
 
8  
Section 1203.066, subdivision (c), provides that probation may be considered 
if the trial court “makes all of the following findings:   
 
“(1)  The defendant is the victim’s natural parent, adoptive parent, stepparent, 
relative, or is a member of the victim’s household who has lived in the victim’s 
household. 
 
“(2)  A grant of probation to the defendant is in the best interest of the child. 
 
“(3)  Rehabilitation of the defendant is feasible, the defendant is amenable to 
undergoing treatment, and the defendant is placed in a recognized treatment program 
designed to deal with child molestation immediately after the grant of probation or the 
suspension of execution or imposition of sentence. 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
11
 
The third provision within the relevant statutory landscape is the Habitual 
Sexual Offender law, section 667.71, which was enacted one year prior to adoption of 
the One Strike law.  As its name suggests, the Habitual Sexual Offender law is 
designed to target repeat sexual offenders, by imposing a sentence of 25 years to life 
in prison on those who commit a specified offense (including a violation of section 
288, subdivisions (a) or (b)(1)) after having previously been convicted of a specified 
offense.  (See § 667.71, subds. (a), (b) & (c)(4).)   
 
Finally, six months before the Legislature enacted the One Strike law, it 
adopted, as urgency legislation, the Three Strikes law, section 667, subdivisions (b)-
(i).9  This statutory scheme provides for enhanced sentencing for recidivist felons, 
including those convicted of violating section 288, subdivision (a) or (b)(1).  (See 
§ 667, subds. (d)(1) & (e).)   
2 
 
We turn now to the legislative history of the One Strike law, section 667.61.  
(5 Stats. 1994, ch. 14X, § 1, p. 8570.)  Our recent opinion in People v. Wutzke (2002) 
                                                                                                                                            
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
 
“(4)  The defendant is removed from the household of the victim until the court 
determines that the best interests of the victim would be served by returning the 
defendant to the household of the victim. . . . 
 
“(5)  There is no threat of physical harm to the child victim if probation is 
granted.  The court upon making its findings pursuant to this subdivision is not 
precluded from sentencing the defendant to jail or prison, but retains the discretion not 
to do so.  The court shall state its reasons on the record for whatever sentence it 
imposes on the defendant.” 
9 
See Statutes 1994, chapter 12, section 1, p. 71 (eff. Mar. 7, 1994).  In 
November 1994, the voters adopted by initiative a substantially identical version of 
the Three Strikes law, codified as section 1170.12.  Insofar as the issues before us are 
concerned, there is no substantive difference between the two laws.  We hereafter 
refer to and cite only the legislative version of the Three Strikes law, section 667, 
subdivisions (b)-(i).   
 
12
28 Cal.4th 923 (Wutzke) recounted that the One Strike law, “[a]s first introduced in 
the Senate, . . . would have amended section 288 to impose life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole (LWOP) on persons convicted of substantial sexual conduct 
with a child under age 14.  The same version of the bill also proposed repealing 
section 1203.066, and otherwise prohibiting probation for anyone convicted of 
violating section 288.  (Sen. Bill No. 26X (1993-1994 1st Ex. Sess.) as introduced 
Feb. 2, 1994, §§ 5, 11, 12.)”  (Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 941.)   
 
We continued in Wutzke:  “However, subsequent versions of the same bill 
abandoned the LWOP proposal in favor of indeterminate life terms of the sort 
ultimately included in section 667.61.  Lawmakers also decided that section 1203.066 
[including the exception set out in subdivision (c) for probation in some cases upon a 
proper showing] should be retained . . . .  (Assem. Amend. To Sen. Bill No. 26X 
(1993-1994 1st Ex. Sess.) Aug. 22, 1994, §§ 1, 3.)  The latter decision apparently 
stemmed from continuing concern that long mandatory prison terms would ‘impede 
the prosecution’ of intrafamilial molesters by making victims and loved ones reluctant 
to report the crimes and to cooperate with authorities.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 26X (1993-1994 1st Ex. Sess.) as amended May 4, 1994, 
p. 12.)  The statutory analysis in Jeffers, supra, 43 Cal.3d 984, was summarized and 
approved in this regard.”  (Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 941.)   
 
Having read and considered the voluminous legislative reports and analyses 
concerning the drafting and enactment of the One Strike law, we agree with both 
parties that those documents do not address the precise question posed in the case 
before us, namely whether a previous conviction under section 288, subdivision (a), 
constitutes a qualifying offense triggering imposition of the One Strike sentencing 
scheme when the defendant qualified for probation as to the previous conviction.  
Nevertheless, as we suggested in Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th 923, those background 
documents do disclose that the Legislature was keenly aware of the related laws — 
 
13
especially the Habitual Sexual Offender law, section 667.71, and the “probation 
limitation law,” section 1203.066, both of which the Legislature amended in the same 
bill in which it enacted the One Strike law10 — and viewed the One Strike law as 
fitting into the landscape of those existing laws, as amended.   
3 
 
With this overview in mind, we return to defendant’s contention that we should 
construe section 667.61, subdivisions (c)(7) and (d)(1), as disallowing not only a 
present conviction of section 288, subdivision (a), as to which a defendant “qualifies” 
for probation under section 1203.066, subdivision (c), but also as disallowing a prior 
conviction of section 288, subdivision (a), as to which a defendant qualified for 
probation under section 1203.066, subdivision (c).   
 
In support, defendant argues that the Legislature determined that “certain 
violations of . . . section 288, subdivision (a)” — that is, those as to which a defendant 
qualified for probation under section 1203.066, subdivision (c) — are “not 
sufficiently egregious as to justify their inclusion as prior offenses for purposes of 
section 667.61.”  In other words, defendant argues, the Legislature decided that if a 
particular offender who has a prior violation of section 288, subdivision (a), qualified 
for probation under section 1203.066, subdivision (c) as to that conviction, that prior 
conviction should never, in the future, merit treatment as a prior conviction under the 
One Strike law.  Defendant does not point to any specific support for this view, and he 
fails to advance any persuasive response to the People’s contrary reading of the 
statutory scheme and its history.   
 
The People assert that the Habitual Sexual Offender law (§ 667.71) — which, 
as noted, is designed to address solely recidivism  informs our interpretation of 
                                             
 
10  
See 5 Statutes 1994, chapter 14X, sections 1-3, page 8570 et seq.   
 
14
those aspects of the One Strike law that also address the problem of recidivism.  The 
People reason as follows:  “[T]he Habitual Sexual Offender law . . . includes within 
its sentencing scheme elevated punishment for both current and prior convictions for 
violations of section 288, subdivision (a), absent the limiting language found in 
section 667.61[, subdivision (c)(7)] . . . .  In other words, when the Legislature 
enacted a law targeting only recidivist sexual offenders (i.e., the Habitual Sexual 
Offender law), it did not exclude from enhanced sentencing treatment any conviction 
for a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), while in enacting a statute targeting 
recidivist sexual offenders and first time offenders who commit certain sexual crimes 
under aggravated circumstances (i.e., the One-Strike law), the Legislature included 
language which excepts from harsh punishment a specified minority of offenders.”   
 
The People assert that “[t]he . . . omission in the Habitual Sexual Offender 
law” of an exception such as that articulated in section 667.61, subdivision (c)(7), 
“leads to only one rational interpretation of the assertedly ambiguous language of the 
One Strike law: that the Legislature intended to provide the possibility of sentencing 
latitude for a probation-qualifying [intra]family sexual offender whose first violation 
of section 288, subdivision (a), was committed under certain egregious circumstances, 
but intended no such similar sentencing distinction to apply to a defendant who was 
previously convicted of a violation of section 288, subdivision (a).”  (Italics added.)   
 
The People’s analogy would be stronger if the recidivist aspects of the two 
schemes (the Habitual Sexual Offender law and the One Strike law) were identical, or 
essentially so.  But they are not.11  Accordingly, the People’s analogy to the Habitual 
Sexual Offender law does not materially advance their position.   
                                             
 
11 
In addition to differing with respect to section 288, subdivision (a) violations, 
these laws differ in two other significant respects.  First, they are dissimilar in terms 
of general coverage.  Although in some respects the qualifying offenses listed in the 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
15
 
The People’s arguments concerning section 1203.066, subdivision (c), 
however, are persuasive.  The People assert that in light of the purpose underlying that 
provision, the Legislature could not have intended the result envisioned by defendant.  
The People aptly summarize the policy considerations that led the Legislature to adopt 
the exception set out in section 1203.066, subdivision (c), and, by incorporation, 
section 667.61, subdivision (c)(7):  “The exception to mandatory imprisonment for 
qualifying [intra]family sexual offenders is premised on the rationale that (1) in 
contrast to pedophiles who have an exclusive lifelong attraction to children, some 
                                                                                                                                            
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
two laws are the same, in other respects the One Strike law’s listing of the same 
general offenses is broader than that of the Habitual Sexual Offender law.  The One 
Strike law, section 667.61, subdivision (c)(6), broadly lists as a qualifying offense 
“[s]odomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence 
duress,” etc.  The Habitual Sexual Offender law, by contrast, lists as qualifying 
offenses only specific subparts of those two statutes.  (§ 667.71, subd. (c)(7) [“[a] 
violation of subdivision (c) of Section 286 by force, violence, duress”] & subd. (9) 
[“[a] violation of subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 288a by force, violence, duress”].)  
In many other respects the coverage of the Habitual Sexual Offender law is much 
broader that that of the One Strike law, including within its scope coverage of 
violations not listed in the One Strike law.  The following violations trigger the 
Habitual Sexual Offender law, but not the One Strike law: violations of section 288.5 
(continuous sexual abuse of a child), section 207, subdivision (b) (kidnapping by 
enticing minor under the age of 14 years for the purpose of committing lewd acts 
upon that minor)), section 208, former subdivision (d) (kidnapping to commit 
specified sex offenses), section 209 (kidnapping with intent to commit crimes such as 
rape, sodomy or oral copulation in violation of section 289), and section 269 
(aggravated sexual assault of a child).  (See § 667.71, subdivision (c)(6), (10)-(13).)   
 
Second, the two laws differ substantially in effect.  Under the Habitual Sexual 
Offender law (and the Three Strikes law for that matter), a trial court retains authority 
to “strike” any punishment-enhancing circumstance (including a prior strike 
conviction) in the interests of justice.  (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Romero) 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.)  Under the One Strike law, by contrast, courts have no such 
discretion; sentencing under the full and severe terms of the law is mandatory.  
(§ 667.61, subd. (f).)   
 
16
adults with age-appropriate mates ‘regress’ by molesting young family or household 
members for situational or opportunistic reasons, (2) such molesters can successfully 
reform if they receive both punishment and treatment, and (3) mandatory prison 
sentences, as opposed to jail time and probation, could do more harm than good in 
some [intra]family molestation cases, as the victim could feel a sense of guilt for 
bringing shame on the family or causing the household to dissolve, and loved ones 
who are emotionally and/or financially dependent on the molester could blame or 
even abandon the victim, which in turn could deter victims and their families from 
reporting the crime, from cooperating with law enforcement officials, and from 
participating in counseling to repair the damaged relationship.”  (See Jeffers, supra, 
43 Cal.3d 984, 993-997; Wutzke, supra, 28 Cal.4th 923, 935 et seq.)   
 
As the People observe, these goals underlying the exception recognized in 
section 1203.066, subdivision (c), “cease to be attainable when the defendant stands 
before the court as a repeat [intra]family molester: he/she has proven to be impervious 
to treatment, the threat to family harmony created by long-term incarceration pales in 
comparison to the threat of almost certain continued sexual abuse, and the pressures 
that might otherwise cause the victim to shun disclosure and/or feel guilt are 
diminished, if not alleviated, by the fact that the molester’s punishment can no longer 
be directly attributable to a report of the current abuse.”   
 
Defendant concedes that there “may be all kinds of policy reasons why any 
prior conviction under subdivision (a) of section 288 should always qualify as a prior 
conviction for purposes of subdivision (d)(1), of section 667.61, regardless of whether 
the defendant was eligible [for] or was granted probation in the prior case.”  But, 
defendant argues, “[c]ourts do not set policy in criminal law . . . .  That is the function 
of the Legislature.  The Legislature has spoken; this Court has its marching orders.  
Section 667.61 does not apply by the plain language of the statute.”   
 
17
 
Defendant’s entreaty to follow his understanding of the language of the law 
does not respond to the People’s point.  As observed above, the “plain language” of 
the statute does not favor defendant, and we do not read the statute as providing the 
“marching orders” that defendant discerns.  Defendant offers no rebuttal to the 
People’s argument that the reasons that motivated the Legislature to adopt the 
exception recognized in section 1203.066, subdivision (c) (recognized in Jeffers and 
Wutzke) simply do not apply in the context of determining whether to count, under the 
One Strike law, a prior section 288, subdivision (a) conviction for which the 
defendant qualified for probation.12   
 
We agree with the People that in light of the language of section 667.61, 
subdivisions (c)(7) and (d)(1), and the rationale underlying a grant of probation for 
certain first-time intrafamily sexual offenders, it is most reasonable to conclude that 
the Legislature intended that a defendant’s prior conviction for violating section 288, 
subdivision (a) should count as a qualifying prior conviction under the One Strike law 
even if, as here, the defendant qualified for probation as to that prior offense.13   
                                             
 
12  
Indeed, as the People observe, under defendant’s construction, so long as a 
defendant were eligible for probation on the prior conviction, that conviction would 
not qualify as a triggering circumstance even if the defendant were ultimately denied 
probation or received it and later violated it.  We doubt that the Legislature intended 
this result.   
13  
Defendant’s reliance upon the “rule of lenity” is misplaced.  As we have held, 
“ ‘[w]hen language which is susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law, 
the policy of this state is to construe the statute as favorably to the defendant as its 
language and the circumstance of its application reasonably permit.’ ”  (People ex rel. 
Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 312 (Lungren).)  But this rule 
applies only when statutory language is ambiguous and the defendant’s proposed 
interpretation is at least as plausible as that of the People.  (People v. Avery (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 49, 58; People v. Douglas (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 810, 815.)  Here, we 
conclude, the People’s interpretation clearly is the more plausible of the two, and, we 
believe, is the one that the Legislature intended.   
 
18
 
It follows that the judgment imposing two 25-years-to-life sentences upon 
defendant under the One Strike law must be affirmed.   
III 
 
When the matter was before the Court of Appeal for review, the appellate 
court, on its own motion, solicited briefing addressing whether defendant additionally 
should have been sentenced under the Three Strikes law, section 667, subdivisions 
(b)-(i).  Ultimately the Court of Appeal determined that the trial court should have 
considered whether to sentence defendant under the Three Strikes law as well as the 
One Strike law and the Habitual Sexual Offender law, and remanded the case for a 
new sentencing hearing “at which the sentencing court shall exercise its informed 
discretion as to whether to dismiss the prior conviction for Three Strikes sentencing 
purposes, or utilize that conviction.”   
 
As defendant concedes, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that he was subject 
to sentencing under the Three Strikes law, as well as under other applicable 
sentencing provisions, is consistent with People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 
157, and Acosta, supra, 29 Cal.4th 105, 128-134, in which we recently held that the 
same prior conviction may be used for sentencing under both the One Strike law and 
the Three Strikes law.   
 
Accordingly, as the Court of Appeal determined, the matter must be remanded 
to the trial court for consideration of sentencing under the Three Strikes law — 
specifically to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under People v. Romero 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to “strike” the prior section 288, subdivision (a) conviction for 
Three Strikes purposes, or instead impose the sentence-doubling provisions of the 
Three Strikes law (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)) upon defendant, a “second strike” offender.   
IV 
 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and hold that defendant’s 1988 
prior section 288, subdivision (a) conviction, for which he was eligible for probation, 
 
19
subjects him to a sentence of 25 years to life under the One Strike law, section 667.61, 
subdivisions (a), (c)(7), and (d)(1).  The matter is remanded for a new sentencing 
hearing at which the trial court may exercise its discretion under the Three Strikes 
law, section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).14   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
                                             
 
14  
As defendant observes, it is unclear from the record whether the trial court 
realized that it had discretion to strike the prior 1988 conviction for purposes of 
sentencing under the Habitual Sexual Offender law.  Accordingly, upon remand, the 
trial court additionally should determine whether it would exercise its discretion to 
strike the prior 1988 conviction for purposes of sentencing under the Habitual Sexual 
Offender law.  Of course, in light of the mandatory One Strike law, defendant still 
will be subject to the sentence of 55 years to life in prison previously imposed by the 
trial court, even if that court elects to exercise its discretion to strike the 1988 prior 
conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law and the Habitual Sexual Offender 
law.   
 
20
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Hammer 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 94 Cal.App.4th 1443 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S104303 
Date Filed: May 29, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Timothy M. Casserly 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster, Steven T. Oetting and Elizabeth S. Voorhies, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Christopher Blake 
4455 Lamont Street, #B 
San Diego, CA  92109 
(858) 274-1772 
 
Elizabeth S. Voorhies 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-3080