Title: State of New Jersey v. J.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-79-03
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2005

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On November 28, 2001, seventeen-year-old J.M. and adult codefendants, John Stagg and Mike Torrisi, met at Torrisi s house and discussed robbing a Mobil gas station in Hackettstown, New Jersey. That same evening, Torrisi drove J.M. and Stagg to the gas station. About fifteen minutes later, J.M. and Stagg entered the attendant s booth. J.M. turned off the lights and Stagg, with a bat that he found in the booth, proceeded to take the guy down. The attendant was seriously injured. J.M. removed the money from the cash register and they both fled to the car. The subsequent investigation led to J.M.. In the presence of his mother, J.M. waived his rights, agreed to give a tape-recorded statement, and admitted his involvement in the robbery. J.M. claimed, however, that he had no prior knowledge of a baseball bat in the booth, and had no knowledge that Stagg would strike the attendant with the bat. J.M. was charged with offenses that if committed by an adult would constitute first-degree robbery, second-degree conspiracy to commit robber, and second-degree aggravated assault. The State filed a timely motion, seeking waiver of jurisdiction by the Family Part to the Law Division (adult court). The State, however, failed to include a statement of reasons why it sought waiver. On January 29, 2002, a Family Part judge held a waiver hearing to determine whether to grant the State motion. The State offered the juvenile s statement into evidence and played the security videotape from the Mobil station depicting the crime. Counsel for J.M. sought to have the juvenile testify to assist the court in determining whether there was probable cause for first-degree robbery and second-degree aggravated assault. The Family Part judge denied the request, found probable cause to believe the juvenile committed a first-degree robbery and second-degree aggravated assault, and granted the State s motion to prosecute the juvenile as an adult. Subsequently, J.M. entered into a plea agreement. On June 26, 2002, the trial court sentenced the juvenile to six years in prison with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C: 43-7.2, along with fines and restitution. J.M. appealed, challenging the Family Part judge s ruling that prohibited him from testifying at the waiver hearing. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded to the Family Part for a new waiver hearing. The panel concluded that the juvenile had a right to testify at the probable cause portion of the waiver hearing and that the prosecutor should have provided a statement of reasons for the waiver application. The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification. The Court also granted amicus curiae status to the Office of the Public Defender. HELD: Rule 5:22-2 is modified to expressly permit a juvenile to present evidence at the probable cause hearing. We also hold that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A: 4A-26a and the Attorney General s Juvenile Waiver Guidelines, the prosecutor s failure to provide a statement of reasons for seeking waiver requires a remand. 1. The State claims the juvenile failed to preserve the issue before us through a conditional plea under Rule 3: 9-3(f). We agree that the failure to enter a conditional plea under that rule generally bars appellate review of non-Fourth Amendment constitutional issues. Because the State failed to raise this argument below, however, it would be unfair not to address this important issue of whether the juvenile may present evidence at the probable cause portion of the waiver hearing. (Pp. 8-9) 2. The United States Supreme Court has declared that a juvenile waiver hearing is a critically important action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile charged with a criminal offense, and that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing, effective assistance of counsel, and a statement of reasons for the waiver decision. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 556, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 1055, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1996). Similarly, our courts have recognized the critical nature of a waiver hearing. State v. R.G.D., 108 N.J. 1, 4-5 (1987). Due process includes providing the defendant with appropriate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Prior to the 2000 amendments, N.J.S.A. 2A: 4A-26(a) accorded a greater opportunity for the juvenile to show that he or she should not be waived to adult court. The juvenile could overcome the presumption of waiver through rehabilitation evidence. In R.G.D., we recognized that the evolution of the waiver statute demonstrated that the Legislature had shifted the balance in favor of waiver and placed a heavier burden on the juvenile who committed an enumerated offense. The 2000 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2A: 4A-26 made clear that with respect to a juvenile sixteen years of age or older charged with an enumerated offense, once the State established probable cause that the juvenile committed the offense, waiver is required without regard to rehabilitation evidence. Thus, the Legislature vested the prosecutor s office with the primary responsibility for juvenile waiver decisions when the juvenile is sixteen-years or older and charged with a designated offense. When a sixteen-year old or above is charged with an enumerated offense, the prosecutor need only establish probable cause for the court to waive the juvenile to adult court. (Pp. 9-13) 3. A probable cause hearing is neither constitutionally required nor recognized at common law. The probable cause hearing is a creation of legislation and our rules, and the defendant may waive the hearing. In the adult setting, a defendant is allowed to cross-examine the State s witnesses, but is not expressly given the right to present evidence. In a juvenile matter, the probable cause hearing takes on greater significance than in the adult context. Our courts have accommodated a juvenile s request to present evidence at a waiver hearing, most often on the issue of rehabilitation, but also on the issue of probable cause. The Family Part Rule for waiver has neither a provision giving the juvenile the right to present evidence at the probable cause hearing, nor a provision prohibiting such a right. See R. 5:22-2. In the present matter, the Family Part judge relied upon Rule 3:4-3, governing probable cause hearings in adult criminal cases, to deny the juvenile the right to testify at the probable cause portion of the waiver hearing. The Appellate Division concluded that because of the critical importance of the probable cause determination, due process requires that the juvenile should have the right to testify at that part of the waiver hearing. We are in complete accord with the view expressed by the Appellate Division panel and conclude that the heightened importance to the juvenile justifies treating juveniles differently from adults at a probable cause hearing. (Pp. 13-17) 4. The Supreme Court s duty to supervise criminal trials and family court juvenile matters provides an independent basis for our decision. This case presents precisely the type of opportunity that justifies our exercise of rulemaking authority to promote the administration of justice in our courts. Given our conclusion that the probable cause portion of the waiver hearing for a juvenile sixteen years of age or older charged with an enumerated offense is such a meaningful and critical stage of the proceedings, we find that consideration of fairness require that we modify our rules to permit the juvenile to present evidence at the probable cause hearing. (Pp. 17-18) 5. In the exercise of our authority to promulgate Court Rules affecting practice and procedure in our courts, we now modify Rule 5:22-2 to permit a juvenile to testify and present evidence at the probable cause portion of the waiver hearing. We refer the matter to the Family Practice Committee to draft an appropriate amendment to R. 5:22-2 that is consistent with this opinion (see footnote at p. 19). The procedure we adopt today does not change our law concerning the evaluation of whether there is probable cause that the juvenile committed the alleged offense. (Pp. 18-22) 6. The decision by the State to seek waiver from the Family Part to the Law Division is a discretionary one. As part of the amendment to the waiver statute, the Attorney General was required to establish guidelines for seeking waiver. The guidelines require the prosecutor to prepare a statement of reasons for a waiver application. For the court to determine that the reasons for seeking waiver are not arbitrary, it must be able to review the State s reasons for the waiver motion. The logical way to do that is to include a statement of reasons along with the motion. We agree with the Appellate Division that the reasons for seeking waiver should have accompanied the waiver motion. Because of the lack of interpretation of the guidelines at the time the State filed its motion seeking waiver, and the subsequent ruling in State ex rel. R.C., 351 N.J. Super. 248 (App. Div. 2002), the matter should be remanded for the State to present its reasons for seeking waiver. (Pp. 22- 23) The judgment of the Appellate Division that vacated the trial court s order waiving jurisdiction over the juvenile, vacated his subsequent guilty plea, and remanded to the Family Part, is AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for a waiver hearing consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE WALLACE s opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.M., Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 12, 2004 Decided February 17, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 364 N.J. Super. 486 (2003). Robert E. Bonpietro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Anthony M. Arbore argued the cause for respondent (Forster &amp; Arbore, attorneys). Susan Brody, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Office of the Public Defender (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). JUSTICE WALLACE delivered the opinion of the Court. The primary issue in this appeal is whether a juvenile may present evidence during the probable cause portion of a juvenile waiver hearing. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26. The trial court denied the juvenile s request to testify at the probable cause hearing. The Appellate Division reversed. Although we agree with the panel s conclusion that the juvenile may present evidence at the probable cause hearing, we ground our decision not on the constitutional basis found by the panel, but in our authority to control the procedures of our courts. We hereby modify Rule 5:22-2 to expressly permit a juvenile to present evidence at the probable cause hearing. We also hold that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26a and the Attorney General s Juvenile Waiver Guidelines, the prosecutor s failure to provide a statement of reasons for seeking waiver requires a remand. [State in Interest of B.T., 145 N.J. Super. 268, 273 (App. Div. 1976), certif. denied, 73 N.J. 49 (1977) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).] Prior to the 2000 amendments, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a) accorded a greater opportunity for the juvenile to show that he or she should not be waived to adult court. If the State established probable cause to believe a juvenile fourteen years or older committed a delinquent act or acts, which if committed by an adult would constitute certain enumerated offenses, no additional showing was required by the State for waiver to occur. In other cases, the State had to show that the nature and circumstances of the offense or the prior record of the juvenile were sufficiently serious and that the interests of the public required waiver. However, at that time, the juvenile could overcome the presumption of waiver by showing that the probability of his [or her] rehabilitation by the use of the procedures, services and facilities available to the court prior to the juvenile reaching the age of 19 substantially outweighs the reasons for waiver[.] State v. Scott, 141 N.J. 457, 464 (1995) (quoting then N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26a(3)). In R.G.D., supra, we traced the history of the juvenile waiver statute and described the procedures the court must follow prior to a determination on waiver. 108 N.J. at 4-15. We recognized that the evolution of the waiver statute demonstrated that the Legislature had shifted the balance in favor of waiver and placed a heavier burden on the juvenile who committed an enumerated offense. Id. at 11. Effective March 14, 2000, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 was amended to make clear that with respect to a juvenile sixteen years of age or older charged with an enumerated offense, once the State established probable cause that the juvenile committed the offense, waiver is required without regard to rehabilitation evidence. The current version of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 provides in pertinent part: Referral to another court without juvenile s consent a. On motion of the prosecutor, the court shall, without the consent of the juvenile, waive jurisdiction over a case and refer that case from the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part to the appropriate court and prosecuting authority having jurisdiction if it finds, after hearing, that: (1) The juvenile was 14 years of age or older at the time of the charged delinquent act; and (2) There is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a delinquent act or acts which if committed by an adult would constitute: (a) Criminal homicide other than death by auto, strict liability for drug induced deaths, pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:35-9, robbery which would constitute a crime of the first degree, carjacking, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated assault which would constitute a crime of the second degree, kidnapping or aggravated arson; or f. The Attorney General shall develop for dissemination to the county prosecutors those guidelines or directives deemed necessary or appropriate to ensure the uniform application of this section throughout the State. [Emphasis added.] Thus, the Legislature vested the prosecutor s office with the primary responsibility for juvenile waiver decisions when the juvenile is sixteen years or older and charged with a designated offense. The intent was to increase prosecutorial discretion and to make waiver more likely in the case of those juveniles. Simply stated, when a sixteen-year old or above is charged with an enumerated offense, the prosecutor need only establish probable cause for the court to waive the juvenile to adult court. A probable cause hearing is neither constitutionally required nor recognized at common law. State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 536 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 936, 81 S. Ct. 383, 5 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1961). Rather, the probable cause hearing is a creation of legislation and our rules, and the defendant may waive the hearing. In the adult setting, our court rules provide that if the defendant does not waive the probable cause hearing and if an indictment has not been returned, a hearing shall be held to determine whether there is probable cause to believe defendant committed the offense. R. 3:4-3(a). While the adult defendant is allowed to cross-examine the State s witnesses, he is not expressly given the right to present evidence. Ibid. In a juvenile matter, the probable cause hearing takes on greater significance than in the adult context. As we emphasized in R.G.D., supra, [s]o important is the [juvenile waiver] decision that the United States Supreme Court has invested it with constitutional significance that requires procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement[s]. [108 N.J. at 5 (quoting Kent, supra, 383 U.S. at 553, 86 S. Ct. at 1053, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 93).] We restate that prior to the 2000 amendments, even for the more serious charges against older juveniles, the juvenile could present evidence of the potential for rehabilitation at the probable cause portion of the waiver hearing. Id. at 16. In R.G.D., we addressed the issue of the evidence the juvenile could present at a waiver hearing to show amenability to rehabilitation, and the proper balance between the juvenile s interest and State s interest in determining whether a juvenile overcame the presumption of waiver. Ibid. We reviewed the waiver procedures at that time and, in respect of the State s proof on probable cause, we explained that [a]lthough the victim s version of the events was sharply contested by the juveniles and belied by some of the circumstances, the evaluation of probable cause is not an evaluation of guilt or innocence. That evidence must await the trial. A juvenile may, however, submit evidence at the waiver hearing that would minimize . . . involvement in the offense in order to enhance [the] chances of being found amenable to rehabilitation. [Ibid. (emphasis added)(citations and internal quotations omitted).] See also State v. Lueder, 74 N.J. 62, 77 (1977) (finding guilt or innocence of juvenile not at issue in waiver hearing); State v. Torres, 313 N.J. Super. 129, 144-47 (App. Div.)(finding that although waiver hearing is critical stage and juvenile has right to testify, record insufficient to determine whether counsel advised juvenile of his right to testify), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 425 (1998); Ferguson, supra, 255 N.J. Super. at 538 (finding error for counsel not to inform juvenile of right to testify at waiver hearing); State in Interest of B.G., 247 N.J. Super. 403, 423 (App. Div. 1991)(noting without discussion that juvenile offered own evidence on probable cause); State in Interest of A.T., 245 N.J. Super. 224, 227 n.1, 227-28 (App. Div. 1991)(reversing finding of no probable cause but not expressly addressing question whether juveniles may offer evidence on probable cause). Those cases demonstrate that our courts have accommodated a juvenile s request to present evidence at the waiver hearing, most often on the issue of rehabilitation, but also on the issue of probable cause. Moreover, even after the 2000 amendments, the Legislature continued to recognize that [n]o testimony of a juvenile at a hearing pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26] shall be admissible for any purpose in any hearing to determine delinquency or guilt of any offense. N.J.S.A. 2A: 4A-29. We note, however, that unlike Rule 3:4-3, the Family Part Rule for waiver does not set forth any requirements for the probable cause hearing. See R. 5:22-2. Therefore, there is neither a provision in the rule giving the juvenile the right to present evidence at the probable cause hearing, nor a provision prohibiting such a right. In the present case, the Family Part judge relied upon Rule 3:4-3, governing probable cause hearings in adult criminal cases, to deny the juvenile the right to testify at the probable cause portion of the waiver hearing. In reversing that decision, the Appellate Division concluded that because of the critical importance of the probable cause determination, the juvenile should have the right to testify at that part of the waiver hearing. J.M., supra, 364 N.J. Super. at 395-96. The panel appeared to ground its decision in legal precedent that due process entitles a party to a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Ibid. Although recognizing that the probable cause hearing portion of a waiver proceeding has been compared to a probable cause hearing for an adult, the panel noted that [g]iven its potential procedural consequences, a probable cause hearing in a juvenile waiver proceeding is a more critical step in the process than a typical probable cause proceeding available to an adult offender. Id. at 397-98. We are in complete accord with the view expressed by the Appellate Division panel concerning the critical nature of the juvenile probable cause hearing. As we explained in R.G.D., supra, once waiver occurs, the juvenile loses all the protective and rehabilitative possibilities available to the Family Part. 108 N.J. at 5. With that in mind, we conclude that the heightened importance to the juvenile justifies treating juveniles differently from adults at a probable cause hearing. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.M., Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED February 17, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY