Title: Donaldson v. Crawford
Citation: 230 S.W.3d 340
Docket Number: SC 88231
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2007

230 S.W.3d 340 (2007)
Joshua DONALDSON, Appellant,
v.
Larry CRAWFORD, Director, Missouri Department of Corrections, Respondent.
No. SC 88231.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
August 21, 2007.
*341 William P. Nacy, Jefferson City, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Spillane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.[1]
Joshua Donaldson was convicted of selling a controlled substance. He was placed on probation. While on probation, he was arrested for rape and armed criminal action. He escaped, but was recaptured. He was convicted of escape and was sent to prison for that offense. When he was eligible to be released from prison, he was detained to answer for violation of his prior probation. His probation on the controlled substance offense was revoked, and Donaldson was sent to prison on that offense.
*342 Claiming that the time he was detained on the escape charge should be credited to his controlled substance sentence, Donaldson filed this declaratory judgment action to direct the department of corrections to give him that credit. The trial court correctly determined that sections 558.031 and 559.100[2] provide that the sentencing court, not the department of corrections, determines whether credit should be given when probation is revoked. The judgment is affirmed.
ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993), sets forth the applicable standard of review: When considering appeals from summary judgments, the Court will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party's motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion. The non-movant is accorded the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. The Court's review is essentially de novo. The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those that should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law. As the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to the intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. The construction of statutes is not to be hyper-technical, but instead is to be reasonable and logical and to give meaning to the statutes. Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 S.W.3d 461, 465 (Mo. banc 2002).
Section 558.031.1 provides:
Section 559.100 provides:
Section 559.100 was enacted prior to section 558.031. 1990 Mo. Laws 778 and 1995 Mo. Laws 599, respectively. Prior to its amendment, section 558.031 had no exception for cases involving probation under section 559.100. Interpreting this earlier version of section 558.031, this Court said: "[T]his statutory scheme contemplates an administrative and not a judicial determination of the jail time to be credited, with no sharing of jurisdiction between the two branches of government." State ex rel. Jones v. Cooksey, 830 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Mo. banc 1992). "[Section] 558.031 appears clearly to contemplate that the department, and not the sentencing court, is to be the actor in the crediting of jail time." Id. at 424.
Under section 559.100, the circuit court has discretion as to the awarding of credit for time served on probation. The amendment to section 558.031 preserves that discretion and clarifies that the circuit court determines whether any credit applies by providing that its provisions do not apply to determinations of credit governed by section 559.100. Moreover, section 559.100 does not limit the circuit court's determination to the sentence imposed after revocation but, instead, applies to any sentence affected by the time spent on probation. This is reflected by the use of the phrase "time served on a sentence" rather than the phrase "time served on the sentence." Reading the sections together, the time on probation is to be credited as determined by the circuit court under section 559.100 because section 558.031, by its own terms, does not apply.
The judgment is affirmed.[3]
LAURA DENVIR STITH, C.J., PRICE, TEITELMAN, LIMBAUGH, RUSSELL and WOLFF, JJ., concur.
[1]  This Court transferred this case from the Court of Appeals, Western District, after an opinion authored by the Honorable Victor C. Howard. Mo. Const. article V, section 10. Parts of that opinion are incorporated without further attribution.
[2]  All statutory references are to RSMo 2000.
[3]  Because of the Court's resolution of the exception provided by section 558.031, it is not necessary to determine whether the offenses are related.