Title: Douglas v. State
Citation: 254 Ind. 517, 261 N.E.2d 567
Docket Number: 169S18
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 1970

254 Ind. 517 (1970)
261 N.E.2d 567
DOUGLAS
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 169S18.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed August 12, 1970.
Rehearing denied December 17, 1970.
*518 Frederick J. Graf, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Walter E. Bravard, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
Appellant was charged by indictment filed June 19, 1968, in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, with "Commission of a Felony While Armed With a Deadly Weapon, To-Wit: Rape." The indictment, omitting heading, formal parts and signature, in pertinent part reads as follows:
Thereafter, on August 6, 1968, appellant filed a Notice of Alibi, and on August 7, 1968, a Motion to Amend Notice of Alibi, and on August 7, 1968, a Motion to Amend Notice of sel filed a "Motion for Disclosure and Production of Evidence Favorable to Accused." In view of appellant's Motion for New Trial, etc., we include in pertinent part such motion, omitting heading, formal parts, etc., viz:
August 20, 1968, the State of Indiana filed its answer to appellant's Notice of Alibi, such answer in substance stated "the date when the defendant committed the offense charged
States Supreme Court in Gilbert v. State of California, 388 was: between 6:00 P.M. on March 14th, 1968, and 6:00 A.M. on March 15th, 1968," and the "place where the defendant committed the offense charged was: in the vicinity of 22nd Street and College Avenue, in the City of Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana."
August 21, 1968, the court sustained a part of appellant's Motion for Disclosure, etc., and ordered the "Prosecutor's Office to furnish names and addresses of witnesses to the defendant *522 on or before August 23, 1968." Thereupon the defendant filed a waiver of trial by jury and requested an early trial.
October 4, 1968, the issues herein were submitted to the court for trial finding and judgment. On the same day the court found defendant guilty as charged by the indictment, ordered a pre-sentence investigation and set sentencing for October 17, 1968. On October 17, 1968, a pre-sentence investigation reported was filed, and sentencing was continued at the request of defense counsel.
On October 24, 1968, appellant filed his Motion for New Trial, which motion, omitting heading, reads as follows:
*523 Exhibit A attached to the above motion, omitting heading reads as follows:
Further affiant sayeth not.
On November 4, 1968, defendant's Motion for New Trial was overruled.
*524 On November 7, 1968, the following further proceedings were had herein to-wit:
Thereafter, appellant filed his petition to appeal in Forma Pauperis, requesting appeal counsel "and all other further, proper and complete relief necessary in the application of and/or the taking of a Pauper appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana." On December 16, 1968, the petition was granted and present appeal counsel was appointed for such purpose.
On February 24, 1969, defendant pro se filed a Verified Motion to Vacate Judgment and Request for Leave to File Same Without Costs or Filing Fees, such motion, omitting heading, signatures and jurat reads in pertinent part as follows:
On Monday, March 24, 1969, the court overruled the above motion.
The Assignment of Errors is:
A summary of the evidence most favorable to the appellee is taken from appellee's brief pages 2-4 inclusive and reads as follows:
Ground One of appellant's Motion for a New Trial alleges irregularities in the proceedings of the court and abuse of *528 discretion by which defendant was prevented from having a fair and impartial trial.
This first specification is broken down into three catagories, 1 (a), (b) and (c). As the motion for new trial is heretofore set out in full these specifications are here deemed sufficiently descriptive.
The writer finds difficulty in harmonizing appellant's arguments at (C) page 14 of his brief and (D) page 16 thereof and at the risk of unduly extending this opinion incorporates said points.
Appellant's argument under specification C relative to 1 (a), (b) and (c) is predicated on Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194.
As far as the record discloses the court ordered the Prosecutor's office to furnish the defendant with the names of the State's witnesses by August 23, 1968. This was in response to defendant's motion above referred to. The record is silent as to any complaint by defendant that the State did not comply with the order so made.
*530 This Court has previously held "We do not require that the State lay bare its case in advance of trial nor that the criminal defendant be allowed a fishing expedition * * *." Howard v. State (1969), 251 Ind. 584, 244 N.E.2d 127, 128; Bernard v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 688, 230 N.E.2d 536, 540.
Appellant saw fit to call to the stand as a witness Sergeant Lund the police officer in charge of the investigation in this case. That witness was examined thoroughly by the defense. His testimony covered the period of time from the rape to the trial, it did not disclose or even hint at any suppressed evidence. We are of the opinion appellant received under specification C (1 a, b and c) all that he was entitled to receive by the motion under our own decisions, as well as by Brady v. Maryland, supra.
With respect to specification D page 16 of appellant's brief, while we have taken the trouble to search the record and have heretofore set out herein appellant's Motion for Disclosure, etc., we are not impressed by his argument. The State asserts, properly we think, that appellant has not properly preserved for appeal the ground of "improper police line-up." This was not a ground presented to the trial court in appellant's motion for new trial. Paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof cannot be construed to present this ground because of the prescription against the use of such general language in Supreme Court Rule 1-14B, which was in existence at the time this appeal was filed. Said rule requires a memorandum stating specifically where the evidence is insufficient or the verdict is contrary to law. No such memorandum can be found in the record, and, therefore, this ground for appeal has been waived. Lynch v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 54, 245 N.E.2d 334.
In support of his contention appellant contends an accused has a right to counsel at an "Identification Parade" or "Show-Up". U.S. v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 *531 L. Ed. 2d 1149; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178.
We adopt the argument of the appellee as follows:
Assuming, arguendo, that appellant had preserved and properly presented as a ground that the "line-up" procedure was improper, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the in-court identification of appellant by the victim was based on anything other than her recognition of him from the time of the rape.
Ground 2 of appellant's motion for a new trial is predicated on alleged newly discovered evidence which he could not have discovered and produced at the trial and shown by the affidavit of one Charles Carter. As we have heretofore set out the motion for new trial and the affidavit of the defendant they are not here copied.
The appellee points out that appellant has failed to comply with old Rule 2-17 (e) and Rule 2-17 (h) of this Court. The State further points out that appellant's motion for new trial was signed by counsel and not appellant and is unverified. Thus there is no affidavit showing diligence in discovering such evidence in the case at bar. The affidavit of Charles Carter showed he was in jail in Marion County, Indiana, at the time of trial and within the jurisdiction of the court.
The affidavit shows that the "evidence" concerns activity in which the appellant participated. Appellant makes no showing *533 he did not know such evidence existed, or that he did not know the whereabouts of the affiant at the time of trial.
A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which fails to state the precise nature of the evidence, does not state facts showing why such evidence was not presented at trial, and is not accompanied by an affidavit showing diligence to discover it presents no question to the court. Lake v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 451, 229 N.E.2d 724.
In the case at bar the State of Indiana presented one witness only, the victim of the alleged rape.
The defendant took the stand in his own behalf and testified that he had seen the prosecuting witness, Luvenia McCoy, prior to the night of March 14, 1968. He testified that she lived right down the street from him for about a year and that he saw her often, had a speaking acquaintance with her, and on or about April 8, 1968, he, Gypsy Morton, the prosecuting witness, and Harold Mayfield were all talking in front of a liquor store at Twenty-Second and College. She did not at that time make any claim, statement or accusation that he had raped her. The defendant categorically denied putting a gun on Luvenia McCoy on March 14, 1969, (this is error as the alleged rape occurred in 1968 and later questions to defendant clearly show his attorney meant the date March 14, 1968), denied raping her, denied forcing her to commit sodomy on him, and denied being in an automobile with her when she threw a gun out the window. Defendant testified he was a married man whose family consisted of a wife and four kids. He also testified he was the same person convicted in the same court of an unrelated charge in another cause of a felony while armed, to-wit: Rape. He further testified he had never owned a gun prior to March 30, 1968, on which date he was arrested and charged with violation of the firearms act. Defendant further testified he went to work March 14, 1968, on the "B" shift at Citizens Gas; he also testified that the *534 prosecuting witness never said or claimed that he tried to attack her until after April 18, 1968, when he got shot, and that it was after he got shot that all the other charges were filed against him. Defendant also testified the rape of which he had previously been convicted was supposed to have occurred on March 16, 1968. When asked if he had seen any other ladies on the fifteenth he testified "I don't know, it depend on how many rape charges he got against me `cause when he first come to the hospital and arrested me, he say he had seven.'" When asked how he happened to get shot he said "A lady was shooting at my nephew," and "She hit me by accidental." "She was close when she shot cause my nephew slapped her." The defense also produced as a witness defendant's half brother, Robert Dotson, who testified as to his brother's purchase of a gun on the night of March 30, 1968, and his subsequent arrest the same night on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon.
Thereafter, the defense rested, the State rested and the defense moved to reopen in order to put Sergeant Lund on the stand as a defense witness. The motion was granted and the Sergeant testified at length about all aspects of the case.
There was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction of the crime of Committing a Felony (Rape) While Armed with a Deadly Weapon. Burns Indiana Statutes 10-4709 provides:
Burns Indiana Statutes 10-4201 reads in part as follows:
The general rule is that a conviction will be sustained if there is any evidence of the facts essential to support the judgment. *535 Bush v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 84, 237 N.E.2d 584. When the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is raised the Supreme Court will consider all that evidence most favorable to the State together with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn thereform. Fisher v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 529, 219 N.E.2d 818.
In conclusion we do not say if this case had been before the Court de novo the same result would obtain. In the case at bar there is conflicting evidence and varying degrees of interest on the part of the witnesses, all of which are matters for determination by the trier of the facts who has the opportunity to observe the witnesses, hear the evidence directly, and through such observation, evaluate the weight thereof and the credibility of the witnesses far more effectively than we through the cold record of the transcript. We concede and acknowledge the possibility that, where the judgment of conviction stands on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant or alleged victim, alone, a defendant might be "shopped" or "framed" or an innocent man unjustly convicted. On the other hand crimes of violence such as murder, rape or attempts to commit the same seldom take place in broad daylight, in public places, in plain view of numerous spectators or potential witnesses and as a matter of public policy the courts must and have decided which horn of the dilemma constitutes the greater threat and hazard to our society. In this state this Court has held that the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Grimm v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 150, 258 N.E.2d 407.
We are of the opinion there was sufficient evidence of probative value to sustain the judgment of the trial court and the trial court committed no reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Givan, JJ., concur. DeBruler, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 261 N.E.2d 567.