Title: Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Peatross
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 042306
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2005

Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., and 
Carrico, Compton, and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW 
COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 042306  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    April 22, 2005 
 
PAUL M. PEATROSS, JR., JUDGE OF THE 
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution 
of Virginia, the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission 
(the Commission), filed a complaint in this Court against 
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., judge of the Sixteenth Judicial 
Circuit.  The Commission alleged that certain charges 
against Judge Peatross for violating the Canons of Judicial 
Conduct for the Commonwealth of Virginia (the Canons), Va. 
Sup. Ct. R. Part 6, § III, were well-founded and of 
sufficient gravity to warrant censure or removal.1  This 
Court conducted “a hearing in open court.”  Va. Const. art. 
VI, § 10.  We conclude that there is not clear and 
convincing evidence that Judge Peatross engaged in either 
“misconduct while in office” or “conduct prejudicial to the 
                                                 
1 Rule 2M of The Rules of the Judicial Inquiry and 
Review Commission (Commission Rules) states that the term 
“ ‘[w]ell [f]ounded’ shall mean that the Commission has 
found based upon clear and convincing evidence and 
supported by facts and sound judgment that the misconduct 
has occurred.”  See 15 VAC 10-10-10. 
proper administration of justice.”  Id.  Therefore, we will 
dismiss the complaint. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The Commission issued two notices, one dated April 15, 
2004, and the other dated July 13, 2004, stating charges 
that Judge Peatross had engaged in misconduct while in 
office and had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.2  The Commission conducted a 
formal hearing on each notice at which the Commission and 
Judge Peatross presented evidence.3  Thereafter, the 
Commission issued orders dated September 21, 2004, and 
October 12, 2004, respectively, in which it set forth its 
findings and conclusions of law.  In each instance, the 
Commission directed that a formal complaint be filed in 
this Court, seeking Judge Peatross’ censure or removal from 
office.  We will address the charges, the evidence adduced 
at the formal hearings, and the Commission’s findings with 
respect to each of the notices. 
A. April Notice 
                                                 
2 Commission Rule 2L provides the term “ ‘[c]harge’ 
shall mean an Inquiry that the Commission determines, after 
a preliminary investigation by counsel and upon the 
recommendation of counsel, could be a violation of the 
Canons of Judicial Conduct or the basis for retirement, 
censure, or removal of a judge.” 
 
3 The formal hearings took place on June 8, 2004, and 
September 21, 2004, respectively. 
 
2
In the April notice, the Commission charged Judge 
Peatross with violating Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4) and 
3B(7).  The charges arose out of Judge Peatross’ handling 
of three separate criminal cases in the Circuit Court of 
Albemarle County: (1) Commonwealth v. Nakesha A. Mills; (2) 
Commonwealth v. Aimee J. Jacques; and (3) Commonwealth v. 
Matthew C. Rexrode.  We will address these cases seriatim. 
1. Commonwealth v. Mills 
In Mills, the defendant was charged with attempt to 
obtain money by false pretense.  On September 12, 2003, the 
defendant appeared before Judge Peatross for the purpose of 
entering a guilty plea to the charge.  During the plea 
colloquy, the defendant seemed uncertain about how to 
respond to some of the questions asked by Judge Peatross.  
Consequently, Judge Peatross allowed the defendant and her 
attorney, James Hingeley of the public defender’s office, 
to converse privately in an office outside the courtroom.  
The Commonwealth’s Attorney, James L. Camblos, III, 
followed them into that office.  Camblos told Hingeley that 
he had decided to reduce the defendant’s charge to a 
misdemeanor because of her favorable appearance, good 
attitude, and lack of prior criminal record. 
When the parties returned to the courtroom, Camblos 
announced to Judge Peatross that he wanted to reduce the 
 
3
felony to a misdemeanor.  Judge Peatross did not allow the 
reduction in the charge but, instead, gave the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney the option either to nolle prosequi 
the charge or to proceed with the felony.  The 
Commonwealth’s Attorney refused to choose either option.  
Judge Peatross then entered an order, sua sponte, to nolle 
prosequi the charge. 
At the hearing before the Commission, Judge Peatross 
explained that, in his opinion, the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
should have moved to reduce the charge before arraignment 
rather than doing so after the defendant had already 
entered a guilty plea to the felony.  He further stated 
that, if the Commonwealth’s Attorney intended to handle the 
charge as a misdemeanor, he should have done so earlier in 
the general district court.  Judge Peatross indicated that 
he did not favor a policy that circumvented the general 
district court where misdemeanor charges should be tried.  
Judge Peatross also acknowledged that he had never 
previously entered a nolle prosequi on his own motion but 
believed when he did so that either the Commonwealth or the 
court could make such a motion.  In his answer to the 
charges filed by the Commission and in his testimony, Judge 
Peatross, however, admitted that his understanding of the 
law was wrong, and that, under Virginia law, a judge has no 
 
4
authority to enter a nolle prosequi except upon motion of 
the Commonwealth. 
 
After the Mills case was concluded, Camblos wrote a 
letter to Judge Peatross expressing his reluctance to make 
suggestions to the court because of what Camblos termed an 
“angry reaction” from the judge.  Camblos, nevertheless, 
wrote that he viewed Judge Peatross as consistent, thorough 
in his analysis, and fair.  Judge Peatross replied, in a 
letter to Camblos, that his responses in court were not 
personal but that he simply wanted to operate the court in 
an efficient manner.  Judge Peatross believed that Camblos’ 
handling of the Mills case had not been efficient.  Judge 
Peatross also stated that “[c]ircuit [c]ourt is not where 
this [c]ourt wants to handle misdemeanor cases, unless they 
occur at the same time as a felony, or come up on appeal.” 
 
Based on the evidence, including an audio recording of 
the Mills guilty plea hearing, the Commission found that 
Judge Peatross had nolle prosequied a felony charge without 
authority to do so and that he took such action because of 
his “displeasure and impatience” with the request by the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney and the defendant’s attorney to 
reduce the felony to a misdemeanor.  The Commission further 
found that the “judge’s uncivil behavior toward the 
attorneys was greatly disproportionate to any action or 
 
5
inaction by the attorneys.”  Finally, the Commission found 
that Judge Peatross had established a policy that he would 
not hear misdemeanor charges in his court unless they were 
companion cases to one or more felony charges against the 
same defendant.  The Commission concluded that Judge 
Peatross’ actions in handling the Mills case violated 
Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3B(2), and 3B(4). 
2. Commonwealth v. Jacques 
 
In Jacques, the defendant was charged with robbery, 
use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, one felony 
charge of failure to appear in the Circuit Court of 
Albemarle County, and four misdemeanor charges of failure 
to appear.4  On December 10, 2003, six days before Jacques’ 
scheduled jury trial, the Commonwealth’s Attorney, Camblos; 
the defendant’s attorney, Llezelle A. Dugger; and the 
defendant met in Camblos’ conference room to discuss the 
terms of a possible plea agreement.  The parties eventually 
signed an agreement in which the defendant agreed to plead 
guilty to the robbery and firearm charges with certain 
recommended sentences.  According to Camblos, Dugger asked 
him about the felony failure to appear charge, and Camblos 
                                                 
4 One of the misdemeanor charges was dismissed as being 
duplicative of the felony failure to appear charge. 
 
6
told her that he did not care about that charge, stating, 
“I will ask the judge to nol pros it.” 
Camblos, with Dugger’s permission, then took the plea 
agreement to Judge Peatross’ office.5  Judge Peatross looked 
at the agreement and asked Camblos to explain its terms.  
After Camblos did so and also described the evidentiary 
difficulties he would have in trying the case, Judge 
Peatross indicated that the plea agreement seemed 
                                                 
5 Judge Peatross was asked at the Commission hearing 
about what policy, if any, he had regarding plea agreements 
being presented to him.  He answered: 
 
I have no policy regarding plea agreements.  
I have no requirement or policy about reviewing 
plea agreements in advance.  If a plea agreement 
is reached in a case, what normally happens is 
the attorneys will send it to my office for me to 
look at in camera without any attorneys there, or 
I may see it in chambers right before I go out to 
arraign.  I do not review plea agreements, I do 
not discuss plea agreements, I do not negotiate 
plea agreements. 
 
 
I challenge them to give me any case where I 
have reviewed a plea agreement before trial in 
chambers, or anywhere, and rejected it and then 
go out and hear it.  It simply has not happened. 
 
 
I will agree that attorneys may have come to 
me and say here is a plea agreement, will you 
accept it or reject it, and I may give them 
indication of feeling, but I don’t formally act 
on it.  That’s against the Rule, and I need to go 
[into] court and review the plea agreement with 
the defendant on the record. 
 
If I am reviewing plea agreements in chambers and 
negotiating them, that’s in violation of the Rule and 
I have no business being a judge. 
 
7
reasonable but asked what was happening with the failure to 
appear charges.  According to Judge Peatross’ testimony at 
the Commission hearing, Camblos stated that he had 
forgotten about those charges and needed to talk to Dugger 
about them.  Camblos, however, testified at the Commission 
hearing that he told Judge Peatross that he had agreed to 
nolle prosequi the felony failure to appear charge.  
According to Camblos, Judge Peatross stated he did not want 
the charge disposed of in that manner and “flicked” the 
plea agreement across the table to Camblos. 
 
After leaving Judge Peatross’ chambers, Camblos took 
the plea agreement back to Dugger and explained what had 
occurred.  The defendant and the two attorneys then entered 
into a second plea agreement.  This agreement retained the 
original terms of the first agreement as to the robbery and 
firearm charges but added a provision stating that the 
felony failure to appear charge would be tried by a jury on 
December 16, 2003.  The terms of the second plea agreement 
also provided that the defendant would plead guilty to the 
misdemeanor failure to appear charges with the sentences to 
“be at the discretion of the court.” 
Later that same day, Judge Peatross, at the request of 
Camblos and Dugger, convened a hearing to take the 
defendant’s guilty pleas.  During that hearing, Judge 
 
8
Peatross accepted and signed the second plea agreement, 
which contained a statement “[t]hat no [j]udge of the 
[c]ircuit [c]ourt has participated in any discussion 
leading to this Agreement under Rule 3A:8.”  On the robbery 
and firearm convictions, Judge Peatross sentenced the 
defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea 
agreement.  As to the three misdemeanor failure to appear 
convictions, Judge Peatross sentenced the defendant to 12 
months in jail on each charge, with the sentences to run 
consecutively. 
The next day, Camblos delivered to Judge Peatross a 
letter stating that he “had agreed to ask for a nol prosse  
on [the felony failure to appear charge] when we entered 
into the plea agreement.”  Camblos also tendered a proposed 
order, which had been endorsed by Dugger, entering a nolle 
prosequi of the felony failure to appear charge.  Camblos 
testified at the Commission hearing that, when he entered 
into the second plea agreement, he intended to go forward 
with a jury trial on the felony failure to appear charge.  
He changed his mind, however, because he believed that 
Judge Peatross’ sentences on the misdemeanor failure to 
appear convictions were “extremely excessive and way beyond 
what was right or proper.” 
 
9
In his testimony at the Commission hearing, Judge 
Peatross explained his rationale for the sentences he 
imposed on the misdemeanor convictions: 
 
The 12-month sentence on each of the misdemeanors, or 
36 months, meant an actual sentence of 9 months. . . . 
[M]y thinking was that if the jury gave a harsh 
sentence on the felony failure to appear, I could 
suspend that 36 months.  If the jury did nothing to 
him, I thought that a 9-month sentence for four 
failure to appears, if he is guilty on the felony 
failure to appear, was a fair sentence, so I didn’t 
think I was giving a harsh sentence, and I left it 
within my discretion to adjust it if the jury gave a 
harsh sentence on the felony failure to appear, which 
could be up to 5 years. 
 
Judge Peatross subsequently convened a hearing on 
December 15, 2003, to discuss Camblos’ letter and the 
proposed nolle prosequi order.  During questioning by Judge 
Peatross about the change in how the felony failure to 
appear charge was to be handled, Camblos explained that the 
reference in his letter to “the plea agreement” was to the 
first agreement.  Camblos avowed to Judge Peatross that, 
when the second plea agreement was entered into and 
accepted by the court, there was no separate agreement to 
move for a nolle prosequi of the felony failure to appear 
charge. 
During that hearing, Dugger indicated to Judge 
Peatross that she agreed with the contents of Camblos’ 
letter but understood the letter to refer to the first plea 
 
10
agreement.  Like Camblos, she stated that, when the court 
accepted the second plea agreement, there was no agreement 
concerning the felony failure to appear charge other than 
to try it before a jury.  She first learned of the proposed 
change in disposition the next morning, when she received a 
telephone call from Camblos asking her to endorse an order 
entering a nolle prosequi of the charge.  At the Commission 
hearing, Dugger testified that she and Camblos had already 
reached their oral agreement about the felony failure to 
appear charge when she and the defendant signed the first 
plea agreement but later stated that there was no such oral 
agreement at that time.  In any event, she acknowledged 
that the first plea agreement did not represent the total 
agreement between the parties. 
At the conclusion of the December 15, 2003 hearing, 
Judge Peatross stated orally from the bench that he was 
going to remove both attorneys as counsel of record in the 
Jacques case.  Subsequent to the hearing, Camblos and the 
defendant filed separate motions to reconsider.6  Camblos 
again asserted that the plea agreement mentioned in his 
December 11, 2003 letter to Judge Peatross referred to the 
initial agreement and not the second one.  In his motion, 
                                                 
6 James Hingeley, who was Dugger’s superior at the 
public defender’s office, filed the motion on behalf of the 
defendant. 
 
11
the defendant argued that the court had no lawful basis to 
remove Dugger as his defense counsel and that the removal 
and delay in his trial was prejudicial to him. 
On January 6, 2004, Judge Peatross entered an order 
removing Camblos “as counsel for the Commonwealth” and 
Dugger “as counsel for the [d]efendant” because of their 
“misrepresentation” to the court concerning the disposition 
of the felony failure to appear charge.  The next day, he 
denied both motions to reconsider.  Judge Peatross 
explained at the Commission hearing that he took those 
actions because he had concluded that Camblos and Dugger 
had violated the plea agreement by submitting an order 
which nolle prosequied the felony failure to appear charge.  
He believed that, if Camblos had merely changed his mind, 
Camblos should have filed a motion to amend the plea 
agreement. 
Judge Peatross also entered an order on January 7, 
2004 dismissing the felony failure to appear charge without 
prejudice.  The order stated: 
 
 
It appearing to the [c]ourt that the [c]ourt had 
good cause to relieve the Commonwealth’s Attorney and 
[c]ourt appointed counsel for the [D]efendant from the 
case for misconduct in misrepresenting facts 
concerning the December 10, 2003 plea agreement to the 
[c]ourt and, through no fault of the Defendant, it 
appears the Defendant has been or may be denied a 
right to a speedy trial because of the misconduct. 
 
 
12
Neither this order nor the January 6, 2004 order was 
endorsed by Camblos or Dugger, nor were the orders sent to 
them.7
On January 20, 2004, Judge Peatross received an 
undated letter from the defendant, asking about the status 
of his plea agreement and claiming that he had been 
“assured that all the failure to appear charges would be 
overlooked.”  On the same day, Judge Peatross responded by 
letter to the defendant and enclosed three orders 
pertaining to the case along with the plea agreement.  
Judge Peatross stated in the letter that the orders should 
answer the defendant’s inquiries.  Judge Peatross did not 
provide copies of the correspondence between him and the 
defendant to either Camblos or Dugger.  Judge Peatross 
testified at the Commission hearing that he did not do so 
because he had removed both counsel from the case. 
Based on this evidence, including an audio recording 
of the December 15, 2003 hearing concerning the proposed 
order to nolle prosequi the felony failure to appear 
charge, the Commission found the evidence contradictory 
concerning the in-chambers conversation between Camblos and 
Judge Peatross with regard to the first plea agreement.  
                                                 
7 Hingeley, on behalf of the defendant, filed a second 
motion to reconsider after entry of the January 7 order.  
Judge Peatross denied the motion. 
 
13
The Commission resolved the credibility issue adversely to 
Judge Peatross and found that “the prosecutor did inform 
the judge in chambers on December 10, 2003, that he had an 
oral agreement with defense counsel to nolle prosequi the 
felony [failure to appear] charge and that the judge did 
inform the prosecutor that he would not accept any 
agreement that purported to nolle prosequi that charge.”  
The Commission thus concluded that, when Judge Peatross 
executed the second plea agreement, thereby representing 
that he had not participated in any discussions leading to 
the agreement, he “knew, or reasonably should have known, 
that such representations were untrue.” 
The Commission further found that, while Judge 
Peatross did not require plea agreements to be previewed by 
him, he nevertheless “countenanced and encouraged” such a 
practice.  Continuing, the Commission found that Judge 
Peatross had acted vindictively and in retaliation against 
Jacques by imposing the maximum sentence on each of the 
misdemeanor failure to appear charges; that, as admitted by 
Judge Peatross in his answer, he did not give either 
Camblos or Dugger notice that he was contemplating their 
removal from the Jacques case; that, when Judge Peatross 
entered the January 6, 2004 order, neither Camblos nor 
Dugger had notice that he was considering a finding that 
 
14
they had made a misrepresentation to the court; that Judge 
Peatross did not afford Camblos or Dugger notice that they 
were charged with professional misconduct or a meaningful 
opportunity to defend themselves against such a charge, and 
did not take any steps to have the January 6, 2004 and 
January 7, 2004 orders delivered to the attorneys; that 
Judge Peatross had no authority to make a finding of 
misconduct or to remove the Commonwealth’s Attorney; that 
Judge Peatross took substantive action in the Jacques case 
during a time when neither party was represented by 
counsel; that Judge Peatross’ decision to remove the two 
attorneys and find them guilty of misconduct was in 
retaliation for the motion to nolle prosequi the felony 
failure to appear charge; that Judge Peatross received two 
ex parte letters from the defendant and responded to one of 
the letters without providing copies of the defendant’s 
letters or the response to either counsel and without 
notifying the Commonwealth that such ex parte 
communications had occurred.8  Based on these findings, the 
Commission concluded that Judge Peatross had violated 
Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3B(2), and 3B(7). 
                                                 
8 Judge Peatross received the second letter on December 
10, 2003. 
 
15
3. Commonwealth v. Rexrode 
 
The Rexrode case was set for docket call on February 
2, 2004.  The public defender representing the defendant 
had filed a motion for a continuance of the scheduled trial 
date of March 3, 2004 because she had to be out of town 
during the week of March 1 to care for her terminally ill 
father.  The public defender who was present at docket 
call, James Hingeley, renewed the motion for a continuance.  
Judge Peatross granted the motion and continued the trial 
to March 17, 2004. 
Later during docket call, as a result of further 
discussions with the Commonwealth’s Attorney, Camblos, 
Hingeley realized that the Rexrode case was complicated and 
therefore the new trial date might not give the defendant’s 
attorney sufficient time to prepare after returning to the 
office.  Hingeley approached Judge Peatross and moved for a 
later trial date.  According to Camblos and Hingeley, Judge 
Peatross, in a courtroom filled with lawyers and litigants, 
then asked Hingeley with irritation, sarcasm, and anger 
while throwing his hands in the air to tell the court what 
day he wanted.  Despite his reaction, Judge Peatross 
continued the trial to a later date.  At the Commission 
hearing, Judge Peatross admitted that he owed the public 
 
16
defender an apology because his conduct was “wrong[,] . . . 
unjustified[,] . . . unprofessional [and] uncalled for.” 
Based on the evidence, an audio recording of the 
February 2, 2004 docket call, and Judge Peatross’ answer 
admitting the Commission’s allegations in the Rexrode 
matter, the Commission found that Judge Peatross’ conduct 
toward the public defender, Hingeley, was “extremely 
impatient, undignified and discourteous” and that he acted 
in retaliation because the public defender’s office had 
filed two motions asking Judge Peatross to recuse himself 
in two unrelated cases due to the judge’s conduct in 
Jacques.  The Commission concluded that Judge Peatross’ 
actions violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 3B(4). 
B. July Notice 
The July notice charged Judge Peatross with violating 
Canons 1, 2, and 2A.  The charges arose out of a 
conversation Judge Peatross had with the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
On June 21, 2004, Judge Peatross attended a meeting of 
the Judicial Council of Virginia in Richmond, of which he 
was a member.  After the close of the meeting, Judge 
Peatross had a private conversation with the Chief Justice 
in order to tender his resignation from the Judicial 
Council and to explain that he was resigning due to the 
 
17
Commission’s findings with regard to the charges brought in 
the April notice.  The Chief Justice immediately inquired 
whether the Commission’s findings would be presented to 
this Court.  Judge Peatross answered that he had no 
expectation or intention that the matter would come before 
this Court.  At that time, Judge Peatross intended to 
accept the terms of an agreement proposed by the Commission 
disposing of the April charges in exchange for the 
Commission’s not filing a formal complaint in this Court. 
During the conversation with the Chief Justice, Judge 
Peatross discussed some facts surrounding the charges and 
one of the terms of the proposed agreement with the 
Commission.  After his conversation with the Chief Justice, 
Judge Peatross saw the actual written agreement and learned 
for the first time about some conditions with which he 
would have to comply that had not been mentioned orally by 
the Commission at the close of the hearing on the April 
charges.  Some days later, Judge Peatross decided not to 
enter into the agreement with the Commission disposing of 
the April charges and relayed this decision to his attorney 
on July 9, 2004. 
Based on this evidence, the Commission found that 
Judge Peatross misrepresented to the Chief Justice that the 
matter before the Commission was concluded and would not be 
 
18
coming before this Court, and that Judge Peatross engaged 
in an ex parte conversation with the Chief Justice about an 
impending case.  The Commission concluded that Judge 
Peatross’ actions violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(7). 
II.  CANONS 
The relevant portions of the Canons at issue in this 
case state the following: 
Canon 1 
A Judge Should Uphold the 
Integrity and Independence of the 
Judiciary. 
 
Canon 2 
A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety 
and the Appearance of Impropriety in 
All of the Judge’s Activities. 
 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the 
law and shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
Canon 3 
 
 
A Judge Shall Perform The Duties 
Of Judicial Office Impartially And 
Diligently. 
 
. . . . 
 
B.(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law 
and maintain professional competence in it. 
 
. . . . 
B.(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified 
and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, 
 
19
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in 
an official capacity . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
B.(7) A judge shall accord to every person 
who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that 
person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according 
to law.  A judge shall not initiate, permit, or 
consider ex parte communications, or consider 
other communications made to the judge outside 
the presence of the parties concerning a pending 
or impending proceeding except that: 
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte 
communications for scheduling, administrative 
purposes or emergencies that do not deal with 
substantive matters or issues on the merits are 
authorized; provided: 
(i) The judge reasonably believes that no 
party will gain a procedural or tactical 
advantage as a result of the ex parte 
communication, and 
(ii) The judge makes provision promptly to 
notify all other parties of the substance of the 
ex parte communication and allows an opportunity 
to respond. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Upon the filing of a formal complaint by the 
Commission, this Court is charged with the duty to conduct 
a hearing in open court to determine whether a judge has 
“engaged in misconduct while in office, or . . . has 
persistently failed to perform the duties of [the] office, 
or . . . has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the proper 
administration of justice.”  Va. Const. art. VI, § 10.  We 
make that determination by considering the evidence and 
making factual determinations de novo.  Judicial Inquiry & 
 
20
Review Comm’n v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 405, 568 S.E.2d 687, 
689 (2002).  Contrary to the Commission’s argument, we do 
not give “due weight” to the Commission’s findings or their 
credibility determinations.  Instead, we accord the 
Commission’s findings only such weight, if any, as we deem 
appropriate in each case.  This is so because the 
Commission’s function is only to determine whether “the 
charges [are] well-founded, and sufficient to constitute 
the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge,” 
thus resulting in a complaint being filed in this Court.  
Code § 17.1-902; see also Va. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
In this type of case invoking the Court’s original 
jurisdiction, see Va. Const. art. VI, § 1, we independently 
review the record created by the Commission and determine 
whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
violation of the Canons as charged in the complaint filed 
by the Commission.  See Lewis, 264 Va. at 405, 568 S.E.2d 
at 689.  If we find such clear and convincing evidence, we 
are required to censure the judge or remove him/her from 
office.  Va. Const. art. VI, § 10.  Those are the only 
sanctions available to the Court. 
The term “clear and convincing evidence” means “that 
degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier 
of facts a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be 
 
21
established.  Such measure of proof is intermediate, more 
than a mere preponderance but less than is required for 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not mean clear and 
unequivocal.”  Middleton v. Johnston, 221 Va. 797, 803, 273 
S.E.2d 800, 803 (1981) (citing Fred C. Walker Agency v. 
Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 540-41, 211 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1975)); 
accord Lewis, 264 Va. at 405, 568 S.E.2d at 689.  The 
Commission has the burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence the charges brought to this Court.  Lewis, 264 Va. 
at 405, 568 S.E.2d at 689. 
A. April Charges 
Judge Peatross admitted many of the facts alleged in 
the April notice.  He conceded that, in the Mills case, he 
lacked authority under Virginia law to nolle prosequi a 
criminal charge except upon motion of the Commonwealth.  In 
the Jacques case, Judge Peatross admitted that he did not 
give notice to Camblos or Dugger that he was considering 
their removal from the case prior to doing so.  Likewise, 
he acknowledged that he sent a letter, along with three 
orders, to Jacques without providing copies of the 
correspondence to Camblos or Dugger.  Finally, in the 
Rexrode case, Judge Peatross stated that he owes Hingeley 
an apology for his reaction to the second request for a 
continuance of the trial date.  Although Judge Peatross 
 
22
admitted these facts, he maintains that his actions in all 
three cases neither constituted judicial misconduct nor 
prejudiced the proper administration of justice. 
The main factual dispute concerned the in-chambers 
conversation between Judge Peatross and Camblos about the 
first plea agreement in Jacques.  The Commission resolved 
the credibility issue adversely to Judge Peatross, basing 
its decision primarily on Judge Peatross’ demeanor as 
gleaned from the audio recordings of the criminal 
proceedings in Mills, Jacques, and Rexrode.  The Commission 
also cited Judge Peatross’ failure to take issue with 
Camblos’ December 15, 2003 in-court representations about 
what had transpired earlier in Judge Peatross’ chambers 
with regard to the first plea agreement, the consistency 
between Camblos’ in-court representations and his report to 
Dugger concerning the conversation with Judge Peatross, and 
both counsel’s preparations for the upcoming jury trial on 
the felony failure to appear charge after Jacques pled 
guilty to the other charges. 
We have listened to the audio recordings of the three 
criminal proceedings forming the basis of the April 
charges.  Contrary to the Commission’s findings and 
argument before this Court, those recordings do not even 
remotely provide clear and convincing evidence of a 
 
23
violation of the Canons, specifically Canon 3B(4), in 
either Mills or Rexrode.  Judge Peatross’ demeanor, in all 
three criminal proceedings, was stern, direct, and 
authoritative but not “uncivil” or “extremely impatient, 
undignified and discourteous,” as found by the Commission. 
It is true that, during the docket call in Rexrode, 
Judge Peatross exhibited some exasperation, but he had 
reason to do so given Hingeley’s vacillation about the 
length of the needed continuance.  Also, Judge Peatross 
acknowledged at the Commission hearing that, as a result of 
the two recusal motions filed by the public defender’s 
office, he felt that he was being falsely accused and 
unfortunately took that feeling out on Hingeley.  There is, 
however, no evidence that Judge Peatross acted in 
retaliation for the two recusal motions.  Moreover, Judge 
Peatross recognized that he should apologize to Hingeley 
for his demeanor on that occasion. 
Not only do the audio recordings fail to provide proof 
of any violation of the Canons, they do not support the 
Commission’s credibility findings adverse to Judge 
Peatross.  Based on our independent review of the record, 
we find no reason to reject the testimony of Judge 
Peatross, Camblos, or Dugger.  Instead, we believe that 
each testified honestly about his or her recollection of 
 
24
the events surrounding the first and second plea agreements 
in the Jacques case and that the differences in their 
testimonies reflect an unfortunate misunderstanding between 
Judge Peatross and Camblos, which was complicated by prior 
disagreements between them. 
Contrary to the Commission’s finding, Judge Peatross, 
during the December 15, 2003 hearing, did not totally fail 
to challenge Camblos’ representations about the in-chambers 
conversation regarding the first plea agreement.  For 
example, the following colloquy demonstrates that Judge 
Peatross did assert his recollection of that conversation: 
THE COURT:  You had brought me a plea 
agreement that dealt with the robbery and the use 
of the firearm. 
 
MR. CAMBLOS:  That’s right. 
 
THE COURT:  And there were other pending 
charges – 
 
MR. CAMBLOS:  Right. 
 
THE COURT:  – and I asked you to take those 
up – 
 
MR. CAMBLOS:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  – and you went back and did 
that? 
 
MR. CAMBLOS:  That’s correct. 
 
In addition, Judge Peatross explained at the Commission 
hearing that he did not want to engage in “a shouting match 
 
25
with [Camblos]” by challenging Camblos’ version of the in-
chambers conversation.  Indeed, the audio recording of the 
December 15, 2003 hearing reflects that Judge Peatross did 
not do so. 
Thus, we conclude that the evidence as to the in-
chambers discussion about the first plea agreement was in 
equipoise.  That conclusion means that there is not clear 
and convincing evidence to prove the charge that Judge 
Peatross knew or should have known that his representation 
that he had not participated in discussions leading to the 
second plea agreement was untrue.  We reach the same result 
as to the charge that Judge Peatross countenances a 
practice requiring all plea agreements to be approved by 
him in advance.  Our holding on these charges should not be 
viewed as approving any practice that involves a trial 
judge in the negotiations leading to a plea agreement or 
that requires parties to submit a plea agreement to a judge 
for approval before tendering the agreement in open court.  
See Rules 3A:8(c)(1)(C) and (c)(2).  Instead, our holding 
simply reflects the lack of clear and convincing evidence 
in this case. 
We further find Judge Peatross was not without 
justification in being frustrated and perplexed about the 
inconsistency between the terms of the Jacques second plea 
 
26
agreement stating that the felony failure to appear charge 
would be tried by a jury and the subsequent order, signed 
by both counsel, which nolle prosequied the charge.  
Camblos presented that order to Judge Peatross, along with 
the letter stating that Camblos had agreed to that 
disposition when the parties entered into “the plea 
agreement,” one day after Jacques had entered guilty pleas 
to the other charges.  All this was preceded by the initial 
plea agreement that did not address all the charges pending 
against Jacques.  Thus, we conclude that there is not clear 
and convincing evidence that Judge Peatross retaliated for 
the motion to nolle prosequi the felony failure to appear 
charge by removing Camblos and Dugger from the case and 
finding that they had engaged in misconduct.  It may be 
that Judge Peatross did not have sufficient grounds to 
warrant his finding, especially as to Dugger.  But, we 
decide only whether his conduct violated the Canons, and it 
did not. 
We do recognize that Judge Peatross, as he admitted, 
removed Camblos and Dugger from the Jacques case without 
any notice to them that he was considering such action.  We 
also find that he failed to provide them with notice that 
he was contemplating a finding of misconduct and that he 
did not take any steps to inform either attorney that the 
 
27
January 6, 2004 and January 7, 2004 orders had been 
entered.  These omissions were, however, errors of law, not 
violations of the Canons.  See Oberholzer v. Comm’n on 
Judicial Performance, 975 P.2d 663, 680 (Cal. 1999) 
(finding that “[m]ere legal error, without more, . . . is 
insufficient to support a finding that a judge has violated 
the Code of Judicial Ethics”); see also Harrod v. Illinois 
Courts Comm’n, 372 N.E.2d 53, 65 (Ill. 1977) (“to maintain 
an independent judiciary mere errors of law . . . should 
not be the subject of discipline”). 
We also note that both attorneys had the opportunity 
to explain their positions and answer Judge Peatross’ 
questions at the December 15, 2003 hearing.  They also both 
filed motions to reconsider before Judge Peatross actually 
entered the January 6, 2004 and January 7, 2004 orders, and 
Hingeley filed another motion to reconsider after entry of 
the January 7, 2004 order.  Moreover, Judge Peatross, like 
any judge in Virginia, has the inherent right to supervise 
the conduct of attorneys practicing before him and to 
discipline an attorney who engages in misconduct, which 
includes the right to remove an attorney of record in a 
case.  Richmond Ass’n of Credit Men, Inc. v. The Bar Ass’n 
of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 335, 189 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1937); 
Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass’n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 836, 
 
28
172 S.E. 282, 283 (1934); Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 
137 Va. 249, 250, 119 S.E.2d 55, 55 (1923). 
Judge Peatross also made errors of law in certain 
other respects.  In Jacques, he should not have dismissed 
the felony failure to appear charge and responded to the 
defendant’s ex parte letter at a time when neither the 
defendant nor the Commonwealth had an attorney of record in 
the case.  He should have rectified that situation and 
provided proper notice before dismissing the case and 
answering the defendant’s letter.  He did, however, have 
both of Jacques’ unsolicited letters placed in the 
defendant’s court file, which was available to the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney and the defendant’s attorney.  In 
Mills, Judge Peatross erred when he, sua sponte, entered a 
nolle prosequi of the felony charge.  We do not condone any 
of those actions; they reflect legal errors by Judge 
Peatross.  But, we cannot say that they rise to the level 
of clear and convincing evidence of a violation of the 
Canons that would warrant censure or removal from office.  
See In re: Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 207 Elton G. 
Tucker, 501 S.E.2d 67, 71 (N.C. 1998) (“judges may not be 
disciplined for errors of judgment or errors of law”). 
Continuing, we cannot find clear and convincing 
evidence that Judge Peatross acted vindictively in 
 
29
sentencing Jacques on the misdemeanor failure to appear 
convictions.  The second plea agreement clearly stated that 
the sentences to be imposed for those convictions were left 
to the sole discretion of Judge Peatross.  The sentence on 
each conviction did not exceed the statutory maximum 
sentence allowed for that offense.  See Code §§ 18.2-456 
and 18.2-457; see also Yoder v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 823, 
832-33, 57 S.E. 581, 584 (1907) (finding a sentence of 15 
days not in excess of the statute because “the limitation 
of [Code § 18.2-457] does not apply to the second, third, 
fourth and fifth classes into which [Code § 18.2-456] is 
divided”). 
The same is true with regard to the charge that Judge 
Peatross had a policy that he would not try misdemeanor 
charges unless they were companion cases to a felony charge 
against the same defendant.  It is true that Judge Peatross 
believed that the general district court should not be 
circumvented with regard to the trial of misdemeanor 
charges and that to do so would not be an effective use of 
judicial resources.  But, the evidence simply fails to show 
that he had established “a policy” against trying 
misdemeanor charges in the circuit court. 
B. July Charges 
 
30
Like many of the underlying facts forming the basis of 
the April charges, Judge Peatross did not dispute the 
factual allegations in the July notice.  Judge Peatross 
admitted that he had a meeting with the Chief Justice in 
order to submit his resignation from the Judicial Council.  
During that meeting, he assured the Chief Justice that the 
matter pending before the Commission would not be coming 
before this Court and proceeded to discuss some of the 
facts surrounding the charges and one of the terms of the 
proposed agreement disposing of the April charges.  The 
Commission, however, again chose to discredit Judge 
Peatross’ testimony that, when he spoke with the Chief 
Justice, he fully intended to accept the Commission’s 
proposed disposition of the April charges.  The Commission 
thus found that Judge Peatross had “misrepresented to the 
Chief Justice that the matter before the Commission had 
been concluded in a manner so that it would not be coming 
before [this Court].” 
Yet again, the record does not contain clear and 
convincing evidence to prove this charge.  It is undisputed 
that Judge Peatross did not see the written agreement 
disposing of the April charges until after his meeting with 
the Chief Justice.  It is also undisputed that the written 
version of the agreement contained conditions that were not 
 
31
announced orally at the conclusion of the formal hearing on 
the April charges.  It was only after Judge Peatross saw 
the written agreement that he decided not to accept its 
terms.  We therefore conclude that Judge Peatross spoke 
truthfully when he told the Chief Justice that he had no 
expectation or intention that the matter would come before 
this Court.  Although Judge Peatross did discuss certain 
facts and details with the Chief Justice, that 
conversation, at the time it occurred, was not about an 
impending case.  Thus, Judge Peatross did not violate 
Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(7). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that there is not clear and 
convincing evidence showing that Judge Peatross violated 
the specified Canons as charged.  We reiterate that some of 
Judge Peatross’ actions in the various matters were the 
result of mistaken interpretations of the law and his 
authority thereunder, and some of his conduct did not 
exemplify the level of professionalism that judges in this 
Commonwealth should exhibit.  His actions and conduct were 
not, however, so egregious as to amount to judicial 
misconduct or conduct that was prejudicial to the proper 
 
32
administration of justice warranting censure or removal 
from office.  Therefore, we will dismiss the complaint.9
Dismissed. 
                                                 
9 To the extent that we have not separately addressed 
each charge, each item of evidence, or each finding of the 
Commission, we have nevertheless considered all of the 
record in concluding that the Commission failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that Judge Peatross violated 
the Canons as charged.  Our review included the testimony 
and letters in support of and in opposition to Judge 
Peatross. 
In light of our disposition, it is not necessary to 
rule on Judge Peatross’ motion to dismiss. 
 
33