Title: Gregory v. Board of Supervisors
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 981184
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 1999

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES E. GREGORY, SR., ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 981184   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
April 16, 1999 
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
William R. Shelton, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in upholding a decision by the Board of Supervisors of 
Chesterfield County (the Board) denying an application for 
rezoning that included proffers of monetary conditions 
substantially lower in amount than those recommended by the 
County. 
 
James E. Gregory, Sr., and Mary C. Gregory own a 30-acre 
parcel of land with frontage on Newbys Bridge Road in 
Chesterfield County (the property).  The Gregorys have lived on 
the property since purchasing it in 1955.  In March 1994, the 
Gregorys entered into a contract to sell the property to Oscar 
H. Harriss. 
Harriss filed an application with Chesterfield County (the 
County) in March 1994, requesting that the zoning classification 
of the property be changed from "Agricultural A" to "Single-
Family Residential R-9."  Harriss later amended the application 
to request that the property be rezoned to "Single-Family 
Residential R-12" (the final application).  In the final 
application, Harriss proposed a residential subdivision of 81 
lots, with a density of about 2.7 dwelling units per acre. 
In his original application to rezone the property to an R-
9 designation, which would have permitted a maximum of 95 lots, 
Harriss proffered cash payments to the County in the amount of 
$5,043 per lot for "infrastructure improvements."  In the final 
application, Harriss proffered cash payments of $1,500 per lot.  
In both applications, Harriss made additional proffers, which 
included the dedication of an easement to permit the widening of 
Newbys Bridge Road and the construction of off-site improvements 
designed to minimize the development’s impact on the surrounding 
area. 
While Harriss' applications were pending, the County had in 
effect a written policy concerning cash proffers.  The policy set 
out a methodology for calculating the cost to the County of 
providing public facilities for each new residence in a proposed 
subdivision, including schools, roads, parks, libraries, and fire 
stations.  In 1995, based on calculations made using this 
methodology, the policy provided that "residential rezoning 
applicants are being asked to proffer $5,083 per lot." 
After reviewing Harriss’ final application, the County's 
planning staff (the staff) recommended approval of the 
application "subject to the applicant addressing the impact on 
 
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capital facilities and the transportation network, consistent 
with the Board's policy."  The staff noted that the proposed 
rezoning and land use conformed to the County's comprehensive 
plan, which designated the property for residential use with a 
density of 1.51 to 4.0 units per acre.  However, the staff 
concluded that the proposal "fail[ed] to adequately address 
concerns relative to impacts on the transportation network and 
capital facilities." 
In its report, the staff estimated that the proposed 81-lot 
development would result in the addition of about 227 new 
residents, including an estimated 47 school-age children.  The 
staff also estimated that the new residences would generate 
about 850 additional daily vehicle trips, primarily along Newbys 
Bridge Road.  The staff concluded that traffic generated from 
the proposed development, along with other traffic using the new 
subdivision roads as "cut through" routes, would "increase 
traffic volumes on the adjacent subdivision streets beyond the 
acceptable level."  The staff estimated that the "fiscal impact" 
on the County's capital facilities resulting from Harriss' 
proposed subdivision of 81 dwelling units would be $5,156 per 
unit. 
The Chesterfield County Planning Commission (the 
Commission) considered Harriss' applications to rezone the 
property at meetings held in June and November 1994.  The 
 
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Commission recommended denial of the final application, citing 
concerns regarding the impact that the rezoning would have on 
traffic, drainage, schools, and fire and rescue service. 
The Board considered Harriss' final application at a public 
hearing in January 1995.  During the hearing, 16 citizens spoke 
in opposition to the application, while one citizen spoke in 
favor of it.  Many of these area residents cited the inability 
of Newbys Bridge Road to accommodate additional traffic.  They 
emphasized that the road had dangerous curves, flooding 
problems, narrow sections preventing school buses from passing 
each other in opposite directions, a lack of shoulders, drainage 
ditches located close to the edge of the pavement, and a very 
high volume of traffic using the road.  Several of these 
citizens also expressed concern regarding the impact that the 
proposed development would have on area schools, particularly on 
the elementary school that would serve children in the proposed 
subdivision.  The principal of that elementary school stated 
that the school's enrollment already exceeded planned capacity 
by 121 students. 
William Poole, Assistant Director of Planning for the 
County, stated at the hearing that the proposed rezoning of the 
property to R-12 was "consistent with the County's adopted Land 
Use Plan."  Poole noted that the predominant zoning 
classification in the general area of the property was single-
 
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family residential, but that most of the land immediately 
adjacent to the subject property was zoned for agricultural use.  
Poole recommended that the application be approved only if the 
Board was satisfied that the application adequately addressed 
the fiscal impact of the proposed development on transportation, 
schools, drainage, and other residential development in the 
area.  The Board voted to deny the application. 
The Gregorys and Harriss (collectively, Harriss) filed a 
motion for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of 
Chesterfield County, seeking a declaration that the Board's 
denial of the rezoning application was, among other things, 
unlawful, arbitrary, and unreasonable.  At a bench trial, Thomas 
E. Jacobson, the County's Director of Planning, testified that 
the County's planning staff had reviewed the initial versions of 
Harriss' application and had recommended approval of them.  
However, after reviewing the final application, the staff 
recommended approval only if the Board determined that the 
County's "capital needs" would be met.  Jacobson acknowledged 
that the only significant difference between the final 
application and the previous versions, other than reducing the 
maximum number of lots from the original proposal of 95 to 81, 
was the decrease in the amount of the cash proffers. 
Jacobson explained that under the County's policy, a 
rezoning applicant can proffer, in lieu of cash, the 
 
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construction of road or sidewalk improvements, or "a myriad of 
[other] ways" of addressing the impact of the proposed 
development on public facilities and infrastructure.  He 
testified that since the County adopted its voluntary proffer 
policy, about 5,500 new lots have been created through rezoning 
approvals, and that about 51% of those lots were either approved 
with no cash proffer or cash proffers of less than the 
recommended amount. 
Donald J. Balzer, who qualified as an expert in land use 
issues, testified that "the most appropriate and reasonable use" 
of the property was an R-9 classification, which allowed an even 
greater density than the R-12 classification Harriss sought.  
However, he also acknowledged that a reasonable use of the 
property under its present agricultural classification would be 
to "leave it as it is" or to subdivide it into two or three lots 
for single family residences. 
The trial court noted that "[p]ersuasive evidence exists 
that full cash proffers or lack thereof played a key factor in 
the Board['s] determination."  The court found that there was 
evidence from which to conclude that the County "expected" cash 
proffers, but that "the evidence is not as definitive" as the 
evidence presented in Board of Supervisors v. Reed's Landing 
Corp., 250 Va. 397, 463 S.E.2d 668 (1995).  The court then 
concluded that the evidence of the proposed development's impact 
 
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on health, safety, and welfare made the reasonableness of the 
Board's decision "fairly debatable." 
The trial court further ruled that the Board's decision was 
not arbitrary or capricious because there was evidence that two 
zoning classifications were reasonable for the property, the 
existing "Agricultural A" classification and the proposed R-12 
classification.  The court entered judgment affirming the 
Board's decision and dismissing the motion for declaratory 
judgment. 
On appeal, Harriss first argues that the evidence showed 
that the Board effectively imposed a proffer requirement, 
contrary to Code § 15.2-2298* and this Court's decision in Reed's 
Landing.  In response, the Board argues that the trial court did 
not err in concluding that the Board based its decision on 
legitimate and mandatory considerations of public health, 
safety, and welfare.  The Board contends that, based on the 
record in this case, its denial of the final application did not 
violate Code § 15.2-2298 or this Court's holding in Reed's 
Landing.  We agree with the Board. 
Initially, we note that, at all times relevant to this 
appeal, Chesterfield County had in effect a conditional zoning 
                     
 
*Effective December 1, 1997, Title 15.1 was re-codified as 
Title 15.2 and Code § 15.1-491.2:1 became Code § 15.2-2298.  
1997 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 587.  Since there were no 
 
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ordinance authorized by Code § 15.2-2298.  This statute permits 
localities that have experienced specified population growth to 
implement conditional zoning in which a landowner is permitted, 
prior to a hearing before a governing body, to submit voluntary 
written proffers of “reasonable conditions” as part of the 
landowner’s proposed amendment to the zoning ordinance.  Code 
§ 15.1-2298(A).  Those conditions may be made part of a rezoning 
if the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the 
conditions, and if the conditions have a reasonable relation to 
the rezoning and are in conformity with the comprehensive plan.  
Id.
The declared purpose of the statutes permitting conditional 
zoning is to "provide for the orderly development of land" when 
"competing and incompatible uses conflict."  Proffers submitted 
by a zoning applicant are permitted “for the protection of the 
community” in which the property subject to the proposed 
rezoning is located.  Code § 15.2-2296. 
These statutory provisions allow a local governing body to 
consider voluntarily proffered conditions as one factor in 
deciding whether to grant a proposed rezoning.  Although a 
governing body may exercise its discretion to grant or deny a 
rezoning request that contains such proffered conditions, the 
                                                                  
substantive changes in the sections at issue, we will refer to 
the current code sections in this decision. 
 
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governing body must make its decision based on the merits of the 
entire application and may not require that any proffered 
conditions be included in the rezoning application. 
In Reed's Landing, we held that under former Code § 15.1-
491.2:1, the predecessor statute to Code § 15.2-2298, a local 
governing body is "not empowered to require a specific proffer 
as a condition precedent to a rezoning."  250 Va. at 400, 463 
S.E.2d at 670.  The evidence in that case showed that there was 
no public opposition to the proposed rezoning, that the Powhatan 
County Planning Commission unanimously recommended that the 
rezoning be approved, and that, since the adoption of "proffer 
guidelines," no R-1 rezonings had been approved without the 
recommended cash proffer.  Id. at 399, 463 S.E.2d at 669.  Thus, 
the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the sole 
reason the Powhatan County Board of Supervisors denied the 
developer's rezoning request was the developer's refusal to make 
a cash proffer of a fixed amount.  Id. at 400, 463 S.E.2d at 
670.  Under those facts, we held that the trial court correctly 
ruled that the proffer was not voluntary within the meaning of 
the statute, and that the Board imposed an unlawful condition 
precedent on the developer.  Id.
In contrast to the record in Reed's Landing, the trial 
court in the present case did not find that the rezoning request 
was denied solely due to the absence of cash proffers in a 
 
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particular amount.  Although the court found "persuasive 
evidence" that the absence of maximum cash proffers "played a 
key factor" in the Board's decision, and that cash proffers were 
"expected," the court also found ample evidence supporting the 
Board’s denial of the application based on health, safety, and 
welfare concerns. 
The decision of a board of supervisors denying an 
application for rezoning is a legislative act that is presumed 
to be reasonable.  City Council v. Wendy's of Western Va., Inc., 
252 Va. 12, 14, 471 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1996); County Bd. v. 
Bratic, 237 Va. 221, 227, 377 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1989); Board of 
Supervisors v. Jackson, 221 Va. 328, 333, 269 S.E.2d 381, 384 
(1980).  This presumption will stand until the applicant 
presents probative evidence that the legislative act was 
unreasonable.  Id.  If the applicant's challenge is met by the 
board with evidence of reasonableness sufficient to render the 
issue fairly debatable, then the legislative action must be 
sustained.  Wendy's of Western Va., 252 Va. at 15, 471 S.E.2d at 
471; Bratic, 237 Va. at 227, 377 S.E.2d at 371; Jackson, 221 Va. 
at 333, 269 S.E.2d at 385.  A matter is fairly debatable if, 
when evaluated by quantitative and qualitative measures, the 
evidence in support of the opposing views could lead objective 
and reasonable persons to reach different conclusions.  Wendy’s 
of Western Va., 252 Va. at 15, 471 S.E.2d at 470-71; Board of 
 
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Supervisors v. Pyles, 224 Va. 629, 638, 300 S.E.2d 79, 84 
(1983). 
Harriss challenged the presumption of reasonableness in 
this case with probative evidence suggesting that the Board 
based its decision on an impermissible proffer requirement.  The 
Board responded to this evidence of unreasonableness with 
evidence that cash proffers were not required as a condition 
precedent to a rezoning, and that the rezoning requested by 
Harriss would adversely impact public health, safety, and 
welfare in the area of the proposed development.  This evidence 
of reasonableness presented by the Board was sufficient to rebut 
Harriss' contention that the Board effectively imposed a proffer 
requirement on his rezoning application. 
Harriss argues, nevertheless, that the Board's decision was 
unreasonable because the only practical, beneficial use of the 
property was to develop it as a residential subdivision.  The 
Board contends in response that the evidence supports the trial 
court’s conclusion that there were two reasonable zoning 
classifications for the property, the existing agricultural 
designation and the proposed R-12 designation.  The Board 
asserts that, therefore, the trial court properly concluded that 
the Board was free to choose between these classifications.  We 
agree with the Board. 
 
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A property owner seeking rezoning bears the burden of 
clearly demonstrating that the existing zoning classification is 
no longer reasonable.  See Jackson, 221 Va. 334, 269 S.E.2d at 
385.  When an existing zoning classification and a proposed 
zoning classification are both reasonable, a legislative body, 
rather than a property owner or a court, has the prerogative to 
choose between those classifications.  Wendy's of Western Va., 
252 Va. at 18, 471 S.E.2d at 473; Board of Supervisors v. Miller 
& Smith, Inc., 242 Va. 382, 384, 410 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1991); 
Jackson, 221 Va. at 335, 269 S.E.2d at 386. 
As stated above, there was evidence that an R-12 zoning 
classification would permit a reasonable use of the property, 
since such a classification would conform to the County's 
comprehensive plan and would be consistent with other existing 
and anticipated residential developments in the area.  However, 
the evidence also established that the property was 
predominantly abutted by parcels zoned for agricultural use, and 
that existing agricultural uses were present throughout the 
surrounding general area.  In addition, there was evidence that 
a reasonable use of the property under its present agricultural 
zoning would be to subdivide it into two or three lots. 
Based on this record, we conclude that Harriss failed to 
meet his evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the present 
zoning classification of the property was unreasonable, and that 
 
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the merits of his rezoning application were fairly debatable.  
Under these circumstances, the trial court was not at liberty to 
substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body.  See 
County of Lancaster v. Cowardin, 239 Va. 522, 525, 391 S.E.2d 
267, 269 (1990); City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land 
Investment Ass'n No. 1, 239 Va. 412, 415, 389 S.E.2d 312, 314 
(1990).  Thus, the trial court properly upheld the Board’s 
legislative determination. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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