Title: State v. Glenn H. Hale
Citation: 2005 WI 7
Docket Number: 2003AP000417-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2005

2005 WI 7 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0417-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Glenn H. Hale,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 238 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 171, 672 N.W.2d 130 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 25, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 21, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS and PROSSER, J.J., join concurrence. 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join concurrence. 
BUTLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Steven D. Phillips, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on he brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 7 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0417-CR  
(L.C. No. 
02 CF 000010) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Glenn H. Hale,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 25, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Glenn Hale, 
seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming his 
convictions, 
which 
included 
two 
counts 
of 
first-degree 
intentional homicide, party to a crime.1  Hale asserts that he is 
entitled to a new trial because the circuit court improperly 
allowed into evidence the former testimony of an unavailable 
witness. 
                                                 
1 State v. Hale, 2003 WI App 238, 268 Wis. 2d 171, 672 
N.W.2d 130 (affirming a decision of the circuit court for 
Kenosha County, David M. Bastianelli, Judge). 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
2 
 
 
¶2 
We agree with Hale that the testimony in question 
should not have been admitted in this case.  Such evidence 
violated Hale's right to confrontation, as he did not have a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  However, we 
also conclude that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained 
and was therefore harmless.  Accordingly, albeit with different 
rationale, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶3 
On December 8, 2001, two men forced their way into a 
Kenosha apartment and robbed its three occupants of drugs and 
money.  One of the robbers was masked and armed with a revolver, 
which he used to fatally shoot two of the victims, Darrel Stone 
and Joshua Kressel. 
¶4 
Two days later, the police received an anonymous tip 
that Robert Jones and his brother-in-law, Glenn Hale, had 
committed the offenses.  The police arrested Jones on December 
12, 2001, and Hale in the early morning of December 14, 2001.  
Jones was tried and convicted in May 2002, while Hale was tried 
separately two months later. 
¶5 
At Hale's jury trial, Mark Bernhardt, the surviving 
victim, described the crimes in detail.  He testified that he, 
Stone, and Kressel were watching television when he heard a car 
pull into the adjacent driveway.  About two minutes later, a 
male identifying himself as "Vinnie" knocked on the door.  Not 
knowing anyone by that name, the victims did not initially open 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
3 
 
the door.  When the knocking persisted, however, Stone answered 
it, and Bernhardt heard what sounded like a gunshot. 
¶6 
Bernhardt testified that two men then entered the 
apartment.  He identified the first man to come in as Jones.  
The other man stood in the doorway dressed completely in black, 
wearing a ski mask, hooded sweater, and gloves.  Bernhardt 
indicated that the masked man was short and wielded a worn-
looking revolver. 
¶7 
According 
to 
Bernhardt, 
Jones 
did 
the 
talking, 
demanding drugs and money from the victims.  When Bernhardt did 
not respond quickly enough, Jones picked him up by his hair.  
Bernhardt gave his money to Jones and got on the floor with his 
back to Jones.  Bernhardt then heard two more gunshots.  Looking 
over his shoulder, he witnessed the men exit the apartment and 
saw Kressel injured and bleeding. 
¶8 
Bernhardt fled to the bathroom and called 911 on his 
cell phone.  He heard a car leaving, looked out the window, and 
saw what he believed to be the profile of a 1989 Chevy Beretta 
pulling out of the driveway.  Bernhardt testified that as the 
son of a mechanic he had been around cars all of his life.  He 
explained that when viewed from the side, a 1989 Chevy Beretta 
looks very similar to a 1989 Chevy Corsica.   
¶9 
The principal question at Hale's trial was whether 
Hale was the masked gunman who participated in the crimes with 
Jones.  Because Bernhardt could not identify the masked gunman, 
the State presented a circumstantial case.  The admission of 
former testimony is the sole evidentiary issue in this case.  To 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
4 
 
place the testimony in its proper context, it is necessary 
initially to review the evidence the State introduced at trial. 
A. The Case Against Glenn Hale 
¶10 Jones, Hale, Tammy Jones (Hale's sister and Jones's 
wife) and Joy Baker (Hale's girlfriend) shared an apartment in 
Kenosha.  Baker testified that Hale and Jones were together at 
the apartment until 5:00 p.m. on December 8, 2001, approximately 
30 minutes before the double homicide.  She said the two men 
left the apartment separately and were headed to the residence 
of Hale's grandfather, Milton Johnson, Sr.   
¶11 Vera Blalock, who lived with Hale's grandfather, 
confirmed the men's arrival.  She testified that Hale and Jones 
met at the residence, talked privately in the bathroom, and then 
left 
together. 
 
According 
to 
Blalock, 
Hale 
returned 
approximately 15 minutes later.  He was wearing a black coat 
with a hood. 
¶12 Kim Kelly, a friend and visitor to the Jones/Hale 
apartment, testified that when Jones returned to his apartment 
later that evening, he was visibly upset.  According to Kelly, 
Hale did not return to the apartment until 7:00 p.m., at which 
time he and Jones talked in another room.  Kelly described their 
conversation as "not friendly" and "shady." 
¶13 A police detective testified that he test drove and 
timed the three most likely routes that Hale and Jones might 
have used on the night of the murders.  The round-trip travel 
time between the Jones/Hale apartment and the murder scene was 
between 10 and 12 minutes.  The residences of both Hale's 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
5 
 
grandfather and Hale's mother were along at least one of these 
routes. 
¶14 A few days before the murders, LaQwandris Johnson, who 
knew both Hale and Jones, went to the victims' apartment to 
purchase marijuana.  Jones accompanied him but remained in the 
car during the drug transaction.  After the purchase, Johnson 
gave some marijuana to Jones, who asked whether the dealer (one 
of the eventual victims) was "all right," and whether he was a 
"tough guy." 
¶15 Johnson's girlfriend, the tipster who had alerted the 
police to Jones's and Hale's possible involvement, told them 
that a car generally matching the description of the car given 
by the victim, Bernhardt, had been "very active in the 
neighborhood" prior to the murders but not afterwards.  The 
police confirmed that a black 1989 Chevy Corsica, which looks 
like a 1989 Chevy Beretta in profile, was parked at the 
residence of Hale's mother two days after the double homicide 
and had been available for Hale's use. 
¶16 After arresting Jones, the police attempted to locate 
Hale.  Since December 10, 2001, two days after the murders, Hale 
had been living in a hotel with his girlfriend, Baker.  Knowing 
that Baker worked at a bar, the police placed it under 
surveillance.  In the early morning hours of December 14, 2001, 
they saw Baker leave the bar and get into a rental car driven by 
Hale.  The car, which was equipped with an activated police 
scanner, sped away when the police attempted to initiate a stop. 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
6 
 
¶17 Hale led 12 to 14 marked units in a high-speed chase 
from Kenosha to Milwaukee, with speeds in excess of 100 miles 
per hour.  Baker testified that during the chase, Hale asked her 
to remove the holstered revolver that was strapped across his 
shoulder and to throw it out the window.  She instead put the 
gun and some ammunition underneath the seat.  Hale also told 
Baker that it "would be probably his last time seeing [her]" and 
"to write him in jail." 
¶18 Ultimately, Hale slowed the car down to about five 
miles per hour, at which point he jumped from the driver's seat 
and took off running through the neighboring residential area.  
The officers pursued Hale on foot, eventually apprehending him 
at gunpoint.2   
¶19 Hale was wearing dark-colored pants when he was 
arrested.  A black, hooded coat was found in the rear of the 
rental car.  After Hale was taken to jail, the police found a 
pair of black knit gloves concealed under the seat bench of the 
squad car where Hale had been sitting. 
¶20  After his arrest, the police briefly interviewed Hale 
about the double homicide.  He denied committing the murders, 
stating that he had been at his grandfather's residence.  At 
some point thereafter, Hale tapped on the door of his holding 
cell to make a bathroom request and, with eyes tearing up, told 
                                                 
2 The defense advances that Hale may have had reason to flee 
because it could be inferred that he was aware of the existence 
of a probation hold for him relating to another matter. 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
7 
 
a detective, "man, if I did it, I just don't remember."  Hale 
repeated this statement to another detective. 
¶21 Baker testified that a few days before the murders, 
she was with Hale when he purchased a black ski mask.  A day or 
two after he was arrested, Hale called and told her that he had 
hidden the ski mask under the "plastic bottom" of her duffel bag 
and instructed her to "get rid" of it.  Baker said she cut up 
the ski mask and gave it to her friend, Kelly, who was in the 
room when Hale called.  Kelly, in turn, stated that she burned 
the mask pieces and flushed them down a toilet. 
¶22 James Toy, who was confined in the same cellblock as 
Hale, testified that Hale confessed to committing the double 
homicide.  According to Detective Strash, when he and another 
detective interviewed Toy in the spring of 2002, Toy repeated 
details of the murders that had neither appeared in the media 
nor been suggested to him by the detectives.3  Toy explained that 
he came forward because a younger brother of his had been 
murdered. 
¶23 Arguably the most critical evidence produced by the 
State was the fully loaded, single-action .44 magnum revolver 
found in the rental car Hale had been driving.  The officer who 
searched the car discovered it beneath a shirt on the floor, 
                                                 
3 
For 
example, 
Toy 
had 
knowledge 
that 
one 
of 
the 
perpetrators identified himself as "Vinnie" at the victims' 
apartment.  Furthermore, Toy indicated that Jones entered the 
room before the masked gunman.    
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
8 
 
under the driver's seat.  The parties stipulated that this gun 
fired the shots that killed Stone and Kressel. 
¶24 Baker testified that Hale obtained a gun and holster 
from David Sullivan, a life-long friend of Hale's, about one 
week before the murders and kept the gun on his person "a lot."  
She stated that the murder weapon "looked like" the gun Hale had 
obtained from Sullivan.  It was the subsequent admission of 
Sullivan's former testimony that is the sole evidentiary issue 
in this case. 
B. David Sullivan's Former Testimony 
¶25 Sullivan testified at Jones's trial, which was tried 
two months prior to Hale's scheduled trial.  On direct 
examination, he said he had known Hale "for a long time," 
indicating 
that 
they 
have 
been 
friends 
since 
childhood.  
Sullivan testified that the gun shown to him at Jones's trial 
"look[ed] like" the gun he provided to Hale at Hale's request.  
Although he did not know for sure, he "guess[ed]" that he had 
given the gun to Hale at the Jones/Hale residence "about six 
months ago," which would have been November 2001, before the 
double homicide of December 8, 2001. 
 
¶26 On 
cross-examination, 
Sullivan 
acknowledged 
that 
shortly before the start of the trial, he had written a letter 
to the prosecutor and the judge, asserting that he was "afraid 
to take the stand" and had suffered from "some kind of altered 
mental state" that deprived him of the ability to "distinguish 
between the truth and [falsity] of what [he had] written in 
[his] previous statements."  Sullivan also testified that he 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
9 
 
told authorities that he was "sure" he had given the gun to Hale 
and not to Jones. 
¶27 Finally, on redirect examination, Sullivan conceded 
that his "mental state" was attributable in part to the guilt he 
felt about having given Hale the murder weapon.  The jury found 
Jones guilty of the charges. 
¶28 Subsequently, the State subpoenaed Sullivan to testify 
on its behalf at Hale's trial but was unable to locate him.  
According to the State, Sullivan's mother gave police his 
address, but Sullivan's girlfriend refused them access to the 
residence.  The court then issued a material witness warrant for 
Sullivan.  At the close of the second day of trial, the State 
reported that he was still being sought. 
¶29 Anticipating that the State may seek to use Sullivan's 
prior testimony from Jones's trial, Hale's counsel filed a 
motion to exclude such evidence.  She argued that the testimony 
did not satisfy the applicable hearsay exception because Jones's 
motive and interest in cross-examining Sullivan were not 
sufficiently similar to Hale's.  Defense counsel also asserted 
that Hale's right to confrontation was violated by the admission 
of the testimony. 
¶30 On the morning of the third day of trial, the State 
informed the court that police had searched the residence where 
Sullivan was believed to be staying but did not find him.  The 
State submitted that Sullivan's prior testimony from Jones's 
trial was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at Hale's trial 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
10 
 
because it was given under oath in a setting where Jones's 
counsel had complete ability to conduct cross-examination.   
¶31 The circuit court allowed the State to introduce 
Sullivan's prior testimony from Jones's trial.  It determined 
that the evidence fit the "former testimony" hearsay exception 
of Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1) (2001-02) because Jones's interest in 
cross-examining Sullivan was "similar" to Hale's and Sullivan 
was unavailable.4  The court also concluded that Sullivan's prior 
testimony would not violate Hale's confrontation right because 
the exception was firmly rooted. 
 
¶32 Sullivan's prior testimony from Jones's trial was then 
read to the jury, identified for jurors as "testimony at a prior 
proceeding." 
 
The 
prosecutor 
and 
Hale's 
counsel 
read, 
respectively, the direct and cross-examination questions of 
Sullivan, while a police detective read Sullivan's answers to 
the questions. 
                                                 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(1) provides: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) FORMER TESTIMONY.  Testimony given as a witness at 
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, 
or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the 
course of another proceeding, at the instance of or 
against a party with an opportunity to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross-, or redirect examination, 
with motive and interest similar to those of the party 
against whom now offered. 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
11 
 
¶33 The jury found Hale guilty of six crimes, including 
two counts of first-degree intentional homicide, party to a 
crime.  After his conviction, Hale appealed the circuit court's 
admission of Sullivan's testimony.   
¶34 On appeal, Hale maintained that Sullivan's prior 
testimony did not satisfy the "former testimony" exception of 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045 because Jones did not have "motive and 
interest 
similar 
to" 
Hale 
in 
his 
cross-examination.  
Alternatively, Hale argued that admission of Sullivan's prior 
testimony violated his right to confrontation because the 
"former testimony" exception, as applied to Sullivan's prior 
testimony, was not firmly rooted and lacked "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness." 
¶35 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court 
decision.  It determined that Sullivan's prior testimony 
satisfied the "former testimony" hearsay exception because Jones 
had a motive and interest similar to Hale "to discredit any link 
between Hale and the murder weapon."  State v. Hale, 2003 WI App 
238, ¶17, 268 Wis. 2d 171, 672 N.W.2d 130. 
¶36 With respect to Hale's right to confrontation, the 
court of appeals expressed doubt that the "former testimony" 
exception was firmly rooted as applied to the facts of the case.  
Id., ¶¶25-30.  However, the court noted that it was bound by its 
prior decision in State v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, ¶20, 257 Wis. 
2d 177, 650 N.W.2d 913, which concluded, without explanation, 
that the former testimony hearsay exception was firmly rooted. 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
12 
 
¶37 In addition, the court of appeals observed that 
Sullivan's testimony would still be admissible even if the 
"former testimony" exception were not firmly rooted.  Id., ¶31.  
It 
did 
so 
because 
the 
prior 
testimony 
at 
issue 
bore 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."  Id., ¶¶31-32. 
¶38 Finally, the court of appeals offered two alternative 
bases for its holding.  First, it observed that Sullivan's 
testimony was also admissible under the "residual hearsay 
exception" of Wis. Stat. § 908.045(6).5  Id., ¶32, n. 5.  Second, 
even if the circuit court had erred in admitting the evidence, 
the error was harmless.  Id. 
¶39 This court granted Hale's petition for review.  Less 
than two weeks later, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Crawford 
v. 
Washington, 
124 
S. Ct. 
1354 
(2004), 
which 
dramatically altered the legal landscape of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.   
II 
¶40 The initial issue in this case is an evidentiary one.  
It asks whether Hale is entitled to a new trial on the ground 
that the circuit court improperly allowed into evidence former 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(6) provides: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(6) OTHER EXCEPTIONS.  A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
comparable 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness. 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
13 
 
testimony that an unavailable witness had given at a separate 
trial of Hale's codefendant.   
¶41 While a circuit court's decision to admit evidence is 
ordinarily a matter for the court's discretion, whether the 
admission of such evidence violates a defendant's right to 
confrontation is a question of law subject to independent 
appellate review.  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶7, 253 Wis. 
2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919 (citing State v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 
504, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
III 
 
¶42 We begin our discussion by examining whether Hale's 
right to confrontation was violated by the circuit court's 
admission of Sullivan's testimony.  Normally this court will not 
address a constitutional issue if the case can be disposed of on 
other grounds.  Labor and Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 
Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984) (citing Kollasch v. 
Adamany, 
104 
Wis. 
2d 552, 
561, 
313 
N.W.2d 
47 (1981)).  
Nevertheless, we deviate from this general rule here in light of 
the recent Crawford decision and its import on Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence in this state.6  Accordingly, we do not 
discuss whether the prior testimony is admissible under a 
                                                 
6 As defense counsel noted at oral argument, there is good 
reason to address the constitutional question first.  To begin, 
given the recent decision of Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 
1354 (2004), the confrontation issue is the easiest to resolve.  
Moreover, 
Crawford 
largely 
renders 
academic 
the 
hearsay 
exceptions because prior testimony may only be admitted against 
a criminal defendant when that defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
14 
 
recognized hearsay exception.  Rather, for purposes of this 
opinion, we assume the testimony at issue was properly admitted 
under a relevant hearsay exception. 
 
¶43 The Confrontation Clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right 
to confront the witnesses against them.  The Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution states, "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him."7  Similarly, Article 
I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides, "[i]n all 
criminal 
prosecutions, 
the 
accused 
shall 
enjoy 
the 
right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face." Wisconsin 
courts 
will 
generally 
apply 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
precedents when interpreting both Clauses.  See, e.g., State v. 
Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶23, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.   
  
¶44 At the time of Hale's trial and appeal, Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), provided the general framework for 
determining the admissibility of out-of-court statements under 
the Confrontation Clause.  There, the Court upheld the use at 
trial of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who the 
State was unable to locate.  Id. at 76.  Although the defendant 
was unable to confront and cross-examine the witness at trial, 
the Court found no violation of the Confrontation Clause.  Id.  
It concluded that the circumstances under which the prior 
                                                 
7 
This 
Sixth 
Amendment 
guarantee 
applies 
to 
state 
prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965).   
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
15 
 
testimony 
was 
given 
provided 
sufficient 
"indicia 
of 
its 
reliability."  Id. at 73.   
¶45 With its decision, the Roberts Court established a 
two-step approach for analyzing the admission of hearsay 
evidence under the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 66.  First, the 
witness must be "unavailable" at trial.  Id.  Second, the 
statement of the unavailable witness must bear adequate "indicia 
of reliability."  Id.  This second prong could be inferred 
without more in a case where the evidence fell within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception or upon a showing of "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness."  Id. 
¶46 The continuing vitality of the Roberts approach was 
recently called into question in Crawford v. Washington, 124 
S. Ct. at 1354.  There, the defendant had stabbed a man who 
allegedly tried to rape his wife.  Id. at 1356.  At trial, the 
wife did not testify because of the invocation of the marital 
privilege.  Id. at 1357.  The State played for the jury the 
wife's tape-recorded statement taken by the police during the 
investigation, which described the stabbing.  Id. at 1356-57.  
The question presented was whether this procedure violated the 
defendant's right to confrontation.  Id. at 1357.  The Court 
determined that it did and reversed the defendant's convictions.  
Id. at 1374.  
¶47 Writing 
for 
the 
majority, 
Justice 
Scalia 
first 
examined the historical roots of the Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
at 1359-63.  Of particular significance was the 1603 English 
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.  Id. at 1360.  Raleigh was 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
16 
 
convicted and put to death on the basis of an out-of-court 
accomplice statement obtained by the Crown.  Id.  He was never 
permitted a face-to-face confrontation of the accuser.  Id.  
Raleigh's death provoked outrage at the fundamental unfairness 
of convicting a person based on such evidence.  Id.   
¶48 The Court concluded that this and other historical 
precedent supported two inferences about the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.  First, "the principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations against the accused."  Id. at 1363.  Second, "the 
Framers 
would 
not 
have 
allowed 
admission 
of 
testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he 
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination."  Id. at 1365. 
  
¶49 After its historical analysis, the Court turned to the 
relevant case law.  It observed that "[a]lthough the results of 
our decisions have generally been faithful to the original 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of 
our rationales."  Id. at 1369.  The Court then identified the 
Roberts case as the primary source of infidelity.  Id.  One of 
Roberts' flaws was admitting statements that consist of ex parte 
testimony upon a mere finding of reliability.  Id.  Such a 
standard 
"often 
fails 
to 
protect 
against 
paradigmatic 
confrontation violations."  Id. 
¶50 Expounding on its criticism of Roberts, the Court 
noted that, "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
17 
 
not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's 
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less 
to amorphous notions of 'reliability.'"  Id. at 1370. The 
Confrontation Clause "commands, not that evidence be reliable, 
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:  by 
testing in the crucible of cross-examination."  Id.  The Roberts 
approach, by contrast, replaced this prescribed method of 
assessing reliability with a "wholly foreign one" based on 
judicial determination.  Id. 
¶51 Although the Court acknowledged that it could resolve 
the case by reweighing the "reliability factors" of Roberts, it 
declined to do so.  Id. at 1373.  Such a result "would 
perpetuate, not avoid, what the Sixth Amendment condemns."  Id.  
Consequently, the Court abrogated the Roberts approach for 
determining 
the 
admissibility 
of 
"testimonial" 
hearsay 
statements.  It held that where "testimonial" hearsay evidence 
is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law 
required:  (1) unavailability and (2) a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.  Id. at 1374.8 
                                                 
8 Additionally, the Supreme Court reasoned that, "[w]here 
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with 
the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their 
development of hearsay law –- as does Roberts, and as would an 
approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny altogether."  Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.  As 
indicated below, however, the evidence in dispute falls under 
the 
category 
of 
"testimonial" 
hearsay, 
implicating 
core 
confrontation right concerns.   
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
18 
 
¶52 With the Crawford decision, a new day has dawned for 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Hale is the beneficiary of 
this 
renaissance 
because 
he 
properly 
preserved 
the 
constitutional issue and his case is still on direct appeal.  
State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993) 
(citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).  
Accordingly, we consider the applicability of Crawford to his 
case. 
¶53 A 
threshold 
question 
for 
applying 
the 
Crawford 
framework is whether the State is proffering "testimonial" 
hearsay evidence.  Although the Court distinguished between 
testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay evidence in its opinion, 
it left "for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of 'testimonial.'"  Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.  
Despite this fact, we have little difficulty concluding that 
Sullivan's testimony from Jones's trial meets this definition.  
As the Court explained, "[w]hatever else the term covers, it 
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to 
police interrogations."  Id.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶54  Because Sullivan's hearsay evidence was "testimonial" 
in nature, we turn next to the requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause as interpreted by Crawford:  (1) unavailability of the 
declarant and (2) a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  
Id. at 1374.  In this case, the parties do not dispute the fact 
that Sullivan was unavailable.  However, they do disagree as to 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
19 
 
whether Hale was properly afforded an opportunity to cross-
examine Sullivan. 
¶55 The 
State 
maintains 
that 
the 
post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause analysis may still be satisfied under the 
facts of this case.  Specifically, it asserts that Hale had an 
opportunity to cross-examine Sullivan at codefendant Jones's 
trial through Jones's examination.  According to the State, this 
"confrontation by proxy" is sufficiently reliable to pass 
constitutional muster because Jones had the same motive and 
interest as Hale to disavow Hale's participation in the charged 
crimes. 
¶56 Although the Crawford case does not directly address 
whether "confrontation by proxy" can satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause in the context of testimonial hearsay evidence, language 
in the opinion strongly suggests that it cannot.  Throughout its 
decision, the Court repeatedly framed the requirement not simply 
in terms of the witness being cross-examined, but that "the 
defendant" have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  
Here, the defendant had no such opportunity. 
¶57 Another problem with the State's position is the 
Supreme Court's lamentation in Crawford that "[c]ourts have 
invoked Roberts to admit other sorts of plain testimonial 
statements despite the absence of any opportunity to cross-
examine."  Id. at 1372.  One of the cases cited for this 
proposition is the court of appeals' decision in State v. Bintz, 
257 Wis. 2d 177.  There, two brothers, David and Robert, were 
tried separately for first-degree murder, party to a crime.  
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
20 
 
Id., ¶5.  At David's trial, a cellmate of his recounted 
statements that David had made, incriminating both himself and 
his brother.  Id., at ¶¶3-5.  The cellmate died before Robert's 
trial, but his statements were nevertheless allowed into 
evidence under the former testimony hearsay exception.  Id., ¶5.  
¶58 We agree with Hale that the Supreme Court would not 
have considered David Bintz's opportunity for cross-examination 
to have satisfied Robert Bintz's confrontation right when it 
specifically denounced the case as an example of the abuses 
produced by the Roberts framework.  Likewise, here, we determine 
that Jones's opportunity to cross-examine Sullivan does not 
satisfy Hale's confrontation right.  We conclude that prior 
testimony may be admitted against a criminal defendant only when 
that defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness giving that testimony.  Because Hale did not have the 
prior opportunity to cross-examine Sullivan, the admission of 
Sullivan's testimony violated Hale's constitutional right to 
confrontation. 
IV 
¶59 Having determined that Hale's right to confrontation 
was violated, we consider next whether the error warrants a new 
trial.  Violation of the Confrontation Clause "does not result 
in automatic reversal, but rather is subject to harmless error 
analysis."  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶28 (quoting State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI 118, ¶2, 256 Wis. 2d 56, 652 N.W.2d 391).   
¶60 The test for this harmless error was set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
21 
 
reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967).  There, the Court explained 
that, "before a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 24.    An error is 
harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."  Id.9   
¶61 Although the Chapman standard is easy to state, it has 
not always been easy to apply.  As a result, this court has 
articulated several factors to aid in the analysis, including 
the frequency of the error, the importance of the erroneously 
admitted 
evidence, 
the 
presence 
or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
erroneously 
admitted 
evidence, whether the erroneously admitted evidence duplicates 
untainted evidence, the nature of the defense, the nature of the 
State's case, and the overall strength of the State's case.  
State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 
97; State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 329 N.W.2d 192 
(1983). 
                                                 
9 At oral argument, both the State and defendant presented 
the test for harmless error as whether the error contributed to 
the verdict obtained.  This is the test articulated in Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 
(1967).  In recent years, the United States Supreme Court and 
this court, while adhering to the Chapman test, have also 
articulated alternative wording.  See, e.g., Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1999); State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485; State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶48, n. 14, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.   
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
22 
 
 
¶62 Hale 
contends 
that 
the 
admission 
of 
Sullivan's 
testimony contributed to the verdict obtained.  He asserts that 
the key to the State's case was the .44 Magnum revolver and that 
Sullivan's testimony was necessary in determining that Hale had 
acquired the gun before the crimes were committed.  For support, 
Hale notes that the prosecution specifically referred to 
Sullivan's testimony twice during opening statements, four times 
during closing argument, and once again during rebuttal.  Under 
such circumstances, Hale argues that the jury likely viewed 
Sullivan's testimony as crucial evidence of his guilt. 
 
¶63 Admittedly, 
Sullivan's 
testimony 
was 
referenced 
several times by the prosecutor at trial.  However, we disagree 
with the characterization that his evidence was crucial.  To 
begin, the nature of the references was brief.  Moreover, 
Sullivan's testimony was not particularly important to the 
determination of Hale's guilt.  This is because Sullivan was 
equivocal on the question of when he gave the gun to Hale.  He 
stated that he was not sure and only "guess[ed]" that it was six 
months before Jones's trial in May 2002.10   
                                                 
10 During direct examination, the following exchange took 
place concerning the timing of the transaction: 
PROSECUTOR:  Okay.  And what is your best estimate 
about the month or the time period when you gave him 
the gun?  Do you know when that was? 
SULLIVAN:  I don't know, about six months ago, I 
guess. 
PROSECUTOR:  Okay.  Was it before – was it in November 
of 2001? 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
23 
 
 
¶64 In any event, the jury did not need the testimony of 
Sullivan to hear how and when Hale acquired the murder weapon.  
Baker, Hale's girlfriend, testified that Hale obtained the gun 
from Sullivan about one week before the murders and had kept it 
on his person "a lot."  She also stated that the murder weapon 
"looked like" the gun Hale had received.  In this respect, the 
untainted evidence of Baker both corroborated and duplicated 
Sullivan's testimony that Hale had obtained the gun before the 
double homicide.  The closing argument of the prosecutor 
reflects this, noting, "David Sullivan in his read testimony 
here in court confirms Joy Baker in saying he did indeed provide 
a gun which looked like this gun."  (Emphasis added). 
 
¶65 Hale's position is further undermined by the nature of 
his defense at trial.  In closing argument, Hale's counsel 
summarized Sullivan's testimony as follows:  "During David 
Sullivan's--the reading of the testimony and the statement from 
David Sullivan, what you got is that he provided Glenn a gun 
about six months before, which was before that time, which would 
have been about the end of November, beginning of December.  No 
one refuted that.  No one disputes that."  (Emphasis added).   
¶66 The reason Hale did not dispute Sullivan's testimony 
was that it was irrelevant to his overall strategy.  At trial, 
Hale invoked an alibi defense, essentially arguing that he could 
not 
have 
committed 
the 
crimes 
because 
he 
was 
at 
his 
                                                                                                                                                             
SULLIVAN:  I'm not sure. 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
24 
 
grandfather's residence.  During closing, his attorney explained 
this to the jury: 
Let's talk about our case.  We didn't have to present 
anything.  We didn't need to present anything.  We 
didn't need to.  Because when you filter though it all 
and you break it down, it's really simple.  See, Glenn 
Hale was not that masked person.  He was not there 
when the offenses were committed.  He was at Vera 
Blalock and Milton Johnson Sr.'s house.  He did own 
that gun but other folks had access to it as well.   
(Emphasis added). 
 
 
¶67 Thus, Sullivan's testimony of how and when the gun was 
acquired by Hale became unimportant in light of the strategy of 
the defense.  Hale conceded in closing argument that the gun was 
given to him prior to the murders.  Instead, his defense counsel 
argued that Hale had an alibi and that "other folks had access" 
to the gun given by Sullivan. 
 
¶68 As a result, the State needed to show much more than 
merely Hale's access to the murder weapon.  The State needed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hale was in fact the masked 
gunman.  Although the nature of its case was circumstantial, the 
evidence it produced was overwhelming. 
 
¶69 A brief review demonstrates the strength of the 
State's case against Hale.  As noted above, Bernhardt, the 
surviving victim, identified codefendant Jones as one of the 
perpetrators.  Jones was married to Hale's sister and was living 
with Hale.  On December 8, 2001, Hale and Jones were together 
one-half hour before the double homicide.  They then went to 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
25 
 
Hale's grandfather's residence where they talked privately in 
the bathroom and then left together. 
 
¶70 Hale, short in stature, was wearing a black coat with 
a hood that police later found in the car when they were led on 
a 
high-speed 
chase. 
 
Bernhardt 
testified 
that 
Jones's 
accomplice, the gunman, was short, wearing a black ski mask, 
black sweater, and black gloves, wielding a worn looking 
revolver. 
¶71 After the shooting, Bernhardt went to a bathroom 
window and saw the perpetrators leave in a car whose profile 
resembles a 1989 Chevy Berretta.  Two days later, a black 1989 
Chevy Corsica, which looks like the Berretta in profile, was 
parked at the residence of Hale's mother.  The crime scene was 
close enough to the residence of Hale's grandfather that Hale 
could have committed the crimes and returned within 15 minutes 
afterwards. 
¶72 For several days after the double homicides, Hale and 
his girlfriend Baker lived in a hotel and drove a rental car.  
When Hale picked up Baker after work on December 14, 2001, six 
days after the homicide, police tried to stop them.  Hale drove 
away and led police on a high-speed chase from Kenosha to 
Milwaukee with speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour.  In 
Milwaukee, Hale jumped from the driver's seat of the moving car 
and took off running before police caught him. 
¶73 In Hale's rental car, police found a fully loaded .44 
Magnum revolver beneath the driver's seat.  The parties 
stipulated that this was the murder weapon in the double 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
26 
 
homicide.  Also in the car were a shoulder holster for the gun, 
loose bullets, a black hooded jacket, and a police scanner. 
¶74 Baker, who was in the front passenger seat during the 
car chase, said she helped Hale unstrap the shoulder holster.  
She testified that Hale had told her to toss the gun and bullets 
out the window, but she decided to put them under the seat 
instead.  Baker said Hale got the gun from Sullivan a few days 
before the double homicide and wore it "a lot."  She also 
testified that during the chase, Hale told her that it "would be 
probably his last time seeing [her]" and "to write him in jail." 
¶75 Shortly before the double homicide, Baker said that 
Hale had purchased a black ski mask.  After his arrest, Hale 
told her that he had hidden the ski mask under the "plastic 
bottom" of her duffel bag and instructed her to "get rid" of it, 
which she and another woman ultimately did. 
¶76 After Hale was taken to jail, the police found black 
gloves stuffed behind the seat of the squad car where he had 
been sitting.  At one point after his arrest, Hale, teary eyed, 
told a detective "man if I did it, I just don't remember."  He 
then repeated that statement to another detective. 
¶77 Finally, Hale confessed the double homicide to fellow 
inmate James Toy in details that mimicked survivor Bernhardt's 
account and were not reported by the media.  Given this 
evidence, along with the abovementioned factors, we agree with 
the State that it is clear "beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
No. 
03-0417-CR   
 
27 
 
V 
 
¶78 In sum, we agree with Hale that the testimony in 
question should not have been admitted in this case.  Such 
evidence violated Hale's right to confrontation, as he did not 
have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  However, 
we also conclude that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained 
and was therefore harmless.  Accordingly, albeit with different 
rationale, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  03-0417-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶79 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I write separately not to solve the 
riddle of harmless error that again confounds the court, but to 
help decipher a particular aspect of the riddle.11  As I have 
written previously, the doctrine of harmless error is a work in 
progress.12   
¶80 I agree with the majority opinion that the applicable 
test for harmless error in the present case is the one set forth 
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), namely, that an 
error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.13   
¶81 Footnote 9 of the majority opinion recognizes that 
some members of the court view the articulation of harmless 
error in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1999), as 
replacing the Chapman test, or at least restating it in a 
substantively different way.  This court has interpreted the 
Neder test as stating that if it is clear beyond a reasonable 
                                                 
11 Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970). 
12 State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶68, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  
13 See majority op., ¶60. 
No.  03-0417-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
doubt that a rational jury would have convicted absent the 
error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict.14 
¶82 In several criminal cases before this court the State 
has avoided taking a position on whether the Neder and Chapman 
tests are the same or different.  The State frequently asserts 
that whichever test is used, the error in that particular case 
was harmless.  In a recent oral argument the State took the 
position that the Neder articulation of the harmless error test 
was somewhat different from the Chapman harmless error test, and 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485 (if it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have convicted absent the error 
then the error did not contribute to the verdict); State v. 
Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶46, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (error 
is harmless if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error); State v. Gary M.B., 2004 WI 33, ¶¶39, 42, 270 
Wis. 2d 62, 676 N.W.2d 475 (Crooks, J., concurring) (same); 
State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶50-52, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d  189 (Crooks, J., concurring) (same). 
For a discussion of Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 
(1999), and harmless error, see 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 27.6(e), at 224-26 (2d ed. Supp. 2004). 
According 
to 
Professor 
LaFave, "The 
Chapman standard 
clearly rejected a 'correct result' test, especially if the 
correct result was to be measured simply by sufficient evidence 
to sustain a conviction.  The standard looked not to whether the 
jury could have convicted without regard to the error . . . but 
to whether the error had influenced the jury in reaching its 
verdict. . . . The Chapman opinion did not clearly indicate, 
however, precisely what weight was to be given to the presence 
of 
overwhelming 
untainted 
evidence 
in 
making 
that 
judgment. . . . In subsequent opinions, the Court has appeared 
to move back and forth between relying heavily upon the presence 
of proof 
of 
guilt in its 
harmless 
error 
analysis, and 
considering that proof as less central to the inquiry." 5 Wayne 
R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 27.6(e), at 958-59 (2d 
ed. 1999). 
No.  03-0417-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
that the Neder test was somewhat easier for the State to meet in 
that case.  
¶83 I agree that the Neder test applies in cases involving 
a fact situation like that in Neder.  Our court has so held 
(over my dissent).15  I have written previously that I view Neder 
as limited to Neder-type cases.  Different errors may call for 
different harmless error tests. 
¶84 Whether the Neder test is the test of general 
application for non-Neder-type cases continues to be debated by 
members of the court.  Thus footnote 9.  This case is not the 
first case, nor will it be the last case, in which the issue of 
the correct articulation of the harmless error test, let alone 
the correct application of the test, is posed.  
¶85 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶35-47. 
No.  03-0417-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
¶86 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I write separately 
because the majority refers to a debate that was settled three 
years ago.  Some justices suggest that the test for harmless 
error set forth in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999), is an "alternative wording" of the harmless-error test 
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), majority op., ¶60 
n.9, and would like to apply the test for harmless error as set 
forth in Chapman.  Majority op., ¶¶60-61. 
¶87 In State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶47, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
647 N.W.2d 189, this court adopted the Neder formulation of the 
harmless error test for constitutional errors.  In doing so we 
noted:  "The Court's use of somewhat different language in 
restating the test can be viewed as a further clarification of 
what it takes to meet the test; that is, that in order to 
conclude that an error 'did not contribute to the verdict' 
within the meaning of Chapman, a court must be able to conclude 
'beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error.'"  Id., ¶48 n.14 (quoting 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).  The result of Harvey was that "the 
harmless error dispute [was] finally put to rest in Wisconsin, 
at least in criminal cases."  Id., ¶51 (Crooks, J., concurring).   
¶88 In 
State 
v. 
Weed, 
2003 
WI 
85, 
¶¶28-29, 
263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485, this court applied the Neder 
formulation of harmless error to a supposed Confrontation Clause 
violation.  We noted that the Neder test was not a sufficiency 
of the evidence test and reaffirmed our explanation in Harvey 
that Neder refined the Chapman test for harmless error.  Id.  
No.  03-0417-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
"In other words, if it is 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a rational jury would have convicted absent the error' then the 
error did not '"contribute to the verdict."'"  Id., ¶29 (quoting 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 18).  Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals indicated that the Neder formulation of harmless 
error is applicable to Confrontation Clause violations post-
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  United States v. 
Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2004). 
¶89 Therefore, I would continue to apply the Neder 
formulation of harmless error to Confrontation Clause violations 
in the aftermath of Crawford.  Because the majority reverts back 
to the Chapman formulation of harmless error without the 
refinements of Neder, and in doing so reopens a debate that was 
definitely settled by this court in Harvey and Weed, I 
respectfully concur.     
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and DAVID T. PROSSER, JR. join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  03-0417-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶91 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This case, which 
follows in the wake of Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 
S. Ct. 1354 (2004), affirms the principle that out-of-court 
"testimonial" statements by witnesses are barred from criminal 
trials by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment unless 
the witnesses are "unavailable" and the defendants against whom 
the statements are to be used have had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the witnesses.  This exclusion of evidence applies 
irrespective of whether the statements are "reliable." 
¶92 I 
join 
the 
majority 
opinion 
articulating 
this 
principle but write separately to emphasize that the principle 
has at least one major exception.  As the Crawford court noted, 
"the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes 
confrontation 
claims 
on 
essentially 
equitable 
grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of 
determining reliability."  Id., 124 S. Ct. at 1370, (citing 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (187[8])). 
¶93 The exception thus stated is essential because it 
discourages defendants from killing, kidnapping, secreting, 
terrorizing, blackmailing, or conspiring with critical witnesses 
so that they become unavailable to testify.  "The rule has its 
foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted to take 
advantage of his own wrong."  Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.  "It is 
the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common 
honesty, and, if properly administered, can harm no one."  Id. 
¶94 Because the effect of the Crawford decision is to 
exclude certain testimonial hearsay that heretofore was thought 
No.  03-0417-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
to be admissible, it is vital for courts to enforce the 
exception to assure the integrity of criminal trials. 
¶95 There is a great deal of authority supporting the 
principle that a defendant forfeits the constitutional right to 
confrontation by wrongdoing or misconduct causing the absence of 
a witness.  This bedrock principle has been accepted by every 
court that has considered it.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651-52 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278-79 (1st Cir. 1996); Steele v. 
Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Rivera, 292 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (E.D. Va. 2003); People v. 
Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People 
v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); 
State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 355-56 (Iowa 2000); State v. 
Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 2004); People v. Salazar, 688 
N.Y.S.2d 
401, 
403-04 (N.Y. 
Sup. 
Ct. 
1999); 
see also 4 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 
§ 507.1 (2d ed. Supp. 2003). 
¶96 Most jurisdictions require that the prosecution prove 
the defendant's wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Emery, 186 F.3d at 927; White, 116 F.3d at 912; Houlihan, 92 
F.3d at 1280; Steele, 684 F.2d at 1201; Rivera, 292 F. Supp. 2d 
at 831; Hallum, 606 N.W.2d at 355-56.  A few courts use the 
"clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof.  State v. 
No.  03-0417-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982); Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 848. 
¶97 The principle of forfeiture by wrongdoing has become 
so well accepted that in 1997, it was codified in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence: 
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
. . . .  
(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered 
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in 
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the 
unavailability of the declarant as a witness. 
In recommending addition of the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" 
exception to the hearsay rule, the Advisory Committee on Rules 
noted that every federal circuit to consider the issue has 
recognized the exception, with most using a preponderance of the 
evidence standard to prove the misconduct.  The Committee 
commented: 
Subdivision (b)(6). Rule 804(b)(6) has been added 
to provide that a party forfeits the right to object 
on hearsay grounds to the admission of a declarant's 
prior statement when the party's deliberate wrongdoing 
or acquiescence therein procured the unavailability of 
the declarant as a witness.  This recognizes the need 
for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent 
behavior "which strikes at the heart of the system of 
justice itself."  United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 
F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 
1204 (1984).  The wrongdoing need not consist of a 
criminal act.  The rule applies to all parties, 
including the government. 
No.  03-0417-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
Every circuit that has resolved the question has 
recognized the principle of forfeiture by misconduct, 
although the tests for determining whether there is a 
forfeiture have varied.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 789 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984); Steele v. Taylor, 684 
F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 
U.S. 1053 (1983); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 
624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 
(1980); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-
59 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).  The 
foregoing cases apply a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  Contra United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 
616, 631 (5th Cir.) (clear and convincing standard), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).  The usual Rule 
104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard has been 
adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule 
804(b)(6) seeks to discourage. 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules——1997 Amendments to Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
¶98 To sum up, corrupt efforts to preclude the testimony 
of witnesses cannot be permitted to succeed.  It is incumbent 
upon courts to enforce this principle in the post-Crawford era. 
¶99 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK join this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶100 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  (concurring.)  I concur with 
the decision and the mandate of the court.  I agree with the 
court's interpretation and analysis of the Confrontation Clause 
under the facts of this case.  While I disagree with the 
majority's statement of the harmless error test, I agree with 
its application of the harmless error analysis in this case.  I 
also conclude that the State met its burden beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.  I write separately because of the majority's 
decision not to discuss whether the prior testimony in this case 
was admissible under a recognized hearsay exception. I also 
write separately to discuss this court's misstatement of the 
harmless error rule.   
I 
¶101 While the confrontation issue may indeed be easy to 
resolve in this case, the hearsay question is equally easy to 
resolve.  The evidence in this case was not admissible under 
either the former testimony exception or the residual exception 
to the hearsay rule.   
¶102 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(1) excludes from the hearsay 
rule, provided the declarant is unavailable as a witness:   
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the 
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition 
taken in compliance with law in the course of another 
proceeding, at the instance of or against a party with 
an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross-, or redirect examination, with motive and 
interest similar to those of the party against whom 
now offered. 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
¶103 David Sullivan testified at the trial of codefendant 
Robert Jones.  Sullivan testified that he had given a gun to 
Hale, not Jones, shortly before the murders.  During Jones' 
trial, Sullivan expressed fear in testifying and guilt in 
providing the murder weapon to Hale.  Later, when subpoenaed for 
the Hale trial, Sullivan simply disappeared. Yet the trial court 
admitted Sullivan's testimony during the Jones' trial against 
Hale in Hale's trial, under the theory that Jones' cross-
examination in his trial could be admitted against Hale because 
Jones possessed a motive and interest similar to Hale.   
¶104 It is important to note here that Jones' cross-
examination of Sullivan took the gun out of Jones' possession 
and placed it in Hale's possession.  Jones was minimizing his 
involvement 
at 
the 
expense 
of 
Hale 
through 
his 
cross-
examination.  Jones identified Hale as the shooter in a 
statement to the police prior to the trial.  Hale, according to 
the trial court, made statements implicating Jones. Indeed, 
Jones and Hale had antagonistic defenses.  Compare State v. 
Nutley, 28 Wis. 2d 527, 543, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964).  
¶105 A motion to sever was filed by Hale.  The State 
conceded that severance was required.  The court agreed, 
ordering separate trials for Hale and Jones.  Under these facts, 
and given this procedural posture, there can be no misstating 
the interests and motives of these two individuals as being 
similar.  Jones was clearly putting the blame on Hale and used 
Sullivan's testimony to further that purpose.  Jones and Hale 
were pointing fingers toward each other.  The trial court should 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
not have admitted that testimony as former testimony under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1), as their motives and interests were 
certainly not similar.   
¶106 I also disagree with the court of appeals that 
Sullivan's testimony was admissible under the "residual hearsay 
exception" 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(6). 
Section 
908.045(6) 
excludes from the hearsay rule, provided the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness, "[a] statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."   
¶107 This exception "is for the novel or unanticipated 
category of hearsay that does not fall under one of the named 
categories, 
but 
which 
is 
as 
reliable 
as 
one 
of 
those 
categories."  State v. Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d 106, 120, 490 N.W.2d 
753 (Ct. App. 1992).  Accordingly, "[i]t is intended that the 
residual hearsay exception rule will be used very rarely, and 
only in exceptional circumstances."  Id.  The State has failed 
to identify how this case is novel or exceptional.  Nor has the 
State clearly established comparable circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness, particularly in light of the antagonistic 
defenses between Jones and Hale.  The shooter was not positively 
identified at the scene, and the gun can be traced back to 
Sullivan.  Thus, Sullivan had ample reason to place the gun in 
someone else's hands.  Consequently, there was no sufficient 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in this 
case. 
 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
II 
¶108 In ¶¶60-61 of its opinion, the majority properly 
states the Chapman16 harmless error test.  In footnote 9, 
however, the majority notes that while adhering to the Chapman 
test in recent years, the United States Supreme Court and this 
court have articulated alternative wording for the test.  While 
the majority is correct that there are alternative wordings for 
the harmless error test, the different wordings make all the 
difference.  The alternative wordings, although all falling 
under 
the 
umbrella 
of 
harmless 
error, 
are 
fundamentally 
different tests that depend on the nature of the error and are 
not interchangeable. 
¶109 The Court in Chapman made it clear that "before a 
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), 
reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967).  An error is harmless if the 
beneficiary of the error proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained." Id. This is the basic test that is applied to most 
constitutional violations that occur during a criminal trial, 
but not all of them.  
¶110 Certain types of errors are "structural" in nature, 
and are considered so fundamental and pervasive that they 
require reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances of 
                                                 
16Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh'g denied, 
386 U.S. 987 (1967).    
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
the particular case. Id. at 23 n. 8; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 
(1999). These errors include a complete denial of counsel,17 a 
biased trial judge,18 racial discrimination in the selection of a 
grand jury,19 denial of self-representation at trial,20 denial of 
a public trial,21 and a defective reasonable-doubt instruction.22  
Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. 
¶111 Most constitutional errors are analyzed using the 
basic harmless error test set forth in Chapman.  Whether such an 
error is harmless depends on a number of factors, all accessible 
to reviewing courts. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (confrontation 
violation). Compare, e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 
(1963) (illegally seized evidence); Gilbert v. California, 388 
U.S. 263 (1967) (illegally seized evidence); Satterwhite v. 
Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (right to consult with counsel); 
Arizona 
v. 
Fulminante, 
499 
U.S. 
279 
(1991) 
(involuntary 
confessions); and Chapman, 386 U.S. 18 (comments on defendant's 
silence).  For these types of errors, the analysis begins with 
an evaluation of the nature of the error and the harm it is 
alleged to have caused in order to determine whether the error 
                                                 
17 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)(citing 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 
18 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
19 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
20 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
21 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
22 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶30, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485; State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶87, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 
661 N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., dissenting).  The appropriate standard 
is not whether there is sufficient evidence, absent the error, 
to support the verdict. Weed, 163 Wis. 2d, ¶¶28-32. Nor does the 
defendant have to show "outcome determinative" prejudice in 
order to state a violation. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679-80.  
¶112 Certain types of constitutional errors by their very 
nature lend themselves to a form of an  "outcome determinative" 
approach. One such error involves ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668 (1984).  The 
Court in Strickland held that in order to challenge the 
conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a defendant would have to show that counsel's performance was 
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. Id. at 687. In discussing the nature of the error, the 
Court determined that it is not enough to show that the error 
had some conceivable outcome of the proceeding, as virtually 
every act or omission of counsel would meet that test. Id. at 
693.  But the Court refused to adopt a strict "outcome 
determinative" approach that the defendant would have to show 
that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered 
the outcome of the case.  Id.  Instead, the Court adopted a 
modified outcome approach, that the defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id.  This test shifts 
the burden to the defendant and is considerably different than 
the reasonable possibility standard set forth in Chapman. 
¶113 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has, on 
more 
than 
one 
occasion, 
adopted 
a 
form 
of 
"outcome 
determinative" harmless error standard in matters involving 
errors in jury instructions. In Neder, the Court examined 
whether the failure to instruct the jury on an uncontested 
element of the offense could be harmless error. The Court 
concluded that where a defendant did not and could not bring 
forth facts contesting the omitted element, "answering the 
question whether the jury verdict would have been the same 
absent the error does not fundamentally undermine the purposes 
of the jury trial guarantee."  Neder, 527 U.S. at 19.  See also, 
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 
391 (1991).  The Court explained in Yates that when dealing with 
presumptions in jury instructions, one cannot look subjectively 
into the minds of the jurors.  Id. at 404-05.  A court must 
approach the inquiry by asking whether the force of the evidence 
presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the 
instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would 
have been the same in the absence of the presumption.  Id.  The 
Court once again focused on the nature of the error in 
determining whether the error was harmless. 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
8 
 
¶114 The proper harmless error test for a confrontation 
violation was set forth in Van Arsdall. The Court specifically 
rejected an outcome determinative test for this type of 
violation, 
distinguishing 
its 
approach 
in 
Strickland. 
Van Arsdall, 466 U.S. at 679-80.  As the focus of the 
Confrontation Clause centers on an individual witness, the focus 
of the prejudice inquiry must be on the particular witness, not 
the outcome of the entire trial. Id. at 680. Factors to consider 
include the importance of the testimony in the prosecution's 
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony 
of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the 
prosecution's case.  Id. at 684.  While the majority here does 
not cite Van Arsdall, it is nevertheless clear that it 
essentially applies Van Arsdall.  See majority op., ¶61. 
¶115 This court has merged the harmless error analysis for 
trial constitutional errors into one standard.  Compare State v. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 
540-47, 
370 
N.W.2d 
222 
(1984) 
(concluding that "reasonable probability" means essentially the 
same thing as "reasonable possibility"); with State v. Harvey, 
2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (concluding 
that the Court in Neder applies the harmless error test in the 
same manner, regardless of the nature of the error complained 
of). See also, id., ¶¶50-52 (Crooks, J., concurring).  This 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
9 
 
construction of the harmless error test is flawed.23 The harmless 
error analysis must depend upon the nature of the error.  Some 
errors can never be harmless, some will have to be evaluated 
under the Chapman "reasonable possibility" test, and some will 
have to be viewed in terms of the outcome absent any error.     
¶116 We should not try to fit a "square peg" into a "round 
hole." This court will necessarily have to struggle with the 
application of the harmless error analysis in light of the 
error. Because the majority in this matter has essentially, but 
                                                 
23 Some of the confusion may stem from language in Neder, 
where the Court suggests that the harmless error inquiry for 
failure to instruct the jury on an uncontested element "must be 
essentially the same" as the inquiry for the erroneous exclusion 
of evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee 
against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999).  One writer suggests that the Court is split 5-4 on 
whether to apply an "overwhelming evidence" standard as opposed 
to looking at the effect of the error on the jury.  Jeffrey O. 
Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness:  Method and Madness in the 
Supreme Court's Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 Kan. 
L. Rev. 309, 324 (2002).  While the Court may be divided, and 
may be moving in the direction of looking at the strength of the 
evidence in evaluating harmless error, it appears to have used 
an 
outcome 
approach 
only 
in 
cases 
involving 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel or jury instruction errors, the language 
in Neder notwithstanding.   
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
10 
 
appropriately, adopted the factors set forth in Van Arsdall,24 
and because the error in this case was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt in light of those factors, I agree with and 
join the decision rendered here today. 
III 
¶117 I join the decision and the mandate of the court 
because it correctly interprets the Confrontation Clause of the 
United States Constitution while protecting the face-to-face 
requirements of the Wisconsin Constitution.  While the majority 
misidentifies the appropriate harmless error test to be applied 
in a confrontation violation, it correctly applies the harmless 
error analysis to facts of this case.  Let there be no doubt, 
however, regarding the admissibility of Sullivan's "former 
testimony" during Hale's trial——that testimony clearly did not 
                                                 
24 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals apparently has the 
same difficulty that the majority has in applying harmless error 
with a confrontation violation.  In United States v. Gilbert, __ 
F.3d __, No. 03-3365-CR (7th Cir. 2004), the court frames the 
harmless error analysis as "whether it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Gilbert 
guilty even absent the admission of Sherese's statement."  Id. 
at __.  Yet, without saying so, the court also appears to apply 
a Van Arsdall-type analysis.  The court reasoned that the 
erroneously admitted evidence was the most probative.  Id. at 
__.  Absent that evidence, the court could not determine whether 
the jury would credit other testimony, or whether other 
evidence, 
if 
credited, 
would be 
sufficient. 
 
Id. 
 The 
prosecution argued that this was the most and perhaps the only 
probative evidence that was offered on the issue of possession.  
Id.  The court concluded that, in light of the evidence as a 
whole, it could not determine that the jury would have returned 
a guilty verdict absent the error.  Id.  The focus was clearly 
on the nature of the error and its impact on the jury.   
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
11 
 
fall within a hearsay exception and should not have been 
admitted into evidence against Hale.   
¶118 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
 
No.  03-0417-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1