Title: Tessie P. Clements v. Alabama State Bar (Appeal from Disciplinary Board of Alabama State Bar ASB-07-241 (A) and ASB-09-1741
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1101167
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2012

REL: 07/06/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
____________________
1101167
____________________
Tessie P. Clements
v.
Alabama State Bar
Appeal from the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar
(ASB-07-241(A) and 09-1741(A))
WOODALL, Justice.
This is an appeal of a decision by the Disciplinary Board
("the Board") of the Alabama State Bar ("the Bar") to suspend
Tessie P. Clements's license to practice law in Alabama for
five years.  We affirm the Board's decision.
1101167
2
Facts and Procedural History
In June 2010, the Office of General Counsel for the Bar
filed 
formal 
charges 
against 
Clements 
for 
allegedly 
"violating
or failing to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Alabama State Bar."  The charges related to two separate
complaints that had been filed against Clements.  With regard
to the first complaint, the Bar alleged misconduct during
Clements's representation of Gerald 
and Maxine 
Ingram 
in 
their
lawsuit against certain real-estate professionals.  The
Ingrams filed a complaint against Clements with the Bar,
alleging that she had failed to inform them of the outcome of
their case and that she had forged their signatures on
affidavits 
filed 
in 
the 
Tuscaloosa 
Circuit 
Court 
("the 
circuit
court") in response to a motion for a summary judgment filed
by the defendants in the real-estate action.  The Bar alleged
that 
Clements's 
actions 
violated 
Rules 
1.3, 
1.4(a), 
3.3(a)(1),
3.3(a)(3), 
8.4(a), 
8.4(b), 
8.4(c), 
8.4(d), 
and 
8.4(g), 
Ala. 
R.
Prof. Cond.
The second complaint against Clements was filed by
Jessica Tubbs, who had been appointed to represent Willie
Banks in a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., proceeding in the
1101167
3
circuit court.  Clements had represented Banks during the
trial of his case.  With regard to the second complaint, the
Bar alleged that "[Clements] fraudulently billed and received
funds from the State of Alabama for her purported meetings
with [Banks] at the Tuscaloosa County Jail [('the jail')]."
The Bar alleged that Clements's actions in this regard
violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and
8.4(g), Ala. R. Prof. Cond.
On July 12, 2010, Clements filed a response to the Bar's
charges, denying the allegations with regard to both
complaints.  That same day, Clements moved to have the matter
transferred to this Court, arguing that she would not receive
a fair hearing before the Board.  Clements's motion was
denied.  Clements later moved to have a separate hearing with
regard to each complaint.  That motion was also denied.
At Clements's request, the Board issued 22 subpoenas for
witnesses to appear at the disciplinary hearing.  Fourteen of
the subpoenaed witnesses filed motions to quash the subpoenas
served upon them.  The motions to quash were granted by the
Board's hearing officer, Billy Bedsole, without a hearing.
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4
On June 9, 2011, a panel of the Board held a disciplinary
hearing on the charges against Clements.  Before the hearing
began, Bedsole informed the parties that one of the five panel
members would not be present for the hearing.  He then asked
Clements if she was satisfied with the composition of the
panel. 
Clements's 
only 
objection 
was 
to 
Bedsole's
participation because, she argued, he had demonstrated a bias
against her.  Before the hearing, Clements had filed a motion
seeking Bedsole's recusal from the panel.  Bedsole denied the
motion, and the hearing proceeded before a four-member panel
without any other objection from Clements as to the
composition of the panel.
With regard to the Ingrams' complaint, Clements conceded
at the hearing that she had signed Gerald Ingram's and Maxine
Ingram's names to the affidavits that had been filed in the
circuit court in the real-estate action.  However, Clements
also testified that she had spoken with Maxine on the day the
affidavits were filed and had asked Maxine if she and Gerald
could come to the office to sign the affidavits.  Clements
testified that, when Maxine said that they could not get to
Clements's office before 5:00 p.m., she asked for and received
1101167
5
Maxine's permission to sign the affidavits on the Ingrams'
behalf.  Clements signed the Ingrams' names to the affidavits,
and the signatures were notarized by Clements's secretary.
Clements also testified that "the affidavits prepared on
behalf of the Ingrams ... were made not only with the consent
of Maxine Ingram, but also using the information that [the
Ingrams had] provided to her during the course of her
representation."  Clements's brief, at 16.  The affidavits
were filed in the circuit court with the Ingrams' response to
the defendants' summary-judgment motion.  Clements did not
inform the circuit court or the defendants that she had signed
the affidavits on the Ingrams' behalf.
The Ingrams testified at the disciplinary hearing that
they had not authorized Clements to sign their names to the
affidavits.  Maxine testified that Clements had encouraged
them not to attend the summary-judgment hearing in their real-
estate action and that Clements had not informed them of the
outcome of the case.  Clements testified that Maxine was at
the Tuscaloosa County courthouse on the day of the summary-
judgment hearing and that she had spoken to Maxine in the
hallway of the courthouse.
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6
The Ingrams further testified that, some months after the
summary-judgment hearing, they went to see another attorney
regarding their case.  That attorney informed them that the
circuit court had entered a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants at the summary-judgment hearing.  The Ingrams then
went to the circuit court clerk's office to review the court
file.  While reviewing the file, they discovered the
affidavits Clements had signed on their behalf.  The Ingrams
conceded at the disciplinary hearing that the information in
the affidavits was accurate.  They insisted, however, that the
signatures on the affidavits were forgeries and that they had
not authorized Clements to sign the affidavits on their
behalf.  The Ingrams filed a complaint against Clements with
the Bar in November 2007.
With regard to the second complaint, Clements testified
that she had represented Willie Banks in the circuit court on
several charges brought against him, including charges of
domestic violence and first-degree rape.  Clements testified
that she was diligent in her representation of Banks and that
she had "got[ten] rid" of the domestic-violence charge.  Banks
was convicted of first-degree rape.
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7
In 2009, Tubbs was appointed to represent Banks in a Rule
32, Ala. R. Crim. P., postconviction proceeding challenging
his first-degree-rape conviction.  Clements testified that
Tubbs telephoned her to inform her that she would be
representing Banks in the Rule 32 proceeding.  According to
Clements, she told Tubbs: "Jessica, I have somewhere I have to
go.  I will be back and I will sit down and I will talk to you
about the case."  Clements's brief, at 58.  Clements went on
to testify that, instead of waiting to meet with Clements,
Tubbs went to Clements's office when she was not there and
removed Banks's file.  
Tubbs testified that after informing Clements that she
had been appointed to represent Banks in his Rule 32
proceeding, she made arrangements with, and thereby obtained
Banks's case file from, Clements's secretary.  Tubbs also
testified that, when she met with Banks at the jail, Banks
told her that Clements had visited him in the jail only once
while she was representing him.  Banks, unable to post bond,
had been in the jail throughout the pretrial and trial
proceedings.
1101167
8
Tubbs began to investigate Banks's claim that Clements
had made only one visit to the jail, which, Tubbs argued,
would have supported an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim against Clements.  During her investigation, she
obtained a copy of the fee declaration Clements had filed in
Banks's case.  Clements claimed in the fee declaration that
she had visited Banks several times in the jail between August
2006 and July 2007 and that each visit had lasted two to three
hours.  Tubbs also obtained a copy of the visitor log of the
jail, in which were recorded the visits to the jail by non-
law-enforcement persons.
Tubbs testified that she could not find Clements's
signature in the visitor log for the dates Clements had shown
in her fee declaration that she visited Banks at the jail.
Tubbs testified that, to be thorough, she had checked the days
immediately surrounding the dates listed in the fee
declaration but that she did not find Clements's name in the
visitor log for any of those days.
Clements objected at the hearing to the admission of the
visitor log as evidence because, she argued, the chain of
custody regarding the log was not proper.  Tubbs testified
1101167
9
that she had received the copies of the visitor log from the
prosecutor during the course of Banks's Rule 32 proceeding.
Clements argued that, because the visitor log had not been
subpoenaed directly from the jail, it was outside the chain of
custody and was therefore inadmissible.  However, Lt. Eric
Bailey, chief of jail operations for the Tuscaloosa Sheriff's
Office, authenticated the log, testifying that the documents
offered were "a true and accurate copy of [the visitor log]."
Lt. Bailey also testified as to the procedure for
visitors entering and exiting the jail.  He testified that all
non-law-enforcement 
persons, 
including 
members 
of 
the 
Bar, 
had
to check in with the guard at the controlled entry to the
jail, had to sign the visitor log, and had to obtain a
visitor-identification badge.  Lt. Bailey testified further
that this procedure was in place in 2009, when he became chief
of jail operations, and that it had been in place for many
years before his appointment.  Attorneys who had been
subpoenaed by Clements testified that the controlled entry to
the jail was often busy and that the procedures for entering
and exiting the jail had been more relaxed under the chief of
jail operations who had preceded Lt. Bailey.  However, the
1101167
10
attorneys also testified that they had never entered or exited
the jail without signing the visitor log and that they had
never witnessed any individual being allowed entry into the
jail without first signing the log.
Clements testified that she had visited several clients
in the jail, including Banks, and that she had not been
required to sign the visitor log every time she entered the
jail.  She testified that the attendants at the jail would
"usually just wave [her] in, say[ing] [']Tessie, who you want
to see?'] and [she would] go back there."  Clements
specifically named James Taggert and Erica Richards as
individuals who would allow her into the jail without
requiring her to sign in.  However, neither Taggert nor
Richards testified at the disciplinary hearing.  
When asked whether she had any supporting evidence for
the entries in the fee declaration, Clements insisted that she
could not provide such evidence because Tubbs had stolen her
file on Banks's case and refused to return it.  However,
Clements did not identify anything allegedly in the file that
would corroborate the entries in the fee declaration.  
1101167
11
After the hearing, the Board found Clements guilty of the
violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct that
had been alleged against her in the Bar's formal charges.  As
a result of its findings, the Board suspended Clements's law
license for five years and ordered her to reimburse the State
of Alabama $1,080 and to pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceedings.  Clements has appealed the Board's decision.
Issues
Clements argues that the Bar "violated [her] due process
rights" by "fail[ing] to bifurcate the hearings on her two ...
unrelated bar complaints," by "fail[ing] to provide her with
hearings on the Motions to Quash filed by witnesses in her
case," and by "fail[ing] to provide a 5-member panel to
adjudicate her cases."  Clements's brief, at 9.  Clements also
argues that the Board's decision was not supported by clear
and convincing evidence.  Finally, Clements argues that "the
... Bar was prejudicial toward [her] in such a manner that she
was denied a fair and impartial hearing and sentencing."
Clements's brief, at 10.
Standard of Review
"This Court applies the 'clearly erroneous'
standard of review to the findings of fact of a
1101167
12
panel of the Disciplinary Board.  Tipler v. Alabama
State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 2003).  '"'A
finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm 
conviction 
that 
a 
mistake 
has 
been
committed.'"'  Tipler, 866 So. 2d at 1137, quoting
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S.
564, 573 (1985), quoting in turn United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
Questions of law presented by an appeal from a Bar
matter are reviewed de novo.  Tipler."
Alabama State Bar Ass'n v. Dudley, [Ms. 1101362, March 2,
2012] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2012).
Analysis
Clements first argues that "the Alabama State Bar
violated her due process rights as a result of the Bar's
failure to bifurcate the [disciplinary hearing on the] two
unrelated bar complaints against her."  Clements's brief, at
40.  Clements argues that "[t]he issue of a combined hearing
involving unrelated bar complaints has not been previously
directly addressed by the Alabama Supreme Court.  However, the
Supreme Court has made a specific guarantee of due process as
it relates to State Bar hearings."  Id.  She then quotes Ex
parte Case, 925 So. 2d 956, 960 (Ala. 2005), for general
principles of law regarding procedural due process, including
the right to "'"an orderly proceeding appropriate to the case
1101167
13
or adapted to its nature, just to the parties affected, and
adapted to the ends to be attained; one in which a person has
an opportunity to be heard, and to defend, enforce, and
protect his rights before a competent and impartial tribunal
legally constituted to determine the right involved."'"
(Quoting Katz v. Alabama State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 351 So. 2d
890, 892 (Ala. 1977), quoting in turn 2 Am. Jur. 2d
Administrative Law § 353.)
However, Clements does not provide any particular
argument as to how the Board's failure to conduct separate
hearings in this case violated the general principles of due
process set forth in Ex parte Case.  Instead, she simply
argues that "a practicing attorney does not lose his or her
right to fundamental due process simply because that attorney
is at a disciplinary hearing." Clements's brief, at 41.  This
Court has stated:
"When a brief states general propositions but fails
to make specific application of those propositions
to the rulings assigned as error, it is waived and
will not be considered on appeal.
"... 'Where an appellant fails to cite any
authority for an argument, this Court may affirm the
judgment on those issues, for it is neither the
Court's duty nor its function to perform all the
legal research for an appellant.'"
1101167
The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure are generally
1
applicable in Bar disciplinary proceedings.  See Rule 3(b),
Ala. R. Disc. P.  
14
Welch v. Hill, 608 So. 2d 727, 728 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Sea
Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v. Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212, 216 (Ala.
1990) (citations omitted)).
Clements also cites Rule 42(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which
provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a
separate trial of any claim ... or of any separate issue.
(Emphasis added.)   Clements argues that "[a]s [her] bar
1
complaints involved two 
completely 
unrelated 
sets of facts and
complainants, [her] request for a separation of her hearings,
rather than a combined hearing[,] should have been granted by
the hearing officer in her cases."  Clements's brief, at 42.
However, the language of Rule 42 is permissive, not mandatory,
and does not require bifurcated proceedings with regard to
separate complaints.  Clements has not demonstrated by
argument or authority that the Board erred in refusing to have
separate hearings, that the Board's hearing violated her due-
process rights, or that she was prejudiced in any way by the
1101167
15
Board's failure to conduct two separate hearings on the two
complaints against her.  
Clements next argues that the Board "violated [her] due
process rights when it failed to provide her with a hearing on
the Motions to Quash filed by witnesses in her case, in
violation of Rule 17(c) of the Alabama Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure."  Clements's brief, at 42.  Rule 17(c) provides:
"An attack on a subpoena issued pursuant to this rule shall be
heard and determined by the Disciplinary Board or by the court
in which enforcement of the subpoena is being sought."  We do
not read Rule 17(c) as providing a right to a hearing on a
motion to quash a subpoena.  Instead, we agree with the Bar
that the requirement that "[a]n attack on a subpoena ... be
heard and determined" simply means that the Board must
"consider and rule upon the issues" raised by motions to
quash. The Bar's brief, at 42.  Indeed, Clements has cited no
authority to the contrary.  It is undisputed that the hearing
officer, pursuant to the authority granted him by Rule
4.2(b)(5), Ala. R. Disc. P., considered and ruled upon the
motions to quash filed in this case.
1101167
16
Moreover, Clements has not argued, either at the hearing
or on appeal, that the testimony of the witnesses whose
subpoenas were quashed was essential to her defense or that
she was prejudiced in any way by the absence of that
testimony. Thus, she has not demonstrated by argument or
authority that the Board's decision to quash the subpoenas
denied her a meaningful opportunity to be heard or that the
Board's decision violated her rights to due process in this
regard.  See Hayes v. Alabama State Bar, 719 So. 2d 787, 790
(Ala. 1998) ("Due Process mandates notice and an opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way.").
Clements next argues that the Bar "violated [her] right
to due process by its failure to provide a 5-member panel to
adjudicate 
her 
disciplinary 
hearing 
pursuant 
to 
Rules 
4(a)(1),
4(a)(2), and 4.1 of the Alabama Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure."  Clements's brief, at 47.  Rules 4(a) and 4.1
address the establishment and general organization of the
Board. 
Rule 
4(a)(1) 
provides 
that 
"[t]he 
Board 
of
Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar shall appoint three
panels of five members each, each panel to be known as 'The
Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar.'"  However, as
1101167
Clements argues in her brief that "the pre-trial conduct
2
of [Bedsole] indicated that he was so clearly biased and
intentionally prevented Attorney Clements'[s] due process
right to a just hearing in front of an impartial tribunal as
guaranteed 
under 
the 
14th 
amendment 
of 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution."
Clements's brief, at 46.  However, as with earlier arguments,
Clements does not argue with particularity or cite any
authority indicating how Bedsole's alleged bias denied her a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.  Further, she has not
17
with the previous arguments, Clements has not demonstrated
that the hearing before a four-member panel violated her right
to due process.
Rule 4(d), Ala. R. Disc. P., provides, in pertinent part,
that "[a] panel shall act only with the concurrence of a
majority of its five members, notwithstanding that fewer than
all members are present to conduct the proceeding." (Emphasis
added.)  This rule expressly anticipates a hearing in which
fewer than five members of the panel participate.  Moreover,
Clements raised no objection at her disciplinary hearing to
the number of members on the panel.  Bedsole asked Clements
directly whether she was "satisfied with the composition of
the panel that [was] going to review [her] case."  As noted
above, Clements objected to Bedsole's presence on the panel,
arguing that he was biased against her and requesting that he
recuse himself.   After Bedsole denied the motion seeking his
2
1101167
appealed Bedsole's decision to deny her motion seeking his
recusal from the panel.  
18
recusal, the hearing proceeded without further objection from
Clements as to the composition of the panel.
"Appellate courts will not consider an issue that was not
properly raised or pleaded in the trial court," State of
Alabama ex rel. State of Ohio v. E.B.M., 718 So. 2d 669, 671
(Ala. 1998), and "'"'[a] party cannot assume inconsistent
positions in the trial and appellate courts and, as a general
rule, will not be permitted to allege an error in the trial
court proceedings which was invited by him or was the natural
consequence of his own actions.'"'"  Ex parte Sharp, [Ms.
1080959, December 4, 2009] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2009)
(quoting Clark v. State, 896 So. 2d 584, 648 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000), quoting in turn other cases).  By failing to object at
the disciplinary hearing to the number of members on the
panel, Clements has waived that argument on appeal. 
Clements next argues that the Board's holding that she
had violated the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct was not
"supported by clear and convincing evidence."  Clements's
brief, at 49.  Clements's arguments regarding the sufficiency
1101167
19
of the evidence relate almost entirely to the credibility of
the witnesses against her.  With regard to the first
complaint, 
Clements 
argues 
that 
"[t]hroughout 
the 
disciplinary
hearing, the Ingrams' testimony proved to be unreliable and
simply in retaliation for Attorney Clements'[s] collection
efforts to recover deposition expenses incurred in their
case."  Clements's brief, at 51.  She also argues that the
Board "disregard[ed] ... the Ingrams' inconsistent testimony
and their lack of memory regarding significant events
surrounding 
Attorney 
Clements'[s] 
representation." 
 
Id. 
at 
56.
With regard to the second complaint, Clements argues that
Tubbs's failure to name Banks in her complaint filed with the
Bar, as well as her "continued unauthorized possession" of
Clements's file on Banks,
"demonstrated that [Tubbs] was not a credible
witness and had no personal knowledge of matters
pertaining to Attorney Clements'[s] representation
of Mr. Banks.  Moreover, Ms. Tubbs'[s] continued
retention of Attorney Clements'[s] office file on
Willie Banks demonstrates that she has an [u]lterior
motive to damage Attorney Clements'[s] law license
in order to make a profit by creating a fraudulent
malpractice suit against Attorney Clements."
Clements's brief, at 58-59. 
1101167
20
This Court has stated: "'"The weight and probative value
to be given to the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses,
the resolution of conflicting testimony, and inferences to be
drawn from the evidence are for the [trier of fact]."'"  Ex
parte McGriff, 908 So. 2d 1024, 1043 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex
parte Roberts, 735 So. 2d 1270, 1278 (Ala. 1999), quoting in
turn Smith v. State, 698 So. 2d 189, 214 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996)).  Here, the Board, as the trier of fact, resolved
credibility questions and any conflicts in the testimony
against Clements.
In its report and order, the Board stated: "We ... find
the testimony of the Ingrams to be credible in that they did
not authorize Clements to execute the affidavits.  We do not
find Clements['s] testimony as to this issue to be credible
and thus reach a finding of guilt on the counts enumerated
hereinabove."  The Board also stated:
"Clements testified that she frequently failed
to sign the visitor registration log [at the jail]
and simply was allowed almost unfettered access to
the [jail].  Clements appeared to assert that Tubbs
or some other third party had gained unauthorized
access to the original visitor registration log and
altered it.  She further claimed that Tubbs had
illegally accessed Clements['s] client file related
to her representation of Willie Banks.  This Panel
finds these assertions to be wholly without merit
1101167
Clements argues that the visitor log was "tainted,"
3
Clements's brief, at 60, and that it "should not have been
admitted into evidence."  Id. at 61.  Specifically, she argues
that the prosecutor from whom Tubbs received the visitor log
21
and finds the testimony of Tubbs and [Lt.] Bailey to
be credible."
After resolving the credibility questions and any
conflicts in the testimony against Clements, the Board had
clear and convincing evidence to support its determination
that Clements had violated the Alabama Rules of Professional
Conduct, as alleged by the Bar.  It is undisputed that
Clements did, in fact, file with the circuit court falsely
signed and notarized affidavits.  Tubbs testified that Banks
told her that Clements had visited him only once while she
represented him.  Tubbs also testified that the number of
visits to Banks at the jail listed in Clements's fee
declaration was not supported by the information in the
visitor log for the jail and that she had received Clements's
file concerning Banks from Clements's secretary.  Lt. Bailey
testified that the pages from the visitor log offered at the
hearing were authentic and that the established procedure at
the jail required all visitors to sign in and out for every
visit to an inmate.   Clements provided no evidence, beyond
3
1101167
"broke the chain of custody for obtaining the jail log[] and
obtained documents from the jail without Chief Bailey's prior
approval."  Clements's brief, at 60-61.  However, as noted
previously, 
Lt. 
Bailey testified that the documents 
offered at
the hearing were "a true and accurate copy of [the visitor
log]."  Clements has provided no evidence to the contrary, nor
has she cited any authority indicating that Lt. Bailey's
testimony was not sufficient to authenticate the visitor log
for admissibility purposes.  Therefore, Clements has not
demonstrated that the Board erred in allowing the visitor log
to be admitted as evidence.
22
her own testimony, indicating that she had made the visits to
Banks that were listed in her fee declaration.
In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the
Board's findings of fact were clearly erroneous or that its
decision was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Therefore, Clements has not demonstrated any error in the
Board's decision in this regard as well.
Finally, Clements argues that "the [Bar] was prejudicial
toward [her] in such a manner that she was denied a fair and
impartial hearing and sentencing."  Clements's brief, at 63.
Clements cites several facts that, she claims, demonstrate
that the panel was biased against her, including the
"extremely harsh sentence" imposed by the Board, which, she
1101167
23
argues, was imposed even though she had no prior record of
discipline with the Bar.  As with her earlier arguments,
however, Clements has not cited any authority in support of
her claim that she was denied a fair and impartial hearing or
in support of her allegation that the sentence imposed was
overly harsh.  Thus, she has failed to demonstrate any
reversible error in the Board's decision in this regard as
well.  See Welch, 608 So. 2d at 728 ("'Where an appellant
fails to cite any authority for an argument, this Court may
affirm the judgment on those issues....'").
Conclusion
Clements has not demonstrated by argument or by citation
to authority that she was denied procedural due process in her
disciplinary proceeding or that the Board's decision was
clearly erroneous.  Therefore, we affirm 
the 
Board's decision.
AFFIRMED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, and Wise,
JJ., concur.
Malone, C.J., recuses himself.