Title: Paul Beasley V. Michael W. Moore
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-2182
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
_____________
No. SC01-2182
_____________
PAUL BEASLEY JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,
Respondent.
[September 26, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Paul Beasley Johnson petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.
Johnson was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, two counts of
armed robbery, kidnapping, arson, and two counts of attempted first-degree
murder.  The trial court imposed three death sentences.  The facts of this case are
more fully set forth in our opinion in Johnson’s direct appeal, where this Court
affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences.  See Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d
1.  In this petition, Johnson alleges:  (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to ensure that the record on appeal was complete; (2) appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the issue that Johnson was absent from critical stages
of the trial; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the
jury weighed invalid aggravating circumstances; (4) this Court should revisit the
issue that the sentencing judge erred by refusing to find the existence of mitigation;
(5) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the jury was
misled by court instructions and State comments; (6) appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the issue that in the penalty phase, the burden of proof
was shifted to Johnson to prove that death was inappropriate; (7) appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the State improperly introduced
nonstatutory aggravating factors; (8) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claim that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Johnson’s challenges for
cause; (9) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim that
Johnson’s sentence rests upon an unconstitutionally automatic aggravating
circumstance; and (10) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
claim that the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s motion to declare Florida’s
death penalty statute unconstitutional.
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4, 6 (Fla. 1992) (Johnson I).  Johnson filed a motion for postconviction relief
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  The trial court denied relief,
and we affirmed that denial.  See Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. 2000)
(Johnson II).  Johnson has now filed with this Court the instant petition for a writ of
habeas corpus which raises ten claims.1  We deny Johnson’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Johnson first asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
ensure that the record on appeal was complete.  When evaluating an ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim raised in a writ of habeas corpus, this Court
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must determine,
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and,
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the
correctness of the result.
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986).  “The defendant has the
burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Johnson’s first claim is without merit.  Johnson’s appellate
counsel filed a supplemental motion with this Court on direct appeal requesting
reconstruction of the record.  This Court denied the motion as being without merit. 
See Johnson I, 608 So. 2d at 13 (“There is no merit in Johnson’s argument that we
should have granted his motion to reconstruct the record.”).  Thus, Johnson has
not shown that his appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise this issue.  See
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 645 (Fla. 2000) (“[I]f an issue was actually
raised on direct appeal, the Court will not consider a claim that appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise additional arguments in support of the claim on
appeal.”).  Johnson also alleges that appellate counsel failed to include missing
record items (some of which are now unavailable) including the court reporter’s
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tapes, the written slips that were used to communicate peremptory challenges to the
trial court, a newspaper article relating to Johnson’s case, and transcripts of
unrecorded discussions occurring during several bench conferences.  Johnson
claims that his appellate counsel’s failure to secure those items has prejudiced his
ability to appeal issues regarding voir dire and the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s
motion to suppress statements made by a jailhouse informant.
Johnson argues generally that these missing items would have aided his direct
appeal, but he does not point to specific errors that occurred due to the omissions
of this material.  In Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2002), this Court
rejected a similar claim and stated:
We have previously rejected a similar claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to have transcribed portions of the
record, including parts of voir dire, the charge conference, and a
discussion of whether the defendant would testify.  See Ferguson v.
Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53, 58 (Fla.1993).  We reasoned that "[h]ad
appellate counsel asserted error which went uncorrected because of
the missing record, or had [the defendant] pointed to errors in this
petition, this claim may have had merit."  Id.  However, because the
defendant "point[ed] to no specific error which occurred" during the
portions of the record that remained untranscribed, we concluded that
appellate counsel was not ineffective.  Id.; see also Turner v. Dugger,
614 So. 2d 1075, 1079-80 (Fla.1992) (finding defendant had not been
prejudiced by failure of counsel to have charge conference
transcribed).  As with the defendant in Ferguson, Thompson has not
pointed to any errors that occurred during the untranscribed portions
of the proceedings.
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(Alterations in original.)  Similarly, Johnson has not demonstrated that the
deficiencies he generally alleges undermine confidence in the correctness of his
sentence.  See Pope, 496 So. 2d at 800.  Johnson is not entitled to relief on this
claim.
Johnson’s second claim asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the claim that Johnson was absent for certain challenges during voir
dire examination.  The trial court imposed a process for challenging potential jurors,
whereby counsel for each side submitted written notes to the judge indicating the
challenged jurors.  The judge then announced the jurors who would be dismissed. 
The record does reflect that Johnson was not at the bench when Johnson’s counsel
delivered to the trial judge the notes listing the challenged jurors.  However, the
record also reflects that Johnson was in the courtroom during the time the notes
were delivered, was present when the jurors were examined in open court, and was
with his counsel when the decisions as to who would be challenged were made. 
The delivery of notes listing challenged jurors only informed the trial court of
Johnson’s decisions.  Johnson was not deprived of his ability to consult with his
trial counsel when the peremptory challenges were being exercised, as was the
defendant in Francis v. State, 413 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 1982).  We conclude
that Johnson was not prejudiced by the procedure used, and thus we hold that
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Johnson has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief on this issue.
Johnson’s third claim asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge the facial validity of the instructions on the aggravating factors.  This
challenge involves four subclaims.
Johnson’s first subclaim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a facial challenge to the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) instruction. 
Johnson raised the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to
object to the CCP instruction in his 3.850 motion, and the circuit court summarily
denied the claim as being without merit.  The circuit court stated:
The trial in the instant case concluded prior to the decision in Jackson
v. State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994).  The trial court instructed the jury
that in order for the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravator to
apply they must find a “heightened degree of calculated premeditation
or methodical intent.”  (R. 3609.)  The instruction attempted to
provide the jury with guidance in analyzing the applicability of the
aggravator.  The defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s
actions were deficient or prejudicial.
State v. Johnson, No. CF 81-0112A1, order at 5 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. order filed
January 28, 1997).  Additionally, the record shows that the CCP instruction given
was broader than the standard instruction and was substantially as requested by
defense counsel.  This Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial. 
Johnson’s direct appeal also occurred before the Jackson decision was decided. 
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Appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to challenge a jury
instruction on the basis of decisions that had not yet been decided.  Cf. Downs v.
State, 740 So. 2d 506, 518 (Fla. 1999).
Johnson’s second subclaim addresses the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
(HAC) instruction.  This subclaim is procedurally barred because this Court
addressed this claim in Johnson I, 608 So. 2d at 13.  See Parker v. Dugger, 550 So.
2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) (“[H]abeas corpus petitions are not to be used for
additional appeals on questions which . . . were raised on appeal . . . .”). 
Johnson’s third subclaim challenges the avoid arrest instruction.  Johnson
concedes that this issue is procedurally barred as having been found without merit
by the postconviction court.  See id.
Johnson’s final subclaim challenge is that the pecuniary gain instruction is
facially invalid.  This claim is without merit because Johnson’s trial counsel agreed
to the instruction for pecuniary gain.  Appellate counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise a claim that was not preserved below or that is without
merit.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 646.
Johnson’s fourth claim asks this Court to revisit the issue of whether the trial
court erred by refusing to find the existence of mitigation.  We find this claim to be
procedurally barred because this claim was addressed on direct appeal.  See
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Parker, 550 So. 2d at 460 (“[H]abeas corpus petitions are not to be used for
additional appeals on questions which . . . were raised on appeal . . . .”).
Johnson’s fifth claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the issue that the jury was misled by court instructions and State comments. 
There was no objection to the trial court’s instructions or the State’s comments,
and appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this issue
unless the alleged error constitutes fundamental error.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d
at 646.  Johnson, however, does not cite to any case in support of his contention
that the trial court’s actions constituted error—much less fundamental error. 
Therefore, Johnson is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Johnson’s sixth claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the issue that in the penalty phase, the burden of proof was shifted to Johnson
to prove that a sentence of death was inappropriate.  This claim is without merit
because the instructions did not shift the burden to the defendant to prove that a
death sentence was inappropriate.  Cf. Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1024
(Fla. 1999).  Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless issue.  See Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847, 848-49 (Fla. 1994).
Johnson’s seventh claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claim that the State improperly introduced nonstatutory aggravating factors
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during closing argument and during the cross-examination of Johnson’s witness,
Dr. Gary Ainsworth.  Johnson claims that the State improperly introduced
references to Johnson’s personality disorders, his inability to conform his conduct
to the law, and his past drug use.  Johnson’s trial counsel did not object to the
State’s closing argument, and appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for
failing to raise unpreserved claims.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 646. 
Additionally, this Court rejected the merits of the closing argument error claim in
Johnson II, 769 So. 2d at 1004 (“[W]hile there were several objectionable
comments made during closing arguments, the argument as a whole was proper.”). 
Therefore, Johnson’s closing argument portion of this ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim is without merit, and the closing argument did not constitute
fundamental error.  See id.
Johnson’s trial counsel did object to the State’s cross-examination of Dr.
Ainsworth, and appellate counsel did not raise the issue on appeal.  Johnson’s
habeas claim, however, focuses on the closing argument and does not demonstrate
how appellate counsel was “measurably outside the range of professionally
acceptable performance” for failing to raise the issue that the prosecutor’s
statements erroneously introduced nonstatutory aggravating circumstances to the
jury.  Pope, 496 So. 2d at 800.  Thus, Johnson’s claim is insufficiently pled, and
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we find no fundamental error in the State's cross-examination.
Johnson’s eighth claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claim that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Johnson’s challenges for
cause.  This issue is procedurally barred and without merit because the substance
of this claim was raised and rejected by this Court on both direct appeal and
postconviction appeal.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 645 (“[I]f an issue was
actually raised on direct appeal, the Court will not consider a claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise additional arguments in support of the
claim on appeal.”).
Johnson’s ninth claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claim that Johnson’s sentence rests upon an unconstitutionally automatic
aggravating circumstance based on the underlying felonies.  This claim was
preserved but was not raised on appeal.  Therefore, Johnson’s ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim is not procedurally barred.  However, this
Court has repeatedly rejected Johnson’s claim as being without merit.  See Blanco
v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997) (“Eligibility for this aggravating circumstance
is not automatic . . . .”).  Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise
a claim that would have been rejected on appeal.  See Lambrix, 641 So. 2d at 848-
49.
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Johnson’s final claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claim that the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s motion to declare
Florida’s death penalty statute unconstitutional.  This claim was preserved but was
not raised on appeal.  Therefore, Johnson’s ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim is not procedurally barred.  However, this Court has consistently
rejected as being without merit claims that are identical to Johnson’s claim.  See,
e.g., Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1181 n.10 (Fla. 2001).  Appellate
counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue.  See
Lambrix, 641 So. 2d at 848-49.
Because all of Johnson’s claims are either without merit or procedurally
barred, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., and
HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Michael P. Reiter, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Northern Region, and Heidi
E. Brewer, Assistant CCRC, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
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Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Candance M. Sabella, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent