Title: Theresa Huml v. Robert W. Vlazny
Citation: 2006 WI 87
Docket Number: 2004AP000036
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2006

2006 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP36 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Theresa Huml, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Robert W. Vlazny, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Todd J. Cecchi, Roy Cecchi, The St. Paul 
Companies, Inc., a/k/a St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Company, and St. Paul Insurance 
Company of Illinois, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
John R. Race 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by John C. 
Thomure, Jr., Timothy M. Hansen, Jonathan C. Wertz, and Michael 
Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Timothy M. 
Hansen and Jonathan C. Wertz. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by Michael 
J. Jassak, Kristin M. Cafferty, Racine, James P. Martin, Lake 
Geneva, and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., and oral argument by 
Kristin M. Cafferty. 
 
 
2006 WI 87
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP36   
(L.C. No. 
1995CV291) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Theresa Huml, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert W. Vlazny, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Todd J. Cecchi, Roy Cecchi, The St. Paul 
Companies, Inc., a/k/a St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Company, and St. Paul Insurance 
Company of Illinois, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
County, John R. Race, Judge.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 809.61 
(2003-04).1 
 
It 
addresses 
the 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
2 
 
relationship between the restitution order in a criminal case 
and a subsequent settlement agreement in a civil case.  The 
Walworth County Circuit Court, John R. Race, Judge, dismissed 
Robert 
Vlazny's 
(Vlazny) 
motion 
to 
enforce 
a 
settlement 
agreement to preclude Theresa Huml (Huml) from enforcing a 
judgment derived from a criminal restitution order, after Vlazny 
was released from probation. 
¶2 
We are presented with two issues.  First, may a civil 
settlement agreement between a crime/tort victim and a criminal 
defendant/tortfeasor preclude the victim from collecting unpaid 
restitution that the defendant was ordered to pay in the 
criminal proceeding, after the defendant's probation ends and 
the unpaid restitution is reduced to a civil judgment pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r)?  Second, did the 
settlement agreement between Theresa Huml and Robert Vlazny 
preclude Huml from enforcing the civil judgment derived from the 
restitution order? 
¶3 
Vlazny argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(b) requires 
a court to enter a civil judgment for the amount of unpaid 
restitution when probation ends.  When this occurs, he contends, 
an existing settlement agreement between the defendant and the 
victim may preclude the victim from enforcing the judgment.  He 
claims that his settlement agreement with Huml bars her from 
enforcing the judgment. 
¶4 
Huml responds that Vlazny's position is contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r), which provides that after probation 
terminates, unpaid restitution "is enforceable in the same 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
3 
 
manner as a judgment in a civil action by the victim[.]"  She 
contends that the phrase "in the same manner as a civil 
judgment" indicates that it is not a civil judgment.  Huml 
reasons that her interpretation is consistent with the notion 
that a restitution judgment is criminal in nature and should not 
be extinguished by a civil settlement agreement.  Therefore, 
Huml concludes, her settlement agreement with Vlazny cannot 
preclude her from enforcing the restitution order once it is 
reduced to a judgment. 
¶5 
We conclude that a civil settlement agreement can have 
no effect upon a restitution order while the defendant remains 
on probation, unless the circuit court finds that enforcing the 
restitution order in addition to the settlement agreement would 
result in a double recovery for the victim.  After a defendant 
is released from probation, however, and any unpaid restitution 
under the restitution order is converted to a civil judgment, a 
settlement agreement between the victim and defendant may——
depending upon its terms——preclude the victim from enforcing the 
judgment.  We conclude that the global settlement agreement that 
Huml entered into with Vlazny precludes her from enforcing the 
judgment converted from the restitution order.  
¶6 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶7 
On June 20, 1993, Vlazny seriously injured Huml when 
the automobile he was driving collided head-on with Huml's car.  
Prior to the accident, Vlazny had been drinking.  On November 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
4 
 
11, 1993, Vlazny was convicted of injury by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a).  The circuit 
court sentenced Vlazny to two years imprisonment but stayed the 
sentence and placed him on three years probation.2  As a 
condition of probation, the circuit court initially ordered 
Vlazny to pay $500,000 in restitution to Huml.  Subsequently, 
the circuit court amended the restitution order after Vlazny and 
Huml stipulated, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c), that 
restitution should be set at $140,000, payable for the duration 
of probation in monthly installments of $425. 
¶8 
At a January 24, 1994, restitution hearing, Court 
Commissioner Paul Barrett noted that the parties' agreed-upon 
restitution schedule would leave the majority of the ordered 
restitution unpaid at the end of Vlazny's probation.3  Assistant 
District Attorney Steven Watson informed the commissioner that 
Huml planned to initiate a civil suit against Vlazny, and that 
any restitution payments would be set off in the civil suit. 
¶9 
On May 16, 1995, Huml filed a civil action against 
Vlazny and the insurer of the car he was driving, St. Paul Fire 
and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul).  Watson, who had left 
the district attorney's office, represented Huml in her civil 
suit.  Huml settled her suit against Vlazny and St. Paul on 
December 12, 1996.  The settlement agreement provided: 
                                                 
2 In addition, Vlazny served 361 days in the Walworth County 
Jail in connection with the crime. 
3 Had Vlazny remained on probation for three years, he would 
have paid to Huml a total of $15,300. 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
5 
 
 
The parties agree that in consideration of the 
full discharge of past, present and future claims 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
allegations 
set 
forth 
in 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint . . . , as a result of 
the 
alleged actions 
or 
omissions 
of 
Defendants, 
Insurer 
agrees 
to 
pay 
the 
sum 
hereinafter 
specified. . . .  
 
This Settlement Agreement and Release shall apply 
to all claims, whether known or unknown, on the part 
of all parties to this Agreement.  In consideration of 
the payments called for herein, Plaintiff completely 
releases and forever discharges Defendants, Insurer, 
and 
their 
agents . . . from 
any 
or 
all 
claims, 
actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, 
costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation 
whatsoever, including court costs, legal expenses and 
attorneys' fees which the undersigned now has or had 
or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any 
way arising out of any and all known and unknown, 
foreseen 
and 
unforeseen 
bodily 
and 
personal 
injuries . . . resulting from the accident, casualty 
or event listed in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.  
(Emphasis added.) 
In exchange for releasing Vlazny and St. Paul, Huml received an 
initial lump sum payment of $548,000, monthly payments for the 
rest of her life in increasing amounts, and larger periodic 
payments paid on average every 16 to 18 months. 
 
¶10 Meanwhile, Vlazny remained on probation.  Because his 
restitution payments were sporadic, his probation was twice 
extended by the court.  In August 2002, more than eight years 
after Vlazny was sentenced, his probation agent recommended that 
Vlazny 
be 
released 
from 
probation 
and 
that 
the 
unpaid 
restitution be reduced to a civil judgment.  The circuit court 
terminated Vlazny's probation in December 2002.  He had paid 
$33,705 to Huml, leaving a balance of $107,900.46.  Pursuant to 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
6 
 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(b), the circuit court entered judgment 
for Huml against Vlazny for the amount of unpaid restitution. 
 
¶11 When Huml attempted to enforce the judgment against 
Vlazny, Vlazny filed a motion in the criminal court to vacate 
the judgment or reduce it to zero, arguing that the settlement 
agreement precluded Huml from enforcing the judgment.  The 
criminal court ruled that the matter became a civil matter when 
the restitution order was reduced to judgment, and it directed 
Vlazny to proceed in civil court.  Accordingly, Vlazny filed a 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement in civil court. 
 
¶12 The circuit court denied Vlazny's motion to reduce the 
judgment to zero, concluding that the settlement agreement had 
no effect upon Huml's ability to enforce the judgment.  Vlazny 
appealed and the court of appeals certified the following 
question: "Whether a written settlement agreement and release 
discharging a defendant from civil liability for all past, 
present and future claims arising out of his or her criminal 
conduct precludes the crime victim from enforcing a subsequent 
judgment for unpaid restitution entered after the defendant has 
been released from probation."  Huml v. Vlazny, No. 2004AP36, 
unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2005). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶13 The 
issue 
presented 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) 
and 
973.20(1r), 
which 
we 
do 
independent of the circuit court's analysis.  State v. Sweat, 
208 Wis. 2d 409, 414-15, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997).  Additionally, 
we must review the settlement agreement to determine whether the 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
7 
 
parties intended it to encompass the restitution judgment.  
Contract interpretation and whether a contract is ambiguous are 
both questions of law we review de novo.  Wis. Label Corp. v. 
Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 26, ¶¶22, 23, 233 
Wis. 2d 314, 607 N.W.2d 276. 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
¶14 In 
statutory 
interpretation, 
we 
begin 
with 
the 
language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous after 
considering the text of the statute, its context, and any 
policies evident from the text, our analysis ordinarily stops 
and we give effect to the intent of the legislature as set forth 
in the plain language of the statute.  Id., ¶¶46, 48.  In the 
absence of ambiguity, we do not look to extrinsic sources to 
ascertain legislative intent, except to bolster the plain 
meaning interpretation.  Id., ¶51. 
 
¶15 A statute is ambiguous when it is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation.  Id., ¶47.  "Ambiguity can 
be found in the words of the statutory provision itself, or by 
the words of the provision as they interact with and relate to 
other provisions in the statute and to other statutes."  Sweat, 
208 Wis. 2d at 416.  We conclude that when they are juxtaposed, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r) are ambiguous. 
 
¶16 On 
one 
hand, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(b) 
plainly 
requires a circuit court to inform the probationer that a "civil 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
8 
 
judgment" will be entered against him for the amount of unpaid 
restitution.  Section 973.09(3)(b) states: 
If the court does not extend probation, it shall issue 
a judgment for the unpaid restitution and direct the 
clerk of circuit court to file and enter the judgment 
in the judgment and lien docket, without fee, unless 
it finds that the victim has already recovered a 
judgment against the probationer for the damages 
covered by the restitution order.  If the court issues 
a judgment for the unpaid restitution, the court shall 
send to the person at his last-known address written 
notification that a civil judgment has been issued for 
the unpaid restitution.  The judgment has the same 
force and effect as judgments entered under s. 806.10.  
(Emphasis added.) 
The statute appears to provide that upon completion of a 
defendant's probation, the circuit court shall enter a "civil 
judgment" "for the unpaid restitution," "unless it finds that 
the victim has already recovered a judgment against the 
probationer for the damages covered by the restitution order."  
This judgment has the same force and effect as other judgments 
for money under Wis. Stat. § 806.10.  Accordingly, the statute 
implies that a separate settlement agreement could encompass the 
judgment derived from the restitution order and could preclude 
the victim from enforcing the judgment. 
¶17 On the other hand, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) suggests a 
judgment derived from a restitution order retains its nature as 
restitution, but that the victim may enforce the judgment by 
using 
civil 
enforcement 
mechanisms 
(e.g., 
attachment 
or 
garnishment) or by seeking remedial sanctions for contempt.  
Section 
973.20(1r) 
states: 
"After 
the 
termination 
of 
probation, . . . restitution 
ordered 
under 
this 
section 
is 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
9 
 
enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action 
by the victim named in the order to receive restitution or 
enforced under ch. 785."   Based on this statute, a reasonable 
person might conclude that any unpaid restitution, even when 
reduced to a judgment, retains its nature as restitution and 
cannot be bargained away in a settlement agreement. 
¶18 To resolve the ambiguity in the relationship between 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r), we look to the broad 
context of these two statutes. 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09 grants a circuit court the 
authority to impose probation upon a criminal defendant.  
Probation serves two purposes, to rehabilitate the defendant and 
to protect society and the public interest.  State v. Gray, 225 
Wis. 2d 39, 68, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999); Huggett v. State, 83 
Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978). 
¶20 In 
furtherance 
of 
these 
dual 
purposes, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b) requires a court to impose restitution 
upon any person placed on probation, "unless the court finds 
there is substantial reason not to order restitution as a 
condition 
of 
probation." 
 
As 
a 
condition 
of 
probation, 
restitution tends to promote rehabilitation by "strengthening 
the 
individual's 
sense 
of 
responsibility." 
 
Huggett, 
83 
Wis. 2d at 798.  Restitution makes at least some of the injury 
inflicted upon the victim tangible to the defendant.  The 
primary purpose of restitution, however, is to compensate the 
victim, thereby advancing society's interest in seeing victims 
made whole.  See Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 422; Huggett, 83 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
10 
 
Wis. 2d at 798; State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, ¶8, 234 
Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 147. 
¶21 The 
link 
between 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09 
and 
973.20 
appears in § 973.09(1)(b), which contains a cross-reference to 
§ 973.20. 
 
Section 
973.20 
dictates 
the 
requirements 
and 
limitations of restitution orders.4 
¶22 An overview of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09 and 973.20 reveals 
that a fundamental policy of these statutes is to make victims 
whole without allowing them to receive double recoveries.  To 
achieve this result, the statutes afford three opportunities to 
avoid double recovery.  First, a defendant may assert any 
defense, including accord and satisfaction or setoff, in the 
sentencing hearing at which the circuit court determines whether 
to impose restitution.  § 973.20(14)(b); Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 
424.  Second, before a circuit court reduces any unpaid 
restitution to a civil judgment, the probationer may prove that 
the victim has already recovered damages from him that are the 
same 
as 
the 
damages 
covered 
by 
the 
restitution 
order.  
§ 973.09(3)(b).  Third, in a civil action a defendant may prove 
that restitution payments set off part or all of a civil 
judgment in favor of the victim. § 973.20(8). 
                                                 
4 For instance, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 prescribes: (a) how to 
value the amount of restitution depending on the nature of the 
crime, § 973.20(2) to (4m); (b) what types of damages may be 
included in a restitution order, § 973.20(5); (c) to whom 
restitution must be paid and in what sequence, § 973.20(5)(d), 
(6), (7), and (9); and (d) when and how restitution payments are 
made, § 973.20(10) to (12). 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
11 
 
¶23 The procedural posture of this case does not fit 
snugly within any of these three scenarios.  Huml and Vlazny did 
not enter into the settlement agreement until after the 
sentencing court imposed the restitution order.  We cannot tell—
—because we do not have the record——whether Vlazny had the 
opportunity to object to the entry of the civil judgment for the 
$107,900.46 of unpaid restitution.5  In any event, Vlazny does 
not seek to set off from the settlement agreement the amount of 
restitution he paid.6  Rather, Vlazny claims his settlement 
agreement with Huml precludes her from enforcing the judgment 
derived from the unpaid restitution. 
¶24 Because the timing of events in this case does not fit 
cleanly into the statutory scheme, and because Huml and Vlazny 
present competing reasonable interpretations, we look to (1) 
legislative history; (2) relevant case law; and (3) public 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(3)(b) 
requires 
the 
sentencing 
court to "hold a probation review hearing prior to the 
expiration 
date 
[of 
probation], 
unless 
the 
hearing 
is 
voluntarily waived by the probationer . . . ."  If the probation 
review hearing is waived, the sentencing court must issue a 
judgment for the unpaid restitution.  If the review hearing is 
not waived, the court must issue a judgment for the unpaid 
restitution "unless it finds that the victim has already 
recovered a judgment against the probationer for the damages 
covered by the restitution order."  We do not know if the 
sentencing 
court 
complied 
with 
either 
alternative 
before 
reducing the $107,900.46 to judgment.  
6 Despite paying $33,705 in restitution to Huml, Vlazny has 
not sought to recover this amount by arguing that it should be 
set off against the amount Huml recovered under the settlement 
agreement. 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
12 
 
policy to determine which interpretation best accords with 
legislative intent. 
A. 
Legislative History 
¶25 The relevant portions of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) 
and 973.20(1r) are the result of two bills crafted by the 
Judicial Council, 1987 Assembly Bill 190, enacted as 1987 
Wisconsin Act 398, and 1989 Assembly Bill 316, enacted as 1989 
Wisconsin Act 188, §§ 1 and 2.  Included in 1987 Wisconsin Act 
398 are Judicial Council notes that explain the changes made by 
the Act. 
¶26 Three notes are of interest.  The first, the Judicial 
Council Prefatory Note, summarizes the changes to the then-
existing law, and states that the Act "allows unpaid restitution 
to be enforced by the victim as a civil judgment when the 
offender is released from probation . . . ."  1987 Wis. Act 398 
(emphasis added). 
¶27 The second Judicial Council note elaborates on this 
point, stating: 
The availability of a civil judgment for unpaid 
restitution 
enforceable 
by 
the 
victim 
under 
s. 
973.20(1), stats., substantially reduces the necessity 
of extending probation solely for the purpose of 
enforcing 
court-ordered 
payments, 
a 
practice 
of 
questionable cost-effectiveness.  [citation omitted]  
Probation may, however, be extended upon stipulation 
of the defendant, to enforce community service in 
satisfaction of restitution, or when the probationer 
has not made a good faith effort to make restitution 
or other payments. 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee 
Note, 
1987, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09 
(emphasis added). 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
13 
 
 
¶28 The third relevant Judicial Council note states that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20 "allows restitution unpaid at the time 
probation or parole supervision terminates to be enforced by the 
victim as a judgment creditor."  Judicial Council Committee 
Note, 
1987, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
These 
Judicial Council notes demonstrate a legislative intent that 
unpaid restitution be converted to a civil judgment upon the 
termination of probation. 
 
¶29 Governor Tommy Thompson vetoed the language in 1987 
Assembly Bill 190 that would have converted a restitution order 
into a civil judgment.7  Gov. Tommy Thompson, Veto Message to 
Assembly Bill 190 (available at Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wisconsin).  In his veto message, Governor Thompson 
explained that he vetoed these provisions because they raised 
                                                 
7 Governor Thompson vetoed the following language from what 
would have been Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(b): 
If the court does not extend probation, it shall issue 
a judgment for the unpaid restitution and direct the 
clerk to file and docket a transcript of the judgment, 
without fee, unless it finds that the victim has 
already recovered a judgment against the probationer 
for the damages covered by the restitution order.  The 
clerk shall send a copy of the judgment to the victim.  
The judgment has the same force and effect as 
judgments docketed under ss. 806.10 and 809.25. 
1987 Wis. Act 398, § 37. 
Likewise, Governor Thompson vetoed the stricken text in 
what 
would 
have 
been 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1): 
"After 
the 
termination of probation . . . , restitution ordered under this 
section is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in a 
civil action by the victim named in the order to receive 
restitution or enforced under ch. 785."  Id., § 43. 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
14 
 
constitutional concerns.  Id.  Specifically, Governor Thompson 
objected to the fact the bill would have allowed a civil 
judgment to be entered without a separate trial to establish the 
propriety of restitution or its amount.  Id. 
 
¶30 The 
effect 
of 
Governor 
Thompson's 
veto 
was 
to 
perpetuate the practice of requiring crime victims to whom 
restitution was owed to institute separate civil actions to 
collect any unpaid restitution once a defendant was released 
from probation.  See Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File 
for 1989 Wis. Act 188, Analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau of 1989 Assembly Bill 316. 
 
¶31 In 
response 
to 
the 
veto, 
the 
Judicial 
Council 
sponsored 1989 Assembly Bill 316, which contained language 
nearly identical to that which was vetoed by the Governor.  In a 
memo to the Senate Judiciary and Consumer Affairs Committee, 
James Fullin, Executive Secretary of the Judicial Council and 
the Reporter for the Judicial Council Restitution Committee, 
explained that (1) the proposal to allow a circuit court "to 
enter a civil judgment for unpaid restitution" was modeled on 
federal law, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 
(VWPA);8 and (2) at least six federal circuits had upheld the 
                                                 
8 The relevant portion of the VWPA stated: "An order of 
restitution may be enforced . . . by the victim named in the 
order to receive the restitution in the same manner as a 
judgment in a civil action."  18 U.S.C. § 3663(h) (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1987) (emphasis added).  This provision was initially 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982).  See Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291 § 5. 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
15 
 
analogous federal provision against constitutional challenges.  
Memorandum from James Fullin to Senate Judiciary and Consumer 
Affairs Committee (Jan. 9, 1990) (available at the Wisconsin 
State Law Library).  On April 10, 1990, 1989 Assembly Bill 316 
was enacted as 1989 Wisconsin Act 188, creating the language at 
issue in this case.  Thus, although the three above-described 
Legislative Council notes were part of 1987 Wisconsin Act 398, 
they apply with equal force to explain 1989 Wisconsin Act 188. 
¶32 In addition to the Judicial Council notes, the 
analysis of 1989 Assembly Bill 316 by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau, which is printed on the bill, stated: 
Under present law, if a probationer or parolee 
does not pay the court-ordered restitution in full 
prior to termination of the probation or parole, or if 
a defendant not placed on probation or parole fails to 
pay the court-ordered restitution, the victim may 
start 
a 
civil 
action 
to 
collect 
any 
unpaid 
restitution.  The victim may start a civil action, 
obtain a judgment for the unpaid restitution, and 
proceed with collection procedures on the judgment.  
Under this bill, restitution unpaid at the end of a 
probation or parole period is docketed as a civil 
judgment if the victim has not already obtained a 
judgment for the damages covered by the restitution 
order. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1989 Wis. Act 
188, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1989 
Assembly Bill 316 (emphasis added). 
¶33 The legislative history, therefore, demonstrates that 
the 
drafters——and, 
in 
turn, 
the 
legislature——intended 
a 
restitution order to become a civil judgment upon the completion 
of probation.  The changes effected by 1987 Wisconsin Act 398 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
16 
 
and 1989 Wisconsin Act 188 streamlined the procedure to reduce 
unpaid restitution to a civil judgment.  Based in part on this 
underlying 
history, 
we 
conclude 
the 
more 
reasonable 
interpretation of the phrase "in the same manner as a judgment 
in a civil action" in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) is that the 
resulting judgment is a civil judgment.  The conditional 
language in the statute may reflect the abbreviated procedure by 
which the judgment was obtained, but it does not diminish the 
fact that the judgment is a civil judgment. 
¶34 Simplifying the procedure by which a victim obtains a 
judgment to enforce unpaid restitution is entirely consistent 
with the overarching purposes of the legislation: to promote the 
dignity of crime victims, to maximize the respect afforded 
victims by the criminal justice system, and to increase the 
amount of restitution recovered.  Allowing a victim to negotiate 
to extinguish his or her interest in a judgment derived from a 
restitution order as part of a global settlement is consistent 
with the legislature's desire to afford respect to the dignity 
of victims. 
B. 
Relevant Case Law 
1. 
Wisconsin Case Law 
¶35 The parties focus their analyses on three Wisconsin 
cases: Sweat; State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 591 N.W.2d 874 
(Ct. App. 1999); and Olson v. Kaprelian, 202 Wis. 2d 377, 550 
N.W.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1996).  Consequently, a brief summary and 
discussion of each case is necessary. 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
17 
 
¶36 In Sweat the defendant claimed a civil statute of 
limitations barred the state from seeking restitution.  Sweat, 
208 
Wis. 2d at 
412. 
 
The 
defendant 
relied 
upon 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), 
which 
states 
in 
part, 
"[t]he 
defendant may assert any defense that he or she could raise in a 
civil action for the loss sought to be compensated."  The court 
rejected the defendant's argument.  Id. at 414.  Instead, it 
interpreted § 973.20(14)(b) to mean that in a restitution 
proceeding a defendant may raise any defense that goes to the 
amount of restitution, such as mitigation, setoff, or accord and 
satisfaction.9  Id. at 424. 
¶37 The availability of accord and satisfaction and setoff 
as defenses to the amount of restitution a circuit court can 
order supports the idea that a victim can give up her right to 
enforce a judgment derived from a restitution order.  Of course, 
a settlement agreement does not necessarily prevent the circuit 
court from ordering restitution, Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 905, 
nor does it necessarily prevent enforcement of a restitution 
order during the term of probation.  Only if a circuit court 
                                                 
9 "Accord 
and 
satisfaction" 
means 
"[a]n 
agreement 
to 
substitute for an existing debt some alternative form of 
discharging that debt, coupled with the actual discharge of the 
debt by the substituted performance."  Black's Law Dictionary 17 
(7th ed. 1999). 
Accord and satisfaction "bars further liability when an 
offer of performance in exchange for full satisfaction of a 
disputed claim is accepted and the promised performance occurs."  
State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 904, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
18 
 
first finds that enforcement of the restitution order would 
result in double recovery for the victim can a settlement 
agreement affect a circuit court's authority to enter or enforce 
a restitution order while a defendant remains on probation. 
¶38 The court has broad power to require restitution, so 
long as the restitution serves statutory purposes.  Restitution 
serves the dual purposes of making the victim whole and 
rehabilitating the defendant.  Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 423.  If a 
restitution order does not serve both purposes, restitution is 
not appropriate.  Thus, if a settlement agreement fails to make 
the victim whole——as determined independently by the circuit 
court——the court may enter a restitution order and enforce it 
while the defendant remains on probation.  See Herr v. Lanaghan, 
2006 WI App 29, ¶¶19-20, __ Wis. 2d __, 710 N.W.2d 496. 
¶39 In Walters the court of appeals held that a civil 
settlement does not restrict the power of a court to order a 
defendant to pay restitution after the defendant and victim 
settle.  Walters, 224 Wis. 2d at 899.  Like the present case, 
Walters arose out of an automobile accident for which the 
defendant was convicted of operating an automobile while 
intoxicated.  Id.  The defendant in Walters argued that a civil 
settlement, which included a release for "all claims and 
damages" that resulted from the accident, should prevent a 
circuit court from being able to enter a restitution order.    
Id. at 899-900.  The court of appeals rejected the defendant's 
contention, explaining that restitution is a remedy that belongs 
to the State and that "a victim has no independent claim to 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
19 
 
restitution which he or she can release . . . ."  Id. at 904-05.  
Significantly, in Walters, the defendant made no attempt to 
prove that enforcement of the restitution order would result in 
a double recovery for the victim.  Id. at 899-900.  Moreover, 
unlike the present case, Walters did not address what happens to 
a restitution order upon the termination of probation. 
 
¶40 In Olson the court of appeals confronted a sequence of 
events the reverse of that presented in Walters.  In Olson the 
criminal court entered a restitution order before the parties 
entered into a settlement agreement.10  Olson, 202 Wis. 2d at 
380.  After a subsequent settlement, the victim attempted to 
enforce the outstanding restitution order.  Id. at 380.  The 
court of appeals acknowledged that a civil settlement and a pre-
existing restitution order could affect one another.  Id. at 
383. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
explained 
that 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(8) 
restitution 
payments 
may 
offset 
the 
amount of a judgment or settlement in a civil action.  Id.  
Before this can occur, however, the party seeking setoff must 
show that the victim stood to reap a double recovery.  Id.  The 
court of appeals concluded that because the defendant had not 
met this burden, the parties' settlement had no effect upon 
enforcement of the restitution order.  Id. at 383-84. 
                                                 
10 The settlement agreement in Olson was much narrower than 
that agreed to by Huml and Vlazny.  It provided: "That the 
Complaint of Kaprelian, and each of the causes of action 
contained therein, whether pleaded or not, may be dismissed upon 
the merits, with prejudice, without costs and without further 
notice."  Olson v. Kaprelian, 202 Wis. 2d 377, 380, 550 
N.W.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
20 
 
¶41 Finally, in a letter to the court that called our 
attention to supplemental authority, Huml invokes Herr.  In Herr 
the defendant sought to reopen a civil judgment entered pursuant 
to a settlement agreement to offset it by the amount of the 
restitution order imposed by the criminal court after the 
parties had settled.  Herr, 710 N.W.2d 496, ¶6.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision to reopen the 
civil judgment, but reversed and remanded the circuit court's 
decision to grant the defendant the offset.  Id., ¶16.  The 
court of appeals held that before setoff was appropriate, the 
circuit court first had to determine whether the damages covered 
in the civil judgment were the same as the special damages11 
covered in the restitution order (i.e., would the result of 
enforcing both the restitution order and the civil judgment be 
double recovery).  Id., ¶20. 
 
¶42 Walters, Olson, and Herr do not address what happens 
to 
unpaid 
restitution 
upon 
the 
completion 
of 
probation.  
Accordingly, we agree with Vlazny that Huml's reliance on these 
cases is misplaced.  We decline Huml's invitation to extend the 
holdings of these cases——that a defendant must prove double 
recovery before a settlement agreement can affect a restitution 
                                                 
11 A restitution order is limited to special damages.  
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a).  Special damages mean "any readily 
ascertainable pecuniary expenditure paid out because of the 
crime."  State v. Johnson, 2005 WI App 201, ¶12, 287 Wis. 2d 381 
704 N.W.2d 625 (interpreting § 973.20(5)).  General damages, 
such as pain and suffering, may not be imposed as part of a 
criminal restitution order.  State v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 
60-61, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
21 
 
order——to proceedings after the defendant is released from 
probation. 
¶43 Huml's position is further undermined by State v. 
Davis, 127 Wis. 2d 486, 381 N.W.2d 333 (1986).  Thelmer Davis 
was placed on probation for five years and ordered to pay 
restitution for committing welfare fraud.  Id. at 487-88.  Three 
times the circuit court extended Davis's probation because 
restitution remained unpaid.  Id. at 489-491.  This court 
concluded it was inappropriate to extend probation when the only 
reason to do so was to collect unpaid restitution.  Id. at 497-
98.  We explained the circuit court's decision to extend Davis's 
probation was an erroneous exercise of discretion because it 
effectively transformed the criminal justice system into a 
collection agency "to collect what eventually became no more 
than a civil debt."  Id. at 499.  Davis, therefore, stands for 
the proposition that once the penal and rehabilitative purposes 
of restitution have been served, only a civil debt remains.  
Id.; see also Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d at 803-04. 
¶44 It is true that restitution in a criminal case is a 
remedy that belongs to the state, not to the victim.  Walters, 
224 Wis. 2d at 904.  Termination of probation, however, signals 
the state's disavowal of any penal or rehabilitative interests.  
Cf. State v. Jackson, 128 Wis. 2d 356, 365-66, 382 N.W.2d 429 
(1986); Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d at 803-04.  Thereafter, only the 
goal of compensating the victim remains.  This is an objective 
adequately accomplished by entry of a civil judgment, which can 
be enforced through civil enforcement mechanisms.  Consequently, 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
22 
 
it is consistent with Wisconsin precedent to allow a victim, in 
anticipation of the defendant completing probation, to release 
her 
right 
to 
enforce 
any 
judgment 
derived 
from 
unpaid 
restitution as part of a settlement agreement. 
2. 
Federal Case Law 
 
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(1r) was based in part on the 
federal VWPA, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h) (1982 & Supp. IV 
1987).12 
 
See 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee 
Note, 
1987, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20. 
 
Consequently, 
Huml 
relies 
to 
a 
considerable extent upon federal case law interpreting this 
provision.13 
 
¶46 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h) provided: 
An order of restitution may be enforced by the United 
States in the manner provided in sections 1812 and 
1813 or in the same manner as a judgment in a civil 
action, and by the victim named in the order to 
receive the restitution in the same manner as a 
judgment in a civil action. 
As the Judicial Council note indicates, the phrase, "in the same 
manner 
as 
a 
judgment 
in 
a 
civil 
action[]" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) was imported from 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h).  
                                                 
12 All references to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h) are to the 1982 
edition of the United States Code as updated by Supplement IV in 
1987. 
13 "It is well established that federal cases may provide 
persuasive guidance to the proper application of state law 
copied 
from 
federal 
law." 
 
State 
v. 
Gudenschwager, 
191 
Wis. 2d 431, 
439, 
529 
N.W.2d 225 
(1995); 
see 
State 
v. 
Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 751-52, 460 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. App. 
1990) (also noting that Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is modeled on the 
VWPA). 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
23 
 
Despite copying some language from 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h), there is 
a critical difference between Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) and 18 
U.S.C. § 3663(h).  Unlike the analogous Wisconsin provisions, 
neither 18 U.S.C. § 3663 nor any other section of the VWPA 
contains a provision that directs a court to enter a judgment 
against the defendant for any unpaid restitution when probation 
ends.  Consequently, the federal cases cited by Huml merely hold 
(1) that the availability of civil enforcement mechanisms does 
not convert a restitution order into a civil judgment; and (2) 
the existence of a settlement agreement cannot preclude a 
district court from entering a restitution order.  See e.g., 
Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 703 
(2d. Cir. 2000) ("§ 3663 contained no suggestion that a court 
may convert a restitution order into a civil judgment or modify 
a restitution order in a civil suit."); United States v. Karam, 
201 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Timilty, 148 
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 
443, 448 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Johnson, 983 F.2d 
216, 220 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846, 
854 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 
839 (11th Cir. 1984).  Contrary to Huml's assertion, because of 
the differences in statutory language, cases interpreting 18 
U.S.C. 
§ 3663(h) 
are 
of 
little, 
if 
any, 
assistance 
in 
interpreting Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r). 
C. 
Public Policy 
¶47 Finally, 
Vlazny's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r) is consistent with 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
24 
 
good public policy.  First, there is considerable value in 
permitting a victim to release her interest in a judgment 
derived from a restitution order because it allows the victim to 
settle the case and replace an uncertain, future recovery with a 
certain, immediate recovery. 
¶48 Second, permitting a release gives a victim an 
additional 
source 
of 
leverage 
to 
negotiate 
a 
favorable 
settlement. 
¶49 Third, there are safeguards to promote the recovery of 
restitution by victims.  On the civil side, in most situations 
where a substantial dollar amount is at stake, a victim will be 
represented by an attorney when negotiating a settlement.  
Preserving the right to enforce a judgment derived from a 
restitution order, therefore, should be as simple as including 
an express exception in the settlement agreement.  On the 
criminal side, because probation can be extended if a defendant 
with the ability to pay fails to make good faith efforts to 
comply with a restitution order, Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d at 803, 
there should be little concern that defendants will be able to 
duck their restitution obligations.  Furthermore, if restitution 
would result in double recovery for the victim, a circuit court 
can still enter a restitution order, "[i]f justice so requires," 
that imposes an obligation upon the defendant to "reimburse any 
insurer, surety or other person who has compensated a victim for 
a 
loss 
otherwise 
compensable 
under 
this 
section."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(d). 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
25 
 
¶50 For all these reasons, we conclude that a civil 
settlement agreement can have no effect upon a restitution order 
while the defendant is on probation unless the circuit court 
first finds that continued enforcement of the restitution order 
would result in a double recovery for the victim.  After a 
defendant is released from probation and any unpaid restitution 
becomes a civil judgment, however, a settlement agreement 
between the victim and the defendant may preclude the victim 
from enforcing the judgment. 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
 
¶51 Having determined that a settlement agreement can 
preclude 
the 
enforcement 
of 
a 
judgment 
derived 
from 
a 
restitution order, we consider whether the terms of the 
settlement agreement between Vlazny and Huml have this effect. 
 
¶52 The lodestar of contract interpretation is the intent 
of the parties.  Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶15, 234 
Wis. 2d 670, 610 N.W.2d 832.  In ascertaining the intent of the 
parties, contract terms should be given their plain or ordinary 
meaning.  Goldstein v. Lindner, 2002 WI App 122, ¶12, 254 
Wis. 2d 673, 648 N.W.2d 892.  If the contract is unambiguous, 
our attempt to determine the parties' intent ends with the four 
corners of the contract, without consideration of extrinsic 
evidence.  Id. 
¶53 Vlazny contends the settlement agreement is clear; it 
bars Huml from enforcing "any or all claims, actions, causes of 
action, demands, rights, [or] damages," without any language to 
exclude judgments derived from unpaid restitution from the scope 
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
26 
 
of the settlement.  It discharges "in full" past, present, and 
future claims.  In using such sweeping words as "any," "all," 
and "whatsoever," the settlement is "global" in its coverage.  
Huml does not dispute that the breadth of the language in the 
settlement agreement encompasses her judgment against Vlazny.  
Rather, she depends upon the argument that a judgment derived 
from a restitution order retains its nature as restitution and 
can never be affected by a settlement agreement, unless the 
defendant establishes that the victim would receive a double 
recovery. 
¶54 We have already rejected Huml's argument.  Once unpaid 
restitution imposed by a restitution order is reduced to a civil 
judgment under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(b), a settlement agreement 
may take effect and preclude enforcement of the judgment. 
¶55 We conclude that the global settlement agreement 
between Huml and Vlazny precludes Huml from enforcing the 
judgment for $107,900.46.  The settlement agreement is a fully 
integrated contract intended to be the final expression of Huml 
and Vlazny's agreement.  Absent ambiguity, it is improper to 
consider extrinsic evidence of intent.  Dairyland Equip. 
Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen, 94 Wis. 2d 600, 607, 288 N.W.2d 852 
(1980); Wis. End-User Gas Ass'n v. PSC, 218 Wis. 2d 558, 567, 
581 N.W.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1998).  Because we conclude the plain 
language of the settlement agreement released all Huml's claims 
and rights to damages arising from the accident, we will not 
consider extrinsic evidence of a contrary intent.  This settles 
the issue.   
No. 
  2004AP36 
 
27 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶56 We conclude that a civil settlement agreement can have 
no effect upon a restitution order while the defendant remains 
on probation, unless the circuit court finds that enforcing the 
restitution order in addition to the settlement agreement would 
result in a double recovery for the victim.  After a defendant 
is released from probation, however, and any unpaid restitution 
under the restitution order is converted to a civil judgment, a 
settlement agreement between the victim and defendant may——
depending upon its terms——preclude the victim from enforcing the 
judgment.  We conclude that the global settlement agreement that 
Huml entered into with Vlazny precludes her from enforcing the 
judgment converted from the restitution order. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2004AP36.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶57 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority that after the defendant's probation ends unpaid 
restitution 
is 
reduced 
to 
a 
civil 
judgment 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r) (2003-04).  I also do 
not dispute that the right to enforcement of this judgment may 
be released by the parties.  However, in my view where 
restitution has been required in a criminal proceeding, any 
release in a settlement of a personal injury claim brought by 
the victim involved should contain express language that 
addresses the issue of future payments in restitution.  Such 
express language certainly is preferable to the uncertainty that 
has been created by the actions and circumstances surrounding 
the 
issue 
of 
restitution 
in 
this 
case. 
 
Therefore, 
I 
respectfully concur.  
¶58 I am not at all confident that the parties in this 
case contemplated, or future parties in a similar position will 
contemplate, unpaid criminal restitution as falling within the 
terms of a civil settlement agreement as a matter of course.  
Given the policies behind restitution, I conclude the better 
result for future victims entitled to restitution payments is an 
express release of their right to enforcement of a civil 
judgment resulting from unpaid criminal restitution. 
¶59 The majority recognizes that the overarching purposes 
of 1987 Wisconsin Act 398 and 1989 Wisconsin Act 188 are: "to 
promote the dignity of crime victims, to maximize the respect 
No.  2004AP36.jpw 
 
2 
 
afforded victims by the criminal justice system, and to increase 
the amount of restitution recovered."  Majority op., ¶34.  I 
agree; however, a better approach to achieving these three 
policy objectives is to require an express agreement to ensure 
that a victim truly intends to release her right to restitution 
payments after the defendant is released from probation.   
¶60 Furthermore, 
restitution 
"serves 
the 
purposes 
of 
punishment and rehabilitation of the defendant, while seeking to 
make the victim of criminal acts whole in regard to the special 
damages sustained," State v. Walters, 224 Wis. 2d 897, 904, 591 
N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999).  Given these policy implications, I 
believe that unpaid restitution should not be swept up into a 
settlement agreement that is silent to any such consideration.   
¶61 The public has an interest in having defendants pay 
the full amount of restitution.  The public wants victims to be 
made whole.  It is one thing if the victim expressly settles the 
unpaid amount of restitution.  It is another thing to have the 
defendant get off the hook because of a "global" settlement 
agreement that lacks any apparent contemplation of such a 
judgment. 
¶62 The majority concludes that the "global" settlement 
agreement Huml signed approximately six years prior to Vlazny's 
termination "is a fully integrated contract intended to be the 
final expression of Huml and Vlazny's agreement."  Majority op., 
¶55.  This settlement includes broad, boilerplate language, but 
it does not include any reference to judgments or restitution. 
No.  2004AP36.jpw 
 
3 
 
¶63 As I alluded to above, the actions of the parties seem 
to indicate that neither party intended for this agreement to 
include unpaid restitution after probation.  Between December 
1996, when the settlement agreement was signed and August 2002, 
Vlazny made 49 restitution payments, and at no time during his 
probation did Vlazny request any offset of his restitution 
payments based on the settlement agreement.  Furthermore, at the 
time of Vlazny's release from probation, Vlazny's probation 
agent wrote that he had "spoken with the victim in the case and 
she has no objections to a Civil Judgment for restitution."  If 
Huml had realized the settlement agreement encompassed an unpaid 
restitution judgment, she likely would have contested the 
release of Vlazny from probation.   
¶64 Despite the apparent confusion surrounding the issue 
of restitution in this case, I ultimately agree with the 
majority that the broad language of the settlement agreement 
releases 
Vlazny 
from 
any 
requirement 
of 
making 
future 
restitution payments.  However, given the legislative intent 
behind 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) 
and 
973.20(1r) 
and 
the 
policies 
behind 
restitution, 
I 
would 
require 
victims 
to 
expressly release a civil judgment for unpaid restitution in 
settlement agreements.     
¶65 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2004AP36.jpw 
 
 
 
1