Title: Chung v. Rosenblum
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S070965
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2024

422	
June 6, 2024	
No. 20
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
STATE OF OREGON
Sandy CHUNG, 
 an individual,
and Yvonne Garcia,  
an individual,
Petitioners,
v.
Ellen ROSENBLUM,  
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S070965)
On petition to review ballot title filed March 21, 2024; 
considered and under advisement on May 7, 2024.*
Kelly Simon, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
Oregon, Inc., Portland, filed the petition and reply memorandum 
for petitioners. Also on those filings was Alicia LeDuc Montgomery.
Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
filed the answering memorandum for respondent. Also 
on the memorandum were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog, Bushong, James, and 
Masih, Justices.*
DEHOOG, J.
The ballot title is referred to the Attorney General for 
modification.
­
______________
	
*  Flynn, C.J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024)	
423
	
DEHOOG, J.
	
Petitioners seek review of the Attorney General’s 
certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54 (2024) (IP 54), 
contending that the summary does not comply with the 
requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(d). We review the 
ballot title to determine whether it substantially complies 
with those requirements. See ORS 250.085(5) (setting out 
that standard). For the reasons explained below, we refer 
the ballot title for IP 54 to the Attorney General for modifi-
cation of the summary.
I.  OVERVIEW OF IP 54
	
We begin with an overview of IP 54, a copy of which 
is attached as an Appendix. IP 54 would enact an “Oregon 
Crimefighting Act,” which, among other provisions, would 
change current law that applies to the pretrial release of 
persons charged with “serious crime[s].” IP 54 defines a “seri-
ous crime” as any felony or Class A misdemeanor charged in 
circuit court. IP 54, Part A, § 1.a.
	
Part A of IP 54 contains the operative provisions 
relating to pretrial release. It first expressly prohibits release 
before arraignment of any defendant charged with a serious 
crime. IP 54, Part A, § 2. It next provides that, when a defen-
dant is arraigned, the judge shall review the charges and 
the defendant’s record, and then decide whether the defen-
dant shall be released pending trial, based on the follow-
ing required considerations: (1) the seriousness of both the 
charges and the defendant’s criminal record, which includes, 
to the extent practicable, all arrests and convictions outside 
of Oregon; and (2) rights established in either the state or 
federal constitutions, including the right of a crime victim 
to be reasonably protected from the defendant throughout 
the criminal justice process, Or Const, Art I, § 43(1)(a), and 
to have pretrial release decisions be based on the principle 
of reasonable protection of the victim and the public, as well 
as the likelihood that the defendant will appear for trial, 
id. at (1)(b). IP 54, Part A, § 3. Also at arraignment, for any 
serious crime, the judge is “empowered to establish security 
424	
Chung v. Rosenblum
as to the appearance” of a defendant, “without restrictions 
previously imposed by statute.”1 Id. § 4.
	
Part A includes two other provisions. First, for any 
person arrested and charged with a serious crime in any 
Oregon circuit court, municipal court, or justice court, all 
state or local agencies “shall cooperate with and comply with 
any custodial hold or order associated with such person[,]” 
including one from any other state or territory, any federal 
agency, any other Oregon county, and any tribal agency. Id. 
§ 5. Second, “the state shall not approve, facilitate, or rec-
ognize any name change” for any person convicted of any 
felony sex crime, first-degree assault, or murder in Oregon, 
or in any United States jurisdiction with substantially sim-
ilar crimes, unless a court finds that extraordinary circum-
stances justify a name change. Id. § 6.
	
Part B of IP 54 provides that local governments 
shall have the power to criminally prohibit or restrict the 
following activities: public intoxication, public drinking of 
alcohol or use of any drug illegal under federal law, disor-
derly conduct, and trespassing on public property. Id. § 1.
	
Part C of IP 54 pertains to funding. It first pro-
vides that the state, through the Department of Corrections 
(DOC), shall reimburse each county for the cost of pretrial 
incarceration of persons charged with serious crimes (with 
related provisions). Id. Part C, § 1. It also provides that DOC 
shall provide—at the state’s expense and using DOC per-
sonnel—incarceration facilities for adults in custody housed 
by a county, for any county jail exceeding 90 percent of its 
capacity for 30 days or more (and continuing until the super-
visory authority confirms that the capacity problem has 
been resolved). Id. §5. Part C also sets out a reimbursement 
rate for the cost of pretrial incarceration, id. at §§ 2 - 4, and 
it provides that none of the reimbursement or housing pro-
visions described in Part C may be set off by any other fund-
ing obligation of the state to any county. Id. § 6.
	
1   As do current Oregon statutes, IP 54 uses the term “security” to mean the 
more commonly understood term, “bail.” See, e.g., ORS 135.265(1) (referring to 
“security amount”). In this opinion, we use the term “security release” to refer 
to release on bail, but we use the simpler term, “bail,” to refer to the setting of a 
“security” amount.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024)	
425
	
If approved by the voters, IP 54 would “super-
sede[ 
] all inconsistent provisions of Oregon law.” Id. Part 
D. It would become effective on passage and would apply to 
crimes committed on or after January 1, 2025. Id. Part E.
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
	
The Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title 
for IP 54, ORS 250.065(3), and the Secretary of State circu-
lated that ballot title for public comment, ORS 250.067(1). 
After considering the substantive comments received, 
the Attorney General modified her draft ballot title, ORS 
250.067(2)(a), and certified the following ballot title to the 
Secretary of State:
“Limits pretrial release, increases state incarcera-
tion costs; requires enforcement of other jurisdic-
tions’ custodial holds/orders
“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: ‘Yes’ vote limits pretrial release, 
increasing jail costs; requires enforcing other jurisdictions’ 
custodial holds/orders; transfers county incarceration 
costs/duties to state in certain circumstances.
“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote retains current pretrial 
release system using risk level assessment, county/state 
incarceration funding system; no requirement to enforce 
other jurisdictions’ custodial holds/orders.
“Summary: Currently, arrested persons may be released 
before first court appearance, depending on crime charged, 
risk level assessment. Counties responsible for pretrial 
incarceration and incarceration sentences under one year. 
State may agree to house county inmate at county expense. 
Persons may legally change name unless change inconsis-
tent with public interest.
“Measure prohibits release of persons charged with felo-
nies/Class A misdemeanors before first court appearance, 
expands judge’s authority to set bail, and requires state to 
pay counties’ pretrial incarceration costs; state/local agen-
cies must enforce custodial holds/orders from other jurisdic-
tions for those persons. State must house county inmates at 
state expense if jail exceeds established capacity threshold. 
Prohibits persons convicted of certain felonies from chang-
ing name. Local governments may prohibit/restrict certain 
activities. Other provisions.”
426	
Chung v. Rosenblum
	
Petitioners are electors who timely submitted com-
ments about the Attorney General’s draft ballot title for IP 
54 and who are dissatisfied with the summary of the cer-
tified ballot title. See ORS 250.085(2) (describing who may 
challenge certified ballot title). We conclude, as explained 
below, that the summary must be modified.
III.  DISCUSSION
	
The summary of a ballot title for a state mea-
sure must contain a “concise and impartial statement” not 
exceeding 125 words that “summariz[es] the * 
* 
* measure 
and its major effect.” ORS 250.035(2)(d). Petitioners contend 
that the summary in the certified ballot title for IP 54 does 
not comply with that standard because it neither sufficiently 
nor accurately describes the proposed measure’s impacts, 
which, they contend, “will result in a total revamp of exist-
ing law and practice in several significant areas,” most 
notably, the law governing pretrial release and bail. They 
relatedly identify specific aspects of both current law and 
IP 54 that the summary either omits or—they contend—
inaccurately describes. The Attorney General responds that 
the summary substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2)
(d) because it uses the available limited words to both tell 
the voters about current law pertaining to pretrial release 
and then describe the substantive changes that IP 54 would 
make.
A.  Comparison of Current Law to IP 54
	
We first briefly summarize the relevant current law 
governing pretrial release, contrasted against Part A of IP 
54, as that contrast relates to petitioners’ arguments.
	
As to release before arraignment, current law tex-
tually emphasizes statewide consistency, the reduction 
of the reliance on security release, and the balancing of 
an arrested person’s rights and a presumption of pretrial 
release against community and victim safety and the risk 
of failure to appear. See ORS 135.233(1) (presiding judge of 
each judicial district shall issue a pretrial release order that 
categorizes arrested persons and offenses in one of three 
ways—those subject to release on recognizance, those sub-
ject to release with special specified conditions (conditional 
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024)	
427
release), and those not eligible for release until arraignment 
(hold for arraignment)); ORS 135.233(2) (Chief Justice shall 
establish release guidelines for those pretrial release orders, 
with the stated purposes of providing a consistent release 
decision-making structure statewide, reducing reliance on 
the use of security, and balancing the defendant’s rights and 
“presumption of pretrial release” against community and 
victim safety and the risk of failure to appear).2 In contrast 
to current law, for any person arrested for a felony or Class A 
misdemeanor, IP 54 would prohibit prearraignment release, 
regardless of the type of crime charged and also regardless 
of any other considerations.3
	
Then, as to release decisions made at arraignment, 
current law requires consideration of several release criteria, 
including review of the defendant’s prior criminal record. See 
ORS 135.230(7); (11) (setting out criteria4); ORS 135.230(10) 
	
2  Pursuant to those statutes, a Chief Justice Order (CJO) is in effect that 
establishes guidelines for the judicial district’s pretrial release orders. Among 
other things, that CJO requires considering the categorization of the crime 
charged (recognizance release, conditional release, and hold for arraignment), as 
well as other objective, nondiscretionary, and person-based considerations, per-
missively including a risk level assessment. CJO 24-014 (May 22, 2024), https://
www.courts.oregon.gov/rules/ Documents/CJO_2024-014.pdf (last accessed May 
30, 2024).
	
3  Current law does prohibit pretrial release—and describes related decision-
making procedures—for certain felonies. See ORS 135.240 (person charged with 
murder, aggravated murder, or treason not subject to release when “the proof is 
evident or the presumption strong” that person is guilty; setting out decision-
making process as to release if those circumstances do not exist; otherwise set-
ting out process for determining whether release shall be denied when defendant 
charged with violent felony and for making related determinations); see also Or 
Const, Art I, § 14 (offenses except murder and treason “shall be bailable by suffi-
cient sureties”; “[m]urder or treason, shall not be bailable, when the proof is evi-
dent, or the presumption strong”); Or Const, Art I, § 43(1)(b) (other than murder, 
aggravated murder, and treason, violent felonies “shall not be bailable” when 
there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime 
and the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a “danger of 
physical injury or sexual victimization” to the victim or the public by the defen-
dant while on release).
	
4  ORS 135.230(7) lists the following “[p]rimary release criteria”: the rea-
sonable protection of the victim or public; the nature of the current charge; the 
defendant’s prior criminal record (if any, but not defined) and whether the defen-
dant appeared for any previously required pretrial appearance; any facts indi-
cating the possibility of violations of law if the defendant were released without 
regulations; and any other facts tending to indicate that the defendant is likely 
to appear. ORS 135.230(11) sets out “[s]econdary” release criteria, including 
the defendant’s employment status history and financial condition, nature and 
extent of family relationships, and past and present residences; the names of 
428	
Chung v. Rosenblum
(magistrate makes release decision based on criteria); see 
also ORS 135.240 (distinguishing releasable offenses from 
nonreleasable offenses); ORS 135.245(3) (referring to per-
sons having a “right to release”). Current law also requires 
a judge to (1) release a defendant on their own recognizance, 
unless the release criteria establish otherwise; (2) consider 
whether conditional release is warranted before considering 
whether security release is warranted; and (3) ultimately 
impose the least onerous type of release reasonably likely to 
ensure the safety of the public and the victim, as well as the 
defendant’s later appearance. ORS 135.245(3) - (4). Finally, 
current law requires, when imposing security release, that 
bail be set in an amount “that will reasonably assure the 
defendant’s appearance.” ORS 135.265(1).
	
As summarized earlier, for persons charged with 
felonies and Class A misdemeanors, Part A of IP 54 would 
apply different requirements at arraignment. First, a judge 
would be required to consider a different list of criteria to 
determine the appropriateness of release (namely, rights 
established in the state and federal constitutions, and the 
seriousness of the new charges and of the defendant’s crim-
inal record).5 Second, consideration of a criminal record 
would include all arrests and convictions outside Oregon 
(as practicable). Third, the judge would more simply be 
charged with “decid[ing] whether the * 
* 
* defendant shall 
be released” pending trial, without sequentially considering 
the appropriate type of release (if any). IP 54, Part A, § 3. 
Finally, the judge would be “empowered to establish security 
* 
* 
* without restrictions previously imposed by statute”—in 
contrast to the current requirement that a judge ordering 
security release must impose bail in an amount sufficient to 
reasonably ensure appearance at trial. Id. § 4.
persons who agree to assist the defendant in attending court; and any facts tend-
ing to indicate that the defendant has strong ties to the community.
	
5  While the criteria set out in IP 54 overlap to some extent with the primary 
release criteria set out in ORS 135.230(7), we note that IP 54 does not expressly 
mention or refer to either the criterion of any facts indicating the possibility of 
violations of law if the defendant were released without regulations or the crite-
rion of any other facts tending to indicate that the defendant is likely to appear. 
IP 54 also does not expressly mention or refer to any of the secondary release 
criteria set out in ORS 135.230(11).
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024)	
429
B.  Parties’ Arguments and Analysis
	
We turn to the parties’ arguments. Petitioners 
argue that the summary in the ballot title for IP 54 is under-
inclusive and misleading because it does not fully commu-
nicate that IP 54 would “significantly re-writ[e]” Oregon’s 
current pretrial detention and bail system. In petitioners’ 
words, the summary “minimizes” a significant shift toward 
pretrial incarceration that IP 54 would effectuate, while 
also failing to inform voters that IP 54 would repeal current 
law designed to ensure consistent statewide pretrial release 
decision-making, based on objective and nondiscretion-
ary risk assessment tools. Petitioners relatedly highlight 
particular changes that, they assert, collectively amount 
to the “major effect” of IP 54: new and expanded criteria 
that judges must consider when making release decisions 
at arraignment; increased judicial discretion in setting 
bail that would permit setting “unrestricted” amounts; and 
other changes that would result from moving away from the 
current decision-making approach.
	
The Attorney General disagrees. She contends that 
the summary tells voters that, currently, arrested persons 
may be released before arraignment depending on the crime 
charged and a risk assessment, whereas IP 54 would pro-
hibit prearraignment release for certain crimes. And the 
summary tells the voters that judges have expanded author-
ity to set bail amounts.
	
As noted earlier, the summary must contain a “con-
cise and impartial statement” not exceeding 125 words that 
“summariz[es] the * 
* 
* measure and its major effect.” ORS 
250.035(2)(d). When a measure includes multiple subjects, 
purposes, or effects, they should be recognized to the extent 
permitted by the word limits. Witt v. Kulongoski, 319 Or 7, 
10 n 3, 872 P2d 14 (1994). To identify the actual major effect 
(or effects) of a measure, we consider the changes that it 
would make, “in the context of existing law”; we then exam-
ine the disputed ballot title component—here, the sum-
mary—to determine whether it “reasonably identifies those 
effects.” Rasmussen v. Kroger, 350 Or 281, 285, 253 P3d 1031 
(2011). In assessing petitioners’ arguments about the sum-
mary, we are mindful that its purpose is to help voters both 
430	
Chung v. Rosenblum
“understand what will happen if the measure is approved,” 
as well as the “breadth of its impact.” Fred Meyer, Inc. v. 
Roberts, 308 Or 169, 175, 777 P2d 406 (1989).
	
We begin with petitioners’ argument that the sum-
mary does not adequately capture the breadth of the changes 
that IP 54 would effectuate. We agree with petitioners that, 
for persons arrested for felonies and Class A misdemean-
ors, IP 54 would create a new pretrial release framework 
that would replace the framework set out in current law. 
That potential change is a major effect of IP 54—perhaps its 
predominant effect. See Rasmussen v. Kroger, 351 Or 195, 
202, 262 P3d 777 (2011) (“[a]n ‘effect’ that is at the heart of 
a proposed measure—such as a shift in the existing stat-
utory paradigm for dealing with a subject of interest to 
the government and the public—qualifies as the proposed 
measure’s ‘subject matter’ 
”). Indeed, IP 54 announces that 
major effect by expressly stating that it “supersedes all 
inconsistent provisions of Oregon law.” IP 54, Part D. As an 
initial matter, we conclude that, to accurately convey the 
nature of that replacement, the summary must state that 
IP 54 supersedes, or overrides, current law. See generally 
Mitchell v. Paulus, 292 Or 577, 580, 640 P2d 1390 (1982) (in 
rejecting an argument that the words “would repeal” should 
be removed from a ballot title, court explained that those 
words were “not a statement of arguable consequences of 
the initiative”; rather, they were “a statement of what the 
initiative expressly provides”).6
	
As discussed next, we also agree with petitioners 
that, to sufficiently convey the scope of the change that IP 
54 would effectuate at arraignment, the summary must 
more fully describe current law and then more fully and 
accurately describe the comparative provisions of IP 54.
	
In that regard, petitioners first argue that the 
summary must convey that IP 54 adds to the criteria that 
judges are required to consider at arraignment, such as an 
	
6  Our conclusion should not be understood to mean that, whenever a pro-
posed ballot measure would amend or repeal an existing law, the ballot title sum-
mary necessarily must include words such as “amends,” “repeals,” “supersedes,” 
or “overrides.” Some changes can be sufficiently summarized, and major effects 
sufficiently explained, without using those words.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024)	
431
expanded definition of a defendant’s criminal record. More 
generally, they also contend that the summary fails to 
reflect the significant impact on release and bail decisions 
made at arraignment. And, they add, the summary does not 
accurately describe the provision of IP 54 that “increase[s]” 
judicial discretion to impose a bail amount, without any 
restrictions existing in current law.
	
We agree with petitioners that the summary is 
deficient in that regard as well. Notably, the summary con-
tains no description whatsoever about the current law that 
governs pretrial release decisions at arraignment—namely, 
that the judge must consider certain criteria; must consider 
conditional release before considering security release; and 
must, if ordering security release, set a bail amount that 
will reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance. That 
omission, in turn, means that the voters would have no abil-
ity to compare current law governing pretrial release deci-
sions made at arraignment to the new provisions proposed 
in IP 54, applicable to persons arrested for felonies or Class 
A misdemeanors. Compounding the problem, as petitioners 
point out, the summary provides only partial information 
about the provisions of IP 54 that apply to such persons at 
arraignment: It mentions only the judge’s authority to set 
bail; it does not mention that IP 54 changes the criteria that 
the judge must consider before making a pretrial release 
decision. And finally, the information that it does pro-
vide—”expands judge’s authority to set bail”—is confusing 
and could be misunderstood; that is, voters could mistakenly 
understand those words to mean that, under IP 54, judges 
would have increased authority to release persons arrested 
for felonies and Class A misdemeanors upon payment of bail 
or otherwise, when, instead, the measure expands the dis-
cretion judges have in setting bail in a way that is no longer 
bound by current considerations or limitations.
	
We conclude that the summary must provide some 
description to the voters about the current law that applies 
to pretrial release at arraignment—including the require-
ments to consider conditional release before security release 
and to set bail in an amount that will reasonably ensure 
appearance. Further, it must describe, accurately but within 
432	
Chung v. Rosenblum
the statutory word limit, the key changes that IP 54 would 
make to that law for persons arrested for felonies and Class 
A misdemeanors, namely, that it changes the criteria that 
the judge must consider and also removes current limits 
on setting bail amounts.7 See Fletchall v. Rosenblum, 365 
Or 98, 116, 442 P3d 193 (2019) (requiring modification of a 
summary “to make the comparison between the current and 
projected decisional arrangements more sensible”).
IV.  CONCLUSION
	
In sum, we conclude that, to substantially comply 
with ORS 250.035(2)(d), the summary in the ballot title for 
IP 54 must be modified in several respects. First, the sum-
mary must clarify that, for persons arrested for felonies and 
Class A misdemeanors, IP 54 would override existing law. 
Second, as to decision-making at arraignment, the sum-
mary must explain that (1) current law requires that con-
ditional release be considered before security release and 
that bail amounts be set to ensure appearance; and (2) IP 54 
would both change the criteria for making prerelease deci-
sions and remove current limits on setting bail amounts.8
	
The ballot title is referred to the Attorney General 
for modification.
	
7  We observe that, with the addition to the summary that IP 54 changes the 
release criteria that a court must consider, the summary by implication would 
sufficiently convey that current law imposes certain criteria (which would change 
if the voters were to approve IP 54).
	
Petitioners in particular emphasize one change to the release criteria—
consideration of an expanded criminal record, which, under IP 54, includes all 
arrests and convictions outside of Oregon (to the extent practicable). To the extent 
that petitioners argue that the summary should include that level of detail, we 
disagree.
	
8  To modify the ballot title in accordance with this opinion, the Attorney 
General could choose to use fewer words to describe other aspects of IP 54 (in 
particular, the current law and provision of IP 54 relating to name changes).
	
We have considered petitioners’ other challenges to the summary in the bal-
lot title for IP 54 and have concluded that none has merit under the “substantial 
compliance” standard set out in ORS 250.085(5). We therefore reject those chal-
lenges without further discussion. 
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024)	
433
APPENDIX
OREGON CRIMEFIGHTING ACT
The People of Oregon hereby adopt the following statute, 
to be known as the “Oregon Crimefighting Act.” This Act 
improves public safety in several ways, and has three prin-
cipal objectives: End the “Catch and Release” system as to 
those charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors; 
empower counties and cities to pass ordinances to fight local 
crime, including public use of drugs which are illegal under 
federal law; require the state to pay for jail space as to those 
charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors who need 
to be held until the trial process is complete.
Part A. End “Catch and Release” of criminal defendants.
Section 1. For purposes of this Part A of this Act:
a.  “Serious crime” means any felony, and any Class A mis-
demeanor, charged in Circuit Court.
b.  “Pretrial release” means a release of a criminal defen-
dant from incarceration (usually jail) before trial.
c.  “Arraignment” means an appearance in front of a 
Circuit Court Judge, either in person or by electronic 
means such as video.
Section 2. Each criminal defendant charged with a seri-
ous crime shall not be eligible for pretrial release from 
incarceration until the criminal defendant is presented for 
arraignment.
Section 3. When a criminal defendant charged with a serious 
crime appears at arraignment, the Circuit Court Judge pre-
siding at the arraignment shall review the criminal defen-
dant’s record, and the charges pending against the criminal 
defendant, and the Judge shall decide whether the crimi-
nal defendant shall be released from incarceration pending 
trial. In making this decision, the judge shall consider:
a.  Rights established in the Constitution of the United 
States.
b.  Rights established in the Constitution of Oregon; these 
include but are not limited to the provisions of Article I, 
434	
Chung v. Rosenblum
Section 43 of the Oregon Constitution which provide 
the right of a crime victim to be reasonably protected 
from the criminal defendant throughout the criminal 
justice process and the right of the public and the vic-
tim to have decisions regarding the pretrial release of 
a criminal defendant be based upon the principle of 
reasonable protection of the victim and the public, as 
well as the likelihood that the criminal defendant will 
appear for trial.
c.  The seriousness of the criminal defendant’s criminal 
record and the seriousness of the new charges against 
the criminal defendant. The defendant’s criminal 
record shall include all arrests and convictions, and 
all citations in lieu of arrest, in Oregon. The criminal 
record shall also include, to the extent practicable, all 
arrests and convictions outside Oregon.
Section 4. The Circuit Court Judge is empowered to estab-
lish security as to the appearance of the criminal defendant 
for trial, without restrictions previously imposed by statute, 
as to any serious crime.
Section 5. As to any person arrested for any felony or any 
Class A misdemeanor charged in any Oregon Circuit Court, 
Municipal Court, or Justice Court, all Oregon State or local 
government agencies shall cooperate with and comply with 
any custodial hold or order associated with such person. This 
includes any custodial hold or order from any other state or 
territory, any federal agency, any other Oregon county, and 
any tribal agency. Each Oregon state or local government 
agency shall, when appropriate, transfer such arrested per-
son to the custody of the jurisdiction presenting the custo-
dial hold or order.
Section 6. In order to prevent certain convicted criminals 
from hiding their identity, the state shall not approve, facili-
tate, or recognize any name change for any person convicted 
of any felony sex crime, assault in the first degree, or any 
degree of murder. This restriction applies as to any convic-
tion for a crime in any jurisdiction within the United States 
where the crime is substantially similar to any of the listed 
Oregon crimes. This restriction may only be set aside by 
an Oregon court which finds extraordinary circumstances 
which justify a name change.
Cite as 372 Or 422 (2024)	
435
Part B. Allow local governments to better protect public 
safety.
Section 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of state law, 
local governments have the power to criminally prohibit or 
restrict the following:
a.  Public intoxication as to alcohol or drugs.
b.  Public drinking of alcohol.
c.  Public use of any drug which is illegal under federal 
law.
d.  Disorderly conduct.
e.  Trespassing on public property.
Section 2. The powers listed in Section 1 of Part B are in 
addition to any power which may be held by a unit of local 
government.
Part C. Ensure sufficient jail space and funding for each 
jail.
Section 1. The state shall reimburse each county for the 
costs of pretrial incarceration of all persons charged with 
felonies or Class A misdemeanors. The reimbursement shall 
cover the costs of incarceration for each day that a person 
charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor is in in the 
custody of the supervisory authority of the county, from the 
date of the person’s arrest until the resolution of the crimi-
nal charge.
Section 2. Every month, the county shall submit to the 
Oregon Department of Corrections a written request 
for reimbursement for the cost of incarcerating persons 
described in Section 1 of this Part C.
Section 3. The Department of Corrections shall reimburse a 
county that submits a request under Section 2 of this Part C 
within 30 days of receiving the request. The reimbursement 
shall occur at the rate of $145 per person per day of incar-
ceration or the actual daily cost of incarcerating a person, 
whichever is higher.
Section 4. If the Department of Corrections determines 
that the reimbursement request by a county under Part C 
436	
Chung v. Rosenblum
is excessive, the issue shall be immediately submitted for 
consideration and resolution by the Circuit Court of that 
county. The decision of the Circuit Court as to the amount 
to be reimbursed shall be final and not subject to appeal.
Section 5. If any county jail exceeds 90% of its capacity for 
30 days or more, the supervisory authority for the county 
shall report this to the Department of Corrections, which 
shall provide incarceration facilities, staffed by Department 
of Corrections personnel, to house inmates from that county, 
at state expense. This shall continue until the supervisory 
authority confirms that the capacity problem has been 
resolved.
Section 6. None of the reimbursement or housing of inmates 
provisions of Part C of this Act may be set off by any other 
funding obligations of the state to any county.
Part D. This Oregon Crimefighting Act supersedes all 
inconsistent provisions of Oregon law.
Part E. This Act is effective upon passage. The provisions 
of this Act apply to crimes committed on or after January 
1, 2025.