Title: State v. James Hubert Tucker, Jr.
Citation: 2005 WI 46
Docket Number: 2003AP001276-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2005

2005 WI 46 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1276-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James Hubert Tucker, Jr.,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 21, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 7, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel T. Dillon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent. 
BUTLER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Walter Dickey, David E. 
Schultz, Michael E. Smith and Cecelia M. Klingele, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, Madison, on behalf of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School, and oral argument by Walter Dickey. 
 
2005 WI 46 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1276-CR  
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 1942) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James Hubert Tucker, Jr.,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 21, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   James Hubert Tucker, Jr. 
(Tucker) seeks review of an order of the court of appeals, 
affirming the circuit court's denial of his motion for sentence 
modification 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h)(2001-02).1 
 
We 
review this case to determine whether the reductions in maximum 
penalties for the crimes of possession with intent to deliver 
cocaine and felony bail-jumping, set forth in the truth-in-
sentencing provisions of 2001 Wis. Act 109 (TIS-II), constitute 
new factors in regard to a sentence modification motion, where 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.   
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
2 
 
the original sentences were imposed in accord with 1997 Wis. Act 
283 (TIS-I).  Additionally, we must determine whether a TIS-I 
offender 
can 
petition 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
a 
sentence 
adjustment under Wis. Stat. § 973.195,2 and whether a different 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.195 states, in relevant part:  
(1g) 
Definition. 
 
In 
this 
section, 
"applicable 
percentage" means 85% for a Class C to E felony and 
75% for a Class F to I felony. 
 
(1r) Confinement in Prison.  (a) An inmate who is 
serving a sentence imposed under s. 973.01 for a crime 
other 
than 
a 
Class 
B 
felony 
may 
petition 
the 
sentencing court to adjust the sentence if the inmate 
has served at least the applicable percentage of the 
term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence.  
If an inmate is subject to more than one sentence 
imposed under this section, the sentences shall be 
treated 
individually 
for 
purposes 
of 
sentence 
adjustment under this section.  
 
(b) Any of the following is ground for a petition 
under par. (a):  
 
1. The inmate's conduct, efforts at and progress 
in rehabilitation, or participation and progress in 
education, treatment, or other correctional programs 
since he or she was sentenced.   
 
3.  A change in law or procedure related to 
sentencing 
or 
revocation 
of 
extended 
supervision 
effective after the inmate was sentenced that would 
have resulted in a shorter term of confinement in 
prison or, if the inmate was returned to prison upon 
revocation of extended supervision, a shorter period 
of confinement in prison upon revocation, if the 
change had been applicable when the inmate was 
sentenced.   
 
4. The inmate is subject to a sentence of 
confinement in another state or the inmate is in the 
United States illegally and may be deported.  
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
3 
 
approach is required for unclassified rather than classified 
felonies.   
¶2 
We conclude, based on our holding in State v. 
Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, that the 
reduced maximum confinement penalties under TIS-II do not 
constitute new factors when a defendant such as Tucker moves for 
the modification of sentences imposed under TIS-I.  Although 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5. Sentence adjustment is 
otherwise 
in the 
interests of justice.  
 
(c) Upon receipt of a petition filed under par. 
(a), the sentencing court may deny the petition or 
hold the petition for further consideration.  If the 
court holds the petition for further consideration, 
the court shall notify the district attorney of the 
inmate's petition.  If the district attorney objects 
to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days 
of receiving notification under this paragraph, the 
court shall deny the inmate's petition.   
 . . . . 
 
(g) Except as provided under par. (h), the only 
sentence adjustments that a court may make under this 
subsection are as follows:  
 
1. 
If 
the 
inmate 
is 
serving 
the 
term 
of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence, a 
reduction in the term of confinement in prison by the 
amount of time remaining in the term of confinement in 
prison portion of the sentence, less up to 30 days, 
and a corresponding increase in the term of extended 
supervision. 
 
2.  If the inmate is confined in prison upon 
revocation of extended supervision, a reduction in the 
amount of time remaining in the period of confinement 
in prison imposed upon revocation, less than up to 30 
days, and a corresponding increase in the term of 
extended supervision.   
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
4 
 
Tucker's initial confinement time for his TIS-I felonies 
exceeded the TIS-II maximum for each sentence, the changes are 
not highly relevant to the imposition of his original TIS-I 
sentences.  The legislature never mandated the retroactive 
application of the reduced penalties.  We further conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195 applies to TIS-I offenders and that the 
legislature has provided an adequate remedy by enacting that 
statutory provision.  Whether the court is dealing with a 
classified or unclassified felony, the same rationale concerning 
new factor jurisprudence and the applicability of § 973.195 
controls. 
I 
¶3 
On February 20, 2002, Tucker pled guilty to two 
crimes: possession with intent to deliver cocaine (five grams or 
less), 
an 
unclassified 
felony3 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)1 
(1999-2000), 
and 
felony 
bail 
jumping, 
a 
Class 
D 
felony 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b) (1999-2000).   
                                                 
3 Under TIS-I, an unclassified felony is any felony other 
than one specified in Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) 1. - 5.  State 
v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, ¶28, 270 Wis.2d 113, 676 N.W.2d 872.  Unlike 
other felony offenses, which were classified as Class A, B, BC, 
D, or E felonies, with the maximum penalty for each class set 
forth in § 973.01, Tucker's crime for possession with intent to 
deliver 
less 
than 
five 
grams 
of 
cocaine 
came 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)1 (1999-2000) which had a sentencing 
range independent of the felony classification system.  See 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶15, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.     
Now, under TIS-II, Tucker's crime is classified as a Class 
F felony, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m(cm)(1).  
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
5 
 
¶4 
Based on his convictions under TIS-I, Tucker was 
subject to penalty maximums of 15 years for the unclassified 
possession charge and ten years for the bail-jumping charge.  
The Rock County Circuit Court, Judge Daniel T. Dillon presiding, 
sentenced him to consecutive sentences of ten years of initial 
confinement and five years of extended supervision for the 
unclassified possession conviction, and five years of initial 
confinement and five years extended supervision for the bail-
jumping conviction.   
¶5 
The maximum penalties for the charges which Tucker was 
convicted were reduced under TIS-II.  For the possession count, 
the maximum penalty was reduced from 15 years to 12 years and 
six months, with a maximum initial confinement time of seven 
years and six months.  For the bail-jumping count, TIS-II 
reduced the maximum total sentence from ten years to six years, 
while the maximum initial confinement time was set at three 
years.  As a result, under TIS-I, Tucker was sentenced to four 
years and six months more initial confinement than was possible 
for the same offenses under TIS-II. 
¶6 
On December 18, 2002, Tucker brought a postconviction 
motion for sentence modification.  He argued that the reduction 
in the maximum penalties under TIS-II constituted new factors 
for 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
consider 
during 
his 
sentence 
modification hearing.  He did not bring a motion for sentence 
adjustment under Wis. Stat. § 973.195, since he believed that 
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
6 
 
the provisions of the statute did not apply to individuals 
sentenced under TIS-I. 
¶7 
On May 1, 2003, the circuit court denied Tucker's 
motion.  In an oral decision, the circuit court determined that 
State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983), did 
not allow the modification of a sentence based on the post-
sentence reduction in penalty and, thus, did not constitute a 
new factor for the circuit court to consider.    
¶8 
On appeal, the court of appeals denied Tucker’s 
sentence 
modification 
motion 
and 
found 
that 
the 
penalty 
reductions set forth in TIS-II were not highly relevant to the 
imposition of his sentences.  The court of appeals based its 
decision on State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, 267 Wis. 2d 213, 
670 N.W.2d 400, which stated that the disparity in sentences 
between TIS-I and TIS-II is not a new factor to be considered in 
deciding motions for sentence modification. 
¶9 
We accepted review of the court of appeals’ order and 
now affirm.   
II 
¶10 In Trujillo, we held that whether a new factor exists 
is a question of law, which we review de novo.  Trujillo, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶11; State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 424, 576 
N.W.2d 912 (1998).  We also held that "[t]he existence of a new 
factor does not, however, automatically entitle the defendant to 
relief."  Trujillo, ___ Wis. 2d ___ (quoting Hegwood, 113 
Wis. 2d at 546).  Ultimately, the decision of whether the 
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
7 
 
sentence should be modified is left to the sound discretion of 
the circuit court.  Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 546.  We will not 
overrule a decision to modify a sentence unless the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Trujillo, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶10; Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 424.   
¶11 This 
case 
also 
presents 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  For guidance, we look to Meriter Hospital Inc. 
v. Dane County, 2004 WI 145, 277 Wis. 2d 1, 69 N.W.2d 627, where 
we discussed the standard of review applicable to issues of 
statutory interpretation.  We stated: 
The 
interpretation 
of a 
statute 
presents 
a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  State v. 
Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  
Although we consider this question independent of the 
decisions of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, we nevertheless benefit from their analyses.  
Meyer v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 
N.W.2d 339 (1999). 
When 
interpreting 
a 
statute, 
the 
primary 
objective "is to determine what the statute means so 
that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 662, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Knowing this, the court's analysis should begin with 
the plain language of the statutory text.  Id., ¶45.  
If the language of the statute is clear on its face, 
the court should apply the statute using the common 
and generally accepted meanings of the terms.  Fox v. 
Catholic Knights Ins. Soc., 2003 WI 87, ¶19, 263 
Wis. 2d 207, 219, 665 N.W.2d 181.  With an unambiguous 
statute, the court need not consult extrinsic sources 
of interpretation.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
Meriter, 277 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶ 12-13.  
¶12 In Trujillo, this court held that the reduction in 
maximum penalties for crimes that resulted from TIS-II does not 
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
8 
 
constitute a new factor when a defendant moves for the 
modification of a sentence imposed under TIS-I.  Trujillo, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶2.  In applying the plain language used by the 
legislature in the TIS-II enactments, we also held that "if the 
legislature 
wanted 
the 
reduced 
maximum 
penalties 
to 
be 
considered in TIS-I sentence modification hearings, it could 
have provided that the reduced penalties in TIS-II shall have 
retroactive application."  Id., ¶21.   
¶13 This case similarly involves a motion for sentence 
modification, 
where the 
defendant's current 
penalties for 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine and felony bail-
jumping under TIS-I exceed the maximum penalties for those 
crimes under TIS-II.  Accordingly, our decision in Trujillo is 
controlling.  Thus, we conclude that a reduction in the maximum 
penalty under TIS-II is not a new factor and that the circuit 
court ruled correctly when it concluded that no new factor was 
present and therefore denied Tucker's motion for sentence 
modification.   
¶14 The present case, however, involves additional issues 
that Trujillo does not address.  Here, we also must decide 
whether Wis. Stat. § 973.195 allows a TIS-I offender to petition 
the court for sentence adjustment.  The State of Wisconsin 
(State) argues that § 973.195 does not apply to such offenders 
because § 973.195(1g) utilizes the TIS-II felony classification 
system to determine the "applicable percentage" of the term of 
initial confinement a person must serve in order to be eligible 
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
9 
 
for sentence adjustment.  In addition, the State raises several 
questions as to how a TIS-I offender's "applicable percentage" 
would be calculated under the statute.  In contrast, Tucker 
relies primarily on the legislative history of § 973.195 to 
conclude that the statute does apply to TIS-I offenders. 
¶15 We begin by examining the text of the statute, which 
states that it applies to "[a]n inmate who is serving a sentence 
imposed under s. 973.01 for a crime other than a Class B 
felony[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r).  As recognized by both 
parties, a person serving a sentence under TIS-I is serving a 
sentence imposed under § 973.01.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.01 (1999-
2000).  Thus, subsection (1r) of the sentence adjustment statute 
supports a conclusion that it applies to TIS-I offenders.   
¶16 However, Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1g), which sets forth 
the "applicable percentage" of term of initial confinement a 
person must serve before being eligible for sentence adjustment, 
states:  "In this section, 'applicable percentage' means 85% for 
a Class C to E felony and 75% for a Class F to I felony."  Under 
TIS-I, felonies were classified into six categories, A-F, and 
the new nine-factor A-I felony classification was one of the 
main features of the TIS-II legislation.4  As there were no F-I 
felonies under TIS-I, subsection (1g) would seem to support a 
conclusion that § 973.195 does not apply to persons sentenced 
under TIS-I.  Furthermore, § 973.195(1g) does not explain how to 
                                                 
4 Compare 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50 
(2003-04) 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50 (1999-2000).   
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
10 
 
calculate the "applicable percentage" for felonies that were 
unclassified under TIS-I.   
¶17 Therefore, as the text of Wis. Stat. § 973.195 leads 
to two equally reasonable interpretations, we conclude that the 
statute is ambiguous and turn to the statute's history and other 
extrinsic sources to guide our analysis.  As noted, under 2001 
Wis. Act 109, § 9459, the effective date of TIS-II was February 
1, 2003.  However, certain provisions were made applicable only 
to crimes committed on or after February 1, 2003, by virtue of 
2001 Wis. Act 109, § 9359.  Section 973.195, the provision for 
sentence adjustment, was not included in this list of provisions 
first applicable to crimes committed on or after February 1, 
2003.  See id.  This is a strong indication that the legislature 
intended that persons sentenced under TIS-I are able to take 
advantage of § 973.195, since the legislature easily could have 
limited the application of § 973.195 to crimes committed on or 
after February 1, 2003, as it did for numerous other provisions 
of 2001 Wis. Act 109.   
¶18 An analysis of 2001 Wis. Act 109 by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau clearly supports the conclusion that persons 
sentenced under TIS-I are able to utilize the procedure set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.195:    
Petitions for adjustment may be filed, beginning 
February 1, 2003, by any prisoner sentenced for a 
crime committed since the effective date of bifurcated 
sentencing (December 31, 1999). . . . Those convicted 
of crimes committed before December 31, 1999, may be 
eligible 
for 
parole 
consideration 
and 
are 
not 
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
11 
 
permitted to petition under the sentence adjustment 
procedure.  
Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs 02-7:  Truth-in-
Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision 4 (Aug. 2002).   
¶19 Furthermore, 
one 
of 
the 
grounds 
for 
sentence 
adjustment relates to the very changes brought about by TIS-II.  
Wis. Stat. sec. 973.195 provides that one of the grounds for 
sentence adjustment is:  
A change in law or procedure related to sentencing or 
revocation of extended supervision effective after the 
inmate was sentenced that would have resulted in a 
shorter term of confinement in prison or, if the 
inmate was returned to prison upon revocation of 
extended supervision, a shorter period of confinement 
in prison upon revocation, if the change had been 
applicable when the inmate was sentenced. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(b)3.   
¶20 As discussed previously in Trujillo, persons sentenced 
under TIS-I generally serve longer periods of confinement than 
those sentenced under either the old indeterminate system of 
sentencing or TIS-II as a result of the delay between the 
implementation of TIS-I and TIS-II.  One of the features of the 
TIS-II reclassification of felonies was that the initial period 
of confinement for crimes was changed so as to approximate the 
maximum 
time 
served 
under 
the 
indeterminate 
system 
of 
sentencing.  Thus, the very act that changed the penalty 
structure for numerous offenses also provided a mechanism for 
adjusting sentences based on a change in law or procedure 
related to sentencing or revocation of extended supervision.  
This strongly supports the conclusion that the legislature 
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
12 
 
intended the sentence adjustment provision to apply to TIS-I 
offenders. 
¶21 Commentary following the enactment of TIS-II further 
supports that conclusion:   
As to whether the new statute will apply to prisoners 
sentenced for crimes occurring between Dec. 31, 1999, 
and Feb. 1, 2003, the Criminal Law Section's proposal 
provided grounds for a petition in light of a change 
in the law.   This was precisely the group of persons 
that this provision was meant to include.   
John A. Birdsall & Raymond M. Dall'Osto, Problems with the New 
Truth-in-Sentencing Law, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 13.  
¶22 Accordingly, our analysis of Wis. Stat. § 973.195, as 
well as extrinsic sources, leads us to conclude that the 
legislature intended the sentence adjustment provision to apply 
to TIS-I offenders.  We recognize that § 973.195(1g), which sets 
forth the "applicable percentage" of the term of initial 
confinement a person must serve before being eligible for 
sentence adjustment, utilizes the TIS-II felony classification 
scheme and does not indicate how to calculate the "applicable 
percentage" for a TIS-I sentence.   
¶23 However, this problem is remedied by simply applying 
the TIS-II felony classification under Wis. Stat. § 939.50 to 
persons sentenced under TIS-I for the limited purpose of 
determining the "applicable percentage" of a term of initial 
confinement in a Wis. Stat. § 973.195 petition for sentence 
adjustment.  For instance, Tucker was convicted of felony bail 
jumping, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b) (1999-2000).  At 
the time he was convicted, his offense was a Class D felony.  
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
13 
 
However, under TIS-II, the crime for which Tucker was convicted 
became a Class H felony.  Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b).  Thus, 
while Tucker remains convicted of this classified felony, for 
purposes of determining what "applicable percentage" of his term 
of initial confinement he must serve in order to be eligible for 
sentence adjustment, we look to how the crime for which he was 
convicted 
is 
currently 
classified 
under 
TIS-II. 
 
That 
"applicable 
percentage" 
is 
then 
applied 
to 
the 
sentence 
originally imposed to determine if he is eligible to file a 
petition under §  973.195(1g). 
¶24 While this analytical framework will be effective in 
most cases where a TIS-I offender seeks sentence adjustment, we 
are also sensitive to the State's concerns as to how this 
procedure 
will 
affect 
an 
individual 
sentenced 
for 
an 
unclassified felony.  However, most of the persons sentenced for 
TIS-I unclassified felonies will not encounter a problem 
because, like Tucker's conviction for possession with intent to 
deliver 
cocaine, 
almost 
all 
of 
the 
felonies 
which 
were 
previously unclassified under TIS-I have now been classified 
under TIS-II.  Thus, in the vast majority of cases, a court will 
simply look to how the previously unclassified crime is 
classified under TIS-II in order to determine the "applicable 
percentage."  There is no reason why the analysis we set forth 
today cannot apply to persons falling into this category.   
 
 
 
2003AP1276-CR   
 
14 
 
III 
¶25 In sum, we conclude, based on our holding in Trujillo, 
that the reduced maximum confinement penalties under TIS-II do 
not constitute new factors when a defendant such as Tucker moves 
for the modification of sentences imposed under TIS-I.  Although 
Tucker's initial confinement time for his TIS-I felonies 
exceeded the TIS-II maximum for each sentence, such changes are 
not highly relevant to the imposition of his original TIS-I 
sentences.  The legislature never mandated the retroactive 
application of the reduced penalties.  We further conclude that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195 applies to TIS-I offenders, and that the 
legislature has provided an adequate remedy by enacting that 
statutory provision.  Whether the court is dealing with a 
classified or unclassified felony, the same rationale concerning 
new factor jurisprudence and the applicability of § 973.195 
controls.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.    
 
No.  2003AP1276-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶26 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I dissent 
in the instant case for the reasons set forth in my dissent in 
State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
 
¶27 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP1276-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶28 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  For the 
reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, I would overrule Hegwood and 
its progeny,5 and reverse and remand this action to the trial 
court for a determination of whether the change in penalty 
structure by the creation of TIS-II constitutes a new factor in 
this proceeding.  
¶29 I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 See e.g., State v. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90, 272 
Wis. 2d 759, 681 N.W.2d 534 and State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 
199, 267 Wis. 2d 213, 670 N.W.2d 400.   
No.  2003AP1276-CR.lbb 
 
1