Title: State v. Jim H. Ringer
Citation: 2010 WI 69
Docket Number: 2008AP000652-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2010

2010 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP652-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jim H. Ringer, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 320 Wis. 2d 702, 771 N.W.2d 928 
(Ct. App 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 10, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Barron   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy M. Doyle   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued 
by Michael J. Losse, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Thomas O. 
Mulligan and the Mulligan Law Office, Spooner, and oral argument 
by Thomas O. Mulligan. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 69
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP652-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2007CF113) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jim H. Ringer, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals1 that 
affirmed an order in limine by the Barron County Circuit Court, 
Timothy M. Doyle, Judge.  Jim H. Ringer (Ringer) was charged 
with repeated sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.025(1)(ar) (2005-06).2  The circuit court granted 
                                                 
1 State v. Ringer, No. 2008AP652-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 18, 2009). 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.025 (2005-06), "Engaging in repeated 
acts of sexual assault of the same child," provides:  
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
2 
 
Ringer's motion in limine, allowing him to introduce at trial 
evidence that the child complainant made prior allegedly 
untruthful allegations of sexual assault against her biological 
father, Christopher H. (Christopher).  On appeal, the State 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion when it deemed the evidence admissible.  We agree and 
therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Whoever commits 3 or more violations under 
s. 948.02(1) or (2) within a specified period of time 
involving the same child is guilty of: 
 . . . . 
(ar) A Class B felony if fewer than 3 of the 
violations were violations of s. 948.02(1)(a) but at 
least 
3 
of 
the 
violations 
were 
violations 
of 
s. 948.02(1)(a) or (b). 
The relevant provisions of Wis. Stat. § 948.02 (2005-06), 
"Sexual assault of a child," are as follows:  
(1) First Degree Sexual Assault.  Whoever has 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who 
has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of one 
of the following:  
(a) If the sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
resulted in great bodily harm to the person, a Class A 
felony.  
(b) If the sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
did not result in great bodily harm to the person, a 
Class B felony. 
Wisconsin Stat. §§ 948.02(1) and 948.025(1) (2005-06) were 
repealed and recreated by 2007 Wis. Act 80, §§ 12 and 13 
(codified as amended at Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1) and 948.025(1) 
(2007-08)).  2007 Wis. Act 80 took effect March 27, 2008.  
Ringer was charged on May 10, 2007, and is therefore subject to 
the 2005-06 version of the statutes. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
3 
 
¶2 
This case presents the following issues: (1) whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
granted Ringer's motion in limine, allowing him to introduce at 
trial evidence that the child complainant made prior allegedly 
untruthful allegations of sexual assault against her biological 
father, and if not, (2) what form the evidence may take at 
trial. 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it granted Ringer's motion in 
limine, allowing him to introduce at trial evidence that the 
child complainant made prior allegedly untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault against her biological father.  Such evidence is 
admissible only if the following three criteria are satisfied: 
(1) 
the 
proffered 
evidence 
fits 
within 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)3 (2007-08);3 (2) the evidence is material to a 
fact at issue in the case; and (3) the evidence is of sufficient 
probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial 
nature.  State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 785, 456 N.W.2d 600 
(1990).  In this case, the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion when it determined that the proffered evidence 
fits within § 972.11(2)(b)3.4  The circuit court erred by 
concluding 
that 
a 
jury 
could 
reasonably 
find 
that 
the 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Because we conclude that the first criterion is not 
satisfied, we need not discuss the other two.  See State v. 
Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 110, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990). 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
4 
 
complainant made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault 
against her biological father.  Because we conclude that 
evidence of the child complainant's alleged prior untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault is not admissible at trial, we 
need not address what form the evidence may take if admitted. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On May 10, 2007, Ringer was charged with repeated 
sexual assault of a child.  The State alleged that between 
September 2006 and May 6, 2007, Ringer repeatedly sexually 
assaulted twelve-year-old Amber, his then adopted daughter.5  
According to the complaint, the assaults occurred at least 
weekly and consisted of touching Amber's vaginal area and the 
nipple area of her breasts both over and under her clothing, 
"humping" against her, placing his finger inside her vagina, 
pushing her hand onto his penis both over and under his 
clothing, and attempting to put his penis inside her mouth.  The 
circuit court found probable cause that Ringer committed a 
felony, and he was bound over for trial. 
¶5 
On October 10, 2007, Ringer filed a motion in limine 
seeking, inter alia, to admit evidence at the jury trial of 
Amber's alleged prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault 
against her biological father, Christopher, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)3.6 
 
Ringer 
argued 
that 
under 
the 
                                                 
5 The record indicates that Ringer has since voluntarily 
terminated his parental rights to Amber.  So too has Amber's 
biological mother, Rebecca. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11 provides, in relevant part:  
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
5 
 
admissibility standard set forth in DeSantis, the circuit court 
could conclude from the proffered evidence that a reasonable 
person could infer that Amber made prior untruthful allegations 
of sexual assault against Christopher. 
¶6 
The circuit court requested that counsel submit to the 
court "an agreed upon packet containing all records and reports 
in any way describing allegations of sexual abuse or sexual 
assault made by [Amber] at any time against any individual."  
Among those records was an incident report by the Rusk County 
Sheriff's Department, dated May 2, 2005.  Amber and her 
biological mother, Rebecca, reported to the sheriff's department 
that Christopher touched Amber's breasts, vagina, and buttocks 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2)(a) In this subsection, "sexual conduct" means 
any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities 
of the complaining witness, including but not limited 
to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement and 
life-style.  
(b) If the defendant is accused of a crime under 
s. 940.225, 948.02, 948.025, 948.05, 948.051, 948.06, 
948.085, or 948.095, or under s. 940.302(2), if the 
court finds that the crime was sexually motivated, as 
defined in s. 980.01(5), any evidence concerning the 
complaining witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions 
of the witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation 
as to prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury, except the following, subject to 
s. 971.31(11):  
 . . . . 
(3) Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault made by the complaining witness. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
6 
 
over the weekends of April 16 through April 17, 2005, and April 
23 through April 24, 2005.  Subject to her biological parents' 
then joint custody arrangement, Amber spent those weekends with 
Christopher at his brother's house.  Amber reported that she 
went to sleep in Christopher's bed, and he thereafter climbed 
into bed with her and began to touch her breasts, vagina, and 
"behind" underneath her clothing.  As indicated by the incident 
report, "Amber stated that [Christopher] never touched her with 
his penis nor did he ever insert anything into her vagina or 
buttocks.  She said that he moved his fingers around." 
¶7 
On 
May 
2, 
2005, 
Investigator 
David 
Hibbard 
(Investigator Hibbard) of the Rusk County Sheriff's Department 
interviewed Christopher regarding Amber's report.  The interview 
was documented in a separate incident report, dated May 3, 2005.  
Christopher acknowledged that Amber stayed at his brother's 
house over the indicated weekends and that he and Amber slept in 
the same bed on the nights of April 16 and April 17, 2005.  
According to the incident report, Christopher stated that he 
rubbed Amber's stomach area over her clothing "for about ten to 
fifteen minutes" while she was sleeping: 
Christopher went on to say that while he was rubbing 
Amber's stomach, Amber's shirt rode up towards her 
breasts and then the tips of his fingers "may have" 
"bumped" the bottom portion of her breasts.  However, 
Christopher said that although he may have touched her 
breast, he did not remember it happening. . . .  Then 
Christopher was asked if he touched her breast 
intentionally or if it was an accident, and he 
immediately claimed it was an "accident".  As the 
interview continued, Christopher also said that he may 
have placed his hand on Amber's breast just as he was 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
7 
 
"drifting off to sleep".  But, again Christopher 
stated he did not "recall" this happening.  Then 
Christopher said, "I'm not saying it did happen and 
I'm not saying it didn't happen", but "I do not know". 
Christopher later indicated that he did not touch Amber's 
breasts, but he did touch the bottom portion of her bra.  He 
denied touching Amber's vaginal area and her buttocks. 
¶8 
Christopher 
also 
provided 
a 
voluntary 
written 
statement to the Rusk County Sheriff's Department, which was 
signed and dated May 2, 2005.  Christopher wrote, "I don't 
recall touching my daughter's breast or vagina but while rubbing 
her stomach may have bumped the bottom of her bra if [sic] I did 
touch her breast it was not in a sexual way." 
¶9 
The sheriff's department referred the matter to the 
Rusk County District Attorney's office, but the district 
attorney, Kathleen A. Pakes (Attorney Pakes), declined to 
prosecute Christopher.  As stated in her affidavit filed with 
the circuit court on October 23, 2007, Attorney Pakes had "no 
reason to believe [Amber] was lying about the assault" and was 
"unaware of any finding that [she] lied."  Nevertheless, 
Attorney Pakes declined to prosecute because she "had no 
corroborating 
facts, 
circumstances, 
physical 
evidence, 
or 
witnesses" and accordingly could not rebut an allegation at 
trial that Amber was lying.  Attorney Pakes concluded, "Do I 
think it happened?  Yes.  Did I think I could prove it?  No.  
Thus, this case was treated as a no process." 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
8 
 
¶10 Beginning on January 4, 2008, and continuing on 
January 24, 2008,7 the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing 
on Ringer's motion in limine.  The court determined that 
pursuant to DeSantis, in order for Ringer to introduce at trial 
evidence of Amber's alleged prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault, he had to make a showing to the court of 
"sufficient evidence to support a reasonable person's finding 
that [Amber] made prior untruthful allegations."8  
                                                 
7 Christopher and his brother, Richard H. (Richard), failed 
to appear at the hearing on January 4, 2008, in violation of 
subpoenas served upon them by Ringer's counsel.  Christopher and 
Richard were therefore held in willful contempt of court, the 
purging of which was subject to their appearance at the 
rescheduled hearing on January 24, 2008.  Christopher and 
Richard so appeared, and the hearing was continued. 
8 The record reveals some back-and-forth between the circuit 
court and Ringer's counsel regarding the defendant's burden of 
proof under State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600 
(1990): 
Attorney Norine [counsel on behalf of Ringer]: 
[J]ust to address the standard . . . [w]e have a 
degree of proof that would allow a reasonable person 
to infer that false allegations have been made, and 
there are two things I'd like to say about that 
standard, because I don't think—— 
The Court: Excuse me, Mr. Norine, I think it's 
stronger than an inference, I think it's a finding. 
Attorney Norine: A finding, yes. 
The Court: Inferences are pretty vague things, 
but this language I'm looking at [in DeSantis] 
indicates I need to find that a reasonable person 
could find that a prior untruthful allegation was 
made. 
Attorney Norine: I may be quoting it wrong, but I 
seem to remember it as being——Your Honor making a 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
9 
 
¶11 Ringer called both Christopher and his brother, 
Richard, to testify.9  Christopher testified that he never 
engaged in any sexual contact or touching with Amber.  He 
acknowledged 
physical 
contact 
with 
her, 
consisting 
of 
"[t]ickling, wrestling, just basically goofing around," but 
maintained that such contact was never of a sexual nature.  
Christopher conceded sleeping in the same bed with Amber but 
"[o]nly if she got scared or whatever and came and climbed in 
while [he] was sleeping."  When questioned at the evidentiary 
hearing regarding the statements he made to Investigator 
Hibbard, Christopher offered the following testimony: 
Q [Attorney Norine, counsel on behalf of Ringer]: 
You said, for example, "I did touch her breast.  It 
was not in a sexual way."  Do you remember making that 
statement? 
A [Christopher]: I couldn't tell you what all I 
put in my statement because I don't recall, but 
offhand, I'm sure it's something to that extent. 
Q: All right.  And did you say at some point 
something to the effect of "I might have done it and I 
might not have done it," something to that effect? 
                                                                                                                                                             
finding that a reasonable person could infer.  Now if 
I'm wrong, I will certainly stand corrected . . . . 
9 Bonnie Kurtz, who provided foster care services to Amber 
in 1999, also testified at the hearing.  Kurtz's testimony 
related to allegations Amber made in May 1999 concerning male 
foster children who "did sex" with her.  Ringer originally 
argued that those allegations also constituted prior untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3.  
However, he abandoned that argument in the circuit court and 
instead focused only on Amber's allegations against Christopher.  
The 1999 allegations are therefore not at issue on appeal. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
10 
 
A: What I remember saying is that if I did it, I 
had done it in my sleep and wasn't aware of it. 
¶12 On cross-examination, Christopher recalled sleeping in 
the same bed as Amber on the evenings of April 16 and April 17, 
2005. 
 
He 
also 
remembered 
telling 
Investigator 
Hibbard 
"something to [the] effect" of the fact that he rubbed Amber's 
stomach area over her clothing while she was sleeping.  While he 
specifically recalled telling the investigator that he may have 
bumped the bottom portion of Amber's bra, as opposed to her 
breast, he did not refute the latter: 
Q [Attorney Babbitt, counsel on behalf of the 
State]: Did you tell the officer that you may have 
touched her breast, but you did not remember it 
happening? 
A [Christopher]: I would say that would be a true 
statement. 
Q: Do you remember telling the officer that if 
you had touched her breast intentionally or if it was 
an accident, you had said it was an accident? 
A: I said it would have been an accident because 
I would never touch her breasts intentionally. 
 . . . . 
Q: Do you recall telling the officer, quote, I'm 
not saying it did happen, and I'm not saying it didn't 
happen, closed quote, but, quote, I do not know, 
closed quoted? 
A: I remember saying that if it happened it would 
have been in my sleep. 
On redirect, Christopher clarified that "[a]ny touching of 
[Amber's] 
private 
parts 
was 
purely 
accidental, 
never 
intentional." 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
11 
 
¶13 Christopher's brother, Richard, also testified at the 
evidentiary hearing.  By the time of the hearing, Christopher 
had lived with Richard for four or five years, and it was at 
Richard's house that Christopher allegedly sexually assaulted 
Amber.  Richard testified that he never observed what he would 
consider improper sexual contact between Christopher and Amber 
and never noticed anything about Amber's behavior or demeanor 
that would give rise to such a suspicion.  While he had no 
recollection of Christopher and Amber sleeping together in the 
same bed in spring of 2005, he did acknowledge that "[w]hen 
Amber was younger if she had nightmares she'd go in and lay down 
with her dad because she was scared." 
¶14 In addition, Ringer filed with the court a portion of 
Amber's purported medical record, which indicated that on 
September 12, 2005, she "denie[d] sexual activity" to her 
physician.  
¶15 The State argued that Ringer failed to bring forth 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable person's finding 
that Amber made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault 
against Christopher.  Because Christopher admitted that he may 
have touched Amber in an intimate area, claiming that any such 
touching was accidental, the State contended that his testimony 
actually confirmed Amber's allegations that Christopher touched 
her in a sexual manner. 
¶16 The circuit court found that based on the testimony, 
"a reasonable person could infer that the prior allegations 
concerning 
Christopher 
[] 
were 
untruthful" 
and 
therefore 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
12 
 
determined that Ringer was entitled to introduce at trial 
evidence of Amber's alleged prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault against Christopher.10  The court arrived at its 
determination based upon the competing inferences raised by 
Amber's 
statements 
to 
the 
sheriff's 
department 
versus 
Christopher's 
statements 
to 
Investigator 
Hibbard 
and 
his 
testimony at the hearing.   
¶17 On one hand, the court acknowledged that Amber accused 
Christopher of touching her breasts, vagina, and buttocks.  On 
the other hand, the court found that Christopher denied engaging 
in any intentional sexual contact or touching with Amber, both 
in the interview with the investigator and at the hearing.  
While recognizing that Christopher "admit[ted] that he may have 
had incidental or accidental contact with his daughter's breast 
or bra," the court noted that he "denie[d] touching her breast 
or bra for any purpose of sexual gratification" and was not 
charged in connection with the incident.11   
                                                 
10 In its oral ruling, the circuit court did not make clear 
what type of evidence Ringer was permitted to introduce at 
trial, stating, "The form of that evidence, I guess I don't know 
at this point."  Ringer's counsel acknowledged that as an 
"entire other open question" and indicated that Ringer would 
argue that he is entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence to 
prove the untruthfulness of Amber's allegations——specifically 
the witnesses who testified at the hearing and "whatever other 
evidence [he] can produce on the question."  The court 
responded, "Well I think you're entitled to do that." 
11 The circuit court noted that Attorney Pakes averred in 
her affidavit that she thought Christopher committed the sexual 
assault, but the court determined "that isn't worth much": 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
13 
 
¶18 Beyond those competing inferences, even the circuit 
court could not conclude "with any certainty" that Amber's 
allegations against Christopher were untruthful:  
The bottom line is, I can't conclude or find with 
any certainty——we know the allegation was made, but I 
can't find that it was truthful or untruthful with any 
degree of certainty.  Is there an inference that the 
allegations were untruthful?  Yeah, there is an 
inference.  That inference is supported by the 
statements made by Christopher [] to both Investigator 
Hibbard and his sworn testimony here today. . . . 
¶19 On February 4, 2008, the circuit court issued a 
written 
order, 
finding 
that 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)3, "a reasonable person could reasonably infer 
that [Amber] made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault 
against [Christopher]."  The court further found that the 
proffered evidence of the alleged prior untruthful allegations 
was material to a fact in issue in Ringer's case and that its 
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.  Accordingly, 
the court ordered that Ringer was allowed to introduce at trial 
evidence of Amber's alleged prior untruthful allegations against 
Christopher. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prosecutors make those decisions all day long every 
day and they decide to charge cases they think they 
have some prospect of prevailing on, and for today's 
purposes, it just doesn't mean much what [Attorney] 
Pakes thinks or feels about the ultimate guilt of this 
gentleman because he was never charged and he was 
never tried and he was never convicted. 
The court also discounted the significance of Amber's 
medical record and Richard's testimony. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
14 
 
¶20 The State filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
permitting Ringer to introduce such evidence.  The State also 
argued that, even if Ringer prevailed on that threshold issue, 
the circuit court erred by not limiting the form of the evidence 
to cross-examination of Amber pursuant to State v. Rognrud, 156 
Wis. 2d 783, 457 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1990). 
¶21 On June 18, 2009, in a per curiam decision, the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order in limine.  State 
v. Ringer, No. 2008AP652-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 18, 2009).  Applying the three-part test set forth in 
DeSantis, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
appropriately exercised its discretion in allowing Ringer to 
introduce at trial evidence of Amber's alleged prior untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault against Christopher.  Id., ¶15.  
First, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
properly determined that the proffered evidence fits within Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3.  Accepting Christopher's testimony as 
true, the court of appeals found "a reasonable basis to infer 
[Amber] falsely accused him of touching her vagina and buttocks 
and that [Christopher] did not intentionally touch [Amber's] 
breasts for any improper purpose."  Id.  Second, the court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in determining that the evidence was material to 
Ringer's defense.  Id., ¶16.  The court of appeals reasoned that 
the 
record 
shows 
factual 
similarities 
between 
Amber's 
allegations against Christopher and those against Ringer, and 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
15 
 
the two allegations were close enough in time to avoid 
diminishing their material comparability.  Id.  Third, the court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
reasonably 
determined 
that 
the 
evidence 
of 
the 
alleged 
untruthful 
allegations against Christopher was sufficiently probative to 
outweigh its prejudicial effect.  Id., ¶18.  The court of 
appeals 
stated 
that 
Amber's 
alleged 
"[p]rior 
untruthful 
accusations of a similar nature made a year and a half earlier 
against her biological father could be a crucial factor in 
determining credibility and presenting a defense."  Id. 
¶22 In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the 
State forfeited its argument that the circuit court erred by not 
limiting the method by which Ringer could inquire into the prior 
allegations at trial.  Id., ¶20 ("We do not generally consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal."). 
¶23 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 24, 2009.  We now reverse the court of 
appeals' decision. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 The admission of evidence is subject to the circuit 
court's discretion.  State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 655, 575 
N.W.2d 475 (1998).  We will not disturb the circuit court's 
decision 
to 
admit 
evidence 
unless 
the 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 777 n.1.  If 
our review of the record indicates that the circuit court 
applied the wrong legal standard in the exercise of its 
discretion or that the facts of record fail to support the 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
16 
 
circuit 
court's 
decision, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  Id.; see also Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 
655.  In this case, we conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion because the record does not 
support its conclusion that a jury could reasonably find that 
Amber made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶25 Wisconsin's rape shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11, 
generally prohibits the introduction of any evidence of the 
complainant's prior sexual conduct "regardless of the purpose."  
§ 972.11(2)(c); see also State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 
643-44, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 420.4, at 283 (3d ed. 
2008).  The rape shield law was enacted "'to counteract outdated 
beliefs that a complainant's sexual past could shed light on the 
truthfulness of the sexual assault allegations.'"  State v. 
Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶39, __ Wis. 2d __, 782 N.W.2d 695 (quoting 
State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, ¶19, 250 Wis. 2d 466, 640 
N.W.2d 112).  The law reflects the legislature's determination 
that evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct is largely 
irrelevant "or, if relevant, substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect."  Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 644; see also 
Carter, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶39; DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 784-85.  
Section 972.11's broad evidentiary prohibition is subject to 
three statutory exceptions, which "encompass those limited 
factual scenarios in which the legislature has determined that 
evidence of a complainant's sexual history may be sufficiently 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
17 
 
probative of a material issue to overcome the prejudicial nature 
of such evidence."  Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 657-58; see 
§ 972.11(2)(b)1-3.  This case concerns the application of the 
third exception: "[e]vidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual 
assault 
made 
by 
the 
complaining 
witness."  
§ 972.11(2)(b)3.   
¶26 A defendant may introduce at trial evidence of the 
complainant's alleged prior untruthful allegations of sexual 
assault "only after close judicial scrutiny."  DeSantis, 155 
Wis. 2d at 785; see also Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 658 ("[M]erely 
offering proof of the general type described in a particular 
exception is not enough to defeat the rape shield statute.").  
Admission of the evidence is subject to Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11), 
see Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), which requires that the circuit 
court first determine that the evidence is "material to a fact 
at issue" in the underlying case and "of sufficient probative 
value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature."   
¶27 Accordingly, pursuant to the test set forth in 
DeSantis, evidence of the complainant's alleged prior untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault is admissible only if the circuit 
court first makes three determinations: (1) the proffered 
evidence fits within Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3; (2) the 
evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case; and (3) the 
evidence is of sufficient probative value to outweigh its 
inflammatory and prejudicial nature.  155 Wis. 2d at 785.   
¶28 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it determined that the 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
18 
 
proffered 
evidence 
of 
Amber's 
alleged 
prior 
untruthful 
allegations 
of 
sexual 
assault 
fits 
within 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)3.  Ringer's failure to satisfy his burden of 
production under § 972.11(2)(b)3 is dispositive of our analysis; 
thus, we need not further discuss the other two criteria.  See 
State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 110, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990) ("If 
the defendant fails to meet this burden, the circuit court must 
conclude that the evidence is inadmissible under the statute and 
the analysis ends."); DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 788 ("If the 
evidence does not meet this basic threshold, the circuit court 
must conclude that the evidence does not come within the 
exception provided by sec. 972.11(2)(b)3.").  We therefore 
address only the first of the DeSantis three-part test. 
A. Whether the Proffered Evidence Fits  
Within Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3 
¶29 Before admitting evidence of the complainant's alleged 
prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault, the circuit 
court must first determine whether the evidence fits within Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3; that is, whether the defendant has 
established a sufficient factual basis for allowing the jury to 
hear the evidence.  DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 786.  As a 
preliminary matter, we will clarify the defendant's burden of 
production under the first part of the DeSantis test. 
¶30 In DeSantis, this court concluded that "the defendant 
should produce evidence at the pre-trial hearing sufficient to 
support a reasonable person's finding that the complainant made 
prior untruthful allegations."  Id. at 787-88 (emphasis added).  
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
19 
 
The circuit court must make a preliminary finding based upon the 
defendant's offer of proof that "the jury could reasonably find 
that the complainant made prior untruthful allegations."  Id. at 
788 (emphasis added).   
¶31 The DeSantis court continued: "In other words, in 
order to admit evidence of untruthful prior allegations of 
sexual assault, a circuit court must be able to conclude from 
the proffered evidence that a reasonable person could reasonably 
infer that the complainant made prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault."  Id. (emphasis added).  We recognize the 
language inconsistency of "find" and "infer" and appreciate the 
confusion that may arise therefrom.  We therefore clarify that 
in 
order 
to 
admit 
evidence 
of 
alleged 
prior 
untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3, 
the circuit court must first conclude from the proffered 
evidence that a jury could reasonably find that the complainant 
made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault.  
¶32 We arrive at that determination by examining Wis. 
Stat. § 901.04, which governs preliminary questions concerning 
the admissibility of evidence and cross-references Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2).  Wisconsin Stat. § 901.04(1) provides: "Preliminary 
questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall 
be 
determined 
by 
the 
judge, 
subject 
to 
sub. (2) 
and . . . [§] 972.11(2)." 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 901.04(2) 
recognizes the doctrine of conditional relevancy; that is, 
"[w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment 
of a condition of fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
20 
 
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a 
finding of the fulfillment of the condition."  (Emphasis added.)  
In other words, "[t]he judge decides whether there is (or will 
be) sufficient evidence of the condition; the jury determines 
ultimately whether the condition exists."  Blinka, supra 
§ 104.2, at 35.  DeSantis applies the conditional relevancy 
analysis of § 901.04(2).  See 155 Wis. 2d at 786 n.5; Blinka, 
supra § 104.2, at 35 n.5; § 420.4, at 288.  Under the 
admissibility standard set forth in DeSantis, the issue is not 
whether the judge is convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the complainant made prior untruthful allegations 
of sexual assault.12  Rather, the judge determines whether a 
jury, acting reasonably, could find that it is more likely than 
not that the complainant made prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault.  See Blinka, supra § 104.2, at 35. 
¶33 For example, in DeSantis, this court concluded that 
the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it 
excluded evidence of the complainant's alleged prior untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault because, based on the pre-trial 
testimony, a reasonable jury could not find that the complainant 
made prior untruthful allegations.  See 155 Wis. 2d at 790-91.  
In that case, DeSantis filed a pretrial motion seeking to 
introduce 
evidence 
of 
the 
complainant's 
prior 
untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault.  Id. at 778.  The circuit court 
                                                 
12 We rejected that argument in DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 
787-88, and similarly do so today. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
21 
 
held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it would admit 
the evidence.  Id. at 779.  DeSantis produced a witness who had 
been the complainant's neighbor at her college dormitory during 
the 1985-86 school year.  Id.  The neighbor testified that in 
fall 1985, the complainant informed her that she had been raped 
by a stranger outside the dormitory.  Id.  However, according to 
the neighbor, in spring 1986, the complainant recanted that she 
had been raped and instead described the incident as a stranger 
putting his arm around her.  Id.  Neither the complainant nor 
the neighbor ever reported the incident to campus authorities or 
the police.  Id. 
¶34 At DeSantis's trial, outside the jury's presence, the 
complainant denied ever telling her neighbor that she had been 
raped.  Id. at 781.  Nevertheless, she testified that in 1985, 
in front of her dormitory, a stranger put his arm around her, 
unsolicited.  Id.  After hearing the complainant's testimony, 
the circuit court determined that DeSantis was not permitted to 
introduce evidence before the jury concerning the complainant's 
prior allegations of sexual assault.  Id.  As its grounds, the 
circuit court cited the remoteness and irrelevancy of the 
evidence.  Id.  
¶35 On appeal, this court agreed with the circuit court 
and concluded that, even accepting the neighbor's testimony as 
true, the complainant's 1985 allegations of a nonconsensual 
assault could not be interpreted as untruthful:  
Both [the neighbor] and the complainant testified 
that 
the 
occurrence 
in 
autumn 
1985 
involved 
a 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
22 
 
nonconsensual touching.  The complainant asserted she 
was forcibly assaulted by a stranger against her will.  
She never recanted this assertion.  [The neighbor's] 
testimony 
does 
not 
impeach 
the 
complainant's 
credibility about charging a nonconsensual touching.  
No matter who is believed, the complainant's 1985-86 
statements can be interpreted as truthful allegations 
of a nonconsensual assault. . . . 
Id. at 790-91. 
¶36 Turning to the case at issue, we conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
determined that the proffered evidence fits within Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)3.  The circuit court erred by concluding that a 
jury could reasonably find that Amber made prior untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault against Christopher.   
¶37 First, unlike the complainant in DeSantis, Amber never 
allegedly made contradictory statements regarding the sexual 
assault taking place.  The record reveals that Amber has never 
recanted with respect to her assertion that Christopher touched 
her breasts, vagina, and buttocks in spring 2005.  We note that 
in DeSantis, the neighbor's testimony, if believed, indicated 
that the complainant either recanted her allegations or at least 
vacillated with respect to the type of nonconsensual assault she 
alleged.  See 155 Wis. 2d at 779.  Despite the complainant's 
divergent statements regarding the alleged assault, this court 
concluded that said evidence was insufficient to support a 
reasonable finding that the allegations were untruthful.  See 
id. at 790-91.  In comparison, Amber has never recanted her 
allegations against Christopher.  The fact that she has never 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
23 
 
recanted her allegations weighs against a jury's finding that 
the allegations were untruthful. 
¶38 Second, 
Christopher's 
statements 
to 
Investigator 
Hibbard and his testimony at the evidentiary hearing may 
actually corroborate, rather than discredit, Amber's allegations 
that he touched her breasts.  According to the incident report, 
Christopher stated that while rubbing Amber's stomach, her shirt 
rode up, and he "may have" "bumped" her breasts, and he may have 
placed his hand on her breast while "drifting off to sleep."  He 
did not refute these statements at the hearing and instead 
testified that any touching of Amber's breasts was accidental, 
done in his sleep, or not of a sexual nature.  However, whether 
the touching was intentional or, as the circuit court stated, 
for "sexual gratification" does not change the fact that 
Christopher acknowledged that the touching may have occurred.  
Whether the State can prove that Christopher committed a sexual 
assault beyond a reasonable doubt and whether he had a valid 
defense to the allegations does not necessarily control the 
analysis as to Amber's truthfulness.  In other words, a jury 
could reasonably find that Amber truthfully alleged that she was 
sexually assaulted regardless of whether from Christopher's 
perspective the touching was for sexual gratification.  The fact 
that Christopher may have a valid defense does not dictate a 
finding that her allegations were untruthful.  
¶39 Moreover, 
even 
though 
Christopher 
may 
have 
consistently denied touching her vagina and buttocks, that 
denial alone is not sufficient to support a jury's finding that 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
24 
 
Amber's allegations were untruthful.  As we made clear in Moats, 
"the distinction as to type of assault is irrelevant to this 
analysis."13  156 Wis. 2d at 110.  Rather, the admissibility of 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3 "is to be reviewed in 
terms of occurrence and whether a prior allegation of the 
general occurrence of a sexual assault is later recanted by the 
complainant or proved to be false by the defendant."  Moats, 156 
Wis. 2d at 110.  In this case, Amber has never recanted, and 
Ringer failed to put forth evidence from which a circuit court 
could conclude that a jury could reasonably find that Amber's 
prior allegations of sexual assault were false.  Merely because 
Christopher's version as to the type of touching that occurred 
                                                 
13 In Moats, this court agreed with the circuit court that a 
variation between the complainant's version of the type of prior 
sexual assault that occurred and the perpetrator's version was 
not alone sufficient to demonstrate that the prior allegations 
of sexual assault were untruthful.  156 Wis. 2d at 110-11.  In 
that case, the five-year-old complainant made prior allegations 
of sexual assault against two men and described the sexual 
assaults as involving penis to vagina contact.  Id. at 103-04.  
However, the two men were charged with and convicted of hand to 
vagina contact and oral contact, respectively.  Id. at 106.  
Moreover, one of the perpetrators specifically denied engaging 
in penis to vagina contact with the child complainant.  Id. at 
109.  This court concluded that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it refused to admit the 
evidence as prior untruthful allegations.  Id. at 110.  The 
circuit court ruled, and this court agreed, that the distinction 
as to the type of prior sexual assault that occurred was 
irrelevant to a determination of whether the complainant's prior 
allegations were untruthful.  Id.  For purposes of excluding the 
evidence under Wis. Stat. 972.11(2)(b)3, what mattered was that 
the two men admitted to having prior sexual contact with the 
child complainant.  Id. at 111. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
25 
 
differs from Amber's version is not alone enough to support a 
jury's finding that the allegations were untruthful. 
¶40 Finally, 
the 
fact 
that 
Christopher 
was 
never 
prosecuted in connection with Amber's allegations, in and of 
itself, does not support a finding that the allegations were 
untruthful. 
 
"Our 
cases 
have 
repeatedly 
acknowledged 
a 
prosecutor's broad discretion in determining whether to charge 
an accused."  State v. Krueger, 224 Wis. 2d 59, 67, 588 
N.W.2d 921 (1999); see also State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 45, 
270 
N.W.2d 160 
(1978) (describing the district attorney's 
discretion in determining whether to commence a prosecution as 
"almost limitless").  A district attorney is charged with 
administering justice, not obtaining convictions.  State v. 
Karpinski, 
92 
Wis. 2d 599, 
607, 
285 
N.W.2d 729 
(1979).  
Accordingly, the district attorney is not required to prosecute 
all cases, including those in which it appears that the law has 
been violated.  Id.  In this case, Attorney Pakes chose not to 
prosecute Christopher despite her belief that the sexual assault 
occurred.  A district attorney's discretionary belief that she 
cannot prove certain allegations beyond a reasonable doubt does 
not conclusively support a determination that the complainant's 
allegations were untruthful. 
¶41 In summary, the circuit court erred when it concluded 
that a jury could reasonably find that Amber made prior 
untruthful allegations of sexual assault against Christopher.  
The circuit court therefore erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it determined that the proffered evidence fits within Wis. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
26 
 
Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3.  Ringer failed to bring forth evidence 
from which a circuit court could conclude that a jury could 
reasonably find that Amber's allegations against Christopher 
were untruthful.  At most, Ringer's offer of proof shows that 
there were competing versions of what occurred and that 
Christopher may have a defense to the allegations.  In this 
case, admitting evidence of Amber's prior allegations against 
Christopher could result in a trial within a trial, confuse the 
issues as they relate to Ringer's case, and invite the jury to 
speculate concerning Amber's truthfulness and whether the prior 
sexual assault occurred.  These facts are simply too complex to 
support a jury's finding that Amber was untruthful without 
conducting a trial within a trial.  The evidence would not be 
relevant to whether Amber made false allegations against Ringer 
unless the jury first determined that Amber made up the 
allegations against Christopher.  However, we have concluded 
that Ringer did not produce evidence from which a jury could 
reasonably find that Amber's allegations against Christopher 
were untruthful.  Despite the fact that the jury is instructed 
not to speculate, see Wis JI——Criminal 140, in this case, the 
jury would have to speculate in order to determine that Amber 
was untruthful.  We refuse to extend § 972.11(2)(b)3 so far.   
¶42 Because we conclude that evidence of Amber's alleged 
prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault is not admissible 
at trial, we need not address what form the evidence may take if 
admitted under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)3. 
No. 
2008AP652-CR   
 
27 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶43 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it granted Ringer's motion in 
limine, allowing him to introduce at trial evidence that the 
child complainant made prior allegedly untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault against her biological father.  Such evidence is 
admissible only if the following three criteria are satisfied: 
(1) 
the 
proffered 
evidence 
fits 
within 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(b)3; (2) the evidence is material to a fact at issue 
in the case; and (3) the evidence is of sufficient probative 
value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature.  
DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 785.  In this case, the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it determined that the 
proffered evidence fits within § 972.11(2)(b)3.  The circuit 
court erred by concluding that a jury could reasonably find that 
the complainant made prior untruthful allegations of sexual 
assault against her biological father.  Because we conclude that 
evidence of the child complainant's alleged prior untruthful 
allegations of sexual assault is not admissible at trial, we 
need not address what form the evidence may take if admitted. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2008AP652-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I write separately to explain what the 
second issue is in the present case.   
¶45 The second issue is described by the majority opinion 
in ¶2 as "what form the evidence may take at trial."  The 
parties frame this issue as follows:  Did the circuit court 
erroneously exercise its discretion in concluding that the 
purported false prior accusation could be proven at Ringer's 
trial by extrinsic evidence? 
¶46 The circuit court held that extrinsic evidence could 
be introduced.  The State argued in the court of appeals and 
here that extrinsic evidence is barred by State v. Rognrud, 156 
Wis. 2d 783, 457 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1990).  The court of 
appeals concluded that the State had waived the issue of the use 
of extrinsic evidence to prove prior false accusations by 
failing to address the merits of the issue at the circuit court. 
¶47 Neither the majority opinion nor I address this issue.   
 
 
 
No.  2008AP652-CR.ssa 
 
1