Title: THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. KEVIN LAMBERT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2000-599
State: new-hampshire
Issuer: new-hampshire Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2001

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk/Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Supreme Court Building, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court's home page is: http://www.state.nh.us/courts/supreme.htm THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ___________________________ Rockingham No. 2000-599 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE v. KEVIN LAMBERT December 17, 2001 Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general (Ann M. Rice, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief), for the State. Carl D. Olson, assistant appellate defender, of Littleton, by brief, for the defendant. NADEAU, J. The defendant, Kevin Lambert, was convicted by a jury of four counts of felonious sexual assault. See RSA 632-A:3, II (Supp. 2000). The Superior Court (Abramson, J.) sentenced him to a combined term of five to ten years in prison, and a consecutive term of three and one-half to seven years, suspended. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erroneously considered unsubstantiated allegations of other crimes when sentencing him. We affirm. Although a sentencing judge has broad discretion to choose the sources and types of evidence upon which to rely in imposing sentence, that discretion is not unlimited. See State v. Kimball, 140 N.H. 150, 151 (1995). "We have held that judges in sentencing should not rely upon allegations of other crimes by the defendant when such allegations are unsubstantiated, resolved by acquittals, or the product of speculation." State v. Tufts, 136 N.H. 517, 519 (1992) (quotation omitted). "If improper evidence is admitted at sentencing, the sentence imposed must be reconsidered unless the trial court clearly gave that evidence no weight." Kimball, 140 N.H. at 151. We review a trial judge's sentencing decision under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Id. Unfortunately, appellate review based upon an "abuse of discretion" standard may be misunderstood by those not familiar with the concept of judicial discretion as misconduct by the trial judge. When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are really deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made. Cf. Bianco, P.A. v. The Home Ins. Co., ___ N.H. ___, ___ (decided December 5, 2001). Because the "abuse of discretion" standard may carry an inaccurate connotation, we will hereafter refer to it as the "unsustainable exercise of discretion" standard. To show that the trial court's decision is not sustainable, "the defendant must demonstrate that the court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case." State v. Johnson, 145 N.H. 647, 648 (2000) (quotation omitted). At the sentencing hearing, the State offered an exhibit showing that during a search of the defendant's apartment, the police obtained "bags of marijuana, grow bulbs [and] plastic bags." The State argued that these items showed that the defendant "was well into using marijuana" and that this "lifestyle" led him to take advantage of the victim. This exhibit was not mentioned in the Presentence Investigation Report. All issues raised by the defendant in his notice of appeal, but not briefed, are deemed waived. State v. Mountjoy, 142 N.H. 642, 652 (1998). Affirmed. BROCK, C.J., and BRODERICK and DALIANIS, JJ., concurred.