Title: Lesley v. City of Montgomery
Citation: 485 So. 2d 1088
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 1986

485 So. 2d 1088 (1986)
Stanley H. LESLEY
v.
The CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al.
84-706.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 14, 1986.
Rehearing Denied March 21, 1986.
*1089 Timothy C. Halstrom of Riggs, Nesmith &amp; Halstrom, Montgomery, for appellant.
J. Bernard Brannan, Jr., Montgomery, for appellee The City of Montgomery.
Jack F. Norton, Chief Counsel and Jerry L. Weidler, Asst. Counsel, for appellees Ray D. Bass and Alabama Highway Dept.
Thomas T. Gallion III of Hooper, Gallion &amp; Wilkerson, Montgomery, for appellee William B. Goodwyn, Inc.
Richard B. Garrett of Rushston, Stakely, Johnston &amp; Garrett, Montgomery, for appellee The Central of Georgia Ry., Inc.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is an appeal by plaintiff Stanley H. Lesley from a motion to dismiss granted in favor of all defendants, namely the City of Montgomery, Central of Georgia Railway, Inc., W.D. Goodwyn, Inc., and Ray D. Bass, the Alabama State Highway Director.
Lesley claims $300,000 damages from defendants for interfering with his right of access to his property by building a three-foot-high retaining wall in front of his property. The lower court held that this action is barred by Lesley's earlier suit seeking to enjoin construction of the wall. We agree.
Lesley is the owner of Griffin Radio and Television, an electronics repair shop on Highland Avenue in Montgomery. He also owns the property upon which the building is located. The building covers almost the entire area of the property.
Immediately adjacent to and west of this property is a railroad track owned and operated by the Central of Georgia Railway. Sometime prior to July 28, 1983, the City of Montgomery announced plans to raise the height of an existing bridge on Highland Avenue, which spans the railroad track, in order to comply with federal regulations. In order to raise the bridge, construction plans required building a retaining wall in front of Lesley's business. It is undisputed that this wall was to be built entirely within the city's right-of-way and 10 to 12 feet from the front of Lesley's business.
On July 28, Lesley filed a complaint with the Circuit Court of Montgomery County requesting a preliminary injunction to halt the construction, alleging that the construction would interfere with his right of access to his business and amount to a taking of his property without compensation. After a full hearing on this complaint on August 17, 1983, Lesley's request was denied. As we indicate in part II of this opinion, we find the judgment to have been an adjudication as to an essential element of this second action.
Lesley filed a notice of appeal of this order, but subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal. This Court dismissed the appeal on January 6, 1984.
By October 12, 1984, construction was complete. On that date, Lesley filed the current action with the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, seeking damages for interference with his right of access to his business. The defendants in this second action were the same as those in the first action, except that Highway Director Ray D. Bass was added as a party.
The defendants filed individual motions to dismiss, raising the defense of res judicata. On March 4, 1985, all defendants except W.D. Goodwin, Inc., were dismissed. On March 19, 1984, W.D. Goodwin was dismissed also. Lesley appeals from those judgments.
In its first order granting the motions to dismiss, the trial court stated:
In Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So. 2d 1190, 1199 (Ala. 1978), we set out the elements of res judicata as follows:
The doctrine of res judicata prohibits the relitigation of all matters which were or could have been litigated in the prior action. Century 21 v. Alabama Real Estate Comm'n, 401 So. 2d 764 (Ala.1981). This doctrine is based on the notion that:
Century 21, 401 So. 2d  at 768, citing Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 320, 47 S. Ct. 600, 602, 71 L. Ed. 1069 (1927).
Lesley first contends that the same cause of action was not present in both suits because the first suit sought injunctive relief pending a final determination of the legal rights of the parties, while the second suit sought damages for the diminution of the value of the property, for lost profits, and for the loss in value of his business. We disagree.
In discussing whether two separate suits were based on the same cause of action, this Court wrote in Geer Brothers, Inc. v. Crump, 349 So. 2d 577, 581 (Ala.1977):
and then quoted from Birmingham Southern Ry. Co. v. Lintner, 141 Ala. 420 [428], 38 So. 363 [365] (1904):
Further, the Court stated:
Geer Brothers, 349 So. 2d  at 580, citing Sessions, 276 Ala. at 13, 158 So. 2d  at 655.
Thus, whether the same cause of action is presented in successive suits depends on whether the act of the defendant is the same in each case, and whether the same evidence would support a recovery in both suits.
Clearly, the defendants' act that Lesley contends is wrongful, namely, constructing a retaining wall, is the same in both suits. Further, in his action for an injunction, Lesley alleged that his right of access to his business would be interfered with if the wall was built. In his second suit, he contends that this same act of interference has caused him damages. The mere fact that the relief sought varies in the two cases, one injunctive and the other monetary, does not mean that there are separate causes of action in the two cases.
Admittedly, there is a division of opinion among the jurisdictions that have considered this question. As one court has stated:
Kettelhut v. Porter, 433 F. Supp. 295, 299 (W.D.Ark.1977), quoting Olmstead v. Rosedale Building &amp; Supply, 229 Ark. 61, 63, 313 S.W.2d 235, 237 (1958).
We are of the opinion that this issue turns upon whether damages may be claimed in an action seeking equitable relief. Clearly, in Alabama, this is permissible.
Rule 2, Ala.R.Civ.P., states that "[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as `civil action.'" It is axiomatic that, in jurisdictions where there has been a merger of law and equity, such as Alabama, damages may be sought in actions requesting what is traditionally equitable relief. See, Wischmann v. Raikes, 168 Neb. 728, 740, 97 N.W.2d 551, 561 (1959), citing Restatement, Judgments, § 66 comment a (1980).
In discussing the exact issue before us, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 comment i (1980) states:
Nothing prohibited Lesley from asserting his claim for damages in his suit for the preliminary injunction. Since the act complained of is the same in both suits, and the evidence presented would be the same, the trial court was correct in holding that the cause of action was the same in both actions.
Lesley also contends that his original request for a preliminary injunction and compensation was not heard on the merits, based on the fact that a trial court may deny a plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction without making a judgment on the merits, or at least without making a judgment on the same "merits" that would be involved in a later suit for damages. Lesley lists five other possible reasons for such a ruling: (1) doubt as to the validity of plaintiff's right to preliminary injunction; (2) absence of a clear and unmistakable right to preliminary injunction; (3) balance of benefits, considering the degree of injury and benefit to each party; (4) absence of an irreparable injury; and (5) having an adequate legal remedy for damages. While Lesley is correct that in an appropriate case any of these reasons is adequate for denying a preliminary injunction, we feel that they have no application here because the trial court did deny the preliminary injunction on the same merits as would be involved in a later suit for damages.
In the hearing on Lesley's application for a preliminary injunction, the court took extensive testimony from Lesley, then heard testimony from Mr. James H. Sigler, the chief administrator for technical services for the City of Montgomery. Mr. Sigler was responsible for the construction of bridges in the City of Montgomery. After direct and cross-examination of these witnesses, the court issued its order denying plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. The court ruled that:
The court clearly considered the merits of appellant's claim by taking testimony from pertinent parties and by deciding "as a matter of law" that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief for the alleged interference with access to his commercial property. While the judgment must be on the merits, Lesley's argument is misplaced. The lack of "merit" situation results when a party has not been given an opportunity to present his position on the relevant law or facts. Here, at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court held, as a matter of law, that Lesley had "no property right ... in the parking spaces"; this necessarily was an adverse adjudication on an element that would have been necessary to a later claim for damages; therefore, Lesley, at that time, had an adverse ruling on the merits of his claim for damages. He did not pursue his appeal from this adverse ruling of the trial court. Lesley also had an opportunity to present his arguments regarding the merits of his claim. He did not present evidence as to damages. We feel that the trial court was correct in finding the present action barred, and affirm.
Finally, while Lesley does not make the argument as one justifying reversal, he points out that the opinion of the trial court denying the preliminary injunction was not introduced before the court that heard the present motion to dismiss. When a party refers to another proceeding or judgment of a court in his pleading before that same court, the court on motion to dismiss may take judicial notice of the entire proceeding. Geer Bros., Inc. v. Crump, 349 So. 2d 577 (Ala.1977).
The only issues presented by this appeal involve the question of whether the judgment in appellant's first lawsuit was res judicata as to this present action, and whether the defendants in the case below met their burden of establishing the plea of res judicata.
The judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and ADAMS, JJ., concur.