Title: BAILEY v STATE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12579
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 1973

No. 12579 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 E L L W O O D C A R L BAILEY, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, STATE O F M O N T A N A , and W. E. DOWLIN, J R . , JUSTICE O F T H E PEACE OF THE BILLINGS TOWNSHIP, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas Beers, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Doris M. Poppler, Deputy County Attorney, argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Robert C. Brogan argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: November 29, 1973 Decided : bEC 2 7 1973 F i l e d : DEC 2 1 1973 M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by the State from an order of the d i s t r i c t court of the thirteenth judicial d i s t r i c t , the Honorable Robert H. Wilson, presiding, which order granted a w r i t denominated andam am us", l a t e r corrected t o Supervisory Control, ordering a justice of the peace t o honor an affidavit of disqualification and c a l l i n another justice of the peace. A defendant, one Ellwood Carl Bailey, was charged with "driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor". H e appeared i n justice court, Billings Township, Yellowstone County, before W. E. Dowlin, Jr.; pleaded "not guilty" on March 6 , 1973; and requested a jury t r i a l . Trial was set for April 17, 1973. O n March 13, 1973, an affidavit of disqualification was filed. Justice of the Peace Dowlin refused t o honor the disqualification affidavit. The t r i a l date was reset for M a y 18, 1973. On April 19, 1973, a petition for a w r i t of mandate was f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court seeking an alternative w r i t t o compel Justice of the Peace Dowlin t o either honor the disqualification or appear t o show cause why he should not. On M a y 11, a hearing was held and the d i s t r i c t court granted a w r i t of mandamus which w r i t ordered Judge Dowlin t o honor the affidavit of disqualifica- tion. On June 5, notice of appeal was f i l e d by the county attorney on behalf of Judge Dowlin. On June 22, the d i s t r i c t court, Judge Wilson, denied ~ a i l e y ' s motion t o t a x costs including attorney fees. In that order, Judge Wilson stated that the w r i t was one of supervisory control, rather than technically mandamus, and therefore denied attorney fees. The defendant Bailey i n the crim- i n a l charge was denominated a "plaintiff" i n the action seeking a w r i t . H e "cross appeals" here, seeking attorney fees and costs against Justice of the Peace Dowlin, denominated a "defendant". The issues on appeal are that the d i s t r i c t court erred i n granting a w r i t of mandamus because: (1) A justice of the peace cannot be disqualified for prejudice, but rather the remedies a r e limited t o appeal and change of the place of t r i a l ander sections 95-2009 and 95-2003, R.C.M. 1947. (2) Mandamus is an inappropriate remedy i f a justice of the peace refuses t o disqualify himself or refuses t o change the place of t r i a l . A s t o the second issue, we have stated heretofore that i n the order denying costs and attorney fees, the d i s t r i c t judge stated the w r i t was one of supervisory control i n the aid of i t s appellate jurisdiction over justice courts under section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947. This would be correct because the w r i t of mandamus i s available only where there i s no plain, speedy and adequate remedy i n the ordinary course of law. Section 93-9103, R.C.M. 1947. Section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "(a) A l l cases on appeal from justices' or police courts must be tried anew i n the d i s t r i c t court and may be t r i e d before a jury of s i x (6) which may be drawn from either the regular panel or jury box No. 3. "(b) The defendant may appeal t o the d i s t r i c t court by giving written notice of h i s intention t o appeal within ten days (10) days a f t e r judgment. "(c) Within t h i r t y (30) days the e n t i r e record of the justice or police court proceedings s h a l l be transferred t o the d i s t r i c t court or the appeal s h a l l be dismissed. It shall be the duty of the defendant to perfect the appeal." Thus a plain, speedy and adequate remedy a t law i s specifically provided and mandamus w i l l not l i e . As t o issue (I), keeping i n mind section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947, quoted above, a "prejudiced" judge, a s distinguished from a "prejudiced" township or community, may be allevia'ted or cor- rected by an appeal and a t r i a l de novo. Chapter 20, T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, i s entitled "Justice and Police Court Proceedings". The Criminal Law Commission comment accompanying the chapter reads i n part: h his Chapter includes only those sections which a r e peculiar or apply exclusively t o justice and police courts. * * * ' Included i n Chapter 20 i s section 95-2003, R.C.M. 1947, which provides : "(a) The defendant or prosecution, before t r i a l , may move for a change of place of t r i a l on the ground that there exists i n the township i n which the charge i s pending such prejudice that a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had i n such township. "(b) The motion s h a l l be i n writing and supported by affidavit which s h a l l s t a t e the facts showing the nature of the prejudice alleged. The defendant or the s t a t e may f i l e counteraffidavits. The court s h a l l conduct a hearing and determine the merits of the motion. "&) I f the court determines that there exists i n the township where the prosecution is pending such prejudice that a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had i t s h a l l transfer the cause t o any other court of competent jurisdiction i n any township where a f a i r t r i a l may be had." Also included i n Chapter 20 is section 95-2009 --Appeal-- previously quoted, which gives a right of t r i a l de novo i n the d i s t r i c t court. Significantly no section providing for substitu- tion of judges appears i n Chapter 20. In Chapter 17, T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, entitled "Pretrial ~ o t i o n s " , appears section 95-1709 --Substitution of judge--; and section 95-1710 --Change of place of t r i a l . Those two sections read : "95-1709. Substitution of Judge. (a) The defendant or the prosecution may move the court i n writing f o r a substitution of judge on the ground that he cannot have a f a i r and impartial hearing o r t r i a l before said judge. The motion s h a l l be made a t l e a s t f i f t e e n days prior t o the t r i a l of the case, or any r e t r i a l thereof a f t e r appeal, except for good cause shown. Upon the f i l i n g of such a mo- tion the judge against whom the motion i s f i l e d shall be without authority t o a c t further i n the criminal action, motion o r proceeding but the provisions of t h i s section do not apply t o the arrangement of the calendar, the regulation of the order of business, the power of transferring the criminal action or proceeding t o some other court, nor t o the power of calling in another judge t o s i t and act i n such criminal action o r proceeding, providing that no judge s h a l l so arrange the calendar as t o defeat the purposes of t h i s action. Not more than one judge can be disqualified i n the criminal action o r proceeding, a t the instance of the prosecution and not more than one judge a t the instance of the defendant or defendants. 11 I f either party i n any matter above-mentioned s h a l l f i l e the affidavit as herein provided such party may not complain of any reasonable delay a s the re- s u l t thereof. "The provision of t h i s section s h a l l be inap- plicable t o any person i n any cause involving a direct contempt of court. "(b) In addition t o the provision of subsection (a) any defendant may move a t any time for substitution of judge for cause, supported by affidavit. Upon the f i l i n g of such motion the court s h a l l conduct a hearing and determine the merits of the motion. I I "95-1710. Change of Place of Trial. "(a) The defendant or the prosecution may move for a change of place of t r i a l on the ground that there exists i n the county i n which the charge i s pending such prejudice that a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had i n such county. The motion shall be made a t l e a s t f i f t e e n days prior t o t r i a l , unless, for good cause shown, it may be made thereafter. I t (b) The motion s h a l l be i n writing and supported by affidavit which s h a l l s t a t e facts showing the nature of the prejudice alleged. The defendant or the s t a t e may f i l e counter-affidavits. The court s h a l l conduct a hearing and determine the merits of the motion. "(c) I f the court determines that there exists i n the county where the prosecution i s pending such pre- judice that a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had it s h a l l trans- f e r the cause t o any other court of competent jurisdic- tion i n any county where a f a i r t r i a l may be had." From the context of these two sections it i s clear that both sections refer t o d i s t r i c t court actions. However, the defendant Bailey argues that since section 95-206, R.C.M. 1947, the chapter on definitions, defines the term "judge" to include justice of the peace, then section 95-1709 using the word "judge" rather than "district court judge", must include the right t o substitution of justice of the peace. Section 95-206, R.C.M. 1947, reads : "'.Judge1 means a person who i s invested by law with the power t o perform judicial functions and includes court, justice of the peace or police magistrate when a particular context so requires. - " (Emphasis added). Does the particular context of section 95-1709, R.C.M. 1947, requirre it? W e think not. Rather, w e find that the overall context of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that sections 95-1709 and 95-1710 apply t o d i s t r i c t courts. A s we have heretofore shown, an adequate, speedy remedy a t law i s provided by the right t o a t r i a l de novo under section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947. Thus a new judge is had in any event. Also, significantly the legislature has not provided for other justices of the peace t o be called in. Many counties and townships have only one justice of the peace. N o provision anywhere i n the Code i s provided for procedures, expenses, record keeping or otherwise for substitution of justices of the peace. This alone strengthens the view that the particular context of section 95-1709 does not require the word "judge" t o include justice of the peace. Rather, it requires that it not be included since other adequate and prompt methods for protecting the r i g h t of a defendant t o justice at.eprovided, as heretofore explained. Accordingly, we hold that a justice of the peace may not be disqualified on a simple affidavit for substitution of judge under section 95-1709, R.C.M. 1947, but rather the provisions of Chapter 20, T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, must be followed. W e reverse the order of the d i s t r i c t court appealed from and remand the cause t o the d i s t r i c t court for dismissal of the complaint of Bailey and for remand t o the justice court of Billings Township for t r i a l of the complaint therein pending.