Title: Oulds v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992489
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2000

Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
DOUGLAS TYRONE OULDS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 992489 
SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The principal issue raised on this appeal is whether the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia correctly ruled that, in the course 
of prosecution of an indictment of a felony defined in a 
Virginia statute, the Commonwealth proved the elements of the 
charged crime including the adoption of a city ordinance 
authorizing police officers to utilize their police powers while 
engaged in off-duty employment. 
 
Douglas Tyrone Oulds was convicted in a bench trial 
conducted in the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg of the 
commission of "assault and battery on . . . a law enforcement 
officer engaged in the performance of his public duties, in 
violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-57 . . . ."  The trial judge 
imposed a sentence of three years and eight months in prison 
with two years and five months suspended during good behavior.  
In an unpublished opinion, Oulds v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
2062-98-3 (September 28, 1999), the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment, and we awarded Oulds this appeal. 
I. THE FACTS 
 
We will summarize the facts from the record of the 
testimony delivered at trial by the defendant, the victim of the 
assault, and an eyewitness to that assault. 
 
Paul R. Adams, a Lynchburg City policeman, had worked off-
duty for 12 years as a security guard at the Plaza, a shopping 
center in Lynchburg.  Adams testified that the police department 
had formally approved his off-duty employment and authorized him 
to act "dressed in uniform, carrying his side arm, handcuffs, 
and some other implements of a police officer."  In the exercise 
of the authority granted by the department and the Plaza, Adams 
had notified Oulds that he was "barred from the Plaza and that 
if he ever came back over there again, he would be arrested for 
trespassing."  Adams recalled that he had been "previously 
familiar with Mr. Oulds" on "[t]wo other occasions at the Plaza 
involving arrests." 
 
On the occasion relevant here, Adams saw Oulds at the Plaza 
and attempted to handcuff and arrest him for trespassing.  
During the struggle that ensued, Adams sustained wounds to his 
mouth and to his right index finger.  Oulds broke free from the 
struggle and ran to another section of the Plaza, where he was 
arrested with the aid of police officers.  Ms. Sarah Reeves, a 
manager of a department in one of the stores in the Plaza, 
testified that she had witnessed the injuries Adams suffered in 
a "wrestling match", Oulds' attempt to flee, and his arrest. 
 
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II. JUDICIAL NOTICE 
 
In support of a motion to strike the Commonwealth's 
evidence, Oulds contended that the Commonwealth had failed to 
prove the elements of the crime because it did not introduce an 
authenticated copy of a city ordinance enacted in compliance 
with Code § 15.2-1712 (formerly § 15.1-33.1) authorizing police 
officers to use their police power in off-duty employment.  In 
response, the Commonwealth identified the city ordinance as 
"Section 31.5 . . . which basically, expressly gives police 
officers permission, as long as they follow the guidelines, to 
work off duty in the City of Lynchburg."1  Announcing that he had 
"ruled before . . . on the very same point," the trial judge 
overruled the motion to strike. 
 
Affirming Ould's conviction on appeal, the Court of Appeals 
held that a trial court "need not admit formally the ordinances 
of the jurisdiction where it sits because it is required to take 
judicial notice of those laws."  In an assignment of error on 
appeal to this Court, Oulds contends that "the Court of Appeals 
erred in the application of the doctrine of judicial notice."  
That error exists, according to Oulds, because "the prosecution 
                     
1 The Lynchburg ordinance, a copy of which was included in 
the record on appeal to the Court of Appeals, provided that 
"police officers will be permitted to engage in off-duty 
employment which requires the use of their police powers."  Such 
an ordinance was definitively authorized by former Code § 15.1-
33.1 (now, § 15.2-1712), which permits, but does not require, a 
locality to enact such regulations. 
 
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did not ask to take judicial notice of " the ordinance, and "a 
copy of the ordinance was not admitted as evidence."  We 
disagree with Oulds' argument. 
 
Oulds' contentions ignore the plain language and function 
of the Virginia statute defining the doctrine of judicial 
notice.  Code § 19.2-265.2(A) reads as follows: 
Whenever, in any criminal case it becomes necessary to 
ascertain what the law, statutory or otherwise, of this 
Commonwealth, of another state, of the United States, of 
another country, or of any political subdivision or agency 
of the same is, or was, at any time, the court shall take 
judicial notice thereof whether specially pleaded or not. 
 
This statute eliminates the necessity of introducing an 
authenticated copy of a city ordinance into evidence and that 
the ordinance be "specially pleaded."  In this case, as recited 
above, the Commonwealth specifically directed the trial court's 
attention to the city ordinance in question.  Thus the Court of 
Appeals did not err in concluding that, under the principle of 
judicial notice, the Commonwealth met its burden to prove that 
the city had adopted an ordinance authorizing police officers to 
work off-duty. 
 
Oulds also complains that the trial court erroneously 
allowed hearsay testimony to establish the existence of and 
compliance with regulations adopted by the city regarding off-
duty employment by police officers.  Again we disagree. 
 
Here, Officer Adams' testimony that he had complied with 
the department's directives concerning off-duty employment was 
 
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not offered to prove the existence and content of such 
regulations. 
III. PUBLIC DUTIES 
 
We do agree with Oulds that "the prosecution must prove a 
law enforcement officer is performing his public duties to 
sustain a felony conviction under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-57."  
Yet, we disagree with Oulds' view that the evidence in this case 
was insufficient to prove that Adams was engaged in the 
performance of public duties. 
 
The felony of which Oulds was convicted is defined in Code 
§ 18.2-57(C).  That statute provides that "if any person commits 
an assault or an assault and battery against another knowing or 
having reason to know that such other person is a law-
enforcement officer . . . engaged in the performance of his 
public duties as such, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 
felony . . . ." 
 
The evidence, including Oulds' own testimony, clearly shows 
that Oulds committed an "assault and battery" upon Adams; that 
Oulds recognized Adams as a "law enforcement officer"; and that 
Adams was engaged in the arrest of a person who had committed a 
criminal trespass upon private property.2  As the Court of 
Appeals' concluded, Adams' "private employment did not relieve 
                     
2 Police officers "may arrest, without a warrant, any person 
who commits any crime in the presence of the officer . . . ."  
Code § 19.2-81. 
 
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him of the responsibility or authority to maintain the peace, 
protect property, and enforce the laws of the Commonwealth." 
Accordingly, we hold that Adams was "engaged in the performance 
of his public duties" when he was assaulted by Oulds. 
 
Finding no error of record in this appeal, we will affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.
 
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