Title: Commonwealth v. Adams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12620
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12620 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARK ADAMS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 7, 2019. - June 27, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Unlawful Interference.  Police Officer. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lowell Division of 
the District Court Department on December 29, 2016. 
 
 
The case was tried before John F. Coffey, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Ilir Kavaja for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Oren Nimni, Luke Ryan, & Molly Ryan Strehorn, for Committee 
for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
Lisa J. Steele, for Commonwealth Second Amendment, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  We address, for the first time, whether 
interference with the lawful duties of a police officer is a 
2 
 
 
common-law crime in Massachusetts. 
Part II, c. 6, art. 6, of the Massachusetts Constitution 
provides that the common law that existed before the 1780 
adoption of that Constitution was "preserved and continued," and 
remains in full force until altered or repealed by the 
Legislature.  Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 
Mass. 162, 171 (1911).  After an examination of our Nineteenth 
Century jurisprudence concerning the illegal acts of 
"obstructing" or "hindering" a police officer, as well as other 
authoritative sources, we conclude that interference with the 
lawful duties of a police officer was, and continues to be, a 
common-law crime, albeit subject to carefully constructed 
limitations to avoid criminalizing constitutionally protected 
activities. 
Because those limitations were exceeded in this case, we 
conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that 
the defendant committed the crime of interference with a police 
officer.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, Lawyers for Civil Rights, 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, and 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts; and by 
Commonwealth Second Amendment. 
3 
 
 
Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 442 (2012).  On December 28, 2016, the 
Tyngsboro police department suspended the defendant's class A 
license to carry firearms.  At 8:15 P.M. that day, three police 
officers went to the defendant's home to serve written notice of 
the suspension, and to retrieve his firearms and ammunition.  
Sergeant Charles Melanson knocked on the front door, while two 
other officers stood to each side of the door. 
The defendant, who was at home with his wife and teenaged 
son, answered the knock and stepped outside to speak with the 
officers.  Melanson explained that the officers were there to 
serve a suspension of the defendant's license to carry firearms, 
and to take his firearms (numbering fifteen) and ammunition from 
his home.  Melanson served the defendant with written notice of 
the license suspension.  The defendant became argumentative and 
visibly upset.  He repeatedly yelled that he was not going to 
give up his firearms, and that he intended to telephone his 
attorney.  He told his wife, who had come to the door, not to 
allow the officers to enter. 
The defendant attempted to go back inside, but Melanson put 
his hand on the front door and held it shut.  Again, the 
officers told the defendant that they were there to confiscate 
his firearms.  He responded by insisting that he was not going 
to give up his guns, and requested an opportunity to consult 
with his attorney.  While this was going on, Sergeant Mark 
4 
 
 
Borque went up the front stairs and walked into the house to 
speak with the defendant's wife.  The defendant told his wife 
not to answer any questions and to telephone his attorney.  He 
protested that he was "[one hundred] percent" not giving up his 
guns, and would not provide the police with the combination to 
his gun safe.  The defendant then again attempted to enter his 
home.  The officers told him to stop, but he quickened his pace 
toward the front door.  One of the officers tackled the 
defendant to the ground and, after a struggle, placed him under 
arrest. 
 
The defendant disputed the officers' version of events.  He 
testified that he told the police that he voluntarily would 
surrender his firearms, but, before doing so, he requested an 
opportunity to consult with his attorney to find out whether he 
had any legal recourse.  The defendant was concerned that the 
police would mishandle his firearms, some of which were 
expensive or had sentimental value.  The officers would not 
allow him to telephone his attorney, and entered his home 
without permission.  The defendant followed them inside and 
demanded that they leave.  At that point, he was tackled to the 
ground and placed under arrest. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  In December 2016, a criminal 
complaint issued from the District Court charging the defendant 
with failure to surrender firearms, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (i); 
5 
 
 
being a disorderly person, G. L. c. 272, § 53; resisting arrest, 
G. L. c. 268, § 32B; and interference with a police officer.  In 
March 2017, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss all charges 
due to a lack of probable cause.  He argued that he had a right, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 140, § 129D, to maintain possession of his 
firearms pending an appeal from the suspension of his firearm 
license.  A District Court judge denied the motion.  In May 
2017, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized 
from his home on the ground that police unlawfully had entered 
without a warrant.  A different District Court judge allowed the 
motion after an evidentiary hearing.  The judge found that no 
exception to the warrant requirement authorized the police to 
enter the defendant's home, forcibly open his gun safe, and 
confiscate his firearms and ammunition.  As a result of the 
suppression order, the Commonwealth dismissed the charge of 
failure to surrender a firearm. 
In September 2017, a two-day trial took place on the 
remaining charges of being a disorderly person, resisting 
arrest, and interference with a police officer.  After the judge 
denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not 
guilty, the jury convicted him of interference with a police 
officer and acquitted him of the other charges. 
The defendant appealed from the conviction.  He argues that 
the judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges 
6 
 
 
because he was not required to surrender his firearms under 
G. L. c. 140, § 129D; the order immediately to surrender his 
firearms violated the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution; the evidence was insufficient to prove 
interference with a police officer; and the jury instructions 
"were woefully inadequate."  We transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant's appeal raises three 
issues.2  First, is the crime with which he was charged 
recognized under Massachusetts common law?3  Second, assuming 
that interference with a police officer is a common-law crime, 
what does it prohibit?  Third, was the evidence, considered in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, sufficient to 
sustain the conviction? 
a.  Whether interference with a police officer is an 
offense recognized under Massachusetts common law.  When the 
                     
2 Because of the result we reach, we do not address the 
defendant's contention that the jury instructions were "woefully 
inadequate." 
 
 
3 The defendant did not challenge the common-law basis for 
the charge of interference with a police officer in the District 
Court, and does not raise the issue on appeal.  When we 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court, we solicited amicus 
briefs that addressed "[w]hether Massachusetts should recognize 
the common-law crime of interfering with a police officer in the 
lawful performance of his or her duties."  See G. L. c. 277, 
§ 47A ("A defense or objection based upon . . . the failure to 
charge an offense may be raised by motion to dismiss prior to 
trial, but shall be noticed by the court at any time"). 
7 
 
 
Massachusetts Constitution was adopted in 1780, Part II, c. 6, 
art. 6, provided for the continuation of the common law by 
declaring that all of the laws "usually practised on in the 
courts of law" were carried into effect as a matter of State law 
until altered or repealed by the Legislature, or declared 
invalid by a court.4  See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 11 
(1971) (art. 6 provides for continuation in Commonwealth of 
great body of common law); Crocker, 208 Mass. at 171 ("The 
general body of jurisprudence which had heretofore existed was 
thus preserved and continued").  The common law of the 
Commonwealth, "when it can be authentically established and 
sustained," is of "equal authority and binding force" to laws 
enacted by the Legislature.  Commonwealth v. Chapman, 13 Met. 
68, 70 (1847).  See Sheehan, petitioner, 254 Mass. 342, 345 
(1926) (definition of crimes "so far as not left to the common 
law" is province of Legislature). 
 
One need not look far to find common-law crimes recognized 
in the Commonwealth that continue with "equal authority and 
binding force" today.  See Chapman, 13 Met. at 70.  In cases of 
                     
4 Part II, c. 6, art. 6, of the Massachusetts Constitution 
provides, "All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used 
and approved in the Province, Colony or State of Massachusetts 
Bay, and usually practised on in the courts of law, shall still 
remain and be in full force, until altered or repealed by the 
legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the 
rights and liberties contained in this constitution." 
8 
 
 
murder and manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, §§ 1 and 13, establish 
penalties, but "what acts shall constitute murder, what 
manslaughter, or what justifiable or excusable homicide, are 
left to be decided by the rules and principles of the common 
law."5  Chapman, supra at 69.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 
481 Mass. 352, 364 (2019); Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 
822 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018); Commonwealth v. 
Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 8 (2002). 
 
i.  Origins.  Massachusetts common law derives originally 
"either [from] the common law of England, or those English 
statutes passed before the emigration of our ancestors."  
Chapman, 13 Met. at 68.  Thereafter, it was shaped by "usages, 
growing out of the peculiar situation and exigencies of the 
earlier settlers of Massachusetts, not traceable to any written 
statutes or ordinances, but adopted by general consent."  Id. at 
69.  See Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, 534-535 (1807) 
(Massachusetts common law was brought from England by "our 
ancestors," and was amended and altered by practice and usage). 
 
Our ability to trace the roots of a given common-law 
                     
 
5 Other offenses that exist as part of Massachusetts common 
law include solicitation to commit a felony, see Commonwealth v. 
Barsell, 424 Mass. 737, 740 (1997); forgery, see Commonwealth v. 
Apalakis, 396 Mass. 292, 298 (1985); uttering a forged 
instrument, see Commonwealth v. Russell, 156 Mass. 196, 197 
(1892); conspiracy, see Commonwealth v. Cantres, 405 Mass. 238, 
240 (1989); and affray, see Commonwealth v. Nee, 83 Mass. App. 
Ct. 441, 444-445 (2013). 
9 
 
 
offense is hampered by a lack of regular reports of the early 
jurisprudence in the Commonwealth.  Prior to adoption of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, "[t]he records of courts were very 
imperfectly kept, and afford but little information in regard to 
the rules of law discussed and adopted in them."  Chapman, 54 
Mass. at 70.  See Commonwealth v. Churchill, 2 Met. 118, 124 
(1840) ("Before the revolution, we had no regular reports of 
judicial decisions . . . and the most familiar rules and 
principles of law").  In 1839, commissioners appointed by the 
Legislature to report on the substance of Massachusetts common-
law offenses observed, "As there are no regular reports of our 
jurisprudence further back than from a period of about twenty 
years after the adoption of the constitution, we have no direct 
contemporary evidence of the law so adopted . . . ."  
Preliminary Report of the Commissioners on Criminal Law, 1839 
Senate Doc. No. 21, at 20 (1839 Preliminary Report). 
The absence of a reported appellate decision, however, does 
not remove a criminal offense from the common law.  See 
Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 833 (1977) ("It is true 
that sometimes, even in a case of first impression, common law 
standards of criminality not previously defined are applied 
against a defendant"); Commonwealth v. Nee, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
441, 444-445 (2013) (absence of appellate decisions did not 
remove offense of "ancient provenance" from common law).  We 
10 
 
 
have rejected the narrow view that the common law could be 
regarded as adopted only if "it could be shown affirmatively 
that it had been adjudicated before the revolution."6  See 
Churchill, 2 Met. at 124. 
ii.  Other authoritative sources.  As a result, we must 
look to other authoritative sources to ascertain the common law.  
The common law may be found in "usage and tradition, and the 
well known repositories of legal learning, [and] works of 
approved authority."  Churchill, 2 Met. at 124.  There is no 
doubt that these were the "great sources" of common law adopted 
by Part II, c. 6, art. 6, of the Massachusetts Constitution.  
Id.  We also have held that the common law of Massachusetts is 
reflected in "records of courts of justice, well authenticated 
histories of trials, and books of reports, digests, and brief 
statements of such decisions, prepared by suitable persons, and 
the treatises of sages of the profession, whose works have an 
established reputation for correctness."  See Chapman, 13 Met. 
at 70. 
We thus undertake to trace the common-law history of 
interference with a police officer by examining the following 
available sources:  English law prior to, and contemporaneous 
                     
 
6 In Commonwealth v. Shave, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1131 (2012), 
the Appeals Court, in an unpublished decision issued pursuant to 
its rule 1:28, mentioned interference with a police officer as a 
crime, without discussion of the validity of the offense. 
11 
 
 
with, the adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution; our mid-
Nineteenth Century case law that references the unlawful acts of 
"obstructing" or "hindering" a police officer; an 1844 report 
commissioned by the Legislature that described categories of 
common-law offenses known as "obstructing and perverting the 
course of justice"; the law usually and traditionally practiced 
in the Commonwealth as reflected in the 1972 Proposed Criminal 
Code of Massachusetts and contemporary Massachusetts court 
records from 1977 to 2018; and the common law of other 
jurisdictions.  Based on these sources, the common-law offense 
of interfering with a police officer was charged (and defendants 
were convicted of the offense) at least as early as 1634. 
iii.  English law.  We turn first to the common law of 
England.  The charge of interference with a police officer 
appeared in a 1634 English case involving a citizen's lawsuit 
against a constable for false imprisonment.  In Sheffeld's Case, 
Clayt. 10, 10-11 (1634), a constable questioned the plaintiff, 
who was a stranger, about which way he had come into town.  The 
plaintiff answered that he had come "over the bridge."  The 
judge found this to be a "scornfull answer," and noted that the 
plaintiff "had no Passe," yet nonetheless had determined to 
travel without one.  The judge decided that there was "good 
cause" to arrest the plaintiff for "opposing the Constable."  
See Busch v. State, 289 Md. 669, 675-676 (1981), quoting 
12 
 
 
Sheffeld's Case, supra (common-law offense of resisting, 
hindering, or obstructing officer was described long ago in 
Sheffeld's Case).  In Rex v. Brady, 2 Leach C.C. 803, 804 
(1797), decided after the adoption of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, a defendant was charged with three offenses:  
assaulting an officer, and thereby hindering him; assaulting an 
officer; and that the defendant "had hindered, opposed, and 
obstructed [the officer] . . . in the due execution of his 
duty." 
iv.  Nineteenth Century Massachusetts cases.  Our early 
case law, by contrast, does not clearly establish interference 
with a police officer as an independent offense.  Rather, in 
most reported cases, the act of obstructing or hindering a 
police officer functions as an aggravating factor to a charge of 
assaulting a police officer. 
The closest support for the argument that interference with 
a police officer is a stand-alone common-law offense is found in 
Commonwealth v. Hastings, 9 Met. 259 (1845).  The indictment in 
Hastings alleged that the defendant, 
"with force and arms, in and upon one Grant Learned an 
assault did make, said Learned then and there being a 
police officer of the city of Boston, and then and there 
being in the lawful discharge of his duty as such police 
officer, and him then and there did beat, bruise, wound and 
evil treat, and did then and there obstruct, hinder and 
oppose said Learned, in the discharge of his duty as such 
police officer, and which he, the said Learned, was then 
and there attempting lawfully to perform." 
13 
 
 
 
Id. at 259-260.  The facts underlying the indictment established 
that Learned, who was appointed as a police officer to patrol a 
Boston theater, had arrested a patron for being drunk and 
disorderly.  Id. at 260.  On the way "towards the jail or watch 
house," Learned released the defendant on the defendant's 
promise to go directly home.  Id.  Instead, while still in 
Learned's sight, the defendant went straight into a barroom.  
Learned followed him inside and "retook" the defendant for the 
purpose of conveying him to jail.  Id.  "[T]he defendant 
thereupon interfered, and obstructed Learned."  Id. 
The primary issue raised in Hastings's appeal was whether 
the police officer was assaulted while in the exercise of his 
legal authority to patrol the theater.  Id. at 261-262.  The 
less than clear language of the indictment could be read as 
charging Hastings either with one offense or with two separate 
offenses. In the first view, the indictment could be understood 
as a single offense of assaulting Learned, with the acts of 
obstructing or hindering a police officer aggravating that 
assault.  Id. at 260.  The indictment also could be construed, 
however, as alleging two separate offenses:  aggravated assault 
and interference with a police officer.  Id. 
In that view, the first offense, aggravated assault, is 
described as, "with force and arms, in and upon one Grant 
14 
 
 
Learned an assault did make, said Learned then and there being a 
police officer of the city of Boston, and then and there being 
in the lawful discharge of his duty as such police officer."  
Id. at 259-260.  The second offense, obstructing or hindering a 
police officer, could be supported based on the language in the 
indictment alleging that the defendant "and . . . then and there 
did beat, bruise, wound and evil treat, and did then and there 
obstruct, hinder and oppose said Learned, in the discharge of 
his duty as such police officer, and which he, said Learned, was 
then and there attempting lawfully to perform" (emphasis added).  
Id. at 260. 
 
In a later decision, this court described interference with 
a police officer as an aggravating factor to simple assault.  
See Commonwealth v. Kirby, 2 Cush. 577, 582 (1849).  The 
defendant in that case was charged with assaulting a constable 
and with "hindering and opposing [the constable] while engaged 
in the due and lawful execution of the duties of his office."  
Id. at 578.  The defendant had prevented the constable from 
executing a warrant for the apprehension of a third party.  Id.  
The defendant argued that the indictment was deficient because 
it failed to allege that he knew, at the time of the alleged 
interference, that the person entering the residence was a 
constable.  Id.  We concluded that the element of knowledge was 
sufficiently alleged, and that the indictment charged a simple 
15 
 
 
assault upon the constable with "the aggravation that it was 
made upon a constable while in the discharge of the duties of 
his office, and with the design of hindering and opposing him in 
the due execution of such official duty."  Id. at 581-582.  See 
Commonwealth v. McHugh, 157 Mass. 457, 458 (1892) (defendant was 
charged with "assault upon . . . a constable, while in the 
discharge of his duty," i.e., preventing constable from removing 
goods subject to attachment by forcibly grabbing hold of 
constable's coat and whiskers, and throwing him to floor); 
Commonwealth v. Tobin, 108 Mass. 426, 426 (1871) (defendant 
charged with assaulting police officer, "and then and there 
also" hindering or opposing officer in lawful discharge of his 
duties). 
 
The practice of charging obstructing or hindering a police 
officer as an aggravated form of assault was described in 
Commonwealth v. Hyde, Thacher's Crim. Cas. 112 (Boston Mun. Ct. 
1825).  The Commonwealth charged Hyde as follows:  "first, for 
an assault and battery committed upon Jason Braman, a constable 
of the city of Boston, on the 25th of May, 1825, said Braman 
being at the time in the actual discharge of the duties of said 
office:  second, for a riotous assembling together to commit an 
unlawful act, and for committing an assault upon the body of 
Jason Braman, a constable in the exercise of his said office."  
Id.  The judge addressed the limited statutory authority granted 
16 
 
 
justices of the peace to punish "all assaults and batteries that 
are not of a high and aggravated nature."  Id. at 113-114.  He 
concluded that "where there are circumstances of aggravation, as 
where the assault is committed upon a magistrate, a sheriff or 
other officer in the actual administration of his office, . . . 
the jurisdiction exceeds the power of a justice of the peace."  
Id. at 114. 
 
v.  1844 legislative commission report of the penal code.  
In 1837, the Legislature appointed a five-person commission to 
"reduce so much of the Common Law of Massachusetts, as relates 
to crimes and punishments and the incidents thereof, to a 
written and systematic Code."7  Resolves 1837, c. 30.  The 
commissioners examined "[a]n extensive mass of materials":  
"[n]umerous digests, treatises, and volumes of reports, . . . 
occupied wholly with the jurisprudence in relation to crimes and 
punishments."  1839 Preliminary Report, supra at 21.  In the 
preface to their final report, the commissioners assured the 
Legislature that "no part of it [had] been finally concluded 
upon without much care to avoid errors and omissions," and that 
"no degree of care [had] been wanting, nor any labor spared."  
Report of the Penal Code of Massachusetts, at iv (1844) (1844 
Report). 
                     
 
7 This code was not codified. 
17 
 
 
 
Chapter 29 of the 1844 Report describes common-law offenses 
under the general topic of prohibitions against "Obstructing and 
Perverting the Course of Justice."  Id. at xv.  The offenses 
listed in that chapter include escape, refusing to receive a 
prisoner, refusing assistance to an officer, preventing or 
suppressing evidence, bribery, and common barratry (vexatious 
incitement of a baseless lawsuit).  Notably, §§ 17 and 18 of 
that chapter describe, respectively, the common-law offenses of 
"threats and intimidation" and "other obstructions to the course 
of justice."  1844 Report, supra at xvi.  Section 17 of chapter 
29 of the 1844 Report states: 
"Whoever wilfully obstructs or attempts to obstruct the 
public legislation, or the due administration or execution 
of the law, by threats of violence against, or intimidation 
of, or endeavoring to intimidate, any member of the 
council, or senate, or house of representatives, or any 
legislative, executive, civil, military or judicial 
officer, or any officer, functionary or person legally 
charged with any duty in the administration, enforcement or 
execution of the law, shall be punished . . . ." 
 
Section 18 of chapter 29 of the 1844 Report provides: 
"Whoever, otherwise than as specified in the preceding 
sections, wilfully and not in the legal exercise of any 
authority, power, function or right, guarantied or granted 
by the constitution or laws, prevents, obstructs, disturbs, 
defeats or perverts the public legislation, or due 
administration, enforcement and execution of the laws, 
whether by wilfully hindering any public, executive, 
legislative, judicial, civil or other officer, commissioner 
or functionary in, or wilfully diverting him from, the 
discharge of his duties and exercise of his rights and 
functions under the laws and constitution, or in any other 
way or by any other means, not authorized by law, shall be 
punished . . . ." 
18 
 
 
 
 
As described in the 1844 Report, and as applicable to the 
defendant's case, at that time Massachusetts common law included 
broad prohibitions against willfully obstructing or hindering 
governmental officials in the lawful performance of their 
duties.  It is significant that Massachusetts common law 
exempted from criminal liability the "legal exercise of any 
authority, power, function or right, guarantied or granted by 
the constitution or laws."  See id.  See also discussion, infra. 
 
vi.  1972 Proposed Criminal Code.  More than a century 
later, the common-law offense described in § 17  of chapter 29 
of the 1844 Report (obstruction by threats of violence or 
intimidation) reappeared in the 1972 Proposed Criminal Code of 
Massachusetts.8  The Proposed Criminal Code, drafted by the 
Governor's committee on law enforcement and administration of 
criminal justice, included a section prohibiting "obstructing 
government administration."  According to the provisions of that 
code, an individual would have committed a "class A misdemeanor" 
if he or she "use[d] force, violence or intimidation, or 
engage[d] in any other unlawful act with intent to interfere 
with a person he [or she] knows to be a public servant 
performing or purporting to perform an official function."  
Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts, c. 268, § 9(a)(1) 
                     
 
8 This proposed code was not codified. 
19 
 
 
(1972).  The crime of obstructing government administration did 
not apply to the "failure to perform a legal duty other than an 
official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with 
law without affirmative interference with governmental 
functions."  Id. at § 9(b). 
 
vii.  Contemporary Trial Court records.  An examination of 
the Trial Court's electronic case management system, using 
records beginning in 1977 (when those records first became 
available electronically) through 2018, shows that 2,600 
individuals were charged with interference with a police officer 
during that period.  See Appendices A, B. 
 
Of the 2,600 charges of that crime from 1977 through 2018, 
the overwhelming majority were charged after 1994.  The number 
of offenses charged annually was in the single digits from 1977 
through 1993, with a median of 2.5 per year.  In 1994, the 
number of charges of interference with a police officer jumped 
to twenty-seven.  Thereafter, the annual number of charges 
continued to increase, but remained less than one hundred 
annually, with a median of 48.5, through 2010.  Beginning in 
2011, the annual median of charges was 242, but overall the 
number of charges increased substantially in almost every year, 
reaching a high of 335 in 2018.  From 2002 through 2018, the 
crime of interference with a police officer was the most serious 
offense of which a defendant was convicted in 147 cases, or 5.65 
20 
 
 
percent of the number of times it was charged. 
 
This significant increase in charges of interfering with a 
police officer coincided with the 1994 publication of a District 
Court complaint manual.  The administrative office of the 
District Court published the manual to provide "offense codes 
and charging language for more than 5,000 offenses."  District 
Court Complaint Language Manual, at 1 (rev. Apr. 13, 2018).  The 
complaint manual includes the common-law offenses of affray, 
criminal contempt of court, escape from a police officer, 
interference with a police officer, resisting arrest, soliciting 
another to commit a felony, obstruction of justice, forgery, and 
uttering.  Under these definitions, an individual interfered 
with a police officer if he or she "did intimidate, hinder or 
interrupt a police officer in the lawful performance of his or 
her duty, in violation of the Common Law."  Id. 
viii.  Common law in other jurisdictions.  Finally, in 
defining Massachusetts common law, we also consider the common 
law of other jurisdictions, as well as statements of 
contemporary commentators.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Barsell, 424 
Mass. 737, 739 (1997) (other States and commentators support 
conclusion that common-law solicitation to murder is 
misdemeanor). 
Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee recognize that the offense of interference with a 
21 
 
 
police officer existed in their common law.  See State v. Beck, 
5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 587, 589 (1969); Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490, 
505 (1876); People v. Krum, 374 Mich. 356, 361, cert. denied, 
381 U.S. 935 (1965); State v. Kirven, 279 S.C. 541, 543 (1983); 
Pope v. State, 528 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).  See 
also J. Miller, Handbook of Criminal law 461 (1934) ("Any 
willful obstruction of justice by resisting an officer who is 
endeavoring to perform his official duty is a misdemeanor at 
common law . . ."); R.M. Perkins, Criminal Law 495-497 (2d ed. 
1969) ("One of the most common forms of obstruction of justice 
involves an interference with a public officer in the discharge 
of his official duty"); 4 C.E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law 
§ 567 (15th ed. 1996) ("At common law, the obstruction of or 
resistance to the performance of a governmental function, as 
where a police officer or other public servant is obstructed in 
the performance of his duty, constitutes an offense"). 
In sum, we conclude that the offense of interference with a 
police officer existed in Massachusetts common law.  We turn to 
the question of what it prohibits, and what it does not. 
b.  What constitutes the offense of interference with a 
police officer?  "In the prosecution of crimes under the common 
law apart from statute, ordinarily it is necessary to allege and 
prove a guilty intent, and as a general principle a crime is not 
committed if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent."  
22 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 142 (1910).  See 
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 553 (1893) ("It is a 
general rule in criminal proceedings at common law that the 
defendant cannot be convicted unless a criminal intent is shown 
. . ."); Commonwealth v. Presby, 14 Gray 65, 66-67 (1859) ("To 
constitute a criminal act, there must, as a general rule, be a 
criminal intent"). 
Thus, we begin with the Commonwealth's burden to establish 
a defendant's criminal intent.  As described in the 1844 Report, 
the offense of interference with a police officer required the 
Commonwealth to prove that a defendant's conduct was "wilful[]."  
Noah Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language, 
published in 1828, defines "willful" as "[g]overned by the will 
without yielding to reason; obstinate; stubborn; perverse; 
inflexible; as a willful man."  "Willful," as used in modern 
times, means "intentional without making reference to any evil 
intent" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Luna, 
418 Mass. 749, 753 (1994).  See Commonwealth v. Brennan, 481 
Mass. 146, 154 (2018) ("willful" requires intentional conduct, 
not accidental).  Black's Law Dictionary defines "willful" as 
"[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1834 (10th ed. 2014). 
Accordingly, to convict a defendant of interference with a 
police officer, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 
23 
 
 
intended his or her conduct, and intended "the harmful 
consequences of the conduct -- that is, the interference with, 
obstruction, or hindrance."  See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 84 Mass. 
App. Ct. 574, 578 (2013) (interpreting willful interference with 
firefighter statute to require intent to interfere).  After all, 
without an intent element, it would be a violation of the law 
"to stand near a police officer and persistently attempt to 
engage the officer in conversation while the officer is 
directing traffic at a busy intersection."  Houston v. Hill, 482 
U.S. 451, 479 (1987).  See Cocroft v. Smith, 95 F. Supp. 3d 119, 
126 (D. Mass. 2015) (observing that "if Massachusetts were to 
recognize the common-law offense of obstructing a police officer 
in the performance of his duty, a conviction would require proof 
that the alleged violator acted with specific intent to 
intimidate, hinder or interrupt the officer"). 
With respect to the conduct that is prohibited by the 
common-law crime of interference with a police officer, the 
nature of the offense is shaped, in large part, by the common-
law restriction against the use of interference with a police 
officer to criminalize the free exercise of rights "guarantied 
or granted by the constitution or laws."  See § 18 of chapter 29 
of the 1844 Report. 
For guidance, we turn to case law from other jurisdictions 
involving constitutional challenges to statutes or ordinances 
24 
 
 
that prohibit interference with a police officer.  In Hill, the 
United States Supreme Court considered an overbreadth challenge 
to a city ordinance providing that "[i]t shall be unlawful for 
any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, 
abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty" 
(citation omitted).  Hill, 482 U.S. at 455.  The "assault" and 
"strike" portions of the ordinance were preempted by provisions 
of the Texas Penal Code, leaving only that portion of the 
ordinance making it unlawful for "any person to . . . in any 
manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the 
execution of his duty" (citation omitted).  Id. at 461.  This 
remaining portion was overbroad, because it prohibited a 
"substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct," such 
as verbally interrupting a police officer while the officer was 
on duty.  Id. at 458, 462 & n.11.  In striking down the 
ordinance, the Court noted that the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution "protects a significant amount of 
verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers."  
Id. at 461.  The Court commented, "The freedom of individuals 
verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby 
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which 
we distinguish a free nation from a police state."  Id. at 462-
463. 
The Court recognized that the ordinance furthered the 
25 
 
 
government's legitimate interest in maintaining public order.  
Id. at 464.  It is constitutionally permissible to prohibit 
individuals from physically obstructing a police officer.  Id. 
at 462 n.11.  It also is constitutionally permissible to 
prohibit an individual from obstructing a police officer through 
the use of "threats of violence"9 against that officer (so-called 
"fighting words").  Id. at 463 n.12.  The police do not, 
however, have unfettered discretion to arrest someone for speech 
that annoys or offends.  Id. at 465.  See Duran v. Douglas, 904 
F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990) ("expression of disapproval 
toward a police officer . . . [falls] squarely within the 
protective umbrella of the First Amendment"). 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota nonetheless has rejected an 
overbreadth challenge to Minnesota's statute prohibiting 
interference with a peace officer.  See State v. Krawsky, 426 
N.W.2d 875, 876 (Minn. 1988).  That statute provided, in 
relevant part, "Whoever intentionally obstructs, hinders or 
prevents the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or 
criminal, or . . . interferes with a peace officer while the 
officer is engaged in the performance of official duties . . . 
may be sentenced . . . ."  Minn. Stat. § 609.50 (1986).  The 
court distinguished Hill, 482 U.S. 451, and thus was able to 
                     
 
9 See § 17 of chapter 29 of the 1844 Report. 
26 
 
 
uphold the statute, by interpreting § 609.50 as "directed solely 
at physical acts, whereas the ordinance in [Hill] was 
significantly broader, prohibiting verbal criticism directed at 
police."  Id. at 876-877.  In addition, the physical acts 
prohibited by the Minnesota statute involved "physically 
obstructing or interfering with an officer, whereas under the 
ordinance in [Hill] one could be punished for merely 
'interrupting' an officer in the line of duty."  Id. at 877.  
Consistent with Hill, the Minnesota court also stated that 
"[t]he statute may be used to punish 'fighting words' or any 
other words that by themselves have the effect of physically 
obstructing or interfering with a police officer in the 
performance of his duties."  Id.  See State v. Leigh, 278 N.C. 
243, 246 (1971) (speech alone cannot be punished as opposition 
of police officer); State v. Williams, 171 Wash. 2d 474, 485-486 
(2011) (crime of obstructing officer requires some conduct in 
addition to pure speech). 
The principle underlying the Massachusetts common-law 
restriction against criminalizing "the legal exercise of any 
authority, power, function or right, guarantied or granted by 
the constitution or laws," see § 18 of chapter 29 of the 1844 
Report, can be distilled to the premise that "a person does not 
violate the law by doing what he has a lawful right to do, 
regardless of whether it obstructs or hinders a police officer."  
27 
 
 
State v. Jarvis, 172 W. Va. 706, 709 (1983).  Accordingly, in 
Massachusetts, the offense of interference with a police officer 
requires proof of a physical act that obstructs or hinders a 
police officer in the lawful performance of his or her duty.  It 
also may include a "threat[] of violence against" the officer, 
see § 17 of chapter 29 of the 1844 Report, which reasonably 
would have the effect of obstructing or interfering with the 
officer in the performance of a lawful duty.10 
Although each case turns on its own facts, because there 
could be endless scenarios surrounding police interactions with 
citizens where an officer might contemplate charging this 
offense, we illustrate the type of conduct prohibited by the 
common-law crime of interference with a police officer by 
examining a civil rights action that was commenced in a Federal 
District Court.  In that case, the plaintiff owned property in 
Falmouth that included an easement deeded to an electrical 
utility.  Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2017).  
Pursuant to the easement, the utility was entitled to enter the 
plaintiff's property to trim, cut, or remove trees and 
                     
 
10 See, e.g., Gay v. State, 179 Ga. App. 430, 431-432 (1986) 
(evidence of obstruction sufficient where defendant threatened 
to get his shotgun and "blow holes in the patrol car" of officer 
who had called for truck to tow defendant's vehicle); State v. 
Mattila, 77 Or. App. 219, 221, 223 (1986) (obstructing 
governmental function established by evidence that defendant 
asked his mother, in loud voice, whether he could shoot deputies 
who had approached house to serve eviction papers). 
28 
 
 
underbrush that endangered its power lines.  Id.  As a result of 
an earlier confrontation with the plaintiff, a tree service 
contracted by the utility to clear vegetation entered the 
easement, accompanied by two Barnstable police officers.  Id.  
When he saw the work crew, the plaintiff went into "a high state 
of agitation," verbally protested, and strung yellow caution 
tape and plastic rope across the easement.  Id. at 18.  The 
police officers and utility workers removed some of the tape and 
rope, causing further delays.  Id.  The officers told the 
plaintiff that the work would not stop absent a court order, and 
warned him to cease interfering with the project.  Id.  Despite 
the warning, the plaintiff sat down on a tree stump and refused 
to move.  Id.  The officers then arrested him for disorderly 
conduct.  Id. 
The plaintiff later filed a complaint asserting claims 
against the officers for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, false arrest, 
false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and other claims.  Id.  On appeal from a magistrate 
judge's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit upheld the allowance of a motion for summary 
judgment by the police on qualified immunity grounds, and 
concluded that the officers had had probable cause to arrest the 
plaintiff for the Massachusetts common-law offense of 
29 
 
 
interference with a police officer.  Id. at 21-22.  The court 
reasoned that the officers had been engaged in the performance 
of the lawful duty of keeping citizens away from a dangerous 
work area, and the plaintiff had obstructed or hindered them by 
blocking the work crew.  Id. 
Accordingly, the offense of interference with a police 
officer requires the Commonwealth to prove four elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  First, the Commonwealth must show that the 
officer was engaged in the lawful performance of a duty.  
Second, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant 
physically performed an act that obstructed or hindered a police 
officer in the lawful performance of that duty.  The act may 
include a "threat[] of violence against" the officer, see § 17 
of chapter 29 of the 1844 Report, which reasonably would have 
the effect of obstructing or hindering the officer in the 
performance of that duty.  Third, the Commonwealth must 
demonstrate that the defendant was aware that the police officer 
was engaged in the performance of his or her duties.  Fourth, 
the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant intended to 
obstruct or hinder the officer in the performance of that duty. 
 
c.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant challenges 
on two grounds the sufficiency of the evidence that his refusal 
to turn over his firearms interfered with the police officers 
who had come to his house to collect them.  First, the defendant 
30 
 
 
disputes whether the officers were acting within the lawful 
performance of a duty when they confiscated his firearms and 
ammunition.  According to the defendant, G. L. c. 140, §§ 129D 
and 131 (f), authorize the police to serve an individual with 
notice of a firearm license suspension or revocation.  Under the 
defendant's interpretation, the individual would be permitted to 
maintain possession of his or her firearms and ammunition 
pending judicial review of the decision to suspend or revoke.  
The defendant maintains that "[a]nything that occurred after the 
[notification of license suspension or revocation] could not be 
considered interference with the lawful performance of [the 
officers'] duty."  Second, the defendant contends that his 
refusal to surrender his firearms and ammunition was not 
sufficient, without more, to support a conviction of common-law 
interference with a police officer. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the jury were entitled to find 
that "the officers' duty encompassed not only the serving of the 
notice [of license suspension or revocation] but also the 
seizing of the weapons -- and that the defendant interfered with 
that duty." 
 
In Massachusetts, local police departments are responsible 
for the issuance of firearms licenses to individuals who reside 
or have a place of business within the jurisdiction.  G. L. 
c. 140, §§ 121, 129B (1).  As relevant to license suspension, 
31 
 
 
G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f), provides, "All licenses to carry 
firearms shall be designated [c]lass A or [c]lass B, and the 
issuance and possession of any such license shall be subject to 
the following conditions and restrictions:" 
"A license issued under this section shall be revoked or 
suspended by the licensing authority, or his designee, upon 
the occurrence of any event that would have disqualified 
the holder from being issued such license or from having 
such a license renewed.  A license may be revoked or 
suspended by the licensing authority if it appears that the 
holder is no longer a suitable person to possess such 
license.  Any revocation or suspension of a license shall 
be in writing and shall state the reasons therefor." 
 
A license holder who is aggrieved by a suspension or 
revocation may seek judicial review in the District Court within 
ninety days of the revocation or suspension.  Id.  Upon the 
revocation or suspension of a class A or class B license, "the 
licensing authority shall take possession of such license and 
the person whose license is so revoked or suspended shall take 
all actions required under the provisions of [§] 129D."  Id.  
General Laws c. 140, § 131 (f), further provides that "[n]o 
appeal or post-judgment motion shall operate to stay such 
revocation or suspension."  Id.  See Firearms Records Bureau v. 
Simkin, 466 Mass. 168, 172-173 (2013).  See also Hightower v. 
Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2012). 
General Laws c. 140, § 129D, on the other hand, contains 
provisions that on their face may appear inconsistent with the 
requirements of c. 140, § 131 (f).  General Laws c. 140, § 129D, 
32 
 
 
provides that a firearm license holder "[u]pon revocation . . . 
[or] suspension . . . shall without delay deliver or surrender 
to the licensing authority where the person resides all 
firearms, rifles, shotguns and machine guns and ammunition which 
the person then possesses unless an appeal of the revocation or 
suspension is pending."  Thereafter, the licensing authority is 
responsible for properly storing and (potentially) disposing of 
the firearms.  Id.  See Andrade v. Somerville, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 
425, 428 (2017). 
As the defendant points out, there indeed is a tension 
between these statutory provisions.  General Laws c. 140, 
§ 131 (f), requires the police to take possession of the revoked 
or suspended firearms license, and states, "No appeal or post-
judgment motion shall operate to stay such revocation or 
suspension."  General Laws c. 140, § 129D, on the other hand, 
requires a license holder immediately to surrender all firearms 
and ammunition to the police "unless an appeal of the revocation 
or suspension is pending." 
"Where possible, we seek to harmonize the provisions of a 
statute with related provisions that are part of the same 
statutory scheme 'so as to give effect to the expressed intent 
of the Legislature'" (citation omitted).  Chin v. Merriot, 470 
Mass. 527, 537 (2015).  Massachusetts courts consistently have 
noted that the underlying goal of firearms control legislation 
33 
 
 
"is to limit access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons."  
Simkin, 466 Mass. at 176, quoting Ruggiero v. Police Comm'r of 
Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 258 (1984).  This purpose is 
effectuated by the provision that "[n]o appeal or post-judgment 
motion shall operate to stay" a revocation or suspension, and 
the requirement that the license holder surrender his or her 
firearms and ammunition "without delay."  See G. L. c. 140, 
§§ 129D, 131 (f). 
 
The two statutes may be harmonized so that they form a 
coherent and consistent whole and the phrase "unless an 
appeal . . . is pending" in G. L. c. 140, § 129D, is understood 
consistent with legislative intent and constitutional 
protections.  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 725 
(2005), quoting LaBranche v. A.J. Lane & Co., 404 Mass. 725, 728 
(1989) ("[W]e should endeavor to harmonize the two statutes so 
that the policies underlying both may be honored.  Implied 
repeal of a statute is disfavored, and we should not impliedly 
repeal a portion of [the statute] unless it 'is so repugnant to, 
and inconsistent with, the later enactment . . . that both 
cannot stand'").  See also Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 179 
(2019) (court strives to give effect to each word of statute so 
no part will be inoperative). 
 
To harmonize the provisions of G. L. c. 140, §§ 129D 
and 131 (f), and give effect to each word, we conclude that the 
34 
 
 
provisions afford a licensing authority two options when seeking 
to implement the suspension or revocation of a license for an 
individual deemed potentially "unsuitable."  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 131 (d). 
 
First, the licensing authority has discretion to provide 
notice to an individual believed no longer to be suitable to 
possess a license, and to seek immediate surrender of that 
individual's license, firearms, and ammunition.11  The failure to 
surrender firearms "without delay," in these circumstances, 
could subject the license holder to criminal sanctions pursuant 
to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (i).12  Thus, a licensing authority may 
                     
 
11 A license to possess a firearm "shall be revoked or 
suspended by the licensing authority . . . upon the occurrence 
of any event that would have disqualified the holder from being 
issued such license or from having such license renewed."  G. L. 
c. 140, § 131 (f).  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 626 (2008) (right to bear arms is not unlimited; individual 
may be statutorily disqualified from holding firearms license, 
on grounds of unsuitability, without violation of Second 
Amendment); Hightower, 693 F.3d at 73-76 ("unsuitable" 
individual, such as felon or one who is mentally ill, is not 
denied due process by revocation of firearms license). 
 
 
12 Here, the defendant refused to allow police to enter his 
home.  A District Court judge properly found that the officers 
were required to obtain a search warrant prior to seizing the 
firearms, because the Commonwealth was unable to establish 
consent or another exception to the warrant requirement.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 236-237 (2005).  In such 
circumstances, if they deem it necessary, police may secure the 
premises from the outside while they await the issuance of a 
search warrant.  See Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 
743 (1990).  See also Commonwealth v. Blake, 413 Mass. 823, 829 
(1992) (securing dwelling, on basis of probable cause to search 
for evidence of crime, includes ability to prevent anyone from 
35 
 
 
seek immediate surrender, prior to a hearing, of firearms in 
such cases.  See G. L. c. 140, §§ 129D, 131 (f). 
 
Although the statute is less than clear, the Legislature 
could not have intended to permit firearms to remain in the 
possession of dangerous individuals during a ninety-day appeal 
period, and then during the possibly lengthy duration of any 
subsequent appeal.  See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 
(1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1204 (2012), quoting 
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009) ("Statistics 
bear out the [United States] Supreme Court's observation that 
'[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly 
combination nationwide'"); Chief of Police of Worcester v. 
Holden, 470 Mass. 845, 864 (2015).  See also United States v. 
Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-805 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 
U.S. 990 (2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding 
statute that precludes those subject to abuse prevention order 
from having firearms); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 
641-645 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1303 (2011) 
(noting Court's holding in Heller "means that some categorical 
disqualifications are permissible:  Congress is not limited to 
case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been shown to be 
untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be established 
                     
entering dwelling and potentially accessing evidence to be 
seized). 
36 
 
 
by evidence presented in court," and upholding revocation of 
license, using intermediate scrutiny, for one convicted of 
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"). 
 
Second, the licensing authority may, in the exercise of its 
discretion, notify the license holder of a revocation or 
suspension without seeking immediate surrender of any firearms.  
In such an instance, the commencing of an appeal would stay the 
obligation to surrender firearms "without delay."  See 
Hightower, 693 F.3d at 68-69. 
 
Here, the defendant received written, in-hand service of 
the suspension of his class A license.  The suspension was based 
upon a report filed by the Department of Children and Families 
alleging that the defendant had injured his wife and that their 
son was at home at the time of the alleged incident.  Where the 
police officers demanded that the defendant surrender his 
firearms because he was no longer believed to be a suitable 
person, the defendant thereupon was required immediately to 
surrender his license, firearms, and ammunition.13  Thus, the 
                     
 
13 The defendant argues that the failure to provide a "safe 
harbor" period for the surrender of firearms violated his 
constitutional right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment, and right to the due process of law.  We disagree.  
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "the right 
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited."  Heller, 554 
U.S. at 626.  Accord McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 
(2010).  Thus, it "is not 'a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.'"  
McDonald, supra, quoting Heller, supra.  The Supreme Court has 
37 
 
 
jury were entitled to find that the police were acting in the 
lawful performance of their duties when they demanded that the 
defendant surrender firearms he was no longer deemed suitable to 
possess. 
Nonetheless, although the defendant's refusal to surrender 
his firearms and ammunition may have violated G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (i), his noncompliance with the demand that he surrender 
his firearms cannot form the basis of a charge of common-law 
interference with a police officers.  The jury were entitled to 
find, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the 
defendant was upset and argumentative.  He insisted that he 
would not comply with the police order, repeatedly demanded to 
contact his lawyer, and told his wife not to allow the police to 
enter their home.  The Commonwealth did not, however, establish 
that the defendant physically obstructed or hindered the officer 
in the performance of a lawful duty.  Moreover, the defendant's 
                     
stated that "prohibitions on the possession of firearms" by 
certain classes of people, including "felons and the mentally 
ill," are among the nonexhaustive "list" of "presumptively 
lawful" regulations a State may adopt.  Heller, supra at 626-627 
& n.26.  Here, the police suspended the defendant's license to 
carry a firearm due to a report of spousal abuse.  In light of 
concomitant safety concerns, the police were entitled to take 
affirmative steps to avert potential harm.  See Hightower, 693 
F.3d at 84 ("unsuitable" license holder not deprived of due 
process by absence of predeprivation hearing).  After the 
surrender of his firearms, the defendant had the opportunity to 
seek judicial review within ninety days of the suspension.  
G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f). 
38 
 
 
protestations did not rise to the level of threats of violence 
against a police officer, which reasonably would have the effect 
of obstructing or interfering with the police in the performance 
of a lawful duty. 
Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 
conviction of interference with a police officer. 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction of interference 
with a police officer is vacated and set aside.  The matter is 
remanded to the District Court for entry of a judgment of not 
guilty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Appendix A. 
 
 
Cases charging interference with a police officer 
 
 
Year Charged 
Number of Charges 
1977 
1 
1981 
1 
1982 
2 
1985 
1 
1986 
1 
1987 
3 
1988 
3 
1989 
4 
1990 
4 
1991 
2 
1992 
7 
1993 
8 
1994 
27 
1995 
35 
1996 
30 
1997 
38 
1998 
25 
1999 
37 
2000 
60 
2001 
42 
2002 
55 
2003 
42 
2004 
44 
2005 
53 
2006 
53 
2007 
59 
2008 
53 
2009 
69 
2010 
66 
2011 
128 
2012 
99 
2013 
164 
2014 
236 
2015 
248 
2016 
285 
2017 
280 
2018 
335 
 
 
Appendix B. 
 
 
Cases where interfering with a police officer 
was the highest offense charged 
 
 
Year Charged 
Number of Charges 
2002 
12 
2003 
11 
2004 
14 
2005 
11 
2006 
13 
2007 
13 
2008 
10 
2009 
12 
2010 
18 
2011 
9 
2012 
13 
2013 
11 
2014 
-- 
2015 
-- 
2016 
-- 
2017 
-- 
2018 
--