Title: GARY HENRY V DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125205
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 13, 2005 
GARY and KATHY HENRY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 125205 
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J. 
The 173 plaintiffs in this matter have asked to 
represent a putative class of thousands in an action 
against defendant, The Dow Chemical Company. 
Their core 
allegation is that Dow’s plant in Midland, Michigan, 
negligently released dioxin, a synthetic chemical that is 
potentially 
hazardous 
to 
human 
health,1 
into 
the 
1 According to the Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine, v
2, p D-145, dioxin is 
[a] synthetic chemical that occurs as a byproduct
in the manufacturing of trichlorophenol. 
Animal 
studies 
have 
shown 
dioxin 
to 
be 
a 
potent
carcinogen. 
It 
is 
also 
believed 
to 
have 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
 
 
                                                 
Tittabawassee flood plain where the plaintiffs and the 
putative class members live and work. 
This situation appears, at first blush, to have the 
makings of a standard tort cause of action. 
But closer 
inspection of plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 
reveals that one of plaintiffs’ claims is premised on a 
novel legal theory in Michigan tort law and thus raises an 
issue of first impression for this Court. 
In an ordinary “toxic tort” cause of action, a 
plaintiff alleges he has developed a disease because of 
exposure to a toxic substance negligently released by the 
defendant. 
In this case, however, the plaintiffs do not 
allege that the defendant’s negligence has actually caused 
the manifestation of disease or physical injury. 
Instead, 
they allege that defendant’s negligence has created the 
risk of disease—that they may at some indefinite time in 
the future develop disease or physical injury because of 
defendant’s allegedly negligent release of dioxin. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs have asked the circuit 
court to certify a class that collectively seeks the 
teratogenic effects. Chloracne (a skin condition
similar in appearance to severe acne) is known to
be associated with exposure to dioxin; metabolic,
hepatic (liver) and neurological disturbances 
have also been reported. 
2  
 
 
 
 
creation of a program, to be funded by defendant and 
supervised by the court, that would monitor the class and 
their representatives for possible future manifestations of 
dioxin-related disease. 
The defendant moved for summary 
disposition, arguing that plaintiffs’ medical monitoring 
claim was not cognizable under Michigan law. 
The circuit 
court denied this motion, and the Court of Appeals denied 
defendant’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal. 
We now reverse the circuit court order denying the 
motion and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor 
of defendant on plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim. 
Because 
plaintiffs 
do 
not 
allege 
a 
present 
injury, 
plaintiffs do not present a viable negligence claim under 
Michigan’s common law. 
Although we recognize that the common law is an 
instrument that may change as times and circumstances 
require, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to alter the 
common law of negligence liability to encompass a cause of 
action for medical monitoring. 
Recognition of a medical 
monitoring claim would involve extensive fact-finding and 
the weighing of numerous and conflicting policy concerns. 
We lack sufficient information to assess intelligently and 
fully the potential consequences of recognizing a medical 
monitoring claim. 
3  
  
 
 
 
 
Equally important is that plaintiffs have asked this 
Court to effect a change in Michigan law that, in our view, 
ought to be made,if at all,by the Legislature. 
Indeed, 
the Legislature has already established policy in this 
arena by delegating the responsibility for dealing with 
health risks stemming from industrial pollution to the 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ). 
As a 
matter of prudence, we defer in this case to the people’s 
representatives in the Legislature, who are better suited 
to undertake the complex task of balancing the competing 
societal interests at stake. 
We therefore remand this matter to the circuit court 
for entry of summary disposition in defendant’s favor on 
plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant, The Dow Chemical Company, has maintained a 
plant on the banks of the Tittabawassee River in Midland, 
Michigan, for over a century. 
The plant has produced a 
host of products, including, to name only a few, “styrene, 
butadiene, picric acid, mustard gas, Saran Wrap, Styrofoam, 
Agent 
Orange, 
and 
various 
pesticides 
including 
Chlorpyrifos, 
Dursban 
and 
2, 
4, 
5-trichlorophenol.” 
Michigan Department of Community Health, Division of 
Environmental and Occupational Epidemiology, Pilot Exposure 
4  
 
 
 
 
Investigation: Dioxin Exposure in Adults Living in the 
Tittabawassee River Flood Plain, Saginaw County, Michigan, 
May 25, 2004, p 4. 
According to plaintiffs and published reports from the 
MDEQ, 
defendant’s 
operations 
in 
Midland 
have 
had 
a 
deleterious effect on the local environment. 
In 2000, 
General Motors Corporation was testing soil samples in an 
area near the Tittabawassee River and the Saginaw River 
when it discovered the presence of dioxin, a hazardous 
chemical believed to cause a variety of health problems 
such as cancer, liver disease, and birth defects. 
By 
spring 2001, the MDEQ had confirmed the presence of dioxin 
in the soil of the Tittabawassee flood plain. 
Further 
investigation by the MDEQ indicated that defendant’s 
Midland plant was the likely source of the dioxin. 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Remediation 
and 
Redevelopment 
Division, 
Final 
Report, 
Phase 
II 
Tittabawassee/Saginaw River Dioxin Flood Plain Sampling 
Study, June 2003, p 42 (identifying Dow’s Midland plant as 
the “principal source of dioxin contamination in the 
Tittabawassee River sediments and the Tittabawassee River 
flood plain soils”). 
In March 2003, plaintiffs moved for certification of 
two classes in the Saginaw Circuit Court. 
The first class 
5  
 
 
was composed of individuals who owned property in the flood 
plain of the Tittabawassee River and who alleged that their 
properties had declined in value because of the dioxin 
contamination. 
The second group consisted of individuals 
who have resided in the Tittabawassee flood plain area at 
some point since 1984 and who seek a court-supervised 
program of medical monitoring for the possible negative 
health effects of dioxin discharged from Dow’s Midland 
plant. 
This latter class consists of 173 plaintiffs and, 
by defendant’s estimation, “thousands” of putative members. 
Defendant moved under MCR 2.116(C)(8) for summary 
disposition of plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim. 
The 
Saginaw Circuit Court denied this motion, and denied 
defendant’s subsequent motions for reconsideration and for 
a stay of proceedings. 
After the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s motion 
for peremptory reversal and emergency application for leave 
to appeal, the defendant sought emergency leave to appeal 
in this Court. Discovery and other preliminary proceedings 
on plaintiffs’ motion for class certification continued in 
the Saginaw Circuit Court until, on June 3, 2004, we stayed 
the proceedings below and granted defendant’s application 
6  
 
 
  
       
 
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
for leave to appeal.2 
Henry v Dow Chemical Co, 470 Mich 870 
(2004).3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo the circuit court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(8). Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 
817 (1999). 
A movant is entitled to summary disposition 
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if “[t]he opposing party has failed 
to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” 
MCR 
2.116(C)(8). 
In determining whether a movant has met this 
standard, we “‘accept[] as true all well-pleaded facts.’” 
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 373; 501 NW 2d 155 (1993), 
quoting Abel v Eli Lilly & Co, 418 Mich 311, 324; 343 NW2d 
164 (1984). 
2 Plaintiffs have since filed a motion for partial
relief from stay, accompanied by a motion for immediate
consideration. 
In light of the issuance of this opinion,
we deny the motions because they are moot. 
3 In January 2005, defendant entered into a settlement
agreement with the MDEQ regarding dioxin contamination in
the Tittabawassee River valley. 
See Hugh McDiarmid, Jr.,
Dow, state OK plan on dioxin, Detroit Free Press (January
20, 2005). 
The agreement, which was reached after months
of negotiation, provides that defendant will fund extensive
cleanup efforts aimed at minimizing residents’ exposure to
dioxin. Id. 
7  
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
I 
The question presented by this appeal is whether, in 
seeking a court-supervised medical monitoring program for 
future dioxin-related illnesses, plaintiffs have stated a 
claim on which relief may be granted. 
MCR 2.116(C)(8). 
Plaintiffs’ theory is that Dow negligently released dioxin 
into the Tittabawassee flood plain and that, as a result, 
plaintiffs must incur the costs of intensive medical 
monitoring for the possible health effects of elevated 
exposure to dioxin. Thus, at its core, plaintiffs’ medical 
monitoring claim is one of negligence. It is usually held 
that in order to state a negligence claim on which relief 
may be granted, plaintiffs must prove (1) that defendant 
owed them a duty of care, (2) that defendant breached that 
duty, (3) that plaintiffs were injured, and (4) that 
defendant’s breach caused plaintiffs’ injuries. 
See Haliw 
v Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 309-310; 627 NW2d 581(2001); 
Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 459; 506 NW2d 
175 (1993). These elements of an action for negligence are 
traditionally summarized, in a formula that ought to be 
familiar to any first-year law student, as “duty, breach of 
that duty, causation, and damages.” Fultz v Union-Commerce 
Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 463; 683 NW2d 587 (2004). 
See also 
8  
 
 
Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 30, pp 164-165 
(describing this “traditional formula”). 
Here, defendant argues that plaintiffs have not 
established 
any 
present 
physical 
injuries, 
and 
have 
therefore failed to state a valid negligence claim. 
We 
agree. 
As an initial matter, it is necessary for us to 
determine the exact nature of plaintiffs’ claim. 
We must 
decide whether plaintiffs are in fact seeking compensation 
for future injuries they may suffer, or for present 
injuries they have suffered. 
If plaintiffs’ claim is for injuries they may suffer 
in the future, their claim is precluded as a matter of law, 
because 
Michigan 
law 
requires 
more 
than 
a 
merely 
speculative injury. 
This Court has previously recognized 
the requirement of a present physical injury in the toxic 
tort context. 
In Larson v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 427 
Mich 301, 314; 399 NW2d 1 (1986), for example, we held that 
a cause of action for asbestosis, which typically is 
manifest between ten and forty years after exposure, arises 
only when an injured party knows or should know that he 
has, in fact, developed asbestosis. 
Similarly, we held 
that a cause of action for asbestos-related lung cancer 
arises only when there has been a “discoverable appearance” 
of cancer. 
Id. at 319. 
Thus, Larson squarely rejects the 
9  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
proposition that mere exposure to a toxic substance and the 
increased risk of future harm constitutes an “injury” for 
tort purposes. 
It is a present injury, not fear of an 
injury in the future, that gives rise to a cause of action 
under negligence theory. 
Here, it is clear that plaintiffs do not claim that 
they have suffered any present physical harm because of 
defendant’s 
allegedly 
negligent 
contamination 
of 
the 
Tittabawassee flood plain. 
Indeed, plaintiffs in their 
arguments to this Court expressly deny having any present 
physical injuries.4 
Plaintiffs have not cited an exception to the rule 
that a present physical injury is required in order to 
state a claim based on negligence. 
Nor, indeed, does the 
dissent.5
 We can therefore reach only one conclusion: if 
the alleged damages cited by plaintiffs were incurred in 
4 Specifically, plaintiffs argue that “[t]hey do not
seek compensation for physical injury or for the enhanced
risk of future physical injury. 
Instead, they seek to
establish a judicially administered medical screening and
diagnostic program to supervise and fund the medical 
monitoring regime that a reasonable physician would advise
for persons exposed to Dow’s dioxin in the way Plaintiffs
have been and are being exposed.” 
5 See post at 9, citing a California case, Miranda v 
Shell Oil Co, 17 Cal App 4th 1651, 1657; 26 Cal Rptr 2d 655
(1993). 
10  
 
 
anticipation of possible future injury rather than in 
response to present injuries, these pecuniary losses are 
not derived from an injury that is cognizable under 
Michigan tort law. 
However, if plaintiffs’ claim is that by virtue of 
their potential exposure to dioxin they have suffered an 
“injury,” in that any person so exposed would incur the 
additional expense of medical monitoring, then their claim 
is also precluded as a matter of law, because Michigan law 
requires an actual injury to person or property as a 
precondition to recovery under a negligence theory. 
As noted in this opinion at 8, the elements that a 
plaintiff in a negligence action must prove are usually 
summed up in the familiar four-part test: (1) duty, (2) 
breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. 
Although these 
four elements are usually the primary focus of a negligence 
analysis, it has always been implicit in this analysis that 
in order to prevail, a plaintiff must also demonstrate an 
actual injury to person or property. 
Indeed, such injury 
constitutes the essence of a plaintiff’s claim. 
The logic behind this injury requirement—and, indeed, 
the very logic of tort law—is that of “giv[ing] security to 
the rights of individuals by putting within their reach 
suitable redress whenever their rights have been actually 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
violated.” 
Cooley on Torts (4th ed), § 32 p 57. 
Accordingly, an individual is entitled to relief under a 
tort theory only when he has suffered a present injury.6  As 
Prosser and Keeton have explained: 
Since the action for negligence developed
chiefly out of the old form of action on the
case, it retained the rule of that action, that
proof of damage was an essential part of the
plaintiff’s case. 
Nominal damages, to vindicate
a technical right, cannot be recovered in a 
negligence action, where no actual loss has 
occurred. 
The threat of future harm, not yet
realized, is not enough. 
Negligent conduct in
itself is not such an interference with the 
interests of the world at large that there is any
right to complain of it, or to be free from it,
except in the case of some individual whose 
interests have suffered. 
[Prosser & Keeton,
Torts (5th ed, § 30, p 165 (emphasis added).] 
6 See Cooley on Torts (4th ed), § 32, pp 57-58: 
Before any violation has in fact taken 
place, the law assumes that none will happen; but
that each individual will respect the rights of
all others. 
Therefore, it does not undertake in
general to provide preventive remedies; it gives
them in a few exceptional cases, which stand on
peculiar grounds, and in which the mischiefs 
flowing from an invasion of rights might be such
as would be incapable of complete redress in the
ordinary methods, or perhaps in any manner. 
In 
most cases it is assumed that, if the law places
within the reach of every one a suitable remedy
to which he may resort when he suffers an injury,
it has thereby not only provided for him adequate
protection, but has given him all that public
policy demands. 
The remedies that are aimed at 
wrongs not yet committed but only threatened, are
so susceptible of abuse that they are wisely
restricted within very narrow limits. 
12  
 
 
   
 
While the courts of this state may not have always 
clearly articulated this injury requirement, nor finely 
delineated the distinction between an “injury” and the 
“damages” flowing therefrom, the injury requirement has 
always been present in our negligence analysis. 
It has 
simply always been the case in our jurisprudence that 
plaintiffs alleging negligence claims have also shown that 
their claims arise from present physical injuries. 
We are 
not aware of any Michigan cases in which a plaintiff has 
recovered on a negligence theory without demonstrating some 
present physical injury. 
Thus, in all known cases in 
Michigan in which a plaintiff has satisfied the “damages” 
element of a negligence claim, he has also satisfied the 
“injury” requirement. 
Plaintiffs effectively urge us to expand our common­
law jurisprudence by concluding that the traditional four­
part 
test 
can 
be 
met 
without 
also 
satisfying 
the 
requirement of a present physical injury, no doubt aware 
that we have never before been squarely presented with such 
a claim. 
Until now, there has never been a need for this 
Court to articulate specifically the injury requirement. 
But in light of the novel nature of plaintiffs’ claims, 
however, it has become necessary for us to do so today. We 
13  
 
 
 
therefore reaffirm the principle that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate a present physical injury to person or property 
in addition to economic losses that result from that injury 
in order to recover under a negligence theory. 
This requirement does not constitute a change in the 
common law of this state. While we have from time to time 
allowed 
for 
the 
development 
of 
the 
common 
law 
as 
circumstances have required, see, e.g., Berger v Weber, 411 
Mich 1; 303 NW2d 424 (1981), the injury requirement has 
always been an implicit part of a negligence action in 
Michigan. 
Had we been presented in 1869 with an action 
against a blacksmith by local residents alleging that the 
blacksmith’s emissions caused them the fear of physical 
injury someday, we have little doubt that this Court would 
have expressly articulated the injury requirement at that 
time. However, such a case has never before been presented 
to this Court, so it falls to us today to articulate what 
this Court has always assumed: present harm to person or 
property is a necessary prerequisite to a negligence claim. 
The requirement of a present physical injury to person 
or property serves a number of important ends for the legal 
system. First, such a requirement defines more clearly who 
actually possesses a cause of action. In allowing recovery 
only to those who have actually suffered a present physical 
14  
 
 
injury, the fact-finder need not engage in speculations 
about 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
a 
plaintiff 
possesses 
a 
congizable legal claim. 
See Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th 
ed), § 30, p 165. 
Second, such a requirement reduces the 
risks of fraud, by setting a clear minimum threshold—a 
present physical injury—before a plaintiff can proceed on a 
claim. 
By requiring a prospective plaintiff to make a 
showing of an actual physical injury, present tort law thus 
excludes from the courts those who might bring frivolous or 
unfounded suits. 
In particular, the fact-finder need not 
be left wondering whether a plaintiff has in fact been 
harmed in some way, when nothing but a plaintiff’s own 
allegations support his cause of action. 
Finally, 
and 
perhaps 
most 
significantly, 
the 
requirement 
of 
a 
present 
physical 
injury 
avoids 
compromising the judicial power. 
The exercise of the 
“judicial power” by this Court, Const 1963, art 6, § 1, 
contemplates 
that 
there 
will 
be 
standards—legally 
comprehensible standards— that guide the judicial branch's 
resolution of the matters brought before it. 
The present 
physical injury requirement establishes a clear standard by 
which judges can determine which plaintiffs have stated a 
valid claim, and which plaintiffs have not. In the absence 
of such a requirement, it will be inevitable that judges, 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
as in the instant case, will be required to 
answer 
questions that are more appropriate for a legislative than 
a judicial body: How far from the Titibawassee River must a 
plaintiff live in order to have a cognizable claim? 
What 
evidence of exposure to dioxin will be required to support 
such a claim? What level of medical research is sufficient 
to support a claim that exposure to dioxin, in contrast to 
exposure to another chemical, will give rise to a cause of 
action? 
Here, it is apparent that the only “injuries” alleged 
by the putative representatives of the medical monitoring 
class are “the losses they have and will suffer as they are 
forced 
to 
monitor 
closely 
their 
health 
and 
medical 
condition because of their exposure to Dow’s Dioxin [sic] 
pollution.” 
Thus, plaintiffs have arguably stated a 
present financial injury, i.e., damages. 
From this 
description, however, it is apparent that plaintiffs do not 
claim that they suffer from present physical injuries to 
person or property. 
Rather, plaintiffs allege that they 
may develop dioxin-related illnesses in the future. 
At 
best, then, the only “injury” from which plaintiffs suffer 
at present is a fear of future illness. 
They seek an 
“equitable remedy” of a medical monitoring program not in 
order to redress actual or present injury to their persons 
16  
 
 
 
 
but instead to screen for possible future injury. In this 
way, 
plaintiffs’ 
claims 
depart 
from 
the 
principles 
articulated earlier in this opinion by Justice Cooley and 
by Prosser and Keeton. 
It is no answer to argue, as plaintiffs have, that the 
need to pay for medical monitoring is itself a present 
injury sufficient to sustain a cause of action for 
negligence. 
In so doing, plaintiffs attempt to blur the 
distinction 
between 
“injury” 
and 
“damages.” 
While 
plaintiffs arguably demonstrate economic losses that would 
otherwise satisfy the “damages” element of a traditional 
tort claim, the fact remains that these economic losses are 
wholly derivative of a possible, future injury rather than 
an actual, present injury. 
A financial “injury” is simply 
not a present physical injury, and thus not cognizable 
under our tort system. Because plaintiffs have not alleged 
a present physical injury, but rather, “bare” damages, the 
medical expenses plaintiffs claim to have suffered (and 
will suffer in the future) are not compensable. 
Plaintiffs’ 
medical 
monitoring 
claim 
is 
also 
distinguishable from other causes of action, such as libel 
or professional malpractice, in which a plaintiff may 
recover 
for 
economic 
losses 
without 
showing 
present 
physical harm. In a cause of action for libel, a plaintiff 
17  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
must show an injury to his reputation.7
 In a cause of 
action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show an 
injury to the fiduciary relationship between the attorney 
and client.8
 In each case, our common law requires a 
present injury in addition to economic loss incurred as a 
result of that injury. 
Here, as noted, the only noneconomic injury alleged by 
plaintiffs is their fear of future physical injury. 
Plaintiffs’ fear, however reasonable, is still not enough 
to state a claim of negligence. 
Even if we were to 
construe plaintiffs’ claim broadly as one for emotional 
distress, our common law recognizes emotional distress as 
the basis for a negligence action only when a plaintiff can 
7. Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 115­
116; 476 NW2d 112 (1991) (stating that the elements of
libel are “1) a false and defamatory statement concerning
the plaintiff, 2) an unprivileged communication to a third
party, 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the
part of the publisher, and 4) either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by publication”). 
8 Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655; 532 NW2d 842
(1995). 
“In order to state a cause of action for legal 
malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of adequately
alleging the following elements: ‘(1) the existence of an
attorney-client relationship; (2) negligence in the legal
representation of the plaintiff; (3) that the negligence
was a proximate cause of an injury; and (4) the fact and
extent of the injury alleged.’”) (Citation omitted.) 
18  
 
 
  
   
                                                 
also establish physical manifestations of that distress.9 
Thus, plaintiffs have not established a present, legally 
cognizable injury.10 
Plaintiffs advance their claim as if it satisfies the 
traditional 
requirements 
of 
a 
negligence 
action 
in 
Michigan. 
In reality, plaintiffs propose a transformation 
in tort law that will require the courts of this state—in 
9 See, e.g., Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 12-13; 179
NW2d 390 (1970). 
See also Hesse v Ashland Oil, 466 Mich 
21, 34 (2002) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that a cause
of action for negligent inflication of emotional distress
requires a showing of physical harm); Prosser & Keeton,
supra, § 54, p 361 (“Where the defendant’s negligence
causes 
only 
mental 
disturbance, 
without 
accompanying
physical injury, illness or other physical consequences,
and in the absence of some other independent basis for tort
liability, the great majority of courts still hold that in
the ordinary case there can be no recovery.”). 
10 Even assuming that the costs associated with 
plaintiffs’ medical monitoring were sufficient to satisfy
the “damages” element and the injury requirement of a
negligence suit, we note that plaintiffs would still face
substantial 
evidentiary 
hurdles 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
“causation” element. 
Significantly, while plaintiffs seek
the imposition of a medical monitoring program for the
possible health effects of elevated exposure to dioxin,
they present no evidence that they themselves have elevated
levels of dioxin in their bloodstreams, that these elevated
levels are attributable in whole or in part to defendant’s
activities, and that these elevated levels will lead to
recognized physical injuries. 
Further, even if plaintiffs
could show the likelihood of physical injuries like those
associated with exposure to elevated levels of dioxin, see
n 1 of this opinion, it is still unproven at this point 
whether such injuries would in fact be attributable to
dioxin released by defendant, as opposed to some other
environmental or physiological cause. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
this case and the thousands that would inevitably follow—to 
make decisions that are more characteristic of those made 
in 
the 
legislative, 
executive, 
and 
administrative 
processes. 
For reasons that we discuss more fully in part 
II, 
we 
are 
not 
prepared 
to 
acquiesce 
in 
this 
transformation. 
Plaintiffs 
maintain 
that 
this 
Court 
implicitly 
recognized 
a 
medical 
monitoring 
cause 
of 
action 
in 
Meyerhoff v Turner Constr Co, 456 Mich 933 (1998). 
In 
Meyerhoff, a number of construction workers were exposed to 
asbestos on the job. 
The Court of Appeals held that 
“medical-monitoring expenses are a compensable item of 
damages where the proofs demonstrate that such surveillance 
to monitor the effect of exposure to toxic substances . . . 
is reasonable and necessary.” Meyerhoff v Turner Constr Co 
(On Remand), 210 Mich App 491, 495; 534 NW2d 204 (1995). 
We vacated the Court of Appeals opinion with respect to the 
medical monitoring claim, but included language in our 
order 
that, 
quite 
understandably, 
led 
to 
confusion 
regarding the viability of a medical monitoring claim in 
Michigan: 
“The 
factual 
record 
is 
not 
sufficiently 
developed to allow a [sic] medical monitoring damages. 
Accordingly, that portion of the Court of Appeals decision 
20  
 
 
 
         
                                                 
 
 
 
which 
holds 
that 
medical 
monitoring 
expenses 
are 
a 
compensable item of damages is vacated.” 456 Mich 933. 
Plaintiffs read the first sentence quoted above to 
suggest that a factual record may in some circumstances be 
“sufficiently developed” to support medical monitoring 
damages. 
Accordingly, they maintain that an action for 
medical monitoring may be sustainable with a sufficiently 
developed record. 
However, while perhaps not a model of clarity, the 
language of Meyerhoff does not support such a conclusion. 
Meyerhoff does not affirmatively state that a cause of 
action for medical monitoring is cognizable under Michigan 
law. 
To the contrary, our order in Meyerhoff vacated the 
part of the Court of Appeals opinion that had held 
precisely that. 
Rather, Meyerhoff should properly be read 
to hold that the factual record in that case was 
insufficiently developed to support a medical monitoring 
claim if such a claim exists in Michigan. 
As we clarify 
today, such a claim does not exist in Michigan.11 
11 While, given the language in Meyerhoff, it was 
certainly not unreasonable for the trial court in the
instant case to decline summary disposition, Meyerhoff
nonetheless is an exceedingly thin reed on which to rest
arguments in favor of a medical monitoring cause of action—
a reed that must give way under the vastly greater weight
Footnotes continued on following page. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Nor are we persuaded by the opinion of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
in Gasperoni v Metabolife, Int'l Inc, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 
20879 (ED Mich, 2000). Plaintiffs assert that the district 
court in Gasperoni “concluded that Michigan would recognize 
a state law claim for medical monitoring and certified a 
class for such a claim.” 
A careful reading of Gasperoni, 
however, reveals that this argument mischaracterizes the 
district court’s opinion. 
The plaintiffs in Gasperoni consumed Metabolife 356, 
an appetite suppressant manufactured and distributed by the 
defendant. 
They filed an action based on theories of 
fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of warranty, and 
sought a number of remedies—including medical monitoring. 
Id. at *3-*4. The defendant in that case did not challenge 
medical monitoring as a cause of action. 
Indeed, the 
defendant had no reason to do so. 
The plaintiffs sought 
medical monitoring only as a form of relief and did not 
claim that medical monitoring was, itself, a viable cause 
of action. 
Thus, the sole issue was whether the 
of Michigan precedent, which requires a manifest physical
injury in order to state a viable negligence claim. 
Meyerhoff's Delphic allusion to a medical monitoring claim
was, at most, mere dictum. 
The trial court thus erred in 
allowing plaintiffs’ claim to proceed to trial. 
22  
 
 
plaintiffs’ proposed class met the requirements provided in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). 
With respect to the plaintiffs’ medical monitoring 
claim, the district court held only that the plaintiffs’ 
medical monitoring claims were not so individualized as to 
preclude class certification. 
Id. at *22. 
Whether a 
medical monitoring claim was viable under Michigan law—the 
central issue in this appeal—was neither raised by the 
defendant in Gasperoni nor addressed by the district court 
in its opinion. 
Far from holding that Michigan would 
“recognize a state law claim for medical monitoring,” as 
asserted by plaintiffs, the district court merely suggested 
that medical monitoring may be a proper form of injunctive 
relief in an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation 
and breach of warranty. 
Thus, as with our order in 
Meyerhoff, Gasperoni does not provide any reason to 
conclude affirmatively that a cause of action for medical 
monitoring is cognizable under Michigan law. 
II 
Having determined that plaintiffs’ claim cannot stand 
under our current law of negligence, we turn now to 
plaintiffs’ core argument—that we should modify the common 
law of negligence in order to permit their medical 
monitoring claim to proceed. 
23  
 
 
  
  
   
This Court is the principal steward of Michigan’s 
common law. 
See, e.g., Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co, 440 
Mich 293, 317; 487 NW2d 715 (1992); Sizemore v Smock, 430 
Mich 283, 285; 422 NW2d 666 (1988). 
Acting in this 
capacity, we have on occasion allowed for the development 
of the common law as circumstances and considerations of 
public policy have required. 
See, e.g., Berger, supra. 
But as Justice Young has recently observed, our common-law 
jurisprudence has been guided by a number of prudential 
principles. See Young, A judicial traditionalist confronts 
the common law, 8 Texas Rev L & Pol 299, 305-310 (2004). 
Among them has been our attempt to “avoid capricious 
departures from bedrock legal rules as such tectonic shifts 
might produce unforeseen and undesirable consequences,” id. 
at 307, a principle that is quite applicable to the present 
case. 
Plaintiffs have asked us to recognize a cause of 
action that departs drastically from our traditional 
notions of a valid negligence claim. 
Beyond this enormous 
shift in our tort jurisprudence, judicial recognition of 
plaintiffs’ claim may also have undesirable effects that 
neither we nor the parties can satisfactorily predict. 
For example, recognizing a cause of action based solely on 
exposure—one without a requirement of a present injury— 
24  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
would create a potentially limitless pool of plaintiffs.12 
See, e.g., Schwartz, Medical monitoring: Should tort law 
say yes?, 34 Wake Forest L R 1057, 1079-1080 (1999) (“Once 
a showing of present physical injury is eliminated, as is 
the case in awards for medical monitoring, attorneys 
representing plaintiffs could virtually begin recruiting 
people off the street to serve as medical monitoring 
claimants.”). Litigation of these preinjury claims could 
drain resources needed to compensate those with manifest 
physical injuries and a more immediate need for medical 
care. 
It is less than obvious, therefore, that the 
benefits of a medical monitoring cause of action would 
outweigh the burdens imposed on plaintiffs with manifest 
injuries, our judicial system, and those responsible for 
12 This was the precise situation that developed in
West Virginia after the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring
in Bower v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 206 W Va 133, 140;
522 SE2d 424 (1999). 
Shortly after the Bower decision, a
classaction was filed against major cigarette manufacturers
on behalf of approximately 270,000 West Virginia smokers 
who had not been diagnosed with any smoking-related
diseases. See In re Tobacco Litigation (Medical Monitoring
Cases), No. 00-C-6000 (W Va, Ohio County Cir Ct, 2001). In 
another medical monitoring classaction filed in West 
Virginia, healthy plaintiffs from seven states (Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West
Virginia) are seeking medical monitoring on the basis of
alleged exposure to toxic materials. See Stern v Chemtall, 
Inc, No. 03-C-49M (W Va, Kanawha County Cir Ct, 2001). 
25  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
administering and financing medical care. 
Because such a 
balancing process would necessarily require extensive fact­
finding and the weighing of important, and sometimes 
conflicting, policy concerns, and because here we lack 
sufficient information to assess intelligently and fully 
the potential consequences of our decision, we do not 
believe that the instant question is one suitable for 
resolution by the judicial branch.13We are certainly not 
alone in our reluctance to engage in the delicate balancing 
of costs and benefits that plaintiffs’ proposed expansion 
of the common law requires. 
Many of these concerns were 
noted by the United States Supreme Court in Metro-North 
Commuter R Co, supra at 442 (holding that the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act, 45 USC 
51 et seq., does not 
permit recovery of future medical monitoring costs).14 
13 It should not need explication that a balancing of 
private interests is invariably present in all legislation
that establishes benefits and burdens. 
To name but a few: 
worker’s 
compensation, 
unemployment 
compensation, 
and 
occupational health and safety. 
Such balancing is the
essence of representative government. 
It is for precisely
this reason that the decision whether and how to recognize
a medical monitoring cause of action should be made by the
people’s representatives in the legislative branch of our
government. See part III of this opinion. 
14
 Some legal scholars and commentators have also
noted the undesirability of judicially sanctioned medical
monitoring claims. 
See, e.g., Guzelian, supra, p 100
Footnotes continued on following page. 
26  
 
 
 
                                                 
There, the Court observed that judicial recognition of mere 
exposure to a toxic substance as a sufficient trigger for 
tort liability could lead to a stampede of litigation that 
would divert resources from more immediate and compelling 
(“Ill-considered 
monitoring 
can 
also 
deter 
diseased 
individuals who are erroneously proclaimed healthy from
returning promptly when symptoms do present, and can lead
to severe psychological harm. 
In addition, the economic,
manpower, and time costs for such programs are usually
substantial.”); Martin & Martin, Tort actions for medical 
monitoring: Warranted or wasteful?, 20 Colum J Envtl L 121,
142-143 (1995) (“[C]reating a new cause of action for
medical monitoring that eliminates one of the traditional
elements of tort actions does not seem warranted. 
Its 
deterrent value is negligible; its compensatory function
should be rendered moot by changes in the health care
system; and the costs of subsequent litigation will exceed
the benefits obtained.”). 
We cite these studies not, as the dissent argues, to
endorse the authors’ views, post at 17-18, but to observe
that it is far from settled that judicially supervised
medical monitoring is an unmitigated benefit for all 
concerned. 
We also note that, while certification of a class
necessarily recognizes that common issues of law or fact
may predominate over individual questions at the time of
certification, 
see 
MCR 
3.501(A)(1)(b), 
there 
is 
no 
guarantee that such common issues will continue over time
to predominate in the instant case, particularly in light
of the apparently perpetual duration of the proposed
monitoring program. 
Rather, it is more likely that 
increasingly competitive interests will arise within the
putative 
class 
of 
plaintiffs—interests 
that 
must 
be 
carefully weighed against each other. 
The likelihood that 
the interests of putative class members will diverge is yet
another reason for judicial deference to the Legislature in
this case. 
27  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
claims, such as those brought by individuals with actual 
disease or injury, to less meritorious claims: 
[T]ens of millions of individuals may have
suffered 
exposure 
to 
substances 
that 
might
justify some form of substance-exposure-related
medical monitoring. . . . 
And that fact, along
with uncertainty as to the amount of liability,
could threaten both a “flood” of less important
cases . . . and the systemic harms that can
accompany “unlimited and unpredictable liability
. . . .” 
[Metro-North Commuter R Co, supra at 
442.] 
See also Wood v Wyeth-Ayerst Labs, 82 SW3d 849, 857 (Ky, 
2002) (citing the policy concerns raised in Buckley); 
Hinton v Monsanto Co, 813 So 2d 827, 831 (Ala, 2001) 
(same).15 
We share the concerns raised by the United States 
Supreme Court in Buckley. Simply put, judicial recognition 
15 It is a reality of modern society that we are all
exposed 
to 
a 
wide 
range 
of 
chemicals 
and 
other 
environmental influences on a daily basis. For that reason 
alone, this Court should be wary of accepting plaintiffs’
invitation to venture down the slippery slope that a 
medical monitoring cause of action would necessarily
traverse. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley: “tens of 
millions of individuals may have suffered exposure to 
substances that might justify some form of substance­
exposure-related medical monitoring.” 
521 US at 442. 
Thus, even if we were to create a medical monitoring cause
of action, in light of both the essentially limitless
number of such exposures and the limited resource pool from
which such exposures can be compensated, a “cutoff” line
would still inevitably need to be drawn. 
The Legislature
is better suited to draw lines of this sort, because such
decisions are fraught with difficult policy determinations. 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
of a medical monitoring cause of action may do more harm 
than good—not only for Michigan’s economy but also for 
“other potential plaintiffs who are not before the court 
and who depend on a tort system that can distinguish 
between reliable and serious claims on the one hand, and 
unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.” 
Buckley, 521 US at 443-444. 
Even if this Court were institutionally equipped to 
gauge the potential costs and benefits of sanctioning a 
medical monitoring cause of action, plaintiffs have done 
little to help us understand the ramifications that a 
decision in their favor might have for Michigan. 
When 
pressed at oral argument to address the potential costs and 
benefits of plaintiffs’ proposed cause of action, for 
example, plaintiffs’ counsel was unable to hazard a guess 
at how Michigan’s economy might be affected: 
Justice Taylor: Where have you made note, or
could you, of the kinds of suspected impact that
monitoring will have on the business environment
of this state. 
I don’t think there’s a word in 
your briefs about that. 
You just sort of assume
it will be taken care of. . . . 
Plaintiffs' Counsel: I think if you look at
the criteria [for a valid medical monitoring
claim] we propose we think it has safeguards for
that. We think it does allow . . . 
Justice Taylor: 
Where in your brief is
there any discussion of what cost this will bear
on Michigan’s business climate? 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs' Counsel: 
I don’t [think] there
is a particular discussion in our brief on what
costs Michigan will bear. 
Justice Young: 
Do you have any idea what
that might be? 
Plaintiffs' Counsel: 
I don’t think we have 
any particular specific dollar idea on what that
will be, no. 
I don’t think we have a specific
dollar idea on what the cost to these people are. 
Justice Taylor: 
Doesn’t this point out the
problem with what you’re asking us to do? 
We 
don’t even know what the cost of this will be. 
This line of questioning goes to the heart of why we are 
reluctant to alter the common law of negligence in the 
manner proposed by plaintiffs: however much equity might 
favor lightening the economic burden now borne by parties 
exposed to dioxin in the Tittabawassee flood plain, we have 
no assurance that a decision in plaintiffs’ favor—which 
would create a hitherto unrecognized cause of action with a 
potentially limitless class of plaintiffs—will not wreak 
enormous harm on Michigan’s citizens and its economy. Such 
a 
decision 
necessarily 
involves 
a 
drawing 
of 
lines 
reflecting considerations of public policy, and a judicial 
body is ill-advised to draw such lines given the limited 
range of interests represented by the parties and the 
resultant lack of the necessary range of information on 
30  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
which to base a resolution.16
 See Young, supra at 307 
(“Good intentions, unsupported by well informed policy 
choices, often result in bad law.”). 
We would be unwise, to say the least, to alter the 
common law in the manner requested by plaintiffs when 
it 
is unclear what the consequences of such a decision may be 
and when we have strong suspicions, shared by our nation’s 
highest court, that they may well be disastrous. 
III 
Although the caution engendered by our difficulty in 
identifying, much less weighing, the potential costs and 
benefits of a decision in plaintiffs’ favor is an important 
factor militating against recognizing plaintiffs’ proposed 
16 We note that plaintiffs are in effect asking us to
create policy, not simply consider it. 
We have previously
cautioned against this Court acting as a policy-making
body: 
As a general rule, making social policy is a
job for the Legislature, not the courts. This is 
especially 
true 
when 
the 
determination 
or 
resolution requires placing a premium on one 
societal interest at the expense of another: The 
responsibility for drawing lines in a society as
complex 
as 
ours—of 
identifying 
priorities,
weighing the relevant considerations and choosing
between 
competing 
alternatives—is 
the 
Legislature’s, not the judiciary’s. 
[Van v 
Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 327; 597 NW2d 15 (1990))
(citations and quotations omitted).] 
31  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
cause of action, there is a stronger prudential principle 
at work here: the judiciary’s obligation to exercise 
caution and to defer to the Legislature when called upon to 
make a new and potentially societally dislocating change to 
the common law.17 
Ours, after all, is a government founded on the 
principle of separation of powers.18  In certain instances, 
the principle of separation of powers is an affirmative 
constitutional bar on policy-making by this Court.19
 In 
other 
cases, 
however, 
the 
separation 
of 
powers 
17 In suggesting that the “only question” properly
posed in this case involves who should pay the costs of
medical monitoring and environmental cleanup, post at 2,
the dissent misapprehends the real question: what is the
appropriate venue for determining the answer to the 
question? 
It is this question, not that posited by the
dissent, that fundamentally divides the majority and the 
dissenting opinions. 
18 See Const 1963, art 3, § 2: 
"The powers of
government are divided into three branches: legislative,
executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another
branch except as expressly provided in this constitution." 
19 See, e.g., Mayor of Lansing v Pub Service Comm, 470 
Mich 154, 161; 680 NW2d 840 (2004) (“Our task, under the
Constitution, is the important, but yet limited, duty to
read and interpret what the Legislature has actually made
the law. We have observed many times in the past that our
Legislature is free to make policy choices that, especially
in controversial matters, some observers will inevitably
think unwise. This dispute over the wisdom of a law,
however, cannot give warrant to a court to overrule the
people's Legislature.”). 
32  
 
 
  
   
                                                 
 
considerations may operate as a prudential bar to judicial 
policy-making in the common-law arena. 
This is so when we 
are asked to modify the common law in a way that may lead 
to dramatic reallocation of societal benefits and burdens.20 
As shown above, plaintiffs have sought a radical change in 
our negligence jurisprudence and have provided no guidance 
on how this proposed change might affect Michigan. 
In 
effect, we have been asked to craft public policy in the 
dark. 
This problem alone ought to make any reasonably 
prudent jurist extremely wary of granting the relief sought 
by the plaintiffs.21 
20 The Illinois Supreme Court recently expressed 
precisely this concern while rejecting a nuisance claim
asserted by the city of Chicago and Cook County against
various gun manufacturers and distributors. 
City of 
Chicago v Beretta USA Corp, 213 Ill 2d 351; 290 Ill Dec
525; 821 NE2d 1099 (2004). 
In rejecting the plaintiffs’
claim that nuisance law should be expanded to hold the
defendants responsible for the costs of gun violence, the
court concluded: 
Any change of this magnitude in the law
affecting a highly regulated industry must be the
work of the legislature, brought about by the
political process, not the work of the courts. 
In response to the suggestion of amici that we 
are abdicating our responsibility to declare the
common law, we point to the virtue of judicial
restraint. [Id. at 433.] 
21 Recent events in Louisiana reinforce the notion that 
the decision whether to permit a cause of action for
medical monitoring is one that belongs to the Legislature.
Footnotes continued on following page. 
33  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
In addition to the problems presented by the legal 
question whether a medical monitoring cause of action 
exists, we are faced with the more practical questions of 
how such a monitoring program would work. 
For example, a 
threshold concern would likely be the determination of 
In Bourgeois v AP Green Industries, Inc, 716 So 2d 355
(La, 1998), the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that a
cause of action for medical monitoring was cognizable under
then-La Civ Code Ann, art 2315, which provided, “Every act
whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened . . . .” 
Although the court
recognized that Louisiana law had not previously allowed 
the recovery of medical expenses “[a]bsent a corresponding
physical injury,” Bourgeois, supra at 358, the court 
decided to follow “a majority of state supreme courts faced
with the issue” in recognizing a medical monitoring cause
of action. 
Id. at 359. 
The court held, however, that
medical 
monitoring 
expenses 
satisfied 
the 
“damage”
requirement of art 2315 only if seven criteria were met.
Id. at 360-361. 
In response, the Louisiana legislature added the 
following language to art 2315, clearly indicating its
disagreement with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in
Bourgeois: 
Damages do not include costs for future 
medical treatment, services, surveillance, or 
procedures of any kind unless such treatment,
services, 
surveillance, 
or 
procedures 
are 
directly related to a manifest physical or mental
injury or disease. 
[1999 La Acts 989, now 
codified at La Civ Code Ann art 2315(B).] 
See, generally, Comment, Implications of amending Civil
Code Article 2315 on toxic torts in Louisiana, 60 La L R
833 (2000). 
34  
 
 
                                                 
eligibility for participation in such a program.22  Such a 
determination involves the consideration of a number of 
practical questions and the balancing of a host of 
competing 
interests—a 
task 
more 
appropriate 
for 
the 
legislative branch than the judiciary. 
Of equal concern would be the administration of such a 
program.23  The day-to-day operation of a medical monitoring 
22 An example of just a few of the questions facing a
court in determining eligibility for such a monitoring
program would include: How old does the applicant have to
be? 
How long must an applicant have lived in the affected
area? 
Where, exactly, is the “affected area”? 
Must the 
applicant 
have 
measurable 
levels 
of 
dioxin 
in 
the 
bloodstream to qualify? If so, what is the threshold level
of dioxin an applicant must have for eligibility? 
The dissent’s argument underscores the difficulty
presented by such an inquiry. 
Justice Cavanagh does not
“advocate that any exposure allows a person to bring a
claim for medical monitoring costs.” 
Post at 6 (emphasis
in dissent). 
But if “any” exposure is not enough on which
to rest such a claim, how much exposure is enough?  The 
dissent apparently recognizes that a cutoff line must 
necessarily be drawn, in light of the competing interests
at stake, but fails to offer any standards to be used in
locating that line. 
However, such a line, if it is to be
drawn at all, must be drawn not by this Court, but by the
Legislature—the branch of government best able to balance
the 
relevant 
interests 
in 
light 
of 
the 
policy
considerations at stake. 
23 An example of some of the questions facing a court
in administering the monitoring program would include: How
would claims be filed? How would claims be processed? Who 
would do the processing—court staff or a private contract
firm? Would a claimant be free to receive testing from any
medical facility he chooses, or would a claimant’s choice
Footnotes continued on following page. 
35  
 
 
 
                                                 
program would necessarily impose huge clerical burdens on a 
court 
system 
lacking 
the 
resources 
to 
effectively 
administer such a regime. 
Nor do the courts possess the 
technical expertise necessary to effectively administer a 
program heavily dependent on scientific disciplines such as 
medicine, chemistry, and environmental science. 
The 
burdens of such a system would more appropriately be borne 
by an administrative agency specifically created and 
empowered to administer such a program. 
The court system, 
in our view, is simply not institutionally equipped to 
establish, promulgate operative rules for, or administer 
such a program. 
The propriety of judicial deference to the legislative 
branch in expanding common-law causes of action is further 
underscored where, as here, the Legislature has already 
created a body of law that provides plaintiffs with a 
remedy. 
Were we to create an alternate remedy in such 
of testing facility be limited? 
To keep down costs of the
program, could defendant be permitted to establish a 
“preferred provider network” of medical professionals such
that claimants could only be tested within the network? In 
the absence of such a network, would claimants be limited
to the usual and necessary costs for such services, or is
the sky the limit? 
How would the system reconcile two
different physicians’ opinions of what is “reasonable” in
terms of medical testing? 
Would there be a grievance
procedure? Would defendant be billed directly, or would it
periodically pay into a fund? 
36  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
cases—one that may be pursued in lieu of the remedy 
selected by our Legislature—we would essentially be acting 
as a competing legislative body. 
And we would be doing so 
without the benefit of the many resources that inform 
legislative judgment.24 
24 Legislators face a far different decision-making
calculus than judges face. 
As one scholarly work recently
observed: 
Legislatures are in the best position to
consider far-reaching and complex public policy
issues. First, they can gather facts from a wide
range of sources to help lawmakers decide whether
the law should be changed and, if so, what sorts
of changes should be made. 
Second, legislatures
make law prospectively, which gives the public
fair 
notice 
about 
significant 
legal
changes. . . .  Third, they must be sensitive to
the will of the public; if they are not, the
public can vote them out of office. 
In our 
democratic system, if far-reaching public policy
decisions are to be made, the public should have
the opportunity to evaluate those changes and
express their agreement or disagreement in the
voting booth. 
Courts, on the other hand, are best suited
to make incremental changes over time.  Judges
decide cases one at a time. 
Their information­
gathering is limited to one set of facts in each
lawsuit, which is shaped and limited by arguments
from opposing counsel who seek to advance purely
private interests. 
Second, judges “make law”
retroactively. 
This creates notice and fairness 
problems. 
Third, there is no “public light”
placed on judicial lawmaking. 
Judges in many
states are appointed, not elected.  The public
has no voice in and must accept judicial will.
When judges are elected, the public is generally
Footnotes continued on following page. 
37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
In this case, the Legislature has already provided a 
method for dealing with the negligent emission of toxic 
substances such as dioxin. 
The Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.101 et seq., 
empowers the MDEQ to deal with the environmental and health 
effects of toxic pollution: 
The 
department 
shall 
coordinate 
all 
activities required under this part and shall 
promulgate rules to provide for the performance
of response activities, to provide for the 
assessment of damages for injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources resulting from a
release, and to implement the powers and duties
of the department under this part, and as 
otherwise necessary to carry out the requirements
of this part. 
[MCL 324.20104(1) (emphasis 
added).] 
Further, MCL 324.20118 provides, among other things: 
(1) 
The 
department 
may 
take 
response
activity or approve of response activity proposed
by a person that is consistent with this part and
the rules promulgated under this part relating to
the selection and implementation of response
activity 
that 
the 
department 
concludes 
is 
necessary and appropriate to protect the public
health, safety, or welfare, or the environment. 
unaware of the legal opinions the judges have
written or the impact of those opinions on 
society. [Schwartz & Lorber, State Farm v Avery: 
State court regulation through litigation has 
gone too far, 33 Conn L R 1215, 1219-1220 
(2001).] 
38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
Remedial 
action 
undertaken 
under 
subsection (1) at a minimum shall accomplish all
of the following: 
(a) Assure the protection of the public
health, safety, and welfare, and the environment. 
These provisions authorize the MDEQ to undertake “response 
activity” and “remedial action” when the public health is 
threatened by pollution. “Response activity” is defined by 
the NREPA as 
[e]valuation, interim response activity, remedial
action, demolition, or the taking of other 
actions necessary to protect the public health,
safety, or welfare, or the environment or the
natural 
resources. 
Response 
activity 
also 
includes health assessments or health effect 
studies carried out under the supervision, or
with the approval of, the department of public 
health and enforcement actions related to any
response activity. [MCL 324.20101(1)(ee).] 
“Remedial action,” which is included in the definition of 
“response activity,” is defined under MCL 324.20101(1)(cc): 
“Remedial 
action” 
includes, 
but 
is 
not 
limited 
to, 
cleanup, 
removal, 
containment,
isolation, 
destruction, 
or 
treatment 
of 
a 
hazardous substance released or threatened to be 
released 
into 
the 
environment, 
monitoring,
maintenance, or the taking of other actions that
may 
be 
necessary 
to 
prevent, 
minimize, 
or 
mitigate injury to the public health, safety, or
welfare, or to the environment. 
Given this statutory framework, this much is clear: 
the 
Legislature 
has 
authorized 
the 
MDEQ 
to 
address 
precisely the sort of environmental and health risks 
occasioned by Dow’s alleged emission of dioxin into the 
39  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
Tittabawassee 
flood 
plain. 
Not 
only 
is 
the 
MDEQ 
specifically authorized under the NREPA to undertake 
“health assessments” and “health effect studies,” MCL 
324.20101(1)(ee), but the department is also empowered to 
take “other actions that may be necessary to prevent, 
minimize, or mitigate injury to the public health, safety, 
or welfare, or to the environment.” 
MCL 324.20101(1)(cc). 
Indeed, 
as 
plaintiffs’ 
counsel 
acknowledged 
at 
oral 
arguments, the MDEQ has been involved in the remediation of 
the Tittabawassee dioxin contamination and has engaged in a 
pilot medical monitoring program of residents. 
Plaintiffs believe, however, that the MDEQ’s response 
has been insufficient—that the department lacks the funding 
necessary to engage in medical monitoring on the scale they 
would prefer.25
 It is apparent, therefore, that the 
25 We cite the NREPA not to comment on its adequacy as
a remedy for addressing environmental contamination or its
effectiveness in dealing with dioxin contamination in the
Tittabawassee flood plain, or to suggest that the NREPA
constitutes the only appropriate remedy in dealing with
“toxic tort” types of cleanups. 
Rather, the Legislature
may, in due course, choose to enact additional legislation
dealing with such cleanups, and the MDEQ may, in due
course, decide that additional measures need to be taken to
address dioxin levels in the Tittabawassee flood plain. We 
note the statutory framework merely to highlight that the
NREPA arises as a result of a balancing of competing policy
interests made by the people’s elected representatives, and
that the MDEQ, in administering the NREPA within the 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
40  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
plaintiffs are asking this Court to create a new remedy—a 
cause 
of 
action 
for 
medical 
monitoring—where 
the 
Legislature has already signaled its preference with 
respect to the appropriate form a remedy should take. 
In 
deference to the policy-making branch of our government, we 
decline to create this alternative remedial regime.26 
IV 
We 
have 
established 
that 
plaintiffs’ 
medical 
monitoring claim is not cognizable under our current law 
and that recognition of this claim would require both a 
departure from fundamental tort principles and a cavalier 
disregard of the inherent limitations of judicial decision­
making. 
For these reasons, defendant is entitled to 
summary 
disposition 
of 
plaintiffs’ 
medical 
monitoring 
claim. 
We need address only one remaining argument: 
executive branch, must undertake decisions grounded in its
own expertise. 
26 We are aware that a number of courts in other 
jurisdictions have allowed claims for medical monitoring to
proceed. See, e.g., Petito v AH Robins Co, Inc, 750 So 2d 
103 (Fla App, 1999); Hansen v Mountain Fuel Supply Co, 858 
P2d 970 (Utah, 1993); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litigation, 916 F2d 829 (CA 3, 1990); Ayers v Jackson Twp,
106 NJ 557; 525 A2d 287 (1987); Burns v Jaquays Mining
Corp, 156 Ariz 375; 752 P2d 28 (Ariz App, 1987); Friends 
for All Children, Inc v Lockheed Aircraft Corp, 241 US App
DC 83; 746 F2d 816 (1984). We find none of the rationales 
in these cases persuasive. 
41  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
plaintiffs’ contention that their request for a medical 
monitoring program is not subject to summary disposition 
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because it is a claim for equitable, 
as opposed to legal, relief.27 
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the nature of the relief they 
seek 
essentially 
puts 
the 
cart 
before 
the 
horse. 
Regardless of what sort of remedy a plaintiff requests, we 
must 
nevertheless 
determine 
whether 
that 
remedy 
is 
supported by a valid claim. 
As the Kentucky Supreme Court 
recently observed, “It is not the remedy that supports the 
cause of action, but rather the cause of action that 
supports a remedy.” Wood v Wyeth-Ayerst Labs, 82 SW3d 849, 
855 (Ky, 2002). 
Here, plaintiffs have pleaded a cause of 
action based on a theory of negligence and have argued that 
we should expand the common law of torts in order to permit 
27
 Amici have urged us to view plaintiffs’ medical
monitoring claim as a request for a preliminary injunction,
arguing 
that 
an 
injunction 
may 
be 
granted 
even 
if 
irreparable harm or injury has not yet occurred. 
Michigan
Coalition of State Employee Unions v Civil Service Comm,
465 Mich 212, 228; 634 NW2d 692 (2001). 
But this argument
disregards 
that, 
in 
order 
to 
obtain 
a 
preliminary
injunction, the movant must establish that he “is likely to 
prevail on the merits . . . .” 
Michigan State Employees
Ass'n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152, 158; 365 NW2d
93 (1984). 
Thus, a court’s prerogative to grant a 
preliminary injunction is tempered by the need to determine
whether the movant has pleaded a claim on which he might
ultimately obtain relief. 
42  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
their medical monitoring claim to proceed.28
 Plaintiffs 
never attempt to characterize their claim as an equitable 
cause of action, and point to no case law where a similar 
tort-based claim is held to create an equitable cause of 
action. 
As shown above, plaintiffs’ claim is not cognizable 
under our current law of negligence and is not within a 
permissible 
expansion 
of 
the 
common 
law. 
Neither, 
perforce, is the claim based in equity. 
A court cannot 
“create substantive rights under the guise of doing 
equity,” or “confer rights” where none exists. 
Stein v 
Simpson, 37 Cal 2d 79, 83; 230 P2d 816 (1951); Lathrop Co v 
Lampert, 583 P2d 789, 790 (Alas, 1978). 
Therefore, 
regardless of whether the relief plaintiffs seek is 
equitable or legal in nature, defendant was entitled to 
summary 
disposition 
regarding 
plaintiffs’ 
medical 
28 For example, plaintiffs’ brief argues, “Plaintiffs
seek to certify a class of individuals who, as a result of
Dow’s negligence, have suffered substantially increased 
risks of exposure to dioxin, and from this exposure,
increased risks of developing grave but latent diseases and
adverse health effects.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
They add,
“These innocent victims of Dow’s negligence should receive 
periodic medical testing so that early detection and 
treatment 
can 
minimize 
the 
impact 
of 
any 
resulting
illness.” (Emphasis added.) 
43  
 
 
 
monitoring cause of action because plaintiffs have not 
stated a valid cause of action. 
V 
Although the dissenting opinion is passionately argued 
and, no doubt, well-intentioned, it is rooted in a number 
of fundamental misconceptions about the applicable law and 
about our majority opinion. 
Some of these errors have 
already been noted and need no further discussion. 
But 
three particular inaccuracies in the dissent warrant 
special mention. 
First, the dissent argues that our holding makes 
“plaintiffs’ physical health . . . secondary to defendant’s 
economic health.” Post at 2. But our opinion does no such 
thing. 
We take no position on whether defendant should or 
should not pay for the costs of monitoring for dioxin­
related disease. 
Rather, we hold that plaintiff has not 
stated a claim under our current tort law and that the 
determination whether that law should change to accommodate 
plaintiffs’ claims belongs, in our view, to the people’s 
representatives in the Legislature. 
It may be desirable that our tort law should expand to 
allow a cause of action for medical monitoring. 
But what 
we as individuals prefer is not necessarily what we as 
justices ought to impose upon the people. 
Our decision in 
44  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
this case is driven not by a preference for one policy or 
another, but by our recognition that we must not impose our 
will upon the people in matters, such as this one, that 
require 
a 
delicate 
balancing 
of 
competing 
societal 
interests. 
In our representative democracy, it is the 
legislative branch that ought to chart the state’s course 
through such murky waters. 
Second, the dissenting opinion casts our opinion as 
one leaving injured plaintiffs without a remedy. 
See post 
at 
26 
(“Today, 
the 
majority 
holds 
that 
defendant’s 
egregious long-term contamination of our environment and 
the resulting negative health effects to plaintiffs are 
just another accepted cost of doing business.”). 
But our 
opinion does not hold that a party who actually contracts a 
dioxin-related disease will be foreclosed from recovery. 
On the contrary, assuming such a person could show physical 
harm and causation, the four elements of a traditional 
negligence claim would be met. 
See p 8 of this opinion. 
Upon such a showing, that person would be entitled to full 
compensation for the injury in the same manner as any other 
person injured by another’s negligence.29 
29 We also note that there would be no statute of 
limitations problems for such a plaintiff. 
Under the so-
Footnotes continued on following page. 
45  
 
 
 
                                                 
The dissent’s overwrought rhetoric aside, the question 
is not whether an injured party should recover for Dow’s 
contamination of the environment but when a party may be 
considered “injured” under Michigan tort law and recover 
for Dow’s negligence. Justice Cavanagh may prefer a system 
in which polluters’ resources are doled out on a first­
come, first-served basis. 
He may be comfortable with the 
notion that such a regime runs the risk of diverting 
limited resources from those devastated by cancer, birth 
defects, and other dioxin-related diseases to those who 
have yet to manifest dioxin-related illness.30
 He is 
entitled to these beliefs. 
But his beliefs are not 
reflected in our common law of negligence and, given the 
potential repercussions of his first-come, first-served 
notions of justice, his vision should be turned into law,if 
at all,by the Legislature. 
This point leads to the dissenting opinion’s third and 
most troubling error: Justice Cavanagh’s complete disregard 
called “discovery rule,” a cause of action “accrues” in the
toxic tort context when an injured party knows or should
have known of the manifestation of the injury. 
See, e.g.
Larson, supra at 314. 
Provided that the injured person
brings an action within three years of the date he knows or
should have known of a dioxin-related injury, the statute
of limitations would be satisfied. See MCL 600.5805(10). 
30 See Metro-North Commuter R Co, supra at 442. 
46  
 
 
 
 
for the effects that our decision may have on those other 
than the parties at bar. 
For example, the dissent asserts 
that our concerns about the effects that a decision in 
plaintiffs’ favor might have are unfounded given the nature 
of the relief that plaintiffs request: 
[T]he majority’s prediction of a ruined 
economy falters after examining the true nature
of the equitable relief that plaintiffs are 
seeking. 
Notably, allowing plaintiffs to seek
medical monitoring costs would not result in a 
windfall for plaintiffs. . . . 
plaintiffs would
receive no money whatsoever. . . . The only
“benefit” that a plaintiff would receive is 
payment for tests ordered by a doctor that are
above and beyond what would generally be ordered
for that plaintiff. [Post at 13-14.] 
The dissent asserts, in effect, that we need not trouble 
ourselves about recognizing plaintiffs’ proposed cause of 
action because they seek a medical monitoring program 
rather than a cash payment. What this argument ignores, of 
course, is that medical monitoring is not without cost. 
Moreover, 
the 
dissent 
overlooks 
the 
fact 
that 
recognizing a cause of action before manifest injury in 
this case will allow other causes of action for negligence 
before manifest injury. 
The dissent’s disdain for our 
“concerns about financial impact” can be sustained only by 
disregarding the effect that these other preinjury actions 
might have on the state’s economy. 
To recognize a medical 
47  
 
 
  
 
monitoring cause of action would essentially be to accord 
carte blanche to any moderately creative lawyer to identify 
an 
emission 
from 
any 
business 
enterprise 
anywhere, 
speculate about the adverse health consequences of such an 
emission, and thereby seek to impose on such business the 
obligation to pay the medical costs of a segment of the 
population that has suffered no actual medical harm. 
Worse still is the dissenting opinion’s failure to 
consider the possible human toll of its approach. 
Indeed, 
our dissenting colleague is offended at our suggestion that 
allowing these plaintiffs to recover might limit resources 
available to those who show manifest physical injury: 
I can think of no greater misdeed than to
actually argue that allowing these plaintiffs to 
seek the equitable remedy of requiring this 
defendant to pay for the costs of necessary
medical monitoring tests somehow would divert 
resources from children with birth defects. This 
is fabrication at its most unforgivable—refusing
to acknowledge that providing plaintiffs with the
opportunity to merely seek an equitable remedy is
well with the bounds of judicial discretion and
will not devastate the economy or cause sick
children to die. 
[Post at 19-20 (emphasis in
original).] 
This is an argument that can be sustained only if one 
believes that we live in a world in which every tortfeasor 
has unlimited resources to compensate those affected by its 
negligence. 
Ours, of course, is not that sort of world. 
48  
 
 
 
 
 
Those who do wrong necessarily have a limited capacity to 
compensate those who suffer from their wrongdoing. 
Justice Cavanagh himself recognized this reality in 
Larson v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, supra at 304.  There, 
he joined a majority opinion holding that manifest injury 
rather than exposure alone gives rise to a claim for 
asbestos exposure. 
The opinion concluded with a frank 
acknowledgement that this rule was necessary in light of 
relatively 
minor 
consequences 
of 
asbestos 
the limited resources available to compensate injured 
parties: 
We 
believe 
that 
discouraging 
suits 
for 
exposure will lead to a fairer allocation of
resources to those victims who develop cancers.
Rather 
than 
encouraging 
every 
plaintiff 
who 
develops asbestosis to recover an amount of money
as compensation for the chance of getting cancer,
we prefer to allow those who actually do develop
cancer to obtain a full recovery. [Id. at 319.] 
Thus, the Larson Court recognized that a rule that created 
an incentive for plaintiffs to seek recovery for asbestosis 
would limit the resources available to compensate those 
whose asbestosis turned to cancer. 
49  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Our nation’s experience with asbestos litigation has 
shown that this concern was well-founded.31  It is therefore 
quite puzzling that our dissenting colleague would show 
such a blithe disregard for the real-world effects of his 
invocation of equity in this case. 
Equity is indeed an instrument of justice. 
But when 
it is exercised without due regard for the interests of 
those who are not before the Court, its invocation can lead 
to great injustice. 
It is precisely because a decision in 
plaintiffs’ favor may have sweeping effects for Michigan’s 
citizens and its economy that we believe this matter should 
be handled by those best able to balance these competing 
interests: the people’s representatives in the Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the trial court erred in denying 
defendant’s 
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition 
regarding 
plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim. 
The cause of action 
31 
See, 
e.g., 
Schwartz 
et 
al., 
Addressing 
the 
“elephantine mass” of asbestos cases: consolidation versus
inactive dockets (pleural registries) and case management
plans that defer claims filed by the non-sick, 31 Pepp L R
271, 273-274 (2003) (noting that asbestos litigation has 
led to “at least 78” bankruptcies, leading to “staggering”
effects on the economy and, worse, fewer resources for the
“truly sick”). 
50  
 
 
proposed by plaintiffs is not cognizable under Michigan 
law. 
Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Saginaw 
Circuit Court for entry of an order of summary disposition 
in defendant’s favor with regard to plaintiffs’ medical 
monitoring cause of action. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
51  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
GARY and KATHY HENRY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 125205 
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 
Defendant-Appellant. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur and join in the majority opinion’s result, 
and in its reasoning. 
I write separately because I do not 
join in the opinion’s citations of an article in the Texas 
Review of Law & Politics, ante at 24, 31. 
1 
There is better authority than a law review article to 
support the propositions for which the article is cited. 
The opinion cites the article for two propositions: (1) 
that “our common-law jurisprudence has been guided by a 
number of prudential principles. . . . Among them has been 
our attempt to ‘avoid capricious departures from bedrock 
legal 
rules 
as 
such 
tectonic 
shifts 
might 
produce 
unforeseen and undesirable consequences,’” and (2) that the 
judiciary is ill-advised to make decisions that involve a 
1 The article is based on remarks Justice Young made at
a joint Federalist Society/Ave Maria Law School symposium. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
drawing of lines reflecting considerations of public 
policy. Ante at 24, 30-31. 
Rather than an out-of-state, nonbinding law review 
article, real and binding Michigan authority for these 
propositions is found in our case law. 
See Olmstead v 
Anderson, 428 Mich 1, 11; 400 NW2d 292 (1987),2 and Van v 
Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 327; 597 NW2d 15 (1999).3
 Because 
there is binding case law for these propositions, the 
citations of the article written by one of the justices 
2 Olmstead noted approvingly that, in a prior case,
“[t]he 
Court, 
therefore, 
applied 
the 
public 
policy
exception to the lex loci doctrine, rather than making
sweeping 
changes 
[by 
reappraising 
Michigan’s 
entire 
conflict 
of 
laws 
policy] 
with 
potential 
unforeseen 
consequences.” 
3 In Van, supra at 327, the Court quoted the following
passage from the earlier Court of Appeals opinion in that
case, 227 Mich App 90, 95; 575 NW2d 566 (1997): 
“As a general rule, making social policy is
a job for the Legislature, not the courts. 
See 
In re Kurzyniec Estate, 207 Mich App 531, 543;
526 NW2d 191 (1994). 
This is especially true
when the determination or resolution requires
placing a premium on one social interest at the
expense 
of 
another: 
‘The 
responsibility 
for 
drawing lines in a society as complex as ours—of
identifying priorities, weighing the relevant 
considerations and choosing between competing
alternatives—is 
the 
Legislature’s, 
not 
the 
judiciary’s.’ 
O’Donnell 
v 
State 
Farm 
Mut 
Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 543; 273 NW2d
829 (1979).” 
2  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
signing the majority opinion can at best be described as 
inappropriate and unnecessary. 
Further, I do not agree with some of the article’s 
tone, nor with its comparison of the common law to 
a drunken, toothless ancient relative, sprawled
prominently and in a state of nature on a settee
in the middle of one’s genteel garden party.[4] 
An article containing such a clumsy and crude analogy that 
mocks the common law is unworthy of citation. 
The people 
of Michigan expressly adopted the common law, in addition 
to statutory laws, in the 1963 Constitution.5 
Therefore, I concur in the result and join in the 
majority opinion, except the citations of the Texas Review 
of Law & Politics article. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
4 Young, A judicial traditionalist confronts the common
law, 8 Texas Rev L & Pol 299, 302 (2004). 
5 Michigan’s Constitution adopted the common law that
was in force in 1963: “The common law and the statute laws 
now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall
remain in force until they expire by their own limitations,
or are changed, amended or repealed.” Const 1963, art 3, §
7. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
GARY and KATHY HENRY, et al, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
No. 125205 
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
The proper issue in this case is whether defendant 
must 
pay 
for 
plaintiffs’ 
medical 
monitoring 
costs. 
However, rather than simply address this basic issue, the 
majority chooses to use this case as a vehicle to raise 
fears about the economy and hypothesize that providing 
medical monitoring to these plaintiffs would result in our 
state’s economic disaster. 
The majority erroneously 
presents this case as one in which it must choose between 
an equitable remedy for plaintiffs and the economic 
viability of defendant and of our state. 
Because the 
dichotomy the majority has constructed is a false one, I 
must dissent. 
At 
its 
core, 
this 
case 
is 
about 
rights 
and 
responsibilities. 
Defendant is undeniably responsible for 
 
 
 
 
 
years of actively contaminating the air, water, and soil 
that surrounds plaintiffs’ homes. 
Defendant is undeniably 
responsible for the suffering that plaintiffs must endure 
as they face years of wondering if the contamination that 
they and their children have been exposed to will result in 
devastating illnesses and their untimely deaths. Thus, the 
issue is who should pay for plaintiffs’ medical monitoring 
costs under the unique circumstances of this case when it 
is clear that defendant is responsible for the wrong that 
prompted the need for plaintiffs to be medically monitored. 
Stated differently, where defendant has contaminated the 
environment, should plaintiffs, defendant, or the taxpayers 
of the state of Michigan pay plaintiffs’ medical monitoring 
costs? 
Whatever the majority’s intent, the result of 
disregarding the only question properly posed in this case 
is that plaintiffs’ physical health is inexcusably deemed 
secondary to defendant’s economic health. 
I.  PLAINTIFFS PRESENT A REASONABLE CLAIM FOR MEDICAL 
MONITORING COSTS 
Plaintiffs are owners and residents of property 
located within the one-hundred-year flood plain of the 
Tittabawassee River in Saginaw County. 
The Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) found as much as 
7,300 parts per trillion (ppt) of dioxin in the flood 
2  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
plain, 
which 
substantially 
exceeds 
Michigan’s 
cleanup 
standard of ninety ppt for direct residential contact.1 
After the MDEQ conducted testing, it determined that 
defendant was the source of the pollution. 
Because of the 
health risks that plaintiffs may face, plaintiffs seek a 
court-supervised 
medical 
monitoring 
program 
that 
is 
administered by qualified health professionals. 
"Dioxin" is the term used to identify a number of 
similar 
toxic 
chemicals. 
Dioxin 
is 
a 
known 
human 
carcinogen 
and, 
as 
the 
majority 
notes, 
“‘a 
potent 
carcinogen.’” 
Ante at 1 n 1 (citation omitted). Exposure 
to dioxin can cause cancer, liver disease, birth defects, 
miscarriages, and reproductive damage, as well as other 
illnesses. 
Children are more significantly affected by 
dioxin than adults. Dioxins do not break down easily. Once 
dioxin is released into the environment, it stays in the 
1 The Michigan Department of Community Health, the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and the 
Michigan Department of Agriculture state that “recent 
studies suggest that dioxins may be far more harmful to
human health than was previously believed and these 
standards [referring to standards for drinking water and 
eating fish and shellfish] as well as others set for soil,
sediment, and food may change in the future.” Dioxins Fact 
Sheet. 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
environment for an extremely long time.2  When dioxin gets 
into a person’s body, it stays indefinitely in a person’s 
blood and body fat. Because dioxin stays in the body for a 
long time, the adverse effects of dioxin exposure may not 
be immediate. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel stated at oral argument that a 
pilot study of the community conducted by the Michigan 
Department of Community Health found that fifty to eighty 
percent of the people tested have dioxin levels that put 
them in the 75th to the 95th percentile compared to the 
national average for their age and gender. 
II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MONITORING WARRANTS 
EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Plaintiffs’ request for a court-supervised medical 
monitoring program that is administered by qualified health 
professionals is undoubtedly reasonable. Plaintiffs merely 
request that defendant pay the cost of medical monitoring 
to ensure that dioxin-related illnesses are caught at their 
2 The majority notes that defendant has entered into a
settlement 
agreement 
in 
which 
“defendant 
will 
fund 
extensive cleanup efforts aimed at minimizing residents’
exposure to dioxin.” Ante at 7 n 3. The specifics of this
agreement indicate that defendant is willing to pay for
items such as landscaping some homes to cover exposed soil
and augmenting some ground cover in public parks; however,
defendant remains unwilling to pay for any necessary
medical monitoring costs as a result of its dioxin 
contamination. 
4  
 
 
 
 
earliest. 
Plaintiffs 
simply 
seek 
to 
minimize 
the 
devastating effects of illnesses caused by defendant’s 
acts. 
The majority, ante at 8, notes that “any first-year 
law student” knows the principle for negligence—duty, 
breach, causation, and damages—and argues that plaintiffs’ 
rights have not been actually violated and they have 
suffered no injuries and, therefore, no damages. 
With 
this, I vehemently disagree. 
Plaintiffs have suffered 
actual harm and damages—the heightened exposure to dioxin 
that they received because of defendant’s acts is akin to 
an injury. 
Plaintiffs were exposed to dioxin at over 
eighty times the level deemed safe for direct residential 
contact. 
Plaintiffs were advised that routine activities, 
such as flower gardening and lawn work, could further 
increase 
their 
risk 
of 
dioxin 
exposure. 
Tittabawassee/Saginaw 
River 
Flood 
Plain, 
Environmental 
Assessment Initiative, June 2003. 
Plaintiffs were further 
advised that they should avoid allowing their children to 
play in the soil to avoid further contamination. 
If it 
were not for defendant’s acts, plaintiffs would not be 
obliged to incur the expenses involved in additional 
testing for early detection of any illnesses caused by the 
increased dioxin exposure. 
In this case, the exposure 
5  
 
 
 
 
itself and the need for medical monitoring constitute the 
injury. 
See, e.g., Petito v AH Robins Co, Inc, 750 So 2d 
103, 105 (Fla App, 1999) (“One can hardly dispute that an 
individual has just as great an interest in avoiding 
expensive diagnostic examinations as in avoiding physical 
injury.”). 
Plaintiffs 
can 
also 
offer 
facts 
sufficient 
to 
establish causation, contrary to the majority’s assertion. 
As noted by the majority, defendant’s Midland plant was 
identified 
as 
the 
“‘principal 
source 
of 
dioxin 
contamination in the Tittabawassee River sediments and the 
Tittabawassee River flood plain soils.’” 
Ante at 5 
(citation omitted). 
Given the facts, it is entirely 
reasonable for plaintiffs to argue that they would not have 
to undergo medical monitoring tests for dioxin poisoning 
but for the actions of defendant. 
To argue that there are 
insufficient facts to support plaintiffs’ argument is a 
willful avoidance of the record. 
Notably, my belief that these plaintiffs should be 
allowed to seek equitable relief does not mean that I 
advocate that any exposure allows a person to bring a claim 
for medical monitoring costs. 
That position would indeed 
be imprudent. 
However, in this case, a candid review of 
the facts indicates that plaintiffs’ heightened exposure 
6  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
has caused them harm and plaintiffs have no adequate legal 
remedy. 
While plaintiffs may not have yet developed 
dioxin-related illnesses, the fact remains that they are at 
a much greater risk because of defendant’s acts. 
As such, 
their long-term exposure to dioxin has caused a change in 
the medical monitoring that plaintiffs would otherwise be 
prescribed. 
For example, according to reasonably accepted 
medical practice, doctors do not generally prescribe 
testing to determine a patient’s dioxin level. However, in 
this case, because of the prolonged exposure to high levels 
of dioxin, a doctor may, according to accepted scientific 
principles, find that such tests are reasonably necessary 
to best monitor and treat a patient. 
When these tests are 
ordered, defendant should be responsible for paying the 
costs of the tests because defendant is responsible for the 
need for the tests. 
Plaintiffs do not, as the majority asserts, advocate 
for “a cause of action that departs drastically from our 
traditional notions of a valid negligence claim” and seek a 
“radical change” in negligence law. 
Ante at 24, 33.3 
3 Also, contrary to the majority’s assertion, Larson v 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 427 Mich 301, 304-305; 399 NW2d
1 (1986), does not affect the decision before the Court
today. 
Larson dealt with the statute of limitations for 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Medical 
monitoring 
is 
recognized 
in 
a 
number 
of 
jurisdictions. 
See, e.g, 
In re Paoli R Yard PCB 
Litigation, 916 F2d 829, 852 (CA 3, 1990); Stead v F E 
Myers Co, 785 F Supp 56, 57 (D Vt, 1990); Merry v 
Westinghouse Electric Corp, 684 F Supp 847, 849 (MD Pa, 
1988); Bower v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 206 W Va 133, 
135; 522 SE2d 424 (1999); Redland Soccer Club, Inc v Dep’t 
of the Army, 548 Pa 178, 194; 696 A2d 137 (1997); Potter v 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 6 Cal 4th 965, 974; 863 P2d 
795; 25 Cal Rptr 2d 550 (1993); In re Fernald, 1989 US Dist 
LEXIS 17762 (SD Ohio, 1989) (appointing trustees and 
special masters to administer a medical monitoring program 
as part of a $78 million settlement). Moreover, because of 
the latent nature of most illnesses resulting from exposure 
to dioxin, plaintiffs may not be able to establish an 
immediate physical injury of the type contemplated by a 
causes of action for asbestosis and cancer related to 
asbestos exposure. 
This Court held that a cause of action 
for asbestosis or cancer related to asbestos exposure
accrues when a person learns or should learn that he has
developed asbestosis or cancer, not when he was first
exposed to asbestos. 
This was necessary because the 
underlying claims in Larson were wrongful death actions
premised on asbestosis and cancer. A person cannot bring a
wrongful death claim for asbestosis until the victim 
actually has asbestosis. 
But Larson has no effect on 
whether plaintiffs can seek an equitable remedy for a
court-supervised 
medical 
monitoring 
program 
that 
is 
administered by health professionals. 
8  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
traditional tort action. 
See, e.g., Paoli, supra at 852 
(“Medical monitoring claims acknowledge that, in a toxic 
age, significant harm can be done to an individual by a 
tortfeasor, notwithstanding latent manifestation of that 
harm.”); Cook v Rockwell Int’l Corp (Cook I), 755 F Supp 
1468, 1476 (D Colo, 1991) (“injuries resulting from 
exposure to toxic substances are often latent”). 
But 
merely because an illness is latent does not mean that 
plaintiffs have not been injured and suffered damages.4 
A plaintiff who is involved in an automobile
accident 
and 
suffers 
no 
observable 
physical
injury 
but 
nevertheless 
undergoes 
medically
necessary diagnostic tests to determine whether
internal injuries exist is no doubt entitled to
recover the costs of the examination. 
If 
accepted 
medical 
practice 
also 
deemed 
it 
necessary to perform such tests in the future, in
order to detect the onset of any subsequently
developing injury caused by the accident, the
costs of the continued tests would be recoverable 
. . . . The outcome should be the same when the 
operative incident is toxic exposure rather than
collision and the potential future harm is 
disease 
rather 
than 
physical 
impairment.
[Miranda v Shell Oil Co, 17 Cal App 4th 1651,
1657; 26 Cal Rptr 2d 655 (1993).] 
4 “The ‘injury’ that underlies a claim for medical
monitoring--just as with any other cause of action sounding
in 
tort--is 
‘the 
invasion 
of 
any 
legally 
protected
interest.’” 
Bower, supra at 139, quoting Restatement 
Torts, 2d, § 7(1) (1964). 
9  
 
 
 
 
See also Friends for All Children, Inc v Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp, 241 US App DC 83, 92; 746 F2d 816 (1984). 
Because of the established facts in this case, a 
court-supervised 
medical 
monitoring 
program 
that 
is 
administered by qualified health professionals is a viable 
and equitable remedy for plaintiffs to seek that is 
nonpreclusive of any future damages claim. See, e.g, Day v 
NLO, Inc, 811 F Supp 1271, 1275 (SD Ohio, 1992) (“Because 
of ongoing court supervision, any medical monitoring 
awarded by this Court would constitute equitable relief.”). 
An equitable remedy is necessary because there is no 
adequate legal remedy for plaintiffs. 
See Multiplex 
Concrete Machinery Co v Saxer, 310 Mich 243, 259-260; 17 
NW2d 169 (1945); Powers v Fisher, 279 Mich 442, 447; 272 NW 
737 (1937). 
“The absence of precedents, or novelty in 
incident, presents no obstacle to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of a court of equity, and to the award of 
relief in a proper case.” 
30A CJS, Equity, Effect of 
Absence of Precedents, § 10, pp 171-172; see also 27A Am 
Jur 2d, Equity, § 100, p 587 (“The appropriateness of the 
equitable remedy is determined by current rather than past 
conditions.”). “The essence of a court’s equity power lies 
in its inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible 
and practical way to eliminate the conditions or redress 
10  
 
 
 
the injuries caused by unlawful action.” 
Freeman v Pitts, 
503 US 467, 487; 112 S Ct 1430; 118 L Ed 2d 108 (1992). 
It is within the sound discretion of the courts 
whether to offer equitable relief. Youngs v West, 317 Mich 
538, 545; 27 NW2d 88 (1947). 
Regardless of how plaintiffs 
may have characterized their pleadings, “[t]he court has 
equitable jurisdiction to provide a remedy where none 
exists at law, even if the parties have not specifically 
requested an equitable remedy, whenever the pleadings 
sufficiently give notice of a party’s right to relief and 
demand for judgment.” 
30A CJS, Equity, Lack of Remedy at 
Law as Ground and Limit of Jurisdiction, § 18, p 180; see 
also 27A Am Jur 2d, Equity, § 216, p 699 (“Equity 
jurisdiction 
nevertheless 
may 
arise 
even 
though 
the 
claimant has pleaded no equitable claims and has not 
pleaded inadequacy of the remedy at law.”); Parkwood Ltd 
Dividend Housing Ass’n v State Housing Dev Auth, 468 Mich 
763, 774 n 8; 664 NW2d 185 (2003). 
However, contrary to 
the 
majority’s 
assertion, 
plaintiffs 
indeed 
ask 
for 
equitable relief as it relates to medical monitoring. 
Plaintiffs’ complaint states that they have no adequate 
remedy at law and they seek “equitable/injunctive relief in 
the form of a medical monitoring program . . . .” 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
While the majority argues that the separation of 
powers precludes it from allowing plaintiffs to proceed, I 
strongly disagree. The majority’s framing of the issue and 
its subsequent argument allow it to claim that “[w]e take 
no position on whether defendant should or should not pay 
for the costs of monitoring for dioxin-related disease.” 
Ante at 44. 
The majority’s argument is essentially that 
its hands are tied because the Legislature has not acted. 
But this argument ignores a basic tenet of our system of 
jurisprudence–courts have the inherent power to provide 
equitable remedies. 
“Every equitable right or interest 
derives not from a declaration of substantive law, but from 
the broad and flexible jurisdiction of courts of equity to 
afford remedial relief, where justice and good conscience 
so dictate.” 
30A CJS, Equity, In general, § 93, p 289. 
The majority’s steadfast insistence that it cannot allow 
plaintiffs to proceed because the Legislature has not acted 
allows the majority to sidestep the issue, instead of 
explicitly stating and supporting its position that these 
plaintiffs are unworthy of relief. 
Because principles of equity are firmly entrenched in 
our justice system, plaintiffs’ position would not require 
this 
Court 
to 
depart 
from 
longstanding 
principles 
fundamental to our justice system. 
“The purpose of equity 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
is to do complete justice in a case where a court of law is 
unable, because of the inflexibility of the rules by which 
it is bound, to adapt its judgment to the special 
circumstances of the case.” 27A Am Jur 2d, Equity, Nature, 
Purpose, and Distinguishing Features, § 2, pp 520-521. 
“[E]quity is the perfection of the law, and is always open 
to those who have just rights to enforce where the law is 
inadequate.” 
Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United 
Workmen of the State of Michigan v Child, 70 Mich 163, 172; 
38 NW 1 (1888). 
Allowing plaintiffs to merely proceed to 
seek a court-supervised medical monitoring program under 
equity principles certainly does not stray from the 
foundations of Anglo-American law. 
III. EQUITABLE RELIEF PROPERLY PLACES THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS ON 
DEFENDANT, THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPOSING
THE COSTS ON PLAINTIFFS 
Throughout its opinion, the majority invokes the fear 
of a ruined economy to support its decision. 
But the 
majority’s prediction of a ruined economy falters after 
examining the true nature of the equitable relief that 
plaintiffs are seeking. 
Notably, allowing plaintiffs to 
seek medical monitoring costs would not result in a 
windfall for plaintiffs. 
“A medical monitoring claim 
compensates 
a 
plaintiff 
for 
diagnostic 
treatment, 
a 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
tangible and quantifiable item of damage caused by a 
defendant’s tortious conduct.” 
Cook I, supra at 1478; see 
also Paoli, supra at 850. 
Notably, these plaintiffs would 
receive 
no 
money 
whatsoever. 
Payments 
for 
doctor­
prescribed testing would be made through a court-supervised 
fund. 
This fund would only compensate plaintiffs for 
medical monitoring costs actually incurred after the 
monitoring was ordered by a qualified health professional. 
The only “benefit” that a plaintiff would receive is 
payment for tests ordered by a doctor that are above and 
beyond what would generally be ordered for that plaintiff.5 
5 This is in contrast to the relief sought in Metro-
North Commuter R Co v Buckley, 521 US 424, 439-441; 117 S
Ct 2113; 138 L Ed 2d 560 (1997). 
In Metro-North, an
employee sought a change in the common law that would
permit a lump-sum damages award for medical monitoring
costs. The Court stated the following: 
[W]e do not find sufficient support in the
common law for the unqualified rule of lump-sum
damages recovery that is, at least arguably,
before us here. 
And given the mix of competing
general 
policy 
considerations, 
plaintiff’s
policy-based arguments do not convince us that
the 
FELA 
[Federal 
Employers’ 
Liability 
Act]
contains 
a 
tort 
liability 
rule 
of 
that 
unqualified kind. 
This limited conclusion disposes of the 
matter before us. 
We need not, and do not,
express any view here about the extent to which
the FELA might, or might not, accommodate medical
Footnotes continued on following page. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Notably, 
the 
majority’s 
concerns 
about 
financial 
impact can actually be alleviated to a great degree by 
allowing plaintiffs’ practical, proactive approach. 
A 
court-supervised medical monitoring program administered by 
qualified 
health 
professionals 
would 
provide 
early 
detection to plaintiffs and likely lessen the fiscal 
damages that defendant would be liable for if dioxin­
related 
illnesses 
are 
discovered 
later. 
The 
early 
detection of illnesses may allow treatment to proceed in a 
more reasonable manner, often with more options for the 
person affected than if detection had been delayed. 
See 
Bower, supra at 140. 
“It is common knowledge early 
diagnosis of many serious conditions promotes enhanced cure 
and survival rates.” Miranda, supra at 1658. “Harm in the 
form of increased risk of future cancer attributable to 
delay in diagnosis and treatment has become so widely 
accepted by the medical community that the existence of 
such 
harm 
could 
be 
reasonably 
inferred 
from 
this 
cost recovery rules more finely tailored than the
rule we have considered. [Id. at 444.] 
As Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, in Metro-North, supra at 455-456, noted, “If I
comprehend 
the 
Court’s 
enigmatic 
decision 
correctly,
Buckley [the employee] may replead a claim for relief and
recover for medical monitoring, but he must receive that
relief in a form other than a lump sum.” 
15  
 
 
 
 
professional common knowledge.” 
Evers v Dollinger, 95 NJ 
399, 424; 471 A2d 405 (1984). “[E]xperts continuously urge 
vigilant detection as the most realistic means of improving 
prognosis . . . .” Id. at 426 n 2, citing Rubin, Clinical 
Oncology for Medical Students and Physicians (3d ed, 1970­
1971), p 33. 
The intent of medical monitoring is “to 
facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of disease or 
illness 
caused 
by 
a 
plaintiff’s 
exposure 
to 
toxic 
substances as a result of a defendant’s culpable conduct.” 
Miranda, supra at 1655. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel clearly 
articulated just such an example of the benefits of medical 
monitoring: 
Let me give you a very clear example of how
medical monitoring would work in an instance like
this. 
Say there’s a woman of child bearing age
and her blood is tested for high levels of dioxin
and she is found to have high levels of dioxin,
95th percentile or so in her body. 
Medical 
doctors 
who 
are 
familiar 
with 
dioxin 
contamination say well one of the possible
results 
of 
having 
high 
levels 
of 
dioxin 
contamination in your blood is that you may have
depressed thyroid function. 
So they do a very
simple test, a standard test for thyroid function
and find out that there is depression of thyroid
function. 
She is then treated and birth defects 
that are linked to depressed thyroid function do
not happen to her [child]. 
She does not have a 
child 
with 
a 
birth 
defect 
because 
that 
preventative measure prevented that irreparable
harm. 
16  
 
 
 
 
The establishment of a court-supervised fund for medical 
monitoring “encourages plaintiffs to detect and treat their 
injuries as soon as possible.” Paoli, supra at 852. 
Notably, the majority fails to mention that plaintiffs 
would not be forced to engage in medical monitoring tests 
if 
they 
chose 
not 
to. 
A 
court-supervised 
medical 
monitoring program would allow plaintiffs to make a choice, 
and those who choose to be monitored and who meet the 
requirements set forth by qualified health professionals 
could be monitored. 
The majority also notes an argument—not often heard— 
that monitoring for the early detection of illnesses can 
actually be bad for plaintiffs because a person with an 
illness who is erroneously proclaimed healthy may ignore 
symptoms and, therefore, delay seeking necessary treatment, 
possibly leading to severe psychological harm. 
The only 
logical import from stating these arguments is that because 
plaintiffs may also be the victims of medical malpractice 
they should consider not going to a doctor to determine if 
defendant’s contamination of the environment poisoned them. 
But a fear of medical malpractice should certainly not 
result in the position that plaintiffs should forgo 
necessary medical testing. 
While the majority states that 
it does not cite these viewpoints to endorse them, but 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
merely to note their existence, the majority’s citation at 
the very least indicates that it deems them relevant 
considerations. 
I, however, do not believe that the 
possibility of medical malpractice should be used to 
support the notion that plaintiffs are not deserving of an 
equitable remedy. 
Also, contrary to the majority, I do not believe that 
an equitable remedy should be refused merely because 
administering the remedy may be inconvenient or even 
difficult. 
“Rather, the true principle [of equitable 
relief] seems to be that the hardship of the plaintiff is 
balanced 
against 
the 
inconveniences 
and 
difficulties 
anticipated by the court, which principle is sometimes 
called the ‘balance of convenience.’” 
27A Am Jur 2d, 
Equity, § 101, p 587. 
Indeed, the desegregation of our 
nation’s schools was certainly not an easy task, yet the 
United States Supreme Court found that overseeing this 
process was an appropriate equitable remedy for the courts. 
Brown v Bd of Ed of Topeka, 349 US 294, 300; 75 S Ct 753; 
99 L Ed 1083 (1955) (“Traditionally, equity has been 
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its 
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling 
public and private needs.”). 
I certainly believe that a 
court in our state, just as courts have done in other 
18  
 
 
states, can determine a suitable way to administer a 
medical monitoring program. 
See, e.g., Cook v Rockwell 
Int’l Corp, 778 F Supp 512, 515 (D Colo, 1991) (Cook II); 
Burns v Jaquays Mining Corp, 156 Ariz 375, 380-381; 752 P2d 
28 (1987); 27A Am Jur 2d, Equity, § 103, p 588 (“[A] court 
of equity is clothed with the authority to designate a 
commission, master, receiver, or agent of the court to 
effectuate and supervise compliance with its decrees and 
orders.”). 
Finally, not content to merely present this case as 
one in which allowing plaintiffs to seek an equitable 
remedy would devastate the economy of Michigan, the 
majority also seeks to pit plaintiffs against “those 
devastated by cancer, birth defects, and other dioxin­
related diseases . . . .” Ante at 46. While the majority 
accuses the dissent of countless transgressions, I can 
think of no greater misdeed than to actually argue that 
allowing these plaintiffs to seek the equitable remedy of 
requiring this defendant to pay for the costs of necessary 
medical monitoring tests somehow would divert resources 
from children with birth defects. 
This is fabrication at 
its 
most 
unforgivable–refusing 
to 
acknowledge 
that 
providing these plaintiffs with the opportunity to merely 
seek an equitable remedy is well within the bounds of 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
judicial discretion and will not devastate the economy or 
cause sick children to die. 
IV. A FURTHER REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF 
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM INDICATES THAT EQUITABLE RELIEF IS PROPER 
At its core, this is not a complex case. 
Defendant 
contaminated the environment with dioxin. 
Because of 
defendant’s conduct, plaintiffs require medical monitoring 
to ensure that the negative effects of defendant’s acts can 
be best countered. 
Medical monitoring costs money. 
Plaintiffs, defendant, or the taxpayers of the state of 
Michigan must pay the costs. 
Because plaintiffs only 
require medical monitoring as a result of defendant’s 
conduct, it seems clear that it is reasonable that 
defendant pay the costs.6
 This is not meant to punish 
defendant; it merely seeks to hold defendant to the 
reasonable standard that a polluter pays for the costs of 
polluting. 
“The mere fact that a wrongdoer may suffer, 
6
 The theory behind a claim for medical
monitoring is simple. 
When a plaintiff is 
exposed to a hazardous substance, it is often
sound medical practice to seek periodic medical
monitoring to ascertain whether the plaintiff has
contracted a disease. 
Because this need for 
medical monitoring was caused by a defendant’s
tortious acts or omissions, a defendant may be
required to pay the cost of monitoring. [Cook I, 
supra at 1477.] 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
however, will not deter equity from granting relief to an 
injured party.” 27A Am Jur 2d, Equity, § 102, p 588. 
The majority’s decision that plaintiffs cannot seek 
equitable relief is indefensible when one realizes that its 
position leaves plaintiffs who cannot afford to pay for 
doctor-prescribed medical monitoring with no recourse. 
“Special tests are available to measure dioxin levels in 
body fat, blood, and breast milk, but these tests are very 
expensive and are not routinely available to the public.” 
Dioxins Fact Sheet, supra. “Indeed, in many cases a person 
will not be able to afford such tests, and refusing to 
allow medical monitoring damages would in effect deny him 
or her access to potentially life-saving treatment.” 
Hansen v Mountain Fuel Supply Co, 858 P2d 970, 976 (Utah, 
1993) (medical monitoring costs may be awarded even when 
the plaintiffs have not yet suffered from any asbestos­
related 
illnesses). 
As 
plaintiffs’ 
counsel 
stated, 
researchers 
conducting 
the 
pilot 
studies 
“have 
been 
besieged by people begging to have their blood tested and 
particularly begging to get their children tested because 
it’s very difficult to do that by yourself. . . . 
it’s 
really, really hard for individuals to get them done 
because it’s cost prohibitive and beyond that it’s just not 
available to them as individuals.” 
21  
 
 
 
 
Whatever its intent, the majority’s result protects a 
wrong-doing corporation at the expense of the health of the 
people wronged. 
But we cannot turn a blind eye to 
defendant’s 
repeated 
contamination 
of 
our 
state’s 
environment 
because 
holding 
defendant 
accountable 
may 
negatively affect its profits. If defendant cannot produce 
its product without behaving responsibly, then it has no 
business operating within our state. 
The lives of the 
people in the affected area are worth more than defendant’s 
financial well-being, even if it were indeed at stake. And 
contrary to the majority’s position, I am fully aware of 
the “real-world effects” of today’s decision, as plaintiffs 
most certainly will be as well. 
The “real-world effects” 
are that defendant, the party responsible for plaintiffs’ 
need for medical monitoring, will not bear any of the costs 
of its wrongdoing. 
Rather, the burden now falls on 
plaintiffs’ shoulders. 
The decision to turn our backs on plaintiffs because 
we have not yet faced a case so egregious violates the 
trust that the people of the state of Michigan have placed 
in us. 
“Our oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate 
error.” 
Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33, 38; 101 NW2d 
227 (1960). “Lack of precedent cannot absolve a common-law 
court from responsibility for adjudicating each claim that 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
comes before it on its own merits.” 
Berger v Weber, 411 
Mich 1, 12; 303 NW2d 424 (1981). “It is the distinguishing 
feature of equity jurisdiction that it will apply settled 
rules to unusual conditions and mold its decrees so as to 
do equity between the parties.” 30A CJS, Equity, Effect of 
Absence of Precedents, § 10, p 172.
 Where a claim is 
equitable in nature, exercising discretion may be necessary 
to ensure that an unconscionable decree is not entered. 
Kratze v Independent Order of Oddfellows, 442 Mich 136, 
142; 500 NW2d 115 (1993). 
And that discretion most 
certainly should be exercised in this case. 
While no one can say with certainty which plaintiffs 
will contract illnesses, suffer, and die because of their 
increased exposure to dioxin, this does not mean that 
plaintiffs 
cannot 
seek 
an 
equitable 
remedy. 
The 
unfortunate reality is that dioxin causes cancer, birth 
defects, and other illnesses. 
The prolonged exposure of 
plaintiffs to such high levels of dioxin puts them at a 
vastly 
increased 
risk. 
When 
a 
qualified 
health 
professional believes that it is in a patient’s best 
interest to administer medical testing that would not be 
required if it were not for defendant’s acts, this Court 
should not deny plaintiffs the ability to seek this modest 
remedy. 
23  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
V. THE “REMEDY” OFFERED BY THE NATURAL RESOURCES AND  
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE PLAINTIFFS’  
CAUSE OF ACTION 
The majority states that the Legislature has already 
provided plaintiffs with a remedy because the “Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 
324.101 et seq., empowers the MDEQ to deal with the 
environmental 
and 
health 
effects 
of 
toxic 
pollution 
. . . .” 
Ante at 38. 
While the MDEQ may take responsive 
action, it is not required to take action. 
Further, the 
fact that the MDEQ may choose to take responsive action to 
minimize injury to the public health does not absolve 
defendant of its responsibility to plaintiffs. 
While the 
majority repeatedly claims to be concerned about the effect 
on Michigan’s economy if plaintiffs are allowed to bring a 
claim against defendant, the majority’s approach shifts the 
costs resulting from defendant’s actions to Michigan 
taxpayers.7
 The majority distorts the fact that the MDEQ 
has the ability to take responsive action. 
Merely because 
7 A shift in financial responsibility conflicts with
the NREPA. 
MCL 324.20102(f) specifically provides, “That
liability for response activities to address environmental
contamination should be imposed upon those persons who are
responsible for the environmental contamination.” See also 
MCL 324.20102(e). 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the MDEQ has this ability does not mean that this is 
plaintiffs’ sole remedy. 
The NREPA clearly provides 
“[t]hat there is a need for additional administrative and 
judicial remedies to supplement existing statutory and 
common law remedies.” 
MCL 324.20102(d) (emphasis added). 
The MDEQ’s ability to act does not eliminate defendant’s 
responsibility to plaintiffs or eliminate the fact that 
plaintiffs can seek a court-supervised medical monitoring 
program funded by defendant. 
As a case in point, a small pilot study is being 
conducted by the state that includes a study of residential 
soil at approximately twenty-five properties within the 
Tittabawassee River flood plain and an investigation of 
dioxin levels in twenty-five adults who are currently 
living on the flood plain and have lived there for at least 
five 
years. 
This 
Pilot 
Exposure 
Investigation 
is 
inadequate to address the concerns of the individual 
plaintiffs. 
But plaintiffs do not, as the majority 
asserts, bring this claim merely because the MDEQ is not 
conducting the study on the scale that they prefer. 
Plaintiffs 
seek 
a 
court-supervised 
medical 
monitoring 
program 
based 
on 
tests 
ordered 
by 
qualified 
health 
professionals; 
plaintiffs’ 
individual 
preferences 
have 
nothing to do with the tests that will be ultimately 
25  
 
 
 
 
ordered. 
Medical monitoring tests would not be done to 
placate 
plaintiffs’ 
fears; 
they 
would 
be 
done 
when 
qualified health professionals using accepted scientific 
principles order medical testing. 
Finally, the concern of the MDEQ is public health, but 
what the MDEQ may deem appropriate to protect the public as 
a whole, even assuming sufficient funds were available in 
the budget, is not necessarily what may be in an individual 
plaintiff’s best medical interest. 
Further, the MDEQ does 
not purport that its study can be extrapolated to provide 
relevant information to other people in the affected areas. 
The MDEQ even states in its Pilot Investigation Fact Sheet 
that the results of an exposure investigation (EI) are 
“site-specific 
and 
applicable 
only 
to 
the 
community 
involved in EI; they are not generalizable to other 
individuals or populations.” 
The majority’s insistent and 
inexplicable refusal to hold defendant accountable for its 
acts allows defendant to escape responsibility for its 
actions and leaves plaintiffs with no adequate remedy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Today, the majority holds that defendant’s egregious 
long-term 
contamination 
of 
our 
environment 
and 
the 
resulting negative health effects to plaintiffs are just 
another accepted cost of doing business. 
But as long as 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
defendant is not held responsible for the decisions it 
makes, it behooves corporations like defendant to continue 
with business practices that harm our residents because the 
courts will shield them from liability by claiming that 
they are powerless to act. 
And it is the people of our 
state who will pay the costs—with their money and with 
their lives—of allowing defendant to contaminate our 
environment with no repercussions. 
Sadly, this Court has 
resorted to a cost-benefit analysis to determine and, 
consequently, degrade the value of human life, and this is 
an analysis that I cannot support. 
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists 
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first 
duties of government is to afford that protection.” 
Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 163; 2 L Ed 60 (1803). Today, 
our Court has shirked its duty to protect plaintiffs and 
the people of our state, thereby leaving defendant’s 
practices and interests unassailed. 
As such, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
27