Title: Malachi M. v. Quintina Q.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12674
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12674 
 
MALACHI M.  vs.  QUINTINA Q.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 9, 2019. - December 26, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Child custody, Modification of judgment.  
Minor, Custody.  Parent and Child, Custody.  Evidence, 
Child custody proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on February 12, 2014. 
 
 
A complaint for modification, filed on May 19, 2016, was 
heard by Randy J. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Traft for the mother. 
 
Robert E. Curtis, Jr., for the father. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Kia L. Freeman & Wyley S. Proctor for Women's Bar 
Association of Massachusetts & another. 
 
Richard M. Novitch, pro se. 
 
Sasha Drobnick, of the District of Columbia, Philip A. 
O’Connell, Jr., & Tony K. Lu for Domestic Violence Legal 
Empowerment and Appeals Project. 
                     
 
1 The parties' names are pseudonyms. 
2 
 
 
 
Kevin J. Powers, Elizabeth V. Brennan, Christine M. 
Bonardi, Roberta M. Driscoll, & Amy DiDonna for D.M. & others. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This is an appeal by the mother from a 
modification judgment that granted sole legal custody of the 
parties' child to the father.  In this case we must resolve the 
tension between the requirement in G. L. c. 208, § 31A, that 
"[i]n issuing any temporary or permanent custody order, the 
probate and family court shall consider evidence of past or 
present abuse toward a parent or child as a factor contrary to 
the best interest of the child" and the constraints of G. L. 
c. 208, § 28, limiting modifications to changed circumstances.  
The issues presented are whether (1) during a proceeding to 
modify a child custody decision the judge must consider evidence 
of domestic abuse that occurred prior to the entry of the 
divorce judgment; (2) during a proceeding to modify a child 
custody decision the judge must consider the applicability of 
the rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest 
of the child to be placed in the custody of an abusive parent, 
even in the absence of evidence of abuse occurring after the 
divorce judgment; and (3) there was a material and substantial 
change in circumstances to warrant the modification. 
We hold that pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 31A, the judge at 
a modification proceeding must consider evidence of both past 
and present abuse, including evidence of domestic abuse that 
3 
 
 
occurred prior to the entry of the divorce judgment, and must 
address the applicability of the rebuttable presumption, even in 
the absence of evidence of abuse occurring after the divorce 
judgment.  We further hold that in the present case, a 
substantial change in circumstances warranted modification of 
the custody order.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm.2 
 
Background.  1.  2015 judgment of divorce nisi.  The 
parties met in 2001 and married in 2003.  They have one child, 
who was born in 2006.  In 2014, the father filed for divorce.  
The parties entered into a partial agreement for judgment, in 
which they agreed to share legal custody of the child.  After a 
trial in which both parties were represented by counsel, the 
judgment of divorce nisi (divorce judgment), which incorporated 
the partial agreement for judgment, was entered in August 2015.3  
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the mother by the Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts and 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute; Richard M. Novitch; and the 
Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, as well 
as the amicus brief submitted in support of the father by D.M. 
and the six M. children. 
 
 
3 Even if the separation agreement provided for the child's 
physical and legal custody, the divorce judge still would have 
had to evaluate whether the agreement was in the best interests 
of the child.  See G. L. c. 208, § 31 (when approving separation 
agreement that provides for child custody, judge "may enter an 
order in accordance with such agreement, unless specific 
findings are made by the court indicating that such an order 
would not be in the best interests of the children"); C.P. 
Kindregan, Jr., M. McBrien, & P.A. Kindgregan, Family Law and 
Practice § 8:20 (4th ed. 2013) ("while the courts have given 
wide latitude to the parties to negotiate and enter into 
4 
 
 
The divorce judgment provided that the parties would share legal 
and physical custody of the child. 
 
As part of the divorce proceedings, the court appointed a 
guardian ad litem (divorce GAL), who conducted an investigation, 
submitted a report (divorce GAL report), and testified at the 
divorce trial.4  The divorce GAL interviewed the mother, the 
father, and the child, as well as other individuals connected to 
the parties.  The divorce GAL report stated, inter alia, that 
the mother alleged that the father hit her and slapped her on 
and off throughout their marriage, that the father turned 
physical three or four times per year, and that the father 
"rage[d]" if the mother tried to speak with him about the 
child's care.  In addition, the mother described to the divorce 
GAL what the divorce judge found to be "a particularly egregious 
occurrence of father assaulting mother in Florida in 2011" (2011 
incident).  The mother alleged that after she was two hours late 
returning home from a shopping trip, the father yelled and 
                     
separation agreements the courts retain the power to provide 
otherwise when the best interests of the children require[] 
it"). 
 
 
4 On appeal, the mother asserts that there was no testimony 
about domestic abuse at the divorce trial and that the statement 
regarding domestic abuse in the divorce judgment derived from 
statements the parties made to the divorce GAL.  The transcript 
from the divorce trial is not part of the appellate record, but 
the father does not dispute this assertion.  The divorce GAL 
report is a part of our record. 
5 
 
 
screamed at her, pushed her into a wall, knocked the door down 
after she locked herself in the bedroom, told her "I will teach 
you a lesson," and stabbed the chair she had just purchased.5  
The mother told the divorce GAL that the child was present in 
the home during this incident.  The divorce GAL report addressed 
the father's description of this incident, with the father 
recalling that he pushed the mother to the floor; that, after 
the mother locked herself in a room, he then pushed the door off 
the hinge; and that the fight ended when he pushed the mother up 
against a wall.  The divorce GAL report stated that the father 
said that he and the mother had had five or six fights that 
became physical and that the mother had hit and slapped him.6  
The divorce GAL report also noted the father's statement that 
after the 2011 incident he "immediately looked for an anger 
management class and booked himself in" and that he had not been 
physical toward the mother since that time, which the mother 
confirmed. 
 
The divorce judgment includes two sentences about domestic 
violence:  "The Court finds that the parties have both engaged 
in physical assaults upon the other during the early part of the 
                     
 
5 The father disputed both that he had a knife and that he 
damaged the chair. 
 
 
6 The mother asserted to the divorce GAL that she never hit, 
slapped, or threatened to hit the father. 
6 
 
 
marriage which culminated in a particularly egregious occurrence 
of father assaulting mother in Florida in 2011.  Following that 
incident, father engaged in anger management counseling at his 
own initiative and there have been no further incidents."  
Neither party appealed from the divorce judgment.7 
 
2.  Postdivorce events.  Certain incidents occurred after 
the divorce judgment, leading the father to seek modification of 
the divorce judgment in May 2016.  In the time between the 
divorce judgment and the modification trial, the father learned 
that the mother had brought the child to the child's 
pediatrician to be tested for a sexually transmitted disease 
(STD),8 that the mother told the child's therapist that the child 
showed signs of regression corresponding to visits with the 
father, and that the mother brought the child to her 
pediatrician for a bruise on the child's face and alleged that 
the bruise could have been from the father squeezing the child's 
face. 
 
In early February 2016, the child was staying with the 
father when she lost a baby tooth.  The mother requested that 
the father give the mother the tooth, but by the time she made 
                     
 
7 The docket indicates that the mother filed a notice of 
appeal, but that she took no further action and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
 
8 The STD testing occurred in March 2015, but the father did 
not learn about it until June 2016. 
7 
 
 
the request the father was traveling and could not provide the 
mother with the tooth.  The mother contacted the police to seek 
assistance with obtaining the tooth from the father's home, but 
the police declined to become involved. 
 
A few days after the tooth incident, the mother reported an 
alleged 2013 incident of abuse to the police (2013 incident).  
The resulting police report stated that an argument between the 
father and the mother led the father to grab the mother's arm, 
"squeezing extremely hard," and to the father throwing the 
mother's car keys at her head; however, the mother ducked and 
the keys landed on the child's leg, causing her to bleed.9  As a 
result of the mother's report, an application for a criminal 
complaint issued against the father, but the application was 
denied for lack of probable cause. 
 
Five days after the denial of the application for a 
criminal complaint, the mother sought a G. L. c. 209A abuse 
prevention order against the father.  A judge granted an ex 
parte abuse prevention order, which, in part, prohibited contact 
between the child and the father for fifteen days, but after a 
full hearing at which both parties were present, the order was 
not extended. 
                     
 
9 The mother recorded the incident in a notebook the same 
evening. 
8 
 
 
 
In February 2016, after receiving a report pursuant to 
G. L. c. 119, § 51A, from a mandated reporter (51A report), the 
Department of Children and Families (department) began a 
screening process concerning the father.  However, the 
department screened the 51A report out, thereby declining to 
become involved. 
 
3.  2016 complaint for modification.  In May 2016, the 
father filed a complaint for modification of the divorce 
judgment, alleging multiple material changes in circumstances, 
including that he "has serious concerns regarding Mother's 
intentional alienation efforts to keep him from exercising his 
parenting time."  The mother filed an answer and counterclaim, 
alleging, in part, that during the abuse prevention order 
hearing, the father admitted to multiple "newly revealed" 
incidents of domestic violence.  The modification judge (judge) 
appointed a guardian ad litem (modification GAL) and ruled that 
the modification GAL report would be an uncontested exhibit at 
trial.10  During the modification proceeding, the judge reviewed 
documentary evidence from the divorce trial and heard testimony 
from the parties. 
 
a.  Documentary evidence.  The modification GAL discussed 
the 2013 incident in his report, writing that the child "did 
                     
 
10 The judge who presided over the modification trial was 
not the same judge who had presided over the divorce trial. 
9 
 
 
state that she had been struck in the leg by car keys during an 
incident in 2013, when her parents had been arguing and her 
father had thrown the keys."  Other exhibits the judge admitted 
during the modification trial included the police report for the 
2013 incident, the mother's journal narrative of the 2013 
incident, and the divorce GAL report.  The judge also reviewed 
the allegations the mother presented in support of the abuse 
prevention order. 
 
b.  Scope of the testimony.  After a pretrial conference, 
the judge issued an order that, at the modification trial, 
"[t]he scope of the testimony shall be from August 15, 2015 
until the present."  The judge subsequently denied the mother's 
motion in limine seeking modification of the order.11  During the 
pretrial hearings, the judge did not waver from her trial order, 
but she did state that she would take questions about evidence 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 
During the one-day modification trial, the judge allowed 
limited testimony regarding events that occurred before the 
divorce judgment.  The judge stated multiple times that she 
would not consider predivorce incidents during the trial, 
including those concerning alleged abuse, stating at one point, 
                     
 
11 The mother argued that limited discussion of incidents 
that predated the divorce was "necessary to give context to the 
parties' conduct after the divorce judgment." 
10 
 
 
"Counsel, I have to be honest.  Even if you convince me these 
things have happened, . . . there was a trial and there was a 
judgment on this issue.  So even if you convince me there's 
something there, there's no change in circumstance."  The judge 
did not allow testimony that provided more than cursory 
reference to predivorce events.  For instance, during the 
modification GAL's testimony, the judge allowed him to confirm 
that he spoke with individuals about predivorce events, but did 
not allow him to expand upon the details of those conversations 
or events.12 
 
c.  The modification judgment.  The modification judgment 
details the mother's allegations concerning abuse and its impact 
on the child, the credibility of the mother's allegations, and 
                     
 
12 The mother's counsel:  "Did you speak to [the child] 
about an incident in 2013?" 
 
 
The father's counsel:  "Objection." 
 
 
The judge:  "No, she can --" 
 
 
The mother's counsel:  "It was in the Liberty Tree Mall." 
 
 
The modification GAL:  "Yes." 
 
 
The mother's counsel:  "Okay.  And what did [the child] 
indicate to you happened on that day?" 
 
 
The father's counsel:  "Objection." 
 
 
The judge:  "Sustained.  He may have spoken to her, but I'm 
not going to let it into evidence. . . .  I think what's going 
to be relevant is how much he relied upon that." 
11 
 
 
the parties' parental abilities.  The modification judgment 
states that in the divorce proceeding, "in support of the 
Judgment of Divorce, the Court found that both parties had 
engaged in physical assaults on the other parent during the 
early years of the marriage which culminated in an assault by 
Father against Mother in Florida in 2011" and after "that 
incident Father voluntarily engaged in anger management 
counseling and that there were no further incidents between the 
parties."  The judge also found that in the modification 
proceedings, "Mother has raised allegations about Father's 
abusive behavior towards her, and the child, which she claims 
occurred prior to the Trial on the Judgment of Divorce.  Mother 
alleges that she continues to be afraid of Father, due to the 
past abuse, which impacts her ability to co-parent with him." 
 
Regarding the mother's specific allegations of abuse, the 
judge found that the mother alleged that the father physically 
abused the child, resulting in a bruise on the child's face; 
"had been inappropriate with the child to get back at [the 
mother] and [she] believed that he was capable of sexually 
abusing the child"; and threw the mother's car keys at the 
mother, striking the child in the 2013 incident.  The judge also 
found that the mother alleged that the child showed signs of 
regression after visiting with the father.  As discussed in more 
detail infra, the judge addressed each of the mother's 
12 
 
 
allegations that the father abused the child and found that the 
professionals (the department, the police, the child's 
pediatrician and therapist, and the modification GAL) 
responsible for responding to the respective allegations did not 
substantiate them. 
 
The judge further found that the application for a criminal 
complaint, stemming from the mother's 2016 report of the 2013 
incident, was denied for lack of probable cause.  She also found 
that the mother obtained the ex parte abuse prevention order 
five days after the application was denied, the ex parte order 
was not extended, and the mother's statement that she did not 
intend the abuse prevention order to prohibit contact between 
the father and the child was not credible. 
 
Moreover, the judge found that despite the mother's 
allegations against the father, "at [the modification] trial, 
Mother testified that she trusts Father to care for the child 
and he does not neglect her."  She further found that the child 
told the modification GAL that "she liked spending time with 
both parents and was not afraid of either of them" and "she 
enjoys her time with Father." 
 
The modification judgment granted the father sole legal 
custody and left the divorce judgment's shared custody provision 
13 
 
 
in place.13  The judge awarded the father legal fees and found 
the mother guilty of civil contempt for "unilaterally 
authoriz[ing]" the child to undergo STD testing without telling 
the father, and thereafter refusing to provide the father with 
information about the testing.14  The mother timely appealed, and 
we granted her motion for direct appellate review.15 
 
Discussion.  1.  Temporal limits on domestic abuse 
evidence.  We first address whether, during a proceeding to 
modify a child custody decision, the statute requires that the 
judge must consider evidence of domestic abuse that occurred 
prior to the entry of the divorce judgment.  The mother argues 
that the judge erred "by failing to consider evidence of events 
                     
 
13 Although phrased as "sole legal custody," the mother 
retained the right to obtain copies of the child's dental, 
medical, and therapeutic records; enroll the child in 
extracurricular activities; and maintain the child's primary 
address for educational purposes. 
 
 
14 The judge did not find the father in contempt.  The 
modification judgment noted that the court had found the mother 
in contempt on two occasions since the divorce, both relating to 
the mother not complying with provisions in the divorce judgment 
regarding communicating with the father about the child's care. 
 
 
15 Prior to oral argument before this court, the father 
moved for this court to "take judicial notice of two trial-court 
orders entered after the docketing of this appeal, as well as 
the updated trial court docket entries through [September 5, 
2019]."  See Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530 (2002).  A 
third trial court judge allowed the mother's motion to present 
evidence of domestic abuse allegations that occurred prior to 
the parties' divorce and appointed a third guardian ad litem to 
interview the child about domestic violence allegations that 
predate the divorce. 
14 
 
 
of domestic violence which had occurred before the entry of the 
divorce judgment" because the paramount concern is "what is now 
and will in the future be in the best interest of the children."  
The father counters that "the law neither requires nor permits 
courts to retry domestic violence issues that were subsumed in 
the underlying original custody judgment."  He further 
emphasizes that res judicata applies to a child custody 
judgment, unless "material and substantial changes in 
circumstances have occurred."  We hold that in a proceeding to 
modify a child custody decision, the judge must consider 
evidence of domestic abuse that occurred before the entry of the 
divorce judgment.  We further hold that the judge in the present 
case did consider evidence of abuse that predated the entry of 
the divorce judgment. 
15 
 
 
We begin with the language of the statute.16  General Laws 
c. 208, § 31A,17 provides in relevant part:  "In issuing any 
temporary or permanent custody order, the probate and family 
court shall consider evidence of past or present abuse toward a 
parent or child as a factor contrary to the best interest of the 
child."18  The Legislature's use of "shall" evinces an intent 
that the judge does not have discretion regarding whether to 
consider evidence of "past or present abuse" -- the judge must 
                     
 
16 "We interpret a statute according to the intent of the 
Legislature, which we ascertain from all its words, 'construed 
by the ordinary and approved usage of the language' and 
'considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished.'"  Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 
Mass. 529, 532 (2019), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006).  See generally G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  "[W]here the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to legislative intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 
Mass. 436, 444 (2008). 
 
 
17 In 1998, Governor Paul Cellucci signed into law "An Act 
relative to the consideration of domestic violence in custody 
and visitation proceedings," amending G. L. cc. 208, 209, 209A, 
and 209C.  See St. 1998, c. 179, § 3.  See generally Quirion, 
Increased Protection for Children from Violent Homes:  The 
Presumption against Awarding Child Custody to a Batterer, 16 
Mass. Fam. L.J. 67 (1998) (providing overview of legislative 
history).  The legislation was "aimed at providing increased 
protection to children exposed to domestic violence and 
[required] a more careful analysis of claims of abuse whenever 
custody or visitation are contested."  Id. at 67. 
 
 
18 The statute defines "abuse" as "the occurrence of one or 
more of the following acts between a parent and the other parent 
or between a parent and child:  (a) attempting to cause or 
causing bodily injury; or (b) placing another in reasonable fear 
of imminent bodily injury." 
16 
 
 
do so.  See Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983) ("The 
word 'shall' is ordinarily interpreted as having a mandatory or 
imperative obligation").  The Legislature's use of "past or 
present abuse" requires a consideration of evidence of abuse 
that occurred at any point during the parties' relationship, 
including before the divorce judgment.  See Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1652 (1993) (defining "past" as 
"belonging to a former time:  having existed or taken place in a 
period before the present").  Moreover, nothing in the language 
of § 31A limits its application to the initial custody order 
made at the time of divorce; it remains applicable at 
modification proceedings.  See G. L. c. 208, § 31A ("any 
temporary or permanent custody order"); Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 97 (defining "any" as "one, some, or 
all indiscriminately of whatever quantity"). 
 
Section 31A's mandate that the judge "consider evidence of 
past or present abuse . . . as a factor contrary to the best 
interest of the child" contrasts with the context of a 
modification proceeding, the evidentiary focus of which is on 
changed circumstances since the entry of the prior custody 
order.  See G. L. c. 208, § 28 (court may modify earlier child 
custody judgment if "a material and substantial change in the 
circumstances of the parties has occurred and the judgment of 
modification is necessary in the best interests of the 
17 
 
 
children"); Taverna v. Pizzi, 430 Mass. 882, 884 (2000); Loebel 
v. Loebel, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 750 (2010) (changed 
circumstances are circumstances that occur subsequent to divorce 
judgment). 
 
However, because the central focus of any child custody 
proceeding is the best interest of the child, evidence of past 
or present abuse, expressly labeled in § 31A as "a factor 
contrary to the best interest of the child," must be taken into 
account by the judge.  See G. L. c. 208, § 28 (court may modify 
earlier judgment if "modification is necessary in the best 
interests of the children"); Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 
231 n.21 (1998), cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 
U.S. 1034 (1999), quoting Ardizoni v. Raymond, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 
734, 738 (1996) ("decision concerning a child's best interests 
is within the discretion of the judge, allowing the judge 'to 
consider the widest range of permissible evidence'"); Supreme 
Judicial Court, Gender Bias Study of the Court System in 
Massachusetts 4 (1989) (Gender Bias Study) ("The Legislature 
and/or appellate courts should make it clear that abuse of any 
family member affects other family members and must be 
considered in determining the best interests of the child in 
connection with any order concerning custody").  Cf. Tammaro v. 
O'Brien, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 259 n.8 (2010), citing Hinds v. 
Hinds, 329 Mass. 190, 191-192 (1952) ("Even in modification 
18 
 
 
actions, a judge is not necessarily precluded from considering 
matters prior to the earlier judgment").  Put another way, 
regardless of whether it is an initial divorce proceeding or a 
modification proceeding, the plain language of § 31A requires a 
Probate and Family Court judge to have a complete view of abuse 
when determining whether a custody decision is in the child's 
best interest.  See Custody of Kali, 439 Mass. 834, 845 (2003), 
quoting Rosenberg v. Merida, 428 Mass. 182, 191 (1998) ("we will 
not sustain an award of custody 'unless all relevant factors in 
determining the best interests of the child have been 
weighed'"); K.A. v. T.R., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 554, 559 (2014) 
("The best interests of a child is the overarching principle 
that governs custody disputes in the Commonwealth" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
In order for the judge to evaluate evidence of past abuse, 
the parties must be able to present such evidence at a 
modification proceeding, despite such a proceeding's focus on 
postdivorce occurrences.  Prohibiting the parties from 
presenting evidence of past abuse, whether raised or not during 
an initial divorce proceeding, may preclude the modification 
judge from effectuating the legislative intent and from creating 
a custody order in the best interest of the child.  See Custody 
of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 599 (1996) ("The very frequency of 
domestic violence in disputes about child custody may have the 
19 
 
 
effect of inuring courts to it and thus minimizing its 
significance"); Hersey v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 555 (1930) 
("The governing principle by which the court must be guided in 
deciding [issues relating to child custody] is the welfare of 
the child.  That is so both as matter of law and as matter of 
humanity").  In addition, even if a divorce judgment addressed 
all of the allegations of domestic abuse occurring before a 
divorce, the modification judge must still consider the 
allegations; it is not enough for the modification judge to 
state that the allegations were addressed at the prior 
proceedings. 
Although a modification judge must consider all allegations 
of domestic abuse, including alleged domestic abuse that 
preceded a divorce, the judge retains discretion regarding the 
nature and scope of the evidence to be admitted on these issues.  
See G. L. c. 208, § 31A ("Nothing in this section shall be 
construed . . . to affect the discretion of the probate and 
family court in the conduct of [a hearing under the rules of 
domestic relations procedure]").  In the present case, the judge 
did not err in limiting the hearing portion of the modification 
proceeding to testimony regarding postdivorce events, and 
allowing other evidence, including evidence of predivorce abuse, 
to be admitted through exhibits because, as explained infra, she 
20 
 
 
considered the evidence of pre- and postdivorce abuse and 
factored the evidence into her decision. 
Review of the record and the modification judgment shows 
that the judge allowed evidence of past abuse as part of the 
modification proceeding and that she incorporated information 
contained in the parties' exhibits into the modification 
judgment.  The judge stated at the start of the modification 
trial that she reviews the exhibit books in detail and "look[s] 
at uncontested exhibits as they're in for everything."  The 
judge reviewed the mother's claim of domestic abuse in the 2013 
incident, admitting the attendant police report and the mother's 
journal narrative as exhibits.  In addition, the modification 
GAL addressed the 2013 incident in his report, which was an 
uncontested exhibit.  The judge also admitted the divorce GAL 
report as an exhibit, and she referenced in her findings the 
mother's allegations presented at the ex parte abuse prevention 
order hearing and the divorce judgment's description of domestic 
abuse. 
 
Moreover, the judge reviewed the mother's postdivorce 
allegations.  The judge's findings covered the department 
screening out the 51A report, the mother obtaining the ex parte 
abuse prevention order five days after the application for a 
criminal complaint had been denied for lack of probable cause, 
the mother raising concerns to the child's pediatrician about 
21 
 
 
the father physically and sexually abusing the child, and the 
mother expressing concerns to the child's therapist that the 
child was regressing after visits with the father. 
 
In conclusion, although the judge limited the testimony 
during the modification trial to the time period after the 
divorce judgment, she allowed the parties to submit evidence of 
past abuse through the trial exhibits, which she stated she 
would review in detail.  The judge also considered the mother's 
postdivorce allegations of abuse, which the judge admitted 
through testimony and documentary evidence.  Our review of the 
modification judgment shows that the judge did review the 
exhibits and that her findings incorporated the contents of the 
exhibits, her credibility determinations, and her consideration 
of the impact on the child of each of the mother's allegations.  
Therefore, it is apparent that the judge considered evidence of 
past and present domestic abuse as a factor contrary to the best 
interest of the child, in accordance with G. L. c. 208, § 31A.19 
                     
 
19 We note that the language of G. L. c. 208, § 31A, 
requires a judge to consider the evidence of past abuse but does 
not mandate the manner in which the judge considers the 
evidence, nor does it distinguish between previously reported or 
unreported abuse.  We emphasize that our holding does not 
restrict a party from presenting evidence of past abuse that was 
not previously reported.  There are various reasons a person 
suffering from abuse may not make a contemporaneous report of 
such abuse, and particularly where the best interests of a child 
are at issue, such evidence may be an important factor.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 333 n.13 (2015).  
See also Family Law and Practice, supra at §§ 76:1, 76:2 
22 
 
 
We are cognizant of the oftentimes overwhelming burden 
faced by Probate and Family Court judges.  Our holding does not 
expand the ability of parties to file a complaint for 
modification.  Instead, we clarify the scope of the Probate and 
Family Court's treatment of allegations of domestic abuse when a 
complaint for modification is properly before the court.  A 
complaint for modification must still be based on changed 
circumstances.  See G. L. c. 208, § 28. 
 
2.  Rebuttable presumption.  We next address the 
accompanying issue of whether a judge at a modification 
proceeding must consider the applicability of the rebuttable 
presumption that it is not in the best interest of a child to be 
placed in the custody of an abusive parent, G. L. c. 208, § 31A, 
even in the absence of evidence of abuse occurring after the 
divorce judgment.  The mother contends that the modification 
judge erred by failing to apply the rebuttable presumption.  The 
father argues that because allegations of domestic violence were 
addressed during the divorce proceedings, for the rebuttable 
presumption to apply to the father on the complaint for 
modification, "it would have to be a new rebuttable presumption 
derived from new domestic violence allegations."  We hold that a 
judge at a modification proceeding must address the 
                     
(detailing history of legal protections for victims of domestic 
abuse and describing battered woman syndrome). 
23 
 
 
applicability of the rebuttable presumption, even in the absence 
of evidence of abuse occurring after the divorce judgment.  As 
explained infra, the judge here properly considered application 
of the rebuttable presumption. 
We begin again with the language of the statute.  See note 
17, supra.  General Laws c. 208, § 31A, provides in relevant 
part: 
"A probate and family court's finding, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that a pattern or serious incident of 
abuse has occurred shall create a rebuttable presumption 
that it is not in the best interests of the child to be 
placed in sole custody, shared legal custody or shared 
physical custody with the abusive parent.  Such presumption 
may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that 
such custody award is in the best interests of the child."20 
 
See Opinion of the Justices, 427 Mass. 1201, 1206-1207 (1998) 
("Because a child's interest in being free from the effects of 
domestic violence is extremely significant, proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence appears to be a sufficient 
standard to allow the rebuttable presumption to attach in 
custody disputes between parents"). 
                     
 
20 The statute defines "serious incident of abuse" as "the 
occurrence of one or more of the following acts between a parent 
and the other parent or between a parent and child:  (a) 
attempting to cause or causing serious bodily injury; (b) 
placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury; or (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual 
relations by force, threat or duress."  G. L. c. 208, § 31A. 
 
24 
 
 
 
Nothing in § 31A's language limits application of the 
rebuttable presumption to the initial divorce proceeding.  See 
G. L. c. 208, § 31A ("If the court finds that a pattern or 
serious incident of abuse has occurred . . .").  Against the 
backdrop of § 31A's mandate that the judge consider past or 
present abuse as a factor contrary to the best interest of the 
child, the negative impacts to a child from such abuse, and the 
overarching emphasis on the best interest of the child during 
child custody proceedings, a broad application of the rebuttable 
presumption is warranted.21  See G. L. c. 208, § 31A; Opinion of 
the Justices, 427 Mass. at 1206, quoting Custody of Vaughn, 422 
Mass. at 595 ("To allow a child to experience or witness 
domestic violence 'is a violation of the most basic human right, 
the most basic condition of civilized society:  the right to 
live in physical security, free from the fear that brute force 
will determine the conditions of one's daily life'"); Gender 
Bias Study, supra at 3 ("Our research indicates that witnessing, 
as well as personally experiencing, abuse within the family 
causes serious harm to children").  Therefore, the rebuttable 
presumption remains applicable at a modification proceeding. 
                     
 
21 Although a judge must consider evidence of past abuse, 
the age of the abuse bears on whether the presumption has been 
rebutted.  Age of the abuse, however, is just one factor for the 
judge to consider, and an absence of abuse after a divorce does 
not necessarily rebut the presumption. 
25 
 
 
If a judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence "that a 
pattern or serious incident of abuse has occurred and issues a 
temporary or permanent custody order," the judge must then 
"enter written findings of fact as to the effects of the abuse 
on the child, which findings demonstrate that such order is in 
the furtherance of the child's best interests and provides for 
the safety and well-being of the child."  G. L. c. 208, § 31A.  
See Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. at 599 ("Domestic violence is 
an issue too fundamental and frequently recurring to be dealt 
with only by implication"); Maalouf v. Saliba, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 
547, 549 (2002) (G. L. c. 208, § 31A, codified requirements in 
Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. at 599-600). 
 
The judge here expressly found that abuse occurred during 
the parties' marriage and discussed in detail the mother's 
allegations regarding abuse and its impact on the child, the 
credibility of the mother's allegations, and the parental 
ability of the mother and the father.  Although the judge did 
not expressly use the term "rebuttable presumption," her 
rationale demonstrates that, assuming she found the 2011 
incident to be a "serious incident of abuse," she determined the 
father to have rebutted the presumption, and that she entered 
written findings in accordance with § 31A. 
 
Notably, the judge found that the child told the 
modification GAL that "she liked spending time with both parents 
26 
 
 
and was not afraid of either of them" and that "she enjoys her 
time with Father." 
In addition, the judge credited the mother's testimony 
"that she trusts Father to care for the child and he does not 
neglect her."  The judge also addressed the 2013 incident.  The 
judge recounted the mother's allegation that the father threw 
the car keys at her but that the keys struck the child, and she 
recounted the father's denial of throwing the keys.  The judge 
further noted, however, that after a hearing for an application 
for a criminal complaint relating to the 2013 incident, during 
which the mother testified, the application was denied because 
no probable cause was found.  Furthermore, the judge noted that 
the mother reported to the police the "alleged abuse that she 
suffered by Father in 2013," in 2016, only after the father did 
not immediately return one of the child's baby teeth that had 
fallen out while the child was with the father. 
 
Moreover, the judge reviewed the mother's postdivorce 
allegations, noting that the respective professionals involved 
with the various allegations had found no basis to substantiate 
the mother's claims.  In this regard, the judge found that the 
department had closed its 51A report screening process for lack 
of protective concerns; that the mother had obtained the ex 
parte abuse prevention order five days "after [she] was 
unsuccessful in pressing criminal charges against Father, 
27 
 
 
accusing him of potentially sexually and physically abusing the 
child, and of physically abusing the child"; that the judge had 
not extended the ex parte abuse prevention order; and that the 
mother was not credible when she testified that she did not 
intend the abuse prevention order to prohibit contact between 
the father and the child.  In addition, the judge addressed the 
mother's claims of abuse regarding the child, finding that when 
the mother brought the child to the doctor for STD testing and 
for a bruise on her face, on both occasions the mother raised 
concerns about the father, but the doctor found no basis to 
substantiate the mother's allegations.  Moreover, the judge 
found that the mother "had completely overreacted to her 
perception of the child's behavior" when she informed the 
modification GAL that the child regressed after spending time 
with the father.  Therefore, assuming the judge determined the 
2011 incident to be a "serious incident of abuse," and applied 
the rebuttable presumption, the record and modification judgment 
reflect that the judge found that the father rebutted the 
presumption. 
 
Although we hold that the judge in the present case 
properly considered application of the rebuttable presumption, 
moving forward, when parties present evidence of abuse, judges 
should explicitly state on the record that they have considered 
whether the parties have met the preponderance standard for the 
28 
 
 
presumption to apply and, if so, whether the abusive parent has 
rebutted the presumption. 
 
3.  Substantial change in circumstances.  The final issue 
is whether a substantial change in circumstances warranted 
modification of the custody order.  The mother argues that the 
modification judge erred by finding a substantial change of 
circumstances because the past abuse provided context for the 
mother's actions since the divorce.  The father argues that 
modification was warranted "because mother's inappropriate and 
recently-escalating campaign of unsubstantiated abuse 
allegations against father was detrimental to the child's best 
interests."  We hold that the judge was warranted in modifying 
the custody order. 
 
"In custody matters, the touchstone inquiry [is] . . . what 
is 'best for the child,'" and "[t]he determination of which 
parent will promote a child's best interests rests within the 
discretion of the judge . . . [whose] findings . . . 'must stand 
unless they are plainly wrong.'"  Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass. 488, 
494 (2012), quoting Custody of Kali, 439 Mass. at 840, 845; 
Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177, 186 (2006).  "The judge is 
afforded considerable freedom to identify pertinent factors in 
assessing the welfare of the child and weigh them as she sees 
fit."  Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 540, 547 (2010).  Such 
factors may include "whether one parent seeks to undermine the 
29 
 
 
relationship a child has with the other parent," Hunter, supra 
at 494, as well as "past or present abuse toward a parent or 
child," G. L. c. 208, § 31A.  When determining whether an 
initial custody order should be modified, the court inquires 
whether "a material and substantial change in the circumstances 
of the parties has occurred and the judgment of modification is 
necessary in the best interests of the child[]."  G. L. c. 208, 
§ 28. 
 
In the present case, the judge's decision was informed by 
substantial findings, a thorough review of the record, and her 
assessment of the witnesses' credibility.  After detailing the 
mother's allegations against the father, the judge found that 
the mother "is still attempting to punish Father and has not 
been able to separate their prior relationship [from] that of 
his relationship with the child" and that "this could 
potentially be extremely detrimental to the child."  Because of 
her findings regarding the mother's behavior, the judge 
determined that "it is in the child's best interest that Father 
shall have sole legal custody of the child."  In addition, the 
judge had the mother's allegations of abuse before her, and 
addressed them in her findings.  As such, the judge was able to 
look to the allegations for context for the mother's behavior, 
but the judge still determined that it was in the best interest 
of the child to award legal custody to the father.  At the 
30 
 
 
modification trial, the judge heard testimony from the mother 
and the father, as well as multiple professionals involved with 
the parties and the child.  The judge was in the best position 
to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and to the extent 
credibility determinations played a role in her decision, we see 
nothing to disturb them.  See Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 
799 (1993) ("judge's assessment of the . . . credibility of the 
witnesses is entitled to deference"). 
 
Moreover, by allowing the mother to retain some aspects of 
legal custody, see note 14, supra, the judge crafted the 
modification of the custody order to address the mother's 
actions.  For instance, the judge found that the mother "has 
attempted to use the child's providers to bolster her case 
against Father," and therefore gave the father the 
responsibility of scheduling all of the child's medical, dental, 
and therapeutic appointments. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judge's conclusion that the 
mother's actions warranted modification of the custody order is 
not plainly wrong or clearly erroneous.  See Hunter, 463 Mass. 
at 494; Mason, 447 Mass. at 186.  We affirm the modification 
judgment in full and decline to vacate the award of attorney's 
fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.