Title: DAVID ROMAIN V FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 135546
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 2009

FILED MARCH 31, 2009 
 
DAVID ROMAIN and JOANN ROMAIN, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
v 
No. 135546 
 
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
and IAQ MANAGEMENT, INC., 
 
 
Defendants, 
and 
 
INSURANCE SERVICES CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
The Wayne Circuit Court summarily dismissed IAQ Management, Inc. 
(IAQ), from this action because IAQ did not owe plaintiffs a duty under the 
contract involved or under general negligence principles.  Thereafter, defendant, 
Insurance Services Construction Corporation, filed a notice under MCR 2.112(K) 
naming IAQ as a nonparty at fault.  Because IAQ did not owe plaintiffs a duty, 
IAQ’s conduct could not have been “a proximate cause of damage sustained by a 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
 
2 
 
party.”1  Therefore, the circuit court properly granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike 
the notice of IAQ as a nonparty at fault2 because a nonparty at fault must be a 
proximate cause of the damage sustained by the injured party.  We affirm the 
circuit court’s ruling.  
 
We write briefly to eliminate a conflict between two published Court of 
Appeals opinions.  Specifically, we overrule the statement in Kopp v Zigich3 that 
“a plain reading of the comparative fault statutes does not require proof of a duty 
before fault can be apportioned and liability allocated.”  That is an incorrect 
statement of Michigan law.  In Jones v Enertel, Inc,4 the Court of Appeals held 
that “a duty must first be proved before the issue of fault or proximate cause can 
be considered.”  Under the “first out” rule of MCR 7.215(J)(1), the Kopp panel 
should have followed Jones or declared a conflict under MCR 7.215(J)(2).  
Because the Kopp panel did not declare a conflict, Jones is the controlling 
precedent and proof of a duty is required “before fault can be apportioned and 
liability allocated” under the comparative fault statutes, MCL 600.29575 and MCL 
                                                 
1 MCL 600.6304(8). 
2 MCR 2.112(K). 
3 Kopp v Zigich, 268 Mich App 258, 260; 707 NW2d 601 (2005). 
4 Jones v Enertel, Inc, 254 Mich App 432, 437; 656 NW2d 870 (2002). 
5 MCL 600.2957(1) provides: 
In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking 
damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, 
3 
 
600.6304.6   
 
In addition to being the controlling precedent under the court rules, Jones 
correctly stated Michigan negligence law; Kopp did not.  As noted by this Court in 
Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp: 7 
 
“In a common law negligence action, before a plaintiff’s fault 
can be compared with that of the defendant, it obviously must first 
be determined that the defendant was negligent.  It is fundamental 
tort law that before a defendant can be found to have been negligent, 
it must first be determined that the defendant owed a legal duty to 
the plaintiff.” 
The same calculus applies to negligent actors under the comparative fault statutes.  
A common-law negligence claim requires proof of (1) duty; (2) breach of that 
duty; (3) causation, both cause in fact and proximate causation; and (4) damages.8  
Therefore, under Michigan law, a legal duty is a threshold requirement before 
there can be any consideration of whether a person was negligent by breaching 
                                                                                                                                                 
the liability of each person shall be allocated under this section by 
the trier of fact and, subject to [MCL 600.6304], in direct proportion 
to the person’s percentage of fault.  In assessing percentages of fault 
under this subsection, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of each 
person, regardless of whether the person is, or could have been, 
named as a party to the action. 
6 MCL 600.6304(1) requires the fact-finder to make findings indicating the 
total amount of damages and each person’s total percentage of fault.  MCL 
600.6304(8) defines “fault” to include “an act, an omission, conduct, including 
intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or any 
conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate 
cause of damage sustained by a party.”  (Emphasis added.) 
7 Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 99; 485 NW2d 676 
(1992), quoting Ward v K mart Corp, 136 Ill 2d 132, 145; 554 NE2d 223 (1990). 
8 Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 449; 506 NW2d 175 
(1993). 
4 
 
that duty and causing injury to another.  Thus, when the Legislature refers to the 
common-law term “proximate cause” in the comparative fault statutes, it is clear 
that for claims based on negligence “‘it must first be determined that the [person] 
owed a legal duty to the plaintiff.’”9  Additionally, MCL 600.6304(8) includes in 
the definition of fault “a breach of a legal duty . . . that is a proximate cause of 
damage sustained by a party.”  Before there can be “a breach of a legal duty,” 
there must be a legal duty.  Without owing a duty to the injured party, the 
“negligent” actor could not have proximately caused the injury and could not be at 
“fault” for purposes of the comparative fault statutes. 
 
 
Affirmed. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
                                                 
9 Riddle, supra at 99 (citation omitted). 
 
1
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DAVID ROMAIN and JOANN ROMAIN, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
v 
No. 135546 
 
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
and IAQ MANAGEMENT, INC., 
 
 
Defendants, 
and 
 
INSURANCE SERVICES CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
 
YOUNG, J. (dissenting). 
I dissent from the readoption of our previously vacated July 23, 2008, 
memorandum opinion in today’s opinion per curiam.  I believe that we erred in 
our construction of the definition of “fault,” as used in MCL 600.6304(8).  
Specifically, I believe that the majority opinion conflates the common-law concept 
of “proximate causation” with the common-law concept of “negligence,” a result 
not contemplated by the plain language of the comparative fault statutes.  On 
reconsideration, I do not believe that the statutes require proof of a duty before a 
person may be found to be a proximate cause of an injury and allocated fault.  
Rather, duty and proximate causation are two separate elements of a negligence 
claim—a wholly different concept than “fault.” 
 
2
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order striking Insurance 
Services Construction’s (ISC) notice of nonparty at fault and remand for further 
proceedings at which the relative fault of both ISC and IAQ Management, Inc. 
(IAQ), should be taken into consideration. 
I.  Relevant Facts and Procedural History 
Plaintiffs, David and Joann Romain, are homeowners who filed a claim 
with their homeowner’s insurance provider, Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance, for 
water and toxic mold damage.  Frankenmuth referred plaintiffs to ISC to 
undertake the remodeling and mold remediation.  After ISC completed the 
remodeling, Frankenmuth hired IAQ to test the air quality in the home.  IAQ 
certified that the mold had been remediated and the home was safe for occupancy.  
Despite IAQ’s certification, plaintiffs alleged that they began suffering from 
illnesses caused by toxic mold.  Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against 
Frankenmuth, IAQ, and ISC. 
Of import to this appeal, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ tort claims 
against IAQ because IAQ did not owe a duty to plaintiffs.  This ruling has not 
been challenged on appeal.  ISC subsequently filed a notice of nonparty at fault 
under MCR 2.112(K)1 naming IAQ.  Ultimately, the trial court struck the notice 
                                                 
1 MCR 2.112(K) provides: 
(1) Applicability.  This rule applies to actions for personal 
injury, property damage, and wrongful death to which MCL 
600.2957 and MCL 600.6304, as amended by 1995 PA 249, apply. 
 
3
on the basis of Jones v Enertel, Inc,2 which held that the existence of a duty is a 
necessary condition precedent to a consideration of proximate causation and 
allocating fault under MCL 600.6304(8).  The trial court recognized, however, that 
Jones was inconsistent with the subsequent Court of Appeals opinion in Kopp v 
Zigich,3 which rejected a duty prerequisite to a finding of fault.  Accordingly, the 
trial court stayed the proceedings to allow ISC to file an interlocutory application 
for leave to appeal. 
The Court of Appeals denied ISC’s application for leave “for failure to 
persuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review.”4  ISC then sought 
leave to appeal in this Court.  We initially affirmed the trial court’s order striking 
the notice of nonparty at fault in a memorandum opinion, which is reproduced in 
the majority opinion.  However, we unanimously granted ISC’s motion for 
reconsideration or rehearing and vacated the earlier memorandum opinion.  We 
asked the parties to address 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2) Notice Requirement.  Notwithstanding MCL 600.6304, 
the trier of fact shall not assess the fault of a nonparty unless notice 
has been given as provided in this subrule. 
Subsections 3 and 4 of the court rule outline the procedural and substantive 
requirements for the notice and allow a plaintiff to amend its complaint following 
the filing of a notice. 
2 254 Mich App 432; 656 NW2d 870 (2003). 
3 268 Mich App 258; 707 NW2d 601 (2005). 
4 Romain v Frankenmuth Mut Ins, unpublished order of the Court of 
Appeals, entered November 21, 2007 (Docket No. 278591). 
 
4
whether the Legislature’s use of the term “proximate cause” in MCL 
600.6304 conflicts with other statutory provisions, whether the 
Legislature intended to impose a legal duty requirement as a 
precondition for allocating fault under MCL 600.2957 and MCL 
600.6304, and whether, if MCL 600.6304 merely codified the 
common-law doctrine of negligence, a finding of duty is a 
prerequisite to a finding of fault.[5] 
 
II.  Standard of Review 
 
This case involves the proper application of various provisions of 
Michigan’s “comparative fault” statutes.  We review issues of statutory 
construction de novo.  Our goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent as 
expressed in the language of the statute.6 
III.  Analysis 
 
In 1995, the Legislature enacted tort reform legislation.  As part of that 
reform, the Legislature abolished joint liability while retaining several liability.  
MCL 600.2956 provides: “Except as provided in [MCL 600.6304], in an action 
based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property 
damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several 
only and is not joint.”7 
The Legislature also enacted MCL 600.2957 and MCL 600.6304 regarding 
the comparative allocation of fault.  Section 2957 provides, in relevant part: 
                                                 
5 Romain v Frankenmuth Mut Ins, 482 Mich 992 (2008). 
6 Renny v Dep’t of Transportation, 478 Mich 490, 495; 734 NW2d 518 
(2007). 
7 MCL 600.2956. 
 
5
(1) In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking 
damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, 
the liability of each person shall be allocated under this section by 
the trier of fact and, subject to section 6304, in direct proportion to 
the person’s percentage of fault.  In assessing percentages of fault 
under this subsection, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of each 
person, regardless of whether the person is, or could have been, 
named as a party to the action. 
 
* * * 
 
(3) [MCL 600.2956 to 600.2960] do not eliminate or diminish 
a defense or immunity that currently exists, except as expressly 
provided in those sections.  Assessments of percentages of fault for 
nonparties are used only to accurately determine the fault of named 
parties.  If fault is assessed against a nonparty, a finding of fault does 
not subject the nonparty to liability in that action and shall not be 
introduced as evidence of liability in another action.[8] 
 
Section 6304 provides: 
(1) In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking 
damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death 
involving fault of more than 1 person, including third-party 
defendants and nonparties, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all 
parties to the action, shall instruct the jury to answer special 
interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating 
both of the following: 
(a) The total amount of each plaintiff’s damages. 
(b) The percentage of the total fault of all persons that 
contributed to the death or injury, including each plaintiff and each 
person released from liability under [MCL 600.2925d], regardless of 
whether the person was or could have been named as a party to the 
action. 
(2) In determining the percentages of fault under subsection 
(1)(b), the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct 
                                                 
8 Emphasis added. 
 
6
of each person at fault and the extent of the causal relation between 
the conduct and the damages claimed. 
(3) The court shall determine the award of damages to each 
plaintiff in accordance with the findings under subsection (1), 
subject to any reduction under subsection (5) or [MCL 600.2955a] or 
[MCL 600.6303], and shall enter judgment against each party, 
including a third-party defendant, except that judgment shall not be 
entered against a person who has been released from liability as 
provided in section 2925d. 
(4) Liability in an action to which this section applies is 
several only and not joint.  Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (6), a person shall not be required to pay damages in an 
amount greater than his or her percentage of fault as found under 
subsection (1).  This subsection and section 2956 do not apply to a 
defendant that is jointly and severally liable under [MCL 600.6312]. 
* * * 
(8) As used in this section, “fault” includes an act, an 
omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of 
warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or any conduct that could give 
rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause of 
damage sustained by a party.[9] 
 
By requiring a duty as a precondition of determining “fault” or “proximate 
causation,” the majority opinion imports principles of common-law “negligence” 
into the tort reform acts.  This is not contemplated by the plain language of the 
statutes.  By its plain language, the definition of “fault” in § 6304(8) does not 
require a party to establish the elements of a negligence claim or prove the 
existence of a duty before allocating fault to a nonparty. 
When a statute employs a common-law term, such as “proximate cause,” 
and expresses no intent to alter the common-law meaning of that term, this Court 
                                                 
9 Emphasis added. 
 
7
must interpret the statute consistently with that meaning.10  When the Legislature 
uses a “legal term of art,” we must give that term its “peculiar and appropriate 
legal meaning.”11 
 
The meaning of “proximate cause” under the common law is easiest to 
ascertain in connection with its role as an element of a common-law negligence 
claim.  In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) duty, (2) 
breach of duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.12  To establish the element of 
causation for a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s 
actions were both a cause in fact and legal cause of its injury.13  The cause in fact 
component is established by showing that the injury or harm would not have 
occurred “but for” the defendant’s action.14  Legal, or proximate, cause, on the 
other hand, “involves examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a 
defendant should be held legally responsible for such consequences.”15 
                                                 
10 MCL 8.3a. 
11 Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 276; 753 NW2d 207 (2008). 
12 Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 375; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). 
13 Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). 
14 Id. at 163. 
15 Id.  See also Stoll v Laubengayer, 174 Mich 701, 705; 140 NW 532 
(1913) (“[I]t must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence 
of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in light 
of the attending circumstances.”). 
 
8
 
As stated, a plaintiff must establish all four necessary elements, including 
duty and proximate cause, as a precondition for a finding of negligence.  As this 
Court explained in Moning v Alfono, the elements of duty and proximate cause are 
related:16 
Duty is essentially a question of whether the relationship 
between the actor and the injured person gives rise to any legal 
obligation on the actor’s part for the benefit of the injured person. 
Proximate cause encompasses a number of distinct problems 
including the limits of liability for foreseeable consequences.  In the 
Palsgraf case, the New York Court of Appeals, combining the 
questions of duty and proximate cause, concluded that no duty is 
owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff. 
The questions of duty and proximate cause are interrelated 
because the question whether there is the requisite relationship, 
giving rise to a duty, and the question whether the cause is so 
significant and important to be regarded a proximate cause both 
depend in part on foreseeability—whether it is foreseeable that the 
actor’s conduct may create a risk of harm to the victim, and whether 
the result of that conduct and intervening causes were foreseeable. 
Initially, the interrelated nature of these elements led me to believe that 
proximate causation could not be established absent the existence of a duty.  
Although related by the common consideration of foreseeability, proximate cause 
and duty are two separate elements of a common-law negligence claim.  Though 
the absence of foreseeability may defeat proof of both, proof of a duty does not 
require proof of proximate causation, nor, most important here, does proof of 
proximate cause require proof of a duty.  The Legislature omitted the term 
“negligence” from the statutes.  Therefore, we presume that the Legislature 
                                                 
16 400 Mich 425, 438-439; 254 NW2d 759 (1977), citing Palsgraf v Long 
Island R Co, 248 NY 339; 162 NE 99 (1928) (Cardozo, J.). 
 
9
intended for courts to allocate “fault” solely on the basis of the listed options 
without importing omitted concepts of common-law negligence.17 
More significant, the imposition of a duty requirement in § 6304(8) would 
be inconsistent with that subsection’s definition of “fault”: “‘fault’ includes an act, 
an omission, conduct, including intentional misconduct, a breach of warranty, or a 
breach of a legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of 
strict liability, that is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.”  By using 
the term “includes” in conjunction with the term “or,” the Legislature expressed its 
intent to make this list of examples nonexhaustive.  A court could determine that a 
person was a proximate cause of a party’s injury and at “fault” on the basis of 
conduct (or lack thereof) not listed in the statute.18  The term “or”  further 
evidences the Legislature’s intent that a defendant seeking to allocate fault to 
another person need only establish one method by which the person was a 
proximate cause of the injury.19  The majority opinion makes the proof of a legal 
duty the exclusive method for proving fault under § 6304(8) through selective 
                                                 
17 Lamp v Reynolds, 249 Mich App 591, 602; 645 NW2d 311 (2002).  See 
also AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 400; 662 NW2d 695 (2003) (“[W]e may 
not read into the statute what is not within the Legislature’s intent as derived from 
the language of the statute.”). 
18 The use of the term “includes” by itself can limit or expand a list.  This 
Court must consider the context in which the term is used to determine the 
Legislature’s intent.  See Surowitz v Pontiac, 374 Mich 597, 606; 132 NW2d 628 
(1965). 
19 “Or” is a disjunctive term indicating that a person has a choice between 
options.  People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 161; 730 NW2d 708 (2007) 
(Corrigan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
10
quotation: “a breach of a legal duty . . . that is a proximate cause of damage 
sustained by a party.”  The majority opinion omits the alternatives specified in the 
statute, e.g., “an act . . . that is a proximate cause . . . .”  It is inconsistent to 
identify a breach of a legal duty as one method among many to establish fault, but 
then impose the existence of a legal duty as a precondition for finding fault. 
The majority opinion’s imposition of a prerequisite duty element is also 
inconsistent with §§ 2957(1) and 6304(1)(b), both of which provide that a person 
shall be allocated fault regardless of whether he could be named as a party to the 
action. These statutes are in pari materia, having a common purpose, and must be 
read together to give effect to the statutes in their entirety.20  A person who does 
not owe a duty to the plaintiff obviously cannot be named as a party to the action.  
Accordingly, a person who does not owe a duty to the plaintiff clearly falls within 
the ambit of these provisions.  To impose a duty requirement for the allocation of 
fault, this Court would have to violate the rules of statutory construction and 
rewrite §§ 2957(1) and 6304(1)(b) to include such an exception.21  This is 
precisely what the majority opinion does. 
Furthermore, the plain language of the statutes does not violate common-
law negligence principles by allowing a plaintiff to collect against a person in the 
absence of a duty.  Section 2957(3) provides that the allocation of fault cannot 
                                                 
20 People v Harper, 479 Mich 599, 621; 739 NW2d 523 (2007). 
21 See AFSCME, supra at 400. 
 
11
subject a nonparty to liability in the current action or be used as evidence against a 
nonparty in a separate action.  Thus, the allocation of fault to a nonparty is not a 
determination that the nonparty was negligent and does not subject him to tort 
liability when the plaintiff cannot otherwise prove all the elements of his claim. 
IV.  Effect of Riddle v McLouth Steel 
I further believe that the majority errs by relying on Riddle v McLouth Steel 
Products Corp22 for the proposition that a named defendant must establish that a 
nonparty owed a duty to the plaintiff as a precondition for a finding of proximate 
causation and fault.  Riddle was decided by this Court before tort reform in 1995 
and the enactment of the comparative fault statutes.  Riddle does not pertain to a 
defendant allocating fault to a nonparty; rather, it considers whether the tenet that 
a landowner owes no duty to business invitees to warn of open and obvious 
dangers was abrogated by the adoption of the “comparative negligence” scheme in 
Michigan.23 
Riddle held that the determination of a duty and the consideration of the 
“comparative negligence” of a plaintiff are separate and distinct because they are 
                                                 
22 440 Mich 85, 99; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). 
23 Historically, the concept of “contributory negligence” barred a plaintiff 
whose own negligence contributed to his injury from collecting any compensation 
from a negligent defendant.  From 1979 until the tort reforms of 1995, Michigan 
courts accepted the common-law concept of “pure comparative negligence.”  
Under this scheme, the plaintiff was entitled to a damages award against a 
negligent defendant reduced by plaintiff’s relative portion of negligence.  See 
Placek v Sterling Hts, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). 
 
12
considered at different points in the case.  When a plaintiff files suit against a 
defendant, the court must determine as a matter of law whether the defendant 
owed that plaintiff a duty.  A negligence action may proceed against the named 
defendant only if there is a legal duty.  “Comparative negligence,” on the other 
hand, is considered at the end of the trial to reduce the damages a defendant owes 
to a plaintiff.24  The statements in Riddle upon which the majority opinion relies 
were meant to describe the relationship of a “plaintiff’s negligence in relation to 
the defendant’s duty”25 and are, therefore, completely unrelated to the 
determination whether the new statutory concept of “fault” may be allocated in the 
absence of a duty.  As discussed, under our statutory scheme, the existence of a 
duty is irrelevant to the allocation of “fault,” which considers only a determination 
of proximate causation.  This is particularly so when allocating fault cannot 
subject a nonparty to liability under § 2957(3). 
The majority opinion’s continued mistaken reliance on Riddle, and the 
improper importation of negligence principles into §§ 2957 and 6304, is caused, in 
part, by the continued use of the term “comparative negligence” to describe the 
allocation of fault under the statutes.26  The use of this term is a misnomer when 
used in relation to these statutes.  Sections 2957 and 6304 make absolutely no 
                                                 
24 Riddle, supra at 95-96. 
25 Id. at 98. 
26 See, e.g., Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151 (2007); 732 NW2d 472; 
Holton v A+ Ins Associates, Inc, 255 Mich App 318; 661 NW2d 248 (2003). 
 
13
reference to negligence and, by their plain language, relate solely to the allocation 
of “fault.”  To remedy any further confusion, I caution the bench and bar to be 
more precise when referring to statutory “comparative fault.” 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Given the plain language of the comparative fault statutes and the common-
law definition of “proximate cause,” I dissent from the majority opinion’s 
importation of negligence principles into §§ 2957 and 6304 and the creation of a 
prerequisite duty element before proximate causation and fault may be considered.  
Put simply, the comparative fault statutes do not describe the allocation of 
negligence.  The statutes describe the allocation of fault between parties and 
nonparties, including persons who could not otherwise be named as a party to the 
suit.  “Fault” is not defined in terms of negligence, but by a nonexhaustive list of 
examples that might amount to a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.  
Accordingly, instead of readopting our previously vacated memorandum opinion, 
I would remand the case to the trial court to reinstate the notice of nonparty at 
fault.   
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Stephen J. Markman