Title: McLarthy v. Hopkins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 546, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 25, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ANNALESIA T. MCLARTHY, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 546, 2010 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
SUSAN E. HOPKINS, 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 09C-06-174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July 13, 2011 
Decided:  July 25, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of July 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On April 15, 2008, Susan Hopkins’ operated a car which collided with 
Annalesia McLarthy’s car proximately resulting in injuries to McLarthy.  
Nationwide Insurance insured both drivers.  In the several days after the accident, 
McLarthy saw both her family doctor and a nurse from Employee Health at 
Wilmington Hospital because she had neck pain.  The health care providers 
prescribed muscle relaxers, told her to stay home from work until her neck felt 
better, and advised her to start physical therapy. 
(2) 
On April 21, Tanya Saunders, a Nationwide liability adjuster 
representing Hopkins, met McLarthy in person.  During their meeting, McLarthy 
2 
 
told Saunders that she had already spoken with a Nationwide Personal Injury 
Protection adjuster and wished to be assured that Nationwide would pay her 
medical bills.  According to McLarthy, Saunders “told [McLarthy] that [she] 
shouldn’t have to worry about anything, because [she] had the PIP [coverage].”  
Saunders then offered McLarthy $750 for a general release of all liability claims.  
McLarthy signed the release, and Saunders gave her a check for $750.  McLarthy 
now wishes to invalidate the release based upon an alleged misrepresentation that 
induced her to sign it and a “mutual mistake of fact.”  The trial judge granted 
Hopkins summary judgment.  Because we find neither of her legal arguments 
valid, we AFFIRM. 
(3) 
We review a trial judge’s decision to grant summary judgment de 
novo on both the facts and the law.1  On a summary judgment record, which is a 
paper record not involving credibility assessments, we may draw our own 
inferences while making factual determinations and evaluating the legal 
significance of evidence.2  We interpret record facts and draw reasonable 
inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.3 
                                          
 
1 LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 191 (Del. 2009). 
2 Id. (quoting Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 656 A.2d 
1094, 1099 (Del. 1995)). 
 
3 Id. 
3 
 
(4) 
McLarthy first contends that the release is unenforceable because 
Saunders materially misrepresented that McLarthy’s PIP coverage with 
Nationwide would cover her medical bills during their meeting and that McLarthy 
signed the release in reliance upon that misrepresentation.  Under Delaware law, a 
contract may be voidable on the basis of misrepresentation if a plaintiff can prove: 
(1) the defendant made a misrepresentation, (2) the defendant knew or believed the 
representation was false or made it with reckless indifference to the truth, (3) the 
defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, (4) the 
plaintiff acted or did not act in justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and 
(5) the plaintiff suffered reliance damages.4  McLarthy’s claim in this case fails on 
the very first element because Saunders made no misrepresentation to McLarthy.  
Saunders did not have authority to settle McLarthy’s PIP claim, but by McLarthy’s 
own deposition testimony, Saunders made no guarantees or promises to McLarthy.  
According to McLarthy, all Saunders told her was that she “shouldn’t have to 
worry about [her medical bills being paid], because [she] had the PIP [coverage].”  
Also, McLarthy had previously spoken to Nationwide’s PIP adjuster handling her 
out of pocket claims on the phone.  He had discussed various PIP coverage 
possibilities with her, so she knew that the PIP adjuster, not Saunders, had the 
                                          
 
4 Tekstrom, Inc. v. Savla, 918 A.2d 1171, 2007 WL 328836, at *4 (Del. 2007) (ORDER). 
4 
 
responsibility to process her PIP claim.  In what we can only characterize as an 
unusual argument, appellant argues that Nationwide did indeed pay all of her PIP 
covered claims, including all medical bills.  Nevertheless, McLarthy maintains that 
Nationwide might not have, and therefore Saunders’s, “misrepresentation” that she 
had PIP coverage and “shouldn’t worry” falsely induced her to settle her non-PIP 
third party claim and sign a release that barred her from seeking non-PIP claims 
from Hopkins’ bodily injury coverage. Finally, McLarthy’s PIP coverage did, in 
fact, pay her medical bills.  Therefore, even had Saunders made a guarantee to 
McLarthy regarding PIP coverage—which she did not—the representation 
accurately represented Nationwide’s actions.  For these reasons, we find no merit 
to McLarthy’s misrepresentation claim. 
(5) 
McLarthy also contends that the release cannot preclude further 
claims because she and Saunders contracted on the basis of a mistaken 
appreciation of the severity of McLarthy’s injuries (the mutual mistake of fact).  
Under Delaware law, if we determine that mutual mistake underlies a general 
release, we must find the release voidable.5  In this case, however, no mutual 
mistake affected the agreement to exchange $750 for the general release.  At the 
time McLarthy signed the release and accepted the check, both Saunders and 
                                          
 
5 Reason v. Lewis, 260 A.2d 708, 709 (Del. 1969). 
5 
 
McLarthy knew that McLarthy was suffering ongoing pain and treatment.  They 
both knew she was undergoing continuing physical therapy.  On the basis of this 
information, the fact that both parties knew that her injuries had not been resolved, 
and in contemplation of the risk that McLarthy’s pain and treatment would 
continue, the parties entered a valid contract this Court may not now set aside.  For 
these reasons, we find no merit to McLarthy’s mutual mistake claim. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice