Title: State v. Gary Lewis Petty
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1993AP002200-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 1996

No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-2200-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Gary Lewis Petty, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 MAY 31, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
JON P. WILCOX, J. 
The 
defendant-petitioner 
Gary 
Lewis 
Petty (Petty) seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals 
decision which affirmed Petty's conviction, following a guilty 
plea, for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and the 
circuit court's order denying post-conviction relief.  The court 
of appeals concluded that Petty was judicially estopped from 
asserting a claim that under Wis. Stat. § 161.45 (1991-92)
1, his 
state conviction was statutorily barred because it was part of the 
                     
     
1  All future references to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1991-
92 statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
2 
conspiracy for which he had pled guilty and was sentenced in 
federal court.   
 
We are presented with two issues on this appeal.  First, did 
the court of appeals err as a matter of law in holding that Petty 
was judicially estopped from challenging his state conviction?  We 
conclude that Petty did not maintain inconsistent positions during 
the course of the state and federal litigation, and there is not 
sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that he attempted 
to "coldly manipulate" the judicial process.  Although a 
discretionary remedy to be applied by the court, the court of 
appeals in this case has mistakenly expanded the breadth of the 
legal requirements for judicial estoppel.  In doing so, we 
therefore conclude that the appellate court erred as a matter of 
law when it judicially estopped Petty's challenge to his state 
conviction under Wis. Stat. § 161.45. 
 
The second issue before this court requires us to consider 
whether Wis. Stat. § 161.45 bars Petty's October 1991 state 
conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, when 
the defendant subsequently entered a negotiated plea to a federal 
charge of conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine, and the 
period covered by the federal conspiracy charge includes the date 
of the incident on which the state charge is based.  We hold that 
 § 161.45 does not bar the state conviction in this case.  The 
determinative moment for identifying when the statutory bar of 
§161.45 applies is the point in the prosecution at which guilt is 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
3 
determined.  In state court, the determination of guilt occurred 
in October 1991 when Petty entered a plea of guilty, prior to 
being indicted on conspiracy charges in federal court.  The 
statutory bar provided under § 161.45 is therefore inapplicable to 
the state conviction for possession.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals on different grounds. 
 
The relevant facts and procedural history are not in dispute. 
 Petty was charged in a criminal complaint filed August 7, 1991, 
in Milwaukee County with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver while armed, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § § 161.16(2)(b)1, 161.41 (1m)(c)2 and 939.05, and 
one count of felon in possession of a firearm, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 941.29(2).  The charges arose from an incident which 
occurred on August 1, 1991, at 3077 N. 25th Street in Milwaukee.  
An information was filed on August 15, 1991, following Petty's 
voluntary waiver of a preliminary hearing.  On October 16, 1991, 
Petty entered a negotiated guilty plea to an amended complaint and 
information wherein the quantity of drugs involved was reduced 
from 25 to 100 grams to 10 to 25 grams.  Sentencing on the state 
charges was postponed. 
 
On December 11, 1991, Petty and several others were named in 
a federal indictment.  We are primarily concerned on this review 
with only two of the nine original federal charges in which Petty 
was named.  The first federal count charged Petty and eight others 
as having conspired to possess with intent to distribute in excess 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
4 
of five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1), during the period from January 1, 1987, to December 
1991.  The sixth federal count alleged that on or about August 1, 
1991, Petty had possessed approximately one ounce of cocaine with 
intent to distribute. 
 
Sentencing on the state charges was originally scheduled for 
January 16, 1992, but was adjourned at least six times before a 
sentence was imposed.  The circuit court was advised that repeated 
delays in sentencing in federal court were attributed to Petty's 
cooperation 
as 
an 
informant 
and 
witness 
in 
ongoing 
drug 
investigations by federal authorities. 
 
Petty received an eleven-year sentence in federal court 
without parole for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 
distribute.  See United States v. Gary Lewis Petty, No. 91-CR-283 
(E.D. Wis. 1992).  The additional federal charges were dismissed, 
including the possession charge relating to the August 1, 1991, 
incident.  Circuit Court Judge Frank T. Crivello sentenced Petty 
on the state charges on November 6, 1992.  He received four years 
on the drug possession charge, to run consecutively to the federal 
sentence of eleven years without parole.  He was sentenced to two 
years in prison on the firearm possession charge
2, to run 
concurrently to his sentence on the state drug possession charge.  
                     
     
2  Petty's conviction on the charge of felon in possession of 
a firearm is not at issue on this review. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
5 
 
Petty originally filed a no-merit notice of appeal in May 
1993.  Shortly thereafter, he filed a motion in the court of 
appeals to allow this appeal to proceed as a meritorious appeal, 
to dismiss the no-merit notice of appeal, and to extend the time 
to file a post-conviction motion.  By order of the court of 
appeals dated June 24, 1993, the appeal was voluntarily dismissed 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.18, and Petty was given time 
to file a post-conviction motion and leave to file another appeal 
after the circuit court ruled on his post-conviction motion. 
 
The post-conviction motion filed by Petty in July 1993 sought 
to vacate and dismiss his conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance while armed on the ground that his conviction 
was barred by Wis. Stat. § 161.45.
3  The circuit court denied the 
motion, holding that § 161.45 did not bar the state prosecution, 
because: (1) the state court prosecution preceded the federal 
court prosecution and (2) Petty's state conviction was for a 
substantive offense while the federal one was for the inchoate 
offense of conspiracy and therefore they did not constitute 
convictions for the same act. 
                     
     
3  Section 161.45 provides as follows: 
 
 
Bar to prosecution. If a violation of this chapter is a 
violation of a federal law or the law of another state, 
a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law 
of another state for the same act is a bar to 
prosecution in this state. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
6 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and 
order of the circuit court.  However, the court did not reach the 
issue of whether Wis. Stat. § 161.45 bars the state prosecution.  
Instead, the court held that Petty's claim was barred by judicial 
estoppel.  The court reasoned that estoppel applied in this case 
because adjournments requested, at least in part by the defense, 
had created the potential claim of statutory double jeopardy.  The 
court articulated its conclusion as follows: 
As we said in State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 936, 944, 437 N.W.2d 
218, 221 (1989), `It is contrary to fundamental 
principles of justice . . .  to permit a party to assume 
a certain position in the course of litigation which may 
be advantageous, and then after the court maintains that 
position, argue on appeal that the action was error.' 
Here, inducing the state court to adjourn sentencing in 
order to attain his federal court goals, Petty created 
his potential claim under § 161.45, STATS., - a claim 
which would not have existed had the state sentencing 
been completed before the federal sentencing. Thus, we 
conclude 
that 
Petty 
is 
judicially 
estopped 
from 
challenging his state conviction. 
State v. Petty, No. 93-2200-CR, slip op. at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
6, 1994).   
 
I.  Judicial Estoppel. 
 
Petty challenges the court of appeals' application of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel in this case on the grounds that the 
facts as presented do not satisfy the traditional requirements of 
the doctrine.  He contends that judicial estoppel is appropriately 
applied 
only 
where 
a 
party 
advances 
two 
irreconcilably 
inconsistent positions, and the inconsistency is the result of an 
intentional, "cold manipulation" of the judicial system.  Petty 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
7 
argues that his positions throughout the course of both the state 
and federal litigation have remained consistent, and the record 
clearly indicates that he did not deliberately attempt to 
manipulate the judicial process, a fundamental prerequisite to 
application of the doctrine.  He maintains that employing the 
equitable doctrine in this case will unnecessarily preclude the 
otherwise meritorious appeal he has raised under Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.45. 
 
"Because 
judicial 
estoppel 
is 
not 
directed 
to 
the 
relationship between the parties, but is intended to protect the 
judiciary as an institution from the perversion of judicial 
machinery, Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th 
Cir. 1982), it is the prerogative of the trial court to invoke 
judicial estoppel at its discretion."  State v. Fleming, 181 
Wis. 2d 546, 558, 510 N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1993).  In this case 
however, the doctrine was not applied by the circuit court, but 
rather, by the court of appeals.  The appellate court's 
interpretation of the fundamental, legal requirements of the 
doctrine is being challenged on this review. 
Determining the elements and considerations involved before 
invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel are questions of law 
which we decide independently.  Harrison v. LIRC, 187 Wis. 2d 491, 
496, 523 N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1994).   
 
The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, as traditionally 
applied in this state, is intended "to protect against a litigant 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
8 
playing `fast and loose with the courts' by asserting inconsistent 
positions."  Fleming, 181 Wis. 2d at 557 (quoting Yanez v. United 
States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1993)).  The doctrine 
precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding 
and 
then 
subsequently 
asserting 
an 
inconsistent 
position.  
Coconate v. Schwanz, 165 Wis. 2d 226, 231, 477 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 
1991).  "Because the rule looks toward cold manipulation and not 
unthinking or confused blunder, it has never been applied where 
plaintiff's assertions were based on fraud, inadvertence, or 
mistake."  Fleming, 181 Wis. 2d at 558 (citing Konstantinidis v. 
Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
4 
 
The court of appeals in Harrison relied upon the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals' recognition that although the doctrine 
is not reducible to a pat formula, certain identifiable boundaries 
clearly exist.  They are as follows: 
First, the later position must be clearly inconsistent with 
the earlier position; second, the facts at issue should 
be the same in both cases; and finally, the party to be 
                     
     
4  The rule that the doctrine of judicial estoppel will not 
be applied where a party took the original position as a result of 
mistake, inadvertence, or fraud dates to the origin of the 
doctrine, in Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857). 
 Originally intended to protect the sanctity of the oath, the 
doctrine held that a party who made a sworn statement was 
judicially estopped from maintaining a contrary position in a 
subsequent proceeding. Id. at 48. The court noted, however, that 
if the original position were taken mistakenly then "the party 
ought certainly to be relieved from the consequences of his 
error." Id.; see also Douglas W. Henkin, Comment, Judicial 
Estoppel - Beating Shields into Swords and Back Again, 139 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1711, 1719 (1991); Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding 
Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 NW. 
U.L. REV. 1244, 1245-46 (1986).  
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
9 
estopped must have convinced the first court to adopt 
its position--a litigant is not forever bound to a 
losing argument. 
Harrison, 187 Wis. 2d at 497 (citing Levinson v. United States, 
969 F.2d 260, 264-65 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989 
(1992)).  The central issue before the appellate court in Harrison 
was whether sworn statements made by Harrison relating to an age 
discrimination claim under state law were contrary to his sworn 
averments and testimony before a federal administrative law judge 
(ALJ) 
determining 
his 
qualifications 
for 
social 
security 
disability.  Harrison had successfully argued that he was 
incapable of working and thus entitled to federal disability 
benefits.  His subsequent age and handicap discrimination suit 
alleged that he was in fact capable of performing his job.  A 
state ALJ ruled that the statements in the two proceedings were 
contrary to each other and employed judicial estoppel to deny 
Harrison's secondary claim.  The Labor and Industry Review 
Commission (LIRC) agreed.  Id. at 493-94. 
 
However, the circuit court reversed and remanded, holding 
that Harrison's position in his age discrimination suit was 
"arguably not totally inconsistent with the position taken during 
the social security proceedings."  Id. at 496.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the remand to LIRC, finding that evaluating the 
alleged "inconsistency" of Harrison's positions involved too many 
unanswered questions, as it was unclear whether federal and state 
legal standards governing inability to perform were identical.  
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
10 
Id. at 500.  In refusing to invoke the equitable doctrine, the 
court cautioned: 
[T]he more uncertain we are that the two judicial actions 
concern the same factual issues or positions, the more 
hesitant we should be in applying judicial estoppel. 
Judicial 
estoppel, 
after 
all, 
is 
an 
equitable 
determination and should be used only when the positions 
taken are clearly inconsistent. 
Id. at 497-98. 
 
In State v. Fleming, the defendant contended that the 
prosecutor had stipulated that the state would not request a jury 
instruction involving a lesser-included offense.  However, after 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the prosecutor in 
fact requested that the instruction be submitted to the jury.  The 
defendant was subsequently convicted of the lesser-included 
offense and appealed on the ground that the circuit court should 
have judicially estopped the prosecution from requesting the 
instruction.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
refusal to employ the equitable doctrine, stating that there was 
no evidence that the prosecutor had attempted to "coldly 
manipulate" or "play fast and loose" with the judicial system.  
Fleming, 181 Wis. 2d at 558.
5 
                     
     
5  The doctrine is only applied when the positions taken by a 
party are truly inconsistent. In State v. Michels, 141 Wis. 2d 81, 
414 N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals invoked 
judicial estoppel to bar a defendant who requested a lesser-
included charge of manslaughter, and then argued that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the conviction.  Id. at 98. The mere 
appearance of inconsistency is insufficient for invocation of the 
doctrine. In Coconate v. Schwanz, 165 Wis. 2d 226, 477 N.W.2d 74 
(Ct. App. 1991), the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine 
where a plaintiff failed to list a note as an asset in a divorce 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
11 
 
The application of judicial estoppel in this state is 
consistent with the majority of the federal circuits recognizing 
the doctrine.
6  In Matter of Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812 (1990), a party had successfully argued 
that a tax court should decide whether his tax debts were 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.  However, upon the receipt of a 
disfavorable ruling by that court, he attempted to appeal the 
decision, claiming that it was inappropriate for the tax court to 
decide the question of dischargeability.  The court of appeals 
relied upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895), which stated: "[w]here 
(..continued) 
proceeding and later asserted a claim for enforceability against 
the maker of the note.  The court held that "Coconate's current 
action against Schwanz cannot be characterized as a position 
inconsistent with one previously taken." Id. at 231; see also 
Boyers, supra note 4, at 1263-64; 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. 
COOPER, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4477 (1981 & Supp. 1994) 
(providing policy reasons for leaving reasonable room for change 
of position). 
     
6  See, e.g., Continental Illinois Corp. v. C.I.R., 998 F.2d 
513, 518 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994) ("[a] 
party can argue inconsistent positions in the alternative, but 
once it has sold one to the court it cannot turn around and 
repudiate it in order to have a second victory"); United States v. 
Kepner, 843 F.2d 755, 760 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[a] party who has 
gained an advantage by characterizing the law of facts involved in 
a 
case 
should 
not 
later 
be 
able 
to 
contradict 
that 
characterization in order to obtain a further advantage"); Stevens 
Technical Services, Inc. v. SS Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584, 588 (9th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 
390 (10th Cir. 1986); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 
1166-67 (4th Cir. 1982) (cautioning that "[t]he circumstances 
under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are 
probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle"); 
Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 936-38 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
12 
a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and 
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, 
simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary 
position."  Cassidy, 892 F.2d at 641.   
 
The court estopped Cassidy from further obstructing the final 
resolution of his tax liability, emphasizing that the doctrine is 
appropriate where "intentional self-contradiction is being used as 
a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum designed for 
suitors seeking justice."  Id.  However, the court also recognized 
the equitable limitations inherent in the application of judicial 
estoppel, and noted that "[i]t should not be used where it would 
work an injustice, such as where the former position was the 
product of inadvertence or mistake."  Id. at 642 (citing Hamilton 
v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Snead) 39, 48 (1857)). 
 
The State argues that judicial estoppel is appropriate in 
this case because Petty actively sought successive adjournments, 
in a conscious, deliberate effort to substantially reduce his 
federal sentencing exposure.  And now, on appeal before this 
court, if he were to succeed on the merits of his claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 161.45, it would be solely because of the delays he caused 
in state court.  The State claims that these two positions are 
directly contradictory, and are the result of an intentional 
manipulation of the judicial process, a clear case for invocation 
of the doctrine. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
13 
 
To 
the 
contrary, 
Petty 
asserts 
that 
the 
continued 
adjournments in state court were the result of his accommodating 
the requests of law enforcement, as he was utilized by the federal 
government as an informant in a number of drug investigations.  A 
review of the record indicates that the State not only did not 
object to, but rather, acquiesced in a majority of the requested 
adjournments in state court.  A number of times the State 
prosecutor joined in the various requests, and on one particular 
occasion, Milwaukee police officer Tom Gorecki explained to the 
circuit court that Petty was needed as a federal informant for 
continuing drug investigations, as he had already testified in one 
drug importation trial.  On another occasion, the State failed to 
produce Petty in court, as he was in federal custody at the time, 
and so the matter was again adjourned.  We find that the evidence 
does not support the State's contention that the adjournments were 
sought by 
the defendant 
so 
as to 
frustrate 
the court's 
jurisdiction in the pending state criminal proceeding. 
 
Petty further contends that the court of appeals mistakenly 
relied upon this court's decision in State v. Gove, 148 Wis. 2d 
936, 437 N.W.2d 218 (1989), to invoke judicial estoppel.  The task 
before this court in Gove was whether, in the interests of 
justice, we should reach an issue that had been waived.  Gove, 148 
Wis. 2d 
at 
940-41. 
 
We 
held 
that 
Gove 
had 
waived 
his 
constitutional right to confrontation by failing to object at 
trial to the circuit court's unavailability determination.  Id. at 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
14 
941. 
 
Concluding 
that 
the 
record 
lacked 
the 
exceptional 
circumstances warranting the court's exercise of discretion in the 
interests 
of 
justice, 
we 
noted 
that 
"Gove 
affirmatively 
contributed to what he now claims was trial court error."  Id. at 
944.  Although the court of appeals attempts to liken the present 
case to that in Gove, the decision to utilize a discretionary 
doctrine to reach an otherwise waived claim is substantially 
dissimilar from the issue presently before this court.
7   
 
The utilization of judicial estoppel in this state, although 
discretionary in nature, is guided by well established legal 
principles.  Two fundamental requirements to application of the 
doctrine are absent here.  The record does not support the State's 
contention 
that 
Petty 
asserted 
irreconcilably 
inconsistent 
positions.  Petty has consistently sought to minimize the length 
of his prison stay, whether it be receiving a concurrent sentence, 
or dismissal of the state charge on grounds of statutory double 
jeopardy. 
                     
     
7  But see State v. Harp, 161 Wis. 2d 773, 469 N.W.2d 210 
(Ct. 
App. 
1991), 
in 
which 
the 
appellate 
court 
exercised 
discretionary powers under the interests of justice doctrine to 
reach a claim that a defendant's conviction should be reversed 
because of a constitutionally defective jury instruction even 
though the defendant "affirmatively contributed" to the error. Id. 
at 782. The court held that use of the doctrine was reasonable 
because the defendant did not request the instruction for tactical 
reasons, the law was in flux at the time, and the defendant was 
"no more responsible for the error than was the state or the trial 
court." Id. at 783. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
15 
 
Similarly, the State's claim that Petty has intentionally 
manipulated the judicial system is unfounded.  The procedural 
history of this case reveals that Petty's appellate counsel was 
unaware of the import of Wis. Stat. § 161.45 at the initial stage 
of appeal.  In fact, Petty originally intended to file a no-merit 
report.  It was only in preparing this document that the issue of 
the applicability of § 161.45 arose, allowing the case to proceed 
with the subsequent filing of a meritorious post-conviction 
motion.  The manipulative perversion of the judicial process, 
which the doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to combat, is 
not present in this case.  Equity does not require estopping Petty 
from asserting a claim under Wis. Stat. § 161.45, where there is 
no suggestion that he intended to play "fast and loose with the 
judicial system," nor did he maintain inconsistent positions 
during the course of the litigation.  The doctrine looks toward 
cold manipulation, not an unthinking or confused blunder.  Absent 
an attack on judicial integrity, the inapplicability of the 
doctrine is justified by the more compelling interest of allowing 
a party to correct an innocent mistake, in light of the high 
stakes involved in a criminal proceeding.  We find that the court 
of appeals has mistakenly expanded the breadth of the legal 
elements required to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel by 
applying it to the facts of the present case.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the appellate court erred as a matter of law. 
 
II.  Prosecution Bar. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
16 
 
The final issue that we address on this review is whether 
Petty's conviction in state court must be vacated because it 
violates Wis. Stat. § 161.45.  The interpretation of a statute is 
a question of law which this court reviews de novo, without 
deference to the lower courts.  State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 
664, 669, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984).  In construing a statute, this 
court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 
legislature.  Benjamin Plumbing, Inc. v. Barnes, 162 Wis. 2d 837, 
856, 470 N.W.2d 888 (1991).  "We must give words their ordinary 
and accepted meanings and try to give effect to every word so as 
to not render any part of the statute superfluous."  Id. (citing 
State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989)).   
 
The focus of our statutory inquiry is that language found in 
Wis. Stat. § 161.45, which provides as follows: 
Bar to prosecution.  If a violation of this chapter is a 
violation of a federal law or the law of another state, 
a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law 
of another state for the same act is a bar to 
prosecution in this state. 
The parties are in agreement that a plain reading of the statute 
requires that: (1) the prosecution in state court must occur after 
a federal conviction,
8 and (2) the federal conviction must be for 
                     
     
8  Although the statute does not specify "former" and 
"subsequent" to identify the mechanism for triggering the 
statutory bar, the State asserts that the only logical reading of 
the statute as a whole is to assume that the Wisconsin prosecution 
must follow the out-of-state (i.e., federal or other state) 
conviction 
or 
acquittal. 
We 
agree. 
Petty 
argues 
that 
interpretation of the statute requires some form of alternative 
analysis, but neglects to define what it would be. Despite this, 
he concedes that application of the statutory bar requires that 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
17 
the "same act," in order for the statutory bar to prosecution to 
apply.  
 
Our analysis of this appeal must begin with a determination 
of the role that the term "prosecution" plays within the framework 
of Wis. Stat. § 161.45, such that it will act to bar additional 
criminal proceedings against a particular individual.  Petty 
contends that his state prosecution for cocaine possession 
occurred after he was convicted in federal court on the conspiracy 
charge.  The analytical basis for this conclusion relies upon the 
fact that Petty defines prosecution under § 161.45 as a process 
that is not completed until sentence has been imposed and judgment 
is entered.  See Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 
(1973) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943); 
United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928)).  Therefore, Petty 
reasons that his state conviction is barred under the statute 
simply because the state prosecution was not technically completed 
until state sentences were imposed in November 1992, following 
completion of the prosecution in federal court. 
 
However, this simplified approach to interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.45 begs the question of what aspect of prosecution it is 
that we are dealing with under the statute.  "The term 
`prosecution' clearly imports a beginning and an end," see 
Bradley, 410 U.S. at 609, and consists of a myriad of activity 
(..continued) 
the prosecution in state court come after the federal prosecution. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
18 
that generically can be classified into three categorical stages: 
(1) initiation, (2) conviction or acquittal, and (3) sentencing.  
The statute at issue does not clearly articulate the stage that a 
prosecution must reach in order to operate as a bar to further 
criminal proceedings under the laws of this state.  Petty contends 
that the imposition of a sentence is the determinative point, 
while the State suggests that the conviction or acquittal stage is 
more appropriate.   
 
In accord with the canons of statutory construction, we are 
to give words their ordinary and accepted meanings so as not to 
render any part of the statute superfluous.  Sher, 149 Wis. 2d at 
9.  Defining the role of the term "prosecution," as utilized under 
Wis. Stat. § 161.45, is the focal point for our analysis of 
Petty's 
present 
claim. 
 
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
acknowledged the common usage of the term "prosecution" in its 
decision in Bradley, where it remarked that "[w]hen people speak 
of prosecutions, they usually mean a proceeding that is under way 
in which guilt is to be determined.  In ordinary usage, sentencing 
is not part of the prosecution, but occurs after the prosecution 
has concluded."  Id. at 608.  Moreover, a "prosecution" has been 
defined as "a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course 
of law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose of 
determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with 
crime."  Black's Law Dictionary at 1221 (6th ed. 1990).   
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
19 
 
We similarly employ the ordinary meaning of the term 
"prosecution" in our limited interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.45, and hold that a prosecution is to be equated with 
conviction or acquittal.  The sentencing phase is therefore not 
the determinative point for analysis under the statute, as Petty 
has argued.  This result is implicit from a reading of the 
statute, which refers to "a conviction or acquittal under federal 
law or the law of another state for the same act [as] a bar to 
prosecution in this state."  § 161.45 (Emphasis added.) 
  
Our interpretation of the statute is supported by the 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 161.45 as well, which, as the 
State notes, is undeniably sparse.
9  However, the language of the 
statutory bar to prosecution within the Controlled Substances Act 
clearly indicates the legislature's intent to abolish the dual 
sovereignty doctrine by statute, with regard to substantially 
identical drug offenses based on the same act.  The United States 
Supreme Court and courts of numerous states have held that a state 
prosecution following a federal prosecution does not constitute a 
violation of the defendant's constitutional protection against 
being placed in double jeopardy.  In Abbate v. United States, 359 
                     
     
9  Wis. Stat. § 161.45 was created in 1971 as a provision of 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, see 1971 Wis. Laws 219, 
§ 16 at 629.  Section 161.45 was adopted without any revision from 
the Uniform Act.  See generally Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 
9 (Part II) U.L.A. 1 (1988).  The Act was designed to supplant the 
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, in effect in many jurisdictions, 
including Wisconsin, since the 1930's.  See 9 (Part II) U.L.A. at 
2. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
20 
U.S. 187 (1959), the United States Supreme Court discussed the 
doctrine of dual sovereignty, observing: 
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different 
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter 
within the same territory . . . .  Each government in 
determining what shall be an offense against its peace 
and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that 
of the other. 
 
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both 
national and state sovereignties is an offense against 
the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by 
each.  The Fifth Amendment, like all the other 
guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only 
to proceedings by the Federal Government, . . . and the 
double 
jeopardy 
therein 
forbidden 
is 
a 
second 
prosecution under authority of the Federal Government 
after a first trial for the same offense under the same 
authority. 
Id. at 194 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 
(1922)).  Despite this directive, a number of states, focusing 
upon the individual's interest in being free from repeated 
prosecutions for the same alleged acts, have enacted legislation 
aimed at alleviating continued prosecution, depending upon the 
similarity of the state and federal charges and upon whether the 
state and federal laws were designed to protect the same 
governmental interests.  See generally Annotation, Conviction Or 
Acquittal In Federal Court As Bar To Prosecution In State Court 
For State Offense Based On Same Facts--Modern View, 6 A.L.R.4th 
802, 816-24 (1981).  Section 161.45 is representative of the type 
of legislation instituted by those jurisdictions precluding 
continuing prosecution, as permitted under the doctrine of dual 
sovereignty. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
21 
 
  We now proceed to analysis of the facts of this case, in 
light of the foregoing, to determine if Wis. Stat. § 161.45 will 
act to bar Petty's conviction in state court.  Petty contends that 
his state prosecution for cocaine possession occurred after he was 
convicted in federal court on the conspiracy charge.  Petty 
reasons that because his federal sentence was imposed in October 
1992, prior to the imposition of sentence in state court in 
November 1992, § 161.45 should bar the state conviction, as the 
state prosecution came after the federal prosecution.  However, 
this argument runs contrary to our conclusion today that 
prosecution is to be equated with conviction or acquittal under 
§ 161.45.  The particular date on which a sentence is imposed is 
not the relevant inquiry under our analysis of the statute. 
 
For purposes of assessing the applicability of Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.45, we must determine the point at which guilt was 
determined on the state and federal charges.  In state court, the 
determination of guilt occurred in October 1991, when Petty 
entered a plea of guilty before Judge Crivello.  At that time, the 
federal prosecution had not begun, as Petty was not even indicted 
on federal charges until December 1991.  Therefore, we conclude 
that because the federal prosecution against Petty occurred after 
he was convicted in state court, the bar to a state prosecution 
contained in § 161.45, is not applicable to Petty's state drug 
conviction in this case.
10 
                     
     
10  Because we conclude that the conviction in state court 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
22 
 
The 
result 
which 
we 
have 
reached, 
based 
upon 
our 
interpretation of the language of the statute, is bolstered by the 
argument advanced by the State in both its brief and during oral 
argument.  The State asserts that the statutory provision at issue 
creates 
a 
form 
of 
statutory 
double 
jeopardy, 
protecting 
individuals from multiple prosecutions by separate sovereign 
entities for the same act even though the constitution does not.
11 
 The United States and Wisconsin constitutions protect a criminal 
defendant from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same 
offense.
12   
 
The proper point at which to begin this analysis is to 
determine the precise moment at which jeopardy attached to the 
state proceeding.
13  We recognized in State v. Comstock, 168 
(..continued) 
preceded the federal prosecution, we need not reach the issue of 
whether the two prosecutions were for the "same act." 
     
11  See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (concluding that 
successive prosecutions by two states for the same conduct was not 
barred by double jeopardy); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132 
(1959) (repeating the rule that successive state and federal 
prosecutions are not in violation of the Fifth Amendment); United 
States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979) (same). 
     
12  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Article I, § 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution states: "[N]o person for the same 
offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment." 
     
13  Petty argues that traditional double jeopardy analysis 
does not apply when interpreting Wis. Stat. § 161.45, contending 
that the statute requires a significantly broader analysis than 
the well-established test of whether the offenses are identical in 
law and fact.  See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932); State v. Poveda, 166 Wis. 2d 19, 22, 479 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
23 
Wis. 2d 915, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992), that "[t]he prohibition 
against double jeopardy is not triggered until `jeopardy attaches' 
in the proceedings.  Jeopardy means exposure to the risk of a 
determination of guilt or innocence."  Id. at 937 (quoting 3 W. 
LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 24.1(c) at 63 (1984)). 
 "Where there is no trial, jeopardy attaches upon the court's 
acceptance of a guilty or no contest plea."  State v. Poveda, 166 
Wis. 2d 19, 25, 479 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Comstock, 
168 Wis. 2d at 937-38; State v. Waldman, 57 Wis. 2d 234, 237, 203 
N.W.2d 691 (1973); Salters, 52 Wis. 2d at 714; Hawkins v. State, 
(..continued) 
App. 1991).  However, the defendant offers no authority for this 
proposition, which seemingly contradicts the language of the 
statute.  As the State recognizes, there is no support in the 
legislative history to substantiate a claim that either the 
drafters of the Uniform Acts or the successive Wisconsin 
legislatures intended to deviate from prevailing double jeopardy 
law concerning what constitutes the same offense for purposes of 
the statutory bar to prosecution.   
 
Rather, the statutory language tracks the Blockburger test as 
it expressly requires an identity of law (between the violation of 
"this chapter" and the federal law or that of another state) as 
well as an identity of fact (the "same act").  Moreover, the fact 
that a primary purpose of the Controlled Substances and Narcotics 
Act is to achieve uniformity, while providing an interlocking 
trellis of drug laws among the state and federal jurisdictions, 
strongly supports the State's assertion that § 161.45 bars a 
subsequent 
state 
prosecution 
only 
when 
the 
offenses 
are 
substantially the same in fact and law.  See generally Prefatory 
Note, 1970 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, at 223.  The defendant has failed to provide 
any authority to bolster his alternative reading of § 161.45, 
relying instead on an unsupported assertion that the legislature 
simply intended to broaden double jeopardy analysis in this state 
without explanation.  We do not agree with this novel reading of 
the statute in question. 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
24 
30 Wis. 2d 264, 267, 140 N.W.2d 226 (1966); and Belter v. State, 
178 Wis. 57, 62, 189 N.W. 270 (1922).
14 
 
As indicated earlier, Petty's guilty plea on the state 
charges was accepted by Judge Crivello in October 1991, and a 
judgment of conviction was entered.  It was at this point that 
jeopardy attached to the state proceedings.  Despite the 
significance 
of 
this 
juncture, 
Petty's 
argument 
remains 
consistent, asserting that the state conviction is barred by Wis. 
Stat. § 161.45 because the state prosecution was not technically 
completed until state sentences were imposed in November 1992.  
However, we have previously demonstrated this reasoning to be 
flawed in light of our reading of § 161.45.  Moreover, the 
appellate court in Poveda clarified that the particular timing or 
date of completion of a prosecution is not the critical factor in 
the court's analysis.  Rather, "the determinative moment is that 
at which jeopardy attaches, for that is, after all, `the lynchpin 
for all double jeopardy jurisprudence.'"  Id. at 25 (quoting Crist 
v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978)). 
                     
     
14  Consistent with the precedent of this court, a number of 
federal circuit courts of appeal have similarly concluded that 
jeopardy attaches upon the acceptance of a guilty plea. See United 
States v. Britt, 917 F.2d 353, 356 n.3 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1090 (1991); United States v. Baggett, 901 F.2d 
1546, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 862 (1990); United 
States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1989); but see United 
States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 831 (1989); Gilmore v. Zimmerman, 793 F.2d 564 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); United States v. 
Combs, 634 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 
(1981). 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
25 
 
The State asks this court to consider the result reached by 
the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 533 A.2d 116 
(Pa. Super. 1987), a case factually similar to the one at hand.  
In Ramirez, the defendants were initially charged with possession 
and delivery of a controlled substance in state court.  The 
defendants pled guilty to the state charges after being indicted 
in federal court on related charges.  Id. at 117-18.  Prior to 
being sentenced in state court, they pled guilty to the federal 
drug conspiracy charges and were sentenced.  When state sentences 
were imposed, the defendants sought to withdraw their state pleas 
on grounds that the state charges were prohibited by a statutory 
double jeopardy bar similar to Wis. Stat. § 161.45.
15   
 
The Pennsylvania court, consistent with the result reached in 
Poveda, held that application of the jeopardy bar was not 
dependent upon the sequence of the filing of the particular 
charges.  Rather, the court articulated that the determinative 
                     
     
15  Though similar to the statutory language before us, the 
Pennsylvania statute has incorporated specific reference to 
"former" and "subsequent" prosecutions. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111 (1995) 
provides as follows: 
 
 
§ 111. When prosecution barred by former prosecution in 
another jurisdiction: 
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United 
States or another state, a prosecution in any such other 
jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in 
this Commonwealth under the following circumstances: 
 
 
 ...  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
 
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
26 
factor triggering the application of the statutory bar was the 
point at which the guilty pleas were entered, stating: "[a] 
prosecution against a defendant, consequently, is not completed, 
and therefore cannot be a `former prosecution,' until a defendant 
is acquitted or convicted."  Ramirez, 533 A.2d at 119.  The court 
therefore concluded that the statutory jeopardy bar was not 
applicable because the Pennsylvania prosecution had been completed 
first.  Id.  
 
In the present case, the State's prosecution of Petty was 
completed on October 16, 1991, when the circuit court accepted his 
pleas of guilty, and jeopardy attached to the proceedings.  See 
Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d at 937-38; Poveda, 166 Wis. 2d at 25.  As 
this date was prior to the prosecution of Petty in federal court, 
we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 161.45 cannot serve to relieve Petty 
from his drug conviction in state court.  We therefore affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals on different grounds. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
No. 93-2200-CR 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-2200-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Gary Lewis Petty, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  190 Wis. 2d 467, 528 N.W.2d 90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
May 31, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 29, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
FRANK T. CRIVELLO 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a 
brief and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Maureen 
McGlynn Flanagan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.