Title: State v. Nathaniel Harvey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-23-95
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 1997

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Pollock, J., writing for a majority of the Court. Defendant appeals from his murder conviction and death sentence. The primary issue raised is the admissibility of DNA evidence. The body of Irene Schnaps was found in her Plainsboro apartment on June 17, 1985. She had received approximately fifteen blows to the head. Some of the blows fractured her skull and caused direct injury to the brain. In addition, some of her teeth were knocked out, her jaw had been broken, and her face and neck were bruised. The medical examiner concluded that the combination of the blows had killed Schnaps, and that she had bled profusely. Investigating police detected no signs of forced entry. Schnaps's bedroom, however, was a scene of obvious struggle. Blood stains were on the carpet and throughout the room. It appeared that someone had attempted to wipe Schnaps's body clean of blood. A white pillowcase bore a bloody sneaker-print with a chevron pattern and the letters PON. Also found in the bedroom were an empty Seiko-LaSalle watch box, an empty Olympus camera box, and an empty jewelry box. Schnaps's pocketbook was open and did not contain any money. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1985, police in the neighboring community of West Windsor were searching for the perpetrator of a series of unsolved burglaries and sexual assaults. Based on eyewitness descriptions, they believed that the perpetrator was a stocky black male, under five-feet three and one-half inches tall, who traveled on foot or by bicycle. Defendant fit the physical description. On October 28, 1985, police investigated three burglaries and arrested defendant after he was seen standing with his bicycle at the edge of a soybean field. One of the burglary victims identified defendant at a subsequent show-up. Defendant confessed to committing a number of burglaries in West Windsor, as well as a sexual assault. Defendant consented to the search of his car and his Jamesburg apartment for evidence involving an unrelated sexual assault. (Defendant claimed to be living in Jamesburg with his father, although it was later determined that he was living in West Windsor with his estranged wife.) Police discovered two watches in the car, one a Seiko-LaSalle like the watch missing from Schnaps's apartment. Defendant was arraigned for Schnaps's murder. He said that he would tell police about the murder, but first wanted to speak to his father. After defendant spoke with his father, police failed to administer new Miranda warnings. Defendant confessed to murdering Schnaps shortly thereafter. At defendant's first trial, the State relied on defendant's confession. A jury convicted defendant of purposeful or knowing murder, robbery, burglary, and other charges. The same jury sentenced defendant to death in the penalty phase. Defendant's first appeal resulted in a reversal of the conviction. The Court found that the trial court's jury instructions did not comport with its opinion in Gerald, which required that a jury must be instructed separately on the crimes of intentional murder and serious-bodily-injury murder. The Court also held that defendant's confession was inadmissible, since defendant did not receive new Miranda warnings after invoking his right to silence. Before defendant's retrial, the State hired Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory to conduct DNA tests on blood recovered at the crime scene. At trial, the State relied on DNA evidence to prove defendant's guilt. The State called two witnesses from Cellmark, who testified generally that DNA tests conducted on blood samples at the crime scene were genetically comparable to defendant's DNA. According to these witnesses, defendant's genotypes for the genetic markers examined were common to only 1-in-1400 African Americans. Additionally, a forensic scientist testified that one of the hairs found on Schnaps's back did not belong to her, and that it was consistent with a control hair taken from defendant. The same scientist testified that a pair of Pony sneakers seized from defendant's ex-wife's apartment were consistent with the sneaker impression found on the pillowcase in Schnaps's apartment. Defendant called as an expert a forensic biologist who testified that the DNA tests conducted by Cellmark were scientifically indefensible. He disputed the 1-in-1400 calculation claimed by the State's experts, concluding that the genetic makeup of the blood recovered from the crime scene could be found in approximately 1-in-50 or 1-in-200 African Americans. HELD: Defendant's convictions and death sentence are affirmed. 1. Defendant cites to the trial court's failure to give a non-unanimous Mejia charge (jury must be instructed that unanimity is not required in determining whether defendant intended to kill). Such error, however, can be considered harmless when the evidence of intent to kill is overwhelming and no rational basis exists for concluding that defendant had intended to inflict only serious bodily injury. In defendant's first trial, it was the statement in his confession that he struck the victim once in response to her striking him that provided a rational basis for a juror to conclude that defendant intended only to injure his victim and not kill her. Defendant's confession was not before the jury in the retrial, and without it, the evidence does not provide a rational basis to support a finding that defendant's intent was to inflict only serious bodily injury. (pp. 15-22) 2. The trial court's instruction and the verdict sheet prevented the jury from considering felony murder until after it had first found defendant guilty of purposeful or knowing murder. Although the charge was flawed, the error was not capable of producing an unjust result. (pp. 23-25) 3. The Court accepts the admission into evidence of the results of DNA polymarker testing, which is used primarily on small samples of genetic material, such as blood stains. On this record, the Court concludes that the scientific community generally accepts polymarker testing, including dot-intensity analysis. The admission of the testimony of the State's experts about the results of the DNA tests was not error. The weight of the evidence was for the jury. (pp. 25-68) 4. The trial court's refusal to permit defendant to further challenge the admissibility of polymarker testing at trial did not violate his constitutional right to present a defense, since defendant remained free to introduce evidence relevant to the weight or credibility of the testimony of the State's experts in respect of the testing. (pp. 69-75) 5. The trial court did not err in admitting the State's statistical evidence tending to show that defendant could not be excluded as a contributor to the blood found at the crime scene (the testimony that defendant's genetic markers were shared by one-in-1400 African Americans). The scientific community has generally accepted such statistics. The statistical evidence can be challenged by the presentation of conflicting expert testimony. (pp. 75-93) 6. Defendant's other challenges to his conviction and sentence are rejected. (pp. 93-134) Defendant's murder conviction and death sentence are AFFIRMED. JUSTICE HANDLER, dissenting, in which JUSTICE O'HERN joins, in part, disagrees with the majority's conclusion that the trial court's erroneous jury charge on the Mejia issue constituted harmless error. (Justice O'Hern joins the dissent on this point.) Justice Handler is also of the view that the DNA testing relied on by the State in proving defendant's guilt -- dot-intensity analysis -- cannot be considered reliable or generally accepted. In addition, he believes that other significant errors contributed to defendant's conviction and death sentence. JUSTICES GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN, concurs in the opinion and judgment of the Court except with respect to Part II thereof. He would therefore affirm the convictions except insofar as the conviction of murder establishes death eligibility. He joins Part Two, Section I of Justice Handler's opinion on the issue of a non-unanimous verdict. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 23 September Term 1995 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Appellant. Argued April 29, 1996 -- Decided July 30, 1997 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County. Michael B. Jones and Stephen A. Caruso, Assistant Deputies Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, attorney). Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by POLLOCK, J. Defendant, Nathaniel Harvey, appeals directly from a judgment of conviction and sentence of death for the purposeful-or-knowing murder of Irene Schnaps. A jury originally convicted defendant of Schnaps's murder and sentenced him to death in October 1986. This Court reversed that conviction because of errors in the admission of defendant's confession and in the failure of the trial court to give a "Gerald charge." State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407 (1990) (Harvey I), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S. Ct. 1336, 113 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1991). The phrase "Gerald charge" refers to a charge that distinguishes murder when the defendant intended to kill from murder when the defendant intended only to cause serious bodily injury that resulted in death. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40 (1988). Neither error occurred in the second trial. In the absence of defendant's confession, the State relied substantially on DNA evidence to establish that defendant was Schnaps's killer. Again, a jury convicted defendant and imposed the death penalty. On this appeal, defendant raises numerous points, including challenges to the admission of the DNA evidence and to the jury charge. After careful review of all of defendant's arguments, we affirm his conviction and death sentence. Investigating police detected no signs of forced entry. The bedroom, however, was a scene of obvious struggle. Blood stains were on the carpet and throughout the room. Schnaps's naked body lay face-up on the floor. She had sustained severe head and facial wounds. Despite the extensive head wounds, no bloodstains were present on Schnaps's chest and stomach. The matting of several small hairs to the victim's body and the absence of blood on her torso suggested that someone had attempted to wipe the body clean. The carpeting around the body was wet from water. Schnaps's back was covered with blood. A white pillowcase bore a bloody sneaker-print with a chevron pattern and the letters "PON." Although the bedding appeared clean, blood stained the mattress, the underlying box spring, a cardboard box that protruded from under the bed, and a towel. The bedroom also included an empty Seiko-LaSalle watch box, an empty Olympus camera box, and an empty jewelry box. In the bathroom, the investigators found Schnaps's pocketbook. The pocketbook was open and did not contain any money. B. The Autopsy On June 18, 1985, Dr. Marvin Shuster, the Middlesex County medical examiner, conducted an autopsy. He determined that Schnaps had sustained approximately fifteen blows to the head. The largest wound, six inches long and one inch wide, extended from the front of her forehead to the top of her head. In general, the skull wounds were either curving or linear. The curving wounds were likely caused by hammer blows, and the linear wounds could have been caused by an item akin to a tire iron, a two-by-four, or a dull hatchet or axe. Some of the blows fractured Schnaps's skull and caused direct injury to the brain. Blows had been delivered from both the right and left sides, some from the front, but most from behind. Triangular pressure marks appeared on both sides of the neck. Some of the victim's teeth were knocked out, and her jaw was broken. The right sides of the neck, jaw, cheek, and forehead were bruised, and she was cut behind one ear. Unable to attribute death to any particular wound, Dr. Shuster concluded that the combination of the blows had killed Schnaps. Schnaps had bled profusely and died within a matter of minutes. C. The Apprehension and Interrogation of Nathaniel Harvey 1. October 28, 1985 Throughout the summer and autumn of 1985, West Windsor police looked for the perpetrator of a series of unsolved burglaries and sexual assaults. Based on eyewitness descriptions, they believed that the perpetrator was a stocky black male, under five-feet three-and-a-half inches tall, who usually travelled on foot or by bicycle. The police also believed that the perpetrator of those other crimes might be responsible for Schnaps's murder. Defendant fit the physical description. On October 28, 1985, police investigating three burglaries arrested defendant after he was sighted standing with his bicycle at the edge of a soybean field in West Windsor. One of the burglary victims identified defendant at a subsequent "show-up." During questioning by West Windsor police on October 28, defendant confessed to committing a number of burglaries in West Windsor, as well as a sexual assault. Defendant also agreed to accompany the police on a car tour to point out the locations of his crimes. 2. October 29, 1985 At 10:00 a.m. on the following morning, defendant accompanied two detectives on a car tour of West Windsor. At 1:15 p.m., defendant consented to a search of his car and his Jamesburg apartment for evidence related to an unrelated sexual assault. Although defendant gave as his address his father's apartment in Jamesburg, he lived with his estranged wife in West Windsor. Apparently, defendant feared that his wife would lose her welfare benefits if he revealed that he lived with her. After defendant signed the consent form, police transferred him to the Mercer County Detention Center. While searching defendant's car, the officers discovered two watches, including a Seiko-LaSalle like the one missing from Schnaps's apartment. They notified the Plainsboro Police Department. After obtaining a search warrant, a Plainsboro officer seized the watch. The search of Harvey's Jamesburg apartment did not yield any evidence. 3. October 30, 1985 Following defendant's arraignment for the murder of Schnaps, investigating officers resumed questioning him. At one point, defendant said that "he would tell [them] about the murder but first wanted to speak to his father." After defendant spoke with his father, police failed to administer new Miranda warnings. Shortly thereafter, defendant confessed to murdering Schnaps. D. The First Trial On November 19, 1985, a Middlesex County grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging defendant with the purposeful-or-knowing murder of Schnaps, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (count one), second-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count two), and second-degree burglary, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count three). Two days later, on November 21, 1985, the Middlesex County Prosecutor filed a Notice of Aggravating Factors pursuant to Rule 3:13-4(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2), making defendant's case a capital prosecution. The State alleged the following aggravating factors: 1. The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c).] 2. The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, imprisonment or confinement for robbery and burglary committed by the defendant [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f).] 3. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing robbery and burglary [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g).] The prosecution relied heavily on defendant's confession. Harvey I, supra, 121 N.J. at 415-17. The jury found defendant guilty of purposeful-or-knowing murder, first-degree robbery, second-degree burglary, and felony murder, for which he had not been indicted. At a penalty-phase hearing, the same jury found the presence of all three alleged aggravating factors and returned a sentence of death. E. Harvey I On direct appeal, this Court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Court held that the trial court's jury instructions on murder did not comport with Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. 40, which required that a jury must be instructed separately on the crimes of intentional murder and serious-bodily-injury murder (SBI murder). At the time of Harvey's trial, a conviction for SBI murder did not render a defendant death-eligible. In his confession, Harvey claimed that the victim struck him and that he then struck her only once. Relying in part on statements in his confession, the Court concluded that the evidence provided a rational basis for a jury to have concluded that defendant intended only to injure Schnaps. Harvey I, supra, 121 N.J. at 413. The Court further held that Harvey's confession had been procured in violation of State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (1986). Hartley provides that after invoking the right to silence, a defendant must receive new Miranda warnings before interrogation can resume. The Court ruled that by asking to speak with his father Harvey had invoked his right to silence. Harvey I, supra, 121 N.J. at 418-20. Consequently, the police should have advised him again of his constitutional rights before resuming interrogation. The failure of the police to abide by that bright-line test rendered defendant's confession inadmissible. Id. at 422. F. The Interim Between Trials Faced with the prospect of retrying Harvey without his confession, the prosecution hired Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory (Cellmark) to conduct DNA tests on the blood recovered from the crime scene. Cellmark, the first commercial laboratory accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, conducts DNA tests exclusively. It analyzed a bloodstained section of Schnaps's box spring, a bloodstained piece of cardboard, and a sample of both Schnaps's and defendant's blood. G. The Retrial Defendant's retrial, from the pretrial motions to the return of the death sentence, lasted from November 25, 1992 to December 16, 1994. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial on January 30, 1995. 1. Pretrial Motions Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant's car, ruling that defendant had consented to the search. The defendant also moved to exclude the State's DNA evidence. After a three-day New Jersey Rule of Evidence 104 (Rule 104) hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion and held that the State's DNA evidence was admissible. 2. Guilt Phase After a lengthy jury-selection process, the guilt phase began on November 29, 1994. a. State's Case The State adduced evidence about the crime scene, including fifty-two photographs and various items of physical evidence. Investigating officers testified to the discovery of the bloody sneaker print, the empty Seiko-LaSalle watch box, the empty jewelry box, and the empty Olympus camera box, all of which were admitted into evidence. Philip Beesley, a forensic scientist employed by the New Jersey State Police, testified that blood work done on control samples from both the defendant and Schnaps revealed that Schnaps's blood was type "one plus, one minus" for the genetic marker PGM, and type "1" for the enzyme CA II. Defendant was type "one plus, one plus" for PGM and type "2-1" for CA II. Beesley further revealed that bloodstains found on the box spring and on the piece of cardboard tested as "one plus, one plus" for PGM and type "2-1" for CA II. He concluded that those stains were consistent with Harvey's blood, therefore, not Schnaps's. Beesley also testified that CA II of phenotype 2-1 is found only in African Americans. Dr. Marvin Shuster testified about the nature of the wounds suffered by Schnaps and the cause of her death. See supra part I.B. Theodore Mozer, a forensic scientist employed by the New Jersey State Police, testified that one of the hairs recovered from Schnaps's back did not belong to her. Mozer testified that this hair had "Negroid" characteristics that were consistent with a control hair taken from Harvey. Mozer also examined two pairs of sneakers seized from Harvey's ex-wife's West Windsor apartment and the size 6 1/2 "Pony" sneakers that Harvey was wearing when he was arrested. Aided by six enlarged photographs of the bloody footprint left at the crime scene, Mozer explained that Harvey's "Pony" sneakers were consistent with the sneaker impression. Although Harvey's sneakers "could" have left the bloody mark, Mozer could not conclude definitively that they had done so. In support of the admission of the DNA evidence, the State presented two witnesses from Cellmark, Julie Cooper, a senior molecular biologist, and Dr. Charlotte Word, a microbiologist and supervisor of forensic casework. They testified generally that DNA tests conducted on the blood samples recovered at the crime scene were genetically comparable to defendant's DNA. Defendant's genotypes for the genetic markers examined were common to only one-in-1,400 African Americans. b. Defendant's Case Defendant did not testify. His case consisted of only two witnesses. A witness from Seiko testified that it had made thousands of watches like the one seized from the trunk of defendant's car. Dr. Robert Shaler, Director of Forensic Biology for the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for the City of New York, testified that he believed that the DNA tests were "scientifically indefensible." In the course of his testimony, he pointed out the imbalances in the dots on the strips. He found imbalances at the GYPA, HBGG and GC loci. Dr. Shaler testified that at the GYPA locus an individual's genes could cause a difference in dot intensity. He further disputed the one-in-1,400 calculation and asserted that he believed that the genetic makeup of the blood recovered from the crime scene could be found in approximately one in fifty to one in 200 African Americans. c. The Verdict In its jury instructions, the court included a Gerald charge. Consistent with State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 530-34 (1992), the court also charged on the unindicted count of felony murder. After deliberating for three and one-half hours, the jury returned its verdict finding defendant guilty of purposeful-or-knowing murder, felony murder, first-degree robbery, and second-degree burglary. 3. Penalty Phase a. State's Case The State relied exclusively on the evidence adduced at the guilt phase to support proof of three aggravating factors: the murder involved aggravated assault of the victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c); the murder was committed to escape detection, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f); and the murder was committed during the course of a robbery and burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g). b. Defendant's Case Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c) and (h), defendant alleged ten mitigating factors: the age of the defendant at the time of the murder; the defendant was traumatized at a young age when he witnessed the death of his older sister; defendant was uprooted from his home and sent to live with his grandparents who abused him; defendant suffered feelings of abandonment when his parents moved north and failed to send for him; he was exposed to domestic violence in the home of his grandparents; he was exposed to domestic violence in the home of his parents; he is a caring and loving father; his continuing relationship with his children including financial contributions; his relationship with his mentally disabled brother and his mentally disabled daughter; and all factors which relate to the defendant's childhood and family background. Professor Richard Moran, a criminologist specializing in the correlation between age and crime, testified that if defendant were sentenced to prison rather than death, he could not be eligible for parole prior to age 64, by which time he would be in the age group least likely to commit violent crime. Therefore, the chances of defendant committing another violent crime would be minute. A forensic social worker testified about defendant's social history. Defendant was raised in poverty. His often-absent father was a sharecropper and a migrant worker. As a two-year old, defendant had been injured in an automobile accident, but did not receive medical treatment. When defendant was four, he and his five-year old sister were left in an unheated home. While trying to light a stove, defendant's sister spilled some kerosene on her nightgown. When defendant lit a match, she burned to death. Defendant's parents later moved to New Jersey, leaving defendant in the care of his grandparents for seven years. During his childhood, defendant was abused by both his grandfather and father. Various family members testified that defendant was a loving and caring father, who also comforted his developmentally-disabled brother. Defendant's family asked the jury not to sentence defendant to death. c. The Verdict After deliberating for two and one-half hours, the jury returned a unanimous verdict that defendant had committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f), and in the course of a robbery and burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g). It did not find aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c), that the murder involved aggravated assault to the victim. The jury further found that the aggravating factors outweighed all of the mitigating factors and that each aggravating factor alone outweighed all of the mitigating factors. The trial court sentenced defendant to death. Later, the trial court sentenced defendant as a persistent offender on the non-capital counts of first-degree robbery and second-degree burglary. Accordingly, defendant received a sentence of life with a twenty-five year parole bar on the first degree robbery conviction to run consecutively to defendant's death sentence for capital murder. On the burglary conviction, defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of five years in prison with a two-and-one-half year parole bar. Those sentences were made consecutive to prison terms previously imposed on defendant for unrelated crimes. Thus, defendant's aggregate sentence, irrespective of the death penalty, is life plus sixty-five years with a fifty-seven-and-one-half year parole disqualifier. inflict serious bodily injury, became the linchpin of capital-punishment eligibility. If the evidence produced at trial provided even a rational basis for a jury to convict a defendant of SBI murder rather than intentional murder, the trial court was compelled to "instruct the jury to specify which, if [either], of those findings forms the basis for conviction." State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 209 (1990). Under Gerald, the jury's key role became to determine whether defendant's intent was to kill or to inflict SBI. State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 484 (1991). In Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 48l, this Court clarified Gerald by stating that a jury need not be unanimous on whether the defendant intended to kill or to injure seriously. The intent-to-kill requirement is not an element of murder, but a "triggering device" for the death-penalty phase of the trial. Id. at 486. Thus, unanimity is not required in making the Gerald determination. Id. at 487 (noting "unanimity requirement extends only to verdicts adverse to the defendant"). A jury can return a valid guilty verdict for purposeful-or-knowing murder even if it cannot agree that defendant killed intentionally. Such a verdict, however, will not support the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 486. In Mejia, the record provided "a rational basis for a jury to find that defendant intended only to cause serious bodily injury." Id. at 481. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury about the possibility of returning a non-unanimous verdict on the defendant's intent thus constituted plain error. In State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 549 (1995), however, we held that a failure to give a non-unanimous Mejia charge could be considered harmless when the evidence of intent to kill was overwhelming and no rational basis existed for concluding that defendant had intended to inflict only serious bodily injury. Although defendant's case was tried seven months before the issuance of Mejia and Harris, defense counsel requested a charge on a non-unanimous verdict. Before us, defendant argues that the absence of a non-unanimous verdict charge coerced the jury into returning a verdict of capital murder. The initial inquiry, then, is whether the evidence provided a rational basis to find that defendant intended to inflict only serious bodily, and not to kill. error was not harmless because there was evidence in this case that could have sustained an SBI . . . verdict. We do not suggest that such a verdict was likely, but merely that if the jury returned that verdict, the court could not reject it."). Satisfaction of the "minimally adequate/rational basis" standard, however, requires more than a mere "scintilla of the evidence." Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 489; State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986). We have found harmless error in cases where defendants' actions have been "so wantonly brutal that the jury could have concluded only that the defendant intended to cause death." Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 488; see, e.g., Harris, supra, 141 N.J. at 550 (victim was handcuffed and lying on ground when defendant shot him in back of head); State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 579 (1992) (Bey III) (defendant stomped on victim with sufficient force to crush her chest), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1131, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 18 (1991) (Biegenwald IV) (defendant fired four gunshots into victim's head); State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 558-60 (1990) (defendant slashed victims' throats, bludgeoned one with baseball bat, and expressed intent to kill both before and after killings); State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 412-14 (1990) (Hightower I) (defendant shot victim at close range in chest, neck, and head, and then dragged victim into freezer); State v. Rose, 120 N.J. 61, 63-64 (1990) (Rose II) (defendant fired twelve-gauge shotgun point-blank into victim's stomach); State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253 (1990) (DiFrisco I) (defendant shot victim four times in head and admitted intention to kill), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996); Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 614-20 (defendant threatened to kill victims two days before murders, inflicted twenty-five to thirty stab wounds with combat knife, cut one victim's throat twice, and paused to take victim's pulse to verify death); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 374-77 (1989) (defendant stated intent to kill immediately prior to stabbing victim twenty-four times). confession were not before the jury in the retrial. Post at ___ (slip op. at 90). Not before the jury was defendant's confession that he had struck the victim only once in response to being punched in the nose. Harvey I, supra, 121 N.J. at 412. That confession provided a rational basis for a juror in the first trial to have concluded that Harvey intended only to injure his victim and not kill her. The absence of Harvey's confession is a critical distinction between the record in Harvey I and that in the present case. found harmless trial courts' failure to provide a non-unanimity instruction. According to the dissent, repeated bludgeoning to the head by a hammer-like instrument, such as the one used by defendant, "is not like a gun fired at close range into a person; the victim's death is not so assured." Post at ____ (slip op. at 93) (citing Hightower I, supra, 120 N.J. at 412-14 (finding that defendant shot victim with a .32-caliber handgun from close range in the chest, neck, and head)). Incomprehensibly, the dissent also concludes that, unlike other cases, "there is no evidence that defendant took further steps to assure Ms. Schnaps's death." Post at ___ (slip op. at 94) (citing Hightower I, supra, 120 N.J. at 413 (finding that defendant dragged victim into freezer); Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 618 (noting that defendant took victim's pulse)). We disagree. The inescapable inference created by the objective facts, especially the severity and number of Schnaps's wounds, is that defendant intended to kill her. Likewise, the inclusion of charges on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated and reckless manslaughter do not compel the need for a Gerald/Mejia charge. Those charges reflect the trial court's caution when instructing the jury. that the jury could have concluded only that the defendant intended to cause death." Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 488. with Purnell, supra, 126 N.J. at 530-34, instructed the jury on felony murder. A conviction for felony murder, however, does not render a defendant eligible for the death penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c; Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 255. In Purnell, this Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed for a murder that was committed in the course of a felony if the jury was not permitted to consider the non-capital verdict of felony murder. Although the trial court here gave a felony-murder charge, the verdict sheet makes clear that the jury could not have considered a verdict on felony murder without first finding defendant guilty of purposeful-or-knowing murder. knowingly. If the jury answered affirmatively, the verdict sheet directed them to page three. That page directed the jury to the Gerald issue, whether defendant had acted with the intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily injury. It also directed the jury to consider whether defendant was guilty of felony murder. Thus, unless the jurors first found defendant guilty of purposeful or knowing murder, they would not have reached the felony-murder alternative. In effect, the verdict sheet distracted the jury from convicting the defendant of felony murder, but not purposeful-or-knowing murder. In a capital case, "the jury must be given every opportunity to convict of the charge not carrying the death penalty." Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 484 (quoting John M. Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code, Annotated, Comment 13 to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e)). Here, the combination of the jury charge and the verdict sheet led the jury away from rendering a non-capital verdict of felony murder. That was error. On the facts of this case, however, the flaws in the charge and verdict sheet do not constitute plain error. Defendant has not advanced any plausible version in which the jury could have convicted him of felony murder without also convicting him of purposeful-or-knowing murder. Nor can we ascertain any such version from the record. In sum, the error was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. DNA testing is an evolving science. The general acceptance or rejection of a test may change over time. Even a test that is accepted generally, moreover, may attract critics. One generally accepted DNA test involves restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis. Because the blood sample in this case was so small, the State's experts could not use RFLP analysis. Instead, they used tests based on a Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): the HLA DQ ALPHA (DQ Alpha) and polymarker (PM) tests. We begin with a basic explanation of DNA. The explanation necessarily uses technical terms and describes scientific methods. Our purpose is to discuss the basic concepts to the extent necessary for comprehension of the trial court's decision to admit the DNA evidence. In the course of our discussion, we shall review objections raised by defendant and the dissent to the admission of the DNA evidence. Generally, the defense repeats arguments rejected by the trial court. The dissent, however, raises several objections not raised by the defense either at trial or on this appeal. Both the defense and the dissent share the objective of precluding the admission of DNA evidence proving that defendant murdered Irene Schnaps. Our scrutiny of the record leads to the conclusion that the trial court did not err in admitting the DNA evidence. The weight of the evidence was a matter for the jury. A gene's position on a chromosome is its locus. In different individuals, genes may be "polymorphic," meaning that they may take different forms or contain different sequences of base pairs. The polymorphic genes, which vary from one person to another, provide the basis for DNA identification. Most DNA has no known function, but even non-functional DNA remains important in forensic analysis. During mitosis, or cell division, each chromosome is copied. The paired nucleotides separate, dividing the chromosome's DNA molecule into two separate strands. Free-floating nucleotides attach to the exposed nucleotides of the separated strands in accordance with the G-C, A-T rule. Thus, each strand reconstitutes identical DNA molecules. When the cell divides, these two identical chromosomes enter newly-created "daughter" cells. Each new cell has the identical genetic composition as the original cell. All cells contain the same chromosomal composition. No two individuals, except identical twins, have the same nucleotide sequences throughout their DNA. DNA testing conducted on cells from various parts of the same body, whether blood, skin, semen, saliva, or hair will yield the same results. As in this case, DNA analysis can help identify donors of genetic material, such as blood. 2. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) At present, the most widely accepted DNA test is the RFLP analysis. See, e.g., Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 892 (Colo. 1993) (holding that "no serious dispute exists as to whether the techniques involved in RFLP analysis are generally accepted"); State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 468 (Mont. 1994) (concluding that "the theory underlying DNA and RFLP technology is generally not open to serious attack and [] such evidence is widely admitted in various state and federal courts and jurisdictions"); State v. Streich, 658 A.2d 38, 48 (Vt. 1995) (noting that "we cannot find any recent decision under any standard of admissibility which refuses to admit the DNA match result based on" the RFLP technology). Recently, in State v. Marcus, the Appellate Division recognized that the scientific community generally accepts RFLP analysis. 294 N.J. Super. 267 (1996). As Judge Skillman stated, "DNA testing by the RFLP method is generally accepted and is sufficiently reliable to warrant its admission in criminal cases." Id. at 285. RFLP was not the DNA analysis employed in this case. A brief description of RFLP, however, may be useful as background information. RFLP focuses on non-functional regions of DNA known as variable-number tandem repeats (VNTRs). In these regions, which typically range from 500 to 10,000 pairs of nucleotides, a core sequence of approximately fifteen to thirty-five base pairs is repeated many times consecutively along the chromosome. The number of repeats varies among individuals. At a given locus or site on a chromosome, sequences with different numbers of repeated units are known as VNTR alleles. Because different VNTR alleles contain different numbers of repeats, these alleles can be identified by their lengths. National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence 14-15 (1996) (NRC Report). In RFLP analysis, the recovered DNA sample and the sample from the suspect are treated with a restriction enzyme, which seeks out a specific nucleotide pattern on the DNA helixes. It then fragments the molecules at those sites. Because of VNTRs, the locations of these sites, and the lengths of the resulting fragments, differ among individuals. Through a process called "gel electrophoresis" the DNA fragments are sorted by size and split into single strands. These strands bond to a nylon membrane, where a specially treated and radioactively-tagged single strand of DNA, called a "genetic probe," is applied. The genetic probe bonds with a targeted VNTR sequence. The nylon membrane is then placed in contact with a piece of X-ray film. The radioactivity of the probes exposes the film, producing a pattern of bands, like the bar-code on a box in a supermarket, where the probes have attached to VNTRs. This bar-code image is called an "autoradiograph" or "autorad." Fragments from different donors contain different numbers of repeat units, with a corresponding variation in the lengths of the fragments. Typically, radioactive probes need days or even weeks to expose the film. Id. at 18. Generally speaking, RFLP testing is time-consuming and may require months for a complete analysis. Ibid. Comparison of the location of the bands reveals whether the targeted VNTR in the subjects's DNA matches the DNA from the recovered genetic material. That analysis can lead with a high degree of certainty to a correlation between the DNA samples. The next step involves analysis of population statistics, which reveals the likelihood of a random match between the samples. Using single-locus probes, the probability of finding a random match between unrelated individuals on all bands of a DNA fingerprint is less than one in ten million. Using one multi-locus probe, the probability is about one in thirty-three billion. Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, "Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence," 84 A.L.R.4th 313, 324 (1991). One problem with RFLP testing is that it requires a large quantity of high-quality genetic material. For example, it requires at least a quarter-sized blood stain or a dime-sized semen stain. Unless those samples are recovered when relatively fresh, they will degrade into fragments too small for RFLP analysis. Id. at 320. Cellmark attempted RFLP testing in this case. The samples, however, were too degraded to permit RFLP analysis. Thus, Cellmark turned to a newer technology, which involved Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). 3. PCR When, as here, the quantity or quality of genetic material recovered from a crime scene is insufficient to allow RFLP analysis, forensic scientists have used the PCR process to amplify the DNA to produce an amount suitable for testing. The PCR process can copy a segment of DNA millions of times. NRC Report, supra, at 22-23. With the resulting genetic product, scientists can conduct "allele-specific probe" analysis. Fleming, supra, 84 A.L.R.4th at 322-23. The PCR process copies DNA fragments similar to the way DNA replicates itself during mitosis. Through heating the DNA sample in a thermal cycler, the process separates the helix into separate strands. Primers composed of short DNA segments are added to define the target sequence of DNA. Then, a basic solution containing the enzyme DNA polymerase and the four basic nucleotides are added to the primed DNA sample. The added nucleotides pair with the exposed nucleotides on the separated target-strands in accordance with the G-C, A-T pairing rule. From the original DNA segment, two identical segments result. The thermal cycler runs through its cycle approximately thirty-two times, amplifying the original sample by a factor of two billion. Currently PCR technology effectively amplifies only small regions of DNA. Accordingly, PCR cannot be used to amplify longer VNTRs for RFLP testing. NRC Report, supra, at 69-70. PCR-based testing methods have several advantages over RFLP analysis. They are relatively simple processes and can yield results within a short period of time, often within twenty-four hours. Of particular importance to the present case, the PCR process also makes possible DNA tests on small amounts of genetic material. A disadvantage of PCR-based tests, however, is that the identified genes have fewer alleles than VNTR's. Hence, scientists must examine more loci to produce the same amount of information about the likelihood that two individuals share a profile. Id. at 71. Also, some of the loci examined by PCR-based tests are functional genes. Unlike non-functional VNTR markers, functional genes are more susceptible to natural selection, a susceptibility that might undermine their usefulness in matching DNA samples. Ibid. Contamination also is of concern in PCR testing. The technology is so efficient that even small contaminants can be replicated along with the targeted DNA. Ibid. Cellmark used two types of PCR-based tests in defendant's case: the HLA DQ Alpha (DQ Alpha) and polymarker (PM) tests. a. HLA DQ Alpha Test The DQ Alpha test reveals an individual's form of alleles for the human-leukocyte-antigen DQ Alpha gene. The purpose of the DQ Alpha test is to identify the genotype or the two alleles that comprise the DQ Alpha gene present in the DNA sample. That result is then compared with the DQ Alpha genotype of the suspect. If the genotypes match, then the suspect cannot be excluded as a possible donor. Genetics population databases then produce the frequency with which the suspect's genotype appears in the population. Although eight alleles have been identified at the DQ Alpha locus, only six are commonly used in forensic work. Ibid. Each of those six alleles can be distinguished by specific enzyme probes. Ibid. The six alleles for DQ Alpha are denominated as 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2, 3, and 4. For the DQ Alpha gene, there are twenty-one possible pair combinations or genotypes. To interpret the results, the test uses a test strip with six chemical dots. Each dot consists of a specific enzyme probe that selectively binds to one of the six DQ Alpha alleles. Because the probes, rather than the DNA, are fixed on the membrane, this is called a "reverse" blot. Ibid. This test strip is then immersed in a solution containing the PCR product. The alleles for DQ Alpha present in the PCR product then attach to their corresponding enzyme probe on the test strip. Where the alleles bond, the dots turn blue. Two of the six dots will turn blue to indicate which two alleles constitute an individual's genotype. If an individual is homozygous, meaning that the two DQ Alpha alleles are identical, only one dot will turn blue. The DQ Alpha test performed on defendant's blood revealed that his genotype for DQ Alpha is 4,4 or homozygous. Approximately 17" of the entire population (about one-in-six people) and 11.9" of the African American population (about one-in-eight) share that genotype. DQ Alpha tests performed on a blood stain from the box-spring fabric indicated the presence of the DQ Alpha alleles 2 and 4. Schnaps's genotype for DQ Alpha was 2,4. If the blood stain on the box spring were from a single donor, defendant could have been excluded because he does not possess the 2 allele. Schnaps, whose genotype matched the alleles, however, could not be excluded. If, however, the blood on the box spring is from a mixed sample, i.e., from more than one donor, then defendant cannot be excluded. The reason is that the 4 allele, which defendant possessed, was present in the blood stain. Based on other evidence, the prosecution established that the box-spring stain was a mixed sample. Courts in New Jersey and in other jurisdictions have admitted results of PCR technology and the DQ Alpha test as scientifically reliable. See State v. Dishon, 297 N.J. Super. 254, 277 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 144 (1997) (finding that no testimonial hearing was necessary to establish the general acceptance of DQ Alpha DNA testing); State v. Williams, 252 N.J. Super. 369, 381 (Law Div. 1991) (holding that "overwhelming and persuasive evidence" pointed to general acceptance of PCR process and DQ Alpha test); State v. Haddock, 897 P.2d 152 (Kan. 1995) (admitting results of DQ Alpha test as scientifically reliable); People v. Palumbo, 618 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (same); State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105 (Wash.), cert. denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 131, 133 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1995) (same). Defendant does not contest the admissibility of the PCR/DQ Alpha test results. He objects, however, to the admissibility of the results of the polymarker test, the validity of which the dissent concedes. Post at (slip op. at 5). Because of defendant's objection, we briefly discuss the polymarker test. b. The Polymarker (PM) Test The PM test works like the DQ Alpha test, but instead of testing for the composition of one gene, it tests for six genes. The six genes tested in the PM test are: LDLR (low density lipoprotein receptor), GYPA (glycophorin A), HBGG (hemoglobin gammaglobulin), D7S8, and GC (Group Component). Each of those genes consists of combinations of either two or three different alleles. A blue-dot test, similar to that used in the DQ Alpha test, determines the genotype for each gene. As explained by Ms. Cooper, one of the State's experts, the PCR test begins by amplifying the amount of DNA. Then, the DNA is passed over a polymere test strip. When the DNA finds its type on that locus, the dot changes color. Each combination of alleles is associated with a population frequency that is expressed as a percentage. After ascertaining a sample's genotypes and population frequencies for each of the five individual genes, a mathematical formula known as the "product rule" reveals the likelihood that another individual in the relevant population would share the test subject's genotype for all five targeted genes. The product rule, which gives the profile frequency in a population as a product of coefficients and allele frequencies, rests on the assumption that a population can be treated as a single, randomly mating unit. NRC Report, supra, at 5. Under the product rule, the population frequencies for each of the six genotypes are multiplied by one another. Defendant's genotype for LDLR is present in 56" of the African-American population, his GYPA in 50%, his HBGG in 27%, his D7S8 in 45%, his GC in 17%, and his DQ Alpha in 11.9%. Applying the product rule, the prosecution's expert testified that one-in-170 African Americans would share defendant's genotype for the LDLR, GYPA, HBGG, D7S8, and GC loci. The product rule equation would be: .56 x .5 x .27 x .45 x .17 = .0058, or, expressed as a ratio, about one-in-170 African Americans. By including defendant's DQ Alpha genotype frequency in the product-rule equation along with the polymarker loci, only one-in-1,400 African Americans would share defendant's composite genotype for all six genes. The product rule equation would be: .56 x .5 x .27 x .45 x .17 x .119 = .00069. Expressed as a ratio, the result is about one-in-1,400 African Americans. 4. The Dot-Intensity or Association-of-Alleles Technique In addition to his general objection to the polymarker test, defendant contends that the polymarker test cannot accurately analyze a mixed-blood sample. At trial, the experts described this method of analysis of interpreting the polymarker test on a mixed-blood sample as involving "the association of alleles." Scientific articles describe it as "dot-intensity" analysis, a description that we adopt generally in this opinion. At the pretrial hearing, Dr. Word, one of the State's experts, testified that the polymarker test is designed so that if a single blood source contributes a pair of heterozygous alleles (i.e. A, B or B, C but not A, A), the two alleles will turn blue in equal intensities. If, however, two or more blood donors contribute the same allele, that dot would be more intense or a darker blue than if an individual donor contributed only one such allele. The same result would follow if one blood donor contributed two of the same allele so as to result in a pair of homozygous alleles (i.e., A, A or B, B but not A, B). In sum, the determination whether a sample is from more than one source of blood depends on the intensity of the color of the dots. Cellmark performed PM tests on three samples: (1) on a bloody towel, assumed to contain blood from the victim only; (2) on a sample of defendant's blood; and (3) from a portion of the box-spring cover that contained a mixture of blood. The polymarker test on the blood removed from the box spring revealed the presence of both possible alleles (A and B) for LDLR, GYPA, and D7S8, and all three possible alleles (A, B, and C) for HBGG and GC. An individual can possess, at most, two different alleles. Consequently, the presence of three different alleles at the HBGG and GC loci demonstrated that the DNA sample from the box spring was a mixture of blood from more than one individual. Dr. Word testified that the PM test conducted on the mixed-blood sample from the box spring revealed two distinct sources. Two sets of alleles caused the color imbalances in the dots from the box-spring sample. On the test strip, some of the blue dots appeared darker, but others were lighter. None of the dots, however, was lighter than the control dot. Those dot-intensity imbalances resulted from the presence of some alleles in pairs and other singly. Using dot-intensity analysis, Dr. Word explained that a theoretical subtraction of the victim's blood from the PM results of the box-spring sample revealed the genotype of the second subject. She explained that if all three alleles for GC were present (A, B, and C) and the A allele-dot was darker on the test strip, the sample contained two A alleles, one B allele, and one C allele. The genotypes of the contributing donors, then, had to be either AB and AC, or AA and BC. No other combinations consisted of two A alleles, and only one each of B and C. Based on dot-intensity analysis of the blood stain from the box spring, the State's experts concluded that the blood could have been a mixture of defendant's blood with that of Schnaps. Cellmark made only two assumptions in its analysis: (1) that Schnaps was a donor to the blood on the box-spring sample; and (2) that the blood was a mixture of two people. The PM test for GC on the box spring revealed the presence of the A, B, and C alleles. The A dot was darker than the other two. That difference indicated that the composition of the GC in the sample consisted of two A alleles, plus the B and C alleles. If the sample had two donors, the possible combinations were AA and BC, or AB and AC. Schnaps was AC type for GC. The remaining donor therefore had to be AB. Defendant's genotype was AB. The D7S8 test on the box-spring sample revealed the A and B alleles, with the A dot being darker. The only possible combination, then, was AA and AB. Schnaps was AA type for D7S8. The remaining donor had to be AB. Defendant's genotype was AB. The HBGG test revealed the A, B, and C alleles at equal intensities. Because no dot was darker, Dr. Word testified that 2. Standard for Admission of Expert Testimony New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702, which is virtually identical to former Evid. R. 56(2), governs the admission of expert testimony. The rule provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier In effect, this rule imposes three basic requirements on the admission of expert testimony: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the subject of the testimony must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to explain the intended testimony. [State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984); N.J.R.E. 702, 1991 Supreme Court Committee Comment.] Defendant does not contest that DNA testing is beyond the ken of the average juror. Likewise, the defense does not dispute the qualifications of Ms. Cooper or Dr. Word as experts in the field of DNA testing. The sole issue is whether the scientific community sufficiently accepted the DNA tests to justify admission of the testimony of the State's experts. In criminal cases we continue to apply the general acceptance or Frye test for determining the scientific reliability of expert testimony. In Frye, supra, 293 F. at 1013-14, the court wrote: [W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to (2) by authoritative scientific and legal writings indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the proffered testimony; and (3) by judicial opinions that indicate the expert's premises have gained general acceptance. The burden to "clearly establish" each of these methods is on the proponent. Williams, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 376. Courts have applied this test in various contexts to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence. See, e.g., Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 209 (admitting expert testimony relating to battered woman's syndrome); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 412-13 (1988) (admitting expert testimony that modified chemical test detected presence of saliva on victim), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146, 103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); Windmere, supra, 105 N.J. at 373 (concluding that voice-print evidence does not derive from reasonably reliable scientific method); Romano, supra, 96 N.J. at 82 (holding breathalyzer scientifically reliable); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525 (1981) (admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony when subjected to strict safeguards ensuring reliability of hypnotic procedure); State v. King, 215 N.J. Super. 504, 518-20 (App. Div. 1987) (finding isoenzyme test, which detects the presence in blood of six distinct enzyme systems, held scientifically reliable); Williams, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 378-83 (holding PCR/DQ Alpha test and Gm/Km blood tests sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial). 3. General Acceptance Proof of general acceptance within a scientific community can be elusive. Windmere, supra, 105 N.J. at 379. Satisfying Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the scientific community has generally accepted the polymarker test. Dr. Word established that independent tests have validated the polymarker's reliability and that highly-regarded laboratories have employed the test in casework. Only defendant doubts the reliability of the PM test. b. Publications Scholarly and scientific publications, moreover, approve the polymarker test. In support of the polymarker test, the State submitted one published article, George Herrin, Nicola Fildes, &amp; Rebecca Reynolds, "Evaluation of the AmpliType PM DNA Test System on Forensic Case Samples," 39 J. Forensic Sci. 1247 (1994) (Herrin article), and two articles that since have been published: Nicola Fildes &amp; Rebecca Reynolds, "Consistency and Reproducibility of AmpliType PM Results Between Seven 5. Dot-Intensity Analysis Defendant asserts that even if the results of the polymarker test are admissible, dot-intensity analysis, the State's method of interpreting the mixed-blood sample, is scientifically unreliable. The dissent likewise rejects dot-intensity analysis. Indeed, the dissent goes so far as to assert that if dot-intensity analysis is reliable, "the results obtained would be inconsistent with defendant being the murderer." Post at (slip op. at 39). At the Rule 104 hearing, dot-intensity analysis was presented as an integral part of polymarker testing. The Rule d. New Jersey Rule of Evidence 403 Finally, the dissent argues that even if the DNA evidence derives from a generally accepted methodology, the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. Post at (slip op. at 50). In particular, the dissent challenges the assumption that only two people provided blood to the box-spring sample and that the victim's and suspect's blood were present in equal amounts. The argument is more theoretical than real. Nothing in the record suggests the presence of more than two persons at the crime scene. In general, whether evidence should be excluded under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 403 because its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value is an issue remitted to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 20 (1994). Only when the trial court commits a clear error of judgment does an appellate court disturb the trial court's decision. State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 496 (1994) (DiFrisco II), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 313 (1988) (Koedatich I), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1989). 2. FBI Report The trial court should have allowed defendant to elicit testimony from Dr. Shaler about an article indicating that the FBI did not use the association-of-alleles or dot-intensity technique. The error, however, was harmless. R. 2:10-2. As previously explained, supra part IV.B.5., some of defendant's criticisms regarding the dot-intensity technique bore on the weight, not the admissibility of the DNA evidence. Thus, the court should have permitted defendant to elicit testimony about the article, which went only to the weight of the State's According to the prosecution's experts, someone with the foregoing genetic make-up could not be excluded as a donor to the mixed-blood sample recovered from the victim's box spring. To determine the percentage of African-American individuals who would share defendant's genotype for all six genes, Cellmark multiplied genotype frequencies by one another in accordance with the product rule. See supra part IV.A.3.b. Application of the product rule indicated that defendant's genotype for all six genes was common to approximately one-in-1,400 African Americans. On appeal, defendant alleges that Cellmark's one-in-1,400 figure was incorrect because it did not include the percentage of African Americans who could have matched the mixed-blood sample. Defendant argues that this alleged error arose because the DQ Alpha percentage used in Cellmark's product-rule calculation was wrong. The dissent agrees. Post at ___ (slip op. at 69-70). The DQ Alpha test conducted on the box-spring sample revealed the presence of the 2 and 4 alleles. It was not possible to associate alleles with the DQ Alpha test. The parties agree that the DQ Alpha test revealed all the possible genotypes that could have combined to reveal the presence of the 2 and 4 alleles: 2,2; 2,4; 4,4. Because defendant's DQ Alpha Cooper: For African-Americans having the polymarker types we have indicated and an individual having a four, four DQ Alpha type, the number is approximately 1 in 1400 in African-Americans. Prosecutor: Let's mark this down the bottom. You can excuse one thousand three hundred and ninety-nine African-Americans from having these characteristics, is that correct? Cooper: Again, these numbers are just giving you an idea how rare or common, how these different types occur in a given population. And if you have a random population of approximately 1400 people, the chances are at least 1 of those people would have those particular polymarker and DQ Alpha type. So described, the one-in-1,400 evidence was relevant to show that defendant's relatively rare composite genotype could not be [Jenkins v. State, 627 N.E.2d 789, 794 (Ind. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 812, 115 S. Ct. 64, 130 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1994).] Defendant had ample opportunity at trial to present the jury with a statistical interpretation of the DNA test results. In fact, Dr. Shaler explained his belief that, without associating alleles and taking into account all possible second donors to the box-spring sample, approximately one-in-100 people could have contributed a non-excludable composite genotype, a more favorable figure than the one-in-666 figure that defendant now propounds. Defendant had the opportunity to challenge the State's statistical evidence, to present his own evidence, and to argue to the jury. We conclude that the trial judge did not err in permitting the jury to evaluate the State's statistical evidence. Our reading of the record reveals that the dissent attributes greater significance to the statistical evidence than the evidence received at trial. The summations did not belabor the statistical evidence. On summation, defense counsel argued: For its part, the State invited the jury to deliberate based on Dr. Shaler's one-in-100 calculation, if it found that calculation to be more credible: Prosecutor: Remember the figures that we have, one in a hundred and seventy, one in fourteen hundred. Evaluate them. If you want to use them, I suggest you should use the one in fourteen hundred, or if you choose, use the figure given by Dr. Shaler, one in a hundred. Exclude ninety-nine percent. Further, the trial court instructed the jury that it was not bound by any expert opinion, that it could assign whatever weight it deemed appropriate to the expert evidence, and that testimony couched in terms of percentages or probabilities could not relieve the State of its burden of proof. The court left the weight of the statistical evidence to the jury. That defendant belatedly has thought of an alternative manner in which to present statistical evidence concerning the DQ Alpha results does not constitute reversible error. I would also -- my proposed instruction will tell the jury that they are to draw no adverse inference against Mr. Harvey, because when the Stonehauser [sic] request was made, Mr. Harvey was not in custody. That was my proposal. All I am saying is that in my view of my notes on this issue and my feeling of the case, so to speak, I am satisfied tht [sic] the question and answer are simply something not capable of producing any prejudice to the defendant whatsoever. Defendant declined the instruction. 38. Have you read anything about this case in the newspaper? ___ Yes ___ No. 39. Other than what the judge said to you today, has anyone else talked to you about this case? ___ Yes ___ No. 40. Have you heard anybody discussing this case or the people involved in it, either here today or at anytime previously? ___ Yes ___ No. The trial court questioned each juror individually concerning their answers. The court also afforded both the defense and the prosecution opportunities to question the jurors. Not one juror was excused because of exposure to prejudicial press coverage. Defendant did not object to the court's handling of the publicity issue. At the close of the February-March 1994 selection phase, and without objection from defendant, the trial court qualified forty-seven jurors. An adjournment to enable defendant to examine the prosecution's DNA evidence delayed resumption of the jury selection process until October 18, 1994. Using the same process, the court qualified six more jurors. Again, no juror was excused on the basis of exposure to publicity. On October 24, 1994, the jurors who had been selected during the February-March phase returned to court. The trial court asked whether, during the interim, they had heard anything about either the parties or the proposed evidence that would impair their ability to serve impartially. Only one prospective juror indicated that he had read about the case. He told the court that he had learned that this case was a retrial and that defendant previously had been sentenced to death. The trial court excused that juror and told the other jurors to return October 28, at which time the court resumed voir dire with the remaining jury pool. You have taken a circumstantial -- you started with everybody in the world and you narrowed that circumstantial by what is available. These are the items that were available at the scene. This is what the State used. I suggest to you, they are more than sufficient to show you beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Harvey committed this offense. This is not speculation, this is not guesswork, this is fact. The probabilities of a person having those things, all these things, are minuscule, well beyond a reasonable doubt, and the person that had these characteristics, whether it be hair, blood, shoe size, shoes and watch is minuscule. That person is Mr. Harvey . . . . Following the State's summation, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's comment that the odds were "minuscule" that all the pieces of evidence, when taken together, proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel argued that the prosecution was "trying to assess a mathematical standard" in determining the existence of reasonable doubt. Further, counsel requested the court to instruct the jury that "reasonable doubt cannot come Thereafter, the investigator described the items sent to the State police laboratory on June 20, 1985. Two of the items were "a pubic hair control taken from the victim," and "oral, vaginal, and anal swabs taken from the victim at the time of autopsy." Defense counsel did not object to the description. Hence, we treat the reference to them as a matter of plain error. The investigator then began to read from the list of items that were later sent to the police laboratory including "pubic hair sample from the sus..." At a sidebar conference, defense counsel objected to mention of defendant's pubic hairs. The court agreed and instructed the prosecutor that the investigator could not refer to the submission of defendant's pubic hair. Defendant now maintains that introduction of the schematic diagram featuring the location of the victim's panties, the mention that vaginal and anal swabs were sent to the police laboratory, and the reference to pubic hair, combined to infect the proceedings with prejudicial inferences of sexual assault. The contention is without merit. Through special instructions, the trial court ensured that the jury understood that the case did not include any allegations of sexual assault. The court did not abuse its discretion in Although defense counsel did not object, the argument was improper. Actions taken by a killer subsequent to the murder are irrelevant to the c(4)(f) determination. They do not inform the inquiry concerning the defendant's motives for killing. See Hightower II, supra, 120 N.J. at 422; Monturi, supra, 195 N.J. Super. at 326-27. The trial court remedied the prosecutor's error by properly instructing the jury that "[a]ny evidence of actions taken by the defendant to conceal the murder itself cannot be used to prove this aggravating factor." Accordingly, the prosecutor's remarks in summation did not constitute plain error. The Model Charge advises, moreover, that when the "State is relying on facts established during a guilt phase verdict to prove an aggravating factor," Manual at J-6 n.8, the trial judge should give the following instruction: However, the guilt and sentencing phases are considered as separate proceedings. The State contends that certain facts established by your verdict in the guilt phase also prove the following aggravating factors I am instructing you that it is your duty to deliberate again on these facts to determine whether they prove the aggravating factor(s) the State alleges. You have the right to reach a different conclusion about whether these facts prove an aggravating factor than the conclusion you reached as to whether they proved guilt. Here, however, the court's failure to designate specifically the evidence that the jury should consider did not constitute plain error. The court instructed the jury not to consider aggravating factors other than those alleged by the State and If he does get paroled when he's first eligible at the age of 64, he will be in the lowest possible category [of individuals likely to commit crime]. And if you look at the fact that he committed the crime in his thirties ... people under 40 commit eighty-nine percent of the crime. He'll move to the 60-plus category where he'll be in the lowest possible risk category. Accordingly, Dr. Moran concluded that "there would be a very tiny minute chance that [Harvey] would ever offend again." On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Dr. Moran about his assumption that defendant would first be eligible for parole in 2014. The prosecutor asked: "And that is twenty years from today or twenty years from 1994. Is that correct?" When Dr. Moran agreed, the prosecutor ceased cross-examination. In anticipation of Dr. Moran's testimony, the State asked that the court instruct the jury that defendant's thirty years without parole would start from the date of his original The prosecutor responded: Is Mr. Harvey's age a mitigating factor for you to consider? Sure you can consider it. You heard the testimony, the penalty, if it is not death, it is thirty years to life, minimum thirty years. What does that mean? Very simple, thirty years. What does that mean in this case? The year 2014, twenty years from now Mr. Harvey will be eligible for parole, twenty years from today. Is that sufficient punishment do you feel? You may consider that. Defense counsel did not object. JUSTICES GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN, concurs in the opinion and judgment of the Court except with respect to Part II thereof. He would therefore affirm the convictions except insofar as the conviction of murder establishes death eligibility. He joins Part Two, Section I of Justice Handler's opinion on the issue of a non-unanimous verdict. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Appellant. HANDLER, J., dissenting. In this case, the Court sanctions a death sentence that was dependent on an analysis of blood samples that served to identify defendant as the killer of Irene Schnaps. That evidence, endorsed by the Court today in affirming defendant's conviction of murder and his sentence of death, was not based on accepted scientific knowledge. Further, the Court deems the evidence to have been reliable even though the hearing conducted by the trial court to determine its admissibility did not focus on its scientific acceptability and reliability. The specific evidence that was admitted to establish defendant's identity was derived from a novel procedure or methodology of blood analysis known as dot-intensity analysis. Dot-intensity analysis cannot, by any measure, be considered reliable or generally accepted. It is not DQa 2 &amp; 4 2,4 2,2; 2,4; 2 = 4 2,4 4,4 or 4,4 LDLR A &amp; B A,B A,A; A,B; B &gt; A B,B B,B or B,B GYPA A &amp; B A,A A,B or B,B A &gt; B A,B A,B HBGG A, B &amp; C B,B A,C A=B=C n/a A,C D7S8 A &amp; B A,A A,B or B,B A &gt; B A,B A,B GC A, B &amp; C A,C A,B; B,B; A&gt;B&amp;C A,B A,B or B,C This table shows that without using dot-intensity analysis, but considering both the DQ-Alpha and polymarker results, defendant cannot be ruled out as a contributor to the mixed sample if the sample also contains Ms. Schnaps's DNA (compare "Suspect's Expected" column with "Harvey's Sample" column). In some instances, however, the results are not particularly helpful because almost no persons are excluded as contributors. For example, the LDLR marker results show that a person with any of the three possible LDLR genotypes (A,A; A,B; or B,B) could have contributed to the mixed sample. On the other hand, even without dot-intensity analysis, the results from the HBGG marker show that the suspect must have a particular HBGG genotype (A,C). [In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1253, 131 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1995).] [Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 761 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3666 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1997) (No. 96-1493).] Here, the "XYZ" in the example is polymarker testing; the unsupported "ABC" conclusion is that dot-intensity analysis can be performed on polymarker testing results. The majority utterly ignores a second related underlying issue in dispute. The issue is not only whether it is possible theoretically to perform dot-intensity analysis, but also whether the polymarker test kit was designed to and was capable of reliably measuring dot intensities as a basis for determining not only the presence or absence of alleles but the relative quantity [State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 427-28 (1990) (Harvey I) (quoting Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 210), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S. Ct. 1336, 113 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1991).]See footnote 9 Dot-intensity analysis does not come close to meeting those standards for the admission of scientific evidence. Dot-intensity analysis never has been successfully performed on any DNA sample anywhere, be it in an experiment or in an actual case. DR. SHALER: Pretty much. PROSECUTOR: So depending upon the individual they may have different interpretations? DR. SHALER: I don't feel these kinds of interpretations are reliable. Nobody to my knowledge has undergone a blind examination to test their abilities to make these kinds of intensity difference decisions. Ms. Cooper, one of the State's experts, also admitted that "intensity difference[s] . . . can be subjective." The subjective nature of this proof is shown by the evidence here. Cellmark's own laboratory technicians could not agree on whether or not some dot intensities were imbalanced. In [Miller, supra, 670 N.E.2d at 738 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring).] Dot-intensity analysis is a separate scientific technique that must be generally accepted prior to the evidence being used [Shea, supra, 957 F. Supp. at 336-37.] Thus, the debate has been over the method of determining the deviations and the size of the deviations from the product rule. Finding that the two principles of equilibrium were violated and that many of the databases being used were not entirely accurate, the 1992 NRC report recommended the use of the "ceiling principle" or the "interim ceiling principle" in calculating frequencies to be used in courtrooms. These principles essentially provided a lower limit of the overall population frequencies even assuming the violations of the equilibrium rules. See NRC Report, supra, at 35-36, 156-59. Although some courts came to accept the ceiling principles, the NRC rapidly found itself under attack for advocating their use. Scientists complained that the rules were overly conservative and recommended instead the use of different 2. Harvey's confession that he struck Schnaps only once and in response to being punched in the nose; 3. The State's argument during penalty-phase that some of the fifteen blows inflicted upon 4. The jury's freedom to reject the pathologist's testimony when other evidence indicated a lack of murderous intent; and 5. The fact that the trial court opted to instruct the jury on lesser and included offenses which did not require murderous intent. It is not comprehensible how any juror could conclude that such scant evidence proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant killed Irene Schnaps in order to avoid apprehension and future prosecution for the robbery. Silence in the evidence is never enlightening, no less dispositive. The majority converts silence, mute circumstances, into powerful and deadly proof. The majority now holds that signs of a struggle support the c(4)(f) factor. Last year, the majority held that the absence of signs of a struggle established the c(4)(f) factor. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 378 (noting that with no signs of a struggle, no other motive could explain why the killing took place). Perhaps one should not be surprised by this latest flagrant contradiction; it is just another in a long string of inconsistent and conflicting rulings regarding the c(4)(f) factor. For example, in Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 377-78, the Court held that the wearing of a mask is evidence supporting the c(4)(f) factor, and in Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 283, the Court noted that disguising oneself is evidence supporting the c(4)(f) factor, but in Harris, supra, 141 N.J. at 535-36, the Court found that the wearing of a mask and then the removal of the mask is evidence supporting the c(4)(f) factor. In Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 377, the Court held that planning a crime where defendant would not be known or recognized supports the For evidence to support the c(4)(f) factor, it must indicate that the murder itself was "intended to eliminate a potential witness to the crime." Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 281. Each of the facts argued by the prosecutor related to defendant's actions taken after the murder and do not support the conclusion that the murder itself was committed to conceal the robbery offense. New Jersey courts repeatedly have held that the actions of a defendant to conceal the murder are not admissible to support the c(4)(f) factor. Hightower I, supra, 120 N.J. at 422; State v. The court then reiterated that instruction: I want to repeat that. The evidence to be considered by you includes the material presented at both phases of the trial, all the witnesses and all physical exhibits. The majority acknowledges that those instructions were incorrect. Ante at __ (slip op. at 121). Yet again, though the majority finds the error harmless, this time because, the majority notes, the prosecutor properly directed the jurors attention to the relevant evidence. Certainly, this error cannot be viewed as harmless in relation to the c(4)(f) factor. As previously pointed out, the prosecutor argued the wrong evidence. See discussion supra at __ (slip op. at 101-04). In dismissing the error, the majority Justice O'Hern joins in Part Two, Section I, of this opinion. NO. A-23 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED Nor is a lower hurdle for admission of scientific evidence that exculpates a defendant a novel idea. This Court previously has suggested such a possibility. In Windmere, supra, 105 N.J. 373, the Court noted that voiceprint identification, while not admissible when offered by the State in a criminal trial as evidence of guilt, "is at least a reliable method to eliminate a person as the unidentified speaker." Id. at 383; see also id. at 383 n.5 ("Similarly, in State v. Prudden, 212 N.J. Super. 608, 617 (App. Div. 1986), the court, while rejecting the use of footprint techniques to identify a defendant, recognized that the techniques were nevertheless sufficiently reliable to exclude a person as the guilty party."). See generally Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at 621 ("We have recognized that standards of proof may vary depending upon the litigational context.") (citing Romano, supra, 96 N.J. 66; In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550 (1982)); State v. Millett, 272 N.J. Super. 68, 98-99 (App. Div. 1994) (recognizing that a criminal defendant may present evidence "if the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's case") (citing State v. Sturdivant, 31 N.J. 165, 179 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 956, 80 S. Ct. 873, 4 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1960)); David McCord, But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!: The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest that Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 917 (1996) (advocating lower standard of admissibility in such circumstances). The fact that Dr. Word testified that "the possible combinations could be only AA and BC, AB and CC, or AC and BB," ante at __ (slip op. at 39), raises serious questions abut the accuracy of her testimony. No one can seriously doubt that there exist six -- not three -- possible combinations. Tested the boxspring matress [sic] and came up with DNA that [Ms. Cooper at Cellmark Diagnostics] believed was a mixture from two different sources. Initially they do -- I put the chart up here Ms. Cooper used, DQ Alpha strip and come back with a type of four, four and I marked that up here, four, four. She indicated the percentage of people in the population, the entire population, that have that four, four, is 17 percent. So you can exclude 83 percent from the entire population of the world just by that DQ Alpha." In fact, the testing revealed that the suspect had either a "4,4" genotype, a "2,4" genotype, or a "2,2" genotype. One could not "exclude 83 percent" of the population from having contributed to the sample. Mr. Harvey stated that he . . . was in the area of Hunter's Glen apartments and he was trying sliding glass doors, patio doors seeing which was open and which wasn't. He found one, which happened to be the apartment of Mrs. Schnaps. He went in, he made his [way] back to the bedroom, the master bedroom. He saw an object lying on the bed, he assumed it was a man at first. The person appeared to be sleeping. He had gone through the dresser drawers or the bureau and he had taken some jewelry, including the watch. At that time Mrs. Schnaps woke up and she went to strike Mr. Harvey. I believe she struck him in the nose causing his nose to bleed. He then responded by striking her with a hammer or what he described as an object like a hammer. He struck her in the head. From there she fell to an area in the bedroom near a fan. She laid there for some time and then she got up and fell closer to the doorway of the bedroom where she lay.