Title: McGuire v. Hodges
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060755
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
RENEE MCGUIRE, ADMINISTRATRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF CODY RAY MCGUIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   OPINION BY 
v. Record Number 060755  
 
  JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 January 12, 2007 
SARAH ELLEN HODGES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY 
Malfourd W. Trumbo, Judge 
 
Renee McGuire, the mother of Cody Ray McGuire and the 
Administratrix of the Estate of Cody Ray McGuire 
(individually and collectively, “McGuire”), appeals from 
the judgment of the Circuit Court of Botetourt County in 
favor of Sarah Ellen Hodges (“Mrs. Hodges”).  On appeal, 
McGuire asserts the trial court erred when it set aside a 
jury verdict in her favor and entered judgment for Mrs. 
Hodges.  For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse 
the judgment of the trial court. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Mrs. Hodges owned a home in Botetourt County with a 
swimming pool located in the backyard.  A chain-link fence, 
four feet high, enclosed the pool with only one gate for 
entry and exit.  For many years, Mrs. Hodges used a chain 
with a separate lock to secure the gate, but in September 
2000, the lock disappeared.  Instead of replacing the lock, 
 
2
Mrs. Hodges wrapped the chain around the gate and the 
gatepost to secure the gate.1 
 
On Sunday, September 17, 2000, Thomas Hodges 
(“Thomas”), Mrs. Hodges’ son, invited McGuire’s husband, 
Stuart McGuire (“Stuart”), to assist him with car repairs 
at Mrs. Hodges’ home.  McGuire and the couple’s two 
children, thirty-month old Cody and four-month old Aaron, 
accompanied Stuart to Mrs. Hodges’ home that afternoon. 
During the visit, McGuire permitted Cody to play in 
the front yard while Stuart worked on the vehicle, which 
was also located in front of the house.  At one point, 
McGuire followed Cody to the backyard, where she saw him 
pulling the chain on the pool gate, evidently interested in 
chasing a toy that was inside the pool area.  She called 
her son away but could not determine from her vantage point 
whether the gate had a lock or that the chain secured the 
gate. 
The two men were unable to finish the car repairs 
without additional parts, so they requested that McGuire go 
to a store to obtain the parts.  She left Cody under the 
supervision of her husband while she went to the store.  A 
                                                 
1 The gate had a movable latch with two separate 
prongs, one of which fit around either side of the 
gatepost.  The prongs of the latch could be lifted and thus 
could not secure the gate without the use of some sort of 
locking device. 
 
3
short time later, Stuart realized that his son was no 
longer playing in the front yard, and after a frantic 
search, he discovered Cody floating in the backyard pool.  
Stuart leapt over the pool fence, pulled Cody from the pool 
and attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation while an 
ambulance was called. 
Cody was taken to a local hospital but died two days 
later.  McGuire qualified as administratrix of his estate 
and filed a wrongful death action in the trial court, 
alleging Mrs. Hodges “negligently failed to properly 
provide, install, use and/or maintain the fence and gate 
surrounding [her] swimming pool.”  McGuire alleged that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of Cody’s death.2 
Evidence at trial established that at the time of 
Cody’s drowning, the pool gate was unsecured except by a 
chain wrapped around the gate and gatepost in some fashion.  
McGuire produced evidence that the fence and gate failed to 
meet the requirements of the National Building Code3 and the 
                                                 
2 Stuart renounced any claim arising out of his son’s 
death pursuant to Code § 8.01-53(C). 
3 The trial court took judicial notice of Section 616.9 
of the ninth edition of the National Building Code, 
promulgated in 1984 by the Building Officials and Code 
Administrators International, Inc. (“BOCA”), which states 
in relevant part: 
Every person owning land on which there is 
situated a swimming pool, which contains 24 
inches (610 mm) or more of water in depth at any 
 
4
Botetourt County Code4 (together, the “Building Code”) 
because the gate was not self-latching, its latch was not 
at least forty-eight inches from the ground, and the 
fence’s top rail was not at least forty-eight inches high.5 
                                                                                                                                                 
point, shall erect and maintain thereon an 
adequate enclosure either surrounding the 
property or pool area, sufficient to make such 
body of water inaccessible to small children.  
Such enclosure, including gates therein, shall be 
not less than 4 feet (1219 mm) above the 
underlying ground.  All gates shall be self-
latching with latches placed 4 feet (1219 mm) 
above the underlying ground and otherwise made 
inaccessible from the outside to small children. 
See Code § 36-98 (authorizing the Board of Housing and 
Community Development to adopt and promulgate the 
Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code) and 13 VAC 
§ 5-63-10(B) (incorporating the International Building 
Code, successor to the National Building Code 
provision relied upon by the trial court). 
4 Section 22-4 of the Botetourt County Code states in 
relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to construct, 
maintain, use, possess or control any swimming 
pool on any property in the county without having 
a fence completely around such swimming pool.  
Every gate in such fence shall be capable of 
being securely fastened at a height of not less 
than four (4) feet above ground level.  Such gate 
shall not be allowed to remain unfastened while 
the pool is not in use. 
The trial court took judicial notice of this Section. 
5 McGuire’s expert witness testified that the gate was 
not self-latching, but Mrs. Hodges’ expert witness 
testified that the gate was self-latching.  McGuire’s 
expert witness testified that the latch was only thirty-two 
inches above the ground, sixteen inches less than required 
by Code, and Mrs. Hodges’ expert witness conceded this 
fact.  McGuire’s expert witness testified that the gate’s 
top rail was only forty-six inches from the ground, but 
Mrs. Hodges’ expert witness testified that the top rail was 
forty-eight inches from the ground. 
 
5
Conflicting evidence was presented about when and how 
Mrs. Hodges left the chain on the gate on the day of the 
accident.  Mrs. Hodges testified that she winterized the 
pool on Saturday, September 16th, the day before the 
McGuires visited.  When this task was completed, she 
testified that she closed the gate, made certain the latch 
was down and secured the chain around the gate and gatepost 
by wrapping the chain in a “figure eight configuration.”  
She confirmed that she knew that the lock was missing when 
she wrapped the chain around the gatepost on September 
16th.  Mrs. Hodges also testified that on Sunday, September 
17th, prior to the arrival of the McGuires, she saw the 
pool and the gate and confirmed that the chain was on the 
gate as she had “left it that Saturday night.” 
Mrs. Hodges’ niece, Dawn Fields, testified that she 
also visited with Mrs. Hodges on the day of the accident.  
Fields testified that Mrs. Hodges told her that she “had 
been in the pool earlier that day the day Cody drowned,” 
which was Sunday, September 17th.  Fields also testified 
that Mrs. Hodges told her that she had “put the chain 
around the fence” but “didn’t tell [Fields] how she put it 
around the fence.”  Fields next saw the gate after Thomas 
came to the house to call 911, and the gate “was standing 
wide open.” 
 
6
Thomas testified that the chain was wrapped around the 
gate and the gatepost when he and Stuart found Cody, and he 
“pull[ed] it . . . pretty hard” and “had to yank the chain 
off” to open the gate.  Thomas also testified that “it took 
a good 10 seconds” for him to release the chain from the 
gate when trying to reach Cody.  However, in announcing his 
decision from the bench, the trial judge observed that 
Thomas’ testimony “had problems.” 
Stuart testified that during the search for Cody, he 
was within ten feet of the fence when he spotted his son in 
the pool.  He immediately ran to the fence, used his hands 
for balance and jumped over the fence and into the pool 
area.  Stuart could not remember whether the gate was open 
or closed when he jumped into the pool area, and he could 
not remember whether Thomas had to open the gate. 
McGuire testified that earlier in the day, when she 
called her son away from the fence, the gate was closed and 
she “could see the chain in Cody’s hands” but she “did not 
know if there was a lock there or not.” 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of McGuire in the 
amount of $217,348.95, plus pre-judgment interest.  Mrs. 
Hodges then moved to set aside the verdict.  The trial 
court considered post-trial submissions, reviewed the 
record, and sustained Mrs. Hodges’ motion to set aside the 
 
7
jury verdict.  The trial court concluded that the evidence 
at trial failed to establish that the Building Code 
violations relied upon by McGuire were a proximate cause of 
Cody’s death.  We awarded McGuire this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
The trial court's authority to set aside a jury 
verdict is limited and should be exercised “only if a jury 
verdict is plainly wrong or without credible evidence to 
support it.”  Jenkins v. Pyles, 269 Va. 383, 388, 611 
S.E.2d 404, 407 (2005); see also Cohn v. Knowledge 
Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 362, 366, 585 S.E.2d 578, 581 
(2003); Shalimar Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 257 Va. 565, 569-70, 
515 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1999); Henderson v. Gay, 245 Va. 478, 
480, 429 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1993); Code § 8.01-430.  If the 
evidence adduced at trial is conflicting on a material 
point, or if reasonable persons may draw different 
conclusions from the evidence, or if a conclusion is 
dependent on the weight the fact finder gives to the 
testimony, a judge may not substitute his or her conclusion 
for that of the jury merely because he or she would have 
reached a different result.  Jenkins, 269 Va. at 388, 611 
S.E.2d at 407; see also Cohn, 266 Va. at 366, 585 S.E.2d at 
581; Shalimar Dev., 257 Va. at 570, 515 S.E.2d at 123; 
Henderson, 245 Va. at 480-81, 429 S.E.2d at 16. 
 
8
 
Because the jury's function is to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and 
resolve all conflicts in the evidence, “[i]f there is 
credible evidence in the record which supports the jury’s 
verdict, we must reinstate that verdict and enter judgment 
thereon.”  Rogers v. Marrow, 243 Va. 162, 166, 413 S.E.2d 
344, 346 (1992); see also Hoar v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., 
Inc., 256 Va. 374, 378, 506 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1998); Carter 
v. Lambert, 246 Va. 309, 314, 435 S.E.2d 403, 405-06 
(1993).  In making this determination, we give the 
recipient of the jury verdict the benefit of all 
substantial conflicts in the evidence, as well as the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.  
Cohn, 266 Va. at 366, 585 S.E.2d at 581; Shalimar Dev., 257 
Va. at 570, 515 S.E. 2d at 123; Henderson, 245 Va. at 481, 
429 S.E. 2d at 16. 
 
To establish negligence sufficient to sustain a 
judgment against Mrs. Hodges, McGuire was required “to show 
the existence of a legal duty, a breach of the duty, and 
proximate causation resulting in damage.”  Atrium Unit 
Owners Ass’n v. King, 266 Va. 288, 293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 
(2003); see also Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 73, 372 S.E.2d 
373, 375 (1988); Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., Inc., 192 
Va. 776, 780, 66 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1951).  By alleging the 
 
9
violation of the Building Code, McGuire presented a claim 
of negligence per se.  MacCoy v. Colony House Builders, 
Inc., 239 Va. 64, 69, 387 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1990); see also 
Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club, 268 Va. 74, 79, 597 S.E.2d 
43, 46 (2004). 
 
The doctrine of negligence per se represents the 
adoption of "the requirements of a legislative enactment as 
the standard of conduct of a reasonable [person]."  Butler 
v. Frieden, 208 Va. 352, 353, 158 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1967).  
A party relying on negligence per se does not need to 
establish common law negligence provided the proponent 
produces evidence supporting a determination that the 
opposing party violated a statute enacted for public 
safety, that the proponent belongs to the class of persons 
for whose benefit the statute was enacted and the harm 
suffered was of the type against which the statute was 
designed to protect, and that the statutory violation was a 
proximate cause of the injury.  Halterman v. Radisson Hotel 
Corp., 259 Va. 171, 176-77, 523 S.E.2d 823, 825 (2000); 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Savoy Constr. Co., 224 Va. 
36, 45, 294 S.E.2d 811, 817 (1982). 
 
While violation of such a statute provides the 
elements of a duty and breach, a plaintiff has not proved 
actionable negligence unless the plaintiff also proves that 
 
10
the failure to adhere to the statutory requirement was a 
proximate cause of the injury.  “[A] mere breach of a 
particular duty imposed by statute does not make the 
violator guilty of actionable negligence, which will 
support a recovery for damages unless such violation was 
the proximate cause of the injury.”  Hamilton v. Glemming, 
187 Va. 309, 317, 46 S.E.2d 438, 442 (1948). 
 
Whether the statutory violation was a proximate cause 
of the injury is generally a factual issue to be decided by 
the trier of fact.  Schlimmer, 268 Va. at 79, 597 S.E.2d at 
46.  Thomas v. Settle, 247 Va. 15, 20, 439 S.E.2d 360, 363 
(1994).  Similarly, if the violation of the statute is in 
dispute, that issue is also for the trier of fact.  
Schlimmer, 268 Va. at 79, 597 S.E.2d at 46.  Kimberlin v. 
PM Transp., Inc., 264 Va. 261, 268, 563 S.E.2d 665, 668 
(2002). 
 
In the case at bar, the evidence was clearly 
sufficient, and the trial court ruled as a matter of law,6 
that Mrs. Hodges violated the Building Code because the 
pool gate latch was not self-latching and the latch itself 
was substantially lower (32 inches from the ground instead 
of 48 inches) than required.  Cody was clearly within the 
                                                 
6 Jury Instruction Number 8 at trial stated: “As a 
matter of law the defendant was negligent.” 
 
11
class of individuals meant to be protected because Section 
616.9 of the National Building Code specifically required 
the fence to make the pool entirely “inaccessible to small 
children.”  The harm suffered here, Cody’s drowning, was 
the type against which the statute was designed to protect.  
The case then turns on whether McGuire, as plaintiff, 
produced credible evidence to show that the foregoing 
statutory violations by Mrs. Hodges were a proximate cause 
of Cody’s death. 
 
McGuire contends that she presented sufficient 
credible circumstantial evidence that allowed the jury to 
draw the permissible inference that Cody accessed the pool 
through the gate by pulling on the chain, lifting the latch 
that was only thirty-two inches from the ground, and then 
slipped through the gate into the pool area.  McGuire 
argues that her burden on appeal is to show that Cody’s 
entry through the defective gate was probable, rather than 
merely possible, and she is not required to exclude all 
other hypotheses.  Further, McGuire avers that the jury was 
able to consider the credibility of Mrs. Hodges, her niece 
and son, among others, and that the weight of the evidence 
demonstrated actionable negligence caused by Mrs. Hodges. 
 
Mrs. Hodges responds that it was McGuire’s burden to 
show Cody accessed the pool as a result of the Building 
 
12
Code violations and that the evidence failed to show that 
any defect in the pool gate was a proximate cause of Cody’s 
death.  Mrs. Hodges contends that McGuire simply failed to 
meet her burden of proof because she failed to show how 
Cody accessed the pool, and thus the jury impermissibly 
presumed negligence just because an accident occurred.  
Mrs. Hodges also responds that the jury’s decision was 
“nothing but their own conjecture and speculation as to how 
Cody entered the pool.”  Mrs. Hodges concludes that the 
trial court properly set aside the jury verdict because 
McGuire “was unable to satisfy her burden of proof.” 
 
We agree with McGuire that the trial court erred in 
setting aside the jury verdict.  The circumstantial 
evidence in this case was sufficient to support the 
decision reached by the jury that Mrs. Hodges’ negligence 
was a proximate cause of Cody’s death. 
 
Mrs. Hodges’ post-verdict motion to set aside the jury 
verdict, and the trial court’s decision to do so, focused 
primarily on our holding in Atrium Unit Owners Association.  
In that case, a condominium unit owner was the victim of a 
burglary with no sign of forced entry.  266 Va. at 290-91, 
585 S.E.2d at 545-46.  The condominium association’s copy 
of the owner’s key was missing, and the owner alleged this 
negligence concerning the key was a proximate cause of her 
 
13
damages.  Id.  Evidence at trial in Atrium demonstrated the 
owner’s sliding glass door was unlocked, providing a means 
of access other than by the missing key.  Id. at 291, 585 
S.E.2d at 546-47.  We reversed the trial court’s judgment 
confirming the jury’s verdict because “there was nothing in 
the record from which the jury could reasonably infer a 
causal connection between [the defendant’s] alleged 
negligence and the damages [the plaintiff] sustained.”  Id. 
at 296, 585 S.E.2d at 549. 
 
Like Atrium, the case at bar is one where the proof is 
entirely by circumstantial evidence.  “Circumstantial 
evidence is proof of a series of other facts than the fact 
in issue, which by experience have been found so associated 
with that fact, that, in the relation of cause and effect, 
they lead to a satisfactory and certain conclusion.”  Ryan 
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 173 Va. 57, 62, 3 S.E.2d 416, 418 
(1939).  Circumstantial evidence in a case must be 
sufficient to establish “that the result alleged is a 
probability rather than a mere possibility.” Southern 
States Coop. Inc. v. Doggett, 223 Va. 650, 657, 292 S.E.2d 
331, 335 (1982).  When predicate facts are proven and the 
jury can draw a reasonable inference without resorting to 
speculation or conjecture, the decision whether to draw the 
 
14
inference is the jury’s.  O'Brien v. Everfast, Inc., 254 
Va. 326, 330, 491 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1997). 
 
The standard of review directs that we consider 
whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to conclude that Cody’s death was probably, rather 
than merely possibly, the result of Mrs. Hodges’ negligence 
regarding the pool gate.  As noted above, evidence heard by 
the jury permitted it to conclude that Mrs. Hodges had 
installed a defective gate which offered a young child 
access to the swimming pool because the latch was not above 
his reach.  Testimony at trial described an unlocked gate, 
secured only by a chain, which the young boy was attempting 
to open shortly before he was discovered floating in the 
pool.  The evidence was in question between Mrs. Hodges’ 
testimony that she left the pool gate firmly secured the 
day before the accident and the niece’s testimony that Mrs. 
Hodges reentered the pool area on September 17th without 
describing the status of the chain on the gate.  While 
McGuire admitted to seeing the chain on the gate, she did 
not know whether the gate was secured. 
 
The only evidence directly supporting as fact that the 
gate was well secured at the time of the drowning was the 
testimony of Thomas, who claimed the chain was wound such 
that he “had to pull it loose” and it took him ten seconds 
 
15
to release it.  However, as the trial court implied, the 
jury was free to discredit Thomas’ testimony, and it was 
unnecessary that McGuire prove the chain was fully removed 
from the gate or that Cody fully opened the gate.  It was 
sufficient to prove Mrs. Hodges’ causal negligence if the 
jury could reasonably infer the non-self-latching gate 
could be opened enough for Cody, a 30-month old child, to 
slip between the gate and the gatepost even with the chain 
still wrapped in some fashion around the gate so as to 
prevent entry by an adult. 
 
Mrs. Hodges did not present evidence, nor does she 
argue on appeal, that Cody gained access to the pool by 
scaling the fence or in some other manner than by the gate.  
Instead, she relies on the argument that McGuire did not 
carry her burden of proof that Cody used the gate in order 
to support the trial court’s decision to set aside the 
jury’s finding of negligence. 
 
However, this case is unlike Atrium in several 
respects.  First, the evidence of Cody pulling on the chain 
shortly before he was found in the pool would be equivalent 
to a condominium association employee in Atrium being seen 
with the missing key outside the condominium owner’s 
residence before the break-in: a circumstance that did not 
occur.  266 Va. at 293-96, 585 S.E.2d at 548-49.  In 
 
16
addition, there was no evidence presented of an alternative 
means of access to the pool other than the defective gate, 
whereas the unlocked sliding glass door provided such an 
alternative in Atrium.  Id.  Accordingly, Atrium does not 
represent applicable precedent for the trial court’s 
decision to set aside the jury’s verdict. 
The jury was able to consider the conflicting 
testimony and draw the permissible inference that a 
proximate cause of Cody’s death was probably Mrs. Hodges’ 
failure to fully secure the defective gate, allowing Cody 
to slip into the pool area by that means.  The facts, 
although conflicting, were sufficiently established for the 
jury to draw an inference that Mrs. Hodges’ negligence 
caused Cody’s death by “a probability rather than a mere 
possibility.”  Southern States, 223 Va. at 657, 292 S.E.2d 
at 335.  McGuire thus presented credible, circumstantial 
evidence at trial that supported the jury’s verdict.  See 
Rogers, 243 Va. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 346. 
It was the province of the jury, not the court, to 
weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the 
witnesses.  See Hoar, 256 Va. at 378, 506 S.E.2d at 780; 
Carter, 246 Va. at 314, 435 S.E.2d at 405-06; and Rogers, 
243 Va. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 346.  Given the conflicting 
circumstantial evidence, the jury properly reviewed the 
 
17
credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence in 
reaching the verdict.  We must therefore reinstate the jury 
verdict because credible evidence supports it.  See Hoar, 
256 Va. at 378, 506 S.E.2d at 780; Carter, 246 Va. at 314, 
435 S.E.2d at 405-06; Rogers, 243 Va. at 166, 413 S.E.2d at 
346. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will therefore reverse 
the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the jury's 
verdict, and enter final judgment for McGuire. 
Reversed and final judgment.