Title: People v. Carney
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S260063
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES LEO CARNEY et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S260063 
 
Third Appellate District 
C077558 
 
Sacramento County Superior Court 
11F00700 
 
 
July 20, 2023 
 
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY  
S260063 
 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.  
 
In People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834 (Sanchez), this 
court upheld the first degree murder conviction of a defendant 
who had engaged in a gang-related shootout that left an 
innocent bystander dead.  Though it was unclear whether the 
defendant or a rival gang member had fired the fatal shot, we 
held that the defendant’s “commission of life-threatening deadly 
acts in connection with his attempt on [the rival gang member’s] 
life was a substantial concurrent, hence proximate, cause of [the 
victim’s] death.”  (Id. at pp. 848–849.)   
The instant case similarly involves a gun battle among 
rivals, but unlike in Sanchez, the evidence here conclusively 
established that the fatal shot was fired by someone other than 
the two defendants whose first degree murder convictions are at 
issue.  The question now before us is whether Sanchez’s 
“substantial concurrent cause” analysis of proximate cause 
permits the defendants’ convictions.  The Court of Appeal 
answered this question in the affirmative, emphasizing that in 
Sanchez, each defendant’s liability for first degree murder was 
not based on the mere possibility that he had fired the fatal shot.  
Rather, the court explained, both defendants in Sanchez “ ‘had 
equally culpable mental states and engaged in precisely the 
same conduct at the same time and place in exchanging shots’ 
such that it was not unfair to hold them equally responsible for 
the victim’s death.”  (People v. Carney (Dec. 10, 2019, C077558 
[nonpub. opn.].)  Based on that reasoning, the Court of Appeal 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
2 
concluded that the actions of defendants Lonnie Orlando 
Mitchell and Louis James Mitchell (collectively, the Mitchells) 
were sufficient to demonstrate that each proximately caused the 
victim’s death, regardless of who actually shot the victim.    
For reasons that follow, we agree with the Court of Appeal 
that, although neither of the Mitchells fired the fatal shot, their 
life-threatening deadly actions constituted proximate cause 
consistent with our holding in Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th 834.  
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.1  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the early afternoon of December 14, 2010, the Mitchells 
entered a South Sacramento barbershop frequented by 
members of the G-Mobb street gang.  The Mitchells were not 
members of G-Mobb and had a history of confrontation with 
several G-Mobb gang members.  Lonnie Mitchell entered the 
barbershop with a TEC-9 assault weapon hanging from a cord 
around his neck; the outline of the weapon was visible under his 
hoodie.  He spoke on his cell phone while he paced back and forth 
inside the barbershop, explaining to his caller that he wanted to 
“shoot the place up.”  Witnesses reported that Louis Mitchell, 
who appeared to be carrying a gun, put on a barbershop cape 
and sat in a chair, as if waiting for a haircut.    
 
1  
Our grant of review also included the following question:  
“What impact, if any, do People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 
and Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f)) 
have on the rule of Sanchez?”  As we explain below (see post, at 
pp. 19–22), neither Chiu nor Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) has any impact on whether 
our holding in Sanchez applies in this case. 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
3 
 
Larry Jones and Ernest S. — friends of defendant James 
Leo Carney — were both inside the barbershop when the 
Mitchells entered.  Ernest was seated in a barber’s chair 
wearing a cape while his son, who sat adjacent to him, was 
getting a haircut.  Concerned about the Mitchells’ hostile armed 
presence in the shop, Jones called Carney and asked him to pick 
him up, along with Ernest and Ernest’s son.  Carney then called 
Marvion Barksdale.  Lonnie Mitchell had recently threatened to 
kill Barksdale over a dispute involving a robbery.  
 
Armed with a revolver, Carney drove to the barbershop.  
When he arrived, he parked across the street from the 
barbershop and stood outside his car.  Ernest quickly left the 
shop with his son and placed him in Carney’s car.   
 
Barksdale also drove to the barbershop with several 
passengers including Dominique Marcell Lott.  When they 
arrived, Barksdale and Lott exited the vehicle, and armed with 
guns, began walking toward the barbershop.  The Mitchells 
were standing outside the shop.  Gunfire erupted.  Louis 
Mitchell, who was still wearing the barber’s cape, fired shots 
towards Carney and Ernest.  Lonnie Mitchell fired the assault 
weapon wildly, according to one witness.  Barksdale and Lott 
were both shot; Barksdale later died.  The evidence was 
inconclusive as to who fired the first shots.  
 
During the exchange of gunfire, a shot fired by Carney 
struck and killed a bystander, Monique N., as she stood at the 
open rear door of her SUV shielding her two-year-old son.  
Monique and her son had just posed for Christmas photos at a 
studio next door to the barbershop.  She was pronounced dead 
at the scene.   
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
4 
 
Before fleeing the scene in a waiting car, the Mitchells 
fired several more shots from the front of the barbershop, hitting 
and injuring four other bystanders inside the shop (John E., 
Adam W., Joshua B., Gralin M.).  Jones who was still in the 
barbershop, fled out the back while firing his handgun at the 
Mitchells.  Jones escaped without injury.  
As relevant here, the Sacramento County District 
Attorney filed an information charging the Mitchells, Carney, 
and Jones with murder (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)) for the 
death of Monique, and with four counts of assault with a firearm 
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) for the four injured victims in the 
barbershop.  The information further alleged that Carney and 
Jones committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street 
gang.  (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)  Before trial, Lott pleaded guilty 
to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 21 years in 
prison.   
At trial, all four defendants asserted they had acted in 
self-defense — i.e., that participants on the other side were the 
aggressors who shot first.  When the evidentiary portion of the 
trial concluded, the trial court instructed that “[a] defendant is 
guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that he 
acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.  The 
defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill.  The defendant 
acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for 
and against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided 
to kill.  The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to 
kill before completing the acts that caused death.”  (See 
CALCRIM No. 521.)  The court also instructed the jury with 
 
2  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise noted. 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
5 
CALCRIM No. 520,3 which, as given, explained in part that 
“[w]hen the conduct of two or more persons contributes 
concurrently as a cause of the death, the conduct of each is a 
cause of the death if that conduct was also a substantial factor 
contributing to the death.”  This instruction also provided that 
“[m]urder under natural and probable consequences is murder 
in the second degree.”  Additionally, the court gave CALCRIM 
No. 562, which provided that “[i]f the defendant intended to kill 
one person, but by mistake or accident killed someone else, then 
the crime, if any, is the same for the unintended killing as it is 
for the intended killing.”  A second paragraph of this instruction 
explained that any defenses “which apply to the intended 
killing, also apply to an unintended killing,” including “defenses 
that decrease the level of homicide.”   
The jury found both of the Mitchells guilty of first degree 
murder.  It acquitted Carney of murder but found him guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter.  As to the four assault victims, the jury 
found the Mitchells guilty of the charges but found Carney not 
guilty.  It acquitted Jones on all counts.   
The Mitchells appealed their first degree murder 
convictions.  They argued that because neither had fired the 
shot that killed Monique, the jury must have found them guilty 
of murder based on their alleged status as accomplices.  Citing 
 
3  
Though the standard instruction CALCRIM No. 520 
explains that “[t]here may be more than one cause of death,” it 
does not include language regarding “concurrent” causes, which 
is contained in CALJIC No. 3.41.  (See post, at p. 8.)  CALCRIM 
No. 520 provides that a substantial factor, which is “more than 
a trivial or remote factor,” “does not have to be the only factor 
that causes the death.”  The trial court here instructed the jury 
in language virtually identical to CALJIC No. 3.41.  
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
6 
our then-recent Chiu opinion, they argued their culpability was 
limited to second degree murder.  The Court of Appeal rejected 
the Mitchells’ contentions.  Relying on Sanchez, supra, 26 
Cal.4th 834, it explained that the Mitchells’ first degree murder 
convictions were based on their own “ ‘culpable mens rea 
(malice),’ not on vicarious liability for aiding and abetting,” 
which, coupled with the evidence that their actions proximately 
caused the victim’s death, provided sufficient evidence for their 
convictions.   
The Mitchells filed petitions for review in this court, which 
we granted in part as to the question of Sanchez’s applicability 
in this case.4  For reasons explained below, we reject the 
Mitchells’ assertion that Sanchez’s “substantial concurrent 
cause” analysis is limited to situations in which it is unclear who 
among the participants in a gun battle actually fired the shot 
that killed the victim.  Rather, Sanchez establishes that the 
conduct of a participant in a gun battle who did not fire the fatal 
shot may contribute substantially and concurrently to — and be 
a proximate cause of — the victim’s death.  (Sanchez, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 845–849.)   
DISCUSSION 
A. Proximate Cause  
“Murder includes both actus reus and mens rea elements.  
To satisfy the actus reus element of murder, an act of either the 
defendant or an accomplice must be the proximate cause of 
death.”  (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660, italics 
 
4  
The Court of Appeal also affirmed Carney’s manslaughter 
conviction.  He petitioned for review in this court, but we denied 
his petition.  
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
7 
omitted.)  Specifically, “a ‘cause of the death of [the victim] is an 
act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that 
produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the 
act or omission the death of [the decedent] and without which 
the death would not occur.’  (See CALJIC No. 3.40.)  In general, 
‘[p]roximate cause is clearly established where the act is directly 
connected with the resulting injury, with no intervening force 
operating.’  (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 
2000) Elements, § 36, p. 242.)”  (People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 860, 866 (Cervantes).)  An intervening force, in turn, “is 
one which actively operates in producing harm to another after 
the actor’s . . . act or omission has been committed.”  (Rest.2d 
Torts, § 441, subd. (1); see People v. Schmies (1996) 44 
Cal.App.4th 38, 46 (Schmies) [“principles of causation apply to 
crimes as well as torts”].) 
Broadly speaking, proximate cause consists of two 
components.  One is cause in fact (also called actual or direct 
causation).  “ ‘ “An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary 
antecedent of an event” ’ ” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. 
Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352 (State Dept. of State 
Hospitals)), and it is commonly referred to as the “but-for” cause 
of death.  (See CALJIC No. 3.40; CALCRIM No. 240 [Causation]; 
CALCRIM No. 520 [First or Second Degree Murder with Malice 
Aforethought (Pen. Code, § 187)].)  The second component 
“ ‘focuses on public policy considerations.  Because the purported 
[factual] causes of an event may be traced back to the dawn of 
humanity, the law has imposed additional “limitations on 
liability other than simple causality.”  [Citation.]  “These 
additional limitations are related not only to the degree of 
connection between the conduct and the injury, but also with 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
8 
public policy.” ’ ”  (State Dept. of State Hospitals, supra, 61 
Cal.4th at p. 353.)5   
As relevant here, when there is evidence of concurrent 
causes, we have held that “ ‘[t]o be considered the proximate 
cause of the victim’s death, the defendant’s act must have been 
a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than 
insignificant or merely theoretical.’ ”  (People v. Jennings (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 616, 643 (Jennings); see CALJIC No. 3.41; see also 
CALCRIM No. 520.)  “[A] cause is concurrent if it was ‘operative 
at the time of the murder and acted with another cause to 
produce the murder.’ ”  (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 
846 (Crew), quoting CALJIC No. 3.41.) “ ‘[A]s long as the jury 
finds that without the criminal act the death would not have 
occurred when it did, it need not determine which of the 
concurrent causes was the principal or primary cause of death.’ ”  
(Jennings, at p. 643.) 
The limitation on liability under the second component of 
proximate cause comes down to the question of foreseeability.  
(See People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 321 (Roberts).)  “The 
object of the criminal law is to deter the individual from 
committing acts that injure society by harming others, their 
property, or the public welfare, and to express society’s 
 
5  
When referred to generally, the term “ ‘ “proximate cause 
‘is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of causation [i.e., cause 
in fact], but with the various considerations of policy that limit 
an actor’s responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.’ ” ’  
[Citation.]”  [Citation.] As Witkin puts it, ‘[t]he doctrine of 
proximate cause limits liability; i.e., in certain situations where 
the defendant’s conduct is an actual cause of the harm, the 
defendant will nevertheless be absolved because of the manner 
in which the injury occurred.’ ”  (State Dept. of State Hospitals, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 353.) 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
9 
condemnation of such acts by punishing them.  ‘The purpose of 
the criminal law is to define socially intolerable conduct, and to 
hold conduct within . . . limits . . . reasonably acceptable from 
the social point of view.’ ”  (Id. at p. 316.)  “The criminal law thus 
is clear that for liability to be found, the cause of the harm not 
only must be direct, but also not so remote as to fail to constitute 
the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s act.”  
(Id. at p. 319.)  Put simply, “[a] result cannot be the natural and 
probable cause of an act if the act was unforeseeable.”  (Id. at 
pp. 321–322; see People v. Fiu (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 360, 372 
(Fiu) [“language in CALJIC No. 3.40 requiring an injury or 
death to be a direct, natural, and probable consequence of a 
defendant’s act necessarily refers to consequences that are 
reasonably foreseeable”].)   
Foreseeability is also relevant when considering the effect 
of an intervening act on the chain of causation.  (See Roberts, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 321–322.)  “To relieve a defendant of 
criminal 
liability, 
an 
intervening 
cause 
must 
be 
an 
unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.  [Citation.]  The 
defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible 
consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the 
defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the 
kind that could result from his act.”  (Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 847; see Schmies, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 49 [“An 
‘independent’ intervening ‘act may be so disconnected and 
unforeseeable as to be a superseding cause, i.e., in such a case 
the defendant’s act will be a remote, and not the proximate, 
cause’ ”].)  “The act of another constitutes a superseding cause 
precluding responsibility of the initial actor only if the other’s 
conduct is both unforeseeable and causes harm that was not the 
foreseeable consequence of the initial actor’s conduct.”  (People 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
10 
v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1329–1330 [whether in-
air collision deaths of two firefighter pilots were “reasonably 
foreseeable consequences” of fire recklessly started near 
methamphetamine laboratory].)  
With this proximate cause framework in mind, we turn to 
Sanchez and its use of the term “substantial concurrent cause.”   
B. Sanchez 
In Sanchez, this court held that the act of a defendant who 
may not have fired the fatal bullet was sufficient to establish 
proximate cause because the act — engaging a rival gang 
member in a public gun shootout — was a “substantial 
concurrent cause” of the victim’s death.  (Sanchez, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 845; see id. at pp. 854–857 (conc. opn. of Kennard, 
J.).)  The parties here offer competing views of what we meant 
by “substantial concurrent cause.”   
The Mitchells contend that “Sanchez’s ‘substantial 
concurrent causation’ theory . . . only makes sense where the 
actual killer is unknown.”  In their view, “[w]here the facts show 
that either defendant’s bullet could have killed the bystander, 
Sanchez treats each defendant’s act in shooting as a ‘substantial’ 
cause of the bystander’s death, applying a lesser standard” than 
actual causation to find defendant guilty of the bystander’s 
murder.  So understood, Sanchez and its “substantial concurrent 
causation” rule of liability are inapplicable here because the 
evidence affirmatively establishes that someone other than the 
Mitchells fired the fatal shot.  To conclude otherwise, the 
Mitchells contend, would render actual causation a “legal 
fiction” in this case because neither of them fired the fatal shot.    
The Attorney General submits a different understanding 
of “substantial concurrent cause” and emphasizes the general 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
11 
reach of Sanchez’s holding.  He contends that our conclusion in 
Sanchez did not turn on any lack of evidence establishing who 
fired the fatal shot.  Rather, he asserts, our application of the 
substantial concurrent causation theory focused on the “effect of 
the defendant’s actions as they relate to the killing and that 
defendant’s personal culpability.”  In other words, the Attorney 
General argues that the Mitchells’ actions of engaging in a gun 
battle in a crowded public place satisfy the proximate cause 
requirement and, together with their intent to kill Carney and 
Jones, support their convictions for the first degree murder of 
Monique.   
In Sanchez, defendant Julio Cesar Sanchez and rival gang 
member and codefendant, Ramon Gonzalez, engaged in a public 
gun battle that resulted in a bystander’s death.  In summarizing 
the case, we stated:  “We know a single stray bullet was the 
actual, direct cause of death.  At the close of evidence all parties 
agreed it could not be established [which defendant] had fired 
the fatal shot.”  (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 845.)  After 
being instructed on proximate causation,6 the jury convicted 
 
6  
The Sanchez jury was instructed:  “ ‘A cause of death is an 
act that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a 
direct, natural and probable consequence of the act, the death of 
a human being, and without which the death would not occur.  
[¶]  There may be more than one cause of the death.  [¶]  When 
the conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently as a 
cause of the death, the conduct of each is a cause of the death if 
that conduct was also a substantial factor contributing to the 
death.  [¶]  A cause is a concurrent cause if it was operative at 
the moment of death and acted with another force to produce the 
death.  [¶]  If you find that a defendant’s conduct was a cause of 
death to another person, then it is no defense that the conduct 
of some other person also contributed to the death.’ ”  (Sanchez, 
 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
12 
both defendants of first degree murder.  (Id. at p. 839.)  The 
Court of Appeal reversed Sanchez’s conviction, concluding that 
in a single-fatal-bullet case “concurrent causation could not 
serve as a basis for finding both defendants liable for 
premeditated first degree murder” because there was only one 
“ ‘direct or actual’ ” cause of death rather than two or more such 
causes.  (Id. at p. 844.)    
 
We reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment, holding that 
“[t]he circumstance that it cannot be determined who fired the 
single fatal bullet, i.e., that direct or actual causation cannot be 
established, does not undermine defendant’s first degree 
murder conviction if it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant’s conduct was a substantial concurrent cause of 
[the bystander]’s death.”  (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 845.)  
We explained that “it is proximate causation, not direct or actual 
causation, which, together with the requisite culpable mens rea 
(malice), determines defendant’s liability for murder.”  (Ibid.)  
We concluded that Sanchez’s “act of engaging Gonzalez in a gun 
battle and attempting to murder him was a substantial 
concurrent, and hence proximate, cause of [the bystander’s] 
death.”  (Id. at p. 839.) 
 
Although Sanchez was the first decision in which we used 
the term “substantial concurrent cause” in this context, Sanchez 
did not articulate a new theory of causation or, as the Mitchells 
assert, announce a “reduced” standard of causation that served 
 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 843, 845, italics added; see CALJIC Nos. 
3.40, 3.41.)   
 
The corresponding CALCRIM instruction on murder given 
in the instant case (CALCRIM No. 520) incorporated the same 
proximate cause language as this instruction in Sanchez.  
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Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
13 
to lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof.  Rather, the term 
“substantial concurrent cause” embraces familiar causation 
concepts of substantial factor and concurrent cause.  (See ante, 
at pp. 7–8.)  It reflects key principles from CALJIC Nos. 3.40 
and 3.41, which together “correctly define proximate causation” 
when there is evidence of more than one cause of death.  (People 
v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 338; see Sanchez, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 843, 845.)   
 
For instance, as given in Sanchez CALJIC No. 3.41 
explained that “ ‘[w]hen the conduct of two or more persons 
contributes concurrently as a cause of the death, the conduct of 
each is a cause of the death if that conduct was also a substantial 
factor contributing to the death.  [¶]  A cause is a concurrent 
cause if it was operative at the moment of death and acted with 
another force to produce the death.’ ”  (Sanchez, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 845; see ante, at p. 11, fn. 6.)  In turn, “ ‘cause of 
death’ ” was defined in Sanchez as “ ‘an act that sets in motion 
a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable 
consequence of the act, the death of a human being . . . .’ ”  
(Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 845, see CALJIC No. 3.40; see 
also ante, at p. 11, fn. 6.)  Drawn from these instructions, the 
term “substantial concurrent cause” used in Sanchez accurately 
describes proximate cause, encompassing the components of (1) 
cause in fact — i.e., requiring the defendant’s conduct to be a 
“substantial factor” contributing to the bystander’s death, and 
(2) policy considerations — i.e., limiting liability for that which 
is the “direct, natural and probable consequence” of the 
defendant’s act.  (See ante, at pp. 7–8.)  
 
In concluding that the defendants’ life-threatening deadly 
actions in Sanchez constituted the “substantial concurrent, and 
hence proximate, cause” of the bystander’s death, the Sanchez 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
14 
majority emphasized the defendants’ acts of “engag[ing] one 
another in a gun battle on a public street in broad daylight” 
(Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 852) and making 
“simultaneous attempts to murder one another in a preplanned 
blaze of gunfire” (id. at p. 853).  These mutual acts were without 
question concurrent, substantial factors contributing to the 
bystander’s death.  Quoting Justice Kennard’s concurrence, the 
majority concluded:  “ ‘Because [Sanchez] and Gonzalez had 
equally culpable mental states and engaged in precisely the 
same conduct at the same time and place in exchanging shots, 
it is not unfair to hold them equally responsible for [the 
bystander’s] death, without regard to which of them actually 
fired the bullet that struck and killed [the bystander].’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 854, quoting id. at p. 856 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  Justice 
Kennard, who signed the majority opinion in Sanchez, 
reiterated these concurrent cause principles in her separate 
concurrence, explaining:  “In legal terms, [Sanchez] committed 
the act of killing [the bystander] if his conduct was a legal or 
proximate cause of [that] death” even if it was Gonzalez who 
fired the fatal bullet.  (Id. at p. 855 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)7   
Justice Kennard went on to discuss in her Sanchez 
concurrence whether Gonzalez’s conduct — firing at Sanchez 
“with a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill [him]” — 
“must in law be regarded as a ‘superseding cause’ that cut off 
[Sanchez’s] responsibility for any injury or death inflicted by the 
 
7  
In this part of her concurrence, Justice Kennard examined 
the possibility that Gonzalez rather than Sanchez fired the 
bullet that killed the bystander and explained why this 
possibility did not preclude a finding that Sanchez’s own 
“conduct caused [the] death.”  (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 
855 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)   
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
15 
bullets that Gonzales fired.”  (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 
855 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  She answered this question in 
the negative, explaining:  “In law, the term ‘superseding cause’ 
means “an independent event [that] intervenes in the chain of 
causation, producing harm of a kind and degree so far beyond 
the risk the original [wrongdoer] should have foreseen that the 
law deems it unfair to hold him responsible.”  [Citation.]  Here, 
[Sanchez] and Gonzalez during their gun battle were attempting 
to kill each other, so that the killing of a bystander was a harm 
that both in kind and degree was within the risk that [Sanchez] 
and Gonzalez must have expected.  Because they each expected 
and intended a death to occur, and a death did occur in a manner 
that was entirely foreseeable, it does not matter, for purposes of 
determining proximate or legal cause under criminal law, that 
the person killed was not the precise object of their lethal 
intent.”  (Id. at pp. 855–856 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) 
Although the Sanchez majority did not refer to the issue 
of superseding cause, its opinion should not be read as 
eliminating that issue from the causation analysis in concurrent 
cause cases.  The focus of the majority’s analysis was the Court 
of Appeal’s erroneous conclusion that, as a matter of law, 
“concurrent causation cannot be established in a single-fatal-
bullet case.”  (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 839.)  That the 
majority, in considering this narrow and specific legal question, 
did not also discuss superseding cause did not — and was not 
intended to — render the superseding cause question irrelevant 
to the determination of proximate cause.  To the extent that 
Sanchez could be understood as suggesting otherwise, we now 
clarify that the question of superseding cause — as Justice 
Kennard’s concurrence recognized — remains part of the 
proximate cause analysis in concurrent cause cases.  
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
16 
Notably, the existing instructions on causation already 
incorporate the concept of any unforeseeable, superseding 
cause.  CALJIC No. 3.40’s requirement that an injury or death 
be a direct, natural, and probable consequence of a defendant’s 
act “necessarily refers to consequences that are reasonably 
foreseeable.”  (Fiu, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 372; see 
CALCRIM No. 240 [“A natural and probable consequence is one 
that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if 
nothing unusual intervenes” (second italics added)].)  Thus, if an 
intervening cause is a reasonably foreseeable result of a 
defendant’s initial act, “ ‘ “the intervening act is ‘dependent’ and 
not a superseding cause, and will not relieve [the] defendant of 
liability.” ’ ”  (Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 871.)  
Conversely, “[a] result cannot be the natural and probable cause 
of an act if the act was unforeseeable.”  (Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 
at pp. 321–322.)  Based on this foreseeability inquiry, therefore, 
a jury necessarily considers, in its determination of proximate 
cause, whether there was any intervening cause that was 
unforeseeable and constituted a superseding cause.  (See id. at 
p. 320, fn. 11 [question of foreseeability will ordinarily be for jury 
to decide — “there is no bright line demarcating a legally 
sufficient proximate cause from one that is too remote”].)   
Sanchez’s conclusion that both shooters in a gun battle 
may be guilty of murder even though only one was the actual 
shooter was consistent with then-existing California decisions.  
For instance, California case law recognized that a defendant 
may be guilty of first degree murder where there are multiple 
proximate causes of death (see People v. Mai (1994) 22 
Cal.App.4th 117, 123, fn. 5); People v. Kemp (1957) 150 
Cal.App.2d 654, 658).  (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 846–
847.)  We also note that several decisions from our sister states 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
17 
have similarly viewed a defendant’s culpability in connection 
with gun battles.  (See e.g., State v. Young (2020) 429 S.C. 155, 
161 [838 S.E.2d 516, 519] [“The majority of jurisdictions impose 
criminal responsibility on all combatants for the consequences 
of mutual combat”]; Commonwealth v. Santiago (1997) 425 
Mass. 491, 504, 681 N.E.2d 1205, 1215 [“By choosing to engage 
in a shootout, a defendant may be the cause of a shooting by 
either side because the death of a bystander is a natural result 
of a shootout, and the shootout could not occur without 
participation from both sides”]; Alston v. State (1995) 339 Md. 
306, 309 [662 A.2d 247, 248] [“ ‘The deadly homicidal force . . . 
was a collective hail of bullets, a collective fusillade, with no 
further parsing required.  Which bullet came from which gun is 
inconsequential’ ”].)8   
In this case, although there was no evidence that either of 
the Mitchells intended to or actually did shoot Monique, the 
evidence did establish the following:  A week before the 
shootout, Lonnie Mitchell had threatened to kill a G-Mobb gang 
member.  On the day of the shooting, the Mitchells armed 
themselves and headed to a barbershop that was a known 
hangout of the G-Mobb.  After entering the barbershop, Lonnie 
 
8  
Some of our statements in Sanchez could be read as 
suggesting that the actual or direct cause of the bystander’s 
death is not relevant to the proximate cause determination.  
(See, e.g., Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 845 [“it is proximate 
causation, not direct or actual causation, which, together with 
the 
requisite 
culpable 
mens 
rea 
(malice), 
determines 
defendant’s liability for murder”]; id. at p. 854 [both defendants 
are guilty “ ‘without regard to which of them actually fired the 
bullet that struck and killed’ ” the bystander].)  To clarify, 
proximate cause consists of both cause in fact and policy 
considerations.  (See ante, at pp. 7–8.) 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
18 
Mitchell told someone over the phone he wanted to “shoot the 
place up.”  Jones then summoned Carney for help.  When 
Carney, Barksdale, and others arrived at the barbershop, 
Lonnie Mitchell shot at Carney and Louis Mitchell shot his 
assault weapon wildly.  During the public shootout, the 
Mitchells shot and killed an adversary, Barksdale, and shot and 
injured four bystanders in the barbershop.  In returning the 
Mitchells’ gunfire, Carney shot and killed Monique.    
Even though the evidence established that neither of the 
Mitchells fired the fatal shot, their first degree murder 
convictions are consistent with Sanchez’s holding that a 
defendant’s “life-threatening deadly acts” in a gun battle may be 
a proximate cause of a bystander’s death.  (Sanchez, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 848–849.)  The jury’s return of varying verdicts as 
to the four defendants — convicting the Mitchells of first degree 
murder and acquitting Jones, while convicting Carney, who 
fired the fatal shot, of only voluntary manslaughter — further 
reveals that the jury did not base its verdict on the defendants’ 
mere participation in the gun battle, but carefully considered 
the Mitchells’ own actions and their personal mens rea.  These 
differing verdicts reflect that the jury determined each 
defendant’s own mental state and assigned culpability 
accordingly.  The conduct of each of the Mitchells constituted a 
“substantial concurrent cause” of the bystander’s death.  
(Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 845.) 
The Mitchells, however, contend that Jennings, supra, 50 
Cal.4th 616 supports their interpretation of the “substantial 
concurrent cause” rule and their view that the rule does not 
apply where, as here, only one bullet hit and killed a bystander.  
In Jennings, the defendant administered lethal doses of 
sedatives and physically abused and deliberately starved his 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
19 
five-year-old son.  We concluded that the drugs, abuse, and 
starvation were each a concurrent cause of his son’s death.  (Id. 
at p. 641 [evidence showed defendant administered drugs to son 
and directed wife to do the same].)  We emphasized that in the 
end, “ ‘[a]s long as the jury finds that without the criminal act 
the death would not have occurred when it did, it need not 
determine which of the concurrent causes was the principal or 
primary cause of death.’ ”  (Id. at p. 643, quoting People v. Catlin 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 155.)  We applied the “substantial factor” 
test of cause in fact because there was evidence of more than one 
cause of death, not because the primary cause of death was 
unknown.  (Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 643–644; see 
Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1049, 1052.)  
Contrary to the Mitchells’ suggestion, Jennings does not compel 
a different interpretation of “substantial concurrent cause” as 
set out in Sanchez.   
C. Chiu and Senate Bill No. 1437 
 
As noted (see ante, at p. 2, fn. 1), our grant of review 
included the question of what impact, if any, People v. Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu) and Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f)) have on the Sanchez rule.  The 
Mitchells argue that Sanchez’s “substantial concurrent cause” 
analysis is “a type of natural and probable consequences liability 
that is inconsistent” with Chiu and Senate Bill No. 1437.  As we 
explain below, the Mitchells incorrectly assume that the term 
“natural and probable consequences” refers only to an aider and 
abettor’s vicarious liability.  (See Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 
320.)  Therefore, we are unpersuaded by their effort to bring the 
definition of proximate cause, which deals with the actus reus of 
a crime (see, ante, at p. 6), within the ambit of Senate Bill No. 
1437 and Chiu’s discussion of the natural and probable 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
20 
consequences doctrine, which both concern the mens rea of a 
crime.  We conclude that Senate Bill No. 1437 and Chiu have no 
direct effect on our holding in Sanchez.   
 
Before Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155, an accomplice who 
aided and abetted a crime could be liable, not only for that target 
offense, but also for any additional offense (including murder) 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine even if 
the accomplice did not intend the additional offense.  (Id. at p. 
164 [“natural and probable consequences doctrine is based . . . 
‘on the policy [that] . . . aiders and abettors should be 
responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally, 
probably, and foreseeably put in motion’ ” (italics omitted)].)  In 
Chiu, we held that the natural and probable consequences rule 
of accomplice liability did not extend to first degree 
premeditated murder because imposing such vicarious liability 
on an aider and abettor — one who did not possess the “uniquely 
subjective and personal” mental state for first degree murder — 
would not serve “legitimate public policy considerations of 
deterrence and culpability.”  (Chiu, at p. 166.)  In 2018, the 
Legislature amended section 188 through Senate Bill No. 1437 
to provide that “[e]xcept as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 
189 [governing felony murder], in order to be convicted of 
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice 
aforethought.  Malice shall not be imputed to a person based 
solely on his or her participation in a crime.”  (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 
as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)  We subsequently held 
that this amendment applied to second degree murder.  (People 
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839.)  
 
Insofar as the proximate cause instruction quoted in 
Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at page 845, refers to a death that is 
“ ‘a direct, natural and probable consequence of’ ” the 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
21 
defendant’s act, it does not concern the imputed malice theory 
of criminal liability that is part of the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine of accomplice liability affected by Chiu 
and Senate Bill No. 1437.  (See Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 
p. 320.)  Understanding the rationale for the addition of the 
“natural and probable consequences” language to the proximate 
cause instruction is helpful in resolving the question before us.   
In 1992, the CALJIC committee added the language to the 
causation instruction (CALJIC No. 3.40) after we clarified the 
causation requirement in certain jury instructions.  (See 
Mitchell v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1052 [disapproving 
BAJI No. 375 because it asked jury to “focus improperly on the 
cause that is spatially or temporally closest to the harm”]; 
Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 321–322 [instructions effectively 
told the jury to disregard foreseeability when determining the 
proximate cause of an injury].)  Our decisions explained that 
“[t]he criminal law . . . is clear that for liability to be found, the 
cause of the harm not only must be direct, but also not so remote 
as to fail to constitute the natural and probable consequence of 
the defendant’s act.”  (Roberts, at p. 319.)   
Thereafter, with our pronouncements from Roberts and 
Mitchell v. Gonzales expressly in mind, the CALJIC committee 
revised CALJIC No. 3.40 to add the phrase “direct, natural and 
probable consequence.”  (People v. Temple (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 
1750, 1756 [1992 revision to CALJIC No. 3.40 “correctly 
embodies the Mitchell v. Gonzales-People v. Roberts test of 
proximate cause”]; see CALCRIM No. 240.)  Contrary to the 
Mitchells’ argument, the reference to “direct, natural and 
probable consequence” in the proximate cause jury instruction, 
which deals with the actus reus of murder, does not implicate 
concerns regarding imputed mens rea and vicarious liability 
PEOPLE v. CARNEY 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
22 
identified in Chiu and Senate Bill No. 1437. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Chiu and Senate 
Bill No. 1437 do not impact or otherwise inform the question of 
Sanchez’s application in this case.   
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court, consistent with our holding in 
Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th 834, properly instructed the jury on 
substantial concurrent causation with respect to Monique’s 
death, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.  
JENKINS, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Carney 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 12/10/19 – 3d Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S260063 
Date Filed:  July 20, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Sacramento  
Judge:  Kevin J. McCormick 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Offices of Beles & Beles, Robert J. Beles, Paul McCarthy and 
Micah Reyner for Defendants and Appellants Louis Mitchell and 
Lonnie Mitchell. 
 
Stephen Greenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
Defendant and Appellant James Leo Carney. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein, Stephen G. 
Herndon, Carlos A. Martinez, Catherine Chatman, Eric L. 
Christoffersen, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Kimberly A. Donohue, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Amicus Populi as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Micah Reyner 
Law Offices of Beles & Beles 
1 Kaiser Plaza, Suite 2300 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 836-0100 
 
Kimberley A. Donohue 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 94244 
(916) 210-6135