Title: Ex parte G.L.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1170813
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2018

Rel: October 26, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1170813
____________________
Ex parte G.L.C.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: G.L.C.
v.
C.E.C. III)
(Baldwin Juvenile Court, JU-17-164.01;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2160980)
BRYAN, Justice.
1170813
G.L.C. ("the mother") petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari seeking review of the judgment of the Court of
Civil Appeals dismissing her appeal as untimely. See G.L.C. v.
C.E.C. III, [Ms. 2160980, May 25, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
Civ. App. 2018).  We granted the petition, and we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause.
Facts and Procedural History
On March 6, 2017, C.E.C. III ("the father") filed a
petition in the Baldwin Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")
seeking to terminate the parental rights of the mother,
alleging that the mother had abandoned their son, A.B.C. ("the
child").  The juvenile court appointed an attorney to
represent the mother, and the juvenile court subsequently
conducted a hearing on the father's petition.  On August 16,
2017, the juvenile court entered a final judgment terminating
the mother's parental rights to the child.  The mother did not
file a postjudgment motion challenging the juvenile court's
judgment; therefore, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. 
App.
P., and Rule 28(C), Ala. R. Juv. P., the mother had 14 days,
or until August 30, 2017, to file her notice of appeal.  The
notice of appeal and docketing statement that appear in the
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record were stamped filed on August 31, 2017, but that date
had been changed by hand to August 30, 2017.  The notice of
appeal and the docketing statement are signed by the mother,
not the court-appointed attorney who represented her during
the termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.  The date next
to the mother's signature on the notice of appeal is August
31, 2017, but it had been changed to August 30, 2017; the date
next to the mother's signature on the docketing statement is
August 31, 2017.1  
On September 6, 2017, the Court of Civil Appeals docketed
the mother's appeal.  The same day, the father's attorney sent
an e-mail to Tina Hadley, a docket specialist in the Baldwin
County circuit clerk's office ("the circuit clerk's office"),
inquiring about the altered dates on the mother's notice of
appeal.  Hadley responded immediately and stated:
"[The mother] attempted to file Aug[ust] 30[th]
which was her 14th day.  The girls in juvenile sent
her upstairs to me and security had locked the door
as it was then 4:30 and the door is actually on an
automatic lock.  I verified with Juvenile that she
had been here and been turned away.  I corrected the
dates so that she met her time frame since it was
not her fault."
1On September 1, 2017, the juvenile court entered an order
appointing a different attorney to represent the mother in
"the appellate action."
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On September 15, 2017, the father filed in the juvenile
court a motion to dismiss the mother's appeal as untimely
filed.  After the mother filed a response, the juvenile court
conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 31,
2017.  The mother testified that she came to the Baldwin
County courthouse on August 30, 2017, and a security officer
"sent [her] upstairs ... to file the appeal." The mother said
that she went upstairs to the circuit clerk's office and
waited for someone to help her.  The mother stated that "it
was about time for them to go" but she eventually told someone
that she was there "to file [a] juvenile appeal."  The
individual whom she spoke to sent her "downstairs" –-
apparently to the juvenile division of the circuit clerk's
office –- but by the time she got there the doors were locked. 
The mother stated that she asked if she could leave the notice
of appeal in an envelope but that "they said ... [she] would
have to come the next day."
The 
mother 
testified 
that 
she 
returned 
to 
the
"downstairs" clerk's office the following day –- August 31 –- 
to file her notice of appeal because that was where she had
been told to go the previous day.  But, when she appeared at
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the clerk's office downstairs, "they" sent her back to the
circuit clerk's office upstairs to file her notice of appeal. 
When the mother returned to the circuit clerk's office
upstairs, someone finally accepted her notice of appeal, and
it was stamped filed on August 31. 
Hadley testified that the mother came to the circuit
clerk's office on August 31, 2017, with her notice of appeal
already filled out and filed her notice of appeal from the
judgment terminating her parental rights.  Hadley agreed that
all the date stamps on the mother's notice of appeal had been
changed from August 31 to August 30 even though the mother had
not actually filed her notice of appeal on August 30.  Hadley
indicated that she changed all the dates on the mother's
notice of appeal from August 31 to August 30 because the
mother had been to the circuit clerk's office on August 30 to
file her notice of appeal but had been unable to do so.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court
stated:
"I think that I have to find that it was not timely
filed.  Do I think the clerk's office needs a better
... standard operating procedure for dealing with
folks that walk up to this courthouse at 4:28 and 52
seconds? Yes. Yes, I do.  But I don't –- I don't
know what their procedure is for that. There
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probably is some procedure and somebody probably did
not follow it.  But I don't know what it is. 
Because I know that things can be filed when the
physical building is locked.  So I know you can do
it, that it's possible.  But I'm not sure what that
procedure is, and I do think the clerk's office
could have handled it better.  But it wasn't filed
in time, ultimately, and the remedy for that is not
to change the date on the paperwork.  So I'll have
to grant the motion to dismiss."
On October 31, 2017, the juvenile court entered an order
dismissing the mother's appeal.  On April 4, 2018, the Court
of Civil Appeals, citing Ex parte Madison County Department of
Human Resources, [Ms. 2160883, November 17, 2017] ___ So. 3d
___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2017), and D.V.P. v. T.W.P., 905 So. 2d
853, 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), issued an order stating that
the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to enter an order
dismissing the mother's appeal and that, therefore, that order
was void.  However, the Court of Civil Appeals reinvested the
juvenile court with jurisdiction for 14 days "for the limited
purpose of making a factual determination as to the date the
notice of appeal was filed."  On April 12, 2018, the juvenile
court entered an order stating that, "[a]fter reviewing the
facts, pleadings, and transcripts available, it is hereby
determined that [the mother] filed her notice of appeal on
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August 31, 2017.  This was 15 days after this Court's final
order."
The Court of Civil Appeals subsequently issued an opinion
dismissing the mother's appeal as untimely filed. See G.L.C.,
supra.  The mother filed a timely petition for a writ of
certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Court of Civil
Appeals' decision.  
Standard of Review
"'"On 
certiorari 
review, 
this 
Court 
accords 
no
presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the
intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de 
novo
the standard of review that was applicable in the Court of
Civil Appeals."'"  Ex parte S.L.M., 171 So. 3d 673, 677 (Ala.
2014) (quoting Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (Ala.
2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d
132, 135 (Ala. 1996)).
Analysis
The mother asks this Court to consider, as a matter of
first impression, whether a notice of appeal may be deemed
timely filed when the filer "physically appears at the clerk's
office and presents a notice of appeal to the clerk before the
7
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expiration of the filing deadline, with [the] intention that
it be received and filed, only to have the clerk's office
decline to receive and file that notice at the time of
presentment."  With the question framed in that manner, we
must first consider the father's argument that, pursuant to
the ore tenus standard of review, this Court must accept the
juvenile court's factual finding that the mother's notice of
appeal was filed on August 31, 2017.  We agree, but we also
note that there is no dispute that the mother's notice of
appeal was not actually filed in the circuit clerk's office
until August 31, 2017; no witness testified otherwise.  The
mother is asking this Court to hold that her notice of appeal
is deemed filed one day earlier based on the evidence that she
appeared in the circuit clerk's office on August 30 and
presented her notice of appeal for filing, but it was not
accepted.
Thus, the pertinent factual question in this case is
whether the mother appeared in the circuit clerk's office on
August 30, 2017, and presented her notice of appeal for filing
before the circuit clerk's office closed.  Although the father
suggests that the juvenile court heard disputed testimony on
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this issue, the record does not support such a conclusion. 
The record does indicate that parts of the mother's testimony
could be construed as inconsistent,2 but all the evidence in
the record indicates that the mother had appeared at the
circuit clerk's office on August 30 to file her notice of
appeal but someone in the circuit clerk's office erroneously
sent her to another part of the courthouse instead of
accepting the notice of appeal.  Regardless, even if there was
disputed evidence presented as to this issue, the record
indicates the juvenile court accepted the mother's testimony
that she had appeared at the circuit clerk's office on August
30 and attempted to file her notice of appeal shortly before
the office closed.  At the conclusion of the hearing on the
father's motion to dismiss, the juvenile court stated on the
record that the circuit clerk's office needed a "better ...
standard operating procedure for dealing with folks that walk
2For example, the mother testified that her notice-of-
appeal forms were already filled out when she appeared at the
circuit clerk's office on August 30 to file her notice of
appeal, but the notice of appeal documents in the record were
initially dated August 31.  This discrepancy was accounted for
by the mother in two ways: she stated that the copy in the
record "may have been the second copy that I tried to redo
neatly with ... typing"; she also stated that  she "probably
had the dates mixed up."
9
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up to this courthouse at 4:28 and 52 seconds"; that "[t]here
probably is some procedure and somebody probably did not
follow it"; and that "the clerk's office could have handled it
better; but that, "ultimately," the mother's notice of appeal
was not filed in time.  The clear implication from those
statements can only be that the juvenile court believed the
mother's testimony that she had been to the circuit clerk's
office on August 30 to file her notice of appeal but that she
was not able to successfully do so.
Although the Court of Civil Appeals also accepted this
factual conclusion, it held that the mother's notice of appeal
was untimely filed.  The court stated: "In applying Alabama
law in this case, we conclude that, although the mother
attempted to bring her notice of appeal to the court on August
30, 2017, the court clerk did not actually receive the notice
of appeal until August 31, 2017." G.L.C., ___ So. 3d at ___. 
In reaching the conclusion that the mother's notice of appeal
was untimely because the circuit clerk's office did not
receive the notice of appeal until August 31, the court relied
primarily upon Holmes v. Powell, 363 So. 2d 760, 761-62 (Ala.
1978), and D.T. v. State, 1 So. 3d 74, 76 (Ala. Civ. App.
10
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2008).  The Court of Civil Appeals summarized the holdings in
those cases as follows:
"In Holmes v. Powell, 363 So. 2d 760, 761-62
(Ala. 1978), our supreme court held that
"'Rule 3(a), [Ala. R. App. P.,] states
that "[I]n civil cases an appeal ... shall
be taken ... by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the trial court, within
the time allowed by Rule 4." The language
of Rule 4 is equally mandatory.  The
language of neither permits the earlier
postmark appearing upon an envelope to be
a substitute for filing with the clerk.  As
Judge Holmes recently observed in Moutry v.
State, 359 So. 2d 388, 390 (Ala. Civ. App.
1978), a case dealing with a similar issue:
"'"A document has not been filed
until 
it 
has 
actually 
been
received 
by 
the court; 
mere
mailing is not enough.  See
Blades v. U.S., 407 F.2d 1397
(9th Cir. 1969)."
"'See also Townsend v. Board of Building
Appeals, 49 Ohio App. 2d 402, 361 N.E.2d
271 (1976); Walsh v. Tucker, 454 Pa. 175,
312 A.2d 11 (1973).'
"In the context of an appeal from a judgment
entered by a juvenile court, this court has noted
that Rule 28(C), Ala. R. Juv. P., provides:
'"Written notice of appeal shall be filed within 14
days of the date the judgment, order, or decree
appealed from is filed in the clerk's office,
whether the appeal is to an appellate court or to
the circuit court for trial de novo." (Emphasis
added.)' D.T. v. State, 1 So. 3d 74, 76 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008).
11
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"In D.T., D.T. had had until February 22, 2008,
to file his notice of appeal.  On February 21, 2008,
he sent his notice of appeal to the Dale Circuit
Court clerk via an overnight-delivery service. 
Nonetheless, the clerk's office did not receive the
notice of appeal until February 26, 2008.  Id.  This
court held that the notice of appeal was untimely,
explaining:
"'D.T. states in his brief to this court
that he sent the notice to the clerk's
office on February 21, 2008, via an
overnight delivery service.   D.T. states
that his "counsel has not received a
satisfactory 
explanation 
from 
[the 
delivery
service] for the delay."  However, the
placing of a notice of appeal with an
overnight delivery service for transmittal
is not sufficient to constitute a "filing"
under Rule 28(C).
"'As this court has explained:
"'"Whereas, 
service 
of
papers is complete upon mailing,
filing is not complete until the
notice is delivered to the proper
filing officer. See Henson v.
Henson, 261 Ala. 63, 73 So. 2d
100 (1954); Covington Bros. Motor
Co. v. Robinson, 239 Ala. 226,
194 So. 663 (1940); Rule 5(e),
[Ala. R. Civ. P.].
"'"....  A document has not
been filed until it has actually
been received by the court; mere
mailing is not enough.  See
Blades v. U.S., 407 F.2d 1397
(9th Cir. 1969); see also 16A
Words and Phrases, 'Filing.'"
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"'Moutry v. State, 359 So. 2d 388, 389–90
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978). See also Alabama
Medicaid Agency v. Peoples, 557 So. 2d 1281
(Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (holding that sending
of notice of appeal via certified mail was
insufficient to constitute filing under
Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P.).  Because D.T.'s
notice of appeal was not received by the
clerk of the Dale Circuit Court until after
the time provided by Rule 28(C), Ala. R.
Juv. P., had lapsed, D.T.'s notice of
appeal was not filed within the time
allowed by the Alabama Rules of Juvenile
Procedure. 
 
Accordingly, 
D.T.'s 
appeal 
must
be dismissed.  Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App.
P.'
"D.T., 1 So. 3d at 76–77 (second emphasis added)."
G.L.C., ___ So. 3d at ___. 
The 
mother 
argues 
that 
Holmes 
and 
D.T. 
are
distinguishable from the present case because those cases
concern the timely filing of a notice of appeal that had been
mailed.  Those cases held, quite logically, that a mailed
notice of appeal cannot be "filed" in the clerk's office until
it has been "received" by the clerk's office.  We agree with
the mother that this case presents a different circumstance:
A notice of appeal was timely hand-delivered to the circuit
clerk's office for filing but was not accepted by the circuit
clerk's office.
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The mother argues that her notice of appeal should be
deemed filed on August 30, 2017, the day she delivered the
notice of appeal to the clerk's office and presented it for
filing.  The mother cites Rubin v. Department of Industrial
Relations, 469 So. 22d 657 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985), among other
cases, in support of her argument. In Rubin, the claimant in
an action for unemployment-compensation benefits timely
"presented the circuit clerk with a notice of appeal and an
affidavit of substantial hardship, requesting initial waiver
of docket fees and service fees." 469 So. 2d at 658.  Although
the circuit clerk accepted those documents from the claimant,
the clerk did not "formally enter the case on the docket"
until the trial judge granted the claimant indigent status,
which did not occur until after the time for filing an appeal
had passed.  Id.  In holding that the claimant's appeal was
timely, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
"It has long been held that in Alabama '[a]
pleading or other paper may be said to have been
duly filed when it is delivered to the proper filing
officer.' Covington Bros. Motor Co. v. Robinson, 239
Ala. 226, 194 So. 663 (1940). See also Henson v.
Henson, 261 Ala. 63, 73 So.2d 100 (1954). Timely
delivery is sufficient even when the clerk fails to
mark the pleading or other paper 'filed.' Home
Insurance Co. v. Shriner, 235 Ala. 65, 177 So. 897
(1937).
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"Thus, 
when 
claimant 
timely 
presented 
the 
notice
of appeal and affidavit of substantial hardship to
the clerk, the case is deemed to have been filed,
notwithstanding that the clerk failed to enter the
case on the docket until the judge signed the
affidavit."
469 So. 2d at 658.
The 
Court 
of 
Civil 
Appeals, 
in 
finding 
Rubin
distinguishable from the present case, noted that the issue in
Rubin "was whether a notice of appeal was untimely when the
appellant failed to pay the appropriate filing fees or obtain
a waiver of the initial filing fee by the date the notice of
appeal was due." G.L.C., ___ So. 3d at ___.  Although that is
correct, Rubin also stands for the proposition that a clerk's
failure to "formally enter the case on the docket" after it
was delivered for filing has no bearing on whether that
document will be considered "filed" for purposes of
determining the timeliness of a notice of appeal. 469 So. 2d
at 
658. 
 We 
further note 
that, 
although 
Rubin 
is
distinguishable from the present case insofar as the clerk's
office in Rubin accepted the claimant's notice of appeal when
it was delivered to the clerk's office, both the clerk's
failure to "docket" the notice of appeal in Rubin and the
clerk's failure to accept the notice of appeal in this case
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were matters beyond the control of the individuals filing the
notices of appeal. 
As early as 1909, this Court recognized that a filer
cannot be prejudiced by the clerk's failure to "do their part"
once a document has been delivered to the clerk's office for
filing. In Falley v. Falley, 163 Ala. 626, 50 So. 894 (1909),
this Court stated: 
"[A] paper was filed when it was delivered to the
proper official charged with the duty of filing the
paper and with making the appropriate indorsement
thereon. It is evident that the act of affixing the
proper indorsement on the paper is a duty to be
performed by the officer, and with a failure of the
officer to seasonably and properly indorse the paper
the party delivering it cannot be prejudiced. He has
done all that is required when he delivers the paper
to the proper official."
163 Ala. at 628, 50 So. at 895 (emphasis added).
The component of this case that is unique is that,
although she attempted to, the mother did not actually place
the notice of appeal in the physical possession of someone in
the circuit clerk's office when she appeared there on August
30. See Phillips v. Beene's Adm'r, 38 Ala. 248, 252 (1862)
("[W]here the law requires or authorizes a party to file a
paper, it simply means that he shall place it in his official
custody.  That is all that is required of him. The party
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cannot be prejudiced by the omission of the officer to endorse
the paper filed."); Falley, supra; and Rubin, supra.  However,
the only reason the mother did not do so was because she was
erroneously told that she was in the wrong division of the
circuit clerk's office for filing her notice of appeal. 
Although the mother did not give physical possession of the
notice of appeal to someone in the clerk's office for filing
on August 30, we do not know what else she could have done
under the circumstances.  She appeared in the proper clerk's
office before the office closed on the 14th day after the
entry of the judgment terminating her parental rights and
informed the circuit clerk's office that she needed to file a
notice of appeal in a juvenile matter.  It was at that point
that, under the direction of someone in the circuit clerk's
office, the mother left the office without placing her notice
of appeal in the possession of the circuit clerk's office for
filing.  Under the particular facts of this case, principles
of equity require that the mother's notice of appeal be deemed
filed on August 30, 2017. See Sparks v. Alabama Power Co., 679
So. 2d 678, 681 (Ala. 1996) (holding, where appellant's
counsel relied on erroneous information given by 
the 
Jefferson
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County 
circuit 
clerk's 
office 
regarding 
whether 
the
appellant's postjudgment motion had been ruled on and, in
reliance on that erroneous information filed an untimely
notice of appeal, that Rule 1, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 1,
Ala. R. App. P., required that "every litigant must receive
fair and just treatment from the court system of this State"
and concluding that the appellant's untimely appeal "must be
taken as timely").3
This Court has held that "[t]he only jurisdictional
prerequisite for an appeal is the timely filing of a notice of
appeal." Dunning v. New England Life Ins. Co., 890 So. 2d 92,
96 (Ala. 2003) (citing Edmonson v. Blakey, 341 So. 2d 481, 484
3Although the doctrine is not applied in this case, both
this Court and the Court of Civil Appeals have applied the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to conclude that an untimely
filed notice of appeal was timely. See, e.g., Ex parte Four
Seasons, Ltd., 450 So. 2d 110, 112 (Ala. 1984) (applying the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to make an untimely appeal
timely where "the untimeliness of the filing of their appeal
was caused by misinformation furnished by the state's officer
and relied upon by the petitioners to their detriment"); and
East Colbert Store, Inc. v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control
Bd., 661 So. 2d 757 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (holding, where the
Board misrepresented the appeals process in a letter to East
Colbert Store and, in reliance on the directions for appealing
set forth in the letter, East Colbert Store filed an untimely
notice of appeal, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
applied because East Colbert Store had relied on the Board's
misrepresentation in filing its notice of appeal).
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(Ala. 1976), and Committee Comments to Rule 3, Ala. R. App. P.
("Timely filing of the notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
act. It is the only step in the appellate process which is
jurisdictional.")).  This Court does not wish to muddy the
waters of this clear directive.  However, when considering the
particular circumstances of this case –- that the mother did
everything she was supposed to do but was prevented from
timely filing her notice of appeal based on erroneous
information given to her by someone in the circuit clerk's
office –- together with the fact that the mother was appealing
the termination of her parental rights, we must conclude that
equity requires that we deem the mother's notice of appeal
timely filed.4 
Conclusion
4We note that, once parental rights have been terminated,
Alabama law provides no method for regaining those rights. See
V.M. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 710 So. 2d 915, 921 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998) ("[T]he termination of parental rights is a
drastic measure, and we know of no means by which those
rights, once terminated, can be reinstated."). See also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) ("[A] ...
decision 
terminating parental 
rights 
is 
final 
and 
irrevocable.
... Few forms of state action are both so severe and so
irreversible."). 
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For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim,
JJ., concur.
Stuart, C.J., concurs specially.
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STUART, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
Many of the circuit clerk's offices in this State are
similar to the circuit clerk's office in Baldwin County
inasmuch as their various divisions are housed in separate
areas and even on separate floors of their courthouses.  When
a party in good faith timely appears and proffers a document
for filing at the wrong division of one of those circuit
clerk's offices, that party's filing is timely.  Such a party
should, of course, be directed to the proper location to
complete their filing, but barring evidence of bad faith,
under no circumstances should their filing, in the event it is
not completed for some reason beyond the party's control,
thereafter be deemed untimely. 
21