Title: Robert C. Taylor v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR07-240
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2007

1 Appellant filed two amended Rule 37.1 petitions. The trial court held that the first amended petition addressed only issues related to sufficiency of the evidence, and such issues were not the proper basis for a Rule 37.1 petition. The trial court also determined that the second amended petition was untimely filed. Appellant does not challenge these rulings on appeal. ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 07­240 ROBERT C. TAYLOR Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered October 25, 2007 PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DREW COUNTY, CR 2004­ 12, HON. SAMUEL B. POPE, JUDGE AFFIRMED. PER CURIAM In 2004, appellant Robert C. Taylor was convicted by a jury of five counts of first­degree forgery and one count of first­degree continuing criminal enterprise. He was sentenced to 600 months’ incarceration. On direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the conviction for first­degree continuing criminal enterprise, but otherwise affirmed the convictions. Taylor v. State, 94 Ark. App. 21, 223 S.W.3d 80 (2006). Subsequently, appellant timely filed a verified pro se petition for relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. 1 The trial court denied the petition after a hearing, and appellant lodged an appeal here from the order. We do not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there was evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. ­2­ State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). On appeal, appellant argues four points for reversal: (I) trial counsel failed to suppress counterfeit money found by appellant’s landlord; (II) trial counsel failed to call the clerk of the Cracker Box Food Store as a witness; (III) trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction that Kevin Brooks was an accomplice; (IV) the trial court erred in failing to grant relief to appellant based on the “illegal probation sentences used against him during the sentencing phase” of the trial. We find no error and affirm the decision of the trial court. Evidence adduced at trial showed that appellant’s landlord was raking the yard behind the duplex apartment rented by appellant’s mother, NancySipes, where appellant resided. The landlord, David Anderson, noticed a blue plastic bag lying up against the outside wall next to the back door to Ms. Sipes’ apartment. He took the bag with the intention of throwing it away with other trash retrieved from the yard, but looked in the bag before doing so. He found a number of bills that were later determined to be counterfeit. Mr. Anderson, who was also the mayor of Monticello, Arkansas, immediately took the bills to the chiefofpolice. At trial, counsel initially objected to the introduction ofthe bills based upon the lack ofa chain ofcustody. After further testimony from witnesses, the trial court admitted the money into evidence. In Point I on appeal, appellant argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failure to move for suppression of the counterfeit money found by appellant’s landlord based on the lack of a search warrant. Appellant maintains that a search warrant was necessary for the money to be retrieved or tested. In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a petition under Rule 37.1 premised on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the ­3­ evidence, the trial court clearlyerred in holding that counsel’s performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient through a showing that counselmade errors so serious that counselwas not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, a petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls withinthe wide range ofreasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Greene , supra. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. The burden is on appellant to provide facts to support his claims ofprejudice. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam). Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counselis effective. Id. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis of postconviction relief. Jackson, supra. Appellant’s allegations in Point I fail for several reasons. First, appellant is attempting to reargue anevidentiaryissue, suppressionofthe counterfeit money, through the guise ofanineffective assistance of counsel claim. Arguments regarding evidentiary issues are not the proper basis for a Rule 37.1 petition. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). Also, were this a proper claim for ineffective assistance ofcounsel, the argument is conclusoryin nature, and appellant ­4­ has failed to show a basis under which trial counsel could have successfully excluded the evidence. Nelson, supra; Jackson, supra. Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make an argument that is meritless, either at trial or on appeal. Greene, supra; Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001). We find no error and affirm the trial court on this point. During the trial, testimony was admitted regarding an incident at the local Cracker Box Food Store. Jessica Green, appellant’s girlfriend, testified that she and appellant went to the Cracker Box Food Store. Once there, appellant directed Ms. Green to take a $100 bill into the store to determine whether the money was authentic. Appellant had previously attempted to buy items at another store with the same bill. Ms. Green asked appellant if the bill was real. Upon an affirmative response, she complied with his request. Jimmy Langford, the clerk working at the Cracker Box Food Store, used a marker on the bill that detects counterfeit money, and deemed the $100 bill to be a forgery. The bill was not returned to Ms. Green, and she did not stay in the store when asked to do so by Mr. Langford while he contacted the police. Mr. Langford wrote down the license plate number of the vehicle Ms. Green was driving as she and appellant drove away. At the hearing on appellant’s Rule 37.1 petition, Mr. Langford testified that Ms. Green only asked him to test the money, and did not attempt to purchase anything with it. In Point II, appellant argues that trial counselrendered ineffective assistance for failure to call Mr. Langford asa witness. Appellant maintains that Mr. Langford would have testified that appellant was not attempting to pass a counterfeit bill, but that he was “simply doing the right thing” to have the money tested. The objective in reviewing an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the ­5­ failure to call certain witnesses is to determine whether this failure resulted in actual prejudice which denied the petitioner a fair trial. Hill v. State, 292 Ark. 144, 728 S.W.2d 510 (1987) (per curiam). An attorney’s decision not to call a particular witness is largely a matter of professional judgment. Strickland, supra; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Even the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not, in itself, proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 702, 38 S.W.3d 334 (2001). Here, had Mr. Langford testified at trial, his testimony that Ms. Green did not attempt to purchase anything in the Cracker Box Food Store does not rise to the level of exculpatory evidence, as appellant argues. Ms. Sherry Prince testified at trial that appellant personally attempted to purchase items worth $2.00 from a Save­A­Lot Store with the same bill prior to the Cracker Box Food Store incident. His actions at the Save­A­Lot Store contradict appellant’s argument that he was only doing the right thing by having Ms. Green ask that the bill be tested at the Cracker Box Food Store. Also, appellant’s action of quickly leaving the Cracker Box Food Store conflicts with his contention that he was doing the right thing. Further, if called as a witness bytrialcounsel, Mr. Langford’s testimony would have been the same as Ms. Green’s testimony, thereby making Mr. Langford’s testimony cumulative to Ms. Green’s. The jury heard Ms. Green’s testimony and was able to weigh it along with the other testimony at trial. Howard v. State, 348 Ark. 471, 79 S.W.3d 273 (2002). Finally, in the hearing on the Rule 37.1 petition, trialcounsel testified that he made a strategic decision not to call Mr. Langford as a witness. Based upon discovery, counsel concluded that Mr. Langford’s testimony would not be beneficial to appellant’s case. Appellant has not shown that counsel’s decision not to call Mr. Langford as a witness resulted in actual prejudice to appellant. ­6­ Hill, supra. Based upon counsel’s professional judgment, his decision to not call Mr. Langford as a witness does not prove counsel was ineffective. Strickland, supra; Wiggins, supra. Next, in Point III on appeal, appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that Kevin Brooks was an accomplice regarding Count III of the felony information, and that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition on that basis. Appellant argues that had the jurybeen given this instruction, it would not have been able to convict appellant ofCount III based on Mr. Brooks’ trial testimony. Although the trial court specifically based its ruling on a recorded telephone conversation between appellant and Mr. Brooks that was played for the jury, and the conversation figures prominently in appellant’s argument on appeal, the pertinent portions of the conversation are not abstracted as required by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2­4(a)(5). See Hodge v. State, 329 Ark. 57, 945 S.W.2d 384 (1997) (cited by Williams v. State, 362 Ark. 416, 208 S.W.3d 761 (2005)); accord Reynolds v. State, 68 Ark. App. 74, 76, 4 S.W.3d 508, 510 (1999) (regarding an audiotape of poor quality, the court of appeals held that “what can be abstracted of the audiotape should be abstracted because the tape was played to the jury, and the contents of the tape comprise the sole subject of appeal.”). A transcript of the conversation was not included in the record ofthe current appeal, or in the transcript of the record on direct appeal. The record does not indicate that appellant filed a motion to waive this abstracting requirement or a petition for a writ of certiorari to supplement the record on appeal to include a transcript of the telephone conversation. The party asserting error has the burden to produce a record sufficient to demonstrateprejudicialerror, and this court doesnot consider evidence not included in the record on appeal. Smith v. State, 343 Ark. 552, 39 S.W.3d 739 (2001). Additionally, appellant fails to provide this court with an abstract sufficient to conduct a ­7­ meaningful review of this matter. Campbell v. State, 349 Ark. 111, 76 S.W.3d 271 (2002) (per curiam). This court has repeatedly held that parties have an affirmative obligation to abstract those portions of the record relevant to the points on appeal, and the record is confined to that which has been abstracted. Lee v. State, 297 Ark. 421, 762 S.W.2d 790 (1989). We will, however, not require appellant to file a substituted addendumor abstract to cure this deficiency in conformance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4­2(b), as it is clear on the record before us that appellant could not prevail. See Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam). Appellant’s argument, which is conclusory in nature, is not the proper basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nelson, supra; Jackson, supra. The burden is on appellant to provide facts to support his claims of prejudice. Nelson, supra. In the instant matter, he fails to state a factual basis under which the jury would not have found appellant guilty on Count III, as his argument merely recites in summary fashion that the recorded statement did not support his conviction, i.e., he fails to explicitly explain how the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Id. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis of postconviction relief. Jackson, supra. We find no error and affirm the trial court on this point. In his last point on appeal, Point IV, appellant maintains that he was incorrectly described as being on probation during the sentencing phase of his trial. He argues that two prior probation convictions were later found to be unlawful, citing Taylor v. State, CACR 04­1020 (Ark. App. Feb. 22, 2006). He further argues that these unlawful probationary periods should not have been described to the jury during sentencing in his 2004 jury trial. While the argument appears to be ­8­ chronologicallyimpossible as stated, the gravamen ofappellant’s complaint is that he was improperly sentenced. However, this argument was contained in appellant’s second amended petition. As noted above, the trialcourt found that this amended petition was untimely filed in the trial court and did not rule on this issue. As there was no ruling on the issue, we cannot consider the matter on appeal. Jackson v. State, 334 Ark. 406, 412, 976 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1998). Affirmed. Brown, J., not participating.