Title: STATE v LAFRENIERE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12460
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 1973

No. 12460 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, RAYMOND K LaFRENIERE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G. H a t f i e l d , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Larsen and Gliko, Great F a l l s , Montana David Gliko argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John P. Connor, Jr. argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana James R. Walsh argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: September 14, 1973 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by defendant Raymond K. LaFreniere from a judgment convicting him of statutory rape entered i n the dis- t r i c t court of Cascade County. Appellant was charged with breaking i n t o the home of a woman and her seventeen year old daughter a t about 3:00 a.m., August 6, 1972. The testimony indicated the daughter was awakened by the sound of a noise of someone i n the room and she thought she saw a naked man. She awakened her mother who was sleeping i n the same room. The mother was assaulted and her hand was cut when she t r i e d t o take a knife away from the intruder. During the following hour and a half the a s s a i l a n t raped the daughter twice and attempted t o rape the mother. A s soon a s they were sure the a s s a i l a n t had l e f t t h e i r home the women called the police who took both women t o the hospital. The medical evidence given by D r . John Pfaff, Jr., indicated t h a t the a s s a u l t a s charged had occurred. Both women t e s t i f i e d there was s u f f i c i e n t l i g h t i n the bedroom t o i d e n t i f y objects i n the room and they gave the investigating t t o f f i c e r s t h i s description of the a s s a i l a n t : a young man, about 5 f e e t , I1 inches i n height, with dark, curly hair". As soon a s possible a statement was taken from the women and a t t h a t time the daughter indicated she thought her a s s a i l a n t resembled a boy who she had observed s t a r i n g a t her on several occasions over a period of several weeks from an apartment d i r e c t l y across from her home. Appellant lived i n t h i s apartment with h i s s tepgrandfather . Three days a f t e r the a s s a u l t Detective Macek v i s i t e d the apartment where appellant lived and talked with both the grand- father and appellant. According t o appellant, Macek asked him i f he knew anything about the rape case and he answered, no. Too, Macek asked him i f he would volunteer t o appear i n a lineup and he said he was willing. O n August 14 appellant was v i s i t e d by policeman Detective Jacobson. Jacobson indicated t h a t due t o the f a c t both women f e l t appellant was the man involved and because he was i n posses- sion of other f a c t s he went t o the apartment t o t a l k with appellant. He was greeted a t the door by a ten year old niece of appellant and she told him appellant was upstairs. When appellant came down- s t a i r s Jacobson went i n t o the kitchen with him and there he informed appellant he f e l t he was g u i l t y of the a s s a u l t . H e t o l d him why and allowed him t o read some material upon which he based h i s con- clusion. Jacobson a l s o read appellant the Miranda warning. A t t r i a l appellant denied he was given the Miranda warning before he answered "yes" t o the question of whether o r not he had raped the Jacobson t e s t i f i e d : "A. I approached --- a f t e r I had been seated a t the kitchen t a b l e with M r . LaFreniere, and once read him h i s r i g h t s , and explained j u s t what I had a s f a r a s evidence, I asked M r . LaFreniere i f he needed any help of any type, and he told me, 'yes, I believe I do.' I said, ' I s the nature of your problem have t o do with a sex problem?' and he said, ' I believe i t is. 1 I then said t o him, 'DO you want---' no, I then asked ?Ir. LaFreniere i f he knew anything about the crime, and wanted t o t a l k t o m e about the crime, and he says, well, the exact words he used don't come t o m e r i g h t now, but he did say, i n context, t h a t he knew about the crime, and it had been bothering him ever since a previous detective had been talking t o him, and t h a t he couldn't sleep, he related t o me, since the l a s t detective had talked t o him. I then asked him i f he was the one---I asked him i f he was, i n f a c t the one who had raped * * ik and he said t o me, 'yes. t 11 A t t h i s point Detective Jacobson again gave appellant t h e Miranda warning, suggested t h a t a lawyer be brought i n , and asked appellant t o come t o the police s t a t i o n t o give a statement. A t the s t a t i o n , before taking the statement and a f t e r another Miranda warning, appellant asked f o r an attorney---no statement was taken. Appellant contends he was not given the Miranda warning before h i s admission t o having committed the crime. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he thought Detective Jacobson was talking about a drinking problem when he answered yes t o Jacobson's question a s t o whether or not he had a problem. This testimony was reviewed by the trial judge in a separate hearing on a moti~n to suppress. The motion to suppress was denied. On August 16, 1972, two days after his arrest, appellant was positively identified by the two women picking him in a lineup. One of the victims also identified him when a voice query was held. Appellant was represented by counsel at the time of the lineup and every precaution was taken to protect appellant's rights. Appellant brings two issues upon appeal: 1 . Whether the investigating officer prejudiced appel- lant's trial by reading directly from a copy of a police report? 2. Whether the state met the proper burden of proof on appellant's motion to suppress a confession? A technical question has been raised as to whether or not the above issues are properly before this Court. While we recognize the validity of the question, we are aware that the crime involved was a serious crime and a severe sentence was imposed and for that reason we will fully discuss the merits of the issues raised. As heretofore noted, there was conflict in the testimony of appellant and Detective Jacobson. On redirect examination the state produced a copy of a police report prepared and filed by Jacobson after appellant's arrest. Jacobson was asked to read specific portions of the report concerning the verbal exchange between himself and appellant relating to appellant's admission of guilt. Counsel for appellant objected on the ground that "this is n o t the o r i g i n a l of the report * * but r a t h e r it i s only a copy, and, therefore, should not be admitted i n t o evidence." The s t a t e indicated t h a t it did not intend t o introduce the report i n t o evidence, nor was it, but r a t h e r i t was using t h e report t o refresh ~ a c o b s o n ' s recollection. The court overruled a p p e l l a n t ' s objection and now appellant contends he was prejudiced. Did the t r i a l court follow permissible procedure i n allowing the use of the memorandum o r report by the witness f o r the purpose of refreshing h i s memory? The applicable s t a t u t e i s section 93-1901-6, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: 11 When witness may r e f r e s h memory from notes. A witness i s allowed t o refresh h i s memory respecting a f a c t by anything w r i t t e n by himself, o r under h i s direction, a t the time t h e f a c t occurred, or immediately thereafter, o r a t any other time when the f a c t was fresh i n h i s memory, and he knew t h a t t h e same was correctly s t a t e d i n the writing. But i n such case the writing must be produced, and may be seen by the adverse party, who may, i f he choose, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read i t t o the jury. So, a l s o , a witness may t e s t i f y from such a writing, though he r e t a i n no recollection of the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s , but such evidence must be received with caution. 11 Jacobson wrote the report, i t was available and was examined previous t o t r i a l by counsel f o r appellant; i t was only used a t t r i a l t o refresh ~ a c o b s o n ' s memory. I n considering the above quoted s t a t u t e , t h i s Court has not heretofore determined whether the term "writing" a s s e t f o r t h i n the s t a t u t e includes the use of a copy. However, California with a l i k e s t a t u t e , p r i o r t o 1967 when it was amended, has had cases construing i t s scope and i n t e n t . People v. Vera, 131 C.A.2d 669, 281 P.2d 65,69; People v. Gardner, 147 C.A.2d 530, 305 P.2d 614. I n each case the issue was resolved i n favor of allowance. I n Vera, appellant claimed e r r o r when a witness f o r the s t a t e was allowed t o read i n d e t a i l t o a jury a mimeographed t r a n s c r i p t of a conversation between witness and appellant. The c o u r t ' s reasoning allowing the witness t o read the m e m o without intro- ducing i t i n t o evidence was: 11 I n the i n s t a n t case a rough t r a n s c r i p t was made by a reporter, Sergeant Flouton then took it, listened t o the recording, and supplied portions which were lacking i n the rough d r a f t . The rou h d r a f t , being a $ document prepared under the Sergeant s direction, f u l l y met the requirements of section 2047 of the Code of C i v i l Procedure, and i t was proper f o r him t o use i t a t the t r i a l t o refresh h i s recollection of the conversation. "Appellant's contention t h a t i f the document was used t o refresh the present memory of t h e witness, the l a t t e r should have referred t o the wi-iting and then t e s t i f i e d , independent of the memorandum -- a s of h i s own personal recollection, i s answered by the court i n People v. Brown, 3 Cal.App. 178, 179, 84 P. 670, 671, wherein i t i s said: 'And the r u l e is not d i f f e r e n t where the witness has a copy of the o r i g i n a l i n h i s hands, which he has compared, and swears t h a t t h e same i s an exact copy of t h e o r i g i n a l memorandum. 111 I n Gardner, a witness was allowed t o read aloud t o t h e jury, over appellant's objection, a typewritten transcription of a conversation between himself and the appellant. The court allowed t h i s reading on the basis t h a t a witness without present recollec- t i o n of the f a c t s who i s allowed t o refresh h i s memory from a memorandum may read d i r e c t l y from the memorandum. I n both California cases the appellate court found no e r r o r i n the use of a copy a s opposed t o the o r i g i n a l and allowed e i t h e r the e n t i r e memorandum o r portions t o be read t o the jury. W e believe the best r a t i o n a l e interpreting section 93-1901-6, R.C.M. 1947, i n not requiring the introduction of the memorandum o r report i n t o evidence, i s s e t f o r t h i n United States v, Riccardi, 11 The reception of a witness' testimony does not depend upon whether i t i s true; t r u t h is a matter f o r the t r i e r of f a c t unless, of course, t h e evidence i s so improbable t h a t reasonable men would not d i f f e r upon it. When the witness t e s t i f i e s t h a t he has a present recollection, t h a t i s the evidence i n the case, and not the writing which stimulates it. I f h i s recollection agrees with t h e writing, i.t i s pointless t o require proof of t h e accuracy of the writing f o r such proof can only amount t o corrobora- t i v e evidence. ?I Appellant r e l i e s on State v. Serge, N.J.L. (19401, 15 A,2d 776, but we find t h a t f a c t u a l l y Sorge - has no application here. There, i n a rape case, t h e prosecutrix executed a statement i n t h e presence of the accused which contained statements prejudicial t o the accused. This statement was read t o the jury by a police o f f i c e r and was admitted by the t r i a l court i n showing a course of conduct. The appellate court held t h a t the reading of the statement was e r r o r because the statement was "hearsay" not I I admissible a s an admission against interest". Here, Jacobson simply r e l i e d upon a report which he had prepared i n order t o t e s t i f y with greater accuracy regarding the admission of appellant. W e find no merit t o appellant's f i r s t issue. Appellant's second issue questions the t r i a l c o u r t ' s refusal t o grant a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o suppress. Appellant argues t h a t t h i s Court should adopt an even more stringent standard of proof concerning voluntary confessions than t h a t required by the United States Supreme Court. He argues t h a t the standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt a s opposed t o the preponder- ance of evidence standard s e t i n 1972 i n Lego v, Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 30 L ed 2d 618, 626, 627, 92 S.Ct. 619. There t h e United States Supreme Court heard the same argument and rejected it. In r e j e c t i n g such contention, the court s t a t e d : "Since the purpose t h a t a voluntariness hearing is designed t o serve has nothing whatever t o do with improving the r e l i a b i l i t y of jury v e r d i c t s , we cannot accept the charge t h a t judging the admissibility of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence undermines the mandate of In r e Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L ed 2d 368, 90 J.Ct. 1068 (1970). * 9 : I I To r e i t e r a t e what we said i n Jackson: when a con- fession challenged a s involuntary i s sought t o be used against a criminal defendant a t h i s t r i a l , he i s e n t i t l e d t o a r e l i a b l e and clear-cut determination t h a t the confes- sion was i n f a c t voluntarily rendered. Thus, the prosecu- t i o n must prove a t l e a s t by a preponderance of the evidence t h a t the confession was voluntary. I I The general r u l e s e t f o r t h i n both Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L ed 2d 908, and Lego i s t h a t a determina- t i o n r e l a t i v e t o the voluntariness of a confession must be made i n a proceeding separate and d i s t i n c t from the t r i a l i t s e l f , and further, a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is constitutionally s u f f i c i e n t . That procedure and standard has long been the established r u l e i n Montana. State v. Chappel, 149 Jont. 114, 423 P.2d 47; S t a t e v. Rossell, 113 Mont. 457, 127 P.2d 379; State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 P, 138. Finding no e r r o r the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. 1 . I 1 6 ' --td---,--,--------'--i'-i'------ir-- i Associate J u s t i c e / j ' Chic,£ J u s t i c e / M r . J u s t i c e Haswell, specially concurring: I concur i n the r e s u l t on the b a s i s t h a t the two issues raised by appellant a r e not presented by the record i n t h i s appeal. On the f i r s t issue, the defendant objected t o admission i n evidence of a copy of a police report. A s the report was n e i t h e r offered nor admitted i n evidence, there i s nothing f o r t h i s Court t o review. The second issue seeks a ruling on the quantum of proof necessary t o sustain a motion t o suppress a confession. Appellant contends t h a t proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is required, while the s t a t e argues t h a t proof "by a preponderance of t h e evidence" i s s u f f i c i e n t . I n substance the record discloses testimony by a police o f f i c e r t h a t defendant was advised of h i s constitutional r i g h t s p r i o r t o any admission o r confession, while defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t no such advice or warning was given p r i o r thereto. This c o n f l i c t i n g testimony presented no middle ground-- i f one version was true, the other was necessarily f a l s e . The t r i a l judge, i n weighing the c r e d i b i l i t y of the two witnesses and t h e i r respective testimony, chose t o believe the police o f f i c e r and disbelieve the defendant. Accordingly, defendant's motion t o suppress t h i s confession was denied. A s the testimony of the police officef under such circumstances s a t i s f i e d both standards of proof, t h i s issue i s not presented by the record herein. A.ssociate Justice.