Title: DANIEL v. DANIEL
Citation: 2001 OK 117, 42 P.3d 863, 72OBJ3708
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2001

DANIEL v. DANIEL Annotate this Case DANIEL v. DANIEL 2001 OK 117 42 P.3d 863 72 OBJ 3708 Case Number: 94027 Decided: 12/18/2001 Mandate Issued: 03/22/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TINA MICHELE DANIEL, Plaintiff/Appellant v. JOE BRENT DANIEL, Defendant/Appellee [42 P.3d 865] CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II Honorable Richard A. Miller, Trial Judge ¶0 The plaintiff/appellant, Tina Michele Daniel (mother/parent), filed for a divorce from the defendant/appellee, Joe Brent Daniel (father/parent). The trial court awarded both parents joint custody of their minor child, with the child residing with the mother during the school year and with the father during the summer. Subsequently, both parents filed motions to terminate joint custody. After a hearing, the trial court terminated joint custody and awarded the father sole custody of the child. The mother appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and ordered its opinion immediately enforceable. We hold that: 1) the Court of Civil Appeals is without authority to decree an opinion immediately enforceable ---- an opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is not effective or enforceable in the district court until the issuance of mandate; and 2) the trial court's award of custody to the father is supported by the evidence. We also hold that each parent is responsible for appeal-related attorney fees. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. Karen A. Pepper Mueller, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant Lyn E. Ables, Madill, Oklahoma, Barry Kent Roberts, Norman, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 This cause involves a dispute over child custody. A divorced mother and father each petitioned for a change from joint custody to sole custody of their minor child. The trial court terminated joint custody and awarded the father sole custody. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court and issued a directive rendering the opinion immediately enforceable. Two issues are presented on certiorari: 1) whether the Court of Civil Appeals may decree an opinion immediately enforceable; and 2) whether the trial court's order terminating joint custody and awarding sole custody of the child to the father was clearly against the weight of the evidence. We hold that: 1) the Court of Civil Appeals is without authority to decree an opinion immediately enforceable ------ an opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is not effective or enforceable in the district court until the issuance of the mandate; and 2) the trial court's award of custody to the father is supported by the evidence. We also hold that each parent is responsible for their appeal-related attorney fees and other litigation expenses. FACTS ¶ ¶3 At the trial on the merits, the father proposed joint custody with physical custody alternating every two weeks. The mother did not submit a custody plan. On July 2, 1999, after the trial on the merits was held, the trial court divided the personal property and debts, ordered the father to pay child support, and granted the divorce. The court awarded both parents joint custody. The child resided with the mother during the school year and with the father during the summer. Both parents were granted liberal visitation with the child during the time that the other parent had physical custody.2 [42 P.3d 866] ¶4 On October 8, 1999, the father filed a motion to terminate joint custody and requested that he be awarded sole custody of the child. He asserted that: the mother had refused and neglected to follow, implement, or abide by the joint custody plan; the mother would not cooperate with or talk to the father regarding the child; and the mother quit her job and moved to Arkansas. The mother filed a counter-motion to modify, arguing that the father's uncooperative behavior fostered antagonism between the parties. She also sought to terminate joint custody, and requested that she be awarded sole custody of the child allowing the father extended visitation privileges. ¶5 A hearing on the motion to modify custody was held on November 16-17, 1999, and both parties presented evidence that the joint custody plan was not working. Each parent sought custody of the child. At the end of the hearing, the trial court, ruling from the bench, terminated joint custody, awarded the father sole custody of the child, and awarded the mother some visitation during the school year and extended visitation privileges in the summer months. On January 7, 2000, an order was entered, memorializing the trial court's ruling. ¶6 The mother appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed. It determined that a change in the physical custody arrangement should not have been ordered because no material change in circumstances was shown that would warrant modifying physical custody. On July 30, 2001, the father filed for rehearing in the Court of Civil Appeals. ¶7 The mother filed an emergency motion in this Court and in the Court of Civil Appeals on August 17, 2001, seeking to have the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion immediately enforceable because she had enrolled the child in school in Arkansas. We denied the application which was filed in this Court. On August 20, 2001, the mother filed another motion in the Court of Civil Appeals, seeking a writ of habeas corpus and a contempt citation. She insisted that the father should be directed to return the child to Arkansas so that the child could begin school. ¶8 On August 22, 2001, the Court of Civil Appeals denied the father's petition for rehearing. It also denied the mother's writ of habeas corpus and contempt requests, but directed the trial court to enforce the Court of Civil Appeals' July 10, 2001, unpublished opinion. The father, on August 30, 2001, filed an emergency application in this Court to stay the Court of Civil Appeals opinion until the mandate issues. On August 30, 2001, we granted the father's emergency application to stay the enforcement of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion.3 We granted certiorari on October 15, 2001. I. ¶9 THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO DECREE AN OPINION IMMEDIATELY ENFORCEABLE ¶10 The mother concedes that an appellate opinion is not final until the mandate is issued, but she argues that nothing prevents an opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals from becoming effective or enforceable in the district court prior to issuance of the mandate.4ThisThis Rule allows the Court of Civil Appeals to issue limited orders in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. It does not provide, express or implied authority for the appellate court to supercede our rules. The father insists that the [42 P.3d 867] Court of Civil Appeals is without authority or power to decree its opinion immediately effective or enforceable in the district court, and that a Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is not effective or enforceable unless and until mandate issues. We agree with the father. ¶11 We recognized in Matter of Chad S., 1978 OK 94, 580 P.2d 983 , the long standing rule that while an appeal is pending in the appellate courts, the district court is without jurisdiction to make any order materially affecting the rights of the parties to that appeal. Any such order is void. An exception to this rule arises if the appeal is filed and the trial court exercises its jurisdiction under 12 O.S. Supp. 1999 §1031.1 within 30 days.5 Then, the Supreme Court will stay the appeal pending final disposition of the cause in the trial court. Absent compliance with §1031.1, the trial court loses its jurisdiction to make any order that pertains to the same issues on appeal.6 ¶12 The Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules provide for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to issue the mandate after the Court of Civil Appeals renders an appellate opinion.7 The mandate from the Supreme Court [42 P.3d 868] is an order requiring the lower tribunal to comply with an appellate opinion,8 and it carries with it the authority for the trial court to proceed.9 When a cause is pending on appeal or on certiorari, a district court's exercise of judicial power with respect to issues which are tendered for review in the appellate forum is ineffectual if it occurs before the mandate has been transmitted to revest the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction.10 ¶14 There is no authority provided by statute or by the rules and practices of this Court which would allow the Court of Civil Appeals to supercede our rules. The Court of Civil Appeals lacked authority to decree an opinion immediately enforceable. A Court of Civil Appeals opinion is not effective or enforceable in the district court until the issuance of the mandate. II. ¶15 THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO THE FATHER IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. ¶16 The mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it terminated joint custody and awarded sole custody to the father because: 1) there was no evidence that the child's best interests would be served by awarding sole custody to the father; and 2) the trial court's custody determination was mainly based on the fact that she had moved to Arkansas. The father insists that the trial court's award of custody is supported by the evidence. Neither parent argues that the other is unfit. ¶17 Ordinarily, a change of custody is justified when the case falls into one of two categories: 1) when circumstances of the parties have changed materially since the prior custody order; or 2) when material facts are revealed which were unknown, and could not have been ascertained with reasonable diligence when the final divorce decree was entered.¶18 Title 43 O.S. 1991 §109 governs joint custody proceedings.18 Section 109 defines joint custody as the sharing by parents in all or some of the aspects of physical and legal care, custody, and control of their children.19 Pursuant to §109, after a joint custody plan is issued, the court can terminate joint custody upon the request of one or both of the parents or whenever the court determines that joint custody is not in the best interest of the child.20 ¶19 The Court addressed the modification of joint custody in Rice v. Rice, 1979 OK 161, 603 P.2d 1125 . The Rice father filed a motion to modify joint custody and sought sole custody of his child. The trial court, after considering testimony that the arrangement was not working well, and that it was not in the child's best interest terminated joint custody and awarded sole custody to the father. The Rice Court recognized that joint custody can be favorable and has been commonly employed in Oklahoma, and in other jurisdictions, to permit a child to be placed under the care and control of one parent during the school year and with the other parent during summer vacation. Nevertheless, the Court, recognizing that the best interest of the child is of paramount consideration, affirmed the trial court, holding that child custody should be modified, if for no other reason than to eliminate the dual custody provisions of the original decree. ¶20 Clearly, Rice, teaches that a change in custody from joint to one parent differs from a change in custody from a one custodial parent to a non-custodial parent. Joint custody will not succeed without the cooperation of the parties. When it becomes apparent to the court that joint custody is not working and it is not serving the child's best interests, then a material and substantial change of circumstance has occurred and the joint custody arrangement must be vacated.21 The mother argues that the trial court's termination of joint custody and change of physical custody during the school year was mainly based on the fact that she had moved to Arkansas.22 However, in addition to the fact that she had moved out-of-state, it was undisputed that the joint custody arrangement was not working. The record contains ample evidence that the parties were unable to agree and cooperate with each other. Several instances of hostility and uncooperativeness between the parents were presented to the trial court. The trial court's determination that joint custody should be terminated is clearly supported by the evidence. [42 P.3d 871] ¶21 When joint custody is terminated the trial court must proceed as if it is making an initial custody determination and award custody in accordance with the best interest of the child, as if no such joint custody decree had been made.23 In a divorce action, the trial court is vested with discretion in awarding custody and visitation.24 Nevertheless, the best interests of the child must be a paramount consideration of the trial court when determining custody and visitation.25 On appeal, this Court will not disturb the trial court's judgment regarding custody absent an abuse of discretion or a finding that the decision is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.26 The burden is upon the party appealing from the custody and visitation award to show that the trial court's decision is erroneous and contrary to the child's best interests.27 III. ¶23 EACH PARENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEY FEES. ¶24 On November 2, 2001, the father filed a motion for appeal-related attorney fees. On November 16, 2001, the wife filed a motion for appeal-related attorney fees and costs. ¶25 Pursuant to Rules 1.16 and 1.83, 12 O.S. Supp. 1997, Ch. 15, App. 1, of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court issues the mandate after the Court of Civil Appeals renders an appellate opinion: if no rehearing is sought; if rehearing is denied and no certiorari is sought to the Supreme Court; or if certiorari is denied by the Supreme Court.36 A Court of Civil Appeals opinion which is decreed immediately enforceable would supercede our mandate rules. There is no authority provided by statute or by the rules and practices of this Court which would allow the Court of Civil Appeals to do so. Consequently, the decree which attempted to render its opinion immediately enforceable is ineffectual. ¶26 When joint custody is terminated the trial court must proceed as if it were making an initial custody determination and award custody in accordance with the best interest of the child.37 On appeal, this Court will not disturb the trial court's judgment regarding custody absent an abuse of discretion or a finding that the decision is clearly contrary [ 42 P.3d 873 ] to the weight of the evidence.38 The record reflects that the trial court's determination is neither against the clear weight of the evidence nor does it appear contrary to the best interests of the child. Additionally, based on our review of the record, there are no compelling or overriding equitable considerations in favor of either litigant to pay appeal-related attorney fees and expenses on behalf of the other, consequently, each party shall bear its counsel-fees and other litigation expenses. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. ¶27 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ. concur. ¶28 OPALA, SUMMERS, JJ., concur in result to part I and concur in parts II and III. FOOT