Title: RONNIE GAY CORNETT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2006-SC-000032-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: November 22, 2006

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. 6*ixprsme ~Vurf of AS CORRECTED : NOVEMBER 30, 2006 RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED D 2006-SC-000032-MR RONNIE GAY CORNETT APPELLANT APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT V . HON . WILLIAM T . CAIN, JUDGE NO . 2005-CR-0005 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appellant, Ronnie Gay Cornett, was convicted on November 4, 2005, on two counts of attempted murder pursuant to KRS 506.010 . He was subsequently sentenced on December 5, 2005, to twenty years imprisonment on each count, set to run concurrently for a total of twenty years imprisonment . Appellant now appeals his conviction and sentence as a matter of right pursuant to Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b), alleging the trial court committed several errors, viz. : (1) that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal ; (2) that the trial court erred in excluding testimony of a psychiatrist who would have testified on Appellant's behalf ; (3) that the trial court erred when it allowed lay opinion testimony concerning statements written by Appellant in a card to his sister ; (4) that the Commonwealth improperly argued to the jury in closing argument that Appellant did not take affirmative steps to establish a renunciation of his plan to commit murder and such constitutes reversible error; and (5) that the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of the domestic violence petition despite a limiting admonition issued to the jury . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence . FACTS Appellant was involved in what has been described as a hotly contested divorce from his now ex-wife, Kathleen Cornett, as of January 2004 and which was finalized on August 3, 2004 . Indeed, the divorce became very bitter and drawn out, culminating in the division of the rather large marital estate in a manner Appellant disliked . Persuaded by a close friend and business partner, Thomas McClain (McClain), Appellant appealed the divorce decree, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals . The divorce decree awarded Kathleen a BP gas station formerly owned by Appellant, the marital residence, as well as other miscellaneous property and required Appellant to pay Kathleen maintenance . Appellant, however, failed to pay the maintenance, surmising that if his appeal was successful, the maintenance would not be returned . In November 2004, following entry of the divorce decree, Appellant was notified that some of his personal effects were being removed from the marital residence . Appellant, angry and upset, called his son to get information on the removal of the personal property . Although the substance of Appellant's conversation with his son is not disclosed, and is otherwise irrelevant, Kathleen was obviously shaken by Appellant's statements as she sought an emergency protective order (EPO) against Appellant . A hearing was subsequently scheduled for November 18, 2004, but was later rescheduled for December 2, 2004 . On this date, Appellant was to appear with his attorney, Scott Crosbie, in the Boyle Family Court before Judge Bruce Petrie, to answer the allegations supporting the EPO . Kathleen Cornett, and her attorney, Eileen O'Brien, were also to be present . Appellant and McClain met in 1986 when McClain was hired as a mining engineer at a mine where Appellant was the manager . In 1996, the two men formed a mining consulting business known as Collier's & Associates in Danville, Kentucky. Over time, they extended their business interests into contract mining . In addition to being business partners, Appellant and McClain were also close friends, and shared their own personal problems with one another. Appellant's problems began in 2001, when he began an affair with Sheila Hagan . McClain was not only aware of the affair, but arranged for Appellant and Hagan to share an apartment in Danville after Appellant's divorce was underway . Collier's & Associates paid the rent on the apartment, and Hagan was even placed on the payroll for the business, despite performing no work for the company. On December 1, 2004, one day before Appellant's scheduled court appearance, Appellant met with McClain at a restaurant in Winchester, Kentucky . McClain was on his way from Danville to deliver employee paychecks to the business's coal mines in West Virginia . Appellant, traveling from West Virginia to Danville, had asked McClain to pick up revised wills for himself and his father . Prior to meeting in Winchester, Appellant told McClain during a phone conversation that he had twenty-five hours left, presumably referring to the fact that in that amount of time, Appellant was scheduled to appear in Boyle Family Court . After McCl.ain gave the wills to Appellant, Appellant presented McClain with a large manila envelope that contained several documents, envelopes, and the key to Appellant's apartment in West Virginia . Also included was a handwritten letter with instructions for McClain to read it in its entirety . Appellant had written the letter the night before, and in it he outlined his final wishes and instructions concerning his funeral, legal matters, and financial arrangements for his estate and Sheila Hagan . Shocked by these events, McClain attempted to talk Appellant out of his plot to kill his ex-wife, her attorney, and Judge Bruce Petrie ; however, Appellant responded that the world would be a better place afterward because the people he killed would not be able to destroy other people's lives as they had his . Before leaving the restaurant that night, Appellant handed McClain $5000 in cash and instructed McClain to bury him as cheaply as possible in a manner to embarrass Appellant's sons . Upon leaving, McClain immediately called Scott Crosbie, and rather than proceeding to West Virginia, McClain went to Lexington and met Crosbie . McClain explained what had occurred and showed Crosbie the letter Appellant had written . McClain also disclosed that on previous occasions Appellant had remarked to him that he was going to kill Kathleen, her attorney, and the judge, but he did not know when or where, at least not until that night. Crosbie then contacted Greg Howard, a close friend, and John Roach, now Justice Roach of the Kentucky Supreme Court, and asked them to meet him at his Lexington office for advice on how to handle the situation . It was decided the best course of action would be to contact Kentucky State Police (KSP) . When alerted to the circumstances, the officers were concerned that Appellant may become suspicious if he sensed anything out of the ordinary, and thus McClain was told to continue on to West Virginia as planned . After returning to Danville, Appellant met up with Hagan at Collier's office building where he parked his truck, surmising that police, who had a warrant for his arrest for failure to pay maintenance, would not find him if he was not in the truck . When Hagan arrived in her Tahoe to pick up Appellant, she noticed that he took a briefcase and a suitcase from his truck and placed them in the back of the Tahoe . Detective Monte Owens of the KSP observed the two arrive at Hagan's apartment in the Tahoe during the early morning hours on December 2, 2004 . After surveillance was placed on the apartment, KSP officers decided the best and safest course of action would be to arrest Appellant as he exited the apartment that morning. In order to effectuate the arrest and prevent Appellant from fleeing, an officer flattened a tire on the Tahoe . Early on the morning of December 2, 2004, Appellant and Hagan's son, Joe Hagan, were leaving Hagan's apartment in Lexington . Appellant was going to take Hagan's son to school . However, upon exiting the apartment, Joe noticed the flat tire on the Tahoe . Kentucky State Police then approached Appellant and arrested him without incident. Appellant later spontaneously stated, "I intended to kill nobody but myself." Following Appellant's arrest, officers, with the consent of Sheila Hagan, searched the apartment. A loaded and holstered pistol was found in the bedroom, and Appellant's briefcase was on the counter downstairs. Police then obtained a search warrant for the briefcase and the Tahoe . A search of the briefcase revealed a bank bag, which contained $10,000 in cash, a Christmas card in an enveloped addressed to Appellant's sister, and a day-planner with a "special event" sticker placed on December 2, 2004 . Next to the briefcase were two envelopes - one addressed to insurance agents and containing executed change of beneficiary forms for Appellant's insurance, the other contained Appellant's last will and testament . When officers searched the Tahoe, they uncovered a brown accordion folder with a large stack of papers inside . A closer look at the papers, however, revealed that a compartment had been hollowed out in the center, and concealed within was a small .45 caliber handgun containing eight live rounds, including one in the chamber . An extra magazine was also placed within and contained an additional seven rounds of ammunition. Officers noted the pistol was loaded, with the hammer cocked and the safety engaged . The Boyle County Grand Jury subsequently indicted Appellant on January 14, 2005, charging Appellant with three counts of Attempted Murder. At Appellant's trial between October 31, 2005, and November 4, 2005, Appellant defended himself on grounds of renunciation and that he abandoned his plan to murder his ex-wife, her attorney and the family court judge . Specifically, Appellant testified on his behalf that, although he took steps to prepare to kill these individuals, including cutting out the compartment in the stack of papers, he changed his mind after meeting with McClain and that by the time he went to bed before the day he was to act on his plan, he abandoned his intent to carry out the plot . The jury did not believe Appellant's story and found him guilty of the attempted murder of his ex-wife, Kathleen Cornett, and of Family Court Judge Bruce Petrie, but acquitted him of attempted murder of Eileen O'Brien, Kathleen's attorney . However, the jury could not agree on a penalty, and Appellant was thus sentenced by the court to two twenty year sentences, set to run concurrently for a total of twenty years . This appeal followed . ANALYSIS I. Trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal . A. Standard of Review When ruling on motions for directed verdict, a trial court must assume all the evidence presented by the Commonwealth is, in fact, true, "leaving questions of weight and credibility to the jury." Baker v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Ky. 1998) (citation omitted) . The trial court is further required to "consider not only the actual evidence, but also `must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth ."' Lawson v . Commonwealth , 53 S .W.3d 534, 548 (Ky . 2001) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) . Moreover, "[i]f the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given ." Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186,187 (Ky . 1991) . "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Benham , 816 S.W.2d at 187 (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill , 660 S .W.2d 3 (Ky . 1983)) . In other words, if after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" then a directed verdict of acquittal may not be granted . Jackson v . Virginia , 443 U .S . 307, 319, 99 S.Ct . 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) . Furthermore, the task of the reviewing body is not to ask itself whether it believes that guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether a rational trier of fact could have reasonably found so . Jackson , 443 U.S . at 319, 99 S.Ct . 2781 ; Commonwealth v. Jones , 880 S.W .2d 544, 545 (Ky . 1994). B. Evidence sufficient such that finding ofguilt notclearly unreasonable . Appellant contends that the trial court was required to grant his motion for directed verdict of acquittal because, as he argues, the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient proof that he took a "substantial step" toward the commission of the planned triple murder . We do not agree . KRS 506.010(1)(b) provides as follows : A person is guilty of criminal attempt to commit a crime when, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he : Intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime . KRS 506.010(2) provides that "[c]onduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subsection (1)(b) unless it is an act or omission which leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to commit the crime which he is charged with attempting." In Commonwealth v . Prather, 690 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Ky. 1985), this Court adopted the standard that "substantial steps . . . are overt acts '. . ,which convincingly demonstrate a firm purpose to commit a crime, while allowing police intervention, based upon observation of such incriminating conduct, in order to prevent the crime when criminal intent becomes apparent."' (Quoting State v. Woods , 48 Ohio St.2d 127, 132, 357 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (1976)) . In Prather , this Court further opined that "the steps be strongly corroborative," id. (internal citations omitted), and that "the emphasis should be on what acts have been carried out and not on what additional acts would have been even more convincing." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added) . Additionally, we found that while "[t]here is no absolute applicable to [KRS 506.010(2)] . . . overt acts, the substantial step, must be considered under all of the circumstances of the case to discover whether they manifest a clear intent to commit -8- the crime." Prather, 690 S.W .2d at 397. With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the facts of this case . Here, Appellant took a number of substantial steps toward the commission of the crime of murder. While some of his acts might properly be characterized as preliminary or merely preparatory, we find the following convincing evidence that Appellant clearly manifested intent to commit the crime and that the question was properly submitted to the jury : (1) Appellant paid off life insurance policies for his two grandchildren ; (2) drafted instructions to Thomas McClain as to his remaining property and provided money to McClain for his burial, leaving no doubt he intended to carry through with his plan to murder his ex-wife, her attorney and the judge as well as take his own life ; (3) drafted his own obituary and eulogy; (4) updated his own will ; (5) wrote farewell cards to relatives ; (6) purposefully cut out a compartment in a stack of papers he intended to carry to court on December 2, 2004, in which he placed a fully loaded .45 caliber handgun and an extra magazine, also fully loaded; (7) placed the stack of papers containing the handgun and extra magazine into a file folder ; (8) placed the folder into the back of the Tahoe, the vehicle he intended to drive on the morning of his court appearance . Even more convincing is the fact that Appellant conceded he had plans to kill his ex-wife, her attorney and Judge Petrie, and conceded that he took the necessary actions to cause his plan to come to fruition, but for the intervention of police . Thus, it is our opinion that these overt acts, considered not as isolated incidents but rather under the circumstances of this case, constituted a clear purpose to commit a crime . Furthermore, we find that the police, adequately apprised of sufficient information necessary to stake out and observe Appellant's actions, properly intervened to prevent the murder of three innocent persons . Appellant argues unconvincingly that these acts were merely preparatory and were not unequivocal steps toward the commission of the crime of murder . Were we to accept Appellant's argument, we would find that police intervention in this case occurred before any actual substantial steps could be fulfilled . However, as we stated in Prather, supra, the focus is only on those acts which were actually carried out and not on what acts "would have been even more convincing." Prather , 690 S.W.2d at 397. Moreover, "the `no reasonable doubt' requirement imposed by KRS 506.010(2) is a matter for jury determination and . . . it was properly submitted to them upon denial of the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal." Id . at 398 . Thus, we find that the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as it was not unreasonable for a jury to find guilt in this case when considering the evidence as a whole . 11. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of Dr. Allen . During Appellant's case in chief, Appellant desired to call Dr. Timothy Allen to testify concerning the results of the psychiatrist's competency evaluation as well as provide general information about depression and suicide . The Commonwealth objected, arguing that competency was not an issue and further requested a Daubert' hearing regarding the basis of the doctor's opinion . Appellant conceded that he was not claiming a mental illness or diminished capacity as a defense, and agreed that the only issue was whether he renounced his attempt to commit the crime . The trial court, however, found the distinction inapposite and opined that Appellant's depression was ' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S . 579, 589-91, 113 S.Ct . 2786, 2795-96, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (holding, inter alia, that the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable) . - 10- irrelevant to the defense of renunciation . We agree and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Allen's testimony. In Miller v . Eldridge , 146 S.W.3d 909, 917-19 (Ky . 2004), this Court unanimously held that reliability determinations made by a trial court pursuant to Daubert are reviewed for clear error, "while the determination as to whether certain testimony assists the trier of fact is reviewed for abuse of discretion ." In this case, the only issue before this Court is whether the trial court's determination that Dr. Allen's testimony would not assist the jury was an abuse of discretion . Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) Rule 702 provides : "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Of course, the evidence must first satisfy the requirement of relevancy under KRE 401 . Moreover, even if relevant, the evidence or testimony may otherwise be excluded if the court finds "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence ." KRE 403 (emphasis added) . A trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard . Goodvear Tire and Rubber Co. v . Thomgson ; 11 S .W.3d 575, 577 (Ky . 2000) . "The same standard applies under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, including KRE 702." Id . (citing Mitchell v . Commonwealth , 908 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Ky . 1995)) (additional citations omitted) . "When faced with the proffer of expert testimony, the trial judge must determine at the outset of trial, pursuant to KRE 104, `whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific[, technical, or other specialized] knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue."' Id . at 578 (quoting Daubert v . Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc ., 509 U.S . 579, 592, 113 S .Ct . 2786, 2796, 125 L.Ed .2d 469 (1993)) . To meet this standard, the expert testimony must be relevant and reliable . Daubert, 509 U .S . at 589, 113 S.Ct . at 2795 . Finally, the test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles . Commonwealth v . English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky . 1999) . In this case, Dr . Allen was employed by the Commonwealth to evaluate Appellant's competency to stand trial, and he performed this evaluation a few months before trial and several months after the commission of the crime . During the Daubert hearing in the Judge Cain's chambers, Dr . Allen stated that he found Appellant to have a high I .Q . and that Appellant fully understood the proceedings, but had trouble dealing with stressful situations that led to suicidal thoughts, characterized as an adjustment disorder . Dr. Allen admitted that his testimony only corroborated what the Appellant had already testified to and thus added nothing that had not already been told to the jury . While portions of Dr. Allen's testimony were scientific in nature, they otherwise added nothing relevant to the case . Appellant argues that Dr . Allen's determination that Appellant was suffering from an adjustment disorder was relevant to his defense of renunciation . However, Dr . Allen even admitted that his testimony would simply repeat what Appellant had told him and thus would constitute a prior consistent statement made prior to litigation that is sought to bolster Appellant's statement that he renounced his intentions to commit the crime . Thus it could hardly be said that Dr. Allen's testimony would otherwise be scientific in nature . Even were we to find the testimony relevant, the trial court was entitled, in its discretion, to exclude the testimony as being cumulative of other properly admitted testimony . In affording the trial court substantial deference in its exclusion of evidence or testimony, we find that the trial court's decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, unsupported by sound legal principles, and thus we decline to reverse ,Appellant's conviction on this basis . III . Trial court did not err by allowing opinion testimony concerning a greeting card . In Appellant's third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Detective Monte Owens to testify as to his opinion and inference concerning a greeting card Appellant addressed to his sister, Terry Lewis . During trial, Detective Owens was asked about the greeting card, which was found next to Appellant's briefcase in Hagan's apartment on the day of his arrest . In the card, Appellant wrote the following to his sister : Sis, though we were never as close as we should have been, I think both of us knew we loved each other . I know I did you . Sorry if I ever did anything to offend or hurt you . Love Always, Ronnie . Please forgive me and take care of Dad . The Commonwealth then asked Detective Owens: "From an evidentiary standpoint, did you determine anything significant when you read the inside of the card?" Appellant objected, which was overruled by the trial court . Detective Owens then answered : "It was more language from Mr . Cornett that indicated that he was going to go through with the plan." Appellant again objected and moved to strike the response, arguing that it was simply Owens' opinion as to what Appellant meant by the -13- words in the card, and that such was the jury's decision . Appellant's objection and motion to strike was again overruled . KRE 701 provides that a lay witness, not testifying as an expert, may otherwise testify in the form of opinions or inferences so long as those opinions or inferences are "(a) [r]ationally based on the perception of the witness ; and (b) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Although lay witnesses may so testify, we note that there is a fine line between interpreting the meaning of someone's statements and inferring or drawing opinions based on those statements . In Tamme v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W.2d 13, 33-34 (Ky. 1998), this Court held that "a witness should not attempt to interpret what another witness meant by what he said." (Citing Adcock v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ky. 1986)) . In Adcock , su ra, the appellant had been convicted of murder, rape and burglary . During the trial, the prosecution examined a witness concerning a conversation he had with the appellant in which the appellant stated he was "in trouble." The witness relayed to the Court the substance of the conversation in which the witness questioned appellant about a burglary he saw on TV and asked him if that was the woman he robbed, to which appellant responded, "That's it." The witness was permitted to testify, over appellant's objection, that he thought appellant meant that the trouble appellant was in was the robbery of the elderly victim, which had indeed been reported on television . This Court held that the appellant's objection should have been sustained, finding that "it was not permissible to allow [the witness] to express his view as to what appellant meant by what he said." Adcock , 702 S .W.2d at 442. Here ; Detective Owens was not asked what Appellant meant by writing the statements in the card ; rather, he was asked if there was anything significant he determined after reading the card . Detective Owens' response could properly be characterized as additional evidence in support of an inference that Appellant intended to carry out his plan, which was rationally based on Detective Owens' own perceptions of the evidence and assisted the jury in understanding his testimony, satisfying KRE 701 . Detective Owens did not testify as to what Appellant meant in the statements contained in the card . Thus, we would find error had Detective Owens been asked what Appellant meant by the statements in the card . On this point, we find Adcock , supra, distinguishable . Furthermore, Detective Owens' testimony involved his perceptions of the words written on the card in the context of his investigation, which included other documents written by Appellant that gave the same impression of finality and death . Thus, the inference drawn by Detective Owens was relevant to whether or not Appellant renounced his intention to commit the murders . Thus we find that the trial court did not err by allowing Detective Owens to testify as to opinions or inferences drawn from the statements Appellant wrote in the card to his sister . IV . Commonwealth's closing arguments were not improper. In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth improperly argued in its closing arguments that Appellant did not take affirmative steps to establish a renunciation of his plan to commit murder and such constitutes reversible error . Appellant also alleges that the Commonwealth improperly made a "golden rule" argument . We disagree as to both arguments . The standard of review for alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is whether the conduct was so egregious that Appellant was denied a fair trial . Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987) . In Appellant's closing argument, he began to list the various pieces of evidence to demonstrate that he had renounced his intentions to commit the crime . Appellant alluded to the fact that on the day of the alleged plot, Appellant did not take the greeting card addressed to his sister, referred to in section III, supra , with him . Appellant was allegedly supposed to meet with her that morning before his scheduled court appearance . Appellant also alluded to that the fact that he had his wallet with him when he was arrested, proving renunciation, although there is some dispute as to whether or not this was indeed true . Finally, Appellant argued that on the morning of December 2, 2004, everything in the apartment was normal in an effort to show that Appellant changed his mind and thus renunciated his intent to commit the crime . In its closing argument, the Commonwealth responded to Appellant's assertions that the evidence clearly established a renunciation . Appellant objected several times during the Commonwealth's closing argument, but was overruled each time . Despite Appellant's vigorous argument to the contrary, the Commonwealth did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof. 'When prosecutorial misconduct is claimed, the relevant inquiry on appeal should always center around the overall fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor . In this case, the overall fairness of the trial was not compromised in any manner by the prosecutor's comment[s] ." Maxie v . Commonwealth , 82 S .W.3d 860, 866 (Ky . 2002) . Furthermore, both parties are given great leeway in making their closing arguments . Slaugther , 744 S.W.2d at 412 . "A prosecutor may comment on tactics, may comment on evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of -16- the defense position." Id . at 411-12 ; see also Bowling v . Commonwealth , 873 S.W .2d 175, 178-79 (Ky. 1993) ; Haynes v. Commonwealth , 657 S.W .2d 948, 953 (Ky . 1983) . Moreover, a prosecutor does not shift the burden of proof by arguing that the defendant failed to present evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's case . Tamme , 973 S.W.2d at 38 . Appellant also alleges that the Commonwealth made an impermissible "golden rule" argument when it stated, while gesturing to Appellant's ex-wife, her attorney, and Judge Petrie : "[Appellant is] asking you to turn him loose to walk among these three people." We disagree with Appellant's contention and characterization of the Commonwealth's statements . "A `golden rule' argument is one in which the prosecutor asks the jurors to place themselves into the victim's position." Lycans v. Commonwealth , 562 S.W.2d 303, 305- 06 (Ky . 1978) . We find the Commonwealth's comments to be proper and in no way a "golden rule" argument as the comments do not ask the jury to place itself in the position of the victims . V. Introduction of domestic violence petition . In his fifth and final assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the domestic violence petition, filed by Kathleen against Appellant, to be introduced into evidence . Again, we disagree . The Commonwealth sought to introduce the documents to show that the court date on the petition was December 2, 2004, and specifically stated that it was not offering the documents for the truth of any allegations contained therein . Appellant objected on hearsay grounds . The trial court permitted the petition to be introduced over Appellant's objection to establish that the court date originally scheduled for - 17- November 18, 2004, was changed to December 2, 2004 . The trial judge then admonished the jury that the petition was not to be considered evidence of guilt, but rather evidence of the change in the court date . Appellant now argues that the trial court was required to perform a balancing test under Bell v. Commonwealth , 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994) (holding that a trial court must make three inquiries to determine the admissibility of other crimes or bad acts evidence, viz. : relevance, probativeness, and prejudice) . Generally, evidence of "prior bad acts" is inadmissible pursuant to KRE 404(b) .2 However, pursuant to KRE 404(b), it may be admissible "[i]f offered for some other purpose ." Additionally, "[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one (1) party or for one (1) purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly." KRE 105(a). This Court has long recognized that "an admonition is usually sufficient to cure an erroneous admission of evidence, and there is a presumption that the jury will heed such an admonition." Matthews v. Commonwealth , 163 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted) . Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the limited admissibility of the domestic violence petition, which was appropriate . Moreover, the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion . There being no error in the admission of the 2 KRE 404(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith . It may, however, be admissible : (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party." - 1 8- domestic violence petition in light of the limiting admonition, there can be no abuse of discretion . We find no error here . CONCLUSION For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence for the attempted murder of his ex-wife, Kathleen Cornett, and Boyle Family Court Judge Bruce Petrie . Graves, Minton, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur. McAnulty, J., dissents by separate opinion, with Lambert, C.J., joining that dissent. Roach, J ., not sitting . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Barbara Anderson 100 Security Trust Building 271 West Short Street Lexington, Kentucky 40507 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D. Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky Kenneth W. Riggs Assistant Attorney General Office of Criminal Appeals Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 ,Six~x7e~tct faoixrf of ~ur.~~rr 2006-SC-000032-MR RONNIE GAY CORNETT APPELLANT APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT V. HON . WILLIAM T . CAIN, JUDGE NO . 2005-CR-0005 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE McANULTY RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Respectfully, I dissent . I disagree with the majority's conclusion that there was no error in the officer's testimony as to the meaning of the greeting card message . I believe that the testimony should have been disallowed on the basis that it was not relevant, not helpful to the jury, and violates the rule in this Commonwealth that one witness is not to testify as to the meaning of another's words . The rule is sound that "a witness should not attempt to interpret what another witness meant by what he said." Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 34 (Ky . 1998) . In Adcock v . Commonwealth , 702 S.W.2d 440 (Ky . 1986), this Court explained the reason for the rule : It is the prerogative of the jury to determine what was meant by a given statement, and so it invades the province of the jury for another witness to tell them what was meant . Id. at 442 . Recently, we affirmed the rule, stating that a witness should not "testify to the mental impressions of another." Young v. Commonwealth , 50 S .W .3d 148 (Ky. 2001). Yet today we state, cryptically, "that there is a fine line between interpreting the meaning of someone's statements and inferring or drawing opinions based on those statements," without informing practitioners where that line is to be drawn . I believe the majority's approval of the testimony in the case at bar will send a message that we have abandoned the long established rule in Tamme and Adcock, and that expansive interpretations of defendants' writings and statements are permissible as long as they are labeled opinion . Furthermore, I believe the testimony was erroneous under the Rules of Evidence . I do not think this testimony fits within the definition of relevant evidence under KRE 401 . Nor was it proper lay opinion under KRE 701 . KRE 701 states that when a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. KRE 701 must be read in conjunction with KRE 602, which limits a lay witness's testimony to matters to which he has personal knowledge . Mills v . Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473, 488 (Ky . 1999) . The detective had no greater "personal knowledge" than anyone else reading the card with knowledge of the case might have . "A witness who is no better qualified than the jury should not be permitted to testify ." Illinois Cent . R. Co. v. Haynes , 139 S.W . 754, 756 (Ky. 1911). The witness had no special knowledge about what appellant meant by his writing, which was ambiguous and susceptible either to the interpretation that he planned to commit the offenses charged or that he was prepared only to commit suicide . Further, I don't believe the opinion was "rationally based" on his perceptions, since the language in the card language was nonspecific, with no references to impending plans, or the reason for the card, or his apology to his sister . The detective provided no specific observations to support his lay opinion . Connell v . Bank of Boston , 924 F.2d 1169, 1178 n .7 (1st Cir . 1991) . Thus, the detective's conclusions were likely drawn as much from his view of the case and conjecture as from a rational conclusion based on what was said on the card . In addition, I do not believe this testimony fits within the parameters of KRE 701(b)'s second requirement that it must be helpful to the jury. The federal courts have interpreted this rule to say that if "attempts are made to introduce meaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is called for by [Rule 701(B)] . " United States v . Rea , 958 F.2d 1206, 1215- 1216 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Fed .R.Evid . 701 Advisory Committee Note on 1972 Proposed Rule) . Rule 701 (b) is designed to "provide assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach." Id. at 1215 (quoting Fed .R.Evid . 704 Advisory Committee Note on 1972 Proposed Rules) ; Hester v . BIC Corp . , 225 F .3d 178, 181-182 (2d Cir. 2000) . Furthermore, this was not testimony relating to a "fact in issue," under KRE 701(b), since it related to the legal conclusion of whether appellant had renounced his plan or intended to go forward with it . In general, a witness cannot testify to conclusions of law . Tamme v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W.2d 13, 32 (Ky. 1998). Finally, I think the manner in which the question was phrased to the witness should not have precluded relief for the appellant . Appellant's counsel objected to the question in the first place because he believed that it called for an impermissible response . Since the only issue regarding the card was the writing itself, it appeared that the Commonwealth was inquiring into an interpretation of the plain words . Nevertheless, even if the trial court believed the form of the question did not invite an improper opinion, it should have granted relief once the opinion was given . When the witness responded inappropriately with a baseless interpretation of the writing rather than with additional evidence, the trial court should have granted appellant's motion to strike the response . I do not believe we can say with certainty that the jury did not rely on the officer's improper and unfounded interpretation of the writing . Thus, I dissent from the majority's opinion affirming the conviction . Lambert, C.J., concurs in this dissent. ,Suyrrmr (~-Vurf -of ~Rrufurhv 2006-SC-000032-MR RONNIE GAY CORNETT APPELLANT APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT V. HON . WILLIAM T . CAIN, JUDGE NO . 2005-CR-0005 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE ORDER OF CORRECTION The original Opinion of the Court entered November 22, 2006, is hereby corrected on its face by substitution of the attached pages 1 and 19 in lieu of the original pages 1 and 19 of the opinion . The purpose of this Order of Correction is to correct typographical errors and it does not affect the holding of the original Opinion of the Court. ENTERED : November 30 , 2006 .