Title: Attorney General v. District Attorney for Plymouth District
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: for
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 12, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12722 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE PLYMOUTH 
DISTRICT & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 5, 2019. - March 12, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Public Records.  Criminal Offender Record Information.  District 
Attorney. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 23, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Rosemary Connolly, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Thomas R. Kiley, Special Assistant Attorney General 
(Meredith G. Fierro also present) for the defendants. 
 
Carrie Benedon, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Rebecca Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
& Lindsay M.K. Custer, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 District Attorney for the Middle District and District 
Attorney for the Cape and Islands District. 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  A reporter for Boston Globe Media Partners, 
LLC (Globe), made a public records request pursuant to G. L. 
c. 66, § 10 (public records law) to each of the offices of the 
Commonwealth's eleven district attorneys and to the office of 
the Attorney General for information stored in an internal 
electronic case database maintained by each of these offices 
(database).  Specifically, the Globe sought data tables 
containing the following twenty-three categories of information 
for each criminal case tracked by the district attorneys and the 
Attorney General in their databases: 
"[1] Case ID Number . . . ; [2] Offense Date; [3] Case 
filing Date; [4] Docket number; [5] Court name where the 
case was handled; [6] Criminal count number; [7] 
Charge/crime Code . . . ; [8] Charge/crime Description 
. . . ; [9] Charge/crime Type . . . ; [10] Department that 
filed the charge; [11] Way charge was initiated (Ex:  grand 
jury indictment, filed by police . . . etc.); [12] 
Defendant ID Num (Internal tracking number used by DA's 
office to identify defendant); [13] Defendant 
Race/Ethnicity; [14] Defendant Gender; [15] Judge's Name 
who handled disposition; [16] Disposition Date; [17] 
Disposition Code; [18] Disposition Description; [19] 
Disposition Type; [20] Disposition/sentence[] recommended 
by prosecutor for each charge; [21] Sentence Type; [22] 
Sentence Description; [23] Case status." 
 
 
All of the offices complied with the request except for 
those of the district attorneys for the Plymouth District, the 
Middle District, and the Cape and Islands District (the district 
attorneys).  The Globe appealed to the supervisor of records 
(supervisor) to determine whether the requested information 
sought from the databases are public records that must be 
3 
 
 
disclosed under the public records law.  The supervisor 
determined that the information constitutes public records and 
ordered the district attorneys to produce the requested data.  
The district attorneys declined to do so, and the supervisor 
referred the matter to the Attorney General, who commenced an 
action seeking a declaration that the requested data are public 
records.  A Superior Court judge allowed the Attorney General's 
motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment declaring 
that the Globe's request seeks public records that must be 
disclosed.  We granted the district attorneys' motion for direct 
appellate review. 
 
On appeal, the district attorneys argue that we should 
reverse the declaratory judgment for two reasons:  first, that 
under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a), these records are 
"specifically or by necessary implication exempted from 
disclosure" under the Criminal Offender Record Information Act, 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 167-178B (the CORI act); and second, that the 
Globe's request requires them not merely to disclose existing 
records but to create a computer program to extract the data and 
create a new report, which exceeds what is required under the 
public records law. 
 
We conclude that the data sought by the Globe from the 
district attorneys would be "specifically or by necessary 
implication exempted from disclosure" under the CORI act if the 
4 
 
 
individuals whose cases were tracked by this data could be 
directly or indirectly identified, because a criminal history of 
these individuals could then be compiled from this data that may 
be more extensive than what members of the public are permitted 
to obtain under the CORI act.  We also conclude that if the 
court case docket number (docket number) for each case were 
segregated and redacted from the remaining categories of 
information, these individuals could not be directly or 
indirectly identified from this data.  We also conclude that a 
request such as this, which requires the extraction of 
categories of information from an existing database, does not 
impose burdens on public record holders that exceed what is 
required under the public records law.  We therefore affirm the 
judgment only in part and declare that the district attorneys 
must disclose to the Globe twenty-two of the twenty-three 
categories of information requested, excising from the 
disclosure the docket number for each case requested.2 
 
Statutory background.  This case requires us to attempt to 
harmonize the language and legislative purpose of two statutes:  
the public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10, and the CORI act, 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 167-178B. 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
5 
 
 
 
1.  The public records law.  The public records law, G. L. 
c. 66, § 10, governs the public's right to access records and 
information held by State governmental entities.  Under the 
public records law, anyone has the right to access or inspect 
"public records" upon request.  G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a).  "The 
primary purpose of the [public records law] is to give the 
public broad access to governmental records."  Worcester Tel. & 
Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 
382-383 (2002).  In enacting the public records law, the 
Legislature recognized that "[t]he public has an interest in 
knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in 
an efficient and law-abiding manner," Attorney Gen. v. Collector 
of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 158 (1979), and that "greater access to 
information about the actions of public officers and 
institutions is increasingly . . . an essential ingredient of 
public confidence in government," New Bedford Standard-Times 
Publ. Co. v. Clerk of the Third Dist. Ct. of Bristol, 377 Mass. 
404, 417 (1979) (Abrams, J., concurring). 
"Public records" are broadly defined as "all books, papers, 
maps, photographs, recorded tapes, financial statements, 
statistical tabulations, or other documentary materials or data, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received 
by any officer or employee" of any Massachusetts governmental 
entity.  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  But "[n]ot every record 
6 
 
 
or document kept or made by [a] governmental agency is a 'public 
record.'"  Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset 
Mgt., 449 Mass. 444, 454 (2007).  The Legislature has identified 
twenty categories of records that fall outside the definition of 
"public records" and are consequently exempt from disclosure 
under the public records law.  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth 
(a)-(u).  Here, only one exemption has been claimed by the 
district attorneys:  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a) 
(exemption [a]) excludes records from disclosure where they are 
"specifically or by necessary implication exempted from 
disclosure by statute." 
A public record holder may invoke exemption (a) as the 
basis for withholding requested records where another statute -- 
the "exempting statute" -- expressly prohibits disclosure.  See, 
e.g., Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 
544 n.5 (1977), citing G. L. c. 167, § 2 (copies of bank 
examination reports "shall be furnished to such bank for its use 
only and shall not be exhibited to any other person . . . 
without the prior written approval of the commissioner"); G. L. 
c. 111B, § 11 (alcohol treatment records "shall be 
confidential"); G. L. c. 41, § 97D (all reports of rape or 
sexual assault "shall not be public reports").  Alternatively, a 
record may be withheld where the exempting statute protects the 
record from disclosure by "necessary implication," such as where 
7 
 
 
the exempting statute prohibits disclosure as a practical 
matter.  See, e.g., Champa v. Weston Pub. Schs., 473 Mass. 86, 
91 n.8 (2015) (Federal statute "does not expressly prohibit 
disclosure of 'education records,' but it does condition receipt 
of Federal funds on the nondisclosure of education records"). 
 
Under the public records act, "a presumption shall exist 
that each record sought is public and the burden shall be on the 
defendant agency or municipality to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that such record or portion of the record may be 
withheld in accordance with state or federal law."  G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10A (d) (1) (iv).  Therefore, the burden rests with the 
district attorneys to prove that the CORI act specifically or by 
necessary implication exempts the requested records from 
disclosure. 
2.  The CORI act.  First enacted in 1972, the CORI act 
centralized the collection and dissemination of criminal record 
information in the Commonwealth.  St. 1972, c. 805.  See New 
Bedford Standard-Times Publ. Co., 377 Mass. at 413.  It created 
a unified management system for all criminal record information, 
allowing, for the first time, the compilation of a comprehensive 
State criminal history for each offender (CORI report).  St. 
1972, c. 805, § 1.  It also strictly limited dissemination of 
those State-compiled criminal histories to criminal justice 
agencies and other entities specifically granted access by 
8 
 
 
statute.  Id.  By imposing these restrictions, the Legislature 
intended to address the need of criminal justice agencies to 
access criminal offender information while "embedded[ing] in the 
statutory public policy of Massachusetts" its "interest in 
promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of 
former criminal defendants."  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 
F. Supp. 89, 97 (D. Mass. 1993) (Fenton). 
In the following years, groups such as employers, victim 
advocates, and the press began to voice dissatisfaction with the 
inaccessibility of criminal record information and challenged 
the constitutionality of the CORI act and related provisions.  
See, e.g., New Bedford Standard-Times Publ. Co., 377 Mass. at 
405; Fenton, 819 F. Supp. at 90; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 
684 F. Supp. 1132, 1132 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part and 
reversed in part, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989) (challenging 
constitutionality of criminal record sealing under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C).  After years of debate and gradual modification, see, 
e.g., St. 1990, c. 319; St. 1977, c. 691, the CORI act was 
substantially revised in 2010 by the enactment of CORI reform.  
St. 2010, c. 256. See Massing, CORI Reform --Providing Ex-
Offenders with Increased Opportunities without Compromising 
Employer Needs, 55 Boston Bar J. 21, 21 (2011) (discussing 
statutory history). 
9 
 
 
CORI reform created a new agency, the Department of 
Criminal Justice Information Services (DCJIS), to manage "data 
processing and data communication systems . . . designed to 
ensure the prompt collection, exchange, dissemination and 
distribution of such public safety information as may be 
necessary for the efficient administration and operation of 
criminal justice agencies and to connect such systems directly 
or indirectly with similar systems in this or other [S]tates."  
G. L. c. 6, § 167A (c).  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 8 (c).  In 
turn, DCJIS developed iCORI, defined as "[t]he [I]nternet-based 
system used in the Commonwealth to access CORI and to obtain 
self-audits."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.02 (2017). 
CORI reform also significantly expanded the availability of 
CORI reports.  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 21.  Where before only 
criminal justice agencies and a narrow group of statutorily 
authorized employers and government agencies could access CORI 
reports, CORI reform created a tiered system of access to CORI 
based on the identity of the requestor.  See id.  See also 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(2) (2017).  For example, under the 
tiered system, "[c]riminal justice agencies may obtain all 
criminal offender record information, including sealed records, 
for the actual performance of their criminal justice duties."  
G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (1).  Members of the general public have 
much more limited access.  In the tier of "open access," any 
10 
 
 
member of the general public, upon written request, may obtain a 
limited amount of CORI about a person:  felony convictions from 
the last ten years that were punishable by imprisonment of five 
years of more, all felony convictions from the past two years, 
misdemeanor convictions from the past year, and information 
regarding custody status and placement if the person is 
incarcerated or on probation or parole.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 172 (a) (4).3  The commissioner of DCJIS also may provide 
access to CORI to persons other than those entitled to obtain 
access where he or she finds that such dissemination "serves the 
public interest."  G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (6). 
CORI reform also substantially decreased the waiting period 
for automatic sealing of criminal records under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100A, and expanded the availability of discretionary sealing 
to continuances without a finding.4  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 128; 
                                                          
 
 
3 In the tier of "standard access," prospective employers 
and landlords who make a request for a CORI report from the 
Department of Criminal Justice Information Services (DCJIS) 
regarding prospective employees or tenants receive more 
information than the general public but less than criminal 
justice agencies:  pending criminal charges, including cases 
continued without a finding that have yet to be dismissed, and, 
unless sealed, misdemeanor convictions from the last five years 
and felony convictions from the last ten years.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 172 (a) (3). 
 
 
4 The waiting period to seal misdemeanor convictions was 
reduced from ten years to five years, and for felony 
convictions, from fifteen years to ten years.  See St. 2010, 
c. 256, § 128; Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 306 n.17 
(2014).  In 2018, as part of the criminal justice reform bill, 
11 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 305-306 (2014).  "These 
reforms, coupled with the procedural protections aimed at 
minimizing discrimination in the hiring process, strongly 
indicate that the Legislature was concerned with the collateral 
consequences of criminal records and sought to make sealing 
broadly available to individuals whose criminal histories or 
records no longer presented concerns of recidivism."  Pon, supra 
at 306. 
Despite the limitations imposed by the CORI act on the 
scope of information that members of the general public, 
employers, and landlords are entitled to receive in a CORI 
report, the CORI act does not prohibit anyone from attempting to 
obtain more information about the criminal history of a 
particular individual from court records or from police daily 
logs or arrest registers, which are presumptively public.5  See 
                                                          
 
the waiting period to seal misdemeanor convictions was further 
reduced from five years to three years, and for felony 
convictions, from ten years to seven years.  See St. 2018, 
c. 69, § 186. 
 
 
5 We say that these records are presumptively public because 
court records involving adults or juveniles adjudicated as 
adults may be impounded, sealed, or expunged, juvenile court 
records are closed to the public, entries regarding juvenile 
arrests must be removed from police logs, and police logs must 
be redacted where an offense is expunged.  See Republican Co. v. 
Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 218, 223 (2004) (court records can be 
impounded and made unavailable for public inspection upon 
showing of good cause); G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A, 100B, 100C 
(sealing of certain probation files and court records); G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 100F, 100G, 100H, 100J (expungement eligibility and 
12 
 
 
G. L. c. 6, § 172 (m) (declaring that "chronologically 
maintained court records of public judicial proceedings" and 
"police daily logs, arrest registers, or other similar records 
compiled chronologically" are "public records").  Those who are 
frustrated by the amount of information available to them in a 
CORI report and want to obtain a complete criminal history can 
go to the clerk's office in every court house, search for every 
case under the individual's name, and review the court file.  
They would be limited in this endeavor only by the practical 
constraints of time and expense; obtaining someone's criminal 
history in this piecemeal fashion does not violate the CORI act.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178.6 
Discussion.  We now turn to our review of the motion for 
summary judgment.  "Our review of a motion judge's decision on 
summary judgment is de novo, because we examine the same record 
                                                          
 
procedures); G. L. c. 41, § 98F (entries regarding juvenile 
arrests); G. L. c. 276, § 100L (police logs must be redacted 
where case is expunged). 
 
 
6 It would, however, be a crime for a member of the public, 
under false pretenses, to obtain from DCJIS or a law enforcement 
agency a more comprehensive criminal history regarding the 
individual than what is available under "open access."  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178.  Moreover, CORI reform made it a crime for an 
employer to request that a prospective employee provide the 
employer with his or her CORI report.  See G. L. c. 6, § 172 
(d).  Because individuals are authorized to receive a full and 
unrestricted CORI report regarding their own criminal history, 
G. L. c. 6, § 175, this provision ensures that employers can 
access only that information to which they are statutorily 
entitled. 
13 
 
 
and decide the same questions of law."  Kiribati Seafood Co. v. 
Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 (2017). 
 
1.  Exemption (a):  "specifically or by necessary 
implication" of the CORI act.  The district attorneys assert 
that under exemption (a) the Globe's requested categories of 
information from the databases are "specifically or by necessary 
implication" exempted from disclosure under the CORI act.  In 
determining whether records are "specifically or by necessary 
implication" exempted from disclosure, we must exercise 
considerable caution.  "Because of the [public records act's] 
presumption in favor of disclosure, we have said that the 
statutory exemptions must be strictly and narrowly construed."  
Globe Newspaper Co. v. District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 
439 Mass. 374, 380 (2003) (Middle District), quoting General 
Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 
801-802 (1999).  We have also said that, where the exemption 
from disclosure derives from the CORI act, "it must be construed 
narrowly."  Middle District, 439 Mass. at 383. 
 
The Attorney General contends that the information sought 
is not CORI as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 167, and therefore not 
"specifically or by necessary implication exempted from 
disclosure" under the CORI act, because the Globe did not 
request the names of the defendants in the database.  It is 
certainly true that the definition of CORI makes clear that it 
14 
 
 
includes only records and data about "identifiable" individuals, 
and that "[c]riminal record information shall not include . . . 
files in which individuals are not directly or indirectly 
identifiable."  G. L. c. 6, § 167.  But the absence of 
defendants' names in the data request does not mean that the 
individuals whose data are in the district attorneys' databases 
cannot be identified. 
 
Where the data request includes docket numbers, the 
identity of the individuals in the requested databases would be 
"indirectly identifiable."  As set forth in Rule 5(a)(2) of the 
Uniform Rules on Public Access to Court Records (Uniform Rules), 
Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Trial Court Rules, at 1007 
(LexisNexis 2018), any person who knows the docket number of a 
criminal case can learn the name of the criminal defendant in 
that case through the Trial Court's public Internet portal.  
This information can be learned by anyone at any place and at 
any time; all that is required is access to a computer. 
 
Once a person in possession of the requested database knows 
the name of the criminal defendant from the docket number, that 
person would be able to link that name to the defendant's 
internal identification number -- which is one of the twenty-
three categories of information requested.  The database could 
then be searched for all cases with that same defendant 
15 
 
 
identification number, and a criminal history of the defendant 
could be compiled. 
 
To be sure, this criminal history would be less 
comprehensive than that compiled by DCJIS, because it would 
include only the cases prosecuted by a particular district 
attorney's office rather than all criminal cases in the 
Commonwealth in which the defendant was arraigned.7  But if, as 
here, the requestor seeks to obtain the same categories of 
information from all the district attorneys and from the 
Attorney General, the requestor would be able to cobble together 
something akin to a Statewide criminal history of the defendant 
that may provide substantially more information about the 
defendant's criminal history than a member of the public could 
obtain through a DCJIS CORI query. 
 
Additionally, obtaining an identifiable individual's 
criminal history through a public records request strips that 
individual of statutory protections granted in CORI reform.  For 
example, G. L. c. 6, §§ 167 and 172 (g), allow any individual, 
without a fee, to obtain through a self-audit the names of all 
persons and entities, other than criminal justice agencies, that 
have made queries to request that individual's CORI.  But if a 
                                                          
 
 
7 The record before us does not indicate whether each of the 
district attorneys uses the same defendant identification number 
for an individual. 
16 
 
 
criminal history could be compiled through a public records 
request, that individual would not be able to learn that someone 
had obtained his or her criminal history.  Moreover, in contrast 
with those persons who receive an individual's criminal history 
through a DCJIS request, there is no legal prohibition against 
further dissemination of a criminal history compiled through a 
public records request.  Compare G. L. c. 6, § 172 (f) ("A 
requestor shall not disseminate criminal offender record 
information except upon request by a subject" of query). 
 
The Legislature, when it enacted CORI reform and granted 
broader access to CORI reports while simultaneously enhancing 
protections for individuals with criminal records, sought to 
"recalibrate the balance between protecting public safety and 
facilitating the reintegration of criminal defendants by 
removing barriers to housing and employment."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 
307.  In light of exemption (a), the public records law cannot 
be interpreted to permit members of the general public to make 
an end run around the CORI restrictions by allowing them to 
generate criminal histories of individuals through public 
records requests to prosecutors, and thereby obtain a more 
extensive criminal history than they would receive through a 
DCJIS query. 
 
The Trial Court sought to avoid a comparable end run around 
the CORI statutory scheme when it crafted limitations on the use 
17 
 
 
of its public Internet portal under the Uniform Rules.  Under 
those rules, a member of the general public may obtain 
electronic access to the name of the defendant and the court 
docket only if he or she knows the docket number of the case; 
one cannot conduct a search of a defendant by name and obtain 
the dockets and case information for all the criminal cases that 
relate to that defendant.  See Rule 5(a)(2) of the Uniform 
Rules.  The rules committee of the Trial Court reasoned that 
"[i]f the Trial Court were to provide the public with the 
ability to remotely search criminal cases by a defendant's last 
name, which could essentially reveal a defendant's entire 
criminal history, it could thwart the careful balance between 
access and privacy struck by the Legislature in enacting the 
CORI statute."  Notes to Rule 5(a)(2) of the Uniform Rules, 
Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Trial Court Rules, at 1009 
(LexisNexis 2018).  See id., quoting State House News Service, 
Nov. 18, 2009 (statement of Sen. Creem) (intent of CORI reform 
was to strike "a great balance . . . between providing 
information that the public has a right to know and protecting 
people's privacy").  The rules committee also noted that the 
limitations imposed on public access to criminal history records 
by the CORI act and the protections imposed by the act against 
dissemination of those records by requestors "could not 
reasonably be maintained if a defendant's criminal history could 
18 
 
 
be pieced together through a search on the Trial Court's 
website."  Notes to Rule 5(a)(2) of the Uniform Rules, supra.  
See New Bedford Standard-Times Publ. Co., 377 Mass. at 415 
(court records that "aggregate information concerning the 
criminal history of an individual" may "threaten the privacy 
interests the [CORI act] seeks to protect"). 
 
There is another important reason, rooted in CORI and 
criminal justice reform, to exempt docket numbers from 
disclosure in this case -- to avoid frustrating the legislative 
purpose regarding the sealing and expungement of cases, because 
"[s]ealing is a central means by which to alleviate the 
potential adverse consequences in employment, volunteering, or 
other activities that can result from the existence of such 
records."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 307, citing G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A, 
fifth par., and 100C, fourth par. 
 
Under G. L. c. 276, § 100A, "[a]ny person having a record 
of criminal court appearances and dispositions in the 
commonwealth on file with the office of the commissioner of 
probation" may request that the commissioner seal the file.  If 
the requestor satisfies all the statutory conditions, "[t]he 
commissioner shall comply with the request."  See id. (setting 
forth statutory conditions).  In addition, under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C, the commissioner shall seal the record of court 
appearances and dispositions recorded "[i]n any criminal case 
19 
 
 
wherein the defendant has been found not guilty by the court or 
the jury, or a no bill has been returned by the grand jury, or a 
finding of no probable cause has been made by the court."  In 
all such sealed cases, the commissioner must notify the clerk of 
the court where the proceeding took place of the sealing, who 
shall seal the court record.  G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A, 100C.  
Where the record is sealed, if anyone other than a law 
enforcement agency searches for the court record, the court 
shall report "that no record exists."  G. L. c. 276, § 100C. 
 
Under G. L. c. 276, §§ 100I and 100K, with respect to some 
criminal offenses that occurred before the offender was twenty-
one years of age, under certain circumstances, the person may be 
eligible for expungement of the criminal record for a particular 
offense by a court order.  See G. L. c. 276, §§ 100I, 100J, 100K 
(setting forth statutory conditions and exclusions).  Where a 
criminal record is expunged by order of the court, the clerk of 
the court where the criminal record was created and the 
commissioner of DCJIS must expunge the records within their 
custody and "order all criminal justice agencies to expunge all 
publicly available police logs."  G. L. c. 276, § 100L (a).  But 
the records within the district attorneys' databases are not 
included in this statutory directive.  In fact, the sealing 
statute does not require that a prosecutor be notified of the 
20 
 
 
subsequent sealing of a case he or she prosecuted.  See G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 100A, 100C. 
 
With respect to the records request here, for cases that 
have already been sealed or expunged, the production of docket 
numbers presents no threat.  If the Globe were to search a 
docket number in the Trial Court's public Internet portal, it 
would receive a message that no record exists -- protecting the 
identity of the criminal defendant in that case.  However, if 
the record produced by the district attorneys has not yet been 
sealed or expunged, the Globe would be able to obtain the name 
of the criminal defendant through the docket number and learn, 
among other things, the nature of the offense and the 
disposition of the case.  And the Globe would still retain this 
information even if the case were subsequently sealed or 
expunged. 
 
This access to identifiable information likely would not 
present a serious threat to the legislative purpose of the 
sealing and expungement statutes if the data request concerned a 
single defendant or a single case.  After all, if the Globe 
obtains a single court record from a court house before that 
case is sealed, the Globe may retain that information even if 
the defendant were subsequently to seal the case.  But where the 
public records request, as here, seeks twenty-three categories 
of information for every case in the district attorneys' 
21 
 
 
databases, the concern that the request will diminish the 
effectiveness of a subsequent sealing or expungement -- and 
undermine the Legislature's purpose in promulgating the sealing 
and expungement statutes -- is far more significant. 
 
We have recognized in a different context the potential 
danger to privacy that can emerge from the compilation of vast 
amounts of personal data.  See Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC 
v. Department of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 440 (2019) 
(Department of Pub. Health).8  We have also recognized that the 
public records law does not distinguish among requesters or 
permit an inquiry "into the requestor's purpose for seeking a 
particular record before determining whether to release it."  
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department 
of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 290 n.12 (2017).  If the 
Globe is entitled to these databases through the public records 
law, individuals and businesses that seek to gather and organize 
this data for profit, such as those who sell data to persons or 
entities who are conducting background checks, would be equally 
entitled to access to these databases.  "Where criminal records 
                                                          
 
 
8 Indeed, in that case, the Globe itself recognized "a 
greater privacy interest in 'vertical compilations' that 
'aggregate information about specific individuals,' such as an 
individual's criminal record, than in 'horizontal compilations' 
that 'provide a limited amount of information about many 
people,' such as a telephone book."  Boston Globe Media 
Partners, LLC v. Department of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 441 
(2019). 
22 
 
 
are increasingly available on the Internet and through third-
party background service providers, criminal history information 
that is available only briefly to the public through official 
means can remain available indefinitely, despite subsequent 
sealing or impoundment."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 304, citing Jacobs & 
Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal 
Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 177, 186-187, 203-208 
(2008).  See also Department of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. at 437 
("Today's current information may be tomorrow's record protected 
from public view . . . .  To examine the Globe's request in a 
vacuum is to ignore that an index from the present is entwined 
with indices from the future"). 
 
Because the disclosure of docket numbers could lead to the 
improper dissemination of criminal history about identifiable 
individuals, the district attorneys contend that all twenty-
three categories of information must, as a necessary implication 
of the CORI act, be withheld from disclosure.  And if the public 
records request were indivisible and our decision were limited 
to giving the Globe all it requested or giving it none, we would 
agree.  But we need not, and do not, view the Globe's records 
request as indivisible -- we may order the segregation and 
redaction of a narrow portion of the requested records in order 
to balance the presumption of public access with the protections 
enacted in CORI reform. 
23 
 
 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the extensive database sought 
here by the Globe is exempt from disclosure as a public record 
by necessary implication of the CORI act and of the statutes 
governing sealing and expungement unless the disclosure is 
redacted to ensure that none of the records are directly or 
indirectly identifiable to any person.  We also conclude that 
this can be accomplished only by redacting the category of 
docket numbers from the database to be produced, because only by 
redacting the docket numbers can these records be neither 
directly nor indirectly identifiable to any person.  Where the 
docket number is redacted, the defendant identification number 
need not be redacted, because it alone will not permit any 
individual to be identifiable from either the records produced 
or from publicly available court records.9 
 
We recognize that barring docket numbers from being 
produced for this records request requires us to distinguish our 
holding in the Middle District case, which the Superior Court 
judge relied upon heavily in her decision.  In Middle District, 
439 Mass. at 375, the Globe sought information from the Attorney 
General and each district attorney regarding the docket number, 
                                                          
 
 
9 The docket number is thus the "key to the castle."  
Although the defendant identification number may be used to 
create a criminal history for an individual, as long as that 
individual is not identifiable, the defendant identification 
number may be produced and the history of an unidentified 
individual may be compiled. 
24 
 
 
defendant name, municipality, and charge for each criminal case 
pertaining to municipal corruption involving elected or 
appointed officials or employees of cities and towns in the 
Commonwealth.  We concluded that a docket number "falls 
squarely" within the definition of "chronologically maintained 
court records of public judicial . . . proceedings" that are 
"public records" under G. L. c. 6, § 172 (m), and must be 
disclosed regardless of whether they are in the possession of 
the court or the district attorney prosecuting the case.  Middle 
District, supra at 382.  We declared: 
"A record does not cease to be a 'court' record when it is 
distributed to the parties to a case, here, to the district 
attorney prosecuting the case.  It retains its original 
character as a 'court' record, and hence a 'public record,' 
without regard to which entity has a copy.  Put 
differently, if the item sought is a court record that 
could be obtained from the clerk's office, it is a public 
record, and it may be obtained from any other government 
official who also happens to have a copy of that same 
public record." 
 
Id. at 383-383. 
 
 
But there are important distinctions which preclude the 
holding in the Middle District case from controlling in this 
case.  In that case, the Globe's public records request was far 
more narrow -- it only requested docket numbers associated with 
a specific type of case and a specific type of defendant.  See 
Middle District, 439 Mass. at 375.  That request would reveal 
information about a defendant regarding a specific offense but, 
25 
 
 
in contrast with the data request in this case, it would not 
permit the requester, armed with these docket numbers, to 
compile a criminal history of these defendants based on the 
other information contained in the data request. 
 
The court itself effectively distinguished the 
circumstances in the Middle District case from the circumstances 
in the instant case when it declared: 
"[A]llowing members of the press and the public to obtain 
docket numbers from the district attorneys does not 
undermine the purposes of the CORI statute.  The CORI 
statute is intended to protect privacy and to promote the 
rehabilitation of criminal defendants, recognizing that 
ready access to a defendant's prior criminal record might 
frustrate a defendant's access to employment, housing, and 
social contacts necessary to that rehabilitation.  Requests 
for docket numbers of particular types of cases, not being 
framed with reference to any named defendant, do not 
subvert the CORI statute.  The CORI statute is not intended 
to shield officials in the criminal justice system from 
public scrutiny.  Evaluation of a district attorney's 
performance of necessity involves review of that district 
attorney's cases, e.g., the types of cases prosecuted, the 
results achieved, the sentences sought and imposed. 
Requiring district attorneys to respond to public records 
requests for docket numbers of particular types of cases 
prosecuted by their offices facilitates that review without 
undermining the CORI statute." 
 
Id. at 384.  In short, disclosure of the docket numbers in the 
Middle District case did not undermine the protections or 
purpose of the CORI statute; disclosure of docket numbers in 
this case, however, if produced as part of the substantial 
database of case information sought here, would undermine the 
CORI statute by allowing the creation of criminal histories of 
26 
 
 
individuals that would not otherwise be available to members of 
the general public though a query to DCJIS.  This analysis 
demonstrates why "a case-by case review is required to determine 
whether an exemption applies."  Matter of a Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 445 Mass. 685, 688 (2006). 
 
We therefore declare that the district attorneys have 
successfully met their burden of proving that disclosure of the 
requested information would be exempt from disclosure under 
exemption (a) of the public records law "by necessary 
implication" of the CORI act and the sealing and expungement 
statutes if the requested information were to include docket 
numbers.  However, if the docket numbers were segregated and 
redacted from the requested information such that no individual 
can be directly or indirectly identified from the information 
obtained by the Globe, the other twenty-two categories of 
information would not be exempt from disclosure "by necessary 
implication" of these statutes. 
 
2.  Creation of a new record.  The district attorneys also 
argue that they do not have to fulfill the Globe's public 
records request because it would require them to create a 
computer program to compile information into a new electronic 
record, a task not required under the public records law. 
 
We have not previously addressed what constitutes the 
creation of a new record.  The disclosure obligation under the 
27 
 
 
public records law applies only to information that is in the 
possession of a governmental entity, regardless of whether its 
form is paper or electronic.  See G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a) ("A 
records access officer . . . shall at reasonable times and 
without unreasonable delay permit inspection or furnish a copy 
of any public record . . . provided that . . . the public record 
is within the possession, custody or control of the agency or 
municipality that the records access officer serves"); G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (public records are "materials or data, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or 
received" by public entity).  Thus, we understand § 10 (a) to 
mean that a member of the public may not, through a public 
records request, require an agency or municipality to create new 
documents that do not already exist. See National Labor 
Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-162 
(1975) (refusing to order Federal agency to create "explanatory 
material" through Freedom of Information Act request because 
would require agency to create new documents); Guide to the 
Massachusetts Public Records Law, Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
Division of Public Records (updated Jan. 2017) at 9, 31.  See 
also Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 165 (1977) (public records 
law generally does not require boards to prepare lists of public 
information, but only requires that they permit inspection and 
provide copies of records in their possession). 
28 
 
 
 
But where public records are in electronic form, as they 
increasingly are and will be, a public records request that 
requires a government entity to search its electronic database 
to extract requested data does not mean that the extracted data 
constitute the creation of a new record under the public records 
law.  This interpretation of the public records law is supported 
by the regulations promulgated by the supervisor, who is 
required to adopt regulations to implement the public records 
law.  See G. L. c. 66, § 1.  Under those regulations, when a 
governmental entity is designing or acquiring an electronic 
record keeping system or database, it "shall ensure, to the 
extent feasible" that it "allows for information storage and 
retrieval methods permitting retrieval of public portions of 
records to provide maximum public access."  950 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 32.07(1)(e)(2) (2017).  The regulations declare: 
"[F]urnishing a segregable portion of a public record shall 
not be deemed to be creation of a new record.  This applies 
to a responsive record in the form of an extract of 
existing data, as such data exists at the time of the 
request and is segregable from nonresponsive and exempt 
data." 
 
950 Code Mass. Regs. § 32.07(1)(f). 
 
The duly promulgated regulations of the supervisor "are 
presumptively valid and 'must be accorded all the deference due 
to a statute.'"  Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages 
Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 520 (2019), quoting Pepin v. 
29 
 
 
Division of Fisheries & Wildlife, 467 Mass. 210, 221 (2014).  
"The burden of demonstrating invalidity rests squarely on the 
party challenging the regulation," Craft Beer Guild, LLC, supra, 
which here are the district attorneys, and they have not cited 
the regulation or argued that it "is contrary to the plain 
language of the [public records] statute and its underlying 
purpose."  Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 466 Mass. 292, 301 (2013), 
quoting Duarte v. Commissioner of Revenue, 451 Mass. 399, 408 
(2008). 
 
Federal courts, in interpreting the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq., have also held that 
electronic database searches do not involve the creation of new 
records.  See National Sec. Counselors v. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 898 F. Supp. 2d 233, 270 (D.D.C. 2012) ("In responding 
to a FOIA request for 'aggregate data,' . . . an agency need not 
create a new database or reorganize its method of archiving 
data, but if the agency already stores records in an electronic 
database, searching that database does not involve the creation 
of a new record.  Likewise, sorting a pre-existing database of 
information to make information intelligible does not involve 
the creation of a new record . . ."); People for the Am. Way 
Found. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 451 F. Supp. 2d 6, 14 
30 
 
 
(D.D.C. 2006).  See also Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 
F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  As one Federal court reasoned: 
"[S]orting a pre-existing database of information to make 
information intelligible does not involve the creation of a 
new record because . . . computer records found in a 
database rather than a file cabinet may require the 
application of codes or some form of programming to 
retrieve the information. . . . Sorting a database by a 
particular data field (e.g., date, category, title) is 
essentially the application of codes or some form of 
programming, and thus does not involve creating new records 
or conducting research -- it is just another form of 
searching that is within the scope of an agency's duties in 
responding to" public records requests" (quotations, 
citation and alteration omitted). 
 
National Sec. Counselors, supra at 270. 
 
Several State courts have also held that conducting a query 
in an electronic database does not constitute the creation of a 
new record for purposes of their States' public records laws.  
See, e.g., American Civ. Liberties Union of Ariz. v. Arizona 
Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 142, 148 (Ct. App. 2016); 
Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Cole, 52 A.3d 
541, 547 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012); Public Employees' Retirement 
Sys. of Nev. v. Nevada Policy Research Inst., Inc., 134 Nev. 
669, 676-678 (2018). 
 
A records custodian is obligated to provide access to 
existing files, "regardless of physical form or characteristics" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  If public 
records are maintained in an electronic database, they must be 
searchable and accessible in a reasonable and useable format so 
31 
 
 
as not to undermine the purpose of the public records law.  In a 
world in which records and information are increasingly stored 
in electronic databases, a public record that would otherwise be 
subject to the public records law "does not become immune from 
production simply by virtue of the method the [public entity] 
employs to catalogue the document," or track the information.  
American Civ. Liberties Union of Ariz., 240 Ariz. at 148, 
quoting Lake v. Phoenix, 220 Ariz. 472, 481 (Ct. App.), rev'd in 
part, 222 Ariz. 5147 (2009). 
 
Here, the requested information already exists in the 
district attorneys' databases, which contain certain data fields 
for each case.10  Other district attorneys and the Attorney 
General, with comparable databases, have already complied with 
the Globe's records request, so we know it is possible.  The 
Globe's request, as limited by this decision, requires the 
district attorneys to segregate and redact from disclosure the 
category of docket numbers, but otherwise the district attorneys 
need only provide a copy of preexisting data fields as 
requested.  We conclude that the segregation and extraction of 
                                                          
 
 
10 That is not to say that every case in each database will 
contain information in every field requested.  For example, with 
respect to the collection of data concerning the defendant's 
race and ethnicity, the district attorneys' practices vary.  But 
to the extent that the information exists for each case, and it 
already has been entered into the district attorneys' databases, 
it must be produced. 
32 
 
 
the requested information from the existing fields in the 
district attorneys' databases is not the creation of a new 
record but is instead the type of data recovery that is expected 
in a digital world under the public records law.  To be sure, we 
do not underestimate the burden on staff time and resources that 
the Globe's records request may impose on the district 
attorneys, given the breadth of its scope, but the district 
attorneys may assess a reasonable fee for the actual cost of 
producing the requested information, consistent with G. L. 
c. 66, § 10 (d). 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm so much of the judgment as orders 
the district attorneys within ninety days to produce the 
requested information from their case management databases, 
except for the docket numbers of each case, which shall be 
segregated and redacted from the information provided.  We also 
affirm so much of the judgment as declares that the categories 
of requested data are public records under the public records 
law and are not exempt from disclosure, but only to the extent 
that these records do not directly or indirectly identify any 
defendant, which requires the segregation and redaction of 
docket numbers from the records to be produced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.