Title: Commonwealth v. LaChance
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11494
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 2014

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SJC-11494 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDMUND D. LaCHANCE, JR. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 7, 2014. - October 21, 2014. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Public trial, Jury, Waiver of constitutional 
rights, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, Criminal, Public 
trial, Empanelment of jury, Waiver, Assistance of counsel.  
Jury and Jurors.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 16, 1999.  
 
 
Following review by the Appeals Court, 58 Mass. 1111 
(2003), a motion for a new trial was considered by Raymond J. 
Brassard, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Alba Doto Baccari for the defendant. 
 
Michael A. Kaneb, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Richard C. Felton, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  This court is again faced with a defendant's 
postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
2 
 
predicated on the failure of trial counsel to object to a court 
room closure during jury empanelment.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alebord, 467 Mass. 106, 111-114, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2830 
(2014); Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 100-105 (2014).  
This time we are required to address a question not previously 
reached, that is, whether prejudice from the deficiency of trial 
counsel in this respect must be affirmatively established as 
part of the claim or is to be presumed because of the structural 
nature of the underlying public trial right that trial counsel 
failed to raise. 
 
1.  Background.  On April 20, 2001, a Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendant of aggravated rape, kidnapping, indecent 
assault and battery, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon.  
The defendant -- represented by new counsel -- filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and on August 5, 2003, a panel of the Appeals 
Court affirmed his conviction in an unpublished decision 
pursuant to that court's rule 1:28.  Commonwealth v. LaChance, 
58 Mass. App. Ct. 1111 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1202 
(2004).  The defendant filed two motions for a new trial in 2003 
and 2004, which were denied by the trial judge in a single order 
on April 15, 2004.  The defendant again timely filed a notice of 
appeal, and a panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the judge's 
3 
 
denial of his two motions for a new trial on May 10, 2005.  
Commonwealth v. LaChance, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (2005).1   
 
In September, 2011, represented by new appellate counsel, 
the defendant filed his third postaffirmance motion for a new 
trial, raising, for the first time, a claim that his right to a 
public trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was violated when his family members were 
excluded from the court room during jury empanelment, and that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
closure.  In support of his motion, the defendant presented his 
own affidavit and affidavits from his mother, his uncle, and his 
trial and former appellate attorneys.  In her affidavit, the 
defendant's mother stated that she, her late husband, and her 
brother were in attendance in the Middlesex County Superior 
Court on April 10, 2001, the date of jury selection.  At 
approximately 9:15 A.M., a court officer informed them that they 
would have to leave the court room.  They left the court room, 
and waited in the lobby.  According to the affidavits of the 
defendant's mother and uncle, the family members attempted to 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant also filed two motions to revise and revoke 
his sentence, which were denied by the trial judge and affirmed 
by a panel of the Appeals Court in an unpublished decision 
pursuant to that court's rule 1:28.  Commonwealth v. LaChance, 
63 Mass. App. Ct. 1108 (2005). 
 
4 
 
reenter the court room at approximately 1 P.M. but were 
prevented from doing so by a court officer.   
 
Trial counsel averred that he believed that the court room 
was closed during jury empanelment, as was the practice in the 
Middlesex County Superior Court at the time, and that he did not 
object to the alleged closure.  Trial counsel further averred 
that he did not discuss the matter with the defendant and was 
not aware at the time of the trial that the Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial extended to jury empanelment.  The 
defendant's former appellate counsel averred that he had no 
tactical or strategic reason not to raise the issue of court 
room closure in any of the defendant's appeals or prior motions 
for a new trial, noting that it did not occur to him that 
closure was an issue in the case.   
 
The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the 
defendant's third motion for a new trial without a hearing, 
reasoning that because the defendant had not objected to any 
closure during jury empanelment, he had waived his public trial 
claim.  The judge further determined that removal of the 
defendant's family from the court room during jury empanelment 
did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
entitling the defendant to a new trial. 
 
On April 4, 2013, following the release of our decisions in 
Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 83, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
5 
 
2356 (2013), and Commonwealth v. Hardy, 464 Mass. 660, cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 248 (2013), the defendant sought 
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for a new trial, 
arguing that prejudice under the second prong of the standard 
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), must be 
presumed due to the structural nature of the right to a public 
trial.  In denying the defendant's motion, the judge assumed 
both that a closure during jury empanelment had occurred and 
that trial counsel's performance in failing to object to the 
closure fell below that of an ordinary fallible lawyer.  
However, the judge rejected the defendant's argument that 
prejudice must be presumed because of the structural nature of 
the underlying public trial right.  Accordingly, the judge 
denied the motion, determining both that the defendant was 
unable to show prejudice resulting from the court room closure 
and that there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.    
 
2.  Discussion.  We conclude that where the defendant has 
procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment public trial claim by 
not raising it at trial, and later raises the claim as one of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his 
conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from 
counsel's inadequate performance (that is, a substantial risk of 
6 
 
a miscarriage of justice) and the presumption of prejudice that 
would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error 
does not apply.  See Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 740-743 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Purvis v. McDonough, 549 U.S. 
1035 (2006); Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 612 (5th Cir. 
2006); Reid v. State, 690 S.E.2d 177, 180-181 (Ga. 2010); People 
v. Vaughn, 821 N.W.2d 288, 297-299 (Mich. 2012) (all concluding 
that structural error alone is not sufficient to warrant 
presumption of prejudice in context of claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 
a.  Right to a public trial.  It is well settled that the 
violation of a defendant's right to a public trial is structural 
error.  See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 105 (2010).  Where 
a defendant raises a properly preserved claim of structural 
error, this court will presume prejudice and reversal is 
automatic.  See Cohen (No. 1), supra at 118-119 (properly 
preserved claim where counsel objected to court room closure at 
trial).  
 
Where counsel fails to lodge a timely objection to the 
closure of the court room, the defendant's claim of error is 
deemed to be procedurally waived.  See Morganti, 467 Mass. at 
102; Lavoie, 464 Mass. at 87-88 & n.8.  Our case law provides 
that unpreserved claims of error be reviewed to determine if a 
7 
 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice occurred.  See 
Lavoie, 464 Mass. at 89, citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 
Mass. 556, 564 (1967).  While violation of the right to a public 
trial is structural error, even structural error "is subject to 
the doctrine of waiver."  Morganti, supra at 101-102, quoting 
Cohen (No. 1), supra at 105-106.  See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 
424 Mass. 618, 641 (1997) (stating doctrine of waiver applies 
equally to constitutional claims).  This includes structural 
error arising through an improper court room closure.  See 
Alebord, 467 Mass. at 113; Morganti, supra at 101-102. 
 
To presume prejudice in this context would ignore the 
distinction, one long recognized by this court, between properly 
preserved and waived claims.  See Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 
Mass. 728, 735-737 & n.7 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 
(2012) (applying waiver analysis in first-degree murder case to 
unobjected to closure during jury voir dire and finding 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice not shown); 
Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 832 (2001) (applying 
waiver analysis, in effect, to unpreserved claim of Sixth 
Amendment right to public trial).  The structural nature of the 
underlying error does not automatically excuse the defendant 
from showing prejudice when advancing an unpreserved claim.  See 
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (holding that 
showing of actual prejudice necessary to overcome procedural 
8 
 
waiver arising from failure to object to structural error at 
trial).  "The presumption of prejudice which supports the 
existence of the right is not inconsistent with a holding that 
actual prejudice must be shown in order to obtain relief from a 
statutorily provided waiver for failure to assert it in a timely 
manner."  Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 245 (1973) 
(presumption of prejudice associated with claim of racial 
discrimination in grand jury composition not available when 
claim first raised in postconviction motion).  "To conclude 
otherwise would tear the fabric of our well-established waiver 
jurisprudence that 'a defendant must raise a claim of error at 
the first available opportunity,'" Morganti, 467 Mass. at 102, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002), and 
would defeat the core purposes of the waiver doctrine:  to 
protect society's interest in the finality of its judicial 
decisions, and to promote judicial efficiency.  Randolph, supra. 
 
b.  Right to effective assistance of counsel.  If an error 
is waived due to the failure of trial counsel to object, we 
still may have occasion to review the error in the 
postconviction context of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  See Alebord, 467 Mass. at 113; Morganti, 467 Mass. at 
103.  To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, however, a defendant also must show that counsel's 
deficiency resulted in prejudice, see Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96, 
9 
 
which, in the circumstances of counsel's failure to object to an 
error at trial, is essentially the same as the substantial risk 
standard we apply to unpreserved errors.  See Commonwealth v. 
Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686-687 (2002). 
 
Because of the structural nature of the defendant's waived 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, the dissent would 
presume prejudice, even in the context of a collateral attack 
based on a claim of a counsel's ineffectiveness.  But a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is not a public trial claim.  
As discussed above, the defendant's public trial claim has been 
procedurally waived.  Presuming prejudice in this context 
ignores the distinct and well-established jurisprudence which 
governs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 
 
With respect to claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized a presumption of prejudice only in 
limited circumstances where the essential right to the 
assistance of counsel itself has been denied.  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) ("Actual or constructive 
denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally 
presumed to result in prejudice," as is "state interference with 
                                                          
 
 
2 Indeed, it would be anomalous if a waived claim reviewed 
on direct appeal under a substantial risk standard could be 
recast as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in which 
prejudice would be presumed. 
 
10 
 
counsel's assistance"); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 
659 & n.25 (1984).  In Strickland, supra at 692, the United 
States Supreme Court went on to identify one additional 
circumstance where "a similar, though more limited, presumption 
of prejudice" would apply:  where "counsel is burdened by an 
actual conflict of interest."  "Even so, the rule is not quite 
the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment 
claims mentioned above [denial altogether and State interference 
with counsel].  Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant 
demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting 
interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected [the] lawyer's performance.'"  Strickland, supra, 
quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980). 
 
In contrast, in circumstances where ineffectiveness is 
based on "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally 
unreasonable, [it will] not warrant setting aside the judgment 
of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment."  Strickland, supra at 691.  "The purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has 
the assistance to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding."  Id. at 691-692.  While a jury empanelment closed 
to spectators (other than jurors) and the defendant's family may 
be a structural error, it will rarely have an "effect on the 
11 
 
judgment," or undermine our "reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding."  Id. at 691, 692. 
 
In Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2007), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
presumed prejudice where a defendant advanced a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to 
object to a public trial structural error.  The court reasoned 
that it would "not ask defendants to do what the Supreme Court 
has said is impossible."  Id. at 65.3  However, to say that 
requiring a showing of prejudice forecloses the possibility of a 
remedy "ignore[s] -- at great cost to the public interest in the 
finality of verdicts -- the established rule that public trial 
rights may be waived," Dyer, 460 Mass. at 735 n.7, and that 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel merit a new trial 
only where the error may have affected the verdict.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  We do not agree with the reasoning 
of Owens in this context, and are more aligned with that of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 
Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d at 740-741, which has concluded that 
aside from the three exceptions noted in Strickland and Cronic, 
                                                          
 
 
3 Although it may be difficult to demonstrate prejudice in 
the context of a closed jury empanelment process, we do not rule 
out that possibility, although we recognize that the possibility 
is greater with respect to trial closures after jury 
empanelment. 
 
12 
 
none of which is present here, the United States Supreme Court 
has instructed that prejudice must be shown in a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See People v. Vaughn, 821 
N.W.2d at 308 (rejecting reasoning of Owens and adopting 
reasoning of Purvis, further nothing that, "[w]ithout 
distinguishing a properly preserved structural error for which 
reversal is required from an error claimed as ineffective 
assistance of counsel, counsel can harbor error as an appellate 
parachute by failing to object to the closure of trial, thereby 
depriving the trial court of the opportunity to correct the 
error at the time it occurs"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the above reasons, the order denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joins).  It is, 
as the court notes, "well settled that the violation of a 
defendant's right to a public trial is structural," and that the 
public trial right under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution applies as much to jury empanelment as to 
"the actual proof at trial."  Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 
212 (2010).  Today's decision effectively forecloses vindication 
of this constitutional right on collateral review, even in cases 
where trial counsel has rendered constitutionally deficient 
performance in failing to object when the court room was closed, 
and neither the defendant nor his counsel knowingly waived his 
right to a public trial.1  See Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 
83, 88-89, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2356 (2013).  
Notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of the public trial 
right in this case, the court holds that the defendant is 
foreclosed from seeking relief because he procedurally waived 
his claim of error when his trial attorney failed to object, and 
his appellate counsel did not raise the claim on direct appeal.  
See id. at 87 n.8 (distinguishing between waiver of right and 
                                                          
 
 
1 When a court room is closed but a defendant has waived his 
right to a public trial, there is no violation of the right.  
See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 649-650 (1997).  
The waiver of a right occurs only where a litigant intentionally 
relinquishes that right.  See Commonwealth v. Lavoie, 464 Mass. 
83, 87, n.8, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2356 (2013); Commonwealth 
v. Deeran, 397 Mass. 136, 140-142 (1986); Commonwealth v. 
Downey, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 229-230 (2010). 
 
2 
 
waiver of claim of error); Commonwealth v. Deeran, 397 Mass. 
136, 140-142 (1986) (noting distinction between "a procedural 
waiver of [defendant's] right to assert a constitutional claim" 
in postconviction motion, and the knowing and intelligent 
"relinquishment of the constitutional right" [emphasis in 
original]). 
 
As the court notes, the defendant did not raise the claim 
that his public trial right was violated until his third 
postconviction motion.  The court recognizes that counsel's 
failure to object was constitutionally deficient performance, 
but nonetheless affirms the denial of the defendant's claim of 
structural error by invoking concepts of finality and judicial 
efficiency to support what it describes to be "our well-
established waiver jurisprudence that 'a defendant must raise a 
claim of error at the first available opportunity.'"  
Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294 (2002).  I 
respectfully disagree that the principles of finality and 
judicial efficiency must be invoked.   Where, as here, the court 
room was closed without a determination that such closure was 
justified according to Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) 
(Waller), a defendant has not waived his constitutional right to 
a public trial, and defense counsel provided ineffective 
3 
 
assistance by failing to object,2 I would invoke the principle 
that "every right, when withheld, must have a remedy."  Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 
Under the court's analysis, henceforth, in any case in 
which trial counsel fails to object to a court room closure, 
either because of a lack of experience or knowledge, or other 
"serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention," 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), a defendant 
will have no meaningful opportunity to raise such a claim on 
collateral review.3  This is necessarily so because, in order to 
obtain relief, a defendant would need to show either (1) that 
his procedurally waived claim of error resulted in a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice, which requires a showing of 
                                                          
 
 
2 There is no suggestion that either the defendant or his 
counsel intended to relinquish the public trial right because 
both the defendant and his counsel were unaware that the public 
trial right applied during jury empanelment.  In such 
circumstances, where it is not consistent with the prevailing 
professional norms at the time of trial, the failure to object 
may constitute deficient performance falling below what is to be 
expected of an ordinary fallible lawyer.  See Commonwealth v. 
Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 103 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Drew, 447 Mass. 635, 641 (2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 943 
(2007). 
 
 
3 The court's decision to foreclose relief for unpreserved 
claims of error regarding the public trial right is limited to 
the context of collateral review in which this case arises.  The 
decision rests on an interest in promoting finality, an interest 
which arises only after a conviction has been affirmed on direct 
appeal, see Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 637 (1997), 
and does not address the question of possible remedies on direct 
appeal. 
 
4 
 
prejudice, see Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 298 
(2002), or (2) that his counsel's representation was 
constitutionally ineffective, which also requires a showing of 
prejudice.4  But the very nature of a right to which presumptive 
prejudice attaches -– such as the right to an open court –- is 
                                                          
 
 
4 In circumstances such as those present here, the standard 
of review for ineffective assistance claims is not "essentially 
the same" as the standard of review for claims of unpreserved 
trial error.  Compare Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 
(1974) (new trial where counsel's deficient performance deprives 
defendant of otherwise available substantial ground of defense), 
with Commonwealth v. Amirault, supra at 646 (new trial where 
waived claim of error results in substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice).  In most circumstances, however, because 
application of either standard will lead to the same result, we 
review under the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
standard and, in so doing, obviate the need to conduct a 
separate review under the Saferian standard.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686-687 (2002); 
Commonwealth v. Peters, 429 Mass. 22, 31 & n.12 (1999); 
Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 624 n.4 (1994).   
 
 
Here, by contrast, the circumstances are precisely those in 
which the substantial risk standard and the Saferian standard 
diverge.  I agree that where a defendant raises a waived claim 
of error regarding the public trial right without asserting a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must 
establish a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, and 
will not be entitled to a presumption of prejudice.  But I would 
hold that a defendant is entitled to a presumption of prejudice 
where a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim and has established that, in failing to object to a court 
room closure, counsel's performance fell below that of an 
ordinary, fallible attorney.  The distinction between preserved 
and waived claims of error is therefore maintained:  a defendant 
who has preserved a claim that his public trial right was 
violated is entitled to reversal, whereas a defendant who has 
waived the claim of error is not entitled to reversal unless he 
establishes that, in failing to object, his trial counsel's 
performance fell below the standard of an ordinary, fallible 
lawyer.  
 
5 
 
that a showing of prejudice is not possible.  See Waller, supra 
at 49 n.9, quoting United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 
F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir. 1969) ("a requirement that prejudice be 
shown would 'in most cases deprive [the defendant] of the 
[public-trial] guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage 
a case in which he would have evidence available of specific 
injury'").  It is nonsensical to impose upon a defendant the 
requirement to establish that trial counsel's failure deprived 
him of an otherwise available substantial line of defense where 
the structural nature of the public trial right makes such a 
showing impossible in practice.5  
 
Requiring that prejudice be shown in these circumstances 
disregards the fundamental purpose of the right to a public 
trial.  The violation of the public trial right is structural 
error that "require[s] automatic reversal without a showing of 
                                                          
 
 
5 The court states that it does not rule out the possibility 
that a defendant could show prejudice resulting from violation 
of the right to a public trial, ante at        n.3, but a showing of 
prejudice is inconsistent with classification of the public 
trial right as structural.  Moreover, the court does not suggest 
how a defendant might show such prejudice, and the effect of its 
holding is that there will be no "occasion to review" 
unpreserved claims of error predicated on the public trial right 
on collateral review.  No other court to have considered this 
issue appears to have suggested that a showing of prejudice 
resulting from a court room closure would be possible.  See, 
e.g., Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 741 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Purvis v. McDonough, 549 U.S. 1035 (2006); Reid 
v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 488 (2010); People v. Vaughn, 491 Mich. 
642 (2012); State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1989). 
 
6 
 
actual harm," because it "necessarily render[s] a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining 
guilt or innocence."  Commonwealth v. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 
177, 183 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 
163 (2010).  See Commonwealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94, 118-119 
(2010) (where jury selection procedure violated public trial 
right, error was structural and therefore no inquiry conducted 
"as to whether it prejudiced the defendant"); Commonwealth v. 
Marshall, 356 Mass. 432, 435 (1969) (reversing conviction based 
on violation of right to public trial, and holding "showing of 
prejudice is not necessary").  This is because the benefits of a 
public trial, while significant, are nonetheless "frequently 
intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance, [but] the 
Framers plainly thought them nonetheless real."  Waller, supra 
at 49 n.9.  See Commonwealth v. White, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 
496 (2014) ("A closure during jury selection undermines the 
values of openness because the public loses the opportunity for 
assurance that those chosen to decide the defendant's guilt or 
innocence will do so fairly"); Commonwealth v. Downey, 78 Mass. 
App. Ct. 224, 229 (2010) ("Because we place such value on the 
right to public trial and because it is virtually impossible to 
demonstrate concrete harm flowing from a violation of that 
right, a violation relieves the defendant of the need to show 
prejudice in order to obtain a new trial").   
7 
 
 
As structural error, the violation of the right to a public 
trial is in a category distinct from trial errors, such as the 
improper admission of evidence, from which specific harm may be 
seen to flow.  Structural errors stand apart from trial errors 
because structural errors "affect[] the framework within which 
the trial proceeds" and thereby "defy analysis by 'harmless-
error' standards," whereas trial errors "occur during the 
presentation of the case to the jury," and "may therefore be 
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented."  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291, 307-308, 
309-310 (1991).  Because a structural defect affects the 
framework in which a trial proceeds, looking for prejudice 
flowing from structural error is "a speculative inquiry into 
what might have occurred in an alternate universe."  United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).  See State 
v. Lamere, 327 Mont. 115, 124 (2005) (structural defects are 
presumptively prejudicial because they "cannot be qualitatively 
or quantitatively weighed against the admissible evidence 
introduced at trial").  
 
The majority decision diminishes the significance of the 
public trial right when it concludes that finality trumps a 
defendant's right to seek a postaffirmance remedy for an 
unpreserved public trial claim, a conclusion we have not reached 
for other unpreserved claims of error.  Notably, we have granted 
8 
 
a new trial on collateral review without requiring a showing of 
prejudice, twenty years after the conviction, where a defendant 
raised an unpreserved claim of error implicating a structural 
defect in jury instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 419 
Mass. 341, 342, 349 (1995).6  And, although a defendant who 
raises an unpreserved claim of error implicating his public 
trial right is now effectively foreclosed from collateral 
review, a defendant who raises an unpreserved trial error 
retains the possibility of reversal if he can show that the 
error resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 447 Mass. 161, 163 
(2006); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 119 (1987); 
Commonwealth v. Callahan, 380 Mass. 821, 826 (1980); 
Commonwealth v. Palmarin, 378 Mass. 474, 477 (1979).  Permitting 
relief for unpreserved trial errors and some unpreserved 
                                                          
 
 
6 In the context of direct appeal, we have reversed 
convictions on the basis of unpreserved claims of error where we 
have recognized that a showing of prejudice would be impossible.   
See Commonwealth v. Sheehy, 412 Mass. 235, 238 (1992); 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 405 Mass. 661, 662 (1989); Commonwealth 
v. Smith, 403 Mass. 489, 493, 496-497 (1988).  Although the 
error in these cases -- alternate jurors sitting in on jury 
deliberations, without objection by trial counsel -- was not 
labeled as "structural," our decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, 
supra, preceded Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291, 307-
308, 309-310 (1991), apparently the first United States Supreme 
Court case to have categorized and labeled as "structural" those 
errors which "defy harmless-error analysis."  See Burns, 
Insurmountable Obstacles:  Structural Errors, Procedural 
Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 727, 732 
(2012). 
 
9 
 
structural errors, but not for errors implicating the public 
trial right, introduces unjustified disparity into our 
jurisprudence.  See Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 735 n.7 
(2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2693 (2012) (rejecting option 
that "would give less protection to waived constitutional rights 
than to ordinary claims of unpreserved errors").  Cf. Burns, 
Insurmountable Obstacles:  Structural Errors, Procedural 
Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 727, 749-
750 (2012) (allowing relief for unpreserved trial errors but 
foreclosing relief for unpreserved structural errors "would be 
absurd if the Court were to come right out and say that this is 
the rule, given the general agreement . . . that most structural 
errors are quite serious").  
 
The court looks to Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 
(1976)7, and Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 743 (11th Cir.), 
                                                          
 
 
7 The court relies on Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 
542 (1976) (Francis), to support its statement that "[t]he 
structural nature of the underlying error does not automatically 
excuse the defendant from showing prejudice when advancing an 
unpreserved claim."  In Francis, supra at 537-538, 542, the 
United States Supreme Court considered a State prisoner's 
petition for Federal habeas corpus relief based on a claim of 
error for which prejudice was presumed; the Court denied relief 
because the State court had deemed the claim waived pursuant to 
its own procedural rules.  The claim did not concern the public 
trial right, but, rather, concerned racial bias in the 
composition of the grand jury.  The Francis opinion does not 
discuss the possibility of ineffective assistance of counsel 
(indeed the opinion predated Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 [1984]), nor did it grapple with the issue that for certain 
types of error, it will be impossible for a defendant to show 
10 
 
cert. denied sub nom. Purvis v. McDonough, 549 U.S. 1035 (2006), 
for support, but these cases rely on comity concerns in the 
context of conducting Federal habeas review of a State 
conviction.8  Concerns of comity are wholly inapplicable here.9   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prejudice.  See Francis, supra at 552 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(Francis Court's imposition of requirement to show actual 
prejudice "without the slightest veneer of reasoning" shields 
the obvious); Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 n.14 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (explaining limited persuasive value of Francis).  
 
 
8 The court also cites Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598 (5th 
Cir. 2006), which likewise arose in the context of Federal 
habeas review of a State conviction.  I disagree with the 
court's view that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit concluded in that case that structural error is 
insufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice in the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The 
circuit court determined that trial counsel rendered deficient 
performance in failing to object to the seating of two jurors 
who stated they would not be fair and impartial, and that the 
seating of such jurors sufficed to establish prejudice under the 
Strickland standard.  Id. at 613-614.  Having determined that 
counsel's errors resulted in prejudice, the circuit court did 
not conduct a determinative analysis as to whether prejudice may 
be presumed for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
predicated on structural error.  The circuit court simply 
stated, "we do not hold that a structural error alone is 
sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice in the 
ineffective assistance of counsel context" (emphasis added).  
Id. at 607. 
 
 
9 Even where comity concerns are applicable, some circuit 
courts of the United States Court of Appeals have presumed 
prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
predicated on counsel's failure to raise structural error at 
trial.  See Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 632 (7th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied sub nom. Winston v. Tegels, 132 S. Ct. 2101 
(2012) (prejudice presumed for ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim predicated on failure to object to structural error in 
jury selection); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 
1998) (presuming prejudice for ineffective assistance claim 
11 
 
See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 433 n.16 (2013) 
("Comity refers to the [United States] Supreme Court's policy 
against excessive interference by Federal habeas courts in State 
criminal convictions that had become final," and has "little 
application to collateral review by State courts themselves").  
Where comity concerns are inapplicable, this court, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and some courts 
in other jurisdictions have not required a showing of prejudice 
to reverse a conviction on collateral review based on an 
unpreserved claim of structural error.  See Owens v. United 
States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2007); Littlejohn v. United 
States, 73 A.3d 1034, 1043 (D.C. 2013);10 Commonwealth v. 
Pinckney, supra at 342, 349.  
 
I agree with the analysis in Owens v. United States, supra; 
Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 87 (2010); and Littlejohn v. United States, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
predicated on failure to inform defendant of right to jury 
trial). 
 
 
10 With respect to consideration of other structural errors 
where comity concerns were inapplicable, courts have presumed 
prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
predicated on counsel's failure to raise such error at trial.  
See Savoy v. State, 420 Md. 232, 255-256 (2011) (prejudice 
presumed for structural error in instructions concerning 
reasonable doubt where defendant did not object at trial); State 
v. Lamere, 327 Mont. 115, 125 (2005) (prejudice presumed for 
ineffective assistance claim predicated on structural error in 
jury selection). 
 
12 
 
73 A.3d at 1043.  Each of these cases rejects the proposition 
that Strickland requires that a defendant must establish 
prejudice in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim 
in all but the three circumstances listed in Strickland.  As the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated in 
Littlejohn v. United States, supra at 1043: 
"The Supreme Court's discussion of three instances in which 
the violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
presumptively prejudicial —- (1) actual or constructive 
denial of counsel; (2) state interference with counsel's 
assistance; and (3) counsel operating under a conflict of 
interest, Strickland, [supra at 692] -- is not necessarily 
an exclusive list of the rare occasions when prejudice may 
be presumed.  Requiring [a defendant] to prove actual 
prejudice as a result of trial counsel's waiver of his 
public trial right would be inconsistent with the [United 
States] Supreme Court's holdings that prejudice is presumed 
when the constitutional error is a structural defect, one 
that 'infect[s] the entire trial process.'  Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, [507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)]; see also Gonzalez–
Lopez, [548 U.S. at 148–149]; Sullivan [v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275, 281 (1993)]; Arizona v. Fulminante, [499 U.S. at 
309-310].  If it is impossible to identify the prejudice 
resulting from a structural defect, it is likewise 
impossible to determine whether counsel's waiver of such a 
'basic protection,' like the public trial guarantee, 'had 
no effect on the judgment.'  Strickland, [supra at 691]."  
(Footnote omitted.) 
 
 
The court also cites with approval a concern articulated by 
another State appellate court that "counsel can harbor error as 
an appellate parachute by failing to object to the closure of 
trial, thereby depriving the trial court of the opportunity to 
correct the error at the time it occurs."  People v. Vaughn, 821 
13 
 
N.W. 2d 288, 308 (Mich. 2012).  I do not accept the court's 
assumption that a defendant's trial counsel, who was aware of 
the removal of the defendant's family members from the court 
room, would engage in conduct that fails to respect the duty of 
zealous representation owed to a client.  See Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.3 & comment 1A, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998).  Cf. Littlejohn v. 
United States, supra at 1046 & n.2 (Pryor, J., dissenting), 
citing D.C. R. Prof. C. 1.3 comment 1 (2007).  The court's view 
rests on the assumption that appellate counsel could establish 
that trial counsel's failure to object was not a tactical 
decision.  Cf. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 250 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("a prisoner would properly be held 
to have intentionally relinquished his right to raise the 
constitutional claim if he failed to raise it for tactical 
reasons").   
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that prejudice 
should be presumed where there is a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel predicated on counsel's failure to object 
to a court room closure, and respectfully dissent.