Title: McNeill v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 237, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WARREN MCNEILL,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 237, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID #9905019691 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  October 30, 2002 
Decided:  November 4, 2002 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
 
This 4th day of November 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
The defendant-below, Warren McNeill, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s April 3, 2001 order denying his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.   
2. 
On November 22, 2000, McNeill pleaded guilty to Attempted Assault 
First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and 
Reckless Endangering First Degree.  On February 8, 2001, McNeill moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea.   
 
2
 
2. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the defendant’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
3. 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.1  The timing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an 
important factor in the exercise of that discretion, the significance of which is 
recognized in the rules governing the plea process.2  Thus, Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 32(d) provides that if a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty “is made before 
imposition … of sentence … the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a 
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.  At any later time, a plea may 
be set aside only by motion under Rule 61.”3  Rule 32(d), as opposed to Rule 61, 
contemplates a lower threshold of cause sufficient to permit withdrawal of a guilty 
plea and one which must guide the discretion of the trial court.4  Here, McNeill 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing; thus, the lower threshold of 
Rule 32(d) applies. 
4. 
The trial judge, aware that McNeill had changed his mind at least 
once before taking the plea about which he now complains, carefully conducted a 
colloquy to ensure that he made the plea knowingly and voluntarily.  At the 
conclusion of the colloquy, the judge accepted the guilty plea, reminding the 
                                                 
1 Blackwell v. State, 736 A.2d 971, 972 (Del. 1999); Patterson v. State, 684 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Del. 1983). 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 Patterson, 684 A.2d at 1237. 
 
3
defendant that he could not change his mind again.  When confronted with the later 
Motion to Withdraw the Plea, the trial judge carefully considered the following 
factors before denying the defendant’s motion: (1) the procedure of the colloquy; 
(2) whether the plea was intelligent, knowing and voluntary; (3) whether the 
defendant had a basis to assert legal innocence; (4) whether the defendant had 
adequate legal counsel throughout the proceedings; and, (5) whether the State 
would be prejudiced or the court would be unduly inconvenienced if the defendant 
were permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.   
5. 
The trial judge after carefully considering the above appropriate 
factors, in the exercise of his sound discretion correctly determined that McNeill’s 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea should be denied. 
6. 
Because the trial judge’s exercise of discretion was the product of a 
rational and clearly articulated decision-making process, he did not err when he 
denied McNeill’s motion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice