Title: Powell v. Warden (Unpublished Order)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 042716
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 2005

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Tuesday, the 8th day of 
November, 2005. 
 
Paul Warner Powell, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
against  
Record No. 042716 
 
Warden of the Sussex I  
 State Prison, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed December 27, 2004, and the respondent's motion to dismiss, the 
Court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted and the 
writ should not issue. 
Petitioner, Paul Warner Powell, was originally convicted in the 
Circuit Court of Prince William County of the capital murder of 
Stacey Lynn Reed, abduction, rape of Stacey's younger sister, 
Kristie Reed, and attempted capital murder of Kristie Reed.  The 
jury fixed petitioner’s sentence at death for the capital murder 
conviction and three terms of life imprisonment and fines totaling 
$200,000 for the remaining convictions.  Upon review of the capital 
murder conviction and the death sentence imposed upon petitioner, 
this Court reversed the capital murder conviction upon a finding 
that the indictment charging petitioner with capital murder in the 
commission of robbery and/or attempted robbery had been improperly 
amended to include a charge of capital murder "during the commission 
of or subsequent to rape and/or attempted rape and/or sodomy and/or 
 
2
attempted sodomy."  Powell v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 532, 552 
S.E.2d 344, 355-56 (2001) (“Powell I”).  This Court reversed 
petitioner’s conviction for capital murder, affirmed the remaining 
convictions, and remanded the case “for a new trial on a charge of 
no greater than first degree murder for the killing of Stacey Reed, 
if the Commonwealth be so advised.”  Id. at 546, 552 S.E.2d at 363. 
After the opinion issued and petitioner had been indicted for 
first-degree murder, petitioner wrote a letter to the Commonwealth's 
Attorney in which petitioner described how he had attempted to rape 
Stacey Reed before he murdered her.  Based on this new evidence, the 
Commonwealth moved to enter a nolle prosequi of the indictment in 
the remanded case, and sought a new indictment against petitioner 
for capital murder.  On December 3, 2001, the grand jury returned an 
indictment charging petitioner with the capital murder of "Stacey 
Lynn Reed during the commission of or subsequent to the attempted 
rape of Stacey Lynn Reed." 
Apart from the new evidence of petitioner's October 21, 2001 
letter to the Commonwealth's Attorney in which petitioner confessed 
to the attempted rape of Stacey, the evidence presented during the 
guilt-determination phase of petitioner's second trial was not 
markedly different from that received during the first trial.  The 
jury found petitioner guilty of capital murder and fixed his 
sentence at death, finding both aggravating factors of future 
dangerousness and vileness.  The trial court confirmed the jury's 
sentence of death.  This Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and 
approved the sentence of death in Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 
107, 590 S.E.2d 537 (2004), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 86 
 
3
(2004) (“Powell II”). 
Procedural Defaults 
 
“A petition for writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for 
an appeal or a writ of error.”  Morrisette v. Warden, 270 Va. 188, 
___, 613 S.E.2d 551, 554 (2005) (citing Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 
27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 
(1975); Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 321-22, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246 
(1969)).  Further, claims that have been previously raised and 
decided at trial and on direct appeal are not cognizable in a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Henry v. Warden, 265 Va. 246, 
249, 576 S.E.2d 495, 496 (2003). 
In claim I(A), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth 
violated his right against double jeopardy by trying him twice for 
the same offense.  In the first portion of claim I(B), petitioner 
alleges that the prosecutor’s animosity towards him demonstrates 
that petitioner’s due process rights were violated and he was tried 
a second time for capital murder because of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness.  In claim II(D), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth violated his right to counsel by eliciting 
incriminating statements from him on November 2, 2001 while 
petitioner was still represented by the attorney who had been 
appointed to represent petitioner in his previous trial.  In claim 
IV(C), petitioner alleges that his due process rights and right to a 
reliable sentencing proceeding were violated by the trial court’s 
vague vileness jury instruction. 
The Court holds that claims I(A), II(D), IV(C), and the first 
 
4
portion of I(B) are barred because these issues were raised and 
decided in the trial court and on direct appeal from the criminal 
conviction and, therefore, they cannot be raised on habeas corpus.  
Henry, 265 Va. at 249, 576 S.E.2d at 496. 
In the second portion of claim I(B), petitioner alleges, for 
the first time, that because the prosecutor sought a capital murder 
charge after the petitioner had been successful on appeal, there is 
a “presumption” that his second trial for capital murder was the 
result of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  In claim I(C), petitioner 
alleges that his subsequent trial violated “the collateral estoppel 
component of the Double Jeopardy Clause” and violated petitioner’s 
right against double jeopardy. 
In claim II(A), petitioner alleges the Commonwealth violated 
his constitutional rights by taking statements from petitioner on 
January 30 and 31, 1999 without obtaining a waiver of petitioner’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Petitioner claims that his right 
to counsel had attached because a magistrate had issued a warrant 
for his arrest.  In claim II(B), petitioner alleges that his 
subsequent statements on February 4, 1999 were unconstitutionally 
obtained as they were “fruits of the poisonous tree” as a result of 
the Commonwealth illegally obtaining his January 30 and 31, 1999 
statements.  In claim II(C), petitioner alleges his February 4, 1999 
statements were “per se invalid” as the police elicited the 
statements from him without counsel being present even though 
petitioner had requested counsel and counsel had been appointed on 
February 1, 1999. 
In claim II(E), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth 
 
5
violated his right to counsel by scheduling the November 2, 2001 
interview before petitioner was formally indicted on December 3, 
2001.  In claim II(F), petitioner alleges that the prosecution 
“unconstitutionally and unethically” communicated to him through the 
police interview on November 2, 2001, violated Rules of Professional 
Conduct 4.2 and 5.3, interfered with petitioner’s relationship with 
counsel, and violated his right to counsel.  In claim II(G), 
petitioner alleges his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 
violated as petitioner’s waiver of his Miranda rights on November 2, 
2001, was involuntarily given. 
In claim III(A), petitioner alleges that the remarks made by 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney in opening and closing arguments 
violated his rights under the Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth 
Amendments as the “remarks vouched for the personal opinions of the 
prosecutors that [petitioner] deserved the death penalty.”  In claim 
III(B), petitioner alleges that remarks made by the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney in the penalty phase of the trial regarding the effect of 
the death penalty in deterring other people from committing future 
crimes violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights. 
In claim IV(A), petitioner alleges he was unconstitutionally 
prosecuted because the indictment against him was deficient as it 
did not allege either vileness or future dangerousness and neither 
factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  In claim 
IV(B), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth was collaterally 
estopped from presenting the issue of future dangerousness at his 
second trial because the jury at petitioner’s first trial returned a 
finding only of vileness. 
 
6
In claim IV(D), petitioner alleges that his constitutional 
rights were violated by the vague jury instruction on future 
dangerousness.  In claim IV(E), petitioner alleges that the jury 
instruction on future dangerousness unconstitutionally “relieved the 
Commonwealth of its burden to prove every element beyond a 
reasonable doubt” because it told the jury that it only had to find 
a “probability” of future dangerousness.  In claim IV(F), petitioner 
alleges that his due process rights and right to a reliable 
sentencing proceeding were violated because the future dangerousness 
aggravating factor excludes consideration of petitioner’s life in 
prison. 
In claim V(A), petitioner alleges that his right to due 
process, his right to be able to participate in his trial, and his 
right to “heightened reliability” in his trial were violated by the 
medication administered to him in prison before trial and the stun 
belt he wore at trial. 
In claim VI(A), petitioner alleges that his rights to due 
process and a reliable sentencing hearing were violated when the 
Commonwealth knowingly introduced Exhibit 51 as evidence of his 
criminal history at the penalty phase of the trial.  In claim VI(B), 
petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth violated his due process 
rights by failing to inform petitioner that “some of the entries on 
Commonwealth Exhibit 51 were false and misleading.”  In a portion of 
claim VI(C), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth violated Code 
§§ 19.2-295.1, -264.2, and -264.4 because Exhibit 51 was not a 
“record of convictions” and listed charges which had been either 
nolle prossed or of which petitioner was found not guilty.  In 
 
7
another portion of claim VI(C), petitioner alleges that the 
Commonwealth violated Code § 19.2-264.3:2 because the Commonwealth 
failed to give notice of its intent to present evidence of 
unadjudicated criminal conduct.  In claim VI(D), petitioner alleges 
the Commonwealth violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it 
introduced Exhibit 51 because there was no “foundational testimony 
as to the personal knowledge of the record-keeper, the regularity of 
its preparation, the reliance on the records, or any other 
circumstance showing trustworthiness.” 
In claim VII(A), petitioner alleges that his constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, due process and 
“to a reliable individualized sentencing determination” were 
violated by the Commonwealth’s introduction of racist statements and 
documents that linked petitioner to certain groups and “broad 
ideas.”  In claim VII(B), petitioner alleges that the Commonwealth 
violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses when it 
introduced certificates of analysis in an attempt to authenticate 
several letters allegedly written by petitioner.  In claim X(A), 
petitioner claims the trial court violated his rights under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as under Code § 19.2-298 
when it failed to allow petitioner to allocute before he was 
sentenced. 
The Court holds that the second portion of claim I(B) and 
claims I(C), II(A), II(B), II(C), II(E), II(F), II(G), III(A), 
III(B), IV(A)
1, IV(B), IV(D), IV(E), IV(F), V(A), VI(A), VI(B), 
                     
1 See Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 223-24, 576 S.E.2d 
471, 488-89 (2003) (failure to include aggravating factors in an 
 
8
VI(C), VI(D), VII(A), VII(B) and X(A) are procedurally defaulted 
because these non-jurisdictional issues could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, are not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Parrigan, 215 Va. at 29, 205 
S.E.2d at 682. 
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
In a portion of claim I(D)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issues stated in claim I(A) and the first 
portion of claim I(B).  The Court holds that this portion of claim 
I(D)(1) is without merit.  The record demonstrates that counsel 
raised these issues at trial. 
 
In another portion of claim I(D)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, stated in the second portion of claim 
I(B), that there is a “presumption” that his second trial for 
capital murder was the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness 
because the prosecutor sought a capital murder charge after the 
petitioner had been successful on appeal. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim I(D)(1) fails to 
satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The record 
demonstrates that petitioner’s indictment for capital murder was 
obtained after petitioner provided evidence, which had previously 
                                                                     
indictment is not jurisdictional and is waived if not raised before 
trial). 
 
9
been unavailable and which supported the charge.  This previously 
unavailable evidence creates an objective justification in the 
charging decision and rebuts any presumption of vindictiveness.  See 
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 376 n.8 (1982); Alabama 
v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798-799 (1989) (presumption of 
vindictiveness which arises from an increased sentence on retrial 
rebutted by objective information justifying the increase).  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s alleged 
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In another portion of claim I(D)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, stated in claim I(C), that his subsequent 
trial violated “the collateral estoppel component of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause” and violated petitioner’s right against double 
jeopardy.  The Court holds that this portion of claim I(D)(1) fails 
to satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in 
Strickland.  The record of petitioner’s criminal trial and direct 
appeal demonstrates that petitioner argued his subsequent trial 
violated the res judicata and law of the case components of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  The factual basis for his argument at trial 
and on appeal is identical to that which he raises in his petition 
for writ of habeas corpus.  This Court rejected the petitioner’s 
arguments and held that jeopardy had attached only to the capital 
murder charge specified by the reading of both the indictment and 
the bill of particulars.  Powell II, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 
554.  As such, res judicata is not implicated because, in 
petitioner’s first trial, the jury was not charged with determining 
 
10
whether petitioner raped or attempted to rape Stacey Reed and, thus, 
could not have made a determination of fact on that matter.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s alleged 
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In a portion of claim I(D)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to raise 
on appeal the issues stated in claim I(A) and the first portion of 
claim I(B).  The Court holds that this portion of claim I(D)(2) is 
without merit.  The record demonstrates that counsel raised these 
issues on appeal.  In another portion of claim I(D)(2), petitioner 
alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel failed to raise on appeal the issues stated in the second 
portion of claim I(B) and in claim I(C).  The Court holds that this 
portion of claim I(D)(2) satisfies neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record demonstrates that these issues were not raised at trial.  
Therefore counsel was reasonable for choosing not to raise claims 
which would have been barred under Rule 5:25.  Further, petitioner 
has articulated no reason why this Court would have invoked either 
exception to Rule 5:25 and reached the merits of either issue.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In a portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim II(A), that the 
 
11
Commonwealth unconstitutionally obtained statements from him on 
January 30 and 31, 1999 without obtaining a waiver of petitioner’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Petitioner claims that his right 
to counsel had attached because formal criminal proceedings had been 
initiated against him when a magistrate had issued a warrant for his 
arrest. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The right to counsel, under the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, exists at the 
start of “adversar[ial] judicial criminal proceedings.”  See United 
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (“we have never held 
that the right to counsel attaches at the time of arrest”); Michigan 
v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986) (“arraignment signals ‘the 
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings’ and thus the 
attachment of the Sixth Amendment”).  As no judicial proceedings had 
been initiated against petitioner at the time he gave his 
statements, the right to counsel had not attached and, therefore, 
trial counsel had no grounds to raise a Sixth Amendment claim.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim II(B), that his 
statements on February 4, 1999 were unconstitutionally obtained as 
 
12
they were “fruits of the poisonous tree” as a result of the 
Commonwealth illegally obtaining his January 30 and 31, 1999 
statements. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  As petitioner’s constitutional right 
to counsel had not been violated when he provided the previous 
statements to the police, the statements he made on February 4, 1999 
could not have been the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”  
Additionally, petitioner admits that he was advised of his Miranda 
rights and orally waived those rights before the February 4, 1999 
statements were made.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim II(C), that his 
February 4, 1999 statements were “per se invalid” as the police 
elicited the statements from him without counsel being present even 
though counsel had been appointed to represent petitioner on 
February 1, 1999. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the transcript 
of the suppression hearing held during petitioner’s first trial, 
demonstrates that petitioner initiated contact with the police on 
 
13
February 4, 1999.  Further, as petitioner admits, he was re-advised 
of his right to counsel and he knowingly and voluntarily waived that 
right.  Therefore, trial counsel had no viable grounds for raising a 
Sixth Amendment claim regarding petitioner’s February 4, 1999 
statements.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue articulated in claim II(D).  The Court 
holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) is without merit.  The 
record demonstrates that counsel raised this issue at trial. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim II(E), that the 
Commonwealth violated his right to counsel by scheduling the 
November 2, 2001 interview before petitioner was formally indicted 
on December 3, 2001. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that 
petitioner’s conversation with the police on November 2, 2001 was 
part of the investigation into the authenticity of the October 21, 
2001 letter which petitioner had sent to the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney.  Armed with the evidence provided by the petitioner in the 
letter and in petitioner’s November 2, 2001 conversation with police 
 
14
officers, the Commonwealth’s Attorney sought and obtained the 
indictment for capital murder.  Petitioner offers no evidence to 
support his claim that the Commonwealth actively delayed seeking an 
indictment in order to circumvent his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim II(F), that the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office “unconstitutionally and 
unethically” communicated to him through the police interview on 
November 2, 2001 without the consent of the attorney who had 
represented petitioner at his first trial.  Petitioner contends that 
the actions of the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office violated Rules 
of Professional Conduct 4.2 and 5.3, interfered with his 
relationship with counsel, and violated his right to counsel because 
the Commonwealth knew petitioner was still represented by his 
previous counsel on November 2, 2001. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  In Powell II, this Court “determined 
that the crime for which [petitioner] was tried and convicted in the 
present case was a separate offense from those for which he had been 
previously convicted.  [Petitioner] had not been formally charged 
with that offense when he was interviewed on November 2, 2001, and, 
 
15
thus, he was not entitled to have his counsel from his prior trial 
present during that interview.”  267 Va. at 142, 590 S.E.2d at 558.  
As petitioner’s right to counsel had not attached to the particular 
crime being investigated and for which petitioner was charged and 
convicted, it was not impacted by the alleged actions of the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office and an objection on this basis 
would have been frivolous.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
raise the issue, articulated in a portion of claim II(G), that his 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated as petitioner’s 
waiver of his Miranda rights on November 2, 2001 was involuntarily 
given because petitioner was allegedly under the influence of two 
mood-altering drugs, Atarax and Depakote. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the motion to 
suppress, the transcript of petitioner’s November 2, 2001 statement 
to police, and the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing, 
demonstrates that petitioner voluntarily and knowingly waived his 
Miranda rights.  Although petitioner was taking Depakote and Atarax, 
the record demonstrates that petitioner was coherent and able to 
understand the questions Detective Leonard was asking.  Petitioner 
fails to state what effects Atarax and Depakote had on his ability 
 
16
to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
raise the issue, articulated in another portion of claim II(G), that 
his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated, as petitioner’s 
waiver of his Miranda rights on November 2, 2001 was involuntarily 
given because Detective Leonard violated his promise not to discuss 
the murder during the interview by asking petitioner questions about 
the murder. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim II(H)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the motion to 
suppress, the transcript of petitioner’s November 2, 2001 statement 
to police, and the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing, 
demonstrates that petitioner voluntarily and knowingly waived his 
Miranda rights.  Petitioner signed the waiver form and initialed 
that no promises had been made to him and the record demonstrates 
that petitioner was informed that he had the right to stop answering 
questions at any time.  Further, the record, including the 
transcripts from the motion to suppress hearing, demonstrates that 
petitioner never invoked his right to silence or his right to 
counsel, and, therefore, there was no basis upon which counsel could 
have raised the issue.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
 
17
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In a portion of claim II(H)(2), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel 
failed to raise on appeal the issues stated in claims II(A), II(B), 
II(C), II(E), II(F), and II(G).  The Court holds that this portion 
of claim II(H)(2) satisfies neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record demonstrates that these issues were not raised at trial.  
Therefore, counsel was reasonable for choosing not to raise on 
appeal claims which would have been barred under Rule 5:25.  
Further, petitioner has articulated no reason why this Court would 
have invoked either exception to Rule 5:25 and reached the merits of 
any of these issues.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim II(H)(2), petitioner alleges 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue, articulated 
in claim II(D), that the Commonwealth violated his right to counsel 
by eliciting incriminating statements from him on November 2, 2001, 
while petitioner was still represented by the attorney who had been 
appointed to represent petitioner at his first trial.  The Court 
holds that this portion of claim II(H)(2) is without merit.  The 
record demonstrates that counsel raised this issue on appeal. 
In a portion of claim III(C)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
 
18
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue articulated in claim III(A) that the 
remarks made by the Commonwealth in opening and closing arguments at 
both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial violated his rights 
under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as the “remarks 
vouched for the personal opinions of the prosecutors that 
[petitioner] deserved the death penalty.”  Petitioner contends the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney referred to himself in the first person as 
he informed the jury that the death penalty would be sought in the 
case and asked the jury to return a sentence of death against 
petitioner. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim III(C)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the "prejudice" prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the remarks in question did not vouch 
for the personal opinion of the Commonwealth’s Attorney but rather 
were based upon the evidence the Commonwealth’s Attorney expected to 
be presented and which had been presented at trial.  Therefore, the 
remarks were not improper and counsel did not act unreasonably for 
failing to object.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim III(C)(1), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because 
counsel failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim III(B), that 
remarks made by the Commonwealth’s Attorney in the penalty phase of 
 
19
the trial regarding the effect the death penalty has in deterring 
other people from committing future crimes violated his rights 
pursuant to the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim III(C)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  This Court has previously held that 
“[w]hile considerations of deterrence should not be the basis for a 
finding of guilt of the offense, such considerations may be argued 
in connection with the punishment to be assessed for the crime."  
Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 156, 157, 482 S.E.2d 837, 838 
(1997) (citing Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 468, 357 S.E.2d 
500, 505, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987)).  Our review of the 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that the 
deterrence argument was raised during the penalty phase of 
petitioner’s trial and, therefore, did not provide counsel with 
grounds for an objection.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim III(C)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel did not 
raise the issues articulated in claims III(A) and III(B).  The Court 
holds that claim III(C)(2) satisfies neither the “performance” nor 
the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record demonstrates that these issues were not raised at trial.  
Therefore, counsel was reasonable for choosing not to raise on 
appeal claims which would have been barred under Rule 5:25.  
 
20
Further, petitioner has articulated no reason why this Court would 
have invoked either exception to Rule 5:25 and reached the merits of 
either issue.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In a portion of claim IV(G)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim IV(A), that 
petitioner was unconstitutionally prosecuted because the indictment 
against him did not allege either vileness or future dangerousness 
and neither factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim IV(G)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  There is no constitutional 
requirement that a capital murder indictment include allegations 
concerning aggravating factors.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 
n. 4 (2002) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment has not been 
construed to include the Fifth Amendment right to “presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
477 n. 3 (2000).  As such, this Court has previously held that 
counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise this issue.  See 
Morrisette v. Warden, 270 Va. at ___, 613 S.E.2d at 556.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
 
21
In another portion of claim IV(G)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
raise the issue, articulated in claim IV(B), that the Commonwealth 
was collaterally estopped from presenting the issue of future 
dangerousness at his second trial because the jury at petitioner’s 
first trial returned a finding only of vileness.  Petitioner 
contends that the jury at petitioner’s first trial returned a 
finding only of vileness after being informed that it could find 
either, both, or neither aggravating factor, and, therefore, that 
the future dangerousness issue had been determined in his favor at 
the end of the first trial. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim IV(G)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Collateral estoppel does not apply 
in petitioner’s case because petitioner was being tried for a 
different crime.  The determination of future dangerousness depends 
in part on and, as this Court has previously held, may be based 
solely on “the circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offense of which he is accused.” See Code § 19.2-264.4(C); Murphy v. 
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 144, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53, cert. denied 510 
U.S. 928 (1993).  The evidence at petitioner’s second trial, 
including petitioner’s attempted rape of Stacey Reed and letters 
written by petitioner while in prison following his first trial, was 
different than that which a jury considered in petitioner’s first 
trial.  Therefore, the issue of collateral estoppel was not 
implicated because the jury at petitioner’s second trial was asked 
to determine an issue that was neither considered nor available at 
 
22
the previous trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim IV(G)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue articulated in claim IV(C).  The Court 
holds that this portion of claim IV(G)(1) is without merit.  The 
record demonstrates that counsel raised this issue at trial.  
In another portion of claim IV(G)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim IV(D), that his 
constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s vague 
future dangerousness jury instruction.  The instruction stated that 
the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “. . . there 
is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.”  
Petitioner claims that the juxtaposition of “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” and “probability” made this instruction vague as one cannot 
find a probability beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim IV(G)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  This Court has already held that 
“the word, ‘probability,’ in the statutory context in which it is 
used, is not ambiguous . . . [t]herefore, the "future dangerousness" 
predicate is not unconstitutionally vague.”  Mickens v. 
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 403, 442 S.E.2d 678, 684, vacated on 
 
23
other grounds, 513 U.S. 922 (1994).  The instruction petitioner 
complains of followed the statute, as approved by this Court, and 
therefore counsel was not unreasonable for failing to raise the 
objection.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim IV(G)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim IV(E), that the 
future dangerousness jury instruction unconstitutionally “relieved 
the Commonwealth of its burden to prove every element beyond a 
reasonable doubt” because it told the jury that it only had to find 
a “probability” of future dangerousness. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim IV(G)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Counsel is not unreasonable for 
failing to object to jury instructions that follow the statute and 
have previously been approved by this Court.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim IV(G)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim IV(F), that his due 
process rights and right to a reliable sentencing proceeding were 
 
24
violated because the future dangerousness aggravating factor 
excludes consideration of petitioner’s life in prison. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim IV(G)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  This Court has previously held that 
a determination of future dangerousness revolves 
around an individual defendant and a specific crime. 
Evidence regarding the general nature of prison life 
in a maximum security facility is not relevant to 
that inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to 
evidence of future dangerousness such as that 
presented in this case. 
 
Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 146, 547 S.E.2d 186, 199-200 
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002) (citing Burns v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 339-40, 541 S.E.2d 872, 893 (2001), cert. 
denied 534 U.S. 1043 (2001)).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In a portion of claim IV(G)(2), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel 
failed to raise on appeal the issues stated in claims IV(A), IV(B), 
IV(D), IV(E), and IV(F).  The Court holds that these portions of 
claim IV(G)(2) satisfy neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The record 
demonstrates that these issues were not raised at trial.  Therefore, 
counsel was reasonable for choosing not to raise on appeal claims 
which would have been barred under Rule 5:25.  Further, petitioner 
has articulated no reason why this Court would have invoked either 
 
25
exception to Rule 5:25 and reached the merits of either issue.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In another portion of claim IV(G)(2), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel 
failed to raise the issue articulated in claim IV(C).  The Court 
holds that this portion of claim IV(G)(2) is without merit.  The 
record demonstrates counsel raised this issue on appeal.  
In claim V(B)(1), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel failed to 
raise the issues, articulated in claim V(A), that his right to due 
process, his right to be able to participate in his trial, and his 
right to “heightened reliability” in his trial were violated by the 
medication administered to him in prison before trial and the stun 
belt he wore at trial.  Petitioner claims that the combination of 
medication he was on, including Depakote, Paxil and Zoloft, caused 
him to appear emotionless and expressionless during trial.  
Petitioner claims that he was never found to be a security threat 
and that the stun belt limited his communication with counsel, 
distracted him during trial, and prejudiced him before the jury. 
The Court holds that claim V(B)(1) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner provides no evidence that he 
was involuntarily medicated or that the medication he was taking 
prior to and during the trial was the reason he appeared “cold, 
 
26
expressionless, and remorseless during the trial.”  Additionally, 
petitioner is unable to demonstrate prejudice because, as was the 
case in Lenz v. Warden, 265 Va. 373, 380, 579 S.E.2d 194, 198 
(2003), there is “nothing in the record that indicates the jury 
observed a stun belt on petitioner during the trial.”  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
 
In claim V(B)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to 
raise on appeal the issues stated in claim V(A).  The Court holds 
that claim V(B)(2) satisfies neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record demonstrates that these issues were not raised at trial.  
Therefore, counsel was reasonable for choosing not to raise on 
appeal claims which would have been barred under Rule 5:25.  
Further, petitioner has articulated no reason why this Court would 
have invoked either exception to Rule 5:25 and reached the merits of 
either issue.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
In a portion of claim VI(E)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issues articulated in claim VI(A) that his 
rights to due process and a reliable sentencing hearing were 
 
27
violated when the Commonwealth knowingly introduced Exhibit 51 as 
evidence of his criminal history at the penalty phase of the trial.  
Petitioner claims that the Commonwealth falsely stated that Exhibit 
51 was a certified copy of his criminal history, when it was neither 
certified nor a copy of his criminal record.  Further, according to 
petitioner, the exhibit contained false and misleading information, 
including, inter alia, information that petitioner had been found 
guilty of capital murder when that conviction had been reversed by 
this Court and later nolle prossed and that charges for felony 
larceny and statutory burglary had been nolle prossed when the 
charges had actually been dismissed. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VI(E)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
what effect, if any, Exhibit 51 had on the jury.  The record, 
including the trial transcript, demonstrates that while Exhibit 51 
indicated that petitioner had previously been found guilty of 
capital murder, the jury was already aware of this information.  
Petitioner’s own letters to the Commonwealth’s Attorney, which had 
been introduced at trial, indicated that petitioner was on “death 
row” after having already been found guilty of capital murder.  When 
Exhibit 51 was introduced, the Commonwealth mentioned only 
petitioner’s prior convictions and did not say anything about the 
capital murder conviction or about any of the charges for which 
petitioner was not convicted.  The Commonwealth did not mention the 
exhibit again during the presentation of the evidence or during 
argument.  The Commonwealth’s argument that petitioner deserved the 
 
28
death penalty was based not on petitioner’s criminal history, but on 
the killing of Stacey Reed, the letters petitioner wrote after 
Stacey Reed’s murder, and petitioner’s racist attitudes.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In another portion of claim VI(E)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim VI(B), that the 
Commonwealth failed to turn over exculpatory information by not 
informing petitioner that “some of the entries on Commonwealth 
Exhibit 51 were false and misleading.”  Petitioner claims that the 
Commonwealth’s actions violated his due process rights. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VI(E)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that on 
December 23, 2002, the Commonwealth provided petitioner’s counsel 
with a copy of the printout later identified as Exhibit 51.  
Petitioner’s knowledge regarding his own criminal record is as 
extensive, if not more so, as the Commonwealth’s.  The inaccuracies 
in the printout, therefore, were before petitioner prior to trial 
and the Commonwealth did not violate its duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
 
29
would have been different. 
In another portion of claim VI(E)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in a portion of claim VI(C), 
that the Commonwealth violated Code §§ 19.2-295.1, -264.2, and -
264.4 because Exhibit 51 was not a “record of conviction” and showed 
charges which had been either nolle prossed or for which petitioner 
was found not guilty.  Petitioner claims that the introduction of 
Exhibit 51 “falsely led the jury to believe that [petitioner] had a 
much more serious criminal record than he did” when deciding future 
dangerousness. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VI(E)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript and the exhibits, demonstrates that the jury was already 
aware that petitioner had previously been found guilty of capital 
murder.  Petitioner’s own letters to the Commonwealth’s Attorney, 
which had been introduced at trial, indicated that petitioner had 
been on “death row” after having been found guilty of capital 
murder.  When Exhibit 51 was introduced, the Commonwealth mentioned 
only petitioner’s prior convictions, did not mention the previous 
capital murder conviction or any of the charges for which petitioner 
was not convicted.  Finally, the Commonwealth focused the jury’s 
determination for a sentence of death not on petitioner’s criminal 
history, but rather on the killing of Stacey Reed, the letters 
petitioner wrote while he was incarcerated, and how petitioner’s 
racist attitudes showed him to be capable of violence.  Thus, 
 
30
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In another portion of claim VI(E)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in another portion of claim 
VI(C), that the Commonwealth violated Code § 19.2-264.3:2 because 
the Commonwealth failed to give notice of its intent to present 
evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct.  Exhibit 51 contained 
information regarding criminal charges that had been either nolle 
prossed or of which petitioner had been found not guilty. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VI(E)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that the Commonwealth complied with Code 
§ 19.2-264:3.2 as counsel acknowledged that he had received the 
document as required.  Therefore, any objection counsel would have 
made on this issue would have been frivolous.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim VI(E)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim VI(D), that the 
Commonwealth violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it introduced 
 
31
Exhibit 51 because there was no “foundational testimony as to the 
personal knowledge of the record-keeper, the regularity of its 
preparation, the reliance on the records, or any other circumstance 
showing trustworthiness.”  The Court holds that this portion of 
claim VI(E)(1) satisfies neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Petitioner has failed to establish that had counsel objected, the 
Commonwealth would not have been able to provide the appropriate 
foundation or that Exhibit 51 would have been ruled inadmissible.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the jury would not have considered Exhibit 51 and the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
 
In claim VI(E)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to 
raise on appeal the issues stated in claims VI(A), VI(B), VI(C), and 
VI(D).  The Court holds that claim VI(E)(2) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that these issues 
were not raised at trial.  Therefore, counsel was reasonable for 
choosing not to raise on appeal claims which would have been barred 
under Rule 5:25.  Further, petitioner has articulated no reason why 
this Court would have invoked either exception to Rule 5:25 and 
reached the merits of either issue.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
32
In claim VI(F), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to have the charges 
listed on Exhibit 51, which had been nolle prossed or dismissed, 
expunged pursuant to Code § 19.2-392.2.  Petitioner claims that the 
inclusion of these charges in a capital sentencing proceeding 
constitutes a “manifest injustice” and that the charges were 
eligible for expungement under the statute. 
The Court holds that claim VI(F) fails to satisfy the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
Petitioner fails to show that any motion for the expungement of his 
record would have succeeded.  Additionally, petitioner has failed to 
show that a “manifest injustice” occurred because the information he 
now complains of was listed in Exhibit 51.  When Exhibit 51 was 
introduced, the Commonwealth mentioned only petitioner’s prior 
convictions and did not say anything about the capital murder 
conviction or about any of the charges where petitioner was not 
convicted.  Exhibit 51 clearly identifies the disposition of each 
charge and thus, the fact that some charges were nolle prossed or 
dismissed was before the jury.  Finally, the Commonwealth focused 
the jury’s determination for a sentence of death not on petitioner’s 
criminal history, but rather on the killing of Stacey Reed, the 
letters petitioner wrote while he was incarcerated, and how 
petitioner’s racist attitudes showed him to be capable of violence.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim VI(G), petitioner alleges he was denied the effective 
 
33
assistance of counsel because appellate counsel in petitioner’s 
first trial failed to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
challenging the convictions that arose from the first trial.  The 
Court rejects claim VI(G) because there is no constitutional right 
to counsel in seeking habeas relief.  Howard v. Warden, 232 Va. 16, 
19, 348 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1986). 
In a portion of claim VII(C)(1), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel 
failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim VII(A), that his 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, 
due process and “to a reliable individualized sentencing 
determination” were violated by the Commonwealth’s introduction of 
racist statements and documents which linked petitioner to certain 
groups and “broad ideas.” 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VII(C)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Petitioner’s racist beliefs and 
writings were a significant and relevant part of the Commonwealth’s 
case because they were evidence of petitioner’s motivation for 
killing Stacey Reed.  This evidence was also properly introduced at 
sentencing to show that petitioner was a dangerous person.  Further, 
petitioner provides no evidentiary support for his speculation that 
the evidence “tended to inflame the jury by linking [petitioner] to 
certain abstract beliefs” and “caused the jury to sentence 
[petitioner] for his abstract beliefs.”  Petitioner does not allege 
that had counsel objected this evidence would have been ruled 
inadmissible and the jury’s determination would have been different.   
 
34
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In another portion of claim VII(C)(1), petitioner alleges he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because 
counsel failed to raise the issue, articulated in claim VII(B), that 
the Commonwealth violated his right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses when it introduced certificates of analysis in an attempt 
to authenticate several letters allegedly written by petitioner.  
Petitioner claims that the certificates of analysis were testimonial 
in nature and without them the Commonwealth could not have 
attributed the letters to him. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim VII(C)(1) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the 
certificates of analysis, show that the Commonwealth complied with 
the requirements of Code § 19.2-187 as the certificates were 
attested to by the scientists who performed the handwriting analysis 
and, therefore, the scientists were not required to appear at trial.  
Additionally, the evidence at trial demonstrates that petitioner 
admitted to the police that he wrote the letters.  Thus, petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient.  
Further, petitioner claims only that counsel's alleged errors “had a 
substantial and injurious effect on [petitioner’s] trial” but does 
not claim that, had counsel objected, the letters would have been 
ruled inadmissible or the result of the proceeding would have been 
 
35
different. 
In a portion of claim VII(C)(2), petitioner alleges he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel 
did not raise the issues articulated in claims VII(A) and VII(B).  
The Court holds that this portion of claim VII(C)(2) satisfies 
neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that these 
issues were not raised at trial.  Therefore, counsel was reasonable 
for choosing not to raise on appeal claims which would have been 
barred under Rule 5:25.  Further, petitioner has articulated no 
reason why this Court would have invoked either exception to Rule 
5:25 and reached the merits of either issue.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In claim VIII(A), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because 
counsel failed to properly investigate petitioner’s background in 
order to rebut the Commonwealth’s claim that petitioner had racist 
beliefs and that petitioner tortured animals.  Petitioner alleges 
that had counsel conducted a proper investigation he would have 
discovered that petitioner had once shared a cigarette with a “black 
male;” that petitioner was known to make references to Satan in 
order “to keep others at a safe distance” and to say things in order 
to shock people, to gain acceptance and to garner attention to 
himself; and that petitioner “wore racism like fashionable clothing” 
 
36
in order to “gain acceptance from certain groups.”  Petitioner 
claims that counsel also would have discovered that he had lived 
without any racial issues in environments where 75% of the occupants 
were black; had “had good friends who were black;” was not 
aggressive towards his cousin’s black boyfriend; that he told 
stories about torturing animals to a classmate who had never seen 
petitioner abuse any animals and did not believe the stories; and 
that petitioner had acted nice to cats and dogs that belonged to 
friends and family. 
The Court holds that claim VIII(A) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The evidence of petitioner’s character 
and demeanor, which he argues should have been presented, would have 
been damaging because evidence existed that petitioner had admitted 
to the police that he was a racist and had tortured animals and 
because the affidavits supplied by petitioner also demonstrate that 
petitioner was known to make racist statements and tell stories 
about abusing animals.  None of the affidavits establish that 
petitioner was either not racist or not abusive to animals.  Thus, 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. 
In claim VIII(B), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to rebut the 
Commonwealth’s claim that petitioner had no remorse because counsel 
did not properly investigate petitioner’s background, interview 
 
37
relevant witnesses, or review the records in the possession of 
petitioner’s prior counsel.  Petitioner alleges that counsel would 
have discovered that petitioner had cried during his January 30, 
1999 police interview and stated that he wanted to tell Stacey 
Reed’s parents he was sorry; that petitioner wanted to write a 
letter to Stacey Reed’s family; that petitioner wanted to trade his 
life for Stacey’s; that petitioner wanted to apologize to Kristie 
Reed; that petitioner broke down and cried during his first trial 
and that a probation officer had noted that petitioner was “confused 
and sorry about committing the crime.” 
The Court holds that claim VIII(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that there was 
overwhelming evidence that petitioner lacked remorse.  Petitioner 
wrote letters to the Commonwealth’s Attorney in 2001, in which he 
taunted the Commonwealth’s Attorney, admitted to stabbing Stacey 
Reed and then “stomping on her throat,” and admitted to drinking 
iced tea and smoking a cigarette after killing her, but in which he 
never expressed remorse.  Petitioner also stated he wanted Stacey 
Reed’s parents to be ready to “relive it all again because if I have 
to suffer for the next 50 or 60 years or however long then they can 
suffer the torment of reliving what happened.”  Additionally, 
petitioner sent a letter to Stacey Reed’s parents two years after 
the murder in which he compared Stacey Reed to pictures of a topless 
model he included with the letter but did not express remorse.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
 
38
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In claim VIII(C), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to rebut the 
Commonwealth’s claim that petitioner had above average intelligence 
by failing to investigate his background, interview relevant 
witnesses, or review the records in the possession of petitioner’s 
prior counsel.  Petitioner contends he had a full-scale IQ score of 
102 in 1991 which placed him at the 54th percentile; that he had a 
full-scale IQ of 87 in 1993; that experts had opined that 
petitioner’s intelligence was “average or below,” and that he was 
capable of functioning in the average range despite low average 
range IQ scores. 
The Court holds that claim VIII(C) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record demonstrates that at trial, 
petitioner’s own expert testified on cross-examination that 
petitioner’s IQ was “within the average range of intelligence.”  The 
reports cited by petitioner demonstrated that he was considered to 
have average intelligence with psychologist William Brock commenting 
that petitioner’s intelligence may not be indicative of his IQ 
scores and psychologist Shayne Weir commenting that petitioner’s 
intelligence was “probably brighter” than petitioner’s IQ score of 
102.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
39
In claim IX(1), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his 
trial because counsel failed to prepare and present “a compelling 
mitigation case.”  Petitioner claims that counsel presented “weak 
testimonial evidence” and no documentary evidence.  In support of 
this claim, petitioner submits affidavits from his mother, Cynthia 
Powell, and one brother, Matthew Powell.  Petitioner contends that 
counsel met only once, briefly, with Matthew Powell, and only asked 
him whether petitioner’s father had been abusive, and that counsel 
did not prepare Cynthia Powell to testify.  Further, petitioner has 
submitted the affidavit of William Stejsall, a psychologist who 
testified on petitioner’s behalf at trial.  Dr. Stejsall states that 
trial counsel deviated from the planned presentation of Dr. 
Stejsall’s testimony and the jury never heard a large part of Dr. 
Stejsall’s findings concerning the factors outside of petitioner’s 
control during his adolescence which led to petitioner developing “a 
self-destructive and antisocial adaptation to life.” 
The Court holds that claim IX(1) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that trial counsel called seven witnesses 
on petitioner’s behalf, including Matthew and Cynthia Powell, who 
discussed various aspects of petitioner’s upbringing and childhood.  
The jury heard evidence that petitioner’s father was abusive and had 
a drinking problem; petitioner’s parents were incapable of 
controlling petitioner; and at one point, petitioner’s parents 
temporarily relinquished custody of petitioner to the Department of 
 
40
Social Services.  The jury was also informed that petitioner’s 
social worker had recommended intensive family therapy after 
petitioner returned home and a juvenile court psychologist, who 
evaluated petitioner in late 1993, recommended that petitioner be 
placed in a long-term treatment facility for at least six months. 
Further, at trial, Dr. Stejsall testified that, as a result of 
his home life, petitioner’s behavioral and mental health issues were 
neglected and he received a variety of treatments with mixed results 
and at various stages of his life petitioner received no treatment 
at all.  Dr. Stejsall opined that petitioner developed behaviors 
described as oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, conduct disorder and serious depression 
which, at times, resulted in petitioner becoming suicidal and 
engaging in self-mutilation.  Dr. Stejsall also testified that 
petitioner had no “serious disciplinary infractions” while 
incarcerated for Stacey Reed’s murder because petitioner had been on 
medications and was receiving psychiatric care.  Petitioner fails to 
allege what additional information Matthew and Cynthia Powell would 
have provided had counsel interviewed them more thoroughly or had 
better prepared them or how additional testimony from Dr. Stejsall 
would have affected the trial.  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim IX(2), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to prepare 
and present “a compelling mitigation case” regarding the “toxic 
 
41
environment in which [he] grew up.”  Petitioner points to the 
following in support of his claim:  a 1991 family assessment which 
described his home life; the reports from a probation officer 
documenting petitioner’s father’s abuse; petitioner’s mother’s 
passivity; and the officer’s failed attempts to obtain intervention 
for petitioner; a 1993 mental status evaluation which documented the 
tension between petitioner and his father; and the sexual assault of 
petitioner when he was seventeen years old. 
The Court holds that claim IX(2) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel presented testimony from 
numerous witnesses regarding the abusive relationship between 
petitioner and his father.  Dr. Stejsall testified that petitioner 
was raised in a “toxic” environment and that a severe beating by a 
large group of young men while petitioner was confined in a juvenile 
detention facility and the sexual assault upon petitioner when 
petitioner was seventeen worsened the effects of petitioner’s mental 
health problems.  Petitioner has failed to assert how the 
information he alleges counsel should have presented is not 
cumulative in nature or how it would have affected the proceedings.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In claim IX(3), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
 
42
investigate, review records, interview witnesses, or prepare and 
present “a compelling mitigation case” regarding his psychological 
problems.  Petitioner cites a 1991 psychological evaluation, reports 
from the Prince William County Public School Special Education 
Department and the city of Manassas Public Schools Eligibility 
Committee, and psychological evaluations of petitioner performed in 
1993 and 1995 in support of his claim. 
The Court holds that claim IX(3) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that Dr. Stejsall, who was initially 
appointed to evaluate petitioner at his first trial and who re-
evaluated petitioner in preparation for his second trial, conducted 
his initial evaluation of petitioner based upon a review of 
petitioner’s “psychological evaluations,” “all of the medical and 
mental-health records that have ever been written or generated in 
connection with [petitioner]” including “three psychiatric 
hospitalizations” and petitioner’s school records including the 
records of “his eligibility and programming as a special education 
student as a seriously, emotionally disturbed student.”  Because Dr. 
Stejsall based his opinion on his review of these materials, which 
are the same materials petitioner claims counsel failed to review, 
counsel acted properly by relying on Dr. Stejsall’s expert opinion 
regarding petitioner’s psychological problems.  Thus, petitioner has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
 
43
different. 
In claim IX(4), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to prepare 
and present “a compelling mitigation case” regarding the obstacles, 
caused by petitioner’s family, to petitioner’s treatment.  In 
support of his claim, petitioner points to evidence of his father’s 
refusal to participate in court-ordered counseling and to allow 
petitioner back in the house.  Further, petitioner cites evidence 
that a probation officer believed that the inability of the family 
to receive appropriate or timely services was preventing petitioner 
and his family from successfully addressing their problems. 
The Court holds that claim IX(4) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  Our review of the record, including the 
trial transcript, demonstrates that the jury was made aware that 
petitioner’s father often did not attend counseling with petitioner 
and that petitioner often did not receive services due to money and 
family problems and the lack of available organizations willing to 
work with the family.  Dr. Stejsall testified that petitioner’s 
“toxic” home environment prevented petitioner from receiving 
consistent treatment of his behavioral and mental-health issues.  
The evidence petitioner presents is cumulative of that presented at 
trial and petitioner has failed to assert how the use of any of this 
evidence would have impacted the jury.  Thus, petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
44
In claim IX(5), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to prepare 
and present “a compelling mitigation case” during the penalty phase 
of the proceeding regarding the life petitioner was living before 
the murder of Stacey Reed.  Petitioner provides evidence in support 
of his claim that indicates he was homeless, had lost his friends, 
had all of his possessions stolen, and had recently broken up with 
his girlfriend.  Petitioner has also presented evidence that he was 
drinking heavily and taking drugs around that time. 
The Court holds that claim IX(5) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the affidavits 
provided by petitioner and the affidavit of counsel, demonstrates 
that petitioner was homeless because his family was either afraid he 
would steal from them or because the children in the home were 
frightened of him and that petitioner’s friends had stopped spending 
time with him because he would “brag a lot” and was acting “weird” 
and “clingy” or “jealous” because of the relationship two of the 
friends had with Stacey Reed.  Counsel made a strategic decision not 
to call any of these people as mitigation witnesses because their 
testimony would have supported a finding of future dangerousness.  
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to present evidence that 
could be “cross-purpose evidence” capable of aggravation as well as 
mitigation.  Lenz v. Warden, 267 Va. 318, 337, 593 S.E.2d 292, 303 
(2004); see also Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 980-81 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 972 (1995).  Thus, petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 
 
45
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In claim IX(6), petitioner alleges that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to prepare 
and present “a compelling mitigation case” during the penalty phase 
of the proceeding regarding petitioner’s lack of future 
dangerousness while in prison.  Petitioner claims counsel should 
have presented a 1993 school report, a 1994 juvenile detention home 
report, and evidence that he had earned his GED while incarcerated 
in 1995 and had no disciplinary violations while incarcerated 
awaiting his second trial. 
The Court holds that claim IX(6) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including the trial 
transcript, demonstrates that counsel presented evidence that 
petitioner did not pose a future danger in prison.  Dr. Stejsall 
informed the jury that, as a result of the medications and 
psychiatric care petitioner received while incarcerated for Stacey 
Reed’s murder, petitioner had no serious disciplinary infractions 
while in prison.  The Commonwealth’s evidence that petitioner posed 
a future danger, however, was overwhelming.  Petitioner admitted 
that he was a racist; claimed that “everybody that ain’t white ... 
needs to die” and stated that if he had waited until he was old 
enough to buy a gun he would have “kill[ed] a lot of somebodies.”  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
 
46
would have been different. 
In claim X(B)(1), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel failed to 
raise the issue articulated in claim X(A) that the trial court 
violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as 
well as under Code § 19.2-298 when it failed to allow petitioner to 
allocute before he was sentenced. 
The Court holds that claim X(B)(1) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part test 
enunciated in Strickland.  There is no constitutional “right” to an 
allocution before sentencing.  Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 
428 (1962)(deprivation of allocution before sentencing is “an error 
which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional”).  The record 
demonstrates that petitioner was prone to making statements 
detrimental to his case.  Further, petitioner has not alleged what 
he would have said if he had been given the opportunity to address 
the court or how such a statement would have impacted the sentence 
he received.  Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. 
 
In claim X(B)(2), petitioner alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel failed to 
raise the issue articulated in claim X(A).  The Court holds that 
claim X(B)(2) satisfies neither the “performance” nor the 
“prejudice” prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  
The record demonstrates that these issues were not raised at trial.  
 
47
Therefore counsel was reasonable for choosing not to raise claims 
which would have been barred under Rule 5:25.  Further, petitioner 
has articulated no reason why this Court would have invoked either 
exception to Rule 5:25 and reached the merits of either issue.  
Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
In claim XI, petitioner alleges that various stages of 
Virginia’s post-conviction process are insufficient to protect his 
constitutional rights.  First, petitioner claims that the statute of 
limitations for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus provided 
him insufficient time to investigate and brief all of his claims.  
Second, petitioner claims that the trial court failed to appoint 
counsel for petitioner’s habeas petition within the time period 
prescribed by Code § 19.2-163.7.  Third, petitioner was refused his 
applications for the appointment of experts to assist with the 
preparation of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Finally, 
petitioner claims that his motions for a copy of his record 
maintained by the Prince William Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Court were denied.   
The Court holds that the issues raised in claim XI are not 
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  “The writ is 
available only where the release of the prisoner from his immediate 
detention will follow as a result of an order in his favor.  It is 
not available to secure a judicial determination of any question 
which, even if determined in the prisoner's favor, could not affect 
 
48
the lawfulness of his immediate custody and detention.”  Virginia 
Parole Board v. Wilkins, 255 Va. 419, 420-421, 498 S.E.2d 695, 696 
(1998). 
In claim XII, petitioner alleges his rights under the Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as Article I, Sections 8, 9 
and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia were violated because the 
jurors were exposed to an extraneous influence, namely a Bible, 
during the trial.  Petitioner claims that at least one unidentified 
juror carried a Bible during the trial and specifically referred to 
it during the penalty phase.  The Court holds that the petitioner 
has failed to allege facts that establish that the jurors were 
“exposed” to a Bible “during the course of the trial” and, 
therefore, claim XII is speculative. 
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
             A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
                Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk