Title: Commonwealth v. Tate
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13227
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13227 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILL TATE. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 6, 2022. - August 22, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Attorney at Law, Attorney-
client relationship, Conflict of interest, Use of 
confidence or secret.  Conflict of Interest.  Consent.  
Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Firearm.  Practice, 
Criminal, New trial, Assistance of counsel, Disclosure of 
evidence, Duplicative punishment. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 31, 2014. 
 
The cases were tried before Renee P. Dupuis, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 6, 2019, was heard by 
her. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Matthew H. Feinberg for the defendant. 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
Merritt Schnipper, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In this case, we are asked to decide whether a 
defendant is entitled to a new trial on the ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel where, prior to trial, defense 
counsel disclosed confidential information to the Commonwealth 
concerning the location of what became key incriminating 
evidence.  This decision rests in part upon a determination 
whether, prior to counsel's disclosure, the defendant had given 
counsel his informed consent to make it. 
 
We conclude that because trial counsel did not present the 
defendant with any option other than disclosing the existence of 
the incriminating objects, the defendant's purported consent to 
the disclosure was neither adequately informed nor voluntary.  
See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0, 471 Mass. 1305 (2015).  Moreover, 
where trial counsel mistakenly believed that he had a duty to 
disclose the confidential, incriminating information to the 
Commonwealth, and did not obtain the defendant's informed 
consent prior to making that disclosure, an actual conflict of 
interest existed that rendered the representation 
constitutionally ineffective.  See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 
Mass. 834, 854 (2008).  Accordingly, the order denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial must be vacated and set 
3 
 
aside, and the matter remanded to the Superior Court for a new 
trial.1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Shooting.  The jury could have found 
the following.  On the evening of January 4, 2014, the victim, 
David Rodriguez; his sister, Jasmine Ward; and their mother, 
Reina Rodriguez,2 were socializing and drinking alcohol together 
in the family's apartment in Fall River.  At some point, Ward 
informed the victim that she had plans later that evening to 
meet with the defendant, who was her former coworker.  The 
victim's former girlfriend, Kendra Lopes, also had worked for 
the same company at the same time as the defendant, and the 
victim was aware that the defendant previously had tried to 
establish a sexual relationship with Ward and Lopes.  Upon 
learning of Ward's plans to meet the defendant, the victim 
insisted that Ward instead stay with him that night, and Ward 
agreed to do so.  Ward nonetheless continued sending text 
messages to the defendant, who had arrived at the apartment 
complex to meet with her. 
 
Surveillance video footage from the security cameras at the 
apartment building shows that, at 12:40 A.M. on January 5, 2014, 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Boston Bar Association. 
 
2 Because she and the victim share a last name, we refer to 
Reina Rodriguez by her first name. 
4 
 
the victim left the elevator at the first-floor lobby.  He 
walked toward an entrance to the building and gestured for 
someone to come inside.  The defendant then entered the building 
and followed the victim into the laundry room.  After several 
minutes, both men left the laundry room, and the defendant 
appeared to leave the building. 
 
At around the same time, Ward, who had remained in the 
victim's apartment, had started feeling sick and went to the 
bathroom to vomit.  When the victim returned to the apartment, 
he did not see Ward and did not know where she was.  He left the 
apartment again and went back to the first floor, where he saw 
the defendant's vehicle drive past the main entrance.  The 
victim ran outside with his cellular telephone in his hand.  As 
he did so, he was shot twice by the defendant; one bullet struck 
him in the chest, and the other in the right thigh.  The 
defendant quickly left the scene.  The victim died before 
paramedics arrived. 
 
The investigation soon focused on the defendant.  Because 
the defendant was living at his mother's house in Rhode Island 
at the time of the shooting, Massachusetts State police officers 
sent a request to the Rhode Island State police to locate him.  
On the morning following the shooting, the defendant, his 
mother, and his sister were driving towards the Fall River 
police station, where he planned to turn himself in, when the 
5 
 
vehicle was stopped by Rhode Island State police troopers.  The 
troopers ordered all three individuals from the vehicle and 
placed the defendant in handcuffs.  Without advising the 
defendant of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), one of the troopers, referencing the firearm used in 
the shooting the previous evening, asked the defendant, "Where's 
the gun?" to which the defendant responded, "I threw it off the 
Braga bridge." 
The troopers transported the defendant to Rhode Island 
State police headquarters, where he made several spontaneous 
statements regarding the shooting before he was left alone in 
his holding cell.  The defendant was arraigned as a fugitive the 
following day, at which point he waived the rendition process 
and was transported to Massachusetts. 
 
b.  Trial proceedings.  The following month, in February of 
2014, the defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court on 
charges of murder, G. L. c. 265, § 1; carrying a firearm without 
a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and carrying a loaded firearm 
without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  Trial took place 
between March 28 and April 7, 2016.  The Commonwealth proceeded 
on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty; the theory of defense was self-defense. 
 
Among other evidence, the jury heard from a State police 
trooper who testified that, in August of 2014, while executing a 
6 
 
search warrant at the defendant's mother's home in Rhode Island, 
officers recovered a locked box in the basement.  Inside the 
box, they found a semiautomatic handgun with a laser pointer 
attachment, a box of .40 caliber ammunition, and a magazine that 
contained several rounds of .40 caliber ammunition.  Bullets 
recovered from the victim's body were tested and determined to 
have come from the gun found in the box.  The lawful owner of 
the gun, a friend of the defendant who was living in another 
State, testified that the defendant stole the gun from him.  The 
friend also testified that the laser pointer attachment that 
came with his purchase of the gun allows a user to see where the 
gun is aimed. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser included 
offense of murder in the second degree, as well as possession of 
a firearm without a license and possession of a loaded firearm 
without a license.  He filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
c.  Posttrial proceedings.  In September of 2019, 
represented by newly appointed appellate counsel, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel.  In July of 2020, the trial 
judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion.  The 
defendant and his mother both submitted sworn affidavits prior 
to the hearing, and trial counsel testified as the sole witness.  
In October of 2020, the motion was denied, and the defendant 
7 
 
appealed from that denial.  The defendant's appeal from the 
denial of the motion for a new trial was consolidated with his 
direct appeal, and we transferred the matter to this court on 
our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In his motion for a new trial, the 
defendant argued that he had been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because, prior to trial, his counsel 
disclosed to the Commonwealth that the gun the defendant used to 
shoot the victim was in the defendant's mother's basement.  The 
defendant maintained that this breach of the duty of 
confidentiality "irreparably prejudiced" him by exposing the 
jury to information that he had stolen the gun, that he had lied 
to police about the location of the gun, and that the gun had 
had a laser attachment that assisted with accuracy in shooting.  
According to the defendant, the introduction of this evidence of 
prior bad acts and bad character essentially forced him to 
testify at trial, and thus to waive his right to remain silent.  
The defendant also argued that trial counsel's agreement with 
the Commonwealth that counsel would not file a motion to 
suppress the defendant's statement to police that he had thrown 
the gun off a bridge, in exchange for the Commonwealth not 
introducing spontaneous statements that the defendant made 
regarding his involvement in the shooting during an interview at 
the Fall River police station, constituted ineffective 
8 
 
assistance of counsel.  In addition, the defendant contends in 
his direct appeal that his convictions under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), which prohibits carrying a firearm without a license, 
and G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), which prohibits carrying a loaded 
firearm without a license, are duplicative. 
a.  Motion for a new trial.  "[W]e review a judge's denial 
of a defendant's motion for a new trial to determine whether 
there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 487 Mass. 370, 374 
(2021).  Where an evidentiary hearing is conducted on a motion 
for a new trial, we "accept the [judge's] findings where they 
are supported by substantial evidence in the record," and we 
"defer to the judge's assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 488 
Mass. 597, 600 (2021).  We afford "special deference . . . to 
both factual findings and the ultimate decision where, as here, 
the motion judge was also the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. 
Tinsley, 487 Mass. 380, 385 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Lane, 
462 Mass. 591, 597 (2012).  Other than for a conviction of 
murder in the first degree, a defendant seeking a new trial 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that 
counsel's performance fell "measurably below that which might be 
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer."  See Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 
9 
 
 
i.  Motion hearing.  The trial judge found that, some six 
months after the shooting, while accessing other items stored in 
the basement, the defendant's mother came across a storage bin 
in an area of the basement where she stored out-of-season 
clothing.  In her affidavit, the defendant's mother averred 
that, prior to that discovery, she had found in her basement the 
jacket that she remembered the defendant had been wearing on the 
evening of the shooting, and that she had visited him in jail to 
ask him if there was anything else in the basement that she 
"needed to know about."  He said that there was and that she 
would "know it when [she] saw it."  Upon searching the basement 
later that day, the defendant's mother noticed the storage bin, 
which she opened to find a locked box inside.  Concerned about 
what it might contain, she contacted his trial attorney, 
informed counsel of what she had found, and told him that she 
wanted the items out of her home.  Counsel instructed her not to 
touch anything or to open the box until he contacted her.  He 
also suggested that she obtain her own counsel. 
 
After speaking with the defendant's mother, counsel sought 
advice concerning the situation from three friends of his who 
were attorneys also experienced in criminal defense.3  He also 
 
 
3 Although the defendant's mother did not open the locked 
box, counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for a new 
trial that he had "assumed" that it contained a weapon. 
10 
 
contacted the Board of Bar Overseers, although he did not feel 
that he was able to obtain any helpful guidance in doing so.  
Based in part on these conversations, counsel concluded that he 
had an ethical obligation to disclose to the prosecution the 
information that he had learned from the defendant's mother.  
The judge found that counsel also believed that the defendant's 
having lied to police about the location of the gun would hurt 
his theory of self-defense, and that it would be in the 
defendant's best interest to "get out in front of the issue by 
acknowledging the defendant's lie and turning over the items to 
the prosecution."  Counsel then wrote the defendant a letter, 
dated August 27, 2014, that said: 
"Please be advised that the firearm and jacket that you 
were wearing were recently discovered.  I believe that it 
is my ethical obligation to make this fact known to the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  I have researched this and 
consulted with two highly experienced attorneys.  It is 
also my information that the individual who discovered the 
weapon may have sought independent legal advice perhaps 
discussing this issue. 
 
"I am mindful that you told the police that you threw the 
weapon over the Braga Bridge as you left the scene, but 
notwithstanding this untruth I cannot advise you or anyone 
else to continue to hide this from the authorities.  I am 
writing this for the protection of many people although I 
am aware that this untruth will not help your case. 
 
"I urge you to be more forthright with me in the future so 
that we may face serious issues early in the case and not 
waste time researching ethical issues. 
 
"It is my intent to see that the authorities both here and 
in Rhode Island . . . recover the weapon and coat 
11 
 
independently.  Said another way, I do not want anyone 
other than the authorities touching the weapon or the coat. 
 
"If you have any questions, please contact my office." 
 
 
Trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for a 
new trial that he brought this letter with him when he next met 
with the defendant at the house of correction.  The judge found 
that, during the meeting, trial counsel discussed "what his 
ethical obligations were, the impact of the discovery on the 
case and his determination that the items would have to be 
turned over to the authorities."  Following this discussion, the 
defendant signed his name beneath a statement at the bottom of 
the letter that stated: 
"I . . . have received a copy of the above 
correspondence/advice from [my attorney] and I am in 
agreement with this position." 
 
After meeting with the defendant, counsel notified the lead 
prosecutor about the defendant's mother's discovery.  The 
prosecutor then informed Massachusetts State police, who, 
working with Rhode Island authorities, obtained warrants to 
search the mother's house, seized the defendant's jacket and the 
locked box, and then obtained a separate warrant to search the 
box, where they found a firearm. 
 
In her memorandum of decision, the judge indicated that she 
found trial counsel to be credible and credited his testimony in 
its entirety.  This testimony included the statement by highly 
12 
 
experienced trial counsel, with forty-eight years of practice as 
an attorney, that he honestly had believed that he had a duty to 
disclose the information he had learned from the defendant's 
mother to the Commonwealth; indeed, counsel testified at the 
hearing, "I . . . still believe I'd do it to this day."  The 
judge concluded that counsel was not ineffective in disclosing 
the confidential information, because the defendant "gave 
informed consent to the disclosure of the evidence after meeting 
with [trial counsel] and discussing the matter."  The judge did 
not address whether counsel was ineffective in not moving to 
suppress the defendant's statement about throwing the gun off a 
bridge. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's finding that the 
defendant had given informed consent was clearly erroneous; he 
contends that trial counsel failed adequately to inform him of 
the consequences of disclosure and that therefore he did not 
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consent[] to 
relinquishing his known rights." 
 
ii.  Attorney's duties of confidentiality and loyalty.  
"Two ethical duties are entwined in any attorney-client 
relationship.  First is the attorney's duty of confidentiality, 
which fosters full and open communication between client and 
counsel, based on the client's understanding that the attorney 
is statutorily obligated . . . to maintain the client's 
13 
 
confidences. . . .  The second is the attorney's duty of 
undivided loyalty to the client. . . .  These ethical duties are 
mandated by the . . . Rules of Professional Conduct."  City & 
County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 38 Cal. 4th 
839, 846 (2006).  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, as amended, 474 
Mass. 1301 (2016); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1335 (2015).  See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 
558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009).  The duty of loyalty is "perhaps the 
most basic of counsel's duties."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 692 (1984).  "[A] defendant must be able to seek the 
advice and guidance of his [or her] attorney and must be able to 
rely on the undivided loyalty of his [or her] counsel to present 
the defense case with full force and zealousness" (citation 
omitted).  Perkins, 450 Mass. at 850.  Integral to the duty of 
loyalty that a lawyer owes a client is the duty of 
confidentiality.  See Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 215 (9th 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1117 (1996).  "The 
constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of counsel, 
untroubled by conflicts of interest, is intended not only to 
prevent the problems that can spring from contemporaneous 
divided loyalties, but also to prevent prejudice to a defendant 
arising from an attorney's treatment of privileged information."  
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 Mass. 382, 391 (1997).  See In re 
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 
14 
 
1986) (attorney's duty of loyalty "encompasses an 
obligation . . . not to divulge confidential communications from 
the client"). 
A.  Conflict of interest.  "A conflict of interest arises 
whenever an attorney's regard for one duty, such as that owed to 
a third party or in service of his [or her] own interests, leads 
the attorney to disregard another duty, such as that owed to his 
[or her] client."  Perkins, 450 Mass. at 851.  See Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.7 comment 1 ("Concurrent conflicts of interest can 
arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own 
interests").  "[U]nder art. 12, if a defendant establishes an 
actual conflict of interest, he [or she] is entitled to a new 
trial without a further showing; [the defendant] need not 
demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected his [or her] 
lawyer's performance or resulted in actual prejudice."  
Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 819 (2010).  On the other 
hand, "where only a 'potential' or 'tenuous' conflict is 
demonstrated, the conviction will not be reversed except upon a 
showing of material prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 397 
Mass. 16, 20 (1986). 
 
An "actual" conflict of interest exists "when a lawyer 
cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of 
action for the client because of the lawyer's other 
15 
 
responsibilities or interests."  Perkins, 450 Mass. at 851, 
quoting Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 comment 4.  "The critical inquiry 
is whether the lawyer has a competing interest or responsibility 
that 'will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent 
professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose 
courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of 
the client.'"  Perkins, supra at 851-852, quoting Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.7 comment 4.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Stote, 456 Mass. 
213, 220-221 (2010) (defense counsel's intimate personal 
relationship with assistant district attorney in office that 
represented Commonwealth on appeal, "standing alone," did not 
create "actual" conflict, where couple did not live together and 
therefore their relationship was not conducive to "inadvertent 
breaches of confidentiality," and assistant district attorney 
was not handling case on appeal [citation omitted]). 
 
B.  Confidentiality.  As stated, the duty of 
confidentiality is correlative to an attorney's duty of loyalty.  
See Damron, 67 F.3d at 214-215.  "It is axiomatic that among the 
highest duties an attorney owes a client is the duty to maintain 
the confidentiality of client information" (citation omitted).  
Perkins, 450 Mass. at 851.  Thus, as several other States also 
have concluded, "a defense attorney's disclosure of confidential 
information . . . necessarily implicates the attorney's duty of 
loyalty as well as the defendant's constitutional right to the 
16 
 
effective assistance of counsel."  See State v. Jones, 278 Mont. 
121, 125 (1996).  See, e.g., State v. Bain, 292 Neb. 398, 406 
(2016) ("government interference in the confidential 
relationship between a defendant and his or her attorney can 
implicate the . . . right to counsel [under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution]"). 
 
The duty of confidentiality is embodied in Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.6; rule 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from revealing "confidential 
information relating to the representation of a client," except 
in certain, narrowly limited circumstances.4  The comments to 
rule 1.6 define "confidential information" broadly, and explain 
that such information goes far beyond statements made by the 
client to the attorney and includes "information gained during 
or relating to the representation of a client, whatever its 
source, that is . . . likely to be embarrassing or detrimental 
to the client if disclosed" (emphases added).  See Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.6 comment 3A.  A lawyer may reveal such confidential 
information, however, if the lawyer receives the client's 
 
 
4 Specific, limited exceptions exist to the requirement of 
confidentiality, where a lawyer reasonably believes that a 
client will be committing a crime that would result in death or 
substantial bodily injury to another.  In such circumstance, an 
attorney may disclose certain information to prevent that harm, 
without the client's consent.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.6 (b) (1)-(3); Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 453 Mass. 
453, 457-459 (2009); Purcell v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 424 Mass. 109, 115 (1997), and cases cited. 
17 
 
"informed consent" to the disclosure.  See McClure v. Thompson, 
323 F.3d 1233, 1244 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. McClure v. 
Belleque, 540 U.S. 1051 (2003) ("[T]he mere fact of consent is 
not sufficient to excuse what would otherwise be a breach of the 
duty of confidentiality.  Consent must also be informed").  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Tahlil, 479 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2018), 
citing Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 (a). 
 
"Informed consent" is defined as an "agreement by a person 
to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has 
communicated adequate information and explanation about the 
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the 
proposed course of conduct."  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0.  Where 
an attorney discloses confidential information without first 
obtaining the client's informed consent, and no exception 
permitting disclosure is applicable, see note 4, supra, the 
attorney has committed a breach of the duty of confidentiality.  
See McClure, 323 F.3d at 1244-1247 (where defense counsel did 
not advise client of all potential adverse consequences of 
disclosure, client's consent was not informed, and breach of 
confidentiality would have occurred if disclosure was not 
permissible under exception in order to prevent commission of 
crime involving imminent risk of substantial bodily injury or 
death). 
18 
 
 
The duty of confidentiality necessarily extends to 
information regarding the location of incriminating objects, as 
such information would be "detrimental to the client if 
disclosed."  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 comment 3A.  Thus, before 
a criminal defense attorney may share information regarding the 
location of incriminating objects with the prosecution, counsel 
first must obtain the informed consent of the client criminal 
defendant.  Notwithstanding the attorney's honestly held belief 
to the contrary in this case, a defense attorney has no 
affirmative obligation to disclose such information.  See Wemark 
v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1999) ("a defense lawyer has 
no legal obligation to disclose information about the location 
of an instrument of a crime when possession of the instrument is 
not taken").  Although Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4, as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1425 (2015), provides that a lawyer may not 
"unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other 
material having potential evidentiary value," this rule is not 
applicable where a lawyer simply has knowledge of the location 
of possibly incriminating evidence about which the lawyer 
remains silent.  See, e.g., J.W. Hall, Jr., Professional 
Responsibility in Criminal Defense Practice § 28.60 (3d ed. Nov. 
2021).  Cf. Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. 399, 
406-407 (2015) (client's privilege against self-incrimination 
19 
 
precluded client's attorney's law firm from turning over 
client's cellular telephone, which might contain potentially 
incriminating evidence, to police, and firm could not be 
compelled to do so). 
In Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 812-813, for instance, the 
defendant appealed from the denial of his application for 
postconviction relief following his conviction of murder in the 
first degree in the stabbing death of his wife, on the ground 
that trial counsel improperly had advised him to reveal to 
prosecutors the location of the knife used in the stabbing.  The 
Iowa Supreme Court concluded that "the decision by defense 
counsel to disclose the location of the knife to the prosecutor 
was premised upon ethical concerns which did not require 
disclosure."  Id. at 817.  The court explained that, where an 
attorney "actively participate[s] in hiding [a fruit or 
instrumentality of a crime], or take[s] possession of it in such 
a way that its discovery becomes less likely," such conduct 
"constitutes an abuse of a lawyer's professional 
responsibilities" (citation omitted).  Id. at 816.  Where, 
however, the attorney does not disrupt or take possession of the 
object, the attorney "has a duty to preserve the confidences of 
the client."  Id. at 817.  See People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 
682, 686 (1981) ("an observation by defense counsel or his 
investigator, which is the product of a privileged 
20 
 
communication, may not be admitted unless the defense by 
altering or removing physical evidence has precluded the 
prosecution from making that same observation"). 
 
C.  Application.  Here, the information that trial counsel 
received from the defendant's mother about what she found in her 
basement was confidential information governed by Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.6, as it concerned the location of an instrumentality of 
the crime.  Trial counsel's belief that he was obligated to 
disclose the information to the prosecution was inaccurate, as 
he did not take possession of the evidence, alter it, or hide 
it.  See Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 816.  Nonetheless, prior to the 
disclosure, trial counsel confronted what he perceived to be an 
ethical dilemma:  he honestly, albeit mistakenly, believed, as 
evidenced by his letter to the defendant and his testimony at 
the hearing, that he had had an obligation to disclose to the 
Commonwealth the location of the jacket and the locked box.  At 
the same time, he was bound by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, and his 
duty of loyalty to his client, to refrain from making the 
disclosure unless he received the defendant's informed consent 
to do so.5 
 
 
5 We do not address the question whether a violation of a 
rule of professional conduct, alone, constitutes behavior 
falling "measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer," for purposes of establishing a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  Under Federal law, a 
21 
 
 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the conflict that 
counsel faced was an actual conflict of interest that rendered 
his representation per se ineffective.  A determination whether 
counsel committed a breach of his duty of confidentiality to the 
defendant is crucial in this analysis.  See McClure, 323 F.3d 
at 1242-1243, quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986) 
("The duty of an attorney to keep his or her client's 
 
violation of a rule of professional conduct may be considered in 
the analysis of ineffectiveness, but such a violation, without 
more, does not necessarily amount to a constitutionally 
deficient performance.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 
(1986) ("breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make 
out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of 
counsel"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) 
("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar 
Association standards and the like . . . are guides to 
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides").  See 
also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000). 
 
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that, "[w]hen 
examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to 
narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth 
Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular 
standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the 
[S]tate's proper authority to define and apply the standards of 
professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice 
in its courts."  See Nix, 475 U.S. at 165.  Many States have 
adopted this approach.  See, e.g., Blackshear v. State, 274 Ga. 
842, 843 (2002); State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 501-502 (Iowa 
2012); Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan. 377, 384 (1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976); Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.3d 148, 
157 (Mo. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 831 (2012); People v. 
Grimes, 32 N.Y.3d 302, 318 (2018); Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 
179-180 (R.I. 2013); Smith v. State, 243 S.W.3d 722, 725 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2007); McCloud v. State, 2021 UT 51, ¶¶ 63-70; State v. 
Cooper, 2019 WI 3, ¶¶ 21-22. 
22 
 
confidences in all but a handful of carefully defined 
circumstances is so deeply ingrained in our legal system and so 
uniformly acknowledged as a critical component of reasonable 
representation by counsel that departure from this rule 'make[s] 
out a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel'"). 
 
The motion judge found that, before the defendant signed 
the statement at the end of the letter indicating his agreement 
with its described plan to disclose, counsel discussed with the 
defendant "the impact of the discovery on the case."  The 
judge's finding is supported by trial counsel's testimony that 
he explained to the defendant the impact that disclosure would 
have on the defendant's right to remain silent at trial.  Thus, 
notwithstanding the defendant's assertions to the contrary, 
counsel did communicate to the client at least something about 
the risks of disclosure.  The motion judge did not find, 
however, that counsel communicated to the defendant the 
"reasonably available alternatives" to disclosure, which Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.0 mandates as necessary to establish informed 
consent.  Nor is there any evidence in the record that would 
have supported such a finding; trial counsel did not assert that 
he discussed with the defendant any option other than 
disclosure, and the letter that counsel wrote and handed to the 
defendant presents disclosure as the sole available option.  In 
that letter, counsel stated explicitly that he had an "ethical 
23 
 
obligation" to share the information that he had learned with 
the prosecution team, and that it was his "intent to see that 
the authorities . . . recover the weapon and coat 
independently." 
 
Certainly, nondisclosure of the information was a 
"reasonably available alternative" that the defendant should 
have been advised to consider.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0.  Even 
if trial counsel believed that disclosure was the defendant's 
best option from a strategic point of view, in light of the 
concern that the defendant's mother potentially would share the 
information with police or the prosecutor if counsel or the 
defendant did not do so, the decision whether to disclose the 
confidential information was the defendant's to make.  At a 
minimum, counsel should have discussed with him the potential 
impact of not disclosing the information, and the various 
possible risks associated with pursuing such a strategy, which 
potentially could have avoided certain powerful evidence being 
put before the jury.  Absent evidence of such a discussion, we 
cannot say that the defendant's consent was "informed."  See 
McClure, 323 F.3d at 1244 (defendant "can provide valid consent 
only if there has been appropriate 'consultation' with his or 
her attorney"); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0 comment 6. 
Moreover, on this record, we are unable to conclude that 
the defendant's purported consent was voluntarily given.  Trial 
24 
 
counsel did not testify, and the record does not suggest, that, 
during the attorney's jailhouse visit, he informed the indigent 
defendant that the defendant could seek to have his current 
counsel withdraw and to be appointed a different attorney.  
Counsel explicitly stated in his letter that he knew the 
disclosure would harm the defendant and that, in reaching his 
decision to disclose, counsel had taken into consideration the 
"other" interests at stake, making abundantly clear to the 
defendant that the defendant's interests were not counsel's 
only, or highest, priority.  As counsel offered the defendant no 
other option aside from disclosure, and counsel gave the 
defendant reason to doubt that disclosure was in his best 
interests, the defendant's consent to disclosure was not 
voluntary; a choice cannot be voluntary if, in fact, it is not a 
choice. 
 
Having determined that counsel committed a breach of the 
duty of confidentiality, we turn to consider whether this breach 
evinced an actual conflict of interest.  We have recognized that 
a conflict of interest can exist between a lawyer's duty of 
confidentiality to a client and another, separate obligation of 
the lawyer.  See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 432 Mass. 767, 780-
781 (2000), S.C., 445 Mass. 626 (2005).  For instance, we have 
concluded that an actual conflict of interest existed by virtue 
of a criminal defense attorney's agreement with a television 
25 
 
company, pursuant to which counsel wore a wireless microphone so 
that his purportedly confidential conversations with his client 
could be recorded to provide material for a television 
documentary.  See Perkins, 450 Mass. at 854.  We explained that 
an actual conflict of interest existed in those circumstances 
because, 
"[o]n the one hand, counsel had a duty to give undivided 
loyalty to and zealous representation of his client.  On 
the other hand, counsel assumed the obligation of wearing a 
wireless microphone and giving third parties seemingly 
unfettered access to his confidential relationship with the 
defendant.  These competing responsibilities created an 
actual conflict of interest for counsel, and the defendant 
was not required to show, pursuant to art. 12, that the 
conflict resulted in actual prejudice or that it had an 
adverse effect on counsel's performance." 
 
Id. 
 
Although Perkins involved a conflict between counsel's duty 
of confidentiality to a client and counsel's voluntarily assumed 
duty to a third party, a conflict also can exist between 
counsel's duty zealously to advocate for a client and counsel's 
personal interest in avoiding violating other ethical rules.  In 
Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 127 (D.C. 1985), for 
instance, a defendant filed a complaint with the bar 
disciplinary authority arguing that his trial counsel had failed 
to undertake diligent efforts to obtain his release pending 
trial.  Counsel was unaware of the complaint until the second 
day of the defendant's trial, when counsel was informed by bar 
26 
 
counsel that bar counsel was opening an inquiry into his 
conduct.  Id. at 128.  After learning of this investigation, the 
trial judge sua sponte declared a mistrial on the ground of a 
conflict of interest.  Id. at 128-129. 
 
In reviewing the propriety of the trial judge's actions, 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that, had trial 
counsel continued to represent the defendant without the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently agreeing to waive the 
conflict, the representation likely would have been 
constitutionally ineffective, and would have deprived the 
defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  
See id. at 137.  The court explained that, 
"as soon as [trial counsel] learned of Bar Counsel's 
intention to pursue an investigation of appellant's 
complaint, he acquired a personal interest in the way he 
conducted appellant's defense -- an interest independent 
of, and in some respects in conflict with, appellant's 
interest in obtaining a judgment of acquittal.  For 
instance, fearing that appellant's complaint to Bar Counsel 
might later be expanded to include claims of ineffective 
assistance at trial, [trial counsel] would have an 
inordinate interest in conducting the defense in a manner 
calculated to minimize any opportunity for post hoc 
criticism of his efforts.  This could compromise [trial 
counsel's] professional judgment about the best means of 
defending this particular case; it could encourage the most 
standard or conservative trial strategy, as well as 
overcautious tactical decisions and courtroom demeanor.  
Furthermore, concerns about the pending investigation might 
impede communications between appellant and [trial 
counsel].  [Trial counsel] might be apprehensive about 
sharing with appellant the reasons behind tactical defense 
decisions and refrain from disclosing to appellant any 
unexpected problem that arose during the course of trial.  
Appellant, in turn, might be reluctant to question [trial 
27 
 
counsel's] trial decisions for fear of further alienating 
counsel in the midst of trial."  (Footnote omitted.) 
 
Id. at 136-137.  See, e.g., Patterson, 432 Mass. at 780 (actual 
conflict existed where defendant's "interests would be better 
served by having the attorney testify [as a defense witness] 
while the attorney's interests would be better served by not 
testifying"); State v. Taylor, 1 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1999) (actual conflict of interest rendered representation 
ineffective where defense counsel was "caught between his 
obligation to do his best for [the defendant] and a desire to 
protect his own reputation and financial interests"); State v. 
Armstrong, 290 Neb. 991, 1015–1016 (2015) (actual conflict 
between defense counsel's interest in avoiding criminal or 
ethical sanctions and defendant's interest in presenting 
strongest defense possible rendered representation ineffective). 
 
Similarly, in Jones, 278 Mont. at 131, 133-134, the Montana 
Supreme Court held that, for purposes of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a presumption of prejudice was warranted 
where, during a hearing on a defense attorney's motion to 
withdraw, the attorney disclosed confidential client information 
to the judge and expressly criticized the client's decision to 
exercise his right to trial.  The court determined that the 
lawyer "totally abandoned his duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality to [the defendant] by putting his personal 
28 
 
interest in not wanting to take [the] case to trial ahead of 
[the defendant's] interest in representation by an attorney 
devoted solely to his interest in exercising his right to 
trial," id. at 134, and that this behavior "created 'an obvious 
conflict of interest,'" id. at 133, quoting Frazer v. United 
States, 18 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1994).  See Frazer, supra 
at 783 (conflict of interest existed where lawyer verbally 
assaulted client and threatened to provide substandard 
performance if client chose to exercise right to trial); Taylor 
v. State, 428 Md. 386, 409-410 (2012) (presumption of prejudice 
due to conflict of interest applies where attorney creates "an 
adversarial relationship" with client defendant by filing suit 
against defendant for unpaid legal fees prior to defendant's 
trial). 
 
For similar reasons, we conclude that, here, despite the 
fact that his firmly and honestly held view of his ethical 
duties was misguided and inaccurate, trial counsel experienced 
an actual conflict of interest between what he thought were his 
ethical duties and his duties toward his client.  Counsel did 
not demonstrate "undivided loyalty" to the defendant.  See 
Perkins, 450 Mass. at 850.  Rather, he stated plainly in his 
letter that he was acting "for the protection of many people," 
albeit that he also explained that he was "aware" that the 
information disclosed would "not help" the defendant's case.  
29 
 
Tellingly, counsel's belief that he was ethically obligated to 
disclose meant that he had a "personal interest in the way he 
conducted [the defendant's] defense -- an interest independent 
of, and in some respects in conflict with, [the defendant's] 
interest in obtaining a judgment of acquittal."  See Douglas, 
488 A.2d at 136.  Here, counsel's contrary interests and 
concerns are evidenced by the fact that he was single-mindedly 
focused on obtaining the defendant's consent to disclosure, and 
did not present or meaningfully explore potential courses of 
conduct other than disclosure or, more importantly, allow the 
defendant to consider other courses of conduct. 
 
Counsel's actions also cannot be justified on the basis of 
trial strategy.  "The very problem with an attorney's conflict 
of interest is that the attorney's judgment about strategic 
choices is clouded by the conflict."  Patterson, 432 Mass. at 
780 n.18.  Although the motion judge found that trial counsel 
had decided that disclosure was the best strategic option for 
the defendant to pursue, this determination is "suspect because 
it is not possible to determine reliably to what extent the 
decision[] [was] based on valid strategic considerations and to 
what extent the decision[] [was] the result of impermissible 
considerations" of trial counsel's perceived ethical obligation 
to the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Michel, 381 Mass. 447, 
454 n.10 (1980).  See also Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 817 (tactics or 
30 
 
strategy did not support trial counsel's disclosure of location 
of knife defendant used to stab his wife, as disclosure was 
premised on counsel's false understanding that he was ethically 
obligated to disclose and "tactics were developed as a means to 
deal with the disclosure").  The conflict thus "foreclose[d] 
alternatives that would otherwise [have been] available" to the 
defendant.  See Perkins, 450 Mass. at 851, quoting Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.7 comment 4.  In these circumstances, we cannot say 
that the defendant received the effective assistance of counsel; 
he therefore is entitled to a new trial under art. 12 without a 
further showing of prejudice.  See Stote, 456 Mass. at 217. 
D.  Permissible courses of action in similar circumstances.  
We emphasize that attorneys confronting similar circumstances to 
those counsel did here, where they know of the location of 
possibly incriminating information but take no action to obtain 
possession of or to conceal or destroy any potentially 
inculpatory objects, violate no ethical rule by remaining 
silent.  Nonetheless, if, in light of the attorney's knowledge, 
the attorney believes that he or she would be unable zealously 
to represent the client and to provide "thorough and competent 
representation," or that there has been an irreconcilable 
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the attorney 
should seek to withdraw well before trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Walter, 396 Mass. 549, 558 (1986) ("motion [to withdraw] would 
31 
 
have been a proper, thoughtful, and prudent action for [defense 
counsel] to take if he believed he was faced with a possible 
conflict as opposed to a genuine conflict").  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 305-306 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 297 (2004).  Of course, if 
the attorney were to withdraw, any successor attorney to 
represent the client likely would confront similar issues, 
particularly if prior counsel had made any notes concerning the 
conflict in the client's file.  See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 
438 Mass. 535, 548, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 907 (2003) 
("Appointment of new counsel would simply have shifted the 
ethical dilemma from one attorney to another").  But a decision 
to protect a client's confidential information by saying nothing 
does not represent interference with the Commonwealth's pursuit 
of its case. 
Moreover, even if a defendant properly is informed and 
chooses to withhold his or her consent to disclosure following a 
full and adequate discussion with counsel, the attorney later 
may confront other ethical issues in the continued 
representation of the client, stemming from counsel's 
"fundamental duty as an 'officer' of the court, who 'must not 
allow the tribunal to be misled by . . . evidence that [he or 
she] knows to be false.'"  See Commonwealth v. Leiva, 484 Mass. 
766, 778 (2020), quoting Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 comment 2, as 
32 
 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015).  A criminal defense attorney 
"who knows that the defendant, the client, intends to testify 
falsely . . . has a duty strongly to discourage the client from 
testifying falsely, advising that such a course is unlawful, 
will have substantial adverse consequences, and should not be 
followed."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e).  To be subject to this 
duty, the attorney must have actual knowledge that the client 
will testify falsely; a reasonable belief that a client might do 
so does not trigger similar obligations.  See Mitchell, 438 
Mass. at 544-548.  So long as counsel confines his or her 
examination of a defendant to matters about which counsel does 
not know a defendant will testify falsely, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.3 (e) comment 8, counsel may balance the duty to advocate 
zealously for the client and to maintain client confidentiality 
with the "fundamental duty as an 'officer' of the court" not to 
mislead the tribunal, see Leiva, 484 Mass. at 778, quoting Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e) comment 2. 
 
iii.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant asserts that trial 
counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the defendant's 
statement about throwing the gun off a bridge, as the defendant 
was in police custody at the time that he was questioned about 
the location of the gun, and he had not yet been advised of his 
Miranda rights. 
33 
 
 
At trial, counsel informed the judge that he had made a 
strategic decision not to seek to suppress the statement given 
without the benefit of Miranda warnings.  The prosecutor then 
explained that the parties had reached an agreement under which 
the defendant would not seek to suppress his statement about the 
gun and the prosecutor would not introduce a statement that the 
defendant made at the Fall River police station, after he had 
been advised of his Miranda rights. 
 
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that 
trial counsel made a strategic error in stipulating to the 
introduction of the defendant's first statement to police, prior 
to being provided his Miranda rights, and the exclusion of the 
recorded statement; the defendant argued, in particular, that 
the introduction of the first statement further damaged his 
case.  As stated, in her denial of the motion for a new trial, 
the judge did not address this argument.  Because we conclude 
that counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest, we 
need not reach the issue whether counsel also was ineffective in 
failing to seek suppression of the first statement.  Of course, 
on remand for a new trial, the parties may litigate anew any of 
the previously stipulated-to issues, as well as any other issue 
concerning the evidence to be introduced or excluded at trial. 
 
b.  Direct appeal.  In his direct appeal, the defendant 
argues that his convictions under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), which 
34 
 
prohibits carrying a firearm without a license, and G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), which prohibits carrying a loaded firearm 
without a license, cannot both stand.  He maintains that 
conviction of both of these offenses constitutes impermissible 
duplicative punishment, as the criminal actions for which he is 
being punished under each charge are "so closely related in fact 
as to constitute in substance but a single crime."  See 
Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371 (2002), quoting 
Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 662-663 (1979). 
 
We addressed this issue in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 486 
Mass. 469, 473 (2020).  There, the Commonwealth had charged the 
defendant only under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) (unlicensed loaded 
firearm), and not under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (unlicensed 
firearm).  We concluded that this was impermissible under the 
statute, as the Legislature intended a charge under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), to constitute further punishment of a 
defendant who also had been convicted under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a).  See Taylor, supra at 474-475.  Accordingly, we 
determined that "G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), is not a freestanding 
crime; it must be accompanied by a charge of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a) or (c)."  Id. at 475.  Thus, the defendant's argument 
that his convictions under both G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), constitute duplicative punishment is 
unavailing. 
35 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
for a new trial is vacated and set aside, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.