Title: LA Ray Realty v. Town Council
Citation: 603 A.2d 311
Docket Number: N/A
State: rhode-island
Issuer: rhode-island Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 1992

603 A.2d 311 (1992) L.A. RAY REALTY et al. v. TOWN COUNCIL OF the TOWN OF CUMBERLAND et al. No. 90-328-A. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. February 6, 1992. Michael Kelly, John Webster, Adler, Pollock &amp; Sheehan, Providence, for plaintiffs. Richard E. Kirby, Woonsocket, for defendants. WEISBERGER, Justice. This case comes before us on the plaintiffs' appeal from a judgment of dismissal of their complaint entered by the Superior Court and also from the denial of their motion for summary judgment. We reverse. The facts of the case are set forth in a stipulation to which the parties have agreed. Said stipulation of facts is set forth below. As will be noted from the stipulation of facts, plaintiffs contend that an ordinance initiated by the electors of the town of Cumberland and providing for a minimum lot size of two acres for any lot in an agricultural A or B zoning district is invalid as inconsistent with the provisions of G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) chapters 23 of title 45, which governs the subdivision of land, and chapter 24 of title 45, which is the enabling act allowing city and town councils to adopt zoning ordinances. The plaintiffs raise a number of constitutional issues as well, but we need not reach the constitutional issues since we regard this case as controlled by the foregoing comprehensive statutes that govern the instant controversy. It should be noted that § 45-23-2 authorizes city and town councils to appoint plan commissions and to empower such commissions to adopt, modify, and amend rules and regulations to control the subdivision of land in each of the municipalities. Such a plan commission was appointed for the town of Cumberland and did, as indicated in stipulation 6, promulgate subdivision regulations governing the size of lots within the relevant areas. It should also be noted that §§ 45-24-2 and 45-24-3 authorize each city or town council to adopt a comprehensive plan through ordinances to govern land use, to prevent the overcrowding of land, to avoid undue concentration of population, and to encourage the most appropriate use of land throughout the town or municipality. These general grants of power by the Legislature to city and town councils would obviously authorize ordinances and regulations to be issued either by the plan commission or the city or town council that would govern and establish, among other requirements, minimum lot sizes for the erection of dwellings. It is significant to observe that both §§ 45-23-4 and 45-24-4 require the plan commission (in the case of chapter 23) and the city or town council (in respect to chapter 24) to give notice of a public hearing prior to adopting or amending rules or regulations relating either to subdivision of land or to zoning ordinances. Further, § 45-24-4(b) requires a city or town council to issue individual notices when a proposed amendment to an existing *314 ordinance includes a change in an existing zoning map.[1] The purpose of these notice requirements, either by publication or individual notice, is to give the owners of affected property or those who may be interested in proposed zoning or subdivision amendments an opportunity to come before the relevant body, either plan commission or municipal council, and express their opinions. The hearing gives interested parties a chance to make their views known to the governing body and to testify or argue either for or against the proposed regulation or amendment. We have held that such public notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the validity of the proposed modification. Quigley v. Town of Glocester, 520 A.2d 975 (R.I. 1987). See also Federal Building &amp; Development Corp. v. Town of Jamestown, 112 R.I. 478, 312 A.2d 586 (1973). The rationale behind this jurisdictional imperative was set forth in Golden Gate Corp. v. Town of Narragansett, 116 R.I. 552, 359 A.2d 321 (1976), as the requirement that when a statute mandates a hearing to which the public is invited and at which it is to be afforded the opportunity to be heard, the right to be heard implicitly carries with it "`a reasonable hope of being heeded.'" Id. at 562, 359 A.2d at 326. We reemphasized this proposition in Quigley, 520 A.2d at 979, also noting that a zoning ordinance is a restriction on a land-estate owner's common law right to the unfettered use of his or her land. This requirement of a meaningful public hearing and the rights of land owners that underlie the requirement cannot be compatible with an ordinance adopted by an initiative or referendum. In the town of Cumberland, as in other municipalities throughout the state, the electorate consists of many thousands of individuals. No meaningful public hearing could be held that could possibly carry with it a reasonable hope of being heeded. In Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973), a similar problem was encountered by the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. There a statewide statute (as opposed to a municipal-charter provision) authorized the adoption and amendment of ordinances by the voters of any municipality. Pursuant to this authority the voters of the township of Sparta adopted an amendment to the zoning ordinance by referendum. In a companion case the voters of the township of Mount Olive also adopted an amendment to the zoning ordinance by referendum. In a declaratory-judgment proceeding the opinion of the court was sought to determine whether the referendum provisions of the statute (Faulkner Act) were applicable to amendments of a zoning ordinance. The Appellate Division affirmed the rulings of the trial judges that the referendum procedure was not applicable to the amendment of a zoning ordinance. In so holding, the court emphasized that certain aspects of the zoning statute seemed inherently incompatible with the referendum process. Among the elements of incompatibility was the very likely probability that the publicity that might accompany the referendum campaign and the exposure and discussion of the issues generated thereby would not be a substitute for the public hearings that would normally be required by the zoning statute prior to adoption or amendment. In Westgate Families v. County Clerk of the Incorporated County of Los Alamos, 100 N.M. 146, 667 P.2d 453 (1983), the Supreme Court of New Mexico, after considering the statewide zoning statute as a whole, determined that the act required that zoning be carried out by representative bodies and not by referendum. A similar holding was enunciated in Elliott v. City of Clawson, 21 Mich. App. 363, 175 N.W.2d 821 (1970). In that case the Michigan Appellate Court reasoned that the requirement of public notice and hearing in the adoption and amendment of zoning ordinances was "`hopelessly inconsistent'" *315 and in conflict with the initiative and referendum authorized by the city charter. Id. at 367, 175 N.W.2d at 823. The court suggested that it would be an idle proceeding for the board of trustees, after an initiative petition is presented to it, to enter upon an investigation of a proper zoning plan, to give notice of and conduct hearings for the benefit of interested property owners and the public in general, and at the conclusion of its deliberations to have no power to change the terms of the proposed ordinance. Id. We believe that the rationale of these cases applies forcefully to the instant controversy. The safeguards and procedural requirements incident to the adoption or amendment of subdivision regulations or zoning ordinances contained in the general enabling acts are inconsistent with and incompatible with the exercise of direct legislation by the voters through the initiative or referendum process. A consideration of our subdivision and zoning statutes in their entirety would make such inconsistencies and incompatibility apparent. These statutory provisions are of statewide application and cannot be superseded by the authority of a municipal home-rule charter. See Cranston v. Hall, 116 R.I. 183, 354 A.2d 415 (1976). The defendant has relied heavily upon an opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 96 S. Ct. 2358, 49 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1976). This opinion dealt only with the applicability of the United States Constitution to a referendum provision authorized by the Ohio Constitution. In that case the Supreme Court of Ohio had held that the Federal Constitution would not allow amendments to zoning ordinances by popular initiative and/or referendum since it was a delegation of power violative of federal constitutional guarantees. The Court in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger held only that the Federal Constitution did not inhibit the enforcement of such a provision in the Ohio Constitution. Nor, it determined, was the referendum process in itself violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case at bar we are not construing either the United States Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island. We are considering only the compatibility of the charter provision of the town of Cumberland authorizing a referendum in respect to land use with the statutory enabling acts relating to the subdivision of land and the adoption or amendment of zoning ordinances. No constitutional adjudication is required to resolve the instant controversy. We have held that the initiative and referendum provision of the charter of the town of Cumberland would not be competent to authorize the procedure to be used to adopt or to amend either a regulation for the subdivision of land or an ordinance regulating zoning in the town. This holding is based upon the inconsistency between the adoption of ordinances by initiative and referendum and the procedural safeguards contained in the general enabling statutes. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider the other issues raised by the parties. For the reasons stated, the plaintiffs' appeal is sustained and the judgment of dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint is hereby reversed. The case may be remanded to the Superior Court with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. [1] It is argued by defendant in the instant case that the amendment adopted by popular vote did not require a change in the zoning map. For purposes of this opinion we shall assume that defendant's contention is correct. However, we note this provision only in determining whether the adoption of an ordinance by initiative or referendum is compatible with the hearing requirements set forth in the general enabling acts.