Title: Matter of Arzuaga-Guevara
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 506, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 23, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN THE MATTER OF 
§
MICHAEL ARZUAGA-GUEVARA,§  No. 506, 2001
a minor,
§
Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children,§  Court BelowCourt of Chancery
§  of the State of Delaware,
Petitioner,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  C.M. No. 10211
v.
§
§
Yadira Guevara, Mother and
§
Jonathan Arzuaga, Father,
§
§
Respondents.
§
  Submitted:  October 17, 2001
     Decided:  October 23, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery.  AFFIRMED.
James Brendan O’Neill, Esquire (argued) and James D. Nutter,
Esquire (argued), Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware,
for appellant, Jonathan Arzuaga.
Kathryn J. Laffey, Esquire (argued), Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorney Guardian Ad Litem for Michael Arzuaga-Guevara.
David J. Ferry, Jr., Esquire (argued), and Rick S. Miller, Esquire,
Ferry & Joseph, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Mother, Yidira
Guevara.
John A. Parkins, Jr., Esquire (argued) and Steven J. Fineman,
Esquire, Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Delaware, for
petitioner, Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children.
2
HOLLAND, Justice:
3
Five-month-old Michael Arzuaga-Guevara (“Michael”) is a patient
in the pediatric intensive care unit at the Alfred I. duPont Hospital for
Children (“Hospital”).  Michael is suffering from severe brain damage and
other injuries allegedly inflicted by his father, Jonathan Arzuaga
(“Father”).  It is undisputed that Michael will spend the rest of his life in a
persistent vegetative state.
This is an appeal by the Father from a final judgment entered by the
Court of Chancery on October 9, 2001.  The Court of Chancery issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order1 appointing Yadira Guevara (“Mother”)
as the permanent guardian for Michael.  That order gave the Mother
authority to instruct the Hospital to withdraw the ventilator that is assisting
Michael’s ability to breathe.  In this appeal, the Father does not challenge
the merits of the Court of Chancery’s findings that Michael has suffered
severe permanent brain injuries and that it is in his best interest to de-
escalate life support to allow nature to take its course.
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Court of
Chancery had jurisdiction over the guardian proceedings that were initiated
by the Hospital.  We have concluded that the Court of Chancery had
4
jurisdiction to act upon the Hospital’s petition.  Accordingly, the judgment
of the Court of Chancery is affirmed.
Substantive Facts
On September 1, 2001, Michael was admitted to the pediatric
intensive care unit at the Hospital.  Michael has remained in intensive care
since the date of his admission.  He is being kept alive with the assistance
of life support through the use of a ventilator and feeding tube.
Michael’s doctors have diagnosed him as suffering from multiple
serious injuries, including extensive irreversible brain damage.  Michael’s
doctors agree that Michael will never be able to walk, talk, see, feed
himself, or perform even the most basic cognitive functions.  He will
require constant, intense medical intervention for the remainder of his life.
Although Michael is in a persistent vegetative state, the evidence is
uncontroverted that the medical technology presently in place can extend
the length of Michael’s life.  Michael’s treating physicians all agree that
the quality of his extended life will always be abysmal.  It is also
uncontroverted that Michael will likely die within a short period of time if
he is taken off the ventilator.  An independent medical examination
                                                                                                         
1 In re Michael Arzuaga-Guevara, Del. Ch., C.M. No. 10211, Lamb, V.C. (Oct. 9,
5
conducted at the request of Michael’s attorney guardian ad litem
corroborates the diagnosis and prognosis of the treating physicians.
Almost immediately after Michael’s admission to the hospital, New
Castle County police officers arrested Jonathan Arzuaga, Michael’s natural
father, for suspicion of crimes associated with Michael’s injuries.  To date,
Jonathan Arzuaga remains in custody at Delaware Correctional Center in
default of secured bail.  On October 9, 2001, a grand jury in New Castle
County returned an indictment against Jonathan Arzuaga charging him with
Assault by Abuse or Neglect,2 Assault in the Second Degree,3 Endangering
the Welfare of a Child (two counts)4 and Offensive Touching.5  No
arraignment date has been set.
Shortly after Michael’s admission to the hospital, his parents
disagreed on whether to place a “Do Not Resuscitate Order” (“DNR
Order”) on his medical chart.  Michael’s Mother agreed to have a DNR
Order placed on Michael’s medical chart.  Michael’s Father refused to
consent to the placement of a DNR Order.  This litigation was commenced
                                                                                                         
2001)(Op. and Order).
2 11 Del. C. § 615.
3 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(1).
4 11 Del. C. § 1102.
5 11 Del. C. § 601.
6
because Michael’s Mother and Father could not agree on the course of
Michael’s treatment.
Procedural Facts
On September 13, 2001, in an effort to obtain definitive guidance
regarding Michael’s medical care, the Hospital filed an emergency petition
in the Court of Chancery.  The Hospital’s petition was filed pursuant to 12
Del. C. § 3901 and sought to have the Mother appointed as interim
guardian for purposes of consenting to or withholding Michael’s medical
treatment.  The Court of Chancery scheduled a hearing to determine
whether to appoint the Mother as Michael’s interim guardian.  Prior to that
hearing, the Court of Chancery appointed Kathryn Laffey, Esquire, who is
acting on a pro bono basis, as an attorney guardian ad litem for Michael.
The Father has been represented by counsel from the Office of the Public
Defender throughout the course of all proceedings.
On September 19, 2001, an evidentiary hearing on the Hospital’s
emergency petition was held by the Court of Chancery.  At the hearing,
counsel for the Father objected to the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction,
arguing that the Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction.  The Father also
7
suggested that a third party be appointed as Michael’s interim guardian
instead of the Mother.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court of Chancery granted the
Hospital’s petition and appointed the Mother as Michael’s interim
guardian.6  The Court of Chancery’s order specifically allowed her to
consent to the entry of a DNR Order.  That order precluded her, however,
from consenting to the de-escalation of life support.
Subsequently, the attorney guardian ad litem appointed for Michael
filed a motion with the Court of Chancery.  That motion sought the entry
of an order instructing the Hospital to de-escalate medical intervention and
the placement of a “Do Not Re-Intubate Order” on Michael’s medical
chart.  A hearing was scheduled for October 2, 2001.  Once again, the
Father was represented by counsel.  David Ferry, Esquire, also acting on a
pro bono basis, represented the Mother at that hearing and has continued to
represent her.
At the October 2, 2001 hearing, counsel for the Father again
objected to the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction.  The hearing proceeded
over the Father’s objection.  The attorney guardian ad litem presented
8
testimony from one of Michael’s attending physicians and a neurologist at
the hearing.  The Mother also testified.  The Father did not testify or
present any evidence.
A few days after the October 2 hearing, the Court of Chancery
entered an opinion and order granting the relief sought.  The portion of
that order that permitted the Mother to consent to the de-escalation of life
support was stayed by the Court of Chancery, however, to allow the Father
time to appeal to this Court.  Upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, this
Court entered an order requiring expedited briefing and continuing the
stay.
Chancery Asserts Guardianship Jurisdiction
The Court of Chancery held that it was vested with jurisdiction to act
on the Hospital’s guardianship petition pursuant to 12 Del. C. § 3901.  The
express language of 12 Del. C. § 3901 specifically vests the Court of
Chancery with jurisdiction to appoint guardians for disabled persons.  That
section states “[t]he Court of Chancery shall have the power to appoint
guardians for the person or property, or both, of any disabled person resident
of this State . . . .”  Section 3901 defines a “disabled person” as “any person
                                                                                                         
6 In re Michael Arzuaga-Guevara, Del. Ch., C.M. No. 10211, Lamb, V.C. (Sept. 21,
2001)(ORDER).
9
who . . . [b]y reason of being under the age of 18 is legally unable to manage
their own property or make decisions concerning the care of their own
person . . . .”
Michael Arzuaga-Guevara was approximately four months old when
this petition was filed.  Accordingly, by definition, Michael is a “disabled
person” within the meaning of Section 3901.  Thus, there can be no question
that the unambiguous language in Section 3901 vests the Court of Chancery
with jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for purposes of consenting to
Michael’s medical care.
Father’s Argument
The only issue the Father raises on appeal challenges the jurisdiction
of the Court of Chancery to appoint a guardian for Michael.  The Father
acknowledges that Section 3901 expressly grants that jurisdiction to the
Court of Chancery.  Nevertheless, the Father contends that the Court of
Chancery was divested of subject matter jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
unambiguous provisions in Section 3901, either because the Family Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over guardianships for minors or because an
adequate remedy at law was available to the Hospital in the Family Court.
The Father bases his alternative arguments on the following statutes:  10
10
Del. C. § 921(3),7 which grants the Family Court exclusive original civil
jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning petitions or actions for the
protection or care of children; 10 Del. C. § 921(4),8 which he alleges grants
the Family Court exclusive original civil jurisdiction in all proceedings
concerning judicial consent to medical care of a child when such consent is
required by law; and 10 Del C. § 925(16),9 which grants the Family Court
general jurisdiction to act in guardianship proceedings involving minors.
Family Court Guardianship Jurisdiction
The Father contends that Sections 921(3), (4) – which define the
Family Court’s exclusive jurisdiction – vest the Family Court with the sole
authority to hear petitions for guardianships.  The terms of Sections 921(3),
(4), however, do not even mention guardians.  Following the enactment of
Section 921, in substantially the same form as it reads today, in an appeal
involving a minor, this Court held in Bunting that “[o]ur Court of Chancery
alone is vested with the power to appoint guardians . . . .”10  The logical
corollary of our holding in Bunting was this Court’s determination that the
                                   
7 10 Del. C. § 921(3) vests the Family Court with exclusive original jurisdiction in all
proceedings on “any petitions or actions, for the education, protection, control,
visitation, possession, custody, care, or support of children . . . .”
8 10 Del. C. § 921(4) vests the Family Court with exclusive original jurisdiction in all
proceedings concerning “[j]udicial consent to employment, medical care, or enlistment
in the armed services of a child when such consent is required by law.”
9 10 Del. C. § 925(16) provides that the Family Court has authority “[t]o appoint
guardians of the person over minors under 18 years of age.”
11
nearly identically-worded predecessor of Sections 921(3), (4) did not grant
the Family Court any jurisdiction to appoint guardians for minors.
Eight years after our holding in Bunting, the General Assembly
enacted 10 Del. C. § 925(16).  The section now provides that “[t]he [Family]
Court and each Judge shall have authority to . . . appoint guardians of the
person over minors under 18 years of age.”  The enactment of Section
925(16) reflects a legislative response to this Court’s holding that Sections
921(3), (4) did not vest the Family Court with any authority to appoint
guardians for minors.
There is no language in Section 925(16), however, that purports to
vest the Family Court with exclusive jurisdiction to appoint guardians for
minors.  Moreover, the legislative history of Section 925(16) reflects that the
section was never intended to confer exclusive guardianship jurisdiction on
the Family Court.  Section 925(16) originated as Senate Bill 247 in the 131st
General Assembly.11  The title to the bill was “An Act . . . Giving Family
Court Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Court of Chancery . . . .”12  The
synopsis to that bill expressly states that the Family Court’s jurisdiction was
to be concurrent with that of the Court of Chancery:  “[t]his Act gives
                                                                                                         
10 In re Bunting, Del. Supr., 311 A.2d 855, 857 (1973).
11 63 Del. Laws, c. 133 (1981).
12 Id.
12
Family Court concurrent authority to appoint guardians of the person over
minors under 18 years of age with the Court of Chancery.”13
In contrast to Section 925, Section 921 provides for certain “exclusive
original civil jurisdiction” in the Family Court.  If the General Assembly
intended that the guardian jurisdiction conferred upon the Family Court in
Section 925(16) was to be exclusive to the Family Court, it would have
included that jurisdictional grant in Section 921.  Therefore, contrary to the
Father’s contention, Section 925(16) – not Sections 921(3), (4) – vests the
Family Court with jurisdiction to appoint guardians for minors and that
jurisdiction is not exclusive.  It is noteworthy that the non-exclusive nature
of the Family Court’s guardian jurisdiction for minors was maintained on
July 10, 2001, when a comprehensive guardianship statute was signed into
law.14
Chancery’s Equity Jurisdiction
Alternatively, relying on 10 Del. C. § 342, the Father argues that the
mere existence of an adequate remedy at law in the Family Court precludes
the assertion of guardianship jurisdiction by the Court of Chancery.15  The
                                   
13 See S.B. 247, 131st Gen. Assem. (Del. 1981).
14 13 Del. C. §§ 2301-2359; 73 Del. Laws, c. 150 (2001).
15 10 Del. C. § 342 reads in pertinent part as follows:  “[t]he Court of Chancery shall
not have jurisdiction to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by
common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State.”
13
operation and application of Section 342 can be understood only in the
historic context of the Court of Chancery’s venerable exercise of general
equity jurisdiction that is now found in Article IV, Section 10 of the
Delaware Constitution.  That general equity jurisdiction can be traced to a
period predating the Declaration of Independence.16
The historical origins of Article IV, Section 10 are found in the
Colonial Act of 1726-1736 (“Gordon Act”).17  The general equity
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was originally established by Sections
21 and 25 of the Gordon Act.  Today, Section 10 of Article IV vests the
Court of Chancery with “all the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court
of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the
colonies, subject to the proviso, originally contained in Section 25 of the
[Gordon Act] . . . to the effect that the Chancellor shall not hear and
determine any cause where a sufficient remedy exists at law.”18  Judge
Rodney has succinctly summarized the scope of Article IV, Section 10 of the
                                   
16 See D. Wolfe and M. Pittinger, Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, § 2-2 The Historical Antecedents of Chancery’s Equity Jurisdiction
at 2-2 (2000).
17 duPont v. duPont, Del. Supr., 85 A.2d 724, 727 (1951).  Between 1726 and 1736,
during the tenure of Governor Patrick Gordon, “An Act for the Establishing Courts of
Law and Equity within this Government” (“Gordon Act”) was passed.  1 Del. Laws, c.
LIV (1700-1797).  By this Act, a court of equity was created for Delaware (then the
Lower Three Counties of Pennsylvania).
18 duPont v. duPont, 85 A.2d at  727.
14
present 1897 Constitution and its corresponding antecedents in Delaware’s
earlier constitutions:
The jurisdiction of equitable causes given by Sec. 21 [of the
Gordon Act] was, as we have seen, translated into
constitutional provisions, and has appeared in every
constitution of the State.  No new jurisdiction was given by
these constitutions, however, but that same jurisdiction was
continued that existed under the original Section 21 . . . .
That jurisdiction was as expressly limited by Sec. 25 of the
same Act because the grant of jurisdiction by Sec. 21, together
with its limitation of that jurisdiction by Sec. 25, is the
jurisdiction which existed and which has been continued from
that time.19
The Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction is also addressed in Article IV,
Section 17 of the Delaware Constitution of 1897.  Section 17 provides that
the General Assembly “shall have power to repeal or alter any Act of the
General Assembly giving jurisdiction to . . . the Court of Chancery . . . and
to confer upon . . . the Court of Chancery jurisdiction and powers in addition
to those hereinbefore mentioned.”20  The question of the General Assembly’s
authority to alter the historic Article IV, Section 10 general equitable
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was answered by this Court in duPont
v. duPont.21
                                   
19 Glanding v. Industrial Trust Co., Del. Supr., 45 A.2d 553, 561 (1945) (Rodney, J.,
dissenting).
20 DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 17.
21 duPont v. duPont, Del. Supr., 85 A.2d 724 (1951).
15
In duPont, this Court rejected the contention that Section 17 of the
1897 Constitution authorized the General Assembly to abrogate the general
equitable jurisdiction vested in the Court of Chancery by Section 10.  Our
analysis in duPont focused initially on the 1792 Delaware Constitution.  We
noted that, in 1792, for the first time, a separate Court of Chancery was
vested with constitutionally defined jurisdiction which could not be
disturbed by the General Assembly.22  We determined that this was made
clear, in particular, by the absence in the Constitution of 1792 of a
counterpart to Section 17 in the 1897 Constitution.23
Accordingly, in duPont, we asked:  What was the purpose of
including the first sentence of what is now Section 17 in the 1831
Constitution, which authorized the General Assembly to repeal or alter any
act giving jurisdiction to the Court of Chancery, since general equity
jurisdiction had been vested in the Court of Chancery by the 1792
Constitution and secured from statutory legislative action?24  The answer
was that between 1792 and 1831, the General Assembly had increased the
powers of the Chancellor by statute.  Consequently, we determined that it
was only with respect to these statutory enhancements of the Court of
                                   
22 Id. at 728.  See also William T. Quillen, Equity Jurisdiction in Delaware Before
1792, 2 DELAWARE LAWYER 18 (1984).
23 duPont v. duPont, 85 A.2d at 729-30.
16
Chancery’s jurisdiction that the General Assembly was authorized to act,
when Section 17 was added to the 1831 Constitution.
Throughout the period from 1831 to 1897, the General Assembly had
continued to confer additional powers upon the Chancellor and the Court of
Chancery.  Accordingly, the 1897 Constitution added a sentence in Section
17 expressly giving the General Assembly power to expand the Court of
Chancery’s jurisdiction beyond its historic equitable origins.  In duPont, we
concluded that Section 17 is not an authorization for the General Assembly
to restrict the Court of Chancery’s general equity jurisdiction to less than it
was in 1792.
The result in duPont, therefore, was our holding “that the general
equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is measured in terms of the
general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain
and is a constitutional grant not subject to legislative curtailment, except in
so far as the proviso . . . originally found as Section 25 of the [Gordon] Act
of 1726-1736, operates to curtail it.”25  In duPont, “we also held that the
Constitutions of 1792, 1831 and 1897 intended to establish for the benefit of
the people of the state a tribunal to administer the remedies and principles of
                                                                                                         
24 Id.
25 Id. at 729.
17
equity.26  Consequently, the historical equitable jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery to hear a matter cannot be divested simply by the legislative
enactment of a new statute addressing the same subject matter.27  The
General Assembly must expressly make the subject matter exclusive to the
new tribunal:  “[i]t is settled that Chancery [historic equitable] jurisdiction
remains, notwithstanding the statutory creation of jurisdiction of the subject
matter in another court and a remedy elsewhere that may be adequate, unless
the remedy is equivalent and is expressly made exclusive in the other
tribunal.”28
When Title 10 of the Delaware Code was revised in 1953, what had
originally appeared as Sections 21 and 25 of the Gordon Act were
reconstituted as Sections 341 and 342.  Section 341, derived from Section
21 of the Gordon Act, provides that “[t]he Court of Chancery shall have
                                   
26 Id.
27 In duPont, we observed that any other construction of Article IV, Section 17 would
permit the practical abolition of all courts by the action of one legislative session.
duPont v. duPont, Del. Supr., 85 A.2d 724, 729-30 (1951).  Such authority would be
in direct conflict with the provisions providing for the amendment of the Delaware
Constitution.  Id.  Such authority would also nullify the “open courts” provision in
Article 9 of Section I that has appeared in every Delaware Constitution since 1792.  Id.
28 Diebold Computer Leasing, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Corp., Del. Supr., 267 A.2d
586, 591 (1970).  See also Douglas v. Thrasher, Del. Supr., 489 A.2d 422, 426 (1985)
(holding that statute conferring jurisdiction on the Family Court over support
agreements does not preclude Chancery jurisdiction over a third party’s claims where
such claims are not made exclusive to the Family Court); Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., Del.
Ch., 429 A.2d 995, 998 (1981).
18
jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity.”29
Section 342, based upon Section 25 of the Gordon Act, provides that “[t]he
Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter
wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before
any other court or jurisdiction of this State.”30
Our brief summary of the Court of Chancery’s general equity
jurisdiction and the colonial origins of Section 342 places the Father’s
alternative Section 342 equitable “adequate remedy at law” argument into
perspective.  Section 342 is “a mere declaration of the ancient rule of
equity” precluding equitable relief where an adequate remedy is available
at law.31  Section 342 “being a mere declaration of the ancient rule of
equity, neither grants nor divests equity of any jurisdiction.”32
Guardianship proceedings, however, are not part of the Court of
Chancery’s historic general equity jurisdiction.  Assuming, without deciding,
that the Family Court can provide an adequate legal remedy,33 the Father’s
                                   
29 10 Del. C. § 341.
30 10 Del. C. § 342.
31 Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d at 998.
32 Id.
33 It is quite possible that the Hospital had no grounds to file a Petition for Guardianship
against the Mother in the Family Court.  Neither the Hospital nor the Father has
alleged that the child is dependent and/or neglected as to the Mother.  A guardianship
petition under 13 Del. C. § 2322(9) requires a statement that each parent is either
unable to or unwilling to provide care for their child.  There is no allegation of the
19
alternative Section 342 argument fails.  Section 342 cannot provide a basis
for the Father’s alternative argument because guardianship jurisdiction has
been conferred on the Court of Chancery by statute and was not part of its
historic general equity jurisdiction.34
A guardianship petition for a minor does not call for equitable relief.
The maxim restricting equity’s reach in Section 342, if there is an adequate
remedy at law, has no applicability in the present appeal.  The only issue for
this Court to decide is whether the guardianship statute confers jurisdiction
on the Court of Chancery to hear the Hospital’s petition.
Chancery’s Statutory Jurisdiction
We have already discussed that, since 1792, the General Assembly
has enhanced the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery through express
statutory enactments.  That authority is now found in Article IV, Section 17
of the Delaware Constitution of 1897.35  That provision specifically
authorizes the General Assembly to enact statutes that confer jurisdiction
                                                                                                         
Mother’s lack of care.  Further, the language of Section 2320 implies that the person or
persons filing the petition are seeking to act as guardian.  The attorney guardian ad
litem also questions whether the Hospital would have had standing to file in the Family
Court since there is no definition of “person” for purposes of Chapter 23 of Title 13;
there is a residency requirement, the Hospital is not a State Agency otherwise eligible
to file a Petition for Dependency/Neglect under Family Court Civil Rule 200; and the
Hospital was not seeking to be appointed as Michael’s guardian.
34 In re Markel, Del. Supr., 254 A.2d 236, 238 (1969).  We overrule any suggestion to
the contrary in City of Newark v. Gass, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 5143, 1977 WL 9533, at
*2 (July 12, 1977).
20
and powers upon the Court of Chancery, in addition to the general equitable
jurisdiction that is found in Section 10.36  Several years ago, over 100
statutory references were collected to demonstrate the breadth and scope of
the Court of Chancery’s statutory jurisdiction.37  The Court of Chancery’s
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the person and/or property of a minor is
one of these statutes.38
Clearly, the General Assembly has more latitude in modifying or
repealing any statutory jurisdiction that it confers upon the Court of
Chancery, in addition to the historic general equitable jurisdiction that is
vested in the Court of Chancery by Article IV, Section 10.  The General
Assembly did not exercise that authority, however, with regard to the Court
of Chancery’s statutory guardianship jurisdiction that is at issue in this
case.39  It is not sufficient for the Father to demonstrate that a guardianship
proceeding for Michael is available in the Family Court.  The Father must
also show that the statute creating the Family Court’s guardianship
jurisdiction demonstrates a clear intent to divest the Court of Chancery of
                                                                                                         
35 DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 17.
36 DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.  See D. Wolfe and M. Pittinger, Corporate and
Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery, § 2-2(d) Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Specifically Conferred by Legislative Enactment at 2-15 (2000).
37 William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 48 (1993).
38 See, e.g., In re Erich, Del. Ch., 310 A.2d 910, 911 (1973); In re Two Minor
Children, Del. Ch., 283 A.2d 859, 861 n.1 (1971).
21
jurisdiction over similar matters.  The Father has failed to discharge that
burden of proof.
We have found no support for the Father’s jurisdictional arguments in
our analysis of the relevant statutory provisions. Applying well-established
principles of statutory construction, we have determined there is no
indication that the General Assembly intended the Family Court’s
guardianship jurisdiction to be exclusive of the Court of Chancery’s
guardianship jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we hold that, at the present time, the
General Assembly intends for the Court of Chancery to retain concurrent
jurisdiction with the Family Court over the appointment of guardians for
minors.40
Conclusion
We commend all of the attorneys for their excellent presentations in
this Court and in the Court of Chancery.  We gratefully acknowledge the pro
bono participation of Kathryn J. Laffey and David J. Ferry, Jr.  Such service
is in accordance with the highest traditions of the Delaware Bar.
The judgment of the Court of Chancery is affirmed.  The stay of
paragraph 1 of the October 10, 2001 Order of the Court of Chancery which
                                                                                                         
39 See 12 Del. C. § 3901.
22
was extended by Order of this Court dated October 11, 2001 is hereby
vacated.41  The Clerk of this Court is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.
                                                                                                         
40 The Court of Chancery has shared subject matter jurisdiction with other courts in the
past.  See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware
Court of Chancery, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 834 (1993).
41 In re Michael Arzuaga-Guevara, Del. Supr., No. 506, 2001, Veasey, C.J. (October
11, 2001), Order at para. 5.