Title: Conservatorship of K.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S258212
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of K.P. 
 
 
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF LOS ANGELES,  
as Conservator, etc., 
Petitioner and Respondent, 
v. 
K.P., 
Objector and Appellant. 
 
S258212 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B291510 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
ZE032603 
 
 
June 28, 2021 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
S258212 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act or Act; Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 provides one-year conservatorships 
for those “gravely disabled as a result of a mental health 
disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.”  (§ 5350.)2  Those 
subject to a conservatorship petition are entitled to a court or 
jury trial to decide if they are “gravely disabled.”  (§ 5350, 
subd. (d)(1).)  The question here is whether the trier of fact must 
find, in addition, that the individual is unwilling or unable to 
voluntarily accept treatment.  This is an issue of statutory 
interpretation on which the Courts of Appeal have differed.  We 
granted review to resolve the conflict and now hold that capacity 
or willingness to accept treatment is a relevant factor to be 
considered on the issue of grave disability but is not a separate 
element that must be proven to establish a conservatorship. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The Los Angeles County Superior Court established a 
conservatorship for 23-year-old K.P. in May 2008 and renewed 
it annually over the next nine years.  In April 2018, the county’s 
public guardian (Public Guardian) filed another renewal 
 
1  
All statutory references are to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. 
2  
Because this case involves only mental disorders, we 
generally dispense with further mention of chronic alcoholism. 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
petition, alleging K.P. remained gravely disabled.  This time, 
K.P. demanded a jury trial.  
 
A psychologist from K.P.’s residential facility testified that 
he suffered from schizophrenia, with auditory hallucinations 
and paranoid delusions.  For example, on the morning of trial he 
asked to enter a witness protection program because he believed 
a fellow resident was planning to attack him.  In another 
incident, K.P. chased and threatened someone he believed had 
intentionally hit him with a basketball.  He could not be 
redirected and was hospitalized.  K.P. also displayed “grossly 
disorganized behaviors,” lack of motivation, and difficulty 
speaking and socializing.  The psychologist concluded K.P. 
lacked significant insight into his disorder.  He minimized his 
symptoms and believed they were caused by medications.  His 
mother had expressed the same belief.  K.P. resisted taking his 
prescriptions or participating in therapy and other services.  The 
psychologist concluded K.P. could not provide for his basic needs 
without medication and did not believe he would take them 
consistently or correctly without a conservator’s supervision.  
The day before trial, K.P. almost gave himself a double dose of 
one potentially toxic pharmaceutical.  The psychologist believed 
K.P. needed round-the-clock supervision and lacked the 
initiative and insight necessary to obtain treatment himself.  
Although he had opportunities to do so, K.P. had never left the 
facility without his therapist or mother.  
 
K.P.’s mother understood that he had a mental illness.  If 
he were released from the conservatorship, she testified that she 
would help him take his medications and attend therapy 
appointments.  She could not provide housing but would help 
him find a place to live.   
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
 
K.P. also testified.  He had not lived outside a hospital or 
treatment facility since 2013.  After some conflicting answers, 
he agreed to stay in his current placement until he could find a 
place to live.  K.P.’s mother had previously been his conservator 
but later became homeless and moved away.  K.P. agreed he 
needed a psychiatrist and said he would see a therapist if 
released, but he denied having any mental illness.  He thought 
his problems might stem from a childhood brain injury.  K.P. 
asserted he did better without his psychiatric drugs and said he 
would not take them if released from the conservatorship.  To 
supplement his Social Security benefits, K.P. planned to become 
an entrepreneur.  
 
The court gave two Judicial Council of California Civil 
Jury Instructions (CACI) relevant to the issue here.  CACI No. 
4000, as given, stated:  “The Office of the Public Guardian claims 
that [K.P.] is gravely disabled due to a mental disorder and 
therefore should be placed in a conservatorship.  In a 
conservatorship, a conservator is appointed to oversee, under 
the direction of the court, the care of persons who are gravely 
disabled due to a mental disorder.  To succeed on this claim, the 
Office of the Public Guardian must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt all of the following:  [¶] (1) That [K.P.] has a mental 
disorder; and [¶] (2) That [K.P.] is gravely disabled as a result 
of the mental disorder.”  
 
CACI No. 4002, as given, explained the meaning of 
“gravely disabled”:  “The term ‘gravely disabled’ means that a 
person is presently unable to provide for his or her basic needs 
for food, clothing, or shelter because of a mental disorder.  
[¶] Psychosis, bizarre or eccentric behavior, delusions or 
hallucinations are not enough, by themselves, to find that [K.P.] 
is gravely disabled.  He must be unable to provide for the basic 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
needs of food, clothing, or shelter because of a mental disorder.  
[¶] If you find [K.P.] will not take his prescribed medication 
without supervision and that a mental disorder makes him 
unable to provide for his basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter 
without such medication, then you may conclude [K.P.] is 
presently gravely disabled.  [¶] In determining whether [K.P.] is 
presently gravely disabled, you may consider evidence that he 
did not take prescribed medication in the past.  You may 
consider evidence of his lack of insight into his medical 
condition.  [¶] In determining whether [K.P.] is presently 
gravely disabled, you may not consider the likelihood of future 
deterioration or relapse of a condition.  [¶] In determining 
whether [K.P.] is presently gravely disabled, you may consider 
whether he is unable or unwilling voluntarily to accept 
meaningful treatment.”  (Italics added.) 
 
K.P. requested a modification of CACI No. 4000 to require, 
as a separate element, a finding that he was “unwilling or 
unable voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment.”  He argued 
the final sentence of CACI No. 4002 directing the jury’s 
attention to this issue was inadequate because it was “thrown 
in at the bottom of [a] less consequential later jury instruction.”  
The court denied the request, observing that resistance to 
voluntary treatment is appropriately considered as an aspect of 
grave disability but is not a separately required element that 
must be proven.  
 
The jury found that K.P. was gravely disabled, and the 
reappointment petition was granted.  On appeal, K.P. 
challenged the refusal to modify CACI No. 4000.  The Court of 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
Appeal concluded there was no error.  We granted review and 
now reach the same conclusion.3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
Although couched as a complaint about jury instructions, 
K.P. essentially claims that a finding of unwillingness or 
inability to accept voluntary treatment is required for a 
conservatorship to be established.  This is a legal question 
subject to de novo review.  (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 142; 
see Conservatorship of P.D. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1163, 1167.)  
Our goal in construing the LPS Act is to effectuate the 
Legislature’s intent.  (John L., at p. 143.)  We consider 
individual statutes in the context of the entire Act so that each 
part may be harmonized and given effect.  (See Moyer v. 
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; 
Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 963.) 
A. 
Overview of the LPS Act 
 
The LPS Act has many purposes, including “end[ing] the 
inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of 
persons with mental health disorders” (§ 5001, subd. (a)), 
“provid[ing] prompt evaluation and treatment” (id., subd. (b)), 
and “provid[ing] individualized treatment, supervision, and 
 
3  
The conservatorship challenged here ended, rendering the 
appeal technically moot.  This problem frequently arises 
because a conservatorship’s duration is short, compared to the 
appellate process.  (See, e.g., Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 131, 142, fn. 2 (John L.).)  The Court of Appeal 
concluded the issue K.P. raises is capable of repetition but likely 
to evade review.  (Conservatorship of K.P. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 
254, 257, fn. 2; see Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 
Cal.App.4th 701, 709.)  We agree and elect to decide this 
otherwise moot appeal. 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
placement services by a conservatorship program” (id., 
subd. (e)).  The Act defines persons as “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” if 
they are unable to provide for basic personal needs of food, 
clothing, or shelter, as a result of a mental disorder.  (§ 5008, 
subd. (h)(1)(A); see § 5350, subd. (e).)   
 
The overall statutory scheme describes a detailed, 
calibrated system for intervention when circumstances indicate 
a person may be suffering from a mental health disorder.  In 
addition to conservatorships, the Act permits 3-day, 14-day, and 
30-day involuntary detentions for intensive treatment.4 
 
1. 
Chapter 2:  Involuntary Detentions 
 
Under chapter 2 of the Act, those gravely disabled by a 
mental health disorder may be held for up to 72 hours for 
evaluation and treatment.  (§ 5150, subd. (a).)  Before such a 
detention can begin, a professional must assess whether the 
person “can be properly served without being detained.”  (Id., 
subd. (c).)  In such a case, services must be provided “on a 
voluntary basis.”  (Ibid.)  After 72 hours, the person may be 
detained for up to 14 days of intensive treatment if three 
conditions are met:  (1) a professional has found that the person 
is gravely disabled due to a mental health disorder (§ 5250, 
subd. (a)); (2) the facility providing treatment agrees to admit 
the person (id., subd. (b)); and (3) the person “has been advised 
of the need for, but has not been willing or able to accept, 
treatment on a voluntary basis” (id., subd. (c)).  This 14-day 
 
4  
Our discussion is confined to the provisions for persons 
gravely disabled due to a mental health disorder, but such 
detentions are also available for individuals who are imminently 
dangerous to themselves or others, or are impaired by chronic 
alcoholism.  (See §§ 5150, 5250, 5260, 5300.) 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
period can be extended by up to 30 days if the professional staff 
finds that the person remains both gravely disabled and 
“unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily.”  
(§ 5270.15, subd. (a)(2).) 
 
Someone certified for a 14-day or 30-day detention has the 
right to a prompt certification review hearing.  (§§ 5254, 5256, 
5270.15, subd. (b).)  The only question to be decided at such a 
review hearing is whether the person is gravely disabled by a 
mental health disorder (see § 5256.5).  If there is insufficient 
probable cause to find grave disability, the person must be 
released.  (§§ 5256.5–5256.6.)5 
 
As an alternative to a certification review hearing, those 
detained have the right to habeas corpus review.  (§ 5275.)  
Unlike a review hearing, habeas review tests all the initial 
certification requirements.  The court must order an immediate 
release if it finds that the detained person is not gravely 
disabled, or “had not been advised of, or had accepted, voluntary 
treatment,” or that the facility is not designated by the county 
or is not equipped and staffed to provide intensive treatment.  
(§ 5276, 2d par.)  These statutes apply only to chapter 2 
detentions, however, and not chapter 3’s more lengthy 
conservatorships.  Although habeas corpus relief may be 
appropriate “in extraordinary circumstances” (In re Gandolfo 
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 899), ordinarily the statutory rehearing 
provisions (§ 5364; see also § 5358.3) and the right to appeal 
 
5  
Release is also required at the end of an involuntary 
detention period, unless the gravely disabled person is certified 
for an additional 14 or 30 days of intensive treatment, is the 
subject of a petition for conservatorship or confinement of a 
dangerous person (see § 5300), or agrees to receive treatment 
voluntarily.  (§ 5257, subd. (b).) 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
from a conservator’s appointment or reappointment provide 
available and adequate remedies for aggrieved conservatees.  
(Gandolfo, at pp. 898–900; see Michelle K. v. Superior Court 
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409, 433; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 
Criminal Law (4th ed. 2020) Criminal Writs, § 25, pp. 630–631.) 
 
2. 
Chapter 3:  Conservatorships 
 
Chapter 3 of the Act goes on to provide for the imposition 
of a conservatorship under specifically described circumstances.  
A “series of temporary detentions may culminate in a proceeding 
to determine whether the person is so disabled that he or she 
should be involuntarily confined for up to one year.  (§§ 5350, 
5361.)  Because of the important liberty interests at stake, 
correspondingly powerful safeguards protect against erroneous 
findings.”  (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 541 
(Ben C.).)  Conservatorships can involve confinement and other 
“disabilities” that may be imposed by the court, such as the loss 
of driving privileges, the right to enter contracts or vote, and the 
right to refuse medical and other treatments.  (§ 5357.)  
 
Section 5352 sets out the requirements for a professional 
recommendation to initiate conservatorship proceedings.  The 
first paragraph of section 5352 addresses recommendations for 
individuals who have already been detained for evaluation and 
treatment under chapter 2.  When the professional in charge of 
an agency providing comprehensive evaluation, or of a facility 
providing intensive treatment, “determines that a person in his 
or her care is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder or 
impairment by chronic alcoholism and is unwilling to accept, or 
incapable of accepting, treatment voluntarily, he or she may 
recommend 
conservatorship 
to 
the 
officer 
providing 
conservatorship investigation of the county of residence of the 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
person prior to his or her admission as a patient in such facility.”  
(§ 5352, 1st par., italics added.)6  Thus, before a professional 
may recommend the initiation of a conservatorship for a 
detained inpatient, that professional must conclude the person 
is not willing or able to consent to voluntary treatment.  This 
requirement recognizes that if a person is able and willing to 
accept inpatient treatment, there may be no need to pursue the 
additional constraints of a conservatorship.  It also recognizes 
that when a person is committed for inpatient treatment, but 
unwilling or unable to consent to that treatment, an additional 
measure of authority over the person may be necessary for 
treatment to be successful and for other services, like general 
medical care, to be provided. 
 
The recommendation standards are different for those 
presently receiving outpatient treatment, however.  The second 
paragraph of section 5352, which addresses outpatients, does 
not mention a willingness or ability to accept treatment.  Under 
that paragraph, the professional agency in charge of “providing 
comprehensive evaluation or a facility providing intensive 
treatment, or the professional person in charge of providing 
mental health treatment at a county jail, or his or her designee, 
may recommend conservatorship for a person without the 
person being an inpatient in a facility providing comprehensive 
evaluation or intensive treatment, if both of the following 
conditions are met:   (a) the professional person[,] or another 
professional person designated by him or her[,] has examined 
and evaluated the person and determined that he or she is 
 
6  
These requirements also apply when conservatorship is 
considered for someone who is already subject to a Probate Code 
conservatorship.  (§ 5350.5, subd. (a).) 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
gravely disabled; (b) the professional person or [designee] has 
determined that future examination on an inpatient basis is not 
necessary for a determination that the person is gravely 
disabled.”7  The distinction between the two paragraphs reflects 
that those not in a county jail are entitled to remain on 
outpatient status if services can be effectively provided on a 
voluntary basis (see §§ 5150, subd. (c) [72-hour period], 5250, 
subd. (c) [14-day period], 5270.15, subd. (b) [30-day period]), 
even when a conservatorship is necessary.8 
 
Under either paragraph of section 5352, the professional’s 
recommendation simply starts the conservatorship process.  If 
the 
county’s 
investigative 
office 
agrees 
with 
the 
recommendation, it initiates court proceedings.  (§ 5352.)  The 
county then conducts a comprehensive investigation of available 
alternatives to conservatorship, examining “all relevant aspects 
of the person’s medical, psychological, financial, family, 
 
7  
If an inpatient placement is necessary for a proper 
determination of grave disability, the detention process under 
chapter 2 may be initiated. 
8  
K.P. offers a different reading of section 5352.  He asserts 
the statute’s second paragraph merely provides an alternate 
mechanism for outpatient recommendations and does not alter 
the substantive standards set forth in the first paragraph.  In 
particular, he contends the first paragraph’s requirements 
should be incorporated into the second paragraph.  This 
interpretation is contradicted by the statutory language, which 
clearly establishes only two requirements for an outpatient 
recommendation and does not reference or incorporate the first 
paragraph’s inpatient recommendation requirements.  More 
importantly, as will be discussed, nothing in section 5352 
evinces a legislative intent to incorporate the guidelines for a 
treatment provider’s initiation of conservatorship proceedings 
into the factual findings required to impose a conservatorship. 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
vocational, and social condition, and information obtained from 
the person’s family members, close friends, social worker, or 
principal therapist.”  (§ 5354, subd. (a).)  After this 
investigation, the county is empowered to “recommend 
conservatorship to the court only if no suitable alternatives are 
available.”  (Ibid.)  A conservator may then be appointed if the 
person is found to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental 
health disorder.  (§ 5350.) 
 
Proposed conservatees have the right to a jury trial to 
determine whether they are gravely disabled.  (§ 5350, 
subd. (d)(1).)  The determination must be unanimous and upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Conservatorship of Early 
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 248 (Early); Conservatorship of Roulet 
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 (Roulet).)  If grave disability is found, 
the court appoints a conservator (§ 5350), imposes disabilities 
on the conservatee as needed (§ 5357), and determines the least 
restrictive appropriate placement (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A)).  The 
conservatee’s home, or that of a relative, is to be given first 
priority, as an alternative to confinement.  (§ 5358, subd. (c)(1).)  
A conservatorship automatically ends after one year and may be 
reestablished only by a new petition (§ 5361), subject to the 
same jury trial rights (see § 5350, subd. (d); Roulet, at pp. 225–
226; Baber v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 955, 959). 
 
The court must terminate a conservatorship before the 
one-year period expires, however, if a progress review 
determines that “the goals [of treatment] have been reached and 
the person is no longer gravely disabled.”  (§ 5352.6, 2d par.)  In 
addition to the right to appeal the judgment imposing 
conservatorship, conservatees may twice petition for rehearing 
on their status as a conservatee.  (§ 5364.)  At such a rehearing, 
petitioners need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
that they are no longer gravely disabled.  (John L., supra, 48 
Cal.4th at p. 152.)  A conservatee’s willingness or ability to 
accept voluntary treatment is not a basis for rehearing (see 
§ 5364) or for an early conservatorship termination (see 
§ 5352.6). 
 
If a conservatorship is still needed at the end of the one-
year term, the conservator may petition for reappointment.  
(§ 5361.)  Such a petition must include the opinion of two 
physicians, or other described professionals, “that the 
conservatee is still gravely disabled as a result of mental 
disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.”  (Id., 1st par.)  
Section 5361 focuses on grave disability alone and makes no 
mention of the conservatee’s amenability to voluntary 
treatment.  A “reestablishment hearing is conducted according 
to the same rules that govern the initial establishment of a 
conservatorship.  [Citations.]  The state has the burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conservatee remains gravely 
disabled.”  (Conservatorship of Deidre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 
1306, 1312; see § 5350, subd. (d)(3).) 
B. 
Statutory Analysis 
 
Reading chapter 3’s provisions together, it is clear the Act 
requires consideration of willingness or ability to accept 
voluntary treatment only when a professional recommends the 
initiation of conservatorship proceedings for a person who is 
currently being treated as an inpatient (§ 5352) or is subject to 
a Probate Code conservatorship (§ 5350.5).  Applicable 
provisions do not mention such a requirement for outpatient 
recommendations (see § 5352) or for reappointment petitions 
(see § 5361). 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
 
Nor does the Act make amenability to voluntary treatment 
an issue that must be separately decided at trial.  Section 5350 
authorizes the court to appoint a conservator “for a person who 
is gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder.”  (See 
also § 5361 [authorizing reappointments].)  It grants “the right 
to demand a court or jury trial on the issue of whether [the 
subject] is gravely disabled.”  (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1), italics added; 
see also § 5352.1 [temporary conservatorship].)  Section 5350 
thus expressly limits conservatorship trials to the issue of grave 
disability.  It does not mention whether the proposed 
conservatee is willing or able to accept treatment voluntarily.  
This subject is also absent from the statutory definition of 
“gravely disabled,” which considers only whether the “person, as 
a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his 
or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.”  
(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); see § 5350, subd. (e)(1).)9  Read 
together, 
sections 5350 
and 
5008 
establish 
only 
two 
requirements for the creation of a conservatorship:  (1) The 
subject has a mental health disorder; and (2) as a result of the 
disorder, the subject is unable to meet basic survival needs. 
 
The Legislature amended section 5350 in 1989 to clarify 
that there is no grave disability if a proposed conservatee can 
survive safely with the assistance of responsible friends, family 
members, or others willing and able to help meet these basic 
 
9  
It should be recalled, however, that those potentially 
subject to conservatorship will often have been found unwilling 
or unable to accept treatment by the professional initially 
recommending conservatorship (§ 5352) and as part of the 
involuntary detention process (see §§ 5150, subd. (c), 5250, 
subd. (c), 5270.15, subd. (a)), in which the determination is 
subject to habeas corpus review (§ 5275). 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
needs.  (See § 5350, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 1989, 
ch. 999, § 2, p. 3484.)  Notably, the modification did not amend 
section 5350, or any other provision of the Act, to require 
separate findings on a person’s amenability to voluntary 
treatment as a prerequisite to imposition of a conservatorship.   
 
Theoretically, someone who is willing and able to accept 
voluntary treatment may not be gravely disabled if that 
treatment will allow the person to meet the needs for food, 
clothing, and shelter.  Under the statutory scheme, however, 
this is an evidentiary conclusion to be drawn by the trier of fact.  
If credible evidence shows that a proposed conservatee is willing 
and able to accept treatment that would allow them to meet 
basic survival needs, the fact finder may conclude a reasonable 
doubt has been raised on the issue of grave disability, and the 
effort to impose a conservatorship may fail.  It may be necessary 
in some cases for the fact finder to determine whether the 
treatment a proposed conservatee is prepared to accept will 
sufficiently empower them to meet basic survival needs.  In 
some cases of severe dementia or mental illness, there may 
simply be no treatment that would enable the person to “survive 
safely in freedom.”  (Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 255; see 
Conservatorship of Symington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1467 
(Symington).)10  As a practical matter, evidence about 
amenability to voluntary treatment will generally be in the 
proposed conservatee’s own hands.  Placing a burden on 
 
10  
K.P. has presented no evidence or argument suggesting he 
was willing to submit to inpatient treatment.  Generally, the 
relevant question in a conservatorship trial is whether the 
proposed conservatee is able to “survive safely in freedom,” 
either alone or with the willing help of others.  (Early, supra, 35 
Cal.3d at p. 255, italics added.) 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
counties “to negate all reasonable doubts as to the possible 
existence of” a treatment the person might voluntarily accept 
would be counter-productive and potentially contrary to the 
goals of the Act.  (Early, at p. 254.)11 
 
Our reading of the statutes is consistent with statements 
in a number of conservatorship cases observing that the “only” 
question at trial is whether the proposed conservatee is unable 
to provide for essential needs due to a mental illness.  (Roulet, 
supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 232; Conservatorship of P.D., supra, 21 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1168; see Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016) 
248 Cal.App.4th 453, 460–461.)  However, K.P. points to other 
cases to support a contrary conclusion.  We now address these 
arguments. 
C. 
K.P.’s Argument and Reliance on Contrary Authority 
 
In support of his position that inability or unwillingness 
to accept voluntary treatment must be separately proven at 
trial, K.P. points to a single statutory provision and early cases 
construing it.  He cites section 5352, which, as noted, requires a 
professional determination of such inability or unwillingness 
before the professional recommends conservatorship for a 
 
11  
Similarly, a person who can survive safely with the 
responsible help of others is not gravely disabled.  If proper 
evidence of such assistance is presented, the county must prove 
that the assistance would not enable the proposed conservatee 
to survive safely without involuntary detention.  But the 
county’s burden on this topic extends only to assistance put at 
issue by the evidence.  Section 5350, subdivision (e)(2) requires 
that, “unless they specifically indicate in writing their 
willingness and ability to help, family, friends, or others shall 
not be considered willing or able to provide this help.”  The mere 
possibility of assistance from others is not sufficient to defeat a 
conservatorship. 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
person receiving inpatient treatment.  As explained above, this 
reliance is misplaced.  By its terms, section 5352 speaks only to 
a professional decision to recommend that a conservatorship be 
established.  That recommendation, if accepted, is followed by a 
structured investigation that may culminate in a trial on grave 
disability and, if a conservatorship is imposed, on the court’s 
determination whether confinement is necessary. 
 
K.P. relies on two cases from the 1980s that held 
resistance to voluntary treatment is an additional element that 
must be proven before conservatorship can be imposed.  
Conservatorship of Davis (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 313 (Davis) was 
a public guardian’s appeal from a finding that the proposed 
conservatee was not gravely disabled.  The trial court had given 
a special instruction at Davis’s request stating, “ ‘before you may 
consider whether Mary Davis is gravely disabled you must first 
find that she is, as a result of a mental disorder, unwilling or 
unable to accept treatment for that mental disorder on a 
voluntary basis.’ ”  (Id. at p. 319.)  It also gave a special 
instruction directing that the jury could not find Davis gravely 
disabled if she was capable of surviving safely with the help of 
willing family members.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal concluded 
it was not error to give these instructions.  (Id. at p. 329.)  It 
attempted to harmonize the various conservatorship statutes by 
concluding that any trial on conservatorship encompassed 
review of all preceding steps, including initiation (§ 5352) and 
investigation (§ 5354).  “Thus, although section 5350 states that 
the issue at trial is ‘whether [the person] is gravely disabled,’ ” 
the court reasoned, “it appears from a reading of the entire act 
that this phrase must be broadly construed to include the 
determination 
of 
whether 
the 
establishment 
of 
a 
conservatorship is necessary in light of all the relevant facts.”  
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
(Davis, at p. 323.)  Drawing on considerations in sections 5352 
and 5354, Davis concluded the LPS statutes “necessarily require 
the trier of fact . . . to determine the question of grave disability, 
not in a vacuum, but in the context of suitable alternatives, upon 
a consideration of the willingness and capability of the proposed 
conservatee to voluntarily accept treatment and upon 
consideration of whether the nondangerous individual is 
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the 
help of willing and responsible family members, friends or other 
third parties.”  (Davis, at p. 325.)12 
 
Two years later, we approved one of the Davis holdings:  
that grave disability cannot be established if the person can 
safely survive with the capable assistance of others.  (Early, 
supra, 35 Cal.3d 244.)  That holding was consistent with United 
States Supreme Court precedent that a state “ ‘cannot 
constitutionally confine . . . a nondangerous individual who is 
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the 
help of willing and responsible family members or friends.’ ”  (Id. 
at pp. 251–252, quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 
563, 576.) 
 
12  
The 
Davis 
decision 
was 
essentially 
followed 
in 
Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, which 
involved similar instructions.  Although it approved the 
instructions in principle, however, Baber found error in the 
voluntary assistance instruction’s phrasing because it asked 
only if the proposed conservatee was “unwilling” to accept 
voluntary treatment, not whether he was “ ‘unwilling or 
unable’ ” to do so.  (Id. at p. 552, italics omitted.)  Thus, a verdict 
of no grave disability would have been required if the jury found 
merely that Baber was willing to accept treatment, even if he 
were incapable of doing so.  (Ibid.) 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
 
Early concluded this constitutional principle had been 
incorporated into the LPS Act (Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 252) 
and reasoned that section 5008’s definition of grave disability 
“was intended to encompass a consideration of whether the 
person could provide these basic needs with or without the 
assistance of willing and responsible family members, friends, 
or other third parties.”  (Early, at p. 254.)  The principle was 
later codified by legislative amendment of section 5350.  (See 
§ 5350, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 1989, ch. 999, § 2, 
p. 3484.)  Notably, however, Early stopped short of imposing a 
potentially “insuperable” burden on public guardians “to negate 
all reasonable doubts as to the possible existence of third party 
aid.”  (Early, at p. 254.)  Early held only that the trier of fact 
“must consider the availability of third party assistance” on the 
issue of grave disability “if credible evidence of such assistance 
is adduced” at trial, and that an instruction regarding this 
evidence must be given upon the proposed conservatee’s request 
if the case is tried to a jury.  (Ibid., italics added.)  Of course, the 
burden of proof remains on the public guardian.  If a proposed 
conservatee chooses to produce evidence on this topic, the 
question is whether any such evidence casts the issue of grave 
disability into reasonable doubt.  
 
Early did not address Davis’s related holding about a 
voluntary treatment element.  Although the trial court had 
refused to give an instruction like the one in Davis, requiring a 
finding on voluntary treatment before consideration of grave 
disability, we did not decide whether that refusal was erroneous 
because the evidence showed Early had consistently refused 
treatment for his disorder.  (Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 255–
256.)  Nevertheless, there are parallels between the third party 
assistance considered in Early and acquiescence to voluntary 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
treatment, in that treatment professionals may provide 
assistance that enables a person to meet survival needs.  As we 
held with regard to third party assistance in Early, evidence of 
a proposed conservatee’s amenability to voluntary treatment is 
relevant and should generally be admitted for the fact finder’s 
consideration.  (See id. at p. 254; see also Davis, supra, 124 
Cal.App.3d at p. 325.)  Such evidence will defeat a 
conservatorship if it raises a reasonable doubt about whether 
the person is gravely disabled. 
 
K.P. also relies on Conservatorship of Walker (1987) 196 
Cal.App.3d 1082 (Walker).  There, the jury was instructed:  “ ‘If 
you find that John Thomas Walker can survive safely in freedom 
by himself or with the help of this available, willing and 
responsible family member, friend or other third party and that 
John Thomas Walker is willing and capable of accepting 
voluntary treatment, then you must find that John Thomas 
Walker is not gravely disabled.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1091, italics 
omitted.)  The Court of Appeal found fault with this instruction.  
(Id. at p. 1092.)  Relying on section 5352 and Davis, it held that 
a conservatorship may be established only upon proof of both 
grave disability, as defined in section 5008, and unwillingness 
or inability to accept voluntary treatment.  (Walker, at pp. 1092–
1093.)  Because Davis established that a “proposed conservatee 
has the right to have a jury determine all the issues relevant to 
the establishment of the conservatorship” (Walker, at p. 1092, 
citing Davis, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 324), the court 
reasoned:  “The jury should determine if the person voluntarily 
accepts meaningful treatment, in which case no conservatorship 
is necessary.  If the jury finds the person will not accept 
treatment, then it must determine if the person can meet his 
basic needs on his own or with help, in which case a 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
conservatorship is not justified.”  (Walker, at pp. 1092–1093.)  
Because the instruction at issue allowed Walker’s jury to reject 
conservatorship only if it found that Walker was both capable of 
meeting his basic needs and willing and able to accept voluntary 
treatment, the court held it was erroneous.  (Id. at p. 1093.) 
 
As K.P. acknowledges, other cases have declined to follow 
Davis and Walker.  The first, Symington, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 
1464, involved a bench trial.  The trial court found the proposed 
conservatee gravely disabled and observed that it was 
unnecessary to decide in addition whether she was willing or 
able to accept voluntary treatment.  (Id. at p. 1466.)  Symington 
challenged the absence of this finding on appeal, asserting that 
grave disability “ ‘by definition includes an unwillingness and/or 
inability on the part of the proposed conservatee to voluntarily 
accept treatment for the mental disorder . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 1467.)  
The Court of Appeal expressed doubt that a finding of 
unwillingness or inability to accept treatment was required, 
explaining that this language is not found elsewhere in the 
conservatorship statutes but only in section 5352, a provision 
“apparently designed to allow treatment facilities to initiate 
conservatorship proceedings at the time a patient is accepted 
where the individual may prove uncooperative.  It appears to 
have been enacted for that limited purpose, not as an additional 
element to be proved to establish the conservatorship itself.”  
(Symington, at p. 1467.)  The court concluded section 5352’s 
reference to unwillingness or inability to accept voluntary 
treatment “is not intended to be a legal term, but is a standard 
by which mental health professionals determine whether a 
conservatorship is necessary.”  (Symington, at p. 1468.)  
Sensitive to the facts of the case before it, which involved an 
octogenarian with severe intellectual and memory impairment 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
from senile dementia (id. at p. 1466), the court observed that 
“many gravely disabled individuals are simply beyond 
treatment.  Under the interpretation of the statutory scheme 
urged upon us, they presumably could not be the subject of an 
LPS Act conservatorship at all.”  (Id. at p. 1467.) 
 
The issue did not resurface for 30 years, until K.P.’s appeal 
here and Conservatorship of D.P. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 794, 
review granted and held February 11, 2020.  In both cases, the 
juries were given a version of CACI No. 4000 that did not 
include unwillingness or inability to accept voluntary treatment 
as a required element for conservatorship.  (D.P., at p. 799; 
Conservatorship of K.P., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 263.)13  
However, both juries were also given a modified version of CACI 
No. 4002, which explained that they could consider willingness 
or ability to accept voluntary treatment in deciding whether the 
proposed conservatees were gravely disabled.  (D.P., at p. 799; 
K.P., at p. 263.)  On appeal, the courts determined these 
instructions accurately reflected the law.  The court here found 
Symington’s reasoning persuasive and agreed that section 5352 
does not require additional proof.  (K.P., at p. 268.)  The Court 
of Appeal in D.P. also agreed with Symington’s statutory 
analysis.  (D.P., at pp. 802–803.)  It further noted that 
section 5352 does not apply to reappointment petitions, and the 
applicable statute requires only a finding that the person 
“ ‘remains gravely disabled.’ ”  (D.P., at p. 804; see § 5352.)  
 
13  
The Judicial Council’s form instruction for CACI No. 4000 
includes this requirement in brackets.  A use note explains, with 
citations to Symington, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at page 1467 and 
Davis, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at page 328, that “[t]here is a split 
of authority as to whether element 3 is required.”  (Use Note to 
CACI No. 4000 (2020) p. 976.) 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
Thus, even if a finding about amenability to voluntary 
treatment were required in the initial appointment of a 
conservator, there was no statutory basis for imposing it in 
reappointment proceedings.  (D.P., at pp. 803–804.) 
 
We agree with these recent decisions that Davis and 
Walker are not persuasive as to the role that acceptance of 
voluntary treatment appropriately plays in a conservatorship 
trial.  As in Early, Davis was partially correct to the extent it 
held a trier of fact may consider a proposed conservatee’s 
openness to treatment when evaluating whether the constraints 
of 
conservatorship 
are 
necessary 
under 
all 
attendant 
circumstances.  Naturally, a trier of fact can consider all 
relevant evidence, which is defined as that “having any tendency 
in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 210.)  Evidence that a person is willing and able to accept 
meaningful treatment is certainly relevant to the ultimate 
question whether a conservatorship is necessary.  But there is a 
difference between relevant evidence and the elements that 
must be proven to determine an action.  In a conservatorship 
trial, the only elements that must be proven are that the person 
(1) suffers from a mental health disorder that (2) renders him or 
her gravely disabled.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350.)  Evidence 
bearing on the person’s ability and willingness to accept 
treatment may assist the fact finder in resolving that question.  
But such willingness is neither an element that must be proven 
nor itself dispositive of the issue of grave disability.14  
 
14  
In this way, amenability to treatment is similar to the role 
of motive in a homicide trial.  Motive is not an element of any 
homicide offense; however, evidence of motive may be relevant 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
Particularly for those suffering from mental illness, openness to 
treatment may not be a fixed status.  It may wax and wane 
depending on many variables, including medication status and 
the particulars of housing status or confinement.  Evidence on 
the topic may also be disputed, or of varying degrees of 
persuasiveness.  Early’s caution against imposing on public 
guardians the insuperable burden of disproving a negative is 
equally applicable here.  (See Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 254.) 
 
Thus, the Davis decision went too far to the extent it called 
for proof of an additional element not found in the statutory 
definition.  Courts may not expand statutory language under the 
guise of interpretation.  (In re Miller (1947) 31 Cal.2d 191, 199; 
see Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)  The Walker court strayed even 
further afield from the statutory framework.  It endorsed a two-
step procedure under which a jury would not even consider the 
issue of grave disability if it concluded the proposed conservatee 
was willing and able to accept treatment.  (See Walker, supra, 
196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1092–1093.)  These cases did not have the 
benefit of the Legislature’s 1989 amendment of section 5350, 
which codified the holdings in Davis and Early on third party 
assistance but did not embrace the additional expansion Davis 
suggested for amenability to voluntary treatment.  They also 
upset the carefully calibrated statutory approach through which 
the Legislature has endeavored to protect both the mentally ill 
and the public, and to ensure that those in need can receive 
prompt, appropriate treatment tailored to their individual 
condition and circumstances.  Conservatorship of Davis, supra, 
124 Cal.App.3d 313, Conservatorship of Walker, supra, 196 
 
to show the offender’s mental state, which is a required element.  
(See People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 740–742.) 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
Cal.App.3d 1082, and Conservatorship of Baber, supra, 153 
Cal.App.3d 542 are therefore disapproved to the extent they are 
inconsistent with the decision here. 
D. 
Due Process 
 
Finally, even assuming the LPS Act does not require it, 
K.P. contends state and federal due process principles prohibit 
the appointment of a conservator unless the state can prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conservatee is unwilling or 
unable to accept treatment voluntarily. 
 
“The liberty interests at stake in a conservatorship 
proceeding are significant.”  (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540; 
see Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 228.)  A conservatorship can 
result in involuntary confinement, which “ ‘ “entails a ‘massive 
curtailment of liberty’ in the constitutional sense.” ’ ”  (Roulet, 
at p. 224.)  A person found gravely disabled also faces 
stigmatization and the loss of personal rights like the freedom 
to drive, vote, enter contracts, and decide about medical 
treatment.  (See Ben C., at p. 540; John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
p. 150; see also § 5357.)  This potential deprivation of liberty 
implicates due process concerns. 
 
K.P. contends, “limiting the jury’s consideration to the sole 
issue of grave disability as defined by the statute would 
seriously infringe on the conservatee’s due process rights.”  His 
argument takes an unduly narrow view of what “grave 
disability” means in a conservatorship trial.  We agree that that 
the fact finder must be allowed to consider all credible evidence 
bearing on the issue of grave disability, including whether the 
person is capable of receiving voluntary treatment.  A 
conservatorship is not be necessary if the mentally ill person is 
willing and able to accept specified, available treatment that 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
will enable the person to survive safely without involuntary 
detention.  (See §§ 5008, 5350, subd. (e)(1).)  The fact finder 
should be able to evaluate competent evidence of the person’s 
amenability to voluntary treatment, and a jury should receive 
appropriate instructions on how the evidence should be 
considered.  But the question here is not just whether the fact 
finder may consider evidence; it is whether due process requires 
that the state prove a proposed conservatee’s resistance to 
voluntary treatment as a separate element.  We are not 
persuaded that the federal or state Constitutions require a 
separate finding on the voluntary treatment issue.  
 
K.P. has not explained why a proposed conservatee’s 
constitutional rights are not sufficiently protected by the fact 
finder’s consideration of amenability to voluntary treatment in 
connection with grave disability, or why the state must instead 
be tasked with proving this issue separately.  We have 
previously declined to create such a new requirement.  Early 
held that a person who can provide for basic survival needs with 
assistance from others is not gravely disabled.  This holding was 
constitutionally required under United States Supreme Court 
precedent.  (See Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 251–252, citing 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 576.)  Yet, though 
Early concluded evidence of third party assistance could be 
considered by the fact finder when offered, it also observed that 
“the burden of proving grave disability [as statutorily] defined 
could well become insuperable if those alleging such disability 
had to negate all reasonable doubts as to the possible existence 
of third party aid.”  (Early, at p. 254.)  
 
Similar to third party assistance, the fact finder may 
conclude there is no grave disability if a person is both willing 
and able to accept treatment that will ensure basic survival 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
needs are met.  Amenability to voluntary treatment is thus 
relevant to the ultimate question of grave disability.  As in 
Early, we conclude evidence on the voluntary treatment issue is 
admissible for the fact finder’s consideration.  But the 
Legislature has not made resistance to voluntary treatment a 
separate element to be proven by the state, nor does any 
constitutional precedent require that it do so.  It has long been 
held that the gravely disabled standard is constitutionally 
sufficient to justify the imposition of a conservatorship.  
(Conservatorship of Chambers (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 277, 285.)  
K.P. has not demonstrated that more is required. 
E. 
Application 
 
At the trial below, both the Public Guardian and K.P. 
presented evidence about K.P.’s willingness and ability to accept 
voluntary treatment.  A psychologist explained that K.P.’s lack 
of insight into his schizophrenia would hinder his ability to 
continue with medications and therapy on a voluntary basis.  
The psychologist believed K.P. needed a conservator’s 
supervision to ensure he would take his medications 
consistently and correctly.  K.P. confirmed this assessment 
when he testified.  He denied having a mental illness and 
admitted he would not continue taking his medications if 
released from conservatorship.  
 
The court also gave appropriate instructions on how this 
evidence could be considered.  After instructing on the Public 
Guardian’s obligation to prove that K.P. had a mental disorder 
and was gravely disabled as a result (CACI No. 4000), the court 
gave a modified version of CACI No. 4002 that specifically 
referenced K.P.’s willingness and ability to accept voluntary 
treatment.  Because evidence on amenability to voluntary 
Conservatorship of K.P. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
treatment was properly admitted, and the jury was properly 
instructed on its relevance, there was no error.  The jury’s 
finding of grave disability was sufficient to appoint a 
conservator. 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Conservatorship of K.P.   
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted (published) XX 39 Cal.App.5th 254 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S258212  
Date Filed:  June 28, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Robert S. Harrison    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Christopher L. Haberman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
and Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 
for Objector and Appellant. 
 
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Rosanne Wong and Joyce M. 
Aiello, Assistant County Counsel, Jose Silva, Principal Deputy County 
Counsel, and William C. Sias, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner 
and Respondent.  
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Christopher L. Haberman 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 521 
Visalia, CA 93279 
(559) 384-0703 
 
William C. Sias 
Deputy County Counsel 
500 West Temple St., Suite 648 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
(213) 407-4947