Title: Whitehead, Travis Stacey v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 082458
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 18, 2009

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
TRAVIS STACEY WHITEHEAD 
 
OPINION BY  
v. 
 
Record No. 082458 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
September 18, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we hold that a positive alert on a vehicle 
by a trained narcotics detection dog, combined with the 
subsequent fruitless searches of the vehicle, the driver, and 
two passengers, does not provide sufficient particularized 
probable cause to allow a search of the only remaining passenger 
in the vehicle.  We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals holding that the search at issue did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Around 3:00 P.M. on April 19, 2006, Officer Jay Quigley, 
who was employed by the City of Suffolk Police Department, 
stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation.  The driver and three 
passengers occupied the stopped vehicle; Travis Stacey Whitehead 
was the "rear right passenger."  Soon after the traffic stop, 
Officer J. B. Carr arrived on the scene with his certified 
narcotics detection dog, Xanto.  Officer Carr and Xanto were 
qualified at trial, without objection, as a "drug detection 
unit" and Xanto was certified to detect the odors of marijuana, 
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. 
While the driver and the three passengers were still inside 
the vehicle, Officer Carr walked Xanto around the vehicle, 
starting at the rear on the passenger's side and proceeding to 
the driver's door where Xanto alerted by sitting and waiting for 
his reward.  Xanto is trained to sit if he detects the odor of 
narcotics at his head height or above, and to lie down when the 
odor is at ground level.  Officer Carr relayed to Officer 
Quigley the fact that Xanto had alerted on the vehicle.  Other 
than advising the occupants that Officer Quigley would search 
the vehicle, Officer Carr and Xanto did not take any further 
action with respect to the vehicle or its occupants. 
Upon learning from Officer Carr that Xanto had alerted on 
the vehicle, Officer Quigley directed the driver and the three 
passengers to exit the vehicle.  He then searched the vehicle 
but found nothing.  Officer Quigley next searched the vehicle's 
occupants, starting with the driver, then the front passenger, 
and finally the two individuals who were sitting in the back 
seat.  The fourth and last person to be searched was Whitehead.  
Officer Quigley did not find any narcotics during his search of 
the first three occupants.  However, when he searched Whitehead, 
Officer Quigley discovered what he described as "two syringes in 
[Whitehead's] right front pants pocket [and] in the same pocket 
 
2
was a paper towel [with] a beer bottle cap wrapped up in it."  
According to Officer Quigley, the bottle cap had "a burnt 
residue inside of it."  Based on his training and experience, 
Officer Quigley believed that the residue was heroin.  
Subsequent forensic analysis of the bottle cap confirmed the 
residue was in fact heroin. 
Whitehead was subsequently indicted for possession of "a 
Schedule I or II controlled substance, in violation of" Code 
§ 18.2-250.  As the case proceeded in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Suffolk, Whitehead filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence found on his person.  At a hearing on the motion to 
suppress, Whitehead conceded that the alert by the narcotics 
detection dog on the vehicle gave the police officer probable 
cause to search the vehicle.  However, Whitehead argued that the 
officer did not have probable cause to search the occupants of 
the vehicle "without some sort of individualized probable cause" 
as to each person. 
With regard to Xanto's alert on the vehicle, the following 
information was elicited during Officer Carr's cross-examination 
by Whitehead's attorney: 
Q. [Defense Counsel:]  [Xanto has] been trained to 
[detect] the odor of narcotics? 
A. [Officer Carr:]  Yes, sir. 
Q.  Now, that doesn't always mean that there are 
narcotics strongly in the vehicle; is that correct? 
 
3
A.  That's correct. 
Q.  Sometimes there may be an old odor or something 
like that? 
A.  Yes, sir. 
Q.  But there is nothing found? 
A.  Correct. 
. . . . 
Q.  And when he searched the car - or the locations he 
alerts on, does that actually mean that that's the 
location of the drugs? 
A.  No.  That's where he gets the odor from. 
Q.  Which means it's just where he's got the best 
airflow? 
A.  Yes, sir. 
The circuit court denied Whitehead's motion to suppress, 
stating in its letter opinion: 
I conclude, first, that the alert by the drug dog 
constituted probable cause to search the vehicle.  
When that search yielded no drugs, and the searches of 
the driver and two other passengers likewise yielded 
no drugs, I conclude that the arresting officer then 
had particularized probable cause to search the 
defendant, whether he had been arrested or not. 
 
Whitehead subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea 
reserving his right to challenge on appeal the circuit court's 
denial of his motion to suppress.  The circuit court found 
Whitehead guilty of the charged offense and sentenced him to 
five years incarceration, with three years and two months 
suspended. 
 
4
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in a published opinion, 
held that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to 
suppress and thus affirmed Whitehead's conviction.  Whitehead v. 
Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 1, 7, 668 S.E.2d 435, 438 (2008).  The 
Court of Appeals concluded that, "[e]ven if we assume arguendo 
that a trained dog's detection of the scent of drugs coming from 
an occupied car does not, of itself, provide sufficiently 
particularized probable cause to search each of the car's 
occupants for drugs, . . . on these facts . . . the search of 
Whitehead's person did not violate the Fourth Amendment."  Id. 
at 5, 668 S.E.2d at 436-37.  Continuing, the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
In this case, the officers had probable cause to 
search the car following Xanto's alert.  And, by the 
time the officers searched Whitehead, they had 
probable cause to search his person through the 
process of elimination.  Each fruitless search - of 
the car and of the other occupants of the car - 
increased the likelihood that Whitehead possessed the 
odorous contraband detected by Xanto's trained nose.  
While it may have been more a result of luck rather 
than a profound understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 
we hold that by the time the officers searched 
Whitehead they possessed the necessary probable cause 
to justify the search. 
 
Id. at 7, 668 S.E.2d at 438 (footnote omitted).1 
                     
1 The Court of Appeals also concluded that Whitehead lacked 
standing to challenge the searches of the first, second, and 
third occupants of the vehicle and therefore refused to address 
Whitehead's argument that the court should ignore those previous 
fruitless searches in deciding whether probable cause existed to 
search him.  The Court of Appeals stated that it "assess[es] the 
 
5
We granted Whitehead this appeal.  In his sole assignment 
of error, Whitehead asserts the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that the search of his person did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
DISCUSSION 
On appeal, Whitehead does not challenge the lawfulness of 
the traffic stop or the fact that the police officer had 
probable cause to search the vehicle based on the positive alert 
by the narcotics detection dog.  See Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 
Va. 171, 180, 670 S.E.2d 727, 732 (2009) (a positive alert from 
a narcotics detection dog establishes probable cause to search a 
vehicle).  Thus, the only issue in this case is whether, after 
the search of the vehicle and three of its four occupants 
revealed no contraband, the police officer then had probable 
cause to search Whitehead.2 
The appellate standard of review applicable in this case is 
well settled:  
                                                                  
existence of probable cause at the time the search [is] 
conducted."  Whitehead, 53 Va. App. at 7 n.3, 668 S.E.2d at 438 
n.3. 
2 As Whitehead correctly notes, a search of his person was 
justified only as a search incident to a custodial arrest.  See 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (search 
incident to a custodial arrest does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment).  Thus, the actual question is whether probable cause 
existed to arrest Whitehead.  See United States v. Di Re, 332 
U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (determining whether defendant was lawfully 
arrested since ensuing search was permissible if probable cause 
to arrest existed). 
 
6
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence claiming a violation of a person's Fourth 
Amendment rights, we consider the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party at trial. The burden is on the defendant to show 
that the trial court committed reversible error. We 
are bound by the trial court's factual findings unless 
those findings are plainly wrong or unsupported by the 
evidence. We will review the trial court's application 
of the law de novo. 
 
Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168-69, 655 S.E.2d 
1, 3 (2008); accord Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 
573, 570 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002). 
Relying on the rationale of the Court of Appeals, the 
Commonwealth argues that by the time the police officer searched 
Whitehead, the officer had the necessary probable cause to 
justify that search.  Whitehead, however, asserts the positive 
alert by the narcotics detection dog provided probable cause to 
search only the vehicle and that there were no facts 
particularized as to him to establish probable cause that he was 
engaged in criminal activity.  Our analysis of the issue before 
us is guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), and Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 
366 (2003), and this Court's decision in El-Amin v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 15, 607 S.E.2d 115 (2005). 
In Di Re, an informant named Reed told an investigator that 
he was to buy "counterfeit gasoline ration coupons" from an 
 
7
individual named Buttitta at a particular location.  332 U.S. at 
583.  The investigator and a detective followed Buttitta's 
vehicle until it arrived at the appointed place.  Id.  The 
officers proceeded to the vehicle and found Reed, the only 
occupant of the rear seat, holding two gasoline ration coupons, 
which later proved to be counterfeit.  Id.  Reed stated he had 
obtained the coupons from Buttitta, who was sitting in the 
driver's seat.  Id.  Michael Di Re was sitting in the front seat 
beside Buttitta.  Id.  All three were taken into custody, 
frisked for weapons, and transported to the police station.  Id.  
At the police station, Di Re complied with a request to empty 
the contents of his pockets.  Id.  Upon doing so, Di Re pulled 
out two gasoline and several fuel oil ration coupons.  Id.  Di 
Re was subsequently "booked" and another search at that time 
revealed one hundred gas ration coupons.  All the coupons in Di 
Re's possession were counterfeit.  Id. 
The Government argued the search of Di Re was "justified as 
incident to a lawful arrest" or, in the alternative, that the 
"search of his person was justified as incident to search of a 
vehicle reasonably believed to be carrying contraband."  Id. at 
583-84.  The Supreme Court initially considered the second 
ground and assumed without deciding, since the vehicle was not 
searched, that there was probable cause to search the vehicle.  
The Court then held: 
 
8
We see no ground for expanding the ruling in 
[Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)] to 
justify this arrest and search as incident to the 
search of a car.  We are not convinced that a person, 
by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities 
from search of his person to which he would otherwise 
be entitled. 
 
Id. at 586-87. 
Since the Government also defended the search on the basis 
that it was incident to a lawful arrest, the Court then 
determined whether there was probable cause to arrest Di Re and 
search his person incident to that arrest.  Noting the 
Government conceded that the only person who committed a 
possible misdemeanor in the open presence of the officer was 
Reed, and that the police had acquired previous information as 
to Buttitta's selling coupons to Reed but had no such 
information as to Di Re, the Court concluded that Di Re's 
presence was not enough to justify the arrest.  Id. at 592.  The 
Court also rejected the Government's reliance on a conspiracy to 
show probable cause to arrest Di Re.  Id. at 593.  The Court 
stated that 
whatever suspicion might result from Di Re's mere 
presence seems diminished, if not destroyed, when 
Reed, present as the informer, pointed out Buttitta, 
and Buttitta only, as a guilty party.  No reason 
appears to doubt that Reed willingly would involve Di 
Re if the nature of the transaction permitted.  Yet he 
did not incriminate Di Re.  Any inference that 
everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must 
disappear if the Government informer singles out the 
guilty person. 
 
 
9
Id. at 594. 
In Ybarra, several police officers executed a warrant 
authorizing the search of a particular tavern and its bartender.  
444 U.S. at 88.  Upon entering the tavern, the officers informed 
all those present that they were going to conduct a "cursory 
search for weapons."  Id.  One of the officers proceeded to pat 
down each of the customers, including Ventura Ybarra.  Id.  
Although the officer felt what he described as "a cigarette pack 
with objects in it," he did not remove the pack from Ybarra's 
pocket.  Id.  Instead, he proceeded to pat down other customers.  
Id.  Several minutes later, the officer returned to Ybarra and 
frisked him once again, relocating and retrieving the cigarette 
pack.  Id. at 89.  Inside the pack the officer found six foil 
packets containing a substance that later proved to be heroin.  
Id.  The trial court denied Ybarra's motion to suppress the 
evidence found during the search of his person because the 
search was justified under an Illinois statute.3  Id. 
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the case, first noted that 
the complaint for the search warrant did not allege that persons 
illegally purchasing drugs frequented the bar, nor did it even 
                     
3 "An Illinois statute authorize[d] law enforcement officers 
to detain and search any person found on premises being searched 
pursuant to a search warrant, to protect themselves from attack 
or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything described 
in the warrant."  Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 87. 
 
10
so much as mention the patrons of the tavern.  Id. at 90.  The 
Court concluded that "[n]ot only was probable cause to search 
Ybarra absent at the time the warrant was issued, it was still 
absent when the police executed the warrant" because the police 
"had no reason to believe that he had committed, was committing, 
or was about to commit any offense under state or federal law."  
Id. at 90-91.  According to the Court, "Ybarra made no gestures 
indicative of criminal conduct, made no movements that might 
suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing of a 
suspicious nature to the police officers."  Id. at 91.  Thus, 
the Court found that "the agents knew nothing in particular 
about Ybarra, except that he was present, along with several 
other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police 
had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for 
sale."  Id. 
The Court further explained: 
It is true that the police possessed a warrant 
based on probable cause to search the tavern in which 
Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was 
executed.  But, a person's mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, 
without more, give rise to probable cause to search 
that person.  Where the standard is probable cause, a 
search or seizure of a person must be supported by 
probable cause particularized with respect to that 
person.  This requirement cannot be undercut or 
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that 
coincidentally there exists probable cause to search 
or seize another or to search the premises where the 
person may happen to be.  The Fourth and Fourteenth 
 
11
Amendments protect the legitimate expectations of 
privacy of persons, not places. 
 
Each patron who walked into [the tavern] was 
clothed with constitutional protection against an 
unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure.  That 
individualized protection was separate and distinct 
from [that] protection possessed by the proprietor of 
the tavern or by [the bartender].  Although the search 
warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers 
authority to search the premises and to search [the 
bartender], it gave them no authority whatever to 
invade the constitutional protections possessed 
individually by the tavern's customers. 
 
Id. at 91-92 (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
The Court also rejected the State's argument that the first 
pat down of Ybarra, permissible as a Terry frisk, provided 
justification for the second search that uncovered the heroin.  
The Court held, "[t]he initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not 
supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently 
dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held must 
form the predicate to a pat down of a person for weapons."  Id. 
at 92-93 (footnote omitted). 
In Pringle, a police officer stopped a vehicle for 
speeding.  540 U.S. at 368.  Three occupants were in the 
vehicle: the driver, who was also the owner of the vehicle; 
Pringle, the front-seat passenger; and the back-seat passenger.  
Id.  When the driver opened the glove compartment to retrieve 
his registration, the officer observed a large amount of rolled-
 
12
up cash.  Id.  During a consensual search of the vehicle, the 
police officer retrieved $763 from the glove compartment and 
"five plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine from behind 
the back-seat armrest."  Id.  After none of the occupants of the 
vehicle would provide information about the ownership of the 
contraband, the officer arrested all three individuals and 
transported them to the police station.  Id. at 368-69. 
Pringle, while in custody and after waiving his Miranda 
rights, admitted that the cocaine belonged to him and claimed 
the other occupants did not know about the drugs.  Id. at 369.  
The trial court denied Pringle's motion to suppress these 
statements as the fruit of an illegal arrest, holding that the 
officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle.  Id.  On review 
before the Supreme Court, it was uncontested that the officer, 
upon recovering the five plastic baggies containing suspected 
cocaine, had probable cause to believe a felony had been 
committed.  Id. at 370.  Thus, "[t]he sole question [was] 
whether the officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle 
committed that crime."  Id.  In deciding that question, the 
Court stated: 
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from 
these facts that any or all three of the occupants had 
knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, 
the cocaine.  Thus a reasonable officer could conclude 
that there was probable cause to believe Pringle 
committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either 
solely or jointly. 
 
13
Id. at 372. 
The Court distinguished its holding in Ybarra, explaining: 
Pringle and his two companions were in a relatively 
small automobile, not a public tavern. [We have] noted 
that "a car passenger – unlike the unwitting tavern 
patron in Ybarra – will often be engaged in a common 
enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest 
in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their 
wrongdoing."  Here we think it was reasonable for the 
officer to infer a common enterprise among the three 
men.  The quantity of drugs and cash in the car 
indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an 
enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to 
admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish 
evidence against him. 
Id. at 373 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 
(1999) (citations omitted)).  The Court also noted that, unlike 
the situation in Di Re when the informant singled out the guilty 
person, none of the three men singled out any one of them with 
respect to the ownership of the cocaine or money.  Id. at 374. 
Finally, in this Court's decision in El-Amin, we upheld the 
constitutionality of a frisk for weapons based on an officer's 
reasonable and particularized suspicion that El-Amin was armed 
and dangerous.  269 Va. at 23, 607 S.E.2d at 119.  There, police 
officers received an anonymous tip that six young black males 
were at a specified location smoking marijuana.  Id. at 18, 607 
S.E.2d at 116.  Two officers responded, and although they 
observed no signs of criminal activity, they approached four 
young black males walking near the identified location and asked 
to speak with them.  Id.  Two of the men walked over to the 
 
14
police officers, but El-Amin and the fourth individual remained 
further back and separate from each other.  Id.  Two other 
police officers then arrived on the scene, and one of them, 
Officer Williams, "immediately observed the fourth individual 
turn away and shove his hands into his waistband."  Id.  Officer 
Williams directed the fourth individual to turn around and face 
him, but that individual did not comply.  Id.  So, Officer 
Williams conducted a pat down search of the fourth individual.  
Id.  When the officer felt what he believed was a gun, he yelled 
"gun."  Id.  Officer Williams found a pellet gun in the fourth 
individual's waistband.  Id. 
Upon hearing Officer Williams yell "gun," another officer 
conducted a pat down search of El-Amin and found a .38-caliber 
revolver.  Id.  The officer then arrested El-Amin for illegal 
possession of a firearm as a juvenile, searched him incident to 
the arrest, and found marijuana and cocaine in his pockets.  Id. 
El-Amin contended that the officer had no particularized 
suspicion to believe he was engaged in criminal activity or that 
he was a danger to the officer and, therefore, "the search and 
seizure, based solely on El-Amin's association or physical 
proximity to the other three youths, was unconstitutional."  Id. 
at 19-20, 607 S.E.2d at 117.  The Commonwealth argued that the 
legitimate concern for officer safety justified the pat down at 
issue and that, under those circumstances, particularized 
 
15
suspicion was not required.  Id. at 21, 607 S.E.2d at 118.  The 
Commonwealth urged the Court to adopt a rule in such cases that 
"approves the search of the companion of a person validly 
detained based solely on the status of companion."  Id. 
This Court declined to adopt such a per se rule.  Id. 
Nevertheless, we concluded that the officer's concern for his 
and the other officers' safety was warranted because the 
encounter took place in the evening in a high crime area and the 
four individuals appeared to be in a group.  Id. at 22, 607 
S.E.2d at 118.  Continuing, we held: 
[U]pon learning that the fourth individual had a hand 
gun, [the police officer] was warranted in inferring 
that the inherent tendency toward violence 
demonstrated by one group member carrying a gun raised 
reasonable and particularized safety concerns as to 
other members of the same group.  The circumstances in 
this case support the officer's objectively reasonable 
apprehension that, upon discovery of a weapon on the 
person of one member of the group, the other members 
of the group might also be armed and dangerous. 
 
Id. at 23, 607 S.E.2d at 119.  
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized  
that El-Amin's companionship status alone was [not] 
sufficient to authorize a pat down search [and] that 
an officer's generalized concern for his safety alone 
would [not] validate such a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The totality of the facts in this case – 
place, time, discovery of a weapon, and group activity 
– validates the pat down search under the principles 
utilized by the Supreme Court when considering Fourth 
Amendment challenges to searches and seizures. 
 
Id.  We also distinguished Ybarra, stating: 
 
16
Ybarra is not dispositive here because in Ybarra the 
officers did not consider the patron and bartender as 
part of a group, the officers had no reason to believe 
that they were subject to any particular danger from 
any of the patrons in the bar, and simply told all 
patrons that they were conducting a cursory search for 
weapons. 
 
Id. at 22 n.5, 607 S.E.2d at 118 n.5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Di Re and 
Ybarra demonstrate that probable cause to arrest and/or search 
an individual must be particularized to that individual; mere 
proximity to criminal activity alone is insufficient to 
establish probable cause.  However, as illustrated by the 
decision in Pringle, evidence showing a common criminal 
enterprise can provide the necessary link between criminal 
activity and an individual so as to establish probable cause 
sufficiently particularized to that individual.  Although El-
Amin involved a frisk for weapons based on the lesser standard 
of reasonable articulable suspicion, see Bass v. Commonwealth, 
259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000) (recognizing that 
the standard of "reasonable suspicion" requires a lesser showing 
than the standard of "probable cause"), this Court nevertheless 
required something more than El-Amin's mere companionship 
status.  Instead, we considered the totality of the 
circumstances, i.e., "place, time, discovery of a weapon, and 
group activity," and concluded that sufficient particularized 
 
17
safety concerns existed as to El-Amin and the other members of 
the group to justify the frisk for weapons.  El-Amin, 269 Va. at 
23, 607 S.E.2d at 119. 
In the case at bar, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, we hold that probable cause to 
search Whitehead was absent.  After the positive alert by the 
trained narcotics detection dog, Officer Quigley unquestionably 
had probable cause to search the vehicle.  See Jones, 277 Va. at 
180, 670 S.E.2d at 732.  However, without something more, the 
positive alert did not provide probable cause sufficiently 
particularized as to Whitehead to allow the search of his 
person.  In contrast to the situation in Pringle, the 
Commonwealth presented no evidence, other than Whitehead's 
status as a passenger in the vehicle, indicating that Whitehead 
and the other passengers were involved in any common enterprise 
involving criminal activity.  There also was no evidence 
indicating Whitehead individually was committing, had committed, 
or was about to commit a criminal offense.  See Di Re, 332 U.S. 
at 594 (informant singled out guilty individual). 
The Commonwealth, however, argues that Xanto's positive 
alert indicated that contraband was present somewhere, and after 
no contraband was found in the vehicle or on the other three 
occupants, that somewhere had to be on Whitehead's person.  
Based on the evidence in this record, we are unwilling to draw 
 
18
such a conclusion.  While the fruitless searches of the vehicle 
and the other occupants increased the likelihood that the 
contraband detected by Xanto was on Whitehead's person, it also 
increased the likelihood that the dog alerted to the odor of 
contraband no longer present in the vehicle.  Officer Carr 
testified at the suppression hearing that a positive alert by 
Xanto did not necessarily mean that drugs were currently present 
in the automobile; rather, Xanto could have alerted to an "old 
odor." 
The positive alert by Xanto and the subsequent fruitless 
searches of the vehicle and three of its occupants may have 
created a strong suspicion that contraband was present on 
Whitehead's person; however, probable cause requires more than a 
strong suspicion.  See Jones, 277 Va. at 178, 670 S.E.2d at 731 
("[P]robable cause exists when 'there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place.'") (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 
(2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))).  
Based on the record in this case, the positive alert and the 
fruitless searches were not sufficient to establish probable 
cause particularized as to Whitehead that he was concealing 
contraband on his person.  Evidence of other factors such as 
those present in Pringle or El-Amin was needed to establish the 
requisite probable cause.  See State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 
 
19
659, 671 (Neb. 2006) (finding that a positive canine alert on a 
vehicle and subsequent fruitless search of the vehicle, combined 
with evidence of complicity in concealing the identity of the 
driver of the vehicle, provided probable cause particularized to 
the passenger that he was concealing drugs on his person); see 
also State v. Gibson, 108 P.3d 424, 430 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005) 
("Probable cause to believe that drugs are located in an 
automobile may not automatically constitute probable cause to 
arrest all persons located in the vehicle; some additional 
factors would generally have to be present, indicating to the 
officer that those persons possessed the contraband."); People 
v. Fondia, 740 N.E.2d 839, 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("'A canine 
alert on the exterior of the vehicle supports the general 
proposition that drugs may well be located within the vehicle, 
but not the more specific proposition that the drugs are 
concealed on a particular occupant thereof.'" (quoting Woodbury 
v. Florida, 730 So. 2d 354, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(Harris, J., dissenting))); State v. Wallace, 812 A.2d 291, 302-
03 (Md. 2002) (holding that a positive canine alert on a 
vehicle, without any other indicia of possession of contraband 
specifically related to the passenger, is insufficient to 
establish probable cause to search a non-owner, non-driver of 
the vehicle).  But see United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 
1045 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a positive canine alert 
 
20
provides probable cause to arrest the driver of the vehicle and 
finding that a fruitless search of the vehicle made it more 
likely that the contraband was on the bodies of the driver and 
passenger); State v. Ofori, 906 A.2d 1089, 1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2006) ("Because of the close association between contraband 
in a vehicle and the driver of (or other passenger in) the 
vehicle, either finding the drugs in the vehicle, as in Pringle, 
or probable cause to believe that they are in the vehicle, as in 
this case, necessarily implicates the driver and passengers."). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we conclude the search of Whitehead's 
person violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The Court of 
Appeals erred by holding otherwise.  Because the evidence seized 
from Whitehead should have been suppressed, there would be 
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on retrial.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, vacate Whitehead's conviction, and dismiss the 
indictment.  See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 681, 594 
S.E.2d 595, 603 (2004). 
Reversed and dismissed. 
 
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