Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. David V. Penn
Citation: 2002 WI 5
Docket Number: 1995AP000536-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2002

2002 WI 5 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
95-0536-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against David V. Penn, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsbility,  
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
David V. Penn,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REINSTATEMENT OF PENN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 23, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCURRED IN 
PART/DISSENTED IN 
PART: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
BABLITCH, J., joins. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2002 WI 5 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  95-0536-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against David V. Penn, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
David V. Penn,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 23, 2002  
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.  Reinstatement granted 
upon conditions.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM   We review the recommendation of the 
referee that David V. Penn's license to practice law, which this 
court suspended in 1996 following his conviction on six 
misdemeanor 
drug 
offenses, 
be 
reinstated 
upon 
certain 
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
2 
 
conditions.  Both the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)1 and the 
Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) join in that recommendation.  No 
appeal has been filed in this matter. 
¶2 
We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law and agree with his recommendation that David 
V. Penn's license to practice law be reinstated and that David 
V. Penn pay the costs of this reinstatement proceedings totaling 
$6803.64; however, we conclude that rather than being given only 
six months to pay the costs of this matter as recommended by the 
referee, David V. Penn shall have one year from the date of this 
order to pay such costs. 
¶3 
In 1996 when this court suspended David V. Penn's 
license to practice law following his conviction on six 
misdemeanor drug offenses, this court wrote: 
We determine that the recommended two-year license 
suspension is appropriate discipline to impose for 
Attorney 
Penn's 
professional 
misconduct. 
 
The 
seriousness of his criminal conduct in using illegal 
drugs is exacerbated by the fact that it occurred in 
the context of his official position as district 
attorney, a position of public trust in the legal 
                                                 
1 Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process underwent a substantial restructuring.  The 
name of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
cases involving attorney misconduct was changed to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and the supreme court rules applicable 
to the lawyer regulation system were also revised.  Although the 
petition for reinstatement in this matter was filed prior to 
that effective date, the petition for reinstatement was referred 
to the referee pursuant to the new provisions of SCR 22.30, and 
a public hearing was held on that reinstatement petition 
pursuant to SCR 22.31.  References in this opinion to the 
supreme court rules will be to those currently in effect unless 
specifically noted.  
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
3 
 
system to which the people of his county elected him.  
His repeated contravention of the criminal law, which 
was widely known in the community, caused significant 
and unjustified damage to the public's perception of 
the integrity of law enforcement personnel throughout 
the county. 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against David V. Penn, 201 Wis. 2d 405, 
406, 548 N.W.2d 526 (1996).   
¶4 
On June 14, 2000, David V. Penn filed a petition for 
reinstatement of his license to practice law.  As noted, that 
petition was referred to a referee pursuant to SCR 22.30.2  The 
referee held a public hearing on the reinstatement petition 
                                                 
2 SCR 22.30 provides:  Reinstatement procedure 
(1) The clerk of the supreme court shall select a referee 
from the panel provided in SCR 21.08, based on availability and 
geographic proximity to the petitioner's place of residence, and 
the chief justice shall appoint the referee to conduct a hearing 
on the petition for reinstatement. In the case of a license 
suspension, the hearing shall not be held prior to the 
expiration of the period of suspension. 
(2) The director shall investigate the eligibility of the 
petitioner for reinstatement and file a response with the 
referee in support of or in opposition to the petition. 
(3) At least 30 days prior to the hearing, the director 
shall publish a notice in a newspaper of general circulation in 
any county in which the petitioner maintained an office for the 
practice of law prior to suspension or revocation and in the 
county of the petitioner's residence during the suspension or 
revocation and in an official publication of the state bar of 
Wisconsin. 
(4) The notice under sub. (3) shall contain a brief 
statement of the nature and date of suspension or revocation, 
the matters required to be proved for reinstatement, and the 
date, time and location of the hearing on the petition.  
 
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
4 
 
where evidence was presented on behalf of the petitioner as well 
as OLR; two members of the public also appeared and presented 
information.  Following that hearing the referee found that 
since his license suspension, David Penn has completed the 
court-ordered period of probation for the criminal charges, has 
addressed his drug dependency by undergoing voluntary in-patient 
treatment and has submitted to random drug testing, and has paid 
the costs of the disciplinary proceeding leading to his 
suspension.  Furthermore, the referee determined that David Penn 
has fulfilled all the requirements set forth in SCR 22.26 for an 
attorney whose license has been suspended and Penn has attended 
continuing legal education programs and obtained a sufficient 
number of credits to be in compliance with the BBE requirements. 
¶5 
In addition, the referee noted that Penn has been 
comprehensively evaluated for alcohol and other drug use issues 
by a physician and by an AODA expert, both of whom were of the 
opinion that Penn may safely be recommended to resume the 
practice of law.  
¶6 
Furthermore, according to the referee, no evidence was 
presented at the public hearing to cast doubt on David Penn's 
qualifications to practice law.  Consequently, the referee 
concluded that David V. Penn could be safely recommended to be 
reinstated to the practice of law, a recommendation in which 
both the BBE and the OLR joined.   
¶7 
We make two observations about questions identified in 
the referee's report.  First the referee questioned the scope of 
the reinstatement proceeding and whether testimony and evidence 
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
5 
 
presented at the public hearing should be restricted to the 
elements listed in SCR 22.29(4)3 required in the reinstatement 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.29(4) provides: 
(4) The petition for reinstatement shall show all of the 
following: 
(a) The petitioner desires to have the petitioner's license 
reinstated. 
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during the period 
of suspension or revocation. 
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the 
order of suspension or revocation and will continue to comply 
with them until the petitioner's license is reinstated. 
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and learning 
in the law by attendance at identified educational activities. 
(e) The petitioner's 
conduct since the 
suspension or 
revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. 
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of and 
attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of 
the bar and will act in conformity with the standards. 
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to the legal 
profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be 
consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in 
matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the 
administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an 
officer of the courts. 
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the requirements 
set forth in SCR 22.26. 
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license if 
reinstated. 
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's business 
activities during the period of suspension or revocation. 
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
6 
 
petition.  On the other hand, the referee stated that although 
it was "fairly obvious" that the hearing on the petition for 
reinstatement should not amount to a retrial of the original 
disciplinary case, the referee wondered if the scope of the 
reinstatement hearing could properly extend to the facts and 
behavior which were the subject of the disciplinary proceedings 
and which led to the license suspension in the first place.   
¶8 
We believe that the rules contemplate that the referee 
conducting a hearing on the petition for reinstatement must 
engage in a full and unrestricted evaluation of the petitioner's 
past, present, and predicted future behavior, as well as any 
other relevant information going to the issue of whether the 
petitioner has the moral character to practice law in this state 
and whether his or her resumption of the practice of law would 
be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of 
the public interest.  We point out that SCR 22.29 lists the 
requirements a petition for reinstatement must show.  However, 
SCR 22.30 dealing with the reinstatement procedure itself, as 
well as the provisions in SCR 22.314 describing the reinstatement 
                                                                                                                                                             
(m) The petitioner has made restitution to or settled all 
claims of persons injured or harmed by petitioner's misconduct 
or, if not, the petitioner's explanation of the failure or 
inability to do so. 
4 SCR 22.31 provides: Reinstatement hearing 
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
7 
 
hearing, bolster the conclusion that the reinstatement hearing 
if necessary can be far-ranging and not limited to addressing 
the listed petition requirements in SCR 22.29(4).  This court 
has in prior cases when considering whether an attorney's 
license to practice shall be reinstated, examined the gravity of 
the underlying misconduct which led to the license suspension or 
revocation.  See Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hersh, 108 
Wis. 2d 450, 321 N.W.2d 927 (1982); see also Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hyndman, 2002 WI 6, ____ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, decided this date.  We believe that the petitioner's 
activities leading to the suspension of his or her license to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating by 
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the petitioner 
has the moral character to practice law in Wisconsin, that the 
petitioner's resumption of the practice of law will not be 
detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of 
the public interest, and that the petitioner has complied fully 
with the terms of the order of suspension or revocation and with 
the requirements of SCR 22.26. 
(2) The reinstatement hearing shall be public.  
(3) The referee shall appoint a person to act as court 
reporter to make a verbatim record of the proceeding as provided 
in SCR 71.01 to 71.03. 
(4) The petitioner and the director or a person designated 
by the director shall appear at the hearing. The petitioner may 
be represented by counsel. 
(5) The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the rules of 
civil procedure. The rules of evidence shall not apply, and the 
referee 
may 
consider 
any 
relevant 
information 
presented. 
Interested persons may present information in support of or in 
opposition to reinstatement.  
 
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
8 
 
practice 
law 
may 
indeed 
be 
relevant 
to 
the 
referee's 
determination of whether that petitioner has demonstrated by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he or she has 
the moral character to resume the practice of law in this state 
and that such resumption would not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice or subversive to the public interest.  
See SCR 22.31.   
¶9 
After a review of the record we conclude that the 
hearing on the reinstatement petition conducted by the referee 
in this case was sufficient and that, as the referee determined, 
David 
Penn 
has 
established 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing evidence that he has satisfied all the criteria for 
reinstatement.  
¶10 Accordingly, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
referee's 
recommendation that David V. Penn's license to practice law in 
this state be reinstated.   
¶11 The second observation made by the referee in his 
report dealt with the authority to impose costs of the 
reinstatement proceedings on the petitioner.  According to the 
referee, the current rules contain no specific provision 
authorizing 
the 
imposition 
of 
costs 
associated 
with 
the 
reinstatement proceeding.   
¶12 We do not share the referee's doubts about the 
authority to impose costs in a reinstatement proceeding.  As the 
referee observed, SCR 22.29(5) specifically provides that "[a] 
petition for reinstatement . . . shall be accompanied by an 
advance deposit in the amount to be set by the supreme court for 
No. 
95-0536-D   
 
9 
 
payment of all or a portion of the costs of the reinstatement 
proceeding." 
 
In 
this 
case, 
David 
Penn's 
petition 
for 
reinstatement was, in fact, accompanied by the required advance 
deposit of $200 for costs.  This rule, as well as the general 
provisions set out for disciplinary proceedings in SCR 22.11 
through SCR 22.24, supports the referee's conclusion in this 
case that costs could be imposed against this petitioner in this 
reinstatement 
proceeding. 
 
Thus, 
we 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
recommendation that David Penn be required, as a condition of 
reinstatement, 
to 
pay 
the 
costs 
of 
these 
reinstatement 
proceedings now totaling $6803.64.  We determine, however, that 
rather than being given only six months to pay such costs, that 
the petitioner may have one year from the date of this opinion 
within which to pay such costs.  Accordingly, we grant Attorney 
David V. Penn's petition to reinstate his license to practice in 
this state.  
¶13 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for reinstatement of 
the license of David V. Penn to practice law in Wisconsin is 
granted, effective the date of this order, upon the condition 
that he comply with the current CLE requirements. 
¶14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that David V. Penn pay the costs 
of this reinstatement proceeding totaling $6803.64 within one 
year of the date of this order.    
 
No. 95-0536-D.dtp 
 
 
 
1
¶15 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  I concur in that portion of the court's decision and 
order reinstating the license to practice law of Attorney David 
V. Penn.  I dissent from the court's determination imposing all 
costs of this reinstatement proceeding ($6,803.64) on Attorney 
Penn.  These costs raise disturbing questions and require 
comment. 
¶16 Attorney Penn was admitted to the State Bar of 
Wisconsin in May 1986.  He was elected Vilas County District 
Attorney in November 1986 and re-elected in 1988 and 1990.  
During this period in public office, Penn developed drug and 
chemical dependency problems resulting in violations of criminal 
law.  In January 1993, after he left office, he was convicted of 
six misdemeanor drug offenses involving the use of marijuana and 
cocaine, and he served jail time as a condition of his 
probation.   
¶17 In July 1992 Penn voluntarily suspended his practice 
of law.  He was officially suspended from membership in the 
State Bar of Wisconsin in October 1993 for failure to pay 
membership dues.  He was formally suspended by the court for a 
period of two years in June 1996.  The record shows that Penn 
has not practiced law for more than nine years.   
¶18 The record also shows, however, that in recent years 
Penn has made a serious and sustained effort to meet his 
obligations, turn his life around, and overcome his past.  Two 
health 
care 
professionals 
recently 
evaluated 
Penn 
and 
recommended his readmission.  The referee, the Office of Lawyer 
No. 95-0536-D.dtp 
 
 
 
2
Regulation (OLR), and the Board of Bar Examiners all recommended 
his readmission.  The court has no evidence of opposition to his 
readmission to the Bar. 
¶19 Penn was assessed $23,973.29 in costs in connection 
with the disciplinary proceeding in 1996.  He ultimately paid 
$26,000 to the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility 
(the Board) in an agreed-upon settlement of this obligation.  
Although Penn did not pay every penny of interest that had 
accrued prior to the settlement, he did pay the full costs plus 
more than $2,000 in interest.  The referee concluded that "Mr. 
Penn has paid the costs of the disciplinary proceeding."  Penn's 
commitment to pay this heavy financial obligation contributed to 
a bankruptcy. 
¶20 In June 2000, more than four years after he was 
suspended 
by 
this 
court, 
Penn 
filed 
a 
petition 
for 
reinstatement.  He submitted his petition under SCR 22.28, the 
controlling rule for reinstatement at that time.  Supreme Court 
Rule 22.28(5) and (7) then provided: 
(5) The 
administrator 
shall 
investigate 
the 
eligibility of the petitioner for reinstatement and 
file a report and recommendation with the board.  At 
least 30 days prior to the hearing on the petition 
before a professional responsibility committee, the 
administrator shall publish a notice in a newspaper of 
general circulation in any county in which the 
petitioner maintained an office prior to suspension or 
revocation and in the county of the petitioner's 
residence during the suspension or revocation and in 
an official publication of the state bar. 
 
The notice shall contain a brief statement of the 
nature and date of suspension or revocation, the 
matters required to be proved for reinstatement and 
No. 95-0536-D.dtp 
 
 
 
3
the date on which a hearing on the petition will be 
held 
before 
a 
professional 
responsibility 
committee . . . . 
. . . .  
(7) A 
petition 
for 
reinstatement 
must 
be 
accompanied by an advance deposit in an amount to be 
set by the board to cover all or part of the costs of 
the reinstatement proceeding.  The board may, in any 
case in which to do otherwise would result in hardship 
or injustice, extend the time for payment or waive 
payment (emphasis added). 
¶21 When Penn submitted his petition, he made an advance 
deposit of $200.00.   
¶22 At the time Penn filed his petition, this court was in 
the process of considering changes to the rules governing 
attorney discipline.  The new rules did not become effective 
until October 1, 2000.  Nonetheless, the Board declined to act 
on Penn's petition while the changes were pending. 
¶23 The new rules eliminate the role of the district 
professional 
responsibility 
committees 
in 
reinstatement 
proceedings.  They provide instead that each reinstatement 
proceeding be assigned to a referee.  Seven months after Penn 
submitted his petition to the Board, the new Office of Lawyer 
Regulation sent Penn's case to referee John N. Schweitzer.  Two 
weeks or so later, the director of OLR retained Attorney Matthew 
F. Anich to represent OLR. 
¶24 Attorney 
Penn 
raised 
questions 
about 
these 
developments.  He disputed the authority of OLR to proceed under 
the new rules rather than the old rules, given that his petition 
was filed more than three months before the new rules took 
effect.  He particularly disputed the retention of a referee 
No. 95-0536-D.dtp 
 
 
 
4
under the new rules and the appointment of private counsel to 
represent OLR, recognizing that he could be called upon to pay 
all their expenses.  He also disagreed with the scope of private 
counsel's 
reinstatement 
investigation 
and 
successfully 
challenged the choice of a specific expert to conduct a drug and 
alcohol abuse assessment. 
¶25 The referee subsequently acknowledged that Penn's case 
produced "the first public hearing on an attorney's petition for 
reinstatement under the Supreme Court Rules that went into 
effect on October 1, 2000," and he wrote an analysis of the 
various issues raised by Penn for "their bearing on future 
hearings."  
¶26 A careful reading of the record shows that Penn raised 
several legitimate issues about the procedures to be followed 
and the powers of OLR, all of which worked to increase his 
costs.5  He is now asked to pay all costs of this proceeding 
($6,803.64), including all costs of deciding these new issues.   
                                                 
5 The referee ruled against Penn on the question whether OLR 
could assign 
an outside 
attorney 
to 
represent 
it 
in a 
reinstatement proceeding.  Nonetheless, the referee wrote: "The 
language in the new versions of SCR 21.03(h), SCR 21.03(o), SCR 
21.04, and SCR 21.05 can be read as not permitting such an 
assignment, and a rule change to clarify the language to 
explicitly permit the assignment of outside counsel is highly 
recommended."  
The new version of SCR 22.24(1) reads: "The supreme court 
may assess against the respondent all or a portion of the costs 
of a proceeding in which it imposes discipline and enter a 
judgment for costs."  An amendment to this rule is presently 
under consideration to "clarify" that costs may be imposed in a 
reinstatement proceeding.  In the Matter of the Petition For 
Amendments to Supreme Court Rules Relating to the Lawyer 
Regulation System, Petition 01-12 at pages 26-27. 
No. 95-0536-D.dtp 
 
 
 
5
¶27 Admittedly, Penn is not now challenging these costs 
before this court; but it takes no imagination to understand 
that he has simply surrendered in order to stop the OLR cost 
meter from running. 
¶28 Attorney Penn is being assessed nearly seven times the 
costs being assessed against Attorney Hyndman in another matter 
decided today, in large part because the much more serious 
Hyndman case was handled under the old rules.  Disciplinary 
Matter Against Hyndman, 2002 WI 6, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___.  I think this result is manifestly unfair.  No doubt, 
Attorney Penn should pay reasonable costs.  In my view, full 
costs are not reasonable under the circumstances here and will 
impose a hardship on an attorney trying to start over.  
Consequently, on the issue of costs, I dissent. 
¶29 I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH joins this concurring/dissenting opinion. 
No. 95-0536-D.dtp 
 
 
 
1