Title: Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Education
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-134-01
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 11, 2003

Doris Green was a science teacher in the Jersey City Public School system for the thirty-year period from 1967 to 1997. In 1994, she sought and obtained an assignment to Public School 22 because of the teacher programs offered there. Green participated in training seminars and other non-classroom activities, including workshops in mediating student disputes and increasing student interest in scholarships. She also attended a summer program at Stevens Institute of Technology, for which she received no compensation but which resulted in a $1,000 grant of computers and materials to her classroom. According to Green, she was asked in May of 1995 by her supervisor and principal, Cassandra Wiggins, to expect a check for more than $500 on behalf of another employee. Wiggins explained that the other teacher had supervised an after-school program for which he did not have adequate credentials. Wiggins had submitted Green s name and credentials to the District and was asking Green to give the money to Wiggins when she received the check so that Wiggins could, in turn, ensure the other teacher was compensated. Green refused to participate in the scheme because she believed it to be fraudulent or illegal. Green presumed the matter was closed. Two months later, Green received a check for $543.63 that she deposited in her bank account believing it to be payment for her participation in a mediation program. It was not until Wiggins telephoned Green at home in July asking whether Green had received the check and demanding payment that Green realized the check she had deposited was not money she had earned. Green brought the matter to the attention of the Vice Principal and then to Lorraine Casey Church, the payroll supervisor for the Jersey City Board of Education. Church advised Green to send a check to the Board enclosing a letter of explanation and to have Wiggins call her. Green followed Church s instructions. Subsequently, Church returned the check to Green with a note informing her that Wiggins had authorized Green s receipt of a portion of the money and that the difference would be taken out of Green s next paycheck. Green kept the remainder of the money, again believing that it was for the mediation program. When the school year started the following September, Wiggins informed Green that she was very angry with her for reporting the incident to Church, and that Green would no longer be able to participate in the Stevens Institute program or the student mediation program. Green was told she was on Wiggins s shit list and that any requests Green made for additional programs or training would be denied. A host of other retaliatory acts followed, including: Green was given substandard evaluations even though her previous evaluations had been consistently satisfactory; she was moved to a dilapidated classroom with inadequate furniture; and she was denied a key to the science lab. In addition, Green s class was treated unfairly. Her students were no longer allowed to participate in opening exercises, an honor roll ceremony, or field trips. These incidents continued throughout two school years, from September 1995 to spring of 1997. Green left her teaching position in May 1997 and went on medical leave as a result of severe headaches and other physical symptoms. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her with a major depressive disorder, finding a causal relationship between her work situation and her illness. Green has never returned to teaching. On May 14, 1997, Green filed suit against the Jersey City Board of Education and several individual defendants, including Cassandra Wiggins, alleging defendants had engaged in continuous and increased forms of harassment dating back to July 23, 1995. She contended defendants behavior caused her loss of employment and that their harassing conduct amounted to a violation of her rights under CEPA. Defendants countered that Green s claims were barred by the Tort Claims Act (TCA) and the one-year statute of limitations of CEPA. The case was tried before a jury in February 2000. After both sides had concluded, but before the jury rendered a verdict, the trial judge dismissed both individual defendants and plaintiff s common law claims. On the CEPA claim, however, the jury returned a verdict against the Jersey City School Board, awarding plaintiff $265,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The trial judge imposed prejudgment interest on both awards. On appeal, the Jersey City Board of Education argued, among other things, that the TCA bars punitive damages in CEPA claims and that prejudgment interest is not allowable on punitive damages. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the jury verdict, but reversed the award of prejudgment interest on punitive damages. The Supreme Court granted the Jersey City Board of Education s petition for certification. HELD: Punitive damages may be awarded under CEPA against public entity defendants in appropriate cases. The CEPA one-year statu t e of limitations begins to run from the final action of retaliation. 1. The Legislature enacted CEPA to protect employees who report illegal or unethical work-place activities. In Abbamont v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405 (1994) (Abbamont I), this Court was evenly divided on the question whether punitive damages are available in a CEPA action brought against a public body. CEPA defines employers to include governmental entities and specifically permits a court to award punitive damages. The justices concurring in the judgment of the Appellate Division cited to these provisions, explaining that the Legislature easily could have exempted government entities from CEPA s punitive damages provision had it wished to do so. They also compared CEPA to the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), finding support for punitive damages against public sector defendants in the unique legislative purpose of the two statutes. Most important, the concurring justices turned to the heightened standard the Court had adopted for imposing punitive damages against public entities, which require willful indifference or actual participation by upper management. In Lockley v. Dept. of Corrections, __ N.J. __ (2003), also decided today, the Court emphasized the importance of that heightened standard when considering whether an award of punitive damages is warranted in the first instance. Since the opinion of Abbamont I nine years ago, the Court has repeatedly requested the Legislature to take up the issue of punitive damages against public entities if it deems the Court s interpretation mistaken. The Legislature has not acted. The Court can only assume from that silence that it intended to subject public entities to punitive damages under CEPA. (pp. 7-15) 2. The Jersey City Board of Education also asserts that because the retaliatory conduct began in September 1995, and Green s complaint was filed on May 14, 1997, her lawsuit is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. This Court has held that under the LAD, where an individual is subject to a continual pattern of tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases. The policy concerns underpinning that determination in respect of LAD claims require the application of the same framework in CEPA claims. Adverse employment action taken against an employee can include, as it did in this case, many separate instances of behavior. Because the acts of retaliation against Green continued until she resigned her teaching position in May 1997, and because Green filed her lawsuit on May 14, 1997, CEPA s one-year statute of limitations does not bar her claim. (pp. 15-19) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICES VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion, expressing the view that the State s presumptive immunity from punitive damage awards can be breached only by a clear and unmistakable pronouncement by the Legislature. Such a pronouncement is not found in CEPA. JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG and ZAZZALI join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ s opinion. JUSTICES VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN have filed a separate, dissenting opinion. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERSEY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, a body corporate and politic, Defendant-Appellant, and CASSANDRA WIGGINS, individually, SHERYL SULLIVAN, individually and FRANK PICCILLO, individually, Defendants. Argued January 6, 2003 Decided August 11, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Howard B. Mankoff argued the cause for appellant (Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman &amp; Goggin, attorneys). Alan L. Krumholz argued the cause for respondent. Jon W. Green argued the cause for amicus curiae, National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (Green, Lucas, Savits, &amp; Marose, attorneys; Mr. Green and Glen D. Savits, on the briefs). Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy Attorney General, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (David Samson, Attorney General, attorney; Karen L. Jordan, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). tak[ing] any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee . . . : a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to a law Most important, in response to concerns regarding an award of punitive damages against public entities, Justice Handler turned to the heightened standard [the Court] ha[d] adopted for imposing . . . damages against [such] entities, id. at 429, stating: Under [the Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 624-25 (1993)] heightened standard for liability, punitive damages may be awarded only if the conduct of managerial or supervisory government officials is particularly egregious and involves willful indifference or actual participation. Based on that kind of misuse of governmental authority, punitive damages serve to effectuate the goals of a statute that is specifically designed to discourage and eradicate vindictive action by employers and to further important interests of both employees and the public. That same year, four months later, Justice Verniero again asked the Legislature to consider the question, restating Justice Pollock s conclusion that [t]he best solution would be for the Legislature to revisit the issue and resolve it definitively. Abbamont II, supra, 163 N.J. at 15 (quoting Abbamont I, supra, 138 N.J. at 436 (Pollock, J., concurring and dissenting)). For nine years the Court repeatedly has requested that the Legislature take up the issue of punitive damages against public entities if it deems our interpretation to have been mistaken. The Legislature has not acted. We can only assume from that silence that it intended to subject public entities to punitive damages under CEPA. See Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 301 (1963) ( The construction of a statute by the courts, supported . . . by continued use of the same language or failure to amend the statute, is evidence that such construction is in accordance with legislative intent. . . . ); accord Cavuoti, supra, 161 N.J. at 133 ( There is ample precedent to support the proposition that, when a statute has been judicially construed, the failure of the Legislature subsequently to act is evidence of legislative acquiescence in the construction given to the statute. ) (collecting cases); Matter of Mun. Election Held on May 10, 1994, 139 N.J. 553, 559 (1995) ( Legislative acquiescence in the interpretation of a statute . . . provides some assurance that our interpretation comports with the intent of the Legislature. ); Egan v. Erie R.R. Co., 29 N.J. 243, 250 (1959) (stating that Legislature s failure to respond to court s interpretation of statute is evidence that such interpretation accords with legislative intent). Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct. The unlawful employment practice therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. Such claims are based on the cumulative [e]ffect of individual acts. That act need not, however, be the last act. As long as the employer has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable hostile environment claim, an unlawful employment practice has occurred, even if it is still occurring. Subsequent events, however, may still be part of the one hostile work environment claim and a charge may be filed at a later date and still encompass the whole. [Id. at 19-20 (quoting Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 115-17, 122 S. Ct. at 2073-74, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 123-25 (citations and footnotes omitted))]. This Court adopted Morgan s schema for determining when a cause of action arising under the LAD would be considered a continuing violation. Id. at 21. Most relevant here, we required an inquiry into whether the plaintiff[] [had] alleged a pattern or series of acts, any one of which may not be actionable as a discrete act, but when viewed cumulatively constitute a hostile work environment[.] Ibid. If the answer to that question is yes then [plaintiff s] cause of action accrued on the date on which the last act occurred, notwithstanding that some of the component acts of the hostile environment [were] outside the statutory time period. Ibid. The policy concerns underpinning the determination in Shepherd in respect of LAD claims require the application of the Morgan/Shepherd framework in CEPA actions. Retaliation, as defined by CEPA, need not be a single discrete action. Indeed, adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment, N.J.S.A. 34:19-2e, can include, as it did in this case, many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable individually but that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct. As Justice Handler said in Abbamont I, supra, CEPA, like LAD, is a civil rights statute. Its purpose is to protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct. Consistent with that purpose, CEPA must be considered remedial legislation and therefore should be construed liberally to effectuate its important social goal. JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG and ZAZZALI join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ s opinion. JUSTICES VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN have filed a separate, dissenting opinion. DORIS GREEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERSEY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, a body corporate and politic, Defendant-Appellant, and CASSANDRA WIGGINS, individually, SHERYL SULLIVAN, individually and FRANK PICCILLO, individually, Defendants. VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN, JJ., dissenting. The majority holds that the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to 9 (CEPA), permits an award of punitive damages against a public entity, in this case an Abbott school district serving poor school children. The decision to allow punitive damages in this setting is not necessary to make the victim whole, for that has been accomplished by the award of compensatory damages and counsel fees. The decision, however, will result in taking scarce resources from needy students. In our view, allowing punitive damages against a public entity is so far contrary to the interests of the public, we would have expected the Legislature to speak clearly and unambiguously if it intended such a declaration against the people s self-interest, as was pointed out in the well-reasoned opinion of Justice Pollock in Abbamont v. Piscataway Board of Education, 138 N.J. 405, 435-36 (1994) (Pollock, J., concurring and dissenting). We believe that sovereign immunity is the baseline, as did the dissent in Abbamont. When the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3 (TCA), reasserted the State s sovereign immunity (except where the TCA allowed suit to be brought), it specifically reaffirmed the common law that punitive damages are not available against the State. N.J.S.A. 9:9-2(c). In our view, the State s presumptive immunity from punitive damage awards can be breached only by a clear and unmistakable expression by the Legislature. The CEPA does not contain that unambiguous pronouncement. Nowhere in the Act or its history is there an expression of legislative intent to alter the decades of law that prohibited punitive damages against public entities. The Court applies an abbreviated version of the Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to 5.17 (PDA), as the standard for an award of punitive damages against a public entity. That the Legislature did not contemplate the use of the PDA for punitive damage awards against public entities is clear from the language of the Act. The PDA was premised on a private sector, profit-oriented model and, therefore, was not intended to apply to public entities. In today s companion case of Lockley v. Department of Corrections, __ N.J. __, __ (2003) (slip op. at 24-26), the Court recognizes the illogic of having a jury determine how much of the state budget (or, as here, that of a political subdivision) can or should be considered when fashioning a punitive damage award, and removes from the jury s consideration the financial impact on the taxpayers. However, taking away an additional limitation on the size of punitive damage awards, places public entities at risk of being treated more harshly than private sector entities, or even individuals. Consideration of the financial ability of a private person or entity was one means of keeping within check a runaway punitive damages award in those cases where there were limited resources to tap. The absence of that factor in the calculation of punitive damages in public entity cases may lead a jury naturally to assume that a public entity has the wherewithal through its power of taxation to pay almost any award. It seems incongruent that the Legislature would have taken such care to establish limiting principles for the award of punitive damages as against the private sector, but have provided no guidance on how such awards should be imposed on public entities. The problem with punitive damages against public entities is that it is unworkable and inflicts punishment not on the wrongdoer but on the innocent taxpayer. Moreover, if upper level managers are not deterred by the prospect of punitive damages being awarded against them personally, they are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of a punitive damages award against the public entity for which they work. Indeed, there already is great deterrent value in having a public entity pay a compensatory damages award and counsel fees. To transfer the penalty of punitive damages to the innocent taxpayer does not advance any salutary purpose. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 272, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616, 635 (1981) (holding that considerations of history and policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad-faith actions of its officials in 1983 federal civil rights cases). If the majority has interpreted the CEPA mistakenly to permit punitive damages against public entities, the Legislature is not without a remedy. Whether permitting punitive damage awards against public entities is good public policy is ultimately the decision of our elected representatives. Their silence or action will be conclusive on the issue. We respectfully dissent. NO. A-134 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court DORIS GREEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERSEY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, a body corporate Politic, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED August 11, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY JJ. Verniero, LaVecchia and Albin