Title: In Re Estate of Reed
Citation: 229 Kan. 431, 625 P.2d 447
Docket Number: 51,422
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 1981

229 Kan. 431 (1981)
625 P.2d 447
In the Matter of the Estate of Sarah R. Reed, Deceased.
No. 51,422

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 25, 1981.
Keith A. Greiner, of Keith A. Greiner, Chartered, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellants Indiana University Foundation and Pauline Winnick.
John G. Atherton, of Atherton, Hurt &amp; Sanderson, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees and cross-appellants George Andrew Reed, Margaret Moore, Marie Siedschlag and Dorothy Schwab.
Elvin D. Perkins, of Perkins &amp; Hollembeak, Chartered, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee Ruth C. Schillinger, Administrator of the Estate of Sarah R. Reed, Deceased.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
This is an appeal by petitioners, Pauline Winnick and Indiana University Foundation, from an order of the Lyon District Court refusing original probate to a document which petitioners contend is the will of Sarah R. Reed, deceased. The issue is whether that instrument may be construed as a will under our statutes.
The facts are undisputed. Sarah R. Reed died in the Whippoorwill boating accident on Lake Pomona near Vassar, Kansas, on June 17, 1978. At the time of her death, she was Director of the School of Library Science at Emporia State University, and she was a resident of Lyon County, Kansas. Before she came to Kansas she was Assistant Dean of the Graduate Library School at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana. While she was living in Indiana she wrote out, in her handwriting and upon a sheet of stationery bearing her name at the top, the following document:
"Witnessed June 2, 1973
The instrument contains no signature in the handwriting of Sarah R. Reed; her name appears only in the engraving at the top of the page.
Shortly after Sarah R. Reed's death, a special administrator was appointed; later, the special administrator filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, alleging that Sarah R. Reed died intestate. Attached to the petition was the document copied above, which had been found among the deceased's possessions. Petitioner alleged that the document was not a duly executed will, but by reason of its contents "petitioner believes that the Court and the persons named in said instrument should be apprised of the existence of said instrument." An order for hearing was entered and notice given. Indiana University Foundation answered, denying that the decedent died intestate and denying that the instrument dated June 2, 1973, was not a will. Hearing on the petition for letters of administration was held September 29, 1978; both Pauline Winnick and the Foundation appeared by counsel. The court found that Sarah R. Reed died intestate, but added "that the Court's finding that said Sarah R. Reed died intestate is subject to the introduction of any evidence that may rebut the finding of intestacy, which said evidence must be submitted to the Court within the statutory period." Letters of administration were issued and administration of the estate proceeded.
Afterwards, and within nine months of the date of death of the decedent, both the Foundation and Pauline Winnick filed petitions for admission of the document dated June 2, 1973, as the last will and testament of Sarah R. Reed, deceased. A consolidated *433 hearing was held on the petitions for probate of will on June 12, 1979. The administrator appeared in person and by counsel; all other parties appeared by counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing the court found that the instrument offered for probate "does not constitute a will pursuant to K.S.A. 59-606 because it is not signed at the end or pursuant to K.S.A. 59-609 because the term `subscribed' in the proviso of such statute means `signed at the end', and therefore the petitions for probate of will filed by Indiana University Foundation and Pauline Winnick are dismissed." This appeal followed.
The controlling issue is whether the instrument, admittedly executed in Indiana, was "subscribed by the testator" as is required by the proviso of K.S.A. 59-609. Petitioners contend the term "subscribed" in the proviso should be interpreted to mean "signed or authenticated as one's own." In support of this contention, petitioners call our attention to K.S.A. 59-2230, which allows foreign probated wills to be admitted to probate in Kansas upon proof of the foreign probate, and contend that if K.S.A. 59-609 is construed to require signing at the end, such a construction would bar the probate in this state of wills executed in jurisdictions which do not require signing at the end, and would be contrary to 59-2230. Also, petitioners contend that since the legislature used the words "signed at the end" in 59-606 and "subscribed" in 59-609, the legislature must have intended a different meaning for those terms. Petitioners rely upon State v. Queen, 103 Kan. 632, 176 Pac. 111 (1918), where we held that an information in a criminal case was "subscribed," as required by statute, where the signature line for the county attorney at the bottom of the information was left blank, but an affidavit to the truth of the information, which immediately followed, was signed and sworn to by that officer. Also relied upon is Southwest Engineering Co., Inc. v. Martin Tractor Co., Inc., 205 Kan. 684, 473 P.2d 18 (1970), where we held that the handprinted name, "Ken Hurt, Martin Tractor, Topeka, Caterpillar" was a sufficient signature on a bid form to bind the bidder, Martin Tractor Co., Inc., relying upon a section of the U.C.C., K.S.A. 84-1-201 (39), which reads:
and the official comment which states:
We turn first to the history of our statutes governing the execution of wills. Prior to statehood, the Territorial Legislature of 1859 adopted an act providing that except for oral wills, all wills "must be in writing, witnessed by two competent witnesses, and signed by the testator." Chapter 131, Laws of 1859, codified as Chapter 215, General Laws of Kansas, 1862. That act was repealed, and new statutes governing wills were enacted in 1865. The new act required that all wills be signed "at the end thereof." It provided:
The substance of the 1865 act has been carried forward in our probate code through the years. See G.S. 1868, ch. 117, § 2; R.S. 1923, 22-201; G.S. 1935, 22-202; and G.S. 1949, 59-606. Our present statute, K.S.A. 59-606, bears a remarkable resemblance to the act of 1865. It reads:
Our first statute, other than procedural statutes, dealing specifically with wills executed outside this state was enacted in 1911. It reads:
With slight modification, this now appears as K.S.A. 59-609, which reads:
K.S.A. 59-609 has not been heretofore construed by this court, but we have had numerous cases dealing with the acts necessary to execute a will under 59-606. In re Estate of Bond, 159 Kan. 249, 153 P.2d 912 (1944), is a case in which the opinion discusses the necessity for a signature by the testator at the end of a will. Justice Smith, speaking for a unanimous court, says at 252-55:
....
....
....
The case of In re Marques' Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1953), involved a holographic will written by a New York resident while she was on a trip to California. The will was written there, and mailed to a cousin in New York; it consisted of two pages, all in the handwriting of the deceased. The first page contained the dispositive provisions, and was signed at the bottom by the testator; the second page contained only a listing of assets. The court said at 879-882:
....
....
The proviso of K.S.A. 59-609 has been a part of that section since its original enactment in 1911. Wills executed outside of this state are recognized, whether executed in the manner required by Kansas statutes or the laws of the state in which the will is executed, or by the laws of the state where the testator resided at the time of execution or at the time of his death; but the proviso requires two things of all such wills: they must be in writing, and they must be subscribed by the testator. An oral will, executed outside the confines of Kansas, is not valid in this state; and a will which is not subscribed by the testator is likewise of no force and effect here. What, then, is the meaning of "subscribed"?
K.S.A. 59-606 uses both "signed at the end" and "subscribed." It says:
The act thus requires the testator to sign at the end, and it requires the witnesses, alternatively, to see him subscribe. It thus uses the terms synonymously. The term "subscribe" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1596 (4th ed. rev. 1968) as "to write underneath, as one's name; sub, under; scribere, to write; or, to write below a documentary statement." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2278 (unabridged 1964) defines "subscribe" as "to write (as one's name) underneath." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 876 (1969) says: "1. to write (one's name) underneath ... 2. to sign with one's own hand in token of consent or obligation by writing one's name beneath."
Thousands of commercial documents change hands daily; many are informal, hastily prepared, and routinely exchanged in accordance with the exigencies of commerce. Wills, on the other hand, are a formal expression of one's wishes, to take effect after the death of the maker. Much more formality has historically been required in the execution of wills than in the execution of day-to-day business and commercial papers. We decline to apply the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, relied upon by *438 the appellants, to the execution of wills. We adhere to what was said in In re Estate of Bond, 159 Kan. 249, and conclude that our statutes relating to the execution of wills must be strictly construed even though, in some rare situation, the intent of a testator may be frustrated. We hold that "subscribed," as used in K.S.A. 59-609, means "signed at the end," and that wills, whether executed within this state or elsewhere, must be signed at the end by the testator in order to be entitled to original probate within this state under that statute.
This is the majority view. In 94 C.J.S., Wills § 177 b (1), pp. 980-981, it is said:
In 79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills § 236, p. 446, the rule is similarly stated:
We do not find the opinion in State v. Queen, 103 Kan. 632, to require a different resolution of the issue. The information in that criminal case contained a blank at the end for the signature of the prosecutor, which was not filled; however, an affidavit, which followed immediately, was signed and sworn to by that official. The statute required an information to be subscribed by the prosecuting attorney, and to be verified by his oath or that of some other person. We treated the one signature as sufficient. We said at 633:
One other argument advanced by appellants should be given attention; that is the argument that to give effect to the proviso of K.S.A. 59-609 would be contrary to the intent of K.S.A. 59-2230, which provides for the probate in this state of wills probated elsewhere. That statute does not mention "signing." K.S.A. 59-2230 *439 provides in substance that if it appears to the satisfaction of the Kansas court that the will has been duly proved and admitted elsewhere, and that it was executed according to the law of the place where it was made, it shall be admitted to probate here. The instrument before us had not been admitted for probate in Indiana when the proceedings below were held, but counsel advised on oral argument that it has since been admitted in that state. Be that as it may, Indiana statutes clearly require that a will be signed. Ind. Code Ann. § 29-1-5-3 [6-503](a) (Burns, 1980 Supp.), states:
"(i) Sign the will;
"(ii) Acknowledge his signature already made; or
This document is unsigned. Whether it was "executed according to the law of the place in which it was made," however, we leave for resolution of the appropriate court in the event application for probate is later made under K.S.A. 59-2229, -2230. We leave also for resolution in an appropriate court whether 59-609 and 59-2230 should be considered in pari materia. Such issues are not now before us.
The issue decided above is determinative of this appeal, and other matters raised need not be decided.
The judgment of the trial court, denying the petitions for probate of the instrument dated June 2, 1973, and holding that that document is not a will under our statutes, is affirmed.