Title: State v. John Norman
Citation: 2003 WI 72
Docket Number: 2001AP003303-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2003

2003 WI 72 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3303-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
John Norman,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 938, 652 N.W.2d 133 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida   
 
JUDGE: 
Douglas T. Fox   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Angela Kachelski and The Shellow Group, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Angela Kachelski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Edwin 
J. Hughes, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2003 WI 72 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 01-3303-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 58) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John Norman,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, 
affirming the judgment of conviction entered by the Circuit 
Court for Oneida County, Douglas T. Fox, Judge.1  The defendant, 
John K. Norman, was charged with six counts of falsifying 
corporate documents, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1) 
(1999-2000),2 and four counts of theft, in violation of 
                                                 
1 State v. Norman, No. 01-3303-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2002).  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a) and (b).  The charges stemmed from 
allegations 
that 
the 
defendant 
falsified 
retail 
purchase 
agreements and established a commission-splitting scheme while 
working as an employee of Shoeder's Marine and Sports Center.  
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of six 
counts of falsifying documents and two counts of theft. 
¶2 
The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing for 
relief on four separate grounds.  These same grounds form the 
defendant's argument in this court. 
¶3 
First, the defendant claims that the circuit court 
erred when it admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of a 
witness who was not present at trial, in violation of his 
constitutional right to confrontation.  The defendant asserts 
that preliminary hearing testimony may never be admitted at a 
criminal trial on the ground that Wisconsin case law allows a 
circuit court to prohibit cross-examination of a witness about 
credibility.   
¶4 
The court of appeals held that that admission of the 
unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony did not 
violate the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.  
We agree with the court of appeals.  The witness's memory, 
credibility, or bias was not at issue at trial.  Consequently, 
the inability of the defendant to cross-examine the witness at 
the preliminary hearing with questions that went to memory, 
credibility, or bias did not present an unusual circumstance 
that undermined the reliability of the witness's testimony in 
the present case. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Second, the defendant claims that the circuit court 
erred when it excluded the hearsay testimony of a witness that 
the defendant sought to introduce as a prior inconsistent 
statement for purposes of impeachment.  The court of appeals 
held that the error in excluding the prior inconsistent 
statements introduced by the defendant was harmless because 
defense counsel was able to effectively communicate the relevant 
information to the jury by other means.  We agree with the court 
of appeals and conclude that it is beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained. 
¶6 
Third, the defendant asserts that his right to a 
unanimous jury verdict was violated by the jury instruction that 
did not require that all members of the jury agree that the 
documents were falsified with the same criminal intent.  Whether 
a jury instruction violates a defendant's right to a unanimous 
verdict involves a multi-step analysis.  We conclude that the 
defendant has failed to develop his assertion and is not 
entitled to the court's consideration of this issue.  We 
therefore hold that the circuit court did not err in instructing 
the jury. 
¶7 
Fourth, 
the 
defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to convict him beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  On review of the evidence, we agree with the 
court of appeals that the defendant did not meet his burden of 
proving that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the State 
and the conviction, is so insufficient in probative value and 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
4 
 
force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of 
fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
I 
¶8 
The facts are as follows.  The defendant began as a 
salesperson at Shoeder's Marine and Sports Center (Shoeder's 
Marine) in 1995.  He was promoted twice, eventually becoming the 
general manager.  In that position and in his prior positions 
with Shoeder's Marine, the defendant worked principally on 
commission.  He also received monetary bonuses and perks, 
including the use of snowmobiles and boats.  In 1999, the 
defendant was making plans to open his own snowmobile and marina 
business, and sales personnel and mechanics of Shoeder's Marine 
agreed to work for him when he opened his business.  Shoeder's 
Marine would be affected by this competition.  
¶9 
In October 1999, Keith Shoeder, the owner of Shoeder's 
Marine, reported to the police that the defendant had altered 
sales documents to suggest that customers had purchased more 
products than they actually did.  The defendant was arrested and 
a search warrant was executed for his home.  The search turned 
up a snowmobile and a boat that Shoeder's Marine records 
indicated had been sold to customers of the dealership.   
¶10 The defendant was charged with fraud for falsifying 
purchase agreements and with theft of Shoeder's Marine property.  
The fraud charges and one of the theft charges stemmed from 
several incidents of falsifying retail purchase agreements.  The 
general fact pattern, however, was the same in each instance.  A 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
5 
 
customer would purchase equipment from Shoeder's Marine, or 
trade in old equipment for new equipment, and receive a purchase 
agreement that accurately reflected the purchase or swap.   
¶11 The purchase agreement for the same transaction on 
file with Shoeder's Marine, however, would show the purchase of 
additional equipment or would fail to show that an item was 
traded in by the customer.  The defendant would then take the 
additional equipment or trade-in for himself.  Because Shoeder's 
Marine bookkeepers rely on the purchase agreements to keep track 
of the business's sales and inventory, altering the documents 
allowed the additional equipment to be removed from inventory 
lists.    
¶12 The final theft charge was based upon an alleged 
commission-splitting 
scheme 
between 
the defendant and Dan 
Krehmeyer, a Shoeder's Marine salesperson.  The defendant, as 
general manager, received a commission on all purchases whether 
he was the salesperson or not.  The defendant apparently took 
advantage of this general commission by establishing a scheme in 
which he would let Krehmeyer sign the purchase agreement for 
some of the sales the defendant made, allowing the defendant to 
obtain his general manager commission, and then Krehmeyer would 
split his fifteen percent sales commission with the defendant as 
well.   
¶13 At trial, the defendant testified that he took several 
products from Shoeder's Marine and falsified the purchase 
agreements to cover those items.  The defendant, however, 
claimed that Keith Shoeder knew of his actions and gave him 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
6 
 
permission to take the products as job perks.3  According to the 
defendant, changing the purchase agreement was a method of 
accounting for the inventory, not fraud.  The defendant denied 
that the commission-splitting scheme existed.  Keith Shoeder 
disputed the defendant's account of the transactions.  
¶14 The jury convicted the defendant on all six counts of 
falsifying documents and on two of the four counts of theft.  He 
was acquitted of one count of felony theft and one count of 
misdemeanor theft. 
¶15 Additional facts necessary for the resolution of each 
particular legal issue are included in the discussion of the 
legal issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
¶16 The first issue raised by the defendant is that the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
when 
it 
admitted 
into 
evidence 
the 
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness, Barbara Park, who 
was not present at trial.  The defendant claims that the 
admission of this testimony violated his right to confrontation 
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
                                                 
3 Keith Shoeder denies ever giving the defendant permission 
to take the products or having any knowledge of falsified 
documents until he discovered the inaccurate purchase agreements 
in 1999. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
7 
 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.4 
¶17 At the preliminary hearing, Park testified that in 
1998 she purchased a new Glastar motorboat from Shoeder's 
Marine.5  Then, in 1999, according to Park's testimony, she 
exchanged her used boat for a new Tracker Topper rowboat.  Park 
made an even trade, paying only $11 for a license, which she 
paid in cash at the time of the exchange.  Park further 
testified that she obtained a receipt which reflected her trade-
in.  She denied seeing or receiving a receipt or purchase 
agreement dated June 16, 1999, indicating a total purchase price 
                                                 
4 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads as 
follows: 
SECTION 7.  In all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and 
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to 
face; to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses 
in 
his 
behalf; 
and 
in 
prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district wherein the offense shall have been 
committed; which county or district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law. 
5 Park identified the purchase agreement at the preliminary 
hearing.   
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
8 
 
for the rowboat as $1,004.81.6  Finally, Park testified that she 
never dealt with the defendant, only a salesperson named "Dan." 
¶18 The defendant asked only three questions of Park on 
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing.  The first 
question confirmed that Park dealt with Dan Krehmeyer both times 
she was at Shoeder's Marine.  The other two questions probed 
whether the Glastar boat had a leaking problem before it was 
traded in.7 
¶19 The defendant objects to the admission of Park's 
preliminary hearing testimony at trial on two grounds. 
                                                 
6 The June 16, 1999, purchase agreement on file with 
Shoeder's Marine did not indicate that Park traded in a 
motorboat.  Instead, the purchase agreement stated that Park 
purchased the rowboat in cash for $1,004.81.  The defendant 
apparently kept the Glastar boat for himself and paid the 
$1,004.81 to Shoeder's Marine, an amount nearly half the value 
of the boat. 
7 The preliminary hearing testimony transcript of the cross-
examination of Park reads as follows: 
Q: Now, the person that you dealt with on both those 
occasions was the person you have described as Dan 
[Krehmeyer]; is that correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And did the first boat, the Glastar that——when you 
traded it in did you have some leaking problems with 
that? 
A: No, sir.  I never had the boat in the water. 
Q: You don't know if there was any leaking problems or 
not? 
A: No, sir. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20 First, the defendant's brief asserts, in passing and 
without explanation, that admitting Park's preliminary hearing 
testimony was error because Park was not "unavailable."   
¶21 The State's motion to allow the reading of Park's 
preliminary hearing testimony was supported by an affidavit from 
the district attorney that Park suffered from a strangulated 
hernia and that her doctor advised her not to drive from her 
home in Indiana to Rhinelander.  Park also declined an offer 
from the State to fly her to Rhinelander. 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(1) states that the former 
testimony of an unavailable witness is not excluded by the 
hearsay rule.8  Section 908.04(1)(d) defines unavailability of a 
witness as including situations in which a declarant "is unable 
to be present or to testify at the hearing because of . . . then 
existing physical . . . illness or infirmity."  The defendant 
offers nothing in support of his bald assertion that "Ms. Park 
was not unavailable."  The circuit court found that Park was 
unavailable for the trial.  On the basis of the defendant's lack 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(1) reads as follows: 
908.045.  Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.  
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at 
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, 
or in deposition taken in compliance with law in the 
course of another proceeding, at the instance of or 
against a party with an opportunity to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross-, or redirect examination, 
with motive and interest similar to those of the party 
against whom now offered. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
10 
 
of any argument on the issue, the circuit court's finding of 
unavailability must stand.   
¶23 Second, according to the defendant, the prohibition on 
questions designed to challenge the credibility of a witness at 
a preliminary hearing makes the admission of preliminary hearing 
testimony at all criminal trials, including at the trial in the 
present case, a violation of an accused's federal and state 
constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination.9   
¶24 Ordinarily, the admissibility of former testimony into 
evidence is a discretionary decision of the circuit court, and 
it will not be overturned unless the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.10  Nevertheless, the question of 
whether the admission of evidence violates an accused's right to 
confrontation is a question of constitutional fact.11  When 
determining a question of constitutional fact, we adopt the 
circuit court's findings of historical fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the appropriate 
constitutional standard to those facts.12  
                                                 
9 State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 397, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984) 
(at a preliminary hearing a judge ascertains plausibility of a 
witness's story, and whether, if believed, it would support a 
bindover; the preliminary hearing judge cannot delve into the 
credibility of a witness). 
10 State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶39, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 
N.W.2d 367. 
11 Id.  
12 Tomlinson, 254 Wis. 2d 502, ¶39. See also State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶7, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919 (citing 
State v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 
1999)). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
11 
 
¶25 In State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 
(1982), this court articulated a multi-step test for determining 
when hearsay evidence is admissible in a criminal trial without 
violating an accused's right to confrontation.  The threshold 
question, the Bauer court ruled, is whether the evidence fits 
within a recognized hearsay exception.13   
¶26 The defendant in the present case does not dispute 
that 
Park's 
preliminary 
hearing 
testimony 
fits 
within 
a 
recognized hearsay exception, Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1), if Park 
is unavailable under the statute. 
¶27 The next step in the Bauer multi-step test is to 
determine whether an accused's right to confrontation has been 
violated by the admission of hearsay evidence under a recognized 
hearsay exception.  To make this determination, a circuit court 
must decide whether two criteria are satisfied.   
¶28 First, in many circumstances, the witness must be 
unavailable.14  The mere absence of a witness does not render the 
witness unavailable at trial for constitutional purposes.15 
Rather, the burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate that the 
                                                 
13 State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 210, 325 N.W.2d 857 
(1982).  For another application of the Bauer test, see State v. 
Stuart, 2003 WI 73, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
14 Tomlinson, 
254 
Wis. 2d 502, 
¶46 
n.7; 
Bauer, 
109 
Wis. 2d at 210-13.  The unavailability analysis at this step is 
derived 
from 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, not a statute.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 
74 (1980). 
15 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
12 
 
witness is absent despite the prosecution's "good-faith effort" 
to obtain the witness's presence at trial.16  The circuit court 
concluded that Park was "unavailable."  Again, the defendant 
makes no argument in this court to contradict the circuit court 
and offers no reason to support a holding that the State did not 
make a good-faith effort to obtain Park's presence at trial. 
¶29 The second criterion established by the Bauer decision 
is that the evidence must bear some "indicia of reliability."17  
If the evidence fits within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," 
a court may infer that the evidence bears the requisite indicia 
of reliability so long as no "unusual circumstance" exists that 
would warrant exclusion of the evidence.18 
¶30 The preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness 
is 
well 
recognized 
as 
a 
"firmly 
rooted 
hearsay 
exception."19  Thus, the reliability of the hearsay evidence may 
be inferred in the instant case.20   
                                                 
16 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); see also La 
Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 336-39, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).  
17 See Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 215-16. 
18 Id. at 215.  
19 Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 216 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 
66). 
20 Testimony at a preliminary hearing provides additional 
indicia of reliability as well.  The defendant was present and 
represented by counsel; the defendant had an opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness; the witness was under oath subject to 
the penalties of perjury; and the proceedings were recorded.   
See Tomlinson, 254 Wis. 2d 502, ¶¶50-51; Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 
219; Nabbefeld v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 515, 527, 266 N.W.2d 292 
(1978). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
13 
 
¶31 The defendant makes two arguments to support his 
position that the admission of Park's preliminary hearing 
testimony violates his constitutional rights to confrontation.  
¶32 The defendant's first argument asserts that the very 
brief cross-examination at the preliminary hearing in the 
instant case, entailing only three questions, constitutes an 
"unusual 
circumstance" 
that 
undermines 
the 
inference 
of 
reliability 
attributable 
to 
Park's 
preliminary 
hearing 
testimony. 
¶33 However, the mere number of questions on cross-
examination, standing alone, cannot be the determinative test of 
whether 
an 
"unusual 
circumstance" 
exists 
to 
render 
the 
preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible at trial.  The 
defendant does not assert his cross-examination was limited in 
any way by the circuit court or the State except that he could 
not challenge the credibility of the witness.  This limitation 
on cross-examination leads to the defendant's other argument.21 
¶34 The defendant's second argument broadly asserts that 
the limitations on preliminary hearing cross-examination barring 
questions that go to the credibility of the witness inherently 
render the admission of preliminary hearing testimony at 
criminal trials a violation of the constitutional rights to 
                                                 
21 See 
State 
v. 
Myren, 
133 
Wis. 2d 430, 
439-40, 
395 
N.W.2d 818 
(Ct. 
App. 
1986) 
(rejecting 
the 
argument 
that 
virtually no cross-examination is per se an unusual circumstance 
warranting exclusion of the preliminary hearing testimony). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
14 
 
confrontation.  According to the defendant, the rights to 
confrontation include the right to challenge credibility.   
¶35 We reject the defendant's argument that preliminary 
hearing testimony may never be admitted at a criminal trial just 
because Wisconsin case law prohibits cross-examination of a 
witness about credibility.  The defendant asserts that admission 
of preliminary 
hearing testimony 
necessarily violates the 
constitutional rights to confrontation.  That precise argument 
was made in Bauer and was rejected.  The Bauer decision followed 
the lead of the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Haywood 
v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1088 (1981), and concluded that the fact that cross-examination 
during a preliminary hearing is limited does not necessarily 
render the testimony inadmissible.22  Indeed, cases throughout 
the country23 and in Wisconsin have upheld the admissibility of 
preliminary hearing testimony for an unavailable witness in the 
absence of unusual circumstances.24 
¶36 We agree with the defendant that the right to 
confrontation in the Sixth Amendment envisions the personal 
                                                 
22 Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 218. 
23 See Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Admissibility or 
Use in Criminal Trial of Testimony Given at Preliminary 
Proceeding By Witness Not Available at Trial, 38 A.L.R. 4th 
(1985 & Supp. 2002). 
24 See, e.g., State v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, ¶17, 257 
Wis. 2d 177, 650 N.W.2d 913; State v. Whiting, 136 Wis. 2d 400, 
416-17, 402 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Myren, 133 
Wis. 2d at 437-40.   
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
15 
 
examination of a witness by the defendant.  The purpose of 
confrontation 
and 
cross-examination 
is 
to 
test 
both 
the 
witness's memory and credibility in the presence of the fact 
finder.25  "These means of testing accuracy are so important that 
the absence of proper confrontation at trial calls into question 
the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process."26  However, 
this fundamental right to confrontation must, at times, be 
dispensed with in order to accommodate competing interests such 
as effective law enforcement and precise workable rules of 
evidence in criminal proceedings.27  Accordingly, both the U.S. 
Supreme Court and this court have held that when a witness is 
unavailable for trial, hearsay evidence may be admitted when 
there has been "substantial compliance with the purposes behind 
the confrontation requirement.  Those purposes are satisfied 
when the trier of fact has a reasonable basis for evaluating the 
truthfulness of the prior statement."28   
¶37 In the present case, there has been substantial 
compliance 
with 
the 
purposes 
behind 
the 
confrontation 
requirement.  The defendant has made no argument, and we can 
come up with none, to suggest that Park's memory or credibility 
is at issue in the present case or that cross-examination of 
                                                 
25 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (quoting 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)). 
26 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (internal citations omitted). 
27 Id. 
28 Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 214 (citations omitted); see also 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
16 
 
Park at trial, had Park been present, would have included any 
questions pertaining to her memory, credibility, or bias against 
the defendant.   
¶38 The facts underlying Park's testimony are not in 
dispute.  The defendant does not dispute that Park traded in her 
Glastar boat for a rowboat.  Neither does the defendant dispute 
that Park dealt with Krehmeyer when trading in her boat and did 
not ever deal with him.  More importantly, the defendant 
admitted at trial that he falsified Park's purchase agreement 
and that he paid the false amount listed on the agreement.29  
Finally, the defendant has offered no evidence, and has not even 
hinted at the possibility, that Park could be challenged on the 
basis of bias, credibility, or memory.       
¶39 The only disputed issue at trial that involved Park's 
testimony in any way was whether Keith Shoeder knew that the 
defendant had falsified the purchase agreement with Park and 
whether Keith Shoeder gave the defendant permission to take the 
exchanged Glastar boat home.  Park's testimony shed no light on 
either of these issues.  Therefore, the defendant's inability to 
cross-examine 
Park 
with 
questions 
that 
go 
to 
memory, 
credibility, or bias does not present an unusual circumstance 
that would undermine the reliability of Park's testimony in the 
present case.    
                                                 
29 In addition, the Glastar boat that Park traded in was 
found at the defendant's home.   
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
17 
 
¶40 Wisconsin case law leaves open the possibility that 
the inability of a defendant to cross-examine a witness at a 
preliminary hearing on questions of memory, credibility, or bias 
could, under 
certain circumstances, 
constitute 
an unusual 
circumstance that would render admission of the preliminary 
hearing testimony a violation of the defendant's right to 
confrontation.30  The case at hand, however, does not present 
such circumstances. 
¶41 Accordingly, we conclude that there was no error, 
either evidentiary or 
constitutional, 
in admitting 
Park's 
preliminary hearing testimony at the defendant's trial.   
III 
¶42 Second, the defendant argues that the circuit court 
erred when it excluded the prior inconsistent statement of a 
witness, Dan Krehmeyer.  The defendant was attempting to use the 
prior inconsistent statement to impeach Krehmeyer. 
¶43 Krehmeyer was the State's principal witness on the 
theft charges stemming from the alleged commission-splitting 
scheme.  According to the State, the commission-splitting scheme 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 221-22 ("Notwithstanding 
the 
fact 
that 
cross-examination 
during 
the 
preliminary 
examination is limited in form, if in substance the questioning 
deals with the witness's credibility, the purposes behind the 
confrontation right may be satisfied. . . . [D]efense counsel 
adequately cross-examined [the witness] 'on the very issues that 
are relevant at the time the witness is unavailable, including 
credibility.'"); Nabbefeld, 83 Wis. 2d at 526-27 ("Where unusual 
circumstances are apparent, the court may have reason to inquire 
into whether a meaningful confrontation was indeed afforded a 
defendant."). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
18 
 
began in 1999 and involved Krehmeyer's writing nine monthly 
checks to the defendant, totaling over $1,000, and representing 
the defendant's share of the commissions Krehmeyer received.   
¶44 On cross-examination at trial, Krehmeyer testified 
that he had never given checks or money to the defendant for 
help in closing sales at Shoeder's Marine prior to the alleged 
agreement to split commissions.  He also testified that he did 
not recall ever doing so. 
¶45 The State then called Detective Ron Lueneburg of the 
Rhinelander Police Department, who testified about the search 
warrant executed at the defendant's house.  During cross-
examination, the defendant asked Detective Lueneburg about 
statements 
Krehmeyer 
made 
to 
him 
during 
the 
police 
investigation.  The question was based on a police report 
Detective Lueneburg had prepared that indicated Krehmeyer had 
written three checks to the defendant in 1997 and stated they 
were legitimate payments for the defendant's assistance in 
closing some sales.  The State objected to the question on 
hearsay grounds, and the circuit court sustained the objection. 
¶46 We agree with the court of appeals and both parties 
that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow the question.  
Krehmeyer's statement to the detective was admissible as a prior 
inconsistent statement under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a).31 
                                                 
31 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.01(4)(a) states that: "A statement 
is not hearsay if . . . the declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement, and the statement is . . . [i]nconsistent with the 
declarant's testimony." 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
19 
 
¶47 The question then is whether the error is prejudicial 
so that a new trial on the theft charge is warranted.  The test 
for harmless error was set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 
U.S. 
987 
(1967), 
which 
stated 
that 
"before 
a 
federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be 
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  An error is harmless if the beneficiary of 
the error proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."32  
This court applies the Chapman test for constitutional and non-
constitutional errors in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 805.18, the 
harmless error statute.33  
¶48 The court has explained that in applying the Chapman 
harmless error test, the reviewing court should consider a 
variety of factors, including but not limited to the frequency 
of the error, the nature of the State's case, the nature of the 
defense, the importance of the erroneously included or excluded 
evidence to the prosecution's or defense's case, the presence or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
                                                 
32 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (quoted 
with approval in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)). 
33 This court continues to follow the Chapman test and 
rejects the notion that Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 
(1999), abandoned the Chapman harmless error test.  See State v. 
Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, ¶41 n.10, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 661 
N.W.2d 76; 
State 
v. 
Carlson, 
2003 
WI 
40, 
¶¶85-86, 
261 
Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., dissenting); State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶48 n.14, 647 N.W.2d 189. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
20 
 
erroneously included or excluded evidence, whether erroneously 
admitted evidence merely duplicates untainted evidence, and the 
overall strength of the prosecution's case.34  
¶49 The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
erroneous preclusion of the statements was not harmless, because 
the evidence would have cast doubt on whether the alleged 1999 
agreement 
between 
the 
defendant 
and 
Krehmeyer 
to 
split 
commissions and defraud Shoeder's Marine actually existed.   
¶50 We disagree with the defendant that the error was 
prejudicial.  The record shows that even though the defense 
could not elicit Krehmeyer's inconsistent statement through 
Detective 
Lueneburg's 
testimony, 
the 
same 
evidence 
was 
effectively communicated to the jury by other means.   
¶51 Krehmeyer initially testified that he had not written 
checks to the defendant before 1999 and did not remember telling 
the police that some checks written to the defendant prior to 
1999 were for legitimate purposes.  After the circuit court 
sustained the hearsay objection regarding the questioning of 
Detective Lueneburg, the defense called Krehmeyer to testify 
again and attempted to use the Detective's police report to 
refresh Krehmeyer's memory.  During this second round of 
questions, Krehmeyer stated that his recollection was not 
refreshed by the document but admitted that if the pre-1999 
checks existed then he did write them and that they would have 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 
329 N.W.2d 192 (1986); State v. Drusch, 139 Wis. 2d 312, 324 
n.1, 407 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
21 
 
been for legitimate purposes, as he had no reason to write the 
checks otherwise.    
¶52 Krehmeyer's prior inconsistent statement was again 
presented to the jury when the defense summarized Krehmeyer's 
testimony, during closing arguments, as "I don't remember 
telling Mr. Lueneburg that I had these checks that I paid him 
and there was legitimate things back in '97."    
 
¶53  Because the jury learned about Krehmeyer's prior 
inconsistent statement, we conclude that it is clear "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."35   
IV 
¶54 The defendant's third argument is that the jury 
instruction for the charge of feloniously falsifying corporate 
documents violated his right to a unanimous jury in the present 
case.  
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.39(1) makes it a crime for an 
employee of a corporation to falsify a record, account, or other 
document belonging to that corporation "with intent to injure or 
defraud."36  The statute reads, in pertinent part: 
943.39 Fraudulent writings.  Whoever, with intent to 
injure or defraud, does any of the following is guilty 
of a Class D felony: 
(1) Being a director, officer, manager, agent or 
employee of any corporation or limited liability 
                                                 
35 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
36 Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1) (emphasis added).   
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
22 
 
company 
falsifies 
any 
record, 
account 
or 
other 
document belonging to that corporation or limited 
liability 
company 
by 
alteration, 
false 
entry or 
omission, 
or 
makes, 
circulates 
or 
publishes any 
written statement regarding the corporation or limited 
liability 
company 
which 
he 
or 
she 
knows 
is 
false . . . .37 
¶56 The 
circuit 
court, 
following 
the 
pattern 
jury 
instructions, instructed the jury on both types of intent as 
follows: 
The 
third 
element 
[of 
the 
crime 
of 
falsifying 
corporate documents] requires that the defendant acted 
with intent to injure or defraud.  Intent to injure 
means that the defendant intended to cause harm of any 
kind.  Intent to defraud means that the defendant 
intended to obtain property that he was not entitled 
to receive.38 
¶57 The defendant argues that the circuit court erred when 
it gave this instruction because it did not require that all 
members of the jury agree that the documents were falsified with 
the same criminal intent.  According to the defendant, the 
                                                 
37 Id. (emphasis added).   
The statute was amended, effective February 1, 2003, to 
make a person convicted under this statute guilty of a Class H 
felony rather than a Class D felony. 
38 Wis JI——Criminal § 1485 (Fraudulent Writings: Falsifying 
a Corporate Record - § 943.39(1)) (2001) (emphasis added).  The 
jury instruction provides, in relevant part:  
3. 
The 
defendant 
acted 
with 
intent 
to 
(injure)(defraud). 
["Intent to injure" means that the defendant intended 
to cause harm of any kind.] 
["Intent to defraud" means that the defendant intended 
to obtain property that (he)(she) was not entitled to 
receive.] 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
23 
 
choice of finding him guilty of falsifying documents with the 
intent to defraud or the intent to injure relieved the jury of 
its duty to reach a unanimous verdict and therefore violated the 
defendant's constitutional right. 
¶58 The Wisconsin Constitution guarantees accuseds a right 
to a trial by jury.39  That guarantee includes the right to a 
unanimous verdict with respect to the ultimate issue of guilt or 
innocence.40  "The principal justification for the unanimity 
requirement is that it ensures that each juror is convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved each 
essential element of the offense."41   
¶59 The 
proper 
analysis 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
defendant's right to a unanimous verdict has been violated by a 
jury instruction involves multiple steps.  First, a court must 
look to the statute defining the crime and ask a threshold 
                                                 
39 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides as follows:  
SECTION 5.  The right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law 
without regard to the amount in controversy; but a 
jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases 
in the manner prescribed by law. Provided, however, 
that the legislature may, from time to time, by 
statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, 
may be based on the votes of a specified number of the 
jury, not less than five-sixths thereof.  
40 State v. Johnson, 2001 WI 52, ¶11, 243 Wis. 2d 365, 627 
N.W.2d 455. 
41 State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 591, 335 N.W.2d 583 
(1993). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
24 
 
question:  Does the statute create multiple offenses or a single 
offense with multiple modes of commission?42  To resolve this 
question, a court is to examine four different factors: the 
language of the statute, the legislative history and context of 
the statute, the nature of the proscribed conduct, and the 
appropriateness of multiple punishments for the conduct.43  The 
point is to determine the legislative intent in drafting the 
statute.44   
¶60 When a court determines that the legislature intended 
to enact a statute creating multiple offenses, it is clear that 
juror unanimity as to each offense is required to convict an 
accused of each offense.45  On the other hand, when a court 
determines that the legislature intended to enact a statute 
creating one crime with alternate modes of commission, the court 
must make a second inquiry to determine whether an instruction 
allowing a conviction based upon a finding as to either mode, in 
the alternative, violates an accused's constitutional right to 
unanimity.46   
                                                 
42 Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 N.W.2d 729 
(1981) (cited with approval in State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 
¶14, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833). 
43 Id. (cited with approval in State v. Derango, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, ¶15). 
44 Id. (cited with approval in State v. Derango, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, ¶15). 
45 Id. at 419. 
46 Id. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
25 
 
¶61 This court has employed two different tests when 
addressing the constitutionality of a conviction based upon a 
jury instruction concerning a statute that creates a single 
offense with alternate modes of commission.  For many years we 
relied upon the Fifth Circuit's "conceptually distinct" test set 
forth in United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).47  
Under the conceptually distinct test, unanimity as to the 
multiple modes of commission is not required unless the 
alternate modes are conceptually distinct.48 
¶62 Then, in Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, we explained that 
the United States Supreme Court had rejected the Gipson test in 
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) and replaced it with a new 
test that focuses on an evaluation of the fundamental fairness 
and rationality of the legislature's choice to provide for a 
single offense with alternate modes of commission.49  In Derango 
and cases subsequent, this court has employed the fundamental 
fairness and rationality test.50 
¶63 In the present case, the defendant presents no 
argument 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1) 
creates 
two 
distinct 
offenses.  Moreover, the defendant presents no argument that 
                                                 
47 See Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶22 (listing Wisconsin 
cases relying upon United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th 
Cir. 1977)).   
48 Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶22. 
49 Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 635 (1991). 
50 See, e.g., Johnson, 243 Wis. 2d 365, ¶17 (applying the 
test in Schad to address a juror unanimity challenge).  
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
26 
 
§ 943.39(1) defines one crime with multiple modes of commission 
that 
are 
either 
conceptually 
distinct 
or 
represent 
a 
fundamentally unfair or irrational legislative choice.51  Rather, 
                                                 
51 The court of appeals is wrong to assert that the 
Committee Comments to the jury instructions in this case provide 
persuasive authority on the constitutionality of instructing the 
jury on alternative modes of commission.  State v. Norman, No. 
01-3303-CR, unpublished slip op. ¶15 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 
2002).   
The Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instruction Committee comment 
on this portion of the instruction explains, "[T]he Committee 
concluded that it would be permissible to instruct on both types 
of intent and that jury agreement on the intent involved would 
not be required.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has reached that 
conclusion with offenses under § 948.07, Child enticement.  
State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833."  
As previously stated, the first step in assessing whether a 
jury instruction violates a defendant's right to a unanimous 
verdict is to discern the legislative intent in adopting the 
statute on which the jury is being instructed.  Consequently, 
the fact that this court held that it was permissible to 
instruct a jury on two alternative modes of commission under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.07 does not necessarily mean that the same is 
true 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1), 
a 
completely 
unrelated 
statute.  Moreover, an instruction must be examined for fairness 
and rationality.  This court has not determined whether an 
instruction may be fair and rational in one fact situation but 
may not be fair and rational in a different fact situation.  See 
Manson, 
101 
Wis. 2d at 
438 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring) 
("Conceptual groupings, while dependent to an extent on the 
statutory language, are also dependent upon the facts in 
evidence."). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
27 
 
the defendant asserts in conclusory fashion that giving the jury 
a choice automatically violates his right to a unanimous jury.52   
¶64 An accused's right to a unanimous verdict is not 
violated every time a judge instructs a jury on a statute that 
presents multiple modes of commission and does not select one 
among the many modes of commission.  An argument that an 
instruction leads to a constitutionally infirm verdict must 
address the legislature's intent in enacting the statute and, 
where multiple modes of commission are found, whether the choice 
provided is constitutionally unacceptable.  Here, the defendant 
has made no such arguments.  We agree with the State that the 
defendant is not entitled to the court's consideration of this 
issue because he has failed to develop his assertion. We 
therefore conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
instructing the jury. 
V 
 
¶65 Finally, the defendant argues that the evidence was 
not sufficient for a jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that he was guilty of the crimes of which he was 
convicted.  Specifically, the defendant asserts that the 
                                                 
52 The defendant cites to a single case, State v. Seymour, 
183 Wis. 2d 683, 515 N.W.2d 874 (1994), to support his argument.  
Seymour, 
however, 
is 
inapposite. 
It 
held 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b) should be read to include distinct 
offenses of theft by an employee based upon the court's 
assessment of the legislative intent in enacting § 943.20.  The 
same legislative intent cannot automatically be attributed to 
Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1), 
a 
statute 
addressing 
a 
different 
offense.      
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
28 
 
evidence does not support a finding that he had the requisite 
intent 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.39(1). 
 
According 
to 
the 
defendant, Keith Shoeder, the owner of the business, consented 
to the defendant's falsifying the purchase agreements and taking 
equipment home.  In addition, the defendant asserts that if he 
had wanted to defraud the business, he would not have added 
items to receipts that would later be reviewed.  
 
¶66 A 
defendant 
challenging 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence used to convict him bears a heavy burden.  A criminal 
conviction will not be reversed unless the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to the State and the conviction, is so insufficient in 
probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law 
that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.53 
 
¶67 The defendant does not meet his heavy burden.  There 
is ample evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt in the case at hand.  First, while it is true, 
as the defendant asserts, that the defendant testified that 
Shoeder knew of and approved of the defendant's actions, Shoeder 
himself testified to the contrary.  Second, Shoeder testified 
that had the defendant not falsified the documents, it would 
have been much easier to discover his actions.  
                                                 
53 State v. Schwebke, 2002 WI 55, ¶40, 253 Wis. 2d 1, 644 
N.W.2d 666. 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
29 
 
¶68 The jury is the ultimate arbiter of a witness's 
credibility.54  Nothing about either Shoeder's or the defendant's 
testimony or other evidence is so insufficient in probative 
value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no 
trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
VI 
 
¶69 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court 
of appeals upholding the judgment of convictions against the 
defendant is affirmed.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 State v. Webster, 196 Wis. 2d 308, 320, 538 N.W.2d 810 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
01-3303-CR   
 
 
 
1