Title: Jordan v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 061211
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2007

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
and Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
RALPH LEE JORDAN 
 
v.  Record No. 061211  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 20, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Ralph Lee Jordan was convicted of possession with the 
intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled substance in 
violation of Code § 18.2-248, and felonious obstruction of 
justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(C).  On appeal, 
Jordan claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
both convictions.  We agree and will therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The relevant facts are not in dispute, as Jordan 
introduced no evidence at his bench trial in the Circuit 
Court of Henrico County on the charges at issue.1  On April 
24, 2004 at approximately 4:10 a.m., a Henrico County 
police officer, F.P. Kern, stopped an automobile driven by 
Jordan after Officer Kern observed the vehicle crossing 
over and striking the double yellow line in the center of 
                     
1  Jordan was tried jointly with Curtis Wright, III, 
who was also charged with possession with the intent to 
distribute a Schedule I controlled substance.  At trial, 
Wright likewise presented no evidence. 
 
2
the roadway several times.  Officer Kern stopped his police 
vehicle behind Jordan’s automobile and illuminated its 
interior with both his headlights and his spotlight.  As 
Officer Kern approached the driver’s side of Jordan’s 
vehicle, he observed a passenger, later identified as 
Curtis Wright, III, lean over, use his left hand to open 
the front passenger door approximately two to three inches, 
and then drop a cylindrical object out of his hand onto the 
ground.  Upon reaching the driver’s side of the vehicle, 
Officer Kern detected the odor of alcohol on Jordan’s 
breath and noticed that Jordan had “glassy eyes.” 
Officer Kern then approached the passenger side of the 
vehicle and found a small prescription bottle lying on the 
wet gravel just under the “rocker panel” of the front 
passenger door.  The prescription bottle was dry, although 
the road was wet from a recent rain.  Considering the 
bottle’s location on the ground, Officer Kern believed the 
tires of Jordan’s vehicle would have crushed it if the 
bottle had been there previously.  Officer Kern opened the 
bottle and found “thirty tablets with nine pieces and 
powder.”  According to Officer Kern, the intact tablets 
“were marked on either side, with a flower or a wagon wheel 
type design.”  Based on his training and experience, 
Officer Kern suspected the tablets were a controlled 
 
3
substance commonly known as “ecstasy.”  Subsequent testing 
by the Division of Forensic Science confirmed that the 
tablets were “3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine,” i.e., 
ecstasy.  Officer Kern asked Wright if he knew anything 
about the bottle.  Wright responded that he did not, but 
admitted that he had just come from “a club.” 
After Jordan failed a variety of field sobriety tests, 
Officer Kern arrested Jordan for driving under the 
influence of alcohol.  He arrested Wright for possession 
with the intent to distribute ecstasy.  Incident to the 
arrests, Officer Kern searched Jordan’s vehicle and found 
in the glove compartment what Officer Kern described as “a 
roll of money . . . rolled sequentially [in] fives, tens, 
twenties, and hundreds” and “held in place by a rubber 
band.”  The roll of cash contained a total of $3,400.  When 
Officer Kern asked Jordan about the money, Jordan admitted 
that it belonged to him, but claimed “that he had his 
automobile dealer[’]s license” and used the money to 
“purchase and deal automobiles.”  Officer Kern testified 
that he told Jordan the roll of money was evidence linking 
Jordan to the distribution of ecstasy. 
Officer Kern placed the roll of money that he had 
recovered in between the two front seats of his police 
vehicle.  With Jordan sitting in the front passenger seat, 
 
4
handcuffed, and restrained by a seatbelt, Officer Kern then 
transported Jordan to the magistrate’s office.  Upon 
arriving at the magistrate’s office, Officer Kern went 
inside to lock up his weapon and, while doing so, left 
Jordan alone in the vehicle.  After Officer Kern removed 
Jordan from the vehicle and took him before the magistrate, 
the roll of cash fell from Jordan’s pants.  Jordan admitted 
taking the money from the police vehicle and told Officer 
Kern that he did so because he believed that the officer 
was going to steal the money. 
Deciding to use more caution with Jordan, Officer Kern 
again handcuffed him.2  According to Officer Kern, Jordan 
“stiffen[ed] his arms and began pulling away  . . . any 
time[] that he had the opportunity.”  Officer Kern 
testified that he had to “forcefully put [Jordan’s] arms 
behind his back, after pinning [Jordan] to the counter.”  
While walking to the probable cause hearing and to his bond 
hearing, Jordan walked slowly and pulled away, requiring 
Officer Kern to pin Jordan against a door or wall several 
times.  On the way out of the magistrate’s office after the 
probable cause determination, Jordan stopped repeatedly, 
causing Officer Kern to bump into him.  Officer Kern 
                     
2  The record is not clear as to when Officer Kern had 
removed the handcuffs. 
 
5
testified that, when he removed the handcuffs so that 
Jordan could be fingerprinted and photographed, Jordan put 
his hands “down the front of his pants and began playing 
with his genitalia.”  After Jordan refused three requests 
to remove his hands, Officer Kern forcibly did so.  During 
the intake process, Jordan also refused to answer questions 
in a timely fashion, instead answering a question after 
three or four other questions had been asked. 
The Commonwealth’s only other evidence came from 
Michael J. Barren, an investigator with the Narcotics Unit 
of the Henrico County Police Department, who testified as 
an expert witness regarding ecstasy and how it is packaged 
and sold.  Barren stated that ecstasy is “commonly referred 
to as club drugs” and is generally used in clubs that have 
dancing all night.  According to Barren, a pill of ecstasy 
typically sells for approximately $20 to $25.  Barren also 
testified that the bottle recovered by Officer Kern was 
approximately one-quarter full and that the quantity of 
pills in the bottle was not consistent with personal use.  
Finally, Barren opined the $3,400 in cash recovered by 
Officer Kern was representative of the sale of 
approximately 130 to 170 pills of ecstasy. 
At the close of the evidence, Jordan moved to strike 
the evidence on both charges.  The trial court denied the 
 
6
motion and found Jordan guilty of possession of ecstasy 
with the intent to distribute and obstruction of justice.  
With regard to the latter offense, the trial court found 
that Jordan had impeded Officer Kern by taking the roll of 
money after Officer Kern had seized it.  The trial court 
also denied Jordan’s post-trial motion to dismiss the 
charges. 
Jordan appealed his convictions to the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia.  A three-judge panel of the Court of 
Appeals denied Jordan’s petition for appeal for the reasons 
stated in its prior unpublished per curiam order.  Jordan 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1642-05-2 (May 16, 2006).  In 
that per curiam order, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the fact-finder could reasonably have inferred from the 
evidence that the $3,400 represented proceeds from the sale 
of the ecstasy pills that were no longer in the bottle that 
Officer Kern recovered and that, consequently, Jordan and 
Wright jointly possessed the ecstasy.  Jordan v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1642-05-2, slip op. at 3 (Feb. 15, 
2006).  The Court of Appeals also concluded that Jordan 
impeded Officer Kern by removing the $3,400 from the police 
vehicle and “by using force” to prevent Officer Kern from 
performing his duties and handcuffing Jordan.  Id.  Jordan 
appeals from the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
7
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Jordan challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain each of his convictions.  He first 
asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that he jointly possessed the ecstasy actually found in 
Wright’s possession.  Next, Jordan claims the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that he either threatened Officer 
Kern with bodily harm or used any force to impede the 
officer.  We will address the issues in that order. 
When the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 
case is challenged on appeal, this Court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 
and accord to it the benefit of all reasonable inferences 
fairly deducible from the evidence.  Welch v. Commonwealth, 
271 Va. 558, 561, 628 S.E.2d 340, 341 (2006);  Walton v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 425–26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 
(1998).  We will not disturb a trial court’s judgment on 
appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.  Code § 8.01-680;  Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 
S.E.2d at 871.  However, “it is just as obligatory upon the 
appellate court, to set aside . . . the judgment of a 
court, when it is, in its opinion, contrary to the law and 
evidence, and therefore plainly wrong, as it is to sustain 
it when the reverse is true.”  Bland v. Commonwealth, 177 
 
8
Va. 819, 821, 13 S.E.2d 317, 317 (1941); accord Tarpley v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256, 542 S.E.2d 761, 763 (2001); 
Hickson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 383, 387, 520 S.E.2d 643, 
645 (1999). 
 
To convict Jordan of possession of ecstasy with the 
intent to distribute, the Commonwealth had to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jordan was aware of the 
presence and character of the drug and that he 
consciously possessed it.  See Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 
497 S.E.2d at 871; Andrews v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 179, 
182, 217 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1975).  “An accused’s mere 
proximity to an illicit drug, however, is not sufficient 
to prove possession.”  Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 S.E.2d 
at 872; accord Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 
630 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2006); Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 
471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986).  Nor does an 
accused’s ownership or occupancy of the premises or 
vehicle where an illegal drug is found create a 
presumption of possession.  Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 
S.E.2d at 872; Garland v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 182, 184, 
300 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1983). 
 
The Commonwealth did not, however, have to establish 
that Jordan actually possessed the ecstasy; proof of 
constructive possession is sufficient.  See Wilson, 272 
 
9
Va. at 26–27, 630 S.E.2d at 330; Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 
497 S.E.2d at 872.  Constructive possession may be 
established when there are “‘acts, statements, or conduct 
of the accused or other facts or circumstances which tend 
to show that the [accused] was aware of both the presence 
and character of the substance and that it was subject to 
his dominion and control.’”  Drew, 230 Va. at 473, 338 
S.E.2d at 845 (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 
474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984)).  That an accused 
occupied or owned the premises or vehicle where a 
controlled substance was found is one circumstance that 
can be considered along with the other evidence in 
determining whether the accused constructively possessed 
the illegal drug.  Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 
716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1982); Gillis v. Commonwealth, 
215 Va. 298, 301, 208 S.E.2d 768, 770–71 (1974).  When, 
as here, a conviction is based on circumstantial 
evidence, the issue before us is not whether there was 
some evidence to support Jordan’s hypotheses of 
innocence, but whether a reasonable fact-finder, upon 
consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected 
Jordan’s theories in his defense and found him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Hudson v. Commonwealth, 
265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). 
 
10
The Commonwealth argues that there was sufficient 
circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable fact-
finder could infer that Jordan was aware of the presence 
and character of the ecstasy and that the ecstasy was 
subject to his dominion and control.  In support of this 
argument, the Commonwealth relies primarily on the $3,400 
in cash found in the glove compartment of Jordan’s 
vehicle, the manner in which the money was rolled, 
Jordan’s acknowledgement that the money belonged to him, 
his subsequent taking of the money from the police 
vehicle after being informed it was evidence against him 
on the drug charge, Jordan’s close proximity to the 
bottle of ecstasy when Wright opened the vehicle’s door 
and dropped the bottle on the ground, Wright’s admission 
that he had just come from “a club,” and Barren’s 
testimony about how ecstasy is packaged and sold and that 
it is “commonly referred to as club drugs.”  We do not 
agree with the Commonwealth’s position. 
The evidence did not establish either that Jordan 
was aware of the character and presence of the ecstasy or 
that the ecstasy was under Jordan’s dominion and control.  
When Officer Kern stopped the vehicle, he observed only 
Wright making furtive movements.  Wright admitted that he 
had been to “a club,” but he did not indicate that Jordan 
 
11
accompanied him to the club.  Other than the roll of 
money, the search of the vehicle and of Jordan’s person 
did not reveal any other contraband or items associated 
with the distribution of controlled substances.  Even 
though Jordan admitted the cash belonged to him, it was 
rolled sequentially according to denominations rather 
than in amounts corresponding to the price of an ecstasy 
pill.  See Archer v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 416, 417, 303 
S.E.2d 863, 863 (1983) (“currency was grouped in amounts 
corresponding to the street price of a Preludin pill”). 
The Commonwealth argues on brief that the roll of 
cash was in denominations commonly used in drug 
transactions, but the record contains no such evidence.  
Admittedly, Jordan removed the money from the police 
vehicle, but he did so after Officer Kern told him the 
cash was evidence that would link him to the distribution 
of ecstasy.  Thus, as the Commonwealth recognizes on 
brief, Jordan could have stolen the roll of cash in order 
to hamper the prosecution of the drug charge against him 
irrespective of whether the money represented proceeds 
from the sale of ecstasy. 
In sum, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence 
“at most, create[d] a mere suspicion.  ‘Suspicion, 
however, no matter how strong, is insufficient to sustain 
 
12
a criminal conviction.’”  Garland, 225 Va. at 184, 300 
S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Stover v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 
618, 624, 283 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1981)).  Thus, we hold 
that the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, 
to prove constructive possession of the ecstasy by 
Jordan.  Upon consideration of all the evidence, a 
reasonable fact-finder could not have found Jordan guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 
578 S.E.2d at 785. 
Turning now to Jordan’s conviction for obstructing 
justice, we again conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain the conviction under Code § 18.2-
460(C).  Jordan was indicted for using threats of bodily 
harm or force knowingly to attempt to intimidate or 
impede a law-enforcement officer in the discharge of his 
duty “relating to a violation of or conspiracy to violate 
[Code] § 18.2-248 or [Code] § 18.2-248.1 (a)(3), (b) or 
(c) or any violent felony offense listed in subsection C 
of [Code] § 17.2-805.”  See Washington v. Commonwealth, 
273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (this day decided) 
(discussing the elements of the offense set forth in Code 
§ 18.2-460(C)).  We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that Jordan’s act of removing the roll of cash 
from the police vehicle and his conduct in the 
 
13
magistrate’s office and during the intake process 
amounted to the use of force knowingly to attempt to 
impede Officer Kern in the discharge of his duties. 
In Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 505 
S.E.2d 388 (1998), the Court of Appeals stated that 
“obstruction of justice does not occur when a person 
fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the 
person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more 
difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from 
performing that task.”  Id. at 429, 505 S.E.2d at 389. 
That statement undermines the Court of Appeals’ decision 
in this case but is consistent with our explanation of 
what constitutes obstruction of justice: 
To constitute obstruction of an officer in 
the performance of his duty, it is not necessary 
that there be an actual or technical assault upon 
the officer, but there must be acts clearly 
indicating an intention on the part of the 
accused to prevent the officer from performing 
his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies 
opposition or resistance by direct action and 
forcible or threatened means.  It means to 
obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose 
or impede the process with which the officer is 
armed. 
 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478–79, 126 S.E. 74, 
77 (1925) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
14
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, Jordan did 
not violate Code § 18.2-460(C) by removing the roll of 
cash from the police vehicle.  Regardless of whether that 
action impeded Officer Kern in the discharge of his 
duties, it did not involve the use of force.  The mere 
act of removing the roll of cash from its location 
between the seats in the police vehicle was not the type 
of “force” contemplated by Code § 18.2-460(C).  See 
Black’s Law Dictionary 673 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the 
term “force” as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed 
against a person or thing”). 
Similarly, we reject the Commonwealth’s argument 
that the evidence concerning Jordan’s conduct in the 
magistrate’s office and during the intake process was 
sufficient to sustain his conviction for obstructing 
justice.  Unquestionably, Jordan was less than 
cooperative and his conduct rendered Officer Kern’s 
discharge of his duties more difficult, but Jordan’s 
conduct again did not involve the use of force.  
Furthermore, it did not impede or prevent Officer Kern 
from performing his tasks.  See Jones, 141 Va. at 479, 
126 S.E. at 77 (throwing a bag of barley into a road in 
front of an officer’s vehicle did not obstruct the 
 
15
officer himself); Ruckman, 28 Va. App. at 429, 505 S.E.2d 
at 389. 
Thus, we conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that Jordan 
obstructed justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(C).3 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and dismiss the indictments. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
                     
3  In contrast to the situation in Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___, there was 
evidence in this case that Officer Kern was discharging his 
duties “relating to a violation of [Code] § 18.2-248.”  
Code § 18.2-460(C).  At the time Jordan allegedly 
obstructed justice, he had been charged with possession 
with the intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled 
substance.