Title: In re Dickens video
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119198
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2019

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No.  119,198 
 
In the Matter of LINDA S. DICKENS, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed February 22, 2019. Indefinite suspension. 
 
Kimberly Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the brief for the petitioner. 
 
Thomas A. Hamill, of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P., of Overland Park, argued 
the cause and was on the briefs for the respondent, and Linda S. Dickens, respondent, argued the cause 
pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Linda S. Dickens, of Overland Park, 
an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 2011.  
 
 
On February 13, 2017, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). After two orders by the hearing panel granted her extensions to file an 
answer, the respondent timely filed an answer to the complaint on April 10, 2017, and an 
amended answer to the complaint on August 7, 2017. A hearing was held on the 
complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on September 
19-20, 2018, where the respondent was personally present and was represented by 
counsel. The hearing panel determined the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (2018 Kan. S. 
2 
 
 
 
Ct. R. 289) (competence); 1.3 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 292) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2018 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 293) (communication); 1.5(d) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 294) (fees); 1.8(e) (2018 Kan. 
S. Ct. R. 309) (providing financial assistance to client); 1.16 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 333) 
(termination of representation); 3.2 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 343) (expediting litigation); 5.1 
(2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 358) (responsibilities of partners, managers, and supervisory 
lawyers); 8.3(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 380) (reporting professional misconduct); 8.4(a) 
(2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 381) (misconduct); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice); and 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on 
lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"DA12309 
 
 
"14. 
On October 14, 2015, the respondent entered into the Kansas attorney 
diversion program. In the diversion agreement, the respondent stipulated to the following: 
 
 
'8. 
The Disciplinary Administrator and the Respondent 
stipulate to the following facts: 
 
a. 
Respondent represented [G.C.] in an 
employment case. 
 
3 
 
 
 
b. 
During the case, [G.C.] was offered a settlement 
of approximately $40,000.00. 
 
c. 
[G.C.] rejected the offer. 
 
d. 
Later, [G.C.] advised Respondent that he was 
running short of money because of medical and other 
expenses. 
 
e. 
Respondent reviewed the Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct and decided that giving [G.C.] a 
loan would not violate the KRPC if the loan was an 
"arm's length" transaction. She did not read the 
Comments to KRPC 1.8. 
 
f. 
Respondent loaned [G.C.] $20,000.00 at 8.99% 
interest with payments of $900.00 due each month with 
the balance payable upon the settlement of the 
employment litigation or and [sic] of his pending 
worker's compensation claims. 
 
g. 
Shortly after she provided the loan, Respondent 
was approached by a bank owner who indicated that the 
bank would like to support the litigation. 
 
h. 
Respondent advised that [G.C.] could use a loan 
that he could use to pay off the loan she made to him, 
plus provide him other needed funds. 
 
i. 
[G.C.] was given a loan. The loan principal was 
paid off, however there was interest that was owing and 
still accruing. 
 
4 
 
 
 
j. 
Prior to the interview with Respondent, the 
Attorney Investigator suggested Respondent review both 
the Missouri and Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct.  
 
k. 
After reviewing both, Respondent acknowledged 
her conduct violated the Rules in both states. 
 
l. 
Respondent contended that the KRPC was not 
implicated because her actions were under her Missouri 
license. 
 
m. 
Respondent acknowledges that KRPC 8.5 
provides: "A lawyer admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this 
jurisdiction although engaged in the practice of law 
elsewhere." 
 
n. 
Respondent reported the misconduct to the 
Missouri Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. 
 
 
'9. 
The Disciplinary Administrator and the Respondent 
agree that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.8(e)[.]' 
 
 
"15. 
As part of the diversion agreement, the respondent agreed to complete a 
total of sixteen hours of continuing legal education, including a total of six hours of 
ethics. The respondent agreed to complete the hours within one year. The respondent 
failed to complete the required continuing legal education hours. 
 
 
"16. 
The diversion agreement also contained the following provision: 
 
 
'The Respondent shall not violate the terms of the diversion 
agreement or the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 
or Kansas Supreme Court Rules. If a new complaint is received during 
5 
 
 
 
the diversionary period, or if within 90 days after the expiration of the 
agreement a new complaint is received alleging violations of the KRPC 
during the diversionary period, these acts shall constitute grounds for a 
request to the Review Committee that the diversion be revoked. The 
Review Committee has the authority to order revocation of the diversion 
and order the matter be set for a public hearing, without any other 
proceedings. In the event that the Respondent violates any of the terms of 
diversion or any of the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct or Kansas Supreme Court Rules, including registration 
requirements, at any time during the diversionary period, the Respondent 
shall immediately report such violation to the Disciplinary 
Administrator. The Respondent shall cooperate with the Disciplinary 
Administrator in providing information regarding any investigations 
relating to her conduct, as required by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 207. 
Failure to do so, may constitute a violation of KRPC 8.4.' 
 
 
"17. 
While the respondent remained on diversion, two new complaints were 
docketed for investigation against the respondent, see DA12475 and DA12526 below. 
The Review Committee of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys found probable 
cause to believe that the respondent violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct in 
DA12475 and DA12526. 
 
 
"18. 
The respondent was given an opportunity to present information to the 
Review Committee as to whether the diversion agreement in DA12309 should be 
revoked. The respondent declined to comment or otherwise provide information to the 
Review Committee. Thereafter, on January 6, 2017, the Review Committee revoked the 
respondent's diversion in DA12309. 
 
 
"19. 
According to Rule 203(d)(vii): 
 
 
'Failure to Complete the Attorney Diversion Program. If the 
Respondent fails to complete the agreed tasks in a timely manner at any 
point in the diversion process, he or she may be terminated from the 
6 
 
 
 
program. If such a termination occurs, traditional formal disciplinary 
procedures will resume. When the complaint is returned to the formal 
disciplinary process, the Respondent's termination from the Attorney 
Diversion Program may be cited as an additional aggravating factor in 
recommending discipline and as a violation of Supreme Court Rule 207 
and KRPC 8.1.' 
 
"DA12475 
 
 
"20. 
In 2012, the respondent began representing G.N. and D.N. In order to 
understand the facts involved in the present disciplinary case, it is necessary to include 
extensive background facts. 
 
 
"21. 
During 1992 and 1993, G.N. and D.N. engaged Ken Liebelt, a licensed 
independent life insurance agent and licensed securities broker, as their investment 
adviser. Liebelt was trained to determine the client's insurance objectives, research the 
client's existing products, run an analysis of the proposed products, and compare the 
benefits of the existing products to any new products proposed. 
 
 
"22. 
At the time, G.N. and D.N. each had a term life insurance policy, 
however the policies had outlived their purpose of insuring against the untimely death of 
D.N., the primary breadwinner of the household. G.N. told Liebelt that she wanted to 
reduce the amount of tax that she and D.N. paid on investments, if possible, through 
changes in their financial portfolio. Accordingly, Liebelt's goal in 1993 was to see what 
tax-advantaged products were available in the marketplace to assist G.N. and D.N. in 
accomplishing this goal. 
 
 
"23. 
That same year, Dave Knudson, Liebelt's supervising general manager, 
called Liebelt and told him of a tax advantaged product that he might want to hear about 
for his clients. In March, 1993, both Liebelt and Knudson attended a conference for the 
purpose of learning about 'universal life insurance.' During this conference, they both 
learned the generalities of a strategy for borrowing out the cash values in a universal life 
policy, all for retirement portfolio enhancement. Although Liebelt did not learn the 
7 
 
 
 
specifics of how to operate the borrowing strategy (balanced funding option), Liebelt 
believed Knudson was very knowledgeable about the strategy. 
 
 
"24. 
Liebelt and Knudson each believed that the life insurance policies would 
lower G.N. and D.N.'s taxes. As such, they agreed to work together to sell the life 
insurance policies to G.N. and D.N. Liebelt and Knudson were not partners and there was 
no written contract between them, rather, it was understood that they would each make a 
commission if the policies were sold. 
 
 
"25. 
G.N. and D.N. relied on the collective advice from Liebelt and Knudson 
by terminating their existing life insurance policies and applying for universal life 
insurance policies with Bankers United Life Assurance Company (hereinafter 'Bankers'). 
Knudson was the managing agent on the policy and Liebelt was the writing agent. 
Although an insurance professional should assess whether the administrative expenses of 
a proposed policy are excessively high, Liebelt did not attempt to assess G.N. and D.N.'s 
existing investments, made no comparison of whether the proposed policies had 
advantages over their existing policies, and did not research any other life insurance or 
investment products; he merely ascertained whether they had cash flow to pay the high 
life insurance premiums necessary for the Bankers' policies. 
 
 
"26. 
After determining how much G.N. and D.N. could pay in premiums, 
Liebelt told Knudson that they 'needed to run the proposal on Knudson's computer 
software program.' Liebelt did not have the software knowledge to run any proposals. He 
went to Knudson's downtown office for this purpose. The new policies were based on the 
maximum amount of premiums G.N. and D.N. could afford to pay. This raised D.N.'s 
coverage from $150,000 to $442,626 and G.N.'s coverage from $25,000 to $271,000. At 
the time G.N. and D.N. completed the insurance policy application, they were advised to 
seek the counsel of a tax professional regarding the potential tax issues of the policy. 
Later, in 1993, when the policies were issued, G.N. and D.N. were advised of the 
maximum interest that would be charged on any loans taken from the cash value in the 
policies. 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
"27. 
From 1993 to 2000, G.N. and D.N. built the cash value in the life 
insurance policies by paying a total of $225,000 in premiums on the two policies. In 
August, 2000, G.N. and D.N. received notice from Bankers that their insurance policies 
were the subject of a class action lawsuit involving allegations against the company 
regarding how the policies were sold and how they performed. Both G.N. and D.N. 
signed documents agreeing to a settlement with the company regarding those issues. 
 
 
"28. 
In 2001, Knudson called Liebelt and advised him that G.N. and D.N. 
could start using the balanced funding option. Liebelt agreed that G.N. and D.N. should 
move forward with this option. Prior to making arrangements for G.N. and D.N. to start 
borrowing against the policies, Liebelt failed to run any underlying calculations or make 
any analysis of whether the interest rate charged on the loans against the policies of 
13.9% was reasonable under the market conditions existing at that time. Liebelt also 
failed to run any data to determine whether G.N. and D.N. were breaking even on the life 
insurance policy. Finally, Liebelt failed to check to see whether there had been any 
changes in tax laws that might have rendered the balanced funding option no longer 
appropriate or advantageous. 
 
 
"29. 
Knudson and Liebelt met with G.N. and D.N. to explain the details of the 
balanced funding option. Later, G.N. called Liebelt and advised him that they wanted to 
go forward with the balanced funding option. 
 
 
"30. 
Knudson and Liebelt met with G.N. and D.N. a second time. During this 
meeting, they instructed G.N. on the documentation she would need for tax purposes with 
the balanced funding option. Liebelt told G.N. that the balanced funding option would 
work for her if she followed the specific instructions of Knudson. 
 
 
"31. 
After the second meeting, Liebelt advised G.N. that he would open a tax-
efficient fund in order to maximize G.N. and D.N.'s tax benefits from the balanced 
funding option. He opened a separate investment account that would be used strictly to 
house the interest and deposits for the balanced funding option. Liebelt instructed G.N. to 
refrain from using the account for any other purpose. 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
"32. 
In 2001 and 2002, G.N. took out loans from the cash value in their 
Bankers' policies, as directed by Knudson. G.N. gave half the loan proceeds to Liebelt to 
invest in the account he opened for use in conjunction with the balanced funding option. 
Liebelt invested in mutual funds. G.N. gave Knudson and the other half of the loan 
proceeds, $73,500, to invest. Knudson put them into LLCs which he had formed. 
Knudson did not tell G.N. that the LLCs were companies he owned nor did he tell her 
that the LLCs were illegal, unregistered companies. He simply told G.N. that her money 
was going into offshore currency exchanges, the silver market, and real estate 
investments in Las Vegas. 
 
 
"33. 
As part of the balanced funding option in the life insurance policy which 
was designed for tax advantages, G.N. and D.N. were to make annual interest payments 
on the policy loans which could, in turn, offset capital gains tax according to the balanced 
funding option plan. G.N. and D.N. had been advised when the loans were taken of the 
details of operating the balanced funding option, their responsibilities under the plan, and 
the importance of making the annual loan interest payments, including the maximum 
interest that would accumulate on the borrowed principal under each policy. G.N. and 
D.N. paid the interest payments due annually on the loans in 2000 and 2001. 
 
 
"34. 
In 2003, G.N. contacted Knudson and suggested she did not have enough 
capital gains to offset and thus had no reason to pay the interest due on the policy loans. 
Knudson agreed she could postpone the interest payment at that time. Liebelt provided no 
advice or information on this issue. G.N. and D.N. never again paid the annual interest 
charges on the policy loans. 
 
 
"35. 
By the end of October, 2003, G.N. knew that the money invested with 
Knudson was completely lost. 
 
 
"36. 
In 2005, Liebelt called G.N. to find out why they were not paying the 
interest due on the loans. When G.N. responded that they were following the advice of 
Knudson, Liebelt did not instruct her to start paying interest due and did not run any 
calculations. Relying on Knudson, Liebelt never learned what G.N. and D.N. were 
required to do to utilize the benefits of the fixed rate loan policy provision. 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
"37. 
Knudson was forced out of the securities business in the mid-2000's. 
 
 
"38. 
G.N. met with a new investment adviser, David Cox, with the intention 
of moving their investments from Liebelt. G.N. informed Cox that she held a Bankers' 
policy and was satisfied with it. She also advised Cox she was uncomfortable with the 
level of risk and dissatisfied with the performance of funds placed for investment with 
Liebelt. On June 10, 2010, G.N. hired Cox to manage their investments. Liebelt remained 
as G.N. and D.N.'s insurance agent. 
 
 
"39. 
In 2012, G.N. and D.N. received notices from Transamerica, the 
successor in interest to Bankers, advising them that they needed to terminate their 
policies because the compounding interest and escalating loan balances consumed the 
cash values of both policies. G.N. and D.N. had been informed of the compounding 
interest and escalating loan balances on an annual basis from 2003 to 2012 by virtue of 
the annual statements. G.N. and D.N. ultimately surrendered the policies in 2012. 
 
 
"40. 
After G.N. and D.N. surrendered the policies, Transamerica conveyed 
approximately $29,000 as the cash surrender value for G.N. and D.N.'s insurance 
policies. Transamerica informed them that it would report to the IRS that the policy 
surrenders had generated $551,000 of taxable income for G.N. and D.N. According to the 
respondent, G.N. and D.N.'s tax liability would have been $198,000 on the $551,000 of 
taxable income declared by Transamerica. 
 
 
"41. 
Each year beginning in 1993, Liebelt had received a copy of the annual 
statement of values on G.N. and D.N.'s policies. Liebelt did not look at the statements 
closely.  Had he done so, he would have seen that the policies would eventually have a 
negative value. 
 
 
"42. 
Cox referred G.N. and D.N. to the respondent for assistance with the tax 
issues. At the time G.N. and D.N. retained the respondent, they were approximately 77 
and 80 years old, respectively. 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
"43. 
G.N. and D.N. met with the respondent, provided her with 
documentation, and discussed the details of the life insurance policies. The respondent 
met with G.N. on many occasions. During those meetings, G.N. told the respondent that 
she learned that the investments they made with Knudson were a total loss between 2006 
and 2009. 
 
 
"44. 
The respondent researched the tax issue for G.N. and D.N. In August, 
2012, the respondent was able to resolve the tax issue by contact with the IRS criminal 
division. The respondent also told G.N. and D.N. that she believed they had a viable 
cause of action against Knudson and Liebelt. D.N. asked respondent what he owed her 
for the assistance with the tax issue. The respondent told G.N. and D.N. that rather than 
pay her hourly for her work, she would agree to be compensated through a contingent fee 
lawsuit against Knudson and Liebelt. 
 
 
"45. 
On approximately August 8, 2012, G.N. and D.N. entered into a 
contingent fee agreement with the respondent. While the respondent contends that the 
contingent fee agreement was reduced to writing and that she and G.N. signed it, she was 
unable to produce a copy of the agreement. D.N. testified that he did not sign a written 
contingency fee agreement, the terms of the fee agreement were discussed by the 
respondent and D.N. many times during the representation, and D.N. asked the 
respondent for a fee agreement on a number of occasions. The respondent never provided 
D.N. with a written fee agreement. 
 
 
"46. 
On February 11, 2013, the respondent filed suit against Liebelt and 
Knudson on behalf of G.N. and D.N. The respondent aggressively pursued G.N. and 
D.N.'s case. According to the respondent, she spent hundreds of hours working on the 
case and incurred over $19,000 in expenses on the case. The respondent learned that 
Knudson was judgment-proof. 
 
 
"47. 
During discovery, G.N.'s deposition was taken. During her deposition, 
conducted on January 20, 2014, G.N. testified that she learned from Knudson that he lost 
all of the funds he invested on behalf of G.N. and D.N. in 2003. This was different than 
what she told the respondent in preparation for filing the case. Following G.N.'s 
12 
 
 
 
deposition, the respondent did not ask G.N. about the discrepancy between what G.N. 
told her in their meetings and what G.N. testified to in her deposition. Additionally, the 
respondent did not explain to G.N. and D.N. that G.N.'s deposition testimony was 
problematic. 
 
 
"48. 
On July 1, 2014, Liebelt filed a motion for summary judgment. In his 
motion, Liebelt argued that the allegations of negligence were time barred because the 
time for those claims began running a variety of years for different claims, from 1993 
through 2010. Liebelt argued that he could not be held liable for the loss of the $73,500 
provided to Knudson because G.N. was aware of the loss by 2003. Finally, Liebelt argued 
that he and Knudson did not enter a joint venture so Liebelt could not be held liable for 
Knudson's wrongdoing. 
 
 
"49. 
Regarding the claims of negligence, the respondent argued in her 
response that G.N. and D.N. did not know they had suffered material losses from the 
loans until 2012 when the policies were forfeited, the cash values were lost, and the tax 
liability of $551,000 was declared by Transamerica. The respondent argued that G.N. and 
D.N. did not know they had been defrauded of the $73,500 until the respondent 
discovered the fraud in 2012. 
 
 
"50. 
On October 1, 2014, in a one-page journal entry of judgment, the court 
granted the motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations: 
 
 
'Defendant Kenneth Liebelt's Motion for Summary Judgment 
came on for hearing on October 1, 2014. Based on the briefs submitted 
and oral arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTED Defendant Liebelt's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
 
 
'Thus, Defendant Liebelt's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted as to Counts I, II, and V, as Plaintiff's action is untimely based 
on the statute of limitations. The Court further finds that Plaintiff cannot 
establish a joint venture as a matter of law, and grants summary 
13 
 
 
 
judgment in favor of Defendant Liebelt based on Plaintiffs' joint venture 
claim. 
 
 
'Further, the Court finds that in this case involving multiple 
defendants, there is no just reason for delay in entering this Summary 
Judgment on behalf of Defendant Kenneth Liebelt only, in accordance 
with K.S.A. 60-254(b). 
 
 
'WHEREFORE, the Court finds that Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED in favor of Defendant Kenneth Liebelt on all causes of 
action against him by Plaintiff herein.' 
 
 
"51. 
After the court entered summary judgment on behalf of Liebelt, on 
October 17, 2014, the respondent sent G.N. an email message. In that message, the 
respondent informed G.N. for the first time that G.N. created a statute of limitations 
problem by her deposition testimony. G.N. responded: 
 
'This is the first time you have mentioned that there was a problem with 
my deposition so I am surprised to hear it now. I did the best I could to 
be honest and accurate. Memory constraints and a multitude of facts to 
recall have perhaps created these problems.' 
 
 
"52. 
On October 29, 2014, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 
In her motion, the respondent argued that the negligence and fraud claims against Liebelt 
should be reinstated because 'there is a question of fact as to whether Liebelt breached 
duties to [G.N. and D.N.] by failing to warn them of impending disaster while he 
remained the Agent on their policies after February 11, 2011.' The parties argued the 
motion on December 12, 2014. The court took the matter under advisement. 
 
 
"53. 
On December 29, 2014, the respondent met with G.N. and D.N. Initially, 
the respondent was cordial. The respondent explained to G.N. and D.N. how she had lost 
a great deal of money representing them in their suit against Liebelt and Knudson. The 
respondent asked G.N. and D.N. if they could think of a way to make it right. When G.N. 
14 
 
 
 
and D.N. did not volunteer to pay the respondent money, her approach changed. The 
respondent became aggressive and clearly stated that she would not suffer this financial 
loss. The respondent indicated that she would be seeking to recover fees from them 
because G.N. misrepresented a key fact. 
 
 
"54. 
On December 30, 2014, the respondent followed up their meeting with 
an email message. In the message, the respondent argued that she could sue G.N. and 
D.N. for negligent misrepresentation of a material fact, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent 
misrepresentation. In addition to threatening to sue G.N. and D.N., the respondent 
threatened to contact their accountant (who works for a financial firm owned by the 
respondent and the respondent's husband) and the IRS and retract the statements that the 
$551,000 reported by Transamerica should be considered phantom income.  
 
'I want you also to be aware of two more significant things: First, if you 
get audited, you will need me and my files to prove to the IRS that the 
income Transamerica declared to you was phantom, and caused by a 
Ponzi scheme. If I have to sue you, I won't be available for that effort 
until and unless I get paid for my work. And, because you haven't paid 
me, you don't own my files—I do. 
 
'Second, given that [G.N.] misrepresented this material fact to me, it 
makes me nervous that perhaps I have rendered legal opinions on the 
Ponzi scheme based on other misrepresented facts by [G.N.]. I am 
concerned I may need to reexamine the opinions I furnished to your 
accountant regarding what I thought was a Ponzi scheme, and on which 
the accountant relied in completing the tax return that saved you from 
$198,000 in taxes. I will have to withdraw all opinions that I no longer 
find substantiated, which will force the accountant to notify the IRS that 
the facts on which she relied in drafting your return no longer exists. I 
suspect this would trigger an audit. 
 
'If you demonstrate that you are acting in good faith rather than 
squeezing enormous benefit out of me for nothing, I will feel that [G.N.] 
15 
 
 
 
was acting in good faith when she told me her story, and I won't believe 
it necessary to reexamine my opinions. 
 
'I conferred substantial efforts and benefit on you, relying on [G.N.]'s 
representation to me that she discovered the losses in 2006 to 2009. That 
she actually discovered them in 2003 gutted the lawsuit through which I 
was to be compensated for my work on your behalf. I will file suit 
against you both next week unless I am paid by Friday. 
 
'I strongly recommend you write your check and deliver it tomorrow so 
you are in the best position to deduct the legal fees as expenses off of this 
year's income. I am not a tax attorney, but this will likely allow you to 
deduct the legal fees as "expenses to preserve in investment." If I am 
paid, I will do all in my power to assist you in getting that deduction.' 
 
 
"55. 
On December 31, 2014, D.N. responded to the respondent's email 
message from the day before. In the email message, D.N. stated that he believed the 
respondent was acting unethically by threatening to file a lawsuit and 'precipitating tax 
woes.' It is clear that following the December 29, 2014, meeting, the attorney-client 
relationship had been significantly damaged. 
 
 
"56. 
On January 2, 2015, because G.N. and D.N. were losing sleep over this 
matter, D.N. offered the respondent $40,000 to settle the dispute. The respondent had 
previously agreed to settle the dispute for $80,000. 
 
 
"57. 
On January 3, 2015, respondent sent G.N. and D.N. an email message 
and detailed her next steps if they were unable to settle the dispute. She indicated that she 
would: 
 
'Inform Mary Shuman in writing that I am no longer confident in the 
facts which I gave her in writing to form the basis of the "Ponzi scheme" 
alternate income calculations under the IRS regulations that resulted in 
relief for you from the declared $550,000 in income[.] 
16 
 
 
 
 
'Inform Mary Shuman that unless she has independent knowledge of 
those facts, she needs to determine whether she must withdraw her 
signature as the tax preparer of your 2012 Tax Return. 
 
'Inform my contact at the IRS that I am withdrawing all of the statements 
I made to the IRS criminal division, as I am no longer confident about 
the facts of which I informed them, due to my discovery that one 
significant fact upon which I relied was misrepresented to me by the 
taxpayer, and that there may be more; thus, I must withdraw my 
statements. 
 
'I must take these steps to protect myself, my license, and my name 
unless we reach a reasonable settlement. I have been damaged in excess 
of $150,000, as a result of [G.N.]'s misrepresentation of a material fact to 
me. If you demonstrate that you are responsible and will take 
responsibility for her failure to tell the truth and the damages it caused, I 
will reconsider whether I feel comfortable leaving my professional name 
and license attached to statements of facts I made on your behalf. 
 
'If you are unwilling to take responsibility, then I can only conclude that 
your regard for credibility and honesty is less than what I am willing to 
risk further by leaving my name and license attached to statement [sic] of 
fact I made on your behalf.' 
 
Whether D.N. and G.N. were willing to pay the respondent money to help offset her 
losses had nothing to do with the reliability of the statements the respondent made to the 
accountant and to the IRS. 
 
 
"58. 
The respondent attached a draft petition to the January 3, 2015, email 
message. In the draft petition, the respondent sought damages and punitive damages and 
alleged negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract and 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and rescission of the contract in equity. 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
"59. 
D.N. responded to the respondent's message and petition. The tone of 
D.N.'s email message, again, makes it clear that the attorney-client relationship was 
significantly injured. D.N. continued to offer $40,000 to settle the dispute. 
 
 
"60. 
On January 7, 2015, the respondent sent G.N. and D.N. an email message 
and included a draft message she threatened to send to Mary Shuman the following day, 
which provided: 
 
'In completing the tax return for [G.N. and D.N.], I supplied facts, 
numbers and dates supporting the conclusion that [G.N. and D.N.] had 
been defrauded by a Ponzi scheme in 2001-2002, and that the taxable 
income declared to them by Transamerica in 2012, totaling $551,000 and 
relating to the forfeiture of the two life insurance policies, was phantom 
income caused by the Ponzi scheme itself, and that the Ponzi scheme had 
caused them other losses as well. 
 
'I have now learned that at least one of the facts given [sic] me by the 
clients was not true. I am gravely concerned, then, that other facts given 
by the clients, and on which I relied, are also false. As a result, I have the 
professional responsibility to withdraw the evidence and information I 
supplied to you, and on which I believe you relied in your work for them. 
 
'Unless you personally independently verified the facts I supplied you 
and on which you relied in getting the declared income exempt, and in 
taking other related losses as deductions on [G.N. and D.N.'s] 2012 
return, you need to inform the IRS that facts were not as they seemed, 
and you must withdraw that 2012 tax return, or at least your signature 
upon it. 
 
'I would not take this step lightly; there has been a serious change by the 
clients in the story given, and I have a duty as an officer of the court to 
18 
 
 
 
withdraw professional opinions I gave. As an enrolled IRS agent, I'm 
sure you had the same obligation.' 
 
D.N. responded to the respondent's email messages, indicating that if she filed suit he 
would file counterclaims. D.N.'s messages continue to exemplify the deterioration in the 
attorney-client relationship. Despite the animosity between the respondent and her 
clients, D.N. continued to offer to settle the matter for $40,000. And also despite the 
animosity between the respondent and her clients, G.N. and D.N. did not terminate the 
respondent's representation because they did not want to open themselves up to a lawsuit 
by the respondent for fees. 
 
 
"61. 
On January 10, 2015, the respondent reiterated her willingness to settle 
the matter for $80,000. The respondent stated '[t]his offer expires Tuesday at 10 am, and 
at 10:01 on Tuesday I will click "send" on the Joco Courts website and efile the lawsuit I 
sent you last week.' On Monday, January 12, 2015, respondent repeated her threat to file 
suit against D.N. and G.N. 
 
 
"62. 
On January 13, 2015, the respondent accepted D.N.'s offer of $40,000. 
Thereafter, the parties attempted to enter into a settlement agreement. The parties were 
unable to come to terms on the language to include in the agreement. 
 
 
"63. 
Evidence of the difficult relationship between the respondent and G.N. 
and D.N. continued. D.N. stated, '[i]f you are getting the idea that I seek to very soon 
have nothing more to do with you, that idea would be precisely right.' 
 
 
"64. 
Despite the respondent's repeated threats to file suit against G.N. and 
D.N., the respondent testified at the hearing on the formal complaint that she never 
intended to file suit against them. Additionally, despite the respondent's repeated threats 
made to G.N. and D.N. to notify the IRS that she was withdrawing her statements to 
them, the respondent never intended to follow through on that threat. Finally, despite the 
respondent's repeated threats made to G.N. and D.N. to contact Mary Shuman and 
suggest that she should review G.N. and D.N.'s tax returns, she never intended to do that. 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
"65. 
On February 3, 2015, the court issued a memorandum decision granting 
reconsideration in part and granting summary judgment in part. In reconsidering its 
earlier decision, the court addressed each of the causes of action individually. The court 
considered G.N.'s deposition testimony that she knew the money she invested with 
Knudson was lost in 2003 when it ruled on only one claim—G.N. and D.N.'s claim 
against Liebelt for the $73,500 loss. The court accepted Liebelt's argument that the statute 
of limitations began in 2003, when G.N. knew that the money was lost. The court 
rejected the respondent's argument that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 
the respondent discovered the fraud in 2012. Because the Court rejected the respondent's 
argument, it would not have made any difference whether G.N. discovered the losses in 
2003, or somewhere between 2006 and 2009; the statute of limitations would have run 
regardless. 
 
 
"66. 
The respondent failed to advise G.N. and D.N. that the court granted the 
motion for reconsideration in part. 
 
 
"67. 
On March 10, 2015, the court scheduled a pretrial conference for April 
30, 2015. The respondent failed to advise G.N. and D.N. of the scheduled pretrial 
conference. 
 
 
"68. 
Finally, on April 28, 2015, the respondent sent an email message to G.N. 
and D.N. In the message, the respondent told G.N. and D.N. that the court reinstated the 
case on limited grounds. Rather than inform G.N. and D.N. of the scheduled pretrial 
conference, the respondent stated 'I will be meeting with the Judge and opposing counsel 
tomorrow or Thursday to assess where we go from here. A trial date will be scheduled, 
then we move forward. I will give you an update.' That same day, D.N. responded. In 
D.N.'s response, he stated: 
 
'If, after I read the alleged order issued by the Judge, and thereafter 
possibly speak with you, I find sufficient basis to authorize you to take 
further action on the past suit bearing [G.N.]'s and my name, I may notify 
you that you may pursue the motion for reconsideration. But you may 
not take any action based on our past tax returns.' 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
"69. 
Following the pretrial conference, the respondent did not provide G.N. 
and D.N. with an update. 
 
 
"70. 
Because the respondent did not timely notify G.N. and D.N. of the court's 
action, on April 30, 2015, D.N. wrote to the judge's administrative assistant asking to be 
provided a copy of all orders or notices issued in the Liebelt litigation. 
 
 
"71. 
On May 9, 2015, despite D.N.'s directive, the respondent included 
consideration of G.N. and D.N.'s past taxes in a settlement demand. 
 
 
"72. 
The next day, D.N., again, made it clear that he was not agreeable 'to any 
theory predicated' on their potential tax liability. 
 
 
"73. 
On June 29, 2015, the respondent submitted a proposed pretrial order to 
the court. The proposed pretrial order filed by the respondent included a theory 
predicated on G.N. and D.N.'s potential tax liability. 
 
 
"74. 
On July 20, 2015, D.N. wrote to the respondent complaining of her 
failure to keep him advised of developments in the Liebelt litigation. On his own, D.N. 
learned that the case been scheduled for trial on October 19, 2015, and a fallback date of 
January 25, 2016, was also scheduled. In that message, D.N. repeated his directive to the 
respondent to refrain from making allegations of damages relating to their income taxes. 
 
 
"75. 
On October 5, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to continue the trial 
scheduled for October 19, 2015, due to health problems the respondent was experiencing. 
On October 7, 2015, the court granted the respondent's motion to continue. 
 
 
"76. 
On January 8, 2016, Liebelt filed a motion to continue the January trial 
setting. The court scheduled a hearing on Liebelt's motion to continue for January 22, 
2016. 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
"77. 
On January 15, 2016, the respondent forwarded material to G.N. and 
D.N. In the material, the respondent included information that she continued to seek 
damages regarding G.N. and D.N.'s potential tax exposure. 
 
 
"78. 
On Saturday, January 16, 2016, D.N. sent the respondent an email 
message. D.N. stated: 
 
'What you must do now is to expressly in writing in a document that you 
must file with the Court and concurrently serve upon defense counsel 
AND upon ME, disavow and withdraw any claim for damages sought by 
plaintiffs herein predicated in any part on plaintiffs' tax liability, actual or 
potential. In the event that you defy this directive to you, I will duly 
apprise the Court and defense counsel of plaintiffs' actual position on 
damages. I also will at that time apprise the Court that, as an attorney 
myself, I am cognizant that my acting pro se herein is unusual, but it is 
imperative that I do so because my attorney has defied my directives to 
her—and that such unethical misconduct is one of her many acts of 
unethical misconduct herein, including extortion. 
 
'If I have not duly received a copy of the above described motion filed by 
you with the Court with concurrent service upon me and defense counsel 
Austenfeld by no later than January 21, 2016, I will file my above-
described notice with the Court and upon defense counsel.' 
 
According to the respondent, she did not receive the email message sent on January 16, 
2016, from D.N. On January 21, 2016, D.N. sent another email message asking why she 
had not responded to his January 16, 2016 email message. After the respondent indicated 
she had not received that message, D.N. forwarded it to her at least twice. The respondent 
clearly had D.N.'s January 16, 2016, email message prior to the hearing held on January 
22, 2016. 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
"79. 
The respondent did not file a document with the court clearly disavowing 
any claim for damages sought by plaintiffs predicated on plaintiffs' tax liability, as 
directed by D.N. 
 
 
"80. 
On January 21, 2016, the respondent forwarded an outline of evidence 
she planned to present at trial on January 25, 2016. Contrary to D.N.'s express direction, 
the respondent included evidence about G.N. and D.N.'s potential tax exposure. The 
respondent did, however, include a paragraph that G.N. and D.N. would not be seeking 
damages regarding the tax exposure. D.N.'s express directions were to 'NOT in any way 
predicate plaintiffs' damages herein, in whole or in part, on plaintiffs' tax liability, actual 
or potential.' 
 
 
"81. 
On January 22, 2016, the court took up Liebelt's request for a 
continuance. During that hearing, D.N. entered his appearance on his own behalf. D.N. 
requested that the case be dismissed with prejudice because the respondent had acted 
unethically. 
 
 
"82. 
The respondent was surprised that D.N. appeared and was taken aback 
by his statements. The respondent stated, '[t]his is the first I was aware that the clients 
were unhappy with my services. I was not informed that they were unhappy or didn't 
want me to represent them until I just heard him speak.' The respondent's statements that 
she was unaware that D.N. was unhappy with the respondent's representation is 
disingenuous at best and, at worst, a deliberate falsehood. The respondent was the 
recipient of at least 20 email messages where D.N. made it clear that he was unhappy 
with the respondent and believed she was unethical. Most recently, the respondent had 
received D.N.'s January 16, 2016, email message at least twice on January 21, 2016. 
 
 
"83. 
On this subject, at the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent 
testified as follows: 
 
'Q. 
[By. Ms. Knoll] Okay. Let's talk about that. You actually 
received the content of that e-mail three times on January 21st? 
 
23 
 
 
 
'A. 
Sure. 
 
'Q. 
And you had read it before you showed up in front of Judge 
Vano?  
 
'A. 
Well, yes. And, so, I wasn't saying that I didn't get that 
information, what I was—the client—[D.N.] was telling the 
judge, judge, she disregarded my instructions to her on January 
16th. And I sent her this e-mail and she never replied to it. I 
think it was fair for me to say, whoa, whoa, I didn't get that e-
mail on January 16th.' 
 
"84. 
 Additionally, the respondent asserted that she had concerns that D.N.'s 
judgment may be impaired by a health reason. The respondent alleged that D.N. exerted 
undue influence or control over G.N. and that G.N. may suffer from the battered wife 
syndrome. When questioned by the court for the source of her concerns, the respondent 
stated that she based her concerns on observations made during meetings with G.N. and 
D.N. when D.N. told G.N. that she could not talk. The respondent stated that D.N. made 
many irrational statements and had exhibited a pattern of less than full comprehension of 
the lawsuit. Finally, the respondent asserted that D.N. may be in need of a guardian ad 
litem. 
 
 
"85. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Liebelt's motion to 
continue and scheduled the case for a status conference on February 29, 2016, at 1:30 
p.m. 
 
 
"86. 
On February 17, 2016, counsel for Liebelt filed a complaint with the 
disciplinary administrator's office. Counsel for Liebelt included the materials she 
received in court on January 22, 2016, from D.N. 
 
 
"87. 
On February 25, 2016, counsel for Liebelt sent the respondent a letter, 
via facsimile. In the body of the letter, counsel for Liebelt stated: 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
'This morning you advised me, in effect, that Mr. Goodman 
"might be" recanting a portion of the supplemental opinion served on 
September 11, 2015. Specifically, you stated that Mr. Goodman would 
recant the entire first paragraph of the opinion, attached. When I tried to 
clarify, you stated that you might "just leave it as is." 
 
 
'Without waiving our right to object whether any 
supplementation of Mr. Goodman's opinion is proper, we request any 
supplemental opinions to which Mr. Goodman will be testifying be 
provided to the undersigned in accordance with the requirements of 
K.S.A. 60-226. Also, please provide the written response prior to our 
February 29th status conference, so that we can report our positions to 
Judge Vano at that time.' 
 
 
"88. 
On February 29, 2016, the court took up the case. At that time, no one 
appeared on behalf of G.N. and D.N. Because no one appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
the court dismissed the case, without prejudice. Even though the respondent was present 
in the courtroom when the court scheduled the status conference and even though counsel 
for Liebelt referred to the date of the status conference in her February 25, 2016, letter, 
the respondent inadvertently recorded the status conference for March 7, 2016. After 
learning that the case had been dismissed, the respondent did not provide that information 
to G.N. and D.N. 
 
 
"89. 
On March 7, 2016, the respondent provided a written response to the 
disciplinary complaint. In her response, the respondent asserted that she committed no 
ethical violations. The respondent also stated: 
 
'. . . Unfortunately, the client misrepresented a material fact. The client 
does not deny that. The misrepresentation caused me damages. I am 
entitled to seek those damages from the client. For a time period I was 
advocating my rights against the client. When the Court reinstated part of 
the case, I determined it was best to ameliorate my damages by moving 
forward with the case, and the client has clearly agreed with that strategy. 
25 
 
 
 
 
'Prior to Jan. 22, I was unaware that the clients had formed the 
conclusion that I was disobeying instructions and directly seeking 
damages for potential tax liability. Perhaps the clients misunderstood that 
I was only preserving the option of adding those damages later in the 
event the clients were audited and assessed liability prior to trial. I 
believe it was my duty to keep this option open. In any event, our final 
pretrial order, our last settlement demand, and our trial exhibit list all 
demonstrate that I have not asked for potential tax liability damages. 
 
'I have followed the client's [sic] instructions throughout the case and 
there is no evidence of ethical breaches on my part. . . .' 
 
At the time the respondent made this statement, she knew that the court rejected her 
argument that, regarding one claim (see ¶ 65), the statute of limitations did not begin to 
run until the respondent informed G.N. and D.N. that they had been defrauded in 2012. 
Regarding that claim, the respondent knew that the court found the statute ran when G.N. 
discovered that the money invested with Knudson was lost. The respondent also knew 
that the court dismissed other allegations in the petition based on other time frames. The 
respondent's argument that G.N. misrepresented a material fact and that 
misrepresentation caused her damages is disingenuous. The respondent knew that 
regardless of G.N.'s deposition testimony the claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
 
 
"90. 
On March 14, 2016, without consulting G.N. and D.N., the respondent 
filed a motion to set aside the journal entry of dismissal. The respondent also filed a 
notice of hearing, scheduling the motion to set aside the journal entry for April 4, 2016. 
The respondent did not inform G.N. and D.N. that she filed the motion to set aside the 
journal entry and that the motion was scheduled for hearing on April 4, 2016. 
 
 
"91. 
On March 15, 2016, D.N. sent an email to the respondent asking about 
two emails he received from the court: one notifying him that something had been 
dismissed and another notifying him that a notice of hearing had been filed. 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
"92. 
On March 16, 2016, D.N. obtained a copy of the notice of hearing from 
the court's administrative assistant. 
 
 
"93. 
On March 17, 2016, D.N. again asked the respondent to update him on 
the status of the litigation. That same day, the respondent sent D.N. a note promising to 
reply later that day or the following day. The respondent did not reply later that day or the 
following day. 
 
 
"94. 
On March 21, 2016, the respondent sent D.N. an email message, 
explaining that she recorded the date of the status conference incorrectly, that the case 
had been dismissed, and that she 'followed procedure in requesting the case be reinstated 
pursuant to Kansas law.' The respondent also informed D.N. that a hearing was scheduled 
for April 4, 2016. 
 
 
"95. 
On March 22, 2016, D.N. sent the respondent an email message 
indicating that at the April 4, 2016, hearing, he would appear and oppose the motion to 
reinstate the case. 
 
 
"96. 
On April 4, 2016, the court took up the respondent's motion to reinstate 
the case. The respondent, counsel for Liebelt, G.N., and D.N. appeared. At the hearing, 
the respondent stated, again, that she was surprised that G.N. and D.N. appeared at that 
hearing because they did not tell her they were going to appear. The respondent again 
asserted that D.N. may be in need of a guardian ad litem. D.N. addressed the court and 
read his March 22, 2016, email into the record. The respondent asserted that she did not 
receive D.N.'s March 22, 2016, email message. The court denied the respondent's motion 
to reinstate the case. 
 
 
"97. 
Later that day, the respondent wrote to G.N. and D.N. seeking 
permission to refile the case. Two days later, on April 6, 2016, G.N. and D.N. sent an 
email message to the respondent informing her that they would not consent to refiling the 
case. 
 
27 
 
 
 
"DA12526 
 
 
"98. 
In 2014, the respondent filed suit on behalf of G.C. against his former 
employer and associated entities. (G.C. in this case is the same G.C. in DA12309, above.) 
The respondent alleged that G.C.'s employers discriminated against him, defamed him, 
and caused him to be assaulted and battered. 
 
 
"99. 
The defendants aggressively defended the cases. The defendants had 
greater resources to spend on the defense than the respondent did to prosecute the case. 
The respondent and her associate attorney had a difficult time keeping up with the 
motions filed by the defense. The respondent attempted to hire an additional associate or 
associate with another firm to help with the litigation. Unfortunately, the respondent was 
not successful in getting help with this litigation. In addition to the respondent's limited 
resources, the respondent also struggled to keep up with filing deadlines because of her 
physical health. 
 
 
"100. 
The respondent's inability to manage this litigation was compounded by 
other events, also. First, while the litigation was pending, the defendants filed suit against 
the respondent and her associate alleging RICO violations as well as defamation. The 
respondent obtained a dismissal of that case a few months later. Second, during the 
litigation, the life of a key witness was threatened. 
 
 
"101. 
The respondent delegated the responsibility of responding to pending 
motions in the litigation to her associate. The associate miscalculated a filing deadline in 
September, 2014, by one day. The respondent was able to preserve the claim by filing a 
claim as a separate case. The two cases were consolidated. 
 
 
"102. 
The respondent, through her associate, filed repeated motions to enlarge 
the time, motions for extension of time, and motions to file out of time throughout the 
litigation. The respondent failed to respond to interrogatories and requests for production 
of documents. The respondent did not timely respond to the motions to dismiss and 
strike. 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
"103. 
On January 27, 2015, in denying a motion filed by the respondent, the 
court noted that the respondent had missed several deadlines and also stated: 
 
 
'Giving Plaintiff every benefit and the opportunity to 
substantively respond to the pending motions, the Court in its November 
25, 2014 Order denied the Defendants' Motions without prejudice and 
allowed Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Petition. At that time, the 
Court ordered "Plaintiff to abide by all further deadlines and to 
substantively respond to all future pending motions." The Court warned, 
"[f]ailure to do so, may result in sanctions." Finally, the Court ordered it 
would reconsider all motions to dismiss and strike that were filed and 
that "Plaintiff shall address the merits of any such motions in a timely 
fashion."' 
 
 
"104. 
Even after the court's January 27, 2015, admonition, the respondent 
continued to miss deadlines. For example, the respondent failed to file an answer or 
otherwise respond to the defendants' counterclaims. 
 
 
"105. 
On April 13, 2015, the court entered default judgment as to certain 
counts pled by the respondent and commented on the respondent's failure to meet 
deadlines and to address the merits of pending motions. The court stated: 
 
 
'Counsel's failure to properly budget her time is not an 
"unavoidable hindrance." While an "IT glitch" could qualify as an 
"unexpected hindrance," in this instance, counsel's carelessness and 
continued disregard of the Court's process creates the "panicked 
situations" counsel continuously finds herself in.' 
 
 
"106. 
On May 8, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to set aside default 
judgment. The respondent attributed her failure to timely respond to administrative errors 
and medical problems. The court denied the respondent's motion because she failed to 
establish good cause. The court pointed out that the respondent inconsistently described 
29 
 
 
 
her limitations based upon her medical problems. Finally, the court concluded that her 
actions were reckless. 
 
 
"107. 
In November, 2015, and December, 2015, the defendants filed motions 
for summary judgment on the merits of the actions. 
 
 
"108. 
After the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, the 
respondent continued to miss deadlines, to file motions to enlarge time, and to file 
motions for leave to file out of time. In explanation, the respondent continued to cite to 
administrative problems and medical issues. Ultimately, the respondent filed no counter 
affidavit or proof to contradict the facts as alleged in the Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
"109. 
On March 31, 2015, the respondent stated to the court that a defendant 
'slipped in' the counterclaims. The respondent later acknowledged that she failed to 
thoroughly read all pleadings filed by the defendants, that her statement that a defendant 
'slipped in' the counterclaims was incorrect, and that the counterclaims were properly 
raised. 
 
 
"110. 
In April, 2016, the court granted the motions for summary judgment and 
dismissed the case with prejudice. In doing so, the court acknowledged that it was not 
proper to grant summary judgment simply because a responsive pleading was not filed. 
The court made its determination on the merits of the case. For example, the court 
concluded that the respondent indisputably sought to recover damages for injuries G.C. 
suffered during the workplace accident which was the subject of his worker's 
compensation settlement. The court also concluded that the plaintiff failed to show the 
service letter to any potential employers and he was not refused employment based on the 
service letter. Regarding the defamation claim, the court further found that the respondent 
failed to identify a defamatory statement that was published and damaged G.C.'s 
reputation. Rather, the evidence established that G.C. was fired for assaulting a patron, so 
the statements made to the media were true and not actionable. 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
"111. 
After the conclusion of the cases, counsel for the defendants filed a 
disciplinary complaint against the respondent. On June 9, 2016, the respondent filed a 
written response to the complaint. In addition, an attorney disciplinary complaint was 
filed against the respondent in Missouri for her actions in representing G.C. As a result of 
that case, the respondent was informally admonished for violating the Missouri 
equivalents to Rule 1.1 and Rule 1.3. The respondent failed to report the Missouri 
disciplinary action to the disciplinary administrator's office. 
 
 
"112. 
Finally, the respondent offered to make settlement payments to G.C. The 
respondent and G.C. reached an agreement to settle G.C.'s potential malpractice action 
against respondent. The respondent paid G.C. what they agreed on. 
 
 
"113. 
G.C. stated, in an affidavit, that he had no complaints regarding the 
respondent and that he believed she took responsibility for her mistakes by paying him. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"114. 
The deputy disciplinary administrator alleged that the respondent 
violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8(e), 1.8(h), 1.16, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.1, 8.3, 8.4, 
and 207. During the hearing on the formal complaint, the deputy disciplinary 
administrator withdrew the allegation that the respondent violated Rule 4.1. 
 
 
"115. 
Of the alleged rule violations, the respondent stipulated that she violated 
Rules 1.3. 1.4, 1.5, 1.8(e), 1.16, 5.1, 8.3, and 8.4(g). 
 
 
"116. 
The hearing panel does not find clear and convincing evidence to support 
a conclusion that the respondent violated Rules 1.8(h), 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 207. 
 
 
"117. 
Based upon the respondent's stipulations and the above findings of fact, 
the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that clear and convincing evidence has 
been presented to establish that the respondent violated Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 
(diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.8(e) (conflict of interest), 1.16 
(termination of representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 5.1 (responsibilities of 
31 
 
 
 
supervisory lawyers), 8.3 (reporting professional misconduct), 8.4(c) (conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to 
practice), as detailed below. 
 
"Rule 1.1 
 
 
"118. 
Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. Rule 1.1. 
'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' In DA12309, the respondent was 
not competent to represent G.C. She did not have the requisite legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation to handle the complex litigation she filed on behalf of G.C. 
The respondent's lack of competence became clear when she was unable to timely 
respond to discovery, motions, and claims filed by the defendants. Further, the 
respondent was found in violation of Rule 1.1 in the Missouri disciplinary action. 'A final 
adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer has been guilty of misconduct shall 
establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this 
state.' Rule 202. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
Rule 1.1. 
 
"Rule 1.3 
 
 
"119. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing their clients. See Rule 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and promptly 
represent G.C. in DA12309. The respondent repeatedly requested additional time to 
respond to discovery requests, motions, and claims. Additionally, the respondent failed to 
timely file discovery requests, motions, and answers. The respondent was found in 
violation of Rule 1.3 in Missouri and, in this case, the respondent stipulated that she 
violated Rule 1.3. Again, '[a] final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer has 
been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a 
disciplinary proceeding in this state.' Rule 202. Because the respondent did not exercise 
reasonable diligence in representing G.C., because she was found in violation of Rule 1.3 
32 
 
 
 
in Missouri, and because she stipulated that she violated Rule 1.3, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated Rule 1.3. 
 
"Rule 1.4 
 
 
"120. 
Rule 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.' In DA12475, the respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) when she failed to keep 
G.N. and D.N. updated regarding the pending litigation. Further, the respondent 
stipulated that she violated Rule 1.4. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated Rule 1.4(a). 
 
"Rule 1.5 
 
 
"121. 
Contingent fee agreements must be in writing. Rule 1.5(d) provides the 
requirement in this regard: 
 
 
'A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which 
the service is rendered . . .  A contingent fee agreement shall be in 
writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, 
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in 
the event of settlement, trial or appeal, and the litigation and other 
expenses to be deducted from the recovery. . . .' 
 
While the respondent indicated that she entered into a written contingent fee agreement in 
DA12475, she was unable to produce one. D.N. testified that he never signed a fee 
agreement, that they discussed the fee agreement on many occasions, and that he 
repeatedly requested that the respondent provide him with a written fee agreement. The 
respondent told D.N. that they would discuss the fee when the case was over. During the 
hearing on this matter, the respondent admitted that she violated Rule 1.5(d). 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that by either failing to enter into a written fee 
agreement or by failing to provide D.N. with a copy of the fee agreement when he 
requested it, the respondent violated Rule 1.5(d). 
33 
 
 
 
 
"Rule 1.8 
 
 
"122. 
Lawyers are not permitted to make loans to clients: 
 
 
'(e) 
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client 
in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:  
 
(1) 
a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses 
of litigation, the repayment of which may be 
contingent on the outcome of the matter; and  
 
(2) 
a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay 
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf 
of the client.' 
 
As stipulated in the diversion agreement, in DA12309, the respondent loaned G.C. 
$20,000, in violation of Rule 1.8(e). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated Rule 1.8(e). 
 
"Rule 1.16 
 
 
"123. 
In certain circumstances, attorneys must withdraw from representing a 
client. Rule 1.16 provides: 
 
'(a) 
Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a 
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the 
representation of a client if:  
 
(1) 
the representation will result in violation of the 
rules of professional conduct or other law;  
 
34 
 
 
 
(2) 
the lawyer's physical or mental condition 
materially impairs the lawyer's ability to 
represent the client[.]' 
 
In DA12475, once the respondent threatened to sue G.N. and D.N. over the fee, the 
respondent was required to withdraw from the representation because of the conflict of 
interest which developed between the respondent and G.N. and D.N. See Rule 1.16(a)(1). 
The respondent was also required to withdraw from the representation of G.C. when her 
physical health impaired her ability to adequately represent G.C. See Rule 1.16(a)(2). The 
respondent acknowledged that she should have withdrawn from her representation of 
G.N. and D.N. Because the respondent was required to withdraw from the representation 
of G.N., D.N., and G.C., the hearing panel finds that the respondent violated Rule 1.16. 
 
"Rule 3.2 
 
 
"124. 
An attorney violates Rule 3.2 if she fails to make reasonable efforts to 
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her client. Id. The respondent caused 
unnecessary delay in G.C.'s case by repeatedly requesting additional time to respond to 
discovery, motions, and claims, in DA12309. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent failed to expedite litigation in violation of Rule 3.2. 
 
"Rule 5.1 
 
 
"125. 
When an attorney hires an associate, the attorney may be responsible for 
the associate's misconduct. 
 
 
'(b) 
A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over 
another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other 
lawyer conforms to the rules of professional conduct. 
 
 
'(c) 
A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's 
violation of the rules of professional conduct if: 
 
35 
 
 
 
(1) 
the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the 
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; 
or 
 
(2) 
the lawyer is a partner or has comparable 
managerial authority in the law firm in which 
the other lawyer practices, or has direct 
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and 
knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but 
fails to take reasonable remedial action.' 
 
In DA12309, the respondent failed to take reasonable efforts to ensure that her associate 
was timely filing pleadings in the litigation involving G.C. Additionally, the respondent 
knew that her associate was not timely filing pleadings and she failed to take reasonable 
remedial action. During the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent admitted that 
she violated Rule 5.1. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
Rule 5.1. 
 
"Rule 8.3(a) 
 
 
"126. 
Attorneys are required to report misconduct. 'A lawyer having 
knowledge of any action, inaction, or conduct which in his or her opinion constitutes 
misconduct of an attorney under these rules shall inform the appropriate professional 
authority.' Rule 8.3(a). In DA12309, the respondent failed to report that a complaint had 
been filed against her in Missouri. Additionally, the respondent failed to report that the 
Missouri disciplinary authorities informally admonished her for the Rule 1.1 and Rule 1.3 
violations in representing G.C. The respondent stipulated to this violation. Because the 
respondent failed to report her misconduct, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated Rule 8.3(a). 
 
36 
 
 
 
"Rule 8.4(a) 
 
 
"127. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (a) [v]iolate or attempt 
to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, 
or do so through the acts of another.' Rule 8.4(a). The respondent, in this case, violated 
KRPC 8.4(a) by violating the competence and diligence rules in Missouri. Additionally, 
the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(a) by violating Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 
(diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.8 (conflicts of interest), 1.16 (termination 
of representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 5.1 (duties of a supervisory attorney), 8.3 
(reporting misconduct), 8.4(c) (dishonest conduct), and 8.4(d) (conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice). As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated Rule 8.4(a). 
 
"Rule 8.4(c) 
 
 
"128. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' Rule 8.4(c). In DA12475, the 
respondent engaged in conduct that involved a misrepresentation when she stated, '[t]his 
is the first I was aware that the clients were unhappy with my services. I was not 
informed that they were unhappy or didn't want me to represent them until I just heard 
him speak.' The respondent knew for more than a year that D.N. was unhappy with her 
conduct. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(c). 
 
"Rule 8.4(d) 
 
 
"129. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' Rule 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice in both DA12309 and 
DA12475. In representing G.N. and D.N., the respondent's conduct prejudiced the 
administration of justice when she did not appear at the February 29, 2016, hearing and 
when she did not properly remove references to G.N. and D.N.'s potential tax liability in 
settlement offers and pleadings filed with the court. The respondent prejudiced the 
administration of justice in G.C.'s case when she failed to file responses to discovery, 
37 
 
 
 
motions, and claims, and particularly when she failed to file responses to the motions for 
summary judgment, resulting in the dismissal of G.C.'s causes of action. Thus, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(d). 
 
"Rule 8.4(g) 
 
 
"130. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' Rule 8.4(g). In 
DA12475, the respondent engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to 
practice law when she accused G.N. of fraudulently misrepresenting the year that G.N. 
discovered that the money entrusted to Knudson was all lost. The respondent engaged in 
conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law when she threatened to sue 
G.N. and D.N. and take other adverse action if they did not pay her $80,000 in attorney 
fees despite her agreement to accept the representation on a contingency fee basis. 
Finally, the respondent engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to 
practice law when she made unsubstantiated adverse claims regarding D.N. in open court 
on January 22, 2016, and April 4, 2016. The respondent admitted that her threats to sue 
G.N. and D.N. and take other adverse action adversely reflect on her fitness to practice 
law, in violation of Rule 8.4(g). The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
Rule 8.4(g). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"131. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"132. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to her clients to provide 
competent and diligent representation. The respondent violated her duty to her clients to 
38 
 
 
 
provide reasonable communication. The respondent violated her duty to her clients to 
refrain from conflicts of interest. The respondent violated her duty to the public to 
maintain her personal integrity. Finally, the respondent violated her duty to the legal 
system to expedite litigation and refrain from prejudicing the administration of justice. 
 
 
"133. 
Mental State. The respondent negligently violated some of her duties and 
knowingly violated other duties. 
 
 
"134. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to her clients. D.N. testified about the distress G.N. and D.N. experienced as 
a result of the respondent's misconduct. G.C.'s cause of action was dismissed because the 
respondent failed to file responses to the motions for summary judgment. Moreover, the 
respondent's misconduct also caused actual injury to the administration of justice. Cases 
were delayed and unnecessary hearings were held because of the respondent's 
misconduct. 
 
 
"135. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
 
a. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent threatened to sue 
her clients, the respondent threatened to withdraw statements the respondent 
made to the IRS, and the respondent threatened to suggest to G.N. and D.N.'s 
accountant that she withdraw her signatures on their tax returns. The respondent 
testified at the hearing on the formal complaint that she never intended to follow 
through with those threats. Thus, the repeated threats made by the respondent 
establish a dishonest motive. Further, the respondent's misconduct in making the 
threats was to entice G.N. and D.N. to pay her attorney fees which, under the fee 
agreement, she was not entitled to receive. As such, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent's misconduct in this regard was motivated by selfishness. 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
b. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct. The respondent repeatedly made threats to take action against her 
clients. Additionally, the respondent repeatedly failed to respond to inquiries by 
D.N. regarding the status of the case. Finally, the respondent repeatedly failed to 
comply with deadlines set by the court in representing G.C. 
 
 
c. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule 
violations. The respondent violated Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 
(communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.8(e) (conflict of interest), 1.16 (termination of 
representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 5.1 (responsibilities of supervisory 
lawyers), 8.3 (reporting professional misconduct), 8.4(c) (conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (conduct that adversely reflects on 
fitness to practice). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
committed multiple offenses. 
 
 
d. 
Vulnerability of Victim. G.N. and D.N. are elderly individuals. 
Even though D.N. practiced law in Illinois for 40 years, G.N. and D.N. were 
vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct as they had no experience with this 
type of matter.  
 
 
e. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The respondent 
has been practicing law since 1983. At the time of the misconduct, the 
respondent had been practicing law for more than 30 years. 
 
 
"136. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
 
a. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
b. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have 
Contributed to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
respondent suffered from anxiety and panic attacks. It is clear that the 
respondent's anxiety and panic attacks contributed to her misconduct. 
 
 
c. 
Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify 
Consequences of Misconduct. Twice after G.C.'s claims were dismissed by the 
court, the respondent paid G.C. for her neglect which led to the dismissals. G.C. 
was satisfied with the respondent's compensation. 
 
 
d. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His 
or Her Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free 
Acknowledgment of the Transgressions. The respondent cooperated with the 
disciplinary process. While the respondent admitted some of the facts that gave 
rise to the violations and agreed that she violated some of the rules alleged in the 
formal complaint, the respondent did not establish a 'full and free 
acknowledgment of the transgressions.' Nonetheless, the hearing panel finds the 
respondent's cooperation to be a mitigating factor. 
 
 
e. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community 
Including Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the 
Character and General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active 
and productive member of the Johnson County bar. The respondent also enjoys 
the respect of her peers and generally possesses a good character and reputation 
as evidenced by several letters received by the hearing panel. 
 
 
f. 
Physical Disability. During a period of time during the 
representations of G.N., D.N., and G.C., the respondent suffered a number of 
medical problems. Clearly, the timing of the medical issues played a part in the 
respondent's misconduct. 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
"137. 
In this case, many of the ABA Standards warrant review. Thus, in 
addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly examined and 
considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.32 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a 
conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the 
possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client. 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client; or 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'4.43 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent 
and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a 
client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'4.53 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
 
(a) 
demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal 
doctrines or procedures and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client; or 
 
(b) 
is negligent in determining whether he or she is 
competent to handle a legal matter and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
42 
 
 
 
'5.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
 
'6.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that 
false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or 
that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes 
no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a 
party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially 
adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 
 
'6.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent 
either in determining whether statements or documents are false 
or in taking remedial action when material information is being 
withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the 
legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse 
effect on the legal proceeding. 
 
'6.22 
Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a 
court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a 
client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a 
legal proceeding. 
 
'6.23 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently 
fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client or other party, or causes interference 
or potential interference with a legal proceeding.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"138. 
The deputy disciplinary administrator recommended a range of 
discipline, depending on which rules the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
43 
 
 
 
violated. At a minimum, the deputy disciplinary administrator recommended that the 
respondent's license be suspended for one year and that the respondent be required to 
undergo a reinstatement hearing under Rule 219. Alternatively, the deputy disciplinary 
administrator recommended that the respondent be disbarred. 
 
 
"139. 
Counsel for the respondent recommended that the respondent be allowed 
to continue to practice law, subject to the proposed plan of probation. 
 
 
"140. 
When a respondent makes a request to be placed on probation, the 
hearing panel is obligated to consider Rule 211(g) to determine whether consideration of 
probation is appropriate. 
 
 
'(3) 
The Hearing Panel shall not recommend that the 
Respondent be placed on probation unless: 
 
(i) 
the Respondent develops a workable, 
substantial, and detailed plan of probation and 
provides a copy of the proposed plan of 
probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and 
each member of the Hearing Panel at least 
fourteen days prior to the hearing on the Formal 
Complaint; 
 
(ii) 
the Respondent puts the proposed plan of 
probation into effect prior to the hearing on the 
Formal Complaint by complying with each of 
the terms and conditions of the probation plan; 
 
(iii) 
the misconduct can be corrected by probation; 
and 
 
44 
 
 
 
(iv) 
placing the Respondent on probation is in the 
best interests of the legal profession and the 
citizens of the State of Kansas.' 
 
 
"141. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent developed a workable, 
substantial, and detailed plan of probation. The respondent provided a copy of the 
proposed plan of probation to the deputy disciplinary administrator and each member of 
the hearing panel months before the hearing on the formal complaint. It is clear that the 
respondent put the proposed plan of probation into effect prior to the hearing by 
complying with each of the terms and conditions of the probation plan. With the 
exception of the dishonest conduct, the misconduct can be corrected by probation. See In 
re Stockwell, 296 Kan. 860, 868, 295 P.3d 572 (2013) ('Moreover, this court is generally 
reluctant to grant probation where the misconduct involves fraud or dishonesty because 
supervision, even the most diligent, often cannot effectively guard against dishonest 
acts.'). Finally, placing the respondent on probation is in the best interests of the legal 
profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas. 
 
 
"142. 
The hearing panel concludes that the requirements of Rule 211(g) do not 
prohibit the hearing panel from considering probation in this case. The hearing panel has 
carefully considered whether the respondent should be placed on probation, despite the 
dishonest conduct. Just as the Supreme Court is generally reluctant to grant probation 
where the misconduct involves dishonest conduct, the hearing panel is likewise reluctant. 
However, in this case, the hearing panel concludes that the significant mitigating factors 
(particularly the absence of a prior disciplinary record) are compelling and the hearing 
panel recommends that the respondent be suspended for a period of two years and that 
the suspension be suspended, to allow the respondent to be put on probation. The hearing 
panel recommends that the probation be for a period of two years, subject to the 
following terms and conditions: 
 
 
1. 
Practice Supervision. Michael S. Martin will serve as the 
respondent's practice supervisor. The respondent will meet with the practice 
supervisor on a monthly basis. The respondent will allow the practice supervisor 
access to her client files, calendar, and trust account records. The respondent will 
45 
 
 
 
comply with any requests made by the practice supervisor. The practice 
supervisor will prepare a quarterly report to the disciplinary administrator 
regarding the respondent's status on probation. The practice supervisor will be 
acting as an officer and an agent of the court while supervising the probation and 
monitoring the respondent's legal practice. As supervising attorney, the practice 
supervisor will be afforded all immunities granted by Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 223 
during the course of his supervising activities. 
 
 
2. 
Practice Limitation. During the period of probation, the 
respondent will limit her practice to estate planning, noncontested probate cases, 
and business law. The respondent will not accept any new contested litigation 
matters without prior approval of the supervising attorney. 
 
 
3. 
Office Procedures. The practice supervisor shall require the 
respondent to develop written office procedures designed to monitor the status, 
deadlines, and court appearances of all matters in which she has undertaken 
representation. The respondent shall provide a copy of the written office 
procedures to the disciplinary administrator. The respondent shall modify that 
procedure if directed to do so by the practice supervisor or the disciplinary 
administrator. The respondent shall follow the written office procedures. 
 
 
4. 
Inventory of Cases and Clients. The respondent shall maintain an 
inventory of all open cases and clients. The respondent shall update the inventory 
on a daily basis. The inventory shall include the client's name, the client's contact 
information, the client's goal, the tasks that remain to be completed, all pending 
deadlines, and the forum (if any) in which the matter is pending. 
 
 
5. 
Audits. Within thirty (30) days of the date of the Court's opinion, 
the practice supervisor shall conduct an initial audit of the respondent's files. 
Thereafter, the practice supervisor shall conduct additional audits quarterly. If the 
practice supervisor discovers any violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the practice supervisor shall include such information in his report. The 
practice supervisor shall provide the disciplinary administrator and the 
46 
 
 
 
respondent with a copy of each audit report. The respondent shall follow all 
recommendations and correct all deficiencies noted in the practice supervisor's 
periodic audit reports. 
 
 
6. 
Professional Liability Insurance. The respondent shall continue 
to maintain professional liability insurance. 
 
 
7. 
Medical Treatment. The respondent will continue her medical 
treatment throughout the period of supervised probation, unless the physician 
determines that continued treatment is no longer necessary. The physician will 
notify the practice supervisor and the disciplinary administrator in the event that 
the respondent discontinues treatment against the recommendation of the 
physician during the probationary period. The respondent will provide the 
physician with an appropriate release of information to allow the physician to 
provide such information to the practice supervisor and the disciplinary 
administrator. 
 
 
8. 
Continued Cooperation. The respondent will continue to 
cooperate with the disciplinary administrator. If the disciplinary administrator 
requests any additional information, the respondent will timely provide such 
information. 
 
 
9. 
Additional Violations. The respondent will not violate the terms 
of her probation or the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In the event that the respondent violates any of the terms of probation or any of 
the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct at any time during 
the probationary period, the respondent will immediately report such violation to 
the practice supervisor and the disciplinary administrator. The disciplinary 
administrator will file a motion to revoke probation with the Supreme Court and 
the chair of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys. See Rule 211(g)(9)-
(12). 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
"143. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the office of the disciplinary administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R.  251). Clear 
and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth 
of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint to which she 
filed an answer and an amended answer. The respondent was also given adequate notice 
of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this court. She filed exceptions to 
the hearing panel's final hearing report. At oral argument, the respondent clarified that 
she is not contesting the allegations against her and she agrees that the facts she contests 
in her brief to this court are not material to the disposition of this case. 
 
The respondent does not take exceptions to the panel's conclusions that she 
violated KRPC 1.1 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 289) (competence); KRPC 1.3 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. 292) (diligence); 1.4 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 293) (communication); 1.5 (2018 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 294) (fees); 1.8(e) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 309) (providing financial assistance to 
client); 1.16 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 333) (termination of representation); 3.2 (2018 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 343) (expediting litigation); 5.1 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 358) (responsibilities of 
supervisory lawyers); 8.3 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 380) (reporting professional misconduct); 
48 
 
 
 
8.4(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 381) (misconduct); 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice); and 8.4(g) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to 
practice). The evidence also supports the panel's conclusions of law. We therefore adopt 
the panel's findings and conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for the 
respondent's violations. At the hearing before this court, the office of the Disciplinary 
Administrator recommended the respondent be suspended indefinitely or, in the 
alternative, that a reinstatement hearing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219 (2018 Kan. 
S. Ct. R. 264) be held before the respondent could return to the practice of law. The 
hearing panel recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law 
for a period of two years, that the suspension be suspended, and that the respondent be 
put on probation subject to the terms and conditions listed in the final hearing report. The 
respondent and her designated practice supervisor filed affidavits asserting the respondent 
is in compliance with the probation plan approved by the panel. 
 
The panel acknowledged that probation is generally not appropriate in cases 
involving dishonest conduct, but it was persuaded by the mitigating circumstances here. 
This court is unconvinced that the mitigating circumstances render the respondent's 
egregious conduct toward her elderly clients amenable to probation. The respondent 
attempts to explain her threatening conduct toward them as an attorney-to-attorney 
negotiation because of D.N.'s status as an attorney. But her conduct in threatening to 
withdraw her statement to the IRS and to file a petition against her clients was simply 
wrong for several reasons.  
 
First, the respondent had special influence over her clients' taxes because she was 
also co-owner of the financial firm that had prepared their tax returns. She exerted this 
49 
 
 
 
influence in her December 30, 2014 email, stating, "First, if you get audited, you will 
need me and my files to prove to the IRS that the income Transamerica declared to you 
was phantom, and caused by a Ponzi scheme." The email also referenced legal opinions 
"on which the accountant relied in completing the tax return that saved you from 
$198,000 in taxes," with both the respondent and the clients aware that the accountant 
was the respondent's employee, a fact which amplified the threat. Even if her 
characterization of "attorney-to-attorney" negotiation was reasonable, her dual role as 
financial advisor and attorney gave her unfair leverage.  
 
Second, her characterization of "attorney-to-attorney" negotiation was 
unreasonable in light of her recommendation for a guardian ad litem for D.N. at the 
January 22, 2016 hearing before the district court. The record is not clear on whether the 
respondent was sincere when she told the district court D.N. might need a guardian ad 
litem. But it is an aggravating factor either way. If the recommendation for a guardian ad 
litem was insincere, then the respondent's attempt to discredit her client before the court 
was unethical. If the recommendation was sincere, then the respondent was unethical for 
engaging in hardball negotiations with a retired attorney whose capacity she knew to be 
diminished. 
 
Moreover, the respondent had an opportunity to show she could satisfactorily 
perform on diversion but failed. While she was on diversion for loaning $20,000 to her 
client in violation of Rule 1.8(e), two new complaints were filed. And she did not contest 
the Disciplinary Administrator's later request to revoke her diversion which was granted 
in January 2017. 
 
This court is not bound by the recommendations made by the Disciplinary 
Administrator or the hearing panel. Supreme Court Rule 212(f) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
255). But this court agrees with the recommendation of the Deputy Disciplinary 
50 
 
 
 
Administrator and holds indefinite suspension is the appropriate discipline. The 
respondent's license to practice law in the state of Kansas shall be indefinitely suspended; 
she will not be eligible for reinstatement for a minimum of three years from the date this 
opinion is filed; upon petitioning for reinstatement, she must establish the conditions set 
forth in Supreme Court Rule 219(d). 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Linda S. Dickens be and she is hereby disciplined 
by indefinite suspension in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2018 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 234), effective on the date of the filing of this opinion. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 262) (notice to clients, opposing counsel, and courts of 
record following suspension). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the respondent seeks reinstatement, she 
shall be subject to a reinstatement hearing under Supreme Court Rule 219 
(reinstatement). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.