Title: New Jersey v. McQueen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2021

New Jersey v. McQueen Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Rasheem McQueen was arrested after driving off when Piscataway police officers attempted to stop him for traffic violations. At police headquarters, McQueen was permitted to make a call on a landline in the “report writing room.” No one told him the call would be recorded: no sign was posted warning that all calls were recorded; no one stood over McQueen to listen to the conversation, and he “mumbled on the phone, hiding what his conversation was.” Later that day, a detective recovered a gun found outside the home near where McQueen had been stopped, and became “suspicious” about the call McQueen had made from headquarters. Without securing a warrant or a subpoena, or consent from McQueen, detectives listened to McQueen’s recorded conversation. The recording revealed that McQueen called Myshira Allen-Brewer and told her to look for his “blicky” (slang for a handgun) near where the gun was found. McQueen was transferred to the Middlesex County Adult Correction Center, from where he made further telephone calls to Allen-Brewer on a clearly designated recorded line. During telephone calls placed from the Correction Center, an automated message advised parties their conversation was being recorded, and inmates received written notification of the warning. In their conversations, McQueen again told Allen-Brewer to look for the “blicky.” A recording of those Correction Center conversations was secured through a grand jury subpoena. Both McQueen and Allen-Brewer were indicted on multiple counts, and both moved to suppress their telephone conversations recorded by the Piscataway Police Department and the Correction Center. The motion judge suppressed the recorded calls and dismissed the indictment against Allen-Brewer. The Appellate Division reversed the suppression of the Correction Center calls and reinstated the charges against Allen-Brewer. The panel, however, split on the legality of the seizure of the police station call, with the majority affirming the suppression of that call. Only Allen-Brewer’s appeal went before the New Jersey Supreme Court, who reversed the Appellate Division: McQueen and Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversation in the absence of fair notice that their conversation would be monitored or recorded. The recorded stationhouse telephone conversation was not seized pursuant to a warrant or any justifiable exigency and therefore should have been suppressed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Rasheem W. McQueen (A-11-20) (084564)Argued March 1, 2021 -- Decided August 10, 2021ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The Court considers whether the right of privacy, safeguarded by the New Jersey Constitution, extends to an arrestee’s call on a police line from the stationhouse when neither party to the call is aware that the police are recording their conversation. Rasheem McQueen was arrested after driving off when Piscataway police officers attempted to stop him for traffic violations. At police headquarters, McQueen was permitted to make a call on a landline in the “report writing room.” No one told him the call would be recorded -- as were all outgoing calls from headquarters. No sign was posted warning that all calls were recorded. No one stood over McQueen to listen to the conversation, and he “mumbled on the phone, hiding what his conversation was.” Later that day, a detective recovered a gun found outside the home near where McQueen had been stopped and became “suspicious” about the call McQueen had made from headquarters. Without securing a warrant or a subpoena, or consent from McQueen, detectives listened to McQueen’s recorded conversation. The recording revealed that McQueen called Myshira Allen-Brewer and told her to look for his “blicky” -- apparently a slang name for a handgun -- near where the gun was found. McQueen was transferred to the Middlesex County Adult Correction Center (Correction Center), from where he made further telephone calls to Allen-Brewer on a clearly designated recorded line. During telephone calls placed from the Correction Center, an automated message advises the parties that their conversation is being recorded, and inmates receive written notification of the warning as well. In their conversations, McQueen again told Allen-Brewer to look for the “blicky.” A recording of those Correction Center conversations was secured through a grand jury subpoena. Both McQueen and Allen-Brewer were indicted on multiple counts, and both moved to suppress their telephone conversations recorded by the Piscataway Police Department and the Correction Center. The motion judge suppressed the recorded calls and dismissed the indictment against Allen-Brewer. 1 The Appellate Division reversed the suppression of the Correction Center calls and reinstated the charges against Allen-Brewer. The panel, however, split on the legality of the seizure of the police station call, with the majority affirming the suppression of that call. The Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal from the appellate panel’s affirmance of the suppression of the police station call, 244 N.J. 244 (2020), but denied Allen-Brewer’s cross-motion seeking a declaration that the Correction Center calls were the “fruit” of the unlawfully recorded police station call, 244 N.J. 245 (2020).HELD: The right of privacy, and particularly privacy in one’s telephone conversations, is among the most valued of all rights in a civilized society. McQueen’s custodial status in the stationhouse did not strip him of all constitutional protections. Article I, Paragraph 7 broadly protects the privacy of telephone conversations in many different settings. McQueen and Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversation in the absence of fair notice that their conversation would be monitored or recorded. The recorded stationhouse telephone conversation was not seized pursuant to a warrant or any justifiable exigency and therefore must be suppressed.1. To determine whether Allen-Brewer had a constitutionally protectible privacy interest in her conversation with McQueen, the Court considers whether Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that call and, if she did, whether the non-consensual and warrantless recording of and listening to her conversation by law enforcement officers violated the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Noting the lack of certainty in this area of federal law, the Court turns to the broader protections afforded under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the State Constitution in analyzing whether McQueen and Allen-Brewer possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the police station call. (pp. 17-19)2. The telephone is an essential instrument in carrying on personal affairs, and there is a general societal assumption that the people and places one calls on a telephone, no less than the resulting conversations, will be private. The place where such a call is made does not matter, be it home, office, hotel, or even public phone booth. What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area open to the public, may be constitutionally protected, and a person does not lose the right to the privacy of a telephone call simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. (pp. 19-21)3. A police station’s “report writing room” is not an area open to the public, and legitimate security concerns must be taken into account in the setting of a stationhouse. Few would dispute that an arrestee has a lesser expectation of privacy within the confines of a police station. A police station, however, is not a constitution-free zone. Clearly, an arrestee cannot make a call from a stationhouse phone line without the authorization of the police. When permission is given, however, the State does not suggest that the police 2 have a right to record and listen to an arrestee’s stationhouse call to his attorney. And, of course, the phone lines are not used exclusively by arrestees. No empirical evidence has been presented to support that there is a general understanding that all outgoing phone lines from a police station are recorded or that social norms instruct that an expectation of privacy in a police station call is not one that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 369 (2003). (pp. 21-23)4. Upon review of the cases on which the State relies, the Court finds no support for the proposition that the general public is aware that a call made by a civilian on an outgoing line can be recorded without notice, or that a call that cannot be overheard by an officer through natural means loses a reasonable expectation of privacy because of a non- consensual recording on a police line. In this case, no police officer heard through the use of the naked ear either side of the conversation. The surreptitiously recorded conversation in this case does not fall within the ambit of the so-called “plain hearing” exception to the warrant requirement. And the holding in State v. Jackson that the defendant-inmates had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their calls was premised on two critical factors: the correctional facilities’ legitimate security interests and the notice given to inmates that their calls might be recorded and monitored. See 460 N.J. Super. 258, 276 (App. Div. 2019), aff’d, 241 N.J. 547 (2020). (pp. 23-28)5. The Court concludes that, under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, an arrestee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a call made from a police station in the absence of notice that the conversation may be monitored or recorded. First, police monitoring of telephone conversations -- without consent, a warrant, or other appropriate judicial authorization -- empowers the government to arbitrarily peer into the most private sanctums of people’s lives in violation of the privacy protections afforded by Article I, Paragraph 7. Second, the State has provided no factual support and scant judicial authority for the notion that New Jersey’s residents have a widespread understanding that all outgoing telephone calls from a police station are recorded. Third, requiring notice of recording does not undermine and may enhance institutional security and public safety by deterring the unlawful use of the stationhouse line. Fourth, the right to notice of monitoring or recording accords with basic notions of fairness and decency. Fifth, the fruits of an unlawful search cannot provide an after-the-fact justification for the search. Sixth, McQueen and Allen-Brewer had an expectation of privacy in their conversation that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Evers, 175 N.J. at 369. The Court explains that Allen-Brewer’s expectation of privacy is largely derivative of McQueen’s privacy right. See id. at 370. (pp. 28-32)6. The Court’s holding that McQueen and Allen-Brewer enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the police station call means that the Piscataway police had to comply with the warrant requirement of Article I, Paragraph 7, in the absence of one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as consent or exigent circumstances. Here, the Piscataway police did not secure 3 either a warrant for the seizure of the recorded conversation or McQueen’s or Allen- Brewer’s consent to monitor or record their call. Nor has the State attempted to justify the seizure based on exigent circumstances. Therefore, the McQueen/Allen-Brewer stationhouse conversation must be suppressed. (pp. 32-33)7. Police departments that record or monitor outgoing calls of arrestees must give them reasonable notice of that practice. Reasonable notice may be satisfied in different ways. For example, the police could have an arrestee read and sign a form that explains the practice or could post a prominent sign by the telephone. Any forms or signs employed to provide notice must take account of language differences, and attorney conversations may not be monitored. (p. 33) AFFIRMED and REMANDED to the trial court.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 11 September Term 2020 084564 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rasheem W. McQueen, Defendant, and Myshira T. Allen-Brewer, Defendant-Respondent. On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division . Argued Decided March 1, 2021 August 10, 2021David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; David M. Liston, of counsel and on the briefs).Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Tamar Y. Lerer, of counsel and on the briefs). 1 Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt, of counsel and on the brief). Tess Borden argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Tess Borden, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). Denise Alvarez argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Denise Alvarez, on the brief). Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice (Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jonathan Romberg, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The right of privacy -- the right to be free from government officialsarbitrarily prying into our personal conversations -- is one of the preeminentrights in our constitutional hierarchy. Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New JerseyConstitution provides heightened protection to telephone calls and prohibitsgovernment eavesdropping, absent a warrant or an exception to the warrantrequirement. This case tests whether the right of privacy, safeguarded by ourState Constitution, extends to an arrestee’s call on a police line from the 2 stationhouse when neither party to the call is aware that the police arerecording their conversation. The police arrested Rasheem McQueen for allegedly committing certainoffenses and brought him to the police station, where he gave a statement to aninvestigating detective. The police permitted McQueen to make a telephonecall from one of the stationhouse’s landlines but did not tell him hisconversation would be recorded or accessible to law enforcement without hisconsent or a warrant. McQueen called and spoke with defendant MyshiraAllen-Brewer. The next day, a detective retrieved the recording and listened totheir private conversation. Based, in part, on the contents of that conversation,Allen-Brewer was charged with various crimes. The trial court suppressed the McQueen/Allen-Brewer telephoneconversation, finding that the warrantless retrieval and use of that recordingviolated Allen-Brewer’s statutory and constitutional privacy rights. In a splitdecision, the Appellate Division panel upheld the suppression of the telephoneconversation on Fourth Amendment grounds only, concluding that McQueenand Allen-Brewer enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy. 11 Only Allen-Brewer’s appeal is before this Court. 3 We affirm. The right of privacy, and particularly privacy in one’stelephone conversations, is among the most valued of all rights in a civilizedsociety. See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 100 (1995); see also Olmstead v.United States, 277 U.S. 438 , 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). McQueen’s custodial status in the stationhouse did not strip him of allconstitutional protections. The police provided McQueen and Allen-Brewerwith no notice that their conversation would be recorded or monitored. ArticleI, Paragraph 7, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, broadlyprotects the privacy of telephone conversations in many different settings. Wehold that McQueen and Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacyin their conversation in the absence of fair notice that their conversation wouldbe monitored or recorded. The recorded stationhouse telephone conversationwas not seized pursuant to a warrant or any justifiable exigency and thereforemust be suppressed. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. On August 27, 2018, at approximately 10:55 p.m., while on patrol in anunmarked vehicle, three Piscataway Township detectives observed anOldsmobile Sierra Cutlass traveling at a high rate of speed and turn without 4 signaling. 2 The detectives activated the patrol vehicle’s overhead lights andsiren, but the Oldsmobile continued on and ran through a stop sign until iteventually pulled over in front of 1640 Quincy Street. One of the detectives approached the Oldsmobile’s open passenger sidewindow and “immediately recognized” the driver as someone he knew to bethe registered owner of the car -- defendant Rasheem McQueen. The detective“advised [McQueen] to turn the car off[,] [t]hrow the keys out the window[,]and put his hands in the air.” Instead, McQueen “put the car into gear and tookoff.” The detectives did not give chase because of the public-safety risk andbecause they knew the identity of the driver. Shortly afterwards, McQueen’s grandfather called 9-1-1 to report thatMcQueen’s car had been stolen, and McQueen told the dispatcher the same.The three detectives then went to McQueen’s residence, arrested him, andtransported him to the Piscataway police headquarters. At headquarters, at approximately 12:11 a.m., Detective Carlos Alamedainterviewed McQueen, who admitted that he fled the scene and falsely reportedhis car as stolen. McQueen also told the detective where he had parked his2 The record before us is based on the transcripts of two days of grand jury testimony and police reports contained in the State’s supplemental appendix to this Court. No testimony was taken at the hearing on the motion to suppress. 5 car. 3 McQueen “insisted” on making a telephone call and was permitted to doso on a landline in the “report writing room.” No one told McQueen that hiscall would be recorded -- as were all outgoing calls from headquarters. Nosign was posted warning that all calls were recorded. No one stood overMcQueen to listen to the conversation. McQueen made the call at around 4:00 a.m. on August 28, before he wastransferred to the Middlesex County Adult Correction Center (CorrectionCenter). According to Detective Joseph Reilly, the call was made “inDetective Alameda’s presence,” and “[McQueen] was very mumbled on thephone, hiding what his conversation was.” Later that day, at about 1:00 p.m., Detective Reilly responded to a reportof a gun found on the lawn at 1650 Quincy Street, the home next door to theaddress where McQueen had been stopped the previous evening. There, on thelawn, Detective Reilly recovered a loaded .38 caliber revolver, with one spentshell in the cylinder. The serial number on the handgun was defaced. After the recovery of the gun, Detective Reilly became “suspicious”about the call McQueen had made earlier in the morning from headquarters.Without securing a warrant or a subpoena, or consent from McQueen,3 A later search of McQueen’s car uncovered an oxycodone pill. 6 Detective Reilly and Detective Sergeant Michael Coffey listened toMcQueen’s recorded conversation. 4 The recording revealed that McQueen called his girlfriend, eighteen-year-old Myshira Allen-Brewer. During the conversation, McQueen toldAllen-Brewer to look for his “blicky” -- apparently a slang name for a handgun-- on the side yard of a house in an area on Quincy Street. He gave herdirections to the location and told her that unless she found the “blicky” first“he would be in a lot of trouble.” 5 While at the Correction Center, McQueen made telephone calls to Allen-Brewer on a clearly designated recorded line. During telephone calls placedfrom the Correction Center, an automated message advises the parties thattheir conversation is being recorded. Additionally, inmates at the CorrectionCenter receive a pamphlet informing them that their “calls may be monitoredand recorded except calls to the Internal Affairs Unit and legal telephonecalls.” In their conversations, McQueen again told Allen-Brewer to look forthe “blicky.” She responded that she had tried and could not find it. He told4 Neither a recording of the conversation nor a transcript of it was made part of the record. Our understanding of that conversation comes from the grand jury testimony of Detective Reilly and Detective Sergeant Coffey. 5 The State represented in its brief and at oral argument that, during the conversation, McQueen told Allen-Brewer that he was “locked up.” 7 her to return to the scene and search the grass because he had thrown it “fairlyfar.” The Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office secured the recording ofthose Correction Center conversations through the issuance of a grand jurysubpoena. B. A Middlesex County grand jury returned a multi-count indictmentagainst McQueen and Allen-Brewer. We recite only the charges against Allen-Brewer, whose appeal is before us: second-degree conspiracy to unlawfullypossess a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 and 2C:5-2; third-degree attemptedhindering by attempting to suppress evidence that might aid in theapprehension or prosecution of McQueen, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3) and 2C:5-1;and fourth-degree attempted obstruction of the administration of law or agovernment function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) and 2C:5-1. Allen-Brewer and McQueen both moved to suppress their telephoneconversations recorded by the Piscataway Police Department and theCorrection Center. The motion judge suppressed the recorded calls, findingthat the State had not complied with the dictates of the New JerseyWiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (Wiretap Act), N.J.S.A. 8 2A:156A-1 to -37. The judge also relied on his written unpublished decisionin State v. Jackson. 6 The judge suppressed the calls from the Correction Center particularlybecause the Wiretap Act does not authorize the Prosecutor’s Office to issue “asubpoena duces tecum to retrieve jail calls from a correctional facility.” Thejudge also suppressed the call from police headquarters primarily based on hisinterpretation of the Wiretap Act. He determined that although McQueen hada diminished expectation of privacy in his location -- police headquarters -- hestill retained an expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation, in theabsence of notice that his call would be recorded. The judge stated that“[p]hone calls have always been different” and found no exception in theWiretap Act permitting the interception of the McQueen/Allen -Brewer call“without prior authorization,” such as a warrant or consent.6 The Appellate Division later reversed that decision, which suppressed the recorded conversations of the defendant-inmates who made calls from two county correctional facilities. 460 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div. 2019), aff’d, 241 N.J. 547 (2020). The Appellate Division rejected the motion judge’s holding that the recording of inmate calls violated the New Jersey Wiretap Act, Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (Federal Wiretap Act), and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. See id. at 266, 268-69. 9 Because the suppression of the evidence against Allen-Brewer left theState without the means to prosecute her, the motion judge dismissed theindictment against her. The Appellate Division granted the State’s motions for leave to appealfrom the orders suppressing the evidence against Allen-Brewer and McQueenand dismissing the indictment against Allen-Brewer. C. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, a three-judge panel of theAppellate Division reversed the suppression of the Correction Center calls andreinstated the charges against Allen-Brewer. The panel held that neither theFederal Wiretap Act nor the New Jersey Wiretap Act barred the interception,recording, or production by grand jury subpoena of the Correction Center callsbetween McQueen and Allen-Brewer. The panel relied on the decision inJackson, 460 N.J. Super. 258, in finding that a detainee at the CorrectionCenter, such as McQueen, is placed on notice that his telephone conversationswill be recorded and may be overheard. The panel therefore reasoned thatMcQueen and Allen-Brewer had no justifiable expectation that theircommunications were not subject to interception, citing In re Application forWarrants to Obtain Comm’ns from Twitter, Inc., 448 N.J. Super. 471, 475(App. Div. 2017). 10 The panel, however, split on the legality of the seizure of the policestation call. The panel majority affirmed the suppression of that call, findingthat the seizure of the McQueen/Allen-Brewer conversation violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The majoritydetermined that (1) McQueen demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacyby “deliberately lowering his voice so an officer . . . would not overhear” hisconversation with Allen-Brewer, (2) McQueen and Allen-Brewer’s“expectation of privacy was reasonable in the absence of any warning” that thecall would be recorded, and (3) their expectation of privacy “should be one'that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’” quoting State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 369 (2003). In support of that position, the majority distinguished a police stationfrom a correctional institution and noted that ordinary citizens are frequentlypresent in police stations for a variety of reasons, including as applicants forgun permits and as victims or arrestees accompanied by family and friends.The majority believed that, in the absence of notice, such individuals wouldreasonably assume that their telephone calls from the stationhouse are privateand not taped. The majority declined to “reach the question of whether therecording of the call would violate the Wiretap Act.” 11 The dissenting judge had a different view. In his opinion, the generalpublic has “knowledge that police department telephones are recorded,” and,therefore, it would be unreasonable for anyone using a stationhouse landline --especially an arrestee waiting to be transported to a county jail --to expect thecall to be private. On that basis, the dissenting judge determined that societyis not prepared to recognize as reasonable “McQueen’s expectation that hisconversation on a police station telephone [would be] private,” even in theabsence of notice that his call would be recorded. Similarly, he stated thatAllen-Brewer “could not reasonably have expected that her conversation withMcQueen . . . would be private” when she undoubtedly knew he was incustody. Last, he concluded that neither the Federal nor State Wiretap Actprohibited the police from recording a call placed from the stationhouse ordisclosing it to the prosecutor. D. The State filed a motion for leave to appeal from the appellate panel’saffirmance of the suppression of the police station call, relying primarily onthe opinion of the panel’s dissenting member. See R. 2:2-2(a). 7 Allen-Brewer7 When there is a dissent in the Appellate Division on an issue arising from a final judgment, an appeal may be taken to this Court “as of right.” R. 2:2- 1(a)(2). Here, because the charges against Allen-Brewer were reinstated, the appeal was interlocutory, requiring the filing of a motion for leave to appeal. 12 filed a protective cross-motion for leave to appeal -- in the event we grantedthe State’s motion -- seeking to have this Court declare that the CorrectionCenter calls were the “fruit” of the unlawfully recorded police station call. 8We granted the State’s motion and denied Allen-Brewer’s cross-motion. 244 N.J. 244 (2020); 244 N.J. 245 (2020). We granted the motions of the American Civil Liberties Union of NewJersey (ACLU), the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey(ACDL), and the Seton Hall University School of Law Center for SocialJustice (Center for Social Justice) to participate as amici curiae. The AttorneyGeneral of New Jersey, who had participated as amicus curiae before theAppellate Division, retained amicus status. II. A. The State and amicus Attorney General (collectively, the State), in largepart, repeat the arguments advanced by the appellate panel’s dissenting judge-- that McQueen (an arrestee), and by extension Allen-Brewer, had noR. 2:2-2. A motion for leave to appeal may be granted “when necessary to prevent irreparable injury.” R. 2:2-2(a). 8 Neither the trial court nor the Appellate Division addressed the “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument raised by Allen-Brewer in her protective cross- motion before this Court. 13 reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone conversation on a policestation phone line that is commonly known to be recorded. The simple logicof the State’s position is that because McQueen had no reasonable expectationof privacy in the telephone call, the recording of and listening to theconversation did not constitute a search, and because the police did notconduct a search, the police did not need a warrant to record or listen to thecall. The State concedes that no published case in this state and few in otherjurisdictions address the issue here but adopts the reasoning of the dissent that“[g]iven the general knowledge that police department telephones arerecorded, notice is implied,” citing Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952 ,955 (7th Cir. 1999), and other federal cases. The State also reasons that therecording of the McQueen/Allen-Brewer conversations falls within what itcharacterizes as “the 'plain hearing’ exception to the warrant requirement.” The State, moreover, contends that the same interest in promotinginstitutional security and public safety that animated the decision in Jackson,which upheld the recording of calls from a county jail (albeit with notice toinmates), justifies the recording of calls from a police station. Last, the Statemaintains that Allen-Brewer possesses no greater privacy rights in thetelephone conversation than McQueen. Thus, if McQueen made theconversation available to law enforcement through his voluntary use of a 14 stationhouse phone line, then Allen-Brewer’s misplaced confidence in theprivacy of that conversation is not conferred constitutional protection. 9 B. Allen-Brewer and supporting amici (the ACLU, ACDL, and Center forSocial Justice) echo many of the points made by the panel majority. Theyassert that the recording of the McQueen/Allen-Brewer conversation withoutconsent, a warrant, or a valid exception to the warrant requirement violatedboth the Federal and State Constitutions. They collectively maintain that thisstate’s constitutional jurisprudence provides heightened protection totelephone calls in many different settings, and that such protection shouldextend to a police station phone call made by an arrestee without notice thathis conversation will be recorded. They assert that no empirical evidence hasbeen presented that social norms do not give rise to an expectation of privacyin an arrestee’s call from a stationhouse.9 We do not address the Attorney General’s argument that the routine recording of police station phone lines does not violate the New Jersey or Federal Wiretap Acts. The issue on which the members of the appellate panel differed and on which this Court granted leave to appeal was the constitutionality of the recording of and listening to the McQueen/Allen- Brewer stationhouse conversation without consent, a warrant, or an exception to the warrant requirement. See Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Bethlehem Twp. Educ. Ass’n, 91 N.J. 38, 48-49 (1982) (“[A]s a general rule an amicus curiae must accept the case before the court as presented by the parties and cannot raise issues not raised by the parties.”). 15 Indeed, Allen-Brewer and amici suggest that the public’s understandingis that an arrestee in police custody has the right to one free call -- to anattorney, a loved one, or a friend -- to seek advice or comfort, without fear ofeavesdropping by law enforcement. They underscore that it would beincongruous that arrestees would have less privacy protection in a policestation call than inmates in a county jail, who are given notice that theirtelephone calls are recorded, citing Jackson. Allen-Brewer and amici note that whatever institutional securityconcerns law enforcement may have are harmonized with constitutionalconcerns by warning arrestees and others using a police line that calls arerecorded and may be monitored. They also reject the argument that the plain -hearing exception to the warrant requirement applies, emphasizing thatMcQueen spoke with his voice lowered to keep his communication private andthat no officer overheard the conversation. Last, they insist that Allen-Brewer’s reasonable expectation of privacyfrom governmental intrusion is independent of and different from whateverprivacy rights McQueen possessed at the police station. If the suppression ofthe police station call is upheld, Allen-Brewer claims that the CorrectionCenter calls must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 16 III. A. The only issue before the Court is the one on which the appellate paneldivided: whether Allen-Brewer had a constitutionally protectible privacyinterest in her conversation with McQueen, who called her on a police linefrom the stationhouse after his arrest. 10 The resolution of that issue depends onwhether Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that call and,if she did, whether the non-consensual and warrantless recording of andlistening to her conversation by law enforcement officers violated theconstitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. For many decades, “New Jersey has had an established policy ofproviding the utmost protection for telephonic communications .” State v.Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 345 (1982). Consistent with that policy, this Court hascharted a different path from federal law and conferred greater privacy10 Typically, a court would first determine whether the non-consensual and warrantless taping of the McQueen/Allen-Brewer conversation violated either the Federal or State Wiretap Acts and only, if necessary, address the constitutional issue. Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez From the Off. of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 95 (2010) (noting that courts “strive to avoid reaching constitutional questions unless required to do so” ). Here, the majority of the appellate panel decided not to resolve the statutory question, and the panel divided on the constitutional question. We accept the case as it comes before us and address the issue on which this Court granted leave to appeal. 17 protections to telecommunications under the New Jersey Constitution. See,e.g., State v. Lunsford, 226 N.J. 129, 155 (2016) (telephone billing records);State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 587-88 (2013) (cell-phone location data); State v.Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 399 (2008) (internet subscriber information); Hunt, 91 N.J.at 348 (telephone billing records). In recognizing that the New Jersey Constitution “may be a source of'individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the FederalConstitution,’” State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 144-45 (1987) (quotingPruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 81 (1980)), we haveconstrued Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution more broadly than its Fourth Amendment counterpart in ensuring “a person’s reasonable expectationof privacy from untoward government intrusion,” particularly within thesphere of telecommunications. See State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308, 328(2020); see also N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7 (guaranteeing “[t]he right of the peopleto be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”). Indeed, under our state constitutional jurisprudence -- unlike the federalapproach under the Fourth Amendment -- we apply an objective test todetermine whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in thematter in question. See State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 236 (2013) (“Unlike thefederal test, the New Jersey constitutional standard does not require the 18 defendant to prove a subjective expectation of privacy.”). The “streamlined”objective inquiry under Article I, Paragraph 7 simply asks whether theindividual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. Ibid. In other words, is theindividual’s expectation of privacy one that “society is prepared to recognizeas reasonable?” See Evers, 175 N.J. at 369 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Given the lack of certainty in this area of federal law, we turn to thebroader protections afforded under Article I, Paragraph 7 of our StateConstitution in analyzing whether McQueen and Allen-Brewer possessed areasonable expectation of privacy in the police station call. B. We have long realized that the telephone is “an essential instrument incarrying on our personal affairs.” Hunt, 91 N.J. at 346. “When a telephonecall is made, it is as if two people are having a private conversation in thesanctity of their living room. It is generally understood to consist of aconversation between two persons, no third person being privy to it in theabsence of consent.” Ibid. The general societal “assumption [is] that the people and places one callson a telephone, no less than the resulting conversations, will be private. Theplace where such a call is made does not matter, be it home, office, hotel, or 19 even public phone booth.” State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 344 (1989)(emphasis added) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52). “The telephone caller is'entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not bebroadcast to the world.’” Hunt, 91 N.J. at 346-47 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 352). It follows that “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in anarea accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” and that aperson does not lose the right to the privacy of a telephone call “simplybecause he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52; see also Mollica 114 N.J. at 344 (“[A]n expectation of privacy. . . consists of a belief that uninvited people will not intrude in a particularway.” (alteration and omission in original) (quoting United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1983))). It is “not the ownership or possessoryright to the telephone, nor even its location, as such, that creates theexpectation of and entitlement to privacy; rather, it is the use of the telephoneto engage in private and personal conversations that implicates the privacyprotection.” Mollica, 114 N.J. at 342. However, “[i]f one party makes the conversation available to others,such as through the use of a speaker phone or by permitting someone else tohear . . . the privacy interest does not remain the same.” Hunt, 91 N.J. at 346. 20 A person can hardly claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in a matter thatthe “person knowingly exposes to the public.” See State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343,354 (2002) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). Additionally, an individual’s“misplaced confidence” in a person who consents to share a conversation orinformation with the government is not protected by Article I, Paragraph 7.See Evers, 175 N.J. at 370. C. Merely because a person has a protectible privacy right in a telephonecall placed from a home, an office, a motel, or a telephone booth does notnecessarily mean that an arrestee has the same privacy right in a call placedfrom a police station. A police station’s “report writing room” is not an areaopen to the public, and legitimate security concerns must be taken into accountin the setting of a stationhouse. Few would dispute that an arrestee has a lesser expectation of privacywithin the confines of a police station. Certainly, an arrestee does not havefreedom of movement. A police station, however, is not a constitution -freezone. An arrestee is free to exercise his constitutional rights in a stationhouse,such as invoking the right to remain silent or requesting the assistance ofcounsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 444 (1966). Within astationhouse, a juvenile taken into custody has a right to consult in private with 21 a parent who is present -- outside of earshot of the attending officers -- beforethe police attempt to commence questioning. State in Interest of A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 345 (2020) (stating that juveniles should be advised “of theirMiranda rights in the presence of a parent or guardian before the policequestion, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile,” and afterwards, “[o]fficersshould then let the parent and child consult in private.” (emphasis added)). Clearly, an arrestee cannot make a call from a stationhouse phone linewithout the authorization of the police. When permission is given, however,the State does not suggest that the police have a right to record and listen to anarrestee’s stationhouse call to his attorney. An arrestee, in custody and cut offfrom the world, may have understandable and mundane reasons for making astationhouse call, such as to ask a parent to hire an attorney, or a spouse tocontact an employer, or a friend to arrange for childcare. And, of course, thephone lines are not used exclusively by arrestees. A crime victim or witness,or those who accompany them to the stationhouse, may use the same policephone line as McQueen. A stationhouse call may be placed for other thannefarious reasons. No empirical evidence has been presented to support a presumption thatthere is a general understanding among the public, at least in New Jersey, thatall outgoing phone lines from a police station are recorded or that social norms 22 instruct that an expectation of privacy in a police station call is not one that“society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See Evers, 175 N.J. at 369(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). Nevertheless, the State urges the Court to impute notice to the generalpublic based on a handful of federal cases, which are largely distinguishable (ifnot helpful to Allen-Brewer) and, in the end, have no dispositive bearing onthe protections guaranteed by our State Constitution. See Amati, 176 F.3d at955; see also Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 , 1319 (9th Cir. 1994);Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 , 984 (6th Cir. 2001); UnitedStates v. Correa, 154 F. Supp. 2d 117 , 123 (D. Mass. 2001). In Amati, current and former police department employees, and theirfriends and family members, brought a civil lawsuit alleging that thedepartment violated the Federal Wiretap Act and the Fourth Amendment byrecording their personal calls on outgoing police station lines without theirknowledge. 176 F.3d at 954-56. The United States Court of Appeals for theSeventh Circuit construed a provision of the Federal Wiretap Act, whichpermits the recording of police lines “by an investigative or law enforcementofficer in the ordinary course of his duties.” Id. at 954 (emphasis added)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii)). The Seventh Circuit held that therecording of “calls to and from a police department is . . . a routine police 23 practice” and that express notice of the recording was not required because“what is ordinary is apt to be known; it imports implicit notice.” Id. at 955. What may be “ordinary” for police department employees and theirfamily members, however, is not necessarily “ordinary” for the general public.Amati does not suggest otherwise. In addition, apparently not all federalcourts, at least in the 1990s, were in agreement with Amati that all policeofficers were on notice that every outgoing call from a stationhouse wasrecorded. See e.g., PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep’t, 832 F. Supp. 808 , 814, 819-20, 836 (D.N.J. 1993) (declining to dismiss thecomplaints of some plaintiff police officers, who alleged lack of knowledgethat their private conversations were recorded); In re State Police Litig., 888 F. Supp. 1235 , 1249 (D. Conn. 1995) (stating that “plaintiffs have established asa genuine issue whether any of the notification methods employed bydefendants informed anyone that the State Police automatically recorded alloutgoing as well as incoming calls”). The other cases cited by the State are distinguishable. In Siripongs, thedefendant placed a call three feet from a police officer and spoke in Thai loudenough for his voice to be picked up by the officer and captured on his hiddenrecorder. 35 F.3d at 1320. The United States Court of Appeals for the NinthCircuit essentially held that the defendant did not have a reasonable 24 expectation of privacy in a communication that could be overheard. Ibid. Incontrast, no police officer here could overhear McQueen’s conversation withAllen-Brewer. In Adams, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit notedthat, although “the routine and almost universal recording of phone lines bypolice departments and prisons” is permissible under the Federal Wiretap Actand “is well known in the industry and in the general public . . . , courts haveruled that even prisoners are entitled to some form of notice that suchconversations may be monitored or recorded.” 250 F.3d at 984. Here, Allen-Brewer and McQueen were not afforded the kind of notice contemplated byAdams. Last, in Correa, the United States District Court for the District ofMassachusetts held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in a telephone call to a co-conspirator that was overheard by a policeofficer “standing nearby.” See 154 F. Supp. 2d at 120-21, 123. Again, theMcQueen/Allen-Brewer conversation was not overheard by a nearby officer. None of those cases cited by the State support the proposition that thegeneral public is aware that a call made by a civilian on an outgoing line canbe recorded without notice, or that a call that cannot be overheard by an officer 25 through natural means loses a reasonable expectation of privacy because of anon-consensual recording on a police line. D. We reject the State’s argument that the surreptitious recording of theMcQueen/Allen-Brewer conversation falls within the ambit of the so-called“plain hearing” exception to the warrant requirement. We acknowledge that,generally, if a “defendant speaks loudly enough to be overheard hisexpectation of privacy vanishes” and that a police officer listening to what hecan naturally hear -- without an enhanced listening device -- acts within thepermissible confines of the Federal and State Constitutions. See State v.Constantino, 254 N.J. Super. 259, 265-68 (Law Div. 1991). However, in the case before us, no police officer heard through the useof the naked ear either side of the McQueen/Allen-Brewer conversation. Theirconversation was not heard by the police in real time but only later because --without notice to either party -- their conversation was recorded on a policeline. Although this Court has yet to directly address the metes and bounds ofthe plain-hearing doctrine, whatever the ambit of that doctrine may be, thesurreptitiously recorded conversation in this case does not fall within it. 26 E. We also conclude that Jackson offers no support for the State’s position.In that case, inmates in the Essex County and Middlesex County correctionalfacilities were advised by written notice as well as by a voice message at thebeginning of every telephone call that their conversations might be recorded ormonitored. 11 460 N.J. Super. at 266. The Prosecutor’s Office issued grandjury subpoenas to both facilities for phone calls made by the defendantinmates. Id. at 267-68. The Appellate Division held that the inmates did notpossess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their calls under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution. The Appellate Division reasoned that “the correctional facilities’ interestin maintaining institutional security and public safety outweighs the right toprivacy asserted here.” Id. at 276 (emphasis added). The use of “here”denotes the recognition that the inmates in the two facilities knew that theywere “being monitored and recorded when speaking on the phone” andtherefore retained no “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Ibid. TheAppellate Division’s holding that the defendant-inmates had no reasonable11 The protocols at both facilities carved out an exception to the recording and monitoring policy for calls made to attorneys or internal affairs. Jackson, 460 N.J. Super. at 266. 27 expectation of privacy in their calls was premised on two critical factors: thecorrectional facilities’ legitimate security interests and the notice given toinmates that their calls might be recorded and monitored. Id. at 276-77. IV. A. In the case before us, we conclude that, under Article I, Paragraph 7 ofthe New Jersey Constitution, an arrestee has a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in a call made from a police station in the absence of notice that theconversation may be monitored or recorded. We come to this conclusion for anumber of reasons. First, our State Constitution confers on New Jersey residents the “utmostprotection [in their] telephonic communications,” see Hunt, 91 N.J. at 345,from wherever the call is placed; “it is the use of the telephone to engage inprivate and personal conversations that implicates the privacy protection ,”Mollica, 114 N.J. at 342. Police monitoring of telephone conversations --without consent, a warrant, or other appropriate judicial authorization --empowers the government to arbitrarily peer “into the most private sanctumsof people’s lives” in violation of the privacy protections afforded by Article I,Paragraph 7. See Manning, 240 N.J. at 328. 28 Second, the State has provided no factual support and scant judicialauthority for the notion that New Jersey’s residents have a widespreadunderstanding that all outgoing telephone calls from a police station arerecorded. Such recordings would capture not just the private conversations ofarrestees, but also highly personal conversations of crime victims, witnesses,and others who happen to find themselves in a stationhouse. Whatever noticemay be “implied” in the case of police officers who use recorded police lines,see Amati, 176 F.3d at 955, cannot be implied in the case of civilians who donot frequent a police station. Additionally, as noted in the brief filed by Seton Hall’s Center for SocialJustice, it may well be that the general belief, as reflected in popular culture, isthat an arrestee typically can make one free call from the stationhouse --without an officer eavesdropping into that private conversation -- which couldbe to a lawyer, a loved one, or a trusted advisor. Consumers who commonlyengage in commercial transactions, moreover, expect that if theirconversations are taped, they will hear a beeping sound or an announcementthat the call may be recorded. If we attributed to New Jersey residents anawareness of the protocols in correctional facilities, such as those in EssexCounty and Middlesex County, where inmates are given double notice thatoutgoing calls are monitored or recorded, would those residents not think a 29 police station would give some form of notice to arrestees before recordingtheir conversations? Third, institutional security and public safety are legitimate concerns fora police station, just as they are for a correctional facility. Surely, if givingnotice in correctional facilities to inmates that their calls may be monitored orrecorded will not compromise security or public safety in those institutions, itis difficult to imagine that some reasonable notice to arrestees will underminesecurity in a police station. It is the monitoring or recording that provides theguarantee of security; notice does not undermine and may enhance thatobjective by deterring the unlawful use of the stationhouse line. Fourth, the right to notice -- if there is monitoring or recording oftelephone conversations by police at the stationhouse -- accords with basicnotions of fairness and decency. An arrestee transported to a police station,who is in custody and given the opportunity to make a telephone call, wouldnaturally reach out to a family member or friend (if not an attorney) for advice,support, or comfort. 12 The warrantless and surreptitious monitoring or12 Monitoring of an arrestee’s call to a lawyer is constitutionally forbidden, regardless of notice. See State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 13 (1980). An arrestee cannot be given the unpalatable choice of speaking with an attorney in the unwelcome presence of a police officer or on a recorded line, or not speaking with an attorney at all. 30 recording of calls of an arrestee who is presumed innocent does not comportwith the values of privacy that are prized in our free society. McDonald v.United States, 335 U.S. 451 , 453 (1948) (“[T]he right of privacy [is] one of theunique values of our civilization and, with few exceptions, stays the hands ofthe police unless they have a search warrant issued by a magistrate on probablecause supported by oath or affirmation.”). Fifth, we do not determine whether an arrestee has a reasonableexpectation of privacy in a telephone conversation by examining the nature ofthe conversation after the police have eavesdropped. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 , 595 (1948) (“[A] search is not to be made legal by what it turnsup. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character fromits success.” (footnote omitted)); McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453 (“[The]guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends tothe innocent and guilty alike.”). The fruits of an unlawful search cannotprovide an after-the-fact justification for the search. That some individualswill use the telephone for unlawful purposes -- whether the telephone islocated in a home, a business, or even a police station -- cannot bedeterminative of whether people generally have a constitutional right to theprivacy of their conversations, free from government intrusion. 31 Sixth, we find that McQueen and Allen-Brewer had an expectation ofprivacy in their conversation that “society is prepared to recognize asreasonable.” Evers, 175 N.J. at 369 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). Allen-Brewer’s expectation of privacy is largely derivative of McQueen’s privacyright. If McQueen had been placed on notice that his call might be monitoredor recorded and proceeded to make the call -- an implied consent scenario --then Allen-Brewer’s misplaced confidence in McQueen’s judgment would notnecessarily confer on her an independent right of privacy. Id. at 370 (“There isno constitutional protection for misplaced confidence or bad judgment whencommitting a crime.”). B. Our holding that McQueen and Allen-Brewer enjoyed a reasonableexpectation of privacy in the police station call means that the Piscatawaypolice had to comply with the warrant requirement of Article I, Paragraph 7, inthe absence of one of the “specifically established and well-delineatedexceptions to the warrant requirement,” such as consent or exigentcircumstances. See Manning, 240 N.J. at 328 (quoting State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111, 126 (2019)). “Because . . . searches and seizures withoutwarrants are presumptively unreasonable, the State bears the burden of 32 demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception to thewarrant requirement applies.” -- at 329. Id. Here, the Piscataway police did not secure either a warrant for theseizure of the recorded conversation or McQueen’s or Allen-Brewer’s consentto monitor or record their call. Nor has the State attempted to justify theseizure based on exigent circumstances. Therefore, the McQueen/Allen-Brewer stationhouse conversation must be suppressed. To be clear, police departments that record or monitor outgoing calls ofarrestees must give them reasonable notice of that practice. Reasonable noticemay be satisfied in different ways. For example, the police could have anarrestee read and sign a form that explains the practice or could post aprominent sign by the telephone. Those examples are not intended to suggestthat other methods would not be equally or more effective. Of course, formsor signs must take account of language differences, and attorney conversationsmay not be monitored. V. In accordance with our long-standing jurisprudence under Article I,Paragraph 7, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding thesuppression of the recording of the McQueen/Allen-Brewer stationhouse 33 conversation. We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with thisopinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 34