Title: Akers v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 992894
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
THOMAS WAYNE AKERS 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 992894 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
September 15, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
William N. Alexander, II, Judge 
 
Thomas Wayne Akers received a death sentence upon a plea of 
guilty to a charge of capital murder during the commission of a 
robbery, Code § 18.2-31(4), in the death of Wesley B. Smith.1  
Although Akers has waived his appeal of right, Code § 17.1-313 
mandates that we review the death sentence.  We must consider 
and determine whether the sentence of death was imposed “under 
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 
factor,” Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), and whether that sentence is 
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Code 
§ 17.1-313(C)(2). 
BACKGROUND 
On the morning of December 19, 1998, responding to a 
citizen report that a body was located there, Franklin County 
Sheriff’s Department Investigator F.M. Jamison went to a field 
at the intersection of State Route 40 and Sawmill Road in 
Franklin County.  Jamison discovered three pools of blood on the 
shoulder of the road and “a clear drag mark which was saturated 
with blood that went down the hill toward a creek.”  Following 
the trail of blood, Jamison discovered Smith’s body, which was 
covered with blood and bore the unmistakable signs of a savage 
beating including “[s]everal wounds to the back of his head, 
deep cuts, hair knocked off his head, a lot of blood on his 
shirt and his coat, and a large pool of blood under his face”.  
Searching further, Jamison found an aluminum baseball bat “lying 
in the creek partially submerged” twelve to fifteen feet from 
Smith’s body.  Subsequent laboratory testing established that 
Smith’s blood was on the bat. 
Forensic examination of Smith’s body revealed that he had 
been struck a minimum of three times in the head “and probably a 
great deal more than three” times.  As a result, Smith suffered 
several fractures to his skull causing a subdural hematoma.  The 
blows were not instantly fatal, and it would have taken “minutes 
to hours, at least,” before Smith died.  In addition to the 
lethal wounds inflicted to his head, Smith suffered numerous 
defensive wounds to his hands and arms.  He also had been struck 
                                                                  
1Akers also pleaded guilty to having robbed Smith, Code 
§ 18.2-58, and was sentenced to life imprisonment for that 
offense.  Akers has not appealed that judgment. 
 
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several times on his back, and his neck was bruised in a manner 
consistent with an attempted strangulation by ligature.  The 
ligature marks were consistent with the size and shape of a belt 
subsequently discovered in Smith’s car. 
Franklin County Sheriff’s Department Investigator H.T. 
Woods interviewed Smith’s mother, his sister, and George 
Slusser, a family friend.  Based on these interviews, Woods 
determined that on the evening of December 18, 1998, Slusser had 
visited Smith at his apartment in Roanoke.  At approximately 
8:00 p.m., Akers and Timothy Martin, Akers’ cousin, arrived at 
Smith’s apartment.  Martin and Smith had been acquainted for 
some time and Martin had recently introduced Smith to Akers.  
Akers and Martin told Smith that they had set him up for a 
“blind date.”  The four men left the apartment and drove in 
Smith’s car a short distance away to drop Slusser off at the 
home of his girlfriend.  Akers, Martin, and Smith were seen 
together later that evening at a Roanoke nightclub. 
After it was discovered that Smith had been murdered, that 
Smith’s apartment had been ransacked, and that several items of 
value were missing from the apartment, arrest warrants were 
issued for Akers and Martin for the murder and robbery of Smith, 
along with a bulletin for law enforcement officers to be on the 
lookout for Smith’s car, which had vanity plates reading 
“WESMODE.”  On December 22, 1998, an officer with the St. Regis 
 
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Mohawk Tribal Police in northern New York observed Smith’s car 
in an area of the Mohawk reservation near the Canadian border 
known for smuggling activity and illegal alien entry.  Upon 
learning that the vehicle and its occupants were wanted in 
Virginia, tribal police stopped the car and took Akers and 
Martin into custody.  Akers subsequently attempted to flee from 
a room at the police station and when he was subdued he told the 
tribal police officers, “It’s a good day to die.” 
When he was arrested, Akers was in possession of Smith’s 
wallet.  A search of Smith’s car revealed numerous items from 
Smith’s apartment, the belt used as a ligature, and a pair of 
black boots covered with Smith’s blood.  The boots were 
subsequently identified as belonging to Akers. 
Thereafter, Akers talked openly with other prisoners about 
Smith’s murder.  Akers stated that he, Martin, and Smith had 
stopped at the field to urinate.  Akers took the belt and placed 
it around Smith’s neck, using it to drag Smith away from the 
car.  Akers then held Smith down on the ground and choked him 
with the belt.  Akers and Martin then took turns beating Smith 
with the baseball bat, which they had found in Smith’s car.  
Smith resisted and begged the two men to stop.  Akers and Martin 
then dragged Smith to the creek where they beat him again and 
abandoned him, throwing the baseball bat into the creek. 
 
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Akers subsequently admitted to the killing in letters sent 
to the Commonwealth’s Attorney.  In one letter, Akers admitted 
that “[i]t was my full intent to kill and rob Wesley Smith after 
I got acquainted with him,” and that he had taken approximately 
two hundred dollars from Smith’s wallet.  In another letter, 
Akers admitted beating Smith to death before returning to 
Smith’s apartment to have “a decent meal and change into 
[Smith’s] clothes and [take] a pleasurable trip to New York.”  
Akers further stated that he left his boots “all blood covered 
for the Commonwealth.”  Akers later told the probation officer 
preparing his presentence report that he planned to kill Smith 
because Martin had told him that Smith “was going to get 20 
other people to assault Martin.” 
Prior to the entry of his guilty plea, Akers was evaluated 
by Evan S. Nelson, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, and 
was found competent to enter that plea.  At a hearing held on 
September 28, 1999, the trial court heard evidence in accord 
with the above-recited facts, and thereafter accepted Akers’ 
guilty plea and ordered that a presentence report be prepared. 
Akers had directed his attorneys not to present any 
evidence on his behalf during the guilty plea hearing or at his 
sentencing hearing.  Following the guilty plea hearing, the 
trial court instructed Akers’ counsel to obtain a further 
opinion from Dr. Nelson concerning Akers’ competence to waive 
 
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his right to present evidence in mitigation at sentencing.  In a 
letter to Akers’ counsel subsequently received into evidence by 
the trial court at the sentencing hearing, Dr. Nelson opined 
that “Akers possessed the capacity to rationally understand, 
appreciate, and consider the consequences of his plea of 
guilty.”  Dr. Nelson further opined that while “[i]t makes all 
parties uncomfortable to see a defendant choose to place himself 
in the [worst] legal position possible” by waiving his right to 
present evidence in mitigation, there was “no viable reason to 
question [Akers’] competency to do so.” 
Following the preparation of the presentence report, the 
trial court held a sentencing hearing on November 5, 1999.  At 
that hearing, the Commonwealth, relying on the evidence from the 
guilty plea hearing, contended that the killing of Smith was 
vile in that it involved an aggravated battery, torture of the 
victim, and resulted from depravity of mind.  Code § 19.2-264.2.  
The Commonwealth also contended that Akers represented a 
continuing threat to society.  Id.  In support of this latter 
contention, the Commonwealth presented evidence of Akers’ 
extensive criminal history including four convictions for 
robbery and seven convictions for larceny.  Akers had also been 
convicted of assaulting correctional officers while in prison 
and had numerous notations of infractions in his prison record 
including disciplinary actions for thirty-two assaults.  The 
 
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Commonwealth offered additional evidence showing that while in 
jail awaiting trial in this case, Akers repeatedly assaulted 
jail officers and destroyed and defaced jail property.2
Akers told the trial court that he wanted to receive a 
death sentence.  Akers reiterated to the trial court statements 
that he had made orally and in letters to the trial court, the 
police, his counsel, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney at various 
times since his arrest that he would “plot and scheme behind 
bars and escape and come back to Franklin County” to commit 
additional murders if he were given a life sentence.  When asked 
if he had anything to say prior to sentencing, Akers said, “I 
have no sympathy or remorse for what I did, and I plan to commit 
another capital murder in the future.”  In imposing the death 
sentence, the trial court found that the aggravating factors of 
vileness in the commission of the murder and of future 
dangerousness to society were both present. 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C), we are required to consider 
“any errors in the trial enumerated by appeal” in any case where 
a sentence of death is imposed.  Accordingly, the trial court is 
                     
2At the sentencing hearing, Akers’ attorneys proffered to 
the trial court evidence in mitigation that they would have 
presented had Akers allowed them to do so.  The proffer 
consisted principally of evidence concerning Akers’ “horrible” 
childhood, prior psychiatric treatment, and testimony of his 
mother and grandmother. 
 
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required to forward the trial record of such case to this Court 
where an appeal of right will be heard.  Code § 17.1-313(A). 
After the trial court record was received, Akers notified 
this Court of “his intent not to participate in [the] appeal” 
permitted pursuant to Code § 17.1-313.  We returned the record 
to the trial court with instructions that a hearing be held to 
determine whether Akers’ waiver of appeal was voluntarily and 
intelligently made.  On March 16, 2000, the trial court 
conducted that hearing and determined that Akers voluntarily and 
intelligently waived his right to participate in the appeal.  On 
April 4, 2000, the trial court entered an order reflecting its 
findings and returned the record to this Court in order that we 
might conduct the mandated review of the death sentence.3
DISCUSSION 
Akers instructed his attorneys to file no brief in support 
of commuting his death sentence.  The review process mandated by 
Code § 17.1-313(C) cannot be waived.  Rather, the purpose of the 
review process is to assure the fair and proper application of 
the death penalty statutes in this Commonwealth and to instill 
                     
3While our consideration of the trial court’s judgment is 
thus limited by Akers’ waiver, we note that the evidence adduced 
by the Commonwealth establishes Akers’ guilt beyond any 
reasonable doubt and that the record adequately supports the 
trial court’s determinations that Akers’ guilty plea, his 
subsequent refusal to participate in his sentencing, and his 
 
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public confidence in the administration of justice.  
Accordingly, by order of this Court dated April 21, 2000, we 
instructed Akers’ attorneys to file a brief limited to the 
issues to be considered under the statutorily mandated review of 
Akers’ death sentence. 
Counsels’ duty to assist the Court in this process as 
officers of the Court does not conflict with their concomitant 
duty to represent the defendant in the manner he desires.  
Undeniably, these concomitant duties may place counsel in an 
ethically difficult and, as Akers’ counsel noted during oral 
argument of this appeal, professionally “frustrating” position.  
The record in this case, however, demonstrates that counsel may, 
without violating the express directives of the defendant 
concerning his desired manner of representation, fulfill the 
obligations owed to the trial court and this Court on appeal.  
In this manner, both the interests of the defendant, as he 
determines them, and the interests of justice are served. 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we now consider whether 
the death sentence in this case was imposed “under the influence 
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.”  The 
brutality of the crime amply demonstrates the vileness and 
depravity of mind involved in the murder of Smith.  Similarly, 
                                                                  
waiver of his appeal of right were voluntary, informed decisions 
 
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Akers’ stated lack of remorse and his insistence that he would 
commit further acts of violence if allowed any modicum of 
freedom demonstrates Akers’ future dangerousness to society.  In 
light of these facts and upon careful review of the whole 
record, we find no evidence that the trial court’s sentencing 
decision was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary 
factor, but was, in fact, wholly grounded in a reasonable 
evaluation of the evidence. 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(2), we next focus our 
consideration on whether the sentence of death in this case is 
“excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”  In 
accordance with Code § 17.1-313(E), we have accumulated the 
records of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court.  The 
records include not only those capital murder cases in which the 
death penalty was imposed, but also those cases in which the 
trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and the defendant 
petitioned this Court for an appeal.  Whitley v. Commonwealth, 
223 Va. 66, 81-82, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
882 (1982). 
“The purpose of our comparative review is to reach a 
reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the imposition of 
                                                                  
on his part. 
 
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the death penalty.  We cannot insure complete symmetry among all 
death penalty cases, but our review does enable us to identify 
and invalidate a death sentence that is 'excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.' "  
Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 
(1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1970 (2000).  In 
complying with the statutory directive to compare this case with 
similar cases, we have specifically focused on cases analogous 
to the facts in this record where the predicate offense was 
robbery and the death sentence was imposed upon a finding by the 
trial court that both aggravating factors were present.  See, 
e.g., Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 376 S.E.2d 288, cert. 
denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 
401, 329 S.E.2d 815, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Edmonds 
v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303, 329 S.E.2d 807, cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 975 (1985).  In each instance, the evidence of the vileness 
of the crime and the defendant’s future dangerousness to society 
is equaled or exceeded by the evidence presented by the 
Commonwealth on these issues in this case. 
Akers presents no argument that the sentence of death in 
his case is disproportionate, and based on our review of this 
case and similar cases we conclude that the sentence of death is 
neither excessive nor disproportionate to sentences generally 
 
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imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to 
Akers’ murder of Smith. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we perceive no reason to commute the death 
sentence in this case and will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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