Title: Chrisman v. Brooks
Citation: 279 So. 2d 500
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 1973

279 So. 2d 500 (1973)
Betty Idell CHRISMAN
v.
K.V. BROOKS, etc.
SC 73.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 7, 1973.
*501 Lusk &amp; Lusk, Guntersville, Jenkins &amp; Wallis, Birmingham, for appellant.
T. J. Carnes, Albertville, for appellee.
MERRILL, Justice.
This appeal is from a decree setting aside a deed from Millard Fillmore Nixon to his niece, Miss Betty I. Chrisman. The deed was executed on June 11, 1969 and Nixon died on June 30, 1969 at the age of eighty-four years. The complainant-appellee, K. V. Brooks, is his nephew and executor of Nixon's estate.
The bill of complaint, as amended, charged that at the time of the execution of the deed, the deceased did not have sufficient mental capacity to execute it, or, in the alternative, that the deed was procured by undue influence on the part of Miss Chrisman, the respondent, or again, in the alternative, that the deed was in effect a conveyance in trust or a constructive trust, and finally, that there was a failure of consideration for the deed. The prayer was that the deed be set aside. Practically all of the estate consisted of the property deeded to Miss Chrisman by Nixon.
We do not recall that any witness described Nixon as an eccentric, but we think the undisputed testimony concerning him when he was concededly mentally competent would support that terminology. Nixon had a college education and for years he had lived alone in Albertville near the *502 main business district. For the last ten or fifteen years of his life, he had not been employed and lived off his social security and welfare payments. Even though his normal behavior was, in some respects, odd, there was no evidence of mental incompetency until after he underwent an operation in a Huntsville hospital. But according to complainant's witnesses, Nixon's physical and mental deterioration began at that time.
When he was dismissed from the hospital at Huntsville, his niece, Miss Chrisman, a registered nurse, who was fifty-nine years of age, when the trial was had in 1971, took him to her home in Birmingham for his recuperation. He was hospitalized in a Birmingham hospital for pneumonia in September, 1968, again for two weeks of tests in April, 1969, and he was operated on for hernia in May, 1969. He was discharged in May and returned to the hospital on June 16, 1969, five days after he executed the deed and died of cancer of the pancreas on June 30, 1969.
We quote a part of the trial court's opinion:
To understand the reference to the hospital records which were in evidence, we quote a few entries from them. The following are some of the entries made during his hospitalization in 1968:
In Dr. Risman's signed history and physical examination, he referred to Nixon as "an elderly white male acutely ill" and that "there was obviously mild senility."
When Nixon was admitted to the hospital on April 10, 1969, Dr. Risman described the patient as "a warm, elderly, senile white male"; and when he was discharged on April 29, 1969, Dr. Risman referred to him as a "senile white male" * * * "discharged with the following diagnosis; arteriosclerotic heart disease with auricular fibrillation (2) inguinal hernia left (3) gout (4) emphysema (5) bronchiectasis (6) abdominal pain of undetermined etiology, possible carcinoma of pancreas manifested only by abnormal chemical tests."
A few of the notations on the clinical records during this period of hospitalization are listed:
Many entries note the "confused" state of the patient. Nixon left the hospital on a stretcher accompanied by Miss Chrisman.
The next day, April 30, he was back in the hospital for a hernia operation and was discharged on May 4. The surgeon wrote of Nixon's previous hospitalization, "It was thought that abdominal pain was probably due to carcinoma of the body or tail of the pancreas."
Nixon remained at Miss Chrisman's home until June 16. It was in this interval that the deed was executed on June 11. A few notations from his final hospitalization read:
Nixon underwent another operation on June 24 and between then and June 30, he seems to have known little except discomfort and pain.
Mr. Nixon's will, executed October 11, 1965, bequeathed any money to be divided between K. V. Brooks, Helen Schlinkert, Edna Vieth, B. I. Chrisman and Aurelia Ferris. He also provided that his real estate be divided among these same five people and James Cox and Delmer Jones, share and share alike.
The evidence as to competency and undue influence was in sharp conflict.
The burden was on the complainant to establish to the reasonable satisfaction of the trier of fact that Nixon did not have sufficient mental capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of his act in executing the deed. Complainant's evidence, if believed, met this burden. Blackwell v. Sewall, 280 Ala. *504 359, 194 So. 2d 519; Spence v. Spence, 239 Ala. 480, 195 So. 717.
Where evidence is heard orally before the trial court, the finding of the court has the effect of a jury's verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless plainly erroneous, whether in law or equity. And we must affirm the trial court's decree, if fairly supported by credible evidence under any reasonable aspect, regardless of what might be our view of the evidence. Patterson v. Brooks, 285 Ala. 349, 232 So. 2d 598. This rule has been applied in the following recent cases where the deed was set aside because of the incompetency of the grantors, or undue influence or both: Skinner v. Todd, 283 Ala. 279, 215 So. 2d 721; Blackwell v. Sewall, 280 Ala. 359, 194 So. 2d 519; McBrayer v. Smith, 278 Ala. 247, 177 So. 2d 571; Gilbreath v. Gilbreath, 278 Ala. 289, 177 So. 2d 915; Mize v. Mize, 273 Ala. 369, 141 So. 2d 200; Casey v. Krump, 263 Ala. 346, 82 So. 2d 424; Payne v. Payne, 284 Ala. 699, 228 So. 2d 15.
While the evidence is not without conflict on material questions, and that of the respondent would support a verdict or decree in her favor, yet we cannot say that the decree is plainly or palpably wrong and therefore we are not inclined to disturb the decree of the trial court. Moore v. Walker, 201 Ala. 629, 79 So. 191.
Under assignment 1, which charges that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the amended bill of complaint, appellant argues that the allegations of mental incapacity and undue influence are insufficient. We think the averments of the bill are sufficient to raise the issue of the soundness of mind of the grantor and as a bill to cancel for undue influence. Cox v. Parker, 212 Ala. 35, 101 So. 657. In Cox, this court also said:
Assignment 8 charges error in the overruling of an objection to a question designed to show that there was ill will among Nixon and his brothers and sisters when the will of Jim Nixon (Nixon's father) was contested by two of Nixon's brothers. The trial court first sustained the objection and after its attention was called to the fact that this being an equity case, the court would only consider relevant evidence, Tit. 7, § 372(1), the court overruled the objection, presumably leaving the parties where they were before the two objections of appellant were made. However, assuming without conceding that the trial court erred, it was harmless error because the appellant introduced, without objection, the entire file in the will dissent case about which the witness was being questioned and the file showed that the will of Jim Nixon had been contested and it resulted in a decision of "no will."
*505 Prejudicial error may not be predicated upon the admission of evidence which has been admitted without objection or motion to exclude at some other stage of the trial. Turner v. Blanton, 277 Ala. 536, 173 So. 2d 80; Harvey Ragland Co. v. Newton, 268 Ala. 192, 105 So. 2d 110.
Assignment 9 charges error in the overruling of an objection. The record shows in part:
In the first place, there is no record of any ruling of the court. The objection was neither overruled nor sustained. After a lengthy colloquy, the court said, "All right. Go ahead." Where the trial court in an equity case did not specially rule on the legality of evidence, the presumption exists that the trial judge considered only that which was relevant, material, competent and legal, and findings by the trial court must be upheld when there was legal evidence before him. Tit. 7, § 372(1), Code 1940; Dougherty v. Hood, 262 Ala. 311, 78 So. 2d 324; Gibson v. Anderson, 265 Ala. 553, 92 So. 2d 692. Secondly, what we stated in discussing assignment 8, as to Tit. 7, § 372(1), is also applicable here.
Assignment 10 charges error in the overruling of objections to the introduction of complainant's Exhibit 1-X, which was a letter from the attending surgeon, Dr. Patton, to attorney (now Judge) Clark E. Johnson, Jr., in which the surgeon commented on Nixon's mentality. The sole objection was that Dr. Patton's letter had not been properly authenticated, but counsel for appellant did state to the court"I will agree that it (the comment in the letter) is in direct conflict to the evidence he (Dr. Patton) gave on deposition." The deposition had been introduced into evidence by appellant.
Again, there is no record of any ruling of the court. And again, the presumption is that the court, under Tit. 7, § 372(1), considered "only such testimony and evidence as is relevant, material, competent and legal."
Moreover, the objection that Dr. Patton's letter was not authenticated was without merit. Judge Johnson testified that he had written the letter to Dr. Patton making the inquiry and that letter was received in evidence as Exhibit 1-W. Counsel for appellant stated to the court that no objection was made to that exhibit because "it has been properly proved by Judge Johnson." Then Judge Johnson stated that Exhibit 1-X was "a reply which I received from Dr. T. B. Patton."
Where letters are shown to have been received in the due course of mail and were on the letterhead of the alleged sender and were in response to letters previously written to the sender, the presumption is that the letters were written by the purported sender, or for him by someone authorized by him, which presumption continues until overcome by evidence to the contrary or by the purported sender. State v. Massey, 271 Ala. 397, 124 So. 2d 462; Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 208 Ala. 559, 94 So. 748; White v. Tolliver, 110 Ala. 300, 20 So. 97.
Affirmed.
HEFLIN, C. J., and HARWOOD, MADDOX and FAULKNER, JJ., concur.