Title: Mount Horeb Community Alert v. Village Board of Mt. Horeb
Citation: 2003 WI 100
Docket Number: 2001AP002217
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2003

2003 WI 100 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2217 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mount Horeb Community Alert, Judy Patenaude, 
Laura Wenman, Audrey Yapp and Wayne Yapp,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Village Board of Mt. Horeb,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 80 
Reported at:  252 Wis. 2d 713, 643 N.W.2d 186 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Callaway   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and WILCOX, JJ. joins the dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Richard C. Yde, Angela A. James, and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Richard C. Yde. 
 
For plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Christopher 
J. Blythe and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison, and oral argument 
by Christopher J. Blythe. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
2003 WI 100 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2217 
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 359) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mount Horeb Community Alert, Judy  
Patenaude, Laura Wenman, Audrey Yapp and  
Wayne Yapp,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Village Board of Mt. Horeb,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This is a mandamus action to 
compel a village board to act on an initiative petition pursuant 
to the direct legislation statute, Wis. Stat. § 9.20 (1999-
2000).1 
¶2  The direct legislation statute permits local electors 
to submit a petition requesting that an attached proposed 
ordinance either be adopted by the municipality's governing body 
without alteration or be referred to a vote in the next 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
01-2217   
 
2 
 
election.  See Wis. Stat. § 9.20(1), (4).  The proposed 
ordinance at issue here, initiated by a group of Mount Horeb 
citizens, would require the Village of Mount Horeb to hold a 
binding referendum prior to the start of construction on any new 
village building project requiring a capital expenditure of $1 
million or more. 
¶3 
Upon presentation and clerical certification of the 
direct legislation petition, the Mount Horeb Village Board 
neither adopted the proposed ordinance nor referred it for a 
vote.  The citizens' group sought a writ of mandamus to compel 
action on the petition under Wis. Stat. § 9.20.  The circuit 
court denied the writ, concluding that the proposed ordinance 
was not a proper subject of direct legislation.  The court of 
appeals reversed.   
¶4 
Direct legislation in cities and villages pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20 is qualified only by four narrow limitations 
which this court has declared are implicit in the statute.  
Direct legislation under Wis. Stat. § 9.20 must be legislative 
in nature, cannot repeal an existing ordinance, cannot exceed 
the powers of the municipal governing body itself, and cannot 
modify statutorily prescribed procedures.  Because the proposed 
ordinance at issue here is legislative in nature, does not 
repeal any existing ordinance, falls within the powers of the 
village board, and does not modify statutory procedures, it is 
fully consistent with the direct legislation statute, and the 
Village Board was therefore required to act upon it under 
No. 
01-2217   
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20(4).  We affirm the court of appeals and remand 
for issuance of the writ of mandamus. 
I. 
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
On December 11, 2000, a group of Mount Horeb citizens, 
Judy Patenaude, Laura Wenman, and Audrey and Wayne Yapp, on 
behalf of a citizens' organization known as Mount Horeb 
Community Alert ("Community Alert"), filed a petition for direct 
legislation with the Mount Horeb village clerk pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20.  Community Alert's petition sought adoption 
of a proposed ordinance that would require any construction 
project costing $1 million or more to be submitted to a binding 
referendum.  The proposed ordinance is as follows: 
Prior to the start of any physical construction of any 
municipally financed (in whole or in part) project 
requiring a Village capital expenditure of $1 million 
or more, the Village Board shall submit to the 
electorate a binding referendum for approval of the 
project.  Failure of the binding referendum shall 
preclude the Village from proceeding with the project.  
The wording of any referendum shall provide the 
specific purpose, location and cost of the project.  
Nothing in this provision shall be construed to 
preclude the Village from exercising its role in the 
planning or design of such publicly financed projects. 
This ordinance shall be in full force and effect upon 
passage and publication as provided by law.   
¶6 
After correcting some technical errors in the form of 
the petition, the village clerk certified and forwarded the 
petition to the Village Board.  The Village Board took up the 
matter on January 16, 2001, and determined that the proposed 
ordinance was not an appropriate subject for direct legislation.  
No. 
01-2217   
 
4 
 
Accordingly, the Village Board neither adopted the proposed 
ordinance nor placed it on the ballot in the spring election. 
¶7 
Rebuffed 
by 
the 
Village 
Board, 
Community 
Alert 
petitioned the Dane County Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus 
to compel action on the direct legislation petition.  The 
circuit court, the Honorable Richard J. Calloway, denied the 
writ, concluding that the proposed ordinance would impermissibly 
modify the statutorily prescribed procedures for borrowing funds 
for municipal expenditures.  Community Alert appealed, and the 
court of appeals reversed.  Mount Horeb Community Alert v. 
Village Board of Mount Horeb, 2002 WI App 80, ¶26, 252 Wis. 2d 
713, 643 N.W.2d 186. 
¶8 
The court of appeals rejected the Village Board's 
claims that the proposed ordinance would modify statutory 
borrowing procedures.  Id., ¶¶10-16.  The court also concluded 
that Community Alert's proposal was legislative in nature, did 
not repeal any existing ordinance, and did not exceed the 
village's municipal powers.  Id., ¶¶17-22.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals concluded that the proposed ordinance was a 
proper subject of direct legislation under Wis. Stat. § 9.20, 
and remanded for issuance of the writ of mandamus.  Id., ¶26.  
We accepted the Village Board's petition for review, and now 
affirm. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ issued in the 
discretion of the circuit court to compel compliance with a 
plain legal duty.  State ex. rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 
No. 
01-2217   
 
5 
 
79 Wis. 2d 97, 105-06, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977).  A writ of 
mandamus is equitable in nature and will issue when the 
plaintiff demonstrates: 1) a clear legal right to relief; 2) a 
positive and plain legal duty on the part of the official or 
body to whom the writ is directed; 3) substantial damage due to 
the nonperformance of the duty; and 4) no adequate remedy at 
law.  Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Lyndon Station, 101 Wis. 
2d 472, 493, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).  Mandamus is the proper means 
to challenge a municipality's failure to comply with the 
requirements 
of 
the 
direct 
legislation 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20.  Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 102; Thompson v. 
Village of Whitefish Bay, 257 Wis. 151, 153-54, 42 N.W.2d 462 
(1950). 
¶10 Because the material facts are not in dispute, we are 
presented 
with 
a 
question 
of 
the 
proper 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20.  This is a question of law that we review 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals.  
Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 106-07; Heitman v. City of Mauston 
Common Council, 226 Wis. 2d 542, 546, 595 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 
1999); Schaefer v. Potosi Village Bd., 177 Wis. 2d 287, 289, 501 
N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1993).   
III. ANALYSIS   
¶11  We begin with James Madison's articulation of the 
justification for government, the necessity of limitations on 
governmental power, and the superiority of the republican form 
of government as a check against faction and the potential 
excesses of the majority: 
No. 
01-2217   
 
6 
 
But what is government itself but the greatest of all 
reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary.  If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government 
would 
be 
necessary. 
 
In 
framing 
a 
government which is to be administered by men over 
men, the greatest difficulty lies in this: you must 
first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.  A 
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on the government; but experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
The Federalist, No. 51 (James Madison). 
¶12 Direct legislation is a potentially powerful limitation 
on governmental authority, a remedy available to the people when 
their representative government has become unresponsive or 
misrepresentative.  As a form of pure democracy, however, it 
also stands in contradiction of the principles of republican 
government, which is designed to guard against the oppression of 
the minority by the majority.2 
¶13 Direct legislation——procedures by which the voters 
themselves adopt legislation——comes in two forms, initiative and 
referendum.3  Initiative involves the initiation and enactment of 
new legislation directly by the electorate; referendum involves 
                                                 
 
2  "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of government . . . ."  United States 
Const. art. IV, § 4. 
 
 
3  Theodore Roosevelt was a prominent proponent of the 
initiative and the referendum during the Progressive movement.  
In a speech to the Ohio Constitutional Convention, Roosevelt 
explained his position: "I believe in the initiative and the 
referendum, which should be used not to destroy representative 
government, 
but 
to 
correct 
it 
when 
ever 
it 
becomes 
misrepresentative."  Theodore Roosevelt, Address Before the Ohio 
Constitutional Convention, Columbus, Ohio (February 12, 1912).   
  
No. 
01-2217   
 
7 
 
direct review by the electorate of legislation which the 
governing body has adopted or provisionally adopted pending 
voter approval.  Landt v. City of Wisconsin Dells, 30 Wis. 2d 
470, 475, 141 N.W.2d 245 (1966); Heitman, 226 Wis. 2d at 546-47. 
¶14  Since 1911, Wisconsin has had a statutory form of 
direct democracy at the local level.4  See Wis. Stat. § 9.20, the 
direct legislation statute; ch. 513, Laws of 1911.5  The direct 
legislation statute provides an initiative procedure by which 
citizens of a city or village may compel their common council or 
village board to pass a proposed ordinance directly or put the 
proposed ordinance before the local electors for a popular vote.   
                                                 
 
4  In his speech to the Ohio Constitutional Convention, 
Theodore Roosevelt commended the Wisconsin method of direct 
democracy to the convention delegates.  See supra, Roosevelt, 
¶13 n.3.   
  
5 The source of the present direct legislation statute was 
ch. 513, Laws of 1911, creating "sections 39 i to 39 l, 
inclusive, of the statutes, relating to the initiative and 
referendum on acts of municipal councils and of boards of county 
supervisors."  Section 39 i "created an initiative procedure, 
the filing of a petition to compel a city council or county 
board to adopt an ordinance, or, in default of such adoption, to 
submit it to popular vote.  Sec. 39 j created a procedure of the 
referendum type, the filing of a petition to compel a city 
council or county board either to repeal an ordinance or 
resolution already adopted, or, in default of such repeal, to 
submit it to popular vote."  Landt v. City of  Wisconsin Dells, 
30 Wis. 2d 470, 475-76, 141 N.W.2d 245 (1966). Section 39 j was 
later repealed and has not since been reenacted.  See § 27, ch. 
383, Laws of 1915.  The remaining sections were revised and 
renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 10.43.  See § 14, ch. 385, Laws of 
1915. 
 
Wisconsin 
Statute 
§ 
10.43 
eventually 
became 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20.  See § 1, ch. 666, Laws of 1965. 
No. 
01-2217   
 
8 
 
¶15 Direct local legislation by initiative "is a creature 
of statute and its use must comport with the requirements 
established by the legislature."  Heitman, 226 Wis. 2d at 547 
(citing Landt, 30 Wis. 2d at 478-79).  A petition for direct 
legislation must be signed by "[a] number of electors equal to 
at least 15% of the votes cast for governor at the last general 
election in their city or village."6   Wis. Stat. § 9.20(1).  
Upon certification as to sufficiency and form by the city or 
village clerk, "[t]he common council or village board shall, 
without alteration, either pass the ordinance or resolution 
within 30 days following the date of the clerk's final 
certificate, or submit it to the electors at the next spring or 
general election."  Wis. Stat. § 9.20(4).  If adopted by the 
council or board or by the voters in the election, the ordinance 
cannot be vetoed, nor can it be repealed or amended for a period 
of 
two 
years, 
except 
by 
a 
vote 
of 
the 
electors.  
Wis. Stat. § 9.20. 
¶16 We have previously held that the procedure for direct 
local legislation established in Wis. Stat. § 9.20 "implements 
the legislative powers that have been reserved to the people" by 
their elected representatives in the legislature.  Althouse, 79 
Wis. 2d at 118-19.  As such, the statute cannot be interpreted 
so as to unduly restrict those reserved local legislative 
powers, which "are exercised with particular appropriateness 
                                                 
6 "Every United States citizen age 18 or older who is a 
resident of an election district in this state is a qualified 
elector of that district."  Wis. Const. art. III, § 1. 
No. 
01-2217   
 
9 
 
under circumstances where the people are of the opinion that 
their elected representatives are not acting in response to the 
public will."  Id. at 119. 
¶17 
Direct 
legislation 
initiated 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20 is subject to four limitations that we have 
held are implicit in the statute.  See Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 
105.  An ordinance initiated under Wis. Stat. § 9.20: 1) must be 
legislative as opposed to administrative or executive in nature; 
2) cannot repeal an existing ordinance; 3) may not exceed the 
legislative powers conferred upon the governing municipal body; 
and 4) may not modify statutorily prescribed procedures or 
standards.  Heitman, 226 Wis. 2d at 548-49 (citing Althouse, 79 
Wis. 2d at 107-08). 
¶18  These limitations preserve municipal control over 
executive and administrative functions and protect the integrity 
of the statutory framework governing municipalities, while at 
the same time permit the proper invocation by electors of the 
direct legislation procedure provided by the statute.  The 
limitations, implicit in the statute itself, are narrowly 
construed and carefully applied so as to avoid judicial dilution 
of the statutory initiative right.  See Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 
118-19.  If the statutory requirements for a direct legislation 
petition have been met, and none of the limitations applies, the 
statute provides that "[t]he common council or village board 
shall, 
without 
alteration, 
either 
pass 
the 
ordinance 
or 
resolution within 30 days . . . or submit it to the electors at 
No. 
01-2217   
 
10 
 
the next spring or general election."  Wis. Stat. § 9.20(4) 
(emphasis added); Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 118.  
¶19 The first of these limitations pertains to the basic 
nature of the ordinance that is the subject of the initiative.  
"Implicit 
in 
the 
direct 
legislation . . . statute 
is 
the 
requirement that the ordinance or statute sought to be passed is 
legislative in character."  Id. at 107.  A proposed ordinance 
that is administrative or executive rather than legislative in 
character is not a proper subject of initiative procedure.  Id. 
at 107-08. 
¶20 For example, in Heider v. City of Wauwatosa, 37 
Wis. 2d 466, 477-78, 155 N.W.2d 17 (1967), voters in the City of 
Wauwatosa had authorized the city to issue bonds in an amount 
not to exceed $7.5 million to acquire school sites and to erect 
and improve school buildings, including a high school.  Id. at 
470.  A subsequent proposal for direct legislation sought to 
restrict the common council's approval of capital expenditures 
for an addition to the high school until a master plan for the 
buildings and grounds had been prepared under the direction of a 
city planning commission, with the guidance of a non-resident 
professional city planner.  Id. at 469-470. 
¶21 Because the subject of the initiative in Heider was not 
affirmative legislation upon a new subject, but instead sought 
to impose conditions on the previously enacted bonding authority 
for construction of the high school, we held that it was not a 
proper subject of direct legislation.  Id. at 475-76.  We used 
No. 
01-2217   
 
11 
 
the following standard to distinguish between legislative and 
administrative or executive matters: 
The test of what is a legislative and what is an 
administrative 
proposition, 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
initiative or referendum, has further been said to be 
whether the proposition is one to make new law or to 
execute law already in existence.  Again, it has been 
said: "The power to be exercised is legislative in its 
nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, 
it is administrative in its nature if it merely 
pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body 
itself, or some power superior to it." 
Id. at 475 (quoting 5 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 16.55 (3rd ed.)). 
¶22 We also noted in Heider that "action relating to 
subjects of permanent and general character are usually regarded 
as legislative, and those providing for subjects of temporary 
and special character are regarded as administrative."  Id.  
Relying on these principles, we held in Heider that the proposed 
direct legislation was administrative rather than legislative in 
nature, because it was "clearly a prescription of a procedure to 
be followed in execution of the ordinance [already] passed.  It 
does not prescribe a 'new policy or plan' but 'merely pursues a 
plan already adopted.'"   Id. at 475-76.7   
¶23 In State ex rel. Becker v. Common Council of City of 
Milwaukee, 101 Wis. 2d 680, 305 N.W.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1981), the 
                                                 
7 We also held that the resolution would have modified the 
statutory authority granted to the city planning commission, an 
administrative body that was charged with carrying the initial 
proposal into effect, and for this additional reason was not a 
proper subject for direct legislation.  See Heider v. City of 
Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 477-78, 155 N.W.2d 17 (1967). 
No. 
01-2217   
 
12 
 
court of appeals relied upon Heider in concluding that a 
proposal for direct legislation which sought to remove the 
Milwaukee 
police 
chief 
was 
administrative 
rather 
than 
legislative in character.  Because the proposal was specific in 
application to the current chief, would have only a temporary 
effect, did not set forth a general and permanent rule of 
conduct, and did not create a new policy or a new plan, the 
court of appeals concluded that the proposed direct legislation 
to remove the chief was administrative in character, and 
therefore not a proper subject of direct legislation.  Id. at 
687.8 
¶24 Some years after Heider, in Althouse, we determined 
that a proposed ordinance which sought to impose rent controls 
was a legislative rather than administrative measure, because 
the common council could have enacted the ordinance as an 
original matter.  Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 102, 118.  We held 
that the direct legislation statute could be used "to compel a 
common council to enact or to place on the ballot any proposed 
ordinance which the common council in its legislative capacity 
could enact."  Id. at 118.  Although the common council had 
refused to enact or place the rent control initiative on the 
                                                 
8  The court of appeals also concluded that the proposal 
would "usurp" the "exclusive authority over the hiring, removal 
and disciplining of police and fire department personnel [] 
vested in the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners."  State ex 
rel. Becker v. Common Council of City of Milwaukee, 101 Wis. 2d 
680, 688-89, 305 N.W.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1981).   
No. 
01-2217   
 
13 
 
ballot because of concerns about its constitutionality, we held 
that: 
[U]nder the peremptory statutory provisions of sec. 
9.20, Stats., the common council has no authority 
whatsoever, in respect to direct legislation, to make 
an initial judgment 
of 
the 
constitutionality or 
validity of the proposed legislation. . . . In 
general, of course, where a city council itself 
initiates an ordinance, it may refuse to adopt it 
because of its doubtful constitutionality. That is 
quite different, however, from the situation where its 
duties 
are 
peremptorily 
mandated 
by 
the 
direct 
legislation statute. 
Id. at 110.9   
¶25 While the initiative process of Wis. Stat. § 9.20 can 
be used to compel the adoption or popular vote on any local 
matter legislative in character, it cannot be used to directly 
or indirectly repeal an existing ordinance.  This second 
limitation on direct legislation was implicated in Landt, 30 
Wis. 2d at 473. There, the proposed ordinance would have 
prohibited the fluoridation of the public water supply, after 
the common council had adopted an increase in the water supply's 
fluoride content.  Id.  Because the proposed fluoridation 
                                                 
9 We 
emphasized 
in 
Althouse 
that 
the 
although 
"the 
intervention of the common council at this juncture of the 
direct legislation process . . . flies in the face of the 
mandatory provisions of sec. 9.20, Stats. [and] also would 
almost totally vitiate the policy behind the direct legislation 
statute[]," mandamus to compel compliance with Wis. Stat. § 9.20 
would be improper if the measure's unconstitutionality is 
"clear" from prior adjudications on the same subject matter, if 
the measure is "beyond the pale of the authority of the council 
itself," or if the measure seeks to repeal an existing 
ordinance.  State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 
2d 97, 110, 118, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977). 
No. 
01-2217   
 
14 
 
prohibition was solely an attempt to repeal an existing 
ordinance, we affirmed the circuit court's judgment quashing the 
petition for a writ of mandamus.  Id. at 473-74.     
¶26 The third limitation on direct legislation stipulates 
that a proposed ordinance may not exceed the legislative powers 
of the local governing body itself.  Heitman, 226 Wis. 2d at 
549.  Electors cannot do through direct legislation what the 
municipal governing body cannot do in its own right.  That is, 
direct legislation cannot exceed or enlarge the powers conferred 
upon the municipal governing body by state law. 
¶27  In Heitman, the court of appeals concluded that a 
proposed ordinance restricting the location of a treatment 
facility for sexually violent persons was essentially a zoning 
measure, required by state law to be submitted to the local 
planning commission.  Id. at 550-52.  As such, the court of 
appeals concluded that the proponent of the proposed ordinance 
in the direct legislation petition was "attempting to do by 
initiative what the Common Council, itself, cannot do; i.e., 
avoid the substantive and procedural safeguards" of state law 
regarding zoning.  Id. at 554.  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals concluded that "[b]ecause initiatives may be used for 
only those legislative acts which a municipality, itself, could 
do, Heitman's proposal is not one that can be accomplished by 
initiative."  Id.    
¶28 Finally, and as a corollary to the third limitation, a 
proposed ordinance under Wis. Stat. § 9.20 may not modify 
statutorily-prescribed procedures or standards that would bind 
No. 
01-2217   
 
15 
 
the common council or village board if it attempted to legislate 
in the same area.  Flottum v. City of Cumberland, 234 Wis. 654, 
291 N.W. 777 (1940); Henderson v. Hoesley, 225 Wis. 596, 275 
N.W. 443 (1937).  Electors may not initiate legislation under 
the direct legislation statute if the proposed legislation would 
modify or conflict with statutorily-prescribed procedures that 
are binding on the municipality itself.  Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 
108; Heider, 37 Wis. 2d at 476-77. 
¶29  In Flottum, the City of Cumberland was embarked upon a 
project to upgrade its electric generating plant, and was 
required to submit the financing of the project to a referendum 
in accordance with certain statutory procedures.  Flottum, 234 
Wis. at 666-67.  A direct legislation petition sought a 
separate, conflicting referendum on the project.  This court 
concluded that "[w]hat the electors demanded was submission of a 
question which would have modified a statutory provision."  Id.  
We held that because the legislature had "prescribed the 
referendum which shall be submitted in [power plant] acquisition 
proceedings, it seems clear that the common council would have 
no authority to modify the express provisions of the statute and 
adopt a different procedure."  Id.; see also Henderson, 225 Wis. 
at 603-04 (proposed ordinance was an improper subject of direct 
legislation because it would have modified the "complete 
procedure" and "special and exclusive means" established by the 
legislature for acquisition of electric utility plant). 
¶30 Similarly, in State ex rel. Becker, 101 Wis. 2d at 687  
n.6, the court of appeals held that the initiative for the 
No. 
01-2217   
 
16 
 
removal of the Milwaukee police chief was an improper subject of 
direct legislation because it conflicted with the state statute 
that vests "the exclusive authority over the hiring, removal and 
disciplining of police and fire department personnel . . . in 
the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners."  Id. at 688.   
¶31 Applying these principles here, we agree with the 
court of appeals that Community Alert's proposed ordinance is a 
proper subject of direct legislation under Wis. Stat. § 9.20.  
The proposed ordinance would require future capital projects 
costing $1 million or more to be submitted to a binding 
referendum.  As such, the proposed ordinance is general in 
application (it applies to all new million dollar construction 
projects), sets forth a permanent rule until repealed, and 
creates new policy.  It does not condition or direct the 
execution of existing law, but, rather, makes new law.  See 
Heider, 37 Wis. 2d at 475; State ex rel. Becker, 101 Wis. 2d at 
685-86.  Accordingly, the proposed ordinance is legislative 
rather than administrative in nature.   
¶32  A village board is statutorily responsible for "the 
management and control of the village . . . finances" and may 
"carry 
its 
powers 
into 
effect 
by . . . appropriation."  
Wis. Stat. § 61.34(1).  The Village Board contends that the 
proposed ordinance is not "fully legislative" because many 
administrative 
decisions 
enter 
into 
municipal 
construction 
projects.  The proposed ordinance, however, does not restrict 
administrative 
decisionmaking 
in 
connection 
with 
municipal 
construction projects; rather, it requires a referendum prior to 
No. 
01-2217   
 
17 
 
the commencement of municipally-financed construction projects 
expected to cost $1 million or more.  The appropriation of funds 
for municipal construction projects is a central legislative 
function. 
¶33  The proposed ordinance carefully specifies that it 
does not restrict the village's administrative decisionmaking 
regarding 
planning 
and 
design 
of 
construction 
projects: 
"[n]othing in this provision shall be construed to preclude the 
Village from exercising its role in the planning or design of 
such 
publicly 
financed 
projects." 
 
The 
Village 
Board's 
contention that the proposed ordinance is more administrative 
than legislative is unpersuasive.  The decision to build a new 
million-dollar project is clearly a legislative one.     
¶34 The Village Board does not identify any existing 
ordinances that would be repealed by the proposed ordinance; the 
second limitation on direct legislation, therefore, is not 
implicated here.  The Village Board does argue, however, that 
the proposed ordinance exceeds the authority of the Board 
itself. 
 
This 
argument 
is 
based 
upon 
the 
hypothetical 
application of the proposed ordinance to a library construction 
project, which, under Wis. Stat. § 43.58(1), is subject to the 
independent control of a separate library board. 
¶35  This argument is misplaced.  Local library boards have 
"exclusive control of the expenditure of all moneys collected, 
donated or appropriated for the library fund, and of the 
purchase of a site and the erection of a library building 
whenever authorized."  Wis. Stat. § 43.58(1).  The library 
No. 
01-2217   
 
18 
 
board's exercise of control over the expenditure of library 
funds 
only 
comes 
into 
play 
after 
library 
funding 
is 
"appropriated" or "authorized."  While the proposed ordinance 
implicates the initial municipal decision to appropriate funds 
for a library construction project of $1 million or more, it 
does not dictate the manner in which those funds are expended 
once appropriated or authorized.  We are satisfied that the 
proposed ordinance does not exceed the powers conferred upon the 
Village Board. 
¶36 Finally, the Village Board argues that the proposed 
ordinance would modify various statutory procedures that govern 
public contracting and financing of municipal construction 
projects.  The Board contends that the proposed ordinance would 
conflict with the public bidding and contracting provisions of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 61.54, 61.55, 61.56 and 62.15,10  insofar as those 
statutes authorize the Village Board to let contracts for public 
improvements pursuant to bidding, and provide an exception to 
the bidding requirement for emergencies when the public health 
and welfare are endangered.  We agree with the court of appeals 
that the proposed ordinance does not modify or conflict with the 
Village Board's statutory authority to enter into construction 
contracts pursuant to public bidding or without public bidding 
in an emergency. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Statute § 62.15 is applicable to the Mount 
Horeb Village Board through Wis. Stat. § 61.56 and section 8.01 
of the Mt. Horeb Village Code of Ordinances. 
No. 
01-2217   
 
19 
 
¶37  The Board contends that the referendum required by the 
proposed ordinance could not be held until after the bidding 
process is complete and contracts are entered into, because only 
then will the specific cost of the project be known.  We share 
the court of appeals' skepticism of this argument: "[e]arly in 
the decisionmaking process, the cost of a project is a political 
issue for all municipalities.  It is unrealistic to assume that 
the Village would have no idea whether a proposed project would 
cost $25,000, $750,000 or $1,250,000."  Mount Horeb Community 
Alert, 252 Wis. 2d 713, ¶15.  While there may indeed be some 
practical difficulties associated with accurately costing a 
construction project in advance of bidding, these are political 
or policy arguments better addressed to the electorate; these 
potential practical difficulties do not operate to preclude the 
initiative from ever reaching the ballot in the first place.  We 
see no conflict between the proposed ordinance and the statutes 
relating to public bidding and contracting sufficient to 
preclude action on Community Alert's petition. 
¶38  The Village Board also contends that the proposed 
ordinance conflicts with the statutory provisions governing 
municipal bonding under Wis. Stat. § 66.0621 and, generally, 
Chapter 67.  The Board describes these statutes as setting forth 
"comprehensive 
procedures 
for 
accomplishing 
municipal 
borrowing," but does not identify how the proposed ordinance 
would modify or conflict with these comprehensive procedures.  
The proposed ordinance does not reference bonding or municipal 
borrowing.  Even assuming that most municipal construction 
No. 
01-2217   
 
20 
 
projects that are expected to cost $1 million or more would be 
financed through bonding, the requirement of prior voter 
approval via a binding referendum does not interfere with the 
statutory procedures governing bond issues.  The Village Board 
states that a referendum pursuant to the proposed ordinance 
"would be in addition to the referenda allowed in ch. 67," but 
concedes that there is nothing in Chapter 67 that "specifically 
prohibit[s] a referendum of the sort required by the proposed 
ordinance."     
¶39 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Community 
Alert's 
proposed ordinance fully complies with Wis. Stat. § 9.20 and is 
therefore an appropriate subject of direct legislation under the 
statute.  It is legislative rather than administrative in 
nature; it does not repeal any existing ordinance; it falls 
within the authority of the Village Board itself; and it does 
not modify or conflict with state statutes that would bind the 
Board if it tried to legislate in the same area.  Because all of 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 9.20 have been met and none of 
the statute's implicit limitations applies, the Village Board 
was required to act on Community Alert's petition pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20(4).  Because the Village Board took no action 
on 
the 
petition, 
mandamus 
to 
compel 
compliance 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20(4) is proper.  See Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 
102.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals which 
remands the cause to the circuit court for issuance of the writ 
of mandamus.  
No. 
01-2217   
 
21 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
1 
 
¶40 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  For the reasons 
set forth below, I must dissent.   
¶41 The proposed ordinance here compromises the principles 
of representative government and thereby raises constitutional 
concerns.  Additionally, while the majority correctly notes that 
direct legislation initiated pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 9.20 is 
subject to four implicit limitations, I believe that this 
ordinance violates at least two of those limitations, in that it 
applies to administrative not solely legislative actions, and it 
attempts to modify statutorily prescribed procedures.  As a 
result, the proposed ordinance conflicts with the direct 
legislation statute, since, in essence, it tries to replace the 
village board with the village electors as the decision maker.  
In doing so, it impairs powers delegated to the Mount Horeb 
Village Board by the legislature. 
 
Representative Government Principles/Constitutional Issues  
 
Analysis 
¶42 I begin, like the majority, with recognition of the 
concept of our republican form of government, as provided for in 
the guarantee clause of section 4, Article IV of the United 
States Constitution.11  As the majority itself recognizes, direct 
legislation is contrary to the principles of our representative 
                                                 
11 "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
union a republican form of government . . . ."  U.S. Const. art. 
IV, § 4. 
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
2 
 
system, in that it fails to protect against the possibility of 
tyranny by the majority.   
It is of great importance in a republic not only to 
guard the society against the oppression of its 
rulers, but to guard one part of the society against 
the injustice of the other part. Different interests 
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If 
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights 
of the minority will be insecure. 
The Federalist, No. 51 (James Madison) 
¶43 The key word in the above quote is "republic".  Our 
founding fathers chose a representative form of government over 
a direct democracy.  In developing the republican form of 
government that exists today, a three-branch government was 
carefully crafted, to include separate powers and authority for 
each branch, so that there are checks and balances to protect 
against fear of tyranny by the majority.   
¶44 Because 
our 
founding 
fathers 
rejected 
a 
direct 
democracy and instead adopted a representative democracy, direct 
legislation, in the form of initiative and referendum, is 
appropriately limited.  In Wisconsin, direct legislation is a 
statutory right, rather than a constitutional right.  Meade v. 
Dane County, 155 Wis. 632, 145 N.W. 239 (1914).  As such, we 
have narrowly interpreted statutory provisions concerning direct 
legislation. See Landt v. City of Wisconsin Dells, 30 Wis. 2d 
470, 478-79, 141 N.W.2d 245, 249-50 (1966).   
¶45 The Wisconsin Constitution does not reserve to the 
people either a general right of initiative or referendum.  
Instead, the people of Wisconsin delegated all lawmaking powers 
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
3 
 
to the legislature with the adoption of the state constitution.  
Wis. Const. Art. IV § 1.   
Administrative Analysis 
¶46 As noted previously, initiative involves legislative 
acts and cannot extend to administrative actions.  Heider v. 
City of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 474, 155 N.W.2d 17, 21 
(1967).  "Where [an ordinance] is administrative in character, 
it is outside the scope of initiative action and . . . it 
becomes a matter of judicial disposition to determine whether or 
not the actions of the electorate under [Section 9.20] are 
proper . . . ."  Id. at 474.   
¶47 The more a direct legislation proposal intrudes on 
city and village functions, the more likely that it will be held 
to be administrative in character.  When a direct legislation 
proposal affects or controls governmental decisions, this court 
has looked to the nature of the governmental entity involved in 
the decision.  In Heider, we held that a proposed resolution 
that would limit the actions of a plan commission was invalid, 
in that "city planning is an administrative function" performed 
by "the city plan commission——an administrative body."  Id. at 
476.  
¶48 Here, the ordinance requires the Mount Horeb Village 
Board to identify in the wording of a capital expenditure 
referendum the "specific purpose, location and cost of the 
[capital improvement] project."  Thus, the ordinance seeks to 
control more than just spending decisions.  The location, and 
the purpose, of the proposed capital project are also at issue.  
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
4 
 
Location decisions are generally functions controlled by an 
administrative body.  For example, as noted in the amicus brief 
of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, the location of a 
water tower is regulated by the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR).  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 811.57.  Similarly, the 
location of public buildings and location of parks, streets, 
airports and other such items, is a shared function of a plan 
commission——an administrative body——with a city council or a 
village board.  Wis. Stat. § 62.23(5).  The provisions of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23 are applicable to villages, such as the 
Village of Mount Horeb.  Wis. Stat. § 61.35.  Community Alert's 
proposed ordinance certainly seems more administrative than 
legislative in nature.  The authority for direct legislation is 
not applicable to administrative decisions.  See State ex rel. 
Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 255 N.W.2d 449 
(1977).   
Modification of Statutory Procedures 
¶49 We disagree with the majority in regard to its 
conclusion that the proposed ordinance does not modify the 
statutory municipal borrowing procedures. 
¶50 "(W)here a statute has conferred a procedure upon a 
[municipal] body, electors may not demand the submission of a 
question which [under the direct legislation statute] would 
modify the statutory authority."  Heider, 37 Wis. 2d  at 477 
(citations omitted).  
¶51 Based on the constitutionally delegated authority 
discussed previously, it seems clear that Wisconsin law does not 
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
5 
 
favor a broad reading of the initiative power.  In Heitman v. 
City of Mauston, 226 Wis. 2d 542, 595 N.W.2d 450 (1999), the 
court of appeals concluded that an ordinance proposal under 
Wis. Stat. § 9.20, which attempted to prohibit the City of 
Mauston from approving the building of a ch. 980 facility on 
city land, was in essence a zoning ordinance.  The court of 
appeals held that the proposed prohibition was "pervasive," and 
was an attempt "to do by initiative what the Common Council 
itself, cannot do, i.e., avoid the substantive and procedural 
safeguards" of the state zoning statutes.  Id. at 554.  The 
proposed ordinance was the type of ordinance electors cannot 
implement under Section 9.20.  Id. at 553.  Likewise, here, the 
Community 
Alert 
initiative 
conflicts 
with 
the 
municipal 
borrowing statutes, Wis. Stat. ch. 67, and with the procedures 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 66.0621 relating to construction 
projects and the revenue obligations involved.  See Denning v. 
City of Green Bay, 271 Wis. 230, 234-35, 72 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 
(1955).  The direct legislation proposal attempts to modify 
comprehensive procedures adopted by the legislature.      
¶52 Here, 
the 
proposed 
ordinance 
would 
alter 
the 
legislatively created structure of village government, and 
undermine the statutory authority granted to the Mount Horeb 
Village Board.  If adopted, the proposed ordinance would make 
the village electors, not the village board, the final decision 
maker, as to whether the village should proceed on any project 
involving a capital expenditure of one million dollars or more.   
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
6 
 
¶53 The legislature granted the village board authority to 
acquire property or manage village finances.  It did not provide 
a general right for village electors to review the exercise of 
these powers by referendum, whether they involve a capital 
expenditure or not.  Rather, the right of village electors to 
require a referendum, in response to an exercise of those 
powers, is limited to specific circumstances, such as bond 
issues.  See Wis. Stat. § 67.05. 
¶54 The majority correctly assumes that the ordinance 
would implicate municipal borrowing, because most projects which 
cost one million dollars or more require borrowing.  Wisconsin 
Stat. ch. 67 provides a comprehensive scheme for municipalities 
desiring to borrow.  Prior to a bond issue, the village board 
must pass a resolution authorizing borrowing.  Wis. Stat. § 
67.05(1).  For the majority, if not all, of large capital 
projects (such as those involving libraries), a referendum must 
then be submitted to the electors for approval of the bond 
issue.  Wis. Stat. § 67.05(5)(b).   
¶55 Assuming that the proposed ordinance operates prior to 
the passage of the initial resolution authorizing borrowing, the 
village electorate first would vote to approve the capital 
project.  If the voters allowed the project to go forward, the 
village 
board 
could 
then 
pass 
a 
resolution 
authorizing 
borrowing.  It must then resubmit the question of whether to 
permit the issuance of bonds.  In effect, under the ordinance 
proposed here, the electorate must approve the proposed project 
twice, because without bonding, the project would more than 
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
7 
 
likely fail.  The resulting cumbersome procedure represents a 
modification of the statutory requirements for borrowing. 
¶56 Wisconsin law does not appear to permit such a 
modification.   In Flottum v. City of Cumberland, 234 Wis. 654, 
666-67, 291 N.W. 777,782 (1940), this court held that a direct 
legislation petition, requesting a referendum on the municipal 
purchase of a power plant, improperly modified statutory 
procedures.  We found that Section 66.06 (now 66.0621) provided 
the mechanism for this type of purchase.  Section 66.06 granted 
the 
common 
council 
the 
authority 
to 
pass 
a 
resolution 
authorizing the purchase, and allowed the submission of the 
question for referendum.  Flottum, 234 Wis. at 666.  Thus, we 
held that the electorate could not request submission of the 
question by direct legislation under Section 10.43 (now 9.20), 
when a separate procedure was already in place.  See also 
Henderson v. Hoesley, 225 Wis. 596, 601, 275 N.W. 443, 445 
(1937) (holding direct legislation not appropriate where "the 
resolution, if it had been adopted . . . would in effect have 
provided that the proposed action . . . be again submitted to 
the voters of the city for their approval or disapproval").   
¶57 It could be argued that this case is distinguishable, 
because the proposed ordinance could conceivably operate prior 
to the second referendum, whereas in Flottum and Henderson the 
ordinance would have resulted in a second referendum.  This 
distinction is not dispositive, however, because the cumulative 
effect is the same: multiple referenda, modifying statutory 
procedures.   
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
8 
 
¶58 The ordinance here directly affects the financing of 
capital projects, an area governed by Wis. Stat. ch. 67.  Thus, 
for that reason, Flottum and Henderson appropriately control the 
outcome of this case.         
¶59 Based on Heider, Flottum, Henderson, Denning, Heitman, 
and the strong commitment to a representative democracy present 
in Wisconsin law, the court of appeals' decision should be 
reversed.   
¶60 Unfortunately, there are some who wish to disrupt the 
wheels of government solely for the purpose of disruption.  The 
majority 
opinion 
provides 
them 
with 
a 
blueprint 
and 
an 
imprimatur.  Although the majority certainly does not intend 
this result, the law of unintended consequences may well 
prevail.   
¶61 For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent.   
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.   
 
 
No.  01-2217.npc 
 
1