Title: Rowan v. Tractor Supply Company
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 011732
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LINDA ROWAN 
 
v.  Record No. 011732     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
March 1, 2002 
TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY 
 
 
UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 5:42, the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia 
entered a certification order requesting that we exercise our 
certification jurisdiction and answer the following question: 
Does a complaint state a Bowman claim under § 18.2-
460 when the plaintiff, an at-will employee, alleges 
that her employer terminated her employment because 
she refused to yield to employer's demand that she 
discontinue pursuing criminal charges of assault and 
battery against a fellow employee? 
 
The district court concluded that the issue presented by this 
question was a matter of first impression under Virginia law 
and that resolution of the issue was dispositive of the matter 
before the district court.  We accepted the certification by 
order entered September 6, 2001.  For the reasons stated 
below, we will answer the certified question in the negative. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The facts as stated in the certification order are as 
follows.1  Linda Rowan (Rowan) was employed as an 
                     
1 Because the matter was considered by the district court 
on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Federal Rule 
administrative cashier for Tractor Supply Company (TSC) from 
May 10, 1999 to February 16, 2000.  During the course of her 
employment, Rowan discovered information that led her to 
believe that her manager, Jerry Michael Snider, and other 
employees, were embezzling money and property from TSC.  When 
Rowan expressed her concerns to Snider about this activity, 
"he reacted violently by twisting her arm and pushing her 
forcefully against the desk." 
 
The next day, September 8, 1999, Rowan reported this 
incident to Rodney Carter, Snider's supervisor and area 
manager.  Carter did not express concern for Rowan, and 
"appeared more interested in keeping news of the incident from 
spreading."  Rowan met with another employee of TSC who told 
her to "keep her mouth shut" and that Rowan would "'suffer the 
consequences'" if she engaged in further action regarding the 
matter. 
 
Rowan filed a civil action against Snider in the General 
District Court of Montgomery County.  Rowan was awarded $1,500 
in damages plus interest and costs by order entered January 
19, 2000.  No appeal was taken from this judgment. 
 
Rowan reported the attack to the police on September 11, 
1999 and charges were filed against Snider. 
                                                                
12(c), the district court accepted as true the factual 
allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings and presented the 
 
2
 
Following the conclusion of the civil suit, Mike Jones, 
the new manager of TSC's Christiansburg store, told Rowan that 
TSC wanted her to drop the charges against Snider and that TSC 
would not "black-ball" her any further if she did.  Jones also 
indicated that Carter wanted the charges dropped and that he 
was a dangerous and powerful person who could "hurt her."  
Despite these admonitions, Rowan did not drop her charges 
against Snider.  TSC terminated Rowan's employment on February 
16, 2000. 
 
Rowan served as the primary witness against Snider at his 
criminal trial, where he was convicted of criminal assault and 
battery on March 7, 2000. 
 
On May 12, 2000, Rowan filed this action in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Roanoke against TSC claiming that she was 
wrongfully terminated in violation of Virginia public policy.2  
TSC removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441.  After discovery, TSC filed a Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  In 
response, Rowan filed a Motion to Certify a Question of Law. 
 
In a memorandum opinion dated June 6, 2001, the district 
court concluded that Rowan's pleadings did not state a 
                                                                
facts in that light. 
2 Rowan filed a two-count Complaint, alleging wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy and retaliatory 
 
3
wrongful termination claim based on either Code § 18.2-456.1 
(employer may not take action against employee for missing 
work because of court appearance pursuant to subpoena or 
summons), or Code § 19.2-11.01(A)(3) (employer should minimize 
crime-victim-employee's loss of benefits or pay resulting from 
court proceedings) because she was terminated before her 
appearance in the criminal trial and thus not penalized for 
complying with a court obligation.  The district court also 
held that Rowan did not state a cause of action based on Code 
§§ 19.2-267 and –456 (offense to disobey witness summons in 
criminal case) because she did not allege that TSC attempted 
to coerce her to disobey a lawful subpoena. 
 
The district court, however, could not determine whether, 
based on current Virginia law, Rowan would be entitled to 
maintain a cause of action for wrongful termination based on 
the public policy embodied in Code § 18.2-460, the obstruction 
of justice statute.  Accordingly, the district court denied 
TSC's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granted Rowan's 
Motion to Certify.3
II.  DISCUSSION 
                                                                
firing for bringing a workers' compensation claim.  A Consent 
Decree was issued March 9, 2001 dismissing the second claim. 
3 The district court also granted Rowan's motion to file 
an amended complaint; however, we restrict our consideration 
to the facts and issue presented in the certification order 
and thus the amended complaint is not before us. 
 
4
 
The phrase "Bowman claim" stems from this Court's 
decision in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 
331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), in which we first recognized an 
exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will based on an 
employer's violation of public policy in the discharge of an 
employee.  In Bowman, several employees were discharged 
because they refused to vote shares of stock in the manner 
directed by the employer.  Former Code § 13.1-32 (currently 
codified in Code § 13.1-662) gave shareholders the right to 
vote their shares.  To fully realize the public policy 
underlying the shareholders' statutory right, shareholders had 
to be allowed to vote such shares free from duress or 
intimidation.  Thus, we concluded that the employer's actions 
in discharging the employees violated the public policy that 
shareholders are entitled to vote their shares free of duress 
or intimidation reflected in the right conferred on the 
shareholder/employee by the statute.  Id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d 
at 801. 
 
Since Bowman, we have considered a number of cases in 
which this public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine has been asserted.  While virtually every statute 
expresses a public policy of some sort, we continue to 
consider this exception to be a "narrow" exception and to hold 
that "termination of an employee in violation of the policy 
 
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underlying any one [statute] does not automatically give rise 
to a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge."  City 
of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 259 Va. 220, 232, 523 S.E.2d 239, 
245 (2000).  In only three circumstances have we concluded 
that the claims were sufficient to constitute a common law 
action for wrongful discharge under the public policy 
exception. 
 
We have just discussed the first instance in which we 
recognized a common law action for wrongful discharge:  an 
employer violated a policy enabling the exercise of an 
employee's statutorily created right.  Bowman v. State Bank of 
Keysville.  We have also allowed such an action to proceed 
when the public policy violated by the employer was explicitly 
expressed in the statute and the employee was clearly a member 
of that class of persons directly entitled to the protection 
enunciated by the public policy.  Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, 
Inc., 253 Va. 121, 480 S.E.2d 502 (1997), and Lockhart v. 
Commonwealth Education Systems Corporation, 247 Va. 98, 439 
S.E.2d 328 (1994), involved discharges based on the public 
policy expressly stated in former Code § 2.1-715.4  (Currently 
codified in Code § 2.2-3900).  That statute provided in 
relevant part that it is "the policy of the Commonwealth" to 
 
6
"safeguard all individuals within this Commonwealth" against 
unlawful discrimination in employment based on gender.  The 
employees in these cases alleged they were discharged based on 
their gender. 
 
Finally, we have recognized a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge where the discharge was based on the 
employee's refusal to engage in a criminal act.  Although 
criminal statutes do not contain explicit statements of public 
policy, the protection of the general public from lawless acts 
is an unquestioned policy underlying such statutes.  We 
recognized that allowing the employment-at-will doctrine to 
"serve as a shield for employers who seek to force their 
employees, under the threat of discharge, to engage in 
criminal activity" would violate this most compelling public 
policy.  Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 190, 523 S.E.2d 246, 
252 (2000). 
 
In this case, the common law action is not based on a 
public policy expressly set out in the statute as it was in 
Lockhart.  Nor does Rowan claim that she is entitled to 
maintain her common law action because she was terminated for 
refusal to engage in a criminal act as did the employee in 
Mitchem.  Rowan asserts that Code § 18.2-460 is " 'consistent 
                                                                
4 In 1995, the General Assembly amended Code § 2.2-2639 
which limited the remedies available to an employee alleging 
 
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with the policy of the Commonwealth to protect the public from 
criminals by shielding those who participate in the 
prosecution and trial of suspected wrongdoers.' "  As a person 
involved in a criminal prosecution, Rowan argues that, to 
effectuate the public policy she posits, the statute must 
provide her with a right to such protection and the violation 
of such right by her employer is a violation of public policy 
sufficient to support her common law cause of action.  We 
disagree with Rowan. 
 
The premise of Rowan's position is that by virtue of Code 
§ 18.2-460, she is vested with a right to be free from 
intimidation with regard to her pressing criminal charges and 
participating in the legal processes connected to those 
charges.  However, unlike the shareholders' right to vote 
shares granted by the statute in Bowman, Code § 18.2-460 does 
not grant a person involved in a criminal prosecution any 
specific right.  Also, in Bowman the public policy violated 
existed to protect the exercise of the statutory right, but 
here there is no statutory right and, therefore, there exists 
no corresponding public policy necessary to protect the right. 
 
Further, Rowan's description of the public policy that 
does underlie Code § 18.2-460 is inconsistent with our prior 
case law.  We have previously described the public policy 
                                                                
unlawful discharge in violation of this policy. 
 
8
underlying the obstruction of justice statute as reflecting 
"the General Assembly's intent to prohibit interference with 
the administration of justice" and as protecting "the public's 
safety and welfare."  Harris, 259 Va. at 233, 523 S.E.2d at 
246.  The goal of this policy is not to protect individuals 
from intimidation, but to protect the public from a flawed 
legal system due to impaired prosecution of criminals.  Thus, 
TSC's actions in discharging Rowan did not violate a right 
granted to her but rather violated a criminal statute enacted 
to ensure that the administration of justice is not subverted. 
In summary, Code § 18.2-460 did not create any statutory 
right or a corresponding public policy of the type that would 
support an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and 
thus allow a common law action for wrongful termination.5  
 
Accordingly, the certified question is answered in the 
negative. 
Certified question answered in the negative.
                     
5 The certified question was limited to consideration of 
Code § 18.2-460 and thus we do not address Rowan's arguments 
that other statutes support the public policy at issue and 
recognize certain rights of crime victims and persons involved 
in criminal prosecution.  
 
9