Title: Friends of the H. Fletcher Brown Mansion, et al. v. The City of Wilmington, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 753, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FRIENDS OF THE H. FLETCHER § 
BROWN MANSION, a Delaware  
§  No. 753, 2010 
unincorporated association, 
 
§ 
KRISTEN F. DIFERDINANDO,  
§ 
DANN J. GLADNICK, MITCHELL §  Court Below – Superior Court 
GLASS, MICHAEL GUNSELMAN, §  of the State of Delaware, 
JEFFREY T. KUSUMI and  
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
CONSTANCE M. SMITH, 
 
§  C.A. No. N10A-01-12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Petitioners Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
THE CITY OF WILMINGTON, a 
§ 
municipal corporation of the State 
§ 
of Delaware, CITY OF   
 
§ 
WILMINGTON ZONING BOARD  § 
OF ADJUSTMENT, and INGLESIDE§ 
HOMES, INC., a Delaware non- 
§ 
profit corporation,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Respondents Below, 
 
§ 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  November 23, 2011 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  December 12, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, 
Justices, and GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en 
Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED.   
 
 
Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, Abbott Law Firm, Hockessin, Delaware, 
for appellants. 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4(a). 
2 
 
 
Martin C. Meltzer, Esquire, Assistant City Solicitor, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for City of Wilmington’s Zoning Board of Adjustment. 
 
 
John E. Tracey, Esquire, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Ingleside Homes, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
3 
 
The petitioners-appellants, Friends of the H. Fletcher Brown Mansion 
(the “Appellants”), appeal from a Superior Court decision in favor of the 
respondents-appellees, City of Wilmington (the “City”), City of Wilmington 
Zoning Board of Adjustment (the “ZBA”), and Ingleside Homes, Inc. 
(“Ingleside”) (collectively, the “Appellees”).  The ZBA had granted three 
use variances  (collectively, the “Use Variance”) to Ingleside to allow partial 
demolition and renovation of the H. Fletcher Brown Mansion (the “Brown 
Mansion”) for use as a thirty-five unit multi-family apartment building for 
senior citizens.  
The appellants raise three arguments on appeal.  First, the appellants 
submit that the ZBA was not properly composed.  Second, they contend that 
the Superior Court erred because the Use Variance conflicts with the City’s 
Comprehensive Plan in violation of title 22, section 702(d) of the Delaware 
Code.  Third, they argue that the record lacked substantial evidence to 
support a finding of unnecessary hardship.   
 
We have concluded that the ZBA was not properly constituted.  
Therefore, it was without authority to act.  Consequently, there is no need to 
address the merits of the appellants’ other two arguments.  The judgment of 
the Superior Court must be reversed.  This matter will be remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.   
4 
 
Facts 
 
The Brown Mansion is located at 1010 North Broom Street, in 
Wilmington, Delaware.  The Brown Mansion includes a two-and-a-half 
story, 10,000 square foot structure built in 1917 with outbuildings and 
gardens.  It is situated in the Cool Spring neighborhood of the City and is 
part of Cool Spring/Tilton Park City Historic District.  The Brown Mansion 
was used as a nursing home prior to 1971, when it was converted into office 
space.  It served as office space from 1971 to 2008.   
 
The property is zoned R-1.  As set forth in section 48-131(a) of the 
Wilmington City Code (the “Code”):  
The R-1 district, one-family detached dwellings, is designed to 
protect and maintain those residential areas now developed 
primarily with one-family detached dwellings on relatively 
large lots and adjoining vacant areas likely to be developed for 
such purposes. It will enable the city to continue to provide a 
restricted type of environment which would otherwise be found 
only in suburban areas.2   
 
The Code does not provide for apartment houses in an R-1 district.3   Section 
48-131(b) further provides:  
In any R-1 district[,] no building or premises shall be used and 
no building shall be erected or altered, except as provided 
elsewhere in this chapter, which is arranged, intended or 
                                          
 
2 Wilmington City Code § 48-131(a).  
3 Id.   
5 
 
designed to be used except for one or more of the uses listed in 
the following subsections of this section.4 
 
 
Ingleside, a non-profit organization, is the owner of the Brown 
Mansion. Ingleside’s mission is to provide affordable housing to senior 
citizens.  Ingleside owns and operates a 208-unit apartment building behind 
the Brown Mansion (the “Ingleside Apartments”).  The Ingleside 
Apartments are connected to the Brown Mansion by a hallway that houses a 
generator and an air handler.  The Ingleside Apartments are zoned multi-
family residential under City Code section 48-138(a). 
The parcel on which the Brown Mansion is governed by the 
Neighborhood Comprehensive Development Plan for the Westside 
Department of Planning and Development, which was adopted by the City 
Council in 1979 (the “1979 Comprehensive Plan”).5  In 2003, the City 
adopted an updated City-Wide Plan of Land Use (the “City-Wide Plan”), 
which is a Component of the Comprehensive Development Plan.  The City-
                                          
 
4 Id. § 48-131(b). 
5 On December 17, 2009, one day after the ZBA issued its written decision in this matter, 
the Wilmington City Council adopted a new Comprehensive Development Plan for the 
West Side Analysis Area (the “2009 Comprehensive Plan”).  The 2009 Comprehensive 
Plan supersedes the 1979 Comprehensive Plan governing the Westside Neighborhood.  
This Court reviews a ZBA decision in light of the plan in effect at the time a use variance 
is approved.  See, e.g., Lynch v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 2006 WL 568764, at *1 & n.2 
(Del. Mar. 7, 2006) (finding new comprehensive plan not applicable where plan took 
effect after City adopted zoning decision in dispute); O’Neill v. Town of Middletown, 
2006 WL 205071, at *37 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2006) (“[T]he Court must measure the 
rezoning against the comprehensive plan in effect at the time of the rezoning, even 
though obviously outdated but one still carrying the force of law.”). 
6 
 
Wide Plan states that “Neighborhood Comprehensive Plans include a more 
detailed analysis of land use and zoning.”6  The 1979 Comprehensive Plan 
contains a “Proposed Land Use Plan,” which in turn designates the parcel on 
which the Brown Mansion sits as “Low Density Residential.”7  The City-
Wide Plan further provides that “Low Density Residential” correlates with 
an R-1 district.  By contrast, “High Density Residential” correlates with R-
5A and R-5B zones, which provide for multi-unit apartment houses.8   
Approximately four years ago, Ingleside and the Cool Spring/Tilton 
Neighborhood Association (the “Civic Association”) began to consider other 
uses for the Brown Mansion.  Ingleside initially sought to rezone the 
property from a single family (R-1) zone to a multi-family (R-5) zone, but 
then decided to pursue a different approach.  The record indicates that, at 
this point, the City mayor’s office asked Leon Weiner & Associates, a 
building development company, to become involved in the process to reach 
a compromise between Ingleside and the community.  
Ingleside developed a new proposal (the “Proposal”) that would 
demolish 1,200 square feet of the Brown Mansion, preserve the remaining 
part of the structure, and build a four-story addition behind the Brown 
                                          
 
6 City-wide Plan of Land Use at 25 (2003). 
7 Neighborhood Comprehensive Plan for the West Side Analysis Area at 28 (1979). 
8 Wilmington City Code §§ 48-136–38.  
7 
 
Mansion to combine the Brown Mansion and the Ingleside Apartments.  The 
four-story addition would provide thirty-five units of affordable housing for 
seniors.  
Ingleside submitted an application to the ZBA, requesting three use 
variances: a variance to permit a multifamily use in an R-1 zone; a side 
variance to permit a setback of thirteen feet, rather than fifteen feet; and a 
variance to permit a four-story structure.  Ingleside also presented the 
Proposal to the Design Review & Preservation Commission (the “DRPC”).  
On October 21, 2009, the DRPC approved the Proposal upon the condition 
that Ingleside obtain approval for a use variance from the ZBA.    
On October 28, 2009, the ZBA held a hearing on Ingleside’s use 
variance application.  The ZBA was comprised of three City employees: 
Harold Lindsey, an employee of the City Department of Real Estate and 
Housing; David Blankenship, of the Department of Public Works; and Mark 
Pilnick, a First Assistant City Solicitor.9  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the three members of the ZBA unanimously approved Ingleside’s three 
variance requests.   
 
After the ZBA granted the Use Variance, the appellants filed a 
Verified Petition in Certiorari in the Superior Court.  The Superior Court 
                                          
 
9 Friends of the H. Fletcher Brown Mansion v. City of Wilmington, 2010 WL 5551334, at 
*13 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2010). 
8 
 
denied the appellants’ request for relief.  The Superior Court concluded that 
the ZBA had properly granted the Use Variance, finding that (1) the 
composition of the ZBA was permissible; (2) the Brown Mansion zoned as a 
single-family residence imposed an unnecessary hardship on Ingleside; (3) 
the ZBA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious; (4) the variance was 
not in conflict with the City’s Comprehensive Development Plan; and (5) 
sufficient proof existed that adequate parking was available come the zoning 
change to multi-family use.    
ZBA Section 322(a) 
At issue in this case is the proper construction of title 22, section 
322(a) of the Delaware Code whereby the City formed its ZBA pursuant to 
this statute.  The relevant, and contested, portion of section 322(a) reads as 
follows: 
In cities or incorporated towns not having heretofore adopted a 
home rule charter pursuant to Chapter 8 of this title, the board 
of adjustment shall consist of the chief engineer of the street 
and sewer department, the city solicitor and the mayor or an 
authorized agent of the mayor.  If the city or incorporated town 
has no city engineer or city solicitor, then the mayor or chief 
executive of such city or town shall appoint 2 members. . . .10  
 
                                          
 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 322(a) (West 2011). 
9 
 
The Appellants and the City agree that neither the “City Solicitor” nor 
the “City Engineer”11 served on the ZBA for purposes of approving the Use 
Variance.  The record reflects that the ZBA was comprised of the Director of 
Transportation, David Blankenship of the City Department of Public Works 
in place of the city engineer; First Assistant City Solicitor Mark Pilnick, in 
place of the city solicitor, and Harold Lindsey of the City Department of 
Real Estate and Housing, as the mayor’s authorized agent.     
The Appellants argue that under section 322(a), the ZBA’s 
composition was impermissible because the statutorily mandated City 
Solicitor and City Engineer members did not participate in the decision.  As 
such, the Appellants contend that the ZBA’s decision must be invalidated.  
However, the City (supported by co-appellee Ingleside Homes, Inc.) argues 
that the plain language of section 322(a) does not control. 
Statutory Construction 
“The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to 
legislative intent.”12  “[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, 
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . 
the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”13  
                                          
 
11 The statute uses both the term “City Engineer” and “Chief Engineer.”  Id. 
12 Del. Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Jain, 29 A.3d 207, 215 (Del. 2011). 
13 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citation omitted).   
10 
 
Moreover, “[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one 
meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to 
aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”14   
 
This Court has held that where the General Assembly delegates 
zoning authority to local jurisdictions, there must be “strict compliance with 
the [legislated] procedures.”15  This is because “zoning ordinances are in 
derogation of common law property rights. . . .”16  The strict conformance 
rule must be applied in examining the composition of the ZBA.  
ZBA Improperly Composed 
The plain language of section 322(a) allows for the Mayor to appoint 
an authorized agent to serve on the ZBA.  The absence of similar plain 
language for the Chief Engineer and the City Solicitor indicates that the 
General Assembly did not intend for an analogous delegation option to exist 
for these two members.  Accordingly, section 322(a)’s plain language 
precludes a conclusion that the Chief Engineer and City Solicitor may 
appoint agents to serve in their place on the ZBA.  Because section 322(a)’s 
                                          
 
14 Id. (citations omitted). 
15 Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Green, 447 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Del. 1982) (“Because 
zoning ordinances are in derogation of common law property rights, [there must be] strict 
compliance with the [legislated] procedures.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  
This strict conformance rule has been applied to find an oral resolution to be an 
“impermissible divergence” from the legislated requirement that amendment of a 
comprehensive plan be in writing.  Fields v. Kent Cnty., 2006 WL 345014, at *3 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 2, 2006). 
16 Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Green, 447 A.2d at 1182 (citation omitted). 
11 
 
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court’s sole function is to enforce 
the statute according to its terms.   
The City argues, however, that this Court should not enforce the plain 
language of section 322(a).  The City contends that section 322(a) should be 
construed in light of the Wilmington City Charter, which provides for the 
performance of department duties by designees.  The City of Wilmington 
Charter at section 3-101 states: 
Each department shall have as its head an officer who, either 
personally or by deputy or by a duly authorized agent or 
employee of the department, and subject at all times to the 
provisions of this Charter, shall exercise the powers and 
perform the duties vested in and imposed upon the 
department.17 
 
Listed in this section are both the Office of the City Solicitor and the Public 
Works Commissioner.  Thus, the City argues that section 3-101 permits both 
department heads (the City Solicitor and the Chief Engineer) to delegate 
their duties and responsibilities, including service on the ZBA.   
The City’s delegation argument fails for two reasons.  First, the 
Charter permits the delegation of duties imposed upon the department rather 
than specific officers of the department.   However, section 322(a) does not 
provide that the ZBA be composed of the Law Department and the 
                                          
 
17 City of Wilmington Charter § 3-101. 
12 
 
Department of Public Works.  Rather, it states that it must consist of specific 
officers—the Chief Engineer and the City Solicitor—from each department.   
Importing the delegation power of section 3-101 of the City Charter 
into section 322(a) by a judicial interpretation is not a narrow reading of the 
zoning statute and is inappropriate in the absence of explicit language from 
the legislature.  Section 322(a)’s enumeration of specific officers for the 
Board’s 
composition, 
instead 
of 
requiring 
general 
departmental 
participation, precludes a delegation.  Service on a quasi-judicial panel, such 
as the ZBA,18 is not within the scope of the duties “vested in and imposed 
upon” the departments that the City Solicitor and the Chief Engineer head.   
Second, and alternatively, the City relies upon the principle of 
statutory construction that a reference to a municipal department or its head 
is generally assumed, as a term of art, to include employees of the 
department.  The general assumption is inapplicable in this case because 
section 322(a)’s plain language explicitly provides for different treatment of 
the Mayor (specifically permitting him to delegate his ZBA responsibilities) 
in contrast to the Chief Engineer and City Solicitor, both of whom are not 
afforded an analogous statutory ability to delegate.  If the General Assembly 
                                          
 
18 See, e.g., Rehoboth Art League, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Town of Henlopen Acres, 
2009 WL 3069672, at *2 (Del Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2009) (“This [c]ourt has routinely 
determined that a Board of Adjustment is a quasi-judicial agency.”). 
13 
 
had wanted to provide this same delegation authority for the Chief Engineer 
and the City Solicitor, it could have done so by including comparable 
delegation language.  The absence of similar delegation language in the case 
of the Chief Engineer and the City Solicitor demonstrates the General 
Assembly’s intent not to provide delegation authority for those two 
members.   
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is particularly 
relevant in this case.  “As the maxim is applied to statutory interpretation, 
where a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and 
the persons and things to which it refers are affirmatively or negatively 
designated, there is an inference that all omissions were intended by the 
legislature.”19  As the United States Supreme Court has noted, for a court to 
supply alleged statutory omissions by the legislature transcends the judicial 
function in a constitutional system that provides for a separation of powers.20 
This Court holds that, pursuant to the plain language of section 
322(a), the appointment of an agent of the Chief Engineer and an agent of 
the City Solicitor to the ZBA was improper.  A properly constituted ZBA 
                                          
 
19 Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1291 (Del. 2007) (quoting Norman J. 
Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 4915 (3d ed.)).  See also 
Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (Del. 1982). 
20 W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166.   
14 
 
must consist of the City Solicitor and the City Engineer, and not agents of 
either office.21  Therefore, the ZBA was not properly constituted at the time 
the Use Variance was granted.  Because the ZBA was not properly 
constituted, its decision must be set aside. 
Statutory ZBA Alternative 
 
The City argues that giving effect to the plain meaning of section 
322(a) will be unreasonably burdensome to the officials directed to serve on 
the ZBA.  The General Assembly has already provided a solution, if service 
on the ZBA is a burden on the City Solicitor and the City Engineer.  Title 
22, section 322(b) states that cities with a home rule charter may establish a 
board of adjustment consisting of five members who are city residents of the 
city.  Section 322(c) mandates section 322(a) as the default provision only if 
a home rule charter city eschews the option of establishing a board of 
adjustment under section 322(b).  Thus, the General Assembly has provided 
the City of Wilmington with the authority to decide whether to compose a 
board of adjustment under section 322(b) or remain with the default 
composition that is provided in section 322(a).   
 
 
                                          
 
21 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Hallowell, 426 A.2d 822, 827 (Del. 1981), 
superceded by statute on other grounds, 21 Del. C. § 3902 (1982).  (“[I]t is not within the 
power of the Court to amend clear statutory language.  The amending responsibility 
belongs to the General Assembly. . . .”) (citations omitted). 
15 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Our holding in this case is limited to its facts and the ZBA statute.  It 
has no effect on the general rule that the duties imposed on a department 
head may be carried out by agents within the department.  The judgment of 
the Superior Court is reversed.  This matter is remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.