Title: Richard G. Pool v. City of Sheboygan
Citation: 2007 WI 38
Docket Number: 2005AP002028
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 2007

2007 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2028 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Richard G. Pool, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
City of Sheboygan, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 122 
Reported at: 293 Wis. 2d 725, 719 N.W.2d 792 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 27, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
L. Edward Stengel 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Stephen G. McLean, city attorney. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Shawn 
Brock 
and 
Skoglind, 
Wurtz, 
Roth, 
Basler 
& 
Brock, 
S.C., 
Sheboygan, and oral argument by Shawn Brock. 
 
 
2007 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2028  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV225) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard G. Pool, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Sheboygan, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 27, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the circuit 
court's order2 granting the City of Sheboygan's (the City's) 
motion to dismiss this action as untimely under the six-month 
statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g) (2003-04).3   
                                                 
1 Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 2006 WI App 122, 293 Wis. 2d 
725,719 N.W.2d 792. 
2 Sheboygan County Circuit Court Judge L. Edward Stengel 
presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
2 
 
The major issue on review is whether the City complied with the 
requirements 
of 
§ 893.80(1g) 
for 
serving 
a 
notice 
of 
disallowance of claim on the claimant, Richard G. Pool (Pool), 
when it sent Pool a notice of disallowance via certified mail 
that was receipted for by Pool's adult daughter.  The circuit 
court found that Pool had actual notice of the disallowance of 
his claim.4  It then concluded that service of the notice of 
disallowance was sufficient because strict compliance with 
§ 893.80(1g) is unnecessary as long as the claimant had actual 
notice of the disallowance of his claim.  The court of appeals 
disagreed, concluding that strict compliance with § 893.80(1g) 
is necessary and the plain language of the statute requires that 
a notice of disallowance be served on the claimant by registered 
or certified mail.  Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 2006 WI App 122, 
¶1, 293 Wis. 2d 275, 719 N.W.2d 792. 
¶2 
We conclude that service of a notice of disallowance 
must be upon the claimant and strictly comply with those modes 
of service set out in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g).  Section 
893.80(1g) requires that service be made by either registered or 
certified mail.  We also conclude that the return of a receipt 
for registered or certified mail signed by the claimant and the 
return of registered mail addressed to the claimant, are 
examples of proof of service acceptable under § 893.80(1g).   
                                                 
4 Before the court of appeals, Pool did not dispute the 
circuit court's finding that he had actual notice of the 
disallowance of his claim.  Pool also asserted to the court of 
appeals that there were no factual issues in dispute. 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Because the six-month statute of limitations period 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g) runs from the date of 
service of the notice of disallowance on the claimant, without 
either proof of service or an admission of proper service, the 
date when the six-month period commences cannot be established.  
Since the record before us does not prove that the City served 
the notice of disallowance on Pool or that Pool admitted proper 
service, the six-month statute of limitations did not commence.  
Therefore, the City's motion to dismiss Pool's action as 
untimely under § 893.80(1g) was erroneously granted by the 
circuit court.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Pool's residence is located on property that abuts 
State Highway 28/South Business Drive (Highway 28) in Sheboygan, 
Wisconsin.  When Pool purchased the property, it included a 
privacy fence running parallel to Highway 28.  On January 7, 
2002, the City informed Pool he must remove his fence because 
Highway 28 was going to be widened.  When Pool objected to 
removing the fence, the City did so on or about May 21, 2003.  
In November 2003, the City installed a sidewalk where Pool's 
fence used to stand.  Pool continued to express objections to 
the City. 
¶5 
On May 25, 2004, Pool filed a notice of claim and 
claim alleging that the City's removal of the fence constituted 
an inverse condemnation without just compensation.  Pool alleged 
the 
removal 
resulted 
in 
a 
"substantial 
decrease 
in 
the 
property's value, as well as a permanent and substantial 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
4 
 
interference with the use and enjoyment of his land."  He sought 
compensation in the amount of $65,000. 
¶6 
On September 8, 2004, the City sent Pool a notice of 
disallowance via certified mail, which disallowed his claim and 
informed him of the six-month statute of limitations for filing 
a lawsuit on the claim.  The City did not check the box on the 
certified mail receipt indicating "restricted delivery."  On 
September 9, 2004, Pool's adult daughter, Tamara Pool, signed 
the certified mail receipt as the recipient.  After the 
signature line on the certified mail receipt, there were boxes 
to check, either "agent" or "addressee," and "agent" was checked 
after Tamara Pool's signature. 
¶7 
On 
March 22, 
2005, 
Pool 
filed 
a 
petition 
for 
ascertainment of compensation against the City in the Circuit 
Court for Sheboygan County.  The City moved to dismiss the 
petition alleging that Pool's petition was untimely under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1g) because it was not filed within six months of 
service of the notice of disallowance of his claim.  Following a 
hearing on June 3, 2005, the circuit court granted the City's 
motion to dismiss, stating that it was "quite troubling and 
probably ill-advised for the City not to check the box that says 
restricted delivery because the statute clearly says complainant 
should be served."   However, the circuit court found that Pool 
had actual notice of the disallowance of his claim, which it 
concluded fulfilled the service requirements of § 893.80(1g) 
necessary to commence the six-month limitation period. 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Pool appealed the circuit court's decision and the 
court of appeals reversed, concluding that service of the notice 
of disallowance was deficient under the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1g) because it was not "served on the claimant," 
but on Pool's daughter.  Pool, 293 Wis. 2d 725, ¶10.   The court 
of appeals stated that actual notice of the disallowance does 
not satisfy the statute and strict statutory compliance is 
required.  Id., ¶¶1, 11-15.  Judge Snyder, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, stated that § 893.80(1g) also required a 
certified mail receipt signed by the claimant, to assure 
consistency with Wis. Stat. § 990.001(13).  Id., ¶21.  The City 
sought 
review, 
arguing 
that 
service 
of 
the 
notice 
of 
disallowance in this case complied with the requirements of 
§ 893.80(1g).  We granted review.  
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶9 
A motion to dismiss presents a question of law that we 
review independently.  Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 2004 
WI 39, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 356, 677 N.W.2d 298 (citing Watts v. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987)).  To 
determine whether the motion to dismiss should be granted in 
this case, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g), which sets 
forth the requirements for service of a notice of disallowance 
and examples of how that service may be proved.  The 
interpretation of a statute is also a question of law that we 
review independently, "but benefiting from the analyses of the 
court of appeals and the circuit court."  Marder v. Bd. of 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
6 
 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 
252, 706 N.W.2d 110. 
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1g) 
¶10 We interpret Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g) to determine the 
requirements for proper service of a notice of disallowance of 
claim under § 893.80(1g).  Statutory interpretation begins with 
the language of the statute.  If the words of the statute have a 
plain meaning, we ordinarily stop our inquiry and apply the 
words chosen by the legislature.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (citing Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Statutory language is read to 
give reasonable effect to every word in order to avoid 
surplusage.  Id., ¶46.  A statute is ambiguous "if it is capable 
of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two 
or more senses."  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is ambiguous, the 
court may examine extrinsic sources, such as legislative 
history.  Id., ¶48.   
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(a)-(b) provide that no 
action may be brought against governmental bodies, officers, 
agents, or employees, unless a claim is filed with such 
governmental body and disallowed.5  Section 893.80(1g) provides 
                                                 
5 Written notice of the circumstances of the claim must be 
served by the claimant on the governmental body within 120 days 
of the happening of the event giving rise to the claim.  Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  Failure to give notice will not bar the 
claim if the government had actual notice and the failure to 
give the notice was not prejudicial.  Id.   
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
7 
 
the service requirements and examples of proof of service for a 
notice of disallowance that are at issue in this case.  Section 
893.80(1g) provides: 
Notice of disallowance of the claim submitted 
under sub. (1) shall be served on the claimant by 
registered or certified mail and the receipt therefor, 
signed by the claimant, or the returned registered 
letter, shall be proof of service. Failure of the 
appropriate body to disallow a claim within 120 days 
after presentation of the written notice of the claim 
is a disallowance.  No action on a claim under this 
section 
against 
any 
defendant 
fire 
company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency nor against any 
defendant officer, official, agent or employee, may be 
brought after 6 months from the date of service of the 
notice of disallowance, and the notice of disallowance 
shall contain a statement to that effect.   
(emphasis added).  In regard to the service required by the 
statute, the statutory language unambiguously requires that 
service of notice of disallowance must be made on the claimant 
and, it must be sent by registered or certified mail. Cary v. 
City of Madison, 203 Wis. 2d 261, 264-65, 551 N.W.2d 596 (Ct. 
App. 1996); Linstrom v. Christianson, 161 Wis. 2d 635, 639, 469 
N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1991).6    
¶12 In Cary, the City of Madison denied a claim for 
damages by sending a notice of disallowance via certified mail 
to the claimant's attorney instead of to the claimant.  Cary, 
                                                 
6 At the time these cases were decided, the statutory 
language at issue was found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b).  Cary 
v. City of Madison, 203 Wis. 2d 261, 263, 551 N.W.2d 596 (Ct. 
App. 1996); Linstrom v. Christianson, 161 Wis. 2d 635, 637-38, 
469 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1991).  Section 893.80(1)(b), as 
referred to in these cases, was renumbered as § 893.80(1)(b) and 
(1g) by 1995 Wis. Act 158, § 18.  
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
8 
 
203 Wis. 2d at 263.  The City of Madison argued that 
"substantial compliance" with the statute should suffice and 
service on an attorney must be considered the equivalent of 
service on the claimant.  Id. at 265 (citing DNR v. City of 
Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 198, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994)).  
However, the court of appeals rejected the argument and 
distinguished Cary from our opinion in City of Waukesha.   
¶13 Our opinion in City of Waukesha limited the concept of 
substantial 
compliance 
to 
a 
claimant's 
notice 
of 
claim, 
recognizing that the statutory requirements for a claimant's 
notice 
of 
claim 
are 
very 
different 
from 
the 
statutory 
requirements for notice of disallowance of claim.  City of 
Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d at 198-202.  Furthermore, in City of 
Waukesha, the substantial compliance standard was applied to the 
notice of claim statute in order to preserve a bona fide claim.  
Cary, 203 Wis. 2d at 267.  To the contrary, in Cary, the City of 
Madison was requesting the court "to go beyond the statute's 
plain language in order to negate an apparently bona fide 
claim."  Id. (emphasis in original).  Accordingly, the court of 
appeals concluded that strict compliance with the notice of 
disallowance statute was required by the unambiguous language in 
then Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b), now Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g). The 
court of appeals noted that this construction also promoted the 
public policy of protecting bona fide claims.  Id. 
¶14 In 
Humphrey 
v. 
Elk 
Creek 
Lake 
Protection 
& 
Rehabilitation District, 172 Wis. 2d 397, 493 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. 
App. 
1992), 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
again 
required 
strict 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
9 
 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g), and in so doing 
preserved bona fide claims.  Id. at 401-02.7  In Humphrey, five 
couples filed a notice of claim and claim against Elk Creek Lake 
Protection and Rehabilitation District (District) for allegedly 
causing flood damage to their properties.  Id. at 398-99.  Each 
of the five couples was served a notice of disallowance.  Id.  
Each 
of 
the 
notices 
listed 
different 
plaintiffs 
as 
the 
"claimant," but the text referred to only one couple's claim as 
disallowed.  Id. at 399-400.  The District argued that the 
plaintiffs' knowledge of the disallowance should suffice, but 
the court sought to preserve the bona fide claims and concluded 
that "even an admission of knowledge of the disallowance does 
not admit proper service sufficient to trigger the six-month 
statute of limitations."  Id. at 403.8 
¶15 The court of appeals in this case again interpreted 
the 
unambiguous 
requirements 
for 
service 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1g) consistent with its past decisions when it required 
strict 
compliance 
if 
a 
shortened 
six-month 
statute 
of 
                                                 
7 The court of appeals stated that "in looking at the 
requirements 
of 
a 
notice 
of 
claim 
statute 
like 
sec. 
893.80(1)(b), Stats., '[a] construction which preserves a bona 
fide claim so that it may be passed upon by a competent tribunal 
is to be preferred to a construction which cuts it off without a 
trial.'"  Humphrey v. Elk Creek Lake Prot. & Rehab. Dist., 172 
Wis. 2d 397, 401-02, 493 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting 
Smith v. Milwaukee County, 149 Wis. 2d 934, 941-42, 440 N.W.2d 
360 (1989)).   
8 The court dismissed the couple's claim that was referred 
to in the text of the notice of disallowance, but concluded the 
notices to the other plaintiffs were not sufficient under the 
statute.  Humphrey, 172 Wis. 2d at 402-03. 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
10 
 
limitations is to apply to a disallowed claim.  In so doing, it 
again referred to the public policy espoused in Cary and 
Humphrey, stating "[b]ecause legitimate claims can be thrown 
aside without redress when a claimant fails to follow the 
statutory requirements, strict compliance is required in how the 
government provides the notice of disallowance."  Pool, 293 
Wis. 2d 725, ¶13 (citing Driver v. Housing Auth. of Racine 
County, 2006 WI App 42, ¶23, 289 Wis. 2d 727, 713 N.W.2d 670).  
The court also noted that the uniformity of method of service is 
a burden the governmental entity can easily bear to make certain 
the citizen's interest in the time in which to institute suit is 
protected.  Id.  The court reasoned that allowing "actual 
notice" or "substantial compliance" would "essentially shift the 
burden to the citizen to prove that the notice given was 
insufficient," which would be "fact driven and credibility laced 
instead of merely documentary."  Id. 
¶16 We agree that the unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1g) requires strict compliance with its terms.  In so 
concluding, we note that strict compliance with § 893.80(1g) 
provides the benefit of a shortened six-month statute of 
limitations period to the governmental body disallowing the 
claim.  We consistently have held that procedural requirements 
in statutes that provide benefits to one of the parties "must be 
strictly complied with in every material particular, or the 
attempt to obtain the benefits of them will fail."  See Duecker 
v. Goeres, 104 Wis. 29, 35-36, 80 N.W. 91 (1899) (concluding 
that the statutory requirement to exhibit the date of a 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
11 
 
rendition of judgment on a transcript is material and must be 
strictly followed in order for the judgment to be transcripted 
to the circuit court); Greene v. Holley, 2 Pin. 488, 2 Chand. 
168 (1850) (concluding "[t]he right to compel a party to give 
evidence in the cause is a strict statutory privilege," and 
therefore, "[t]he party claiming the privilege must show full 
compliance 
with 
the 
statute, 
or 
he 
loses 
his 
right").  
Therefore, in order for the City to obtain the benefit of the 
shortened six-month statute of limitations, it must strictly 
comply with all requirements for service of the notice of 
disallowance in § 893.80(1g).  
¶17 The fact of service on a claimant and proof of that 
service are two different concepts.  Home Bank v. Becker, 48 
Wis. 2d 1, 6, 179 N.W.2d 855 (1970).  Just as it is the fact of 
service of a summons, not the form of the proof of that service, 
that is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on a court in 
many circumstances, see, e.g., Gehr v. City of Sheboygan, 81 
Wis. 2d 117, 122, 260 N.W.2d 30 (1977), it is the fact of 
service on the claimant that commences the running of the six-
month statute of limitations under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g).  
Although there is no requirement in § 893.80(1g) that proof of 
service be filed, proof will be required when the person to have 
been 
served 
asserts 
that 
service 
was 
not 
proper 
under 
§ 893.80(1g).  See Home Bank, 48 Wis. 2d at 6.   
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1g) assists in identifying 
examples that are proof of service under that statute.  It lists 
a receipt signed by the claimant for either registered or 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
12 
 
certified mail and the return of a registered letter.  The court 
of appeals did not reach the issue of whether a receipt signed 
by the claimant is necessary to effect service of a certified 
letter.  Instead, the majority opinion noted that a signed 
receipt for a certified letter probably was not required, but 
that it would be conclusive proof of service when provided.  
Pool, 293 Wis. 2d 725, ¶16 n.5.   
¶19 Here, the receipt for delivery of the certified mail 
was not signed by Pool.  The parties have not briefed or argued 
the import of the examples of proof of service listed in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1g), and addressing that issue is not necessary 
to our decision in this case.  Accordingly, we leave for another 
day to determine whether the examples in § 893.80(1g) are or are 
not an exclusive list of how service may be proved and whether 
the examples listed are "conclusive" proof of service.   
¶20 In this case, service of the notice of disallowance 
was attempted via certified mail.  Pool's daughter, Tamara, 
signed the returned receipt as the recipient of the certified 
letter.  Tamara was not the claimant.  Therefore, absent other 
evidence that the certified mail containing the disallowance of 
claim was personally served on Pool, himself, the return receipt 
is proof that Pool was not served in compliance with the terms 
of the statute.  Accordingly, service of the notice of 
disallowance did not comply with the requirements set forth in 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
13 
 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g).9  In order to 
start the clock ticking on the six-month statute of limitations, 
Pool, himself, had to be served with the certified mail.   
¶21 The City argues that because Pool had "actual notice" 
of the notice of disallowance, the six-month statute of 
limitations commenced when the postal service delivered the 
certified mail.  However, as explained above, the statutory 
requirements of service are unambiguously set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1g).  Strict compliance with the statute is necessary 
for the City to obtain the benefit of the shortened six-month 
statute of limitations period and also to protect Pool's bona 
fide claim.  Since the City did not properly serve the notice of 
disallowance, the six-month statute of limitations did not 
                                                 
9 The City had requested a return receipt for the delivery 
at the designated address, which was in addition to the basic 
certified mail receipt that does not require a recipient to sign 
for the mail.  Pool, 293 Wis. 2d 725, ¶¶22-23 (Judge Snyder 
concurring in part; dissenting in part).  The City could have 
easily ensured compliance with the statute if it had requested 
the certified mail be served upon Pool, himself, by checking the 
box requiring restricted delivery and paying an additional fee 
of $3.70.  Id., ¶24. 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
14 
 
commence when the certified mail was delivered.  Accordingly, 
Pool's lawsuit was not untimely filed under § 893.80(1g).10 
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 990.001(13) 
¶22 The City also contends that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g) 
must be read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 990.001(13).  
Section 990.001(13) states: 
[W]henever the statutes authorize or require the use 
of registered mail, and do not require a return 
receipt of the addressee only, certified mail may be 
used if a sender's receipt is obtained from the postal 
authorities and return receipt is requested.  If a 
return receipt signed by addressee only is required, 
registered mail must be used.       
Therefore, the City argues that if § 893.80(1g) requires the 
notice of disallowance to be received and signed for by Pool, 
himself, only registered mail could be used according to 
§ 990.001(13).  Stated otherwise, the City contends that to 
                                                 
10 The City does not dispute that Pool's claim is timely if 
the six-month statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g) 
does not apply.  If a notice of disallowance is not served on a 
claimant within 120 days after a written notice of the claim was 
sent to the governmental body, as required by § 893.80(1g), the 
six-month statute of limitations does not apply.  Blackbourn v. 
Sch. Dist. of Onalaska, 174 Wis. 2d 496, 501, 497 N.W.2d 460 
(Ct. App. 1993).  Although we do not fully address this issue 
because it is not in dispute, we note that the six-year statute 
of limitations for condemnation actions would apply assuming 
this condemnation action is a statutory action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10, as alleged in the City's Brief in Support of its Motion 
to Dismiss.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(a) (applying to actions 
"upon a liability created by statute"); Andersen v. Village of 
Little Chute, 201 Wis. 2d 467, 486-87, 549 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. App. 
1996) (stating that actions under § 32.10 would be subject to 
the six-year statute of limitations under § 893.93(1)(a), but 
concluding 
the 
condemnation 
action 
in 
the 
case 
was 
a 
constitutional taking because it was temporary).   
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
15 
 
harmonize the two statutes, § 893.80(1g) may not be interpreted 
to require that a certified mail receipt be signed by the actual 
claimant to effect service.  
¶23 We are not persuaded by the City's argument for a 
number of reasons.  First, one of the basic tenants of statutory 
construction is that courts are to construe a statute so that no 
part of it is rendered superfluous.  Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 
172 Wis. 2d 234, 250, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.80(1g) expressly allows the use of either certified or 
registered mail.  It also lists a receipt for certified mail 
signed by the claimant as an example of proof of service.  Were 
we to construe Wis. Stat. § 990.01(13) and § 893.80(1g) as the 
City has, both provisions would be superfluous.   
¶24 Second, Wis. Stat. § 990.001 states in its opening 
sentence that its provisions should not be construed to "produce 
a 
result 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
manifest 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature."  Interpreting § 990.001(13) as the City suggests 
would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of 
the legislature because the unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1g) requires service of a notice of disallowance on the 
claimant by either registered or certified mail.  And finally, 
interpreting § 990.01(13) as the City suggests would cause that 
general statute to conflict with the more specific statute, 
§ 893.80(1g).  To do so is contrary to the usual rules of 
statutory construction.  State v. Smith, 106 Wis. 2d 151, 159, 
316 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1982).  Accordingly, we conclude that 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
16 
 
§ 990.01(13) has no application to the issues presented by this 
review. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶25 We conclude that service of a notice of disallowance 
must be made on the claimant and must strictly comply with those 
modes of service set out in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g).  Section 
893.80(1g) requires that service be made by either registered or 
certified mail.  We also conclude that the return of a receipt 
for registered or certified mail signed by the claimant and the 
return of registered mail addressed to the claimant are examples 
of proof of service acceptable under § 893.80(1g).  
¶26 Because the six-month statute of limitations period 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g) runs from the date of 
service of the notice of disallowance on the claimant, without 
either proof of service or an admission of proper service, the 
date when the six-month period commences cannot be established.  
Since the record before us does not prove that the City served 
the notice of disallowance on Pool or that Pool admitted proper 
service, the six-month statute of limitations did not commence.  
Therefore, the City's motion to dismiss Pool's action as 
untimely under § 893.80(1g) was erroneously granted by the 
circuit court.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2005AP2028   
 
 
 
1