Title: State v. Barrett
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45463
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2000

Filed:  September 14, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
JACOB BARRETT,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9402002CR; CA A91378; SC S45463)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted October 12, 1999.
	Peter Gartlan, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was
David E. Groom, Public Defender.
	Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.  
	*Appeal from Klamath County Circuit Court,
	 Roxanne Osborne, Judge.
	 153 Or App 621, 958 P2d 215 (1998).
    **Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
This criminal case presents the issue whether a
sentencing court may impose multiple life sentences on defendant
for the aggravated murder of one victim.  The trial court
concluded that it had such authority under former ORS 161.062(1),
repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 136, § 1 (providing for separate
punishments for separate statutory violations) (1) and imposed two
consecutive life sentences, as well as a third life sentence to
run concurrently with the other two.  The Court of Appeals
affirmed that judgment.  State v. Barrett, 153 Or App 621, 958
P2d 215 (1998).  We allowed review and now reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals.  
The following facts are not in dispute.  Defendant and
two accomplices robbed a convenience store at gunpoint.  During
the commission of the robbery, defendant forced the 72-year-old
clerk into the back room.  The clerk refused to stay there. 
Defendant shot and killed her when she returned to the store.  
Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with
five felonies, including three counts of aggravated murder under
ORS 163.095:  (1) count 1, for aggravated felony murder, based on
defendant's intentional killing of the victim during the
commission of a robbery; (2) count 2, also for aggravated felony
murder, based on defendant's intentional killing of the victim
during the commission of a kidnaping; (3) count 3, for aggravated
murder committed to conceal the perpetrator's identity; (4) count
4, for "simple murder" under ORS 163.115; and (5) count 5, for
first-degree robbery under ORS 164.415.  Defendant pleaded no
contest to all counts, and the trial court found defendant guilty
of all five charges.  The court then "merged" count 4 (simple
murder) with count 3 (aggravated murder to conceal identity) and
merged count 5 (first-degree robbery) with count 1 (aggravated
felony murder committed during a robbery).  The trial court then
imposed consecutive life sentences, with 30-year minimums each,
on counts 1 and 2, and a third life sentence with a 30-year
minimum on count 3, to run concurrently with the life sentence
imposed on count 1.  In support of its decision to impose
consecutive sentences on counts 1 and 2, the trial court stated
that those two offenses were not merely incidental violations of
separate statutory provisions but, rather, indicated defendant's
willingness to commit more than one offense.  
On appeal, defendant assigned error, first, to the
trial court's failure to merge all three convictions for
aggravated murder and, second, to the trial court's imposition of
consecutive sentences on the two aggravated felony-murder
convictions.  As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by considering
the first sentence of former ORS 161.062(1), which provides:
	"When the same conduct or criminal episode violates two
or more statutory provisions and each provision
requires proof of an element that the others do not,
there are as many separately punishable offenses as
there are separate statutory violations."
The court observed that this court had held (in State v.
Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 278, 779 P2d 600 (1989)) that three
preconditions must exist for former ORS 161.062(1) to be
applicable to a defendant's conduct:  (1) the defendant's acts
must constitute the same conduct or criminal episode; (2) the
defendant's acts must violate two or more "statutory provisions;"
and (3) each "statutory provision" must require "proof of an
element that the others do not."  Barrett, 153 Or App at 623-24. 
The Court of Appeals also noted that, in Crotsley, this court
held that a defendant violates separate "statutory provisions"
for purposes of former ORS 161.062 if the statutory provisions
address "separate legislative concerns."  Id. at 624-25.  
Based on the foregoing review of the statutory and case
law, Court of Appeals concluded that: 
	"[I]n each of the three counts of aggravated murder of
which defendant is convicted, the legislature was
trying to address a separate and distinct legislative
concern, each of which was intended to be a 'single
crime.'  Conduct supporting each of the three
aggravated murder convictions did not merely constitute
three alternative ways to commit a single crime.  Each
involved different harm to the victim and, in our view,
each constituted conduct that the legislature intended
to punish separately."  
Id. at 627-28.  In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied on its earlier holding in a case that posed a
similar question, State v. Burnell, 129 Or App 105, 877 P2d 1228
(1994).  In Burnell, the court held that a defendant could be
sentenced separately under former ORS 161.062(1) for multiple
felony murder convictions involving only one victim, when each
conviction was based on a separate underlying felony, because
each felony-murder conviction was based on proof of an element
that had not been required for conviction on the other counts. 
Id. at 109.  Noting that the same was true of the various
aggravated murder convictions with which defendant in this case
was charged and convicted, the court concluded that there was no
reason to treat this case differently from Burnell.  Barrett, 153
Or App at 626.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, although
defendant properly was charged with and convicted of multiple
counts of aggravated murder based on the existence of multiple
aggravating circumstances, defendant's conduct in intentionally
murdering one victim did not violate "two or more statutory
provisions," as that phrase is used in former ORS 161.062(1). 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.  
As noted, defendant was charged with and convicted of
three counts of aggravated murder, based on three different
aggravating circumstances involving the intentional killing of a
single victim.  Defendant does not dispute that his conduct
constituted a single criminal episode for purposes of former ORS
161.062(1).   Accordingly, as did the Court of Appeals, we focus
on the meaning of the phrase "two or more statutory provisions"
in former ORS 161.062(1).  
We begin by noting that former ORS 161.062(1) requires
both that a defendant's acts violate "two or more statutory
provisions" and that each "statutory provision" require "proof of
an element that the others do not."  In relying on its earlier
decision in Burnell, the Court of Appeals in this case appears to
have held that the fact that each count of aggravated murder
requires proof of an element that the others do not itself
establishes the existence of two or more statutory violations. 
The use of the conjunctive in former ORS 161.062(1), however,
indicates that two separate inquiries are required:  First, a
defendant must violate two or more statutory provisions; only
then does the court consider whether each statutory provision
requires proof of an element that the others do not.  
We interpret the legislature's intent respecting the
phrases "two or more statutory provisions" and "separate
statutory violations" in former ORS 161.062(1) by using the
methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  We first look to the text
of the statute, read in context, as the best indicator of the
legislature's intent.  Id. at 610-11.  At that first level of
analysis, we consider this court's prior interpretations of the
wording at issue as part of the statutory context.  See Davis v.
O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 741, 891 P2d 1307 (1995) (so stating).  If
the intent of the legislature is clear after that text and
context inquiry, the court looks no further.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.
Former ORS 161.062(1) itself does not define
specifically either "statutory provision" or "separate statutory
violation."  However, this court has discussed the meaning of
"statutory provision" in two prior cases, Crotsley and State v.
Kizer, 308 Or 238, 779 P2d 604 (1989). 
In Crotsley, this court held that a defendant could be
convicted and separately punished for first- and third-degree
rape, as well as for first- and third-degree sodomy, based on the
same criminal conduct.  In that case, the defendant forcibly
compelled the victim, who was 14 years old, into sexual
intercourse and "deviate sexual activity."  308 Or at 275. 
Because the defendant's conduct violated four different statutes
-- ORS 163.355(1) (third-degree rape, based on sexual intercourse
with a female under the age of 16), ORS 163.385(1) (third-degree
sodomy, based on deviate sexual intercourse with a person under
the age of 16), ORS 163.375(1)(a) (first-degree rape, based on
sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion), and ORS 163.405(1)
(first-degree sodomy, based on deviate sexual intercourse by
forcible compulsion), the court held that the defendant had
violated "two or more statutory provisions."  Respecting the
phrase "two or more statutory provision," this court made the
following observation:  "[W]e interpret the term 'two or more
statutory provisions' to include prohibitions such as those in
this case that address separate and distinct legislative
concerns."  308 Or at 278 (emphasis added).  
The Crotsley court then turned to the specific issue
whether each of the provisions that the defendant had violated in
that case required proof of an element that the others did not. 
The court concluded that different elements were required to
prove each statutory provision, inasmuch as the first-degree rape
and sodomy charges were based on the fact of forcible compulsion,
and the third-degree rape and sodomy charges were based on the
victim's age.  Id. at 280.  Under the circumstances, this court
held that the third-degree rape and sodomy charges were not
simply lesser-included offenses to the first-degree rape and
sodomy charges.  Id.
In Kizer, the court considered whether a defendant who
falsely had made and then uttered a written instrument could be
convicted and punished separately for two counts of forgery under
ORS 165.007 -- one for making the instrument (in violation of ORS
165.007(a)) and one for uttering the same instrument (in
violation of ORS 165.007(b)).  In that case, this court stated
that the phrase "statutory provision" in former ORS 161.062(1)
"was not defined to mean a section, subsection, or paragraph;
consistent with its purpose, the term can be interpreted to mean
any provision defining a 'single crime,' whatever visual form the
provision is given."  308 Or at 243.  This court then held that
the forgery statute defined a single crime, notwithstanding that,
in violating ORS 165.007, the defendant actually committed two
separate acts, either of which would have been punishable alone. 
Id. at 243-44.  The court based that conclusion on the
legislative history of the forgery statute, which showed that the
legislature intended that making and uttering a written
instrument constitute a single crime.  Id. at 243.
With the foregoing case law in mind, we next consider
whether the various aggravating circumstances set out as
subsections of ORS 163.095 "address separate and distinct
legislative concerns" and, thus, are separate statutory
provisions, each constituting a "single crime."  
Aggravated murder is defined as "murder as defined in
ORS 163.115 which is committed under, or accompanied by, any of"
18 different aggravating circumstances. (2)  ORS 163.095.  As
pertinent to this case, aggravating circumstances include the
following: 
"(d)  Notwithstanding ORS 163.115(1)(b), the
defendant personally and intentionally committed the
homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS
163.115(1)(b).
"(e)  The murder was committed in an effort to
conceal the commission of a crime, or to conceal the
identity of the perpetrator of a crime."
ORS 163.095(2).
ORS 163.115 provides in part:  
"(1)  Except as provided in ORS 163.118 [first-
degree manslaughter] and 163.125 [second-degree
manslaughter], criminal homicide constitutes murder:
"* * * * * 
"(b)  When it is committed by a person, acting
either alone or with one or more persons, who commits
or attempts to commit any of the following crimes and
in the course of and in furtherance of the crime the
person is committing or attempting to commit, or during
the immediate flight therefrom, the person, or another
participant if there be any, causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants:
"* * * * *
"(E)  Kidnaping in the second degree as defined in
ORS 163.225;
"* * * * *
"(G)  Robbery in the first degree as defined in
ORS 164.415."
Although this court stated in Kizer that the phrase
"statutory provision" is not defined to mean either a section,
subsection, or paragraph, we think that the use of a single
section nonetheless is some indication that the legislature
intended to define a single crime.  The wording of the first
sentence of ORS 163.095 supports that interpretation.  It defines
aggravated murder as murder "committed under, or accompanied by,
any" of various aggravating circumstances.  (Emphasis added.) 
"Any" means one or more. (3)  Thus, the first sentence of ORS 163.095
suggests that any or all the enumerated circumstances simply
serve to prove the single essential element of "aggravation."    
In addition, the context of ORS 163.095 includes the
statutes setting out the penalties for murder and aggravated
murder.  For a so-called "simple murder," that is, a murder
unaccompanied by any aggravating circumstance, the statutory
penalty is a life sentence with a mandatory minimum period of
confinement of 25 years.  ORS 163.115(5)(a) and (b).  If the
murder is "aggravated," the penalties are enhanced:  the
defendant faces death, life imprisonment without the possibility
of release or parole, or life imprisonment with a mandatory
minimum sentence of 30 years.  ORS 163.105(1)(a) and (c).  That
context suggests a single legislative intent to punish more
severely certain murders that the legislature deems to be
particularly heinous.  
The Court of Appeals concluded that each of the
aggravating circumstances at issue here involved different harms
to the victim, demonstrating that the legislature intended to
punish aggravated murder under each of the circumstances
separately.  We agree that the legislature undoubtedly intended
that each of the felonies underlying a felony murder be
separately punishable.  It does not follow, however, that each
subsection of the aggravated murder statute constitutes a
separately punishable crime for purposes of former ORS
161.062(1).  The wording of the statute that we just have
reviewed shows that the harm that the legislature intended to
address by ORS 163.095 was the intentional, aggravated killing of
another human being.  The aggravating factors constitute no more
than different theories under which murder becomes subject to the
enhanced penalties for aggravated murder.  That defendant's
conduct in intentionally murdering the victim in this case was
"aggravated" by "any," i.e., one or more, act surrounding that
conduct does not convert that conduct into more than one
separately punishable offense.  
As is evident from the foregoing analysis, we do not
agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "defendant's
record here [with respect to aggravated murder] should reflect
that his conduct consisted of three different crimes."  Barrett,
153 Or App at 627.  Nonetheless, for the reasons that follow, we
agree that there are cogent reasons why defendant's record should
depict the full extent of his involvement in the criminal conduct
that led to the victim's death.  
Each of the three theories of aggravated murder at
issue here is one on which the jury had to agree unanimously. 
State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 377, 780 P2d 725 (1989) (in order to
convict defendant of aggravated murder, jury must unanimously
agree on the facts required to establish each aggravating factor
charged under ORS 163.095).  If the trial court were to enter a
conviction on only one count, and dismiss the other two, it
always would be possible that an appeal would result in a
reversal, for insufficient evidence, of the count that was
selected to serve as the basis for conviction.  With the other
two counts dismissed, defendant would be able to argue that he
was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of
aggravated murder.  Such an outcome would be inappropriate, if
there were evidence to sustain defendant's guilt under either of
the other two counts, but there is no obvious mechanism for
"reviving" counts that have been dismissed.  
Defendant suggests that, in this case, the goal would
have been met had the trial court simply entered one conviction
for aggravated murder committed to conceal one's identity and
separate convictions for robbery and kidnaping.  As the foregoing
discussion indicates, we do not believe that the trial judge was
required to hazard a legitimate conviction in that way.  We think
that the appropriate procedure would have been to enter one
judgment of conviction reflecting the defendant's guilt on the
charge of aggravated murder, which judgment separately would
enumerate each of the existing aggravating factors. (4)  Because our
rationale requires that defendant be resentenced, we remand the
case to the trial court for that purpose.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.  

1. After the Court of Appeals issued its decision in this
case, the legislature repealed ORS 161.062.  Or Laws 1999, ch
136, § 1.  The fist sentence of former ORS 161.062(1), which is
at issue in this case, appears in identical form in ORS
161.067(1).  Both former ORS 161.062 and ORS 161.067 became law
in 1985.  As this court explained in State v. Crotsley, 308 Or
272, 276 n 3, 779 P2d 600 (1989), both statutes began as
identically worded proposals which, in effect, were enacted
twice, one in an amended legislative version, former ORS 161.062,
and, later, one in an unamended initiative version, ORS 161.067. 
ORS 161.067 remains in effect.  Throughout this opinion, we refer
to former ORS 161.062.

2. One of the aggravating circumstances listed in ORS
163.095 is that the murder was committed during the course of one
of 12 felonies listed in ORS 163.115(1)(b).  ORS 163.095(2)(d). 
Moreover, one of those 12 felonies, ORS 163.115(1)(b)(H) refers
to "[a]ny felony sexual offense in the first degree defined in
this chapter."  Chapter 163 includes four felony first-degree
sexual offenses:  ORS 163.375 (rape in the first degree), ORS
163.405 (sodomy in the first degree), ORS 163.411 (unlawful
sexual penetration in the first degree), and ORS 163.427 (sexual
abuse in the first degree).  Viewing each of those underlying
felonies as a separate aggravating circumstance brings the total
number of alternative ways in which simple murder can be elevated
to aggravated murder to 32. 

3. Websters Third New Int'l Dictionary, 97 (unabridged ed
1993), defines "any" as "1: one indifferently out of more than
two: one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind: * * * 2: one,
some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity: a: one or
more: not none * * *."  

4. Under the foregoing analysis, a separate conviction
could be entered on the robbery charge on remand.  Robbery and
aggravated murder clearly are set out in two different statutory
provisions, ORS 164.415 and ORS 163.095.  Moreover, in light of
our conclusion that the various aggravating circumstances are not
"elements" for purposes of former ORS 161.062(1) but, rather,
alternative ways of proving the element of aggravation, the
statutory provisions penalizing robbery and aggravated murder
each involve an element that the other does not and address
separate legislative concerns.  Accordingly, for purposes of
former ORS 161.062(1), we do not view robbery as a lesser-
included offense to the aggravated-murder charge.