Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN RODNEY MCRAE
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121300
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 22, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 121300 
JOHN RODNEY MCRAE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
In this case we must determine whether the admission 
of statements made by defendant to a sheriff’s reserve 
deputy violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
We 
conclude that the admission of the statements did violate 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because, under the 
circumstances in this case, the reserve deputy was a state 
actor at the time he questioned defendant, who had not 
waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
We have 
already concluded that such an error would not be harmless 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt;1 therefore, we reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new 
trial. 
I. FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder after 
the remains of fifteen-year-old Randy Laufer were found on 
the grounds of defendant’s previous residence. 
After 
defendant was arrested, he received his Miranda2 warnings 
and invoked both his Fifth Amendment right to be free from 
compelled self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. 
After arraignment, while defendant was in 
custody awaiting trial, defendant apparently requested to 
speak to an old neighbor, Dean Heintzelman. 
It had been 
ten years since defendant had seen Heintzelman, and 
defendant was unaware that Heintzelman had become a reserve 
police officer. 
Further, defendant was unaware that both 
Heintzelman and Heintzelman’s son were part of the police 
team present at the scene when Randy Laufer’s body was 
recovered. 
Heintzelman visited defendant after he finished his 
shift as a reserve deputy. 
Before visiting defendant, 
Heintzelman asked the permission of one of the corrections 
1 465 Mich 874 (2001). 
2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed
2d 694 (1966). 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
officers to do so. 
Heintzelman was in full uniform, 
complete with badge. 
Although it was some time after 
eleven o’clock at night, Heintzelman was allowed to go 
directly to defendant’s maximum security cell. Heintzelman 
later testified that he had the following conversation with 
defendant: 
Well, first we just started talkin’, talkin’
about – shook hands and everything, you know,
like 
I 
hadn’t 
seen 
him 
in 
a 
long, 
long
time. . . . I asked him about his boy, Marty, 
‘cuz his boy Marty is the same age as my son.
. . . I told him, I said, “Well, Marty’s in here 
from what I understand, too.”[3] And then he 
showed me pictures of Marty’s wife and his baby,
and we carried on a conversation, like you or I
would. 
And then I said – I asked John – I said,
“John, did you do what you’re charged with here?”
And he didn’t answer me. So we just went talkin’
again about, well, more or less about Marty
again. 
And I said, “Well, you know, they think
Marty had something to do with that, you know,
with Randy.” 
And he says, “Well, if they try to
pin it on Marty, I’ll let ‘em fry my ass.” 
And 
that was his words. 
I said, “John, did you do it?” 
And he just
hung his head down and said, “Dean, it was bad.
It was bad.” 
That’s – we didn’t discuss it any
more. 
After questioning defendant about the charges, Heintzelman 
reported the discussion to Lieutenant McClellan, who was 
the officer in charge of the Laufer investigation scene. 
Heintzelman then volunteered to go back and talk to 
3 Defendant’s son had been held as an accessory to the
murder. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
defendant if McClellan requested. 
Heintzelman was not 
permitted to speak with defendant again. 
Defendant moved to suppress Heintzelman’s testimony 
regarding 
defendant’s 
statements 
because 
the 
alleged 
statements were obtained in violation of defendant=s right 
to counsel and because defendant was not given Miranda 
warnings again before questioning. 
After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to 
suppress on the ground that defendant had initiated the 
conversation. 
After defendant was convicted by a jury of 
first-degree murder, he challenged on appeal the admission 
of the statements.4  The Court of Appeals did not determine 
if there was error, ruling instead that, even if the 
admission were error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.5
 
Upon defendant=s first application for leave to appeal, 
this Court determined that if the admission of the 
statement were error, such error would not be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court vacated the Court of 
4 Defendant also raised two other issues that are not 
before this Court. 
5 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 12,
2001 (Docket No. 217052). 
4  
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Appeals judgment in part and remanded the case for 
reconsideration of defendant=s claim of error.6 
On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court did not err in admitting this evidence, because “the 
statement 
at 
issue 
was 
made 
in 
the 
context 
of 
a 
conversation between former friends, which, as the trial 
court in this case found, was initiated by the defendant.”7 
Defendant again appealed to this Court, and we granted 
leave, directing the parties to address: 
“(1) whether 
defendant's statements to Officer Heintzelman constituted 
the interaction of custody and official interrogation, as 
discussed in Illinois v Perkins, 496 US 292 [110 S Ct 2394; 
110 L Ed 2d 243] (1990), and (2) whether Officer 
Heintzelman was a state actor at the time defendant made 
the statements to him.” 468 Mich 921 (2003). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In order to determine whether a constitutional error 
occurred, we must first determine whether Heintzelman was a 
state actor, which is a mixed question of fact and law. We 
review for clear error a lower court’s findings of fact, 
6 465 Mich 874 (2001). 
7 Unpublished opinion per curiam, on remand, issued
February 12, 2002 (Docket No 217052), slip op at 5. 
5  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
MCR 2.613(C), and review de novo questions of law. 
People 
v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 599; 628 NW2d 528 (2001). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. STATE ACTOR ANALYSIS 
The people argue that Heintzelman was not a state 
actor because he did not visit defendant in an official 
police capacity, but was invited to visit defendant as a 
former neighbor and friend. 
That defendant was unaware of 
Heintzelman’s reserve deputy status when he asked to see 
him, however, does not end the inquiry. 
In Griffin v Maryland, 378 US 130, 135; 84 S Ct 1770; 
12 L Ed 2d 754 (1964), the Supreme Court held that “[i]f an 
individual is possessed of state authority and purports to 
act under that authority, his action is state action. 
It 
is irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had 
he acted in a purely private capacity or that the 
particular action which he took was not authorized by state 
law.”8
 It is clear from the record that Heintzelman 
8 Although we agree with the dissent that not every act
performed by someone who happens to be a police officer
constitutes state action, it must be noted that the cases
cited by the dissent in support can be distinguished from
this case. 
Only one case, United States v McGreevy, 652 F2d 849
(CA 9, 1981), involves a constitutional challenge. 
In 
McGreevy, 
the 
defendant 
alleged 
a 
Fourth 
Amendment 
violation because the Federal Express worker who searched
his package also happened to be a police officer. 
The 
court rejected the Fourth Amendment claim on the ground
6 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
that the FedEx worker was not acting under color of state
law when he opened the package. 
The court noted that the 
worker did not obtain his FedEx job as a result of being a
police officer and “carefully separated” the two jobs. Id. 
at 851. 
The same cannot be said for Heintzelman. 
At the 
time he questioned defendant, Heintzelman was present at 
defendant’s maximum-security cell at 11:30 PM by virtue of
his status as a sheriff’s reserve deputy. 
He did nothing
to 
“carefully 
separate” 
himself 
from 
his 
apparent
authority. 
The remaining cases cited by the dissent are civil
claims brought under 42 USC 1983. 
The dissent does not 
explain why these civil cases, predicated on federal 
statute, 
should 
be 
dispositive 
for 
purposes 
of 
constitutional claims. 
Although the United States Supreme
Court has held that conduct that is state action for 
constitutional purposes is action “under color of state
law” for § 1983 purposes, it has never held that the
opposite is true. 
In other words, conduct that fails to
constitute action “under color of state law” for § 1983
purposes does not necessarily fail to represent state 
action for constitutional purposes. In Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v Tarkanian, 488 US 179, 182 n 4; 109 S Ct
454; 102 L Ed 2d 469 (1988), the United States Supreme
Court merely stated that in that case, in which the 
plaintiff claimed he had been deprived of his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights in violation of § 1983, “the
under-color-of-law requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are
equivalent.” 
We read the footnote as merely setting forth
the unremarkable conclusion that, for Fourteenth Amendment
violations premised on violations of § 1983, the two state­
action inquiries are equivalent. 
This case, however,
involves a very different inquiry. 
The other § 1983 cases cited by the dissent can be
similarly distinguished. 
In Barna v Perth Amboy, 42 F3d
809 (CA 3, 1994), the plaintiffs brought a civil action
under 42 USC 1983 as a result of an alleged assault by the
defendant police officers. 
The assault occurred when one 
of the off-duty police officers thought he saw one of the
plaintiffs strike his sister and intervened. 
The court 
held that this initial altercation was a family dispute and
that the off-duty officers were therefore not acting under
color of state law. 
Id. at 815. Because of the personal
nature of the dispute, the court concluded that the use of
the police-issued night stick in the fight, although 
7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
possessed actual state authority — he was deputized as a 
Clare County sheriff’s reserve deputy. 
The dispositive 
question, then, is whether Heintzelman purported to act 
under that authority. 
The word “purport” means: 
“1. to present, esp. 
deliberately, the appearance of being; profess or claim 
. . . .  2. to convey, express or imply.” 
Random House 
objective indicia of police authority, did not transform 
the personal family dispute into an action taken under
color of state law. 
Bosignore v City of New York, 683 F2d 635 (CA 2,
1982), involved an off-duty police officer who used his
police-issued revolver to shoot his wife and then commit
suicide. 
The wife survived and attempted to bring a claim
under 42 USC 1983. The court rebuffed her attempt, stating
simply that the officer was not acting under color of state
law since his actions in shooting his wife and committing
suicide were not committed in the performance of any actual
or pretended duty, but were personal pursuits. Id. at 638­
639. 
In Delcambre v Delcambre, 635 F2d 407 (CA 5, 1981),
the plaintiff was assaulted by her brother-in-law, who also
happened to be the police chief. 
The plaintiff’s § 1983
action was dismissed because the Court found that the 
altercation arose out of family and political matters and
that the plaintiff was neither arrested nor threatened with
arrest. 
Under the circumstances, the court found that the
family and political dispute was not conducted under color
of state law. Id. at 408. 
All the above cases involved truly personal matters.
The same cannot be said here. It was only by virtue of his
position as a governmental agent that Heintzelman was able
to question defendant at the location and time he did.
Further, given the decade that had lapsed without any
contact between the two and Heintzelman’s subsequent offer
to Lieutenant McClellan to obtain more information, any
claims that Heintzelman was solely acting out of concern
for defendant’s welfare are suspect.
8 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed). 
The record evidence 
shows that Heintzelman visited defendant in his full 
uniform, thus creating the appearance that he was a state 
actor. Further, Heintzelman received permission from a 
corrections officer to visit defendant late at night in his 
maximum-security cell. 
The people conceded at oral 
argument that an ordinary citizen would not have been 
granted permission under the same circumstances. 
Thus, it 
was only by virtue of his status as a reserve deputy that 
Heintzelman was granted direct access to defendant’s 
maximum-security 
cell, 
a 
restricted 
area 
where 
only 
governmental 
agents 
are 
normally 
allowed 
to 
tread. 
Further, this access was granted late at night, a time when 
ordinary citizens are prohibited from visiting inmates.9 
There is no evidence that Heintzelman sought to 
distance himself from his actual or apparent police 
authority. Instead, defendant was questioned in the middle 
of the night by a sheriff’s reserve deputy (albeit one he 
had known a decade earlier) in full uniform. 
Indeed, 
Heintzelman’s actions during and after the questioning only 
reinforced his actual or apparent authority. 
During his 
9 Again, we stress that Heintzelman’s visit to 
defendant at his maximum-security cell at 11:30 PM is 
significant not because it somehow means Heintzelman tried
to “catch defendant off guard” as suggested by the dissent,
but because only governmental agents were allowed access to
maximum-security cells, particularly at that time of night.
9 
 
 
 
 
“conversation” with defendant, Heintzelman twice brought up 
the subject of defendant’s son in an apparent attempt to 
get defendant to answer Heintzelman’s questions. 
Further, 
after he spoke to defendant, Heintzelman contacted the 
lieutenant in charge of the investigation, relayed the 
contents of the conversation, and offered to obtain more 
information. 
Finally, it is also telling that Heintzelman 
was not allowed any further contact with defendant for fear 
of violating defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
The facts of this case distinguish it from United 
States v Gaddy, 894 F2d 1307 (CA 11, 1990), cited by the 
dissent. 
In Gaddy, the defendant’s aunt was a police 
officer. 
Through her position as an officer, she learned 
that the defendant was in custody. A detective advised the 
aunt that it would be in her nephew’s best interest to 
cooperate, but did not request that the aunt talk to the 
nephew. 
The aunt contacted the nephew from her home and 
encouraged him to speak. 
He agreed and spoke to officials 
after waiving his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
In determining that the aunt was not a state actor, 
the court noted that the aunt was not part of the 
investigative team on the defendant’s case and acted solely 
out of concern for his welfare. Id. at 1311. In contrast, 
here Heintzelman was part of the police team present for
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the recovery of the victim’s body from defendant’s former 
residence. Further, it cannot be said that Heintzelman was 
acting solely out of a concern for defendant’s welfare. He 
had not seen or spoken to defendant in ten years, and, upon 
reporting the conversation to his superior, volunteered to 
obtain more information from defendant. 
Thus, the lack of 
any close relationship between Heintzelman and defendant, 
along 
with 
Heintzelman’s 
actions 
after 
speaking 
to 
defendant, distinguish this case from Gaddy.10 
Taken together, the evidence shows that Heintzelman 
was possessed of state authority and purported to act under 
that authority. 
Therefore, under Griffin, his action is 
state action. 
B. SIXTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The next issue is whether Heintzelman’s questioning of 
defendant violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the 
right to counsel. 
In Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484; 
101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), the United States 
10 Similarly, the facts of this case distinguish it
from Cook v Georgia, 207 Ga 820; 514 SE 2d 657 (1999).
First, although the defendant’s father in Cook was an FBI 
agent, the FBI was not exercising jurisdiction over the
case—it was purely a state matter. 
In contrast, here
Heintzelman was not only a part of the police team present
at the recovery of the victim’s body, but was a part of the
agency that had jurisdiction over the case. 
Further, it
cannot be contended that Heintzelman’s relationship with
defendant, whom he had not seen or spoken to in a decade,
is akin to that of a father and son. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
Supreme Court established the bright-line rule that an 
accused, having expressed a desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, may not be subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been 
made 
available 
unless 
the 
accused 
initiates 
further 
communication. The initiation of a conversation related to 
the investigation, standing alone, is insufficient to 
establish a waiver of the previously asserted right to 
counsel. 
We incorporated the Edwards rule in People v 
Paintman, 412 Mich 518; 315 NW2d 418 (1982), and the 
Edwards rule was extended to Sixth Amendment claims in 
Michigan v Jackson, 475 US 625; 106 S Ct 1404; 89 L Ed 2d 
631 (1986). 
It is important to note that the Sixth Amendment may 
be violated by questioning that does not rise to the level 
of the custodial interrogation required under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
In Fellers v United States, 540 US ___; 124 S 
Ct 1019; 157 L Ed 2d 1016 (2004), a unanimous Supreme Court 
clarified 
that 
“an 
accused 
is 
denied 
‘the 
basic 
protections’ of the Sixth Amendment ‘when there [is] used 
against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating 
words, which federal agents . . . deliberately elicited 
from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of 
counsel.’” 
Id. at 4, citing Massiah v United States, 377 
US 201, 206; 84 S Ct 1199; 12 L Ed 2d 246 (1964). 
The 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
Court continued: 
“We have consistently applied the 
deliberate-elicitation 
standard 
in 
subsequent 
Sixth 
Amendment cases . . . and we have expressly distinguished 
this 
standard 
from 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
custodial­
interrogation standard . . . .” 
Id.
 This is consistent 
with the Court’s holding in Michigan v Jackson, supra at 
632 n 5, that the Sixth Amendment provides a right to 
counsel even when there is no interrogation and no Fifth 
Amendment applicability. 
 
Even under Edwards, however, the initiation of any 
verbal exchange with governmental agents is insufficient to 
permit further questioning. In Oregon v Bradshaw, 462 US 
1039; 103 S Ct 2830; 77 L Ed 2d 405 (1983), a four-justice 
plurality ruled that communications were “initiated” for 
purposes 
of 
the 
Edwards 
rule 
by 
conversation 
that 
“represent[s] a desire on the part of an accused to open up 
a 
more 
generalized 
discussion 
relating 
directly 
or 
indirectly to the investigation.” Id. at 1045. 
The 
dissenting justices would have defined “initiation” even 
more narrowly as a communication or dialog about the 
subject matter of the investigation. Pursuant to Bradshaw, 
the defendant must initiate communication concerning the 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
investigation in order to avoid running afoul of the rule 
articulated in Edwards.11 
We hold that Heintzelman’s questioning of defendant 
violated the Edwards rule, as clarified in Bradshaw.12  Even 
solely reviewing Heintzelman’s testimony regarding his 
conversation with defendant, there is no proof evincing a 
desire on the part of defendant to pursue a discussion 
relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. 
Defendant merely initiated a social visit with his old 
friend and neighbor. 
It was Heintzelman, not defendant, 
who initiated all questioning relating to the investigation 
and charges against defendant for the murder of Randy 
Laufer. 
In fact, Heintzelman testified that he tried at least 
four separate times to initiate questioning regarding the 
investigation: 
(1) 
he 
initially 
volunteered 
that 
defendant’s son was also incarcerated, but defendant did 
not respond; (2) Heintzelman expressly asked defendant if 
11 
Further, 
even 
if 
a 
defendant 
initiates 
a 
conversation related to the investigation, the state must
still establish that the defendant made a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to have 
counsel present at questioning under the totality of the
circumstances. Bradshaw at 1046. 
12 Indeed, the people conceded at oral argument that if
Heintzelman was a state actor, the admission of defendant’s
statements 
to 
Heintzelman 
violated 
defendant’s 
Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
he did what he was charged with, and again defendant did 
not respond; (3) Heintzelman told defendant that the police 
thought defendant’s son was involved in the murder, at 
which point defendant responded that “if they try to pin it 
on [my son], I’ll let ‘em fry my ass”; and (4) Heintzelman 
again expressly asked defendant if he committed the murder, 
and defendant responded “Dean, it was bad. 
It was bad.” 
Thus, not only did defendant not demonstrate any desire to 
talk about the subject of the investigation, he failed or 
refused 
to 
answer 
Heintzelman’s 
first 
two 
questions 
regarding the murder. 
It was only when Heintzelman 
continued 
to 
press 
defendant 
that 
defendant 
finally 
answered. 
Because defendant did not demonstrate a desire 
to discuss matters directly or indirectly related to the 
investigation, Heintzelman’s questioning was in violation 
of defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.13 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that Heintzelman was a state actor and 
deliberately 
elicited 
incriminating 
statements 
from 
defendant in violation of the bright-line rule, established 
13 We clarify that we do not hold, as the dissent
suggests, that a sheriff’s reserve deputy may never ask a 
friend about a crime without running afoul of the Sixth
Amendment. 
Rather, we hold only that if, at the time of
the questioning, that sheriff’s reserve deputy is a state
actor and questions the defendant in violation of the
Edwards rule as clarified in Bradshaw, that questioning
violates the Sixth Amendment. 
15  
 
 
 
 
in Edwards and clarified in Bradshaw, that protects a 
defendant 
against 
any 
subsequent 
government-initiated 
questioning following the exercise of the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
Heintzelman both possessed actual state 
authority and purported to act under that authority; 
therefore, his action is considered state action. Although 
defendant may have asked to speak with Heintzelman, at no 
point did defendant express a desire to discuss subjects 
directly or indirectly related to the investigation. 
Therefore, 
defendant’s 
statements 
in 
response 
to 
Heintzelman’s questioning regarding the murder should not 
have been admitted at trial. 
We have already determined 
that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; 
therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and remand for a new trial. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 121300 
JOHN RODNEY MCRAE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. 
The majority is reversing 
defendant's conviction of first-degree murder on the ground 
that the trial court erred in admitting a statement that 
defendant made to Dean Heintzelman, defendant’s former 
neighbor and friend, who happens to volunteer as a part­
time, reserve police officer. 
Specifically, the majority 
concludes that this admission violated defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
I strongly disagree. 
In my 
judgment, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
not violated because, when Heintzelman spoke to defendant, 
he was acting as a friend, not as a police officer. Thus, 
there was no governmental action and, therefore, no 
violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was arrested and charged with first-degree 
murder. 
The police advised defendant of his Miranda1 
rights, and defendant told the police that he did not wish 
to answer any questions without his attorney present. 
While 
defendant 
was 
incarcerated 
awaiting 
trial, 
he 
requested a visit from his former neighbor and friend, Dean 
Heintzelman. Heintzelman owns an excavating company and in 
his spare time volunteers as a part-time, reserve officer.2 
According to Heintzelman, the visit began by defendant 
talking about and showing Heintzelman pictures of his son 
and his son’s wife and baby.3
 At some point, Heintzelman 
asked defendant whether he committed the murder with which 
he was charged. 
Defendant did not answer. 
After further 
conversation, Heintzelman again asked defendant if he was 
involved in the murder. 
Defendant hung his head and said, 
“It was bad, Dean. It was bad.” 
Defendant brought a motion to suppress Heintzelman’s 
testimony regarding this statement, alleging that the 
1 Miranda v Arizona, 385 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed
2d 694 (1966). 
2 When defendant initially requested this visit, he did
not know that Heintzelman was a reserve police officer.
However, Heintzelman had just finished transporting a 
prisoner before he came to visit defendant and, thus, was
wearing his police uniform during his visit with defendant.
3 An inmate who was present during this visit also
testified that defendant and Heintzelman’s conversation 
began with defendant talking about his family.
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
statement was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination and his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
The trial court denied 
defendant’s motion to suppress. 
Following a jury trial, 
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. 
The Court 
of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, even if the admission 
of the statement was error, it was harmless error.4
 This 
Court then vacated the Court of Appeals judgment in part, 
concluding that, if there was error, the error was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.5  On remand, the Court 
of Appeals again affirmed, concluding that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement.6 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo, while 
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. 
People v 
LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). 
“The 
decision whether to admit evidence is within the trial 
court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of that discretion.” 
People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 
409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). 
4 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 12,
2001 (Docket No. 217052). 
5 465 Mich 874 (2001). 
6 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 12,
2002 (Docket No. 217052). 
3  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
   
III. ANALYSIS 
After a defendant has been indicted, his Sixth 
Amendment right to assistance of counsel attaches. Massiah 
v United States, 377 US 201, 206; 84 S Ct 1199; 12 L Ed 2d 
246 (1964).7
 Accordingly, a defendant’s incriminating 
statements, deliberately elicited by governmental agents 
after the defendant has been indicted and in the absence of 
defendant’s counsel, are not admissible at trial unless the 
defendant himself initiated the conversation concerning the 
investigation with the governmental agents. 
Michigan v 
Jackson, 475 US 625; 106 S Ct 1404; 89 L Ed 2d 631 (1986). 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is broader than the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel in the sense that the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
provides 
a 
right 
to 
counsel 
beyond 
custodial interrogations. 
Fellers v United States, 540 US 
___; 124 S Ct 1019; 157 L Ed 2d 1016 (2004). 
However, 
“[c]onstitutional 
protections 
apply 
to 
governmental action only . . . .” 
Grand Rapids v Impens, 
414 Mich 667, 673; 327 NW2d 278 (1982). 
Therefore, one 
acting 
as 
a 
private 
individual, 
rather 
than 
as 
a 
governmental actor, cannot violate an accused’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
Further, merely because a 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for
his defense.” 
US Const, Am VI. 
See also Const 1963, art
1, § 20. 
4 
7 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
person may, in some instances, be considered a governmental 
actor, does not mean that this person is always a 
governmental actor. See Polk Co v Dodson, 454 US 312, 324­
325; 102 S Ct 445; 70 L Ed 2d 509 (1981)(although a public 
defender is considered a state actor when performing some 
official duties, he is considered a private actor when he 
is representing a criminal defendant). 
Accordingly, not 
every act performed by an individual who happens to be a 
police officer constitutes state action. 
See, e.g., Barna 
v Perth Amboy, 42 F3d 809, 817 (CA 3, 1994)(an off-duty 
police officer who used his night stick in a fight was not 
a state actor); Bonsignore v City of New York, 683 F2d 635, 
638-639 (CA 2, 1982)(an off-duty police officer’s use of a 
police revolver to shoot his wife was not state action); 
Delcambre v Delcambre, 635 F2d 407, 408 (CA 5, 1981)(an on­
duty police officer’s assault of the plaintiff at a police 
station was not state action because it arose out of a 
personal dispute and the officer neither arrested nor 
threatened to arrest the plaintiff); United States v 
McGreevy, 652 F2d 849, 851 (CA 9, 1981)(a police officer 
who opened a package while working for Federal Express was 
not a state actor).8 
8 The majority observes that all the cases that I cite
are distinguishable from the instant case. 
If, by this
observation, the majority means that none of these cases
5 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
In United States v Gaddy, 894 F2d 1307 (CA 11, 1990), 
the defendant’s aunt, who happened to be a police officer, 
persuaded the defendant to confess to the police. 
The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that she was acting as the defendant's aunt, not 
as a state actor, because she was not part of the 
investigative team on her nephew’s case, she was not 
directed by a superior to contact her nephew, there was no 
evidence that she was acting in the normal course of her 
duties when she initiated contact with her nephew, and she 
involves a former neighbor and friend who happens also to
be a part-time, volunteer, reserve police officer, then I
agree. 
However, the majority has likewise failed to cite
any case in support of its own conclusions that involves a
former neighbor and friend who happens also to be a part­
time, volunteer, reserve police officer.  The majority's
response to this dissent constitutes nothing more than a
recognition that the circumstances of the instant case are
unusual ones. 
What the cases that I cite do stand for is 
the proposition that not everything that a person who is a
police officer does constitutes state action. 
The majority further criticizes some of these cases on
the ground that they address whether conduct constitutes 
state action for the purpose of 42 USC 1983, while the
issue here is whether Heintzelman’s conduct constitutes 
state action for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated that,
if conduct constitutes state action for the purpose of the
Constitution, it necessarily constitutes state action for
the purpose of § 1983. 
Brentwood Academy v Tennessee 
Secondary School Auth Assoc, 531 US 288, 295 n 2; 121 S Ct
924; 148 L Ed 2d 807 (2001). 
Contrary to the majority’s
contention, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the opposite is also true. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
v Tarkanian, 488 US 179, 182 n 4; 109 S Ct 454; 102 L Ed 2d
469 (1988)(“the under-color-of-law requirement of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth
amendment are equivalent”). 
6
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
made no written report following her communication with her 
nephew.9 
The facts of the instant case are similar, but even 
more compelling. 
Heintzelman was not acting in the normal 
course of his duties when he talked with defendant—his 
normal 
duties 
included 
transporting 
prisoners, 
not 
questioning them; Heintzelman's duties as a part-time, 
reserve police officer were entirely noninvestigative in 
nature;10 Heintzelman was not part of the investigative team 
on defendant’s case;11 Heintzelman was not directed by a 
superior or anyone else to contact defendant; Heintzelman 
was requested by defendant himself to speak with him; 
Heintzelman was not acting under the direction of the 
investigating police officers; Heintzelman was not acting 
in 
concert 
with 
the 
investigating 
police 
officers; 
9 The Georgia Supreme Court looked at these same
factors in concluding that the defendant’s father, who
happened to be an FBI agent, acted as a father, not as a
state actor, when he asked his son if he had shot the
victim. Cook v Georgia, 270 Ga 820; 514 SE 2d 657 (1999). 
10 When asked what his duties as a reserve police
officer 
included, 
Heintzelman 
responded: 
“I 
go 
on 
transport, transport prisoners. 
We take care of ball 
games, do security at ball games. 
We help with visitation
at the jail. That sort of stuff.” 
11 Although, as the majority states, Heintzelman “was 
part of the police team present for the recovery of the
victim’s body from defendant’s former residence,” ante at 
10-11, he was there, not in any sort of investigative
capacity, but simply as a volunteer to help guard the scene
until the state police forensic team arrived.
7 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Heintzelman asked no follow-up questions of defendant as 
would have any other minimally trained investigative 
officer; and Heintzelman made no written report following 
his conversation with defendant.12 
The majority cites Griffin v Maryland, 378 US 130, 
135; 84 S Ct 1770; 12 L Ed 2d 754 (1964), for the 
proposition that “[i]f an individual is possessed of state 
authority and purports to act under that authority, his 
action is state action.” 
I agree that whether Heintzelman 
purported to act under state authority is the dispositive 
question. 
In Griffin, an amusement park employee identified 
himself as a deputy sheriff and ordered the petitioners to 
leave the amusement park. 
By identifying himself as a 
state officer and ordering the petitioners to leave the 
park, he clearly purported to act under state authority 
and, thus, his action was effectively state action. 
Unlike the officer in Griffin, Heintzelman did not 
purport to act under state authority. Rather, he purported 
to do nothing more than act as a friend. 
He came to see 
12 Although the prosecutor further asserted at oral
argument that Heintzelman did not report anything about his
conversation with defendant to the investigating officers
until nearly a week after it occurred, I can find no
confirmation of this fact in the record. 
However, the
record 
is 
similarly 
bereft 
of 
evidence 
that 
this 
conversation was promptly reported to the investigating
officers. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
  
 
defendant at defendant’s request, he spoke to defendant 
about their families, and he asked defendant, as a friend 
might do when his friend has been accused of murder, what 
was going on. Further evidence that Heintzelman was acting 
as a friend, not as a police officer, is that when 
Heintzelman 
asked 
defendant 
if 
he 
was 
involved 
and 
defendant said, “Dean, it was bad,” rather than pressing 
defendant for further evidence of guilt, as anyone acting 
as a police officer would certainly do, he simply left. 
Heintzelman behaved, not as a police officer would, but as 
a disappointed friend would when confronted with an 
incriminating statement made by one’s friend concerning a 
heinous murder.13 
The majority’s conclusion that Heintzelman acted as a 
state actor when he spoke with defendant is based entirely 
13 
The majority states that the fact that after 
Heintzelman was confronted with defendant’s incriminating
statement, he “offered to obtain more information” from
defendant evidences that Heintzelman was acting, not as a
friend, but as a state actor when he spoke with defendant.
Ante at 10. 
If Heintzelman had, in fact, spoken with
defendant as he offered to do, this would certainly be
relevant in determining whether the subsequent conversation
with defendant constituted state action. However, the fact
that Heintzelman, after being confronted with defendant’s
incriminating statement, decided that he would be willing
to speak to defendant in order to help the investigating
officers, sheds no light on whether Heintzelman went to see
defendant in the first place as a governmental agent or as
a friend. 
Indeed, if anything, Heintzelman's offer of
future assistance to the officers implies that his initial
conversation with defendant had a different purpose.
9 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
on the fact that Heintzelman served as a part-time, 
reserve police officer, and that when he spoke with 
defendant it was late at night and he was wearing a police 
uniform. 
As explained above, not everything a police 
officer does, regardless of when it is done and regardless 
of the circumstances under which it is done, constitutes 
state action. 
Not even everything a police officer, who 
happens to be uniformed, does constitutes state action. 
That Heintzelman happened to be wearing a uniform when he 
spoke with defendant does not transform Heintzelman’s 
personal actions into state actions.14
 Likewise, the fact 
that their conversation took place after normal visiting 
hours 
does 
not 
transform 
Heintzelman’s 
personal 
conversation with defendant into state action.15 
14 Heintzelman was wearing a uniform, not because he
was attempting to intimidate defendant, or to communicate
his public authority, but because he came to visit 
defendant at defendant's request at a time when he happened
to be in uniform. 
15 Heintzelman visited defendant at around 11:00 P.M.,
not because he was attempting to catch defendant off guard,
but because he happened to be at the jail where defendant
was incarcerated at that time since he had just finished
transporting a prisoner there. 
The majority states that
the fact that their conversation took place so late is
relevant because only governmental agents would have had 
access to defendant at that time of night. 
However, that
this conversation took place several hours before or after
normal visiting hours does not transform this private
conversation into state action. That the police officer in
Barna only had access to a police-issued night stick 
because he was a police officer, did not make his use of
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Apparently, 
the 
majority 
would 
have 
no 
problem 
admitting 
defendant’s 
statement 
to 
Heintzelman 
if 
Heintzelman had first gone home, changed his clothes, and 
come back the next morning to speak with defendant. 
However, in my judgment, it is difficult to comprehend the 
significance 
the 
majority 
gives 
these 
factors 
in 
determining whether a jury will or will not have access to 
defendant's statement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The majority has concluded that someone who happens to 
have volunteered as a part-time, reserve police officer 
cannot ask a friend about a crime with which he has been 
charged without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.16  As 
a result, a clearly incriminating statement made about a 
brutal murder—a statement made voluntarily and fully in 
this night stick in a fight state action, just as the fact
that the officer in Bonsignore only had access to a police­
issued revolver because he was a police officer did not
make his use of this revolver to shoot his wife state 
action. 
16 The majority rejects this characterization of its
holding, and replies that it is merely concluding that a
part-time, reserve police officer can never ask a friend
about a crime only while acting as a state actor. 
Of 
course, such a reply is a mere tautology since the very
issue before this Court is whether Heintzelman was a state 
actor. 
The majority's references to Edwards and Bradshaw 
are similarly circular. 
To repeat, under the majority's
analysis, a part-time, reserve police officer would not be
able to ask a friend about a crime with which he has been 
charged without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
compliance with the requirements of Miranda v Arizona17—is 
to be excluded from the justice system. 
And defendant's 
jury of peers—tasked with carrying out one of the gravest 
responsibilities of citizens in a democracy, determining 
the truth of a criminal charge—will be required to carry 
out 
this 
responsibility 
while 
being 
deprived 
of 
a 
compelling piece of evidence, freely given words from 
defendant's own mouth. 
When all the facts are considered, it is clear that 
Heintzelman spoke to defendant as a friend, not as a 
governmental actor and, thus, Heintzelman could not have 
violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Stephen J. Markman
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
17 By stating that there was no Miranda violation, I am
not implying that compliance with Miranda was required.
Indeed, 
for 
the 
same 
reason 
that 
I 
conclude 
that 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not 
violated—there was simply no state action—I would also
conclude that his Fifth Amendment right was not violated.
The reference to Miranda is simply to underscore the utter
lack of coercion surrounding the statement that the 
majority is suppressing. 
12