Title: State v. Wyatt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S45859
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 1, 2000

Filed:  December 1, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
RALPH ADRIAN WYATT,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC CR9501237; CA A95425; SC S45859)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 4, 1999.
	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the
petition were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Per C. Olson, of Hoevet, Snyder &amp; Boise, P.C., Portland,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief
was Ronald H. Hoevet.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**
	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Raymond Bagley, Judge. 155 Or App 192, 962 P2d 780 (1998).
	**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
		The state seeks review of a Court of Appeals' decision
reversing defendant's convictions for rape, sexual abuse, and
delivery of a controlled substance.  The Court of Appeals held
that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding the
testimony of defendant's expert witness as a sanction for a
violation of the reciprocal criminal discovery statutes.  State
v. Wyatt, 155 Or App 192, 962 P2d 780 (1998).  Because we
conclude that defendant did not preserve at trial the issue of
the appropriate sanction, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.  
		In preparation for defendant's trial, the prosecution
obtained a written report and notes regarding certain physical
evidence from Hormann, the state's DNA expert.  The prosecution
timely disclosed the report and notes to defense counsel, and its
intention to call Hormann as a witness.  After Hormann had
testified on the second day of trial, defense counsel told the
prosecutor that he might call Grimsbo, a forensic scientist, as
an expert witness.  He did not then disclose the nature of
Grimsbo's anticipated testimony.  Defense counsel had not listed
Grimsbo on the defense witness list that he had provided to the
state.
		Early on the third day of trial, the prosecutor asked
defense counsel whether he intended to call Grimsbo as a witness. 
Defense counsel responded that he did not think that he would
call Grimsbo, but that he was "not certain."  Later that evening,
defense counsel left a recorded telephone message at the
prosecutor's office to the effect that he would call Grimsbo as a
witness.  The prosecutor listened to that message at about 6:30
a.m. on the fourth day of trial. 
When the trial resumed that morning, the prosecutor
objected to Grimsbo's testimony "on the basis that it's a
violation of discovery." (1)  The prosecutor noted that, because the
state timely had disclosed Hormann's report and notes, as well as
its intent to call her as a witness at trial, defense counsel had
had ample time to prepare to cross-examine Hormann and to rebut
her testimony.  The prosecutor continued:
	"And for us to adequately prepare for Mr. Grimsbo's
testimony, it would necessitate having Mrs. Hormann
here, at a minimum, and we have not prepared to do that
because we didn't have anything but a possibility that
[Grimsbo] may be called as a witness."
		Defense counsel responded that, notwithstanding his
receipt of Hormann's report and notes, "the clarity of the issue
and the need for Mr. Grimsbo's testimony was not clear to me
until after [Hormann] testified."  At that time, defense counsel
did not argue that there was no discovery violation or that there
was no prejudice to the state.  Defense counsel then made an
offer of proof concerning Grimsbo's anticipated testimony. 
Thereafter, the court excluded Grimsbo's testimony as a sanction
for defendant's discovery violation, explaining:
"[G]iven the stage of the proceedings, that the
potential for Mr. Grimsbo's testimony should have been
obvious earlier in the proceeding, there's a lack of
notice to the State, and that evidence would be
excluded." (2)  

Defense counsel did not ask the trial court to consider 
alternatives to precluding Grimsbo's testimony.  Defendant was
ultimately convicted.
		After judgment was entered, defendant moved for a new
trial.  That motion was based, in part, on the exclusion of
Grimsbo's testimony.  At the hearing on the motion, defendant
asserted for the first time that the trial court had erred by not
first considering alternatives to exclusion.  The trial court
denied defendant's motion.
		On appeal, defendant assigned error to the exclusion of
Grimsbo's testimony.  He argued that there was no discovery
violation, that there was no prejudice to the state, and that the
trial court erred in failing to consider alternatives to
exclusion.  In the Court of Appeals, the state agreed that
defendant had preserved the sanction issue at trial.  The Court
of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that defendant had
committed a discovery violation and that the state would have
suffered actual prejudice from Grimsbo's testimony.  Wyatt, 155
Or App at 202.  The court then concluded that the trial court
erred in failing to consider whether the prejudice could have
been remedied by a less onerous sanction.  Id.  After further
concluding that the error was not harmless, the court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.  Id. at 204. 
We allowed the state's petition for review.  
		On review, the state argues that, rather than remanding
for a new trial, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the
case to the trial court for findings regarding whether a less
onerous sanction was available.  Defendant responds that the
trial court could not conduct a suitable inquiry regarding the
existence of a less onerous sanction at this time and, therefore,
a new trial is the only appropriate remedy.
		In so arguing, defendant primarily relies on two
decisions of this court.  State v. Mai, 294 Or 269, 656 P2d 315
(1982), involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the
witness preclusion sanction provided for in ORS 135.865.  In Mai,
this court upheld a trial court's statutory right to exclude
witness testimony as a sanction for a discovery violation in
certain circumstances:
"[T]he preclusion sanction of ORS 135.865 is not
inconsistent with Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution,[ (3)] provided that the court finds that the
prosecution is prejudiced by the defendant's failure to
comply with the reciprocal discovery statutes, and
provided further, that it appears that no sanction
short of preclusion effectively will avoid the
prejudice which the defendant's lack of compliance
created." 
Id. at 280.  Thus, the court determined that two predicates are
necessary for ORS 135.865 to be applied consistently with the
Oregon Constitution:  The trial court was obligated to make
determinations regarding the existence of prejudice and the
necessity of the preclusion sanction.
		In State v. Ben, 310 Or 309, 798 P2d 650 (1990), the
trial court excluded the testimony of a defense witness due to a
discovery violation.  This court agreed with the trial court that
both the defendant and his counsel had committed discovery
violations.  Nevertheless, this court reversed the defendant's
convictions, explaining:  
	"[I]t does not appear from the record, and the trial
court made no pertinent findings, that a lesser
sanction -- such as a saving instruction to the
witnesses plus a continuance to give the prosecutor
time to renew her request, or requiring defense counsel
to disclose the anticipated substance of the witnesses'
testimony -- would not avoid the prejudice. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred."
Id. at 318.  Ben illustrates this court's willingness to
determine from the record, and in the absence of pertinent
findings, that the trial court had failed to meet the
requirements of Mai.
		As the quoted material from Mai and Ben illustrates,
defendant's reliance on those cases is understandable.  However,
an examination of the briefing in those cases establishes that a
preliminary question -- preservation -- was not at issue in
either case.  That preliminary question is present here. 
Accordingly, before allowing the state's petition for review
here, we requested briefing regarding whether defendant preserved
at trial the issue whether the trial court considered the
availability of a less onerous sanction and, assuming that that
issue was not preserved, the effect of the state's failure to
raise preservation as an issue to the Court of Appeals.  We
address those issues first.  
Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court
will not be considered on appeal.  Ailes v. Portland Meadows,
Inc., 312 Or 376, 380, 823 P2d 956 (1991); State v. Abel, 241 Or
465, 467, 406 P2d 902 (1965); ORAP 5.45(2). (4)  Defendant contends
that he preserved the sanction issue at trial "by opposing the
[s]tate's motion to exclude [Grimsbo] and by making an offer of
proof as to the witness's testimony."  We understand defendant to
argue that the question here is whether there was a discovery
violation and that that question is broad enough to encompass
everything from whether the trial court's finding of a discovery
violation was correct, to whether the violation caused prejudice
to the state, to whether the sanction imposed by the court was
impermissible for any reason.  The state responds that defendant
did not preserve the dispositive issue that the Court of Appeals
considered, i.e., whether the trial court erred in excluding
Grimsbo's testimony.  As noted, the state agreed before the Court
of Appeals that defendant had preserved the sanction issue at
trial.  On review, however, the state now argues that a party may
not waive, either by failing to raise or by conceding the issue,
the requirement that the adversely affected party must preserve
an issue at trial. (5)
		In State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988),
this court stated:
	"We have previously drawn attention to the distinctions
between rasing an issue at trial, identifying a source
for a claimed position, and making a particular
argument. * * * The first ordinarily is essential, the
second less so, the third least."
(Emphasis in original.)
		Defendant relies on Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 948 P2d
722 (1997).  That case involved a prison inmate's claim that he
had filed a complaint within the applicable statute of
limitations.  A defendant moved to dismiss the inmates's action
on the ground that it was not commenced within the applicable
statute of limitations.  The trial court granted that motion, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.  On review, the inmate asserted,
for the first time, that a particular date was the date of
filing.  This court allowed the inmate to make the new assertion,
stating: 
	"[T]he issue was preserved sufficiently under the
standards set out in State v. Hitz, * * * because [the
inmate] raised and preserved the broader legal issue --
whether the trial court erred in holding that his
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 
Under the rationale in Hitz, a specific alternate
argument regarding that issue can be raised for the
first time in this court." 
Stull, 326 Or at 77.   
		The state relies on State v. Stevens, 328 Or 116, 122,
970 P2d 215 (1998), in which this court stated: 
	"[F]or purposes of preserving error, it is essential to
raise the relevant issue at trial, but less important
to make a specific argument or identify a specific
legal source with respect to the issue raised. 
[Citing] Hitz.  Although that principle imparts some
degree of liberality to the preservation requirement,
it does not transform that requirement into a cursory
search for some common thread, however remote, between
an issue on appeal and a position that was advanced at
trial.  Instead, in considering whether an objection at
trial raised the 'issue' being advanced on appeal, an
appellate court must view the facts in light of the
purposes of fairness and efficiency that underlie the
requirement."
		The state also relies on State v. Wilson, 323 Or 498,
918 P2d 826 (1996), an aggravated murder case that came to this
court on automatic and direct review.  In that case, the
defendant had objected at trial to the admission of certain
evidence on hearsay grounds.  The trial court concluded that the
evidence was admissible under OEC 804(3)(c) (statement against
penal interest).  On review, the defendant argued, for the first
time, that the evidence also should have been excluded under OEC
804(2) (unavailability of witness).  This court refused to
consider that argument, stating: 
		"At trial, defendant did not cite OEC 804(2) and
did not argue that [the witness]'s absence was 'due to
the * * * wrongdoing of the [state] for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.'"
Id. at 512 (second set of brackets in original).  This court held
that the OEC 804(2) argument was not preserved below and,
therefore, would not be considered.  Id. (citing State v. Isom,
313 Or 391, 406, 837 P2d 491 (1992) ("[a]n objection on one
ground is not sufficient to preserve some other objection")). (6) 
The foregoing cases demonstrate that a party must
provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her
objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can
identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to
consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is
warranted.  When, as here, a party subject to a sanction for a
discovery violation does not deny at trial that it is subject to
some sanction, its failure to object to the particular sanction
imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some
other sanction, (7) fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the
judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less
onerous sanction.  Defendant's arguments and offer of proof here
did not identify adequately for the judge the issue of
alternatives to precluding Grimsbo's testimony during the trial. 
Accordingly, defendant did not preserve the issue.
		Defendant contends, in the alternative, that the duty
to raise the issue of a less onerous sanction rested on the
state.  He argues:
	"[I]t was the State that moved for the exclusion of
Grimsbo on the basis of a discovery violation.  As the
moving party, the State carried the burden of asserting
the basis for the motion.  See Pacific Eng. Corp. v.
Evans Products Co., 280 Or 257, 262-63, 570 P2d 655
(1977) ('[O]bjections to evidence must ordinarily be
stated with sufficient specificity to disclose to the
trial court the defects in the proposed evidence which
it expects to urge in the event of an appeal and to
give the trial court and counsel an opportunity to
remedy any such defects.')"  
(Emphasis in original.)  Defendant's citation to Pacific Eng.
Corp. is inapposite.  That case placed the burden of asserting
the basis for an objection to evidence on the moving party. 
Here, the state met that requirement.  As the party objecting to
evidence on the basis of a discovery violation, the state's 
burden was to demonstrate that a discovery violation had
occurred.  It is clear from the record that the trial judge found
that defendant had committed a discovery violation.
		Finally, defendant argues that the trial court had an
affirmative duty to inquire, sua sponte, about whether any
prejudice to the state could have been remedied through a less
onerous sanction.  Defendant cites no authority for that
proposition and we are aware of none.  Moreover, we are aware of
no reason, and defendant points to none, to except these
circumstances from the general rule that the party that is
adversely affected by a ruling must preserve an alleged error in
the trial court.  Ailes, 312 Or at 380.
Having concluded that the issue of a less onerous
sanction was not preserved at trial, we proceed to consider the
effect of the state's failure to raise preservation as an issue
in the Court of Appeals and, further, the state's concession on
appeal that defendant had preserved the sanction issue at trial. 
Specifically, we must determine whether that failure or that
concession made it permissible for the Court of Appeals to
consider defendant's sanction argument.
		Defendant contends that, under ORAP 9.20(2), (8) this
court does not have authority to review the question whether the
less onerous sanction issue was preserved.  Defendant argues
that, because the state conceded on appeal that he had preserved
the sanction issue, the issue of preservation was not "before"
the Court of Appeals.  That argument ignores the threshold
question whether the sanction issue was, in the words of ORAP
9.20(2), "properly before the Court of Appeals."  ORAP 9.20(2)
(emphasis added.)  We conclude that, because it was not
preserved, and because the trial court's ruling was not error on
the face of the record, the sanction issue was not "properly
before the Court of Appeals."
		This court's case law supports that conclusion.  In
State v. Bucholz, 317 Or 309, 855 P2d 1100 (1993), the issue in
question was not preserved at trial.  Id. at 320.  The Court of
Appeals nevertheless reached the issue and decided it in
defendant's favor.  Id.  On review, this court reversed the Court
of Appeals, explaining:
	"Defendant would have an appellate court reverse for
absence of findings even though, had the matter been
called to the sentencing court's attention,
applicability of [the statute at issue] might easily
have been established.  To preserve an error * * * a
defendant who objects to lack of express findings * * *
must place that objection on the record at the time of
sentencing.  The Court of Appeals was not required to
consider the error and should not have done so. 
Defendant's claim of error is rejected."
Id. at 321.  Similarly, in State v. Jensen, 313 Or 587, 887 P2d
525 (1992), the issue was not preserved at trial.  Id. at 598. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reached the issue.  Id. at
589.  On review, this court reversed on the unpreserved claim,
holding that the Court of Appeals should not have reached the
claim.  Id. at 598-99.
		In State v. Farmer, 317 Or 220, 856 P2d 623 (1993), the
defendant did not preserve a claim of error in the trial court,
but did raise it in the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals
considered the claim.  This court reversed, explaining:
		"The unpreserved claim of error cannot be reviewed
on appeal because it was not preserved at trial and
because it does not qualify for the exception in ORAP
5.45(2) permitting discretionary review of unpreserved
'error of law apparent on the face of the record.' * *
*
		"In addition, this court recently held that it
would not review an unpreserved claim of error merely
because the Court of Appeals did so, if the Court of
Appeals failed expressly to justify its review as
discretionary review of an error of law apparent on the
face of the record.  State v. Castrejon, 317 Or 202,
212, 856 P2d 616 (1993)."
Id. 317 Or at 224 (emphasis in original).  In Castrejon, 317 Or
at 211-12, this court held that ORAP 9.20(2) permits this court
to review only those unpreserved issues that qualify as error
apparent on the face of the record.  The error alleged in this
case is not of that variety, because it is open to debate whether
a less onerous sanction was available to remedy defendant's
discovery violation.  Accordingly, we may not revive the
unpreserved claim of error in this case, even if the Court of
Appeals did so.
		The foregoing cases demonstrate the necessity of
preserving claims of error at trial.  We hold that the rule of
Castrejon, which permits this court to review only those
unpreserved issues that qualify as errors apparent on the face of
the record, applies to cases in which the lack of preservation
was not raised to the Court of Appeals and to cases in which the
opposing party wrongly conceded that the issue had been preserved
in the trial court.
		On this record, neither the state's failure to raise
preservation as an issue in the Court of Appeals, nor the state's
erroneous concession that the sanction issue had been preserved
at trial, conferred authority on that court to consider
defendant's unpreserved claim of error.  Castrejon, 317 Or at
211-12; ORAP 5.45(2).  The issue on which the Court of Appeals
based its decision in this case was not preserved for appeal, and
that court should not have considered it.
		Defendant also assigned error on appeal to an alleged
error in polling the jury.  The Court of Appeals did not reach
that matter.  Accordingly, we remand the case to that court to
consider defendant's second assignment of error.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

1. 	ORS 135.835 provides, in part:
		"Except as otherwise provided in ORS 135.855 and
135.873, the defense shall disclose to the district
attorney the following material and information within
the possession or control of the defense:
		"(1) The names and addresses of persons, including
the defendant, whom the defense intends to call as
witnesses at the trial, together with relevant written
or recorded statements or memoranda of any oral
statements of such persons other than the defendant."
ORS 135.845 provides, in part:
		"(1) The obligations to disclose shall be
performed as soon as practicable following the filing
of an indictment or information in the circuit
court[.]"

2. 	ORS 135.865 provides:
		"Upon being apprised of any breach of the duty
imposed by the provisions of ORS 135.805 to 135.873
[reciprocal discovery] and 135.970 ,the court may order
the violating party to permit inspection of the
material, or grant a continuance, or refuse to permit
the witness to testify, or refuse to receive in
evidence the material not disclosed, or enter such
other order as it considers appropriate."

3. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part: 
	"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right * * * to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor[.]"

4. 	ORAP 5.45(2) provides:
		"No matter assigned as error will be considered on
appeal unless it was preserved in the lower court and
assigned as error in the party's opening brief;
provided that the appellate court may consider errors
of law apparent on the face of the record."
Defendant does not argue that the trial court's ruling
constituted an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 
Moreover, the fact that defendant raised an issue for the first
time in a motion for a new trial does not cure his earlier
failure to preserve an issue at trial.  Yates v. Stading, 219 Or
464, 473-74, 347 P2d 839 (1959); State v. Langley, 214 Or 445,
476-77, 323 P2d 301 (1958).

5. 	The state concedes that the law requires a trial court,
if asked, to consider available alternative sanctions.

6. 	Other decisions of this court also have emphasized the
importance of the preservation of an issue for appeal.  See,
e.g., Davis v. O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 737, 891 P2d 1307 (1995)
(rules pertaining to preservation of error in trial courts are
intended to advance goals such as ensuring that positions of
parties are presented clearly to initial tribunal and that
parties are not taken by surprise, mislead, or denied
opportunities to meet an argument); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347,
356, 800 P2d 259 (1990)(reasons for rule are to allow adversary
to present its position and to permit trial court to understand
and correct any error); Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77-78,
559 P2d 1275 (1977) (reason for requirement is not merely to
promote form over substance but to promote efficient
administration of justice and saving of judicial time); Denham et
ux v. Cuddeback, 210 Or 485, 493, 311 P2d 1014 (1957) (related
purpose is to prevent litigants from speculating on verdict, then
appealing if verdict is against them).

7. 	By contrast, in State v. Ben, 310 Or 309, 313-14, 798
P2d 650 (1990), the defense counsel objected to preclusion and
suggested less onerous sanctions to the trial court, thus
preserving the sanction issue for appeal.

8. 	ORAP 9.20(2) provides:
		"If the Supreme Court allows a petition for
review, the court may limit the questions on review. 
If review is not so limited, the questions before the
Supreme Court include all questions properly before the
Court of Appeals that the petition or the response
claims were erroneously decided by that court.  The
Supreme Court's opinion need not address each such
question.  The court may consider other issues that
were before the Court of Appeals."
(Emphasis added.)