Title: Selma Gross v. Rebecca Lyons
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-201
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94201
____________
SELMA GROSS,
Petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA LYONS,
Respondent.
[May 18, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
addressing the following question, which the court certified to be of great public
importance:
WHERE A PLAINTIFF IS INVOLVED IN TWO
UNRELATED ACCIDENTS AND SUES ONLY THE
TORTFEASOR IN THE FIRST ACCIDENT, ARE
THE PRINCIPLES OF APPORTIONMENT
CONTAINED IN C.F. HAMBLEN, INC. V. OWENS,
127 Fla. 91, 172 So. 694, 696 (1937), AND
WASHEWICH V. LeFAVE, 248 So.2d 670, 672 (Fla.
4TH DCA 1971) APPLICABLE?
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Gross v. Lyons, 721 So. 2d 304, 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We answer the certified question affirmatively.
The facts and procedure are as follows:  
[Respondent]'s lawsuit arises from a [July 1992]
rear-end collision that she claims resulted in multiple
injuries, including an injury to her back.  Three months
later [respondent] was involved in a second automobile
accident. [Respondent] claimed that she did not suffer
any additional injuries as a result of this second accident
and that her damages resulted from the first accident. 
When [respondent]'s condition did not improve,
[respondent]'s treating orthopedic surgeon performed a
fusion on her lower lumbar spine. [The operation and
subsequent therapy occurred after the second accident.]
[Petitioner] admitted liability for causing the first
accident, but denied being the legal cause of
[respondent]'s damages. [Petitioner] claimed that any of
[respondent]'s medical problems, including her back
surgery, resulted from a preexisting back condition [a
Pars defect] or alternatively from the second accident.
Gross, 721 So. 2d at 305.  
The trial court instructed the jury that respondent could recover for an
aggravation of a preexisting condition; however, the court also gave the following
instruction concerning the second accident:  
The court has determined and now instructs you as
a matter of law that Mrs. Gross was negligent in the
operation of a motor vehicle and that such negligence was
the sole legal cause of the collision involving Rebecca
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Lyons on July 2, 1992.
Rebecca Lyons is therefore entitled to recover
from Selma Gross such loss, injury or damage as is
shown by the greater weight of the evidence to have thus
been caused.
You are further instructed that Rebecca Lyons may
not recover any loss, injury or damage caused by the
second accident of September 15, 1992. 
(Emphasis added.)  Subsequent to receiving the above instruction, the jury returned
a defense verdict and awarded zero damages.
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
ruling on the instruction because   
if the injuries could not be apportioned between the two
accidents, the tortfeasor causing the first accident could
be held responsible for the entire condition if plaintiff has
made all reasonable efforts to apportion the injuries.  
Because the jury instruction was an incomplete
statement of the law concerning subsequent accidents,
the jury might reasonably have been confused and misled
as to what to do if they determined a combination of both
accidents caused [respondent]'s condition but that the
damages could not be separated.  In conjunction with the
complete instruction given on aggravation of a preexisting
condition, this incomplete instruction might have also
improperly led the jury to believe that if the damages
could not be apportioned, the first tortfeasor would not
be responsible for the damages.
Id. at 308.
C. F. HAMBLEN, INC. V. OWENS
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On review before this Court, petitioner argues that the Fourth District erred in
extending the rule in C. F. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens, 127 Fla. 91, 172 So. 694, 696
(1937), to the instant scenario so that a previous tortfeasor may be liable for the
harm caused by a subsequent tortfeasor if the jury cannot apportion the injury
between the two.  Petitioner also advocates that this Court should adopt the "rough
apportionment" method of dividing damage where a jury cannot apportion by a
preponderance of the evidence.  We disagree with petitioner on both counts.
The reasoning in support of Hamblen and its progeny also supports the
application of the Hamblen rationale to the instant circumstance.  Hamblen
recognized the 
settled law that where injuries aggravate an existing
ailment or develop a latent one, the person whose
negligence caused the injury is required to respond in
damages for the results of the disease as well as the
original injury.  In such cases the injury is the prime cause
which opens the way to and sets in motion the other
cause and the latter cannot be regarded as an independent
cause of injury, nor can the wrongdoer be allowed to
apportion the measure of responsibility to the initial
cause.   The defendant must be responsible in damages
for such part of the diseased condition as his negligence
has caused and if there can be no apportionment, or it
cannot be said that the disease would have existed apart
from the injury, then he is responsible for the diseased
condition.   
  
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127 Fla. at 95-96, 172 So. at 696.  
The Fourth District in Washewich v. LeFave, 248 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA
1971), applied Hamblen to an instance of successive accidents and held that
where the evidence reveals two successive accidents, and
the defendant is only responsible for the second accident,
the burden is on the plaintiff to prove to the extent
reasonably possible what injuries were proximately
caused by each of the two accidents.  The jury should be
instructed to make an apportionment of the damages as
between the two accidents insofar as it may be reasonably
possible to do so, but if an apportionment is impossible,
the jury may be authorized to charge the defendant with
all damages flowing from the entire injury.
Washewich, 248 So. 2d at 672-73.  The Washewich court relied on what it found
to be the purpose of the Hamblen court's decision against apportionment:  "The
rule of Hamblen v. Owens has as its purpose the prevention of a subsequent
wrongdoer from escaping responsibility where his conduct contributed to the
creation of the situation in which the problems of apportionment arose." 
Washewich, 248 So. 2d at 673.  An additional purpose in support of the
Washewich decision is that the injured party should be able to recover for his or
her injuries and the recovery should not be diminished because of a jury's inability
to apportion injury between wrongdoers.
In the present case, we have the reverse of Hamblen and Washewich, i.e., the
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prior tortfeasor is sued, but the concerns are the same.  In keeping with Hamblen’s
principle of making the plaintiff whole, we conclude that where the plaintiff sues the
first of two successive tortfeasors and establishes liability, but the jury cannot
apportion the injury between the two after both parties have had the opportunity to
present evidence on the issue, the first tortfeasor will be liable for the entire injury. 
The requirement of proving proximate cause as it relates to the issue of
apportionment is relaxed so as to allow recovery for the indivisible injury.  See id.
at 672.  Furthermore, "a tortfeasor should not escape responsibility when two
independent causes both proximately contribute to cause an ultimate injury and
plaintiff has done everything that could reasonably have been expected of her to
segregate the damages as between the two accidents."  Gross, 721 So. 2d at 307
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In such an instance, prior tortfeasors will be
liable for whole injuries just as subsequent tortfeasors have been liable for entire
unapportionable injuries, thereby providing full relief for proven injuries suffered by
victims of negligence.  Imposition of liability for the indivisible injury upon the prior
tortfeasor mirrors the like imposition on subsequent tortfeasors imposed by
Hamblen.   
THE INDIVISIBLE INJURY RULE
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Our application of Hamblen to the instant scenario effectively results in our
application of the “Indivisible Injury Rule” under which successive tortfeasors
cause damages which the jury cannot apportion, thus giving rise to their liability for
all of the damages.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for the
apportionment of damages between various tortfeasors who contribute to injury if
each tortfeasor’s harm is “distinct” or there is a “reasonable basis for determining
the contribution of each cause to a single harm.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts §
433A (1965).  Conversely, the Restatement explains that when “two or more causes
combine to produce such a single [harm], incapable of division on any logical or
reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the
courts have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each
of the causes is charged with the responsibility for the entire harm.”  Id. § 433A(2)
cmt. i.  Many states apply this rule.  See, e.g., Stubbs v. Ringler, Nos. 85C-OC-1,
86C-MR-13, 1988 WL 117284, at *3 (Del Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1988)(citing Leishman
v. Brady, 3 A.2d 118, 120 (Del. Super. Ct. 1938)); Barlow v. Tornhill, 537 S.W.2d
412, 418 (Mo. 1976); Ravo v. Rogatnick, 514 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (N.Y. 1987);
Pang v. Minch, 559 N.E.2d 1313, 1323-25 (Ohio 1990); Bradford v. Vento, 997
S.W.2d 713, 734 (Tex. App. 1999)(“Joint and several liability is also appropriate
when the tortious acts of multiple tortfeasors combine to produce a single,
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indivisible injury.”). 
Application of the indivisible injury rule is not inconsistent with Florida
statutory law concerning the apportionment of damages amongst tortfeasors based
on fault.  Section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that trial courts “shall
enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of
fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability.”  In Fabre v.
Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), this Court observed that the Legislature’s
intention in enacting section 768.81 was to “replace joint and several liability with a
system that requires each party to pay for noneconomic damages only in
proportion to the percentage of fault by which that defendant contributed to the
accident.”  Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.  The indivisible injury rule and the
apportionment of damages based on fault are not mutually exclusive.  Here, for
example, petitioner was the sole legal cause for the accident; therefore, if that
accident was a substantial factor in causing respondent to suffer an indivisible
injury, then petitioner would be liable for the entire damage.  Accordingly, we
hereby adopt into Florida law the indivisible injury rule to be applied when a jury
cannot apportion injury, as quoted from the Arizona Supreme Court:  “When the
tortious conduct of more than one defendant contributes to one indivisible injury,
the entire amount of damage resulting from all contributing causes is the total
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amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff.”  Piner v. Superior Court, 962
P.2d 909, 915-16 (Ariz. 1998)(internal quotation marks omitted).              
ROUGH APPORTIONMENT
In so holding, we reject petitioner's invitation for this Court to adopt into
Florida law the "rough apportionment" method of dividing damages where the jury
cannot apportion injury by a preponderance of the evidence.  The Supreme Court
of Hawaii in a scenario similar to the case sub judice held that it was error to
instruct the jury that the defendant in the first accident would be liable for all the
damages if it could not apportion damages between successive unrelated accidents. 
That court held that  
the proper procedure is for the trial court to instruct the
jury that if it is unable to determine by a preponderance of
the evidence how much of the plaintiff's damages can be
attributed to the defendant's negligence, it may make a
rough apportionment.  Heretofore, this court has
recognized that
the law never insists upon a higher degree of
certainty as to the amount of damages than
the nature of the case admits, and that where,
as here, the fact of damage is established, a
more liberal rule is allowed in determining the
amount . . . . 
Inherent in such a lessening of the burden of proof
is the assumption that both parties will be permitted to
2  A "preponderance" of the evidence is defined as "the greater weight of the evidence,” Black's
Law Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 1999), or evidence that "more likely than not" tends to prove a certain
proposition.  American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987)).
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introduce all relevant evidence pertaining to all the
accidents even though all the alleged tortfeasors may not
be before the court in the same action . . . . 
The trial court should instruct the jury that if it is
unable to make even a rough apportionment, it must
apportion the damages equally among the various
accidents.  We recognize that this resolution is arbitrary. 
It is, however, no less arbitrary than placing the entire
loss on one defendant.  
Loui v. Oakley, 438 P.2d 393, 397 (Haw. 1968) (footnote omitted).
We decline to adopt "rough apportionment" into Florida law because it is a
speculative method of apportioning damage since the jury is asked to make a
decision by less than a preponderance of the evidence.2  Furthermore, to proceed
to the next stage of the "rough apportionment" method and simply divide evenly the
damage between tortfeasors would work, in many cases, to deny plaintiffs recovery
from tortfeasors not a party to the proceeding based on an apportionment that,
again, is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence.  Under either guise of
"rough apportionment," victims of negligence would be prevented from being
compensated because inferior evidence would result in an arbitrary apportionment. 
Finally, we view our expansion of the rule in Hamblen and the adoption of the
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indivisible injury rule to be less of a departure from established Florida precedent
than would be the case if we adopted “rough apportionment” into our
jurisprudence.  We therefore decline to adopt "rough apportionment."
Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve
the decision below.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance
Fourth District - Case No. 4D96-1399 
(Palm Beach County)
Elizabeth M. Rodriguez of Kubicki Draper, Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Fountain & Williams, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for Respondent
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Richard A. Barnett, Hollywood, Florida,
for The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae