Title: Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. BOLI
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S056265
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2010

FILED: April 14, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
EMERALD STEEL FABRICATORS, INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES,
Respondent on Review.
(BOLI 3004; CA
A130422; SC S056265)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 6, 2009, at
University of Oregon School of Law, Eugene, Oregon.
Terence J. Hammons, of Hammons &amp; Mills,
Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Erika L. Hadlock,
Acting Solicitor General.
Paula A. Barran, of Barran Liebman LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Associated Oregon
Industries.
James N. Westwood, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland,
filed the brief for amici curiae Pacific Legal Foundation and National
Federation of Independent Business.  With him on the brief was Deborah J. La Fetra.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the
revised order on reconsideration of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and
Industries are reversed.
Walters, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in
which Durham, J., joined.
*Appeal from Revised Order on Reconsideration
dated July 13, 2006, of the Bureau of Labor and Industries.  220 Or App 423,
186 P3d 300 (2008).
KISTLER, J.
The Oregon Medical
Marijuana Act authorizes persons holding a registry identification card to use marijuana
for medical purposes.  ORS 475.306(1).  It also exempts those persons from
state criminal liability for manufacturing, delivering, and possessing marijuana,
provided that certain conditions are met.  ORS 475.309(1).  The Federal
Controlled Substances Act, 21 USC § 801 et seq., prohibits the
manufacture, distribution, dispensation, and possession of marijuana even when
state law authorizes its use to treat medical conditions.  Gonzales v. Raich,
545 US 1, 29, 125 S Ct 2195, 162 L Ed 2d 1 (2005); see United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 US 483, 486, 121 S Ct 1711, 149 L
Ed 2d 722 (2001) (holding that there is no medical necessity exception to the
federal prohibition against manufacturing and distributing marijuana).
The question that
this case poses is how those state and federal laws intersect in the context of
an employment discrimination claim; specifically, employer argues that, because
marijuana possession is unlawful under federal law, even when used for medical
purposes, state law does not require an employer to accommodate an employee's
use of marijuana to treat a disabling medical condition.  The Court of Appeals
declined to reach that question, reasoning that employer had not preserved it. 
Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. BOLI, 220 Or App 423, 186 P3d 300
(2008).  We allowed employer's petition for review and hold initially that
employer preserved the question that it sought to raise in the Court of
Appeals.  We also hold that, under Oregon's employment discrimination laws,
employer was not required to accommodate employee's use of medical marijuana. 
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision.
Since 1992, employee
has experienced anxiety, panic attacks, nausea, vomiting, and severe stomach
cramps, all of which have substantially limited his ability to eat.  Between
January 1996 and November 2001, employee used a variety of prescription drugs
in an attempt to alleviate that condition.  None of those drugs proved
effective for an extended period of time, and some had negative effects.  In
1996, employee began using marijuana to self-medicate his condition.
In April 2002,
employee consulted with a physician for the purpose of obtaining a registry
identification card under the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.  The physician
signed a statement that employee has a "debilitating medical
condition" and that "[m]arijuana may mitigate the symptoms or effects
of this patient's condition."  The statement added, however, "This is
not a prescription for the use of medical marijuana."  The statement that
employee's physician signed tracks the terms of the Oregon Medical Marijuana
Act.  That act directs the state to issue registry identification cards to
persons when a physician states that "the person has been diagnosed with a
debilitating medical condition and that the medical use of marijuana may
mitigate the symptoms or effects" of that condition.  ORS 475.309(2).(1)  No prescription is
required as a prerequisite for obtaining a registry identification card.  See
id.
Based on the
physician's statement, employee obtained a registry identification card in June
2002, which he renewed in 2003.(2) 
That card authorized employee to "engage in * * * the medical use of
marijuana" subject to certain restrictions.  ORS 475.306(1).  Possession
of the card also exempted him from state criminal prosecution for the
possession, distribution, and manufacture of marijuana, provided that he met
certain conditions.  ORS 475.309(1).
Employer
manufactures steel products.  In January 2003, employer hired employee on a
temporary basis as a drill press operator.  While working for employer,
employee used medical marijuana one to three times per day, although not at
work.  Employee's work was satisfactory, and employer was considering hiring him
on a permanent basis.  Knowing that he would have to pass a drug test as a
condition of permanent employment, employee told his supervisor that he had a
registry identification card and that he used marijuana for a medical problem;
he also showed his supervisor documentation from his physician.  In response to
a question from his supervisor, employee said that he had tried other
medications but that marijuana was the most effective way to treat his
condition.  Neither employee's supervisor nor anyone else in management engaged
in any other discussion with employee regarding alternative treatments for his
condition.  One week later, the supervisor discharged employee.
Two months later, employee
filed a complaint with the Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI), alleging that
employer had discriminated against him in violation of ORS 659 A. 112.  That
statute prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified person because
of a disability and requires, among other things, that employers "make
reasonable accommodation" for a person's disability unless doing so would
impose an undue hardship on the employer.  ORS 659A.112(2)(e).  Having
investigated employee's complaint, BOLI filed formal charges against employer,
alleging that employer had discharged employee because of his disability in
violation of ORS 659A.112(2)(c) and (g) and that employer had failed to
reasonably accommodate employee's disability in violation of ORS 659A.112(2)(e)
and (f).  Employer filed an answer and raised seven affirmative defenses.
After hearing the
parties' evidence, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed order in
which he found that employee was a disabled person within the meaning of ORS chapter
659A but that employer had not discharged employee because of his disability. 
The ALJ found instead that employer had discharged employee because he used
marijuana and ruled that discharging employee for that reason did not violate
ORS 659A.112(2)(c) or (g).  The ALJ went on to rule, however, that employer had
violated ORS 659A.112(2)(e) and (f), which prohibit an employer from failing to
reasonably accommodate the "known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified disabled person," and from denying employment
opportunities to an otherwise qualified disabled person when the denial is
based on the failure "to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or
mental impairments of the employee."
Among other things,
the ALJ ruled that employer's failure to engage in a "meaningful
interactive process" with employee, standing alone, violated the
obligation set out in ORS 659A.112(2)(e) and (f) to reasonably accommodate
employee's disability.  The ALJ also found that employee had suffered damages
as a result of those violations, and the commissioner of BOLI issued a final
order that adopted the ALJ's findings in that regard.
Employer sought
review of the commissioner's order in the Court of Appeals.  As we understand
employer's argument in the Court of Appeals, it ran as follows:  Oregon law
requires that ORS 659 A. 112 be interpreted consistently with the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC § 12111 et seq.   Section 12114(a) of the ADA provides that the
protections of the ADA do not apply to persons who are currently engaged in the
illegal use of drugs, and the federal Controlled Substances Act prohibits the
possession of marijuana without regard to whether it is used for medicinal
purposes.  It follows, employer reasoned, that the ADA does not apply to
persons who are currently engaged in the use of medical marijuana.  Like the
ADA, ORS 659 A. 124 provides that the protections of ORS 659 A. 112 do not apply to
persons who are currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs.  Employer reasoned
that, if ORS 659 A. 112 is interpreted consistently with the ADA, then ORS
659 A. 112 also does not apply to persons who are currently engaged in medical marijuana
use.  Employer added that, in any event, the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Raich and the Supremacy Clause required that interpretation.
The Court of Appeals
did not reach the merits of employer's argument.  It concluded that employer
had not presented that argument to the agency and thus had not preserved it.  Accordingly,
we begin with the question whether employer preserved the issues before BOLI
that it sought to raise in the Court of Appeals.
Employer raised
seven affirmative defenses in response to BOLI's complaint.  The fifth
affirmative defense alleged:
"Oregon law prescribes that ORS 659 A. 112 be
construed to the extent possible in a manner that is consistent with any
similar provisions of the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as
amended.  That Act does not permit the use of marijuana because marijuana is an
illegal drug under Federal Law."
That affirmative defense is broad enough to
encompass the argument that employer made in the Court of Appeals.  To be sure,
employer's fifth affirmative defense does not refer specifically to ORS 659 A. 124. 
However, it alleges that the ADA does not apply to persons who use marijuana, a
proposition that necessarily depends on both 42 USC § 12114(a), the federal counterpart to ORS 659 A. 124, and the
Controlled Substances Act.  And the fifth affirmative defense also states that
ORS 659 A. 112 should be construed in the same manner as the ADA.  Although employer
could have been more specific, its fifth affirmative defense is sufficient to
raise the statutory issue that it sought to argue in the Court of Appeals.(3)
Ordinarily, we would
expect that employer would have developed the legal arguments in support of its
fifth affirmative defense more fully at the agency hearing.  However, the Court
of Appeals issued its decision in Washburn v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc.,
197 Or App 104, 104 P3d 609 (2005), two weeks before the hearing in this case,
and employer concluded that the reasoning in Washburn foreclosed its
fifth affirmative defense.  The Court of Appeals held in Washburn that
an employer's failure to accommodate an employee's use of medical marijuana
violated ORS 659 A. 112.  In reaching that holding, the Court of Appeals decided two
propositions that bore on the validity of employer's fifth affirmative
defense.  First, it reasoned that the requirement in ORS 659 A. 139 to interpret
ORS 659 A. 112 consistently with the ADA does not require absolute symmetry
between state and federal law.  Id. at 109-10.  Second, it held that, as
a matter of state law, the employee's medical use of marijuana was "not
unlawful" for the purposes of a federal statute that prohibits the use of illegal
drugs in the workplace.  Id. at 114-15.  The court noted that the
question "[w]hether medical use of marijuana is unlawful under federal law
is an open question" and that the United States Supreme Court had granted the
government's petition for certiorari in Raich to decide that question.  Id.
at 115 n 8. 
At the hearing in
this case, employer told the ALJ that five of its affirmative defenses (including
the fifth affirmative defense) were "foreclosed by the Washburn decision"
but that it was "not withdrawing them."  Employer did not explain the
basis for that position.  We note, however, that the Court of Appeals'
conclusion in Washburn that ORS 659 A. 139 does not require absolute symmetry
between the state and federal antidiscrimination statutes and its conclusion that
medical marijuana use is "not unlawful" under state law effectively
foreclosed reliance on ORS 659 A. 139 and ORS 659 A. 124 as a basis for employer's
fifth affirmative defense.  There would be little point in arguing before the
ALJ that employee was currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs if, as the
Court of Appeals had just stated in Washburn, the use of medical
marijuana is not illegal.(4) 
The ALJ issued a proposed order in which it ruled that the Court of Appeals
decision in Washburn controlled, among other things, employer's fifth
affirmative defense.
 After the ALJ filed
his proposed order, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Raich
and held that Congress had acted within its authority under the Commerce Clause
in prohibiting the possession, manufacture, and distribution of marijuana even
when state law authorizes its use for medical purposes.  545 US at 33.  Raich
addressed the question that the Court of Appeals had described in Washburn
as open -- whether using marijuana, even for medical purposes, is unlawful
under federal law.  Employer filed a supplemental exception based on Raich and
alternatively a request to reopen the record to consider Raich. 
Employer argued that, as a result of Raich, "states may not
authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes" and that
"[t]he impact of this decision is that [employer] should prevail on its
Fourth and Fifth Affirmative Defenses."
BOLI responded that the
ALJ should not reopen the record.  It reasoned that Raich did not
invalidate Oregon's medical marijuana law and that, in any event, employer
could have raised a preemption argument before the Court issued its decision in
Raich.  Employer replied that, as it read Raich, the
"Supreme Court has ruled that legalization of marijuana is preempted by
federal law.  This obviously invalidates the Oregon Medical Marijuana
Act."  Employer also explained that it had raised this issue in its fourth
and fifth affirmative defenses, which "recite[d] that marijuana is an
illegal drug under federal law, and that state law deferred to federal
law."  After considering the parties' arguments, the ALJ allowed
employer's motion to reopen the record, stating that "[t]he forum will
consider the Supreme Court's ruling in Raich to the extent that it is
relevant to [employer's] case."  Later, the Commissioner ruled that the
Controlled Substances Act, which was at issue in Raich, did not preempt
the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.
As we read the record,
employer took the position before the agency that, like the protections of the federal
ADA, the protections of ORS 659 A. 112 do not apply to a person engaged in the
use of illegal drugs, a phrase that, as a result of controlling federal law,
includes the use of medical marijuana.   We conclude that employer's arguments
were sufficient to preserve the issue that it sought to raise on judicial review
in the Court of Appeals.  To be sure, employer's fifth affirmative defense, as
pleaded, turned solely on a question of statutory interpretation.  Employer did
not raise the preemption issue or argue that federal law required a particular
reading of Oregon's statutes until employer asked the ALJ to reopen the record
to consider Raich.  Perhaps the ALJ could have declined to reopen the
record.  However, once the ALJ chose to reopen the record and the Commissioner chose
to address employer's preemption arguments based on Raich, then employer's
federal preemption arguments were also properly before the agency.(5)
As noted, the Court
of Appeals reached a different conclusion regarding preservation, and we
address its reasoning briefly.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that, in telling
the ALJ that Washburn foreclosed its affirmative defenses, employer
adopted the specific defenses that the employer in Washburn had asserted
and that employer was now limited to those defenses.  220 Or App at 437.  The
difficulty, the Court of Appeals explained, was that the statutory issues that
employer had raised in its affirmative defenses and sought to raise on judicial
review differed from the issues that the employer had raised in Washburn. 
Id.
In our view, the
Court of Appeals misperceived the import of what employer told the ALJ. 
Employer reasonably acknowledged that the reasoning in Washburn
controlled the related but separate defenses that it was raising in this case. 
Employer did not say that it was advancing the same issues that the employer
had asserted in Washburn, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.
The Court of Appeals
also concluded that employer had not preserved its argument regarding the
preemptive effect of the Controlled Substances Act, as interpreted in Raich. 
Washburn, 220 Or App at 437-38.  It noted that, on judicial review,
employer argued that federal law required its interpretation of Oregon's
antidiscrimination statutes while it had argued before the agency that federal
law preempted the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.  Id.  We read the record
differently.  As explained above, employer made both arguments before the agency.(6)
Having concluded
that employer preserved the issues it sought to raise on judicial review, we
turn to the merits of those issues.(7) 
Employer's statutory argument begins with ORS 659A.124(1), which provides that
"the protections of ORS 659 A. 112 do not apply to any * * * employee who is
currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs if the employer takes action
based on that conduct."(8) 
It follows, employer reasons, that it had no obligation under ORS 659A.112(2)(e)
and (f) to reasonably accommodate employee's medical marijuana use.  In
responding to that argument on the merits, BOLI does not dispute that employee
was currently engaged in the use of medical marijuana, nor does it dispute that
employer discharged employee for that reason.  Rather, BOLI advances two
arguments why ORS 659 A. 124 does not support employer's position.
As we understand
BOLI's first argument, it contends that, because the commissioner found that
employer had violated ORS 659A.112(2)(e) and (f) by failing to engage in a
"meaningful interactive process," ORS 659 A. 124 is inapposite.  We
reach precisely the opposite conclusion.  The commissioner explained that
engaging in a "meaningful interactive process" is the "mandatory
first step in the process of reasonable accommodation" that ORS 659A.112(2)(e)
and (f) require.  However, ORS 659 A. 124 provides that "the protections of
ORS 659 A. 112 do not apply" to an employee who is currently engaged in the
illegal use of drugs, if the employer takes an adverse action based on that use. 
Under the plain terms of ORS 659 A. 124, if medical marijuana use is an illegal
use of drugs within the meaning of ORS 659 A. 124, then ORS 659 A. 124 excused
employer from whatever obligation it would have had under ORS 659 A. 112 to
engage in a "meaningful interactive process" or otherwise accommodate
employee's use of medical marijuana.
BOLI advances a
second, alternative argument.  It argues that "employee's use of medical
marijuana was entirely legal under state law" and thus not an "illegal
use of  drugs" within the meaning of ORS 659 A. 124.  BOLI recognizes, as it
must, that the federal Controlled Substances Act prohibits possession of
marijuana even when used for medical purposes.  BOLI's argument rests on the
assumption that the phrase "illegal use of drugs" in ORS 659 A. 124 does
not include uses that are legal under state law even though those same uses are
illegal as a matter of federal law.  BOLI never identifies the basis for that
assumption; however, a state statute defines the phrase "illegal use of
drugs," as used in ORS 659 A. 124, and we turn to that statute for guidance
in resolving BOLI's second argument.
ORS 659 A. 122 provides,
in part:
"As used in this section and ORS 659 A. 124,
659 A. 127 and 659A.130:
"* * * * *
"(2) 'Illegal use of drugs' means any use
of drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under state law
or under the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. 812, as amended, but
does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed
health care professional, or other uses authorized under the Controlled
Substances Act or under other provisions of state or federal law."(9)
The definition of "illegal use of
drugs" divides into two parts.  The first part defines the drugs that are
included within the definition -- all drugs whose use or possession is unlawful
under state or federal law.  Marijuana clearly falls within the first part of
the definition.  The second part of the definition excludes certain uses of
what would otherwise be an illegal use of a drug.  Two exclusions are
potentially applicable here:  (1) the exclusion for "uses authorized under
* * * other provisions of state * * * law" and (2) the exclusion for
"the use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed health care
professional."  We consider each exclusion in turn.
We begin with the
question whether employee's use of medical marijuana is a "us[e] authorized
under * * * other provisions of state * * * law."  We conclude that, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, it is an authorized use.  The Oregon
Medical Marijuana Act affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, in
addition to exempting its use from state criminal liability.  Specifically, ORS
475.306(1) provides that "[a] person who possesses a registry
identification card * * * may engage in * * * the medical use of
marijuana" subject to certain restrictions.  ORS 475.302(10), in turn,
defines a registry identification card as "a document * * * that
identifies a person authorized to engage in the medical use of
marijuana."  Reading those two subsections together, we conclude that ORS
475.306(1) affirmatively authorizes the use of marijuana for medical purposes(10) and, as a statutory
matter, brings the use of medical marijuana within one of the exclusions from the
"illegal use of drugs" in ORS 659A.122(2).(11)
Employer argues,
however, that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires
that we interpret Oregon's statutes consistently with the federal Controlled
Substances Act.  We understand employer's point to be that, to the extent that ORS
475.306(1) affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, federal law preempts
that subsection and that, without any effective state law authorizing the use
of medical marijuana, employee's use of that drug was an "illegal use of
drugs" within the meaning of ORS 659 A. 124.(12)  We turn to that
question and begin by setting out the general principles that govern preemption. 
We then discuss the federal Controlled Substances Act and finally turn to
whether the Controlled Substances Act preempts the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act
to the extent that state law affirmatively authorizes the use of medical
marijuana.
The United States
Supreme Court recently summarized the general principles governing preemption:
"Our inquiry into the scope of a statute's
pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that '"[t]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone" in every pre-emption case.'  Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 US 470, 485, 116 S Ct 2240, 135 L Ed 2d 700 (1996)
(quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 US 96, 103, 84 S Ct 219, 11
L Ed 2d 179 (1963)).  Congress may indicate a pre-emptive intent through a
statute's express language or through its structure and purpose.  See Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US 519, 525, 97 S Ct 1305, 51 L Ed 2d 604 (1977).
* * * Pre-emptive intent may also be inferred if the scope of the statute
indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field,
or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law.  Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 US 280, 287, 115 S Ct 1483, 131 L Ed 2d 385 (1995).
"When addressing questions of express or
implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis 'with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'  Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 US 218, 230, 67 S Ct 1146, 91 L Ed 1447
(1947)."
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, ___ US ___, ___, 129 S Ct 538, 543, 172 L Ed 2d 398 (2008). 
With those
principles in mind, we turn to the Controlled Substances Act.  The central
objectives of that act "were to conquer drug abuse and to control the
legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.  Congress was
particularly concerned with the need to prevent the diversion of drugs from
legitimate to illicit channels."  Raich, 545 US at 12-13 (footnotes
omitted).  To accomplish those objectives, Congress created a comprehensive,
closed regulatory regime that criminalizes the unauthorized manufacture,
distribution, dispensation, and possession of controlled substances classified
in five schedules.  Id. at 13.
The Court has explained
that:  
"Schedule I drugs are categorized as such because of
their high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted medical use, and absence
of any accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment.  [21 USC] § 812(b)(1). 
These three factors, in varying gradations, are also used to categorize drugs
in the other four schedules.  For example, Schedule II substances also have a
high potential for abuse which may lead to severe psychological or physical
dependence, but unlike Schedule I drugs, they have a currently accepted medical
use.  [21 USC] § 812(b)."
Id. at 14. 
Consistent with Congress's determination that the controlled substances listed
in Schedule II through V have currently accepted medical uses, the Controlled
Substances Act authorizes physicians to prescribe those substances for medical
use, provided that they do so within the bounds of professional practice.  See
United States v. Moore, 423 US 122, 142-43, 96 S Ct 335, 46 L Ed 2d 333
(1975).(13) 
By contrast, because Schedule I controlled substances lack any accepted medical
use, federal law prohibits all use of those drugs "with the sole
exception being use of [Schedule I] drug[s] as part of a Food and Drug
Administration preapproved research project."  Raich, 545 US at 14;
see 21 USC § 823(f)
(recognizing that exception for the use of Schedule I drugs).
Congress has
classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug, 21 USC § 812(c), and federal law
prohibits its manufacture, distribution, and possession, 21 USC § 841(a)(1). 
Categorizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug reflects Congress's conclusion that
marijuana "lack[s] any accepted medical use, and [that there is an]
absence of any accepted safety for use in medically supervised
treatment."  Raich, 545 US at 14 (citing 21 USC § 812(b)(1)). 
Consistently with that classification, the Court has concluded that the Controlled
Substances Act does not contain a "medical necessity" exception that
permits the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana for medical
treatment.  Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 US at 494 and n 7.(14)  Despite efforts to
reclassify marijuana, it has remained a Schedule I drug since the enactment of
the Controlled Substances Act.  See Raich, 545 US at 14-15 and n
23 (summarizing "considerable efforts," ultimately unsuccessful, to reschedule
marijuana).
Section 903 of the
Controlled Substances Act addresses the relationship between that act and state
law.  It provides:
"No provision of this subchapter shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the
field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the
exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between
that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot
consistently stand together."
21 USC § 903.  Under the terms of section
903, states are free to pass laws "on the same subject matter" as the
Controlled Substances Act unless there is a "positive conflict"
between state and federal law "so that the two cannot consistently stand
together."
When faced with a
comparable preemption provision, the Court recently engaged in an implied
preemption analysis to determine whether a federal statute preempted state law. 
Wyeth v. Levine, ___ US ___, ___, 129 S Ct 1187, 1196-1200, 173 L Ed 2d
51 (2009).(15) 
That is, the Court asked whether there is an "actual conflict"
between state and federal law.  An actual conflict will exist either when it is
physically impossible to comply with both state and federal law or when state
law "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"  Freightliner Corp.,
514 US at 287 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67, 61 S Ct 399,
85 L Ed 2d 581 (1941)).
The Court has
applied the physical impossibility prong narrowly.  Wyeth, 129 S Ct at 1199
(so stating); id. at 1209 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).(16)  For example, in Barnett
Bank v. Nelson, 517 US 25, 116 S Ct 1103, 134 L Ed 2d 237 (1996), the
question was whether "a federal statute that permits national banks to
sell insurance in small towns pre-empts a state statute that forbids them to do
so."  Id. at 27.  Although the two statutes were logically inconsistent,
the Court held that it was not physically impossible to comply with both.  Id.
at 31.  A national bank could simply refrain from selling insurance.  See
Wyeth, 129 S Ct at 1209 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(explaining physical impossibility test).
Under that
reasoning, it is not physically impossible to comply with both the Oregon
Medical Marijuana Act and the federal Controlled Substances Act.  To be sure, the
two laws are logically inconsistent; state law authorizes what federal law
prohibits.  However, a person can comply with both laws by refraining from any
use of marijuana, in much the same way that a national bank could comply with
state and federal law in Barnett Bank by simply refraining from selling
insurance.
Because the "physical
impossibility" prong of implied preemption is "vanishingly
narrow," Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va L Rev 225, 228 (2000), the
Court's decisions typically have turned on the second prong of implied
preemption analysis -- whether state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 
See Hines, 312 US at 67 (stating test).  In Barnett Bank, for
example, the Court stated, as a self-evident proposition, that a state law that
prohibited national banks from selling insurance when federal law permitted
them to do so would stand as an obstacle to the full accomplishment of
Congress's purpose, but it then added  "unless, of course, that federal
purpose is to grant [national] bank[s] only a very limited permission,
that is, permission to sell insurance to the extent that state law also
grants permission to do so."  Barnett Bank, 517 US at 31
(emphasis in original).  Having considered the text and history of the federal
statute and finding no basis for implying such a limited permission, the Court
held that the state statute was preempted.  Id. at 35-37.
The Court has
reached the same conclusion when, as in this case, state law permits what
federal law prohibits.  Michigan Canners &amp; Freezers v. Agricultural Bd.,
467 US 461, 104 S Ct 2518, 81 L Ed 2d 399 (1984).  In Michigan Canners,
federal law prohibited food producers' associations from interfering with an
individual food producer's decision whether to bring that individual's products
to the market on his or her own or to sell them through the association.  Id.
at 464-65.  Michigan law on this issue generally tracked federal law; however,
Michigan law permitted food producers' associations to apply to a state board
for authority to act as the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of a
particular commodity.  Id. at 466.  When the state board gave a
producer's association that authority, all producers of a commodity had to
adhere to the terms of the contracts that the association negotiated with food
processors, even when the producer had declined to join the association.  Id.
at 467-68.
In considering
whether federal law preempted the Michigan law, the Court held initially that it
was physically possible to comply with both state and federal law.  The Court reasoned
that, because the "Michigan Act is cast in permissive rather than
mandatory terms -- an association may, but need not, act as exclusive
bargaining representative -- this is not a case in which it is [physically]
impossible for an individual to comply with both state and federal law."  Id.
at 478 n 21 (emphasis in original).  The Court went on to conclude, however, that
"because the Michigan Act authorizes producers' associations to engage in
conduct that the federal Act forbids, it 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'"  Id. at 478 (quoting Hines, 312 US at 67).
The preemption issue
in this case is similar to the issue in Michigan Canners and Barnett Bank. 
In this case, ORS 475.306(1) affirmatively authorizes the use of medical
marijuana.  The Controlled Substances Act, however, prohibits the use of
marijuana without regard to whether it is used for medicinal purposes.  As the
Supreme Court has recognized, by classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug,
Congress has expressed its judgment that marijuana has no recognized medical
use.  See Raich, 545 US at 14.  Congress did not intend to enact a
limited prohibition on the use of marijuana -- i.e., to prohibit the use
of marijuana unless states chose to authorize its use for medical purposes.  Cf.
Barnett Bank, 517 US at 31-35 (reaching a similar conclusion regarding the
scope of the national bank act).  Rather, Congress imposed a blanket federal
prohibition on the use of marijuana without regard to state permission to use
marijuana for medical purposes.  Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532
US at 494 &amp; n 7.
Affirmatively
authorizing a use that federal law prohibits stands as an obstacle to the implementation
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the Controlled Substances
Act.  Michigan Canners, 467 US at 478.  To be sure, state law does not
prevent the federal government from enforcing its marijuana laws against
medical marijuana users in Oregon if the federal government chooses to do so. 
But the state law at issue in Michigan Canners did not prevent the
federal government from seeking injunctive and other relief to enforce the
federal prohibition in that case.  Rather, state law stood as an obstacle to
the enforcement of federal law in Michigan Canners because state law
affirmatively authorized the very conduct that federal law prohibited, as it
does in this case.
To the extent that
ORS 475.306(1) affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, federal
law preempts that subsection, leaving it "without effect."  See
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 516, 112 S Ct 2608, 120 L Ed
2d 407 (1992) ("[S]ince our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 427 (1819), it has been settled that state law that conflicts with
federal law is 'without effect.'")  Because ORS 475.306(1) was not
enforceable when employer discharged employee, no enforceable state law either
authorized employee's use of marijuana or excluded its use from the
"illegal use of drugs," as that phrase is defined in ORS 659A.122(2)
and used in ORS 659 A. 124.  It follows that BOLI could not rely on the exclusion
in ORS 659A.122(2) for "uses authorized * * * under other provisions of
state * * * law" to conclude that medical marijuana use was not an illegal
use of drugs within the meaning of ORS 659 A. 124.
The commissioner
reached a different conclusion regarding preemption, as would the dissenting
opinion.  We address the commissioner's reasoning before turning to the dissent. 
The commissioner, for his part, adopted the reasoning from an informal Attorney
General opinion, dated June 17, 2005, which concluded that the Controlled
Substances Act does not invalidate the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.  Letter of
Advice dated June 17, 2005, to Susan M. Allan, Public Health Direction,
Department of Human Services.  In reaching that conclusion, the Attorney
General focused on those parts of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that either
exempt medical marijuana users from state criminal liability or provide an
affirmative defense to criminal charges.  Id. at 2.(17)  In concluding that
those exemptions from state criminal liability were valid, the Attorney General
relied on a line of federal cases holding that "Congress cannot compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program."  See Printz
v. United States, 521 US 898, 935, 117 S Ct 2365, 138 L Ed 2d 914 (1997)
(so stating); New York v. United States, 505 US 144, 162, 112 S Ct 2408,
120 L Ed 2d 120 (1992) (stating that "the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern
according to Congress's instructions").  The Attorney General concluded
that Oregon was free, as a matter of state law, to exempt medical marijuana use
from criminal liability because Congress lacks the authority to require Oregon
to prohibit that use.
The Attorney
General's opinion has no bearing on the issue presented in this case for two
reasons.  First, as noted, one subsection of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act
affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana.  ORS 475.306(1).  Other
provisions exempt its use from state criminal liability.  See, e.g.,
ORS 475.309(1); ORS 475.319.  In this case, only the validity of the
authorization matters.  ORS 659A.122(2) excludes medical marijuana use from the
definition of "illegal use of drugs" for the purposes of the state
employment discrimination laws if state law authorizes that use.  The Attorney
General's opinion, however, addresses only the validity of the exemptions; it
does not address the validity of the authorization found in ORS 475.306(1).  It
thus does not address the issue that is central to the resolution of this case.
Second, and more
importantly, the validity of the exemptions and the validity of the
authorization turn on different constitutional principles.  The Attorney
General reasoned that the exemptions from criminal liability are valid because "Congress
cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program"
-- a restriction that derives from Congress's limited authority under the
federal constitution.  See Printz, 521 US at 935 (stating limited
authority); New York, 505 US at 161-66 (describing the sources of that
limitation).  Under the Attorney General's reasoning and the United States
Supreme Court decisions on which his opinion relies, Congress lacks authority
to require states to criminalize conduct that the states choose to leave
unregulated, no matter how explicitly Congress directs the states to do so.
By contrast, there
is no dispute that Congress has the authority under the Supremacy Clause to preempt
state laws that affirmatively authorize the use of medical marijuana.  Whether
Congress has exercised that authority turns on congressional intent: that is,
did Congress intend to preempt the state law?  See Cipollone, 505 US at
516 (describing preemption doctrine).  More specifically, the constitutional
question in this case is whether, under the doctrine of implied preemption, a
state law authorizing the use of medical marijuana "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."  See Hines, 312 US at 67 (stating that test).  Nothing
in the Attorney General's opinion addresses that question, and the commissioner
erred in finding an answer in the Attorney General's opinion to a question that
the Attorney General never addressed.
The dissent addresses
the issue that the Attorney General's opinion did not and would hold for
alternative reasons that ORS 475.306(1) does not stand as an obstacle to the
full accomplishment of Congress's purposes in enacting the Controlled
Substances Act.  The dissent reasons that, because ORS 475.306(1) does not
"giv[e] permission to violate the Controlled Substances Act or affec[t]
its enforcement, [that subsection] does not pose an obstacle to the federal act
necessitating a finding of implied preemption."  ___ Or at ___ (Walters,
J., dissenting) (slip op at 9).(18) 
In the dissent's view, the fact that a state law affirmatively authorizes
conduct that federal law explicitly forbids is not sufficient to find that the
state law poses an obstacle to the full accomplishment of the purposes of the
federal law and is thus preempted.  The dissent also advances what appears to
be an alternative basis for its position.  It reasons that the Oregon Medical
Marijuana Act, as a whole, exempts medical marijuana use from state criminal
liability and that ORS 475.306(1) is merely one part of that larger exemption. 
It appears to draw two different legal conclusions from that alternative
proposition.  It suggests that, to the extent ORS 475.306(1) merely exempts
medical marijuana use from criminal liability, then Congress lacks power to
require states to criminalize that conduct under the line of cases that the
Attorney General cited.  Alternatively, it suggests that, because authorization
is merely the other side of the coin from exemption, authorizing medical
marijuana use poses no more of an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes
of the Controlled Substances Act than exempting that use from state criminal
liability and thus that use is not preempted.  We begin with the test that the
dissent would employ in obstacle preemption cases.
As noted, the dissent would hold that
a state law stands as an obstacle to the execution and accomplishment of the
full purposes of a federal law (and is thus preempted) if the state law purports
to override federal law either by giving permission to violate the federal law or
by preventing the federal government from enforcing its laws.  We do not
disagree that such a law would be an obstacle.  But it does not follow that
anything less is not an obstacle.  Specifically, we disagree with the dissent's
view that a state law that specifically authorizes conduct that a federal law
expressly forbids does not pose an obstacle to the full accomplishment of the
purposes of the federal law and is not preempted.
If Congress chose to
prohibit anyone under the age of 21 from driving, states could not authorize
anyone over the age of 16 to drive and give them a license to do so.  The state
law would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress (keeping everyone under the age of 21 off the road) and
would be preempted.  Or, to use a different example, if federal law prohibited
all sale and possession of alcohol, a state law licensing the sale of alcohol
and authorizing its use would stand as an obstacle to the full accomplishment
of Congress's purposes.  ORS 475.306(1) is no different.  To the extent that
ORS 475.306(1) authorizes persons holding medical marijuana licenses to engage
in conduct that the Controlled Substances Act explicitly prohibits, it poses
the same obstacle to the full accomplishment of Congress's purposes (preventing
all use of marijuana, including medical uses).
The dissent,
however, reasons that one state case and four federal cases support its
view of obstacle preemption.  It reads State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27,
854 P2d 399 (1993), as providing direct support for its view.  See ___
Or at ____ (Walters, J., dissenting) (slip op at 9).  In Rodriguez, federal
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents obtained evidence pursuant
to a federal administrative warrant that was valid under federal law but not
under the Oregon Constitution, and the question was whether suppressing
evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant in a state criminal proceeding was
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of the
federal immigration laws.  This court held that it was not.  Suppressing
evidence in the state criminal proceeding was completely unrelated to the INS's
ability to carry out its separate mission of enforcing the federal immigration
laws in a federal administrative proceeding.  This court did not hold in Rodriguez,
as the dissent appears to conclude, that state law will be an obstacle to the
full accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law only if state law
interferes with the federal government's ability to enforce its laws.
The dissent also relies
on four United States Supreme Court cases "for the proposition that states
may impose standards of conduct different from those imposed by federal law
without creating an obstacle to the federal law."  ___ Or at ___ (Walters,
J., dissenting) (slip op at 12).  It follows, the dissent reasons, that the
mere fact that state law authorizes conduct that federal law forbids does not
mean that state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of the
federal law.  The four cases on which the dissent relies stand for a narrower
proposition than the dissent draws from them.  In interpreting the
applicable federal statute in each of those cases, the Court concluded that
Congress intended to leave states free to impose complementary or supplemental regulations
on a person's conduct.  None of those cases holds that states can authorize
their citizens to engage in conduct that Congress explicitly has forbidden, as
ORS 475.306(1) does.
In Wyeth, one of the cases on
which the dissent relies, the defendant argued that permitting state tort
remedies based on a drug manufacturer's failure to warn would "interfere
with 'Congress's purpose to entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling
decisions that strike a balance between competing objectives.'"  129 S Ct
at 1199 (quoting the defendant's argument).  After considering the history of
the federal statute, the Court concluded that "Congress did not intend FDA
oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness."  Id. at 1200.  The Court concluded instead that
Congress intended to allow complementary state tort remedies.  Id. 
Given that interpretation of the federal law, the Court determined that the
state tort remedy was consistent with, and not an obstacle to, Congress's
purpose in requiring warnings in the first place.  Put differently, the state
law was not an obstacle to Congress's purpose because Congress intended to permit
states to continue enforcing complementary tort remedies. 
The Court's opinion in Florida Lime &amp; Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 US 132, 83 S Ct
1210, 10 L Ed 2d 248 (1963), on which the dissent also relies, is to the same
effect.  In that case, the Court determined that a federal marketing order setting
minimum standards for picking, processing, and transporting avocados did not
reflect a congressional intent to prevent states from enacting laws governing "the
distribution and retail sale of those commodities."  373 US at 145.  As
the Court explained, "[c]ongressional regulation at one end of the stream
of commerce does not, ipso facto, oust all state regulation at the other
end."  Id.  The Court accordingly concluded that there was "no
irreconcilable conflict with the federal regulation [that] require[d] a
conclusion that [the state law] was displaced."  Id. at 146.(19)  The Court's reasoning implies
that, when, as in this case, there is an irreconcilable conflict between state
and federal law, that conflict "requires a conclusion that [the state law]
[i]s displaced."  See id.
In both Florida Lime &amp; Avocado and Wyeth and the other two
cases the dissent cites, the Court interpreted the applicable federal statute
to permit complementary or supplementary state law.(20)  None of those cases considered state laws that
authorized conduct that the federal law specifically prohibited, as is present in
this case, and none of those cases stands for the proposition that such a law
would not be an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of
Congress.  Rather, the Court's opinion in Florida Lime &amp; Avocado points
in precisely the opposite direction; it teaches that when, as in this case, the
state and federal laws are in "irreconcilable conflict," federal law
will displace state law.  See 373 US at 146.
As
noted, the dissent also advances what appears to be an alternative ground for
its position.  The dissent reasons that ORS 475.306(1) does not affirmatively
authorize the use of medical marijuana; it views that subsection instead as
part of a larger exemption of medical marijuana use from state criminal laws.  The
dissent's reasoning is difficult to square with the text of ORS
475.306(1).  That subsection provides that a person holding a registry
identification card "may engage" in the limited use of medical
marijuana.  Those are words of authorization, not exemption.  Beyond that, if ORS
475.306(1) were merely part of a larger exemption, then no provision of state
law would authorize the use of medical marijuana.  If that were true, medical
marijuana use would not come within one of the exclusions from the "illegal
use of drugs," as that phrase is defined in ORS 659 A. 122, and the
protections of ORS 659 A. 112 would not apply to employee.  See ORS
659 A. 124 (so providing).(21)
Another thread runs through the
dissent.  It reasons that, as a practical matter, authorizing medical marijuana
use is no different from exempting that use from criminal liability.  It concludes
that, if exempting medical marijuana use from criminal liability is not an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of the Controlled Substances Act
and is thus not preempted, then neither is a state law authorizing medical
marijuana use.  The difficulty with the dissent's reasoning is its premise.  It
presumes that a law exempting medical marijuana use from liability is valid because
it is not preempted.  As the Attorney General's opinion explained, however,
Congress lacks the authority to compel a state to criminalize conduct, no
matter how explicitly it directs a state to do so.  When, however, a state
affirmatively authorizes conduct, Congress has the authority to preempt that
law and did so here.  The dissent's reasoning fails to distinguish those two
analytically separate constitutional principles.
In sum, whatever the wisdom of
Congress's policy choice to categorize marijuana as a Schedule I drug, the
Supremacy Clause requires that we respect that choice when, as in this case,
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of
the federal law.  Doing so means that ORS 475.306(1) is not enforceable. 
Without an enforceable state law authorizing employee's use of medical
marijuana, that basis for excluding medical marijuana use from the phrase
"illegal use of drugs" in ORS 659A.122(2) is not available.
As noted, a second possible
exclusion from the definition of "illegal use of drugs" exists, which
we also address.  The definition of "illegal use of drugs" also
excludes from that phrase "the use of a drug taken under supervision of a
licensed health care professional."(22) 
ORS 659A.122(2).  On that issue, as noted above, employee's physician signed a
statement that employee had been diagnosed with a debilitating condition, that
marijuana may mitigate the symptoms or effects of that condition, but that the physician's
statement was not a prescription to use marijuana.  That statement was
sufficient under the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act to permit employee to obtain
a registry identification card, which then permitted him to use marijuana to
treat his condition.  Employee's physician recommended that employee use
marijuana five to seven times daily by inhalation.  However, without a
prescription, employee's physician had no ability to control either the amount
of marijuana that employee used or the frequency with which he used it, if employee
chose to disregard his physician's recommendation.
The question thus
posed is whether employee used marijuana "under supervision of a licensed
health care professional."  The answer to that question turns initially on
what a person must show to come within that exclusion.  As explained below, we
conclude that two criteria must be met to come within the exclusion.  As an
initial matter, the phrase "taken under supervision" of a licensed
health care professional implies that the health care professional is
monitoring or overseeing the patient's use of what would otherwise be an
illegal drug.  See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2296 (unabridged
ed 2002) (defining supervise as "coordinate, direct, and inspect
continuously and at first hand the accomplishment of" a task); cf. Moore,
423 US at 143 (holding that a physician who prescribed methadone, a Schedule II
controlled substance, without regulating his patients' dosage and with no
precautions against his patients' misuse of methadone violated section 841 of
the Controlled Substances Act).
Beyond supervision,
when a health care professional administers a controlled substance, the
exclusion requires that the Controlled Substances Act authorize him or her to
do so.  That follows from the text and context of the definition of illegal use
of drugs set out in ORS 659A.122(2).  After providing that the illegal use of
drugs does not include "the use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed
health care professional," the legislature added "or other uses
authorized under the Controlled Substances Act."  The phrase "or other
uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act" is telling.  The words
"other uses" imply that the preceding use (the use of drugs taken under
supervision of a licensed health care professional) also refers to a use authorized
by the Controlled Substances Act.  See Webster's at 1598 (defining "other"
as "being the one (as of two or more) left").
Not only does the
text of ORS 659A.122(2) imply that the use of controlled substances taken under
supervision of a licensed health care professional refers to uses that the
Controlled Substances Act authorizes, but the context leads to the same
conclusion.  See Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 401, 84 P3d 140 (2004)
(explaining that context includes "'the preexisting common law and the
statutory framework within which the law was enacted'") (quoting Denton
and Denton, 326 Or 236, 241, 951 P2d 693 (1998)).  As noted, the Controlled
Substances Act both authorizes physicians and other health care professionals to
administer controlled substances for medical and research purposes and defines
the scope of their authority to do so.  See Moore, 423 US at 138-40 (so holding). 
We infer that, in excluding "the use of a drug taken under supervision of
licensed health care professionals" from the phrase "illegal use of
drugs," the legislature intended to refer to those medical and research
uses that, under the Controlled Substances Act, physicians and other health
care professionals lawfully can put controlled substances.
Another contextual
clue points in the same direction.  The exclusion in ORS 659A.122(2) for the
use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed health care professional is
virtually identical to an exclusion in the definition of illegal use of drugs
found in the ADA.  See 42 USC § 12111(6)(A) (excluding "the use of a drug taken under
supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by
the Controlled Substances Act").  The federal exclusion contemplates
medical and research uses that the Controlled Substances Act authorizes, and
there is no reason to think that, in adopting the same exclusion, the Oregon
legislature had any different intent in mind.  Cf. Stevens, 336 Or at
402-03 (looking to the federal counterpart to ORCP 36 to determine Oregon
legislature's intent).   Given the text and context of ORS 659A.122(2),
we conclude that, when a health care professional administers a controlled
substance, the exclusion for the "use of a drug taken under supervision of
a licensed health care professional" refers to those medical and research
uses that the Controlled Substances Act authorizes.
In sum, two criteria
are necessary to come within the exclusion for the use of a controlled
substance taken under supervision of a licensed health care professional:  (1) the
Controlled Substances Act must authorize a licensed health care professional to
prescribe or administer the controlled substance and (2) the health care
professional must monitor or supervise the patient's use of the controlled substance. 
In this case, we need not decide whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the
second criterion -- i.e., whether employee's physician monitored or oversaw
employee's use of marijuana.  Even if it were, the Controlled Substances Act
did not authorize employee's physician to administer (or authorize employee to use)
marijuana for medical purposes.  As noted, under the Controlled Substances Act,
physicians may not prescribe Schedule I controlled substances for medical
purposes.  At most, a physician may administer those substances only as part of
a Food and Drug Administration preapproved research project.(23)  Because there is no
claim in this case that employee and his physician were participating in such a
project, employee's use of marijuana was not taken under supervision of a
licensed health care professional, as that phrase is used in ORS 659A.122(2).
Because employee did
not take marijuana under supervision of a licensed health care professional and
because the authorization to use marijuana found in ORS 475.306(1) is
unenforceable, it follows that employee was currently engaged in the illegal
use of drugs and, as the commissioner found, employer discharged employee for
that reason.  Under the terms of ORS 659 A. 124, "the protections of ORS
659 A. 112 do not apply" to employee.  The commissioner's final order on
reconsideration rests, however, on the premise that the protections of ORS
659 A. 112 -- specifically, the requirement for employer to engage in a
"meaningful interactive process" as an aspect of reasonable
accommodation -- do apply to employee.  Under ORS 659 A. 124, that premise is mistaken,
and the commissioner's revised order on reconsideration cannot stand.  Both the
commissioner's order and the Court of Appeals decision affirming that order on
procedural grounds must be reversed. 
Given the number of
the issues discussed in this opinion, we summarize the grounds for our decision
briefly.  First, employer preserved its challenge that, as a result of the
Controlled Substances Act, the use of medical marijuana is an illegal use of
drugs within the meaning of ORS 659 A. 124.  Second, two potentially applicable exclusions
from the phrase "illegal use of drugs" -- the use of drugs authorized
by state law and the use of drugs taken under the supervision of a licensed
health care professional -- do not apply here.  Third, regarding the first
potentially applicable exclusion, to the extent that ORS 475.306(1) authorizes
the use of medical marijuana, the Controlled Substances Act preempts that
subsection.  We note that our holding in this regard is limited to ORS
475.306(1); we do not hold that the Controlled Substances Act preempts
provisions of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that exempt the possession,
manufacture, or distribution of medical marijuana from state criminal
liability.  Fourth, because employee was currently engaged in the illegal use
of drugs and employer discharged him for that reason, the protections of ORS
659 A. 112, including the obligation to engage in a meaningful interactive discussion,
do not apply.  ORS 659 A. 124.  It follows that BOLI erred in ruling that
employer violated ORS 659 A. 112.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals and the revised order on reconsideration of the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Labor and Industries are reversed.
WALTERS,
J., dissenting.
Neither
the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act nor any provision thereof permits or requires
the violation of the Controlled Substances Act or affects or precludes its
enforcement.  Therefore, neither the Oregon act nor any provision thereof
stands as an obstacle to the federal act.  Because the majority wrongly holds
otherwise, and because, in doing so, it wrongly limits this state's power to
make its own laws, I respectfully dissent.
The
United States Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty in which
state and federal governments exercise concurrent authority over the people.  Printz
v. United States, 521 US 898, 920, 117 S Ct 2365, 138 L Ed 2d 914 (1997).  
Each government is supreme within its own sphere.  Id. at 920-21.  In
enacting the federal Controlled Substances Act, which prohibits all use of
marijuana, Congress acted pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause. 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 US 1, 5, 125 S Ct 2195, 162 L Ed 2d 1 (2005).  In
enacting the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, which permits the circumscribed use
of medical marijuana, Oregon acted pursuant to its historic power to define
state criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 US 589, 603, 603 n 30, 97 S Ct 869,
51 L Ed 2d 64 (1977); Robinson v. California, 370 US 660, 664, 82 S Ct
1417, 8 L Ed 2d 758 (1962). 
In
enacting the Controlled Substances Act, Congress did not have the power to
require Oregon to adopt, as state criminal law, the policy choices represented
in that federal act.  Congress does not have the power to commandeer a state's
legislative processes by compelling it to enact or enforce federal laws.  New
York v. United States, 505 US 144, 149, 112 S Ct 2408, 120 L Ed 2d 120
(1992).  "[E]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution
to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly
to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts."  Id. at
166.
Because
it had authority to enact the Controlled Substances Act, Congress did, however,
have the power to expressly preempt state laws that conflict with the
Controlled Substances Act.  A cornerstone of the Supreme Court's Supremacy
Clause analysis is that "[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in
those in which Congress has legislated in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied," the Court "start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."  Wyeth
v. Levine, ___ US ___, ___, 129 S Ct 1187, 1194-95, 173 L Ed 2d 51 (2009)
(internal ellipsis and quotation marks omitted).  The Court relies on that
presumption out of "respect for the States as independent sovereigns in
our federal system."  Id. at 1195 n 3 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As
the majority recognizes, the Controlled Substances Act does not include an
express preemption provision.  ___Or at ___ (slip op at 17-18).  It contains,
instead, "a saving clause" intended to "preserve state
law."  See Wyeth, 129 S Ct at 1196 (so construing nearly
identical provision in Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).  Thus, the
majority should begin its analysis "with the assumption that the historic
police powers [exercised by the State of Oregon] were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act * * *." Id. at 1194-95.
The
majority does not do so.  It instead implies, from the federal policy choice
that the Controlled Substances Act represents, a Congressional intent to
preempt provisions of Oregon law that makes a different policy choice.  ___ Or
at ___ (slip op at 30).  To understand the majority's error in applying the
"obstacle" prong of the United States Supreme Court's implied preemption
analysis, it is important to understand the purposes and effects of the federal
and state laws that are at issue in this case.
Congress
enacted the federal Controlled Substances Act, as the majority explains, to
"conquer drug abuse" and "control" traffic in controlled
substances.  ___Or at ___ (slip op at 15-16).  In listing marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, Congress decided that marijuana has no recognized medical
use.  Therefore, "Congress imposed a blanket federal prohibition" on
the use of marijuana.  ___ Or at ___  (slip op at 21).  As noted, Congress did
not expressly indicate, however, that states could not enact their own criminal
drug laws or make different decisions about the appropriate use of marijuana.
Oregon
did in fact enact its own criminal drug laws, including the state Uniform
Controlled Substances Act (ORS 475.005 to 475.285 and ORS 475.840 to 475.980). 
That act controls and punishes, as state criminal law, the use of all
substances that the federal government classifies as Schedule I drugs,
including marijuana.  ORS 475.840; ORS 475.856 - 475.864.  Oregon also enacted
the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.  That act exempts certain medical marijuana
users from the state criminal drug laws, including from the state
Uniform Controlled Substances Act.  The Oregon Medical Marijuana Act does not
permit Oregonians to violate the federal Controlled Substances Act or bar the
federal government from continuing to enforce the federal Controlled Substances
Act against Oregonians.  The Oregon Attorney General described the purpose and
reach of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act in a letter ruling: 
"The Act protects medical marijuana users who comply
with its requirements from state criminal prosecution for production,
possession, or delivery of a controlled substance.  See, e.g., ORS
475.306(2), 475.309(9) and 475.319.  However, the Act neither protects
marijuana plants from seizure nor individuals from prosecution if the federal
government chooses to take action against patients or caregivers under the
federal [Controlled Substances Act]. The Act is explicit in its scope: 'Except
as provided in ORS 475.316 and 475.342, a person engaged in or assisting in the
medical use of marijuana [in compliance with the terms of the Act] is excepted
from the criminal laws of the state for possession, delivery or
production of marijuana, aiding and abetting another in the possession,
delivery or production of marijuana or any other criminal offense in which
possession, delivery or production of marijuana is an element * * *.'  ORS
475.309(1)."
Letter of Advice
dated June 17, 2005, to Susan M. Allen, Public Health Director, Department of
Human Services, 2 (first emphasis in original; later emphases added).(1)  The Oregon Attorney
General also concluded in that letter ruling that the decision of the Supreme
Court in Raich -- that Congress had authority to enact the blanket
prohibitions in the Controlled Substances Act -- had no effect on the validity
of Oregon's statute: 
"Raich does not hold that state laws
regulating medical marijuana are invalid nor does it require states to repeal
existing medical marijuana laws.  Additionally, the case does not oblige states
to enforce federal laws.  * * * The practical effect of Raich in Oregon
is to affirm what we have understood to be the law since the adoption of the
Act."(2)
Id. (emphasis in original).
The
majority seems to accept that the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act does not bar the
federal government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act.  The majority
acknowledges that "state law does not prevent the federal government from
enforcing its marijuana laws against medical marijuana users in Oregon if the
federal government chooses to do so."   ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 21-22).  
The majority also seems to accept, as a result, that provisions of the Oregon
Medical Marijuana Act that exempt persons from state criminal liability do not
pose an obstacle to the Controlled Substances Act.(3)  However, in the
majority's view, one subsection of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, ORS 475.306(1),
presents an obstacle to the Controlled Substances Act and does so solely
because it includes words of authorization.  Id. at __ (slip op at 23).
As
I will explain in more detail, I believe that the majority is incorrect in
reaching that conclusion.  First, the words of authorization used in ORS
475.306(1) and other subsections of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act serve only
to make operable the exceptions to and exemptions from state prosecution
provided in the remainder of the act.  The words of authorization used in those
subsections do not grant authorization to act that is not already inherent in
the exceptions or exemptions, nor do they permit the violation of federal law. 
Second, in instances in which state law imposes standards of conduct that are
different than the standards of conduct imposed by federal law, but both laws
can be enforced, the Supreme Court has not held the state laws to be obstacles
to the federal laws, nor discerned an implied Congressional intent to preempt
the state laws from the different policy choices made by the federal
government.  Thus, the majority is incorrect in finding that the standard of
conduct and policy choice represented by the Controlled Substances Act
prohibits a different state standard of conduct and policy choice.  Both the
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act and the Controlled Substances Act can be enforced,
and this state court should not interpret the federal act to impliedly preempt
the state act.
The
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act contains a number of subsections that use words of
authorization.  Those subsections are interwoven with the subsections of the
act that except and exempt medical marijuana users from criminal liability. 
For instance, ORS 475.309, which the majority cites as a provision that excepts
persons who use medical marijuana from state criminal liability, ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 24), provides that a person engaged in or assisting in the medical
use of marijuana "is excepted from the criminal laws of the
state" if certain conditions, including holding a "registry
identification card," are satisfied.  (Emphases added.)  ORS
475.302(10) defines "registry identification card" as follows:  
"a document issued by the department that identifies a
person authorized to engage in the medical use of marijuana and the
person's designated primary caregiver, if any."  
(Emphasis added.)
Consider
also ORS 475.306(1), the section of the act that the majority finds offending. 
That subsection references both ORS 475.309, the exception section, and the
registry identification card necessary to that exception.  ORS 475.306(1)
provides:  
"A person who possesses a registry
identification card issued pursuant to ORS 475.309 may engage in,
and a designated primary caregiver of such person may assist in, the medical
use of marijuana only as justified to mitigate the symptoms or effects of the
person's debilitating medical condition."(4)
(Emphasis added.) 
Reading those three provisions together, it is clear that ORS 475.306(1) serves
as a limitation on the use of medical marijuana that the registry
identification card and ORS 475.309 together permit.  Under ORS 475.306(1), a
person who possesses a registry identification card issued pursuant to ORS
475.309 may engage in the use the card permits "only as justified
to mitigate the symptoms or effects of the person's debilitating medical
condition."  (Emphasis added.)
ORS
475.319, another section of the act that the majority cites as creating an
exemption from criminal liability, also depends on words of permission for its
operation.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 24).  ORS 475.319 creates an affirmative
defense to a criminal charge of possession of marijuana, but only for persons
who possess marijuana "in amounts permitted under ORS
475.320."  (Emphasis added.)  ORS 475.320(1)(a) provides:  "A registry
identification cardholder * * * may possess up to six mature
marijuana plants and 24 ounces of usable marijuana."  (Emphasis added.)   
The
words of authorization used in ORS 475.306(1) are no different from the words
of authorization that are used in other sections of the act and that are
necessary to effectuate ORS 475.309 and ORS 475.319 and the exceptions to and
exemptions from criminal liability that they create.  Those words of
authorization do not grant permission that would not exist if those words were
eliminated or replaced with words of exception or exclusion.  Even if it did
not use words of permission, the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act would permit, for
purposes of Oregon law, the conduct that it does not punish.  Furthermore, the
statutory sections that provide that citizens may, for state law purposes,
engage in the conduct that the state will not punish have no effect on the
Controlled Substances Act that is greater than the effect of the sections that
declare that the state will not punish that conduct.
Because
neither the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act nor any subsection thereof gives
permission to violate the Controlled Substances Act or affects its enforcement,
the Oregon act does not pose an obstacle to the federal act necessitating a
finding of implied preemption.  In State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27, 854
P2d 399 (1993), this court recognized that state and federal laws can prescribe
different standards, each acting within its own authority, without affecting
the other's authority, and without offending the Supremacy Clause.  In that
case, the defendant had been arrested by federal immigration agents on a
warrant that the state conceded did not satisfy the oath or affirmation
requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  The state
argued, however, that, because the warrant was valid under federal law,
"the Supremacy Clause render[ed] Article I, section 9, inapplicable to the
arrest * * *."  Id. at 34.  The court rejected that argument and
concluded that preemption was not at issue because the application of the state
constitutional requirements for an arrest warrant did not "affect the
ability of the federal government to administer or enforce its * * *
laws."  Id. at 36.  Because the court interpreted the state
constitution not to impose requirements on arrests by federal officers, the
state and the federal law did not conflict:
"Because this court's interpretation of Article I,
section 9, in this context, cannot and will not interfere with the federal
government in immigration matters, the Supremacy Clause has no bearing on this
case and this court is not 'preempted' from applying Article I, section 9, to
defendant's arrest." 
Id.  Similarly, the Oregon Medical Marijuana
Act "cannot and will not interfere with" the federal government's
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act and does not offend the Supremacy
Clause.
Instead
of following Rodriguez, the majority relies on two United States
Supreme Court cases for the proposition that state law that permits what
federal law prohibits is impliedly preempted.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 21). 
The majority then concludes that, "[t]o the extent that ORS 475.306(1)
affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, federal law preempts
that subsection, leaving it 'without effect.'"  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at
22).  I disagree with the majority's analysis for two reasons.  First, the
cases that the majority cites stand only for the proposition that when federal
law bestows an unlimited power or right, state law cannot preclude the exercise
of that power or right.  The Controlled Substances Act does not create a right;
it prohibits certain conduct.  Second, other Supreme Court cases hold that when
a federal law does not create powers or rights but, instead, sets standards for
conduct, state law may set different standards for the same conduct without
offending the Supremacy Clause, as long as both sets of laws may be enforced. 
By deciding not to punish the medical use of marijuana, the Oregon Medical
Marijuana Act authorizes, for state law purposes, conduct that the Controlled
Substances Act prohibits.  The Oregon Medical Marijuana Act does not, however,
offend the Supremacy Clause because it does not affect enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act.  
In
the first of the two cases on which the majority relies, Barnett Bank v.
Nelson, 517 US 25, 116 S Ct 1103, 134 L Ed 2d 237 (1996), a federal statute
explicitly granted national banks the unlimited power to sell insurance in
small towns.  A state statute forbade and impaired the exercise of that power,
and the court held that it was preempted.
Michigan
Canners &amp; Freezers v. Agricultural Bd., 467 US 461, 104 S Ct 2518, 81 L
Ed 2d 399 (1984), the second case on which the majority relies, concerned a
conflict between the federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act, which protects
the rights of producers of agricultural goods to remain independent and to
bring their products to market on their own without being required to sell
those products through an association, and a Michigan statute.  Id. at
473.  As the court explained in Massachusetts Medical Soc. v. Dukakis,
815 F2d 790, 796 (1st Cir), cert den, 484 US 896 (1987), the
Agricultural Fair Practice Act creates a "right to refrain from joining an
association of producers[.]"  (Ellipses omitted.)  The Michigan statute at
issue prevented the exercise of the right conferred by the act by precluding an
agricultural producer "from marketing his goods himself" and
"impos[ed] on the producer the same incidents of association membership
with which Congress was concerned * * *."  Michigan Canners, 467 US
at 478.  The Court held that under those circumstances, the state statute was
preempted.
Neither
Barnett nor Michigan Canners stands for the proposition that a
state statute that permits conduct that the federal government punishes is
preempted.  In those cases, the federal statutes did not punish conduct; they
created powers or rights.  The Court therefore struck down state statutes that
forbade, impaired or prevented exercise of those powers or rights.  Because the
Controlled Substances Act does not create a federal power or right and the
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act does not forbid, impair, or prevent the exercise
of a federal power or right, Barnett and Michigan Canners are
inapposite.  The more relevant Supreme Court cases are those that consider the
circumstance that exists when federal and state laws impose different standards
of conduct.  Those cases stand for the proposition that states may impose
standards of conduct different from those imposed by a federal law without
creating an obstacle to the federal law.  
In
California v. ARC America Corp., 490 US 93, 109 S Ct 1661, 104 L Ed 2d
86 (1989), the Court considered, under the "obstacle prong" of its
"actual conflict" implied preemption analysis, the conflict between
Section 4 of the federal Clayton Act, which authorizes only direct purchasers
to recover monopoly overcharges, and a state statute, which expressly permits recovery
by indirect purchasers.  The Supreme Court held that, even if the state statute
directly conflicted with the goals of the federal law, as the Ninth Circuit had
held, the state statute was not preempted.  The Supreme Court reasoned that
states are not required to pursue federal goals when enacting their own laws: 
"It is one thing to consider the congressional policies
identified in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining
what sort of recovery federal antitrust law authorizes; it is something altogether
different, and in our view inappropriate, to consider them as defining what
federal law allows States to do under their own antitrust law."
Id. at 103.
Other
Supreme Court cases also illustrate the Court's refusal to imply preemption,
under the "obstacle" prong of its implied preemption analysis, where
state and federal statutes set contrary standards or pursue contrary
objectives.  In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 US 238, 246, 104 S Ct
615, 78 L Ed 2d 443 (1984), a case that the court in ARC America cited
as authority, the jury had awarded the plaintiff a judgment of $10 million in
punitive damages against the defendant, a nuclear power company.  The defendant
asserted that a conflict existed between the state law that permitted the
judgment and a federal law regulating nuclear power plants, with which the
defendant had complied.  Despite an earlier ruling that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission had exclusive authority to regulate the safety of nuclear power
plants,(5)
and even though the Court accepted that "there is tension between the
conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal law
and the conclusion that a State may nevertheless award damages based on its own
law of liability," id. at 256, the Court refused to invalidate the
state law.  
In
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 US 132, 83 S Ct
1210, 10 L Ed 2d 248 (1963), a federal statute authorized the marketing of
Florida avocados on the basis of weight, size, and picking date; California,
however, regulated the marketing of avocados sold in the state on the basis of
oil content.  As a result of the differing standards, about six percent of
Florida avocados that were deemed mature under federal standards were rejected
from California markets.  The plaintiffs argued that the federal standard for
regulating Florida avocados preempted California's conflicting regulation.  As
the dissent argued: 
"The conflict between federal and state law is
unmistakable here. The Secretary asserts certain Florida avocados are mature.
The state law rejects them as immature. And the conflict is over a matter of
central importance to the federal scheme. The elaborate regulatory scheme of
the marketing order is focused upon the problem of moving mature avocados into
interstate commerce. The maturity regulations are not peripheral aspects of the
federal scheme." 
373 US at 173
(White, J., dissenting).  The majority, however, concluded that the test of
whether an actual conflict existed was not whether the laws adopted contrary
standards, but whether both laws could be enforced: 
 "The test of whether both federal and state
regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether
both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal
superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or
different objectives."
Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
The
Court's most recent case on the issue, Wyeth v. Levine, ___US___, 129 S
Ct 1187, 174 L Ed 2d 51 (2009), is in accord.  In that case, the court was
presented with a conflict between state and federal law that the dissent
characterized as follows:  "The FDA told Wyeth that Phenergan's label
renders its use 'safe.'  But the State of Vermont, through its tort law said: 
'Not so.'"(6) 
Id., 129 S Ct at 1231 (Alito, J. dissenting).  Nevertheless, the
majority upheld the state law.  Although the two laws imposed contradictory
standards, the state law was not preempted.  
The
cases that I have reviewed demonstrate that the Supreme Court requires more as
a basis for implying a congressional intent to preempt a state law than a
Congressional purpose that is at odds with the policy that a state selects. 
The Court has permitted state laws that impose standards of conduct different
than those set by federal laws to stand unless the state laws preclude the
enforcement of the federal laws or have some other demonstrated effect on their
operation.  The Court has found state laws that forbid, impair or prevent the
exercise of federally granted powers or rights to be preempted.
The
majority does not contend, in accordance with those cases, that ORS 475.306(1)
or the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act as a whole precludes enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act or has any other demonstrated effect on its
"accomplishment and execution."  The only obstacles to the federal
act that the majority identifies are Oregon's differing policy choice and the
lack of respect that it signifies.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 31).   
As
an example of the way it believes the Supremacy Clause to operate, the majority
posits that, if Congress were to pass a law prohibiting persons under the age
of 21 from driving, a state law authorizing persons over the age of 16 to drive
and giving them a license to do so would be preempted.(7)  ___ Or at ___ (slip op
at 26).  The majority would be correct if Congress had authority to make
such a law and if Congress expressly preempted state laws allowing
persons under the age of 21 to drive or indicated an intent to occupy the
field.  However, without such statement of Congressional intent, implied
preemption does not necessarily follow.  As a sovereign state, Oregon has
authority to license its drivers and to choose its own age requirements.  If
Oregon set at 16 years the minimum age for its drivers then, the Oregon driver
licenses it issued would give 16-year-olds only state permission to drive.  The
Oregon law would not be preempted, but neither would it protect 16-year-olds
from federal prosecution and liability.  
As
a result, an Oregon legislature considering whether to enact such a law could
decide, as a practical matter, that it would not be in the interest of its
citizens to grant licenses that could result in federal prosecution.  Suppose,
however, that Congress had passed the federal law that the majority posits, but
that federal officers were not enforcing it.  Or suppose further that the
federal government had announced a federal policy decision not to enforce the federal
law against "individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous
compliance with existing state laws" permitting minors to drive.  Could
Oregon not serve as a laboratory allowing minors to drive on its roads under
carefully circumscribed conditions to permit them to acquire driving skills and
giving Congress important information that might assist it in determining
whether its policy should be changed?  Is not one of federalism's chief virtues
that "a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country"?  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US
262, 311, 52 S Ct 371, 76 L Ed 747 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (so
contending).  
In
the case of medical marijuana, the federal government in fact has announced
that it will not enforce the Controlled Substances Act against
"individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state laws permitting the medical use of marijuana."(8)  Oregon is not the only
state that permits the use of medical marijuana, and at least one state is
considering rules to "identify requirements for the licensure of producers
and cannabis production facilities."  New
Mexico's "Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act," 2007 New Mexico Laws ch
210, § 7 (SB 523).(9)
As I explained at the outset, the federal
government has no power to require that the Oregon legislature pass state laws
to implement or give effect to federal policy choices.  One sovereign may make
a policy choice to prohibit and punish conduct; the other sovereign may make a
different policy choice not to do so and instead to permit, for purposes of
state law only, other circumscribed conduct.  Absent express preemption, a
particular policy choice by the federal government does not alone establish an implied
intent to preempt contrary state law.  A different choice by a state is just
that -- different.  A state's contrary choice does not indicate a lack of
respect; it indicates federalism at work.
The
consequence of the majority's decision that the Controlled Substance Act
invalidates ORS 475.306(1) is that petitioner is disqualified from the benefits
of ORS 659 A. 124, which imposes a requirement of reasonable accommodation.  The
majority states that it does not decide "whether the legislature, if it
chose to do so and worded Oregon's disability law differently, could require
employers to reasonably accommodate otherwise qualified disabled employees who
use medical marijuana to treat their disabilities."  ___ Or at ___ n 12 (slip
op at 14-15 n 12).  Indeed, different words could be used for that purpose. 
For instance, the legislature could state expressly in ORS chapter 659A that
disabled persons who would be entitled to the affirmative defense set forth in
ORS 475.319 (a provision the majority does not find preempted) are not
disqualified from the protections of the Oregon Disability Act, including the
requirement of reasonable accommodation.  Or, to be even more careful, the
legislature could state, in chapter 659A, the conditions that a medical marijuana
user must meet to be entitled to the protections of the Oregon Disability Act
without any reference to the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.  If the legislature
took either of those actions, reasonable accommodation would not be tied to the
provision of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that the majority finds to be of
"no effect."  
Although
such changes could secure the right of reasonable accommodation for disabled
persons who use medical marijuana in compliance with Oregon law, the changes
would not eliminate the questions that the majority's analysis raises about the
validity of other provisions of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that use words
of authorization or about the reach of Oregon's legislative authority.  If the
majority decision simply represents a formalistic view of the Supremacy Clause
that permits Oregon to make its own choices about what conduct to punish (and
thereby to permit) as long as it phrases its choices carefully, perhaps my
concern is overstated.  But as I cannot imagine that Congress would be
concerned with the phrasing, rather than the effect, of state law, I not only
think that the majority is wrong, I fear that it wrongly limits the legislative
authority of this state.  If it does, it not only limits the state's authority
to make its own medical marijuana laws, it limits the state's authority to
enact other laws that set standards of conduct different than the standards set
by the federal government.  Consider just one statute currently on the books --
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act.
Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act affirmatively authorizes physicians to use controlled
substances to assist suicide.(10) 
In Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 US 243, 126 S Ct 904, 163 L Ed 2d 748 (2006),
the Supreme Court considered the validity of a federal Interpretive Rule that
provided that "using controlled substances to assist suicide is not a
legitimate medical practice and that dispensing or prescribing them for this
purpose is unlawful under the [Controlled Substances Act]."  Id. at
249.  The Supreme Court decided that the Interpretive Rule was invalid and did
not decide whether the federal rule preempted the Oregon act.  But if the
federal government were to adopt a statute or a valid rule to the same effect,
would this court hold that, because the Oregon Death with Dignity Act grants
physicians permission to take actions that federal law prohibits, the state
statute is preempted and of no effect?  If so, the court would invalidate a
state law using an analysis that at least three members of the Supreme Court
have recognized to be faulty:  
 "[T]he [Interpretive Rule] does not purport to pre-empt
state law in any way, not even by conflict pre-emption  -- unless the Court is
under the misimpression that some States require assisted suicide."
Gonzales, 546 US at 290 (Scalia, J., joined
by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas,J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
I
do not understand why, in our system of dual sovereigns, Oregon must fly only
in federal formation and not, as Oregon's motto provides, "with her own wings." 
ORS 186.040.  Therefore, I cannot join in a decision by which we, as state
court judges, enjoin the policies of our own state and preclude our legislature
from making its own independent decisions about what conduct to criminalize. 
With respect, I dissent.
Durham,
J., joins in this opinion.
1. The
2001 version of the applicable statutes was in effect at the time of the events
that gave rise to this proceeding.  Since 2001, the legislature has amended
those statutes but not in ways that affect our decision, and we have cited to
the 2009 version of the statutes.
2. ORS
475.309(7)(a)(C) requires a person possessing a registry identification card to
submit annually "[u]pdated written documentation from the cardholder's
attending physician of the person's debilitating medical condition and that the
medical use of marijuana may mitigate the symptoms or effects" of that
condition.  If the person fails to do so, the card "shall be deemed
expired."  ORS 475.309(7)(b).
3. BOLI
points to nothing in its rules that suggests that more specificity was
required.  Cf. OAR 839-050-0130 (providing only that affirmative
defenses must be raised or waived).
4. To
be sure, the Court of Appeals reserved the question in Washburn whether
the use of medical marijuana is unlawful under federal law, but that did not
detain it from holding that the employer in that case had an obligation under
ORS 659 A. 112 to accommodate the employee's use of medical marijuana.  Given Washburn's
holding, employer reasonably conceded its controlling effect until, as noted
below, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Raich. 
5. After
the Commissioner issued his final order in this case, this court reversed the
Court of Appeals decision in Washburn.  Washburn v. Columbia Forest
Products, Inc., 340 Or 469, 480, 134 P3d 161 (2006).  This court held that
the employee in Washburn was not a disabled person within the meaning of
ORS chapter 659A.  Id. at 479.  Given that holding, this court did not
reach the other issues that the Court of Appeals had addressed in Washburn. 
After this court's decision in Washburn, the commissioner withdrew the
final order and issued a revised order on reconsideration, adhering to his
earlier resolution of employer's affirmative defenses in this case.
6. As
noted, employer moved to reopen the record on the ground that, as a result of Raich,
"states may not authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes" and that "[t]he impact of this decision is that [employer]
should prevail on its Fourth and Fifth Affirmative Defenses."  Employer
thus told the agency that the Controlled Substances Act, as interpreted in Raich,
compelled its interpretation of Oregon's antidiscrimination statutes. 
Additionally, in response to BOLI's arguments, employer contended that the
Controlled Substances Act preempted the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act. 
7. We
note that both California and Washington have considered whether their state
medical marijuana laws give medical marijuana users either a claim under
California's fair employment law or an implied right of action under Washington
law against an employer that discharges or refuses to hire a person for
off-work medical marijuana use.  See Roe v. Teletech Customer Care
Management, 152 Wash App 388, 216 P3d 1055 (2009); Ross v. Ragingwire
Telecommunications, Inc., 42 Cal 4th 920, 174 P3d 200 (2008).  Both the
California and Washington courts have held that, in enacting their states'
medical marijuana laws, the voters did not intend to affect an employer's
ability to take adverse employment actions based on the use of medical
marijuana.  Roe, 216 P3d at 1058-61; Ross, 174 P3d at 204. 
Accordingly, in both Washington and California, employers do not have to
accommodate their employees' off-site medical marijuana use.  We reach the same
conclusion, although our analysis differs because Oregon has chosen to write
its laws differently.
8. ORS
659 A. 124 lists exceptions to that rule, none of which applies here.  See ORS
659A.124(2) (recognizing exceptions for persons who either are participating in
or have successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and are
no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs).
9. Before
2009, former ORS 659A.100(4) (2001) defined the phrase "illegal use
of drugs."  In 2009, the legislature renumbered that definition as ORS
659A.122(2). 
10. The
ballot title for the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act confirms that interpretation
of the act.  See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009)
(looking to legislative history to confirm text).  The caption, "yes"
vote result statement, and summary of the ballot title focused on the fact that
the measure, if enacted, would allow permit-holders to use medical marijuana
and referred to the exemption from criminal laws only at the end of the
summary.  Official Voters' Pamphlet, Nov 3, 1998, 148.  The caption stated that
the measure "[a]llows medical use of marijuana within limits; establishes
permit system."  The "yes" vote result statement was to the same
effect, and the summary stated that current law prohibits the possession and
manufacture of marijuana but that the measure "allows engaging in,
assisting in, medical use of marijuana."  Id.  Only at the end of
the summary did the ballot title add that the measure "excepts permit
holder or applicant from marijuana criminal statutes."  Id.  
11. The
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act also exempts medical marijuana use from state
criminal liability.  See ORS 475.309(1) (excepting persons holding
registry identification cards from certain state criminal prohibitions); ORS
475.319 (creating an affirmative defense to certain criminal prohibitions for
persons who do not hold registry identification cards but who have complied
with the conditions necessary to obtain one).  Because ORS 659A.122(2) excludes
from the definition of illegal use of drugs only those uses authorized by state
law, the provisions of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that are relevant here
are those provisions that affirmatively authorize the use of medical marijuana,
as opposed to those provisions that exempt its use from criminal liability.
12. The
only issue that employer's preemption argument raises is whether federal law
preempts ORS 475.306(1) to the extent that it authorizes the use of medical
marijuana.  In holding that federal law does preempt that subsection, we do not
hold that federal law preempts the other sections of the Oregon Medical
Marijuana Act that exempt medical marijuana use from criminal liability. We
also express no opinion on the question whether the legislature, if it chose to
do so and worded Oregon's disability law differently, could require employers
to reasonably accommodate disabled employees who use medical marijuana to treat
their disability.  Rather, our opinion arises from and is limited to the laws
that the Oregon legislature has enacted. 
13. Two
subsections of the Controlled Substances Act accomplish that result.  Section
823(f) directs the Attorney General to register physicians and other
practitioners to dispense controlled substances listed in Schedule II through
V.  21 USC § 823(f).  Section 822(b) authorizes persons registered with the
Attorney General to dispense controlled substances "to the extent
authorized by their registration and in conformity with the other provisions of
this subchapter."  21 USC § 822(b).
14. The
specific question in Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was whether
there was a medical necessity exception for manufacturing and distributing
marijuana.  The Court explained, however, that, "[l]est there be any
confusion, we clarify that nothing in our analysis, or the statute, suggests
that a distinction should be drawn between the prohibitions on manufacturing
and distributing and the other prohibitions in the Controlled Substances
Act."  532 US at 494 n 7.
15. The
provision at issue in Wyeth provided that the federal statute did not
preempt state law unless there was a "direct and positive" conflict
between state and federal law.  Wyeth, 129 S Ct at 1196.  At first
blush, one might think that the Court would have looked to the standard that
Congress had expressly provided -- whether there is a "direct and positive
conflict" between the state and federal laws -- to determine the extent to
which federal law preempts state law.  See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 US 504, 517, 112 S Ct 2608, 120 L Ed 2d 407 (1992) (holding that the
preemptive effect of a federal act is "governed entirely" by an
express preemption provision).  Implied preemption, however, addresses a
similar issue, and the Court used an implied preemption analysis in Wyeth without
any discussion.  129 S Ct at 1196-1200.  Given Wyeth, we follow a
similar course here.
16. Justice
Thomas noted that the Court had used different formulations to explain when it
would be physically impossible to comply with both state and federal laws and
questioned whether the Court had applied that standard too strictly.  Wyeth,
129 S Ct at 1208-09 (opinion concurring in the judgment).  In his view, the
physical impossibility test is too narrow, and asking whether state law stands
as an obstacle to the purposes of the federal law too amorphous.  He would have
asked whether the state and federal law are in direct conflict.  Id.; see
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va L Rev 225, 260-61 (2000) (reasoning that
historically and practically preemption reduces to a "logical
contradiction" test).
17. The
Attorney General's opinion stated that the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act
"protects users who comply with its requirements from state criminal
prosecution for production, possession, or delivery of a controlled
substance."  Letter Opinion at 2.  In support of that statement, the
opinion cited former ORS 475.306(2) (2003), which provided an
affirmative defense for persons who possessed excess amounts of marijuana if
possession of that amount of marijuana were medically necessary.  See Or
Laws 2005, ch 822, §2 (repealing that provision).  The opinion also cited ORS
475.319 and ORS 475.309(9), which provides an affirmative defense to criminal
liability for persons who have applied for but not yet received a registry
identification card.
18. The
dissent phrases the test it would apply in various ways throughout its
opinion.  For instance, it begins its opinion by stating that the Oregon Medical
Marijuana Act neither "permits [n]or requires the violation of the
Controlled Substances Act."  ___ Or at ___ (Walters, J., dissenting) (slip
op at 1).  Because the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act permits (and indeed
authorizes) conduct that violates the Controlled Substances Act, we understand
the dissent to use the word "permits" to mean expressly purports to "giv[e]
permission," as it later rephrases its test.  We also note that, if the
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act "required" a violation of federal law,
then the physical impossibility prong of implied preemption would apply.
19. The
dissenting opinion quotes the dissent in Florida Lime &amp; Avocado for
the proposition that the conflict between state and federal law in that case
was unmistakable.  See ___ Or at ___ (Walters, J., dissenting) (slip op
at 13-14) (quoting Florida Lime &amp; Avocado, 373 US at 173 (White, J.,
dissenting)).  The majority, however, disagreed on that point, 373 US at
145-46, and its conclusion that federal law left room for complementary state
law was pivotal to its conclusion that the federal marketing order did not
preempt California law.   
20. The
other two United States Supreme Court cases on which the dissent relies are to
the same effect.  Neither case involved a federal statute that, as the Court
interpreted it, prohibited what the state law authorized.  See California v.
ARC America Corp., 490 US 93, 103, 109 S Ct 1661, 104 L Ed 2d 86 (1989) (explaining
that nothing in an earlier decision that only direct purchasers may bring an action
under section 4 of the Clayton Act "suggests that it would be contrary to
congressional purposes for States to allow indirect purchasers to recover under
their own antitrust laws"); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 US
238, 256, 104 S Ct 615, 78 L Ed 2d 443 (1984) (holding that, even though
Congress "was well aware of the NRC's exclusive authority to regulate
safety matters," Congress also had "assumed that state law remedies,
in whatever form they might take, were available to those injured in nuclear incidents").
21. There
is a suggestion in the dissent that ORS 475.306(1) is integral to the goal of
exempting medical marijuana use from state criminal liability and cannot be
severed from the remainder of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.  That act, however,
contains an express severability clause, and it is not apparent why the
provisions exempting medical marijuana use from state criminal liability cannot
"be given full effect without [the authorization to use medical marijuana
found in ORS 475.306(1)]."  See Or Laws 1999, ch 4, § 18 (providing
the terms for severing any part of the act held invalid).
22. The
commissioner did not consider whether this exclusion applied, in part because
the Court of Appeals had stated in Washburn that the use of marijuana
for medical purposes was "not unlawful," which the parties and the
commissioner concluded was sufficient to answer employer's reliance on ORS
659 A. 124.  Although we could remand this case to the commissioner to permit him
to address whether this exclusion applies, its application in this case turns
solely on an issue of statutory interpretation, an issue on which we owe the
commissioner no deference.  In these circumstances, we see no need to remand
and unnecessarily prolong the resolution of this case.
23. Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 US 243, 126 S Ct 904, 163 L Ed 2d 748 (2006), addressed a
different issue from the one presented here.  The Controlled Substances Act
provides that Schedule II controlled substances have accepted medical uses, and
the issue in Gonzales was whether the Attorney General had exceeded his
statutory authority in defining which uses of Schedule II controlled substances
were legitimate medical uses.  In this case, by contrast, the Controlled
Substances Act provides that Schedule I controlled substances, such as
marijuana, have no accepted medical use.  That congressional policy choice both
addresses and conclusively resolves the issue that the Attorney General lacked
statutory authority to address in Gonzales.
1. Consistent
with the Attorney General's letter opinion, ORS 475.300(4) provides that ORS
475.300 to 475.346 -- the entirety of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act -- is
"intended to make only those changes to existing Oregon laws that
are necessary to protect patients and their doctors from criminal and civil
penalties[.]"  (Emphasis added.)
2. The
question that the Oregon Attorney General answered in the letter opinion was
"Does Gonzales v. Raich, 545 US [1] (2005), * * * invalidate the
Oregon statutes authorizing the operation of the Oregon Medical Marijuana
Program?"  The Attorney General said, "No."  The Attorney
General explained that "[t]he Act protects medical marijuana users who
comply with its requirements from state criminal prosecution for production,
possession, or delivery of a controlled substance," and cited ORS 475.309,
ORS 475.319, and ORS 475.306(2).  At the time of the Attorney General opinion,
ORS 475.306(2) (2003) provided:  
"If the individuals described in subsection (1) of this
section possess, deliver or produce marijuana in excess of the amounts allowed
in subsection (1) of this section, such individuals are not excepted from the
criminal laws of the state but may establish an affirmative defense to such
charges, by a preponderance of the evidence that the greater amount is
medically necessary to mitigate the symptoms or effects of the person's
debilitating medical condition."
ORS 475.306(2) (2003), amended by Or Laws 2005, ch
822, § 2 (emphasis added).  Thus, one of the subsections of the Oregon Medical Marijuana
Act that the Attorney General cited used words of authorization very similar to
those used in ORS 475.306(1).
Throughout the opinion, the Attorney
General discussed the continued validity of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act as
a whole and did not in any way differentiate between provisions of the act that
authorize medical marijuana use and those that create an exemption from state
prosecution.  In fact, the Attorney General specifically opined that the state
is entitled to continue to issue registry identification cards -- cards that,
by definition, are documents that identify persons "authorized to
engage in the medical use of marijuana."  ORS 475.302(10) (emphasis
added).
3. The
majority expressly leaves that question open, however.  ___ Or at ___ n 12
(slip op at 14-15 n 12).
4. The
majority recognizes that it is essential to read ORS 475.306(1) and ORS
475.302(10) together to find an affirmative authorization to use marijuana for
medicinal purposes.  ___Or at ___ (slip op at 13).  However, the majority does
not explain why it finds ORS 475.306(1) and not ORS 475.302(10) preempted.
5. Pacific
Gas &amp; Elec. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 US 190, 211-13, 103 S Ct
1713, 75 L Ed 2d 752 (1983).
6. The
FDA had also adopted a regulation declaring that "certain state law
actions, such as those involving failure-to-warn claims, 'threaten FDA's
statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible for
evaluating and regulating drugs.'"  Id. at 1200.
7. As
I read the majority opinion, a state law providing that Oregon would not punish
drivers between the ages of 16 and 21, as opposed to permitting those persons
to drive, would withstand a Supremacy Clause challenge.
8. Memorandum
from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General for Selected United States
Attorneys on Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the
Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct 19, 2009) (available at
http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192) (accessed Apr 6, 2010) (emphasis in
original).
9. New
Mexico's "Lynn and Erin Compassionate Use Act," 2007 New Mexico Laws
ch 210, § 7 (SB 523), requires relevant state agencies to develop rules that
"identify requirements for the licensure of producers and cannabis
production facilities and set forth procedures to obtain licenses," as
well as "develop a distribution system for medical cannabis" that
comports with certain requirements.  The New Jersey "Compassionate Use
Medical Marijuana Act," S119, Approved PL 2009, c 307, § 7, provides for
the creation of "alternate treatment centers, each of which 
"shall be authorized to acquire a reasonable initial
and ongoing inventory, as determined by the department, of marijuana seeds or
seedlings and paraphernalia, possess, cultivate, plant, grow, harvest, process,
display, manufacture, deliver, transfer, transport, distribute, supply, sell,
or dispense marijuana, or related supplies to qualifying patients or their
primary caregivers who are registered with the department pursuant to section 4
of [PL , c (C)(pending before the Legislature as this bill)] this act." 
The Maine Medical Marijuana Act provides for the creation of
"nonprofit dispensaries" which are authorized to dispense up to two
and one-half ounces of marijuana to qualified patients.  Me Rev Stat title 22,
§ 2428-7.  In Rhode Island, "The Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater
Medical Marijuana Act," provides for the creation of "compassion
centers," which "may acquire, possess, cultivate, manufacture,
deliver, transfer, transport, supply or dispense marijuana * * * to registered
qualifying patients and their registered primary caregivers." RI Gen Laws
§ 21-28.6-12.
10. ORS
127.815(1)(L)(A) authorizes physicians to dispense medications for the purpose
of ending a patient's life in a humane and dignified manner when that patient has
a terminal illness and has satisfied the written request requirements that the
Act provides.  ORS 127.905(1) authorizes a terminally ill patient to "make
a written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a
humane and dignified manner in accordance with [the Act]."