Title: State v. Serrell
Citation: 507 P.2d 1405
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 1973

507 P.2d 1405 (1973)
STATE of Oregon, Respondent,
v.
Titus Servon SERRELL, Petitioner.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted March 5, 1973.
Decided April 2, 1973.
Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and John W. Osburn, Sol. Gen., Salem.
HOLMAN, Justice.
Defendant was convicted of the illegal sale of narcotics and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Or. App., 95 Adv.Sh. 1487, 501 P.2d 1324 (1972). We allowed defendant's petition for review.
The only issue we will consider on review is the claim by defendant that he was denied a speedy trial. The indictment alleged that the illegal sale of narcotics was made on September 27, 1971. Defendant was indicted on February 15, 1972, and tried on March 24, 1972. He does not complain of the lapse of time between indictment and trial. He does complain, however, of the 141 days between the time he made the alleged sale to an undercover agent and the time he was indicted. Defendant argues that the state had all information concerning his guilt on the day of the crime which he is alleged to have committed, and that its delay in returning the indictment prejudiced him because his memory during the interim failed him concerning his whereabouts on the day of the crime.
The Court of Appeals, in its opinion in this case, stated at 95 Adv.Sh. 1488-1489, 501 P.2d at 1325:
*1406 In State v. Griffin, 7 Or. App. 19, 489 P.2d 985 (1971), it also said:
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals believes that the time between the state's knowledge of a violation of the law by a defendant and its charging him with that violation may be taken into consideration in determining whether he has been given a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals is in error in this respect. The right of a speedy trial is given by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the State of Oregon.[1] Concerning the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States held in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971):
In State v. Vawter, 236 Or. 85, 90-91, 386 P.2d 915, 917 (1963), this court said:
From the foregoing, it is plain that the time elapsing prior to an arrest or a formal charge is not taken into consideration in determining whether a defendant has been given a speedy trial. Since defendant made no complaint concerning the lapse of time between his indictment and trial, there is no question in this case involving a speedy trial.[2]
However, although the right to be charged promptly with a crime is not protected by the constitutional provisions entitling a defendant to a speedy trial, his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment may so protect him, depending upon the circumstances. The primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges is the statute of limitations. However, in United States v. Marion, supra, the Court said:
In any event, the accused has the burden of proving that his right to due process was prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. It is our opinion that he does not carry his burden by claiming he does not remember where he was on the day the crime was alleged to have been committed.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
[1]  As implemented by ORS 134.120.
[2]  For a more recent extensive opinion on a defendant's right to speedy trial, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).