Title: City of Chicago v. Holland
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90585
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 2003

Docket No. 90585-Agenda 22-November 2001.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee, v. WILLIAM G. 
HOLLAND, Auditor General of the State of Illinois, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 19, 2003.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	In 1995 the General Assembly amended section 3-1 of the
Illinois State Auditing Act (Auditing Act) (30 ILCS 5/3-1 (West
2000)) to include a provision directing the Auditor General of the
State of Illinois to conduct a compliance and management audit of
the City of Chicago (City) and any other entity regarding the
operation of O'Hare International Airport (O'Hare), Midway
Airport (Midway), and Merrill C. Meigs Field (Meigs)
(collectively, the airports). When the Auditor General attempted
perform an audit under authority of that amendment, the City
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the circuit court of Cook
County to prevent the audit from proceeding. On the parties'
respective cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court
entered judgment for the City and against the Auditor General,
holding that the amendment violated article VIII, section 3, of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §3). The
Auditor General now appeals. Because the circuit court's
judgment declared a statute of the State of Illinois invalid, the
appeal was taken directly to our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
	Article VIII, section 3(b), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §3(b)) provides that the Auditor
General "shall conduct the audit of public funds of the State" and
"shall make additional reports and investigations as directed by the
General Assembly." The General Assembly has implemented the
mandates of article VIII, section 3, through enactment of the
Illinois State Auditing Act (30 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)).
30 ILCS 5/1-2(a) (West 2000). That statute was amended in 1995
to include the following new section:
			"As soon as practical after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of 1995, the Auditor General shall
conduct a compliance and management audit of the City
of Chicago and any other entity with regard to the
operation of Chicago O'Hare International Airport,
Chicago Midway Airport and Merrill C. Meigs Field. The
audit shall include, but not be limited to, an examination
of revenues, expenses, and transfers of funds; purchasing
and contracting policies and practices; staffing levels; and
hiring practices and procedures. When completed, the
audit required by this paragraph shall be distributed in
accordance with Section 3-14." Pub. Act 89-386, eff.
August 18, 1995 (amending 30 ILCS 5/3-1 (West 1994)).
	Following enactment of the amendment, the Auditor General
notified the City that an audit would be conducted in accordance
with the statute's provisions. The Auditor General's office
subsequently solicited proposals for furnishing expert professional
services to conduct the audit. A proposal submitted by the firm of
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (KPMG) was ultimately selected by the
Auditor General.
	When the auditing process commenced, the City filed this
action against the Auditor General in the circuit court of Cook
County. The City's complaint, as amended, was in four counts.
Counts I and II took issue with the scope of the audit. The City
asserted that under the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act and
article VIII, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VIII, §3), the Auditor General's authority was limited to audits
of public funds of the state. The City complained, however, that
the audit of its airports would go beyond public funds of the state
and would also include examinations of the use of nonstate funds
at the airports and management operations or activities at the
airports that are financed by nonstate funds.
	In count I of its amended complaint, the City alleged that to
the extent the audit embraced expenditures and operations that
were not financed by public funds of the state, it was unlawful
under both the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act and article
VIII, section 3, of the Constitution. Count II asserted, in the
alternative, that if the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act could
be construed as allowing the Auditor General to conduct a general
audit that was not restricted to the use of public funds of the state
or to the management of governmental activities financed with
public funds of the state, the amendment would still be
unconstitutional under article VIII, section 3, of the Illinois
Constitution. Count III, in turn, alleged that even if the 1995
amendment to the Auditing Act were read to permit an audit of the
use of nonstate funds in connection with the operations of the
City's airports and even if such an audit did not contravene article
VIII, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution, the 1995 amendment
would violate the prohibition in article IV, section 13, of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13) against special
legislation.
	Count IV of the City's amended complaint raised no
constitutional claims. It took issue only with KPMG, the firm
retained by the Auditor General, to conduct the audit. The City
claimed that KPMG had performed or was performing services for
the City and was under legal, contractual and ethical duties to
maintain the confidentiality of information it had obtained from
the City in the course of providing those services. The City
asserted that use of KPMG to perform the audit of the airports
would "violate applicable provisions of Illinois law and applicable
ethical rules and would be inconsistent with the legal and
contractual rights of the City."
	For its relief, the City requested a judgment declaring: (1) that
the Auditor General's authority under the 1995 amendment to the
Auditing Act is limited to an examination of the use of public
funds of the state by the City in connection with its airport
operations; (2) that article VIII, section 3(b), of the Illinois
Constitution does not authorize the General Assembly to direct the
Auditor General to audit the use of nonstate funds at Chicago
airports; and (3) that if the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act
were interpreted to require a general audit of the use of funds in
connection with the operation of Chicago's airports, including
funds that do not qualify as public funds of the state, it would
contravene article IV, section 13's prohibition against special
legislation. The City further requested issuance of an injunction
barring the Auditor General from proceeding with his audit of the
City's airports and prohibiting him from using KPMG to conduct
the audit.
	The Auditor General answered the City's amended complaint
and asserted a counterclaim based on the City's failure to comply
with a subpoena issued in connection with the audit of the City's
airports. It subsequently filed a motion to dismiss count IV of the
City's amended complaint, which challenged the use of KPMG, on
the grounds that the Auditor General's contract with the firm had
expired and KPMG would therefore not be involved with the audit
of the airports. The circuit court granted that motion and dismissed
count IV. The propriety of that action has not been challenged and
is not an issue in this appeal.
	The litigation continued over the next several years.
Following conferences between the parties and the circuit court,
the court entered an order in December of 1999 staying any further
discovery pending resolution of any issues the parties wished to
raise by way of cross-motions for summary judgment. In March of
2000, the Auditor General filed a motion pursuant to section
2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West
2000)) asking the circuit court to enter summary judgment denying
the relief sought by the City in its amended complaint and granting
enforcement of the audit-related subpoena as sought in the Auditor
General's counterclaim. The following month, the City filed a
cross-motion seeking entry of summary judgment in its favor on
counts I through III of its amended complaint and against the
Auditor General on his counterclaim.
	In support of their respective motions, the parties submitted
voluminous documentation concerning the funding of the City's
airports. The parties prepared and filed additional legal
memoranda, and a hearing on the summary judgment motions was
conducted on June 27, 2000. Based upon the evidence, the law and
the arguments presented to it, the circuit court entered an order
declaring that the Auditor General's constitutional and statutory
authority to conduct audits extends only to public funds of the
state. In the case of the City's airports, the court held "public funds
of the State" consist solely of those funds directly disbursed by the
state to the airports. Accordingly, the court concluded that when
carrying out the audit mandated by the 1995 amendment to the
Auditing Act, the Auditor General must limit himself to such
funds. Based on these conclusions, the court denied the Auditor
General's motion for summary judgment and granted the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the City.
	The Auditor General subsequently moved for rehearing and
clarification. That motion resulted in entry of an additional order
by the circuit court. The court's new order, dated October 13,
included an express holding that the 1995 amendment to the
Auditing Act is unconstitutional because it impermissibly
broadened the Auditor General's authority. Having declared the
1995 amendment invalid on that basis, the court ruled that it had
no need to address the additional argument that the amendment
violated the prohibition against special legislation. The court then
proceeded to reiterate that it was denying the Auditor General's
motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion for
summary judgment filed by the City.
	The circuit court's resolution of the parties' respective
motions for summary judgment entirely disposed of the litigation.
The court's order was therefore final and appealable. Arangold
Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 358 (1999). The appeal has been
taken directly to our court based on the circuit court's
determination that a statute of this state, the 1995 amendment to
the Auditing Act, is invalid. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a).
	In an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, review is
de novo. The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question
of fact, but to determine whether one exists. Summary judgment
is proper where pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits
on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735
ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Land v. Board of Education of the
City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 421 (2002).
	In assessing whether the City of Chicago was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law in the case before us, we must first
consider the validity of the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act.
As with entry of summary judgment, the constitutionality of a
statute is subject to de novo review. Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57 (2001). Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality. Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998). A party challenging a statute has the
burden of rebutting that presumption and clearly establishing a
constitutional violation. Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 436
(2002). This court has a duty to construe a statute in a manner that
upholds its validity and constitutionality if such a construction is
reasonably possible. People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392, 394
(2002).
	The circuit court believed that the 1995 amendment to the
Auditing Act was invalid because it impermissibly broadened the
Auditor General's power beyond that authorized by article VIII,
section 3, of our state's constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII,
§3). The circuit court's view was that under the clear and
unambiguous language of article VIII, section 3, the Auditor's
General auditing authority was reserved for audits of "public funds
of the State."(1) As the court interpreted the 1995 amendment to the
Auditing Act, the legislation authorized the Auditor General to
exceed that limitation and undertake audits of the City's airports
that encompassed more than "public funds of the State." To the
extent that the 1995 amendment permitted audits that were not
limited to "public funds of the State," the court reasoned, the law
lacked constitutional authority and was invalid.
	In assailing this conclusion, the Auditor General contends that
the circuit court fundamentally misunderstood the operation of this
state's constitution. Although article VIII, section 3(b), by its
terms, refers only to audits of "public funds of the State" and does
not purport to authorize the Auditor General to conduct audits that
go beyond "public funds of the State," the Auditor General notes
that the provision does not expressly prohibit audits that go
beyond "public funds of the State" and that under our
constitutional scheme, the General Assembly is free to enact any
legislation it desires so long as the constitution does not
specifically forbid it.
	Our court regards the language in the constitution as a
limitation upon the legislature's authority, not as a grant of power.
Based on that view, our court has held that the General Assembly
is free to enact any legislation that the constitution does not
expressly prohibit. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65, 78 (1998). Where, however, the constitution specifically
addresses the authority of constitutional officers or the power of
the General Assembly to enact particular legislation, basic
principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation still apply.
The court must ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions in the
constitutional and legislative contexts in which they appear. See
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Cronson, 183 Ill. App. 3d 710, 718 (1989).
Constitutional officers may not act in contravention to the
constitutional and statutory authority conferred on them. See
Chicago Bar Ass'n, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 725. Action by a
constitutional officer that is not authorized by the constitutional
provisions creating his position and defining his powers or by
legislation promulgated under authority of such constitutional
provisions is impermissible. See Chicago Bar Ass'n, 183 Ill. App.
3d at 725-26.
	That being said, we do not believe that an audit conducted in
accordance with the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act would
exceed the authority conferred on the Auditor General by the
constitution. The position of Auditor General is created by article
VIII of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII), which governs
state finance. Section 2(b) of article VIII provides that the General
Assembly "shall make appropriations for all expenditures of
public funds by the State." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §2(b).
Section 3(a) of article VIII requires the General Assembly to
"provide by law for the audit of the obligation, receipt and use of
public funds of the State" and establishes the position of Auditor
General. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §3(a). Section 3(b) of article
VIII specifies that the duties of the Auditor General include
conducting "the audit of public funds of the State." Ill. Const.
1970, art. VIII, §3(b).
	To implement the provisions of article VIII, section 3, the
General Assembly enacted the Auditing Act. 30 ILCS 5/1-2(a)
(West 2000). The purpose of the Act is to
			"provide a comprehensive and thorough post audit of
the obligation, expenditure, receipt and use of public
funds of the State *** to the end that the government of
the State of Illinois will be accountable to the General
Assembly and the citizens and taxpayers, and to the end
that the constitutional and statutory requirements
governing state fiscal and financial operations will be
enforced." 30 ILCS 5/1-2(b) (West 2000). 
	Based upon the provisions of article VIII and the Auditing
Act, our appellate court has held that "the role of the Auditor
General is to conduct audits with respect to all funds appropriated
or otherwise authorized by the General Assembly following the
Governor's preparation and submission of the State budget."
Chicago Bar Ass'n, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 719. The 1995 amendment
to the Auditing Act is consistent with that role. Contrary to the
view taken by the circuit court, it does not purport to authorize the
Auditor General to undertake audits that are more far-reaching.
Consideration of the language used in the amendment makes that
apparent.
	By its terms, the amendment requires the Auditor General to
perform a "compliance and management audit" of the City or any
other entity with regard to the operation of the City's airports. 30
ILCS 5/3-1 (West 2000). Under the Auditing Act, the terms
"compliance audit" and "management audit" are specifically
defined. 30 ILCS 5/1-13, 1-14 (West 2000). Both are types of
"post audits." Post audits are "post facto examination[s] of books,
documents, records, and other evidence relating to the obligation,
receipt, expenditure or use of public funds of the State ***."
(Emphasis added.) 30 ILCS 5/1-12 (West 2000). The audit
mandated by the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act therefore
does not exceed the Auditor General's constitutional authority. He
is charged by the constitution with auditing public funds of the
state, and public funds of the state are what he is expressly called
upon to audit by the 1995 amendment.
	Because the audit required by the 1995 amendment pertains
to public funds of the state and because article VIII, section 3(b),
of the Illinois Constitution charges the Auditor General with
responsibility for auditing public funds of the state, the circuit
court was wrong to declare, in its amended order, that the 1995
amendment was invalid on the grounds that it exceeded the
permissible bounds of article VIII. The circuit court's analytical
error, however, does not end our inquiry. What is before us on
review is the trial court's judgment, not the reasoning the court
employed. Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1983). Our function is to determine whether the
trial court reached the proper result. The reasons given by a lower
court for its decision or the findings on which a decision is based
are not material if the judgment is correct. See Board of Managers
of Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass'n No. 1-A v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 116 Ill. App. 3d 690, 694 (1983). As a
reviewing court, we can sustain the decision of the circuit court on
any grounds which are called for by the record regardless of
whether the circuit court relied on the grounds and regardless of
whether the circuit court's reasoning was sound. Bell v. Louisville
&amp; Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 148 (1985).
	Although the circuit court in this case erred in declaring the
1995 amendment to the Auditing Act invalid, we believe that the
court was nevertheless correct in granting summary judgment in
favor of the City and against the Auditor General to prevent the
Auditor General from enforcing his subpoenas and proceeding
with the audit of the City's airports. As we have just discussed, the
reason the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act does not
contravene article VIII, section 3(b), of the constitution is that the
type of audits it authorizes are post audits, which are limited, by
the terms of the Auditing Act, to examination of materials
"relating to the obligation, receipt, expenditure or use of public
funds of the State." 30 ILCS 5/1-12 (West 2000). The Auditing
Act does not specifically define the phrase "public funds of the
State." It merely provides that the phrase has the meaning ascribed
to it in article VIII of the constitution. 30 ILCS 5/1-18 (West
2000). Our appellate court, however, has construed the pertinent
constitutional and statutory provisions to mean that the funds the
Auditor General is empowered to audit are those "appropriated or
otherwise authorized by the General Assembly following the
Governor's preparation and submission of the State budget." 
Chicago Bar Ass'n, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 719. That construction is
fully consistent with the stated purpose of the Auditing Act, which
is to provide a comprehensive and thorough post audit of the
obligation, expenditure, receipt and use of public funds of the state
"to the end that the government of the State of Illinois will be
accountable to the General Assembly and the citizens and
taxpayers." 30 ILCS 5/1-2(b) (West 2000). 
	Based on the foregoing, there is no question that the Auditor
General could lawfully audit those funds specifically appropriated
or otherwise authorized by the General Assembly for the City's
airports following the Governor's preparation and submission of
the state budget. The problem is that none of the City's three
airports, O'Hare, Midway, and Meigs Field, receives any funding
from the state treasury.
	 An affidavit submitted by the City from its Deputy
Comptroller for Enterprise Funds showed that the funds received
and used by O'Hare and Midway consist primarily of (1) self-generated revenue from users of the airports, such as fees paid by
the airlines, passengers and tenants, and (2) federal grants. The
City does not pay for the operations of O'Hare or Midway. Their
operations are accounted for separately from the City's, and their
revenues are deposited in trust accounts held by a bank. They are
not deposited with the City's treasurer. Since at least 1986, no
state funds were budgeted, obligated or received for use at O'Hare.
Midway previously received minimal state funding (less than 2%
of its total revenues between 1991 and 1995), but that funding
apparently came to an end in 1996. Grants from the state to
Midway during 1995 and 1996 amounted to only approximately
$45,000.
	Meigs Field, the City's third airport, is paid for by the City
and included within the City's budget. Although the City receives
funding from the state for a variety of purposes, it has not received
any state appropriations for operation of Meigs Field since 1995,
when the amendment to the Auditing Act at issue in this case was
enacted. Prior to 1995, state funding for Meigs Field was minimal.
	Because of the reduction and eventual elimination of state
funding for the City's airports, an audit of those airports, which is
limited by statute and by the constitution to public funds of the
state, would necessarily be limited in scope. Based on the
materials in the record, such an audit could not lawfully extend
beyond the limited sums granted by the state for Midway airport
in 1995 and 1996. The audit proposed by the Auditor General,
however, would encompass all aspects of the City's airport
operations and operations of the City itself, to the extent those
operations related to the airports, without regard to the source of
funding. The circuit court was therefore correct in ruling that the
audit was improper. It was likewise correct in refusing to enforce
the subpoenas issued in connection with that audit.
	In arguing for the more expansive audit he proposes, the
Auditor General urges a definition of public funds of the state that
is not restricted to funds appropriated or otherwise authorized by
the General Assembly following the Governor's preparation and
submission of the state budget. Specifically, the Auditor General
asserts that public funds of the state should include federal grants
which the state receives for disbursements to the airports. We
disagree. The City has correctly observed that the state has no
lawful authority to utilize the federal grants for anything other than
their intended purposes. When grants are made by the federal
government for the City's airports, the state merely serves as a
conduit for the grants' disbursement. See 620 ILCS 5/38, 40 (West
2000). These are federal monies. That they pass through the state's
treasury prior to disbursement to the City's airports does not
convert them into public funds of the State.
	The Auditor General also attempts to justify a more expansive
audit by pointing out that each year the City receives hundreds of
millions of dollars from the state from the state income tax, state
sales tax, and state auto/hotel tax. The Auditor General argues that
because the City uses these funds for municipal services, including
fire and police protection, and because some of those municipal
services are utilized by the City's airports, the airports can be said
to utilize public funds of the state and are subject to audit on that
basis. Once again, we disagree. The City charges the airports for
the municipal services they utilize, and the airports pay for those
services through the revenues they generate. The provision of such
services therefore cannot be said to involve the expenditure of
public funds of the state, even indirectly. In addition, because the
municipal services used by the airports are paid for through funds
generated by the airports rather than funds from the state treasury,
permitting a state audit of the airports based on their use of
municipal services could not possibly advance the ultimate
objective of the Auditing Act which, as we have indicated earlier
in this disposition, is to hold the State of Illinois "accountable to
the General Assembly and the citizens and taxpayers."
	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court
did not err when it granted judgment in favor of the City and
against the Auditor General on the parties' respective motions for
summary judgment. The audit of the City's airports exceeded the
Auditor General's constitutional and statutory authority and was
properly enjoined. The judgment of the circuit court is therefore
affirmed.

Affirmed.
	I respectfully dissent. The majority finds the 1995 amendment
to the Auditing Act constitutional by limiting the authority of the
Auditor General to audit only those public funds of the state
" 'appropriated or otherwise authorized by the General Assembly
following the Governor's preparation and submission of the State
budget.' " Slip op. at 9, quoting Chicago Bar Ass'n, 183 Ill. App.
3d at 719. This limitation is unduly restrictive. To the contrary, I
conclude that article VIII of the Illinois Constitution and the
Auditing Act set forth a comprehensive scheme for the control,
management, and audit of state finances. The amendment to the
Auditing Act does not contravene the Illinois Constitution and
must be interpreted in a manner to assure that the expenditure of
the public's money is given appropriate scrutiny.
	The Auditing Act implements article VIII, section 3, of the
Illinois Constitution (30 ILCS 5/1-2(a) (West 1996)) and places
the Auditor General under the control and direction of the General
Assembly (30 ILCS 5/1-2(c) (West 1996)). The Auditor General
is expressly recognized as a legislative officer of the State of
Illinois under our constitution. 30 ILCS 5/1-2(c) (West 1996). The
Auditing Act "is intended to provide a comprehensive and
thorough post audit of the obligation, expenditure, receipt and use
of public funds of the State under the direction and control of the
Auditor General, to the end that the government of the State of
Illinois will be accountable to the General Assembly and the
citizens and taxpayers, and to the end that the constitutional and
statutory requirements governing state fiscal and financial
operations will be enforced." 30 ILCS 5/1-2(b) (West 1996).
	Through the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act, the
legislature explicitly directs the Auditor General to undertake an
audit of the airports that "shall include, but not be limited to, an
examination of revenues, expenses, and transfers of funds;
purchasing and contracting policies and practices; staffing levels;
and hiring practices and procedures." 30 ILCS 5/3-1 (West 2000). 
We should construe the statute so that no word or phrase is
rendered superfluous or meaningless. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). The plain language of the 1995 amendment
with respect to the airports demonstrates that the General
Assembly's directive to the Auditor General contemplates an audit
beyond a narrow category of state funds limited to only those
public funds of the state directly dispersed to the airports and
totaling only $45,000.
	The essential question we are called upon to determine in this
case is what funds constitute "public funds of the State." We must
determine whether the legislature intended the 1995 amendment
to the Auditing Act to require the Auditor General to audit all
public funds of the state, or only those state funds passed to the
City and airports through appropriation, grant, or some other form
of direct dispersal.
	The Auditing Act states that the phrase "Public funds of the
State" has "the meaning ascribed to that term in Article VIII of the
Constitution." 30 ILCS 5/1-18 (West 1996). However, the term
"public funds" is not defined in the Illinois Constitution.
Therefore, we must attempt to assign a meaning to the term as it
is used in the constitution. The best guide to interpreting the
Illinois Constitution is the document's own plain language.
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65, 77 (1998).
Interpretation of a constitutional provision begins with the
language of the provision. Graham v. Illinois State Toll Highway
Authority, 182 Ill. 2d 287, 301 (1998).
	Article VIII, section 1(a), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
states that"[p]ublic funds, property or credit shall be used only for
public purposes." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §1(a). Article VIII,
section 3, reads as follows:
		"§3. State Audit and Auditor General
			(a) The General Assembly shall provide by law for the
audit of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of
the State. The General Assembly, by a vote of three-fifths
of the members elected to each house, shall appoint an
Auditor General and may remove him for cause by a
similar vote. The Auditor General shall serve for a term of
ten years. His compensation shall be established by law
and shall not be diminished, but may be increased, to take
effect during his term.
			(b) The Auditor General shall conduct the audit of
public funds of the State. He shall make additional reports
and investigations as directed by the General Assembly.
He shall report his findings and recommendations to the
General Assembly and to the Governor." Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VIII, §§3(a), (b).
	In addition to the plain language of section 3 of article VIII,
it is important to note that section 4 does not distinguish between
state and local funds. Section 4 provides:
		"§4. Systems of Accounting, Auditing and Reporting
			The General Assembly by law shall provide systems of
accounting, auditing and reporting of the obligation,
receipt and use of public funds. These systems shall be
used by all units of local government and school
districts." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §4.
	This section is evidence of the General Assembly's
constitutional authority to ensure adequate and responsible
accounting and reporting of public funds at the local level.
Moreover, section 4 reflects the General Assembly's responsibility
to ensure that all units of local government are properly utilizing
public funds. For example, the General Assembly also permits, or
in some instances mandates, the Auditor General to audit other
political subdivisions in section 3-1. 30 ILCS 5/3-1 (West 1996).
	The majority relies on the appellate court's holding in
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Cronson for the proposition that " 'the role
of the Auditor General is to conduct audits with respect to all
funds appropriated or otherwise authorized by the General
Assembly following the Governor's preparation and submission
of the State budget.' " Slip op. at 8, quoting Chicago Bar Ass'n,
183 Ill. App. 3d at 719. While Chicago Bar Ass'n is instructive as
to the general background of the Auditor General's inception and
duties, as well as the types and manner of execution of audits that
may be conducted by the Auditor General, the facts of this case are
distinguishable from Chicago Bar Ass'n. The audit in Chicago
Bar Ass'n related to a regulatory agency charged with the
regulation of, and admission to, the practice of law in Illinois. It is
well settled that this power is an exclusive function of the Illinois
Supreme Court and is within this court's inherent judicial power.
People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 119 Ill. 2d 485, 492-93 (1988).
Chicago Bar Ass'n did not deal with specific legislation passed by
the General Assembly mandating that the Auditor General conduct
a specific audit. The audit in Chicago Bar Ass'n was not initiated
at the direction of the General Assembly, but by the Auditor
General himself. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 714.
	It is also clear that the passage from Chicago Bar Ass'n relied
upon by the majority is not compatible with the Illinois
Constitution. In addition to the plain language of article VIII,
article II, section 2, states that "[t]he enumeration in this
Constitution of specified powers and functions shall not be
construed as a limitation of powers of state government." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. II, §2. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 525 (1990), and Graham,
182 Ill. 2d  at 301, we stated that it "is well accepted in this State
that the constitution is not regarded as a grant of powers to the
legislature but is a limitation upon its authority; the legislature
may enact any legislation not expressly prohibited by the
constitution." See also Kluk v. Lang, 125 Ill. 2d 306, 324 (1988).
	The General Assembly has the constitutional authority to
direct the Auditor General to conduct a wide-ranging audit of the
airports and the Auditor General should not be barred from
conducting a legislatively directed audit of public funds of the
state simply because those funds were not first submitted to the
Governor for approval or because the funds have become an
inseparable part of a larger whole that also contains funds from
other sources. The Illinois Constitution clearly evinces both a
scheme and a desire for citizens and taxpayers to be assured that
the constitutional and statutory requirements governing state fiscal
and financial operations will be enforced. In so doing, it does not
limit the Auditor General's authority to "all public funds of the
state that can be clearly identified in the General Assembly's line-item budget" or "all public funds of the state that can be
characterized as direct grants or appropriations from an executive
agency of the government of the State of Illinois." It simply states
that the General Assembly shall provide by law for the audit of the
obligation, receipt, and use of "public funds of the state."
	The City received no less than $4 billion in public funds of
the state during the years of 1995 through 1998. Were we to adopt
the majority's limited definition of public funds of the state, the
majority of these public funds would not be subject to the
legislatively mandated audit. The record indicates that the
operations of the airports are funded from a number of different
sources, including self-generated funds, state funds, and federal
funds. Each airport is financed and operated on a stand-alone
basis, separate from the City's other operations. The revenue and
expenses of O'Hare and Midway are accounted for and audited
separately from those of other City departments and agencies.
Because the operating budget of Meigs is small in comparison
with the other two airports, it is accounted for within the City's
general corporate fund budget. The Auditor General introduced
evidence that the City receives hundreds of millions of dollars in
state funding annually. Relying on the City's own financial reports
for 1995 through 1998, the Auditor General contends that the City
received a total of approximately $1.922 billion in state funding
from a combination of the state income tax, the state sales tax, and
state auto and hotel taxes. In addition, the City's financial
statements show that it received annually what were characterized
as "Federal/State Grants." According to the Auditor General, the
City refused requests to disclose its breakdown of the grants into
state and federal portions. The total for these grants for the years
through 1998 was $2.269 billion. I agree with the majority that
federal grant funds directed without condition to the City or
airports by the federal government via the State of Illinois as
receiving agent are not public funds of the state and are not subject
to audit. The use and audit of these funds is governed by federal
law. However, to the extent that such federal funds have been
commingled with public funds of the state and cannot be
separated, the Auditor General should also be permitted to
examine such funds to the extent necessary to produce a
meaningful and adequate audit.
	When conducting an audit, the Auditor General examines
proper management of resources and seeks to identify inefficient
or uneconomical practices to ensure that public funds are being
used to maximum efficiency. To hold that billions of dollars
gathered from the taxpayers and citizens of Illinois are no longer
subject to inspection and are beyond the reach of the constitutional
officer charged with ensuring that they are used efficiently and
only for public purposes, simply because the funds have been
commingled with funds from other nonstate sources, or because
the funds were not a specific grant or appropriation, would
frustrate the purpose of the Illinois Constitution and the Auditing
Act. "Public funds of the state" includes those funds appropriated
by the General Assembly to the airports. In addition, the plain
textual meaning of the term must also include those funds
generated due to actions or policies of the state such as sales tax,
income tax, or grants.
	Therefore, I would find that the 1995 amendment to the
Auditing Act directs the Auditor General to conduct an audit of
the City of Chicago and any other entity regarding the operation of
O'Hare International Airport, Midway Airport, and Merrill C.
Meigs Field, and that the audit should not be limited to only those
state funds directly dispersed to the City through grant or
appropriation. Furthermore, the Illinois Constitution does not
prohibit the General Assembly from directing the Auditor General
to conduct such an audit, as it sets forth a comprehensive scheme
for the control, management, and audit of state finances.
Accordingly, the finding of summary judgment by the circuit court
of Cook County in favor of the City should be reversed and the
cause should be remanded for further proceedings.
	JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1Article VIII, section 3(b), which defines the Auditor General's
authority, does not limit his power to conducting audits. It also
authorizes him to make "additional reports and investigations as
directed by the General Assembly." That additional authority, however,
is not pertinent to the dispute before us. The action challenged in this
case is an audit, not some other type of report or investigation, and its
validity must therefore be assessed in terms of the restrictions governing
audits.