Title: Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2019

Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In 2005, Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos retained the law firm of Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C. ("Borrus firm"), for help with a business dispute with Steven Eleftheriou. Represented by the Borrus firm, Dimitrakopoulos and his wife filed a complaint against Eleftheriou and his wife. For undisclosed reasons, the Borrus firm filed a motion to withdraw as counsel shortly after it was retained. Days later, the Borrus firm filed a complaint against Dimitrakopoulos, alleging that its former client owed it $93,811.95 in fees for legal services and that payment had been demanded and not made. Dimitrakopoulos, acting pro se, filed an answer to the collection complaint but filed no counterclaim or third-party claim. In a proceeding before an arbitrator six months after the collection action was filed, the Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious settled their dispute. In light of the settlement, the arbitrator did not issue an award. Months later, the court in the collection matter granted the Borrus firm’s unopposed motion for a final judgment by default in the amount of $121,947.99 for legal services, interest, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. Dimitrakopoulos did not appeal. A total of sixteen months elapsed between the filing of the Borrus firm’s collection action and the entry of the default judgment in that action. After the resolution of the business dispute between the Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious, the collection action remained pending for an additional ten months. On September 10, 2015, approximately three years after the entry of judgment in the collection action, the Dimitrakopouloses sued the Borrus firm and the principal attorneys who worked on their matter for legal malpractice. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the "entire controversy" doctrine and the doctrine of waiver. The Dimitrakopouloses argued that the damages claimed in the malpractice action were known to them as of September 6, 2011, the day that they settled their dispute with the Eleftherious. The trial court concluded that the Dimitrakopouloses could have asserted their malpractice claim in the collection matter. An Appellate Division panel affirmed that judgment and stated that under Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997), legal malpractice claims were exempt from the entire controversy doctrine to the extent that they need not be asserted in the underlying action. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the collection action at issue in this matter was not an “underlying action” as that term was used in Olds, and that the entire controversy doctrine could bar the claim. The record of this appeal, however, was inadequate for an application of the equitable rules that governed here. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C. (A-46-17) (080357)Argued October 10, 2018 -- Decided March 7, 2019PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. The entire controversy doctrine seeks to impel litigants to consolidate their claims arising from a single controversy whenever possible. If a party fails to assert a claim that the entire controversy doctrine requires to be joined in a given action, a court may bar that claim. In this appeal, the Court reviews a judgment dismissing a legal malpractice claim asserted by two clients against their former counsel. The malpractice claim was not asserted until three years after the conclusion of a collection action filed by the law firm against the clients to recover unpaid legal fees. In 2005, Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos retained the law firm of Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C. (Borrus firm), for assistance in a business dispute with Steven Eleftheriou. Represented by the Borrus firm, Dimitrakopoulos and his wife filed a verified complaint against Eleftheriou and his wife. For reasons that the record does not disclose, the Borrus firm filed a motion to withdraw as counsel shortly after it was retained. On March 7, 2011, the Borrus firm filed a complaint against Dimitrakopoulos, alleging that its former client owed it $93,811.95 in fees for legal services and that payment had been demanded and not made. Dimitrakopoulos, acting pro se, filed an answer to the collection complaint but filed no counterclaim or third-party claim. In a proceeding before the arbitrator on September 6, 2011 -- six months after the collection action was filed -- the Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious settled their dispute. In light of the settlement, the arbitrator did not issue an award. On July 12, 2012, the court in the collection matter granted the Borrus firm’s unopposed motion for a final judgment by default in the amount of $121,947.99 for legal services, interest, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. Dimitrakopoulos did not appeal. Accordingly, a total of sixteen months elapsed between the filing of the Borrus firm’s collection action and the entry of the default judgment in that action. After the resolution of the business dispute between the Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious on September 6, 2011, the collection action remained pending for an additional ten months. 1 On September 10, 2015, approximately three years after the entry of judgment in the collection action, the Dimitrakopouloses sued the Borrus firm and the principal attorneys who worked on their matter for legal malpractice. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the entire controversy doctrine and the doctrine of waiver. The Dimitrakopouloses argued that the damages claimed in the malpractice action were known to them as of September 6, 2011, the day that they settled their dispute with the Eleftherious. The trial court concluded that the Dimitrakopouloses could have asserted their malpractice claim in the collection matter. An Appellate Division panel affirmed that judgment and stated that under this Court’s decision in Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997), legal malpractice claims are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine to the extent that they need not be asserted in the underlying action. The panel confirmed, however, that the underlying action was the litigation between the Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious, not the Borrus firm’s collection action. Like the trial court, the panel concluded that during the remaining ten months of the collection action, the Dimitrakopouloses had a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate their malpractice claim. The panel did not reach the Borrus firm’s waiver argument. The Court granted the Dimitrakopouloses’ petition for certification. 232 N.J. 280 (2018).HELD: The Court reiterates its holding in Olds that the entire controversy doctrine does not compel a client to assert a legal malpractice claim against an attorney in the underlying litigation in which the attorney represents the client. 150 N.J. at 443. However, the collection action at issue in this matter was not an “underlying action” as that term is used in Olds, and the entire controversy doctrine may bar the claim. The record of this appeal, however, is inadequate for an application of the equitable rules that govern here.1. The entire controversy doctrine embodies the principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court. The doctrine seeks to impel litigants to consolidate their claims arising from a single controversy whenever possible. When a court decides whether multiple claims must be asserted in the same action, its initial inquiry is whether they arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions. The determinative consideration is whether distinct claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from interrelated facts. (pp. 16-18)2. The entire controversy doctrine raises special concerns when invoked in the setting of legal malpractice. Olds, 150 N.J. at 446. In Olds, an attorney representing the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action allegedly failed to timely serve documents on a defendant physician. Id. at 428-29. The Court found that the client’s legal malpractice claim remained unaccrued until the client’s medical malpractice claim was dismissed, id. at 439, and that “the risk of the disclosure of privileged information and the generally adverse effects on attorney-client relationships outweigh any benefit from requiring a client to assert a malpractice claim in the pending lawsuit,” id. at 441-42. The Court therefore held that “the entire controversy doctrine no longer compels the assertion of a legal-malpractice claim in an underlying action that gives rise to the claim.” Id. at 443. (pp. 18-21) 2 3. The mandatory joinder of malpractice claims in collection actions, however, does not raise the concerns identified in Olds. An attorney’s collection action is not an “underlying action” for purposes of Olds, and may provide an appropriate forum for the assertion of a malpractice counterclaim. (pp. 21-24)4. That principle, however, does not end the analysis. The entire controversy doctrine is an equitable doctrine whose application is left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases. In this appeal, the Dimitrakopouloses invoke two equitable principles: the rule that the entire controversy doctrine does not apply to claims that are unknown or unaccrued, and the requirement that once the claim accrued, the forum of the earlier action must have afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate the claim in order for the doctrine to apply. (pp. 24-26)5. In the legal malpractice setting, the accrual date is not necessarily the date on which the client actually knew the facts on which the malpractice claim is based. For the claim to accrue, the client must sustain actual damage. For application of the discovery rule, the date that a cause of action accrued is determined by the court alone and ordinarily by way of a pretrial inquiry on either affidavits, depositions or a Lopez hearing conducted pursuant to Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973). A court charged to decide when a legal malpractice claim accrued for purposes of the entire controversy doctrine should conduct a similar inquiry, which may include an evidentiary hearing analogous to a Lopez hearing if necessary to resolve factual disputes. The court’s careful evaluation of the facts is essential to ensure that the entire controversy doctrine is applied equitably. (pp. 26-29)6. Application of the entire controversy doctrine requires equality of forum. In that inquiry, the court’s focus is whether the prior forum afforded the claimant a fair and reasonable opportunity to investigate, assert, and litigate the contested claim, after that claim accrued. If the client’s malpractice claim accrued before the collection action ended, then the court must determine whether the client would have had a fair and reasonable opportunity at that point in the collection action to assert and litigate that claim. The question whether the forum provides a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate the malpractice claim warrants a case- specific inquiry. (pp. 29-31)7. The record of this appeal is inadequate to resolve the issues. At the trial court’s discretion, it may develop the record with additional submissions from the parties, conduct an evidentiary hearing similar to a Lopez hearing on the discovery rule, and consider summary judgment motions filed by the parties pursuant to Rule 4:46. Finally, the trial court should consider on remand the Borrus firm’s contention that the Dimitrakopouloses waived their right to pursue a malpractice claim. (pp. 32-34) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’S opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 46 September Term 2017 080357 Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos and Matilde Dimitrakopoulos, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., Steven L. Fox, Esq. and Anthony B. Vignuolo, Esq., Defendants-Respondents, and Frazer Evangelista & Company, LLC, and Ralph J. Evangelista, Defendants. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided October 10, 2018 March 7, 2019Jae H. Cho argued the cause for appellants (Cho Legal Group, attorneys; Kristen M. Logar, on the brief).James E. Stahl argued the cause for respondents (Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, attorneys; James E. Stahl, on the brief). 1 Diana C. Manning argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Robert B. Hille, President, of counsel and on the brief, and Diana C. Manning and Peter J. Gallagher, on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The entire controversy doctrine “seeks to impel litigants to consolidatetheir claims arising from a single controversy whenever possible.” Thorntonv. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 5 (1983) (quoting Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 113 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The doctrine serves “toencourage complete and final dispositions through the avoidance of piecemealdecisions and to promote judicial efficiency and the reduction of delay.”Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 610 (2015). If a party fails toassert a claim that the entire controversy doctrine requires to be joined in agiven action, a court may bar that claim. R. 4:30A; R. 4:7-1. In this appeal, we review the trial court’s judgment dismissing a legalmalpractice claim asserted by two clients against their former counsel. Themalpractice claim was not asserted until three years after the conclusion of acollection action filed by the law firm against the clients to recover unpaidlegal fees. The trial court held that the entire controversy doctrine barred the 2 legal malpractice claim, and an Appellate Division panel affirmed thatdecision. We reiterate our holding in Olds v. Donnelly that the entire controversydoctrine does not compel a client to assert a legal malpractice claim against anattorney in the underlying litigation in which the attorney represents the client. 150 N.J. 424, 443 (1997). A collection action brought by a law firm against itsclient, however, does not constitute such underlying litigation for purposes ofthe principle stated in Olds. The assertion of a malpractice claim in such anaction -- in which the attorney and client are already adverse -- does not raisethe privilege and loyalty concerns that warranted the exception to the entirecontroversy doctrine recognized in Olds. In appropriate settings, a court mayapply the entire controversy doctrine to preclude a legal malpractice claim thata client has declined to assert in the attorney’s action to collect unpaid legalfees. The entire controversy doctrine, however, is constrained by principles ofequity. It “does not apply to unknown or unaccrued claims.” Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 606 (quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 273-74 (1995)).Consequently, a client whose malpractice claim was not asserted in anattorney’s collection action may avoid preclusion of that claim by proving thathe or she did not know, and should not reasonably have known, of the 3 existence of the claim during the pendency of the collection action. See Maurov. Raymark Indus., Inc., 116 N.J. 126, 135-36 (1989) (citing Ayers v.Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 583 (1987)); Cafferata v. Peyser, 251 N.J.Super. 256, 260-61 (App. Div. 1991). Moreover, even if the malpractice claimaccrued before or during the earlier action, the client may avoid the entirecontroversy doctrine by demonstrating that the prior forum did not afford “afair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated” the malpractice claim.Gelber v. Zito P’ship, 147 N.J. 561, 565 (1997) (quoting Cafferata, 251 N.J.Super. at 261). Those principles demand a thorough examination of theindividual case. We conclude that the collection action at issue in this matter was not an“underlying action” as that term is used in Olds, and that the entire controversydoctrine may bar the claim. The record of this appeal, however, is inadequatefor an application of the equitable rules that govern here. That record does notreveal when the cause of action for legal malpractice accrued or indicatewhether the malpractice claimants would have had “a fair and reasonableopportunity to have fully litigated” their claim had they asserted it in thecollection action. DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 273; see also Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 606;Oliver v. Ambrose, 152 N.J. 383, 396 (1998). Those questions warrant furtherconsideration by the trial court based on an expanded record. 4 Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment, and remandthis matter to the trial court for further proceedings. I. A. In 2005, Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos settled a dispute with a businessassociate, Steven Eleftheriou.1 As a term of that settlement, Dimitrakopoulosand Eleftheriou formed a limited liability company, Integrated Constructionand Utilities, LLC (Integrated). The LLC’s members were Dimitrakopoulos’swife, Matilde Dimitrakopoulos, who owned a fifty-one percent interest, andEleftheriou, who owned the remaining forty-nine percent interest. Althoughhe was not a member of the LLC, Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos was theexclusive agent for his wife in the management of the LLC and wasresponsible for several aspects of its operations. Apparently suspicious that Eleftheriou was diverting Integrated funds,Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos retained the law firm of Borrus, Goldin, Foley,Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C. (Borrus firm). In October 2009, he and theBorrus firm signed a retainer agreement, which set forth the hourly rates to becharged for legal services by the two principal attorneys designated to work on1 We summarize the factual background based on the record presented to the trial court in connection with the Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss. 5 the matter, Steven L. Fox and Anthony B. Vignuolo, and by the firm’sassociates.2 In the retainer agreement, Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos agreed to fullycooperate with the firm and pay all bills. The Borrus firm agreed to provide“conscientious, competent and diligent services” and to “seek to achievesolutions which are just and reasonable” for its client, but noted that “attorneyscannot and do not warrant, predict or guarantee results or the final outcome ofany case.” Represented by the Borrus firm, the Dimitrakopouloses filed a verifiedcomplaint against Steven Eleftheriou and his wife Daniella Eleftheriou in theChancery Division. The record does not include the verified complaint filedby the Borrus firm and does not reveal the claims that the Borrus firm assertedon the Dimitrakopouloses’ behalf. Other than to note that Steven and DaniellaEleftheriou filed a counterclaim, the record does not indicate what proceedingstook place during the initial stage of that action.2 The undated retainer agreement in the record was signed by Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos and by Vignuolo on behalf of the Borrus firm. The agreement was not signed by Matilde Dimitrakopoulos and does not indicate that Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos executed it on his wife’s behalf. Nonetheless, it appears that the Borrus firm represented Matilde Dimitrakopoulos as well as her husband in their business dispute with Eleftheriou. 6 For reasons that the record does not disclose, the Borrus firm filed amotion to withdraw as counsel for the Dimitrakopouloses shortly after it wasretained. On December 17, 2009, the return date of the firm’s motion towithdraw from the case, Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos and the Eleftheriousagreed that their dispute would be submitted to binding arbitration. TheBorrus firm represented that it would submit to the court a list of potentialarbitrators and that it would continue to serve as counsel for theDimitrakopouloses until the court appointed an arbitrator. The Borrus firmand the Eleftherious’ counsel agreed to submit to the court a consent order bywhich the court would appoint an arbitrator and dismiss the action pending inthe Chancery Division. It appears that, after an arbitrator was selected, the Borrus firm waspermitted to withdraw as counsel and the Dimitrakopouloses retainedsubstitute counsel to represent them in the arbitration proceedings. B. On March 7, 2011, the Borrus firm filed a complaint against EvangelosDimitrakopoulos in the Law Division. The firm alleged that its former clientowed it $93,811.95 in fees for legal services and that payment had beendemanded and not made. The Borrus firm represented that, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:13-6 and Rule 1:20A-6, it had advised Evangelos 7 Dimitrakopoulos in writing of his right to pursue fee arbitration.Notwithstanding the fact that Matilde Dimitrakopoulos was also its formerclient, the Borrus firm did not name her as a defendant in the collection action . Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos, acting pro se, filed an answer to thecollection complaint. He admitted that the Borrus firm had demanded paymentof its outstanding legal fees, that those fees remained unpaid, and that he hadbeen advised of his statutory right to pursue fee arbitration. Dimitrakopoulosdenied, however, that he had “promised to pay for services which wereunnecessary and contrary to [his] direction.” He filed no counterclaim againstthe Borrus firm, or any third-party claim.3 In a proceeding before the arbitrator on September 6, 2011 -- six monthsafter the collection action was filed -- the Dimitrakopouloses and theEleftherious settled their dispute. The terms of that settlement are not in therecord. In light of the settlement, the arbitrator did not issue an award.3 A certification purporting to comply with Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) was attached to Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos’s answer in the collection matter. That certification did not conform to the language of Rule 4:5-1(b)(2), which broadly mandates disclosure of related actions and parties. Instead of stating whether “the matter in controversy is the subject of any other action pending in any court or of a pending arbitration proceeding” and “whether any other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated,” as the Rule requires, Dimitrakopoulos certified only that the matter “is not the subject matter of any other suit presently in any court or in any American Arbitration proceedings” and that he knew of “no other parties to the suit.” 8 Later that month, the court in the collection matter granted the Borrusfirm’s unopposed motion to suppress Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos’s answer forfailure to provide complete and responsive certified answers to interrogatoriespursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1). The court imposed that remedy withoutprejudice. The Borrus firm then sought suppression of the answer withprejudice and the entry of a default judgment against EvangelosDimitrakopoulos. He opposed that motion, and the trial court declined tosuppress his answer with prejudice. The court ordered Dimitrakopoulos torespond to specified interrogatories and gave him additional time to providethe discovery. Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos evidently failed to comply withthat order. On July 12, 2012, the court in the collection matter granted the Borrusfirm’s unopposed motion for a final judgment by default in the amount of$121,947.99 ($93,811.95 on a book account for legal services; $19,788.99 inprejudgment interest; $7935 in attorneys’ fees; and $412.05 in court costs)plus post-judgment interest. Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos did not appeal thefinal judgment against him. Accordingly, a total of sixteen months elapsed between the filing of theBorrus firm’s collection action and the entry of the default judgment in thataction. After the resolution of the business dispute between the 9 Dimitrakopouloses and the Eleftherious on September 6, 2011, the collectionaction remained pending for an additional ten months. C. On September 10, 2015, approximately three years after the entry ofjudgment in the collection action, Evangelos and Matilde Dimitrakopoulossued the Borrus firm, Fox, and Vignuolo for legal malpractice. In theircomplaint filed in the Law Division, the Dimitrakopouloses alleged that theBorrus firm had agreed to binding arbitration of the business dispute withouttheir consent. They asserted that their attorneys were negligent in failing toamend the Chancery Division complaint to assert claims relating to acompeting business established by Steven Eleftheriou and that the omission ofclaims relating to that new business had limited their recovery in arbitration.The Dimitrakopouloses also claimed that their counsel improperly conducteddiscovery, declined to inform them about developments relevant to their case,and failed to obtain an adequate expert’s report, and that the firm’s bills wereinappropriate. The Dimitrakopouloses sought compensatory and punitivedamages and other relief. The Borrus firm, Fox, and Vignuolo moved to dismiss the complaint forfailure to state a claim on which relief could be granted under Rule 4:6-2(e),based on the entire controversy doctrine and the doctrine of waiver. The 10 Dimitrakopouloses opposed the motion. They argued that they were notobligated to assert a counterclaim for malpractice in the collection casebecause the six-year statute of limitations on malpractice actions had yet torun, and because they did not know during the pendency of the underlyingaction that their former counsel had committed malpractice. At oral argument,the Dimitrakopouloses informed the trial court that the damages claimed in themalpractice action were known to them as of September 6, 2011, the day thatthey settled their dispute with the Eleftherious. The trial court agreed that the entire controversy doctrine did not compelthe Dimitrakopouloses to assert their malpractice claim during the underlyingaction in which the Borrus firm had represented them but concluded that theDimitrakopouloses could have asserted their malpractice claim in thecollection matter. The court found that the Dimitrakopouloses were aware oftheir malpractice claim when they resolved their dispute with the Eleftheriousand that the ten months after, during which the collection action continued,afforded a reasonable period in which to pursue a malpractice claim. Thecourt entered an order dismissing the malpractice action with prejudicepursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The Dimitrakopouloses appealed the trial court’s judgment. In anunpublished opinion, an Appellate Division panel affirmed that judgment. The 11 panel acknowledged that the entire controversy doctrine does not precludeclaims that are unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued and does not bar any cause ofaction if the prior forum did not afford a full and fair opportunity to litigate theclaim. The panel stated that under this Court’s decision in Olds, legalmalpractice claims are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine to theextent that they need not be asserted in the underlying action. The panelconfirmed, however, that for purposes of the entire controversy doctrine, theunderlying action was the litigation between the Dimitrakopouloses and theEleftherious, not the Borrus firm’s collection action. Noting the Dimitrakopouloses’ concession that their damages wereascertained when the underlying action concluded in September 2011, thepanel reasoned that, by that point in time, the malpractice claim had accrued.Like the trial court, the panel concluded that during the remaining ten monthsof the collection action, the Dimitrakopouloses had a fair and reasonableopportunity to litigate their malpractice claim. The panel did not reach theBorrus firm’s waiver argument. We granted the Dimitrakopouloses’ petition for certification. 232 N.J. 280 (2018). We also granted the motion of the New Jersey State BarAssociation (NJSBA) to appear as amicus curiae. 12 II. A. The Dimitrakopouloses urge that we reverse the Appellate Division’sjudgment and hold that their claim is not barred by the entire controversydoctrine. They assert that when the collection action was filed, they wererepresenting themselves and were unaware that they had a claim formalpractice. They contend that any application of the entire controversydoctrine that requires a pro se litigant to identify a malpractice claim would becontrary to public policy. The Dimitrakopouloses assert that they did not havea fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate their malpractice claim in thecollection action because a collection action involves only attorneys’ fees. B. The Borrus firm, Fox, and Vignuolo contend that we should affirm theAppellate Division panel’s judgment, or, in the alternative, remand the matterto the trial court for a determination of the date on which theDimitrakopouloses’ malpractice claim accrued. They observe that theDimitrakopouloses submitted no certification or other proof in support of theircontention that they were unaware of their malpractice claim until years afterthe underlying action resolved. Noting Evangelos Dimitrakopoulos’s assertionin the answer to the collection complaint that he was billed for legal work that 13 was unnecessary and contrary to his direction, the Borrus firm, Fox, andVignuolo argue that Dimitrakopoulos was clearly aware of his legalmalpractice claim when he filed that answer. They argue that the doctrine ofwaiver, like the entire controversy doctrine, bars the malpractice claim. C. Amicus curiae NJSBA urges that we affirm the Appellate Division’sjudgment, arguing that the Borrus firm’s collection lawsuit is not anunderlying action for purposes of Olds because it is not the case in which thefirm represented the Dimitrakopouloses and because it raises no concernsabout privileged communications between lawyer and client. The NJSBAnotes that when an attorney sues a client for outstanding legal fees, the clienthas the right to request fee arbitration, a proceeding that permits a client topreserve a legal malpractice claim against a later assertion of the entirecontroversy doctrine. The NJSBA contends that unless the entire controversydoctrine applies in the circumstances of this appeal, no attorney’s collectionjudgment could be considered final because the client would be permitted tobring a malpractice action at a later stage. 14 III. A. A court considering a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion examines “the legalsufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,” Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), limiting itsreview to “the pleadings themselves,” Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010).If the court considers evidence beyond the pleadings in a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion,that motion becomes a motion for summary judgment, and the court applies thestandard of Rule 4:46. Ibid.; see also Wreden v. Township of Lafayette, 436 N.J. Super. 117, 128 (App. Div. 2014). “At this preliminary stage of the litigation the Court is not concernedwith the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in thecomplaint,” and the plaintiff is “entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.”Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746. Accordingly, review of acomplaint’s factual allegations must be “undertaken with a generous andhospitable approach.” Ibid. Nonetheless, if the complaint states no claim thatsupports relief, and discovery will not give rise to such a claim, the actionshould be dismissed. Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2011); Camden Cty. Energy RecoveryAssocs., L.P. v. DEP, 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64-65 (App. Div. 1999). 15 An appellate court reviews de novo the trial court’s determination of themotion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e). Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v.County of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017). It owes nodeference to the trial court’s legal conclusions. Rezem Family Assocs., 423 N.J. Super. at 114. B. 1. The entire controversy doctrine “embodies the principle that theadjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only onecourt.” Cogdell ex rel. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 15 (1989);see also N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 4 (providing that, subject to court rules, “theLaw Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers andfunctions of the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legaland equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters incontroversy between the parties may be completely determined”). Thedoctrine “seeks to impel litigants to consolidate their claims arising from a'single controversy’ whenever possible.” Thornton, 94 N.J. at 5 (quotingAlfone, 87 N.J. at 113). Three significant concerns in the administration of justice support claimpreclusion under the entire controversy doctrine: “(1) the need for complete 16 and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairnessto parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3)efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.” Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 605 (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 267); accord Highland LakesCountry Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 123, 125 (2009). A series of court rules implement the entire controversy doctrine in ourcourts. Subject to exceptions not relevant here, Rule 4:30A provides that “[n]on-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shallresult in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entirecontroversy doctrine.” Rule 4:7-1 addresses the filing of counterclaims mandatedby the doctrine. In their initial pleadings, parties must also disclose in certifiedform “whether the matter in controversy is the subject of any other action pendingin any court or of a pending arbitration proceeding,” and “whether any other actionor arbitration proceeding is contemplated.” R. 4:5-1(b)(2). That disclosurerequirement exists “to implement the philosophy of the entire controversydoctrine.” Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:5-1(2019). When a court decides whether multiple claims must be asserted in thesame action, its initial inquiry is whether they “arise from related facts or thesame transaction or series of transactions.” DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 267. The 17 doctrine does not mandate that successive claims share common legal issues inorder for the doctrine to bar a subsequent action. Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 605;DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271. Instead, “the determinative consideration is whetherdistinct claims are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arisefrom interrelated facts.” DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271. 2. The entire controversy doctrine raises special concerns when invoked inthe setting of legal malpractice. Olds, 150 N.J. at 446. If a lawyer’s handlingof a matter generates a malpractice claim, his or her subsequent invocation ofthe entire controversy doctrine implicates the attorney-client relationship, thelawyer’s ethical obligations, and client confidences. Id. at 440-43; see N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20(2)(c); N.J.R.E. 504(2)(c); R.P.C. 1.6(c)(2). We first confronted an application of the entire controversy doctrine to alegal malpractice claim in Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran &Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 (1995). There, we affirmed the dismissal of a legalmalpractice action brought by a commercial tenant against its former attorney.Id. at 303. The tenant’s attorney allegedly committed malpractice when heapproved the landlord’s erroneous formula for the calculation of rent increasesas part of the settlement of a rent dispute. Id. at 286. Although the attorneydisclosed his mistake to his client and withdrew as counsel after filing an 18 action on his client’s behalf to reform the lease, the client waited until thereformation action was settled before filing an action for malpractice againstits former counsel. Id. at 286-88. Rejecting the former client’s argument thatlegal malpractice claims should be exempt from the entire controversydoctrine, we held that the client was compelled to assert its malpractice claimin the reformation action. Id. at 291, 303. Because the client had not done so,we barred its claim. Id. at 303. In Olds, decided two years after Circle Chevrolet, we again consideredthe impact of the entire controversy doctrine on legal malpractice claims.There, an attorney representing the plaintiff in a medical malpractice actionallegedly failed to timely serve the summons and complaint on a defendantphysician before withdrawing as counsel in the matter. Olds, 150 N.J. at 428-29. The former client filed a legal malpractice claim against the attorney, whomoved to dismiss the action because the legal malpractice claim had not beenasserted in the underlying medical malpractice litigation as Circle Chevroletrequired. Id. at 430. The Appellate Division declined to bar the legalmalpractice action because it had not accrued until the court dismissed theplaintiff’s medical malpractice claim against the physician. Id. at 431. We affirmed and modified the Appellate Division panel’s judgment. Weconcurred with the panel that the client’s legal malpractice claim remained 19 unaccrued until the client’s medical malpractice claim was dismissed. Id. at439. We reiterated that the entire controversy doctrine “encompasses'virtually all causes, claims, and defenses relating to a controversy’ betweenparties engaged in litigation.” Id. at 433 (quoting Cogdell, 116 N.J. at 16).Nonetheless, we characterized claim preclusion under Rule 4:30A as “aremedy of last resort,” id. at 446, and cautioned that a court should determinewhether a remedy short of preclusion “will vindicate the cost or prejudice toother parties and the judicial system,” id. at 448. Most significantly, we directly acknowledged criticism of our decisionin Circle Chevrolet and conceded that our decision in that case had not“fulfilled our expectations.” Id. at 440. We noted that when an attorney is“made the adversary” and a client is forced to engage a second attorney topursue a legal malpractice claim in a pending litigation, the interests of thefirst attorney and the client diverge. Ibid. We also recognized that the CircleChevrolet rule might force clients to forego malpractice claims in order tomaintain their legal representation until pending litigation is resolved, and that“the requirement that clients join their attorneys in the original lawsuitjeopardizes attorney-client confidences.” Id. at 440-41. We concluded that“the risk of the disclosure of privileged information and the generally adverseeffects on attorney-client relationships outweigh any benefit from requiring a 20 client to assert a malpractice claim in the pending lawsuit.” Id. at 441-42.4We therefore held that “the entire controversy doctrine no longer compels theassertion of a legal-malpractice claim in an underlying action that gives rise tothe claim.” Id. at 443. In Olds, we thus stated a core principle: the entire controversy doctrinedoes not require an attorney’s current or former client to assert a legalmalpractice claim against that attorney in the litigation that gave rise to themalpractice claim even if the two claims arise from the same or related factsand would otherwise be subject to mandatory joinder. Ibid. The Dimitrakopouloses argue that the collection matter in this case isakin to the underlying litigation in Olds, and the limitations on the entirecontroversy doctrine imposed in Olds preclude the doctrine’s application inthis appeal. The mandatory joinder of malpractice claims in collection actions,however, does not raise the concerns that we identified in Olds when we4 In Olds, we noted that malpractice claims arising from legal services in a transactional matter are unlikely to raise the same concerns as claims arising from a representation in litigation, as a transactional attorney “is not saddled with the conflicting roles of advocating on behalf of the client in the underlying litigation and representing his or her own interests as a defendant.” 150 N.J. at 442. We observed, however, that “[t]he line between transactional and litigation representation . . . is not always clear,” and we declined to adopt a separate rule for the application of the entire controversy doctrine to legal malpractice claims arising from transactional matters. Ibid. 21 abandoned the rule of Circle Chevrolet. It is highly improbable that in thewake of a collection complaint, a legal malpractice claim will disrupt aharmonious attorney-client relationship. See Olds, 150 N.J. at 440. Assertedas a counterclaim in a collection action in which the former attorney is theonly other party, a malpractice claim poses little risk to client confidences.See ibid. A rule requiring such joinder is unlikely to pressure a client toforego his or her malpractice claim out of concern that he or she willantagonize trusted counsel. See id. at 440-41. In short, it is the rare case inwhich a client’s litigation interests or his or her privileged communicationswill be imperiled if the entire controversy doctrine mandates the filing of amalpractice counterclaim in a current or former attorney’s collection lawsuit. Indeed, as counsel for NJSBA noted at oral argument, clients sued bytheir attorneys to collect outstanding legal fees commonly assert counterclaimsfor malpractice in those actions. See, e.g., Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 430(2005) (noting that the plaintiff client, sued for unpaid legal fees, asserted acounterclaim based on allegations of legal malpractice); Alpert, Goldberg,Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J. Super. 510, 522-23, 542(App. Div. 2009) (dismissing on summary judgment a legal malpracticecounterclaim filed in response to attorney’s attempt to recover unpaid legalfees); Newell v. Hudson, 376 N.J. Super. 29, 31-34 (App. Div. 2005) (same); 22 Charles A. Manganaro Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp.Sewerage Auth., 344 N.J. Super. 343, 347-48 (App. Div. 2001) (discussing theneed for an affidavit of merit pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 when a clientasserts a counterclaim for malpractice in its former counsel’s collectionaction); Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 577-79(App. Div. 1998) (dismissing a legal malpractice counterclaim filed in acollection action). In practice, legal malpractice counterclaims are frequentlyasserted as counterclaims in attorney collection actions, and litigated in tandemwith those claims. The Dimitrakopouloses rely on our decision in Higgins v. Thurber, 205 N.J. 227, 228-30 (2011), for the proposition that the entire controversydoctrine should not apply if the prior proceeding is a collection action. InHiggins, we declined to apply the entire controversy doctrine to bar an estatebeneficiary’s legal malpractice and contract claims against the estate’sattorneys. Ibid. Those claims were asserted after the conclusion of an actionto settle an account on an estate trust pursuant to Rule 4:87-1(a), a proceedingwe described as “a formalistic proceeding, unique to probate.” Id. at 229; seeR. 4:87-1(a). We reasoned that because that action’s “stylized format involvesa line-by-line review [of] the exceptions to an accounting,” and the actionfocuses “'on the conduct of the executor, not the conduct of others,’” the entire 23 controversy doctrine “is out of place” and should not apply in that setting.Higgins, 205 N.J. at 229 (quoting Perry v. Tuzzio, 288 N.J. Super. 223, 229(App. Div. 1996) (holding that the entire controversy doctrine does not bar aclaim that was not asserted in a probate action for an accounting)). We do not concur with the Dimitrakopouloses that an attorney’scollection action is analogous to the probate accounting at issue in Higgins. Acollection action is not a specialized proceeding to confirm an executor’sestate accounting, but rather a litigated matter in which the attorney’s handlingof the client’s case is directly at issue. A malpractice claim is by no means outof place in such a proceeding. Higgins has no bearing on this appeal. In sum, an attorney’s collection action against his or her client is not an“underlying action” for purposes of Olds, and does not implicate the concernsthat prompted us to abandon the Circle Chevrolet rule. Such an action mayprovide an appropriate forum for the assertion of a malpractice counterclaim. C. 1. That principle, however, does not end the analysis. As we have longacknowledged, “the boundaries of the entire controversy doctrine are notlimitless. It remains an equitable doctrine whose application is left to judicial 24 discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases.” Nicastro, 201 N.J. at 125 (quoting Oliver, 152 N.J. at 396). Because “the polestar for the application of the [entire controversy] ruleis judicial fairness,” a court must apply the doctrine in accordance withequitable principles, with careful attention to the facts of a given case. K-LandCorp. No. 28 v. Landis Sewerage Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 74 (2002) (alteration inoriginal) (quoting Reno Auto Sales, Inc. v. Prospect Park Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 243 N.J. Super. 624, 630 (App. Div. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).The doctrine’s equitable nature “bar[s] its application where to do so would beunfair in the totality of the circumstances and would not promote any of itsobjectives, namely, the promotion of conclusive determinations, party fairness,and judicial economy and efficiency.” Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted) (alterationin original) (quoting Pressler, Current N.J. Rules, cmts. 1 & 2 on R. 4:30A(2002)). “In considering whether application of the doctrine is fair, courtsshould consider fairness to the court system as a whole, as well as to allparties.” Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 605. In this appeal, the Dimitrakopouloses invoke two equitable principles:the rule that the entire controversy doctrine does not apply to claims that areunknown or unaccrued, see Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 606, and the requirement thatonce the claim accrued, the forum of the earlier action must have afforded a 25 fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate the claim in order for the doctrine toapply, see Gelber, 147 N.J. at 565. We consider each in turn. 2. As we held in Circle Chevrolet and reiterated in Olds, “the determinationof the accrual of a legal-malpractice claim for the purposes of imposing theentire-controversy bar is like the determination of the accrual of the bar of thestatute of limitations.” Olds, 150 N.J. at 436 (citing Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J.at 296).5 In both decisions, we derived our analysis from the discovery rule,the equitable principle governing statute of limitations cases that “triggers theaccrual of the statute of limitations for attorney-malpractice actions.” Ibid. AsJudge Pressler observed, “[t]he knowledge of the existence of a cause of actionwhich will invoke the entire controversy doctrine is the same as the knowledgewhich will trigger the running of the statute of limitations in those cases to5 The entire controversy doctrine and the statute of limitations are distinct from one another; even if a claim is timely filed for purposes of the statute of limitations, it must be separately analyzed in accordance with Rule 4:30A. See, e.g., Vision Mortg. Corp., Inc. v. Patricia J. Chiapperini, Inc., 156 N.J. 580, 584-86 (1999) (addressing entire-controversy-doctrine and statute-of- limitations issues separately and concluding that neither the statute of limitations nor the entire controversy doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim); Cafferata, 251 N.J. Super. at 259 (considering the applicability of the entire controversy doctrine to a claim that was filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations). 26 which the discovery rule of deferred accrual is applicable.” Cafferata, 251 N.J. Super. at 260. Principles developed in cases analyzing the discovery rule thereforeapply with equal force to the entire controversy doctrine. For statute oflimitations purposes, a cause of action accrues “when a plaintiff knows or,through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of the basis for acause of action against an identifiable defendant.” The Palisades at Fort LeeCondo. Ass’n, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427, 447 (2017) (citingCaravaggio v. D’Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 246 (2001)); see also Kendall v.Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 191 (2012) (observing, in a medicalmalpractice appeal, that a cause of action accrues when “the facts presentedwould alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence that he or shewas injured due to the fault of another” and that a plaintiff need not have legaladvice or an expert opinion in order for his or her cause of action to accrue);Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 66 (1998) (same). In the legal malpractice setting, the accrual date is not necessarily thedate on which the client actually knew the facts on which the malpracticeclaim is based; instead, that date “is set in motion when the essential facts ofthe malpractice claim are reasonably discoverable.” Vastano v. Algeier, 178 N.J. 230, 242 (2003). For the claim to accrue, “[t]he client must sustain actual 27 damage.” Olds, 150 N.J. at 437 (citing Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483,492 (1992)). As we noted in Grunwald, “[l]egally cognizable damages occurwhen a plaintiff detrimentally relies on the negligent advice of an attorney.Actual damages are those that are real and substantial as opposed tospeculative.” 131 N.J. at 495 (citation omitted). However, the client need nothave incurred all of his or her damages in order for the malpractice claim toaccrue. Ibid. (“[A] client may suffer damages[] in the form of attorney’s fees[]before a court has announced its decision in the underlying action. It is notnecessary that all or even the greater part of the damages . . . occur before thecause of action arises.” (quoting United States v. Gutterman, 701 F.2d 104,106 (9th Cir. 1983))). Our statute of limitations case law also provides guidance regarding theprocedure by which a judge determines when a cause of action accrued inorder to resolve an entire controversy doctrine dispute. For application of thediscovery rule, the date that a cause of action accrued is determined “by thecourt alone and ordinarily by way of a pretrial inquiry on either affidavits,depositions or a so-called evidential Lopez hearing” conducted pursuant toLopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973). Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 36.2.2 on R.4:5-4. “Obviously, however, if there is no dispute as to the facts controllingthe discovery determination, a Lopez hearing is not required.” Ibid. 28 A court charged to decide when a legal malpractice claim accrued forpurposes of the entire controversy doctrine should conduct a similar inquiry,which may include an evidentiary hearing analogous to a Lopez hearing ifnecessary to resolve factual disputes. See Dinizo v. Butler, 315 N.J. Super. 317, 322-23 (App. Div. 1998) (remanding matter for an evidentiary hearing todetermine when a claim accrued for purposes of the entire controversydoctrine). As in statute-of-limitations determinations, the court’s carefulevaluation of the facts is essential to ensure that the entire controversy doctrineis applied equitably. 3. As we have observed, “application of the [entire controversy] doctrinerequires equality of forum, that is, the first forum must have been able toprovide all parties with the same full and fair opportunity to litigate the issuesand with the same remedial opportunities as the second forum.” Hernandez v.Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 661 (1996) (alteration in original)(quoting Perry, 288 N.J. Super. at 230); see also Gelber, 147 N.J. at 565;Cafferata, 251 N.J. Super. at 261. In that inquiry, the court’s focus is whether the prior forum afforded theclaimant a fair and reasonable opportunity to investigate, assert, and litigatethe contested claim, after that claim accrued. Thus, in DiTrolio, we 29 scrutinized the procedural history of the prior suit and found that the “plaintiffhad ample opportunity to have fully litigated the claim in the first action; hesimply chose not to.” 142 N.J. at 274. In contrast, the Appellate Divisionpanel deciding Cafferata concluded that the plaintiff had no meaningfulopportunity to litigate a medical malpractice claim in a Special Civil Partcollection action in which “[n]o judge was involved” and the proceeding “wasin effect an informal expedited mediation appropriate to small claims buthardly to significant tort litigation.” 251 N.J. Super. at 261. When, as here, an attorney seeks to bar a client’s malpractice claimbecause that claim was not asserted as a counterclaim in a collection action,the court’s determination of the date that the claim accrued may end theinquiry. If the client’s legal malpractice claim accrued after the collectionaction was resolved, then the client clearly had no opportunity to assert thatclaim in the collection action, and the entire controversy doctrine does notpreclude it. R. 4:30A. If, however, the client’s malpractice claim accrued before the collectionaction ended, then the court must determine whether the client would have hada fair and reasonable opportunity at that point in the collection action to assertand litigate that claim. As does the court’s assessment of the timing of themalpractice claim’s accrual, the question whether the forum provides a fair and 30 reasonable opportunity to litigate the malpractice claim warrants a case-specific inquiry. The court may consider such issues as the steps required toinvestigate, file and prosecute the malpractice claim in that forum, the status ofthe collection action when the malpractice claim accrued, the time constraintsimposed by the rules of court, and the prospect of obtaining extensions of timeto litigate the malpractice claim. 4. In summary, the following principles derived from our case law governthe application of the entire controversy doctrine to this appeal. First, in order for the entire controversy doctrine to bar a legalmalpractice claim because that claim was not joined in a prior action, the twoclaims must “arise from related facts or the same transaction or series oftransactions,” Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 605 (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 267), butneed not share common legal theories, ibid.; DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271. Thatrequirement is clearly met in this case, in which the collection and malpract iceclaims derive from the Borrus firm’s legal representation of theDimitrakopouloses. Second, the entire controversy doctrine does not require a client orformer client to bring a legal malpractice case in the underlying action inwhich the attorney represented the client. Olds, 150 N.J. at 443-44. 31 Third, an attorney’s collection action against the client, in which theattorney seeks payment of legal fees incurred in the representation of theclient, is not an “underlying action” within the meaning of Olds. Accordingly,a client’s legal malpractice claim that is not asserted in the attorney’scollection action may be barred under the entire controversy doctrine. Fourth, a court should not preclude a claim under the entire controversydoctrine if such a remedy would be unfair in the totality of the circumstancesand would not promote the doctrine’s objectives of conclusive determinations,party fairness, and judicial economy and efficiency. Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 605;K-Land, 173 N.J. at 70; DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 273-74. A range of equitableprinciples may apply to a particular case. Here, the core questions are whenthe claim accrued, and whether, given the steps required to assert and litigatethe claim, the forum of the collection action then afforded theDimitrakopouloses a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate the legalmalpractice claim. D. The record of this appeal, developed for purposes of a motion to dismissfor failure to state a claim under Rule 4:6-2(e), is inadequate to resolve theissues. In this appeal, the “totality of the circumstances” analysis that our case 32 law mandates cannot be conducted based on the pleadings alone; that analysisrequires further proceedings on remand. The parties dispute the date on which the Dimitrakopouloses’malpractice claim accrued. Although they conceded before the trial court thatthe malpractice claim accrued when their dispute with the Eleftherious settledon September 6, 2011, the Dimitrakopouloses now maintain that their claimaccrued on a later date. The Borrus firm, Fox, and Vignuolo contend that themalpractice claim accrued prior to September 6, 2011, but acknowledge thatthe evidence on which they rely in that regard is not in the record on appeal. Moreover, the appellate record contains scant information about thecollection action itself. We are not in a position, based on the record, todetermine whether, following the accrual of their cause of action, theDimitrakopouloses would have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigatetheir malpractice claim had they brought that claim in the collection action.The record is also inadequate for us to decide whether the Borrus firm’sdecision not to name Matilde Dimitrakopoulos as a defendant in the collectionaction affects the application of the entire controversy doctrine to this appeal. Those issues, and any other relevant questions that the trial courtidentifies on remand, should be determined on an expanded record. At thetrial court’s discretion, it may develop that record with additional submissions 33 from the parties, conduct an evidentiary hearing similar to a Lopez hearing onthe discovery rule, and consider summary judgment motions filed by theparties pursuant to Rule 4:46. Finally, the trial court should consider on remand the Borrus firm’scontention that the Dimitrakopouloses waived their right to pursue amalpractice claim, as that claim was not reached when the trial court and theAppellate Division considered the motion to dismiss. IV. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the matter isremanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’S opinion. 34