Title: State v. Delano J. O'Brien
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP003028-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3028-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Delano J. O'Brien,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  214 Wis. 2d 327, 572 N.W.2d 870 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 21, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 17, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph D. McCormack 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  Abrahambson, C.J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Martin E. Kohler, John C. Thomure, Jr., and Kohler & 
Hart, Milwaukee and oral argument by John C. Thomure, Jr. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  96-3028-CR 
  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Delano J. O'Brien,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
JAN 21, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The defendant seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. O’Brien, 
214 Wis. 2d 327, 572 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1997), affirming the 
judgments of conviction for two counts of third-degree sexual 
assault and an order denying his motion for post-conviction 
relief entered by the Circuit Court for Ozaukee County, Joseph 
D. McCormack, Judge.  We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  
¶2 
There are three issues before us on review:  (1) did 
the circuit court err by applying the physical proximity test to 
the search warrant of the defendant’s premises and by failing to 
suppress evidence obtained from the search of the defendant’s 
vehicle located nearby; (2) should a criminal defendant be 
entitled to post-conviction discovery; and (3) was the defendant 
denied effective assistance of counsel.  We hold that the 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
2 
physical proximity test was properly applied and that the 
reasonable scope of the premises search warrant encompassed the 
defendant’s vehicle.  We agree that a criminal defendant has a 
right 
to 
post-conviction 
discovery 
when 
the 
sought-after 
evidence would be relevant to an issue of consequence, but this 
remedy should not be extended to a case, such as this, where the 
evidence would not create a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome.  We also conclude that the defendant failed 
to demonstrate prejudice under his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 
I. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In the early 
morning hours of May 8, 1994, the male victim, an 18-year old, 
160 lb. high school senior and state qualifying wrestler, 
reported to police that the defendant, a 55-year old, 200-230 
lb. male, had performed fellatio on him and had anal intercourse 
with him without his consent.  The victim explained that during 
the previous day, he had been helping the defendant plant trees 
at the defendant’s farm.  They were unable to complete the 
planting before dark, and the victim agreed to stay overnight to 
finish the planting in the morning.  After watching a rental 
movie, “Robin Hood, Men in Tights,” the defendant showed the 
victim the spare bedroom where he would sleep for the evening.  
The victim told the police that the defendant came into the 
spare bedroom and performed fellatio and anal intercourse on him 
without his consent.  
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
3 
¶4 
Once the defendant left the spare bedroom, the victim 
gathered up some of his things and fled the defendant’s home.  
He drove off in his own vehicle naked from the waist down and 
flagged down a town marshal.  The victim was taken to the 
sheriff’s department for an interview and written statement.  He 
was then transported to a hospital where he was examined, and 
hair samples, blood samples, penile swabs and anal swabs and 
smears were taken.   
¶5 
Later that morning, the police obtained a search 
warrant and four officers went to the defendant’s residence to 
conduct the search.1  The defendant’s residence was a farmstead 
consisting of a two-story duplex, a barn, an outbuilding, a 
small backyard and two driveways.  The officers searched the 
upper level of the duplex which was occupied by the defendant, 
and one officer walked through the barn and the outbuilding on 
the property.  Located next to the outbuilding, approximately 
200 feet west of the home, was a vehicle that was registered to 
the defendant.2  The officer opened the door and saw a pair of 
jeans tucked behind the driver’s seat.  Detective David Guss, 
                     
1 The search warrant authorized a search of the premises, 
occupied by the defendant, and described as “1618 Hawthorne 
Drive - brown in color siding with white trim, two family 
residence, specifically upper flat with said residence having 
two driveways.”  The officers were looking for “a pair of white 
Hanes 32-34 classic underpants and one pair of blue jeans 
. . . which may constitute evidence of a crime.” 
2 Once at the residence, and prior to the execution of the 
search warrant, Detective David Guss conducted a license 
registration check of the vehicle’s plates and learned that it 
was registered to the defendant. 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
4 
the chief investigator of the complaint, was notified, and Guss 
removed the jeans from the truck, looked through them and found 
a pair of underwear in one of the pockets.  The items matched 
those described in the search warrant.  The police then arrested 
the defendant and charged him with two counts of third-degree 
sexual assault. 
¶6 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the jeans and underwear that were recovered from his 
vehicle.3  The circuit court denied the motion concluding that in 
the case of a tenancy, where two or more tenants are sharing the 
same real estate, those portions of the property that are common 
to both become part of the curtilage of the place directed to be 
searched.  Because no evidence was introduced allocating any 
portions of the defendant’s property to him or his tenant, 
excepting the duplex, the court found that the area immediately 
surrounding the duplex was a common area that he shared with the 
other tenant and that the premises warrant extended to this 
curtilage, including the defendant’s vehicle.   
¶7 
At trial, the victim testified that the defendant, who 
had gone to the bathroom, came back into the spare bedroom and 
climbed into bed with him.  The defendant rolled the victim on 
                     
3 The defendant also filed a motion to compel discovery, 
specifically the crime lab reports from the victim’s examination 
after the alleged assault.  The circuit court conducted an in 
camera review of the reports which were negative as to any 
external signs of trauma.  The court concluded that as long as 
the State did not assert that the victim sustained injuries, the 
reports would not be furnished to the defendant.  
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
5 
to his back, sat on his stomach with his head facing the 
victim’s feet, took off the victim’s pants and underwear, and 
performed fellatio on him.  The victim stated that he told the 
defendant to stop several times.  When asked if he did anything 
to get away, the victim stated, “there’s not much [he] could do 
because [the defendant] was sitting on [his] chest . . . [The 
victim] thought about punching him, but he’s a big guy.  And 
[he] didn’t think that would work.”  The defendant testified 
that the act of fellatio was consensual.   
¶8 
After the defendant got off his chest, the victim 
turned immediately to his side.  According to the victim, the 
defendant then pushed him onto his stomach and inserted his 
penis into the victim’s anus.  Again, the victim testified that 
he told him to stop, but the defendant continued with the 
assault.  The defendant laid next to the victim for a short time 
and then left the spare bedroom at which time the victim left 
the defendant’s home and flagged down a town marshal.  The 
defendant denied having anal intercourse with the victim.   
¶9 
Also at trial, the parties stipulated to the findings 
in the crime lab report and to the nurse’s findings at the 
hospital.  They agreed that Detective Guss would read the 
contents of those reports to the jury.  According to the crime 
lab report, a trace of semen was found on an external penile 
swab and on a penile smear, but the possible source was 
inconclusive.  No semen was identified on a second penile smear, 
an external anal swab, an internal anal swab, anal smears, a 
saliva standard, the jeans found in the search or the T-shirt 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
6 
taken from the victim.  Semen was identified on a white blanket 
taken from the defendant’s residence, and the defendant was 
noted as a possible source of the semen.4  Pursuant to the 
stipulation, Guss also reported that the nurse physically viewed 
the victim’s anus and noted zero lacerations or tears.  
¶10 A jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of 
third-degree 
sexual 
assault 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.225(3) (1993-94).5  The defendant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate sentence not to exceed 30 months on count one and 
five-years probation on count two, to run consecutively.  Both 
sentences were stayed pending appeal. 
¶11 Post conviction, the defendant filed a “motion to 
remove exhibits for purposes of physical testing in anticipation 
of motion for postconviction relief.”  The defendant sought to 
remove and test the blood samples, semen samples and anal swabs 
and smears taken from the victim.  The defendant argued that the 
evidence would help to prove the victim’s consent as to the 
fellatio charge and to support his denial of anal intercourse.  
The circuit court denied the motion. 
                     
4 Additional findings of the crime lab report included an 
inconclusive finding of semen located on a quilt; pubic hair 
combings and a head hair that were consistent with the victim; 
one hair found on the undressing paper that was dissimilar to 
the defendant, but inconclusive as to the victim; and no semen 
was 
identified 
on 
either 
a 
saliva 
standard, 
jeans, 
or 
underpants, found during the search or the T-shirt collected 
from the defendant.  These findings were read to the jury.    
5 All future references to the Wis. Stats. will be to the 
1993-94 version of the statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
7 
¶12 The defendant then filed a motion for post-conviction 
relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel arguing in 
part that counsel failed to present testimony of the victim’s 
wrestling 
history—evidence 
that the 
defendant 
believes is 
exculpatory.  The circuit court also denied that motion 
concluding that even if the evidence of the victim’s wrestling 
experience had been admitted, the result would not have been 
different and that trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable.6  The 
defendant appealed.   
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the judgments of 
conviction and the order denying post-conviction relief.  The 
court concluded that the search of the defendant’s premises and 
person was proper and that the scope of the premises search 
warrant reasonably included the defendant’s vehicle parked in 
the common area.  The court also determined that the exceptions 
to the general rule against discovery should be extended to 
post-conviction discovery.  The court adopted a materiality 
standard for removal of evidence post conviction, to be reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard.7  Finally, the court 
                     
6 The defendant provided three bases for counsel’s allegedly 
deficient conduct:  (1) counsel stipulated to the inconclusive 
crime lab report; (2) counsel stipulated that there was no 
physical evidence of trauma to the victim, but allowed, without 
calling a rebuttal witness, testimony that victims do not always 
present physical symptoms; and (3) counsel failed to uncover the 
victim’s wrestling experience.  The defendant only raises the 
third issue on appeal before this court.    
7 The court of appeals also set forth guidelines, to be 
applied prospectively only, that require the party filing the 
post-conviction discovery request to: 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
8 
concluded that the defendant failed to establish that he was 
prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies in counsel’s conduct.  
This court granted the defendant’s petition for review on all 
three issues.   
II. 
¶14 The first issue that we consider is whether the 
circuit court and court of appeals erred by applying the 
physical proximity test to the search warrant of the defendant’s 
premises and by refusing to suppress the evidence recovered from 
the defendant’s vehicle which was located on the premises. The 
defendant argues that his vehicle was not part of the curtilage 
of the premises as specifically described in the warrant.  Thus, 
                                                                  
(1) provide supporting affidavits with the motion 
which describe the material sought to be discovered 
and explain why the material was not supplied or 
discovered at or before trial; 
 
(2) establish that alternative means or evidence is 
not already available such that the postconviction 
discovery is necessary to refute an element in the 
case; 
 
(3) describe what results the party hopes to obtain 
from discovery and explain how those results are 
relevant and material to one of the issues in the 
case; and  
 
(4) after meeting the first three criteria, the party 
must 
then 
convince 
the 
trial 
court 
that 
the 
anticipated results would not only be relevant, but 
that the results would also create a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome. 
 
State v. O’Brien, 214 Wis. 2d 327, 342, 572 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 
1997).   
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
9 
while the truck may be within the common area of the property, 
he claims the police were still required to demonstrate probable 
cause to search the truck for evidence.  The State insists that 
the premises search included the vehicle and was proper.  
¶15 When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we 
uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2); State v. Whitrock, 
161 Wis. 2d 960, 973, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991).  Whether the facts 
satisfy the constitutional requirement of reasonableness of a 
search presents a question of law, which we review independently 
of the circuit court and court of appeals.  State v. Fry, 131 
Wis. 2d 153, 171, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).   
¶16 The circuit court found that the area outside the 
defendant’s residence, which was not specifically allocated to 
one tenant or the other, was a common area to both, and as such 
became part of the curtilage8 of the premises directed to be 
searched.  According to the court, the defendant’s vehicle, 
which was parked next to the outbuilding, was located in this 
curtilage, and was subject to the premises warrant. 
                     
8 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990), in part, defines 
curtilage: 
  For 
search 
and 
seizure 
purposes, 
includes 
those 
outbuildings which are directly or intimately connected with 
habitation and in proximity thereto and the land or grounds 
surrounding the dwelling which are necessary and convenient and 
habitually used for family purposes and carrying on domestic 
employment. 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
10
¶17 This finding is supported by the evidence.  There is 
no evidence suggesting that those portions of the farmstead, 
except for the duplex itself, were specifically allocated to 
solely the defendant or his tenant.  Detective Guss testified 
that the vehicle was parked approximately 200 feet west of the 
home, next to the outbuilding.  Photos introduced at the 
suppression hearing confirm that the vehicle was located within 
the curtilage of the defendant’s living quarters, especially in 
the context of a rural setting.    Based on this evidence, we 
conclude that the circuit court’s finding that defendant’s 
vehicle was parked within the common area is not clearly 
erroneous. 
¶18 All persons are to be secure from unreasonable 
searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.9  The two provisions are interpreted in concert, 
                     
9 Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
  Searches and seizures . . . The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
  The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
11
and the development of Wisconsin law on search and seizure 
parallels that developed by the United States Supreme Court.  
State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 389, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996). 
¶19 In the case of a premises warrant, the warrant 
generally authorizes the search of all items on the premises so 
long as those items are plausible receptacles of the objects of 
the search.  Id. at 389 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 820-21 (1982)).  Courts have utilized different approaches 
for determining the proper scope of a premises search warrant.  
Andrews, 
201 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
391 
(primary 
approaches 
are 
“relationship,” “notice” and “physical proximity or possession” 
tests).     
¶20 In Andrews, this court adopted the physical proximity 
test.  Under the physical proximity test, 
 
police can search all items found on the premises that 
are plausible repositories for objects named in the 
search warrant, except those worn by or in the 
physical possession of persons whose search is not 
authorized 
by 
the 
warrant, 
irrespective 
of 
the 
person’s status in relation to the premises. 
Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d at 403.  Under this test, the cornerstone 
of the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of the search, 
remains.  Id. 
¶21 The premises warrant in this case authorized the 
search of the upper flat of the defendant’s premises in order to 
locate a pair of underpants and blue jeans, as well as other 
items described by the victim.  Those two items were not located 
                                                                  
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
12
in the residence, so the detectives extended the search to the 
buildings nearby.  The vehicle was parked next to one of the 
buildings, approximately 200 feet from the home.  The detectives 
knew that the vehicle was registered to the defendant, and that 
the items were small enough to fit inside of it.  Because the 
vehicle was a plausible repository for the objects named in the 
search warrant, and because the vehicle was in close proximity 
to the home, we conclude that the detectives search of the 
vehicle was reasonable.  
¶22 The 
defendant 
also 
contends 
that 
the 
physical 
proximity test, as articulated by the court of appeals, is now 
without any limitation.  He argues that in order to search a 
large tract of land with several buildings, vehicles and 
containers, the police will simply insert the word “premises” 
and the address in the warrant.  The State, as expected, 
counters that the court of appeals’ decision did not create 
unlimited authority for the police to search under a premises 
warrant.  We agree with the State. 
¶22a The defendant’s concerns about future abuses by the 
authorities in obtaining search warrants ignores two bedrock 
principles of search and seizure law.  First, search warrants 
are not merely filled out by police officers; rather, “[s]earch 
warrants must be issued by a neutral, disinterested magistrate 
to whom it has been demonstrated that there is probable cause to 
believe that the evidence sought will aid in prosecution for a 
particular offense.”  Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d at 390.  Second, the 
concept of reasonableness must be met.  The court must examine 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
13
the totality of the given circumstances to determine whether the 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d at 973-74.  Because the 
search of the vehicle was reasonable, we affirm.   
  III. 
¶22b The second issue that we consider is whether the 
defendant was entitled to, and was improperly denied, the 
opportunity to remove exhibits, post conviction, for scientific 
testing.  Our focus here is on the defendant’s right to post-
conviction discovery. 
¶22c Historically, the right to discovery in criminal cases 
has been limited to that which is provided by statute.  State v. 
Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 474, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 971.23 governs the rights to and procedures for 
discovery in criminal cases.  While § 971.23(5)10 allows for 
pretrial discovery of scientific evidence, it is uncontested 
that it does not provide for post-conviction discovery of 
scientific evidence.   
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. §  971.23(5) provides in part: 
  On motion of a party subject to s. 971.31(5), 
the court may order the production of any item of 
physical 
evidence 
which 
is 
intended 
to 
be 
introduced at the trial for scientific analysis 
under such terms and conditions as the court 
prescribes. . . . 
 
The comments that follow § 971.23 indicate that sub. 
(5) is limited to items of evidence which are intended 
to be introduced at trial and either the state or the 
defendant may move for scientific testing.  Note, 
1969, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.23 (West 1985).   
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
14
¶22d Nevertheless, the defendant points out that a judgment 
of conviction does not terminate the defendant’s rights.  The 
defendant argues that when the truth is not discovered prior to 
or 
during 
trial, 
and 
post-conviction 
counsel 
identifies 
information which may lead to a fair determination of guilt or 
innocence, then there should be a process for the defendant to 
remove the evidence, post conviction, so the matter may be fully 
litigated.  The defendant contends he is entitled to such a 
process.   
¶22e The court of appeals agreed with the defendant’s 
theory, concluding that, as with in camera inspections of 
confidential information, the exceptions to the general rule of 
discovery should be extended to post-conviction discovery.  
O’Brien, 214 Wis. 2d at 340.  The court initially stated, and we 
believe correctly so, that the party seeking post-conviction 
discovery must establish that the evidence sought to be gained 
is material.  Id.   The court also set forth guidelines, to be 
applied in future cases, but not this one, intended to prevent 
or limit discovery abuses.  Id. at 342-43.  It, therefore, 
considered the defendant’s claim utilizing the standards set 
forth for pretrial discovery (discovery decisions governed by a 
discretionary standard of review).  Id. at 343. 
¶23 It is well-established that under the due process 
clause, 
criminal 
defendants 
must 
be 
given 
a 
meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.  State v. Shiffra, 
175 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).  In fact, 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
15
this court in State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 172, 549 N.W.2d 
435 (1996), recognized, albeit inferentially, the right of a 
defendant 
to 
utilize 
post-conviction 
discovery 
when 
the 
evaluation is of evidence that is “critical, relevant, and 
material.” 
¶24 “[E]vidence is [consequential]11 only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
A 
‘reasonable 
probability’ 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion)); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  Evidence 
that is of consequence then is evidence that probably would have 
changed the outcome of the trial.  See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-
84 (adopting Strickland standard of consequential evidence); 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (explaining 
meaning of consequential evidence).  “The mere possibility that 
an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense 
                     
11 In State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 786 n.15, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998), this court noted that the concept of 
consequential fact replaces and is interchangeable with the 
common law term of materiality.  “Material facts are those that 
are of consequence to the merits of the litigation.  Relevancy, 
in turn, is a function of whether the evidence tends ‘to make 
the existence of [a material fact] more probable or less 
probable than it would without the evidence.’”  Michael R.B. v. 
State, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 724, 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993)(citation 
omitted); see generally 1974 Judicial Council Committee’s Note 
to Wis. Stat. § 904.01, 59 Wis. 2d R8.  We will use the concept 
of consequential fact.   
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
16
. . . does not establish ‘[a consequential fact]’ in the 
constitutional sense.”  Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-110. 
¶25 Based on the above-stated principles, we conclude that 
a defendant has a right to post-conviction discovery when the 
sought-after evidence is relevant to an issue of consequence.  
Nevertheless, we decline, at this time, to adopt the guidelines 
as created by the court of appeals.  Rather, we believe that a 
determination whether evidence is of consequence to the case 
will limit the remedy of post-conviction discovery to only those 
situations where it is warranted.   
¶26 Turning to this case, the defendant sought further 
scientific testing on certain samples taken from the victim to 
help prove that the victim consented to the act of fellatio, and 
to show that anal intercourse never occurred.  The circuit court 
concluded that it was without authority and reason to grant the 
defendant’s motion for post-conviction discovery.  The circuit 
court noted that Wis. Stat. § 971.23(5) does not provide for the 
release of evidence, post conviction, for scientific testing.  
The circuit court also found that little, if any, weight should 
be given any possible information obtained by such testing; the 
defendant 
simply 
was 
not 
prejudiced 
by 
not 
having 
more 
scientific testing.  Essentially, the circuit court found that 
the result of the trial would not have been different because 
the evidence was not material.  We will not disturb a circuit 
court’s findings regarding evidentiary facts unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Woods, 117 Wis.2d 701, 715, 345 
N.W.2d 457 (1984).  
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
17
¶27 Even though a criminal defendant should have a right 
to post-conviction discovery when the sought-after evidence 
would be consequential to the case, Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 171, 
we agree with the circuit court that the sought-after evidence 
in this case probably would not change the outcome of the trial, 
see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684.  Even if post-conviction testing 
revealed no blood and no semen, it is simply of no consequence 
to the outcome of this case.  The critical evidence—the victim’s 
testimony that he did not consent to the acts performed by the 
defendant, coupled with the detective’s testimony that the 
victim, who was half-naked, who appeared very upset and 
distraught and who was trembling, waved down a town marshal to 
report the assault—would not be rebutted or weakened by further 
testing of the samples.  Even if testing of the sought-after 
evidence produced the results the defendant claimed it would, 
there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would be different. 
¶28 In sum, we hold that a defendant has a right to post-
conviction 
discovery 
when 
the 
sought-after 
evidence 
is 
consequential to the case.  We find, however, that this remedy 
is unwarranted in a case such as this, where the evidence would 
not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome.  We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals’ ultimate determination 
that post-conviction discovery was unwarranted in this case.  We 
decline, however, to adopt at this time the guidelines that were 
created by the court of appeals.  Rather, we hold that a party 
who seeks post-conviction discovery must first show that the 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
18
evidence is consequential to an issue in the case and had the 
evidence been discovered, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. 
IV. 
¶29 The third issue that we address is whether the 
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.  The right 
to effective assistance of counsel derives from the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.12  In order to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must prove that counsel’s performance was 
                     
12 Article I, §  7 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
  In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
  In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.   
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
19
deficient, and that such deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
¶30 Under the Strickland test, if the defendant has failed 
to show prejudice, this court need not address the deficient 
performance prong.  State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 236, 548 
N.W.2d 69 (1996).  In order to show prejudice, “[t]he defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  As this court has noted, the 
touchstone of the prejudice component is “whether counsel’s 
deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable 
or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.”  State v. Smith, 207 
Wis. 2d 258, 276, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997)(quoting Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993)). 
¶31 The 
determination 
of 
whether 
particular 
actions 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 
of law and fact.  State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 
587, 
609, 
516 N.W.2d 
362 
(1994). 
 
The 
circuit court’s 
“determinations of what the attorney did, or did not do, and the 
basis for the challenged conduct are factual and will be upheld 
unless they are clearly erroneous.”  State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 
2d 207, 216, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986).  However, whether counsel’s 
conduct violated the defendant’s right to effective assistance 
of counsel is a question of law that this court decides without 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
20
deference to the circuit court and court of appeals.  State v. 
Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).    
¶32 The defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
argument is based on, as he alleges, trial counsel’s failure to 
conduct a proper investigation and learn that the victim was a 
successful high school wrestler.  The defendant argues that the 
information would have provided compelling evidence that the 
victim had a special ability to elude the defendant, and it 
related to the victim’s credibility.  The defendant insists that 
he is not arguing that the victim had a duty to resist or to 
attempt to escape; rather, this evidence, he claims, goes to the 
victim’s credibility—his story that he was pinned does not 
comport with his background. 
¶33 The State counters that the circuit court correctly 
determined that the victim’s wrestling experience was not 
relevant, and that even if it was placed before the jury, the 
result would not have been any different.  The State points out 
that the real issue in this case is not whether the victim 
resisted, but whether the victim consented to the sexual 
contact.   
¶34 We agree that the defendant has failed to satisfy the 
prejudice prong of his claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Despite the defendant’s attempt to couch his argument 
in terms of attacking the credibility of the victim, the 
victim’s ability or inability to ward off the defendant’s 
advances is totally irrelevant to the assault.  In Wisconsin, a 
victim of sexual assault is not required to resist the assault 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
21
to establish that the act was nonconsensual.  State v. Clark, 87 
Wis. 2d 804, 815, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1979). Thus, whether the 
victim was a state qualifying wrestler, or had no wrestling 
experience at all, is completely irrelevant to whether or not he 
consented to the assault.  
¶35 As with most sexual assault cases, the only witnesses 
to the crime here are the victim and the defendant.  In cases 
like this, the jury’s verdict is often a matter of which person 
the jury finds to be more credible. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 
149 Wis. 2d 418, 427, 439 N.W.2d 122 (1989).  Here, the 
defendant relied on consent as a defense to the fellatio charge 
and denied the charge of anal intercourse.  The victim, however, 
testified that he did not consent to the sexual acts and claimed 
that he told the defendant to stop numerous times, but was 
ignored.  The jury found the victim’s story to be more credible 
than that of the defendant.  It is within the province of the 
jury to decide issues of credibility, to weigh the evidence and 
resolve conflicts in the testimony.  State v. Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d 
400, 404, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993).  The victim’s 
testimony, which was substantiated by the police detectives’ 
testimony, supports the jury’s verdict.   
¶36 We conclude that even if the jury knew of the victim’s 
wrestling experience, there is no reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would have been different.  Because the 
defendant has failed to establish prejudice, we affirm the order 
denying post-conviction relief. 
No.  96-3028-CR 
 
22
¶37 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.    
No.  96-3028-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶38 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   I agree with the 
majority opinion that on a post-conviction motion a circuit 
court may allow a defendant to remove exhibits for scientific 
testing.  The determination of such a post-conviction motion is 
a matter within the discretion of the circuit court.13  I also 
agree with the majority 
opinion 
that 
in 
this 
case the 
defendant's post-conviction 
motion 
to 
remove 
exhibits for 
scientific testing was properly denied.  However, I do not join 
Part III of the majority opinion because I conclude that the 
defendant's motion in this case can easily be resolved by 
applying the existing evidentiary rules of relevancy. 
¶39 The first step that either a circuit court must take 
in deciding whether to grant such a post-conviction motion or 
this court must take in reviewing the circuit court's ruling on 
such a motion is to determine whether the results that the 
defendant hopes to obtain from the scientific testing would be 
relevant, non-cumulative evidence.  
¶40 "Relevant evidence" is defined by Wis. Stat. § 904.01 
(1995-96)14 as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
                     
13 See, e.g., State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 
N.W.2d 707 (1997) (motion for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence); Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 482-83, 
247 N.W.2d 105 (1976) (motion for withdrawal of guilty plea 
prior to sentencing).  
14 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1995-96 version.  
No.  96-3028-CR.awb 
 
2 
it would be without the evidence."  Further, Wis. Stat. § 904.03 
allows a circuit court to exclude relevant evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."  
¶41 Here, the hoped-for results from testing the exhibit 
concerning the penile swab and smear collected from the victim 
would not be relevant evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.01, and 
the hoped-for results from testing the exhibit containing the 
anal swabs and smears collected from the victim would be 
excluded as needless presentation of cumulative evidence under 
Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03.  
I 
therefore 
would 
hold 
that the 
defendant's post-conviction motion was properly denied on the 
simple basis of existing rules of relevancy. 
I. 
¶42 The first exhibit that the defendant sought to remove 
for post-conviction scientific testing was the penile swab and 
smear collected from the victim.  The trial record established 
that trace amounts of semen were present on the penile swab and 
smear but that no conclusion could be drawn as to their source. 
¶43 The defendant hoped for a post-conviction test result 
that would show that the victim was the source of the trace 
amounts of semen on the penile swab and smear.  The defendant 
argued that such a result would tend to negate count one (third- 
degree sexual assault by fellatio) because it would establish 
that the victim had in fact consented to the act. 
¶44 In denying the defendant's post-conviction motion, the 
circuit court and court of appeals correctly concluded that the 
No.  96-3028-CR.awb 
 
3 
presence of the victim's semen in the penile swab and smear 
would not make consent more or less probable.  I agree with the 
circuit court and the court of appeals that the defendant's 
argument that the presence of the victim's semen on the penile 
swab proves consent requires a "substantial presumptive leap" 
and is "purely speculative." 
II. 
¶45 The second exhibit that the defendant sought to remove 
for post-conviction scientific testing contained the anal swabs 
and smears collected from the victim.  The test result that the 
defendant hoped to obtain was that no semen or blood appeared in 
the anal swabs and smears.  The defendant argued that such a 
test result would tend to negate count two (third-degree sexual 
assault by anal intercourse) by showing that the defendant and 
victim had not engaged in anal intercourse. 
¶46 According to the trial record, no trace of semen was 
found on the anal swabs and smears collected from the victim; 
the crime lab report made no reference to the presence of any 
semen or blood in the anal swabs and anal smears; the nurse 
conducting the physical examination of the victim's anus noted 
"zero lacerations or tears."  The testimony and the test results 
were undisputed at trial. 
¶47 Because the jury 
was presented with 
uncontested 
evidence that there was no semen found in the anal swabs and 
smears collected from the victim and that the examining nurse 
physically viewed the victim's anus and noted the absence of 
lacerations or tears, 
the 
post-conviction 
scientific 
test 
No.  96-3028-CR.awb 
 
4 
results that the defendant hoped to obtain would constitute a 
"needless presentation of cumulative evidence" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03. 
¶48 The defendant's motion for post-conviction scientific 
testing 
fails 
to 
meet 
rudimentary 
rules 
of 
relevancy.  
Therefore, no further analysis of this court is necessary to 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
¶49 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.  
 
No.  96-3028-CR.awb 
 
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