Title: Forster v. Hall
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 021086
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2003

Present:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., and 
Carrico1 and Compton, S.JJ. 
 
RICHARD A. FORSTER 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 021086 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
February 28, 2003 
JAMES S. HALL, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 
Keary R. Williams, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the chancellor 
correctly determined that an implied reciprocal negative 
easement prohibits the placement of “mobile homes” on all the 
lots of a residential subdivision.  We further consider whether 
the chancellor correctly determined that certain structures that 
were permanently annexed to the land are not in violation of the 
restriction imposed by this easement. 
BACKGROUND 
On August 25, 1978, Goose Creek Partnership (the 
partnership), of which Carl Cartwright, Jr., was a member, 
acquired a tract of land in Tazewell County.  The partnership 
had the land surveyed and platted as a residential subdivision 
to be known as “Goose Creek Estates,” separating it into five 
contiguous sections with a total of 113 lots.  The plats of 
                     
1 Chief Justice Carrico presided and participated in the 
hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of 
his retirement on January 31, 2003. 
sections 1, 2, and 3 of the subdivision were recorded in the 
land records of the County on December 29, 1978 and contained no 
restrictive covenants.  The plats of sections 4 and 5 of the 
subdivision were recorded in the land records of the County on 
February 14, 1979 and contained only restrictions regarding 
approval of sewer and water systems. 
Over approximately the next sixteen years, the partnership 
included in the vast majority of the deeds to lots in Goose 
Creek Estates sold to the original purchasers a restrictive 
covenant providing that “no mobile homes, either single or 
double-wide, may be parked and/or erected on the property.”2  
James S. Hall and Joyce S. Hall (the Halls) purchased Lot 3, 
Section 4 of Goose Creek Estates on March 9, 1994, from the 
partnership.  The Halls’ deed contained the restrictive covenant 
against parking or erecting mobile homes on their property. 
Richard A. Forster (Forster) purchased Lot 5, Section 1 of 
Goose Creek Estates in March 1996 from Thomas E. Kelley and 
Angela A. Kelley, who had acquired the lot from the partnership 
in a deed that contained the restrictive covenant against 
parking or erecting mobile homes on the property.  Forster also 
                     
2 The language expressing the restrictive covenant was not 
identical in every deed; however, the slight variance of 
language is not material to our determination of the issues 
raised in this appeal. 
 
 
2
acquired Lot 35, Section 1 in June 1996 during the partnership’s 
attempt to auction the remaining lots of the subdivision.3  
Forster’s deed for this lot did not contain the restriction 
against mobile homes, but the restriction was subsequently added 
by a recorded deed of correction.  Similar corrective deeds were 
recorded for other lots conveyed pursuant to the auction. 
On May 30, 1996, prior to the auction, the Halls also 
purchased Lot 2, Section 4 of Goose Creek Estates.  At their 
request, the restriction against mobile homes was not included 
in the deed for this lot.  On October 31, 1996, David Wayne 
McKinney and Eva Sue McKinney (the McKinneys) purchased Lot 1, 
Section 4 of the subdivision.  At their request, the restriction 
against mobile homes was not included in their deed for this 
lot. 
In 1997, the Halls permitted their son to move his “double-
wide manufactured” home onto Lot 2, Section 4 in Goose Creek 
Estates.  In 1998, the Halls also permitted their daughter to 
move her “double-wide manufactured” home onto this lot.  The 
homes were placed on brick foundations.  Porches were added and 
the tongues and wheels were removed from both homes.  The Halls 
pay the real estate taxes on these homes. 
                     
3 Forster’s wife was a co-grantee in the deeds of both lots, 
but was not a party in the subsequent equitable proceeding from 
which this appeal arises. 
 
3
On August 20, 1997, the McKinneys conveyed portions of 
their property in the subdivision by deeds of gift to their 
daughters, Stephanie D. Bowling and Margaret E. Brown.  Bowling 
and Brown both moved “double-wide manufactured” homes onto their 
portions of Lot 1, Section 4.  Each home was placed on a cinder 
block foundation and the tongues and wheels were removed.  
Bowling and Brown pay the real estate taxes on their homes. 
On February 16, 1999, Forster4 filed a bill of complaint in 
the Circuit Court of Tazewell County against the Halls, the 
McKinneys, Bowling, and Brown (hereinafter collectively, the 
landowners).  Forster sought a determination “that Lots 1, 2, 
and 3 of Section 4, Goose Creek Estates subdivisio[n], each are 
subject to [an implied reciprocal negative] easement that no 
mobile home, either single or double-wide, shall be placed on 
said land at any time,” and that this restriction may be 
enforced by the owner of any lot in the subdivision.  Forster 
requested that the chancellor enter an injunction requiring 
removal of the four double-wide manufactured homes from Lots 1 
and 2, Section 4.  The landowners filed answers denying that 
these particular lots were subject to the implied reciprocal 
negative easement asserted by Forster. 
                     
4 The owners of another lot in Section 1 of Goose Creek 
Estates joined Forster in the bill of complaint, but they are 
not parties to this appeal. 
 
4
The chancellor received evidence in accord with the above-
recited facts during an ore tenus hearing on November 16, 2000.  
In addition, relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, 
Cartwright was called as a witness by Forster and testified at 
length concerning the partnership’s marketing of Goose Creek 
Estates.  According to Cartwright, the subdivision, though 
platted in five sections, was marketed as a single development.  
Cartwright testified that in a number of instances the 
restrictive covenant against mobile homes was not included in 
the deed to a particular lot at the purchaser’s request.  
However, if no such request was made, the restriction was 
included in the deed to each lot as a matter of course.  As a 
result, 105 of the 113 lots in the subdivision were conveyed by 
the partnership with the restrictive covenant.  Cartwright 
explained that the purpose of the restrictive covenant was to 
“protect” the property of the partnership and the purchasers of 
individual lots from “mobile homes” and, thus, benefit the 
partnership and the purchasers. 
Cartwright also testified that the intent of the 
partnership in including the restrictive covenant in the various 
deeds was to keep the subdivision free of mobile homes with “the 
tongues sticking out and the wheels hanging down.”  Continuing, 
Cartwright testified that the partnership wanted to prevent the 
placement of the “old style” flat-roofed mobile homes in the 
 
5
subdivision.  By contrast and without objection, he indicated 
that the partnership had not contemplated barring all 
“manufactured homes” from the subdivision and that aesthetically 
the homes at issue now are not of the type contemplated by the 
partnership when the restriction was imposed on the various lots 
in the subdivision. 
By letter to counsel dated August 14, 2001, the chancellor 
opined that an implied reciprocal negative easement prohibits 
the placement of mobile homes on any lot in Goose Creek Estates 
and that Forster has the equitable right to enforce this 
easement.  However, the chancellor further opined that the homes 
placed by the landowners on their lots are not in violation of 
the restriction imposed by the easement.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the chancellor first found it persuasive that the 
homes in question have been annexed to the real property and, in 
that condition, can only be transferred by deed as real estate 
rather than by certificate of title as personal property.  See 
Code § 46.2-653; former Code § 46.1-44 (referenced by the 
chancellor and effective at time the subdivision was created).  
While recognizing that the classification of the structures as 
personal property or real property was not dispositive of the 
issue whether they are subject to the easement, the chancellor 
further opined that Cartwright’s testimony established that 
“these structures as they now exist are not the type the common 
 
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grantor intended to prohibit with the restrictions contained in 
the deeds.”  (Emphasis added.)  In contrast, the chancellor 
noted that “the condition of the structures at the time they 
were moved onto the properties would have rendered them subject 
to the restrictions found in the various deeds.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
On January 31, 2002, the chancellor entered a final decree, 
adopting by reference the reasoning of the opinion letter and 
awarding judgment to the landowners.  This appeal followed. 
Forster challenges the chancellor’s judgment that the 
structures placed on the landowners’ lots are not “mobile homes” 
within the meaning of the restriction imposed by the implied 
reciprocal negative easement.  By assignment of cross-error, the 
landowners challenge the chancellor’s judgment that their lots 
are subject to the implied reciprocal negative easement. 
DISCUSSION 
The standard of review that we apply in this appeal is well 
established.  Under Code § 8.01-680, we will affirm the 
chancellor’s judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, 
Inc., 258 Va. 140, 149, 515 S.E.2d 277, 283 (1999); W.S. Carnes, 
Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 385, 478 S.E.2d 295, 
301 (1996).  Moreover, in determining whether the evidence 
supports that judgment, we consider the evidence in the light 
 
7
most favorable to the prevailing party in the proceedings before 
the chancellor.  Id.
We first consider whether the chancellor correctly 
determined that an implied reciprocal negative easement 
prohibiting the placement of mobile homes was created on any of 
the lots in Goose Creek Estates.  If so, we consider whether the 
landowners’ lots are subject to that easement even though they 
had expressly sought to exempt their lots from the burden of any 
such restriction. 
An implied reciprocal negative easement arises “when a 
common grantor develops land for sale in lots and pursues a 
course of conduct which indicates an intention to follow a 
general scheme of development for the benefit of himself and his 
purchasers and, in numerous conveyances of the lots, imposes 
substantially uniform restrictions, conditions, and covenants 
relating to use of the property.”  Duvall v. Ford Leasing 
Development Corp., 220 Va. 36, 41, 255 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1979).  
If such a scheme of development is proved, “the grantees acquire 
by implication an equitable right . . . to enforce similar 
restrictions against that part of the tract retained by the 
grantor or subsequently sold without the restrictions to a 
purchaser with actual or constructive notice of the restrictions 
and covenants.”  Minner v. City of Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180, 188, 
129 S.E.2d 673, 679 (1963).  (Emphasis added.) 
 
8
Here, the record is clear that the partnership that 
developed Goose Creek Estates conveyed 93% of the lots in that 
subdivision by deeds that contained “substantially uniform 
restrictions, conditions, and covenants relating to use of the 
property.”  Moreover, Cartwright’s testimony establishes that 
this general scheme of development was employed to enhance the 
marketability of the lots in the subdivision and was for the 
benefit of the partnership and the purchasers of the lots in the 
subdivision, such as Forster. 
While it is true that the partnership, the common grantor, 
acquiesced in requests from a small number of purchasers to omit 
the restriction from their deeds, there is no evidence that this 
was done with the concurrence of the other lot owners.  
Moreover, the fact the landowners made such requests with regard 
to the deeds for their lots is conclusive proof that they had 
actual notice of the restriction in deeds to other lots in the 
subdivision.  Thus, the landowners were at least constructively 
on notice that the restriction could burden the use of their 
lots by way of an implied reciprocal negative easement, even 
though the restriction was omitted from their deeds.  Minner, 
204 Va. at 190, 129 S.E.2d at 680.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the chancellor correctly determined that all the lots in Goose 
Creek Estates are subject to an implied restriction against 
 
9
parking or erecting mobile homes thereon, and that Forster is 
entitled to enforce that restriction. 
We now turn to the issue whether the evidence established 
that the structures placed on their lots by the landowners are 
in violation of the restriction against “mobile homes” imposed 
by the implied reciprocal negative easement.  As with any 
restrictions of the free use of land, which are disfavored by 
public policy and must be strictly construed, Mid-State 
Equipment Co. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 140, 225 S.E.2d 877, 884 
(1976), the person claiming the benefit of an implied reciprocal 
negative easement has the burden to prove its applicability to 
the acts of which he complains.  Riordan v. Hale, 215 Va. 638, 
641, 212 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1975).  Thus, Forster had the burden of 
proving that the structures placed by the landowners on their 
lots were not in accord with the restriction imposed by the 
common grantor in this case. 
As noted above, the language of the restrictive covenant as 
it appears in the various deeds, provides that “no mobile homes, 
either single or double-wide, may be parked and/or erected on 
the property.”  Our consideration of the covenant and its 
application to the evidence in this case ordinarily would be 
guided by several well-settled principles.  When the language in 
a deed is clear, unambiguous, and explicit, a court called upon 
to construe such language should look no further than the four 
 
10
corners of the deed itself.  Irby v. Roberts, 256 Va. 324, 329, 
504 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1998).  In such cases, parol evidence of 
“‘the circumstances at the time of [the deed’s] creation’ is not 
to be considered in giving effect to the clear, unambiguous, and 
explicit language of the deed.”  Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. Mill 
Two Associates Partnership, 259 Va. 685, 695, 529 S.E.2d 318, 
324 (2000) (quoting Daugherty v. Diment, 238 Va. 520, 525, 385 
S.E.2d 572, 574 (1989)). 
We do not find any ambiguity or lack of clarity in the 
language of the restrictive covenant in question.  However, 
while not expressly finding that this language was ambiguous, 
the chancellor considered Cartwright’s testimony to determine 
the meaning of “mobile homes” as contemplated by the developers 
of the subdivision.  That evidence was admitted without 
objection.  Accordingly, although it does not carry the weight 
of a stipulation, we also will consider the evidence as 
presented to the chancellor without objection in construing the 
meaning of the language of the restrictive covenant.  See Bauer 
v. Harn, 223 Va. 31, 36, 286 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1982). 
At the time the first deeds for lots in Goose Creek Estates 
were executed, the term “mobile home” was defined by statute as 
“a building constructed on a chassis for towing to the point of 
use and designed to be used as a dwelling; or two or more such 
units separately towable, but designed to be joined together at 
 
11
the point of use to form a single dwelling and which is designed 
for removal to and installation or erection on other sites.”  
1975 Acts, ch. 535 (enacting Code § 55-248.41).5  Here, it is not 
disputed that the structures in question were built on chassis 
so that they could be towed to their points of intended use and, 
thus, fall within the ambit of the definition of a “mobile 
home.”  Indeed, the chancellor found that these structures, at 
the time they were moved onto the landowners’ lots, were in 
violation of the restrictive covenant for that reason. 
Cartwright’s testimony does not contradict that conclusion.  
Rather, his testimony, taken in the light most favorable to the 
landowners, is that once these structures were annexed to the 
land they were no longer the type of mobile homes contemplated 
by the language of the restriction.  The chancellor agreed and, 
thus, found that these structures “as they now exist” do not 
violate the restriction.  We disagree. 
The chancellor’s finding in this regard is not one of fact 
but of law.  The chancellor’s finding is not binding on this 
                     
5 Subsequent amendments to Code § 55-248.41 modified this 
definition, but did not alter the basic description of the 
structure as one constructed on a permanent chassis for the 
purpose of being towed to its point of intended use.  Effective 
January 1, 1990, the term “mobile home” was changed to 
“manufactured home” in Code § 55-248.41 and in other 
definitional statutes, see, e.g., Code § 46.2-100.  For purposes 
of this appeal, we treat the terms mobile home and manufactured 
home as synonymous. 
 
12
Court because we are provided with the same opportunity as the 
chancellor to consider the language of the restriction in 
question.  See Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187-88, 313 
S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984); see also Christopher Assocs. v. Sessoms, 
245 Va. 18, 22, 425 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1993).  There is no 
language in the restriction which permits a structure that is 
otherwise a mobile home to be transformed, by placing it on a 
foundation and removing its tongue and wheels, so that it no 
longer may be considered a mobile home within the meaning of the 
restriction.  Moreover, the words “parked and/or erected” negate 
any distinction between mobile homes that are temporarily parked 
on the lots and those that are placed on permanent foundations.  
In short, the structures placed on their lots by the landowners 
were mobile homes when originally placed there, and they remain 
mobile homes within the meaning of the restrictive covenant as 
written by the developers of the subdivision.  Cartwright’s 
testimony, in this regard, alters the language of the 
restriction and would create a distinction in the type of mobile 
home prohibited where no such distinction was created by the 
language used in the restriction. 
We recognize that in Williams v. Brooks, 238 Va. 224, 227, 
383 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1989), we drew a distinction between 
“mobile homes of a temporary character . . . and . . . those 
which, as here, are permanent in the sense that they are affixed 
 
13
to the realty and possess most, if not all, of the amenities one 
usually associates with an ordinary home.”  However, in Williams 
the restrictive covenant used the term “trailer” rather than 
“mobile home,” and, while accepting the premise that the two 
terms were synonymous, we based our holding upon a further 
provision of the restrictive covenant which limited its 
application to “structure[s] of a temporary character.”  Id.  
There is no such limiting language in the restrictive covenant 
from which the implied reciprocal negative easement arises in 
this case.  Accordingly, we hold the structures on the lots at 
issue here are “mobile homes” within the meaning of the implied 
reciprocal negative easement, and the chancellor erred in 
finding that Forster has not sustained his burden of proving the 
right to enforce that easement. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the chancellor’s judgment 
that all the lots of Goose Creek Estates are subject to an 
implied reciprocal negative easement prohibiting the parking or 
erecting of “mobile homes, either single or double-wide” on any 
lot, reverse the chancellor’s judgment that the structures in 
question are not in violation of the restriction contained in 
that easement, and remand this case to the chancellor for entry 
of a decree directing the landowners to remove the mobile homes 
from their respective properties. 
 
14
                                         Affirmed in part, 
 
 
           reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
  and remanded. 
 
15