Title: Commonwealth v. Rossetti
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13036
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2022

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SJC-13036 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANDREW ROSSETTI. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 8, 2021. - May 5, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence.  Statute, 
Construction.  Words, "Minimum term," "Mandatory minimum." 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 6, 2017. 
 
Pleas of guilty were accepted by Joshua I. Wall, J., and 
questions of law were reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for the defendant. 
 
Howard P. Blatchford, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Joshua M. Daniels, Reyna Ramirez, & Christine Sunnerberg, 
for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case requires us to determine whether 
G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a) (2) (§ 178H [a] [2]), permits an 
2 
 
individual convicted of failure to register as a sex offender, 
subsequent offense, to be sentenced to a term of incarceration 
in State prison of less than five years.  We hold that it does 
not. 
Background.  We briefly recite the undisputed facts.  
Following a 2008 rape conviction, the defendant, Andrew 
Rossetti, was required to register as a sex offender.  Since 
that time, the defendant already had been twice convicted of 
failure to register as a sex offender in two unrelated actions 
when, in 2017, a grand jury indicted him on two counts of 
failure to register as a sex offender, subsequent offense, under 
§ 178H (a) (2).1  In 2019, the defendant pleaded guilty on both 
counts and the subsequent offense enhancements.  On count 1, the 
judge imposed a sentence of two years of probation, with the 
condition that the defendant comply with sex offender 
registration requirements.  On count 2, the judge announced that 
he intended to sentence the defendant "to one to two years in 
 
1 General Laws c. 6, § 178H (a), provides in relevant part:  
"A sex offender required to register pursuant to this chapter 
who knowingly:  (i) fails to register; (ii) fails to verify 
registration information; (iii) fails to provide notice of a 
change of address; or (iv) who knowingly provides false 
information shall be punished in accordance with this section." 
 
General Laws c. 6, § 178H (a) (2) (§ 178H [a] [2]), 
provides in relevant part:  "A second and subsequent conviction 
under this subsection shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
[S]tate prison for not less than five years." 
3 
 
the state prison," but that he was staying the sentence pending 
his report of the questions now before this court.  With the 
consent of the parties, the judge then reported the following 
two questions to the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004), and Mass. R. A. P. 5, 
as appearing in 481 Mass. 1608 (2019): 
"1.  Whether G. L. c. 6, [§ 178H (a) (2),] permits a state 
prison sentence for a period of less than five years. 
 
"2.  Whether the court's proposed sentence of one to two 
years committed to state prison is lawful under G. L. c. 6, 
[§ 178H (a) (2)]." 
 
We subsequently granted the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review.  Based on the plain language of the statute, 
we answer both reported questions, "No." 
Discussion.  1.  Minimum terms and mandatory minimum 
sentences.  The parties' reliance on this court's varied 
opinions related to criminal sentencing has revealed that, over 
the years, our sentencing jurisprudence has become less than 
clear.2  Thus, we must make plain the meaning of certain language 
 
2 This lack of clarity was also recently observed in a 
Boston Bar Journal article on this court's sentencing 
jurisprudence related to mandatory minimum sentences, with the 
author titling one section, "Confusing Cases, Confusing Law."  
Cohen, Careful Scrutiny:  The SJC and Mandatory Sentencing Laws, 
65 Boston Bar J. (Summer 2021), https://bostonbarjournal.com 
/2021/06/28/careful-scrutiny-the-sjc-and-mandatory-sentencing 
-laws [https://perma.cc/6BNV-XY9F]. 
4 
 
in our sentencing jurisprudence before turning to the reported 
questions.3 
 
The parties' citations to, among others, Commonwealth v. 
Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535 (2020); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 482 
Mass. 366 (2019); Commonwealth v. Wimer, 480 Mass. 1 (2018); 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297 (2015); Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 
Mass. 530 (2009); Commonwealth v. Hines, 449 Mass. 183 (2007); 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772 (2000); Commonwealth v. 
Claudio, 418 Mass. 103 (1994), overruled on other grounds by 
Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87 (2013); and Commonwealth v. 
Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718 (1984), have revealed specifically that 
this court has not been as precise as is necessary in its use of 
the phrases "mandatory minimum sentence" and "minimum term."  It 
also is clear from the parties' briefs that there is no clear 
understanding of where a minimum term ends and a mandatory 
minimum sentence begins. 
The questions reported to this court surround whether the 
sentencing judge is bound by the minimum term presented in 
 
3 While we do not today announce a new rule regarding the 
construction of mandatory minimum sentences, as urged by amicus 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the 
clarifications discussed underscore that this court has required 
and continues to require the Legislature to use unambiguous 
language before we can conclude that a mandatory minimum 
sentence has been created. 
5 
 
§ 178H (a) (2).  The defendant argues that the statute does not 
create a "mandatory minimum sentence," whereas the Commonwealth 
argues that the statute imposes a "minimum term."  Because this 
court's "[i]nherent powers" include "among other things, those 
'whose exercise is essential to . . . [the court's] capacity to 
decide cases,'" Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 475 Mass. 482, 490 
(2016), quoting Brach v. Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't, 
386 Mass. 528, 535 (1982), and because this court possesses the 
"inherent authority to interpret the law," Sullivan v. Chief 
Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 24 
(2006), we take this opportunity to delineate the differences 
between a "minimum term" and a "mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment" or "mandatory minimum sentence"4 in order to guide 
 
4 Offense-specific statutes that use the word "mandatory" 
generally refer to a "mandatory minimum term of imprisonment" 
rather than a "mandatory minimum sentence."  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 265, § 43 (b); G. L. c. 94C, § 32K; G. L. c. 265, § 13D; 
G. L. c. 269, § 10E (2), (3).  However, the Legislature has 
referred to a "mandatory minimum term of imprisonment" as a 
"mandatory minimum sentence."  Compare G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (b) 
("No sentence imposed under the provisions of this section shall 
be for less than a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 
[three and one-half] years . . ."), with G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (c) 
(discussing parole eligibility of "[a]ny person serving a 
mandatory minimum sentence for violating any provision of this 
section").  Thus, we understand the phrases "mandatory minimum 
term of imprisonment" and "mandatory minimum sentence" generally 
to be interchangeable.  Additionally, where the Legislature 
variously uses the term "mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment," see statutes cited supra, and "minimum term," 
see, e.g., G. L. c. 127, § 129D (d); G. L. c. 127, § 133; G. L. 
c. 127, § 133A; G. L. c. 279, § 26, logic and our rules of 
 
6 
 
our decision-making in this case and ensure that the lower 
courts have coherent principles to guide decisions related to 
sentencing, see Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 762 
(2020) (recognizing confusion created by past jurisprudence and 
taking opportunity to delineate distinction between "pretrial 
probation" and "pretrial conditions of release" before answering 
reported questions); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 480 Mass. 777, 
783 (2018) (reformulating reported questions to "provid[e] clear 
and simple guidance to trial courts and litigants").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Claudio, 484 Mass. 203, 205 (2020) (broadening 
reported question). 
"As with all matters of statutory construction, our goal in 
construing [a] . . . statute is to ascertain and effectuate the 
intent of the Legislature."  Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 
186, 192 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 
633 (2018).  "[T]he language of the statute . . . is 'the 
principal source of insight' into the intent of the 
 
statutory construction lead to the conclusion that there is a 
distinction between a minimum term and a mandatory minimum term 
of imprisonment or mandatory minimum sentence, see Commonwealth 
v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 538 (2020) (express prohibition on 
probation in one statutory provision and absence of such 
prohibition in another lead to conclusion that, under first 
provision, probation is prohibited and, under second provision, 
it is not); City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 
784, 788-789 (2019) ("When interpreting the absence of language 
in an otherwise 'detailed and precise [statute], we regard [an] 
omission as purposeful'" [citation omitted]). 
7 
 
Legislature."  Newberry, supra, quoting Sisson v. Lhowe, 460 
Mass. 705, 708 (2011).  Therefore, "we start 'with the language 
of the statute itself and presume, as we must, that the 
Legislature intended what the words of the statute say'" 
(quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 
679 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713 
(2009).  "[S]tatutory language should be given effect consistent 
with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the 
Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result."  
Randolph v. Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 5 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019).  See G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Third ("Words and phrases shall be construed 
according to the common and approved usage of the language").  
When necessary, "[w]e derive the words' usual and accepted 
meaning from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, 
such as their use in other legal contexts and dictionary 
definitions."  Commonwealth v. Vigiani, 488 Mass. 34, 36 (2021), 
quoting Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 536.  See G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  
"Where the language of a statute is clear, [however,] courts 
must give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and . . . 
need not look beyond the words of the statute itself."  
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 457 Mass. 805, 810-811 (2010), quoting 
Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Weston, 430 Mass. 637, 640 
(2000). 
8 
 
We reaffirm the long-held principle of statutory 
interpretation that we interpret a statute to effectuate the 
Legislature's intent, looking at words' "plain meaning" in light 
of "sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as 
their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions," 
and we further note that legal terms must be defined with 
precision.  Randolph, 488 Mass. at 5, quoting Wassilie, 482 
Mass. at 573.  Vigiani, 488 Mass. at 36, quoting Montarvo, 486 
Mass. at 536. 
We previously have not distinguished clearly between the 
terms "minimum term" and "mandatory minimum" sentence,5 although, 
for the reasons discussed infra, it is clear that the 
Legislature conceives of the two concepts as separate and 
distinct.  The terms must be distinguished, then, if we are to 
give meaning to the varied language the Legislature has employed 
in our sentencing statutes and effectuate legislative intent to 
 
5 For example, this court previously has referred to the 
five-year minimum term discussed in § 178H (a) (2) as, at 
different times, a "minimum" and a "mandatory minimum."  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Wimer, 480 Mass. 1, 6 n.5 (2018) ("minimum 
sentence"), with Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 306 (2015) ("mandatory 
minimum sentence").  In Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 
775 (2000), this court referred to the twenty-year minimum term 
in G. L. c. 265, § 18C, as a "mandatory minimum."  Later, while 
still referring to the twenty-year minimum term as a "mandatory 
minimum," we held that such term was, in fact, not mandatory 
where probation was allowed as an alternative sentence.  
Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 Mass. 530, 535 (2009). 
9 
 
develop minimum terms and mandatory minimum sentences as 
distinct sentencing concepts. 
a.  Minimum term.  This court understands that when the 
Legislature prescribes in an offense-specific statute that a 
defendant shall be incarcerated for "not less than" a certain 
number of years, such language generally defines the "minimum 
term" permitted under the statute, according to the plain 
meaning of such phrase.  "Minimum" is defined as "[o]f, relating 
to, or constituting the smallest acceptable or possible quantity 
in a given case."  Black's Law Dictionary 1192 (11th ed. 2019).  
"Term," as relevant here, is defined as a "fixed period of 
time."  Id. at 1773.  Thus, a minimum term as defined in an 
offense-specific sentencing statute generally refers to the 
shortest length of time to which a judge may sentence a 
defendant if the judge chooses to impose a sentence of 
incarceration.6  In other words, if a judge sentences a defendant 
to a term of incarceration, the judge has no discretion to 
 
6 Sentences of incarceration in State prison must be 
indeterminate.  G. L. c. 279, § 24 (§ 24).  As applied to an 
indeterminate sentence, the minimum term defined in the offense-
specific statute serves as the shortest length of time that may 
be set as the lower end of a sentence expressed as a range 
consistent with § 24.  Thus, if a judge chooses to sentence a 
defendant to incarceration, the phrase "minimum term" refers to 
the shortest length of time to which the defendant may be 
sentenced, whether that length of time is imposed as a fixed, 
determinate sentence or as the lower end of a sentence expressed 
as a range. 
10 
 
sentence the defendant to less than the minimum term provided by 
the Legislature.7  See, e.g., Brown, 431 Mass. at 779 ("not less 
than" number in offense-specific statute "is always the shortest 
sentence that can be imposed"). 
 
7 It has been suggested that the sentencing guidelines 
permit a judge to impose a sentence of incarceration for a term 
that is shorter than the statutorily defined minimum term.  See 
Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 
Jurisdiction Profile:  Massachusetts 9 n.34 (updated Apr. 2017); 
Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guide 18 (Feb. 
1998).  See also Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, Advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines 59, 151 (Nov. 2017) (although "[s]entences 
that depart from mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration 
prescribed by statute are prohibited by the Guidelines," minimum 
term in G. L. c. 6, § 178H [a] [1], not designated as 
"mandatory," suggesting "minimum terms" are distinct from 
mandatory minimum sentences and downward departure is allowed in 
case of minimum terms). 
 
The sentencing guidelines "shall take effect only if 
enacted into law" by the Legislature.  Commonwealth v. Russo, 
421 Mass. 317, 322 (1995).  G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (a) (1).  
Therefore, although G. L. c. 211E, § 3 (e), provides that "the 
sentencing judge may depart from the range established by the 
sentencing guidelines and impose a sentence below any mandatory 
minimum term prescribed by statute," that section "is 
appropriately construed to mean that the authority to depart 
from mandatory minimum sentences set by statute was not intended 
to operate independently of sentencing guidelines recommended by 
the commission, and the guidelines themselves must be enacted by 
the Legislature before they take effect."  Commonwealth v. 
Laltaprasad, 475 Mass. 692, 701 (2016), quoting G. L. c. 211E, 
§ 3 (e).  No sentencing guidelines proposed by the Sentencing 
Commission have yet been enacted by the Legislature.  See 
Laltaprasad, supra at 693.  See House Bill No. 1731 (Jan. 13, 
2021) (proposed legislation).  Therefore, "a sentencing judge 
currently may not impose a sentence that departs from the 
prescribed mandatory minimum" sentence or minimum term.  
Laltaprasad, supra. 
11 
 
When sentencing a defendant to a term of incarceration in 
State prison, the judge must impose a sentence under the 
offense-specific statute and any relevant mandate of G. L. 
c. 279, § 24 (§ 24).  With certain exceptions, § 24 mandates 
that an indeterminate sentence must be imposed when sentencing a 
defendant to incarceration in State prison.8  Id.  Specifically 
as used in § 24, "minimum term" refers to the length of time 
imposed as the lower end of a sentence expressed as a range; it 
indicates the shortest period of time to which the offender is 
sentenced.  If the minimum term defined in the offense-specific 
statute differs from the minimum permissible minimum term of one 
year provided in § 24, the higher of the two controls as the 
shortest minimum term that may be imposed for a State prison 
 
8 Section 24 provides in relevant part: 
 
"If a convict is sentenced to the [S]tate prison, except as 
[a] habitual criminal, the court shall not fix the term of 
imprisonment, but shall fix a maximum and a minimum term 
for which he [or she] may be imprisoned.  The maximum term 
shall not be longer than the longest term fixed by law for 
the punishment of the crime of which he [or she]  has 
be[en] convicted, and the minimum term shall be a term set 
by the court, except that, where an alternative sentence to 
a house of correction is permitted for the offense, a 
minimum [S]tate prison term may not be less than one year.  
In the case of a sentence to life imprisonment, except in 
the case of a sentence for murder in the first degree, and 
in the case of multiple life sentences arising out of 
separate and distinct incidents that occurred at different 
times, where the second offense occurred subsequent to the 
first conviction, the court shall fix a minimum term which 
shall be not less than [fifteen] years nor more than 
[twenty-five] years." 
12 
 
sentence for that offense.  Thus, § 178H (a) (2), which provides 
that an offender "shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
[S]tate prison for not less than five years," defines a minimum 
term of five years and, as discussed infra, a presumed maximum 
term of life.  Therefore, if a judge sentences a defendant to 
incarceration in State prison pursuant to § 178H (a) (2), it 
must be for a term ranging from, at least, five years (minimum) 
to, at most, life (maximum). 
Because, as discussed infra, a minimum term defined in an 
offense-specific statute does not necessarily require a 
mandatory minimum sentence, where a judge is sentencing a 
defendant pursuant to a minimum term that does not contain 
additional language indicating such term to be part of a 
mandatory minimum sentence, the judge presumably retains 
discretion to order probation instead of incarceration9 or, in 
the case of a sentence of incarceration in a house of 
 
9 Over the years, we have referred to the minimum term in 
G. L. c. 265, § 18C, as a "mandatory minimum" sentence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480 Mass. 575, 583 (2018); Zapata, 455 
Mass. at 535; Brown, 431 Mass. at 775.  However, we held in 
Zapata that probation was allowed as an alternative sentence 
under § 18C.  Zapata, supra.  Thus, § 18C does not impose a true 
"mandatory minimum sentence" as we define that term today.  Our 
holding in Zapata leads to the same conclusion as to other 
statutes that provide for a sentence of "imprisonment . . . for 
life or for any term of not less than" a certain number of years 
but that do not expressly prohibit probation.  In light of 
Zapata, such language, on its own, creates only a minimum term. 
13 
 
correction, to suspend a sentence of incarceration.10  See 
Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 541-542; Zapata, 455 Mass. at 531.  
Further, the imposition of a minimum term of incarceration 
presumably does not, on its own, make unavailable to the 
defendant various mechanisms for reducing actual time 
incarcerated, such as good conduct deductions.  G. L. c. 127, 
§ 129D.  See Brown, 431 Mass. at 774 n.6.  These mechanisms 
could reduce actual time incarcerated to less than the specified 
minimum term imposed by the sentencing judge. 
b.  Mandatory minimum sentence.  Although the Legislature 
has never officially defined "mandatory minimum sentence" or 
"mandatory minimum term of imprisonment," the Legislature's 
working definition of the terms is revealed through reported 
questions to this court, as well as the plain meaning of the 
word "mandatory."11  Black's Law Dictionary defines "mandatory" 
as "[o]f, relating to, or constituting a command; required; 
preemptory."  Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 1151.  In 1979, 
the House of Representatives reported questions of law to this 
 
10 The 1993 "truth-in-sentencing" act  eliminated the 
availability of suspended sentences for sentences of 
incarceration in State prison.  G. L. c. 127, § 133, as 
appearing in St. 1993, c. 432, § 11.  However, because that act 
only speaks to State prison sentences, a sentence of 
incarceration in a house of correction still may be suspended. 
 
11 If the Legislature disagrees with this interpretation, it 
is free to amend or enact new statutes clarifying the meaning of 
"mandatory minimum sentence." 
14 
 
court about then-proposed sentencing legislation.  In its 
report, the House referred to one of the pending bills as 
imposing "a penalty of a twenty-five year mandatory imprisonment 
with no probation, parole, furlough, or reduction of sentence 
for good conduct"12 (emphasis added).  Opinion of the Justices, 
378 Mass. 822, 824-825 (1979).  The phrase "twenty-five year 
mandatory imprisonment" indicates that the House understood the 
language of the bill to create a mandatory minimum sentence of 
twenty-five years.  The House then described that mandatory 
minimum sentence to preclude the availability of "probation, 
parole, furlough, [and] reduction of sentence for good conduct."  
Id. 
The plain meaning of "mandatory "13 and the definition 
provided to this court by the House are consistent to the extent 
 
12 The bill provided in relevant part that a convicted 
defendant "shall be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate 
prison for not less than twenty-five years.  Any sentence so 
imposed shall not be suspended, nor shall any person so 
convicted be eligible for probation, parole or furlough or 
receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct.  
Prosecution under this section shall neither be continued 
without a finding nor placed on file by the court."  Opinion of 
the Justices, 378 Mass. 822, 823 (1979), quoting Senate Bill No. 
777 (1979). 
 
13 Consistent with this plain language understanding, where 
the word "mandatory" is used to describe the term of 
imprisonment required by an offense-specific statute, we have 
not hesitated to determine that such statute calls for a 
mandatory minimum sentence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 
478 Mass. 154, 155 & n.2 (2017) (interpreting G. L. c. 94C, 
 
15 
 
that they reveal the Legislature's understanding and intent that 
a "mandatory minimum term of imprisonment" or "mandatory minimum 
sentence" refers to a minimum criminal penalty that (1) the 
sentencing judge has no discretion to lower or otherwise avoid, 
and (2) once imposed, must be served fully by the defendant.14  
We also have concluded in the past that language imposing 
restrictions similar to those in the bills discussed in Opinion 
of the Justices operates to establish a mandatory minimum 
sentence.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cowan, 422 Mass. 546, 548-
549 (1996) (discussing mandatory minimum sentence created by 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a], as amended through St. 1990, c. 511, §§ 
2, 3 [unlawful firearms possession]); Commonwealth v. 
Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 239, 241-242 (1987) (discussing 
mandatory minimum sentence created by G. L. c. 90, § 24G [a], as 
amended through St. 1982, c. 373, § 9 [vehicular homicide]).  
Therefore, we understand a mandatory minimum sentence both to 
(1) provide the minimum term to which a judge may sentence a 
 
§ 32A [b] and [d], as amended through St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 13, 
14, which provided for "mandatory minimum term[s] of 
imprisonment," as imposing mandatory minimum sentences). 
 
14 As the Legislature's working definition of "mandatory 
minimum sentence" appears to incorporate, but is not equivalent 
to, a "minimum term," such definition also reveals that the 
Legislature understands "minimum term" to be a sentencing 
concept distinct from "mandatory minimum sentence." 
16 
 
defendant and (2) preclude judicial and executive discretion in 
ways that a minimum term does not.15 
If a statute imposes a mandatory minimum sentence, the 
judge has no discretion to sentence a defendant to less than the 
statutorily defined minimum term.  A mandatory minimum sentence, 
however, further restricts judicial discretion by precluding a 
judge from (1) sentencing a defendant to probation instead of 
incarceration, (2) ordering that a sentence be suspended, (3) 
placing a case on file, or (4) continuing a case without a 
finding.  A mandatory minimum sentence also requires that a 
defendant be incarcerated for the full length of the mandatory 
minimum sentence, meaning the defendant is not eligible for, 
 
15 Because a mandatory minimum sentence eliminates judicial 
and executive discretion in sentencing, represents one of the 
harshest types of penalties the Legislature can impose, and, as 
discussed by the dissent, post at    , has been found to lead to 
racial disparities in incarcerated populations, this court long 
has been hesitant to find that a statute imposes a mandatory 
minimum sentence unless the Legislature uses the clearest of 
language indicating its intent to create such penalty.  See, 
e.g., Zapata, 455 Mass. at 534-535. 
 
Where, as here, a minimum term provides a judge with the 
discretion to sentence a defendant to probation and presumably 
provides the Department of Correction with the discretion to 
reduce an inmate's sentence to less than the minimum term, the 
same hesitation does not apply.  We conclude that the plain 
language of the statute and Brown's instruction that "[l]anguage 
such as this has always been interpreted in the same manner:  
the 'not less than' phrase denotes a minimum sentence. . . .  It 
is always the shortest sentence that can be imposed, the number 
of years that determines parole eligibility," are dispositive 
here.  Brown, 431 Mass. at 777, 779. 
17 
 
among other things, early release, good conduct and other 
sentence reductions, parole, or probation, until such mandatory 
minimum sentence has been served. 
2.  Additional clarifications.16  Having defined our 
understanding of both "minimum term" and "mandatory minimum," we 
further define our understanding of the meaning of various 
language used by the Legislature when drafting legislation 
related to sentencing, none of which we conclude is sufficient, 
on its own, to create a mandatory minimum sentence. 
Where a sentencing statute provides that a defendant "shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not less than" a certain length 
of time, according to its plain language, the statute is 
providing the minimum term to which a judge may sentence the 
defendant if the judge chooses to sentence the defendant to 
incarceration in the first instance.  We have noted before that 
"[l]anguage such as this has always been interpreted in the same 
manner:  the 'not less than' phrase denotes a minimum 
sentence. . . .  It is always the shortest sentence that can be 
imposed, the number of years that determines parole 
eligibility."  Brown, 431 Mass. at 777, 779.  This language does 
not, however, create a mandatory minimum sentence because, under 
 
16 The definitions and clarifications discussed are intended 
to operate as default understandings of this court.  We do not 
foreclose the possibility that any term may have a different 
meaning in a specific context not identified here. 
18 
 
the rule of lenity, probation is permissible under a statute 
providing a minimum term but not an express prohibition on 
probation. 
The rule of lenity requires us to give a defendant "the 
benefit of any rational doubt" where we conclude that a "statute 
is ambiguous or [we] are unable to ascertain the intent of the 
Legislature."  Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 542, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 254 (2014).  In previous decisions 
interpreting sentencing statutes that are silent as to the 
availability of probation, we have held that such silence 
creates an ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of the 
defendant under the rule of lenity, and thus probation is 
available.  See Montarvo, supra (where one subsection expressly 
prohibits probation and another does not, statute is ambiguous 
such that rule of lenity applies to interpret latter subsection 
to allow probation); Zapata, 455 Mass. at 531 (statute that does 
not prohibit probation expressly is ambiguous such that rule of 
lenity requires interpretation that probationary sentence is 
allowed). 
Additionally, where our sentencing statutes all relate to 
the same subject matter, the sentencing of criminal defendants, 
"they should be construed together so as to constitute a 
harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose."  
Commonwealth v. Donohue, 452 Mass. 256, 266-267 (2008), quoting 
19 
 
Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 
(1975).  See Commonwealth v. Alfonso, 449 Mass. 738, 744-745 
(2007).  Our sentencing statutes also reveal that "when the 
Legislature intends to bar probation, it knows how to say so 
explicitly."  Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 540, quoting Zapata, 455 
Mass. at 534.  For example, G. L. c. 265, § 18B, expressly 
provides that no person convicted under the statute "shall . . . 
be eligible for probation."  Other statutes include similarly 
express prohibitions.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 90, § 24G (a) 
(vehicular homicide); G. L. c. 266, § 14 (burglary and related 
offenses); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (d), (m) (firearms possession 
offenses); G. L. c. 272, § 7 (deriving support from prostitute).  
Thus, the absence of express language prohibiting probation in a 
statute creates an ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of 
the defendant under the rule of lenity, and probation is 
available.17 
 
17 Contrary to the concurrence's assertion, post at    , we 
have reached this conclusion through a comprehensive review of 
existing statutory language and an effort to effectuate 
legislative intent, fully consistent with both our rules of 
statutory interpretation and our obligations under art. 30 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We cannot interpret 
each sentencing statute as if in a silo, isolated from all other 
sentencing statutes -- many of which we have found to be drafted 
from identical or nearly identical component language.  As with 
our interpretation of "mandatory minimum," if the Legislature 
disagrees with this interpretation, it is free to amend or enact 
new statutes clarifying when probation is or is not available as 
an alternative sentence to incarceration. 
20 
 
As a result, "not less than" language, on its own, does 
nothing more or less than create a minimum term, as defined 
above.18  This language has the same effect where the statute 
also defines a maximum term of incarceration.   We do not 
distinguish between statutes that define both a maximum and a 
minimum term of incarceration and those that define only a 
minimum because, where only a minimum is expressly imposed, we 
presume that the maximum term of incarceration permitted under 
the statute is life.  Commonwealth v. Logan, 367 Mass. 655, 657 
(1975), citing Binkley v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 848, 849-850 (10th 
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 926 (1949), and People v. 
McNabb, 3 Cal. 2d 441, 444-445 (1935).  See Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 251-252 (2018); Commonwealth v. 
Berardi, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 466-467 (2015).  Moreover, by 
its plain language, a maximum term simply places a limit on 
judicial discretion at the upper end of a sentencing range; it 
 
18 The defendant argues that the rule of lenity counsels a 
different conclusion, requiring us to hold that where a statute 
requires a sentence of "not less than" a certain number of 
years, a judge nevertheless has discretion to sentence a 
defendant to less than that number.  Because the rule of lenity 
applies where we "are unable to ascertain the intent of the 
Legislature" (emphasis added; citation omitted), Montarvo, 486 
Mass. at 542, where the language of a statute is plain but the 
courts have created ambiguity through inconsistent case law, the 
rule of lenity is inapplicable.  Thus, because the language of 
§ 178H (a) (2) is plain, the rule of lenity does not apply.  We 
must effectuate the clear intent of the Legislature to impose a 
sentence of incarceration of "not less than" a designated number 
of years. 
21 
 
has no relevance to the construction of a minimum term or 
mandatory minimum sentence. 
As such, when determining whether a statute imposes a 
minimum term of incarceration or a mandatory minimum sentence, 
language that purports to create a penalty of incarceration "for 
life or a term of not less than X years" or "for a term of not 
less than X years nor more than Y years" is functionally 
equivalent to "not less than" language appearing on its own and, 
rather than establishing a mandatory minimum sentence, simply 
establishes the minimum term of incarceration to be imposed if a 
defendant is sentenced to incarceration.  "Not less than" 
language, on its own or in conjunction with maximum term 
language such as that just discussed, does not establish a 
mandatory minimum sentence because it does not restrict 
mechanisms such as probation and sentence reductions that could 
result in a defendant being incarcerated for a shorter term than 
the minimum term imposed by the judge.19 
Turning to maximum term language, where a sentencing 
statute provides that a defendant "shall be punished by 
 
19 While we previously have concluded that language such as 
"for life or a term of not less than" a certain number of years 
created a mandatory minimum sentence, see Brown, 431 Mass. at 
774-776, we since have clarified that such language, without 
additional express prohibitions on probation, parole, 
suspensions, and sentence-reducing mechanisms, merely creates a 
minimum term and not a mandatory minimum sentence, as we now 
define those terms, see Zapata, 455 Mass. at 531. 
22 
 
imprisonment for not more than" a certain length of time, such 
language, according to its plain meaning, prohibits a judge from 
sentencing a defendant to a term of incarceration for more than 
that length of time.  Thus, it creates the maximum term of 
incarceration that a sentencing judge may impose on a defendant 
and, therefore, "the maximum amount of time that the prisoner 
will serve in prison if he . . . is not granted parole."  Brown, 
431 Mass. at 774, quoting Connery v. Commissioner of Correction, 
33 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 254 (1992), overruled on other grounds by 
Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13 
(2018).  This definition applies whether the statute also 
defines a minimum term of incarceration or not.20  As discussed 
supra, the presence or absence of a maximum term is irrelevant 
to the analysis surrounding whether a statute creates a minimum 
term or mandatory minimum sentence.  The inverse is also true; 
the presence or absence of minimum term or mandatory minimum 
sentence language is irrelevant to the analysis surrounding 
whether a statute creates a maximum term. 
 
20 If the statute defines a minimum term of incarceration, 
maximum term language may appear as "not more than," "nor more 
than," "or more than," or "life or."  For example, it may appear 
as "shall be punished by a term of imprisonment in the [S]tate 
prison for not less than five nor more than fifteen years," 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32F (a) (distribution of controlled substances 
to minors), or "shall be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate 
prison for life or for any term of not less than twenty years," 
G. L. c. 265, § 18C (home invasion). 
23 
 
Where a sentencing statute includes language such as "no 
person convicted under this section shall be eligible for 
probation," the plain meaning of such language is that the 
imposition of probation is prohibited.  Such language, 
therefore, restricts judicial discretion such that a judge may 
not sentence a defendant to probation and must, instead, impose 
a sentence of incarceration if one is specified in the statute.  
This language does not, however, on its own, or in conjunction 
with a minimum term, create a mandatory minimum sentence 
because, without additional restrictive language, a convicted 
person potentially could be eligible for good conduct and other 
deductions that would result in a period of incarceration of 
less than the term imposed by the sentencing judge. 
Where a sentencing statute prohibits sentence reductions or 
deductions through language such as "no person convicted under 
this section shall receive any deductions from his sentence for 
good conduct," the plain meaning is that the enumerated 
deductions are not available to a defendant sentenced under such 
a statute.  Such language is insufficient on its own, or in 
combination with a minimum term, however, to create a mandatory 
minimum sentence because, if probation is not likewise 
prohibited, a defendant could be sentenced to a term of 
probation rather than incarceration, or, if sentenced to 
24 
 
incarceration in a house of correction, could have such sentence 
suspended. 
In sum, we will not construe a sentencing statute to 
contain a mandatory minimum sentence where there is only one of 
the following provisions:  "not less than" language, "not more 
than" language, a prohibition on probation, or a prohibition on 
sentence deductions.  We further will not find a mandatory 
minimum sentence where "not less than" language is combined only 
with maximum term language, a prohibition on probation, or a 
prohibition on sentence deductions.  Each of these provisions 
standing alone, or in the combinations just discussed, is 
insufficient to unambiguously convey the Legislature's intent to 
create a mandatory minimum sentence.21 
3.  Reported questions.  Before we reach the first reported 
question, we must address, in light of the definitions and 
clarifications provided above, whether § 178H (a) (2) creates a 
mandatory minimum sentence requiring incarceration in State 
 
21 While "the Legislature 'is not restricted to one means of 
expression' in establishing a sentencing scheme," Zapata, 455 
Mass. at 534, quoting Brown, 431 Mass. at 776, we note that, 
pursuant to the rule of lenity, we interpret ambiguous statutory 
language in the defendant's favor, Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 542. 
25 
 
prison for not less than five years.22  We conclude that it does 
not. 
Section 178H (a) (2) provides in relevant part that a 
defendant who is convicted of failure to register as a sex 
offender, subsequent offense, "shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the [S]tate prison for not less than five years."  This 
language constitutes the full scope of sentencing guidance 
provided by the Legislature to the judge when sentencing an 
individual convicted under § 178H (a) (2).23  The statute does 
not include language concerning a maximum term, and it is silent 
as to the availability of probation as an alternative to 
incarceration and as to sentence-reducing mechanisms, such as 
good conduct deductions. 
As discussed supra, where a statute is silent as to the 
availability of probation, it is ambiguous such that the rule of 
lenity applies and leads us to conclude that the statute allows 
for a sentence of probation.  We therefore conclude that the 
absence of express language prohibiting probation in 
§ 178H (a) (2) creates an ambiguity in the statute and, thus, 
 
22 The defendant argues in his brief that G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178H (a), does not carry a five-year mandatory minimum State 
prison sentence. 
 
23 The remaining portion of § 178H (a) (2), imposing 
community parole supervision for life on certain offenders, has 
been invalidated as unconstitutional.  Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 
Mass. 294, 295, 308-309 (2014). 
26 
 
probation is presumably available as an alternative sentence to 
incarceration.  Because probation is presumably allowed as a 
sentencing option under § 178H (a) (2), that section does not 
impose a true "mandatory minimum" pursuant to which a judge 
would have no discretion to sentence a defendant to probation.24 
Having concluded that § 178H (a) (2) does not impose a 
mandatory minimum sentence, we must determine next the import of 
the phrase, "not less than five years."  By its plain language, 
and pursuant to the definitions and clarifications provided 
supra, "not less than five years" means precisely what it 
appears to say:  a sentence of incarceration imposed under 
§ 178H (a) (2) must be for "not less than five years."25  Thus, 
 
24 We also note that, because § 178H (a) (2) contains no 
language prohibiting sentence deductions, such deductions are 
presumably available.  Therefore, § 178H (a) (2) also does not 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence because a defendant 
sentenced thereunder presumably may take advantage of any 
available sentence deductions such that he or she may serve less 
than the full minimum term of the sentence imposed by the judge. 
 
25 While we share the dissent's concern about the racial 
disparities in our incarcerated populations, we note that we do 
not today create a new sentencing concept of "minimum term."  
Rather, we clarify judicially created ambiguities in the law to 
render our jurisprudence consistent with the plain language 
utilized by the Legislature, as our rules of statutory 
construction require us to do.  While we agree that we should be 
hesitant to remove the discretion of sentencing judges at this 
time, see post at    , our decision today merely reflects the 
Legislature's intent to do just that.  The result in this case 
is compelled by the plain language employed by the Legislature 
in § 178H (a) (2).  As "it is the [L]egislature, not the 
[c]ourt, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment," 
 
27 
 
if a judge chooses to sentence a defendant to incarceration 
under § 178H (a) (2), the minimum term of such sentence must be 
at least five years.26 
Because § 178H (a) (2) provides for "imprisonment in the 
[S]tate prison," the indeterminate sentencing statute, G. L. 
c. 279, § 24, also applies, requiring any State prison sentence 
imposed under § 178H (a) (2) to be indeterminate.  In reading 
the indeterminate sentencing statute together with an offense-
specific statute such as § 178H (a) (2), where the minimum term 
 
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820), 
it is also the domain of the Legislature to determine what, if 
any, discretion a sentencing judge has.  It would violate the 
fundamental principle of separation of powers to rewrite 
§ 178H (a) (2) as the dissent wishes us to do.  See art. 30 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
 
We also observe that, where § 178H (a) (2) imposes only a 
minimum term and not a mandatory minimum sentence, a judge 
presumably has the discretion to sentence a defendant to 
probation.  Thus, on remand, the sentencing judge here could 
decide that, where he had wanted to sentence the defendant to a 
term of from one to two years of incarceration, a minimum term 
of five years would be too harsh; in such an event, the judge 
could sentence the defendant to probation. 
 
26 It has been suggested that interpreting § 178H (a) (2) to 
allow for the imposition of probation or a term of incarceration 
of not less than five years creates a Hobson's choice.  To the 
extent that this argument carries any weight, we note that the 
choice available under § 178H (a) (2) is far less severe than 
that under G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a) (habitual offenders), which 
may require a judge to choose between imposing probation or a 
term of incarceration of not less than twenty years, Montarvo, 
486 Mass. at 542-543, or that under G. L. c. 265, § 18C (home 
invasion), which always so requires, Zapata, 455 Mass. at 535.  
The Legislature is free to establish such a sentencing 
structure. 
28 
 
or mandatory minimum sentence provided in the offense-specific 
statute exceeds that provided in § 24, the two statutes facially 
may be applied together, and the offense-specific statute 
determines the minimum term to which a judge may sentence a 
defendant.27 
Applied here, the five-year minimum term in § 178H (a) (2), 
read together with § 24, requires a judge who chooses to 
sentence a defendant to incarceration in State prison to impose 
an indeterminate sentence, the minimum term of which may not be 
less than five years.  We therefore answer the first reported 
question, whether § 178H (a) (2) permits a judge to impose a 
sentence of incarceration in State prison for a term of less 
than five years, "No."  If a judge chooses to sentence an 
offender to incarceration pursuant to § 178H (a) (2), the 
 
27 It would be illogical for the Legislature to enact 
offense-specific statutes with offense-specific minimum terms 
relating to incarceration in State prison if it expected all 
such minimum terms to mean only that the designated offense is a 
felony, and the specifics of such terms should be ignored in 
favor of the one-year minimum term provided in § 24.  Such a 
construction of our statutory sentencing scheme would render the 
"not less than five years" language in § 178H (a) (2) 
inoperative and lead to just such an illogical result.  Because 
we do not interpret statutes in such a way that parts are 
"inoperative or superfluous" or that creates an illogical 
result, § 24 is to be applied in conjunction with any minimum 
term or mandatory minimum sentencing language contained in the 
relevant offense-specific statute at issue.  Wolfe v. Gormally, 
440 Mass. 699, 704 (2004), quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 136, 140 (1998).  See Brown, 431 
Mass. at 774; Commonwealth v. Logan, 367 Mass. 655, 657 (1975). 
29 
 
minimum term imposed must be "not less than five years."  
Because a term of incarceration in State prison for less than 
five years is prohibited under § 178H (a) (2), we also must 
answer the second reported question, whether the judge's 
proposed sentence of from one to two years committed to State 
prison is lawful under § 178H (a) (2), "No." 
The defendant cites to Rodriguez, 482 Mass. 366; Hines, 449 
Mass. 183; and Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, for the proposition 
that although § 178H (a) (2) calls for a sentence of "not less 
than five years," it does not actually require a sentence with a 
minimum term of "not less than five years."  Lightfoot and 
Rodriguez are inapplicable here, and therefore do not support 
the defendant's assertion.  While Hines arguably supports the 
defendant's position, we conclude today that it was wrongly 
decided and, therefore, is overruled.  Thus, none of these cases 
leads us to conclude that a judge may sentence a defendant to 
less than a statutorily required minimum term. 
The defendant's reliance on Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, is 
misplaced.  The statute at issue in Lightfoot and the interplay 
between that statute and the version of the indeterminate 
sentencing statute in effect at the time bear little resemblance 
to the case before us.  See id. at 719-720.  The offense-
specific statute at issue in Lightfoot provided for a 
determinate State prison sentence, in clear violation of the 
30 
 
mandate of the indeterminate sentencing statute, G. L. c. 279, 
§ 24, inserted by St. 1924, c. 152.  Lightfoot, supra at 718 
n.1, 719, citing G. L. c. 272, § 7, as amended through St. 1980, 
c. 409.  As the statute at issue here imposes an indeterminate 
sentence that facially can be construed in harmony with § 24, 
Lightfoot is inapplicable to our analysis. 
The dilemma the court faced in Lightfoot was that the 
apparently determinate sentence provided for in the offense-
specific statute at issue was made somewhat less determinate by 
the inclusion of language providing that a sentence imposed 
under the statute "shall not be reduced to less than two years."  
Lightfoot, 391 Mass. at 718 n.1, quoting G. L. c. 272, § 7, as 
amended through St. 1980, c. 409.  Because we generally seek to 
effectuate legislative intent rather than invalidate it, where 
possible, the Lightfoot court interpreted this language in 
conjunction with the specified five-year term as creating a two-
year mandatory minimum sentence and a five-year maximum term, 
bringing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 24.28  
Lightfoot, supra at 721.  However, where, as here, the offense-
 
28 In Commonwealth v. Marrone, 387 Mass. 702, 706-707 
(1982), this court invalidated a statute that similarly imposed 
a determinate State prison sentence but that did not provide any 
language suggesting that such sentence might be reduced.  In 
such a case, we determined that "it would be sheer conjecture 
. . . to conclude that the Legislature meant the fifteen-year 
term to be either the maximum term or the minimum term" of an 
indeterminate sentence.  Id. at 704. 
31 
 
specific statute provides clear minimum term language (i.e., 
"not less than") that facially complies with the mandate of 
§ 24, the offense-specific and indeterminate sentencing statutes 
facially may be applied together, and there is no ambiguity that 
we must resolve. 
Additionally, the indeterminate sentencing statute in 
effect when Lightfoot was before this court required a minimum 
term of at least two and one-half years in State prison, whereas 
the current version of the statute requires a minimum term of at 
least one year, with exceptions.  Compare G. L. c. 279, § 24, 
inserted by St. 1924, c. 152, with G. L. c. 279, § 24, as 
amended through St. 2014, c. 189, § 6.  Thus, a sentence that 
comported with the two-year mandatory minimum set forth in the 
offense-specific statute at issue in Lightfoot may have failed 
to comply with the two and one-half year minimum then required 
by § 24.  This conflict between the statutes, which does not 
exist here, created potential ambiguity that, pursuant to the 
rule of lenity, was to be resolved in favor of the defendant.  
Lightfoot, 391 Mass. at 720.  Thus, it was in that context that 
the Lightfoot court concluded that the reference to State prison 
was meant to render the offense a felony.  Id. at 721-722.  Such 
context does not exist here, where the minimum term provided for 
in § 178H (a) (2), the sex offender registration statute, 
exceeds the one-year minimum term now required by the 
32 
 
indeterminate sentencing statute, § 24, such that the two 
statutes can be read together according to their plain meanings.  
Thus, the defendant's reliance on Lightfoot is inapt. 
In Rodriguez, this court attempted to harmonize three less 
than harmonious provisions of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m) 
(§ 10 [m]).29  In so doing, we held that § 10 (m) permits a State 
 
29 General Laws c. 269, § 10 (m), provides in relevant part: 
 
"[A]ny person not exempted by statute who knowingly has in 
his possession, or knowingly has under his control in a 
vehicle, a large capacity weapon or large capacity feeding 
device therefor who does not possess a valid license to 
carry firearms . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
[S]tate prison for not less than two and one-half years nor 
more than ten years.  The possession of a valid firearm 
identification card issued under [G. L. c. 140, § 129B,] 
shall not be a defense for a violation of this subsection; 
provided, however, that any such person charged with 
violating this paragraph and holding a valid firearm 
identification card shall not be subject to any mandatory 
minimum sentence imposed under this paragraph.  The 
sentence imposed on such person shall not be reduced to 
less than one year, nor suspended, nor shall any person 
convicted under this subsection be eligible for probation, 
parole, furlough, work release or receive any deduction 
from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have 
served such minimum term of such sentence . . . .  
Prosecutions commenced under this subsection shall neither 
be continued without a finding nor placed on file." 
 
The sole difference between the current version of the 
statute, quoted here, and the version at issue in Rodriguez is 
that the earlier version referred to "a valid Class A or Class B 
license to carry firearms," whereas the current version refers 
to "a valid license to carry firearms."  Compare G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (m), inserted by St. 1998, c. 180, § 70, with G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (m), as amended through St. 2014, c. 284, § 91 (effective 
Jan. 1, 2021).  The difference does not affect our analysis or 
that of the Rodriguez court. 
33 
 
prison sentence of less than two and one-half years although the 
first provision of § 10 (m) states that offenders "shall be 
punished by imprisonment in a [S]tate prison for not less than 
two and one-half years nor more than ten years."  Rodriguez, 482 
Mass. at 373-374.  G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  The court's decision 
to depart from a plain language interpretation in Rodriguez, 
however, was required because other language in § 10 (m) 
rendered unclear the meaning of the above-quoted provision.  See 
Rodriguez, supra at 368 ("if the paragraph ended there, the two 
provisions might be readily reconciled . . . .  Of course, the 
paragraph has three, not two provisions"). 
The statutory structure present in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), 
is uniquely "vexing."  Rodriguez, 482 Mass. at 368.  It creates 
two classes of offenders, firearm identification (FID) card 
holders, and non-FID-cardholders, and calls for two different 
minimum terms of imprisonment30 -- one of one year and another of 
two and one-half years -- applicable to non-FID-card holders.  
Id. at 369-370.  This conflict led the court to interpret 
 
30 Although the Rodriguez court characterized the term of 
imprisonment language as creating "two different mandatory 
minimum sentences," Rodriguez, 482 Mass. at 370 n.4, in light of 
our discussion today it is more accurate to characterize the 
first provision of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), as setting forth a 
minimum term rather than a mandatory minimum sentence.  However, 
because we conclude today that a judge lacks discretion to 
impose a sentence below a specified minimum term even where such 
minimum term is not part of a mandatory minimum sentence, the 
characterization does not affect the Rodriguez court's analysis. 
34 
 
§ 10 (m), in light of legislative history surrounding the 
"truth-in-sentencing" act and the rule of lenity, as creating, 
"for non-FID-card holders, a lower end of the sentencing range 
of from one to two and one-half years, with at least one year to 
serve, in State prison."  Id. at 373. 
The language we interpret in § 178H (a) (2) is nearly 
identical in structure to the first provision of § 10 (m), with 
both statutes providing that an offender "shall be punished by 
imprisonment in . . . [S]tate prison for not less than" a 
certain number of years.  As the Rodriguez court concluded, the 
import of such language, without more, is clear.  Rodriguez, 482 
Mass. at 368.  Unlike in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), and Rodriguez, 
in § 178H (a) (2), there is no additional statutory language 
rendering the five-year minimum term ambiguous or in need of any 
interpretation beyond the plain language of the statute.  As 
such, Rodriguez is inapplicable.31 
The defendant's reliance on Hines, 449 Mass. 183, likewise 
does not preclude the answers we provide today, as the case was 
decided wrongly and now is overruled.  The principle of stare 
 
31 The analysis in Rodriguez was tied to a statutory 
structure that this court has described as "vexing," being "no 
grammatical paragon," and "caus[ing] courts some consternation."  
Rodriguez, 482 Mass. at 368, and cases cited.  We have not found 
this statutory structure replicated elsewhere among our 
sentencing statutes.  Absent another similarly constructed 
statute, we think Rodriguez has little applicability beyond 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m). 
35 
 
decisis does not prevent us from overruling Hines for having 
been wrongly decided.  "The principle of stare decisis is not 
absolute."  Shiel v. Rowell, 480 Mass. 106, 108 (2018), citing 
Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 562, cert. denied sub nom. 
Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 (2004).  "[W]hether it shall be 
followed or departed from is a question entirely within the 
discretion of the court."  Shiel, supra, quoting Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Helvering v. 
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).  Where our 
sentencing jurisprudence does not currently reveal any settled 
or consistent legal principles surrounding minimum term language 
(as evidenced by the reported questions in this case), we view 
our decision today as departing only minimally from the 
principle of stare decisis.  See Knick v. Scott, 139 S. Ct. 
2162, 2177-2179 (2019).  Courts must construe statutory language 
to effectuate legislative intent, in part, to respect the 
separation of powers inherent in our governmental structure, and 
to avoid rewriting the Legislature's statutes in a 
constitutionally impermissible way.  See art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ("the judicial [department] 
shall never exercise the legislative . . . powers").  Any 
36 
 
departure from this principle of statutory construction, 
therefore, is not the kind of inconsistency that must be 
followed in the name of stare decisis.  Where the reasons for 
departing from precedent outweigh the factors that favor 
adherence to it, we can and should acknowledge our past mistakes 
and cease perpetuating them.  Shiel, supra at 109, citing 
Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 617 (1980). 
"Respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong 
decisions."  Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 
455 (2015).  But it does not dictate that we do so here.  When a 
court of last resort contemplates whether to overrule a past 
decision, it considers factors such as the quality of that 
decision's reasoning, whether the rule it established is 
workable, whether it is consistent with other related decisions, 
and whether there has been reliance on the decision.  See Knick, 
139 S. Ct. at 2178.  See also Shiel, 480 Mass. at 108, quoting 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("adhering to 
precedent is our 'preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process'"). 
None of these factors favors our continued adherence to 
Hines.  First, as explained infra, the reasoning in Hines was 
37 
 
flawed and the outcomes unjustified.  Continuing to adhere to 
decisions in which we did not faithfully interpret a statute 
consistently with legislative intent does not promote "the 
actual [or] perceived integrity of the judicial process."  Cf. 
Shiel, 480 Mass. at 108, quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.  
Second, the problematic portions of Hines establish no clear 
interpretive principles to apply to similar language in other 
statutes.32  Third, Hines is inconsistent with Brown, 431 Mass. 
at 776-779, which, as explained infra, we did not reasonably 
distinguish in Hines.  Finally, reliance interests are 
relatively low and arguably illegitimate.  Parties are unlikely 
to have "order[ed] their affairs" in reliance on the minimum 
sentence they believe they could receive for a crime they might 
commit, and it is unclear whether we ought to recognize such 
reliance even if it existed.  Contrast Kimble, 576 U.S. at 457 
 
32 The dissent asserts that, where the Legislature made an 
amendment to G. L. c. 265, § 18B, in 2014 but left unchanged the 
"not less than" language, the Legislature has approved of the 
court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Hines, 449 Mass. 183 (2007).  
Post at    .  However, because we have, at various times prior 
to 2014, interpreted "not less than" language as being 
essentially inoperative, e.g., Hines, 449 Mass. at 191-192, or, 
conversely, as establishing a mandatory minimum sentence, e.g., 
Brown, 431 Mass. at 775, there was no clear prior construction 
of that language for the Legislature to reenact.  Further, the 
"not less than" language in the statute at issue in Brown was 
also reenacted after our decision was issued in that case, see 
St. 2004, c. 150, § 17. 
38 
 
(adhering to precedent is most favored when precedent concerns 
property or contract law). 
In Hines, this court vacated a sentence of five years of 
probation imposed pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 18B, because the 
statute expressly prohibits probationary sentences.  Hines, 449 
Mass. at 190.  This court also concluded that the statutory 
language providing that a person "shall" be sentenced to a term 
of incarceration of "not less than five years" did not create a 
"mandatory minimum State prison sentence of five years" where 
the statute did not include the word "mandatory," despite the 
statute's prohibition of "probation, parole, furlough, . . . 
work release[, and] deduction[s] . . . for good conduct."  Id. 
at 190-191, quoting G. L. c. 265, § 18B.  The court then 
instructed the sentencing judge, on remand, to "'fix a maximum 
and minimum term' [of incarceration] in accordance with [the 
indeterminate sentencing statute,] G. L. c. 279, § 24."   Hines, 
supra at 191-192.  In so instructing, the Hines court appeared 
to allow the sentencing judge discretion to impose a sentence of 
less than five years.  This was error. 
First, the court's attempt to distinguish Brown is not 
compelling.  In a footnote, the Hines court rejected an argument 
that Brown was dispositive, reasoning that the language of § 18B 
(which calls for "imprisonment . . . for not less than five 
years") was not similar enough to G. L. c. 265, § 18C (which 
39 
 
calls for "imprisonment . . . for life or for any term of not 
less than twenty years") for our previous interpretation of 
§ 18C to control our interpretation of § 18B.  See Hines, 449 
Mass. at 191 n.4.  We did not explain in Hines the significance 
of the inclusion of a maximum term in § 18C and the lack thereof 
in § 18B.  Nor has the defendant provided us with an 
explanation.  We conclude that there is no significant 
difference as related to any defined minimum term, as both 
statutes include the relevant phrase "not less than," which, as 
discussed supra, operates to create a minimum term. 
Thus, Brown ought to have controlled the outcome in Hines.  
But even setting Brown aside, the reasoning in Hines does not 
withstand scrutiny.  The Legislature need not use the word 
"mandatory" to render its clear commands operative.  See Brown, 
431 Mass. at 776 ("The Legislature . . . is not restricted to 
one means of expression; and in actual practice it has not so 
restricted itself").  The Hines court did not explain why the 
absence of the word "mandatory" was significant.  Section 18B 
plainly restricts the minimum term of a sentence imposed 
consistently with § 24, and further provides that such minimum 
term must be served as a mandatory minimum sentence by 
prohibiting "probation, parole, furlough, . . . work release[, 
and] deduction[s] . . . for good conduct."  Hines, 449 Mass. at 
190-191, quoting G. L. c. 265, § 18B.  There was no reason in 
40 
 
Hines to interpret § 18B other than in accordance with its plain 
meaning.  The absence of the word "mandatory" is irrelevant. 
The fatal problem with the portion of Hines interpreting 
the phrase "for not less than five years" is that it renders 
that phrase meaningless.  We are obligated to avoid such 
constructions.  See Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 538, quoting Ropes & 
Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412 (2009) ("A statute 
should be construed so as to give effect to each word . . ."); 
Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 227, 231 (2007), citing Wolfe v. 
Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704 (2004).  We attempted to address 
this deficiency in Hines by reasoning that the language in § 18B 
that we had determined not to have the effect of requiring a 
five-year minimum State prison sentence instead had the effect 
of marking the underlying offense as a felony.  See Hines, 449 
Mass. at 191; G. L. c. 274, § 1 ("A crime punishable by . . . 
imprisonment in the state prison is a felony").  Such a 
construction, however, would still render the five-year minimum 
inoperative in a way our rules of statutory construction do not 
permit and risks rendering language contained across a wide 
range of our sentencing statutes obsolete. 
For example, the statute at issue in Hines, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18B, provided that an individual convicted of an offense under 
the statute "shall . . . be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not less than five years; provided, however, 
41 
 
that [if certain conditions are met], such person shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 
ten years" (emphasis added).  If the only meaning of language 
imposing a State prison sentence for not less than a certain 
number of years is to designate an offense as a felony 
punishable by incarceration in State prison for at least one 
year under § 24, there could be no discernible reason for the 
Legislature to provide for two separate and distinct minimum 
terms in State prison under a single statute.  After all, the 
import of both the "not less than five years" and "not less than 
ten years" language would only require a judge to sentence a 
defendant to a term of incarceration of not less than one year. 
Further, the Legislature could have marked the underlying 
offense in § 18B as a felony by mandating only that persons 
convicted thereunder "shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
State prison" (omitting "for not less than five years").  The 
Legislature knows how to do this.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 265, 
§ 19 (a) (persons convicted of unarmed robbery "shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for life or for 
any term of years" [emphasis added]).  Thus, this interpretation 
of what the Legislature sought to accomplish with these 
provisions still problematically leaves their crucial language 
("for not less than five years") meaningless and risks similarly 
invalidating all offense-specific minimum terms of more than one 
42 
 
year in State prison.33  We must avoid this interpretation.  See 
Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 538, citing Ropes & Gray LLP, 454 Mass. 
at 412. 
In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 484 Mass. 1024, 1026 n.8 (2020), 
we relied on Hines to conclude that § 18B did not impose a 
"mandatory minimum sentence of five years for a first offense," 
but instead should be read to impose a two-year minimum term and 
at least a five-year maximum term.  As in Hines, the Thomas 
court failed to reconcile that conclusion with our rejection in 
Brown, 431 Mass. at 773, 775, of the argument that "not less 
than" language "establishes the minimum number of years the 
judge could impose as the higher (maximum) number of years of 
the sentence" because such an interpretation would be "in direct 
 
33 Statutes containing minimum terms that would be rendered 
obsolete include, among others, G. L. c. 265, § 18B (unlawful 
possession of firearm while in commission of felony); G. L. 
c. 269, § 10I (c) (transporting firearm into Commonwealth that 
causes death of another); G. L. c. 265, § 21A (armed assault 
with intent to steal motor vehicle); G. L. c. 265, § 13H 1/2 (d) 
(indecent assault and battery by law enforcement, first 
offense); G. L. c. 266, § 17 (armed breaking and entering); 
G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a) (2) (failure to register as sex offender, 
subsequent offense); G. L. c. 272, § 35A (lascivious acts with 
child under sixteen, subsequent offense); G. L. c. 265, § 13F 
(indecent assault and battery on person with intellectual 
disability, first offense); G. L. c. 266, § 18 (armed home 
invasion); G. L. c. 265, § 26 (armed kidnapping); G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18 (a) (armed assault on elderly person with intent to rob or 
murder); G. L. c. 265, § 17 (armed robbery); G. L. c. 265, § 18A 
(armed assault in dwelling house); G. L. c. 265, § 24 (armed 
assault with intent to rape); G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b) (armed 
rape). 
43 
 
conflict with the plain language of the statute."34  As in Hines, 
Brown should have controlled in Thomas. 
In short, to the extent that we held in Hines and concluded 
in Thomas that statutory language providing that a State prison 
sentence must be "for not less than X years" may be ignored if 
neither the word "mandatory" nor an upper limit on the length of 
the sentence also appears in the provision, that holding is 
erroneous, for it is contrary to our obligation to construe 
statutes in line with their plain meaning and so as to 
effectuate faithfully Legislative intent.  See Sharris v. 
Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 594 (2018). 
As the court did in Hines, the defendant erroneously 
distinguishes Brown to argue that we should not read 
§ 178H (a) (2) to impose a minimum term of incarceration of five 
years where the statute does not provide a maximum term of 
incarceration.35  The defendant notes that a maximum term was 
included in the statute at issue in Brown, which we determined 
 
34 The dissent similarly fails to reconcile the court's 
conclusion in Thomas with the clear statement in Brown that such 
a reading of the statute is "in direct conflict with the plain 
language of the statute."  See post at    ; Brown, 431 Mass. at 
775. 
 
35 The dissent similarly asserts that we previously have 
rejected the argument that the presence or absence of maximum 
term language does not affect how we construe minimum term 
language, citing Hines, 449 Mass. at 191 n.4.  Post at    .  As 
discussed supra, Hines was wrongly decided and is now overruled. 
44 
 
to impose a mandatory minimum sentence.36  Setting aside Hines, 
this argument is unavailing.  The meaning of the phrase "not 
less than" is unaffected by whether it is followed by "or more 
than" language. 
Further, to the extent that the defendant suggests that 
§ 178H (a) (2) may be invalid for its lack of a maximum term, it 
is well settled that where a sentencing statute imposes a 
minimum but not a maximum sentence, "the maximum sentence 
permitted by the Legislature is presumed to be a life term."  
Logan, 367 Mass. at 657.  See Berardi, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 467 
(because § 178H [a] [2] is presumed to carry life term, 
defendant tried thereunder entitled to full number of peremptory 
challenges required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 20 [c] [1], 378 Mass. 
890 [1979]).  See also Crayton, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 251-252 
(defendant tried under statute similarly presumed to carry life 
term entitled to full number of peremptory challenges). 
The defendant also argues that a minimum term of 
incarceration of five years under § 178H (a) (2) could result in 
the punishment of "passive" conduct and be so disproportionate 
to the conduct at issue as to render such sentence 
unconstitutional.  However, because the issue is not raised by 
 
36 As discussed supra, the statute at issue in Brown, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18C, imposes a minimum term and not a mandatory 
minimum sentence, as we define those terms today. 
45 
 
the facts presented, "we do not here decide whether in a 
particular case a sentence imposed pursuant to the broad" 
sentencing range in § 178H (a) (2) "might be so disproportionate 
to the offense as to constitute cruel [or] unusual punishment."  
Logan, 367 Mass. at 657, citing McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 
Mass. 322, 328 (1899), aff'd, 180 U.S. 311 (1901). 
In Logan, 367 Mass. at 656-657, this court examined whether 
G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1972, c. 312, § 5 
(unlawful firearms possession), was unconstitutionally vague 
because it failed to specify "a maximum limit on sentences 
thereunder."  The court held that the statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague because, "[u]nder such a statute[,] the 
maximum sentence permitted by the Legislature is presumed to be 
a life term."  Id. at 657.  The defendant waived argument on the 
reported questions addressing whether the statute constituted 
cruel or unusual punishment, or cruel and unusual punishment, 
and the Logan court noted in passing that it did not decide 
whether any specific sentence imposed "pursuant to the broad 
authorization in G. L. c. 269, § 10, might be so 
disproportionate to the offense as to constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment."  Id. at 656-657.  Similarly here, although 
§ 178H (a) (2) presumably allows for a maximum term of life, we 
cannot say that a life sentence imposed under § 178H (a) (2) 
would be constitutional. 
46 
 
We observe, however, that because a person only may be 
convicted of failure to register under G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a), 
if such failure is "knowing[]," the defendant's argument that a 
mandatory minimum would punish an offender for "passive conduct" 
must fail.  "'Knowingly' when used in a criminal statute 
'commonly imports a perception of the facts requisite to make up 
the crime.'"  Commonwealth v. Lawson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 627, 
629-630 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Altenhaus, 317 Mass. 
270, 273 (1944).  Thus, in a prosecution for a violation of 
G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a), "the Commonwealth [is] required to prove 
that the defendant knew of the requirement that he register but 
did not do so despite this knowledge. . . .  Absent a 
defendant's conscious disregard of the information necessary to 
provide him with the requisite knowledge, the Commonwealth 
cannot meet its burden merely by establishing that the knowledge 
was available to the defendant" (emphasis added; citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 12 
(2007). 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed supra, we answer 
both reported questions, "No."  Under § 178H (a) (2), a judge 
may sentence a defendant convicted of failure to register as a 
sex offender, subsequent offense, to probation or to a term of 
incarceration in State prison; if sentencing a defendant to a 
term of incarceration in State prison, a judge must impose an 
47 
 
indeterminate sentence, the minimum term of which cannot be less 
than five years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
BUDD, C.J. (concurring).  General Laws c. 6, § 178H (a) (2) 
(§ 178H [a] [2]), states in relevant part that a "second and 
subsequent conviction [for failure to register as a sex 
offender] shall be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate 
prison for not less than five years."  The reported questions 
ask, in essence, whether § 178H (a) (2) permits a State prison 
sentence for a period of less than five years.  I agree with the 
court that the statutory language plainly requires that any 
State prison sentence imposed pursuant to this section must have 
a minimum term of incarceration of five years or greater.1  See 
Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 594 (2018).  I further 
agree that, to reach this commonsense conclusion, Commonwealth 
v. Hines, 449 Mass. 183 (2007), must be overruled to the extent 
that it ignores the plain meaning of similar sentencing language 
in G. L. c. 265, § 18B. 
However, the court goes beyond the reported questions to 
conclude that § 178H (a) (2) allows a judge to impose a sentence 
of probation in lieu of a sentence of incarceration.  Generally, 
I believe the better practice is to focus on the issues 
 
1 By "minimum term" I refer to the lower number of a State 
prison sentence expressed as a range in accordance with G. L. 
c. 279, § 24. 
 
2 
 
reflected in the reported questions.2  Here, although I do not 
take a position on the conclusion the court reaches regarding 
the availability of probation under § 178H (a) (2), I am 
troubled by its methodology. 
In the course of answering questions not presented,3 the 
court creates an interpretive presumption concerning the 
availability of probationary sentences that departs from the 
 
2 The court asserts that it must address the availability of 
probationary sentences to clear up confusion caused by purported 
deficiencies in our case law.  Ante at    .  However, apart from 
conclusory assertions, the court points to no evidence of 
confusion on this point.  Indeed, here, the judge sentenced the 
defendant to probation for a separate violation of § 178H (a) 
(2) without expressing uncertainty or concern about its 
legality.  Nor was the sentence challenged by the Commonwealth.  
As for our case law, I am aware of no deficiencies in our 
interpretation of sentencing statutes aside from Hines, which 
created uncertainty regarding only how short the minimum term of 
a prison sentence could be pursuant to § 178H (a) (2).  Having 
overruled Hines, the court has eliminated the root of any 
confusion and fully resolved the reported questions. 
 
3 The court explains at length its use of the phrases 
"minimum term" and "mandatory minimum sentence."  Ante at    .  
The court expends such effort partly because it perceives 
inconsistency in how we have used the label "mandatory minimum" 
in the past.  Id. at    ,    , note 5.  But the court identifies 
no substantive problems with our sentencing jurisprudence 
flowing from this "inconsistency."  As to the "inconsistency" 
itself, the minor variations in language upon which the court 
focuses -- i.e., whether the word "mandatory" is used when 
describing sentencing restrictions that obviously are mandatory 
-- are innocuous reflections of the fact that the same thing can 
be said in multiple ways.  The court's attempt to ensure that 
"mandatory minimum" means always, and only, what it here defines 
that term to mean will generate more confusion than clarity in 
the interpretation of our sentencing jurisprudence moving 
forward. 
3 
 
plain meaning of statutory language and is not grounded in 
legislative intent.  Ante at    ,    ,    .  The court then 
applies that presumption to § 178H (a) (2).  Id. at    , note 
25.  In so doing, the court seems to disregard basic rules of 
statutory interpretation, thereby risking a violation of art. 30 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  I therefore cannot 
join those portions of the opinion. 
Today, the court declares that it will interpret statutes 
providing that certain offenders "shall be punished by 
imprisonment . . . for not less than [X] years" not to require 
that those offenders be punished by imprisonment unless the 
statute additionally contains language like "nor shall any such 
offenders be eligible for probation."  Ante at note 9,    .  The 
court reasons that, because the Legislature included express 
prohibitions on probation in some sentencing statutes, the 
absence of an express prohibition on probation in other 
sentencing statutes renders ambiguous whether the Legislature 
intended that probation be available under those statutes that 
do not expressly mention it.  Id. at    .  Without considering 
any other sources of legislative intent, the court concludes 
that it must resolve this supposed ambiguity by interpreting 
probation to be available under all such statutes.  Id. 
This reasoning disregards the plain meaning of "shall be 
punished by imprisonment."  See Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 
4 
 
Mass. 186, 192 (2019), quoting Sisson v. Lhowe, 460 Mass. 705, 
708 (2011) (statute's plain language is "'the principal source 
of insight' into the intent of the Legislature"); Commonwealth 
v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713 (2009) (when interpreting statutory 
language, we "start 'with the language of the statute itself and 
presume . . . that the Legislature intended what the words of 
the statute say'" [quotation omitted]).  Considered on its own, 
this phrase conveys the Legislature's intent that offenders be 
punished by imprisonment.  See Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 
Mass. 535, 537 (2020) (interpreting habitual offender statute, 
G. L. c. 279, § 25 [§ 25]); Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 Mass. 
530, 535 (2009) (interpreting armed home invasion statute, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18C [§ 18C]).  Indeed, we previously have acknowledged 
that "probation appears to be unavailable" where a statute 
contains such language and provides for no alternative sentence.  
Montarvo, supra.  See Zapata, supra (such language "would 
suggest a legislative intent that a defendant convicted under 
the statute could be sentenced to only a term of incarceration, 
not probation"). 
In the course of explaining its new interpretive 
presumption, however, the court neither considers the plain 
meaning of the phrase "shall be punished by imprisonment" nor 
addresses the fact that we previously have acknowledged that 
5 
 
plain meaning.  Rather, the court takes the position that 
Montarvo, supra, and Zapata, supra, stand for the proposition 
that, in statutes that explicitly mandate imprisonment, the 
absence of a prohibition on probation creates ambiguity as to 
whether offenders may be sentenced to probation instead of 
imprisonment.  Ante at    .  The court misconstrues these cases. 
In both Montarvo and Zapata, we interpreted the statute at 
issue (§ 25 [a] and § 18C, respectively) to permit probation in 
lieu of incarceration because either the history or the language 
of the statute made its facially plain command that offenders 
"shall be punished by imprisonment" ambiguous.  See Montarvo, 
486 Mass. at 537-538; Zapata, 455 Mass. at 535.  We then 
resolved this ambiguity favorably to defendants pursuant to the 
rule of lenity.  See Montarvo, supra at 542-543; Zapata, supra. 
Contrary to the court's suggestion, in neither case was 
this ambiguity created by the mere absence of language 
prohibiting probation.  Ante at    , note 9.  Rather, in Zapata, 
455 Mass. at 535 n.7, the court considered the absence of such 
language significant only because "the unique legislative 
history" of § 18C made it so.  Specifically, the Legislature's 
decision to remove such language from a previous version of 
§ 18C created the ambiguity.  See id. at 531-535.  Similarly, in 
Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 537-538, the court considered significant 
the absence of language prohibiting probation in § 25 (a) only 
6 
 
because such language was present in § 25 (b).  It was the 
"juxtaposition" of § 25's simultaneously enacted subsections 
that made § 25 (a) ambiguous, id. at 537, not the absence of 
language precluding probation in § 25 (a) considered on its own. 
The court suggests that Montarvo can be extended such that 
the Legislature's decision to include a prohibition on probation 
in some sentencing statutes should be considered evidence that 
the Legislature intended, conversely, that probation be 
available under any sentencing statute without a prohibition on 
probation.  Ante at    .  However, the "maxim of negative 
implication,"4 relied on (properly in my view) in Montarvo, 
generally is applied only to simultaneously enacted provisions 
within a single statute, where one may assume that the 
Legislature considered the provisions together when it adopted 
the statutory language.  See Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 538.  See 
also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) ("negative 
implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest when 
the portions of a statute treated differently had already been 
joined together and were being considered simultaneously when 
the language raising the implication was inserted").  By 
contrast, little reasonably may be inferred about legislative 
 
4 See Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 628 (2010) (maxim of 
negative implication stands for proposition "that the express 
inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another"). 
7 
 
intent from the absence of language in one sentencing statute 
that exists in some other sentencing statute, where the statutes 
were enacted at different times and concern different crimes.5  
Compare, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 488 (2008) 
(rejecting reasoning from negative implication where disparate 
statutory provisions "were enacted separately and are couched in 
very different terms"); Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 65 
(2017) (likewise, "where the [sentencing] statutes . . . vary 
significantly" in "language and structure"). 
Notably, "[a]s with all aids for interpretation," the maxim 
of negative implication "is subordinate to the primary rule that 
legislative intent governs the interpretation of a statute."  2A 
N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 47:23 (7th ed. 2014 & Nov. 2021 update) 
(Sutherland).  See Globe Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 Mass. 
 
5 Although it is true that we construe related statutes 
together such that they form "a harmonious whole consistent with 
the legislative purpose," Commonwealth v. Donohue, 452 Mass. 
256, 266-267 (2008), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of 
Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975), see ante at    , this 
principle directs that we interpret statutes such that they are 
substantively consistent and aligned with the underlying 
legislative purpose.  The court has not identified a uniform 
legislative purpose underlying all sentencing statutes, let 
alone one that would require us to depart from a plain language 
reading of statutes requiring that offenders "shall be punished 
by imprisonment" without mentioning probation.  Nor has the 
court explained why a plain language interpretation of such 
statutes renders our various sentencing statutes substantively 
inharmonious with one another. 
8 
 
113, 119 (2011) (rejecting interpretation based on negative 
implication given absence of "evidence that the Legislature 
intended this result").  Because "the language of the statute" 
is "'the principal source of insight' into the intent of the 
Legislature," Newberry, 483 Mass. at 192, quoting Sisson, 460 
Mass. at 708, the plain meaning of the language in the statute 
ordinarily should trump "negative implications" from language 
not in the statute.  See Sutherland, supra at § 47:25 (maxim of 
negative implication "is an interpretive tool useful to remind 
courts first to look only to a statute's literal language to 
determine legislative intent" [emphasis added]). 
Thus, the mere absence of a prohibition on probation does 
not overcome our default presumption that when the Legislature 
directs that offenders "shall be punished by imprisonment," it 
means exactly what it says.  See Williamson, 462 Mass. at 679.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 775-776 (2000) 
(interpreting statute to impose twenty-year mandatory minimum 
sentence as plainly required by its language, notwithstanding 
absence in statute of language customarily used to impose 
mandatory minimum sentences).  Whereas Montarvo and Zapata 
support the proposition that such facially clear language may be 
rendered ambiguous on careful examination of a statute's text, 
purpose, and history, see Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 537-542; 
Zapata, 455 Mass. at 531-535, they do not support the 
9 
 
proposition that such facially clear language presumptively is 
ambiguous.  This presumption, announced by the court today, is 
patently backward.  See Newberry, 483 Mass. at 192; Williamson, 
supra.  By ignoring the plain language of these sentencing 
statutes in a systematic way, the court encroaches upon the 
Legislature's authority "to establish criminal sanctions," 
raising "a serious question concerning the separation of 
powers."  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 922 (1976).  
See Ex parte Millbrook, 304 So. 3d 202, 205 (Ala. 2020) 
("Adhering to the plain meaning of a statute ensures that this 
Court complies with its constitutional mandate . . . [to] say[] 
what the law is without overstepping its role and legislating 
from the bench"); Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 497 P.3d 618, 620 (Nev. 
2021), quoting ASAP Storage, Inc. v. Sparks, 123 Nev. 639, 653 
(2007) ("Statutes should be given their plain meaning whenever 
possible; otherwise . . . the constitutional separation-of-
powers doctrine is implicated"). 
I share the concern voiced by Justice Wendlandt, post 
at    ,    ,    , and echoed by the court, ante at notes 15, 25, 
that mandatory minimum sentences risk unduly harsh penalties for 
any individual and contribute to the unjustly disproportionate 
rate of incarceration for Black and brown folks.  But this 
concern no more enables this court to presume ambiguity where 
sentencing language is clear than it enables us to wholly ignore 
10 
 
clear sentencing language.  We are bound to interpret statutes 
to faithfully effectuate legislative intent, see Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 483 Mass. 123, 127 (2019), even where we consider the 
Legislature's policy choice unwise or unjust, see Commonwealth 
v. Laltaprasad, 475 Mass. 692, 701-703 (2016). 
Because the court's newly announced blanket presumption 
regarding the availability of probation results from an apparent 
misapplication of our case law and additionally may violate art. 
30, I can endorse neither the presumption nor the application of 
it to § 178H (a) (2).6  Accordingly, I concur in the court's 
answers to the reported questions, ante at    , in its decision 
to overrule Hines, ante at    , and in its disposal of the 
defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of § 178H (a) 
(2), ante at    .  I cannot, however, join the rest of the 
opinion.
 
6 As noted supra, I would not reach the issue.  Were the 
question of the availability of probation under § 178H (a) (2) 
before us, it is quite possible that the mention of "release 
from probation" in the statute as enacted would render the 
legislative intent with respect to the availability of probation 
ambiguous, leading to the application of the rule of lenity.  
See Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 542; Zapata, 455 Mass. at 535.  But a 
close analysis of the statute would be required to be sure. 
WENDLANDT, J. (dissenting).  At a time when we are 
beginning to understand that statutes imposing mandatory minimum 
sentences are resulting in the disproportionate incarceration of 
Black and brown defendants in our Commonwealth, we ought not to 
further strip judges of discretion in sentencing.  There can be 
no doubt that the court's decision to overrule Commonwealth v. 
Hines, 449 Mass. 183 (2007), does just that.  While making 
"plain the meaning of certain language" in our own sentencing 
jurisprudence is an auspicious and laudable goal, ante at    , 
on balance I believe it should yield to the principle of stare 
decisis, especially where (as here) fidelity to that principle 
is consistent with both legislative inaction in the face of our 
prior construction of sentencing statutes and our commitment to 
racial justice.1  Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
1 See Statements by Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice 
Ralph D. Gants and Trial Court Chief Justice Paula M. Carey in 
Response to the Release of Harvard Law School's Report on Racial 
Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal Justice System 
(Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/news/statements-by-
supreme-judicial-court-chief-justice-ralph-d-gants-and-trial-
court-chief-justice [https://perma.cc/JX2W-6PJY] (describing 
"Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System" 
report, see note 9, infra, as a "'must read' for anyone who is 
committed to understanding the reasons for [racial] disparities 
and taking action to end them"); Gants & Carey, Creating Courts 
Where All Are Truly Equal, 65 Boston Bar J. 4, 4 (Winter 2021) 
(reiterating call to "recommit ourselves to the systemic change 
needed to make equality under the law an enduring reality for 
all" in wake of killing of George Floyd and subsequent social 
unrest). 
2 
 
To be sure, interpreting the phrase "for not less than" a 
specified number of years in an offense-specific statute to be 
the minimum term under the indeterminate sentencing statute, 
G. L. c. 279, § 24,2 has an undeniable mathematical elegance.3  
And, if we were writing on a tabula rasa, the court's analysis 
presents perfectly persuasive, plain statutory construction.  
The court's attempt to carve a framework to instruct the 
Legislature as to how to implement mandatory minimum sentences 
in an area that has not been the beacon of clarity perhaps is 
admirable.  Ante at    .  Still, I would not depart from our 
previous case-by-case approach from which certain standards 
 
2 The indeterminate sentence statute dates back to 1895.  
See Commonwealth v. Marrone, 387 Mass. 702, 706 & n.7 (1982) 
(setting forth history of statute).  In its present form, it 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
"If a convict is sentenced to the [S]tate prison, except as 
[a] habitual criminal, the court shall not fix the term of 
imprisonment, but shall fix a maximum and a minimum term 
for which he [or she] may be imprisoned.  The maximum term 
shall not be longer than the longest term fixed by law for 
the punishment of the crime of which he [or she] has be[en] 
convicted, and the minimum term shall be a term set by the 
court, except that, where an alternative sentence to a 
house of correction is permitted for the offense, a minimum 
[S]tate prison term may not be less than one year." 
 
G. L. c. 279, § 24. 
 
3 As the court acknowledges, even the "minimum term" set by 
a sentencing judge may not be the minimum term actually served 
by the defendant in light of other sentencing reduction schemes, 
such as good time credits, when available.  Ante at    . 
3 
 
emerge.4  This has been the "settled" law to which stare decisis 
counsels fealty. 
"Stare decisis -- in English, the idea that today's [c]ourt 
should stand by yesterday's decisions -- is 'a foundation stone 
of the rule of law.'"  Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 
U.S. 446, 455 (2015), quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community, 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014).  It "promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
 
4 These standards include the following.  First, the 
Legislature can require a judge to sentence a defendant to a 
mandatory minimum term by using the words "mandatory" and 
"minimum" in the offense-specific statute.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lightfoot, 391 Mass. 718, 721 (1984); Marrone, 387 Mass. at 704.  
See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 772, 775-776 (2000).  
Second, the Legislature can set forth a mandatory minimum term 
by stating that (i) the sentence imposed "shall not be reduced 
to less than" a specified number of years "nor suspended"; 
(ii) once convicted, a defendant shall not "be eligible for 
probation, parole, or furlough or receive any deduction from his 
sentence for good conduct or otherwise until he shall have 
served" that same number of years; and (iii) the prosecution 
shall not "be continued without a finding nor placed on file."  
Lightfoot, supra at 719 n.1, 721, quoting G. L. c. 272, § 7.  
Third, where a statute sets forth both a minimum sentence and a 
maximum sentence and specifies that the minimum sentence is "not 
less than" a specified number of years, the sentence cannot be 
for "less than" that specified number of years.  See Brown, 
supra at 776-777.  Fourth, as set forth infra, we have told the 
Legislature that the phrase "for not less than" a specified 
number of years, without also specifying a maximum term or 
including the words "shall not be reduced," is ambiguous and 
will not strip the judge of discretion to sentence the defendant 
for less than the specified number of years.  See Hines, 449 
Mass. at 191 n.4.  See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 484 Mass. 
1024, 1026 n.8 (2020). 
4 
 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process" (citation omitted).  Knick v. Scott, 139 S. 
Ct. 2162, 2189 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  To respect it 
"means sticking to some wrong decisions," on the justification 
that "it is usually 'more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right.'"  Kimble, supra, 
quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Stare decisis "carries enhanced force" in connection with 
our construction of a statute, where a decision "effectively 
become[s] part of the statutory scheme."  Kimble, 576 U.S. at 
456.  The Legislature is, of course, free to amend a statute 
where it concludes that our construction of its intent is wrong.  
Instead of taking it upon ourselves to revisit our prior 
jurisprudence on the basis that we now think the prior court's 
reasoning is no longer persuasive, we should recognize that when 
it comes to matters of statutory construction "critics of our 
ruling can take their objections across the street, and [the 
Legislature] can correct any mistake it sees."  Id.  Here, we 
are faced squarely with a situation in which the Legislature can 
alter our prior holding and has not done so. 
This last point ought to guide our decision in this case 
because, nearly fifteen years ago in Hines, we specifically 
addressed an offense-specific statute with precisely the same 
5 
 
language as the one at issue in the present case; it provided 
that the defendant shall be sentenced "for not less than" a 
specified number of years in State prison and did not provide in 
addition a maximum sentence.  See Hines, 449 Mass. at 191-192.  
We concluded that such language is ambiguous in light of the 
indeterminate sentencing statute, which requires a sentencing 
judge to set both a maximum term and minimum term in State 
prison.  See note 2, supra.  Accordingly, we held that, absent a 
statutory maximum term, the language "for not less than" a 
specified number of years did not preclude a judge from 
sentencing a defendant to a number of years in State prison that 
was less than the number set forth in such an offense-specific 
statute.5  Hines, supra. 
In so doing, we specifically distinguished the offense-
specific statute that used the phrase "for not less than" a 
specified number of years but not did not specify a maximum term 
 
5 Instead, we construed the language -- "for not less than" 
a specific number of years "in the [S]tate prison" -- to mean 
that the offense was a felony.  Hines, 449 Mass. at 191, citing 
Lightfoot, 391 Mass. at 721 (rejecting contention that offense-
specific statute stating that offender "shall . . . be punished 
[in the State prison] for not less than five years" required 
minimum term of five years and concluding instead that "[b]y 
imposing a State prison sentence, the Legislature provided that 
a violation of [the statute] would constitute a felony").  See 
Lightfoot, supra at 721-722, quoting Commonwealth v. Hayes, 372 
Mass. 505, 511 (1977) ("The reference to State prison 'may well 
indicate the Legislature's use of the statutory shorthand for a 
felony . . .'"). 
6 
 
from the statute at issue in Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 Mass. 
772, 776-777 (2000), that set forth both a minimum term and a 
maximum term.  In other words, we rejected the very argument 
adopted by the court that "the presence or absence of a maximum 
term is irrelevant" to how we construe minimum term language.  
Ante at    .  See Hines, 449 Mass. at 191 n.4 (rejecting 
argument that statute that provided "for not less than" 
specified number of years is "essentially the same" as statute 
at issue in Brown, 431 Mass. at 776-777, which provided both 
maximum and minimum term using phrase "for not less than").  We 
expressly stated that the absence of a maximum term was 
dispositive.  See id. (distinguishing statute in Brown, setting 
forth "two terms, both a maximum and a minimum term," from 
statute setting forth only that offender shall be punished "for 
not less than five years").  We also concluded that the absence 
of the phrase "shall not be reduced to less than" the specified 
number of years in the offense-specific statute bolstered our 
conclusion that "for not less than" the specified number of 
years did not strip the judge of sentencing discretion.6  See id.  
 
6 Specifically, we distinguished an offense-specific statute 
that prescribed a sentence in State prison "for not less than" 
five years from one that provided that the offender "shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for [twenty] years.  
Said sentence shall not be reduced to less than ten years 
. . . ."  Hines, 449 Mass. at 191 n.4.  The absence of "shall 
not be reduced," we held in Hines, permitted a judge to sentence 
 
7 
 
Indeed, just two years ago, citing to Hines, 449 Mass. at 191-
192, we confirmed unanimously that "for not less than five 
years" permits "[a] judge, for instance, [to] sentence a 
defendant to not less than two years and not more than five 
years."  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 484 Mass. 1024, 1026 n.8 
(2020). 
Today, the court overrules Hines, adopting the very same 
arguments we rejected in that precedential case.7  See ante 
 
a defendant to less than five years despite the language "for 
not less than" five years.  Id. 
 
7 By contrast, we have justified overruling prior decisions 
when we have been presented with new arguments, not previously 
considered.  Thus, in Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734 (2014), 
we addressed a statute imposing strict liability on the owner of 
a building for injuries caused by "any" building code 
violations.  Id. at 738-739.  We had previously concluded that 
the statute reached only code violations concerning fire safety.  
Id. at 739, citing McAllister v. Boston Hous. Auth., 429 Mass. 
300, 304 n.5 (1999).  In the precedential case, however, we 
mistakenly relied on our construction of a prior version of the 
statute expressly limiting the owners' liability to fire code 
violations.  Sheehan, supra at 739-740 (noting McAllister 
decision's reliance on pre-amendment case law).  It was 
significant in our estimation that, in the precedential case, 
the court did not address the effect of the amendment and the 
parties did not bring the amendment to the court's attention.  
Id. at 740 n.8 & 741.  See Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 
617 (1980) (noting prior case law being overturned "nowhere 
elucidated or sought to balance" argument then being 
considered).  In overruling the prior case, we did not, as the 
court does here, adopt an argument we had previously considered 
and rejected.  Instead, we reached that precedential decision 
"without the benefit of the vigorous advocacy on which the 
adversary process relies."  Sheehan, supra at 740 n.8, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 284 (2004).  As one of the 
cases relied on by the court now, and authored by a unanimous 
 
8 
 
at    .  Reversing course, the court now holds that the phrase 
"for not less than" a specified number of years (even without a 
maximum term and without the additional language "shall not be 
reduced to less than," each of which we found so critical in 
Hines) sets the minimum term to which a judge, seeking to 
incarcerate a defendant, must sentence a defendant under the 
indeterminate sentencing statute.8 
Of course, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide," Kimble, 
576 U.S. at 465; however, where "the Legislature is presumed to 
be aware of judicial decisions that have consistently 
interpreted these statutes in the traditional fashion," Brown, 
431 Mass. at 777, and yet has not changed the statute to reflect 
an intent contrary to our construction, I would not be so quick 
to alter course, upsetting recent, unanimous decisions.  See, 
e.g., Thomas, 484 Mass. at 1026 n.8; Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
482 Mass. 366, 370 n.3. (2019). 
 
court just a few years ago, acknowledges, "[o]verruling 
precedent requires something above and beyond mere disagreement 
with its analysis."  Shiel v. Rowell, 480 Mass. 106, 109 (2018). 
 
8 Hines specifically distinguished Brown on the basis that 
the statute at issue in Brown contained both a maximum and 
minimum sentence, consistent with the indeterminate sentence 
statute.  Hines, 449 Mass. at 191 n.4.  In the court's current 
estimation, that basis is no longer "compelling," see ante 
at    ; yet, mere disagreement with yesterday's court's 
reasoning does not provide a basis for overruling it today, 
especially where, as here, the Legislature has not seen fit to 
do so. 
9 
 
Given the absence of legislative action in response to our 
case law, discussed supra, it is hardly a violation of art. 30 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to refuse to abandon 
our jurisprudence in favor of stare decisis.  See ante at note 
25,    .  To the contrary, the absence of legislative action 
addressing our fifteen year old decision in Hines suggests the 
Legislature has continued to use the phrase "for not less than" 
a specified number of years (without additionally specifying a 
maximum term) to indicate precisely what we held it to mean in 
Hines -- neither a "minimum term" nor a "mandatory minimum 
term."9  See Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456 (noting importance of stare 
decisis in connection with interpretation of statutes, where a 
decision "effectively become[s] part of the statutory scheme"). 
 
9 I disagree with the court's conclusion that reliance 
interests are "relatively low" because this case does not 
involve property or contract interests, ante at    ; in my view, 
a criminal defendant's liberty interests are as worthy of 
consideration, if not more.  Any assessment of the extent to 
which "parties have ordered their affairs" in reliance on our 
case law needs, at the least, to consider any and all instances 
where a prosecutor, defense counsel, or trial judge (each bound 
by our holding in Hines) has made critical charging decisions, 
negotiated plea deals, and sentenced defendants.  Given that 
only two percent of criminal cases go to trial, and we see only 
a very small fraction of those cases on appeal, the court's 
dismissal of reliance interests as "low" is unsupported.  See E. 
Tsai Bishop, B. Hopkins, C. Obiofuma, & F. Owusu, Criminal 
Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law School, Racial Disparities 
in the Massachusetts Criminal System 61 (Sept. 2020) (Bishop et 
al.), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2020/11 
/Massachusetts-Racial-Disparity-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/W5KA-MX3R]. 
10 
 
Indeed, the Legislature revisited the very same offense-
specific statute at issue in Hines in 2014 (seven years after 
our holding), and left unchanged the relevant "for not less 
than" language.  See 2014 House Doc. No. 4376.10  Just last year, 
we observed that such legislative inaction "is a strong 
indication that the Legislature approved of the court's 
statutory construction of [this] provision[]."  Commonwealth v. 
Bohigian, 486 Mass. 209, 216 (2020).  In doing so, we echoed the 
same observation made in 2007, the year Hines was decided.  See 
Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812 (2007) (because we 
presume Legislature is aware of our prior decisions, 
"reenact[ment of] statutory language without material change" 
implies adoption of prior construction). 
Significantly, the decision to overrule our 2007 decision 
in Hines, which we affirmed in 2019 in Rodriguez, and to 
overrule our 2020 decision in Thomas, see ante at    , comes at 
a time when the available data show that stripping judges of 
discretion in sentencing has resulted in Black and brown 
defendants being disproportionately represented in the 
 
10 The court's dismissal of this legislative inaction rests 
on its rejection today of the distinction we drew in Hines 
between a statute that uses the words "for not less than" and 
the statute in Brown that set both a minimum and maximum term.  
See ante at note 32. 
11 
 
Commonwealth's population of incarcerated people.11  Just last 
term, the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School 
issued a report, concluding that mandatory minimum sentences are 
a dominate cause of the stark discrepancies between outcomes for 
white defendants and those for Black and brown defendants.12 
The court correctly notes that, "[w]here the reasons for 
departing from precedent outweigh the factors that favor 
adherence to it, we can and should acknowledge our past mistakes 
and cease perpetuating them."  Ante at    , citing Franklin v. 
 
11 The Massachusetts Sentencing Commission reported that, in 
2014, Massachusetts imprisoned Black and Latinx people at rates 
that substantially outpaced national averages.  Massachusetts 
Sentencing Commission, Selected Race Statistics 2 (Sept. 27, 
2016) (finding that in Massachusetts, Black people were 
incarcerated at nearly eight times the rate of whites, and 
Hispanic people were incarcerated at nearly five times the rate 
of whites, compared to national rates of 5.8 times the rate of 
whites and 1.3 times the rate of whites, respectively).  See 
Bishop et al., supra at 4, citing A. Nellis, The Sentencing 
Project, The Color of Justice:  Racial and Ethnic Disparity in 
State Prisons 17 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/10/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-
Disparity-in-State-Prisons-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QT3-RVJ8] 
("A 2016 report from The Sentencing Project comparing racial and 
ethnic disparities in incarceration rates across all 50 states 
ranked Massachusetts the highest in disparities for Latinx 
people and the 13th highest for Black people"). 
 
12 See Bishop et al., supra at 59 ("[C]ases involving 
offenses that carry mandatory and statutory minimum sentences 
contribute to the disparities we see in incarceration length for 
people of color.  Defendants of color are more likely to face 
charges that carry mandatory incarceration time, and these more 
serious and high-risk sentencing possibilities translate into 
plea deals that are more likely to involve incarceration and 
longer sentences"). 
12 
 
Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 617 (1980).  See Franklin, supra at 617-
619 (overruling prior case law regarding accrual for purposes of 
statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice 
actions).  In doing so in Franklin, however, we were guided by 
the "manifest injustice" of continuing to abide by the prior 
decision.  Id. at 618 (revisiting prior rule on ground that it 
was manifestly unjust to permit statute of limitations to run 
before "blameless" patient reasonably could know of injury).  We 
stated, "This court is not barred from departing from [the 
prior] rule if persuaded that the values in so doing outweigh 
the values underlying stare decisis."  Id. at 617.  Here, unlike 
in Franklin, the value of racial justice to which we all should 
be committed and the value of stare decisis coincide.  We need 
not abandon the latter to achieve the former.13 
The court's decision to overrule Hines further strips 
judges of sentencing discretion, requiring judges to choose 
between probation and a State prison term "for not less than" 
the prescribed number of years, "offering a sentencing judge in 
some cases a Hobson's choice between probation and a mandatory 
 
13 To the extent the Legislature values imposition of 
minimum terms or mandatory minimum terms for specific offenses 
despite the resulting disparities, we have told it how to do so, 
see note 4, supra; Hines precludes neither such legislative 
action nor the Legislature's considered judgment of the 
available data on the effect of such sentences on racial 
justice. 
13 
 
term of [a prescribed number of] years in prison."  Commonwealth 
v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 542 (2020).14  The panoply of choices 
previously available under our sentencing jurisprudence is now 
much more constrained. 
In light of the foundational significance of stare decisis 
in connection with our decisional law construing statutes, as 
well as the Legislature's inaction to correct any perceived 
misconstruction of its intent, and because we ought not be blind 
to the impact of today's "clarifications" on Black and brown 
defendants, I dissent. 
 
14 This case provides an example of the further restrictions 
the court's holding places on judges' discretion.  The trial 
judge here concluded that the appropriate sentence for this 
defendant was from one to two years; now, he cannot impose this 
sentence.  The statute in Hines, G. L. c. 265, § 18B, now 
suddenly imposes a mandatory minimum term for second or 
subsequent offenders.  For a nonexhaustive list of other 
statutes that will now strip judges of sentencing discretion, 
see ante at note 33.