Title: Commonwealth v. Oberle
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12149
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2017

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SJC-12149 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM OBERLE. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     December 8, 2016. - February 28, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Kidnapping.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, 
Criminal, Jury and jurors, Challenge to jurors.  Evidence, 
Prior misconduct. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 17, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The defendant, William Oberle, appeals from 
three assault and battery convictions, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a), 
and a kidnapping conviction, G. L. c. 265, § 26, arising out of 
an incident of domestic violence.  The defendant argues that the 
2 
 
 
 
trial judge erred in denying his peremptory challenge of a 
female juror and in admitting prior bad act evidence.  We reject 
both arguments and affirm the judgments of conviction of assault 
and battery.  The defendant also argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping conviction.  We 
are unpersuaded, and affirm that conviction. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  Because the defendant 
challenges, in part, the sufficiency of the trial evidence, we 
summarize it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 611, 676-677 (1979).  The 
defendant and the victim began a romantic relationship in the 
summer of 2013.  The defendant made the victim feel 
uncomfortable and insecure, and prevented her from looking at or 
speaking with others in public.  In February, 2014, the victim 
went to a hospital emergency room with bruising to her ears, 
face, neck, and arm after the defendant had beaten and strangled 
her.  As he wrapped his hands around her neck during that 
incident, the defendant told the victim he was going to kill 
her. 
 
The couple soon reconciled and moved together to the home 
of the defendant's daughter in Dedham.  They occupied a bedroom 
in the basement of the house, which had a private back door and 
3 
 
 
 
a shared exit through the first-floor kitchen.1  Although their 
relationship briefly stabilized following the move, the 
defendant's physical abuse of the victim resumed, and the 
defendant struck the victim's face on multiple occasions.  The 
victim struggled with alcohol and was intoxicated daily during 
this period. 
 
On July 4, 2014, the defendant and victim argued because 
the defendant refused to return the victim's bank card, an act 
she took as a sign that he was again using drugs.  Following the 
argument, the defendant left; the victim stayed home, drank 
several beers, and went to bed.  When the defendant returned to 
the house after midnight, the argument escalated.  The defendant 
punched the victim's face, chest, and legs.  He held her down 
and choked her, saying he would kill her.  The victim was unable 
to call for help because the defendant had taken her cellular 
telephone the day before. 
 
The victim lost consciousness for an unspecified period of 
time.  When she woke up, the defendant was still on top of her, 
shouting, with his hands around her neck.  The victim was unsure 
how she got away or how much time had passed, but recalled that 
there was daylight when she ran out the back door of the 
basement.  Barefoot, bleeding, and wearing only her pajamas, she 
                     
1 The defendant's daughter and grandson lived on the first 
floor.  A roommate also lived upstairs. 
4 
 
 
 
ran across the street and hid in the garage of a rental car 
business.  The defendant initially remained in the basement 
bedroom, but the victim saw him walk down the driveway as she 
waited for the business to open so that she could telephone the 
police. 
 
Matthew Kronk arrived to open the rental car business at 
approximately 7:30 A.M.  The victim approached Kronk to ask for 
help, and he telephoned 911.  Paramedics and Dedham police 
officers responded to the scene and brought the victim to the 
hospital, where her injuries were photographed.  They included 
bruising to the arm and left eye, bleeding in the nose and ear, 
and neck abrasions.  The victim's treating physician opined that 
these injuries were consistent with multiple blows to the face 
and body, and with strangulation. 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of attempted murder, kidnapping, witness intimidation, 
and four counts of assault and battery.  At the close of the 
Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required finding 
of not guilty on the charges.  The judge allowed the motion in 
relation to the charge of witness intimidation but denied it for 
the remaining charged crimes.  The defendant renewed his motion 
at the close of the defense case, and it was again denied. 
The jury acquitted the defendant of attempted murder and 
one of the assault and battery charges, and convicted him of 
5 
 
 
 
kidnapping and three counts of assault and battery.2  The 
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we allowed his 
application for direct appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Peremptory challenges.  We begin by 
summarizing what happened at trial during jury selection.  After 
directing a series of questions to the jury venire as a group 
and noting their answers, the trial judge conducted an 
individual voir dire of every prospective juror called.  Both 
counsel and the defendant were present at sidebar for the 
judge's individual juror questioning, and the judge required 
counsel to raise any peremptory challenge to a prospective juror 
immediately after the judge completed his questioning. 
The judge excused for cause the first prospective juror 
called (juror no. 1), a woman, because her close friend's recent 
experience with domestic violence was likely to influence her 
thinking.  Juror no. 2, a man, was seated.  The defendant 
exercised a peremptory challenge to juror no. 3, a woman who was 
a college sophomore.  Juror no. 4, a woman with at least twenty-
three years' professional experience, was seated without 
challenge.  The judge excused jurors nos. 5 and 6, both of whom 
                     
 
2 The judge sentenced the defendant to from three and one-
half to five years in State prison on the kidnapping conviction, 
and to ten years' probation on each of the assault and battery 
convictions; the probationary sentences were concurrent with 
each other, from and after the defendant's prison sentence on 
the kidnapping conviction. 
6 
 
 
 
were women whose family or friends had been victims of domestic 
violence.  The defendant exercised his second peremptory 
challenge to juror no. 7; she was a college student studying 
criminal justice who had "lost faith" in "the system." 
The defendant exercised his third peremptory challenge to 
juror no. 8, the seventh woman out of the first eight 
prospective jurors called.  The judge allowed the challenge.  
Before doing so, the following exchange between the judge and 
the defendant's counsel took place: 
The judge:  "Counsel, I think there's a pattern of excusing 
female jurors.  This is the second one or the third; one of 
them I think I understand.  The juror we had a few moments 
ago spoke about knowing people in prison and the like.  But 
I think there's a clear pattern here of excusing younger 
female jurors.  [Juror no. 8], like the others you excused, 
they were all in their twenties, perhaps early thirties at 
the oldest.  And I'm going to make that finding and require 
you give me a reason." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Okay.  I'd suggest that I have had no 
choice but to excuse female jurors because that's all we've 
had up here except we had one man up here so far.  We have 
excused one because we had clear questions about her 
ability to be unbiased; she said so right in the report.  
The other two my client did not feel comfortable with.  We 
have a lot of female -- " 
 
The judge:  "'Not feeling comfortable' is not going to do 
it." 
 
Defense counsel:  "Peremptories.  It's a peremptory 
challenge.  If it was an even number of men and women that 
we have been interviewing, but we've only interviewed, what 
-- so we're interviewing -- we've allowed one on.  So I'd 
suggest that we've been completely unbiased in the way that 
we've chosen.  We had no alternative other than to excuse 
women because that's all we've been faced with is women, so 
-- " 
7 
 
 
 
 
The judge:  "There's no requirement to excuse good jurors, 
whatever their gender. . . .  I think there's a marked 
pattern, [defense counsel].  I'm going to give you -- 
really lean over backwards and give you the benefit of the 
doubt with this juror.  But that will be the last one, 
because what you have given me by way of explanation is 
wholly inadequate.  I don't doubt that you're being 
truthful; I have no reason to doubt that.  But the 
substance of what you've explained is that there is no 
substance to it, none whatsoever." 
 
The next seven prospective jurors called were five men and 
two women.  Of this group, two men and one woman -– a person 
with fourteen years' experience as an elementary school teacher 
-- were seated without challenge.  The judge excused one man due 
to a scheduling conflict, and the Commonwealth exercised 
peremptory challenges with respect to two other men.  The 
defendant sought to exercise a peremptory challenge to the next 
prospective juror called, juror no. 15, a thirty-eight year old 
woman with fifteen years' experience as a teacher and then a 
teacher recruiter for a company offering early childhood 
education and care.  When the judge asked the juror about her 
exposure to domestic violence, she stated that she had filed 
three reports of child abuse during her time as a teacher.  This 
exchange followed: 
Defense counsel:  "We will exercise a peremptory challenge 
based on her answers to your questions, based on what she 
has done for [fifteen] years, based on the fact she saw 
51As on three occasions, giving her intimate knowledge of 
that whole aspect of the world of a cycle -- " 
 
8 
 
 
 
The judge:  "There's no 51A issue here."3 
 
Defense counsel:  "No, but that is a field that deals with 
abuse, deals with aggression, deals with violence within 
families, within relationships, and that is something she 
has intimated now she has a very good knowledge of.  It's a 
knowledge well enough that she has filed 51As on three 
occasions.  And that's the basis of our -- and note that 
she's a [thirty-eight year] old lady, so she's older than 
just a young girl.  And I think our challenge is merited." 
 
The judge:  "I'm going to deny the exercise of that 
peremptory challenge.  There is a pattern here.  I think 
that the defendant and counsel are seizing upon the 
background of this particular juror, and I am not persuaded 
that this is anything other than a pretext, respectfully; 
and I think it's an effort to keep females off the jury.  
It's a distinct pattern.  And I have examined the juror 
with care, perceive absolutely no basis or substance for 
this challenge.  So I'm going to disallow it." 
 
Juror no. 15 was seated over the defendant's objection and 
participated in the jury's deliberations. 
There were ten men and five women remaining in the venire.  
Of this group, the judge excused a man who knew one of the 
witnesses, a man who believed people accused of domestic 
violence were guilty, and a man who admitted to bias in favor of 
police.  The judge also excused a woman who was the director of 
a residential program for women with addictions, explaining, 
"[T]here may be some evidence to the effect that the alleged 
victim, who is a female, had or may have had some sort of 
drinking, alcohol issue."  The defendant exercised his three 
                     
 
3 General Laws c. 119, § 51A, requires mandated reporters, 
including teachers like juror no. 15, to report suspected child 
abuse or neglect to the Department of Children and Families. 
9 
 
 
 
remaining peremptory challenges to two men and one woman in this 
group.  The judge allowed the defendant's challenge of the woman 
(as well as the men), noting that women had been seated since 
the blocked challenge to juror no. 15. 
From a jury venire composed of sixteen men and fourteen 
women, eight men and six women were seated; seven male and five 
female jurors ultimately deliberated. 
The defendant argues that the trial judge's denial of his 
peremptory challenge to juror no. 15 constituted error, and 
because the error was structural, it entitles him to reversal of 
his convictions.  Further, he argues that given the absence of 
detailed findings, the judge's ruling warrants no deference on 
review.  The Commonwealth contends that the judge acted within 
his considerable discretion in denying the defendant's challenge 
and also made sufficient findings in support of that denial.  
The record shows that the defendant's arguments are not without 
some basis, but we conclude that the defendant's claim for 
reversal must fail. 
 
"Peremptory challenges cannot be used 'to exclude members 
of discrete groups solely on the basis of bias presumed to 
derive from that individual's membership in the group.'"  
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 804, 807 (2000), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 881 (1979).  A peremptory challenge may not be based on a 
10 
 
 
 
prospective juror's gender, because gender is a discrete 
grouping defined in art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, as amended by art. 106 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution.  Soares, supra at 486 & n.29.  See 
Rodriguez, supra.  However, age is not a discrete grouping 
defined in the Constitution, and therefore a peremptory 
challenge may permissibly be based on age.  Commonwealth v. 
Samuel, 398 Mass. 93, 95 (1986).  Peremptory challenges are 
presumed to be proper, but that presumption may be rebutted on a 
showing that (1) there is a pattern of excluding members of a 
discrete grouping and (2) it is likely that individuals are 
being excluded solely on the basis of their membership in that 
group.  Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 8-9 (2013), and cases 
cited.  Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463 (2003), 
and cases cited.  The burden of making a prima facie showing of 
a discriminatory pattern "ought not be a terribly weighty one."  
Maldonado, supra at 463 n.4. 
 
Once such a pattern is found, the burden shifts to the 
party exercising the challenge to provide a "group-neutral" 
explanation for it.  Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 463.  The judge 
must then determine whether the explanation is both "adequate" 
and "genuine": 
 
"An explanation is adequate if it is 'clear and 
reasonably specific,' 'personal to the juror and not 
based on the juror's group affiliation,' . . . and 
11 
 
 
 
related to the particular case being tried. . . .  An 
explanation is genuine if it is in fact the reason for 
the exercise of the challenge. . . .  An explanation 
that is perfectly reasonable in the abstract must be 
rejected if the judge does not believe that it 
reflects the challenging party's thinking."  
(Citations omitted; emphases in original.) 
 
Id. at 464-465. 
 
An erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge is a 
structural error, requiring reversal without a showing of 
prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 164-165 
(2010), and cases cited.  A trial judge has considerable 
discretion in ruling on whether a permissible ground for the 
peremptory challenge has been shown, and we will not disturb 
that ruling so long as it is supported by the record.  
Rodriguez, 431 Mass. at 811. 
 
Here, it is true that when the judge first found a 
discriminatory pattern at the point the defendant challenged 
juror no. 8, seven of the eight prospective jurors who had been 
called had been women, and the pattern he identified was based 
on only two prior strikes of "young women."  The judge's 
articulated reason for finding a pattern is troubling in that, 
as we previously noted, "[t]here is no constitutional basis for 
challenging the exclusion of young persons."  Samuel, 398 Mass. 
at 95.  Compare Commonwealth v. Jordan, 439 Mass. 47, 62 (2003) 
(challenges based on combination of race and gender violate art. 
12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).  But even assuming 
12 
 
 
 
for argument that there was no basis for finding an 
impermissible pattern at the time the judge declared one, the 
judge did not reject the defendant's peremptory challenge to 
juror no. 8.  Rather, the judge allowed the challenge, and the 
juror was excused.  By the time the defendant exercised another 
peremptory challenge -- to juror no. 15, a thirty-eight year old 
woman -- all three of the defendant's previous peremptory 
challenges had been to women, and juror no. 15 would have been 
the fourth out of four.  And, significantly, the judge's 
statements concerning the defendant's proffered challenge to 
juror no. 15, quoted supra, indicate with reasonable clarity 
that the pattern the judge found to exist was a pattern of 
challenging women (his reference was to "females") as a group, 
not a pattern based solely on young women -- i.e., age.  Compare 
Samuel, supra.  Even though the venire contained a substantial 
number of women and two women had previously been seated as 
jurors, we are not persuaded that the judge abused his broad 
discretion in finding an impermissible pattern at the point he 
rejected the defendant's peremptory challenge to juror no. 15.  
See Rodriguez, 431 Mass. at 811 (that women were 
disproportionately represented in venire, had been seated on 
jury, and remained in venire did not preclude judge from finding 
that defendant lacked gender-neutral reason for peremptory 
challenge). 
13 
 
 
 
 
Irrespective of when a pattern is initially found to exist, 
once it occurs, the critical point of focus for the trial judge 
as well as the appellate court turns to the adequacy and 
genuineness of the explanation proffered by the party seeking to 
exercise the peremptory challenge.  See Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 
465.  Because a judge must find that both the adequacy and 
genuineness prongs of the explanation are satisfied in order to 
allow a peremptory challenge once a pattern has been identified, 
see id. at 464-465, the judge's determination that either one 
falls short is sufficient to support its denial.  See 
Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 323 (1999) (affirming 
judge's disallowance of peremptory challenge after judge found 
it disingenuous).  Here, unfortunately, the judge did not make 
specific findings concerning the adequacy of the defendant's 
proffered reason for challenging juror no. 15.  But even if we 
were to assume that the proffered explanation that juror no. 
15's experience as a mandated reporter of child abuse qualified 
as an individualized, group-neutral, and adequate explanation 
for the challenge, the judge was not thereby obligated to accept 
that explanation as genuine.  See Maldonado, supra at 465.  The 
judge pointed out that there was no child abuse at issue in this 
case, specifically found that the defendant's proffered 
explanation for the challenge was a pretext for keeping women 
off the jury, and denied the challenge for that reason.  See 
14 
 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78, 82-83 (1997) (affirming 
judge's disallowance of peremptory challenge of African-American 
juror whose spouse worked for State child welfare agency, where 
case did not concern child abuse).  Although the judge clearly 
should have addressed the adequacy of the defendant's proffered 
reasons for challenging juror no. 15, we conclude that the judge 
did not abuse his discretion in finding a lack of genuineness.4  
We thus affirm the judge's denial of the defendant's peremptory 
challenge to juror no. 15. 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence of kidnapping.  The 
defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support 
his conviction of kidnapping under G. L. c. 265, § 26.  
Specifically, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove 
any act of confinement or restraint beyond that inherent in the 
underlying assaults and batteries.  In reviewing this claim, we 
consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational 
                     
4 We emphasize again that it is important that a judge make 
the required separate and specific findings as to the adequacy 
and genuineness of an explanation for the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge once a pattern of improper exclusion has 
been made.  Because an erroneous denial of a peremptory 
challenge constitutes structural error, Commonwealth v. Hampton, 
457 Mass. 152, 164 (2010), it is critical that the record on 
appeal reflect the judge's reasoning in order to allow for 
appropriate appellate review.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 
Mass. 1, 11 n.14 (2013) (discussing importance of findings in 
reviewing judge's allowance of prosecutor's challenge to 
African-American juror). 
15 
 
 
 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-
677.  We conclude that the Commonwealth offered sufficient 
evidence of kidnapping independent of the assaults and 
batteries, and accordingly, we affirm the defendant's kidnapping 
conviction. 
 
To prove a person guilty of kidnapping, the Commonwealth 
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the person 
"without lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confine[d] or 
imprison[ed] another person within this commonwealth."5  G. L. 
c. 265, § 26.  "[T]he essential element of kidnapping is not the 
level of violence but rather the defendant's forcible or secret 
confinement or imprisonment of the victim against [her] will."  
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1999).  
"Confinement is 'broadly interpreted to mean any restraint of a 
person's movement.'"  Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 
190, 193 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Lent, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 
705, 710 (1999).  See Commonwealth v. Dykens, 438 Mass. 827, 841 
(2003).  It is not required that the Commonwealth prove a 
specific intent to confine, Commonwealth v. Ware, 375 Mass. 118, 
                     
 
5 In contrast, assault and battery requires that the 
defendant intentionally commit a "harmful [or] offensive 
touching[]" of the victim, without justification or excuse.  See 
Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 482 (1983) (discussing 
common-law crime of assault and battery, as codified at G. L. 
c. 265, § 13A). 
16 
 
 
 
119-120 (1978), but the act of confinement must be independent 
of the other crimes at issue, Boyd, supra at 195.  As the 
Appeals Court has explained: 
 
"The consistent rule of the decisions is that 
confinement, detention, or restraint exceeding the conduct 
necessary for commission of the other charged offenses 
constitutes independent, not incidental, conduct.  In the 
generic scenario of these cases, the perpetrator has 
deceived or forced the victim into confinement enabling the 
accomplishment of a grievous crime against the person of 
the victim.  In those circumstances, the confinement is 
facilitation, and not duplication, of the further offense. 
 
 
"The distinction is not a technicality.  It embodies 
the reality of the separate and specific injury inflicted 
upon the trapped victim as a captive:  the frustration and 
indignity of detention; the experience of vulnerability and 
helplessness; and the dread of an unknown ending." 
 
Id.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 253-254 (1986) 
(declining to consider "confinement or asportation used as a 
means to facilitate the commission of [the charged rape and 
robbery] as merged in the substantive crime"). 
 
This case presents no basis for a departure from these 
principles.  Indeed, the evidence of confinement amounts to just 
the "separate and specific injury" contemplated in Boyd.  Here, 
a rational juror could have found that the defendant told the 
victim he was going to kill her, held her down by the throat, 
and ignored her plea that he stop, and that she was unable to 
call for help and attempted to leave but could not.  The 
victim's testimony also reasonably permitted a finding that she 
had experienced difficulty breathing and ultimately lost 
17 
 
 
 
consciousness, and that when she regained consciousness, the 
defendant was still on her, shouting, with his hands around her 
neck.  Finally, a rational juror could have concluded that the 
victim attempted to leave the shared bedroom but for some time 
could not, and that this confinement was protracted:  although 
it was dark when the entire incident began, it was light by the 
time the victim escaped, barefoot, injured, and wearing only her 
pajamas. 
 
Particularly where "[a]ny restraint of a person's liberty" 
has long been adequate (citation omitted), Dykens, 438 Mass. at 
841, the evidence here of confinement independent of the other 
charged crimes was sufficient to support the defendant's 
conviction of kidnapping.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Mass. 
App. Ct. 237, 242 (2006) (evidence of confinement sufficient to 
support kidnapping component of aggravated rape charge where 
defendant poked victim with stick, threatened to kill her, and 
prevented her from leaving); Lent, 46 Mass. App. Ct. at 710 & 
n.5 (evidence sufficient to support kidnapping conviction where 
defendant showed victim a gun, pulled her by her jacket, and 
constrained her by holding onto her backpack while they walked 
toward his truck, even where victim was able to escape before 
being forced into vehicle). 
c.  Prior bad act evidence.  Before trial, the Commonwealth 
moved in limine to admit evidence, including photographs, of the 
18 
 
 
 
February, 2014, beating of the victim by the defendant.  Defense 
counsel argued that this was prior bad act evidence that would 
be unfairly prejudicial and inflame the jury.  The judge, 
however, allowed the evidence as illustrative of "the entire 
relationship between the two."  At trial, the Commonwealth 
introduced, over the defendant's objection, testimony from the 
victim and Worcester police officer Jose Ortiz about the 
February, 2014, incident, and three photographs of bruising on 
the victim's face, neck, and arm resulting from the incident.  
Each photograph was enlarged to poster size and displayed on 
easels facing the jury during the victim's testimony.  Seventeen 
photographs of the July, 2014, incident were also admitted, with 
ten similarly enlarged and displayed alongside the three 
photographs of the February incident. 
The judge gave a limiting instruction at the close of the 
victim's testimony, telling jurors they were permitted to 
consider evidence of the February, 2014, incident only "insofar 
as [they] find it bears on . . . the relationship between the 
witness and the defendant, the intent with respect to the events 
at issue in this case, the motive, the absence of a mistake, or 
the absence of accident."  He repeated this instruction in his 
final charge. 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in admitting 
evidence of the prior incident of alleged domestic violence 
19 
 
 
 
between him and the victim because the evidence was of the 
defendant's prior bad acts and the probative value of that 
evidence was outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.  We 
disagree.6 
 
Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show a 
defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the charged 
crime, but may be admissible if relevant for other purposes such 
as common scheme, pattern of operation, identity, intent, or 
motive.  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 16 (2014).  Even 
if such evidence is relevant for other purposes, however, its 
probative value must not be outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249-250 & n.27 
(2014).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016).  "Determinations of 
the relevance, probative value, and prejudice of such evidence 
are left to the sound discretion of the judge, whose decision to 
admit such evidence will be upheld absent clear error."  
Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158-159 (2007), and 
cases cited. 
 
It is well established that in appropriate cases, a 
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence may be admitted for 
the purpose of showing a "defendant's motive and intent and to 
depict the existence of a hostile relationship between the 
                     
 
6 The Commonwealth contends that the defendant failed to 
preserve an objection to this evidence.  The objection appears 
to have been properly preserved. 
20 
 
 
 
defendant and the victim."  Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 
534, 551 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 
777, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999).  See Commonwealth v. 
Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 574 & n.6 (2005).  Moreover, the 
defendant's argument against admission ignores the fact that he 
was separately indicted for attempted murder, a crime requiring 
the Commonwealth to prove specific intent.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jordan (No. 1), 397 Mass. 489, 491–492 (1986).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Ormonde, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 236-237 (2002).  
Given the crimes with which the defendant was charged and the 
relatively short period between the incidents, evidence of the 
February, 2014, beating was probative of the defendant's mental 
state and intent in relation to the victim at the time of the 
July, 2014, offenses, and in our view, not unfairly prejudicial.7  
See Jordan (No. 1), supra, and cases cited.  "The fact that the 
jury did not return verdicts of guilty on the [attempted murder 
indictment] is not determinative of the admissibility of the 
evidence."  Id. at 492 n.4. 
 
The defendant argues further that the photographs of the 
prior bad acts were especially inflammatory and unfairly 
prejudicial.  This argument fails, given that "[t]he 
                     
 
7 It is not a foundational requirement for the admissibility 
of prior bad act evidence that the Commonwealth show either that 
the evidence is necessary or that there is no alternative way to 
prove its case.  See Commonwealth v. Copney, 468 Mass. 405, 413 
(2014); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2016). 
21 
 
 
 
admissibility of photographic evidence rests almost entirely in 
the discretion of the judge . . . [and] [i]t is a 'rare 
instance[] in which the probative value of [such] evidence is 
[so] overwhelmed by its inflammatory potential' that a reversal 
would be warranted" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 270 (1982).  See Commonwealth v. Bell, 
473 Mass. 131, 142 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016) 
(photographs admissible if relevant to material issue, and "are 
not rendered inadmissible solely because they are gruesome [or 
duplicative] or may have an inflammatory effect on the jury" 
[citation omitted]).  Here, the photographs of the February, 
2014, incident were relevant to the defendant's intent as to the 
incident occurring five months later in July, and the judge did 
not abuse his discretion in finding that their probative value 
outweighed any unfair prejudice to the defendant.8  See Bell, 
supra at 144.  Moreover, the judge sought to guard against the 
photographs' potential prejudicial effect by carefully 
instructing the jury, when the photographs of and related 
testimony concerning the February, 2014, incident were 
introduced in evidence and again during the final charge, that 
                     
 
8 Although we conclude that the photographic evidence 
depicting the victim's injuries resulting from the defendant's 
February, 2014, beating was properly admitted, we question the 
appropriateness of permitting the prosecutor to display poster-
sized enlargements of the photographs, given the potential for 
prejudice inherent in prior bad act evidence.  See Commonwealth 
v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 n.27 (2014). 
22 
 
 
 
the evidence could be considered only on the issues of the 
relationship between the victim and defendant and the 
defendant's intent, motive, or absence of mistake or accident -- 
and not the defendant's propensity to commit the alleged crimes.  
The judge did not err in admitting the testimony or the 
photographs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.