Title: MOVIUS v MOVIUS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12083
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1972

NO. 12083 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 R U T H A. M O V I U S , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - ARTHUR J. MOVIUS, JR., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Scott, Scott and Baugh, Billings, Montana. J e f f r e y J o Scott argued, Billings, Montana. For Respondent : Michael J. Whalen argued, Billings, Montana. Submitted: February 16, 1972 Decided : flM 1 - 1 9 7 ~ ~ 1 I Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, s i t t i n g in place of M r . Justice Wesley Castles, delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal and cross-appeal arises out of two separate actions filed in the d i s t r i c t court of the thirteenth judicial d i s t r i c t , in and for the county of Yellowstone, both of which were consolidated in the lower court. The source of both actions i s a divorce decree entered between the parties on August 8, 1956. The decree incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement, the terms of which form the basis of t h i s appeal. Appellant here and plaintiff below i s the f i r s t wife of respondent who i s also a cross-appellant. The parties in t h i s opinion will be referred to respectively as plaintiff and defendant. The matters presently before the Court were instituted by plaintiff in the divorce action to enforce certain terms of the property settlement agreement alleged t o have been breached by defendant. Plaintiff a t the same time filed an original complaint in specific performance to compel compliance with the same agreement. The reason for t h i s duplication in the lower court i s not entirely clear. In any event, the issues in each case are identical, and will be so treated here. Plaintiff asserts six issues for review; defendant cross-appeals on the court's requirement that he pay any alimony a t a l l . All issues in vary- ing degrees go to the d i s t r i c t court's construction of the property settle- ment agreement. I t i s most convenient to discuss the issues in conjunction with the evidence. The important facts are not in dispute. A t the time of their divorce in 1956, the parties agreed in w r i t i n g on matters of property settlement, alimony and child support. The pertinent provisions of their agreement read as follows: "6. Beginning September 1, 1956, First Party will make the following monthly payments to Second Party: "(a) The sum of $632.00 per month. "(b) The s u m of $150.00 per month for the support of Arthur J. Movius, 111. "(c) The s u m of $1 50.00 per month for the support of David Lewis Movius. " ( d ) The a d d i t i o n a l sum o f $150.00 per month f o r t h e support o f each o f s a i d sons during t h e months o f each year each i s attending college. "Second Party agrees t h a t from the payments s p e c i f i e d under ( b ) , (c) and (d), she w i l l care f o r and maintain s a i d c h i l d r e n u n t i l they r e s p e c t i v e l y complete t h e i r c o l l e g e education; provided, however, t h a t i f t h e sums s p e c i f i e d under (b), ( c ) and ( d ) , together w i t h o t h e r income, i f any, received by s a i d c h i l d r e n should be inadequate t o pay f o r the maintenance o f s a i d c h i l d r e n and t h e i r c o l l e g e expenses, F i r s t Party w i l l , upon s a t i s f a c t o r y proof t h a t the afore- s a i d sums are inadequate f o r such purposes, make such addi- t i o n a l payments as may be reasonably necessary t o permit each o f said c h i l d r e n t o maintain the l i v i n g standards prevalent a t the college which he i s attending. "If the adjusted gross income o f t h e Party o f t h e F i r s t P a r t i s l e s s than $35,000.00 f o r any year, t h e payments t o Second Party f o r t h e succeeding year under subpara- graphs (a), (b), ( c ) , and (d) s h a l l be decreased by 4 per cent o f the d i f f e r e n c e between the adjusted gross income and $36,500.00. If the adjusted gross income o f F i r s t Party i s more than $38,000.00 f o r any year, t h e payments t o Second Party f o r the succeeding year under subparagraphs ( a ) , ( b ) , ( c ) and (d) s h a l l be increased by 4 per cent o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e between $36,500.00 and t h e adjusted gross income. " This extensive quotation forms t h e basis o f p l a i n t i f f ' s contentions on appeal. She claims f i r s t t h a t the d i s t r i c t c o u r t should have awarded her t h e sum o f $6,750.00 f o r a d d i t i o n a l expenses i n c u r r e d by her f o r t h e c o l l e g e education o f the two boys over and above defendant's c h i l d support payments. This t h e c o u r t refused t o do f o r the reason t h a t p l a i n t i f f produced no proof as t o the character o f such expenses, t h e i r amount o r t h e i r necessity. I n short, the t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o show t h e " s a t i s f a c t o r y proof" required by paragraph 6 (d) t o c r e a t e t h e e x t r a o b l i g a t i o n . Likewise, i t appears during t h e period p l a i n t i f f claims the a d d i t i o n a l support t h a t defendant gave d i r e c t f i n a n c i a l a i d t o t h e c h i l d r e n w h i l e they were e n r o l l e d i n college. W e agree t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m f o r a d d i t i o n a l education expenses i s n o t sustained by the evidence. The c h i l d r e n being now emancipated and educated, there i s no f u r t h e r issue on c h i l d support. P l a i n t i f f ' s next c l a i m has t o do w i t h her alimony r i g h t s . Defendant's income i s down s u b s t a n t i a l l y from i t s l e v e l a t t h e time o f t h e divorce. Apply- i n g t h e 4 percent reduction formula provided i n t h e agreement, t h e d i s t r i c t court denied plaintiff in entirety her right to alimony in 1969 and reduced i t substantially for 1970. In doing so, the court applied the 4 percent adjustment figure on a monthly rather than an annual basis. The effect of this was t o give defendant the benefit of 48 percent (4 percent per month times 12 months) of any reduction in income below $36,500.as an offset against alimony. Plaintiff urges this was error, that the 4 percent reduction factor should have been applied annually. The property settlement agreement does not s t a t e which interpretation i s correct. Both parties testified in favor of the interpretation most favorable to each. In concluding as i t did, the d i s t r i c t court found: "Referring to the agreement as a whole, there i s discernible an intention of the parties to s e t t l e their affairs on an approximate equal sharing basis. The division of real and personal property interests, on the terms provided, demonstrates this. An analysis of para- graph 6 shows the existence of a similar objective w i t h respect to P l a i n t i f f ' s entitlement to share in the De- fendant's future income. B y keying the amount of support payments to the r i s e and f a l l of Defendant's income, when i t varies more than $1,500.00 either way from $36,500.00, an adjustment figure of 4% per month approaches an equal division of income. Although the agreement pro- vides for an increase or a decrease of payments 'for the succeeding y e a r ' , i t i s the payments specified under subparagraphs ( a ) , (b), (c) and (d) which are adjusted and they are monthly payments. On this point the De- fendant must prevai 1 . " W h i 1 e w e recognize p l a i n t i f f ' s argument that a contrary decision might have been reached, w e cannot say as a matter of law that the d i s t r i c t court misconstrued the agreement. I t was forced to resolve an ambiguity, and there are sound reasons to support the decision reached. The court was compelled to look a t the overall intent of the parties by established prin- ciples of contract construction, such as stated in Steen vs. Rustad, 132 Mont. 96, 313 P.2d 1014: " * * * I t i s well established that a court, i n inter- preting a written instrument, will not isolate certain phrases of that instrument in order to garner the intent of the parties, but will grasp the instrument by i t s four corners and i n the light of the entire instrument, ascertain the paramount and guiding intention of the parties. * * *" Plaintiff next urges that the court, under the same formula applied above, should have increased rather than decreased her alimony. This argu- ment i s based on the fact that the defendant, a physician and surgeon prac- ticing in Billings, sold his interest in his medical partnership (The Billings Clinic) in 1967 for $80,000, payable over two years. This, urges plaintiff, should have been includable as part of defendant's "adjusted gross income" for those years, since i t was so listed on his income tax re- turns. The trial court declined to accept this contention and excluded the sale proceeds from defendant's income for purposes of determining alimony. In so holding, the court emphasized the provisions of paragraph 2 of the property settlement agreement, reading as follows: "The Party of the First Part shall retain and o w n all property standing in his name, consisting of the following: "(b) His interest in the assets and accounts receiv- able of The Billings Clinic." T o adopt plaintiff's position would operate to vest her with an interest in property that was clearly granted to defendant years before in the agreement. The district court reasoned and w e agree that to include the sale proceeds of defendant's separate property for alimony computation would negate the express intention of the parties as above quoted. Plain- t i f f in 1956 relinquished all interest in and to The Billings Clinic. She should not now be heard to reassert i t . In conjunction with these proceedings in the lower court, the de- fendant petitioned to henceforth completely el iminate al 1 al imony require- ments. His petition was based upon an alleged change in the financial cir- cumstances of the parties. The trial court complied to the extent of reduc- ing plaintiff's alimony to $132 per month. Both parties appeal from this determination. There i s no issue raised as to the authority of the district court to make the modification. Whether the provisions of the property settlement agreement were contractual or decretal i s not argued. The question i s whether the court abused its discretion in ruling as it did. The standard to be applied in such cases is stated in Daniels v. Daniels, 147 Mont. 57, 409 P.2d 824, as follows: " * * * Thus, we see that under our law there is no guarantee of an annuity to a divorced wife. The trial judge in the ambit of his discretion must weigh the relative circumstances of the parties in light of the evidence presented in determining whether conditions demand a variation, alteration or revocation of alimony and support payments. We will look critically at that determination only if it is shown to be unsupported by the evidence before the trial court of the changing situations of the parties. The delicate decision is one of balancing the needs of the wife for support and maintenance against the husband's honest abil i ty to provide. " Under the facts here, we do not find the necessary abuse of dis- cretion. For the ten years following the divorce, defendant's income ranged general ly between $36,500 and $45,000 annually. Then, with the termination of his partnership interest in The Billings Clinic in 1967, defendant's in- come dropped to $1 9,500 the fol lowing year. It rose to $26,500 in 1969 and was not more than that in 1970. At the time of the hearing, defendant was $10,000 in debt with no assets beyond accounts receivable from his medical practice. He had exhausted the receipts from the sale of the Clinic in setting up his new practice, making alimony payments and meeting living ex- penses. Plaintiff, on the other hand, had accumulated a net worth of approxi- mately $137,000 and in addition was a 50 percent beneficiary to the proceeds of an estate appraised at $102,000 at the time of hearing. Although her in- come earning capacity was in dispute due to injuries sustained in a bicycle- pedestrian accident, we cannot disagree with the district court's holding that she was financially able to provide for herself. The fact that defendant used a $20,000 inheritance from his sister in 1969 to meet mortgage payments on a home owned by his present wife is not in our opinion sufficient justification to overturn the lower court's ruling. Again we are dealing with broad discretionary guidelines, and whether we agree or disagree with the district court is not the issue. We are not able to state as a matter o f law t h a t the t r i a l judge abused "the ambit o f h i s discretion." Daniels , supra. What we have said above applies equally t o both p l a i n t i f f ' s appeal and defendant's cross-appeal on the subject o f f u t u r e alimony. The r u l i n g i s affirmed. The $132 monthly payments do no more than pay the premiums on an insurance p o l i c y carried by p l a i n t i f f (with the children as contingent beneficiaries) on defendant's 1 i f e . Such insurance pol i c y was referred t o i n the property settlement agreement. There i s no dispute t h a t out o f the $632 monthly a1 imony payments c a l l e d f o r therein, the sum o f $132 was s e t aside as the insurance premium. This being the f a c t , we cannot dispute the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s finding: "Considering the purposes behind the creation and main- tenance o f t h i s insurance policy, i t should be continued i n e f f e c t . "The payment t o p l a i n t i f f , therefore, should be reduced t o the sum o f $1 32.00 per month from and a f t e r March 6, 1970." The f i n a l issue f o r review i s whether the d i s t r i c t court erred by dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s claim f o r one-half the value o f c e r t a i n Montana State College revenue bonds owned by the parties a t the time o f the divorce. Para- graph 3 o f the property settlement agreement provides as follows: "Each o f the parties shall be e n t i t l e d t o an undivided one-half i n t e r e s t i n a l l stocks and bonds standing i n the names o f the p a r t i e s hereto as j o i n t tenants." There i s much argument whether the bonds were owned by the p a r t i e s as j o i n t tenants or, as contended by defendant, were bearer bonds. The d i s - t r i c t court held they were not j o i n t l y owned. W e need not resolve t h a t issue, f o r i t i s undisputed t h a t defendant cashed the bonds i n 1957 and retained the proceeds. He d i d so i n opposition t o a demand made by p l a i n t i f f ' s coun- sel i n 1957 o r 1958 t h a t he pay over one-half the proceeds t o her. I n Montana, an action upon the provisions o f a w r i t t e n contract must be commenced w i t h i n eight years o r be barred by the Statute o f Limitations. Section 93-2603, R.C.M. 1947. P l a i n t i f f here waited nearly 14 years a f t e r the alleged breach became known t o her. The judgment o f the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. ' Hon. Jack Shanstrom, district judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Wesley Castles. thief, dtftice : . , + \.