Title: State v. Jorgenson
Citation: 195 Kan. 683, 408 P.2d 683
Docket Number: 44,261
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 1965

195 Kan. 683 (1965)
408 P.2d 683
THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
RONNIE DEAN JORGENSON, Appellant.
No. 44,261

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 11, 1965.
Rowland Edwards, of Waterville, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Floyd Sorrick, Jr., county attorney, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, attorney general, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
Appellant claims error in the failure to give certain requested instructions to the jury which convicted him of the offense of burglary in the third degree under K.S.A. 21-521.
At the trial the prosecution evidence developed the following: Appellant was an employee for a custom combine operator in October, 1964, cutting milo. On October 21, 22, and 23 he drove a combine at the farm of Archie Taylor, Mr. Taylor hauling the grain with a tractor. On those three days appellant ate his noon meal in the Taylor home, about one mile from Mahaska in Washington County. At quitting time the evening of Thursday, October 22, Mr. Taylor asked him to stop by the Taylor home on appellant's way to town to ask Mrs. Taylor to drive the car to where Taylor was storing milo so he would not have to drive the tractor back. Appellant delivered the message to Mrs. Taylor who thereafter left home to pick up her husband as requested, closing but not locking the doors to the house. The following Sunday the Taylors noticed that their son's .22 caliber rifle, customarily kept behind a door in the back hall, was missing. Suspecting appellant, Mr. Taylor *684 caused a search warrant to be issued as a result of which the sheriff of Washington County found the missing rifle in the trunk of appellant's car. Appellant answered questions and signed a statement written by the county attorney, which included the following:
Appellant testified as a witness in his own behalf substantially as follows: That on the three days he was cutting milo for Mr. Taylor he ate his noon meals in the Taylor home; that about quitting time he delivered Mr. Taylor's message to Mrs. Taylor that she was to pick him up at the state line; immediately after delivering this message at the Taylor house he drove a pickup to Mahuska for a bottle of pop; that he had a pair of goggles which he wore to keep the dust out of his eyes; he had evidently misplaced the goggles and had worked without them that afternoon and had two sore eyes; that he went back to the Taylor place thinking they might have fallen out of the pickup when he was at the Taylor place, but they were not there so he went in to the house to see if they were there; he knocked on the door first but did not think there was anyone at home as the car was not there; he went through the screen door on the back porch, pushing in a button to open the door; he looked for the goggles but did not see them where he thought they might be, on top of the egg case where he laid his hat with the goggles; he never did find the goggles. He further testified:
"Q. Well, now, where was this gun?
"A. It's in the same room about five feet away.
"Q. Had you noticed that gun before?
"A. No.
"Q. When did you get the idea of taking the gun?
"A. I don't know.
"Q. Did you pick it up and look at it?
"A. Yes.
*685 "Q. You didn't put it back then?
"A. No. Took it.
"Q. Then what did you do with it?
Appellant also testified he did not mention the missing goggles to Mrs. Taylor when he delivered the message to her and did not say anything to anybody about them prior to the trial.
Initially appellant was charged with both burglary and larceny of the rifle in connection with the burglary but at the close of all the testimony the charge of larceny was dismissed upon application of the appellee.
Appellant requested the giving of the following two instructions:
"No. ____
"No. ____
The court declined to give appellant's requested instructions on the theory the matter was covered in the instructions given. It gave stock instructions of a general nature, and on the particular point at issue instructed the jury as follows:
"2.
"2. That he so entered in the daytime;
..............
"3.
The instructions given included a general one as to what might be considered in determining intent.
Appellant was found guilty of burglary in the third degree. Thereafter he moved for a new trial, stating among other things, trial error in the instructions. His motion was overruled and he now urges as error the court's failure to give his requested instructions or the substance thereof, and the failure to grant a new trial.
Appellant concedes the correctness of the instructions given but in effect says they were inadequate in presenting his theory of the case.
The rule is well established that error cannot be predicated on the refusal to give certain instructions where those which are given cover and include the substance of those which are refused *687 (See cases cited at 2 Hatcher's Kansas Digest, rev. ed., Criminal Law, § 306; 4 West's Kansas Digest, Criminal Law, § 829).
Thus, the precise point at issue is whether the jury was adequately advised on the issue of the intent of appellant at the time he entered the Taylor home, an intent to commit a larceny therein being an essential element of the offense of burglary. We think the jury was adequately and properly advised as to the requisite intent and as to appellant's position thereto. Instruction No. 2, subsection 4, above-quoted, plainly and specifically stated that, "In order to find defendant guilty" it would be necessary to find beyond a reasonable doubt that "defendant entered said building with the intent to steal...." (Our emphasis.)
Instruction No. 3 restated the general necessity as to finding of the truth of the various elements constituting the offense of burglary before a verdict of guilty could be returned, and it concluded with the converse of the proposition, specifically directing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty if it found the state had not proved each and every element contained in instruction No. 2 to its satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt.
The word "intent" as used in the instructions was not used in any technical sense nor in any way different from its ordinary use in common parlance. There was nothing particularly technical or complex about the issue presented to the jury from either a legal or a practical standpoint. Appellant claimed an innocent intent in entering the home  appellee claimed otherwise. We think the instructions, not otherwise objected to, embodied appellant's defense and presented the issue squarely and fairly to the jury. We do not say it would have been improper for the court to have given the substance of one of appellant's requested instructions but at the same time we cannot say it was prejudicial error for the court to fail to do so in view of the other instructions given. We do note that in the closing argument to the jury appellant's counsel dwelt at length upon the issue of appellant's intent, stressing repeatedly that appellant entered the house not with an intent to steal but with intent to look for his missing goggles and that therefore he could not be guilty of burglary under the court's instructions. We do not think the jury was misled or that it misunderstood as to the point at issue or that appellant suffered any prejudice in the failure to give the requested instructions. Therefore the actions of the trial court are affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.