Title: Fortt v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 618, 1999
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TSCHAKA W. FORTT,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§  No. 618, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware,  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr.A. No. IN98-02-0048 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§     through 0051 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§   IN8-02-1465 and 1467 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  December 14, 2000 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  March 13, 2001 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Raymond M. Radulski, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
From January 12, 1998 through January 16, 1998, two armed 
robberies and an attempted armed robbery occurred in the Newark area.  
Four eyewitnesses to the three crimes all identified the defendant-appellant, 
Tschaka W. Fortt, as the perpetrator.  Fortt was indicted on two counts of 
Robbery in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Robbery in the First 
Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony, and two counts of Wearing a Disguise.  The nolle prosequi was 
entered as to the Wearing a Disguise counts.   
Following a jury trial at which he did not testify, Fortt was found 
guilty of all remaining charges.  Fortt was sentenced to minimum mandatory 
terms of incarceration of two years at Level V on each of the robbery and 
attempted robbery charges, followed by probation.  Fortt was also sentenced 
to three years of incarceration at Level V on each of the weapons charges, 
followed by probation.  This is Fortt’s direct appeal. 
 
Fortt has raised three issues in this Court.  First, he alleges that the 
Superior Court committed reversible error by denying a motion for 
severance of his trials for each separate incident.  Second, Fortt alleges that 
the Superior Court erred in denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal on 
the firearm offense relating to the University Exxon robbery.  Finally, Fortt 
 
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contends that the Superior Court erroneously admitted a gun into evidence 
because that weapon was not linked to any of the alleged robberies.   
 
We have concluded that although the Superior Court erroneously 
admitted the gun into evidence, the error was harmless.  We have also 
concluded that Fortt’s other two arguments are without merit.  Accordingly, 
the judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
The University Plaza Exxon Robbery 
 
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on January 12, 1998, Sarah Kiefer was 
working as a clerk cashier at the University Plaza Exxon.  A man wearing a 
black hooded sweatshirt approached the counter with a gun in one hand and 
a backpack in the other.  The man threw the backpack on the counter.  He 
then screamed at Kiefer to fill the backpack with money from the store cash 
register.   
On the evening of January 16, 1998, Kiefer selected Fortt’s picture 
from an array containing the photographs of six individuals.  During her 
testimony at trial, Kiefer identified Fortt in the courtroom as the robber.  
Kiefer stated she observed the robber inside the lighted store from 
approximately three feet away.  She also testified that she was sure Fortt was 
holding a gun.   
 
4
 
While the University Exxon robbery was in progress, Charles Brown 
was making a fuel delivery to the gasoline station.  Brown went inside the 
station as the robber was departing.  When Kiefer said that she had just been 
robbed, Brown went back outside and watched Fortt enter the driver’s side 
of a car parked behind the building.  As the getaway car drove off, Brown 
noticed a temporary tag taped to the back window of the vehicle.  Brown 
also made a courtroom identification of Fortt as the robber. 
The Kirkwood Highway Pathmark Attempted Robbery 
 
On the early morning of January 14, 1998, Edwina Richards drove her 
automobile to the Kirkwood Highway Pathmark store to do her grocery 
shopping.  A man wearing a backpack approached Richards in the parking 
lot and demanded the keys to her car.  When Richards observed a semi-
automatic pistol in the man’s hand, she began screaming for help.  Richards 
testified that she had a close view of the attempted carjacker’s face from a 
distance of approximately eighteen inches.  She made a courtroom 
identification of Fortt as the person who had attempted to steal her car at 
gunpoint. 
The Newark Wilmington Trust Robbery 
 
On the morning of January 16, 1998, the Chesmar branch of the 
Wilmington Trust Company in Newark, Delaware was robbed of 
 
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approximately $3,300.  The robber walked up to Deborah Pineault’s teller 
counter in the bank, pointed a black gun at her, and handed her a note 
demanding money.  She observed the robber’s face from approximately two 
feet away.  Pineault testified at trial that she was certain that Fortt was the 
person who robbed her.  The bank surveillance videotape of the robbery was 
also admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. 
Firearm Evidence Sufficient 
 
Count II of Fortt’s grand jury indictment charged him with Possession 
of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony at the January 12, 1998 
robbery of the University Plaza Exxon.  At the conclusion of the State’s 
case,   Fortt’s attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to the 
provisions of Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 29(a), as to Count II 
only of the indictment. Fortt did not challenge the sufficiency of the trial 
evidence as to the other counts of his indictment, including the other two 
other charges of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a 
Felony. 
 
In support of the partial motion for a judgment of acquittal before the 
Superior Court and on appeal, Fortt submits that “unlike the other victims, 
Keifer never testified that it looked like a real gun or that she even thought it 
was a real gun.”  This assertion is contradicted by the factual record.  The 
 
6
contention disregards several statements in the trial testimony of Keifer 
which characterize what was being pointed at her as a gun.  One of those 
references is an exchange between the prosecutor and Keifer, as follows: 
 
Q.  And were you sure that it was a gun? 
 
A.  Yes. 
Keifer also testified that she gave Fortt the money in her register because 
“He was standing there holding a gun on me.”  In addition, Keifer testified 
that Fortt “had the gun in one hand, and the backpack in the other.”   
 
With regard to Fortt’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, the issue for 
the Superior Court and for this Court to determine is the same.  To wit, could 
any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the State, have found the essential elements of the Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony charge associated with the January 12 
1998 robbery of the University Plaza Exxon beyond a reasonable doubt?1  
The Superior Court properly concluded, that on the basis of Keifer’s 
testimony, a rational trier of fact could find the “gun” possessed by the 
                                          
 
1 See Seward v. State, Del. Supr., 723 A.2d 365, 369 (1999); Liket v. State, Del. Supr., 
719 A.2d 935, 939 (1998); Williams v. State, Del. Supr., 539 A.2d 164, 168 (quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
 
7
robber was a “firearm” as that term is defined in 11 Del. C. § 222(11).2  
Consequently, on the basis of Keifer’s entire testimony, a rational trier of 
fact could find that Fortt was in possession of a “firearm” during the 
commission of the University Plaza Exxon robbery.  Accordingly, the trial 
judge properly denied the defense partial motion for a judgment of acquittal 
as to Count II. 
Severance Properly Denied 
 
In a single indictment, the State charged Fortt with armed robberies on 
January 12 and January 16, 1998, and an attempted armed robbery on 
January 14, 1998.  That same indictment included companion firearm 
possession charges relating to each incident.  Superior Court Criminal Rule 
8(a) permits such a joiner “if the offenses charged are of the same or similar 
character or based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan.”3  The rule permitting joinder of offenses “is designed to promote 
                                          
 
2 See 11 Del. C. § 222(11) (“‘Firearm’ includes any weapon from which a shot, projectile 
or other object may be discharged by force of combustion, explosive, gas and/or 
mechanical means, whether operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded.”); see generally 
Seward v. State, 723 A.2d at 369; Cline v. State, Del. Supr., 720 A.2d 891, 892 (1998); 
Liket v. State, 719 A.2d at 939.  A weapon may be manifested to a victim even though the 
victim never sees a gun.  See Harrigan v. State, Del. Supr., 447 A.2d 1191, 1193 (1982); 
State v. Smallwood, Del. Supr., 346 A.2d 164, 167 (1975).   
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8(a). 
 
8
judicial economy and efficiency, provided that the realization of those 
objectives is consistent with the rights of the accused.”4 
 
Fortt filed a pretrial motion to sever the charges and have three 
separate trials for each of the respective incidents on January 12, 14 and 16, 
1998.  In his motion, Fortt claimed that he would be prejudiced by a joint 
trial of the three incident because “there is a likelihood that the jury may be 
confused and return a verdict based not on the evidence, but on the sheer 
number of charges presented.”  The Superior Court denied Fortt’s pretrial 
motion for severance of his trials on the basis of this Court’s holding in 
Younger.5 
 
Severance is not required ipso facto, simply because the alleged 
charges involve different victims and occur at separate times.6  In Younger, 
this Court noted that “where offenses are of the same general character, 
involve a similar course of conduct and are alleged to have occurred in a 
relatively brief span of time it is proper to try the offenses together.”7  In 
Younger, this Court also reaffirmed that the burden is on the defendant to 
                                          
 
4 Weddington v. State, Del. Supr., 545 A.2d 607, 615 (1988) (quoting Mayer v. State, Del. 
Supr., 320 A.2d 713, 717 (1974)). 
5 Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 496 A.2d 546, 550 (1985). 
6 Id. at 550; McDonald v. State, Del. Supr., 307 A.2d 796, 798 (1973) (“The mere fact 
that the crimes were ‘separate,’ committed against different individuals with a lapse of 
time in between them, does not require severance.”). 
7 Younger v. State, 496 A.2d at 550. 
 
9
establish “substantial injustice” or unfair prejudice in order to be entitled to a 
severance of charges.8   
 
In the Superior Court and in this Court, Fortt has only alleged 
hypothetical prejudice that his jury was confused by the evidence or that it 
accumulated the evidence improperly against him.  Allegations of mere 
hypothetical prejudice are insufficient to carry the defendant’s burden of 
proof.9  Consequently, Fortt has failed to demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that “substantial injustice” or unfair prejudice resulted from the 
joint trial of the alleged robbery offenses in his case.10     
The State also points out that Fortt’s jury was instructed to evaluate 
the evidence as to each count in the indictment separately during its 
deliberations.  Specifically, Fortt’s jury was instructed that “[y]ou must 
consider each count separately and return a separate verdict as to each.  Just 
because you reach a conclusion as to one count, it does not mean that the 
conclusion would apply to other counts.  Each count must be considered 
separately.”  The jury is presumed to understand and follow the instructions 
given by the Superior Court.11   
                                          
 
8 Id.; see Bates v. State, Del. Supr., 386 A.2d 1139, 1141-42 (1978); Lampkins v. State, 
Del. Supr., 465 A.2d 785, 794 (1983). 
9 Younger v. State, 496 A.2d at 550 (quoting Bates v. State, 386 A.2d at 1142).   
10 See Howard v. State, Del. Supr., 704 A.2d 278, 280 (1998); Bates v. State, 386 A.2d at 
1141. 
11 See Dawson v. State, Del. Supr., 637 A.2d 57, 62 (1994). 
 
10
 
A trial judge’s denial of a pretrial motion for severance of charges is 
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.12  “An abuse of discretion 
occurs when ‘a court has . . . exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the 
circumstances,’ [or] . . . so ignored recognized rules of law or practice . . . to 
produce injustice.”13  We have concluded that the Superior Court properly 
exercised its discretion in denying Fortt’s pretrial motion for severance.   
Handgun Error Harmless 
 
Fortt’s final contention is that the Superior Court improperly 
overruled the defense objection to the admission of a nine millimeter 
handgun seized at the residence of  Aaron Jackson, where Fortt was arrested.  
Fortt’s argument at trial and on appeal is that the gun, introduced as State’s 
Exhibit #32, was not sufficiently linked with the firearm possessed by the 
robber in the three January, 1998 incidents.  In support of his argument, 
Fortt relies upon this Court’s decision in Farmer.14 
 
In this appeal, the State acknowledges that the handgun admitted as 
State’s Exhibit #32 was not identified by any of the three robbery victims as 
appearing to be the same or similar to the weapon utilized in the three 
                                          
 
12 See Steckel v. State, Del. Supr., 711 A.2d 5, 9 (1998); Howard v. State, 704 A.2d at 
280; Weddington v. State, Del. Supr., 545 A.2d 607, 616 (1988); Wiest v. State, Del. 
Supr., 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1988); Bates v. State, 386 A.2d at 1141. 
13 Lilly v. State, Del. Supr., 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (1994) (quoting Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Adams, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 567, 570 (1988)); see also Floudiotis v. State, 
Del. Supr., 726 A.2d 1196, 1202 (1999).   
14 Farmer v. State, Del. Supr., 698 A.2d 946, 948-49 (1997). 
 
11
January, 1998 incidents.  Jackson, in whose home the weapon was 
discovered, testified that Fortt had never seen the gun and “never even was 
aware of it.”  Nevertheless, the State argues that the handgun introduced as 
State’s Exhibit #32 was admissible and relevant to demonstrate that Fortt 
had access to such a weapon.   
 
The decision of a trial judge to admit or exclude evidence on 
relevancy grounds is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion 
standard.15  Delaware Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.”16  “Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible.”17   
 
In Farmer, this Court held evidence that a defendant, charged with a 
weapon’s offense, had access to a firearm is probative only if that particular 
firearm is connected to the specific criminal act charged.18  In Farmer, we 
                                          
 
15 Id.; Hovington v. State, Del. Supr., 616 A.2d 829 (1992). 
16 D.R.E. 401. 
17 D.R.E. 402. 
18 As we explained in Farmer: 
 
Evidence that a defendant, charges with a shooting, had a firearm in his 
possession is surely probative if that firearm is tied to the criminal act.  
But without a satisfactory evidentiary link, such evidence carrier the risk 
that the jury may associate mere ownership of a firearm with a disposition 
to use it.  Speculation based on mere ownership of instruments adaptable 
 
12
held that the “nexus requirement” must be satisfied as a predicate to 
admissibility.19  Accordingly, in Farmer, we stated “it is not sufficient that 
the defendant had a hand gun available to him.”20  In Farmer, we concluded 
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to admit into evidence a 
gun that the State concededly could not link to the shooting in question.21    
Similarly, in Fortt’s case, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial judge to admit State’s Exhibit #32 into evidence without a 
satisfactory predicate testimonial or other evidentiary link to any of the three 
alleged January 1998 crimes.  In Farmer, we could not say “with any 
confidence that the speculative evidence concerning the gun found in 
Farmer’s apartment was not a factor in the jury’s deliberations.”22  In Fortt’s 
case, however, we have concluded that the error was harmless. 
 
All three of the complaining witnesses testified unequivocally that 
Fortt possessed a handgun.  We are confident that the jury’s verdicts, 
convicting Fortt of the three firearm possession charges, were based upon 
that clear and convincing trial testimony by the three complaining witnesses.  
                                                                                                                             
 
for use in a crime subjects the defendant to the same risk that 
impermissible character or bad act evidence may post—equating 
disposition with guilt. 
 Farmer v. State, 698 A.2d at 949. 
19 Id. at 948-49; Whitfield v. State, Del. Supr., 524 A.2d 13, 15-17 (1987). 
20 Farmer v. State, 698 A.2d at 949. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
 
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Accordingly, the error by the trial judge in allowing the admission of the 
handgun as State’s Exhibit #32 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.23   
CONCLUSION 
 
The final judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                          
 
23 D.R.E. 103(a); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 42(a); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967).  See generally Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 643 A.2d 1360, 1369 (1994); Nelson 
v. State, Del. Supr., 628 A.2d 69, 77 (1993).