Title: Brown, Dwayne v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090161
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 2010

PRESENT:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
DWAYNE JAMAR BROWN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 090161 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
          
 
  January 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
DEMETRIOUS OMAR BROWN 
 
v. 
 
Record No. 090201 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In these appeals, we consider whether a juvenile who has 
been tried as an adult and found guilty of a crime that has a 
mandatory minimum sentence may be sentenced to a juvenile 
disposition, pursuant to Code § 16.1-272, rather than the 
mandatory minimum sentence.  As a preliminary matter, we also 
consider whether the Commonwealth properly preserved its bases 
for appeal as required by Rule 5A:18. 
Relevant Facts and Proceedings 
 
When Demetrious Omar Brown (Demetrious) was sixteen and 
his cousin Dwayne Jamar Brown (Dwayne) was fifteen, they 
participated in the armed robbery of a group of people who had 
gathered in an apartment to play cards.  Demetrious and Dwayne 
both waived their rights to a preliminary hearing in the 
juvenile and domestic relations district court under Code 
§ 16.1-270, and were certified for trial as adults under Code 
§ 16.1-269.1.  In the circuit court, Demetrious and Dwayne pled 
guilty to numerous charges, including five counts of use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.1 
Demetrious’ Sentencing Hearing 
 
The Circuit Court of Bedford County held Demetrious’ 
sentencing hearing on March 25, 2008.  Demetrious’ counsel 
argued for Demetrious to receive a juvenile disposition on the 
five convictions for use of a firearm in the commission of a 
felony.  The Commonwealth argued that Demetrious’ five 
convictions for use of a firearm required the circuit court to 
impose the mandatory minimum sentence set forth for each in the 
use of a firearm statute, Code § 18.2-53.1. 
 
The Commonwealth argued that under Bullock v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 375-77, 631 S.E.2d 334, 342-43 
(2006), a trial court’s broad discretion over juvenile 
sentences in Code § 16.1-272 did not override the mandatory 
minimum sentences required by Code § 18.2-53.1.  The 
Commonwealth stated to the circuit court that in Bullock, 
the Court did deal with the situation where there was 
a request for a juvenile disposition . . . and there 
was a conflict in the statutes as to whether [or] not 
                     
1 Each defendant also pled guilty to burglary with intent 
to commit robbery, discharge a firearm in an occupied dwelling, 
and eleven counts of robbery.  
 
2
the broad discretion in the juvenile sentencing 
statute could override the mandatory provisions of 
the Use of Firearm statute. The Court of Appeals 
[held] that it could not, in fact, override that. 
 
 
The circuit court responded by taking a recess to review 
Bullock.  Thereafter, the Commonwealth reiterated that it was 
“relying on Bullock.” 
 
The circuit court held that Bullock prevented the circuit 
court from imposing a juvenile disposition on a use of a 
firearm charge under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1), but that the court 
could impose a juvenile disposition pursuant to Code § 16.1-
272(A)(2).  As his sentence on the use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony charges, the circuit court ordered 
Demetrious committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice 
until his twentieth birthday.  See Code § 16.1-285.1.  The 
circuit court imposed adult time sentences for the remaining 
offenses, with all sentences to run concurrently, for a total 
period of incarceration of twenty-five years, and suspended 
that adult time. 
Dwayne’s Sentencing Hearing 
 
The Circuit Court of Bedford County held Dwayne’s 
sentencing hearing on April 4, 2008.  Dwayne’s counsel argued 
for Dwayne to receive a juvenile disposition on the five 
convictions for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  
The Commonwealth recommended that Dwayne receive the mandatory 
 
3
minimum sentence for each of the five convictions for use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony.  However, the 
Commonwealth also stated, “Obviously the Court has discretion 
to treat [Dwayne] as a juvenile, treat him as an adult or to 
come up with a split disposition in the case, sentence him to a 
juvenile facility until he’s eighteen and then transfer him to 
an adult facility.”  Acknowledging that the circuit court 
sentenced Demetrious as a juvenile, the Commonwealth noted 
Dwayne’s more extensive prior record and stated, “I really see 
nothing to be gained by treating Dwayne Brown as a juvenile in 
this case.”  The prosecutor did not mention the Bullock 
decision or the reasoning stated therein.   
 
The circuit court classified Dwayne’s convictions for use 
of a firearm in the commission of a felony as “non-violent 
juvenile felonies,” imposed a juvenile disposition for those 
convictions under Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) and committed Dwayne to 
the Department of Juvenile Justice until his eighteenth 
birthday.  As to the remaining convictions, the judge gave 
Dwayne “a sentence of 25 years in the penitentiary, suspended 
after the service of 24 months in jail,” commencing on his 
eighteenth birthday. 
Commonwealth’s Appeal 
 
The Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth’s appeal as 
to the sentences imposed upon Demetrious and Dwayne for the 
 
4
convictions of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.  
Upon a motion by the Commonwealth, the two cases were 
consolidated.  Both defendants claimed that the Commonwealth 
had failed to properly preserve for appeal, as required by Rule 
5A:18, its argument that the circuit court did not have the 
discretion to sentence the defendants to juvenile dispositions 
on the use of a firearm charges.  In an unpublished opinion, 
the Court of Appeals held that the Commonwealth had complied 
with Rule 5A:18 in both cases, and that the circuit court erred 
when it imposed juvenile dispositions upon Demetrious and 
Dwayne instead of the mandatory minimum sentences prescribed in 
Code § 18.2-53.1.  The Court of Appeals vacated the sentences 
imposed for each defendant’s convictions and remanded the 
proceedings against each defendant for resentencing consistent 
with its opinion.  Commonwealth v. Brown, Record Nos. 0919-08-
3, 0920-08-3 (Nov. 25, 2008). 
Analysis 
 
A.  Rule 5A:18 
 
 
On appeal to this Court, both Demetrious and Dwayne argue 
that the Commonwealth failed to preserve for appeal, as 
required by Rule 5A:18, its argument that the circuit court did 
not have the discretion to sentence the defendants to juvenile 
dispositions on their convictions for use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony.  They claim that the Court of Appeals 
 
5
erred in holding that the Commonwealth satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 5A:18.2  Because these appeals involve two 
separate sentencing hearings, we will separately analyze the 
relevant issues. 
1.  Demetrious Brown v. Commonwealth 
 
 
Demetrious contends that under Rule 5A:18 the Commonwealth 
did not preserve the sentencing issue for appeal because the 
Commonwealth did not object to the court’s imposition of a 
juvenile disposition upon Demetrious.  The Commonwealth 
responds that it satisfied Rule 5A:18 by making the circuit 
court aware of its position on mandatory sentencing.  The 
Commonwealth contends that it argued consistently that Code 
§ 18.2-53.1 and Bullock required the circuit court to impose 
the mandatory minimum sentences specified in Code § 18.2-53.1 
and limited the circuit court’s ability to sentence Demetrious 
as a juvenile.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
As a question of law, the interpretation of Rule 5A:18 
requires de novo review.  Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 
517, 659 S.E.2d 311, 315 (2008) (applying de novo review to an 
                     
2 The Commonwealth was the appellant in the Court of 
Appeals and, upon our review, must be held to the requirement 
that “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered 
as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated 
together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling 
. . . .”  Rule 5A:18.  Cf. Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 
105, 114-15, 677 S.E.2d 265, 270 (2009), in which case the 
Commonwealth was the appellee. 
 
6
interpretation of Rule 5A:20).  Rule 5A:18 requires a litigant 
to make timely and specific objections, so that the trial court 
has “an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues 
presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.”  
West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337, 597 S.E.2d 274, 278 
(2004).  The Court of Appeals has held that a litigant may 
satisfy Rule 5A:18 in multiple ways. Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 
512, 515, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1991).  Moreover, in reference 
to Rule 5A:18’s Supreme Court Rule counterpart, Rule 5:25, this 
Court recently stated that Code § 8.01-384 controls our 
interpretation of the rule.  Helms v. Manspile, 277 Va. 1, 7, 
671 S.E.2d 127, 130 (2009).  Code § 8.01-384(A) should likewise 
inform an interpretation of Rule 5A:18.  
Code § 8.01-384(A) provides as follows:  
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court 
shall be unnecessary; . . . it shall be sufficient 
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the 
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the 
action which he desires the court to take or his 
objections to the action of the court and his grounds 
therefor; . . . .  Arguments made at trial via 
written pleading, memorandum, recital of objections 
in a final order, oral argument reduced to 
transcript, or agreed written statements of facts 
shall, unless expressly withdrawn or waived, be 
deemed preserved therein for assertion on appeal. 
 
Under Code § 8.01-384(A) and our analysis in Helms, if a trial 
court is aware of a litigant’s legal position and the litigant 
did not expressly waive such arguments, the arguments remain 
 
7
preserved for appeal.  Helms, 277 Va. at 7, 671 S.E.2d at 129-
30. 
The Commonwealth preserved for appeal its arguments 
concerning the issue of Demetrious’ sentences because the 
Commonwealth made the circuit court aware of its position.  At 
Demetrious’ sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth argued that 
the mandatory minimum sentence applied to Demetrious’ five 
convictions for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony 
because Bullock controlled the circuit court’s sentencing 
determination.  The Commonwealth argued, expressly relying upon 
the Bullock decision, that the circuit court lacked discretion 
to impose a juvenile disposition under Code § 16.1-272 where a 
juvenile tried as an adult was found guilty of violating Code 
§ 18.2-53.1.  Even after the circuit court took a recess to 
review Bullock, the Commonwealth reiterated that its argument 
relied on Bullock. 
The record indicates that the circuit court understood the 
Commonwealth’s position; the circuit court attempted to 
harmonize Bullock, Code § 18.2-53.1’s mandatory language and 
Code § 16.1-272’s juvenile provisions.  Because the circuit 
court was aware of and had acknowledged the Commonwealth’s 
position, which the Commonwealth never expressly waived, and 
the circuit court had “an opportunity to rule intelligently on 
the issues presented,” West, 43 Va. App. at 337, 597 S.E.2d at 
 
8
278, the Commonwealth preserved for appeal its argument that 
the circuit court was required to impose the statutorily 
mandated sentences upon Demetrious.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
Court of Appeals in holding that the Commonwealth complied with 
Rule 5A:18 in Demetrious’ case. 
2.  Dwayne Brown v. Commonwealth 
 
Dwayne likewise contends that the Commonwealth failed to 
preserve for appeal, in the manner required by Rule 5A:18, its 
argument that the circuit court lacked the discretion to 
sentence him as a juvenile pursuant to Code § 16.1-272, rather 
than in accordance with the mandatory minimum sentencing 
provisions of Code § 18.2-53.1.  Dwayne argues not only  that 
the Commonwealth failed to object when the circuit court 
imposed a juvenile disposition, but also that the Commonwealth 
conceded that the circuit court had the authority to sentence 
Dwayne as a juvenile.  Moreover, Dwayne contends that the 
Commonwealth did not prove good cause or a miscarriage of 
justice necessary to allow the Court of Appeals to review the 
unpreserved issue concerning his sentencing. 
The Commonwealth responds by asserting that the circuit 
court was aware of the mandatory sentencing issue, in part 
because Dwayne’s sentencing shared common facts with 
Demetrious’ sentencing and took place only ten days later 
before the same judge.  The Commonwealth argues that its 
 
9
attorney, the same attorney that prosecuted Demetrious’ case, 
did not concede the court’s authority to impose a juvenile 
disposition, but rather asked that the mandatory minimum 
sentences be imposed. 
At Dwayne’s sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth requested 
that the circuit court apply the mandatory minimum sentence, 
but it failed to argue that the circuit court did not have the 
discretion to sentence Dwayne as a juvenile.  The Commonwealth 
neither referenced Bullock nor Code § 18.2-53.1 to argue that 
the circuit court was required to impose the mandatory minimum 
sentences.  In fact, the Commonwealth acknowledged the circuit 
court’s discretion by stating: “Obviously the Court has 
discretion to treat [Dwayne] as a juvenile, treat him as an 
adult or to come up with a split disposition in the case, 
sentence him to a juvenile facility until he’s eighteen and 
then transfer him to an adult facility.” 
The Commonwealth cannot rely on the arguments it made 
during Demetrious’ sentencing hearing to demonstrate it 
satisfied Rule 5A:18 at Dwayne’s hearing.  Though the same 
Commonwealth’s attorney prosecuted both Demetrious and Dwayne, 
Dwayne’s hearing was a separate proceeding in which he was 
represented by a different defense attorney.  The Commonwealth, 
at Dwayne’s hearing, did not put the circuit court on notice of 
the Commonwealth’s argument that the circuit court did not have 
 
10
the discretion to impose a juvenile sentence upon Dwayne.  
Because the Commonwealth did not, during Dwayne’s proceedings 
before the circuit court, articulate an argument that the 
circuit court did not have the authority to impose a juvenile 
sentence upon Dwayne, the issue was not preserved for appeal.    
On appeal, a litigant may raise an unpreserved issue based 
on the ends of justice if the error “was ‘clear, substantial 
and material.’”  West, 43 Va. App. at 338, 597 S.E.2d at 279 
(quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 
8, 11 (1989)); see Rule 5A:18.  This Court has stated that  
Rule 5A:18, like our Rule 5:25, allows an appellate 
court to consider a matter not preserved by 
objection in the trial court “to attain the ends of 
justice.”  Application of the ends of justice 
exception is appropriate when the judgment of the 
trial court was error and application of the 
exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice or 
the denial of essential rights. 
 
Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 17, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 
(2005). 
The Commonwealth has not demonstrated that Rule 5A:18’s 
ends of justice provision is applicable in this case.  Because 
the Commonwealth stated to the circuit court that it 
“[o]bviously . . . has discretion to treat [Dwayne] as a 
juvenile,” we conclude that the Commonwealth has not shown that 
the circuit court committed a clear, substantial and material 
 
11
error, or that the ends of justice exception is necessary to 
avoid a grave injustice or the denial of essential rights.  
We hold that with respect to the appeal in the matter of 
Dwayne Brown v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth did not comply 
with Rule 5A:18, and thus failed to preserve for appeal its 
argument that the circuit court did not have the discretion to 
sentence Dwayne as a juvenile on the use of a firearm charges.  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
vacating Dwayne’s juvenile disposition for the use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony convictions, and reinstate the 
sentence imposed by the circuit court. 
B.  Code § 18.2-53.1 and Code § 16.1-272 
 
 
Demetrious argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it 
vacated and remanded the circuit court’s juvenile disposition 
for his five convictions for use of a firearm in the commission 
of a felony.  Demetrious argues that the circuit court 
correctly sentenced him as a juvenile because Code § 16.1-
272(A)(2) gives the court discretion to forego the mandatory 
minimum sentences required by Code § 18.2-53.1. 
 
The Commonwealth responds that the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that the circuit court erred in imposing a 
juvenile disposition under Code § 16.1-272.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that 
the circuit court should have considered Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) 
 
12
instead of Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) in sentencing Demetrious and 
that the language in Code § 18.2-53.1 requires the circuit 
court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence on juveniles tried 
as adults and found guilty of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony.  We agree with the Commonwealth.   
In determining whether the mandatory language in Code 
§ 18.2-53.1 limited the circuit court’s discretion to sentence 
Demetrious as a juvenile under Code § 16.1-272, we must first 
closely examine the relevant statutes.  The statute concerning 
use or display of a firearm in committing a felony, Code 
§ 18.2-53.1, states in relevant part:  
Violation of this section shall constitute a separate 
and distinct felony and any person found guilty 
thereof shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum 
term of imprisonment of three years for a first 
conviction, and to a mandatory minimum term of five 
years for a second or subsequent conviction under the 
provisions of this section. Such punishment shall be 
separate and apart from, and shall be made to run 
consecutively with, any punishment received for the 
commission of the primary felony.  
 
Code § 18.2-12.1 defines “mandatory minimum” as follows: 
 
“Mandatory minimum” wherever it appears in this Code 
means, for purposes of imposing punishment upon a 
person convicted of a crime, that the court shall 
impose the entire term of confinement, the full 
amount of the fine and the complete requirement of 
community service prescribed by law. The court shall 
not suspend in full or in part any punishment 
described as mandatory minimum punishment. 
 
 
13
Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)-(2), setting forth provisions relating to 
the powers of a circuit court in the trial and sentencing of 
juveniles, provides as follows: 
A.  In any case in which a juvenile is indicted, the 
offense for which he is indicted and all ancillary 
charges shall be tried in the same manner as provided 
for in the trial of adults, except as otherwise 
provided with regard to sentencing. Upon a finding of 
guilty of any charge, the court shall fix the 
sentence without the intervention of a jury. 
 
   1.  If a juvenile is convicted of a violent 
juvenile felony, for that offense and for all 
ancillary crimes the court may order that (i) the 
juvenile serve a portion of the sentence as a serious 
juvenile offender under § 16.1-285.1 and the 
remainder of such sentence in the same manner as 
provided for adults; (ii) the juvenile serve the 
entire sentence in the same manner as provided for 
adults; or (iii) the portion of the sentence to be 
served in the same manner as provided for adults be 
suspended conditioned upon successful completion of 
such terms and conditions as may be imposed in a 
juvenile court upon disposition of a delinquency case 
including, but not limited to, commitment under 
subdivision 14 of § 16.1-278.8 or § 16.1-285.1. 
 
   2.  If the juvenile is convicted of any other 
felony, the court may sentence or commit the juvenile 
offender in accordance with the criminal laws of this 
Commonwealth or may in its discretion deal with the 
juvenile in the manner prescribed in this chapter for 
the hearing and disposition of cases in the juvenile 
court, including, but not limited to, commitment 
under § 16.1-285.1 or may in its discretion impose an 
adult sentence and suspend the sentence conditioned 
upon successful completion of such terms and 
conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile court upon 
disposition of a delinquency case.  
 
After Demetrious, a juvenile, waived in writing the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile and domestic relations district 
 
14
court and his right to a preliminary hearing, the juvenile 
court transferred and certified Demetrious for criminal 
proceedings in the circuit court.  See Code § 16.1-269.1; Code 
§ 16.1-270.  Demetrious was indicted, tried in the same manner 
as provided for adults, and found guilty of numerous crimes, 
including five counts of use of a firearm in the commission of 
a felony.   
Code § 18.2-53.1 clearly states that any person found 
guilty of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony shall 
be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.  At 
the same time, however, Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) - (2) gives a 
circuit court the discretion to sentence a juvenile tried as an 
adult to a juvenile disposition rather than sentencing the 
juvenile as an adult.  Thus, it appears that the provisions of 
Code § 16.1-272 and Code § 18.2-53.1 are in conflict with each 
other regarding whether a circuit court must impose an 
applicable mandatory minimum sentence upon a juvenile tried as 
an adult.   
An ordinary rule of statutory construction serves to 
resolve the conflict.  “ ‘[W]hen one statute speaks to a 
subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the 
same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be 
harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter 
prevails.’ ”  Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 22-23, 419 
 
15
S.E.2d 606, 618 (1992) (quoting Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Harris, 
220 Va. 336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)). 
This Court in Thomas considered whether a juvenile 
convicted of capital murder by a jury should be sentenced by a 
judge pursuant to Code § 16.1-272’s juvenile provisions, or 
sentenced by a jury under the death penalty statutes. 244 Va. 
at 21, 419 S.E.2d at 617.  We resolved the apparent conflict 
between the juvenile provision and the death penalty statutes 
by applying the death penalty statutes.  The death penalty 
statutes were applicable because, while the statutes all dealt 
with punishing criminal offenders, the death penalty statutes 
addressed the specific crime charged.  In contrast, the 
juvenile provisions in Code § 16.1-272 used general language 
applicable to a range of offenses and did not contain a set 
penalty.  Id. at 22-23, 419 S.E.2d at 618.3  
In the present case, Code § 18.2-53.1 prescribes a 
specific penalty for individuals found guilty of use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony.  It requires a mandatory 
minimum of three years imprisonment for the first conviction 
and five years for subsequent convictions.  Code § 16.1-272 
only contains general language on sentencing and does not set 
                     
3 We nevertheless acknowledge that in Roper v. Simmons, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death 
 
16
forth specific penalties.  The rules of statutory construction, 
as exemplified in Thomas, require us to resolve the apparent 
conflict between Code § 18.2-53.1 and Code § 16.1-272 by 
applying Code § 18.2-53.1, which is the more specific statute 
on sentencing for the specific firearms offenses involved here. 
We hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in 
determining that the charges against Demetrious for use of a 
firearm were ancillary to his violent juvenile felony charges 
of robbery and that Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) was the proper 
subsection of the statute for the circuit court to consider in 
sentencing Demetrious.  However, the result would be the same 
if the circuit court could have sentenced Demetrious pursuant 
to Code § 16.1-272(A)(2).  Code § 18.2-53.1 requires any person 
convicted of that crime to serve a mandatory minimum period of 
incarceration, even if that person may be subject to sentencing 
under Code § 16.1-272.4 
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of Appeals 
correctly held with respect to the appeal in the matter of 
Demetrious Brown v. Commonwealth that the circuit court erred 
                                                                 
penalty on offenders who were under age 18 when their crimes 
were committed.  543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
4 In comparison, the mandatory minimum sentence is not 
applicable when a juvenile court retains jurisdiction and a 
juvenile is tried as a juvenile because, in such an instance, 
the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent rather than found guilty 
of a specific crime.  See Code § 16.1-273(A); Code § 16.1-308; 
Code § 16.1-228. 
 
17
when it sentenced Demetrious to a juvenile disposition under 
Code § 16.1-272 instead of imposing the mandatory minimum 
sentences required by Code § 18.2-53.1.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the Court of Appeals’ judgment as it relates to Demetrious.  
Conclusion 
 
In summary, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals in Dwayne’s appeal because the Commonwealth failed to 
preserve the sentencing issue as required by Rule 5A:18, and we 
will enter final judgment affirming the judgment of the circuit 
court with respect to that case.  With regard to Demetrious’ 
appeal, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
 
          Record No. 090161 – Reversed and final judgment. 
 
           Record No. 090201 – Affirmed. 
 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the Court of Appeals 
and now the majority here in these consolidated appeals have 
misconstrued the pertinent statutory scheme embodied within the 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law, Code 
§ 16.1-226 et seq. (“juvenile law”), in which the issue of the 
“apparent conflict” between the provisions of Code § 16.1-272 
and Code § 18.2-53.1 arises.  Specifically, I disagree with the 
conclusion reached by the majority that Code § 18.2-53.1 is the 
more specific of these two statutes and, therefore, the 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of this statute limit 
 
18
the circuit court’s discretion to sentence a juvenile tried as 
an adult pursuant to the sentencing alternatives provided by 
Code § 16.1-272. 
Initially, it should be noted that it is difficult to 
reconcile the patent disparity between the results occasioned 
by the majority’s decision in the appeal of Dwayne Jamar Brown 
and its decision in the appeal of Demetrious Omar Brown.  That 
disparity flows from the majority’s conclusion that in the case 
of Dwayne Jamar Brown the Commonwealth failed to preserve the 
substantive issue in its appeal to the Court of Appeals as 
required by Rule 5A:18.  The Court of Appeals had held that in 
both cases the Commonwealth had preserved the issue in accord 
with Rule 5A:18.  I agree with that holding for the reasons 
stated by the Court of Appeals.  Commonwealth v. Brown, Record 
No. 0919-08-3, slip op. at 5-8 (Nov. 25, 2008).  Beyond 
question, the record establishes that the experienced and able 
circuit court judge who presided over both of these cases was 
well aware of the Commonwealth’s position that the court was 
required to apply the mandatory sentencing provisions of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Dwayne Jamar Brown, I will 
not belabor the point because the majority’s reversal of the 
Court of Appeals’ holding on this procedural issue in that case 
effectively moots the substantive issue and has the practical 
 
19
effect of a holding that the trial court was not required to 
apply the sentencing terms of Code § 18.2-53.1 in that case.  
This result in the case of Dwayne Jamar Brown is consistent 
with my view of the substantive issue presented in both appeals 
now before this Court.  Accordingly, I will confine my 
subsequent analysis to the substantive issue raised in the 
appeal of Demetrious Omar Brown (hereafter, “Demetrious”). 
It is axiomatic that with the General Assembly’s enactment 
of the juvenile law, there is an intended distinction between a 
court’s permitted imposition of a sentence of imprisonment upon 
an adult person for the violation of a criminal statute and the 
dispositional alternatives available to a court to impose a 
sentence upon a similarly situated “juvenile,” defined as “a 
person less than 18 years of age” in Code § 16.1-228.  One of 
the purposes of the juvenile law is “[t]o protect the community 
against those acts of its citizens, both juveniles and adults, 
which are harmful to others and to reduce the incidence of 
delinquent behavior and to hold offenders accountable for their 
behavior.”  Code § 16.1-227(4).  To that end, the juvenile law 
“shall be construed liberally and as remedial in character.”  
Code § 16.1-227. 
In this context, the juvenile law draws a bright-line 
distinction between a juvenile who is fourteen years of age or 
older at the time of an alleged offense and is charged with an 
 
20
offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult and a 
juvenile who is less than fourteen years of age.  In only the 
former circumstance, the statutory scheme permits the juvenile 
court to transfer the juvenile to the appropriate circuit court 
having criminal jurisdiction of such offenses if committed by 
an adult.  Code § 16.1-269.1(A).  Additionally, a juvenile 
fourteen years of age or older charged with an offense which if 
committed by an adult could be punished by confinement in a 
state correctional facility, may waive the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court and have his case transferred to the appropriate 
circuit court.  Code § 16.1-270. 
As pertinent to this appeal, the juvenile law defines a 
“[v]iolent juvenile felony” as “any of the delinquent acts 
enumerated in subsection B or C of § 16.1-269.1 when committed 
by a juvenile 14 years of age or older.”  Code § 16.1-228.  
Robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58 is a violent juvenile 
felony under Code § 16.1-269.1(C).  A violation of Code § 18.2-
53.1, which penalizes as a separate felony the use or display 
of a firearm in committing a felony, is not an enumerated 
violent juvenile felony under either Code § 16.1-269.1(B) or 
(C). 
In addition to the age of the juvenile, the statutory 
scheme within the juvenile law draws a distinction between the 
type of felony offense charged against the juvenile.  In a case 
 
21
involving a juvenile fourteen years of age or older at the time 
of the alleged offense who is charged with an offense which 
would be a felony if committed by an adult, the case may be 
transferred by the juvenile court to the appropriate circuit 
court following a transfer hearing conducted on motion of the 
attorney for the Commonwealth pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(A).  
In contrast, in a case involving a juvenile fourteen years of 
age or older at the time of the alleged offense who is charged 
with a violent juvenile felony, the juvenile court, upon proper 
notice by the attorney for the Commonwealth, is required to 
conduct a preliminary hearing, and, upon a finding of probable 
cause, to certify the charge, and all ancillary charges, to the 
grand jury for indictment.  Code § 16.1-269.1(C) and (D).  In 
either circumstance, upon indictment, subsequent trial, and 
conviction of the juvenile, the statutory scheme provides for 
the dispositional alternatives available to the circuit court. 
These dispositional alternatives are contained within the 
comprehensive provisions of Code § 16.1-272.  This statute 
provides that: 
A. In any case in which a juvenile is indicted, the 
offense for which he is indicted and all 
ancillary charges shall be tried in the same 
manner as provided for in the trial of adults, 
except as otherwise provided with regard to 
sentencing. Upon a finding of guilty of any 
charge, the court shall fix the sentence without 
the intervention of a jury. 
 
 
22
   1.  If a juvenile is convicted of a violent 
juvenile felony, for that offense and for all 
ancillary crimes the court may order that (i) the 
juvenile serve a portion of the sentence as a 
serious juvenile offender under § 16.1-285.1 and 
the remainder of such sentence in the same manner 
as provided for adults; (ii) the juvenile serve 
the entire sentence in the same manner as 
provided for adults; or (iii) the portion of the 
sentence to be served in the same manner as 
provided for adults be suspended conditioned upon 
successful completion of such terms and 
conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile court 
upon disposition of a delinquency case including, 
but not limited to, commitment under subdivision 
14 of § 16.1-278.8 or § 16.1-285.1. 
 
   2.  If the juvenile is convicted of any other 
felony, the court may sentence or commit the 
juvenile offender in accordance with the criminal 
laws of this Commonwealth or may in its 
discretion deal with the juvenile in the manner 
prescribed in this chapter for the hearing and 
disposition of cases in the juvenile court, 
including, but not limited to, commitment under 
§ 16.1-285.1 or may in its discretion impose an 
adult sentence and suspend the sentence 
conditioned upon successful completion of such 
terms and conditions as may be imposed in a 
juvenile court upon disposition of a delinquency 
case.  
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Code § 16.1-278.8(14) permits the court to commit a 
juvenile eleven years of age or older to the Department of 
Juvenile Justice for certain felony offenses and Class 1 
misdemeanors.  Code § 16.1-285.1(A), relating to the commitment 
of a juvenile fourteen years of age or older who has been found 
guilty of certain felony offenses or has been transferred from 
a juvenile district court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1, 
 
23
permits the circuit court to commit the juvenile to the 
Department of Juvenile Justice if upon consideration of various 
statutorily enumerated criteria “in the opinion of the court 
the needs of the juvenile and the interests of the community 
would clearly best be served by [such] commitment.”  Code 
§ 16.1-285.1(C) provides that: 
In ordering commitment pursuant to this section, the 
court shall specify a period of commitment not to 
exceed seven years or the juvenile’s twenty-first 
birthday, whichever shall occur first.  The court may 
also order a period of determinate or indeterminate 
parole supervision to follow the commitment but the 
total period of commitment and parole supervision 
shall not exceed seven years or the juvenile’s 
twenty-first birthday, whichever occurs first. 
 
As pertinent to the present appeal, one of the criteria 
the court must consider in applying this code section is 
“whether the offense involved the use of a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon by brandishing, displaying, threatening with 
or otherwise employing such weapon.”  Code § 16.1-
285.1(B)(2)(iii). 
 
As recounted by the majority, Demetrious was sixteen years 
of age when he committed eleven counts of armed robbery in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58 and five counts of use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  
In accord with the statutory scheme outlined above, Demetrious 
waived a preliminary hearing on the charges, was certified to 
be tried in the circuit court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1, 
 
24
pled guilty to the charges, and was ultimately tried and 
convicted.  In its final sentencing order, in pertinent part, 
the circuit court stated: 
On the convictions for Use of a Firearm in Commission 
of a Felony and Use of a Firearm in Commission of a 
Felony, Second or Subsequent Offense, the Court finds 
[that] these offenses are not statutorily defined by 
[Code] § 16.1-228 as violent juvenile felonies.  The 
Court imposes a juvenile disposition on these 
convictions, in accordance with [Code] § 16.1-
272(A)(2), and hereby commits [Demetrious] to the 
Department of Juvenile Justice until his 20th 
birthday, in accordance with [Code] § 16.2-285.1. 
 
 
With regard to the robbery offenses, the circuit court 
sentenced Demetrious to a term of 25 years in the penitentiary 
on each offense to run concurrently, suspended those sentences 
conditioned on good behavior for 10 years, and placed 
Demetrious on active adult probation for 5 years commencing 
upon his release from incarceration with the Department of 
Juvenile Justice. 
Code § 16.1-272(A)(2), unlike subsection (A)(1), applies 
to “any other felony,” rather than a “violent juvenile felony” 
and all “ancillary crimes,” which are defined in Code § 16.1-
228 as “any delinquent act committed by a juvenile as a part of 
the same act or transaction . . . which would be a felony if 
committed by an adult.”  In this case, the use of a firearm 
offenses are clearly “ancillary crimes” to the violent juvenile 
felony of robbery.  Thus, the circuit court should have 
 
25
sentenced Demetrious pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) instead 
of Code § 16.1-272(A)(2).  Regardless, the Commonwealth never 
objected to Demetrious being sentenced pursuant to Code § 16.1-
272(A)(2), and thus, failed to preserve any objection to the 
circuit court’s use of subsection (A)(2).  
Nonetheless, the circuit court’s sentence in Demetrious’ 
case is entirely consistent with the provisions of Code § 16.1-
272(A)(1)(iii) which expressly provides that the court may 
order “the portion of the sentence to be served in the same 
manner as provided for adults to be suspended conditioned upon 
successful completion of such terms and conditions as may be 
imposed in a juvenile court . . . including . . . commitment 
. . . under [Code] § 16.1-285.1.”  Additionally, the circuit 
court’s sentence is consistent with the provisions of Code 
§ 16.1-272(A)(2) which also expressly provides that the court 
may order “commitment under [Code] § 16.1-285.1 or may in its 
discretion impose an adult sentence and suspend the sentence 
conditioned upon successful completion of such terms and 
conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile court upon 
disposition of a delinquency case.”  One such dispositional 
alternative available to a juvenile court is a commitment of a 
juvenile to the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to Code 
§ 16.1-278.8(A)(14). 
 
26
 
It is then readily apparent that whether the circuit court 
had imposed its sentence upon Demetrious under Code § 16.1-
272(A)(1) or (A)(2), both subsections permitted the court to 
commit Demetrious to the Department of Juvenile Justice under 
Code § 16.1-285.1 and to suspend the adult sentence imposed on 
him conditioned on his successful completion of that 
Department’s program.  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals and 
the majority conclude that the circuit court was not permitted 
to impose a juvenile disposition upon Demetrious under Code 
§ 16.1-272 because Code § 18.2-53.1 prescribes a specific 
penalty for individuals found guilty of use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony and, therefore, is a more specific 
statute than Code § 16.1-272 and requires the individual to 
serve a mandatory period of incarceration. 
 
As a general proposition, it is difficult for me to 
conclude from the language of Code § 18.2-53.1 relating to “any 
person” that the General Assembly intended to potentially 
impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years 
upon a juvenile fourteen years of age at the time the offense 
was committed and that “[s]uch punishment shall be separate and 
apart from, and shall be made to run consecutively with, any 
punishment received for the commission of the primary felony.”  
Such an interpretation of this statute would seem to be 
contrary to the ameliorative purpose of the juvenile justice 
 
27
system and the statutory scheme that implements it.  In my 
view, the “conflict” which the majority finds between Code 
§ 16.1-272 and Code § 18.2-53.1 is illusory. 
 
Code § 16.1-272 specifically and comprehensively addresses 
the sentences that are authorized to be imposed by a circuit 
court upon juveniles fourteen years of age or older.  In 
contrast, Code § 18.2-53.1 has no such age limitation for a 
person who violates its provisions.  Moreover, Code § 16.1-
272(A) expressly provides that “[i]n any case in which a 
juvenile is indicted, the offense . . . and all ancillary 
charges shall be tried in the same manner as provided for in 
the trial of adults, except as otherwise provided with regard 
to sentencing.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, if indeed there is a 
conflict between Code § 16.1-272 and Code § 18.2-53.1, these 
statutes are readily harmonized to resolve that conflict. 
 
Clearly Code § 18.2-53.1 reflects a legislative intent 
that the offense it prescribes be punished.  The provisions of 
Code § 16.1-272 permit a juvenile to be so punished, just as 
occurred in Demetrious’ case.  However, because Code § 16.1-272 
specifically addresses juvenile offenders and permits the 
suspension of sentences in “any [such] case,” this statute 
 
28
permits the circuit court in its discretion to suspend a 
sentence imposed under Code § 18.2-53.1.∗ 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals in Demetrious’ case and Dwayne’s case and 
enter final judgment affirming the decision of the circuit 
court in both cases. 
 
JUSTICE MILLETTE, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO joins, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority’s view that with respect to the 
appeal in the matter of Dwayne Jamar Brown v. Commonwealth, the 
Commonwealth did not comply with Rule 5A:18, and thus failed to 
preserve for appeal its argument that the circuit court did not 
have the discretion to sentence Dwayne as a juvenile on the use 
of a firearm in the commission of a felony charges. 
 
I respectfully dissent, however, in the matter of 
Demetrious Omar Brown v. Commonwealth.  I disagree with the 
majority on two issues.  First, I believe that the Commonwealth 
failed to preserve for appeal its argument that the use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony charges are ancillary 
charges to the robberies and thus require sentencing pursuant 
to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1). 
                     
∗ In light of the decision by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005), 
 
29
 
At Demetrious’ sentencing, the Commonwealth argued that 
under Code § 18.2-53.1 the five use of a firearm charges 
required a mandatory minimum sentence of 23 years (three years 
for the first conviction and five years for the second and each 
subsequent conviction).  The Commonwealth relied upon Bullock 
v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 631 S.E.2d 334 (2006), to 
support its argument that the “broad discretion in the juvenile 
sentencing statute could [not] override the mandatory 
provisions of [Code § 18.2-53.1].” 
 
Bullock was a juvenile who was certified and convicted as 
an adult for two robberies and two charges of use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony.  Id. at 362, 631 S.E.2d at 336.  
Pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1), the circuit court suspended 
imposition of the sentence on the robbery convictions and 
sentenced Bullock to consecutive terms of three and five years 
incarceration for the firearms convictions.  Id. at 364, 631 
S.E.2d at 336.  The Court of Appeals held that the mandatory 
minimum sentencing provisions of Code § 18.2-53.1 precluded the 
circuit court from suspending any portion of the mandatory 
sentence pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii).  Id. at 377, 
631 S.E.2d at 343.  In its analysis, the Court of Appeals 
discussed the conflict between the language of Code § 18.2-
                                                                 
the majority’s reliance upon Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 
419 S.E.2d 606 (1992), is not persuasive. 
 
30
53.1, requiring a mandatory minimum sentence that cannot be 
suspended, and the language of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii), 
permitting “the portion of the sentence to be served in the 
same manner as provided for adults be suspended upon successful 
completion of such terms and conditions as may be imposed in a 
juvenile court . . . .”  According to the Court of Appeals, 
there is a conflict when one statute prohibits suspension of a 
sentence and a second statute authorizes it, so that under Code 
§ 16.1-272(A)(1), a juvenile sentenced as an adult is not 
eligible to have his mandatory minimum sentence suspended.  
Bullock, 48 Va. App. at 377, 631 S.E.2d at 343. 
 
When the Commonwealth concluded its argument in 
Demetrious’ case, the circuit court judge recessed the 
sentencing proceeding in order to review the statutes and the 
Bullock opinion.  Upon consideration of the Commonwealth’s 
argument, the judge acknowledged that he agreed with the 
Commonwealth that if Demetrious were sentenced pursuant to Code 
§ 16.1-272(A)(1), any suspension of the sentence imposed for 
the use of firearm conviction was precluded by the mandatory 
sentencing requirements of Code § 18.2-53.1.  However, the 
judge concluded that if Demetrious were sentenced pursuant to 
Code § 16.1-272(A)(2), a juvenile sentence could be imposed, 
and suspended, without conflicting with the mandatory minimum 
requirements of Code § 18.2-53.1.  In concluding that 
 
31
Demetrious’ sentence for use of a firearm could be imposed 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(2), the judge wrongly relied on 
the fact that use of a firearm is not defined as a violent 
felony requiring sentencing pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1).  
The judge failed to consider that the use of a firearm charges 
were ancillary offenses to the robberies and that sentencing 
for violent offenses, as well as ancillary offenses, was 
required to be pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) (dealing with 
a conviction for “a violent felony . . . and for all ancillary 
crimes”) and not pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(2). 
 
When the circuit court rejected the Commonwealth’s 
argument and imposed a juvenile disposition pursuant to Code 
§ 16.1-272(A)(2) on the use of a firearm charges, the 
Commonwealth did not make any objection to the circuit court’s 
imposition of a juvenile disposition pursuant to Code § 16.1-
272(A)(2).  Despite ample opportunity to do so, the 
Commonwealth never argued that sentencing for the ancillary 
charges of use of a firearm was required pursuant to Code 
§ 16.1-272(A)(1).  The judge was never put on notice that the 
Commonwealth disagreed with the judge’s analysis that 
Demetrious could be sentenced for the nonviolent, yet 
ancillary, use of a firearm charges pursuant to Code § 16.1-
272(A)(2), instead of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1).  In light of that 
failure by the Commonwealth, I disagree with the majority that 
 
32
the Commonwealth properly preserved the sentencing issue for 
appeal. 
 
Second, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the 
resulting preclusion of juvenile disposition for the use of a 
firearm charges would have been the same if the circuit court 
was authorized to sentence Demetrious pursuant to Code § 16.1-
272(A)(2). 
 
Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) first authorizes the circuit court 
to “sentence or commit the juvenile offender in accordance with 
the criminal laws of the Commonwealth.”  But Code § 16.1-
272(A)(2) also gives the circuit court the alternative option 
to “in its discretion deal with the juvenile in the manner 
prescribed . . . for the hearing and disposition of cases in 
the juvenile court.”  This language is not in conflict with the 
mandatory sentencing language of Code § 18.2-53.1 because 
unlike subsection (A)(1)(iii) it does not, on the one hand, 
require a mandatory adult sentence, and then, on the other 
hand, allow its suspension.  Subsection (A)(2) provides as an 
option a specific provision dealing with exclusively juvenile 
sentencing for non-violent felonies.  This sentencing 
alternative addresses the dispositional goals of juvenile 
sentencing without ever requiring an adult sentence. 
 
We have long recognized that 
 
 
33
[t]he trial and punishment of minor offenders 
follows the regular criminal procedure, modified, 
in certain respects, by the statutes setting up 
juvenile and domestic relations courts.  These 
statutes have established a system whereby most 
juvenile offenders are first subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts for 
proceedings therein designed to subject such 
offenders to the supervision and control of the 
State in a manner in which the delinquent ways of 
the child will be corrected and he be made to lead 
a correct life.  
 
Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 279, 16 S.E.2d 641, 643 
(1941).  But different criminal procedures are applied to 
“children who have committed grave offenses.”  Id. at 279, 16 
S.E.2d at 643-44. 
 
In certain situations, Code § 16.1-272(A)(2) authorizes 
the circuit court to accomplish the rehabilitative purposes of 
juvenile disposition for juveniles tried as adults and found 
guilty of a felony, and gives the court the discretion to 
fashion a juvenile disposition, thereby avoiding the mandatory 
minimum sentences prescribed by Code § 18.2-53.1.  By contrast, 
none of the three sentencing options in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1), 
involving sentencing of a violent juvenile felony, gives the 
circuit court the discretion to impose such a juvenile 
disposition because all three require an adult sentence.  
Pursuant to subsection (A)(1), the court may order that (i) the 
juvenile be committed for a portion of his or her sentence 
under § 16.1-285.1 and serve the remainder of his or her 
 
34
sentence as an adult; (ii) the juvenile serve the entire 
sentence as an adult; or (iii) the portion of the sentence to 
be served as an adult be suspended conditioned upon successful 
completion of such terms and conditions as may be imposed in a 
juvenile court upon disposition of a delinquency case. 
 
Because the court under circumstances not presented in 
this case, involving sentencing of a juvenile convicted of any 
felony other than a violent felony or an ancillary offense, 
would have the option to fashion a juvenile disposition instead 
of imposing an adult sentence with a mandatory minimum period 
of incarceration, I cannot join the majority’s conclusion that 
the result would have been the same if the circuit court could 
have sentenced Demetrious pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(2). 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals in both Dwayne’s and Demetrious’ appeals 
because the Commonwealth failed to preserve its arguments with 
regards to sentencing, and would enter final judgment affirming 
the judgment of the circuit court in both cases. 
 
35