Title: Bonds v. Bonds
Citation: 409 So. 2d 704
Docket Number: 53000
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: January 27, 1982

409 So. 2d 704 (1982) Martha Moore BONDS v. George Mitchell BONDS and Life &amp; Casualty Insurance Company. No. 53000. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 27, 1982. Nora J. Hall, Roy O. Parker &amp; Associates, Tupelo, for appellant. Finch &amp; Finch, J. Barry Finch, Iuka, Hugh N. Clayton, New Albany, for appellees. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and BROOM and DAN M. LEE, JJ. DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Chancery Court of Tishomingo County wherein Martha Moore Bonds, complainant/appellant, caused a writ of garnishment to issue against Life &amp; Casualty Insurance Company, who admitted indebtedness to George Mitchell Bonds, defendant/appellee, in the amount of $10,477.28, being the cash value of three separate insurance policies issued to George Bonds. The writ of garnishment was quashed by the chancellor who opined that the cash values of the policies were exempt under Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-3-11 (1972). Aggrieved of this finding, Martha Bonds appeals and we reverse. On May 24, 1977, George Mitchell Bonds was held in willful contempt of the Chancery Court of Tishomingo County for nonpayment of child support and alimony. A judgment was rendered against him in the amount of $21,006.84, in favor of Martha Moore Bonds, his former wife, for child support and alimony. In an effort to satisfy a portion of the judgment, Martha Bonds subsequently caused a writ of garnishment to issue against Life &amp; Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee. Life &amp; Casualty answered the writ, admitting it was indebted to George Bonds for the cash value of three policies issued to Bonds, being: (1) No. 853594 with a cash value of $3,509.45; (2) No. 878333 with a cash value of $3,737.60; and (3) No. 1164454 with a cash value of $3,230.23. In an attempt to quash the writ, George Bonds asserted the cash surrender value of the life insurance policies was exempt pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-3-11 (1972). Martha Bonds answered the assertion to the right of exemption, stating that Section 85-3-11 was inapplicable due to the fact that appellee had the *705 right to change the beneficiary at any time. In fact, George Bonds had exercised his right to change beneficiaries several times. The chancellor found Section 85-3-11 controlling, so he granted Bonds' motion to quash the writ and entered a final decree to that effect. Did the chancellor err in quashing the writ of garnishment? Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-3-11 (1972) provides: Appellant contends this statute is inapplicable to the present case due to the fact that appellee reserved the right to change the beneficiary in each policy; therefore, the beneficiary's interest would not vest until the death of the insured. This question was well settled by this Court in American Life Insurance Company v. Hauer, 218 Miss. 560, 67 So. 2d 523 (1953), the Court stating: This principle of law applied to this case simply means the cash surrender value is still controlled or owned by Bonds until his death and does not answer the question presented here which is, does Section 85-3-11 exempt the cash surrender value from an action to garnish these funds to partially satisfy a decree for child support and alimony? This precise question has not been dealt with to our knowledge in this state; however, this Court in Dreyfus v. Barton, 98 Miss. 758, 54 So. 254 (1910), interpreted what is now Mississippi Code Annotated section 85-3-13 (1972), not the exemption statute involved here, exempting certain proceeds of life insurance policies made payable to the estate or administrator: Dreyfus, supra, involved the ordinary contractual obligation by which creditors and debtors are created, not child support and alimony payments that are involved here. This Court has distinguished the ordinary creditor and debtor relationship from child support and alimony judgments for exemption purposes as early as 1932 in the case of Hollis v. Bryan, 166 Miss. 874, 143 So. 687 (1932), interpreting exemptions under a federal act for world war veterans pertaining to child support and alimony, wherein this Court said in part: To the same effect is Stirgus v. Stirgus, 172 Miss. 337, 160 So. 285 (1935), wherein this Court stated: A more recent case of this Court distinguishing alimony and child support from the usual creditor/debtor relationship as it applies to exemption statutes is Felder v. Felder's Estate, 195 Miss. 326, 13 So. 2d 823 (1943), which states in part: We therefore hold that Section 85-3-11 is not applicable to this case of child support and alimony. While it has been said many times by this Court that exemption statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, Dreyfus, supra, United States Fid. &amp; Guar. Co. v. Holt, 148 Miss. 885, 114 So. 818 (1927), even this liberal interpretation must yield when the subject of the garnishment is for child support and alimony which have been specifically excluded from the general exemption statute, the only statute that could apply in this case, which is Section 85-3-1 and provides in part: The exclusion of alimony, separate maintenance and child support from the exemption statute was apparently brought about by this Court's decisions in Hollis, Stirgus and Felder, supra, distinguishing alimony and child support from the usual and ordinary creditor and debtor relationship. Perhaps it can be said that the public policy for alimony is not as strong now in the light of E.R.A., working wives and career women, as it was in 1932, 1935 and 1943 when the Hollis, Stirgus, and Felder, supra, decisions were written, but we hasten to point out that the amended general exemption statute, Section 85-3-1, supra, was effective from and after passage June 15, 1966. Furthermore, public policy with reference to child support has not diminished. This Court holds that the learned chancellor erred in holding appellee was exempt under Section 85-3-11, supra, and sustaining appellee's motion to quash garnishment. The order sustaining the motion to quash is reversed and judgment is rendered here against the garnishee defendant in the sums of $3,509.45 on Policy No. 853594, $3,737.60 on Policy No. 878333 and $3,230.23 on Policy No. 1164454. All costs are assessed to appellee George Mitchell Bonds. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT HERE FOR APPELLANT. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.