Title: Payne v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 081258
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2009

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
 
KELLY DINELLE PAYNE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No.  081258   
 
   JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
    APRIL 17, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, the primary issue is whether a criminal 
defendant can be convicted and punished for both felony homicide 
and aggravated involuntary manslaughter when the defendant 
killed one victim. 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Kelly D. 
Payne was charged with felony homicide in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-33, aggravated involuntary manslaughter in violation of 
Code § 18.2-36.1, and two counts of felony “hit and run” in 
violation of Code § 46.2-894.  Prior to trial, Payne filed a 
motion to compel the Commonwealth to pursue prosecution either 
under felony homicide or aggravated involuntary manslaughter.  
The trial court denied the motion. 
Following a jury trial, Payne was found guilty on all 
charges.  Payne appealed to the Court of Appeals.  In a 
published opinion, Payne v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 120, 661 
S.E.2d 513 (2008), the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of 
the trial court.  Payne appeals.  
 
 
FACTS 
At approximately 9:30 a.m. on March 7, 2006, Payne arrived 
at her place of employment, Auto Pawn of America (Auto Pawn), 
located on Midlothian Turnpike in Richmond.  She drove her 
boyfriend’s white pick-up truck to work.  Payne’s supervisor, 
Kevin Penrose, testified that Payne arrived at work with the 
smell of alcohol on her breath. 
Auto Pawn was equipped with video surveillance equipment, 
and the Commonwealth presented a portion of the video 
surveillance recording from the day of the accident as evidence.  
The video recording showed Payne at various times during the 
workday holding a bottle of Crown Royal whiskey.  The video 
recording also showed Payne drinking from a clear plastic cup, 
which contained a brown liquid. 
Payne’s co-worker, Steve Messner, testified that he 
observed Payne with a bottle of Crown Royal whiskey from the 
office freezer and also observed her with the bottle in one hand 
and a cup in the other hand.  Although Messner did not see Payne 
drink from the Crown Royal whiskey bottle, he saw her drinking 
from the plastic cup throughout the entire day.  Both Messner 
and Penrose testified that Payne’s behavior changed during the 
day; they testified that she became flirtatious.  Due to her 
“irrational and erratic” behavior, Penrose asked Payne to leave 
work early.  As she was leaving work, which was approximately 
 
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4:00 p.m., Messner attempted to stop Payne by yelling her name; 
however, she ignored him and “shot across” the road nearly 
striking another vehicle in the parking lot. 
Thereafter, Penrose discovered that approximately one third 
of the whiskey was missing from his Crown Royal whiskey bottle 
that he kept in the office freezer.  Shortly after Payne left 
Auto Pawn, she drove her vehicle into the back of a car that was 
stopped at a red light.  The driver of that car, Ruth Ann 
Priest, testified that the truck driven by Payne “slammed” into 
her car, and after the collision, Priest was bleeding and felt 
dazed, dizzy, and lightheaded.  Priest did not get out of the 
car.  However, she looked in her rear-view mirror and saw the 
driver of the truck was a woman with sunglasses down around her 
face who appeared “dazed” and “lethargic.”  Priest called 911 
and remained in her car.  Approximately four minutes after the 
collision and while Priest was on the telephone with the 911 
operator, Payne drove away from the scene of the accident.  
Priest later drove herself to a medical clinic where she was 
diagnosed with a neck sprain. 
Michael Foster testified that he saw someone driving away 
from the location of the accident with Priest in a white pick-up 
truck, which he identified as the truck Payne was driving.  
Foster followed the truck and observed the driver drive onto the 
curb.  He further observed the driver swerve across all three 
 
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lanes of traffic and make an abrupt right turn.  The driver then 
drove the truck back onto the curb striking a pedestrian, 
Ashokkumar M. Patel.  Foster called 911 and reported the 
accident stating that the driver, later identified as Payne, was 
“driving like a maniac.”  Payne did not stop the truck after 
hitting Patel; she continued onto Chippenham Parkway.  Patel 
later died from his injuries. 
At approximately 4:30 p.m., Payne arrived at the Forest 
Restaurant, which is about ten minutes by car from the 
intersection where Patel was struck.  Frances Laney, a waitress 
at the restaurant, testified that Payne “seemed fine” when she 
first arrived, and she served her a beer and a sandwich.  Laney 
conceded that she did not observe Payne walk into the restaurant 
because Laney was in the kitchen at that time.  Laney testified 
that Payne appeared intoxicated after she made “a mess” of her 
sandwich; other customers informed her that Payne had ingested 
pills. 
After Laney testified, Payne’s counsel moved for a 
mistrial, arguing that Laney’s testimony was exculpatory 
evidence that was not disclosed by the Commonwealth prior to 
trial.  The trial court denied the motion. 
The Commonwealth introduced into evidence at trial a 
transcript of a telephone call that Payne placed while she was 
an inmate at the Richmond City Jail.  During the telephone 
 
4
conversation, Payne stated that she was “doing shots” of liquor 
during the day of her accident.  She also stated that she was an 
alcoholic and that she had previously attended Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings. 
The Commonwealth presented Dr. Julia Pearson, a 
toxicologist, to testify concerning the effects of alcohol and 
the ability of alcoholics to conceal those effects.  Payne’s 
counsel objected to the expert testimony, arguing that the 
Commonwealth had failed to lay a proper foundation for the 
testimony.  The trial court overruled the objection, but 
excluded expert testimony regarding general information 
concerning intoxication and limited Dr. Pearson’s testimony to 
the effects of alcohol on an alcoholic.  Dr. Pearson testified 
that alcoholics are able to mask the effects of alcohol on their 
psychomotor skills but not on their cognitive skills, such as 
their judgment and reasoning. 
Payne did not present any evidence.  The jury found Payne 
guilty of felony homicide, aggravated involuntary manslaughter, 
and two counts of felony “hit and run”, and sentenced her to a 
total of 46 years in prison.  Payne filed a post-trial motion, 
arguing that her sentences for both felony homicide and 
aggravated involuntary manslaughter violated the prohibition 
against double jeopardy.  Payne also filed a motion for a new 
trial, arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose 
 
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exculpatory evidence prior to trial.  The trial court conducted 
a hearing and denied the motions. 
Payne appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted her 
petition as to her assignment of error concerning double 
jeopardy.  In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
Payne’s conviction holding that the legislature intended to 
impose multiple punishments.  Id. at 129, 661 S.E.2d at 517. 
ANALYSIS 
Payne contends that the trial court erred in convicting her 
for both felony murder and aggravated involuntary manslaughter.  
Payne argues that pursuant to Code § 18.2-36.1(C), the 
legislature has authorized prosecution under that vehicular 
manslaughter statute and any other homicide statute, but not for 
a common law homicide offense.  She contends that felony 
homicide is a common law offense and, thus, Code § 18.2-36.1(C) 
does not authorize prosecution of felony homicide in addition to 
vehicular aggravated involuntary manslaughter.  Additionally, 
Payne contends it is a violation of the double jeopardy 
provision of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to convict and sentence her twice for killing a 
single person.  
 
The Commonwealth responds that the language in Code § 18.2-
36.1(C) supports and proves that the legislature intended 
multiple punishments in this instance.  The Commonwealth further 
 
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states that convictions under felony murder and aggravated 
involuntary manslaughter require proof of different elements, 
and do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.  We 
agree with the Commonwealth. 
 
Resolution of the issue concerning whether the multiple 
punishments imposed upon the defendant are proper requires a 
determination of what punishments the legislature intended to 
impose.  In making such a determination, we must first examine 
the statutes under which the defendant was convicted. 
 
Code § 18.2-36.1 provides as follows: 
A. Any person who, as a result of driving under the 
influence in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) 
of § 18.2-266 or any local ordinance substantially 
similar thereto unintentionally causes the death of 
another person, shall be guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter. 
 
B. If, in addition, the conduct of the defendant was 
so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless 
disregard for human life, he shall be guilty of 
aggravated involuntary manslaughter, a felony 
punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 
one nor more than 20 years, one year of which shall be 
a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. 
 
C. The provisions of this section shall not preclude 
prosecution under any other homicide statute.  This 
section shall not preclude any other revocation or 
suspension required by law.  The driver’s license of 
any person convicted under this section shall be 
revoked pursuant to subsection B of § 46.2-391. 
 
Code § 18.2-33, entitled “Felony homicide defined; punishment,” 
provides as follows: 
 
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The killing of one accidentally, contrary to the 
intention of the parties, while in the prosecution of 
some felonious act other than those specified in 
§§ 18.2-31 and 18.2-32 is murder of the second degree 
and is punishable by confinement in a state 
correctional facility for not less than five years nor 
more than forty years. 
 
This Court must determine the General Assembly’s intent 
from the words contained in the statutes.  Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006).  
Clearly, the language in Code § 18.2-36.1(C) stating that “[t]he 
provisions of this section shall not preclude prosecution under 
any other homicide statute” expresses the legislative intent for 
multiple punishments.  Code § 18.2-36.1(C) does not make an 
exception for a prosecution under a statute that was previously 
a common law crime.  Code § 18.2-33 is a homicide statute; it 
defines the elements and states the punishment for felony 
homicide.  Code § 18.2-36.1(C) specifically states that 
prosecution for aggravated involuntary manslaughter does not 
preclude prosecution under another homicide statute such as Code 
§ 18.2-33. 
We next must discern whether the convictions and 
punishments for aggravated involuntary manslaughter and felony 
murder, which both stem from the death of one victim, violate 
the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  In pertinent part, this amendment 
provides that “[n]o person shall  . . . be subject for the same 
 
8
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.  “This constitutional provision guarantees 
protection against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same 
offense.”  Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 227, 509 S.E.2d 
293, 300 (1999).  In a case where both of the defendant’s 
convictions occurred in a single trial, the only relevant 
constitutional guarantee is protection against multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 
Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (1981). 
It is clear from the face of the statutes that the General 
Assembly intended to create two distinct offenses, aggravated 
involuntary manslaughter and felony homicide, which Payne 
violated by her actions.  Thus, we must consider the rule set 
forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), 
that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation 
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether 
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does 
not.”  See Payne, 257 Va. at 228, 509 S.E.2d at 300.  In this 
case, each offense requires proof of an element that the other 
does not.  The felony homicide statute requires the Commonwealth 
to prove that the defendant unintentionally caused the death of 
 
9
another, while in the prosecution of a felonious act.  Code 
§ 18.2-33.  The aggravated involuntary manslaughter statute 
requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant was 
driving under the influence of intoxicants, unintentionally 
caused the death of another, and engaged in conduct that was “so 
gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for 
human life.”  Code § 18.2-36.1(B). 
To convict under the felony homicide statute, the 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant committed the killing 
in the commission of a felonious act; however, the Commonwealth 
is not required to prove any level of intoxication or 
recklessness.  To convict under the aggravated involuntary 
manslaughter statute, the Commonwealth must prove intoxication 
and recklessness; however, the Commonwealth is not required to 
prove that the defendant committed the killing in the commission 
of a felonious act. 
Each offense requires proof of an element that the other 
does not.  We hold that aggravated involuntary manslaughter, 
Code § 18.2-36.1, and felony homicide, Code § 18.2-33, are 
different offenses under the Blockburger test.  The General 
Assembly intended that each statutory offense be punished 
separately, and Payne’s convictions and punishments do not 
violate the constitutional guarantee of protection against 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
 
10
Payne also assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to 
grant her motion for a new trial on the grounds that the 
Commonwealth failed to produce exculpatory evidence to the 
defense prior to trial, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963).  Specifically, Payne argues that the 
Commonwealth failed to disclose Laney’s testimony that Payne did 
not appear intoxicated when initially arriving at the 
restaurant, and that it was only after other customers informed 
Laney that Payne had taken some pills that Laney noticed Payne 
was intoxicated.  The Commonwealth contends that it was not 
required to disclose such evidence because the evidence is not 
exculpatory and Payne was aware that she went to the restaurant, 
that she ingested pills, and that there were other people in the 
restaurant that may have observed her behavior.  The 
Commonwealth further asserts that the evidence was not material 
for purposes of Brady. 
In Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, the Supreme Court held that “the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  The defendant’s 
due process rights have been violated if he does not receive 
such evidence or if he receives the evidence at a point when he 
cannot effectively use it.  Bowman v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 130, 
 
11
133, 445 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1994).  “Exculpatory evidence is 
material if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense.  A ‘reasonable probability’ is 
one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 
of the proceeding.”  Id. at 133, 445 S.E.2d at 112. 
Assuming, without deciding, that Laney’s testimony was 
exculpatory, it was not material because there is no reasonable 
probability that pretrial disclosure of Laney’s testimony would 
have resulted in a different outcome.  Payne was charged with 
killing Patel while driving under the influence, and evidence 
that she ingested pills after the accident was not relevant to 
her level of intoxication at the time she hit Patel.  The 
Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence that Payne was 
intoxicated before she killed Patel.  Payne smelled of alcohol 
when she arrived at work, and there was testimony and a video 
recording depicting Payne’s behavior at work as “erratic.”  The 
videotape showed Payne holding a Crown Royal whiskey bottle and 
a cup.  After she left work, one third of the Crown Royal 
whiskey was missing, and the jury could have inferred she drank 
it.  An eyewitness reported that Payne was “driving like a 
maniac” right before and right after she hit Patel.  
Additionally, during a telephone call Payne placed from jail, 
Payne admitted that she was “doing shots” of liquor the entire 
 
12
day of her accident.  Thus, there is not a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different had the Commonwealth disclosed Laney’s testimony 
pretrial, and denial of Payne’s motion for a new trial was not 
erroneous. 
Payne also argues that the trial court erred in allowing 
expert testimony concerning general information of intoxication.  
The Commonwealth asserts the expert testimony concerned the 
behavior of alcoholics and that a proper foundation was laid by 
introducing the telephone call where Payne admitted she was an 
alcoholic and that she attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. 
 
A trial court’s admission of expert testimony is in the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  Commonwealth v. Miller, 
273 Va. 540, 549, 643 S.E.2d 208, 213 (2007).  Expert testimony 
is admissible when it concerns matters not within the ordinary 
knowledge of the jury.  Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 
726, 250 S.E.2d 749, 755-56 (1979).  The purpose of expert 
testimony is to assist the trier of fact in understanding the 
evidence.  Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 95, 103, 557 
S.E.2d 213, 218 (2002).  In addition, expert testimony must be 
based on an adequate foundation; “expert testimony is 
inadmissible if it is founded on assumptions that have an 
insufficient factual basis.”  Keesee v. Donigan, 259 Va. 157, 
161, 524 S.E.2d 645, 647-48 (2000). 
 
13
 
In this case, the trial court specifically excluded expert 
testimony regarding general information concerning intoxication 
and limited the expert’s testimony to that concerning how 
alcoholics are able to conceal certain effects of alcohol.  The 
Commonwealth had previously introduced the transcript of Payne’s 
telephone conversation when she admitted that she was an 
alcoholic and attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.  Dr. 
Pearson’s testimony concerning how an alcoholic may be able to 
mask certain symptoms of intoxication was not within the 
ordinary knowledge of a layperson, and it assisted the jury in 
understanding why Payne may not have appeared drunk at times.  
We hold that the expert testimony was based on an adequate 
foundation and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting such expert testimony. 
 
Payne further contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to support her convictions for aggravated involuntary 
manslaughter, felony murder, and the felony “hit and run” 
involving Priest.  Regarding the aggravated involuntary 
manslaughter conviction, Payne argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that she was intoxicated at the time she 
hit Patel.  Payne asserts that this Court should reverse her 
conviction for the felony “hit and run” involving Priest because 
the evidence was insufficient to prove that Payne knew or should 
have known that the collision resulted in an injury.  
 
14
Consequently, as that conviction was the predicate felony for 
the conviction of felony murder, Payne argues that her 
conviction for felony murder should be reversed also. 
 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth and will reverse the judgment of 
the trial court only if it is plainly wrong or without 
evidentiary support.  Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 182, 
670 S.E.2d 727, 734 (2009).  We hold that the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient 
to support Payne’s convictions. 
 
The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Payne 
was intoxicated prior to hitting Patel to support her conviction 
of aggravated involuntary manslaughter.  Her employer smelled 
alcohol on her breath, and Payne was asked to leave work early 
because of her “irrational and erratic” behavior.  After she 
left work, whiskey kept there was found to be missing.  Payne 
admitted that she was “doing shots” of liquor the entire day of 
her accident, and immediately before and after Payne hit Patel, 
an eyewitness observed Payne driving erratically.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court’s finding that Payne was intoxicated when she hit Patel, 
and, accordingly, Payne’s conviction for aggravated involuntary 
manslaughter is affirmed. 
 
15
 
Payne was also convicted of felony “hit and run” under Code 
§ 46.2-894, which provides in part: 
 
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident 
in which a person is killed or injured or in which an 
attended vehicle or other attended property is damaged 
shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the 
accident as possible . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Any person convicted of a violation of this 
section is guilty of (i) a Class 5 felony if the 
accident results in injury to or the death of any 
person . . . . 
 
In addressing a predecessor statute to Code § 46.2-894, this 
Court stated the following in regards to the elements of the 
crime of “hit and run”: 
Knowledge necessarily is an essential element of the 
crime. This does not mean that the person should have 
positive knowledge of the extent of the damage or 
injuries inflicted. It does mean that, in order to be 
guilty of violating the statute, "the driver must be 
aware that harm has been done; it must be present in 
his mind that there has been an injury; and then, with 
that in his mind, he must deliberately go away without 
making himself known. If an injury is inflicted under 
such circumstances as would ordinarily superinduce the 
belief in a reasonable person that injury would flow, 
or had flowed, from the accident or collision, then it 
is the duty of the operator to stop his vehicle." 
 
Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 220, 38 S.E.2d 328, 
329 (1946).  “[T]he Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 
possessed actual knowledge of the occurrence of the accident, 
and such knowledge of injury which would be attributed to a 
 
16
reasonable person under the circumstances of the case.”  Kil v. 
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 811, 407 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1991). 
 
In this case, there was evidence that Payne knew or should 
have known that Priest was injured during the collision.  Priest 
testified that Payne “slammed” into the back of Priest’s car and 
the collision “jerked [Priest] forward pretty hard.”  The 
collision left Priest “bleeding,” “dazed,” “dizzy,” “light 
headed” and resulted in a sprained neck.  Further, the collision 
caused Payne’s glasses to fall down around her face and left 
Payne sitting in her vehicle “dazed” and “lethargic.”  Payne was 
clearly aware of the extent of the accident as the collision was 
significant enough that Payne waited at the accident scene for 
over four minutes before deciding to flee.  During the time 
Payne was at the scene after the collision, Payne never went to 
Priest’s vehicle to check on her injury status, even though 
Priest remained in her vehicle.  Thus, the evidence was 
sufficient to support a finding that Payne knew of the 
collision, and knew or should have known of Priest’s injury, 
and, accordingly, Payne’s conviction for the felony “hit and 
run” involving Priest is affirmed.  Consequently, Payne’s 
argument that the circuit court erred in finding her guilty of 
felony murder because there was insufficient evidence to prove 
she was guilty of felony “hit and run” in the accident involving 
Priest must fail. 
 
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For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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