Title: ENGLUND v ENGLUND
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13231
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 28, 1976

No. 13231 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1976 DANNIE E N G L U N D , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - CLINTON E. E N G L U N D , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Smith and Harper, Helena, Montana Charles A. Smith, 1 1 1 argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Thomas A. Dowling argued, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Submitted: March 1, 1976 Decided: /h/\ti 2 $ 13/o I , ;*b Filed : , . , ' M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and Clark County. The a c t i o n w a s i n s t i t u t e d as a motion t o vacate a portion of a judgment made and entered i n a divorce proceeding some f i v e years ago. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t denied t h e motion and t h i s appeal followed. After some t h i r t y years of marriage t h e wife i n s t i t u t e d proceedings f o r s e p a r a t e maintenance i n 1969. The husband counterclaimed asking f o r a divorce. Following a hearing t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted t h e husband a divorce. The decree ordered a property d i v i s i o n c o n s i s t i n g of f o u r i n s t a l l m e n t lump sum pay- ments of $2,500 each, over a two year period, by t h e husband t o t h e wife, with corresponding r e a l property conveyances from t h e wife t o t h e husband. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t ordered t h e husband t o pay $400 per month alimony. Immediately following t h e decree t h e wife f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l a l l e g i n g i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e proceedings by t h e c o u r t , i n t h a t it d i d n o t r u l e on m a t e r i a l f a c t s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e a s s e t s of t h e p a r t i e s . Hearing was had on t h e motion b u t t h e c o u r t took no a c t i o n . N o appeal was taken from t h e decree. Thereafter t h e husband sought enforcement of t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e decree d i r e c t i n g t h e signing over of c e r t a i n property t o him and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h e wife i n contempt and ordered her t o execute c e r t a i n deeds and documents t o t h e husband. She complied and t h e husband made t h e $400 monthly payments u n t i l 1 9 7 5 when he moved t o set a s i d e t h e alimony award payments on t h e grounds they were void because t h e divorce w a s granted t o him. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h e alimony award was void, b u t held t h e husband was estopped from denying i t s v a l i d i t y a f t e r r e l y i n g upon t h e decree t o compel t h e wife t o t r a n s f e r c e r t a i n property t o him. The husband appeals and r a i s e s t h e s e i s s u e s : 1. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was without j u r i s d i c t i o n , power o r a u t h o r i t y t o award alimony t o t h e wife because t h e divorce w a s not granted t o t h e wife f o r an offense of t h e husband. 2. Section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, t h e s e c t i o n governing t h e award of alimony only t o t h e wife i n divorce a c t i o n s i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under A r t i c l e 11, Sections 4 and 17, 1972 Montana Constitution; A r t i c l e 111, Section 27 of t h e 1889 Montana Constitution; and t h e F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments of t h e United S t a t e s Constitution. The t r i a l judge i n t h i s case had d i f f i c u l t y i n t r y i n g t o under stand what had moved t h e t r i a l judge i n t h e o r i g i n a l divorce a c t i o n i n terming t h e award t o t h e wife a s alimony. I n a memorandum and order he noted: "There i s no question t h a t t h e provision of t h e decree (denominated 'Findings of F a c t , Conclusions of Law and Judgment' and f i l e d May 1 4 , 1970) pro- viding f o r alimony payments by t h e defendant, who w a s granted t h e divorce, was void a b i n i t i o , as such. I t should be noted, however, t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s order i t s e l f suggests t h a t t h e payments required w e r e not alimony, a s described, but payments t o be made as a p a r t of a property s e t t l e m e n t , not agreed upon between t h e p a r t i e s . The f i r s t order of t h e c o u r t provides f o r f o u r payments of $2,500.00 each 'as a p a r t i a l property s e t t l e m e n t . ' N o reference i s made t o any o t h e r p a r t of t h e 'property settle- ment', which suggests, i n f e r e n t i a l l y , t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t may be t h e payments t h a t were denominated 'alimony.' However, t h e t h i r d p a r t of t h e o r d e r deepens t h e mystery by providing f o r modification of t h e 'alimony' upon proper showing. I f t h e 'alimony' w e r e t o be deemed a p a r t of t h e 'property settlement' then modification would n o t be appropriate. W e a r e , then, a t a l o s s t o determine j u s t e x a c t l y what was intended by t h e c o u r t i n regard t o t h e payments t h e defendant now wishes t o set a s i d e . "Nor do I have any doubt t h a t t h e payments made t o d a t e i n compliance with t h e 'alimony' order do not and cannot c o n s t i t u t e r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h a t o r d e r , i f t h e order i t s e l f is void. It i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a void o r d e r cannot be made e f f e c t i v e by com- pliance. " However, t h e t r i a l c o u r t goes on t o hold t h a t due t o t h e f a c t a p p e l l a n t had s u c c e s s f u l l y taken a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n t o enforce the decree, he was estopped from challenging its validity. We agree. We do not agree that the order was void. - The court was in jurisdiction at the time it made its decree and what obviously was intended to be a part of the "property settlement" became mistakenly labeled "alimony". Here the wife who had worked for most of the marital years in the business office of appellant's plumbing business, helped in the accumulation of considerable property. She signed over those interests at a time after she incurred a serious physical nerve disease and could no longer be a productive part of the labor market. Her medical and drug expenses had become far more costly than those of a person of her age. We find the $400 payments to be a part of the "property settlement" and not walimony" as re- ferred to by the district court. Appellant's second issue relates to the constitutionality of section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947. Having decided the alimony argu- ment, it is unnecessary to discuss the constitutional issue, but we note the question was not raised in the district court and could not on appeal be argued before this Court. It is fundamental that on appeal this Court will consider for review only those issues raised before the trial court. Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48; State Highway Commission v. Milanovich, 142 Mont. 410, 384 P.2d 752; Clark v. Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, The judgment is affirmed. L Justice / \ We concur: \ Justi I sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice