Title: DEL. VALLEY UNDER. AGENCY, INC. v. Williams & Sapp, Inc.
Citation: 359 Pa. Super. 368, 518 A.2d 1280
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 1986

359 Pa. Superior Ct. 368 (1986) 518 A.2d 1280 DELAWARE VALLEY UNDERWRITING AGENCY, INC. v. WILLIAMS &amp; SAPP, INC., and Walter Sapp Insurance Agency, Inc., Successor, and Donald G. Powell and Nancy Powell, His Wife. Appeal of WILLIAMS &amp; SAPP, INC. and Walter Sapp Insurance Agency, Inc., Successor. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued September 10, 1986. Filed December 11, 1986. *370 Georgia A. Broz, Pittsburgh, for appellants. David K. Rudov, Pittsburgh, for Delaware Valley, appellee. James H. Joseph, Pittsburgh, for Powell, appellee. Before BROSKY, ROWLEY and POPOVICH, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from an order of the trial court which sustained preliminary objections for lack of personal jurisdiction over the appellees, Donald and Nancy Powell. We must reverse and remand the matter for reasons herein stated. The factual allegations which were set forth in appellees' preliminary objections consisted of the following:[1] Appellees, the Powells, lived in Fox Chapel until 1984, at which time they moved to the State of Washington. Although they did not sell their house in Fox Chapel at that time, their homeowners' insurance policy was cancelled because the house was vacant. The Powells had initially received their insurance coverage through their broker, Williams &amp; Sapp, Inc., and the successor, Walter Sapp Insurance Agency, Inc. (Sapp). The Powells contacted Sapp to learn what action they should take concerning the insurance. Sapp agreed to *371 contact other sources of insurance to determine what coverage could be obtained. The Powells eventually obtained insurance coverage through their insurance brokers in Tacoma, Washington. Sapp, however, had obtained an insurance binder for the Powell's dwelling from plaintiff, Delaware Valley Underwriting Agency, Inc. After being advised of the existence of the other policy, the Powells instructed Sapp to cancel the binder. The Powells have not returned to Pennsylvania and they are not engaged in the conduct of any business in Pennsylvania. The trial court concluded that a Pennsylvanian could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the Powells under the long arm statute[2] essentially because "[t]he Powells had no reason to believe that through the telephone call with Sapp [that] they were entering into a contract with a Pennsylvania company requiring premiums to be paid in Pennsylvania. Thus, the quality and nature of the activity of the Powells in Pennsylvania is such that it would be unreasonable and unfair to require them to conduct a defense in this state." Trial Court Opinion at 4. This appeal followed. Appellant contends that the trial court erred because it improperly relied upon the predecessor statute to 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 5322. According to appellant, Section 5322 now provides a broader basis for jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the long arm statute, supra, are set forth in the following manner: 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322. Additionally, the applicable standard of review has been summarized accordingly: At this stage of the proceedings, because "of the failure of the parties to provide the evidence necessary for a proper determination of the issue", we must remand the matter. Holt Hauling &amp; Warehousing v. Aronow Roofing, 309 Pa.Super. 158, 161, 454 A.2d 1131, 1133 (1983). The record in this case contains no evidence from which we can make an independent determination of the nature and quality of the Powells' activity in Pennsylvania with respect to their ownership of the real estate and the instant cause of action. Although the trial court states that the Powells were not parties to the insurance contract and that the Powells have not returned to Pennsylvania since their departure to the State of Washington, there is no record evidence to support its conclusions. The trial court also states that the factual allegations which were set forth in the appellees' preliminary objections "were not contested by Sapp".[3] However, we have said: Holt Hauling &amp; Warehousing v. Aronow Roofing, 309 Pa.Super. at 161, 454 A.2d at 1133 (1983). *375 Because appellees bore the burden of supporting its objections to the court's jurisdiction, we are unable to rely upon the uncontested factual allegations which were set forth in the appellees' preliminary objections. Greene v. Liebergott, 236 Pa.Super. at 477, 344 A.2d at 502 ("Because the preliminary objections did not contain a notice to plead, this averment of fact must be considered as being denied by appellant despite his failure to file a responsive pleading.") Hence, a "remand is necessary to allow the parties a reasonable period of time within which to present evidence by deposition, interrogatories or otherwise which will allow a determination of the factual issues raised by" the preliminary objections. Id. Order vacated and record remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.[4] Jurisdiction relinquished. [1] We also note that the order which forms the basis of the instant appeal is a final order. Reifinger v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 315 Pa.Super. 147, 149-56, 461 A.2d 839, 841 (1983) ("the order in question effectively terminated the litigation as to the additional defendant".). [2] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322. [3] Trial Court Opinion at 1. [4] On remand, the trial court should apply the current version of the long arm statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322. See e.g., Kenny v. Alexson Equipment Company, 495 Pa. 107, 125-27, 432 A.2d 974, 980 (1981).