Title: Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor and Industry Review Commission
Citation: 2003 WI 106
Docket Number: 2002AP000815
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2003

2003 WI 106 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0815 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and  
Susan Catlin,  
 
Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 290 
Reported at:  258 Wis. 2d 414, 654 N.W.2d 286 
(Ct. App. 2002 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 28, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Barron   
 
JUDGE: 
James C. Eaton   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and SYKES, JJ., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Robert H. Duffy, Sean M. Scullen, and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert H. Duffy. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, the cause was argued by David C. Rice, assistant 
attorney 
general, 
with 
whom 
on the 
brief 
was Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Susan Catlin, there was a 
brief by Monica M. Murphy and the Wisconsin Coalition for 
Advocacy, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Monica M. Murphy. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Melissa A. Cherney and 
Chris Galinat, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Education 
Association Council. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Rebecca L. Salawdeh and 
Urban Taylor & Stawski, Ltd., Milwaukee; Patrick O. Patterson 
and Law Office of Patrick O. Patterson, S.C., Fox Point; and 
Patricia A. Lauten and The Schroeder Group, S.C., Waukesha, on 
behalf of the Survival Coalition of Wisconsin 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Francis X. Sullivan, 
William C. Williams, and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Cheese Makers Associations, Inc., and 
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Paul A. Kinne, Madison, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2003 WI 106 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0815  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 289) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and  
Susan Catlin,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a decision 
of the Court of Appeals, District III,1 which affirmed an order 
of the circuit court of Barron County, the Honorable James C. 
Eaton presiding.  The circuit court affirmed a decision of the 
State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), 
which reversed an order of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gary 
Olstad.  LIRC determined that Susan Catlin (Catlin) was an 
individual with a disability within the meaning of the Wisconsin 
                                                 
1 Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2002 WI App 290, 258 
Wis. 2d 414, 654 N.W.2d 286. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
2 
 
Fair Employment Act (WFEA), Wis. Stat. § 111.31-.395 (1999-
2000),2 and that Crystal Lake Cheese Factory had discriminated 
against her based on her disability within the meaning of the 
WFEA.  LIRC found that Crystal Lake's refusal to modify Catlin's 
job duties to exempt her from performing the heaviest physical 
tasks, and to make physical modifications to the work place, 
constituted the denial of a reasonable accommodation, which it 
could have provided without hardship. 
¶2 
We are presented with the following issues: (1) 
whether LIRC reasonably interpreted Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b)3 
and § 111.34(2)(a)4 of the WFEA, when it found there was a 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) provides:  
(1) Employment discrimination because of disability 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(b) Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's 
or 
prospective 
employee's 
disability 
unless 
the 
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise 
or business. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(2)(a) provides:  
Notwithstanding 
s. 111.322, 
it 
is 
not 
employment 
discrimination because of disability to refuse to 
hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar 
or terminate from employment, membership or licensure 
any 
individual, 
or 
to 
discriminate 
against 
any 
individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, 
conditions 
or 
privileges 
of 
employment 
if 
the 
disability is reasonably related to the individual's 
ability 
to 
adequately 
undertake 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities 
of 
that 
individual's 
employment, 
membership or licensure. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
3 
 
reasonable accommodation Crystal Lake could have provided its 
former employee, Catlin, without hardship; (2) whether Crystal 
Lake was denied due process by LIRC's failure to consult with 
the administrative law judge; (3) whether there was substantial 
and credible evidence to support the factual findings made by 
LIRC, upon which it based its decision that there was a 
reasonable 
accommodation 
Crystal Lake 
could 
have provided 
Catlin, 
without 
hardship, 
within 
the 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and § 111.34(2)(a). 
¶3 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
Accordingly, we hold that requiring Crystal Lake to modify the 
job duties of Catlin and make physical modifications to the 
workplace 
was 
not 
unreasonable. 
 
With 
such 
reasonable 
accommodations, she would have the ability to undertake, 
adequately, her job-related responsibilities.   
¶4 
Next, we hold that Crystal Lake was not denied due 
process when LIRC, prior to reversing the ALJ's holding, failed 
to consult with the ALJ.  We hold that since LIRC's findings did 
not hinge on issues of witness credibility, LIRC was not 
required to confer with the ALJ, and that there was therefore no 
violation of Crystal Lake's due process rights. 
¶5 
Finally, we hold that there was substantial and 
credible evidence in the record to justify LIRC's findings.  
There was substantial evidence to show that Crystal Lake could 
have made reasonable accommodations for Catlin, and Crystal Lake 
has failed to meet its burden of establishing that such 
No. 
02-0815   
 
4 
 
reasonable accommodations for Catlin would create hardship on 
it. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In August 1995 Catlin was hired by the Crystal Lake 
Cheese Factory to work in its wholesale department.  The 
wholesale department consisted of four positions: department 
head, cheese cutter, cryovacer (shrink-wrapping or bagging and 
sealing the cheese), and labeler. The main duties of the 
wholesale 
department 
were 
to 
cut 
cheese 
into 
specified 
quantities and sizes according to orders.  The cheese was then 
packaged and sealed, labeled, and boxed for shipping.  Catlin 
was initially hired as a cheese cutter, but was later promoted 
to department head of the four-person department.  
¶7 
A typical day for Catlin started with her making 
calculations concerning the weight of the different cheeses that 
had to be cut, based on the orders.  This took about an hour.  
Next, she made up labels and put them on the boxes that the 
orders went into.  She would pull the boxes from the back, make 
the boxes up and put the labels on them.  Meanwhile, the cutter 
would be cutting the cheese and placing it on the table.  After 
the cheese was placed on the table, it was bagged and cryovaced.  
The cheese was bagged, sealed, and put in a basket.  The basket 
then had to be dipped in a pot of hot water.  The packages of 
cheese were then dried off and labeled, weighed on a scale, 
priced, and boxed.  
¶8 
All 
four 
workers 
in 
Crystal 
Lake's 
wholesale 
department were cross-trained in all four positions within the 
No. 
02-0815   
 
5 
 
department, and all were capable of assisting one another when 
an employee fell behind or when the department was busier than 
usual.  As the department head, Catlin was required to gather 
orders and create an order list specifying the sizes and types 
of cheese that needed to be cut for that day.  In addition to 
other administrative duties, Catlin was required to weigh, 
label, and box the cheese.  She would also price boxes and 
packages, assist in the assembling of boxes, place the packages 
on pallets, and move them into the cooler for pickup.  Catlin 
also assisted the other members of her department with their 
duties, as needed, to help control the flow of work. 
¶9 
In November 1996 Catlin was involved in a non-work 
related automobile accident that left her a quadriplegic, though 
she eventually regained partial use of both of her arms.  She is 
now required to use a wheelchair to move around.  During her 
hospitalization and ensuing rehabilitation period, Catlin filed 
for and received full disability benefits. 
¶10 In September 1997 Catlin decided that she was ready to 
return to work, so she contacted Tony Curella (Curella), the 
president of Crystal Lake, to inquire about the circumstances of 
her resuming her position as department head.  Crystal Lake 
subsequently 
hired 
David 
Johnson 
(Johnson), 
a 
management 
consultant of Genex Services, to determine what types of 
accommodations would be needed in order to allow a person 
confined to a wheelchair to perform the duties Catlin's position 
required.  Curella had told Johnson that the department head had 
to be able to perform all of the functions in the wholesale 
No. 
02-0815   
 
6 
 
department.  Also, no one from Crystal Lake ever gave Johnson 
any information about Catlin, other than that she used a 
wheelchair.  Ultimately, Johnson found that Catlin could not 
have been reasonably accommodated, as a person with Catlin's 
disability would be unable to perform all the tasks required of 
her as the department head (i.e., she was unable to perform all 
the 
functions 
of 
all 
four 
positions 
in 
the 
wholesale 
department).  More specifically, Johnson noted that Catlin would 
have difficulty pulling and stocking inventory because of weight 
and the height of the storage area——up to seven feet above the 
floor.  Crystal Lake therefore concluded, based on the report 
from Johnson, that it could make no reasonable accommodations 
for Catlin. 
¶11 In 
October 
1999 
Catlin 
asked 
Crystal 
Lake 
to 
reconsider its decision, and in the meantime, she hired her own 
expert, 
Jeffery 
Annis 
(Annis) 
of 
the 
UW-Stout 
Assistive 
Technology and Assessment Center, to determine the feasibility 
of her returning to work as department head. At the time of this 
assessment, the wholesale department had been eliminated and 
Catlin's job no longer existed.  Regardless, the assessment 
initiated 
by 
Catlin 
found 
that 
Catlin 
could 
have 
been 
accommodated, if certain physical changes had been made in the 
workplace, and if her job had been modified so that she would 
not have been required to perform those physical aspects of her 
job that she was no longer able to perform.  
¶12 Like Johnson, Annis found that Catlin would be unable 
to perform some of the duties of her position that required 
No. 
02-0815   
 
7 
 
climbing, lifting, or performance in a standing position.  For 
example, she could not lift 40-pound blocks of cheese or reach 
cheese stored on a high shelf.  Nevertheless, the assessment 
stated that she was still capable of performing most of her job-
related duties.  Due to the inability to modify some of the 
above job duties, the assessment suggested that an easier way to 
accommodate Catlin would be to make her job more clerical, and 
eliminate 
many 
of 
the 
physical 
duties. 
 
The 
assessment 
recommended that Catlin's job duties be modified so that as a 
lead person she need do only the paperwork and final packaging, 
along with filling out invoices, receipts, and packing lists.  
Both before Catlin's accident and at the time she attempted to 
return to work, her mother and her sister were employed in the 
wholesale department as part of the same team that Catlin led. 
¶13 When Catlin realized that she would not be allowed to 
resume her position as the department head at Crystal Lake 
Cheese Factory, she filed a charge of disability discrimination 
with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
and the charge was  cross-filed with the Equal Rights Division 
of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development.  This 
occurred in March of 1998.  Catlin alleged that Crystal Lake 
violated the WFEA by terminating her employment, and by refusing 
to permit her to return to work because of her disability. The 
federal filing was subsequently dismissed by notice sent on 
April 27, 1998.  
 
 
No. 
02-0815   
 
8 
 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Administrative Law Judge's Decision 
¶14 An Equal Rights Division hearing was held before the 
ALJ on January 25, 2000.  At the hearing, Phillip Robertson, 
Crystal Lake's operations manager, testified to some of the 
costs in modifying the factory to accommodate Catlin.  Crystal 
Lake asserted that these costs were unreasonable.  In October 
2000 Olstad determined that Crystal Lake had not discriminated 
against Catlin in refusing to allow her to return to work 
following her automobile accident.  He found there were no 
reasonable accommodations that Crystal Lake could have made, 
without imposing on it a hardship.  Consequently, Olstad 
determined that Crystal Lake had not violated the WFEA. 
B. Labor and Industry Review Commission's Decision 
¶15 Catlin appealed the ALJ decision to LIRC.  In July 
2001 LIRC reviewed the case and reversed the ALJ's ruling.  LIRC 
did not consult with the ALJ regarding the credibility of the 
witnesses because LIRC believed that its reversal of the 
examiner's decision was not based upon any differing assessment 
of witness credibility. It found that Crystal Lake could have 
made reasonable accommodations in the factory and modifications 
to Catlin's duties that would have allowed Catlin to return to 
work as the department head.  LIRC found that as of the day that 
Catlin sought reinstatement she was physically able to perform 
most of the jobs in the wholesale packing department; LIRC, Fair 
Employment Decision, Finding 14, p. 3 (May 5, 2000), but that 
she could not perform some of the heaviest physical tasks. Id., 
No. 
02-0815   
 
9 
 
Finding 15, p. 4.  More specifically, LIRC found that Crystal 
Lake could have altered Catlin's job duties and exempted her 
from certain activities that she was no longer physically 
capable of performing, and that doing so was well within the 
bounds of reasonable accommodation.  LIRC determined that the 
refusal to modify Catlin's job duties to exempt her from 
performing the heavier physical tasks, constituted a denial of a 
reasonable accommodation that Crystal Lake could have provided 
without hardship. Id., Finding 16, p.4.  In a memorandum opinion 
explaining 
its 
findings, 
LIRC 
stated 
in 
part: 
LIRC 
has 
"previously found that it is reasonable to require an employer 
to restructure the physical demands of the job in order to 
accommodate a disabled employee, provided this can be achieved 
without hardship to the employer."  Fields v. Cardinal TG Co., 
ERD Case No. 1997-02574 (LIRC, Feb. 16, 2001). 
¶16 LIRC also found that, in order to perform her job 
duties, Catlin needed some physical modifications to the 
workplace.  LIRC, Fair Employment Decision, Findings 17-18, pp. 
4-5 (May 5, 2000). LIRC determined that Crystal Lake's refusal 
to make physical modifications also constituted denial of a 
reasonable accommodation that Crystal Lake could have provided 
without hardship.  Id., Finding  19, p. 5.  Furthermore, LIRC 
found that at the time Catlin sought to return to work she did 
not even need an accessible bathroom.5  Thus, the cost of putting 
                                                 
5 Catlin 
was 
"catheterized" 
when 
she 
first 
sought 
reinstatement, but by the time of LIRC's review she was using a 
bathroom.  LIRC, Fair Employment Decision, Finding 18, p. 5 (May 
5, 2000).  
No. 
02-0815   
 
10 
 
in an accessible bathroom, even if it was $47,000 as the 
employer claimed, was not a basis upon which Catlin could 
lawfully be denied reinstatement.  LIRC ordered Crystal Lake to 
reinstate Catlin, provide "make whole" remedies6 to her, and pay 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.  
C. The Circuit Court Decision 
¶17 On August 16, 2001, Crystal Lake filed for judicial 
review of LIRC's decision, and on  February 7, 2002, the circuit 
court affirmed LIRC's decision.  It found that LIRC had 
reasonably interpreted the WFEA, and that there was substantial 
and credible evidence in the record to support LIRC's findings. 
D. The Court of Appeals' Decision 
¶18 Crystal Lake appealed to the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals, District III.  On October 8, 2002, the court of appeals 
affirmed and, thus, upheld LIRC's decision.   
¶19 Applying the great weight standard of review, the 
court of appeals concluded that LIRC's interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) was acceptable when it found that 
Crystal Lake's refusal to modify Catlin's duties to exempt her 
from the heaviest physical tasks constituted a denial of 
reasonable accommodation.  The court of appeals concluded that 
LIRC 
reasonably 
interpreted 
the 
reasonable 
accommodation 
provision of the WFEA to mean that an employer may be required 
                                                 
6 LIRC ordered Crystal Lake to pay Catlin the sum she would 
have 
earned 
as 
an 
employee 
from 
the 
date 
she 
sought 
reinstatement until she resumed employment with Crystal Lake, 
refused a valid reinstatement offer, or it was shown that 
reinstatement was not feasible. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
11 
 
to modify some job responsibilities of a disabled employee who 
can perform some or most (but not all) job-related functions, 
unless the employer can show that such modifications would cause 
a hardship. 
¶20 The court of appeals found that Crystal Lake had 
presented 
no 
evidence 
showing that 
accommodating Catlin's 
disability would create a hardship.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that LIRC did not deny Crystal Lake due process when 
it rejected some of the ALJ's factual findings and failed to 
consult with him.  Finally, the court of appeals declined to 
remand the case in order to give Crystal Lake the opportunity to 
show hardship. 
¶21 Crystal Lake petitioned for review of the decision of 
the court of appeals and we granted review on February 19, 2003. 
III. ISSUES 
¶22 As noted, we are presented with the following issues: 
(1) whether 
LIRC 
reasonably 
interpreted 
Wis. Stat.  
§ 111.34(1)(b) and Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a) of the WFEA when it 
found that there was a reasonable accommodation Crystal Lake 
could have provided its former employee, Catlin, without 
hardship; (2) whether Crystal Lake was denied due process by 
LIRC's failure to consult with the administrative law judge; 
(3) whether there was substantial and credible evidence to 
support the factual findings made by LIRC, upon which it based 
its decision that there was a reasonable accommodation Crystal 
Lake could have provided Catlin, without hardship within the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and § 111.34(2)(a). 
No. 
02-0815   
 
12 
 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 Crystal Lake argues that a de novo standard of review 
is appropriate for LIRC's decision.  In support of the de novo 
standard, Crystal Lake contends that the issue of whether 
reasonable accommodation under the WFEA includes a duty to 
create a new job for a disabled employee is one of first-
impression for LIRC.  Alternatively, Crystal Lake argues that 
LIRC's decision in this case is inconsistent with its previous 
decisions on other matters.  Accordingly, based on Kannenberg v. 
LIRC, Crystal Lake maintains that if an issue is one of first-
impression before the agency, or the agency's position is 
inconsistent with other decisions on the matter, de novo is the 
appropriate standard of review.  Kannenberg v. LIRC, 213 
Wis. 2d 373, 385-86, 571 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1997).  Crystal 
Lake also maintains that LIRC's interpretation is in direct 
conflict with decisions from the Wisconsin Personnel Commission 
and 
federal 
courts 
interpreting 
analogous 
federal 
anti-
discrimination laws.   
¶24 The respondents, LIRC and Catlin,7 disagree and argue 
that LIRC's determination that Crystal Lake could have made 
reasonable accommodations that would have allowed Catlin to 
continue working as the department head, is entitled to "great 
weight" deference, and must be affirmed if it is reasonable and 
not contrary to the clear meaning of the statute.  See Target 
                                                 
7 Hereinafter, the respondents will usually be referred to 
collectively as Catlin. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
13 
 
Stores v. LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 13-14, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 
1998).  This is true even if the court were to conclude that 
another interpretation was more reasonable.  See id. 
¶25 Catlin 
argues 
that 
if 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
is 
reasonable, then the reviewing court must affirm its decision 
under the great weight standard of review.  In support of this 
argument Catlin maintains that the weight and credibility of the 
evidence are matters for the agency, and not for the reviewing 
court, to evaluate. See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. ILHR Dep't., 90 
Wis. 2d 408, 418, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979); Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).  
Even when more than one inference can reasonably be drawn, the 
finding of the agency is conclusive. See Vocational Tech. & 
Adult Educ. Dist. 13 v. ILHR Dep't., 76 Wis. 2d 230, 240, 251 
N.W.2d 41 (1977).   
¶26 Moreover, Catlin argues that if an agency's decision 
depends on any fact found by the agency, the court shall not 
substitute its own judgment as to the weight of the evidence of 
any 
finding 
of 
fact 
for 
that 
of 
the 
agency.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6). 
 
Additionally, 
relying 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10),8 Catlin argues that great weight shall 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(10) states: 
Upon such review due weight shall be accorded the 
experience, 
technical 
competence, 
and 
specialized 
knowledge 
of 
the 
agency 
involved, 
as 
well 
as 
discretionary authority conferred upon it. The right 
of the appellant to challenge the constitutionality of 
any act or of its application to the appellant shall 
not be foreclosed or impaired by the fact that the 
appellant has applied for or holds a license, permit 
or privilege under such act. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
14 
 
be 
accorded 
the 
experience, 
technical 
competence, 
and 
specialized knowledge of the agency involved.   
¶27 According to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6),9 LIRC's decision 
may be reviewed by a court and will only be set aside or 
remanded to the agency "if [the court] finds that the agency's 
action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record."  "Substantial evidence does 
not mean a preponderance of the evidence.  Rather, the test is 
whether, taking into account all the evidence in the record, 
'reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as the 
agency.'"  Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 
Wis. 2d 127, 
133, 
325 
N.W.2d 339 
(1982) 
(citing 
Sanitary 
Transfer & Landfill, Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 270 
N.W.2d 144 (1978)).  The reviewing court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of an agency in a contested case as to the 
weight of evidence on any disputed finding of fact.  
¶28 A reviewing court must first determine what level of 
deference to accord an agency decision.  If the agency's 
                                                 
 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(6) provides: 
If the agency's action depends on any fact found by 
the agency in a contested case proceeding, the court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency as to the weight of the evidence on any 
disputed finding of fact.  The court shall, however, 
set aside agency action or remand the case to the 
agency if it finds that the agency's action depends on 
any 
finding 
of 
fact 
that 
is 
not 
supported 
by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
15 
 
determination is entitled to great weight, a court will sustain 
it unless it directly contravenes a statute, is clearly contrary 
to legislative intent, or lacks a rational basis.  Harnischfeger 
Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995).  
Here, any decision made by LIRC will be given great weight due 
to the agency's knowledge and experience in application of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34.  Target, 217 Wis. 2d at 13. 
¶29 In Target the court of appeals determined that LIRC's 
interpretation of reasonable accommodation should be given great 
weight.  Id.  The court stated that "[w]e give LIRC's 
interpretation of a statute varying degrees of deference 
depending on its obligations with respect to administering the 
statute, its experience in doing so, and the nature of the 
determinations."  Id.  The court then went on to explain why it 
concluded great weight should be given to LIRC's interpretation 
of reasonable accommodation: 
First, LIRC is charged with adjudicating appeals from 
the hearing examiner's decision on complaints under 
the 
WFEA, 
§ 
111.39(5), 
Stats., 
which 
includes 
complaints under § 111.322, Stats., for handicap 
discrimination.  Second, § 111.34(1), Stats., was 
enacted in 1981 and LIRC has developed experience and 
expertise in interpreting this section. . . .   Third, 
by according great deference to these determinations, 
we will promote greater uniformity and consistency 
than if we did not do so.  Fourth, this determination 
is 
intertwined 
with 
factual 
determinations, 
see 
McMullen v. LIRC, 148 Wis. 2d 270, 276, 434 N.W.2d 
830, 
833 
(Ct. 
App. 
1988) 
(what 
is 
reasonable 
accommodation depends on the facts in each case).  
Fifth, this determination involves value and policy 
judgments about the obligations of employers and 
employees when an employee, or prospective employee, 
No. 
02-0815   
 
16 
 
has a handicap.  See Kannenberg, 213 Wis. 2d at 385, 
571 N.W.2d at 171. 
Id., (some citations omitted). 
¶30 We agree with the standard of review set forth in 
Target, and hold that LIRC's interpretations, including its 
determination of reasonable accommodation in this case, should 
be given "great weight" deference.10  In doing so, we reject 
Crystal Lake's contention that the issue was one of first 
impression, or that its position is inconsistent with other 
decisions on the matter.  LIRC has had many opportunities to 
address this issue of what reasonable accommodation is under the 
WFEA.  "Under the great weight standard of review, we uphold 
LIRC's interpretation of the statute if it is reasonable and not 
contrary to the clear meaning of the statute, even if we 
conclude that another interpretation is more reasonable."  Id. 
at 13-14. 
V. ISSUE ONE——LIRC'S INTERPRETATION OF REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT HARDSHIP AND ABILITY TO UNDERTAKE JOB 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
¶31 As noted previously, Wis. Stat. § 111.34 states:  
 
                                                 
10 The dissent argues for application of the due weight 
deference standard of review, which it characterizes as one 
which allows the reviewing court to accept "an alternative 
interpretation that is more reasonable."  Dissent, ¶108.  While 
we believe that great weight deference is appropriate here, even 
under a due weight deference standard, our approval of LIRC's 
interpretations of the statutory sections involved would not 
change.  Its interpretations are "more reasonable" than the 
alternatives offered by Crystal Lake. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
17 
 
Disability; exceptions and special cases 
(1) Employment discrimination because of disability 
includes, but is not limited to: 
 . . . . 
(b) Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's 
or 
prospective 
employee's 
disability 
unless 
the 
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise 
or business. 
(2)(a) 
Notwithstanding 
s. 
111.322, 
it 
is 
not 
employment discrimination because of disability to 
refuse 
to 
hire, 
employ, 
admit 
or 
license 
any 
individual, to bar or terminate from employment, 
membership 
or 
licensure 
any 
individual, 
or 
to 
discriminate against any individual in promotion, 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment if the disability is reasonably related to 
the individual's ability to adequately undertake the 
job-related 
responsibilities 
of 
that 
individual's 
employment, membership or licensure.  
¶32 The statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 111.34 requires 
that an employer must show the individual's disability "is 
reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately 
undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's 
employment . . . ." 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a). 
 
However, 
an 
employer 
violates 
the 
WFEA 
if 
it 
refuses 
to 
reasonably 
accommodate an employee's disability without demonstrating that 
the 
accommodation 
would 
be 
a 
hardship 
on 
it.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b).  Taken together, § 111.34(1)(b) and 
(2)(a) require an employer to prove that even with reasonable 
accommodations, the employee would not be able to perform his or 
her job responsibilities adequately or that, where reasonable 
No. 
02-0815   
 
18 
 
accommodations would enable the employee to do the job, hardship 
would be placed on the employer.  Target, 217 Wis. 2d at 17. 
A. Arguments 
¶33 Crystal Lake argues that LIRC's interpretation of 
reasonable accommodation under the WFEA is unreasonable and 
erroneous.  The WFEA does not define reasonable accommodation or 
the extent to which an accommodation may be required for a 
disabled employee.  Moreover, Crystal Lake contends that there 
is little guidance from Wisconsin's appellate courts regarding 
the scope of reasonable accommodation under the WFEA.  See id. 
at 17.  Relying on Target,11 Crystal Lake argues that eliminating 
the duties of an employee's position is not an accommodation 
that enables the disabled employee to "adequately undertake job-
related responsibilities" of her employment.   
¶34 Crystal Lake maintains that neither LIRC, nor Catlin's 
expert, suggests that there is any such accommodation that would 
have allowed Catlin to do her job.  Instead, Crystal Lake claims 
that LIRC required Crystal Lake to excuse Catlin from those 
duties she could no longer perform, essentially creating a new 
job.  Under the statutory language of the WFEA, Crystal Lake 
argues that an employee must be able to "adequately undertake 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities 
of 
[the] 
individual's 
employment. . . . "  Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a). 
                                                 
11 In Target, the court of appeals held that "the purpose of 
reasonable accommodation is to enable employees to adequately 
undertake job-related responsibilities."  Target Stores v. LIRC, 
217 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998).  
No. 
02-0815   
 
19 
 
¶35 Next, Crystal Lake argues that the legislature's use 
of the definite article, "the" in Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a), 
without modification, can only be reasonably interpreted to mean 
all of the functions that make up the job.  The use of the 
article "the," Crystal Lake contends, is contrary to the 
interpretation adopted by the court of appeals in this case, 
where the court found that as long as the employee could perform 
"some" of the job-related responsibilities, the employer is 
obligated reasonably to accommodate the employee by eliminating 
those tasks which the employee can no longer do.  Crystal Lake 
Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2002 WI App 290, ¶26, 28-29, 258 Wis. 2d 
414, 654 N.W.2d 286. 
¶36 Crystal Lake contends that this court should look to 
analogous 
federal 
statutes 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Personnel 
Commission in interpreting reasonable accommodation, even though 
neither the court, nor LIRC, is bound by those decisions in 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a).  See Target, 
217 Wis. 2d at 18-19; Kannenberg, 213 Wis. 2d at 387.  In 
support of its argument, Crystal Lake points out that federal 
courts have routinely held that reasonable accommodation does 
not require an employer to eliminate job duties, create a new 
job, or employ others to perform functions that a disabled 
employee cannot perform.  Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 
835, 845-846 (7th Cir. 2002); Watson v. Lithonia Lighting, 304 
F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2002).  Consequently, Crystal Lake asks 
us to find that the WFEA's reasonable accommodation provision 
No. 
02-0815   
 
20 
 
does not require an employer to create a new position for a 
disabled employee. 
¶37 Catlin disagrees and argues that the court should not 
read 
federal 
legislation 
into 
the 
intent 
of 
Wisconsin's 
legislators.  Instead, Catlin maintains that the WFEA should be 
interpreted in accordance with "our legislature's intention 
rather 
than 
with 
the 
intention 
of 
other 
jurisdictions."  
McMullen v. LIRC, 148 Wis. 2d 270, 275-76, 434 N.W.2d 830, 833 
(Ct. App. 1988).  Wisconsin has determined that while federal 
and other states' cases applying similar legislation may be 
enlightening to the WFEA cases, they are not binding upon 
Wisconsin courts.  Id.  Thus, Catlin argues that while this 
court may consider how federal courts have dealt with the 
question of reasonable accommodation under the Americans with 
Disability Act (ADA), since the WFEA is similar, but not 
identical, guidance is limited as to the determination of what 
is reasonable under the WFEA.  In support of its position, 
Catlin 
argues 
that 
there 
are 
significant 
differences 
in 
statutory language between the WFEA and the ADA.  See McMullen, 
148 Wis. 2d at 275.  Catlin points out that the ADA requires an 
employer 
to 
make 
reasonable 
accommodations 
only 
to 
the 
disability of a "qualified individual with a disability" and a 
"qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with 
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
No. 
02-0815   
 
21 
 
such individual holds . . . ." See 42 U.S.C §§ 12111(8)12 and 
12112(5)(A).13  The WFEA, Catlin contends, requires an employer 
reasonably to accommodate an employee's disability, but an 
"individual with a disability" is not limited to an individual 
who can perform the "essential functions" of the employment 
position 
with 
or 
without 
accommodation. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.32(8)14 and 111.34(1)(b). 
                                                 
12 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) states:  
The term "qualified individual with a disability" 
means an individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of 
this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the 
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are 
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written 
description 
before 
advertising 
or 
interviewing 
applicants for the job, this description shall be 
considered evidence of the essential functions of the 
job. 
13 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A), states:  
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term 
"discriminate" 
includes: 
 
not 
making 
reasonable 
accommodations 
to 
the 
known 
physical 
or 
mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
such 
covered 
entity 
can 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity. 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.32(8) provides:  
"Individual with a disability" means an individual who: 
(a) Has a physical or mental impairment which makes 
achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity 
to work; 
(b) Has a record of such an impairment; or 
No. 
02-0815   
 
22 
 
¶38 Moreover, Catlin argues that under the ADA analysis, 
it is not even clear that the tasks that Catlin could no longer 
perform were considered essential functions of her position.  
Catlin points out that as the department head, her primary 
responsibility was to process orders and do inventory sheets——
tasks which she could still perform.  Furthermore, Catlin 
asserts that Crystal Lake has offered no case law, under the 
ADA, that says an individual must be able to perform all 
functions of four different positions, or they will not be 
considered a qualified individual with a disability entitled to 
protections under the law.   
¶39 Catlin argues that even if the ADA is considered when 
applying the WFEA, it makes no difference since the ADA requires 
an employer to engage in an interactive process with an employee 
to determine a reasonable accommodation, and that in the present 
case, no such process was undertaken. 
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation 
it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate 
an informal interactive process with the qualified 
individual 
with 
a 
disability 
in 
need 
of 
the 
accommodation.  This process should identify the 
precise limitations resulting from the disability and 
potential 
reasonable 
accommodations 
that 
could 
overcome those limitations. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) 1995.15  Again, no such interactive 
process took place here.  Catlin points out that Crystal Lake 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Is perceived as having such an impairment. 
15 EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment 
Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1995). 
No. 
02-0815   
 
23 
 
never inquired of her as to what accommodations she needed.  
Catlin argues that this failure violated the intent of the WFEA 
as well.  Furthermore, Catlin argues that under the ADA, 
determining whether a function is essential includes determining 
whether removing the function would fundamentally alter that 
position if the position exists to perform a particular 
function, if there are other employees available to perform that 
function, and the amount of time spent performing the function.  
Americans With Disabilities Act Handbook, p. I-38, U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and U.S. Department of Justice 
(1992).  Even under this analysis, Catlin contends, it is not 
clear whether the few tasks Catlin was no longer able to do, 
even with accommodations, qualified as essential functions or 
marginal functions.  Her position was not the cutter position 
nor was it the cryovacer position.   
¶40 Crystal Lake argues that all Catlin's job functions 
were essential, and that not only is Catlin required to perform 
all the functions of her position, but it is also essential that 
she be able to perform all the functions of all the other 
employees in the department, no matter what their primary role 
is.  Catlin argues that Crystal Lake's comment that nothing in 
the WFEA's legislative history "suggests an intent to construe 
the duty of 'reasonable accommodation' differently than under 
the ADA" is similarly unpersuasive, given that the WFEA's 
disability provisions predate the ADA by almost ten years.   
¶41 In summary, Catlin argues that Crystal Lake is 
inappropriately 
attempting 
to 
move 
this 
case 
from 
the 
No. 
02-0815   
 
24 
 
protections of the WFEA, and instead apply an analysis used 
under the ADA.  The ADA distinguishes between essential and 
marginal functions, but the term "essential functions" has no 
particular meaning under the WFEA.  Target, 217 Wis. 2d at 16-17 
n.9.  
¶42 Under the WFEA a complainant must first show that he 
or she is an "individual with a disability" within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8), and that the employer took one of the 
actions enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 111.322.16  Target, 217 
Wis. 2d at 9.   
¶43 Once a disability has been proven by the employee, the 
burden then shifts to the employer to prove a defense under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34.  Id.   
¶44 In this case, there is no dispute among the parties 
that Catlin was disabled within the meaning of the WFEA, or that 
she was not allowed to return to work because of her disability.  
Also, it is uncontested that Catlin's disability was reasonably 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.322 provides:  
Discriminatory actions prohibited. 
Subject to ss. 111.33 to 111.36, it is an act of 
employment discrimination to do any of the following: 
(1) To refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any 
individual, to bar or terminate from employment or 
labor organization membership any individual, or to 
discriminate against any individual in promotion, 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment or labor organization membership because of 
any basis enumerated in s. 111.321. 
 . . . . 
No. 
02-0815   
 
25 
 
related to her adequately performing her job responsibilities, 
unless reasonable accommodations were made.  The question 
remains whether, with reasonable accommodations Catlin must then 
be able to perform all of the job-related responsibilities 
adequately.  Also left in question is whether or not there was a 
reasonable accommodation that Crystal Lake could have provided 
Catlin without hardship.  Under LIRC's interpretation of 
"reasonable accommodation," it found that Crystal Lake could 
have modified Catlin's job duties to accommodate her disability.  
Catlin contends that a reviewing court may not make an 
independent determination of the facts,17 and that the decision 
of LIRC should not be set aside unless it can be shown that the 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  Id. at 11 
(citing Hamilton v. ILHR Dept., 94 Wis. 2d 611, 617, 288 
N.W.2d 857, 860 (1980)). Crystal Lake, however, contends that 
this interpretation is unreasonable because it is being forced 
to create a new job to accommodate a disabled employee. 
¶45 LIRC 
determined 
that 
Crystal Lake 
should 
modify 
Catlin's job duties and make physical modifications to the plant 
as a reasonable accommodation.  Crystal Lake argues that, in 
this case, LIRC's interpretation of reasonable accommodation is 
unreasonable.  Under Crystal Lake's alternate interpretation, an 
employer would only be required to assist an employee with his 
or her job responsibilities if there is some reasonable 
                                                 
17 See Hixon v. PSC, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 629, 146 N.W.2d 577 
(1966). 
No. 
02-0815   
 
26 
 
accommodation that will enable the employee to undertake all of 
his or her job duties.  Crystal Lake argues that an employer 
would not be  required to modify an employee's duties, or to 
exempt an employee from having to perform certain duties.  
Crystal Lake relies heavily on federal court decisions under the 
ADA in support of its interpretation.  The basis for using the 
ADA in interpreting reasonable accommodation is, according to 
Crystal Lake, due to the similarity in language and purpose of 
the federal statute to the WFEA.  Crystal Lake asserts that 
physical modifications to the plant and/or modification to 
Catlin's duties would have posed a hardship for the company.  
Catlin takes the position that Crystal Lake failed in meeting 
its burden of proving hardship. 
B. Analysis 
¶46 Though this court may look to federal law for guidance 
in 
determining 
if 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
"reasonable 
accommodation" was reasonable, we are not bound by those cases 
in interpreting the WFEA.  Id. at 18-19; McMullen, 148 
Wis. 2d at 275-76.  See also American Motors Corp. v. ILHR 
Dep't, 101 Wis. 2d 337, 353, 305 N.W.2d 62 (1981).  The WFEA is 
a "remedial statute . . . [and] should be broadly interpreted to 
resolve the problem it was designed to address."  McMullen, 148 
Wis. 2d at 275.  Also,  
the statutory language and scheme contained in the 
analogous . . . federal 
legislation 
differ[s], 
sometimes significantly, from that found in sec. 
111.34(1)(b).   . . . Our [The Wisconsin] legislature 
has established its own scheme for dealing with 
employment discrimination based on handicap and has 
No. 
02-0815   
 
27 
 
articulated 
the 
specific 
policy 
considerations 
underlying that scheme.  Therefore, we will construe 
sec. 111.34(1)(b) in accordance with our legislature's 
intention rather than with the intention of other 
jurisdictions.   
McMullen, 148 Wis. 2d at 275-276.  Clearly, this court is  not 
bound 
by 
federal 
law 
in 
determining 
whether 
LIRC's 
interpretation of "reasonable accommodation" was appropriate. 
¶47 The court of appeals has previously addressed the 
issue of interpretation of reasonable accommodation in both 
Target and McMullen.  In each case, the court of appeals held 
that a reasonable accommodation was not limited to only an  
accommodation that would permit the employee to perform all of 
his or her job responsibilities.   
¶48 In Target, the court upheld a decision by LIRC to 
"temporarily refrain from enforcing a disciplinary rule" against 
an employee as a reasonable accommodation.  Target, 217 Wis. 2d 
at 18.  The employee was unable, due to sleep apnea, to stay 
awake at times while performing her job duties.  Id. at 5-6.  
LIRC determined that it was unreasonable to fire the employee 
without allowing time to see if treatment of the condition would 
correct the problem.  Id. at 8-9.  The employee's sleep apnea 
was reasonably related to her ability to perform adequately her 
job responsibilities.  However, the court upheld LIRC's decision 
as 
a 
reasonable 
accommodation, 
even 
though 
it 
did 
not 
immediately allow her to perform adequately her job duties.  Id. 
at 16-18. 
¶49 Similarly, in McMullen, the court of appeals required 
an employer to transfer an employee to a different position as a 
No. 
02-0815   
 
28 
 
reasonable accommodation of the employee's disability.  The 
court held that a "'reasonable accommodation' may include a 
transfer of a handicapped employee to another position for which 
he is qualified, depending on the facts of each individual 
case."  McMullen, 148 Wis. 2d at 271.  This accommodation also 
did not allow the employee to perform his current job duties, 
but instead placed him in a job better suited to his current 
abilities.  It was essentially a change or modification in the 
employee's job-related responsibilities. 
¶50 In Frito Lay, Inc. v. LIRC, despite the fact that it 
was 
decided 
before 
the 
legislature 
added 
the 
reasonable 
accommodation requirement to the WFEA, the court of appeals held 
that arrangements made among other employees to accommodate one 
employee's disability, negated the employer's claim of an 
exception to the law against employment discrimination based on 
disability.  Frito Lay, Inc. v. LIRC, 95 Wis. 2d 395, 407-08, 
290 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980).  In that case, Frito Lay 
employed drivers, including the complainant, to make both 
interstate and intrastate deliveries from its warehouse in 
Beloit.  Id. at 399.  The complainant was a truck driver whose 
lack of visual acuity barred him because Wisconsin and Federal 
requirements 
differed 
for 
interstate, 
but 
not 
intrastate 
deliveries.  Id.  Delivery runs were allocated based on 
seniority, and all drivers senior to the complainant agreed to 
ensure that he had only intrastate runs.  Id.  The court held 
that this accommodation did not allow the employer to discharge 
No. 
02-0815   
 
29 
 
the complainant for failing to meet the federal (interstate) 
vision requirements.  Id. at 408. 
¶51 In this case, at least two of the three other 
employees in Catlin's department agreed that it would be 
feasible for them to accommodate a change in Catlin's duties 
because 
of 
her 
disability. 
 
This 
further 
supports 
the 
reasonableness, under Frito Lay and the current WFEA, of such a 
job modification.18 
¶52 Based on the prior decisions in Target, McMullen, and 
Frito Lay, we hold that LIRC's interpretation of "reasonable 
accommodation" is not unreasonable, but rather is a reasonable 
one.  A reasonable accommodation is not limited to that which 
would allow the employee to perform adequately all of his or her 
job duties.  A change in job duties may be a reasonable 
accommodation in a given circumstance.  See Target, 217 
Wis. 2d 1; McMullen, 148 Wis. 2d 270.  As we have determined 
LIRC's interpretation to be reasonable, under the "great weight" 
                                                 
18 This court upheld the court of appeals' decision in Frito 
Lay by an evenly divided court.  We recognize that the facts in 
Frito Lay are distinguishable from the case at bar.  In Frito 
Lay the drivers chose their own truck routes based on seniority, 
and voluntarily left the intrastate routes to the complaintant 
in that case.  In this case the job duties of Catlin's sister 
and mother are not determined by them, but rather, set by the 
employer, Crystal Lake.  However, we still find Frito Lay 
persuasive in demonstrating that, even prior to the current 
version of the WFEA, this court upheld a voluntary re-
arrangement 
of 
job 
responsibilities 
by 
the 
employees 
as 
reasonable. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LIRC, 95 Wis. 2d 395, 290 N.W.2d 
551 (Ct. App. 1980). 
No. 
02-0815   
 
30 
 
standard of review, we must, therefore, defer to LIRC's 
conclusion.19 
¶53 While we are satisfied that LIRC's finding of no 
hardship also deserves great weight deference, and is correct, 
we reserve a thorough discussion of the hardship issue for our 
review of issue three. 
VI. ISSUE TWO——DUE PROCESS 
¶54 Crystal Lake argues that it was denied due process 
when LIRC rejected the hearsay testimony of Phillip Robertson, 
regarding the cost of constructing a wheelchair accessible 
bathroom.  Crystal Lake contends that LIRC should have consulted 
with the ALJ regarding Robertson's credibility.  Catlin, 
however, argues that Crystal Lake was not denied due process by 
LIRC's failure to consult with the ALJ regarding credibility 
issues, since LIRC's decision did not depend on the credibility 
of the witness.  Because credibility was not the basis upon 
which the commission's decision hinged, the commission and the 
examiner were not required to consult.  Rather, the testimony of 
Robertson was dismissed because it was uncorroborated hearsay.  
Catlin, therefore, asserts that LIRC was correct to reject the 
finding of the ALJ, since crucial findings cannot be based on 
                                                 
19 The dissent attempts to lead us into a trap, involving 
the employee's ability to perform "some" as opposed to "most" or 
"all" job responsibilities.  Dissent, ¶89, 113, 118, 127.  The 
proper emphasis is on the employee's ability to perform her or 
his job responsibilities adequately, rather than on terms such 
as "some" or "most" or "all."   
No. 
02-0815   
 
31 
 
hearsay testimony alone.  Village of Menomonee Falls v. DNR, 140 
Wis. 2d 579, 610, 412 N.W.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1987). 
¶55 In support of her position, Catlin points out LIRC 
reached its decision because of its interpretation of how 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34 should be applied to the case, and that 
credibility was not a factor in reaching that decision.  Crystal 
Lake had an opportunity to present its argument at the hearing 
and the ALJ ruled in its favor.  Catlin argues that the fact 
that LIRC reached a result different than the ALJ does not mean 
that Crystal Lake's due process rights were violated.  Simply 
put, there were reasonable alternative conclusions one could 
draw from the testimony and LIRC chose one that was different 
than the ALJ's. Consequently, Crystal Lake's due process rights 
were not violated by LIRC's decision. 
¶56 Crystal Lake maintains that it was denied due process 
not only when LIRC failed to confer with the ALJ on issues of 
credibility, but when LIRC rejected evidence that was admitted 
without objection at the hearing. More specifically, Crystal 
Lake points out that while the ALJ determined that Catlin had to 
regularly perform the functions of the other positions in the 
department, LIRC determined the opposite without ever conferring 
with the ALJ.  Crystal Lake argues that due process would have 
required LIRC to confer with the ALJ before reversing the ALJ's 
determination. 
¶57 Essentially, Crystal Lake argues that LIRC's failure 
to consult with the ALJ prior to reversing the decision, as well 
as its rejection of Robertson's testimony on hearsay grounds, 
No. 
02-0815   
 
32 
 
constituted a denial of due process and ultimately led to LIRC's 
finding that there was a reasonable accommodation that Crystal 
Lake could have provided without hardship. 
¶58 Catlin argues that the LIRC decision did not depend on 
the credibility of witness testimony, but rather that LIRC 
interpreted the testimony in a different way.  For example, 
rather than accepting the ALJ's determination that Catlin 
regularly assisted others in the wholesale department, LIRC only 
noted that the record did not indicate the "frequency" with 
which she assisted the other workers.  Catlin argues that there 
were reasonable alternative conclusions one could draw from the 
same testimony, and just because LIRC happened to reach a 
conclusion that was different from the ALJ, and against Crystal 
Lakes' interest, does not imply that Crystal Lakes' due process 
rights were violated. 
¶59 Essentially, Catlin argues that LIRC reached its 
decision 
because 
of 
its 
interpretation 
of 
how 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34 should be applied to the case, and that 
credibility was not a factor in reaching that decision.  As a 
result, LIRC did not violate Crystal Lake's due process rights. 
¶60 We agree and hold that Crystal Lake was not denied due 
process by LIRC's failure to consult with the ALJ regarding 
credibility since LIRC's findings were not based upon the 
credibility of the operation manager's testimony.  Rather, LIRC 
reached its decision because of its interpretation of how 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34 should be applied to this case.  Put 
differently, the facts of the case and LIRC's interpretation of 
No. 
02-0815   
 
33 
 
the statute were the real reasons for LIRC's decision.  Thus, we 
hold that since LIRC's decision did not hinge upon witness 
credibility,20 LIRC was not required to consult with the ALJ and, 
therefore, Crystal Lake was not denied due process. 
VII.  ISSUE THREE——SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE——REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT HARDSHIP 
 
¶61 Crystal Lake argues that LIRC's factual findings 
lacked evidentiary support in the record.  In holding that 
Crystal Lake could have accommodated Catlin without hardship, 
LIRC found that Catlin could still perform most of her duties.  
Crystal Lake counters that this finding is against the evidence 
in the record.  It maintains its position that Catlin regularly 
performed several activities, which LIRC found Catlin did only 
infrequently.  Crystal Lake maintains that it is critical that 
Catlin should be able to perform not only her regular tasks, but 
all tasks for all positions in the department. 
 
¶62 Additionally, Crystal Lake asserts that the record 
does 
not 
support 
LIRC's 
finding 
that 
neither 
physical 
modifications to the plant, nor modifications to Catlin's 
duties, would have posed a hardship to the company.  It points 
to the $47,000 estimate for a wheelchair-accessible restroom, as 
well as the other plant modifications, as proof of hardship.  
Crystal Lake points out that the court of appeals acknowledged 
that modifying Catlin's duties may lead to production slowdowns.  
                                                 
20 We strongly disagree with the dissent's attempt to turn 
LIRC's statutory interpretations into "credibility assessments."  
Dissent,  ¶¶90, 133-136. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
34 
 
Crystal Lake disagrees, however, with the court of appeals that 
Crystal Lake fell short of proving hardship when it failed to go 
further and ensure there was evidence in the record of the 
consequences of such slowdowns. 
¶63 Catlin maintains that LIRC, in this instance, has 
determined that there was substantial evidence to support its 
determination that reasonable accommodations were appropriate 
for Crystal Lake to make.  LIRC found that Catlin could perform 
most of her duties, and that the duties Crystal Lake argues 
Catlin could not perform were not her regular responsibilities. 
Under LIRC's interpretation of the statutes, as long as Catlin 
could perform some of her duties, which the record indicated she 
could, then there were reasonable accommodations that could and 
should have been made.  Catlin felt that she would be able to 
perform most tasks that were part of her job with little or no 
accommodation.   
¶64 Catlin asserts that Crystal Lake had no knowledge 
regarding what duties she was capable of performing, and never 
asked her what accommodations she thought she might need.  
Catlin contends that the WFEA has been found to include a duty 
to gather sufficient information from the employee and from 
qualified experts, as needed, to determine what accommodations 
are necessary.  Keller v. UW-Milwaukee, No. 90-0140-PC-ER, (Mar. 
19, 1993).  Catlin argues that Crystal Lake failed to satisfy 
this duty.  Crystal Lake was aware that Catlin had a disability 
and would require some sort of accommodation, but never 
approached her to inquire about what job duties she was capable 
No. 
02-0815   
 
35 
 
of performing.  Additionally, Catlin contends that Crystal Lake 
did not look at the possibility of transferring her to another 
position if it felt she could not adequately perform her job.  
She argues that such a transfer may also be a reasonable 
accommodation under the WFEA.  Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b). 
¶65 She argues that with minor changes to the building and 
some assistive technology, she could have performed her job.  
Catlin asserts, and the Annis assessment points out, the easiest 
way to accommodate Catlin would have been to modify her job 
duties so that Catlin did not have to perform the more 
physically demanding tasks.  Everyone in the department was 
cross-trained, and at least two of the three other team members 
acknowledged that they could make up for Catlin's restricted 
duties. 
¶66 Based on the evidence contained in the record, Catlin 
argues that there was clearly a sufficient amount of credible 
evidence to support the findings of LIRC. 
¶67 The complainant in a disability discrimination, under 
the WFEA, must show that:  (1) he or she is handicapped under 
WFEA, and (2) that the employer has taken one of the enumerated, 
proscribed actions under the WFEA.   Target, 217 Wis. 2d at 9.  
Once the complainant has made these two showings, the employer 
may proffer a defense that the accommodations named by the 
complainant would impose a hardship on the employer.  Id.  In 
such a case the employer has the burden of proving that 
hardship.  Id. at 9-10.  If the employer fails to prove this 
defense, it is in violation of WFEA.   
No. 
02-0815   
 
36 
 
A. Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(1)(B) Hardship 
¶68 Although 
Crystal 
Lake 
argues 
that 
reasonably 
accommodating Catlin would have resulted in a hardship for it, 
Catlin argues that Crystal Lake did not meet its burden of 
proving hardship pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b), nor did 
it meet its burden under Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a).  Target, 217 
Wis. 2d at 10.   
[I]f an employer refuses to reasonably accommodate an 
employee's (or prospective employee's) handicap  and 
is unable to demonstrate that the accommodation would 
pose a hardship, then the employer violates the WFEA.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b).  Reading the two paragraphs 
of § 111.34 together, once the employee has met the 
first two showings, the employer must show either that 
a reasonable accommodation would impose a hardship——
§ 111.34(1)(b), 
or that, 
even 
with a 
reasonable 
accommodation, 
the 
employee 
cannot 
"adequately 
undertake 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities"——
§ 111.34(2)(a). 
Id. 
¶69 In support of her argument, Catlin points out that 
Crystal 
Lake 
did 
not 
offer 
any 
evidence 
showing 
that 
accommodating 
her 
would 
be 
a 
hardship 
for 
it. 
 
More 
specifically, Catlin points out that Crystal Lake offered no 
evidence showing that by exempting her from duties she could not 
perform it would suffer a hardship.  Moreover, Catlin contends 
that Crystal Lake did not even explore accommodations it could 
have 
made 
for her, let 
alone show 
that 
any 
particular 
accommodation would impose a hardship upon it.  Catlin states 
that the owner of Crystal Lake Cheese Factory, Curella, admitted 
as much in his testimony.  Curella testified that he "didn't 
No. 
02-0815   
 
37 
 
make any effort whatsoever for what might be appropriate 
accommodations for [Catlin] to return to work . . . ." (R. 
14:4). 
¶70 Furthermore, Catlin argues that restructuring her job 
duties would not have imposed a hardship on Crystal Lake since 
everyone in the four-person department was cross-trained in all 
tasks in the department, and that other members of the 
department were willing to perform the heavy physical tasks that 
Catlin could not do.  The other department members did not 
object even if this meant they would get a disproportionate 
share of those duties.  As noted previously, the other team 
members included Catlin's sister who already had the heaviest 
job as cutter, and Catlin's mother.  Both of them were willing 
to perform the heavy physical tasks that Catlin could not do.  
LIRC found Crystal Lake could have accommodated Catlin without 
hardship by exempting her from performing the heavy physical 
tasks that were beyond her capabilities, and by making some 
physical modifications to the workplace.  LIRC, Fair Employment 
Decision, Findings 16, 19, p. 4-5 (May 5, 2000).   
¶71 In regard to the hearsay testimony that a new 
wheelchair 
accessible bathroom would 
cost 
$47,000, 
Catlin 
contends that Crystal Lake provided no documentation to support 
this figure.  Moreover, Catlin argues that there was no evidence 
as to what Crystal Lake's financial resources were like.  As a 
result, Catlin argues that it is possible that the $47,000 may 
not have been a significant cost for Crystal Lake, in relation 
to its financial situation.  There was no evidence showing that 
No. 
02-0815   
 
38 
 
Crystal Lake could not reasonably afford such an expense.  While 
Crystal Lake argues that the alleged cost of the new bathroom 
would be three times Catlin's wages, Catlin contends that there 
is no legal basis for such an argument.  Catlin points out that 
a new bathroom could be used by all employees.  As such, Catlin 
argues that Crystal Lake failed to prove that accommodating her 
would impose a hardship on it.   
¶72 Lastly, 
Catlin 
argues 
that 
the 
other 
necessary 
physical modifications that would be needed in order to 
accommodate her were relatively inexpensive.  One modification 
included addressing the three-inch threshold on the entry door, 
something she claims could easily be remedied with a small ramp.  
Other modifications dealt with changes that could be made to the 
factory such as the lowering of tables and other items, and, 
where necessary, the widening of aisles. 
¶73 In summary, Catlin agues that Crystal Lake did not 
meet its burden of proof that an accommodation would impose a 
hardship pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.43(1)(b). 
¶74 In the present case, neither party disputes that 
Catlin is handicapped or that Crystal Lake took termination 
action based on that handicap.  The issues, therefore, are 
whether the record supports, with substantial and credible 
evidence, LIRC's conclusion that reasonable accommodations were 
available to Crystal Lake, accommodations that would allow 
Catlin to perform her job duties, and that Crystal Lake has 
failed to demonstrate that those reasonable accommodations would 
create a hardship for Crystal Lake. 
No. 
02-0815   
 
39 
 
B. Analysis 
¶75 In determining whether an employer is required, under 
the WFEA, to accommodate a disabled employee, the questions of 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
accommodation 
and 
hardship 
to 
the 
employee, while overlapping, are two "separate and distinct 
considerations 
that 
are 
to 
be 
addressed 
independently."  
McMullen, 148 Wis. 2d at 277.  Thus, in examining the record for 
evidence to support each, we will also treat the two as distinct 
determinations. 
¶76 In this case there is substantial evidence in the 
record 
to 
support 
LIRC's 
conclusion 
that, 
hardship 
notwithstanding, there were reasonable accommodations Crystal 
Lake could have taken in order to keep Catlin as an employee.  
Crystal Lake could have modified the jobsite to allow Catlin 
full access, and let her continue to perform those tasks she is 
still able to perform.  Among the accommodations that could and 
should have been considered: a ramp, installed at the entrance, 
would allow wheelchair access; the tables and other fixtures 
could be lowered; the bathroom could be modified; and, where 
necessary, aisles could be widened. 
¶77 When the state legislature modified the WFEA in 1981, 
it 
added 
provisions 
that 
require 
employers 
dealing 
with 
handicapped employees or applicants to evaluate the individual 
in order to determine whether he or she can meet the 
requirements of the job in question.  Wis. Stat. § 111.34.  
Crystal Lake in this case failed to investigate what Catlin 
herself could still do despite her disability.  Johnson, the job 
No. 
02-0815   
 
40 
 
analysis evaluator from Genex, was told only that he was to 
examine the job and job site with regard to a person in a 
wheelchair.  At no time did Crystal Lake contact Catlin; in 
fact, there is evidence in the record that Crystal Lake managers 
avoided her phone calls.  This failure by Crystal Lake appears 
to have been a violation of the intent of the WFEA. 
¶78 Another way Crystal Lake could have accommodated 
Catlin's disability is by modifying her responsibilities.  This 
is an accommodation, we hold, that appears to be reasonable 
under the circumstances here and within the purview of the WFEA.  
The other employees could divide among themselves those physical 
tasks Catlin is now unable to do, and she could focus just on 
the many job responsibilities that she can do.  As noted, other 
employees have testified that they would be willing and able to 
do this.    
¶79 Having found substantial and credible evidence in the 
record to support LIRC's finding that Crystal Lake could have 
reasonably accommodated Catlin, we now turn to the issue of 
hardship for Crystal Lake.  As noted previously, we are 
satisfied that LIRC's determinations are entitled to great 
weight deference on this issue as well.  Since Catlin has made 
the required showings that she is handicapped and that the 
employer has taken a proscribed action under the WFEA, the 
employer has the burden of showing hardship.  Target, 217 
Wis. 2d at 9. 
¶80 As to physical and job modifications, Crystal Lake has 
failed in its burden to prove hardship.  Further, we agree with 
No. 
02-0815   
 
41 
 
the court of appeals that this matter should not be remanded to 
allow Crystal Lake to attempt now to make a new showing of 
hardship.  Crystal Lake chose to rely on what it argued was an 
erroneous interpretation of the WFEA by LIRC.  Failed trial 
strategy is not grounds for remand.  See State v. McDonald, 50 
Wis. 2d 534, 538, 184 N.W.2d 886, 888 (1971). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶81 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
Accordingly, we hold that requiring Crystal Lake to modify the 
job duties of Susan Catlin and make physical modifications to 
the workplace is not unreasonable and would be a reasonable 
accommodation.  With such accommodations, she would have the 
ability 
to 
adequately 
undertake 
her 
job-related 
responsibilities. 
¶82 Next, we hold that Crystal Lake was not denied due 
process when LIRC, prior to reversing the ALJ's holding, failed 
to consult with the ALJ regarding witness credibility issues.  
We hold that since LIRC's findings did not hinge on issues of 
credibility, LIRC was not required to confer with the ALJ, and 
that there was, therefore, no violation of Crystal Lake's due 
process rights.  LIRC reached its decision here based on its 
interpretation of the proper application of Wis. Stat. § 111.34 
to the facts presented. 
¶83 Finally, we hold that there was substantial and 
credible evidence in the record to justify LIRC's findings.  
There was substantial evidence to show that Crystal Lake could 
have made reasonable accommodations for Catlin, and Crystal Lake 
No. 
02-0815   
 
42 
 
has failed to meet its burden of establishing that such 
reasonable accommodations for Catlin would create hardship on 
it. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶84 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion does not reasonably accommodate the interests and rights 
of Wisconsin employers. 
¶85 By ruling in favor of Susan Catlin, the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission (LIRC) incorrectly interpreted the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act's (WFEA) ban on employment 
discrimination on the basis of disability.  LIRC held that the 
WFEA requires an employer to "accommodate" an applicant or 
employee that cannot perform all the applicant or employee's 
necessary 
job 
responsibilities, 
even 
with 
reasonable 
accommodations.  I strongly disagree with this interpretation of 
the WFEA and with the burden it imposes on employers. 
¶86 Today, a majority of this court affirms this statutory 
misinterpretation——made 
in 
the 
first 
instance 
by 
an 
administrative agency——and adopts this erroneous approach as the 
law of this state.  In the process, the court has taken from 
Wisconsin employers the ability to define the required job 
duties of their employees.  This is a result altogether 
unintended by the WFEA. 
¶87 I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
in 
three 
primary 
respects. 
¶88 First, LIRC and its companion agency, the Wisconsin 
Personnel Commission, have not consistently ruled that removing 
necessary elements of an employee's job can be considered a 
reasonable accommodation under Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) that is 
consistent with § 111.34(2)(a).  Therefore, I would grant only 
due weight deference to LIRC's interpretation of how § 111.34 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
2 
 
governs adverse employment actions taken against an employee or 
applicant that cannot perform all the necessary functions of the 
job for which she applies or for which she is already hired. 
¶89 Second, LIRC's interpretation of § 111.34 in this case 
is manifestly less reasonable than a readily understandable 
alternative meaning.  Section 111.34(2)(a), even when read in 
conjunction with § 111.34(1)(b), cannot be read to require that 
an applicant or employee need only be able to perform "some" or 
"most" of the basic responsibilities of the job that he or she 
fills in order to compel an employer to hire or retain that 
person.  Rather, the reasonable accommodations contemplated by 
§ 111.34 are those that assist the disabled employee's ability 
to perform a preexisting job.  "The job" is defined by the basic 
duties that are incumbent upon the employment. 
¶90 Finally, it was impermissible for LIRC to find 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of factual conclusions that 
were inconsistent with those reached by the administrative law 
judge (ALJ) without having first conferred with the ALJ.  LIRC's 
factual 
findings 
regarding 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
job 
responsibilities that the complainant could or could not perform 
after her accident were based predominantly on testimony from 
the complainant herself and others.  To declare that these 
findings are not based on credibility assessments is astounding. 
¶91 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
I. RESTATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
¶92 As an initial matter, I must highlight the central 
factual matter at issue in this case: what responsibilities of 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
3 
 
Catlin's job could she perform after an injury confined her to a 
wheelchair, and what duties could she not perform, even with 
reasonable accommodations? 
¶93 Catlin's job was lead worker/supervisor of Crystal 
Lake Cheese Factory's wholesale department.  As the supervisor 
of this four-person department, Catlin's job required her to 
perform a variety of duties.   
¶94 The majority has adopted LIRC's findings as to 
Catlin's ability to perform adequately "most" of her job duties 
following her accident.  LIRC concluded that, as of the date she 
sought reinstatement, Catlin could (1) train employees; (2) make 
boxes; (3) make labels; (4) bake cheese; (5) label cheese (if 
she used a "reacher" to get at the labels); (6) weigh cheese; 
(7) price cheese; (8) box cheese; (9) put the cheese on pallets; 
(10) do inventory and other paperwork; and (11) clean up and 
wash equipment.  Catlin's testimony during the hearings before 
the ALJ supports LIRC's findings that Catlin could, as a purely 
quantitative matter, perform these tasks. 
¶95 There also is a nontrivial number of duties that LIRC 
found——and which Catlin has admitted——that she could not 
perform.  Catlin could not perform "some" of the heavier 
physical tasks, including (1) lifting 40-pound blocks of cheese; 
(2) loading and unloading cheese onto hand carts and semi 
trucks; (3) reaching boxes stacked high in the storeroom; (4) 
reaching cheese stacked high in the cooler; (5) cutting cheese; 
and (6) placing the cheese in the hot-water bath to shrink-wrap 
it.  LIRC proclaimed that the last two duties were not ones that 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
4 
 
Catlin performed "very frequently," as they were primarily the 
jobs of the cheese cutter and "cryovacer."  Conspicuously absent 
from either of LIRC's lists is the vacuum-bagging role of the 
cryovacer, which involves the operation of a cryovac machine.  
In addition, prior to her accident Catlin had assisted in moving 
cheese by use of a handcart and loading it on a pickup truck to 
go to the retail store.21  After her accident, Catlin was unable 
to perform either of these two functions as well. 
¶96 In all, there is no disagreement between the parties 
or their respective experts that Catlin was physically unable to 
perform a fair number of her job duties, even with reasonable 
accommodations. 
¶97 In determining whether Catlin could undertake her job 
responsibilities adequately, it appears that LIRC took mostly a 
quantitative approach.  LIRC simply counted the number of duties 
Catlin could perform, added to this number those duties that she 
could perform with accommodation, and then compared this total 
to the number of jobs that she could not perform.  Accordingly, 
it determined that Catlin could perform "most" of her job 
functions.  This analytical technique is suspect, because it 
fails to account for the amount of time that Catlin spent daily 
on each of the jobs and the relative importance of each of the 
tasks that she was required to perform.  Rather than engaging in 
such 
an 
analysis 
of 
assigning 
weight 
to 
Catlin's 
job 
requirements, LIRC slapped the ambiguous modifier "most" on the 
                                                 
21 This pickup truck loading process apparently took place 
primarily, though not exclusively, at Christmas time. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
5 
 
number of duties that she could still do and concluded that the 
duties she could not do anymore were those that she had 
performed "not very frequently." 
¶98 There is mostly ambiguous testimony regarding how 
often and for what length of time Catlin engaged in any of her 
duties.  As a result, it is difficult to determine how the 
performance of each of these tasks relates to Catlin's ability 
to adequately perform the functions that are necessary to her 
position.22  However, we do know the amount of time that she 
spent on one of her tasks; we know that she only spent about one 
to one-and-a-half hours at the beginning of her day handling her 
general paperwork and administrative duties.  According to the 
"modifications" recommendation of Catlin's expert, however, 
these "paperwork" duties would have constituted the majority of 
Catlin's job upon her "accommodation."23 
                                                 
22 One duty that LIRC "found" Catlin able to do was "train."  
Catlin testified that there was a man who was not cross-trained 
when she began in the wholesale department.  Because Catlin was 
the lead worker, it is assumed that she took on the cross-
training of this individual.  This is the only instance in which 
Catlin indicated that she may have previously engaged in 
training, and even this is an assumption.  Yet "training" is one 
of LIRC's findings of what Catlin could do after her injury.  To 
be sure, it was also found that Catlin could no longer aid in 
loading and unloading trucks.  There is some testimony that she 
only needed to do this occasionally, especially around December.  
It would seem that these two, relatively minor functions would 
cancel each other out. 
23 According 
to 
Jeffrey 
Annis, 
the 
rehabilitation 
technologist who conducted an assessment of Catlin's job site 
and job capabilities for Catlin: 
As far as I can see, the only opportunity 
[Catlin] would have had to return to that position is 
if there would have been numerous accommodations put 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶99 In any event, Catlin and several other witnesses 
testified that one of the primary responsibilities of the four 
employees in this department was to undertake the jobs of the 
other three employees in the event of a temporary absence or if 
another employee were falling behind and needed help.  For 
example, Catlin testified that she often "jumped in" to take 40-
pound blocks of cheese to and from the cooler and that some days 
she would do this "a couple of times a day."  This task required 
her not only to lift the blocks but also to reach to the higher 
shelves in the cooler.  Naturally, the ability of these four 
employees to work together and to work smoothly by filling in 
when needed was essential to the efficiency of the department's 
production process.  In all, Catlin assisted with all the duties 
of the wholesale department on a daily basis and many of these 
duties she could no longer perform after her accident. 
¶100 Nevertheless, LIRC concluded that Catlin could be 
assigned to performing all but the "heaviest physical tasks" in 
a department where such tasks are commonplace and where all 
employees, including Catlin, were required to perform each 
other's duties on a daily basis.  Of course, LIRC's conclusion 
is based on a different view of the facts than that of the ALJ 
who first heard this case.  Of particular concern is the 
                                                                                                                                                             
in place.  The easier option would be to make 
modifications to her job description so she would be 
required, as lead person, to only do the paper work, 
final packaging, and filling out invoices, receipts, 
and packing lists.   
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
7 
 
difference between how the ALJ and LIRC characterized the 
frequency by which Catlin assisted other members of the 
department, including help with the "heavy physical tasks."  The 
ALJ concluded in his findings of fact that each employee in the 
department "regularly had to assist each other to keep work 
flowing smoothly and cover for each other when temporary 
absences occurred."  Meanwhile, LIRC concluded that the duties 
which Catlin could not perform were tasks that she did not do 
"very frequently" and were those that she "helped out only 
occasionally."  Well, which is it? 
II. LEVEL OF DEFERENCE 
¶101 The 
majority begins 
its 
analysis 
by 
incorrectly 
finding that LIRC's legal conclusions in this case are entitled 
to extremely deferential treatment under the "great weight" 
standard of review.  As this court has previously stated:   
Great weight deference is appropriate once a court has 
concluded that: (1) the agency was charged by the 
legislature 
with 
the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; (2) that the interpretation of the agency is 
one of long-standing; (3) that the agency employed its 
expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the 
interpretation; 
and 
(4) 
that 
the 
agency's 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency 
in the application of the statute.   
Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 
(1995); see also UFE v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 
N.W.2d 57 (1996); Linsey v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 
N.W.2d 14 (1992).  LIRC has failed to meet the second and fourth 
prongs of the test.  Thus, I would conclude that great weight 
deference is an inappropriate standard of review. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶102 Though 
LIRC 
has 
experience 
in 
interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34, LIRC's interpretation of the statute on 
matters related to this issue is not one of "long standing."  
Therefore, LIRC does not satisfy the second prong of the test.  
I believe that "[t]his is precisely the situation that warrants 
due weight deference: LIRC has had some experience interpreting 
[Wis. Stat. § 111.34], 
yet 
has 
not 
faced 
the 
particular 
circumstances we have here."  Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶19, 
236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635. 
¶103 Indeed, LIRC has yet to address the specific issue of 
whether "reasonable accommodation" under the WFEA includes a 
duty to eliminate multiple, basic job duties of an employee and 
to create a wholly different, previously nonexistent job for a 
disabled employee.  LIRC incorrectly cites Fields v. Cardinal TG 
Co., ERD Case No. 1997-02574 (LIRC Feb. 16, 2001), as conclusive 
support for the proposition that LIRC has held a reasonable 
accommodation to require an employer to restructure the physical 
demands of the job in order to accommodate a disabled employee.  
Even putting aside that Fields was decided well after the 
evidentiary hearing in this case, that case actually held that 
an employer may not restructure the job of a disabled employee 
such that the employee is no longer able to perform it because 
of a disability.   
¶104 Outside of Fields, LIRC cites no legal authority or 
precedent from its own opinions to directly support its prior 
history of following the rule it presently advances.  Thus, 
while LIRC may have addressed cases that are similar to this 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
9 
 
question, this is the first occurrence under these particular 
circumstances.  Therefore, great weight deference should not be 
afforded to LIRC’s interpretation.  See Local No. 695 v. LIRC, 
154 Wis. 2d 75, 81, 452 N.W.2d 368 (1990). 
¶105 To the extent LIRC has addressed issues related to 
modifying jobs as a means of accommodating an employee's 
disability, it has a spotty history of providing uniformity and 
consistency in applying § 111.34.  In McMullen v. LIRC, 148 
Wis. 2d 270, 434 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1988), LIRC was given no 
deference 
in 
its 
interpretation 
of 
§ 111.34 
due 
to 
its 
inconsistent 
statements 
regarding 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
accommodation could ever include an employee's transfer to 
another position.  Id. at 274.  LIRC had stated in its own 
decision in the matter that transferring a disabled employee to 
another position may be considered a reasonable accommodation.  
Id.  When facing the court of appeals, however, LIRC reversed 
its position and argued that an employer's duty to accommodate 
could never include a transfer.  Id.  Not only did LIRC 
contradict itself within the framework of a single case, it did 
so on a topic similar to the issue in this case. 
¶106 Indeed, McMullen is not the only case illustrating 
LIRC's limitations when interpreting § 111.34 on issues related 
to the present case.  In Macara v. Consumer Co-op, ERD Case No. 
8802872 (LIRC Feb. 14, 1992), LIRC held that the duty to 
accommodate does not require creating a position or discharging 
another employee to allow for a transfer of a disabled employee.  
Meanwhile, in 1988, the Wisconsin Personnel Commission, LIRC's 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
10 
 
sister 
agency, 
had 
analyzed 
§ 111.34(2)(a) 
in 
light 
of 
§ 111.34(1)(b) and ruled that the WFEA does not require an 
employer to create a new job or reassign job duties to other 
staff as a reasonable accommodation.  Harris v. DHSS, Case No. 
84-0109-PC-ER (Wis. Personnel Comm'n Feb. 11, 1988).  Rather, 
"the employer's obligation is limited to the job-related 
responsibilities of the handicapped individual's employment vis-
à-vis the particular job he or she occupies or for which he or 
she is applying."  Id. at 14-15.  In both of these decisions, 
the foregoing conclusions were not particular to the facts of 
the case but were offered as general legal principles. 
¶107 If nothing else, this history indicates inconsistency 
in agency interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 111.34 on this matter.  
"[S]pecial deference to be afforded an agency is the result of a 
course of uniform interpretation over a period of time."  Local 
No. 695, 154 Wis. 2d at 84.  Given the preceding history, there 
has hardly been uniform application of § 111.34 by LIRC and the 
Wisconsin Personnel Commission.  Therefore, due weight should 
clearly be afforded in this case. 
¶108 Under the due weight standard, "a court need not defer 
to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is not 
the interpretation which the court considers best and most 
reasonable."  Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 660 n.4; see also 
Brauneis, 
236 
Wis. 2d 27, 
¶20 
("Pursuant 
to 
due 
weight 
deference, an agency's statutory interpretation is accorded some 
weight, but is not conclusive.").  This court is not bound by 
LIRC's statutory interpretation.  See Brauneis, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶15.  "The fact that the agency's interpretation is reasonable 
does not mean that its interpretation will necessarily be 
upheld.  If a court finds an alternative interpretation more 
reasonable, it need not adopt the agency's interpretation."  
UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 287.  Therefore, if this court finds, by 
means 
of 
its 
own 
independent 
analysis, 
an 
alternative 
interpretation that is more reasonable, then it need not adopt 
the agency's interpretation. 
¶109 By adopting an incorrect level of deference regarding 
LIRC's legal conclusion, this court has abdicated its role to 
define the law established under Chapter 111 and has passively 
allowed 
the 
establishment 
of 
a 
wholly 
less 
reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
the 
law. 
 
At 
a 
minimum, 
given 
the 
inconsistency of the administrative agencies addressing similar 
issues, and the lack of LIRC decisions addressing this precise 
issue, this court should have engaged in an independent review 
of what § 111.34 demands on this question. 
III. PROPER APPLICATION OF WIS. STAT. § 111.34 
¶110 The WFEA prohibits employment discrimination on the 
basis 
of 
disability. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.321, 
111.34.  
Accordingly, 
it 
is 
unlawful 
employment 
discrimination 
to 
"refus[e] to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective 
employee's disability unless the employer can demonstrate that 
the 
accommodation 
would 
pose 
a 
hardship 
on 
the 
employer[] . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 111.34(b). 
¶111 However, the legislature has provided affirmative 
defenses to a WFEA claim of employment discrimination based on 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
12 
 
disability.  In the present case, we need only look at 
§ 111.34(2)(a), which states: 
Notwithstanding 
s. 
111.322 
[the 
prohibition 
against 
employment 
discrimination], 
it 
is 
not 
employment discrimination because of disability to 
refuse to hire, employ . . . to bar or terminate from 
employment . . . any 
individual . . . if 
the 
disability is reasonably related to the individual's 
ability 
to 
adequately 
undertake 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities 
of 
that 
individual's 
employment . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a) (emphasis added).   
¶112 The 
majority 
quite 
accurately 
describes 
the 
relationship between §§ 111.34(1)(b) and 111.34(2)(a), stating: 
"Taken together, [the provisions] require an employer to prove 
that even with reasonable accommodations, the employee would not 
be able to perform his or her job responsibilities, or that, 
where reasonable accommodations would enable the employee to do 
the job, hardship would be placed on the employer."  Majority 
op., ¶32 (citing Target Stores v. LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 576 
N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, 
the majority fails to apply the foregoing standard and, in the 
process, adopts LIRC's improper application of § 111.34.  LIRC's 
approach 
rewrites 
the 
statute 
to 
generate 
a 
nonexistent 
requirement that employers retain or hire someone who is unable 
to perform the responsibilities of any existing job, even with 
reasonable physical accommodations. 
¶113 Crystal 
Lake 
has 
met 
the 
requirements 
of 
§ 111.34(1)(b) and § 111.34(2)(a), even under the formulation 
articulated by the majority.  First, Catlin is unable to perform 
all her existing job responsibilities, much less perform them 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
13 
 
all adequately as required by § 111.34(2)(a).  Second, Catlin is 
unable "to do the job" that she has been performing.  Instead, 
she is only able to perform a new and more limited job——one that 
is substantively different from her prior position. 
¶114 As discussed earlier, Catlin is now unable to do 
significant, daily elements of her job.  In particular, she is 
now frequently unable to "step in" and assist other members of 
the department to keep production going smoothly.  It is 
unreasonable to interpret § 111.34 to require Crystal Lake to 
retain an employee who, by virtue of her disability, is unable 
to perform these necessary elements of her job and to create a 
job devoid of these duties, when no such job previously 
existed.24 
¶115 LIRC itself has argued as much, and in a situation 
much more favorable to an employee's protections under § 111.34.  
In LIRC's brief before the court of appeals in McMullen, a case 
that is discussed above, LIRC argued that "the duty to 
accommodate an employee's handicap under the WFEA . . . does not 
require an employer to transfer the employe to a different job."  
Brief of LIRC at 24, McMullen v. LIRC, 148 Wis. 2d 270. 
                                                 
24 Would this court have reached the same decision if 
Crystal Lake declined to hire someone for the wholesale 
department's lead position because that applicant suffered from 
Catlin's disability and was unable to do the same elements of 
the job that Catlin was unable to perform?  The WFEA applies 
equally 
to 
applicants 
as 
it 
does 
to 
current 
employees.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.32(1).  After today's decision, a Wisconsin 
employer must be prepared to post job openings in which it may 
ultimately 
be 
required 
to 
hire 
someone 
who, 
even 
with 
accommodations, 
will 
not 
be 
able 
to 
perform 
the 
duties 
attributed to that position. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
14 
 
¶116 To be sure, some job responsibilities may not be 
necessary, in that they do not fundamentally alter the job being 
performed.  Nevertheless, as a general matter, the reasonable 
accommodations required under § 111.34(1)(b) must go to aiding 
the employee or applicant in performing the job responsibilities 
for which they are, or will be, hired.  There will be times when 
an employer will have to endure additional costs to reasonably 
accommodate an individual so that the employee can perform all 
of his or her job duties.  Because of the additional cost of 
employing this individual over someone who would not require 
accommodation, the employer would likely prefer, as a economic 
matter, not to hire the disabled person.  The WFEA, however, has 
made this type of discrimination unlawful.  It is this 
protection that is wisely provided by the WFEA. 
¶117 What the WFEA does not make unlawful is an employer's 
decision not to hire or retain an employee who, because of his 
or her disability, cannot perform the necessary duties of the 
job, even with all reasonable accommodations. 
¶118 The questionable reasoning of LIRC's interpretation is 
seen in the circularity of the majority's holding, in which it 
states, "we hold that requiring Crystal Lake to modify the job 
duties of Susan Catlin and make physical accommodations to the 
workplace, 
was 
not 
unreasonable. 
 
With 
such 
reasonable 
accommodations, she would have the ability to undertake, 
adequately, her job-related responsibilities."  Majority op., 
¶3.  Assuming that "job duties" and "job responsibilities" are 
synonymous, 
how 
can 
Catlin 
undertake 
her 
job-related 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
15 
 
responsibilities, "adequately" or otherwise, if she does not 
need to perform those responsibilities?  LIRC and the majority 
use "modify" as a euphemism so as to require Crystal Lake to 
eliminate multiple, basic duties of the job for which Catlin was 
hired.  Even worse, the majority endorses the nebulous notion 
that an employee or applicant need only perform "some" or "most" 
of his or her job duties.25  
¶119 Catlin and LIRC also misconstrue the well-expressed 
legislative intent of the WFEA.  The WFEA does not mandate the 
full employment of people with disabilities per se.  It 
encourages the full employment of properly qualified persons 
with disabilities.  Wis. Stat. § 111.31(3).  Catlin and LIRC 
consistently argue for——and the majority apparently grants them—
—an interpretation of § 111.34 that effectuates a purpose in the 
WFEA whereby Crystal Lake is required to give Catlin some job——
any job——even one that does not fit within the structure of the 
business enterprise.  This outcome is not what the WFEA intends 
for persons who are unable to perform a job.  By virtue of her 
injuries, Catlin was not properly qualified to perform the job 
for which she was hired; nor could she have been reassigned to 
another job that was open for which she was qualified. 
                                                 
25 This 
answer 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
majority's 
formulation of the primary issue in this case, which it 
describes as: "whether, with reasonable accommodations Catlin 
must 
then 
be 
able 
to 
perform 
all 
of 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities adequately."  Majority op., ¶44. 
 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶120 Catlin 
does 
not 
argue 
that 
reasonable 
physical 
accommodations would adequately and reasonably compensate for 
her disability and thereby allow her to perform the necessary 
functions of her job.  Therefore, even if the court finds that 
the physical accommodations demanded by Catlin and LIRC are not 
unreasonable and do not impose a hardship,26 § 111.34(2)(a) still 
requires that the employee be able to actually do the necessary 
functions of the job with those accommodations.  Again, it is 
conceded that Catlin is unable to do many of the necessary 
duties of her job that she had performed daily. 
¶121 The inescapable effect of LIRC's ruling is that 
Crystal Lake must either (1) have nobody perform the duties that 
Catlin used to do, and thereby decrease productivity; (2) hire a 
new employee to do these duties and incur unnecessary costs27; or 
(3) have other existing employees undertake the duties that 
Catlin can no longer perform, thereby taking these employees 
away from the duties they would otherwise be performing.  Each 
of these options necessarily imposes hardship on an employer in 
a manner that § 111.34(2)(a) expressly states need not occur. 
¶122 Businesses must worry about profit, which is achieved 
through efficiency.  Crystal Lake assigned specific job duties 
                                                 
26 I do not concede that Crystal Lake has failed to 
establish hardship based on the physical accommodations required 
of the facility to handle Catlin's needs. 
27 LIRC stated in its Memorandum Opinion that Crystal Lake 
failed to establish that it would have needed to hire additional 
help if Catlin was permitted not to perform all her duties.  
However, before the ALJ, Phillip Robertson, Crystal Lake's 
operations manager, directly testified that the company would 
have been required to hire additional help in this situation. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
17 
 
to the individuals in Catlin's department, presumably to 
increase efficiency.  Indeed, all the members of the department 
were cross-trained in all the other jobs in order to be more 
efficient and diverse in their roles in the production process.  
Take away one of the components in this process, and an 
intimate, finely tuned, production process loses the level of 
productivity set by the employer for this four-person unit. 
¶123 As the majority admits, all four workers in Crystal 
Lake's wholesale department were cross-trained in all four 
positions, "and all were capable of assisting one another when 
an employee fell behind, or when the department was busier than 
usual."  Majority op., ¶8.28  This "assistance" is a requirement 
of each person's job, not a matter of mere "capability."  By 
virtue 
of 
Catlin's 
disability, 
which 
confines 
her 
to 
a 
wheelchair, she is now frequently incapable of assisting other 
employees in the department as needed.  How, then, can she 
perform these necessary elements of her job?   
¶124 Remarkably, 
LIRC 
and 
the 
majority 
twist 
the 
significance of this cross-training to make much out of the not-
so-surprising testimony that Catlin's mother and sister would 
                                                 
28 We would add to these circumstances assisting each other 
at times when an employee was absent, either due to illness or 
to other demands of the job. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
18 
 
"help" with the job duties that Catlin could not do.29  Majority 
op., ¶¶70, 78.  This discussion is irrelevant and inappropriate.  
Section 111.34(2)(a) addresses the ability of the employee or 
applicant at issue to "adequately undertake the job-related 
responsibilities of that individual's employment."  In addition, 
it ignores the fact that such "accommodation" necessarily 
diverts Catlin's mother and sister from their own duties. 
¶125 Finally, there has been much ado about nothing related 
to Crystal Lake's method of determining if Catlin could have 
been accommodated.  It is not necessary in this case that 
Crystal 
Lake, 
when 
it 
assessed 
whether 
Catlin 
could 
be 
reasonably accommodated to perform her job, talk with Catlin or 
inform the professional evaluator anything more about her 
disability than that she was confined to a wheelchair.  In some 
instances, such as this case, there are certain realities in 
what a person confined to a wheelchair is physically unable to 
do, even with all reasonable physical accommodation. 
 
¶126 It is telling that the majority offers no authority to 
directly support the reasonableness of LIRC's interpretation of 
§ 111.34.  Contrary to what the majority asserts, the cases it 
cites do not hold "that a reasonable accommodation [is] not 
                                                 
29 In fact, the majority states that Catlin argued that 
"[t]he 
other 
department 
members 
did 
not 
object 
even 
if 
[performing Catlin's heavy physical tasks] meant they would get 
disproportionate share of those duties."  This appears to be an 
overstatement, as only two of the three other members (Catlin's 
mother and sister) testified that they would agree to do so.  In 
addition, this testimony, besides being inherently biased, is 
speculative, because by the time of the hearing in this case, 
Crystal Lake had apparently eliminated the wholesale department 
at which these employees worked. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
19 
 
limited to only an accommodation that would permit the employee 
to perform all of his or her job responsibilities."  Majority 
op., ¶47. 
¶127 Target Stores, 217 Wis. 2d 1, involved a temporary and 
treatable disability.  The court of appeals held in favor of the 
complainant, even though the accommodation would not allow the 
complainant to perform all her job duties immediately.  Id. at 
14.  However, the complainant's disability (sleep apnea) was a 
temporary one that was treatable.  After a short treatment 
period, the employee would have likely been able to perform all 
her job duties.  Id. at 7.  It is unlikely that Catlin's 
rehabilitation will ever allow her to perform all her job 
duties, in either the short-term or long-term future.  Target 
Stores is clearly distinguishable. 
¶128 In McMullen v. LIRC, 148 Wis. 2d 270, 434 N.W.2d 830 
(Ct. App. 1988), the complainant was seeking a transfer to an 
open position for which he was qualified.  The court held that a 
reasonable accommodation may include a transfer to an open 
position for which the employee is qualified, though, depending 
upon the facts of each individual case, such transfer may also 
be considered a hardship.  Id. at 271.  The majority's assertion 
that Catlin's required accommodation is similar to what occurred 
in McMullen and "was essentially a change or modification in the 
employee's job-related responsibilities," majority op., ¶49, is 
inaccurate.  In McMullen there was a transfer to a different, 
vacant position that the company needed to fill anyway.  Catlin 
is not requesting a transfer to an existing, open position for 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
20 
 
which she is qualified.  She is asking for her old job back, 
with certain daily job responsibilities eliminated because she 
can no longer adequately perform them, even with accommodation.  
This is a critical distinction from McMullen. 
¶129 Finally, in Frito Lay, Inc. v. LIRC, 95 Wis. 2d 395 
(Ct. App. 1980), the issue of accommodation was not one in which 
any new job was created; rather the complainant was once again 
reassigned to a position that he was qualified to fill——namely, 
driving 
intrastate 
trucking 
routes 
rather 
than 
driving 
interstate routes, which his disability prevented him from 
doing. 
¶130 In all, unlike Target Stores, McMullen, and Frito Lay, 
the position that LIRC and the majority opinion claim that 
Catlin should "fill" did not exist at the time of her injuries, 
did not exist when Crystal Lake was assessing whether Catlin 
could be adequately accommodated to do her job, and exists now 
only by fiat of LIRC. 
¶131 In all, LIRC's interpretation of § 111.34, as adopted 
by 
the 
majority, 
is 
highly 
questionable 
and 
imposes 
an 
unreasonable burden on Wisconsin businesses.  Section 111.34 
cannot be read to require that an applicant or employee only be 
able 
to 
perform 
"some" 
or 
"most" 
of 
the 
necessary 
responsibilities of the job.  See majority op., ¶63.  Rather, a 
reasonable 
accommodation 
under 
§ 111.34(1)(b), 
when 
read 
together with § 111.34(2)(a), is one that permits an employee to 
perform adequately all of his or her necessary job duties or, in 
some instances, to perform all the necessary job duties of 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
21 
 
another existing job.  Under the facts of this case, Crystal 
Lake 
has 
fully 
met 
its 
burden 
under 
§ 111.34(2)(a) 
of 
demonstrating that Catlin's disability is reasonably related to 
her ability to adequately undertake the job responsibilities of 
her employment. 
IV. DUE PROCESS & SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
¶132 The majority opinion concludes by rejecting Crystal 
Lake's contention that LIRC improperly reached its decision by 
failing to confer with the ALJ regarding evidence submitted 
before the ALJ.  The majority states that LIRC's findings did 
not "hinge on issues of witness credibility," and therefore LIRC 
was not required to consult with the ALJ.  Majority op. ¶¶4, 54. 
¶133 The majority errs, however, in suggesting that the 
only element of credibility at issue was that of Crystal Lake's 
operations manager, Phillip Robertson, regarding the cost of 
constructing 
a 
wheelchair-accessible 
bathroom. 
 
This 
is 
incomplete.  The credibility assessments required for LIRC to 
reach its conclusions involved other matters.  Of primary 
importance are the conflicting findings regarding the frequency 
by which Catlin had performed the job responsibilities that she 
could not perform after her accident.  LIRC's factual findings 
regarding which job responsibilities the complainant could or 
could not perform after her accident, even with physical 
accommodation, were based almost completely on testimony from 
the complainant.  See majority op., ¶63 ("Catlin felt that she 
would be able to perform most tasks that were part of her job 
with little or no accommodation.").  From this, LIRC concludes 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
22 
 
that Catlin could perform "most" of her duties.  See majority 
op., ¶63. 
¶134 The 
problem is 
that 
this 
ultimately 
dispositive 
factual finding, which is of questionable reliability and is 
based on credibility assessments, is then applied to LIRC's new 
and incorrect interpretation of § 111.34.  It is telling that 
even the majority seems tentative on this conclusion, stating 
"Crystal Lake could have accommodated Catlin's disability [ ] by 
modifying her responsibilities.  This is an accommodation, we 
hold, that appears to be reasonable under the circumstances and 
within the purview of the WFEA."  Majority op., ¶78 (emphasis 
added). 
¶135 Even 
if 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 111.34 
were 
correct, the ALJ based his assessment not solely upon an 
adoption of Crystal Lake's theory of law, but also on his 
findings that the job duties that Catlin could not now perform 
were ones she used to do "regularly."  Therefore, LIRC needed to 
consult with the ALJ to determine the basis upon which it 
reached a different factual conclusion on this matter.30  See 
                                                 
30 As but one example of Catlin's testimony that undermines 
LIRC's "not very frequently" finding is the following: 
[ATTORNEY GROISS]: Now you indicated . . . that the 
cutting of the cheese was a cutter's responsibility, 
and you say you didn't——you rarely had to cut the 
cheese, but you took it upon yourself to do that; is 
that correct? 
[CATLIN]: Yes. 
[GROISS]: And when  you're talking about this——this——
this cutting of the cheese, when you say "rarely," you 
would be cutting cheese several times during the 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
23 
 
Hermax 
Carpet 
Marts 
v. 
LIRC, 
220 
Wis. 2d 611, 
617, 
583 
N.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1998); Hoell v. LIRC, 186 Wis. 2d 603, 614, 
522 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1994).  Again, even under LIRC's 
interpretation of § 111.34, this factual determination was 
critical.  Furthermore, Catlin, LIRC, and the majority have each 
relied on testimony from Catlin's mother and sister, who happen 
to be two of the three other employees in the wholesale 
department, who claimed that they could "pick up the slack" and 
cover Catlin's job duties as needed.  Majority op., ¶29.  The 
credibility of these statements is also at issue. 
¶136 These findings, it seems to me, are undoubtedly based 
on credibility assessments.  Therefore, I disagree that it was 
permissible for LIRC to reach factual conclusions without having 
conferred 
with 
the 
administrative 
law 
judge, 
whom 
LIRC 
ultimately reversed.  At a minimum, this case should be remanded 
so that LIRC can be required to consult with the ALJ and to 
determine why LIRC and its administrative law counterpart 
                                                                                                                                                             
course of the week, would you not, as a normal course 
of your job function? 
[CATLIN]: Not several, no. 
[GROISS]: What, once a week?  You have no answer? 
[CATLIN]: It's a hard question to answer. 
[GROISS]: And that's because you're always doing these 
various functions; is that correct? 
[CATLIN]: If we get busy, yeah. 
[GROISS]: You're always being asked to fill in this 
instance and do these various jobs; is that correct? 
[CATLIN]: Yeah. 
No.  02-0815.dtp 
 
24 
 
reached two different assessments regarding the nature of the 
duties Catlin could and could not do and to determine if the 
ALJ's conclusion was based on more than merely an adoption of a 
different rule of law. 
¶137 I am authorized to state that JUSTICES JON P. WILCOX 
and DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent.