Title: Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP000059
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2021

2021 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP59 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Clean Wisconsin, Inc. and Pleasant Lake 
Management  
District, 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Dairy 
Business Association, Midwest Food Processors 
Association, Wisconsin Potato & Vegetable 
Growers Association, Wisconsin Cheese Makers 
Association, Wisconsin Farm Bureau  
Federation, Wisconsin Paper Council and 
Wisconsin Corn Growers Association, 
          Intervenors-Co-Appellants, 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Valerie Bailey-Rihn   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the intervenor, there were briefs filed by Eric M. 
McLeod, Kirsten A. Atanasoff, Lisa M. Lawless, and Husch 
Blackwell LLP, Madison and Milwaukee. There was an oral argument 
by Eric M. McLeod. 
 
 
2 
 
For the intervenors-co-appellants, there were briefs file 
by Robert I. Fassbender and Great Lakes Legal Foundation, 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Robert I. Fassbender. 
 
For the petitioners-respondents, there was a brief file by 
Carl A. Sinderbrand and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison. There was 
an oral argument by Carl Sinderbrand.  
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Gabe 
Johnson-Karp 
and 
Jennifer 
L. 
Vandermeuse 
assistant 
attorneys general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, 
attorney general, Madison. There was an oral argument by Gabe 
Johnson-Karp. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Central Sands 
Water Action Coalition by Andrea Gelatt, Rob Lundberg, Adam 
Voskuil, and Midwest Environmental Advocates, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Trout Unlimited, Inc. by Henry E. Koltz and Schmidt, Darling & 
Erwin, Milwaukee.    
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 72 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP59 
(L.C. Nos. 2016CV2817, 2016CV2818, 2016CV2819, 2016CV2820, 2016CV2821, 
2016CV2822, 2016CV2823, 2016CV2824) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Clean Wisconsin, Inc. and Pleasant Lake 
Management District, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Dairy 
Business Association, Midwest Food Processors 
Association, Wisconsin Potato & Vegetable 
Growers Association, Wisconsin Cheese Makers 
Association, Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, 
Wisconsin Paper Council and Wisconsin Corn 
Growers Association, 
 
          Intervenors-Co-Appellants, 
 
Wisconsin Legislature, 
 
          Intervenor. 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
2 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Valerie Bailey-Rihn, Judge.  Modified and 
affirmed, and, as modified, cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   One of the Department of 
Natural Resources' (DNR) many responsibilities is to evaluate 
applications to operate high capacity groundwater wells.  For 
certain wells, the DNR must follow a specific environmental 
review process before approving the application.  For all other 
wells, that process is not required, although the DNR sometimes 
still considers the potential environmental effects of a 
proposed well when evaluating the well's application.  The eight 
well 
applications 
at 
issue 
here 
fall 
into 
the 
latter 
category:  a formal environmental review was not required, but 
the DNR had information that the wells would negatively impact 
the environment.  Despite that knowledge, the DNR approved the 
applications after concluding it had no authority to consider 
the proposed wells' environmental effects. 
¶2 
Clean Wisconsin, Inc. and the Pleasant Lake Management 
District 
(collectively, 
"Clean 
Wisconsin") 
appealed 
that 
decision to the circuit court.1  They argued that the DNR's 
decision was contrary to Lake Beulah Management District v. 
DNR, 2011 WI 54, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73, where we held 
that the DNR had the authority and discretion to consider the 
                     
1 The Honorable Valerie Bailey-Rihn of the Dane County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
3 
 
environmental effects of all proposed high capacity wells.  The 
DNR argued that Lake Beulah is no longer good law because Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m) (2019-20),2 enacted at roughly the same time 
we decided Lake Beulah, limits an agency's actions to only those 
"explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a 
rule," and, for these wells, a formal environmental review was 
not required under Wis. Stat. § 281.34.3  Thus, the question 
presented 
is 
whether 
§ 227.10(2m) 
commands 
a 
different 
conclusion here than in Lake Beulah.  The circuit court decided 
that it does not and we agree.  We hold that the DNR erroneously 
interpreted the law when it concluded it had no authority to 
consider the environmental effects of the eight wells at issue 
here.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order with the 
modification that the circuit court remand all eight well 
applications to the DNR. 
I 
¶3 
Consolidated 
in 
this 
case 
are 
eight 
permit 
applications for high capacity wells, all of which were filed 
                     
2 All 
references 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
are 
to 
the 2019-20 version. 
3 The DNR "shall review" a well application "using the 
environmental review process in its rules" when a proposed well 
is "located in a groundwater protection area," loses more than 
95 percent of the water it withdraws, or "may have a significant 
environmental impact on a spring."  Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4)(a). 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
4 
 
between March 2014 and April 2015.4  At the time, and consistent 
with our holding in Lake Beulah, the DNR's common practice was 
to 
review 
environmental-impact 
information 
for 
most 
high 
capacity well applications, regardless of whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.34(4)(a) required such a review.  If the review revealed 
that the proposed well would cause adverse environmental 
effects, the DNR would either deny the application or place it 
"on hold," neither denying nor approving it.  For all eight 
wells at issue here, the DNR flagged the applications for 
further review of their potential environmental impacts.  For 
seven of the wells,5 it completed that review and determined that 
approving the well would adversely affect waters covered by the 
public trust doctrine.6  The DNR then placed all eight well 
applications on hold. 
                     
4 The well owners and respective case numbers are:  Lutz, 
2016CV2817; 
Pavelski, 
2016CV2818; 
Peplinski, 
2016CV2819; 
Frozene, 
2016CV2820; 
Turzinski, 
2016CV2821; 
Laskowski, 
2016CV2822; 
Lauritzen, 
2016CV2823; 
Derousseau, 
2016CV2824.  
There is no dispute that all eight wells are "high-capacity 
wells" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 281.34(1)(b). 
5 A 
DNR 
scientist 
had 
recommended 
investigating 
the 
Turzinski well's effect on the headwaters of a nearby creek, but 
the DNR approved the application before collecting any evidence 
on those potential effects. 
6 Rooted in the Wisconsin Constitution, the public trust 
doctrine requires the state to protect its "navigable waters" 
for the public's benefit.  See Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1; Movrich 
v. 
Lobermeier, 
2018 
WI 9, 
¶¶25-29, 
379 
Wis. 2d 269, 
905 
N.W.2d 807. 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
5 
 
¶4 
While those applications were on hold, the DNR's well-
approval process changed.  In 2016, then-Attorney General Brad 
Schimel released an opinion regarding Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) 
and its effect on the DNR's well-permit authority and our 
holding in Lake Beulah.  The Attorney General's opinion 
concluded that this court did not address § 227.10(2m) in Lake 
Beulah and that, after the enactment of § 227.10(2m), the DNR 
had no authority to impose specific permit conditions that were 
not explicitly listed in a relevant statute.  See Opinion of 
Wis. Att'y Gen. to Robin Vos, Assembly Committee on Organization 
Chairperson, OAG-01-16, ¶2 (May 10, 2016).  He read Lake Beulah 
as holding that the legislature had "impliedly delegated" to the 
DNR broad, public-trust authority, which could not withstand 
§ 227.10(2m): 
Although the Lake Beulah Court found that DNR had 
broad 
implied 
authority 
to 
impose 
permit 
conditions, 335 
Wis. 2d 47, 
¶3, 
that 
holding 
now 
directly conflicts with Act 21.  I conclude that 
through Wis. Stat. §§ 227.10(2m) [and 227].11(2)(a), 
the 
Legislature 
has 
limited 
DNR's 
authority 
to 
regulate high capacity wells only as explicitly 
enumerated through statute or rule.  DNR cannot 
premise such authority on broad statements of policy 
or general duty, such as those found in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 281.11-.12. 
OAG-01-16, ¶31 (footnote omitted).  The DNR adopted this opinion 
and began approving most of the applications it had placed on 
hold.  And, despite its having evidence that some of those 
proposed wells would adversely affect public-trust waters, the 
DNR generally imposed no permit conditions to protect those 
waters. 
 
The 
DNR 
also 
stopped 
reviewing 
the 
potential 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
6 
 
environmental effects of proposed wells except when such a 
review was required under Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4).  Under this 
new approach, and despite its prior determination that the wells 
at issue here would adversely affect public-trust waters, the 
DNR approved all eight well applications without any conditions. 
¶5 
Clean Wisconsin appealed each approval to the circuit 
court under Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Clean Wisconsin argued that the 
DNR 
approved 
those 
wells 
based 
upon 
an 
erroneous 
legal 
determination that it had no authority outside of Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.34(4) to consider the environmental effects of a proposed 
high capacity well.  Citing Lake Beulah for support, Clean 
Wisconsin argued that the DNR has both a public-trust duty and 
the express statutory authority to consider the environmental 
impact of all proposed high-capacity wells.  The DNR countered 
that Lake Beulah did not control for two reasons:  (1) it was 
"decided incorrectly" because it "amalgamat[ed]" an "implied" 
authority for the DNR to review a proposed well's environmental 
effects rather than looking to the statutes' explicit text; and 
(2) per the Attorney General's 2016 opinion, Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) negated Lake Beulah's holding.  Several business 
associations intervened and urged the circuit court to find that 
the DNR had properly approved the well applications.7  These 
                     
7 The intervenors at the circuit court were Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce, Dairy Business Association, Midwest 
Food Products Association, Wisconsin Potato and Vegetable 
Growers 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Cheese 
Makers 
Association, 
Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, Wisconsin Paper Council, and 
Wisconsin Corn Growers Association. 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
7 
 
associations argued that ruling otherwise would create a permit 
system without standards and leave applicants without clear 
guidance about which applications would be further reviewed for 
their potential environmental impact. 
¶6 
The circuit court agreed with Clean Wisconsin that 
Lake Beulah applied and that the DNR erred in determining it 
could not consider the environmental effects of all proposed 
high capacity wells.  The circuit court pointed to a footnote in 
Lake Beulah in which we briefly mentioned that Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) did not affect our analysis.  It then explained 
that the DNR, the business associations, and the Attorney 
General's opinion raised arguments that we had rejected in Lake 
Beulah.  Having concluded that the DNR was bound by Lake Beulah, 
the circuit court found that "[a]bsent the Attorney General['s] 
opinion, the DNR would have denied all . . . of these well 
applications [except for the Turzinski application] as impacting 
navigable waters."  It therefore vacated the seven approved 
applications and remanded to the DNR the Turzinski application 
so that the DNR could consider the well's potential effect on 
the headwaters of a nearby creek. 
¶7 
The DNR and the business associations appealed, and, 
in early 2019, the court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
8 
 
court.8  After we accepted certification, 
two noteworthy 
procedural developments occurred.  First, we granted the 
legislature's 
motion 
to 
intervene, 
creating 
two 
sets 
of 
intervenors:  the business associations and the legislature.  
Throughout this opinion, we refer to them collectively as the 
"Intervenors."  Second, the DNR now agrees with the circuit 
court and Clean Wisconsin that the DNR has the authority to 
review the environmental impact of a proposed well even if such 
a review is not required by Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4). 
II 
¶8 
This certified appeal presents two questions:  
(1) 
Does Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) prohibit the DNR from 
considering the potential environmental effects of a 
proposed high capacity well when such consideration is 
not required by Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4)? 
(2) 
Does Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5m) bar Clean Wisconsin's 
claims? 
¶9 
The scope of the DNR's statutory authority is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  See Papa v. DHS, 2020 
WI 66, ¶19, 393 Wis. 2d 1, 946 N.W.2d 17.  When reviewing an 
agency's decision under Wis. Stat. ch. 227, we will generally 
                     
8 The court of appeals also certified another consolidated 
"companion" case, Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. DNR, No. 2016AP1688.  
Although 
both 
cases 
address 
the 
effect 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) 
on 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
DNR's 
permit-approving 
authority, each deals with a different authorizing statute, thus 
presenting different legal questions.  See Clean Wis., Inc. v. 
DNR, No. 2016AP1688, slip op. (Wis. S. Ct. July 8, 2021). 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
9 
 
uphold that decision unless we conclude that "the agency has 
erroneously interpreted a provision of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(2), (5).  If an agency erroneously interpreted a 
provision of law and the correct interpretation of law does not 
"compel[] a particular action," we remand the cause to the 
agency "for further action" according to the correct statutory 
interpretation.  § 227.57(5); see also Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC 
v. DOR, 2021 WI 26, ¶¶39, 41, 396 Wis. 2d 69, 955 N.W.2d 793. 
¶10 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay, 2020 
WI 95, ¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 953 N.W.2d 318.  When interpreting 
statutes, we start with the text, and if its meaning is plain on 
its face, we stop there.  Myers v. DNR, 2019 WI 5, ¶18, 385 
Wis. 2d 176, 922 N.W.2d 47.  We also consider the statutory 
context, interpreting language consistent with how it is used in 
closely related statutes.  Moreschi, 395 Wis. 2d 55, ¶¶13, 23.  
We afford no deference to the agency's interpretation of the 
statute in question.  Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2g). 
III 
¶11 Our analysis starts with a brief overview of the 
public trust doctrine and the statutes governing high capacity 
wells.  We next review our Lake Beulah decision and whether Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m) changes any of our conclusions there.  We 
conclude with a discussion of whether Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5m) 
bars any of the claims here. 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
10 
 
A 
¶12 Any analysis of agency actions affecting the state's 
navigable waters "must start with the public trust doctrine."  
Hilton v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166.  
This doctrine, enshrined in the Wisconsin Constitution, entrusts 
the State to protect Wisconsin's "navigable waters": 
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all 
rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as 
such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to 
the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants 
of the state as to the citizens of the United States, 
without any tax, impost or duty therefor. 
Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1; see also Movrich v. Lobermeier, 2018 
WI 9, ¶26, 379 Wis. 2d 269, 905 N.W.2d 807 (noting that the 
doctrine's roots stretch back to the 1787 Northwest Ordinance).  
We have long interpreted this provision broadly and consistent 
with its sweeping scope, explaining that it protects more than 
strictly navigable waters or related commercial navigation 
rights.  See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 
Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816 (1914); Muench v. PSC, 261 Wis. 492, 
53 N.W.2d 514 (1952); Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 2013 
WI 74, ¶72, 250 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.  For instance, we 
have held that the doctrine extends to "all areas within the 
ordinary high water mark of the body of water in question."  
Movrich, 379 Wis. 2d 269, ¶27.  It protects not only the Great 
Lakes' beds but also "lesser inland waters," including "areas 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
11 
 
covered with aquatic vegetation" within a particular high water 
mark.  R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶19, 244 
Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781.  Similarly, we have held that the 
doctrine safeguards the public's use of the state's waters for 
even "purely recreational purposes."  Id.; Nekoosa Edwards Paper 
Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, 47, 228 N.W. 144 (1930) 
(explaining that the public has a right to use certain state 
waters 
for 
"sailing, 
rowing, 
canoeing, 
bathing, 
fishing, 
hunting, skating, and other public purposes").9 
¶13 The legislature, as one of the public's trustees, has 
delegated to the DNR some of its public trust responsibilities.  
Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶34; see also Wis.'s Env't Decade, 
Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 527, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978).  Broadly 
speaking, the legislature charged the DNR with the "general 
supervision and control over the waters of the state."  Wis. 
Stat. § 281.12(1).  To carry out that mission, the legislature 
granted the DNR the "necessary powers" to enhance the "quality 
management and protection of all waters of the state" against 
"all present and potential sources of water pollution."  Wis. 
Stat. § 281.11.  More specifically, the legislature has mandated 
                     
9 The public-trust doctrine is not unlimited in scope.  It 
does not apply to unnavigable wetlands that are part of no body 
of water's ordinary high water mark.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. 
v. DNR, 2013 WI 74, ¶¶85-90, 110, 250 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800 
(noting, however, that the DNR may still regulate such areas if 
it has the statutory authority to do so).  And we have explained 
that the public-trust jurisdiction does not extend to "non-
navigable land."  See id. 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
12 
 
that the DNR "shall carry out the planning, management[,] and 
regulatory programs necessary for implementing the policy and 
purpose of this chapter," including "plans and programs for the 
prevention and abatement of water pollution and for the 
maintenance and improvement of water quality."  § 281.12(1).  
The legislature explained that this "comprehensive program under 
a single state agency" was "needed to protect human life and 
health" as well all uses of water throughout the state.  
§ 281.11.  It also directs courts to "liberally construe[]" the 
water-protection statutes "in favor of the [statutes'] policy 
objectives" so as to ensure that the DNR serves the "vital 
purpose[]" of protecting the state's public-trust waters.  Id. 
¶14 To that end, the DNR regulates the construction and 
operation of high capacity groundwater wells.  All high capacity 
wells must be approved by the DNR through a discretionary permit 
process.  Wis. Stat. §§ 281.34(2), 281.35.  The DNR is never 
obligated to give its approval.  Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 
¶41.  When it does approve an application, it is required to 
impose certain permit conditions, such as the condition that 
"all high capacity wells" comply with the groundwater-withdrawal 
requirements in § 281.35(4)-(6).  See § 281.34(5)(e).  And in 
certain circumstances, the DNR is required to deny a permit, 
such as when it is unable to ensure, via permit conditions, that 
a well will not "cause significant environmental impact" or that 
such impact is not "balanced by the public benefit of the well 
related to public health and safety."  See § 281.34(5)(a)-(d).  
Additionally, the DNR must conduct an environmental-impact 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
13 
 
analysis before approving a permit for three categories of 
wells, a process detailed in its administrative rules.  See 
§ 281.34(4)(a); Wis. Admin. Code § NR 820.29-.32 (June 2020). 
¶15 The parties agree that an environmental review is not 
required for any of the eight wells in this case.  Because 
environmental review is legislatively required for some well 
applications but not for the ones at issue, the Intervenors 
allege that the DNR is implicitly prohibited from considering 
environmental-impact evidence in its permit-approval decision. 
B 
1 
¶16 We addressed the same issue in Lake Beulah.  As the 
Intervenors argue here, the Village of East Troy argued in Lake 
Beulah 
that 
the 
DNR 
had 
no 
authority 
to 
consider 
the 
environmental effects of a proposed high capacity well that fell 
outside the scope of Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4).  See Lake Beulah, 
335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶29.  East Troy asserted that because the 
legislature required the DNR to conduct an environmental review 
in limited circumstances, it had implicitly precluded the DNR 
from conducting such reviews in all other circumstances.  Id.  
And, according to East Troy, the "general policy provisions" of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11 and 281.12 could not "supersede[]" that 
specific requirement.  Id.  East Troy argued that allowing the 
DNR to consider the environmental effects of all applications 
for 
high 
capacity 
wells, 
not 
just 
those 
required 
under 
§ 281.34(4), would "create a permit system without standards" 
and cause confusion for permit applicants.  See id., ¶¶29, 42. 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
14 
 
¶17 We unanimously rejected those arguments, holding that 
the DNR has both a constitutional duty and the statutory 
authority to consider the environmental effects of all proposed 
high capacity wells.  Id., ¶39.  We held that the DNR's 
constitutional public-trust duty stems from the legislature 
delegating to the DNR that obligation via Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11 
and 281.12.  Id., ¶¶34, 39.  And for the DNR to fulfill its duty 
under § 281.11 to "protect, maintain, and improve" the state's 
water supply, it had to consider the environmental effects of a 
proposed high capacity well.  Id., ¶39 & n.29.  Put another way, 
a permit application for a high capacity well triggers the DNR 
to act on its public-trust duty, under which it cannot ignore 
"concrete, scientific evidence of potential harm to waters of 
the state."  Id., ¶¶39 n.28, 46. 
¶18 We also explained that what the DNR's duty sometimes 
requires, its statutory authority likewise permits.  "[T]here is 
nothing in either Wis. Stat. § 281.34 or § 281.35" that prevents 
the DNR from considering the environmental effects of proposed 
wells for which it is not required to do so.  Id., ¶41.  Rather, 
the legislature has "expressly granted" the DNR the "discretion 
to undertake the review [the DNR] deems necessary for all 
proposed high capacity wells."  Id., ¶39.  As for East Troy's 
argument that the DNR's broad discretion over permit approvals 
created a system "without standards," we explained that "broad 
standards 
[are] 
not . . . non-existent 
ones." 
 
Id., 
¶43.  
Indeed, 
"[g]eneral 
standards 
are 
common 
in 
environmental 
statutes" 
because 
they 
allow 
the 
DNR 
to 
"utilize[] 
its 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
15 
 
expertise" in determining how best to protect the environment 
within its statutory limits.  Id., ¶43 & n.34.  To ignore that 
expertise and prevent the DNR from considering evidence of 
potential environmental effects both "conflict[ed] with the 
permissive language in the statutes" and might have led to the 
"absurd result" where the DNR would be forced to approve a 
permit for a well that met other statutory requirements but that 
the DNR "knew . . . would cause harm to the waters of the 
state."  Id., ¶¶28, 42.  We therefore concluded that the DNR has 
"the 
authority 
and 
the 
general 
duty" 
to 
consider 
the 
environmental impact of proposed high capacity wells, especially 
when it is presented with evidence of potential environmental 
harms.  Id., ¶¶64, 66. 
¶19 We reaffirm our statutory analysis in Lake Beulah.  
Our unanimous decision there correctly interpreted the well-
permitting statutes, each of which is the same today as it was 
in 2011.  Accordingly, there is no need to re-interpret those 
statutes. 
2 
¶20 But Lake Beulah alone does not resolve this case 
because, after we heard oral arguments in that case, the 
legislature passed Act 21.  See 2011 Wis. Act 21; Lake Beulah, 
335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶39 n.30.  The Act contained significant 
revisions to Wis. Stat. ch. 227, which governs administrative 
agencies and procedures, including adding subsec. (2m) to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10: 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
16 
 
No agency may implement or enforce any standard, 
requirement, or threshold, including as a term or 
condition of any license issued by the agency, unless 
that standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly 
required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a 
rule that has been promulgated in accordance with this 
subchapter . . . . 
The question is therefore what effect, if any, does § 227.10(2m) 
have on our analysis in Lake Beulah?  The Intervenors argue that 
the DNR correctly determined, based on then-Attorney General 
Schimel's 2016 opinion, that § 227.10(2m) prohibits it from 
considering the environmental effects of a proposed high 
capacity well, except for when required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.34(4). 
¶21 We hold that Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) does not alter 
our analysis or conclusion in Lake Beulah.  The DNR's authority 
to consider the environmental effects of proposed high capacity 
wells, while broad, is nevertheless explicitly permitted by 
statute. 
¶22 The key to understanding § 227.10(2m) is to understand 
the meaning of the term "explicitly."  There is no definition of 
"explicit" in the statutes, but it is a common word and the 
parties generally agree on its ordinary, dictionary definition.  
See Moreschi, 395 Wis. 2d 55, ¶21.  "Explicit" is ordinarily 
defined as meaning "'clearly expressed' so as to 'leav[e] 
nothing implied.'"  See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 645 
(3d ed. 1994).  The parties disagree about the relationship of 
"explicit" to "broad."  The Intervenors read "explicit" as the 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
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opposite not only of "implicit" but also of "broad" and 
"general,"10 arguing that explicit authority must be specific.  
Clean Wisconsin counters that explicit authority can be broad or 
general, so long as the broad authority is clear. 
¶23 Explicit authority and broad authority are different 
concepts but not mutually exclusive ones.  An explicit phrase 
can be broad or specific; broad authority can be either explicit 
or implicit.  See, e.g., Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶39 ("the 
legislature has explicitly provided the DNR with the broad 
authority"); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., 
536 U.S. 424, 433 (2002) (noting that a "general" provision 
"explicitly" preempted certain regulations); Explicit, American 
Heritage Dictionary 645 (3d ed. 1994) (providing the example 
phrase:  "generalizations 
that 
are 
powerful, 
precise, 
and 
explicit").  The Intervenors err by treating "explicit" and 
"broad" as incapable of co-existing in a statute's authorizing 
language.  In doing so, they misinterpret the scope of Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m). 
¶24 Section 227.10(2m) targets, in a general sense, only 
the distinction between explicit and implicit agency authority.  
It requires courts to strictly construe an agency's authorizing 
                     
10 Implicit, American Heritage Dictionary 906 (3d ed. 1994) 
("not directly expressed" or "not readily apparent"); Broad, id. 
at 241 ("covering a wide scope" or "general"); General, id. 
at 755 ("not limited in scope . . . or application").  Given the 
similarities in the definitions of "broad" and "general," and 
the fact that "general" is a synonym for "broad," we use those 
two terms interchangeably. 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
18 
 
statute 
as 
granting 
the 
agency 
no 
implicit 
authority.  
Section 227.10(2m) does not, however, strip an agency of the 
legislatively granted explicit authority it already has.  Nor 
does it negate a more targeted "directive from the legislature" 
to "liberally construe" the specific statutes that expressly 
confer an agency's authority.  See Wis. Stat. § 281.11; Wis. 
Dep't of Justice v. DWD, 2015 WI 114, ¶30, 365 Wis. 2d 694, 875 
N.W.2d 545 
("We 
take 
such 
a 
directive . . . seriously.").  
Accordingly, for purposes of § 227.10(2m), if the legislature 
clearly expresses in a statute's text that an agency can 
undertake 
certain 
actions, 
the 
breadth 
of 
the 
resulting 
authority will not defeat the legislature's clear expression.  
See also Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, No. 2016AP1688, slip op., ¶25 
(Wis. S. Ct. July 8, 2021). 
¶25 That is the case here:  the legislature has granted 
the DNR the broad but explicit authority to consider the 
environmental effects of a proposed high capacity well.  As we 
explained in Lake Beulah, the legislature clearly granted that 
authority 
by 
delegating 
to 
the 
DNR 
certain 
public-trust 
responsibilities in Wis. Stat. § 281.12.  See Lake Beulah, 335 
Wis. 2d 47, ¶¶34, 39.  The text of § 281.12 explicitly requires 
the DNR to "carry out the planning, management[,] and regulatory 
programs necessary" to achieve the purpose of ch. 281.  Just as 
explicitly, but even more specifically, the DNR "shall formulate 
plans and programs" to protect the state's waters.  § 281.12(1).  
In considering the potential environmental impacts of proposed 
high capacity wells, the DNR is carrying out those express 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
19 
 
directives.  See Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶¶39-44.  That its 
explicit authority to do so is broad does not negate that 
authority. 
¶26 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 281.34 
and 281.35 
are 
further 
explicit legislative permission for the DNR to exercise its 
broad authority under Wis. Stat. § 281.12.  By the plain text of 
§§ 281.34(5)(e) 
and 
281.35(5)(d), 
the 
DNR 
"shall" 
impose 
conditions on an approved well to ensure that, among other 
requirements, the well will neither "adversely affect[]" any 
"public 
water 
rights 
in 
navigable 
waters" 
nor 
"have 
a 
significant detrimental effect on the quantity or quality of the 
waters of the state."  For some well applications, the DNR will 
be able to impose the necessary permit conditions based solely 
on its "expertise in water resources management."  See Lake 
Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶¶42-43, 46.  But for others, the DNR 
may need to collect and review evidence about a well's potential 
environmental effects before it knows what permit conditions 
will prevent those adverse effects.  See id.  In either case, 
the DNR is carrying out its explicit statutory directive to 
protect the state's waters via certain permit conditions.  
Therefore, the well-permitting statutes, in addition to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 281.11 and 281.12, explicitly allow the DNR to consider 
a proposed well's potential effect on the environment.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 281.12, 281.34(5)(e); Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶46. 
¶27 Because the legislature explicitly granted the DNR 
broad authority to consider the potential environmental impact 
of proposed high capacity wells, we conclude that the enactment 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
20 
 
of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) does not change our holding in Lake 
Beulah.  The DNR's authority to consider the environmental 
effects 
of 
all 
high 
capacity 
wells 
is 
consistent 
with 
§ 227.10(2m) and the DNR erred when it concluded otherwise. 
3 
¶28 The Intervenors' remaining arguments miss the mark and 
mirror the arguments we rejected in Lake Beulah.  Like East Troy 
in Lake Beulah, the Intervenors argue that a general statute 
cannot confer explicit authority.  As discussed above, however, 
and exemplified in Wis. Stat. § 281.12, general and explicit are 
not mutually exclusive concepts. 
¶29 The Intervenors' claim that Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) 
"superseded" and "nullif[ied]" Lake Beulah falters for the same 
reason, but also because it rests on a misrepresentation of our 
holding in Lake Beulah.  The Intervenors misleadingly report 
that we "found" the DNR's broad public-trust duty "implicitly 
contained the more specific power" to consider the environmental 
effects of all proposed high capacity wells.  Nowhere in Lake 
Beulah did we describe the DNR's environmental-review authority 
as "implicit."  What we actually said was that "the legislature 
has expressly granted the DNR the authority and a general duty 
to review all permit applications and decide whether to issue 
the permit."  Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶39 (emphasis added).  
Thus, § 227.10(2m) does not supersede or nullify our holding in 
Lake Beulah.  See id., ¶39 n.31. 
¶30 The Intervenors' resort to Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) 
does not save its argument.  That statute prevents courts from 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
21 
 
finding implicit agency-rule-making authority in general policy 
or purpose statements that contain no explicit rule-making 
authorization.  But this case is not about the DNR's rule-making 
power; section 227.11(2)(a) is therefore irrelevant. 
C 
¶31 Finally, 
regarding 
the 
second 
question 
in 
this 
certified appeal, we agree with the circuit court that Clean 
Wisconsin's claim is not barred by Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5m).  
That provision 
bars a challenge "based on the 
lack of 
consideration of the cumulative environmental impacts" of a 
proposed high capacity well.  Id. (emphasis added).  Clean 
Wisconsin's claims, however, are based on the fact that the DNR 
considered the potential environmental impact of these wells 
when deciding whether to grant the well permits.  Accordingly, 
§ 281.34(5m) is no bar to Clean Wisconsin's challenge. 
III 
¶32 The DNR erroneously interpreted a provision of law 
when it interpreted Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) as a bar to 
considering a proposed high capacity well's potentially adverse 
environmental effects for which an environmental review was not 
otherwise required.  That error, however, does not compel the 
DNR to either approve or deny the permits.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(5).  
Rather, after considering the environmental 
effects of these proposed wells, the DNR must use its discretion 
and expertise to determine whether to approve the wells.  We 
therefore affirm the circuit court's vacating the DNR's approval 
of the wells, but, on remand to the circuit court, we modify the 
No. 
2018AP59 
 
22 
 
circuit court's order with instructions that it remand all eight 
applications to the DNR.  See id.; Applegate-Bader Farm, 396 
Wis. 2d 69, ¶¶39, 41. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are modified and affirmed, and, as modified, the cause is 
remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶33 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting). 
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a 
standing rule to live by, common to every one of that 
society, and made by the legislative power erected in 
it . . . and not to be subject to the inconstant, 
uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man[.] 
John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 22 (John Gough 
ed., 1947) (emphasis added).  In a striking affront to the will 
of the people, a majority of this court defies the law enacted 
by the people's representatives in the legislature, warps the 
plain language of enabling statutes, and affords administrative 
agencies and unelected bureaucrats the power to override the 
legislature from which they derive their delegated authority.  
In doing so, the majority upends the foundational principle that 
"administrative agencies are the creatures of the legislature 
and are responsible to it."  Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 
Wis. 2d 46, 57, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968) (emphasis added). 
¶34 Through Act 21,1 the Wisconsin Legislature curtailed 
the exercise of regulatory power by abating the authority the 
legislature delegated to administrative agencies.  Specifically, 
the legislature mandated that "[n]o agency may implement or 
enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold, including as a 
term or condition of any license issued by the agency, 
unless . . . [it] is explicitly required or explicitly permitted 
by statute or by a rule[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) (emphasis 
added).  Functionally, the legislature reclaimed a portion of 
its constitutionally-conferred powers previously delegated to 
                     
1 2011 Wis. Act 21. 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
2 
 
agencies, an act embodying the indelible principle that "an 
agency's powers, duties and scope of authority are fixed and 
circumscribed by the legislature and subject to legislative 
change."  Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 56 (emphasis added). 
¶35 Instead of giving effect to this legislative change, 
the 
majority 
nullifies 
it. 
 
Disregarding 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m)'s instruction that agencies may exercise only those 
enforcement powers "explicitly" granted by the legislature or 
properly promulgated by rule, the majority infuses its statutory 
analysis with environmental policy concerns in order to reach 
the conclusion that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
possesses the power to conduct environmental impact reviews for 
the eight high capacity wells at issue in this case.  It 
doesn't. 
¶36 To arrive at its favored holding, the majority severs 
Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) from any relationship with DNR's 
enabling authorities.  Because DNR lacks any explicit authority 
to conduct environmental impact reviews for the eight high 
capacity wells, DNR may not undertake them.  Lake Beulah Mgmt. 
Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73, does 
not (and cannot) supersede the law.  The circuit court erred in 
vacating DNR's well approvals and the majority errs in affirming 
the judgment.  I dissent. 
I.  STATUTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Statutes Governing High Capacity Wells 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 281 governs DNR's review and 
approval of high capacity well applications.  Under Wis. Stat. 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
3 
 
§ 281.34(1)(b), "high capacity wells" have a pumping capacity of 
more than 100,000 gallons per day (gpd).  Wells with a pumping 
capacity of less than 100,000/gpd are subject to a different set 
of requirements and are not at issue in this case.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 281.34(3)(a) (requiring owners of a well that is "not a 
high capacity well" to simply notify the department before its 
construction and pay a $50 fee). 
¶38 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 281 divides high capacity wells 
into two separate categories:  wells with a "water loss" above 
2,000,000/gpd in any 30-day period [hereinafter "large wells"], 
and wells with a "water loss" below 2,000,000/gpd [hereinafter 
"medium wells"].2  See Wis. Stat. § 281.35(4)(b)1.  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 281.34(1)(g), "water loss" means "a loss of water from 
the basin from which it is withdrawn as a result of interbasin 
diversion or consumptive use or both." 
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 281.35(5)(d) sets forth express 
requirements DNR must follow before approving an application for 
a large well.  Among other requirements, DNR "shall determine" 
"[t]hat no public water rights in navigable waters will be 
adversely affected [by the proposed large well]" and that "the 
proposed withdrawal will not have a significant detrimental 
effect on the quantity and quality of the waters of the state."  
                     
2 Although the phrases "large wells" and "medium wells" do 
not appear in the Wisconsin Statutes, they are helpful labels 
for conceptualizing the statutory scheme under which DNR reviews 
and approves high capacity well applications.  As will be 
explained later, although "large wells" and "mediums wells" are 
both "high capacity wells," only the former are subject to the 
heightened mandates of Wis. Stat. § 281.35. 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
4 
 
§ 281.35(5)(d)1, 6.  If DNR approves a large well application, 
it "shall modify the applicant's existing approval or shall 
issue a new approval that specifies" a number of permitting 
conditions, including, among other things, "[t]he dates on 
which . . . water may be withdrawn," "[t]he uses for which water 
may be withdrawn," and "[a]ny other conditions, limitations and 
restrictions that the department determines are necessary to 
protect the environment[.]"  § 281.35(6)(a)3, 4, 7. 
¶40 In contrast, medium wells are subject to considerably 
fewer permitting requirements than large wells; DNR is only 
sometimes allowed to conduct an environmental impact review 
before approving an application for a medium well.  Unlike large 
wells, DNR need not satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.35(5)(d) before approving a medium well application.  
Instead, medium wells primarily fall under the purview of Wis. 
Stat. § 281.34.  Pursuant to § 281.34(4)(a), DNR may conduct an 
environmental impact review only when a high capacity medium 
well falls into one of three categories:  (1) "[a] high capacity 
well that is located in a groundwater protection area";3 (2) "[a] 
                     
3 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 281.34(1)(am) 
defines 
"groundwater 
protection area" as "an area within 1,200 feet of any of the 
following: 
1. An outstanding resource water identified under s. 281.15 
that is not a trout stream. 
2. An exceptional resource water identified under s. 281.15 
that is not a trout stream. 
(continued) 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
5 
 
high capacity well with a water loss of more than 95 percent of 
the amount of water withdrawn"; and (3) "[a] high capacity well 
that may have a significant environmental impact on a spring."  
§ 281.34(4)(a)1-3.4 
¶41 Under Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5), if a high capacity well 
corresponds to one of these three categories, DNR follows its 
environmental review process in accordance with its properly 
promulgated rules.  Pursuant to this process, if DNR determines 
"that an environmental impact report . . . must be prepared for 
a proposed high capacity well" falling under one of the above 
three categories, DNR "may not approve the high capacity well" 
unless it includes permitting conditions "that ensure that the 
high capacity well does not cause significant environmental 
impact."  See § 281.34(5)(b)-(d) (emphasis added).  Importantly 
for purposes of this case, the Wisconsin Statutes do not 
expressly authorize or require DNR to conduct an environmental 
impact review for medium wells that do not fit at least one of 
these three categories. 
B.  DNR's Approval of Eight High Capacity Wells 
¶42 All parties agree that the eight wells at issue in 
this case have a pumping capacity above 100,000/gpd and a water 
                                                                  
3. A class I, class II, or class III trout stream, other 
than a class I, class II, or class III trout stream that 
is a farm drainage ditch with no prior stream history, as 
identified under sub. (8)(a)." 
4 "Large wells" are also subject to the provisions of Wis. 
Stat. § 281.34(4)(a), in addition to the requirements set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 281.35(5)(d). 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
6 
 
loss below 2,000,000/gpd in any 30-day period.  With these 
characteristics, they are all medium wells.  Between March 2014 
and April 2015, DNR received permit applications for the eight 
wells from parties uninvolved in this dispute.  Ostensibly 
guided by this court's decision in Lake Beulah, DNR screened the 
applications for potential adverse impacts to waters of the 
state.  In relevant part, Lake Beulah held that "DNR has the 
authority and a general duty to consider whether a proposed high 
capacity well may harm waters of the state."  Lake Beulah, 335 
Wis. 2d 47, ¶3. 
¶43 For three of the applications at issue in this case, 
DNR delayed approval of the permits, citing concerns about 
neighboring waters; however, it never conducted a formal 
environmental review.  For one of the applications, DNR 
initially recommended approval with a limited capacity for the 
well, but deferred its decision for further evaluation.  For the 
remaining four applications, DNR conducted an analysis of the 
cumulative impacts these wells would have on surrounding waters 
and concluded that these four applications should be denied.  
However, instead of denying the applications, DNR offered the 
applicants the option to place them "on hold," noting that "the 
[Wisconsin] Legislature is currently discussing legislation that 
may affect the review of these applications."  That new 
legislation was Act 21, which, as relevant to this case, created 
Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).  DNR accurately anticipated that 
§ 227.10(2m) would have an impact on the approval of well 
applications, among other agency actions.  Under that statute, 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
7 
 
agencies——including 
DNR——may 
not 
enforce 
"any 
standard, 
requirement, or threshold, including as a term or condition of 
any license," unless it is "explicitly required or explicitly 
permitted by statute or by a rule[.]"  § 227.10(2m).  In other 
words, the legislature prohibited DNR (and all other agencies) 
from acting beyond the authority explicitly delegated to it by 
the legislature.  Because the legislature enacted § 227.10(2m) 
more than one month after this court heard oral argument in Lake 
Beulah and just six weeks before this court released its 
decision, the court did not apply the statute at all. 
¶44 While all eight applications in this case were 
pending, the Wisconsin State Assembly requested a formal opinion 
from the Attorney General to resolve any confusion between Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m) and Lake Beulah.  The Attorney General 
concluded that § 227.10(2m) requires "an agency [to] have an 
explicit authority to impose license and permit conditions."  
2016 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 1, ¶29 (2016) (OAG-01-16).  According 
to the Attorney General, "[t]he timing of Act 21's passage, as 
well as the plain language of the decision, supports [the] 
conclusion that the Lake Beulah court did not interpret and 
apply Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m)."  Id., ¶9.  Fundamentally, the 
Attorney General recognized that in enacting Act 21, the 
legislature "explicitly limited agency authority."5  Id., ¶26. 
                     
5 In May 2020, a new Attorney General withdrew OAG-01-16 in 
its entirety.  See https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/
files/news-media/5.1.20_High_Cap_wells_Letter.pdf. 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
8 
 
¶45 In light of the Attorney General's formal opinion, DNR 
proceeded to review the eight well applications to determine 
whether environmental review of the medium wells was explicitly 
required or permitted by statute or rule.  DNR answered this 
question in the negative, concluding that the eight wells did 
not fit any of the three categories listed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.34(4)(a) and therefore did not trigger environmental 
review.  DNR subsequently approved all eight well permits 
without conducting a formal environmental review. 
¶46 Clean Wisconsin, Inc. and Pleasant Lake Management 
District (Petitioners) filed petitions for judicial review of 
DNR's approval of the well permits.  The actions were 
consolidated in Dane County Circuit Court.  The circuit court 
ruled in favor of Petitioners, vacating seven of DNR's approved 
permits and remanding for an evaluation of environmental impacts 
on the eighth approved permit. 
¶47 DNR, as well as a group of intervening industry 
organizations,6 appealed the decision of the circuit court.  The 
court of appeals certified the case to this court.  After we 
accepted certification, DNR reversed its position before the 
lower 
courts 
and 
aligned 
its 
arguments 
with 
those 
of 
Petitioners.  The Joint Committee on Legislative Organization, 
                     
6 Intervening 
industry 
organizations 
include 
Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce, Dairy Business Association, Midwest 
Food Processors Association, Wisconsin Potato & Vegetable 
Growers 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Cheese 
Makers 
Association, 
Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, Wisconsin Paper Council, and 
Wisconsin Corn Growers Association. 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
9 
 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Legislature, intervened.  After a 
stay of proceedings, briefing proceeded on the merits and this 
court heard oral argument. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶48 Emphasizing 
the 
adverse 
environmental 
effects 
of 
approving these wells, the majority declines to apply the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) and affirmatively rejects 
the legislature's limitations on agency authority——and not just 
DNR's.  Contrary to the majority's conclusions, there is no 
legal authority for DNR to conduct environmental impact reviews 
of any of the eight proposed high capacity wells, much less any 
"explicit authority" as § 227.10(2m) commands.  The public trust 
doctrine certainly doesn't confer it.  Lake Beulah did not 
decide 
otherwise——the 
court 
never 
interpreted 
or 
applied 
§ 227.10(2m) in that case.  The majority conducts its analysis 
exactly 
backwards, 
purportedly 
seeking 
"explicit" 
agency 
authority first, finding only broad policy statements and 
general duties in the enabling statutes, and then torturing the 
language and meaning of § 227.10(2m) in order to achieve an 
absolute obstruction of that law.  A proper analysis starts with 
§ 227.10(2m). 
A.  The "Explicit Authority" Requirement 
¶49 When it enacted Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) more than a 
decade ago, the "legislature lamented that state agencies were 
somehow exercising regulatory authority far beyond what it 
intended to grant them."  Kirsten Koschnick, Making "Explicit 
Authority" Explicit:  Deciphering Wis. Act 21's Prescriptions 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
10 
 
for Agency Rulemaking Authority, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 993, 995 
(2019).  In response, the legislature——as the elected voice of 
the people of Wisconsin——"spoke up and clarified, through a 
piece of legislation, the ways in which it confers regulatory 
authority upon agencies."  Id. at 996.  Act 21 "dramatically 
alter[ed] 
the 
regulatory 
authority 
enjoyed 
by 
all 
state 
agencies."  Id. 
¶50 As part of Act 21, the legislature created Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m), which imposes an "explicit authority" requirement 
upon agencies.  In relevant part, the statute provides as 
follows: 
No agency may implement or enforce any standard, 
requirement, or threshold, including as a term or 
condition of any license issued by the agency, unless 
that standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly 
required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a 
rule that has been promulgated in accordance with this 
subchapter, except as provided in s. 186.118(2)(c) and 
(3)(b)3. 
§ 227.10(2m) (emphasis added).  Contrary to the majority's 
vitiating reading of it, the statute speaks for itself:  an 
agency may not enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold 
(including as a condition of a license) unless the agency is 
explicitly required or permitted to do so by statute or by 
properly promulgated rules. 
¶51 "Explicit" means what any person would reasonably 
understand it to mean:  something "[e]xpressed without ambiguity 
or vagueness" and "leaving no doubt."  Explicit, Black's Law 
Dictionary 725 (11th ed. 2019); see also Explicit, Oxford 
English Dictionary 901 ("[d]istinctly expressing all that is 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
11 
 
meant; leaving nothing merely implied or suggested; unambiguous; 
clear"); State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶53, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (instructing courts to 
turn to dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain meaning of 
a 
statute). 
 
"Required" 
and 
"permitted" 
likewise 
hold 
commonplace meanings.  The former means to "to stipulate as 
obligatory by authority," particularly to comply with a "law 
[or] regulation."  Require, The American Heritage Dictionary 
1492 (5th ed. 2011); Require Oxford English Dictionary 2541 (6th 
ed. 2007).  The latter means to "allow or give consent to a 
person or thing to do . . . something."  Permit, The American 
Heritage Dictionary 2166 (5th ed. 2011); Permit Oxford English 
Dictionary 1315 (6th ed. 2007) ("to allow the doing of 
(something); consent to").  After Act 21, agency authority may 
no longer be derived by implication.  As the plain language of 
§ 227.10(2m) provides, if an enabling statute or lawfully 
promulgated 
rule 
does 
not 
unambiguously——and 
without 
any 
intimation of doubt——confer authority upon an agency to exercise 
a certain power (either to comply with the law or in accordance 
with the legislature's express consent), the agency simply does 
not possess that power; instead, the legislature retains it. 
¶52 This 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) 
conforms to our precedent.  In Palm, we noted that the 
legislature 
"significantly 
altered 
our 
administrative 
law 
jurisprudence by imposing an 'explicit authority requirement' on 
our interpretations of agency powers."  Wisconsin Legislature v. 
Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶51, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (citation 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
12 
 
omitted).  In particular, we determined that the language of 
§ 227.10(2m) 
"requires 
us 
to 
narrowly 
construe 
imprecise 
delegations of power to administrative agencies."  Id., ¶52 
(citation omitted).  Agencies may not, for example, glean 
implied powers from general statutory language, nor can they 
transform broad statutory statements of legislative purpose or 
intent into a conferral of authority.7  See 
id.  The 
legislature's new statutory scheme "prevent[s] agencies from 
circumventing this new 'explicit authority' requirement by 
simply utilizing broad statutes describing the agency's general 
duties or legislative purpose as a blank check for regulatory 
authority."  Id. (quoted source omitted). 
¶53 Just last year in Papa v. DHS, this court applied the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) in considering whether 
the Department of Health Services (DHS) had the authority to 
recoup payments made to Medicaid service providers.  See Papa v. 
DHS, 2020 WI 66, ¶2, 393 Wis. 2d 1, 946 N.W.2d 17.  Applying 
explicit language in DHS's enabling statutes and properly 
                     
7 Even within the space of agency rulemaking, Act 21 forbids 
agencies from promulgating rules under merely implicit grants of 
authority.  For example, agencies may not promulgate rules by 
relying 
upon 
statements 
of 
"legislative 
intent, 
purpose, 
findings, or policy," Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a)1, nor can 
agencies rely upon "statutory provision[s] describing the 
agency's general powers or duties."  § 227.11(2)(a)2.  Neither 
do "statutory provision[s] containing a specific standard, 
requirement, 
or 
threshold" 
"confer 
rule-making 
authority . . . or augment [any agency's] rule-making authority 
beyond the rule-making authority that is explicitly conferred on 
the agency by the legislature."  § 227.11(2)(a)3 (emphasis 
added). 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
13 
 
promulgated rules, we concluded that DHS had the authority to 
recoup such payments only in three specific circumstances:  when 
DHS cannot verify (1) the actual provision of covered services, 
(2) that the reimbursement claim is appropriate for the service 
provided, or (3) that the reimbursement claim is accurate for 
the service provided.  Id., ¶40.  Because DHS's recoupment 
policy exceeded the explicit grant of authority to DHS, it was 
unlawful.  Id., ¶41.  Significantly for this case, we determined 
that "absent any explicit authority" for DHS's recoupment 
policy, "we are left with a clear conclusion[:]  [t]here is no 
legal basis for [that policy]."  Id.  Under the directives of 
§ 227.10(2m), this court is supposed to "look to the statutes 
and promulgated [agency] rules to determine the scope of [the 
agency's] explicit . . . authority."  Id., ¶32 (emphasis added).  
If these sources of law do not explicitly confer authority, the 
agency lacks any lawful power to take that specific agency 
action.  
¶54 Elevating its environmental policy preferences over 
the legislature's prerogative to reclaim its constitutional 
authority, the majority distorts the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(2m) to achieve its own ends.  In doing so, the 
majority 
flagrantly 
flouts 
foundational 
principles 
of 
constitutional governance.  "We have long recognized that 
administrative agencies are creations of the legislature and 
that they can exercise only those powers granted by the 
legislature."  Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 697, 478 
N.W.2d 582 (1992) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  "[T]he 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
14 
 
legislature may withdraw powers which have been granted, 
prescribe the procedure through which granted powers are to be 
exercised, and if necessary wipe out the agency entirely."  
Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 57.  Administrative agencies are not only 
"creatures of the legislature," but they "are responsible to 
it."  Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 43 
Wis. 2d 570, 579, 169 N.W.2d 65 (1969).  When the legislature 
confines agency authority within the legislature's explicit 
consent, that is the law and the will of the people, which this 
court is duty-bound to respect and to uphold. 
¶55 The majority frees administrative agencies from the 
legislature's "explicit authority" requirement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m), to the detriment of the structural separation of 
powers embodied in our constitutional architecture.  "The United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions both vest exclusive powers in 
each of three independent branches of government, not four."  
Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶47, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 
N.W.2d 600 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  An 
administrative state was "not the Framers' design."  Peter J. 
Wallison, Judicial Fortitude:  The Last Chance to Rein in the 
Administrative 
State 
ix 
(2018). 
 
Instead, 
the 
Framers 
"structured a tripartite system of separate powers in which each 
branch of the government had an assigned but limited role."  Id.  
"The 
legislature 
makes, 
the 
executive 
executes, 
and 
the 
judiciary construes the law."  Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 46 
(1825).  Neither our state nor federal constitutions empower 
anyone other than the legislature to make law——including any 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
15 
 
administrative agency.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All 
legislative 
Powers 
herein 
granted 
shall 
be 
vested 
in 
a 
Congress[.]"); Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power 
shall be vested in a senate and assembly[.]").  "Through the 
Constitution, after all, the people had vested the power to 
prescribe rules limiting their liberties in Congress alone."  
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  As James Madison declared, 
"[n]o political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, 
or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of 
liberty" than the separation of powers.  The Federalist No. 47, 
at 301 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).  Preserving the 
legislature's prerogative to control its constitutionally-vested 
law-making powers safeguards the peoples' liberty. 
¶56 Courts "have too long abrogated [their] duty to 
enforce the separation of powers required by our Constitution."  
DOT v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 91 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., concurring).  The majority abrogates the court's duty in 
this case.  While some may applaud the court's advancement of 
environmental goals, its decision "sanctions the growth of an 
administrative system that concentrates the power to make laws 
and the power to enforce them in the hands of a vast and 
unaccountable administrative apparatus that finds no comfortable 
home in our constitutional structure."  Id. (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 
The 
majority 
makes 
administrative 
agencies 
superior to the legislature, which is irreconcilable with the 
republican system of governance established by the Framers.  "In 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
16 
 
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily 
predominates."  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 322 
(James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).  "The people bestowed 
much 
power 
on 
the 
legislature, 
comprised 
of 
their 
representatives whom the people elect to make the laws."  Gabler 
v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶60, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 
897 N.W.2d 384 (emphasis added).  The people never imparted any 
power 
on 
administrative 
bureaucrats 
insulated 
from 
any 
democratic oversight by the people.  Through Act 21, the 
legislature reclaimed the power the people gave it and this 
court has no authority to override this legislative choice. 
¶57 The majority's move has injurious impact far beyond a 
handful of wells.  "Although the Framers could not have 
envisioned the modern administrative state, they certainly 
envisioned the danger to liberty posed by the accumulation of 
government powers in the hands of federal officials."  Charles 
J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, 25 Nat'l Aff. 
96, 96 (Fall 2015).  This concern exists no less at the state 
level. 
 
Although 
the 
legislature 
created 
our 
current 
administrative 
system, 
the 
majority 
transforms 
it 
into 
Frankenstein's monster, a behemoth beyond legislative control 
unless the legislature kills it.  While the majority's decision 
in this case is an affront to the legislature, it is the people 
who will suffer in its aftermath.  "The concentration of power 
within 
an 
administrative 
leviathan 
clashes 
with 
the 
constitutional allocation of power among the elected and 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
17 
 
accountable branches of government at the expense of individual 
liberty."  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶42 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring).  When the judiciary rides roughshod 
over laws restricting the exercise of delegated legislative 
authority, it imperils "the liberty of all citizens."  Operton 
v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶80, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  "The Framers 'believed the new 
federal government's most dangerous power was the power to enact 
laws restricting the people's liberty.'"  Fabick v. Evers, 2021 
WI 28, ¶56, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2134 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting)).  In this case, the majority affords 
administrative agencies carte blanche to regulate the people and 
entities they govern, based solely on broad grants of authority, 
denying the legislature the ability to check the actions of the 
bureaucracy it created.  
¶58 Notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional basis 
for the administrative state, "many commentators assert that 
there is little alternative to the powerful administrative 
agencies we have today," in light of an increasingly "complex 
U.S. economy and society."  Wallison, supra, at 19, 30.  But 
"[g]overnmental efficiency can never be allowed to trump the 
people's liberty."  Fabick, 396 Wis. 2d 231, ¶67 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring).  "The end result" of the majority's 
view of agencies "may be trains that run on time (although I 
doubt it), but the cost is to our Constitution and the 
individual liberty it protects."  Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
18 
 
U.S. at 91 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Instead of "straying 
further and further from the Constitution without so much as 
pausing," we should "stop to consider that document before 
blithely giving the force of law to any other agency."  Michigan 
v. E.P.A., 576 U.S. 743, 763-64 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
The people of Wisconsin gave the legislature——not administrative 
agencies——the 
power 
to 
make 
law. 
 
Accordingly, 
if 
the 
legislature decides to curtail the delegated powers of agencies 
by enacting legislation limiting agency action to that which is 
explicitly required or permitted by the legislature, this court 
must uphold the law.  The legislature neither requires nor 
permits DNR to conduct an environmental review of the eight 
wells at issue in this case and the majority's conclusion to the 
contrary undermines the rule of law. 
 
B.  DNR Lacks Explicit Authority to Conduct Environmental  
Impact Reviews for the Eight High Capacity Wells. 
¶59 Nowhere in the Wisconsin Statutes or in any lawfully 
promulgated rules does DNR have the explicit authority to 
conduct an environmental impact review of the high capacity 
wells at issue in this case.  All parties agree that the eight 
wells have a "water loss" below 2,000,000/gpd and a pumping 
capacity above 100,000/gpd, qualifying each as a medium well.  
None of them are large wells, so Wis. Stat. § 281.35(5)(d) does 
not apply.  The only statutory authority authorizing DNR to 
conduct environmental reviews of medium wells lies in Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.34(4)(a).  Nothing in that statute expressly authorizes 
DNR to do so in this case. 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
19 
 
¶60 To reiterate, Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4)(a) explicitly 
authorizes DNR to conduct environmental impact reviews only for 
three specific types of high capacity wells:  (1) "[a] high 
capacity well that is located in a groundwater protection area"; 
(2) "[a] high capacity well with a water loss of more than 95 
percent of the amount of water withdrawn"; and (3) "[a] high 
capacity well that may have a significant environmental impact 
on a spring."  § 281.34(4)(a)1-3.  The parties all agree that 
the eight wells in this case do not fit any of these three 
categories.  This fact is fatal to Petitioners' claim.  Section 
281.34(4)(a) is the only statute requiring DNR to conduct an 
environmental impact review for high capacity medium wells, but 
only for three categories of wells to which the eight wells in 
this case do not belong:  "[DNR] shall review an application for 
approval of any of the following [three categories] using the 
environmental review process[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  Even the 
majority acknowledges that "an environmental review is not 
required for any of the eight wells in this case."  Majority 
op., ¶15.  No statute permits environmental reviews of these 
wells either.  Because the eight high capacity medium wells 
under consideration do not fall into any of the three statutory 
categories explicitly requiring DNR action, DNR has no authority 
to conduct environmental impact reviews of them.8 
                     
8 DNR——now arguing in support of Petitioners——contends that 
allowing DNR to conduct environmental impact reviews for high 
capacity medium wells only if they fall under Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.34(4)(a)'s three categories would lead to absurd results.  
According 
to 
DNR, 
under 
the 
definition 
of 
"groundwater 
protection area" for example (see footnote 3, supra), DNR 
(continued) 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
20 
 
¶61 The 
majority 
gives 
short 
shrift 
to 
Wis. 
Stat.  
§ 227.10(2m) and contrives "explicit" authority from broadly 
worded statements of policy and purpose rather than express 
requests or permissions from the legislature.  In particular, 
the majority relies on Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11 and 281.12.  These 
broadly-worded statutes leave everything to inference and 
implication.  The former——nothing more than a "[s]tatement of 
policy 
and 
purpose"——states 
in 
part 
that 
DNR 
"shall . . . protect, maintain and improve the quality and 
management of the waters of the state[.]"  § 281.11.  The 
latter——a provision of "[g]eneral department powers and duties"—
—states in part that DNR "shall have the general supervision and 
control over the waters of the state" and "shall carry out the 
                                                                  
possesses the authority to conduct an environmental impact 
review for proposed wells within 1,200 feet of high-quality 
waters but not wells just a few feet further——a result it deems 
absurd.  But the legislature engages in this sort of line-
drawing 
all 
the 
time 
and 
DNR's 
position 
abandons 
basic 
principles of statutory interpretation.  It is the job of this 
court to "apply [a] statute as written, not interpret it as we 
think it should have been written."  Columbus Park Hous. Corp. 
v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶34, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 
N.W.2d 633.  "Policy decisions are left to the legislature."  
Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶37, 341 
N.W.2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367.  "[W]e are not permitted to second-
guess the policy choice of the legislature" that it was 
"entitled to make."  Kohn v. Darlington Cmty. Sch., 2005 WI 99, 
¶43, 
283 
Wis. 2d 1, 
698 
N.W.2d 794. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 281.34(4)(a)1, the legislature mandates environmental impact 
reviews for high capacity wells located in a groundwater 
protection area, which the legislature defines as areas within 
1,200 feet of high-quality waters.  See § 281.34(1)(am).  The 
legislature set the standard, which DNR may not override.  There 
is nothing absurd about this provision or its application.  The 
legislature established a threshold of 1,200 feet and that is 
the standard we must apply. 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
21 
 
planning, management and regulatory programs necessary for 
implementing 
the 
policy 
and 
purpose 
of 
this 
chapter."  
§ 281.12(1).  Branding these nebulous grants of authority 
"explicit" empties the word of any meaning and impermissibly 
defeats the legislature's curtailment of agency power. 
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. 
§§ 281.11 and 281.12 contain 
no 
explicit statement authorizing DNR to conduct environmental 
impact reviews; notably, the phrase "environmental impact 
review" (or anything remotely similar) does not appear in the 
statute at all.  Section § 227.10(2m) flatly prohibits agencies 
from deriving authority from such sweeping statements of "policy 
and purpose" or "general duties."  See § 227.10(2m) (stating 
that 
agencies 
can 
impose 
permitting 
conditions 
only 
as 
"explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a 
rule").  As we just construed it in Palm, Act 21 "prevent[s] 
agencies from circumventing this new 'explicit authority' 
requirement by simply utilizing broad statutes describing the 
agency's general duties or legislative purpose as a blank check 
for regulatory authority."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶52 (quoted 
source omitted).  The majority's reliance on these descriptions 
of general duties, policies, and purpose is in error. 
¶63 DNR's 
properly 
promulgated 
rules 
afford 
it 
no 
authority to conduct an environmental impact review for these 
eight wells either.  DNR——now arguing in support of Petitioners—
—points to Wis. Admin. § NR 140.02(4) as a basis for such 
authority.  Under that rule, DNR "may take any actions . . . if 
those actions are necessary to protect public health and welfare 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
22 
 
or prevent significant damaging effect on groundwater or surface 
water quality[.]"  § NR 140.02(4).  Just like Wis. Stat.  
§§ 281.11 and 281.12, this provision makes no mention of 
environmental impact reviews, nor does its decidedly broad 
language contain any explicit authorization for such reviews.  
"Any actions necessary" cannot be reasonably construed as an 
"explicit" requirement or permission as Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) 
demands.  DNR additionally cites Wis. Admin. § NR 150.20, but 
that 
provision 
does 
not 
explicitly 
require 
or 
allow 
environmental impact reviews for the wells at issue in this 
case.  Under § NR 150.20(1m)(h), an environmental impact 
analysis is not a prerequisite for the approval of wells under 
Wis. Stat. § 281.34 "except for wells under [§] 281.34(4)."  
(Emphasis added.)  Under DNR's own rules, approvals of high 
capacity wells outside of § 231.34(4)(a)'s three categories are 
merely "minor actions."  See § NR 150.20(1m). 
¶64 Attempting to buttress its flimsy statutory analysis, 
the majority disclaims any "need to re-interpret" Wis. Stat. 
§§ 281.11 or 281.12 and instead elects to "reaffirm our 
statutory analysis in Lake Beulah" despite its abrogation by the 
legislature's enactment of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).  Majority 
op., ¶19.  In blatant defiance of duly enacted law, the majority 
refuses 
to 
allow 
§ 227.10(2m) 
to 
take 
effect, 
instead 
illegitimately allowing the court's superseded decision to 
supplant the law.  In relevant part, Lake Beulah held that "DNR 
has the authority and a general duty to consider potential 
environmental harm to the waters of the state when reviewing a 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
23 
 
high capacity well permit application."  Lake Beulah, 335 
Wis. 2d 47, ¶44.  The court further determined that "[t]he high 
capacity 
well 
permitting 
framework 
along 
with 
the 
DNR's 
authority and general duty to preserve waters of the state 
provides the DNR with the discretion to undertake the review it 
deems necessary for all proposed high capacity wells, including 
the authority and a general duty to consider the environmental 
impact of a proposed high capacity well on waters of the state."  
Id., ¶39.  According to the Lake Beulah court, Wis. Stat. ch. 
281——reflecting a "delegation of the State's public trust 
obligations"——endows DNR with this extraordinary authority.  Id. 
¶65 Setting 
aside 
its 
questionable 
constitutional 
validity,9 Lake Beulah was superseded by the legislature's 
                     
9 See Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶48, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 
929 
N.W.2d 600 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) 
("Applying an originalist interpretation of the Constitution, 
some 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
justices 
and 
several 
commentators have opined against the legislature relinquishing 
its vested legislative power 'or otherwise reallocat[ing] it,' 
echoing the historical understanding that '[t]he legislative 
c[ould not] transfer the power of making laws to any other 
hands:  for it being but a delegated power from the people, they 
who have it [could not] pass it over to others.'  DOT v. Ass'n 
of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 73 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil 
Government § 141, at 71 (J. Gough ed. 1947)) (emphasis added; 
alterations in original). See also Richard A. Epstein, Why the 
Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of 
Law, 3 N.Y.U. J. of L. & Liberty 491, 496 (2008) (the argument 
'that the Constitution authorizes the creation of independent 
agencies with aggregated powers of a legislative, executive, and 
judicial nature . . . fails so long as it depends on any form of 
originalism' and 'the text itself points to a system whereby the 
tripartite division is meant to be rigid in law'); Phillip 
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 336 (2014) ('[T]he 
government can bind Americans only through laws, and only 
through courts with juries and judges, thus preserving the most 
(continued) 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
24 
 
rollback of regulatory discretion in Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), 
which abrogated that decision.  As a preliminary matter, Lake 
Beulah never considered the impact of § 227.10(2m) on its 
analysis, although the majority pretends they coalesce.  The 
legislature enacted this statute in 2011, more than one month 
after the Lake Beulah court heard oral argument and only six 
weeks before the court released its decision.  In a footnote, 
the Lake Beulah court acknowledged that "[n]one of the parties 
argue[d] that the amendments to Wis. Stat. ch. 227 in [Act 21] 
affect the DNR's authority in this case."  Id., ¶39 n.31.  In 
supplemental briefing after oral argument, both DNR and Lake 
Beulah Management District discussed the impact of Act 21 on the 
case, but the court simply concluded that Act 21 "[did] not 
affect [its] analysis" and that it "does not address this 
statutory change any further."  Id.  Obviously, the Lake Beulah 
court declined to consider the impact of Act 21 in declaring 
DNR's broad agency powers.  In this case, the court addresses 
Act 21's impact on DNR's powers for the first time. 
¶66 Regardless of the timing between Act 21 and this 
court's decision in Lake Beulah, the court's pronouncements in 
that case are contrary to the legislature's curtailment of 
agency powers in Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), which abrogated that 
case.  It is the duty of this court "to say what the law is" 
lest we "risk perpetuating erroneous declarations of the law."  
Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶73 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
                                                                  
basic conditions of freedom.')."). 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
25 
 
concurring).  Instead of recognizing that the legislature now 
prohibits agencies from enforcing "any standard, requirement, or 
threshold" unless it is "explicitly required or explicitly 
permitted by statute or rule" the majority doubles down on Lake 
Beulah's 
pre-§ 227.10(2m) 
analysis, 
which 
sanctions 
agency 
action so long as "[t]here is nothing in either Wis. Stat.  
§§ 281.34 or 281.35 that prevents the DNR from considering the 
environmental effects of proposed wells for which it is not 
required to do so."  Majority op., ¶18 (quoted source omitted).  
This is the exact opposite of what § 227.10(2m) says.  Instead 
of respecting the legislature's decision to confine agency 
action 
within 
the 
bounds 
of 
the 
legislature's 
explicit 
requirements and permissions, the majority restores the status 
quo ante Act 21.  The majority rewrites the law to give agencies 
a free hand to act unless the legislature explicitly prohibits 
the specific agency action.  Such judicial activism subverts the 
will of the people expressed in the laws enacted by their 
elected representatives. 
¶67 The majority is quite transparent about its motives in 
rewriting the law, explaining that denying "DNR the discretion 
to undertake the review the DNR deems necessary" would preclude 
DNR from "utiliz[ing] its expertise in determining how best to 
protect the environment[.]"  Majority op., ¶18 (quoted sources 
omitted).  In this stunning admission, the majority reveals the 
policy preferences motivating its decision to allow anointed 
"experts" to reign over the people as bureaucratic overlords, 
unconstrained 
by 
the 
democratic 
safeguards 
the 
majority 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
26 
 
immobilizes in this decision.  The majority's decision is 
"antithetical to the Founders' vision of our constitutional 
Republic, in which supreme power is held by the people through 
their elected representatives."  Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶45 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). 
¶68 Preserving Lake Beulah as an accurate declaration of 
law despite superseding legislative action overthrows the 
legislature as the "supreme lawmaking body" of this state.  City 
of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 448, 214 N.W. 820 (1927).  
As we recognized nearly a century ago: 
Where the Legislature has enacted statutes within the 
proper field of legislation, and not violative of the 
provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, its 
edicts are supreme, and they cannot be interfered with 
by the courts; and, where legal principles have been 
laid down by the courts in the proper exercise of 
their judicial functions, and have continued in force 
for such a period as to create vested rights, such 
principles are clothed with a force possessed by a 
statutory enactment, and should be recognized and 
applied until the lawmaking body sees fit either to 
abrogate or modify them. 
Id. at 428 (emphasis added).  No one contends Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(2m) violates our state or federal constitutions.  If 
anything, the statute represents at least a partial restoration 
of the constitutional order.  Section 227.10(2m) has the force 
of law but the majority violates the constitutional separation 
of powers by making this court a super-legislature, effectively 
vetoing 
law 
because 
it 
interferes 
with 
the 
majority's 
environmental policy preferences.  The legislature's mandate in 
§ 227.10(2m) precludes DNR from conducting an environmental 
impact review on a proposed well unless it is "explicitly 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
27 
 
required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule[;]" a 
mere "general duty" or only implied "discretion" fall short of 
an explicit authorization. 
¶69 The majority seems to suggest the public trust 
doctrine provides independent authority for DNR to conduct 
environmental impact reviews of the wells in this case, although 
it also recognizes that "DNR's constitutional public-trust duty 
stems from the legislature delegating to the DNR that obligation 
via Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11 and 281.12."  Majority op., ¶17.  
Because the constitution does not mention DNR anywhere, the only 
mechanism by which the legislature could delegate its public 
trust duty to DNR would be statutory.  Because neither § 281.11 
nor § 281.12 explicitly require or permit DNR to exercise the 
legislature's public trust duties, § 227.10(2m) precludes DNR 
from exercising them regardless of how §§ 281.11 and 281.12 were 
interpreted in the past. 
¶70 The public trust doctrine developed from language in 
Article IX, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
provides in relevant part:   
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all 
rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as 
such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to 
the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants 
of the state as to the citizens of the United States, 
without any tax, impost or duty therefor.   
Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1.  Interpreting this language, this 
court has held that "[t]he legislature has the primary authority 
No.  2018AP59.rgb 
 
28 
 
to administer the public trust for the protection of the 
public's rights, and to effectuate the purposes of the trust."  
Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶19, 
293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166 (emphasis added); see also State 
v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 465, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983) ("The 
primary authority to administer this trust for the protection of 
the public's rights rests with the legislature, which has the 
power of regulation to effectuate the purposes of the trust.").  
Accordingly, DNR possesses authority under the public trust 
doctrine only to the extent "the legislature has delegated to 
DNR the duty of enforcing the state's environmental laws."  
Hilton, 
293 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶20. 
 
DNR 
does 
not 
hold 
any 
constitutional authority; rather, its powers exist only insofar 
as the legislature grants them to DNR. 
¶71 By enacting Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), the legislature 
limited its delegation of powers to DNR, which may conduct an 
environmental impact review only if the legislature explicitly 
requires or permits one.  As explained, the legislature has not 
done so, and the public trust doctrine confers no such authority 
on DNR.  As the Attorney General recognized, Act 21 "revert[ed]" 
the public trust duties the legislature previously delegated to 
DNR "back to the Legislature, which is responsible for making 
rules and statutes necessary to protect the waters of the state. 
The Legislature is free to grant the authority to DNR to impose 
any conditions the Legislature finds necessary.  However, the 
DNR has only the level of public trust duty assigned to it by 
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the Legislature, and no more."  2016 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 1, ¶53 
(2016) (OAG-01-16). 
¶72 A faithful reading of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) leads to 
the inescapable conclusion that the legislature abrogated Lake 
Beulah and curtailed the broad grants of authority previously 
delegated to agencies——including DNR.  DNR has no explicit 
authority to conduct an environmental impact review for any of 
the eight high capacity wells at issue in this case because the 
legislature has not explicitly required or permitted such 
reviews.  No statute or lawfully promulgated rule provides DNR 
with any explicit authority to take this regulatory action.  The 
circuit court erred in vacating DNR's well approvals in order to 
accommodate such reviews and the majority errs in upholding the 
circuit court's mistake. 
* * * 
¶73 The people of Wisconsin constitutionally conferred 
limited powers of governance across three (not four) branches of 
government.  Extending beyond the parties to this case, the 
majority's decision undermines the sovereignty of the people and 
disturbs the equilibrium of governmental power to the detriment 
of the governed: 
Frequently an issue comes before this court clad, so 
to speak, in sheep's clothing:  the potential of the 
asserted principle to effect important change in the 
equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and 
must 
be 
discerned 
by 
a 
careful 
and 
perceptive 
analysis.  But this wolf comes as a wolf. 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The 
majority patently disregards the law, impermissibly shifting 
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power from Wisconsin's citizens to unelected bureaucrats.  The 
people never gave this court any authority to recalibrate the 
constitutional 
powers 
of 
the 
legislature 
vis-a-vis 
the 
executive.  While doing so may accomplish the environmental 
protection agenda of the majority, its decision to ignore duly 
enacted law wounds our democracy and renders the legislature 
impotent to reclaim authority it imprudently delegated to the 
administrative state.10  The majority's decision stands athwart 
the liberty-preserving principle that the legislature may modify 
or 
altogether 
terminate 
its 
delegation 
of 
power 
to 
administrative 
agencies, 
as 
subordinate 
creatures 
of 
the 
legislature. 
¶74 "Administrative 
agencies 
are 
created 
by 
the 
legislature.  The legislature has the ability to withdraw an 
agency's power, dictate how any agency is exercised, and 
extinguish the agency's power entirely."  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
¶189 (Kelly, J., concurring) (citing Wis. Stat. § 15.02 and 
Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 57).  Through Act 21, the legislature 
both withdrew a portion of agency power and dictated how that 
power is to be exercised, but the majority overrides those 
                     
10 See Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶45 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) 
("Transferring 
to 
administrative 
agencies the core legislative duty of making laws abnegates 
powers the people gave their elected representatives.  The 
consolidation of power within executive branch agencies 'often 
leaves Americans at the[ir] mercy' endowing agencies with 'a 
nearly freestanding coercive power' and '[t]he agencies thereby 
become rulers of a sort unfamiliar in a republic, and the people 
must 
jump 
at 
their 
commands.' 
Phillip 
Hamburger, 
Is 
Administrative Law Unlawful? 335 (2014)."). 
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exclusively legislative choices.  "It is not too much to say 
that we risk losing our democracy unless we can gain control of 
the agencies of the administrative state."  Wallison, supra, at 
ix.  Defying the law of this state, the majority nullifies the 
legislature's chosen mechanism for taking back some control, 
leaving the legislature with no apparent alternative but to 
repeal the statutes by which it has delegated its constitutional 
authority to make law, thereby extinguishing agency power 
altogether.  Whether a majority of this court would respect that 
legislative act, or instead trigger a constitutional crisis, 
must await the legislature's response to this calamitous 
decision.  I dissent. 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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