Title: People v. Emerson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84049
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 2000

Opinion filed February 17, 2000.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
In 1985, defendant was convicted of the murder and armed robbery of Delinda 
Byrd, as well as the attempted murder and armed robbery of Robert Ray. A jury 
found defendant eligible for the death penalty based on Byrd's murder and found 
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death 
penalty. Pursuant to defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered 
that defendant receive a new sentencing hearing. United States ex rel. 
Emerson v. Gramley, 883 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The federal 
appellate court affirmed the district court. Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996).
The circuit court of Cook County held a new sentencing hearing, at which a 
jury again found defendant eligible for the death penalty and found no 
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. 
The propriety of that sentence is now before this court pursuant to defendant's 
direct appeal. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. Defendant's 
death sentence has been stayed pending our review. 134 Ill. 2d R. 609(a).
BACKGROUND
This case is before this court for the fourth time. The procedural history of 
the case begins in the early 1980s, when defendant was tried for the 1979 murder 
and armed robbery of Byrd, the attempted murder and armed robbery of Ray, and 
aggravated arson. A jury convicted defendant of these offenses and imposed the 
death penalty for Byrd's murder. On direct review, however, this court found 
that defendant was denied a fair trial based on (1) the admission at trial of a 
prior consistent statement by Ray and (2) improper comments by the prosecution 
during closing argument. This court reversed defendant's convictions and 
sentence and remanded the cause for a new trial. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487 (1983) (Emerson I). On remand, a jury again convicted 
defendant of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery and aggravated arson and 
imposed the death penalty. Pursuant to defendant's direct appeal, this court 
reversed his conviction for aggravated arson but affirmed his other convictions 
and death sentence. People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411 (1987), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235, 109 S. Ct. 246 (1988) 
(Emerson II). The circuit court dismissed defendant's subsequent 
petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, 
ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq. (now 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1996))) without 
an evidentiary hearing, and this court affirmed that dismissal. People v. 
Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d 100 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1037, 123 L. Ed. 2d 485, 113 S. Ct. 1865 (1993) (Emerson III).
The federal district court granted in part defendant's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. The court rejected defendant's claim that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial but remanded the cause for a new 
sentencing hearing after finding that defendant failed to receive the effective 
assistance of counsel at sentencing. United States ex rel. Emerson v. 
Gramley, 883 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Emerson IV). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court. Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996) (Emerson 
V), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339, 117 S. Ct. 1260 (1997).
On remand, at the eligibility phase of defendant's sentencing hearing, Robert 
Ray testified that, in 1979, he and his cousin owned the Centaur Lounge at 1154 
West 69th Street in Chicago. On Sunday, August 12, 1979, Ray opened the lounge 
at noon. During the day, he received three or four telephone calls from 
defendant. Defendant's brother Ricky Jackson had introduced Ray to defendant, 
and Ray had known defendant for about a year. When he called, defendant 
indicated that he planned to visit Ray at the lounge that day. Because business 
was slow, Ray closed the lounge early, at around midnight or 1 a.m.
Before Ray closed the lounge, he received another telephone call from 
defendant, during which defendant told him that he still planned to visit. After 
the lounge was closed, defendant arrived with his brother Richard Jackson 
(Jackson). Although Ray knew defendant's brother Ricky, he had never met 
defendant's other brother, Richard. Ray opened the door and security gate for 
defendant and Jackson, and the three men walked to the apartment in the rear of 
the lounge.
Ray explained that he rented this apartment, which was accessed by a door 
behind the bar in the lounge. Inside the apartment were two bedrooms, a 
bathroom, and a kitchen. In the bedroom where Ray slept, there was a window that 
opened onto an air shaft between the apartment and the neighboring building. The 
window in the other bedroom was covered with boards.
Soon after the three men sat down in the kitchen area of the apartment, Ray's 
girlfriend, Delinda Byrd, arrived. After Byrd's arrival, Ray left the apartment 
to go across the street to buy a package of cigarettes. When he returned, the 
group continued to talk in the kitchen area. Ray could not remember if they had 
anything to drink and could not remember much about their conversation, except 
that he told defendant and Jackson that the lounge had not yet started to "pay 
off."
During their conversation, Ray turned to look at defendant and saw that 
defendant had a gun pointed at him. Defendant told Ray that it was a robbery or 
a stick up. Defendant then made Ray and Byrd lie face down on the floor and tied 
their hands and feet with electrical cord he took from a lamp.
Defendant then searched Ray and Byrd and took the money they were carrying. 
Afterward, he emptied the cash register in the lounge. When he returned to the 
apartment, defendant asked Ray if he had any guns. Ray told him that there were 
two guns in the closet of his bedroom, and defendant went into the bedroom to 
retrieve the guns. Defendant then walked back and forth transporting other items 
from the apartment into the lounge. While defendant tied Ray and Byrd, emptied 
the cash register, and removed items from the apartment, Jackson sat on a desk 
in the apartment and pointed a gun at Ray and Byrd.
After defendant stopped moving items from the apartment to the lounge, Ray 
heard Jackson say "use this" to defendant. Ray could not see what Jackson was 
referring to at the time because he was lying on his stomach, but then defendant 
stood over him with the half pair of scissors that Ray used to operate a broken 
doorknob in the apartment. Defendant lifted Ray's shoulder from the ground and 
stabbed him twice in the chest with the scissors. Jackson was still sitting at 
the desk holding the gun during Ray's stabbing.
Ray lay very still after defendant stabbed him until he saw defendant stand 
over Byrd. When he realized that defendant "was about to do the same thing to 
her," Ray begged him not to do it. Defendant turned and gave Ray a "real evil" 
look. Ray did not actually see defendant stab Byrd because he looked away as he 
saw defendant swing his hand holding the scissors in a downward motion toward 
Byrd.
Next, Ray heard defendant walk past him into Ray's bedroom. Ray did not 
recall whether Jackson accompanied defendant into the bedroom. Defendant stayed 
in the bedroom for a minute or two. When he exited the room, defendant and 
Jackson lifted Ray and threw him into the bedroom, which was now on fire. 
Defendant and Jackson then threw Byrd on top of Ray. They closed the door, and 
Ray heard a noise as if they were fastening the doorknob. After the noise 
stopped, Ray untied his hands and tried to open the door but could not. Ray then 
opened the window in the bedroom and fell into the air shaft. Byrd, who was able 
to follow him, fell on top of him. Ray then untied his feet and untied Byrd's 
hands and feet.
After freeing himself and Byrd, Ray reentered the bedroom and again tried 
unsuccessfully to open the bedroom door. He then climbed back into the air 
shaft, where he opened the kitchen window. The smoke and heat coming from the 
kitchen, however, made him immediately close that window. He and Byrd screamed 
for help, after which Ray stood on the kitchen window sill and "kicked in" an 
air conditioner and some plasterboard from a window leading from the air shaft 
to the lounge. He and the air conditioner fell into the lounge. Ray exited the 
lounge through the front door. After learning that neighbors had called the fire 
department, he attempted to reenter the lounge, but the smoke prevented him from 
doing so. He then ran to the back of the building, where he could see into the 
air shaft through a two- or three-inch opening between the air shaft and the 
neighboring building. Byrd told him that it was getting hard to breathe in the 
air shaft, and Ray told her that he would save her. He returned to the front of 
the building, and he saw that the fire department had arrived. He told the 
firemen where Byrd was trapped but then collapsed on the ground because of his 
injuries.
While Ray was in the hospital, he learned that Byrd had died. The police 
visited Ray in the hospital and showed him a photographic array. Ray testified 
that he selected photographs of defendant and Jackson from the array and told 
police that these were the men who had robbed him and Byrd. When shown these 
same photographs in court, Ray again selected photographs of defendant and 
Jackson and stated that these two men robbed and stabbed him.
Chicago police officer Gregory Stevenson testified that, around 4 a.m. on 
August 13, 1979, he and his partner responded to a call at the Centaur Lounge. 
They found Ray sitting on the curb bleeding from his chest and the lounge on 
fire. Ray told Stevenson that he was the owner of the lounge, that he had been 
robbed, and that his girlfriend was still trapped in the building. After 
observing that the fire department had arrived, Stevenson and his partner spoke 
further with Ray. Ray said that two men had robbed him, stabbed him, and set the 
lounge on fire. Ray identified the two men as defendant and his brother Richard 
Jackson. Ray described the building where the brothers lived. Stevenson and his 
partner went to this building, but did not find defendant or Jackson. When they 
returned to the lounge, the fire had been extinguished. Inside the apartment, 
they found a wire coat hanger wrapped around a doorknob assembly on the floor 
outside the bedroom. In the bedroom, they also found two electrical wires. 
Stevenson did not remember seeing an air conditioner at the scene. He did not 
know whether fingerprints or scissors were found at the scene.
Chicago firefighter Edward Barry testified that, when he arrived at the 
Centaur Lounge on August 13, 1979, Ray was standing in front of the building. 
Ray told the firefighters that Byrd was trapped in the rear of the building. 
When Barry went to the rear of the building, he saw Byrd in the air shaft. 
Because of the intensity of the fire, the firefighters were unable to remove her 
from the air shaft. They poured water on top of her but, by the time the fire 
was extinguished, Byrd had died. Based on his experience, Barry opined that the 
fire began in the apartment behind the lounge.
Detective Craig Cegielski testified that a warrant was issued for defendant's 
arrest on August 14, 1979. Defendant was arrested on February 12, 1980.
Dr. Edmund R. Donoghue testified that he is the chief medical examiner for 
Cook County, and he examined the report of the autopsy performed on Delinda 
Byrd. The doctor who had performed this autopsy and prepared the report had 
passed away. Donoghue explained that there were second- or third-degree burns 
over 90% of Byrd's body. The deposits of soot in her larynx and trachea, as well 
as the amount of carbon monoxide in her blood, indicated that she was alive when 
the fire began. The report also stated that Byrd had five stab wounds to her 
back. According to the autopsy report, Byrd died of multiple stab wounds to her 
back, and the burns to her body were a "significant contributing condition" to 
her death. The immediate cause of her death was the stab wounds, but an 
unrelated condition that contributed to her death was the burns. Dr. Donoghue 
concurred in the report's conclusion with respect to the cause of Byrd's death. 
In Donoghue's opinion, one instrument could have caused all of Byrd's stab 
wounds, and it was possible that the wounds were caused by scissors.
At the conclusion of its case at the eligibility hearing, the State presented 
evidence that, in 1985, a jury had returned guilty verdicts against defendant 
for the murder and armed robbery of Byrd and the attempted murder and armed 
robbery of Ray. In addition, the State presented a stipulation that defendant 
was born on September 26, 1951.
The defense presented no evidence at the eligibility hearing. Instead, 
defendant made a motion for a directed finding. The circuit court denied this 
motion. The jury returned a verdict finding defendant eligible for the death 
penalty under the felony murder statutory aggravating factor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6) (now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996)). The circuit 
court denied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
At the aggravation-mitigation phase of defendant's sentencing hearing, the 
State presented the following evidence: David Heim testified that he was working 
as a clerk in a camera store on March 13, 1975. That morning, defendant entered 
the store and placed a camera on layaway. Around noon, defendant returned to the 
store, pointed a gun at Heim, and demanded the money in the cash register. 
Defendant took this money, as well as the paper documenting the layaway. He then 
pushed Heim to the back of the store, where the manager was processing a bank 
deposit. Defendant also took the money that was to be included in the deposit 
and exited the back of the store.
Ronald Parram testified that, on February 27, 1971, he was working as an 
assistant manager in a shoe store. A few minutes before the store closed, 
defendant entered the store and asked for change for a $10 bill. When Parram 
opened the register, defendant placed a gun to his head and said, "[T]his is a 
stickup." Defendant removed the money from the register and also asked the 
customer in the store for his money. Defendant then exited the store and hailed 
a cab. Parram followed defendant and, when the cab stopped at a stop sign, 
Parram wrestled the gun from defendant and held him until police arrived.
Detective Thomas Duffy testified that, on April 13, 1971, he and his partner 
were on patrol in an unmarked police car when they observed a young man driving 
a Cadillac in a parking lot across from the criminal courthouse at the 
intersection of 26th and California in Chicago. By comparing the license number 
to their "hot sheet," they discovered that the car was stolen. They arrested 
defendant, who was driving the car. Duffy learned that the car had been stolen 
on April 9, 1971, from Harold Guberman. The keys to the car had been taken on 
January 30, 1971, during an armed robbery of Guberman's store. On February 8, 
1971, Guberman had been robbed again at gunpoint by defendant while walking to 
his car after closing his store. Guberman had identified defendant as the robber 
in a lineup.
Lieutenant James Devereaux testified that, at about 9:50 p.m. on February 11, 
1980, he and his partner were working in an unmarked car when they responded to 
a call of a suspicious man. The man, whom Devereaux identified as defendant, was 
standing on the corner of Broadway and Addison looking down those streets in all 
four directions. The drugstore at the corner of this intersection closed at 10 
p.m. The officers approached defendant and performed a pat-down search after 
seeing a bulge in his waistband. They found a .38-caliber fully-loaded revolver. 
Defendant told them that his name was Micky Johnson. After arresting defendant, 
Devereaux learned that the gun had been stolen on October 21, 1979. He also 
learned that defendant was wanted in connection with Byrd's murder.
In addition to this testimony, the State presented seven certified copies of 
conviction. These documents indicated that, in 1970 and 1971, in the circuit 
court of Cook County, defendant pleaded guilty to three armed robbery offenses, 
grand theft, and robbery. For each of these offenses, he received a sentence of 
four to eight years' imprisonment, to run concurrently. In June 1975, defendant 
pleaded guilty in federal court to knowingly receiving and possessing money 
stolen from a federally insured bank and to unlawfully using a firearm to commit 
felonies. Defendant was sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment for 
these federal convictions. On February 23, 1976, in the circuit court of Cook 
County, defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery and received a sentence of 
five to eight years' imprisonment, to run concurrently with his federal 
sentence. On July 24, 1979, less than a month before Byrd's murder, defendant 
was released from prison on parole.
As mitigating evidence, the defense presented the testimony of Jill Miller, a 
forensic social worker, whom the defense had retained to prepare a social 
history of defendant. In preparing this history, Miller reviewed police reports, 
defendant's criminal history, and other records. She interviewed defendant, his 
family members, and his friends. According to Miller, defendant was born in 1951 
in rural Missouri. Defendant was the fourth of six children. The family moved to 
Chicago when defendant was about four years old. Shortly after this move, 
defendant's father left the family. Defendant's mother, whom relatives described 
as illiterate, did not work when defendant was a child and used welfare to 
support the family. According to Miller, defendant's mother was loving but 
seemed cognitively impaired and did not enforce limits with respect to her 
children's behavior.
In 1958, defendant's oldest brother died of cancer. In 1960, when defendant 
was eight years old, defendant was shot in the abdomen during an armed robbery 
of the grocery store where he worked. After the shooting, defendant was unable 
to complete the school year. He fell behind in school and had to repeat the 
second grade when he was nine years old. He was afraid to leave the house and 
became a truancy problem, as a result of which he was placed in a special school 
for truant children.
When he was 11 years old, he was placed in a residential school for truant 
children. He was assigned to the fourth grade even though other children of his 
age were in the sixth grade. As the result of an act of sexual misconduct at the 
residential school, defendant was adjudicated delinquent and transferred to the 
custody of the Illinois Youth Commission in 1963. He spent his teenage years in 
and out of juvenile correctional facilities. His conduct and adjustment in these 
facilities was good, and he was frequently paroled.
He was repeatedly returned to the facilities, however, for truancy, parole 
violations, or his mother's inability to control him. For example, he was 
returned to one of the facilities in 1966 because his mother could not control 
him. Two months after he was paroled in August 1966, he was arrested for 
burglary and again returned to a Youth Commission facility. At the end of 1968, 
he was absent without leave from a facility. One month later, he was arrested 
for petty theft and disorderly conduct.
During the summer of 1968, defendant was placed in a vocational welding 
program, but he was removed from the program when he missed classes due to 
oversleeping. Subsequently, defendant was placed in a work release program with 
Caterpillar in Joliet, where he worked until December 1969. At that time, 
however, he was paroled to Chicago, even though he had requested to be paroled 
elsewhere on the basis that Chicago was not a good environment for him.
Testing in 1964 showed that defendant had an IQ of 80, which is low-average 
or on the borderline of mental retardation. A later test showed that his IQ was 
87. Testing in 1965 indicated that defendant had a learning disability. 
Counseling was recommended but not provided. The highest grade in which 
defendant was placed was fifth grade. His highest functioning level was fourth 
grade. He was unable to pass the general equivalency diploma examination.
Defendant was formally paroled from the Youth Commission in February 1970. In 
August of that year, he was arrested for an armed robbery at an insurance 
agency. He was released on bond. Three months later, he committed his first 
armed robbery of Guberman. He was arrested in February 1971 for the shoe store 
robbery but was released on bond in March, shortly after the death of his 
daughter. In April, he was arrested for stealing Guberman's car. He pleaded 
guilty to these offenses and was incarcerated. He was released on parole in 
December of 1974. In March 1975, he robbed the camera store. After pleading 
guilty to that offense, he was again incarcerated. He was released on July 24, 
1979.
During the 1970s, defendant spent most of his time in prison, where he did 
well in work assignments and adjusted well. While in prison in 1975, defendant 
was married, but he was divorced two years later. He has been in prison since 
1980 for the offenses at issue in this case. His prison records during his most 
recent incarceration show that his adjustment has been positive, he follows 
rules, he is respectful to staff and to others, and he occupies his time 
constructively. He had an assignment working in the prison laundry, got married, 
and spent his free time crocheting and knitting gifts.
Various prison staff members testified with respect to defendant's behavior 
in prison during the 1990s. Marvin Skidmore, a captain at the Pontiac 
Correctional Center, testified that he had known defendant since 1990, although 
he did not have close contact with him until January 1997. Skidmore testified 
that he supervises inmates' movements when they are outside their cells. Since 
January 1997, he had supervised defendant's work in the prison laundry. Before 
he could work in the laundry, defendant had to apply for this job, and his 
application had to be approved by numerous prison officials. Defendant picked up 
inmates' laundry, washed it, and returned it. He worked seven days a week, 
although he was paid for only five days a week. He made $25 a month doing 
laundry. Defendant enjoyed certain privileges as a result of his laundry job. 
When he was out of his cell performing his job, he was not placed in handcuffs, 
although a guard checked on him every hour. There were very few complaints about 
defendant's work in the laundry, and he never had any problems with the guards 
or other inmates. The job would have been taken from him immediately if he had 
caused any trouble.
Another guard, Jill Ann Beatty, testified that she worked in the condemned 
unit of the prison for most of the period between September 1988 and the 
present. Defendant had given her no problems, and he treated her better than did 
other inmates. In his spare time, he made jewelry boxes, knitted, and crocheted. 
According to Beatty, defendant behaved the way she would want all of the inmates 
to behave. He was polite, smiled, and cared about his job.
Frances Childress testified that she had known defendant since 1992, when he 
started in his laundry position. She was a correctional clerk in the condemned 
unit, and her office was next to the laundry where defendant worked. He made 
coffee for her in the morning, gave her poetry he had written, and asked about 
her family. She described him as a friend and an excellent worker. She called 
him by his nickname, "M.O." In his spare time, he made jewelry boxes, afghans, 
and pillows to give as gifts or to sell.
Joni Stallman testified that she met defendant in 1992 when she was working 
as a paralegal in the condemned unit at Pontiac. She would see him a few days a 
week. He was very kind and polite and helped her carry books.
Reverend Eldon Kendall testified that he had known defendant since he began 
working as a chaplain at Pontiac in 1988. According to Kendall, defendant was 
one of the easiest inmates "to get along with." Kendall married defendant and 
his wife, Patricia, and helped them renew their wedding vows on their first 
anniversary. Kendall testified that defendant always reminded him when the date 
of their anniversary was approaching.
In addition to the testimony of these prison staff members, there was 
testimony from several individuals with whom defendant had corresponded while in 
prison. Harold Gullett testified that he began corresponding with defendant in 
1987. Defendant's letters were kind, considerate, and contained discussions of 
his faith. They did not discuss the reason he was in jail. Harold and his wife 
had received birthday and holiday cards from defendant, as well as gifts, 
including a scarf, a stocking cap, and western shirts with their names 
cross-stitched on them. The work on these crafts was very well done. According 
to Harold, defendant seemed articulate, well-read, of above-average 
intelligence, and well-versed in the written word, such as the Bible. Harold 
stated that defendant was a living example of a person who had made lemonade 
with the lemons the world handed him. Testimony by Harold's wife, Marjorie, was 
similar. She added that, when defendant learned that she needed major surgery, 
he asked if there was anything he could do to help. He offered to give her 
anything that she needed. Marjorie interpreted this as an offer of blood or an 
organ. Neither Harold nor Marjorie knew why defendant was in prison, but 
Marjorie testified that the knowledge that defendant could be good under his 
circumstances had enriched her life.
Jana Minor testified that she corresponded with defendant from the early 
1980s until 1990. She had also visited him in prison. Minor stated that 
defendant had showed concern for her and her family and had crocheted a cape for 
her.
Lynn Bones testified that she began corresponding with defendant in the early 
1980s. They exchanged over 100 letters. During the time that they corresponded, 
defendant's letter writing improved. Defendant's views seemed well thought out. 
He enriched her life by teaching her that individuals in jail were not 
necessarily bad. Defendant gave her a jewelry box he had made for her birthday 
and an afghan.
Donald Wheat testified that he had corresponded with defendant for 10 years. 
He was impressed with the quality of defendant's letters, thoughts, and 
philosophy of life. Defendant had sent Wheat items that he had made, such 
as afghans. Wheat would sell these items for defendant and give him the 
proceeds. He learned from defendant that people can change.
Defendant's wife, Patricia Emerson, testified that she lives in London and 
first met defendant in 1992 through correspondence. In their correspondence, 
they discussed Patricia's friends, her job as a school teacher, her hobbies, her 
interests in mathematics and philosophy, defendant's interest in learning 
Spanish, his crafts, and his interest in painting. They were married in 1993. 
Since that time, Patricia Emerson had visited defendant 18 times. She was able 
to spend about 50 days a year visiting defendant. Patricia Emerson stated that, 
after she retires, she plans to move to the United States to be with defendant. 
Defendant had given her many gifts that he made, including a poncho, a jacket 
with a hood, and a jewelry box. According to a previously prepared statement 
Patricia Emerson read to the jury, defendant had taught her to see the good in 
people and not to criticize others. She testified that defendant had offered an 
organ to Marjorie Gullett. Patricia Emerson further testified that defendant had 
changed in the past few years by becoming better able to express his feelings 
and had written poetry for her.
After hearing this evidence, the jury found no mitigating factors sufficient 
to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. The circuit court entered 
judgment sentencing defendant to death on August 19, 1997.
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that his death sentence must be reversed and the cause 
remanded for the imposition of a sentence other than death because (1) the 
circuit court failed to comply with the federal court order remanding the case 
for resentencing within 120 days; (2) the jury verdict finding him eligible for 
the death penalty was not supported by the evidence at the sentencing hearing; 
(3) his death sentence is excessive based on the evidence presented at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing; (4) his death sentence is 
disproportionate when compared to sentences received by his codefendant and by 
defendants in other cases; and (5) the Illinois death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to defendant. Alternatively, 
defendant contends that errors at both the eligibility and 
aggravation-mitigation stages of sentencing require that he receive a new 
sentencing hearing. Finally, defendant challenges the performance of his counsel 
at his 1985 trial.
I. Presentencing Issues
A. Compliance With the Federal Court Mandate
We begin by addressing defendant's claim that the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to sentence him because it failed to do so within the time period 
required by the federal courts. The federal district court mandate provided: 
"Emerson's petition for habeas corpus is granted with respect to this 
sentence of death and denied in all other respects. The state is ordered to 
resentence petitioner pursuant to the dictates of the Sixth Amendment within 120 
days of the date of this order." The order was dated March 30, 1995. On July 30, 
1996, the federal appellate court affirmed the federal district court. 
Emerson V, 91 F.3d  at 907. On October 4, 1996, the federal district 
court issued an order that provided, "The 120-day period for Emerson's 
resentencing shall run from the date on which the supreme court disposes of 
Emerson's petition for certiorari." The United States Supreme Court 
denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari on March 17, 1997. 
Emerson v. Gilmore, 520 U.S. 1122, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339, 117 S. Ct. 1260 
(1997).
At a June 26, 1997, status conference, counsel for defendant informed the 
circuit court of the time limit provided in the federal district court's order. 
Defense counsel indicated his agreement to begin the sentencing proceedings on 
July 14, 1997, the day before the expiration of the 120-day period. The circuit 
court, therefore, set the case for sentencing on July 14 "[b]y agreement." On 
July 14, the jury for the sentencing proceedings was selected. Testimony in the 
eligibility phase began the next day. On July 16, the jury found defendant 
eligible for the death penalty. The jury returned its verdict in the 
aggravation-mitigation phase on July 18, 1997. The circuit court's judgment and 
execution order was dated August 19, 1997.
According to defendant, the 120-day time limit set by the federal courts 
expired on July 15, 1997, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to 
sentence him after this date. Defendant concludes that, because he was sentenced 
on August 19, 1997, his sentence is null and void. He, therefore, asks us to 
vacate his death sentence and remand the cause for imposition of a sentence 
other than death. The State responds that defendant's sentence is valid because 
the sentencing proceedings commenced within the 120-day period. Alternatively, 
the State asks us to reject defendant's argument because, inter alia, 
(1) defense counsel agreed to a continuance until July 14, and (2) certain 
delays in the sentencing proceedings were attributable to defendant.
We find that defendant's restrictive interpretation of the federal district 
court order is unwarranted. Counsel for both sides, as well as the circuit 
court, were aware of the 120-day time limit contained in the federal district 
court order. Given the nature of capital sentencing proceedings, their agreement 
to begin the sentencing proceedings on July 14, 1997, indicates that the court 
and the attorneys, including defense counsel, believed that the federal district 
court's order required commencement, but not completion, of the sentencing 
proceedings within the 120-day period. We conclude that this is the reasonable 
interpretation of the federal district court order. See also Cave v. 
Singletary, 84 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that state-court 
sentencing proceedings were timely when, during the 90-day period mandated by 
the federal court order, a status conference was held at which the parties 
agreed on a later sentencing date).
Defendant provides us with no authority to support his claim that the federal 
district court order required the sentencing proceedings to be 
completed by the expiration of the 120-day period. He relies on cases 
in which federal courts have found that a state court failed to comply with the 
time limit contained in a federal court order disposing of a defendant's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. In these cases, however, the state 
courts failed to even commence, much less complete, the necessary proceedings 
within the time period required by the federal court orders. See Latzer v. 
Abrams, 615 F. Supp. 1226 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (during the 60-day period within 
which the federal court required the defendant to be retried pursuant to his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the state court arraigned the 
defendant but failed to begin his trial); Homan v. Sigler, 283 F. Supp. 404 (D. Neb. 1968) (the state court never conducted the evidentiary hearing that 
the federal court required it to hold within 90 days of its order disposing of 
the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus). Thus, these 
decisions fail to support defendant's claim that initiation of resentencing 
proceedings within the time period ordered by a federal court is insufficient to 
comply with an order such as the one in this case.
In any event, even assuming that the circuit court failed to comply with the 
time limit contained in the federal district court order, we would reject 
defendant's challenge to his sentence. Even if a state court fails to conduct 
new sentencing proceedings within the time period ordered by the federal court 
pursuant to a defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 
state court may nevertheless resentence the defendant. See Smith v. 
Lucas, 16 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Zant, 972 F.2d 318 
(11th Cir. 1992); see also Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 
1993) (if the state fails to retry a defendant within the time ordered by the 
federal court, the state may usually nevertheless rearrest and retry the 
defendant). Thus, even if untimely, the circuit court's sentencing order in this 
case is valid.
B. Voir Dire
Next, we address defendant's argument that his sentence must be vacated and 
his cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing because of certain errors that 
occurred during voir dire. According to defendant, the circuit court 
erred in "death-qualifying" prospective jurors and in excusing venireperson 
Sandra Hersil for cause based on her views about the death penalty.
1. Death Qualification of the Jury
During voir dire, the circuit court asked prospective jurors whether 
their feelings about the death penalty were such that "no matter what the facts 
of the case may be and no matter what the background of the Defendant may be, 
that under no circumstances would you ever give the death penalty in a murder 
case." The court excluded for cause those venirepersons who indicated that their 
feelings about the death penalty would prevent them from imposing it under any 
circumstances.
According to defendant, the exclusion of these venirepersons violated his 
federal and state constitutional rights because it resulted in a jury that was 
more punitive and more likely to impose the death penalty and denied him his 
right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the 
community. See U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 
8.
In other cases, the United States Supreme Court has already rejected the 
federal constitutional challenges defendant makes to the death-qualification 
procedure. The Court has stated that the State has a "legitimate interest in 
excluding those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment would not allow 
them to view the proceedings impartially, and who therefore might frustrate 
administration of a State's death penalty scheme." Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412, 416, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 846-47, 105 S. Ct. 844, 848 (1985). Thus, a 
juror may be excluded for cause based on his or her views on the death penalty 
if "the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " 
Wainwright, 469 U.S.  at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 851-52, 105 S. Ct.  at 852, 
quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980). Under this standard, the Court has held that a juror who 
"in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her 
instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause." 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 502, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2229 (1992).
Defendant argues that this court should nevertheless find that the death 
qualification of the jury in this case violated his rights to due process and an 
impartial jury under the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 
2, 8. As defendant argues, this court may interpret provisions of the Illinois 
Constitution more broadly than analogous federal constitutional provisions. See 
People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996). In determining the extent 
of state constitutional protections, federal decisions interpreting similar 
federal constitutional provisions are persuasive but not controlling. People 
v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414, 436 (1994).
Defendant fails to offer a convincing reason why, in the context of death 
qualification, this court's interpretation of state constitutional rights to due 
process and an impartial jury should differ from the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of their federal constitutional counterparts. He provides us with 
no basis for concluding that the framers of the Illinois Constitution intended 
it to be interpreted differently than the federal constitution with respect to 
death qualification of jurors. See People v. DiGuida, 152 Ill. 2d 104, 
118 (1992) ("[W]here the language of the State constitution, or where debates 
and committee reports of the constitutional convention show that the Framers 
intended a different construction, [this court] will construe similar provisions 
in a different way from that of the Supreme Court"). Moreover, in the past, this 
court has indicated agreement with the Supreme Court's decisions finding that 
death qualification of a jury does not violate a defendant's federal 
constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury. See, e.g., 
People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 165 (1984); People v. Free, 
94 Ill. 2d 378, 401-02 (1983).
In addition, in an analogous case involving death qualification of a jury, 
this court has already rejected the argument that the state due process clause 
provides greater protections for defendants than the federal due process clause. 
In People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995), this court held that, 
where the same jury that determines a defendant's guilt also decides whether to 
impose the death penalty, death qualification of the jury does not violate the 
due process provision of the Illinois Constitution. After noting that the United 
States Supreme Court had held that death qualification of a jury under these 
circumstances does not violate federal due process (see Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)), the 
Coleman court rejected the defendant's argument that death 
qualification nevertheless violates Illinois constitutional due process 
protections. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 549-50, citing People v. 
Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d 238, 266 (1986) ("defendant has not presented, nor do 
we perceive independently, any State constitutional basis for departing from our 
prior cases and the now-consistent Supreme Court position on the issue").
In arguing that this court should that find the death-qualification process 
violates the Illinois Constitution, defendant relies entirely on three 
"empirical studies on the effect of death qualification." See C. Haney, 
"Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on its Biasing Effects, 18 Law 
&amp; Hum. Behav. 619, 629 (1994); R. Fitzgerald &amp; P. Ellsworth, Due 
Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 Law 
&amp; Hum. Behav. 31, 46 (1984); E. Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled 
Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from 
California, 3 Woodrow Wilson L.J. 11, 25-31 (1981). He asserts that these 
studies "conclusively demonstrate that death qualification disproportionately 
excludes African-Americans, women, Democrats, younger people, low income people, 
the least and the best educated, unskilled workers, Jews, and agnostics."
Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have rejected such 
studies as a basis for finding that death qualification of a jury denies a 
defendant of his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of 
the community. See Lockhart, 476 U.S.  at 168-79, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 
144-51, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-68; People v. Kubat, 114 Ill. 2d 424, 439-40 
(1986). In this case, we also decline to base a finding that death qualification 
violates our state constitution on three social science studies. We hold that it 
was proper for the circuit court in this case to death qualify the jury.
2. Exclusion of Venireperson Sandra Hersil
Defendant contends, however, that, even if we uphold the death-qualification 
procedure used in this case, his sentence must be vacated and his cause remanded 
for a new sentencing hearing because the circuit court erred in excluding 
prospective juror Sandra Hersil for cause based on her opposition to the death 
penalty.
During voir dire, when venireperson Sandra Hersil was asked about 
her views on the death penalty, she stated:
The circuit court then asked Hersil whether she would refuse to vote for the 
death penalty, regardless of the facts of the case. Hersil replied:
The circuit court asked Hersil if she meant that, in this case, she would not 
be able to vote for the death penalty, no matter what the facts were. Hersil 
stated: "Probably the only time I could do it [is] if it involved a small 
child." At the request of counsel for both sides, the circuit court informed 
Hersil that, under Illinois law, a person could be eligible for the death 
penalty in certain circumstances and asked Hersil whether she could follow the 
law and vote for the death penalty if that were appropriate. Hersil responded: 
"I think I probably would. I don't know that I could vote for it."
According to defendant, it was error to exclude Hersil for cause because, 
although she indicated that imposing the death penalty might cause her 
psychological or emotional trauma, she indicated a "clear willingness to set 
aside her personal feelings and follow the law."
A prospective juror may not be removed for cause merely because he or she 
expresses general objections or conscientious or religious scruples against the 
imposition of the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 
522, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 784-85, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-77 (1968); People v. 
Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 316 (1998). For a venireperson's views on the death 
penalty to justify excusing that person for cause, they must " 'prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with 
his instructions and his oath.' " Wainwright, 469 U.S.  at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 851-52, 105 S. Ct.  at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980); People v. 
Seuffer, 144 Ill. 2d 482, 505 (1991). Removal of a venireperson for cause 
is appropriate unless it is clear that the venireperson is willing to set aside 
his or her own beliefs in favor of the rule of law. Lockhart, 476 U.S. 
at 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d  at 149-50, 106 S. Ct.  at 1766; People v. Taylor, 
166 Ill. 2d 414, 423-24 (1995); People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 386 (1990).
In determining whether a venireperson should be excused for cause, the 
venireperson's remarks must be considered as a whole. People v. 
Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 511 (1996). "A trial judge need not follow a set 
formula in posing questions on voir dire, and it may be appropriate to 
exclude a prospective juror even though the person has not expressed his or her 
views with meticulous precision." People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 99 
(1996). The circuit court's determination as to whether a prospective juror 
should be excused for cause will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. 
People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 489 (1998).
We find that, viewed in their entirety, Hersil's voir dire responses 
support the circuit court's determination that her views on the death penalty 
would have " 'prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of 
[her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] 
oath' " (see Wainwright, 469 U.S.  at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 851-52, 
105 S. Ct.  at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980)). While Hersil indicated that she 
believed she could vote in favor of imposing the death penalty if a relative or 
small child were the victim, she stated that, in other cases, she did not think 
she could impose the death penalty or did not know if she could. Her responses 
do not, as defendant claims, indicate a "clear willingness" to follow the law 
despite her personal feelings about the imposition of the death penalty. When 
specifically asked whether she could follow the law by imposing the death 
penalty in an appropriate case, Hersil initially responded that she "probably" 
would, but then stated that she did not know whether she could. It was not clear 
from these responses that Hersil would have been able to set aside her personal 
beliefs and follow the law. See Lockhart, 476 U.S.  at 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d  
at 149-50, 106 S. Ct.  at 1766; Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d  at 423.
In other cases involving voir dire responses similar to Hersil's, 
this court has held that the circuit court properly excused the prospective 
jurors for cause. For example, in People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 100 
(1996), the prospective juror initially stated that she did not really believe 
in the death penalty and did not know whether she could vote to impose it. The 
prospective juror then asserted that she would be able to follow the law and 
vote to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case but subsequently stated 
that she did not think she would be able to sign a verdict in favor of the death 
penalty. This court concluded that, when the prospective juror's remarks were 
viewed as a whole, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excusing 
her for cause. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d  at 100; see also Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d  at 424.
As in Cole, Hersil's responses to questioning about her ability to 
follow the law were equivocal and indicated that she would not be able to vote 
in favor of the death penalty. The circuit court was in a superior position to 
evaluate the meaning of Hersil's responses (see People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 295-96 (1997)), and we cannot conclude based on the record that it 
abused its discretion in excusing her for cause. We find no error in the 
voir dire of prospective jurors for defendant's sentencing hearing.
II. Eligibility
Defendant challenges the jury's eligibility verdict on several bases. He 
contends that his death sentence must be reversed and his cause remanded for 
imposition of a sentence other than death because there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding of eligibility. In the alternative, 
defendant argues that he must receive a new sentencing hearing because of the 
following errors at the eligibility stage of sentencing: (1) the circuit court 
admitted hearsay testimony by Stevenson concerning a prior consistent statement 
by Ray; (2) the circuit court permitted four photographs of Byrd's body to be 
published to the jury; (3) the circuit court made comments indicating its 
opinion that defendant was eligible for the death penalty; (4) the prosecution 
made improper remarks during its closing argument; and (5) the circuit court 
failed to respond to a question the jury posed during its deliberations.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that his death sentence cannot stand because the evidence 
was insufficient to support the jury's finding of eligibility. In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence at eligibility, the standard is "whether, after 
viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the elements necessary to establish 
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 436 (1999), citing People v. 
Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 213-14 (1992). Under this standard, "determinations 
of the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are the responsibility of 
the trier of fact." People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 95 (1991).
In this case, the State relied exclusively on the felony-murder aggravating 
factor to establish defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. See Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6). The State sought to prove defendant's 
eligibility by showing that defendant killed Delinda Byrd during the course of 
an armed robbery. Thus, to return a verdict of eligibility for the death 
penalty, the jury was required to find (1) defendant was 18 years or older; (2) 
defendant was found guilty of murder; (3) Byrd was actually killed by defendant; 
(4) defendant killed Byrd "intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts 
which caused the death created a strong probability of death or great bodily 
harm to the murdered individual or another"; and (5) Byrd was killed during the 
course of an armed robbery. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 
9-1(b)(6).
Defendant challenges only the jury's finding that he actually killed Delinda 
Byrd. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion by 
the jury that he, rather than Jackson, stabbed Byrd or set the fire in the 
bedroom. With respect to Byrd's stab wounds, defendant notes that there was no 
physical or scientific evidence that showed that he stabbed Byrd. In addition, 
defendant asserts that Ray's testimony did not support a conclusion that 
defendant stabbed Byrd because Ray admitted that he looked away before she was 
stabbed. According to defendant, the evidence that Jackson suggested the 
scissors as a weapon by saying, "use this," indicates that he, rather than 
defendant, actually stabbed Byrd. As for the fire, defendant argues that Ray 
testified that he did not know who started the fire and that both defendant and 
Jackson were in the bedroom before Ray noticed it was on fire. Defendant 
concludes that, based on this evidence, no reasonable jury could have found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually killed Byrd.
After reviewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we cannot agree with defendant that there was an insufficient basis 
for the jury's determination that he actually killed Byrd. First, we find that 
the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion by the jury that defendant 
inflicted Byrd's stab wounds, which Donoghue testified were the immediate cause 
of her death. While there was no physical evidence connecting defendant to 
Byrd's stabbing, Ray's testimony was sufficient to support a conclusion that 
defendant stabbed her.
Ray's testimony indicated that it was defendant, not Jackson, who took the 
active role in the offenses against Ray and Byrd. Defendant was the one who 
called Ray to arrange the visit on the night of the murder. Defendant was the 
one who announced the armed robbery and first pointed a gun at Ray and Byrd. He 
was also the one who tied Ray and Byrd with electrical cord, emptied the cash 
register, removed items from the apartment, and stabbed Ray. During the robbery 
and stabbings, Jackson merely sat nearby and pointed a gun at Ray and Byrd.
Ray's testimony about the details of Byrd's stabbing also indicated that 
defendant himself inflicted her stab wounds. Ray testified that, immediately 
after defendant stood over him and stabbed him with a half pair of scissors, 
defendant straddled Byrd in such a way that Ray concluded that defendant was 
about to "do the same thing to her." When Ray begged defendant not to stab Byrd, 
defendant gave him an "evil" look. While Ray did not actually see defendant 
place the scissors into Byrd's back, Ray saw the hand in which defendant held 
the scissors move in a downward motion toward Byrd before Ray turned away. 
Donoghue testified that all of Byrd's wounds could have been made by the same 
instrument and that this instrument could have been a pair of scissors. It was 
reasonable to infer, based on this testimony, that defendant stabbed Byrd. See 
People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 211 (1999) (circumstantial evidence is 
sufficient to support a verdict of guilty where it satisfies the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard).
By contrast, defendant's theory that Jackson stabbed Byrd is not reasonable 
based on the evidence. Defendant's suggestion that, just as Ray turned away, 
defendant stopped the downward motion of his hand and gave the scissors to 
Jackson to actually stab Byrd defies common sense and logic. The fact that 
defendant had just stabbed Ray and appeared to be preparing to stab Byrd in the 
same manner strongly supports a conclusion that defendant, not his brother, 
stabbed Byrd. Moreover, Jackson's direction to defendant to "use this" does not 
indicate that Jackson stabbed Byrd. To the contrary, the fact that Jackson 
suggested a weapon for defendant to use rather than using it himself to stab Ray 
indicates that defendant stabbed Byrd.
The evidence was also sufficient to support a determination by the jury that 
defendant set the fire, which resulted in the burns that were a contributing 
cause of Byrd's death. Ray testified that, after defendant stabbed him, 
defendant went into Ray's bedroom for a few minutes. When defendant exited the 
room, defendant and Jackson carried Ray into this bedroom, which was now on 
fire. A reasonable inference from this description of events is that defendant 
set the fire in the bedroom. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Ray did not 
testify that Jackson accompanied defendant into the bedroom before helping 
defendant throw Ray and Byrd into the room. Instead, Ray testified that he did 
not recall whether Jackson went into the bedroom with defendant. Ray's testimony 
that the bedroom was on fire after defendant entered it for a few minutes, as 
well as his testimony describing defendant's primary role in the robbery and 
stabbings, permitted a reasonable inference by the jury that defendant, rather 
than Jackson, set the fire in the bedroom. Accordingly, we hold that, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (Pasch, 152 
Ill. 2d at 213-14), a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant killed Byrd and was eligible for the death penalty under section 
9-1(b)(6).
Alternatively, defendant argues, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing 
because the jury's verdict finding him eligible for the death penalty was 
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Given defendant's failure to 
cite any authority supporting the application of a manifest weight of the 
evidence standard to this court's review of an eligibility verdict, we decline 
to apply this standard. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. Madej, 
177 Ill. 2d 116, 162 (1997) (failure to cite relevant authority results in 
waiver of the argument); see also Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 342-44 (under 
the Illinois capital sentencing scheme, a defendant has a liberty interest in 
having a jury decide his or her eligibility for death and whether any mitigating 
factor or factors should preclude capital punishment and a court may not make 
these determinations when a defendant has elected a jury).
B. Admission of Officer Stevenson's Testimony
In addition to challenging the evidentiary support for the jury's eligibility 
verdict, defendant asserts that several errors that occurred at the first stage 
of sentencing require that he receive a new sentencing hearing. Among these 
errors is the admission of Officer Stevenson's testimony that Ray had identified 
defendant and Jackson as the men who had robbed and stabbed him. Specifically, 
defendant asserts that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing by Stevenson's 
testimony that, during the conversation he and his partner had with Ray outside 
the burning lounge, Ray said, "[T]wo guys had came in and robbed him, had 
stabbed him and set the lounge on fire." Stevenson further testified that Ray 
said that the two men were "Dennis" and his brother. According to defendant, 
this testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and its admission permitted the State 
to improperly bolster Ray's credibility. Defendant asserts that the erroneous 
admission of this testimony was unduly prejudicial in light of the fact that the 
State's theory of eligibility was entirely dependent on Ray's testimony. 
Defendant admits that there was no objection at trial to Officer Stevenson's 
testimony but urges us to review the issue under the plain error doctrine.
The State responds that the defendant waived this issue and that the plain 
error doctrine does not apply. Further, the State argues that Officer 
Stevenson's testimony was not inadmissible hearsay. According to the State, the 
testimony was properly admitted to show why Officer Stevenson and his partner 
went to look for defendant and his brother after talking to Ray. Alternatively, 
the State contends that the testimony was properly admitted under the 
excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Finally, the State asserts that 
any error was harmless because defendant's identity as one of the perpetrators 
was not an issue at eligibility.
The plain error doctrine permits a court to consider an error not properly 
preserved at trial where the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error 
was so substantial as to deny the defendant a fair proceeding. People v. 
Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 254-55 (1998). Neither of these circumstances 
applies to defendant's claim. The evidence at defendant's eligibility hearing 
was not closely balanced.
In addition, we find that the circuit court properly admitted Stevenson's 
testimony about Ray's identification of defendant. The rules governing the 
admission of evidence at trial also apply at the eligibility stage of capital 
sentencing. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(e) (now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) 
(West 1996)). Generally, a witness may not testify concerning an out-of-court 
statement by the witness or a third person when that out-of-court statement 
corroborates the declarant's testimony at trial. People v. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (1994). When the statement is one of identification, however, 
this general rule does not apply. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d  at 507-08. 
Instead, section 115-12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 
5/115-12 (West 1996)) provides a statutory exception to the hearsay rule for 
such testimony. According to this provision:
Officer Stevenson's testimony falls squarely within this statutory exception. 
The declarant, Ray, testified at the eligibility hearing, and the defense had an 
opportunity to cross-examine him about his statement to police identifying 
defendant and Jackson as the individuals who had just stabbed and robbed him. 
See Beals, 162 Ill. 2d at 507-08; People v. Tayborn, 254 Ill. 
App. 3d 381, 390 (1993).
In arguing that the admission of Officer Stevenson's testimony requires that 
he receive a new sentencing hearing, defendant notes that the admission of 
similar testimony was one of the bases for this court's decision in Emerson 
I that he receive a new trial. See Emerson I, 97 Ill. 2d  at 
499-502. We observe, however, that Emerson I was decided in 1983, prior 
to the enactment of section 115-12 in 1984. Under this statute, Officer 
Stevenson's testimony was properly admitted at defendant's sentencing hearing. 
Accordingly, we find no plain error.
C. Admission of Photographs
Defendant also contends that the admission of photographs of Byrd's body 
require that he receive a new sentencing hearing because these photographs were 
not relevant to eligibility and were unduly prejudicial. During the eligibility 
phase of sentencing, defendant objected to the admission of seven morgue 
photographs of Byrd on the basis that they were irrelevant and inflammatory. The 
circuit court admitted all of the photographs into evidence, but ordered that 
only four of these photographs be published to the jury. In all four 
photographs, Byrd's skin is burned and peeling. One of these photographs shows 
Byrd's face, shoulders, and hands. Another shows her entire body, but her 
clothing covers all but her face, neck, hands, and one arm. The third photograph 
shows the front of her torso. Her shirt is opened, revealing several stab wounds 
on her chest. Several stab wounds to her back are also visible in the fourth 
photograph, which depicts the back of Byrd's torso without her clothing. During 
their testimony, Donoghue and Barry described these photographs.
"The purpose of the first stage of a capital sentencing hearing is to allow 
the jury to determine a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty free from 
any potentially inflammatory evidence that could improperly influence this 
decision." Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 490. Thus, only evidence that 
directly relates to the statutory prerequisites for eligibility should be 
admitted at the first stage of a capital sentencing hearing. People v. 
Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 224 (1993). The circuit court's decision to 
admit photographs into evidence at the eligibility stage will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 175 
(1991).
In this case, the State relied on section 9-1(b)(6) to establish defendant's 
eligibility for the death penalty. Pursuant to this provision, the State was 
required to show, inter alia, that defendant actually killed Byrd and 
that he did so "intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts which caused 
[her] death created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to [Byrd] 
or another." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6).
The photographs were relevant to both of these statutory prerequisites. They 
assisted the jury in determining whether defendant actually killed Byrd. They 
helped the jury to understand and evaluate Donoghue's testimony concerning the 
cause of her death, as well as Ray's testimony concerning the manner of her 
death. By showing the nature, location, and extent of Byrd's injuries, the 
photographs were also probative of defendant's intent to kill her and his 
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily 
harm. See Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 495 (photographs of a decedent are 
admissible at the eligibility stage to show the nature and extent of the 
injuries, to show the manner and cause of death, and to help the jury understand 
the testimony of a witness).
Defendant claims that the photographs were not relevant to the statutory 
requirements of section 9-1(b)(6) because they showed Byrd's burns. He asserts 
that her death was caused by her stab wounds, and there was no evidence that he 
started the fire. We disagree. The photographs do not show only Byrd's burns. 
Her stab wounds, which defendant concedes caused her death, are visible in two 
of the four photographs. In addition, contrary to defendant's assertion, 
evidence of Byrd's burns was not irrelevant to the issues at the eligibility 
hearing. Ray's testimony permitted a reasonable inference that defendant started 
the fire in the bedroom, and Donoghue testified that the burns Byrd sustained in 
this fire were a contributing cause of her death. Accordingly, photographs of 
her burns were probative of whether defendant actually killed Byrd and whether 
he intended to do so.
Defendant further argues that, even if probative of the statutory 
prerequisites at eligibility, the photographs should have been excluded because 
their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. Although photographs 
that are introduced solely to inflame the jury are not admissible (People v. 
Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 405 (1995)), photographs of a deceased victim 
which are probative of an issue at eligibility are admissible, even if gruesome 
or inflammatory (Simms, 143 Ill. 2d at 177).
In this case, we find that the photographs of Byrd's body were not admitted 
solely to inflame the jury and that their probative value outweighed their 
prejudicial effect. Only four photographs of Byrd's injuries were published to 
the jury, and each helped to show the nature, location, and extent of her 
injuries. Two were necessary to show the location of her stab wounds, and all 
four demonstrated that serious burns covered most of her body. We hold that the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence at 
eligibility. See Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 496 (autopsy photographs of a 
15-month-old victim were properly admitted to show a defendant's eligibility 
under section 9-1(b)(6)); Simms, 143 Ill. 2d  at 175 (several 
photographs of the victim's stab wounds and bloodstains in the victim's 
apartment were admissible to show the defendant's eligibility under section 
9-1(b)(6)); People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487, 517-18 (1988) 
(photographs of the victim's stab wounds were admissible to show the defendant's 
eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6)).
D. Comments by the Court
Defendant next argues that comments by the circuit court regarding the 
expected length of the sentencing hearing deprived him of a fair hearing on 
eligibility by suggesting that the court believed defendant would be found 
eligible for the death penalty. For example, during voir dire, the 
circuit court made the following statements to a panel of prospective 
jurors:
In addition, on the first day of the eligibility hearing, the circuit court 
apologized for keeping the jurors late the previous night, but told them: "Had 
we not picked the jury yesterday, we would still be in the jury selection 
process today which means that we would delay everything one additional day and 
so while you probably weren't too happy last night you probably will be happier 
Friday or Monday or whenever we're done with the case that we don't have to come 
back an extra day." At the end of the day, the circuit court informed the 
jurors, "I've been speaking with the attorneys and we do anticipate that we 
should be able to finish the case by Monday."
According to defendant, these comments were improper because they suggested 
to jurors that the court assumed defendant would be found eligible for the death 
penalty and that an aggravation-mitigation hearing would be necessary. Further, 
defendant asserts that the circuit court's comments indicated the defendant's 
own attorneys shared this assumption. He claims that the prejudice from these 
remarks is demonstrated by the short time the jury spent deliberating the 
eligibility question. Thus, defendant contends that a new sentencing hearing is 
required.
The State responds that defendant waived this issue for review by failing to 
object to the circuit court's comments at trial. The State also challenges 
defendant's argument on the merits. According to the State, the circuit court's 
comments were innocuous and "routine housekeeping."
As defendant argues, this court has relaxed the waiver rule when the asserted 
error involves the conduct of the circuit court. See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 161; People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455 (1990); People v. 
Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963). We will, therefore, address the 
merits of defendant's argument despite his failure to object to the circuit 
court's comments at trial.
The circuit court is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all 
defendants receive a fair trial. People v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196, 
250 (1992). Because of its great influence on jurors, the circuit court must 
"exercise restraint over [its] utterances and refrain from unnecessary 
disparagement of issues." Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 487. Comments by the 
circuit court will not, however, amount to reversible error unless they are 
material or had a probable effect on the jury's verdict. People v. 
Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 38-39 (1996).
In an analogous case, People v. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d 317 (1987), this 
court held that the circuit court's remarks about the expected length of the 
trial were proper. In Shum, during voir dire, the circuit 
court provided prospective jurors with an estimate of the length of the 
defendant's trial. During the trial, the circuit court also told the jury when 
it could expect to be sequestered. The defendant argued that these comments 
denied him a fair trial. We found no error based on the circuit court's 
statements regarding the length of the trial. Instead, we found that the court's 
statements permitted prospective jurors to determine whether they would be able 
to serve on the jury during the entire trial. This was an appropriate exercise 
of the court's responsibility for informing prospective jurors of the scope of 
their duty. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d  at 345-46. Similarly, the circuit court's 
remark about when the jury could expect to be sequestered was proper because it 
was consistent with the circuit court's responsibility for organizing the court 
and its consideration for the jury. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d  at 346.
As in Shum, we find no error in the circuit court's comments 
regarding the estimated length of the sentencing hearing in this case. It was 
appropriate for the circuit court to provide prospective jurors with an estimate 
of the length of defendant's sentencing hearing in order to determine their 
ability to serve on the jury throughout the sentencing hearing. With respect to 
the circuit court's comments during the hearing, we find that they were proper 
in light of the circuit court's administrative responsibilities at the 
sentencing hearing. See Shum, 117 Ill. 2d  at 346; see also People 
v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 205-06 (1989) (circuit court's comments did not 
indicate to the jury that it assumed the defendant would be found guilty).
Moreover, during voir dire and at the conclusion of the eligibility 
hearing, the circuit court instructed jurors that, if they did not unanimously 
find defendant eligible for the death penalty, the second phase of the 
sentencing hearing would not take place. In addition, before the jury began its 
deliberations with respect to eligibility, the circuit court stated: "Neither by 
these instructions nor by any ruling or remark which I have made do I mean to 
indicate any opinion as to the facts or as to what your verdict should be." We 
cannot conclude that the circuit court's estimate of the length of the 
sentencing hearing had any effect on the eligibility verdict. Accordingly, we 
decline to grant defendant a new sentencing hearing on this basis.
E. Closing Argument
In addition to asserting that improper comments by the circuit court denied 
him a fair hearing at the eligibility stage of sentencing, defendant contends 
that statements made by the prosecution at this stage constitute reversible 
error. First, defendant claims he was denied a fair sentencing hearing by the 
prosecution's reference to evidence not relevant to his eligibility for the 
death penalty. During its rebuttal argument, the prosecution stated: "You are 
not going to be able to find out what he is like, Dennis Emerson, until we 
get-until you sign a verdict form for eligibility." According to defendant, this 
comment invited the jury to speculate as to what he "is like," and his character 
or bad acts were not relevant at eligibility. Defendant asserts that identical 
comments by the prosecution caused this court to grant him a new trial in 
Emerson I.
As defendant argues, the prosecution's argument at eligibility must be 
limited to the narrow issue at that stage: whether the defendant is eligible for 
the death penalty. See People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 60-61 (1994). 
Argument relating to other matters, such as whether the defendant 
should receive the death penalty, is improper. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 60-61.
The State does not dispute that the prosecution's statement about what 
defendant "is like" was improper. Instead, the State asserts that any prejudice 
resulting from this statement was cured by defendant's prompt objection, the 
circuit court's sustaining of this objection, and the court's immediate 
instruction to the jury that "The only thing you are deciding ladies and 
gentlemen, is the eligible [sic] for the death penalty as I told you 
numerous times." 
Prosecutors are given wide latitude in making closing arguments (People 
v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 330 (1998)), and a reviewing court will not 
reverse a jury verdict based on improper remarks unless they result in 
substantial prejudice to the defendant (People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 145 (1998)). "As a general rule, reversal and remandment are unnecessary 
where the trial court has sustained a defense objection, thereby curing the 
potential for improper influence from the comment, especially where the jury is 
instructed that closing argument of the attorneys should not be considered as 
evidence in the case." People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 407 (1994). The 
circuit court is in the best position to determine whether improper comments by 
the prosecution during closing argument resulted in prejudice to a defendant 
(People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1998)), and a circuit court's 
determination with respect to the propriety of closing argument will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion (Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d at 
145).
In this case, we find that the prosecutor's comment does not require that 
defendant receive a new sentencing hearing. Although the comment was improper, 
the circuit court sustained the defense objection and instructed the jury 
regarding the limited question before them at the eligibility stage. See, 
e.g., People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1989) (closing 
argument did not deny the defendant of a fair trial when circuit court sustained 
the defendant's objection to the argument and gave the jury an appropriate 
instruction). Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he suffered substantial 
prejudice as a result of the State's remark.
Furthermore, defendant's argument that this court reversed his conviction in 
Emerson I based on similar comments does not support his contention 
that a new sentencing hearing is required. In Emerson I, the circuit 
court had granted defendant's motion in limine to preclude the State 
from commenting on the fact that, when he was arrested, defendant was in 
possession of a loaded revolver. Emerson I, 97 Ill. 2d  at 496. During 
closing argument at the end of defendant's trial, defense counsel argued that 
defendant did not offer resistance when he was arrested and did not behave like 
a guilty person. The prosecution responded: " '[W]e can't tell you 
everything he did after his arrest and he knows it. Maybe when this is over I 
will tell you what he did when he was arrested.' " Emerson I, 97 Ill. 2d  at 496. This court held that the comment by the prosecution was error 
because it is improper to argue facts that are inadmissible. Emerson I, 
97 Ill. 2d  at 497. Based on the cumulative effect of this and several other 
errors, this court reversed defendant's conviction. Emerson I, 97 Ill. 2d  at 502.
Like the prosecution's references to inadmissible evidence in Emerson 
I, the prosecution's comment regarding what defendant "is like" was 
improper. As stated, however, any error resulting from the prosecution's 
argument at defendant's sentencing hearing was cured when the circuit court 
sustained defendant's objection and instructed the jury that defendant's 
eligibility was the only issue before it. In Emerson I, by contrast, 
the error was not cured, and the prosecution's reference to inadmissible facts 
was one of several improper comments by the prosecution during its argument. 
Thus, whereas a new trial was required in Emerson I, a new sentencing 
hearing is not required in the present appeal.
Defendant also claims that he was denied a fair hearing at the eligibility 
phase by the prosecution's repeated misstatement of the evidence during its 
argument. Defendant's assertion of error is based on the prosecution's argument 
that he set the fire at the Centaur Lounge. For example, the prosecution argued: 
"The reason a lot of this evidence is not there is because of Dennis Emerson. 
*** He set the fire. *** He burned the place and left no fingerprints. No 
evidence whatsoever. That is how we know the defendant's intent." According to 
defendant, this argument was improper because there was no evidence that he set 
the fire or that police had any difficulty obtaining physical evidence due to 
fire damage.
The State argues that defendant has waived this issue for review by failing 
to object to these comments at the eligibility hearing. Defendant urges us to 
nevertheless consider the issue as plain error.
Neither element of the plain error doctrine is satisfied with respect to this 
issue. See Brown, 185 Ill. 2d  at 254-55. As stated, the evidence at 
eligibility was not closely balanced. In addition, remarks by the prosecution 
during closing argument are considered proper so long as they are based on facts 
in evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  
at 330. Contrary to defendant's assertion, there was evidence presented at the 
eligibility hearing that he set the fire in Ray's apartment. Ray testified that, 
after stabbing him and Byrd, defendant went into Ray's bedroom for a few 
minutes. After leaving the bedroom, defendant and Jackson threw Ray into the 
bedroom, which was, at that time, on fire. The prosecution's argument that 
defendant set the fire was legitimately based on inferences from the evidence in 
this case. Likewise, the prosecution's statement that evidence was unobtainable 
because of the fire was a reasonable inference based on evidence concerning the 
extensive fire damage to the apartment and lounge. Accordingly, we find no error 
based on the State's argument regarding defendant's role in setting the 
fire.
F. The Court's Response to the Jury's Question
Defendant also claims prejudice from the circuit court's refusal to answer a 
question the jury presented to the court during its deliberations on 
eligibility. The jury asked: "Do we unconditionally accept the previous 
judgments of guilty for murder, attempted murder and two counts of armed robbery 
as fact when evaluating this case or can we apply reasonable doubt to the prior 
guilty verdicts?" The circuit court asked the State and defense counsel for 
their recommendations for answering this question. The State asked the court to 
respond: "[Y]ou have evidence before you that the defendant has been convicted 
of armed robbery, attempt murder and murder. You are to consider that evidence 
in the eligibility phase." Defense counsel recommended that the court respond: 
"You are required to deliberate solely based on the evidence you have heard in 
this case in accordance with my instructions." The circuit court decided to 
provide the jury with the following answer: "You have received the evidence and 
jury instructions. Please continue to deliberate." Neither party objected to the 
wording of the circuit court's response.
Now, defendant claims that the circuit court failed to respond to the jury's 
question and that this failure requires that he receive a new sentencing 
hearing. According to defendant, the circuit court was required to respond to 
the jury's question because it demonstrated the jury's confusion regarding the 
legal effect of his prior convictions. Defendant contends that, as a result of 
the circuit court's failure to respond to the jury's question, there is a 
"strong likelihood" that the jury failed to make its own determination at 
eligibility as to whether defendant had actually killed Byrd because it assumed 
that this issue had already been determined at trial.
We agree with the State that defendant has waived this issue for review. 
"Where a defendant acquiesces in the circuit court's answer to the jury's 
question, the defendant cannot later complain that the circuit court abused its 
discretion." People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 38 (1990). In this case, 
we are unable to discern any significant difference between the answer suggested 
by defense counsel and the answer the circuit court provided to the jury. 
Accordingly, we find the issue waived.
III. Aggravation-Mitigation
Having determined that defendant was properly found eligible for the death 
penalty under section 9-1(b)(6), we now turn to his arguments that the jury's 
verdict at the second stage of sentencing cannot stand. Defendant asserts that 
an examination of the evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage, as 
well as sentences received by his codefendant and defendants in other cases, 
demonstrates that the death penalty is an excessive sentence in his case. Thus, 
he contends, this court must vacate his death sentence and remand his cause for 
imposition of a sentence other than death. Alternatively, defendant argues that 
he must receive a new sentencing hearing because the following errors, 
individually and cumulatively, denied him a fair hearing: (1) the circuit court 
excluded evidence of Jackson's sentence; (2) the circuit court prevented the 
jury from considering residual doubt; (3) the circuit court refused certain jury 
instructions proposed by the defense; (4) the circuit court permitted the State 
to make a rebuttal argument; and (5) the prosecution made improper comments in 
its closing argument.
A. Propriety of the Death Penalty in Defendant's Case1. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Evidence
Defendant argues that his death sentence must be vacated because the evidence 
presented at the second stage of sentencing demonstrates that death is an 
excessive sentence in his case. With respect to the State's evidence in 
aggravation, defendant asserts that the evidence indicates that, rather than a 
premeditated attack, the crimes were unplanned and the result of an isolated, 
explosive incident. In addition, defendant contends that his criminal record is 
20 years old and that the acts that formed the basis for this record were not 
the acts of a calculating criminal. Defendant claims that, while the aggravating 
evidence was limited, weak, and remote, the evidence in mitigation was 
extensive, strong, and fresh. He argues that, despite his troubled childhood, 
his record in prison is "exemplary," and he has developed positive and enduring 
relationships through correspondence and his interaction with prison staff 
members. In light of this mitigating evidence, defendant contends that his death 
sentence should be reversed and his cause remanded for the imposition of a 
sentence other than death. Alternatively, defendant claims that the jury's 
decision at the second stage of sentencing is contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence and that he must, therefore, receive a new sentencing hearing.
In determining whether a sentence of death is appropriate, we must consider 
the character and record of the defendant. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 340 (1992). "[E]ach capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own 
facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of 
the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the 
ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty." People v. 
Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280 (1989). The propriety of a death sentence in 
a particular case depends on a balance between aggravating and mitigating 
factors, and the existence of one or more mitigating factors does not require a 
sentence other than death. People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 150 
(1992). Our review of defendant's death sentence requires us to make a separate 
evaluation of the record. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d  at 340-41. However, "the 
decision of a capital sentencing jury will not be overturned lightly, 
particularly where that decision is amply supported by the record." People 
v. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d 64, 77 (1996); see also People v. Jones, 
156 Ill. 2d 225, 256 (1993). In this case, we find that the record amply 
supports the jury's conclusion that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors.
The evidence in aggravation included the brutal and senseless nature of 
defendant's murder of Byrd and attempted murder of Ray. There was no indication 
that either Byrd or Ray resisted defendant and his brother's robbery of Ray's 
lounge and apartment. In fact, defendant had tied them with electrical cord and 
made them lie face down on the floor of the apartment while Jackson pointed a 
gun at them. While they were in this helpless position, defendant stabbed Ray 
twice in the chest, and, after ignoring Ray's pleas to not harm Byrd, also 
stabbed her. Apparently believing that these steps to subdue Ray and Byrd were 
insufficient, defendant lit a fire in Ray's bedroom and left Ray and Byrd to die 
in the burning room after securing the doorknob to prevent them from escaping 
the fire. Defendant suggests that these events were spontaneous, but the 
evidence that defendant waited until Ray closed the bar to visit, that defendant 
had a history of committing armed robberies of businesses at closing time, and 
that defendant brought a gun with him when he visited Ray indicates advance 
planning.
In addition, there was evidence that defendant's crimes against Ray and Byrd 
were the culmination of a criminal record that began when defendant was a 
juvenile. This record showed that, shortly after he was released from a juvenile 
correctional facility or prison, defendant would engage in criminal activity. 
Indeed, Byrd's murder occurred less than one month after defendant was released 
from prison for another offense. His crimes progressed from minor offenses as a 
juvenile to violent offenses as a young adult. Defendant attempts to minimize 
the seriousness of these offenses, but we observe that his criminal record 
includes several armed robberies, and Byrd's murder illustrates the potential 
for violence associated with this type of crime.
In mitigation, defendant relies in part on his troubled childhood, low-IQ, 
and learning disability. In other cases, however, we have held that a jury may 
find that evidence of a defendant's troubled childhood or developmental problems 
is not inherently mitigating and may be considered aggravating because it 
suggests future dangerousness. See Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 140; 
People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491-92 (1996).
The majority of defendant's mitigating evidence concerns his good behavior 
since his incarceration in 1980. We have previously found in other cases, 
however, that a defendant's good behavior in prison was insufficient to offset 
the aggravating evidence against the defendant. See Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  
at 140; People v. Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d 409, 437 (1995). While 
defendant's conduct in prison is commendable, we do not find that it outweighs 
the aggravating evidence in this case. There was evidence that, when defendant 
was incarcerated prior to the armed robberies he committed in the seventies and 
his crimes against Ray and Byrd, defendant's adjustment to imprisonment was 
positive and his behavior in correctional facilities was good. We cannot 
conclude, therefore, that defendant's most recent good behavior necessarily 
indicates a transformation in his character. See People v. Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 354, 361 (1993), quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 
14-15, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 13, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1676 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring, 
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.) (" '[O]ne arrested for a capital 
crime, and particularly a convicted defendant awaiting sentencing, has every 
incentive to behave flawlessly in prison if good behavior might cause the 
sentencing authority to spare his life. Good behavior in those circumstances 
would rarely be predictive as to the conduct of the prisoner after 
sentence has been imposed' " (emphasis in original)).
In addition, there were significant conflicts in the evidence regarding 
defendant's character. For example, Miller testified that defendant had a 
learning disability, was borderline mentally retarded, and never functioned 
above a fourth-grade level. By contrast, defendant's wife testified that she and 
defendant had communications involving her interests in philosophy and 
mathematics, and other individuals with whom defendant corresponded described 
him as articulate, well-read, and above-average intelligence. Furthermore, the 
evidence that, after his incarceration, defendant was kind, considerate, polite, 
and responsible appears inconsistent with the evidence of his violent and 
extensive criminal record. Given these discrepancies, the jury at sentencing 
could have reasonably concluded that defendant's behavior in prison was not an 
accurate indication of his character. In light of the aggravating evidence and 
our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the death penalty was an 
excessive sentence in this case.
Having determined that there is ample support in the record for the jury's 
verdict at the aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing, we decline to 
consider defendant's alternative argument that he must receive a new sentencing 
hearing because the jury's decision to impose the death penalty was against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant has failed to cite any authority for 
the application of this standard to our review of the jury's verdict at the 
second stage of sentencing. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 162; see also Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 342-44.
2. Richard Jackson's Sentence and Sentences Imposed in Other 
Cases
In addition to arguing that his death sentence is excessive based on the 
evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing, defendant 
contends that a comparison of his sentence to sentences received by Richard 
Jackson and defendants in other cases demonstrates that the death penalty is 
inappropriate in defendant's case. Defendant claims that his death sentence is 
"grossly disproportionate" to Jackson's 60-year term of imprisonment. Defendant 
argues that Jackson's role in the offenses against Ray and Byrd was equal to, if 
not more culpable, that defendant's. Defendant asserts that Jackson "came up 
with the idea" of using the scissors to stab Ray and Byrd, held them at gun 
point, and helped throw them into the burning bedroom. In addition, defendant 
bases his disproportionality argument on Jackson's criminal record, which 
includes violent crimes, and Jackson's poor disciplinary record in prison. In 
light of this evidence of Jackson's conduct and his own, good conduct in prison, 
defendant argues that his death sentence must be vacated and his cause remanded 
for a sentence other than death to be imposed.
While a disparity in the sentences of codefendants does not, in itself, show 
a violation of fundamental fairness, "[a]rbitrary and unreasonable disparity 
between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants is impermissible." 
People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 216 (1997). In reviewing the 
sentences of codefendants, this court considers the following factors: "the 
nature of the offense, each defendant's relative involvement or culpability, his 
character and background, including any criminal record, and his potential for 
rehabilitation." Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 175-76.
Under these factors, we find that defendant's death sentence is not 
unreasonably disparate. Defendant's and Jackson's criminal backgrounds are 
comparable. Evidence in the record shows that, prior to his incarceration for 
the offenses against Ray and Byrd, Jackson was convicted of robbery and unlawful 
use of a weapon. While in prison in 1981, Jackson stabbed a prison guard and was 
convicted of aggravated battery and armed violence. Defendant has convictions 
for grand theft, robbery, and receiving and possessing money stolen from a 
federal bank. Also, like his brother, defendant has a criminal history involving 
violent offenses, such as armed robbery and unlawful use of a weapon to commit 
felonies.
Defendant correctly observes that his behavior in prison is better, by far, 
than his brother's. Whereas defendant has had essentially no disciplinary 
problems, Jackson's prison record from 1980 to 1984 shows that he had repeated 
disciplinary violations involving violence, including possession of a weapon, 
attacking prison staff members, and fighting.
While their behavior in prison suggests that defendant's potential for 
rehabilitation may be greater than that of his brother, this is only one factor 
we consider in determining whether a defendant's capital sentence is 
disproportionate to his codefendant's sentence. We must also consider the 
relative culpability of defendant and Jackson in the crimes against Ray and 
Byrd. We disagree with defendant's assertion that Jackson's role in these crimes 
was equal to or greater than his own. While we do not minimize Jackson's 
responsibility for these offenses, we believe that defendant was clearly the 
more culpable participant in these crimes. Defendant arranged to meet with Ray, 
defendant initiated the armed robbery by pointing a gun at Ray and Byrd, 
defendant tied Ray and Byrd with electrical cord, defendant removed items from 
the apartment, defendant stabbed Ray and Byrd, and defendant set the fire in the 
bedroom. Jackson assisted defendant in committing the crimes by holding Ray and 
Byrd at gunpoint, suggesting a weapon for the stabbings, and helping to carry 
Ray and Byrd into the bedroom, but defendant performed the primary role in the 
crimes. Based on defendant's greater involvement and culpability in the crimes, 
we find his greater sentence was justified.
Defendant also argues that a comparison of his sentence to sentences received 
by defendants in other cases demonstrates that his sentence is excessive. 
Defendant claims that the circumstances surrounding his offense are much less 
egregious than those in other cases in which this court has upheld the 
imposition of the death penalty for murder during the course of an armed 
robbery. See People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158 (1996); People v. 
Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494 (1995). In support of his argument that the death 
penalty is excessive in his case, defendant also relies on other decisions in 
which this court has vacated the defendants' death sentences. See People v. 
Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53 (1997); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 
(1986); People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980).
Although comparative proportionality review is not required by the federal 
constitution or the Illinois death penalty statute, this court has nevertheless 
exercised its discretion to address comparative sentencing arguments by 
defendants in other capital cases. See, e.g., People v. 
Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1994). In this case, we also choose to 
consider defendant's comparison of his sentence to sentences received by 
defendants in other capital cases.
A comparison of the facts of defendant's case to those in People v. 
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158 (1996), and People v. Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494 (1995), however, does not demonstrate that the death penalty was an 
excessive sentence in defendant's case. In those cases, as in defendant's, the 
death penalty was imposed for murders that occurred in the course of an armed 
robbery. In Munson, the defendant robbed the victim at gunpoint, 
kidnapped him, fatally shot the victim because he was afraid the victim would 
identify him, and then set the victim's car on fire. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 167-73. In Ashford, the defendant fatally shot four individuals 
during an armed robbery because he did not want to leave any witnesses. 
Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d  at 497-99. According to defendant, unlike 
Munson and Ashford, his case did not involve a planned, 
premeditated attack. Thus, defendant asserts, the death penalty is excessive in 
his case.
We cannot agree. There was evidence in the case at bar that defendant did 
indeed plan the armed robbery of the lounge. If the murders in Munson 
and Ashford were more horrific than those in defendant's case, such 
fact does not demonstrate that the facts of defendant's case are not, in 
themselves, sufficiently aggravating to warrant the imposition of the death 
penalty. As stated, defendant killed Byrd in a ruthless and brutal fashion. We 
find that defendant's comparison of his case to Ashford and 
Munson does not indicate that the death penalty was inappropriate in 
his case.
Defendant's comparison of his case to Smith, Buggs, and 
Carlson, also does not demonstrate that his death sentence is 
excessive. Our decisions to vacate the defendants' death sentences in those 
cases were based on mitigating factors that are not present in defendant's case. 
See, e.g., Smith, 177 Ill. 2d  at 100-01 (the defendant had no 
criminal record, the murder was motivated by the defendant's husband's affair, 
and the murder was an isolated incident); Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d  at 294-95 
(the defendant had no history of criminal activity, the murder was a product of 
marital disharmony, and the murder was an isolated incident); Carlson, 
79 Ill. 2d  at 588-90 (the defendant had no criminal record and the murders 
occurred while the defendant was under an extreme emotional disturbance). 
Accordingly, these cases fail to show that the death penalty is excessive in 
defendant's case. See People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 249-50 
(1997).
B. Exclusion of Evidence of Richard Jackson's 
Sentence
We now turn to defendant's arguments that errors at the second stage of 
sentencing require that he receive a new sentencing hearing. Defendant asserts 
that it was error for the circuit court to exclude evidence of Richard Jackson's 
sentence at the aggravation-mitigation stage. According to defendant, the fact 
that Jackson had received a 60-year prison term was relevant mitigating 
evidence. Without this evidence, defendant argues, the jury was "left to 
speculate that Jackson already had received the death penalty."
It is well established by the precedent of this court that a defendant does 
not have a right to present evidence of a codefendant's sentence at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing. See, e.g., People 
v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 54 (1998). As we explained in 
People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 271-72 (1993), evidence of a 
codefendant's sentence is not a relevant mitigating factor at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage, where the focus is on the defendant's character 
and participation in the offense. "[R]equiring the sentencer to examine and 
compare the relative culpability of the defendants and the circumstances in 
aggravation and mitigation applicable to each would unnecessarily complicate an 
already difficult task." Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at 272. Thus, while a 
reviewing court may consider whether a defendant's sentence is disparate when 
compared to a codefendant's sentence, a defendant does not have a right to 
present the sentencing jury with evidence of a codefendant's sentence. 
Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 92. Based on this authority, we hold that the 
circuit court did not err in excluding evidence of Jackson's sentence.
C. Residual Doubt
Defendant further contends that it was error for the circuit court to prevent 
the jury from considering, at the aggravation-mitigation stage, residual doubt 
with respect to defendant's guilt. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State 
made a motion in limine to preclude the defense from arguing residual 
doubt. The circuit court granted this motion. During its closing argument at the 
second stage of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued: "Are you going 
to condemn a man on the strength of Robert Ray's testimony?" The circuit court 
sustained the State's objection to this statement. During a subsequent 
discussion with the attorneys outside the presence of the jury, the circuit 
court interpreted defense counsel's remarks about the strength of Ray's 
testimony as a residual doubt argument. The court instructed defense counsel 
that he could argue the facts of the murder but not discuss residual doubt.
Defendant argues that this ruling by the circuit court requires that he 
receive a new sentencing hearing. First, he asserts that the argument the 
circuit court prohibited was not "purely" a residual doubt argument. Instead, 
"disputing the strength of Ray's testimony concerning the circumstances of the 
crime was a proper response to the State's argument [discussing the 
circumstances of the crime] and a proper argument concerning the presence or 
absence of aggravating or mitigating factors in the evidence concerning the 
circumstances of the offense." Second, defendant contends that the circuit court 
should have permitted him to argue residual doubt. Although he acknowledges 
decisions by this court that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
argue residual doubt at aggravation-mitigation, he claims that these decisions 
should not apply to this case because different juries determined guilt and 
sentencing. Defendant contends that, where the same jury determines guilt and 
sentencing, there is a "built-in safeguard" because, as a practical matter, the 
jury cannot be prevented from considering residual doubt at sentencing. 
According to defendant, this "safeguard" has "undoubtedly made the difference in 
many cases where defendants have not been sentenced to death."
Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that a 
defendant has no right to present evidence of residual doubt at the second stage 
of sentencing. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 
172-75, 101 L. Ed. 2d 155, 165-66, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2327-28 (1988); 
Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d at 500-01; Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d  at 79; 
People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 454-55 (1995). As we stated in 
Hooper, "Residual doubt is not relevant to the circumstances of the 
offense or to the defendant's character and, as a result, is not relevant to the 
imposition of the death penalty." Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d  at 79. This court 
has also rejected the argument that when there is a different jury at sentencing 
than at the guilt phase, a defendant should be permitted to argue residual 
doubt. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 501. Defendant has failed to persuade us 
that we should reconsider these holdings.
Thus, we find no error in the circuit court's ruling prohibiting defense 
counsel from disputing the strength of Ray's testimony at the second stage of 
defendant's sentencing hearing. We agree with the circuit court's interpretation 
of defense counsel's remarks about Ray's credibility as a residual doubt 
argument. The circuit court properly restricted defense counsel's references to 
residual doubt while permitting argument regarding the circumstances of 
defendant's crimes.
D. Jury Instructions
Defendant also asserts that a new sentencing hearing is required based on the 
circuit court's refusal to give the jury five instructions he proposed at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage. Defendant's Instruction No. 2 asked the jury to 
consider certain non-statutory mitigating factors. Defendant's failure to 
include this instruction in the record, however, prevents us from reviewing the 
circuit court's decision to refuse it. People v. Dall, 207 Ill. App. 3d 
508, 527 (1991) (defendant waived review of the propriety of his proposed 
instruction by failing to include it in the record). Neither the common law 
record nor the report of proceedings reveals the substance of this instruction. 
Although defendant describes the contents of the instruction in his brief, we 
cannot rely on this description. We are, therefore, unable to review the merits 
of his argument and find the issue defaulted.
The circuit court also refused to give the jury the following nonpattern 
instructions that defendant proposed:
In rejecting these instructions, the circuit court found that their subject 
matter was covered by the language of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 
Criminal, No. 7C.06 (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d), which the court 
had decided to give the jury. This pattern instruction informed the jury that 
mitigating factors it should consider included, "[t]he defendant may be 
rehabilitated or restored to useful citizenship" and "[a]ny other reason 
supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to 
death."
The circuit court also refused defendant's request to give the jury the 
following instruction on the unanimity requirement: "The jury may consider [a] 
mitigating factor even though all or some of the other jurors do not believe 
that a mitigating factor exist[s]." Instead, the circuit court instructed the 
jury in accordance with IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05, which provides: "Under the 
law, the defendant shall be sentenced to death if you unanimously find that 
there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death 
sentence. If you are unable to find unanimously that there are no mitigating 
factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, the court will 
impose a sentence other than death."
It is within the discretion of the circuit court to decide whether to give 
the jury a nonpattern instruction. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 519. The 
circuit court does not abuse its discretion in refusing a nonpattern instruction 
if there is an applicable pattern instruction or if other instructions given to 
the jury cover the same material as the proposed nonpattern instruction. 
Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 519. In this case, the subject matter of 
defendant's proposed instructions was covered by two pattern instructions, which 
the circuit court provided the jury.
Furthermore, this court has held that, when the circuit court instructs a 
jury pursuant to IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 and IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06, no 
separate instructions on mercy and unanimity, such as the ones proposed by 
defendant, are required at the second stage of sentencing. See Buss, 
187 Ill. 2d  at 235 (the circuit court did not err in refusing the defendant's 
mercy instruction when the jury received IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06); 
Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 70-71 (the circuit court did not err in refusing 
the defendant's unanimity instruction when the jury received IPI Criminal 3d No. 
7C.05). Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting 
defendant's proposed instructions.
E. Closing Argument
1. Rebuttal Argument
In addition, defendant claims that a new sentencing hearing is required 
because the circuit court permitted the State to make a rebuttal argument during 
the aggravation-mitigation stage. According to defendant, the party who has the 
burden of persuasion is normally entitled to a rebuttal argument. Defendant 
contends, however, that there is no justification for permitting the State to 
make a rebuttal argument at the aggravation-mitigation stage, because both the 
State and the defendant bear the burden of proof at sentencing.
This court has repeatedly held that, because the State is the moving party at 
sentencing, the circuit court has the discretion to permit the State to present 
a rebuttal argument at the second stage of sentencing. See, e.g., 
People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 93, (1996); People v. 
Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 95 (1994); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 302-03 (1983). Defendant has failed to provide us with any persuasive 
reason for reconsidering those holdings and we decline to do so in this case. We 
hold that the circuit court properly permitted the State to make a rebuttal 
argument at the aggravation-mitigation stage of defendant's sentencing 
hearing.
2. Comments by the Prosecution
Defendant further argues that improper comments by the prosecution during 
closing argument at the second stage of sentencing require that his sentence be 
vacated and his case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Defendant objected 
at trial to only two of these comments: the State's remark that "[t]he defendant 
has forfeited his right to go to jail for society to pay for his existence" and 
its statement that defendant held a job that paid $25 an hour. As the State 
argues, defendant has waived review of the alleged errors relating to the 
remaining comments, to which he failed to object. See People v. Enoch, 
122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). With respect to the comments to which he failed to 
object, defendant asserts that this court may nevertheless consider his 
arguments based on the plain error doctrine.
Because the evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage of 
defendant's sentencing hearing was closely balanced, we agree with defendant 
that we may review the merits of his arguments concerning the State's closing 
argument. See People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 379 (1992); 
People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 577 (1980); People v. 
Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 454-56 (1979) (Ryan, J., concurring). After 
considering these arguments, we find no reversible error and, thus, also no 
plain error. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995) (all plain 
errors are reversible errors). 
Among the portions of the State's argument on which defendant bases his claim 
of reversible error is the State's comment that the jury should "[s]entence the 
defendant to death so that he can wake up every morning and know that he is in 
jail for the consequences of the acts which he committed to Delinda Byrd. Let 
him be reminded every morning about what he did on August 13, 1979." According 
to defendant, the "clear implication" from this statement was that defendant 
would not be executed if the jury imposed the death penalty and this improperly 
minimized the jury's sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985). We 
find that this "implication" is anything but clear. At no time did the State 
suggest that, if the jury imposed a death sentence, that this sentence would not 
be executed. At most, the State's argument that defendant would have time to 
think about the jury's sentence suggests that defendant would not be put to 
death immediately following a verdict imposing the death penalty. We find no 
error based on this argument.
In addition, defendant contends that the State's argument concerning the cost 
of his incarceration was improper. He bases this claim of error on the State's 
remark that "The defendant has forfeited his right to go to jail for society to 
pay for his existence." In addition, defendant asserts that it was error for the 
State to comment on privileges he enjoyed in prison. The State described his 
life in prison as "privileged," referred to his paying job, TV, and radio and 
claimed that defendant was "so eager to avoid being shackled he will hold a $25 
an hour [sic] job to avoid being locked down and supervised."
We disagree that this argument requires that we vacate defendant's sentence. 
First, we find that any error stemming from the State's comment about society 
paying for defendant was cured by defense counsel's prompt objection, the 
circuit court's sustaining this objection, and its instruction to the jury to 
disregard argument not based on the evidence. See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  
at 159-60. With respect to the State's remarks about defendant's privileges, we 
do not interpret this argument as a comment on the cost of defendant's 
incarceration. Finally, while the State's argument that defendant was paid $25 
an hour was incorrect (Skidmore testified that defendant was paid $25 a month), 
we do not believe that it resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant. After 
defendant objected to this misstatement, the circuit court stated to the jury, 
"Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard the evidence." In addition, the jury was 
instructed that the arguments of the attorneys were not evidence and that 
argument not based on the evidence should be disregarded.
Further, defendant argues that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing by the 
State's argument about Byrd's hopes and dreams because it distracted the jurors 
from the task of balancing aggravating and mitigating factors and was 
unsupported by evidence in the record. The prosecution argued:
In People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 155 (1991), this court held 
that, at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing, the State may 
introduce evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the defendant's 
victim and the impact of the defendant's crime on the victim and the victim's 
survivors. See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735-37, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608-09 (1991). This court stated that such 
evidence is relevant to the jury's consideration of the proper punishment for 
the defendant because it helps the jury to assess his moral culpability. 
Howard, 147 Ill. 2d  at 158; see also Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 
200. However, "arguments which are calculated to play upon the jurors' emotions 
are clearly improper." People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 78 
(1994).
We find that the State's argument concerning Byrd was an improper appeal to 
the juror's emotions. Nevertheless, we do not believe that it was so 
inflammatory that it denied defendant a fair sentencing hearing. In other cases 
involving challenges to the prosecution's argument at the second stage of 
sentencing, this court has considered the effect of similar comments about the 
victim's survivors and what the victims would be doing if they were alive. 
Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 512, 513 (the prosecution asked the jury to 
" '[p]icture what it was like' " for the victim in her last moments of 
life and stated that, for the victim's mother, what should have been a 
" 'fond memory, shining lights of her life, her fifteen-month old daughter, 
instead, is a tragic memory' "); People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 41 
(1996) (the prosecution asked the jury to remember the nine-year-old victim who 
would "  'never light up his grandfather's home with his infectious 
smile' "); People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 285 (1989) (the 
prosecution argued about the victims' rights to get married, have a family, have 
children, and spend time with their families). In those cases, we concluded that 
these comments were, in and of themselves, not so prejudicial as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 513; 
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 42; Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d  at 285. 
Likewise, in this case, we find that the prosecution's argument about Byrd does 
not require reversal of defendant's sentence.
Defendant also asserts reversible error resulting from the prosecution's 
argument that his exercise of his constitutional rights to appeal his 
convictions and sentence was an aggravating factor. Defendant bases this 
contention on the following portions of the State's argument:
In addition, defendant complains about the State's references to the fact 
that defendant had been incarcerated since 1980.
We cannot agree with defendant's contention that the prosecution improperly 
commented on his exercise of his constitutional rights to appeal his 
convictions. Remarks during closing argument must be reviewed in the context of 
the closing arguments as a whole. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d  at 62. After 
reviewing the prosecution's remarks, we are unable to find any explicit or 
implicit reference to defendant's exercise of his rights to appeal.
Defendant also objects to the State's characterization of his mitigation 
evidence as a "con job." For example, the State argued that defendant was 
"conning" the Gulletts because "even bad people can be nice to people who are 
nice to them." Similarly, the State also asserted that defendant was pulling a 
"con job" by "trying to convince people that he is now reformed" and that 
defendant's marriage should be considered aggravating evidence because it was 
"the snow balling of defendant's con job." In addition, defendant challenges the 
State's suggestion that Jill Miller was involved in the con job. During her 
cross-examination by the State, the State asked Miller whether some children who 
had been shot went on to lead productive lives. Miller responded that a child's 
reaction to being shot depended on the child's resiliency, cognitive 
functioning, and support. During its closing argument, the State described 
Miller as a "hired gun" and criticized Miller's response to its question. The 
State argued: "Instead of yes or no, she said well, no, no it depends on 
your-babble came out of her mouth because she knew the path I was leading on. 
She had to cover the tracks. Doing anything she could."
According to defendant, these comments require reversal of his conviction 
because they amounted to an accusation that the defense case involved deceit or 
trickery, were unsupported by the evidence, and suggested to the jury that they 
would be victims of defendant's con game if they did not sentence him to 
death.
We agree that, under the facts of this case, the State's references to 
defendant as a "con man," its characterization of his good behavior as a "con 
job," its suggestion that Miller was involved in the "con job," its description 
of Miller as a "hired gun," its denouncing Miller's testimony as "babble [that] 
came out of her mouth," and its statement "She had to cover the tracks. Doing 
anything she could" were improper. However, we find that this improper argument 
was not so highly inflammatory, in and of itself, that it requires reversal of 
his sentence. See People v. Landgham, 182 Ill. App. 3d 148, 159-60 
(1989); People v. Slaughter, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1069 (1980).
In support of his argument that the State's description of him as a "con man" 
requires reversal of his conviction, defendant relies on our decision in 
People v. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d 80 (1985). In Bean, this court 
found that it was error for the State to argue, without support in the record, 
that defense counsel's trial strategy "was a subterfuge deliberately calculated 
to introduce reversible error unfairly." See Bean, 109 Ill. 2d  at 101. 
Bean is distinguishable from the present case in that the comments at 
issue in Bean were an attack on defense counsel, whereas the argument 
in this case was an improper comment on the defendant's credibility. In 
addition, in Bean, this court's decision that the defendant was 
entitled to a new trial was based on the circuit court's erroneous denial of the 
defendant's motion for severance and comments by the codefendant's counsel on 
the defendant's failure to testify. The holding in Bean, therefore, 
does not support reversal of defendant's sentence based on the State's 
characterization of his mitigating evidence as a "con job." We conclude that no 
reversible error occurred with respect to the State's closing argument at the 
aggravation-mitigation stage. Accordingly, we also find no plain error. See 
Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 17.
F. Cumulative Error
Defendant claims that, even if the errors at the second stage of sentencing 
are not enough, individually, to warrant a new sentencing hearing, the 
cumulative effect of these errors mandates reversal of his sentence. We have 
rejected defendant's assertions of error at the aggravation-mitigation stage, 
except for his arguments that certain portions of the State's closing argument 
were improper. With respect to the errors that occurred during the State's 
closing argument, we have concluded that, in and of themselves, the State's 
comments did not deprive defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. We also find 
that, cumulatively, these errors do not require reversal of defendant's 
sentence.
Any prejudice resulting from the State's improper argument regarding the cost 
of defendant's incarceration and its misstatement that he was paid $25 an hour 
in the prison laundry, was cured when the circuit court sustained defendant's 
objections and gave the jury appropriate instructions. The State's 
characterization of defendant's mitigating evidence as a "con job" and its 
emotional appeal to the jury concerning Byrd's hopes and dreams were also 
improper. However, comments by the State in closing argument will not be 
considered reversible error unless they result in substantial prejudice to the 
defendant such that it is impossible to determine whether the comments caused 
the jury's verdict. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d  at 289-90. In this case, the 
jury was presented with evidence of the ruthless and brutal nature of Byrd's 
murder, as well as evidence of defendant's history of committing crimes 
involving violence. In addition, the circuit court instructed the jury that 
closing arguments were not evidence and that arguments not based on the evidence 
should be disregarded. Given this instruction and the aggravating evidence in 
this case, we cannot conclude that, even cumulatively, the errors that occurred 
during the State's closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation stage require 
reversal of defendant's sentence.
IV. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Defendant also asserts that his death sentence must be vacated and his case 
remanded for a sentence other than death because the Illinois death penalty 
statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. In other cases, 
this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including 
his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a 
burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of 
mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; 
People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. 
Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to 
prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. 
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173-74 (1997)); (3) permits the arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty (see, e.g., Johnson, 182 Ill. 
2d at 113); (4) violates the Illinois constitutional requirement that offenders 
be restored to useful citizenship (see, e.g., People v. 
Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 266 (1983)); (5) does not require the jury to 
make written findings (see, e.g., Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 
173-74); (6) gives the prosecution unbridled discretion to seek the death 
penalty (see, e.g., Fair, 159 Ill. 2d at 96); (7) does not 
require comparative proportionality review (see, e.g., 
Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d  at 173; People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 351 (1994)); (8) permits the jury to consider any nonstatutory aggravating 
factor in making its sentencing determination (see, e.g., 
Buss, 187 Ill. 2d  at 248; Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d at 112-13); and 
(9) is vague because it fails to define mitigating factors (see, e.g., 
People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 197-98 (1994)). We have also 
previously rejected defendant's argument that, together, the features of the 
death penalty statute render it unconstitutional. See, e.g., People 
v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175, 215 (1997). We adhere to our prior decisions 
concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty statute because defendant 
fails to offer any new or compelling reason for our reconsideration of these 
holdings.
In addition to these facial attacks on the constitutionality of the Illinois 
death penalty statute, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the 
application of this statute to him. Defendant first asserts that the Illinois 
death penalty statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because the almost 
20-year delay in imposing the death penalty against him has "eviscerated any 
justification for imposing the death penalty," and to execute him now would 
violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. 
Defendant cites no relevant authority, however, for the proposition that the 
imposition of the death penalty becomes unconstitutional after a certain amount 
of time has elapsed since a defendant's commission of a crime. More 
particularly, defendant has failed to provide us with pertinent authority to 
support his claim that the period of time that has passed since he murdered Byrd 
causes the imposition of the death penalty in his case to amount to cruel and 
unusual punishment. Accordingly, we find the issue waived. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 
341(e)(7); Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 162.
Defendant also claims that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional as 
applied to him because it permits a jury different than the one that decided his 
guilt to make the sentencing determination. This argument is, however, 
essentially a repetition of defendant's residual doubt argument. A defendant has 
no constitutional right to have a jury at sentencing consider residual doubt. 
See Franklin, 487 U.S.  at 172-75, 101 L. Ed. 2d  at 165-66, 108 S. Ct. 
at 2327-28; Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 500-01. We find no constitutional 
bar to the application of the death penalty statute to defendant.
V. Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial
In addition to his challenges to his sentence, defendant raises two arguments 
with respect to the assistance of his counsel at trial. First, in his pro 
se brief, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial because his counsel failed to preserve issues for appeal. 
Second, defendant's appellate counsel argues that the circuit court erred by 
refusing to grant defendant leave to supplement the record of the sentencing 
proceedings with materials relevant to defendant's challenge to the 
effectiveness of his trial counsel. Defendant argued the ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel in his post-sentencing motion and requested that the circuit 
court permit him to supplement the record with the report of proceedings and 
common law record from his 1985 trial and with documents filed in support of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. The circuit court denied this request.
Both this court and the federal courts have already considered and rejected 
defendant's challenges to his convictions based on the assistance of his counsel 
at trial. In deciding defendant's direct appeal from his convictions in 
Emerson II, this court held that defendant was not denied the effective 
assistance of counsel at trial. Emerson II, 122 Ill. 2d  at 433. In 
reviewing the dismissal of defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, this 
court held that defendant had failed to provide any additional basis for his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and the doctrine of res 
judicata barred further consideration of defendant's arguments on this 
issue. Emerson III, 153 Ill. 2d  at 106-07. Pursuant to defendant's 
petition for habeas corpus relief, both the federal district court and 
appellate court rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim on its merits. See Emerson IV, 883 F. Supp.  at 242; Emerson 
V, 91 F.3d  at 900-05. We continue to view this issue as res 
judicata. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court's refusal of 
defendant's motion to supplement the record, and we refuse defendant's request 
that we once again examine the performance of his counsel at trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. We 
direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Thursday, May 11, 2000, 
as the date on which the sentence of death, entered by the circuit court of Cook 
County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided 
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court shall send a 
certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the 
warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where 
defendant is confined.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
I disagree with the majority's decision to engage in comparative sentencing 
review. See slip op. at 43-44. Just weeks ago, in People v. Fern, No. 
86154 (November 18, 1999), this court held:
This unqualified rejection of a comparative sentencing analysis leaves no 
doubt that a comparative sentencing approach is improper and may not be used 
when reviewing the propriety of a defendant's sentence.(1) 
Notwithstanding the fact that the ink has yet to dry on this court's decision in 
Fern, the majority here has decided that comparative sentencing 
analysis is not so bad after all, as long as only this court gets to do it. I am 
unable to join the majority's decision to engage in an analysis that this court 
forbids every other court in this state from performing.
That said, I agree with the majority's conclusion that defendant's sentence 
should be affirmed. In reaching this conclusion, I recognize the significant 
facts that the only evidence the State presented in aggravation arose from acts 
defendant committed before 1980 and that defendant presented substantial 
mitigating evidence relating to his behavior since 1980. Nevertheless, these 
facts were completely presented to the jury. The jury weighed these facts and 
concluded that the mitigating evidence was not sufficient to preclude the 
imposition of the death penalty. While I believe that the evidence here was 
close, I find nothing in the record to justify a reversal of the jury's 
decision.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this special concurrence.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Dennis 
Emerson, was found guilty of the murder of Delinda Byrd, the attempted murder of 
Robert Ray, the armed robbery of both Byrd and Ray, and aggravated arson. A 
sentencing hearing was then conducted, after which the jury returned a verdict 
directing the court to sentence defendant to death. Defendant was so 
sentenced.
Defendant appealed to this court, and we reversed and remanded for a new 
trial. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487 (1983). On retrial, defendant 
was once again found guilty of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and 
aggravated arson and was once again sentenced to death. Defendant then brought a 
second appeal to our court. This time we granted an outright reversal to 
defendant on his conviction for aggravated arson, but affirmed his convictions 
for murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery. We also upheld his death 
sentence. People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411 (1987). Three of the 
court's seven justices dissented.
Defendant next sought post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Cook 
County. The circuit court dismissed his post-conviction petition without an 
evidentiary hearing. We affirmed. People v. Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d 100 
(1992). Defendant then attempted to obtain habeas corpus relief in the 
federal courts. The federal courts determined that there was no basis for 
setting aside the guilt phase of defendant's second trial but held that 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase required that 
defendant's death sentence be set aside and that he be granted a new sentencing 
hearing. Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996).
Pursuant to the mandate of the federal courts, a new sentencing hearing was 
conducted by the circuit court of Cook County. At that hearing, a jury 
determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty and that there was 
nothing to preclude imposition of a penalty of death in this case. The circuit 
court then sentenced defendant to death, and he has appealed directly to our 
court as a matter of right. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.
On this appeal, defendant contends that his death sentence should be vacated 
and that he should receive a sentence other than death because, inter 
alia, our state's death penalty law is unconstitutional. I agree. For the 
reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 
(1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) 
and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 
I, §2). Defendant's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he should 
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 
9-1(j).
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court, 
vacate defendant's death sentence, and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. I therefore dissent.
1. But see Fern, slip op. at 13-24 (Rathje, J., 
dissenting).