Title: Quintin D. L'Minggio v. Jane Gamble
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2001AP000535
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2003

2003 WI 82 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0535 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Quintin D. 
L'Minggio,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Jane Gamble and Gerald Berge,  
 
Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  252 Wis. 2d 766, 642 N.W.2d 645 
(Ct. App.-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 3, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald C. Nichol   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: WILCOX, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed) 
CROOKS and SYKES, JJ., join 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Colleen D. Ball, Sarah A. Huck, and Reinhart Boerner Van 
Deuren S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Colleen Ball. 
 
For the respondents-respondents the cause was argued by 
Corey F. Finkelmeyer, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2003 WI 82 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0535   
(L.C. No. 
00-CV-3236) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Quintin D.  
L'Minggio,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jane Gamble and Gerald Berge,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.     
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.    
Quintin 
L'Minggio 
(L'Minggio) petitioned this court for review of a court of 
appeals' decision that upheld a circuit court's dismissal of 
L'Minggio's challenge to a prison disciplinary hearing.1  The 
circuit court construed L'Minggio's petition for habeas corpus 
as a petition for certiorari and dismissed it as untimely under 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. L'Minggio v.Gamble, No. 01-0535, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2002).   
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2) (1999-2000).2  The court of appeals 
affirmed the dismissal of L'Minggio's action, but on the grounds 
that L'Minggio failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b) and Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
310.04 (Apr., 1998).   
¶2 
We conclude that L'Minggio's petition was properly 
construed as an action for certiorari rather than habeas corpus 
since a writ of certiorari provides L'Minggio with an adequate 
remedy in the law and has historically been used to challenge 
prison disciplinary decisions.  We also conclude that L'Minggio 
exhausted 
his 
administrative 
remedies 
by 
satisfying 
the 
requirements under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.04.  Since the 
Department of Corrections (Department) failed to provide notice 
to L'Minggio of any further appeal rights when his inmate 
complaint was rejected, we conclude that the Department is 
estopped from claiming that L'Minggio failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies in this case.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the matter to 
the circuit court for Dane County for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.             
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
On February 15, 2000, prison officials at the Kettle 
Moraine Correctional Institution issued L'Minggio a conduct 
report for allegedly participating in gang activity and planning 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
3 
 
to assault prison staff.  On February 24, 2000, a prison 
adjustment 
committee 
found 
L'Minggio 
guilty 
of 
violating 
administrative rules against group resistance and conspiracy to 
commit battery.  The adjustment committee stated that it relied 
upon the following factors in reaching its decision: (1) the 
person who prepared the report had been a reliable investigator 
in the past; (2) there were five notarized witness statements 
regarding L'Minggio's involvement in the alleged incident; and 
(3) L'Minggio's witnesses had no knowledge of the incident.  The 
adjustment 
committee 
imposed 
eight 
days 
of 
adjustment 
segregation and three years of program segregation.   
¶4 
L'Minggio appealed the adjustment committee's decision 
to the program review committee, arguing that he was denied his 
due process rights to a fair and impartial hearing; that he did 
not have an impartial adjudicator; and that he was denied the 
opportunity to present and question witnesses on his behalf.  
The program review committee rejected L'Minggio's arguments and 
found him guilty of the charges, which resulted in transferring 
L'Minggio to the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility in Grant 
County for three years.   
¶5 
L'Minggio appealed the disciplinary determination to 
the warden, who affirmed the decision on March 6, 2000.  After 
attempting to appeal the warden's decision to the Secretary of 
the Department of Corrections, L'Minggio filed an inmate 
complaint regarding the disciplinary proceeding on June 12, 
2000.  The next day, the Inmate Complaint Examiner (ICE) 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
4 
 
rejected L'Minggio's complaint as untimely because it was not 
filed within 14 days of the incident, as required under Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(3).3  L'Minggio claims that he received 
the ICE's rejection on June 21, 2000.   
¶6 
L'Minggio next attempted to seek judicial review by 
petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in the Dane County 
Circuit Court.  L'Minggio's petition was returned to him along 
with a letter dated August 3, 2000, explaining that certain 
documents were missing from his submission and that habeas 
corpus actions should be venued in the county of confinement. 
¶7 
On August 31, 2000, L'Minggio mailed another document 
labeled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the circuit 
court 
in 
Grant 
County, 
the 
county 
where 
L'Minggio 
was 
incarcerated.  Upon review, the Grant County Circuit Court, 
George S. Curry, Judge, construed L'Minggio's action as a 
petition 
for 
certiorari, 
rather 
than 
habeas 
corpus, 
and 
transferred the case to Dane County in accordance with the venue 
provision of Wis. Stat. § 801.50(3).4  The Dane County Circuit 
Court, Gerald C. Nichol, Judge, agreed that the action was 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(3) provides:  "An 
inmate shall file a complaint within 14 calendar days after the 
occurrence giving rise to the complaint, except that the 
institution examiner may accept a late complaint for good 
cause."   
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.50(3) provides:  "All actions in 
which the sole defendant is the state, any state board or 
commission or any state officer, employee or agent in an 
official capacity shall be venued in Dane County unless another 
venue is specifically authorized by law." 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
5 
 
properly construed as a petition for certiorari, but dismissed 
it as untimely under Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2).5  The Dane County 
Circuit Court determined that L'Minggio's cause of action 
accrued on March 23, 2000, which was the date L'Minggio received 
the warden's response to his administrative appeal; therefore, 
L'Minggio did not file his petition within the 45-day deadline 
required under § 893.735(2).     
¶8 
In an unpublished per curiam decision, the court of 
appeals affirmed the Dane County Circuit Court's dismissal of 
L'Minggio's action, but on different grounds.  The court of 
appeals disagreed with the Dane County Circuit Court that the 
45-day time limit for L'Minggio's certiorari action started to 
run with the warden's decision; however, the court of appeals 
concluded that L'Minggio was barred from seeking judicial review 
because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.    
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.735(2) provides: 
An 
action 
seeking 
a 
remedy 
available 
by 
certiorari made on behalf of a prisoner is barred 
unless commenced within 45 days after the cause of 
action accrues.  The 45-day period shall begin on the 
date of the decision or disposition, except that the 
court may extend the period by as many days as the 
prisoner proves have elapsed between the decision or 
disposition and the prisoner's actual notice of the 
decision 
or disposition.  
Subject 
to 
no 
contact 
requirements 
of 
a 
court 
or 
the 
department 
of 
corrections, a prisoner in administrative confinement, 
program segregation or adjustment segregation may 
communicate by 1st class mail, in accordance with 
department of corrections' rules or with written 
policies of the custodian of the prisoner, with a 3rd 
party outside the institution regarding the action or 
special proceeding. 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
6 
 
¶9 
In reviewing the dismissal of L'Minggio's challenge to 
his prison disciplinary hearing, we address the following 
issues: (1) whether L'Minggio exhausted his administrative 
remedies as required under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.04 and (2) 
whether L'Minggio's petition was properly construed as an action 
for certiorari rather than habeas corpus.        
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 To determine whether L'Minggio's petition was properly 
construed as an action for certiorari instead of an action for 
habeas corpus poses a question of law that this court reviews de 
novo.  State ex rel. Woods v. Morgan, 224 Wis. 2d 534, 537, 591 
N.W.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1999).   
¶11 The examination of whether L'Minggio exhausted his 
administrative 
remedies 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application of chapter 310 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  
The interpretation of an administrative regulation is a question 
of law that this court reviews de novo.  In re Marriage of Brown 
v. Brown, 177 Wis. 2d 512, 516, 503 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1993).  
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Exhaustion of Remedies 
¶12 We first address whether L'Minggio exhausted his 
administrative remedies under chapter 310 of the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code.  The exhaustion of administrative remedies 
is required pursuant to Wisconsin's Prisoner Litigation Reform 
Act, Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b), and Wis. Admin. Code. § DOC 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
7 
 
310.04.6  Under § DOC 310.04, if an inmate wishes to challenge 
the procedures used by an adjustment committee or a hearing 
officer in a prison disciplinary action, he or she must appeal 
to the warden under § DOC 303.76 and file an inmate complaint 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.02(7)(b) provides: 
No prisoner may commence a civil action or 
special proceeding, including a petition for a common 
law writ of certiorari, with respect to the prison or 
jail conditions in the facility in which he or she is 
or has been incarcerated, imprisoned or detained until 
the person has exhausted all available administrative 
remedies 
that 
the department of 
corrections has 
promulgated by rule or, in the case of prisoners not 
in the custody of the department of corrections, that 
the sheriff, superintendent or other keeper of a jail 
or house of correction has reduced to writing and 
provided reasonable notice of to the prisoners. 
 
Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 310.04 provides:  
Before an inmate may commence a civil action or 
special proceedings against any officer, employe or 
agent of the department in the officer's, employe's or 
agent's official or individual capacity for acts or 
omissions committed while carrying out that person's 
duties as an officer, employe or agent or while acting 
within the scope of the person's office, the inmate 
shall file a complaint under s. DOC 310.09 or 310.10, 
receive a decision on the complaint under s. DOC 
310.12, have an adverse decision reviewed under s. DOC 
310.13, and be advised of the secretary's decision 
under s. DOC 310.14.  With respect to procedures used 
by the adjustment committee or hearing officer in a 
prison disciplinary action under ch. DOC 303, an 
inmate shall appeal to the warden under s. DOC 303.76 
and file an inmate complaint under s. DOC 310.08(3) in 
order to exhaust administrative remedies.  
 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
8 
 
under § DOC 310.08(3), 
in 
order 
to 
exhaust 
his or her 
administrative 
remedies. 
 
L'Minggio 
fulfilled 
the 
first 
requirement by appealing the adjustment committee's decision to 
the warden in accordance with § DOC 303.76.  L'Minggio also 
satisfied the second requirement by filing an inmate complaint 
pursuant to § DOC 310.08(3); however, the ICE rejected his 
complaint as untimely.   
¶13 The 
ICE 
rejection 
letter 
received 
by 
L'Minggio 
declared his complaint "rejected" because the complaint was not 
filed within 14 calendar days of the incident as required under 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(3).  However, the rejection letter 
provided no information as to whether L'Minggio could appeal the 
ICE's rejection of his complaint or if there was a further step 
that L'Minggio would have to take in order to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.   
¶14 In contrast, prior ICE decision letters received by 
L'Minggio regarding other complaints, which had been dismissed 
on the merits, explicitly provided notice that "[i]f you are 
adversely affected by the decision, you have 10 calendar days to 
appeal the decision to the Corrections Complaint Examiner.  Form 
(DOC-405) 
for 
such an 
appeal 
may be 
obtained 
from the 
Institution Complaint Examiner."  No such notice was provided in 
the ICE decision letter in this case, which rejected L'Minggio's 
complaint for untimeliness.   
¶15 The Department's failure to advise L'Minggio that he 
could appeal the ICE's rejection of his complaint estops the 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
9 
 
Department from claiming that L'Minggio failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  Although L'Minggio's complaint was 
rejected by the ICE as untimely, L'Minggio was neither aware of 
nor informed 
that 
there 
were any 
further 
steps in the 
administrative process.  Therefore, we hold that L'Minggio 
exhausted his administrative remedies by following the express 
directives under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.04 by (1) appealing 
the adjustment committee's decision to the warden and (2) filing 
an inmate complaint.    
B. Petition for Certiorari versus Habeas Corpus 
¶16 We next address whether L'Minggio's petition was 
properly construed as an action for certiorari rather than for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  At the outset, we note that it is well-
settled that pro se complaints are to be liberally construed to 
determine if the complaint states any facts that can give rise 
to a cause of action.  bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 
520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983).  Therefore, a court should not deny 
a prisoner's pleading based on its label rather than its 
allegations.  Id. at 521.     
¶17 The writ of habeas corpus arises out of the common law 
and 
is 
guaranteed 
by 
both 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
federal 
constitutions as well as state and federal statutes.7  Although 
habeas corpus typically  arises out of a criminal proceeding, it 
is a separate civil action that is founded on principles of 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. Const. Art. I, §  
9, cl. 2; Wis. Stat. § 782.01; 28 U.S.C. § 2241.     
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
10 
 
equity.  State ex rel. Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 225 
Wis. 2d 446, 450, 593 N.W.2d 48 (1999) (citing State ex rel. 
Korne v. Wolke, 79 Wis. 2d 22, 26, 255 N.W.2d 446 (1977); State 
ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 220, 85 N.W. 1046 
(1901)).   
¶18 Habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ that is only 
available to a petitioner under limited circumstances.  State v. 
Haas, 2002 WI 43, ¶12, 252 Wis. 2d 133, 643 N.W.2d 771.  A 
petitioner who seeks habeas corpus relief is required to meet 
certain criteria.  First, a petitioner must be restrained of his 
or her liberty.  Fuentes, 225 Wis. 2d at 451.  Second, a 
petitioner must show that the restraint was imposed by a 
tribunal without jurisdiction or that the restraint was imposed 
contrary 
to 
constitutional 
protections. 
 
Id. 
 
Third, 
a 
petitioner must demonstrate that there was no other adequate 
remedy available in the law.  Id.   
¶19 This court has not addressed whether habeas corpus may 
ever constitute the proper remedy for a claim that a prisoner's 
constitutional rights have been abridged by conditions of 
confinement.  bin-Rilla, 113 Wis. 2d at 524.  "Conditions of 
confinement" have been described as claimed denials of rights 
after a sentence is imposed when an individual is in custody.  
Id. at 518.  In bin-Rilla, we concluded that the appropriate 
remedy 
for 
a 
prisoner's 
claim 
of 
illegal 
conditions 
of 
confinement 
was 
not 
release 
from 
custody, 
but 
rather 
a 
judicially mandated change in the illegal conditions or an 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
11 
 
injunction against the practices and possibly a damages award.  
Id. at 522.8    
¶20 In contrast to a petition for habeas relief, a court 
that is petitioned for a writ of certiorari regarding a decision 
by a prison adjustment committee determines: (1) whether the 
committee 
kept 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; 
(2) 
whether 
the 
committee acted according to law; (3) whether the committee's 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive, 
or 
unreasonable 
and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence 
was 
such 
that 
it 
might 
reasonably 
make 
the 
determination in question.  State ex rel. Hoover v. Gagnon, 124 
Wis. 2d 135, 140, 368 N.W.2d 657 (1985).  A certiorari court is 
limited to reviewing the record and cannot consider additional 
facts outside of the record.  State ex rel. Richards v. Leik, 
175 Wis. 2d 446, 455, 499 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
State ex rel. Lomax v. Leik, 154 Wis. 2d 735, 739-40, 454 
N.W.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1990); State ex rel. Hippler v. City of 
Baraboo, 47 Wis. 2d 603, 614-15, 178 N.W.2d 1 (1970)).     
¶21 Even though this court has not determined whether 
alleged illegal conditions of confinement may ever be challenged 
via habeas corpus, "[c]ertiorari is the well-established mode of 
judicial review for inmates . . . who seek to challenge prison 
                                                 
8 In bin-Rilla, we noted that there are several remedies 
that a prisoner may pursue other than habeas corpus to challenge 
conditions 
of 
confinement, 
such as 
mandamus, 
prohibition, 
certiorari, and a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 518 n.4, 335 N.W.2d 384 
(1983).    
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
12 
 
disciplinary decisions."  State ex rel. Curtis v. Litscher, 2002 
WI App 172, ¶12, 256 Wis. 2d 787, 650 N.W.2d 43.  The challenge 
of prison disciplinary decisions via a writ of certiorari is 
supported by a body of Wisconsin case law.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Staples v. DHSS, 115 Wis. 2d 363, 340 N.W.2d 194 (1983); 
Casteel v. Kolb, 176 Wis. 2d 440, 500 N.W.2d 400 (Ct. App. 
1993); Richards, 175 Wis. 2d at 449-50; State ex rel. Irby v. 
Israel, 95 Wis. 2d 697, 702-03, 291 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1980); 
State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 119, 289 
N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1980).   
¶22 As a challenge to a prison disciplinary action, 
L'Minggio's claims can be adequately addressed by a certiorari 
action.  In appealing the adjustment committee's decision, 
L'Minggio argued that he was denied his due process rights to a 
fair and impartial hearing; that he did not have an impartial 
adjudicator; and that he was denied the opportunity to present 
and question witnesses on his behalf.  A certiorari court could 
review the record with respect to L'Minggio's claims to 
determine whether the adjustment committee acted according to 
law, 
whether 
its 
actions 
were 
arbitrary, 
oppressive 
or 
unreasonable, and whether the evidence was such that it might 
have reasonably made the determination in question.   
¶23 Judicial 
review 
of 
whether 
a 
prison 
adjustment 
committee acted according to law includes reviewing whether the 
committee followed its own rules governing the conduct of its 
hearings.  Meeks, 95 Wis. 2d at 119.  If there is evidence that 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
13 
 
is 
contrary 
to 
a 
committee's 
decision 
that 
indisputably 
establishes a fact, then the committee's decision constitutes a 
violation of law that may be reached by certiorari.  State ex 
rel. Heller v. Lawler, 103 Wis. 460, 465, 79 N.W. 777 (1899).  
For example, the court of appeals has held on certiorari review 
that a hearing examiner, who had witnessed a riot and hostage 
situation, and then participated in the resulting prison 
disciplinary proceeding, should have been disqualified from the 
proceeding under one of the Department's own administrative 
rules, 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ 
DOC 303.82(2).9 
 
Curtis, 
256 
Wis. 2d 787, ¶20.       
¶24 Nevertheless, L'Minggio asserts that certiorari is not 
an adequate remedy in this case because he received affidavits 
from witnesses who recanted their accusations, which were not 
before the adjustment committee when it made its decision, and 
are therefore not part of the record.  While L'Minggio is 
correct that facts outside the record are not considered in a 
certiorari review, these affidavits can be taken into account, 
albeit indirectly, under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(3).  
Section DOC 310.09(3) provides that "the institution complaint 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC  303.82(2) provides:  
No person who has substantial involvement in an 
incident, which is the subject of a hearing, may serve 
on the committee for that hearing.  Committee members 
shall determine the subject matter of the hearing in 
advance in order to allow replacement of committee 
members if necessary and thereby avoid the necessity 
of postponing the hearing. 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
14 
 
examiner [ICE] may accept a late complaint for good cause."  
§ DOC 310.09(3) (emphasis added).  It is arguable that these 
affidavits, which were not before the adjustment committee, 
could constitute "good cause" for allowing a late complaint.  
Therefore, a certiorari court could consider whether the ICE 
acted 
according 
to 
law 
and 
whether 
its 
actions 
were 
unreasonable, 
arbitrary 
or 
oppressive 
when 
it 
rejected 
L'Minggio's complaint for untimeliness, despite the fact that 
L'Minggio received affidavits from witnesses, who had withdrawn 
their accusations after the adjustment committee had already 
made its decision.  If a certiorari court finds that an 
adjustment committee did not act according to law or acted 
unreasonably, arbitrary or oppressive, then it may vacate the 
committee's decision and remit the punishment imposed.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Irby v. Israel, 184 Wis. 2d 831, 847-48, 522 
N.W.2d 9 (1994); Santiago v. Ware, 205 Wis. 2d 295, 337-38, 556 
N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶25 Accordingly, since L'Minggio has an adequate remedy 
via a writ of certiorari and since prison disciplinary actions 
have been customarily addressed as certiorari actions, we hold 
that L'Minggio's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was 
properly construed as a petition for certiorari.  Furthermore, 
similar to our determination in bin-Rilla, we conclude that a 
circuit court is a more appropriate forum than an appellate 
court to make the kind of factual inquiry that may be necessary 
to review L'Minggio's claims.  bin-Rilla, 113 Wis. 2d at 523.  
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
15 
 
Therefore, we conclude that L'Minggio's petition for certiorari 
should be transferred to the circuit court for Dane County for 
appropriate proceedings.      
¶26 Finally, 
we 
briefly 
address 
whether 
L'Minggio's 
petition for certiorari was filed within the 45-day deadline as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2).  Under § 893.735(2), the 
45-day time period begins on the date of the decision or 
disposition, but may be extended to the date an inmate receives 
actual notice of the decision or disposition.  The Dane County 
Circuit Court determined that L'Minggio's cause of action 
accrued on March 23, 2000——the date L'Minggio received the 
warden's response to his administrative appeal.  The Dane County 
Circuit Court concluded that L'Minggio did not file his petition 
within the 45-day deadline because he did not mail his petition 
until almost five months later, in August of 2000.  However, the 
court of appeals disagreed with the circuit court's analysis and 
ruled that the 45-day time limit for filing a certiorari action 
is tolled while an inmate pursues a complaint through the Inmate 
Complaint Review System, citing State ex rel. Frasch v. Cooke, 
224 Wis. 2d 791, 592 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1999).  In Frasch, the 
court of appeals stated that "certiorari review could not be 
granted on any issue . . . until after [an] ICRS review of the 
procedural issues."  Id. at 796.  See also State ex rel. Purifoy 
v. Malone, 2002 WI App 151, ¶¶9-12, 256 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 1 
(45-day deadline under § 893.735(2) was tolled while inmate 
pursued and exhausted administrative remedies).   
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
16 
 
¶27 In this case, L'Minggio claims that he received the 
ICE's rejection letter of his complaint on June 21, 2000; hence, 
the 45-day time limit began to run as of June 21, 2000.  
Therefore, in order for L'Minggio's petition to be timely, it 
must have been filed before August 5, 2000.  L'Minggio asserts 
that he placed the materials for his petition in the prison 
mailbox system on August 1, 2000, which were received by the 
Dane County Circuit Court around August 3, 2000.  Accordingly, 
since L'Minggio's petition was filed before August 5, 2000, his 
petition was timely.         
¶28 Even if the 45-day time period did not begin to toll 
until June 21, 2000, the Dane County Circuit Court also noted 
that L'Minggio's petition was incomplete.  This court has stated 
that a "tolling rule will not excuse a pro se prisoner who 
ultimately fails to pay filing fees, address the petition 
properly, or otherwise comply with filing requirements."  State 
ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 2001 WI 119, ¶27, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, 
635 N.W.2d 292.  L'Minggio claims that his incomplete petition 
was not his fault, but rather was due to the "vagaries of the 
mail."  L'Minggio explains that he placed his certiorari 
petition materials in two envelopes that were taped together, 
and which unfortunately became separated in the mailing process.   
¶29 If L'Minggio can present proof by affidavit or another 
evidentiary submission that he placed both envelopes (i.e. a 
complete petition) in the prison mailbox system before August 5, 
2000, and otherwise complied with the filing requirements, then 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
17 
 
his filing might be acceptable in light of the tolling rule for 
pro se prisoners.  State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI 
App 262, ¶14, 240 Wis. 2d 310, 622 N.W.2d 763.  With respect to 
certiorari petitions, the tolling rule provides that "when a 
prison inmate places a certiorari petition in the institution's 
mailbox for forwarding to the circuit court, the forty-five day 
time limit in Wis. Stat. § 893.735(2) is tolled."  State ex rel. 
Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 238, ¶14, 239 Wis. 2d 327, 620 
N.W.2d 409; see also Nichols, 247 Wis. 2d 1013, ¶24.  We 
conclude that if L'Minggio can provide evidence that he complied 
with the filing requirements for a petition for certiorari by 
depositing the proper materials for his petition in the prison 
mailbox system prior to August 5, 2000, then his petition for 
certiorari may be deemed timely filed under § 893.735(2).    
¶30 In sum, we conclude that L'Minggio exhausted his 
administrative remedies by fulfilling the two requirements under 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.04 of appealing to the warden and 
filing an inmate complaint.  Because L'Minggio was never 
informed or notified that he could appeal the ICE's rejection of 
his inmate complaint, 
L'Minggio effectively 
exhausted his 
administrative 
remedies 
as 
required 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b) and § DOC 310.04.  Furthermore, we 
hold that L'Minggio's petition was properly construed as an 
action for certiorari instead of habeas corpus since a writ of 
certiorari provides L'Minggio an adequate remedy in the law and 
has historically been used to challenge prison disciplinary 
No. 01-0535 
 
   
 
18 
 
decisions.  Accordingly, we remand the cause to the circuit 
court for Dane County for appropriate proceedings.        
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
Dane County for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
No.  01-0535.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶31 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
The majority declines the opportunity presented by this case to 
decide whether a writ of habeas corpus may ever constitute the 
proper remedy for a claim that a prisoner's constitutional 
rights have been abridged by conditions of confinement.  The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
the 
petitioner's 
claims 
can 
be 
adequately addressed by a certiorari action and therefore it 
need not reach the issue of habeas corpus. 
¶32 I write separately because I am concerned that the 
adequacy of relief under a writ of certiorari is an illusion in 
this case.   
¶33 The petitioner's claim is premised on the fact that he 
has affidavits from witnesses who withdrew their accusations 
against him after the adjustment committee made its decision.  A 
court will thus be able to determine whether the defendant's 
constitutional rights were violated only if it considers the 
affidavits of these witnesses.  As the majority admits, however, 
a 
certiorari 
court 
can 
consider 
these 
affidavits 
only 
"indirectly," if it finds that the ICE did not act according to 
law or that its actions were unreasonable when it rejected the 
petitioner's complaint for untimeliness in the face of these 
affidavits.10 
¶34 In addition, the petitioner's certiorari action need 
be heard only if it was timely filed.  There is a factual 
dispute in the present case regarding whether the petitioner 
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶24. 
No.  01-0535.ssa 
 
2 
 
mailed his completed petition for "certiorari" before August 5, 
2001.  The majority puts the burden on the petitioner to provide 
evidence that he put his petition in the prison mailbox system 
prior to August 5, 2000, indicating that an affidavit or other 
evidentiary submission "might be acceptable."11 
¶35 These two hurdles are not insignificant for the 
petitioner and raise questions about the adequacy of certiorari 
as an avenue for relief in this case.  
¶36 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
   
 
 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶29. 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶37 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I agree with the court's conclusion that if L'Minggio 
exhausted his remedies, the appropriate judicial mechanism for 
dealing with his claims is a writ of certiorari.  However, I 
disagree with the court's determination that L'Minggio exhausted 
the available administrative remedies.  The court's decision 
suggests that because there was no notice of appeal rights on 
the actual rejection letter L'Minggio received, he should be 
excused from any additional steps in the required process.  I 
must disagree.  Chapter 310 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
clearly describes the procedures inmates are required to 
complete before heading into court.  L'Minggio failed to 
complete this process.  For that reason, I respectfully dissent 
from the judgment of this court. 
¶38 As the majority finds, L'Minggio was required to 
exhaust his administrative remedies under Wisconsin's Prisoner 
Litigation 
Reform 
Act, 
Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b), 
and 
Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 310.04.  Majority opinion, ¶12.  At least some 
of L'Minggio's complaints challenged procedures used by an 
adjustment 
committee 
or 
a 
hearing 
officer 
in 
a 
prison 
disciplinary action.  Accordingly, under § DOC 310.04, L'Minggio 
was required to file both an appeal with the warden under §  DOC 
303.76 and an inmate complaint under § DOC 310.08(3).12  See 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Admin. Code § 310.04 provides, in relevant 
part: 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
2 
 
majority opinion, ¶12.  The majority finds that L'Minggio 
satisfied both of these requirements.  Id.  While we agree with 
the finding that L'Minggio satisfied the first requirement, 
based on the language of the DOC provisions, we cannot agree 
that he satisfied the second. 
¶39 The court holds that L'Minggio satisfied the second 
requirement for exhausting his remedies by filing a complaint 
with the Inmate Complaint Examiner (ICE) under § DOC 310.08(3), 
a complaint that was rejected as untimely.  Majority op., ¶12.  
Section DOC 310.08(3) provides:   
After exhausting the appeal in s. DOC 302.19, 303.75 
or 303.76, an inmate may use the ICRS [Inmate 
Complaint Review System] to challenge the procedure 
used by the adjustment committee or hearing officer, 
by a program review committee, or by any decisionmaker 
acting on a request for authorized leave. 
Because § DOC 310.04 requires the inmate to file a complaint 
under § DOC 310.08, the "may" in § DOC 310.08 does not mean that 
the procedure is optional; the inmate must follow the direction 
set forth in § 310.08——the inmate must use the ICRS.  Section 
DOC 310.08(3) itself does not describe the required procedures; 
rather, the section directs the inmate to use the ICRS process.   
¶40 The ICRS process is laid out in other sections of 
chapter 310.  For example, § DOC 310.06 is titled "Organization 
of inmate complaint review system," and explains the overall 
                                                                                                                                                             
With respect to procedures used by the adjustment 
committee or hearing officer in a prison disciplinary 
action under ch. DOC 303, an inmate shall appeal to 
the warden under s. DOC 303.76 and file an inmate 
complaint under s. DOC 310.08(3) in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
3 
 
process.  Section DOC 310.06 provides that in order to use the 
complaint system, the inmate is to file a complaint with the ICE 
under § DOC 310.09 (for individuals) or § DOC 310.10 (for group 
complaints).  L'Minggio filed as an individual, so he was 
required to follow the procedures in § DOC 310.09.  Section DOC 
310.09 states clearly that complaints are to be filed within 14 
calendar days of an occurrence, but late complaints may be 
accepted for "good cause."  Section DOC 310.11, entitled 
"Processing complaints at the institution level" states the 
procedures to be used by the ICE once a complaint is filed.  
Under § DOC 310.11(11), the ICE is to send a report and 
recommendation to the appropriate reviewing authority.  There 
are no distinctions made in the section regarding the process to 
be done.  Whatever the recommendation by the ICE, a report and 
recommendation are to be passed along to the appropriate 
reviewing authority.  Section DOC 310.12 sets out the procedure 
if this is not done.  Under § DOC 310.12(3), "[i]f the 
complainant does not receive the decision within 23 working days 
of the ICE's receipt of the complaint, the parties shall 
consider the complaint dismissed and the complainant may appeal 
immediately." (Emphasis added.)   
¶41 Section DOC 310.13(1) provides the next step:  "A 
complainant dissatisfied with a decision may, within 10 calendar 
days after the date of the decision, appeal that decision by 
filing a written request for review with the corrections 
complaint examiner on forms supplied for that purpose."  Section 
DOC 310.14(1) provides the final step in the process:  "The 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
4 
 
corrections complaint examiner (CCE) shall send the written 
recommendation, along with a copy of the institution complaint 
file, to the secretary who shall make a decision based on the 
record 
within 
10 
working 
days 
following 
receipt 
of 
the 
recommendation."   
¶42 This multi-step process is confirmed in § DOC 310.06.  
As noted, § DOC 310.06(1) directs the inmate to file a 
complaint.  Next, § DOC 310.06(2) describes the ICE's options in 
dealing with a complaint.  Third, § DOC 310.06(3) states that 
the appropriate reviewing authority will make a decision under 
§ DOC 310.12.  Section DOC 310.06(4) then explicitly provides 
that an inmate may appeal an adverse decision under § DOC 
310.13.  Finally, under § DOC 310.06(5) and (6), the CCE is to 
investigate and make a recommendation to the secretary, who 
shall then review the CCE's report and make a decision.  
¶43 None of these procedures suggest that there is an 
exception for complaints "rejected" as untimely.  The majority 
holds in this case that L'Minggio is not required to do anything 
beyond filing a complaint with the ICE because he was "neither 
aware of nor informed that there were any further steps in the 
administrative process."  Majority op., ¶15.  Implicitly, the 
majority opinion also seems to suggest that a "rejection" for 
untimeliness is different.  It is true that the rejection in 
this case was different from other ICE decisions L'Minggio 
himself had received.  Other letters from the ICE to L'Minggio 
contained an explicit notification of appeal rights.  The 
rejection in this case had no such notification.  Nevertheless, 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
5 
 
the process laid out in the Department's administrative code is 
clear.  These provisions are sufficient notice to an inmate of 
his or her right to appeal. 
¶44 This court has found that documents from pro se 
prisoners are to be liberally construed.  See bin-Rilla v. 
Israel, 
113 
Wis. 2d 514, 
520-21, 
335 
N.W.2d 384 
(1983).  
However, inmates are required to follow the procedures set out 
by the Department to exhaust their remedies before attempting to 
get a remedy in court. 
¶45 To assure that inmates can follow the procedures, the 
Department has set guidelines for itself to make the process 
accessible.  Under § DOC 310.05, "[t]he department shall make 
the written complaint procedure readily available to all 
inmates."  In fact, the Department makes sure every inmate is 
provided an explanation of the procedures:  "The department 
shall provide each inmate written notification and an oral 
explanation of the complaint procedures upon arrival at an 
institution, including instructions on how to file a complaint 
at the institution."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.05. The record 
in this case shows that L'Minggio was well aware of the process.  
L'Minggio's own statements declare that he is a so-called 
"jailhouse lawyer."  Further, in his supplemental appendix to 
this court, L'Minggio provided, among other documents, a copy of 
instructions on the complaint process.   
¶46 Since L'Minggio added these instructions to the record 
in this case, we assume that L'Minggio had them at his disposal.  
These instructions state:  "The following rules govern the 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
6 
 
processing of complaints.  The Institution Complaint Examiner 
(ICE) may reject any complaint that does not comply."  Number 9 
on the list of instructions goes on to explain the procedures: 
Your complaint will be acted upon by the ICE who will 
make a recommendation to the appropriate reviewing 
authority.  If you do not receive the reviewing 
authority's decision within 23 working days of the 
date your complaint was acknowledged, you are to 
consider your complaint denied.  If your complaint was 
denied or if you were not satisfied with the reviewing 
authority's decision, you may send your appeal to the 
Corrections Complaint Examiner within 10 calendar days 
after 
the 
receipt 
of 
the 
reviewing 
authority's 
decision.  Forms may be obtained on the housing unit 
or from the office of the ICE.  The CCE will make a 
recommendation on your complaint to the Secretary of 
the Department of Corrections.  The Secretary will 
review the material submitted and render a decision. 
(Emphasis added.)  These instructions unambiguously provide that 
the inmate has the right to appeal.  While a pro se prisoner may 
be afforded some leeway in his court filings, an inmate is 
required to exhaust his or her remedies.  The Department of 
Corrections provides the inmates with the procedures to follow.  
The onus is, and should be, upon the inmate to be aware of the 
procedures and follow through with the requirements.  L'Minggio 
did not do so in this case. 
¶47 I also cannot accept the argument that a "rejection" 
for untimeliness is different than other types of denial.  The 
pertinent definition listed in the American Heritage Dictionary 
for the verb "reject" is, "To refuse to consider or grant; 
deny."  American Heritage Dictionary 1522 (3d ed. 1992).  The 
Department provisions clearly allow for an inmate to appeal an 
adverse decision.  Whether you call the complaint rejected, 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
7 
 
denied, or dismissed, common sense suggests that a "rejected" 
complaint is a decision by the ICE and is certainly adverse to 
the inmate.  The instructions L'Minggio provided to this court 
make this point even more profound.  Under these instructions, 
an inmate may appeal if the complaint was "denied" or if the 
inmate was "not satisfied" with the reviewing authority's 
decision.  This instruction also provides, as does chapter 310, 
that if the inmate does not receive a decision from the 
reviewing authority, he or she should assume the complaint is 
denied, triggering the right to appeal. 
¶48 Although L'Minggio was not provided explicit notice of 
his right to appeal on the rejection from the ICE, inmates are 
informed of the proper procedures to follow in filing a 
complaint.  This court has found that the Prisoner Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA) requires prisoners with certain types of 
claims must exhaust their administrative remedies before taking 
their claims to court.  See Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, 
¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686; Cramer v. Court of Appeals, 
2000 WI 86, ¶20, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591.  This court's 
decision in Cramer discussed the purposes of the PLRA, noting:  
"The history of the [PLRA] legislation also reveals that the 
PLRA was not designed exclusively to restrict frivolous lawsuits 
but rather to limit broadly prisoner litigation at taxpayers' 
expense."  Cramer, 236 Wis. 2d 473, ¶40.  While I agree that 
courts are to liberally construe filings from pro se prisoners, 
the prisoner has the responsibility to fulfill the requirements 
of the PLRA.  Wisconsin's PLRA was intended to reduce the amount 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
8 
 
of prisoner litigation flooding the court system.  The inmates 
are informed of the process and should be required to complete 
the process before attempting to seek relief from the state 
courts.  L'Minggio did not complete the administrative process 
and, as a result, should be denied relief. 
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and DIANE S. SYKES join this opinion. 
 
No.  01-0535.jpw 
 
 
 
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