Title: Perry v. Decker
Citation: 457 A.2d 357
Docket Number: N/A
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 1983

457 A.2d 357 (1983)
Bradford PERRY, Sr., Plaintiff,
v.
Henry James DECKER, Secretary of Public Safety of the State of Delaware, and Robert J. Voshell, Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles of the State of Delaware, Defendants.
STATE of Delaware,
v.
Robert E. BARBEN, Defendant.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted January 19, 1983.
Decided February 3, 1983.
James T. Vaughn, Jr. (argued), Vaughn &amp; Vaughn, Dover, Harold Schmittinger and Charles E. Whitehurst, Jr., Schmittinger &amp; Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, for plaintiff Perry.
Arlen Mekler (argued), Wilmington, for defendant Barben.
Roger A. Brown (argued) and James J. Hanley, Deputy Attys. Gen., Wilmington, for State.
Before HERRMANN, C.J., McNEILLY and HORSEY, JJ.
HERRMANN, Chief Justice:
Two related Certifications of questions of law are involved here: (1) A Certification by the Court of Chancery in Perry v. Decker, et al. (hereinafter "Perry"); and (2) a *358 Certification by the Superior Court in State v. Barben (hereinafter "Barben"). Both were accepted by this Court on the grounds that the questions of law are of first instance in this State and that there are urgent reasons to have them settled by this Court as soon as practicable.
The basic issue in both Certifications is the legal status of House Bill No. 780 (amending 21 Del.C. Chs. 27 and 41), passed by the General Assembly on July 1, 1982, instituting new procedures and penalties governing the offense of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or other drugs.
This is an action to enjoin the State Secretary of Public Safety and the State Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles from conducting a driver's license revocation hearing under H.B. 780.
The following pertinent facts are undisputed:
On July 1, 1982, the General Assembly passed H.B. 780. The Bill contained an appropriation of $135,000 "for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this Act." The Bill was presented to the Governor on July 9, 1982. On July 21, 1982, the Governor acted upon the Bill by approving and signing it, but purported to reduce the appropriation to $20,000 "by line item veto" and return of the Bill to the House of Representatives with the following message:
The Bill now rests in the House of Representatives as returned by the Governor, without any further action thereon.
The Act provided that it became effective 90 days after enactment. In accordance therewith, the Department of Public Safety began enforcing the Act on October 20, 1982.
On October 27, 1982, Perry was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177 as amended by H.B. 780. Under the provisions of the Act, the Department commenced the newly prescribed administrative proceedings to determine whether Perry's license should be revoked. After the commencement of the administrative procedures, Perry filed the action for *359 injunctive relief which led to this Certification by the Court of Chancery.
The following undisputed facts are all that need be added to the foregoing statement of facts:
On October 26, 1982, Barben was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, in violation of § 4177 as amended by H.B. 780. By transfer from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Court of Common Pleas, and upon Barben's refusal to waive the right of jury trial, the case came to the Superior Court. Shortly before the day for arraignment, the Superior Court submitted its pending Certification.
The Certification from the Court of Chancery presents the following Question of Law:
The Certification from the Superior Court presented the foregoing Question and the following additional Question:
Perry and Barben contend that H.B. 780 did not become law for these reasons: that under Del.Const. Art. III, § 18,[*] the Governor lacked the authority to disapprove the appropriation provision of H.B. 780; that the line-item veto provisions of Art. III, § 18 apply only to appropriation bills as such and that, otherwise, the Governor may not approve a bill in part and disapprove it in part; that, therefore, the action of the Governor, in effect, amounted to a veto of the entire Bill and, therefore, no part of H.B. 780 became law.
The State contends that the Governor's action in purporting to reduce an item of appropriation was a nullity and, therefore, H.B. 780 is law because it was not vetoed in accordance with Art. III, § 18. Alternatively, the State argues that the attempted reduction of the appropriation item was, in effect, a permissible line-item veto under Art. III, § 18 and, therefore, the entire Bill was not vetoed.
In the Questions presented by both Certifications, it is assumed, arguendo, that the *360 Governor lacked the power to reduce the amount of an appropriation under Art. III, § 18. Accordingly, we do not consider that issue.
The threshold issue of the Questions, as certified, is whether the Governor correctly exercised the line-item veto power, vested in him by Art. III, § 18, upon the appropriation provision of H.B. 780. We think not.
The controlling sentence of Art. III, § 18 is thus:
Upon the bases of its text, its historical background, and the great weight of authority, we hold that the above provision of Art. III, § 18 applies only to a bill containing more than one appropriation and "embracing distinct items."
First as to its text: due significance must be accorded to the plain and unambiguous plural terms appearing in the reference to "any bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items." The single appropriation provision of H.B. 780 does not fall within that category of bills. Only bills containing more than one "distinct" item of appropriation of money meet the language of § 18 providing for the Governor's authority to disapprove one part of a bill while approving another part.
Second, it is clear that the drafters of the line-item veto provision of Art. III, § 18 contemplated its application only to "appropriation bills." A delegate to the 1897 Constitutional Convention remarked that Art. III, § 18 seemingly was taken from the Federal Constitution. Judge Spruance responded thereto as follows:
Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Delaware 1896-1897, Vol. 1 P. 232.
Finally, the great weight of authority supports the conclusion that the application of a constitutional line-item veto provision such as ours must be limited to bills which contain "distinct items"[**] of appropriation and may not be applied to bills which contain only a single item of appropriation: State v. Okla. Bd. of Corrections, Okla. Supr., 614 P.2d 551 (1980); State v. Olson, N.D.Supr., 286 N.W.2d 262 (1979); Cenarrusa v. Andrus, Idaho Supr., 582 P.2d 1082 *361 (1978); Regents of State University v. Trapp, Okla.Supr., 28 Okl. 83, 113 P. 910 (1911); State v. Holder, Miss.Supr., 76 Miss. 158, 23 So. 643 (1898).
We conclude that the Governor was not empowered, under Del. Const. Art. III, § 18, to disapprove by line-item veto the single item appropriation in H.B. 780; that, therefore, the Governor's action did not accomplish his purpose of approving and enacting the Bill into law in part, and disapproving and not enacting it into law in part.
This then leads to the ultimate question for decision: Did all of H.B. 780 become law, in the form passed by the General Assembly, or did none of it become law? By virtue of Del. Const. Art. III, § 18, of prior Opinions of the Justices of this Court, and of other eminent authorities, we are compelled to hold that H.B. 780 in toto has failed of enactment into law.
The enactment of a law in this State must be in strict accordance with the provisions of the State Constitution, Art. III, § 18. The present status of H.B. 780 fits nowhere in the constitutional format for the valid enactment of a statute: It has not been approved by the Governor in its entirety by signature; it does not meet the constitutional exception for line-item or partial veto; it has been returned to the House of Representatives within 10 days of its receipt under cover of a veto message, thus preventing it from becoming law without the Governor's approval; it now rests in the House and has not been reconsidered and repassed in both Houses. Thus, there is no provision of Art. III, § 18 under which it may be held that H.B. 780 now stands validly enacted into law.
The State takes the position that since the Governor's action in seeking to reduce the appropriation was a "nullity," H.B. 780 has not been vetoed in any respect and, therefore, is law. The position is untenable and in conflict with prior Opinions of the Justices of this Court holding that, under Art. III, § 18 of our Constitution, an invalid partial veto of a bill nullifies a partial approval of the bill and results in its failure of enactment. We adhere to that rule.
In Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr. 210 A.2d 852 (1965), a Bill containing 14 sections was presented to the Governor. He attempted to approve the first 13 sections over his signature and to line-item veto Section 14. It was held that the partial veto power did not apply because an appropriation bill was not involved; that the Governor's disapproval of Section 14 nullified his attempt to approve the other Sections; and that no part of the Bill became law. That Opinion of the Justices was based upon the following rationale:
210 A.2d  at 854-55. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale underlying the entire governmental concept here involved, which *362 we find persuasive and hereby adopt, was well stated by the Justices of this Court in the foregoing Opinion as follows:
210 A.2d  at 855.
The principles endorsed in the foregoing Opinion of the Justices were adhered to in the more recent Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 306 A.2d 720 (1973). There, the Attorney General had previously ruled (just as the State here contends) that an invalid line-item veto left the entire Bill valid and operative as though the veto had not occurred. The Justices expressly disagreed, endorsing the rationale of the 1965 Opinion, above quoted, and stating:
306 A.2d at 723-24; accord, Okla. Bd. of Corrections, 614 P.2d  at 556; Regents of State University v. Trapp, 113 P.  at 914.
For the foregoing reasons, we must conclude that H.B. 780 in its entirety failed of enactment. The result is regrettable but necessary, we think, by a proper construction of our Constitution.
Accordingly, the Question presented by the Certification of the Court of Chancery is answered in the Negative.
In view of the Negative Reply to the first Question, the additional Question presented by the Certification from the Superior Court is answered in the Affirmative.
[*]  Del. Const., Art. III, § 18 provides in pertinent part:

"Section 18. Every bill which shall have passed both Houses of the General Assembly shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the Governor; if he approves, he shall sign it; but if he shall not approve, he shall return it with his objections to the House in which it shall have originated, which House shall enter the objections at large on the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, three-fifths of all the members elected to that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent together with the objections to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by three-fifths of all the members elected to that House, it shall become a law; * * *. If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, * * *.
* * *
"* * * The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items of appropriation disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills, over the Executive veto. * * *." Other provisions of Art. III, § 18, dealing with the status of a bill after final adjournment of the General Assembly, are not pertinent here. It is undisputed that, because "recessed to the call of the Chair," both Houses were not in final adjournment.
[**]  The language "distinct items" and "distinct terms" appear to be words of art in common usage in state constitutional provisions authorizing line-item veto of appropriations.