Title: David Kelsey Sparre v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC2023-0163
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 13, 2024

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2023-0163 
____________ 
 
DAVID KELSEY SPARRE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
June 13, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
David Kelsey Sparre, a prisoner under sentence of death, 
appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his successive 
motion for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851 of the Florida 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.1  We affirm. 
In 2011, a jury found Sparre guilty of first-degree murder, and 
consistent with a unanimous jury recommendation, the trial court 
sentenced him to death.  Sparre appealed, but this Court affirmed 
his conviction and sentence in all respects.  Sparre v. State (Sparre 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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I), 164 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2015).  Sparre’s sentence became final in 
2015, when the U.S. Supreme Court denied Sparre’s certiorari 
petition.  See Sparre v. Florida, 577 U.S. 961 (2015).  We later 
rejected his initial postconviction challenge.  Sparre v. State (Sparre 
II), 289 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 2019).     
Before us now is a circuit court order denying Sparre’s 
successive postconviction motion alleging newly discovered 
evidence—namely, that there is new testimony showing alleged 
inaccuracies or incompleteness in his presentence investigation 
report (PSI).  Sparre claims that the court erred in summarily 
denying his claim without first holding an evidentiary hearing.  We 
disagree.2 
A circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a rule 
3.851 motion “whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient 
claim that requires a factual determination.”  Rogers v. State, 327 
So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 
560 (Fla. 2012)).  However, a summary denial will be upheld if the 
 
 
2.  “The standard of review here is de novo.”  Rogers v. State, 
327 So. 3d at 787 n.5 (citing Boyd v. State, 324 So. 3d 908, 913 
(Fla. 2021)). 
 
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motion is legally insufficient or procedurally barred, or if its 
allegations are conclusively refuted by the record.  Morris v. State, 
317 So. 3d 1054, 1071 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Matthews v. State, 288 
So. 3d 1050, 1060 (Fla. 2019)). 
Generally, postconviction claims are untimely if filed more 
than a year after the judgment and sentence became final.  See Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.851(d).  When a newly discovered evidence claim is 
brought as a successive claim, the defendant must demonstrate an 
exception to the rule’s time limitations.3  See Howell v. State, 145 
So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 2013); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2) (subjecting 
successive motions to rule’s timing requirements); Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.851(d)(2) (precluding consideration of an untimely motion that 
 
 
3.  Rule 3.851(d) contains three timeliness exceptions: 
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were 
unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and 
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 
diligence, or 
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not 
established within [1 year after the judgment and 
sentence became final] and has been held to apply 
retroactively, or 
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file 
the motion. 
 
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does not meet one of the exceptions).  Here, Sparre cannot establish 
any applicable exception.  See Mungin v. State, 320 So. 3d 624, 626 
(Fla. 2020) (“It is incumbent upon the defendant to establish the 
timeliness of a successive postconviction claim.”). 
Sparre’s PSI, the basis for his claim, has been available since 
it was filed with the trial court in 2012.  And Sparre does not argue 
that either he or his counsel were precluded from reviewing it or 
interviewing its author in a timely fashion.  Indeed, Sparre has 
offered no coherent explanation, either here or below, why trial 
counsel or postconviction counsel could not have discovered the 
alleged deficiencies years earlier with the exercise of due diligence.4  
See Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50, 53 (Fla. 2022); Dailey v. 
State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1287-88 (Fla. 2021); Dillbeck v. State, 304 
So. 3d 286, 288 (Fla. 2020). 
Moreover, Sparre has raised numerous issues related to his 
PSI in prior appeals, but we have rejected all such claims as 
meritless.  Thus, we find Sparre’s claims not only untimely, but also 
 
4.  Due diligence is measured from the time new evidence 
becomes discoverable.  See Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 
(Fla. 2008). 
 
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otherwise procedurally barred.5  See Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 
1017, 1025 (Fla. 2023) (holding a prisoner’s due process claims had 
“already been raised and considered by this Court in prior 
proceedings” and thus were “procedurally barred” (quoting 
Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 657 (Fla. 2000))). 
Accordingly, based on the reasoning above, we affirm the order 
summarily denying Sparre’s successive postconviction motion. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
5.  We also reject Sparre’s claims that the trial court’s reliance 
on the PSI entitles him to relief under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  See amend. XIV, 
§ 1, cl. 3, U.S. Const.  These arguments are reiterations of the same 
claims Sparre has been litigating since his direct appeal and which 
we previously rejected.  Sparre I, 164 So. 3d at 1193-98; Sparre II, 
289 So. 3d at 855.  To the extent any specific claim had not yet 
been fully litigated prior to the filing of the present successive 
motion, we conclude that such claims are either procedurally 
barred (since they could have been raised in Sparre’s direct appeal 
or initial postconviction proceeding) or legally insufficient on their 
face and without merit.  See, e.g., Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 
480 (Fla. 2018); Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 999-1000 (Fla. 
2009). 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Kevin A. Blazs, Judge - Case No. 162010CF008424AXXXMA 
 
Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Dawn B. 
Macready, Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and 
Chelsea Rae Shirley and Nida Imtiaz, Assistant Capital Collateral 
Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee