Title: Nieves v. Office of the Public Defender
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2020

Nieves v. Office of the Public Defender Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary This case arose from the representation of plaintiff Antonio Nieves by a state public defender, Peter Adolf, Esq. After his conviction, Nieves was granted post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. DNA evidence later confirmed that Nieves was not the perpetrator, and the underlying indictment against him was dismissed. Nieves subsequently recovered damages from the State for the time he spent wrongfully imprisoned. He then filed the present legal malpractice action seeking damages against the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) and Adolf. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) barred the damages sought because Nieves failed to vault N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)’s verbal threshold. The motion court concluded that the TCA and its verbal threshold were inapplicable. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that “public defenders are public employees that come within the TCA’s immunities and defenses” and that Nieves’s claim fell squarely within the TCA. The Appellate Division also held that plaintiff’s claim for loss of liberty damages fell within the TCA’s limitation on recovery for pain and suffering in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), which Nieves failed to satisfy. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the TCA applied to Nieves’s legal malpractice action, and his claim for loss of liberty damages failed to vault the verbal threshold for a pain and suffering damages claim under the strictures of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Antonio Chaparro Nieves v. Office of the Public Defender (A-69-18) (082262)Argued January 6, 2020 -- Decided April 15, 2020LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether the Tort Claims Act (TCA), which governs tort actions filed against public entities and employees, applies to a criminal defendant’s legal malpractice claim filed against his public defender. The Court also considers whether, if the TCA applies, a claim for loss of liberty damages is subject to its “verbal threshold” for pain and suffering awards, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). This case arises out of the representation of plaintiff Antonio Chaparro Nieves by a state public defender, Peter Adolf, Esq. After his conviction, Nieves was granted post- conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. DNA evidence later confirmed that Nieves was not the perpetrator, and the underlying indictment against him was dismissed. Nieves subsequently recovered damages from the State for the time he spent wrongfully imprisoned. He then filed the present legal malpractice action seeking damages against the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) and Adolf. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the TCA barred the damages sought because Nieves failed to vault N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)’s verbal threshold. The motion court concluded that the TCA and its verbal threshold were inapplicable. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that “public defenders are public employees that come within the TCA’s immunities and defenses” and that Nieves’s claim fell squarely within the TCA. The Appellate Division also held that plaintiff’s claim for loss of liberty damages fell within the TCA’s limitation on recovery for pain and suffering in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), which Nieves failed to satisfy. The Court granted certification “limited to the issues of whether legal malpractice claims are exempt from the [TCA] and whether plaintiff’s 'loss of liberty’ damages claim is subject to the verbal threshold of the TCA.” 237 N.J. 428 (2019).HELD: The TCA applied to Nieves’s legal malpractice action, and his claim for loss of liberty damages failed to vault the verbal threshold for a pain and suffering damages claim under the strictures of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 1 1. The Court reviews key provisions of the TCA, which has the overarching approach of rendering public employees liable for an act or omission to the extent that a private person would be liable for same, unless an immunity attaches. It is well recognized that, through the TCA, the Legislature established that generally, immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is the exception. “Public entity” is a defined term in the TCA. It “includes the State, and any county, municipality, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public body in the State.” N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. The term “public employee” is also defined. It “means an employee of a public entity.” Ibid. And “'[e]mployee’ includes an officer, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated or part-time, who is authorized to perform any act or service.” Ibid. The TCA governs its coverage through its defined terms. (pp. 8-10)2. The OPD is an office within the executive branch of State government; its head is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the State Senate. Further, the OPD relies on annual State funding appropriated through the State Budget. Consideration of those facts leaves no room to doubt that the OPD meets the TCA’s definition of a public entity. Nor is there room to doubt that the Public Defender’s exercise of control over his individual public defenders makes those employees the type of person intended by the TCA to be considered public employees for the Act’s purposes. Whether as a full-time staff attorney or a contracted pool attorney serving as a public defender, the individuals serving in such capacity and under the control of the Public Defender meet the definition of an employee of the OPD for TCA purposes and have been treated as public employees in previous cases. See Rogers v. Cape May Cty. Office of the Pub. Def., 208 N.J. 414, 417 (2011). (pp. 10-12)3. Although the professional representational duty owed by a public defender is to his or her individual client, N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-11, public defenders are performing a public function -- that of ensuring representation for indigent defendants in criminal matters brought by the State, see N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-3, -5. The fact that such attorneys are adversaries of other state actors prosecuting the criminal charges does not mean they lose their state public employee status under the TCA. The Act contains no express exemption for public defenders, or for public entities and public employees who fall within the definitions of those terms but are excluded because of the nature of their work. The OPD is a public entity under the TCA and Adolf is an employee of that public entity. Therefore, the TCA with its immunities, defenses, and limitation on tort claims filed against public entities and their public employees applies to defendants. (pp. 12-16)4. Where liability is permitted, the TCA limits certain damages available to a plaintiff who brings a claim for injury. Among its limitations, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) addresses awards for pain and suffering. Known as the “verbal threshold,” subsection (d) provides in part that “[n]o damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss 2 of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00.” The verbal threshold by its terms applies to pain and suffering claims and not to economic damages. (pp. 16-18)5. Nieves is not seeking economic damages in this matter. He claims that quality of life damages were recognized to be recoverable in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557 (1987), and should be recoverable here. To the extent Nieves relies on Ayers, that reliance is misplaced. Ayers involved at bottom a nuisance claim, and its damages explanation must be understood in its narrow context. In legal malpractice actions, the Court recognizes there to be two general categories of damages -- economic damages or an emotional distress award, and Nieves’s loss of liberty damages fall within the subset of emotional distress damages. The Court has not spoken on the issue of emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice action but finds it is sensible to recognize that a legal malpractice claim can, in certain circumstances, result in an award of emotional distress damages. In the present matter, however, there is an unavoidable hurdle to any such award: emotional distress damages are controlled under the TCA through its limitations on the recovery of a pain and suffering award. New Jersey case law holds that emotional distress is considered pain and suffering under the TCA. There is no other category of damages into which plaintiff’s claim -- denominated as loss of liberty damages or quality of life damages -- fits in this legal malpractice claim premised on attorney negligence. It is either economic damages or a pain and suffering award. Since Nieves already obtained economic damages, his remaining claim must be analyzed under the TCA’s constraints on a pain and suffering award. As the Appellate Division correctly held, Nieves failed to satisfy the standards for vaulting the verbal threshold for a pain and suffering damages claim under the strictures of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). (pp. 18-23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting in part, agrees that the TCA applies here and would also hold that non-pecuniary damages -- such as pain and suffering, loss of liberty, and loss of enjoyment of life -- should not be awarded in legal malpractice cases at least in the absence of egregious or extraordinary circumstances. Justice Albin disagrees, however, that the TCA’s limitation on awards for “pain and suffering” in N.J.S.A. 59:9- 2(d) also limits awards for loss of liberty, which is a distinct species of damages not mentioned in the statute. In Justice Albin’s view, neither the text of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) nor the Court’s jurisprudence equates pain and suffering damages with loss of liberty damages, and the majority’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) will have unintended negative consequences in cases unrelated to legal malpractice.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 69 September Term 2018 082262 Antonio Chaparro Nieves, a/k/a Anthony Chaparro, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Office of the Public Defender and Peter S. Adolf, Esq., Defendants-Respondents. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided January 6, 2020 April 15, 2020Thomas D. Flinn argued the cause for appellant (Garrity, Graham, Murphy, Garofalo & Flinn, attorneys; Thomas D. Flinn, of counsel and on the briefs, and Francis X. Garrity, on the briefs).Daniel M. Vannella, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Daniel M. Vannella, on the briefs).George Conk argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Evelyn Padin, President, of counsel, and George Conk, on the brief). 1 JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This case arises out of the representation of plaintiff Antonio ChaparroNieves by a state public defender, Peter Adolf, Esq., for criminal chargesrelated to sexual assault. After his conviction, Nieves was granted post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. DNAevidence later confirmed that Nieves was not the perpetrator, and theunderlying indictment against him was dismissed. Nieves subsequentlyrecovered $608,333.33 in damages from the State under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-2, asection of the Mistaken Imprisonment Act, N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -7, for the timehe spent wrongfully imprisoned. He then filed the present legal malpracticeaction seeking damages against the Office of the Public Defender and Adolf. In this appeal Nieves argues that the Tort Claims Act (TCA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, which governs tort actions filed against public entitiesand public employees in this state, should not apply to a criminal defendant’slegal malpractice claim filed against his public defender. If the Act applies,Nieves then contends that the Act’s limitations concerning pain and sufferingawards should not apply to the loss of liberty damages he seeks in thismalpractice action. 2 The appellate judgment under review held that the TCA applied toNieves’s legal malpractice action and that his claim for loss of liberty damageshad to satisfy the Act’s requirements for a pain and suffering award. Weaffirm the Appellate Division’s judgment on both issues. I. In 2015, Nieves served the State with a notice of tort claim, pursuant tothe TCA, and filed the instant complaint against Adolf and the Office of thePublic Defender (OPD) (collectively, defendants) asserting legal malpracticein the defense of the criminal charges that had been filed against him. Nievesalleged that defendants’ deficient representation was the proximate cause ofhis wrongful conviction and twelve-year incarceration. He also claimed thatAdolf violated Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.7. At the close of discovery, defendants sought dismissal of the complaintby filing a motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued that a violationof the RPCs does not give rise to a cause of action in tort and that the TCAbarred the damages sought because Nieves failed to vault the Act’srequirements for a pain and suffering award, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)(the “verbal threshold” requirements for a pain and suffering award) . Nievessought only noneconomic damages, and defendants argued that his subjectiveemotional injuries could not be recovered because he had not demonstrated 3 permanent psychological injury accompanied by physical symptoms and hadfailed to produce evidence of $3600 in medical expenses. The motion court agreed that a violation of the RPCs does not provide abasis for a cause of action in tort and dismissed that count. However, withrespect to the remainder of Nieves’s complaint, the court concluded that theTCA and its verbal threshold were inapplicable to Nieves’s claims.Accordingly, the court brushed aside defendants’ arguments, rooted in theAct’s requirements, that they were entitled to dismissal where Nieves made noclaim for economic damages, did not provide an expert report from apsychologist or psychiatrist, and did not certify that he had any medicalexpenses. In its denial of a subsequent motion for reconsideration filed bydefendants, the court further explained that, whether an individual is represented by private counsel or counsel appointed from a publicly funded institution, he is entitled to the same level of competency. And, if that level of competency falls below the standard, then he should also be entitled to the same level of recovery, whether he is represented by private counsel or counsel appointed from a publicly funded institution.Defendants sought interlocutory appellate review. The Appellate Divisionreversed and ordered the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. 4 The Appellate Division reviewed the Act’s definitions, which address itsscope, as well as pertinent case law, and concluded that “the OPD is a publicentity and public defenders are public employees that come within the TCA’simmunities and defenses.” The Appellate Division relied on Rogers v. CapeMay County Office of the Public Defender, in which this Court, in focusing ona question of compliance with a TCA procedural requirement, stated that“[c]laims for damages against defendants -- a public entity and a publicemployee -- are subject to the provisions of the Tort Claims Act.” (quoting 208 N.J. 414, 420 (2011)). Finding that precedent applicable to Nieves’s claimof legal malpractice against defendants, the appellate court concluded that theclaim fell squarely within the Act -- and that Nieves had failed to meet theAct’s requirements. Further, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff’s claim for loss ofliberty damages based on his wrongful imprisonment fell within the TCA’slimitation on recovery for pain and suffering in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). The courtrelied on DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, 183 N.J. 149, 164-65 (2005), inwhich the Court applied the TCA to a claim for false imprisonment filedagainst arresting police officers and required that claim to “vault the verbalthreshold in order to be cognizable.” Concluding that Nieves failed both tosatisfy N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)’s requirements to demonstrate medical expenses of 5 at least $3600 and to establish through objective evidence that he had suffereda permanent injury and a permanent loss of a bodily function that issubstantial, the Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment. We granted Nieves’s petition for certification “limited to the issues ofwhether legal malpractice claims are exempt from the [TCA] and whetherplaintiff’s 'loss of liberty’ damages claim is subject to the verbal threshold ofthe TCA.” 237 N.J. 428 (2019). We also granted amicus curiae status to theNew Jersey State Bar Association. II. The parties advance essentially the same arguments put forward beforethe Appellate Division. Nieves acknowledges that the OPD may be a public agency and publicdefenders may be public employees in many settings, but he argues that whenthey are engaged in the representation of a criminal defendant, publicdefenders are not engaged in government action. Therefore, he claims theTCA does not apply. Even if the TCA did apply, Nieves contends that theverbal threshold is inapplicable because the “quality of life” damages he seekshave been, according to him, recognized to be qualitatively different fromsubjective damages for pain and suffering. (citing Ayers v. Township ofJackson, 106 N.J. 557 (1987)). 6 Defendants, on the other hand, in claiming the protections of the TCAapply, assert that the TCA protects a broad swath of public entities and publicemployees, and includes “any employee of a public entity, including the Stateand its many departments, offices, and other agencies.” Defendants argue thatthe definitions setting forth the TCA’s scope encompass the OPD and itsemployees. Further, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for “loss ofliberty” damages amounts to the same as a claim for emotional distressdamages and is thus subject to N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) and its threshold, whichNieves has not vaulted. According to defendants, of the two types of damagesrecognized in a legal malpractice action -- economic loss and, under certaincircumstances, emotional distress -- Nieves already recovered economicdamages and is not seeking them in this matter, and he is ineligible under theverbal threshold for pain and suffering damages. The New Jersey State Bar Association fully supports defendants’position that the TCA applies to claims of legal malpractice filed againstpublic defenders in connection with representation of indigent individuals incriminal proceedings. 7 III. A. The background to and development of the TCA have been addressedmany times before. See, e.g., Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284, 289-91 (2004). “The overall purpose of the [TCA] was to reestablish the immunityof public entities while coherently ameliorating the harsh results of thedoctrine [of sovereign immunity].” Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 115(2000). N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 and 2-1 set forth the essential immunity of publicentities. N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 declares that “public entities shall only be liable fortheir negligence within the limitations of this act and in accordance with thefair and uniform principles established herein.” N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(a) states that,“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this act, a public entity is not liable for aninjury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entityor a public employee or any other person.” Subsection (b), in turn, subjectsliability to any immunities the Act provides for public entities, as well as anydefenses that would be available if the public entity defendant were a privateperson. N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a) then sets forth the primary source of public entityliability: an “injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a publicemployee within the scope of his employment.” See Margolis & Novack, 8 Current N.J. Statutes Title 59, Claims Against Public Entities, cmt. 1 & cmt. of1972 Task Force on N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 (2020). If the public employee is notliable for an act or omission, the public entity is not liable. N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(b). The Act details the liability of public employees. While liability islimited in various areas, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 59:3-1(c) (“A public employee isnot liable for injury where a public entity is immune from liability for thatinjury.”); N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(a) (“A public employee is not liable for an injuryresulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in him [or her].”),the overarching approach of the TCA renders public employees liable for anact or omission to the extent that a private person would be liable for same,unless an immunity attaches, N.J.S.A. 59:3-1(a). It is well recognized that, through the TCA, the Legislature establishedthat “[g]enerally, immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is theexception.” Fluehr v. City of Cape May, 159 N.J. 532, 539 (1999). The Actdelineates both procedural and substantive requirements for bringing a tortclaim against the State, public entities, and public employees. “Public entity” is a defined term in the TCA. It “includes the State, andany county, municipality, district, public authority, public agency, and anyother political subdivision or public body in the State.” N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. Theterm “public employee” is also defined. It “means an employee of a public 9 entity.” Ibid. Under the Act, “'[e]mployee’ includes an officer, employee, orservant, whether or not compensated or part-time, who is authorized toperform any act or service; provided, however, that the term does not includean independent contractor.” Ibid. The Act governs its coverage through its defined terms. We thus turn to theapplication of those definitions to defendants in this matter. B. The OPD is an office within the executive branch of State government.N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-3. The head of the OPD is appointed by the Governor withthe advice and consent of the State Senate. N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-4. Further, theOPD relies on annual State funding appropriated through the State Budget.See, e.g., Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, AppropriationsHandbook (F.Y. 2019-2020) (“Appropriations Handbook”) B-203, B-204,https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/omb/publications/20approp/FullAppropAct.pdf. Consideration of those facts leaves no room to doubt thatthe OPD meets the TCA’s definition of a public entity. Further, we perceive no room to doubt that the Public Defender’sexercise of control over his individual public defenders makes thoseemployees the type of person intended by the TCA to be considered publicemployees for the Act’s purposes. The Public Defender is statutorily required 10 to exercise ongoing quality control over the competent professional servicesthe office is expected to provide to indigent defendants. N.J.S.A. 2A:158-A -8(cases to be assigned to attorneys “in the light of the nature, complexity andother characteristics of the cases, the services to be performed, the status of thematters, and other relevant factors”). The Public Defender is responsible forensuring proper staffing, including by contracting with outside pool attorneys.N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-9; see also id. at -7(c) to (d). All serve at the pleasure ofthe Public Defender. N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-6. Whether as a full-time staffattorney or a contracted pool attorney serving as a public defender, theindividuals serving in such capacity and under the control of the PublicDefender meet the definition of an employee of the OPD for TCA purposes.Moreover, we note that the Legislature includes in its annual budget funds forindemnification “for the defense of indigents.” Appropriations Handbook B-210; accord N.J.S.A. 59:12-1. We have heretofore treated a state public defender as a public employeein connection with a tort claim filed under the TCA. In Rogers, although wewere not faced with a question about the applicability of the TCA to a legalmalpractice claim for damages filed against the OPD and a public defender, weheld the plaintiff’s claims against the OPD and the public defender in thatmatter were “not barred by the one-year filing limitation in [the TCA].” 208 11 N.J. at 417. The appeal involved a question about the date from which theAct’s timeframes for notice and filing of a claim should be calculated; in thatcontext, we obviously regarded the OPD and its public defender employees asfalling under the procedural requirements for suit contained in the TCA. Seeibid. Nevertheless, Nieves maintains that the issue has not been resolved bythis Court. We turn next to his arguments for retreating from the positiontaken in Rogers, which clearly considered the OPD and public defenders to be,respectively, a public entity and public employees for purposes of the TCA. C. Nieves argues the OPD and public defenders are not subject to the TCAbecause when they represent the interests of criminal defendants, as in thiscase, they are not “engaged in government action.” We cannot agree with thatproposition. The OPD is performing a state function when providing representationfor indigent defendants. See N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-3, -5 (establishing the Officeof the Public Defender in order to comply with the New Jersey Constitutionand making it “the duty of the Public Defender to provide for the legalrepresentation of any indigent defendant who is formally charged with thecommission of an indictable offense”). Although the professional 12 representational duty owed by a public defender is to his or her individualclient, N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-11, public defenders are performing a publicfunction -- that of ensuring representation for indigent defendants in criminalmatters brought by the State. And the fact that such attorneys are adversariesof other state actors prosecuting the criminal charges does not mean that theylose their state public employee status under the TCA.1 The Act contains no express exemption for public defenders, or forpublic entities and public employees who otherwise fall within the definitionsof those terms but are excluded because of the nature of their work. See N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. The plainly worded definitions control the inquiry here. Thelegislative definitions are straightforward, making their intent clear andunambiguous. See State v. Sutherland, 231 N.J. 429, 443-44 (2018) (“Wheninterpreting a statute we look first, and foremost, to its actual language andascribe to its words their ordinary meaning.”). We enforce plainly worded1 There are other instances when a state agency represents a private party’s interests in an adversarial proceeding in which the opposing party may also be represented by another state attorney. For example, the Division on Civil Rights may prosecute a Law Against Discrimination claim against a public entity and public employee. Although representation in such cases is provided to private parties and professional duties flow to the individual represented, the representation itself is required by law and is in the public interest, and attorneys are not -- and should not be -- stripped of “public employee” status under the TCA when performing that statutory representational role. 13 statutes according to their terms. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492(2005). The OPD is a public entity under the TCA and Adolf is an employee ofthat public entity. Therefore, the TCA with its immunities, defenses, andlimitation on tort claims filed against public entities and their publicemployees applies to defendants.2 The fact that this is a legal malpractice action does not alter thatconclusion. Nieves relies on a published trial court opinion to argueotherwise. In Delbridge v. Office of Public Defender, a Law Division judgefound an exception to the immunity afforded under the TCA for legalmalpractice claims. 238 N.J. Super. 288, 311 (Law Div. 1989). Identifying noprecedent in this state at the time, the Delbridge court relied on United StatesSupreme Court cases analyzing immunity for public defenders in actionsbrought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ibid. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 , 325 (1981); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 , 205 (1979)). Those2 Although we need not go beyond the plain language of the statute, we note that extrinsic aids support our conclusion. The California Tort Claims Act, on which our State’s TCA was modelled and to which we have turned for insight from time to time, interprets its analogous definitions to the same end with respect to that state’s public defenders. See Briggs v. Lawrence, 281 Cal. Rptr. 578 , 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding, in the context of a legal malpractice claim, that public defenders are public employees within the meaning of California’s Tort Claims Act). 14 cases, however, were limited to federal public defenders in § 1983 actions andare not controlling in this matter before our Court. Indeed, in the decisionscited by Delbridge, the United States Supreme Court noted their limits. SeePolk County, 454 U.S. at 325 (“[W]e intimate no views as to a publicdefender’s liability for malpractice in an appropriate case under state tortlaw.”); Ferri, 444 U.S. at 197-98 (“We are not concerned with the elements ofa state cause of action for malpractice . . . . [W]hen state law creates a causeof action, the State is free to define the defenses to that claim, including thedefense of immunity, unless, of course, the state rule is in conflict with federallaw.”). This is a simple application of the TCA to a tort action brought against astate public entity and its employees. A legal malpractice claim is “groundedin the tort of negligence.” McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001).Numerous decisions recognize that. See, e.g., Rogers, 208 N.J. at 421;Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993). Tort claims generally -- andthat includes legal malpractice claims -- are governed by the TCA whenbrought against the State, public entities, and public employees. An attorney certainly owes a duty of care to the individual beingrepresented, but that does not alter the status of the public defender as a publicemployee, or the OPD’s status as the public employer. Both are entitled to the 15 benefit of the TCA’s application, which does not provide absolute immunitybut places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in suchsettings. Having determined that the TCA controls here, we turn to theapplication question involved. IV. A. Pertinent to this appeal, where liability is permitted, the TCA limitscertain damages available to a plaintiff who brings a claim for injury. 3 SeeN.J.S.A. 59:9-2. Among its limitations, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) addresses awardsfor pain and suffering. Known as the “verbal threshold,” subsection (d)provides in part that [n]o damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00. [N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d).]3 The Act defines “injury” as “death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property or any other injury that a person may suffer that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person.” N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. 16 That provision weeds out claims for “subjectively measured damages forpain and suffering, which are not compensable by the Tort Claims Act,” Ayers, 106 N.J. at 571 (quoting Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 202 N.J. Super. 106,118 (App. Div. 1985)), from claims for objectively measured damages for painand suffering that can meet the threshold’s expense and other requirements .Notably, that limitation does not apply to willful or other outrageousmisconduct excepted under N.J.S.A. 59:3-14. See Leang v. Jersey City Bd. ofEduc., 198 N.J. 557, 584 (2009); Toto v. Ensuar, 196 N.J. 134, 147-48 (2008). A two-part test is used to assess whether a plaintiff satisfies therequirements of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). See, e.g., Toto, 196 N.J. at 145; Knowlesv. Mantua Twp. Soccer Ass’n, 176 N.J. 324, 329 (2003). To “vault the[verbal] threshold, '[a] plaintiff must show “(1) an objective permanent injury,and (2) a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial.”’” Toto, 196 N.J. at 145 (second alteration in original) (quoting Knowles, 176 N.J. at 329);see also Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 406 (1997) (interpreting the TCA torequire not a total permanent loss of a bodily function, but “a permanent lossof the use of a bodily function that is substantial”). B. The second issue on which we granted certification is whether Nieves’sloss-of-liberty damages claim is subject to the TCA’s verbal threshold. 17 The verbal threshold by its terms applies to pain and suffering claimsand not to economic damages. See DelaCruz, 183 N.J. at 164. Nieves is notseeking economic damages in this matter. And, as already noted, Nieves hasreceived an award in excess of $600,000 under the Mistaken ImprisonmentAct, an award that is calculated in relation to time served and capped based ona claimant’s earnings per year before incarceration. N.J.S.A. 52:4C-5(a). We do not discount the injury Nieves has suffered as a result of havingspent more than twelve years imprisoned for a crime he did not commit. Thequestion we must address is only whether Nieves must submit to therequirements for a pain and suffering award in pursuing his noneconomicclaim for loss of liberty damages. He claims that quality of life damages wererecognized to be recoverable in our decision in Ayers and should berecoverable here, as loss of liberty damages, unencumbered by the verbalthreshold. We find his reliance on Ayers unsound and his argument in supportof a new category of damages in legal malpractice claims otherwiseunpersuasive.44 To the extent that our dissenting colleague chooses to discuss damages awards for loss of liberty in settings outside of a legal malpractice claim, we have no reason to comment. We address solely the issue before the Court, which concerns the availability of loss of liberty damages in a legal malpractice claim filed against a state public defender. 18 C. To the extent Nieves relies on Ayers, that reliance is misplaced. Ayersinvolved at bottom a nuisance claim. In Ayers, the defendant’s landfillcontaminated the plaintiffs’ well water with toxic pollutants, causing theplaintiffs to not have access to running water for nearly two years. 106 N.J. at 565, 570. The plaintiffs brought a claim for nuisance under the TCA. Id. at565. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs damages for, among other things,impairment of their quality of life. Id. at 565-66. This Court held that theplaintiffs’ quality of life damages were not subject to the TCA’s verbalthreshold for pain and suffering damages, explaining that pain and suffering“was not intended to bar claims for the inconvenience associated with theinvasion of a property interest.” Id. at 571 (emphasis added). Notably, theCourt stated that “[a] claim for quality of life damages is derived from the lawof nuisance.” Ibid. To the extent the Court discussed quality of life impacts inrecognizing a unique damage claim in that matter, the damages explanationmust be understood in its narrow context. It has not been expanded uponsince, and we decline the invitation to incorporate it here. As for urging that we recognize what is described to be a new “sliver” ofdamages in this legal malpractice action that would not be subject to the verbalthreshold requirements for a pain and suffering award under the TCA, we 19 likewise decline. We recognize there to be two general categories of damagesin legal malpractice actions, and Nieves’s loss of liberty damages fall withinthe subset of emotional distress damages where such are recoverable inattorney malpractice claims. A legal malpractice action has three elements: “(1) the existence of anattorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the defendant attorney,(2) the breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) proximate causation of thedamages claimed by the plaintiff.” McGrogan, 167 N.J. at 425. Generally,damages are awarded on the basis of economic loss. See id. at 424-26. This Court has not spoken on the issue of emotional distress damages ina legal malpractice action. However, the Appellate Division has commentedon the possibility of such an award. In the setting of a legal malpractice caseinvolving an underlying medical malpractice claim, the Appellate Divisionstated that it was persuaded that emotional distress damages should not be awarded in legal malpractice cases at least in the absence of egregious or extraordinary circumstances. Whether viewed within the context of the traditional concept of proximate cause, or simply as a matter of sound public policy, we are convinced that damages should be generally limited to recompensing the injured party for his economic loss. [Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 399 (App. Div. 1987) (citations omitted).] 20 See also Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 435 N.J. Super. 198 (App. Div. 2014)(relying on Gautam). It is fair to say that, presently, emotional distressdamages are acknowledged to be potentially recoverable in certain legalmalpractice settings. The Restatement provides helpful insight in this respect. It recognizesthat a lawyer liable for legal malpractice may be subject to economic damagesand damages for emotional distress. Restatement (Third) of the LawGoverning Lawyers § 53 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). In its comment (g) ondamages for emotional distress, the Restatement notes the differing rules thatapply among the jurisdictions canvassed, with many cases focusing onintentional, outrageous, or reckless behavior or similarly egregiouscircumstances, and some that have allowed emotional distress damages formalpractice causing a client’s imprisonment. See id. at cmt. g; see alsoRestatement (Second) of Torts § 905 (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (“Compensatorydamages that may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss includecompensation (a) for bodily harm, and (b) for emotional distress .”); id. at cmt.g (mentioning “loss of freedom” as an element of emotional distress damages“if the defendant intentionally causes the loss”). It is sensible to recognize that a legal malpractice claim can, in certaincircumstances, result in an award of emotional distress damages. But, in the 21 present matter, there is an unavoidable hurdle to any such award: emotionaldistress damages are controlled under the TCA through its limitations on therecovery of a pain and suffering award. Our case law holds that emotional distress is considered pain andsuffering under the TCA. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 577; cf. Collins v. Union Cty.Jail, 150 N.J. 407, 422-23 (1997) (recognizing that a permanent psychologicalinjury, when properly documented, can meet the verbal threshold requirementsof the TCA for emotional distress as a pain and suffering award). There is noother category of damages into which plaintiff’s claim -- denominated as lossof liberty damages or quality of life damages -- fits in this legal malpracticeclaim premised on attorney negligence.5 It is either economic damages or apain and suffering award. Since Nieves already obtained economic damages,his remaining claim must be analyzed under the TCA’s constraints on a painand suffering award. As the Appellate Division correctly held, Nieves failed to satisfy thestandards for vaulting the verbal threshold for a pain and suffering damages5 Because it is not alleged, we need not address a TCA analysis where intentional, willful, malicious or other outrageous conduct addressed through N.J.S.A. 59:3-14 is asserted, although we acknowledge that conduct meeting that section’s standards has been recognized as exempt from the limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). See, e.g., Leang, 198 N.J. at 584; Toto, 196 N.J. at 145, 147-48. 22 claim under the strictures of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Defendants were entitled tosummary judgment, and the Appellate Division’s judgment appropriatelyordered dismissal of the complaint filed in this matter. V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part. 23 Antonio Chaparro Nieves, a/k/a Anthony Chaparro, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Office of the Public Defender and Peter S. Adolf, Esq., Defendants-Respondents. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, applies to legal malpractice actions brought against public defendersbecause they are state employees. I would also hold that non-pecuniarydamages -- such as pain and suffering, loss of liberty, and loss of enjoyment oflife -- “should not be awarded in legal malpractice cases at least in the absenceof egregious or extraordinary circumstances.” See Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 399 (App. Div. 1987). I disagree with the majority, however, that the TCA’s limitation onawards for “pain and suffering” in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) also limits awards forloss of liberty, which is a distinct species of damages not mentioned in thestatute. Neither the text of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) nor our jurisprudence equatespain and suffering damages with loss of liberty damages. The majority’s 1 overly expansive interpretation of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) will have unintendednegative consequences in cases unrelated to legal malpractice. Indeed, today’sdecision will likely foreclose persons who are wrongly arrested andimprisoned from recovering damages for their loss of liberty caused by state,county, and municipal actors. I therefore respectfully dissent. I. N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) -- often referred to as the “verbal threshold” -- setsforth the limitations on an award for pain and suffering damages against apublic entity. The statute provides that [n]o damages shall be awarded against a public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any injury; provided, however, that this limitation on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering shall not apply in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement or dismemberment where the medical treatment expenses are in excess of $3,600.00. [N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d).] The first canon of statutory interpretation is to look to the plain languageof the statute to discern its meaning. See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477,492-93 (2005). The statute, by its terms, limits only “the recovery of damagesfor pain and suffering” unless the verbal threshold is met. It does not limit therecovery of damages for loss of liberty. See DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, 2 183 N.J. 149, 164 (2005) (“[T]he effect of the verbal threshold is limited topain and suffering claims; [other] damages are not limited by the [TCA] .”).Although damages for pain and suffering and loss of liberty are subsets of non-pecuniary damages, loss of liberty damages are not a subset of pain andsuffering damages. Our jurisprudence recognizes that these are different formsof damages. Pain and suffering is generally defined as “subjective symptoms ofdepression, stress, health concerns, and anxiety” or “intangible, subjectivefeelings of discomfort that are associated with personal injuries.” Ayers v.Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 571, 576 (1987); see also Model JuryCharges (Civil), 8.11E, “Disability, Impairment and Loss of the Enjoyment ofLife, Pain and Suffering” (rev. May 2017) (defining pain and suffering as “thepain, physical and mental suffering, discomfort, and distress that a person mayendure as a natural consequence of the injury”); 2 Stein on Personal InjuryDamages § 8:2 (3d ed.) (defining pain and suffering as not only “physicalpain,” but also “fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock,humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror, or ordeal”). Loss of liberty damages are a distinct category of damages from painand suffering damages, as recognized by other jurisdictions. The United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that “[t]he damages 3 recoverable for loss of liberty for the period spent in a wrongful confinementare separable from damages recoverable for such injuries as physical harm,embarrassment, or emotional suffering.” Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93 , 125 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Martinez v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 445 F.3d 158 , 161 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “emotional distress andloss of liberty [are] separate components of [a] false arrest claim” andtherefore “are 'separable’ and thus separately compensable”). The purpose ofloss of liberty damages is to “redress the denial of free movement and theviolation done to [the plaintiff’s] dignity as a result of the unlawful detention,and not the physical and mental injuries arising from the incident.” Gardner v.Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348, 1353 (2d Cir. 1990); see alsoPhillips v. District of Colombia, 458 A.2d 722 , 725 (D.C. 1983) (recognizingloss of liberty damages and holding that “the single fact of imprisonment, thedeprivation of one’s right to move about, is compensable”). Not all non-pecuniary damages fall within the category of pain andsuffering damages. Model Civil Jury Charge 8.11E distinguishes betweendamages for disability impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and pain andsuffering. Loss of enjoyment of life is defined as “the inability to pursue one’snormal pleasure and enjoyment.” Model Jury Charges (Civil), 8.11E (citingEyoma v. Falco, 247 N.J. Super. 435, 452 (App. Div. 1991)). “[T]he actual 4 loss of enjoyment of life is not a function of pain and suffering.” Eyoma, 247 N.J. Super. at 452. Additionally, “[d]isability and impairment is clearlydistinct and separate from pain and suffering.” Ibid. Indeed, in Ayers, this Court distinguished between quality of lifedamages and pain and suffering damages in an action brought by municipalresidents against Jackson Township for ground and water contamination. 106 N.J. at 565, 569-72. Acknowledging that quality of life damages derive fromthe law of nuisance, the Court concluded that “quality of life damagesrepresent compensation for losses associated with damage to property, and . . .do not constitute pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act.” Id. at 571-72. Additionally, loss of liberty does not fall within the category ofemotional distress. The elements of emotional distress damages, in manyways, are indistinguishable from pain and suffering damages. Ayers, 106 N.J.at 576; see also Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 77-78 (2004) (listing cases inwhich emotional distress damages were recoverable for various types ofinjuries). Loss of liberty, moreover, is an objective fact. A determination thata person has been deprived of liberty does not require an inquiry intosubjective feelings of emotional distress or mental anguish. There is no basis in the TCA or our jurisprudence for the majority’sconclusion that “loss of liberty damages fall within the subset of emotional 5 distress” in legal malpractice actions, see ante at ___ (slip op. at 19), or, forthat matter, in any other legal action. Had the Legislature intended to sweepinto the verbal threshold more than just pain and suffering damages , the statutewould have limited the recovery of not just pain and suffering but also loss ofliberty damages, or would have limited recovery of all non-pecuniary damages.See N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). We must presume that the Legislature is conversantwith our jurisprudence, that it chose the statute’s language with precision, andthat it intended what it said. DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-94. Limiting theverbal threshold to pain and suffering was a policy choice made by theLegislature. This Court should not extend the metes and bounds of the verbalthreshold beyond the Legislature’s clearly expressed intention. The majority’s conflation of loss of liberty damages with pain andsuffering and emotional distress damages undoubtedly will become a source ofconfusion in future cases. By blurring the lines between loss of liberty andpain and suffering/emotional distress damages, the majority decision raisescertain questions. Will an individual who is wrongly arrested and confined notbe entitled to damages for the loss of his liberty solely because he did notsuffer “permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement ordismemberment” under N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d)’s verbal threshold? Does the 6 wrongful loss of one’s liberty -- beyond economic damages, such as lost wages-- have no value under the TCA? Words and phrases make a difference. They do not have endlesselasticity. Defining loss of liberty damages as the same as pain and sufferingand emotional distress damages is a breaking point. I therefore respectfullydissent. II. To be clear, I believe that plaintiffs must vault a high threshold to beentitled to non-pecuniary damages in a legal malpractice action, whetheragainst a public defender or a private attorney. At least in the absence of“egregious or extraordinary circumstances,” damages for pain and suffering,loss of liberty, and loss of enjoyment of life should not be permissible. SeeGautam, 215 N.J. Super. at 399; Ovando v. County of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 439-40 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “[a]n emotional injuryresulting from the incarceration of an innocent defendant is plainlyforeseeable” and therefore “a defense attorney in a criminal case owes a dutyto his or her client to avoid such an injury”). But cf. Dombrowski v. Bulson, 971 N.E.2d 338, 340-41 (N.Y. 2012) (declining to depart from New York’srule “limiting recovery in legal malpractice actions to pecuniary damages” 7 because to allow non-pecuniary damages “would have, at best, negative and, atworst, devastating consequences for the criminal justice system”). Because the present record before this Court does not indicate whetherthe alleged legal malpractice here was “egregious or extraordinary,” I wouldremand to the trial court for consideration of this issue. 8