Title: Carter v. State
Citation: 234 N.E.2d 650, 250 Ind. 13
Docket Number: 31,080
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 1968

250 Ind. 13 (1968)
234 N.E.2d 650
CARTER
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 31,080.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 11, 1968.
*14 Forrest Bowman, Jr., of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, C.J.
The appellant, Danny H. Carter, was convicted by a jury for the felony of Involuntary Manslaughter as defined by Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., (1956 Repl.), § 10-3405.
The appellant's motion for a new trial claims several alleged errors. The appellant objected to the Court's preliminary Instruction No. 4, but such Instruction was given by the Court over such objection.
The Court's preliminary Instruction No. 4 reads as follows:
It is appellant's contention that under Indiana law jurors are permitted to ask questions of a witness during the progress of a trial. The State contends that the appellant has failed to cite any Indiana case law, and appellant frankly *15 admits that Indiana is without case law on this question. However, we believe the weight of authority in other jurisdictions permits jurors to propound relevant questions during the progress of a trial subject to the proper regulation of such conduct by the Trial Court and subject to the exercise of the sound discretion of the Trial Court.
In 159 A.L.R. 347 we find the following quote:
In State v. Sheppard (1955), 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
In Ratton v. Busby (1959), 230 Ark. 667, 326 S.W.2d 889, the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the jury asking witnesses forty-five questions during the course of the trial. This trial was a lawsuit arising out of one aircraft colliding with another thereby necessitating the use of experts. Their testimony was replete with technical jargon known only to people connected with aviation. Such interrogation by jurors was necessary in order for them to understand the testimony given.
In the trial of appellant's case the jury did not have an opportunity to ask any question of any witness because in its preliminary instruction the Trial Court had foreclosed the right of the jury to ask questions. We can but conclude that preliminary Instruction No. 4 was erroneous.
The practice of permitting jurors to propound questions should not be encouraged by the Trial Court, but it should not be forbidden by preliminary instruction. As a question is propounded during the course of a trial it is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court to make a determination as to whether the question is for the evident purpose of discovering the truth and whether such question is proper.
*17 This case must be re-tried because of the erroneous instruction heretofore discussed; and, therefore, we will not protract this opinion by discussing the other errors claimed by appellant.
Judgment is reversed with instructions to the Trial Court to grant appellant's motion for a new trial.
Arterburn, Hunter and Jackson, JJ., concur.
Mote, J., dissents.
NOTE.  Reported in 234 N.E.2d 650.