Title: Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-058
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2001

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC94058
____________
KESHBRO, INC., etc., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MIAMI, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
____________
No. SC95600
____________
CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, 
Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH H. KABLINGER,
Respondent.
[July 12, 2001]
1  Section 893.138(2), Florida Statutes (1995), provides the authority for
municipalities and counties to create nuisance abatement boards:
Any county or municipality may, by ordinance, create an
administrative board to hear complaints regarding the
nuisances described in subsection (1).
The nuisances proscribed in subsection (1) include prostitution and drug-related
activity.
-2-
SHAW, J.
We have for review City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., 717 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1998), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in City of St.
Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).  We have jurisdiction. 
Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  We also have for review the decision in City of St.
Petersburg v. Kablinger, 730 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which certified
conflict with the decision in City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., 717 So. 2d 601 (Fla.
3d DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We have
consolidated these cases for review.
The question posed by these cases is whether temporary closures ordered 
by nuisance abatement boards to abate public nuisances as defined by section
893.138(1), Florida Statutes (1995), and the corresponding city code provisions
constitute compensable takings.1  Before addressing that question, we must
2  Both Keshbro and Kablinger raise claims collateral to the conflict issue
before this Court, which were not addressed by the respective district courts of
appeal.  We decline to address those claims.  See,e.g., Crosby v. Jones, 705 So.
2d 1356, 1359, n.1 (Fla. 1998).  Specifically, both Keshbro and the City of St.
Petersburg raise issues regarding the propriety of the trial courts’ orders granting
summary judgment.  Additionally, Keshbro argues that the Third District
impermissibly relied on extraneous evidence in determining that the nuisance activity
was inextricably intertwined with the operation of the Stardust Motel.
 
3  Section 46-1(a) of the City of Miami Code provides:
Any building, place or premises located in the city which
has been used on three or more occasions, documented
by substantiated incidences, as the site of the unlawful
sale or delivery of controlled substances, or for any act
as defined in F.S. ch. 893, and where there has been at
least one criminal conviction for the acts defined in F.S.
ch. 893, within a six-month period from the date of the
first substantiated incident, at the same location, is hereby
declared to be an unlawful public nuisance.  In the
-3-
determine the takings analysis appropriate to these facts.2
City of Miami v. Keshbro
Petitioner, Harish Gihwala, has owned and operated the Stardust Motel, a
fifty-seven-unit building located at 6730 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, since
1988.  On October 16, 1992, the City of Miami Nuisance Abatement Board (NAB)
ordered the Stardust closed for one year as a drug- and prostitution-related public
nuisance in violation of sections 46-1(a) and (c) of the City of Miami Code and
section 893.13(1), Florida Statutes (1991).3  Thereafter, the Stardust reopened in
absence of a certified conviction at the premises, the
allegations of F.S. ch. 893 related to public nuisance must
be substantiated by seven documented instances within a
six-month period from the date of the first documented
instance in order to support a finding of public nuisance
at the premises.
Section 46-1(c) provides the same with regards to prostitution activity.
4  The NAB order embodying the stipulation attributed no criminal wrongdoing
to Gihwala: “The City of Miami does not assert or imply that the owner, personally,
is party to any drug sales or illegal activities.”  The partial closure plan called for the
closure of six rooms for six months, during which time Gihwala was to refurbish
said rooms.  Thereafter, another six rooms would be closed for  refurbishing,
Gihwala’s finances permitting.  A total of fifteen rooms were to be closed and
refurbished pursuant to the stipulation, with no more than six rooms being closed at
any one time. 
-4-
1993; however, the problems soon resurfaced. 
On December 10, 1996, the NAB served Gihwala with a notice of hearing
again charging the Stardust as a drug-and prostitution-related public nusiance.  The
notice cited at least eight arrests involving drug and prostitution activity within the
Stardust and its curtilage in the preceding six months.  Gihwala then entered into a
stipulation with the NAB pleading no contest to a finding that the Stardust
constituted a public nuisance and agreeing to a partial closure of the Stardust.4 
Four months later, on March 4, 1997, following a status report hearing, the NAB
ordered the closure of seven additional rooms for six months based on additional
5  The NAB heard evidence of an arrest for the sale of cocaine in two separate
 rooms at the Stardust and evidence that the property was “maintaining an
atmosphere and reputation as a place of prostitution and drug sales.”
-5-
incidents of drug-and-prostitution-related nuisance activity.5  
Finally, on June 30, 1997, the NAB, after hearing additional evidence of
nuisance activity including three arrests involving the sale of cocaine, ordered the 
complete closure of the Stardust for six months.   The order provided as follows:
Ordered and Adjudged that the Stardust Motel is in
violation of this Board’s Order declaring public nuisance
and further that the Stardust Motel shall be closed for the
duration of this Board’s jurisdiction, or until February 12,
1998.  Respondents are ordered to remove all guests
within five days of the date of this Order.  The premises
shall be secured within five days of the date of this order. 
Gihwala responded by filing suit against the City of Miami and the NAB in
Dade County Circuit Court for declaratory and injunctive relief and inverse
condemnation, claiming that the NAB’s complete closure of the Stardust for six
months constituted a taking requiring compensation.  The circuit court granted
Gihwala’s motion for summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim and
the city appealed.
On appeal, the Third District reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary
judgment under the authority of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
-6-
1003 (1992), finding that while the NAB’s closure order denied Gihwala all
economically beneficial uses of the Stardust, no compensation was required
because the uses prohibited by the order, i.e., that of a “brothel and drug house,”
had no tradition of protection at common law nor did they inhere in the property
rights of Gihwala at the time he acquired title.  City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., 717
So. 2d at 604-05.  In so ruling, the Third District distinguished the Second
District’s decision in City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen by noting the extent to which
the nuisance activity had become intertwined with the operation of the Stardust:  “It
is for this reason that we do not certify conflict with City of St. Petersburg v.
Bowen; i.e., Bowen does not include any discussion of inextricable intertwining of
proscribed uses with other, valid uses.”  Keshbro at 604 n.8.
In Bowen, the Second District applied Lucas and found a compensable
taking where the St. Petersburg NAB ordered an apartment complex closed for one
year as a nuisance based on purported drug use by tenants.  The Bowen court
found the NAB’s one-year closure of the apartment complex “one of the most
invasive methods of abating the purported nuisance that was available.”  675 So. 2d
at 629.  The Second District further stated:  “If the City of St. Petersburg wants to
wage a war on drugs in part by means of this type of temporary taking then the City
will be required to pay landowners just compensation.”  Id. at 632. 
6  Section 19-67 of the St. Petersburg Code of Ordinances provides in pertinent
part:
(d) The Nuisance Abatement Board shall hear complaints
alleging that any place or premises constitutes a public
nuisance, and may find said place or premises, or any
part thereof, to be a public nuisance, upon clear and
convincing and competent evidence that said place or
premises:
(1) Has been used on one occasion as the site of
the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, where
such possession constitutes a felony and that has been
previously used on more than one occasion, all within a
6-month period, as the site of the unlawful sale, delivery,
manufacture, or cultivation of any controlled substance;
or has been used on more than two occasions, all within a
6-month period:
(3) As the site of the unlawful sale, delivery,
manufacture, or cultivation of any controlled substance.
-7-
City of St. Petersburg v. Kablinger
On July 1, 1993, the City of St. Petersburg’s NAB issued an order closing
the property at issue here, an apartment complex then owned by Residential
Property Management Inc., (RPM), based on at least two incidents involving the
sale of cocaine within the preceding six months in violation of section 19-67 of the
St. Petersburg Code of Ordinances.6  
In 1995, following corporate dissolution, RPM assigned its interest in the
aforementioned property to Kablinger.  Thereafter, Kablinger filed a complaint on
June 17, 1997, against the City of St. Petersburg for inverse condemnation seeking
7  The Second District in Kablinger relied exclusively on Bowen in deciding
the takings issue.  In Bowen the Second District analyzed the takings issue under
Lucas after concluding that the complete closure of an apartment complex for one
year as a drug-related public nuisance deprived the owners of substantially all use
of their property.  Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 629.  
8  Amicus briefs in support of the City of Miami were filed by the Florida
League of Cities and the City of St. Petersburg.  The City of Miami, Florida
Association of Counties, Orange County, Florida Association of County
Attorneys, and the State of Florida filed briefs in support of the City of St.
Petersburg.  
-8-
compensation for the 1993 closure.  The trial court granted Kablinger’s motion for
summary judgment as to the City’s liability.  
On appeal, the Second District affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment finding the case “materially indistinguishable” from its earlier decision in
Bowen and certifying conflict with Keshbro.  Kablinger, 730 So. 2d at 410. 
Lucas Analysis
In the instant cases both district courts, although reaching different
conclusions regarding compensation, applied the takings analysis established in
Lucas.7  The Cities of Miami and St. Petersburg, as well as some of the amici
curiae,8 argue that the closures ordered by the respective NABs are not suitable for
treatment under Lucas.  Our review of Lucas and the cases proceeding it lead us to
the opposite conclusion. 
9  The Lucas court explained its categorical treatment of regulations effecting
the deprivation of all economically beneficial or productive use of property by
stating:
We have never set forth the justification for this
rule.  Perhaps it is simply, as Justice Brennan suggested,
that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the
landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation.  “[F]or what is the land but the profits
thereof[?]”  Surely, at least, in the extraordinary
circumstance when no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to
indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply
“adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life,” in
a manner that secures an “average reciprocity of
advantage” to everyone concerned.  And the functional
basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to
affect property values without compensation–that
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
-9-
In Lucas, the Supreme Court acknowledged the recognition in its takings
jurisprudence of at least two forms of regulatory action which require
compensation without the usual case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint:  (1) where the regulation compels the property
owner to suffer a physical invasion, or (2) where the regulation “denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.  In
the latter case, the State can resist compensation only if the regulation “proscribe[s]
use interests [which] were not part of [the property owner’s] title to begin with.” 
Id. at 1027.9  Accordingly, a regulation which amounts to a deprivation of all use
incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law,”–does
not apply to the relatively rare situations where the
government has deprived a landowner of all economically
beneficial uses. 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (citations omitted).
10  Concisely stated, “ [a] regulation eliminating the value of private property
effects a taking unless the purpose of the regulation is to control a public nuisance.” 
Stuart Miller, Triple Ways to Take: The Evolution and Meaning of the Supreme
Court’s Three Regulatory Taking Standards, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 243, 254 (1998).
-10-
“must . . . do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the
State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”  Id. at 1029.  This
has been labeled the “nuisance exception.”10
The property owner in Lucas purchased two residential beachfront lots
intending to build single-family homes.  Thereafter, South Carolina passed
legislation effectively barring any residential development on Lucas’s land.  505
U.S. at 1007.  Lucas brought suit in state court claiming that the legislation effected
a taking requiring compensation.  Id. at 1009.  The trial court agreed, finding that
Lucas’s beachfront lots were rendered valueless by the legislation’s ban on
construction.  The Supreme Court accepted the trial court’s factual finding that
11  On remand the South Carolina Supreme Court found no common law basis
or principle  allowing the state to prohibit Lucas’s construction of residential
property on the land.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E. 2d 484
(S.C. 1992).  Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court so that it
could determine the actual damages sustained by Lucas as a result of the temporary
deprivation of the use of his property.  Id.
-11-
Lucas’s property was rendered valueless in concluding that South Carolina’s action
warranted treatment under the latter of the two categorical formulations as a
deprivation of all economically beneficial or productive use.  Consistent with that
finding, the Court remanded the case so that the South Carolina courts could
determine any “background principles of nuisance and  property law” which would
have prohibited Lucas’s contemplated uses of the land, thereby absolving the state
of its duty to compensate.  Id. at 1031.11 
Whether that categorical analysis is appropriate here turns on whether the
temporary closures ordered by the respective NAB’s can be characterized as 
depriving Gihwala and Kablinger of “all economically beneficial or productive  use”
of their land.  The cities argue that the very temporary nature of the closures
precludes such a characterization.  
Undoubtedly, as noted by the Supreme Court in Lucas, the application of
Lucas’s deprivation of all economically beneficial use standard is limited:
Justice Stevens criticizes the “deprivation of all
economically beneficial use” as “wholly arbitrary,” in that
-12-
“[the] landowner whose property is diminished in value
95% recovers nothing,” while the landowner who suffers
a complete elimination of value “recovers the land’s full
value.”  This analysis errs in the assumption that the
landowner whose deprivation is one step short of
complete is not entitled to compensation.  Such an owner
might not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical
formulation, but as we have acknowledged time and
again, “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and . . . the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations’
are keenly relevant to the takings analysis generally.
Id. at 1019 n.8.  Such a fatal blow to a property’s economic value, argue the cities,
cannot be struck by a temporary closure like that ordered here by the respective
NABs.  See, e.g., Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560,
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“If, however, a regulation prohibits less than all
economically beneficial use of the land and causes at most a partial destruction of
its value, the case does not come within the Supreme Court’s ‘categorical’ taking
rule.”).
In the instant cases the courts determined that the temporary closures issued
by the respective NABs could amount to a “deprivation of all economic use” as
that phrase is used in Lucas, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s language in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987): “‘Temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of
12  Those regulations which fall short of effecting a categorical taking are
appropriately analyzed under the ad-hoc factual inquiry outlined in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  See, e.g., Florida
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Zeman v. City
of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996); Woodbury Place Partners v. City
of Woodbury, 492 N.W. 2d 258, 261 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).  The Penn Central
analysis is an ad-hoc factual inquiry requiring the examination of several factors in
the consideration of a takings claim; keenly relevant in that analysis is “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and . . . the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”  Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).  
13  In Bowen the Second District stated:
-13-
his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the
Constitution clearly requires compensation.”  Indeed, this Court has relied on First
English in stating that temporary deprivations can constitute takings:  “A taking
occurs where regulation denies substantially all economically beneficial or
productive use of land.  Moreover, a temporary deprivation may constitute a
taking.”  Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G.W.S. Corp.,
640 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1994).  However, the issue is not whether temporary
deprivations can constitute takings; it is clear that such regulations can.12  Instead,
the question posed is whether regulations which temporarily deprive one of the use
of property can qualify for categorical treatment under Lucas’s deprivation of all
economically beneficial or productive use standard.13  
Based upon the A.G.W.S. case and the Joint
Ventures case, as well as numerous United States
Supreme Court cases, if the closure of the Lorraine
Apartments by the nuisance abatement board resulted in
depriving the owner of all economic use of the property,
even if this deprivation was temporary, then as a matter of
law there is deemed to have been a taking and the
property owner is entitled to be compensated for the
economic loss suffered.
675 So. 2d at 629 (emphasis added).  While we have previously indicated that
temporary deprivations can constitute a taking, we have not addressed whether
regulations designed by their enactors to be temporary, i.e., prospectively
temporary regulations, are appropriately analyzed under Lucas’s categorical rule. 
See Palm Beach County v. Wright, 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994) (rejecting claims by
landowners that county thoroughfare maps forbidding any land use activity in an
area designated for future roadway construction established a per se taking and was
facially invalid); Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S.
Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994) (reaffirming that Joint Ventures was decided on
due process grounds in rejecting  claims that Joint Ventures established a per se
taking claim for landowners affected by the maps of reservation); Joint Ventures,
Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990) (holding statute allowing
the Department of Transportation to file maps of reservation preventing an affected
property owner from obtaining the necessary development permits for his property
an impermissible exercise of the State’s police power on due process grounds).  
-14-
In that vein, the cities counter that the First English court issued the
aforementioned “temporary taking” language in deciding the narrow remedial issue
before it, rather than holding that takings of a defined duration can qualify for
categorical treatment under Lucas.  
In First English, a church sought compensation for an alleged regulatory
taking after the County of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance prohibiting the
14 The church maintained a retreat center for handicapped children and related
 structures on the affected land.  Those structures were destroyed in the flood,
which precipitated the county ordinance.
-15-
building or rebuilding on land owned by the church because of flood concerns.14 
The church alleged that the ordinance deprived it of all use of the affected property,
requiring the county to provide just compensation.  The California Court of Appeal
rejected the church’s claim under the authority of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598
P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).  In Agins, the California Supreme
Court held that “compensation is not required until the challenged regulation or
ordinance has been held excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a writ of
mandamus and the government has nevertheless decided to continue the regulation
in effect.”  First English, 482 U.S. at 308-09.  The practical effect of the Agins rule
was to hold that the “Fifth Amendment, as made applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, [did] not require compensation as a remedy for
‘temporary’ regulatory takings--those regulatory takings which are ultimately
invalidated by the courts.”  Id. at 310.  
The Court was previously unable to review the Agins rule because of 
concerns with finality:  
Concerns with finality left us unable to reach the
remedial question in the earlier cases where we have been
-16-
asked to consider the rule of Agins.  In each of [those]
cases, we concluded either that regulations considered to
be in issue by the state court did not effect a taking, or
that the factual disputes yet to be resolved by state
authorities might still lead to the conclusion that no taking
had occurred.  
Id. at 311 (citations omitted).  The Court perceived no such barrier to an
examination of the Agins rule in First English, given the California Court of
Appeal’s affirmance of the trial court’s ruling that the church’s claim that the
ordinance denied it of all use of its property was irrelevant.  Id. at 309. 
Accordingly, the  Court was finally confronted with the narrow question of
remedies posed by the application of the Agins rule:  “The disposition of the case
on these grounds isolates the remedial question for our consideration.”  Id. at 311. 
Thus, the issue before the Court in  First English was whether a landowner
who claims his property has been taken by a land-use regulation can recover
damages for the time prior to the time the regulation is determined to constitute a
taking.  Id. at 306-07.  The Court answered the question in the affirmative:  “We
merely hold that where the government’s activities have already worked a taking of
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the
duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective.” Id. at 321.  
-17-
In this context, it appears that the Court used the term “temporary taking” to
refer to the period before a regulatory taking is invalidated by the courts: “Appellant
asks us to hold that the California Supreme Court erred in Agins v. Tiburon in
determining that the Fifth Amendment . . . does not require compensation as a
remedy for ‘temporary’ regulatory takings--those regulatory takings which are
ultimately invalidated by the courts.”  Id. at 310 (emphasis added).  Accordingly,
First English really involved a question of remedies, not a determination that
temporary takings, as that term is used here, can constitute deprivations of all
economically beneficial use.  See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2000) (“What is ‘temporary,’
according to the [First English] Court’s definition, is not the regulation; rather, what
is ‘temporary’ is the taking, which is rendered temporary only when an ordinance
that effects a taking is struck down by a court.”), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3799
(U.S. June 29, 2001); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“The United States
Supreme Court in First English made it abundantly clear that the Court was
deciding the remedies issue--and only that issue.”); Dwight H. Merriam, What is the
Relevant Parcel in Takings Litigation?, SC43 ALI-ABA 505, 526 (1998) (“In First
English the Supreme Court held that once a court concludes that a regulation goes
15  See also Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W. 2d 258,
262 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (“First English does not create a new liability standard
to determine when a ‘temporary’ taking occurs, but clarifies the appropriate remedy
after a taking is recognized. . . . The apparent reach of First English is to
retrospectively temporary takings (e.g., regulations subsequently rescinded or
declared invalid), not prospectively temporary regulations . . . .”); Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1621 (1988) (“On the
interpretation suggested here, the First English decision does not reach regulatory
enactments, even totally restrictive ones, that are expressly designed by their
enacters to be temporary . . . .”).
-18-
too far and effects a taking, money damages are a constitutionally-required
remedy.”).15
Nevertheless, while we agree the Court’s discussion of temporary takings in
First English referred to retrospectively temporary takings, absolutely precluding
prospectively temporary regulations from treatment under Lucas elevates form over
substance and defies economic realities. See City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding city’s closure of a restaurant for one year under
drug nuisance statute a total taking, concluding that the closure denied the property
owners of all economically viable use under Lucas); State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah,
702 N.E. 2d 81, 124 (Ohio 1998) (holding the same as to one-year closures of
property pursuant to nuisance abatement statutes, noting that “[t]he fact that the
order is of limited duration does not change this conclusion”).  To allow such a fine
distinction to guide the takings inquiry would ignore the drastic economic impacts
16
In Justice Blackmun’s view, even with respect to
regulations that deprive an owner of all developmental or
economically beneficial land uses, the test for required
compensation is whether the legislature has recited a
harm-preventing justification for its action.  Since such a
justification can be formulated in practically every case,
this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a
stupid staff.  We think the Takings Clause requires courts
to do more than insist upon artful harm-preventing
characterizations.  
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12 (citations omitted).  
-19-
inflicted by such regulations, rendering the protections offered by the categorical
rule meaningless.  Cf.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12 (criticizing the vagaries of the
harm-prevention logic which previously dominated the Court’s takings inquiry as
allowing the government to escape the requirement of compensation where the
legislature had artfully crafted the subject regulation).16  In sum, we are unable to
discern any meaningful distinction justifying the preclusion of prospectively
temporary regulations from categorical treatment under Lucas.  Moreover, we
believe this to be the only logical outgrowth of First English.  See Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1250 (D. Nev. 1999) (“Since the [First English] Court . . . [found] that
‘retrospectively’ temporary regulatory takings should be compensated, it is hard to
see that it would reach a different conclusion when faced with a ‘prospectively’
17  See also G. Richard Hill, Foreword to Regulatory Taking: The Limits of
 Land Use Controls, at xxii (G. Richard Hill, ed. 1990).  Hill criticizes the
Minnesota appellate court’s decision in Woodbury, where the court declined to
apply Lucas’s categorical takings analysis to a two-year interim moratorium on
development because of the regulation’s defined duration:
In an impressive act of judicial legerdemain, the court
distinguished Lucas because the Lucas taking was
presumptively permanent, until such a time as the
legislature amended the act to allow a special permit,
transforming the taking to a temporary act.  In
Woodbury, the Minnesota court found that a two-year
holding period was merely a delay and not a taking of all
use.  In terms of its impact on the property owner,
however, it is certainly difficult to see the distinction
between the two cases.  
-20-
temporary regulatory taking.”), aff’d in part, reversed in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th
Cir. 2000).17
Moreover, the courts refusing to extend First English beyond its remedial
genesis to prospectively temporary regulations have done so in the land use and
planning arena, where an entirely different set of considerations are implicated from
those in the context of nuisance abatement where a landowner is being deprived of
a property’s dedicated use.  The concerns specific to the regulation of land use and
planning were noted by the Ninth Circuit in declining to apply Lucas’s categorical
takings analysis to the temporary takings claims of landowners in the Lake Tahoe
region with regard to a temporary moratorium on development instituted in an effort
-21-
to stem the environmental degradation of Lake Tahoe:
[T]he widespread invalidation of temporary planning
moratoria would deprive state and local governments of
an important land-use planning tool with a well-
established tradition.  Land-use planning is necessarily a
complex, time-consuming undertaking for a community,
especially in a situation as unique as this.  In several
ways, temporary development moratoria promote
effective planning.  First, by preserving the status quo
during the planning process, temporary moratoria ensure
that a community’s problems are not exacerbated during
the time it takes to formulate a regulatory scheme. 
Relatedly, temporary development moratoria prevent
developers and landowners from racing to carry out
development that is destructive of the community’s
interests before a new plan goes into effect.  Such a race-
to-development would permit property owners to evade
the land-use plan and undermine its goals.  Finally, the
breathing room provided by temporary moratoria helps
ensure that the planning process is responsive to the
property owners and citizens who will be affected by the
resulting land-use regulations. 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 216 F.3d at 777 (citations and footnote
omitted).  
Other Available Uses
In addition to the claims regarding the closures’ defined duration, the cities
contend that the property owners were not deprived all economically beneficial or
productive uses of the property because they had other uses available to them
under the terms of the closure orders.  We disagree.  The orders closing the
18  The Second District in Bowen reached a similar conclusion:  
There can really be no question that by virtue of its
closing order, the Nuisance Abatement Board has
deprived the Plaintiff of all economic use of this property. 
The property, a 15 unit apartment building, can be put to
no other use during the close down period.
675 So. 2d at 631; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009 n.2 (noting that South
Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act allowed “the construction of certain
nonhabitable improvements, e.g., ‘wooden walkways no larger in width than six
feet,’ and ‘small wooden decks no larger than one hundred forty-four square
feet.’”).
-22-
properties in question rendered the properties economically idle, which impact is all
the more onerous with regards to property that has already been dedicated to a
particular use: 
Owner Gihwala and his family reside on the
premises, in four of the rooms.  The City’s suggestion
that this alone is an economically viable use of a 57-unit
motel defies the logic of finance.  The City’s further
suggestion that the zoning code allows some 60 uses
other than as a motel ignores the fact that the structure on
the property was designed and built as a motel. 
Transforming it into some other use (a shopping mall? a
gasoline station?) for the six-month-closure period lacks
any basis in reason.
Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 604 n.7.18
Our conclusion that the closure orders issued by the respective NABs
deprived Gihwala and Kablinger of all economically beneficial or productive use of
19  In this regard the Second District stated in Bowen:
In the present case, there is no common law nuisance
being prevented by the closure.  The prohibited activity
was any use of the apartment building.  The NAB order
did not really proscribe any particular nuisance, such as
would be done by enjoining the sale or use of drugs on
the premises.  Such an injunction would leave other legal
uses available to the Plaintiff, but the order involved here
left no use available.
-23-
their properties does not end our inquiry.  Under Lucas, the cities can resist
compensation only if they can identify “background principles of nuisance and
property law that the prohibit the uses” proscribed by the orders.  Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1031.  A regulation so restricting the use of property can “do no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts--by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that
affect the public generally, or otherwise.”  Id. at 1029.  
The difficulty posed by the action of the NABs emanates from the breadth of
the respective orders closing the subject properties.  The orders proscribed all uses
of the respective properties, both legal and illegal.  Cf. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 631
(emphasizing that the NAB’s closure order of the apartment complex proscribed all
uses of the property, leaving no uses available).19  Under Lucas, our inquiry must
675 So. 2d at 631.
-24-
therefore focus on whether the closure orders mirror the relief which “could have
been achieved in the courts--by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or
otherwise.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.  
It is well settled in this State that injunctions issued to abate public nuisances
must be specifically tailored to abate the objectionable conduct, without
unnecessarily infringing upon the conduct of a lawful enterprise.  See, e.g., Brower
v. Hubbard, 643 So. 2d 28, 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“Injunctions must be
specifically tailored to each case; they should not infringe upon conduct that does
not produce the harm sought to be avoided”); 4245 Corp. v. City of Oakland Park,
473 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (“The injunction totally putting the
corporation out of business was too drastic and its terms overbroad.  The trial
court should have limited the injunction to the illegal acts of lewdness and given the
corporation an opportunity to function as a legitimate enterprise”); Health Clubs,
Inc. v. State ex rel. Eagan, 377 So. 2d 28, 29-30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979) (“Where
illegal conduct which has been decreed to constitute a public nuisance is separable
from legal conduct within a business enterprise, only the illegal conduct may be
20  With regard to the Third District’s finding that the operation of the Stardust
was inextricably intertwined with the drug and prostitution activity precipitating the
NAB’s action, Gihwala argues that he should not be punished as an innocent
-25-
enjoined.”).  
In the case of the Stardust, however, the Third District concluded that the
operation of the Stardust had become inextricably intertwined with the drug and
prostitution activity sought to be enjoined:
[T]he record reflects that the motel was, in reality, not a
motel, but rather a brothel and drug house which the
owners, for whatever reason, failed to stop operating on
their property.  The record shows that the prostitution
and drug-related activities were inextricably intertwined
with the motel.  In order to preclude these proscribed
activities, it was necessary to bar access to the base of
operations, which, the Board concluded, could only be
done by completely closing the Stardust Motel.
Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 604 (footnote omitted).  We agree.  The record
demonstrates that the City of Miami NAB acted patiently in attempting to eradicate
the drug and prostitution problem at the Stardust.  Their efforts, however, met with
failure.  As emphasized by the Third District, the drug and prostitution activity had
become part and parcel of the operation of the Stardust.  On this record of
extensive and persistent drug and nuisance activity which had become inextricably
intertwined with the Stardust’s operation, we conclude that the City of Miami’s
NAB acted reasonably in ordering the temporary closure of the Stardust .20  
property owner for the criminal acts of third parties.  While Gihwala’s arguments
are certainly compelling, neither Gihwala, nor Kablinger for that matter, have
challenged the validity of these regulations on due process grounds as an invalid
exercise of the State’s police power.  We are presented here solely with the
remedial question of whether compensation is owed to Gihwala or Kablinger. 
Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed the constitutionality of similar
regulations.  See City of Minneapolis v. Fisher, 504 N.W. 2d 520 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (rejecting a facial and as applied constitutional attack of a one-year closure of
a public sauna under nuisance abatement regulations for prostitution convictions of
third parties); State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E. 2d 81 (Ohio 1998) (holding
statute allowing the closure of property for one year upon proof of felony drug
convictions on the premises unconstitutional as applied to property owners which
neither acquiesced nor participated in the drug activities); City of Seattle v. McCoy,
4 P.3d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding drug nuisance abatement statutes
calling for one-year closure of nuisance properties unconstitutional on takings and
due process grounds as applied to restaurant owners which were not involved in
the illegal activity and actively sought to prevent the drug activity on their property);
City of Milwaukee v. Arrieh, 526 N.W. 2d 279 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting
claim that a statute, providing for property closures on the basis of drug activity,
was unconstitutional in that it punished innocent property owners).
-26-
The same, however, cannot be said of the NAB’s action in Kablinger.  No
similar record of persistent drug activity precipitated the apartment’s closure;
rather, the St. Petersburg NAB closed the apartment complex solely on a finding
that the apartment had been the site of cocaine sales on more than two occasions. 
Unlike the Stardust, there was no extensive record indicating that the drug activity
had become an inseparable part of the operation of the apartment complex.  Absent
such a record, we are unable to conclude that the NAB’s action in closing
Kablinger’s apartment complex for one year was specifically tailored to abate the
-27-
drug nuisance found to exist at the property.  
Based on the foregoing, we approve the decisions reached in Keshbro and
Kablinger. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
(Two Cases Consolidated)
-------------------------
Case No. SC94058
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Constitutional Construction
Third - Case No. 3D98-1151 
(Dade County)
David Forestier, North Miami, Florida,
for Petitioners
Jose Fernandez, City of Miami Assistant Attorney, Miami, Florida, and Paul B.
Feltman of Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas, Miami, Florida,
for Respondents
-28-
Harry Morrison, Jr., General Counsel, Florida League of Cities, Tallahassee,
Florida, Thomas A. Bustin, Assistant City Attorney, City of St. Petersburg, St.
Petersburg, Florida, and Robert H. Freilich and Stephen J. Moore of Freilich,
Leitner & Carlisle, Kansas City, Missouri,
for the Florida League of Cities, Inc., and the City of St. Petersburg, 
Amici Curiae
--------------------------
 Case No. SC95600
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Direct Conflict
Second District - Case No. 2D98-01850
(Pinellas County)
Michael S. Davis, City Attorney, and Thomas A. Bustin, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Petersburg, Florida, and Robert H. Freilich and Stephen J. Moore of Freilich,
Leitner & Carlisle, Kansas City, Missouri,
for Petitioner
Robert H. Willis, Jr., St. Peterburg, Florida, and Alan E. DeSerio of Brigham
Moore Gaylord Schuster Merlin & Tobin, LLP, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent
Herbert W. A. Thiele, County Attorney, Leon County, and Celeste F. Adorno,
Assistant County Attorney, Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Florida Association of Counties, Amicus Curiae
-29-
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for The State of Florida, Amicus Curaie
Paul B. Feltman of Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas, Miami, Florida,
for the City of Miami, Florida and the City of Miami Nuisance Abatement
Board, Amici Curiae
George L. Dorsett, Assistant County Attorney, Orange County, Orlando, Florida,
for Orange County and Florida Association of County Attorneys, 
Amici Curiae