Title: In re Magar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S29172
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2003

Filed: April 10, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of 
MAGAR E. MAGAR,
									Accused.
(OSB 94-178, 94-210; SC 29172)
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Submitted on the record May 9, 2000.
	Magar E. Magar, Portland, filed the briefs for himself.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, and
Riggs, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	Complaint dismissed.
	*Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; De Muniz and Balmer,
JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
		PER CURIAM
		This lawyer disciplinary proceeding involves two causes
of complaint.  In the first, the Oregon State Bar (Bar) alleged
that the accused violated Code of Professional Responsibility
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-102(A)(1) (knowingly asserting position
to harass or maliciously injure another) and DR 7-102(A)(2)
(knowingly advancing claim or defense unwarranted under existing
law) while representing his clients, the Korgans, in bankruptcy
and related matters.  In the second, the Bar alleged that the
accused violated DR 6-101(A) (incompetent representation) and DR
6-101(B) (neglect of legal matter) while representing his client,
London, in a dissolution proceeding.  
A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board determined that
the accused had not violated DR 7-102(A)(1), (1) but had violated DR
7-102(A)(2), DR 6-101(A), and DR 6-101(B), and imposed a one-year
suspension.  This court's review is automatic and de novo.  ORS
9.536(2) and (3); BR 10.1 and 10.6. 
		The Bar has the burden of establishing alleged
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  "Clear and
convincing evidence" means evidence establishing that the truth
of the facts asserted is highly probable.  In re Johnson, 300 Or
52, 55, 707 P2d 573 (1985).  For the reasons that follow, we
dismiss the complaint.
KORGAN MATTER
	
In 1985, the accused filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding for the Korgans, and the bankruptcy court confirmed a
Chapter 13 plan. (2)  Later, the Korgans purchased a house from the
Walslebens.  The purchase contract required the Korgans to pay
the property taxes and provided that, if they failed to do so,
such failure would constitute a default permitting the Walslebens
to foreclose.
		The Korgans became delinquent in their payment of
property taxes on the house.  In May 1990, the Walslebens'
lawyer, Bassett, demanded that the Korgans pay the taxes.  In
response, the accused wrote a letter to Bassett in behalf of the
Korgans, stating, in part:
	"[T]he property is in no jeopardy of foreclosure by the
taxing authorities because as you know foreclosure
occurs when more than three years of taxes are
delinquent and that further the Korgans are in a
chapter 13 bankruptcy a situation that would forestall
any action by both your clients and the county."
(Emphasis added.)  When the accused wrote that letter, he was
aware of a bankruptcy opinion from the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon that held, contrary to the
accused's statement, that the bankruptcy estate ceases to exist
after plan confirmation and, thus, the automatic stay that
attaches upon the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings no
longer applies as to the estate.  In re Mason, 51 BR 548 (D Or
1985).  The accused also was aware, however, that other federal
bankruptcy cases had been critical of Mason.
	Bassett reviewed the Korgans' bankruptcy court file and
concluded that the stay did not apply to the property in
question.  The Walslebens then filed an action in state court
against the Korgans seeking strict foreclosure.  In response, the
Korgans filed another Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which
prevented the state court from entering a foreclosure decree. 
The Walslebens then moved for relief from the automatic stay
imposed as part of the second Chapter 13 proceeding.  The
bankruptcy court granted the motion and entered an order lifting
the stay as to the Walslebens' state foreclosure action.  In
1991, the state court entered an interlocutory judgment of strict
foreclosure in the Walslebens' favor, and, later that year, the
Korgans were evicted from the property.
	In the meantime, the accused, acting in the Korgans'
behalf, filed an appeal from the bankruptcy court's order with
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP).  In 1992,
however, the Walslebens sold the property in question to Hill, a
family friend of the Walslebens.  The Walslebens then moved to
dismiss the appeal as moot, in light of the sale of the property
to Hill.  The accused countered that the sale was fraudulent and
that it was calculated to provoke the BAP to dismiss the appeal. 
The BAP agreed with the Walslebens and dismissed the appeal.  The
accused then appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed the BAP's dismissal.
	In 1993, the Korgans filed an adversary proceeding for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Walslebens in
bankruptcy court.  That action sought to annul the sale of the
property to Hill and to reinstate the bankruptcy stay.  The
complaint alleged that the sale was a sham transaction and,
therefore, a fraud on the bankruptcy court.  The Walslebens,
however, successfully moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding. 
In particular, the bankruptcy court held that (1) the automatic
stay, once lifted, could not be reinstated; (2) the accused's
claims in the adversary proceeding were untimely under the
applicable procedural rules; and (3) the bankruptcy trial court
could not undo the effect of the BAP's dismissal of the appeal.
	The Bar instituted disciplinary proceedings against the
accused, alleging that he had filed various pleadings, motions,
and appeals in state and federal court that had violated DR 7-102(A)(1) and DR 7-102(A)(2).  After a hearing, the trial panel
rejected the Bar's allegation that the accused had violated 7-102(A)(1), finding that the accused had been motivated to protect
the Korgans' property, rather than to harass or maliciously
injure Bassett or the Walslebens.  The trial panel also concluded
that the accused's litigation filings in the Korgans' behalf did
not violate DR 7-102(A)(2): 
	"[T]he Accused's conduct in carrying out the protracted
litigation in the Walsleben matter both in state court
and in the bankruptcy court, had some basis in existing
law.  The Bar's own witness * * * Snyder testified that
the bankruptcy procedure through BAP and the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals was warranted.  We find that
the Accused's attempt to reinstate the stay [in the
adversary proceeding] based upon fraud following denial
by the 9th Circuit was theoretically warranted by
existing law as an attack upon a judgment because of
fraud on the court."
The trial panel, however, concluded that the accused had violated
DR 7-102(A)(2) by stating in his letter to Bassett that the
Korgans' property was protected from foreclosure by the automatic
stay in the bankruptcy proceeding.  The trial panel, citing
Mason, concluded that "existing law held that the property was
afforded no such protection."
	DR 7-102(A)(2) provides that, in representing a client,
a lawyer shall not
	"[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law except that the lawyer
may advance such claim or defense if it can be
supported by good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."	
The Bar argues that, under Mason, the accused's assertion in his
letter to Bassett -- that the automatic stay in the Korgans'
bankruptcy proceeding protected the property -- was unwarranted. 
In Mason, the issue was whether the automatic stay provided for
in 11 USC section 362(a), which generally protects the property
in a bankruptcy estate from creditors' claims, protects post-confirmation wages from garnishment to satisfy a post-confirmation debt.  The court concluded that the stay did not
apply to wages earned post-confirmation because the bankruptcy
estate ceased to exist post-confirmation.  The wages therefore
could be garnished without violating the stay.  51 BR at 550.  In
other words, the post-confirmation wages belonged to the debtor,
not to the estate that had been protected by the stay, and so
those wages could be garnished.  As the Bar contends, that
holding is contrary to the position that the accused asserted in
his letter to Bassett.
	The accused, however, correctly maintains that several
courts had rejected Mason before the accused wrote to Bassett. 
One case in particular concluded that Mason was "premised upon
[a] mistaken belief" that confirmation was relevant to
determining whether property was within the scope of the estate. 
In re Aneiro, 72 BR 424, 428-29 (Bankr SD Cal 1987); accord In re
Root, 61 BR 984, 985 (Bankr D Colo 1986) ("strongly
disagree[ing]" with Mason's conclusion that confirmation of
Chapter 13 plan vests all property of estate in debtor, rather
than in estate).
	Another, more detailed, opinion, In re Schewe, 94 BR
938 (Bankr WD Mich 1989), also disagreed with Mason, concluding
that the automatic stay in a Chapter 13 proceeding protects a
debtor's possessory interest in "residential real property both
prior to and subsequent to confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan." 
94 BR at 946.  Schewe concluded that the "majority of the cases
which hold the automatic stay does not apply in Chapter 13 cases
postconfirmation involve alimony, maintenance[,] and support
issues."  Id. at 945.  The court further asserted that such
circumstances factually are different from circumstances in which
a "debtor is a wage earner, [and] the continued further occupancy
of his residential premises may be essential to earning his
income and carrying out the terms of the debtor's confirmed
plan."  Id.  
	The cases cited above, each disagreeing with Mason,
represented part of the existing law when the accused wrote the
letter to Bassett.  Those cases demonstrate that, at the time
when the accused wrote to Bassett, Mason had not received
universal acceptance among bankruptcy courts.  That fact
undercuts the Bar's allegation that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2), because "existing law" included the opinions of courts
that disputed Mason's legal conclusions. (3)  Further, one of those
cases, Schewe, stands as authority that real property should be
treated as subject to the stay.
	We conclude that the accused did not advance a claim or
defense that was unwarranted under existing law and, therefore,
did not violate DR 7-102(A)(2) when he made his assertions in the
letter to Bassett.
	The Bar also argues that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2) when he filed the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy
court in 1993 after the Ninth Circuit dismissed his appeal.  The
complaint in the adversary proceeding was based upon the theory
that the Walslebens had transferred the property to a straw man,
Hill, to render moot any proceedings regarding that property. 
The accused testified that he "could not believe that there could
be a bona fide sale of this property with so much litigation
attached to it."  In light of that litigation, the accused
thought that it did not "make any financial sense for anybody to
buy it."  From the accused's point of view, several facts
reasonably caused him to suspect that the transaction was not
completely at arm's length:  (1) the purchaser, Hill, was a
family friend of the Walslebens; (2) the accused believed that
the selling price was below market value; and (3) opposing
counsel had prepared the transaction documents.  Although the
accused already had raised that issue in the dispute about
whether the bankruptcy appeal was moot, he pressed it again in
the adversary proceeding, because that was a forum in which the
accused could conduct discovery to attempt to prove his
contention that the transaction was a sham.
	The substantive merits of the bankruptcy adversary
proceeding are difficult to assess, and the Bar's brief on that
issue does not address the merits in terms of then-existing
bankruptcy law.  The Bar appears to argue that the adversary
proceeding was simply "too much" and that the accused was overly
zealous in filing that action.  The Bar, however, does not
analyze the claims that the accused made in the adversary
proceeding to determine whether they were legally unwarranted
under DR 7-102(A)(2).  The only authority that the Bar cites on
that issue is In re White, 311 Or 573, 815 P2d 1257 (1991), for
the proposition that filing duplicative actions violates DR 7-102(A)(2).  
	As noted above, the Bar bears the burden of showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2) based upon conduct that was "unwarranted" under
existing law.  Here, the legal context was bankruptcy law.  The
Bar has failed to make a sufficient argument, supported by
relevant bankruptcy authorities, to support its contention under
DR 7-102(A)(2) that the adversary proceeding legally was
unwarranted and that no argument could be made for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.  Instead, the tenor of
the Bar's argument on review appears more appropriately addressed
to a harassment claim under DR 7-102(A)(1), a claim that it
explicitly abandoned on review.  That argument fails as a
challenge to the legal validity of the accused's conduct under DR
7-102(A)(2) in the bankruptcy law context.  We conclude that the
Bar has not established that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2)
in the adversary proceeding.
	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the accused
did not violate DR 7-102(A)(2).
  LONDON MATTER
	London and her husband met during the mid-1970s and
married for the first time in 1979.  That marriage produced one
child and ended in dissolution in 1982.  Thereafter, the parties
maintained an intermittent relationship, visiting each other
periodically, and may have lived together between 1984 and 1986. 
In December 1991, the couple married again.  In April 1993,
however, they separated, and the husband petitioned to dissolve
the marriage.  London and the couple's son (then 12 years old)
remained in the marital home, which the husband had owned in his
own name since before the couple's first marriage. 
London, who knew the accused from his prior
representation of her in a bankruptcy matter, hired the accused
to represent her in the dissolution proceeding.  Shortly
thereafter, she provided him with a written "synopsis" of the
couple's relationship and an itemized settlement request.  The
synopsis and settlement request suggested that London expected
that the entire span of the couple's relationship -- not only the
period of their second marriage -- would factor into the outcome
of the proceeding. (4)  According to the accused, who had been
handling divorce cases since 1976, "from the beginning [he had]
viewed it as a short-term marriage" and had informed London "that
in all probability this marriage was going to be found to be a
short term marriage[.]" (5)
	In June 1993, as his "first order of business," the
accused wrote to opposing counsel, Niedermeyer, requesting that
the husband pay $200 per month in child support during the pendency of the proceedings and agree to permit London to remain
in the house.  The husband agreed to permit London and their son
to remain in the house, but he refused to pay child support.  The
accused did not litigate that issue, concluding that an award of
support likely would be accompanied by a requirement that London,
rather than the husband, make the monthly mortgage payment.
	In August 1993, the accused filed London's response to
the husband's petition.  Around that time, the accused also
conducted informal discovery.  Specifically, he orally requested
from Niedermeyer information concerning the husband's debts, the
husband's 1992 income tax return, his latest wage stubs, and any
information related to retirement benefits.  Niedermeyer gave the
accused "all the information supplied to [him] by [the husband],"
which apparently consisted of the husband's W-2 Form and tax
return for 1992, and a pay stub from September 1993.  That
information did not document fully the husband's 401(k)
retirement account, a profit-sharing plan, and a pension plan
(collectively, "the retirement plan").  The accused did not seek
further discovery; neither did he take the husband's deposition.
	As the case proceeded toward trial, London discussed
matters with the accused "as often as was necessary," because she
"wanted to make sure he had as much information as he needed, and
[she] wanted to stay abreast of what was going on."  She
remembered at least two, and possibly three, office visits with
the accused, as well as several telephone calls over the course
of the representation.  For his part, the accused remembered that
London had "called a great deal" and recalled "many meetings with
* * * London[,] who used to come, without appointment, to the
office."  There is no evidence in the record about the
particulars of those conversations.
	At some point, the accused asked London to write down
for him exactly what she wanted.  She listed: (1) child support;
(2) to stay in the house until their son turned 18; (3) the
furniture to remain in order; (4) the rights and privileges of a
landlord; and (5) reliable transportation.  Based in part upon
that list, the accused stated that he was able "to comprehend
with difficulty" that London's most important demand was that she
and the couple's son be permitted to remain in the marital home
until the son turned age 18.  The record does not reflect at what
point in the pretrial process the accused came to that
conclusion.  At some point, the accused also sought to establish
the value of the house by driving by it and by reviewing tax
assessor records for the property.
	At trial call on Friday, December 10, 1993, the accused
reported ready for trial, which was scheduled for the following
Monday.  At that time, the accused remained of the view that the
marriage was a short-term one, and he even acknowledged as much
to Niedermeyer that day.  According to the accused, however,
during trial preparation over the weekend, London "absolutely
insisted that she wanted to present this relationship as a long
term relationship."  He also reviewed some documents that London
had brought with her, some of which he believed supported the
theory of a long-term marriage.  Despite his continuing belief
that London was on "legally shaky grounds," the accused concluded
that she was entitled to make that argument.
	The accused next determined that he did not have
sufficient evidence, including full documentation of the
retirement plan, to make the argument:
	"If in fact it was a long term relationship then I lacked the documentation to proceed and I needed more time to produce more documents.  But as a short term marriage I was prepared to proceed and accomplish the primary objective of my client to remain in the residence until her son was 18 years old."
The accused used the information that he had to prepare the trial
memorandum.
		In that memorandum, in addition to other relief
requested, the accused argued that the court should deem the
parties to own the marital home as tenants in common, permit
London and the couple's son to remain in the home until the son
turned age 18, require the husband to make mortgage payments
during that period in lieu of paying child support, and
thereafter award London half the equity in the home.  The
memorandum is detailed factually, but contains no citation to
legal authority.  It appears that, in addition to relying on his
recollection of what trial courts had done or said in the past in
such cases, the accused consulted a continuing legal education
publication to inform his understanding of the relevant legal
issues.
		On Monday, December 13, 1993, at the outset of trial,
the accused requested a two-week continuance to present
additional documentary evidence of a long-term marriage.  The
trial court denied that request, adding that he "virtually
[would] have to treat [the marriage] as the short-term marriage
it evidently is."  Later, during the accused's direct examination
of London, the court chided the accused for not having authority
on hand to support the accused's argument for a tenancy in
common.  At the close of the evidence, the court also denied the
accused's renewed motion for a continuance.
		In its ruling on the merits, the court stated that it
"must treat this case as a short term marriage" and "attempt to
put the parties somewhat back in the condition that they were at
the time of the marriage."  As relevant here, the court awarded
London possession of the marital home through June of the
following year and a judgment for $2,000 to compensate her for
the increase in value of the husband's retirement plan during the
marriage.  The court refused to award attorney fees against the
husband and later complained to the Bar about the accused's
handling of the London matter.
		The Bar ultimately filed a complaint alleging that, in
his representation of London, the accused had acted incompetently
and neglectfully in violation of DR 6-101(A) and (B).  Although
the Bar's pleading sets out various specifications of alleged
incompetence and neglect, three main issues emerged at the trial
panel hearing:  (1) whether the accused mishandled the issue of
long-term versus short-term marriage; (2) whether the accused
should have conducted formal discovery; and (3) whether the
accused waited too long before beginning trial preparation.
		As to the first issue, the Bar's expert, Gevurtz,
opined, in part, that the accused should have researched whether
he could have presented the marriage as a long-term one.  Gevurtz
added that that area of the law "is one of the more confusing
[areas]."  In a later colloquy with the accused, Gevurtz asserted
that "you had absolutely * * * nothing to lose by dealing with it
as a long-term marriage" and that "there was really no reason
right from day one" not to treat it as such.  As to the second
issue, Gevurtz offered his opinion that the case had called for
something more persistent and formal concerning discovery and
that, at a minimum, the accused should have taken the husband's
deposition.  Finally, as to the issue of preparation, Gevurtz was
of the view that the accused had not been timely in that respect.
		For his part, and in addition to other arguments and
evidence, the accused relied upon the testimony of opposing
counsel, Niedermeyer.  Niedermeyer offered his opinion that
London had been "well represented in this case."  Respecting
discovery, Niedermeyer testified that, "[i]n fact, I thought [the
accused] was giving me a hard time because it was such a short
marriage" and that the accused "was pushing pretty hard." 
Niedermeyer repeated several times that he always had viewed the
marriage as a short-term one and stated that he "didn't think the
case should have ever gone to trial."
		The trial panel concluded that the accused had violated
both DR 6-101(A) and (B) in his representation of London.  In
support of that conclusion, the trial panel found, among other
things, that
	"[t]he case was tried without the benefit of all available evidence regarding Mr. London's retirement plans.  This evidence could have been obtained by the Accused if he had undertaken reasonable and timely discovery.  The case was also tried without the Accused advancing any legal authority for the proposition the relationship between the parties was long-term."
On review in this court, the accused challenges the trial panel's
determination, arguing, among other things, that he "was ready,
had enough facts[,] and was prepared to argue" London's case.
		DR 6-101 provides:
		"(A) A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client.  Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
		"(B) A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer."
		This court has stated that determining whether a lawyer
has provided incompetent representation in violation of DR 6-101(A) "is a fact-specific inquiry."  In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 60,
36 P3d 468 (2001).  So too, we conclude, is the determination
whether a lawyer has neglected a legal matter.  We also emphasize
that the standard for assessing competence and diligence is an
objective one; the lawyer's mental state is irrelevant.  Compare
DR 7-101(A)(3) (lawyer shall not "intentionally * * * [p]rejudice
or damage the lawyer's client * * *"); In re Collier, 295 Or 320,
328, 667 P2d 481 (1983) ("'Intentionally' is a material and key
element of DR 7-101(A)(3).").  Instead, the court will consider
whether a lawyer who has violated DR 6-101 acted intentionally,
knowingly, or negligently only as one of the factors in
determining the appropriate sanction.  As a final general
observation that applies to both subsections of DR 6-101, we note
that the outcome of a matter in which a lawyer has acted
incompetently or neglectfully is not a pertinent consideration. 
In re Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 555, 857 P2d 136 (1993) ("If a
lawyer does a poor job, but the client fortuitously or through
the efforts of others obtains a good result, that does not excuse
the lawyer from providing competent representation or justify
neglecting the case.").
		Moving to the subsections of DR 6-101, and beginning
with competence under subsection (A), this court has stated that
the best measure for determining lawyer competency is "the
standard stated in DR 6-101(A) itself."  Id. at 554.  That
standard requires a lawyer to employ the "legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."  DR 6-101(A).  We pause to note, however, that
incompetence and negligence are not synonymous terms.  A lawyer -- otherwise knowledgeable, skillful, thorough, and prepared --
might commit a misstep for which he or she might have to respond
in damages.  That lawyer, although negligent, has not violated DR
6-101(A).  Conversely, but less likely, a lawyer might act
without the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, or preparation
necessary for the representation, but commit no misstep that
gives rise to an actionable negligence claim.  That lawyer would
have acted incompetently, but not negligently.  Consequently, and
as the factors set out in DR 6-101(A) themselves suggest, this
court's inquiry in competence cases generally has focused upon
the reasonableness of the accused lawyer's conduct in the broader
context of the representation, rather than in respect of specific
aspects of the representation.  See, e.g., Gastineau, 317 Or at
553-54 (incompetence often found when "there is a lack of basic
knowledge or preparation[,]" but not when lawyer "showed
experience and professional ability" or Bar failed to prove that
position was taken "'in pretense or bad faith, or in culpable
ignorance'").  That, however, will not always be the case; the
analysis remains a fact-specific one. 
We proceed to consider neglect, or lack of diligence,
under DR 6-101(B).  One commentator has described lack of
diligence as "a special and wide-spread variety of incompetence,"
consisting of "incompetently failing to act when advancing or
protecting a client's interests calls for action," and as ranging
from "virtual abandonment of the client to procrastination." 
Charles Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 191 (1986). (6)  As with
competence, neglect is not interchangeable with negligence:  "A
lawyer's neglect of a client's business does not necessarily give
rise to actionable negligence."  In re Chambers, 292 Or 670, 674
n 3, 642 P2d 286 (1982).  At the same time, however, this court
recently has stated that, "[t]o prove a violation of DR 6-101(B),
the Bar must show a course of negligent conduct."  Eadie, 333 Or
at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added); see
also Collier, 295 Or at 328-29 (noting that court in prior cases
had contrasted course of conduct with "isolated" acts of
"ordinary negligence").  We adhere to the principal construct set
out in Eadie:  Neglect in the context of DR 6-101(B) is the
failure to act or the failure to act diligently.  It requires
this court to view a lawyer's conduct along a temporal continuum,
rather than as discrete, isolated events.  To avoid confusion,
however, we restate the Bar's burden under DR 6-101(B) as
requiring clear and convincing evidence of a course of neglectful
conduct.
		With those principles in mind, we proceed to determine
whether the Bar has proved that the accused acted neglectfully or
incompetently in representing London.  At the outset, our review
of the record leaves the clear impression that, at least until
the weekend before trial, the accused both viewed and prepared to
try London's dissolution case as involving only a short-term
marriage.  The accused's belief that the marriage was short term
appears to have affected many of the actions that he took, and
did not take, in the representation.  Accordingly, we begin with
an assessment of the accused's determination that the London
matter involved a short-term marriage.
		The record demonstrates that the accused settled upon
his theory that the marriage was a short-term one quickly, almost
matter-of-factly, and without the benefit of substantial legal
research.  Moreover, the fact that the accused somewhat altered
his theory of the case shortly before trial arguably suggests
that his earlier preparation was inadequate.  Nevertheless, as
set out below, when we view those factors against the record as a
whole, we are unable to conclude that the Bar has proved that the
manner in which the accused adopted his initial theory of the
case was neglectful or incompetent.
		As a preliminary matter, we reject the Bar's argument
that the accused in essence ignored his client's wishes.  As
noted, we have discounted the significance of the synopsis that
London provided to the accused, upon which the Bar's argument
primarily relies, and there is no other evidence in the record
that clearly indicates that London directed the accused to
present the case in one way or another.
		As to the adequacy of the factual and legal bases upon
which the accused formed his theory of the case, we note that the
accused was familiar with London from the prior representation,
that he maintained something approaching regular contact with
her, and that the record does not disclose the specifics of those
communications.  Moreover, by the time of the representation, the
accused had acquired substantial experience with divorce cases. 
Finally, in shaping his understanding of the case, the accused
relied to some extent on prior discussions of the law in that
area by trial courts.
		We also deem as having some relevance to our inquiry
the fact that both the trial court and opposing counsel espoused
the same view of the case as the accused's initial view.  And,
significantly, the Bar's expert did not go so far as to state a
legal opinion that, considering the nature of the couple's
relationship, London's second marriage properly should have been
viewed as a long-term one.  Instead, he emphasized only that the
accused had nothing to lose by arguing for a longer duration
relationship.  Finally, the Bar has not cited any domestic
relations case law or other authority that would tend to
demonstrate that the accused should have viewed the case as
presenting a long-term marriage.
		Considering all the foregoing factors together, as well
as the record as a whole, the Bar has demonstrated that the
accused should have rested his initial theory of the case on a
stronger foundation.  The Bar, however, has failed to prove that
it is highly probable that the accused's legal conclusions or the
manner in which he came to them were so unreasonable as to
support a determination of either incompetence or neglect. 
Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether the accused
adequately handled the dissolution of a short-term marriage. 
And, because we conclude that the Bar's arguments that the
accused was neglectful under DR 6-101(B) do not require an
extended discussion, we begin with that rule.
		In the course of his approximately six-month
representation of London, the accused (1) informally attempted to
obtain interim relief for her; (2) filed a response in her
behalf; (3) conducted limited informal discovery; (4) met or
spoke with her on a number of occasions; (5) prepared a factually
detailed trial memorandum; and (6) tried the case.  For its part,
the Bar points to actions that the accused did not undertake and
takes issue with the manner in which the accused carried out some
of the tasks that he did undertake.  Those arguments are tenable. 
On balance, however, when those shortcomings are viewed along the
continuum of the representation, we disagree with the Bar that
this record demonstrates neglect of a legal matter.  The accused
did not miss deadlines, and the case did not languish.  In short,
there was no course of neglectful conduct.  The accused did not
neglect a legal matter in violation of DR 6-101(B).
		Determining whether the accused acted incompetently
under DR 6-101(A) in this matter presents a closer question.  The
focal points of the Bar's case are the level of discovery
respecting the husband's retirement plan and the point at which
the accused began his trial preparation.  Respecting discovery,
we question the overall significance in London's case of
information about her husband's retirement account.  The focus
here was to restore the parties to their premarital positions. 
Moreover, we do not accept the Bar's argument that minimum
standards of professional competence required the accused to
depose the husband either as a general matter or specifically as
to the retirement plan.  Considering together the lack of
complexity of the case, the state of this record, and the burden
of proof, the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused's limited discovery efforts in London's behalf
constituted an unreasonable level of thoroughness or preparation.
		As a final matter, we consider the timing of the
accused's trial preparation.  By all accounts, the accused did
not begin trial preparation until the weekend before the Monday
setting and only after having reported ready at trial call on
Friday morning.  That timing suggests a lack of reasonable
preparedness.  See, e.g., Chambers, 292 Or at 678 (record left
"distinct impression that [the accused lawyer] prepared and tried
the criminal case 'by the seat of his pants'").  Moreover, the
work that remained to be completed that weekend was not limited
to memorializing legal arguments and preparing exhibits for
trial.  The accused still needed to review, as an initial matter,
some of London's documents.  That fact, and the fact that the
accused ultimately offered no legal citation in support of his
position, suggests in this context a lack of reasonable
thoroughness.  See, e.g., Eadie, 333 Or at 61 (accused lawyer
who, among other things, failed to order copy of client's
deposition transcript for use at trial violated DR 6-101(A)).
		We must assess those concerns, however, in the context
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case that the
accused litigated.  Concerning the factual circumstances of
London's case, the couple was of modest means, there was
comparatively little property to distribute, and the issues of
contention were few.  Moreover, the accused's grasp of the
pertinent facts at trial, notwithstanding that he began preparing
late, supports his assertion that he ultimately "had enough
facts" to argue London's case.
		Concerning the legal circumstances of the case, and as
we noted earlier, the distribution of property in a short-term
marriage dissolution usually "is a relatively simple task in the
nature of a recission."  ___ Or at ___ n 5 (slip op at 11 n 5,
citing Jenks, 294 Or at 242).  Once the question whether the
accused should have viewed the marriage as a long-term one is
removed from the equation, we cannot describe the case as legally
complicated.  In the context of that simple case, we conclude
that the accused both had and conveyed a sufficient understanding
of the pertinent legal issues to avoid violating DR 6-101(A).
		Finally, we note that, although for purposes of this
opinion we have grouped the Bar's arguments on review into
specific categories, we have considered each of the arguments
that the Bar advanced in support of its position.  Having done
so, and applying the standard that DR 6-101(A) sets out in the
broader context of the accused's representation of London as a
whole, the record does not demonstrate that it is highly probable
that the accused acted incompetently in violation of DR 6-101(A).
		In conclusion, the Bar has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(1) or
(2) in the Korgan matter, or DR 6-101(A) or (B) in the London
matter.
		Complaint dismissed.



1. 	The Bar did not seek review of the trial panel's
determination that the Bar had failed to prove the allegations
relating to the Korgan matter under DR 7-102(A)(1).

2. 	Filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition creates an
estate that holds the debtor's assets.  See 11 USC § 1306
(describing estate property).  When the bankruptcy court confirms
a Chapter 13 plan, however, the assets are revested in the
debtor, unless the plan provides otherwise.  11 USC § 1327.

3. 	The Bar assumes, without analysis, that Mason was
binding authority in that district for the broad proposition that
the confirmation of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan terminates the
automatic stay as to the property of the estate.  That assumption
is questionable.  Some courts have held that, unless an entire
federal district court binds itself to a decision by issuing that
decision en banc, that decision merely is law of the case.  See, e.g., In re Bakarat, 173 BR 672, 679 (Bankr CD Cal 1994) (so
stating).  Mason was not an en banc opinion, but represented the
opinion of only one district court judge sitting in appellate
review of a bankruptcy court decision.

4. 	The accused asserts that he did not receive the
synopsis until after commencement of this disciplinary
proceeding.  The evidence, however, clearly and convincingly
indicates that London gave that document to the accused shortly
after she hired him.  The Bar characterizes the synopsis as
indicating that "London wanted to present the relationship as a
long-term marriage."  Although we agree that the document can be
read in that way, we disagree with the Bar's implicit assertion
that the document must be read in that way.  The synopsis does
not express such an intention clearly. 

5. 	Courts have applied the concept of a "short-term
marriage" in the context of distributing marital assets.  Broadly
speaking, upon the dissolution of a short-term marriage, the
"property division is a relatively simple task in the nature of a
rescission."  Jenks and Jenks, 294 Or 236, 242, 656 P2d 286
(1982).  According to Jenks, the determination whether a marriage
is "short-term" depends not upon "any specific number of months
or years[,]" but, instead, upon whether "the parties' financial
affairs become commingled or committed to the needs of children
to the point that the parties cannot readily be restored to their
premarital positions."  Id.  More recently, this court has stated
that, whether one defines a short-term marriage by looking to
duration or to the commingling of assets, "reliance solely on the
concept of a 'short-term' marriage * * * will lead to analytical
mistakes."  Massee and Massee, 328 Or 195, 210, 970 P2d 1203
(1999) (citations omitted).  Instead, the factors set out in the
relevant statute, ORS 107.105(1)(f), "are the guide to the
court's discretion in dividing marital property."  Id.  Our use
of the term "short-term marriage" in this opinion should not be
construed as an endorsement of that term.

6. 	The Bar may elect to allege in a particular instance
that the same conduct constitutes both neglect and incompetence. 
Because neglect is a subset of incompetence, and also because, in
such a case, a determination that the accused lawyer violated
both DR 6-101(A) and (B) would not affect the sanction analysis,
this court in such cases normally will not address the competency
issue.  See, e.g., In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 31 P3d 414 (2001)
(applying principle in analogous context).