Title: Gunn v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 475, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 1, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LA MAR GUNN,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
U.S. BANK NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION and EQCC HOME 
EQUITY LOAN TRUST 1998-2,  
 
                    Defendants Below- 
         Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 475, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below- Court of Chancery 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  C.A. No. 5917 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: November 10, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    December 1, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 1st day of December 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The plaintiff-appellant, La Mar Gunn, filed an appeal from the 
Court of Chancery’s August 18, 2011 order affirming the Master in 
Chancery’s June 2, 2011 Final Report.  The defendants-appellees, U.S. Bank 
National Association and EQCC Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2 
(collectively, the “Bank”), have moved to affirm the judgment of the Court 
 
2
of Chancery on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief 
that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.2 
 
(2) The record before us reflects that the original owners of a 
property located at 201 Cornwell Drive, Bear, Delaware (the “Property”) 
took out a first mortgage from EquiCredit Corporation in 1997.  In 1998, 
they took out a second mortgage from a different lender.  In 2001, they 
defaulted on the first mortgage.  EquiCredit assigned its interest in the first 
mortgage to the Bank.  Thereafter, the Bank foreclosed and a sheriff’s sale 
was scheduled.  However, the sale was stayed when the owners of the 
Property filed for bankruptcy.  In 2003, Gunn, despite being aware that the 
first mortgage was in default, purchased both the second mortgage and the 
Property by quitclaim deed, and then proceeded to make improvements on 
the Property.   
 
(3) In 2004, the bankruptcy stay was lifted.  In November of 2004, 
after the Bank again filed a foreclosure action in the Superior Court and the 
sheriff’s sale again was scheduled, Gunn intervened in the action and moved 
to stay, claiming that the Bank did not have standing to bring the foreclosure 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 In his Final Report, the Master in Chancery reserved decision on the Bank’s request for 
attorney’s fees.  By letter dated June 15, 2011, the Bank requested that its claim be 
preserved pending review by the Court of Chancery of Gunn’s exceptions to the Final 
Report.  The Court of Chancery docket reflects that the Bank did not raise its claim for 
attorney’s fees in its opening brief addressing Gunn’s exceptions, thereby waiving the 
claim. 
 
3
action and that the assignments transferring the first mortgage to the Bank 
were invalid.  In 2008, the Superior Court finally permitted the sheriff’s sale 
to proceed and Gunn filed an appeal in this Court.  The matter was remanded 
to the Superior Court so that Gunn could conduct further discovery 
regarding his claims.3  On remand, after Gunn had failed to conduct any 
discovery, the Superior Court confirmed that the Bank was the real party in 
interest and that the sheriff’s sale was proper.   This Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s judgment.4  
 
(4) Gunn thereafter filed a complaint alleging unjust enrichment in 
the Court of Chancery against the Bank, claiming that the Bank did not have 
standing to bring the foreclosure action and that the assignments transferring 
the mortgage to the Bank were invalid.  The Court of Chancery dismissed 
Gunn’s claims on the ground that they had previously been decided against 
him.  On appeal from the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of his complaint, 
Gunn advances several claims of error, which may fairly be summarized as 
follows: a) the Bank did not have standing to bring the foreclosure action; 
and b) the assignments transferring the mortgage to the Bank were invalid.    
                                                 
3 Gunn v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, Del. Supr., No. 102, 2009, Ridgely, J. (December 1, 
2009). 
4 Gunn v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, Del. Supr., No. 102, 2009, Ridgely, J. (June 30, 
2010). 
 
4
 
(5) The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are well-
established.  The res judicata doctrine prevents a party from bringing a 
second lawsuit based on the same cause of action after a judgment on that 
claim has been rendered in a prior lawsuit involving the same parties.5  
Similarly, where an issue of fact essential to a decision has been previously 
litigated and decided by way of a valid and final judgment, the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of that issue in a second lawsuit 
against a party in the first case on a different cause of action.6  We conclude 
that the Court of Chancery properly dismissed Gunn’s claims, because those 
claims were precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel.     
 
(6) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
                                                 
5 Oakes v. Oakes, Del. Supr., No. 709, 2010, Jacobs, J. (Feb. 16, 2011) (citing M.G. 
Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999) ). 
6 Id. (citing Messick v. Star Enter., 655 A.2d 1209, 1211 (Del. 1995)). 
 
5
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Court of Chancery is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
/s Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                  Justice