Title: State v. Randant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52289
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2006

FILED: June 15, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DALE RICHARD RANDANT,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 98-052; CA A111296; SC S52289)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 7, 2006.
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs was
Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public Defense
Services, Salem.
Kaye McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With her on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Dale Richard Randant filed briefs in propria persona.  With
him on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services,
Salem.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
*Appeal from Yamhill County Circuit Court, John L. Collins,
Judge. 192 Or App 668, 87 P3d 688, adhered to on recons, 196 Or
App 601, 103 P3d 1134 (2004).
KISTLER, J.
In this criminal case, defendant repeatedly called the
police over a five-month period asking to talk to them.  He did
so after the police had advised him that he had been indicted for
aggravated murder and after his lawyer had advised him not to
talk to the police.  The question that this case poses is what
steps the state and federal constitutions required the police to
take before they could accept defendant's repeated invitations to
talk with him.  The trial court held that the officers had
respected defendant's constitutional rights, and the Court of
Appeals upheld that ruling.  State v. Randant, 192 Or App 668, 87
P3d 688, adhered to on recons, 196 Or App 601, 103 P3d 1134
(2004).  For the reasons set out below, we affirm the Court of
Appeals decision.
Defendant worked for Saffa and Alaa Nasser at their
automobile body shop.  The Nassers suspected that defendant had
been taking money from their business.  One day, defendant and
Saffa left the business together.  Only defendant returned. 
Eight days later, the police found Saffa's body on Parrett
Mountain.  He had been shot, and his body had been hidden several
feet off the road in some underbrush.
Two days after law enforcement officers from Oregon
discovered Saffa's body, police officers in Olympia, Washington,
arrested defendant on an unrelated charge.  Detective O'Connell
went to Olympia to talk to defendant about Saffa's death.  After
O'Connell advised defendant of his Miranda rights, defendant
invoked his right to counsel and O'Connell terminated the
interview.
On December 22, 1997, the State of Oregon indicted
defendant for multiple counts of aggravated murder arising out of
Saffa's death, kidnapping, and being a felon in possession of a
firearm.  Approximately four months later, on April 21, 1998,
defendant called O'Connell from the jail in Olympia where he
still was being held.  When O'Connell answered the telephone, he
acknowledged that defendant had called "several times * * * a
couple of Fridays ago," but explained that he had not been able
to call defendant back.  O'Connell then asked defendant what was
on his mind, and defendant said, "I wanna know, uh, if you guys
checked anything out any further and uh, when you're gonna talk
to me, and uh, when I'll be going there?"  O'Connell reminded
defendant that he previously had invoked his right to counsel and
that O'Connell could not speak with him about Saffa's death. 
O'Connell noted that "it appears you've changed your mind on that
issue," and defendant replied, "I could talk about some things."
Before speaking further with defendant, O'Connell
advised him that he had been indicted for aggravated
murder. (1)  During the remainder of the call, defendant
acknowledged that he had been involved in Saffa's death but
stated that it was not a murder.  He suggested, without
disclosing any details, that another person also had been
involved.  He asked if the police had checked for fingerprints on
the murder weapon and said that he had been "thinking you guys
would come up here and we were gonna talk about [the
investigation]."
Defendant called O'Connell a second time on June 8,
1998.  He wanted to know why O'Connell had not come up to Olympia
to talk to him.  During that conversation, defendant said that
his lawyer (2) had told him "not to talk to you."  As defendant
explained, he had directed his lawyer, "[G]o feel 'em out, you
know.  Tell the prosecutor or whoever * * * [t]hat I want to talk
to 'em.  [The lawyer] said * * * no, no you don't talk to 'em,
this an[d] that."  O'Connell replied, "You do, you know, do what
you thin[k] best.  I, I am doing my best to try and get up
there."
Defendant then briefly sketched out for O'Connell what
had occurred the day of Saffa's death.  He said that he, his
girlfriend, and Saffa had driven to Parrett Mountain to look at
some property that defendant was thinking about buying.  While
they were on Parrett Mountain, defendant and Saffa got into a
struggle over the business.  The girlfriend took a gun out of the
van to try to get their attention.  When defendant tried to take
the gun away from her, it discharged accidentally hitting and
killing Saffa.
Defendant explained that he had called O'Connell
because he was concerned that his girlfriend was changing her
story, either under the influence of Saffa's brother Alaa or to
avoid her own responsibility for Saffa's death.  Defendant wanted
O'Connell to understand the "true facts," asked O'Connell to
arrange a polygraph test so that defendant could prove his
innocence, and wanted O'Connell to tape record his conversations
with his girlfriend to prove that she had been there when Saffa
died.
The day after that telephone call, on June 9, 1998, the
trial court appointed a lawyer to represent defendant on the
charges arising out of Saffa's death.  The lawyer wrote a letter
to the district attorney stating that he invoked "defendant's
constitutional rights, expressly, but not limited to his right to
remain silent.  I wish to be present during any questioning, or
attempted questioning by any law enforcement officials."
On June 25, defendant called O'Connell a third time. 
He told O'Connell that he had a lawyer and that the lawyer
"didn't want me to talk to you."  O'Connell replied that, "[W]ell
you, you do, you know, what you think, uhm, you should do." 
O'Connell explained that he was not going to "comment on
[defendant's decision] either way."  Defendant then returned to
his familiar themes of wanting the officers to arrange a
polygraph examination for him, his concerns that his girlfriend
was now lying to avoid responsibility, and his efforts to
persuade O'Connell that he was innocent.
Defendant spoke with the police officers four more
times.  Two of those discussions are relevant to the claims that
he raises on review. (3)  The police brought defendant to
Oregon on June 29. (4)  Later that day, another officer,
Boothby, interviewed defendant at defendant's request.  Before
talking with defendant, Boothby advised him of his Miranda
rights.  Defendant said that he had told his lawyer to come to
the interview but noted that the lawyer had not done so.  When
Boothby asked if defendant wanted to wait until his lawyer got
there, defendant declined.  After noting that the trial court had
appointed counsel for defendant, Boothby said, "And he's advised
you not to talk about the case, correct?"  Boothby then added
that he understood that defendant had wanted "to talk about some
certain issues."  As Boothby was trying to clarify that point,
defendant interjected that he knew, "I do not have to talk to
you.  I've been calling you guys for months asking to talk to
you."  Defendant then proceeded to tell Boothby about the events
leading to Saffa's death.
Approximately a month and a half later, on August 11,
1998, O'Connell spoke with defendant in person, again at
defendant's request.  O'Connell readvised defendant of his
Miranda rights, noted that defendant's lawyer had advised
defendant not to speak with the police, noted that defendant's
lawyer had written to the district attorney invoking defendant's
rights, and observed finally that defendant had asked to speak
with him.  Having considered that information, defendant
reaffirmed that he wanted to speak with O'Connell and discussed,
in great detail, the events that had resulted in Saffa's death. 
In the August 11, 1998, interview, defendant both repeated and
expanded on the information that he had told O'Connell and
Boothby earlier. 
Defendant's efforts to convince the officers that he
was not responsible for murdering Saffa proved unsuccessful.  The
state continued to pursue the prosecution, and defendant filed a
pretrial motion to suppress the statements that he had made to
O'Connell and Boothby.  The trial court denied the motion. 
During trial, the state introduced evidence from six of those
discussions. (5)  The jury found defendant guilty of multiple
counts of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping, and being a
felon in possession of a firearm.  At sentencing, the jury
declined to impose the death penalty but found that defendant
should serve a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 
The trial court entered judgment accordingly.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals accepted the state's
concession that the trial court had erred in failing to merge
some of the convictions and remanded the case for the trial court
to enter a corrected sentence.  Randant, 192 Or App at 669.  The
Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the remainder of the trial
court's rulings.  Id.  Defendant has petitioned for review of
those rulings.  We allowed review to consider only one issue --
whether O'Connell and Boothby's interviews with defendant
violated his state or federal constitutional right to
counsel. (6)  We begin with defendant's state constitutional
claims.  See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 123
(1981) (stating ordinary sequence of analysis).
The right to counsel derives from two separate
provisions in the Oregon Constitution -- Article I, section 11,
and Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.  The right
to counsel recognized by Article I, section 12, is an adjunct to
a defendant's state constitutional Miranda right.  See State v.
Haynes, 288 Or 59, 71, 602 P2d 272 (1979) (describing Article I,
section 12, right to counsel as a "derivative right" to protect
against involuntary confessions).  It attaches when a defendant
is either in custody or compelling circumstance and only then if
the defendant invokes the right.  See State v. Roble-Baker, 340
Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (2006) (explaining when Article I,
section 12, rights attach); State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89, 672
P2d 1182 (1983) (defendant's request for counsel at arraignment
did not constitute invocation of right to counsel under Article
I, section 12).  In contrast, Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution focuses on a defendant's rights during a
criminal prosecution and provides that, in such a prosecution, a
defendant "shall have the right * * * to be heard by * * *
counsel."  That right attaches when the state indicts a defendant
and does so "independently of any invocation of that right by
[the] defendant * * *."  Sparklin, 296 Or at 92.
In his brief on the merits, defendant does not contend
that the police violated his right to counsel under Article I,
section 12.  Rather, he relies solely on his right to counsel
under Article I, section 11.  He contends that, under Sparklin,
his Article I, section 11, right to counsel attached when the
state indicted him for aggravated murder.  All of defendant's
discussions with O'Connell and Boothby occurred after that date,
and defendant argues that those discussions violated Article I,
section 11, for one of three reasons.  First, he argues that he
could not waive his Article I, section 11, right to counsel
without his counsel's presence or at least advance notice to his
counsel.  Second, he contends that any waiver of that right must
satisfy the standard set out in State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 831
P2d 666 (1992), or at least be preceded by Miranda warnings. 
Finally, he argues that, on the facts of this case, O'Connell
interfered with his right to counsel.
We begin with defendant's argument that either his
counsel's presence or advance notice was necessary before he
could waive his Article I, section 11, right to counsel. 
Commenting on that right, this court explained in Sparklin:
"[O]nce a person is charged with a crime[,] he or she
is entitled to the benefit of an attorney's presence,
advice and expertise in any situation where the state
may glean involuntary and incriminating evidence or
statements for use in the prosecution of its case
against defendant.  This is so whether or not [a]
defendant specifically requests an attorney's presence
at the interrogation."
296 Or at 93.  Ordinarily, "there can be no interrogation of a
defendant concerning the events surrounding the crime charged
unless the attorney representing the defendant on that charge is
notified and afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend."  Id. 
Sparklin made clear, however, that a defendant always may choose
to volunteer statements as long as he or she does so "on his [or
her] own initiative and not in response to questioning."  Id.
The court did not have occasion in Sparklin to consider
what procedures police officers must follow when a defendant
initiates a conversation with them after the right to counsel has
attached.  Four years later, however, the court addressed that
issue in State v. Foster, 303 Or 518, 530, 739 P2d 1032 (1987). 
In Foster, the state had indicted the defendant, and the trial
court had appointed counsel to represent him.  Id. at 522.  The
defendant asked through an intermediary to speak with the police,
who complied with his request.  Id.  After the officers advised
the defendant of his Miranda rights, he spoke with them and,
during the interview, admitted involvement in the charged crime. 
Id.
The court held that the defendant validly had waived
his Article I, section 11, right to counsel and chosen to speak
with the police.  Id. at 530.  The court reasoned:
"In prohibiting police interrogation of a defendant
after the appointment or retention of counsel, this
court was careful in Sparklin to note that '[a]
defendant may, of course, volunteer statements, but
this must be on his own initiative and not in response
to questioning.'  296 Or at 93.  In support of this
proposition, the court cited State v. Beaver, 248 Or
101, 432 P2d 509 (1967), wherein the defendant, after
appointment of counsel, initiated contact with the
police and confessed.  The same form of initiation
occurred here when, according to the trial court's
findings, defendant asked [a friend] to contact the
police so that he could give a full statement of his
involvement in the crime."
Id.  Noting that the defendant had "decided to speak with the
police without any request on the part of the police," the court
found that the resulting police interview had complied with the
defendant's Article I, section 11, right to counsel.  Id. at 530-31.
The court's decision in Foster answers defendant's
argument that O'Connell and Boothby could not talk with him
unless his counsel was present or unless they had advised his
counsel that they were going to speak with him.  Foster makes
clear that neither counsel's presence nor advance notice is
necessary when a defendant voluntarily chooses to speak with the
police.  In this case, defendant contacted the police on each
occasion and initiated conversations with them. (7)  Because
defendant sought to speak with O'Connell and Boothby without any
request on their part, we conclude that, under Foster, they did
not need to notify his counsel before accepting his invitation. 
See id. (recognizing proposition).
Defendant advances a second argument.  He contends
that, before the officers could speak with him, they needed to go
through the sort of colloquy that this court required in Meyrick
to ensure a knowing waiver of the Article I, section 11, right to
counsel.  Defendant's reliance on Meyrick is misplaced.  The
issue in that case was the level of knowledge necessary before a
defendant could forego representation by counsel at trial and
appear pro se.  See Meyrick, 313 Or at 130 (stating issue).  The
court held that a defendant contemplating self-representation
should know, in addition to his right to counsel, of the risks of
proceeding at trial without a lawyer.  Id. at 133.  The court
explained that a "colloquy on the record between the court and
the defendant wherein the court, in some fashion, explains the
risks of self-representation is the preferred means" of
communicating that information.  Id.
In this case, defendant did not seek to waive his right
to counsel and represent himself at trial.  It follows that the
sort of colloquy that the court required in Meyrick was not
necessary for defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent
waiver of his rights in this situation.  Rather, as the decision
in Foster makes clear, when a defendant voluntarily initiates
contact with the police after counsel has been appointed,
knowledge of the Miranda rights is sufficient to ensure that the
defendant's waiver of his or her Article I, section 11, right is
a knowing one.  See Foster, 303 Or at 530-31 (holding that
procedures used in that case complied with Article I, section
11).
Applying that standard, we note that, as defendant
argues, O'Connell did not readvise defendant of his Miranda
rights before talking with him on the telephone on April 21,
June 8, and June 25.  The state responds that there is evidence
in the record from which the trial court could have found that
defendant was aware of his Miranda rights.  Not only did
O'Connell and defendant discuss some of the Miranda rights during
their first telephone conversation, but defendant told O'Connell
during their second and third conversations that his lawyer had
told him not to talk with the police -- a fact from which the
trial court could infer that defendant was aware of the rights
that he was relinquishing by talking with O'Connell.  See
Meyrick, 313 Or at 132 ("[i]n determining whether a defendant's
waiver of counsel was the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right, the trial court should focus on
what the defendant knows and understands") (emphasis in
original).
We need not decide whether the references to Miranda
during the first three telephone calls were sufficient to ensure
that defendant knew all the rights that he was giving up when he
called O'Connell.  As explained below, any error in admitting
evidence from those calls was harmless.  On June 29, 1998,
Boothby readvised defendant of his Miranda rights before talking
with him, and O'Connell readvised defendant of those same rights
before he spoke with him on August 11, 1998.  Both officers also
noted, as defendant had told them on several occasions, that
defendant's counsel had advised him not to talk to them. 
Defendant's decision to waive his right to counsel on those two
occasions clearly met the standard stated in Foster.  Even if the
earlier waivers were insufficient, a question on which we express
no opinion, we conclude that any error in admitting the
transcripts of those three conversations at trial was not likely
to have affected the jury's verdict and thus was harmless.  See
State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (stating state
harmless error standard).  In each of those initial
conversations, defendant only sketched out the information that
he later told Boothby and O'Connell in far greater detail on July
29 and August 11. (8)
Defendant advances a final argument under Article I,
section 11.  He contends, even if he initiated the discussions
with O'Connell, O'Connell impermissibly interfered during the
course of those discussions with his right to counsel.  Defendant
argues that O'Connell discussed certain issues with defendant,
such as taking a polygraph or tape recording defendant's
conversation with his girlfriend, that should be the subject of
lawyer-client communications.  He also contends that O'Connell
undermined the lawyer-client relationship by questioning
defendant's lawyer's decisions.  One difficulty with defendant's
argument is that defendant was the person who raised the issues
that he now contends O'Connell should not have discussed. 
Moreover, having examined the transcripts of the interviews, we
agree with the trial court that O'Connell acted professionally
throughout his conversations with defendant.  In many instances,
O'Connell clarified defendant's misunderstandings, reminding him,
for example, that defendant could not talk "off the record" and
that what defendant said could be used against him.
Defendant also argues that the officers violated his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Before analyzing defendant's
argument, we briefly review the United States Supreme Court's
cases discussing the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the terms on which a defendant may waive it.  A
majority of the Court held in Massiah v. United States, 377 US
201, 205-06, 84 S Ct 1199, 13 L Ed 2d 246 (1964), what a
plurality of the Court would have held five years earlier in
Spano v. New York, 360 US 315, 79 S Ct 1202, 12 L Ed 2d 1265
(1959):  Once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, the
state may deal with a defendant only through his or her counsel
unless the defendant waives that right.  In Massiah, a police
informant elicited information from the defendant after
indictment and appointment of counsel.  The Court explained that
the right to counsel's assistance guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment applies to "indirect and surreptious interrogations as
well as those conducted in the jailhouse."  377 US at 206
(internal quotations omitted).  The Court accordingly held that
the evidence that the informant covertly had obtained should be
suppressed.  Id. at 206-07. (9)
Because the defendant in Massiah did not know that he
was speaking to a government informant, that case did not require
the Court to decide whether the defendant had waived his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.  See United States v. Henry, 447 US
264, 273, 100 S Ct 2183, 65 L Ed 2d 115 (1980) (stating that "the
concept of a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment
rights does not apply in the context of communications with an
undisclosed undercover informant acting for the Government"). 
The Court, however, has addressed that issue in two cases that
bear on the resolution of this case.
In Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387, 401, 97 S Ct 1232,
51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977), the Court held that the evidence in that
case failed to establish that a former mental patient
intentionally had relinquished his right to counsel in response
to police interrogation. (10)  In reaching that conclusion, the
Court was careful to make clear that it was not holding "that
under the circumstances of this case [the defendant] could not,
without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments."  Id. at 405-06 (emphasis in
original).  As Justice Powell observed in a concurring opinion,
"the opinion of the Court is explicitly clear that the right to
assistance of counsel may be waived, after it has attached,
without notice to or consultation with counsel."  Id. at 413
(concurring opinion).
Having recognized in Brewer that prior notice to or
consultation with counsel is not necessary before a represented
defendant may waive his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
the Court considered what steps the police must take to ensure a
valid waiver of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights in Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 US 285, 108 S Ct 2389, 101 L Ed 2d 261 (1988). 
In that case, the state had indicted the defendant for murder,
and he asked an officer if anyone else had been indicted.  Id. at
288.  On learning that the state had not indicted another person,
defendant asked, "'[W]hy wasn't he indicted, he did everything.'" 
Id.  The defendant then mentioned a witness to the murder, and
the officer interrupted him to advise him of his Miranda rights. 
Id.  Having waived his Miranda rights, the defendant spoke at
length about the murder.  Id.
The Court held that, even though the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had attached, the Miranda warnings that the
officer provided were sufficient to ensure that the defendant's
waiver of that right was knowing.  The Court reasoned:
"[W]e have taken a more pragmatic approach to the
waiver question -- asking what purposes a lawyer can
serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in
question, and what assistance he could provide to an
accused at that stage -- to determine the scope of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of
warnings and procedures that should be required before
a waiver of that right will be recognized."
Id. at 298.  The Court noted that, at one end of the spectrum, it
had concluded that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at a postindictment photographic display identification.  Id.  At
the other end of the spectrum, "recognizing the enormous
importance and role that an attorney plays at a criminal trial,
[the Court has] imposed the most rigorous restrictions on the
information that must be conveyed to a defendant * * * before
permitting him to waive his right to counsel at trial."  Id.  The
Court concluded:
"Applying this [pragmatic] approach, it is our
view that whatever warnings suffice for Miranda's
purposes will also be sufficient in the context of
postindictment questioning.  The State's decision to
take an additional step and commence formal adversarial
proceedings against the accused does not substantially
increase the value of counsel to the accused at
questioning, or expand the limited purpose that an
attorney serves when the accused is questioned by
authorities.  With respect to this inquiry, we do not
discern a substantial difference between the usefulness
of a lawyer to a suspect during custodial
interrogation, and his value to an accused at a
postindictment questioning."
Id. at 298-99 (footnote omitted). (11)
The Court was careful to make clear that the issue in
Patterson arose after indictment but before the defendant had
requested counsel at arraignment and before counsel had been
appointed.  It noted that, once a defendant requests counsel at
arraignment or counsel is appointed, "a distinct set of
constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the
attorney-client relationship takes effect."  Id. at 290 n 3.  In
those two situations, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
prohibits police from initiating a conversation with the
defendant that leads to waiver.  See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 US
625, 636, 106 S Ct 1404, 89 L Ed 2d 631 (1986); Maine v. Moulton,
474 US 159, 176, 106 S Ct 477, 88 L Ed 2d 481 (1985) (so
holding).  Only if the defendant initiates that conversation can
the waiver be valid.  See Jackson, 475 US at 634-36 (recognizing
proposition). (12)
With that background in mind, we turn to the six
discussions between defendant and the police that the state
introduced at trial.  The first two discussions occurred after
the state had indicted defendant but before the trial court had
appointed counsel to represent him on the charges arising out of
Saffa's death.  Under Patterson, defendant's waiver of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel will be valid if defendant was aware
of his Miranda rights.  The last four discussions occurred after
indictment and after counsel had been appointed to represent
defendant on the charged crimes.  Patterson teaches that, in that
situation, defendant's waiver will be valid only if he initiated
the conversation that led to the waiver and if he was aware of
his Miranda rights.
As explained above, defendant initiated each of the
discussions with the officers.  He also received Miranda warnings
before his June 29 discussion with Boothby and his August 11
discussion with O'Connell.  As also explained above, we need not
decide whether defendant was aware of his Miranda rights on the
other four occasions.  Even if he were not, any error in
admitting the transcripts of those conversations was harmless in
light of the evidence concerning the June 29 and August 11
interviews.  See Harrington v. California, 395 US 250, 254, 89 S
Ct 1726, 23 L Ed 2d 284 (1969) (even if two confessions should
not have been admitted, any error was harmless because evidence
was cumulative); State v. Cook, 340 Or 530, 544, ___ P3d ___
(2006) (stating federal harmless error standard).  In those two
discussions, defendant repeated at great length everything that
he had mentioned on the other occasions to O'Connell.  The trial
court did not commit reversible error in denying defendant's
motion to suppress his statements.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
1. When advised of that fact, defendant asked, "Is that
bad, bad, bad?" O'Connell replied, "Yeah, I won't, I won't sugar
coat it, that's bad."
2. On June 9, 1998, the trial court appointed a lawyer for
defendant on the charges arising out of Saffa's death.  Because
this conversation occurred a day earlier, defendant presumably
was referring to the lawyer appointed to represent him on the
unrelated charges in Washington.
3. The first of the other two discussions was a September
14, 1998, telephone call to O'Connell, in which defendant asked
about the status of investigative leads that he wanted O'Connell
to pursue.  The second discussion was a December 14, 1998,
telephone call to O'Connell, which the state did not offer at
trial.
4. The State of Oregon held defendant in custody until his
trial on the aggravated murder and other charges arising out of
Saffa's death.
5. The state introduced the transcripts of the telephone
conversations on April 21, 1998; June 8, 1998; June 25, 1998; and
September 14, 1998.  It also introduced the transcript of
O'Connell's August 11, 1998, interview with defendant.  Finally,
the state called Boothby, who testified concerning his June 29,
1998, interview with defendant.
6. Defendant has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising
additional issues.  We decline to consider those issues and limit
our review of the Court of Appeals decision to the issue stated
above.
7. Indeed, defendant often expressed frustration because
the police officers had not called him back or come to talk with
him; as he told the officers, "I've been calling you guys for
months asking to talk to you."
8. Similarly, we need not decide whether O'Connell was
required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before
accepting his September 14, 1998, telephone call.  Even if he
were, any error was harmless.
9. In two later cases, the Court explored the boundaries
of Massiah.  The first case held that the police "deliberately
elicited" information from a represented defendant when they
placed a jailhouse informant in the defendant's cell, who then
engaged the defendant in conversations about his crimes.  United
States v. Henry, 447 US 264, 270-75, 100 S Ct 2183, 65 L Ed 2d
115 (1980).  In the second case, the police used an informant to
obtain evidence from a represented defendant regarding the
defendant's plan to kill a witness.  Maine v. Moulton, 474 US
159, 164-65, 106 S Ct 477, 88 L Ed 2d 481 (1985).  Although
gaining information about an uncharged crime (killing the
witness) did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the police were aware that the informant and the
defendant also would talk about the charged crime.  Id. 
Reasoning that a "knowing exploitation by the State of an
opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being
present" violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court
held that the defendant's statements concerning the charged crime
should have been suppressed.  Id. at 176.
10. In Brewer, the police officers had told the defendant's
lawyer that they would not interrogate him while they were
transporting him to a different location.  430 US at 392.  They
knew that the defendant "was a former mental patient, and knew
also that he was deeply religious."  Id.  During the transport,
they used psychological means to induce the defendant to confess. 
Id. at 392-93. 
11. The Court added in a footnote that it "has recognized
that the waiver inquiry focuses more on the lawyer's role during
such questioning, rather than the particular constitutional
guarantee that gives rise to the right to counsel at that
proceeding."  Patterson, 487 US at 299 n 12.  It concluded that
"it should be no surprise that we now find a strong similarity
between the level of knowledge a defendant must have to waive his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and the protection accorded to
Sixth Amendment rights."  Id.
12. In Jackson, the Court held as a matter of the Sixth
Amendment that, "if police initiate interrogation after a
defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding,
of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's [Sixth
Amendment] right to counsel for that police-initiated
interrogation is invalid."  475 US at 636.  The Court explicitly
borrowed the Fifth Amendment rule from Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US
477, 101 S Ct 1880, 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), and found that that
rule applies equally to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Jackson, 475 US at 634-35.  Similarly, in Moulton, the Court
recognized that, once counsel is appointed, a defendant may rely
on counsel to serve as a "medium between him and the State."  474
US at 176.