Title: In re I.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S229276
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 2018

1 
 
Filed 4/26/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re I.C., a Person Coming Under the 
) 
Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL 
) 
SERVICES AGENCY, 
) 
 
 
)  
S229276 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
)  
Ct.App. 1/2 A141143 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
)  
Alameda County 
ALBERTO C., 
)  
Super. Ct. No. SJ12019578 
 
) 
 
Objector and Appellant. 
)  
 
____________________________________) 
 
In a juvenile dependency proceeding, a child’s out-of-court reports of 
parental abuse are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the child is 
competent to testify in court.  (In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 20 (Cindy L.); 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 355.)  But a juvenile court may not base its findings solely 
on the hearsay statements of a truth-incompetent child—that is, a child who may 
not testify because she is too young to separate truth from falsehood—unless the 
child’s statements bear “special indicia of reliability.”  (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 1227, 1246, 1231 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at pp. 1250–1251 (conc. opn. 
of Kennard, J.) (Lucero L.).)  This requirement, rooted in the constitutional 
guarantee of due process, reflects a balance between the vital interests at the heart 
of the juvenile dependency system:  It is designed to ensure that children are 
 
2 
 
protected from abuse while guarding against the risk that children will needlessly 
be separated from their parents on the basis of unreliable reports that are not 
subject to testing in court. 
We granted review to determine whether, under the rule established in 
Lucero L., certain uncorroborated hearsay statements made by a three-year-old 
child provided a sufficient basis to determine that she had been sexually abused by 
her father.  Although the juvenile court found the statements to be unclear, 
confusing, not credible, and unreliable in significant respects, it ultimately 
concluded that the indicia of the statements’ reliability outweighed the indicia of 
unreliability.  Based on the child’s statements, the juvenile court adjudged her a 
dependent of the court and ordered her father removed from the family home.  The 
Court of Appeal, deferring to the juvenile court’s weighing analysis, affirmed.  
Mindful of the balance of interests underlying the Lucero L. rule, we conclude that 
the juvenile court erred and reverse the judgment. 
I. 
A. 
Under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (section 300), a 
court may exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child who has been abused, 
neglected, or is otherwise at risk of “serious physical harm” because of a parent’s 
or guardian’s abuse or inability to provide adequate supervision, care, or 
protection.  (§ 300 [listing categories of children subject to dependency 
jurisdiction].)  A dependency proceeding commences when a child welfare agency 
files a petition alleging that a child has been abused or otherwise comes within the 
court’s jurisdiction under section 300.  (Id., §§ 325, 332.)  The court then holds a 
hearing at which it may receive in evidence “[a]ny legally admissible evidence 
that is relevant to the circumstances or acts that are alleged to bring the minor 
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”  (Id., § 355, subd. (a); see id., § 334.)  
 
3 
 
“Proof by a preponderance of evidence must be adduced to support a finding that 
the minor is a person described by Section 300” who may be adjudged a 
dependent of the court.  (Id., § 355, subd. (a).) 
“A dependency adjudication is a preliminary step that allows the juvenile 
court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over the endangered child’s 
care.”  (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 617.)  After the juvenile court takes 
that preliminary step, the court may impose limitations on parental authority as 
necessary to protect the child.  (Ibid.; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (a).)  It 
may also order that the child be removed from a parent’s physical custody if there 
is clear and convincing evidence that removal is necessary to protect the child 
from a substantial risk of harm.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c); In re I.J. 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)  In some cases, a dependency adjudication may lead 
to termination of parental rights.  (In re Ethan C., supra, at p. 617; see Cynthia D. 
v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 247–250.)   
B. 
In September 2012, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the 
Agency) filed a section 300 petition to have I.C., then three years old, and her 
brother J.C., then five years old, declared dependents of the juvenile court.  The 
petition alleged that I.C. had been sexually abused by her father (Father), and that 
both children were at risk as a result of the abuse.1  Shortly thereafter, the court 
ordered that the children be temporarily placed with the Agency and issued a 
temporary restraining order ordering Father to move from the family home and to 
have no contact with I.C. and J.C. except for supervised visitation.  Approximately 
                                              
1  
The allegations involving J.C. were dropped at the dispositional hearing. 
 
4 
 
two weeks later, the Agency permitted the children to return to their mother 
(Mother), on the condition that Father remain out of the home. 
A jurisdictional hearing was held over the course of six days in December 
of 2012 and January and March of 2013.  Evidence before the court showed that, 
approximately two months before the alleged parental abuse occurred, I.C. had 
been sexually molested by an eight-year-old neighbor named Oscar.  Oscar had 
come to the younger children’s home and was playing with them in a bedroom 
when Mother noticed that it had gotten quiet and the bedroom door was closed.  
When Mother opened the door, she saw a blanket had been thrown over the bunk 
bed.  Oscar, I.C., and J.C. were on the bed.  Mother asked, “Hey, what’s going on 
here?” and I.C. said, “Oh, nothing.  We’re just kissing.”  Mother asked J.C. what 
was going on, and he began crying and responded:  “Oscar was kissing [I.C.] and 
he put a train in her.”  A wooden toy train was on the bed next to the children.  
According to the social services report, Oscar also “stuck his penis into [I.C.’s] 
vagina.” 
Mother told Oscar, “Get out of my house . . .  I’m calling your mother.”  
Oscar ran home.  Mother again asked J.C. what had happened.  He said that Oscar 
was laying on top of I.C., kissing her, and said, “We’re going to fuck.”  Although 
Oscar instructed J.C. to look away, J.C. at one point turned and saw Oscar putting 
the wooden train in I.C.’s vagina. 
Mother called a hospital to seek advice.  The hospital employee with whom 
she spoke, with Mother’s consent, called the police.  A police officer arrived and 
interviewed the children.  The police later interviewed Oscar, who admitted to 
“kissing [I.C.] on the mouth” but “did not admit to inserting any toy or his penis.” 
Mother later testified that she did not recall either I.C. or J.C. telling her 
that Oscar had put his penis in I.C.  The police advised Mother to take I.C. to an 
emergency room, where a doctor examined her.  The doctor told Mother that he 
 
5 
 
could not tell whether Oscar had used the wooden train or if Oscar had sex with 
I.C.  
The matter was referred to Child Protective Services, but the investigation 
proved inconclusive.  An investigator from Child Protective Services attempted 
without success to contact I.C. and her parents on numerous occasions after the 
incident occurred.  In the months that followed the incident with Oscar, Mother 
testified, she had many discussions about this incident with I.C., and explained the 
difference between “good touches and bad touches.”  She used the words “penis” 
and “vagina” during those talks. 
Approximately two months after the incident, on Friday, September 7, 
2012, the family saw Oscar again when Mother, Father, and I.C. took J.C. to his 
first day of school.  I.C. said, “ ‘Mom, Oscar is going to [J.C.]’s school.’ ”  Mother 
testified that I.C. was frightened and confused.  At that point, Mother testified, 
“we realized we had a problem, because [I.C.] would go to the same school.”  The 
family “talked about it all weekend.”  
On Tuesday evening of the following week, I.C. spontaneously said to 
Mother:  “My dad put his penis on me.”  J.C. corrected her, saying:  “No, that’s 
what Oscar did to you.”  Mother asked I.C. for details, but other than saying it 
happened on J.C.’s bed, “[s]he kept saying the same thing”:  “Daddy put his penis 
on me.”  Mother said she “tried to get [I.C.] to tell me what happened, but it didn’t 
seem like it all went together and made very much sense.” 
The next morning, Mother asked I.C. about what she had said the night 
before.  I.C. said she was “just kidding.”  Although I.C. did not normally go to day 
care on Wednesdays, Mother decided to take her, explaining that I.C. had “told me 
something within the last 12 hours that was rather alarming . . . and I thought until 
I could figure out what was the reason why she was saying this, I took her to 
school, where she loved to be.”  Mother, who worked full time, also explained that 
 
6 
 
she took I.C. to day care that day so I.C. would not be home with Father.  Before 
Mother left, she woke Father and told him what I.C. had said.  He said, “That’s 
crazy.” 
Later that morning, a child welfare worker made an unannounced visit to 
I.C.’s preschool and spoke to I.C.  The social services report states:  “[I.C.] was 
open and cooperative.  Minor was not able to tell the difference between telling a 
true [sic] and telling a lie. . . .  [I.C.] reported to Child Welfare Worker that her 
father touched her vagina with his penis.  [I.C.] stated that this happened in her 
home in [J.C.’s] room.”  I.C. underwent a sexual assault forensic examination at 
Children’s Hospital in Oakland, but “results of the examination [were] 
inconclusive.”  
I.C. and J.C. were taken to the Child Abuse, Listening, Interviewing, and 
Coordination Center (CALICO), a facility that offers forensic interviews of 
children who may have suffered abuse or neglect.  In a videotaped interview, I.C. 
again said that her father had molested her.  I.C. was seated on a carpeted platform 
next to a padded mat.  She promised to tell the truth and not tell any lies.  The 
interviewer asked I.C. what she had done that morning and I.C. said she had 
watched a movie, taken a nap, gone to San Francisco with her mother, gone to the 
park, gone shopping with her mother and bought glasses and eggs, gone to school, 
played in the park, and sat in a chair at her house and watched television. 
When asked what she had told her teacher at day care that morning, I.C. 
answered:  “I told daddy put penis on me,” adding, “then he put a train on me and 
he put a flower on me yesterday.”  Pointing to the mat next to her, she said, “In 
this bed,” but then said they were on J.C.’s bed.  I.C. climbed on the mat, lay down 
and opened her legs and, gesturing towards her groin area, said “he do this to my 
vagina.”  When asked again what Father had done, I.C. repeated:  “Put a penis and 
then a flower and then the train.”  The interviewer asked what I.C. was wearing.  
 
7 
 
I.C. said:  “I don’t wear clothes . . . he take off my clothes.  He take of[f] my 
shoes, my pants and my shirt. . . .  My underwear too . . . and my socks.” 
I.C. said Father then kissed her on her mouth and she said, “stop it,” 
adding:  “And he didn’t listen to me when I say ‘stop it.’ ”  When asked why she 
wanted Father to stop, I.C. said, “because he can’t do that to touch me here,” 
putting her hand on her groin area.  She repeated:  “He didn’t listen to me, so I say 
‘stop it.’  Then he didn’t listen to me. . . .  He still doesn’t listen to me.”  The 
interviewer asked what I.C. wanted Father to stop doing, and she replied:  “Don’t 
do that.  Okay.  That’s . . . mine.  If he leaves my vagina alone, just leave it.  Okay.  
Then he didn’t . . . leave me alone still. . . .  He still bothers me,” adding:  “Don’t 
do that, okay, that’s mine.  If you do that then gonna be in trouble.  So he do that 
. . . and he didn’t stop it.” 
I.C. said she was on the bed and Father was lying next to her with no 
clothes on.  Father “smacked the wall” five times and I.C. said, “stop it.”  The 
interviewer asked I.C., “Was any part of your Daddy’s body touching any part of 
your body when you were lying like that?” and she answered:  “Yeah.  He put 
penis on me.”  When asked to say more about that, she said:  “Put penis on me, 
and he put penis on me, he put penis on me yesterday,” gesturing toward her groin 
area each time and adding “five times” and holding up five fingers.  When asked 
what Father had done five times, I.C. said, “this and this and this and this and 
this,” moving her hand to her vagina each time.  I.C. said it did not feel good.  I.C. 
demonstrated that Father “put penis on me like this,” touching her vagina, and 
“then like that,” poking between her legs with her fingers two times, adding “he 
put penis on me and he do this, this, this, this,” poking with her hand each time.  
Asked if anything came out of Father’s penis, I.C. said, “Yeah,” adding, “it’s 
ducky.” 
 
8 
 
Asked if a penis is the same thing as a train, she said, “Yeah.”  I.C. said she 
got up and ran away to a car in her garage “[b]ecause he did stuff to me and I’m 
sad.” 
I.C. said when Mother returned home, she told Mother what Father had 
done and “told her ‘stop it.’ ”  She “said, Daddy, stop it, that’s not . . . yours, that’s 
mine.  Anyone can touch my vagina.”  I.C. “told her ‘stop it’ and her listen to me.”  
I.C. stated Mother said, “ ‘[S]top.’  ‘Oh my, daddy is going to be in all so much 
trouble.’ ”  I.C. said her father was going to jail and had told the police, “ ‘I 
promise, I won’t do it again.’ ” 
When asked whether Father had ever done that before, I.C. said “yes,” 
explaining:  “He put, hmm, another train on me.”  When asked if this ever 
happened anywhere else besides in J.C.’s bed, I.C. said, “it was in my house and 
here.”  Asked to explain what she meant by “here,” she gestured to the mat next to 
her. 
The interviewer asked, “have you ever seen your daddy do that to anybody 
else?” and I.C. answered, “He do that to RJ,” Father’s 21-year-old daughter from a 
previous marriage.  Asked what she saw Father do, I.C. said:  “Put penis in the 
flower and the train and train and . . . that’s it.”  She added that Father removed 
RJ’s clothes and removed his own clothes and RJ kissed him.  I.C. was with them 
on J.C.’s bed, as well as her babysitter and her babysitter’s sister.  Asked what 
Father wanted to do, she said, “the bad things,” which are “[t]he train, the train 
and train—and the flower and the penis.” 
After a break, the interviewer asked I.C. if Father touched her vagina with 
his penis “on the outside or the inside” and I.C. said:  “The inside.”  When asked 
how that felt, she said:  “Feels hurt.”  When asked where it hurt, she pointed to her 
groin area and said, “here.”  She said that Father took off her clothes and kissed 
 
9 
 
her vagina.  That felt “not good.”  She repeated “not good” several times.  She said 
it happened in J.C.’s bed four times, a “long time” ago. 
At the jurisdictional hearing, the child welfare worker assigned to the case, 
Sylvina Cooper, testified that she believed “that the allegation of sexual molest of 
the minor, [I.C.], is accurate” and “that there has to be a process for the father in 
terms of counseling . . . and for someone to assess when and if it would be a good 
time for the father to return to the family unit.” 
Cooper testified that I.C. “presents as being very, very intelligent and very, 
very mature, beyond the age of three.  And she has a very high level of language 
development.”  Cooper watched the video recording of I.C.’s CALICO interview 
and “believe[d] that most of the statements that [I.C.] made are credible” and that 
I.C. knows the difference between what is true and what is false.  I.C. reported to 
her mother, school personnel at the day care center, the child welfare worker who 
interviewed I.C. at the day care center, and the CALICO interviewer that her 
father had sexually molested her and each account was consistent.  Cooper knew 
of no possible motive for I.C. to make up these allegations.  Finally, Cooper 
testified that during a supervised visit, I.C. asked if Father could come home. 
Father’s 21-year-old daughter from a previous marriage, who is known as 
RJ, testified that Father had never touched her inappropriately and she had never 
seen her father touch I.C. inappropriately. 
Throughout the juvenile dependency proceedings, Father denied that he 
molested his daughter and Mother stated that she does not believe he did. 
C. 
After the close of evidence, the juvenile court declared I.C. a dependent 
child of the court, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Father sexually 
molested I.C.  In a lengthy ruling, the court stated: 
 
10 
 
“This is a very difficult case because the evidence comes from a three-year-
old child who, at times, was very clear in her statements about what happened, and 
at other times was very unclear, and at times very confusing about the statements 
that she makes concerning what she alleges her father did to her. 
“Essentially, all the Court has to go on in this case is the hearsay statements 
of a three-year-old minor, [I.C.].  [¶] . . . [¶] 
“. . . The Court believes that when the minor made the statement to her 
mother that, ‘Daddy put penis on me,’ this was a statement that came out of the 
blue.  It was completely spontaneous.  It was not a product of [] prompting on the 
part of the mother.  The mother was caught completely off guard by the 
statement. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  [T]hey were not in the middle of the discussion of what 
occurred in July or any other matters of a sexual nature.  [¶] . . . [W]hen the minor 
made the same statements shortly thereafter to the staff at the day care center, 
again, the statements were completely spontaneous. 
“She has consistently repeated the same core allegations to various people:  
Her mother, the day care center staff, and the Calico staff.  [¶]  In fact, on the 
Calico tape, she depicted the incident with great detail, using gestures, hand signs, 
words, and actions, as were noted in the police report.  She repeats the details 
throughout the 40 minutes or so of the interview.  [¶] . . . [¶]  And the court can 
find no evidence that she has a motive to lie about the statements that she made. 
“What supports unreliability:  Her very confusing statements about the train 
and the flower as it relates to the father.  It’s very difficult to follow her thought 
process in relating the train and the flower to her father.  It leads one to believe 
that maybe she’s having some sort of flashback to the July encounter with the 
eight-year-old.  [¶] . . . . 
“Another piece of evidence that one could conclude leads to the 
unreliability of her statements is that she made statements during the course of her 
 
11 
 
Calico interview that both her stepsister, RJ, was in the bed with her and her 
father, and two other girls, that they were all naked, and the father was wanting to 
do bad things to them, to each one of them.  These statements are not believable, 
and in fact, were denied by RJ.  [¶]  Her statement on the Calico tape that she had 
an encounter with the father on the couch at Calico was not correct, and it’s 
unreliable.  [¶] . . . [¶] 
“So there’s supporting evidence on both sides. . . . [¶] But the Court finds 
the evidence that supports the reliability more compelling.  The Court does not 
subscribe to the theory that the minor is having a flashback to the July incident and 
is projecting that incident onto the father.  [¶] There’s several distinctions between 
the July incident and the statement made by the minor regarding the September 
encounter with the father.  For example, . . . in the July incident, the minor never 
used the word penis to describe her experience with the eight-year-old. . . . [T]he 
minor did not say that the eight-year-old had used his penis.  She only referred to a 
train being used.  And according to the observations of her brother, a toy train was 
used in that incident.  [¶]  In the September incident, although she talked about a 
train and she talked about a flower, she was very clear in her statement that, 
‘Daddy put his penis on me.’  [¶]  She did not refer to anyone other than the father 
. . . . [¶]  In the July incident, both the mother and the brother were at home.  In the 
Calico statements, she was very clear that the encounter with her father occurred 
while her mother was at work and while her brother was at school.  It’s a very 
different scenario than the scenario in the July incident.  [¶] . . . [¶] 
“So to this Court, reviewing all the evidence that’s been presented, the core 
allegations of the minor have remained consistent, they have remained 
spontaneous throughout the recounting of this incident, and the Court can find no 
motive on her part to lie about this.  The Court can find no credible evidence that 
there is or was a psychological process that was involved here that caused the 
 
12 
 
minor to somehow misstate what had happened to her in July with what she claims 
her father did to her.  The Court can find no evidence of any fraud or any deceit or 
any und[ue] influence.”  The court confirmed that it based its ruling on the hearsay 
statements of I.C. “and the circumstances under which those statements were 
made.” 
The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing in several sessions over the 
course of the following year.  Based in significant part on its jurisdictional finding 
that Father had sexually molested I.C., the juvenile court found that the Agency 
had sustained its burden of proof and ordered that Father continue to be removed 
from the family home until further order of the court.   
D. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and 
dispositional findings.  Noting that the case involved a “somewhat novel 
application of In re Lucero L.,” the court concluded that the “juvenile court’s 
decision to receive evidence of [I.C.’s hearsay statements] . . . is supported by 
substantial evidence and thus properly served as the basis for asserting the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child.”  The court 
acknowledged, as had the juvenile court, that discrepancies in I.C.’s statements 
made this “ ‘a very difficult case.’ ”  But the court noted that the juvenile court had 
both viewed the videotaped CALICO interview with I.C. and “took particular 
pains to state its reasoning as to why it found I.C.’s evidence reliable.”  “Given the 
scrupulousness with which the juvenile court evaluated the pros and cons of the 
hearsay statements,” the court concluded, “there is no basis on this record for 
overturning the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.”  The court further 
concluded that the jurisdictional finding supported its dispositional finding “that 
the minor’s safety required separation from [Father].” 
 
13 
 
Justice Stewart dissented.  In her view, the juvenile court erred in asking 
merely whether I.C. was “more credible than not,” rather than asking whether 
I.C.’s truthfulness was “ ‘ “so clear” ’ that ‘ “the test of cross-examination would 
be of marginal utility.” ’  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 [(plur. opn. of 
Mosk, J.)].)”  She further faulted the Court of Appeal majority for failing to 
review the record for substantial evidence that would have met that standard.  In 
her view, “[t]he juvenile court’s own concerns about the reliability of I.C.’s 
hearsay statements—all of which were uncorroborated [fn. omitted]—
demonstrates that there is not substantial evidence that meets the Lucero L. 
mandate.”2 
II. 
A. 
As a general rule, an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of its 
content is inadmissible in evidence.  (Evid. Code, § 1200.)  This rule, which is “of 
venerable common law pedigree,” is rooted in concerns about reliability.  (Cindy 
L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 27.)  Unlike in-court testimony, hearsay statements 
generally are not made under oath; they are generally made outside of the view of 
the trier of fact, which therefore cannot adequately assess the speaker’s credibility; 
and they are not generally subject to testing through cross-examination.  (Cindy L., 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 27; Englebretson v. Industrial etc. Com. (1915) 170 Cal. 
                                              
2  
Father’s counsel has informed this court that Father has since been 
permitted to return home, subject to Mother’s supervision of his interactions with 
I.C., and that the juvenile court dismissed the dependency proceeding shortly 
before our grant of review.  Father argues, however, that the case is not moot 
because the jurisdictional finding has significant continuing consequences.  The 
Agency did not file a response and conceded at oral argument that the 
jurisdictional finding has significant continuing consequences for Father.  We 
agree with the parties that the case is not moot. 
 
14 
 
793, 798.)  In cases of suspected child abuse or neglect, however, strict adherence 
to the rule would lead to the exclusion of firsthand reports of many victims in the 
very proceedings that are designed to protect them from harm.  Child victims of 
abuse and neglect may be unable to testify in court for a number of reasons; young 
children, in particular, are often incompetent to testify in court because they are 
unable to understand the duty to tell the truth under oath.  (See Evid. Code, § 701, 
subd. (a)(2) [“A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is:  [¶] . . . [¶] 
[i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.”].)  For that 
reason, the traditional hearsay bar has been modified in the juvenile dependency 
context to allow courts to consider certain out-of-court statements concerning 
suspected abuse or neglect, including the statements of so-called “truth-
incompetent” young children. 
This court first began to frame what we have termed the “special 
evidentiary rules for dependency hearings” in In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
368 (Malinda S.).  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1237 (plur. opn. of 
Mosk, J.).)  In Malinda S., we held that statutory provisions authorizing juvenile 
courts to consider “social studies” prepared by probation officers or social workers 
also implicitly created a hearsay exception for the various hearsay statements 
typically contained in such studies.  (Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 379.)  We 
further held that courts may rely on such studies as “competent evidence” in 
making their jurisdictional findings.  (Id. at p. 382 [construing Welf. & Inst. Code 
former § 355].)  In so ruling, we had “assumed that those whose hearsay 
statements appear in a social study would be available for cross-examination.  
[Citation.]  We did not consider whether such statements would be admissible and 
competent evidence if the testimony of the child making those statements was not 
available during the hearing.”  (Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 22.) 
 
15 
 
In part to codify the rule of Malinda S., the Legislature in 1996 amended 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 355 (section 355), which prescribes rules for 
the conduct of jurisdictional hearings.  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1240–
1242 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  Subdivision (a) of section 355, as amended, 
provides:  “[a]ny legally admissible evidence that is relevant to the circumstances 
or acts that are alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court is admissible and may be received in evidence.”  Subdivision (b) adds:  “A 
social study prepared by the petitioning agency, and hearsay evidence contained in 
it, is admissible and constitutes competent evidence upon which a finding of 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 300 may be based, to the extent allowed by 
subdivisions (c) and (d).”3  Finally, subdivision (c)(1) of section 355 provides:  “If 
a party to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to the admission of 
specific hearsay evidence contained in a social study, the specific hearsay 
evidence shall not be sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional finding or any 
ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based, unless the petitioner 
establishes one or more of the following exceptions,” including, as particularly 
relevant here:  “(B)  The hearsay declarant is a minor under 12 years of age who is 
the subject of the jurisdictional hearing.  However, the hearsay statement of a 
minor under 12 years of age shall not be admissible if the objecting party 
establishes that the statement is unreliable because it was the product of fraud, 
                                              
3  
“For purposes of this section, ‘social study’ means any written report 
furnished to the juvenile court and to all parties or their counsel by the county 
probation or welfare department in any matter involving the custody, status, or 
welfare of a minor in a dependency proceeding pursuant to Article 6 (commencing 
with Section 300) to Article 12 (commencing with Section 385), inclusive.”  
(§ 355, subd. (b)(1).) 
 
16 
 
deceit, or undue influence.”4  As amended, section 355 “broadly authorize[s] 
reliance on any hearsay contained in the social study by a child victim under the 
age of 12, as long as an objecting party does not prove that the statement was 
procured by means of fraud, deceit, or undue influence.”  (Cindy L., supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 28, fn. 6.) 
In a separate development, California courts in the wake of Malinda S. also 
crafted a broader, more general common law “child dependency exception” for 
out-of-court statements of children in dependency proceedings.  (Cindy L., supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 20; see In re Carmen O. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 908.)  In Cindy L., 
we explained that although courts must “proceed with caution” in developing new 
exceptions to the “general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible because it is 
inherently unreliable,” the child dependency exception concerned a class of 
evidence for which there was a “substantial need.”  (Cindy L., at pp. 27–28.)  We 
explained:  “[T]here are particular difficulties with proving child sexual abuse:  the 
frequent lack of physical evidence, the limited verbal and cognitive abilities of 
child victims, the fact that children are often unable or unwilling to act as 
witnesses because of the intimidation of the courtroom setting and the reluctance 
to testify against their parents.  [Citation.]  Given these realities, the categorical 
exclusion of child hearsay . . . will often mean the exclusion of significant, reliable 
evidence required for the juvenile court to assert its jurisdiction over the child and 
to ultimately protect him or her from an abusive family relationship.”  (Id. at p. 28, 
fn. omitted.) 
                                              
4  
Subdivision (d) of section 355 states:  “This section shall not be construed 
to limit the right of a party to the jurisdictional hearing to subpoena a witness 
whose statement is contained in the social study or to introduce admissible 
evidence relevant to the weight of the hearsay evidence or the credibility of the 
hearsay declarant.” 
 
17 
 
We also acknowledged in Cindy L. that necessity alone is insufficient; “an 
exception to the hearsay rule is not valid unless the class of hearsay evidence 
proposed for admission is inherently reliable.”  (Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at 
p. 28.)  To “better safeguard the reliability of a child’s hearsay statements” (ibid.) 
and to “provide specific due process protections for parents in child dependency 
hearings” (id. at p. 18), we concluded that a child’s out-of-court statements were 
admissible if:  (1) “the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide 
sufficient indicia of reliability”; (2) the child is available for cross-examination or 
other evidence corroborates the child’s statements; and (3) interested parties have 
notice the statements will be used (id. at p. 29).   
In Cindy L., we noted the passage of the Legislature’s 1996 amendments to 
section 355, but had no occasion to consider their import, since the amendments 
postdated the events at issue in the case.  (Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 28, 
fn. 6.)  We considered those amendments for the first time in Lucero L., in which 
we explored the relationship between the social study exception codified in the 
newly amended section 355 and the child dependency exception recognized in 
Cindy L. 
The question in Lucero L. concerned a juvenile court’s admission of, and 
reliance on, the hearsay statements contained in a social study of a truth-
incompetent three-year-old child.  In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Mosk, 
the court concluded that section 355 authorizes the admission of such statements 
contained in a social study, regardless of whether the statements satisfied the test 
for admission under the child dependency exception announced in Cindy L., 
including the requirements of reliability and corroboration.  (Lucero L., supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 1231 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  But the plurality opinion explained 
that “ ‘[t]he admissibility and substantiality of hearsay evidence are different 
issues.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1244.)  Even though the hearsay statements of a truth-
 
18 
 
incompetent child, contained in a social study, are admissible, the plurality 
concluded, they “may not be relied on solely as a basis for a jurisdictional finding 
unless the court finds that they show special indicia of reliability.”  (Id. at 
p. 1231.) 
In so holding, the plurality applied the balancing test “under California and 
federal law used to determine what sort of process is due in a given judicial or 
administrative proceeding.”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1246 (plur. opn. of 
Mosk, J.).)  The plurality reasoned that “relying too heavily on the hearsay 
statements of incompetent minors to make jurisdictional findings when there has 
been no opportunity for cross-examining the minor” (id. at p. 1244)—and, in 
particular, when the minor “has been determined to be incompetent to distinguish 
between truth and falsehood” (id. at p. 1246)—raises a substantial risk of 
erroneously depriving parents of their substantial interest in maintaining custody 
of their children.  (Id. at pp. 1244–1247.)  Accordingly, due process requires a 
showing that “ ‘the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide 
sufficient indicia of reliability’ ” before a juvenile court may rely exclusively on 
such a statement in making its jurisdictional findings.  (Id. at p. 1248.)  On the 
other hand, the plurality concluded, the federal and state Constitutions do not 
require that the child’s statements be corroborated by other evidence; while “ ‘[a] 
requirement of corroboration is an additional safeguard against the possibility of 
fabrication by very young witnesses whose out-of-court statements are insulated 
from the rigors of cross-examination,’ ” it is not “mandated by due process.”  (Id. 
at pp. 1248–1249.)  Applying these principles, the plurality in Lucero L. upheld a 
jurisdictional finding based on the hearsay statements of the truth-incompetent 
child, concluding that the statements were sufficient to sustain the finding because 
they showed special indicia of reliability.  (Id. at pp. 1231, 1249–1250.)   
 
19 
 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennard, joined by Justice Brown, 
generally agreed with the plurality’s legal framework:  “(1) Hearsay statements by 
a minor who is the subject of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 hearing, 
and who is incompetent to testify because of an inability to understand the 
obligation to tell the truth, are admissible under [section 355] when they appear in 
a social study and are not the product of fraud, deceit, or undue influence; (2) this 
rule of admissibility does not violate the federal and state Constitutions; and 
(3) such statements may not form the sole basis for a jurisdictional finding unless 
they show special indicia of reliability.”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1250–1251 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  Justice Kennard disagreed with the 
plurality’s application of the rule to the facts of the case, however; in her view, 
because there was corroborating evidence in the case, it was unnecessary to 
decide, as the plurality had, whether the child’s hearsay statements bore special 
indicia of reliability. 
Justice Chin, joined by Justice Baxter, concurred in the result.  He also 
agreed with the plurality that “the hearsay statements in the social study were 
admissible and that unreliable and uncorroborated hearsay, alone, would be 
insufficient to sustain the trial court’s jurisdictional finding.”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 1252 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).)  He would have based that conclusion 
solely on section 355’s requirement that a jurisdictional finding must be supported 
by “proof by a preponderance of the evidence,” though he acknowledged that “[i]t 
might also violate due process to base a finding on unreliable and uncorroborated 
evidence.”  (Id. at p. 1253.)  
B. 
1. 
In this case, Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s decision to admit 
his three-year-old daughter’s out-of-court statements describing the alleged 
 
20 
 
incident of abuse.  He contends, rather, that the juvenile court misapplied the rule 
of Lucero L. when it relied solely on those statements in finding that the abuse 
occurred.  I.C.’s uncorroborated out-of-court statements, he argues, did not 
manifest the special indicia of reliability required by Lucero L. to sustain the 
court’s jurisdictional finding.5 
In pressing this argument, Father relies heavily on a passage in Lucero L. in 
which the plurality responded to concerns about the due process implications of 
dispensing with Cindy L.’s requirement that a child’s hearsay statements be 
corroborated to be admitted in evidence:  “In concluding that the corroboration 
requirement is inapplicable, we emphasize the importance of juvenile court 
scrutiny of the statements of young children who are both legally incompetent and 
insulated from cross-examination.  At least in the case of a truth incompetent 
minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only ‘if the 
declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test 
of cross-examination would be of marginal utility . . . .’ ”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 1249 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 
                                              
5  
At oral argument, counsel for the Agency argued for the first time—and 
contrary to the position taken in its briefing—that Lucero L. does not apply at all 
because there was no evidence that I.C. was truth incompetent.  The Agency has 
forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in a timely manner.  (See People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 584.) 
 
Both parties have assumed that due process does not require that a child’s 
hearsay statements be corroborated by independent evidence.  The plurality 
opinion in Lucero L. so stated (see Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1248–1249 
(plur. opn. of Mosk, J.)), but because the other members of the court believed that 
there was, in fact, corroborating evidence in that case, there was no majority vote 
for the proposition.  We agree with the plurality opinion that corroboration is not a 
due process requirement.  (See id. at p. 1249 [noting that a criminal prosecution 
may be based on a child’s uncorroborated hearsay statement and reasoning that 
“[t]he standard of evidence cannot be higher under the due process clause in a 
dependency hearing”]; id. at p. 1248.) 
 
 
21 
 
U.S. 805, 820.)  Father contends that the juvenile court ignored this requirement of 
“clear truthfulness” when it determined that I.C.’s statements were sufficiently 
reliable to support its jurisdictional finding, and that no substantial evidence in the 
record satisfies the “clear truthfulness” standard. 
While we agree with Father that the juvenile court erred in its evaluation of 
the reliability of I.C.’s statements, we do not believe the court’s error lies in its 
failure to ask whether I.C.’s truthfulness was “so clear from the surrounding 
circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.”  
The test established in Lucero L., endorsed by a majority of the members of the 
court, is simply whether the statements show “special indicia of reliability.”  
(Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1231 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at pp. 1250–
1251 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  The “clear truthfulness” language quoted in the 
plurality opinion was borrowed from Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. 805, in 
which the high court held that the prosecution in a criminal trial may introduce the 
out-of-court statements of a young victim of child abuse if the statements bear 
“ ‘adequate “indicia of reliability.” ’ ”6  (Id. at p. 815.)  The court explained that 
                                              
6  
Since Idaho v. Wright, the high court has held that substantive reliability is 
no longer the touchstone of admissibility of hearsay statements in a criminal case; 
the operative question, instead, is whether the hearsay declarant is bearing 
“testimony” against the accused.  (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 
54.)  If the declarant’s statements are testimonial, the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment ordinarily prohibits their introduction unless the witness is 
“unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”  (Ibid.)  Applying this framework, the high court has held that a 
young child’s out-of-court statements describing abuse to a teacher are not 
testimonial, and has noted that “[s]tatements by very young children will rarely, if 
ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”  (Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. ___, 
___–___ [135 S.Ct. 2173, 2181–2182].)  The high court has not squarely 
addressed whether Idaho v. Wright has continued vitality in the wake of Crawford, 
nor has it addressed whether due process places any limitations on reliance in 
criminal cases on the uncorroborated hearsay statements of a child witness that do 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
22 
 
this determination is to be made by reference to “relevant circumstances . . . that 
surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly 
worthy of belief,” without regard to any evidence that might corroborate the 
statement.  (Id. at p. 819.)  The court went on to explain that this rule “derives 
from the rationale for permitting exceptions to the general rule against hearsay,” 
which the court summarized as follows:  “[I]f the declarant’s truthfulness is so 
clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would 
be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the 
statement at trial.”  (Id. at pp. 819–820.) 
When the court in Idaho v. Wright applied these general principles to the 
case before it, however, the court did not suggest that the proper inquiry was 
whether it would have been more than marginally useful to cross-examine the two-
and-a-half-year-old child declarant in the case.  It instead outlined a nonexhaustive 
list of factors for a court to consider when deciding whether “the child declarant 
was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made”—that 
is, whether the child’s statements bore indicia of reliability comparable to 
statements falling under recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.  (Idaho v. 
Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 822; id. at p. 827.)  And likewise in Lucero L., this 
court engaged in the same sort of analysis to uphold the juvenile court’s 
jurisdictional finding in what it acknowledged was a “close” case involving a 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
not satisfy the Idaho v. Wright standard of reliability.  (Cf. Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318 [due process requires that a criminal conviction be 
supported by evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt].)  We have no occasion to consider these questions in this civil dependency 
case. 
 
23 
 
series of hearsay statements by a three-and-a-half-year-old child that “were not 
identical in every detail.”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1250 (plur. opn. of 
Mosk, J.).)  The law’s general approach to the development of exceptions to the 
hearsay bar does properly inform the inquiry.  (See Idaho v. Wright, at p. 820.)  
But ultimately the question is simply whether the “ ‘time, content and 
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability’ ” to support 
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding, considering the important interests at 
stake.  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1248 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting 
Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 29.)   
This reliability requirement is not designed to be “especially formidable,” 
or to be “so stringent” that “it will impede the government’s ability to protect 
children in an abusive situation.”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1247 (plur. 
opn. of Mosk, J.).)  But neither is it an empty formality.  Rather, as Lucero L. 
made clear, the reliability requirement is an important procedural safeguard 
against the risk of erroneous determinations based solely on hearsay statements “in 
an area in which the truth of a hearsay statement [is] particularly open to 
question,” and in which the cost of error may be to needlessly separate families 
from one another, at substantial cost to parents and children alike.  (Id. at p. 1248 
(plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at p. 1247; id. at pp. 1250–1251 (conc. opn. of 
Kennard, J.); see Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 383–384.)   
We have previously identified certain factors courts may consider in 
determining whether a child’s hearsay statements satisfy this standard of 
reliability, including:  “(1) spontaneity and consistent repetition; (2) the mental 
state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar 
age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.”  (Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 30, 
citing Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at pp. 821–822; id. at p. 29.)  Cindy L. also 
cited “the child’s ability to understand the duty to tell the truth and to distinguish 
 
24 
 
between truth and falsity” as a factor—albeit not a determinative one—in 
determining the reliability of her out-of-court statements.  (Cindy L., at p. 30.)  A 
court’s determination is not limited to these factors, however; “any factor bearing 
on reliability may be considered.”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1250 (plur. 
opn. of Mosk, J.).)  “[T]he unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether 
the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement 
was made.”  (Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 822.) 
2. 
The juvenile court in this case acknowledged the nature of the task before 
it, observing:  “This is a very difficult case because the evidence comes from a 
three-year-old child who, at times, was very clear in her statements about what 
happened, and at other times was very unclear, and at times very confusing about 
the statements that she makes concerning what she alleges her father did to her.”  
Although the court made no express finding that I.C.’s statements bore special 
indicia of reliability, the court concluded that I.C.’s statements were sufficiently 
reliable because the statements were made spontaneously, because I.C. was 
consistent in her “core allegations” (that her father had put his penis on her), and 
there was no evidence that I.C. had been prompted or coached, or that she had any 
motive to lie.  The juvenile court acknowledged, on the other hand, that several of 
I.C.’s statements regarding Father’s alleged abuse were “not believable,” and that 
I.C.’s “very confusing statements about the train and the flower . . . lead[] one to 
believe that maybe she’s having some sort of flashback” to her earlier sexual 
molestation by her eight-year-old neighbor, Oscar.  The court rejected the latter 
possibility, explaining that “the minor never used the word penis to describe her 
experience with the eight-year-old,” that I.C.’s description of the September 
incident differed in certain respects from the circumstances of the July incident, 
and that I.C. had stated during the CALICO interview that “what her father did to 
 
25 
 
her hurt.”  In affirming the juvenile court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal 
understood the juvenile court to apply the correct standard under Lucero L., and it 
considered itself bound by the substantial evidence standard to defer to the court’s 
weighing analysis, given the “scrupulousness with which the juvenile court 
evaluated the pros and cons of the hearsay statements.” 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the juvenile court’s lengthy ruling 
is commendably thorough.  It is, however, a separate question whether the ruling 
is adequately supported by the record.  
The plurality opinion in Lucero L. states, and the parties here have 
assumed, that the juvenile court’s ruling must be upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence.  (See Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 (plur. opn. of 
Mosk, J.), citing Soto v. State of California (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 196, 199.)  We 
accordingly proceed on that assumption as well.7  Substantial evidence is a 
deferential standard, but it is not toothless.  It is well settled that the standard is not 
satisfied simply by pointing to “ ‘isolated evidence torn from the context of the 
whole record.’ ”  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577, quoting Traynor, 
The Riddle of Harmless Error (1969) p. 27; id. at p. 578.)  Rather, the evidence 
supporting the jurisdictional finding must be considered “in the light of the whole 
record” “to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence 
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . .”  (Johnson, at pp. 577–578.)  
And in the Lucero L. context in particular, in which the central determination at 
issue concerns the very reliability of the evidence on which the court has based its 
                                              
7  
We note, however, that there was not a majority for this proposition in 
Lucero L.; because the other members of the court concluded that the child’s 
statements in the case were corroborated, they did not consider the standard of 
review that applies to a court’s decision to rely solely on the uncorroborated 
hearsay statements of a truth-incompetent minor. 
 
26 
 
findings, a court may not conclude that the standard is satisfied merely because the 
record contains some evidence that the court could have found reliable; a 
reviewing court instead must consider whether the record as a whole provides 
substantial evidence to support a determination that the child’s statements bear 
special indicia of reliability. 
Here, the evidence supporting I.C.’s reliability was weaker than the 
juvenile court acknowledged.  Although the juvenile court addressed the factors 
identified in Lucero L., it failed to take adequate account of the confounding role 
of I.C.’s prior molestation.  For example, the juvenile court emphasized that I.C.’s 
initial statement to her mother that her father had sexually abused her “came out of 
the blue.”  But I.C. had been sexually molested only two months earlier by an 
older child.  The incident resulted in a response from police, a hospital 
examination, and many discussions with Mother about inappropriate touching and 
about private body parts.  On the Friday before I.C. made her statement regarding 
Father, I.C. saw Oscar for the first time since he molested her when the family 
took her brother to his first day of school.  I.C. was frightened “and very 
confused” and the family “talked about it all weekend.”  It was early the following 
week when I.C. first said that her father had “put his penis on me.”  Given the 
timing, it is unsurprising that her family’s immediate reaction—including that of 
her five-year-old brother—was that I.C. was somehow recalling her earlier 
molestation:  “No, that’s what Oscar did to you.”  Under these circumstances, the 
fact that I.C. spoke spontaneously of sexual molestation was not a compelling 
indicator of trustworthiness.  The probability that I.C.’s statements resulted from 
her recent molestation by Oscar, and her surprise encounter with her abuser just 
days earlier, cannot be ignored. 
The juvenile court also relied heavily on its finding that I.C. “has 
consistently repeated the same core allegations to various people.”  But the 
 
27 
 
consistency of I.C.’s “core allegations” was not particularly strong given the 
juvenile court’s own finding that many of I.C.’s core allegations were either false 
or confusing.  In her CALICO interview, for example, I.C. asserted that she had a 
naked encounter with her father, her stepsister RJ, the babysitter, and the 
babysitter’s sister.  As the juvenile court noted, these statements were “not 
believable.”  As for the “core allegation” that Father put his penis on her, I.C. also 
stated that Father put a train and a flower on her, that a penis is the same thing as a 
train, and that she had seen her father “[p]ut penis in the flower and the train and 
train.”  As the juvenile court acknowledged, these statements were “very 
confusing” and again suggested that I.C. might be recalling the July incident in 
which Oscar used a toy train. 
The connection between the alleged abuse by Father and the July incident 
in which I.C. was molested and her recent surprise encounter with her abuser also 
was stronger than the juvenile court acknowledged.  As noted, both the timing and 
content of I.C.’s allegations concerning her father strongly suggested a 
relationship to her earlier molestation.  It is true, as the juvenile court noted, that 
no evidence showed that I.C. herself had previously used the word “penis” in 
connection with her molestation by Oscar.  But a social services report concerning 
the incident indicates that Oscar had “stuck his penis in [I.C.’s] vagina.”  Mother 
testified that over the following weeks, she and I.C. engaged in several 
conversations about the incident, using words such as “penis” and “vagina.” 
It is also true, as the juvenile court noted, that I.C.’s description of the 
circumstances surrounding the abuse by her father differed in certain respects from 
the circumstances surrounding the abuse by Oscar.  For example, while the 
incident involving Oscar occurred while Mother was at home, I.C. told the 
CALICO interviewer that the abuse by Father had occurred while her mother was 
at work and J.C. was at school.  But I.C.’s description changed over the course of 
 
28 
 
the interview; at another point, she told the interviewer that her mother was 
sleeping at the time of the abuse.  And in any event, the differences between these 
accounts would go only to show that I.C. was not referring to the incident with 
Oscar, or misremembering the incident involving Oscar as having involved Father.  
These differences also are consistent, however, with the possibility that I.C. had 
woven her memories of the incident with Oscar into an imagined account of 
strikingly similar abuse by her father.   
Although, as the juvenile court noted, there is no evidence in this case to 
suggest that I.C. was coached or had a motive to lie, the evidence does indicate 
that I.C. had a tendency to interweave fantasy with truth.  Her fantastical 
statements ranged from the highly significant—for example, her assertion that her 
father had molested her along with her stepsister, babysitter, and babysitter’s 
sister—to the mundane:  After promising to tell the truth, I.C. told her interviewer 
that she had spent the morning taking a nap with her babysitter, watching a movie, 
going to San Francisco, and going to the park, when, in fact, she had done none of 
those things.  This pattern is equally relevant in evaluating whether I.C. was likely 
telling the truth about the incidents involving Father. 
The Agency argues that our review must take account of the testimony of 
Child Welfare Worker Sylvina Cooper, who, the parties stipulated, “is an expert in 
risk assessment for child abuse and child sexual abuse.”  Cooper testified that she 
believed that Father had molested I.C., and that I.C. was not merely recalling the 
earlier incident involving Oscar.  But Cooper herself had not discussed the 
allegations with I.C.; her opinion was based on her review of I.C.’s statements to 
Mother, day care teachers, the child welfare worker, and the CALICO interviewer.  
When asked to explain the basis for her belief, Cooper cited I.C.’s “very detailed 
descriptions of what she said that her father did to her.  Her use of words that he 
put his penis on her.  That she told him that this was bad, these are bad things . . . .  
 
29 
 
She put gestures.  It just seemed very, very specific regarding her father.”  Cooper 
also acknowledged, however, that discussions in the home regarding I.C.’s 
previous sexual abuse “could” have had some impact on I.C.’s allegations 
involving her father.  She further acknowledged that some of I.C.’s allegations 
were, in fact, false.  Cooper’s opinion that I.C. was telling the truth about the 
alleged abuse by Father does not constitute substantial evidence that I.C.’s 
statements bear special indicia of reliability. 
3. 
The Court of Appeal, in upholding the juvenile court’s determination, 
acknowledged the “weaknesses and inconsistencies of I.C.’s statements.”  But it 
deferred to the juvenile court because it believed that the juvenile court’s 
determination rested on an evaluation of I.C.’s credibility based on what the court 
had seen in the videotaped interview.  The court reasoned that “[s]uch a credibility 
determination qualifies as a legitimate consideration, one of the non-enumerated 
factors ‘bearing on reliability’ permitted by Lucero,” and that such credibility 
determinations are “beyond [the] power” of an appellate court “to revisit.”  We 
conclude this was error. 
There are certainly many advantages to videotaping interviews with 
suspected victims of child abuse.  Among them, videotaping makes it easier to 
evaluate the circumstances under which the child’s statements were given and the 
propriety of the interviewing techniques, and it creates a clear record of what the 
child said and the manner in which she said it.  (Cf. Commonwealth v. Patton 
(2010) 458 Mass. 119, 134 [“A videotape possesses ‘certain special 
characteristics,’ including the precise words used by the child and display of the 
child’s demeanor as she related what happened, adding to its reliability”]; Off. of 
Atty. Gen., Cal. Dept. of Justice, California Child Victim Witness Judicial 
Advisory Committee:  Final Report (Oct. 1988) p. 27 [Recording an interview 
 
30 
 
with a child, “more so than a written record, can assist in determining whether a 
child was asked leading questions, or was prodded into giving certain answers.”]; 
id. at p. 28.)  
But the fact that the juvenile court was able to view a videotape of I.C.’s 
interview (as, indeed, was this court) does not end the inquiry.  We are required to 
consider the entire record to determine whether the juvenile court’s finding is 
supported by substantial evidence.  It is possible that the juvenile court may have 
been influenced by I.C.’s gestures as captured on the video recording; as noted, 
Child Welfare Worker Cooper mentioned these gestures in explaining the basis for 
her opinion that I.C. had been molested.  But as noted, given I.C.’s prior sexual 
molestation, we cannot conclude that the degree of sexual knowledge 
demonstrated by her gestures is an accurate indicator of the reliability of her 
allegations involving Father.  It is not clear what else, if anything, the juvenile 
court may have seen in the videotape that might have influenced its reliability 
determination.  The Agency has not argued that I.C.’s demeanor during the 
interview supports the reliability of her allegations involving Father, and the 
juvenile court made no such finding.  And as all acknowledge, I.C. was not telling 
the truth at several points during the interview.  In the end, assumptions about the 
conclusions the juvenile court might have drawn about the child’s credibility from 
viewing an out-of-court videotaped interview are not a substitute for careful 
consideration of whether the record as a whole provides substantial evidence to 
support a finding that the child’s statements bear the requisite special indicia of 
reliability.  The videotape, in short, cannot close the substantial gap between the 
indications of I.C.’s unreliability and the juvenile court’s finding that I.C.’s 
account was sufficiently reliable to support a jurisdictional finding. 
 
31 
 
4. 
A juvenile court presented with a child’s out-of-court reports of parental 
abuse faces a sensitive and difficult task.  “Although the parent has an interest in 
avoiding an erroneous finding of jurisdiction, the child—and, accordingly, the 
court—has at least as important an interest in avoiding erroneous findings of no 
jurisdiction.”  (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1257 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).)  
Courts evaluating abuse allegations must keep in mind that a child’s verbal and 
cognitive limitations may prevent her from providing an account of her abuse that 
is as coherent and consistent as we might expect from an adult.  (See id. at p. 1250 
(plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  A child’s account may reflect uncertainty, and may even 
contain some contradictions, and nevertheless warrant the court’s trust.  (See 
United States v. Dorian (8th Cir. 1986) 803 F.2d 1439, 1444–1445.)  
This case, however, involves an unusual situation in which the child 
recently had been molested and had just encountered, once again, the older child 
who had molested her.  Her repeated statements about abuse were strikingly 
similar to descriptions of that recent act of molestation.  Moreover, the child’s 
accounts contained both inconsistences and inaccuracies that were woven through 
her core allegations.  The juvenile court acknowledged that its jurisdictional 
finding was based entirely on the child’s hearsay statements, but the court did not 
make an express finding, and the record supplies no adequate basis to support an 
implied finding, that the child’s statements bore special indicia of reliability as 
required by Lucero L.  The juvenile court therefore erred in making its 
jurisdictional finding that the child had been sexually abused by her father, on 
which the court based its order that the father be removed from the family home.   
 
32 
 
 
III. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
RENNER, J.* 
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re I.C. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 239 Cal.App.4th 304 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S229276 
Date Filed: April 26, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Willie Lott, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Louise E. Collari, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Objector and Appellant. 
 
Aida Aslanian for California Appellate Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector and 
Appellant. 
 
Donna R. Ziegler, County Counsel, Melinda Leong Capozzi, Nicole L. Roman and Samantha Stonework-
Hand, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Louise E. Collari 
4115 Blackhawk Plaza Circle, Suite 100 
Danville, CA  94506 
(925) 487-3795 
 
Samantha Stonework-Hand 
Deputy County Counsel 
1221 Oak Street, Suite 450 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 272-6700