Title: State v. Gell
Citation: 351 N.C. 192
Docket Number: 469A98
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 469A98
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JAMES ALAN GELL
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a
judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Meyer, J., on
2 March 1998 in Superior Court, Bertie County, upon a jury
verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. 
Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his
appeal of additional judgments was allowed by the Supreme Court
on 22 March 1999.  Heard in the Supreme Court 13 October 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by David F. Hoke,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Nora Henry Hargrove for defendant-appellant.
FRYE, Chief Justice.
Defendant was indicted on 7 August 1995 for first-degree
murder, conspiracy to commit murder, armed robbery, and
conspiracy to commit armed robbery.  He was tried capitally, and
the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder on
the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation; under the
theory of lying in wait; and under the felony murder rule.  The
jury also found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder,
robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a
firearm.
In a separate capital sentencing proceeding conducted
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury found as an aggravating
circumstance that defendant committed the murder while engaged in
the commission of robbery with a firearm.  At least one juror
found the existence of one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance
and an unspecified catchall mitigating circumstance.  The jury
recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence of death for
the conviction of first-degree murder.  The trial court also
sentenced defendant to terms of imprisonment for the armed
robbery and conspiracy convictions.
For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that
defendant’s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free of
prejudicial error and that the death sentence is not
disproportionate.  Accordingly, we uphold defendant’s convictions 
and sentence of death.
The State’s evidence presented at trial tended to show that
the victim, Allen Jenkins, was killed in his home in Aulander,
North Carolina, by two shotgun wounds to the chest, fired at
close range by his own shotgun, sometime during the evening of
3 April 1995.  The State’s primary witnesses were two girls, aged
fifteen at the time of the murder, Crystal Morris and Shanna
Hall.  Morris and Hall both testified pursuant to plea
agreements; the girls pled guilty to second-degree murder and
armed robbery in exchange for their truthful testimony, and
charges against them of first-degree murder and conspiracy were
dropped.
In April of 1995, Crystal Morris lived with Shanna Hall and
Hall’s parents in their home.  Hall was dating defendant, and
defendant, Hall, and Morris used drugs together.  Morris and Hall
also knew the victim, Allen Jenkins; he allowed the girls to
visit his home and drink alcohol there.
The day of the murder, defendant drove Morris and Hall to
Aulander.  Morris and Hall went to Jenkins’ home, and all three
were drinking wine coolers.  At one point in the afternoon,
Jenkins left his home to go to the nearby Red Apple store to
purchase more wine coolers.  While Jenkins was gone, Morris
telephoned defendant.  During the telephone conversation,
defendant told Morris that he would have to “hurt our friend,”
referring to Jenkins, and that he would meet Morris and Hall at
the Red Apple.  When Jenkins returned home, Morris and Hall
walked to the Red Apple, where they met defendant.  Morris, Hall,
and defendant left the store and began walking.  At some point,
the three stopped to talk.  Defendant was carrying a knife inside
his coat, and he told Hall and Morris that he was going to rob
Jenkins.
Morris and Hall returned to Jenkins’ home and entered
through the back door.  Morris went with Jenkins to his bedroom
to help him connect a VCR.  Hall used the bathroom, then left the
house and saw defendant, who was outside.  Hall exited and
reentered the house several times, speaking once to defendant,
who did not respond.  Morris remained in the house with Jenkins,
and the two went into the kitchen to get ice for a drink.  Morris
testified that as she followed Jenkins from the kitchen back
toward his bedroom, defendant, standing partially behind the
bedroom door, shot Jenkins twice.  Hall testified that she was
outside the house when she heard one shot fired.  Hall went
inside and saw defendant with a gun, yelling at Morris to tell
him where the money was.  Morris told defendant that Jenkins kept
his money in a cabinet.  Defendant pried open the cabinet and
took money and a checkbook; defendant also carried away from the
house a set of keys, the shotgun, a box of shotgun shells, and
two empty shells.
After the murder, Morris, Hall, and defendant left, walking
across a field behind Jenkins’ house.  Defendant threw the gun,
shells, knife, and keys into some woods that bordered the field. 
As they walked, defendant stopped under a street light and said,
“Let’s see how much his life cost him,” and counted out
approximately $400.00 from the victim’s wallet.
The three then walked to Morris’ grandmother’s home, where
Morris called her boyfriend, Gary Scott.  Scott arrived shortly
thereafter and drove the three home, dropping off defendant first
and then taking Morris and Hall to Hall’s house.  Lacy White
testified that he gave defendant a ride about midnight and that
when defendant gave him gas money, it looked like defendant had
about $500.00.
In the early hours of the morning of 4 April 1995, defendant
went to Hall’s home.  Hall eventually accompanied defendant to
Virginia and Maryland in a stolen pickup truck.  While defendant
was driving, Hall tossed a wallet, some keys, and a checkbook out
the window off a bridge.  Defendant returned Hall to North
Carolina on 6 April 1995.  The gun and other evidentiary items
were retrieved in July 1995, after Morris showed police their
location in the woods behind Jenkins’ house.
Jenkins’ body was found on 14 April 1995, and an autopsy was
performed the next day.  The state of decomposition of the body
indicated a time of death of between one and two weeks prior to
the autopsy.  Additionally, development of larvae found on the
body was consistent with Jenkins having been killed on 3 April
1995.
Defendant did not testify.  However, several witnesses
testified on defendant’s behalf.  The primary theory of the
defense was that the date of death proposed by the State was
incorrect and that defendant was not involved in the murder at
all.  Defendant also presented testimony and evidence attempting 
to impeach the State’s two main witnesses, Morris and Hall.
In defendant’s first assignment of error, he contends the
trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to refer repeatedly
to the potential testimony of State’s witnesses as “truthful”
during jury voir dire.  Specifically, defendant objected to the
following question asked of prospective jurors:
You may hear testimony from a witness who is
testifying pursuant to a plea agreement.  This witness
has pled guilty to a lesser degree of murder in
exchange for their promise to give truthful testimony
in this case.
Do you have any opinions about plea agreements
that would make it difficult or impossible for you to
believe the testimony of a witness who might testify
under a plea agreement?
Defendant contends that whether testimony is truthful is for the
jury to decide after hearing the evidence and that it was error
to indoctrinate jurors into thinking of the State’s witnesses as
truthful because they had promised to give truthful testimony.
The goal of jury selection is to ensure that a fair and
impartial jury is empaneled.  See State v. Fullwood, 343 N.C.
725, 732, 472 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1122, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997); State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365,
388, 459 S.E.2d 638, 651 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134
L. Ed. 2d 478 (1996).  Regulation of the voir dire is a matter
within the broad discretion of the trial court.  Fullwood, 343
N.C. at 732, 472 S.E.2d at 887.  “‘In order for a defendant to
show reversible error in the trial court’s regulation of jury
selection, a defendant must show that the court abused its
discretion and that he was prejudiced thereby.’”  Id. (quoting
State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 268, 439 S.E.2d 547, 559, cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994)).
The trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the disputed question.  The prosecutor’s voir dire
inquiry merely outlined the plea agreement under which  witnesses
might testify and sought to determine whether a plea agreement
would have a negative effect on prospective jurors’ ability to
believe testimony from such witnesses.  The question did not
invade the province of the jury to judge the credibility of the
State’s witnesses, nor did it suggest that the jury could
disregard its duty to decide which testimony to believe.
Further, at trial, the jurors were instructed that they were
the sole judges of the credibility of each witness they heard. 
They were additionally instructed as follows:
Now, there is evidence which tends to show that
two witnesses were testifying under an agreement with
the prosecutor for a charge reduction in exchange for
their testimony.  If you find that they or either of
them testified in whole or in part for this reason, you
should examine that testimony with great care and
caution in deciding whether or not to believe it.
If after doing so, you believe that testimony in
whole or in part, you should treat what you believe the
same as any other believable evidence.
Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.  See
Gregory, 340 N.C. at 408, 459 S.E.2d at 663.  We conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
prosecutor to engage in this questioning during voir dire and
that defendant was in no way prejudiced by the questioning.  This
assignment of error is without merit.
By his next two assignments of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse prospective
jurors Owens and Lassiter for cause and in later denying his
motion for additional peremptory challenges.  Defendant asserts
that both prospective jurors exhibited an extensive knowledge of
people involved in the investigation and people who testified at
trial and that they had been privy to conversations about the
case by those “in the know.”  Defendant also contends that Owens’
answers indicated he would give greater credibility to a law
enforcement witness he knew personally.
Prospective juror Owens was a State Highway Patrol trooper,
and he admitted that he had discussed with his friend Police
Chief Gordon Godwin some facts about the case.  Prospective juror
Lassiter knew the victim and his family, and he was a friend of
two potential witnesses for the State.  Lassiter also had
discussed the case with people in town and had formed an opinion
“as to how this case happened and who could have done it.” 
However, after a careful review of the voir dire transcript, it
is clear that both Owens and Lassiter indicated unequivocally
that they could listen to the evidence and render an impartial
decision based solely on the evidence presented in court.  The
trial court engaged in the following colloquy with prospective
juror Owens:
Q.
Mr. Owens, if Chief Godwin testified and you found
his testimony to be believable and then someone you did
not know testified and you found their testimony to be
believable, would you give the Chief’s testimony any
greater weight than that other believable witness?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
Do you have any reservations at all about your
ability to set aside what you heard and decide this
case solely on what you hear from this witness stand,
the arguments of the attorneys, and the instructions of
the court?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
You have no reservations about that?
A.
No, sir.
Likewise, the trial court confirmed Lassiter’s ability to
set aside any opinion he might have formed previously, as
demonstrated by the following questioning:
Q.
Mr. Lassiter, you heard me say to the jurors as a
body earlier that the question is not whether you ever
had an opinion about the case but whether you can set
it aside, put it out of your mind and decide this case
solely on the basis of the evidence you hear from the
stand, the arguments of the attorneys and the charge of
the court.  Do you remember me saying that?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And the question is can you do that?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Do you have any reservation at all about your
ability to do that?
A.
No, sir.
Q.
All right, sir.  You firmly believe that you can
set aside anything you knew or any opinion you had
formed at an earlier time and decide this case based
solely on the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and
the charge of the court?
A.
Yes, sir.
The granting of a challenge for cause rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a
showing of abuse of that discretion.  See State v. Trull, 349
N.C. 428, 441-42, 509 S.E.2d 178, 188 (1998), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 68 U.S.L.W. 3224 (1999); State v.
Hartman, 344 N.C. 445, 458, 476 S.E.2d 328, 335 (1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1201, 137 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1997).  Because both
prospective jurors indicated that they could render an impartial
decision based only on the evidence presented and because Owens
clearly stated that he would not give Chief Godwin’s testimony
greater weight than that of a witness he did not know, defendant
shows no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of his
challenges for cause.  See Hartman, 344 N.C. at 461, 476 S.E.2d
at 337; State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 308, 389 S.E.2d 66, 71
(1990).  These assignments of error are rejected.
Next, defendant assigns error to the trial court’s allowing
SBI Agent Dwight Ransome to read to the jury two statements given
to him by Crystal Morris on 26 July 1995 and 12 August 1997.  The
jurors were furnished copies of each statement as Ransome read
it.  Defendant objected, arguing that the statements were not
corroborative and that they contained inadmissible hearsay.  The
objections were overruled and defendant moved for a mistrial,
which was also denied.
Defendant asserts that this issue is similar to that raised
in State v. Frogge, 345 N.C. 614, 481 S.E.2d 278 (1997).  In
Frogge, the defendant allegedly described to a fellow inmate  the
murders of the defendant’s father and stepmother.  The inmate
later gave a statement to the police regarding the defendant’s
admissions.  However, at trial, the inmate, testifying as a
witness for the State, recounted a different version of the
events.  The trial court permitted a police detective to read the
contents of the witness’ prior statement, which was offered for
corroborative purposes.  This Court concluded that the witness’
prior statement “contained information manifestly contradictory
to his testimony at trial and did not corroborate the testimony”
and, therefore, held that it was error for the trial court to
admit the prior statement for the purpose of corroboration.  Id.
at 618, 481 S.E.2d at 280.
It is well established that a witness’ prior consistent
statements may be admitted to corroborate the witness’ sworn
trial testimony but prior statements admitted for corroborative
purposes may not be used as substantive evidence.  See, e.g.,
State v. Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 681, 403 S.E.2d 301, 303-04
(1991).  However, “[i]n order to be corroborative and therefore
properly admissible, the prior statement of the witness need not
merely relate to specific facts brought out in the witness’s
testimony at trial, so long as the prior statement in fact tends
to add weight or credibility to such testimony.”  State v. Ramey,
318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573 (1986); see also State v.
Mickey, 347 N.C. 508, 519, 495 S.E.2d 669, 676, cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 142 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1998); State v. McDowell, 329 N.C.
363, 384, 407 S.E.2d 200, 212 (1991).  However, the State may not
introduce as corroboration prior statements that actually,
directly contradict trial testimony.  See McDowell, 329 N.C. at
384, 407 S.E.2d at 212.
Defendant points to several instances in which he contends
Morris’ earlier statements to police were not corroborative of
her testimony at trial.  For example, Morris’ statement of
26 July 1995, State’s exhibit 10, contained the following
statement:  “The plan was for Morris and Shanna to get Alan Gell
into Allen Ray Jenkins’ house or to keep Allen Ray so that he
could not see Alan Gell come into the house.”  At trial, Morris
testified that “Alan told Shanna and I to go back to the
residence and leave the back door open so that when he came he
could get in.”  We disagree with defendant’s characterization of
Morris’ prior statements and trial testimony.  While the earlier
statements contained slight variations and some additional
information, they contained nothing directly contradicting the
witness’ trial testimony, as was the case in State v. Frogge.
Upon careful review of both Morris’ out-of-court statements
and her trial testimony, we conclude that the prior statements
were substantially similar to and tended to strengthen and
confirm her trial testimony.  Both the earlier statements and the
trial testimony indicated that Morris was aware of defendant’s
intention “to hurt our friend,” referring to Jenkins.  Both
revealed that defendant sought Morris’ and Hall’s assistance in
entering Jenkins’ home through an unlocked door, and both
revealed that defendant had a knife and intended to use it to rob
Jenkins.  In both her prior statements and in her testimony,
Morris related that she told defendant there was a gun in the
house.  Further, the description of events immediately
surrounding  Jenkins’ shooting recounted in Morris’ 26 July 1995
statement was  consistent with her trial testimony.  For these
reasons, we conclude that it was not error for the trial court to
permit Agent Ransome to read Morris’ prior statements to the
jury.
Morris’ 26 July 1995 statement also contained the phrase,
“Dewayne said that ‘Alan has told me all about it.’”  Defendant
contends this was inadmissible double hearsay which  implied that
defendant told Dewayne Conner about the robbery and murder. 
However, Morris’ prior statement, which contained this reference
to what Conner said, was not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, but rather to bolster the testimony Morris gave
at trial.  Therefore, the statement was not hearsay.  See
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1999).
By his next assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred in permitting witness Shanna Hall to assert her
attorney-client privilege with regard to a prior inconsistent
statement Hall made in conference with her attorney.  Defendant
contends that Hall’s prior statement was admissible and that the
court’s ruling denied him the right of confrontation, the right
to cross-examination, and the right to present a defense.  We
disagree.
During a conference with her attorney on 5 July 1995, and in
the presence of Crystal Morris, Hall made a statement concerning
the events surrounding the murder, which was recorded and later
reduced to writing.  In this statement, Hall said that she was
sitting on the porch when she heard the gunshot, yet she
testified at trial that she was standing by the barn.  When
defendant attempted to cross-examine Hall about this statement,
the trial court allowed her to assert her attorney-client
privilege.  Defendant contends that the privilege was waived,
because the statement was later published to others, and that the
statement should have come in under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 106.
We have fully examined the transcript surrounding the cross-
examination of Hall.  It reveals that defendant was specifically
allowed to question Hall on the subject matter of her previous
statement and that her assertion of attorney-client privilege did
not prevent defendant from cross-examining Hall to obtain the
information he sought.  During a voir dire of the witness out of
the presence of the jury, defense counsel questioned Hall as
follows:
Q.
Ms. Hall, do you recall making a statement on
July 5, 1995, in a conference with you, Crystal Morris,
and your attorney, Mr. Perry Martin?  Do you recall
that?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Do you recall in that statement of July 5, 1995,
that you made the statement that I was feeling kind of
sick, so after I went into the bathroom, I walked
outside and was sitting there.  I was sitting on the
porch getting some air and I heard -- I didn’t hear but
one gunshot.  And so I walked in and when I walked in,
I was behind [Crystal] and I didn’t see him do it, but
I walked in after he did it.
Do you now recall making that statement that you
were sitting on the porch when you heard the shot?
A.
No, I don’t recall that.  I was not sitting on the
porch.
Q.
I understand you’ve testified that you were not
sitting on the porch, but my question is did you ever
make that statement to you[r] lawyer that you were, in
fact, sitting on the porch?
A.
Yes, I did.
. . . .
Q.
. . . That would be in contradiction as to what
you testified on direct examination; would that be
correct?  In other words, you said on direct, and I
believe also on cross, that you were standing out by
the barn, I believe, when you heard the first shot.
A.
Yes, that is where I was.
Q.
But you do admit to making the statement about
being on the porch when you heard the shot.  Is that
what I understood you to say?  I’m not saying it’s
correct.  I’m just saying that you made the statement.
A.
Yes.
THE COURT:  Anything further?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No, sir.
After further discussion between defense counsel, the
prosecutor, and the trial court, the court ruled as follows:
The witness has not published the statement to
anyone.  Therefore, I’m going to recognize and uphold
her exercise of her privilege, her attorney-client
privilege with regard to the statement.
Because the State doesn’t object, I’m going to
allow the defense attorney to ask her the question in
the presence of the jury as to whether or not she had
previously told anyone that she heard the gunshot while
she was seated on Mr. Jenkins’ back porch and allow her
to explain her answer.
Without objection, and without Hall’s asserting any attorney-
client privilege, defense counsel did ask Hall the question. 
Further, defense counsel read that portion of the statement to
Hall, and she confirmed making it.  Although defense counsel
originally proposed questioning Hall as to “statements that she
gave on July 5th, 1995,” there is no indication in the transcript
of Hall’s voir dire, or her later questioning before the jury,
that defendant wanted to or attempted to pursue any other aspect
of the 5 July 1995 statement.  Defendant’s argument that he was
not permitted to fully cross-examine Hall is not credible in
light of the trial record.
Defendant’s next issue concerns numerous instances in which
defendant contends the trial court expressed an opinion,
denigrated defense counsel, and commented on witnesses and
testimony, violating N.C.G.S. § 15A-1222 and § 15A-1232 and
depriving defendant of a fair trial, due process, and an
impartial tribunal in violation of the state and federal
Constitutions.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1222 provides that “[t]he judge may not
express during any stage of the trial, any opinion in the
presence of the jury on any question of fact to be decided by the
jury,” and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1232 requires that “[i]n instructing
the jury, the judge shall not express an opinion as to whether or
not a fact has been proved.”  This Court has said that “[i]n
evaluating whether a judge’s comments cross into the realm of
impermissible opinion, a totality of the circumstances test is
utilized.”  State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 155, 456 S.E.2d
789, 808 (1995).  Further, a defendant claiming that he was
deprived of a fair trial by the judge’s remarks has the burden of
showing prejudice in order to receive a new trial.  See State v.
Barnard, 346 N.C. 95, 105-06, 484 S.E.2d 382, 388 (1997).
Defendant makes sixteen assignments of error regarding the
trial court’s alleged improper expressions of opinion and
improper comments.  We have fully examined the trial transcript
and conclude that, when viewed in the totality of circumstances,
defendant fails to show prejudice.  The trial court made
appropriate inquiries into evidentiary issues, asked questions
designed to promote a proper understanding of the testimony, and
generally supervised and controlled the course of the trial and
the scope and manner of witness examination with care and
prudence.  These assignments of error are without merit.
Defendant next raises two assignments of error regarding the
trial court’s prohibition of evidence that witnesses Morris and
Hall previously had alleged that their inculpatory statements
were coerced.  Prior to tendering their pleas, Morris and Hall
had filed motions to suppress their statements of 26 July 1995,
alleging, inter alia, that the statements had been coerced and
were otherwise taken in violation of their constitutional rights. 
These motions were subsequently allowed in part and denied in
part, after which Morris and Hall immediately entered pleas.
Defendant wanted to question Morris and Hall about whether
they had claimed the statements were coerced.  The trial court
refused to permit Morris and Hall to be cross-examined with
regard to the motions to suppress and supporting affidavits
because the documents had been signed by the witnesses’ attorneys
and not the witnesses personally.  Defendant contends this ruling
was erroneous because it limited his right to impeach Morris and
Hall.
A review of the trial record reveals that after a lengthy
discussion of the issue, out of the presence of the jury, between
the trial court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel, the
following colloquy occurred:
[COURT]:  All right.  Essentially what you are
doing is you have marked as defendant’s exhibit
number 4, Mr. Warmack’s motion to suppress in the case
of State against Crystal A. Morris, which is not this
case that we’re trying.  Do you want to cross-examine
her concerning a statement in Mr. Warmack’s motion to
suppress.  The State has objected to it.  All right.
[DEFENSE]:  Yes, sir.
[COURT]:  I’m going to sustain the State’s
objection.
[DEFENSE]:  Yes, sir, we note an exception.
[COURT]:  If you haven’t had your say, you go
ahead. 
[DEFENSE]:  I think I have indicated to the court.
[COURT]  All right.  I’m going to sustain the
State’s objection.  There may be another method that
you would want to pursue.
[DEFENSE]:  Well, I think I can probably ask her
directly on examination was she coerced into making it.
[COURT]:  Certainly.  And if you want to show that
her attorney made some statement, I suppose you could
call him.
The trial court ruled similarly regarding defendant’s attempt to
introduce the motion to suppress in Shanna Hall’s case.
The motions to suppress and supporting affidavits were
inadmissible hearsay.  Cf. State v. Edwards, 315 N.C. 304, 337
S.E.2d 508 (1985) (search warrant and supporting affidavit);
Gouldin v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 161, 102 S.E.2d 846
(1958) (motion and affidavit for leave to file supplemental
answer).  Therefore, the trial court correctly prohibited
defendant from questioning Morris and Hall regarding the specific
documents filed on their behalf in their individual cases. 
However, the record shows that defendant was not prevented from
impeaching the witnesses by questioning them about the
voluntariness of their statements.  We find no error in the trial
court’s handling of this issue, and therefore, we reject
defendant’s argument.
By his next assignment of error, defendant asserts that the
evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
there was a conspiracy to commit murder or a conspiracy to commit
armed robbery.  A criminal conspiracy is an agreement, express or
implied, between two or more persons, to do an unlawful act or to
do a lawful act in an unlawful way or by unlawful means.  See
State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 216, 481 S.E.2d 44, 61 (1997),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1998).  Defendant
contends that Crystal Morris’ and Shanna Hall’s testimony did not
support a finding of an agreement between the three codefendants
to rob or kill Jenkins.
The State presented the following evidence from which the
jury could conclude that a conspiracy existed between Morris,
Hall, and defendant to rob and murder Jenkins.  Morris telephoned
defendant from the victim’s house, and defendant said that “he
would be there in a little while.”  Defendant also told Morris to
look for Jenkins’ money and that “when he got there he would have
to hurt our friend.”  Defendant said he would meet Morris and
Hall at the Red Apple store, and the three codefendants did in
fact meet there.  Defendant told Hall and Morris that he was
going to rob Jenkins and showed them a knife concealed in his
coat.  Defendant inquired if Jenkins kept guns in his house, and
Morris told defendant that he did.  Defendant told Morris and
Hall to return to Jenkins’ house and leave the back door open so
that he could get in.  Morris and Hall did return to Jenkins’
home.  Hall entered and exited the house through the back door
several times, speaking to both Morris, who was in the house with
Jenkins, and defendant, who was hiding in the barn.  Defendant
entered the house undetected.  After defendant shot Jenkins,
Morris showed him where Jenkins’ money was kept.  The three
codefendants then left the house together and walked to Morris’
grandmother’s house, and defendant discarded evidence in the
woods along the way.
“Direct proof of the charge [of conspiracy] is not
essential, for such is rarely obtainable.  It may be, and
generally is, established by a number of indefinite acts, each of
which, standing alone, might have little weight, but, taken
collectively, they point unerringly to the existence of a
conspiracy.”  State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 712, 169 S.E.
711, 712 (1933), quoted in State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 48, 436
S.E.2d 321, 348 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed.
2d 881 (1994).  Further, a conspiracy may be an implied
understanding rather than an express agreement.  See State v.
Arnold, 329 N.C. 128, 142, 404 S.E.2d 822, 831 (1991).  Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, see State
v. Williams, 345 N.C. 137, 142, 478 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1996), we
conclude that the evidence in this case was sufficient to submit
the conspiracy charges to the jury.
Defendant’s eighth argument is that the trial court erred in
failing to intervene ex mero motu when the prosecutor argued to
the jury that witness Peggy Johnson was lying.  Johnson testified
that Crystal Morris told her that defendant was not the person
who committed the murder.  The conversation between Johnson and
Morris allegedly occurred while the two were in the Bertie Martin
Regional Jail in August of 1997, at the time Morris entered her
plea agreement.  On rebuttal, Johnson’s testimony was discredited
by jail records indicating that she and Morris had never been
incarcerated at the same time.  However, overnight, defense
counsel found computer records showing that Morris had been in
the Bertie Martin Regional Jail from 25-27 June 1997, a time when
Johnson was also incarcerated there.  Defendant was permitted to
reopen the case to present the surrebuttal evidence, but Johnson
was not reexamined.
During his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:
The last witness of theirs I want to mention is
this Peggy Johnson.  Now, Peggy Johnson was lying. 
There’s just no other way to put it.  Peggy Johnson sat
on that witness [sic] and told you -- I know you heard
it -- that Crystal Morris told her after her plea
agreement that she did that because her family
pressured her to do it, and that the defendant didn’t
do the murder.
Well, that is baloney.  Peggy Johnson was not even
in jail with Crystal Morris when Crystal Morris did her
plea.  That was an out and out lie.  How can you base
reasonable doubt or any doubt on the testimony of a
liar?  You can’t.  She’s even a convicted liar.
Defendant contends, and we agree, that this argument was
improper.  While a prosecutor may argue to the jury that it
should not believe a witness, see State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313,
344, 471 S.E.2d 605, 623 (1996), it is improper for a lawyer to
call a witness a liar, see State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 217,
241 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1978); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157
S.E.2d 335, 345 (1967).  The prosecutor violated this rule in the
instant case.
Nevertheless, we have said that “the impropriety of the
argument must be gross indeed in order for this Court to hold
that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and
correcting ex mero motu an argument which defense counsel
apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.” 
State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979);
see also Barnard, 346 N.C. at 106, 484 S.E.2d at 388.  In order
to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to intervene ex mero motu, a “defendant must show that
the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness
that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.”  State
v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 45, 506 S.E.2d 455, 467 (1998), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1999).  Defendant has
not done so in this case.
We note initially that Johnson’s credibility had been
impeached by her prior convictions for embezzlement and for
writing worthless checks.  In her direct testimony, Johnson
claimed to have talked to Morris while the two were jailed
together in the Bertie Martin Regional Jail when Morris was there
“to sign a plea bargain for a murder charge.”  Subsequently,
records presented by Captain William White of the Bertie Martin
Regional Jail showed that Johnson was not incarcerated there
during the time period, 8-13 August 1997, when Morris was there
to enter her plea.  Therefore, although jail records admitted on
surrebuttal showed that Morris and Johnson may have been in jail
together for two days in June 1997, there could have been no such
conversation as Johnson contended at the time she testified that
it occurred.  Thus, the evidence presented during trial supported
the assertion that Johnson testified falsely, and we conclude
that the prosecutor’s argument was not so grossly improper that
the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu.  This
assignment of error is rejected.
By two assignments of error, defendant next contends that
the trial court erred in its treatment of the (f)(1) mitigating
circumstance, that “[t]he defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity.”  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (1999). 
In support of this mitigating circumstance, defendant sought to
admit his prior criminal record consisting of one conviction for
misdemeanor larceny of a tractor.  The State successfully argued
that the trial court should also admit defendant’s conviction for
felonious larceny resulting from the theft of the truck in which
defendant and Hall fled on the night of the murder.  Despite
defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury that
“defendant’s record consisted of one felony larceny conviction of
a truck and one misdemeanor larceny conviction of a tractor.”
Defendant contends that it was error to include the felony
larceny conviction in the jury’s consideration of the (f)(1)
mitigating circumstance because the conviction for the truck
theft was the subject of collateral attack by a pending motion
for appropriate relief at the time of defendant’s murder trial. 
Defendant cites no authority in support of this position, and we
have found none.  This argument is rejected.
Defendant also contends that it was error to permit the jury
to consider his felony larceny conviction because the theft of
the truck occurred after the homicide for which defendant was
being sentenced, citing State v. Coffey, 336 N.C. 412, 418, 444
S.E.2d 431, 434 (1994).  We agree.  This Court stated in Coffey
that “it is clear that the mitigating circumstance at N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(1) pertains only to that criminal activity committed
before the murder.”  Id. (emphasis added).  We reject the State’s
argument that the felony larceny was properly considered in the
instant case because it was part of a “continuous transaction”
with the murder.  The continuous transaction analysis is
misplaced in this context.  The language of N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(1) is clear, and we reaffirm our decision in Coffey
that “history of prior criminal activity” as used in that statute
“refers to criminal activity occurring before the murder.”  Id.
Nevertheless, this case is distinguishable from Coffey, in
which we ordered a new sentencing proceeding because the trial
court improperly allowed consideration of criminal activity
occurring after the murder for which the defendant was being
sentenced.  In Coffey, the defendant was convicted of the first-
degree murder of a child.  The murder had occurred in 1979;
however, the trial court permitted the jury to consider, in
rebuttal of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance, the defendant’s
convictions on nine counts of indecent liberties and indecent
exposure that occurred in 1986, seven years after the murder.  In
Coffey, the State “emphasized defendant’s pedophilia, and history
of sexual abuse of children, in closing arguments when it
repeatedly referred to the defendant as a ‘child molester.’”  Id.
at 422, 444 S.E.2d at 437.  We concluded that evidence of the
defendant’s 1986 convictions was “extremely prejudicial” and was
inadmissible either to rebut the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance
or to explore the bases of the opinions of the defendant’s expert
witnesses.  Id.
In this case, we first note that while defendant’s
conviction of felony larceny was improperly admitted during the
sentencing proceeding, evidence of defendant’s theft of Dewayne
Conner’s truck was already properly before the jury, having been
presented during the guilt phase of the trial.  Further, the
evidence of defendant’s larceny conviction was not of the same
highly prejudicial nature as the improper evidence allowed in
Coffey.  Additionally, the jury in this case had before it
extensive evidence of defendant’s drug activity.  The prosecutor
sought to show during the trial that defendant’s drug activity
was an important factor leading to the murder, and she emphasized
this in closing arguments:
Now, the first proposed mitigating [sic] is that
the defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity.  Now, the word significant is very
important in that sentence.  You’ve only had evidence
of 2 prior convictions.
The defendant stole the tractor and the defendant
stole the truck.  You might say well, that’s not all
that significant.  Then you will also note that this
circumstance says criminal activity, not criminal
convictions.
And you’ve heard evidence that this defendant was
a crack user, cocaine user, marijuana user, and that
not only that, but he provided cocaine and marijuana to
2 15-year old girls.
So I argue to you that you cannot find that that
is not a significant history of prior criminal
activity.  I argue to you that you should vote no, each
and every one of you, to that first proposed mitigating
circumstance because his prior criminal activity is
significant.  It’s significant in that it led us to
this point.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s
errors on this issue do not require a new sentencing proceeding.
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s overruling
of his objection to the prosecutor’s biblical argument during
closing arguments of the capital sentencing proceeding.  The
argument went as follows:
From the Old Testament and the Book of Numbers
anyone who kills a person is to be put to death as a
murderer upon the testimony of witnesses.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, your Honor.
[PROSECUTOR]:  That’s what we’ve done in this
case, ladies and gentlemen.
[COURT]:  Overruled.
[PROSECUTOR]:  You’ve heard the testimony of
witnesses.  You have convicted this man and rightly so,
of murder in the first degree.  The death penalty is
here.  Now, they might argue to you the New Testament
changes all that.  No, it doesn’t.  Jesus didn’t come
to destroy the law or the prophesies of the Old
Testament.  He came to fulfill them.
Listen to this in Deuteronomy.  Cursed is the man
who kills his neighbor secretly and all the people
shall say amen.  Cursed is the man who kills an
innocent person for money, and all the people shall say
amen.  It’s time to sentence this man, a murderer, to
die and let the people of Bertie County say amen. 
Thank you.
Defendant contends that this argument was improper on
several grounds.  First, because the prosecutor invoked a
biblical reference specifically as to the people of Bertie
County, it made the death penalty in this case appear to be
ordained by the Bible.  Second, allowing such a religious-based
argument violates the separation of church and state.  Third, it
is constitutionally impermissible to relieve the jury of its
responsibility for deciding defendant’s sentence by arguing that
the death penalty is divinely inspired.  Finally, the religious
argument injects an arbitrary and inflammatory element into the
capital sentencing decision because the Bible is not relevant to
the facts or law of this case.
We begin by repeating our recent warning to counsel
that they should base their jury arguments solely upon
the secular law and the facts.  Jury arguments based on
any of the religions of the world inevitably pose a
danger of distracting the jury from its sole and
exclusive duty of applying secular law and
unnecessarily risk reversal of otherwise error-free
trials.
State v. Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 27, 510 S.E.2d 626, 643, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 68 U.S.L.W. 3228 (1999).
However, we also note that “‘more often than not,’ we have
concluded that such biblical arguments are within permissible
margins given counsel in arguing ‘hotly contested cases.’”  State
v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 36, 478 S.E.2d 163, 182 (1996), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997); see also State
v. Holden, 346 N.C. 404, 433, 488 S.E.2d 514, 530 (1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1126, 140 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1998).  We conclude
that such is the case here and that the trial court did not err
in overruling defendant’s objection to the first part of the
above argument or in failing to intervene ex mero motu as to the
remainder.
The first part of the prosecutor’s argument, to which
defendant objected, emphasized “the testimony of witnesses” and
sought to remind the jury that it had heard testimony from
witnesses supporting its verdict of guilty.  This is not the type
of argument that we have in the past found to be an “improper use
of religious sentiment.”  State v. Ingle, 336 N.C. 617, 648, 445
S.E.2d 880, 896 (1994) (citing State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 313
S.E.2d 507 (1984) (disapproving argument that the power of public
officials is ordained by God), and State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326,
307 S.E.2d 304 (1983) (noting the impropriety of arguing that the
death penalty is divinely inspired)), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1020, 131 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1995).  Further, immediately preceding
the challenged argument, the prosecutor clearly referred to the
secular laws of North Carolina, telling the jury, “[t]he State
has proven to you what is required by law for the imposition of
the death penalty in this case.”  See Bond, 345 N.C. at 36-37,
478 S.E.2d at 182; State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 61, 463 S.E.2d
738, 770 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 794
(1996).
As to the remainder of the prosecutor’s argument, defendant
did not object at trial.  Again, the prosecutor did not say that
the law of North Carolina is divinely inspired or that law
officers are ordained by God.  Walls, 342 N.C. at 61, 463 S.E.2d
at 770; see also Davis, 349 N.C. at 47, 506 S.E.2d at 480. 
Defendant particularly complains that the prosecutor’s argument
“takes the Biblical mandate and applies it to Bertie County,
making it appear that the death penalty in this case is ordained
by the Good Book.”  We disagree.  The prosecutor said, “and let
the people of Bertie County say amen.”  This falls within the
permissible practice of “urg[ing] the jury to act as the voice
and conscience of the community.”  State v. Peterson, 350 N.C.
518, 531, 516 S.E.2d 131, 139 (1999).  Thus, while we do not
approve of the prosecutor’s use of biblical references in the
closing arguments of this sentencing proceeding, we do not find
the argument to be so grossly improper that the trial court erred
by failing to intervene ex mero motu.  This assignment of error
is rejected.
Defendant’s next assignment of error also concerns the
prosecutor’s closing arguments at sentencing.  Defendant contends
that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor, over
objection, to address the jurors by name and inform them that it
was time for them to impose the death penalty, citing State v.
Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 362 S.E.2d 513 (1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988).  In Holden, this Court found
no error where the trial court sustained the State’s objection to
the defense counsel’s attempt to ask each juror individually to
spare the defendant’s life.  We held that the argument “was
improper in that it asked each individual juror to decide
defendant’s fate on an emotional basis, in disregard of the
statutorily prescribed procedure of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, and in
disregard of the jurors’ duty to deliberate with the entire jury
toward the end of reaching a unanimous verdict.”  Id. at 163, 362
S.E.2d 537.
In this case, the prosecutor reminded the jurors that,
during voir dire, each had answered “yes” when asked whether he
or she could return a sentence of death “[i]f the State proves to
you what is required by law for the imposition of the death
penalty.”  The prosecutor then called out the jurors’ names and
said, “The State has proven to you what is required by law for
the imposition of the death penalty in this case.  The time has
come for you to impose the sentence of death in this case.”
The basis for the Court’s decision in Holden was that the
defendant’s argument attempted to persuade jurors to decide the
defendant’s sentence “on an emotional basis, in disregard of the
statutorily prescribed procedure . . . and in disregard of the
jurors’ duty to deliberate.”  Id.  In the instant case, the
State’s argument merely sought to remind the jurors that they had
affirmed that they could follow the law if the State proved what
was required to impose the death penalty.  This case is similar
to State v. Wynne, in which we held that the rule of Holden was
not violated where the prosecutor, in closing arguments, called
the jurors by name and asked them to “have no doubt.”  329 N.C.
507, 525, 406 S.E.2d 812, 821 (1991).  This assignment of error
is rejected.
By two assignments of error, defendant next contends that
the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu to
prevent the prosecutor from commenting on defendant’s exercise of
his right to remain silent.  During the closing arguments of the
sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor stated that defendant had
not acknowledged wrongdoing and asked the jurors if they had
heard defendant apologize or express sorrow or remorse.  This
Court has previously held that similar statements do not
constitute an impermissible comment on a defendant’s absolute
right to remain silent.  See, e.g., State v. McNatt, 342 N.C.
173, 175-76, 463 S.E.2d 76, 77-78 (1995); State v. Hill, 311 N.C.
465, 474-75, 319 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1984).  We reject this
assignment of error.
By another assignment of error, defendant claims that the
trial court erred and violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 and the Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution when it denied defendant’s request for a peremptory
instruction on the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance of “[t]he
defendant having found a closer path to the Lord.”  In support of
this mitigating circumstance, defendant presented the testimony
of Richard Hayes, a pastor who visited defendant in jail.  Hayes
and defendant prayed together and read and discussed scriptures
and salvation.
A defendant is entitled to a peremptory instruction when a
mitigating circumstance is supported by uncontroverted evidence. 
See State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 568, 508 S.E.2d 253, 274
(1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1999);
State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 446, 502 S.E.2d 563, 582 (1998),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 L. Ed. 2d 907 (1999).  Reverend
Hayes testified, “I believe that [defendant] is seeking a closer
walk with the Lord, and I hope he’s finding that.”  During the
charge conference, the prosecutor argued that “[t]here is
testimony that the reverend has an opinion on that [mitigating
circumstance], but there is no evidence as to what the defendant
has really discovered,” and the trial court declined to give a
peremptory instruction.  We conclude that while Reverend Hayes’
testimony could support the jury’s finding the mitigating
circumstance, it is not uncontroverted evidence that defendant
had “found” a closer path to the Lord.  The trial court did not
err in failing to give a peremptory instruction as to this
mitigating circumstance, and this assignment of error is
rejected.
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred and
violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16 when it aggravated defendant’s
armed robbery sentence by finding that defendant was armed with a
deadly weapon at the time of the offense.  The State argues that
the trial court did not in fact find the use of a deadly weapon
as an aggravating factor in sentencing defendant for armed
robbery.  We agree.  The transcript fully supports the State’s
position; it clearly indicates that the trial court did not--and
recognized that it could not--find this aggravating factor in
sentencing defendant for the armed robbery conviction.  The fact
that box number 10 on the “Felony Judgment Findings of
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors” form was checked is an
obvious clerical error because it is inconsistent with the trial
court’s actual findings.  Defendant is not entitled to a new
sentencing hearing on the armed robbery conviction.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in its instructions on Issues Three and Four of
the sentencing instructions.  Defendant argues that the trial
court instructed the jury in contradictory terms, at one point
telling jurors that they “must” consider mitigating circumstances
in deciding Issue Three and then that they “may” consider found
mitigating circumstances in Issue Four.  Defendant contends that
the two different treatments of the mitigating circumstances were
confusing, leading to an unreliable and unguided jury decision. 
We disagree.
Because defendant did not object at trial, this issue is
reviewed for plain error.  See State v. Adams, 347 N.C. 48, 69,
490 S.E.2d 220, 231 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1096, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 878 (1998); State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 541, 467 S.E.2d
12, 23 (1996).  “In order to rise to the level of plain error,
the error in the trial court’s instructions must be so
fundamental that (i) absent the error, the jury probably would
have reached a different verdict; or (ii) the error would
constitute a miscarriage of justice if not corrected.”  State v.
King, 342 N.C. 357, 365, 464 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1995).
The instructions of which defendant now complains are as
follows:
Now, please look at Issue Number 3 on your form. 
That issue reads do you unanimously find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances found is, or are, insufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
found by you?
If you find from the evidence one or more
mitigating circumstances, you must weigh the
aggravating circumstance found by you against the
mitigating circumstances when deciding this issue.
When you decide this issue, each juror must
consider any mitigating circumstance or circumstances
that the juror determined to exist by a preponderance
of the evidence in Issue 2.  In so doing, you are the
sole judges of the weight to be given any individual
circumstance which you find, whether it be aggravating
or mitigating.
. . . .
If you answer Number 3, yes, you must consider then Issue
Number 4.  Look at it on your form.  It reads do you unanimously
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance
you found is sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition
of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating
circumstance or circumstances found by one or more of you?
Now, in deciding this issue, you are not to
consider the aggravating circumstance standing alone. 
You must consider it in connection with any mitigating
circumstances found by one or more of you.  When you
make this comparison, every juror may consider any
mitigating circumstance or circumstances that juror
determined to exist by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Emphasis added.)
We do not accept defendant’s contention that the use of the
word “must” in the instruction on Issue Three and the word “may”
in the instruction on Issue Four confused the jury or created a
contradiction in the instructions leaving the jury unguided in
determining defendant’s sentence.  The above-quoted instructions
given by the trial court in this case are virtually identical to
the pattern capital sentencing instructions.  See N.C.P.I.--Crim.
150.10 (1998).  As this Court said in State v. Lee, approving the
pattern instructions:
The rule of McKoy [v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990),] is that jurors may not
be prevented from considering mitigating circumstances
which they found to exist in Issue Two.  Far from
precluding a juror’s consideration of mitigating
circumstances he or she may have found, the instant
instruction expressly instructs that the evidence in
mitigation must be weighed against the evidence in
aggravation.
335 N.C. at 287, 439 S.E.2d at 569-70.
The trial court’s instructions in this case were nearly
identical to the jury instructions approved in State v. Lee and
in numerous other cases.  See, e.g., Gregory, 340 N.C. at 417-18,
459 S.E.2d at 668; State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 532-33, 453
S.E.2d 824, 852-53, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 
(1995).  Most important, the instructions in this case did not
preclude a juror from considering mitigating circumstances he or
she may have found, and they instructed that the evidence in
mitigation must be weighed against the evidence in aggravation. 
See Lee, 335 N.C. at 287, 439 S.E.2d at 570.  We find no error,
plain or otherwise.
Also under this assignment of error, defendant raises the
claim, repeatedly rejected by this Court, that use of the word
“may” in the trial court’s instructions on sentencing Issue Four
was error.  We decline to depart from our prior decisions on this
issue.  See, e.g., State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 653, 509
S.E.2d 415, 426 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d
___, 68 U.S.L.W. 3225 (1999).
By another assignment of error, defendant challenges the
trial court’s denial of his motion to bar the request for or
imposition of the death penalty.  Defendant acknowledges that
this Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of North
Carolina’s death penalty statute, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000.  See,
e.g., Williams, 350 N.C. at 35, 510 S.E.2d at 648; State v.
Stephens, 347 N.C. 352, 368, 493 S.E.2d 435, 445 (1997), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1998).  Defendant,
however, requests that this Court reconsider its previous
decisions upholding the death penalty, citing Justice Blackmun’s
dissent in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143, 127 L. Ed. 2d
435, 436 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  We have considered
this argument before, and defendant presents no new compelling
reason for this Court to change its position.  See Williams, 350
N.C. at 36, 510 S.E.2d at 648.  Additionally, defendant contends
that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to
defendant in this case because “defendant’s sentencing procedure
did not conform to N.C.G.S. [§] 15A-2000.”  We disagree, having
found no reversible error in defendant’s capital sentencing
proceeding.  This assignment of error is rejected.
Defendant raises eight additional issues that he concedes
have been previously decided adversely to his position. 
Defendant raises the following issues for purposes of requesting
that this Court reconsider its prior holdings and to preserve the
issues for subsequent review:  (1) whether the trial court erred
by denying defendant’s motion to preclude the prosecution from
using peremptory challenges to strike jurors who indicated
uncertainty about the death penalty, (2) whether the trial court
erred by denying defendant’s motion for individual jury voir
dire, (3) whether the trial court’s instruction that all evidence
in both phases of the trial was competent for the jurors’
consideration violated defendant’s constitutional rights,
(4) whether the trial court erred in submitting the aggravating
circumstance that the murder was committed by defendant while
engaged in the commission of robbery with a firearm, (5) whether
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for
additional peremptory challenges, (6) whether the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s motion to prohibit death-
qualification of the jury, (7) whether the trial court erred in
instructing the jurors that they must consider whether the
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances have mitigating value and
may reject those that do not, and (8) whether the trial court’s
use of the terms “satisfaction” and “satisfy” in instructions
defining the burden of proof applicable to mitigating
circumstances was plain error.  After carefully considering
defendant’s arguments on these issues, we find no compelling
reason to depart from our prior holdings.
 Having concluded that defendant’s trial and separate
capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we
turn to the duties reserved exclusively for this Court in capital
cases.  It is our duty under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2) to
ascertain:  (1) whether the record supports the jury’s finding of
the aggravating circumstance on which the sentence of death was
based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
consideration; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.
In this case, the sole aggravating circumstance submitted to
and found by the jury was that the murder was committed by
defendant while defendant was engaged in the commission of
robbery with a firearm, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5).  After
thoroughly examining the record, transcripts, and briefs in this
case, we conclude that the jury’s finding of the (e)(5)
aggravating circumstance was fully supported by evidence
presented at defendant’s trial.  Further, there is no indication
that the sentence of death in this case was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
consideration.  We now turn to our final statutory duty of
proportionality review.
We begin our proportionality review by comparing the present
case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the
death penalty was disproportionate.  State v. McCollum, 334 N.C.
208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  We have found the death penalty
disproportionate in seven cases.  State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318,
372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d
653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483
S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997),
and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988);
State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v.
Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163; State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C.
674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305
S.E.2d 703 (1983).
We conclude that this case is not substantially similar to
any case in which this Court has found the death penalty
disproportionate.  We note several features of this case that 
distinguish it from the cases in which we have found the death
sentence to be disproportionate.  First, it is significant that
the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the
theories of malice, premeditation, and deliberation; lying in
wait; and felony murder.  We have said that “[t]he finding of
premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and
calculated crime.”  State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d
470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S.
1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).  “A defendant’s lying in wait to
commit murder has also been recognized by this Court as a
significant consideration in proportionality review.”  State v.
LeGrande, 346 N.C. 718, 730, 487 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1997). 
Additionally, the victim was shot twice at close range in his own
home.  This Court has emphasized that a murder committed in the
home particularly “shocks the conscience, not only because a life
was senselessly taken, but because it was taken by the
surreptitious invasion of an especially private place, one in
which a person has a right to feel secure.”  State v. Brown, 320
N.C. 179, 231, 358 S.E.2d 1, 34, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98
L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987), quoted in Adams, 347 N.C. at 77, 490 S.E.2d
at 236.  In this case, defendant engaged in a conspiracy with two
young girls to commit the armed robbery and murder, relying on
the victim’s familiarity with and trust of the girls to gain
access to the victim’s home.  Finally, although the jury
considered a total of twenty-four statutory and nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, only two were found by at least one
juror to exist and to have mitigating value:  the (f)(9) catchall
mitigating circumstance, unspecified; and the nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance that defendant had a substance abuse
problem at the time of the incident.
It is also proper to compare this case to those where the
death sentence was found proportionate.  McCollum, 334 N.C. at
244, 433 S.E.2d at 164.  However, it is unnecessary to cite every
case used for comparison.  Id.; State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350,
400, 428 S.E.2d 118, 146, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed.
2d 341 (1993).  Whether the death penalty is disproportionate “in
a particular case ultimately rest[s] upon the ‘experienced
judgments’ of the members of this Court.”  State v. Green, 336
N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046,
130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994).
We cannot conclude, after comparing this case to other
roughly similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed and
considering both the crime and defendant, that the death penalty
was disproportionate or excessive as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court must be and are
left undisturbed.
NO ERROR.