Title: Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler
Citation: 190 So. 2d 313
Docket Number: 34347
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 28, 1966

190 So. 2d 313 (1965)
SINCLAIR REFINING CO., a Corporation, Petitioner,
v.
Margaret Scott BUTLER, As Administratrix of the Estate of Warren E. Butler, Deceased, and J.P. Canington, Respondents.
No. 34347.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 20, 1965.
On Rehearing September 28, 1966.
*314 Scott, McCarthy, Preston &amp; Steel and Dwight Sullivan, Miami, for petitioner.
Green &amp; Hastings and Irma Robbins Feder, Miami, for Margaret Scott Butler.
Fred C. Davant, of Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Hinckley &amp; Davant, Miami, for J.P. Canington.
PER CURIAM.
We have heard oral argument on the petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeal, Third District, 172 So. 2d 499, because of apparent jurisdiction in this court.
After oral argument and a careful study of the record and briefs, we conclude this *315 court is without jurisdiction in the matter because of lack of a direct conflict as required by the Constitution, Article V, Section 4, F.S.A.
The writ is discharged.
THORNAL, C.J., THOMAS, ROBERTS, and O'DONNELL, JJ., and TROWBRIDGE, Circuit Judge, concur.
ROBERTS, Justice.
On rehearing granted we have reconsidered the question of direct-conflict jurisdiction posed by the petitioner, Sinclair Refining Co., and have concluded that the record proper in the cause brought here for review from the District Court of Appeal, Third District, discloses a conflict with a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, on the same point of law. The factual background is set forth in the decision of the District Court, reported at 172 So. 2d 499.
An examination of the record proper discloses that the trial court charged the jury:
Upon reviewing the charges, the District Court said:
The conflict is no less real because of the fact that the Third District appellate court in the case sub judice did not discuss the point of law involved and simply held, in general terms, that the trial court did not commit "harmful error" in its ruling on the matter in question. The giving of the charge by the trial court was assigned as error and argued on the appeal and, as noted, was, in effect, affirmed without discussion by the District Court. This court is now committed to the rule that such a disposition of a point of law, appearing in the record proper, may constitute a decisional conflict sufficient to invoke the direct-conflict jurisdiction of this court to review by certiorari the decision on such point made by a District Court of Appeal. See Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., Fla. 1965, 177 So. 2d 221; Home Development Company of St. Petersburg v. Bursani, Fla. 1965, 178 So. 2d 113; and Young Spring &amp; Wire Corp. v. Smith, Fla. 1965, 176 So. 2d 903.
Having concluded that we have direct-conflict jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, we have also considered the propriety of its decision of the legal question upon which a directly opposite conclusion was reached by the Second District Court of Appeal in Doby v. Griffin, Fla.App. 1965, 171 So. 2d 404. This question may be stated as follows:
In Doby v. Griffin, supra, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held "no", and in this case the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held "yes".
Section 45.11, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., is known as the "survival statute" and provides for so-called "survival actions" as follows:
In the instant case the survival action was brought by the widow of the decedent, as administratrix of his estate, to recover damages for the physical injuries and pain and suffering of the decedent and medical expense. Although no special claim was made in the complaint for the funeral expense, the plaintiff was allowed to adduce evidence of such expense (over the objection of the petitioner, one of the defendants) and the court charged the jury (also over the objection of the petitioner) that the "cost of his funeral and burial expense" could be considered by the jury in awarding damages to the plaintiff. As noted, this ruling was in effect affirmed without comment by the appellate court in the case presently before us. In Doby v. Griffin, supra, 171 So. 2d 404, a survival action also brought by the administratrix of decedent's estate, it was held flatly and unequivocally by the Second District Court of Appeal that funeral expenses were not recoverable.
The decisions of this court respecting the items of damage recoverable in a survival action have established the rule that the death of the decedent is the "cut off" point beyond which the personal-representative-plaintiff may not go in proving and recovering, on behalf of the decedent's estate, the damages sustained by the decedent in his person and property on account of the tortious act of the defendant. See Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So. 2d 213; Epps v. Railway Express Agency, Fla. 1949, 40 So. 2d 131; Ellis v. Brown, Fla. 1955, 77 So. 2d 845; cf. Sullivan v. Sessions, Fla. 1955, 80 So. 2d 706. As stated in Ake v. Birnbaum, supra, the damages recoverable in a survival action are only those "which deceased could have recovered had he lived and maintained the action."
Common logic dictates that a tortfeasor should be held answerable to someone for the funeral expense of the person fatally injured by his tortious act, just as the tortfeasor must answer for the medical expense necessitated by the injurious consequences of his tortious act; and it has been held in this state that, where the surviving husband brings suit under the Wrongful Death Act, Sec. 768.01 et seq., Fla. Stat., F.S.A., to recover from the tortfeasor the damages sustained by him on account of the wrongful death of his wife, the funeral expenses of the wife incurred and paid by the husband may be recovered by him where the amount thereof is claimed as special damages. See Potts v. Mulligan, 141 Fla. 685, 193 So. 767; Lithgow v. Hamilton, Fla. 1954, 69 So. 2d 776; Legare v. United States, D.C.Fla. 1961, 195 F. Supp. 557. But where the surviving spouse is the wife, instead of the husband, her right to recover for the funeral expenses of the husband in a Wrongful Death action has been denied. Compare dictum at page 769 in Potts v. Mulligan, supra, 193 So. 767, commenting on Saucer v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 5 Cir., 49 F.2d 385 (in which the right of the widow to recover, in a Wrongful Death action, the expense of her husband's funeral was expressly denied.). And where the "named beneficiary" entitled to sue under the Wrongful Death Act was the administrator of the decedent's estate, it has been held by this court that funeral expenses of the decedent were not recoverable (although it also appeared that no special claim for such damages was made *317 in the complaint). See International Shoe Co. v. Hewitt, 1936, 123 Fla. 587, 167 So. 7.
We note that the Wrongful Death Act, Sec. 768.01 et seq., Fla. Stat., F.S.A., creates in the named beneficiaries (the order of succession being the surviving spouse, then the minor child or children if no spouse survives, then other dependents, and finally the executor or administrator of the estate of the decedent if no one of the other classes survives) a cause of action against the tortfeasor to recover "such damages as the party or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the party killed; * * *" Sec. 768.02, ibid; and that it was indicated in Potts v. Mulligan, supra, that the obligation of the husband to pay for the funeral expenses of his deceased wife, and of a father to pay for the same for his deceased minor children, justified the designation of such expenditures as damages "sustained by reason of the death of the party killed", for which recovery should be allowed in a Wrongful Death action when specially claimed.
We recognize that in some jurisdictions the administrator cannot recover for damages occurring after death; see 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, Sec. 127, p. 183. But in other jurisdictions it has been held that the administrator can recover for such burial expenses; see 25A C.J.S. Death § 108, p. 946, which discusses both sides of the question; however, an exception has been recognized where a statute places a mandatory obligation on the administrator to pay reasonable funeral expenses, thereby reducing the estate under his administration to the extent of that amount. Section 733.20, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., makes it the duty of the administrator to pay the funeral expenses of his decedent.
At page 950, Volume 25A C.J.S., a rule is announced as follows:
The fact that in the next paragraph C.J.S. recognizes the rule "In some jurisdictions the administrator cannot recover funeral expenses" demonstrates the confusion among the courts of the various states on the subject.
See also 17 C.J. 1338 this language:
In considering the matter we have examined 15 Am.Jur. 511, which provides:
In General Refractories Co. v. Mozier, 235 Ky. 252, 30 S.W.2d 952, the court held *318 that the administrator was the proper person to claim funeral expenses, commenting:
The right of the administrator to recover funeral expenses was recognized in Pennsylvania in Migias v. United States, D.C., 167 F. Supp. 482. That court said "the administrator is entitled to recover the expenses of funeral, burial and monument in the total sum of $1426.95, which items are reasonable."
Also the right of the administrator to recover funeral expenses was recognized in Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat. Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702, 78 A.L.R.2d 198, in which the court stated:
On the other side of the coin, this court denied the right of the administrator to recover funeral expenses in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Hewitt, 167 So. 7, and at page 11 said:
In Doby v. Griffin (Fla.) supra, 171 So. 2d 404, the Second District Court of Appeal held that funeral expenses are not recoverable in a survival action relying, among other things, on § 925, Comment i, of American Law Institute-Restatement of Torts, and on Spillman v. Weimaster, 275 Mich. 93, 265 N.W. 787, and quoted with approval from the Spillman case this language:
*319 In Potts v. Mulligan, supra, 193 So. 767, this court cited with approval from Regan v. Davis, 290 Pa. 167, 138 A. 751, 54 A.L.R. 1073, as follows:
Still another rule appears in 15 Am. Jur. 511, Section 100:
This statement is anchored to an Iowa case, Brady v. Haw (1919), 187 Iowa 501, 174 N.W. 331, 7 A.L.R. 1306. We have considered this theory, but are not sufficiently impressed to adopt it as a rule of this court.
It can thus be seen that if funeral expenses are not recoverable by a personal representative in a survival action, or in a suit by a personal representative under the Wrongful Death Act as was held in International Shoe Co. v. Hewitt, supra, 167 So. 7, nor in a suit by the surviving widow under the Wrongful Death Act as was indicated in Potts v. Mulligan, supra, 193 So. 767, the tortfeasor will in such cases go "free" insofar as this item of damage, resulting from his tortious act, is concerned.
In view of the foregoing, it is obvious that the law is at least uncertain in this state on the question of funeral expenses.
We, therefore, align this court with the decisions of those other courts which hold that the right to recover reasonable funeral expenses vests in the personal representative of a decedent who has been killed by the tortious act of another; and where such funeral expenses have been paid by a surviving spouse or parent or other person, that person would of course be entitled to reimbursement from the personal representative. Sec. 733.20, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.
In reaching this conclusion, we hereby expressly recede from a contrary rule announced in International Shoe Co. v. Hewitt (1936) 123 Fla. 587, 167 So. 7, and the decisions of this court holding that the surviving spouse or parent may recover for the funeral expenses of a deceased wife or child, and Ellis v. Brown (Fla.) 77 So. 2d 845 is modified so as to conform to the view expressed herein. In fairness, we point out that Doby v. Griffin, supra, 171 So. 2d 404, was anchored to existing authority at the time it was decided; however, the rule announced by the Second District Court of Appeal in that case, in view of what we have said herein, is not approved by this court and is overruled by this decision.
After full consideration of the Wrongful Death Statute § 768.01 and § 768.02, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., and also the survival statute, 45.11 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. we hold:
(1) Funeral expenses cannot be recovered in an action brought under the Wrongful Death Act, § 768.01 and § 768.02 by a surviving spouse, child or dependent.
(2) A personal representative can recover for funeral expenses in a survival action brought under § 45.11, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.
*320 (3) An administrator suing to recover funeral expenses derives his authority, and has the duty to sue, under the Probate laws, and it is therefore not necessary to show the non-existence of a widow or children or dependents in order to show a status to maintain the suit. Furthermore, the power is inherent in an administrator to sue for recovery of funeral expenses, since he is legally bound to pay them from estate funds.
Therefore, the Third District Court of Appeal, in the case here under review, in holding that the administratix was entitled to recover for funeral expenses of her decedent, is in conformity with the rule herein announced, and being without error, the writ of certiorari heretofore issued in this cause is discharged.
It is so ordered.
O'CONNELL, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., and TROWBRIDGE, Circuit Judge, concur.
THORNAL, C.J., dissents with Opinion.
THOMAS, J., dissents and agrees with THORNAL, C.J.
THORNAL, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I do not wish to belabor the matter of jurisdiction. However, the majority opinion, simply expands the jurisdictional concepts of Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., Fla., 177 So. 2d 221, one step further. The majority there held that the Supreme Court could excavate the trial court records in an independent effort to unearth a "conflict" when a District Court affirms without opinion. Now they tell us that even when a District Court files a complete and detailed opinion, the Supreme Court may sua sponte dig back through the trial record in an effort to pick up something which, in its opinion the District Court has allegedly overlooked. One may recall that this was one of the evils which the dissenters foresaw as logically implicit in Foley. The next one will, of course, be an examination of the trial testimony as a part of the so-called "record proper". This will come, if it doesn't already inhere in the majority approach. Incidentally, the majority concept of what constitutes the "record proper" has never been definitively stated in any of these cases which judicially expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Here the majority has constructed another vehicle to enable us to follow one of two rules of law, and I have no quarrel with the rule on the merits which has been approved. I simply do not agree that we have the power to reach it. Once again, I say that I have abounding respect for the opinions of my colleagues, and I regret that I find it necessary to record my disagreement.
THOMAS, J., concurs.