Title: COM. EX REL. LEIDER v. Leider
Citation: 335 Pa. Super. 249, 484 A.2d 117
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 1984

335 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 (1984) 484 A.2d 117 COMMONWEALTH ex rel. Andree M. LEIDER, Now Known As Andree Banks v. David S. LEIDER, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued June 26, 1984. Filed November 2, 1984. *251 Neil Hurowitz, King of Prussia, for appellant. Robert M. Berger, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before OLSZEWSKI, POPOVICH and CERCONE, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal by appellant, David S. Leider, from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Division, dated March 1, 1982, which modified, retroactive to January 20, 1982, the support order for the couples' child, Suzanne. On January 3, 1967, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County entered an order of support requiring David S. Leider to provide support for Suzanne in the amount of $20.00 per week. This order was complied with until August 9, 1980, when Suzanne attained the age of 18. Appellee filed a Petition to Modify the support order since Suzanne had enrolled in Villanova University. Appellant also filed preliminary objections to appellee's Petition alleging that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court overruled the objections by order dated November 6, 1981. Instantly, appellant claims that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County lacked jurisdiction since (1) both parties reside outside of its jurisdiction, specifically, *252 one party resides in Chester County and the other in Florida; (2) said petition is in reality a petition for contribution for college expenses and was, therefore, filed in an improper forum; (3) that appellee is an improper party-plaintiff and should have been named as a party-defendant; (4) that appellee has no standing to bring a support action for college expenses on behalf of her adult daughter; and (5) the action should have been brought under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 6741 and that, applying said Act, jurisdiction and venue are lacking. Appellant's contentions are meritless. Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6710 provides that the court making a support order shall Moreover, § 6751 of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act provides In Commonwealth ex rel. Fiebig v. Fiebig, 258 Pa.Super. 300, 392 A.2d 804 (1978), the court held 272 Pa.Superior Ct. at 419, 416 A.2d at 526. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Kessler v. Kessler, 260 Pa.Super. 169, 393 A.2d 1205 (1978) and Soloff v. Soloff, 215 Pa.Super. 328, 257 A.2d 314 (1969). The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County clearly maintains jurisdiction to modify the support order entered against appellant. The fact that Suzanne has attained the age of 18 does not end appellant's duty of support and does not dislodge the jurisdiction which originally attached. Where a child has the ability and incentive to pursue a college education, a parent has a legal duty to furnish aid, subject to the ability to provide financial assistance without undue hardship. Lederer v. Lederer, 291 Pa.Super. 22, 435 A.2d 199 (1981). Moreover, appellee had standing to bring such support action on behalf of Suzanne. For Commonwealth ex rel. Kessler v. Kessler, 260 Pa.Superior Ct. at 172, 393 A.2d at 1206. Although it would have been possible for Suzanne to have maintained an action on her own behalf against her parents[3] for contribution to college expenses, since Suzanne lives with appellee and is supported by her mother, appellee has standing. Appellant further contends that the trial court should have granted his petition to vacate the support order because As we have already held that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County had jurisdiction, the question remains whether the trial court abused its discretion in increasing the amount of appellant's support obligation. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in entering the support order for college expenses because no testimony was presented as to appellant's income and assets. Since We agree. Our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the order of support can be sustained on any valid grounds. Marvin v. Marvin, 193 Pa.Super. 179, 164 A.2d 128 (1960). We must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the lower court order or alternatively, whether the lower court was guilty of an abuse of discretion. A finding of abuse of discretion is not lightly made; but only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. Commonwealth ex rel. Hartranft v. Hartranft, 267 Pa.Super. 572, 407 A.2d 389 (1979). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Caswell v. Caswell, 280 Pa.Super. 359, 421 A.2d 762 (1980). Commonwealth ex rel. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 311 Pa.Super. 32, 457 A.2d 98 (1983). We are mindful that "[e]ach parent's ability to pay is dependent upon his or her property, income and earning capacity." Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 538, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974).[4] *256 In Commonwealth v. Schofield, 173 Pa.Super. 631, 98 A.2d 437 (1953), this court held 173 Pa.Superior Ct. at 646-647, 98 A.2d at 444. Relevant also is Berry v. Berry, 278 Pa.Super. 30, 419 A.2d 1340 (1980) wherein the court stated 278 Pa.Superior Ct. at 34, 419 A.2d at 1342. In her Petition, appellee alleged the following changes in circumstances: Appellant subsequently filed a Petition to Vacate the Support Order which simply alleged that his obligation to support Suzanne terminated upon her attaining the age of 18. At no time did he deny the allegations in appellee's Petition,[6] and we have already held that his obligation did not automatically cease at Suzanne's eighteenth birthday. Appellant's counsel denied none of appellee's allegations at trial, nor is there a denial contained in appellant's brief. Indeed, appellant's attorney conceded that appellant is a certified public accountant (N.T. 1/20/82 at 26).[7] Pursuant to our power to consider appellant's earning capacity and since appellant was duly notified but refused to appear to defend against this action for modification and since the amount which appellant should be ordered to pay is largely in the discretion of the trial court, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the order to pay the sum of $75 per week for Suzanne's support retroactive to January 20, 1982.[8] Order affirmed. [1] 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(88), eff. June 27, 1978. As amended 1980, October 5, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 501(a). [Suspended by Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.31(9), Adopted April 23, 1981, effective July 22, 1981 see Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.18] [2] 1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, effective June 27, 1978. [3] Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 263 Pa.Super. 299, 397 A.2d 1218 (1979). [4] The testimony indicated that at the time of the hearing appellee worked as a sales clerk and earned $123.78, after taxes, per week. She and her daughter were planning to move to a new apartment since they had been unable to afford their current rent. She had $11,000 in the bank, which she used to supplement her income but which "can't last much longer." (N.T. at 32). [5] The case was continued from January 20, 1982, to March 1, 1982, so that appellant could appear. [6] See, by way of analogy, Kappe Associates Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 234 Pa.Super. 627, 341 A.2d 516 (1975). [7] An admission of an attorney may be binding upon his client. Umani v. Reber, 191 Pa.Super. 185, 155 A.2d 634 (1959). [8] The lower court agreed to review the order after six months if "any undue hardships were occasioned by the order." (Opinion, Dandridge, J. at 2).