Title: State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Busch
Citation: 1998 OK 103, 69OBJ3488, 976 P.2d 38
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: October 13, 1998

State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Busch Annotate this Case State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Busch 1998 OK 103 976 P.2d 38 69 OBJ 3488 Case Number: SCBD #4234 Decided: 10/13/1998 Modified: 05/18/1999 Mandate Issued: 01/22/1999 Supreme Court of Oklahoma STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, Complainant, v. J. Michael Busch, Respondent [976 P.2d 41] ¶0 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the complaint alleges, in two counts, multiple instances of unprofessional conduct deemed to warrant sanctions. Upon de novo review of the record of proceedings before the trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal, RESPONDENT IS DISBARRED AND ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING, WHICH SHALL BE DUE WHEN THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL Allen Welch, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. Thomas C. Lane, Sapulpa, Oklahoma, for Respondent. OPALA, J. ¶1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the issues to be decided are: (1) Does the record submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful de novo consideration of the complaint's disposition? ¶2 The Oklahoma Bar Association [Bar] charged J. Michael Busch [Busch or respondent], a licensed lawyer, with two counts of professional misconduct. After a hearing, a trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal [panel or PRT] issued a report containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with a recommendation of discipline. PRT found that respondent had violated numerous provisions of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct [ORPC] I INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD ¶3 This bar disciplinary proceeding was commenced on 26 December 1996 by the filing of the Bar's complaint in accordance with the provisions of RGDP Rule 6. ¶4 Upon the conclusion of hearings, the panel found clear and convincing evidence to support both counts. II THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL DE NOVO CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING ¶5 In a bar disciplinary proceeding this court functions in an adjudicative capacity as a licensing authority vested with exclusive original jurisdiction. [976 P.2d 43] ¶6 The court's duty can be discharged only if the trial panel submits a complete record of the proceedings. ¶7 We have carefully scrutinized the extensive record and conclude that it is adequate for this court's de novo consideration of respondent's professional misconduct in contest. III DE NOVO ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION OF PRT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ¶8 PRT rejected the testimony of two witnesses ¶9 Respondent argues that the exclusion of this critical proof has denied him a fair and impartial hearing in conformity to the standards of due process and to the RGDP rules. According to him, this court's de novo review cannot be conducted without an examination of the complete record. The excluded evidence, respondent reasons, is crucial where, as here, he alone "rebuts the allegations of disgruntled former clients." Respondent claims that the documentary and [976 P.2d 44] testimonial evidence should have been admitted (a) on his direct examination to bolster both his credibility and the weight of the evidence as well as (b) on cross examination of his former clients for purposes of impeachment. Its exclusion, he asserts, was an abuse of discretion. While the evidentiary rules operate as a shield to protect opposing parties from surprise and to facilitate the disciplinary process, respondent urges, they should not be used as a sword to sap crucial evidence from a party's case. Because the hearings were conducted over a period of several months, ¶10 Respondent appears to excuse his failure timely to submit the testimonial and documentary evidence either by inadvertence or by ambiguity in the disciplinary rules. In his brief respondent argues (a) there is nothing in the RGDP which requires either a pretrial order or strict adherence to its terms and (b) the RGDP is "ambiguous" as to what discretion PRT has to exclude evidence on technical grounds. According to respondent, a PRT pretrial order may describe broadly large categories of evidence without giving a detailed list of particular testimony and documentary items. For this notion respondent cites Rule 5, Rules for the District Courts. ¶11 The Bar disagrees that District Court Rule 5 allows imprecise reference to documentary and testimonial evidence. We are directed to the terms of Rule 5(G) and (I), which explicitly require the parties to identify witnesses and documents The Orderly Conduct of Disciplinary Proceedings ¶12 Generally, the rules in civil proceedings govern disciplinary proceedings and the reception of evidence. Pretrial Order [976 P.2d 45] ¶13 Pretrial order is a procedural tool that serves to ensure (a) the economical and efficient conduct of trial in every case and (b) the expeditious resolution of the merits The Offer Of Proof ¶14 When an objection to testimonial or documentary proof is sustained on the ground that it was not submitted before the PRT deadline, the party seeking to avoid the probative exclusion must tender sufficient excuse for its failure earlier to identify the tendered evidence. If the excuse is rejected, the proof sought to be adduced must be followed by an offer of proof. Documentary Evidence Offered For Rebuttal ¶15 When considering whether testimonial or documentary evidence offered for rebuttal should be admitted, though it was tendered after the panel's deadline for timely submission in advance of the hearing, greater latitude is to be allowed than when resolving similar questions for one's case in chief. Review of Evidentiary Rulings ¶16 For consideration of PRT's critical evidentiary rulings, this court conducts a nondeferential, de novo examination of all relevant factors, ¶17 PRT's 27 March 1997 scheduling order directed the parties to provide each other with a final list by 8 April 1997, which was to include a brief description of each proposed exhibit item and a list of witnesses. The order, which was entered more than six months before the trial commenced, specifically states that "[e]xcept for good cause shown, no witnesses shall be permitted to testify in chief for any party unless such witness' name was listed." During the course of the disciplinary proceedings, respondent offered for admission numerous exhibits, as well as the testimony of two witnesses, which he had failed to submit before the PRT deadline for identification of documentary and testimonial evidence intended to be offered in the hearings. PRT refused to admit those items of documentary and testimonial proof which were not submitted before its imposed deadline and met mid-hearing objection from the Bar. ¶18 It would have been better practice and more helpful to this court's de novo review for the PRT to have ruled on each item that was offered and excluded from evidence by providing a reasoned basis for the panel's action. These very rulings we must now make ourselves. The excluded evidence (tendered by respondent) falls into three categories - (1) correctly excluded documentary evidence followed by a proffer, ¶19 On de novo review of PRT's evidentiary rulings, we hold that (1) the documentary and testimonial proof shown in Appendices A and C either (a) has direct relevance to respondent's defense of the disciplinary complaint or (b) constitutes rebuttal testimony addressed to an expected or anticipated portion of the Bar's case; and (2) the proffer of documentary proof shown in Appendix B is insufficient for testing the correctness of the panel's exclusion. We adopt these PRT evidentiary rulings as correct. IV COUNT ONE ¶20 Count one of the complaint rests on a grievance filed by Ann Harker [Harker], respondent's client. Harker was sued by her former employer to collect a debt on two promissory notes and for damages occasioned by her misappropriation of funds. The Summary Judgment On Harker's Default ¶21 On 11 January 1994 the plaintiff filed a first request for admissions. Respondent sent the requests (and a cover letter) to Harker, explaining the need for a return of the materials by 1 February 1994. Harker received the admissions and enclosure, but could not fully understand the substance of the request. She answered some of the few admissions, and then sent a letter to respondent, dated 26 January 1994, setting out the source of her confusion. ¶22 Respondent testified that no response to the motion was made because Harker had not instructed him either to defend the suit or to file for bankruptcy. ¶23 A default judgment entered against Harker on 29 April 1994 was in the amount of $108,639.41, of which $41,962.00 was based on the finding that Harker had "wrongfully embezzled and misappropriated" that sum. The quoted language of the amended journal entry made the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Although accepting the blame for the presence of this language in the judgment, respondent failed to seek its vacation or reconsideration or to bring an appeal. ¶24 According to respondent, shortly after he received the 29 April 1994 amended journal entry and discovered the critical "embezzlement" terminology, he discussed various options with Harker and her son: (a) an adversarial contest in bankruptcy, (b) a direct appeal or (c) a motion to set aside the judgment. According to Harker, she tried to contact respondent that day by fax and by phone but could not reach him. The Indemnity Agreement [976 P.2d 49] ¶25 Because the judgment included a finding of misappropriation and embezzlement, respondent offered to file for Harker a Chapter 13 bankruptcy The Two Bankruptcies ¶26 On 31 May 1994 respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy on Harker's behalf. Because the schedules and a Chapter 13 plan were not timely tendered, the bankruptcy was dismissed on 24 August 1994. Respondent filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy on 15 November 1994 and himself paid the filing fees. The initial meeting of the creditors was stricken because respondent told the bankruptcy trustee that he was converting the case from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7 proceeding. ¶27 Although Harker's bankruptcy was eventually concluded by another attorney, she has not been indemnified for the nondischargeable portion of the default judgment. Respondent explains that the first dismissal was occasioned by Harker's failure to give him the necessary information to complete the forms and the second was due to the Harker's tax problems that had not been timely resolved. Even though Harker's son was not listed as counsel of record on either of his mother's bankruptcies, respondent assumed that she "was receiving independent counsel" from her son about the happenings in the those cases. ¶28 The panel concluded that respondent violated (a) ORPC Rule 1.1 ¶29 We find that each of these violations has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Inasmuch as respondent said he believed it was unnecessary to do so because the client's son, an attorney, was present, his utterance reveals a basic misunderstanding of why the rule calls for independent advice. It is to give a client notice that his (or her) attorney has some type of personal interest at stake. The mere presence of a client's lawyer-relative when an indemnification agreement is discussed does not relieve a practitioner of the obligation to explain the legal implications to the client. We hold that respondent should have advised Harker to seek other representation on the indemnification phase. In failing to do so, he violated ORPC Rule 1.8(h). ¶30 The evidence is a clear and convincing that respondent failed to inform his client (a) that a judgment had been rendered against her and (b) that it contained language which would make the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy. ¶31 A lawyer's license is this court's certificate of the bearer's ongoing professional fitness to deal with the public as a legal practitioner. Public confidence in the practitioner is essential to the orderly functioning of the profession. A lawyer's misconduct adversely reflects on the entire Bar because it exhibits a lack of commitment to the client's cause, to the courts, and to other members of the Bar. ¶32 Professional competence - acting promptly in pending matters and communicating with a client - is a licensed legal practitioner's mandatory obligation. Albeit onerous, it is the very minimum to be expected from a lawyer. It epitomizes professionalism. V COUNT TWO ¶33 Count two arises from a complaint by Kish Resources [Kish]. Kish is an Irish corporation doing oil and gas business in the United States. ¶34 In August of 1992 respondent was entrusted with $65,000 from Kish investors. Forty thousand dollars went to Houseco for the initial purchase of the Iron Post lease. There remained an outstanding balance of $25,000. ¶35 Later in November of 1992 respondent arranged for the sale of ARC stock owned by Kish. The proceeds from this sale also were entrusted to respondent. He was to receive power of attorney for the sale of the stock, arrange a sale, and then hold the unds in trust until Kish authorized further action to be taken. ¶36 The specific violations at issue deal with the assets entrusted to respondent solely from the November sale of ARC stock, amounting to $76,657.70. In December of 1992 there was a third and final sale of Kish-owned ARC stock. The proceeds were [976 P.2d 53] originally to be entrusted to respondent, but Butler placed a stop payment on the transfer to him. That stop payment order is not essential to the issue here. Respondent had already received and deposited the November proceeds prior to the issuance of the stop payment order. The critical issue for this case is how the November proceeds were entrusted and accounted for according to the 22 October 1992 agreement. ¶37 On 17 December 1992 respondent complied with Kish's order to transfer the entrusted $50,000 to a Nevada bank account. The transfer failed for lack of sufficient funds. On 13 January 1993 respondent confirmed that he was sending another $50,000 check to Kish but retaining the balance of the funds. Respondent's second check did not clear, again because of insufficient funds. On 18 February 1993 respondent confirmed an agreement with Kish to pay $50,000 over the course of three months, plus interest, in exchange for Kish's promise not to initiate legal action against him. Again, respondent failed to pay Kish. ¶38 After more than a year, the $50,000 remained unsatisfied. On 18 May 1994 Kish sought a lawyer in Kentucky, Charles Boarman [Boarman], to look into the matter. Boarman wrote a letter requesting respondent to clear up the obligation. Respondent failed to answer the letter. Boarman then wrote a second, more direct, communication. In spite of the repeated requests, respondent did not pay the amount sought. When the matter was not resolved, Kish filed a complaint against respondent. ¶39 Respondent attributes much to an incomplete record. He asserts that neither Kish nor Butler appears to be "paragons of financial integrity." Directing us to testimony at the PRT hearing, he states that Kish never possessed stable leadership and was notorious for not paying its bills, which necessitated payment of many of its creditors with cash. Respondent explains that he was told by Kish's chief executive to repay himself and to use the balance of the $76,000 for operating funds. According to respondent, the $50,000 in question was not payable from the $76,000 stock sale, which was actually received and deposited into his trust fund. Rather, he claims that it was from a separate pool of funds represented by a check received by him, payment of which was stopped by Kish through its stockbroker. Directing us to the testimony of his lease operator, Beverly Vassar, respondent argues that she had made an accounting of the funds to Kish on many occasions, both orally and in writing. His inability to document this version of the expenditures is attributable to the fact that all of his accounting records have been forwarded to Kish. Moreover, he admits that his recordkeeping and records maintenance was "abysmal". ¶40 The PRT found and concluded that respondent violated (a) ORPC Rule 1.3 ¶41 Respondent's failure to provide diligent representation and keep his client reasonably informed as to the status of representation amounts to a violation of ORPC Rule 1.3 ¶42 A lawyer's highest fiduciary duty comes into being when a legal practitioner is entrusted with a client's funds. A fiduciary of the highest order, the trustee must meet the settlor's expectation that the obligations imposed on the office of trustee will be carried out for the exclusive benefit of the cestui que trust. ¶43 When a client's money is entrusted to an attorney, the latter's fiduciary duty is to apply strictly the funds to the specific purpose intended. Where money has been entrusted to any attorney for a specific purpose, he must apply it to that purpose. He may not avail himself of a counterclaim or set-off for fees by interposing demands against any money of his client coming into his hands for such specific purpose. ¶44 Respondent clearly understood, through his own words, that $50,000 of the November stock proceeds were to go into the trust, while the remaining $26,657.70 was to be used for payment of adverse judgments or incurred expenses from the Iron Post lease. Following respondent's deposit of the November proceeds, he made a number of unauthorized withdrawals from the trust account. The trust record entries show that respondent made withdrawals, giving his succinct descriptions of the purpose: "cash," "attorney's fees," "Michael J. Busch," and "not indicated." ¶45 The fact that the client owes a fee to his attorney is no excuse for the latter to appropriate the client's funds to his own use. ¶46 On 17 December 1992 respondent attempted a $50,000 wire transfer to Kish, but the transfer did not clear because of insufficient funds. On 13 January 1993 respondent sent another $50,000 check to Kish that also failed to clear for the same reason. On 18 February 1993 respondent sent a letter stating that he would pay Kish $50,000 with interest over three months, in exchange for Kish's commitment not to bring an action or complaint against him. ¶47 The issuance of overdrawn checks manifests an abiding disregard of the fundamental rule of ethics - that of common honesty. Without honesty the profession forfeits its role in the administration of legal process. ¶48 We hold that not only has respondent violated the above noted rules of professional conduct, but that he also is in violation of ORPC Rule 1.2(a). VI RESPONDENT SHOULD BE DISBARRED ¶49 Respondent urges that disbarment is not an appropriate discipline. According to him, the two complaints prosecuted in this cause were known to the Bar at the time of his last disciplinary proceeding. Because the Bar is pressing them piecemeal, he [976 P.2d 56] will be prevented from applying for reinstatement for a period in excess of seven years. Moreover, respondent urges that the court find, as it did in State ex rel. Okl. Bar Ass'n v. Busch [Busch III], ¶50 Respondent's argument in support of mitigation is unpersuasive. BuschIII teaches that the Americans with Disabilities Act ¶51 The primary purpose for imposing professional discipline is not to punish but to protect the public by re-examining the offender's continued fitness to practice law. ¶52 Upon de novo review and findings - rested on clear and convincing evidence - that respondent is unfit for the practice of law, he is disbarred and ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding in the sum of $10,110.11. ¶53 RESPONDENT IS DISBARRED AND ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING, WHICH SHALL BE DUE WHEN THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL. ¶54 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS, HARGRAVE, OPALA, and WILSON, JJ, concur; ¶55 WATT, J., concurs in result. [976 P.2d 56] ¶56 APPENDIX A CORRECTLY EXCLUDED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE FOLLOWED BY PROFFER ¶57 A.COUNT ONE ¶58 1) Exhibit 41 (7 December 94 fax cover letter and memo from Busch to Harker's son (Jack)) was offered to show (a) that Busch had a meeting with Harker and her [976 P.2d 57] son and (b) that both the son and Busch were assigned separate duties in connection with Harker's bankruptcy. PRTTr. at 917. ¶592)Exhibit 259 (7 October 1993 fax from plaintiff's attorney to Busch with attached 2-page journal entry of default judgment against Harker) was offered to show that under the doctrine of completeness, the journal entry of judgment should be admitted as pages 8 and 9 of Complainant's Exhibit 44 (Exhibit 44 is a copy of the petition filed in the Henthorne v. Harker lawsuit that was faxed to Busch on 7 October 1993) to show that Busch had received an earlier fax of the judgment which did not contain any allegations of embezzlement. PRTTr. at 881-82. ¶603)Exhibit 268 (letter from Harker's son to the Oklahoma Tax Commission dated 30 November 1994 with attachments) was offered to show the planning that was done to assist Harker in her bankruptcy proceeding. PRT Tr. at 914. ¶614)Exhibits 68, 74 and 260 were offered to rebut Harker's statement in her bar complaint that after respondent had undertaken to resolve her dispute with her former employer she had no other contact with Busch until after the 4 August 1993 summons had been served on her. Exhibit 68 (30 September 1992 letter from respondent to Harker) PRT Tr. at 875; Exhibit 74 (letter from Harker to Busch received on 23 October 1992). PRTTr. at 876; Exhibit 260 (1 July 1992 fax cover letter from Harker to Busch with copy of tax information). PRT Tr. at 874. ¶62 5) Exhibits 261, 262 and 264 were offered to rebut Harker's testimony that she met with Busch and delivered these materials. These exhibits show that they were actually faxed to him. Exhibit 261 (a fax cover sheet from Harker to Busch, dated 3 August 1993) was offered to show that the petition received by Harker was faxed to Busch's office on 3 August. PRT Tr. at 879; Exhibit 262 (a fax cover sheet and attachment from Harker to Busch, dated 5 August 1993) was offered to show that Harker's husband on his wife's behalf faxed the summons to Busch. PRT Tr. at 875-880; Exhibit 264 (plaintiff's first request for admissions in Henthorne v. Harker) was offered to show the admissions received by Busch which was transmitted to Harker with handwritten notation showing a receipt date of 11 January 1994 and a response date of 8 February 1994. PRT Tr. at 899-990. ¶636)Exhibit 71 (19 January 1994 letter and bill from Busch to Harker) was offered to show that Busch (a) requested the admissions from Harker as well as (b) set out the payment schedule for his bill. PRT Tr. at 893, 897. ¶64 B.COUNT TWO ¶651)Exhibit 132 (unsigned mechanic's and materialmen's lien by Busch against Kish Resources for work performed on oil and gas leases owned by Kish, dated August 1992) was offered as part of respondent's proof in his case in chief. PRT Tr. at 644. ¶662)Exhibit 133 (an unsigned and undated mechanics' and materialmen's lien by Beverly Vassar dba BV Operating against Kish Resources for $32,800 for work performed on oil and gas leases) was offered as part of respondent's "case in chief." PRT Tr. at 645. ¶673)Exhibit 96 (letter from Kenny Smith to Kish Resources, attention of Pat Butler, dated 8 April 1992) was offered to show that on 14 March 1992 he received and reviewed the receivership and foreclosure lawsuit from Lee Levinson. PRT Tr. at 929. ¶684)Exhibit 100 (letter from Busch addressed "To Whom It May Concern", dated 29 April 1992) was offered to show that Boyer was taking over the operations of the Iron Post Field and to show that Busch had asked everyone cooperate with Boyer. PRT Tr. at 931. ¶69 5) Exhibit 116 (18 August 1992 letter from Busch to Tom Lee) was offered to show (a) that the only instruction Busch received about his legal services was to resolve the Kish/Houseco matter relating to the Iron Post field and (b) no other instructions had been given about his legal services in connection with the Palo Pinto Field or any other matter. PRT Tr. at 934. [976 P.2d 58] ¶70 6) Exhibit 118 (letter from Busch to Tom Lee, dated 19 August 1992) was offered to show the wiring instructions for the payment of invoices faxed to Tom Lee on August 18 for operation of the Iron Post Field. PRT Tr. at 935. ¶717) Exhibit 180 (23 April 1993 letter from Busch to Carl Royse) was offered to show that Busch had updated Royse on various matters, which included clearing up the titles on the Iron Post Lease. PRT Tr. at 950. ¶728) Exhibit 187 (letter from John Woods, certified accountants, to Busch dated 13 May 1993) was offered to show that John Woods (auditors who had been instructed to audit Kish's financial statements for the period ended December 31, 1992) had asked Busch to forward all accounting records to them. PRT Tr. at 946. ¶739)Exhibit 188 (13 May 1993 fax cover sheet from Busch to Garber along with copy of John Woods' 13 May 1993 letter) was offered to show that Busch had forwarded the letter to Garber asking for further instructions. PRT Tr. at 947. ¶7410) Exhibit 226 (15 December 1993 letter to Busch from Royse for Kish Resources USA) was offered to show that (a) Royse wanted to meet with Busch on 18 or 19 December 1993, (b) he indicated they would only have a short time together and (c) he requested a telephone number where he could reach Busch. PRT Tr. at 957-59. ¶7511) Exhibit 228 (3-page fax to Carl Royse from Busch) was offered to show his response to Busch's request to meet with Royse - that their time together would be limited. PRT Tr. at 962 ¶7612) Exhibit 229 (20 December 1993 letter from Royse to Busch) was offered to show that the letter to Busch advised him that the Kish Board would be advised of the situation at the Iron Post Lease and that Royse would give Busch a reply as soon as he heard from the Board. PRT Tr. at 965. ¶7713)Exhibit 240 (undated letter from Beverly Vassar on Busch's stationary to Tom Lee) was offered to show that (a) Vassar had informed Tom Lee that the Iron Post lease was in jeopardy, (b) there were no funds, (c) the Creek County Corporation Commissioner was looking at the lease, (d) there were potential fines and (e) Vassar sought reimbursement to Busch for the money spent on the lease. PRT Tr. at 937. ¶7814) Exhibit 248 (list of equipment) was offered as a document that would speak for itself; and that would show (a) what equipment was on the different wells and (b) that the list was submitted to Vassar in the due course of operating the lease. PRT Tr. at 648-49. ¶7915) Exhibit 251(affidavit of Kenny Rogers, a Tulsa lawyer) was offered to show that (a) while working as an associate of Bill House Rogers was asked to prepare document to effectuate the transfer of 50% of Houseco's holdings in the Iron Post lease and (b) later on he was asked by Butler if he could change some documents in order to circumvent some of the brokers in the deal. PRT Tr. at 924. ¶8016) Exhibit 269 (minutes of Kish Resources' PLC, dated 28 April 1993) was offered to show that Busch was working closely with Garber and that during the board meeting there was no discussion that Busch owed Kish any money. PRT Tr. at 945. ¶8117)Exhibit 88 (14 February 1992 letter from Lee Levinson to Butler) was offered to lay a predicate. Boarman's complaint [Count Two] alleges that Busch failed to preserve the Iron Post Lease. Respondent intends to establish that he did not lose anything, that it was their own conduct that caused them to lose the lease. PRT Tr. at 612. ¶82 The exclusion's correctness of items 1 through 6 in Count One and of items 1 through 17 in Count Two rests on our conclusion that the refused documents relate to the essential elements of respondent's defense or address themselves to anticipated proof by the prosecution. Middlebrook, supra note 29 at 582. [976 P.2d 59] ¶83 APPENDIX B CORRECTLY EXCLUDED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE FOLLOWED BY INSUFFICIENT PROFFER ¶84COUNT TWO ¶851)Exhibit 95 (letter from Busch to Tom Lee, dated 4 April 1992) was offered as part of the offer of proof. PRT Tr. at 632 ¶862)Exhibit 102 (7 May 1992 letter to Busch from Tom Lee) was offered as part of the offer of proof. PRT Tr. at 634 ¶873)Exhibit 155 (10 January 1993 letter from Elroy (Carl) Royse to Busch)(identified as actually 10 January 1994) was offered by reading the text of the letter. PRT Tr. at 966 ¶884)Exhibit 231 (11 January 1994 letter from Henson to Busch) was offered by reading the text of the letter. PRT at 967 ¶895)Exhibit 232 (20 January 1994 fax from Busch to David Naylor) was offered by reading the text of the letter. PRT Tr. at 968 ¶906)Exhibit 233 (30 January 1994 letter from Busch to Kish Board) was offered by paraphrasing the content of the letter. PRT Tr. at 970 ¶917)Exhibit 234 (1 June 1994 letter from David Naylor to Royse) was offered to show that Naylor responded to Royse's December 22 fax; the text of the June 1 letter was read. PRT Tr. at 971 ¶928)Exhibit 241 (Boyer Activities) was offered as part of the offer of proof. PRTTr. at 636 ¶939)Exhibit 242 (BV Operating Statement May-July) was offered as part of the offer of proof. PRT Tr. at 638 ¶9410)Exhibit 245 (Expenses on Iron Post) was offered as part of the offer of proof. PRT Tr. at 639 ¶95In the face of insufficient proffer we cannot test the correctness of the panel's exclusion. Crussel, supra note 28 at 1118-19. ¶96 APPENDIX C CORRECTLY EXCLUDED TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE FOLLOWED BY SUFFICIENT PROFFER ¶971)Hondo Smith (office manager for Busch) - he would testify about matters that respondent's medical expert had earlier testified to concerning (a) what was necessary for Busch to conduct business, (b) how that business is being conducted, (c) what changes have been made, (d) the present organization of Busch's office and (e) the manner in which he now conducts business. He would testify that (a) when he went to work for Busch the filing system was in total disarray and files were scattered in numerous places, and (b) any delay in providing items to the Bar that were not provided was due to poor record keeping and filing. His testimony would show what respondent has done since his May 1996 suspension to offset the problems which are similar to many of the allegations raised in the present proceedings. PRT Tr. at 5-7, 869 ¶982)Nellie Rine - she would testify about the organization of Busch's files and that they had to be completely reorganized. PRT Tr. at 869 ¶99The exclusion's correctness of items 1 through 2 rests on our conclusion that the rejected testimony relates to the essential elements of respondent's defense. Middlebrook, supra note 29 at 582. FOOT