Title: Rutter v. Jones Blechman Woltz and Kelly
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 012612
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2002

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
CHARLES RUTTER, EXECUTOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF MILDRED  
DUNCAN 
 
v.  Record No. 012612 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
 
 
 
September 13, 2002 
JONES, BLECHMAN, WOLTZ & 
KELLY, P.C., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Norman Olitsky, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the executor of an 
estate could maintain an action for legal malpractice in the 
preparation of the decedent's testamentary documents. 
FACTS 
 
This case was decided on demurrer, and, therefore, we take 
as true all material facts properly pleaded by plaintiff Rutter 
and all inferences properly drawn from those facts.  Burns v. 
Board of Supvrs., 218 Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 
(1977).  In 1993, Mildred Duncan retained Jones, Blechman, Woltz 
& Kelly, P.C. (the Jones Blechman firm) to assist in her estate 
planning.  Duncan wanted each of her two housekeepers to receive 
a "remembrance amounting to about $5,000 respectively" and 
wanted "10% of the residue of her estate be devised to Trinity 
United Methodist Church and Washington and Lee University as 
charitable bequests."  John T. Thompkins, III, a member of the 
Jones Blechman firm, prepared Duncan's last will and testament 
and created a revocable trust.  The language of the revocable 
trust suggested the amount of the remembrance to the 
housekeepers, but ultimately left the bequest amount to the 
trustee's discretion. 
 
Because the trust, as written, left the bequest to the 
housekeepers to the trustee's discretion, the amounts of the 
bequests to Washington and Lee University and Trinity United 
Methodist Church were not ascertainable at the time of Duncan's 
death.  As a result, the bequests to Washington and Lee 
University and Trinity United Methodist Church did not meet the 
federal tax requirements for charitable tax deductions pursuant 
to I.R.C. §  2055(a) and, upon Duncan's death, her estate 
incurred tax liabilities on those bequests amounting to 
$663,996. 
 
Charles M. Rutter, III, the executor of Duncan's estate, 
filed this legal malpractice action against the Jones Blechman 
firm and Thompkins (collectively "the defendants") on behalf of 
the estate, alleging in Count I that, as a result of the 
defendants' negligent drafting of the will and revocable trust, 
the testamentary documents failed to effectuate Duncan's 
intentions and constituted a breach of contract between Duncan 
and the defendants.*  As damages for this breach, Rutter claimed 
                     
 
* The second count of Rutter's motion for judgment alleged 
that the defendants negligently advised Duncan's estate after 
her death.  The assignment of error limited this Court's review 
to those allegations of negligence occurring "prior to 
 
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that Duncan, "by and through her executor" was entitled to 
recover the amount she paid the defendants to draft the 
testamentary instruments and consequential damages of $663,996, 
the amount of the otherwise avoidable tax liability assessed to 
the estate.  The defendants demurred to the motion for judgment 
asserting that Rutter lacked the standing to bring the action 
and was not damaged as a matter of law.  The trial court 
sustained the demurrer and entered a judgment in the defendants' 
favor.  We awarded Rutter this appeal. 
DISCUSSION
 
The parties spend a great deal of time discussing the 
existence or non-existence of privity between the executor, 
Duncan, and the defendants.  Privity, however, is not 
dispositive in this case.  For purposes of the issue before us, 
there is no assertion that Rutter has privity with the 
defendants independent of his capacity as the personal 
representative of the decedent.  There is also no dispute that 
Rutter is entitled to undertake a number of activities regarding 
Duncan's rights and interests in his representative capacity as 
executor of her estate.  The crux of this case is the ability of 
an executor to bring an action for legal malpractice in 
connection with the preparation of testamentary documents. 
                                                                  
[Duncan's] death" and, therefore, the issues addressed in Count 
II are not before us. 
 
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Code § 8.01-25, enacted in derogation of common law, 
provides that, "[e]very cause of action whether legal or 
equitable, which is cognizable in the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
shall survive either the death of the person against whom the 
cause of action is or may be asserted, or the death of the 
person in whose favor the cause of action existed."  This 
provision specifically limits survival of actions to those that 
"existed" prior to the decedent's death.  The relevant issue, 
then, is whether the cause of action Rutter asserts was one 
which could have been raised by Duncan during her lifetime. 
 
A cause of action for legal malpractice requires the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship which gave rise to 
a duty, breach of that duty by the defendant attorney, and that 
the damages claimed by the plaintiff client must have been 
proximately caused by the defendant attorney's breach.  In the 
absence of any injury or damage, there is no cause of action. 
Allied Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 766, 232 S.E.2d 
774, 776 (1977). 
 
While the alleged breach of contract occurred during 
Duncan's lifetime upon the drafting of her testamentary 
documents, the damage or injury resulting from the breach that 
Rutter claims – the avoidable estate tax liability - did not 
occur until after Duncan's death.  Nevertheless, Rutter argues 
that there was a cause of action during Duncan's lifetime 
 
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because she was entitled to recover the amounts she paid to the 
defendants to draft the deficient testamentary documents.  The 
tax liability and associated accounting and legal expenses 
incurred after her death, according to Rutter, were no more than 
an escalation of the damages or injury caused by the defendants' 
malpractice.  We disagree. 
 
As noted above, one of the elements of a legal malpractice 
cause of action is injury or damage proximately caused by the 
breach of contract.  In this case, the fee Duncan paid the 
defendants for their services was not an injury resulting from 
the legal malpractice.  It was merely the agreed-upon cost of 
the service, the consideration given for the contract, and not 
the damage or injury arising from the breach of the contract. 
 
The injury or damage that was proximately caused by the 
legal malpractice alleged in this case was the additional amount 
of the tax assessed against the estate and additional legal and 
accounting fees required – all of which did not arise until 
after Duncan's death. 
 
Accordingly, because the cause of action for legal 
malpractice asserted in this case did not come into existence 
during Duncan's lifetime and thus did not survive her death, we 
will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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