Title: Manuel Valle v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-754
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 2001

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC94754
____________
MANUEL VALLE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[January 18, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Manuel Valle appeals the trial court's denial of postconviction relief after an
evidentiary hearing.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For
the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court's order denying Valle
postconviction relief.  
This Court recited the procedural history of this case in Valle's appeal from
the trial court's summary denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under
1In Valle's second direct appeal, this Court described the specific details of the crime:
On April 2, 1978, Officer Louis Pena of the Coral Gables Police Department was on
patrol when he stopped appellant and a companion for a traffic violation.  The events
that followed were witnessed by Officer Gary Spell, also of the Coral Gables Police
Department.  Officer Spell testified that when he arrived on the scene, appellant was
sitting in the patrol car with Officer Pena.  Shortly thereafter, Spell heard Pena use his
radio to run a license check on the car appellant was driving.  According to Spell,
appellant then walked back to his car and reached into it, approached Officer Pena and
fired a single shot at him, which resulted in his death.   Appellant also fired two shots at
Spell and then fled.  He was picked up two days later in Deerfield Beach.  Following
his jury trial, appellant was also found guilty of first-degree murder of Spell and after a
non-jury trial, he was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla.
1985)).
2At Valle's 1981 retrial, "[a] rehabilitation officer testified that Valle had been a model prisoner
and was rehabilitated during his prior imprisonment."  Valle v. State, 502 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla.
1987).  The trial court excluded the expert testimony of a clinical psychologist and two corrections
consultants that Valle proffered to prove that, if given a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death,
he would be a model prisoner.  See id.  This Court held that the excluded expert testimony differed in
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Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850: 
Valle was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and
possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to death for the murder
charge.[1]  Valle v. State, 394 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1981).  On direct
appeal, this Court reversed the convictions and sentences and
remanded for a new trial.  Id.  On retrial in 1981, Valle was again
convicted on those three counts and again sentenced to death.  The
convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court in Valle v.
State, 474 So.2d 796 (Fla.1985).  The United States Supreme Court
subsequently vacated Valle's death sentence and remanded the case to
this Court for further consideration in light of Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), regarding
the admissibility of model prisoner testimony.  Valle v. Florida, 476
U.S. 1102, 106 S. Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986). We remanded for
a new sentencing hearing before a new jury.[2]  On resentencing, the
"quality and substance" from that of the rehabilitation officer, and therefore was not cumulative.  Id. 
Instead, the excluded testimony concerned proof that Valle would be a model prisoner in the future,
while the rehabilitation officer only testified as to Valle's prior prison behavior.  See id.
3The aggravating factors were: (1) prior violent felony; (2) avoiding a lawful arrest; (3) murder
committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or enforcement of laws;
(4) murder committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal
justification; (5) victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of official duties.  The
trial court merged factors (2), (3), and (5).  The court found no evidence of statutory mitigation and
concluded that either the evidence did not establish nonstatutory mitigation or the nonstatutory
mitigation was outweighed by the aggravating factors.  See Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1333 n.1
(Fla. 1997).
4Pertinent to the instant ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in the 1988 resentencing, Valle
introduced the testimony of expert witnesses who stated that Valle would be a good prisoner if given a
life sentence.  See Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 46 (Fla. 1991).  This Court held that it was not
improper for the State to cross-examine these experts as to Valle's prison behavior by questioning them
about specific incidents in prison for which he had not been convicted.  See id.  This Court noted that
the expert witnesses had formed their opinions from Valle's prison records, including reports of the
incidents explored on the State's cross-examination.  See id.  Moreover, the Court explained that
because Valle's experts relied on Valle's criminal records as a basis for their opinions, including the
transcript from the probation revocation hearing concerning an incident where Valle attempted to run
over a police office, cross-examination on information contained within these records was proper.  See
id.  Finally, this Court ruled that it was not improper for the State to cross-examine a defense witness
about his opinion concerning Valle's future prison behavior if, "hypothetically, he were eligible for parole
in fifteen years."  Id.  This Court explained that because the witness had testified that "lifers" always
make good prisoners because the prison will always be their home, the State could cross-examine the
witness to determine whether his opinion would change given the possibility of parole eligibility.  Valle,
581 So. 2d at 46.
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jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four.  The trial court,
Judge Norman Gerstein presiding, imposed the death sentence, finding
five aggravating factors (three were merged) and no mitigating
evidence.[3]  
 
Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1332-33 (Fla. 1997) (citation omitted).
After this Court affirmed Valle's death sentence in 1991,4 Valle filed his first
rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court summarily denied
5Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
6Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
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without prejudice to file a legally sufficient motion.  See id. at 1332.  Valle then filed
his second postconviction motion, raising twenty claims.  See id.  Following a
Huff5 hearing, the trial judge denied the second postconviction motion without an
evidentiary hearing.  See id. at 1336.  
On appeal to this Court, Valle argued that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing and claimed that his resentencing counsel was ineffective based on the
following acts or omissions: (1) failing to move for disqualification of the
resentencing trial judge based upon allegations that the judge had kissed the
victim’s widow and fraternized with friends of the victim in full view of the jury; (2)
unreasonably introducing evidence of Valle's prison behavior, referred to as
Skipper6 evidence; (3) failing to move for disqualification of the trial judge based on
alleged ex parte communications with the State; (4) failing to call as witnesses
Valle’s mother and former wife; (5) failing to properly object to and preserve for
appeal the State’s peremptory challenges at voir dire for racial discrimination; and
(6) failing to prevent the State from filling the courtroom with an “overwhelming
presence” of uniformed police officers for the purpose of intimidating the jury and
judge.  See id. at 1333-35.  Moreover, Valle claimed that the trial court erred by not
7This Court rejected Valle's third contention that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing
to move for disqualification of the trial judge based upon alleged ex parte communications with the
State, ruling that the allegation was insufficient as a matter of law.  See id. at 1334.  The Court also
rejected Valle's fourth contention regarding ineffective assistance in failing to call as witnesses Valle's
mother and former wife, finding that their testimony would have been cumulative.  See id.  Moreover,
the Court rejected Valle's fifth claim regarding ineffective assistance in failing to properly object to and
preserve for appeal the State's peremptory challenges at voir dire for racial discrimination, ruling that
there was "no reasonable probability Valle could prove the challenge had been made in a discriminatory
manner."  Id. at 1335.  The Court also found that the record conclusively refuted Valle's sixth
contention regarding ineffective assistance in failing to object to the State filling the courtroom with
uniformed police officers, because Valle's counsel filed a pretrial motion to prevent the attendance of
uniformed police officers.  See id.  Further, the Court found that the record refuted Valle's contentions
regarding the State's noncompliance with section 119.07(2)(a).  See id.  Finally, the Court held that
Valle's claims concerning the trial court's refusal to pursue public record claims were either moot or
without merit.  See id.
8This Court also found the following claims procedurally barred: (1) the resentencing court
improperly denied Valle's petition for a writ of error coram nobis; (2) the instruction on the cold,
calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on merger of aggravating circumstances; (4) Florida's death
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requiring the Dade County State Attorney’s Office to comply with section
119.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), which mandates that an agency list the basis
for a claimed public records exemption.  See Valle, 705 So. 2d at 1335.  Finally,
Valle asserted that the trial court erred by refusing to grant Valle leave to pursue
public records claims against several state agencies under chapter 119, Florida
Statutes (1999), and to thereafter amend his motion.  See id. 
This Court affirmed the summary denial of all but two of Valle’s claims:7
ineffective assistance as to the failure to move for disqualification of the trial judge
and ineffective assistance regarding the introduction of the Skipper evidence.8  See
penalty statute is vague and overbroad; (5) the penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted the
burden to Valle; (6) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct and
presentment of uncharged collateral crimes; and (7) the trial court erred in finding no mitigating
circumstances.  See id. at 1335-36.
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id. at 1336.  Accordingly, this Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on these
two claims.  See id.  
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing.  Because Valle
voluntarily waived his claim pertaining to the allegations concerning the resentencing
judge's conduct, the trial court considered only Valle’s claim concerning ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for unreasonably presenting Skipper evidence, which led
to the State's introduction of prejudicial rebuttal evidence.  The trial court ultimately
denied Valle’s claim.  
In the present case, Valle raises two issues on appeal from the trial court's
denial of postconviction relief.  First, Valle claims the trial court erred in adopting
almost verbatim the State's proposed order denying 3.850 relief, in violation of
Valle's due process rights.  Second, Valle asserts that the record demonstrates
ineffective assistance at his resentencing due to defense counsel's presentation of
Skipper evidence.  We address each of these issues in turn.
ADOPTION OF THE STATE'S PROPOSED ORDER
Following the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court requested
9As we recently noted in Patton, a distinction exists between the adoption of proposed orders
after a postconviction evidentiary hearing and the adoption of proposed sentencing orders, which are
governed by section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1999), and require the trial court to determine
independently specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances that applied in the case.  Patton, 25 Fla.
L. Weekly at S751; see Patterson v. State, 513 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (Fla. 1987).  In the sentencing
context, this Court has held that the trial court may not request that the parties submit proposed orders
and adopt one of the proposals verbatim without a showing that the trial court independently weighed
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.
1993); Patterson, 513 So. 2d at 1262; Nibert v. State, 508 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1987).  The reason for
this limitation is that because the evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors is the basis for the
imposition of a sentence of life or death, "[t]he sentencing order must be sufficiently detailed to allow
this Court to perform its proportionality review, the review which may ultimately determine whether a
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and received proposed orders from both the State and Valle.  On receipt of the
State’s order, Valle immediately filed written objections not only to the content of
the order, but also to the propriety of accepting proposed orders generally.  The
day after receiving Valle’s objections, the court entered an order denying relief. 
Valle claims that the trial court violated his due process rights by the wholesale
adoption of the State’s proposed order denying postconviction relief.  Valle asserts
that although the trial court emphasized that it would write its own order, the
court’s order was almost identical to the State’s proposed order.  
This Court has rejected similar due process challenges based solely on the
fact that the trial court adopted the State's proposed order where that order was
supported by the testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  See Patton v. State, 25 Fla.
L. Weekly S749, S750-51 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2000); Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d
100, 104 (Fla. 1994); Groover v. State, 640 So. 2d 1077, 1078-79 (Fla. 1994).9  On
person lives or dies."  Patton, 25 Fla. L. Weekly at S751.  By contrast, a defendant brings a motion for
postconviction relief after this Court has affirmed the judgment and sentence and it is presumed correct. 
See id.  Moreover, this Court has stated that the trial court's failure to prepare its own findings in
support of the death penalty does not constitute reversible error "so long as the record reflects that the
trial judge made the requisite findings at the sentencing hearing."  Patterson, 513 So. 2d at 1262;
Nibert, 508 So. 2d at 4.  Thus, the instant case is distinguishable from Patterson and its progeny in that
Valle challenges the submission of proposed findings in a hearing denying postconviction relief, a
procedure not governed by section 921.141.
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the other hand, we have found a due process violation to exist when the defendant
was not served with a copy of the State's proposed order or given an opportunity
to file objections.  See Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993); Rose v.
State, 601 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 1992).
In contrast to Rose and Huff, in this case the defense had the opportunity to
present its own proposed order and to file objections to the State's proposed
order.  In addition, although the differences were not substantial, it does appear that
the trial court made changes to the trial court's order, thus revealing that the trial
court reviewed both orders and did not simply "rubber-stamp" the State's order. 
Most importantly, however, we find that the trial court's final order is supported by
the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing.  See Patton, 25 Fla. L. Weekly at
S750.  Accordingly, we find no due process violation and no reversible error in this
case as a result of the trial court's adoption of a substantial portion of the State's
10As we stated in Patton, we once again reiterate that this holding "is limited to these specific
facts and would caution trial courts that the more prudent approach is for courts to draft their own
orders."  Patton, 25 Fla. L. Weekly at S753 n.5.
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proposed order.10  See generally Glock v. Moore, Nos. SC00-2432, SC00-2535,
2001 WL 10604, *4 (Fla. Jan. 5, 2001).
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
We next address Valle's claim that his counsel was ineffective for introducing
"model prisoner" evidence pursuant to Skipper, which resulted in the State's
introduction of prejudicial rebuttal evidence concerning Valle's misconduct in
prison between 1981 and 1988.  Valle asserts that his counsel introduced model
prisoner evidence because they believed they were legally required to under this
Court's remand, rather than as a matter of strategy.  At the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, however, the trial court ruled that Valle failed to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel because he demonstrated neither deficient conduct
nor prejudice as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must prove two elements:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
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requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 219-20 (Fla.
1998).
  
In evaluating whether an attorney’s conduct is deficient, "there is 'a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance,'" and the defendant "bears the burden of proving that
counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and
that the challenged action was not sound strategy."  Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d
616, 628 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89).  This Court has held
that defense counsel’s strategic choices do not constitute deficient conduct if
alternative courses of action have been considered and rejected.  See Shere v.
State, 742 So. 2d 215, 220 (Fla. 1999).  Moreover, "[t]o establish prejudice [a
defendant] 'must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.'"  Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1511-12 (2000) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 220.
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In analyzing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must
afford deference to the trial court’s factual findings, utilizing a "competent
substantial evidence" standard.  Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla.
1999).  However, because ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed
questions of fact and law, while affording deference to the trial court's factual
findings, this Court must perform an independent review of both the deficiency and
prejudice prongs under Strickland.  See id. at 1031-32.
In its order denying Valle's motion for postconviction relief, the trial court
summarized the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing by three of the four
attorneys who represented Valle.  The court then concluded that: (1) the defense
recognized that if they had presented substantially the same evidence that they had
presented in the 1981 retrial, the result of the 1988 resentencing would have been
the same; i.e., Valle would have been sentenced to death; and (2) the record
"clearly demonstrates a recognition by [defense counsel] that he well and fully knew
that he did not have to put on the same evidence at the resentencing hearing that
was excluded at the prior hearing in 1981."  As the trial court explained:
The Court concludes that the evidence demonstrated that
defense counsel, despite their claim to the contrary, did not believe
that they were required by the mandate of the Florida Supreme Court
to introduce evidence that the defendant was, and in the future, would
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be a model prisoner.  Rather, it is clear, that these experienced
attorneys believed that without additional mitigating evidence,
substantially different from that introduced in 1981, the result of the
sentencing proceeding would be the same.  To that end, they decided
not to introduce past model prisoner testimony or future model
prisoner testimony, but rather modified it to present nonviolent
prisoner testimony, which they believed would preclude the rebuttal
evidence of the defendant’s bad acts in prison; a belief which
continued through the appeal of the defendant's third death sentence. 
Such actions are reasonable and clearly not deficient under the
standards of Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
After a thorough review of the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, we agree with
the trial court that defense counsel's performance at the 1988 resentencing
proceeding did not fall outside the bounds of reasonable professional conduct so
as to constitute deficient performance as contemplated by Strickland.  
Moreover, even if we did conclude that Valle's counsel acted deficiently, we
would still be compelled to affirm because we agree with the trial court that Valle
cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.  As the trial court stated in
pertinent part:
It is clear that, as recognized by Mr. Zelman prior to trial, without any
new mitigating evidence being presented to a jury, the result at the
resentencing would be the same as in 1981.  In 1981, the substantially
identical testimony concerning the mitigating factors related to the
defendant’s background and mental state were presented to the jury. 
In addition, in 1981, there was testimony, without any rebuttal, that the
defendant had been a model prisoner at the Stockade.  However,
despite that testimony, the jury recommended death by a vote of 9 to
3.  In 1988, even with the nonviolent prisoner testimony and its
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rebuttal, the jury recommended death, this time with a vote of 8 to 4. 
Thus, the Court finds that if the defense had not put on the nonviolent
prisoner testimony, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different.  This Court reaches this conclusion based
on the entire record not necessarily because of the above-stated vote.   
The trial court in its 1988 sentencing order, found no statutory
mitigating circumstances, and gave little weight to the nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances.  They could not have reasonably outweighed
the three very powerful aggravating circumstances involved in this
killing of a police officer, which was done in cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner, for the purpose of avoiding arrest, and at the
same time, attempting to commit first degree murder of another police
officer.  As such, any deficiency by counsel was clearly not prejudicial
under the dictates of Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
We agree with the trial court and conclude that any error in presenting the penalty
phase evidence did not deprive Valle of a "fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 219.  In sum, our
confidence in the outcome of the resentencing phase proceedings was not
undermined as a result of counsel's performance.  See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1512;
Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 219.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,
Richard Margolius, Judge - Case No. 78-5281 A
Todd G. Scher, Litigation Director, and Suzanne D. Myers, Staff Attorney, Office of
the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Fariba N. Komeily, Assistant Attorney
General, Miami, Florida,
for Appellee