Title: ZELL v ZELL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13161
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1977

No. 13161. I N THE SUPREPE COURT OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 R A Y M O N D W. ZELL, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VICTORIA ZELL, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Smith, Emmons, B a i l l i e and Walsh, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Robert J. Emmons a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : F r i s b e e and Moore, Cut Bank, Montana L a r r y E p s t e i n a r g u e d , Cut Bank, Montana Submitted: March 30, 1977 Decided: JUN -6 1971 F i l e d : ! 6 19id - C l e r k M r . Chief J u s t i c e Paul G. Hatfield d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This is an appeal of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s property d i v i s i o n rendered i n a divorce a c t i o n . Before t h e m e r i t s of t h e case can be reached w e must determine whether t h i s appeal i s properly before t h i s Court. Respondent, Raymond W. Z e l l , has f i l e d a motion t o dismiss t h i s appeal, based upon t h e f a i l u r e of a p p e l l a n t , V i c t o r i a M. Z e l l , t o f i l e a timely n o t i c e of appeal with t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . There has been no d i s t r i c t c o u r t record f i l e d with t h i s Court t h e r e f o r e w e must r e l y upon t h e b r i e f s of t h e p a r t i e s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e t i m e sequence involved. The judgment was entered October 2 0 , 1975, with t h e n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment personally served upon a p p e l l a n t ' s t r i a l counsel October 23, 1975. A f t e r contacting another a t t o r n e y a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal on December 9 , 1975. Thereafter a p p e l l a n t r e t a i n e d a t h i r d a t t o r n e y t o present t h i s appeal. The f a c t s show t h i s n o t i c e of appeal w a s f i l e d 17 days a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e 30 days allowed f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal by t h e Montana Rules of Appellate C i v i l Procedure. Rule 4 ( a ) , M. R.App.Civ.P. s t a t e s : "An appeal s h a l l be taken by f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal i n t h e d i s t r i c t court. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P. states i n p a r t : "The t i m e within which an appeal from a judgment o r an order must be taken s h a l l be 30 days from t h e e n t r y t h e r e o f , except t h a t i n c a s e s where s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment i s required by Rule 77(d) of t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l ~ ; o c e d u r e t h e time s h a l l be 30 days from t h e s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment * * *. "Upon showing of excusable n e q l e c t , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may extend t h e time f o r t i l i n g t h e n o t i c e of appeal by any p a r t y f o r a period not t o exceed 30 days from t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l time prescribed by t h i s r u l e . " (Emphasis supplied.) It is well s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t an untimely n o t i c e of appeal is a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e c t , which renders t h i s Court powerless t o hear t h e appeal. Jackson v. Tinker, 161 Mont. 51, 504 P.2d 692; L e i t h e i s e r v. Mont. S t a t e Prison, 161 Mont. 343, 505 P.2d 1203; Haywood v. S e d i l l a , 167 Mont. 101, 535 Appellant does not d i s p u t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f i l i n g of her n o t i c e of appeal was untimely. What she now argues is t h a t she is e n t i t l e d t o an extension of t i m e , a l l e g i n g excusable neglect. However, t h i s Court i s not t h e proper forum f o r such a request. Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., only g r a n t s t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h e a u t h o r i t y t o extend t h e t i m e f o r taking an appeal. Furthermore Rule 3 and Rule 2 1 ( b ) , M.R.App.civ.P., p r o h i b i t t h i s Court from extending t h e t i m e f o r t a k i n g an appeal. Rule 3 states: " I n t h e i n t e r e s t of expediting d e c i s i o n upon any matter before it, o r f o r o t h e r good cause shown, t h e Supreme Court may, except as otherwise pro- vided i n Rule 21(b) , suspend t h e requirements o r provisions of t h e s e r u l e s on a p p l i c a t i o n of a p a r t y o r on its own motion and may order pro- ceedings i n accordance with i t s d i r e c t i o n . " (Emphasis supplied. ) Rule 2 1 (b) provides: "The c o u r t f o r good cause shown may upon motion - - extend t h e time prescribed by t h e s e Rules o r by its order f o r doing any act, and may thereby permit an act t o be done a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of such t i m e i f t h e f a i l u r e t o act w a s excusable under t h e circumstances; but t h e c o u r t may not extend t h e time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal, except as provided i n Rule 5." (Emphasis supplied.) The combined e f f e c t of Rule 3 and Rule 21(b) is f u r t h e r explained i n t h e Advisory Committee's Note t o Rule 3 , M.R.App.Civ.P., wherein it i s s t a t e d : " * * * Rule 21(b) p r o h i b i t s t h e Supreme Court from extending t h e t i m e f o r taking appeal." This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rule 3 and Rule 21(b) i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t given t h e i r counterparts i n t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s of a p p e l l a t e procedure. The Advisory Committee notes p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e s e s p e c i f i c r u l e s , Rule 3 and Rule 21(b) w e r e p a t t e r n e d a f t e r t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s . I n f a c t , Rule 3, M.R.App.Civ.P. and Rule 2 , of t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s a r e i d e n t i c a l i n substance and comment. 9 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 11202.03, i n t e r p r e t i n g Rule 2 of t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s s t a t e s : "Thus a c o u r t of appeals has no power t o permit an appeal t o be sought o r taken a f t e r t h e ex- p i r a t i o n of t h e t i m e f i x e d by s t a t u t e o r r u l e . * * *" (Emphasis supplied. ) See a l s o : Bogart v. People o f S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a , 409 F.2d 25, cert. den. 393 U.S. 1101, 89 S.Ct. 900, 2 1 L Ed 2d 793; United S t a t e s v. Tallman, 437 F.2d 1103; Bryant v. E l l i o t t , 467 F.2d 1109; Cramer v. W i s e , 494 F.2d 1185. For t h e s e reasons, w e conclude t h a t t h i s Court h a s no a u t h o r i t y t o permit an appeal t o be taken a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e t i m e f i x e d by Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P. I f an extension of t i m e i s sought, t h e proper forum t o make such a r e q u e s t is t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . A question, which n a t u r a l l y arises and which must be discussed, i s t h e l e n g t h of t i m e a p a r t y has t o r e q u e s t a n exten- s i o n of t i m e from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal. The f e d e r a l r u l e s of a p p e l l a t e procedure s p e c i f i c a l l y address t h i s s u b j e c t . I n 9 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 11204.08, Rule 4 (a) provides i n p a r t : " * * * Such an extension may be granted b e f o r e o r a f t e r t h e t i m e otherwise p r e s c r i b e d by t h i s subdivision * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) The Montana Rules of Appellate C i v i l Procedure are s i l e n t a s t o t h i s s u b j e c t and do n o t provide any guidance one way o r t h e o t h e r . W e b e l i e v e t h a t allowing a p a r t y t o r e q u e s t such an extension of t i m e before o r a f t e r t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l t i m e prescribed by Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., i s t h e b e t t e r procedure and w e adopt t h i s view. This does n o t , however, g i v e a p a r t y a n unlimited amount of t i m e t o request an extension of time from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . Rule 5 provides: "Upon showing of excusable neglect, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may extend t h e t i m e f o r f i l i n s t h e n o t i c e - - of appeal by any p a r t y f o r a period-not t o exceed 30 days from t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e o r i q i n a l t i m e prescribed by t h i s Rule." (Emphasis supplied.) Consequently t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t l o s e s its a u t h o r i t y t o g r a n t such an extension a f t e r t h e a d d i t i o n a l 30 day period expires. A s applied t o t h i s case, t h i s r u l e would r e q u i r e t h e a p p e l l a n t t o make a request f o r extension of time no l a t e r than 60 days from t h e s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment. For t h e s e reasons, t h e respondent's motion t o dismiss t h i s appeal i s granted. Furthermore, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is i n s t r u c t e d t h a t its a u t h o r i t y t o consider a p p e l l a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r an extension of t i m e , i f she should s o choose, e x p i r e s 60 days from t h e d a t e of s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment, excluding t h e amount of time we concur: L 7 h - LA/& - - - - - - - - ------ -----