Title: Alfa Mutual Insurance Company v. David A. Bone and Lora Bone
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061808
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 2009

REL:01/09/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1061808
_________________________
Alfa Mutual Insurance Company
v.
David A. Bone and Lora Bone
_________________________
1061834
_________________________
David A. Bone and Lora Bone
v.
Alfa Mutual Insurance Company
Appeals from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-06-1392)
1061808; 1061834
2
BOLIN, Justice.
Alfa Mutual Insurance Company appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of David A. Bone and his wife, Lora Bone
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Bones"), on
Alfa's complaint seeking a judgment declaring its rights and
liabilities under an insurance policy.  The Bones cross-
appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in denying their
summary-judgment motion as to one issue.  We dismiss both the
appeal and the cross-appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
At the time of the incident giving rise to this action,
Robert E. Townley was residing in a house owned by Jean
Townley Waters, his grandmother.  The house was located on
"Leesburg Rd. HWY 279" in Etowah County and was insured by a
policy of insurance issued by Alfa.  The declarations page of
the policy named Waters as the insured and listed her mailing
address as "908 S. 6th St., Gadsden, Al. 35901."  The
homeowner's policy issued by Alfa provides the following
definitions:
"You and your mean the named insured shown on
the Declarations.
"....
1061808; 1061834
3
"9.  Insured means;
"a. you and residents of your
household who are:
"(1) your relatives;
"....
"16. Relative means a person related to you or
your spouse by blood or marriage."
Additionally, the homeowner's policy excluded coverage for
"bodily injury" or "property damage,"
"(1) which is either expected or intended by an
insured ... [or]
"(2) which is the result of willful or malicious
acts of an insured ...."
Townley had been residing at the Leesburg address for
approximately two years at the time of the shooting that is
the basis for this action.  Townley did not pay his
grandmother rent for living at the Leesburg address, but he
did pay for the utilities and performed maintenance and upkeep
on the house.  At no time had Waters resided with Townley at
the Leesburg address.  Rather, at all times relevant to the
issues presented in this case, Waters resided at the Gadsden
address listed in the homeowner's policy.
The evidence established the following facts.  Before she
was married to David, Lora had been married to Townley.
1061808; 1061834
4
Townley's marriage to Lora ended in divorce in May 2004, after
Lora and David had engaged in an extramarital affair.  Townley
and Lora were awarded joint custody of their children
following the divorce.  Townley and David had been friends
before the divorce and continued to be friends afterwards.
However, there was a history of arguments and confrontations
between the men.
On January 2, 2005, Townley and his children had returned
to the Leesburg address after visiting relatives out of town.
Lora and David were returning from Gatlinburg, Tennessee,
where they had celebrated the new year.  During the Bones'
return trip, Townley and Lora argued over the course of
several cellular-telephone conversations as to whether Lora
could pick the children up that day.  Townley testified that
he had visitation with the children that day and that the
children were not scheduled to return to Lora until the
following day.  The argument between Townley and Lora
escalated with each conversation, and it ended with Lora
telling Townley that she was coming to get the children and
Townley telling Lora not to do so.
As Townley was unpacking his vehicle he placed a nine-
millimeter handgun he owned in the rear pocket of his pants.
1061808; 1061834
5
After he placed the handgun in his pocket, one of the children
called him over to a trampoline in the yard where she was
playing.  Townley was standing by the trampoline when the
Bones arrived.  The Bones parked in a paved driveway located
on property owned by David Brewster, which was adjacent to the
Leesburg address.  The driveway was used jointly by both
Brewster and Townley as a boat ramp to access Lake Weiss,
which was located to the rear of the Waters and Brewster
properties.  The driveway was also used by Townley to access
a small outbuilding on the Waters property where personal
recreational watercraft were stored.  Townley was unsure where
the actual boundary line between the Brewster property and the
Waters property was located but stated that when one pulls
into the driveway he or she is on Brewster's property and that
when one reaches the water he or she is on Waters's property.
After the Bones pulled into the driveway, Lora got out of
her vehicle and began arguing with Townley.  Townley stated
that he told Lora that she needed to leave.  Townley then
moved toward David, who was standing beside the driver's door
of the vehicle, and the two men began arguing. Townley stated
that he tossed his cellular telephone at David.  David stated
that Townley threw the cellular telephone at him and struck
1061808; 1061834
6
him in the face with it.  David then picked Townley's cellular
telephone up and threw it toward the lake.  Townley then moved
around the vehicle and struck the windshield and the
passenger-side window, causing them both to shatter.  Townley
reached into the vehicle through the shattered passenger-side
window, retrieved David's cellular telephone, and then threw
David's telephone toward the lake.
After Townley and David had thrown each other's cellular
telephones toward the lake, they proceeded down the driveway
toward the lake to retrieve them.  Townley and David argued,
cursed, and "scuffled" with each other as they made their way
down the driveway.  As the confrontation escalated in the
driveway, Townley yelled for his oldest child to telephone
emergency 911.  He then pulled the handgun from his back
pocket and told David to leave.  Townley stated that he held
the handgun across his chest in a nonthreatening manner and
that he never pointed it at David.  Townley testified that
David then threw a punch at him, striking him in the eye and
causing the handgun to discharge.  David was struck in the
chest and severely injured.  Townley testified that he did not
know how the safety device on the handgun became disengaged.
David testified that he did not punch Townley and that once he
1061808; 1061834
7
saw the handgun in Townley's hand he decided to leave.  He
stated that in the instant that he turned to walk away he felt
something strike him in the chest.  David testified that he
never saw the gun pointed at him in a threatening manner.
After being shot, David walked up the driveway and left the
scene with Lora.  Townley was indicted for, and pleaded guilty
to, assault in the third degree, a violation of § 13A-6-
22(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.
The Bones sued Townley and Waters on December 22, 2006,
alleging 
that 
Townley 
negligently 
and/or 
recklessly 
discharged
a handgun while he was on premises owned by Waters, which
caused David to suffer serious personal injuries.  Townley and
Waters answered the complaint on January 23, 2007, generally
denying the allegations in the complaint and asserting certain
affirmative defenses.
On February 1, 2007, the Bones amended their complaint to
allege that Townley's conduct in discharging the handgun was
willful and wanton.  On March 2, 2007, Alfa moved to intervene
in the Bones' action against Townley and Waters, seeking a
declaration 
of 
its 
rights 
and 
liabilities 
under 
the
homeowner's insurance policy issued by Alfa to Waters, which
insured the premises on which the shooting allegedly occurred.
1061808; 1061834
8
Alfa alleged in its complaint in intervention that Townley and
Waters were not covered by the policy because, it alleged,
Townley was not an insured under the policy; the shooting did
not occur on the insured premises; the shooting was excluded
from coverage as an "expected or intended" act; and the
shooting was excluded from coverage as a "willful or
malicious" act.  On April 2, 2007, the trial court granted
Alfa's motion to intervene.  Thereafter, the Bones answered
Alfa's complaint in intervention, generally denying the
allegations.
On June 14, 2007, the Bones moved for a summary judgment,
arguing that Townley, Waters's grandson, was residing on the
insured premises with her consent at the time of the shooting
and that the policy exclusions for "expected or intended" acts
and "willful or malicious" acts were not applicable to exclude
Townley from coverage because, they argued, there was no
evidence to indicate that Townley intended to shoot David.
On July 18, 2007, Alfa responded to the Bones' motion for
a summary judgment and filed its own motion for a summary
judgment.  Alfa argued in support of its motion that Townley
was not an insured under the homeowner's policy; that the
shooting did not occur on the insured premises; and that, even
1061808; 1061834
9
if Townley was an insured and the shooting occurred on the
insured premises, there was no coverage because the shooting
was an "expected or intended" act of Townley or a "willful or
malicious" act and therefore fell within an exclusion to the
policy.
On July 23, 2007, the Bones amended their complaint a
second time to delete the claim alleging that Townley's
conduct constituted willful or wanton conduct.  On July 26,
2007, the Bones amended their motion for a summary judgment
and responded to Alfa's argument in its summary-judgment
motion that Townley was not an insured under the homeowner's
policy and that the shooting did not occur on the insured
premises.  The Bones contended that they were entitled to a
summary judgment on all four coverage issues before the trial
court. On August 2, 2007, Alfa responded to the Bones' amended
motion for a summary judgment and their response to Alfa's
summary-judgment motion.  Alfa also filed an answer on that
same date to the Bones' second amended complaint.
Following a hearing, the trial court, on September 7,
2007, entered a summary judgment in favor of the Bones and
against Alfa on three of the four coverage issues, finding:
(1) that the shooting was not expected or intended and thus
1061808; 1061834
On September 12, 2007, the Bones moved the trial court
1
to sever and/or bifurcate Alfa's complaint in intervention;
Alfa opposed the Bones' motion to sever and/or bifurcate.  It
does not appear that the trial court ruled on this motion. 
10
was not excluded from coverage under the "expected or
intended" exclusion; (2) that Townley was an insured under the
policy; and (3) that the shooting occurred on the insured
premises.  However, the trial court found that the issue
whether coverage was excluded based on the exclusion for
"willful or malicious" acts presented a factual issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.  On September 19, 2007, the
trial court entered an order certifying its summary judgment
on the three coverage issues as final pursuant to Rule 54(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P.   These appeals followed.
1
Case no. 1061808
This Court recently stated:
"[I]t is incumbent upon this Court to ensure that it
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
""'As this court has said
many times previously, a final
judgment is necessary to give
jurisdiction to this court on an
appeal, and it cannot be waived
by the parties. ..."
"'....
1061808; 1061834
11
"'When it is determined that an order
appealed from is not a final judgment, it
is the duty of the Court to dismiss the
appeal ex mero motu.'
"Powell v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 293 Ala.
101, 102, 300 So. 2d 359, 360 (1974) (quoting
McGowin Investment Co. v. Johnstone, 291 Ala. 714,
715, 287 So. 2d 835, 836 (1973)).
"'Ordinarily, an appeal can be brought
only from a final judgment.  Ala. Code
1975, § 12-22-2.  If a case involves
multiple claims or multiple parties, an
order is generally not final unless it
disposes of all claims as to all parties.
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  However, when
an action contains more than one claim for
relief, Rule 54(b) allows the court to
direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more of the claims, if it makes the
express determination that there is no just
reason for delay'
"Grantham v. Vanderzyl, 802 So. 2d 1077, 1079-80
(Ala. 2001)."
North Alabama Elec. Coop. v. New Hope Tel. Coop., [Ms.
1051800, October 17, 2008] __ So. 2d __, __ (Ala. 2008). 
With regard to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., this Court
has stated:
"Pursuant to Rule 54(b), a trial court may
direct 'the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.'
But Rule 54(b) makes an order final -- and therefore
appealable -- 'only where the trial court has
completely disposed of one of a number of claims, or
one of multiple parties.'  Tanner v. Alabama Power
Co., 617 So. 2d 656, 656 (Ala. 1993) (quoting
1061808; 1061834
12
Committee Comments on the 1973 adoption of Rule
54(b)) (emphasis added in Tanner).  In other words,
for a Rule 54(b) certification of finality to be
effective, it must fully adjudicate at least one
claim or fully dispose of the claims as they relate
to at least one party."
Haynes v. Alfa Fin. Corp., 730 So. 2d 178, 181 (Ala. 1999).
In this case, Alfa sought a judgment declaring its rights
and liabilities under the homeowner's policy issued to Waters
based on its presentation of four coverage issues: (1) whether
Townley was an insured under the policy; (2) whether the
shooting occurred on insured premises; (3) whether the
shooting was excluded from coverage as an "expected or
intended" act; and (4) whether the shooting was excluded from
coverage as a "willful or malicious" act.  The trial court
entered a summary judgment against Alfa and in favor of the
Bones on the first three coverage issues.  However, the trial
court found that a material question of fact existed as to
whether the shooting was the result of a "willful or
malicious" act, and it did not dispose of this issue by
summary judgment.  Because this issue is still pending in the
trial court awaiting determination by the appropriate trier of
fact, the summary judgment did not completely dispose of
Alfa's claim seeking a declaratory judgment as to its rights
1061808; 1061834
13
and liabilities under the homeowner's policy.  Haynes, supra.
See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v.
City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 381 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1994),
addressing the federal counterpart to Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
("[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 54(b) may be used to grant final judgment
status over a declaratory judgment action which is part of a
multi-claim litigation, so long as the declaratory judgment
aspect of the litigation has in fact been brought to final
judgment. See, e.g., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d
1249, 1253 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1993); Granite State Ins. Co. v.
Degerlia, 925 F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1991); Horn v. Transcon
Lines, Inc., 898 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1990). Thus, the term
'claim' as used in Rule 54(b) must be construed broadly so as
to include declaratory judgment actions."  (emphasis added)).
Therefore, 
the 
trial 
court's 
attempted 
Rule 
54(b)
certification of its partial summary judgment resolving issues
that did not finally conclude Alfa's declaratory-judgment
action was not effective to create a final and appealable
judgment.  Because this appeal is from a nonfinal judgment, we
cannot address the issues presented, and the appeal must be
dismissed.
Case no. 1061834
1061808; 1061834
14
The Bones appeal from the denial of their motion for a
summary judgment on the issue whether Townley was excluded
from coverage under the "willful or malicious" acts exclusion
of the policy.  The Bones had argued in support of their
motion that the "willful or malicious" acts exclusion was not
applicable to exclude Townley from coverage because, they
argued, there was no evidence to indicate that Townley
intended to shoot David.  This Court will not entertain the
Bones' attempted appeal of the denial of their motion for a
summary judgment.  "'"Such an order is inherently non-final
and cannot be made final by a Rule 54(b), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
certification.... An order denying summary judgment is
interlocutory and nonappealable."'"  Continental Cas. Co. v.
SouthTrust Bank, N.A., 933 So. 2d 337, 340 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Fahy v. C.A.T.V. Subscriber Servs., Inc., 568 So. 2d
1219, 1222 (Ala. 1990), quoting in turn Parsons Steel, Inc. v.
Beasley, 522 So. 2d 253, 257-58 (Ala. 1988)).  Accordingly,
because the Bones have attempted to cross-appeal from a
nonappealable judgment, we must dismiss the cross-appeal.
Conclusion
We dismiss both Alfa's appeal and the Bones' cross-appeal
as being from nonfinal judgments.
1061808; 1061834
15
1061808 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
1061834 -- APPEAL DISMISSED. 
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Parker,
and Murdock, JJ., concur.
 
1061808; 1061834
16
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur specially in case no. 1061808; I concur in case
no. 1061834.  
As to case no. 1061808, I concur in the main opinion's
conclusion that, because the issue whether the shooting was
the result of a "willful or malicious" act is still awaiting
determination, the trial court's summary judgment did not
completely dispose of Alfa's claim.   Even if the trial court,
for purposes of the summary-judgment motion filed by the
Bones, were to make a determination as to whether the shooting
was the result of a "willful or malicious" act, and thereupon
grant the Bones' motion for a summary judgment as to the
question of Alfa's liability, I question whether that judgment
would be appropriate for certification as a final judgment
under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The issues involved in such
a judgment would in many respects be the same as those yet to
be adjudicated between the Bones, on the one hand, and Waters
and Townley, on the other, and the risk of inconsistent
results remains.  Indeed, any final determination as to
whether Alfa will be liable monetarily to the Bones will still
depend on whether Waters and Townley are found liable to the
Bones on the underlying tort claim, something not yet
1061808; 1061834
17
determined.  As this Court stated in Branch v. SouthTrust Bank
of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987):
"'Rule 54(b)  certifications should be granted only
in exceptional cases ....' ....
"....
"The facts in this case ...  do not present the
type of situation that Rule 54(b) was intended to
cover.  ...  It ... appears that the issues in the
... claims in this case are so closely intertwined
that 
separate 
adjudication 
would 
pose 
an
unreasonable risk of inconsistent results. We must
conclude, therefore, that in the interest of
justice, the claims should not be adjudicated
separately."