Title: Graham v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 942189
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANDRE L. GRAHAM 
 
v.  Record Nos. 942189 and 942192 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                           June 9, 1995 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
James B. Wilkinson, Judge 
 
 
Andre L. Graham was tried upon indictments charging him with 
eight felonies arising out of the October 8, 1993 shootings of 
Sheryl L. Stack and Edward Martin.  One indictment charged Graham 
with Stack's capital murder with a deadly weapon during the 
commission of Martin's robbery, another indictment charged Graham 
with an attempt to rob Stack, two indictments charged Graham with 
Martin's robbery and malicious wounding, and the remaining four 
indictments charged Graham with the use and display of a firearm 
in a threatening manner during the commission of the foregoing 
four felonies. 
 
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial conducted pursuant 
to Code §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, a jury convicted Graham of all 
eight charges.  A subsequent proceeding was conducted under the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-295.1 in which the Commonwealth 
introduced Graham's record of prior convictions.
*  The jury then 
                     
     
*Graham's prior convictions were:  November 20, 1991:  
unauthorized use of an automobile, assumption of the name of 
another, concealed weapon, trespass on posted property; January 
17, 1992:  failure to appear in court, possession of cocaine, 
possession of cocaine with firearm; August 25, 1994:  capital 
murder, use of firearm in commission of capital murder, robbery, 
use of firearm in commission of robbery, capital murder, robbery, 
use of firearm in commission of robbery. 
 
 
 
 
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fixed Graham's punishments at the following periods of 
imprisonment for six of the non-capital convictions:  life for 
the aggravated malicious wounding, 25 years for the robbery, 10 
years for the attempted robbery, and five years each for three of 
the firearm convictions, all of which the court imposed. 
 
In the second stage of the capital murder trial, the jury 
fixed Graham's punishment for the capital murder of Stack at 
death based on its findings of "future dangerousness" and 
"vileness," and at five years imprisonment for the firearm 
conviction in connection with the murder.  The court then 
referred the matter to the probation officer for an investigation 
and report pursuant to the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.5.  
After considering the report, the court imposed the death 
sentence and the penitentiary sentence for the firearm 
conviction. 
 
Graham is before this Court for automatic review of his 
death sentence, Code § 17-110.1(A), and we have consolidated that 
review with the appeal of his capital murder conviction.  Code 
§ 17-110.1(F).  We have also certified Graham's appeal of his 
remaining convictions from the Court of Appeals, transferring 
jurisdiction over that appeal to this Court pursuant to Code 
§ 17-116.06, thereby consolidating all these matters. 
 
Since the Commonwealth prevailed in the trial court, we 
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  Swann 
 
 
 
 
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v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 225, 441 S.E.2d 195, 198, cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 234 (1994). 
 
EVIDENCE 
 
After finishing their work at the Steak and Ale Restaurant 
on Midlothian Turnpike in south Richmond on the night of October 
7, 1993, Stack drove her Volvo sedan and Martin drove his red 
sports car to another restaurant in Richmond where they had 
something to eat.  James Jones, the night auditor of a motel 
adjacent to the Steak and Ale Restaurant parking lot, was 
standing outside the motel talking to another employee when he 
saw Stack and Martin return to the parking lot after 2:00 a.m. on 
October 8.  Jones noticed Stack and Martin standing beside one of 
the two cars talking and kissing until Jones returned to work 
inside the motel.  Twenty to twenty-five minutes later, Jones 
heard two loud noises, "two or three seconds [apart], maybe up to 
ten seconds" and saw a third car being driven from the area. 
 
When Jones looked toward the parking lot, he noticed that 
the Volvo's engine was running and its lights were on, but that 
the red sports car was gone.  As he walked toward the Volvo, 
Jones noticed a body lying on the ground and immediately called 
the police. 
 
Harold Giles, a Richmond Police officer who was in the 
immediate area, got Jones's call "[a]bout 3:59 [a.m.]" and was at 
"the scene `within a minute or so.'"  He found Stack and Martin, 
both shot in the head, lying face down in a pool of blood, with 
 
 
 
 
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their hands touching.  Giles testified that "they were trying to 
communicate to each other, but I couldn't make out what they were 
saying."  In addition to observing that the Volvo's engine was 
running and its lights were on, Giles also noticed that the front 
passenger door was open.  Giles "protect[ed] the crime scene 
until the detectives arrived." 
 
When Detective Thomas R. Searles arrived at the scene at 
"approximately" 6:00 a.m., Stack and Martin had been taken to the 
hospital.  Searles took photographs and collected the physical 
evidence.  One photograph of the front seat of Stack's car shows 
that it had been ransacked, with Stack's personal property and 
purse in disarray in the front seat.  Searles found a .45 caliber 
cartridge case and two .45 caliber bullets that were 
approximately one foot apart. 
 
Stack was comatose when she arrived at the hospital and died 
some time later without regaining consciousness.  Although Martin 
had been shot in the head and suffered extensive brain injuries, 
he survived and was able to testify.  Dr. William Broaddus, a 
neurosurgeon who treated Martin, testified that the bullet that 
entered Martin's head damaged the left side of his brain, 
resulting in Martin's loss of his left eye, a partial paralysis 
on the right side of his body, and an impairment in his ability 
to generate language.  However, Dr. Broaddus said that Martin's 
comprehension, memory, and intelligence were perfectly normal, 
only his "ability to express what he is thinking is 
 
 
 
 
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impaired. . . .  It just takes him a lot longer and with a lot 
more effort." 
 
Martin testified that he and Stack were seated in her car in 
the parking lot when a man Martin later identified from a 
photographic spread as Graham approached the car.  Graham had a 
gun and told them to get out of the car.  After Stack and Martin 
got out of the car, Graham told Martin to hand over his wallet 
and car keys to another man who was with him, but unarmed.  As 
Graham held "the gun on [Stack and Martin]," the other man first 
got in Stack's car and started it, then got in Martin's car, 
where, according to Martin, the other man "saw" Martin's compact 
disc recordings (CDs).  While the other man was in Martin's car, 
Graham told Stack and Martin that if they would lie down on the 
parking lot and close their eyes, he would not hurt them.  Even 
though both did as they were directed, they were each shot in the 
head as they lay on the ground with their eyes closed. 
 
Although Martin does not remember how long it was after he 
closed his eyes that he was shot, Graham was the last person 
Martin saw with a gun before he closed his eyes.  After he was 
shot, Martin realized that his "car was being started and the car 
was coming at [him] so [he] quickly rolled over to get out of the 
way of the car."  After they were shot, Stack and Martin were 
holding hands and he was trying to talk to her. 
 
Priscilla Booker, who had been living with Graham in an 
apartment on Midlothian Turnpike since early July 1993, testified 
 
 
 
 
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that on the morning of Stack's murder, she saw Graham in the same 
red car as that shown in a police photograph of Martin's car.  
Later that morning, as Booker was watching the news on a local 
television station, she mentioned to Graham the reports of the 
shooting in the Steak and Ale parking lot.  Graham's response 
was, "why do [you] worry about other people." 
 
Graham then asked Booker to stop looking at the news and, 
when she continued to do so, he became upset.  When Booker asked 
Graham why she should not watch the news, he replied that "he 
knew who did it[,] but he didn't." 
 
Two or three days after the Stack murder, Booker found 
Martin's box of over 200 CDs in the trunk of her car.  Graham 
told her that he had bought these CDs for $10, and Booker put 
them in storage.  The police recovered Martin's car a few days 
after the crimes, but were unable to obtain any useful 
fingerprint evidence from it. 
 
On the morning of December 3, 1993, Graham, who was 
incarcerated in the Chesterfield County jail on another charge, 
made a telephone call to Booker in the presence of Gary McGregor, 
a Chesterfield County deputy sheriff.  Graham told Booker several 
times during the conversation to "go into the closet, get the bag 
with the contents and get rid of it."  McGregor immediately 
reported this conversation to his superiors.  Shortly thereafter, 
Detective W.F. Showalter of the Chesterfield County Police 
Department went to Booker's apartment.  There he found a .45 
 
 
 
 
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caliber pistol in a plastic bag in a linen closet. 
 
The gun was heavily oiled, and the police were unable to 
recover any fingerprints from it.  However, Booker testified that 
she had seen the transaction in which Graham had obtained the gun 
in September 1993, and that since that time, Graham had kept it 
in his constant possession.  Booker testified that Graham even 
slept with it.  After examining the gun, the bullets, and the 
cartridge case found at the scene, Ann Davis Jones, a firearms 
identification expert, testified that Graham's gun was the weapon 
from which the bullets and the cartridge case found at the scene 
had been fired and ejected. 
 
The police found Martin's CDs in a storage locker rented by 
Booker's mother.  The CDs were examined by Leland W. Kennedy, a 
fingerprint expert, who testified that 31 of the 48 identifiable 
fingerprints found on the CDs were those of Graham. 
 
ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
Five of the issues that Graham presents for appeal he 
candidly admits we have previously decided adversely to his 
contentions.  He further states that he "has no additional 
argument that has not been raised by other death penalty 
defendants in cases previously cited by this court."  We know of 
no reasons to modify our previous decisions and, therefore, 
reject each of the following claims: 
 
1.  The statutes fail "to guide the jury's discretion in its 
consideration of the `vileness' and `future dangerousness' 
 
 
 
 
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aggravating factors."  Rejected in Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 
Va. 528, 535, 450 S.E.2d 365, 371 (1994). 
 
2.  The capital murder statutes "allow the jury to use the 
evidence of prior convictions to impose the sentence of death, 
violating defendant's protection against double jeopardy."  
Rejected in Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 82, 452 S.E.2d 
862, 865 (1995); Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 404, 442 
S.E.2d 678, 684-85, vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 115 
S.Ct. 307 (1994). 
 
3.  "The death penalty, per se, constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment under current standards of decency."  Rejected 
in Joseph, 249 Va. at 82, 452 S.E.2d at 865; Williams, 248 Va. at 
536, 450 S.E.2d at 371. 
 
4.  The "[f]ailure to give adequate jury instructions on 
mitigation, use of model jury instructions, and jury verdict 
forms inhibits the jury from giving independent weight to aspects 
of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of 
the offense that are proffered in mitigation."  Rejected in 
Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 442 (1994). 
 
5.  The "[f]ailure of Virginia to provide for meaningful 
appellate review deprives [Graham] of statutory rights and due 
process of law."  Rejected in Joseph, 249 Va. at 82, 452 S.E.2d 
at 865; Williams, 248 Va. at 536, 450 S.E.2d at 371. 
 
GUILT PHASE 
 
 
 
 
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Graham does not argue that the evidence is insufficient to 
establish his presence when these crimes were committed.  Indeed, 
in exercising his right of allocution before sentencing, Graham 
told the court, "[i]t was three of us there," but Graham denied 
that he was the "triggerman." 
 
Graham contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove 
that he was the "triggerman."  Since Martin cannot remember how 
long it was after he closed his eyes before he and Stack were 
shot, Graham argues that the Commonwealth had the burden of 
excluding the hypothesis that Graham might have given the gun to 
the other man, who then shot Stack and Martin. 
 
Nothing in the evidence suggests that Graham may have given 
the gun to the other man in the interval between the time Martin 
closed his eyes and he and Stack were shot.  Instead, Graham's 
ownership of the gun, his retention of the gun even when 
sleeping, Martin's testimony, and Graham's direction to Booker to 
"get rid of the bag" containing the gun, taken together, amply 
justify the conclusion that Graham was the person who shot the 
victims. 
 
Since nothing in the evidence supports Graham's hypothesis, 
we conclude that his hypothesis does not spring from the 
evidence, but from the imagination of Graham's counsel.  
Therefore, the Commonwealth had no duty to negate this 
hypothesis.  Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 433, 309 S.E.2d 
325, 329 (1983); Turner v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 148-49, 235 
 
 
 
 
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S.E.2d 357, 361 (1977).  Accordingly, we find no merit in this 
contention. 
 
Next, Graham contends that the court erred in failing to 
give an instruction that he described as a "cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction."  This instruction provided: 
 
 
In deciding what the facts are, you must consider 
all the evidence.  In doing this, you must decide which 
testimony to believe and which testimony not to 
believe.  You may disbelieve all or any part of any 
witness's testimony.  In making that decision, you may 
take into account a number of factors including the 
following: 
 
 
 
1.  Was the witness able to see, or hear, or know 
the things about which the witness testified? 
 
 
 
2.  How well was the witness able to recall and 
describe those things? 
 
 
 
3.  What was the witness's manner while 
testifying? 
 
 
 
4.  Did the witness have any interest in the 
outcome of this case or any bias or prejudice 
concerning any party or any matter involved in the 
case? 
 
 
 
5.  How reasonable was the witness's testimony 
considered in light of all the evidence in the case? 
 
 
 
6.  Was the witness's testimony contradicted by 
what that witness has said or done at another time, or 
by the testimony of other witnesses, or by other 
evidence? 
 
 
 
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, 
keep in mind that people sometimes forget things.  You 
need to consider therefore whether a contradiction is 
an innocent lapse of memory or an intentional 
falsehood, and that may depend on whether it has [to] 
do with an important fact or with only a small detail. 
 
 
 
These are some of the facts you may consider in 
deciding whether to believe testimony. 
 
 
 
The weight of the evidence presented by each side 
 
 
 
 
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does not necessarily depend on the number [of] 
witnesses testifying on one side or the other.  You 
must consider all the evidence in the case, and you may 
decide that the testimony of a smaller number of 
witnesses on one side has greater weight than that of a 
larger number on the other. 
 
 
 
All of these are matters for you to consider in 
finding the facts. 
 
 
 We rejected a similar claim in Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 
Va. 220, 256, 421 S.E.2d 821, 843 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
___, 113 S.Ct. 1319 (1993).  Since the Satcher jury was fully 
instructed on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, 
we held that a separate instruction on identity was not required. 
Here, the court fully instructed the jury on the presumption of 
innocence, the Commonwealth's burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the consideration of circumstantial evidence, 
and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the weight 
of the evidence.  Accordingly, we conclude that Graham's proposed 
instruction was not required, and that the court did not err in 
refusing to grant it. 
 
Finally, Graham contends that the trial court erred in its 
refusal to set the verdicts aside and grant a new trial because 
of the Commonwealth's alleged violation of the court's order 
requiring it to disclose all exculpatory evidence prior to trial. 
 According to Graham, this alleged violation deprived him of the 
due process rights articulated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). 
 
The alleged exculpatory evidence was the misidentification 
 
 
 
 
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by Martin of the other man present at the scene in a photographic 
spread of six suspects presented at the same time Martin picked 
Graham from another photographic spread.  Prior to trial, the 
Commonwealth advised Graham only that Martin was unable to 
identify the other man.  However, we will not consider this 
contention since Graham learned of Martin's misidentification 
during his cross-examination of one of the Commonwealth's 
witnesses, and he failed to bring the matter to the court's 
attention at that time by way of a motion for mistrial, a motion 
for a continuance, or a request for other relief.  Instead, he 
used the fact of Martin's misidentification to his own advantage 
in his argument to the jury and raised the Brady issue only after 
the jury returned an adverse verdict.  By that time, he had 
waived the point.  Therefore, we will not consider his claim that 
the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.  Rule 
5:25. 
 
SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
Graham does not argue either that his death sentence was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 
arbitrary factor, or that it is excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty in similar cases.  Nevertheless, we have reviewed his 
death sentence on the record pursuant to the mandate of Code 
§ 17-110.1. 
 
At the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth referred to 
Graham's record of previous convictions.  It also introduced 
 
 
 
 
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testimony showing Graham's two prior capital murder convictions 
on August 25, 1994.  These capital murder convictions arose from 
Graham's participation in the murder and robberies of a 
Chesterfield County couple on November 30, 1993.  Both were shot 
in the head. 
 
Graham introduced mitigation evidence.  Sherry Oliver, a 
22-year-old friend of Graham, testified that Graham "was polite" 
and never got angry with her or her two children.  Jacqueline 
Graham, Graham's mother, testified that he was 24 years old, that 
he had one child, age 4, that he was always "very respectful" 
with her and any other adult, and that he had never been violent 
in his life. 
 
Dr. Leigh D. Hagan, a forensic psychologist who examined and 
tested Graham, testified that Graham had "an overall intelligence 
score of 84, which places him mid-way in the lower average 
range. . . .  It tells us that this is not a matter of mental 
retardation."  Dr. Hagan described the results of researchers who 
studied the incarceration history of 453 murderers whose death 
sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment and found that 
only nine-tenths of one percent committed other homicides in 
prison during the following 15 years of imprisonment.  Based upon 
this study and his examination of Graham, Dr. Hagan opined that 
Graham "will not pose any greater threat, ongoing threat to 
society than any other murderer given a life sentence." 
 
However, our review discloses nothing in the record to 
 
 
 
 
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indicate that the jury was influenced by any arbitrary factor in 
imposing the death sentence.  And clearly the jury's findings of 
both the "vileness" and "future dangerousness" factors are amply 
supported by the evidence. 
 
Further, we have examined the records that we have compiled 
of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, Code 
§ 17-110.1, including those in which life sentences were imposed. 
 In doing so, we have paid particular attention to those cases in 
which the sentence was based on both the "vileness" and "future 
dangerousness" predicates.  Those cases are collected in Spencer 
v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 318-20, 384 S.E.2d 785, 799-800 
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990), supplemented in 
Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 413-14, 422 S.E.2d 380, 397 
(1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1880 (1993), and in 
Williams, 248 Va. at 550, 450 S.E.2d at 379.  Since Williams, the 
following cases also have considered sentences in which both 
predicates were involved:  Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 
452 S.E.2d 669 (1995), and Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 
450 S.E.2d 124 (1994), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1433 
(1995).  Based upon our review of these records, we conclude that 
Graham's death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate, 
considering both the crime and the defendant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Finding no error in the trial court's judgments and 
perceiving no other reason to set aside the sentence of death, we 
 
 
 
 
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will affirm the convictions and sentences. 
 
Record No. 942189 -- Affirmed. 
 
Record No. 942192 -- Affirmed.