Title: Doe v. Thompson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 110318
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2016

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 110,318 
 
JOHN DOE, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KIRK THOMPSON, DIRECTOR OF THE KANSAS 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and FRANK DENNING, 
JOHNSON COUNTY, KANSAS, SHERIFF, 
Appellants. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Kansas' statutes governing judicial notice, K.S.A. 60-409 et seq., apply to all facts, 
regardless of whether a particular fact may be labeled an adjudicative fact or a legislative 
fact. 
 
2. 
 
Although anonymous or pseudonymous litigation is an atypical procedure, it 
should be permitted where an important privacy interest outweighs the public interest in 
the litigant's identity. 
 
3. 
 
Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall pass 
any ex post facto law. Ex post facto laws include retroactively applied legislation that 
make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
 
The constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes. 
 
5. 
 
To determine whether the retroactive application of a statutory scheme violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, a court first determines the legislature's intention. If a statutory 
scheme was intended to be punitive, it cannot be applied retroactively under any 
circumstances. 
 
6. 
 
If the legislature intended to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and 
nonpunitive, the next inquiry is whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate the State's intent to deem it civil. If a statutory scheme is 
punitive in effect, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits its application retroactively. 
 
7. 
 
The Kansas Offender Registration Act, K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq., as amended in 
2011, is punitive in effect, and the amended statutory scheme cannot be applied 
retroactively to any sex offender who committed the qualifying crime prior to July 1, 
2011. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; LARRY D. HENDRICKS, judge. Opinion filed April 22, 2016. 
Affirmed. 
 
Christopher M. Grunewald, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Ward E. Loyd, 
assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellant 
Kirk Thompson, and Kirk T. Ridgway, of Ferree, Bunn, Rundberg, Radom & Ridgway, Chartered, of 
Overland Park, was with him on the briefs for appellant Frank Denning.  
 
3 
 
 
 
Christopher M. Joseph, of Joseph Hollander & Craft, LLC, of Topeka, argued the cause, and 
Carrie E. Parker, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
James R. Shetlar, of Overland Park, was on the brief for amicus curiae The National Center for 
Victims of Crime. 
 
Jessica R. Kunen, of Lawrence, was on the brief for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation of Kansas. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Plaintiff, proceeding under the pseudonym John Doe, filed a 
declaratory judgment action against agents of the State, claiming that retroactive 
application of the 2011 amendments to the Kansas Offender Registration Act, K.S.A. 22-
4901 et seq. (KORA), violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 10 of the United 
States Constitution (hereafter, Ex Post Facto Clause). The district court granted summary 
judgment in Doe's favor, finding that while the legislature intended KORA to be a civil 
statutory scheme, the act was punitive in effect pursuant to the factors identified in 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 
(1963) (Mendoza-Martinez factors). Consequently, the district court concluded that, 
because KORA's retroactive application assigned a new punitive measure to a crime 
already consummated, it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  
 
The State appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that the district court 
erred by (1) refusing to strike inadmissible evidence submitted in support of Doe's motion 
for summary judgment; (2) taking judicial notice of certain journal articles; and (3) 
concluding that the KORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. In addition, 
the State complains about the district court's order granting Doe leave to proceed with a 
pseudonym. We affirm the district court's result. 
4 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
In 2003, after being charged with inappropriately touching or fondling a 14- or 15-
year-old child, Doe pled guilty to and was convicted of one count of indecent liberties 
with a minor, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3503(a)(1) (Furse 1995). In April 2003, he 
received a controlling prison term of 32 months, but the prison portion of his sentence 
was suspended and he was placed on probation for 36 months. It appears that probation 
was Doe's presumptive sentence. Doe successfully completed his probation in April 
2006.  
 
At the time of his conviction, KORA required Doe to register with both the 
Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) and the Johnson County Sheriff's Office for a 
period of 10 years from the date of his conviction, given that he was not incarcerated. 
K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-4906(a). Doe submitted his initial registration forms following his 
April 2003 sentencing and thereafter complied with the KORA registration and reporting 
requirements.  
 
Information from the registration form, such as the offender's name, age, address, 
gender, race, and photograph, is available for public access on the Johnson County 
Sheriff's website, which allows the public to search for offenders by name or 
geographical location. In addition, the website contains a "share and bookmark" feature 
that allows users to share registry information via email and other Internet information 
sharing resources.  
 
The KBI's website provides even more information for public access, including 
such additional information as the offender's hair and eye color, the dates of offense and 
conviction, the county of conviction, and the age of the victim. It also allows the public to 
search for an offender by name and geographical location. The public can also learn if a 
5 
 
 
 
phone number, email, or Facebook identity belongs to an offender. Finally, the KBI 
website provides a community notification system that allows an individual to be notified 
by email when a registered offender registers a home, work, or school address that is near 
an address of interest to the notified individual.  
 
Before Doe was scheduled to complete his reporting requirements, on June 15, 
2011, the KBI sent a letter to all registered offenders, including Doe, detailing recent 
legislative amendments to KORA that were to become effective on July 1, 2011. The 
letter advised Doe that the amendments were retroactive and would apply to all offenders 
regardless of when their underlying offenses occurred. Particularly germane to Doe was 
the notification that his period of registration had been extended from 10 years to 25 
years after conviction, i.e., Doe's KORA completion date was changed from the year 
2013 to the year 2028.  
 
In response, Doe filed a petition for declaratory judgment against KBI director 
Kirk Thompson and Johnson County Sheriff Frank Denning (hereafter collectively 
referred to as "the State"). Doe sought a judicial determination that the retroactive 
application of the 2011 KORA amendments, particularly the extension of the registration 
period, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by effecting an after-the-fact increase in 
punishment for a previously committed crime. Doe sought, and was granted, leave to 
proceed with his lawsuit using a pseudonym in order to protect his identity, his family 
members' identities, and the identity of the victim in the underlying criminal case.  
 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. To his motion, Doe attached 
affidavits and journal articles. The affidavits described how the registration requirements 
had adversely impacted Doe and his family. The journal articles provided general 
discussions of the difficulties that sex offenders encounter due to the registration 
requirements, together with social science findings regarding the impact that registration 
6 
 
 
 
laws have on recidivism. The State filed a motion to strike specific portions of the 
affidavits, claiming that they were "replete with testimony unsupported by specific 
material facts or personal knowledge or both; inadmissible hearsay testimony"; and 
contained lay opinion testimony that lacked proper foundation. In addition, the State 
contended that Doe's motion for summary judgment "inappropriately attempts to use 
general law journal articles and other publications in lieu of testimony to establish certain 
facts."  
 
The district court denied the defendants' motion to strike and granted Doe's motion 
for summary judgment. As will be discussed in more detail below, the district court found 
that the 2011 amendments to KORA imposed additional burdens upon KORA registrants 
so as to render the act punitive in effect. Specifically, the district court concluded that 
"KORA's current provisions subject Mr. Doe to punishment under any definition," and, 
therefore, the retroactive application of those punitive provisions to a previously 
committed crime violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court entered judgment 
requiring defendants to immediately terminate Doe's additional 15-year registration 
requirement and delete all KORA information that was being publicly displayed.  
 
The State filed a timely appeal, invoking this court's jurisdiction pursuant to 
K.S.A. 60-2101(b), which provides that "[a]n appeal from a final judgment of a district 
court in any civil action in which a statute of this state or of the United States has been 
held unconstitutional shall be taken directly to the supreme court." 
 
DENIAL OF STATE'S MOTION TO STRIKE MATERIAL 
FROM PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
The State argues that the district court erred in failing to strike certain evidence 
that Doe submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the 
State complains about:  (1) testimony contained in the affidavits that was not based on 
7 
 
 
 
personal knowledge; (2) inadmissible hearsay evidence contained within the affidavits; 
and (3) purported "legislative facts" contained in journal articles, which forms the basis 
of the second issue discussed below. The State contends that the error was unfairly 
prejudicial because several of the objectionable affidavit statements "were recited by the 
district court as uncontroverted material facts." Doe claims that the State's argument is a 
"straw man," because the statements were not relied upon by the district court in deciding 
the summary judgment motion. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
The State challenges the legal basis upon which the district court considered the 
affidavits and journal articles in conjunction with Doe's summary judgment motion. We 
exercise de novo review over a challenge to the legal adequacy of the district court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence. See State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, Syl. ¶ 6, 284 
P.3d 251 (2012). 
 
To the extent that we are called upon to interpret our judicial notice statute, K.S.A. 
60-409, we conduct a de novo review. See Jeanes v. Bank of America, 296 Kan. 870, 
873, 295 P.3d 1045 (2013) (statutory interpretation a legal question subject to de novo 
review). 
 
Analysis 
 
We begin with the State's challenges to the affidavits of John Doe and his wife, 
Jane Doe. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-256(e)(1), the statutory provision governing motions for 
summary judgment, contains a specific provision addressing affidavits or declarations 
that are submitted in support of, or opposition to, a summary judgment motion, to-wit:   
 
8 
 
 
 
 
"A supporting or opposing affidavit or declaration must be made on personal 
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant or 
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. If a paper or part of a paper is 
referred to in an affidavit or declaration, a sworn or certified copy must be attached to or 
served with the affidavit or declaration. The court may permit an affidavit or declaration 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories or additional 
affidavits or declarations." 
 
 
Affidavits submitted in support of, or in opposition to, a summary judgment 
motion must set forth evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial. Estate of 
Belden v. Brown County, 46 Kan. App. 2d 247, 285-86, 261 P.3d 943 (2011). Moreover, 
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 141(d) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 258) provides that a "party 
may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a 
form that would be admissible in evidence."  
 
Although the State's motion to strike objected to 33 of the 44 paragraphs contained 
in Doe's affidavit and 15 of the 19 paragraphs contained in Jane Doe's affidavit, the 
State's brief in this appeal narrowed the focus of their objections to 12 paragraphs in 
Doe's affidavit and 6 paragraphs in Jane Doe's affidavit. The challenged paragraphs deal 
generally with how the registration has impacted the Does' children, Doe's employment 
and housing, Doe's access to school activities, and Doe's access to a hospital visitation. 
 
With respect to the Does' children, the affidavits stated that other parents had 
instructed their children not to associate with the Doe family; that the Doe children had 
been teased at school and had come home crying because their classmates had called Doe 
a "bad man," a "pervert," or a "pedophile"; that the children were only repeating what 
they heard their parents say; and that the parents knew nothing about Doe except what 
could be reviewed on the offender registry. The State complains that the Does were not 
personally present to hear what the other children had said or what they had heard from 
9 
 
 
 
their parents, and that the Does could not personally know whether the other children's 
parents had accessed the registry or had obtained their knowledge from some other 
source. 
 
The State's assertion that the affiants lacked personal knowledge has some merit 
with respect to the speculation about what the schoolmates' parents told them or that the 
parents obtained their knowledge of Doe by accessing the registry. But the Does observed 
first-hand the trauma their children had experienced and personally heard the children 
explain that the source of that mental anguish was teasing and name-calling by their 
schoolmates. To the extent the State is arguing hearsay, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-460(l) 
recognizes an exception for statements of physical or mental condition, including the 
declarant's existing state of mind or emotion, when the mental condition is in issue or is 
relevant to prove or explain the acts or conduct of the declarant. See State v. Hobson, 234 
Kan. 133, 154, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983). The Doe children's statements about what their 
schoolmates said and did was certainly relevant to explain why they came home from 
school crying.  
 
With respect to his employment, Doe's affidavit stated that he had continued to 
work for a corporation throughout his prosecution and even after his conviction, but that 
he "was terminated once [his] presence on the Offender Registry was brought to the 
attention of [his] employer." Doe asserted that someone had told his manager that he was 
listed as a sex offender, whereupon the manager terminated Doe and had him escorted 
from the building. Doe related that the manager had said that other employees working 
for the company had felony convictions, but that Doe's listing on the registry would 
expose the company to public relations liabilities and issues related to employees' 
concerns for workplace safety.  
 
10 
 
 
 
Doe also testified about his attempts to find employment commensurate with his 
education, skills, and abilities. He said prospective employers always rejected him as 
soon as he disclosed his registration status. Some even told him to come back when he 
was "off the list." 
 
The State's brief makes the somewhat confusing argument that Doe had "provided 
no basis to testify to the truth about [his] former manager's thoughts about Doe's 
registration status," for example, that there were corporate concerns about liabilities or 
that a coworker had found Doe on the registry and told the former manager. But, of 
course, Doe's basis for testifying about what his former manager said was that the 
manager was saying those things directly to Doe, while firing him. Moreover, whether 
the manager was being totally truthful in all that he said to Doe is not really the point. 
Rather, what is germane is that the manager told Doe that he was fired because his name 
was on the registry.  
 
Again, although not argued by the parties, it appears that the manager's statement 
can be admitted under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-460(l) to explain the manager's state-of-
mind, i.e., the reason he undertook the action at issue, even if it cannot be used to prove 
that Doe was actually listed on the registry or that there was actually a corporate concern 
about liabilities. See Monroe v. Board of Ed. of Town of Wolcott, Connecticut, 65 F.R.D. 
641, 649 (D. Conn. 1975) (school principal's affidavit recitation based on what he heard 
the school board say were reasons for expelling a student fit hearsay exception for 
declarations of present existing motive or reason for action).  
 
Perhaps Doe might have obtained an affidavit directly from the manager and 
avoided the State's hearsay challenge. But we recently opined that "[a] statement 
contemporaneously describing a declarant's belief or intention is inherently more 
trustworthy than a statement made after the fact, when incentives to embellish or 
11 
 
 
 
fabricate may have arisen." State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 131, 262 P.3d 285 (2011). 
Moreover, even if the manager's statement of the reason for firing Doe was not 
admissible, it would be reasonable to infer that the reason was the registry, given the 
timing and abruptness of the termination.  
 
With respect to housing, Doe's affidavit described his attempts to rent a place to 
live. Even though his rental applications reflected prior military service, an excellent 
credit history, and sufficient income to support the monthly rent, landlords repeatedly 
refused to rent to Doe. The landlords related to Doe that they had no problem with the 
registration per se but that the map on the website showing where sex offenders live was 
a problem because it would cause current tenants to leave and potential tenants to avoid 
the area. 
 
In its brief, the State makes no separate argument as to why this statement should 
be struck, other than to refer back to its comprehensive presentation to the district court, 
which included tables specifying specific objections to each paragraph. But Doe could 
certainly testify that, after he began disclosing that he was listed on the sex offender 
registry, he was repeatedly denied housing. Then it would be a reasonable inference to 
draw that a website map showing the location of registered sex offenders would be an 
impediment to a registrant obtaining an apartment.  
 
The only other affidavit paragraph that drew a specific argument from the State on 
appeal concerned Doe being denied admittance to visit neighbors at a hospital. The 
affidavit related that at the entrance, a security guard swiped Doe's driver's license but 
then advised him that the hospital could not accommodate his visit and that he had to 
leave. The affidavit added the declaration:  "I was only barred from entering because I 
was listed on the Offender Registry, not because of my crime." The State argues that 
"Doe's testimony about the truth of whether a hospital barred his entry solely because of 
12 
 
 
 
his registration status and not his crime is not founded on personal knowledge of the 
hospital's policies or instructions to its guards."  
 
The State's concern about whether the guard's actions were based upon hospital 
policy or instructions misses the point. As will be discussed later, Doe's status as a 
registrant was identified on his driver's license. Doe could certainly testify that he 
attempted to enter the hospital, but when he presented his sex offender driver's license, he 
was denied admittance. The district court could consider that testimony and infer that 
admittance was denied based upon the registry identification on the swiped license. 
 
Nevertheless, to the extent the affidavits contain inadmissible evidence, a remand 
to the district court is unnecessary. The principal issue before us is whether the district 
court's summary grant of plaintiff's declaratory judgment was erroneous, as a matter of 
law. Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review and can disregard any information 
that was improperly contained within the affidavits. 
 
Judicial Notice of Journal Articles 
 
The State next complains that the district court twice erred in its handling of the 16 
journal articles attached as appendices to Doe's motion for summary judgment. First, it 
contends that the district court was wrong in ruling that the Kansas judicial notice statute 
does not apply to "legislative facts." Then, the district court compounded the error by 
actually taking judicial notice of the journal articles to support its determination that 
KORA violates ex post facto.  
 
While Doe did not cite to the articles in his statement of uncontroverted facts, he 
used them to supply the factual premise for some of his legal arguments. For example, 
Doe referenced the journal articles to support his arguments that offender registration and 
13 
 
 
 
notification requirements create adverse collateral consequences for registered sex 
offenders, e.g., that registered sex offenders face employment difficulties, challenges to 
obtain housing, and social stigmatization. He cited to other journal articles in support of 
the argument that such difficulties can increase a sex offender's recidivism rate; that the 
offense-based tier system of determining registration lengths was not reasonably related 
to the danger of recidivism; and that "[c]ontemporary studies overwhelmingly indicate 
that registration and notification laws do not reduce sex crime recidivism rates." 
 
Standard of Review  
 
The resolution of this issue will depend on the applicability of our judicial notice 
statute, K.S.A. 60-409. That presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Jeanes, 
296 Kan. at 873.  
 
Analysis 
 
The State's motion to strike the journal articles asserted that Doe was 
inappropriately using the law journal articles and other publications as a substitute for the 
competent and admissible testimony needed to establish the material facts upon which his 
arguments relied. The State also argued that Doe's legal argument impermissibly relied 
on contentions of fact not contained in his statement of uncontroverted facts, in violation 
of Kansas Supreme Court Rule 141(a)(1). In response, Doe argued that the journal 
articles were not offered to prove adjudicative facts, but instead were relevant to establish 
legislative facts, to which the rules of evidence do not apply. 
 
In denying the State's motion to strike, the district court concluded that the journal 
articles containing results of social science research studies were admissible as legislative 
facts. Accordingly, the district court opined that "[b]ecause the studies are legislative 
facts, the judicial notice statutes do not apply, and the Court may take judicial notice of 
14 
 
 
 
the studies when ruling on the parties' summary judgment motions." In its memorandum 
decision and order, the district court placed some reliance upon the social science 
research contained within certain journal articles. 
 
On appeal, the State argues that Kansas' judicial notice statute, unlike federal law, 
makes no distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts, and that judicial notice of 
the social science evidence relied upon by the district court was not statutorily authorized. 
In addition, the State contends that the journal articles did not contain legislative facts; 
that the articles did not support the definitive conclusions reached by the district court; 
and that Doe was required to have an expert witness to authenticate, explain, validate, or 
adopt the conclusions upon which the district court relied. Doe counters that the journal 
articles do constitute legislative facts to which K.S.A. 60-409 is inapplicable and that 
both the United States Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme Court have been taking 
judicial notice of legislative facts for years without any regard to evidentiary rules, such 
as evidence admissibility. Nevertheless, Doe suggests that we can hold that the 2011 
amendments to KORA are punitive, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, without 
relying on the legislative facts at issue here. 
 
Doe's argument that appellate courts have selectively used "legislative facts" to 
support a holding is not entirely without merit. For instance, in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 
84, 103, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003), which will be discussed in detail 
below, the United States Supreme Court refers to "grave concerns over the high rate of 
recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class." The high 
Court even labels the risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders as "'frightening and 
high.'" 538 U.S. at 103 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 153 L. 
Ed. 2d 47 [2002]). It gives one pause to think that the "legislative facts" frequently used 
to justify sex offender registration laws might not be completely accurate, if Doe's journal 
15 
 
 
 
articles are to be believed. Nevertheless, the question here is whether our judicial notice 
statute applied to Doe's appended journal articles, and we find that it does. 
 
K.S.A. 60-409 specifically lists the type of facts that must or may be judicially 
noticed. For example, the statute provides that judicial notice shall be taken of common 
law, constitutions, and public statutes, as well as "specific facts and propositions of 
generalized knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the 
subject of dispute." K.S.A. 60-409(a). In addition, the statute provides that judicial notice 
may be taken of "such facts as are so generally known or of such common notoriety 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of 
dispute," and "specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are 
capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of 
indisputable accuracy." K.S.A. 60-409(b)(3) and (4).  
 
A major impediment to Doe's argument is the statutory language. Unlike the 
federal rule of evidence, K.S.A. 60-409 does not explicitly limit its application to 
"adjudicative facts." Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) ("This rule governs judicial notice of an 
adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact."). Ordinarily, "[w]hen a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the legislative intent behind 
that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something into the statute that is 
not readily found in its words." Bussman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 298 Kan. 700, 
725, 317 P.3d 70 (2014). 
 
Perhaps more importantly, our statute appears to govern the types of facts which 
would fall within the category of "legislative facts." For example, K.S.A. 60-409(a) 
specifically provides that judicial notice shall be taken of laws, constitutions, and 
statutes. In contrast, the language of Fed. R. Evid. 201 does not mention statutes, laws, or 
regulations because the federal provision expressly excludes legislative facts, and 
16 
 
 
 
"[s]tatutes are considered legislative facts" of which the authority of courts to take 
judicial notice is "unquestionable." United States v. Williams, 442 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th 
Cir. 2006). Additionally, K.S.A. 60-409(a) provides that judicial notice shall be taken of 
"specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge as are so universally known 
that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute." (Emphasis added.) This, too, 
appears to be encompassed by the definition of "legislative facts." See United States v. 
Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1976) (defining legislative facts as "established truths, 
facts or pronouncements that do not change from case to case but apply universally").  
 
Accordingly, even if the district court was correct in determining that the 
information in the journal articles constituted legislative facts, it nevertheless erred in 
finding that K.S.A. 60-409 did not apply. If a Kansas court is to take judicial notice of a 
fact—either adjudicative or legislative—it must do so in conformity with our judicial 
notice statutes.  
 
Here, it appears that if the journal articles reporting social science findings fall 
within any statutory category it would be the provision for "specific facts and 
propositions of generalized knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate 
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy." K.S.A. 60-
409(b)(4); see also K.S.A. 60-410 (provisions relating to determination as to propriety of 
taking judicial notice). But the district court found K.S.A. 60-409(b) inapplicable, and, 
consequently, it did not consider whether the articles upon which it relied were "sources 
of indisputable accuracy."  
 
The State contends that the articles are not indisputably accurate because the 
subjects of recidivism and the measure of the benefits of public notification laws 
generally are not closed subjects. Instead, the State argues, the submitted articles are 
simply "recent scholarship on a debated subject." We agree. While it does appear that 
17 
 
 
 
there is an evolution of knowledge and opinion taking place with respect to sex offender 
recidivism and the effects of public notification laws, the articles appended by Doe to his 
summary judgment motion could not be deemed to be the definitive final word on the 
topic, i.e., were not sources of indisputable accuracy.  
 
But, again, we need not remand to the district court. We can simply conduct our de 
novo review without reference to the appended articles.  
 
USE OF A PSEUDONYM 
 
  
Before proceeding to the principal issue before us, we pause briefly to address the 
State's complaint that the district court should not have permitted Doe to proceed under a 
pseudonym.  
 
Standard of Review  
 
Both parties agree that an abuse of discretion standard of review applies when 
considering a district court's decision to allow an action to proceed anonymously. See 
Unwitting Victim v. C.S., 273 Kan. 937, 944, 47 P.3d 392 (2002). Our familiar abuse of 
discretion standard is stated as follows: 
 
"'Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is 
based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; 
or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support 
a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is 
based.' State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 
1594 (2012)." State v. Nelson, 296 Kan. 692, 694, 294 P.3d 323 (2013). 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
This court has expressly held that "[a]lthough anonymous or pseudonymous 
litigation is an atypical procedure, where an important privacy interest outweighs the 
public interest in the identity of the plaintiff, the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed 
anonymously." Unwitting Victim, 273 Kan. at 944. The Unwitting Victim court balanced 
the plaintiff's claimed right to privacy against the public interest militating against 
pseudonymity, utilizing nine factors:  (1) The extent to which the identity of the litigant 
has been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be 
avoided and the substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of public interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant's identity; (4) whether, because of the 
purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public 
interest in knowing the litigant's identities; (5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to 
the pseudonymous party and attributable to his or her refusal to pursue the case at the 
price of being publicly identified; (6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously 
has illegitimate ulterior motives; (7) the universal level of public interest in access to the 
identities of the litigants; (8) whether the litigant is a public figure; and (9) whether 
opposition to the pseudonym is illegitimately motivated. 273 Kan. at 947-48. 
 
As the State acknowledges, the district court utilized the nine factors to conduct a 
balancing test, comparing the public's interests versus Doe's privacy rights. In other 
words, the district court used the correct legal standard. 
 
The State does not point us to any place in the district court's careful consideration 
of the factors where the judge was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. We have carefully 
reviewed the court's rulings on each of the factors and cannot discern anything that was 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. The State has failed to establish that no reasonable 
person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. To the contrary, the State 
19 
 
 
 
has offered no rational explanation as to why the public's safety would be better protected 
by disclosing the identity of an individual challenging KORA on purely legal grounds as 
essentially a class representative. Rather, its complaint appears to be simply that the court 
did not assess the evidence in a manner that would yield the State's desired result. This 
was not a case of an abuse of discretion, but rather the exercise of learned discretion. 
 
Finally, the State's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are unavailing. 
The district court had evidence to support its findings. We decline the State's implicit 
invitation to reweigh that evidence. 
 
In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Doe to 
proceed pseudonymously. 
 
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE VIOLATION 
 
The State's substantive issue is whether the 2011 amendments to KORA can be 
retroactively applied to Doe without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. The State 
contends that, even though Doe committed his crime before the 2011 amendments, the 
Ex Post Facto Clause is simply inapplicable because the amended KORA is still a 
regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive. Our resolution will hinge on whether the 
2011 amendments rendered the KORA statutory scheme so punitive in effect as to negate 
any implied intent to make it "civil." See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (citing Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 [1997]). We find that 
they do. 
 
But before proceeding, we pause to clarify what we are not deciding today. We are 
not saying that the 2011 version of KORA is unconstitutional as applied to any sex 
offender who commits a covered crime on or after its July 1, 2011, effective date. 
20 
 
 
 
Although we are finding that the KORA statutory scheme is now penal in nature, the 
legislature is permitted to impose penal sanctions on future violators. We are saying that 
the legislature cannot add today's new sanction to a punishment imposed yesterday. The 
only sex offenders affected by this decision are those that have been complying with the 
Kansas registration requirements in effect when they committed their offenses. And this 
decision does not relieve any registrant from completing the registration requirements in 
effect when he or she committed the applicable offense. Further, this opinion will have no 
effect on any offender's obligations under federal law. 
 
Likewise, as emphasized in State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 700, 923 P.2d 1024 
(1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997), "we are not balancing the rights of . . . sex 
offenders against the rights of . . . their victims." Rather, our duty is to resolve "a claim of 
constitutional infringement arising from retroactive legislation." 260 Kan. at 700. The 
Constitution does not exclude sex offenders from its protections. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
"When the application of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, this 
court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard of review. State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 
676, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996)." State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 768, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008). 
 
Analysis 
 
Ex Post Facto Clause 
 
The constitutional protection in issue here is found in Article I, § 10, which simply 
states, in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law." "We 
have held that a law is ex post facto if two critical elements are present:  (1) The law is 
retrospective, and (2) the law disadvantages the offender affected by it." State v. Gleason, 
21 
 
 
 
299 Kan. 1127, 1159-60, 329 P.3d 1102 (2014) (citing State v. Jaben, 294 Kan. 607, 612, 
277 P.3d 417 [2012]; State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 770, 187 P.3d 1283 [2008]).  
 
Recently, this court clarified that "retroactively applied legislation that simply 
'alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage' does not, in and of itself, violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause. The disadvantage, to be unconstitutional under the Clause, must fall 
within one of the categories recognized in Beazell [v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S. 
Ct. 68, 70 L. Ed. 216 (1925)]." State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 277, 323 P.3d 829 (2014). 
The Beazell category that is applicable here is "'"[a]ny statute . . . which makes more 
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission."'" Todd, 299 Kan. at 277 
(quoting Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70); see also Gleason, 299 Kan. at 1159-60. Doe 
claims, and the district court found, that the 2011 amendments to KORA made the 
punishment for Doe's 2001-2002 crimes more burdensome. 
 
But "[t]he constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal 
statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them." Myers, 260 Kan. at 677. The 
State contends that KORA is not punishment for the sex offender's crime, but rather a 
civil regulatory scheme enacted for the purpose of public safety. 
 
State v. Myers  
 
Kansas first considered whether a sex offender registration law ran afoul of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause in Myers, which was filed in 1996. Myers related the relatively brief 
history of Kansas' law, beginning in 1993 with the Habitual Sex Offender Registration 
Act (HSORA), which required repeat offenders to register for 10 years. Registration 
consisted of a statement in writing that included the offender's name, date of birth, social 
security number, fingerprints, and a photograph, as well as information on the offense(s) 
committed and the dates/location of conviction(s). K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-4907. But 
22 
 
 
 
HSORA, specifically K.S.A 1993 Supp. 22-4909, said that the registration information 
"shall not be open to inspection by the public" or subject to the Kansas Open Records 
Act, and that the data could only be obtained by a law enforcement officer or other 
person specifically authorized by law. 
 
The following year, the act was amended and renamed the Kansas Sex Offender 
Registration Act (KSORA) because it included first-time offenders, who were subject to 
the 10-year registration term. Second or subsequent offenses resulted in lifetime 
registration. KSORA also allowed for public inspection of registration information at the 
sheriff's office and specifically made the registration information subject to the Open 
Records Act. L. 1994, ch. 107, secs. 1-7. 
 
Myers had committed his offense prior to the effective date of KSORA. 
Consequently, Myers claimed that the retroactive application of KSORA's reporting and 
disclosure requirements violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The State conceded that 
KSORA was being retroactively applied to Myers but argued that the intent and purpose 
of KSORA was regulatory, rather than punitive. The Myers court agreed with the State, 
holding that while KSORA contained no express statement of legislative intent or 
purpose, "the legislative history suggests a nonpunitive purpose—public safety." 260 
Kan. at 681. 
 
But Myers recognized that its analysis did not end with its "public safety" 
conclusion. Rather, it had to determine "whether the 'statutory scheme was so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.' United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242, 248-49, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980)." 260 Kan. at 681. Ultimately, 
Myers determined that the registration component of KSORA was remedial but that the 
public disclosure provisions of the act were too punitive in effect to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. Specifically, the Myers court held:   
23 
 
 
 
"For Myers, KSORA's disclosure provision must be considered punishment. We hold that 
the legislative aim in the disclosure provision was not to punish and that retribution was 
not an intended purpose. However, we reason that the repercussions, despite how they 
may be justified, are great enough under the facts of this case to be considered 
punishment. The unrestricted public access given to the sex offender registry is excessive 
and goes beyond that necessary to promote public safety." 260 Kan. at 699. 
 
Enroute to that holding, Myers found that the practical effect of KSORA's 
unrestricted dissemination of registration information "could make it impossible for the 
offender to find housing or employment" and that "[u]nrestricted public access to the 
registered information leaves open the possibility that the registered offender will be 
subjected to public stigma and ostracism." 260 Kan. at 696. Then, the court opined that 
"[t]o avoid the ex post facto characterization, public access [to registration information] 
should be limited to those with a need to know the information for public safety 
purposes" and that those authorized to access the information should only use it for 
public safety purposes. 260 Kan. at 700. 
 
The State urges us to accept Myers' holding as being equally applicable to the 
registration component of KORA, but to find that Myers' holding on the public disclosure 
component was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith.  
 
Smith v. Doe 
 
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that retroactive application of the 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 538 U.S. at 105-06. Smith was the first time the Court had considered this type of 
claim; however, the Court applied its well-established framework of (1) determining 
whether the legislature's intention was to enact a "a regulatory scheme that is civil and 
24 
 
 
 
nonpunitive" and, if so, (2) "examin[ing] whether the statutory scheme is '"so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention" to deem it "civil."'" 538 
U.S. at 92 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). This framework is often referred to as 
the "intent-effects" test. See, e.g., Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 
872 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 
Under the intent portion of the test, "[w]hether a statutory scheme is civil or 
criminal 'is first of all a question of statutory construction.'" Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 
(quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). If the legislature intended to punish, the ex post 
facto violation is established and no inquiry into the effects of the act is required. 538 
U.S. at 92-93.  
 
The first inquiry under intent is whether "'the legislature, in establishing the 
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label 
or the other.'" Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 
118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 [1997]). The Court relied upon the Alaska Legislature's 
express statutory finding that "'sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending' and 
identified 'protecting the public from sex offenders' as the 'primary governmental interest' 
of the law." Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (quoting 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 41, § 1). Citing 
to its earlier decision in Hendricks, the Court reiterated that "an imposition of restrictive 
measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is 'a legitimate nonpunitive 
governmental objective and has been historically so regarded.'" Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 
(quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363).  
 
Smith held that the stated nonpunitive intent of the ASORA was not altered by the 
Alaska Constitution's inclusion of protecting public safety as a purpose for the criminal 
justice system, by the legislature's partial codification of the ASORA in the criminal 
procedure code, or by the requirement for courts accepting criminal pleas and entering 
25 
 
 
 
criminal judgments to inform defendants of the ASORA requirements. 538 U.S. at 93-96. 
The Court noted that its conclusion was "strengthened by the fact that, aside from the 
duty to register, the statute itself mandates no procedures[,]" but "[i]nstead . . . vests the 
authority to promulgate implementing regulations with the Alaska Department of Public 
Safety, . . . an agency charged with the enforcement of both criminal and civil regulatory 
laws." 538 U.S. at 96. Therefore, the Court held that the Alaska Legislature's intent "was 
to create a civil, nonpunitive regime." 538 U.S. at 96. 
  
After concluding that the intent of the Alaska Legislature was nonpunitive, the 
Court turned to the effects of the ASORA. 538 U.S. at 97. The Court held that "[b]ecause 
we 'ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent,' [citation omitted] '"only the clearest 
proof" will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100). The Court utilized the factors identified in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 544, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963), but 
noted that "[b]ecause the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various 
constitutional contexts . . . they are 'neither exhaustive nor dispositive,' [citations omitted] 
but are 'useful guideposts.' [Citation omitted.]" 538 U.S. at 97. The Court explained:   
 
"The factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the 
regulatory scheme:  [1] has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; 
[2] imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; [3] promotes the traditional aims of 
punishment; [4] has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5] is excessive 
with respect to this purpose." Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.  
 
Smith summarily dismissed the remaining two Mendoza-Martinez factors—
"whether the regulation comes into play only on a finding of scienter and whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime"—by declaring those factors carried "little 
weight." 538 U.S. at 105.  
26 
 
 
 
Under the first factor, whether the "regulatory scheme . . . has been regarded in our 
history and traditions as a punishment," the Court reasoned that "[a] historical survey can 
be useful because a State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a means 
deemed punitive in our tradition, so that the public will recognize it as such." 538 U.S. at 
97. The Court noted that sex offender registration and notification statutes "'are of fairly 
recent origin,' which suggests that the statute was not meant as a punitive measure, or, at 
least, that it did not involve a traditional means of punishing." 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting 
Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 989 [9th Cir. 2001]).  
 
The Smith Court rejected the respondents' argument that ASORA, and particularly 
its notification provisions, "resemble shaming punishments of the colonial period." 538 
U.S. at 97-98. The Court recognized that "[s]ome colonial punishments indeed were 
meant to inflict public disgrace"; however, unlike the ASORA, the colonial punishments 
had a corporal element, involved direct confrontation between the public and the 
offender, or expelled the offender from the community. 538 U.S. at 97-98. The Court 
held that the stigma from the ASORA "result[ed] not from public display for ridicule and 
shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, 
most of which is already public." 538 U.S. at 98. The Court was not swayed by the fact 
that Alaska posted registration information on the Internet, concluding that a member of 
the public visiting the State's website was analogous to the person visiting the official 
criminal records archive. 538 U.S. at 99.  
 
 
In analyzing the second factor, whether "the regulatory scheme . . . imposes an 
affirmative disability or restraint," the Court considered "how the effects of the Act are 
felt by those subject to it. If the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are 
unlikely to be punitive." 538 U.S. at 97, 99-100. The Court noted that unlike prison, "the 
paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint," the act did not impose physical restraint. 
538 U.S. at 100. Further, the Court held the act less burdensome than occupational 
27 
 
 
 
disbarment, which is nonpunitive. 538 U.S. at 100. Additionally, the Court rejected sex 
offenders' employment and housing difficulties as conjecture unsupported by evidence. 
538 U.S. at 100. The Court recognized the potential "lasting and painful impact on the 
convicted sex offender"; however, the court held "these consequences flow not from the 
Act's registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a 
matter of public record." 538 U.S. at 101.  
 
The Court also noted that the Ninth Circuit, which had held ASORA constituted 
punishment, incorrectly believed that ASORA required sex offenders to update 
registration in person. 538 U.S. at 101. Additionally, the Court rejected the Ninth 
Circuit's conclusion that registration was "parallel to probation or supervised release in 
terms of the restraint imposed" because while the "argument has some force," unlike 
registration, "[p]robation and supervised release entail a series of mandatory conditions 
and allow the supervising officer to seek the revocation of probation or release in case of 
infraction." 538 U.S. at 101. Although noting that offenders "must inform the authorities 
after they change their facial features (such as growing a beard), borrow a car, or seek 
psychiatric treatment, they are not required to seek permission to do so." 538 U.S. at 101. 
The Court reasoned that although a sex offender may be prosecuted for a registration 
violation, such prosecution is separate from the individual's original offense. 538 U.S. at 
102.  
 
The third factor involves whether the "regulatory scheme . . . promotes the 
traditional aims of punishment." Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The Supreme Court has described 
those aims as retribution and deterrence. See, e.g., Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. 
The Court held that although the ASORA might deter future crimes "[a]ny number of 
governmental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment" and "'[t]o hold 
that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions "criminal" . . . would 
severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation.'" Smith, 
28 
 
 
 
538 U.S. at 102 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105). The Court held that the act's 
registration obligations were not retributive based upon the differing duration of reporting 
for different categories of offenders because these measures were "reasonably related to 
the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective." 538 U.S. at 
102.  
 
The Court found that the fourth factor, a rational connection to a nonpunitive 
purpose, was the most significant factor in its "determination that the statute's effects are 
not punitive." 538 U.S. at 102. In Smith, the respondents agreed that ASORA's 
nonpunitive purpose of alerting "'the public to the risk of sex offenders in their 
communit[y]'" was "valid, and rational." 538 U.S. at 103 (quoting Otte, 259 F.3d at 991). 
However, the Court summarily rejected the respondent's argument that ASORA was not 
"'narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated purpose,'" reasoning that a "statute is not 
deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it 
seeks to advance." 538 U.S. at 103.  
 
When assessing the fifth factor, whether the regulatory scheme is excessive with 
respect to its purpose, the Court opined it need not determine "whether the legislature has 
made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is 
whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive 
objective." Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. The Court concluded that ASORA's application to all 
convicted sex offenders, without any individualized assessment of the offender's 
dangerousness, did not render the act punitive. Finding that the risk of recidivism by sex 
offenders was "'frightening and high,'" the Court held that "[i]n the context of the 
regulatory scheme the State can dispense with individual predictions of future 
dangerousness and allow the public to assess the risk on the basis of accurate, nonprivate 
information about the registrants' convictions without violating the prohibitions of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause." 538 U.S. at 103-04.  
29 
 
 
 
Relying on empirical research on child molesters, the Court also held that the 
duration of ASORA's reporting requirements was not excessive because "'most reoffenses 
do not occur within the first several years after release,' but may occur 'as late as 20 years 
following release.'" 538 U.S. at 104 (quoting National Institute of Justice, R. Prentky, R. 
Knight, & A. Lee, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Child Sexual Molestation: Research Issues 14 
[1997]). 
 
Finally, the Court held that the widespread dissemination of the registration 
information was not excessive, instead finding that the "notification system is a passive 
one:  An individual must seek access to the information." 538 U.S. at 105. The Court also 
determined that making the registry information available throughout the state was not 
excessive in light of population mobility, citing to a study indicating that 38% of 
recidivist sex offenses took place in different jurisdictions than where the previous 
offense was committed. 538 U.S. at 105. 
 
Having determined that the respondents had failed to show "that the effects of the 
law negate Alaska's intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme," the Smith majority 
declared that the act was nonpunitive and that its retroactive application did not violate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 538 U.S. at 105-06.  
 
In stark contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court would later use the same intent-effects 
test that the Smith Court utilized but would find that ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the Alaska state constitution, concluding: 
 
 
"Because ASORA compels (under threat of conviction) intrusive affirmative 
conduct, because this conduct is equivalent to that required by criminal judgments, 
because ASORA makes the disclosed information public and requires its broad 
dissemination without limitation, because ASORA applies only to those convicted of 
crime, and because ASORA neither meaningfully distinguishes between classes of sex 
30 
 
 
 
offenses on the basis of risk nor gives offenders any opportunity to demonstrate their lack 
of risk, ASORA's effects are punitive. We therefore conclude that the statute violates 
Alaska's ex post facto clause." Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1019 (Alaska 2008). 
 
Interestingly, the Alaska court cited with approval to Myers. Doe, 189 P.3d at 
1017. Other states have likewise relied on their state constitutions to prohibit retroactive 
application of sex offender registration statutes. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 
377-78 (Ind. 2009); Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 430 Md. 
535, 547-48, 62 A.3d 123 (2013); State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St. 3d 344, 347-49, 952 
N.E.2d 1108 (2011); Starkey v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, ¶ 76-79, 
305 P.3d 1004 (2013). But, Kansas does not have a specific Ex Post Facto Clause in our 
state constitution. Todd, 299 Kan. at 276.  
 
And this court is bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
United States Constitution, albeit we are not bound by any lower federal court. See 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113 S. Ct. 838, 122 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1993) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal 
law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a 
state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's 
interpretation. In our federal system, a state trial court's interpretation of federal law is no 
less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is 
located."). Accordingly, our inquiry becomes whether KORA, as amended in 2011, is 
sufficiently distinct from ASORA reviewed in Smith that it mandates a different result 
under the federal Constitution.  
 
Application of Intent-Effects Test to KORA, as Amended in 2011 
 
In the initial step of the intent-effects test, the statutory provisions are construed to 
determine whether the legislature intended to enact a punitive provision. If so, retroactive 
31 
 
 
 
application of the provisions is always prohibited; no further inquiry is needed. Smith 
found ASORA nonpunitive, first pointing to express statutory language, stating that the 
objective of the law was to protect the public from sex offenders and that the release of 
certain information to the public assists in protecting the public safety. 538 U.S. at 93. 
Smith also noted that Alaska's statutory scheme placed the notification provisions in the 
health, safety, and housing code, albeit the registration provisions were codified in the 
criminal procedure code. Moreover, the Alaska statute mandated no procedures but rather 
it vested the Alaska Department of Public Safety with authority to promulgate 
implementing regulations, leading the Smith Court to infer that "the legislature 
envisioned the Act's implementation to be civil and administrative." 538 U.S. at 96. 
 
KORA, in contrast, is wholly contained within our criminal procedure code, 
mandates the manner of implementation, and imposes serious criminal sanctions for 
noncompliance. As State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 678, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), pointed 
out, Kansas' act "contains no express statement of legislative intent or purpose." 
Curiously, our sex offender act has been amended numerous times since Myers noted the 
absence of a legislative expression of intent or purpose while finding the notification 
provisions punitive in effect. See L. 1997, ch. 181, secs. 7-14; L. 1999, ch. 164, secs. 29-
34, 36; L. 2000, ch. 150, sec. 2; L. 2001, ch. 208, secs. 10-16; L. 2002, ch. 163, sec. 6; L. 
2002, ch. 55, secs. 1-4; L. 2003, ch. 123, secs. 3-9; L. 2005, ch. 202, secs. 1-2; L. 2006, 
ch. 212, sec. 20; L. 2006, ch. 214, sec. 2, 6-10; L. 2007, ch. 181, secs. 1-7; L. 2008, ch. 
57, sec. 1; L. 2008, ch. 74, sec. 1; L. 2009, ch. 32, sec. 44; L. 2010, ch. 66, sec. 1; L. 
2010, ch. 74, sec. 11; L. 2010, ch. 135, secs. 35-37; L. 2010, ch. 147, sec. 8; L. 2010, ch. 
155, sec. 10; L. 2011, ch. 95, secs. 1-11; L. 2012, ch. 149, secs. 1-10; L. 2013, ch. 127, 
secs. 1-8; and L. 2014, ch. 117, secs. 2-3. Nevertheless, the legislature has yet to 
definitively express the intent or purpose of the act. 
 
32 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding that KORA is more fully clothed in criminality than was Smith's 
ASORA, we need not ruminate on how the high court would judge the Kansas 
Legislature's intent or purpose. We have our own precedent; Myers found a nonpunitive 
purpose of public safety in the legislative history of KSORA. Doe points us to no 
subsequent legislative history that would lead us to overturn Myers' holding on the intent 
portion of the analysis. Accordingly, we proceed to consider how the factual distinctions 
between the statute under examination in Smith and that under examination today affect 
the "effects" portion of the test.  
 
We begin with a list of the most significant differences between the 2011 version 
of KORA and the version of ASORA reviewed in Smith:   
  
 KORA applies to a broader group of offenders.  
The 2011 KORA applies to sex offenders, violent offenders, and drug offenders 
(with no personal use exception). K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4902. ASORA only 
applied to sex offenders and child kidnappers. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010 (2000). 
 
 KORA requires frequent in-person reporting regardless of registration changes. 
KORA requires in-person quarterly reporting for sex offenders in each location 
where the offender resides, maintains employment, or attends school. K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 22-4905(b). Additionally, transient offenders must register in person in the 
location where the offender is physically present every 30 days. K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 22-4905(e). ASORA did not require in-person reporting after initial 
registration. Alaska required annual written verification for nonaggravated sex 
offenses and quarterly written verification for aggravated offenses. Alaska Stat. § 
12.63.010(d) (2000). 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 KORA often requires longer registration terms. 
For the majority of first-time sex offenses, KORA requires 25 years or lifetime 
registration.  K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4906. For first-time nonaggravated sex 
offenses, the ASORA required 15-year registration.  Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020 
(2000). 
 
 KORA requires additional registration information.  
In addition to the registration information offenders were required to provide 
under ASORA, KORA registration requires:  alias dates or places of birth; 
temporary lodging information; telephone numbers; social security number; 
occupation; name of any anticipated employer and anticipated place of 
employment; photocopies of current driver's licenses and identification cards; 
aircraft and watercraft license plates and registration information; information 
concerning where motor vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft are habitually parked or 
otherwise kept; professional licenses, designations, and certifications; 
preconviction mental health treatment; schools attended or expected to be 
attended; travel and immigration documents; name and telephone number of 
probation, parole, or community corrections officer; email addresses; all online 
identities used on the Internet; any information relating to membership in online 
social networks; DNA exemplars; and the sex and date of birth of each victim. 
Compare K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4907 with Alaska Stat. § 12.63.10 (2000).  
 
 KORA requires in-person registration updates.  
KORA additionally requires in-person registration updates within 3 days of any 
information change. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(g). ASORA required a written 
update for a change of residence. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(c) (2000).  
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 KORA requires additional information dissemination to the public.  
In addition to the information made available to the public under ASORA, KORA 
disseminates:  any other offenses for which the offender has been convicted or 
adjudicated; temporary lodging information; address of any place where the 
offender will be a student; and professional licenses, designations, and 
certifications the offender holds. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4909(b)(3), (5), (8), and 
(10); Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087 (2000).  
 
 KORA imposes costly registration fees.  
KORA requires that offenders remit a $20 fee, four times per year, in each 
location where an offender resides, maintains employment, or attends school. 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(k). ASORA allowed the department of public safety 
to adopt fees for registration and required that fees be based upon actual costs and 
be set at a level not to discourage registration. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(d)(3) 
(2000). 
 
 KORA requires provision of notice for travel outside the United States.  
Under KORA, an offender must give 21 days' notice of international travel except 
in emergency situations. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(o). No restriction on travel 
was included in ASORA.  
 
 KORA requires annual driver's license and identification card renewal and the 
Motor Vehicle Drivers' License Act requires a distinguishing number on the 
KORA registrant's driver's licenses.  
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(l); K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-243(d). ASORA did not 
contain similar requirements.  
  
35 
 
 
 
 Kansas considers whether a parent is subject to KORA or is residing with a 
person subject to KORA in determining child custody, residency, and parenting 
time.  
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 23-3203(h), (j). Alaska's domestic relations code did not 
require consideration of registered offender status. See Alaska Stat. §§ 25.20.090 
(2000); 25.24.150 (2000).  
 
 KORA imposes burdensome penalties for violations.  
Under the 2011 KORA, a first conviction is a severity level 6 person felony, a 
second conviction is a severity level 5 person felony, a third conviction is a 
severity level 3 person felony, and a violation continuing for more than 180 days 
is a severity level 3 person felony. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4903. Under ASORA, 
the penalty for a first-time failure to register was a class A misdemeanor. Alaska 
Stat. § 11.56.840 (2000). The penalty for a second time failure to register or failure 
to register with the intent to escape detection or identification and to facilitate the 
person's commission of a sex offense or child kidnapping was a class C felony, the 
lowest severity level felony in Alaska. Alaska Stat. § 11.56.835 (2000); Alaska 
Stat. § 11.81.250 (2000). 
 
The district court found these differences significant, opining that, since Smith, the 
requirements in Kansas had become "increasingly severe." Further, the district court 
noted that the advent of the widespread use of social media had significantly changed the 
landscape for dissemination of offender information. The court then individually 
discussed four of the Mendoza-Martinez factors.  
 
Following the Smith format, we will likewise individually discuss the guideline 
factors from Mendoza-Martinez, although it is important to keep in mind that it is the 
entire "statutory scheme" that must be examined for its punitive effect. See Smith, 538 
36 
 
 
 
U.S. at 92 (effects analysis requires the appellate court to "examine . . . the statutory 
scheme" [emphasis added]); Myers, 260 Kan. at 681 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 
U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 [1980]) ("ask whether the 'statutory 
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect'" [emphasis added]). For instance, a 
particular registration requirement may not have the same punitive effect in a statutory 
scheme that permits a reduction in registration time for proven rehabilitation, as it does in 
a statutory scheme that precludes any individualized modifications. 
 
The first factor considered by Smith was whether the regulatory scheme has been 
regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment. 538 U.S. at 97. Again, the Smith 
Court rejected the argument that ASORA's notification provisions "resemble shaming 
punishments of the colonial period," finding that such early punishments as shaming, 
humiliation, and banishment involved more than the dissemination of information. 538 
U.S. at 97. Then, notwithstanding that the focus was supposed to be upon the "effects" of 
the law, rather than the legislative intent, Smith rationalized that Alaska did not "make the 
publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory 
scheme." 538 U.S. at 99. Nevertheless, the 2011 KORA crosses the line drawn by Smith.  
 
Myers cited to Artway v. Attorney General of State of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1265 (3d 
Cir. 1996), for a quotation from Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, 63-64 
(Random House 1950) (1850), which, referring to the portion of Hester Prynne's 
punishment for adultery that required her to wear a scarlet "A" upon her dress, stated:  
"'There can be no outrage . . . against our common nature,—whatever be the 
delinquencies of the individual,—no outrage more flagrant than to forbid the culprit to 
hide his face for shame; as it was the essence of this punishment to do.'" KORA mimics 
that shaming of old by branding the driver's license of a registrant with the designation, 
"RO." See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-243(d). While a driver's license is not worn upon a 
person's chest, it is required to be displayed for a variety of reasons unrelated to KORA's 
37 
 
 
 
public safety purpose, e.g., to obtain medical treatment, to obtain a checking account 
balance from a bank teller, to vote in Kansas, etc. See also Starkey v. Oklahoma Dept. of 
Corrections, 2013 OK 43, ¶ 59, 305 P.3d 1004 (2013) ("driver's license is frequently 
necessary in face-to-face encounters when cashing a check, using a credit card, applying 
for credit, obtaining a job, entering some public buildings, and in air travel . . . 
subject[ing] an offender to unnecessary public humiliation and shame . . . not unlike a 
'scarlet letter.'"). Consequently, in the words of Smith, the statutory scheme "[holds] the 
person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-face shaming." 538 U.S. at 98. In the 
words of the district court, "the notation on the [driver's] license is a visible badge of past 
criminality in line with traditional punishment."  
 
Likewise, Smith's description of Alaska's posting of registration information on the 
Internet as a passive system, akin to physically visiting "an official archive of criminal 
records," 538 U.S. at 99, is antiquated in today's world of pushed notifications to listservs 
and indiscriminate social media sharing. The Supreme Court has recently recognized the 
vast amount of data that is currently available to most citizens on their smartphones and 
that "a cell phone [can be] used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen." 
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014). 
Indeed, Myers' fear that "[t]he print or broadcast media could make it a practice of 
publishing the list [of sex offenders] as often as they chose," 260 Kan. at 697, has come 
to pass. Websites contain pop-up ads offering to locate sex offenders for the viewer. 
Indeed, one would not be surprised to find that an application (app) for a mobile device 
had been developed that would provide instant access to the location of all sex offenders 
in a given location. And, as the district court noted, members of the public may now post 
public comments about an offender after using the Johnson County "share and 
bookmark" feature that posts registry information on social media sites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and Myspace. In contrast, Smith's analysis of ASORA specifically noted the 
absence of the ability of the public to comment.  538 U.S. at 99. The district court 
38 
 
 
 
therefore concluded that "citizens can use the county-sponsored website to create a 
virtual forum for public shaming, which closely resembles traditional punishment." We 
agree. 
  
Any suggestion that disseminating sex offender registration on an Internet website 
reaches no more members of the public and is no more burdensome to the offender than 
maintaining an archived criminal record simply ignores the reality of today's world. 
Moreover, the argument that the additional widespread dissemination enhances the 
effectiveness of the registration system simply misses the point; the focus of this part of 
the intent-effects test is to assess whether there is a penal effect on the offender. For 
example, placing the offender in a locked stockade on the courthouse square would more 
effectively achieve the purpose of public safety, but, of course, the effect of that method 
could not be labeled nonpunishment. 
 
On the registration side of the statutory scheme, KORA utilizes a traditional 
means of punishment when it requires quarterly registration in person in each location 
where the offender works, lives, or attends school. Reporting in person to a State agent, 
up to 12 times a year, to update the agent on the offender's personal, employment, and 
educational status replicates what we most often see when the criminal sanction of 
probation or parole is imposed. 
 
The next Mendoza-Martinez factor—whether the statutory scheme subjects the 
offender to an affirmative disability or restraint—involves an inquiry into "how the 
effects of the Act are felt by those subject to it." 538 U.S. at 99-100. Smith noted that 
ASORA imposed no physical restraint on offenders, and, although registrants had to 
inform the authorities of certain changes, such as a job or residence, the offenders were 
not required to obtain prior permission for the change. Of course, in Kansas, KORA 
requires 21 days' prior notification for international travel.  
39 
 
 
 
But the more common restraint on an offender's freedom of movement under 
KORA is more indirect. The offender must register in person quarterly in each applicable 
jurisdiction and remit $20 to each jurisdiction each time, at the risk of committing a new 
felony under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4903. As the district court noted, that will result in 
the offender paying from $80 to $240 a year. Further, KORA's definition of "reside" is 
extremely broad. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4902(j) provides that "[i]t shall be presumed that 
an offender resides at any and all locations where the offender stays, sleeps or maintains 
the offender's person for seven or more consecutive days or parts of days, or for seven or 
more non-consecutive days in a period of 30 consecutive days." Under those rules, an 
offender could inadvertently acquire a new registration residence by taking a week's 
vacation out-of-county, or by having a sales route where the offender stays in an out-of-
county motel for 2 nights a week, i.e., 8 nonconsecutive days in a period of 30 
consecutive days. As the district court opined, "in-person, quarterly reporting restricts 
offenders' time and freedom" and is akin to the punitive measure of probation or parole, 
as we have discussed above. 
 
The district court also found that KORA registration and notification created 
housing and occupational barriers for an offender. Smith rejected as "conjecture" the 
argument that registration under ASORA had created employment or housing problems 
in that case, declaring that "these consequences flow not from the Act's registration and 
dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of public 
record." 538 U.S. at 100-01. But here, the State's argument that Doe's employment and 
housing barriers were constructed by his conviction, rather than by his registration, is not 
supported by the evidence. 
 
Granted, the district court relied on social science research gleaned from the 
journal articles for such information as the pervasiveness of employment difficulties 
associated with registration. But the district court also had direct testimony in this case 
40 
 
 
 
from Doe himself, stating that he retained his job through the time of his prosecution and 
conviction, only to be fired after his registration became public. Moreover, Doe's listing 
on the registry was the reason given for both his job termination and his inability to get a 
better job. Likewise, the published map showing the residential location of sex offenders 
was the reason given by prospective landlords for refusing to rent to Doe.  
 
To say Doe's housing and employment problems flowed from the public record of 
his conviction, rather than from the notification provisions of KORA, defies logic and 
common sense. First, one would have to question how many members of the general 
public are proficient at accessing and interpreting archived court records. Next, those 
records would not identify the offender's place of employment, so that a public relations 
reaction to the corporate employer would be a remote possibility, whereas the offender is 
tied to the employer in the registry. Likewise, the criminal defendant's address at the time 
of conviction, even if contained within the public portion of the court records, would not 
necessarily be the same as when the record was accessed. Moreover, although a 
defendant on probation must notify the defendant's probation officer of a change of 
address, that information is not open to the public. Certainly, potential landlords would 
have no concern that other tenants would ascertain the offender's current address from the 
prior court record. That information would have to come from KORA. 
 
Blaming the public record of conviction, rather than KORA registration and 
dissemination, for housing and employment difficulties also defies our precedent. Myers 
looked at the practical effect of unrestricted dissemination of registration information and 
concluded that it "could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or 
employment." 260 Kan. at 696. Certainly, the ensuing increase in the number of people 
with access to the Internet since Myers, along with the increased ease with which 
information can be shared and commented upon, only serves to corroborate that case's 
prescient holding. 
41 
 
 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that KORA's statutory 
scheme works an affirmative disability or restraint on the offender. 
 
The next factor is whether the statutory scheme promotes the traditional aims of 
punishment:  deterrence and retribution. Smith acknowledged the deterrent effect of the 
law but summarily considered that to be a necessary component of effective government 
regulation. Smith then rejected the lower court's conclusion that ASORA was retributive 
for basing the length of the reporting requirement on the extent of wrongdoing, rather 
than the risk posed by the offender. It concluded, without further explanation, that the 
broad categories and length of required reporting were "reasonably related to the danger 
of recidivism" and, thus, consistent with the regulatory objective. 538 U.S. at 102. But cf. 
Com. v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Ky. 2009) ("When a restriction is imposed equally 
upon all offenders, with no consideration given to how dangerous any particular 
registrant may be to public safety, that restriction begins to look far more like retribution 
for past offenses than a regulation intended to prevent future ones."). 
 
If the 10-year length of reporting was reasonably related to the danger of 
recidivism in 2003, when Doe was convicted and the year after Smith was decided, one 
has to wonder what happened in 2011 to make the reasonable relationship two and a half 
times greater. The State has provided nothing to support the reasonableness of the 25-
year reporting term. Even Smith's "legislative fact" in support of ASORA's length of 
reporting was that sex offenders may reoffend "'as late as 20 years following release.'" 
538 U.S. at 104. KORA's new reporting term is 25% longer than Smith's outside limit. 
Moreover, Doe's "legislative fact" from current social science indicates that the risk of 
recidivism actually decreases as the offender ages. Even if we do not take judicial notice 
of that "legislative fact," we can conclude that there is no evidentiary or logical support 
for the increase in reporting term. Such arbitrariness is inherently retributive. 
 
42 
 
 
 
The next factor—which Smith labeled "a '[m]ost significant' factor"—is the act's 
rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose. Smith found ASORA rationally connected 
to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety, even though the act was not '''narrowly drawn 
to accomplish the stated purpose.'" 538 U.S. at 102-03. Smith would apparently require 
the imprecision to render the nonpunitive purpose a "'sham or mere pretext.'" 538 U.S. at 
103 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371).  
 
Arguably, under the current KORA, public safety has become a pretext. Without 
differentiating between the 18-year-old immature, marginally intelligent, sexually naïve 
person who succumbs to the seduction of a mature-acting, sexually informed 15-year-old 
child and the 30-year-old confirmed pedophile that rapes preschoolers and is not 
amenable to rehabilitation, KORA fails to effectively notify the public of the danger of 
recidivism. Too much is too little. Moreover, that flaw is accentuated by KORA's 
prohibition in K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4908:  "No person required to register as an offender 
pursuant to the Kansas offender registration act shall be granted an order relieving the 
offender of further registration under the act." Even fully rehabilitated offenders will be 
on the registry for a quarter-century. In the words of the district court, "[w]ithout a 
mechanism for challenging long registration periods, offenders who are compliant with 
the registration requirements and have a low risk of recidivism suffer consequences that 
outweigh the minimal increases in public safety created by registration." Cf. Gonzalez v. 
State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 320-21 (Ind. 2013) (finding that Indiana's registration law was 
excessive in relation to its articulated purpose because the act contained no mechanism 
for determining whether offender had been rehabilitated or no longer presented a risk to 
the public thereby alleviating the need for registration). 
 
On the flip side, the registry could be underinclusive because only convicted sex 
offenders must register. One who has engaged in the same conduct as Doe might well 
avoid being subjected to the rigors of registration by pleading to a non-sex offense, by 
43 
 
 
 
being acquitted because of a suppressed confession, or by having a conviction overturned 
on appeal because of an illegal search or some other reason, other than insufficient 
evidence. One can envision that a prosecutor might use offender registration as a plea 
bargaining chip to leverage a guilty plea to a charge that the prosecutor has amended 
from a KORA offense to a non-KORA offense, which would effectively nullify the 
public safety purpose of KORA. Again, the point is that the statutory scheme is not 
closely connected to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. 
 
The final factor is whether the statutory scheme is excessive in relation to its 
regulatory purpose. Our discussion of the other factors has touched upon the excessive 
nature of KORA, at least as amended in 2011. For instance, the information a registrant is 
required to provide has increased dramatically from that required in the Myers era, to 
include such items as the registration number of owned watercraft.  
 
And the penalty for noncompliance with the stringent and complicated registration 
rules has been elevated to a level 6 person felony, as opposed to being a misdemeanor 
under the act reviewed in Smith. Granted, the countering argument is that the increased 
penalty is for committing a new crime. But the sex or other offense is a necessary 
predicate to any conviction for failing to comply with KORA, because only those who 
have been convicted of a qualifying offense are subject to the registration requirements. 
Moreover, when the penalty for failing to comply with registration exceeds the penalty 
for the crime triggering the registration requirement, the statutory scheme loses its civil 
regulatory blush.  
 
Smith relied heavily on its "legislative facts" to justify ASORA's excessive 
provisions, which may or may not remain valid. But what we do know is that Smith's 
reliance on the notification system being "passive," 538 U.S. at 105, does not translate to 
today's system under KORA. For instance, the KBI will provide active notification under 
44 
 
 
 
certain circumstances, and, as the district court correctly noted, "the current internet 
notification schemes are more aggressive than they were when Smith was decided, 
offenders are at a greater risk of suffering ostracism and even vigilante acts by members 
of the community." Again, Myers got it right with respect to the effects of unlimited 
public dissemination of registration information. 
 
In finding that the current KORA's statutory scheme is so punitive in effect as to 
negate the implied legislative intent to deem it civil, we are not unaware of the fact that a 
number of federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have found the federal act, the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2012), 
nonpunitive and appropriately applied retroactively. Those cases are not persuasive 
because of the differences between SORNA and KORA. For instance, SORNA 
differentiates between classes of offenders, whereas KORA is a one-size-fits-all scheme; 
KORA is not restricted to just sex offenders, whereas SORNA is; KORA has no 
mechanism for obtaining an early release from the registration requirement, whereas 
SORNA allows for a reduction in registration time for a clean record; KORA requires a 
special, annually renewed driver's license and child custody notification not found in 
SORNA; KORA requires more registration information than SORNA; KORA imposes a 
fee, whereas SORNA does not; and KORA has a broader definition of "resides" than 
SORNA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911, 16914-16 (2012). In other words, looking at the 
statutory scheme as a whole, the effects of KORA are considerably more punitive than 
those of SORNA. 
  
In short, we affirm the district court. KORA as amended in 2011 is punitive in 
effect, and the amended statutory scheme cannot be applied retroactively to any person 
who committed the qualifying sex offense crime prior to July 1, 2011.  
 
45 
 
 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
* * * 
 
BILES, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I agree with the majority that 
our legislature intended for the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) and its 2011 
amendments to be a civil regulatory scheme for public safety that was nonpunitive. I also 
agree the proper retroactivity test boils down to whether the 2011 amendments that 
prompt the present controversy render KORA so punitive as applied to sex offenders as 
to negate that intent. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 
164 (2003) (applying intent-effects test for federal Ex Post Facto Clause purposes). Our 
state constitution does not contain a similar provision or suggest a different analytical 
process. See State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 276, 323 P.3d 829 (2014) (no Ex Post Facto 
Clause in Kansas Constitution). 
 
But this just means we are being asked to answer a federal question, which 
logically suggests adhering to the federal law on this subject. My colleagues in the 
majority too easily disregard the substantial federal caselaw that yields a contrary result 
from the one reached today. This caselaw uniformly concludes that the federal Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2012), 
as well as offender registration laws from other states, are nonpunitive and may be 
applied retroactively without violating the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. This authority 
sets the path we must follow. 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 110,318 under 
the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the vacancy on the court 
created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the United States 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  
 
46 
 
 
 
 
Standard of review 
 
Our standard of review is well known when considering a challenge to a statute's 
constitutionality; yet its recitation in the majority opinion tellingly ignores critical 
components, namely:  we always presume legislative enactments are constitutional and 
we resolve all doubts in favor of a statute's validity. State v. Cheeks, 298 Kan. 1, 4, 310 
P.3d 346 (2013); Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, 
Inc., 292 Kan. 285, 315, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011). This presumption of constitutionality 
emanates from the critical doctrine of separation of powers, which recognizes that courts 
are concerned only with the legislative power to enact statutes—not with the wisdom 
behind them. Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 636, 646, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012). 
 
We do not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the statute infringes on constitutionally protected rights. State v. Carr, 300 
Kan. 1, 285, 331 P.3d 544 (2014) (quoting State v. Brown, 280 Kan. 898, 899, 127 P.3d 
257 [2006]). And as the United States Supreme Court noted in Smith, "'only the clearest 
proof'" of punitive effect is sufficient to override the legislature's intent to create a civil 
regulation. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 
S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 [1997]); see also United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 
2005 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[Y]oung must present the 'clearest proof' that either the purpose or 
the effect of [SORNA] is in fact so punitive as to negate its civil intent. This he cannot 
do.").  
 
The majority's analysis deviates from these principles by framing the question as 
an examination into whether differences between KORA and the Alaska statute the 
United States Supreme Court upheld in Smith "mandates a different result." Slip op. at 
30. But viewing the controversy in this way ignores the presumption of constitutionality, 
47 
 
 
 
resourcefully casts off the numerous decisions cited below that have upheld various 
registration requirements against federal retroactivity challenges, and renders 
meaningless the "clearest proof" standard stated in Smith. The majority's stated reason for 
this approach is that federal circuit court opinions are not binding on state supreme 
courts, so the majority will not consider whether their holdings may inform our thinking. 
This smacks of simply being a means to a predetermined end. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits state and 
federal governments from retroactively imposing additional punishment for a criminal 
offense. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9-10. As noted, Kansas does not have a comparable 
constitutional dictate. See Todd, 299 Kan. at 276. 
 
Federal appellate courts have unanimously held retroactive application of the 
federal offender registration requirements found in SORNA does not violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. United States v. Brunner, 726 F.3d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 860 
(11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 560 
U.S. 974 (2010), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United States, 535 U.S. ___, 
132 S. Ct. 975, 181 L. Ed. 2d 935 (2012); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied  559 U.S. 974 (2010); Young, 585 F.3d at 206 (noting that Young 
made no "effort to prove that the effect of SORNA is so punitive as to make it not a civil 
scheme, and any attempt to do so would have been futile"); United States v. May, 535 
F.3d 912, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 556 U.S. 1258 (2009), abrogated on other 
grounds by Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. 975; United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 937-38 
48 
 
 
 
(10th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012); see 
also United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying Mendoza-
Martinez factors to hold SORNA was not cruel and unusual punishment as applied to a 
juvenile); United States v. Stacey, 570 Fed. Appx. 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding ex 
post facto challenge to conviction for failing to register under SORNA foreclosed by 
Shenandoah); United States v. Sampsell, 541 Fed. Appx. 258, 260 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(holding ex post facto challenge to SORNA foreclosed by Gould).  
 
In addition, federal circuit courts have upheld state sex offender registration laws 
against federal ex post facto challenges, even when those state laws contained provisions 
more expansive in scope and impact than either SORNA or the Alaska provisions 
addressed in Smith. See Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(upholding California requirement that offenders register in-person every 90 days); 
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 
2012) (upholding Nevada law expanding category of individuals who must register, 
increasing time period offenders were subject to registration, adding in-person 
registration requirements, and expanding law enforcement obligations to notify specified 
entities that an offender resided nearby); Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 
2007) (upholding Tennessee law requiring, among other things, extended lifetime 
registration and satellite-based monitoring with wearable GPS device); Hatton v. Bonner, 
356 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding California law containing several 
provisions different from the Alaska statute analyzed in Smith).   
 
The majority disingenuously characterizes this unanimous body of caselaw as just 
the decisions of "a number of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal," which it then discounts 
by noting the obvious, i.e., there are differences between the federal SORNA and our 
state's KORA. Slip op. at 44. And while it is true that none of the statutory schemes 
upheld by other courts are identical to KORA, there is substantial overlap, and so the 
49 
 
 
 
rationale from those decisions should apply with equal force here. I would not so quickly 
disdain this federal caselaw because it compellingly answers the real question presented:  
Are there convincing reasons to believe the United States Supreme Court would view 
KORA differently than it viewed the Alaska law in 2003 when it decided Smith? See 
Litmon, 768 F.3d at 1243 ("[T]here is no reason to believe that the addition of [the 90-
day, in-person registration] requirement would have changed the outcome [in Smith]."). If 
the answer to that question is no, then this court must affirm. 
 
To answer the question presented, we apply the two-step test from Smith to 
determine whether the 2011 KORA amendments constitute an additional form of 
punishment when applied to offenders required to comply with them because of 
convictions that occurred before the amendments were enacted. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 
92. And as noted, the majority correctly concludes in the first step that the Kansas 
Legislature intended for its 2011 amendments to preserve KORA's status as a civil 
regulatory scheme. Slip op. at 32. After that, we move to the second step, where we must 
decide whether those 2011 amendments are "'"so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
negate [the State's] intention" to deem [KORA] "civil."'" Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. This is 
where I depart from the majority's analysis. 
 
For this second step, we should follow the federal factors laid out in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963). See 
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. Those factors consider the degree to which the regulatory scheme 
imposes a sanction that:  (1) has historically been regarded as punishment; (2) constitutes 
an affirmative disability or restraint; (3) promotes the traditional aims of punishment; (4) 
is rationally connected to a nonpunitive purpose; (5) is excessive in relation to the 
identified nonpunitive purpose; (6) contains a sanction requiring a finding of scienter; and 
(7) applies the sanction to behavior that is already a crime. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
at 168. In Smith, the Court focused on the first five as more relevant in evaluating 
50 
 
 
 
Alaska's registration and notification law, concluding the remaining two were of "little 
weight." 538 U.S. at 105. I will do the same. 
 
HISTORICAL FORM OF PUNISHMENT   
 
The majority holds that the 2011 KORA "crosses the line drawn by Smith" by too 
closely resembling the shaming punishments from the colonial period. Slip op. at 36-37. 
KORA does this, according to the majority, by posting the registrant's information on the 
Internet, "branding" a registrant's driver's license with the letters "RO," and requiring 
quarterly registration in each location where an offender works, lives, or attends school. 
Let's take each of these in turn. 
 
Posting offender information on the Internet 
 
As summarized below, there is overwhelming federal authority holding that 
Internet posting of registrant information is not analogous to historical forms of 
punishment. The analysis used to reach that conclusion applies in equal force to KORA, 
regardless of other differences the statutory schemes may have. The majority overreaches 
by rejecting this caselaw and adopting a contrary view. 
 
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that Alaska's offender registration 
act could apply retroactively and "[t]he fact that Alaska posts the information on the 
Internet does not alter our conclusion." 538 U.S. at 99. The Court held the posting 
requirement was not akin to historical punishments despite recognizing that it subjects the 
offender to public shame or humiliation because most of the information related to an 
already public criminal record and dissemination of it furthers a legitimate governmental 
objective. 538 U.S. at 99. The Smith Court explained:  
 
51 
 
 
 
"[T]he stigma of Alaska's Megan's Law results not from public display for ridicule and 
shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, 
most of which is already public. Our system does not treat dissemination of truthful 
information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as punishment. On the 
contrary, our criminal law tradition insists on public indictment, public trial, and public 
imposition of sentence. Transparency is essential to maintaining public respect for the 
criminal justice system, ensuring its integrity, and protecting the rights of the accused. 
The publicity may cause adverse consequences for the convicted defendant, running from 
mild personal embarrassment to social ostracism. In contrast to the colonial shaming 
punishments, however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an 
integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme." 538 U.S. at 98-99. 
 
The Smith Court then added:   
 
 
"The fact that Alaska posts the information on the Internet does not alter our 
conclusion. It must be acknowledged that notice of a criminal conviction subjects the 
offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent of the 
publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could 
have been designed in colonial times. These facts do not render Internet notification 
punitive. The purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for 
its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Widespread public access is necessary for 
the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence 
of a valid regulation." 538 U.S. at 99.  
 
In so holding, the Court's analysis recognizes the obvious—posting information on the 
Internet makes it far more accessible and subjects the offender to increased shame and 
humiliation. Nevertheless, the Court held that Internet posting did not make Alaska's 
statutory scheme punitive. 
 
 
The majority characterizes the Smith Court's 2003 analysis of the Internet as 
"antiquated," and then concludes:  "Any suggestion that disseminating sex offender 
52 
 
 
 
registration [information] on an Internet website reaches no more members of the public 
and is no more burdensome to the offender than maintaining an archived criminal record 
simply ignores the reality of today's world." Slip op. at 38. 
 
 
But as seen from its holding, Smith did not base its conclusion on some old-
fashioned, dial-up modem/floppy disk notion of the World Wide Web; nor did it consider 
accessing offender information on the Internet nothing more than a walk to the 
courthouse to thumb through publicly available paper files. Smith's rationale withstands 
the more recent development of a mobile, smartphone Internet. Indeed, these 
developments can be viewed as furthering the nonpunitive, public safety ends supporting 
offender registration because, as Smith acknowledged, "[w]idespread public access is 
necessary for the efficacy of the scheme." Smith, 538 U.S. at 99. The majority simply 
disagrees with the Court's conclusion but needs a rationale for considering the question 
further. This becomes overwhelmingly evident when the authority from more recent 
courts applying Smith is acknowledged. 
 
 
Consider first the federal notification statute, SORNA. Similar to KORA, the 
federal law requires that offender information including the offenders' names, physical 
descriptions, photographs, criminal offenses, and criminal histories be made publicly 
available on the Internet. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16914, 16918-16920 (2012). Under SORNA, 
the states and enumerated territories, including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, 
must each maintain websites for this purpose. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(10); 16918(a) 
(2012). The federal government, in turn, must maintain a website containing "relevant 
information for each sex offender and other person listed on a jurisdiction's Internet site." 
42 U.S.C. § 16920. Each of these websites must make the information obtainable "by a 
single query for any given zip code or geographic radius set by the user." 42 U.S.C. §§ 
16918(a), 16920(b). And among SORNA's others mandates, an appropriate official must 
affirmatively distribute notice of an individual's sex offender status to "each school and 
53 
 
 
 
public housing agency" in the area where that sex offender resides. 42 U.S.C. § 
16921(b)(2) (2012). In short, SORNA goes further than the Alaska scheme at issue in 
Smith and further than KORA as to affirmative notification of statutorily specified 
groups.     
 
Nevertheless, all federal circuits addressing whether SORNA's publication 
requirements are punitive have followed Smith and held they are not, despite candidly 
recognizing they can result in greatly increased public shame. See, e.g., Parks, 698 F.3d 
at 5-6 (noting the disadvantages from the publicity attendant to SORNA's Internet 
requirements "are obvious" and refusing to invalidate SORNA due to "wide 
dissemination" of offender's information, citing Smith); Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 937-38 
("SORNA, just as the Smith scheme, merely provides for the 'dissemination of accurate 
information about a criminal record, most of which is already public'"); see also United 
States v. Talada, 631 F. Supp. 2d 797, 808 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (citing Smith and 
upholding SORNA as a valid regulatory program even though it requires widespread 
Internet dissemination of offenders' information, a community notification program, and 
in-person reporting). 
 
Also persuasive is the Ninth Circuit's 2012 decision upholding retroactive 
application of a Nevada statute that, among other things, not only required Internet 
publication of registration information, but also active notification to specified groups 
over and above what was required by SORNA, such as youth and religious organizations. 
Masto, 670 F.3d at 1051. In rejecting any notion that these features were akin to historical 
forms of punishment, the Ninth Circuit held:  
 
"Active dissemination of an individual's sex offender status does not alter the [Smith] 
Court's core reasoning that 'stigma . . . results not from public display for ridicule and 
shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, 
54 
 
 
 
most of which is already public.' [Citation omitted.] Though 'humiliation increas[es] in 
proportion to the extent of the publicity,' the 'purpose and the principal effect of 
notification are to inform the public for its own safety.' [Citation omitted.]" 670 F.3d at 
1056.    
 
There is also recent state court authority, relying heavily on Smith, that holds 
posting registered offenders' information on the Internet is not akin to traditional shaming 
punishments. See Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 834-36 (Wyo. 2014) ("Although 
dissemination of information relating to a registrant's status as a sex offender may have 
negative consequences for the registrant, information regarding the offense is made 
public at the time of trial, and its publication under WSORA is merely a necessary 
consequence of the Act's intent to protect the public from harm."); State v. Letalien, 2009 
ME 130, ¶ 38, 985 A.2d 4 (2009) (Internet posting of sex offender information is not 
punitive in purpose or effect, citing Smith; Maine and federal Ex Post Facto Clauses are 
coextensive); see also Doe I v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶ 35, 61 A.3d 718 (2013) 
(following Letalien). 
 
I would follow this abundant caselaw and hold that KORA's Internet posting of 
information is not akin to historical shaming punishments. And in reaching that 
conclusion, I would further note the majority's discussion of the sharing functions 
available on the Johnson County Sherriff's website is irrelevant to the statute's 
constitutionality because KORA does not require this capability; and, just as importantly, 
the majority cites no authority that would find a federal ex post facto violation because of 
a nonstatutorily mandated software feature added by a local law enforcement agency.  
 
Regardless, given the overwhelming weight and substance of the caselaw rejecting 
federal ex post facto challenges based on widespread Internet dissemination of offender 
registration information, as well as the federal courts' more recent validations of Smith, I 
55 
 
 
 
would not consider Smith's rationale to be "antiquated" or subject to easy dismissal, and I 
would not weigh this against the statute's constitutionality. The majority errs in this 
regard. 
 
"Branding" a registrant's driver's license 
 
Next, the majority declares that KORA "mimics [the] shaming of old by branding 
the driver's license of a registrant with the designation, 'RO.'" Slip op. at 36. The majority 
is referring to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-243, which provides that an offender's driver's license 
"shall be assigned a distinguishing number by the division [of motor vehicles] which will 
readily indicate to law enforcement officers that such person is a registered offender. The 
division shall develop a numbering system to implement the provisions of this 
subsection." This requirement, while not technically contained in KORA, differentiates 
Kansas laws from SORNA, although the statute only requires a distinguishing number 
and the "RO" practice is just a decision by a state agency that is not specifically dictated 
by the statute. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-243(d).  
 
The majority draws support for its view from a divided decision in Starkey v. 
Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, 305 P.3d 1004 (2013), which considered 
the Oklahoma Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. See Okla. Const., art. 2, § 15. But I do 
not find Starkey persuasive for several reasons. 
 
First, although the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the intent-effects test, that 
court's majority suggests they applied a lower standard as to when the effects of a 
measure are punitive under the Oklahoma Ex Post Facto Clause by noting that the United 
States Constitution simply establishes a floor for constitutional rights in Oklahoma. 2013 
OK 43, ¶ 45 ("How we apply the 'intent-effects' test is not governed by how the federal 
courts have independently applied the same test under the United States Constitution as 
56 
 
 
 
long as our interpretation is at least as protective as the federal interpretation."). Second, 
Oklahoma's offender registry law imposed harsher restraints on offenders because of 
residency boundaries (minimum distance from schools, playgrounds, etc.) and a 
requirement that Oklahoma driver's licenses and identification cards spell out the term 
"Sex Offender." In contrast, KORA contains no residency exclusions and Kansas simply 
uses as a matter of state agency practice an abbreviation (RO), which applies equally to 
non-sex-offenders. Finally, the Starkey court relied upon the totality of the Oklahoma 
law's harsher circumstances when determining they weighed in favor of punishment. 
2013 OK 43, ¶ 61 ("[W]e are not making a determination of the constitutionality of any 
of these individual registration requirements but for purposes of analyzing the second 
Mendoza-Martinez factor we find the totality of these requirements weigh in favor of 
punishment."). 
 
Offering a different analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court's unanimous decision 
in Smith v. State, 84 So. 3d 487 (La. 2012), reached the opposite conclusion regarding its 
driver's license labeling and is more on point. In so holding, the Louisiana court 
acknowledged that including the words "sex offender" printed in orange color on an 
offender's driver's license "may be remotely similar to historical forms of punishment, 
such as public humiliation, [but] the immediate need for public protection was a corollary 
of, rather than an addendum to, the punishment for sex offenders." Smith, 84 So. 3d at 
496 n.7-8, 498. The court then concluded that the requirement of a notation on an 
offender's driver's license "may be harsh, may impact a sex offender's life in a long-lived 
and intense manner, and also be quite burdensome to the sex offender, [but] we do not 
find them to constitute an infringement of the principles of ex post facto." 84 So. 3d at 
499. 
 
Admittedly, the Louisiana court did not articulate whether it was relying on the 
federal or state constitution for its holding, but this does not appear to make a difference 
57 
 
 
 
because that court had previously held Louisiana's Ex Post Facto Clause offers the same 
protections because it was patterned after the United States Constitution. See State ex rel. 
Olvieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735 (La. 2001). For this reason, I find the Louisiana decision 
more persuasive than the Oklahoma decision.   
 
Quarterly registration 
 
Next, the majority labels KORA's quarterly, in-person registration requirements 
for each location where the offender works, lives, or attends school as "a traditional 
means of punishment" by likening the requirement to probation or parole. Slip op. at 38. 
It does so without citation to any authority or explanation as to how quarterly reporting 
mandates offend federal ex post facto caselaw. Again, a review of the unanimous federal 
caselaw upholding SORNA is persuasive and leads to a contrary conclusion. 
 
SORNA's in-person reporting requirements differentiate between types of sex 
offenses in determining the frequency of in-person reporting. There must be in-person 
verification "not less frequently than" once a year for Tier I sex offenders, twice a year 
for Tier II sex offenders, and four times per year for Tier III sex offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 
16916 (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (defining Tiers I, II, and III). In Parks, the First 
Circuit recently noted SORNA's in-person requirement was "surely burdensome for those 
subject to it," but nevertheless concluded this was not punitive, noting:  
 
"To appear in person to update a registration is doubtless more inconvenient than 
doing so by telephone, mail or web entry; but it serves the remedial purpose of 
establishing that the individual is in the vicinity and not in some other jurisdiction where 
he may not have registered, confirms identity by fingerprints and records the individual's 
current appearance. Further, the inconvenience is surely minor compared to the 
disadvantages of the underlying scheme in its consequences for renting housing, 
58 
 
 
 
obtaining work and the like—consequences that were part of the package that Smith itself 
upheld." 698 F.3d at 6.  
 
See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1281-82 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Doe v. Cuomo, 755 
F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2014) (approving triennial, in-person reporting as being 
reasonably related to the nonpunitive, prospective goals of protecting the public and 
facilitating law enforcement efforts). 
 
Admittedly, KORA's reporting requirements are more burdensome than those in 
SORNA because under KORA, all sex offenders are subject to in-person registration four 
times per year, and drug and violent offenders must report in person a minimum of three 
times per year. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(b). KORA further requires an offender to 
report registration changes in person "to the . . . agency or agencies where last 
registered." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(a), (g). In addition, the 
definition of "reside" in KORA is broader than the definition in SORNA. Compare 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4902(j) (definition of "reside") with SORNA's 42 U.S.C. § 16911. 
Therefore, it is obvious KORA imposes a greater registration burden on the offender than 
SORNA. But the question is whether the federal courts would view these changes as 
tipping the balance. I think not. 
 
Consider again as an example Matso in which the Ninth Circuit rejected a federal 
ex post facto challenge to a Nevada law that essentially mirrored SORNA's registration 
requirements, but also expanded the category of individuals required to register, added to 
the frequency offenders were subject to registration, and required in-person registration. 
Matso, 670 F.3d at 1051; see also Litmon, 768 F.3d at 1242-43 (holding California's 90-
day, in-person lifetime registration requirement does not violate federal ex post facto 
principles); Hatton, 356 F.3d at 965 (no evidence California's registration requirement 
has an objective to shame, ridicule, or stigmatize sex offenders). These decisions strongly 
59 
 
 
 
point in a direction that indicates KORA's reporting requirements do not offend federal 
ex post facto principles. 
 
Additionally, the majority's analogy to probation is not persuasive. While 
probation/parole may have "reporting" in common in the abstract, this is only one aspect 
of many conditions attached to these punishments. For example, probationers are subject 
to searches of their persons and property simply on reasonable suspicion of a probation 
violation or criminal activity and are subject to random drug tests. They may also be 
required to avoid "injurious or vicious habits" and "persons or places of disreputable or 
harmful character"; permit state agents to visit their homes; remain in Kansas unless 
given permission to leave; work "faithfully at suitable employment"; perform community 
service; go on house arrest; and even serve time in a county jail. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-
6607(b), (c).  
 
In sum, I do not believe the federal courts, more specifically the United States 
Supreme Court, would hold that this historical-form-of-punishment factor weighs toward 
an ex post facto violation.    
 
AFFIRMATIVE DISABILITY OR RESTRAINT 
 
The majority focuses next on what it characterizes as the "more common restraint 
on an offender's freedom of movement" under KORA, which is the quarterly registration 
requirement in each applicable jurisdiction and the required $20 registration fee, as well 
as the KORA's broader definition of the word "resides." Slip op. at 39. The majority notes 
the registration costs, depending on circumstances, could be $80 to $240 annually. 
 
But the majority fails to explain how the federal courts would hold that these 
components of KORA would weigh this factor against the Kansas law. For example, no 
60 
 
 
 
evidence was presented establishing that the KORA registration costs were a fine instead 
of a fee. See Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 2014) ("The burden of 
proving that it is a fine is on the plaintiffs . . . ."). 
 
In Mueller, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld Wisconsin's annual $100 
registration fee against a sex offender who moved out-of-state but was still required to 
register in Wisconsin. In doing so, the court noted first that plaintiff had done nothing to 
get over the first hurdle by presenting evidence regarding the fee versus the registration 
program's cost. 740 F.3d at 1134 ("[T]hey cannot get to first base without evidence that it 
is grossly disproportionate to the annual cost of keeping track of a sex offender 
registrant—and they have presented no evidence of that either. They haven't even tried."). 
Similarly, Doe has done nothing as to this evidentiary hurdle, yet the majority strikes this 
factor against KORA even though the burden is on the challenger and the statute is 
presumed constitutional. 
 
Second, the Seventh Circuit noted the nonpunitive purpose of collecting fees and 
where the responsibility lies for having to provide a registry, stating: 
 
"The state provides a service to the law-abiding public by maintaining a sex offender 
registry, but there would be no service and hence no expense were there no sex offenders. 
As they are responsible for the expense, there is nothing punitive about requiring them to 
defray it." 740 F.3d at 1135.   
 
 
If it is the potential for a total annual cost of $240 that offends the majority, what 
is the legal basis for that? The majority leaves this unexplained.  
 
Next, the majority holds that housing and employment problems result from the 
registry, which ties back to the widespread dissemination of information on the Internet 
61 
 
 
 
discussed above, which Smith and the other federal courts have plainly rejected. But the 
majority believes KORA suffers an additional evidentiary blow because of direct 
evidence that Doe actually lost a job and housing opportunities because of the Internet 
registry. I disagree this tips the balance when the caselaw is considered. 
 
 
As noted earlier, my review of federal caselaw from Smith on down shows the 
courts have fully understood that actual consequences result from offender registration 
and have not dismissed these consequences simply as conjecture. See, e.g., Smith, 538 
U.S. at 99; Parks, 698 F.3d at 6 ("The prospective disadvantages to Parks from such 
publicity are obvious."). Indeed, several courts have approved state laws that imposed 
actual residential living restrictions on offenders, which are literally off-limits zones 
disabling offenders from living in close proximity to schools, playgrounds, etc. See Doe 
v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (Iowa's 2,000-foot buffer zone regulatory, not 
punitive); Salter v. State, 971 So. 2d 31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (approving 2,000-foot 
buffer zone); People v. Leroy, 357 Ill. App. 3d 530, 828 N.E.2d 769 (2005) (approving 
500-foot buffer zone); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005) (upholding 2,000-
foot buffer zone); see also Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1004 (6th Cir. 2007) ("The 
[Tennessee] Act's registration, reporting, and surveillance components are not of a type 
that we have traditionally considered as a punishment, and the district court correctly 
found that they do not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint in light of the 
legislature's intent."); Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 186 N.C. App. 134, 650 S.E.2d 618 
(2007) (upholding ban on entering public park); Doe v. Baker, No. Civ. A. 1:05-CV-
2265, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (upholding 1,000-foot 
buffer zone). Clearly, such exclusions cause lost opportunities for housing and 
employment for offenders, yet these prohibitions were upheld as nonpunitive.   
 
62 
 
 
 
I am not persuaded the federal courts would find KORA to impose requirements 
traditionally considered to be affirmative disabilities or restraints to the point of weighing 
this factor against constitutionality. 
  
TRADITIONAL AIMS OF PUNISHMENT 
 
The third Mendoza-Martinez factor is whether the "regulatory scheme . . . 
promotes the traditional aims of punishment." Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The Court has 
described those aims as retribution and deterrence. See, e.g., Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. at 168.  
 
The majority's analysis of this factor is muddled and difficult to unpack. It is 
unclear to me whether the majority is relying on the articles attached to Doe's summary 
judgment motion or its own intuition. As best as I can tell, the majority ultimately ignores 
the attachments and simply holds that KORA promotes traditional aims of punishment 
because the legislature increased the reporting term from 10 to 25 years. Slip op. at 41. 
But this conclusion is at odds with the federal caselaw.  
 
But the fact that KORA has a deterrent effect is not conclusive. The Smith Court 
found that "[a]ny number of government programs might deter crime without imposing 
punishment" and "'[t]o hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such 
sanctions "criminal" . . . would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in 
effective regulation.' [Citations omitted.]" 538 U.S. at 102. The Court also rejected the 
lower court's finding that Alaska's registration obligations were retributive based upon the 
length of reporting differing between individuals convicted of nonaggravated offenses 
and those "convicted of aggravated or multiple offenses." 538 U.S. at 102. The Court 
found the "categories . . . and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement are 
63 
 
 
 
reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory 
objective." (Emphasis added.) 538 U.S. at 102.  
 
The Smith Court's analysis is equally applicable to KORA, though not wholly 
dispositive because the Court was addressing a 15-year registration requirement and 
KORA has a 25-year requirement. But SORNA imposes a 25-year registration 
requirement on Tier II offenders and a lifetime requirement on Tier III offenders, 42 
U.S.C. § 16915 (2012), and the federal courts addressing this issue have upheld SORNA 
based on Smith. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed this registration requirement in W.B.H. and held 
that SORNA is no different than the Alaska act at issue in Smith. 664 F.3d at 858-59. The 
W.B.H. court reasoned that SORNA is "reasonably related to the danger of recidivism 
posed by sex offenders." 664 F.3d at 858. And the court explained that while SORNA 
"allows the public and law enforcement to determine the general whereabouts of 
convicted sex offenders, . . . it does not directly restrict their mobility, their employment, 
or how they spend their time." 664 F.3d at 858. So, the court found that any deterrent 
effect or purpose of SORNA does not justify a finding that the act's purpose is punitive. 
664 F.3d at 858; see also Under Seal, 709 F.3d at 265 (quoting from Smith to find that 
SORNA does not promote traditional aims of punishment). 
 
I would find under Smith and the cases interpreting SORNA that the traditional 
aims of punishment factor weighs in favor of KORA being fairly characterized as 
nonpunitive. 
 
64 
 
 
 
RATIONAL CONNECTION TO NONPUNITIVE PURPOSE 
 
In Smith, the Court identified this as "a 'most significant' factor in our 
determination that the statute's effects are not punitive." 538 U.S. at 102 (citing United 
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 [1996]). The 
Smith Court did not elaborate on what is meant by "rational connection to a nonpuntive 
purpose" before analyzing the Alaska act under the standard. One commentator has noted 
that the standard is "deferential to the state purpose (much like rational basis review 
under substantive due process analysis)." Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May States 
Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children?, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 961, 984 
(2006). In State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 774, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008), this court determined 
that "the registration act was intended to promote public safety and to protect the public 
from sex offenders, who constitute a class of criminals that is likely to reoffend."  
 
The majority concludes that arguably under the current version of KORA, "public 
safety has become a pretext." Slip op. at 42. The majority finds fault with KORA because 
it does not distinguish between types of offenders and contains no mechanism for 
relieving a "fully rehabilitated" offender from its notification burdens. But the Ninth 
Circuit and others have rejected similar arguments. In Matso, the court held: 
 
 
"Plaintiffs argue Smith overstated the risk of sex-offender recidivism. They note 
that Smith cited several studies on sex offender recidivism. See id. at 104. Plaintiffs then 
rely on an expert declaration critiquing the methodology of the recidivism studies in 
Smith. The district court did not make any factual finding regarding the risk of sex 
offender recidivism. Even had it adopted the declaration's conclusions as its own, a 
recalibrated assessment of recidivism risk would not refute the legitimate public safety 
interest in monitoring sex-offender presence in the community." 670 F.3d at 1057.  
 
65 
 
 
 
See also Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1006 (Tennessee Legislature "could rationally conclude 
that sex offenders present an unusually high risk of recidivism, and that stringent 
registration, reporting, and electronic surveillance requirements can reduce that risk and 
thereby protect the public" and concluding that "[w]here there is such a rational 
connection to a nonpunitive purpose, it is not for the courts to second-guess the state 
legislature's policy decision"). In addition, the Second Circuit recently held the New York 
Legislature's "decision to eliminate the possibility of relief from registration for twenty 
years" for level one offenders did not render the registration provisions punitive. Cuomo, 
755 F.3d at 112. 
 
The majority fails to cite any authority for its analysis of this factor; and the 
proposition that offender registration schemes are rationally related to the nonpunitive 
purpose of public safety finds overwhelming approval in the federal caselaw. Even 
Myers, 260 Kan. at 681, appears to assume offender registration is rationally connected to 
public safety, and the Alaska state case that held post-Smith changes to the Alaska act 
were an ex post facto violation admits registration, at least as to sex offenders, advances a 
nonpunitive public safety purpose. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1015-16 (Alaska 
2008).  
 
I do not see how the majority can say no public safety purpose is rationally 
furthered by having sex, drug, and violent offenders register. I would follow the 
referenced precedent and hold that KORA has a rational connection to a nonpunitive 
purpose, so this factor does not weight towards punishment.  
 
EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO REGULATORY PURPOSE 
 
In Smith, the Court clarified that "[t]he excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto 
jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best 
66 
 
 
 
choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the 
regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective." 538 U.S. at 
105. The Smith Court further noted that ex post facto jurisprudence does not preclude a 
state from making reasonable categorical judgments that certain crimes should have 
particular regulatory consequence.  
 
Instead of independently analyzing this factor, the majority merely harkens back to 
the ground it already plowed, concluding:  "Our discussion of the other factors has 
touched upon the excessive nature of KORA." Slip op. at 43. The majority then 
specifically cites the fact that the 2011 KORA amendments required more information 
from the offenders and that the penalty for noncompliance has increased. Slip op. at 43. I 
would hold that neither of these requirements is excessive given KORA's public safety 
purpose based on the authority cited above.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the 2011 KORA offender registration scheme imposes a number of 
burdens on sex offenders, I believe the applicable federal caselaw considering similar 
burdens under other offender registration schemes compels us to conclude that the 2011 
KORA amendments do not violate the United States Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause 
as applied to sex offenders and that the United States Supreme Court would so hold. 
 
NUSS, C.J., and LUCKERT, J., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting 
opinion.