Title: Strom v. Amvets
Citation: 280 S.C. 146, 311 S.E.2d 721
Docket Number: 22026
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 1984

280 S.C. 146 (1984) 311 S.E.2d 721 J. P. STROM, Chief, State Law Enforcement Division, Appellant, v. AMVETS, et al., Respondents. 22026 Supreme Court of South Carolina. January 11, 1984. *147 Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Retired Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. William K. Moore, Columbia, for appellant. W. Paul Cantrell, Jr., Charleston, for respondents. January 11, 1984. NESS, Justice: This appeal involves the bingo statute. Appellant asserts the court erred in holding Act # 496, Acts and Joint Resolutions of 1980, now codified as S.C. Code Ann. §§ 52-17-10, et seq. (1976 as amended), unconstitutional. Appellant also claims the trial court erred in concluding the unconstitutional portion of the Act was not severable from the remainder of the legislation. We agree and reverse as to severability. Act # 496, § 2(2), now codified as S.C. Code Ann. § 52-17-20(2) (1976 as amended) states: Appellant concedes the underlined portion of the above-quoted section is unconstitutional as it (1) constitutes special legislation in violation of Article III, Section 34, Subdivision IX of the South Carolina Constitution; and (2) denies equal protection to bingo operators located outside the geographical areas designated in § 52-17-20(2). He argues, however, that the remainder of this Act, particularly § 3(6), now codified as § 52-17-30(6), is constitutional, and should be given full effect after the unconstitutional provision is severed. We agree. Although respondents have abandoned their contention as to the unconstitutionality of § 52-17-30(6), we feel this issue merits our consideration. In St. John's Melkite Catholic Church v. Commissioner of Revenue, 240 Ga. 733, 242 S.E. (2d) 108 (1978) the Georgia Supreme Court held a statute which prohibited bingo operators from conducting bingo games on the same premises during any eighteen hour period was a proper exercise of the State's police power. Once § 52-17-20(2) is severed from the remainder of the Act, § 52-17-30(6) performs a similar function. We hold § 52-17-30(6) is a constitutional exercise of the State's police power. "The principle that a statute may be constitutional and valid in part and unconstitutional and invalid in part is generally recognized." In re Aiken County Board of Education v. Knotts, 274 S.C. 144, 150, 262 S.E. (2d) 14, 17 (1980); State v. Keenan, 278 S.C. 361, 296 S.E. (2d) 676 (1982). In Townsend v. Richland County, et al., 190 S.C. 270, 280-1, 2 S.E. (2d) 777, 781 (1939) this Court determined: See also, Lee v. Clark, et al., 224 S.C. 138, 77 S.E. (2d) 485 (1953); Reith v. S.C. State Housing Authority, et al., 267 S.C. 1, 225 S.E. (2d) 847 (1976). Additionally, in Gillespie v. Blackwell, et al., 164 S.C. 115, 122, 161 S.E. 869, 872 (1931), this Court held: See also Stone v. Traynham, 278 S.C. 407, 297 S.E. (2d) 420 (1982). Considering the remainder of Act # 496, we are satisfied that it meets all the foregoing conditions, and hold that the constitutional part of it shall stand. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's finding that § 52-17-20(2) (Act # 496, § 2(2)) is unconstitutional, but reverse its determination that this section is not severable from the remainder of the Act. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. LEWIS, C.J., and LITTLEJOHN, GREGORY and HARWELL, JJ., concur.