Title: Segal v. ASICS America Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S263569
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
MICKEY SEGAL et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S263569 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Four 
B299184 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC597769 
 
 
January 13, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Irion* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
S263569 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
A prevailing party in civil litigation is entitled to recover 
costs incurred in the litigation.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, 
subd. (b).)  Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.51 sets forth 
specific items of costs that are allowed or prohibited.  (§ 1033.5, 
subds. (a), (b).)  The statute also authorizes the trial court in its 
discretion to award or deny an item of costs not mentioned in 
this section.  (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).)   
We granted review to resolve a conflict among the Courts 
of Appeal regarding whether costs incurred in preparing 
photocopies of exhibits and demonstrative aids for trial are 
recoverable under section 1033.5 even if they were not 
ultimately used at trial.  In this case, the Court of Appeal held 
that such exhibit-related costs are recoverable under section 
1033.5, subdivision (a)(13) (hereinafter section 1033.5(a)(13)), 
which allows the recuperation of costs for models, enlargements, 
and photocopies of exhibits “if they were reasonably helpful to 
aid the trier of fact.”  The court further held that such costs may 
be awarded in the trial court’s discretion under section 1033.5, 
subdivision (c)(4) (hereinafter section 1033.5(c)(4)). 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that costs 
related 
to 
unused 
photocopies 
of 
trial 
exhibits 
and 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
demonstratives are not categorically recoverable under section 
1033.5(a)(13), but they may still be awarded in the trial court’s 
discretion pursuant to section 1033.5(c)(4).  Accordingly, we 
affirm the Court of Appeal, although on slightly narrower 
grounds.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Size It, LLC, and Mickey Segal (collectively, 
plaintiffs) sued defendants ASICS America Corporation, ASICS 
Corporation, Kevin Wulff, Kenji Sakai, Motoi Oyama, and 
Katsumi Kato (collectively, defendants) for fraud.  The case 
proceeded to trial, and the jury rendered a verdict in defendants’ 
favor.   
Defendants subsequently filed a memorandum of costs 
pursuant to section 1032.  Plaintiffs moved to tax costs; that is, 
they asked the court to deny or reduce several of defendants’ 
claimed costs.  As pertinent here, plaintiffs challenged the costs 
associated with preparing photocopies of exhibits, exhibit 
binders, and closing argument demonstrative aids that were 
prepared for but ultimately not used at trial.  Defendants 
opposed the motion.   
Following a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ 
motion in part and denied it in part.  As relevant here, the court 
allowed defendants to recover their costs associated with 
photocopying trial exhibits, creating exhibit binders, and 
preparing demonstrative boards and slides even though they 
were not used at trial.     
The Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling on the motion to 
tax costs.  (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 
659, 667 (Segal).)  It held that costs associated with unused 
demonstratives and photocopies of trial exhibits are recoverable 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
under section 1033.5(a)(13).  (Segal, at pp. 666–667.)  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed 
with the analysis of section 1033.5(a)(13) set out in two prior 
appellate court decisions — Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 
141 Cal.App.4th 1550 (Seever) and Ladas v. California State 
Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761 (Ladas).  (Segal, at 
p. 667.)  The Court of Appeal further held that these costs are 
also allowable in the trial court’s discretion under section 
1033.5(c)(4).  (Segal, at p. 667.)  The Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of section 1033.5(c)(4), although in conflict with 
the Seever decision, was consistent with the holdings reached in 
Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836 
(Benach) and Applegate v. St. Francis Lutheran Church (1994) 
23 Cal.App.4th 361 (Applegate).   
As noted, we granted review to resolve the conflict. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Generally, a trial court’s award of costs is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 
1332.)  Yet when the issue is one of statutory interpretation, it 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  (Ibid.) 
A prevailing party is entitled “as a matter of right” to 
recover costs in any action or proceeding unless a statute 
expressly provides otherwise.  (§ 1032, subd. (b).)  Section 1033.5 
sets forth the types of expenses that are and are not allowable 
as costs under section 1032.  Specifically, subdivision (a) of 
section 1033.5 describes items that are “allowable as costs,” 
subdivision (b) describes items “not allowable as costs, except 
when expressly authorized by law,” and section 1033.5(c)(4) 
provides that “[i]tems not mentioned in this section and items 
assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
court’s discretion.”  All costs, whether expressly permitted under 
section 1033.5, subdivision (a) or awarded in the trial court’s 
discretion pursuant to section 1033.5(c)(4), must be “reasonably 
necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely 
convenient 
or 
beneficial 
to 
its 
preparation” 
(§ 1033.5, 
subd. (c)(2)) and “reasonable in amount” (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(3)).   
Section 1033.5(a)(13) provides that costs for “[m]odels, the 
enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the 
electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental 
equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they 
were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.”  As noted above, 
there is a split of appellate authority regarding whether costs 
associated with unused demonstratives and photocopies of trial 
exhibits are recoverable, either categorically under section 
1033.5(a)(13) or in the court’s discretion pursuant to section 
1033.5(c)(4). 
A.  The Conflicting Appellate Court Decisions 
In Ladas, the appellate court held that costs associated 
with photocopies of exhibits, exhibit binders, blowups, and 
transparencies prepared for but not used at trial are not 
allowable as costs under section 1033.5(a)(13).  (Ladas, supra, 
19 Cal.App.4th at p. 775.)  It observed:  “Section 1033.5, [former] 
subdivision (a)(12)[, now subdivision (a)(13),] provides that 
expenses of trial exhibits ‘may be allowed if they were reasonably 
helpful to aid the trier of fact.’  (Italics added.)  It follows that 
fees are not authorized for exhibits not used at trial.”  (Ibid.)  
The Ladas court concluded that because the case was dismissed 
before trial, the prevailing party “failed to qualify for recovery of 
exhibit costs under this standard.”  (Ibid.)   
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
Subsequent to Ladas, however, the appellate court in 
Applegate concluded that costs incurred in preparing unused 
trial exhibits are allowable under a different provision of the 
costs statute.  (Applegate, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 363–
364.)  In Applegate, the plaintiff dismissed the action on the day 
of trial.  (Id., at p. 364.)  Nevertheless, the reviewing court held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
defendant to recover costs incurred in preparing such exhibits 
under section 1033.5(c)(4).  (Applegate, at p. 364.)  It reasoned 
that “[t]he exhibits prepared were ‘reasonably necessary to the 
conduct of the litigation’ ” because they were made for a trial 
that the defendants “were forced to continue preparing for” until 
a dismissal was filed.  (Ibid.)  The Applegate court characterized 
its holding as follows:  “An experienced trial judge recognized 
that it would be inequitable to deny as allowable costs exhibits 
which a prudent attorney would prepare in advance of trial, and 
which were not used only because the action was dismissed by 
the opposing party on the day of trial.”  (Ibid.)  In a footnote, the 
Applegate court acknowledged that the appellate court in Ladas 
had disallowed such costs, but distinguished that decision on the 
ground that “Ladas only considered whether the exhibit costs 
were allowable under section 1033.5, [former] subdivision 
(a)(12)[, now subdivision (a)(13)], not whether they could be 
awarded in the trial court’s discretion under subdivision (c)(4).”  
(Applegate, at p. 363, fn. 4.)  
Yet after Applegate, another reviewing court held that 
costs related to preparing unused trial exhibits are not 
recoverable under section 1033.5(a)(13) or section 1033.5(c)(4).  
(Seever, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1558–1560.)  In Seever, 
the appellate court concluded, as the Ladas court had, that the 
statutory language of section 1033.5(a)(13) (then numbered as 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
subdivision (a)(12)) “[o]n its face . . . excludes as a permissible 
item of costs exhibits not used at trial, which obviously could not 
have assisted the trier of fact.”  (Seever, at p. 1557.)  The Seever 
court further determined that in light of the limiting language 
of section 1033.5(a)(13), costs related to unused exhibits are also 
not awardable in the trial court’s discretion under section 
1033.5(c)(4).  (Seever, at pp. 1558–1560.)  The court reasoned 
that by imposing express limitations regarding the type of 
exhibit costs that are allowable under section 1033.5(a)(13) 
(exhibits that were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact), 
the Legislature sought to preclude courts from exercising 
discretion to award costs for those items when the conditions in 
section 1033.5(a)(13) are not met.  (Seever, at pp. 1558–1560.)  
Thus, the Seever court concluded, “[T]he discretion granted in 
section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4), to award costs for items not 
mentioned in section 1033.5 is simply inapplicable” under the 
circumstances.  (Seever, at pp. 1559–1560.)  In so ruling, the 
Seever court expressly disagreed with Applegate’s holding that 
only those costs items expressly prohibited by section 1033.5, 
subdivision (b) are outside the scope of the trial court’s 
discretionary authority under section 1033.5(c)(4).  (Seever, at 
pp. 1558–1559.)   
The Seever court pointed to other provisions of section 
1033.5, subdivision (a) that, by their terms, implicitly excluded 
permissible items of costs, even though they were not expressly 
prohibited 
under 
subdivision 
(b). 
 
(Seever, 
supra, 
141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1559.)  The court observed:  “Perhaps most 
obviously, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision 
(a)(10), provides attorney fees are allowable as costs when 
authorized by contract, statute or law.  Although section 1033.5, 
subdivision (b), does not address attorney fees, no one would 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
contend the trial court has discretion under section 1033.5, 
subdivision (c)(4), to award attorney fees as costs in a case not 
included within one of the three subdivision (a)(10) categories, 
based on a showing the fees incurred were ‘reasonably necessary 
to the conduct of the litigation.’  Similarly, section 1033.5, 
subdivision (a)(3), authorizes the recovery of costs for taking, 
videotaping, and transcribing necessary depositions (whether or 
not actually used at trial), including an original and one copy of 
depositions taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions 
taken by the party against whom costs are allowed.  Deposition 
copies, therefore, are plainly not one of those ‘[i]tems not 
mentioned in this section’: The Legislature has expressly stated 
how many copies may be included as recoverable costs; and, in 
our view, the trial court has no discretion under section 1033.5, 
subdivision (c)(4), to permit recovery for additional copies even 
if the prevailing party is able to demonstrate those copies were 
reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.”  (Ibid.)  
According to the Seever court, because section 1033.5(a)(13) has 
expressly stated what is allowable, section 1033.5(c)(4) does not 
apply.  (Seever, at pp. 1559–1560.)   
Nevertheless, just one year after Seever was decided, a 
different division of the same appellate district held that costs 
for unused trial exhibits are recoverable in the trial court’s 
discretion under section 1033.5(c)(4).  (Benach, supra, 
149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 855–856.)  In Benach, as in Applegate, 
the reviewing court explained that it would be inequitable to 
deny as allowable and recoverable those costs relating to 
exhibits that any prudent counsel would prepare in advance of 
trial.  (Benach, at p. 856.)  The Benach court noted that the 
parties in that case had specifically agreed to and completed a 
mutual exchange of exhibits before trial, and prepared exhibit 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
binders for use by the court and witnesses.  (Ibid.)  The appellate 
court also observed that nothing suggested the prevailing party 
could have anticipated that many of its prepared exhibits would 
not be used at trial.  (Ibid.)  The Benach court did not attempt 
to distinguish or even acknowledge the Seever decision. 
B.  The Decision Below 
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that costs incurred 
in preparing photocopies of exhibits and demonstratives for trial 
are recoverable as a matter of right under section 1033.5(a)(13) 
and in the trial court’s discretion pursuant to section 
1033.5(c)(4), even though they were not ultimately used at trial.  
(Segal, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.)  As a preliminary 
matter, the Court of Appeal determined that the “interpretation 
of section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13) must reflect the reality of 
how complicated cases are tried.”  (Segal, at p. 666.)  The court 
emphasized that prudent counsel must prepare exhibits well in 
advance of trial, and yet even the most experienced lawyers will 
have difficulty guessing which exhibits and demonstrative aids 
will actually be used due to the inherent unpredictability of 
trial.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal also emphasized that 
applicable local rules may require the pretrial exchange and 
premarking of all exhibits that might be used at trial, and, as in 
this case, “the trial court’s own procedures often require counsel 
to premark and prepare multiple copies of their exhibits.”  (Ibid.)  
The court further reasoned that even if exhibit binders contain 
documents never offered or admitted at trial, their preparation 
facilitates trial proceedings and helps avoid wasting jurors’ 
time.  (Ibid.)  Because the pretrial preparation of exhibit 
photocopies, binders, and demonstrative aids allow trials to 
proceed more efficiently, the court reasoned, “[T]hey are 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
‘reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact’ ” and therefore 
recoverable under section 1033.5(a)(13).  (Segal, at p. 666.)   
In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeal expressly 
disagreed with Ladas and Seever.  (Segal, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 667.)  In the Court of Appeal’s view, the Seever and Ladas 
courts had “ ‘ “ ‘ “read into the statute allowing costs a 
restriction which has not been placed there.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Segal, at 
p. 667.)  The Court of Appeal reiterated that “the meaning of the 
phrase ‘reasonably helpful to the trier of fact’ is broader than the 
limited notion of helpfulness in the specific task of finding facts, 
and encompasses as well the more general concept of 
helpfulness in the form of efficiency in the trial in which the trier 
of fact is asked to perform that task.”  (Ibid.)2   
For the same reasons, the Court of Appeal also concluded 
that costs incurred in preparing unused trial exhibits are 
permitted in the trial court’s discretion under section 
1033.5(c)(4).  (Segal, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.)   
C.  Analysis 
Plaintiffs maintain that defendants are not entitled to 
recover costs for unused trial exhibits and demonstratives under 
section 1033.5(a)(13) because the plain language of the statute 
does not encompass such items.  We agree.   
“ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental 
task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to 
effectuate the law’s purpose.  We first examine the statutory 
 
2  
The Court of Appeal did not fully quote section 
1033.5(a)(13), which allows the recovery of costs for certain 
items that “were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.”  
(Italics added.) 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.  We do 
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope 
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the 
enactment.  If the language is clear, courts must generally follow 
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in 
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If the 
statutory language permits more than one reasonable 
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”  
[Citation.]  “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in 
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of 
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, 
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative 
purpose.” ’ ” ’  [Citation.]  The interpretation of a statute 
presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo.”  
(Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 190.) 
As observed earlier, section 1033.5(a)(13) provides that 
costs for “[m]odels, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies 
of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including 
costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be 
allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.”  
(Italics added.)  The statutory language on its face excludes 
unused demonstratives and photocopies of exhibits because they 
did not assist the trier of fact.  In describing which exhibit-
related costs are allowable, the Legislature used the past tense, 
i.e., if the items “were reasonably helpful” (ibid., italics added) — 
not if they “would be” or “could be” reasonably helpful.  Because 
this criterion is phrased in the past tense, it conveys that the 
models, enlargements of exhibits, and photocopies of exhibits 
must have, in fact, assisted the trier of fact.  And the trier of fact 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
engages in a determination of factual issues in a judicial 
proceeding.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the “trier of 
fact,” also termed “fact-finder,” is “[o]ne or more persons who 
hear testimony and review evidence to rule on a factual issue.”  
(Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) pp. 1815, 737; see id., at p. 737 
[noting that “fact-finder” is termed “trier of fact” “in a judicial 
proceeding” (italics omitted)].)  We have similarly observed that 
the term “trier of fact” “recognizes the factual, rather than 
strictly legal, character of the inquiry[,]” and “is used 
interchangeably to refer to a judge or jury.”  (Cornette v. 
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 75.)  Thus, 
costs for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits are 
allowable under section 1033.5(a)(13) only if they were put 
before the trier of fact.3  Demonstratives and photocopies of trial 
exhibits would not have assisted the trier of fact in resolving the 
pertinent factual issues in a case if they were never used.  
As stated, the Court of Appeal below took a broader view 
of section 1033.5(a)(13).  Explaining that the interpretation of 
this provision “must reflect the reality of how complicated cases 
are tried,” the court concluded that because the “pretrial 
preparation 
of 
exhibit 
photocopies 
and 
demonstratives 
reasonably anticipated for use at trial expedites the 
proceedings,” allowing trials to proceed more efficiently, such 
 
3  
We recognize that the Court of Appeal recently addressed 
the related, yet distinct issue of whether photocopies of exhibits 
used in a non-trial proceeding are recoverable under section 
1033.5(a)(13).  (Rozanova v. Uribe (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 392, 
461–463.)  Because the demonstratives and photocopied exhibits 
in this case were prepared for trial, rather than some other 
proceeding, we need not address this additional question.  
Suffice it to say, photocopies of exhibits and demonstratives not 
used at all are not allowable as costs under section 1033.5(a)(13). 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
photocopies and demonstratives are reasonably helpful to aid 
the trier of fact.  (Segal, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 666.)  But 
the language of section 1033.5(a)(13) does not support such a 
sweeping construction.  As noted above, this provision requires 
that the items were (in fact) reasonably helpful to aid the trier of 
fact (a judge or jury in ruling on a factual issue).  This language 
is in tension with the Court of Appeal’s holding that all 
photocopied 
exhibits 
and 
demonstratives 
“reasonably 
anticipated” for use at trial (Segal, at p. 666) are recoverable 
under section 1033.5(a)(13), even if the unused exhibits were not 
in fact useful, even in a facilitative capacity.  
Furthermore, the broad reading of section 1033.5(a)(13) 
advanced by defendants and the Court of Appeal below renders 
the “reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact” phrase essentially 
superfluous in the context of the costs recovery statute.  Because 
section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2) already limits allowable costs 
to expenses “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the 
litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its 
preparation,” it is not clear how the Court of Appeal’s reading of 
section 1033.5(a)(13) imposes any additional limits on exhibit 
costs.  Instead, the most natural reading of section 1033.5(a)(13) 
and section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2) is that the “reasonably 
helpful to aid the trier of fact” clause (§ 1033.5(a)(13)) was not 
meant to capture all exhibit-related costs that were in some way 
helpful to the orderly and efficient conduct of the litigation — a 
consideration already accounted for in subdivision (c)(2) — but 
was instead more narrowly focused on the helpfulness of the 
demonstratives and photocopied exhibits to the adjudication of 
factual issues by the trier of fact.   
Defendants offer a different interpretation of section 
1033.5(a)(13).  They maintain that the statute requires only that 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
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13 
the method of preparing and displaying exhibits, such as 
models, enlargements, or photocopies, must be “reasonably 
helpful.”  (§ 1033.5(a)(13).)  The particular exhibits themselves, 
defendants assert, need not be useful to aid the trier of fact, or, 
indeed, used at all, so long as the method of preparing them is 
useful.  We conclude that neither the language of the statute nor 
its history supports such an interpretation.  
As noted, section 1033.5(a)(13) provides that “[m]odels, 
the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits . . . may 
be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of 
fact.”  The syntax of the provision makes clear that the only 
reasonable understanding of “they” as used in the statute is that 
the word refers solely to the items themselves.  Indeed, appellate 
courts interpreting this provision have allowed the recovery of 
costs under section 1033.5(a)(13) “only if the items ‘were 
reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.’ ”  (County of Riverside 
v. City of Murrieta (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 616, 629, italics 
added.)   
Nor do we perceive in the legislative history any indication 
that section 1033.5(a)(13) allows costs so long as the method of 
preparing exhibits is reasonably helpful.  According to an 
analysis of Assembly Bill No. 828 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which 
amended section 1033.5(a)(13) to include the electronic 
presentation of exhibits, the then-existing provision already 
required that “a party seeking to recover costs for models and 
exhibits must show that the models and exhibits were 
reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 828 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2017, p. 3, italics added.)  The bill 
analysis reiterated that “[w]hile this bill expands the list of 
allowable recoverable costs to include electronic exhibits, this 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
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14 
bill importantly maintains the requirement that such exhibits 
must be reasonably helpful in aiding the trier of fact.”  (Ibid., 
italics added.)  Similarly, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest 
described the then current version of section 1033.5(a)(13) as 
“provid[ing] that costs for models and enlargements of exhibits 
and photocopies of exhibits may be recovered if the items were 
reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.”  (Legis. Counsel’s 
Dig., Assem. Bill No. 828 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), italics added.)  
This history reflects legislators’ understanding that section 
1033.5(a)(13) requires that the models and photocopied exhibits 
themselves be reasonably helpful.  Although “ ‘the Legislature’s 
expressed views on the prior import of its statutes” are “neither 
binding nor conclusive in construing the provision[,]” they are 
“ ‘entitled to due consideration’ even if a ‘gulf of decades 
separates’ 
the 
legislative 
declaration 
and 
the 
earlier 
enactment.”  (Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 
10 Cal.5th 375, 389–390.) 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a prevailing 
party is not entitled to recover costs associated with preparing 
photocopies of exhibits and demonstratives under section 
1033.5(a)(13) if the items were not presented to the trier of fact.  
The issue remains, however, whether the trial court in its 
discretion may award costs for such items under section 
1033.5(c)(4).   
Plaintiffs urge this court to apply the analysis set forth in 
Seever — that a trial court may not exercise its discretion to 
award costs when the Legislature has expressly qualified the 
scope of allowable items in section 1033.5, subdivision (a) and 
thereby implicitly prohibited the recovery of costs for similar 
items that are not specifically enumerated in that provision.  
(Seever, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1559–1560.)  And yet, 
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15 
other courts have viewed the interplay of section 1033.5, 
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) differently.   
In Science Applications Internat. Corp. v. Superior Court 
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103, the Court of Appeal 
interpreted section 1033.5 as follows:  “Reading the two subparts 
of subdivision (c) together with the rest of the cost statute, we 
conclude, if an expense is neither expressly allowable under 
subdivision (a) nor expressly prohibited under subdivision (b), it 
may nevertheless be recovered if, in the court’s discretion, it is 
‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than 
merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.’ ”  (Science 
Applications, at p. 1103, quoting § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).)  The 
court elaborated:  “The statutory scheme clearly establishes two 
mutually exclusive sets of trial preparation expenses — one set 
which is allowable as a matter of right (§§ 1033.5, subd. (a), 
1032, subd. (b)) and one which is not (§§ 1033.5, subd. (b), 1032, 
subd. (b)).  Expenses which do not fit into either of these two 
categories fall into a special statutory safety net: they may be 
recovered but only at the discretion of the court (§ 1033.5, subd. 
(c)).”  (Science Applications, at p. 1103; see also Applegate, supra, 
23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 363–364 [“Items not specifically allowable 
under [section 1033.5,] subdivision (a) and not prohibited under 
subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion 
of the court if ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the 
litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its 
preparation’ ”].)  
We conclude that Science Applications and Applegate are 
more consistent with the general principles of statutory 
construction.  As noted, section 1033.5, subdivision (a) lists 
items specifically allowable as costs; subdivision (b) lists the 
items that “are not allowable as costs, except when expressly 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
authorized by law” (id., subd. (b)).  The Seever court reasoned 
that by imposing limits on certain categories of allowable costs 
under subdivision (a), the Legislature also implicitly precluded 
the recovery of additional subcategories of those same items, 
even if they were not explicitly prohibited under subdivision (b).  
(Seever, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1559–1560.)  But other 
provisions of the costs statute undermine Seever’s analysis and 
demonstrate that when the Legislature intended to preclude 
recovery of costs related to items described in subdivision (a), it 
did so explicitly — and not implicitly.   
For example, section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(8) expressly 
provides that fees of expert witnesses ordered by the court are 
allowable as costs.  Under Seever’s logic, fees of expert witnesses 
not ordered by the court would implicitly become not allowable.  
And yet the Legislature expressly disallowed such costs in 
subdivision (b)(1).  Similarly, section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(9) 
provides that transcripts of court proceedings ordered by the 
court are allowable.  Nevertheless, the Legislature expressly 
prohibited the recovery of costs for transcripts of court 
proceedings not ordered by the court under subdivision (b)(5).  
Indeed, the Legislature specified in subdivision (b)(3) that 
“photocopying charges, except for exhibits” (italics added) are not 
allowable as costs, but it would make little sense to expressly 
“except” such photocopying costs if, as plaintiffs contend, section 
1033.5(a)(13) already implicitly precluded them.  If the 
Legislature had wished to exclude as costs exhibits that were 
not reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact, it could have done 
so — and given its corresponding contemporaneous treatment 
in related circumstances, presumably would have done so — by 
including that prohibition in subdivision (b).  Yet subdivision (b) 
contains no such express prohibition.   
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
We are also unpersuaded by Seever’s emphasis on section 
1033.5, subdivision (a)(10), the attorney fees provision, in 
support of its conclusion that the Legislature implicitly 
precluded certain costs without expressly excluding them under 
section 1033.5, subdivision (b).  (Seever, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1559.)  Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10) provides that 
attorney fees are allowable as costs when authorized by 
contract, statute, or law.  Although we agree that attorney fees 
not authorized by contract, statute, or law are not allowable, 
despite section 1033.5, subdivision (b)’s silence concerning this 
item, we are mindful that section 1033.5 is not the only 
applicable set of constraints on a trial court’s discretion to award 
attorney fees as costs.  Section 1021 codifies the rule that “each 
party to a lawsuit ordinarily pays its own attorney fees” unless 
a statute or contract provides otherwise.  (Mountain Air 
Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
744, 751; see § 1021 [“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically 
provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation 
of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, 
express or implied, of the parties”].)  Reading sections 1021 and 
1033.5 together,4 the limited circumstances in which attorney 
fees may be awarded as costs identified in section 1033.5, 
subdivision (a)(10) are necessarily exclusive.  Meanwhile, no 
similar background principles apply to restrict exhibit costs to 
those allowed by section 1033.5(a)(13).  Thus, we hesitate to 
extrapolate Seever’s negative implication argument based solely 
 
4  
In the same bill that enacted section 1033.5, the 
Legislature also considered and amended section 1021, further 
suggesting that the two statutes should be harmonized and read 
together.  (See Stats. 1986, ch. 377, § 2, p. 1578 [amending 
§ 1021]; id., § 13, p. 1579 [enacting § 1033.5].) 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
on section 1033.5’s attorney fees provision to other items in the 
costs statute. 
Accordingly, we find no indication that the Legislature 
intended to circumscribe the trial court’s discretionary authority 
under section 1033.5(c)(4) to award costs incurred in preparing 
demonstratives and photocopies of trial exhibits, even though 
they were not ultimately used at trial, when such materials are 
reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation and reasonable 
in amount.  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129 
[courts should not “ ‘ “ ‘ “read into the statute allowing costs a 
restriction which has not been placed there” ’ ” ’ ”].)  Instead, we 
view section 1033.5 as being silent regarding demonstratives 
and photocopied exhibits not presented to the trier of fact, 
rendering them “[i]tems not mentioned in this section” that 
“may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.”  
(§ 1033.5(c)(4).)  Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeal that 
costs for such items are allowable in the trial court’s discretion 
under section 1033.5(c)(4). 
Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments are unconvincing.  They 
claim that allowing the prevailing party to recover costs for 
photocopies of exhibits and demonstrative aids not put before 
the trier of fact would “create a perverse incentive to litigants 
(especially those well-funded) to over prepare highly prejudicial, 
objectionable exhibits, slides and content that would never be 
shown to a jury in order to drive up recoverable costs.”  But 
section 1033.5 instructs trial courts to strike costs that are not 
“reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” or 
“reasonable in amount” (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(2), (3)), and courts 
have routinely done so, including costs for unused photocopies 
of trial exhibits (e.g., Great Western Bank v. Converse 
Consultants, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 615).  It bears 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
repeating that any award of costs — whether categorically 
recoverable under section 1033.5, subdivision (a) or allowable in 
the court’s discretion under section 1033.5(c)(4) — must meet 
the requirements of subdivision (c)(2) and (3).  We are confident 
that these statutory limitations will continue to guard against 
the prospect of abuse.   
Plaintiffs also maintain that it would be illogical to force a 
party to pay for the costs of certain exhibit-related items, such 
as demonstrative slides prepared for closing argument, that the 
party successfully excluded from trial.  The Legislature could 
have spelled out a categorical prohibition against shifting costs 
for inadmissible exhibits, but did not.  In the absence of such a 
bar, these are the type of costs that may be awarded in the trial 
court’s discretion, and the Court of Appeal properly held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by doing so in this 
case.  (Segal, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 
Court of Appeal erred when it held that costs for demonstratives 
and photocopies of exhibits prepared for, but ultimately not used 
at, 
trial 
are 
categorically 
recoverable 
under 
section  
 
SEGAL v. ASICS AMERICA CORPORATION 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
1033.5(a)(13), but it correctly determined that such costs are 
recoverable in the trial court’s discretion under section 
1033.5(c)(4).  Accordingly, because the Court of Appeal’s 
disposition was correct, we affirm its judgment.5   
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
IRION, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5  
We disapprove the decision in Seever v. Copley Press, Inc., 
supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 1550 to the extent it is inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Segal v. ASICS America Corporation 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 50 Cal.App.5th 659 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S263569 
Date Filed:  January 13, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Elizabeth Allen White 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Greenspoon Marder, James H. Turken, Michael J. Dailey, Blake L. 
Osborn; Norton Rose Fulbright and Rebecca Lawlor Calkins for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Sidley Austin, Jack S. Yeh, David R. Carpenter, Alexis Miller Buese, 
Collin P. Wedel and Rara Kang for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Rebecca Lawlor Calkins 
Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP 
555 South Flower Street, 41st Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 892-9357 
 
David R. Carpenter 
Sidley Austin LLP 
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 896-6679