Title: Holt v. Holt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190025
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2020

Rel: August 21, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1190025
____________________
Michael J. Holt
v.
Jere B. Holt, as coexecutor of the Estate of 
Geneva H. Holt, deceased
Appeal from Walker Circuit Court
(CV-16-900276)
SHAW, Justice.
Michael J. Holt, the coexecutor of the estate of Geneva
H. Holt, deceased, and the defendant in an action below
involving the estate, appeals the Walker Circuit Court's
1190025
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and coexecutor of the
estate, Jere B. Holt. We dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In October 2007, Jere and Michael's mother, Geneva Holt,
died. In May 2008, Jere and Michael filed a petition in the
Walker County Probate Court to probate their mother's will. In
June 2008, the probate court entered an order admitting the
will to probate and issued letters testamentary to Jere and
Michael as coexecutors.  
In August 2016, Jere filed a petition in the Walker
Circuit Court to remove the proceedings from the probate
court. In a separate motion, Jere asked the circuit court to
construe the provisions of the will to allow the remaining
assets in Geneva's estate to be used to satisfy a $140,000
cash bequest to him in Geneva's will. Michael filed a response
to Jere's motion in which he asserted a counterclaim seeking
a judgment declaring that the specific bequest to Jere had
adeemed. On June 4, 2019, the circuit court entered an order
in favor of Jere, holding that the cash bequest to Jere could
be satisfied by selling assets of the estate. Thereafter,
Michael filed a notice of appeal to this Court. 
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1190025
Discussion
Although neither party on appeal challenges the circuit
court's 
jurisdiction, 
"the 
absence 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived, and it is the duty of an
appellate court to notice the absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction ex mero motu." McElroy v. McElroy, 254 So. 3d
872, 875 (Ala. 2017). As a general matter, the probate court
has both original and general jurisdiction over matters
relating to the administration of an estate. See § 12–13–1,
Ala. Code 1975. However, the circuit court may acquire
jurisdiction over the administration of an estate if the
estate is properly removed from the probate court to the
circuit court pursuant to § 12–11–41, Ala. Code 1975. That
Code section provides:
"The administration of 
any 
estate 
may 
be 
removed
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, without assigning any special
equity; and an order of removal must be made by the
court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such
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1190025
estate can be better administered in the circuit
court than in the probate court."
Thus, "'[o]nce a party seeking to remove the administration of
an estate pursuant to § 12–11–41[, Ala. Code 1975,] makes a
prima facie showing that she is an "heir, devisee, legatee,
distributee, 
executor, 
administrator 
or 
administrator 
with 
the
will annexed,"'" the circuit court, to obtain jurisdiction,
must then order the removal of the administration of the
estate. Nelson v. Nelson, 10 So. 3d 603, 605 (Ala. Civ. App.
2008) (quoting Ex parte McLendon, 824 So. 2d 700, 704 (Ala.
2001)).
In DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814 (Ala. 2011), this
Court addressed a situation in which a party sought to remove
the administration of an estate from a probate court to a
circuit court pursuant to § 12–11–41. In explaining how a
circuit court can obtain jurisdiction of such a case, this
Court made clear that "the filing of a petition for removal in
the circuit court and the entry of an order of removal by that
court are prerequisites to that court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the 
administration of the estate pursuant to
§ 12–11–41[, Ala. Code 1975]." 68 So. 3d at 822 (some emphasis
added). Because, among other things, the circuit court never
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1190025
"enter[ed] an order purporting to remove the 
administration of
the estate from probate court," 68 So. 3d at 822, this Court
concluded that the circuit court did not 
obtain subject-matter
jurisdiction and that, as a result, the judgment entered by
that court was void and the appeal was due to be dismissed.
See also Nelson, 10 So. 3d at 605 (holding that, because the
circuit court "failed to enter an order removing" the
administration of the estate from the probate court, "the
circuit court never acquired jurisdiction").
In the present case, the record contains no order of
removal, and the parties did not produce one after this Court
issued a show-cause order. It thus appears that a removal
order was not entered in this case. As a result, the circuit
court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the
administration of Geneva's estate; its June 4, 2019, order,
therefore, is void, and the appeal is due to be dismissed. See
Vann v. Cook, 989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) ("A
judgment 
entered 
by 
a 
court 
lacking 
subject-matter
jurisdiction is absolutely void and will not support an
appeal; an appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal
from such a void judgment.").
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1190025
However, the parties note the following language from the
circuit court's June 4, 2019, order:
"3. Since there are other acts to be accomplished in
this estate, which has been removed to the Circuit
Court of Walker County, Alabama, the Court leaves
the estate open at the present time to accomplish
all actions necessary to eventually effect the
closing of this estate."
(Emphasis added.) According to the parties, the emphasized
language in the above quote constituted an "order of removal"
by the circuit court, despite the fact that the circuit court
never issued a separate order removing the estate from the
probate court.
Contrary to the parties' contention, however, the circuit
court's June 4, 2019, order is not an order of removal. This
order was entered after trial and merely states an apparently
incorrect belief that the case had previously been properly
removed when, in fact, it had not. The parties have offered no
other evidence or explanation indicating that the circuit
court entered an actual order of removal as required by the
caselaw discussed above.
The parties also argue that, even if this Court were to
conclude that the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction
over the administration of the estate because it failed to
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enter 
a 
separate 
removal 
order, 
Michael's 
counterclaim 
invoked
the 
circuit 
court's 
jurisdiction. 
This 
argument 
is
unpersuasive. This Court has previously held that, when a
court fails to initially obtain subject-matter jurisdiction,
it does not obtain jurisdiction over a subsequently filed
counterclaim. See Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cty. v.
Thomas, 130 So. 3d 199, 204 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (holding
that, because the Board's petition did not invoke the trial
court's jurisdiction, that court likewise did not obtain
jurisdiction over a party's counterclaims, filed in the same
action, and its dismissal of those counterclaims was also
void). Here, because the circuit court never 
acquired subject-
matter jurisdiction over the administration of Geneva's
estate, that court likewise did not obtain jurisdiction over
Michael's counterclaim. 
The circuit court's June 4, 2019, order is void. Because
a void judgment will not support an appeal, this appeal from
that judgment must be dismissed. See Vann, 989 So. 2d at 559,
and Blevins v. Hillwood Office Ctr. Owners' Ass'n, 51 So. 3d
317, 321–23 (Ala. 2010). 
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
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