Title: Edwards v. Weeks
Citation: 633 So. 2d 1035
Docket Number: 91-CA-00481
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 1994

633 So. 2d 1035 (1994) Terri EDWARDS, Mayor of the Town of Wesson, v. Lewis J. WEEKS, Jr. No. 91-CA-00481. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 10, 1994. Richard E. Stratton, III, Brookhaven, for appellant. James D. Shannon, Hazlehurst, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, C.J., and McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ. HAWKINS, Chief Justice, for the court: This case presents the interesting issue of the right of a mayor of a town operating under a Code Charter to veto an order of its board of aldermen appointing a town attorney. Because the trial court erred in denying the mayor the right to veto pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 21-3-15 (Supp. 1990), we reverse and render on the issue presented. Lewis J. Weeks, Jr. (Weeks), appointed town attorney in July 1981 for the Town of Wesson, served in this capacity until 1990. The Town of Wesson operates under a Code Charter as provided by Miss. Code Ann. § 21-3-1 et seq. (1972). The governing authorities consist of a mayor and five aldermen. During the town's regular September 1990 meeting, the board of aldermen voted to remove Weeks as town attorney and to employ Attorney Richard E. Stratton, III. In the October 1990 town meeting, the board, following a 3-2 vote, ordered that Weeks be rehired as town attorney. Mayor Edwards advised the board that she had the right to veto the rehiring order. Within the time limited by and pursuant to provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 21-3-15 (Supp. 1990), Mayor Edwards vetoed the rehiring order. During the town's January 1991 meeting, the board again, by order following a 3-2 vote, reinstated Weeks as its town attorney and terminated the employment of Attorney Stratton. Again, pursuant to the statutory provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 21-3-15, Mayor Edwards vetoed the board's order. Weeks instituted suit against the town seeking to enjoin it, its officials, agents and employees, from interfering with his service as town attorney. Alternatively, Weeks sought restoration to the position of town attorney and damages for breach of contract. After a lengthy hearing, the chancellor rendered an opinion finding and holding, inter alia, that the mayor had no power or *1036 authority to veto the board's action in rehiring Weeks. Aggrieved, the mayor appeals contending that she had the power and authority by statute to veto the board's orders. Miss. Code Ann. § 21-15-25 (1972) provides: Miss. Code Ann. § 21-15-17 (1972) provides, inter alia: Miss. Code Ann. § 21-3-15 (Supp. 1990) provides: The trial court found that it was not the legislature's intent to vest the mayor with the authority to veto employment of a town attorney. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon Rich v. McLaurin, 83 Miss. 95, 35 So. 337 (1903). In Rich, the Hattiesburg Board of Aldermen, by resolution adopted in 1903, elected W.H. Cook to the office of city police justice. Rich, the mayor, vetoed the election and refused to allow Cook to take possession of the office. R.S. McLaurin, the district attorney suing on the relation of Cook, instituted quo warranto proceedings against Rich to recover possession of the office. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Cook. On appeal, the cause was affirmed, the court's opinion stating: 83 Miss. at 101-02; 35 So. at 337. Subsequent to Rich, the statute was amended by deleting the word "measure" *1037 and inserting "ordinances" in its place and stead. In 1982, the statute was amended by adding Section (3) broadening the definition of "ordinance" as used in the statute. Rich is distinguishable from this case because: (a) The appointment of the police justice in Rich required no legislative action. The code chapter on "Municipalities" in 1903 did not provide how he should be elected. The court noted that the election was spawned solely from "convenience and necessity." Miss. Code Ann. § 21-15-25 (1972) specifically states that the governing authorities "may" appoint an attorney and "may" employ and compensate for legal services which the regular municipal attorney is not required to perform as a result of his employment. The trial court properly held that exercise of this discretion and employment of an attorney required legislative as well as administrative action. (b) The code section in effect when Rich was decided has been amended to change the word "measure" to "ordinances" and to include within the definition of the term "ordinances" all resolutions and orders.[1] Miss. Code Ann. § 21-15-25 (1972) clearly states that the "governing authorities" of the municipality are clothed with the authority to appoint the municipal attorney. The governing authorities in this case consist of the mayor and board of aldermen. The mayor, however, is authorized to vote only in case of a tie. To deny him the right of veto provided in § 21-3-15 would make him powerless in the appointment process for a town attorney. The municipal attorney is not a department head exercising one portion of the administrative functions of the municipality. He represents and advises the whole municipality, not one or more members of the board of aldermen. He is not a member of any board or commission, and exercises no vote or authority other than the advice and representation he is employed to render on behalf of the municipality. The mayor, who has the primary responsibility for daily discharge of municipal functions, including supervision of all departments and enforcement of the charter and ordinances, is entitled to participation in the process when a municipal attorney is appointed. The trial court failed to glean legislative intent for participation by the mayor. We disagree. It is apparent that the legislature, in broadening the definition of the term "ordinance" to embrace and include all resolutions and orders of the board of aldermen, effectively provided for mayoral participation in the appointment process of the municipal attorney. While we do not decide the limits of the veto power granted by § 21-3-15, it is clear to us that the veto power extends to an order by the board of aldermen appointing a municipal attorney. Of course, the board of aldermen may override the mayor's veto by a 2/3 vote of the board members as provided in the statute. We conclude that under § 21-3-15, Mayor Edwards had the right and power to veto the board of aldermen orders dated October 2, 1990, and January 2, 1991, and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment rendered here modifying the trial court judgment to the extent that it fails to recognize the validity of the mayor's veto. REVERSED AND RENDERED. DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ., concur. [1] Under the mayor/council form of government, the term "ordinance" is deemed to include ordinances, resolutions, orders and any other official actions of the council, except those procedural actions governing the conduct of the council's meetings, appointing a clerk of council, and exercising the council's investigative functions under Section 21-8-13(4). See Miss. Code Ann. § 21-8-47 (1972).