Title: Ward v. TOWN TAVERN
Citation: 191 Or. 1, 228 P.2d 216
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 1951

Decree vacated; judgment modified February 28, 1951.
*4 William L. Dickson and Arthur H. Lewis, of Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief were McCarty, Dickson &amp; Swindells, of Portland.
*5 John F. Reynolds, of Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Pedersen and Reynolds, of Portland.
Before LUSK,[*] Chief Justice, and BRAND,[] ROSSMAN, HAY and LATOURETTE, Justices.
DECREE VACATED. JUDGMENT MODIFIED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by one of the two defendants, Town Tavern (a corporation), from a decree of the Circuit Court which (1) affirmed and adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by Honorable Herbert C. Hardy, referee, before whom the cause was tried; (2) dismissed the cause as to the other defendant, Pittock Block, Inc.; (3) awarded judgment to the plaintiff against the defendant, Town Tavern, in the following sums: $6,350.49 as the balance due the plaintiff for work and materials furnished to the defendant; $2.25 for filing and recording the plaintiff's lien notice; $5.00, cost of the preparation of the lien notice; $1,850 as compensation for the plaintiff's attorney; and $850 as compensation for the referee; and (4) sustained the validity of the plaintiff's lien and ordered its foreclosure.
The defendant-appellant presents the following assignments of error:
The plaintiff (sole respondent) is a building contractor. The defendant, Town Tavern (sole appellant), operates a restaurant in leased portions of an office building in Portland owned by the defendant, Pittock Block, Inc. After the latter had filed an answer which set forth grounds of nonliability, the plaintiff confessed the averred facts and made no attempt to establish any liability on the part of that defendant. As we have indicated, the attacked decree dismissed the suit as to Pittock Block, Inc., and from that part of the decree no appeal has been taken. Hereafter, when we employ the term "defendant", we will mean Town Tavern.
In the early part of 1947 the defendant wished to alter the premises occupied by its restaurant and also to incorporate into them two adjacent store rooms and some additional basement space, all of which it had acquired under lease. A firm of store designers, entitled Rink and Hoffmann, prepared plans and specifications which outlined the proposed improvements. Before the plans had taken their final form, some estimates were obtained. June 10, 1947, the plaintiff and the defendant signed a contract which bound the plaintiff to perform the work "as shown by the plans, drawings and specifications prepared for the job by Messrs. Rink and Hoffmann." The undertaking included, in addition to the demolition of some existing partitions and structural parts, other work such as carpentry, plumbing, painting, wiring, plastering and *7 cement work. No specified day was fixed for the completion of the job, but the contract said:
Much time was consumed during the trial concerning the defendant's liability or nonliability for performing work not shown in the plans and known as extras. Concerning that phase of the dispute, the contract contained this provision:
The following is the part of the contract which governs the amount to be paid to the plaintiff:
*8 After the execution of the contract, the plaintiff promptly began his undertaking. At the outset, while walls were being demolished and other phases of the project were under way, the restaurant remained in operation, but later, as contemplated, it closed while other parts of the work were being performed. When the contract was signed, the parties surmised that two weeks' shutdown for the restaurant would suffice. However, it was forced to remain closed four weeks. October 2, 1947, the plaintiff claimed that he had completed his work and shortly presented to the defendant a statement of account which totaled $27,471.85 less $19,241.29 paid to him during the progress of the work. The total was more than had been anticipated. The increased cost was due, in part, to the incompleteness of the plans, unanticipated difficulties that were encountered, many changes in the work that the defendant ordered and additional work performed at its request.
Toward the close of the undertaking ill will was engendered between the parties, the blame for which each attributed to the other. As a result of that development, the plaintiff did not feel at liberty to return his workmen to the restaurant after the completion of the work to trim an occasional door or transom that stuck and to make adjustments to plumbing and other installations that failed to function properly. The lack of that follow-up attention did not enhance the defendant's appraisal of the work. The account was not paid, and presently the plaintiff filed a notice of a mechanic's and materialman's lien (§§ 67-101 to and including 67-113, O.C.L.A.), which stated that in performing his services the plaintiff had earned *9 $27,471.85 and had credited the account with $20,570.44. It showed a balance of $6,901.41 was due the plaintiff.
The cause which underlies this appeal arose when the plaintiff filed his complaint which, omitting mention of formal matters, alleged (1) the contract, as well as requisitions by the defendant for extra items, their performance by the plaintiff, the fact that the plaintiff earned in the manner just indicated $27,471.85, that there was credited on the account $20,570.44 and that a balance of $6,901.41 remained unpaid; (2) that (a) the plaintiff filed a notice of a mechanic's and materialman's lien which, after stating the condition of the account, showed a balance of $6,901.41 remained unpaid, (b) the plaintiff had paid $2.25 for filing the lien notice and $5.00 for having it prepared, and (c) the plaintiff had notified the defendant of the filing of the lien and of his intention to foreclose it. The complaint closed with a prayer for (1) judgment for the aforementioned sums of $6,901.41, $2.25, $5.00 and an attorney's fee of $3,000; (2) a decree for the establishment of the lien; and (3) an order for the foreclosure of the lien. Specifically, the estate or item of property upon which the plaintiff sought to impose his lien is thus designated in the complaint:
The answer, apart from admitting the status of the parties, the execution of the contract and that the plaintiff performed "certain labor and furnished certain *10 materials," denied all other averments. In addition, it submitted three "further, separate, affirmative answers." The first of these averred that the plaintiff "did not diligently pursue" his contract, with the result that the defendant was damaged in the amount of $2,100. The second alleged that the reasonable value of all of the work and materials furnished by the plaintiff did not exceed $15,000 and that the defendant had paid on account $20,570.44, thus overpaying the amount for which it was liable $5,570.44. The third stated that in the performance of his work the plaintiff used "inferior materials and workmanship and negligently and improperly performed various parts of the work," to the damage of the defendant in the amount of $3,000. The prayer of the answer demanded that the complaint
When the cause was assigned for trial to the Honorable James R. Bain, one of the judges of the Circuit Court, he entered an order of reference, which recited:
Accompanying the signature of Judge Bain to the Order of Reference there appears the word "Approved" followed by the signatures of counsel for the plaintiff and for the defendant.
After the cause had been referred to the Master, a trial occurred before him, in the course of which testimony of twenty-five witnesses was taken, which, as transcribed, covers 1,167 pages. In addition, there were received 65 exhibits consisting in part of time books, sets of blueprints, extensive statements of account and similar multiple-paged documents. The referee displayed a commendable interest in the duty which he had undertaken. Unencumbered with a witness stand and in the intimate manner rendered possible by an office, he sat down with the witnesses at his desk as the story was unfolded. The milieu was one in which the parties and witnesses felt at ease. The plans, specifications and other documents lay before the referee, counsel and witness as the facts were recounted. The referee himself asked many of the questions and, since all of the exhibits were upon his desk, he could turn quickly from one to another in grasping the significance of the testimony. Of course, the oath was administered to the witnesses, and *12 the rules of evidence were observed. An entry in one of the records shows that at the close of the hearing the referee "spent four full days in the study and preparation of the case and in the preparation of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." Those four days were well spent. We have read the entire transcript of evidence and believe that the findings of fact are an excellent, succinct portrayal of the facts.
The referee's findings of fact include the following:
The findings state that the defendant paid to the plaintiff during the progress of the work $20,570.44, leaving a balance of $6,901.41. They credit the defendant with $550.92 on account of the aforementioned defective workmanship, leaving a balance payable of $6,350.49. The defective details are carefully enumerated, one by one, in the findings. Accompanying the enumeration is a delineation, item by item, of the defects and a finding of the cost of remedying each of them.
*13 The first of the conclusions of law declares:
It was in that sum, together with the incidental items, that the court, upon approving the findings of fact and conclusions of law, entered the attacked decree and judgment.
After the findings of fact and conclusions of law had been submitted to the Circuit Court, the defendant filed objections to them which, upon a hearing, were overruled.
We shall now consider the first assignment of error. It reads: "The Court erred in refusing to dismiss the suit." Amplifying that contention, the defendant says: "The lien should be dismissed as the lien statement contains unsegregated non-lienable items."
Evidence supplied by the plaintiff himself shows that a large part of the charges which he made was for the installation upon the leased premises of articles which, clearly, were trade fixtures. They were not intended to become part of the building and were removable at the defendant's pleasure. Examples of them are coffee urns, steam chests, a soda fountain, a hood over the kitchen stove, shelves or racks in the refrigerators and a vanity table. The charges for installation of the trade fixtures were not segregated in the lien notice from the other charges, but were lumped in with them. It is impossible to determine from anything contained in the lien notice how much of the total charge of $27,471.85 was for labor and material expended in the installation of the trade fixtures.
*14 1. It is well settled that a lien is non-enforceable if the lien notice mingles in unsegregational form lienable and non-lienable items: Valder v. Berg, 122 Or. 661, 260 P. 240. The plaintiff frankly concedes that rule, for his brief says: "It is admitted that where a mechanic's lien claim contains lienable and non-lienable items in a lump sum, the lien is invalid and suit cannot be maintained." Therefore, if the work and materials spent upon the trade fixtures are non-lienable, the lien cannot be sustained. We must, therefore, determine whether or not the labor and materials consumed in attaching to the building the coffee urns, soda fountain, etc., were lienable.
2. Mechanics' and materialmen's liens are purely statutory and are obtainable only by those who can meet the statutory requisite. Like claimants for Cinderella's slipper, an exacting demand must be met by applicants for a lien, and all who cannot conform are rejected. Section 67-101, O.C.L.A., says:
This case is not concerned with a "wharf, bridge, ditch" or any of the other structures enumerated in the act with the exception of "building". Hence, we can disregard all of the enumerated classes except "any *15 building". Next, it is to be noticed that no lien is obtainable for anything done concerning a building unless the thing done consisted of "performing labor upon or furnishing material" used "in the construction, alteration or repair" of the building.
Liens authorized by § 67-101, O.C.L.A., may be had upon estates less than freeholds in extent: § 67-102, O.C.L.A., and Matthiesen v. Arata, 32 Or. 342, 50 P. 1015. But § 67-101, in prescribing the conditions under which a lien is obtainable, does not require less from an applicant for a lien upon a leasehold estate than it does from one who seeks a lien upon the freehold. Both are confronted with the same demand. Before going further, we shall take notice of decisions which dealt with the issue presented by this appeal; that is, may one have a lien upon a leasehold estate for supplying labor or material in attaching to a building, covered by the lease, a trade fixture which did not become and was not intended to be part and parcel of the building.
In support of his alleged lien, the plaintiff cites: Dobschuetz v. Holliday, 82 Ill. 371; Cornelius v. Washington Steam Laundry, 52 Wash. 272, 100 P. 727; Hathaway v. Davis, 32 Kan. 693, 5 P. 29; Ehrsam v. Rice, 153 Kan. 483, 112 P.2d 95; and Jarrell v. Block, 19 Okl. 467, 92 P. 167.
We do not believe that the Dobschuetz decision held that a mechanic's lien is obtainable for labor spent in installing trade fixtures. The court described the installations placed upon the property by the plaintiff in that case as "attached to the realty" and in another place said they were "attached to the soil." A third reference to them was "Connected, as they are, with other machinery attached and made part of the realty, they become a part also." If a word or two found in *16 the decision encourages an inference favorable to the plaintiff, later decisions by the Illinois courts, of which we shall now take notice, which construed and applied the Dobschuetz decision, show that the inference is unwarranted: Curran v. Smith, 37 Ill. App. 69, and Haas Electric Co. v. Amusement Co., 236 Ill. 452. In the Curran decision, the court said:
In the Haas Electric Company opinion, it is said:
Thus, we see that the Illinois courts do not construe the Dobschuetz decision as a holding that the installation of trade fixtures which do not become part of the realty affords the basis for a mechanic's lien. We now turn to another Illinois decision, McAlear v. New York Life Insurance Co., 177 Ill. App. 339, in which the alleged lien was based upon the fact that the plaintiff's *17 assignor, at the request of a tenant of the defendant who operated a restaurant in a building owned by the defendant, installed in the restaurant a ventilating system for which the tenant failed to pay. The system consisted largely of a blower, motor and canopy. In holding that the lien could not be sustained, the decision said:
We do not think that Illinois holds that an ordinary trade fixture constitutes the basis for a mechanic's lien.
We are of the belief that Cornelius v. Washington Steam Laundry, supra, the second authority cited by the plaintiff, is not supported by the decisions upon which it depends. Moreover, Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Hawthorne, 21 Wash. 2d 74, 150 P.2d 55, is clearly a holding that articles supplied by a materialman which do not become part or parcel of the building cannot support a lien. That decision ignored Cornelius v. Washington Steam Laundry. In the Westinghouse case, it appeared that the plaintiff had supplied a large quantity of electrical goods for a plant. *18 Examples of the goods were copper wires, wire holders, conduits and motors. The decision quoted with approval the following taken from 36 Am. Jur., Mechanics' Liens, § 78, p. 64:
That decision held that the wire, conduits and items essential to fastening them in place were fixtures. All of them had been permanently attached to the building. Concerning the motors and some of the other items, the decision pointed out:
Then the decision said:
The court ruled that the wires, conduits and their fasteners were fixtures, but that all of the other appliances, such as the motors and sliding rails, were not subjects *19 for a lien. It is apparent that our sister state to the north does not employ the rule attributed to it by the plaintiff.
We come now to the Oklahoma and Kansas decisions cited by the plaintiff. As quoted in Hathaway v. Davis, supra, Kansas has a statute which provides:
As is stated in the Jarrell decision, Oklahoma's mechanic's lien statute "was that adopted from the state of Kansas." It incorporates the provision just quoted. Oregon has no clause of like kind. In the Oklahoma and Kansas decisions the courts found that the labor for which liens were sought was expended upon items which had become part of the realty. In the Oklahoma case, the item was a dwelling house. In the Kansas (Hathaway) case, the object was a building occupied by a creamery; in the other Kansas (Ehrsam) case, the structure was a grain elevator. It may not be amiss in reading those decisions to take note of the following, which we quote from 36 Am. Jur., Mechanics' Liens, § 78, p. 63:
*20 We shall now consider three decisions rendered by this court concerning mechanics' liens in which the landlord-tenant relationship was a factor.
In Patterson v. Gallagher, 25 Or. 227, 35 P. 454, the plaintiffs were plumbers and two of the defendants were owners of a store building which was occupied by the third defendant, their tenant. The latter, preparatory to conducting a saloon upon the leased premises, employed the plaintiffs to connect his bar with the water and sewer pipes. In the case now before us some of the charges mentioned in the lien notice were for services rendered by plumbers in connecting a soda fountain with the city's pipes and another part of the charges was for the services of the same men in connecting a cocktail bar. In the Patterson case, the tenant failed to pay the charges and thereupon the plumbers filed a mechanic's lien notice. The decision, adverse to the lien, after quoting from the section of our code of which we have taken notice, said:
It added:
The decision held:
Although the tenant was a party-defendant, the court's reasoning did not expressly mention him. The decision dismissed the complaint.
In Honeyman v. Thomas, 25 Or. 539, 36 P. 636, the plaintiffs were materialmen. The defendants were lessees and an attaching creditor of the latter. The leasehold estate was a stone quarry. The material supplied by the plaintiffs consisted of the castings, chains, wire ropes, etc., which, when assembled at the quarry, became a derrick. The latter was fastened to the ground by guy wires which extended from the top of the derrick to stakes in the ground and to anchor poles which were imbedded in rock. After the completion of the derrick it was attached by the creditor whom we have mentioned, and after judgment the derrick was sold. In the meantime, the plaintiffs filed a notice of lien "upon said derrick, materials and machinery, and also upon Thomas &amp; Hartley's leasehold interest in said property, * * *." The trial court held that the materials which constituted the derrick never lost their status as personal property and that the tenant was always free to remove them. It held the lien invalid. In sustaining that decision, this court said:
In Matthiesen v. Arata, 32 Or. 342, 50 P. 1015, the plaintiff was a contractor, and the defendant was a lessee who held for a term of years a room in a building in which he planned to operate a saloon. Pursuant to contract, the plaintiff furnished the material and *22 performed the work whereby the room was rendered suitable for the intended purpose. His work consisted of wainscoting the room with oak lumber, installing oak-trimmed pilasters and ceiling beams, constructing partitions, hanging a door, framing and casing the door opening, and performing other similar work. The defendant, that is, the lessee, failed to pay for the work and after a lien notice had been filed the suit under review was instituted. The Circuit Court sustained the lien. In holding that the installations became a part of the freehold, the decision of this court said that the situation was not "embarrassed by any agreement of the parties that the material and labor furnished should be and remain personal property." After reviewing the tests for determining whether personal property has been so affixed to a structure that it has become a part of the freehold, the decision said:
The decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed and the lien was sustained.
3. We see from the three decisions just reviewed that work and materials cannot support a lien of the kind authorized by § 67-101, O.C.L.A., unless they became a part and parcel of the building itself. If they were expended upon an article belonging to the tenant, such as a bar or a derrick which did not become a part *23 of the building, they do not afford a basis for a lien. But if the work and the material were so applied that they became a part of the building itself, as, for example, in furnishing and fastening in place wainscoting, partitions and doors, failure to pay for them authorizes a lien.
The three decisions just reviewed are in accord with the opinions rendered by the courts of other states. Vol. 57, C.J.S., Mechanics' Liens, § 26, p. 520, says:
From 36 Am. Jur., Mechanics' Liens, § 31, p. 36, we quote:
See, also, § 78 of the same volume.
McFeron v. Doyens, 59 Or. 366, 116 P. 1063, cited by the plaintiff, is not contrary to the authorities just reviewed. In that case, the lien claimant did not seek relief against the land. He confined his lien claim to the improvement he had installed. The words of the McFeron decision are: "Plaintiff does not ask relief against the land." See, also, Kezartee v. Marks &amp; Co., 15 Or. 529, 16 P. 407.
4. Only those are entitled to mechanics' or materialmen's liens who can match the requirements of § 67-101, O.C.L.A., which does not grant a lien upon a leasehold *24 upon any different terms than upon a freehold. In both instances the claimant must prove that he performed labor or supplied material which became part of the building upon which he claims a lien. The trade fixtures upon which much of the plaintiff's labor was expended never became, and were never intended to become, part of the structure. That being true, no lien can be had for that part of the claim; and since that part cannot be separated by anything contained in the lien notice from the balance of the account, the lien must fail.
Since we have held the lien invalid for the reason just expressed, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other attacks made by the defendant upon the lien. Because the lien is invalid, the part of the attacked decree which foreclosed it must be vacated.
The above, however, does not fully dispose of the assignment of error under consideration. It reads: "The court erred in refusing to dismiss the suit." The question now occurs, should this court, because the lien is invalid (1) order the dismissal of the suit; (2) vacate the decree of foreclosure but sustain the judgment which the plaintiff recovered for the value of his services and materials; (3) remand the cause for trial as an action at law; or (4) adopt some other course.
5, 6. Section 67-109, O.C.L.A., provides:
The section clearly authorizes the entry of a judgment against the person or persons who ordered the performance of the work or the delivery of the material. See *25 James A.C. Tait &amp; Co. v. Stryker, 117 Or. 338, 243 P. 104. Going on, § 67-109 says:
Thus, although a mechanic's and materialman's lien was unknown to the common law, nevertheless, after a claimant has established his right to such a lien, there is available to him as the means of enforcing it all of the machinery of our courts of equity.
The statute which authorizes mechanics' and materialman's liens was enacted in 1885. In 1893 this court announced the decision entitled Ming Yue v. Coos Bay R.R. Co., 24 Or. 392, 33 P. 641, which was an appeal from a decree for the defendant rendered in a suit for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. The decree was entered after a demurrer to the complaint had been sustained. We now quote from the decision:
In 1898 Denny v. McCown, 34 Or. 47, 54 P. 952, was decided. It was an appeal by the defendant from a decree for the plaintiffs, entered in a suit for the foreclosure of a deed which was intended as a mortgage. After the decision had held the mortgage void, it said:
When the Ming Yue and the Denny cases were decided, the section of our laws which, as since amended, is § 9-102, O.C.L.A., read as follows:
See § 391 B. &amp; C. Codes and Statutes of Oregon.
General Laws of Oregon, 1917, Chapter 95, amended that provision by expanding and liberalizing the powers of equity courts. The part of the amendment material to the issues before us is the following:
See § 9-102, O.C.L.A. Section 391 B. &amp; C., as amended by the 1917 enactment, is now § 9-102, O.C.L.A.
It is reasonable to infer that one of the purposes of the 1917 amendment was to enable our courts to determine all of the issues pertaining to a transaction without shunting the parties back and forth through a succession of law suits. Evidently the legislative branch wished to render it unnecessary in the future to dismiss, for the reasons stated in the Ming Yue and the Denny decisions, suits akin to them.
According to 19 Am. Jur., Equity, § 196, p. 168:
This court promptly discerned and gave effect to the purpose of the 1917 amendment. For instance, in Simpson v. First National Bank, 94 Or. 147, 185 P. 913, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Harris, the court said:
Cole v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 115 Or. 456, 239 P. 98, declared:
We take the following from Nelson v. Smith, 157 Or. 292, 69 P.2d 1072:
Section 6-102, Oregon Code 1930, provides:
In construing the above section of the statute, this court in Spencer v. Wolff, supra, which was quoted with approval in Weith v. Klein, 136 Or. 201 (298 P. 902), said:
*30 We come now to decisions in cases which sought the foreclosure of liens and written since the adoption of the 1917 amendment. In McCann v. Oregon Scenic Trips Co., 105 Or. 213, 209 P. 483, the complaint averred that the defendant had purchased from the plaintiff automobile accessories worth $478.14, installed them upon an automobile truck described in the complaint, failed to pay the purchase price, and that the plaintiff had filed a claim for lien in the office of the county clerk of Clatsop County. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction "of the subject of the action" and that the complaint did not "state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." After the demurrer had been overruled, the defendant refused to plead further and the court entered a decree which granted the plaintiff judgment for $478.14, an attorney fee and ordered the foreclosure of the lien. The defendant appealed. The decision of this court said:
The court held the lien invalid because, although the applicable statute required the lien notice to be filed *31 in the county in which the labor and materials were expended, the complaint did not allege that the labor and materials were furnished in Clatsop County, that being the county in which the lien notice was filed. Then the decision said:
Having reached that conclusion, the court was confronted with the problem as to whether the suit should be dismissed. It said:
Although the lien was held invalid, the proceeding was not dismissed. The author of the opinion, Chief Justice *32 BURNETT, believed that the judgment should be affirmed, but the other members of the court who heard the appeal felt that, since the proceeding was deemed in the Circuit Court as a suit in equity, the defendant, that is, the appellant, had not had an opportunity to try it as an action at law. Accordingly, the decree was vacated and the cause was remanded for trial as an action at law.
In Brakebush v. Aasen, 126 Or. 1, 267 P. 1035, the plaintiff was a logger who brought suit, not only for himself but also for twelve assignors, all of whom claimed that wages which they had earned in the production of logs remained unpaid. The prayer sought judgment for the wages, the establishment of a lien and the foreclosure of the latter. The employer had become insolvent and the defendant was the receiver of the employer's assets. After demurrer to the complaint had been overruled and the defendant had refused to plead further, the defendant was adjudged in default, but, before entering a decree, the Circuit Court heard testimony, at the close of which it awarded the plaintiff judgment for $2,140.20, the foreclosure of the lien, an allowance of $350 as compensation for plaintiff's attorney and a further allowance of $143, cost of the preparation of the lien notice. Because the lien notice described land which did not exist, this court held the lien invalid. After it had done so, the court took notice of the 1917 amendment and, finding that the complaint stated a good cause of action for wages earned, affirmed the judgment for the amount of the wages, but eliminated the attorneys' fees and costs of preparation of the lien notices. The decision pointed out that the defendant's only defense was based upon the invalidity of the lien and that the defendant had *33 not controverted the averments concerning the labor performed by the workmen and the failure of the employer to have made payment. In other words, the suit presented no issue concerning the amount awarded by the judgment.
Johnson v. Shasta View Lumber Co., 129 Or. 469, 278 P. 588, was concerned with a suit for the foreclosure of a timber owner's lien upon lumber manufactured from logs cut from his land. (See § 67-1303, O.C.L.A.). The plaintiff was the timberland owner; the defendant, Shasta View Lumber Company, was the manufacturer of the lumber upon which the lien was sought, and two other defendants were creditors of the Shasta View Company who sought to have the court declare unconstitutional § 67-1303 thereby defeating the alleged lien. The Shasta View Company demurred to the complaint and after the demurrer was overruled refused to plead further. Thereupon judgment and decree were rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the Shasta View Company. From that decree the two defendants, whom we have described as creditors of the Shasta View Company, appealed. Upon their failure to serve notice of appeal upon the Shasta View Company, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal. In sustaining the motion, this court, in referring to the plaintiffs, that is, the lien claimants, said:
*34 We interrupt the quotation to call attention to the sentence just quoted. Going on, the decision said:
In Van Lydegraf v. Tyler, 128 Or. 236, 271 P. 740, 273 P. 719, and Dimitre Electric Co. v. Paget, 175 Or. 72, 151 P.2d 630, the briefs of the appellants, who were the owners, contained no assignment of error which attacked the amount awarded the lien claimant for the work which he had performed and the materials which he had supplied. The attacks were confined to the validity of the liens. The Van Lydegraf decision, after holding that the evidence failed to establish the lien, vacated the part of the decree which ordered the foreclosure of the lien and then, after stripping from the judgment all sums which arose out of the lien, such as the attorney fee, the sum paid for filing the purported lien notice and the sum allowed for preparing the lien notice, affirmed the part of the judgment which represented the value of the plaintiff's work and materials. The Dimitre Electric Company decision held the lien invalid because the claimant had lumped in its lien notice, which described twenty houses, the amounts which it had earned under separate contracts for its services upon each of the houses. After *35 it had vacated the decree of foreclosure, it took the same course in regard to the judgment as in the Van Lydegraf decision.
7. The above will suffice as a review of our former decisions. We think it is manifest that § 9-102, O.C.L.A., prohibits the dismissal of a suit on account of a plaintiff's inability to establish an alleged lien if the complaint, in addition to averring the lien and praying for its foreclosure, states a good cause of action for labor performed or materials supplied. If the sum for which judgment is sought is free from dispute, judgment for that amount may be entered even though the plaintiff fails to prove his lien or the court holds it invalid. If the value of the labor or materials was in controversy but the defendant waived trial by jury, the court may enter judgment for the proper amount. If trial by jury was not waived and the value of the labor or materials was controverted, the cause should be transferred to the law side of the court.
8. We think it is clear that it is not the duty of this court to enter an order for the dismissal of this suit. The invalidity of the lien and the consequent failure of the plaintiff to have established a basis for equitable relief does not warrant the dismissal of his cause. He alleged, and, according to the report of the referee as approved by the Circuit Court, proved a good cause of action. Accordingly, we reject the first assignment of error as lacking in merit.
We quoted in a preceding paragraph all of the five assignments of error. The remaining four, so far as they call for an expression of our views, can be considered jointly.
9. We pointed out that the parties joined in a stipulation that this cause should be tried by a referee and *36 that the order of reference bears the approving signature of counsel for both plaintiff and defendant. The stipulation and the order of reference were fully warranted: §§ 5-601 to and including 5-612 and § 9-202, O.C.L.A. As is evident from those sections of our laws, referees may be appointed in law actions as well as in equity suits. We have mentioned the fact that the referee's findings were adopted by the Circuit Court and that the attacked judgment is based upon those findings. Since the judgment is challenged, the question presents itself: Should we deem the findings as those of a chancellor, and thereby give them only an advisory effect, or should we deem them the findings of a law court and yield to them the controlling effect of a jury's verdict.
According to the order of reference, there was assigned to the referee "the above entitled cause." "Cause" is the word which was employed in the order of reference. It was used more than once. Neither the word "action" nor the word "suit" appears in that order. Frequently the words "cause" and "case" are used synonymously. It seems reasonable to infer that the word "cause" was selected in order to make it clear that the entire controversy was assigned to the referee.
10. A referee, unless his powers are restricted by the order of reference, is authorized to (1) rule upon the admissibility of evidence, (2) pass upon motions for the amendment of the pleadings, (3) prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (4) resolve all other procedural issues that arise in the course of the trial. The referee performs the same duties that the judge of the court would have performed had he not made *37 the order of reference: § 5-608, O.C.L.A., and 45 Am. Jur., Reference, § 22, p. 558.
11-13. When a party stipulates for a trial before a referee, he does not irretrievably commit himself to the findings which the referee may enter. Our statutes afford him the privilege of presenting to the Circuit Court objections to the referee's rulings and findings. Section 5-612, O.C.L.A., says:
In a law action the findings, both in the Circuit Court and this court, are deemed tantamount to the verdict of a jury: Tribou v. Strowbridge, 7 Or. 156, and Shell Company of California v. O'Reilly, 121 Or. 215, 253 P. 1046. But in equity suits the report is merely advisory, and, upon appeal, it is the duty of this court to try the suit de novo, notwithstanding the referee's findings: O'Leary v. Fargher, 11 Or. 225, 4 P. 330, and Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Or. 354, 45 P. 904.
In presenting its argument in behalf of the four remaining assignments of error, which we are considering jointly, the defendant in several instances, argues that the findings of fact erroneously resolved fact issues which governed the award and size of the judgment. For instance, the defendant's brief contains statements such as: "No recovery for defective workmanship. * * * The court erred in refusing to give judgment to appellant on its counterclaim." Those propositions, which are based upon the defendant's disagreement with the findings of fact, demand that we determine whether findings pertaining to an award of judgment, after it developed in the trial that the *38 plaintiff was entitled to no equitable relief, are controlling or are merely advisory. It is well to take note of the procedure to which the defendant resorted in the Circuit Court after the referee had filed his report.
When the referee's report was submitted to the Circuit Court, the defendant filed a paper which it termed a motion. The latter not only sought dismissal of the suit for reasons expressed in the motion, but also presented a series of objections to the referee's findings. The motion to dismiss was based in part upon "the ground that included in said alleged mechanic's lien were and are unsegregated nonlienable items for which liens cannot be claimed under the laws of Oregon." As we have held, the lien is invalid because it contained in unsegregational forms lienable and nonlienable items. Both the referee and the Circuit Court should have held it invalid. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's motion deemed the lien invalid, it did not ask that the cause be transferred to the law side of the court and that it be tried from there on as a law action. We add that after defendant had become satisfied from the evidence that the lien was invalid, it did not object to the jurisdiction of equity over the remaining phases of the controversy.
14. Possibly the defendant's failure to move for a transfer to the law side of the court was due to a belief that when equity has once taken hold of a controversy, it retains jurisdiction and grants legal relief even though the plaintiff wholly failed to establish any basis for equitable jurisdiction. This court, however, held in Oregon Growers' Co-operative Association v. Riddle, 116 Or. 562, 241 P. 1011:
*39 In Multnomah County v. Portland Cracker Co., 49 Or. 345, 90 P. 155, that rule was applied in the following manner:
In the present instance, the plaintiff alleged a basis for equity jurisdiction, but failed to prove it.
Thus, although the defendant could have embraced the procedure authorized by § 9-102, O.C.L.A., as construed and applied in decisions such as McCann v. Oregon Scenic Trips Co., supra, it did not do so. It made no motion to transfer to the law side. To the contrary, the motion filed by the defendant said:
15. Thus, we see that when the referee's report was pending for disposition before the Circuit Court, the defendant, although contending that the lien was invalid, with the consequent unmentioned result that equity had no jurisdiction over the cause, did not ask the chancellor to vacate the bench, but requested him to determine the merits of plaintiff's demand for judgment. In short, the defendant, far from objecting to equity's jurisdiction over the demand for judgment, consented to it by affirmatively praying that the chancellor determine the condition of indebtedness between the parties.
The situation just mentioned renders apt the following words which were spoken in Hansen v. Bogan, 127 Or. 399, 272 P. 668:
From Oldenburg v. Claggett, 142 Or. 238, 20 P.2d 234, we take the following:
16. A party who wishes to contend, upon appeal, that equity had no jurisdiction to render the decree which he attacks, must make timely objections in the *42 trial court unless the subject is wholly outside of equity's jurisdiction. In the absence of such objections, he will be deemed to have waived them: Buckman v. Hill Military Academy, 190 Or. 194, 223 P.2d 172; Lewis v. Shook and Lee et al., 185 Or. 67, 201 P.2d 908; Buckman v. Hill Military Academy, 182 Or. 621, 189 P.2d 575; Mogul Transportation Co. v. Larison, 181 Or. 252, 181 P.2d 139; and 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 88, p. 451. As we have shown, no objection was made to the jurisdiction which the chancellor was exercising.
17. The cause was tried in the very manner that the defendant voluntarily chose. The defendant joined in the stipulation for trial before a referee. The challenged findings are those of the tribunal which was appointed in accordance with the defendant's wishes. Had the cause been transferred to the law side of the court when it developed that the lien was invalid, the same individual would have continued upon the bench. Even the nomenclature by which he and his tribunal were designated would not have been changed. It will be perceived by reverting to the defendant's objections to the referee's findings of fact that the defendant did not ask for a retrial of the cause, but only for a change in the amounts awarded to the plaintiff. Since the defendant had stipulated for trial by referee, it was not entitled to some other form of trial, such as trial by jury.
18. In view of the fact that the parties deemed that the proceeding was on the equity side of the court, and in view of the further fact that both parties by affirmative action asked the chancellor to determine all issues, we shall deem the challenged findings as those of an equity court. We will regard them, not as controlling, but as advisory.
*43 We have read the entire transcript of evidence with care and have bestowed similar attention upon the numerous exhibits. To set forth herein our analysis of the testimony and of the extensive exhibits introduced by the parties would greatly prolong this opinion. We shall content ourselves with the statement that it is our conviction that all issues of fact were correctly resolved by the referee. We adopt his findings, bearing as they do the approval of the Circuit Court, as our own.
19. In arguing the third assignment of error, the defendant urges that the judgment is too large. It contends that, notwithstanding the plaintiff "was not entitled to recover for extra items not authorized in writing," the attacked judgment contains awards for extra items for which the defendant gave no written authority. A preceding paragraph of this opinion quotes the section of the contract signed by the plaintiff and the defendant upon which the defendant's argument is based. The judgment includes no award for any extra work performed by the plaintiff's workmen which was not authorized in the prescribed manner, but it includes awards for work performed and material supplied by plumbers, painters and electrical contractors not in response to the plans and specifications and which were not authorized in writing. The defendant itself chose those contractors and itself directed them what to do. In many instances officials of the defendant stood over the plumbers, electricians, etc., and supervised them in the performance of their labors. The contract between the plaintiff and the defendant subjected those contractors to the plaintiff's general supervision so that all of the work would co-ordinate, conform to a schedule and proceed expeditiously. The *44 plaintiff was the common paymaster and keeper of accounts. As we have seen, he was paid by the defendant on a cost-plus basis. There is no contention that any work was performed or any material delivered for which the defendant did not, in fact, give orders. It is our belief that the provision of the contract upon which the defendant relies did not govern those extra items: Pippy v. Winslow, 62 Or. 219, 125 P. 298.
The above, we believe, disposes of every issue which requires a statement of our views. It follows from the foregoing that the decree of the Circuit Court must be vacated. It also follows that the judgment for the value of the labor and materials is without error. All sums allowed for the preparation of the lien notice, the filing of the lien and compensation for the plaintiff's attorney must be disallowed. The amount allowed as compensation for the referee is approved. The defendant (appellant) is entitled to costs and disbursements.
The cause is remanded to the Circuit Court with instructions to enter a judgment in harmony with the above.
[*]  Chief Justice when this case was argued.
[]  Chief Justice when this opinion was rendered.