Title: Alack v. Phelps
Citation: 230 So. 2d 789
Docket Number: 45531
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 1970

230 So. 2d 789 (1970) Sam ALACK, Virgil Hamilton, Admr. of the Estate of John B. Phelps, Dec'd and Virgil Hamilton, Guardian of Janet Carol Phelps, a Minor v. Thelma M. PHELPS, Guardian of Ronny Gene Phelps and Johnny Eugene Phelps, Minors. No. 45531. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 26, 1970. Lipscomb, Barksdale, Steen &amp; Caraway, Jackson, for appellants. Phillips &amp; White, Magnolia, for appellee. *790 ROBERTSON, Justice. An interlocutory appeal was granted by the Chancery Court of Pike County, Mississippi, so that a final answer could be made to the question of whether minor children of a deceased natural father, who were adopted by others, would inherit from their natural father. Another question to be answered is whether these adopted children, through their guardian, have a right to bring suit under the wrongful death statute for the death of their father, where suit was brought by the administrator of the father's estate and settled before trial, the proceeds of the settlement being paid to the guardian of a minor child of a second marriage of the natural father. The chancery court overruled a plea in bar interposed by appellant, Sam Alack, which plea set up the adoption of the twin boys by their paternal grandparents, and also asserted that a full settlement had been made and the suit of the administrator brought under the wrongful death statute dismissed. On July 20, 1967, John B. Phelps was killed in a head-on collision with Sam Alack. Phelps was 26 years of age at the time of his death. His second wife, Linda, died later of injuries suffered in this accident. His 2 year old daughter, Janet Carol Phelps, a child of the second marriage, was also injured in this accident. Virgil Hamilton, Administrator of the Estate of John B. Phelps, and also Guardian of Janet Carol Phelps, brought suit against Sam Alack for the wrongful death of John B. Phelps. The suit was transferred to Federal District Court because Alack was a resident citizen of Louisiana. The Chancery Court of Pike County in approving a compromise settlement of $40,000, also found that "Janet Carol Phelps is the sole wrongful death beneficiary of John B. Phelps," and directed the guardian to deposit the $40,000 in his guardianship account. The chancery court authorized the guardian to dismiss with prejudice *791 the Federal District Court suit, and this was done by order entered on the minutes. Thelma M. Phelps, the paternal grandmother and the adoptive mother, was appointed guardian of Ronny Gene Phelps and Johnny Eugene Phelps, twin boys born on August 10, 1961, to John B. Phelps and his first wife, Nola Phelps. The mother died when these children were born. The little boys and their father continued to live with the grandparents and when they were about 13 months old, at the insistence of their father, and upon his promise to help support them, the grandparents, C.E. Phelps and his wife, Thelma M. Phelps, adopted their two grandsons. The Decree of Adoption, dated September 21, 1962, tracked Section 1269-06, Misissippi Code of 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1968) and among other things, provided: Having been authorized by the chancery court so to do, Thelma M. Phelps, as Guardian of Ronny Gene Phelps and Johnny Eugene Phelps, Minors, brought suit against Sam Alack, Virgil Hamilton, Administrator of the Estate of John B. Phelps, deceased, and Virgil Hamilton, Guardian of Janet Carol Phelps, a Minor. Hamilton, as Administrator and Guardian, answered that by virtue of the adoption of Ronny and Johnny Phelps that under Section 1453, the wrongful death statute, they were no longer heirs of their deceased natural father. Alack interposed the same defenses by way of special plea, and also asserted that the $40,000 settlement was a full, fair and reasonable settlement, that said monies are in the guardian's account and are subject to proportionate distribution to these two minors, if the Court should hold that they are heirs of their deceased father. The guardian of Ronny and Johnny Phelps answered that the adoption of Ronny and Johnny Phelps was at the sole insistence and instigation of their father, John B. Phelps, and upon his promise to aid and assist in every way possible in their rearing, support, maintenance and education. The guardian further answered that the chancellor hearing the adoption proceeding knew that C.E. Phelps had heart trouble and exacted the same promise of John B. Phelps, the father of said children, at the hearing. The guardian charged collusion and conspiracy between Alack and Hamilton, Administrator and Guardian. Guardian Phelps also contended that the alleged settlement on its face covered only the one claim of Janet Carol Phelps, the minor child of John B. Phelps by his second marriage. The chancellor heard the special plea in bar separately and ruled that Ronny and Johnny Phelps, even though adopted by their paternal grandparents, were still entitled to inherit from their natural father, and were not foreclosed from asserting *792 their rights under the wrongful death statute. Sam Alack appealed. Adoption is purely a creature of statute; it was unknown at common law. 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption section 2 page 861 (1962) expresses it in this way: Section 1269-06, Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1968), sets forth what the final decree of adoption shall contain and the effect of such a decree: Mississippi early reached the decision that, in the absence of express statutory prohibition, the adopted child will inherit from both the natural and adoptive parents. In Sledge et al. v. Floyd, 139 Miss. 398, 104 So. 163 (1925), the Court said: We have a maxim of equity that also enters the picture, "When parties are *793 disabled equity will act for them." Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice 2d Ed., section 34, page 37 (1950). Children are under the disability of minority and cannot act for themselves. The equity court will protect their rights. While the effect of a final decree of adoption is that the natural parent or parents will not inherit by or through the child, and all parental rights are terminated, Mississippi's adoption law does not state in any shape, form or fashion that the right of the child to inherit from its natural parents is terminated. We think the intent of the legislature is clear; they intended for the child to continue to inherit from his or her natural parents. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Children § 63(c) page 454 (1936) succinctly states the applicable law in this way: There is no express legislative declaration to that effect in Mississippi's adoption law. Does the bringing of an action under the wrongful death statute by the Administrator of the Estate of John B. Phelps, deceased, which action was compromised and settled solely for the benefit of the minor child of the second marriage, bar the guardian of Ronny and Johnny Phelps, minors, from bringing action in their behalf? We think not. Section 1453, Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1968) provides, in part: Ronny and Johnny Phelps are interested parties; yet they were not made parties, and their interests and damages to them, were admittedly not considered in the settlement of the action brought. Was this suit decided on the merits? We think not. A jury did not determine what damages were just and due to all the parties interested. This action was settled without trial. This question was posed in the early case of Sudberry v. Meridian Fertilizer Factory, 106 Miss. 744, 64 So. 723 (1914). The *794 language of the wrongful death statute in 1914 was essentially the same as it is today. In Sudberry, the Court had this to say: A case of actual fraud was presented to this Court in Keanum v. Southern Railway Co., 151 Miss. 784, 119 So. 301 (1928). In Keanum, it was contended that a prior settlement would bar a subsequent suit. The Court thus answered this argument: We do not intend to say, and we do not say, that suits cannot be compromised and settled without a trial. We do say that such settlement must be bona fide, and that the rights of, and damages to, all interested parties must be considered and settled. Since the rights of these two little boys were not considered, and the damages to them determined, the settlement made does not bar them from asserting their rights and having their day in court. The judgment of the chancery court in overruling the plea in bar is affirmed, and this cause remanded for further hearing. Affirmed and remanded. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and PATTERSON, INZER and SMITH, JJ., concur.