Title: People v. Savory
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88786
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2001

Docket No. 88786-Agenda 12-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								JOHNNY LEE SAVORY, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Johnny Lee Savory, filed a motion in the
circuit court of Peoria County pursuant to section 116-3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West
1998)), in which he sought to obtain scientific testing of certain
evidence introduced at his murder trial 20 years ago. The circuit
court denied defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed.
309 Ill. App. 3d 408. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	The offenses for which defendant was convicted occurred in
Peoria on January 18, 1977. The victims, Connie Cooper, 19 years
old, and her brother, James Robinson, 14 years old, were found
murdered in their home. They had been stabbed repeatedly, and
there were no signs of forced entry to the residence. Defendant,
also 14, was a friend of James and was known to have been at the
house the night before the offenses. Defendant was questioned by
police a week after the victims' bodies were discovered. After
making several exculpatory statements concerning his activities on
January 17 and 18, 1977, defendant eventually confessed to the
crimes.
	Defendant was convicted of the two murders following a jury
trial in 1977. On appeal, the appellate court concluded that
defendant's confession was inadmissible and reversed the
convictions. People v. Savory, 82 Ill. App. 3d 767 (1980). The
cause was remanded for a new trial, which was conducted in 1981,
following a change of venue to Lake County.
	At defendant's second trial, the State introduced evidence of
certain admissions made by defendant to several of his friends on
the day of the offenses. One of these friends, Ella Ivy, testified that
defendant made inculpatory statements before 4:30 p.m., the time
the victims' bodies were discovered. Ella stated that, at
approximately 2:30 p.m. on January 18, defendant told her that he
and James Robinson had been playing karate and that he had
accidentally cut James. Ella also testified that she saw defendant
again a little more than an hour later, around 4 p.m., and that he
told her that Robinson and his sister were dead. That night,
defendant told Ella that he was planning to take flowers to the
victims' mother, and Ella saw a knife fall out of defendant's
wallet.
Ella's brother, Frankie Ivy, testified that, at approximately 8 p.m.
on January 18, defendant said that he had accidentally stabbed
James Robinson and his sister.
	Tina Ivy, sister of Ella and Frankie, testified that, at
approximately 7 p.m. on January 18, defendant told her that "two
kids had got killed." Defendant also told her that he and Robinson
had been practicing karate earlier that day and that he had
accidentally cut Robinson. Tina further testified about a
conversation she had with defendant the day after the murders, on
January 19. On that occasion, defendant told her that whoever
committed the offenses must have known the victims, because the
family dog, a German shepherd, would not have allowed a stranger
in the house. Defendant also told Tina that the victims had been
brutally stabbed.
	At the second trial, the State also introduced evidence of
statements that defendant made to police prior to making his
inadmissible confession. In these statements, defendant said that,
on January 17, the night before the victims were killed, he and
James had prepared cooked corn and hot dogs in the kitchen and
had played karate games in the living room. Defendant also said
that they had moved the television set to the floor so that it would
not get knocked over during their play. The State argued that the
contents of these statements revealed a knowledge of the crime
scene that only the offender would have had, and that what
defendant said occurred on the evening of January 17 actually took
place on January 18 and resulted in the deaths of the two victims.
The State supported this argument with testimony from the
victims' mother and stepfather. This testimony showed that James
and the defendant had not eaten anything during the defendant's
visit on the evening of January 17. The testimony also showed
that, when the victims' mother and stepfather left for work on the
morning of January 18, the kitchen was clean and the television set
was in its customary place on a stand. The victims' mother further
stated that she prepared corn and hot dogs for the children that
morning and left the food on the stove for them. The parents
returned home at approximately 4:30 p.m. and discovered the
victims' bodies. At that time, the kitchen was in disarray and the
television set was on the living room floor.
	The State also presented physical evidence connecting
defendant to the offenses, including evidence that hairs consistent
with defendant's were found in the bathroom sink and tub, that a
knife from defendant's home had blood on it, and that a bloodstain
found on a pair of trousers recovered from the defendant's home
was of the same blood type as Connie Cooper's.
	Defendant presented evidence of an alibi and also attempted
to show that the victims' stepfather and former boyfriends of
Connie might have committed the crimes. Regarding the
bloodstained trousers, defendant's father testified that they
belonged to him, and that the bloodstain was from a cut he had
received on his leg.
	At the conclusion of the second trial, a jury again found
defendant guilty of the murders of Connie Cooper and James
Robinson. The trial judge later sentenced defendant to concurrent,
indeterminate sentences of 40 to 80 years' imprisonment for the
two offenses. Defendant's convictions and sentences were
affirmed on appeal. People v. Savory, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1023
(1982). Defendant's subsequent post-conviction petitions, which
included his claim that Tina and Frankie had purportedly recanted
their testimony, were denied. His request for habeas corpus relief
was also denied. No. 3-84-0008 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23); No. 3-90-0059 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23); Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011
(7th Cir. 1987).
	Defendant initiated the present proceeding in 1998 by filing
a motion in the circuit court of Peoria County pursuant to section
116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
5/116-3 (West 1998)). Section 116-3 allows a defendant to have
physical evidence subjected to scientific testing that was not
available at the time of trial if certain requirements are met. To
obtain testing, a defendant must present a prima facie case that
identity was the issue at his trial and that the evidence to be tested
has been under a secure chain of custody. Testing is permitted if,
among other requirements, "the result of the testing has the
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence
materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual
innocence." 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1) (West 1998).
	In the present case, defendant's motion requested that DNA
testing be performed on the bloodstained trousers that the State
contended defendant had been wearing at the time of the offenses.
Defendant maintained that he is innocent of the murders. He
alleged that the test results would show that the blood did not
match that of Connie Cooper, and would thus eliminate one of the
pieces of physical evidence introduced by the State at trial. The
motion also requested testing of material found under Connie
Cooper's fingernails(1)
	After a hearing, the circuit court denied defendant's motion.
With respect to the bloodstained trousers, the court concluded that
defendant had satisfied the first two requirements of the statute,
namely, that identity was the issue at his trial, and that the
evidence had been subject to a sufficient chain of custody. The
court determined, however, that the test results would not be
materially relevant to defendant's assertion of actual innocence.
After reviewing the transcript of defendant's second trial, as well
as the various opinions rendered in the different proceedings, the
judge concluded that, even if DNA testing of the blood on the
trousers showed that it was not Connie Cooper's, that evidence
would not significantly affect the State's case. Therefore, the
blood evidence was not materially relevant to defendant's claim of
actual innocence.
	With one justice dissenting, the appellate court affirmed the
circuit court judgment, though on different grounds. 309 Ill. App.
3d 408. The appellate court concluded that the remedy provided by
section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is available only
in cases where the proposed scientific testing will, by itself,
completely vindicate a defendant. The appellate court determined
that in this case, even a test result favorable to defendant could not
completely vindicate him, because a favorable test result would
still be consistent with a conclusion of guilt.
	The dissenting justice disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the statute, finding it too narrow. 309 Ill. App. 3d
at 416-17 (Holdridge, P.J., dissenting).
	We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
	As a preliminary matter, the State argues that this court does
not have jurisdiction over the present appeal. The State contends
that there is no avenue of appeal for a defendant from an adverse
ruling on a motion for testing under section 116-3. We disagree.
Article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution provides, in
pertinent part:
			"Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a
matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial
District in which the Circuit Court is located except in
cases appealable directly to the Supreme Court ***. The
Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the
Appellate Court from other than final judgments of 
Circuit Courts." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6.
Supreme Court Rule 603 provides:
			"Appeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the
United States or of this State has been held invalid and
appeals by defendants from judgments of the circuit
courts imposing sentence of death shall lie directly to the
Supreme Court as a matter of right. All other appeals in
criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court." 134
Ill. 2d R. 603.
Supreme Court Rule 2(b)(2) states that the term " '[j]udgment'
also includes decree, determination, decision, order, or portion
thereof." 134 Ill. 2d R. 2(b)(2). An order of the circuit court
denying a defendant's motion for testing pursuant to section 116-3
of the Code of Criminal Procedure disposes of the defendant's
request for relief under that provision. The motion seeks to initiate
a separate proceeding, independent of any claim for post-conviction or other relief. Thus, denial of a motion requesting
relief under section 116-3 is a judgment-or decree, determination,
decision, or order, as our Rule 2(b)(2) provides-that finally
disposes of the defendant's claim. Thus, the denial of defendant's
motion by the circuit court in the present case was a final
judgment, and the appellate court possessed jurisdiction over the
defendant's appeal from the adverse ruling.
	We now turn to the merits of defendant's appeal. Defendant
contends that the appellate and circuit courts erred in denying his
motion for scientific testing pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998).
Defendant maintains that he fulfilled the prerequisites of the
statute and that the present cause should therefore be remanded so
that the bloodstain on the trousers can be subjected to DNA
testing.
	Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
provides:
			"(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial
court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her
case for the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA
testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial
which resulted in his or her conviction, but which was not
subject to the testing which is now requested because the
technology for the testing was not available at the time of
trial. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served
upon the State.
			(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:
				(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted
in his or her conviction; and
				(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a
chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not
been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in
any material aspect.
			(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under
reasonable conditions designed to protect the State's
interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing
process upon a determination that:
				(1) the result of the testing has the scientific
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence
materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual
innocence;
				(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method
generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community." 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998).
	The appellate court determined that forensic testing under
section 116-3 should be permitted only when a result favorable to
the defendant will, by itself, vindicate the defendant. Defendant
argues that the appellate court's interpretation of section 116-3
incorrectly restricts the operation of the statute. According to
defendant, the phrase "the result of the testing has the scientific
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially
relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence" shows
that section 116-3 does not limit testing to cases in which a result
favorable to the defense will, by itself, vindicate the defendant
who is requesting the test. Defendant further contends that, under
the appellate court's interpretation of section 116-3, the statute
can be used only in cases in which a lone offender leaves blood,
semen or other physical evidence at the scene, because only in
those cases would a test result of the physical evidence that was
favorable to the defense result in complete vindication of the
defendant. According to defendant, if the case involved multiple
defendants, or if it was claimed, as in this case, that evidence from
the victim was left on the defendant, then testing could not
completely exonerate the defendant. Defendant contends that such
a limited application of the statute is improper.
	The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Pullen,
192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000); Michigan Avenue National Bank v.
County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The language
used by the legislature is the best indicator of legislative intent,
and thus our inquiry appropriately begins with the statutory text.
In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000); Business &amp; Professional People
for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 146 Ill. 2d 175, 207 (1991). The statutory language must be given its plain
and ordinary meaning, and when the terms used by the legislature
are clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to other
aids of construction. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d 
at 504; Henry v. St. John's Hospital, 138 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1990).
We conclude that an examination of the language in section 116-3
reveals that it does not contain the restriction the appellate court
imposed on it.
	At issue here is the requirement of section 116-3(c)(1) that
"the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce
new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the
defendant's assertion of actual innocence." Relevant evidence is
"[e]vidence tending to prove or disprove a matter in issue."
Black's Law Dictionary 579 (7th ed. 1999). The term "materially"
modifies the term "relevant" and means "to a significant extent or
degree." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1392
(1993). Thus, evidence which is "materially relevant" to a
defendant's claim of actual innocence is simply evidence which
tends to significantly advance that claim. The language used by the
legislature in section 116-3 does not support the appellate court's
restrictive interpretation of the statutory requirements. As our
appellate court has noted in other cases involving section 116-3,
if the legislature had intended to limit application of the statute to
the instances in which a test result favorable to the defendant
would, standing alone, lead to his complete vindication, it would
have chosen a different way of expressing the statutory
requirements. See People v. Hockenberry, 316 Ill. App. 3d 752,
758-59 (2000); People v. Rokita, 316 Ill. App. 3d 292, 301-02
(2000).
	The State contends, however, that its proposed interpretation
of the statute, limiting the statute's scope to tests that would
completely vindicate the defendant seeking them, is consistent
with the legislative history of the provision. The State points to
comments made by one of the legislation's sponsors during
debates on the bill that eventually became section 116-3.
Discussing the requirements of the statute, one senator explained,
"The testing will then be-will then be ordered if-if the evidence
would basically result in the person being absolutely acquitted of
the evidence [sic]." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
May 9, 1997, at 106-07 (statements of Senator Petka). While we
agree that testing is available in the circumstances referred to by
the senator, we cannot agree that the language used by the
legislature limits the availability of the special remedy found in
section 116-3 to those circumstances. As we have noted, the
language of the statute does not support such a restricted
interpretation. Accordingly, we hold that section 116-3 is not
limited to situations in which scientific testing of a certain piece
of evidence would completely exonerate a defendant.
	It remains for us to decide whether the evidence at issue in
this case is "materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of
actual innocence," as section 116-3 requires. That question cannot
be determined in the abstract. Rather, it requires a consideration of
the evidence introduced at trial, as well as an assessment of the
evidence defendant is seeking to test.
	We hold that the evidence defendant seeks to test is not
"materially relevant" to his claim of actual innocence. We have
carefully reviewed the transcript of defendant's second trial,
conducted in 1981, which resulted in the convictions he now
challenges. Our examination of the record shows that the
testimony regarding the possible source of the bloodstain on the
pair of trousers was only a minor part of the State's evidence in
this case. A far greater portion of the State's case consisted of
defendant's knowledge of certain features of the crime scene, such
as the type of food prepared in the kitchen that day and the
placement of the television set, which only the offender could have
known, and of defendant's statements to Ella, Frankie, and Tina
Ivy that he had been at the victims' home the day of the murders
and had cut one or both of the victims. Of particular significance
in this regard was defendant's admission to Ella Ivy, made during
the afternoon of January 18, prior to the discovery of the crimes,
that the two victims were dead. The State's closing argument
concentrated on these aspects of the case. Notably, it was not until
rebuttal argument that the prosecution mentioned the evidence
regarding the bloodstained trousers. As the circuit court noted
when it denied defendant's motion for DNA testing, the bloodstain
evidence was essentially a collateral issue at trial and was not
central to the State's evidence of guilt. Under these circumstances,
a test result favorable to defendant would not significantly advance
his claim of actual innocence, but would only exclude one
relatively minor item from the evidence of guilt marshaled against
him by the State.
	Arguing that the blood evidence played a more significant role
in his conviction, defendant cites two passages from the State's
rebuttal argument at the conclusion of the trial, in which the
prosecutor referred to the bloodstained trousers as evidence of
defendant's guilt. These comments, however, were made only in
response to defendant's own closing argument, in which defense
counsel cited defense evidence showing that the trousers belonged
to defendant's father and had become bloody when the father
injured his leg. Rather than demonstrating the importance of the
evidence of the bloodstained trousers, the State's rebuttal
argument establishes its relative insignificance. That the
prosecutor waited until rebuttal to refer to the match between
Connie Cooper's blood type and the blood type found on the
trousers further indicates that the trousers were only a minor part
of the State's array of evidence against defendant. This assessment
is borne out by a review of the record, which as we have noted,
contains stronger evidence of defendant's guilt than the
bloodstained trousers. This evidence includes defendant's
inculpatory comments made to several friends only hours after the
murders occurred, as well as statements made by defendant to
police in which defendant revealed a knowledge of the crime scene
that only the offender could have had.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,
affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County, is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
1.      1On appeal, defendant has abandoned this request.