Title: NELSON v IOWA MUTUAL INS CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12474
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 29, 1973

No. 12474 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1973 H. J. NELSON, iixecutor o f t h e E s t a t e of Nora Rennie, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, IGJA M U T U A L INSWNCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. . i p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Seventh J u d i c i a l District, Honorable L. C . Gulbrandson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Leonard H. Langen argued, Glasgow, Montana For Kespondent : Habedank, Cumming and Best, Sidney, Montana Otto T. Habedank argued, Sidney, Montana Submitted: September 25, 1973 Hon. Peter G. Meloy, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison, delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant, Iowa Mutual Insurance Company, appeals from a judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f , H. J. Nelson, Executor of the e s t a t e of Nora Rennie, deceased, rendered by the d i s t r i c t court of the seventh j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Richland County, i n an action involving the interpretation of medical pay provisions of a family automo- b i l e insurance policy. The f a c t s were stipulated. On a night i n November 1970, near Sidney, Montana, Nora Rennie was driving her c a r on a country road. The road was i c y and a high wind was producing a ground blizzard. The temperature was eight degrees below zero. The car slipped off the road, coming t o r e s t on a steep bank with the c a r ' s r i g h t side against a fence. She got out of the c a r , slipped, and s l i d underneath the car. She regained her f e e t , moved t o the r e a r of the car and f e l l again. She proceeded south behind the c a r and followed along the fence which was constructed of both barbed wire and sheep fence. For a short distance t o the south of the r e a r of her automobile, Nora Rennie l e f t a blood t r a i l i n the snow which may have come from a deep laceration on her l e f t leg. I n addition, she l e f t blood t r a i l s on the fence which she was handling with her bloody hands. She followed the fence f o r a distance of 269 f e e t , a f t e r crossing and recrossing the fence. She f e l l i n t o an i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h a t which time she may have fractured o r dislocated her ankle. She then began crawling back t o her c a r and was found about 143 f e e t behind t h e car. Death was caused by f r o s t b i t e and exposure a s a consequence of the injury t o the ankle, blood l o s s , shock and cold temperatures. The insurance coverage applicable here was: "TO pay a l l reasonable expenses + c Jc including funeral services. "To o r f o r the named insured and each r e l a t i v e who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death r e s u l t i n g there- from, hereinafter c a l l e d 'bodily i n j u r y ' , caused by accident, "(a) while occupying the owned automobile, > k * * I "Definitions. occupying1 means i n o r upon o r entering i n t o o r alighting from. 11 Under the policy the executor made a claim f o r funeral expenses of $1,625, which was refused. Suit was i n s t i t u t e d . The t r i a l judge concluded t h a t the language of the policy was ambiguous; was w r i t t e n by the defendant; and must be s t r i c t l y construed against the defendant who i s responsible f o r the am- biguity. Recovery of the $1,625 was allowed. Defendant specifies e r r o r on the part of the t r i a l court i n making i t s findings of f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment. The t h r u s t of defendant's contention i s t h a t there i s no ambiguity i n the language of the policy and it does not cover the s i t u a t i o n a s disclosed by the f a c t s stipulated. There i s no question but t h a t there was an accident when the c a r slipped off the road. There i s no question but t h a t there was some bodily injury. A s t o when the bodily injury occurred, the agreed statement of f a c t s merely conjectures. The immediate cause of death was exposure and f r o s t b i t e . Defendant contends the language of the policy i s c l e a r and s p e c i f i c a l l y provides t h a t coverage i s provided only when there i s bodily i n j u r y while occupying the c a r o r i n entering the c a r o r alighting from the c a r , and since there i s no proof of bodily i n j u r y while occupying, entering o r a l i g h t i n g from the vehicle there i s no coverage. It i s p l a i n t i f f ' s position t h a t the language of t h e policy i s ambiguous i n t h a t it may be read j u s t a s reasonably t h a t the 1 I "bodily injury" does not have t o occur while "occupying", entering", o r "alighting from" the c a r , but only t h a t the "accident'l occur within such limitations and t h a t any "bodily injury1' occurring t h e r e a f t e r i s covered a s long a s there i s a proximate cause between the accident and the injury. The accident occurred while the deceased was occupying the vehicle. The death occurred outside of the vehicle. Many courts have d e a l t with the meaning of the words "while i n o r upon, entering o r alighting from". From the numerous cases c i t e d by both p a r t i e s i t appears t h a t the courts do not give a l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the words but do include, within the meaning of the language, a c t s which a r e i n some reasonable manner connected with the use of the automobile, but not s t r i c t l y i n , upon, entering o r alighting from it. Defendant c i t e s Carta v. Providence Washington Indemnity Company, 143 Conn. 372, 122 A.2d 734, 736. While t h i s Court does not necessarily agree with the r e s u l t reached by t h a t court, the language used can provide a reasonable and workable r u l e of construction. The court said: "It i s not reasonable t o believe t h a t t h e parties intended the coverage t o end f o r one who gets both f e e t on the ground a f t e r emerging from the vehicle and, while then i n the a c t , l e t us say, of closing the door i s struck by a passing automobile. Some reasonable length of time must be allowed a person, a f t e r getting out, f o r the completion of a c t s which can reasonably be expected from those i n similar situations. " (Emphasis supplied) It i s a reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the policy language t o apply the r u l e of Carta t o the factual s i t u a t i o n here, where we have a c a r on a r u r a l road going i n t o a d i t c h a t night. Blizzard conditions prevailed. The temperature was eight degrees below zero. A high wind c h i l l f a c t o r was present. She expired because of the s i t u a t i o n i n which she was placed a s a r e s u l t of the accident. Under the f a c t s stipulated, the deceased's a c t i v i t i e s a f t e r the accident were s o l e l y directed t o e x t r i c a t i n g herself from the c a r t o a place of safety. Such a c t i v i t y was reasonably carried out and was reasonably connected with the operation of the vehicle. The t r i a l court found the language of the policy ambiguous and s t r i c t l y construed i t against the insurance company. The language i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y c l e a r a s t o whether the bodily i n j u r y must be while occupying, entering or alighting from the vehicle, o r whether it i s sufficient that the bodily injury occur while out of the vehicle a s i t apparently did i n the instant case. The policy language does not define the terms "entering" or "alighting" i n such manner a s w i l l encompass factual situations that of necessity w i l l arise. The language of the policy i s not sufficiently definitive of the l i m i t s of l i a b i l i t y and i s thus ambiguous. It i s the duty of the insurer t o l i m i t i t s l i a b i l i t y by clear and unambiguous language. I f it does not, then the language used by the insurer must be s t r i c t l y construed against it. Section 13-720, R.C.M. 1947. The judgment i s affirmed . Hon. Peter G. M ~ O ~ , D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g for Justice John Conway Harrison. hie£ Justice Justices. J