Title: Country Visions Cooperative v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP000960
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2021

2021 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP960 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Country Visions Cooperative, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company and United 
Cooperative, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 672,946 N.W.2d 169 
PDC No:2020 WI App 32 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 21, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 25, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Gary R. Sharpe   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a concurring opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner, 
there were briefs filed by David G. Peterson, J. Bushnell 
Nielsen, Bridget M. Hubing, Malinda J. Eskra, and Reinhart 
Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Waukesha. There was an oral argument by 
J. Bushnell Nielsen. 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants, there was 
a brief filed by Ryan J. Walsh, Amy C. Miller, and Eimer Stahl 
LLP, Madison; with whom on the brief was John C. O’Quinn, Megan 
M. Wold and Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, D.C.; with whom on 
 
 
2 
the brief was Michael B. Slade, Yates M. French, and Kirkland & 
Ellis LLP, Chicago, Illinois. There was an oral argument by Ryan 
J. Walsh. 
 
 
2021 WI 35 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP960 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV546) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Country Visions Cooperative, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company and United 
Cooperative, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants. 
FILED 
 
APR 21,2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Country Visions 
Cooperative v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 2020 WI App 32, 392 
Wis. 2d 672, 946 N.W.2d 169, affirming in part, reversing in 
part, and remanding with directions the Fond du Lac County 
circuit court's order1 granting Country Visions Cooperative 
("Country Visions") specific performance of its right of first 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Gary R. Sharpe presided. 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
2 
 
refusal to a property that Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. ("ADM") 
was attempting to sell to United Cooperative ("United").  This 
case requires us to determine whether the circuit court properly 
set the price at which Country Visions may exercise its right of 
first refusal.   
¶2 
"A right of first refusal is a contractual right to be 
first in line should the opportunity to purchase or lease a 
property arise."  MS Real Est. Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox 
Fam. Tr., 2015 WI 49, ¶24, 362 Wis. 2d 258, 864 N.W.2d 83.  
Country Visions held a right of first refusal to a parcel of 
property with a grain facility in Ripon, Wisconsin ("Ripon 
Property"), which ADM owned.  Unbeknownst to Country Visions, 
ADM entered into negotiations with United to sell the Ripon 
Property, along with three other parcels throughout Wisconsin.  
When Country Visions learned of these negotiations, Country 
Visions informed ADM of its right of first refusal.  In 
response, ADM and United attempted to sever the transaction into 
two separate transactions.  As part of this severance, one of 
the new transactions became an offer from United to ADM to 
purchase the Ripon Property alone for $20 million.  Country 
Visions did not match this purchase price, and ADM and United 
closed on their deal.   
¶3 
Country Visions brought this lawsuit against ADM and 
United (collectively, "Defendants") claiming that the $20 
million sale was a sham and sought specific performance of its 
right of first refusal at a lower price.  Specifically, Country 
Visions claims that Defendants artificially inflated the price 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
3 
 
to overcome Country Visions' right of first refusal.  The 
circuit court held a bench trial and concluded that the $20 
million sale of the Ripon Property was a sham.  As such, the 
circuit court determined that the price for the Ripon Property 
was actually $16.6 million and granted Country Visions 15 days 
to exercise its right of first refusal at that price.   
¶4 
Country Visions and Defendants cross-appealed the 
circuit court's decision to the court of appeals on a variety of 
issues.  The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded the case to the circuit court.  Country 
Visions, 392 Wis. 2d 672, ¶64.  As relevant to the issue before 
us——whether the circuit court properly set the price at which 
Country Visions may exercise its right of first refusal——the 
court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in 
how it determined the appropriate right of first refusal 
exercise price.  Id., ¶37.  Despite this conclusion, the court 
of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court to determine 
whether the $16.6 million exercise price included personal 
property, which the right of first refusal contract excluded 
from Country Visions' purchase rights.  Id., ¶43.   
¶5 
Country Visions petitioned this court seeking to set 
the exercise price at $7.7 million——the price that Country 
Visions' expert determined as the "fair market value" of the 
Ripon Property.2  Country Visions argued that we should do so 
                                                 
2 Neither Country Visions nor Defendants asked us to review 
any of the other determinations of the court of appeals. 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
4 
 
because the circuit court violated basic right of first refusal 
principles when it set the exercise price based on United's 
willingness to pay more than the appraised value of the Ripon 
Property.  We disagree.   
¶6 
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
considering the unique synergies that the Ripon Property 
provides to United when it set the exercise price higher than 
the appraised value.  For rights of first refusal, a prospective 
buyer may choose to offer significantly more than the appraised 
value of a property, especially in the context of a package 
deal.  Thus, depending on the terms of the right of first 
refusal contract and the facts of the case, a circuit court may 
set an exercise price that exceeds the appraised value of the 
burdened property.  However, we conclude that remand is 
necessary to determine whether the $16.6 million exercise price 
includes more than is called for in the right of first refusal 
contract.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision 
and remand to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
5 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
This case centers on a right of first refusal contract 
between Country Visions and ADM.3  The right of first refusal 
contract provides as follows: 
1. 
For a period of ten (10) years from the date 
hereof (the "ROF Period"), [ADM] hereby grants to 
[Country Visions] a right of first refusal to purchase 
the [Ripon Property] or applicable portion thereof, 
but only on the terms and conditions as provided in 
this Agreement.  During [the] ROF Period, [ADM] shall 
not sell, convey or in any way convey or transfer any 
part [of] the [Ripon Property] without first complying 
with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. 
If at any time during the ROF Period, [ADM] 
desires to sell any part of the [Ripon Property] to a 
party . . . , pursuant to a bona fide written offer 
from a third party (the "Third Party Offer"), [ADM] 
shall first notify [Country Visions] of [ADM's] desire 
to sell the [Ripon Property] or applicable portion 
thereof (the "Offered Property") and such notice (the 
                                                 
3 Country Visions and ADM were not the original parties to 
this contract.  Originally, Golden Grain, LLC and Agri-Land 
Co-op sold the Ripon Property to Olsen Brothers Enterprises, 
LLP.  As part of this deal, Olsen Brothers Enterprises granted 
to Golden Grain and Agri-Land Co-op a right of first refusal to 
the Ripon Property, which is the right of first refusal contract 
at issue in this case.   
After the right of first refusal contract was executed, 
Olsen Brothers Enterprises sold the Ripon Property to Paul and 
David Olsen individually, which did not trigger the right of 
first refusal.  Paul and David Olsen later filed for bankruptcy.  
As part of this bankruptcy, ADM purchased the Ripon Property.  
Golden Grain and Agri-Land Co-op, through a series of 
mergers and assignments, transferred their right in the right of 
first refusal agreement to Country Visions.  
Consequently, ADM became the owner of the Ripon Property, 
and Country Visions became the holder of the right of first 
refusal to the Ripon Property.  
No. 
2018AP960   
 
6 
 
"Notice") shall be deemed an offer to sell the Offered 
Property upon the terms set forth in the Third Party 
Offer.  The Notice shall identify the bona fide 
prospective purchaser of the Offered Property in 
addition to specifying the purchase price and other 
terms and conditions of such proposed sale (such price 
and other terms being referred to as "the Third Party 
Terms") and shall be accompanied by a copy of the 
Third Party Offer.  [Country Visions] shall have the 
right and option to purchase the Offered Property on 
the Third Party Terms but only if [Country Visions] 
shall provide written notice of such election to [ADM] 
within fifteen (15) days after [Country Visions'] 
receipt of the Notice. . . .   
The parties do not dispute that the right of first refusal 
contract outlines the following obligations for the exercise of 
the right of first refusal:  ADM cannot sell the Ripon Property 
without first offering it to Country Visions; Country Visions 
has a right to purchase the Ripon Property at the third party's 
purchase price; and Country Visions has 15 days to exercise the 
right of first refusal and provide notice of its intent to match 
the third-party offer for the Ripon Property after receiving 
notice of the third party's offer.  
¶8 
In May 2015, and unbeknownst to Country Visions, ADM 
started negotiations to sell its Wisconsin grain business assets 
to United.  Defendants reached a tentative agreement for United 
to purchase the Ripon Property and three other grain storage 
facilities around Wisconsin4 from ADM for a total price of $25 
million. 
 
The 
tentative 
agreement 
included 
the 
land, 
improvements, and personal property of each facility; it did not 
                                                 
4 The 
other 
facilities 
are 
located 
in 
Westfield, 
Auroraville, and Oshkosh.  
No. 
2018AP960   
 
7 
 
include the inventory of grain that ADM had in storage at each 
facility.    
¶9 
Sometime in early October 2015, Country Visions 
learned of the proposed sale of the Ripon Property.  On 
October 8, 2015, Country Visions informed ADM that it held a 
right of first refusal to the Ripon Property.  Country Visions, 
pursuant to the right of first refusal contract, requested a 
copy of the third-party offer to purchase so that it could 
determine whether it wanted to exercise its right of first 
refusal.   
¶10 At this point, Defendants had not executed their 
tentative agreement.  Upon learning of Country Visions' right of 
first 
refusal, 
Defendants 
restructured 
their 
tentative 
agreement.  Defendants severed the tentative agreement into two 
separate transactions.  One transaction called for United to 
purchase the Ripon Property from ADM, excluding all inventory 
and personal property, for $20 million.  The other transaction 
called for United to purchase from ADM the other three 
properties and all personal property for $5 million and all 
inventory at its market value.  Defendants assigned such a high 
value to the Ripon Property in part due to the unique synergies 
the Ripon Property would provide to United's business.5   
                                                 
5 The circuit court explained the unique synergies that the 
Ripon Property provided to United as follows: 
[The Ripon Property] was particularly beneficial to 
[United] because its 50 railroad car loading capacity 
in conjunction with United's second location in Ripon 
and location in Oshkosh all serviced by the same rail 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
8 
 
¶11 On October 13, 2015, United provided ADM with a formal 
offer to purchase the Ripon Property for $20 million, triggering 
ADM's obligations under the right of first refusal contract.  
The next day, consistent with its contractual obligations, ADM 
notified Country Visions of United's formal offer and provided 
Country Visions with a copy of the offer.  Country Visions 
claimed this $20 million purchase price was a sham and elected 
not to meet the terms of the third-party offer.    
¶12 On October 16, 2015, Defendants closed on the other 
transaction, purchasing the other three properties and personal 
property for $5 million.  In early November, after the right of 
first refusal exercise period lapsed, Defendants closed on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
line, allowed it to load 100 car trains to ship grain 
to more lucrative markets.   
In 
addition, 
the 
proximity 
of 
Auroraville 
and 
Westfield allowed trucking of grain to the [Ripon 
Property] for shipping, all within an operations 
system 
geographically 
proximate 
to 
the 
subject 
location.  
. . . . 
[United] intended to use and does use [the Ripon 
Property] to store and ship grain and does and can 
implement 100 car trains that increase profitability 
and can reach markets not ordinarily available without 
the ability to load 100 car trains.  In addition, 
unlike an agronomy use primarily for storage and 
manufacture of livestock feed, the United operation 
loads, ships, stores for future shipping and transfers 
grain using a margin that requires larger amounts to 
be handled in order to obtain profitability.  The 
Court 
does 
find 
synergies 
with 
United's 
other 
facilities and with the ability to load 100 car 
trains. 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
9 
 
Ripon Property transaction, with United purchasing it for $20 
million.  Country Visions brought a lawsuit against Defendants.  
 
II.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶13 On November 11, 2015, Country Visions filed this 
lawsuit seeking, as relevant to this appeal, a declaratory 
judgment that it had the right to purchase the Ripon Property 
for its fair market value and specific performance of the right 
of first refusal contract at that fair market value.6   
¶14  After 
several 
years 
of 
pre-trial 
motions 
and 
decisions not relevant to this appeal, the circuit court held a 
bench trial.  During the bench trial, Country Visions and 
Defendants supplied expert testimony as to the value of the 
                                                 
6 In response, ADM moved to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding 
at which it purchased the Ripon Property.  In re Olsen, 563 
B.R. 899, 902 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co. v. Country Visions Coop., No. 17-cv-0313-
bhl, 2021 WL 651553 (E.D. Wis. 2021).  The bankruptcy court 
agreed to reopen the proceeding and addressed the issue of 
"whether a final, non-appealable order approving a real estate 
sale could extinguish a right of first refusal without affording 
the holder of the right formal notice and the opportunity to 
object."  Id.  The bankruptcy court held that Country Visions 
"was 
not 
given 
notice 
during 
the 
bankruptcy 
proceedings 
sufficient to satisfy due process before its rights were 
extinguished," so ADM did not take the Ripon Property "free and 
clear of [Country Visions]' interest."  Id. at 909.  Therefore, 
ADM is still subject to the right of first refusal despite its 
purchase of the Ripon Property out of bankruptcy.  
No. 
2018AP960   
 
10 
 
Ripon Property.7 
 Country Visions' expert, Mark Akers, opined 
that the Ripon Property was worth $7.7 million.8  Defendants' 
                                                 
7 There were several experts in this case, but the circuit 
court focused on two in reaching its decision:  Mark Akers for 
Country Visions and Jack Friedman for Defendants.  Similarly, 
the parties focused on Akers' and Friedman's testimony.  Just as 
the circuit court and parties did, we will focus on these two 
experts.  
8 Akers reached this valuation using the cost approach and 
sales comparison approaches of appraisal.  The cost approach 
"seeks to measure the cost to replace the property."  Adams 
Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶35, 294 
Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803.  "In the cost approach, the 
appraiser analyzes the cost of the subject improvements by 
comparison to the cost to develop similar improvements as 
evidenced by the cost of construction of substitute properties 
with the same utility as the subject property."  Appraisal 
Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 377 (13th ed. 2008).  
Using the cost approach, Akers estimated that the value of the 
Ripon Property at $7,548,000.    
"In the sales comparison approach, an opinion of market 
value is developed by comparing properties similar to the 
subject property that have recently sold, are listed for sale, 
or are under contract (i.e., for which purchase offers and a 
deposit have been recently submitted)."  Id. at 297.  Using the 
sales comparison approach, Akers estimated the value of the 
Ripon Property at $7,458,000.   
Akers then averaged the cost approach and the sales 
comparison 
approach 
to 
reach 
his 
opinion 
of 
value 
at 
$7.5 million.  The circuit court believed that his opinion of 
value was in error based on "errors in the bin size and some 
inaccuracy 
about 
access 
and 
some 
criticism 
regarding 
comparables" and determined that $7.7 million was a more 
accurate reflection of Akers' opinion of value as it was Akers' 
"higher number on his margin of error."  We accept this as 
Akers' opinion of value for purposes of this appeal, as both 
parties do.   
No. 
2018AP960   
 
11 
 
expert, Jack Friedman, opined that the Ripon Property was worth 
$16.6 million to United.9   
¶15 On May 3, 2018, the circuit court issued a written 
decision.  The court concluded "that the $20 million dollar 
offer [for the Ripon Property] was a sham at an arbitrarily 
inflated price" "for the purpose of preventing [Country Visions] 
from exercising the right of first refusal."  The court also 
found that 
the fair value for [United] to use in purchasing the 
[Ripon 
Property] 
was 
the 
$16.6 
million 
dollars 
testified to by the witness the court believes was 
                                                 
9 Friedman reached this valuation amount by analyzing the 
value of the Ripon Property "in the context of the $25 million 
United spent when purchasing four facilities from ADM in 2015."  
Specifically, Friedman said that "a reasonable approach to 
valuing the Ripon Property in context of this transaction is to 
consider what percentage of the total $25 million value was 
attributable to the Ripon Property."   
Friedman 
used 
the 
income 
capitalization 
method 
to 
approximate the prices of the other three facilities——Westfield, 
Auroraville, and Oshkosh——that were part of this deal.  "In the 
income 
capitalization 
approach, 
an 
appraiser 
analyzes 
a 
property's capacity to generate future benefits and capitalizes 
the income into an indication of present value."  Appraisal 
Institute, supra note 8, at 445.  To reach his valuation for the 
facilities, Friedman looked at the grain storage capacity, rail-
loading capability, and quality of cropland near the facility to 
inform his estimate of value.  Using these factors, among 
others, Friedman assigned $500,000 for the Westfield facility as 
salvage value only, $2 million for the Auroraville property, and 
$5.9 million for the Oshkosh facility.  Friedman then estimated 
that the value of the Ripon Property was the remainder of the 
$25 million total purchase price——$16.7 million.  As the circuit 
court noted in its decision, this number should have been 
$16.6 million, but this error is of no consequence to our 
conclusion, and we use $16.6 million as Friedman's opinion of 
value. 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
12 
 
most credible in assessing valuation, Jack Friedman, 
whose credentials as an operator in the grain industry 
in Iowa and one with experience in valuing and 
acquiring grain elevator properties together with his 
own assessment of the values of the other three 
properties acquired by [United] from [ADM] made his 
opinion the most persuasive testimony.  Although 
Mr. Friedman valued the Ripon property at $16.7 
million when that figure is coupled with the other 
valuations for the remaining properties the value was 
overstated by $100,000 so the Court has reduced his 
estimate as to the Ripon property from $16.7 to $16.6 
million.   
. . . The 
plaintiff 
would 
have 
this 
court 
construe fair market value to an appraiser's opinion 
based 
upon 
comparables, 
assessed 
values 
and 
a 
depreciated cost assessment.  This Court believes that 
appraised value can also include both the income 
approach together with some inherent qualities that 
would be attributable to a specific buyer.  Those type 
of 
inherent 
qualities 
can 
include 
things 
like 
proximity in the case of an adjoining owner, access in 
the case of a land locked parcel and synergies in a 
case like [United] and its geographical and rail line 
related enhancements to value.   
Ultimately, the circuit court granted Country Visions specific 
performance to exercise the right of first refusal——giving 
Country Visions 15 days to exercise the right of first refusal 
at the $16.6 million exercise price.   
¶16 Both Country Visions and Defendants appealed the 
circuit court's decision on numerous grounds.  As relevant to 
our review, the court of appeals was asked to address "the 
appropriate price at which the [right of first refusal] was to 
be exercised."  Country Visions, 392 Wis. 2d 672, ¶31.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the circuit court "did not err 
in considering the unique synergies specific to United in 
determining an appropriate exercise price under the equitable 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
13 
 
remedy it adopted."  Id., ¶37.  However, the court of appeals 
did not specifically affirm the Ripon Property's $16.6 million 
valuation because it was unclear from the circuit court's 
decision whether the $16.6 million valuation included personal 
property, which the court of appeals determined was excluded 
from the terms of the right of first refusal contract.  Id., 
¶38.  To remedy this lack of clarity, the court of appeals 
remanded for the circuit court to "determine what portion of the 
$25 million previously agreed-upon price is fairly allocable to 
the real estate alone, had United made a bona fide offer for 
just that property."  Id., ¶43.  
¶17 Country Visions petitioned this court seeking to set 
the exercise price at $7.7 million——the price that Country 
Visions' expert determined as the "fair market value" of the 
Ripon Property.  Country Visions argued that we should do so 
because the circuit court violated basic right of first refusal 
principles when it set the exercise price based on United's 
willingness to pay more than the appraised value of the Ripon 
Property.  We granted review.   
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 This case requires us to determine whether the circuit 
court properly set the price at which Country Visions could 
exercise its right of first refusal.  This requires us to apply 
the law to the circuit court's findings of fact.   
¶19 "We uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous."  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
14 
 
Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.  
"[A] finding of fact is clearly erroneous when 'it is against 
the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.'"  
Id., ¶39 (quoting State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 
Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748).  "Therefore, although evidence may 
have presented competing factual inferences, the circuit court's 
findings are to be sustained if they do not go 'against the 
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.'"  Id. 
(quoting Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶12).   
¶20 The application of the circuit court's findings of 
fact to the law is a question of law.  Id., ¶35.  "We decide 
questions of law independently."  Id.  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
¶21 We begin our analysis with a general discussion of 
rights of first refusal, paying particular attention to the 
interaction between rights of first refusal and inflated values 
in package deals.  We then apply that law to the facts of this 
case.   
A.  Rights of First Refusal Generally 
¶22 "A right of first refusal is a contractual right to be 
first in line should the opportunity to purchase or lease a 
property arise."  MS Real Est. Holdings, 362 Wis. 2d 258, ¶24.  
As we have explained, a right of first refusal is 
a right to buy before or ahead of others, thus, a pre-
emptive right contract is an agreement containing all 
the essential elements of a contract, the provisions 
of which give to the prospective purchaser the right 
to buy upon specified terms, but, and this is the 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
15 
 
important point, only if the seller decides to sell.  
It does not give the pre-emptioner the power to compel 
an 
unwilling 
owner 
to 
sell, 
and 
therefore 
is 
distinguishable from an ordinary option. 
Id., ¶25 (quoting Edlin v. Soderstrom, 83 Wis. 2d 58, 68, 264 
N.W.2d 275 (1978)).  "Where the procedure [for exercising the 
right] is clear and the time to exercise the right is 
reasonable, a right of first refusal 'provides a possible buyer 
who is constantly available.'"  Id., ¶28 (quoting Bruns v. 
Rennebohm Drug Stores, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 88, 99, 442 N.W.2d 591 
(Ct. App. 1989)).   
¶23 Thus, if a property owner receives an offer, the owner 
must offer the property to the right holder first in compliance 
with the right of first refusal contract terms.10  If the right 
holder accepts the property owner's offer, the right holder 
purchases the property.  If the right holder declines the 
property owner's offer, the property owner may then accept the 
prospective buyer's offer.  Accordingly, "[t]he holder of a 
right of first refusal cannot force landowners to sell or lease 
their property unless they freely choose to do so.  Even then, 
                                                 
10 We note that generally, right of first refusal contracts 
provide that the right holder must purchase the property at the 
same purchase price with the same terms and conditions as the 
prospective buyer.  See, e.g., MS Real Est. Holdings, LLC v. 
Donald P. Fox Fam. Tr., 2015 WI 49, ¶6, 362 Wis. 2d 258, 864 
N.W.2d 83.  As is the case with every contract, the parties to a 
right of first refusal contract can set the terms of the 
contract, including setting a fixed exercise price or setting 
the methodology——such as "objective pricing by way of appraisal 
or market index"——for calculating the exercise price.  See 
David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 Stan. 
J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 37-38 (1999).   
No. 
2018AP960   
 
16 
 
landowners may condition such sale or lease on terms that are 
acceptable to them."  Id., ¶29. 
¶24 These basic principles of rights of first refusal 
become more complicated when the burdened property is sold as 
part of a package deal with other real or personal property that 
is not subject to the right of first refusal.  In addressing 
package deals and rights of first refusal, jurisdictions across 
the nation have adopted varying approaches.11   
¶25 In Wisconsin, the court of appeals addressed this 
problem of package deals and rights of first refusal for the 
first time in Wilber Lime Products, Inc. v. Ahrndt, 2003 WI 
App 259, 268 Wis. 2d 650, 673 N.W.2d 339.  In Wilber Lime, the 
court of appeals addressed facts similar to those now before us.  
There, the property owner sold 180 acres, of which Wilber Lime 
held a right of first refusal to 25 of the acres.  Id., ¶¶2-3.  
To resolve the case, the court of appeals had to determine how a 
court should address a right of first refusal when a property 
                                                 
11 Some jurisdictions hold that the selling of a burdened 
property as part of a larger package deal does not trigger the 
right of first refusal but enjoins the sale of the burdened 
property as part of a package deal.  See Bernard Daskal, Rights 
of First Refusal and the Package Deal, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J. 461, 
475-79 (1995).  Other jurisdictions hold that the selling of a 
burdened property as part of a package deal does trigger the 
right of first refusal.  See id. at 480.  These jurisdictions 
that hold that the right of first refusal is triggered disagree 
as to the remedy: one jurisdiction opting for contract damages; 
another jurisdiction opting for specific performance on the 
entire package deal; and the majority of jurisdictions opting 
for specific performance on the burdened property alone.  See 
id. at 480-84.   
No. 
2018AP960   
 
17 
 
that is subject to that right of first refusal is sold as part 
of a package deal.  Id., ¶8.  After surveying how different 
jurisdictions addressed such a case, the court of appeals 
settled on the "middle road" approach the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals set forth in Pantry Pride Enterprises v. Stop & Shop 
Cos., 806 F.2d 1227, 1230 (4th Cir. 1986).  Explaining the 
Fourth Circuit's conclusions, our court of appeals stated the 
following: 
[T]he [Fourth Circuit] concluded that the right of 
first refusal was triggered and that awarding specific 
performance was consistent with the parties' intent 
when they agreed to the right of first refusal.  
[Pantry Pride, 806 F.2d at 1230].  However, the court 
did not think that a simple pro rata valuation was 
fair.  Instead, the court remanded the case for an 
allocation of the fair market value of the property 
burdened by the right of first refusal.  Id. at 1231.  
"Permitting the exercise of the first refusal right 
[based on the purchase price of the whole] provides 
[the holder of the right] a windfall for which it 
never bargained in the lease."  Id.  It would bear "no 
relation to its worth" and the holder of the right of 
first refusal would "have acquired [the property] at 
an absurdly low price and on terms never really agreed 
to between [the parties]."  Id. 
Wilber Lime, 268 Wis. 2d 650, ¶11.  Relying on Pantry Pride's 
logic, our court of appeals held that the sale of a property 
subject to a right of first refusal as part of a package deal 
triggers the right of first refusal to the burdened property and 
that the right holder is entitled to specific performance for 
the sale of the burdened property.  Id., ¶12.   
¶26 The court of appeals went on to recognize "like the 
court in Pantry Pride, [there is] the possibility that the acres 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
18 
 
being sold are not all of equal value."  Id., ¶13.  The court of 
appeals then concluded: 
[T]he most equitable resolution is to determine the 
fair market value of the twenty-five acres.  This 
protects the landowner from being forced to sell the 
twenty-five acres at a price lower than its fair 
market value and therefore lower than the owner would 
accept if the twenty-five acres were sold alone.  It 
also prevents [right holder] from receiving a windfall 
of being able to purchase the land at a price lower 
than its value.  This approach best fulfills the 
intentions of the parties when they entered into the 
agreement granting [right holder] the right of first 
refusal. 
Id.   
¶27 This very passage is the basis of Country Visions' 
argument that the circuit court did not apply a proper 
methodology in determining the exercise price for the Ripon 
Property.  Country Visions argues that the exercise price for 
the Ripon Property must be set at the "fair market value," as  
determined using the three-tiered methodology of appraisals set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) (2019-20).12  This hierarchical 
                                                 
12 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
"Tier 1" of this three-tiered methodology requires the 
appraiser to examine a "recent arm's-length sale" of the subject 
property.  Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶32, 
379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784.  "If there is no recent sale of 
the subject property, the appraiser moves to tier 2, examining 
recent, arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable properties 
(the 'sales comparison approach')."  Id., ¶33.  "When both tier 
1 and tier 2 are unavailable, an assessor moves to tier 3."  
Id., ¶34.  For tier 3, an assessor: 
may consider all the factors collectively which have a 
bearing on value of the property in order to determine 
its fair market value.  These factors include cost, 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
19 
 
methodology is applicable in cases involving taxation and 
eminent domain, where the need for uniform application is 
essential.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1); Metro. Assocs. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶31, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784 
(applying the methodology to taxation cases); Adams Outdoor 
Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶47, 294 
Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 (same to eminent domain cases); 
State ex rel. Levine v. Bd. of Rev. of Vill. of Fox Point, 191 
Wis. 2d 363, 
372, 
528 
N.W.2d 424 
(1995) 
(explaining 
that 
§ 70.32(1) "seeks to ensure a uniform method of taxation by 
requiring assessors to assess real estate at its fair market 
value, using the 'best information' that the assessor can 
practicably obtain").  However, the goal of the circuit court 
when setting the exercise price for a right of first refusal is 
not to determine the fair market value of the burdened property.  
Rather, the circuit court must determine the actual price that 
the prospective third-party buyer would have offered for the 
burdened property, based on the terms of the contract and facts 
of the case (we will refer to this actual price as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
depreciation, replacement value, income, industrial 
conditions, location and occupancy, sales of like 
property, book value, amount of insurance carried, 
value asserted in a prospectus and appraisals produced 
by the owner.  Both the income approach, which seeks 
to capture the amount of income the property will 
generate over its useful life, and the cost approach, 
which seeks to measure the cost to replace the 
property, fit under the umbrella of tier 3 analysis.  
Id. (cleaned up). 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
20 
 
"prospective offer price").  See Wilber Lime, 268 Wis. 2d 650, 
¶13 ("This approach best fulfills the intentions of the parties 
when 
they 
entered 
into 
the 
agreement . . . ."). 
 
This 
prospective offer price, contrary to Country Visions' argument, 
need not equal the appraised value nor the fair market value.  
See Pantry Pride, 806 F.2d at 1231-32; In re Adelphia Commc'ns 
Corp., 368 B.R. 348, 357-58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  As the 
court in Adelphia explained,  
The price paid by [the prospective third-party buyer] 
apparently exceeded fair market value, but it was 
their right to pay greater than market value.  The 
valuation expert for the [right holder] conceded as 
much.  It makes no difference that the [property] 
might be worth more to [the prospective third-party 
buyer] than to other potential buyers because of 
synergies and economies of scale that [the prospective 
third-party buyer] could bring to bear.  It appears 
that [the prospective third-party buyer] was willing 
to pay more for the [property] than other potential 
offerors would have paid.  But that is exactly why one 
could not simply rely on what the "fair market value" 
of the [property] might be to those other potential 
buyers.  It is the offer made by [the prospective 
third-party buyer] that must be matched by the [right 
holder].  
Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 357-58.  Indeed, the prospective offer 
price may be significantly higher than either the appraised 
value or the fair market value of the burdened property.  A 
prospective buyer may be willing to pay significantly more than 
the appraised value because the property gives the prospective 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
21 
 
buyer greater utility than a different buyer.13  This is perhaps 
even more true when a potential buyer is purchasing the burdened 
property in a package deal where the value of the burdened 
property increases for the potential buyer because of synergies 
or relationships between the properties that are a part of the 
package deal.  See, e.g., Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 357 ("It makes 
no difference that the Consortium Systems might be worth more to 
Time Warner than to other potential buyers because of the 
synergies and economies of scale that Time Warner could bring to 
bear."); In re Albion Disposal, Inc., 152 B.R. 794, 802 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The value of the OSL land if sold alone is far 
less than the value of the OSL lands if combined with the Smith 
lands in a 'package deal.'" (footnote omitted)); see also It's 
My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc., 811 F.3d 676, 688 (4th Cir. 
2016) ("The real loss would be the productive synergies created 
when sellers package complementary products.").  Consequently, 
we reject Country Visions' contention that the prospective offer 
price must equal the appraised or fair market value.14   
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Ben Krumholz, Packers' Development Potential 
Moves Across Lombardi Ave with Funeral Home Site Purchase, 
Fox 11 
News 
(July 
1, 
2020), 
 
https://fox11online.com/ 
news/local/green-bay/packers-development-potential-moves-across-
lombardi-ave-with-funeral-home-site-purchase 
(explaining 
that 
the Green Bay Packers paid three times the assessed value for 
two parcels to support its Titletown District development).  
14 To the extent that Wilber Lime says that the circuit 
court in that case was to determine the fair market value on 
remand, we interpret that as requiring the circuit court to 
determine the prospective offer price. 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
22 
 
¶28 This general discussion of rights of first refusal and 
package deals elucidates certain key principles that are 
applicable to the case before us.  First, the sale of a property 
that is subject to a right of first refusal as part of a package 
deal triggers the right of first refusal.  Wilber Lime, 268 
Wis. 2d 650, ¶12.  Second, a circuit court must break up the 
package deal and allow a right of first refusal holder to 
exercise that right on only the burdened property.  Id.  Third, 
the circuit court must look to the contract to determine how to 
calculate the exercise price for the right of first refusal.  MS 
Real Estate, 362 Wis. 2d 258, ¶¶24-29.  Fourth, if the right of 
first refusal contract provides that the right holder must match 
the purchase price and terms and conditions of the prospective 
buyer's offer, as is generally the case, the court must 
determine the prospective offer price——the actual price that the 
prospective third-party buyer would have offered for the 
burdened property based on the terms of the contract and facts 
of the case.  See Wilber Lime, 268 Wis. 2d 650, ¶13; Pantry 
Pride, 806 F.2d at 1231-32; Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 357-58.  
Finally, the circuit court may grant specific performance to the 
right holder to exercise the right of first refusal to purchase 
the burdened property at the exercise price.  See Wilber Lime, 
268 Wis. 2d 650, ¶13.  
B.  Application 
¶29 With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of 
the dispute between Country Visions and Defendants.  The right 
of first refusal contract between Country Visions and ADM was a 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
23 
 
typical right of first refusal contract, providing that Country 
Visions has the right to purchase the Ripon Property at the 
"purchase price and other terms and conditions" that a third 
party offered.   
¶30 When ADM and United entered an agreement to sell the 
Ripon Property, the offer triggered Country Visions' right of 
first refusal.  The circuit court found that "the $20 million 
offer was a sham at an arbitrarily inflated price" and, instead, 
used the $25 million package deal price to determine an accurate 
exercise price.   
¶31 The circuit court then set the exercise price at $16.6 
million and granted to Country Visions specific performance.  
Country Visions argues that this number is far greater than the 
appraised value of the property——$7.7 million——meaning we should 
replace the circuit court's exercise price of $16.6 million with 
the appraised value.  As we described above, a prospective buyer 
may choose to offer significantly more than the appraised value 
of a property, especially in the context of a package deal.  
This case typifies such a transaction.  The circuit court found 
that the "synergies in a case like [United] and its geographical 
and rail line [serve as] enhancements to value."  Because of 
these unique synergies that the Ripon Property provided to 
United, the circuit court determined that the prospective offer 
price that United offered for the Ripon Property was $16.6 
million.  Accordingly, we reject Country Visions' request to set 
the exercise price in this case at the $7.7 million amount that 
its expert determined was the appraised value of the Ripon 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
24 
 
Property.15  Furthermore, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not err in considering the unique synergies that the Ripon 
Property provides to United when it set the exercise price 
higher than the appraised value.   
¶32 However, while the circuit court did not err in how it 
reached its conclusion, it is unclear in the circuit court's 
decision whether the court correctly valued only the portion of 
the package deal that was subject to the right of first refusal.  
This lack of clarity arises because the circuit court used the 
package deal to set the exercise price, and that package deal 
included the land, improvements, and personal property of each 
of the four facilities.  Country Visions' right of first refusal 
was for the real property at the 
Ripon Property only.  
Consequently, the package deal should be broken up, removing the 
other three facilities and all personal property, and Country 
Visions should be permitted to exercise its right of first 
refusal on only the real property at the Ripon Property.  See 
Wilber Lime, 268 Wis. 2d 650, ¶12.  While it is clear that the 
circuit court removed the other three facilities, it is unclear 
from the record whether the circuit court removed the personal 
                                                 
15 This case involved sophisticated commercial actors.  If 
Country Visions had wished for the right of first refusal 
contract to require that the exercise price be set at the 
appraised value of the Ripon Property, it could have contracted 
to do so.  See Walker, supra note 10, at 37-38 (explaining the 
different methods a right of first refusal can set the exercise 
price).  
No. 
2018AP960   
 
25 
 
property when it determined that the actual value of the Ripon 
Property was $16.6 million.   
¶33 Accordingly, we conclude that remand is necessary to 
determine whether the $16.6 million exercise price included more 
property than what the right of first refusal contract covers.  
On remand, the circuit court should create a record such that 
the exercise price is comprised of the real property at the 
Ripon Property only.  Finally, the circuit court may then grant 
specific performance to Country Visions at that exercise price.  
We leave to the circuit court's discretion how best to 
accomplish these directions on remand. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
considering the unique synergies that the Ripon Property 
provides to United when it set the exercise price higher than 
the appraised value.  For rights of first refusal, a prospective 
buyer may choose to offer significantly more than the appraised 
value of a property, especially in the context of a package 
deal.  Thus, depending on the terms of the right of first 
refusal contract and the facts of the case, a circuit court may 
set an exercise price that exceeds the appraised value of the 
burdened property.  However, we conclude that remand is 
necessary to determine whether the $16.6 million exercise price 
includes more than is called for in the right of first refusal 
contract.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision 
No. 
2018AP960   
 
26 
 
and remand to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶35 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  We 
review a right of first refusal (ROFR) that is held by Country 
Visions Cooperative.  The ROFR burdens the Ripon Property, which 
was owned by Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM).  The Ripon Property 
was part of a package sale to United Cooperative that also 
included three other properties, Oshkosh, Auroraville and 
Westfield, all of which were owned by ADM.   
¶36 We are asked to determine whether the price for the 
Ripon Property under the ROFR is controlled by an appraisal 
purporting to define the Ripon Property's fair market value or 
whether the price is affected by the price that United assigned 
to the Ripon Property in its package offer.  I conclude that the 
ROFR's terms, which do not mention fair market value, control.  
The ROFR grants a right to purchase by matching "the purchase 
price and other terms and conditions of such proposed sale" made 
by a bona fide purchaser in a written offer.1  Therefore, the 
terms Country Visions must match, i.e., the exercise price, in 
order to purchase the Ripon Property are United's terms if they 
comprise a bona fide offer.  However, an opinion on the fair 
market value of the Ripon Property may provide some guidance 
about whether the price United alleges that it paid for the 
Ripon Property in its package purchase was bona fide or an 
artificial price created to defeat Country Visions' purchase 
under the ROFR.  In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 368 B.R. 348, 
356-57 (Bnkr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that when the offeror 
                                                 
1 R. 826:2.   
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
2 
 
and the seller have set a good faith price for an asset sold as 
part of a group, that price should control).   
¶37 The majority opinion concludes that the $16.6 million 
exercise price for the Ripon Property that was set by the 
circuit court should be reviewed to determine whether it 
included personal property that was sold with the real estate 
under the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA).2  For the reasons set 
forth below, I agree and therefore, I respectfully concur and 
join the majority opinion.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶38 The majority opinion capably sets out the background 
underlying this controversy.  Therefore, I describe here only 
that which is necessary to understand my writing below.   
¶39 Country Visions brought this lawsuit to enforce its 
ROFR to purchase the Ripon Property that ADM sold to United as 
part of a $25 million package sale of four properties, which 
included both real estate and personal property.3  The circuit 
court held a lengthy bench trial.4   
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶6.   
3 Although the Ripon Property was subject to an allegedly 
separate offer to purchase for $20 million, with the remaining 
three properties selling for $5 million, the sales were inter-
dependent.  As counsel for United said, "We need to be sure they 
are tied.  I know there must be a bit of a trust factor but we 
need to do the 2 together."  On review, there is no real 
challenge to the Ripon Property being part of a package sale.  
4 Circuit Court Judge Gary R. Sharpe of Fond du Lac County 
did outstanding judicial work in addressing the many, many 
factual and legal issues presented by this very complicated 
case. 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶40 The circuit court found that United had valued the 
property it purchased from ADM in various ways.  For example, 
United and ADM allocated the $25 million purchase price as $14 
million for personal property, leaving $11 million for all four 
parcels of real estate.5  United's executive, David Cramer, 
assigned $20 million of the purchase price to the Ripon 
Property.6  And, United booked the cost of the Ripon Property at 
$8.725 million.7   
¶41 Country Visions and United provided experts to opine 
on the actual price for the Ripon Property's part of the $25 
million package sale.  Country Visions presented Mark Akers who 
appraised the property as having a fair market value of $7.5 
million.8  The circuit court found that his approach to valuation 
was "insufficient in determining value in a sale to United."9   
¶42 The circuit court found that United "intended to use 
and does use [the Racine Property] to store and ship grain and 
does 
and 
can 
implement 
100 
car 
trains 
that 
increase 
profitability."10  The court also found that the Ripon Property 
                                                 
5 Findings of Fact, ¶8.  Some of the "Findings of Fact" 
actually are conclusions of law, and some of the listings after 
the heading "Conclusions of Law" are findings of fact.  However, 
to assist a reader who is referring to the record, I use the 
labels of the circuit court.   
6 Id., ¶14.   
7 Id., ¶22.   
8 Id., ¶23.   
9 Id., ¶25.   
10 Id. 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
4 
 
had "synergies with United's other facilities and with the 
ability to load 100 car trains."11 
¶43 United presented testimony from Jack Friedman, who 
opined that the Ripon Property had a value of $16.7 million to 
United.  Due to what the circuit court characterized as a math 
error, the court concluded that the Ripon Property accounted for 
$16.6 million of the $25 million United paid to ADM based on 
Mr. Friedman's testimony.12  
¶44 The circuit court also made a number of "Conclusions 
of Law," most of which we were not asked to review.  One 
conclusion for which we accepted review is whether "the fair 
value for United Cooperative to use in purchasing the subject 
parcel was the $16.6 million dollars testified to by [] Jack 
Friedman."13  The circuit court concluded that Country Visions 
was entitled to specific performance against United at the 
exercise price of $16.6 million.14   
¶45 The court of appeals concluded that the ROFR required 
a bona fide offer, but not necessarily an offer based on the 
fair market value derived through the three tiered methodology 
employed in taxation and eminent domain valuations.  Country 
Visions Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. and United Coop., 
2020 WI App 32, ¶33, 392 Wis. 2d 672, 946 N.W.2d 169.  The court 
                                                 
11 Id.  
12 Id., ¶26.   
13 Conclusions of Law, ¶5.   
14 Id., ¶10.   
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
5 
 
reasoned that because County Visions' right to purchase arose 
under a ROFR, courts are "more interested in discerning the most 
likely arms-length purchase price pertaining to this buyer."  
Id., ¶34 (emphasis in original).  The court of appeals was 
concerned with whether the circuit court's $16.6 million 
exercise price included the "business assets [] set forth in the 
APA" because "nowhere does it appear that Friedman——and by 
extension the trial court——took into account the value of the 
personal property at all."  Id., ¶¶39, 40 (emphasis in 
original).    
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶46 On review, we affirm the circuit court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Phelps v. Physicians 
Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 
N.W.2d 615.  In the case before us, once the historic facts are 
determined we compare them to the requirements of the ROFR.  
This presents a question of law that we independently decide, 
while benefitting from discussions in previous court decisions.  
Id., ¶35.   
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
6 
 
B.  ROFR General Principles 
¶47 It has been said that a ROFR is "simply a fancy name 
for a small bundle of contract terms."  Walker, David I., 
Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 
5 (1999).  As we have explained, a ROFR creates contractual 
rights, the terms for which are stated in the document granting 
the rights.  Edlin v. Soderstrom, 83 Wis. 2d 58, 68, 264 N.W.2d 
275 (1978) (noting that such a contract may give a prospective 
purchaser the right to buy if the seller decides to sell).  A 
ROFR also imposes a duty on the owner of such property to offer 
to the holder of the ROFR the opportunity to purchase at terms 
another has offered, which terms the owner is willing to accept.  
Wilber Lime Prods., Inc. v. Ahrndt, 2003 WI App 259, ¶8, 268 
Wis. 2d 650, 673 N.W.2d 339.   
¶48 When a ROFR burdens property that the owner has chosen 
to sell together with other properties, sorting out the exercise 
price for the property to which the ROFR applies can be 
complicated.  This is especially so when the ROFR contains no 
yardstick, such as appraised value or fair market value, by 
which to measure the terms of an offer that the owner says it is 
willing to accept for an entire package.  Daskal, Bernard, 
Rights of First Refusal and the Package Deal, 22 Fordham Urb. 
L.J., 461, 465 (1995) (explaining that where no criteria are 
stated for the exercise of the ROFR, the third party's terms 
provide relevant criteria).  However, "allocations of price to 
elements of a package may readily be manipulated to defeat 
contractual rights of first refusal."  Pantry Pride Enters., 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
7 
 
Inc. v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 806 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 
1986) (emphasis in original).   
¶49 Courts have examined various methods by which to value 
the exercise price for ROFRs that burden one property in a 
package 
sale. 
 
As 
with 
general 
contract 
interpretation 
principles, some courts attempt to determine the intent of the 
parties to the ROFR.  See Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 
F.3d 130, 142 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing prior dealings between 
the parties).  Some courts have held that in the absence of bad 
faith or another basis for a change in the allocated price, 
proportionate pricing controls.  See Adelphia Commc'ns, 368 B.R. 
at 356-58.  Other courts have said that when the ROFR contains 
price terms, the owner must honor those terms if it wished to 
sell.  See Foster v. Bullard, 554 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1977).  
C.  Country Visions' ROFR 
¶50 Country Visions' ROFR is set out in a document 
recorded at the Fond du Lac Register of Deeds.  It states in 
relevant part:   
[T]he Grantor has agreed to grant to the Grantee a 
right of first refusal to purchase the Property but 
only 
upon 
the 
terms 
and 
conditions 
set 
forth 
herein. . . .  For a period of ten (10) years from the 
date hereof (the "ROF Period"), the Grantor hereby 
grants to the Grantee a right of first refusal to 
purchase 
the 
Property 
or 
applicable 
portion 
thereof . . . . 
If at any time during the ROF Period, the Grantor 
desires 
to 
sell 
any 
part 
of 
the 
Property . . . pursuant to a bona fide written offer 
from a third party (the "Third Party Offer"), the 
Grantor 
shall 
first 
notify 
the 
Grantee 
of 
the 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
8 
 
Grantor's desire to sell . . . .  The Grantee shall 
have the right and option to purchase the Offered 
Property on the Third Party Terms but only if the 
Grantee shall provide written notice of such election 
to the Grantor within fifteen (15) days after the 
Grantee's receipt of the Notice.[15]  
As with any written document under which a party is asserting 
rights, we begin with the terms of the document.  Solowicz v. 
Forward Geneva Nat.l, LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 
N.W.2d 111.  Having reviewed the entire ROFR, the dispositive 
provisions of which are set forth above, I conclude that there 
is nothing in the ROFR that provides any type of measurement by 
which to gage whether the price at which United asserts it 
purchased the Ripon Property is the actual price or whether it 
is a price manipulated to defeat Country Visions' contractual 
rights. 
¶51 In addition, Wisconsin has had limited appellate cases 
that address property subject to a ROFR that is being sold with 
other properties for a package price.  Wilber Lime did so.  It 
arose in the context of the sale of a 180-acre farm in which 25 
acres were subject to a ROFR.  Wilber Lime, 268 Wis. 2d 650, ¶1.  
The court of appeals was concerned that determining the exercise 
price for the 25 acres by dividing the purchase price by 180 and 
then multiplying the quotient by 25 assumed that each acre had 
the same value when that may not be true.  Id., ¶11.  Therefore, 
the court rejected proportionate pricing that other courts have 
used.  See Adelphia Commc'ns, 368 B.R. at 356-58.   
                                                 
15 R. 826:2. 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶52 As it structured how the actual price for the 25 acres 
should be determined, the court concluded that it was equitable 
"to determine the fair market value" of the twenty-five acres 
that were subject to the ROFR.  Wilber Lime, 268 Wis. 2d 650, 
¶13.  Wilber Lime explained that the fair market value "protects 
the landowner from being forced to sell the twenty-five acres at 
a price lower than its fair market value and . . . [i]t also 
prevents Wilber Lime from receiving a windfall of being able to 
purchase the land at a price lower than its value."  Id.  
¶53 Although Wilber Lime's directive to determine the fair 
market value of the 25 acres subject to the ROFR is an equitable 
solution given the context in which the court's decision was 
made, it has very limited, if any, relevance to the commercial 
package sale of which the Ripon Property was a part.  This is so 
because of the very different contexts in which Wilber Lime and 
Country Visions arise.   
¶54 For example, in Wilber Lime, the court sought to 
determine an equitable exercise price for 25 acres of farmland 
that was part of a 180-acre farmland purchase.  In the case 
before us, four commercial properties were purchased as part of 
a package.  All have revenue generating potentials, but those 
potentials vary considerably.  Some are on a rail line and some 
are not; some were in good repair and some were not.  In 
addition, United's purchase of the four properties gives it 
control of grain storage and shipping in an area west of Lake 
Winnebago in which United had been only a participant prior to 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
10 
 
the purchase.  This control factor likely affected the price 
United was willing to pay.    
¶55 Furthermore, it is without question that United 
purchased the Ripon Property to generate revenue.16  There is 
nothing in Wilber Lime that indicates that revenue generation 
was part of the motivation for the purchase of 25 acres.  
Because the ROFR grants Country Visions the right to match the 
purchase price and other terms and conditions that United 
actually paid, but grants no right to a cap or ceiling price set 
by the fair market value, I conclude that it is United's actual 
price paid for the Ripon Property that controls Country Visions 
exercise price.   
¶56 On remand, the central question is whether United's 
expert included personal property acquired under the APA when he 
asserted that the actual price for the Ripon Property was $16.6 
million.  This question can be addressed on remand in at least 
two ways.   
¶57 First, personal property belonging to all four parcels 
of real estate should be identified and valued.  The exercise 
                                                 
16 Friedman discussed EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest Taxes 
Depreciation and Amortization), which is gross revenue achieved 
before paying the costs of doing business, in the context of 
evaluating the potential purchase of property.  R.630:155-57.  
EBITDA is a metric used in measuring strength of performance for 
an on-going business.  Hon. Christopher S. Sontchi, Valuation 
Methodologies:  A Judge's View, 20 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1, 
11 (2012).  EBITDA differs significantly from the NOI (Net 
Operating Income), another metric used to measure the strength 
of a business.  The NOI focuses on the income generated by a 
business after the costs of doing business have been addressed.  
Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City of Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶9, 372 
Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611.    
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
11 
 
price for the Ripon Property cannot include personal property 
because the ROFR affords Country Visions no right or obligation 
to purchase personal property.  Pantry Pride, 806 F.2d at 1229.   
¶58 Second, Friedman testified to both the value of the 
Ripon Property as a standalone parcel (the value without "taking 
into consideration any synergies from anything around it")17 and 
its value to United.  Both values must be carefully reviewed.   
¶59 It was Friedman's opinion that "the Ripon Property has 
high strategic value to United because it is centrally located 
within United's grain facility network and located on the same 
rail line as three of United's other large rail-loading 
facilities."18  He used two valuation methods for the Ripon 
Property.   
¶60 In part of his trial testimony, he started his 
valuation with the $25 million package purchase price.  He then 
deducted $500,000 for the value of Westfield and $2,000,000 for 
Auroraville.19  This left $22,500,000 to be divided between 
Oshkosh and Ripon.  He said that he divided that number based on 
the percentage of the total volume handled by these two 
properties, with 26% ($5,850,000) attributed to Oshkosh and 74% 
($16,650,000) attributed to Ripon.20  However, in his written 
report he attributed "52% of the total volume handled in the 
                                                 
17 R. 630:155. 
18 R. 773:12, Expert Report of Jack Friedman. 
19 R. 630:163-65. 
20 R. 630:166. 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
12 
 
last full year that ADM owned those facilities" to Ripon.21  He 
did not mention personal property that also was purchased under 
the APA.22 
¶61 Friedman also calculated a stand alone value for the 
Ripon Property by using 16 cents EBITDA-per bushel times the 5.2 
million bushel capacity of Ripon, which results in an annual 
EBITDA of $832,000.  He then multiplied the annual EBITDA by 10, 
yielding a standalone value for the Ripon Property of $8.3 
million.23  This valuation is based solely on the revenue 
generating potential of the Ripon Property and Friedman's 
opinion that a multiple of 10 is reasonable for a grain business 
such as the Ripon Property.    
¶62 Friedman also opined that United achieved a 6 to 10 
cent per bushel "margin gain" by using rail shipping with 100-
car trains.  This is in addition to the usual per bushel revenue 
generation.24  Therefore, if Friedman had stayed with the 
$832,000 annual EBITDA he calculated for the Ripon Property and 
added a 6 to 10 cent per bushel margin gain onto Ripon's volume 
                                                 
21 R. 773:19. 
22 If 52% of the $25,000,000 package price were assigned to 
the Ripon Property, Ripon would have a value of $13,000,000, and 
if 52% were applied to what remained of the package price after 
Friedman's deductions for Westfield and Auroraville, Ripon would 
have a value of $11,700,000.  Simply stated, Friedman is a 
skillful witness and his opinion that $16.6 million is the 
actual price United paid for the Ripon Property is based on his 
choice of percentages that he applied to the package purchase 
price.   
23 R. 630:155-57. 
24 R. 630:141. 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
13 
 
of 5,200,000, the adjusted annual EBITDA that includes the 
margin gain would be $1,144,00025 to 1,352,000.26  If those 
adjusted annual EBITDAs for the Ripon Property are then 
multiplied by 10, the multiple Friedman testified was used in 
assessing potential grain business purchases, the actual price 
for the Ripon property would be between $11,440,000 and 
$13,520,000.   
¶63 Friedman 
was 
asked 
similar 
questions 
on 
cross-
examination that related to United doing only twelve 100-car 
trains in 2016.27  He was asked, based on United's actual 2016 
production, if margin gains of 2.83 to 4.8 and were added to 
Ripon's standalone value of $8.3 million, the range of prices 
for Ripon would be between $11.13 million and $13.1 million.28   
¶64 Friedman agreed with opposing counsel's valuation if 
actual 2016 performance were used.29  However, Friedman objected 
to the valuation because United had plans to move 22 million 
bushels of grain each year, which he believed it could 
accomplish.30   
                                                 
25 5,200,000 x .06 = 312,000 + $832,000 = $1,144,000.  
26 5,200,000 x .10 = 520,000 + 832,000 = $1,352,000. 
27 R. 630:211-215. 
28 The above two examples are based on revenue production.  
Therefore, they may have value to the circuit court when this 
matter is remanded to determine whether personal property was 
included in the $16.6 million price that the circuit court found 
as the price United paid for the Ripon Property.   
29 R. 630:215. 
30 There are approximately 400,000 bushels of grain in a 
100-car train.  R. 773:12.  Therefore, to ship 22 million 
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶65 I agree with the majority opinion that on remand 
additional briefing or testimony may be necessary.31   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶66 The majority opinion and the court of appeals both 
concluded that the $16.6 million exercise price for the Ripon 
Property that was set by the circuit court should be reviewed to 
determine whether it included personal property that was sold 
with the real estate under the APA.  For the reasons set forth 
above, I agree and therefore, I respectfully concur and join the 
majority opinion. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
bushels of grain each year, United would have to ship 55, 100-
car trains per year, rather than the 12 it shipped in 2016.  
31 Majority op., ¶33.   
No.  2018AP960.pdr 
 
 
 
1