Title: Woodward v. Morgan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 952041
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 1996

Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
ADIN K. WOODWARD, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 952041                      September 13, 1996 
 
HENRY C. MORGAN, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
William G. Plummer, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this suit brought to enforce a restrictive covenant in a 
deed and to enjoin construction of a residence, the dispositive 
question on appeal involves the interpretation of the covenant. 
 
In 1935, the original plat of "Ubermeer Annex No. 1," a 
residential subdivision located in the present City of Virginia 
Beach, was recorded.  As originally platted, the subdivision 
consisted of 13 sites, labelled "A" through "M."  Initially, the 
13 sites were conveyed as twelve lots and sold to 11 landowners. 
 
In 1982, appellees Henry C. Morgan, Jr., and Marnie J. 
Morgan, his wife, defendants below, purchased Lot K and the 
existing residence, known as 420 52nd Street.  This lot, as well 
as the others in the subdivision, had been originally conveyed by 
the Masury Corporation subject to nine restrictive covenants.  
After the initial sales, the subsequent deeds contained the usual 
language making the conveyances subject to all the unexpired 
conditions, restrictions, easements, and reservations of record 
affecting the property. 
 
The restriction at issue in this dispute is No. 5, which 
provides:  "That not more than one residence exclusive of 
outbuildings shall be erected upon one lot."  
 
In 1989, the defendants resubdivided Lot K, creating two 
 
 
 
 
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lots designated "K-1" and "K-2."  Lot K-1, upon which the 
residence is situated, encompasses approximately 0.45 acre.  Lot 
K-2 contains approximately 0.116 acre and is currently vacant.  
The defendants propose to construct a residence upon Lot K-2; 
this spawned the present lawsuit. 
 
In January 1995, appellants Adin K. Woodward, Lucille 
Woodward, Everett W. Foote, Laura Foote, Charlotte Y. Dashiell, 
Richard L. Walthall, and Juliette Walthall, plaintiffs below, 
filed a bill of complaint against the defendants.  The 
plaintiffs, owners of property in the subdivision, contended that 
the language of the Ubermeer Annex No. 1 deeds is clear and 
unambiguous:  a lot was conveyed, and only one residence was to 
be constructed upon it even though the original lot was 
resubdivided.  Asserting they are parties intended to be 
benefitted by the deed restriction, the plaintiffs asked the 
court to rule that the restriction will be violated by the 
construction of a dwelling on Lot K-2 and asked the court to 
enjoin the construction. 
 
Responding to the bill of complaint, the defendants 
contended that the word "lot" has no relation to the originally 
platted sites or to the originally conveyed lots, and therefore 
the restriction permits construction of as many residences as 
there are legally created lots in the subdivision. 
 
Following a June 1995 ore tenus hearing, at which the 
chancellor considered testimonial and documentary evidence, the 
 
 
 
 
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court ruled in favor of the defendants.  In an oral opinion, the 
chancellor stated, and counsel for the parties agreed, that the 
"dispositive" question involved interpretation of covenant No. 5. 
 
The court found the covenants to present "an ambiguous 
situation" and, examining the intention of the original grantor, 
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the word "lot" meant a 
lot as originally conveyed.  Rather, the court decided that the 
word means a parcel that may at any time become a lot.   
 
Consequently, the court ruled in the August 1995 final 
decree dismissing the bill of complaint, from which the 
plaintiffs appeal, that "erection of the proposed single family 
residence on K-2 does not violate any of the restrictive 
covenants." 
 
Parenthetically, we note that the trial court, both during 
the oral opinion and in the final decree, ruminated upon certain 
"additional" findings of fact without making any conclusions of 
law, dealing with what the defendants describe as "waiver and 
acquiescence."  As the defendants properly note on brief, 
however, those findings "do not affect the court's ruling" 
because counsel for "both sides agreed" that the court's decision 
regarding ambiguity was "dispositive of the issues."  Thus, we 
shall not address further the chancellor's "additional" findings 
but shall focus upon interpretation of the restriction. 
 
Virginia law on the subject of restrictive covenants in 
deeds is settled.  Valid covenants restricting the free use of 
 
 
 
 
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land, although widely used, are not favored and must be strictly 
construed.  The burden is upon the party seeking to enforce deed 
restrictions to demonstrate that the covenants are applicable to 
the acts of which complaint is made.  Substantial doubt or 
ambiguity is to be resolved against the restrictions and in favor 
of the free use of property.  Friedberg v. Riverpoint Bldg. 
Comm., 218 Va. 659, 665, 239 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1977). 
 
"Nevertheless, equity will enforce restrictions when they 
are reasonable and the intention of the parties is clear."  Marks 
v. Wingfield, 229 Va. 573, 577, 331 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1985). 
 
In Renn v. Whitehurst, 181 Va. 360, 25 S.E.2d 276 (1943), 
this Court considered the intention of the same grantor (Masury 
Corporation) regarding an identical restriction ("That not more 
than one residence exclusive of outbuildings shall be allowed 
upon one lot") in the deeds of a subdivision ("Ubermeer") 
adjacent to the subdivision that is the subject of the present 
dispute.  This Court declared the restrictions "valid and 
enforceable," id. at 365, 25 S.E.2d at 278, and determined they 
formed part of a general plan for disposing of lots "as highly 
restricted residential property."  Id. at 362, 25 S.E.2d at 277. 
 
Like this Court's prior ruling in Renn based on the evidence 
in that case, we hold, based on the evidence in the present case, 
that this restriction is valid and enforceable, forming part of a 
general plan to keep density low, preserve an area of large 
residential lots, and maintain property values.  From a reading 
 
 
 
 
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of restriction No. 5, together with the other restrictions, we 
believe that the original grantor and its immediate grantees, in 
plain and unambiguous language, intended the term "lot" to mean a 
lot as originally conveyed. 
 
Each of the source deeds for Ubermeer Annex No. 1 is part of 
the appellate record.  When applied to the subdivision as a 
whole, the term "lot" clearly means the sites as originally 
conveyed.  For example, the grantees of sites D and K, the first 
sites conveyed, each received a "lot," identified as a particular 
"lot" as designated by a letter on a plat.  Likewise, the 
grantees of sites C, E, F, J, L, and M each received a "lot," 
identified as a particular "site" as designated by a letter on a 
plat.  The single grantee of sites A and B received two "lots," 
identified as two individual sites.  Thus, eight grantees 
received one "lot" each while another grantee received a pair of 
"lots."  Each conveyance was subject to the restriction, and the 
term "lot" in each means the sites as originally conveyed. 
 
The defendants, urging affirmance of the judgment below, 
point to the evidence showing that sites G, H, and I were 
originally conveyed differently than the other sites.  The record 
shows that these three lots were sold as a site and one-half to 
two different purchasers.  Site I and the western one-half of 
site H were sold originally to one purchaser and called one 
"lot."  Site G and the eastern one-half of site H were sold 
originally to another buyer and called one "lot."  One residence 
 
 
 
 
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was placed later on each of the two lots. 
 
The defendants argue that this constituted the placing of 
more than one residence per lot because a portion of the 
structures on "new" Lot G with one-half of site H, and on "new" 
Lot I with one-half of site H, amounted to placing parts of two 
residences on original site H.  Thus, defendants contend, the 
argument that the grantor, in creating the subdivision, wanted to 
limit the purchaser's right to build only one residence on the 
original lots "ignores the grantor's resubdivision and ignores 
the reality of what actually occurred -- the subsequent erection 
of two different residences on Lot H."  We reject this 
contention. 
 
In the first place, there is no evidence that 
representatives of the grantor corporation knew where any future 
structures would be located on the properties.  In the second 
place, and more important, each grantee obtained a "lot," 
described as one and one-half sites.  The manner of these 
conveyances, providing for less density and less construction, 
was consistent with the overall plan for a highly restricted 
residential subdivision. 
 
Finally, one other contention made by the defendants merits 
discussion.  They say that "further confusion" is added to the 
restrictions when No. 7 is considered.  It provides:  "That all 
residences erected upon said property shall be at least fifteen 
feet from the line [sic] and at least three feet from the side 
 
 
 
 
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line of each lot."  "Obviously," argue the defendants, 
"restriction 7 contemplates more than one residence on the 
property conveyed." 
 
We disagree.  Manifestly, as the plaintiffs contend, 
restriction No. 7 addresses the construction of successive, not 
coexisting, structures. 
 
Consequently, we will reverse the final decree in this suit 
because it is plainly wrong and contrary to law.  We will enter 
final judgment declaring that construction of a residence on Lot 
K-2 will violate the applicable restrictive covenants for 
Ubermeer Annex No. 1.  Additionally, we will remand the cause to 
the trial court for entry, if necessary, of an appropriate 
injunction to enforce our judgment. 
 
Reversed, final judgment, 
                                       and remanded.
 
 
JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I agree with the trial court that this restrictive covenant 
is ambiguous.  As the majority has stated, any substantial doubt 
or ambiguity must be resolved against the restriction and in 
favor of the free use of the property.  Friedberg v. Riverpoint 
Bldg. Comm., 218 Va. 659, 665, 239 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1977).  
Moreover, because restrictive covenants are disfavored, they will 
not be aided or extended by implication.  Stevenson v. Spivey, 
132 Va. 115, 119, 110 S.E. 367, 368 (1922); see Mid-State 
Equipment Company, Inc. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 140, 225 S.E.2d 
 
 
 
 
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877, 884 (1976). 
 
The majority assumes that "lot" in the restrictive covenant 
has the same meaning as "lot" in the property description.  There 
is no basis for such an assumption.  As used in the restrictive 
covenant, "lot" can be interpreted with equal force as meaning 
"any lot in Ubermeer Annex No. 1," or as meaning "any lot 
appearing on the original plat for Ubermeer Annex No. 1."  If the 
grantor had intended in the restrictive covenant that "lot" mean 
"any lot appearing on the original plat," the grantor could have 
imparted that meaning by using the same term it used elsewhere in 
the restrictive covenants, "upon the property hereby conveyed." 
 
I also believe that the majority's reliance on Renn v. 
Whitehurst, 181 Va. 360, 25 S.E.2d 276 (1943), is misplaced.  
Renn is inapposite to the issue before us, because its holding 
was based on a property owner's attempt to enlarge her house and 
convert it into "duplex" housing on one lot.  Id. at 365, 25 
S.E.2d at 278.  In contrast, the Morgans are seeking to build 
only one dwelling on Lot K-2.  Accordingly, I would affirm the 
trial court's judgment.