Title: State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Wood
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2022-0901
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 2023

Rel: October 20, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0901 
_________________________ 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
 
v.  
 
Brian M. Wood and Jennifer A. Wood 
 
 
Appeal from Lee Circuit Court 
(CV-18-900157) 
 
BRYAN, Justice. 
 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State 
Farm"), a defendant below, appeals from a judgment entered against it 
on a jury verdict in an automobile-accident case.  We affirm. 
SC-2022-0901 
2 
 
As will be discussed in more detail below, Brian M. Wood ("Brian") 
was driving through an intersection in Auburn when his vehicle was T-
boned by a vehicle being driven by Mark Stafford.  Brian and his wife 
Jennifer A. Wood sued Stafford, an uninsured motorist, in the Lee Circuit 
Court, alleging claims of negligence, wantonness, and loss of consortium.  
Because Stafford was uninsured, the Woods also sued their automobile-
insurance company, State Farm, seeking uninsured-motorist benefits 
under their policy.  The Woods unsuccessfully attempted to serve 
Stafford.  Pursuant to Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Woods sought to 
proceed to a final judgment against the other defendant, State Farm.1  
The trial court held a jury trial, at which several witnesses testified.  At 
the close of the Woods' evidence, State Farm moved for a judgment as a 
matter of law ("JML") on its contributory-negligence defense and on the 
 
1Rule 4(f) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
"When there are multiple defendants and the summons (or 
other document to be served) and the complaint have been 
served on one or more, but not all, of the defendants, the 
plaintiff may proceed to judgment as to the defendant or 
defendants on whom process has been served and, if the 
judgment as to the defendant or defendants who have been 
served is final in all other respects, it shall be a final 
judgment."  
SC-2022-0901 
3 
 
Woods' wantonness claim, and the trial court denied that motion.  State 
Farm renewed its motion for a JML at the close of all the evidence, and 
the trial court denied that motion as well.  In relevant part, the trial court 
charged the jury on claims of negligence and wantonness, the affirmative 
defense of contributory negligence, and the doctrine of subsequent 
negligence.   
 
The jury returned a verdict in the Woods' favor, awarding them 
$700,000 in compensatory damages, and the trial court entered a 
judgment on that verdict.  The jury did not award any punitive damages. 
State Farm filed a postjudgment motion challenging the judgment on 
various grounds, including whether the wantonness claim should have 
gone to the jury.  The postjudgment motion was denied by operation of 
law, and State Farm appealed.  
 
The accident occurred at the intersection of Sandhill Road and 
South College Street in Auburn on April 26, 2016, at approximately 6:15 
p.m., on a clear, sunny day.  Stafford was driving a BMW automobile 
south on South College Street.  At trial, Juan Barnes testified that 
Stafford's vehicle passed his vehicle about a half mile before the 
intersection where the accident occurred.  Barnes testified that Stafford 
SC-2022-0901 
4 
 
was speeding, weaving in and out of traffic, and almost collided with a 
motorcycle after passing Barnes.  According to Barnes, Stafford was 
driving dangerously, and Barnes was concerned that Stafford was "going 
to kill somebody."  Similarly, Kari McPherson testified by deposition that 
Stafford passed her shortly before the accident occurred.  McPherson 
testified that Stafford switched lanes very quickly to get around her and 
that her automobile shook as he passed her.  She estimated that 
Stafford's vehicle was traveling at least 90 miles per hour; the speed limit 
on the road was 55 miles per hour.  As Stafford drove toward the 
intersection, he drove over a hillcrest approximately 800 feet from the 
intersection; until topping the hillcrest, Stafford's view of the intersection 
was obstructed by the hillcrest.  Before reaching the hillcrest, Stafford 
drove past a sign stating that the "RIGHT LANE MUST TURN RIGHT" 
at the upcoming intersection.   
To the south of Stafford, Brian arrived at the intersection traveling 
west on Sandhill Road.  At the time, there was a stop sign at the 
intersection controlling the west-bound traffic traveling on Sandhill 
Road.  At trial, Brian testified that he stopped his Honda Ridgeline truck 
at the stop sign.   To Brian's right were three south-bound lanes of traffic 
SC-2022-0901 
5 
 
on South College Street.  From the perspective of a driver traveling south 
on South College Street, there is a left-turn lane that leads traffic left, or 
east, onto Sandhill Road.  The middle lane is a flow-through lane that 
takes traffic south past the intersection.  On the right, there is a 
mandatory right-turn lane that takes traffic onto the street on the 
opposite side of the intersection from where Brian was stopped.  Brian 
testified that, when he attempted to cross the intersection, there were no 
vehicles in the middle flow-through lane and the left-turn lane to his 
right.  He testified that, when checking traffic to his right, his sight was 
directed toward the two lanes that contained traffic that would cross his 
path, i.e., the flow-through lane and the left-turn lane.  Brian testified 
that, although he never saw Stafford's vehicle, he concluded that it must 
have been in the mandatory right-turn lane as Brian began to cross the 
intersection because the vehicle was not in the other two lanes to his 
right.  As Brian attempted to cross the intersection, his vehicle was T-
boned by Stafford's vehicle, causing permanent injury to Brian.  The 
collision occurred in the pass-through lane.  Pam Stirling, an accident-
reconstruction expert, testified at trial that Stafford's vehicle was 
SC-2022-0901 
6 
 
traveling between 69-78 miles per hour when it collided with Brian's 
vehicle.  As noted, the speed limit was 55 miles per hour.   
On appeal, State Farm first argues that the trial court erred by 
giving the jury an instruction on the doctrine of subsequent negligence.  
The doctrine of subsequent negligence, also known as the last-clear- 
chance doctrine, is a method of establishing liability despite a plaintiff's 
contributory negligence.  Dees v. Gilley, 339 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Ala. 
1976).  That is, a plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a defense to a 
defendant's subsequent negligence.  Id. 
"The elements of proof of subsequent negligence are: (1) that 
the plaintiff was in a perilous position; (2) that the defendant 
had knowledge of that position; (3) that, armed with such 
knowledge, the defendant failed to use reasonable and 
ordinary care in avoiding the accident; (4) that the use of 
reasonable and ordinary care would have avoided the 
accident; and (5) that plaintiff was injured as a result.  
Treadway v. Brantley, 437 So. 2d 93 (Ala. 1983)." 
 
Zaharavich v. Clingerman, 529 So. 2d 978, 979 (Ala. 1988).   State Farm 
first argues that there is no evidence indicating that Stafford knew that 
Brian was in a dangerous position.  State Farm also argues that, even if 
Stafford knew that Brian was in a dangerous position, "there is no 
indication that a sufficient amount of time passed in which to allow a 
preventative effort" by Stafford.  State Farm's brief at 15.  That is, State 
SC-2022-0901 
7 
 
Farm seems to argue that, due to the alleged lack of time between 
discovering the peril and the accident, Stafford could not have reasonably 
avoided the accident.  Thus, State Farm argues that the trial court erred 
by giving an instruction on subsequent negligence. 
Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part: 
"No party may assign as error the giving or failing to give a 
written instruction, or the giving of an erroneous, misleading, 
incomplete, or otherwise improper oral charge unless that 
party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating the matter objected to and the grounds of the 
objection." 
 
Thus, to preserve its argument that the trial court erred by giving the 
subsequent-negligence charge, State Farm was required to have "(1) 
objected before the jury retired to consider its verdict; (2) stated the 
matter that [it] was objecting to; and (3) supplied the grounds for [the] 
objection."  Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545, 558 (Ala. 2006).   
 
At the charge conference, the theory of subsequent negligence was 
first mentioned by the Woods' attorney in response to the trial court's 
stating that it would charge the jury on the affirmative defense of 
contributory negligence: 
"THE COURT:  So I am going to give [the charge on 
contributory negligence].  
 
SC-2022-0901 
8 
 
"[THE WOODS' ATTORNEY]:  Okay. And then the 
subsequent 
negligence 
[charge], 
because 
contributory 
negligence is not a defense to subsequent negligence. 
  
"THE COURT:  Well, that's the one you had that I really 
didn't understand.  I thought that was pretty confusing. 
 
"[ONE OF STATE FARM'S ATTORNEYS]:  Judge, 
that's actually what I was going to bring up.  
 
"MS. WOOD:  Okay.  Do you want me to talk about the 
elements of subsequent negligence first and then we can 
figure out …." 
 
 
The trial court then located the proposed charge on subsequent 
negligence and explained its confusion regarding the charge: 
"THE COURT:  I guess what -- what my problem is, you 
know, we haven't heard from Stafford.  So … here are the 
elements.  The plaintiff was in a perilous position.  Okay. 
Well, that's fine.  Two, the defendant had actual knowledge 
that the plaintiff was in a position of danger.  Three, the 
defendant, with such knowledge, negligently failed to use 
reasonable and ordinary care in avoiding the accident. 
 
"[THE WOODS' ATTORNEY]:  He -- 
 
"THE COURT:  So we don't we don't -- know what he 
knew. 
 
"[THE WOODS' ATTORNEY]:  He was facing the 
direction of … the cross over; he was facing it. 
 
"THE COURT:  Yes, but --  
 
"[THE WOODS' ATTORNEY]:  And there is evidence 
that Brian was crossing.   
SC-2022-0901 
9 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well … how do we know -- 
 
"[THE WOODS' ATTORNEY]:  Because he was facing 
that direction. 
  
"THE COURT:  … I guess I will give it, but I mean, the 
same thing, you know -- you know, if -- if you are asking -- you 
know, we haven't heard from him, we are asking for this 
charge.  I guess you can infer he was facing -- I mean, he 
clearly was facing that direction.  Now, whether or not he had 
his eyes closed or not, I don't know." 
 
 
Immediately after the above exchange, one of State Farm's 
attorneys commented on the proposed subsequent-negligence charge: 
"[STATE FARM'S ATTORNEY]: Well, I guess -- Your 
Honor, how can -- if they are alleging he was negligent and 
subsequently negligent -- I mean -- I mean, it's the same thing 
as negligence.  I mean, that that's their whole case, is that 
they allege that Stafford was negligent.  So now they are 
asking for the --  
 
"THE COURT: Well --  
"(Parties talking at the same time.) 
"[STATE FARM'S ATTORNEY]: -- charge of negligence 
and subsequent negligence.  It -- it seems redundant to me. 
 
"[THE 
WOODS' 
ATTORNEY]: 
No, 
it's 
-- 
the 
contributory negligence defense does not apply to subsequent 
negligence. 
 
"THE COURT:  Yes, but I mean -- I will give it[, i.e., the 
charge on subsequent negligence] …." 
 
SC-2022-0901 
10 
 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
After the trial court charged the jury and before the jury retired to 
consider the case, the trial court asked State Farm's attorneys if they had 
any objections, and one of State Farm's attorneys replied: "We will just 
renew our objections."  
 
The record indicates that State Farm's attorney was confused about 
the nature and import of the subsequent-negligence doctrine.  At most, 
she objected to the subsequent-negligence charge on the ground that it 
was "redundant."  However, on appeal, State Farm does not argue that 
ground.  Rather, State Farm argues that the subsequent-negligence 
charge should not have been given because, State Farm says, there was 
insufficient evidence to support that charge.  Specifically, State Farm 
argues that there was no evidence indicating that Stafford knew that 
Brian was in a dangerous position and that, even if Stafford did know 
that Brian was in a dangerous position, "there is no indication that a 
sufficient amount of time passed in which to allow a preventative effort" 
by Stafford.  State Farm's brief at 15.   Regarding that first point, State 
Farm observes that Stafford did not testify, and it argues that "there is 
no indication as to what Stafford may have observed, seen, felt, heard, or 
SC-2022-0901 
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thought immediately prior to or at the time of impact."  Id. at 14.  Thus, 
that part of State Farm's argument echoes concerns raised by the trial 
court during the charge conference, as noted above.  However, as the 
Woods note in their brief, State Farm never objected to the subsequent-
negligence charge on the ground now asserted on appeal before that 
charge was given to the jury. 
 
As noted, Rule 51 provides that "[n]o party may assign as error … 
the giving of an erroneous … or otherwise improper oral charge unless 
that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection."  In its 
reply brief, State Farm contends that it properly objected to the 
subsequent-negligent charge on the ground now argued on appeal, 
stating that the issue was "debated extensively amongst counsel" at the 
charge conference.  State Farm's reply brief at 6.  However, the above-
quoted dialogue indicates that State Farm never actually objected to the 
charge on the ground State Farm now asserts on appeal.  Instead, the 
trial court sua sponte raised a concern about the appropriateness of the 
charge, and State Farm later fashioned an argument based on that 
concern after the jury had returned its verdict.  State Farm seems to 
SC-2022-0901 
12 
 
imply that the trial court's sua sponte contemplations about the charge 
were sufficient to preserve State Farm's argument on appeal.  However, 
State Farm cites no caselaw supporting that position.  The plain text of 
Rule 51 expressly requires that a party object and state the grounds for 
the objection, and "the failure to do so prevents appellate review of the 
alleged error."  McElmurry v. Uniroyal, Inc., 531 So. 2d 859, 860 (Ala. 
1988).  State Farm waived its argument challenging the subsequent-
negligence charge by not timely raising the argument.2  
 
Next, State Farm argues that the trial court erred by allowing the 
wantonness claim to go to the jury because, State Farm says, there is 
insufficient evidence to support that claim.  As they did regarding the 
subsequent-negligence issue, the Woods argue that State Farm did not 
preserve this argument because, the Woods say, State Farm did not 
 
2After the jury retired to consider the verdict, one of State Farm's 
attorneys stated: "We will take exception to the wantonness charges and 
then there was the charge about subsequent negligence.   I think that 
was the other one that we raised an objection to earlier."  As noted, State 
Farm, at most, may have earlier objected to the subsequent-negligence 
charge on the ground that it was redundant; at any rate, the objection to 
the charge after the jury retired was untimely under Rule 51.  In its 
postjudgment motion, State Farm did argue that the subsequent-
negligence charge was unsupported by the evidence; however, by that 
point, the argument had already been waived under Rule 51.   
SC-2022-0901 
13 
 
specifically object to the proposed wantonness charge at the charge 
conference.  However, we conclude that State Farm's wantonness 
argument was preserved for appeal. Although the point is not always 
clear in State Farm's argument, State Farm argues that the trial court 
erred by not entering a JML under Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P., on the 
wantonness claim.  See State Farm's brief at 9-10 (discussing the 
standard for reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML).   That argument 
is a different type of argument than State Farm's first argument 
concerning the propriety of a jury instruction on the Woods' theory of 
subsequent negligence.  Under Rule 50, to preserve its argument that the 
trial court should have entered a JML on the wantonness claim on the 
ground of insufficient evidence, State Farm was required to (1) move for 
a JML at the close of all the evidence on that ground and (2) renew that 
motion in a postjudgment motion.  Rule 50; Committee Comments on 
1973 Adoption of Rule 50; and Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 28 So. 
3d 716, 722 (Ala. 2009).  State Farm followed that procedure in this case 
and thus preserved its argument for appeal.  The Woods argue that Rule 
51 controls this issue, as they did regarding the subsequent-negligence 
charge.  However, the issue whether State Farm preserved its argument 
SC-2022-0901 
14 
 
that the trial court erred by not entering a JML on the wantonness claim 
is controlled by Rule 50, not the procedure under Rule 51.  See Complete 
Cash Holdings, LLC v. Powell, 239 So. 3d 550, 556 n.7 (Ala. 2017) 
(discussing the distinction between a challenge to a ruling on a JML 
motion under Rule 50 and a challenge that invokes Rule 51); and Cook's 
Pest Control, 28 So. 3d at 722-23 (same).   State Farm preserved its 
argument regarding the wantonness claim. 
 
Although State Farm has preserved its argument that there was 
insufficient evidence to support sending the wantonness claim to the jury, 
State Farm has not presented a sufficient record allowing us to review 
that issue.  Among other things, State Farm challenges aspects of the 
deposition testimony of McPherson, a driver who allegedly witnessed the 
accident.  State Farm contends that there are inconsistencies between 
McPherson's affidavit testimony and her deposition testimony and that, 
while being cross-examined during her deposition, she recanted some of 
her testimony made earlier in the deposition.  McPherson's affidavit was 
not admitted into evidence at trial.  A video of McPherson's deposition 
testimony was shown to the jury at trial, but that testimony was not 
transcribed by the court reporter.  Although the deposition testimony was 
SC-2022-0901 
15 
 
shown to the jury, a copy of the video was not actually admitted into 
evidence.  The Woods moved the trial court to admit a transcript of 
McPherson's deposition testimony, but the trial court declined to admit 
the transcript; State Farm objected to the Woods' motion to admit the 
transcript of the deposition.  The record does contain an excerpt from 
McPherson's deposition attached to a motion for a partial summary 
judgment submitted by the Woods.  Thus, this Court does have access to 
some of the testimony that the jury saw.  However, only a portion of the 
deposition testimony was attached to the summary-judgment motion, 
and it does not include State Farm's cross-examination of McPherson.   
The record also contains two pages of deposition testimony taken from 
State Farm's cross-examination of McPherson; those two pages were 
attached to a motion in limine filed by the Woods.  In its appellate briefs, 
State Farm relies on a short excerpt from its cross-examination during 
the deposition, and that short excerpt was read to Pam Stirling, the 
Woods' expert witness, while she was being cross-examined at trial.3  
 
3The excerpt read to Stirling reflected McPherson's agreement with 
this statement posed to her during her deposition:  "So it's accurate you 
don't remember anything that happened from when [Stafford's vehicle]-- 
you didn't see anything that happened between the time that [Stafford's 
vehicle] left your line of sight until the point of impact.  Is that correct?" 
SC-2022-0901 
16 
 
 
State Farm's argument regarding McPherson's testimony is 
material to its argument that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
finding of wantonness.  However, we do not have a complete transcript of 
the deposition testimony before us, and we do not have a copy of the video 
viewed by the jury.  Thus, we do not have all the evidence that the jury 
considered regarding a material issue.  This Court addressed a similar 
issue in Vaughan v. Oliver, 822 So. 2d 1163, 1170 (Ala. 2001): 
"Although the depositions of Dr. Perry, who was Oliver's 
vascular surgeon, and Dr. Sullivan, who was Oliver's 
admitting and main treating physician, were read to the jury, 
the court reporter did not transcribe the in-court reading of 
the deposition testimony of either doctor.  No party admitted 
the depositions themselves into evidence or filed the 
depositions with the court.  Therefore, the jury and the trial 
court had evidence before them not included in the record on 
appeal.  'Where all the evidence is not in the record, it will be 
presumed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
verdict or judgment.'  Berryhill v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 
479 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Ala. 1985).  See also Smith v. Smith, 
596 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1992); Eubanks & Eubanks, Inc. v. Colonial 
Pacific Leasing, 757 So. 2d 437 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Cofer v. 
Town of Good Hope, 655 So. 2d 1028 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995); 
Jones v. Jones, 603 So. 2d 1109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992)." 
 
 
In this case, the jury considered evidence that we do not have before 
us on appeal, i.e., parts of McPherson's deposition testimony.  "[T]he 
burden is on the appealing party to insure that an adequate record is 
available for review on appeal."  Ex parte Olson, 472 So. 2d 437, 438 (Ala. 
SC-2022-0901 
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1985).  " 'Where all the evidence is not in the record, it will be presumed 
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict or judgment.'"  
Vaughan, 822 So. 2d at 1170 (quoting Berryhill v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 479 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Ala. 1985)).  Accordingly, we must presume 
that there was evidence to support the trial court's decision to deny the 
motion for a JML and the jury's verdict, and the judgment on the verdict 
is due to be affirmed in this regard.4   
Although the judgment as to this issue is due to be affirmed on the 
above-discussed ground, we note that, regardless, State Farm's 
wantonness argument is without merit. 
"'When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a [JML], this Court 
uses the same standard the trial court used initially in 
deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a [JML].  
Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 
1997).  Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is 
whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to 
allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a factual 
resolution.  Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992).  
The nonmovant must have presented substantial evidence in 
order to withstand a motion for a [JML].  See § 12-21-12, Ala. 
 
4State Farm does not directly address the principle stated in 
Vaughan.  Rather, State Farm, in its reply brief, essentially argues that 
the record contains an account of that part of McPherson's testimony that 
State Farm believes it needs to support its argument; however, that 
argument sidesteps the principle in Vaughan and the cases cited in 
Vaughan.   
 
SC-2022-0901 
18 
 
Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 
547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  A reviewing court must 
determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof 
has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute 
requiring resolution by the jury.  Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353.  
In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a [JML], this Court 
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the 
jury would have been free to draw.  Id.'" 
 
Leiser v. Raymond R. Fletcher, M.D., P.C., 978 So. 2d 700, 705-06 (Ala. 
2007) (quoting Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Invs. Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 
2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003)). 
 
State Farm argues that there was insufficient evidence to send the 
wantonness claim to the jury.  Specifically, State Farm argues that, other 
than the evidence of Stafford's excessive speed, there was no evidence of 
wantonness.  Wantonness is "[c]onduct which is carried on with a 
reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." § 6-11-
20(b)(3), Ala. Code 1975.  "We have held that wantonness involves 'the 
conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing 
of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or 
omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.'" Lands v. 
Ward, 349 So. 3d 219, 229 (Ala. 2021) (quoting Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 
2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007)) (emphasis omitted).   
SC-2022-0901 
19 
 
State Farm emphasizes that, in the context of driving, "[t]his Court 
has held that while speed alone does not amount to wantonness, speed, 
coupled with other circumstances, may amount to wantonness."  Hicks v. 
Dunn, 819 So. 2d 22, 24 (Ala. 2001).   State Farm argues that "the actual 
evidence presented at trial was limited to a single factor -- Stafford's 
speed"  -- and that there was no evidence of "other circumstances" in 
addition to speed.  State Farm's brief at 16-17.  However, as we will 
discuss below, that is not the case.  The Woods contend that Stafford was 
speeding in the mandatory right-turn lane when he abruptly changed 
lanes into the flow-through middle lane, where he collided with Brian's 
vehicle.  It is undisputed that Stafford was speeding and that the collision 
occurred in the flow-through lane as Brian was attempting to cross the 
intersection. However, State Farm challenges whether there was 
evidence indicating that Stafford made a lane change from the 
mandatory right-turn lane to the flow-through lane.  In doing so, State 
Farm does not seem to contest that such a lane change would constitute 
a circumstance that, combined with unsafe speed, would support a 
finding of wantonness.  See State Farm's brief at 17 ("Admittedly, [the] 
Wood[s] sought to offer an argument regarding a pre-accident lane 
SC-2022-0901 
20 
 
change by Stafford.").  Indeed, evidence of an unsafe lane change in a 
speeding case is an additional circumstance that can support a finding of 
wantonness.  See Hornady Truck Line, Inc. v. Meadows, 847 So. 2d 908, 
916 (Ala. 2002) (indicating that, when a tractor-trailer truck that was 
traveling at an unsafe speed merged from one lane to another without 
warning, that was an additional circumstance that could support a 
wantonness claim). 
 
State Farm notes that there was no direct, eyewitness testimony 
that Stafford changed lanes shortly before the accident occurred.  
However, there was circumstantial evidence from which the jury could 
have concluded that Stafford moved from the mandatory right-turn lane 
to the flow-through lane shortly before the accident occurred.  
"'"'"Circumstantial evidence is in nowise considered inferior evidence 
and is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence provided it points to 
[establishing the fact sought to be proved]."'"'"  Wiggins v. Mobile 
Greyhound Park, LLP, 294 So. 3d 709, 723 (Ala. 2019) (citations omitted); 
see also Bell v. Colony Apartments Co., 568 So. 2d 805, 810-11 (Ala. 1990) 
("A fact is established by circumstantial evidence if it can be reasonably 
inferred from the facts and circumstances adduced.").  Brian testified 
SC-2022-0901 
21 
 
that, when he attempted to cross the intersection, there were no vehicles 
in the flow-through lane and the left-turn lane to his right.  He testified 
that, when checking traffic to his right, his sight was directed toward the 
two lanes that contained traffic that would cross his path, i.e., the flow-
through lane and the left-turn lane.  Brian testified that, although he 
never saw Stafford's speeding vehicle, he concluded that it must have 
been in the mandatory right-turn lane as Brian began to cross the 
intersection because the vehicle was not in the other two lanes to his 
right.  As noted, it is undisputed that Stafford's vehicle collided with 
Brian's vehicle in the pass-through lane.  Brian's testimony was evidence 
from which the jury could have concluded that Stafford suddenly changed 
lanes very shortly before the accident.  That evidence, combined with 
evidence of speeding, is evidence supporting a claim of wantonness.  
Hornady Truck Line, 847 So. 2d at 916. 
 
Furthermore, besides evidence of the lane change, there were 
additional circumstances that, when combined with Stafford's speed, 
support a claim of wantonness.   Before the accident occurred, Stafford 
drove past an intersection-crossing warning sign indicating that he was 
approaching an intersection.  Before he drove over the hillcrest on the 
SC-2022-0901 
22 
 
way to the intersection, he drove past a regulatory traffic sign, i.e., a sign 
that must be obeyed, see Alabama Driver's Manual, which was admitted 
into evidence, stating that the "RIGHT LANE MUST TURN RIGHT" at 
the upcoming intersection.  At around that point, Stafford's view of the 
upcoming intersection was blocked by the hillcrest.  Further along the 
road, beyond the hillcrest, the word "ONLY" and an arrow pointing right 
were painted on the mandatory right-turn lane.   Although, as State 
Farm notes, there is no direct evidence of what Stafford was aware of as 
he drove toward the intersection, "'"knowledge may be proved by 
showing circumstances from which the fact of knowledge is a reasonable 
inference; it need not be proved by direct evidence."'" Hicks, 819 So. 2d 
at 24 (citations omitted).  Ignoring traffic warning signs and the existence 
of a hillcrest obscuring a driver's view of an upcoming intersection are 
additional factors that can combine with speed to elevate a driver's 
conduct from negligence to wantonness.  See Hicks, 819 So. 2d at 25 
(stating that there was evidence supporting a wantonness claim when 
"the jury could have found that Dunn was driving much faster than the 
posted speed limit," "that he was not paying attention to the road," and 
"that he did not slow his speed despite the construction signs and his 
SC-2022-0901 
23 
 
knowledge that a restaurant into which patrons would likely be turning 
was on the other side of the hill he was cresting, obscured from his view").  
 
In sum, there was evidence of "additional circumstances"  in 
addition to Stafford's speeding sufficient to support sending the 
wantonness claim to the jury.  Primarily, there was evidence from which 
the jury could have concluded that Stafford moved from the mandatory 
right-turn lane into the flow-through lane very shortly before the collision 
with Brian's vehicle.  Further, there was evidence from which the jury 
could have concluded that Stafford was made aware of the upcoming 
intersection by an intersection-crossing warning sign, that Stafford saw 
that his view of the intersection was initially blocked by a hillcrest, and 
that Stafford was warned by a traffic sign and road markings that he was 
driving in a mandatory right-turn lane. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, State Farm has failed to establish 
that the trial court erred by not setting aside its judgment entered on the 
jury's verdict, and we affirm the judgment.   
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.