Title: City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12111; SJC 12177
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12111 
SJC-12177 
 
CITY OF REVERE & others1  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS GAMING COMMISSION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2016. - March 10, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Gaming.  License.  Administrative Law, Judicial review, 
Intervention.  Practice, Civil, Action in nature of 
certiorari, Review of administrative action, Intervention, 
Interlocutory appeal.  Jurisdiction, Judicial review of 
administrative action. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 16, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss the intervener's complaint and a motion 
to dismiss the plaintiffs' second amended complaint were heard 
by Janet L. Sanders, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review, and following the order by Sanders, J., 
for entry of final judgment, the Supreme Judicial Court granted 
a second application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
                     
 
1 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 103, 
Louis Ciarlone, Ronald Hills, Debra A. Santa Anna, and Elaine 
Leto; Mohegan Sun Massachusetts, LLC, intervener. 
2 
 
 
 
Kenneth S. Leonetti & Christopher E. Hart (Michael Hoven 
also present) for the intervener. 
 
Patricia L. Davidson for city of Revere. 
 
David S. Mackey (Mina S. Makarious & Melissa C. Allison 
also present) for the defendant. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  This case concerns the process by which the 
Massachusetts Gaming Commission (commission) awarded a gaming 
license in late 2014 to Wynn MA, LLC (Wynn).  The plaintiffs -- 
an unsuccessful applicant for the license, the city that would 
have hosted the unsuccessful applicant, a labor union, and 
individual citizens -- filed two complaints in the Superior 
Court that alleged numerous defects in the commission's process 
for awarding the license to Wynn.  The commission filed motions 
to dismiss both complaints.  A judge in the Superior Court 
allowed the motions on all but one count of one of the 
complaints, permitting only the unsuccessful applicant's claim 
for certiorari review to survive.  The parties now appeal 
various aspects of the judge's decision.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
 
Background.  1.  Gaming in Massachusetts.  In November, 
2011, the Legislature enacted St. 2011, c. 194, An Act 
3 
 
 
establishing expanded gaming in the Commonwealth (act).2  Section 
16 of the act created the gaming commission and set forth 
standards under which applicants could obtain a license from the 
commission to operate a gaming establishment.  See G. L. c. 23K, 
inserted by St. 2011, c. 194, § 16.  The act describes two types 
of licenses.  The one at issue here, a "category 1 license," 
permits the operation of "a gaming establishment with table 
games and slot machines."  See G. L. c. 23K, § 2.  The act 
authorizes the commission to issue up to one such license in 
"region A," which encompasses the counties of Suffolk, 
Middlesex, Essex, Norfolk, and Worcester.  G. L. c. 23K, § 19 
(a) (1). 
 
The license application process relevant to this case 
unfolded in two phases, as contemplated by the commission's 
regulations.  See 205 Code Mass. Regs. § 110.01 (2012).  
Applicants were required first to demonstrate their suitability 
and eligibility based on criteria described in G. L. c. 23K, 
§§ 12 and 15.  Only those applicants deemed suitable by the 
commission proceeded to the second phase, in which the 
commission considered the applicant's entire application.  See 
G. L. c. 23K, § 12 (c).  In this phase, the commission evaluated 
                     
 
2 The court's opinion in Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 
478, 480-482 (2014), sets forth a more complete description of 
St. 2011, c. 194 (act). 
4 
 
 
the applicants based on nineteen statutory criteria and issued a 
corresponding statement of findings.  See G. L. c. 23K, § 18.  
The criteria required the commission to evaluate how well the 
applicants would advance a broad array of objectives, ranging 
from promoting local businesses and using sustainable 
development principles to maximizing revenues received by the 
Commonwealth and mitigating the potential impacts of gaming on 
host and surrounding communities.  See id. 
 
Ultimately, the license application process challenged in 
this case came down to a choice between two applicants -- Wynn, 
which proposed a casino in Everett, and Mohegan Sun 
Massachusetts, LLC (Mohegan Sun), which proposed a casino in 
Revere.  In September, 2014, the commission awarded the license 
to Wynn.  In November, 2014, the commission issued a thirty-six-
page written determination, with accompanying exhibits, 
explaining its evaluation of the competing applications.  This 
determination formally awarded the license to Wynn and denied 
the application of Mohegan Sun. 
 
2.  Alleged defects in the licensing process.  In October, 
2014, the city of Revere (city), the International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers Local 103 (union), and four union members 
(individual plaintiffs) brought suit in the Superior Court 
against the commission.  In early 2015, these plaintiffs filed a 
second amended complaint.  At around the same time, Mohegan Sun 
5 
 
 
filed a motion to intervene and a complaint in intervention.  
The motion to intervene was allowed without opposition. 
 
The second amended complaint and Mohegan Sun's complaint in 
intervention contain four virtually identical counts.  In the 
first two counts, Mohegan Sun, the city, and the union seek 
review and reversal of the commission's award of the gaming 
license to Wynn under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (count I), and under 
G. L. c. 249, § 4 (count II).  Concerning counts I and II, they 
allege, for example, that the commission in its agreement to 
award the license to Wynn failed to include several commitments 
or conditions required by the act relating to environmental 
requirements, neighboring community obligations and investor 
suitability; failed to give proper weight to host and 
surrounding community agreements, adopted an improper 
arbitration regulation, failed to properly consider various 
mitigation plans, and accepted incorrect employment estimates;  
treated Wynn and Mohegan Sun differently, with inequitable 
results for Mohegan Sun, in part by using differing grading 
procedures, inconsistently applying the statutory requirement 
that license applicants have no affiliates or close associates 
who would not qualify for a license, and engaging in improper ex 
parte communications with Wynn; and failed properly to take into 
account the suitability (in particular, the criminal history) of 
certain individuals allegedly involved in the transaction in 
6 
 
 
which Wynn purchased the land for its casino.  They also allege 
that Wynn failed properly to disclose its involvement in an 
ongoing criminal investigation as required by the act. 
 
In count III of the respective complaints, Mohegan Sun, the 
city, and the union seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to 
G. L. c. 231A, § 1, to the effect that the act is 
unconstitutional as applied and that, to the extent the act 
precludes judicial review, it violates the constitutional 
guarantee of due process and also separation of powers 
principles.  In count IV, the plaintiffs allege that the 
commission's regulations implementing the act are ultra vires 
and unconstitutional. 
 
Finally, in the second amended complaint only, the 
individual plaintiffs seek relief under the open meeting law, 
G. L. c. 30A, § 23 (count V).  Essentially, count V alleges that 
a quorum of the commission engaged in deliberations that should 
have taken place in a public meeting, including during the 
recess of a public meeting and on other occasions.  Additional 
allegations in the complaints are discussed where relevant 
infra. 
 
3.  Procedural history.  In July, 2015, the commission 
moved to dismiss both complaints.  In December, 2015, the motion 
judge allowed the motion to dismiss the second amended 
complaint.  The judge ruled that counts I through IV of that 
7 
 
 
complaint must be dismissed under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1), 
365 Mass. 754 (1974), for lack of standing because the city and 
the union are not within the "zone of interests" that the act 
arguably protects.  She also ruled that the individual 
plaintiffs' allegations regarding the open meeting law failed to 
rise above the speculative level, and therefore could not 
survive a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) 
for failure to state a claim. 
 
With respect to Mohegan Sun's complaint in intervention, 
the motion judge allowed the motion to dismiss count I, ruling 
that § 17 (g) of the act expressly precludes judicial review 
under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  However, she denied the motion with 
respect to count II, concluding that Mohegan Sun satisfied the 
prerequisites for certiorari review.  Because this ruling 
permitted a form of judicial review of the commission's region A 
decision, the judge dismissed as moot counts III and IV of 
Mohegan Sun's complaint seeking declaratory relief. 
 
The commission filed a notice of appeal with respect to 
Mohegan Sun's surviving count II, claiming that the doctrine of 
present execution authorizes interlocutory review.   After entry 
of final judgment the plaintiffs filed their own notice of 
appeal.  This court allowed applications for direct appellate 
review of both the commission's and the plaintiffs' appeals. 
8 
 
 
 
Standard of review.  This court reviews orders on motions 
to dismiss de novo.  Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 266 
(2013).  For purposes of that review, we accept as true the 
facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaints and any exhibits 
attached thereto, drawing all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiffs' favor.  Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass'n v. Kargman, 
474 Mass. 107, 116 (2016). 
 
Discussion.  The parties' appeals raise several issues, 
which we address in the following order.  First, we consider the 
claims raised by Mohegan Sun and the commission concerning the 
motion judge's dismissal of Mohegan Sun's claim under G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14, and the judge's determination that certiorari 
review of the commission's decision is available.  We also 
review, briefly, the judge's dismissal of Mohegan Sun's claims 
for declaratory relief in counts III and IV of the complaint.  
We next address the claims of the city and the union that the 
judge erred in ruling that they lacked standing to challenge the 
commission's decision.  Finally, we consider the open meeting 
law claim of the individual plaintiffs. 
 
1.  Claims of Mohegan Sun and the commission.  a.  Judicial 
review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  General Laws c. 30A, § 14, 
provides for judicial review of an agency decision in an 
adjudicatory proceeding, "[e]xcept so far as any provision of 
law expressly precludes" it.  G. L. c. 30A, § 14, first par.  
9 
 
 
Section 17 (g) of the act, in turn, provides that "[t]he 
commission shall have full discretion as to whether to issue a 
license.  Applicants shall have no legal right or privilege to a 
gaming license and shall not be entitled to any further review 
if denied by the commission" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 23K, 
§ 17 (g). 
 
The motion judge concluded that Mohegan Sun's claim for 
relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, fails because G. L. c. 23K, 
§ 17 (g) expressly precludes such review.  Mohegan Sun argues 
that § 17 (g) is narrow in scope, barring review under G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14, of the commission's denial of Mohegan Sun's 
license application, but not of the commission's grant of a 
license to Wynn.  We agree with the motion judge's reading of 
§ 17 (g).  Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that the 
commission's licensing proceeding qualified as an "adjudicatory 
proceeding" within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A,3 the language in 
                     
 
3 The act is opaque on this point, stating that "[t]he 
commission shall conduct a public hearing on [a gaming license] 
application pursuant to [§] 11 1/2 of [c.] 30A."  G. L. c. 23K, 
§ 17 (c).  There is no "§ 11 1/2" within G. L. c. 30A.  It is 
possible (and we think likely) that the Legislature intended to 
reference G. L. c. 30A, § 11A 1/2, in which case it would have 
been pointing to a version of the open meeting law that was 
repealed by a 2009 enactment, effective in 2010 (one year prior 
to the passage of the act).  See St. 2009, c. 28, §§ 17-18 
(repealing G. L. c. 30A, §§ 11A and 11A 1/2, and adding G. L. 
c. 30A, §§ 18-25).  On the other hand, if the Legislature 
intended to refer to G. L. c. 30A, § 11, then it would be 
referring to the section that describes adjudicatory 
 
10 
 
 
§ 17 (g) evinces a clear legislative intent to "expressly 
preclude[]" judicial review of commission licensing decisions 
within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 14, first par.  This 
preclusion includes, but is not limited to, entities whose 
applications have been denied by the commission. 
 
Mohegan Sun's main argument to the contrary hinges on the 
phrase in § 17 (g) "if denied by the commission."  According to 
Mohegan Sun, this phrase shows that the Legislature intended 
§ 17 (g) to bar review of the denial of a gaming license, but 
not the grant of one.  This reading distorts the syntax of § 17 
(g).  The language at issue provides:  "Applicants . . . shall 
not be entitled to any further review if denied by the 
commission."  G. L. c. 23K, § 17 (g).  The subject of this 
sentence is "applicants," which is later modified by the phrase 
"if denied by the commission."  Thus, the statute withholds "any 
further review" from entities whose applications have been 
denied by the commission.  This structure requires that a 
"denial" occur before the bar to review operates.  But the bar, 
once triggered, attaches to the failed applicant, not to the 
"denial" of that entity's application. 
                                                                  
proceedings.  Although the commission adverted to this problem 
its motion to dismiss, the parties do not discuss it in their 
briefs to this court. 
11 
 
 
 
More importantly, we consider the language of § 17 (g) to 
reflect a broader legislative intention to curtail judicial 
review, barring anyone, not just failed applicants, from 
obtaining review of commission licensing decisions through the 
ordinary channels of judicial review that the Legislature has 
otherwise provided, including review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  
See Olmstead v. Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 466 Mass. 582, 
588 (2013) (court gives effect to statute's plain and ordinary 
meaning where statute's words are clear).  There was no error. 
 
b.  Availability of certiorari review.  Given our 
interpretation of § 17 (g), the obvious threshold question  
regarding certiorari review is whether such review of a 
commission licensing decision may be available notwithstanding 
§ 17 (g).  The answer to the question is yes.  Although § 17 (g) 
precludes ordinary modes of judicial review and thereby 
qualifies, for purposes of G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as a provision 
rendering review under that statute unavailable, it does not 
have the same effect with respect to certiorari review, which 
"is of extraordinary nature" and "is one of the ancient 
prerogative writs, whose history stretches far back toward the 
beginnings of the common law."  Swan v. Justices of Superior 
Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544 (1916).  That history provides an 
independent basis for certiorari review outside the scope of 
§ 17 (g) and G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  As the court stated in Swan, 
12 
 
 
supra, only "words unmistakable in import" will "express a 
legislative purpose to deprive parties . . . from the shelter of 
this writ," and we do not read the language of § 17 (g) as going 
so far.  See Swan at 543-544 (statutory language, "there shall 
be no appeal" from decision of Superior Court judge "falls far 
short" of precluding certiorari review).  See also Indeck v. 
Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 384 (2008) (certiorari review 
"not necessarily precluded" even where decision declared "final 
or unreviewable").  Our conclusion is reinforced when we 
consider the language of § 17 (g) against the backdrop of the 
Legislature's declaration that a "paramount policy objective" of 
the act is to "ensur[e] public confidence in the integrity of 
the gaming licensing process."  G. L. c. 23K, § 1 (1).  It would 
be difficult to give meaning to that declaration were we to read 
§ 17 (g) as the commission suggests we should -- that is, as 
precluding even the extraordinary remedy of certiorari review.  
Again, there was no error. 
 
 Here, there are four issues related to certiorari review:  
(1) whether Mohegan Sun's complaint in intervention was timely; 
(2) whether the doctrine of present execution allowed the 
commission to bring an immediate, interlocutory appeal from the 
motion judge's decision that certiorari review is available to 
Mohegan Sun; (3) whether Mohegan Sun satisfies the necessary 
conditions to entitle it to certiorari review; and (4) if so, 
13 
 
 
what is the nature and scope of certiorari review of a licensing 
decision by the commission. 
 
(1)  Timeliness.  The commission argues that Mohegan Sun's 
certiorari claim is jurisdictionally time barred because the 
complaint was not filed within the sixty-day limitations period 
in G. L. c. 249, § 4.  Mohegan Sun responds that its motion to 
intervene and accompanying complaint relate back to the time of 
the original plaintiffs' complaint in much the same way as Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 15 (c), 365 Mass. 761 (1974), permits for amended 
complaints. 
 
"Whether a party should be allowed to intervene is a matter 
that is largely left to the discretion of the judge below."  
Corcoran v. Wigglesworth Mach. Co., 389 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1983), 
citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (b), 365 Mass. 769 (1974).  Although 
a statute of limitations and its accompanying rationale of 
repose certainly are important factors in resolving the issue, 
they are not necessarily dispositive; rather, timeliness in the 
intervention context is a more flexible concept that also may 
take into account (1) the stage at which the party intervened, 
(2) any prejudice that arises from a delayed intervention, and 
(3) an applicant's particular need to intervene.  See J.W. Smith 
& H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice, § 24.4, at 374-376 (2d ed. 2006). 
 
Here, at the time of Mohegan Sun's motion to intervene, the 
original plaintiffs had just filed an assented to motion to file 
14 
 
 
their second amended complaint.  Mohegan Sun's motion to 
intervene then was allowed without opposition from the 
commission.  As discussed supra, the claims and allegations in 
the second amended complaint and the intervenor's complaint are 
very similar.  The commission did not challenge the timeliness 
of the intervention, in its motion to dismiss, until several 
months after the intervention was allowed.  Given those 
circumstances, the commission cannot show that it was prejudiced 
by Mohegan Sun's intervention.  See Corcoran, 389 Mass. at 1003.  
See also Sargeant v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 383 Mass. 
808, 819 (1981). 
 
Furthermore, we agree with the motion judge that, at least 
in this case, there is little functional difference between 
Mohegan Sun filing a complaint in intervention and Mohegan Sun 
being added as a new plaintiff to the original plaintiffs' 
second amended complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 15; if the 
latter course of action had been followed, the generous 
relation-back principles applicable to amendments to complaints 
would permit the amendment.  Cf. Rafferty v. Sancta Maria Hosp., 
5 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 628 (1977) ("[T]he distinction in this 
case between a motion to intervene and a motion to amend by 
adding plaintiffs is purely formal . . . .  Whether we treat the 
new plaintiffs as parties added by an amendment which relates 
back to the original complaint or as interveners makes no 
15 
 
 
difference in the circumstances of this case").  Accordingly, we 
decline to disturb the motion judge's ruling that Mohegan Sun's 
certiorari claim is not barred as untimely. 
 
(2)  Doctrine of present execution.  The denial of the 
commission's motion to dismiss Mohegan Sun's certiorari review 
claim is an interlocutory ruling.  The doctrine of present 
execution provides a narrow exception to the general rule 
prohibiting interlocutory appeals, provided two conditions are 
met:  (1) the matter is collateral to the merits of the 
controversy, and (2) the interlocutory ruling will interfere 
with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the 
final judgment.  See Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 151-152 
(2012).  Generally, orders denying motions to dismiss based on 
immunity from suit satisfy both criteria.  Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 
264–265, and cases cited. 
 
Given these requirements, the commission's attempt to 
invoke the doctrine hinges on its position that § 17 (g) 
precludes any and all forms of judicial review of its licensing 
decisions, and therefore immunizes the commission from suit. 
 
We have decided in this case that certiorari review of 
licensing decisions sometimes may be available.  Therefore, the 
commission is not entirely immune from suit, and it may not 
invoke the doctrine of present execution to obtain review of the 
judge's interlocutory order.  Nevertheless, we discuss the other 
16 
 
 
two issues concerning certiorari review that we have identified 
because they have been briefed fully by the parties, they raise 
significant issues of statutory interpretation concerning the 
commission (a relatively new and important public agency), and 
addressing them is in the public interest.  See Marcus, 462 
Mass. at 153, and cases cited. 
 
(3)  Prerequisites for certiorari review.  In general, a 
plaintiff is only entitled to certiorari review of an 
administrative decision if it can demonstrate the presence of 
three elements:  "(1) a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding, 
(2) from which there is no other reasonably adequate remedy, and 
(3) a substantial injury or injustice arising from the 
proceeding under review."  Indeck, 450 Mass. at 385.  The 
commission argues that Mohegan Sun, as an applicant for a gaming 
license, does not have a justiciable right to vindicate through 
certiorari review and that, even if it does, the proceedings 
appealed from are not judicial or quasi judicial.   We agree 
with the motion judge that Mohegan Sun meets the prerequisites 
for certiorari review in this case. 
 
When distinguishing a quasi judicial agency proceeding from 
a legislative or purely administrative one, we have looked 
generally to the form of the proceeding and examined the extent 
to which it resembles judicial action.  See Hoffer v. Board of 
Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 457 (2012).  However, the 
17 
 
 
line beyond which an agency proceeding becomes quasi judicial is 
rarely a bright one.  Instead, courts have looked to a number of 
factors in deciding the question:  (1) whether the proceeding is 
preceded by specific charges, see School Comm. of Hudson v. 
Board of Educ., 448 Mass. 565, 576 (2007); (2) whether the 
proceeding involves sworn testimony by witnesses subject to 
cross-examination, see id., or a party attesting to certain 
facts, see Frawley v. Police Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 
727 (2016), as opposed to unsworn statements by interested 
persons advocating for or against a proposed new policy, see 
School Comm. of Hudson, 448 Mass. at 576; (3) whether the agency 
conducts an investigation into the veracity of attested-to 
facts, see Frawley, supra; (4) whether the proceeding culminates 
in an individualized determination of a party's entitlement to 
some benefit, see id., or an individualized course of 
discipline, see Hoffer, supra, as opposed to culminating in the 
adoption of a rule of general applicability, see Pronghorn, Inc. 
v. Licensing Bd. of Peabody, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 70, 72 (1982); 
and (5) whether the proceeding is followed by the adoption of 
formal findings of fact, see School Comm. of Hudson, supra. 
 
Applying those factors here, we observe, on the one hand, 
that the licensing hearing was not preceded by specific charges, 
was not adversarial in the typical judicial sense, and provided 
no opportunity for cross-examination.  See 205 Code Mass. Regs. 
18 
 
 
§ 118.07 (1)-(2) (2014).4  Further, it invited unsworn statements 
by persons advocating support or opposition to a license 
application.  See G. L. c. 23K, § 17 (d). 
 
On the other hand, applicants were required to present 
information to the commission "truthfully, fully and under 
oath."  205 Code Mass. Regs. § 118.07 (2).  Applicants also were 
provided an opportunity to respond to the commission as part of 
the licensing hearing, both to correct perceived factual errors 
in the commission's presentations and to respond to conditions 
that the commission proposed to place on the granting of a 
license.  Further, the commission was required to conduct 
thorough investigations into the applicants, first into their 
suitability, see G. L. c. 23K, § 12, and later, for those deemed 
suitable, into the materials the applicants submitted as part of 
their applications, see G. L. c. 23K, §§ 15 (11), 17, 18.  Once 
those steps were completed, the commission made a highly 
                     
 
4 The commission points out that its regulations describe 
the proceedings in the second phase of the licensing process as 
"administrative and legislative in nature, not adjudicatory."  
205 Code Mass. Regs. § 118.07 (1) (2014).  However, as discussed 
in note 3, supra, the statutory authority for that declaration 
is less than clear.  More to the point, the term "adjudicatory 
proceeding" has a specific statutory definition, see G. L. 
c. 30A, § 1 (1), with specific consequences regarding, for 
instance, how the hearing is conducted, see G. L. c. 30A, §§ 10, 
11.  As discussed in more detail in the text, the term "quasi 
judicial proceeding" has a substantially broader and more 
flexible meaning than the term "adjudicatory proceeding" as 
defined in G. L. c. 30A.  Consequently, our analysis is not 
dependent on the designation "adjudicatory proceeding." 
19 
 
 
individualized determination to issue a gaming license to Wynn 
and to deny the same to Mohegan Sun.  This determination did not 
concern a new rule of general applicability, but rather 
conferred a particular benefit upon a particular entity and 
denied that benefit to another entity.  The determination was 
accompanied by more than twenty pages of findings and evaluation 
analyzing the manner in which each applicant proposed to advance 
the statutory objectives of the act. 
 
We conclude that, on balance, the category of quasi 
judicial proceedings is flexible enough to include the 
commission's licensing hearing at issue here.  Accordingly, 
Mohegan Sun has satisfied the first element for certiorari 
review. 
 
Mohegan Sun also satisfies the second element of certiorari 
review, demonstrating that it has available to it no other 
adequate remedy.  See Indeck, 450 Mass. at 385.  The commission 
does not contest this point.  To the contrary, it argues that 
its licensing decisions generally are not subject to any 
judicial review whatsoever; it further contends that such 
preclusion of review is both commonplace and constitutional.    
However, the point at which ordinary avenues of review vanish 
(e.g., G. L. c. 30A, § 14) is precisely where the extraordinary 
remedy of certiorari may come into play.  See Indeck, 450 Mass. 
at 384 ("certiorari review is not necessarily precluded even if 
20 
 
 
a decision is declared [by rule or statute] to be final or 
unreviewable"); MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, 342 Mass. 
612, 614 (1961) ("Apart from review under [G. L. c. 30A], if 
available, certiorari is the only way of reviewing decisions 
declared final by statute"); Natick v. Massachusetts Dep't of 
Pub. Welfare, 341 Mass. 618, 620 (1961) ("It is well established 
that certiorari lies notwithstanding provisions barring appeal 
by any party"); Swan, 222 Mass. at 544. (certiorari review 
available "when no other means of relief are open").  Thus, our 
conclusion that § 17 (g) generally precludes judicial review of 
commission licensing decisions under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, 
supports Mohegan Sun's argument that it meets the second element 
for certiorari review. 
 
At oral argument, the commission pointed out other areas of 
the law that might allow judicial review of certain commission 
decisions.  For instance, it mentioned §§ 35, 36, and 45 of the 
act itself.  However, these provisions do not pertain to a 
decision by the commission regarding the issuance of a license.  
Even if they did, these sections explicitly provide for an 
adjudicatory hearing under G. L. c. 30A.  See G. L. c. 23K, 
§§ 35 (g), 36 (d), 45 (e).  The act makes no such provision for 
gaming license applicants (like Mohegan Sun) whose applications 
have been denied, and indeed generally precludes such entities 
21 
 
 
from obtaining judicial review of commission licensing 
decisions. See G. L. c. 23K, § 17 (g). 
 
Additionally, the commission directed us to certain Federal 
cases where the courts upheld a general statutory bar to 
judicial review of agency decisions, but left open the 
possibility of limited review in egregious cases.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1044–1045 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 917 (1993), and cases cited 
(upholding general preclusion of judicial review, but noting 
review would remain possible for "colorable constitutional 
claims" and when agency head "acted in excess of his delegated 
authority").  One problem with this cluster of cases is that 
they do not specify the precise mechanism for obtaining review 
in the hypothetical egregious case.  More to the point, they do 
not stand for the proposition that certiorari is an 
inappropriate mechanism for seeking review when those egregious 
cases arise in the shadow of a general statutory bar to judicial 
review.  Thus, the cases do not help the commission with respect 
to the second element. 
 
In these circumstances, Mohegan Sun has sufficiently 
demonstrated a lack of adequate alternative relief such that it 
satisfies the second element for certiorari review. 
 
Finally, Mohegan Sun has satisfied the third element for 
certiorari review by alleging that the proceeding under review 
22 
 
 
has worked a substantial injury or injustice.  See Indeck, 450 
Mass. at 385.  As the motion judge observed, the commission 
relies heavily on Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478 (2014), 
and Caesars Mass. Mgt. Co., LLC v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327 (1st 
Cir. 2015), to support its position that Mohegan Sun does not 
have a justiciable right that was injured such that certiorari 
review may proceed.  The commission overstates the value of 
these cases to its position.  It is true that, in Abdow, supra 
at 495, this court said that the act "provides applicants with 
no enforceable legal rights and contains strong language 
suggesting that the Legislature intended to give them none."  
Similarly, in Caesars, supra at 334, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, drawing on our opinion in Abdow, 
said that Massachusetts law does not recognize a gaming license 
application as "a source of expectable value sufficiently 
reliable to be protected as property."  But these remarks, in 
context, were supporting a narrower holding:  that license 
applicants do not have a constitutionally protected interest in 
a gaming license.  See Abdow, supra at 487, 493, 495-496; 
Caesars, supra at 334-335. 
 
A constitutionally protected right and a "justiciable 
right" for purposes of certiorari review are two different 
creatures.  In most cases, the former is a subset of the latter.  
For instance, in the Hoffer case, this court rejected the 
23 
 
 
plaintiff's argument that she had a constitutionally protected 
property interest in the reinstatement of her medical license.  
461 Mass. at 455-456.  Nevertheless, "we treat[ed] the wrongful 
withholding of [the plaintiff's] reinstatement to her chosen 
profession as sufficient injury under the third prong of the 
Indeck test" such that certiorari review was appropriate.  See 
id. at 457.  See also Bielawski v. Personnel Adm'r of Div. of 
Personnel Admin., 422 Mass. 459, 464, 467 (1996) (rejecting 
constitutional claims of police officer who was not promoted, 
but noting "[t]he appropriate method of review . . . would have 
been for the plaintiff to seek relief in the nature of 
certiorari"); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Boston Licensing Bd., 
380 Mass. 919, 923 (1980) (permitting certiorari review where 
agency proceeding "resulted in injury in the form of a lost 
license" to operate coffee shop). 
 
We recognize that, in the Hoffer and Saxon cases, for 
example, the parties sought certiorari review while attempting 
to restore a license that had been taken away from them, whereas 
here, Mohegan Sun seeks certiorari review despite not having 
been awarded a license in the first place and where the statute 
makes clear that "[a]pplicants shall have no legal right or 
privilege to a gaming license."  G. L. c. 23K, § 17 (g).  
Nonetheless, those cases show it is not necessary that Mohegan 
Sun assert a constitutional right in order to obtain certiorari 
24 
 
 
review.  Cf. Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. 
Selectmen of Randolph, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 303 (1985) 
(Yerardi's) ("In this Commonwealth the right to a hearing where 
government exerts power upon an individual in a matter of 
consequence has been related, on occasion, not strictly to the 
constitution, but to an ethic that pervades our legal system").  
Here, Mohegan Sun had a legitimate expectation, backed up by 
substantial investments of resources in the application process, 
that the commission would follow the law in awarding the license 
that Mohegan Sun sought.  This interest, which Mohegan Sun 
asserts was harmed by the commission's alleged deviations from 
the statutory standards, satisfies the third element of 
certiorari review. 
 
(4)  Nature and scope of certiorari review.  Generally, the 
standard of review for a certiorari action is calibrated to the 
nature of the action for which review is sought.  See, e.g., 
Frawley, 473 Mass. at 728, and cases cited.  "Ordinarily, where 
the action being reviewed is a decision made in an adjudicatory 
proceeding where evidence is presented and due process 
protections are afforded, a court applies the 'substantial 
evidence' standard."  Figgs v. Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 
354, 361–362 (2014).  On the other hand, "where the decision 
under review was not made in an adjudicatory proceeding," but 
rather "entails matters committed to or implicating a board's 
25 
 
 
exercise of administrative discretion, the court applies the 
'arbitrary or capricious' standard" (citation omitted).  Id. at 
362 n.14.  Further, in order to best tailor the scope of review 
to the nature of the administrative decision at issue, it is 
sometimes necessary to analyze separately the component parts of 
the underlying decision.  See Yerardi's, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 
300.  In other words, some components of an administrative 
decision may be unreviewably discretionary, while others will be 
"submissible to the test of elementary justice that is invoked 
by the words 'arbitrary or capricious.'"  Id. at 301. 
 
The Legislature intended § 17 (g) to sharply curtail the 
availability of judicial review of commission licensing 
decisions, and thereby avoid protracted legal battles over every 
commission licensing decision.  Such litigation would result in 
lost tax revenue and might make gaming companies more reluctant 
to apply for a license because of the risk of burdensome 
litigation.  Section 17 (g) embodies a directive to avoid, to 
the extent possible, those costs. 
 
Accordingly, the standard of review for a certiorari action 
should be extremely deferential to the commission.  In essence, 
the act places a number of "unreviewable policy considerations," 
Casa Loma, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 
231, 234 (1979), squarely in the hands of the commission.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 23K, § 18 (2) ("promoting local businesses in 
26 
 
 
host and surrounding communities); § 18 (5) ("building a gaming 
establishment of high caliber with a variety of quality 
amenities . . . so that patrons experience the diversified 
regional tourism industry"); § 18 (13) ("offering the highest 
and best value to create a secure and robust gaming market in 
the region and the commonwealth").  To review the commission's 
decisions regarding these types of highly discretionary 
determinations -- exercises of the commission's "professional 
expertise and judgment in weighing and balancing a wide range of 
considerations peculiar to the petitioner in light of the public 
interest" (quotation and citation omitted), Hoffer, 461 Mass. at 
455 -- would be inappropriate. 
 
On the other hand, Mohegan Sun alleges, for example, that 
the commission, in awarding the license to Wynn, violated 
certain requirements of the act, ignored specific statutory 
criteria, and gave favorable treatment to Wynn in contravention 
of the act.  Such allegations are amenable to arbitrary and 
capricious review, where courts ask whether an agency's 
discretionary decision was "legally erroneous or so devoid of 
factual support as to be arbitrary and capricious."  MacLaurin 
v. Holyoke, 475 Mass. 231, 238 (2016).  These components of the 
commission's decision can be disturbed only if they were based 
on a "legally untenable ground" or if "unreasonable, whimsical, 
capricious, or arbitrary" in nature (citation omitted).  See 
27 
 
 
Forsyth Sch. for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in 
Dentistry, 404 Mass. 211, 218 (1989).  Such a carefully 
circumscribed mode of analysis accords with the animating 
principle behind certiorari review -- that it is "a limited 
procedure reserved for correction of substantial errors of law 
apparent on the record created before a judicial or 
quasi[]judicial tribunal."  School Comm. of Hudson, 448 Mass. at 
575-576.  It also accords with our understanding that the 
Legislature, through § 17 (g), sharply curtailed the 
availability of judicial review of commission licensing 
decisions, and thereby vested a tremendous amount of discretion 
in the commission. 
 
c.  Declaratory judgment.  Mohegan Sun also seeks a 
declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the act 
and the commission's regulations.  However, it concedes that the 
motion judge properly ruled that because it has met the 
prerequisites to obtain certiorari review, its constitutional 
claims, which are premised on the absence of any available 
avenue of judicial review, are moot.  Therefore, these claims 
were properly dismissed. 
 
2.  Claims of the city and the union.  The city and the 
union assert substantially the same claims against the 
commission as does Mohegan Sun, seeking review under both G. L. 
c. 30A and the certiorari statute, and seeking declaratory 
28 
 
 
judgment.  The motion judge ruled that the city and the union 
both lacked standing to bring those claims because, unlike 
Mohegan Sun, their injuries did not fall within the "zone of 
interests" protected by the act. 
 
At the outset, we note that the city and the union cannot 
be within the "zone of interests" protected by the act for 
purposes of review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, because, as 
previously discussed, § 17 (g) of the act expressly precludes 
such review.  If disappointed license applicants cannot obtain 
judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, it would be absurd to 
construe the statute as allowing such review to parties, like 
the city and the union, who suffer a less direct injury from the 
licensing process.  See Flemings v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 375–376 (2000) (declining to construe 
statute in way that "produce[s] absurd results").  Because G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14, is an inappropriate vehicle for either the city or 
the union to challenge commission licensing decisions, their 
standing to bring such a claim is immaterial.  See Frawley, 473 
Mass. at 724-725 & n.6. 
 
With respect to the certiorari and declaratory judgment 
claims of the city and the union, "[w]e treat standing as an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction."  Ginther v. Commissioner 
of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322 (1998).  "A party has standing when 
it can allege an injury within the area of concern of the 
29 
 
 
statute or regulatory scheme under which the injurious action 
has occurred."  School Comm. of Hudson, 448 Mass. at 579, 
quoting Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 293 (1977).  
Whether a plaintiff's injury falls within the so-called "zone of 
interests" of a statute or regulatory scheme depends upon a 
number of factors, including "[1] the language of the statute in 
issue; [2] the Legislature's intent and purpose in enacting the 
statute; [3] the nature of the administrative scheme; [4] 
decisions on standing; [5] any adverse effects that might occur, 
if standing is recognized; and [6] the availability of other, 
more definite, remedies to the plaintiffs."  Enos v. Secretary 
of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135–136 (2000).5  In weighing 
these factors, "we pay special attention to the requirement that 
                     
 
5 The union (and, to a lesser extent, the city) argues that 
the "zone of interests" test and the accompanying factors 
enunciated in Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 
132, 135–136 (2000), apply only where the relevant statute 
provides no independent basis for standing, and thus would 
govern for its declaratory judgment claim, but not for its 
certiorari claim.  We disagree.  The union cites no authority, 
and we have located none, to support such a distinction.  
Moreover, the argument is at odds with the logic of Enos itself, 
which seems to suggest its factors may apply regardless of 
whether a statute provides an independent basis for standing.  
Even if we agreed that the union and the city have standing, 
those claims would fail because, for the same reasons stated in 
the text, neither has suffered the requisite "substantial injury 
or injustice" to satisfy the third element for certiorari 
review.  See Indeck v. Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 385 
(2008). 
30 
 
 
standing usually is not present unless the governmental official 
or agency can be found to owe a duty directly to the 
plaintiffs."  Id. at 136. 
 
We now apply these factors to the city and the union. 
 
a.  The city's standing for certiorari and declaratory 
judgment claims.  The city argues that the act ensures that the 
licensing process takes into account the interests of 
municipalities, especially "host communities."  See G. L. 
c. 23K, §§ 2, 15 (8), (13), (14).  Because the city was a host 
community to Mohegan Sun, with a statutorily mandated host 
community agreement in place, the city argues it should have 
standing to challenge the ultimate decision of the commission in 
awarding the license to Wynn and denying the license to Mohegan 
Sun. 
 
Although § 17 (g) reveals a clear legislative intent to 
sharply curtail judicial review of commission licensing 
decisions, and thereby avoid the costs and delays of protracted 
litigation, an important purpose is served by keeping open at 
least some limited avenue for judicial review in order to 
prevent wholesale violations of the act and to ensure public 
confidence in the licensing process.  Against that backdrop, we 
conclude that granting standing for a certiorari action only to 
the disappointed applicant, and not to its host community, 
strikes the appropriate balance.  At the end of the day, the 
31 
 
 
potential benefits affiliated with the award of a gaming license 
accrue first to the applicant, and only secondarily to the host 
community.6  If the Legislature intended for host communities to 
have standing to challenge a commission licensing decision, it 
would have done so far more clearly than in anything we can find 
in the act and its associated regulations. 
 
With respect to the fourth Enos factor, we are aware of no 
other decisions concerning standing that are particularly 
instructive here.  Regarding the fifth and sixth factors, we 
acknowledge that our opinion today effectively leaves the city 
with no avenue to challenge the commission's licensing decision.  
On the other hand, the city understates the adverse effect of 
protracted litigation that would result if the statute conferred 
standing on municipalities to challenge the grant of a gaming 
license.  This factor deserves particular weight given our 
understanding that the Legislature intended § 17 (g) to restrict 
judicial review of commission licensing decisions. 
                     
 
6 By no means does this belittle the loss that the city 
suffered when the commission ultimately awarded the region A 
license to Wynn and not Mohegan Sun.  The potential economic 
benefits to the city, discussed at length in its brief, were 
substantial.  But the city loses sight of the fact that these 
benefits were never more than potential, and always were 
contingent upon Mohegan Sun's receipt of a license that the 
commission had "full discretion" not to award.  See G. L. 
c. 23K, § 17 (g). 
32 
 
 
 
In light of all of these factors, we concur with the motion 
judge that the city does not have standing to pursue its 
certiorari and declaratory judgment claims. 
 
b.  The union's standing for certiorari and declaratory 
judgment claims.  Essentially, the union argues that its members 
had an expectation of significant employment opportunities 
should the commission have awarded the region A license to 
Mohegan Sun.  Further, it argues that the act expressly included 
employment opportunities and the support of organized labor as 
considerations in the licensing process.  See G. L. c. 23K, §§ 1 
(5), 18 (18). 
 
The reasons discussed with respect to the city apply with 
equal, if not greater, force to defeat the union's argument, 
where the harm it claims to have suffered is even more remote 
than that claimed by the city.  In essence, the potential 
benefits that the union claims to have lost do not suffice to 
confer standing in the face of forceful statutory language 
limiting judicial review of commission licensing decisions.  We 
do not read the act to bestow any right or interest upon the 
union, nor to create any duty between the commission and it.  We 
agree with the motion judge that, if the act did either of those 
things in a way that was sufficient to confer standing, 
virtually any resident who could have been employed by Mohegan 
Sun would also have standing to challenge the commission's award 
33 
 
 
of the license to Wynn.  Thus, in addition to the delay 
discussed in connection with the city, conferring standing upon 
the union could have the drawback of exposing the commission to 
a flood of lawsuits, all despite the language in § 17 (g) aimed 
at curtailing exactly such litigation.  That harm would inure 
not only to the commission, but to successful applicants and 
their host communities as well.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the union lacks standing to assert its certiorari and 
declaratory judgment claims. 
 
3.  The individual plaintiffs' open meeting law claim.  The 
individual plaintiffs allege the commission violated the open 
meeting law, G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18-35, based on three bundles of 
allegations:  (1) the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
recess of an otherwise public September, 2014, hearing; (2) the 
inferences of nonpublic deliberations to be drawn from the 
public statements of two commissioners; and (3) calendar entries 
suggesting a quorum of the commission engaged in nonpublic 
deliberations.  The commission argues, in line with the motion 
judge, that none of the individual plaintiffs' allegations raise 
their claim for relief above a speculative level. 
 
A complaint only survives a motion to dismiss if it 
includes enough factual heft "to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level."  Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 
Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
34 
 
 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  The open meeting law provides a framework 
under which "all meetings of a public body shall be open to the 
public" unless a statutory exception applies.  G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 20 (a).  A "meeting" under the statute consists of "a 
deliberation by a public body with respect to any matter within 
the body's jurisdiction."  G. L. c. 30A, § 18.  There are 
several statutory exceptions from this broad definition of 
"meeting" -- for example, "attendance by a quorum of a public 
body at a public or private gathering, including a conference or 
training program or a media, social or other event, so long as 
the members do not deliberate" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 18 (b).  A "deliberation," in turn, includes "an oral or 
written communication through any medium, including electronic 
mail, between or among a quorum of a public body on any public 
business within its jurisdiction."  G. L. c. 30A, § 18.  It does 
not include "the distribution of a meeting agenda, scheduling 
information or distribution of other procedural meeting [sic] or 
the distribution of reports or documents that may be discussed 
at a meeting, provided that no opinion of a member is expressed" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 30A, § 18.  The statute also permits 
a public body to deliberate on certain matters in executive 
session, closed to the public.  G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18, 21.  
Finally, the open meeting law permits an array of remedies for a 
violation, ranging from nullifying the action taken at a meeting 
35 
 
 
to imposing a civil penalty or compelling compliance with the 
law.  G. L. c. 30A, § 23 (c). 
 
Although the statute was substantially revised and 
reorganized in 2009, see St. 2009, c. 28, §§ 17, 18, we conclude 
that the new statutory language and structure does not require 
us to abandon wholesale our existing open meeting law 
jurisprudence.  In particular, we interpret the open meeting law 
as continuing to be a statute "designed to eliminate much of the 
secrecy surrounding the deliberations and decisions on which 
public policy is based."  Ghiglione v. School Comm. of 
Southbridge, 376 Mass. 70, 72 (1978).  And the new version of 
the statute does not alter our belief that "[i]t is essential to 
a democratic form of government that the public have broad 
access to the decisions made by its elected officials and to the 
way in which the decisions are reached."  Foudy v. Amherst-
Pelham Regional Sch. Comm., 402 Mass. 179, 184 (1988). 
 
With this framework in mind, we agree with the motion 
judge's decision except insofar as she dismissed the plaintiffs' 
claim based on the commissioners' calendar entries.  As the 
foundation for that theory, the plaintiffs submitted a compact 
disc of the commissioners' calendar entries from 2012 to 2015, 
along with a summary table, alleging numerous violations of the 
36 
 
 
open meeting law.  Although the full disc is not now before us,7 
the record does include two examples that appear to "plausibly 
allege" violations of the law.  One set of entries shows four 
commissioners8 were scheduled to attend a three-hour "applicants 
discussion" on July 31, 2013.  Another shows three commissioners 
were scheduled to attend a one-hour "advisory groups 
brainstorming" session on April 8, 2014.9  Indulging all 
                     
 
7 The precise status of this disc is somewhat unclear.  
According to the parties' briefs, the disc was not attached to 
the second amended complaint.  However, it was submitted to the 
court and the parties after the commission's motion to dismiss 
had been filed, and was before the motion judge prior to the 
motion to dismiss being argued and decided.  It further appears 
that the judge took judicial notice of these documents, and her 
decision indicates she took them into account in her ruling on 
the motion to dismiss. 
 
 
8 Typically, for a five-member body, a quorum consists of 
three members.  See G. L. c. 30A, § 18 ("quorum" consists of "a 
simple majority of the members of the public body, unless 
otherwise provided"); G. L. c. 23K, § 3 (d) (quorum of 
commission consists of three commissioners). 
 
 
9 A third set of entries depicts what the plaintiffs allege 
constitutes a so-called "rotating quorum" violation of the open 
meeting law, in which one commissioner, followed in close 
sequence by two other commissioners, received a traffic 
briefing.  See McCrea v. Flaherty, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 648-
649 (2008) (describing "rotating quorum" open meeting law 
violation).  It is not clear from the calendar entries alone 
whether these meetings consisted of the mere distribution of 
information to be discussed at a meeting, see G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 18, or whether, as the plaintiffs suggest, they constituted 
three commissioners engaging in serial deliberation.  
Nevertheless, this court has held that even the information-
gathering activity of a public body may constitute a "verbal 
exchange" such that the body has deliberated within the meaning 
 
37 
 
 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor, it appears 
plausible that an "applicants discussion" or "advisory groups 
brainstorming" session, attended by a quorum of the commission, 
would include at least some discussion that qualifies as a 
"deliberation" of a matter within the commission's jurisdiction, 
such that the meeting should have been open to the public under 
the statute.  Accordingly, we conclude that these calendar 
entries raise the plaintiffs' claim for relief above a 
speculative level.  Moreover, we must accept as true the 
allegations in the plaintiffs' summary chart, of which the above 
are merely two examples.  This chart depicts, albeit with 
somewhat less precision and detail than the full calendar 
entries, numerous additional potential violations of the open 
meeting law.10 
 
Contrary to the commission's argument on appeal, a letter 
to the commission from the Attorney General, dated December 23, 
2015, entitled "Open Meeting Law Review," demonstrates why 
                                                                  
of the statute.  See Gerstein v. Superintendent Search Screening 
Comm., 405 Mass. 465, 470 (1989). 
 
10  We take no position about whether the plaintiffs will 
ultimately succeed in proving this claim.  In particular, we 
note that the commission, in its motion papers and appellate 
briefs, did not specifically address the two sets of calendar 
entries that we mention in the text. 
 
38 
 
 
dismissal was inappropriate at this stage in the litigation.11  
The letter describes the Attorney General's investigation into 
the commission's meeting practices and concludes that, despite 
"broad compliance" with the open meeting law, the commission did 
violate the law on some occasions.  At least some of the 
commissioners' meetings determined by the Attorney General to 
have violated the law appear to be reflected in the plaintiffs' 
summary chart.  Thus, the letter illustrates that sorting out 
which of the plaintiffs' allegations can be substantiated and 
which cannot requires some degree of investigation, and 
therefore is a task for the discovery process. 
 
Finally, the individual plaintiffs argue that the motion 
judge effectively carved out a new exception to the open meeting 
law for public bodies, like the commission, whose members are 
also full-time employees of the agency.  We need not decide 
whether the motion judge indeed did carve out such an exception 
by her ruling.  In any event, no such exception exists.  The 
fact that the commissioners are full-time employees of the 
commission, see G. L. c. 23K, § 3 (e), does not change the 
statutory definition of "deliberation" for purposes of the open 
meeting law, nor does it change the conditions under which a 
                     
 
11 We acknowledge that the motion judge did not have this 
letter before her, as it postdates her ruling, and we do not 
consider it as to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.  Rather, 
we use it simply to illustrate why dismissal was inappropriate. 
39 
 
 
"meeting" of a public body must be open to public.  In other 
words, the fact that the commission's structure may make it 
difficult to comply with the law does not alter the requirement 
of compliance. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the individual plaintiffs have 
plausibly stated a claim for relief under the open meeting law.  
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the judge's decision. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, 
reverse in part, the judge's allowance of the defendant's motion 
to dismiss, and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.