Title: Morris v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC14-1317
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1317 
____________ 
 
DONTAE MORRIS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 27, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Dontae Morris appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and his 
sentences of death.1  For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and 
sentences.   
I.  Background 
 
Morris was convicted and sentenced to death on two counts for the first-
degree premeditated murders of Officer David Curtis and Officer Jeffrey Kocab.  
The evidence at trial established that on June 29, 2010, at about 2:13 a.m., Officer 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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Curtis pulled over a red Toyota Camry in Hillsborough County for not displaying 
an automobile tag.  Cortnee Brantley was the driver, and Dontae Morris was in the 
passenger’s seat.  The dashcam video from Officer Curtis’ patrol car was played 
for the jury at trial.  The transcript of that video includes a discussion in which 
Morris identifies himself to Officer Curtis, disclosing his name, age, and birthdate.   
The transcript continues with a discussion between Officer Curtis and Ms. Brantley 
about the missing tag on the vehicle, and Ms. Brantley states that the tag was 
stolen.   
Officer Curtis returned to his patrol car, entered Morris’ name in his in-car 
computer, and discovered that there was a warrant out for Morris.  He called for 
backup, and Officer Kocab pulled up and parked behind Officer Curtis’ parked 
patrol car.  Then both officers approached the passenger side of the parked Camry.  
Officer Curtis, with Officer Kocab standing right behind him at the passenger side 
of the vehicle, asked Morris to exit the vehicle.  Morris exited the vehicle as if he 
was surrendering but instead grabbed a gun and shot both officers in the head.  The 
approximate time for the homicides of Officers Curtis and Kocab was 2:18 a.m.  
This interaction is captured in the dashcam video in the following way: 
[Officer Curtis]:  —you know anything about it? 
[The Defendant]:  The warrant? 
[Officer Curtis]:  Yeah. 
[The Defendant]:  I ain’t got no warrant. 
[Officer Curtis]:  Okay.  Step over here.  Turn around and step and put 
your hands behind your back. 
 
 
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(Shots fired.) 
[Ms. Brantley]:  Baby—Babe. 
 
The remaining portion of the video captures panicking individuals tending to 
the injured officers and performing CPR.  Both officers were transported to Tampa 
General Hospital where they were later pronounced dead.  The officers’ autopsies 
confirmed that both officers died of fatal gunshot wounds to the head.  
Furthermore, an expert in the field of firearms analysis and identification 
concluded that both of the projectiles removed from the bodies of Officer Curtis 
and Officer Kocab were fired from the same firearm.  
 
Immediately following the shooting, Morris fled the scene, running on foot 
northbound.  Four days after the homicides, Morris turned himself in.   
 
On the front seat of Officer Curtis’ patrol vehicle, detectives found Officer 
Curtis’ notepad and Cortnee Brantley’s driver’s license.  On the notepad, Officer 
Curtis had noted the name and birthdate of the passenger as it was provided to him 
when he asked the passenger to identify himself.  Additionally, in Officer Curtis’ 
car, the mobile dispatch terminal, or in-car computer, indicated Dontae Morris’ 
name, his identifying information, and a photograph of him.  Morris’ birth 
certificate was entered into evidence and matched the name and birthdate that the 
passenger of the Camry in the dashcam video provided to Officer Curtis.     
Temika Jones testified that she saw Morris, whom she knew as “Quelo,” on 
the day of the murders in the morning.  She remembered that he was wearing a 
 
 
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dark blue vest with a white shirt underneath, dark khaki shorts, and white sneakers 
or tennis shoes.  Ms. Jones also testified that Morris called her around 2 a.m.  Later 
that day, detectives interviewed Ms. Jones.  When the detectives showed her a 
photograph, which was a still photo from the dashcam video, she identified the 
individual in the photo as Morris.  She testified that it looked like Morris because 
of the head shape and outfit and because he had on the same clothing that he had 
on that morning when she saw him.   
Additionally, two witnesses testified that they saw a black male running 
northbound from the scene of the incident.  Ynalia Keen lived in a bottom floor 
apartment near where the traffic stop took place.  She testified that on the night of 
the incident, she had stepped out of her apartment to get snacks from a gas station, 
and, when she heard the gunshots, she rushed back inside.  From inside her 
apartment, looking through a front window that looks out onto the street, she saw a 
black male running on the sidewalk towards her apartment building, then into the 
apartment complex, cutting through the middle of the parking lot, and jumping a 
small fence.  When she could not see him through the front window, Ms. Keen 
went to the kitchen to look through the window at the back of the apartment, where 
she saw him jump another, taller, chain-link fence.   
The next day, on June 30th, Detective Charles Massucci interviewed Ms. 
Keen.  Ms. Keen identified Morris’ photograph from a photographic lineup.  Ms. 
 
 
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Keen also wrote the following statement:  “Seen him on the back road with a group 
of people.  He had ran by my house when the people was shot.  Seen him at the 
Shell store.”    
The other witness, Alfred Thompson, was walking northbound on the street 
where the traffic stop took place.  As he walked past the Camry, he noticed that the 
car had two occupants sitting in the front seat, a black female in the driver’s side 
and a black male in the passenger’s side.  He also saw the officer in his vehicle at 
that time.  After Mr. Thompson passed the cars, he heard two gunshots coming 
from behind him from the direction of the police car and the other vehicle, and he 
hid behind another car; he did not see the individual who fired the shots.  
Thereafter, Mr. Thompson saw a black male run northbound (on the same sidewalk 
he was walking on), go through an apartment complex, and jump a chain-link 
fence.         
Just north of the crime scene, detectives found footprints on the bottom part 
of the large fence at the perimeter at the back of the apartment complex and also 
found a piece of a zipper that was torn off from an article of clothing attached to 
the top of that fence.   
On the night of the murders, Morris called Ashley Price and confided in her 
regarding the murders.  Ms. Price went to the Tampa Police Department on June 
30, the next day, and spoke with Officer Kevin Durkin.  She testified that she knew 
 
 
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Morris as “Quelo” and that Morris called her more than once in the early morning 
hours of June 29.  When she answered a call from Morris around 3:30 a.m., he 
asked for a ride, but she did not give him one.  She spoke with him on the phone 
again at around noon that day, and Morris told Ms. Price “that he did it,” telling her 
to watch the news about the police officers.  Ms. Price also testified that Morris 
told her the following:  that he shot the officers to get away from them, that he was 
out of the car when he shot the officers, that there were two officers, that he shot 
them in the head, that he referred to them as “crackers,” that he got the gun from 
under the seat, that he gave the officer his name, that the officer had gone back to 
run his name, that he was afraid that he had a warrant, that he was the passenger in 
the car, and that he was going to try to go to Jacksonville.   
Detective Charles Massucci confirmed that between the time of the murders 
and the afternoon of June 30, there were no releases from the Tampa Police 
Department about the facts of the case to the press or to the media concerning this 
subject matter that Ms. Price discussed.   
The red Toyota Camry was located at an apartment complex on the morning 
of June 29, the same day as the crime, roughly nine-and-a-half hours after the 
crime itself.  This apartment complex was located about 2.8 miles from the crime 
scene.  The building in which Ms. Brantley, the driver, was located was about 500 
yards from where the Camry was parked.  Pursuant to a search warrant, the red 
 
 
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Camry was seized and searched.  DNA analysis showed the blood found on the 
exterior passenger side rear door matched that of Officer Curtis.   
Ms. Brantley was escorted to Tampa Police Department headquarters and 
was interviewed.  During the approximately six-and-a-half hour interview, 
detectives asked Ms. Brantley more than once to identify the front seat passenger 
in the Camry during the stop, but she never identified him.   
Additionally, cell phone records were presented at trial for cell phones 
associated with Morris and Ms. Brantley.  Based on testimony regarding the cell 
records, cell towers, mapping, and diagrams, the cell phone use placed Morris and 
Ms. Brantley at or near the scene of the crime at the time of the incident.  And the 
testimony revealed phone calls made in the minutes before and after the murders of 
the two officers from the cell phone associated with Morris.   
Following the State’s case, the defense rested without presenting any 
evidence or witnesses.  Thereafter, the jury returned guilty verdicts for two counts 
of first-degree premeditated murder and one count of escape while being 
transported.     
At the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that, on March 13, 2013, 
Morris was convicted of the first-degree murder and attempted robbery with a 
firearm of Rodney Jones and that Morris had been sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole for that conviction.  The State also presented four 
 
 
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victim impact statements from family members of Officers Curtis and Kocab.  In 
mitigation, Morris presented the testimony of his mother, two cousins, and his 
aunt.  On November 19, 2013, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote 
of twelve to zero on both counts.     
At the subsequent Spencer2 hearing, the defense presented mental health 
mitigation with expert testimony from Dr. Valerie McClain, an expert in forensic 
psychology and neuropsychology.  Dr. McClain reviewed Morris’ prior mental 
health records from Dr. Lamar Ingulli, which included memory testing and IQ 
testing.  Dr. McClain diagnosed Morris with major depression with psychotic 
features and borderline intellectual functioning but not intellectually disabled.  She 
testified that Morris had deficiencies in verbal comprehension, such as word 
knowledge and processing speed.   
Then the State presented rebuttal mental health expert testimony and 
additional victim impact testimony.  Dr. Emily E. Lazarou, an expert in the area of 
forensic psychiatry, testified that she reviewed Dr. McClain’s depositions, Dr. 
Ingulli’s medical records, and Morris’ school records, and opined that Morris was 
in the average range of intellectual functioning with an IQ of at least 100 to 110.   
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
- 9 - 
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Morris to death in accordance with the 
jury’s unanimous recommendations on both counts.  In so doing, the trial court 
found the following aggravators were proved as to each count beyond a reasonable 
doubt:  (1) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of use of violence to a person (great weight); (2) 
the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody (did not weigh or consider 
because merged with law enforcement officer aggravator); and (3) the victim of the 
capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his 
official duties (great weight).   
The trial court also found the following mitigators:  (1) Morris was 
prematurely born to a sixteen-year-old, unwed mother (minimal weight); (2) 
Morris’ father was murdered when he was two years old (no weight); (3) Morris 
was raised by his maternal grandmother during his early years, but her health was 
fragile and she could not and did not adequately care for him (minimal weight); (4) 
Morris’ mother did not bond with her child because she suffered severe postpartum 
depression and was a child herself (moderate weight); (5) Morris started to bond 
with his step-grandfather, but he became a crack addict and left the family 
(minimal weight); (6) Morris was raised without a father or any other male role 
model (moderate weight); (7) Morris’ mother subsequently gave birth to two more 
 
 
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children, and she eventually married their father (minimal weight); (8) Morris’ 
mother attempted to make a home with a supportive family (minimal weight); (9) 
Morris’ mother grew tired of the limited success of her efforts to integrate Morris 
into her new family, and Morris felt more and more isolated, alone, rejected, and 
left out (minimal weight); (10) Morris had to watch his siblings receive support 
and affection of a father, support he never had (minimal weight); (11) fourteen-
year-old Morris assumed the role of man of the house and source of support for his 
siblings when his mother left her husband, and Morris suffered with his mother 
through a long and bitter divorce (minimal weight); (12) after the divorce, the 
family moved in with another man, and he and Morris competed for the role of 
man of the house and father to his siblings, and Morris was asked to leave the 
home (moderate weight); (13) the family conflict was encouraged by Morris’ 
former stepfather, who undermined and sabotaged the discipline of Morris and his 
siblings (moderate weight); (14) Morris lived for a period of time with his paternal 
grandparents, but they failed to control or discipline him, and he showed signs of 
deteriorating school work and social and behavioral turmoil (minimal weight); (15) 
Morris was close to his aunt and his cousins, who were positive influences and a 
healthy support system for him, but they moved during the time of his family’s 
turmoil (minimal weight); (16) Morris’ early teen years were unstable, and he was 
uprooted multiple times, attending five different schools and living in various 
 
 
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relatives’ homes over a two-year period (minimal weight); (17) when Morris 
became involved in the juvenile justice system, his mother obtained counseling for 
him, and she also petitioned juvenile authorities and the court system to get more 
stringent treatment programs for him (moderate weight); (18) his mother’s requests 
were refused, and she was told Morris’ offenses were not serious enough, and he 
got no meaningful help or guidance during this critical juncture in his development 
(moderate weight); (19) Morris has maintained a supportive relationship with his 
child (moderate weight); (20) Morris has maintained a caring and supportive 
relationship with his cousins and other family members even while in jail (minimal 
weight); (21) Morris has expressed remorse for killing (minimal weight); and (22) 
the above circumstances cumulatively established general mitigating evidence that 
provides reasons the death penalty is not appropriate (moderate weight).   
II.  Analysis 
A.  Motion to Strike Jury Panel 
Morris first argues that the trial court erred in denying Morris’ motion to 
strike the jury panel based on statements made by a prospective juror, Juror K, 
during jury selection.3  However, we conclude that the trial court did not err.   
                                          
 
 
3.  This prospective juror was eventually stricken for cause. 
 
 
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The denial of a motion to strike the jury panel is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Williams v. Osking, 105 So. 3d 653, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).  “In 
order for the statement of one venire member to taint the panel, the venire member 
must mention facts that would not otherwise be presented to the jury.”  Johnson v. 
State, 903 So. 2d 888, 897 (Fla. 2005).  Additionally, “[a] venire member’s 
expression of an opinion before the entire panel is not normally considered 
sufficient to taint the remainder of the panel.”  Id. 
 
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  First, Juror K’s 
statements uttered before the other potential jurors did not reveal any knowledge 
she may have had regarding Morris previously being indicted for and convicted of 
another murder.  Her comments, including the terms “another performance” and 
“repeat performance,” seem to allude to her view that if the defendant was already 
convicted during the first proceeding, the guilt phase, for first-degree murder, that 
doing “another performance” of a second proceeding, the penalty phase, would be 
“wasting taxpayer’s money.”  And the State’s follow-up question seems to suggest 
that the prosecutor was interpreting her responses in this way since he explained 
that different evidence would be presented at the penalty phase (i.e., “evidence of 
aggravation”).  Additionally, neither the prosecutor nor the prospective juror 
mentioned Morris, and the prospective juror did not reveal any knowledge she had 
 
 
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about the defendant.  Instead, the exchange reflects only a hypothetical discussion 
about a possible waste of resources with multiple proceedings.   
 
It is only when Juror K was brought in and questioned individually without 
the other jurors present that she revealed that she had knowledge of Morris’ other 
crimes.  When the comments made outside the presence of the jury are combined 
with the general and hypothetical comments she made in the presence of the jury, it 
becomes possible that Juror K may have been referring to her knowledge of the 
other crimes.  However, this discussion took place outside the presence of the jury 
panel.  Importantly, Juror K did not reveal in the comments she made in the 
presence of the jury any of her knowledge of other crimes.  Additionally, the 
questioning of Juror K was promptly stopped before she revealed anything 
improper.  Cf. Evans v. State, 36 So. 3d 185, 185-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) 
(reversing and remanding for a new trial because a prospective juror’s comments 
during voir dire that he knew the defendant from his work as a detention deputy at 
the jail suggested that the defendant had prior criminal charges or convictions). 
Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Morris’ motion to strike the entire jury panel. 
B.  Spontaneous Statements While Under Observation in Jail 
Next, Morris claims the trial court erred in overruling an objection to the 
admission of Morris’ redacted statement made while he was under observation in 
 
 
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jail.  Specifically, at trial, a corrections deputy testified that on one occasion he 
came to be in the presence of Morris and that he heard Morris make the following 
statement:  “I repent for killing.”  Morris also claims that the trial court erred in 
preventing the defense from presenting evidence regarding Morris’ mental state at 
the time he made the statement.  However, we conclude that the trial court did not 
err in admitting the redacted statement and that any error in preventing the defense 
from presenting evidence was harmless. 
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion.  See Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 94 (Fla. 2007).  
Under Florida law, all relevant evidence, defined as that tending to prove or 
disprove a material fact, is admissible unless otherwise provided by law.  See §§ 
90.401-90.402, Fla. Stat.  Relevant evidence is inadmissible, however, if the 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  See 
§ 90.403, Fla. Stat.   
An admission of a party opponent is admissible as an exception to the 
hearsay evidence rule.  § 90.803(18), Fla. Stat.  “In the context of a criminal trial, 
an admission [by] the defendant is admissible if it tends in some way, when taken 
together with other facts, to establish guilt.”  Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 
274 (Fla. 1988).  The evidence must “be relevant to a material issue other than 
 
 
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propensity or bad character.”  Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 279 (Fla. 2003) 
(quoting Drake v. State, 441 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 1983)).  
In this case, Morris’ statement, “I repent for killing,” constitutes evidence 
tending to show that he was involved in the murders.  And because the statement 
was redacted to take out the reference to killing five people, the statement does not 
tend to show propensity or bad character.  Moreover, the probative value of 
Morris’ redacted statement is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.  
Additionally, Morris argues that the trial court erred in preventing the 
defense from presenting evidence regarding Morris’ mental state at the time he 
made the statement.  Pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code, Morris could offer 
evidence to dispute the truthfulness of his statement and impeach his admission.  
See § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat.  Specifically, the testimony Morris sought to offer was 
relevant to the circumstances surrounding his statement, namely his mental state at 
the time he made the statement, in an attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the 
statement that he made.  See, e.g., Palmes v. State, 397 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 1981) 
(defendant’s state of mind is relevant to the question of what weight to give the 
confession in determining guilt).  However, any error in excluding evidence of 
Morris’ mental state at the time he made the statement was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986).   
 
 
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C.  Officers’ Testimony Regarding Dashcam Videotape 
Additionally, Morris claims that the trial court erred in allowing law 
enforcement officers to give opinions identifying Morris’ voice and image from the 
dashcam videotape.  Specifically, Morris argues that, because these witnesses were 
law enforcement officers, the jury would defer to their opinions.  However, we 
conclude that any possible error was harmless. 
“A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard.”  Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219, 1229 (Fla. 2015) (citing 
Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008)).  “In determining whether an error 
was harmful, the focus is on the effect that the error has upon the trier-of-fact.”  
Gregory v. State, 118 So. 3d 770, 782 (Fla. 2013) (citing Williams v. State, 863 So. 
2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 2003)).   
In Evans, 177 So. 3d at 1228, this Court addressed the issue of whether the 
trial court erred in permitting a law enforcement officer to testify to voice 
identification and offer his opinion that the voice on a 911 call-back recording was 
the defendant’s.  The majority of this Court held that the trial court erred when it 
admitted Detective Judy’s opinion testimony because he did not have prior special 
familiarity with the voice of the defendant.  Id. at 1230-31.   
However, in this case, any error in admitting the detectives’ testimony 
identifying Morris’ voice and image on the dashcam video was harmless beyond a 
 
 
- 17 - 
reasonable doubt.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138.  The video itself revealed 
Morris’ identity, specifically, when Officer Curtis asked him to state and spell his 
name and asked him for his birthdate and age.  This identification was 
corroborated by Officer Curtis’ notepad found on the front seat of his patrol car, 
listing the identifying information provided by Morris, as well as the search for his 
name (revealing his warrant) on Officer Curtis’ in-car computer.  Additionally, 
Temika Jones testified at trial and identified Morris from a still picture taken from 
the dashcam video.  Accordingly, any error here was harmless. 
D.  Ashley Price’s Prior Consistent Statements 
Morris claims that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Durkin to 
testify regarding prior consistent statements that Ashley Price made to the detective 
on the day after the murder because this testimony improperly bolstered Ms. 
Price’s testimony.  However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  See 
Tumblin v. State, 29 So. 3d 1093, 1100 (Fla. 2010); see also Hudson, 992 So. 2d at 
107 (stating that the standard of review of a trial court’s decision to admit evidence 
is abuse of discretion).   
 
“ ‘Generally, prior consistent statements are inadmissible to corroborate or 
bolster a witness’s trial testimony’ because they are usually hearsay, but a prior 
consistent statement may be admitted as nonhearsay if certain conditions are met.”  
Tumblin, 29 So. 3d at 1100 (quoting Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003)).  
 
 
- 18 - 
Specifically, “prior consistent statements are considered non-hearsay if the 
following conditions are met:  the person who made the prior consistent statement 
testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning that statement; and 
the statement is offered to ‘rebut an express or implied charge . . . of improper 
influence, motive, or recent fabrication.’ ”  Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 197-
98 (Fla. 1997) (quoting § 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989)).   
In this case, Ms. Price was subject to cross-examination, and the prior 
consistent statement was offered to rebut an implied charge of improper influence, 
motive, or fabrication.  By eliciting testimony of a financial benefit, the defense 
implied an improper motive for Ms. Price’s testimony.  Ms. Price’s prior consistent 
statement, which she made the day after the murders when she went to the police, 
was offered to rebut this implied charge of improper motive.  Accordingly, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ms. Price’s prior consistent 
statement.   
E.  Threats to Ashley Price 
Morris also contends that the trial court erred in denying Morris’ motion for 
mistrial based on the jury hearing about threats against Ashley Price.  The trial 
court denied the motion because the threats could not be attributed to Morris and 
because the trial court also provided a curative instruction.  We conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion.   
 
 
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This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial for abuse of 
discretion.  Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 371 (Fla. 2008).  “A motion for 
mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant 
receives a fair trial.”   Id. at 372 (quoting Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 
1997)).   In other words, “[a] motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an 
error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.”  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 
389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006).  Additionally, “[i]t has been held that evidence of threats 
made against witnesses is inadmissible to prove guilt unless the threats are shown 
to be attributable to the defendant.”  Koon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 
1987).     
In this case, the State did not suggest, with its question regarding threats, 
that the threat came from the defendant.  Additionally, the suggested threats in this 
case were not made to influence Ms. Price’s testimony, but rather the threats of an 
unknown and ambiguous nature were apparently the reason for Ms. Price 
relocating her residence.  Cf. Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042, 1043-44 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1980) (reversing and remanding for a new trial when the State insinuated that 
the defendant, or someone connected with him, had made threats against a witness 
to keep her from testifying without presenting any evidence to connect the 
defendant to the threats), disapproved on other grounds by Justus v. State, 438 So. 
2d 358, 368 (Fla. 1983).  Furthermore, even assuming the question from the State 
 
 
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was inappropriate, there was no response to the question because the defense 
promptly objected, the State stopped its questioning of the witness after the court 
sustained the defense’s objection, and the court gave a curative instruction 
explaining that Morris had nothing to do with the threats mentioned.  See Tumblin, 
29 So. 3d at 1102 (“The giving of a curative instruction will often obviate the 
necessity of a mistrial.” (quoting Graham v. State, 479 So. 2d 824, 825 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1985))).  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion for mistrial.4   
F.  Sufficiency 
Regardless of whether the parties raise the issue, this Court “independently 
review[s] the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a sentence of death 
has been imposed.”  Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 227 (Fla. 2010).  To conduct 
this review, this Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the State 
to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 
655, 674 (Fla. 2006); see also Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952, 966-67 (Fla. 2008) (“In 
appeals where the death penalty has been imposed, this Court independently 
                                          
 
 
4.  We also conclude that Morris was not denied a fundamentally fair trial 
based on cumulative error.  See Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 202 (Fla. 2005), 
receded from on other grounds by State v. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d 434, 437 (Fla. 
2012); Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 189 (Fla. 1991). 
 
 
- 21 - 
reviews the record to confirm that the jury’s verdict is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.”). 
 
As detailed above, the dashcam video from Officer Curtis’ patrol car 
captured the killings of Officers Curtis and Kocab.  In the video, Morris identifies 
himself, spelling his full name and accurately providing his date of birth and age.  
This same identifying information was discovered in Officer Curtis’ car, including 
on Officer Curtis’ notepad on which he wrote the identifying information the 
passenger provided him and on Officer Curtis’ in-car computer after he entered a 
search with Morris’ identifying information.  Additionally, Ashley Price testified 
that Morris called her the morning of the shootings, and Morris confided in her, 
telling her “that he did it” and giving her details about the crime not yet released to 
the media.  And Temika Jones testified at trial and identified Morris from a still 
picture taken from the dashcam video.  Two witnesses testified that they saw a 
black male running from the scene of the crime after the shootings and saw him 
jump a large fence at the back of an apartment complex.  One of these witnesses 
identified Morris from a photographic lineup shown to her by detectives the day 
after the shootings.  
 
Accordingly, competent, substantial evidence supports Morris’ convictions 
for first-degree murder.   
 
 
 
- 22 - 
G.  Proportionality 
Furthermore, Morris’ death sentences are proportionate under the 
comparative proportionality review this Court undertakes in every death penalty 
case.  In conducting its proportionality review, this Court does not compare the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 
485, 500 (Fla. 2011).  Instead, this “Court looks at the totality of the circumstances 
to determine if death is warranted in comparison to other cases where the sentence 
of death has been upheld.”  Id. (quoting England, 940 So. 2d at 408).  Additionally, 
this Court has recognized that, “[q]ualitatively, prior violent felony and HAC are 
among the weightiest aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.”  
Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 542 (Fla. 2010).  
 
Morris’ case involves the shooting of two law enforcement officers on duty.  
His jury recommended death by a vote of twelve to zero on both counts of first-
degree murder.  The trial court found three aggravating circumstances were proved 
as to each count beyond a reasonable doubt and assigned weight as follows:  (1) 
prior capital felony conviction (great weight); (2) escape or avoid arrest (did not 
weigh or consider because merged with law enforcement officer aggravator); and 
(3) victim was a law enforcement officer (great weight).  In contrast to this weighty 
aggravation, the trial court found 22 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, none 
of which were assigned more than moderate weight. 
 
 
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Under the totality of the circumstances, Morris’ death sentences are 
proportionate in relation to other death sentences that this Court has upheld.  See 
Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 651 (Fla. 1997) (finding death sentence 
proportionate where the trial court found and merged three aggravators, and found 
two statutory mitigators, including the defendant’s age (42 years old) at the time of 
the offense and no significant criminal history, and a number of nonstatutory 
mitigators); see also Altersberger v. State, 103 So. 3d 122, 130-31 (Fla. 2012) 
(finding death sentence proportionate where the trial court found the aggravators 
(1) CCP (great weight); and (2) victim was a law enforcement officer (great 
weight), and several mitigating circumstances, including that capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired (moderate weight), and defendant was brought up in a 
dysfunctional family and home environment (moderate weight)); Wheeler v. State, 
4 So. 3d 599, 613 (Fla. 2009) (finding death sentence proportionate where the trial 
court found the aggravators (1) CCP (great weight); (2) the merged avoid arrest 
aggravator, that the victim was a law enforcement officer and murder was 
committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of law; and (3) prior violent felony 
(some weight), and mitigating circumstances (1) committed while under the 
influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance (some weight); (2) capacity 
to appreciate the criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements 
 
 
- 24 - 
of law was substantially impaired (some weight); and other mitigators given 
minimal to some weight); Bailey v. State, 998 So. 2d 545, 551-52, 554 (Fla. 2008) 
(finding death sentence proportionate where the trial court found the aggravators 
(1) defendant was on probation at the time of the crime (great weight); and (2) 
avoid arrest (great weight), and a number of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, 
such as the defendant’s young age and low IQ, all given little weight). 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Morris’ sentences are proportionate.   
H.  Hurst 
Finally, after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. 
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), Morris filed supplemental briefing, arguing that his 
death sentences are unconstitutional under Hurst and that his case should be 
remanded for the imposition of life sentences.  However, because the Hurst error in 
this case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm Morris’ death 
sentences.  
We have held that “section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes, does not mandate 
the imposition of a life sentence in the event of a [Hurst] violation.”  Knight v. 
State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S133, S140, 2017 WL 411329, at *14 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017) 
(citing Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 63-66 (Fla. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 
16-998 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2017)).  Moreover, in Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 
2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-8569 (Mar. 30, 2017), this Court emphasized 
 
 
- 25 - 
the unanimous recommendations of death and held that the Hurst error was 
harmless. 
What we said in Davis, 207 So. 3d at 175, is also applicable here: 
[T]he jury unanimously found all of the necessary facts for the 
imposition of death sentences by virtue of its unanimous 
recommendations.  In fact, although the jury was informed that it was 
not required to recommend death unanimously, and despite the 
mitigation presented, the jury still unanimously recommended that 
[the defendant] be sentenced to death . . . .  The unanimous 
recommendations here are precisely what we determined in Hurst to 
be constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of death. 
Accordingly, the Hurst violation in Morris’ case was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See id.  Therefore, as in Davis, the Hurst violation here does not entitle 
Morris to a new penalty phase. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Morris’ convictions for first-degree 
murder and his sentences of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur as to the conviction and concur 
in result as to the sentence. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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QUINCE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm Morris’s convictions of two 
counts of first-degree murder.  I dissent, however, to the decision to affirm 
Morris’s sentences and would find that the Hurst error in this case was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As I’ve stated previously, “[b]ecause Hurst 
‘requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of 
death,’ the error cannot be harmless where such a factual determination was not 
made.”  Hall v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S153, S165, 2017 WL 526509 at *24 (Fla. 
Feb. 9, 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hurst 
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016)); see also Truehill v. State, 42 Fla. L. 
Weekly S223, S234, 2017 WL 727167 at *23 (Fla. Feb. 23, 2017).   
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
William Fuente, Judge - Case No. 292010CF010203000AHC 
 
Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant 
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee