Title: Rogers v. Beiderwell
Citation: 175 Kan. 223, 262 P.2d 814
Docket Number: 39,056
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: November 7, 1953

175 Kan. 223 (1953)
262 P.2d 814
BYRON G. ROGERS, JAMES H. ROGERS, and FRANK A. BRUNO, Appellants,
v.
FLORENCE BEIDERWELL, Appellee.
No. 39,056

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 7, 1953.
Martin F. Trued and Brainard L. Anderson, both of Tribune, were on the briefs for the appellants.
Logan N. Green, Roland H. Tate, and Daniel R. Hopkins, all of Garden City, were on the briefs for the appellee.
*224 The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEDELL, J.:
Plaintiffs' action was one for a money judgment based on breach of an oral contract alleged to have been made with defendant's husband.
Plaintiffs' appeal from an order sustaining defendant's demurrer to their petition. Appellee's demurrer was based on four grounds, the last being that the petition failed to state a cause of action against her. That ground of the demurrer was sustained and it is the only ground urged by appellee in support of the ruling.
The first paragraph of the petition recites appellants reside in Denver, Colorado, and appellee resides in Garden City. The petition further alleged:
The question presented is whether the petition contains sufficient allegations of agency to state a cause of action against appellee. In Donie v. Associated Co., Inc., 173 Kan. 753, 252 P.2d 609, it was held the president of a corporation, the alleged agent, was without legal authority to declare dividends. However, relative to the sufficiency of pleading agency generally it was said:
In Rule v. Mitchell, 173 Kan. 803, 252 P.2d 924, it was held:
In the course of the opinion we said:
In the above cited Arizona case it was held:
Appellee criticizes the italicized allegation in the instant petition, to wit, "... and although acting as the agent of the defendant ...," contending it is not a direct allegation of agency. The allegation of agency might well have contained a statement that the agency was authorized. As already indicated, however, the lack of a statement of authorization did not render the petition completely vulnerable. There was no motion to make it more definite and certain and on demurrer it must be liberally construed in favor of the pleader. We think the allegation is reasonably understandable. It means that although E.R. Beiderwell represented he had a claim he was, in fact, acting as the agent for appellee, his wife.
The criticized allegation, however, is not all the petition that has a bearing on the subject of agency. It will be observed the third paragraph of the petition further alleges the actions of appellee's husband therein described were performed "... with the consent and approval of the defendant ..." and "... with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant ..." and that E.R. Beiderwell received the full sum of $34,000 for the use and benefit of the defendant.
What was the legal effect of these facts which for purposes of the demurrer were admitted to be true? The question was squarely presented in Will v. Hughes, 172 Kan. 45, 238 P.2d 478, relied on by appellants. In that case a defendant landowner disavowed original authority of her brother to interfere with the harvesting of crops by her tenant. We said:
So in the instant case we think the ratification by appellee of her husband's action, if originally unauthorized, was equivalent to an original grant of authority.
The demurrer was improperly sustained and the order is reversed.