Title: DETROIT FIREFIGHTERS ASSN V CITY OF DETROIT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 131463
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2008

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2008 
DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION IAFF LOCAL 344, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 131463 
CITY OF DETROIT,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT 
YOUNG, J. 
At issue in this public labor law dispute between plaintiff Detroit Fire 
Fighters Association and defendant city of Detroit is whether the circuit court 
properly issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of 
defendant’s proposed layoff and restructuring plan where plaintiff contends that 
the plan violates the “status quo” provision of 1969 PA 312 (Act 312), MCL 
423.243, by, among other things, jeopardizing the safety of the remaining 
firefighters. We conclude that the injunction was erroneously entered. 
Where a party seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent an alleged status 
quo violation, a two-step process is required.  First, the moving party must satisfy 
 
 
 
 
 
the traditional four-part test that is prerequisite for issuance of any preliminary 
injunction. Second, if the preliminary injunction test is met and the injunction is 
granted, the circuit court must promptly resolve the merits of the status quo claim. 
Pursuant to MCR 3.310(A)(5), if a preliminary injunction is granted, a “trial of the 
action on the merits must be held within 6 months after the injunction is granted, 
unless good cause is shown or the parties stipulate to a longer period.” 
The status quo provision of Act 312 prevents either party from altering, 
without consent, “existing wages, hours, or other conditions of employment,” 
which concern mandatory subjects of bargaining, while Act 312 arbitration is 
pending. The status quo provision does not prevent parties from exercising their 
contractual rights if they do not alter an existing wage, hour, or other condition of 
employment.  In this case, it is defendant’s implementation of its restructuring and 
layoff plan that is at issue. Plaintiff claims that it is a change in “existing . . . 
conditions of employment” because it will jeopardize firefighter safety, which our 
precedent treats as a “condition of employment” and a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that it has the contractual right 
to lay off firefighters. Thus, in order for the status quo provision to be violated in 
this case, it must be determined that the restructuring and layoff plan actually 
alters a condition of employment, namely firefighter safety. 
The question is what standard a circuit court must apply in order for it to 
determine that an employer’s challenged action actually violates the status quo 
provision by altering this condition of employment.  The Court of Appeals in Oak 
2  
 
 
                                                 
Park Pub Safety Officers Ass’n v Oak Park1 recently adopted the standard that a 
staffing proposal must be “inextricably intertwined with safety” to be a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. We adopt this standard for circuit court review of the type 
of status quo violation claim presented here.  A circuit court must conclude that 
the employer’s challenged plan is so “inextricably intertwined with safety” that its 
implementation would impermissibly alter the status quo by altering this 
“condition” of employment. 
The circuit court must make thorough factual 
findings supporting such a conclusion. 
Here, not only did the circuit court fail to resolve the safety claim on the 
merits, it entered what amounted to a permanent injunction without applying the 
traditional injunctive standards. Thus, we hold that the circuit court erroneously 
granted injunctive relief and the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed that 
decision. 
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals, vacate the preliminary 
injunction entered by the circuit court, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff is the exclusive bargaining representative of eligible Detroit Fire 
Department (DFD) employees. Defendant is the employer.  Both are parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that took effect in 1998 and expired on 
1 277 Mich App 317, 330; 745 NW2d 527 (2007). 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
June 30, 2001. Until a new agreement is forged in the Act 312 arbitration, the 
parties continue to operate under the old CBA.  That CBA states in pertinent part 
at Article 2.D that 
[t]he City reserves the right to lay off personnel for lack of work or 
funds; or for the occurrence of conditions beyond the control of the 
Department; or when such continuation of work would be wasteful 
and unproductive . . . . 
In Article 14, the parties agreed that 
[w]ages, hours and conditions of employment legally in effect on the 
effective date of this agreement, shall, except as improved herein, be 
maintained during the term of this Agreement. 
It is not the intent of this Article to restrict, interfere with, 
prevent or hinder the City from carrying out its duties and 
responsibilities to the public well being, by way of illustration, but 
not limitation, those rights, duties and responsibilities enumerated in 
Article 2 and the Purpose and Intent clause hereof, subject to the 
City’s obligations under PERA [public employment relations act] 
and other laws. 
After the CBA expired in 2001, the parties were unable to agree to a new 
contract. In December 2002, plaintiff invoked compulsory arbitration under Act 
312 to create a successor agreement. Act 312 is meant to provide an “alternate, 
expeditious, effective, and binding” arbitration process.2  Unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties, Act 312 requires the arbitrator to call a hearing within 15 days of 
2 Section 1 of Act 312 provides, in pertinent part: “It is the public policy of 
this state that in public police and fire departments, where the right of employees 
to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees 
and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, 
effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes . . . .” MCL 423.231 
(emphasis added). 
4  
 
 
                                                 
 
being appointed,3 conclude the hearing within 30 days of its commencement,4 and 
issue a written opinion within 30 days of the conclusion of the hearing.5  Here, the 
parties waived the time limitations that Act 312 imposes on the arbitration process.  
As a result, the “expeditious” Act 312 arbitration process is still pending after 
more than five years. 
 
Defendant experienced serious budget shortfalls during the ongoing Act 
312 arbitration. These difficult financial circumstances affected the operations of 
the DFD, leading defendant to implement a restructuring plan and a round of 
layoffs, effective July 1, 2005.  Unfortunately, the budget problems persisted, and 
defendant announced, in September 2005, an additional plan to restructure the 
DFD. Under this plan, defendant proposed to lay off 65 firefighters, demote 10 
battalion chiefs, and reduce the number of battalions from eight to five.  The plan 
reassigned the battalion chief’s duties at “garden variety fires” to the senior officer 
at the scene, and deactivated five engine and ladder companies. 
Plaintiff filed suit in the Wayne Circuit Court on September 12, 2005, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the September 2005 
reorganization plan from going into effect while the Act 312 arbitration was 
pending. Plaintiff argued that unilateral implementation of the restructuring plan 
3 MCL 423.236. 
4 Id. 
5 MCL 423.238. 
5  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
violated the status quo provision of Act 312 because it required unilateral 
alteration of minimum staffing, job duties, seniority, parity, and emergency 
medical service requirements, all of which affected both firefighter safety and 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
The circuit court held hearings beginning in late September, and granted 
plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction on October 17, 2005.  The court 
found that there were issues of fact concerning whether the layoffs would have an 
impact on the safety of the firefighters—a mandatory subject of bargaining under 
this Court’s decision in Local 1277, Metropolitan Council No. 23, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO v City of Center Line6 (Center Line II). 
The circuit judge sent the case to the assigned Act 312 arbitrator, Michael 
P. Long, to decide the safety issue and render his decision by October 27, 2005, at 
which time the circuit judge would determine if the preliminary injunction would 
remain in place. Although he held hearings, the arbitrator responded to the circuit 
court in an October 27, 2005, opinion stating that he was “not able to make any 
well reasoned determination as to the resolution of this dispute.”  Arbitrator Long 
indicated that he lacked jurisdiction to decide the safety issue, observing that 
“[t]he normal channels were not followed regarding reference of the matter to 
[Act] 312 arbitration.” 
He sent the case back to the circuit court and 
6 414 Mich 642; 327 NW2d 822 (1982). 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
recommended that the circuit court order the parties to mediation while keeping 
the injunction in place until the mediation process concluded. 
The circuit court again granted a preliminary injunction in an October 31, 
2005, order following another hearing.  At this hearing the court reviewed its 
earlier statements and conceded: 
I do want to say for the record after reading the transcript of 
the previous hearing of the 17th, that I felt that my choice of words 
was inapt because it sounded like I was making a determination that 
there was an impact. That is not my place to do that. 
However, the circuit judge clarified, “I find that there’s a serious question of fact 
as to whether or not [the restructuring plan] would have an impact on fire fighters’ 
safety, or indeed upon working conditions or working hours.”  Relying on Center 
Line II and Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit,7 the court found that the 
reorganization and layoff plan “may implicate mandatory provisions of collective 
bargaining, namely the impact on [sic] the Plan on the hours and conditions of 
employment (including the safety) of the members of the plaintiff.”  The 
preliminary injunction order enjoined defendant from eliminating the battalion 
chiefs, eliminating the firefighting companies, and laying off the firefighters.  It 
also ordered the parties to take all necessary steps to have the matter brought 
before an Act 312 panel to determine the factual questions surrounding the safety 
7 135 Mich App 660; 354 NW2d 297 (1984), vacated 419 Mich 915 (1984). 
7  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
issues. The order maintained the injunction until the issuance of a final and 
binding Act 312 award. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in a published decision.8 
Observing that the parties had a duty under PERA to collectively bargain about 
mandatory subjects of bargaining and that layoff decisions are not mandatory 
subjects, the panel relied on this Court’s decision in Center Line II to hold that 
“where, as here, proposed layoffs and restructuring may impact the safety of 
working conditions for firefighters, those proposals are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining.”9  The panel agreed with the circuit court’s finding that “the evidence 
established ‘serious issues of fact’ as to whether the proposed changes would 
impact safety, working conditions and working hours,” and as a result “the 
proposed changes were subjects of mandatory bargaining, and defendant could not 
therefore make these unilateral alterations while the parties are engaged in 
compulsory arbitration.”10  It disagreed with defendant’s argument that injunctive 
relief was inappropriate because the terms of the CBA permitted defendant to 
carry out the restructuring plan. 
8 Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 271 Mich App 457; 722 NW2d 705 
(2006). 
9 Id. at 461. 
10 Id. at 463. 
8  
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal with this Court.  This 
Court granted leave to appeal.11  Following oral arguments, this Court ordered 
supplemental briefing,12 and subsequently ordered reargument.13 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of a temporary injunction 
for abuse of discretion.14  There is an abuse of discretion when the trial court’s 
decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.15  A question of statutory 
11 477 Mich 927 (2006). The grant order asked the parties to brief “whether 
the defendant may implement the restructuring plan, or lay off firefighters, before 
coming to an agreement with the plaintiff about the impact of those actions.”   
12 478 Mich 1201 (2007). In this order, we asked the parties to address (1) 
whether Metropolitan Council No 23, Local 1277, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Center 
Line, 78 Mich App 281; 259 NW2d 460 (1977) (Center Line I), correctly held that 
jurisdiction to enforce § 13 of Act 312, MCL 423.243, resides in the circuit court, 
and (2) whether the Michigan Employment Relations Commission has primary 
jurisdiction to enforce § 13, see Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison, 465 Mich 185; 
631 NW2d 733 (2001). Given our resolution of this case, we do not reach the 
issues we asked the parties to address on reargument. 
13 480 Mich 880 (2007). 
14 Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v Civil Service Comm, 465 
Mich 212, 217; 634 NW2d 692 (2001). 
15 Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 
(2006). 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
 
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.16  Finally, issues of 
contract interpretation are also questions of law reviewed de novo.17 
ANALYSIS 
Public labor relations in Michigan are governed by PERA. One of PERA’s 
primary purposes “is to resolve labor-management strife through collective 
bargaining.”18  Under PERA a public labor union may not strike when 
disagreements arise in the collective bargaining process.19  Because public sector 
labor unions in Michigan lack the right to strike, they lack a significant tool to 
leverage their bargaining position. 
By its own terms, Act 312 is “supplementary” to PERA, which was enacted 
over 20 years earlier.20  Act 312 was intended, in the specific context of police and 
firefighter unions, to redress the imbalance in bargaining power created by the 
prohibition of strikes, and to preclude the possibility of an illegal strike by these 
16 Costa v Community Emergency Med Services, 475 Mich 403, 408; 716 
NW2d 236 (2006). 
17 Sweebe v Sweebe, 474 Mich 151, 154; 712 NW2d 708 (2006). 
18 Port Huron Ed Ass’n v Port Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 311; 
550 NW2d 228 (1996). 
19 MCL 423.202. 
20 MCL 423.244 (“This act shall be deemed as supplementary to Act No. 
336 of the Public Acts of 1947, as amended, being sections 423.201 to 423.216 of 
the Compiled Laws of 1948, and does not amend or repeal any of its provisions; 
but any provisions thereof requiring fact-finding procedures shall be inapplicable 
to disputes subject to arbitration under this act.”). 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
unions that provide vital public services, namely police and fire protection.  As 
Justice Coleman observed: 
When policemen engage in a strike, the community becomes 
immediately endangered by the withdrawal of their services. 
Likewise, our case law has often focused on the fact that fire fighters 
have a distinct and crucial employment relationship with a public 
employer.[21] 
Thus, 
[u]nder Act 312, if the public employer and the police offers’ or fire 
fighters’ bargaining unit have not reached an agreement concerning 
a mandatory subject of bargaining, and mediation proves 
unsuccessful, either party may initiate binding arbitration in order to 
avert a strike.[22] 
The status quo provision of Act 312 states that  
[d]uring the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration panel, 
existing wages, hours and other conditions of employment shall not 
be changed by action of either party without the consent of the other 
but a party may so consent without prejudice to his rights or position 
under this act.[23] 
21 Dearborn Fire Fighters, 394 Mich at 279 (opinion of Coleman, J.).  In 
Dearborn Fire Fighters, with three justices not participating, the remaining four 
justices considered the constitutionality of Act 312.  Justice Levin and Chief 
Justice Kavanagh held that the act was unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation 
of legislative power. Justice Coleman held the statute constitutional in its entirety. 
Justice Williams held the statute constitutional on the facts of the case.  With the 
members of this Court evenly split, the Court of Appeals decision upholding the 
constitutionality of Act 312 was affirmed. The constitutionality of Act 312 was 
again considered and upheld by a majority of this Court in Detroit v Detroit Police 
Officers Ass’n, 408 Mich 410; 294 NW2d 68 (1980), and Center Line II. 
22 Dearborn Fire Fighters, 394 Mich at 280 (opinion of Coleman, J.). 
23 MCL 423.243. 
11  
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Recalling the delicate balance of bargaining power our labor statutes seek to 
preserve in police and firefighter labor disputes, this provision was intended to 
prevent either party from gaining unfair leverage during the pendency of Act 312 
interest arbitration. 
Under the status quo provision, neither party without consent can alter 
“existing wages, hours, and other conditions of employment” while Act 312 
arbitration is pending.  We observed in Center Line II that safety is a condition of 
employment and, as such, a mandatory subject of bargaining.24 Consequently, the 
24 See Center Line II, 414 Mich at 661-664. See also, e.g., Manistee v 
Manistee Fire Fighters Ass’n, Local 645, IAFF, 174 Mich App 118, 122; 435 
NW2d 778 (1989). In Center Line II, one of the central issues was the scope of an 
Act 312 panel’s authority. This Court interpreted Act 312 in the context of 
PERA’s distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, 
observing that “[w]hile Act 312 does not specifically delineate the scope of the 
arbitration panel’s authority, it can be inferred from an analysis which considers 
[PERA] . . . and Act 312 together.”  Id. at 651-652. We held that “[g]iven the fact 
that Act 312 complements PERA and that under § 15 of PERA the duty to bargain 
only extends to mandatory subjects, . . . the arbitration panel can only compel 
agreement as to mandatory subjects.” Id. at 654. Thus, we concluded that the Act 
312 panel in Center Line II exceeded the scope of its authority when it compelled 
the parties to accept a layoff provision as part of a new labor contract because the 
layoff clause, which provided that police officer layoffs for lack of funds could 
only be made in conjunction with layoffs and cutbacks in other departments, fell 
within the scope of management prerogative and was outside the realm of 
mandatory subjects of bargaining.  However, Center Line II cautioned that “while 
the initial decision to lay off is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, and 
therefore cannot be compelled in an arbitration award, it is clear that there is a 
duty to bargain over the impact of that decision.” Id. at 661. The impact of the 
decision to lay off, according to Center Line II, might implicate a mandatory 
subject of bargaining that triggers the duty to collectively bargain.   
(continued . . .) 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
status quo provision prohibits changes to an existing condition of employment 
such as safety during the pendency of Act 312 arbitration. 
Of chief importance in a case involving an alleged status quo violation is 
whether an employer’s restructuring and layoff plan alters a condition of 
employment such as safety. The Court of Appeals recently held in Oak Park that 
where a union seeks to compel Act 312 arbitration with respect to staffing 
decisions, it must demonstrate that those decisions are “inextricably intertwined 
with safety” to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining. 25  If it does not, then 
the employer cannot be compelled to arbitrate the staffing decision under Act 312. 
The Oak Park panel rejected as “untenable” the union’s proposed alternative 
standard that “as long as a staffing decision arguably affects, concerns, or relates 
to safety—whether the effect be minimal, insignificant, or unjustifiable—the issue 
of staffing is a condition of employment that is subject to mandatory arbitration.”26 
It reasoned: 
The standards implemented by the hearing referee and MERC 
in this case are consistent with the requirement that only those 
(. . . continued) 
In this case, both parties appear to concede that, consistent with Center Line 
II, defendant retains the prerogative to lay off firefighters.  However, plaintiff 
argues that the impact of the restructuring plan, which includes layoffs, implicates 
a mandatory subject of bargaining because it affects firefighter safety, a “condition 
of employment” that should not be altered during Act 312 arbitration proceedings. 
25 Oak Park, 277 Mich App at 329-330.  See also Trenton v Trenton Fire 
Fighters Union, Local 2701, IAFF, 166 Mich App 285; 420 NW2d 188 (1988). 
26 Id. at 326. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
matters that have a significant impact on conditions of employment 
are subject to mandatory bargaining.  The impact of a staffing 
decision on working conditions, including safety, must be proven to 
be significant, not merely to arguably exist . . . . To adopt the 
union’s position would be tantamount to requirement that most, if 
not all, minimum staffing proposals—particularly with regard to 
[public safety officers], police officers, firefighters, and others 
engaged in high-risk professions—be subject to mandatory 
bargaining, given that a reduction in the number of these employees 
will arguably have some—albeit minimal—impact on safety.  Such a 
conclusion would have the effect of invading the city’s prerogative 
to determine the size and scope of its business, including the services 
it will provide. We decline to reach such a conclusion.[27] 
Although Oak Park addressed a different legal issue and not the status quo 
issue presented here, we find the logic and standard endorsed by Oak Park 
compelling in this context.28  A hasty or tentative finding that a restructuring and 
layoff plan violates the status quo would “invad[e] the city’s prerogative to 
determine the size and scope of its business, including the services it will 
provide,”29 just as surely as if every employer’s staffing decision that merely 
arguably affected safety conditions was subject to mandatory bargaining.  Thus, 
whether a layoff and restructuring plan jeopardizes employee safety requires a 
27 Id. at 329-330 (citations omitted). 
28 In Oak Park, the city filed an unfair labor practice charge against the 
union, alleging that the union unlawfully demanded bargaining over permissive 
bargaining subjects, such as a safety/staffing provision, in an Act 312 arbitration. 
The hearing referee and the MERC panel ruled in favor of the city, deciding that 
the union breached its duty to bargain in good faith.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed in a published opinion per curiam. 
29 Id. at 330. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
careful examination of the plan details and a finding that the plan is “inextricably 
intertwined with safety” such that it would have a “significant impact” on safety.30 
The central problem with the circuit court’s decision in this case, and by 
extension the Court of Appeals decision to affirm it, is that it only found that 
defendant’s layoff and restructuring plan “may” implicate a mandatory subject of 
bargaining and that this case “raised questions of fact” about firefighter safety. 
After issuing the preliminary injunction, the circuit court never conclusively 
determined that the plan unlawfully altered the status quo.  Indeed, the circuit 
court expressly stated that it was not deciding the merits of plaintiff’s claim.  And, 
when the circuit court attempted to induce Arbitrator Long to resolve the safety 
dispute, he declined to do so. 
Given the magnitude of a decision to restrain an employer’s exercise of a 
management prerogative, this level of uncertainty in a circuit court ruling is 
untenable. By its terms, this injunction was to remain in place until the conclusion 
of Act 312 arbitration, but a determination on the merits would never have been 
made. On a practical level, what was termed by the circuit court a “preliminary 
injunction” became a de facto permanent injunction, without resolving the merits 
of the alleged status quo violation.  Moreover, the injunction was issued where the 
traditional elements required for injunctive relief had not been established. 
Specifically, although the circuit court found that there were “issues of fact” 
30 Id. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
regarding the safety issue, it did not find that there was a likelihood of success on 
the merits in this regard, nor did the court conclude that the firefighters would 
suffer irreparable harm. 
Where a party seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent an alleged status 
quo violation as in this case, the party must satisfy a two-step process.  First, it 
bears the burden of proving that the traditional four elements favor the issuance of 
a preliminary injunction. The trial court must evaluate whether (1) the moving 
party made the required demonstration of irreparable harm, (2) the harm to the 
applicant absent such an injunction outweighs the harm it would cause to the 
adverse party, (3) the moving party showed that it is likely to prevail on the merits, 
and (4) there will be harm to the public interest if an injunction is issued.31 
Second, if a trial court determines that the standards for a preliminary 
injunction have been met and chooses to issue an injunction, it must promptly 
31 Michigan State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 
152, 157-158; 365 NW2d 93 (1984).  See also Pontiac Fire Fighters v Pontiac, 
___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 132916, decided July 23, 2008). 
We disagree with and overrule as inconsistent with this Court’s decision the Court 
of Appeals holding in Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 142 Mich App 248; 
369 NW2d 480 (1985), that the traditional injunctive standards do not apply when 
issuing an injunction to remedy a violation of the status quo provision.  This Court 
has consistently held that it is “basically contrary to public policy in this State to 
issue injunctions in labor disputes absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury, 
or breach of the peace.” Holland School Dist v Holland Ed Ass’n, 380 Mich 314, 
326; 157 NW2d 206 (1968); see also Michigan State Employees Ass’n, 421 Mich 
at 164-165; Michigan Law Enforcement Union, Teamsters Local 129 v Highland 
Park, 422 Mich 945 n 1 (1985). An injunction concerning a dispute about the 
status quo provision should be treated no differently. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
decide the merits of the status quo claim.  MCR 3.310(A) governs preliminary 
injunctions.  Subsection 5 requires that “[i]f a preliminary injunction is granted . . . 
[t]he trial of the action on the merits must be held within 6 months after the 
injunction is granted, unless good cause is shown or the parties stipulate to a 
longer period.”32 
Therefore, on remand, the circuit court must engage in this two-step 
inquiry. First, it must determine whether plaintiff has satisfied the traditional four­
part test for a preliminary injunction, particularly that plaintiff has demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits that the plan is “inextricably intertwined with 
safety” and made a showing of irreparable harm.  Second, if the circuit court 
issues a preliminary injunction there must be a determination on the merits that the 
challenged employer action is “inextricably intertwined with safety” as that 
standard was articulated in Oak Park. It must do more than conclude that the 
challenged employer action arguably affects safety. To that end, any decision by 
the circuit court that the employer action is “inextricably intertwined with safety” 
must be conclusive and supported by specific, detailed findings of fact. 
32 However, MCR 3.310(A)(2) permits the court to accelerate the process 
by advancing and consolidating the trial of the action on the merits with the 
hearing on the motion. In either case, the merits of the claim cannot remain 
unresolved. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
We hold that the circuit court erred when it issued the preliminary 
injunction preventing the implementation of the restructuring plan.  The circuit 
court issued what amounted to a permanent injunction where the underlying merits 
of the alleged status quo violation would never be resolved, contrary to the 
requirements of MCR 3.310(A)(5). We further hold that, when a safety claim is 
alleged, an employer’s challenged action alters the status quo during the pendency 
of an Act 312 arbitration only if the action is so “inextricably intertwined with 
safety” that the action would alter a “condition of employment.” 
We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment, vacate the preliminary 
injunction entered by the circuit court, and remand the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Stephen J. Markman 
Cavanagh, J.  I concur in the result only. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION IAFF LOCAL 344, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 131463 
CITY OF DETROIT,
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur in the majority’s decision to remand this case to the circuit court 
for a clear determination of whether the city of Detroit’s reorganization plan 
violates § 13 of Act 312. The remand is necessary because the circuit court stated 
its conclusions in terms that are too tentative. 
The circuit court must determine whether the union is likely to succeed on 
the merits of its claim that a status quo violation occurred.  If it finds such a 
likelihood, it may presume that the union will be irreparably harmed should the 
violation not be enjoined for the duration of the arbitration proceedings.  Because I 
 
 
 
  
  
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
have reached this conclusion, it follows that I would not overrule Detroit Police 
Officers Ass’n v Detroit.1 
In Detroit POA, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court was not 
required to make a finding of irreparable harm or inadequate remedy at law before 
enjoining violations of § 13 of Act 312.2  It relied on the interpretation by federal 
courts of a similar status quo provision in the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA).3 
That provision states in relevant part that “rates of pay, rules, or working 
conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally 
acted upon . . . by the Mediation Board . . . .”4 
Federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have held that 
this provision allows injunctive enforcement by the district courts without a 
showing of irreparable harm in cases of major disputes.5  Federal courts forgo the 
1 Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 142 Mich App 248; 369 NW2d 
480 (1985) (Detroit POA). 
2 Id. at 253. 
3 45 USC 151 et seq. 
4 45 USC 156.  
5 Major disputes involve disagreements over future contractual rights or 
changes in the terms in existing agreements. The parties are required to maintain 
the status quo during a lengthy bargaining and mediation process. ABX Air, Inc v 
Airline Professionals Ass’n of the Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No 
1224, AFL-CIO, 266 F3d 392, 396 (CA 6, 2001). The United States Supreme 
Court authorized the use of injunctive relief to enforce the status quo provision of 
the RLA for major disputes. Consolidated Rail Corp v R Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 
491 US 299, 303; 109 S Ct 2477; 105 L Ed 2d 250 (1989). In Detroit & Toledo 
(continued . . .) 
2  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
traditional requirement of irreparable harm because the plain statutory language 
does not require such a showing and irreparable harm is presumed in cases 
involving major disputes.6 
The majority argues that issuing an injunction without a showing of 
irreparable harm goes against the public policy of this state and that a status quo 
violation should not receive special treatment.7  However, only one of the cases 
cited by the majority involves a violation of § 13 of Act 312.  In its peremptory 
order in that case, the Court did not consider the public policy concerns codified in 
Act 312.8 And when the Court had an opportunity to consider whether the holding 
(. . . continued)  
Shore Line R Co v United Transportation Union, 396 US 142, 150; 90 S Ct 294;  
24 L Ed 2d 325 (1969), the Supreme Court explained its rationale: “[D]elaying the  
time when the parties can resort to self-help provides time for tempers to cool,  
helps create an atmosphere in which rational bargaining can occur, and permits the  
forces of public opinion to be mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or  
lockout.”  
6 A showing of irreparable injury is not required in light of the public 
interest in settlement of labor disputes and the fact that the duty to maintain the 
status quo “contains no qualification to the effect that the carrier has no obligation 
to [maintain the status quo] unless irreparable injury would otherwise result.” 
Southern R Co v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 337 F2d 
127, 133-34 (DC Cir, 1964). 
7 Ante at 16 n 31. 
8 See Michigan Law Enforcement Union, Teamsters Local 129 v Highland 
Park, 422 Mich 945 n 1 (1985). 
3  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
of Detroit POA contradicted the public policy of this state, it denied leave to 
appeal.9 
It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that the Court should not 
impose policy choices that differ from those selected by the Legislature.10 The 
majority here acknowledges the public policy concerns that occasioned the passing 
of Act 312: “Act 312 was intended, in the specific context of police and firefighter 
unions, to redress the imbalance in bargaining power created by the prohibition of 
strikes, and to preclude the possibility of an illegal strike by these unions that 
provide vital public services, namely police and fire protection.”11  These policy 
concerns are expressly codified in two statutes: MCL 423.231, which affords 
arbitration to police and firefighter unions as “an alternate, expeditious, effective 
and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes,”12 and MCL 423.243, which 
prohibits unilateral changes in the status quo while arbitration is pending.13 
9 Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 424 Mich 894 (1986). 
10 People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 152-153; 599 NW2d 102 (1999). 
11 Ante at 10-11.  
12 MCL 423.231 states in relevant part: “It is the public policy of this state 
that in public police and fire departments, where the right of employees to strike is 
by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees and the 
efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, 
effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes . . . .” (Emphasis 
added.) 
13 MCL 423.243 states: “During the pendency of proceedings before the 
arbitration panel, existing wages, hours and other conditions of employment shall 
(continued . . .) 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
The traditional requirement of irreparable harm requires a determination 
that the injury cannot be repaired by means other than an injunction.14  A unilateral 
change in the status quo has an obviously negative effect on a union’s bargaining 
power. It compromises the integrity of the bargaining process. Because of the 
bargaining disadvantage at which unilateral changes place a union, the union is 
unlikely to attain a retroactive restoration of the status quo.  Because a strike is the 
only method of maintaining bargaining power in the face of a unilateral change, 
Act 312 aims to prevent the resort to strikes by police and firefighters.  Thus, in 
passing Act 312, the Legislature effectively decided that any remedy other than an 
injunction would be inadequate. 
Consequently, a status quo violation 
presumptively causes irreparable harm. 
The Court of Appeals in Detroit POA did not err in concluding that no 
showing of irreparable harm was necessary to enjoin violations of the status quo 
during Act 312 arbitration.  While I concur in the decision to remand this case to 
the circuit court, I would not require the union to show irreparable harm.  Such 
(. . . continued)  
not be changed by action of either party without the consent of the other but a  
party may so consent without prejudice to his rights or position under this act.”  
14 Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v Civil Service Comm, 465 
Mich 212, 241; 634 NW2d 692 (2001) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
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harm should be presumed if the court determines that the city’s reorganization 
plan violates the status quo.15 
Marilyn Kelly 
15 I believe that the most important reason for issuing an injunction for the 
duration of Act 312 arbitration proceedings is to protect the parties’ bargaining 
positions. But irreparable harm should be presumed in the case of a status quo 
violation for another reason as well. 
The majority posits that, to show a status quo violation, the union must 
demonstrate that the city’s reorganization plan is “so ‘inextricably intertwined 
with safety’ that its implementation would impermissibly alter the status quo by 
altering this ‘condition’ of employment.” Ante at 3. But the impact of proposed 
layoffs on firefighter safety was also deemed relevant to the question of 
irreparable harm in Pontiac Fire Fighters v Pontiac, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ 
NW2d ___ (Docket No. 132916, decided July 23, 2008), which the majority cites 
for the four traditional elements of injunctive analysis. Ante at 16 n 31. Unlike 
Pontiac, this case involves an Act 312 arbitration, so the majority directs the 
circuit court to look for both irreparable harm and a status quo violation. If both 
these inquiries are premised on the impact of the layoffs on firefighter safety, then 
the majority essentially directs the circuit court to engage in a duplicative analysis. 
6