Title: Arvia v. Madigan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95590
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2004

Docket No. 95590-Agenda 16-January 2004.
PATRICK C. ARVIA, Appellee, v. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney 							
General, et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed April 15, 2004. 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of section 11-501.8 of
the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.8 (West 2000)),
commonly referred to as the "zero tolerance law." Generally, the zero
tolerance law provides that any driver under the age of 21 who tests
positive for the presence of alcohol or refuses testing upon a police
officer's proper request is subject to summary suspension of his or her
driving privileges. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(a), (d) (West 2000). The zero
tolerance law also provides that a driver may contest such a suspension
at an administrative hearing before the Secretary of State, whose decision
is subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law
(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)). 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e), (h)
(West 2000).
	The circuit court of Cook County held section 11-501.8
unconstitutional on its face, finding the administrative proceedings
contemplated in the statute violate the equal protection and due process
rights of drivers under the age of 21. The State appealed directly to this
court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). We reverse.

BACKGROUND
	On July 29, 2000, a Winnetka police officer issued a traffic citation
to plaintiff Patrick Arvia for failing to obey a stop sign. The police officer
also issued plaintiff a "Zero Tolerance Warning to Motorist Under 21,"
and requested plaintiff take a Breathalyzer test. The warning advised
plaintiff, who was under the age of 21, that refusal to complete requested
chemical tests would result in suspension of his license for a minimum of
six months. The warning also advised plaintiff that if he submitted to the
requested test and the test disclosed an alcohol concentration greater than
0.00,(1) his driving privileges would be suspended for a minimum of three
months. Plaintiff refused to take the Breathalyzer test. The officer prepared
a sworn report, certifying that plaintiff had refused the test, and submitted
the report to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, in turn,
notified plaintiff that his driving privileges would be suspended for six
months, beginning September 13, 2000.
	Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Secretary of State, seeking
rescission of the suspension of his driving privileges. The hearing
proceeded on September 18, 2000. Plaintiff offered various grounds for
rescission: the officer had no reason to believe that he had violated the
Illinois Vehicle Code; the officer lacked probable cause to believe that he
had consumed any amount of alcohol; and the officer failed to advise him
of the consequences prior to asking him to submit to a Breathalyzer test.
Plaintiff also claimed that he had not, in fact, refused to take a Breathalyzer
test, and that he had ingested a prescribed or recommended dosage of
medicine that contained alcohol. After hearing testimony and considering
the evidence, the hearing officer rejected plaintiff's arguments and
recommended denial of plaintiff's petition for rescission. The Secretary of
State, in an order entered November 2, 2000, accepted the hearing
officer's recommendation and upheld the suspension. The order stated
that it was "subject to appeal within 35 days under the Administrative
Review Law [735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)]."
	Plaintiff did not seek review of the Secretary's final decision under
the Administrative Review Law. Rather, on November 28, 2000, plaintiff
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, naming then Attorney General
James Ryan and Secretary of State Jesse White as defendants.(2) Plaintiff
sought a declaration that section 11-501.8 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code-the zero tolerance law-violates the equal protection rights of drivers
under the age of 21. In his complaint, plaintiff did not mention the
administrative hearing which he had requested, and in which he had
already participated, or the Secretary of State's final decision upholding
the suspension of his driving privileges. Plaintiff did allege that on August
21, 2000, he had filed a "Petition to Rescind the Statutory Summary
Suspension" in the circuit court, but that he had been unable to obtain a
hearing on that petition; he then filed his complaint for declaratory
judgment.
	The State moved to dismiss plaintiff's declaratory judgment action,
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 2000)). The circuit court denied that motion. Thereafter,
plaintiff moved for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West
2000)). Plaintiff posited that drivers 21 years of age or older who refuse
to submit to a chemical test for alcohol and are subject to summary
suspension of their driving privileges (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West
2000)) are entitled to a judicial hearing to contest the suspension (625
ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2000)), but that under the zero tolerance law,
drivers under the age of 21 who refuse to submit to such a test and are
subject to summary suspension of their driving privileges may only
challenge the suspension at an administrative hearing before the Secretary
of State (625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000)). Plaintiff argued that no
rational reason exists to deny him the right to appear before a "neutral
judge" to challenge his license suspension, and that the statutory
classification, based on age, was unreasonable and arbitrary, violating his
right to the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the United States
and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §2). In response, the State argued that plaintiff misread the statutory
scheme and that any difference in available forums is rationally related to
the legislature's goal of preventing underage drinking and driving. The
circuit court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding
section 11-501.8 of the Illinois Vehicle Code unconstitutional.
	After the circuit court's ruling, attorneys for the State learned that
plaintiff had already challenged his license suspension before the Secretary
of State, resulting in a final administrative decision upholding the
suspension. The State subsequently filed a motion to vacate the summary
judgment order. The State argued that plaintiff should have filed a
complaint for administrative review, and that plaintiff's declaratory
judgment action was an improper collateral attack on the Secretary of
State's adverse decision. The State further argued that principles of waiver
and res judicata barred plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. The circuit
court denied the motion to vacate. This appeal followed. See 134 Ill. 2d
R. 302(a).

ANALYSIS
	The State first argues that plaintiff's constitutional claim was not
properly before the circuit court based on principles of waiver, exhaustion
of administrative remedies, and res judicata. Because this argument
presents only issues of law, our review proceeds de novo. See In re
A.H., 207 Ill. 2d 590, 593 (2003).

I. Waiver
	The State contends that plaintiff's failure to raise his constitutional
challenge in the administrative hearing before the Secretary of State
waived review of the matter on administrative review and, in the context
of this case, in plaintiff's separate complaint for declaratory judgment.
	As a general rule, issues or defenses not raised before the
administrative agency are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the
first time on administrative review. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co.
v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278 (1998). This rule has been applied to
constitutional issues, even though the administrative agency lacks the
authority to decide such issues. E.g., Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d  at 278.
Assuming, without deciding, that the same waiver rules apply where, as
here, the litigant files a separate declaratory judgment action, rather than
a complaint for administrative review, we find no waiver under the facts
of this case.
	We note first that the scope of a license suspension hearing before
the Secretary of State is expressly circumscribed by statute. The zero
tolerance law states:
		"The scope of this hearing shall be limited to the issues of:
				(1) whether the police officer had probable cause to
believe that the person was driving or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle *** and the police officer had
reason to believe that the person was in violation of any
provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of
a local ordinance; and
				(2) whether the person was issued a Uniform Traffic
Ticket ***; and
				(3) whether the police officer had probable cause to
believe that the driver had consumed any amount of an
alcoholic beverage ***; and
				(4) whether the person, after being advised by the officer
that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be
suspended if the person refused to submit to and complete the
test or tests, did refuse to submit to or complete the test or
tests to determine the person's alcohol concentration; and
				(5) whether the person, after being advised by the officer
that the privileges to operate a motor vehicle would be
suspended *** did submit to and complete the test or tests
that determined an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00;
and
				(6) whether the test result of an alcohol concentration of
more than 0.00 was based upon the person's consumption of
alcohol in the performance of a religious service or ceremony;
and
				(7) whether the test result of an alcohol concentration of
more than 0.00 was based upon the person's consumption of
alcohol through ingestion of the prescribed or recommended
dosage of medicine." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000).
By so defining and restricting the scope of the hearing, the statute
dissuades a party from raising other issues and defenses before the
Secretary of State.
	We note further that, although this court has applied the general
waiver rule to bar a party from raising a constitutional issue on review
where that party failed to raise it before the agency (Carpetland U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351,
396-97 (2002); Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d at 278-79), this court has
refrained from adopting a bright-line rule "requiring" a party to raise all
constitutional issues before the agency. Rather, we have held that it is
"advisable" to assert a constitutional challenge before the administrative
tribunal. Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d  at 397; Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d  at
278.
	In addition, we find it significant that plaintiff mounted a facial
challenge to the validity of the zero tolerance law. A principal reason
underlying this court's preference that litigants assert a constitutional
challenge before the agency-notwithstanding the agency's inability to rule
on the matter-is that it allows opposing parties a full opportunity to present
evidence to refute the constitutional challenge. Such an evidentiary record
is indispensable because administrative review is confined to the record
created before the agency. Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d  at 397. A facial
challenge to a statute, however, presents an entirely legal question that
does not require factfinding by the agency or application of the agency's
particular expertise. See County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186,
199 (1987); Board of Education of Rich Township High School
District No. 227 v. Brown, 311 Ill. App. 3d 478, 488 (1999).
	The express statutory language restricting the scope of a zero
tolerance license suspension hearing, the absence of a decision from this
court "requiring" a litigant to raise all constitutional issues before the
administrative agency, and the nature of the constitutional challenge
asserted here militate in favor of a finding that plaintiff did not waive his
constitutional challenge. The State argues, however, that this case is similar
to Carpetland and Texaco-Cities, where we held that the plaintiffs
waived review of their constitutional claims by failing to raise them before
the administrative agency. As discussed below, the present case is
distinguishable and does not require the same outcome.
	In Carpetland, the employer sought administrative review of an
adverse ruling by the Director of Employment Security. On administrative
review before the circuit court, the employer argued, for the first time, that
the Director's actions violated his due process rights because the Director
had a direct, proximate and pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
proceeding. On review before this court, we held that the employer had
waived review of the matter by not raising it before the administrative
tribunal. Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d  at 397.
	In the present case, although the circuit court found the statute
unconstitutional on both due process and equal protection grounds,
plaintiff did not allege a due process violation. Plaintiff confined his
constitutional challenge to the equal protection clause. We recognize,
however, that underlying plaintiff's equal protection argument is his
contention that a hearing before the Secretary of State is necessarily
biased because the official who suspended his license is the same official
who will decide any challenge to the suspension. In this respect, plaintiff's
claim in the present case is similar to the employer's claim in Carpetland.
That is, both cases involve a potential conflict of interest which could
render the administrator's actions constitutionally suspect. Despite this
similarity, we do not find Carpetland controlling.
	In Carpetland, we held the issue waived because the employer failed
to raise the matter before the agency, depriving the Director of the
opportunity to "build a record in response to the constitutional challenge."
Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d  at 397. In the instant case, however, the State
conceded before the circuit court that there were no unresolved factual
issues germane to the court's determination of plaintiff's constitutional
claim. This concession is reflected in the State's brief before the circuit
court, as well as that court's written order: "In this case, the parties agree
that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Thus, this Court can
properly dispose of the controversy on [plaintiff's] motion for summary
judgment." Accordingly, the State cannot now argue that waiver applies
because it was deprived of the opportunity to "build a record in response
to the constitutional challenge." Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d  at 397.
	In Texaco-Cities, the plaintiff, a pipeline transporter of crude oil and
other petroleum products, filed a complaint for administrative review
challenging a decision of the acting director of the Illinois Department of
Revenue. The director determined that the gain the plaintiff realized from
the sale of certain pipeline assets constituted business income, and that
such income was subject to apportionment under section 304(d)(2) of the
Illinois Income Tax Act (35 ILCS 5/304(d)(2) (West 1994)). In the
circuit court, the plaintiff successfully argued that apportionment of the gain
under section 304(d) amounted to a violation of the plaintiff's due process
rights. The appellate court refused to consider that question, deeming it
waived by the plaintiff's failure to raise the matter during the administrative
proceedings. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 286 Ill.
App. 3d 529, 535 (1997). On appeal to this court, we affirmed the
judgment of the appellate court. Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d  at 278-79.
Citing the need to avoid piecemeal litigation and allow parties an
opportunity to present evidence to refute the constitutional challenge, we
held that the plaintiff's constitutional challenge "to the application of section
304(d)(2) in this case" was waived. Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d  at 279.
	The plaintiff in Texaco-Cities, unlike plaintiff in the instant case, did
not mount a facial challenge to the statute. That is, the plaintiff did not
argue that the apportionment formula of section 304(d) of the Illinois
Income Tax Act was invalid in all cases. Rather, the plaintiff argued that
application of section 304(d) to the specific income at issue in that case
violated its due process rights. "[W]here it is alleged that a statute valid
upon its face is applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner, the rule
generally prevails that recourse must be had in the first instance to the
appropriate administrative board." Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook,
13 Ill. 2d 493, 495 (1958); accord Phillips v. Graham, 86 Ill. 2d 274,
289 (1981). Such a constitutional infirmity "depends almost wholly upon
a determination of factual matters in which the specialized agency is
thought to be more proficient." Bank of Lyons, 13 Ill. 2d  at 495. Because
plaintiff here did not argue that the zero tolerance law was applied in a
discriminatory manner, we do not find Texaco-Cities controlling.
	Under the facts of this case, we reject the State's argument that
plaintiff waived review of his constitutional claim by not raising the matter
before the Secretary of State. We caution litigants, however, that it
remains advisable to raise all defenses before the administrative
tribunal-even those outside of the agency's authority to decide-or risk
waiver on review.

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
	The State also argues that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies precluded plaintiff from pursuing his constitutional challenge in his
declaratory judgment action.
	Generally, a party may not seek judicial relief from an administrative
action unless the party has exhausted all available administrative remedies.
County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999); Phillips, 86 Ill. 2d  at 289. Requiring the exhaustion
of administrative remedies "allows the administrative agency to fully
develop and consider the facts of the cause before it; it allows the agency
to utilize its expertise; and it allows the aggrieved party to ultimately
succeed before the agency, making judicial review unnecessary."
Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308
(1989). Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff pursued the only relief available
to him before the administrative agency: a hearing before the Secretary of
State. The Secretary of State's decision was not reviewable by any other
administrative tribunal. The Secretary's decision was, however, subject to
judicial review in the circuit court under the Administrative Review Law
(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)). 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(h)
(West 2000).
	Importantly, the exhaustion doctrine extends to administrative review
in the circuit court. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d  at 551. That is, where the
Administrative Review Law is applicable and the circuit court may grant
the relief a party seeks within the context of reviewing the agency's
decision, a circuit court has no authority to entertain independent causes
of action regarding the agency's actions. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d  at
551-52, citing Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 498-99
(1989). "Any other conclusion would enable a party to litigate separately
every alleged error committed by an agency in the course of the
administrative proceedings." Dubin, 128 Ill. 2d  at 499; see Midland
Hotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 312,
316 (1996) (affirming dismissal of class action complaint as improper
collateral attack on final agency decision, where that decision was
reviewable under the Administrative Review Act); Burgess v. Board of
Fire &amp; Police Commissioners, 275 Ill. App. 3d 315, 320 (1995)
(affirming dismissal of action seeking declaratory judgment and writ of
mandamus challenging agency hiring decision, where decision was
reviewable under the Administrative Review Law).
	In line with these authorities, the State argues that plaintiff's only
recourse in this case was to file a complaint for administrative review and
that plaintiff's complaint for declaratory judgment was an improper
attempt to circumvent the administrative review process, thus running afoul
of the exhaustion doctrine. We disagree.
	Although this court has required relatively strict compliance with the
exhaustion doctrine, we have also recognized exceptions. Castaneda,
132 Ill. 2d  at 308. One such exception, relevant here, provides that a
plaintiff who challenges the validity of a statute on its face need not exhaust
administrative remedies. Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d  at 309; County of Kane,
116 Ill. 2d  at 199. The reason for this exception is apparent: administrative
review is confined to the proofs offered and the record created before the
agency. Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d  at 397. A facial attack to the
constitutionality of a statute, which presents purely legal questions, is not
dependent for its assertion or its resolution on the administrative record.
County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d  at 199; Board of Education, 311 Ill. App.
3d at 488-89.
	Plaintiff here mounted a facial challenge to the zero tolerance law,
bringing himself within the foregoing exception to the exhaustion doctrine.
Accordingly, plaintiff's failure to file a complaint for administrative review
is not a bar to his declaratory judgment action.

IV. Res Judicata
	The State further argues that res judicata bars plaintiff's
constitutional claim because plaintiff "could have" raised the matter in a
complaint for administrative review. The State's argument misses the
mark.
	The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acts as an absolute
bar to a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The bar extends to
all matters that were offered to sustain or defeat the claim in the first
action, as well as all matters that could have been offered for that purpose.
Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 389 (2001); River
Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 302 (1998). Res
judicata promotes judicial economy by preventing repetitive litigation and
also protects parties from being forced to bear the unjust burden of
relitigating essentially the same case. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d  at 319,
quoting Henstein v. Buschbach, 248 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1015-16 (1993).
	Here, the only prior decision to which res judicata might attach is the
Secretary of State's decision upholding plaintiff's license suspension. See
Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, 333 Ill. App.
3d 711, 717 (2002) ("Both res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to
administrative decisions that are adjudicatory, judicial, or quasi-judicial in
nature"); O'Rourke v. Access Health, Inc., 282 Ill. App. 3d 394, 403
(1996) (same). As already discussed, however, the Secretary of State did
not and could not decide plaintiff's constitutional claim. Thus, plaintiff's
complaint for declaratory judgment does not qualify as a "relitigation" of
the same case.
	The State argues, however, that plaintiff cannot avoid res judicata
by choosing to forgo the administrative review portion of the earlier
proceeding. According to the State, because plaintiff "could have" raised
his constitutional claim in a complaint for administrative review, plaintiff
was precluded from raising the issue in his declaratory judgment action.
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff could have raised his constitutional
claim in a complaint for administrative review-even in the absence of a
claim that the Secretary's decision was otherwise incorrect-the State cites
no authority for the proposition that res judicata bars litigation of an issue
that might have been raised in a proceeding that never took place.
	Simply stated, res judicata prevents a party from taking two bites
out of the same apple. People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002),
quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988). Here, plaintiff took
one bite: he litigated the facial validity of the statute in one proceeding in
the circuit court, the only forum in which the issue could have been
resolved. Res judicata does not bar plaintiff's constitutional challenge.
Our holding is, of course, limited to the unique facts present here. In most
cases involving agency action, the preferable route for cautious counsel to
take is to file a complaint for administrative review and avoid the need to
overcome the many procedural pitfalls plaintiff faced in the present case.
	Having rejected the State's argument that plaintiff's constitutional
claim was not properly before the circuit court, we turn now to the
substantive issue on appeal: whether the zero tolerance law violates the
equal protection or due process rights of drivers under the age of 21. We
begin with an overview of the statute.

IV. The Zero Tolerance Law
	Section 11-501.8 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides that drivers
under the age of 21 who are arrested, as evidenced by a Uniform Traffic
Ticket for any violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code or similar provision of
a local ordinance, shall be deemed to have given consent to chemical tests
of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol
content of the person's blood, provided the police officer has probable
cause to believe that the driver has consumed any amount of an alcoholic
beverage. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(a) (West 2000). The officer requesting
the test must warn the driver that refusal to submit to the test, or
submission to the test resulting in an alcohol concentration more than 0.00,
may result in the suspension of driving privileges. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.8(c) (West 2000). The length of the suspension ranges from
three months to two years, depending on whether the driver is a first
offender, and whether the driver refuses the test or submits to a test that
discloses an alcohol concentration more than 0.00. 625 ILCS
5/6-208.2(a) (West 2000). If the driver refuses the test or submits to a
test disclosing the presence of alcohol, the officer must file a sworn report
with the Secretary of State and notify the driver of the sanction and that
it will be effective on the forty-sixth day following the date notice was
given. The Secretary of State, upon receipt of the officer's sworn report,
enters the appropriate suspension on the driver's record, and also notifies
the driver of the sanction and its effective date. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(d)
(West 2000).
	A driver may contest a zero tolerance license suspension by
requesting an administrative hearing with the Secretary of State. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000). The hearing is subject to the same general
requirements for all administrative hearings before the Secretary of State.
625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000) (incorporating by reference the
hearing provisions set forth in section 2-118 (625 ILCS 5/2-118 (West
2000))). As already noted, the statute expressly limits the scope of the
hearing to seven issues. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000). At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Secretary of State may rescind, modify, or
continue the sanction. If the Secretary of State does not rescind the
sanction, the driver may apply for a restricted driving permit, which may
be granted by the Secretary of State for good cause shown. 625 ILCS
5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000). A final decision of the Secretary of State is
subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735
ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)), expressly adopted by the zero
tolerance statute. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(h) (West 2000).
	The zero tolerance law, like all statutory enactments, carries a strong
presumption of constitutionality. See In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d 510, 517 (2002); Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309, 316 (2002). This
presumption means that we must uphold the statute's validity if reasonably
possible, and that plaintiff, as the party challenging the statute, must bear
the burden of clearly establishing the statute's constitutional infirmity. Allen
v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 21 (2003). Because the
constitutionality of a statute presents an issue of law, our review is de
novo. Allen, 208 Ill. 2d  at 21.

V. Equal Protection
	The analysis employed by this court to assess equal protection claims
is the same under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV, §1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). People v. Fisher,
184 Ill. 2d 441, 450 (1998). The guarantee of equal protection of the law
requires the government to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 309 (2001); Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d  at
450. The government may not accord different treatment to individuals
who have been placed by statute into different classes based on criteria
wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. The government,
however, is not forbidden from drawing proper distinctions in legislation
among different categories of people. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 309.
	The level of scrutiny applicable in reviewing legislative classifications
depends on the nature of the classification. Where the statute creates a
"suspect" classification, such as one based on race or national origin, or
impinges on fundamental rights, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny.
Statutes which do not implicate these concerns are subject to rational
basis review. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 37 (1998); People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1992). The plaintiff maintains that the Illinois Vehicle Code
impermissibly classifies drivers based on age. Age is not a suspect
classification under the equal protection clause and need only satisfy the
rational basis test. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d  at 8; see also Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522, 542, 120 S. Ct. 631, 645-46 (2000) (reaffirming that age is not a suspect classification
under the federal equal protection clause). Under the rational basis test our
review is limited and deferential; we inquire only "whether the method or
means employed in the statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of the
legislation is rationally related to that goal." A.A., 181 Ill. 2d  at 38. If we
can reasonably conceive of any set of facts to justify the statutory
classification, we will uphold the statute. A.A., 181 Ill. 2d  at 38; Reed,
148 Ill. 2d  at 8.
	The crux of plaintiff's equal protection argument is that, had he been
21 years of age or older at the time of his license suspension, he could
have challenged the suspension at a judicial hearing in the circuit court, but
because he was under 21 years of age, he was required to pursue his
challenge at an administrative hearing. According to plaintiff, this
purportedly age-based differential treatment is not rationally related to the
statute's purpose. We agree with the State that plaintiff misreads the
Illinois Vehicle Code.
	In support of his argument that a judicial hearing would have been
available to him, had he been 21 years of age or older, plaintiff cites to
section 11-501.1 (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2000)) and section
2-118.1 (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2000)), part of our DUI law.
Section 11-501 prohibits a person from driving while under the influence
of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating compound. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)
(West 2000). Under the implied-consent provisions, persons arrested
under the DUI law face summary suspension of their driving privileges
where testing discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more or where
the driver refuses to submit to a test. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West
2000). Under section 2-118.1, summary suspensions under the DUI law
may be challenged at a judicial hearing. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West
2000).
	Plaintiff's reliance on the DUI law is puzzling because plaintiff was not
arrested for DUI. Accordingly, the provisions of the DUI law governing
challenges to summary suspensions under that law are irrelevant. We note,
in any event, that had plaintiff been arrested for DUI, he would have had
the same access to a judicial hearing to contest the summary suspension
of his driving privileges as any other driver because the DUI law does not
distinguish among drivers on the basis of age. The DUI law is age neutral.
	The circuit court, however, looked past plaintiff's age-based
argument and ruled that any individual threatened with the summary
suspension of his or her driver's license should be treated the same.
Essentially, the circuit court determined that persons faced with summary
suspension of driving privileges under the zero tolerance law are similarly
situated to persons faced with summary suspension of driving privileges
under the DUI law for purposes of equal protection review. We disagree.
	Under the DUI law, the implied-consent provisions are only triggered
where the person is arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 2000). A person arrested under the
DUI law faces the prospect of criminal prosecution and, if found guilty,
faces the imposition of criminal penalties and revocation of his or her
driving privileges. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(c), (g) (West 2000). The summary
suspension provisions are intended to promptly remove impaired drivers
from the road, pending criminal prosecution. People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990).
	In contrast, the implied-consent provisions of the zero tolerance law
are triggered where a driver under the legal drinking age violates any
provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code and the officer has probable cause
to believe he or she has consumed any amount of an alcoholic beverage.
625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(a) (West 2000). The summary suspension
provisions are not necessarily tied to removing impaired drivers from the
road, since suspension may result from the consumption of even small
amounts of alcohol. Rather, the summary suspension provisions provide
youthful drivers an incentive-not found in the DUI law-to refrain from
consuming any amount of alcohol. A young driver whose license is
suspended under the zero tolerance law faces no other collateral
consequences, such as criminal prosecution. Indeed, unlike the DUI law,
the zero tolerance law prohibits evidence of the driver's blood-alcohol
concentration to be used in any other civil or criminal proceeding.
Compare 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West 2000) with 625 ILCS
5/11-501.8(f) (West 2000).
	We conclude that persons faced with summary suspension of driving
privileges under the zero tolerance law are not similarly situated to persons
faced with summary suspension under the DUI law for purposes of equal
protection review, and the circuit court erred in finding the zero tolerance
law unconstitutional on that basis.

VI. Due Process
	The circuit court also ruled that the zero tolerance law violates the
procedural due process rights of drivers under the age of 21.
	A fair trial before a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,
a requirement that applies to both courts and administrative agencies
which perform adjudicatory functions. Scott v. Department of
Commerce &amp; Community Affairs, 84 Ill. 2d 42, 54-55 (1981), quoting
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 723, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1464 (1975). Plaintiff maintains that he was denied his right to a fair
and impartial hearing because the hearing was conducted by the same
official who suspended his license. Plaintiff argues that "[w]hen the
Secretary of State acts as both prosecutor and judge, the proceeding
cannot be impartial."
	We note our disagreement with plaintiff's assertion that the Secretary
of State "prosecutes" license suspensions under the zero tolerance law.
The process for summary suspensions is purely administrative. That is, the
zero tolerance law requires the Secretary of State to suspend a person's
driving privileges upon the receipt of a law enforcement officer's sworn
report that the driver refused a chemical test or that the chemical test
disclosed the presence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(d) (West
2000). The Secretary of State exercises no discretion, and unless the
driver wishes to contest the suspension, it will simply run its course and the
matter is closed.
	Plaintiff's improper characterization aside, we will not presume, as
plaintiff does, that the Secretary of State's hearing officers are necessarily
biased. Indeed, "[w]ithout a showing to the contrary, state administrators
'are assumed to be [individuals] of conscience and intellectual discipline,
capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances.' " Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 728, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1468 (1975), quoting United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 85 L. Ed. 1429, 1435, 61 S. Ct. 999,
1004 (1941); accord Scott, 84 Ill. 2d  at 55; Collura v. Board of Police
Commissioners, 113 Ill. 2d 361, 370 (1986); Abrahamson v. Illinois
Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 95 (1992).
Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's unsubstantiated claim that the
administrative hearing contemplated under the zero tolerance law denies
drivers their right to a hearing before a neutral tribunal.
	In concluding that the zero tolerance law violates the due process
rights of drivers, the circuit court did not simply rely on the presumed bias
of the hearing officers. The circuit court also emphasized the differences
between an administrative hearing before the Secretary of State to contest
a zero tolerance suspension, and a judicial hearing to contest a DUI
suspension. The circuit court implicitly concluded that a judicial hearing is
superior to an administrative hearing and that the driver is so
disadvantaged by the administrative procedure under the zero tolerance
law as to result in a violation of the driver's right to procedural due
process. We disagree.
	Contrary to the circuit court's finding, the judicial license suspension
hearing contemplated under the DUI law and the administrative license
suspension hearing contemplated under the zero tolerance law are not so
different. Indeed, in both types of license suspension hearings, the scope
of the hearing is expressly limited by statute. Compare 625 ILCS
5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000) (limiting zero tolerance suspension hearing to
seven issues) with 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2000) (limiting DUI
suspension hearing to four issues). In both types of hearings, the person
challenging the suspension bears the burden of proof. See People v. Orth,
124 Ill. 2d 326, 337-38 (1988) (motorist challenging DUI suspension
bears the burden of proof); 92 Ill. Adm. Code §1001.620 (2003) (zero
tolerance petitioner carries the burden of proof). In both instances, the
hearing may be conducted upon a review of the officer's own official
reports, provided, however, that the driver may subpoena the officer. 625
ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2000); 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West
2000). Although a person faced with summary suspension under the zero
tolerance law must challenge his suspension initially before the Secretary
of State, judicial review is not precluded. Administrative review in the
circuit court is available. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(h) (West 2000).
Moreover, the standard of review applicable to the Secretary of State's
findings in a zero tolerance license suspension case is the same standard
applicable to appellate review of circuit court findings in a DUI license
suspension case. See Carpetland, 201 Ill. 2d  at 369 (agency
determinations of fact are reviewed under a manifest weight of the
evidence standard); Orth, 124 Ill. 2d  at 341 (trial court's finding that
motorist established a prima facie case for rescission will not be
overturned on appeal unless against the manifest weight of the evidence).
We find no basis to conclude, as the circuit court did, that the
administrative hearing under the zero tolerance law was substantially
different from the judicial proceeding under the DUI law and no reason to
conclude that the administrative procedure deprives drivers procedural
due process.

CONCLUSION
	We conclude that plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the zero
tolerance statute was properly before the circuit court, but that the circuit
court erred in finding the statute unconstitutional on equal protection and
due process grounds. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit
court.
Reversed.
1.       "Alcohol concentration means either grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath." 625 ILCS 5/11501.8(b)(v) (West 2000).
2.                
       Attorney General Lisa Madigan has been substituted as a defendant by operation of law. 735 ILCS 5/21008(d) (West 
2000).