Title: Matter of Coruzzi
Citation: 484 A.2d 667, 98 N.J. 77
Docket Number: N/A
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 6, 1984

98 N.J. 77 (1984) 484 A.2d 667 IN THE MATTER OF PETER J. CORUZZI, AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued November 7, 1984. Decided December 6, 1984. *78 David E. Johnson, Jr., Director, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Peter J. Coruzzi argued the cause pro se. PER CURIAM. Following a jury trial respondent was convicted of four counts of bribery contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. Each charge arose out of his misconduct as a Judge of the Superior Court. The jury concluded that in three separate criminal matters respondent had accepted or agreed to accept bribes; and that the consideration for the bribe money in two of those cases was to be respondent's agreement not to impose custodial sentences, while in the third it was to be his undertaking to change a custodial sentence to a non-custodial term. Respondent received the money in two of the cases. In the third he solicited the bribe but did not receive it. In May 1982 the trial court sentenced respondent to a five-year custodial term, imposed a fine, and ordered restitution. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273 (1983), and we denied certification, 94 N.J. 531 (1983). This Court temporarily suspended respondent from the practice of law in June 1982. On the completion of removal proceedings under the pertinent statutes, N.J.S.A. 2A:1B-1 to -11, we permanently removed respondent from judicial office in March 1984, based on our finding beyond a reasonable *79 doubt that he had engaged in misconduct in office. Matter of Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 581-82 (1984). We held that After respondent had been released from confinement in June 1984, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) acted upon the motion of the Office of Attorney Ethics for final disciplinary action. Respondent did not appear at the scheduled hearing before the DRB, whose Conclusions and Recommendations were as follows: By virtue of the prior proceedings in this Court involving respondent his petition for certification following the Appellate Division's affirmance of his conviction, and our role in the removal proceedings we are intimately familiar with the record of his conviction. Respondent sought at oral argument before this Court (he filed no brief) to have us go behind that conviction, to examine anew his contentions challenging the conviction and this Court's participation in his removal, and, presumably, in these disciplinary proceedings, as to which he asks for discovery. As to the first point, we have but recently adverted to the rule, firmly established "[l]ong before the 1970 adoption of the judicial removal statute, * * * that the conviction of an attorney conclusively established the underlying facts in disciplinary proceedings." Matter of Coruzzi, supra, 95 N.J. at 571, citing In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 36 (1982); In re Mirabelli, 79 N.J. 597, 601-02 (1979); In re Mischlich, 60 N.J. 590, 593 (1973); In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 316, 321 (1951), cert. den. sub. nom., Isserman v. Ethics Committee, 345 U.S. 927, 73 S. Ct. 706, 97 L. Ed. 1357 (1953). But even were we persuaded, as we are not, that that rule should be ignored and the conviction re-examined, we are satisfied, as was the Appellate Division, that respondent's guilt has been established beyond any reasonable doubt. As to respondent's "discovery" argument, that too was raised before, in the removal proceedings, and given thoughtful consideration. It was rejected then, as it is now, for these reasons: Bribery is viewed as so reprehensible as almost invariably to call for disbarment. See In re Hughes, supra, 90 N.J. at 38-39. It must evoke particular consternation when committed by a sitting judge, for then it strikes directly at the heart of the administration of justice. Unlike the situation in In re Mirabelli, supra, 79 N.J. at 602 (prompt concession of guilt, cooperation with ethics officials: discipline, suspension for three years), this case reveals absolutely no extenuating circumstances. Surely a public official's years of public service cannot serve to mitigate the sanction when, as here, his misconduct is in direct disregard of the public trust. In re Friedland, 95 N.J. 170, 173 (1984). Under the circumstances no discipline short of disbarment would be commensurate with the transgression. Respondent's name will be stricken from the roll. He is ordered to reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for administrative costs. So ordered. *82 Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN and GARIBALDI join in this opinion. It is ORDERED that PETER J. CORUZZI of HADDONFIELD be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and it is further ORDERED that PETER J. CORUZZI be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further ORDERED that PETER J. CORUZZI reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for administrative costs; and it is further ORDERED that respondent comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with suspended, disbarred or resigned attorneys.