Title: Ex parte H. Chase Dearman.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180911
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2020

REL:  June 26, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180911
____________________
Ex parte H. Chase Dearman
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  H. Chase Dearman
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-17-5331.70;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-18-0049)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
1180911
H. Chase Dearman petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision
affirming, without an opinion, the Mobile Circuit Court's
order finding Dearman in direct contempt, as that term is
defined by Rule 33.1(b)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P.  See Dearman v.
State (No. CR-18-0049, July 12, 2019), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
Crim. App. 2019) (table) (on return to remand) ("Dearman II"). 
We granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision is in conflict with Hawthorne v.
State, 611 So. 2d 436 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); In re Powers,
523 So. 2d 1079 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); and/or In re Carter,
412 So. 2d 811 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982).1  We conclude that the
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is in conflict with
Hawthorne, and we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals'
judgment.
1We note that Dearman also alleged that Dearman II is in
conflict with Ex parte Walker, 122 So. 3d 1287 (Ala. Civ. App.
2013).  However, we did not grant certiorari review as to
Dearman's argument regarding Ex parte Walker because Ex parte
Walker is a plurality decision and, thus, is not a "prior
decision[]" of the Court of Civil Appeals for purposes of
Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P.
2
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Facts and Procedural History
On 
August 
30, 
2018, 
Dearman, 
an 
attorney, 
was
representing James Markese Wright at Wright's probation-
revocation hearing before the circuit court; Judge James T.
Patterson was the circuit-court judge presiding over the
hearing.  During the course of the probation-revocation
hearing, the following exchange occurred between Dearman and
Judge Patterson:
"[Wright's probation officer]:  During the
search [of Wright's house], I ended up locating in
the kitchen drawer, what was later determined to be
a controlled substance.
"[The State]:  Specifically, what was it?
"[Wright's probation officer]:  AK-47 Herbal
Incense.
"[The State]:  Would that be on the streets
known as --
"MR. DEARMAN:  I object.  This officer has no
training in narcotics whatsoever.  This is not a
regular drug and regularly identifiable.
"And in addition to that, the district court
found no probable cause on this case, the facts of
which the court is now hearing.
"THE COURT:  All right.
"MR. DEARMAN:  We've had a preliminary hearing.
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"THE COURT:  'Alabama Rules of Evidence,
Article 11, Miscellaneous Rules, Rule 1101, rules
inapplicable.  These rules, other than those with
respect to privileges, do not apply in the following
situations:  Preliminary questions of fact, grand
jury, 
miscellaneous 
proceedings 
including
proceedings 
for 
extradition 
or 
rendition,
preliminary hearing in criminal cases, sentencings,
granting and revoking probation.'[2]
"MR. DEARMAN:  Judge, in district court --
"THE COURT:  No. They don't apply.
"MR. DEARMAN:  May I finish my objection?
"THE COURT:  No, you may not.  There's no
objection here.  They don't apply.  The Rules of
Evidence don't apply here.
"MR. DEARMAN:  I have an objection for the
record.
"THE COURT:  No, sir.  The rules don't apply.
The rules don't apply, Mr. Dearman.
"MR. DEARMAN:  The Judge is talking over me. 
"THE COURT:  The rules don't apply.
"MR. DEARMAN:  My objection --
"THE COURT:  The rules don't apply.
"MR. DEARMAN:  My objection is --
"THE COURT:  The rules don't apply.
"MR. DEARMAN:  My objection is --
2We note that this is not a verbatim reading of Rule 1101,
Ala. R. Evid.
4
1180911
"THE COURT:  The rules don't apply.
"MR. DEARMAN:  Okay.  Let me know when I can
speak.
"THE COURT:  You're not going to speak. If
you're going to make an objection, you're not going
to speak.
"MR. DEARMAN:  May the record reflect that I'm
not allowed to make --
"THE COURT:  Get him out of here.  Take the
lawyer out.  Get out.
"MR. DEARMAN:  May the record reflect --
"THE COURT:  Get out.
"MR. DEARMAN:  -- that I am being ordered out of
the courtroom --
"THE COURT:  Get out.
"MR. DEARMAN:  -- and the Judge has lost his
temper --
"THE COURT:  Get out.
"MR. DEARMAN:  -- again.
"THE COURT:  Get out. 
"Take him back.
"(Proceedings concluded.)"
On the same day of the hearing, the circuit court entered
the following order:
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"Based on his conduct before this court this
date at hearing on the probation revocation of his
client, James Markese Wright, and specifically his
conduct after this court advised Mr. Dearman that
per Ala. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3), the rules of evidence
do not apply to granting or revoking probation, and
because of his contemptuous conduct cted [sic]
toward this court immediately after this Rule of
Evidence was pointed out to him, this court finds
attorney Chase Dearman in direct contempt of court
per Rule 33.1(b)(1)[, Ala. R. Crim. P].[3]
"This matter was immediately disposed of by
undersigned ordering Mr. Dearman to leave [the]
courtroom ..., and this court will take no further
action in this regard -- this time.  However, please
be advised that further outbursts of this nature may
lead to other sanctions allowed per Ala. R. Crim. P.
Rule 33."
On September 24, 2018, Dearman filed a motion requesting that
the circuit court vacate its August 30, 2018, order and
requested a hearing on the matter.  In his motion, Dearman
alleged that he was not given notice of the specific
contemptuous conduct and a reasonable opportunity to present
3"Direct contempt" is defined in Rule 33.1(b)(1), Ala. R.
Crim. P., as follows:
"'Direct Contempt' means disorderly or insolent
behavior or other misconduct committed in open
court, in the presence of the judge, that disturbs
the court's business, where all of the essential
elements of the misconduct occur in the presence of
the court and are actually observed by the court,
and where immediate action is essential to prevent
diminution of the court's dignity and authority
before the public."
6
1180911
evidence or mitigating circumstances as required under
Rule 33.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., which states:
"The court shall apprise the person of the specific
conduct on which the finding [of direct contempt] is
based and give that person a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence or argument regarding excusing
or mitigating circumstances. No decision concerning
the punishment to be imposed shall be made during
the course of the proceeding at which the contempt
occurs, unless prompt punishment is imperative to
achieve immediate vindication of the court's dignity
and authority."
On September 26, 2018, the circuit court denied Dearman's
motion.  Dearman appealed the order of contempt to the Court
of Criminal Appeals.  See Dearman v. State, [Ms. CR-18-0049,
April 12, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2019)
("Dearman I").
In Dearman I, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, as
follows:
"Rule 33.2(b) mandates that a person found in
contempt be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence or argument in an effort to excuse
or to mitigate the contemptuous behavior. Dearman
was 
not 
afforded 
an 
opportunity 
to 
do 
so. 
Therefore, the circuit court erred when it failed to
comply with Rule 33.2(b), and Dearman is entitled to
relief on this issue."
___ So. 3d at ___.  Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals
remanded the matter to the circuit court and ordered it to
7
1180911
comply with Rule 33.2(b).  The Court of Criminal Appeals
expressly stated that, "[b]ecause we are remanding this case
for the circuit court to comply with Rule 33.2(b), we
pretermit discussion of Dearman's remaining issue on appeal,
namely, whether the circuit court erred in finding Dearman in
direct contempt."  Dearman I, ___ So. 3d at ___ n. 1. 4
On remand, the circuit court conducted a hearing on
May 10, 2019, to comply with Rule 33.2(b).  At the hearing, at
which Dearman was present, the circuit court stated that it
found Dearman in direct contempt "because of the challenge
[to] judicial authority as shown in the record on appeal" and
that Dearman's "behavior necessitated immediate and prompt
punishment; i.e., removal from the courtroom."  Dearman was
then given the opportunity to present evidence or argument
regarding excusing or mitigating circumstances, at which time
Dearman stated:
4Dearman also argued in Dearman I that the Court of
Criminal Appeals should order Judge Patterson to recuse
himself from the contempt proceedings.  See Dearman I, ___
So. 3d at ___.  The Court of Criminal Appeals considered the
merits of Dearman's argument, but did not find it convincing. 
Dearman did not petition this Court for certiorari review of
Dearman I.
8
1180911
"I would like to state for the record that it was my
intent only to fulfill my duty as the advocate for
my client. 
"I was taught in law school that if you do not
put it on the record, you've lost it forever, and
that was all I was simply trying to do. There was no
intent on my behalf. It certainly wasn't anything
personal."
Following the hearing, the circuit court entered an order,
which states, in pertinent part:
"Today at the hearing mandated by the Court of
Criminal Appeals, Mr. Dearman was advised by this
court ... th[at] he had been held in contempt [on
August 30, 2018,] because the court was of the
opinion that what transpired was a challenge to the
court's authority; therefore, the court felt it
necessary to promptly punish said behavior, yet
considered the matter closed based on the order I
had entered that day."
On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
by 
unpublished
memorandum.  Dearman II.  Dearman filed an application for
rehearing, which was denied on August 2, 2019.
On August 19, 2019, Dearman petitioned this Court for
certiorari review of Dearman II.  We granted certiorari review
to determine whether Dearman II is in conflict with Hawthorne,
supra, Powers, supra, and/or Carter, supra.
9
1180911
Standard of Review
In Holland v. State, 800 So. 2d 602, 604 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
"'The scope of review on the issue of contempt "is
limited to questions of law and, if there is any
evidence to support its finding, the judgment of the
trial court will not be disturbed."'  [Graham v.
State, 427 So. 2d 998,] 1006 [(Ala. Crim. App.
1983)], citing Murphy v. Murphy, 395 So. 2d 1047,
1049 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)."5
5Under Alabama precedent as it currently stands, the "any
evidence" standard of review set forth in Ex parte Holland is
applied in reviewing findings of criminal contempt occurring
in a criminal case.  However, we note that the following
standard set forth in Ex parte Ferguson, 819 So. 2d 626 (Ala.
2001), is the standard of review applied in reviewing findings
of criminal contempt occurring in a civil case:  
"[T]he standard of review in an appeal from an
adjudication of criminal contempt occurring in a
civil case is whether the offense, i.e., the
contempt, was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 99
L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988); Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co., 785
F.2d 970 (11th Cir. 1986); and United States v.
Turner, 812 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1987)(an attorney
was found guilty of criminal contempt by United
States District Judge Brevard Hand)."
819 So. 2d at 629 (emphasis added.)  Before the adoption of
Rule 33, Ala. R. Crim. P., and its provision for the appeal of
contempt findings, all contempt findings were reviewed by
petition for the writ of certiorari.  The "any evidence"
standard of review was applied in that context.  Stack v.
Stack, 646 So. 2d  51, 56 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)("In reviewing
contempt judgments by writ of certiorari, this court applied
the standard of whether there was any evidence to support the
judgment of the trial court.").  Rule 33 became effective on
10
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Discussion
Dearman argues that his conduct at the August 30, 2018,
hearing did not "constitute an act of direct contempt." 
Dearman's brief, p. 14.  Dearman argues that he was not
challenging the circuit court's authority at the August 30,
2018, hearing, but was attempting "to put a timely and
complete objection on the record" in defending his client.  In
so arguing, Dearman argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision is in conflict with Hawthorne, supra.
In Hawthorne, an attorney used the phrase "sons of
bitches" during closing argument.  There was no objection made
by opposing counsel at the time the phrase was used, and the
trial court took no immediate action to stop or to reprimand
January 1, 1991, and the procedural components were later
determined to apply to contempt proceedings in a civil case. 
See Baker v. Heatherwood Homeowners Ass'n, 587 So. 2d 938, 944
(Ala. 1991) ("Rule 33 applies to the contempt proceeding even
though this is a civil proceeding.").  The Court of Criminal
Appeals continued to apply the "any evidence" standard after
the adoption of Rule 33, but the Court of Civil Appeals began
applying different standards of review.  This explains the
divergence in Alabama precedent, and there may be good reason
for applying the same standard of review whether the contempt
occurs in a criminal case or a civil case, but that issue is
not before us today; the Court would be well served to address
this complex area of the law at a future time when the issue
is directly presented and the parties have had the opportunity
to research, brief, and argue their positions concerning it.
11
1180911
the attorney for using the phrase.  It was not until the
opposing side was giving its closing argument that the
attorney's use of the phrase "sons of bitches" was objected to
as inappropriate.  The trial court agreed, stating that "'[i]t
was highly improper to use that language in the courtroom.'" 
Hawthorne, 611 So. 2d at 437.  Ten days later, the trial court
gave the attorney "an opportunity to be heard as to whether he
should be held in contempt of court for using the phrase 'sons
of bitches.'"  Id.  Following the hearing, the trial court
"issued an order finding the [attorney] guilty of direct
criminal contempt of court."  Id.  The attorney appealed to
the Court of Criminal Appeals.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that
"[t]he question is whether the conduct amounts to direct
criminal contempt of court" as defined by Rule 33.1(a) and
Rule 33.1(c)(1) (now Rule 33.1(b)(1) and 33.1(b)(3)), Ala. R.
Crim. P.  Hawthorne, 611 So. 2d at 437.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals stated that, "[w]hile the language used was
unprofessional, indecorous, unnecessary, and unbecoming of a
member of the bar, the record is devoid of any evidence that
'immediate action [was] essential to prevent diminution of 
the
12
1180911
court's dignity and authority before the public.'  See A[la].
R. Cr[im]. P. 33.1[(b)(1)]."  Hawthorne, 611 So. 2d at 437. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals further stated that "the record
is devoid of sufficient evidence that the [attorney's] use of
the phrase 'sons of bitches' 'obstruct[ed] the administration
of justice' or interrupted, disturbed, or hindered the 
court's
proceedings."  Id. at 438 (quoting Rule 33.1(c)(1) (now
Rule 33.1(b)(3)(a)), Ala. R. Crim. P.).
In concluding as it did in Hawthorne, the Court of
Criminal Appeals specifically stated that the record was
"devoid of any evidence" supporting the trial 
court's judgment
of contempt.  Hawthorne, 611 So. 2d at 437.  It is clear that
the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the "any evidence"
standard of review, which states that a trial court's judgment
of contempt will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to
support its finding.  Holland v. State, 800 So. 2d at 604
("'"[I]f there is any evidence to support its finding, the
judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed."' [Graham
v. State, 427 So. 2d 998,] 1006 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1983)],
citing Murphy v. Murphy, 395 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Ala. Civ. App.
1981).").  Having concluded that the record was devoid of any
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evidence to support the trial court's judgment of contempt,
the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment.6
In the present case, the circuit court held Dearman in
contempt because he repeatedly attempted to make a specific
objection after the circuit court determined that the Alabama
Rules of Evidence did not apply at the August 30, 2018,
probation-revocation hearing.  It appears that the circuit
court believed that the objection Dearman was attempting to
make was related to that particular ruling.  However, it is
unclear from the record the exact objection that Dearman
6We note that, at the very end of its opinion in
Hawthorne, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:  "Moreover,
the Court of Civil Appeals has held that '[a]n error in
judgment without clear and convincing evidence of bad faith
intent is insufficient for a finding of contempt.'  In re
Powers, 523 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (citing In
re Carter, 412 So. 2d 811 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982))."  Hawthorne,
611 So. 2d at 438.  This would suggest that, in Hawthorne, the
Court of Criminal Appeals abandoned the long-standing "any
evidence" standard for the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard.  However, the Court of Criminal Appeals provided no
analysis of the facts of that case under the clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard and discussed it no further; the
above-quoted sentence appears to be purely dicta.  This is
supported by the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals has
never again cited Powers or Carter, and our research does not
indicate that the Court of Criminal Appeals has ever applied
the 
clear-and-convincing-standard 
in 
a 
contempt 
case. 
Contempt that occurs during a criminal proceeding has
consistently been reviewed under the "any evidence" standard.
14
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sought to assert.  It is certainly true that the circuit court
made its position clear that the Alabama Rules of Evidence do
not apply in a probation-revocation proceeding, but it is
unclear if Dearman was attempting to object to that particular
ruling.  The only objections on the record that Dearman made
during the probation-revocation hearing are as follows: 
"MR. DEARMAN:  I object.  This officer has no
training in narcotics whatsoever.  This is not a
regular drug and regularly identifiable.
"'And in addition to that, the district court
found no probable cause on this case, the facts of
which the Court is now hearing."
Dearman then noted that "[w]e've had a preliminary hearing,"
at which point the circuit court read from Rule 1101, Ala. R.
Evid., which states that the Alabama Rules of Evidence do not
apply 
in 
probation-revocation 
hearings. 
 
Immediately
thereafter, Dearman stated:  "Judge, in district court --." 
It is at this point that the circuit court would not permit
Dearman to continue to speak.  Therefore, based on the facts
before us, there is nothing indicating that Dearman was
attempting to continually object to the 
circuit court's ruling
that the Alabama Rules of Evidence do not apply in a
probation-revocation hearing.  Dearman stated that he had "an
15
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objection for the record," but the circuit court responded,
"[n]o sir."  Dearman then attempted to state his objection,
three times, beginning his objection with "[m]y objection
...." or "[m]y objection is ...."  Each time, however, the
circuit court spoke over Dearman and then told Dearman that
"[y]ou're not going to speak.  If you're going to make an
objection, you're not going to speak."  This statement of the
circuit court indicates that not only was the circuit court
not allowing Dearman to object to its determination that the
Alabama Rules of Evidence did not apply to the hearing (if
that was even Dearman's objection), but that Dearman could
make no objection whatsoever.
As did the Court of Criminal Appeals in Hawthorne, we
conclude in the present case that the record is devoid of any
evidence that Dearman's conduct "disturb[ed] the court's
business" and that "immediate action [was] essential to
prevent diminution of the court's dignity and 
authority before
the public."  Rule 33.1(b)(1).  The evidence before us
indicates that Dearman, by trying to make an objection on the
record to preserve the issue for appellate review, was simply
trying to engage the court in the business before it, not
16
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detract from it.  The immediate action taken by the circuit
court in silencing Dearman was not to prevent Dearman from
diminishing the court's dignity or authority, but to prevent
Dearman from asserting a necessary objection on behalf of his
client.  When finally given the opportunity to present
mitigating evidence as to why Dearman continually attempted to
state his objection on the record -- an opportunity afforded
Dearman only after the circuit court was ordered to do so by
the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dearman I -- Dearman
specifically stated that his intent was "only to fulfill my
duty as the advocate for my client."  Dearman further
explained that he believed that "if you do not put [a specific
objection] on the record, you've lost it forever, and that was
all I was simply trying to do. There was no intent on my
behalf."  Dearman's understanding of the law is correct.  See
Cook v. State, 384 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980)
("Specific grounds for objection waive all grounds not
specified, and the trial judge will not be placed in error on
grounds not assigned in an objection.  Carter v. State, 205
Ala. 460, 462, 88 So. 571 (1921); Andrews v. State, 359 So. 2d
1172, 1176 (Ala. Cr[im]. App. 1978). 'Unless appropriate
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grounds are stated, objections to the admission of evidence
are unavailing on appeal, even though the evidence may have
been subject to some ground not assigned.'  Reese v. State, 49
Ala. App. 167, 171, 269 So. 2d 622, 625, cert. denied, 289
Ala. 750, 269 So. 2d 625 (1972).").  Dearman was appropriately
attempting to prosecute his client's cause.
In Hawthorne, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined
that a trial court's judgment of contempt must be affirmed if
there is any evidence in support of it.  In the present case,
as in Hawthorne, the record is devoid of any evidence in
support of the circuit court's finding Dearman in direct
contempt.  Dearman was properly attempting to state a specific
objection for the record; there is no evidence indicating that
Dearman was diminishing the dignity or authority of the
circuit court.  The Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion in
its unpublished memorandum in Dearman II that there was some
evidence to support the circuit court's contempt judgment is
in conflict with Hawthorne.  Accordingly, because Dearman II
is in conflict with Hawthorne, we reverse the Court of
Criminal Appeals' judgment in Dearman II.
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Dearman also alleges that Dearman II is in conflict with
Powers and Carter.  However, because we have already concluded
that Dearman II is in conflict with Hawthorne, there is no
need to consider whether it is in conflict with Powers and
Carter.  Moreover, we note that Powers and Carter appear to be
distinguishable from the present case.  In both cases, the
Court of Civil Appeals examined whether the trial court's
finding of contempt that occurred during a civil proceeding
was supported by clear and convincing evidence; those cases
did not apply the "any evidence" standard that is applicable
in the present case.7
7We further note that Powers and Carter, which stand for
the principle that a finding of criminal contempt in a civil
case is to be affirmed if supported by clear and convincing
evidence, may have been overruled sub silentio by this Court's
decision in Ex parte Ferguson, 819 So. 2d 626, 629 (Ala.
2001), in which this Court stated, in pertinent part:
"[T]he standard of review in an appeal from an
adjudication of criminal contempt occurring in a
civil case is whether the offense, i.e., the
contempt, was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 99
L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988); Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co., 785
F.2d 970 (11th Cir. 1986); and United States v.
Turner, 812 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1987)(an attorney
was found guilty of criminal contempt by United
States District Judge Brevard Hand)."
Dearman has not directed us to authority indicating that any
such rule in Alabama has been applied to a finding of criminal
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Court of
Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the circuit court's finding of
criminal contempt is in conflict with Hawthorne.  
Accordingly,
we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand
the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.8
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Stewart,
and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
contempt in a criminal case.
8We note that Dearman also raises two arguments in his
brief before this Court that he did not raise in his petition
for the writ of certiorari.  Dearman argues that the circuit
court's "failure to follow the procedures in Rule 33.2[, Ala.
R. Crim. P.,] invalidate the contempt order."  Dearman's
brief, p. 20.  Dearman also argues that this Court should
order Judge Patterson to recuse himself from any further
contempt proceedings.  The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed
Dearman's recusal argument in Dearman I, and, as noted above,
Dearman did not seek certiorari review of Dearman I. 
Moreover, Dearman did not raise that argument in Dearman II. 
Accordingly, those issue are not properly before us, and we
will not consider them.
20