Title: Commonwealth v. Cousin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12252
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 11, 2018

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SJC-12252 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH COUSIN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 5, 2017. - January 11, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Conflict of Interest.  Attorney at Law, Conflict of interest.  
Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 4, 2002. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Nancy Holtz, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on March 1, 2013, was heard by Janet L. 
Sanders, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Amanda Teo, Assistant District Attorney (David J. Fredette, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 
defendant, Joseph Cousin (Cousin), was convicted of murder in 
the second degree.  Cousin filed a motion for a new trial, 
2 
 
 
 
claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective because he was 
burdened by an actual conflict of interest.  A Superior Court 
judge granted Cousin's motion for a new trial.  The Commonwealth 
appealed, and we allowed its application for direct appellate 
review.1  The issue before this court is whether Cousin presented 
sufficient evidence to establish that his trial counsel was 
burdened by an actual conflict of interest.  Although Cousin has 
set forth the basis for what may well constitute a potential 
conflict of interest, we conclude that he failed to meet his 
burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was operating 
under an actual conflict of interest.  Therefore, we vacate the 
allowance of Cousin's motion for a new trial and remand the case 
to the Superior Court for further proceedings to determine 
whether there was a potential conflict causing prejudice that 
would warrant a new trial. 
 
1.  Prior proceedings and background.  We briefly indicate 
the nature of Cousin's criminal case, followed by a summary of 
the facts pertinent to Cousin's conflict claim, as they were 
found by the judge.  We also reserve certain facts for later 
discussion. 
 
Following an investigation by the Boston police department 
                                                 
1 The Commonwealth also moved for reconsideration of the 
motion judge's decision and to reopen the evidence.  Following a 
hearing on that motion, the judge issued an amended memorandum 
but otherwise declined to reopen the evidence or reconsider her 
decision. 
3 
 
 
 
(BPD) homicide division, Cousin and another man were charged 
with murder for the shooting death of a young girl.  In 2004, 
Cousin and his codefendant were tried jointly for the murder, 
and the jury acquitted the codefendant.  The jury were 
deadlocked concerning Cousin, and eventually a mistrial was 
declared.  In Commonwealth v. Cousin, 449 Mass. 809, 815-816, 
823 (2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1007 (2008), we determined 
that double jeopardy did not bar Cousin's retrial because the 
prosecutor's inquiry into the jurors' criminal records during 
deliberation was not government misconduct intended to goad the 
defendant into moving for a mistrial. 
 
Cousin was retried for the murder in 2009, and was 
represented by Attorney William White (White).  Cousin was 
convicted of murder in the second degree, and he was later 
sentenced to life in prison.  His direct appeal from his 
conviction to the Appeals Court has been stayed pending the 
outcome of this case. 
 
In the meantime, Cousin, represented by new counsel, moved 
for a new trial, arguing that White was burdened by an actual 
conflict of interest.  The primary grounds for the alleged 
actual conflict were the involvement of White and his former law 
firm in two Federal civil rights lawsuits.  Specifically, White 
and his former law partners defended members of the BPD who were 
accused of misconduct in the course of other, unrelated criminal 
4 
 
 
 
investigations. 
 
The judge, who was not the trial judge, held three days of 
evidentiary hearings before granting Cousin's motion.  We 
present the pertinent facts she found in her written memorandum 
of decision and order. 
 
a.  White and the Federal civil rights cases.  White joined 
the law firm of Davis, Robinson & White (DRW) as a partner in 
the early 1990s.  DRW was comprised of three partners:  White, 
Willie Davis, and Frances Robinson.  White concentrated 
primarily on criminal defense, and he and Robinson 
intermittently represented police officers in disciplinary and 
administrative hearings.  An attorney for the Boston police 
patrolmen's union occasionally referred police discipline cases 
to Robinson; however, there was no indication that Robinson or 
DRW had a formal contractual relationship with the patrolmen's 
union, the BPD, or the city of Boston (city). 
 
DRW was organized as a limited liability partnership.  The 
partners did not share profits or fees, and each partner earned 
only the money he or she generated.  The partners generally 
worked independently on cases, particularly their criminal 
matters.  The partners did, however, share common overhead 
expenses and office resources.  Occasionally, the DRW partners 
would meet to discuss their cases.  However, there is no 
indication that these informal discussions involved the 
5 
 
 
 
disclosure of confidential client information. 
 
White left DRW in early 2007 and formed his own law firm, 
William White & Associates (White & Associates).  Several years 
thereafter, White operated White & Associates in office space he 
rented in the same building as DRW; however, his firm was 
neither connected to, nor was his practice affiliated with, DRW.  
At the hearing on Cousin's motion, White testified that after he 
left DRW, his former partners only referred him a limited number 
of civil litigation matters.  In January, 2009, the same year as 
Cousin's second trial, White relocated his firm to a different 
office building in Boston. 
 
Cousin's claim that White was burdened by an actual 
conflict of interest focused primarily on the involvement of 
White and Robinson in two Federal civil rights cases, Drumgold 
vs. Callahan, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 04-11193-NG (D. Mass. 2004) 
(Drumgold), and Cowans vs. Boston, U.S. Dist. Ct. No. 05-11574-
GGS (D. Mass. 2005) (Cowans). The plaintiffs in the Drumgold and 
Cowans cases alleged that BPD homicide investigators had 
committed acts of police misconduct that led to their erroneous 
convictions, which were later overturned.  Cousin's motion 
relies heavily on the purported similarities between the police 
investigations underlying the Drumgold and Cowans cases and his 
own. 
 
i.  Robinson's involvement in the Cowans case.  The judge 
6 
 
 
 
found that Robinson represented Rosemary McLaughlin, a member of 
BPD's latent fingerprint unit, who was a named defendant in the 
Cowans civil rights lawsuit. 
 
Stephen Cowans was convicted of a shooting, in part based 
on fingerprints that were recovered from the crime scene and 
that McLaughlin, and another member of BPD's latent fingerprint 
unit whose work McLaughlin verified, matched to him.2  Several 
years later, items from the crime scene underwent 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.  The testing revealed that 
Cowans's DNA was not present on any of the items.  A further 
internal investigation also revealed that a latent fingerprint 
recovered from the crime scene had been erroneously 
individualized to Cowans.  Based on this investigation, in 2004, 
the Commonwealth joined in Cowan's motion for a new trial and 
the conviction was vacated. 
 
Following his exoneration, Cowans filed the Federal civil 
rights lawsuit seeking damages against the BPD and certain 
officers involved in the investigation, including McLaughlin.  
Robinson filed her notice of appearance on behalf of McLaughlin 
on April 5, 2006.3  Cowans's complaint alleged that McLaughlin 
had discovered but concealed the fact that his fingerprints had 
                                                 
2 The full factual background of that case is set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Cowans, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 812-813 (2001). 
 
 
3 The record is unclear concerning how Robinson came to 
represent McLaughlin. 
7 
 
 
 
been erroneously matched to the those recovered at the crime 
scene.  The claims against McLaughlin focused exclusively on her 
involvement in Cowans's investigation and did not implicate her 
conduct in other investigations.  Robinson represented 
McLaughlin until the Cowans case was resolved in September, 
2007.  Although the city paid the settlement in the Cowans case, 
it did not pay for Robinson's defense of McLaughlin. 
 
ii. White's involvement in the Drumgold case.  White's 
involvement in the Drumgold litigation began in 2006, while he 
was a partner at DRW.  White represented two of the BPD officers 
named in the Drumgold case in succession -- a detective and then 
Lieutenant Timothy Callahan. 
 
Shawn Drumgold was convicted of murder in connection with 
the 1988 shooting death of a twelve year old girl.4  After 
Drumgold had been convicted and sentenced, he filed several 
motions for a new trial, seeking to have his conviction 
overturned on numerous grounds, including that members of the 
BPD had coerced witnesses into implicating him in the shooting.  
There also were claims that BPD officers failed to provide 
exculpatory evidence by not disclosing favorable treatment given 
to a prosecution witness.  The Commonwealth's assessment of the 
investigation concluded that Drumgold had not received a fair 
                                                 
4 The full factual background of that case is set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 423 Mass. 230, 233-235 (1996). 
8 
 
 
 
trial, and his conviction was vacated in 2003. 
 
In 2004, Drumgold filed the Federal civil rights lawsuit, 
claiming that the BPD officers involved in his investigation 
engaged in coercive tactics, pressured witnesses to give 
favorable testimony, and withheld exculpatory evidence, leading 
to Drumgold's erroneous conviction.  Drumgold also claimed that 
the BPD encouraged such conduct.  The city, as one of the named 
parties, retained its own counsel, but hired White to represent 
the detective in his individual capacity.  White was later hired 
to represent Callahan after the detective had been dismissed 
from the lawsuit.  The city had agreed to pay for the legal 
defense of the detective and Callahan pursuant to an 
indemnification agreement.  Although that agreement was not 
produced as part of Cousin's motion for a new trial, White 
testified that he had charged the city for his time representing 
the detective and Callahan on an hourly basis, at an agreed 
rate.  White would submit monthly bills to the city for its 
review and payment.  Over the course of White's representation 
of the detective and Callahan, the city paid White more than 
$310,000 for his work.  White testified that despite being 
compensated by the city for representing the detective and 
Callahan, he fully recognized that his only clients were the two 
officers, and his loyalty toward them was undivided. 
 
In January, 2008, the detective was dismissed from the 
9 
 
 
 
lawsuit.  Because White had been involved in discovery and the 
litigation in general, White testified that the city asked him 
to represent Callahan.  White filed his notice of appearance on 
behalf of Callahan on January 29, 2008.  Although White was 
listed as a lead attorney on the docket, he testified that he 
was not "asked to become the lead counsel for Callahan."  An 
attorney who had been the lead counsel representing Callahan 
maintained her position, and she assigned tasks to White.  When 
White began representing Callahan, he had already left DRW and 
was practicing at White & Associates. 
 
The judge noted that the course of the Drumgold litigation 
and the nature of the lawsuit indicated that the interests of 
the city and the individual defendants were aligned.  In the 
same way that the city had indemnified the individual defendants 
for their legal fees, the city also would be responsible for 
paying any judgment or settlement arising from the claims of 
misconduct against the individual officers.  The judge observed 
that even though the city had separate counsel, its liability 
was contingent on the liability of the individual defendants.  
Further, the judge noted that White had worked closely with the 
city while defending both the detective and Callahan, as evinced 
by the defendants' multiple joint filings and the conduct of the 
10 
 
 
 
litigation.5 
 
Concerning the structure and mechanics of the Drumgold 
trial, a judge in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts ordered that the trial be divided into 
three phases.  The first phase would address the liability of 
the individual officers, including Callahan.  The second phase 
would address the liability of the city and the BPD.  If the 
jury determined that there was a constitutional violation in 
either of the first two phases, then the third phase would 
address damages.  The first phase of the trial took place in 
March, 2008, where White participated in defending Callahan.  
The jury found that Callahan was liable for one of the civil 
rights claims against him, relating to his failure to disclose 
that he gave "substantial amounts" of money to a witness for the 
Commonwealth.  The parties then agreed to conduct the damages 
phase of the trial concerning the money Callahan had given to 
the witness, but the jury were unable to reach a verdict.  On 
March 31, 2009, the judge ordered a retrial that was 
specifically limited to Callahan's conduct regarding the 
witness, which was scheduled for September, 2009.6 
                                                 
5 In October, 2007, counsel for the respective defendants, 
including White, filed summary judgment motions on behalf of 
their clients. 
 
6 The scope of BPD Lieutenant Timothy Callahan's retrial was 
limited to whether he intentionally or recklessly withheld 
11 
 
 
 
 
White did not participate in the Callahan retrial because, 
at that point, he was representing Cousin, whose criminal trial 
also was scheduled for September, 2009.  Although White did not 
participate in the Callahan retrial, he did not move to withdraw 
from the representation or otherwise remove himself from the 
case.  White testified that he was open to returning to 
represent Callahan if there was more work to be done on the 
Drumgold litigation after Cousin's case concluded. 
 
b.  White's representation of Cousin.  White was appointed 
to represent Cousin in 2008.  Davis, White's former law partner 
at DRW, had represented Cousin during his first trial.  After 
the appeal concerning Cousin's mistrial concluded, Davis 
withdrew as Cousin's counsel and recommended that White be 
appointed as successor counsel.7  White was no longer working at 
DRW at this time and he did not have a referral relationship 
with his former firm.  Cousin initially indicated that he 
intended to retain private counsel for his second trial, but 
after meeting White in the Nashua Street jail, Cousin agreed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence from prosecutors about "(1) the fact that [the witness] 
was housed at a hotel and provided with meals; (2) that there 
were promises of favorable treatment in [the witness's] pending 
criminal cases; and (3) that money was given to [the witness]."  
Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F. Supp. 2d 405, 408 (D. Mass. 2011), 
overruled on another ground, 707 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 
7 White testified that Davis's recommendation that he take 
over the Cousin's defense was spurred by a chance encounter 
between White and Davis, where they talked briefly about the 
case. 
12 
 
 
 
have White represent him.  Based on the testimony of White and 
Cousin at the hearing on the motion for a new trial regarding 
this meeting, the judge concluded that White did not provide 
sufficient information to Cousin about his representation of a 
police officer in the Drumgold case to allow Cousin to make an 
informed choice about choosing White as his attorney. 
 
Much of Cousin's claim that White was operating under an 
actual conflict of interest depended on the similarities he 
alleged between his case and the Drumgold and Cowans cases. 
 
The judge found that on June 29, 2002, the victim was shot 
and killed while playing at a park in the Roxbury section of 
Boston.  The perpetrator fired the fatal shot from a vehicle 
that was in the vicinity of the park.  Cousin's fingerprints 
were recovered from the exterior of that vehicle.  Additional 
fingerprints were also recovered from the vehicle.  Several of 
those fingerprints were individualized to two other individuals, 
including Cordell McAfee; other fingerprints were not initially 
matched to any individual.  The same fingerprint analyst who 
examined fingerprints in the Cowans case also examined the 
fingerprints recovered from the vehicle, and McLaughlin verified 
the reports that the analyst generated.  Shortly before Cousin's 
second trial, Rachel Lemery, another forensic examiner with the 
BPD latent fingerprint unit, reviewed those fingerprint reports.  
Based on her analysis of other fingerprints recovered from the 
13 
 
 
 
vehicle in 2002, Lemery was able to match those fingerprints to 
Daryl Richardson, a match that the previous analyst had failed 
to make before Cousin's first trial.8  It was likely that 
Richardson's fingerprint could have been matched in 2002, 
because Richardson was convicted of a crime in 1998, and thus 
his fingerprints were likely on file. 
 
The Richardson fingerprint match also is applicable to 
Cousin's claim that the lead detective in his case, Daniel 
Keeler, engaged in misconduct leading to Cousin's conviction.  
Specifically, Cousin contended that Keeler had used coercive 
techniques during his interrogation of Cordell McAfee, whose 
fingerprints had been found inside the vehicle and whose 
recorded statement implicated Cousin and his codefendant.  The 
issue with McAfee's recorded statement was that at least the 
first hour was not recorded, and Keeler did not take notes or 
generate a report summarizing the interview.  Further, at 
Cousin's first trial Keeler admitted that, prior to activating 
the recording device, McAfee had been shown certain photographic 
arrays that included photographs of Cousin and his codefendant  
and had not identified either individual.  Moreover, McAfee 
confessed that he had been in the vehicle during the shooting, 
                                                 
8 Rachel Lemery conducted a review of the fingerprints that 
the other analyst had analyzed and that McLaughlin had verified 
after the other analyst and McLaughlin had been removed from the 
BPD latent fingerprint unit. 
14 
 
 
 
along with two men named "Daryl" and "Man."  Cousin claimed that 
Keeler had coerced McAfee into changing his story while off tape 
and then recorded only McAfee's inculpatory statements. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review the disposition of a motion for 
a new trial "to determine whether there has been a significant 
error of law or other abuse of discretion. . . . When, as here, 
the motion judge did not preside at trial, we defer to that 
judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses at the 
hearing on the new trial motion, but we regard ourselves in as 
good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial record" 
(citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 
(1986).  "While we will not disturb a judge's subsidiary 
findings which are warranted by the evidence, 'ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law, particularly those of constitutional 
dimensions, are open for our independent review.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Walter, 396 Mass. 549, 553-554 (1986), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 667 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 
(1976). 
 
a.  Actual conflict of interest.  The Commonwealth contends 
that the judge erred in concluding that White was burdened by an 
actual conflict of interest while representing Cousin.  
Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts that White's involvement 
in the Drumgold litigation and his former partner's 
representation of McLaughlin in the Cowans case, whether 
15 
 
 
 
considered in isolation or in the aggregate, did not amount to 
an actual conflict.  We agree.  Although Cousin identifies 
certain aspects of White's representation that are concerning, 
and may implicate a potential conflict of interest, Cousin has 
failed to meet his burden of adducing sufficient, nonspeculative 
evidence to establish that White was burdened by an actual 
conflict of interest. 
"Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States and art. 12 of the Declaration 
of Rights of the Commonwealth, criminal defendants have a right 
to the assistance of counsel unimpaired by loyalties to other 
clients."  Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 819 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Fogarty, 419 Mass. 456, 458 (1995).  
This bedrock constitutional guaranty "is intended to prevent a 
defendant's attorney from being hampered by contemporaneous 
divided loyalties or by having acquired privileged information 
which inhibits him in his representation of the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Soffen, 377 Mass. 433, 437-438 (1979).  If a 
defendant establishes an actual conflict of interest under art. 
12, "he is entitled to a new trial without a further showing; he 
need not demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected his 
lawyer's performance or resulted in actual prejudice."  Mosher, 
16 
 
 
 
supra. See Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 169-170 (1982).9  
No further showing is required because "the effect of the 
conflict on the attorney's representation of the defendant is 
likely to be pervasive and unpredictable, while the difficulty 
of proving it may be substantial, 'particularly as to things 
that may have been left not said or not done by counsel.'"  
Mosher, supra, quoting Hodge, supra at 170. 
An "actual" or "genuine" conflict of interest exists where 
the "independent professional judgment of trial counsel is 
impaired, either by his own interests, or by the interests of 
another client" (quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 
397 Mass. 16, 20 (1986).  An actual conflict infects the 
defendant's representation to the point where "prejudice is 
'inherent in the situation,' such that no impartial observer 
could reasonably conclude that the attorney is able to serve the 
defendant with undivided loyalty."  Mosher, 455 Mass. at 819-
820, quoting Commonwealth v. Epsom, 399 Mass. 254, 262 (1987).  
In determining whether such a conflict exists we look to the 
standards set forth in the applicable codes of professional 
ethics.  Mosher, supra at 820 n.19. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, 
                                                 
 
9 It is well established that art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights provides broader protection than the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which only entitles 
a defendant to a new trial if an actual conflict and prejudice 
is established.  Compare Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 
169-170 (1982), with Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 
(1980). 
17 
 
 
 
as appearing in 471 Mass. 1335 (2015).10 
Given that representations marred by actual conflicts of 
interest exude the egregious and readily apparent divided 
loyalty of counsel, the circumstances where we have found an 
actual conflict have typically been limited to "[1] where an 
attorney represents codefendants with inconsistent or 
contradictory lines of defense; [2] where an attorney or an 
associate maintains an attorney-client or direct and close 
personal relationship with a material prosecution witness; or 
[3] where an attorney has business [or personal] reasons for 
preferring a verdict unfavorable to the defendant he or she 
represents."  Mosher, 455 Mass. at 820, quoting Walter, 396 
Mass. at 554-555.  Actual conflicts are present in these 
situations because they epitomize the facial repugnance of an 
attorney's divided loyalty, which places an unmistakable stain 
on the attorney-client relationship.  See Mosher, supra at 819.  
These limited categories also stand in stark contrast to the 
multitude of situations that may give rise to a potential 
conflict of interest.  Id. at 823.  Because a potential conflict 
of interest involves a more tenuous conflict, a defendant's 
conviction "will not be reversed except upon a showing of 
                                                 
 
10 In this opinion, we use the 2015 version of Massachusetts 
Rules of Professional Conduct, even though they were not in 
effect at the time the events at issue in this case took place, 
where changes to the rules are not material to our analysis. 
18 
 
 
 
material prejudice."  Shraiar, 397 Mass. at 20. 
The defendant carries the burden of proving both the 
existence and precise character of the alleged conflict of 
interest.  See Walter, 396 Mass. at 554; Soffen, 377 Mass. at 
437.  To satisfy this burden, we require "demonstrative proof 
detailing both the existence and the precise character of this 
alleged conflict of interest; we will not infer a conflict based 
on mere conjecture or speculation."  Commonwealth v. Stote, 456 
Mass. 213, 218 (2010), quoting Shraiar, 397 Mass. at 20.  We 
look to the attendant facts and circumstances surrounding the 
claimed actual conflict.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 
Mass. 382, 392 (1997) (consideration of all facts concerning 
defendant's claim of conflict including attorney's relationship 
with prosecution witness, ethical problems, and undenied 
allegations of broken client confidence).  There is no 
substitute for meeting this burden other than sufficient, 
concrete evidence demonstrating an attorney's divided loyalty 
such that prejudice is inherent in the representation.  For this 
reason, we have never held that a defendant can establish an 
actual conflict of interest by cobbling together a collection of 
potential conflicts.  In determining whether an actual conflict 
exists, we do not consider potential conflicts in the aggregate, 
even in a representation plagued by potential conflicts; nor do 
we accept that potential conflicts have a synergistic effect 
19 
 
 
 
that can result in the creation of an actual conflict. 
The circumstances surrounding Cousin's claim that White had 
an actual conflict involve what appear to be, at first glance, a 
morass of factually similar cases, obscured connections between 
attorney-client relationships, and a thread of disturbing 
allegations of police misconduct.  Our review of the record 
reveals that these connections are in fact discretely 
compartmentalized aspects of unrelated cases.  Although the 
circumstances in this case, as they were developed at the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, do not amount to an 
actual conflict, White's representation of Cousin nonetheless 
presents troubling issues that may constitute a potential 
conflict of interest.  However, we do not address the issue of a 
potential conflict because the only issue that was considered at 
the hearing on the motion for a new trial was whether there was 
an actual conflict.11 
b.  White's involvement in the Drumgold case.  The focal 
point of the judge's decision that White had an actual conflict 
was his involvement in the Drumgold civil rights lawsuit.  The 
judge construed White's involvement as embodying two problematic 
                                                 
11 On remand, there is an opportunity for additional 
evidentiary hearings to determine whether there was a potential 
conflict of interest, and whether Cousin was prejudiced thereby. 
 
20 
 
 
 
components: (1) White's overlapping representation of Callahan;12 
and (2) White's economic and personal interest in maintaining a 
professional relationship with the city, the entity that paid 
White's legal fees in the Drumgold case.  We review each issue 
in turn. 
i.  The Callahan representation.  The judge's conclusion 
that there was a substantial risk that White's loyalty may have 
been divided between Callahan and Cousin was based on her view 
that, "[t]o vigorously defend Cousin, White would necessarily 
have to take a position that was not in the interest of his 
client Callahan in the Drumgold [F]ederal suit . . . ."  This 
conclusion assumed that the Drumgold and Cousin cases were 
inextricably intertwined to the point where there were competing 
interests, such that White would be inhibited from zealously 
representing Cousin. 
As a threshold matter, in considering an alleged actual 
conflict stemming from an attorney's simultaneous representation 
of multiple clients who are not codefendants, the presence of an 
actual conflict has generally been limited to situations where 
the defendant's trial counsel simultaneously represents a 
prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant.  See 
                                                 
12 The claims against the detective in the Drumgold Federal 
civil rights lawsuit had been dismissed well before Cousin's 
second criminal trial.  Therefore, the judge did not find, and 
Cousin does not argue, that White's prior representation of that 
detective created an actual conflict. 
21 
 
 
 
Mosher, 455 Mass. at 820, and cases cited.  In these 
circumstances, the conflict is clear; the prospect of defense 
counsel's cross-examination of a prosecution witness who is also 
counsel's client almost inevitably "inhibit[s] defense counsel 
from conducting vigorous cross-examination of the witness, or 
inhibit[s] defense counsel from pursuing certain avenues of 
inquiry through that witness, or tempt[s] counsel to disclose 
client confidences."  Commonwealth v. Patterson, 432 Mass. 767, 
776 (2000), S.C., 445 Mass. 626 (2005), overruled on another 
ground by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87 (2013).  In the 
present case, Callahan was neither involved in the investigation 
of Cousin nor called to testify as a prosecution witness at 
Cousin's trial.  In this respect, the alleged conflict 
concerning White's representation of Callahan in the Drumgold 
case falls well outside our established actual conflict 
paradigm.  See Mosher, supra at 820.13 
Cousin endeavors to recast the circumstances of his case 
                                                 
 
13 In the context of a simultaneous representation: 
 
 
[W]e have found an actual conflict only where (1) at 
the time of trial, the defense attorney continued to 
represent a prosecution witness who furnished material 
testimony concerning a critical issue in the case against 
the defendant; or (2) the defense attorney had previously 
represented a prosecution witness in a matter related to 
the defendant's criminal case who furnished material 
testimony concerning a critical issue in the case against 
the defendant. 
 
Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 820 (2010). 
22 
 
 
 
and the underlying criminal case in the Drumgold litigation to 
create the appearance that these cases are so interrelated that 
White's loyalty was inherently divided.  Cousin's argument is 
that White had an actual conflict in representing a BPD officer 
in the homicide division accused of police misconduct in the 
course of an investigation and, at the same time, representing a 
criminal defendant who sought to impugn the investigatory 
conduct of the BPD officers who investigated his case.  This 
proposition does not establish an actual conflict, although it 
may constitute a potential conflict. 
In analyzing Cousin's claim that White was saddled by a 
conflict of interest due to an overlapping representation, our 
analysis is aided by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7.  See Mosher, 455 
Mass. at 820 n.19.  With limited exceptions, rule 1.7 prohibits 
an attorney from representing a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent 
conflict of interest occurs where "(1) the representation of one 
client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there 
is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer."  Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.7 (a) (1), (2).  Cousin does not contend, and the record 
does not indicate, that White's representation of Callahan was 
23 
 
 
 
directly adverse to Cousin.  Accordingly, we need only determine 
whether White's overlapping representations of Callahan and 
Cousin posed a significant risk that White would be materially 
limited in representing Cousin.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (a) 
(2). 
The concern reflected in Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (a) (2) is 
that an attorney's duty to another client may materially limit 
the defendant's representation by inhibiting attorney's ability 
to "consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of 
action for the client."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 comment 8.  To 
determine whether there is a significant risk that the attorney 
is materially limited, "[t]he critical questions are the 
likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if 
it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's 
independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or 
foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on 
behalf of the client."  Id.  An attorney may be materially 
limited "by having acquired privileged information which 
inhibits him in his representation of the defendant."  Soffen, 
377 Mass. at 438.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7. 
The Drumgold and Cousin criminal cases involve the tragic 
shooting deaths of children.  The BPD homicide division 
investigated both cases.  Each case also involved claims of 
misconduct against the BPD officers who investigated the 
24 
 
 
 
killings, and both cases received significant media coverage.  
Described in these broad brush strokes, Cousin advances the 
judge's theory that a zealous representation of Cousin required 
an attack on the BPD homicide division, which was inconsistent 
with Callahan's interests, a BPD officer accused of misconduct 
in an unrelated civil case.  Under the lens with which we 
analyze the claimed actual conflict, however, the differences 
between the cases are significantly more telling than their 
apparent similarities. 
The record before this court establishes that Callahan was 
not involved in the investigation or prosecution of Cousin.  
Moreover, there is no connection between the allegations of 
police misconduct in those cases.  Cousin claims that Detective 
Keeler conducted a coercive interrogation of McAfee, the 
individual who eventually implicated Cousin in the shooting and, 
as detailed above, failed to reveal exculpatory evidence that 
McAfee provided.  Beyond Detective Keeler's conduct, Cousin also 
points to the analyst's failure to match fingerprints recovered 
from the vehicle to Richardson, and McLaughlin's verification of 
that faulty report.  The failure to originally individualize the 
fingerprints recovered from the vehicle to Richardson precluded 
Cousin from exploring a viable avenue in his defense. 
When White was representing Cousin at his retrial in 
September, 2009, the claims against Callahan in the Drumgold 
25 
 
 
 
case had been significantly narrowed.  A jury already had 
determined that Callahan was not liable for all civil rights 
claims other than failing to disclose exculpatory material 
concerning a key witness.  The Federal District Court judge 
limited the scope of the Callahan retrial to whether Callahan 
failed to disclose the fact that the witness was housed in a 
hotel and provided with meals, that there was promises of 
favorable treatment in the witness's pending criminal cases and 
that money was given to him.  Setting aside the fact that the 
Drumgold case and Cousin's criminal case were unrelated legal 
actions, Callahan was clearly not facing misconduct claims that 
remotely resembled Cousin's claims regarding Keeler. 
Because Cousin's case and the Drumgold case are 
unmistakably separate legal actions, involving different BPD 
officers investigating the killings, and distinguishable claims 
of police misconduct, a vigorous attack on the police conduct in 
Cousin's defense would not constitute an attack on all members 
of BPD's homicide unit.14  Moreover, Cousin has failed to produce 
                                                 
 
14 Were we to accept Cousin's premise, the natural 
implication would be a prohibition on attorneys representing a 
police officer in a civil case accused of misconduct and, at the 
same time, representing a criminal defendant who had been 
investigated by a different member of the same police 
department, even if the cases were unrelated and there was no 
connection between the officer-defendant in the civil case and 
the other members of that police department who investigated the 
defendant's case.  This would be an overbroad and imprecise 
application of our conflict of interest law that would 
26 
 
 
 
any evidence from the record suggesting that vigorously 
defending Cousin would be inconsistent with representing 
Callahan.  We are further persuaded that, based on this record, 
White's representation of Callahan did not create an actual 
conflict of interest because there is no indication that White 
acquired confidential information from Callahan that materially 
limited his representation of Cousin.  See Soffen, 377 Mass. at 
437-438. See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7. 
ii.  White's economic and personal interests.  The judge 
also concluded that White had an actual conflict of interest 
stemming from his economic and personal interest in the Drumgold 
litigation.  In the judge's view, "White had an economic or 
personal interest, at the time he represented Cousin, in 
remaining on good terms with the BPD, thus creating a 
substantial risk that the manner in which he represented Cousin 
could materially and adversely be affected."  Beyond White's 
financial compensation for his representation of the individual 
officers in the Drumgold case, the judge emphasized that, "[a]s 
the entity that paid the bills, the city was essentially White's 
largest paying client in the year leading up to Cousin's second 
trial."  On appeal, Cousin endorses this reasoning and further 
asserts that because the city was White's client, White was 
                                                                                                                                                             
undoubtedly impact the law practice of many attorneys and limit 
the ability of police officers to hire the attorney of their 
choice. 
27 
 
 
 
restrained from vigorously challenging the investigation in his 
case because of his professional obligations to the city. 
Much like an actual conflict arising from the competing 
interests of clients, an attorney's own interests can impair his 
or her independent professional judgment to the point of causing 
an actual conflict.  See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 
852 (2008); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (a) (2) & comment 1.  An 
attorney's personal interest can amount to an actual conflict of 
interest in a variety of situations.  See, e.g., Hodge, 386 
Mass. at 168 (defense counsel's financial incentive "in not 
antagonizing his firm's client"); Commonwealth v. Crocken, 432 
Mass. 266, 273 (2000) ("A lawyer's personal interests surely 
include his interest in maintaining amicable relations with his 
relatives, his spouse, and anyone with whom he is comparably 
intimate").  But see Commonwealth v. Milley, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 
685, 689 (2006) (claim that attorney was complicit in hiring 
scheme to ensure he continued to receive appointments from 
clerk-magistrate was too speculative and did not show actual 
conflict with duty to represent defendant). 
In the context of an attorney's economic interest in a 
representation, we have held that an actual conflict exists 
"where an attorney has business reasons for preferring a verdict 
unfavorable to the defendant he or she represents" (citation 
omitted).  Mosher, 455 Mass. at 820.  However, an attorney's 
28 
 
 
 
financial interest in being compensated for providing legal 
representation, by itself, is generally too attenuated to 
constitute an actual conflict.  We have held that an actual 
conflict can materialize out of an attorney's financial interest 
in a representation combined with that attorney's duty of 
loyalty to another client or a third person.  For example, in 
Hodge, 386 Mass. at 168, trial counsel was burdened by an actual 
conflict where he was faced with cross-examining a prosecution 
witness who was, at that time, represented by that attorney's 
law firm.  We held that trial counsel was burdened by an actual 
conflict caused by his "financial interest in not antagonizing 
his firm's client by a vigorous cross-examination designed to 
discredit him, and his duty to consider only [the defendant's] 
best interest in deciding whether and how to cross-examine" the 
firm's client.  Id.  The actual conflict in Hodge did not depend 
exclusively on trial counsel's financial interest in the 
representation, but the significant risk that his loyalty would 
be inherently divided in cross-examining his firm's client.  See 
id. 
Cousin has failed to adduce any facts to support his claim 
that White had an actual conflict because the city paid him to 
represent Callahan and the detective in the Drumgold case.  The 
fact that White was paid more than $310,000 for his 
representation, without more, does not provide a basis to 
29 
 
 
 
conclude that there was an actual conflict of interest.  
Furthermore, our conclusion is not altered by White's testimony 
indicating that he was open to returning to defend Callahan 
after Cousin's trial concluded, where this prospect, by itself, 
is also too speculative to conclude that White's personal 
interest caused him to have a divided loyalty, amounting to an 
actual conflict.  Although White's prospect of future work for 
the city would certainly be relevant in analyzing a potential 
conflict claim, without more it is too tangential to constitute 
an actual conflict. 
Cousin's claim that White had an actual conflict because 
the city was essentially his client is equally unsupported by 
the record.  Significantly, Cousin relies on speculation and 
conjecture to support his allegation that White was constrained 
from vigorously defending him through an attack on the alleged 
police misconduct in Cousin's defense because it could have 
exposed the BPD, and ultimately the city, to greater liability.15  
                                                 
15 Cousin contends that White admitted during the hearing on 
the motion for a new trial that he had a conflict of interest.  
This alleged acknowledgement occurred during an exchange between 
the judge and White, following White's testimony that he 
developed a practice of telling all of his criminal clients that 
he represented a police officer in the Drumgold case.  The judge 
inquired, "Because it could be perceived as a conflict of 
interest?"  White replied that "[i]t would certainly be 
perceived as a conflict of interest."  The context of this 
exchange, in light of White's multiple repudiations about having 
an actual conflict, belie Cousin's contention that White 
conceded the existence of an actual conflict. 
30 
 
 
 
In search of support for this proposition, Cousin relies on 
United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 90-92 (2d Cir. 2002).  
Schwarz involved a police officer who had been charged with 
assault.  Id. at 80.  In that case, the defendant's law firm had 
entered into a two-year, $10 million retainer agreement with the 
Policeman's Benevolent Association (PBA) to represent "all 
police officers in administrative, disciplinary, and criminal 
matters as well as to provide them with civil legal 
representation."  Id. at 81.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit determined that at the point the 
individual who had been assaulted filed a civil lawsuit against 
the PBA, an actual conflict arose because the PBA's interests 
diverged from those of the defendant.  Id. at 91.  There was an 
actual conflict at that point because the PBA's interest in 
limiting its liability diverged from the defendant's interest in 
advancing a defense in which he would implicate another police 
officer in the assault.  Id.  Defense counsel's zealous 
representation of the defendant in the criminal case could have 
hampered the PBA's defense in the civil suit and, as a result, 
the defendant's counsel faced an actual conflict between his 
representation of the defendant, on the one hand, and his 
professional obligation to the PBA as well as his own personal 
and financial interest on the other.  Id. at 91-92.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Wooldridge, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 167-168 
31 
 
 
 
(1985) (firm's contract with police association imposed 
continuing professional duties on firm's lawyers to former 
clients who were members of police association). 
The circumstances in Schwarz, particularly the existence of 
an agreement that the attorneys in Schwarz represented the PBA 
directly, highlight the infirmities in Cousin's claim that White 
had an actual conflict due to his relationship with the city.  
There is no indication that White represented the city, a police 
union, or anyone other than Murphy and Callahan in the Drumgold 
case.  Indeed, White testified at the hearing on the motion for 
a new trial that he only represented Murphy and Callahan in the 
Drumgold litigation.  Moreover, White testified that he 
understood his loyalty was exclusively to the detective and 
Callahan.16  Although White's agreement with the city to 
represent the individual officers was not produced at the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, Cousin has failed to put 
forth evidence to controvert White's testimony that he only 
represented the detective and Callahan.  Contrast Schwarz, 283 
F.3d at 96 (attorney's firm had $10 million retainer agreement 
with PBA to represent all police officers in variety of legal 
proceedings). 
                                                 
16 Although White's alleged personal interest in remaining 
on good terms with the city is certainly a relevant 
consideration in a potential conflict analysis, it is too 
ephemeral to amount to an actual conflict. 
32 
 
 
 
Similarly, there is no suggestion in the record that White 
or the city's conduct in the Drumgold case expanded the scope of 
White's representation beyond the detective and Callahan.17  The 
record is silent concerning what, if any, direction or control 
the city exerted over White in the course of his involvement in 
the Drumgold case.  Significantly, no information was developed 
concerning whether White had acquired confidential information 
about the city that may have been material to Cousin's defense, 
particularly his allegations of police misconduct.  Had White 
acquired confidential information about the city or the BPD that 
would have materially limited his representation of Cousin and 
created a concurrent conflict, that likely would have 
constituted an actual conflict.  See Soffen, 377 Mass. at 437-
438.  See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7.  Although this may be a 
compelling avenue of exploration concerning a claim that there 
was a potential conflict, based on the record before this court, 
it does not amount to an actual conflict.  This conclusion 
applies equally to the premise that White may have been less 
                                                 
17 Cousin has failed to establish that there was an implied 
attorney-client relationship between White and the city.  See 
Bays v. Theran, 418 Mass. 685, 690 (1994) ("attorney-client 
relationship may be implied when [1] a person seeks advice or 
assistance from an attorney, [2] the advice or assistance sought 
pertains to matters within the attorney's professional 
competence, and [3] the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees 
to give or actually gives the desired advice or assistance" 
[quotations and citation omitted]).  Although the record before 
this court is undeveloped in this respect, it could be an area 
of relevant consideration in a potential conflict analysis. 
33 
 
 
 
than vigorous in defending Cousin because White wanted to 
maintain an amicable relationship with the city and not expose 
the city to greater liability in the Drumgold case.  It is clear 
from the dearth of information in the record that Cousin has 
failed to carry his burden of proving that White had an actual 
conflict as a result of his involvement in the Drumgold 
litigation or his relationship to the city. 
c.  Robinson's representation of McLaughlin.  In 
determining that White was burdened by an actual conflict, the 
judge considered, at least in part, Robinson's representation of 
McLaughlin, one of the fingerprint analysts in Cousin's case.  
Robinson defended McLaughlin, in the Cowans case, while White 
and Robinson were law partners at DRW, against a claim that 
McLaughlin had concealed an erroneous fingerprint match that had 
implicated Cowans in a shooting.  Cousin contends that White 
continued to owe a duty of loyalty to his former partner's past 
client that prohibited White from representing Cousin, thus 
amounting to an actual conflict.  We discern no such conflict. 
At the outset, it is uncontroverted that neither White nor 
Robinson was representing McLaughlin at the time of Cousin's 
trial.  Robinson's representation of McLaughlin ended in 
September, 2007, when the Cowans case settled.  White left DRW 
in 2007 and began his own firm, White & Associates.  He filed 
his notice of appearance on behalf of Cousin approximately one 
34 
 
 
 
year later, on October 22, 2008.  Significantly, McLaughlin was 
never identified as a witness for the Commonwealth and she did 
not testify at Cousin's first or second trials, which began in 
September, 2009.  White never confronted the prospect of cross-
examining his former partner's past client in defending Cousin. 
Even were we to assume that McLaughlin may have testified 
as a prosecution witness against Cousin, despite her no longer 
being a member of the latent fingerprint unit, we have generally 
held that terminating that conflicting representation prior to 
the defendant's trial "obviat[es] the risk of simultaneous 
representation."  Martinez, 425 Mass. at 389.  Because 
Robinson's representation of McLaughlin ended approximately two 
years before Cousin's trial, White was not burdened by an actual 
conflict.  See Mosher, 455 Mass. at 821-823 (no actual conflict 
resulted from representation terminated one month prior to 
trial); Patterson, 432 Mass. at 775-776 (no actual conflict 
resulted from previously terminated representation); Fogarty, 
419 Mass. at 459-460 (no conflict where defense counsel's 
associate ended representation of prosecution witness prior to 
defendant's retaining defense counsel); Commonwealth v. Smith, 
362 Mass. 782, 783-784 (1973) (no conflict where defense 
counsel's representation of prosecution witness ended before 
defendant's trial commenced). 
The fact that neither White nor Robinson was representing 
35 
 
 
 
McLaughlin at the time of Cousin's trial does not end our 
inquiry concerning whether White had a surviving duty of loyalty 
to McLaughlin that would have impeded him from vigorously 
representing Cousin.  To resolve this issue, we are guided by 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1359 (2015), 
which traces the contours of an attorney's duty of loyalty to 
former clients.  Rule 1.9 prohibits an attorney from 
representing clients whose interests are adverse to a former 
client, particularly where that former client's confidential 
information may be at issue in the subsequent representation.  
See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (a). 
An attorney who leaves a law firm to take a position at 
another law firm may have a continuing duty of loyalty to his or 
her former firm's past clients.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 (b).  
That attorney is prohibited from representing a person in the 
same or a substantially related matter in which their former 
firm had represented a client where (1) that person's interests 
are materially adverse to the former client, and (2) the 
attorney acquired protected confidential information from the 
former client that is material to that person's case.  Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.9 (b) (1), (2).  This prohibition "operates to 
disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual 
knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c)."  
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 comment 5.  If the attorney did not 
36 
 
 
 
acquire knowledge about the former firm's client, and that 
attorney joins another firm, "neither the lawyer individually 
nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another 
client in the same or a related matter even though the interests 
of the two clients conflict."  Id. 
Although McLaughlin was a past client of White's prior law 
firm, White testified at the hearing on the motion for a new 
trial that he was uninvolved in Robinson's representation of 
McLaughlin, and he did not acquire any confidential information 
about McLaughlin.  There is nothing in the record that 
contradicts White's testimony that the partners at DRW generally 
handled their cases independently.  To the extent that White and 
his law partners at DRW discussed cases generally, the record is 
insufficiently developed to support an inference that general 
discussion about cases indicates that White acquired 
confidential information about McLaughlin from Robinson.18  There 
was no indication that White was restrained from challenging 
McLaughlin's work as a fingerprint analyst in Cousin's case.19 
                                                 
18 This type of informal discussion of cases, depending on 
their content and whether confidential information was 
discussed, would be a relevant inquiry in a potential conflict 
analysis. 
 
19 The difference between the allegations of misconduct 
against McLaughlin in this case compared to the Cowans case is 
also significant.  In the Cowans case, McLaughlin was accused of 
concealing the discovery that a fingerprint recovered from the 
crime scene was erroneously matched to Cowans, thus implicating 
37 
 
 
 
Furthermore, a telephone conversation that Robinson 
coordinated between White and McLaughlin does not change our 
view that there is insufficient evidence to establish an actual 
conflict on these grounds.  White testified that in the course 
of preparing for Cousin's trial, and in response to the report 
that the originally analyzed and unmatched fingerprints actually 
had a match, White attempted to contact McLaughlin.  Robinson 
facilitated the telephone call between White and McLaughlin 
after White mentioned, in the course of having lunch with 
Robinson, that he was preparing for Cousin's criminal trial and 
he had been unable to contact McLaughlin.  White spoke with 
McLaughlin in private, and Robinson was not present for the 
conversation.  Significantly, White testified that he did not 
acquire any confidential information about McLaughlin during 
that telephone call, and there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that White gleaned any confidential information during 
that conversation, which he described as brief and "not . . . 
terribly productive."  Accordingly, Cousin fails to set forth 
any information suggesting that White acquired confidential 
                                                                                                                                                             
an apparently innocent individual in a crime.  Here, the 
evidence indicates that McLaughlin verified another analyst's 
fingerprint analysis, in which that analyst evidently failed to 
individualize a latent print to an individual who was presumably 
in the fingerprint database.  With no view on whether this 
constituted negligence, misconduct, or neither, it is 
nonetheless clear here that the allegations against McLaughlin 
in the two cases have no connection that would inhibit White 
from attacking McLaughlin's work in defending Cousin. 
38 
 
 
 
information, either before or during this telephone call, that 
triggers the prohibitions prescribed in rule 1.9 (b).  The mere 
fact that Robinson put White in contact with her former client 
in no way subverts that proposition.20 
3.  Conclusion.  Based on the foregoing, we discern that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish that White was 
burdened by an actual conflict.  We vacate the judge's decision 
granting Cousin's motion for a new trial and remand the case to 
the Superior Court for further evidentiary hearings on whether 
Cousin was prejudiced by potential conflicts of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                 
20 The record is equally devoid of evidence that Robinson's 
representation of McLaughlin arose from an underlying, 
contractual referral relationship between the city or the Boston 
police patrolmen's union and Robinson and White.  This is not 
altered by White's brief testimony indicating that Robinson knew 
the attorney for the patrolmen's union.