Title: Commonwealth v. Rainey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13285
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13285 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHAREE RAINEY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2022. – April 6, 2023. 
 
Present:  Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & 
Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Probation, Revocation of probation, Hearsay.  
Evidence, Wiretap, Hearsay.  Due Process of Law, Probation 
revocation.  Global Positioning System Device.  Statute, 
Construction. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 5, 2012. 
 
A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by 
Michael D. Ricciuti, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Gail M. McKenna for the defendant. 
Brooke Hartley, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Christopher P. Conniff & Michelle Mlacker, of New York, 
Kacie Brinkman, of Illinois, Claudia Leis Bolgen, & Thanithia 
Billings, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
Nina L. Pomponio, Special Assistant Attorney General, & 
Arthur J. Czugh for Massachusetts Probation Service, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  While on probation for assault and battery, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13A, and for violating an abuse prevention 
order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7, the defendant, Charee Rainey, 
forcibly entered his then girlfriend's home over her objection 
and proceeded to assault her.  Responding to the subsequent 
domestic disturbance call, Boston police officers arrived at the 
victim's residence; one officer activated his body-worn camera 
before entering the premises.  The still-distraught victim 
reported the assault to the officers.  One officer recorded the 
victim's statement in writing; and the officer who was equipped 
with the body-worn camera was able to capture on the audio-
visual video footage the victim's reporting of the events that 
had transpired, the state of her home within his plain view, and 
his own interview of the victim's two daughters.  The defendant, 
who had fled the apartment immediately following the assault, 
was not recorded. 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the wiretap statute, 
G. L. c. 272, § 99, precluded the use of the body-worn camera 
footage at his probation violation proceeding, and that the 
recording violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  We disagree.  Further concluding that 
the Superior Court judge did not abuse his discretion in 
3 
 
concluding that the victim's statements were substantially 
reliable, and seeing no reason to doubt the judge's statement 
that his findings regarding the defendant's global positioning 
system (GPS) violations did not drive the decision to revoke 
probation, we affirm.1 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts found by the judge, 
supplemented by our independent review of the video footage from 
the body-worn camera.  See Commonwealth v. Yusuf, 488 Mass. 379, 
381 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 341 
(2012) ("we are in the same position as the . . . judge in 
viewing the videotape"). 
 
a.  Facts.  Relevant to the present appeal, in 2013, the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to three years of 
probation for assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A, to run 
concurrently with three years of probation for violation of an 
abuse prevention order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7.2  The conditions of 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
Massachusetts Probation Service. 
 
 
2 The defendant also was convicted and ultimately sentenced 
to five years and one day in State prison for assault and 
battery by means of a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily 
injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c), to run concurrently with five 
years of probation for another violation of an abuse prevention 
order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7.  Relevant to the appeal, the 
defendant's term of incarceration was to be followed by the 
aforementioned three years of probation.  The defendant was also 
found guilty of malicious destruction of property, G. L. c. 266, 
 
4 
 
probation included that he obey all laws, have no contact with 
the 2013 victim,3 and wear a GPS device to ensure he stayed away 
from the 2013 victim.4 
 
In December 2019, while the defendant was serving probation 
for these crimes, Boston police Officers Richard Santiago and 
Sparks Flantey responded to a call of an "intimate partner in 
domestic violence" at the home of the defendant's then 
girlfriend (victim).  Before entering the victim's apartment, 
Santiago activated his body-worn camera.5 
 
The victim allowed the officers to enter her apartment.  
Her voice was shaky, and she was sniffling and distraught.  The 
victim's two young daughters were home. 
 
§ 127, but no sentence for this crime is noted in the docket; on 
appeal, the defendant raises no issue relating thereto. 
 
 
3 The 2013 victim is not the same victim as in the present 
case. 
 
 
4 A GPS device "is an electronic monitor designed to report 
continuously the probationer's current location."  Commonwealth 
v. Thissell, 457 Mass. 191, 191 n.1 (2010), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 740 (2009). 
 
 
5 "As the name suggests, a body-worn camera is a small 
camera that is clipped to a police officer's uniform, on his 
chest or possibly to head-gear, such as glasses or a head-
mount."  Blitz, American Constitution Society for Law and 
Policy, Police Body-Worn Cameras:  Evidentiary Benefits and 
Privacy Threats, at 3 (May 2015).  "It can then record video of 
the area in front of it and audio of the surrounding 
environment.  The camera is either activated by the officer 
wearing it or automatically triggered by a sound, movement, or 
other stimulus."  Id.  See St. 2020, c. 253, § 104 (a) (defining 
"Body-worn camera"). 
5 
 
 
The victim proceeded to report the events that had 
transpired that evening.  She explained that, approximately two 
hours earlier, while she was asleep, the defendant had taken her 
apartment keys, the keys to her then-inoperable truck, and the 
keys to her rental car.  After she awakened, she ordered a pizza 
for pickup and called the defendant to inquire as to the 
location of the rental car so that she could retrieve the pizza 
order.  They argued, and she told him not to return to the 
apartment.  She placed a sofa couch in front of the door to 
block his entrance. 
 
In contravention of her request, the defendant returned to 
the apartment and attempted to open the door; the victim asked 
him not to enter and warned that she would call the police.  
Nevertheless, the defendant forced the door open, moving the 
couch forward and injuring the victim's toe. 
 
In the ensuing struggle, he pushed the victim's neck and 
chest, scratching her chest.  The victim yelled for her older 
daughter to call the police and to go to the upstairs neighbor; 
in response, the defendant covered the victim's mouth and then 
slapped the telephone from the daughter's hand. 
The defendant pushed the victim to the ground and used his 
legs to push her away.  He then took some personal belongings 
and fled the apartment in the rental vehicle, also taking with 
him the apartment keys. 
6 
 
 
The victim repeated parts of this account of the assault 
several times in response to officers' questions, consistently 
explaining the timeline of events and the cause of her injuries.6  
As she spoke, Flantey took written notes of her report, and she 
spelled the names of those involved.  Santiago told her that 
detectives would come to photograph her injuries, and that he 
would preserve the information she had reported in his police 
report. 
 
Santiago testified that he saw the victim's chest injuries.  
He also spoke with the older daughter, who confirmed that the 
defendant had covered the victim's mouth and slapped the 
telephone from the daughter's hand.7 
 
Emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and detectives arrived 
at the scene; the EMTs attended to the victim's injuries. 
 
The officers asked the victim to contact the car rental 
company to obtain information to assist in finding the defendant 
and the rental vehicle.  While the victim was on the telephone 
with the car rental company, Santiago announced that he was 
 
 
6 Shortly after the police officers arrived, the victim 
stepped outside to retrieve the pizza she had ordered, now for 
delivery, for her children. 
 
 
7 The victim's younger daughter explained that she had 
covered her face during the altercation and did not see 
anything. 
7 
 
recording and asked whether that was acceptable.  No verbal 
response is recorded on the video footage.8 
 
Thereafter, the victim and the older daughter went with the 
EMTs to the hospital.9  Officers stayed in the apartment until 
the lock on the apartment door was changed to impede the 
defendant's reentry. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  Based in large part on the report 
of the domestic disturbance, the probation department issued a 
notice of surrender, alleging new criminal conduct and failure 
to pay fines.10  The probation department subsequently amended 
the notice to add allegations of failures to comply with GPS 
requirements in May, June, and July of 2020. 
 
At the final surrender hearing, Santiago testified and the 
body-worn camera footage was admitted over the defendant's 
 
 
8 Throughout the recording, a periodic beeping can be heard, 
but it is not clear from the video footage whether the noise was 
audible to others. 
 
 
9 The victim's younger daughter was left in the care of her 
neighbor. 
 
 
10 The alleged crimes for the probation violations were 
assault and battery on a household or family member, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13M (a); threat to commit a crime, G. L. c. 275, § 2; 
assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); malicious 
destruction of property worth under $1,200, G. L. c. 266, § 127; 
and breaking and entering at nighttime to commit a felony, G. L. 
c. 266, § 16. 
 
 
The defendant also was charged in a parallel criminal case 
stemming from this incident; each count was ultimately disposed 
of in a nolle prosequi. 
8 
 
objection that the statements in the video footage were hearsay.  
The probation department also submitted an e-mail message 
detailing the defendant's alleged GPS violations; there was no 
objection to the admission of these GPS documents. 
 
Determining that the statements captured on the video 
footage were substantially reliable by applying the factors set 
forth in Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474 (2016), 
discussed infra, the judge found all but one of the new charges, 
destruction of property, proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  He did not consider, as a basis for his decision, 
whether the defendant failed to pay fines; and, while the judge 
found that the probation department had proved the GPS 
violations, he explained, "candidly, that [did not] drive the 
result here." 
 
The judge revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced 
him to two years in a house of correction on the assault and 
battery conviction, followed by one year of probation for the 
violation of the abuse protection order.11  Explaining his 
rationale for revoking probation, the judge stated that 
"[d]omestic abuse is serious" and the video footage was 
 
 
11 The transcript and the written findings indicate that the 
one year of probation was for both violations of the abuse 
protection order; however, the defendant should have already 
served his sentence on one violation concurrently with his 
incarcerated sentence.  See note 2, supra. 
9 
 
"telling" -- "this defendant was given a chance to avoid a harsh 
sentence, and he had lots of opportunities to avoid it, and went 
right back to the activity that got him in trouble in the first 
place."12  The defendant appealed, and we ordered the case 
transferred to this court sua sponte. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Wiretap statute.  On appeal, the 
defendant first maintains that the wiretap statute, G. L. 
c. 272, § 99, precluded use of the body-worn camera footage in 
connection with the probation violation proceeding.  Subsection 
99 C of the statute makes it a crime to "willfully commit[] an 
interception . . . of any . . . oral communication," punishable 
by, inter alia, a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for five 
years in State prison, or both.  G. L. c. 272, § 99 C 1.  The 
term "interception" is defined as "to secretly hear[ or] 
secretly record . . . the contents of any . . . oral 
communication through the use of any intercepting device by any 
person other than a person given prior authority by all parties 
to such communication."  G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.  An 
"intercepting device" includes "any device or apparatus which is 
 
 
12 In his written findings, the judge set forth further 
reasons for the disposition, including the circumstances of the 
crime for which probation was ordered and the crime's impact on 
any person or the community, the nature of the probation 
violation, the defendant's record of prior probation violations, 
the opportunity for rehabilitation under community supervision, 
and the recommendation of the probation officer. 
10 
 
capable of transmitting, receiving, amplifying, or recording a 
wire or oral communication other than a hearing aid."  G. L. 
c. 272, § 99 B 3.  A body-worn camera is an intercepting device. 
 
i.  Exclusionary rule.  The defendant's contention that the 
body-worn camera footage was improperly admitted and used at his 
probation violation proceeding faces several procedural hurdles.  
To begin, the exclusionary rule does not generally apply to 
probation violation proceedings.  See Commonwealth v. Olsen, 405 
Mass. 491, 494 (1989); Commonwealth v. Vincente, 405 Mass. 278, 
280 (1989).  This is because "[t]he purpose of probation rather 
than immediate execution of a term of imprisonment 'in large 
part is to enable the [convicted] person to get on his feet, to 
become law abiding and to lead a useful and upright life under 
the fostering influence of the probation officer.'"  
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 64 (2006), quoting Mariano 
v. Judge of Dist. Court of Cent. Berkshire, 243 Mass. 90, 93 
(1922).  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) ("Its 
purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as 
constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being 
confined for the full term of the sentence imposed").  "Evidence 
that a probationer is not complying with the conditions of 
probation may indicate that he or she has not been rehabilitated 
11 
 
and continues to pose a threat to the public."13  Vincente, 
supra.  For this reason, "it is extremely important that all 
reliable evidence shedding light on the probationer's conduct be 
available during probation [violation] proceedings" (citation 
omitted).  Id. 
 
Indeed, the ability to review all reliable evidence is a 
common interest shared by both the State and the probationer.  
See Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 321 (2013) ("the 
interest in an accurate evaluation [of all the reliable 
evidence] -- the only interest shared by both parties -- is of 
central concern in determining the scope of a probationer's due 
process rights").  See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
785 (1973) ("Both the probationer . . . and the State have 
interests in the accurate finding of fact and the informed use 
of discretion -- the probationer . . . to insure that his 
liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make 
certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a 
successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing 
the safety of the community"). 
 
 
13 A probationer has already been convicted of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt and enjoys "only . . . conditional 
liberty . . . dependent on observance of special [probation] 
restrictions."  Olsen, 405 Mass. at 493, quoting Morrissey, 408 
U.S. at 480. 
12 
 
 
By contrast, "the risk that illegally obtained evidence 
might be excluded from [probation violation] proceedings is 
likely to have only a marginal additional deterrent effect on 
illegal police misconduct."  Vincente, 405 Mass. at 280.  
Accordingly, we have determined that the exclusionary rule 
should not apply to such proceedings.  Id.14 
 
Thus, if the remedy the defendant seeks is available, its 
basis must be found in the wiretap statute itself.15  Tellingly, 
the defendant cites no such remedial provision. 
 
While the wiretap statute provides remedies for violations 
of the statute, none of those remedies applies to individuals in 
the defendant's position.  For example, the statute allows "a 
defendant in a criminal trial" to move to suppress the contents 
 
 
14 The defendant does not suggest that there was "egregious 
police conduct" or "conduct that 'shock[s] the conscience'" in 
this case (citation omitted).  Olsen, 405 Mass at 496. 
 
 
15 The defendant mentions in passing that Santiago may have 
violated the Boston police department's policy regarding the use 
of body-worn cameras.  Neither the defendant nor the 
Commonwealth addresses whether any such violation would preclude 
the use of the video footage in connection with a probation 
violation proceeding; accordingly, we do not address the issue.  
We note that the policy permits officers to use a body-worn 
camera without notice when "an immediate threat to the officer's 
life or safety or the life or safety of any other person makes 
[body-worn camera] notification dangerous."  See Boston Police 
Department Rule 405, Body Worn Camera Policy § 2.5 (June 3, 
2019).  Here, at least when Santiago initially activated the 
body-worn camera, he did not know whether the defendant was 
present or posed an ongoing threat; moreover, Santiago stayed in 
the victim's apartment until the lock was changed to prevent the 
defendant's reentry. 
13 
 
of intercepted wires or communications.  G. L. c. 272, § 99 P.  
Because a probation violation proceeding is not a criminal 
trial, see Commonwealth v. Costa, 490 Mass. 118, 123 (2022), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990) 
("Revocation hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution"), 
this remedy is not available. 
 
The statute also allows an "aggrieved person" a private 
right of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or 
uses an unauthorized interception.  G. L. c. 272, § 99 Q.  An 
aggrieved person is defined as "any individual who was a party 
to an intercepted wire or oral communication or who was named in 
a warrant authorizing the interception, or who would otherwise 
have standing to complain that his personal or property interest 
or privacy was invaded in the course of an interception."  G. L. 
c. 272, § 99 B 6.  The defendant rightly does not claim to be an 
aggrieved person; while the victim reported the assault by the 
defendant, he himself was not a party featured in the body-worn 
camera footage.16  Compare Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc., 
487 Mass. 655, 658-659 (2021) (action brought by aggrieved 
person, alleging he was secretly recorded). 
 
16 The defendant also was not named in a warrant authorizing 
the body-worn camera recording; there was none.  Nor does the 
defendant contend that his personal or property interest or 
privacy was invaded such that these interests would preclude the 
recording.  Additionally, a probation violation proceeding is 
not a civil action for damages.  G. L. c. 272, § 99 Q. 
14 
 
 
These provisions, which carve out specific remedies for 
certain individuals, belie the defendant's assertion that the 
statute entitles him to the remedy he seeks.  See Fascione v. 
CAN Ins. Cos., 435 Mass. 88, 94 (2001), quoting 3 N.J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.18, at 46 (5th ed. 1992) 
("[W]here a statute creates a new right and prescribes the 
remedy for its enforcement, the remedy prescribed is 
exclusive").  See also Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Prop. 
Dev. LLC, 473 Mass. 580, 588 (2016), quoting Bank of Am., N.A. 
v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 619 (2013) (applying "the statutory 
maxim, 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' meaning 'the 
expression of one thing in a statute is an implied exclusion of 
other things not included in the statute'"). 
 
Indeed, given the rights available under the statute, the 
defendant's reliance on the statute in connection with the 
probation violation proceeding is at best questionable.  
Notably, each of the cases the defendant cites involves 
individuals who were themselves recorded.17  See, e.g., 
 
17 Nor is this the type of case that might trigger the 
doctrine of third-party standing, which may be available to a 
defendant in a criminal trial and further requires a showing of 
egregious misconduct.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 470 Mass. 
574, 578 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Scardamaglia, 410 Mass. 
375, 380 (1991) ("in a case where the police engage in 
'distinctly egregious' conduct that constitutes a significant 
violation of a third party's art. 14 rights in an effort to 
obtain evidence against a defendant, it may be appropriate to 
 
15 
 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 468 Mass. 417, 421, 428 (2014) 
(concerning suppression of recording of defendant's voice in 
telephone call); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289, 302-303 
(2011) (suppression of defendant's statements, secretly recorded 
by informant); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 833 (1996) 
(declining to suppress videotape of defendant during booking 
procedure); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 503 (1976) 
(refusing to suppress taped conversations in which defendant was 
participant); Commonwealth v. Ashley, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 
749, 762 (2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 838 (2013) (affirming 
denial of motion to suppress defendant's recorded statements 
during police station interrogation). 
 
ii.  Use of body-worn camera to record victim's report.  
Passing over these substantial hurdles, the defendant asserts 
that the plain language of the wiretap statute shows that the 
Legislature intended to preclude the use of the body-worn camera 
footage in a probation violation proceeding because the statute 
criminalizes, inter alia, the secret recording of oral 
communications.  G. L. c. 272, § 99 C 1.  In the defendant's 
 
permit the defendant to rely on the standing of the third party 
to challenge the police conduct").  See also Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493, 511 (2020), quoting Santiago, supra 
("We also repeatedly have declined to adopt target standing 
under art. 14, but have left open the possibility of applying 
the doctrine in cases of 'distinctly egregious police 
conduct'"). 
16 
 
view, Santiago committed a crime under the wiretap statute, 
potentially subjecting Santiago to incarceration in State 
prison, even though he was responding to the call that a crime 
had transpired, the victim consented to his entry into her home, 
and she knew that, at the least,18 officers were creating a 
written record of her report of the details of the domestic 
violence committed by the defendant that evening; indeed, she 
helped the responding officers correctly spell the names of her 
daughters for the written record.  Moreover, because the wiretap 
statute also makes it a crime to willfully disclose or use a 
prohibited interception, G. L. c. 272, § 99 C 3, the defendant 
contends that the prosecutor, the probation officer, and the 
Superior Court judge also are subject to criminal penalties.19 
 
 
18 The record is devoid of information sufficient to 
determine whether the victim heard Santiago announce that he was 
recording or whether the body-worn camera operated in a manner 
that would have notified the victim that she was being recorded.  
Accord Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 395, 400-401 
(2009) (recording of defendant's telephone call in police 
interview room not illegal interception under wiretap statute 
because he was told police officers intended to videotape 
interview, and thus "the defendant knew that his words in the 
interview room were subject to being recorded"); Commonwealth v. 
Rivera, 445 Mass. 119, 134 (2005) (Cowin, J., concurring) (no 
interception where video cameras were in plain view and 
"defendant can be presumed to have had actual awareness of the 
existence of the devices and that he was under surveillance"). 
 
19 He also contends that his counsel's failure to object to 
the use or disclosure of the video footage was ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
17 
 
 
A.  Standard of review.  "We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo."  Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 
488 Mass. 325, 331 (2021).  "Our primary goal in interpreting a 
statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature."  Id., 
quoting Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018).  
"[O]ur analysis begins with 'the "principal source of insight 
into legislative intent"' -- the plain language of the statute."  
Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 362 (2022), quoting Tze-
Kit Mui v Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 Mass. 710, 712 (2018).  
We have explained: 
"The general and familiar rule is that a statute must be 
interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature 
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary 
and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers 
may be effectuated" (emphasis added). 
 
Pesa, supra, quoting Commissioner of Revenue v. Dupee, 423 Mass. 
617, 620 (1996).  See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 
322, 332 (2022), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & 
Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006) (same). 
 
"When the meaning of a statute is brought into question, a 
court properly should read other sections and should construe 
them together."  City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 
Mass. 784, 790 (2019), quoting LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 
328, 333 (1999).  See Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory 
18 
 
Retirement Appeals Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605 (2019) ("Beyond plain 
language, [c]ourts must look to the statutory scheme as a whole 
. . . so as to produce an internal consistency within the 
statute . . . .  Even clear statutory language is not read in 
isolation" [quotations omitted]); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 
Mass. 768, 777 (2017) ("The plain language of the statute, read 
as a whole, provides the primary insight into that intent. . . .  
We do not confine our interpretation to the words of a single 
section"). 
 
Where the Legislature has set forth its intent in the form 
of a codified preamble, we consider the preamble as part of the 
whole statute, to the extent that it does not conflict with the 
more specific statutory provisions.  See Brookline v. 
Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Quality Eng'g, 398 Mass. 
404, 412 (1986) ("general preambles . . . do not take precedence 
over specific provisions").  In construing the wiretap statute, 
in particular, we have turned repeatedly to the statute's 
preamble to inform our analysis.  See, e.g., Curtatone, 487 
Mass. at 659-660; Tavares, 459 Mass. at 295 & n.5; Commonwealth 
v. Ennis, 439 Mass. 64, 68 (2003); Gordon, 422 Mass. at 833; 
Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 279 (1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1147 (1982). 
B.  Statutory framework.  Admittedly, subsection 99 C of 
the wiretap statute could be construed literally as the 
19 
 
defendant suggests, subjecting police officers, probation 
officers, prosecutors, and the judge to severe penalties.  See 
G. L. c. 272, § 99 C 1 (crime to "willfully commit[] an 
interception . . . of any . . . oral communication"); G. L. 
c. 272, § 99 C 3 (criminalizing willful disclosure or use of 
interception).  However, "in the absence of more specific 
statutory language to that effect . . .  , we are unwilling to 
attribute that intention to the Legislature."  Gordon, 422 Mass. 
at 832-833. 
"[O]ur respect for the Legislature's considered judgment 
dictates that we interpret the statute to be sensible, rejecting 
unreasonable interpretations unless the clear meaning of the 
language requires such an interpretation."  Osborne-Trussell v. 
Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 254 (2021), quoting 
Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 620 
(2013).  See Patel, 489 Mass. at 364, quoting Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) ("the 
Legislature 'does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes'"); Commonwealth v. Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 82 (2016), 
quoting Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 251 (1996) 
("Because we assume generally that the Legislature intends to 
act reasonably, '[w]e will not adopt a literal construction of a 
statute if the consequences of such a construction are absurd or 
unreasonable'"). 
20 
 
 
Our decision in Gordon is instructive.  There, the 
defendant contended that the wiretap statute precluded law 
enforcement officials from making an audio-visual recording of 
the defendant's booking procedure at the police station.  
Gordon, 422 Mass. at 832.  While we acknowledged that subsection 
99 C of the statute could "be read literally as making unlawful 
the audiotaping of booking procedures without the knowledge of 
the persons being booked," we were unwilling to attribute such 
an intent to the Legislature in the absence of more specific 
language.  Id. at 832-833.  Instead, we read subsection 99 C in 
the context of the statute as a whole, including its codified 
preamble.  See id. at 833.  See also Plymouth Retirement Bd., 
483 Mass. at 605. 
 
We concluded that the "legislative focus [of the wiretap 
statute, as set forth in the statute's preamble,20] was on the 
protection of privacy rights and the deterrence of interference 
 
 
20 In pertinent part, the preamble codified the 
Legislature's finding that "organized crime" existed in the 
Commonwealth and was "a grave danger to the public welfare and 
safety."  G. L. c. 272, § 99 A.  The Legislature concluded that 
"[n]ormal investigative procedures" were "not effective in the 
investigation of illegal acts committed by organized crime" and 
that "law enforcement officials must be permitted to use modern 
methods of electronic surveillance, under strict judicial 
supervision, when investigating these organized criminal 
activities."  Id.  The preamble also codified the Legislature's 
recognition that "the uncontrolled development and unrestricted 
use of modern electronic surveillance devices pose grave dangers 
to the privacy of all citizens of the commonwealth."  Id. 
21 
 
therewith by law enforcement officers' surreptitious 
eavesdropping as an investigative tool."  Gordon, supra at 833.  
The Legislature, we observed, "[did] not appear to have in mind 
the recording of purely administrative bookings steps following 
an individual's arrest."  Id.  Accordingly, we declined to read 
the statute as barring the admission of the recording of the 
booking procedure in the defendant's criminal trial.  Id. 
 
Similarly, nothing in the wiretap statute as a whole, 
including its codified preamble, evinces an intent to prohibit 
recording a victim's volunteered report of a crime where, as 
here, the victim was aware that officers already were 
memorializing her report in writing, much less an intent to 
criminalize the use of such a recording at a probation violation 
proceeding.  The body-worn camera was not used as an 
investigative tool to secretly eavesdrop on an otherwise private 
conversation;21 it captured the victim's voluntary statement to 
police officers, which she knew was being memorialized by them 
 
 
21 The Commonwealth incorrectly suggests that the wiretap 
statute protects only communications as to which the speaker 
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus that its 
protections are coextensive with the Fourth Amendment and art. 
14.  Compare Jackson, 370 Mass. at 506 ("we would render 
meaningless the Legislature's careful choice of words if we were 
to interpret 'secretly' as encompassing only those situations 
where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy"), 
with Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 489 Mass. 292, 295 (2022) 
(defendant may challenge search or seizure under art. 14 and 
Fourth Amendment only if defendant has reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
22 
 
in writing.  The resulting video footage was not a clandestine 
recording precluded by the wiretap statute; rather, it merely 
preserved the statement (albeit through an alternative, 
electronic medium) that the victim voluntarily gave to law 
enforcement officers and which she understood was being recorded 
by them by means of paper and pen.22  See Ashley, 82 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 762 (declining to construe wiretap statute to criminalize 
use of camera in police station interrogation room to record 
defendant's volunteered statement to officers when officers 
"repeatedly expressed their intention to get it 'down on paper' 
and memorialize the interview").  Accord Commonwealth v. Hyde, 
434 Mass. 594, 602 & n.9 (2001) (contrasting "clandestine 
recording" prohibited by wiretap statute with "good practice" of 
electronic recording of police interrogations based on 
presumption "that, when police interrogations are electronically 
 
 
22 The wiretap statute does not define the term "record."  
Accordingly, we concluded that "record" as used in the wiretap 
statute should be given its plain and ordinary meaning to "mean, 
'to set down in writing' or 'to cause (sound, visual images) to 
be transferred to and registered on something by electronic 
means in such a way that the thing so transferred and registered 
can . . . be subsequently reproduced'" (emphasis added).  
Commonwealth v. Moody, 466 Mass. 196, 209 (2013), quoting 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1898 (1971).  See 
Moody, supra ("secretly record" as used in wiretap statute 
"includes the interception of text messages by viewing and 
transcribing them for use at a later date" [emphasis added]). 
23 
 
recorded, the suspect is aware that the interrogation is being 
preserved").23 
 
C.  Legislative history.  The legislative history also does 
not support the defendant's construction.  See HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A., 490 Mass. at 332-333, quoting Chandler v. County Comm'rs 
of Nantucket County, 437 Mass. 430, 435 (2002) ("Where the 
statutory language is not conclusive, we may 'turn to extrinsic 
sources, including the legislative history . . . , for 
assistance in our interpretation'").  Instead, the history 
confirms our conclusion in Gordon, 422 Mass. at 833, that the 
Legislature was concerned principally with the investigative use 
of surveillance devices by law enforcement officials to 
eavesdrop surreptitiously on conversations. 
 
The relevant provisions of the statute trace their history 
to 1964 when the Legislature established a special commission to 
study "the laws relative to eavesdropping and the use of 
 
 
23 The defendant mistakenly relies on Hyde to support his 
contention that the plain meaning of the wiretap statute 
criminalizes the police officer's recording in this case.  In 
Hyde, 434 Mass. at 599-600, we construed the statute to prohibit 
the secret recording of police officers performing their public 
duties.  As the dissent in Hyde noted, such a literal 
construction was unnecessary, id. at 607 (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting); and the literal construction led to an 
unconstitutional result.  See Project Veritas Action Fund v. 
Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 844 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. 
Ct. 560 (2021) ("Section 99 violates the First Amendment in 
criminalizing the secret, nonconsensual audio recording of 
police officers discharging their official duties in public 
spaces"). 
24 
 
electronic recording devices . . . with a view to strengthening 
the laws relative to eavesdropping and the use of wire tapping 
recording devices" [emphasis added].  St. 1964, c. 82.  See 
Tavares, 459 Mass. at 294-295, quoting Commonwealth v. Vitello, 
367 Mass. 224, 231 (1975) ("the Legislature appointed a special 
commission in 1964 to investigate electronic eavesdropping and 
'ensure that unjustified and overly broad intrusions on rights 
of privacy are avoided'").  In April 1967, the commission issued 
an interim report, which focused on various types of 
"eavesdropping devices," namely "bug[s]."  1967 Senate Doc. No. 
1198, at 3.  These "subminiature transmitter[s]" could eavesdrop 
on unknowing speakers and "transmit a very clear signal at least 
[seven] blocks in downtown Boston and [could] pick up a whisper 
at [twenty] feet."  Id.  See Hyde, 434 Mass. at 608 n.7 
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (devices were not mere audiotape 
recorders, but rather "sophisticated inventions of then-recent 
origin that could be concealed in telephones or walls").  See 
also Curtatone, 487 Mass. at 659, quoting Tavares, supra ("Here, 
the legislative intent, apparent both in the legislative history 
of the act and the act itself, concerns limiting 'electronic 
eavesdropping' . . . .  The act was adopted in 1968 in direct 
response to 'the commercial availability of sophisticated 
surveillance devices and the ease with which they facilitated 
surreptitious recording of private citizens' by private 
25 
 
individuals and law enforcement alike"); Commonwealth v. Moody, 
466 Mass. 196, 201 (2013), quoting Tavares, supra (same); Ennis, 
439 Mass. at 68 & nn.9, 10, quoting 1968 Sen. Doc. No. 1132, at 
6 ("the Legislature sought to prohibit all 'secret' electronic 
eavesdropping by 'private individuals'" because "the commission 
heard testimony that newly developed inventions, 'eavesdropping 
devices' and 'bugs,' could be easily concealed and used to 
monitor private conversations secretly and continuously. . . .  
The commission feared that '[a] person with a minimal education 
in electronics [could] easily install these commercially 
available devices for purposes of illegally intercepting wire or 
oral communications'").  The commission recommended enacting new 
legislation to clarify the "eavesdropping" statute, G. L. 
c. 272, § 99.  1967 Senate Doc. No. 1198, at 14-15. 
 
The following year, the commission proposed a new version 
of G. L. c. 272, § 99.  See 1968 Senate Doc. No. 1132, at 14 
(Appendix A).  The commission recommended that the Commonwealth 
"strictly forbid electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping by 
members of the public," id. at 6, and permit "eavesdropping and 
wiretapping by law enforcement officials . . . in order to 
effectively combat the menace of organized crime but only if 
such wiretapping and eavesdropping . . . be strictly supervised 
by the judicial branch of the government," id. at 7-8.  The 
commission's proposed bill defined "interception" as secretly 
26 
 
hearing or recording a communication without the prior consent 
of all parties -- a marked departure from the one-party consent 
exception contained in the former statute, which had required 
only the consent of either the sender or the receiver.  Compare 
1968 Senate Doc. No. 1132, at 14, with St. 1959, c. 449, § 1.  
See Thorpe, 384 Mass. at 280 n.7 (as proposed, "[l]aw 
enforcement officers were required, without exception, to obtain 
warrants before conducting any surveillance" [emphasis added]). 
The statute, as amended, reflects most of the 
recommendations of the commission, with the addition of a 
preamble.  See St. 1968, c. 738, § 1.  The statute, however, 
retained the one-party consent exception for law enforcement 
officers, but only under narrow circumstances; specifically, it 
authorized these officers "to conduct warrantless electronic 
surveillance" in connection with "investigation" of organized 
crime when they were a party to the communication or had been 
given authority by a party (emphasis added).  Thorpe, 384 Mass. 
at 280 n.7, citing G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4, 7.  The Legislature's 
focus was the use of devices, like bugs, for clandestine or 
surreptitious eavesdropping; the Legislature did not appear to 
have in mind law enforcement officers' use of devices to record 
a crime victim's voluntary reporting of a crime under 
circumstances where, as here, the victim understood her 
statement was being preserved by them.  In sum, the legislative 
27 
 
history (like the statutory framework, including the preamble) 
is devoid of anything to support the defendant's proposed 
construction, and accordingly, we reject it. 
 
b.  Constitutional analysis.  The defendant's contention 
that the recording violated the State and Federal Constitutions 
requires little attention.  Where, as here, 
"the officer was lawfully present in the home and the body-
worn camera captured only the areas and items in the plain 
view of the officer as he or she traversed the home, in a 
manner consistent with the reasons for the officer's lawful 
presence, the recording is not a search in the 
constitutional sense and does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment or art. 14." 
 
Yusuf, 488 Mass. at 390. 
 
c.  Hearsay.  The defendant next maintains that the judge 
erred in relying on the video footage and the GPS evidence, 
which he contends were not substantially reliable hearsay. 
 
i.  Standard of review.  "[R]evocation proceedings must be 
flexible in nature" and "all reliable evidence should be 
considered."  Durling, 407 Mass. at 114.  "[W]hen hearsay is 
offered as the only evidence of the alleged violation, the 
indicia of reliability must be substantial . . . because the 
probationer's interest in cross-examining the actual source (and 
hence testing its reliability) is greater when the hearsay is 
the only evidence offered."  Id. at 118. 
 
To determine whether hearsay has substantial indicia of 
reliability, a judge may consider, inter alia, 
28 
 
"(1) whether the evidence is based on personal knowledge or 
direct observation; (2) whether the evidence, if based on 
direct observation, was recorded close in time to the 
events in question; (3) the level of factual detail; (4) 
whether the statements are internally consistent; (5) 
whether the evidence is corroborated by information from 
other sources; (6) whether the declarant was disinterested 
when the statements were made; and (7) whether the 
statements were made under circumstances that support their 
veracity." 
 
Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 484.  "There is no requirement that 
hearsay satisfy all the above criteria to be trustworthy and 
reliable."  Costa, 490 Mass. at 124, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 133 (2010).  "[W]here a judge relies on 
hearsay evidence in finding a violation of probation, the judge 
should set forth in writing or on the record why the judge found 
the hearsay evidence to be [substantially] reliable."  
Hartfield, supra at 485.  See Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 
308 (2020) ("For probation [violation] hearings, in which 
substantially reliable hearsay . . . is admissible, we have 
required judges to state explicitly the reasons supporting the 
reliability of any hearsay they rely upon").  We review a 
judge's determination that hearsay is substantially reliable, 
like other evidentiary decisions, under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  See, e.g., N.E. Physical Therapy Plus, Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 358, 363 (2013) (trial judge's 
ruling on applicability of exception to hearsay rule reviewed 
for abuse of discretion). 
29 
 
 
ii.  The recorded statements.  The judge found the victim's 
statements in the body-worn camera footage to be substantially 
reliable, noting that the statements were made based on personal 
knowledge,24 factually detailed, internally consistent, and 
corroborated (e.g., the victim's injuries were visible on the 
video footage and were observed by Santiago).  The judge 
determined that, while the victim was not disinterested, her 
daughter may have been, and the daughter confirmed some of the 
events.  And he found that the circumstances of the statements, 
particularly the emotional distress of the victim, lent them 
credibility.  Balancing the factors, the judge found that the 
statements were substantially reliable; none of the defendant's 
arguments to the contrary suggests that the judge abused his 
discretion. 
 
iii.  The GPS evidence.  Based on the GPS records, which 
were introduced without objection, the judge also found that the 
 
 
24 Contrary to the defendant's argument that the statements 
were made two hours after the events, it is clear from the video 
footage that, while the defendant took the victim's keys two 
hours prior to his assaulting the victim, he did not return to 
the apartment at that time; instead, the altercation occurred 
shortly before the statements were made.  See Yusuf, 488 Mass. 
at 380-381, citing Clarke, 461 Mass. at 341 (independent review 
of video footage); Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 654-
655 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 
429, 438 (2015) (reviewing court may supplement judge's 
subsidiary findings with evidence from documentary evidence 
unless that would cause it to "reach a conclusion of law that is 
contrary to that of [the] . . . judge"). 
30 
 
defendant violated the GPS conditions of his probation.  On 
appeal, the defendant argues that, because the GPS records were 
unreliable, the judge's reliance on the records requires the 
revocation to be vacated.  Seeing no reason to doubt the judge's 
statement that the GPS violations did not "drive the result," we 
disagree. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order revoking probation and imposing 
sentence are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.