Title: Reuter v. City of Methuen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13121
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 2022

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SJC-13121 
 
BETH REUTER  vs.  CITY OF METHUEN. 
 
 
 
Essex.     October 6, 2021. - April 4, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Public Employment, Termination, 
Vacation pay.  School and School Committee, Custodian, 
Termination of employment.  Employment, Termination.  
Labor, Wages, Failure to pay wages, Damages.  Damages, 
Liquidated damages, Attorney's fees, Interest.  Practice, 
Civil, Damages, Attorney's fees, Costs, Interest.  
Interest. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 24, 2014. 
 
The case was heard by John T. Lu, J., and a motion for 
attorney's fees and costs was also heard by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Deborah I. Ecker for the defendant. 
Anthony S. Augeri for the plaintiff. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
Barry J. Miller, Molly C. Mooney, & Emily Miller for 
Northeast Human Resources Association, Inc. 
 
 
 
2 
Raven Moeslinger for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  On the day the plaintiff, Beth Reuter, was 
discharged from employment, the city of Methuen (defendant or 
city) owed her $8,952.15 for accrued vacation time.  Rather than 
pay this amount on the day of her termination, as required by 
the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148 (Wage Act or act), the 
defendant paid her three weeks later.  After a demand from the 
plaintiff's lawyer over a year after that, the defendant paid 
the plaintiff a further $185.42, which represented the trebled 
interest for the three weeks between the plaintiff's termination 
and the payment of the vacation pay.  The present suit followed. 
The issue is not whether the city violated the Wage Act in 
failing to pay the plaintiff for her vacation time on the day 
she was fired -- it clearly did.  Rather, the parties dispute 
the proper measure of damages for the private right of action 
for Wage Act violations under G. L. c. 149, § 150, when the 
employer pays wages after the deadlines provided in the act but 
before the employee files a complaint.  Given the strict time-
defined payment policies underlying the Wage Act, and the 
liquidated damages provision providing for treble damages for 
"lost wages and other benefits," we conclude that an employer is 
responsible for treble the amount of the late wages, not trebled 
interest.  As the prevailing party, the plaintiff is also 
 
 
 
3 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs.1 
1.  Background.  a.  The plaintiff's termination and 
procedural history.  The relevant facts are not disputed by the 
parties.  Reuter worked as a custodian for the city's school 
department starting in 1988.  In February 2013, the plaintiff 
was convicted of larceny over $250 in a single scheme under 
G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1).  The defendant sent a letter formally 
terminating the plaintiff on March 7, 2013.  At the time she was 
terminated, the plaintiff had accrued $8,952.15 in unused 
vacation time. 
The defendant sent four separate checks totaling this 
amount on March 28, 2013.  The plaintiff unsuccessfully 
contested her termination before the Civil Service Commission 
and appealed to the Superior Court.  On March 11, 2014, while 
that appeal was pending, the plaintiff's counsel sent the city a 
demand letter for $23,872.40, which represented a trebling of 
the late vacation pay, plus $5,986.10 for attorney's fees, minus 
setoff for the late payment.  The plaintiff's termination was 
affirmed by the Superior Court on April 14, 2014.  Shortly 
after, on July 24, 2014, the defendant responded to the demand 
letter with an "unconditional check" for $185.42, which 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the New 
England Legal Foundation; Northeast Human Resources Association, 
Inc.; and the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. 
 
 
 
4 
represented a trebling of the twelve percent annual interest2 on 
the plaintiff's vacation pay accrued during the three weeks 
between her termination and payment.  The payment was made 
"without admitting any liability as to the payment of these 
wages." 
The plaintiff commenced the present action on September 24, 
2014.  She asserted an individual claim for the failure to pay 
her vacation pay on the day of her termination, as required by 
the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148.  The plaintiff also alleged 
that the city engaged in a practice of failing to pay departing 
workers on time, and purported to bring a class claim on behalf 
of all city employees who were "involuntarily discharged" or 
"voluntarily left employment" in the prior three years.  The 
defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint under 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and then 
answered the complaint. 
Following discovery, the plaintiff moved for class 
certification on November 8, 2017.  A Superior Court judge 
denied certification on February 5, 2018, finding that the 
plaintiff's Wage Act claims were not suited for class treatment.3 
 
2 The letter did not explain why this was the proper 
interest rate. 
 
3 The plaintiff did not appeal from the denial of class 
certification. 
 
 
 
5 
The case then proceeded to a bench trial on the plaintiff's 
individual claims before a different Superior Court judge on 
March 4, 2019.  The trial judge issued an order noting that 
there were no disputed facts except as related to attorney's 
fees, and holding that the plaintiff was only entitled to treble 
twelve percent interest4 for the three-week delay in receiving 
her vacation pay, which she had already received. 
The judge also found that the plaintiff was entitled to 
attorney's fees.  The plaintiff's counsel submitted records 
showing $75,695.76 in fees and costs, including $12,610 from the 
failed attempt to certify a class.  Applying the "lodestar" 
method, the trial judge determined that the full amount was fair 
and reasonable, noting that the defendant had committed a "plain 
violation of the statute." 
Judgment entered on the order.  The defendant appealed from 
the award of attorney's fees, and the plaintiff cross-appealed 
from the judge's determination that she was not entitled to 
treble lost wages.  We court transferred the appeal to this 
court on our own motion. 
b.  The Wage Act.  General Laws c. 149, § 148, provides 
 
4 Again, why this rate was selected was not explained, 
although it appears to have been stipulated to by the parties.  
It did not represent statutory prejudgment interest, which the 
clerk determined to be zero dollars given the plaintiff's 
failure to recover damages. 
 
 
 
6 
that employers must pay their employees "weekly or bi-weekly" 
within either six or seven days of the "termination of the pay 
period during which the wages were earned."  However, "any 
employee discharged from such employment," such as the 
plaintiff, "shall be paid in full on the day of his discharge."  
Id.  It also defines "wages" to include "any holiday or vacation 
payments due an employee under an oral or written agreement."  
Id.  Combined, these two provisions make clear that a terminated 
employee is entitled to all accrued vacation benefits on the day 
of discharge.  Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 454 
Mass. 63, 67-68 (2009), citing Attorney General Advisory 99/1 
(1999) ("Like wages, the vacation time promised to an employee 
is compensation for services which vests as the employee's 
services are rendered.  Upon separation from employment, 
employees must be compensated by their employers for vacation 
time earned"). 
The scope, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms of the 
act have varied greatly since it was first enacted, but in 
interpreting it, we have always recognized it was intended "for 
the protection of employees, who are often dependent for their 
daily support upon the prompt payment of their wages."  
Commonwealth v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 206 Mass. 417, 424 
(1910).  See Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Mass. 164, 171 & nn.6-8 
(2012) (describing history of Wage Act and noting "the 
 
 
 
7 
Legislature has highlighted [its] fundamental 
importance . . .  by repeatedly expanding its protections").  
Because of the potentially severe financial consequences of even 
a minor violation, the act not only "protect[s] wage earners 
from the long-term detention of wages by unscrupulous employers" 
(citation omitted), id. at 170, but also "impose[s] strict 
liability on employers," who must "suffer the consequences of 
violating the statute regardless of intent" (quotation and 
citations omitted), Dixon v. Malden, 464 Mass. 446, 452 (2013), 
quoting Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 592 
(2009). 
Originally, the Wage Act empowered only government 
officials to bring civil or criminal proceedings for violations.  
See St. 1887, c. 399, § 2.  Despite strict liability and the 
threat of fines, and later even imprisonment, the Legislature 
eventually decided, however, that government action alone was 
insufficient to enforce the Wage Act.  In 1993, the Legislature 
enacted the private action provision of § 150, giving an 
employee the right to "institute and prosecute in his own name 
and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly 
situated, a civil action for injunctive relief and any damages 
incurred, including treble damages for any loss of wages and 
other benefits" for violations of § 148 and other labor laws.  
St. 1993, c. 110, § 182.  See Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 
 
 
 
8 
246-247 (2013) (1993 act transferred enforcement authority from 
Department of Labor and Industries to Attorney General, and "the 
Legislature contemporaneously created the private right of 
action as a means further to ensure rigorous enforcement of the 
Wage Act").5  The amendment also provided that a prevailing 
employee was "entitled to an award of the costs of the 
litigation and reasonable attorney fees."  St. 1993, c. 110, 
§ 182.  This provision ensured "rigorous enforcement" of the 
Wage Act by encouraging cases to be brought by "private 
attorneys general" (citations omitted).  Ferman v. Sturgis 
Cleaners, Inc., 481 Mass. 488, 494-495 (2019). 
We interpreted the treble damages provision in § 150, as it 
was phrased in the 1993 act, as punitive damages limited to 
cases where the employer's conduct was "outrageous," and 
therefore discretionary rather than mandatory.  Wiedmann v. The 
Bradford Group, Inc., 444 Mass. 698, 710 (2005).  Three years 
 
5 Government enforcement remains a vital part of the act and 
is now entrusted to the Attorney General under the first 
paragraph of G. L. c. 149, § 150.  Section 148 itself provides 
that violators "shall be punished or shall be subject to a civil 
citation or order as provided in [§] 27C."  Section 27C imposes 
various punishments, including fines and imprisonment, the 
degree of which depends on whether the violator acted willfully 
and whether the violator is a repeat offender.  As we have 
recognized, "[t]he Attorney General's right to enforce G. L. 
c. 149 and the right of private citizens to enforce provisions 
of that chapter represent parallel and distinct enforcement 
mechanisms."  DePianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 
Mass. 607, 612 (2013). 
 
 
 
9 
later, the Legislature further amended § 150 and other labor 
laws to expressly provide that the employee "shall be awarded 
treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and 
other benefits."  St. 2008, c. 80, § 5.  Like the equivalent 
provision of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the provision 
of liquidated damages recognized the reality underlying the Wage 
Act:  that a late-paid worker can face consequences "so 
detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of 
workers . . . that [treble] payment must be made in the event of 
delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that 
minimum standard of well-being."  George v. National Water Main 
Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 376 (2017), quoting Brooklyn Sav. 
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).  While these 
consequential damages can be severe to the worker, they are also 
generally "too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other 
than by liquidated damages."  George, supra, quoting Overnight 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-584 (1942).  Like 
the rest of the Wage Act, the liquidated damages provision 
applies without regard to the employer's intent.  George, supra 
at 379 (Legislature declined to qualify liquidated damages 
provision with "good faith exception" as Congress did for Fair 
Labor Standards Act). 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Whether the 
 
 
 
10 
plaintiff was entitled under G. L. c. 149, § 150, to treble the 
amount of late-paid wages or trebling of interest as the trial 
judge ordered is an issue of statutory interpretation, which we 
review de novo.  Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 487 Mass. 
403, 408 (2021).  "[A] statute must be interpreted according to 
the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Id. at 414, quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006).  We conclude that the statute calls for treble the 
amount of late-paid wages. 
b.  The private right of action and the remedy.  We begin 
with the express language of the Wage Act.  For discharged 
employees the statute is clear and emphatic:  "any employee 
discharged from such employment," such as the plaintiff, "shall 
be paid in full on the day of his discharge."  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148.  The statute leaves no wiggle room.  Payment, including 
vacation pay, is to be made in "full" on the "day" of the 
discharge.  Id.  As explained above, prompt payment of all wages 
owed is necessary for employees who often live paycheck to 
paycheck and who may not be able to pay rent or other 
 
 
 
11 
necessities.  See George, 477 Mass. at 376; New York Cent. & 
H.R.R.R., 206 Mass. at 424.  The consequences of late payments 
may therefore be severe for such employees.  For all of these 
reasons, late payments constitute clear violations of the 
statute. 
Employees not paid in full on time may bring a private 
action "for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for 
any lost wages and other benefits."  G. L. c. 149, § 150.  Here, 
we recognize that the word "lost" creates some ambiguity.  A 
late payment is not the same as a lost payment.  This language, 
however, must be read with the over-all context and purpose of 
the act in mind.  The act is directed at prompt payment of 
wages.  As explained above, any delay may have severe 
consequences for employees, and therefore the statute does not 
tolerate or in any way condone delay.  Thus, we conclude that 
"lost wages" encompass all late payments under the Wage Act. 
The remedy is also explicit.  The employee "shall be 
awarded treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost 
wages and other benefits."  G. L. c. 149, § 150.  The remedy is 
thus expressly focused on trebling the lost wages and other 
benefits.  The remedy is also specifically described as a 
liquidated damages remedy.  As we explained in George:  "The 
retention of a workman's pay may well result in damages too 
obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by 
 
 
 
12 
liquidated damages."  George, 477 Mass. at 376, quoting 
Overnight Motor Transp. Co., 316 U.S. at 583-584. 
One amicus claims that imposing treble damages for late-
paid wages would create perverse incentives for employers 
because the recovery would be the same whether they quickly 
corrected the mistake or let the matter proceed to a lawsuit 
without paying at all.  By imposing strict liability, however, 
the Legislature has decided that employers rather than employees 
should bear the cost of such delay and mistakes, honest or not.  
See George, 477 Mass. at 379; Dixon, 464 Mass. at 452.  The 
Legislature has chosen the stick rather than the carrot to 
encourage compliance with the act and to address a history of 
nonpayment and wage theft. 
We recognize that this rule puts employers in a difficult 
position when immediately terminating employees for misconduct 
as in the instant case.  Because wages and other benefits are 
due to employees on the day they are discharged, and it may be 
unclear how much an employee must be paid on short notice, 
employers would be liable for treble damages if they 
miscalculated the amount owed. 
However, the Legislature appears to have considered the 
differences between involuntary discharges and other separations 
from employment, and apparently the consequences of differential 
treatment.  Section 148 expressly distinguishes between an 
 
 
 
13 
"employee leaving his employment," who must "be paid in full on 
the following regular pay day or, in the absence of a regular 
pay day, on the following Saturday," and an "employee discharged 
from such employment," who must "be paid in full on the day of 
his discharge."  In the former case, the employer does not 
control when an employee quits and may not have advance notice.  
The employee also controls when he or she leaves and likely has 
secured replacement employment or otherwise considered the 
consequences of a short delay in receiving his or her pay.  
Therefore, the act provides a reasonable grace period for 
employers to provide the employees' pay, including vacation pay.  
In the latter case, the employer decides if and when to 
terminate an employee, while the employee has no control over 
when it will happen and may not know ahead of time.  The 
Legislature's command is clear:  if you choose to terminate an 
employee you must be prepared to pay him or her in full when you 
do so.  Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 454 Mass. at 71.  This may 
mean that employees who, like the plaintiff, have engaged in 
illegal or otherwise harmful conduct may have to be suspended 
rather than terminated for a short period of time until the 
employer can comply with § 148.  See Dixon, 464 Mass. at 451 n.6 
(invalidating ordinance that withheld vacation payments to 
employees terminated for "fault" as inconsistent with § 148); 
Knous v. Broadridge Fin. Solutions, Inc., 991 F.3d 344, 345-346 
 
 
 
14 
(1st Cir. 2021) (employee was not discharged for purposes of 
Wage Act when he was told to leave office and to stop all work, 
but rather on day that his pay and benefits ended). 
c.  Interest.  Finally, we address the trial judge's 
conclusion that interest is the proper measure of damages for 
late payment of wages.  The problem with this interpretation is 
that it is unsupported by the language of the statute and 
inconsistent with its purpose. 
There is no language in § 150 in any way suggesting that 
the payment of interest is the proper remedy for violation of 
the act.  While we have considered whether twelve percent 
prejudgment statutory interest is appropriate under G. L. c. 231 
§ 6B, 6C, or 6H, when back pay is awarded under the Wage Act, 
see George, 477 Mass. 371, an award of interest under all these 
statutes is in addition to an award to the claimant, and does 
not provide the primary source of recovery. 
Awarding only interest for late payment is also 
inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the act.  As 
explained above, the statute expects and demands the prompt 
payment of wages to employees who rely on such payments "to pay 
for the family's housing, transportation, food and clothing, 
tuition, and medical expenses."  George, 477 Mass. at 380.  Much 
more is therefore at stake than the loss of the time value and 
depreciation of sums owed.  These damages are likely to be 
 
 
 
15 
concentrated in the immediate aftermath of their nonpayment, 
when the employee has not had a chance to secure replacement 
income and expenses incurred in reliance on the payments come 
due.6 
The idea that interest is an appropriate remedy for late 
payments derives from an influential trial court decision:  
Dobin vs. CIOview Corp., Mass. Sup. Ct., No. 2001-00108 
(Middlesex County Oct. 29, 2003).  In that case, the trial court 
drew a negative inference from a single sentence in § 150:  "The 
defendant shall not set up as a defen[s]e a payment of wages 
after the bringing of the complaint."  Id.  The trial court 
concluded that this sentence created a partial defense by 
negative implication for precomplaint payments of late wages.  
Id.  See Clermont v. Monster Worldwide, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 
353, 357-359 (D. Mass. 2015); Littlefield vs. Adcole Corp., 
Mass. Sup. Ct., No. ESCV201500017 (Essex County June 18, 2015). 
We conclude that this interpretation is incorrect.  We 
interpret this particular provision simply to mean what it 
expressly states:  the defendant shall not set up as a defense 
the payment of wages after the filing of a complaint.  The 
sentence at issue is also preceded by a sentence that directly 
 
6 This is especially true of discharged employees, who have 
not planned or otherwise agreed to the termination of their 
employment. 
 
 
 
16 
addresses defenses generally, stating that "no defen[s]e for 
failure to pay as required . . .  shall be valid" except "the 
attachment of such wages by trustee process or a valid 
assignment thereof or a valid set–off against the same, or the 
absence of the employee from his regular place of labor at the 
time of payment, or an actual tender to such employee at the 
time of payment of the wages so earned by him" (emphases added).  
G. L. c. 149, § 150. 
We decline to adopt the negative implication drawn by the 
Dobin court for a number of reasons.  As a preliminary matter, 
"the maxim of negative implication -- that the express inclusion 
of one thing implies the exclusion of another -- 'requires great 
caution in its application.'"  Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 
628 (2010), quoting 2A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.25, at 429 (7th ed. 
2007).  "[T]he maxim will be disregarded where its application 
would thwart the legislative intent made apparent by the entire 
act."  Halebian, supra, quoting 2A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra at § 47.25, at 
433–435.  See Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 65 (2017). 
Also, the negative implication that was drawn in the trial 
court decisions and that the defendant seeks to draw here does 
not in any way support the payment of interest.  As explained 
above, interest is not in any way mentioned in the statute.  
 
 
 
17 
Additionally, if the sentence were to provide a defense to 
payment by negative implication, it should logically provide a 
total defense, not a partial defense that allows for the 
recovery of interest.7 
More importantly, a reading of § 150 allowing a defense for 
late payments made before litigation is commenced would 
essentially authorize, and even encourage, late payments right 
up to the filing of a complaint.  As many, if not most, 
terminated employees lack the financial and other wherewithal to 
hire lawyers, it would appear to encourage nonpayment as well as 
late payment.  Thus, the entire purpose and thrust of § 148 and 
§ 150 cut against this interpretation. 
For all these reasons, we choose not to read more into the 
sentence at issue than what it expressly states. 
d.  Response to concurrence.  Although the issue was not 
raised, briefed, or argued by any party or amicus in this case, 
 
7 This is borne out by the history of the provision.  The 
Legislature added the language establishing the alleged defense 
in 1891.  St. 1891, c. 239, § 2.  At the time, there was no 
private right of action, and the act was enforced by the "chief 
of the district police, or any state inspector of factories and 
public buildings."  St. 1887, c. 399, § 2.  Whatever the 
Legislature intended in 1891 by providing that postcomplaint 
payment was not a defense to prosecution by government 
officials, it could not, as the trial court in the Dobin 
decision stated, have created a partial defense to the treble 
damages provision or intended to address the amount of damages 
recoverable under the private right of action, none of which 
existed until over a century later.  St. 1993, c. 110, § 182. 
 
 
 
18 
or raised as a possibility in any of the cases of which we are 
aware, Justice Georges suggests in his concurrence that other 
plaintiffs may be entitled to recover not only treble lost wages 
as liquidated damages but also other damages incurred.  Indeed, 
from the time the plaintiff sent her pre-action demand letter to 
the city, she has consistently claimed that the proper remedy is 
simply treble the amount of late-paid wages, and the action 
proceeded for seven years through trial on that understanding. 
The concurrence thus seeks essentially to opine on an issue that 
has not been raised or in any way decided here without the 
benefit of any briefing.  This we decline to do. 
e.  Attorney's fees.  Our disposition of the plaintiff's 
cross appeal makes our consideration of the defendant's appeal 
significantly simpler; the plaintiff has established that 
prevailing employees are entitled to treble the amount of late 
wages, not just treble interest as found by the trial judge.  
This is a significant victory and an important clarification of 
existing law.  The plaintiff is now clearly the "prevailing" 
party for the purposes of recovering attorney's fees and costs 
under § 150. 
The one remaining issue is whether the plaintiff should 
receive all her fees and costs stemming from the unsuccessful 
efforts to certify a class, considering that the motion for 
class certification was denied and the plaintiff did not appeal.  
 
 
 
19 
See Barfield v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 
132, 151-153 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming reduction of attorney's 
fees and costs to plaintiff who succeeded on individual Fair 
Labor Standards Act claim but failed to certify collective 
action); Cullens v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 
1494-1495 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding successful plaintiffs were 
not "catalyst" for benefits to class where class certification 
had been denied).  But see Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of 
Mobile County, 600 F.2d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 1979), modified, 616 
F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1980) (instructing lower court to consider 
fact that "the plaintiffs have performed a valuable service for 
the class . . .  which they sought to represent" in determining 
fees and costs); Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 
1161, 1197-1198 (N.D. Iowa 2003), aff'd, 382 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 
2004) (holding fees incurred on unsuccessful class certification 
effort were recoverable because, at time complaint was filed, 
"plaintiff's counsel reasonably believed that a class action was 
a viable and efficient means of addressing" violations).  The 
trial judge did not address this issue in his order granting all 
of the plaintiff's fees and costs, and we have neither the 
record nor the briefing necessary to decide this question.  We 
therefore remand to the trial court the question whether the 
plaintiff is to be compensated for some or all of her attorney's 
fees for the unsuccessful legal work performed regarding class 
 
 
 
20 
certification, and for an explanation by the trial judge of his 
exercise of discretion in deciding this question. 
3.  Conclusion.  The statutory language and purpose of the 
Wage Act require prompt payment of wages and the trebling of 
those wages as liquidated damages when they are paid late.  The 
remedy for late payment is therefore not the trebling of 
interest payments on those wages as found by the trial judge, 
but the trebling of the late wages.  As the plaintiff is the 
prevailing party, she is also entitled to attorney's fees, 
subject to reconsideration of the fees related to class 
certification as provided in this decision.  The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
 
8 The plaintiff has requested appellate attorney's fees in 
her brief.  See Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10 (2004).  As the 
prevailing party in this appeal, the plaintiff is "statutorily 
entitled to recover reasonable appellate attorney's fees and 
costs" under the Wage Act.  Ferman, 481 Mass. at 496-497, 
quoting Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 132 
(2014).  Therefore, the plaintiff "may file a request for 
appellate attorney's fees and costs with this court."  Ferman, 
supra at 497. 
 
GEORGES, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court's 
conclusion that late-paid wages are "lost wages" for purposes of 
the Wage Act.  I write separately, however, to express my 
concern that the court's opinion mistakenly may imply that 
employees suing for "lost wages and other benefits" may not also 
sue for "any damages incurred."  G. L. c. 149, § 150.  While the 
employee's complaint in this case did not implicate the 
relationship between the Wage Act's liquidated damages clause 
and its authorization of suit for "any damages incurred," parts 
of the court's opinion nonetheless could be understood as 
addressing, and settling, that issue in a manner that subsumes 
the latter provision into the former. 
 
In explaining why the employee, Beth Reuter, is entitled to 
treble her entire late-paid wages, and not merely treble the 
forgone interest on those wages, the court asserts that 
"consequential damages" are "generally 'too obscure and 
difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated 
damages.'"  Ante at    .  Shortly thereafter, it uses the same 
quotation in a slightly different context.  The quotation the 
court relies upon is from George v. National Water Main Cleaning 
Co., 477 Mass. 371, 376 (2017).  In that case, we answered a 
certified question from the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts as to whether statutory prejudgment 
interest (under G. L. c. 231, § 6B or 6C) could be added to an 
2 
 
 
 
award of "liquidated (treble) damages" under G. L. c. 149, 
§ 150.  See George, supra at 372.  In holding in George that 
prevailing plaintiffs could be awarded both liquidated damages 
and statutory prejudgment interest, however, we did not address 
the relationship between the Wage Act's provision on liquidated 
damages and its authorization of suit for "any damages 
incurred."  Nonetheless, I believe that many workers reasonably 
could understand the court's opinion as now implying that, in 
vindicating Wage Act rights, workers may be awarded only one 
type of monetary relief, or, put another way, that the act's 
liquidated damages clause effectively swallows its authorization 
of suit for "any damages incurred." 
General Laws c. 149, § 150, provides that a worker who 
suffers a violation of the Wage Act may commence "a civil action 
for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for any 
lost wages and other benefits."  An employee who prevails on 
such a claim "shall be awarded treble damages, as liquidated 
damages, for any lost wages and other benefits and shall also be 
awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys' 
fees."  Id.  The Legislature therefore seemingly has made two 
distinct choices in its formulation of G. L. c. 149, § 150, 
authorizing complaints "for any damages incurred, and for any 
lost wages and other benefits" (emphasis added), meaning that an 
aggrieved worker apparently may choose to sue for both.  The 
3 
 
 
 
Legislature also did not include the words "any damages 
incurred" in the liquidated damages clause, which provides only 
that successful plaintiffs "shall be awarded treble damages, as 
liquidated damages, for any lost wages and other benefits and 
shall also be awarded [attorney's fees]" (emphasis added).  Id. 
 
Had the Legislature intended that the liquidated damages 
clause cover all possible damages, including "any damages 
incurred," it could have signaled that in several ways.  
Instead, the Legislature placed the phrase "any damages 
incurred" in a separate provision, apart from the provision on 
liquidated damages, and we cannot regard that choice as 
meaningless.  See Rowley v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 438 Mass. 
798, 802 (2003) ("If that was the legislative intent, the 
wording of the statute could have easily reflected it.  It does 
not" [footnote omitted]). 
 
General Laws c. 149, § 150, moreover, applies to far more 
than just G. L. c. 149, § 148, the substantive section of the 
Wage Act; it facilitates the vindication of rights created by a 
host of other statutes, many of which do not directly concern 
wages.1  See, e.g., G. L. c. 149, § 150 (authorizing suit for, 
 
1 General Laws c. 149, § 150, provides that an "employee 
claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of [G. L. c. 149, 
§§ 33E, 52E, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 150C, 152, 152A, 159C, or 
190,] or [G. L. c. 151, § 19,] may . . . institute and prosecute 
in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for 
 
4 
 
 
 
inter alia, violations of Domestic Violence and Abuse Leave Act, 
G. L. c. 149, § 52E; section regulating behavior of staffing 
agencies, G. L. c. 149, § 159C; and provision entitling public 
employees to serve as organ donors without penalty from their 
employers, G. L. c. 149, § 33E).  For example, an employee suing 
a staffing agency for "knowingly issu[ing] . . . false, 
fraudulent or misleading information," see G. L. c. 149, 
§ 159C (e) (1), might have suffered lost wages as the result of 
the employer's actions.  But such a plaintiff well might have 
suffered other harm as a result of that fraud.  Nowhere does 
G. L. c. 149, § 150, state or suggest that such an employee 
could not also then sue for "any damages incurred"; the 
provision simply says that employees may commence "a civil 
action for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for 
any lost wages and other benefits." 
 
Reading the consequential damages provision out of G. L. 
c. 149, § 150, would harm vulnerable workers in two primary 
ways:  by making the likelihood of being made whole by a Wage 
Act suit dependent on the amount of one's lost wages, and by 
creating incentives for employers to be less attentive to the 
prompt payment of lower-income workers. 
 
others similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive relief, 
for any damages incurred, and for any lost wages and other 
benefits" (emphasis added). 
5 
 
 
 
 
If workers who seek recompense for "lost wages and other 
benefits" may not also do so for "any damages incurred," their 
damages will be capped at treble their late-paid wages.  This 
would mean that many workers who face catastrophe due to an 
employer's withholding of wages would have virtually no chance 
of being made whole by a Wage Act complaint.  For example, a 
late paycheck could lead to missed mortgage payments and 
foreclosure on one's home, missed tuition payments and 
subsequent disenrollment, or significant health issues stemming 
from an inability to pay for crucial medication.  Without the 
ability to sue for consequential damages, compensation for Wage 
Act plaintiffs would correspond not to the harm they had 
suffered, but simply -- and solely -- to the size of their 
paychecks.  That cannot be what the Legislature intended; as the 
court notes, we have "always recognized" that the Wage Act "was 
intended 'for the protection of employees, who are often 
dependent for their daily support upon the prompt payment of 
their wages'" (citation omitted).  Ante at    . 
 
Moreover, if workers who suffer lost wages could not also 
sue for "any damages incurred," G. L. c. 149, § 150, would 
create perverse incentives for employers to be far more 
attentive to the prompt payment of higher-earning employees.  
Take, for example, a situation in which an unscrupulous employer 
realizes that a terminated employee has not been paid on time, 
6 
 
 
 
but also is aware that this employee might file a complaint only 
for "lost wages and other benefits," and not for consequential 
damages.  The employer could well decide to withhold payment in 
the hope that the employee lacked the wherewithal or resources 
to file a complaint; after all, aside from possible attorney's 
fees, the employer's liability would be roughly the same (i.e., 
treble the late paycheck), regardless of whether the employee 
was paid immediately or only after months or years of 
litigation.  In purely economic terms, the less that employee 
earned, the more rational taking such a risk would be. 
 
Here, Reuter did not seek damages for "any damages 
incurred"; her complaint asserted only the violation of the 
requirement in G. L. c. 149, § 150, of timely payment of wages 
due to terminated employees.  The question before the court thus 
was the proper measure of damages for wages paid late, but 
before an employee files a complaint seeking damages for "lost 
wages and other benefits," and I wholeheartedly join the court's 
resolution of that issue.  I write separately to point out that, 
despite language in the court's opinion that may suggest that 
the court, sub silentio, has decided whether employees suing 
for, and receiving, damages for "lost wages and other benefits" 
may not also sue for "any damages incurred," the court has not 
done so in this case.  For reasons I have touched upon in this 
concurrence, I read G. L. c. 149, § 150, to permit employees to 
7 
 
 
 
seek two separate forms of relief, based both on the language 
used in the statute and on the clear legislative purpose of the 
Wage Act, which fully supports this reading.  But at a minimum, 
this remains an unresolved issue for the court to address in a 
different case, where that issue is raised directly.