Title: State v. Ohta
Citation: 114 Ariz. 489, 562 P.2d 369
Docket Number: 3631
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 1977

114 Ariz. 489 (1977) 562 P.2d 369 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Brenda (Lee) OHTA, Appellant. No. 3631. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. March 16, 1977. Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, Chief Counsel, Georgia Butcher Ellexson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Terry J. Adams, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. In conformance with a plea agreement, Brenda Lee Ohta pled guilty to a charge of second degree burglary and was sentenced *490 to not less than four and one-half years to not more than five years in the Arizona State Prison. She appeals. Affirmed. On October 5, 1975, appellant and another person entered a store known as Rings &amp; Things in Phoenix, Arizona, with the intention of taking the salesclerk's purse. Appellant's role was to keep the clerk busy while her companion took the purse. Appellant was arrested in an automobile in which several purses, including the one belonging to the salesclerk of Rings &amp; Things, were found. Appellant's first claim is that the trial court did not adequately determine that a factual basis existed for her guilty plea and did not properly inform her of the nature of the charge against her. After the trial judge was informed that Ohta intended to plead guilty to second degree burglary, he developed these facts concerning the commission of the offense: We hold that the transcript as a whole shows that the appellant acknowledged her participation in the crime of burglary. A court is not required to advise a defendant of each specific element of the offense to which he is pleading guilty, absent the special circumstances as found in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976). State v. Howell, 109 Ariz. 165, 506 P.2d 1059 (1973); State v. Anderson, 109 Ariz. 158, 506 P.2d 1052 (1973); State v. Reynolds, 25 Ariz. App. 409, 544 P.2d 233 (1976). Since appellant admitted complicity in the physical acts constituting the elements of the offense charged when she was questioned by the court, and it clearly appears that she entered the store intending *491 to engage in a theft, a factual basis existed for the guilty plea. The plea was intelligently made as required by Rule 17.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). State v. Ferrell, 108 Ariz. 394, 499 P.2d 109 (1972). Appellant urges that the trial judge abused his discretion when he refused upon the request of appellant's counsel to grant a motion to continue sentencing in order to file a Rule 11 motion. Rule 11.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Appellant's counsel at one time requested a pre-sentence hearing but thereafter withdrew his request. At the time of sentencing when appellant requested imprisonment rather than probation, her counsel made a motion for continuance of the sentencing. Counsel did not suggest that there was any evidence of appellant's incompetency other than that stemming from her request for imprisonment. He said that he did not think her request was "the product of a rational mind." In this Court he points to Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975), as authority that it is the best practice for the trial court to grant a defense motion for a continuance to determine the defendant's competence. Drope is not authority here for two reasons. First, Drope does not hold that a court must accept an attorney's personal convictions concerning his client's mental capacity. Id. at 177 n. 13, 95 S. Ct. at 906, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 116. The trial court here knew of the facts which caused defense counsel to feel appellant was not rational. Second, in Drope there was a request for a continuance prior to trial. The Court approved of the motion to continue because the resolution of the defendant's competence could be made at an early date. Id. Here, the request by defense counsel did not come until the court had commenced the sentencing procedures. dures. Basically, the real issue is whether a Rule 11 hearing should have been granted to determine if the appellant was competent. As to this, we have held that a court must order a mental examination pursuant to Rules 11.1 and 11.3 to determine if a defendant understands the proceedings or can assist in his defense "if reasonable grounds for the need of such an examination exist." State v. Verdugo, 112 Ariz. 288, 541 P.2d 388 (1975). It is the established rule that the trial court has broad discretion in determining if reasonable grounds exist, and unless there has been manifest abuse in this discretion, the trial court will be upheld. State v. Verdugo, supra; see State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1967). A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 308, 376 P.2d 773 (1962). We cannot say that the sentencing judge abused his discretion when he determined there were no reasonable grounds for a competency hearing and, therefore, no grounds for a continuance. At the time when appellant informed the court that she preferred to go to the Arizona State Prison instead of being on probation, the judge questioned her: After further questions from the judge as to her reasons, she stated that her number one thought was: "Getting my time; all that I deserve and having it over with." Later the judge again queried the appellant: The probation report and the appellant's own comments in court reveal a history of repeated criminal activity. For much of her criminal conduct she had neither been apprehended nor charged. Although the appellant's desire was unusual, we do not find it wholly irrational or unreasonable under the circumstances. Appellant argues that Rule 26.7 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure required the postponement of the sentencing. Rule 26.7(a) provides: It is asserted that counsel requested a pre-sentence hearing pursuant to Rule 26.7 by the following dialogue on the date of sentencing: We agree that the record as a whole reflects that the motion was in effect a request to grant a continuance in order to hold a pre-sentence hearing pursuant to Rule 26.7(a). However, counsel's motion was predicated on the assertion that appellant's request for imprisonment was irrational. Since the purpose of a pre-sentence hearing is to insure that the sentencing judge is fully informed as to the character of the individual to be sentenced and the circumstances of the crime, State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 208, 540 P.2d 680 (1975), it was not error to deny a continuance when it became apparent that appellant did not contemplate bringing to the court's attention evidence which was not already being considered. See State v. Ferguson, 19 Ariz. App. 264, 506 P.2d 655 (1973). The allegedly irrational remarks were exhaustively investigated by the judge at the time he questioned appellant. Hence, there was no purpose in granting a continuance for a pre-sentence hearing because no additional light would have been shed on appellant's reasons and there was no prejudicial error in denying counsel's request. Judgment affirmed. CAMERON, C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur.