Title: Kenneth J. Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Insurance Co.
Citation: 2009 WI 71
Docket Number: 2006AP002910
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2009

2009 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2910 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kenneth J. Behrendt, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Gulf Underwriters Insurance Co. and Silvan 
Industries, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Auto Owners Insurance Co., Peter Harding, 
Cincinnati Insurance Co., W.D.M. Enterprises of 
Marinette, WI and James E. Fisher, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette   
 
JUDGE: 
David G. Miron   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the concurrence.  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Mark S. Young, Rhonda L. Lanford, and Habush Habush & Rottier 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mark S. Young. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by John J. 
Laffey, Michael D. Rosenberg, Sarah Thomas Pagels, and Whyte 
Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by John J. 
Laffey. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2910  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV61) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kenneth J. Behrendt, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Gulf Underwriters Insurance Co. and Silvan 
Industries, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Auto Owners Insurance Co., Peter Harding, 
Cincinnati Insurance Co., W.D.M. Enterprises  
of Marinette, WI, and James E. Fisher, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals decision1 affirming an order 
granting summary judgment to Silvan Industries, Inc. (Silvan) 
and its insurer, Gulf Underwriters Insurance Co. (Gulf).  Silvan 
and Gulf were among those sued by Kenneth Behrendt (Behrendt) 
                                                 
1 Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 2006AP2910, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008). 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
2 
 
after he was injured when a tank exploded while he was using it 
at his job in an oil change business.  The tank had been 
fabricated as a favor to Behrendt's employer; it was made as a 
side job by someone who worked at Silvan at the time, and it was 
subsequently customized for use in the oil change business.  
Behrendt claimed that Silvan was negligent in permitting the 
tank to be made as a side job and vicariously liable for its 
employee's conduct in making the tank, but Silvan won dismissal 
of the claims, and the court of appeals affirmed.  Behrendt 
sought review here of the court of appeals' decision. 
¶2 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the grant 
of summary judgment on both the vicarious liability claim and 
the negligence claim.  In order for an employer to be 
vicariously liable for an employee's act, the act must have been 
within the scope of employment.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that summary judgment is appropriate on the claim of 
vicarious liability because the only evidence presented was that 
the tank was a side project that was completed for the 
employee's own purpose and thus was outside the scope of 
employment.  
¶3 
As to the negligence claim, we reach the same result 
as the court of appeals though we arrive at that result via a 
somewhat different analysis.  We agree with both the circuit 
court and the court of appeals that the focus here is properly 
on whether Silvan could have foreseen the effects of its policy.  
We also agree that, as a matter of law, it was not foreseeable 
that under Silvan's policy of allowing employees to do side 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
3 
 
projects, a non-pressurized tank built as a side job would later 
be modified and pressurized and, years later, explode and cause 
injury.  However, while the court of appeals affirmed the grant 
of 
summary 
judgment 
on 
the 
grounds 
that 
the 
lack 
of 
foreseeability meant that Silvan had no duty to Behrendt, we 
reiterate our prior holdings in the vast majority of cases that 
every person is subject to a duty to exercise ordinary care in 
all of his or her activities.  Silvan was subject to such a duty 
with regard to its policies on side jobs, and under these 
circumstances that duty required Silvan to exercise care that 
its policy on side jobs did not create an unreasonable risk of 
injury to Behrendt.   
¶4 
However, we then look at whether Silvan breached that 
duty by failing to exercise the care a reasonable person would 
use in similar circumstances.  In most cases, whether a 
defendant breached a duty is a question of fact that is 
submitted to the jury and thus is not appropriate for summary 
judgment.  In this case, however, it is the lack of foreseeable 
risk that convinces us, as a matter of law, that Silvan cannot 
be said to have failed to exercise ordinary care with regard to 
its policy on side jobs.  Further, there is no material fact in 
dispute as to Silvan's policies about side jobs and its 
prohibition on employees making pressurized vessels as side jobs 
for personal use.  There is in addition uncontroverted evidence 
in the record that Silvan took steps such as having holes cut 
into any tanks that were considered as scrap——as well as 
testimony of the tank's owner that this tank itself originally 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
4 
 
had holes in it——and that the point of cutting holes into the 
tanks was to keep them from being used with air pressure.  
Summary judgment is appropriate on the negligence claim because 
under these circumstances Silvan did not breach its duty to act 
with ordinary care. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Behrendt's claims arise from the explosion of a tank, 
and the tank, to which fixtures were later added, was originally 
built as a side job by a Silvan employee.  The questions raised 
in this appeal thus concern Silvan's policy of permitting 
employees to use company equipment and scrap materials to make 
items for personal use.  Silvan manufactures tanks to be used 
under 
pressure, 
such 
as 
air 
receivers 
and 
water 
tanks.  
Pressurized vessels are subject to strict manufacturing codes 
and third-party inspection; after each tank is tested, inspected 
and certified, it is labeled and registered with the National 
Board of Boilers and Pressure Vessel Inspectors.2  Silvan's 
policy permitting side jobs prohibited employees from making 
pressurized tanks, and a system was in place to prevent 
employees' personal use of any tanks that were scrapped by the 
company: holes were cut in any scrapped tanks to make them 
worthless as pressurized vessels. 
¶6 
As noted above, one of the side jobs made by a Silvan 
employee is at the center of this case.  When Daniel Linczeski 
                                                 
2 Deposition testimony in the record described this process.  
It is also detailed at the web site of the National Board of 
Boilers and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, www.nationalboard.org. 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
5 
 
(Linczeski) decided to open an oil change business, he needed a 
piece of equipment to collect oil drained from vehicles, and he 
went to his father-in-law, James Fisher (Fisher), who worked at 
Silvan.  Fisher and a co-worker at Silvan, Rex Sommers 
(Sommers), welded pieces of scrap metal to create a large flat-
bottomed cylinder with a domed top.  The tank, which was several 
feet high and held about 55 gallons of oil, was delivered to 
Linczeski.  Testimony in the record indicates that after the 
tank was fabricated, the system for collecting and disposing of 
oil was modified over a period of weeks.  Linczeski got Peter 
Harding (Harding), a plumber, to plug several holes in the side 
of the tank.  The plumber also fitted the tank with valves——one 
for the top that allowed oil to be drained into the tank but 
could be closed to keep oil from splashing out when the tank was 
moved, and one at the bottom of the tank to allow oil to be 
drained out of the tank.  Other changes were made to make the 
tank more convenient to use; for example, wheels were added to 
the bottom to make it easy to move around, and studs were added 
to the side so that wrenches could be hung on the tank.  
Linczeski's modifications ultimately included having one of the 
plugs that had originally plugged a hole taken off the tank and 
substituting instead a fitting that could be hooked up to an air 
hose.  Air pressure could then be used to empty the tank.3 
                                                 
3 The record includes deposition testimony from Linczeski in 
which opposing counsel confirmed an answer apparently given in 
response to written interrogatories: 
 
Q: . . . This is the third to last entry.  "At 
some point in the 1990s, did you decide to utilize a 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
6 
 
¶7 
The tank was apparently used without incident until 
June 15, 2004, when Behrendt, an employee of Linczeski's, was 
using the tank with air pressure.  It exploded, and he was 
injured.  Behrendt sued Silvan, alleging negligence; he also 
sued Fisher for negligence and, in connection with Fisher's 
alleged negligence, alleged vicarious liability against Silvan 
for Fisher's acts as its employee.4  Behrendt alleged that the 
shape of the tank and the welds holding it together made it 
dangerous to be used with air pressure; therefore, he argued, 
Fisher was liable for fabricating it, and Silvan was both 
vicariously liable as his employer and liable in its own right 
for having a policy permitting side jobs.  Silvan argued it was 
only the subsequent pressurizing of the tank that was the reason 
for the explosion, and that in any event, the original 
                                                                                                                                                             
portable tank system that you would use to collect oil 
drained from customers' vehicles and use that type of 
portable tank to transfer oil from that tank to larger 
holding tanks using air pressure?"  And it says, 
"Answer: Yes."  Do you see that? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: Okay. Is that accurate? 
 
A: Yes. 
4 Behrendt also sued Silvan for strict liability, but he has 
not appealed that claim's dismissal.  Behrendt's other claims, 
against Fisher and Harding and their insurers, were allowed to 
proceed because there are disputed issues of fact.  Those claims 
are not at issue here.  Behrendt did not sue Sommers, the Silvan 
employee 
who 
assisted 
Fisher 
in 
constructing 
the 
tank; 
Behrendt's claim for vicarious liability against Silvan is in 
connection with his claim of negligence involving Fisher. 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
7 
 
construction was outside the scope of Fisher's employment.  
Therefore, Silvan argued, the company was not liable under any 
theory. 
¶8 
All the defendants moved for summary judgment.  The 
Marinette County Circuit Court, Judge David G. Miron presiding, 
denied Fisher's and Harding's motions for summary judgment.  The 
circuit court granted Silvan's summary judgment motion on 
Behrendt's strict liability claim because Silvan did not 
manufacture the tank.  The circuit court also granted Silvan's 
summary judgment motion on the negligence claim and on the 
vicarious liability claim, ruling that public policy factors 
barred a finding of negligence against Silvan because the 
negligence was too remote from the injury and because allowing 
recovery would open the door to fraudulent claims and would have 
no sensible or just stopping point.5  
¶9 
Behrendt appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court decision.  Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 
No. 2006AP2910, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 
2008).  The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the vicarious 
liability claim against Silvan because Fisher was not working 
within his scope of employment at Silvan when he built the tank.  
                                                 
5 The circuit court granted summary judgment "with respect 
to Silvan and Gulf Underwriters" while addressing the question 
of vicarious liability in passing: "It's not for the benefit of 
Silvan.  It's simply a fringe benefit that they're allowing 
their employees to have . . . ."  The circuit court noted, "I 
don't have any problem applying the public policy consideration 
at this point to cut off responsibility here." 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
8 
 
Id., ¶9.  The court stated that the side projects were "solely 
for the employees' personal benefit" and thus were so little 
actuated by the purpose of serving the employer that as a matter 
of law there was no vicarious liability.  Id., ¶¶8-9.  
¶10 The court of appeals also affirmed summary judgment as 
to the negligence claim on the grounds that Silvan had no duty 
to Behrendt because any harm caused by Fisher was unforeseeable:  
"[T]his lack of foreseeability and absurdly attenuated chain of 
events . . . supports the circuit court's ruling . . . ."  Id., 
¶13.  The court of appeals stated that "[t]he only facts 
relevant to Silvan's duty are the existence of its policies 
permitting side jobs but prohibiting manufacture of pressure 
vessels."  Id. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 Review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo.  
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-17, 401 
N.W.2d 816 (1987).  Summary judgment is appropriate if there are 
no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2007-08).  
This Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 
WI 97, ¶32, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443. 
¶12 Vicarious liability can be ruled out, as a matter of 
law, if the evidence presented supports only the conclusion that 
the conduct is outside the scope of employment.  Block v. Gomez, 
201 Wis. 2d 795, 805, 549 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
9 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Negligence claim 
¶13 We begin with the question of whether summary judgment 
was properly granted on the claim of negligence against Silvan. 
¶14 "The analysis of the four elements necessary to state 
a claim for actionable negligence is the first consideration for 
a court when deciding motions for summary judgment . . . ."  
Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶25, 291 Wis. 2d 
283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  The four elements are "(1) [a] duty of care 
on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a 
causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an 
actual loss or damage as a result of the injury."  Rockweit v. 
Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).  "However, 
in Wisconsin, the elements of duty and breach are usually 
presented to the trier of fact in a question asking whether the 
defendant was negligent, and then the elements of causation and 
damages are addressed."  Nichols v. Progressive Ins. Co., 2008 
WI 20, ¶12, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 746 N.W.2d 220 (citing Wis. JI——
Civil 1005 (2006)).  
¶15 The court of appeals, relying on language in A.E. 
Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 
N.W.2d 764 (1974), and Rolph v. EBI Companies, 159 Wis. 2d 518, 
464 N.W.2d 667 (1991), affirmed the grant of summary judgment on 
the grounds that the first element, a duty of care on the part 
of the defendant, was not present here.  Behrendt, unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶11. 
 
The 
court 
focused 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
10 
 
foreseeability, ruling that it was unforeseeable as a matter of 
law that a non-pressurized tank made as a side job by an 
employee would later be pressurized and, after years of use, 
explode and cause injury.  Id., ¶13  The court said "[d]uty is 
established 'when it can be said that [an act's potential to 
harm] was foreseeable . . . .'"  Id., ¶11 (quoting Rolph, 159 
Wis. 2d at 532).  The court of appeals held that in this case no 
duty was established as to Silvan because it cannot be said that 
it was foreseeable that Silvan's alleged act, permitting 
employees to do side jobs, would lead to injury.  Id., ¶13. 
¶16 We agree with the court of appeals that the question 
of foreseeability is the proper one on which to focus.  However, 
we disagree that the consideration of foreseeability necessarily 
leads to a finding of no duty in this case.  Our analysis is 
framed by recent case law in which this court addressed 
questions of duty and breach.  In Nichols v. Progressive 
Northern Insurance Co., 2008 WI 20, ¶¶45, 47, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 
746 N.W.2d 220, we reiterated that Gritzner6 and Rockweit were 
"still good law in Wisconsin."  Nichols, 308 Wis. 2d 17, ¶¶47.  
There we held that "in a negligence case, a defendant's conduct 
'is not examined in terms of whether or not there is a duty to 
do a specific act, but rather whether the conduct satisfied the 
duty placed upon individuals to exercise that degree of care as 
would 
be 
exercised 
by 
a 
reasonable 
person 
under 
the 
                                                 
6 Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 
N.W.2d 906. 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
11 
 
circumstances.'"  Id., ¶45 (quoting Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 
WI 68, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906). 
¶17 As has been often stated, "Wisconsin has long followed 
the minority view of duty set forth in the dissent of Palsgraf 
v. Long Island Railroad [162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)].  In that 
dissent, Judge Andrews explained that '[e]veryone owes to the 
world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may 
unreasonably threaten the safety of others.'"  Alvarado v. 
Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350 
(citations omitted). 
¶18 As we stated in Hoida, "[W]hat is within the duty of 
ordinary care depends on the circumstances under which the 
claimed duty arises.  For example, what is comprised within 
ordinary care may depend on the relationship between the parties 
or on whether the alleged tortfeasor assumed a special role in 
regard to the injured party."  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶32.  In 
Hoida, the plaintiff, a subcontractor who had been defrauded on 
a construction project, had argued that the duty of ordinary 
care encompassed requirements for the defendant bank to take 
steps to be sure that third parties were being paid for the work 
they did for the party which had taken the construction loan.  
The bank was, Hoida alleged, required by a duty of ordinary care 
"to identify the subcontractors and materialmen for the project; 
to verify that sufficient work on the project had been completed 
to 'justify disbursement'; and to collect lien waivers from [the 
plaintiff] before disbursing funds from [the tortfeasor's] 
loan."  Id., ¶20.  In holding that the duty of ordinary care did 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
12 
 
not extend to those affirmative acts, we said that the duty of 
ordinary care "is determined by what would be reasonable given 
the facts and circumstances of the particular claim at hand." 
Id., ¶32.  In that case, among the circumstances we considered 
was 
contractual 
language 
limiting 
the 
duties. 
 
("These 
contractually assumed obligations and agreed upon limitations 
for [the bank] shaped its duty of ordinary care in disbursing 
the proceeds of the construction loan because they set out what 
the parties agreed was reasonable under the circumstances."  
Id., ¶38.) 
¶19 Additionally, we find two comments to language in 
Section 7 of the Third Restatement of Torts7 helpful in 
clarifying the role foreseeability plays in the analysis.  The 
Restatement says, "An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of 
physical harm."  Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for 
                                                 
7 This court's long-standing practice has been to review and 
decide whether to adopt sections from the Restatements on a 
case-by-case basis as we deem it necessary.  See, e.g., Green v. 
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶29, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 
N.W.2d 727.  We have previously noted, without finding it 
necessary to adopt, helpful language from sections in the 
Restatements where it provides further support for the rationale 
for a holding.  See Pamperin v. Trinity Mem'l Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 
188, 205, 423 N.W.2d 848 (1988) (stating, "We further note that 
those 
courts 
imposing 
liability 
[on 
similar 
facts] 
have 
frequently 
looked 
to 
two 
sections 
of 
the 
Restatements——
Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 429 (1965), and Restatement 
(Second) of Agency sec. 267 (1958)."). 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
13 
 
Physical Harm § 7(a) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).8  The 
comments accompanying this stated principle are helpful because 
they make a clear distinction between the determinations 
required for duty and for breach. 
Sometimes reasonable minds cannot differ about whether 
an actor exercised reasonable care under § 8(b).  In 
such cases courts take the question of negligence away 
from the jury and determine that the party was or was 
not negligent as a matter of law.  Courts sometimes 
inaptly express this result in terms of duty.  Here, 
the rubric of duty inaccurately conveys the impression 
that the court's decision is separate from and 
antecedent to the issue of negligence.  In fact, these 
cases merely reflect the one-sidedness of the facts 
bearing 
on 
negligence, 
and 
they 
should 
not 
be 
misunderstood as cases involving exemption from or 
modification of the ordinary duty of reasonable care.  
Id., cmt. i (emphasis added). 
Courts do appropriately rule that the defendant has 
not breached a duty of reasonable care when reasonable 
minds 
cannot 
differ 
on 
that 
question. 
These 
determinations are based on the specific facts of the 
case, are applicable only to that case, and are 
appropriately cognizant of the role of the jury in 
factual determinations.  A lack of foreseeable risk in 
a specific case may be a basis for a no-breach 
determination, but such a ruling is not a no-duty 
determination. Rather it is a determination that no 
reasonable person could find that the defendant has 
breached the duty of reasonable care.  
                                                 
8 These sections are part of Proposed Final Draft No. 1 and 
are among the sections approved as of August 2008 by both the 
American Law Institute Council and its membership.  According to 
the introduction, "The draft has not yet been published in final 
form only because the project has been expanded . . . .  After 
that work is completed and approved, the Reporters will do their 
final editorial work and an update of the Reporters' Notes, and 
then the final text of this Restatement project will be 
published."  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical Harm Intro. (August 2008) (WESTLAW). 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
14 
 
Id., cmt. j (emphasis added). 
¶20 Though some language in prior Wisconsin cases invokes 
foreseeability inquiries in connection with duty——in fact, the 
court of appeals quoted that language in its analysis——the 
approach set forth in Section 7, Comments i and j, is most 
consistent with the approach we have taken on the issue of duty 
in the vast majority of our cases.  See Nichols, 308 Wis. 2d 17. 
¶21 Occasionally, there are cases where a negligence claim 
fails because the duty of care does not encompass the acts or 
omissions that caused the harm,9 but this is not one of them.  
The allegations are that the tank involved here was built at 
Silvan with its materials under a policy that permitted workers 
to fabricate personal projects at work.  Under Wisconsin law and 
our Palsgraf minority approach, Silvan had a duty to exercise 
ordinary care under the circumstances so that its policy 
permitting side jobs did not create "an unreasonable risk of 
injury" to Behrendt.  
¶22 We next turn to the question of whether that duty was 
breached.  We recognize that ordinarily, the issue of breach is 
                                                 
9 In a footnoted response to the dissent, the Hoida majority 
clarified the nature of its holding as to duty:  "[T]he majority 
opinion clearly concludes that [the defendants] have a duty to 
exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.  What the 
majority opinion turns on is whether the circumstances of this 
case require [the defendants] to undertake all the affirmative 
acts that Hoida requests."  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 
2006 WI 69, ¶30 n.15, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17 (citations 
omitted). 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
15 
 
one for the jury; however, there are exceptions in rare cases.10 
Admittedly, we have not always clearly drawn the distinction 
between duty and breach of duty.  "'Where the facts alleged to 
give rise to a duty are agreed upon, the question of the 
existence of a duty is one of law.  This question is closely 
related to the question of whether a defendant is not negligent 
as a matter of law, i.e., based on the facts presented, no 
properly instructed, reasonable jury could find the defendant 
failed to exercise ordinary care.  Generally, this question is 
for the jury and should be decided as a matter of law before 
trial only in rare cases.'"  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 419 
(emphasis added) (quoting Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227, 251-
52, 278 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1979)). 
¶23 In a case where there is no genuine issue of material 
fact as to the breach and where there is a lack of foreseeable 
risk, it can be said as a matter of law that, based on the facts 
presented, there is no breach because "no properly instructed, 
reasonable jury could find the defendant failed to exercise 
ordinary care."  Id.  This is such a case. 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals described this case as "one of the 
rare negligence cases where summary judgment is appropriate," 
though its analysis focused on duty rather than breach.  
Behrendt, unpublished slip op., ¶10. 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
16 
 
¶24 Behrendt 
argued 
that 
summary 
judgment 
is 
not 
appropriate here because there are disputed facts,11 but we are 
not persuaded that those facts are material to the question of 
breach.  Rather, we, like the court of appeals, are satisfied 
that the material fact here is "the existence of [Silvan's] 
policies permitting side jobs but prohibiting manufacture of 
pressure vessels."  Behrendt, unpublished slip op., ¶13. 
¶25 The circuit court and court of appeals both noted the 
lack of foreseeability.  The circuit court alluded to it when it 
discussed the "too remote" public policy consideration.  The 
court of appeals more pointedly discussed "precisely this lack 
of foreseeability and absurdly attenuated chain of events" and 
concluded that it was "simply unforeseeable, as a matter of 
law," that Silvan's policy of permitting certain types of side 
jobs would result in harm.  Id.  The court of appeals reasoned 
that there was too much distance in the chain——beginning with 
Silvan's policy, an employee's fabrication of a tank as a side 
job, and the decision by a third party to modify the tank, and 
                                                 
11 Behrendt argued that while Silvan says employees were not 
permitted 
to 
make 
pressurized tanks, deposition testimony 
indicates that it is possible that pressurized tanks were made 
as side jobs; however, there was no evidence put forward of the 
existence of any other pressurized tank that had been made as a 
side job.  Behrendt also said while there was testimony that a 
supervisor's permission for side jobs was required, there was 
also testimony that side jobs may have been done without 
permission.  However, the testimony as to this particular side 
job was that it was done by a supervisor, Fisher; further, it 
was the testimony of Fisher's supervisor that had he been asked 
about doing this particular side job, he would not "have a 
problem with that" so long as it was not done on the clock.  
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
17 
 
ending with the explosion of the tank some ten years later——for 
the risk of injury to be foreseeable.  Id.  We agree.  
¶26 As we noted earlier, there is helpful language in the 
Third Restatement of Torts that explains the relationship among 
duty, breach, and foreseeability:  
Courts do appropriately rule that the defendant has 
not breached a duty of reasonable care when reasonable 
minds 
cannot 
differ 
on 
that 
question. 
 
These 
determinations are based on the specific facts of the 
case, are applicable only to that case, and are 
appropriately cognizant of the role of the jury in 
factual determinations.  A lack of foreseeable risk in 
a specific case may be a basis for a no-breach 
determination, but such a ruling is not a no-duty 
determination.  Rather it is a determination that no 
reasonable person could find that the defendant has 
breached the duty of reasonable care.  
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft 
No. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
¶27 Here the lack of foreseeable risk is the basis for the 
determination that there was no breach, and, therefore, the 
granting of summary judgment as to the negligence claim was 
proper. 
¶28 We recognize that this court has taken other paths in 
analyzing cases depending on the facts of each case.  As noted 
above, under other circumstances, occasionally a claim may fail 
because a defendant's duty of care did not extend to the alleged 
acts or omissions.  And certainly this case, like others, might 
be reviewed and legitimately resolved on public policy grounds.  
In that regard, we recognize that both the circuit court and the 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
18 
 
court of appeals alluded to public policy concerns presented by 
this case. 
¶29 The application of public policy factors to preclude 
recovery for negligence has a long history in Wisconsin.  See 
Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).  In 
Colla, we articulated the six public policy factors that 
Wisconsin courts use today to limit liability in negligence 
claims: (1) "the injury is too remote from the negligence"; (2) 
the recovery is "'wholly out of proportion to the culpability of 
the negligent tort-feasor'"; (3) the harm caused is highly 
extraordinary given the negligent act; (4) recovery "would place 
too unreasonable a burden" on the negligent tort-feasor; (5) 
recovery would be "too likely to open the way to fraudulent 
claims"; and (6) recovery would enter into "'a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point.'" Id. at 599 (citations 
omitted); see also Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI 
62, ¶¶30-35, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345.  Any one of the six 
factors, if applicable, could preclude liability.  Hoida, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, ¶41. 
¶30 Here, the first factor would be relevant.  As 
recognized above, both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals noted the attenuated chain of events.  The circuit court 
referenced public policy factors in its decision:  "So I think 
the too remote analysis is appropriate here. . . .  I don't have 
any problem applying the public policy consideration at this 
point to cut off responsibility here." 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
19 
 
¶31 However, we are satisfied that an analysis which 
clarifies 
that 
foreseeability 
is 
properly 
taken 
into 
consideration as to breach is the better approach here because 
it makes clear that we are not deviating from the Palsgraf 
minority position that we have adhered to in the vast majority 
of our cases. 
B. 
Vicarious liability claim 
¶32 The second claim we consider is Behrendt's claim of 
vicarious liability against Silvan.  As we noted above, we 
review the grant of summary judgment de novo, and summary 
judgment can be appropriate for a claim of vicarious liability 
if the conduct is clearly outside the scope of employment.  
Vicarious liability can be ruled out as a matter of law if the 
evidence presented supports only the conclusion that the conduct 
is outside the scope of employment.  Block, 201 Wis. 2d  at 805.  
We hold that summary judgment was proper as to this claim.  We 
agree with the court of appeals' application of Block to the 
evidence presented here. 
¶33 Behrendt 
alleged 
in 
the 
complaint 
that 
Fisher 
performed negligent acts "while in the scope of his employment" 
and Silvan, as his employer is "therefore vicariously liable for 
any damages caused by his negligence."  In his brief to this 
court, Behrendt argued that issues of fact exist as to whether 
Silvan is vicariously liable for the acts of Fisher or Sommers. 
Behrendt's arguments on vicarious liability that depend on the 
acts of the co-worker, Sommers, are unavailing because they are 
irrelevant.  The court of appeals correctly noted in a footnote 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
20 
 
that arguments about vicarious liability are only relevant as to 
Fisher's conduct because allegations of vicarious liability are 
related to Behrendt's claim against Fisher.  No claim was 
brought by Behrendt against Sommers.  We thus turn to the basis 
for the vicarious liability claim: whether the acts by Fischer 
that are allegedly negligent were within the scope of his 
employment at Silvan.  
¶34 We have explained that a vicarious liability claim 
arises where "an employer is alleged to be vicariously liable 
for a negligent act or omission committed by its employee in the 
scope of employment.  Thus, vicarious liability is based solely 
on the agency relationship of a master and servant."  L.L.N. v. 
Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 698 n. 21, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997) 
(citing Shannon v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 364, 370, 289 
N.W.2d 564 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) 
(1957)) 
(distinguishing 
between 
vicarious 
liability 
and 
negligent supervision).  In other words, vicarious liability, 
premised on the negligent act committed by an employee, does not 
exist absent a finding that an employee was negligent.   
¶35 The question as to vicarious liability is whether at 
the time of the act alleged, the employee's conduct was within 
the scope of his employment, which we have defined as conduct 
that is "actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
employer."  Olson v. Connerly, 156 Wis. 2d 488, 500, 457 N.W.2d 
479 (1990).  The question on summary judgment is whether there 
is any genuine issue of material fact about that. 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
21 
 
¶36 Behrendt argued that the act of building the tank was  
"actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer" 
because it was done under the umbrella of Silvan's policy of 
letting employees do these side jobs, and that policy had the 
purpose of serving Silvan because it increased employee morale. 
¶37 Silvan argued that the party whose acts are in 
question is Fisher and that there is no evidence put forward 
that Fisher thought his acts were serving Silvan.  Silvan 
additionally argued that the question is not whether the policy 
permitting side jobs benefitted Silvan, but rather whether the 
employee himself or herself was at least partly actuated by the 
purpose of serving the employer. 
¶38 Behrendt's assertion that the policy of allowing the 
side jobs provided the benefit to Silvan of improved employee 
morale, even if it is true, does not mean that the worker who 
fabricated the tank was actuated by a purpose to serve the 
employer.  The question is whether in making the tank Fisher 
(against whom negligence is alleged) was actuated by a purpose 
to serve the employer.  
¶39 Block focuses on the employee's intended purpose.  
Block, 201 Wis. 2d at 806.  The evidence in the record indicates 
that the tank, like the other side jobs, was built as a personal 
benefit to the employee.  Fisher enlisted a co-worker to help 
fabricate the tank.  Silvan was never paid for the tank or the 
materials or the labor.  There is nothing in the record that 
shows any purpose to benefit the employer or any resulting 
benefit to the employer, either.  
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
22 
 
¶40 The court of appeals observed that "these side 
projects were solely for employees' personal benefit" and that 
no evidence was introduced that would lead it to conclude 
otherwise.  Behrendt, unpublished slip op., ¶9.  It therefore 
held that summary judgment in Silvan's favor was proper on the 
question of vicarious liability.  For the same reasons, we 
agree. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶41 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the grant of 
summary judgment on both the vicarious liability claim and the 
negligence claim.  In order for an employer to be vicariously 
liable for an employee's act, the act must have been within the 
scope of employment.  We agree with the court of appeals that 
summary judgment is appropriate on the claim of vicarious 
liability because the only evidence presented was that the tank 
was a side project that was completed for the employee's own 
purpose and thus was outside the scope of employment.  
¶42 As to the negligence claim, we reach the same result 
as the court of appeals though we arrive at that result via a 
somewhat different analysis.  We agree with both the circuit 
court and the court of appeals that the focus here is properly 
on whether Silvan could have foreseen the effects of its policy.  
We also agree that, as a matter of law, it was not foreseeable 
that under Silvan's policy of allowing employees to do side 
projects, a non-pressurized tank built as a side job would later 
be modified and pressurized and, years later, explode and cause 
injury.  However, while the court of appeals affirmed the grant 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
23 
 
of 
summary 
judgment 
on 
the 
grounds 
that 
the 
lack 
of 
foreseeability meant that Silvan had no duty to Behrendt, we 
reiterate our prior holdings in the vast majority of cases that 
every person is subject to a duty to exercise ordinary care in 
all of his or her activities.  Silvan was subject to such a duty 
with regard to its policies on side jobs, and under these 
circumstances, that duty required Silvan to exercise care that 
its policy on side jobs did not create an unreasonable risk of 
injury to Behrendt.   
¶43 However, we then look at whether Silvan breached that 
duty by failing to exercise the care a reasonable person would 
use in similar circumstances.  In most cases, whether a 
defendant breached a duty is a question of fact that is 
submitted to the jury and thus is not appropriate for summary 
judgment.  In this case, however, it is the lack of foreseeable 
risk that convinces us, as a matter of law, that Silvan cannot 
be said to have failed to exercise ordinary care with regard to 
its policy on side jobs. Further, there is no material fact in 
dispute as to Silvan's policies about side jobs and its 
prohibition on employees making pressurized vessels as side jobs 
for personal use.  There is in addition uncontroverted evidence 
in the record that Silvan took steps such as having holes cut 
into any tanks that were considered as scrap——as well as 
testimony of the tank's owner that this tank itself originally 
had holes in it——and that the point of cutting holes into the 
tanks was to keep them from being used with air pressure.  
Summary judgment is appropriate on the negligence claim because 
No. 
2006AP2910   
 
24 
 
under these circumstances Silvan did not breach its duty to act 
with ordinary care. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).   I join 
the majority opinion.  I write separately to address the issues 
raised in Justice Roggensack's concurring opinion. 
¶45 Negligence law has evolved over the centuries and 
continues to evolve.  No one has said that negligence law is 
easy to understand and apply or that all of our cases fit 
together altogether comfortably and without any tension. Any 
attempt to synthesize our case law should be applauded.   
¶46 But the problem with the concurrence, as I see it, is 
that it tries to make things simpler than they are and is 
therefore misleading.  To quote Albert Einstein, "everything 
should be made as simple as possible but not simpler."   
¶47 Justice Roggensack's concurrence essentially argues 
that the negligence analysis in Wisconsin differs depending on 
whether a defendant's alleged negligence is viewed as a 
negligent act or a negligent failure to act.  The distinction 
between a negligence claim arising "from an allegation of a 
failure to act" and "a claim asserting that the act in question 
was negligently performed" is central to the argument set forth 
in the concurrence.1 
¶48 The concurrence concludes that when a defendant's 
alleged negligence is viewed as an omission rather than an 
affirmative act, the court must first determine whether the 
defendant's general duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary 
care implied a more specific duty to perform the act that was 
                                                 
1 Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶88.   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
2 
 
omitted.2  Furthermore, if the court determines that the 
defendant's general duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary 
care did not imply a specific duty to perform the omitted act, 
the defendant as a matter of law cannot be negligent.3      
¶49 The concurrence applies a different analysis when a 
defendant's alleged negligence is viewed as an affirmative act 
negligently performed or undertaken.  The concurrence asserts 
that under these circumstances, the question of negligence 
simply is whether the defendant exercised ordinary care under 
the circumstances when performing or undertaking the act.4  No 
time need be spent, according to the concurrence, analyzing 
whether the defendant's general duty to exercise reasonable and 
ordinary care implied a more specific duty to engage (or to 
refrain from engaging) in any particular conduct. 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶100 (stating 
that because Hoida v. M & I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17, "turned on whether [M&I Midstate 
Bank's] failure to take certain actions was negligent by 
omission," the question presented "was whether M&I's duty of 
ordinary care under the circumstances required M&I to take the 
actions that Hoida claimed M&I had a duty to undertake" 
(emphasis in original)).   
3 See Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶106 ("If it is 
determined 
that 
the 
duty 
of 
ordinary 
care 
under 
the 
circumstances presented did not include taking the action which 
was omitted, that is the end of the analysis because all of the 
elements of a negligence claim will not have been proven."). 
4 See, e.g., Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶117 ("Silvan 
acted affirmatively when it created the side job policy.  
Accordingly, Silvan's policy must have evidenced the exercise of 
reasonable care, which we have also characterized as ordinary 
care under the circumstances[.]" (internal citations omitted)).   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶50 There are three essential problems with the concurring 
opinion's analysis.   
¶51 First, attempts to distinguish between a negligent act 
(misfeasance) and a negligent omission (nonfeasance) have a long 
history in the law, and the distinction is generally recognized 
as a tenuous and misleading one.  The concurrence is a throwback 
to earlier but not better days. 
¶52 Second, Justice Roggensack's summary of the Wisconsin 
negligence cases law is incorrect.  The decisions of this court 
set forth a unified negligence standard, applicable to all 
conduct, whether classified as an act or omission.  The cases 
show that the question of negligence is whether the defendant's 
conduct (be it an act or omission) was consistent with the 
standard of reasonable and ordinary care.  The cases also show 
that when a defendant's alleged negligence is viewed as an 
omission, Wisconsin's negligence standard does not require a 
determination whether the defendant had a duty under the 
circumstances to perform the omitted act.  See also Wis JI——
Civil 1005 (titled "Negligence: Defined"), which states that 
"[a] person is not using ordinary care and is negligent, if the 
person, without intending to do harm, does something (or fails 
to do something) that a reasonable person would recognize as 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
4 
 
creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or 
property."5  
                                                 
5 Indeed, the Reporters' Note to § 37 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts cites Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995), for the proposition that Wisconsin "does not 
employ no-duty rules [but] nevertheless reaches the same result 
by employing public policy to avoid liability for those whose 
acts played no rule in creating risk to another."  Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 37, at 719 
(Reporters' Note) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
5 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The concept of duty in tort law is in "turmoil."  W. 
Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
671, 671 (2008).  Courts and academics have offered varying 
accounts of the proper role for duty in contemporary tort law.  
See, e.g., Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist., 734 P.2d 1326, 
1331 (Or. 1987) ("[D]uty plays an affirmative role when an 
injured plaintiff invokes obligations arising from a defendant's 
particular status or relationships, or from legislation, beyond 
the generalized standards that the common law of negligence 
imposes on persons at large.  In cases based solely on common-
law negligence, 'no-duty' is a defensive argument asking a court 
to limit the reach of these generalized standards as a matter of 
law."); Coburn v. City of Tucson, 691 P.2d 1078 (Ariz. 1984) 
("Many tort decisions exhibit an unfortunate tendency to confuse 
the concepts of 'duty' and standard of conduct and to argue that 
the city is, or is not, under a duty to post warning signs, 
remove obstructions from the road or sidewalks, install traffic 
control sidewalks, install traffic control devices, fix potholes 
and the like.  We believe that an attempt to equate the concept 
of 'duty' with such specific details of conduct is unwise.  
Attempting to define or evaluate conduct in terms of duty tends 
to rigidify the concept of negligence——a concept which, by 
definition, must vary from case to case, depending upon the 
relationship of the parties and the facts of each case." 
(internal citations omitted)); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. 
Keating, Abusing "Duty", 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 265, 268 (2006) 
("The role of 'duty' doctrine is to fix the legal standard 
applicable to the defendant's conduct.  Duty rulings must 
therefore be categorical.  They must specify the general 
standard 
of 
care 
owed 
by 
some 
class 
of 
potential 
injurers . . . ."); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733, 1744 (1988) 
(concluding that a proper account of the concept of duty in the 
law of negligence "must conceive of duty as relational, that is, 
as owed by specific defendants or classes of defendants to 
specific plaintiffs or classes of plaintiffs, rather than by 
each individual to the word at large[,] . . . must conceive of 
duty as relationship-sensitive, . . . [and] must conceive of 
duty as a non-instrumental (or deontological) concept by taking 
serious the idea that 'duty' carries with it a notion of 
obligatory force"); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on 
Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984) ("It is better to reserve 
'duty' for the problem of the relation between individuals which 
imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the 
other, and to deal with particular conduct in terms of a legal 
standard of what is required to meet the obligation.  In other 
words, 'duty' is a question of whether the defendant is under 
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶53 Third, 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurring 
opinion 
misinterprets not only the Wisconsin case law but also the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005), an authority from which both 
the majority opinion and Justice Roggensack's concurrence seek 
guidance. 
 
The 
concurrence 
erroneously 
interprets 
the 
Restatement (Third) as supporting the concurring opinion's view 
that whenever the defendant's negligence consists of an omission 
rather than an act, the inquiry must be whether the defendant 
had an affirmative duty to perform the act that was omitted.  
Contrary to the concurrence, the Restatement (Third) recognizes 
that whenever the entire course of a person's conduct has 
created a risk of physical harm, the person is negligent if——by 
act or omission alike——the person fails to exercise reasonable 
and ordinary care.   
                                                                                                                                                             
in negligence cases, the duty is always the same——to conform to 
the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the 
apparent risk."). 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts explains the role of duty 
as follows: "In most cases, courts . . . need not refer to duty 
on a case-by-case basis.  Nevertheless, in some categories of 
cases, reasons of principle or policy dictate that liability 
should not be imposed.  In these cases, courts use the rubric of 
duty 
to 
apply 
general 
categorical 
rules 
withholding 
liability. . . . No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court 
can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules 
of law applicable to a general class of cases."  Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 7 cmt. a, at 90-
91 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
For a discussion of the concept of duty in a case involving 
private nuisance, negligence and a possessor of land, see 
Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2009 WI 70, ¶¶___-___, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
7 
 
I 
 
¶54 The distinction between misfeasance (a negligent act) 
and nonfeasance (a negligent omission) has a long history in 
tort law, and the tenuous and misleading nature of the 
distinction between the two has been frequently pointed out.6  A 
negligent omission may be viewed as nonfeasance but also may be 
viewed as active negligence when the whole venture or enterprise 
is considered.7  "[N]o rule has been formulated to prescribe 
whether courts are to characterize conduct as affirmative action 
with an embedded omission or as simple nonaction."8   
¶55 Indeed, 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence 
itself 
acknowledges 
that 
a 
defendant's 
negligence 
often 
may 
be 
"characterized as either a failure to act or as an act 
negligently performed, depending on the lens that the author of 
the opinion applies."9  Thus the analysis in the concurrence 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 56, at 373-75 
(5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical Harm § 37 cmt. c, at 711, Reporters' Note, cmt. a, at 
718, 720-22 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
7 See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Scope of Duty in Negligence 
Cases, 47 N.W. U. L. Rev. 778, 800-09 (1952-53); Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 37 cmt. c, at 
711 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("The proper question is 
not whether an actor's specific failure to exercise reasonable 
care is an error of commission or omission.  Instead, it is 
whether the actor's entire conduct created a risk of physical 
harm.").  See also Hocking, 2009 WI 70, ¶31 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).  
8 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 315, at 855 (2001). 
9 Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶88. 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
8 
 
resting on the difference between action and omission rests on 
quicksand. 
II 
 
¶56 The decisions of this court state a unified negligence 
standard applicable to conduct, whether characterized as an act 
or an omission.  This court has stated the negligence standard 
as follows: "A person is not using ordinary care and is 
negligent, if the person, without intending to do harm, does 
something (or fails to do something) that a reasonable person 
would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or 
damage to a person or property."10  This standard requires a 
determination whether a defendant's conduct (be it action or 
omission) represents a failure to exercise reasonable and 
ordinary care under the circumstances, that is, whether a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have 
recognized the defendant's conduct as creating an unreasonable 
risk of injury or damage to a person or property.   
                                                                                                                                                             
The concurrence struggles to determine which "lens" the 
majority opinion uses in the present case.  The concurrence 
observes that "[t]he negligence claim Behrendt pled can be 
viewed as being based both on an affirmative act negligently 
undertaken and on a failure to act."  Justice Roggensack's 
concurrence, ¶112.  The concurrence then spends two paragraphs 
analyzing the majority opinion before concluding that the 
majority opinion "presumes" that Behrendt alleges the negligent 
performance of an affirmative act rather than a negligent 
omission.  See Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶113-114.     
10 Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶14, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 
N.W.2d 350 (emphasis added; quotation marks & citation omitted).   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
9 
 
 
¶57 This negligence standard, applicable equally to acts 
and omissions, has been stated time and again in the cases, 
dating back to 1931.11   
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶22, 611 N.W.2d 906 (Wilcox, J., lead op.) ("A 
person is not using ordinary care and is negligent, if the 
person, without intending to do harm, does something (or fails 
to do something) that a reasonable person would recognize as 
creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or 
property." (emphasis added; quoting Wis JI——Civil 1005)); id., 
235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶76 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring/majority) ("A 
person is not using ordinary care and is negligent if the person 
fails to do something that a reasonable person would recognize 
as creating an unreasonable risk of injury to another." 
(emphasis added)); Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 424, 
541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) ("A person fails to exercise ordinary care 
when, without intending to do any harm, he or she does something 
or fails to do something under circumstances in which a 
reasonable person would foresee that by his or her action or 
failure to act, he or she will subject a person or property to 
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage." (emphasis added; 
citation omitted)); Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 443-44, 
442 N.W.2d 25 (1989) ("A person fails to exercise ordinary care 
when, without intending to do any wrong, he does an act or omits 
a precaution under circumstances in which a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such 
act or omission will subject him or his property, or the person 
or property of another, to an unreasonable risk of injury or 
damage." (emphasis added; citation omitted)); Peters v. Holiday 
Inns, Inc., 89 Wis. 2d 115, 122-23, 278 N.W.2d 208 (1979) ("A 
person fails to exercise ordinary care when, without intending 
to do any wrong, he does an act or omits a precaution under 
circumstances in which a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such act or omission 
will subject him or his property, or the person or property of 
another to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage." (emphasis 
added; quotation marks and citation omitted)); Osborne v. 
Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N.W. 372 (1931) ("Every 
person is negligent when, without intending to do any wrong, he 
does such an act or omits to take such a precaution that under 
the circumstances present he, as an ordinary prudent person, 
ought reasonably to foresee that he will thereby expose the 
interests of another to an unreasonable risk of harm." (emphasis 
added)). 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶58 A recent line of cases drives home the point that even 
when a defendant's alleged negligence is viewed as an omission, 
Wisconsin's negligence standard requires a determination of 
whether the defendant's conduct comported with the standard of 
reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances, rather 
than a determination whether the defendant had a duty under the 
circumstances to perform an act that was omitted.  The relevant 
decisions 
are 
Rockweit 
v. 
Senecal, 
197 
Wis. 2d 409, 
541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995), Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906, and Nichols v. Progressive Northern 
Insurance Co., 2008 WI 20, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 746 N.W.2d 220.  
These three cases show that the negligence standard in Wisconsin 
applies to allegedly negligent omissions as it does to allegedly 
negligent acts.   
¶59 In Rockweit, defendant Ann Tynan spent the night at 
the same campground as 18-month-old Anthony Rockweit, who was at 
the campground with his parents.  The campground had a communal 
fire pit.  Tynan joined Anthony's family around the fire pit but 
otherwise had no connection to the fire or the pit.  "Tynan did 
not maintain the fire pit in any manner, nor provide any 
necessary materials to fuel it at any time during her visit."12  
Tynan's only connection to the fire pit was that she sat beside 
it, socializing with other persons including Anthony's family. 
¶60 Three individuals remained beside the fire pit when 
the evening reached its end: Tynan, Anthony's father, and 
another relative of Anthony.  These three people went to bed 
                                                 
12 Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 415.   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
11 
 
without extinguishing the fire's smoldering embers.  Anthony 
later woke up and slid into the fire pit, sustaining serious 
injuries. 
¶61 By a guardian, Anthony sued numerous people, including 
Tynan and the other two people who were around the fire pit at 
the end of the evening.  The jury found that Tynan was causally 
negligent and assigned her liability for 3% of Anthony's 
injuries.   
¶62 On appeal, Tynan argued that "she did not have a duty 
to Anthony to extinguish the fire because Wisconsin law does not 
impose a duty to assist or preserve a person from a risk of 
injury or a hazardous situation created by another."13   
¶63 The court of appeals classified Tynan's conduct as an 
affirmative act, namely "negligent management or control of a 
fire."14  It affirmed the verdict against Tynan on that basis.   
¶64 This court agreed with Tynan that the case was "a case 
of inaction."15  It rejected the court of appeals' "suggestion 
that by socializing around the fire pit that evening, Tynan 
assumed an affirmative obligation to extinguish the embers."16  
¶65 Nevertheless, this court also found "Tynan's argument 
that she cannot be held liable for Anthony's injuries because 
Wisconsin law does not impose a duty upon her to act to be 
                                                 
13 Id. at 421.   
14 Id.   
15 Id.   
16 Id.   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
12 
 
without merit."17  The Rockweit court stated that "Tynan did owe 
Anthony a common law duty, the duty to exercise ordinary 
care."18  The court then turned its attention to the question 
whether Tynan breached that duty by failing to put out the 
fire.19   
                                                 
17 Id. at 423. 
18 Id.   
Justice Wilcox's Rockweit opinion is an opinion of all the 
justices of this court insofar as it concludes that under 
Wisconsin law Tynan owed a common-law duty to everyone to 
exercise ordinary care and rejects Tynan's argument that she 
could not be liable for Anthony's injuries because Wisconsin law 
did not impose a duty upon her to act.  Justice Steinmetz's 
concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Day) departed from 
Justice Wilcox's opinion only insofar as Justice Wilcox's 
opinion concluded that credible evidence supported the jury's 
finding of negligence.  Justice Steinmetz concluded that the 
standard of due care was not violated.  See Rockweit, 197 
Wis. 2d at 433 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).  Justice Steinmetz's 
opinion refers to Justice Wilcox's opinion as the majority 
opinion.  See id.  My concurring opinion in Rockweit (joined by 
Justice Bradley) addresses and discredits "the defendant's claim 
that 'Wisconsin law does not impose a duty upon one person to 
actively assist or preserve a person from a risk of injury 
created by another.'"  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 429.  My 
concurring opinion also refers to Justice Wilcox's opinion as 
the majority opinion.  See Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 430, 431 
n.2, 432 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
19 Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 423. 
This court sustained the jury's finding that Tynan had 
breached her duty to exercise ordinary care and was negligent.  
The court concluded that the jury's finding was supported by 
credible evidence in the circuit court record.  See Rockweit, 
197 Wis. 2d at 424. 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶66 In 
the 
Gritzner 
case, 
defendant 
Roger 
Bubner's 
girlfriend's son, 
Michael, sexually abused the Gritzners' 
daughter while she was in Bubner's home.  Bubner allegedly knew 
that Michael had a propensity to sexually abuse other children.  
Bubner also allegedly failed to warn the Gritzners about 
Michael's propensity or to supervise Michael while Michael was 
with the Gritzners' daughter.  The Gritzners filed a complaint 
against Bubner claiming (1) negligent failure to warn the 
Gritzners that Michael had a propensity toward sexual abuse; and 
(2) negligent failure to control Michael.20   
¶67 The Gritzners' negligence claims were focused on 
Bubner's failures to act rather than on Bubner's affirmative 
actions.  The lead opinion acknowledged that "[t]he Gritzners' 
claims against Bubner [were] based on Bubner's duty to take 
certain affirmative actions——to warn [the Gritzners] about 
Michael and to control Michael's behavior."21   
                                                                                                                                                             
The Rockweit court went on to conclude on the basis of 
public policy considerations that Tynan should not be liable to 
Anthony despite her causal negligence.  See Rockweit, 197 
Wis. 2d at 425-29.  The court reasoned that Anthony's injuries 
were wholly out of proportion to Tynan's culpability and were 
too remote from Tynan's negligence.  It also reasoned that there 
would be no sensible stopping point if liability were imposed 
upon someone in Tynan's position. 
"[E]ven when a duty of care exists and the other elements 
of 
negligence 
have 
been 
established, 
public 
policy 
considerations may preclude liability.  However, Wisconsin 
courts address public policy concerns directly, rather than 
asking whether the defendant owed a 'duty' to the particular 
victim."  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶24 (Wilcox, J., lead 
opinion) (footnote omitted). 
20 Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶2 (Wilcox, J., lead opinion).   
21 Id., ¶21 (Wilcox, J., lead opinion).   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶68 Bubner "frame[d] his response to the Gritzners' claims 
under the rules governing affirmative duties to act in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts . . . ."22  Bubner's approach 
apparently worked at the circuit court, which dismissed the 
Gritzners' claims on the ground that "Bubner had no legal duty 
to warn the Gritzners about Michael's alleged propensities or to 
control Michael's conduct."23   
¶69 This court, however, did not decide the case by 
determining whether Bubner had a duty to perform the acts that 
he allegedly had failed to perform.  The lead opinion stated 
that "the crucial question in evaluating the Gritzners' claims 
is not whether Bubner had any 'duty' to take affirmative actions 
but whether Bubner's alleged failure to take certain actions was 
consistent with his duty to exercise a reasonable degree of 
care."24  Citing the lead opinion, the concurring/majority 
                                                 
22 Id.   
23 Id., ¶13 (Wilcox, J., lead opinion).   
24 Id., ¶25 (Wilcox, J., lead opinion).  
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
15 
 
opinion similarly stated that "[a] person is not using ordinary 
care and is negligent if the person fails to do something that a 
reasonable person would recognize as creating an unreasonable 
risk of injury to another."25   
¶70 The Gritzner court remanded the cause for a full 
factual resolution of the Gritzners' negligence claims.26  The 
lead opinion would have dismissed the Gritzners' failure-to-warn 
claim but not on the ground that Bubner had no duty to warn the 
Gritzners and was not negligent.  The lead opinion would have 
dismissed the failure-to-warn claim on the basis of public 
policy considerations.27   
¶71 Justice Roggensack's concurrence cannot be reconciled 
with Rockweit or Gritzner.  The concurrence contends that when a 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Gritzner lead opinion also explained that although this 
court has considered and relied upon the provisions in the 
Restatement relating to affirmative duties to act, the court 
"has not expressly adopted this framework."  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 
2d 781, ¶22 (Wilcox, J., lead opinion).  The lead opinion stated 
that "instead" of the Restatement provisions, "the general 
framework governing the duty of care in Wisconsin negligence 
actions is that: 'A person is negligent when [he or she] fails 
to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care is the care which a 
reasonable person would use in similar circumstances. A person 
is not using ordinary care and is negligent, if the person, 
without intending to do harm, does something (or fails to do 
something) that a reasonable person would recognize as creating 
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or 
property.'"  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶22 (Wilcox, J., lead 
opinion) (quoting Wis JI——Civil 1005; brackets in Gritzner). 
25 Gritzner, 
235 
Wis. 2d 781, 
¶76 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring/majority).   
26 Id., ¶¶76, 86 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring/majority).   
27 Id., ¶¶28-44, 70 (Wilcox, J., lead opinion).   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
16 
 
defendant's alleged negligence is viewed as an omission rather 
than an act, the court must determine whether the defendant had 
a duty under the circumstances to perform the act that was 
omitted.  This court, however, did not decide Rockweit by 
determining whether Tynan had a duty to extinguish the camp fire 
and did not decide Gritzner by determining whether Bubner had a 
duty to warn the Gritzners or to control Michael.  The Rockweit 
court found "Tynan's argument that she cannot be held liable for 
Anthony's injuries because Wisconsin law does not impose a duty 
upon her to act to be without merit."28  The Gritzner court 
concluded 
that 
"the 
crucial 
question 
in 
evaluating 
the 
Gritzners' claims is not whether Bubner had any 'duty' to take 
affirmative actions but whether Bubner's alleged failure to take 
certain actions was consistent with his duty to exercise a 
reasonable degree of care."29   
¶72 In Nichols, this court affirmed the vitality of 
Rockweit and Gritzner.  The Nichols court was confronted with a 
decision of the court of appeals suggesting that in Hoida, Inc. 
v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 
N.W.2d 17——a decision authored by Justice Roggensack——this court 
had "overturned or backed away from" Rockweit and Gritzner.30  
The Nichols court made clear that "Hoida was not intended to 
overturn prior case law" and that "Gritzner and Rockweit are 
                                                 
28 Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 423.   
29 Gritzner, 
235 
Wis. 2d 781, 
¶25 
(Wilcox, 
J., 
lead 
opinion).   
30 Nichols, 308 Wis. 2d 17, ¶34. 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
17 
 
still good law in Wisconsin."31  It stated that "[n]othing in 
Hoida was intended to overrule or change the principles of law 
expressed in Gritzner and Rockweit."32   
¶73 The Nichols opinion confirmed that the negligence 
standard applied in Rockweit and Gritzner was correct.  It 
concluded that "in a negligence case, a defendant's conduct is 
not examined in terms of whether or not there is a duty to do a 
specific act, but rather whether the conduct satisfied the duty 
placed upon individuals to exercise that degree of care as would 
be exercised by a reasonable person under the circumstances."33  
¶74 Justice Roggensack's concurrence is no more consistent 
with Nichols than it is with Rockweit or Gritzner.  The 
concurrence relies in large part upon Justice Roggensack's Hoida 
decision to set forth an argument about the negligence standard 
that contradicts the analysis in Rockweit and Gritzner.34  Yet 
Nichols explicitly rejects the idea that Justice Roggensack's 
Hoida decision changed the law of negligence as it is explained 
in the Rockweit and Gritzner decisions.  Furthermore, Nichols 
concludes, in direct contradiction to Justice Roggensack's 
concurrence, that in a negligence case, a defendant's conduct 
should not be analyzed in terms of whether the defendant had a 
duty to perform a specific act.   
                                                 
31 Id., ¶¶34, 47.   
32 Id., ¶47.   
33 Id., ¶45 (quoting Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶24 (Wilcox, 
J., lead opinion)).   
34 See Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶101-102, 105, 108 
(relying upon Hoida).   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶75 The Nichols case was decided just last year.  Justice 
Crooks's majority opinion was joined by Justice Roggensack, as 
well as by Justices Bradley, Prosser, and Ziegler.35  One wonders 
what could have happened in the course of one year to make 
Justice Roggensack suddenly doubt the wisdom of Justice Crooks's 
careful discussion. 
III 
¶76 The majority opinion in the present case seeks 
guidance from § 7 the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability 
for Physical Harm (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).36  Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence does the same.37    
¶77 Section 7(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
explains the circumstances under which a person is subject to 
the general duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care.  It 
provides in full as follows: 
An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of 
physical harm. 
 
¶78 A related provision, § 37, "states the obverse" of 
§ 7(a): In the absence of conduct creating a risk of physical 
harm to another, an actor ordinary has no duty of care to 
another.38  Section 37 provides in full as follows: 
                                                 
35 The concurring opinion, which I authored and which 
Justice Butler joined, did not object to the majority opinion's 
discussion of Rockweit and Gritzner or its general discussion of 
the negligence standard in Wisconsin.   
36 See majority op., ¶¶19-20, 26. 
37 Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶114.   
38 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) § 7 cmt. l, at 99. 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
19 
 
An actor whose conduct has not created a risk of 
physical harm to another has no duty of care to the 
other unless a court determines that one of the 
affirmative duties provided in §§ 38-44 is applicable. 
 
¶79 Under the Restatement (Third) approach, when the 
defendant's conduct has created a risk of physical harm to 
another, the defendant must exercise reasonable and ordinary 
care under the circumstances, and the question of negligence is 
whether the defendant has exercised such care.39  When the 
defendant's conduct has not created a risk of physical harm to 
another, the question of the defendant's negligence turns on 
whether the defendant was subject to (and breached) a more 
specific affirmative duty to act.   
 
¶80 Justice Roggensack's concurrence apparently concludes 
that under the Restatement (Third), a person is required to 
exercise reasonable and ordinary care only when performing 
affirmative acts.  The concurrence states that "[s]ection 7's 
discussion of duty is limited to affirmative acts; it does not 
address duty based on an alleged failure to act."40  The 
implication seems to be that the Restatement (Third) supports 
the concurring opinion's view that when a defendant's alleged 
                                                 
39 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical 
Harm § 3, at 34 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("A person 
acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care 
under all the circumstances.").   
40 See Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶114  
The concurrence also relies upon the majority opinion's use 
of § 7 of the Restatement (Third) as evidence that the majority 
opinion views the defendant's alleged negligence in the present 
case as consisting of an affirmative act.  See Justice 
Roggensack's concurrence, ¶¶113-115.   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
20 
 
negligence is viewed as an omission rather than an act, the 
inquiry should be whether the defendant had an affirmative duty 
to act under the circumstances rather than whether the defendant 
exercised reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances. 
 
¶81 The concurrence misinterprets the approach of §§ 7 and 
37 of the Restatement (Third). 
¶82 Section 7(a) of the Restatement (Third) states that an 
actor41 is to exercise reasonable and ordinary care when the 
actor's "conduct" creates a risk of physical harm.  The meaning 
of the word "conduct" is broad.  A defendant's "conduct" is 
limited neither to the defendant's affirmative acts nor to the 
particular conduct constituting the focal point of a negligence 
claim against the defendant.   
  
¶83 This point is made clear by Restatement (Third) of 
Torts § 37 cmt. c., which explains how a court may distinguish 
between cases in which the defendant is to exercise reasonable 
and 
ordinary 
care 
under § 7(a) and cases in which the 
defendant's conduct must be analyzed in terms of more specific 
affirmative duties to act under §§ 38-44.  The comment states 
that "[t]he proper question is not whether an actor's specific 
failure to exercise reasonable care is an error of commission or 
                                                 
41 The word "actor" in § 7(a) should not be viewed as 
limiting § 7(a) to persons who take affirmative acts.  The 
Restatement 
(Third) 
itself 
explains 
that 
it 
employs 
a 
"convention" of "referring to the person whose actions or 
conduct may be subject to tort liability as the 'actor'[,]" even 
when "the actor may not have engaged in any action or conduct 
relevant to the harm that occurred."  Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Liability for Physical Harm at 709 (Proposed Final Draft 
No. 1, 2005). 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
21 
 
omission.  Instead, it is whether the actor's entire conduct 
created a risk of physical harm."42  In other words, the comment 
explicitly recognizes that in light of a person's entire course 
of conduct, the person may be subject to (and may breach) the 
general duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in his or 
her omissions as well as acts.   
¶84 The same comment provides specific examples of cases 
in which a defendant's alleged negligence may be viewed as an 
omission yet the defendant's conduct must be analyzed in terms 
of whether the defendant exercised reasonable and ordinary care 
under § 7(a).  The comment states that "a failure to employ an 
automobile's brakes or a failure to warn about a latent danger 
in one's product is not a case of nonfeasance governed by the 
rules [in §§ 38-44 relating to specific affirmative duties to 
act], because in those cases the entirety of the actor's conduct 
(driving an automobile or selling a product) created a risk of 
harm.  This is so even though the specific conduct alleged to be 
a breach of the duty of reasonable care was itself an 
omission."43    
 
¶85 My 
point 
here 
is 
not 
that 
Wisconsin's 
law 
of 
negligence is consistent in all respects with the Restatement 
                                                 
42 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm 
§ 37 cmt. c, at 711 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).   
43 Id.   
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
22 
 
(Third).  It is not.44   My point is rather that the Restatement 
(Third)'s approach does not turn on whether the defendant 
engaged in an act or omission.  The Restatement (Third) instead 
recognizes that whenever the entire course of a person's conduct 
has created a risk of physical harm, the person is negligent if—
—by act or omission alike——the person fails to exercise 
reasonable and ordinary care.   
                                                 
44 The Reporters' Note to § 37 of the Restatement (Third), 
cites the Rockweit decision for the proposition that Wisconsin 
"does not employ no-duty rules [but] nevertheless reaches the 
same result by employing public policy to avoid liability for 
those whose acts played no role in creating risk to another."  
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 37, 
at 719 (Reporters' Note) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).   
This court does not in the present case adopt any 
provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical Harm (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  The majority 
opinion explains that this court has "previously noted, without 
finding it necessary to adopt, helpful language from sections in 
the Restatements where it provides further support for the 
rationale for a holding."  Majority op., ¶19 n.7. 
No.  2006AP2910.ssa 
 
23 
 
¶86 Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence, 
distinguishing 
between an act and an omission, is ostensibly offered "to assist 
the readers of [this court's] opinions as they step into the 
thicket of a negligence claim in Wisconsin[.]"45  From my vantage 
point the concurrence unfortunately makes the thicket thicker. 
¶87 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
 
                                                 
45 Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶88.   
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶88 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I concur 
in the result reached by the majority opinion in regard to both 
claims made.  I write only with regard to the negligence claim 
in order to point out the difficulty in assessing duty, and the 
scope of duty, under our negligence jurisprudence.  Some of the 
difficulty is caused in part by our failing to be precise in our 
reasoning when a claim of negligence arises from an allegation 
of a failure to act, as distinguished from a claim asserting 
that the act in question was negligently performed.  This 
difficulty 
is 
enhanced 
when 
the 
claim 
made 
could 
be 
characterized as either a failure to act or as an act 
negligently performed, depending on the lens that the author of 
the opinion applies.  And some of the difficulty occurs because 
our jurisprudence in this area continues to develop.  Because 
the majority opinion does not address duty, and because I hope 
to assist the readers of our opinions as they step into the 
thicket of a negligence claim in Wisconsin, I write separately 
and respectfully concur in the majority opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶89 The context in which this negligence claim arose is 
carefully and correctly narrated in the majority opinion.1  
Summarily stated, Kenneth J. Behrendt (Behrendt) alleges that 
Silvan Industries, Inc. (Silvan) was causally negligent for the 
injuries he sustained when a tank that he alleged had been 
manufactured at Silvan ten years earlier exploded.  The tank was 
manufactured by Silvan employees as a "side job," i.e., a 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶¶5–7. 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
2 
 
personal job, for the employees' personal use.  At the time of 
its manufacture, Silvan had a policy that side jobs were 
permitted, but employees were not permitted to manufacture 
pressure vessels.  In compliance with that policy, the tank that 
was manufactured at Silvan had holes cut in it before it left 
Silvan and was unusable as a pressure vessel at that time.   
¶90 At some later date, the holes in the tank were plugged 
by a third party who was unaffiliated with Silvan, and a fixture 
was added so that the tank could be subjected to air 
pressurization.  It was while the tank was pressurized that it 
exploded, injuring Behrendt. 
¶91 Behrendt 
claimed 
that 
Silvan 
was 
negligent 
in 
"distributing" the tank; "in failing to issue proper and 
adequate warnings and instructions concerning the use" of the 
tank; and "in the manner in which it designed, manufactured 
[and] assembled" the tank.2  In his brief, Behrendt argues more 
generally, alleging that Silvan was negligent because it 
permitted side jobs where defective or dangerous items could be 
made.   
¶92 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of 
Behrendt's negligence claim against Silvan.  The court concluded 
that Silvan had no duty to Behrendt because his injuries, which 
arose from modification of the tank, were not foreseeable by 
Silvan.3  The majority opinion affirms the dismissal of the 
                                                 
2 Amended Complaint, ¶20.   
3 Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 2006AP2910, 
unpublished slip op., ¶5 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008). 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
3 
 
negligence claim because it concludes that Silvan's duty of 
ordinary care under the circumstances, with regard to its policy 
of permitting side jobs, was not breached.4  The majority opinion 
does not opine on the scope of Silvan's duty under the 
circumstances presented.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶93 Because the facts relating to the manufacture of the 
tank are undisputed, whether Silvan had a duty and the scope of 
that duty are questions of law, which we decide independently.  
Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 528, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991) 
(citing Fitzgerald v. Ludwig, 41 Wis. 2d 635, 639, 165 N.W.2d 
158 (1969)).   
B. 
General Principles 
¶94 A 
plaintiff 
seeking 
to 
recover 
on 
a 
claim 
of 
negligence must prove four elements:  "(1) the existence of a 
duty of care on the part of the defendant, (2) a breach of that 
duty of care, (3) a causal connection between the defendant's 
breach of the duty of care and the plaintiff's injury, and (4) 
actual loss or damage resulting from the injury."  Gritzner v. 
Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶19, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906 
(citing Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 260, 
580 N.W.2d 233 (1998)); Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶4. 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
4 
 
419, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995)5 (citing Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 
74 Wis. 2d 526, 531, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976)).   
¶95 In analyzing any negligence claim, it is necessary to 
remember 
that 
"[d]uty 
is 
still 
an 
important 
factor 
in 
determining whether an act is negligent."  A.E. Inv. Corp. v. 
Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974) 
(emphasis added).  The concept that duty remains an element of a 
negligence claim is in danger of being obscured when we 
oversimplify duty, based on the assertion that this court has 
adopted the minority view in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  See, e.g., Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate 
Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶64, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17 (Bradley, 
J., dissenting).   
¶96 Our 
adoption 
of 
the 
minority 
view 
in 
Palsgraf 
sometimes applies under the facts presented and sometimes it is 
a red herring that clouds the negligence analysis.  In this 
regard, it is helpful to examine what the dissent in Palsgraf 
did not conclude, as well as what it did conclude.  First, the 
                                                 
5 Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 541 N.W.2d 742 
(1995), contains no majority opinion in regard to proof of the 
elements of Rockweit's negligence claim.  The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Wilcox, joined by Justices Bablitch and 
Geske, concluded that there was a duty, but it did not affirm 
the jury finding of causation.  Id. at 424-25.  Instead, the 
majority opinion assumed causation and precluded liability based 
on public policy.  Id.  Then Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, 
joined by Justice Bradley, "address[ed] the defendant's claim 
that 'Wisconsin law does not impose a duty upon one person to 
actively assist or preserve a person from a risk of injury 
created by another.'"  Id. at 429.  Justice Steinmetz's 
concurrence, joined by then Chief Justice Day, agreed with the 
majority opinion's public policy analysis, but also concluded 
there had been no breach.  Id. at 433.   
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
5 
 
minority view in Palsgraf did not eliminate the element of duty 
from a negligence claim.  As Chief Justice Heffernan explained 
while asserting that the court had "expressly adopted the 
Palsgraf minority rationale," we examine duty when we are 
determining whether an act is negligent.  A.E. Inv., 62 Wis. 2d 
at 483-84.  It is only after "an act has been found to be 
negligent, [that] we no longer look to see if there was a duty 
to the one who was in fact injured."  Id. at 484 (quoting 
Schilling v. Stockel, 26 Wis. 2d 525, 531, 133 N.W.2d 335 
(1965)).  Second, the dissent in Palsgraf did address the flow 
of the duty of ordinary care to others when a negligent act 
occurred.  Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).   
¶97 The minority rationale of Palsgraf never concludes or 
implies that duty is no longer an element of a negligence claim.  
To explain:  Palsgraf arose from an affirmative act that was 
negligently performed, from which negligence Palsgraf claimed 
injury.  In Palsgraf, two men were attempting to board a train 
that was in motion.  Id. at 99.  An employee of the railroad 
pushed one of the men from behind in order to assist him onto 
the train, and in so doing he caused the man to drop the package 
he was carrying.  Id.  The package fell onto the rails and 
exploded.  Id.  The shock of the explosion caused the scales on 
the railway platform to fall and to strike Palsgraf.  Id.   
¶98 Palsgraf sued, and the dissenting opinion in that New 
York case took issue with the denial of her claim.  Id. at 102 
(Andrews, J., dissenting).  The dissent set the issue consistent 
with the description of duty in A.E. Investment when it said: 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
6 
 
The result we shall reach depends upon our theory as 
to the nature of negligence.  Is it a relative 
concept——the breach of some duty owing to a particular 
person or to particular persons?  Or, where there is 
an act which unreasonably threatens the safety of 
others, is the doer liable for all its proximate 
consequences, even where they result in injury to one 
who would generally be thought to be outside the 
radius of danger?   
Id.  The focus of Palsgraf's dissent, as quoted above, and the 
focus of this court's use of Palsgraf, as explained in A.E. 
Investment, is on the range of persons to whom a negligent actor 
may be liable, after a negligent act has been found.  A.E. Inv., 
62 Wis. 2d at 484 (concluding that "[o]nce negligence is 
established, 
the 
defendant 
is 
liable 
for 
unforeseeable 
consequences as well as foreseeable ones[, and] he is liable to 
unforeseeable plaintiffs").   
¶99 The Palsgraf decision arose from an affirmative act 
negligently undertaken and the question presented was whether 
Palsgraf's damages were "so connected with the negligence that 
the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former."  
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  Stated 
otherwise, Palsgraf's dissent parsed to whom liability flows 
from a negligent act affirmatively undertaken.  One could 
characterize the Palsgraf dissent's position as to whom a duty 
of ordinary care was owed when the negligent act occurred.   
¶100 Hoida, by contrast with Palsgraf, turned on whether 
the lender's failure to take certain actions was negligent by 
omission.  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶17.  Therefore, Hoida 
addressed whether the first element of a negligence claim, duty, 
had been alleged.  Stated otherwise, the question presented was 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
7 
 
whether M&I's duty of ordinary care under the circumstances 
required M&I to take the actions that Hoida claimed M&I had a 
duty to undertake.  Id.  In Palsgraf, there was no question that 
the railroad employee acted and that his act of pushing the 
passenger onto the moving train was negligent.  Palsgraf, 162 
N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  The minority view in 
Palsgraf was concerned with how far liability for the negligent 
act flowed, not with whether there was negligence.  Id. at 103. 
¶101 While examining what acts the bank in Hoida was 
required to take, we explained that "one has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care under the circumstances."  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 
¶30 (citing Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶20).  We noted that what 
acts are required when one exercises ordinary care will depend 
upon the circumstances under which the claimed duty to act 
arises.  Id., ¶32 (citing Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank Wis., 2005 
WI 109, ¶¶18-20, 283 Wis. 2d 234, 700 N.W.2d 15). 
¶102 In Hatleberg, we also examined what acts a bank was 
required to take pursuant to its duty to exercise ordinary care 
under the circumstances.  Hatleberg, 283 Wis. 2d 234, ¶3.  We 
concluded that the bank was not negligent because it had no duty 
under the circumstances to review the trust document to ensure 
that it would effectively avoid taxes.  Id.  Hatleberg, like 
Hoida, involved an element of the claim of negligence, duty, 
which element was based on an alleged failure to act.  Hatleberg 
did not involve an affirmative act that was negligently 
performed, as Palsgraf did.   
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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¶103 In Baumeister v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co., 2004 
WI 148, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1, we examined whether 
certain acts were required in order to satisfy an architect's 
duty of ordinary care under the circumstances when the claim of 
negligence was based on a failure to act.  Id., ¶18.  
Baumeister's conclusion turned on whether the architect's duty 
of ordinary care under the circumstances required him to take 
certain actions.  Id.  In so doing, Baumeister examined the duty 
element of a negligence claim.  Id.  It did not examine a 
negligently performed act and determine whether liability to 
Baumeister should flow from that act, as the dissent in Palsgraf 
did.  Id.  
¶104 We do not always address duty when a negligence claim 
is under review.  For example, on numerous occasions we have 
chosen to assume that all four elements of a negligence claim 
are present, but nevertheless have precluded liability based on 
public policy factors.  Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2008 
WI 20, ¶¶3, 19, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 746 N.W.2d 220 (concluding that 
even if the court assumed that the Niesens had a duty to 
supervise the juveniles on their property, the Nichols' claim 
was denied on public policy grounds); Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 
WI 101, ¶39, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923 (concluding that on 
public policy grounds common law negligence claims against a 
landlord or a landowner based on injury caused by a dog are 
limited to situations where the landlord or landowner is also 
the owner or keeper of the dog).  However, a preclusion of 
liability is not a preclusion of negligence because "negligence 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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and liability are distinct concepts."  Nichols, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 
¶19 (citing Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶25). 
¶105 To summarize, when the negligence claim is based on a 
failure to act, the claim is, in the first instance, focused on 
whether the omission was negligent.  Stated otherwise, the focus 
in a failure to act case is, at least initially, on examining 
the duty element of a negligence claim to determine the scope of 
that alleged duty under the circumstances.  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 
283, ¶32; Hatleberg, 283 Wis. 2d 234, ¶3; Baumeister, 277 
Wis. 2d 21, ¶18.   
¶106 If it is determined that the duty of ordinary care 
under the circumstances presented did not include taking the 
action which was omitted, that is the end of the analysis 
because one of the elements of negligence will not have been 
proven.  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶19; A.E. Inv., 62 Wis. 2d 
at 484.  Therefore, the initial determinations in failure to act 
cases do not come within the rubric of Palsgraf's dissent, where 
a negligent act had already occurred and the dissent parsed the 
effect of that negligent act on Palsgraf's claim of damages.  
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  
¶107 Stated otherwise, what Palsgraf provided, and what 
this court has adopted, is that when a negligent act has 
occurred, the actor generally is liable to all who are injured 
by it.  In evaluating that liability, we do not consider whether 
the actor had an individualized duty to each injured person.  
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103.   
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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¶108 A careful reading of the above cases, and many others 
that arise in the context of common law negligence, shows that 
the term "duty" has been used in two ways:  (1) identifying duty 
as an element of a common law negligence claim and (2) 
identifying duty by describing an obligation to an injured 
person.  When the negligence claim is based on a failure to act, 
the initial focus will be on the first use of duty.  Hoida, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, ¶51.  When the negligence claim arises from an 
affirmative act claimed to be negligently undertaken, the second 
use of duty may be the central focus of our analysis.  Pfeifer 
v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 235-36, 55 
N.W.2d 29 (1952) (concluding that in Wisconsin a negligent 
actor's liability is not limited to the probable consequences of 
his act).  However, our opinions have not always been precise in 
our descriptions of duty and the scope of duty under the 
circumstances presented, thereby causing some confusion for the 
reader.6   
                                                 
6 The discussion of duty is rarely simple.  For example, it 
can be affected by the relationship between the alleged 
tortfeasor and the party claiming injury.  See, e.g., Gritzner 
v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶¶52-56, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 
906 (concluding that Bubner had a duty to take affirmative acts 
to protect the child because he stood in loco parentis with 
regard to the injured child and because he voluntarily undertook 
a duty to protect her).  Or, duty may be affected by the law 
underlying the obligation that is claimed to have been breached.  
See, e.g., Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 2004 WI 39, ¶2, 
270 Wis. 2d 356, 677 N.W.2d 298 (concluding that in the context 
of a claimed breach of fiduciary duty, an intentional tort, 
corporation officers and directors owed only the duty of 
ordinary care to corporate creditors unless the corporation was 
both insolvent and no longer a going concern).   
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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¶109 Chief Justice Abrahamson takes the unusual tact of 
attacking a concurring opinion in her ongoing mission of 
attempting to eliminate the element of duty from common law 
negligence claims in Wisconsin.7  In so doing, she only 
strengthens the black letter law that a negligence claim in 
Wisconsin has duty as an element.  Nichols, 308 Wis. 2d 17, ¶11; 
Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶17; Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶19; 
Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 418.   
¶110 Contrary to the lament of Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
Rockweit and Nichols are consistent with my discussion above.  
Rockweit examined whether a duty existed, and explained that 
"[a]lthough individuals generally owe a duty of ordinary care to 
all persons, we recognize that limitations do exist with respect 
to the imposition of a legal duty in some cases."  Rockweit, 197 
Wis. 2d at 421. In Nichols, we affirmed that in Wisconsin 
liability has been precluded under a negligence theory of 
recovery "based on the absence of a duty," although we have more 
frequently limited liability based on public policy concerns.  
Nichols, 308 Wis. 2d 17, ¶47.   
¶111 Brown v. Dibbell, 227 Wis. 2d 28, 595 N.W.2d 358 
(1999), 
is 
interesting 
to 
compare 
with 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's concurrence herein because she authored Brown.  
Brown arose in an informed consent context.  Id. at 33.  The 
physician, 
who 
Brown 
contended 
had 
provided 
insufficient 
information, defended in part by asserting that Brown, as the 
patient, had a duty to ascertain the completeness of the 
                                                 
7 Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence, ¶¶50-53.  
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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information the physician provided.  Id. at 47.  The court found 
no such duty existed.  "A patient's duty to exercise ordinary 
care generally does not encompass a duty to ascertain the truth 
or the completeness of the information presented by a doctor."  
Id. at 51.  The reasoning in Brown is similar to my conclusion 
that when a claim is based on a failure to act, we begin by 
examining whether there was a duty to undertake the acts that 
were alleged to have been wrongfully omitted.  Duty remains a 
highly nuanced element of negligence; it has not been gobbled up 
by the dissenting opinion in Palsgraf. 
C. 
Behrendt's Negligence Claim  
¶112 The negligence claim Behrendt pled can be viewed as 
being based both on an affirmative act negligently undertaken 
and on a failure to act.  For example, Behrendt alleged that 
Silvan was negligent in the manner in which the tank was 
manufactured and in failing to issue proper warnings and 
instructions.8  Presumably, the claim of negligent manufacturing 
arises from the allegation that the tank was manufactured as a 
side job under Silvan's policy that permitted side jobs.  This 
contention is based on the implicit allegation that Silvan's 
                                                 
8 Amended Complaint, ¶20.  Behrendt does not continue his 
failure to warn allegation before us.  Perhaps Behrendt has 
dropped this allegation because the tank could not have been 
used as a pressure vessel when it left Silvan.  See Schreiner v. 
Wieser Concrete Prods., Inc., 2006 WI App 138, ¶15, 294 Wis. 2d 
832, 720 N.W.2d 525 (concluding that the plastic sheeting was 
not defective, thereby requiring no warning, even though it may 
have been used in an improper way).  However, regardless of the 
reason, I do not address this claim because Behrendt did not 
brief or argue it to us.  Truttschel v. Martin, 208 Wis. 2d 361, 
369, 560 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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creation of a policy that permitted side jobs was an affirmative 
act negligently undertaken.   
¶113 The majority opinion focuses on the allegation that 
the tank was negligently manufactured because of Silvan's policy 
that permitted side jobs.9  Therefore, the majority opinion is 
analyzing an affirmative act, i.e., the creation of the policy 
permitting side jobs.   
¶114 That the majority opinion's focus is on an affirmative 
act is shown by its decision to employ Section 7 of the Third 
Restatement of 
Torts as the framework for much of its 
discussion.10  Section 7 of that Restatement addresses the 
element of duty for negligence claims.  It provides:  "An actor 
ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the 
actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm."  Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical Harm § 7(a) (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  Section 7's discussion of duty is 
limited to affirmative acts; it does not address the element of 
duty based on an alleged failure to act.  As the Restatement 
explains: 
Relationship with affirmative duties to act.  The 
general duty rule contained in this Section is 
conditioned on the actor's having engaged in conduct 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶24.   
10 Id., ¶¶19-20, 26.  
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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that creates a risk of physical harm.  Section 3711 
states the obverse of this rule:  In the absence of 
conduct creating a risk of harm to others, an actor 
ordinarily has no duty of care to another.   
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 cmt. l (Proposed Final Draft 
No. 1, 2005).  Accordingly, because of the manner in which the 
majority opinion has shaped its discussion, I conclude that it 
presumes an affirmative act based on Silvan's policy of 
permitting side jobs.   
¶115 It is important for the reader to be aware of whether 
the claim analyzed is one of an affirmative act negligently 
undertaken or an alleged failure to act, in order to fully 
understand the decision.  Here, it is an affirmative act, the 
creation of Silvan's policy permitting side jobs, that was 
alleged to be negligently undertaken.  Behrendt has not 
presented to us a negligence claim based on an alleged failure 
to act.  
¶116 Even 
though 
the 
majority 
opinion 
employs 
§ 7's 
discussion of duty as a framework, it focuses its discussion of 
liability on the second element of a negligence claim, breach.12  
                                                 
11 Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical 
Harm § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) provides:  "An 
actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical harm to 
another has no duty of care to the other unless a court 
determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38-
44 is applicable."  See § 38 (duty imposed by statute); § 39 
(duty based on prior conduct); § 40 (duty due to special 
relationship with the victim); § 41 (duty due to special 
relationship with persons posing risks of harm to others); 
§§ 42-43 (duty due to voluntary undertakings).  
12 Majority op., ¶43. 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
15 
 
It concludes that Silvan was not negligent because it did not 
breach its duty of ordinary care under the circumstance.13   
¶117 With regard to Silvan's creation of its side job 
policy, I agree that Silvan did not breach its duty of ordinary 
care under the circumstances.  Silvan acted affirmatively when 
it created the side job policy.  Accordingly, Silvan's policy 
must have evidenced the exercise of reasonable care, Johnson v. 
Seipel, 152 Wis. 2d 636, 644, 449 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1989), 
which we have also characterized as ordinary care under the 
circumstances, Totsky v. Riteway Bus Service, Inc., 2000 WI 29, 
¶57, 233 Wis. 2d 371, 607 N.W.2d 637.   
¶118 It is undisputed that Silvan's policy precluded the 
manufacturing of pressure vessels as side jobs.  I conclude that 
the policy forbidding the manufacture of pressure vessels was 
reasonable, 
and 
Behrendt 
does 
not 
contend 
that 
Silvan's 
preclusion of the manufacturing of pressure vessels as a side 
job was unreasonable or that it violated Silvan's duty of 
ordinary care under the circumstances.  Furthermore, Silvan's 
policy was followed on this side job because holes were cut into 
the tank so that it could not have been used as a pressure 
vessel when it left Silvan's control.  Therefore, Silvan did not 
breach 
its 
duty 
to 
exercise 
ordinary 
care 
under 
the 
circumstances.   
¶119 Furthermore, the tank that left Silvan did not cause 
Behrendt's injuries.  It was the actions of third parties 
unaffiliated with Silvan that created the tank to which air 
                                                 
13 Id. 
No.  2006AP2910.pdr 
 
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pressure 
could 
be 
applied, 
which 
tank 
caused 
Behrendt's 
injuries.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶120 In conclusion, the negligence claim that was argued to 
us is based on the allegation of an affirmative act negligently 
undertaken.  It is not based on an alleged failure to act.  
Therefore, the majority's analysis relying on the determination 
of breach, rather than duty, is appropriate in this instance. 
¶121 Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the majority 
opinion. 
¶122 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
 
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