Title: Yao v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 35S02-1112-CR-704
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2012

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
James H. Voyles  
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Tyler D. Helmond 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Voyles Zahn Paul Hogan & Merriman 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Jodi Kathryn Stein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Alan D. Burke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Burke Law Office 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew A. Kobe 
Rochester, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Jeremy N. Gayed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael H. Michmerhuizen 
 
 
 
 
 
Barrett & McNagny LLP 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R.P. Fisher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fisher & Ireland 
Wabash, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 35S02-1112-CR-704 
 
AN-HUNG YAO AND YU-TING LIN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellants-(Defendants below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee-(Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court 
Nos.   35C01-1001-FC-12 
          35C01-1001-FC-16 
The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 35A02-1006-CR-678 
_________________________________ 
 
September 13, 2012 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Sep 13 2012, 8:33 am
 
2 
Case Summary  
 
 
Associated with a toy gun business, Defendants were charged with counterfeiting, theft, 
and corrupt business influence arising out of their conduct concerning toy semi-automatic 
weapons that were look-alikes of real weapons for which a gun manufacturer allegedly owned a 
federally protected trademark.  Defendants moved to dismiss the charges; the trial court granted 
their motion with respect to counterfeiting on grounds that the facts alleged did not constitute an 
offense.  On interlocutory review the Court of Appeals concluded that all charges should be 
dismissed on grounds that Indiana lacked jurisdiction.  Disagreeing with our colleagues on this 
point, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
Yu-Ting Lin operates Generation Guns, a Houston, Texas based business, which imports 
from Taiwan and sells in this country certain products it labels as “airsoft guns.”1  An-Hung Yao, 
vice-president of a bank in Houston, is a friend of Lin’s and has helped her by setting up 
bookkeeping and computer systems for Lin’s business, and by attending trade shows with her.  
As part of an investigation into potential trademark infringements, firearms manufacturer 
Heckler & Koch, Inc. (“H & K”), through a private consulting firm and in cooperation with the 
Indiana State Police, ordered airsoft guns from Generation Guns.  H & K directed that the toy 
guns be shipped to an address in Huntington County, Indiana.  Lin, Yao, or both were allegedly 
involved in the process of receiving the order, accepting payment, and effecting shipment of the 
airsoft guns.  On the basis of H & K’s verification that the toys delivered to Huntington County 
were replicas of H & K’s real weapons, the Huntington County Prosecutor charged Lin and Yao 
with three counts each of Class D felony theft and Class D felony counterfeiting, and one count 
each of Class C felony corrupt business influence.   
 
                                                 
1 “Airsoft” guns are described as toy replicas that look like real guns, but shoot lightweight plastic pellets 
instead of metal BBs or live ammunition.  See, e.g., State v. Jasso, 273 P.3d 309, 309 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 
2012); People v. Glenn, 814 N.W.2d 686, 688 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).     
 
3 
 
Lin and Yao (collectively, the “Defendants”) moved to dismiss all charges against them.  
Defendants contended the facts cannot constitute the offense of theft because one cannot exert 
unauthorized control over a trademark.  Because the corrupt business influence charges were 
predicated on the theft counts,2 the Defendants argued for their dismissal on the same basis.  
With respect to the charge of counterfeiting the Defendants contended the facts alleged cannot 
constitute the crime of counterfeiting because an airsoft gun is not a written instrument within 
the meaning of the counterfeiting statute.  As to all charges Lin, but not Yao, also argued 
dismissal was required because Indiana lacked jurisdiction over the alleged offenses.3  The trial 
court entered an order granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the counterfeiting charges but 
denied the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges.  The 
trial court made no express ruling concerning Lin’s jurisdictional argument.  See Appellant Lin’s 
App. at A090-091.  The trial court also certified its order for interlocutory appeal; the Defendants 
separately appealed and the State cross-appealed.   
 
 
After accepting jurisdiction and consolidating the Defendants’ appeals, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that all charges should have been dismissed on grounds “the trial court lacked 
territorial jurisdiction because there is no evidence any conduct that is an element of the alleged 
offenses occurred in Indiana.”  Yao v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  The 
State sought transfer, which we granted.  See App. Rule 58(A).  Additional facts are set forth 
below where necessary.    
 
                                                 
2 As applicable to the Defendants in this case the statute provides in relevant part: 
A person . . . who is employed by or associated with an enterprise, and 
who knowingly or intentionally conducts or otherwise participates in the 
activities of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; 
commits corrupt business influence, a Class C felony. 
 
Ind. Code § 35-45-6-2(3).  As charged here “Racketeering activity” means “to commit” or “to attempt to 
commit” theft.  See I.C. § 35-45-6-1(e)(14).  
3 Although he did not raise it before the trial court, Yao adopted this argument on appeal.  As did the 
Court of Appeals, we decline to find waiver.  We summarily affirm this aspect of the court’s opinion.  
 
4 
Standard of Review 
 
 
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information for an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. 2008).  “An abuse of discretion 
occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 
circumstances before it.”  Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012).  A trial court 
also abuses its discretion when it misinterprets the law.  State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 
N.E.2d 794, 800 (Ind. 2011).   
 
Discussion 
 
 
On motion by a defendant Indiana law permits dismissal of a charging information on a 
number of grounds.  See I.C. § 35-34-1-4.  The Defendants here set forth two grounds for 
dismissal of the charges: one, dismissal is proper because “[t]he facts stated do not constitute an 
offense,” I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(5) and two, “[t]here exists some jurisdictional impediment to 
conviction of the defendant for the offense charged.”  I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(10).  We address the 
jurisdictional claim first. 
 
A. 
Territorial Jurisdiction 
 
 
Indiana Code section 35-41-1-1(b) provides “[a] person may be convicted under Indiana 
law of an offense if: (1) either the conduct that is an element of the offense, the result that is an 
element, or both, occur in Indiana.” (emphasis added).  The Defendants argue the trial court 
lacks jurisdiction over this prosecution because neither the “conduct that is an element of” nor 
“the result that is an element” of the charged offenses occurred in Indiana.  Br. in Opposition to 
Trans. at 10-11. 
 
 
We first observe that Indiana statutes do not list jurisdiction as an element of the offenses 
for which these Defendants are charged.  Nonetheless “[t]he plain, ordinary, and usual meaning 
of [I.C. § 35-41-1-1] clearly establishes ‘in Indiana’ as a prerequisite for Indiana criminal 
prosecutions and thus restricts the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction to Indiana’s actual 
 
5 
territorial boundaries.”  Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ind. 1994).  Consequently, this 
Court treats territorial jurisdiction as though it were an element of an offense and has held that 
the State must prove this element “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Ortiz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 370, 
375 (Ind. 2002).  Precisely because this is so “the issue must be submitted to the jury unless the 
court determines no reasonable jury could fail to find territorial jurisdiction beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id. (quoting McKinney v. State, 553 N.E.2d 860, 863-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)).  If the 
court makes such a determination then no jury instruction on the issue is required and the 
question of jurisdiction is decided by the court as a matter of law.  However, at this preliminary 
stage of the proceedings with only arguments of counsel informing the trial court’s decision, the 
basis of finding a lack of jurisdiction is necessarily constrained.  And appellate review is limited 
to whether the trial court abused its discretion.  
 
 
With respect to the charge of theft, the conduct prohibited by statute is “exert[ion of] 
unauthorized control.”  I.C. § 35-43-4-2.  The Defendants argue “[t]he only ‘exertion of control’ 
alleged by the State is the sale of airsoft guns.”  Br. of Lin at 18.  We first note that the charging 
informations – which the Defendants seek to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds – make no 
allegation concerning sale.  Rather they simply track the language of the statute and declare in 
relevant part: 
 
Sometime from June 2009 to August 2009, in Huntington County, 
Indiana, Yu-Ting Lin a/k/a Lin Yu Ting knowingly or intentionally 
exerted unauthorized control over property belonging to Heckler & 
Koch, Inc., with the intent to deprive the owner of any part of its 
value or use, namely: trademarks and/or markings or symbols of 
identification. 
 
Appellant Lin’s App. at A-018-020; see Appellant Yao’s App. at 62-64 (identically-worded 
information charging Yao with theft).  Second, contrary to the Defendants’ apparent claim, 
“exertion of control” is not limited to sale.  Instead to “exert control” means to “obtain, take, 
carry, drive, lead away, conceal, abandon, sell, convey, encumber, or possess property, or to 
secure, transfer, or extend a right to property.”  I.C. § 35-43-4-1.  If at trial the State fails to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendants, in Indiana, engaged in any one or more of 
these several forms of exerting control over the property of Heckler & Koch then the Defendants 
 
6 
will be entitled to acquittal, or perhaps judgment on the evidence.  But this is a sufficiency of the 
evidence determination.  At this stage of the proceedings we cannot say as a matter of law that 
the charging information is jurisdictionally infirm.  See, e.g., Benham, 637 N.E.2d at 138 
(“[U]pon a motion to dismiss [under I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(10)] the defendant is required to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
With respect to the charge of counterfeiting, the conduct prohibited by statute is 
“mak[ing] or utter[ing]” a written instrument.  I.C. § 35-43-5-2(a)(1) (now I.C. § 35-31.5-2-
345).4  Neither defendant makes a specific claim concerning this particular charge.  Instead both 
generally insist that all relevant conduct in this case took place in either Taiwan or the state of 
Texas, and ground their argument on the meaning of the sale of goods as used in the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  First, similar to “exert control” under the theft statute, “mak[ing] or 
utter[ing]” under the counterfeiting statute is not limited to the sale of goods.  Rather, to “utter” 
means “to issue, authenticate, transfer, publish, deliver, sell, transmit, present, or use.”  I.C. § 35-
41-1-27.  Second, even if the evidence later shows that the Defendants did not “sell” in Indiana 
property belonging to Heckler & Koch (within the meaning of the criminal statutes), this says 
nothing about whether the Defendants engaged in other forms of “making or uttering” a written 
instrument in Indiana. 
 
 
Consistent with the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in this case, the Defendants 
also claim there cannot be a more expansive understanding of jurisdiction under the criminal law 
than under the civil law.  See Br. in Opposition to Trans. at 12.  We disagree.  Writing for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Holmes laid down a broad basis for criminal territorial 
jurisdiction:  “Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing 
detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been 
present at the effect . . . .”  Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).  Further, “the scope of 
a state’s jurisdiction over defendants in criminal cases is bound up with the scope of its 
substantive criminal law” and criminal jurisdictional doctrine evolved quite independently from 
                                                 
4 Pursuant to Senate Enrolled Act 26 enacted by the Indiana General Assembly in 2012, several Indiana 
Code criminal law definitions were moved into a new section of the Code.  For convenience and clarity, 
we provide both citations. 
 
7 
the doctrine of civil jurisdiction.  Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1, 37 
(2010) (listing reasons for analyzing questions of criminal jurisdiction separately from questions 
of civil jurisdiction).  Cf. In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Mass. 1999) (“The jurisprudence 
of personal jurisdiction has no bearing on the question whether a person may be brought to a 
State and tried there for crimes under that State’s laws.”)  Today, criminal jurisdiction is for the 
most part a creature of expansive state statutes designed in part to permit prosecution for 
consequences felt within a state resulting from criminal acts occurring outside a state.  See 
Wayne R. LaFave, et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 16.4(c) at 847-49 (3d ed. 2007).   
 
 
In sum, we cannot conclude that as a matter of law the Defendants engaged in no conduct 
nor effected any result in Indiana that was an element of either the theft or the counterfeiting 
charge.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying sub silentio Lin’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.    
 
B. 
Do the Facts Alleged Constitute the Offense of Counterfeiting?  
 
 
 
The Informations charging the Defendants with counterfeiting allege in relevant part:  
 
Sometime from June 2009 to August 2009, in Huntington County, 
Indiana, An-Hung Yao, a/k/a Andy An-Hung Yao, knowingly or 
intentionally uttered a written instrument, namely: an airsoft gun, 
in such a manner that it purported to have been made by another 
person or by authority of one who did not give authority, namely: 
Heckler & Koch, Inc.  
 
Appellant Yao’s App. at 65; see also Appellant Lin’s App. A-015-017.  Generally contending the 
State is attempting to criminalize civil trademark infringement, and that an airsoft gun cannot 
constitute a written instrument, the Defendants moved to dismiss the counterfeiting charges.  The 
trial court granted the motions.  
 
 
To convict the Defendants of counterfeiting, the State must show they knowingly or 
intentionally made or uttered a written instrument in such a manner that it purports to have been 
 
8 
made by authority of one who did not give authority.  See I.C. § 35-43-5-2(a).  For purposes of 
the Indiana counterfeiting statute, “written instrument” is defined as follows: 
 
“Written instrument” means a paper, a document, or other 
instrument containing written matter and includes money, coins, 
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, medals, 
retail sales receipts, labels or markings (including a universal 
product code (UPC) or another product identification code), or 
other objects or symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification. 
 
I.C. § 35-43-5-1(t). 
 
 
The Defendants’ claim that their airsoft guns cannot constitute a written instrument is 
premised on their reading of the foregoing statute.  In short, according to the Defendants, a 
written instrument must consist of a “paper, a document, or other instrument containing written 
matter.”  As the Defendants see it, the remainder of the statute merely provides examples of 
instruments containing written matter.  In other words, the Defendants contend the “instrument” 
must contain “written matter” – which could be merely a marking or stamping of some kind – in 
order to qualify as an object of the counterfeiting statute.  And the Defendants appear to argue 
that because the toy guns obviously are not pieces of paper or documents and contain no written 
matter, they cannot be counterfeited.5 
 
 
 
On the other hand the State views the definition of “written instrument” as “a paper, a 
document, or other instrument containing written matter . . . or other objects or symbols of value, 
right, privilege, or identification.”  According to the State the phrase “and includes money, coins, 
. . . labels or markings . . . etc.” modifies the term “instrument containing written matter.”  In 
other words, a written instrument could be an instrument containing written matter or it could be 
an object or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification – whether or not such object or 
symbol contains any writings or markings. 
                                                 
5 The record is not entirely clear as to whether the airsoft guns “contain[ed] written matter.”  At the 
hearing on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the State argued that no such marking or inscription was 
necessary because the guns themselves, in their design, constituted “written instruments” under the 
counterfeiting statute.  See Lin’s Tr. of Hrg. on Mot. to Dismiss at 31-32.  Alternatively, the State argued 
that the guns did contain such a marking and therefore the guns were “written instruments” if such 
marking was necessary to make them so.  See Lin’s Tr. of Hrg. on Mot. to Dismiss at 31-32.   
 
9 
 
 
We think the State has the better of the argument.  It is true that criminal statutes must be 
strictly construed against the State, and “may not be enlarged beyond the fair meaning of the 
language used and . . . held to include offenses other than those clearly defined.”  Bond v. State, 
515 N.E.2d 856, 857-58 (Ind. 1987).  However, when the language is susceptible to more than 
one construction, we must construe the statute in accord with the apparent legislative intent.  
This is done by “giving effect to the ordinary and plain meaning of the language used in the 
statute.”  Clifft v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310, 316 (Ind. 1995) (citing Helton v. 
State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)).  Also, penal statutes are not to be read so 
narrowly as to exclude instances the statute fairly covers or in a manner that disregards 
legislative purposes and intent.  Merritt v. State, 829 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ind. 2005). 
 
 
The case of Jacobs v. State, 640 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied, is 
instructive.  In that case the defendant was charged with Class C felony forgery for selling t-
shirts displaying the federally registered trademarks of Guess, Nike, and Polo.  Like the 
counterfeiting statute, Indiana’s forgery statute applies to the making or uttering of a “written 
instrument” as defined in Indiana Code section 35-43-5-1.6  The Court of Appeals reviewed the 
legislative history and purpose of the “written instrument” definition and concluded that in 
revising the statute in 1976 the General Assembly intended to broaden the definition of the term.  
See id. at 65.  The result of this, the court concluded, was that the statute “encompass[ed] a wide 
range of prohibited conduct” including “the forgery of a registered trademark on a t-shirt.”  Id.  
at 64-65.7   
 
 
At first blush it seems intuitive that “written instrument” must at least consist of a 
document of some kind.  But we agree with the Jacobs court that the Legislature broadened the 
scope and definition of “written instrument” to include more than just documents, paper, and 
other instruments containing written matter.  Instead the definition includes “other objects or 
                                                 
6 The statute in Jacobs was essentially the same as it is today.  Written instrument was defined as “a 
paper, document, or other instrument containing written matter and includes money, coins, tokens, 
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, medals, or other objects or symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification.”  I.C. § 35-43-5-1 (1994 supp.). 
7Although the Jacobs holding applied to the printing on a t-shirt, the Jacobs court did not foreclose the 
possibility that the physical object (the t-shirt itself) could constitute a written instrument.   
 
10 
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.”  It seems clear enough to us that a handgun 
or rifle – just as an unsigned Monet painting, Frederick Remington sculpture, or Tiffany vase – 
could be subject to counterfeiting.  To require actual writing or markings on a replica in order to 
bring it within the reach of the counterfeiting statute would defeat the purpose of the statute and 
eliminate a very wide range of items.  We are not convinced the Legislature intended such a 
result.  
 
 
We conclude that Defendants’ airsoft gun is a written instrument within the meaning of 
the statute and therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the counterfeiting charges. 
 
C. 
Do the Facts Alleged Constitute the Offense of Theft?  
 
 
The Informations charging the Defendants with theft allege in relevant part:  
 
Sometime from June 2009 to August 2009, in Huntington County, 
Indiana, Yu-Ting Lin a/k/a Lin Yu Ting knowingly or intentionally 
exerted unauthorized control over property belonging to Heckler & 
Koch, Inc., with the intent to deprive the owner of any part of its 
value or use, namely: trademarks and/or markings or symbols of 
identification.  
 
Appellant Lin’s App. at A-018-020; see also Appellant Yao’s App. 62-64.  The trial court denied 
the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the theft charges and the related corrupt business influence 
charges.  The Defendants contend this was error because the facts alleged do not constitute the 
offense of theft.  See I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(5).   
 
 
Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2 provides in relevant part: “A person who knowingly or 
intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive 
the other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class D felony.”  In advancing 
their arguments the Defendants make two claims.  First, “trademarks and/or markings or 
symbols” as alleged in the State’s charging informations cannot constitute “property” under the 
theft statute.  Second, “it is not theoretically possible . . . to ‘exert unauthorized control’ over the 
 
11 
trademarks and/or markings or symbols.”  Appellant Lin’s App. at A-040; See Appellant Yao’s 
App. at 40.   
 
1. 
Trademarks, markings, and symbols as property 
 
 
Indiana Code section 35-41-1-23(a) (now I.C. § 35-31.5-2-253(a)) defines “property” as 
“anything of value.”  The statute specifies that property includes, among other things, “a gain or 
advantage,” “real property, personal property, money, labor, and services,” “intangibles,” and 
“trade secrets.”  I.C. § 35-41-1-23(a)(1), (2), (3), (9) (now I.C. § 35-31.5-2-253(a)(1), (2), (3), 
(9)).  The definition of property as “anything of value” including “intangibles” is extremely 
broad and we see no reason it could not encompass the charged “trademarks and/or markings or 
symbols of identification.”  See State v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985) (recognizing 
that the information derived from use of a computer constitutes property under the theft statute).  
Cf. Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 818 (Ind. 2009) (Boehm, 
J. concurring in result) (agreeing with the majority’s implication “that a website design is 
personal property and is subject to a conversion claim, whether or not it is ‘goods’ subject to the 
Uniform Commercial Code”).  We hasten to add that we do not declare that the “trademarks 
and/or markings or symbols of identification” at issue in this case actually have any value.  
Rather this is an evidentiary matter that is subject to proof at trial.  At this stage of the 
proceedings we reach the narrow conclusion that the charged items may constitute property 
depending on the evidence.  
 
2. 
Exertion of control over trademarks, markings, and symbols   
 
 
As discussed earlier, Indiana Code tells us what it means to “exert control” for purposes 
of the theft statute.  “‘[E]xert control over property’ means to obtain, take, carry, drive, lead 
away, conceal, abandon, sell, convey, encumber, or possess property, or to secure, transfer, or 
extend a right to property.”  I.C. § 35-43-4-1(a).  The Defendants contend that it is “not 
theoretically possible” to “‘exert unauthorized control’ over a third party’s trademark right.”  
Appellant Lin’s Br. at 9.  And this is so, according to the Defendants, because a trademark is 
merely the right to use an “identifier” to designate origin or aid in the sale of goods.  Appellant 
 
12 
Lin’s Br. at 9.  Thus, the argument continues, the property over which the Defendants are alleged 
to have exerted unauthorized control is H & K’s right to sell products with a distinctive 
appearance.  This, according to Defendants, may constitute trademark infringement but it cannot 
amount to the exertion of unauthorized control.  The Defendants also cite an unpublished federal 
district court opinion that  concluded: “[N]either the Defendants’ copying of the distinct look of 
the [H & K] weapon nor the use of [H & K’s registered trademark] itself constitutes obtaining, 
taking, carrying, driving, leading away, concealing, abandoning, selling, conveying, 
encumbering, or possessing [H & K’s] intangible property.”  Heckler & Koch, Inc. v. German 
Sport Guns GMBH, No. 09-cv-00039-WTL-JMS, 2009 WL 3200587, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 
2009).  The court’s rationale is not readily apparent.  In any event we disagree with the court’s 
conclusion.  First, we are examining a statute which clearly prohibits a very wide range of 
activity.  See Nash v. State, 433 N.E.2d 807, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (“It is well established in 
Indiana that subsection (a) of the theft statute, which makes it an offense to knowingly exert 
unauthorized control over property of another, comprehends a broad field of conduct . . . .”).  
Second, we see no reason a trademark right cannot at least be “encumbered.”  See, e.g., Black’s 
Law Dictionary 607 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “encumbrance” as “[a] claim or liability that is 
attached to property or some other right and that may lessen its value . . . ”); see also TRIPS: 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 20, 33 Int’l Legal 
Materials 908 (“The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably 
encumbered by special requirements, such as use with another trademark, use in a special form 
or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings.”).  
  
 
At the heart of and woven throughout the Defendants’ argument is the insistence that this 
case should be resolved under civil trademark infringement law, not criminal law.  Lin argues for 
example, “[b]y taking sides in this commercial dispute and trying to force a resolution in H [&] 
K’s favor under the coercive power of the criminal law, the State has subverted the process of 
rights-determination that trademark law is intended to embody.”  Appellant Lin’s Br. at 8.  But 
                                                 
8 More specifically, TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 20, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 
90.  
 
13 
whether a theft prosecution is “the ‘wrong tool for the job’ when it comes to defining intellectual 
property interests,” Appellant Yao’s Br. at 15 (quoting 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25:9:50 (4th ed. 2008)), is not our decision to make.  
Rather, our job is to apply the Indiana criminal statutes as drafted by the Legislature.  And under 
those statutes, the questions in this case include whether the Defendants, did beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 1) knowingly or intentionally; 2) obtain, take, carry, sell, convey, encumber, or possess 
property, or secure, transfer, or extend a right to property; 3) which property belonged to H & K; 
4) without H & K’s consent; 5) with intent to deprive H & K of any part of the property’s value 
or use?  And these are all questions of fact that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss.  Cf. 
McGraw, 480 N.E.2d at 553 (recognizing in prosecuting a person for unauthorized use of a 
computer as theft that dismissal may have been improper but judgment on the evidence was 
properly granted because the evidence did not support all the elements required by the theft 
statute).  In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motions 
to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss the charging informations on 
jurisdictional grounds, and its denial of Defendants’ motions to dismiss the charging 
informations alleging theft and corrupt business influence.  We reverse the trial court’s grant of 
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the charging informations alleging counterfeiting.  
 
Dickson, C.J., and David and Massa, JJ., concur.