Title: Alley v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 5, 2015
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT ALLEY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 5, 2015 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1212019156 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  June 4, 2015 
 
 
 
 
    Decided:  July 24, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 24th day of July 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and 
the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
On August 28, 2014, the defendant-appellant, Robert Alley, pled 
guilty to one count of Robbery in the Second Degree.  On December 19, 2014, 
after a presentence investigation and upon the State’s motion, the Superior Court 
found Alley to be a habitual offender and sentenced him under 11 Del. C. § 
4214(a) to a total period of eight years and six months at Level V incarceration, 
with credit for 726 days previously served.  This is Alley’s direct appeal. 
 
2
 
(2) 
Alley’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and 
careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, counsel informed Alley of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him 
with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief and 
appendix.  Alley also was informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s 
presentation.  Alley submitted four issues for inclusion in the Rule 26(c) brief.  
After the State filed its response to the Rule 26(c) brief, Alley’s counsel filed a 
letter including two additional points that Alley would like the Court to 
consider.  Although this submission is untimely and nonconforming, we 
nonetheless will address Alley’s supplemental points because it does not appear 
from defense counsel’s affidavit that counsel properly informed Alley that all of 
his points had to be submitted within the 30 day time limit set forth in Rule 
26(c)(ii)(B).    
 
(3) 
The Superior Court record reflects that Alley was indicted in this 
case in March 2013 for two counts of Robbery in the First Degree and one count 
of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony.  In June 2014, the 
State informed the Superior Court about a potential conflict between Alley and 
his appointed public defender because of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim that Alley was pursuing against another public defender in a 
 
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postconviction petition that he had filed in January 2013 challenging the validity 
of his 2008 guilty plea to felony Resisting Arrest.  In a colloquy with the 
Superior Court, Alley did not agree to waive any potential conflict of interest.  
The Superior Court thus appointed substitute conflict counsel to represent Alley 
in this matter.1   
 
(4) 
On August 18, 2014, Alley moved to proceed pro se with substitute 
counsel acting as standby counsel.  The Superior Court granted Alley’s motion.  
Several days later, however, Alley wrote a letter to the Superior Court stating 
that he had changed his mind and that he wanted his standby counsel to 
represent him.  Thus, on August 28, 2014, Alley, with the assistance of his 
counsel, pleaded guilty to one count of Robbery in the Second Degree.  The 
Superior Court accepted the guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation.  
At the guilty plea hearing, counsel informed the Superior Court that Alley 
intended to challenge the State’s motion to seek habitual offender sentencing 
because of an alleged defect related to his 2008 predicate felony conviction for 
Resisting Arrest.  Counsel informed the Superior Court that Alley’s 
postconviction motion challenging his 2008 conviction remained pending before 
another Superior Court judge. 
                                                 
1 The substitute counsel appointed by the Superior Court to represent Alley in this case was 
the same lawyer who had been appointed to represent Alley in his then-pending 
postconviction matter. 
 
4
 
(5) 
On December 1, 2014, the State moved to declare Alley to be a 
habitual offender.  By the time of Alley’s sentencing hearing on December 19, 
2014, the Superior Court had denied Alley’s postconviction motion challenging 
his 2008 predicate felony conviction,2 which this Court affirmed on appeal.3  
Thus, at Alley’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the Superior 
Court that there was no good faith basis to oppose the State’s habitual offender 
motion.  The Superior Court declared Alley to be a habitual offender under 11 
Del. C. § 4214(a) and sentenced Alley to eight years and six months at Level V 
incarceration.  This appeal followed. 
 
(6) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of 
defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold:  a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could 
arguably support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of 
the record in order to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at 
                                                 
2 State v. Alley, 2014 WL 605440 (Del. Super. Feb. 14, 2014). 
3 Alley v. State, 2014 WL 7009961 (Del. Nov. 20, 2014).  This Court also dismissed Alley’s 
petition for certiorari raising the same challenge to his 2008 conviction.  See In re Alley, 2014 
WL 7251989 (Del. Dec. 18, 2014). 
 
5
least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 
presentation.4    
 
(7) 
In response to his counsel’s motion, Alley raised four claims for 
inclusion in his counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief.  After the brief was filed, Alley 
raised two additional points in a supplemental filing.  Alley’s first point is that 
the Superior Court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender because his 
2008 felony conviction for Resisting Arrest was unconstitutional.  Second, Alley 
argues that his right to self-representation was denied when the Superior Court 
allowed defense counsel to represent him at the sentencing hearing and to 
concede his status as a habitual offender when Alley, in fact, wished to represent 
himself and challenge the State’s habitual offender motion.  Third, Alley asserts 
that the Superior Court and the State both interfered with his right to the counsel 
of his choice when it raised a non-existent conflict between Alley and his first 
lawyer, who was a public defender.  Fourth, Alley contends that substitute 
counsel violated his rights by withholding his mental health evaluation and the 
presentence investigation (“PSI”) report from him.  Fifth, Alley asserts that the 
indictment in his 2008 case was defective.  Finally, Alley contends that the 
Superior Court erred in sentencing him to more than the minimum mandatory 
five-year term of imprisonment.  We address these claims in order. 
                                                 
4 Penson v Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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(8) 
Alley first argues that the Superior Court erred in sentencing him as 
a habitual offender because his 2008 predicate felony conviction was 
constitutionally infirm.  By the time of Alley’s sentencing hearing, however, a 
different Superior Court judge already had rejected Alley’s postconviction 
challenge to his 2008 conviction.5  We affirmed that decision on appeal.6  Thus, 
we find no merit to Alley’s challenge to the validity of his 2008 conviction in 
this proceeding.  It is clear from the record that the State provided sufficient 
documentary evidence in this case to establish that Alley had the requisite 
number of predicate felony convictions to be declared a habitual offender.  
Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s imposition of Alley’s 
habitual offender sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). 
 
(9) 
Alley next contends that his counsel violated his right to self-
representation by informing the Superior Court that Alley did not oppose the 
State’s habitual offender motion because Alley did want to challenge the 
motion.  Alley, however, had written to the Superior Court and specifically 
requested to withdraw his request to proceed pro se.  Alley thus appeared at his 
sentencing represented by his counsel.  Under the circumstances, we find no 
merit to Alley’s contention that he was denied his right of self-representation 
                                                 
5 State v. Alley, 2014 WL 605440 (Del. Super. Feb. 14, 2014). 
6 Alley v. State, 2014 WL 7009961 (Del. Nov. 20, 2014). 
 
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because we find no clear and unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel.7  
Furthermore, after counsel informed the Superior Court at the sentencing 
hearing that Alley did not oppose the State’s habitual offender motion, Alley 
was given the opportunity to speak directly to the sentencing judge.  Alley spoke 
to the judge at length.  Alley did not contradict his counsel’s representation that 
there was no opposition to the State’s motion, nor did Alley offer any argument 
challenging his sentencing as a habitual offender.  Under these circumstances, 
we find no merit to Alley’s claim.  
 
(10) Alley’s third point is that the State and the Superior Court deprived 
him of his right to the counsel of his choice by raising a conflict between Alley 
and his public defender, which resulted in the appointment of conflict counsel.  
The record, however, belies Alley’s contention.  When the issue of a potential 
conflict with the public defender was brought to the Superior Court’s attention, 
the judge questioned Alley about the potential conflict on the record.  The judge 
indicated that it was unclear if an actual conflict existed, but the judge informed 
Alley that he could waive any potential conflict and continue to be represented 
by his assigned public defender.  Alley did not agree to waive any potential 
conflict.  Accordingly, the judge told him that conflict counsel would be 
appointed to represent him.  Neither Alley nor his public defender raised any 
                                                 
7 Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 197-98 (Del. 1980). 
 
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objection.  Under the circumstances, there is no merit to Alley’s suggestion that 
the State manufactured a conflict in order to deprive him of the counsel of his 
choice.  
 
(11) Alley’s fourth contention is that his substitute counsel violated his 
right to self-representation by failing to provide him with a copy of Alley’s 
mental health evaluation and the PSI report.  As we have already found, 
however, Alley was not self-represented.  He specifically requested to have his 
stand-by counsel reappointed to represent him.  Accordingly, there is no merit to 
his claim. 
 
(12) Alley’s fifth claim, which was included in his supplemental filing, 
raises a different challenge to the validity of his 2008 conviction by arguing that 
the indictment in that case was defective.  Even if we assume as a procedural 
matter that the Superior Court could have properly considered this claim before 
sentencing Alley as a habitual offender in this case, Alley in fact did not raise 
this argument below.  We find no basis to consider this belated argument for the 
first time in this appeal.8  
 
(13) Finally, Alley contends that the Superior Court erred in sentencing 
him to more than the minimum mandatory five year sentence.  Our review of a 
sentence generally ends upon a determination that the sentence is within the 
                                                 
8 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
9
statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.9  As Alley recognizes, his sentence 
was well within the range of authorized sentences.  Moreover, the Superior 
Court reviewed all of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors in 
Alley’s case and ultimately imposed a sentence that was less than the State’s 
recommendation.  On this record, we find no error or abuse in the Superior 
Court’s decision to sentence Alley as a habitual offender to eight and a half 
years in prison. 
 
(14) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Alley’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Alley’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Alley could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm 
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The 
motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
  
 
                                                 
9 Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 790 (Del. 2003).