Title: State v. Chambers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000411-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 2021

2021 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP411-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Decarlos K. Chambers, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 393 Wis. 2d 595,947 N.W.2d 648 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 23, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, LTD., Waukesha. 
There was an oral argument by Mark S. Rosen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Scott E. Rosenow. 
 
 
2021 WI 13 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP411-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF289) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Decarlos K. Chambers, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB. 23, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Chambers, 
No. 2019AP411-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jun. 2, 
2020), affirming the Milwaukee County circuit court's1 judgment 
of 
conviction 
and 
order 
denying 
Decarlos 
Chambers' 
postconviction motion.  The State charged Chambers with first-
degree reckless homicide with a dangerous weapon, as a party to 
a crime, and possession of a firearm by a person adjudicated 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner presided.  
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
2 
 
delinquent for a felony.  After a trial, a jury found Chambers 
guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless 
homicide with a dangerous weapon, as a party to a crime, and 
possession of a firearm by a person adjudicated delinquent for a 
felony.   
¶2 
After Chambers' conviction, the United States Supreme 
Court announced its decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 
U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).  In McCoy, the Court held that 
trial counsel cannot concede a client's guilt when a client 
expressly asserts that the objective of the defense is to 
maintain innocence and the client objects to the concession of 
guilt.  Id. at 1509.  The Court also held that this error is 
structural, and one for which a new trial is required.  Id. at 
1512. 
¶3 
Seeking to apply McCoy to his case, Chambers filed a 
postconviction motion challenging his judgment of conviction on 
the grounds that his trial counsel conceded his guilt during 
closing arguments contrary to his objective of maintaining 
absolute innocence and over his objections.  The circuit court 
disagreed with Chambers and held that Chambers' trial counsel 
did not concede his guilt during closing argument.  The court of 
appeals agreed, holding that Chambers' counsel did not violate 
the principles set forth in McCoy.  We also agree.  
¶4 
Because we conclude that Chambers' counsel never 
conceded his guilt during closing arguments, Chambers' McCoy 
claim fails.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On January 17, 2017, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Chambers.  The complaint alleged two counts.  
The first count alleged that Chambers committed first-degree 
reckless homicide with a dangerous weapon, as a party to a 
crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.05 (2017-18).2  
Specifically, the complaint alleged that Chambers "as a party to 
a crime, did recklessly cause the death of Kyle Tymone Weary, 
another human being, under circumstances which showed utter 
disregard for human life" "while using a dangerous weapon."  The 
second count, possession of a firearm by an adjudicated 
delinquent, alleged that Chambers possessed a firearm despite 
being adjudicated delinquent of an act that would constitute a 
felony, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(bm).  That same day, 
Chambers was arrested and made his initial appearance before the 
circuit court.  
¶6 
On January 25, 2017, the circuit court held a 
preliminary hearing, found probable cause for the charges, and 
bound Chambers over for trial.  On February 7, 2017, the court 
arraigned Chambers.  The State filed its Information, charging 
Chambers 
with 
the 
two 
counts 
contained 
in 
the 
criminal 
complaint.  Chambers pled not guilty to both counts.  
¶7 
On August 14, 2017, Chambers' jury trial commenced.  
After both sides rested their arguments, the circuit court began 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
4 
 
a discussion with the parties regarding jury instructions.  The 
State requested that the court instruct the jury as to the 
lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless homicide.  
Chambers did not object.  Chambers' trial counsel requested time 
to discuss the proposed jury instructions with Chambers prior to 
the court finalizing those instructions.  After a discussion off 
the record, Chambers' trial counsel confirmed that Chambers 
agreed with the proposed jury instructions, including the 
instruction for second-degree reckless homicide.   
¶8 
The following day, August 16, 2017, the circuit court 
instructed the jury and both parties made their closing 
arguments.  As part of her closing argument, Chambers' trial 
counsel stated that because "whoever shot [Kyle Weary]" did so 
"at night, in the dark, in the rain, a distance away," the jury 
"should 
consider" 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide. 
 
She 
concluded the closing argument by insisting that because there 
was reasonable doubt based on the evidence, the jury "should 
find [Chambers] not guilty." 
¶9 
The court then submitted the case to the jury, which 
began its deliberation.  Later that afternoon, the jury returned 
its verdict.  The jury found Chambers guilty of the lesser-
included offense of second-degree reckless homicide with a 
dangerous weapon, as a party to a crime, for count one and 
guilty of possession of a firearm by a person adjudicated 
delinquent for a felony for count two.  The court sentenced 
Chambers to ten years of initial confinement and eight years of 
extended supervision on count one and two years of initial 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
5 
 
confinement and three years of extended supervision on count 
two, with the sentences to run consecutively.  
¶10 On December 12, 2018, Chambers filed his motion 
seeking postconviction relief.  In this motion, he claimed that 
his trial counsel conceded his guilt against his expressed 
intent to maintain absolute innocence, contrary to the new rule 
the United States Supreme Court announced in McCoy, 138 
S. Ct. 1500 (2018).  Specifically, Chambers argued that when his 
trial counsel stated that the jury "should consider" second-
degree reckless homicide, it was a concession of his guilt on 
the lesser-included offense.  Because this error is structural, 
Chambers asserted that he must receive a new trial to remedy the 
error.  The circuit court denied Chambers' postconviction 
motion, holding that Chambers' trial counsel never conceded his 
guilt at trial.  
¶11 Chambers appealed both his judgment of conviction and 
the circuit court's order denying his postconviction motion.  
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  Chambers, No. 
2019AP411-CR, ¶5.  The court of appeals held that, "[t]rial 
counsel's closing argument, read in its entirety, shows that 
trial counsel did not concede Chambers' guilt."  Id.  
¶12 On June 30, 2020, Chambers petitioned this court for 
review.  We granted review. 
 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
6 
 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 Chambers alleges that his trial counsel conceded his 
guilt 
in 
closing 
argument, 
violating 
his 
right 
to 
"the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence," which the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees.  "This 
court 
independently 
reviews 
whether 
deprivation 
of 
a 
constitutional right has occurred."  State v. Jones, 2010 WI 72, 
¶23, 326 Wis. 2d 380, 797 N.W.2d 378.  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶14 We 
begin 
our 
analysis 
by 
discussing 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment and McCoy.  We then turn to the merits of Chambers' 
McCoy claim in this case.3 
A.  The Sixth Amendment and McCoy 
¶15 The Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence."  This right "speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel, 
and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant."  
McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 820 (1975)).  While counsel "is still an assistant," 
                                                 
3 The State argued that Chambers forfeited his right to 
raise a McCoy claim.  Because we reject Chambers' claim on the 
merits, we decline to address the State's forfeiture argument.  
See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 
Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 ("Issues that are not dispositive 
need not be addressed.").  
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
7 
 
"[t]rial management is the lawyer's province."  Id.  This means 
that "[c]ounsel provides his or her assistance by making 
decisions such as 'what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary 
objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding 
the admission of evidence.'"  Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008)).  While counsel makes the 
decisions regarding trial management, some decisions "are 
reserved for the client——notably, whether to plead guilty, waive 
the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and 
forgo appeal."  Id.   
¶16 The United States Supreme Court has previously held 
that "[w]hen counsel informs the defendant of the strategy 
counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the 
defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not 
impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit 
consent."  Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 192 (2004).  In 
Nixon, Nixon's counsel repeatedly explained that the litigation 
strategy he was pursuing was to concede guilt and focus on the 
penalty phase of the trial——attempting to avoid a death penalty 
sentence.  Id. at 181.  "Nixon was generally unresponsive" to 
these explanations and neither consented nor objected to his 
counsel's strategy.  Id.  Counsel followed his proposed 
litigation strategy, but Nixon was still found guilty and 
sentenced to death.  Id. at 184.  Nixon appealed, arguing that 
his counsel provided ineffective assistance because his counsel 
never obtained his express consent to a strategy of conceding 
guilt.  Id. at 186-87.  The United States Supreme Court 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
8 
 
disagreed and concluded that when the defendant "neither 
consents nor objects" to a strategy of conceding guilt, such 
decisions are within the scope of counsel's strategic choices.4  
Id. at 178.  
¶17 The United States Supreme Court recently distinguished 
its Nixon holding.  McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1512.  In McCoy, the 
defendant's counsel "concluded that the evidence against McCoy 
was overwhelming and that, absent a concession at the guilt 
stage that McCoy was the killer, a death sentence would be 
impossible to avoid at the penalty phase."  Id. at 1506 
(footnote omitted).  McCoy "vociferously insisted that he did 
not engage in the charged acts and adamantly objected to any 
admission of guilt."  Id. at 1505.  Instead of complying with 
McCoy's wishes, his counsel told the jury during his opening 
argument that "there was 'no way reasonably possible' that [the 
jury] could hear the prosecution's evidence and reach 'any other 
conclusion than Robert McCoy was the cause of these individuals' 
death.'"  Id. at 1506 (quoted source omitted).  In his closing 
argument, McCoy's counsel "reiterated that McCoy was the killer" 
and "told the jury that he 'took [the] burden off of [the 
prosecutor].'"  Id. at 1507 (quoted source omitted).  The jury 
found him guilty and returned three death sentences.  Id.  
                                                 
4 The United States Supreme Court determined that such 
claims are subject to a standard ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel analysis, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688 (1984).   
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
9 
 
¶18 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the question of "whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense 
counsel to concede guilt over the defendant's intransigent and 
unambiguous objection."  Id. at 1507.  The Court held that 
"[a]utonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to 
assert innocence" belongs in the category of decisions reserved 
for the defendant alone.5  Id. at 1508.  A lawyer violates that 
autonomy "[w]hen a client expressly asserts that the objective 
of 'his defence' is to maintain innocence of the charged 
criminal acts" and the lawyer acts contrary to that objective.  
Id. at 1509 (quoting U.S. Const. amend VI).  The Court expounded 
upon this holding: 
If a client declines to participate in his defense, 
then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense 
pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the 
defendant's best interest. Presented with express 
statements of the client's will to maintain innocence, 
however, counsel may not steer the ship the other way.  
Id.  The Court concluded that this error was structural and 
therefore subject to neither the Court's ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel jurisprudence nor ordinary harmless-error analysis.  
Id. at 1510-11.  
¶19 Distinguishing McCoy's facts from Nixon's facts, the 
Court explained that Nixon's counsel did not violate Nixon's 
autonomy because Nixon never asserted that his desired defense 
                                                 
5 We note that the United States Supreme Court made this 
holding specifically in the context of a capital murder case.  
See McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 
(2018).  We assume, without deciding, that this holding applies 
equally in non-capital murder cases.   
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
10 
 
objective was absolute innocence.  Id. at 1509-10.  Instead, 
"Nixon 'was generally unresponsive' during discussions of trial 
strategy, and 'never verbally approved or protested' counsel's 
proposed approach."  Id. at 1509 (citing Nixon, 543 U.S. at 
181).  While Nixon complained about the admission of guilt only 
after trial, Nixon, 543 U.S. at 185, McCoy opposed his counsel's 
admission of guilt "at every opportunity."  McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 
1509.  Ultimately in McCoy, the Court held that because his 
counsel conceded his guilt against his insistent objections, 
McCoy's Sixth Amendment rights were violated, and McCoy was 
granted a new trial due to the error.  Id. at 1512.6 
¶20 Accordingly, 
to 
succeed 
on 
a 
McCoy 
claim, 
the 
defendant must show that he or she "expressly assert[ed] that 
the objective of 'his defence' is to maintain innocence of the 
charged criminal acts" and the lawyer did not "abide by that 
objective and [overrode] it by conceding guilt."  Id. at 1509; 
see, e.g., Atwater v. State, 300 So. 3d 589, 591 (Fla. 2020) 
(dismissing a McCoy claim because the defendant did not 
"express[] to counsel that his objective was to maintain his 
innocence or that he expressly objected to any admission of 
guilt"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 13, 2021) 
(No. 20-6851); United States v. Felicianosoto, 934 F.3d 783, 787 
(8th Cir. 2019) (analyzing the record to determine the defendant 
                                                 
6 McCoy holds that in order to prove a Sixth Amendment 
violation, a defendant must have expressed to his counsel his 
clear opposition to admission of his guilt.  We read McCoy as 
not necessarily requiring a defendant to contemporaneously 
object on the record in order to preserve that claim.  
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
11 
 
did not maintain absolute innocence), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
2644 (2020); Merck v. State, 298 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 2020) 
(holding that counsel did not concede guilt at trial), petition 
for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 8, 2021) (No. 20-6806); United 
States v. Wilson, 960 F.3d 136, 143-44 (3rd Cir. 2020) 
(describing the kinds of concessions reserved for the defendant 
under McCoy), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2021 WL 78300 (2021); 
Truelove v. State, 945 N.W.2d 272, 276 (N.D. 2020) (holding that 
the defendant did not meet either requirement of a McCoy claim).  
B.  Chambers' McCoy Claim 
¶21 Chambers argues that his trial counsel violated his 
right to autonomy, recognized in McCoy, necessitating that he 
receive a new trial.7  Chambers asserts that when his trial 
counsel told the jury that it should "consider" second-degree 
reckless homicide instead of first-degree reckless homicide, his 
trial counsel conceded his guilt to the lesser-included offense 
of second-degree reckless homicide.  We conclude that Chambers' 
                                                 
7 We note that the parties agree that McCoy announced a new 
rule for criminal prosecutions and must be applied retroactively 
to Chambers' case as it is before us on direct review.  See 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) ("[A] new rule 
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied 
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which 
the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."); State 
v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993) (applying 
the Griffith rule to Wisconsin). 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
12 
 
trial counsel did not concede his guilt during closing argument.8  
Accordingly, Chambers' McCoy claim fails.  
¶22 Chambers argues that the following statement in his 
trial counsel's closing argument conceded his guilt:  
But the jury instruction tells you to all see if 
you can agree on first-degree reckless.  And only if 
you can't, then you should go to the second part, 
which is second-degree reckless, right? 
Second-degree 
reckless 
is 
also 
criminally 
reckless conduct.  Which I think everybody would agree 
that should you have a gun, shooting in the direction 
of a house or person, is criminally reckless conduct. 
And I think that under these circumstances, the 
second-degree reckless -- that does not include utter 
disregard for human life is something you should 
consider.  There's an actual description. 
And the jury instructions from the judge say the 
difference between first and second-degree reckless 
homicide is that first-degree requires a proof of one 
additional element.  Circumstances of conduct showed 
utter disregard for human life. 
                                                 
8 Because the record here demonstrates that Chambers' 
counsel did not concede his guilt, we assume, without deciding, 
that Chambers "expressly assert[ed] that the objective of 'his 
defence' is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts," 
satisfying the first requirement of a McCoy claim.  138 
S. Ct. 1509.  Additionally, because of this assumption, we need 
not address the situation of when the State and defendant 
disagree about whether the defendant "expressly assert[ed] that 
the objective of 'his defence' is to maintain innocence of the 
charged criminal acts," as a McCoy claim requires. Id.  Compare 
United States v. Felicianosoto, 934 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir. 
2019) (declining to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing) 
with State v. Howard, No. 2019AP1384-CR, ¶42, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020) (per curiam) (remanding the 
case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether McCoy was 
violated).  
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
13 
 
So again, shooting a gun in the dark, when 
somebody is shooting a gun already, and it's clear 
that the ShotSpotter evidence is that there is 
overlapping shots, right?  It's not like one person or 
one gun shoots and then stops, and then another gun 
shoots, 
does 
not 
support 
first-degree 
reckless 
homicide. 
(Emphasis added.)  Chambers argues that when his trial counsel 
stated that the jury should "consider" second-degree reckless 
homicide, she conceded his guilt.  However, in reviewing her 
entire closing argument, we conclude that Chambers' trial 
counsel never conceded Chambers' guilt.9   
¶23 Chambers primarily focuses his argument on his trial 
counsel's use of the word "consider."  However, the language 
that trial counsel used matches the language of the jury 
instruction the court read.  Prior to Chambers' closing 
argument, the circuit court instructed the jury.  As part of 
those jury instructions, the court told the jury that it must 
consider whether the defendant was guilty of second-degree 
reckless 
homicide. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
court 
stated 
the 
following: 
 
The defendant in this case is charged with first-
degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime.  You 
must first consider whether the defendant is guilty of 
that offense.   
 
If you're not satisfied the defendant's guilty of 
first-degree reckless homicide, as a party to a crime, 
                                                 
9 Because we conclude that Chambers' trial counsel did not 
concede his guilt during closing argument, we do not address the 
State's argument that counsel can maintain absolute innocence 
while simultaneously suggesting that, in the alternative to 
absolute innocence, the jury should consider a lesser-included 
offense if the jury believes the defendant to be guilty.   
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
14 
 
you must consider whether or not the defendant is 
guilty of second-degree reckless homicide, as a party 
to a crime, which is a less serious degree of 
homicide.  
. . . . 
 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant or a person the defendant was a 
party to a crime with caused the death of Kyle Weary 
by 
criminally 
reckless 
conduct, 
and 
that 
the 
circumstances of the conduct showed utter disregard 
for human life, you should find the defendant guilty 
of first-degree reckless homicide.  
 
If you are not so satisfied, you must not find 
the 
defendant 
not 
[sic] 
guilty 
of 
first-degree 
reckless homicide, party to a crime, and you should 
consider whether the defendant is guilty of second-
degree reckless homicide, as a party to a crime, in 
violation of 940 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, 
which is a lesser included offense of first-degree 
reckless homicide as a party to a crime.  
(Emphases added.)10  Accordingly, when counsel stated that the 
jury should "consider" second-degree reckless homicide, she was 
                                                 
10 This jury instruction is nearly identical to the pattern 
jury instruction for first- and second-degree reckless homicide. 
See Wis. JI—Criminal 1022 (2015). The pattern jury instruction 
provides: 
The defendant in this case is charged with first 
degree reckless homicide, and you must first consider 
whether the defendant is guilty of that offense.  If 
you are not satisfied that the defendant is guilty of 
first degree reckless homicide, you must consider 
whether or not the defendant is guilty of second 
degree reckless homicide which is a less serious 
degree of criminal homicide. 
. . . .  
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant caused the death of (name of 
victim) by criminally reckless conduct and that the 
circumstances of the conduct showed utter disregard 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
15 
 
merely restating the jury instruction the circuit court gave 
earlier that morning.11   
¶24 If the similarity between the jury instruction and 
what Chambers' trial counsel said were all we had to review in 
this case, it may be a more difficult decision.  We have more 
than just this similarity in this case.  We have all of 
Chamber's trial counsel's closing argument, which when read in 
its entirety (as the jury would have heard it), unquestionably 
shows that Chambers' trial counsel never conceded his guilt.  
Immediately preceding the statements that Chambers believes show 
the concession, his trial counsel made the following statement: 
                                                                                                                                                             
for human life, you should find the defendant guilty 
of first degree reckless homicide. 
If you are not so satisfied, you must not find 
the 
defendant 
guilty 
of 
first 
degree 
reckless 
homicide, 
and 
you 
should 
consider 
whether 
the 
defendant is guilty of second degree reckless homicide 
in violation of § 940.06 of the Criminal Code of 
Wisconsin, which is a lesser included offense of first 
degree reckless homicide. 
Wis. JI—Criminal 1022, at 1, 3 (2015) (emphases added). 
11 Chambers specifically consented to the inclusion of this 
jury instruction that used the word "consider."  If he felt that 
instructing the jury to "consider" second-degree reckless 
homicide was a concession of guilt, he could have objected to 
the jury instruction at that time.  Had he done so, the circuit 
court, as well as appellate courts, could examine the jury 
instruction to determine if it accurately restates that law or 
is constitutionally infirm.  See, e.g., State v. Trammell, 2019 
WI 59, ¶15, 387 Wis. 2d 156, 928 N.W.2d 564 (reviewing whether 
Wis. 
JI——Criminal 
140 
(2017) 
misstates 
the 
law 
or 
is 
constitutionally infirm).  
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
16 
 
In this case, though, whoever shot that person 
who made the bad decision, Kyle Weary, whoever shot 
him is at night, in the dark, in the rain, a distance 
away.  You heard the medical examiner say it's not a 
close-up shot.  And it is under circumstances that are 
so confusing and so not clearly utter disregard for 
human life that I don't agree that the first-degree 
reckless homicide is a reasonable verdict. 
She also concluded the argument asserting Chambers' absolute 
innocence, stating the following: 
That's what he said at the beginning.  Not guilty.  
Denied each and every element of the crime. 
In this case, there is information that if 
believed, if it is found to be credible, reliable 
evidence might support the fact that Decarlos Chambers 
was the shooter.  But that's the problem.  It might 
support it. 
And this is not a civil case where you think 
about who's got a little better story than the other 
side and balance it out.  And I'm balancing my hands 
like the scales of justice.  That's where that comes 
from. 
In this case, you know, this is a homicide case.  
There are serious consequences to Mr. Chambers.  This 
is a case where there has to be confidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt before there should be a conviction. 
And because of the problems that I've pointed out 
that you all know, you all sat there and listened, had 
notebooks.  I’m sure you'll go back there and think of 
some things that I [didn't] think about that are 
inconsistent, 
that 
don't 
add 
up, 
that 
are 
contradictions, that lead you to what I think is a 
reasonable conclusion that there's not sufficient 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Decarlos 
Chambers. 
I think that you should find him not guilty. 
These statements demonstrate that Chambers' trial counsel never 
abandoned his position of absolute innocence.  She continued to 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
17 
 
advocate Chambers' absolute innocence both before and after she 
told the jury to "consider" second-degree reckless homicide.   
¶25 When looking at the entire record, it is clear that 
Chambers' trial counsel never conceded his guilt.  She was 
mirroring 
the 
language 
from 
the 
jury 
instructions 
and 
continually advocated his absolute innocence throughout her 
closing argument.  Accordingly, Chambers' McCoy claim fails.    
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 Because we conclude that Chambers' counsel never 
conceded his guilt during closing arguments, Chambers' McCoy 
claim fails.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2019AP411-CR   
 
 
 
1