Title: Commonwealth v. Jackson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031186
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., 
and Carrico and Compton, S.JJ. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 031186 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
January 16, 2004 
KENNETH LAMONT JACKSON 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a trial judge must 
recuse himself from presiding over a probation revocation 
hearing if he was the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the 
jurisdiction at the time and place of the defendant’s original 
criminal conviction.  The Court of Appeals held that recusal was 
mandatory under such circumstances.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 40 
Va. App. 343, 579 S.E.2d 375 (2003).  We disagree. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
In 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, Kenneth Lamont 
Jackson pled guilty in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk 
to two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 
and was sentenced to 20 years in the penitentiary with 18 years 
suspended.  After his release from confinement, he was accused 
of violating the terms of his suspended sentence and ordered to 
show cause why the suspended sentence should not be revoked. 
 
Judge Charles D. Griffith, Jr. was the presiding judge at 
Jackson’s revocation hearing.  Counsel for Jackson requested 
Judge Griffith to recuse himself because he was the elected 
Commonwealth’s Attorney in Norfolk at the time Jackson was 
convicted of the offenses resulting in the suspended sentence.  
Judge Griffith took the oath of office as a judge of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk after the date of Jackson’s 
original sentencing.  Judge Griffith denied Jackson’s motion, 
and after hearing the evidence found that Jackson had violated 
the terms of his suspended sentence. Judge Griffith revoked the 
previously suspended sentence. 
Jackson appealed the judgment of the trial court alleging 
that Judge Griffith erred by failing to recuse himself from the 
case.  Pursuant to Code § 17.1-402(D), the appeal was heard by 
the Court of Appeals, en banc “upon its own motion.”  The Court 
of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court citing 
concern for “maintaining the integrity of the judicial system.”  
Jackson, 40 Va. App. at 347, 579 S.E.2d at 376-77.  Holding that 
the probation revocation hearing “was a continuation of the 
proceedings of [Jackson’s] underlying criminal conviction,”  id. 
at 347, 579 S.E.2d at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
the Court of Appeals concluded that “Judge Griffith served as 
both the accuser at the original trial, and the trier-of-fact in 
the continuation of the same proceeding” and, therefore, had 
“abused his judicial discretion as a matter of law, in refusing 
to recuse himself in this matter.”  Id. at 348, 349, 579 S.E.2d 
 
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377, 378.  The Commonwealth appealed the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
II. Analysis 
 
Jackson’s basis for demanding Judge Griffith’s recusal was 
Canon 3(E)(1)(b) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for the State 
of Virginia.  This Canon states in pertinent part that a judge 
shall disqualify himself or herself if “[t]he judge served as a 
lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the 
judge previously practiced law served during such association as 
a lawyer concerning the matter.”  While the Canons may be 
helpful, the case law of the Commonwealth determines whether 
failure to recuse warrants reversal of a judgment.  A purported 
violation of the Canons alone is not enough to mandate reversal.  
See Welsh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 300, 317, 416 S.E.2d 451, 
461 (1992); Davis v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 587, 591, 466 
S.E.2d 741, 743 (1996). 
 
In Green v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 191, 195-96, 557 S.E.2d 
230, 233 (2002), we held that, in Virginia, while a probation 
revocation hearing is a criminal proceeding, it “is not a stage 
of a criminal prosecution.”  See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 782 (1973).  Our decision in Green overrules any 
implication to the contrary in Merritt v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. 
App. 506, 509, 528 S.E.2d 743, 744 (2000), and is controlling 
 
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over any dicta to the contrary in Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 
303, 305 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 
Our holding in Green undercuts the primary basis for the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, which was that “Judge Griffith 
served as both the accuser at the original trial, and the trier-
of-fact in the continuation of the same proceeding.”  Jackson, 
40 Va. App. at 348, 579 S.E.2d at 377.  In fact, Judge Griffith 
was not the trier-of-fact at a continuation of the same 
proceeding.  He was the trier-of-fact at a separate proceeding.  
We have not required a judge to recuse him or herself from a 
case merely because he or she has seen or had indirect knowledge 
of the defendant on a previous occasion, without a showing of 
bias or prejudice.  See Deahl v. Winchester Dept. of Social 
Services, 224 Va. 664, 672-73, 299 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1983); 
Davis, 21 Va. App. at 591, 466 S.E.2d at 743. 
 
Jackson’s argument would result in per se disqualification 
of any judge who had served as Commonwealth’s Attorney in any 
matter involving individuals who had committed a crime or been 
prosecuted at the time that the judge was Commonwealth’s 
Attorney without any indication of the judge’s actual prior 
involvement in the case or other evidence of bias or prejudice.  
We have rejected, and continue to reject, such a per se rule.  
See Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 673, 283 S.E.2d 905, 
908 (1981). 
 
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In a case such as this one, the party moving for recusal of 
a judge has the burden of proving the judge’s bias or prejudice.  
Jackson has not met this burden. 
 
In the absence of proof of actual bias, recusal is properly 
within the discretion of the trial judge.  See id. at 674, 283 
S.E.2d at 908; Motley v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 262, 
536 S.E.2d 101, 106 (2000).  In this case, Judge Griffith did 
not abuse his discretion.  The revocation proceeding, while 
criminal in nature, is not the same proceeding as the original 
trial or sentencing.  Additionally, there is no evidence that 
Judge Griffith treated Jackson in a biased or prejudicial manner 
at the revocation hearing. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 
reversed, the case will be remanded to the Court of Appeals with 
direction that the Court of Appeals remand the case to the trial 
court, and the trial court’s judgment shall be reinstated. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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