Title: State v. VanBeek
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP000447-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 4, 2021

2021 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP447-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Heather Jan VanBeek, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 4, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 23, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Kent R. Hoffman   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶¶22-35 and ¶¶46-65, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect 
to ¶¶1-21, ¶¶36-45, and ¶66.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by Jay 
Pucek, assistant state public defender. There was an oral 
argument by Jay Pucek. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Scott E. Rosenow. 
 
 
 
2021 WI 51 
 
 NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.2019AP447-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF720) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Heather Jan VanBeek, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 4, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to ¶¶22-35 and ¶¶46-65, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect 
to ¶¶1-21, ¶¶36-45, and ¶66.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Sheboygan County.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case is before us 
on certification from the court of appeals1 pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2019-20).2  The court of appeals certified 
                     
1 State v. VanBeek, No. 2019AP447-CR, certification (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2020). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
(continued) 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
2 
 
the following question:  "whether a consensual encounter becomes 
an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment when an 
officer requests and takes an individual's driver's license to 
the 
officer's 
squad 
car 
without 
reasonable 
suspicion."  
Accordingly, we review the Circuit Court of Sheboygan County's3 
judgment of conviction of Heather VanBeek for possession of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.  VanBeek's conviction 
arose from a search of her vehicle that she contends violated 
her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.   
¶2 
On the certified question, we conclude that the answer 
depends 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances 
surrounding 
an 
encounter.  Further, while VanBeek was not seized when Officer 
Oetzel took her driver's license to run a records check, VanBeek 
was seized when Oetzel returned to her vehicle, withheld her 
driver's license and continued to question her and her passenger 
in order to hold her until a drug-sniff dog, i.e., the K9 unit, 
that he had requested arrived.  Finally, we conclude that the 
seizure 
was 
unlawful 
because, 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances, Oetzel did not have reasonable suspicion that 
VanBeek was engaged in criminal activity at the time he seized 
her.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment of 
                                                                  
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Honorable Kent Hoffman of Sheboygan County presided. 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
3 
 
conviction and remand with instruction to grant VanBeek's motion 
to suppress. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual Background 
¶3 
On the night of November 12, 2017, the City of 
Sheboygan Police Department received an anonymous call that a 
truck, 
with 
two 
occupants, 
had 
been 
sitting 
near 
the 
intersection of 6th Street and Superior Avenue in Sheboygan for 
approximately an hour.  The caller also stated that a person 
approached the truck with a backpack and left later without it.  
The caller provided no description of the truck.   
¶4 
Sheboygan Police Officer Sung Oetzel responded to the 
call.  When he arrived, Oetzel saw only one truck in the 
location that had been identified.  However, to be sure it was 
the truck to which the caller referred, he quickly drove around 
the area and confirmed there was only one truck with two 
occupants nearby.  Oetzel parked his squad car behind the truck 
and activated his squad car's spotlight.4  
¶5 
VanBeek and her passenger, Branden Sitzberger, were 
sitting in VanBeek's truck when Oetzel approached.  Oetzel made 
contact with VanBeek, saying that "someone called in, suspicious 
that two people were just sitting here."5  VanBeek responded that 
                     
4 He did not activate his squad car's red and blue emergency 
lights. 
5 The entire interaction between VanBeek and Oetzel was 
recorded on Oetzel's body camera.  
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
4 
 
she was "waiting for [Sitzberger] to walk."  Sitzberger 
similarly stated that VanBeek had just picked him up.  Oetzel 
informed VanBeek that the caller said VanBeek had been sitting 
there for an hour, which VanBeek denied.  Sitzberger said it had 
been "about ten minutes."  Oetzel responded by saying "it was an 
anonymous caller, you know how people exaggerate sometimes.  I 
don't know."  VanBeek answered affirmatively when Oetzel asked 
if Sitzberger was her boyfriend and if she was "just waiting"; 
Oetzel responded "sounds legit."  During his initial encounter 
with VanBeek, Oetzel did not ask about a backpack or a third 
person that the caller had mentioned.  There is nothing in the 
record to show whether such a person had been present.   
¶6 
Oetzel then asked VanBeek and Sitzberger for their 
information "for his report, so [he] [could] just get out of 
[here]."  Sitzberger asked if Oetzel was going to just write 
down the information.  Oetzel told Sitzberger he wanted their 
"IDs" so he could "compare faces."  While VanBeek and Sitzberger 
were giving their driver's licenses to Oetzel, Oetzel asked what 
they were doing that night, and Sitzberger responded that 
VanBeek had just picked him up and they were going back to 
Cascade.  Oetzel took possession of their driver's licenses and 
said "Okay.  I'll be right back, okay."  VanBeek and Sitzberger 
replied "alright." 
¶7 
Before returning to his squad car, Oetzel spoke to 
another officer who had arrived on scene.  Oetzel told the other 
officer that VanBeek said she was "waiting for her boyfriend" 
and "[he] [didn't] think it [was] anything suspicious."  When he 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
5 
 
ran a records check on VanBeek and Sitzberger, Oetzel discovered 
that neither person had outstanding warrants.  However, Oetzel 
learned that VanBeek had overdosed in February of that year and 
that Sitzberger was on supervision.  Based on these two 
additional facts, Oetzel called for the K9 unit.  Oetzel then 
exited his squad car and once again spoke to the other officer 
who was on scene.  As he returned to VanBeek's vehicle, Oetzel 
asked the other officer if he "had enough to just hold them 
until [the K9 unit] [got] [there]."  
¶8 
After 
he 
returned 
to 
VanBeek's 
vehicle, 
while 
retaining possession of their driver's licenses, Oetzel asked 
VanBeek and Sitzberger numerous questions, some of which he had 
already asked and they had answered.  For example, Oetzel asked 
VanBeek to confirm that she lived in Cascade, to repeat her 
address, to confirm her date of birth, and to provide a phone 
number.  As Oetzel questioned her, VanBeek asked whether her 
"license was bad."  Oetzel answered no, and she answered 
Oetzel's questions.  After questioning VanBeek, Oetzel moved on 
to Sitzberger, asking him to confirm his address and for a phone 
number.  Sitzberger also complied.   
¶9 
While 
retaining 
their 
driver's 
licenses, 
Oetzel 
continued his questioning, saying "Heather, you were saying that 
you were picking him up.  I thought you [Sitzberger] said you 
live here."  Sitzberger denied saying that he lived in the area 
and that he was at a friend's house.  Oetzel asked, "which 
friend?" and Sitzberger responded with the name "Jake" who he 
said lived "a couple blocks down."  Oetzel asked whether Jake 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
6 
 
lived on Superior, and Sitzberger responded affirmatively, 
though he seemed unsure whether Jake lived at 7th or 8th street.  
Sitzberger said that he thought VanBeek was outside but did not 
see her, so he called her and walked around trying to find her.   
¶10 Oetzel then asked Sitzberger more questions about 
Jake, including where exactly on Superior Jake lived, for Jake's 
full name, and for Jake's phone number.  Oetzel told Sitzberger 
that he "just want[ed] to verify [Sitzberger's] story" because 
Sitzberger was on supervision.  He "wanted to confirm that there 
[was] a Jake there so that [Sitzberger] wasn't lying to [him]."  
Sitzberger offered to call Jake, but Oetzel told Sitzberger that 
he would rather "have the phone number and [he] can call [Jake] 
himself."  After taking Jake's phone number down, Oetzel asked 
Sitzberger if Sitzberger had been drinking.  Sitzberger said 
that he had not.  Oetzel said that he asked because Sitzberger's 
face was "a little red" and Sitzberger replied saying he "just 
got done walking" and that it was hot in the truck.  Oetzel then 
returned to questioning Sitzberger about Jake. 
¶11 This time, the questions included how Sitzberger knew 
Jake and how long he had known him.  Sitzberger responded, 
telling Oetzel that he met Jake through a friend and that he had 
known Jake for about five or six months.  After taking down that 
information, Oetzel circled back to his original questions and 
asked VanBeek and Sitzberger how long they had been sitting 
there.  VanBeek said that up to that point she had been there 
for "probably an hour."  She clarified that before Oetzel 
arrived she was there for half an hour.  Oetzel exclaimed that 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
7 
 
an hour is "a long time" and asked if she had been sitting there 
alone for awhile, which VanBeek responded to affirmatively.  
Shortly thereafter, the K9 unit arrived, and Oetzel asked 
VanBeek and Sitzberger to exit the truck. 
¶12 After VanBeek and Sitzberger got out of the truck, the 
K9 unit conducted a sweep of the truck and the dog alerted, 
indicating there were drugs present.  Oetzel and another officer 
searched the truck and discovered one gram of methamphetamine 
and a pipe, for which they arrested VanBeek.  The entire 
incident lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
B.  Procedural History 
¶13 The State charged VanBeek with one count of Possession 
of Methamphetamine, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(g), and 
one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.573(1). 
 
VanBeek 
moved 
to 
suppress 
the 
methamphetamine and drug pipe found during the search. 
¶14 In her suppression motion, VanBeek contended that 
Oetzel's initial contact with her was unlawful, and, even if it 
were not, the stop was extended beyond its initial mission 
without reasonable suspicion that she or Sitzberger were 
committing, had committed or were about to commit a crime.  She 
argued that Oetzel's extended questioning while retaining her 
driver's license violated her right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures as guaranteed by both the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.   
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
8 
 
¶15 The circuit court held two hearings on VanBeek's 
motion to suppress where the court heard testimony from Oetzel.  
On direct examination, Oetzel testified that he was dispatched 
to the intersection based on an anonymous call, but "the 
description of the vehicle was not provided by the anonymous 
caller so [he] went further south" to see if any other vehicles 
were sitting idle with two occupants.   
¶16 Oetzel confirmed that he did not know why Sitzberger 
was on supervision and that he "didn't ask dispatch."  On cross-
examination, Oetzel gave conflicting testimony on whether he 
mentioned the anonymous caller's information regarding a third 
person or a backpack during the initial encounter.  First, 
Oetzel said that he "[couldn't] recall" whether he mentioned the 
backpack.  A few moments later, he stated that "[he] told them 
why [he] was there with the suspicious complaint about two 
individuals being inside a vehicle, a truck, and that [an] 
unknown person approached them with a backpack."  The bodycam 
footage confirms that Oetzel did not mention the backpack at any 
point during the interaction.  And Oetzel further confirmed this 
on re-cross examination. 
¶17 Oetzel also confirmed that he did not have reasonable 
suspicion at the time that he took VanBeek's and Sitzberger's 
driver's licenses back to his squad car.  Finally, Oetzel 
confirmed that VanBeek had not committed any traffic violations 
and that he did not see or smell any indications of drug use.  
¶18 In analyzing VanBeek's motion to suppress, the circuit 
court noted that it was required to "judg[e] the reasonableness 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
9 
 
of a stop and search [and] . . . to look at the totality of 
circumstances of the situation."  The circuit court concluded 
that 
"the 
initial 
contact 
with 
[VanBeek's] 
vehicle 
was 
reasonable and that . . . the entire contact with the defendant 
and the passenger was reasonable under a totality of the 
circumstances."6  This led the circuit court to conclude that the 
K9 search was also reasonable.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
denied VanBeek's motion to suppress.   
¶19 VanBeek pled no contest, and the circuit court 
subsequently entered a judgment of conviction.  VanBeek appealed 
to the court of appeals, where she argued that "Oetzel's demand 
for and retention of [her] driver's license transformed his 
contact with her into a seizure."  VanBeek contended that "no 
reasonable person would feel free to leave and go about his or 
her business once a police officer takes and retains their 
driver's license."  Accordingly, VanBeek contended that she was 
seized when Oetzel took her and Sitzberger's driver's licenses 
back to his squad car.  VanBeek further asserted that the 
seizure was not justified by reasonable suspicion or the 
                     
6 The circuit court concluded that the initial approach 
"probably" was justified under the community caretaker doctrine.  
VanBeek's trial counsel asked for clarification on this point, 
and the court stated that "[i]f you look at the standards it 
clearly is a seizure, you know, because he approaches the 
vehicle, and I think it was a bona fide community caretaker 
activity as the state laid out[.]"  The court also found that 
the initial contact was "a valid investigative stop . . . under 
the 
community 
caretaker 
[doctrine]." 
 
The 
court 
further 
concluded that the secondary contact was valid under both the 
community caretaker doctrine and based on reasonable suspicion. 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
10 
 
community caretaker doctrine and that, even if the initial 
interaction was valid, the extension of the stop to wait for the 
K9 unit was not.   
¶20 The State countered, arguing that "Oetzel first seized 
VanBeek when he asked her to exit her truck right before the dog 
sniff occurred."  The State disagreed with VanBeek's position 
that she was seized when Oetzel took her driver's license back 
to his squad car.  The State argued that per our holding in 
State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, 
Oetzel's retention of VanBeek's license was not a seizure and 
rather, "[Oetzel] did not attempt to restrict [VanBeek's] 
movement until" he asked her to step out of her vehicle.  
Alternatively, the State argued that the earliest Oetzel seized 
VanBeek was during his second interaction.  In either event, the 
State maintained that Oetzel had reasonable suspicion for the 
seizure.  
¶21 After reviewing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it 
relates to VanBeek's contentions, the court of appeals certified 
an issue to us in regard to Oetzel taking VanBeek's driver's 
license to his squad car without reasonable suspicion.  The 
court of appeals reasoned that "[t]his case presents an 
important issue that arises when officers investigate citizen 
complaints that are not, as yet, supported by reasonable 
suspicion to believe crime is afoot."  The court of appeals also 
sought further clarification on the following statement from 
Floyd:  "If an officer withholds a person's documents, there is 
good reason to believe that the person was not 'free to leave' 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
11 
 
at that time."  Id., ¶31.  We accepted the court of appeals' 
certification.7  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶22 Whether evidence should have been suppressed is a 
question of constitutional fact.  State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, 
¶19, 391 Wis. 2d 831, 943 N.W.2d 845.  We "employ a two-step 
inquiry" to make that determination.  Id.  First, we uphold a 
circuit court's findings of historic fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Id., ¶20.  Second, we independently and 
objectively examine the facts known to the officer at the time 
of the alleged seizure, applying constitutional principles to 
them.  Id.  "The burden is on the State to prove that the search 
was constitutionally permissible because police did not obtain a 
warrant prior to searching the vehicle."  Id., ¶21 (citing State 
v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 806, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994)).   
B.  Fourth Amendment Principles 
¶23 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The Wisconsin Constitution contains 
nearly identical protections, Wis. Const. art. I, § 11, which we 
have interpreted consistent with its federal counterpart.  State 
                     
7 "When we accept certification from the court of appeals, 
we acquire jurisdiction of the entire appeal."  State v. Denk, 
2008 WI 130, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775.  Accordingly, 
"[w]e . . . consider all issues raised before the court of 
appeals."  Id. 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
12 
 
v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  In 
this case, we are focused on the meaning of "seizures" within 
the Fourth Amendment.   
¶24 Although courts regularly talk about "searches and 
seizures" as though they were an inseparable tandem, they are 
constitutionally and analytically distinct principles.  State v. 
Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶25, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  "A 
seizure differs from a search, as it 'deprives the individual of 
dominion over his or her person or property.'"  Id. (citing 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)).   
¶25 When a seizure is claimed to have occurred, we first 
determine when it began and whether it was constitutionally 
permissible at its inception.  Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶30 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).  We then 
determine 
whether 
the 
officer's 
continued 
actions 
were 
"reasonably 
related 
in 
scope 
to 
the 
circumstances 
which 
justified the interference in the first place."  Arias, 311 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).   
¶26 Not every police-citizen interaction implicates the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16; see also 
State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶39, 263 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 
72.  Law enforcement officers may approach citizens on the 
street, put questions to them, and ask for identification 
without implicating the Fourth Amendment "as long as the police 
do not convey a message that compliance with their request is 
required."  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); see 
also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) ("[P]olice 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
13 
 
questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  While most citizens will respond to a 
police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without 
being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the 
consensual nature of the response.").  Absent law enforcement 
conduct that indicates required compliance, these types of 
interactions are consensual encounters and generally do not 
receive Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. 
¶27 However, a police-citizen interaction can rise to the 
level of a temporary, investigative detention, commonly referred 
to as a Terry stop.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.  To pass Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny, Terry stops must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  Id.; see Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (codifying the standard 
for Terry stops).   
¶28 An officer has reasonable suspicion "when, at the time 
of the stop, he or she possesses specific and articulable facts 
which would warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity 
[is or] was afoot."  State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 
N.W.2d 681 (1996) (citing State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 
294, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972)).  Finally, arrests are seizures and 
must be supported by probable cause.  Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 
811, 815-16 (1985).  Here, we determine whether the consensual 
interaction between VanBeek and Oetzel shifted at some point in 
time from a consensual encounter to a seizure for which 
reasonable suspicion was required. 
¶29 A 
seizure 
occurs 
if, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances, the "police conduct would have communicated to a 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
14 
 
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the 
officers' 
request 
or 
otherwise 
terminate 
the 
encounter."  
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.  Stated otherwise, a seizure occurs 
"when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."  
United 
States 
v. 
Mendenhall, 
446 
U.S. 
544, 
552 
(1980).  
"Determining whether a seizure has occurred is a highly 
fact-bound inquiry."  United States v. Tyler, 512 F.3d 405, 410 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
¶30 We determine whether a person would have felt free to 
leave or otherwise terminate the encounter based on an objective 
view of the specific facts presented.  That analysis employs the 
"innocent 
reasonable 
person, 
rather 
than 
the 
specific 
defendant."  County of Grant v. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, ¶30, 356 
Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 253.  "If a reasonable person would have 
felt free to leave but the person at issue nonetheless remained 
in police presence, perhaps because of a desire to be 
cooperative, there is no seizure."  State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, 
¶37, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729. 
C.  The Certified Question 
¶31 The court of appeals certified the question of whether 
an officer taking a citizen's driver's license back to the 
officer's squad car necessarily constitutes a seizure.  As we 
explain below, we conclude that such law enforcement officer 
conduct could amount to a seizure.  However, rather than create 
a bright-line rule that such conduct is always a seizure or is 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
15 
 
never a seizure, we continue to analyze whether a seizure 
occurred based on the totality of circumstances presented. 
¶32 "In the ordinary course, a police officer is free to 
ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth 
Amendment."  Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 
177, 185 (2004); see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 ("[The 
agents] requested, but did not demand to see the respondent's 
identification and ticket.  Such conduct without more, did not 
amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected 
interest.").  Further, an officer approaching a parked car and 
questioning the individual or individuals within does not 
necessarily amount to a seizure.  See, e.g., Vogt, 356 Wis. 2d 
343, ¶41 (concluding that an officer parking behind a vehicle, 
approaching and knocking on the window to question the occupant 
did not amount to a seizure); see also United States v. 
Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases).   
¶33 However, what may begin as a valid and consensual 
encounter can rise to the level of a seizure, and an officer's 
retention of an individual's driver's license is an important 
factor that courts consider.  For example, in Florida v. Royer, 
narcotics agents approached Royer in the concourse of an airport 
and asked to see his ticket and his identification.  Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494 (1983).  
Royer explained the 
discrepancy between the name on his ticket and the name on his 
identification.  Id.  The officers, rather than returning 
Royer's identification and airline ticket, informed Royer that 
they were narcotics officers and "asked Royer to accompany them 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
16 
 
to a room" away from the concourse.  Id.  The officers also 
retrieved Royer's luggage without Royer's consent.  Royer 
unlocked one suitcase, which an officer opened "without seeking 
further assent from Royer," and the officers broke open the 
other suitcase after Royer said "go ahead."  Id.  Each bag 
contained narcotics, and Royer was arrested.  Id. 
¶34 The 
Court 
analyzed 
these 
circumstances 
and 
the 
plurality concluded that "[w]hat had begun as a consensual 
inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory 
procedure in a police interrogation room, where the police, 
unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their 
suspicions."  Id. at 503.  The Court reasoned that because Royer 
was in the police interrogation room, "[t]he officers had 
Royer's ticket, they had his identification, and they had seized 
his luggage[,]" the interaction lost its consensual nature.  Id.  
In providing additional clarity, the Court stated that, had the 
officers "return[ed] his ticket and driver's license, and 
inform[ed] him that he was free to go if he so desired, the 
officers may have obviated any claim that the encounter was 
anything but a consensual matter from start to finish."  Id. at 
504 (emphasis added).  
¶35 A number of federal circuits have reasoned that the 
prolonged retention of an individual's driver's license was an 
important factor in determining whether a seizure occurred.  For 
example, the Seventh Circuit included an officer's retention of 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
17 
 
a driver's license in its non-exhaustive list of factors to 
consider.8  Tyler, 512 F.3d at 410 (listing relevant factors in 
the totality of circumstances analysis including "whether the 
person was deprived of identification or other documents without 
which he could not leave"); see also United States v. Weaver, 
282 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that "the retention of 
a person's identification is an important factor in determining 
whether a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
occurred" but declining to adopt a bright-line rule); Jefferson, 
906 
F.2d 
at 
349 
("We 
have . . . noted 
that 
in 
certain 
circumstances a consensual encounter may become a seizure if the 
officer retains the individual's driver's license."); United 
States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) 
("When a law enforcement official retains control of a person's 
identification papers, such as vehicle registration documents or 
a license, longer than necessary to ascertain that everything is 
in order, and initiates further inquiry while holding on to the 
                     
8 The 
Seventh 
Circuit 
likened 
Tyler 
to 
the 
court's 
jurisprudence surrounding "airport and train station stops."  
United States v. Tyler, 512 F.3d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 2008).  The 
court concluded there was a meaningful distinction in the 
expediency 
with 
which 
officers 
asked 
for, 
examined 
and 
ultimately returned an individual's driver's license.  Id.  
("Where 
the 
officers 
told 
the 
defendant 
he 
was 
under 
investigation for carrying drugs or retained possession of his 
identification, travel documents, and/or luggage, we held there 
was 
a 
seizure. . . .  
Where 
the 
officers 
only 
generally 
identified themselves as narcotics investigators and immediately 
returned the defendant's identification and travel documents, we 
held the initial consensual encounter did not ripen into a 
seizure.") (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
18 
 
needed papers, a reasonable person would not feel free to 
depart."); United States v. Waksal, 709 F.2d 653, 660 (11th Cir. 
1983) ("We fail to see how appellant could have felt free to 
walk away from police officers when they still possessed the 
documents necessary for him to continue his journey.").   
¶36 We 
conclude 
that 
an 
officer's 
retention 
of 
an 
individual's driver's license is a significant but not the 
dispositive fact.  Our conclusion is consistent with Wisconsin 
Fourth Amendment precedent.  In State v. Luebeck, the court of 
appeals analyzed an encounter during which an initially valid 
stop ripened into an unlawful seizure.  See generally State v. 
Luebeck, 2006 WI App 87, 292 Wis. 2d 748, 715 N.W.2d 639.  
There, the officer stopped Luebeck for a lane deviation and a 
suspicion that he was driving under the influence.  Id., ¶2.  
The officer obtained Luebeck's and his passenger's driver's 
licenses and ran warrant checks.  Id.  The officer also 
instructed Luebeck to perform a field-sobriety test, which 
Luebeck passed, and the officer administered a preliminary 
breath test; Luebeck was under the legal limit.  Id., ¶3.  The 
officer ultimately "advised Luebeck that he was going to issue 
him a warning for the lane deviation and then release him."  Id.   
¶37 While retaining Luebeck's driver's license and having 
not yet issued him the warning, the officer continued to 
question Luebeck about his passenger's ability to drive in his 
place.  Id., ¶4.  Before administering a breath test on 
Luebeck's passenger, the officer asked if Luebeck had anything 
illegal on his person or in his car.  Id.  Luebeck denied each 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
19 
 
question and consented when the officer asked to search him and 
the car.  Id.  Luebeck had nothing on his person, but the car 
search uncovered marijuana.  Id., ¶5.  Luebeck argued that he 
was unlawfully seized at the time he gave his consent to search.  
Id., ¶6. 
¶38 The circuit court and court of appeals agreed with 
Luebeck.  At the outset, the court of appeals agreed with the 
State that the initial traffic stop was valid.  Id., ¶¶7, 10.  
However, after examining the totality of circumstances, the 
court of appeals concluded that a reasonable person in Luebeck's 
position would not have felt free to leave or otherwise 
terminate the encounter at the time that Luebeck consented to 
the search.  Id., ¶15.  The court distinguished Luebeck's case 
from two cases on which the State relied and explained: 
Luebeck was detained for over twenty minutes, his 
driver's license was held by the police, no citation 
or warning for lane deviation had yet been issued, he 
passed all of the field sobriety tests and his 
preliminary breath test indicated a blood alcohol 
content below the legal limit, and yet he was being 
questioned about his passenger's ability to drive in 
his place.  In Williams, the officer issued and 
explained the traffic warning, returned Williams' 
identification, shook hands with Williams, and said, 
"[W]e'll let you get on your way then." . . . In 
Gaulrapp, we expressly distinguished the case from 
others that "involved prolonged detention after the 
officers concluded or should have concluded that the 
justification for the initial stop did not warrant 
further detention." 
Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶¶7-12, 255 Wis. 2d 
1, 646 N.W.2d 834 and State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 608, 
558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996)).   
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
20 
 
¶39 In coming to its conclusion, the court examined 
numerous Tenth Circuit cases that had concluded "that a 
motorist's consent to search his or her vehicle is invalid where 
a deputy does not return documents relating to the initial 
traffic stop prior to asking for consent to search the vehicle." 
Luebeck, 292 Wis. 2d 748, ¶16.9  The court of appeals did not 
adopt a bright-line rule to that effect; rather, it concluded 
that "the fact that [a] person's driver's license or other 
official documents are retained by the officer is a key factor 
in assessing whether the person is 'seized.'"  Id. 
¶40 We made a similar statement in Floyd; however, Floyd's 
language must be interpreted in context.  There, Floyd was 
stopped because his car registration had been suspended for 
emissions violations.  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶2.  Floyd had no 
driver's license with him, but he did identify himself with a 
Wisconsin State identification card, which he handed to the 
officer.  Id., ¶4.  After the officer had drafted the relevant 
citations, he returned to Floyd's car and while retaining 
Floyd's identification card, he asked Floyd to step out of the 
car so that he could explain the citations to him.  Id., ¶5.  It 
was at this point that Floyd alleged that his seizure was 
unlawfully extended.  Id., ¶14.   
                     
9 See United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1040 (10th Cir. 
1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holt, 264 
F.3d 1215, 1226 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lambert, 
46 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Walker, 
933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir. 1991).  
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
21 
 
¶41 After Floyd had exited the vehicle, the officer asked 
if he could search him, to which request the circuit court found 
Floyd consented.  Id., ¶9.  Floyd argued on appeal that his 
"consent" was not voluntary.  "Specifically, he argued that 
because Deputy Ruffalo had not returned his identification card 
prior to asking whether he would consent to a search, his 
response could not be voluntary because he was unlawfully 
seized."  Id., ¶31.  This argument conflated Floyd's earlier 
argument that his seizure became unlawful because it was 
extended with an implication that consent was not voluntarily 
given because the officer had not returned his identification 
card.  Id., ¶32.  Although we reasoned that if an officer 
retains a person's identification "there is good reason to 
believe the person was not 'free to leave' at that time," id., 
¶31, we concluded that it had no bearing on Floyd's seizure 
because his initial seizure was lawful and that seizure was not 
unlawfully extended during the explanation of the tickets or the 
officer's subsequent request to search him.  Id., ¶31.   
¶42 It was statements from Luebeck and Floyd that may have 
caused the court of appeals to certify a question to us.  We 
stand by statements made in the contexts presented in those 
cases.  While the withholding or retention of an individual's 
driver's 
license 
may 
be 
a 
"key 
factor," 
important, 
or 
analytically significant, we decline to set forth a bright-line 
rule that any time an officer retains an individual's driver's 
license that person is seized.  Rather, courts should continue 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
22 
 
to analyze whether the individual is seized based upon the 
totality of circumstances.  
¶43 The above cases teach that police conduct is the 
dispositive 
factor 
in 
determining 
whether 
a 
seizure 
has 
occurred.  As the Supreme Court clearly set out in Bostick, "the 
crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct 
would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not 
at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his 
business.'"  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)).  
¶44 Applying the above principles to this case, based upon 
the totality of the circumstances, Oetzel taking VanBeek's 
license back to his squad car did not amount to a seizure.  
Oetzel took VanBeek's and Sitzberger's licenses back to the 
squad car upon his request to do so and with their permissions.  
The video-cam Oetzel was wearing recorded that when Oetzel 
received the licenses that they handed to him, he began to move 
away from VanBeek's car.  He said, "Okay. I'll be right back, 
okay?"  VanBeek and Sitzberger both replied "alright."  This 
appears to be a continuation of what had been a cordial 
interaction among VanBeek, Sitzberger and Oetzel.   
¶45 A reasonable person in VanBeek's position would have 
understood that their "alright" responses permitted Oetzel to 
retain her driver's license and that her ability to lawfully 
operate her vehicle would be delayed until Oetzel returned to 
her car.  Further, Oetzel reasonably relied on their verbal 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
23 
 
interactions before he returned to his squad car.  Accordingly, 
under the totality of circumstances that bear on the certified 
question, VanBeek consented to Oetzel's retention of her license 
until he returned from his squad car, and therefore, she was not 
seized when he took her driver's license to the squad car and 
ran a warrant check.10   
D.  Other Issues Presented 
1.  Seizure 
¶46 Having re-affirmed that the totality of circumstances 
continues to be the correct analytical metric by which to 
analyze claimed seizures, we determine based on that metric 
whether VanBeek was seized at any subsequent point during her 
interaction with Oetzel.  We conclude that VanBeek was seized 
when Oetzel returned to her vehicle, retained her driver's 
license, and continued to pose questions to her and Sitzberger 
in order to prevent them from leaving before the K9 unit 
arrived.  We conclude that a reasonable person in VanBeek's 
position would not have felt free to drive away and terminate 
the encounter with Oetzel while he retained her driver's license 
and continued to question her and Sitzberger.   
                     
10 Although we determine that in this case there was not a 
seizure when Oetzel took their identifications back to his squad 
car, nothing in this opinion should be taken as concluding that 
an officer running a records check back at the officer's squad 
car will never amount to a seizure.  Courts are to continue to 
analyze the totality of circumstances of each encounter.  
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
24 
 
¶47 We also conclude that there are no facts from which to 
conclude that VanBeek consented to Oetzel's retention of her 
driver's license after he returned to her vehicle.  Rather, a 
reasonable person in VanBeek's position would have believed that 
Oetzel would return her driver's license as soon as he returned 
from his squad car so "he could get out of here." 
¶48 However, when Oetzel returned, rather than "just 
getting out of here" as he originally said, he retained their 
driver's licenses.  He also continued to question them for 
nearly eight more minutes, in order to hold them until the K9 
unit he had requested arrived.  Merely because this was not a 
traffic stop in the ordinary sense, it does not follow that 
Oetzel's 
conduct 
did 
not 
turn 
the 
interaction 
into 
an 
investigative detention.  
¶49 Oetzel's questioning after his return from his squad 
car was repetitive of questions he had already asked and they 
had answered.  VanBeek was confused by Oetzel's repetitive 
questions and asked him if her "license was bad," indicating 
that she had expected to have her license returned and be on her 
way back to Cascade. 
¶50 A reasonable person being repetitively questioned 
while the officer retained her driver's license would not feel 
free to drive away and thereby terminate the encounter.  It was 
Oetzel's conduct of retaining their driver's licenses while 
repeatedly asking questions that she and Sitzberger had already 
answered, that coerced VanBeek to remain in Sheboygan.  Also, 
Oetzel's questioning was intended to require them to remain in 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
25 
 
Sheboygan so that time would pass and the K9 unit would appear 
to sniff for drugs.  Accordingly, VanBeek was seized during the 
second round of repetitive questions while Oetzel retained her 
driver's license.11  
2.  Reasonable Suspicion 
¶51 A seizure runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it is 
unreasonable, and a temporary detention is unreasonable if under 
the totality of circumstances it is not supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  Coffee, 391 Wis. 2d 831, ¶2.  As we have concluded 
that Oetzel seized VanBeek during their second interaction, we 
now determine whether the seizure was supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  We conclude that it was not.  
¶52 Reasonable suspicion, as with other Fourth Amendment 
inquiries, is an objective test that examines the totality of 
circumstances.  State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 675, 407 N.W.2d 
548 (1987).  An officer has reasonable suspicion if he or she 
has "a suspicion grounded in specific, articulable facts and 
reasonable inferences from those facts, that the individual has 
                     
11 The circuit court concluded, and the State argued, that 
this interaction was justified by the community caretaker 
doctrine.  We disagree.  An officer exercises a bona fide 
community 
caretaker 
function 
generally 
"when 
the 
officer 
discovers a member of the public who is in need of assistance."  
State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶32, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 
598.  As we discussed above, we conclude that Oetzel's 
interaction with VanBeek was not to determine whether she or 
Sitzberger were in need of assistance but was rather to 
investigate the anonymous call that the police department 
received.  Accordingly, Oetzel was not performing a bona fide 
community caretaker function and the doctrine does not apply 
here.   
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
26 
 
committed a crime."  Id.  "An inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or 'hunch' will not suffice."  Id. (citing Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27).   
¶53 The State offered the following five facts that it 
contends support the conclusion that Oetzel had reasonable 
suspicion that VanBeek and Sitzberger had been, or were about to 
be, involved in criminal conduct:  (1) "VanBeek and Sitzberger 
were hanging around a neighborhood for at least several 
minutes"; (2) "Oetzel did not receive a satisfactory explanation 
for that behavior"; (3) "the suspicious behavior here occurred 
late at night:  Officer Oetzel began speaking to VanBeek and 
Sitzberger around 12:22 a.m."; (4) "an anonymous caller had 
reported that two people were sitting in a truck for an 
hour. . . .  Based on his training and experience, Officer 
Oetzel thought that people 'are usually utilizing narcotics' if 
they are sitting in a parked vehicle for a long period of time"; 
and (5) "someone here made brief contact with a vehicle.  The 
concerned caller told police that someone with a backpack had 
come to the truck and then left."  To be sure, because we have 
concluded 
that 
the 
seizure 
occurred 
during 
the 
second 
interaction, we note that Oetzel also knew that VanBeek had 
overdosed earlier in the year and that Sitzberger was on some 
sort of supervision.   
¶54 In response, VanBeek argues that there is nothing 
suspicious about sitting in a car and that the facts derived 
from the anonymous call, namely that the car had been in the 
location for an hour and that someone approached the vehicle 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
27 
 
with a backpack and then left without it, were insufficient to 
support reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.   
¶55 We begin with the anonymous call.  "[A]n anonymous tip 
alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or 
veracity . . . ."  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) 
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983)).  "[A]n 
informant's 
'veracity,' 
'reliability,' 
and 
'basis 
of 
knowledge,'" are "highly relevant" to testing the strength of 
anonymous information within the totality of circumstances.  
State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 140, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) 
(cleaned 
up). 
 
In 
Richardson, 
we 
concluded 
that 
"the 
corroboration by police of innocent details of an anonymous tip 
may under the totality of the circumstances give rise to 
reasonable suspicion to make a stop."  Id. at 142.  We 
articulated two guiding principles for assessing the weight that 
we should place on anonymous calls: 
First, 
the 
greater 
the 
amount, 
specificity 
and 
uniqueness of the detail contained in an anonymous 
tip, the more likely it is that the informant has an 
adequate basis of knowledge.  When attempting to 
define the nature of the verified details of the tip 
necessary, the White Court placed special emphasis on 
the police verification of the caller's predictions of 
the third party/suspect's future actions.  White, [496 
U.S. at 332].  The Court referred to this as a 
verification of significant aspects of the tip.  We 
adopt this aspect of verification of the anonymous tip 
which serves to avoid investigative stops based on 
minimal facts that any passerby or resident on the 
street could enunciate.  Second, when significant 
aspects 
of 
an 
anonymous 
tip 
are 
independently 
corroborated by the police, the inference arises that 
the anonymous informant is telling the truth about the 
allegations 
of 
criminal 
activity. 
 
Under 
this 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
28 
 
principle, police who have corroborated significant 
aspects of a tip are allowed the reasonable inference 
under the circumstances that if an informant is 
correct as to these significant aspects, he or she is 
more probably than not correct as to the ultimate fact 
of criminal activity.   
Id. at 142-43 (footnote omitted).   
¶56 We continue to abide by these principles, but we 
conclude that the dearth of significant facts enunciated by the 
anonymous caller in this case substantially lowers the weight 
that we place on the call in the totality of circumstances.  
Unlike Richardson, White or Gates,12 wherein the respective 
tipsters were able to provide unique, useful and predictive 
information to police prior to police interaction, the caller 
here merely told Sheboygan police that a non-descript truck, 
occupied by two people, was parked on the street for "an hour" 
and that someone had approached the vehicle with a backpack and 
then left without it.  Those facts are "minimal facts that any 
passerby or resident on the street could enunciate."  See id. at 
142.  The caller did not allege that the persons in the truck 
were engaged in criminal activity.  Accordingly, as we consider 
                     
12 See State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 132, 456 N.W.2d 
830 (1990) (the tip provided "a detailed description of the 
defendant and his immediate future plans"); Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (the call "stat[ed] that Vanessa White 
would 
be 
leaving 
235-C 
Lynwood 
Terrace 
Apartments 
at 
a 
particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right 
taillight lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey's Motel, 
and that she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine 
inside a brown attaché case"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
225 (1983) (the tip was a letter that described how the Gates 
sold drugs including the specific process the two used to travel 
between Florida and Illinois).   
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
29 
 
a call about a non-descript truck parked on the street with two 
occupants, the additional assertion that someone came to the 
truck with a backpack and left without it does not weigh heavily 
in our analysis.  Apparently, those facts were not significant 
to Oetzel because he never asked VanBeek or Sitzberger about a 
third person or a backpack.  
¶57 The call in this case is more analogous to that in 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).  There, a person 
anonymously called the police to inform them "that a young black 
male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt 
was carrying a gun."  Id. at 268.  Officers responded, saw three 
men "just hanging out" and one of the individuals at the bus 
stop matched the caller's description.  Id.  "Apart from the 
tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of 
illegal conduct."  The officers frisked J.L. and uncovered a 
firearm.13  Id. 
¶58 The Court concluded that "[t]he tip . . . lacked the 
moderate indicia of reliability present in White and essential 
to the Court's decision in that case."  Id. at 271.  Further, 
the Court noted "[t]hat the allegation about the gun turned out 
to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the 
frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging 
in unlawful conduct."  Id.  The Court rejected the petitioner's 
                     
13 At the time of his arrest, J.L. was 16 years of age, and 
"was charged . . . with carrying a concealed firearm without a 
license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18."  
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000). 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
30 
 
argument "that the tip was reliable because its description of 
the suspect's visible attributes proved accurate."  Id. at 271.  
In rejecting Florida's argument, the Supreme Court held that "a 
tip [has to] be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not 
just in its tendency to identify a determinate person."  Id. at 
272. 
¶59 Here, and similar to J.L., Oetzel was able to 
corroborate only the identifying factors given by the caller, 
e.g., that there was a truck parked at the alleged location that 
had two occupants.  The only fact that could have been somewhat 
suspicious was that the caller said someone approached the 
vehicle with a backpack and then left without it.  However, 
Oetzel asked no questions about a third person or a backpack, 
and the record does not reflect whether such a person existed.  
We agree with the parties that the call, alone, could not have 
supported reasonable suspicion.  We conclude that the call was 
useful only to the extent that it may have "help[ed] the police 
correctly identify the person whom the tipster mean[t] to 
accuse."  See id. at 272. 
¶60 Aside from the call, all that Oetzel knew at the time 
of the seizure was that VanBeek overdosed earlier in the year 
and that Sitzberger was on supervision.  Oetzel did not know the 
source of drugs that caused VanBeek's overdose, whether from a 
physician or from an illegal source.  There is nothing in the 
record to connect her overdose in February with criminal 
activity in November.   
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
31 
 
¶61 That Sitzberger was on supervision also provides no 
reason to believe that he was involved in criminal activity with 
VanBeek.  As the Tenth Circuit explained in United States v. 
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994), a prior conviction 
for an unknown offense provides no support for reasonable 
suspicion.  Id.  If this were not the case, those on supervision 
subsequent to a conviction could be searched anywhere and 
anytime that the fact of supervision became known.   
¶62 Furthermore, Oetzel testified that he neither saw nor 
smelled any indication of drug use, and VanBeek's window was 
rolled down as she spoke with him.  Accordingly, we are not 
convinced that at the time of the seizure the State met its 
burden of proving that Oetzel had reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity was afoot. 
¶63 Two cases from the court of appeals are supportive of 
our conclusion.  In State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 95-98, 593 
N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), where Betow was stopped for 
speeding, the court of appeals concluded that the officer 
prolonged an initially valid traffic stop without reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
Betow 
had 
controlled 
substances 
in 
his 
possession.  The State argued that reasonable suspicion existed 
based on the following facts:  (1) Betow's wallet had a mushroom 
sticker on it, which the State argued denoted drug use; (2) the 
stop occurred late at night; (3) Betow seemed nervous; (4) Betow 
was returning to Appleton from Madison, a city that the State 
argued was associated with ready drug obtainment; and (5) Betow 
did not provide the officer with a plausible explanation for his 
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
32 
 
purpose in Madison.  Id.  The court of appeals examined these 
facts as the totality of circumstances relative to Betow's 
seizure and concluded that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to prolong the stop.14  Id. at 98. 
¶64 In State v. Gammons, 2001 WI App 36, 241 Wis. 2d 296, 
625 N.W.2d 623, Gammons was a passenger in a car stopped because 
it did not have a rear license plate.  Id., ¶2.  After 
questioning extended beyond the license plate, Gammons was 
arrested for possession with intent to deliver cocaine.  Id., 
¶1.  He asserted that the officer's questions exceeded the 
permissible scope of the stop.  Id.  The court of appeals 
analyzed the following facts:  (1) "an out-of-town vehicle in an 
area purportedly known for drug activity"; (2) "a night-time 
stop"; (3) "and a nervous suspect."  Id., ¶23.  The court of 
appeals held that these facts, taken together, did not form a 
sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion.  Id., ¶25.  The court 
held that because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion 
of drug activity, "the Fourth Amendment required [the officer] 
to terminate the stop and allow Gammons and the other men to 
continue about their business."  Id., ¶24.  As we set forth 
                     
14 Although Betow and Gammons each dealt with the extension 
of a traditional traffic stop, an officer may not extend a 
lawful traffic stop "absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily 
demanded to justify detaining an individual."  Rodriguez v. 
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015).  Because the reasonable 
suspicion analysis is the same for extensions of stops as it is 
for initial stops, see State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 95, 593 
N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), we apply the principles articulated 
in those cases to the reasonable suspicion assessment here.    
No. 
2019AP447-CR 
 
33 
 
above, the State's proffered foundation for reasonable suspicion 
here is considerably weaker than those in Betow and Gammons.   
¶65 Accordingly, based on the totality of circumstances, 
Oetzel did not have reasonable suspicion when he returned to 
VanBeek's truck, retained her driver's license and continued to 
question her; therefore her seizure was unlawful.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶66 On the certified question of whether a driver is 
seized when a police officer takes the driver's identification 
to the officer's squad car to run a records check, we conclude 
that the answer depends on the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the encounter.  Further, while VanBeek was not 
seized when Officer Oetzel took her driver's license to run a 
records check, VanBeek was seized when Oetzel returned to her 
vehicle, withheld her driver's license and continued to question 
her and her passenger in order to hold her until a drug-sniff 
dog, i.e., the K9 unit, that he had requested arrived.  Finally, 
we conclude that, based on the totality of circumstances, Oetzel 
did not have reasonable suspicion that VanBeek was engaged in 
criminal activity at the time he seized her.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the circuit court's judgment of conviction and remand 
with instruction to grant VanBeek's motion to suppress. 
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded with instructions. 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶67 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I concur 
that Heather VanBeek was unlawfully seized when police retained 
her driver's license while repetitively questioning her.1  I 
disagree, however, with the conclusion that VanBeek was not 
seized earlier in her encounter with police.  The totality of 
the circumstances reveals that VanBeek was seized when police 
took her driver's license back to the squad car for a records 
check because, at that point, a reasonable person would not feel 
free to leave or to otherwise end the interaction. 
I 
¶68 Sheboygan Police Officer Sung Oetzel responded to an 
anonymous call reporting that two people had been sitting in a 
parked truck in the same spot for approximately an hour and that 
a person wearing a backpack had approached the truck.  Oetzel 
approached the truck with his squad car's spotlight activated 
and asked VanBeek, who was sitting in the driver's seat, why and 
how long she had been parked there.  VanBeek explained that she 
had been there about ten minutes waiting for her passenger and 
that they were about to drive home to Cascade. 
¶69 Oetzel 
responded 
that 
the 
explanation 
"sound[ed] 
legit," 
but 
still 
asked 
VanBeek 
and 
her 
passenger 
for 
identification "for [his] report."  The passenger asked if he 
could just write down his information, but Oetzel stated that he 
needed a photo ID to "compare faces."  Both VanBeek and her 
passenger provided their driver's licenses.  With both licenses 
                     
1 I join the majority/lead opinion with respect to ¶¶22-35 
and ¶¶46-65. 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
in hand, Oetzel stated "I'll be right back, okay," and as he 
walked 
away, 
VanBeek's 
passenger 
responded, 
"alright."  
VanBeek's response to Oetzel was unclear.  Before Oetzel reached 
his squad car, he explained to another officer that he had not 
observed "anything suspicious." 
¶70 Oetzel checked VanBeek's record from his squad car and 
learned that she had overdosed several months earlier.  Oetzel 
then ordered a drug-sniffing dog to the scene.  He returned to 
VanBeek's truck, retaining her license while repetitively 
questioning her and her passenger until the dog arrived.  Once 
on scene, the dog alerted officers to the evidence underlying 
VanBeek's conviction and this appeal. 
¶71 We review the court of appeals' certified question of 
"whether a consensual encounter becomes an unconstitutional 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment when an officer requests and 
takes an individual's drivers license to the officer's squad car 
without reasonable suspicion."  While I agree that such conduct 
is not a seizure in all circumstances, I conclude that under the 
circumstances here, it was. 
II 
¶72 Interactions between citizens and the police fall on a 
spectrum.  On one end are interactions outside the Fourth 
Amendment, such as voluntary encounters in public spaces, which 
may include the police requesting someone's identification.  See 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).  Further down the 
spectrum and subject to the Fourth Amendment are Terry and 
traffic stops——short investigative seizures permissible only if 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
the police have reasonable suspicion that a person has just 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime or 
traffic violation.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Terry 
stops); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 
N.W.2d 560 (traffic stops).  At the opposite end of the spectrum 
from voluntary encounters is a seizure2:  police conduct that 
"deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person."  
E.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).  Police 
conduct constitutes a seizure when, considering all of the 
circumstances, it would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that she is not "free to leave."3  I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 215 (1984). 
¶73 Interactions on the spectrum are dynamic such that 
police conduct can transform an initially voluntary encounter 
                     
2 The other Fourth Amendment event, a "search," is not 
alleged or implicated during this first interaction and is 
therefore not discussed in this opinion. 
3 Courts sometimes state this question differently depending 
on the case's particular facts.  State v. Williams, 2002 
WI 94, ¶22 n.6, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834.  Regardless of 
how 
the 
test 
is 
phrased, 
the 
"key 
question" 
is 
the 
same:  "whether 
a 
reasonable 
person 
can 
'terminate 
the 
encounter' with police."  
Peery v. City of Miami, 977 
F.3d 1061, 1071 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)); see also, e.g., Bostick, 501 U.S. 
at 435-36 (asking whether a reasonable person would feel "free 
to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the 
[police] encounter" because the defendant, a passenger on an 
interstate bus, was already not free to leave for reasons 
outside the police's presence); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 
U.S. 567, 576 (1988) (asking whether a police car accelerating 
to drive alongside a defendant was so intimidating that a 
reasonable person would not feel "free to disregard the police 
presence and go about his business"). 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
into 
a 
seizure. 
 
See 
United 
States 
v. 
Monsivais, 
848 
F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2017) (officer converted a non-Fourth 
Amendment roadside assistance or "welfare check" into a Fourth 
Amendment seizure by announcing he would pat down the stranded 
driver).  If an individual is seized without sufficient Fourth 
Amendment justification, then subsequently obtained evidence 
must generally be suppressed.  See State v. Scull, 2015 
WI 22, ¶¶20-21, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562. 
¶74 Because 
Oetzel 
lacked 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
VanBeek had committed or was about to commit a crime or traffic 
violation, any seizure of VanBeek, even a temporary one, would 
be unlawful.4  Oetzel's encounter with VanBeek started out as 
voluntary, requiring no special justification to initially 
approach and question VanBeek in her truck since she was parked 
on a public street.  See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 25 
F.3d 1426, 1430 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & 
Seizure § 9.4(a) (6th ed. 2020).  Thus the question is whether 
Oetzel's subsequent actions toward VanBeek escalated this 
initially voluntary interaction to the level of a seizure. 
¶75 The interaction moved toward a seizure when Oetzel 
asked VanBeek for her photo ID.  Generally, such a request is 
                     
4 There is no support in the record for the community 
caretaker exception.  Oetzel observed neither VanBeek nor her 
passenger in distress and thus lacked "reasonable grounds to 
believe there [was] an emergency at hand and an immediate need 
for [his] assistance for the protection of life or property."  
See State v. Ferguson, 2001 WI App 102, ¶17, 244 Wis. 2d 17, 629 
N.W.2d 788 (quoting United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 
888 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
not a Fourth Amendment seizure.  See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.  
But Oetzel's conduct indicated that his request was in fact a 
command that VanBeek could not refuse.  See Bostick, 501 U.S. 
at 437 (explaining that a seizure occurs when police "ask to 
examine the individual's identification" in a way that indicates 
"compliance with their requests is required").  Specifically, 
Oetzel 
rejected 
the 
offer 
to 
write 
down 
the 
requested 
information, stating instead that he needed a photo ID to 
"compare faces."  When an officer rejects a less-intrusive 
alternative, a reasonable person could believe that her only 
other option is to comply with the officer's "request."  Cf. id. 
¶76 Even so, until Oetzel walked away, VanBeek at least 
had an opportunity to ask for her license back so she could 
terminate the encounter and go on her way (although whether 
anyone would actually feel comfortable doing this is another 
question5).  Once Oetzel left the side of VanBeek's car, however, 
that opportunity vanished.  No reasonable person would think she 
could drive away when an officer walks off with her driver's 
license, particularly when doing so would violate state law.  
See Wis. Stat. § 343.18(1) (2020-21) (prohibiting the operation 
of a vehicle without immediately possessing one's license); 
Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶31 ("If an officer withholds a person's 
                     
5 For that reason, several courts have held that persons are 
seized when an officer questions them while retaining their 
license.  See United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 
(10th 
Cir. 2006); 
United 
States 
v. 
Chavez-Villarreal, 
3 
F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jordan, 958 
F.2d 1085, 1087-89 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
documents, there is good reason to believe the person was not 
'free to leave' at that time."); see also United States v. 
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that 
an officer "effectively immobilized" and therefore seized a 
driver by retaining the driver's license because driving away 
without the license would violate state law).  Thus, VanBeek was 
unlawfully seized because Oetzel's conduct would cause a 
reasonable person in VanBeek's circumstances to feel as though 
she were not free to leave or to otherwise terminate the 
encounter.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55, 657 
(1979) (holding that, absent reasonable suspicion, "detaining 
the driver in order to check his driver's license" is a Fourth 
Amendment violation). 
¶77 VanBeek's alleged "consent" to Oetzel confiscating her 
license does not change that conclusion for two reasons.  First, 
it confuses the role consent plays in a Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  A person's consent informs the reasonableness of a 
seizure, not whether an officer's conduct constitutes a seizure 
in the first place.  See United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 
1088 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining that whether a seizure 
occurred depends only on what the "police conduct reasonably 
communicated").  I have uncovered no case supporting the novel 
proposition that one can consent to a seizure of her person.  
Second, even if one could so consent, the record contains no 
support for the conclusion that VanBeek unequivocally consented 
to Oetzel's taking her license back to his squad car for the 
purpose of running a records check.  See State v. Reed, 2018 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
WI 109, ¶¶8, 57, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56 (holding that, 
in the context of a Fourth Amendment search, consent "must be 
unequivocal and specific"). 
¶78 Instead, the record is, at best, ambiguous as to 
whether VanBeek agreed to Oetzel's taking her license back to 
his squad car.  Oetzel did not testify on that point and the 
circuit court made no factual findings regarding what VanBeek 
said to Oetzel or whether she consented to Oetzel taking her 
license back to his car.  That leaves Oetzel's body-camera 
footage.  The video strongly suggests that when Oetzel took 
VanBeek's license and told her that he would "be right back," he 
was telling VanBeek what he was going to do, not asking for her 
permission to do it.  Oetzel neither informed VanBeek of the 
specific reason why he was taking her license nor awaited her 
response before walking away.  Moreover, VanBeek's response is 
unclear.  Although VanBeek's passenger responded to Oetzel's 
statement by saying "alright," VanBeek's response is muddled and 
lost under her passenger's voice.  While one might infer that 
she did not say "no," such an inference falls short of the 
unequivocal, affirmative statement the law requires.  See United 
States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Even a 
spoken assent to search may be too ambiguous to establish 
consent 
in 
certain 
circumstances."); 
cf. 
Reed, 
384 
Wis. 2d 469, ¶57 
(explaining 
that 
"mere 
acquiescence" 
is 
No.  2019AP447-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
insufficient to constitute consent (quoted source omitted)).6  
The record evidence therefore belies any consent justification 
(if one were even possible) for her being seized. 
¶79 VanBeek was thus seized when Oetzel took her license 
back to his squad car.  That seizure continued when Oetzel 
returned to VanBeek's truck yet retained her license and 
repetitively questioned her until a drug-sniffing dog arrived.  
Accordingly, any evidence obtained as a result of Oetzel's 
unlawful seizure of VanBeek must be suppressed.  For these 
reasons, I concur. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this concurrence. 
 
                     
6 Even 
assuming 
the 
passenger's 
"alright" 
constitutes 
consent regarding his license, he has neither actual nor 
apparent "common authority" to consent on VanBeek's behalf.  Cf. 
State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶23, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 
N.W.2d 810; see also United States v. Woodrum, 208 F.3d 8, 12 
(1st Cir. 2000) (order denying rehearing en banc) (Lynch, J., 
dissenting) ("[S]imply, and obviously, a person cannot give 
third-party consent to the . . . seizure of another person."). 
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶81 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  While 
I agree with the majority/lead opinion's1 conclusion that VanBeek 
was not seized when Officer Oetzel took her driver's license to 
his squad car and ran a warrant check, see majority/lead op., 
¶45, I write separately because VanBeek was not seized when 
Officer Oetzel returned to VanBeek's vehicle and continued 
asking her follow-up questions.  When looking at the totality of 
the circumstances, it is clear that VanBeek was free to ask for 
her 
driver's 
license 
back 
and 
end 
the 
interaction.  
Consequently, her encounter with Officer Oetzel was consensual, 
and she was not seized.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
 
I.  ANALYSIS 
¶82 For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, there are two 
types of seizures.  The first type is a "physical force" 
seizure.  See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 
(1980).  The second type is a "show of authority" seizure.  Id.  
Under either type of seizure, a seizure occurs "[o]nly when the 
officer . . . has in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen."  Id.   
                     
1 Justice Roggensack's opinion was joined in part by 
Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Dallet, and Karofsky.  Specifically, 
those justices joined Justice Roggensack's opinion "with respect 
to ¶¶22-35 and ¶¶46-65."  Concurrence, ¶67 n.1.  Thus, for the 
sake of clarity, I refer to Justice Roggensack's opinion as the 
"majority/lead" opinion throughout this dissent because the 
opinion in its entirety is not joined by a majority of the 
court.  The opinion is a "majority" with respect to ¶¶22-35 and 
¶¶46-65.  All other paragraphs represent the rationale of 
Justice Roggensack and thus constitute a lead opinion.   
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶83 While an officer cannot unreasonably seize a person, 
this does not mean that police are prohibited from interacting 
with members of the public.  Police and members of the public 
regularly engage in "consensual encounters," which do not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
19 n.16 (1968); see also State v. Griffiths, 2000 WI 72, ¶39, 
236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained, an encounter between police and an 
individual "will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it 
loses its consensual nature."  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 
434 (1991).  Under this framework, we have held that certain 
encounters between police and individuals are consensual, 
including the police approaching individuals, asking them 
questions, requesting their identification, and asking for 
consent to search.  Griffiths, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶39 (citing 
Bostick, 
501 
U.S. 
at 
434-35). 
 
These 
interactions 
are 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment "as long as the police do 
not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 
required."  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35.   
¶84 Although "consensual encounters" are not subject to 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, an officer cannot temporarily detain 
a person for investigative purposes without implicating the 
Fourth Amendment because such a detention is a seizure.  Terry, 
392 U.S. at 30.  Such temporary, investigative detentions are 
referred to as Terry stops.  See, e.g., State v. Blatterman, 
2015 WI 46, ¶24, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26.  For a Terry 
stop to pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the officer must have 
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
"reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being 
committed, or is about to be committed."  State v. Young, 2006 
WI 98, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.24.   
¶85 To determine whether an encounter between police 
officers and an individual was either a consensual encounter or 
a seizure, we "must consider all the circumstances surrounding 
the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free 
to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter."  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.  Phrased differently, we 
must determine, under the totality of the circumstances, whether 
"a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police 
and go about his business.'"  Id. at 434 (quoting California v. 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).2  "The test is objective 
and considers whether an innocent reasonable person, rather than 
the specific defendant" would have felt free to terminate the 
encounter and go about their business.  County of Grant v. Vogt, 
2014 WI 76, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 253.  Even if an 
innocent reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the 
encounter and go about their business, "but the person at issue 
nonetheless remain[s] in police presence, perhaps because of a 
                     
2 As part of the totality of the circumstances, as explained 
in the majority/lead opinion's answer to the certified question 
in this case, "an officer's retention of an individual's 
driver's license is a significant but not the dispositive fact."  
Majority/lead op., ¶36.   
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
desire to be cooperative, there is no seizure."  Young, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.   
¶86 Applying this test to the facts of VanBeek's case, as 
capably set forth in the majority/lead opinion, it is clear that 
VanBeek was not seized when Officer Oetzel either went back to 
his squad car or when Officer Oetzel returned to VanBeek's 
vehicle and retained her identification.3   
¶87 I agree with the majority/lead opinion's statement 
"that [Officer] Oetzel taking VanBeek's license back to his 
squad car did not amount to a seizure."  Majority/lead op., ¶44.  
Such a conclusion is consistent with the longstanding Fourth 
Amendment principles that I just explained.  The concurrence 
suggests that there is "no case supporting the novel proposition 
that one can consent to a seizure of her person."  Concurrence, 
¶77. 
 
However, 
an 
individual 
affirmatively 
approving 
an 
officer's retention of a driver's license indicates that the 
encounter has not lost its consensual nature.  Bostick, 501 U.S. 
at 434.  Such affirmative approval——commonly referred to as 
consent——is a strong indicator under the totality of the 
circumstances that the encounter has retained its consensual 
nature.  See Mendenhall, 445 U.S. at 558.  Thus, as the 
majority/lead opinion aptly described, "A reasonable person in 
                     
3 VanBeek concedes that her encounter with Officer Oetzel 
was consensual when Officer Oetzel first approached her vehicle 
and when she handed Officer Oetzel her license.  The dispute 
arises only with regard to whether the encounter remained 
consensual after Officer Oetzel returned to his squad car with 
VanBeek's identification.   
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
VanBeek's position would have understood that [VanBeek's and her 
passenger's] 'alright' responses permitted [Officer] Oetzel to 
retain her driver's license."  Majority/lead op., ¶45.   
¶88 Moreover, even without her license, VanBeek could 
still "disregard the police and go about [her] business."  As 
she explained to Officer Oetzel when he first approached, she 
and her passenger were sitting in the vehicle for some period of 
time.  As such, VanBeek's "business"——that she must have felt 
free to return to——was sitting in her vehicle with her 
passenger.  Officer Oetzel returning to his squad car with 
VanBeek's driver's license in no way impeded upon VanBeek's 
business of sitting in her vehicle.  Furthermore, VanBeek never 
signaled that she wanted to leave, which would indicate that her 
business was leaving the area.  Her affirmative approval to 
Officer 
Oetzel 
returning 
to 
his 
squad 
car 
with 
her 
identification strongly suggests that her business was sitting 
in her vehicle, not leaving the area.  Accordingly, VanBeek was 
not seized when Officer Oetzel returned to his squad car with 
VanBeek's driver's license.4    
                     
4 The 
concurrence 
wrongly 
concludes 
to 
the 
contrary, 
believing that Officer Oetzel walking away with VanBeek's 
driver's 
license 
automatically 
transformed 
the 
consensual 
encounter into a seizure.  Concurrence, ¶76.  Such a conclusion 
effectively asks for a bright-line rule that whenever an officer 
walks away with an individual's driver's license, the individual 
is automatically seized.  As is routinely stated, "[t]he Supreme 
Court has eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment 
inquiries], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the 
reasonableness inquiry."  State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶17, 274 
Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33, 39 (1996)); see generally State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, 
¶¶37-42, 391 Wis. 2d 831, 943 N.W.2d 845 (explaining why bright-
(continued) 
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
¶89 Having concluded that VanBeek was not seized when 
Officer Oetzel returned to his squad car, I now address the 
point at which I diverge from the majority/lead opinion——when 
Officer Oetzel returned to VanBeek's vehicle.  The majority/lead 
opinion concludes that "VanBeek was seized during the second 
round of repetitive questions while Oetzel retained her driver's 
license."  Majority/lead op., ¶50.  I disagree because there are 
no facts in the record that demonstrate that the otherwise 
consensual 
encounter 
between 
Officer 
Oetzel 
and 
VanBeek 
transformed into an impermissible seizure.   
¶90 An officer can ask questions and retain identification 
of an individual without that encounter transforming into a 
seizure.  See Griffiths, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶39 (citing Bostick, 
501 U.S. at 434-35).  This includes if the officer asks follow-
up questions.  See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).  
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[u]nless the 
circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to 
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was 
not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that 
the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth 
                                                                  
line rules are disfavored).  Instead of a bright-line rule, as 
the concurrence essentially suggests, the proper inquiry is 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 
person would have felt free to terminate the encounter and go 
about their business.  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 
(1991).   
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
Amendment."  Id.5  Only "if the person[] refuses to answer and 
the police take additional steps . . . to obtain an answer, then 
the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective 
justification to validate the detention or seizure."  Id. at 
216-17.  Accordingly, either the circumstances must be so 
intimidating that the questioning would cause a reasonable 
person to believe that she was not free to leave if she had not 
responded, or the police must take additional steps to obtain an 
answer after a refusal to answer for the interaction to 
transform from a consensual encounter into a Fourth Amendment 
seizure.  We have neither in this case.  
¶91 Here, the only circumstances that the majority/lead 
opinion points to are that Officer Oetzel retained VanBeek's 
driver's license and continued to ask repetitive questions.  
Majority/lead op., ¶50.  However, repeated questioning is 
permissible 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
so 
long 
as 
the 
circumstances are not "so intimidating as to demonstrate that a 
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave 
if he had not responded."  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.  Thus, 
Officer Oetzel's retention of the driver's license must have 
been "so intimidating" that a reasonable person in VanBeek's 
position would not have felt free to terminate the encounter and 
go about her business.  But a reasonable person is willing to 
                     
5 The formulation of the reasonable person test evolved to 
its current form after I.N.S. v. Delgado, 446 U.S. 210 
(1984):  Whether an innocent, reasonable person would have felt 
free to terminate the encounter and go about their business.  
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.   
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
ask for the return of their identification.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that the defendant was free to request his license be returned 
to him so that he could end the encounter).  VanBeek could have 
requested that Officer Oetzel return her identification, and she 
could have gone about her business.  Id.  However, she chose not 
to.  Instead, she "nonetheless remain[ed] in police presence, 
perhaps because of a desire to be cooperative."  Young, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.  Accordingly, Officer Oetzel's retention of 
VanBeek's identification was not "so intimidating" that VanBeek 
could not have requested the return of her identification and 
terminated the encounter.   
¶92 Moreover, the majority/lead opinion relies heavily on 
the fact VanBeek would not have been able to terminate the 
encounter and leave the scene because she needed her license to 
lawfully operate her vehicle.  Majority/lead op., ¶45.  However, 
this reliance is misplaced.  The test for a seizure is not 
whether a person would feel free to leave the scene; rather, the 
proper inquiry is whether a person would feel free to terminate 
the encounter and go about their business.  See Bostick, 501 
U.S. at 439.  As I explained above, VanBeek's "business" when 
Officer Oetzel arrived was sitting in her vehicle with her 
passenger.  Although she expressed an interest in leaving the 
scene, this was not her "business."  Consequently, Officer 
Oetzel's retention of her driver's license in no way impeded her 
ability to go about the business of sitting in her vehicle with 
her passenger.   
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
¶93 Accordingly, 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, VanBeek was not seized when Officer Oetzel 
returned to her vehicle, asked follow-up questions, and retained 
her identification.  Officer Oetzel's questioning and retention 
of VanBeek's identification was not sufficiently intimidating to 
render mandatory compliance and transform the encounter into a 
seizure.  VanBeek could have asked for the return of her 
identification, but she never did, "perhaps because of a desire 
to be cooperative."  Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.  Moreover, 
VanBeek did not need her license to go about her business——
namely, sitting in her vehicle with her passenger.    
¶94 Because VanBeek was not seized, the circuit court did 
not err when it denied VanBeek's motion to suppress.   
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶95 While 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's 
conclusion that VanBeek was not seized when Officer Oetzel took 
her driver's license to his squad car and ran a warrant check, 
see majority/lead op., ¶45, I write separately because VanBeek 
was not seized when Officer Oetzel returned to VanBeek's vehicle 
and continued asking her follow-up questions.  When looking at 
the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that VanBeek was 
free to ask for her driver's license back and end the 
interaction.  Consequently, her encounter with Officer Oetzel 
was consensual, and she was not seized.   
¶96 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶97 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and BRIAN K. HAGEDORN join this dissent. 
No.  2019AP447-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1