Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JONATHAN JOE JONES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119818
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 11, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v
 No. 119818  
JONATHAN JOE JONES,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, J.  
Following 
a 
jury trial, defendant was convicted of first­
degree murder, MCL 750.316, and conspiracy to commit murder,  
MCL 750.157a. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s  
convictions, holding that defendant was denied a fair trial  
when 
the 
prosecution 
elicited testimony from its “key witness”  
that the witness had taken and passed a polygraph test.  
Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that introduction  
of this testimony was error, we hold that defendant’s  
convictions should not be reversed because the unpreserved,  
nonconstitutional 
error 
did 
not 
affect 
defendant’s 
substantial  
 
rights.  
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and  
remand the matter to that Court to address an issue that was  
raised before that Court, but not decided.  
I  
On August 11, 1998, at approximately 2:00 to 3:00 a.m.,  
a Saginaw resident named Oliver R. Henderson was kicked and  
stomped to death1 by two men. 
The prosecution alleged the  
assailants to be Kim G. Martin and the defendant.  
The evidence against the defendant included a DNA match  
of the victim's blood on defendant’s trousers,2 which were  
seized from defendant’s house, inculpatory statements that he  
made before and after the killing, testimony concerning the  
defendant’s 
actions 
two hours after the assault, and testimony  
of an eyewitness.  
Julie Pryor, who has a child fathered by defendant,  
testified that before the assault defendant had said that he  
was going to take revenge on the person that had taken his  
television.  
“A. [Pryor] said, I’m going to get them, you know. I’m 
going to hurt them. I’m going to beat them up.  
* * *  
1 Mr. Henderson died in January 1999, after five months 
in a coma.  
2 At trial, a scientist from the Michigan State Police 
DNA lab testified that there were bloodstains matching the 
victim’s blood found on Kim Martin’s shoes, as well as on 
pants belonging to defendant.  
2  
 
“A. [Pryor] I can’t recall exactly, but I know he said, 
I am going to get that M-F-r. I’m going to kick his A.”  
Pryor testified that, after 5:00 a.m. on August 11, defendant  
had come home, asked her if the police had been by, and  
changed his clothes.  Pryor also testified that later she  
asked defendant if he had attacked the victim, “Rodell,” and  
that defendant admitted that he had done it.  
“Q. Did you have occasion to speak with the defendant, 
Jonathan Joe Jones, about what had happened to Rodell [the 
deceased]?  
“A. Yeah, but it wasn’t once or twice maybe.  
“Q. Where was it that you spoke to him about it?  
“A. At Mike’s house.  
“Q. What did he say about what had happened to Rodell?  
“A. I just asked him, you know, why he did it.  And he  
said he took the TV and told him why.  He wouldn’t say nothing  
else.  
“Q. Did he seem remorseful?  
“A. No.  
“Q. Did he tell you any specific acts that he had done to 
Rodell?  
“A. No.  
* * *  
“Q. So you asked him specifically if he had done this to 
Rodell?  
“A. Yes.  
“Q. And he admitted to you that he had?  
“A. Yeah.”  
Pryor 
also 
testified 
that on another occasion, while defendant  
3  
was talking about the victim, she overheard defendant say “he  
stomped his ass.”  
On the first day of trial, while cross-examining a police  
officer, defense counsel sought to demonstrate that Ricky  
Jones,3 an eyewitness to the killing, had told multiple  
stories during the course of the investigation. Counsel asked  
the officer, “In fact, you gave Mr. Jones a polygraph on two  
different occasions, is that correct?”  The circuit court  
sustained the assistant prosecutor's immediate objection, and  
the question was never answered.  
At the next recess, the assistant prosecutor moved for a  
mistrial:  
I'm moving for a mistrial based upon [defense 
counsel's] referral to the fact that Ricky Jones 
was given a polygraph test. Clearly if the People 
brought this out about defendant it would be  
grounds for a mistrial, and I believe it's just as 
inappropriate for defense to attack a prosecution 
witness through the use of inadmissible evidence as 
it would be for the People to do the same thing.  
The court denied the motion:  
Well, I believe it could be handled by a 
curative instruction.  I don't think it manifests  
necessity and jeopardy has attached.  I will deny 
the motion.  
No curative instruction was given, nor was one requested by  
either party.  
The following day, Ricky testified.  Ricky stated that  
3 
 Ricky Jones is not a relative of the defendant.  To  
prevent any confusion we will refer to him throughout the 
opinion as “Ricky.”  
4  
 
Kim Martin was kicking the victim in the head.  After a time,  
Martin asked defendant, "Did you want a piece of this?"  
Defendant then joined in.  Defendant jumped and landed with  
both feet on the victim's head four or five times.  Ricky  
acknowledged that he drank three to five forty-ounce beers  
over a twelve to fourteen hour period on the day of the  
attack, and had ingested $30 to $40 worth of crack cocaine  
several hours before witnessing the attack.  Near the end of  
his testimony on direct examination by the assistant  
prosecutor, the following exchange occurred.  
“Q. Did you take a polygraph in this case?  
“A. Yes.  
“Q. Did you pass that?  
“A. Yes.  
“[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to object.  
“The Court: Sustained.  
“[Assistant Prosecuting Attorney]: 
Judge, that was 
brought up yesterday over my objection.  
“The Court: Sustained.  Sustained. Move on.  Move on.”  
No curative instruction was offered or requested, nor did  
defendant move to strike the witness’s answer.  
At the conclusion of the jury trial, defendant was found  
guilty 
of 
first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.  
He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment.  
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which  
5  
 
 
reversed defendant’s convictions.4
 The Court of Appeals  
focused on the assistant prosecutor’s question to Ricky about  
the polygraph examination that he had taken and passed. The  
Court 
of 
Appeals 
held that the assistant prosecutor’s question  
violated the bright-line rule that testimony concerning the  
result of a polygraph examination is not admissible at trial.  
People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 377; 255 NW2d 171 (1977). The  
Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s convictions, holding  
that the error was prejudicial to defendant and seriously  
affected the fairness of the judicial proceeding.  
We granted the prosecutor’s motion for leave to appeal  
limited to the issue whether defendant’s conviction should be  
reversed because the assistant prosecutor asked  a key witness  
whether he had taken and passed a polygraph examination.  
II  
In our grant of leave to appeal, we asked the parties to 
address the doctrine of invited error.5  However, our review 
of this case has convinced us that invited error is not the  
4 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 17, 2001 
(Docket No. 221264).  
5 The order stated, in part: “If this was error, what 
category of error was it, and by what standard should the 
Court decide whether the error warranted reversal of the  
defendant’s convictions? 
The parties are to address  
specifically whether any error that occurred was ‘invited’ by 
the defense.  See United States v Young, 470 US 1 (1985); 
Vannoy v City of Warren, 386 Mich 686 (1972); People v Finley,  
431 Mich 506, 543 n 11 (1988) (Cavanagh, J.).  The parties are 
to further discuss whether and, if so, how, the ‘invited 
error’ 
doctrine 
fits 
into 
this 
Court’s 
jurisprudence 
regarding 
forfeiture and waiver of error.  See People v Carines, 460  
Mich 750 (1999); People v Carter, 462 Mich 206 (2000).” 465  
Mich 974 (2002).  
6  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
relevant doctrine.
 Rather, it would be more accurate to 
characterize the applicable doctrine as “invited response.”6  
The doctrine of invited response is used as an aid in 
determining whether a prosecutor’s improper remarks require 
the reversal of a defendant’s conviction. It is used not to  
6  “Invited error” is typically said to occur when a  
party’s own affirmative conduct directly causes the error. 
For example, in Vannoy v City of Warren, 386 Mich 686, 690; 
194 NW2d 304 (1972), this Court explained that a party cannot 
seek appellate review of an instruction that he himself 
requested, saying, "Assuming error as claimed, that error 
comes within the purview of what of tradition and common sense 
is known as 'invited error.'" Appellate review is precluded 
because when a party invites the error, he waives his right to 
seek appellate review, and any error is extinguished. People  
v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). To the  
contrary, in this case the alleged error was not directly 
attributable to the affirmative conduct of defendant and  
defendant cannot be said to have waived the alleged error—the 
prosecutor’s overreaching—for appellate review.  
A doctrine that is related to the “invited response” 
doctrine, but not applicable in this case, is the doctrine of 
“fair response.” Under the doctrine of fair response, there 
is no error because a party is entitled to fairly respond to 
issues raised by the other party.  We adopted the doctrine of  
“fair response” in People v Fields, 450 Mich 94; 538 NW2d 356  
(1995).  Regarding what is fair response, this Court in Fields  
stated, “[t]he nature and type of comment allowed is dictated 
by the defense asserted, and the defendant’s decision  
regarding whether to testify. When a defense makes an issue  
legally relevant, the prosecutor is not prohibited from 
commenting on the improbability of the defendant’s theory or 
evidence.” Id. at 116.  See also United States v Robinson, 485 
US 25, 31; 108 S Ct 864; 99 L Ed 2d 23 (1988) (holding that 
when the prosecutor’s statement that the defendant could have 
explained his story to the jury was made in response to the 
comments made by defense counsel, the prosecutor’s statements 
did not infringe the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights).  In  
contrast, although the prosecutor’s conduct in this case was 
“invited” in the sense that defense counsel “opened the door” 
to the admission of the polygraph examination evidence, it 
cannot be characterized as “fair.”  The response is not “fair” 
because evidence of a polygraph test is clearly inadmissible, 
the prosecutor demonstrably knew that the evidence was not 
admissible, and the prosecutor did not avail himself of the 
curative instruction offered by the court to remedy 
defendant’s improper questioning, choosing instead to resort 
to a self-help remedy entailing inadmissible evidence.  
7  
 
 
  
 
excuse improper comments, but to determine their effect on the 
trial as a whole. Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168, 182; 106 
S Ct 2464; 91 L Ed 2d 144 (1986).  
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the  
doctrine of invited response has an appropriate place in  
determining whether the prosecutor’s closing remarks affected  
the fairness of a trial. United States v Young, 470 US 1, 12­
13; 105 S Ct 1038; 84 L Ed 2d 1 (1985).  Under the doctrine of  
invited 
response, 
the proportionality of the response, as well  
as the invitation, must be considered to determine whether the  
error, which might otherwise require reversal, is shielded  
from appellate relief. Young, supra.  
We now apply this doctrine as an aid to determine whether  
the prosecutor’s improper introduction of evidence at trial  
affected the fairness of the trial.  In determining the effect  
of 
the 
prosecutor’s 
improper introduction of the polygraph, we  
must analyze the circumstances surrounding that error,  
including the defense counsel’s conduct.  Whether Ricky had  
taken a polygraph examination (and, inevitably, whether Ricky  
had 
passed 
the 
examination) was introduced by defense counsel.  
By its very nature, especially in the context of the defense’s  
attack on the credibility of Ricky, this question tended  
strongly to imply that Ricky had “failed” the polygraph  
examination.  Nevertheless, we specifically disapprove of the  
prosecutor’s 
knowing 
inappropriate 
behavior 
in 
introducing 
the  
evidence of the polygraph examination.  
The prosecution  
objected 
to 
defense 
counsel’s improper question, and the court  
8  
 
 
 
 
sustained that objection.  Further, the court offered to  
provide a curative instruction, although ultimately one was  
not requested by either party. 
It 
was the assistant  
prosecutor who then decided on his own to offer the  
inadmissible evidence in rebuttal to the defense attorney’s  
question about the polygraph.  As the Court emphasized in  
Young, the idea of invited response is not to be read as  
suggesting judicial approval of response-in-kind.  Id. at 10.  
In this case, the trial court had offered the remedy of a  
curative instruction.  The prosecution was not entitled to  
take the matter of balancing the equities into its own hands.  
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice,  
not simply that of an advocate.  
III 
 
The 
issue 
is 
whether the assistant prosecutor’s question  
to Ricky about the polygraph test is error requiring reversal  
of defendant’s convictions. 
We review this under the  
standards for unpreserved, nonconstitutional error. Defense  
counsel 
objected 
to 
the prosecutor’s questions, but only after  
they had already been answered, and did not request that the  
answers be stricken.  We agree with the rule that to be  
timely, 
an 
objection 
should be interposed between the question  
and the answer.  See In re Weiss, 224 Mich App 37, 39; 568  
NW2d 336 (1997).  The purpose of requiring objections to be  
timely, see MRE 103(a)(1), is to give the trial court an  
9  
 
 
 
opportunity to correct the error.  People v Grant, 445 Mich  
535, 551; 520 NW2d 123 (1994).  Accordingly, we review  
defendant’s 
claim 
of 
error under the standard for unpreserved,  
nonconstitutional error set out in People v Grant, supra, and  
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).  
To avoid forfeiture of an unpreserved, nonconstitutional  
plain error, the defendant bears the burden of establishing  
that: (1) error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear  
or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial  
rights. Grant, supra at 548-549, and Carines, supra at 763.  
Once the defendant establishes these three elements, the  
appellate 
court 
must 
still exercise its discretion in deciding  
whether to reverse.  Reversal is warranted only when the  
plain, unpreserved error resulted in the conviction of an  
actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously  
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the  
judicial 
proceedings 
independent 
of 
the 
defendant’s 
innocence.  
Carines, supra at 763.  
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the first two  
criteria were met. 
As the parties concede, testimony  
concerning the result of a polygraph examination is not  
admissible at trial,  Barbara, supra. The bright-line rule  
that evidence relating to a polygraph examination is  
inadmissible is well established.  See Barbara, supra, and  
People v Brocato, 17 Mich App 277, 290-294; 169 NW2d 483  
10  
 
 
(1969).  Further, the assistant prosecutor had earlier  
objected to defense counsel’s attempt to inject a reference to  
the polygraph examination.  Thus, there is no question that  
this was plain error.  
The question is whether this plain error affected  
defendant’s substantial rights.  To establish that a plain  
error affected substantial rights, there must be a showing of  
prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the  
lower-court proceedings. Grant, supra. The defendant bears  
the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.  Carines,  
supra, p 763.  The Court of Appeals held that the error  
required reversal because Ricky was the prosecution’s key  
witness—the only eye witness to the attack.  We disagree, and  
hold that defendant has failed to meet his burden of  
persuasion regarding prejudice.  
As we outlined above, there was substantial evidence  
corroborating Ricky’s testimony.  Bloodstains matching the  
victim’s blood were found on Kim Martin’s shoes and  
defendant’s pants. There was testimony that two hours after  
the attack, the defendant returned home, asked Julie Pryor if  
the police had been there, and changed his clothes.  Further,  
Julie Pryor testified that she had heard defendant admit  
committing the attack on the victim.  
We also consider, as a factor in determining whether the  
error affected defendant’s substantial rights, that this was  
an invited response.  Although the testimony that Ricky had  
11  
 
 
passed the polygraph examination did tend to improperly  
bolster his credibility, it clearly was in rebuttal to the  
defense counsel’s earlier, inaccurate suggestion that Ricky  
had failed a polygraph examination. The prosecutor elicited  
the testimony that the witness had actually passed the  
polygraph to rebut this false implication.  However, there  
would have been no need to rebut such a false implication if  
defense 
counsel 
had 
not 
previously 
attacked 
Ricky’s  
credibility with the use of inadmissible evidence.  We find  
that this reduces any potential harm resulting from the  
improper polygraph evidence introduced by the prosecutor.7  
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we do not hold that  
the invited-response doctrine excuses the prosecutor’s  
“willful and deliberate side-stepping of the trial court’s  
ruling . . . .” Post at 3. Rather, as we have explained, n  
6, the prosecutor’s conduct did not constitute a “fair  
response”; 
the 
prosecutor improperly took matters into his own  
hands by eliciting the inadmissible evidence regarding the  
polygraph test.  Nevertheless, much as the United States  
Supreme Court did in Young, supra, we have examined the  
7 
 We do not “dim[] the brightness” of the rule  
prohibiting the admission of polygraph-examination evidence, 
despite the dissent’s assertion to the contrary, post at 8.  
The bright-line rule in People v Barbara, supra, that  
testimony concerning the result of a polygraph examination is 
not admissible at trial remains intact.  We reverse the  
holding of the Court of Appeals that defendant was denied a 
fair trial because we conclude that this unpreserved, 
nonconstitutional 
error 
did 
not 
affect 
defendant’s 
substantial  
rights.  
12  
 
 
prosecutor’s conduct in context and have determined that  
although error occurred, reversal under the plain-error  
doctrine is not warranted.  
In Young, the defendant was on trial for mail fraud and  
other crimes arising out of a transaction with Apco Oil  
Corporation. 
 
During 
summation, 
defense 
counsel 
intimated 
that  
the 
prosecution 
deliberately 
withheld 
exculpatory 
evidence 
and  
attempted to cast a false light on the defendant’s activities.  
Defense counsel pointed at the prosecutor’s table and stated:  
“I submit to you that there’s not a person in this courtroom  
including those sitting at this table who think that [the  
defendant] intended to defraud Apco.”  Young, supra at 4-5  
(citation omitted).  The prosecutor did not object to defense  
counsel’s summation, but responded to this statement during  
rebuttal argument by commenting: “‘I think [defense counsel]  
said that not anyone sitting at this table thinks that Mr.  
Young intended to defraud Apco.  Well, I was sitting there and  
I think he was. . . .  If we are allowed to give our personal  
impressions since it was asked of me.’” Id. at 5 (citation  
omitted).  Defense counsel did not object and did not request  
any curative instructions.  On appeal, however, defendant  
argued that he was unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor’s  
remarks during rebuttal.  
The Court held that the issue was not whether the  
prosecutor’s response was appropriate, but whether it was  
“plain error” that a reviewing court could act on absent a  
13  
  
 
timely objection. The Court noted that both defense counsel  
and the prosecutor played fast and loose with the rules of  
professional conduct; the Court cautioned that “[t]he kind of  
advocacy shown by this record has no place in the  
administration of justice and should neither be permitted nor  
rewarded; a trial judge should deal promptly with any breach  
by either counsel.” Id. at 9. However, the Court held that  
“the issue is not the prosecutor’s license to make otherwise  
improper arguments, but whether the prosecutor’s ‘invited  
response,’ 
taken 
in 
context, 
unfairly 
prejudiced the  
defendant.” 
Id.  Thus, the reviewing court must “not only  
weigh the impact of the prosecutor’s remarks, but must also  
take into account defense counsel’s opening salvo.”  Id. at 12  
(emphasis supplied.) The Court concluded:  
[T]he prosecutor’s statement of his belief 
that the evidence showed Apco had been defrauded 
should not have been made; it was an improper 
expression 
of 
personal 
opinion 
and 
was 
not  
necessary to answer defense counsel’s improper 
assertion that no one on the prosecution team 
believed respondent intended to defraud Apco. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that any potential harm  
from this remark was mitigated by the jury’s  
understanding that the prosecutor was countering  
defense 
counsel’s 
repeated 
attacks 
on 
the  
prosecution’s integrity and defense counsel’s  
argument that the evidence established no such  
crime. [Id. at 17-18 (emphasis supplied).]  
We find the Young Court’s plain error analysis to be  
persuasive.  The facts of this case are directly analogous to  
those present in Young: The prosecutor and defendant each  
played fast and loose with the rules of professional conduct  
14  
 
when they, in turn, attempted to place inadmissible polygraph  
evidence before the jury.  However, as in Young, any potential  
prejudice 
to 
defendant 
resulting 
from 
the 
prosecutor’s 
conduct  
was mitigated by the fact that he was acting in response to  
defense counsel’s own improper attempt to create a false  
inference that Ricky had failed a polygraph examination.  
Moreover, in light of the substantial evidence of defendant’s  
guilt, the error cannot be said to have been outcome­
determinative.  
Given the substantial evidence corroborating Ricky’s  
testimony and establishing defendant’s guilt and defense  
counsel’s prior, improper attempt to create a false inference  
that Ricky had failed a polygraph examination, the additional  
improper bolstering created by the testimony that Ricky had  
taken and passed a polygraph test was not outcome­
determinative.  
Because defendant has not met his burden of establishing  
that the error complained of affected the outcome of the  
lower-court 
proceedings, 
defendant 
did 
not 
establish 
the 
three  
elements necessary to avoid forfeiture. 
Accordingly,  
defendant forfeited the claim of error by not timely objecting  
to the assistant prosecutor’s question to Ricky about the  
polygraph test.  
Conclusion  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court  
of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.  
15  
MCR 7.302(F)(1). 
The Court of Appeals did not address  
defendant’s argument that his convictions should be reversed  
because the circuit court admitted gruesome photographs. We  
remand the case to the Court of Appeals to address that issue.  
We do not retain jurisdiction.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
16  
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 119818  
JONATHAN JOE JONES,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I must respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority  
only to the extent that introduction of the polygraph evidence  
constitutes an unpreserved error. To avoid forfeiture of an  
unpreserved 
error, 
whether 
constitutional 
or  
nonconstitutional, a defendant must prove three things: (1)  
the error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the plain  
error affected defendant’s substantial rights.1  See People v  
Grant, 445 Mich 535, 548-549; 520 NW2d 123 (1994); People v  
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).  
Whether 
the 
error 
is 
constitutional 
or  
nonconstitutional has no effect on the test to be employed in 
determining whether an unpreserved error ultimately warrants 
reversal.
 However, I think it is important to note that 
improper introduction of polygraph-examination evidence is 
arguably a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to 
a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. People v  
Barbara, 400 Mich 352; 255 NW2d 171 (1977).  
1 
  
I agree with the majority that defendant has met the  
first two prongs. However, I must respectfully dissent from  
the remainder of the opinion because I disagree with the  
majority’s assertion that defendant has not met his burden of  
persuasion with respect to the effect the error had on his  
substantial rights.  
An error “affecting substantial rights” is an error that  
is “prejudicial.”  In Grant, supra at 553, this Court held  
that  
a plain, unpreserved error may not be considered by 
an appellate court for the first time on appeal 
unless the error could have been decisive of the  
outcome or unless it falls under the category of 
cases, yet to be clearly defined, where prejudice 
is presumed or reversal is automatic.  [Emphasis in 
original.]  
While, admittedly, there is other evidence against defendant  
in this case, bolstering the credibility of the (otherwise  
incredible) sole eyewitness with the admission of polygraph­
examination results is clearly prejudicial.  
Polygraph-examination evidence is excluded from trial  
because it “ha[s] not received the degree of standardization  
or 
acceptance 
among 
scientists 
which 
would 
warrant  
admissibility.” People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 364; 255 NW2d  
171 (1977).  One of the earliest cases in which this Court  
examined the admissibility of polygraph examinations was  
People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955). 
In that  
2  
 
case, this Court recognized “[t]he tremendous weight which  
such tests would necessarily carry in the minds of [jurors].”  
Id. at 372.  Although the majority notes the bright-line rule  
against introducing polygraph-examination evidence, the  
majority 
minimizes 
the effect of that violation on defendant’s  
substantial rights by calling it an “invited response.”  
The majority’s use of the doctrine of “invited response”  
“as an aid to determine whether the prosecutor’s improper  
introduction of evidence at trial affected the fairness of the  
trial” ante at 8, is flawed in two major respects. First, the  
“invited response” rule does not allow a party to introduce  
evidence in response to an improper action.  Both cases on  
which the majority relies, Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168;  
106 S Ct 2464; 91 L Ed 2d 144 (1986), and United States v  
Young, 470 US 1; 105 S Ct 1038; 84 L Ed 2d 1 (1985), involved  
“responses” made in the prosecutor’s closing remarks, not  
“responses” in the form of clearly inadmissible evidence.  The  
prosecutor’s willful and deliberate sidestepping of the trial  
court’s ruling on his objection is not the type of “response”  
contemplated 
by 
the 
“invited response” doctrine.  The doctrine  
of “invited response,” as adopted by the United States Supreme  
Court, does not allow a prosecutor to introduce evidence in  
derogation of the trial court’s ruling that such evidence is  
improper simply because it is a “response” to defense  
3  
 
  
counsel’s actions. The majority claims that “[t]he facts of  
the instant case are directly analogous to those present in  
Young: The prosecutor and defendant each ‘played fast and  
loose with the rules of professional conduct . . . .’” Ante  
at 14.  What the majority fails to recognize in its “analogy”  
is that the attorneys in Young “played fast and loose with the  
rules 
of 
professional conduct” in making their closing remarks  
(which are not to be considered as evidence by the jury),  
while the attorneys in this case played fast and loose with  
introduction of evidence itself.  
The 
second 
problem with the majority’s application of the  
“invited response” doctrine is the failure to recognize that  
the doctrine applies where there was no objection to the  
initial impropriety.2  Here, the prosecutor timely objected to  
the improper question regarding the polygraph examination.  
The objection was sustained, and the question remained  
unanswered. 
Yet, apparently because the prosecutor was  
unsatisfied with the trial judge’s refusal to grant a  
2  See Darden, supra (improper comments by prosecutor 
were made in closing remarks, in response to comments made by 
defense in opening summation); Young, supra at 13 (“the 
prosecutor at the close of defense summation should have 
objected to the defense counsel’s improper statements with a 
request that the court give a timely warning and curative 
instruction to the jury.”); Lawn v United States, 355 US 339, 
359; 78 S Ct 311; 2 L Ed 2d 321 (1958) (defense counsel made 
improper statements in closing argument, the prosecutor did 
not object, but rather responded in his summation).  
4  
 
 
mistrial, he felt compelled to ignore the judge’s ruling and  
elicit information regarding the polygraph examination on  
cross-examination. 
 
The 
“invited 
response” 
doctrine 
should 
not  
be expanded so it can be used as a vehicle for circumventing  
the rulings of trial judges on the admissibility of evidence,  
nor should it be applied so as to implicitly condone the  
conduct of the prosecutor in this case.3  
The proper procedure when a party attempts to introduce  
inadmissible evidence is an objection.  In this case, a proper  
objection 
was 
made 
to defense counsel’s improper question; the  
trial judge correctly sustained the objection.  Instead of  
requesting 
the 
curative instruction proposed by the judge, the  
prosecutor chose to ignore the trial court’s ruling and  
attempted to right the wrong on his own.  
The majority’s expansion of the “invited response”  
doctrine to allow total disregard for the rulings of the trial  
judge, as well as the evidentiary rules, could have  
catastrophic results.  Allowing introduction of polygraph­
examination evidence through the back door eviscerates the  
3  I thank the majority for pointing out that the 
prosecutor’s conduct was improper.  Ante at 12. While I agree 
that application of the “invited response” doctrine does not 
expressly 
excuse 
the 
prosecutor’s 
behavior, 
it 
does 
implicitly 
condone such behavior. Hopefully, this exchange between the 
dissent and majority will clarify that the majority opinion 
should not serve as an invitation to  attorneys to defy the  
rulings of trial judges.  
5  
protections guaranteed by the Michigan Rules of Evidence and  
encourages attorneys to retaliate against the introduction or  
attempted 
introduction of improper evidence in any manner they  
see fit.  The prosecutor in this case intentionally ignored  
the trial court’s ruling and declined the proper method of  
addressing defendant’s improper question. It is exactly this  
type of misconduct that the Michigan Rules of Evidence are  
intended to protect against.  
The 
“rules 
are 
intended 
to 
secure 
fairness 
in  
administration . . . to the end that the truth may be  
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”  MRE 102.  The  
rules of evidence are meaningless if evidence that is not  
admissible under the rules becomes admissible because of  
egregious behavior on the part of the prosecutor in response  
to an attempt to introduce improper evidence. This degrades  
the authority of the trial judge and encourages prosecutorial  
misconduct.  
If 
one 
takes 
away the majority’s erroneous application of  
the “invited response” doctrine, it is clear that defendant’s  
substantial rights were affected by the introduction of the  
improper polygraph-examination evidence.  The evidence was  
prejudicial to defendant because it could have affected the  
outcome of the trial.  
Once a defendant has shown that an unpreserved error was  
6  
 
 
a plain error that affected substantial rights, the appellate  
court may, in its discretion, reverse defendant’s conviction.  
“Reversal is warranted only when the plain, unpreserved error  
result[s] in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant  
or when an error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity,  
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings independent  
of the defendant’s innocence.”  Ante at 10, citing Carines,  
supra at 783.  
The prosecutor’s deliberate introduction of polygraph­
examination evidence, in derogation of the trial court’s  
ruling, clearly affects the fairness, integrity, and public  
reputation of judicial proceedings.  Polygraph-examination  
evidence is excluded from trial because it does not meet the  
standard for admissibility of scientific evidence and because  
of the potential effect on jurors. See Barbara, supra at 364;  
see also Davis, supra at 372.  The prosecutor’s flagrant  
disregard for the trial judge’s ruling that the evidence was  
not admissible clearly affects the integrity and public  
reputation 
of 
judicial proceedings.  As the majority correctly  
notes, “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of  
justice, not simply that of an advocate.” Ante at 9.  
To allow prosecutors (or defense attorneys) to introduce  
polygraph-examination evidence in response to an improper  
attempt to reduce or bolster a witness’s credibility  
7  
undermines the integrity and public reputation of judicial  
proceedings.
 In this case, the trial judge sustained the  
prosecutor’s objection when defense counsel questioned a  
witness about a polygraph examination.  The judge also stated  
that the error could be cured with an instruction. In spite  
of the judge’s ruling, the prosecutor took matters into his  
own hands and asked the witness about the polygraph  
examination.
 This makes a mockery of the longstanding  
prohibition 
on 
introduction 
of 
polygraph-examination 
evidence,  
the prosecutor’s responsibility to act as a minister of  
justice, and the trial judge’s ability to enforce rulings on  
the admissibility of evidence.  
Although 
the 
majority 
does 
not 
expressly 
permit 
violation  
of the bright-line rule against introduction of polygraph­
examination 
evidence, the evidence can be admitted through the  
back door if the prosecutor chooses to disregard the trial  
court’s ruling.  In extending the “invited response” doctrine  
to the admission of polygraph-examination evidence despite a  
sustained objection, the majority dims the brightness of this  
rule and opens the door to abuse by both parties.  
The introduction of the polygraph-examination evidence  
constitutes plain error that affected defendant’s substantial  
rights. Because the prosecutorial misconduct also seriously  
affected the integrity and public reputation of the  
8  
proceedings, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
9