Title: Conservatorship of John L.
Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 131
Docket Number: S157151
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2010

1 
Filed 2/25/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
Conservatorship of the Person of JOHN L.    ) 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND 
) 
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S157151 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D048654 
JOHN L., 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Objector and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MH99550 
 
____________________________________) 
 
At a hearing on April 4, 2006, the superior court considered a petition to 
establish a conservatorship of the person of John L. pursuant to the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act (LPS Act or Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.).1  A report 
prepared by a conservatorship investigator the month before the hearing stated that 
John “made it clear” he did not want a conservator and did not need any 
assistance.  At the hearing, however, John‟s appointed attorney informed the court 
that John did not want to be present in court and was not contesting the 
conservatorship.  Relying on the attorney‟s representations, the court excused 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to this code. 
 
2 
John‟s presence, granted the petition, and appointed the Public Conservator of San 
Diego County as conservator of John‟s person.  We conclude the superior court 
did not commit any statutory or due process violation in doing so.  We therefore 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The LPS Act authorizes the superior court to establish a conservatorship of 
a person who is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder.  (§§ 5350, 5008, 
subd. (h)(1).)  Here, the Public Conservator of San Diego County (Public 
Conservator) sought to establish an LPS conservatorship of the person of 60-year-
old John L.  The relevant facts, all of which occurred in 2006, are undisputed. 
On February 15, John was taken to an emergency psychiatric unit in San 
Diego on an involuntary basis.  He was yelling and screaming and unable to 
provide a chief complaint.  Later that day, John was transferred to the behavioral 
health unit at Palomar Hospital, under the care of Dr. Christopher Gorman.  
During John‟s stay, he was described as extremely manic, grandiose, 
nondirectable, intrusive, manipulative, and having poor boundaries.  He refused 
antipsychotic medication until February 22, when a court-appointed hearing 
officer found that he lacked the capacity to withhold his consent on the matter.  
(See Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1303.) 
On February 24, Dr. Gorman executed a declaration recommending a 
conservatorship based on his belief that John was gravely disabled as a result of a 
mental disorder, diagnosed as “Bipolar Disorder, manic [with] psychotic features.”  
(§ 5352.1.)  He cited the circumstances that John had been evicted from his 
apartment, and that while residing at Palomar Hospital he took food from other 
patients‟ trays, barricaded the door to his room (which required fire department 
intervention), often walked around with his shirt open, and had attempted to leave 
his room one night naked from the waist down.  Although Dr. Gorman considered 
3 
other alternatives to conservatorship, he found no suitable alternative available for 
John. 
Dr. Gorman executed a second declaration stating he had informed John 
that a recommendation for conservatorship of the person was being filed with the 
court, and that a petition for appointment of a conservator also might be filed.  He 
explained to John what the appointment of a conservator meant and identified the 
possible orders that could result from a hearing on the petition.  He also informed 
John of his rights to be present at the hearing, to hire an attorney of his choice or 
to have one appointed for him, to demand a court or jury trial on the issue of grave 
disability, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to produce witnesses in 
opposition to the petition. 
On March 7, the Public Conservator filed an “Ex Parte Petition for 
Appointment of Temporary Conservator and Conservator of the Person” for John 
(the petition), along with Dr. Gorman‟s two declarations.  (§§ 5350, 5352.)  That 
same day, the court appointed the Public Conservator as temporary conservator.  
(§ 5352.1.) 
On March 17, a “Citation for Conservatorship” was issued, notifying John 
he was required to appear at a hearing on April 4, at which time the court would 
determine whether to appoint the Public Conservator as a conservator of his 
person.  (§ 5350; Prob. Code, § 1823.)  The temporary conservator filed a 
“Conservatorship Investigation Report” (the investigation report), prepared by 
investigator Candy Elson of the Public Conservator‟s office, which recommended 
that a conservatorship be established to ensure John would obtain necessary 
mental heath treatment.  (§ 5354.)  The investigation report summarized John‟s 
lengthy history of mental illness dating back to the early 1960‟s and noted both his 
previous diagnosis of schizophrenia and his current diagnosis as “Bipolar Manic 
with Psychosis.”  The report recounted that John had numerous past involuntary 
4 
hospitalizations with a long history of medication noncompliance, a significant 
history of violent, agitated, and obstreperous behavior when hospitalized, and an 
“extremely turbulent” present course at Palomar Hospital. 
The investigation report additionally described investigator Elson‟s meeting 
with John at Palomar Hospital on March 3.  According to Elson, John appeared 
somewhat subdued and sedated, and also was “religiously preoccupied” and 
delusional.  John, however, “made it clear that he did not want a Conservator and 
thought that he did not need any assistance.”  The report concluded there was no 
viable alternative to conservatorship, and recommended “a closed, locked facility” 
as “the least restrictive, most appropriate placement to meet [John‟s] needs.”  
(§ 5354.) 
John was personally served with the petition and citation for 
conservatorship.  His appointed counsel, Lidia Garcia, was served with the 
petition, the investigation report, and notice of the April 4 hearing for the 
appointment of the Public Conservator as a conservator of the person for John. 
John did not attend the April 4 hearing.  As relevant here, Garcia appeared 
at the hearing on John‟s behalf and reported to the court, “Your [H]onor, I have 
visited with him at Telecare Choices.  Recently he was here.  He had requested a 
writ which he took off calendar.  At any rate Mr. L[.] is doing much better.  [¶] We 
discussed the conservatorship and on Friday then he wished to put it over until 
yesterday so that he could think about it.  When we met he indicated that at this 
time he was not contesting the conservatorship.  He did not want to be present in 
court.  So we would ask the court to excuse his presence.” 
After excusing John‟s presence from the hearing, the superior court 
received the investigation report into evidence.  (§ 5354.)  It then ordered the 
appointment of the Public Conservator as conservator of the person of John and 
further ordered that John not be permitted to vote or contract, to possess a driver‟s 
5 
license or a firearm, or to refuse or consent to medical treatment.  Consistent with 
the investigation report‟s recommendation, the court determined that the least 
restrictive placement available and necessary for John was a closed, locked 
treatment facility. 
On appeal, John contended his rights under the LPS Act, as well as his state 
and federal constitutional due process rights, were violated when the superior 
court proceeded with the April 4 conservatorship hearing in his absence and 
ordered the conservatorship without any admissible evidence that he knowingly 
and intelligently waived his right to appear at the hearing.  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed.2 
DISCUSSION 
The central issue is whether the superior court properly proceeded with the 
April 4, 2006, hearing on the petition to establish a conservatorship of the person 
in John‟s absence.  It bears emphasis that, before his appeal, John raised no 
objection to the court‟s actions; in fact, it is undisputed he told his appointed 
attorney he was not contesting the proposed conservatorship and did not wish to 
appear at the hearing.  The court excused John‟s presence and appointed a 
conservator only after hearing the attorney‟s representations on the matter. 
We first review the requirements of the LPS Act to determine whether a 
violation occurred when the superior court excused John‟s absence based upon his 
appointed counsel‟s representations.  If no statutory violation appears, we must 
                                              
2  
John‟s conservatorship ended during the pendency of the appellate process.  
“We exercise our discretion to decide this otherwise moot case because it raises 
important issues that are capable of repetition but likely to evade review.”  (In re 
Lemanuel C. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 33, 38, fn. 4; see Conservatorship of Susan T. 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1011, fn. 5.) 
 
6 
then determine if the court nonetheless deprived John of due process in 
establishing the conservatorship as it did.  These are legal issues subject to de 
novo review.  (See Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 357; 
Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 610.) 
A.  The LPS Act 
The LPS Act governs the involuntary detention, evaluation, and treatment 
of persons who, as a result of mental disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled.  
(§ 5150 et seq.)  The Act authorizes the superior court to appoint a conservator of 
the person for one who is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et seq.), so 
that he or she may receive individualized treatment, supervision, and placement 
(§ 5350.1).  As defined by the Act, a person is “gravely disabled” if, as a result of 
a mental disorder, the person “is unable to provide for his or her basic personal 
needs for food, clothing, or shelter.”  (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) 
Integral to the LPS Act is its procedure for ascertaining whether a 
conservatorship of the person should be established.  Each county is required to 
designate an agency to undertake an investigation to aid the court in determining 
whether a conservatorship is appropriate (§ 5351), and the investigating officer 
must submit a comprehensive written report to the court prior to the 
conservatorship hearing (§ 5354).  The written report must include “all relevant 
aspects of the person‟s medical, psychological, financial, family, vocational and 
social condition, and information obtained from the person‟s family members, 
close friends, social worker or principal therapist.”  (Ibid.)  It must also state if the 
investigator recommends a conservatorship, and if not, identify all available 
alternatives.  (Ibid.)  When a conservatorship is recommended, the report must 
make recommendations concerning a suitable conservator, the powers and duties 
to be granted and imposed upon the conservator, the legal disabilities to be 
7 
imposed upon the proposed conservatee, and the appropriate placement.  (§§ 5355, 
5356.) 
The procedures for establishing a conservatorship include a number of 
requirements pertaining to notice, hearing and trial rights, and other matters.  
Specifically, the petition for appointment of a conservator of the person and the 
citation for conservatorship must be served upon the proposed conservatee at least 
15 days before the scheduled hearing date, and the proposed conservatee must be 
given notice of the privileges and rights subject to deprivation as part of the 
conservatorship.  (§ 5350; Prob. Code, §§ 1823, 1824.)  A hearing must be held 
within 30 days of the date of the petition, and the court must “appoint the public 
defender or other attorney for the . . . proposed conservatee within five days after 
the date of the petition.”  (§ 5365.)  The proposed conservatee “shall have the right 
to demand a court or jury trial on the issue whether he or she is gravely disabled,” 
but must do so before or within five days following the hearing on the 
conservatorship petition.  (§ 5350, subd. (d).)  The party seeking imposition of the 
conservatorship must prove the proposed conservatee‟s grave disability beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and a jury verdict finding such disability must be unanimous.  
(Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235.)  An LPS conservatorship 
automatically terminates after one year, and reappointment of the conservator 
must be sought by petition.  (§ 5361.) 
To determine whether the superior court violated the LPS Act when it 
proceeded with the April 4, 2006, hearing in John‟s absence, we must first find 
what the Act requires.  In construing the Act, our goal is to ascertain and 
effectuate the Legislature‟s intent.  (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
661, 666; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 543.) 
We start by observing that the LPS Act makes no express mention of any 
specific requirement for the presence of a proposed conservatee at a hearing to 
8 
establish a conservatorship of the person.  Section 5350, however, mandates that 
LPS conservatorships shall be established pursuant to the procedure set forth in the 
Probate Code, subject to certain listed exceptions.  As pertinent here:  “The 
procedure for establishing . . . a conservatorship under this chapter shall be the 
same as that provided in Division 4 . . . of the Probate Code, except as follows:  
[¶] . . .  [¶] (f) Conservatorship investigation shall be conducted pursuant to this 
part and shall not be subject to Section 1826 . . . of the Probate Code.  [¶] . . .  [¶] 
(h) As otherwise provided in this chapter.”  (§ 5350, italics added.)  In turn, 
division 4 of the Probate Code embodies the Guardianship-Conservatorship Law 
(Prob. Code, § 1400 et seq.), a separate statutory scheme governing the 
appointment of conservators of the person for “adults who for any reason are 
incapable of taking care of themselves.”  (38 Cal.Jur.3d (2006) Incompetent 
Persons, § 3, p. 180.)3 
Before delving into the relevant Probate Code procedures, we briefly 
review some important distinctions between LPS conservatorships and probate 
conservatorships.  Unlike an LPS conservatorship, a probate conservatorship does 
not depend on a showing of grave disability resulting from a mental disorder, and 
involuntary commitment is not contemplated.  (See generally 38 Cal.Jur.3d, supra, 
Incompetent Persons, § 3, p. 180.)  While LPS conservatorship proceedings may 
be initiated only by the agency-designated conservatorship investigator (§ 5352), 
the proposed conservatee, spouse, domestic partner, relative, or other “interested” 
agency, person, or friend has standing to file a petition for a probate 
conservatorship (Prob. Code, § 1820, subd. (a)).  Finally, the court need not 
appoint counsel in all proceedings to establish a probate conservatorship because, 
                                              
3  
Henceforth, this opinion will refer to conservatorships established pursuant 
to the Guardianship-Conservatorship Law as probate conservatorships. 
9 
unlike the situation in LPS conservatorships, there is no risk of involuntary 
commitment.4  But because the person seeking the probate conservatorship may or 
may not be acting free of ulterior motives, the court generally must appoint a 
“court investigator” to perform an independent and comprehensive investigation.  
(Prob. Code, § 1454; Prob. Code, § 1826 [providing exception in subd. (o) when 
the proposed conservatee personally executes the petition or nominates the 
conservator, and attends the hearing].)5 
We now return to section 5350, requiring that the conservatorship 
procedures set forth in division 4 of the Probate Code be followed in establishing 
LPS conservatorships where they do not conflict with LPS Act provisions.  As 
relevant here, division 4 contains Probate Code section 1825, which provides that 
“[t]he proposed conservatee shall be produced” at the hearing to establish a 
conservatorship, subject to three exceptions.  We are concerned with the exception 
                                              
4  
In contrast to LPS procedures, appointment of counsel in a probate 
conservatorship proceeding is mandatory only if the proposed conservatee 
requests counsel, or if the court determines, based on information contained in the 
court investigator‟s report or obtained from any other source, that the appointment 
would be helpful to the resolution of the matter or is necessary to protect the 
proposed conservatee‟s interests.  (Prob. Code, § 1471, subds. (a), (b).) 
 
5  
The individual appointed as the “court investigator” may not have a 
personal or other beneficial interest in the proceeding (Prob. Code, § 1454, subd. 
(a)), and must have the following qualifications: “(1) The training or experience, 
or both, necessary (i) to make the investigation required under this division, (ii) to 
communicate with, assess, and deal with persons who are or may be the subject of 
proceedings under this division, and (iii) to perform the other duties required of a 
court investigator.  [¶] (2) A demonstrated sufficient knowledge of law so as to be 
able to inform conservatees and proposed conservatees of the nature and effect of 
a conservatorship proceeding and of their rights, to answer their questions, and to 
inform conservators concerning their powers and duties.”  (Prob. Code, § 1454, 
subd. (b).) 
 
10 
set forth in subdivision (a)(3) of that section (Probate Code section 1825(a)(3)), 
providing that a proposed conservatee may be excused from attending the hearing 
if he expressly informs the “court investigator” that he is unwilling to attend and 
does not contest the conservatorship or oppose the proposed conservator.6  To aid 
in the operation of Probate Code section 1825, Probate Code section 1826 requires 
the court investigator to interview the proposed probate conservatee personally, to 
provide relevant information regarding the hearing to establish a conservatorship 
and the proposed conservatee‟s rights, to determine the individual‟s inability or 
unwillingness to attend the hearing and desire to contest the establishment of the 
conservatorship or appointment of the proposed conservator, and to report the 
investigator‟s determinations to the court.  (Prob. Code, § 1826, subds. (c), (e), (f), 
(k).)7  The Probate Code‟s mechanism for excusing a proposed conservatee‟s 
                                              
6  
Probate Code section 1825, subdivision (a), requires that the proposed 
conservatee “be produced” at the hearing to establish a probate conservatorship, 
“except in the following cases:  [¶] (1) Where the proposed conservatee is out of 
the state when served and is not the petitioner.  [¶] (2) Where the proposed 
conservatee is unable to attend the hearing by reason of medical inability.  [¶] (3) 
Where the court investigator has reported to the court that the proposed 
conservatee has expressly communicated that the proposed conservatee (i) is not 
willing to attend the hearing, (ii) does not wish to contest the establishment of the 
conservatorship, and (iii) does not object to the proposed conservator or prefer that 
another person act as conservator, and the court makes an order that the proposed 
conservatee need not attend the hearing.”  This case does not implicate the first 
two statutory exceptions, pertaining to proposed conservatees who are out of state 
and those who are unable to attend the hearing because of medical inability.  
(§ 1825, subd. (a)(1), (2).) 
 
7  
Probate Code section 1826 provides in pertinent part that, regardless of 
whether the proposed conservatee attends the hearing, the court investigator shall 
interview the proposed conservatee personally (id., subd. (a)); inform the proposed 
conservatee of the nature, purpose, and effect of the proceeding, and of the right to 
oppose the proceeding, to attend the hearing, to have the matter of the 
establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury, to be represented by legal 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
11 
production and attendance through a court investigator promotes the dual 
legislative goals of minimizing the individual‟s unwanted court appearances, while 
guarding against abuse of the conservatorship process by ensuring the individual 
actually wants to forgo attendance and opposition to the proposed conservatorship. 
In determining whether and to what extent the procedures set forth in 
Probate Code section 1825 apply to LPS conservatorship proceedings, we must 
give effect to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350‟s explicit command that 
the procedure for establishing LPS conservatorships shall be the same as that 
provided for establishing probate conservatorships, except that “[c]onservatorship 
investigation shall be conducted pursuant to [the LPS Act] and shall not be subject 
to [Probate Code] Section 1826.”  (§ 5350, subd. (f).)  The quoted language is 
critical, for as noted above, the Probate Code contemplates the use of a court-
appointed investigator to conduct an independent investigation into whether a 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
counsel, and to have legal counsel appointed by the court if the proposed 
conservatee is unable to retain counsel (id., subd. (b)); determine whether it 
appears the proposed conservatee is unable or unwilling to attend the hearing (id., 
subd. (c)); determine whether the proposed conservatee wishes to contest the 
establishment of the conservatorship (id., subd. (e)); determine whether the 
proposed conservatee objects to the proposed conservator or prefers another 
person to act as conservator (id., subd. (f)) and whether the proposed conservatee 
wishes to be represented by legal counsel and desires appointment of legal counsel 
(id., subds. (g), (i)); determine whether the appointment of legal counsel would be 
helpful to the resolution of the matter or is necessary to protect the proposed 
conservatee‟s interests in any case where the proposed conservatee does not plan 
to retain legal counsel and has not requested appointment of counsel (id., subd. 
(j)); and report to the court in writing “[w]hether the proposed conservatee is not 
willing to attend the hearing, does not wish to contest the establishment of the 
conservatorship, and does not object to the proposed conservator or prefer that 
another person act as conservator” (id., subd. (k)(2)). 
12 
conservatorship should be established, and in particular, Probate Code section 
1826 requires the court investigator to interview the proposed conservatee in order 
to ascertain and report the information necessary to trigger the application of 
Probate Code section 1825(a)(3).  (Prob. Code, § 1826, subds. (c), (e), (f), (k).)  
By contrast, the agency-designated official charged with conducting a 
conservatorship investigation in an LPS proceeding has none of the duties 
specified in Probate Code section 1826 (see ante, fn. 7), and in particular has no 
obligation to investigate or report on the proposed conservatee‟s unwillingness to 
attend the hearing or nonopposition to the conservatorship.  (See Welf. & Inst. 
Code, §§ 5354, 5356.) 
In order to give effect to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350‟s 
mandate that LPS conservatorships be established pursuant to the same procedure 
used to establish probate conservatorships where there is no conflict between the 
two schemes, we hold that Probate Code section 1825(a)(3)‟s procedure pertaining 
to a proposed conservatee‟s production and attendance at the hearing must be 
followed in LPS cases, with one exception.  That exception, rooted in section 
5350, subdivision (f), effectively bars the authorization and use of a court-
appointed investigator to convey the desire of a proposed conservatee not to 
appear at a hearing.  Section 5350‟s prohibition on the use of court investigators, 
however, does not foreclose using other procedures generally applicable in civil 
proceedings, namely, Code of Civil Procedure section 283, subdivision 1, which 
permits an attorney to make binding representations in court on behalf of her 
client.  Indeed, as we explain below, construing the LPS Act to permit counsel for 
proposed LPS conservatees to seek excusal of their clients‟ presence is logical and 
furthers the purposes of the Act. 
In providing that the procedure set forth in division 4 of the Probate Code 
shall apply in establishing LPS conservatorships absent a statutory conflict, 
13 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 plainly requires the operation of 
Probate Code section 1827, which provides in full:  “The court shall hear and 
determine the matter of the establishment of the conservatorship according to the 
law and procedure relating to the trial of civil actions, including trial by jury if 
demanded by the proposed conservatee.”  (Italics added.)  While proceedings 
under the LPS Act are already commonly viewed as being civil in nature (e.g., 
Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 537 (Ben C.)), Probate Code 
section 1827 makes it all the more clear that the laws of civil procedure apply in 
LPS conservatorship proceedings.  (See Conservatorship of Maldonado (1985) 
173 Cal.App.3d 144, 148.) 
Of significance here is Code of Civil Procedure section 283, subdivision 1, 
which prescribes the manner in which an attorney may bind her client in a civil 
proceeding.  (See City of Fresno v. Baboian (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 753, 757.)  
Under that statute, an attorney “shall have authority” to “bind [her] client in any of 
the steps of an action or proceeding by [her] agreement filed with the Clerk, or 
entered upon the minutes of the Court.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 283, subd. 1.)  In 
view of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, Probate Code section 1827, 
and Code of Civil Procedure section 283, subdivision 1, we hold that a client who 
tells his appointed attorney he is unwilling to attend the hearing and does not wish 
to contest a proposed LPS conservatorship may reasonably expect his attorney to 
report such information to the court, with binding effect.  (See Conservatorship of 
Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 (Mary K.); Conservatorship of 
Maldonado, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 148.)8 
                                              
8  
We express no opinion on the situation where an appointed attorney seeks 
to excuse her client‟s presence at the hearing without the client‟s consent or over 
the client‟s objection. 
14 
Although Probate Code section 1825 speaks in terms of requiring that a 
proposed conservatee “be produced” at the hearing unless one of three exceptions 
is shown, John suggests the provision is properly understood as conferring a 
“right” upon a proposed conservatee to attend the hearing.  (Cf. Prob. Code, 
§ 1823, subd. (b)(5).)  John‟s interpretation of the statute, however, does not 
support a different outcome.  Even assuming Probate Code section 1825 grants 
such a right of attendance, the right is of legislative origin and not a constitutional 
right.  When a statutory right in a civil commitment scheme is at issue, the 
proposed conservatee may waive the right through counsel if no statutory 
prohibition exists.  (E.g., People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 452-454 
[in sexually violent predator recommitment proceeding, trial court properly 
accepted counsel‟s representation that client wanted court trial instead of jury 
trial]; Mary K., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 271.)  Our review of the LPS Act 
discloses no provision purporting to bar a proposed conservatee‟s reliance on 
counsel to convey to the court a waiver of the right to attend a hearing to establish 
an LPS conservatorship.9 
                                              
9  
John also suggests the term “court investigator,” as used in Probate Code 
sections 1825 and 1826, may include persons, such as investigator Candy Elson in 
the instant case, who conduct conservatorship investigations in LPS proceedings.  
Starting from this premise, he contends that Elson‟s investigation report did not 
satisfy Probate Code section 1825(a)(3)‟s requirement for excusing his production 
at the April 4 hearing because it indicated he was opposed to the conservatorship.  
These contentions are lacking in merit.  First, we have already explained that an 
agency-appointed LPS conservatorship investigator has no obligation to 
investigate or report on the matters addressed in Probate Code section 1825(a)(3).  
Second, the LPS Act, properly construed, allowed John to obtain court excusal of 
his production through his attorney.  Third, although John evidently told Elson in 
early March that he was opposed to a conservatorship, there is no dispute he told 
his attorney otherwise shortly before the April 4 hearing. 
15 
Moreover, allowing a proposed LPS conservatee to communicate such 
matters through counsel is substantially consistent with the procedure applicable in 
probate conservatorships, without posing any conflict with LPS Act provisions.  
As indicated above, Probate Code section 1825(a)(3) contemplates that a person 
who has no objection to a proposed conservatorship or conservator and no desire 
to attend the hearing may have his production at the hearing excused after 
informing the court of his views through a court investigator, i.e., one who has 
“demonstrated sufficient knowledge of law so as to be able to inform . . . proposed 
conservatees of the nature and effect of a conservatorship proceeding and of their 
rights, [and] to answer their questions.”  (Prob. Code, § 1454, subd. (b)(2); see 
ante, fn. 5.)  Our interpretation of the LPS Act allows a person who has no 
objection to a proposed LPS conservatorship, and no desire to attend the hearing, 
to similarly have his production excused when he has communicated his wishes to 
the court through an advocate who is professionally obligated to perform these 
same advisory duties.  Permitting counsel to serve this function is only logical, and 
satisfies the Legislature‟s intent both to safeguard the rights of proposed 
conservatees and “to minimize, when appropriate and warranted, actual court 
appearances” in proceedings to establish a conservatorship.  (Conservatorship of 
Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 718, 731 (Moore).)10 
                                              
10  
Relying on an unenacted bill that he claims was “later revised and became” 
the bill that was enacted as a predecessor of Probate Code section 1825, John 
contends the Legislature considered, but later rejected, a provision that would have 
allowed the proposed conservatee‟s attorney to waive presence at the probate 
conservatorship hearing.  (Assem. Bill No. 4260 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) § 17; see 
Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Dig. of Assem. Bill No. 4260 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) 
p. 2.)  Even assuming the unenacted bill may be considered a part of the legislative 
history of Probate Code section 1825, we reject John‟s suggestion that the 
Legislature‟s action (or inaction) evinces an intent to preclude attorney waivers of 
presence. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
16 
In this case, John‟s appointed attorney, Lidia Garcia, informed the superior 
court at the April 4 hearing that she had discussed the conservatorship with John, 
and that John indicated to her (1) “at this time he was not contesting the 
conservatorship” and (2) he “did not want to be present in court.”  There is no 
suggestion that Garcia misrepresented what John told her or that she lacked actual 
authority to waive John‟s presence on his behalf.  (See Conservatorship of 
Maldonado, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 148.)  Garcia‟s conveyance of John‟s 
stated desire to absent himself from the hearing was duly entered upon the minutes 
of the court, and was thus effective to bind John.  (§ 5350; Prob. Code, § 1827; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 283, subd. 1.)  The superior court did not violate the LPS Act 
when it excused John‟s production and proceeded with the April 4 hearing without 
him in attendance. 
B.  Due Process 
Because a conservatorship may result in an involuntary civil commitment, 
John contends that the interests involved in conservatorship proceedings are no 
less fundamental than those at stake in criminal proceedings, and that therefore 
many of the due process safeguards against the erroneous deprivation of liberty in 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
The unenacted bill reflects that, prior to the time the Probate Code provided 
authority for court investigators in 1976, the Legislature considered a provision 
requiring appointment of counsel in all proceedings to establish a probate 
conservatorship.  (Assem. Bill No. 4260 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) § 17; see Assem. 
Com. on Judiciary, Dig. of Assem. Bill No. 4260 (1973-1974 Reg. Sess.) p. 2; cf. 
Stats. 1976, ch. 1357, § 7, p. 6184; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Dig. of Assem. Bill 
No. 1417 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 15, 1975, p. 3.)  But because 
the Legislature decided not to mandate counsel in all such proceedings, its 
decision to forgo the accompanying provision for waivers through counsel is 
hardly surprising. 
17 
the criminal context — such as the right to a hearing, the right to trial, and the 
right to confront witnesses — are equally important and apply in the 
conservatorship context.  John claims he was denied due process because the 
superior court found he waived these fundamental rights, without any showing his 
waiver was valid.  More specifically, although John does not dispute that his 
attorney accurately informed the court he did not want to attend the hearing or 
contest the conservatorship, he argues that the court improperly relied on the 
attorney‟s unsworn statements without asking her any questions to determine 
whether he was capable of providing, and had provided, a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of his rights.  (See Thorn v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 666, 675 
(Thorn) [absent the patient‟s understanding “of the nature of his detention and of 
his rights, it is difficult to perceive how he could knowingly decide whether or not 
to exercise them”].) 
“ „The question of whether due process has obtained can only be answered 
by scrutinizing the circumstances in which the deprivatory action arose.  
[Citations.]  “Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must 
apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the 
quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the 
need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.  [Citation.]” ‟  
[Citation.]”  (Conservatorship of Tian L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1028.)  In 
conservatorship cases, we balance three factors to determine whether a particular 
procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process:  the private interests at 
stake, the state or public interests, and the risk that the procedure or its absence 
will lead to erroneous decisions.  (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 538-539 
[relying on Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18 and In re 
Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952].)  We also consider “ „the availability of prompt 
remedial measures.‟ ”  (Thorn, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 673.) 
18 
There can be no doubt that “[t]he liberty interests at stake in [an LPS] 
conservatorship proceeding are significant.  A person found to be gravely disabled 
may be involuntarily confined for up to one year, and the conservatorship may be 
extended for additional one-year periods, so long as the person remains gravely 
disabled.”  (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540.)  In addition to such confinement, 
a conservatorship may result in the loss of other personal rights, including driving 
privileges, contracting and voting rights, and the right to refuse or consent to 
medical treatment.  (See ibid.; § 5357.)  A person also has a reputational interest in 
not being improperly or unfairly stigmatized.  (See Conservatorship of Roulet, 
supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 228-230.) 
Likewise, there is no question that the public interests promoted by the LPS 
Act are substantial.  The goals of the Act include “ „ending the inappropriate and 
indefinite commitment of the mentally ill, providing prompt evaluation and 
treatment of persons with serious mental disorders, guaranteeing and protecting 
public safety, safeguarding the rights of the involuntarily committed through 
judicial review, and providing individualized treatment, supervision and placement 
services for the gravely disabled by means of a conservatorship program.  
(§ 5001.)‟  [Citation.]  The Act also serves to protect the mentally ill from criminal 
victimization (§ 5001, subd. (g)) and from the myriad forms of suffering endured 
by those unable to care for themselves.”  (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540.) 
As much as the private interests at stake are weighty and deserving of 
protection, the stated purposes of the LPS Act foreclose any argument that an LPS 
commitment is equivalent to criminal punishment in its design or purpose.  
Because of their differing objectives, “the analogy between criminal proceedings 
and proceedings under the LPS Act is imperfect at best and . . . not all of the 
safeguards required in the former are appropriate to the latter.”  (Ben C., supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 538 [declining to require Anders/Wende procedures in LPS 
19 
conservatorship appeals]; see Conservatorship of Susan T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 
1020 [exclusionary rule inapplicable in LPS conservatorship proceedings]; 
Conservatorship of Joel E. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 429, 439-440 [no 
constitutional right to self-representation]; Conservatorship of Bones (1987) 189 
Cal.App.3d 1010, 1015-1016 [no constitutional right not to testify].) 
Nonetheless, because the private interests implicated in an LPS 
conservatorship are significant, “several layers of important protections” have 
been built into the system (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540) to “vigilantly 
guard[] against erroneous conclusions” in such proceedings (id. at p. 542).  For 
starters, the LPS Act provides for a “carefully calibrated series of temporary 
detentions for evaluation and treatment” before a person may be found to be 
gravely disabled and subject to a year-long commitment.  (Ben C., at p. 541.)  The 
process begins with an initial 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment 
(§ 5150), which may be extended by certification for 14 days of intensive 
treatment (§ 5250) and is subject to additional extension periods of detention and 
involuntary commitment when further intensive treatment is found necessary (e.g., 
§§ 5270.15, 5300). 
Moreover, a number of notice requirements must be satisfied before a 
conservatorship may be imposed.  The proposed conservatee must be advised of 
the right to a hearing, the right to representation of counsel, and the right to 
demand a court or jury trial.  (§§ 5350, 5365; Prob. Code, § 1823; In re Gandolfo 
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 897 & fn. 3.)  Additionally, the proposed conservatee is 
entitled to service of the conservatorship petition and the citation for 
conservatorship at least 15 days before the specified hearing date (§ 5350; Prob. 
Code, § 1824), as well as notice of the privileges and rights subject to deprivation 
as part of the conservatorship and a copy of the conservatorship investigation 
report (§§ 5350, 5356; Prob. Code, § 1823). 
20 
Another important protection is the requirement that the court appoint an 
attorney for the proposed LPS conservatee within five days after the date of the 
petition.  (§ 5365.)  Like all lawyers, the court-appointed attorney is obligated to 
keep her client fully informed about the proceedings at hand, to advise the client 
of his rights, and to vigorously advocate on his behalf.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 6068, subd. (c); Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701, 710 
[a proposed LPS conservatee has a statutory right to effective assistance of 
counsel]; Conservatorship of Benvenuto (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1030, 1037, fn. 6 
[“Implicit in the mandatory appointment of counsel is the duty of counsel to 
perform in an effective and professional manner.”]; see Mary K., supra, 234 
Cal.App.3d at p. 272; Conservatorship of Ivey (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1559, 
1566.)  The attorney must also refrain from any act or representation that misleads 
the court.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d); Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 5-
200(B).) 
Finally, prompt remedial relief is available through several mechanisms 
after a conservatorship has been established.  As indicated, an LPS 
conservatorship automatically terminates after one year.  (§ 5361.)  During this 
one-year period, the conservatee may twice petition for rehearing as to his status 
as a conservatee (§ 5364), and need only prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence at the rehearing that he is no longer gravely disabled.  (Ben C., supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 541.)  Additionally, the conservatee may twice petition for a hearing 
to contest the rights denied under section 5357 or the powers granted to the 
conservator under section 5358.  (§ 5358.3.)  The availability of these remedial 
measures “will ordinarily insure that any change in the conservatee‟s condition or 
other circumstance affecting the appropriateness of the restrictions placed on him 
is recognized within a reasonable time.”  (In re Gandolfo, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 
899.) 
21 
We now assess the risk that judicial reliance on an attorney‟s unsworn 
statements in court regarding a proposed conservatee‟s waiver of presence and 
trial rights will lead to erroneous conservatorship decisions.  To aid in our 
consideration, we find it useful to look to the Court of Appeal‟s analysis in Moore, 
supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 718, a case addressing a similar due process challenge in 
the analogous context of a petition to reestablish an LPS conservatorship.  In 
Moore, the public conservator had served the petition and all required notices on 
the conservatee and his appointed attorney.  (See § 5362.)  Prior to the noticed 
hearing date, the attorney filed a sworn declaration stating she had ascertained that 
the conservatee did not oppose reestablishment of conservatorship and did not 
request a hearing.  On the basis of that declaration and the submitted medical 
evidence, the superior court followed statutory procedures and, on its own motion 
and without a formal hearing, reappointed the public conservator and reimposed a 
restriction that the conservatee could not refuse treatment directly bearing on his 
grave disability.  (Moore, at p. 724.) 
In analyzing the adequacy of the statutory ex parte reestablishment 
procedures followed by the superior court, Moore reviewed the relevant statutory 
notice, hearing, and trial provisions11 and additionally considered the application 
of the local rules that directed counsel to inform the court, via a sworn affidavit, if 
the conservatee had no opposition to the conservator‟s reappointment.  Moore 
determined that not only did the combination of these procedures provide 
“constitutionally sound safeguards against error,” but they affirmatively 
“welcomed and encouraged [the conservatee‟s] participation in the 
                                              
11  
The LPS Act provides that the right to demand a court or jury trial on the 
issue of grave disability also applies in proceedings to reestablish conservatorship.  
(§ 5350, subd. (d); see § 5362.) 
22 
conservatorship decision.”  (Moore, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 730.)  Moreover, 
by ensuring that counsel would inform the court of any nonopposition to the 
proposed reestablishment, the procedures allowed the conservatee “to avoid a 
potentially uncomfortable and disruptive court appearance which, in light of his 
nonopposition to reestablishment, would have likely been brief and pro forma.”  
(Ibid.)  Moore further observed that, even assuming the court acts in error, any 
“loss of liberty would have arguably been de minimus” because the conservatee 
could challenge the ex parte reestablishment under statutory provisions (§§ 5362, 
5364) or anytime by writ of habeas corpus.  (Moore, at p. 730; cf. In re Gandolfo, 
supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 899-900 [habeas corpus available only in extraordinary 
circumstances where the statutory procedures are shown to be inadequate and to 
result in unreasonable consequences greatly detrimental to conservatee].) 
In a passage that speaks to the situation here, Moore emphasized the 
significance of a conservatee‟s representation by counsel in determining the 
validity of the conservatee‟s waiver of a hearing or trial:  “ „When counsel is 
present, a voluntary and intelligent waiver of known rights may properly be 
inferred from the record, without a specific on-the-record showing as to each 
right.‟ ”  (Moore, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 733.)  Moore also rejected the 
contention that conservatees who have been found gravely disabled are unable to 
knowingly and intelligently waive their right to a hearing.  As the decision 
observed, “conservatees are not, by reason of their conservatorship, automatically 
considered incompetent, and their ability to knowingly and intelligently waive 
their hearing rights is a question of fact.”  (Id. at p. 732; see § 5331 [“No person 
may be presumed to be incompetent because he or she has been evaluated or 
treated for mental disorder . . . , regardless of whether such evaluation or treatment 
was voluntarily or involuntarily received.”]; In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 17 
[“ „one of the cardinal principles of LPS‟ ” is “ „that mental patients may not be 
23 
presumed incompetent solely because of their hospitalization‟ ”]; Riese v. St. 
Mary’s Hospital & Medical Center, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1319 [“LPS 
recognizes that patients may be involuntarily committed yet nevertheless remain 
capable of giving informed consent.”].) 
Returning to the instant case, we reach a conclusion similar to the one 
obtained in Moore, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 718.  When we consider the 
combination of due process protections that have been built or read into the LPS 
Act, including the prehearing notice and counsel requirements and the requirement 
for a comprehensive conservatorship investigation report, as well as the familiar 
duties imposed on counsel in the representation of LPS clients and the availability 
of remedies after a conservatorship is in place, we have no difficulty concluding 
that these numerous checks sufficiently guard against the risk of erroneous 
conservatorship decisions, without the need to impose additional waiver-related 
requirements.  Accordingly, a superior court may properly find a waiver of 
presence and trial rights when informed by the attorney that the proposed 
conservatee does not want to attend the hearing to establish the LPS 
conservatorship and does not oppose the conservatorship.  Whether the proposed 
conservatee has knowingly and intelligently waived his presence and trial rights is 
a question of fact; it may not be presumed that a person found gravely disabled, or 
one who has been evaluated or treated for a mental disorder, is incompetent to 
waive such rights. 
Here, John does not deny he informed his appointed attorney, Lidia Garcia, 
that he did not wish to attend the hearing and did not contest the proposed LPS 
conservatorship.  John claims, however, that Garcia‟s representations on the 
matter were contradicted by investigator Elson‟s report stating that, in their 
meeting on March 3, John “made it clear that he did not want a Conservator and 
thought that he did not need any assistance.”  We disagree.  As reported by Garcia 
24 
and confirmed by court records, John‟s actions after his meeting with Elson gave 
rise to the reasonable implication that his views substantially changed during the 
month preceding the Tuesday, April 4, 2006, hearing. 
At the April 4 hearing, Garcia described the following chronology of events 
to the superior court.  After the March 3 meeting with investigator Elson, John 
filed a writ petition opposing his detention, and he thereafter appeared in court but 
decided not to pursue the writ.  In this regard, Garcia was referring to events 
already known to the court.12  Garcia then explained that she and John discussed 
the conservatorship, and that on the Friday before the April 4 hearing John wanted 
more time to think about it.  When the two later met, John told Garcia he was not 
contesting the conservatorship and did not want to be present in court.  On this 
record, the court could reasonably conclude that while John initially opposed a 
conservatorship when asked about the subject on March 3, he subsequently 
changed his mind and decided he no longer wished to contest the conservatorship 
and did not want to attend the April 4 hearing.13 
                                              
12  
The record before us reflects that the judge who handled John‟s writ 
petition was the same judge presiding at the April 4 hearing.  John‟s petition, 
denying he had a mental disorder that rendered him dangerous or gravely disabled, 
was presented to the court on March 6 and set for hearing the next day.  The court 
issued a writ requiring John‟s production at the March 7 hearing, and John 
appeared at the hearing but withdrew the writ petition. 
 
13  
On February 22, a court-appointed hearing officer found that John lacked 
the capacity to withhold his consent to antipsychotic medication.  On March 7, 
John was placed under a temporary conservatorship that restricted his rights to 
vote and contract, and his right to consent or refuse to consent to medical 
treatment.  Because these circumstances were apparent from the record at the time 
of the April 4 hearing, John contends the superior court should not have assumed 
he was capable of knowingly or intelligently waiving his presence and trial rights.  
We are not persuaded. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
25 
John complains the court should not have relied on his attorney‟s 
representations because they were not given under oath.  We conclude that sworn 
statements are not necessary in this context.  Misrepresenting to the court that a 
client has no objection to a conservatorship is, among other things, a serious 
violation of the Business and Professions Code and the State Bar Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6068, subd. (d), 6106; Rules Prof. 
Conduct, rule 5-200(B).)  Because an attorney remains answerable for such 
misconduct (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6077, 6100; see Clark v. Willett (1868) 35 Cal. 
534, 539), there is little to be gained by requiring counsel to submit her statements 
under oath. 
More importantly, the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an attorney 
“shall have authority” to “bind [her] client in any of the steps of an action or 
proceeding by [her] agreement . . . entered upon the minutes of the Court.”  (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 283, subd. 1.)  That is exactly what happened here.  John told his 
appointed attorney he did not contest the proposed conservatorship and did not 
want to attend the hearing.  The attorney then informed the court of John‟s 
position, which was duly entered upon the court minutes.  No more was necessary.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
As the record indicates, John began taking antipsychotic medication after 
the hearing officer‟s February 22 finding.  He thus had been on medication for 
well over a month by the time he met with Garcia shortly before the April 4 
hearing.  Garcia reported at the hearing that John was “doing much better,” and 
that not only was he able to discuss the conservatorship with her, but he even 
asked for more time to “think about it” before making a decision.  On this record, 
the court cannot be faulted for accepting the proffered waiver.  (See § 5331.) 
 
26 
(See Mary K., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 271; Conservatorship of Maldonado, 
supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 148.)14 
Finally, both John and amicus curiae California Association of Mental 
Health Patients‟ Rights Advocates contend a proposed LPS conservatee must 
appear in court in person, or the court must go to him, so the court may observe 
the individual directly and conduct personal questioning in order to evaluate his 
capacity and ensure his waivers are intelligent and knowing.  We disagree. 
We find that the value of requiring an unwilling proposed conservatee to 
appear before the court is too slight to justify its adoption as part of the 
conservatorship process.  First, although a court‟s observation of an individual 
might be useful in some circumstances, an attorney will generally have a more 
extensive opportunity to confer with her client about his rights and to weigh the 
client‟s behavior.  (See Conservatorship of Chambers (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 277, 
288.)  Second, compelling a proposed conservatee to appear before the court, 
irrespective of his stated nonopposition to conservatorship and request to be 
absent, would effectively render his right to waive presence and a trial 
                                              
14  
People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510 does not compel otherwise.  In 
Davis, we held that an attorney did not effectuate a valid waiver of the defendant‟s 
federal and state rights to presence at a pretrial hearing because, even though the 
attorney informed the court that the defendant was aware of the purpose of the 
hearing and had decided to waive his presence, the defendant had not submitted a 
waiver in written form and there was no evidence he understood the right he was 
waiving and the consequences of doing so.  (Davis, at pp. 529-532.)  That 
decision, however, involved the federal constitutional right to be personally 
present at a criminal trial (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.), as well as a statutory 
right of presence that could not be waived absent the defendant‟s personal written 
waiver (Pen. Code, § 977, subd. (b)).  As explained above, we find this case to 
present another of those situations where “the analogy between criminal 
proceedings and proceedings under the LPS Act is imperfect at best and . . . not all 
of the safeguards required in the former are appropriate to the latter.”  (Ben C., 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 538.) 
27 
meaningless.  Third, mandating attendance under such circumstances might also 
result in “a potentially uncomfortable and disruptive court appearance” for the 
proposed conservatee which, in light of his nonopposition, would likely be “brief 
and pro forma.”  (Moore, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 730.) 
In sum, we conclude the superior court did not deprive John of due process 
when it established the conservatorship of his person in his absence.  This 
conclusion is consistent with decisions generally recognizing that, even though 
certain rights implicated in civil proceedings are substantial, they may be waived 
by an attorney with the client‟s express consent.  (Mary K., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d 
at pp. 269-271 [bench trial held after counsel reported client‟s wish to waive jury 
trial]; cf. Linsk v. Linsk (1969) 70 Cal.2d 272, 278 [counsel cannot abdicate a 
substantial right of the client contrary to express instructions]; Conservatorship of 
Christopher A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 613 [attorney may not, without the 
client’s express consent, enter into a stipulated judgment regarding placement, 
disabilities, and conservator powers].)  It also finds support in prior decisions 
acknowledging that, in the absence of any contrary indication, the superior court 
may assume that an attorney is competent and fully communicates with the 
proposed conservatee about the entire proceeding.  (E.g., Mary K., supra, 234 
Cal.App.3d at p. 272; Conservatorship of Ivey, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1566; 
see also People v. Ngo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 30, 37 [an attorney admitted to the 
California Bar is presumptively competent].)15 
                                              
15  
John argues that the superior court‟s error in excusing him from the 
proceedings led to a second error, namely, that the court failed to conduct an on-
the-record voir dire as required under Probate Code section 1828.  No voir dire is 
required, however, when the court excuses the proposed conservatee‟s attendance 
pursuant to Probate Code section 1825(a)(3).  (Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (c).)  
Because the court properly accepted John‟s waiver of his rights through counsel, 
this contention fails. 
28 
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
The superior court did not violate John‟s statutory or due process rights 
when it proceeded, in John‟s absence, with the April 4, 2006, hearing on the 
petition to establish a conservatorship of his person.  The judgment of the Court of 
Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Conservatorship of John L. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 154 Cal.App.4th 1090 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S157151 
Date Filed: February 25, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Kerry Wells 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Linda M. Fabian, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Objector and Appellant. 
 
Morten P. Cohen for California Association of Mental Health Patients‟ Rights Advocates as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Objector and Appellant. 
 
Anne E. Menasche for Protection & Advocacy, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector and 
Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
John J. Sansome, County Counsel, Leonard W. Pollard II and William A. Johnson, Jr., Deputy County 
Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Linda M. Fabian 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 696-0282 
 
Morten P. Cohen 
536 Mission Street 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
9415) 442-6678 
 
William A. Johnson, Jr. 
Deputy County Counsel 
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355 
San Diego, Ca  92101-2469 
(619) 531-5801