Title: Hale v. Town of Warrenton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 160813
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2017

VIRGINIA:  
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the 
City of Richmond on Thursday, the 20th day of April, 2017.  
 
Robert F. Hale, Jr.,  
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 against 
Record No. 160813 
 
 
Circuit Court No. CL15-262 
 
Town of Warrenton, 
 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Upon an appeal from a judgment 
rendered by the Circuit Court of Fauquier 
County. 
 
Robert F. Hale, Jr., appeals an order from the Circuit Court of Fauquier County 
sustaining the Town of Warrenton’s demurrer and dismissing Hale’s complaint with prejudice.  
Because the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer, we reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
I. 
 
 On appeal from a final order granting a demurrer, “we recite the facts contained in the 
pleadings and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  
Coutlakis v. CSX Transp., Inc., 293 Va. 212, 215, 796 S.E.2d 556, 558 (2017).  We also take into 
account factual allegations contained in “documents brought into a case as a result of a motion 
craving oyer” as they “are incorporated into the pleadings and may be used to ‘amplify’ the facts 
alleged in a complaint when a court decides whether to sustain or overrule a demurrer.”  EMAC, 
L.L.C. v. County of Hanover, 291 Va. 13, 21, 781 S.E.2d 181, 185 (2016) (alteration and citation 
omitted). 
In April 2006, the Director of Planning and Community Development for the Town of 
Warrenton, Charles Mothersead, sent Hale a letter offering him employment as the Town’s 
Building Official and Property Maintenance Official.  Hale accepted the offer and thereafter 
began service as the only executive Building Official in charge of the Building Department for 
the Town. 
According to Hale, after he later found himself in conflict with “people of considerable 
influence in Warrenton,” J.A. at 4, the Town Manager notified him in November 2012 that he 
was being removed from his “supervisor role in the Building Department,” although his “pay 
2 
 
grade, job title and other assigned duties” would “remain the same,” id. at 80.  In June 2013, the 
Town announced that another employee had been appointed as the Town’s new Building 
Official.  Later that month, Hale filed a grievance with the Town concerning his removal from 
the office of executive Building Official. 
After the Town decided that the matter was not grievable, Hale appealed to the circuit 
court.  In that proceeding, Mothersead conceded that Hale was not hired as “an interim building 
official,” but rather “as a full-time employee” who served as “the only building official for the 
Town of Warrenton at that time.”  Id. at 19.  Mothersead confirmed that Hale was the “executive 
official” in charge of the building department.  Id. 
Hale also testified in the circuit court proceeding.  He agreed with the Town’s attorney on 
cross-examination that he had initially served in a “probationary” status but stated that this status 
had expired after serving six months on the job.  Id. at 28.  The circuit court did not address these 
issues, however, and instead held that Hale had failed to file a timely grievance.  Id. at 40-42. 
 
In 2015, Hale filed a complaint seeking money damages against the Town for wrongful 
termination against public policy.  Hale later amended his complaint and instead requested a writ 
of mandamus to reappoint him as “the executive official in charge of the Warrenton building 
division,” id. at 7, as a remedy for the Town’s alleged violation of 13 VAC § 5-63-50(A), a 
regulation codifying Section 105.1 of the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code.  The Town 
filed a demurrer in response and contended that Hale did not allege facts demonstrating that he 
was ever permanently appointed as the Town’s Building Official.  The Town also filed a motion 
craving oyer for the exhibits entered into evidence at the hearing for his grievance appeal to the 
circuit court.  After hearing oral argument on the motions, the circuit court granted the motion 
craving oyer, upon which the parties had reached agreement, and sustained the demurrer.  During 
the hearing at which the circuit court sustained the demurrer, the court stated that the alleged 
facts did not demonstrate that the Town had made a “permanent appointment” of Hale as 
Building Official.  R. at 305. 
II. 
 
On appeal, Hale argues that he alleged sufficient facts to survive a demurrer and to permit 
the reasonable inference that he was permanently appointed as the Building Official for the 
Town of Warrenton.  We agree. 
3 
 
1. 
“The purpose of a demurrer is to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action 
upon which the requested relief may be granted.”  Dye v. CNX Gas Co., 291 Va. 319, 323, 784 
S.E.2d 703, 705 (2016).  While a complaint need not “descend into statements giving details of 
proof in order to withstand demurrer,” it must contain “sufficient allegations of material facts to 
inform a defendant of the nature and character of the claim.”  Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac, 
286 Va. 137, 143, 747 S.E.2d 804, 807-08 (2013) (quoting CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering 
Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 24, 431 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1993)). 
For the purpose of evaluating the circuit court’s ruling on a demurrer, “we consider as 
true all the material facts alleged in the complaint, all facts impliedly alleged, and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from such facts.”  Assurance Data, 286 Va. at 143, 747 S.E.2d at 
807 (alteration and citation omitted).  On appeal, however, this Court is not bound by 
“conclusions of law” or “conclusory allegations” in the complaint.  Brown v. Jacobs, 289 Va. 
209, 212 n.2, 768 S.E.2d 421, 423 n.2 (2015) (citations omitted).  As a result, we review de novo 
the sufficiency of the legal conclusions ascribed to factual allegations in the pleading.  Evans v. 
Evans, 280 Va. 76, 81-82, 695 S.E.2d 173, 175-76 (2010). 
2. 
The Virginia Administrative Code outlines the procedures for the appointment and 
removal of Building Officials: 
Every local building department shall have a building official as 
the executive official in charge of the department.  The building 
official shall be appointed in a manner selected by the local 
governing body.  After permanent appointment, the building 
official shall not be removed from office except for cause after 
having been afforded a full opportunity to be heard on specific and 
relevant charges by and before the appointing authority. 
13 VAC § 5-63-50(A) (emphasis added) (codifying Section 105.1 of the Virginia Uniform 
Statewide Building Code).  The Warrenton Town Code further specifies that “[t]he Town 
manager shall appoint a building official qualified,” under the Virginia Uniform Statewide 
Building Code, and that only “[t]he town manager may serve as the building official until such 
appointment is made.”  Warrenton Town Code § 4-2. 
4 
 
 
In his amended complaint, Hale alleges that he “was the executive official in charge of 
the building department, by permanent appointment”; that he “was the only building official for 
the Town of Warrenton”; and that he had “lost all supervisory responsibilities, without the 
benefit of any hearing, or an opportunity to have a hearing.”  J.A. at 3-4 (emphasis added).  
Mothersead also conceded that Hale was hired as a “full-time,” not a mere “interim,” Building 
Official.  Id. at 19.1  Hale acknowledged his initial “probationary” status but stated that this 
status was in effect only for the first six months of his employment.  Id. at 28.  Upon this and 
other allegations, Hale contends that, while he was initially “hired as an at-will employee,” 
Appellant’s Br. at 12, his appointment thereafter became permanent. 
These factual allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to Hale, support the 
reasonable inference that the Town Manager’s actions in hiring Hale as the sole Building Official 
on a full-time basis — subject only to a six-month at-will, probationary period — could be 
construed as a permanent appointment of Hale as Building Official upon the expiration of his 
probationary status.  In short, whether Hale was permanently appointed is a disputed issue of 
fact.  The circuit court thus erred in concluding that Hale failed to plead sufficient allegations of 
material facts to withstand the Town’s demurrer.2 
III. 
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Fauquier County is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 
                     
1 The Town conceded in its brief that Mothersead, the Director of Planning, who “fell 
under the Town Manager’s supervision and control,” sent Hale’s employment offer “on behalf of 
the Town.”  Appellee’s Br. at 2.  At oral argument, the Town further admitted that the evidence 
demonstrated a “delegation” of the Town Manager’s hiring authority to Mothersead and that the 
letter extending the offer of employment “came from somebody who was appointed by the Town 
Manager to do that.”  Oral Argument Audio at 18:51 to 19:05.  Mothersead also testified that this 
“method of hiring . . . was determined by the Town of Warrenton.”  J.A. at 19. 
2 Because the mandamus remedy requested by Hale may turn on factual findings made on 
remand, we offer no opinion on whether that remedy would be appropriate in this case in the 
event Hale succeeds on the merits.  Whether a writ of mandamus should be issued and, if so, its 
remedial scope, are both matters that should be addressed by the circuit court after determining, 
among other things, Hale’s employment status and whether the Town violated any of Hale’s 
specific rights. 
5 
 
This order shall be certified to the Circuit Court of Fauquier County and shall be 
published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
                A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
          
                    Teste: 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk