Title: A.J. Maggio Co. v. Willis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90624
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2001

Docket No. 90624-Agenda 41-May 2001.
A.J. MAGGIO COMPANY, Appellant, v. COY WILLIS et al. 								(Illinois Emcasco Insurance Company, Appellee).
Opinion filed September 27, 2001.
 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiff, A.J. Maggio Company (Maggio), brought a
four-count, second-amended complaint against the defendants,
Willis Construction (Willis) and Illinois Emcasco Insurance
Company (Emcasco), to recover the cost of repairing a defective
sewer installed by Willis. Counts III and IV of the second-amended complaint alleged claims of assignment and subrogation
against Emcasco in connection with a commercial general liability
policy that Emcasco issued to Willis. The trial court granted
Emcasco's motion to dismiss counts III and IV and found that
there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. The
appellate court eventually affirmed the dismissal of counts III and
IV (316 Ill. App. 3d 1043) and we granted Maggio's petition for
leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315). For the reasons that
follow, we now dismiss Maggio's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND
	The underlying facts of this case are fully set forth in the
opinion of the appellate court. 316 Ill. App. 3d 1043. For the
purpose of this appeal, we need only discuss the relevant
procedural history. On Maggio's appeal from the trial court, the
appellate court initially ruled in favor of Maggio and held that the
trial court erred in dismissing Maggio's claims of assignment and
subrogation. Thereafter, Emcasco filed a petition for rehearing
(hereinafter, the first petition for rehearing) before the appellate
court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 367 (155 Ill. 2d R. 367).
Emcasco argued that the appellate court had "overlooked or
misapprehended" the nature of the insurance policy Emcasco had
issued to Willis. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(b). The appellate court
allowed Emcasco's petition for rehearing. Maggio then answered
the petition and argued that Emcasco had raised a wholly new
issue and, therefore, Emcasco's petition should be denied. Maggio
did not answer the merits of Emcasco's petition regarding the
nature of the insurance policy Emcasco had issued to Willis. The
appellate court was persuaded by Emcasco. It entered an order
withdrawing and vacating its initial opinion and, on September 26,
2000, the court entered judgment on Emcasco's petition and
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Maggio's assignment and
subrogation claims. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1049.
	At that point, Maggio filed neither a petition for leave to
appeal or a notice of intent to do so. Instead, Maggio filed its own
petition for rehearing (hereinafter, the second petition for
rehearing) arguing that the appellate court had improperly
considered a new argument on Emcasco's petition for rehearing
and, as a result, Maggio was denied due process. Emcasco
responded by filing a motion to strike Maggio's petition as
improper under Supreme Court Rule 367(e) (155 Ill. 2d R. 367(e)),
which the appellate court denied. Then on November 6, 2000, the
appellate court denied Maggio's petition and 15 days later, Maggio
filed a notice of intent to appeal.
	On appeal before this court, Maggio submits various
arguments directed to the appellate court's September 26, 2000
judgment on the first petition for rehearing filed by Emcasco. In
response, Emcasco argues that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
367(e), which prohibits successive petitions for rehearing (155 Ill.
2d R. 367(e)), Maggio was barred from filing its petition in the
appellate court in the first place. In addition, Emcasco argues that
Maggio failed to file a timely appeal from the appellate court's
September 26, 2000 judgment on Emcasco's petition for
rehearing. Emcasco maintains that Maggio's filing of the second
petition for rehearing did not toll the time for filing an appeal.
Therefore, Emcasco argues, this court lacks jurisdiction. We agree
with Emcasco.



ANALYSIS
	Because the dispute over this court's jurisdiction turns in part
on Maggio's filing of the second petition for rehearing and, in
particular, whether the second petition for rehearing may toll the
deadline for filing a notice of intent to appeal, we will begin with
a discussion of the propriety of that petition.
	Supreme Court Rule 367 states that a petition for rehearing
"may be filed within 21 days after the filing of the judgment,
unless on motion the time is shortened or enlarged by the court or
a judge thereof." 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(a). In 1967, we added
paragraph (e), which states:
			"When the Appellate Court has granted a petition for
rehearing and entered judgment on rehearing no further
petitions for rehearing shall be filed in that court." 36 Ill.
2d R. 367(e).
Previously, petitions for rehearing before the appellate courts were
governed by the rules of the respective appellate courts. See 7 Ill.
2d R. 44(4); 355 Ill. R. 44. With the addition of paragraph (e) in
1967, however, we established the rule against successive petitions
for rehearing in the appellate court.
	 Maggio argues that the language of Rule 367(e) is ambiguous
because it does not say that no further petitions shall be filed by
"any of the parties." Maggio then reasons that because Rule 367(e)
is ambiguous, we must look to the committee comments to discern
its meaning. Our comment states:
			"When [the appellate court] has twice considered a
case, once initially and a second time on rehearing, there
would seem to be no need for further consideration,
especially when there is a higher court from which relief
can be sought. See Rules 315(b), 316, and 317 as to the
date from which the time for seeking Supreme Court
review begins to run." 155 Ill. 2d R. 367, Committee
Comments, at clxiii.
Maggio contends that the comment adds further ambiguity in that
it states that "there would seem to be no need for further
consideration" by the appellate court. (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill.
2d R. 367, Committee Comments, at clxiii.
	We find, however, that the rule is not ambiguous. Section (e)
clearly provides that "no further petitions" may be filed before the
appellate court once that court has entered judgment on a petition.
(Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(e). The meaning of "no other
petitions" does not need to be qualified or explained by yet another
phrase such as that supplied by Maggio. Under the plain language
of the rule, the bar to a successive petition for rehearing applies 
regardless of whether the petition is brought by the same party or
by a different party. In addition, we note that Maggio's petition for
rehearing came after the appellate court had entered judgment on
Emcasco's petition. The plain language of the rule prohibits a
party from filing a petition for rehearing once "the Appellate Court
has granted a petition for rehearing and entered judgment on
rehearing ***." (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(e). Maggio's
petition, therefore, is barred because it came after the appellate
court had entered its judgment on Emcasco's petition.
	Furthermore, though we need not rely on statutory comments
where the language of the particular provision is unambiguous (see
In re Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies of School District No.
205, 193 Ill. 2d 490, 496 (2000) (where a statute's language is
clear and unambiguous, we will not resort to other aids of
construction)), the comment supplies the rationale for the rule.
When the appellate court enters judgment on a petition for
rehearing, the court has twice considered the issue: once at the
instance of the party who filed the original appeal and a second
time at the instance of the party who filed the petition for
rehearing. There is no need for the appellate court to consider the
issue yet a third time, particularly when "there is a higher court
from which relief can be sought." 155 Ill. 2d R. 367, Committee
Comments, at clxiii. Pursuant to Rule 367(e), therefore, successive
petitions for rehearing in the appellate court are barred.
	We note that both parties rely in their arguments on case law
which involved successive petitions for rehearing before our
supreme and appellate courts. The precedential value of those
cases are limited, however, by the fact that Supreme Court Rule
367(e) has since been adopted, and by the fact that in none of those
cases do we consider the issue of a second petition for rehearing
tolling the filing date of an appeal. Accordingly, we do not find
case law prior to the 1967 amendment of Rule 367 to be
controlling in the matter at hand.
	Maggio appeals from the appellate court's judgment on the
first petition for rehearing, which was filed by Emcasco. Supreme
Court Rule 315(b) requires that if a petition for rehearing is
granted, any subsequent petition for leave to appeal must be filed
"within 21 days of the entry of the judgment on rehearing." 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(b); PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 305 (1981) (holding that the effective date of the appellate
court's judgment is the date that judgment is entered on rehearing).
Our rules demand strict compliance in the timely filing of appeals
or affidavits of intent as a matter of jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 150 (1994); Archer Daniels Midland
Corp. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538 (1984). In addition, the
comment to Rule 367(e) emphasizes the filing deadline by
specifically referring litigants to "Rule[ ] 315(b) *** as to the date
from which the time for seeking Supreme Court review begins to
run." 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(e), Committee Comments, at clxiii.
	The appellate court here entered judgment on Emcasco's
petition for rehearing on September 26, 2000. Instead of filing a
petition for leave to appeal or affidavit of intent, however, Maggio
filed its own petition for rehearing. It was not until November 21,
2000, 56 days after the appellate court entered judgment on the
first petition for rehearing filed by Emcasco, that Maggio filed its
affidavit of intent. Maggio's appeal to this court came too late.
Moreover, because Maggio's second petition for rehearing was
barred by Rule 367(e), it cannot toll the filing date of Maggio's
appeal.
	In further support of its argument that it should have been
allowed to file a second petition for rehearing, Maggio submits
that it was somehow misled by the appellate court because in the
upper right-hand corner of the court's opinion on Emcasco's
petition for rehearing, there was stamped the following: "NOTICE.
The text of this opinion may be changed or corrected prior to the
time for filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the
same." In addition, Maggio suggests that the appellate court's
denial of Emcasco's motion to strike indicated to Maggio that its
petition for rehearing would be entertained and that, therefore, it
would toll the filing date for Maggio's appeal. These arguments
are unavailing, however, because they ignore the plain language of
our Rules 315 and 367.
	A judgment was rendered on Emcasco's petition for rehearing
on September 26, 2000. Maggio, therefore, had 21 days, or until
October 17, 2000, to file its petition for leave to appeal or affidavit
of intent. It failed to do so; thus, this court does not have
jurisdiction to hear Maggio's appeal and we dismiss it.



Appeal dismissed.