Title: State v. Florida Nat. Properties, Inc.
Citation: 338 So. 2d 13
Docket Number: 45787
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 1976

338 So. 2d 13 (1976)
STATE of Florida and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, Appellants,
v.
FLORIDA NATIONAL PROPERTIES, INC., Etc., Appellee.
No. 45787.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 14, 1976.
Rehearing Denied October 14, 1976.
*14 Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth G. Oertel, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Kenneth L. Connor and Robin Gibson of Gibson &amp; Connor, Lake Walers, for appellee.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on appeal from the Circuit Court, Highlands County. The trial court in its final judgment passed upon the constitutionality of Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, giving this Court jurisdiction of the direct appeal.[1]
Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, reads as follows.
The facts of this case are as follows.
Appellee-Plaintiff is a riparian owner of certain lands in Highlands County bordering Lake Istokpoga, a navigable lake. The ordinary high-water mark of Lake Istokpoga was meandered at different points and different times by U.S. Government surveyors in the late 1800's and early 1900's. Lake Istokpoga was meandered in the area of Appellee's property in 1928. Appellee deraigns its title back to certain warranty deeds issued by Appellant-Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, the Trustees having previously received the lands by a swamp and overflow lands grant from the U.S. Government. The land was acquired by Appellee for the purposes of development and of resale as a residential community on the shores of Lake Istokpoga; *16 because of this, a need to do some work in the navigable waters of Lake Istokpoga arose. Approximately four years prior to the filing of this action, a dispute arose between the Trustees and Appellee as to the location of the boundary lines between the sovereignty bottom lands of the Lake and Appellee's upland property. Efforts to resolve the dispute were fruitless; the Trustees maintained that, pursuant to Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, the boundary line should be located at a contour 41.6 feet above mean sea level, a boundary unacceptable to Appellee since this proposal laid claim to approximately half of Appellee's purchased property (generally, throughout the trial Appellee claimed that the ordinary high-water line was at an elevation of approximately 38.5 feet above mean sea level).
Throughout the proceedings the Trustees maintained that the ordinary level of the Lake was permanently and artificially lowered during the 1920's as the result of certain drainage operations conducted by property owners surrounding the Lake; it was the Trustees' position that the unauthorized drainage of the Lake by the riparian owners could not be considered to have decreased the State's ownership and that the ordinary high-water line as it existed in 1926 would remain the legal boundary between State and private ownership. The evidence showed that some of the riparian owners had exercised self-help by dynamiting obstacles from a drainage canal to return the Lake to an ordinary level and to expel flood waters from farm lands following the historic 1926 hurricane. Therefore, Appellee's position was that any lowering of the Lake was legally reliction and that the present ordinary high-water line, regardless of the historical contour of the Lake, is the appropriate boundary between private and State-owned land. The testimony clearly shows that the survey notes, made after the mean level of the Lake was lowered, reflect that this lowering resulted in the exposure of only marshland, not of lake bottom. Furthermore, the surveyor's notes continue to say that the Lake is contained in a well-defined basin with an almost continuous shore rim which is timbered with good timber, mostly shore variety, giving positive proof of the location of the lakeshore before the drainage operations were put into effect. There was additional testimony that this timbered shore rim, which ranged from 3 to 10 chains wide between the lakeshore and Istokpoga marsh in Section 13, and from 2 to 5 chains wide in Section 12, is essentially the same today as at the time of the survey in 1928. The survey notes also indicate that the draining by the landowners approximately equaled the amount the Lake had been raised by the hurricane, thereby balancing out.
Following a two-day trial the lower court ruled that the boundary line betwen Appellee's upland property and the sovereignty bottom lands was the present ordinary high-water mark of Lake Istokpoga. The trial judge specifically found that in the disputed area the 1928 Government meander line was at all points coordinate with or upland of the present ordinary high-water mark of Lake Istokpoga; consequently, the court set aside Appellants' claim to all property upland of the 1928 meander line in the area of Appellee's property. The court also found that Appellants' claim to the 41.6 feet contour had been based on Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, and adjudged the statute to be unconstitutional both on its face and as applied by Appellants, as follows:
It is from this final judgment that this appeal is taken.
Historically, the Crown or the government has owned for the benefit of the public the areas covered by navigable bodies of water so that the government could protect the pubic's right of navigation and preserve commerce;[2] the upland owners have owned the dry lands down to the high-water mark. In the instant case, the Trustees retreated from their reliance on Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, relying instead on Article X, Section 11, Florida Constitution, for their claim of ownership of the lands in question:
Appellant-State asserts that not all of Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, should be held unconstitutional as certain provisions prohibit encroachments by upland owners upon sovereignty lands and require State permits for modification of the boundary lines in elevating or lowering the submerged sovereignty lands. In our view, right of control over sovereignty lands is so inherent in the State that we feel such control can be exercised with or without specific statutory provisions.
Upon careful consideration of both the record and arguments of counsel, we conclude that the trial court correctly held the efforts of the State to fix specific and permanent boundaries were improper, and we hold that Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional. We agree that subsection (3), which fixes the boundary line between sovereignty lands and riparian uplands, cannot be separated from the remaining portions of the statute, and with the exception of subsection (2), which consists entirely of definitions, all other sections are closely connected with and refer to the boundary line between sovereignty lands and riparian uplands as fixed by subsection (3). Therefore, we also agree with the lower court's conclusion that the statute, which contains no severability clause, is invalid in its entirety.
Additionally, the ancient common law relating to accretion and reliction prevails in Florida. However, we recognize that the doctrine of reliction is applicable in situations where water recedes by imperceptible degrees from natural causes and that it does not apply where land is reclaimed by deliberate drainage.[3] This is not the situation in the instant case. Here, the evidence clearly shows that the 1926 self-help by the riparian owners did not affect a lowering of the water level below the normal high-water mark; instead, as the survey notes show, the action merely returned the water to its normal level and did not expose any lake bottom. Therefore, while the Appellee is entitled to the land down to the present ordinary high-water line, as held by the lower court, it is not because of the doctrine of reliction but because of the location of the actual, present high-water mark. This is not to say that, where an unlawful change in the high-water mark has been precipitated, the land uncovered by the lowering would belong *19 to the upland owner; to the contrary, such bottomland would continue to be owned by the State.[4] Acquiescence or failure by the State to restrain an artificial lowering of the water table for a long period might constitute laches or estoppel depending upon facts and equities in each case.
It is our opinion, and we so hold, that the property line separating sovereignty and riparian property rights is the ordinary high-water mark in meandered fresh water lakes. In doing so we recognize that such line is subject to change from natural causes or with joint consent of the State and private riparian owners. Furthermore, as stated above, we sustain the learned trial court in holding Section 253.151, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional in its entirety. An inflexible meander demarcation line would not comply with the spirit or letter of our Federal or State Constitutions nor meet present requirements of society.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS and ADKINS, JJ., and KLEIN, Circuit Court Judge, concur.
ENGLAND, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, with which OVERTON, C.J., concurs.
HATCHETT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
ENGLAND, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the Court's affirmance of the trial court on the issues litigated in this case, but I dissent from the Court's declaration that all of Section 253.151 is unconstitutional.
The lawsuit filed by Florida National Properties, Inc. sought a declaration of the boundary to certain of its property. After the trial judge had set that boundary he declared Section 253.151 unconstitutional in its entirety. On review here, the State concedes the invalidity of the boundary-setting provisions contained in subsection 253.151 (3). The State argues, and I believe rightly, that it was unnecessary and improper for the judge to invalidate other portions of Section 253.151 which had no relevance to this boundary dispute.
Only subsections 253.151(3) and (4) of the statute involve the setting of boundaries between private and sovereign lands. Other provisions of the statute regulate private activities in connection with sovereign lands. This lawsuit presents no occasion to invalidate this regulatory scheme. The fact that Section 253.151 contains no severability clause which would allow the invalidation of any particular subsection is no impediment to the more limited action I would approve. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 137 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1962); State v. Calhoun County, 127 Fla. 304, 170 So. 883 (1936).
OVERTON, C.J., concurs.
HATCHETT, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the view that riparian landowners take title to new lands created by natural accretion and reliction, and I see no reason why riparian landowners should be divested of title to land, which has been submerged by hurricane or other catastrophe, when they take measures necessary to restore their property to its ordinary state. In my opinion, this case requires decision of no other question, and certainly does not require striking down a statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision as to the validity of Fla. Stat. § 253.151 (1973).
Appellee Florida National Properties, Inc. (Florida National), filed a complaint in the trial court, alleging a dispute between appellants and appellee over ownership of land, and asking for declaratory and injunctive relief. This is the kind of question which courts have traditionally been called upon to answer in ejectment *20 and quiet title actions, but declaratory judgment is also an appropriate means for resolution of such a controversy. State Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Pineta Co., 287 So. 2d 126 (Fla.3d App.Dist. 1973); Bozeman v. Roberts, 188 So. 2d 23 (Fla.1st App.Dist. 1966). Contra, Stark v. Marshall, 67 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1953) (alternative basis for decision). The form of action cannot, however, alter the "established maxim of statutory construction that courts have the judicial obligation to sustain legislative enactments when possible." North Port Bank v. State Dep't of Revenue, 313 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1975); State v. Aiuppa, 298 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1974); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1974); Burnsed v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974); State v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1973). "It is elementary that ... if fairly possible a statute should be construed to avoid . . an unconstitutional interpretation," State ex rel. Shevin v. Metz Construction Co., Inc., 285 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1973), if it is necessary to reach the constitutional question at all. In my view, there is no need to pass on the validity of any portion of Fla. Stat. § 253.151 (1973), in deciding the parties' rights to the property in contention.
In paragraph four of its complaint, Florida National alleged:
Both general counsel for the Board of Trustees, on its behalf, and the attorney general, on behalf of the State, filed answers to the complaint. The attorney general answered paragraph four to the effect that he was without knowledge as to the truth of the averment, and subsequently took the unequivocal position that Fla. Stat. § 253.151 (1973) ought not apply. The Board of Trustees answered paragraph four, as follows:
In short, the pleadings reflect that both sides agreed that Fla. Stat. § 253.151 (1973) ought not control on the question the complaint raised. Appellee alleged that the appellants' reliance on the statute was misplaced and unjustified, and the appellants answered that their reliance on the statute was nonexistent.
In paragraph six of the complaint, Florida National simply "contend[ed] that Florida Statute 253.151 is unconstitutional ..." The attorney general and the Board of Trustees answered paragraph six with "deny" and "denied", respectively. *21 This exchange added nothing. The mere allegation that a statute is unconstitutional cannot suffice to put the statute's constitutionality in issue, even though opposing parties deny the allegation. Otherwise, it would lie in the parties' power to require a court to decide a statute's constitutionality, although such an adjudication was unnecessary to decision of the cause. The contrary rule is well-settled in Florida, as elsewhere, even if it is not followed today. For reasons it does not articulate, the Court chooses not to "adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds." Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975); Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1973); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969).
The pretrial order dated March 26, 1974,[3] reflects the trial judge's initial doubt whether it was necessary to decide the constitutionality of Section 253.151. The final judgment recites that evidence showed the appellants had previously relied on "this Statute as their authority for the State's claim" and concluded that the appellants' conceded "retreat" from this position "is not convincing." But the position a litigant takes in a lawsuit is not a question of fact to be decided on the basis of evidence. A litigant may abandon any defense he elects to abandon, and the defendant in a civil suit may waive any right he chooses, generally simply by never asserting it. Cf. Barth v. Florida State Contractors Service, Inc., 327 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976). The court's decision today stands for the unlikely proposition that a party claiming, in the course of out of court negotiations, that a statute lends support to his position has thereby necessitated an adjudication as to the statute's constitutionality, when the other side files suit. I disagree.
Rehearing denied.
OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD, and ENGLAND, JJ., and KLEIN, Circuit Court Judge, concur.
HATCHETT, J., dissents.
[1]  Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
[2]  Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S. Ct. 517, 38 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1973); Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
[3]  Martin v. Busch, Id. at 287.
[4]  Id.
[1]  Exhibit C reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Dear Mr. Ward:
Florida National Properties, Inc. Lake Istokpoga Highlands County
The staff has reviewed the exhibits you furnished as well as other pertinent data relative to the original ordinary high water line of Lake Istokpoga. Based on this information, we believe the elevation of the original ordinary high water line of this lake to be 41.6 feet above mean sea level.
[2]  land. The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people... .
[3]  In this order, the trial court delineated the "issues to be tried," as follows:

1. Location of the boundary line between the sovereignty bottom lands of Lake Istokpoga and Plaintiff's upland property.
2. Whether or not Lake Istokpoga has been artificially drained; and if so, the effect, if any, of such drainage on the property rights of the parties.
3. Whether or not the State of Florida, through the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, bases its claim to the disputed property on Florida Statute 253.151.
4. If applicable, the Constitutionality of Florida Statute 253.151 on its face and as applied in the instant case.