Title: Richard W. Rhodes v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-31
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-31 
____________ 
 
RICHARD W. RHODES,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 13, 2008] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Richard Rhodes was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death.  We affirmed his conviction, see Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 
1989), and later his sentence, see Rhodes v. State, 638 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1994).  He 
now appeals an order of the circuit court denying a motion for postconviction relief 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the circuit 
court’s order denying the motion on all issues. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Rhodes was convicted of first-degree murder for the manual-strangulation 
death of a woman, later identified as Karen Nieradka.  The facts of the crime, as 
we have previously described them, are briefly summarized here.1  Nieradka’s 
decomposing body was found on March 24, 1984, in debris being used to construct 
a berm in St. Petersburg.  The debris came from a hotel in Clearwater, which had 
been demolished nine days earlier.  The cause of death was determined to be 
manual strangulation, causing the hyoid bone in Nieradka’s neck to break.  
Although the only clothing found on her body was a brassiere around her neck, no 
physical evidence of sexual battery was found. 
On March 2, 1984, the Florida Highway Patrol stopped Rhodes in Hernando 
County; he was driving a car registered to the victim.  After the body was 
identified, Rhodes was questioned and ultimately arrested for the murder.  During 
the various interviews, Rhodes gave different and sometimes conflicting 
statements, ultimately claiming that the victim died accidentally when she fell from 
the third floor of the Sunset Hotel. 
During the original trial, three of Rhodes’s former cellmates at the Pinellas 
County Jail testified that Rhodes admitted killing the victim.  The jury found 
                                          
 
1.  The facts are taken from Rhodes’s direct appeal and his appeal from 
resentencing.  See Rhodes, 547 So. 2d 1201; Rhodes,  638 So. 2d 920. 
 
 
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Rhodes guilty of first-degree murder and recommended that he be sentenced to 
death.  The trial judge followed the recommendation.  On appeal, we affirmed the 
conviction.  However, because of various penalty phase errors, we vacated the 
death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing.  Rhodes v. State, 547 So.2d at 
1201. 
 
On remand, a newly empaneled jury recommended death by a vote of ten to 
two.  The trial court followed the jury recommendation.  In aggravation, the 
sentencing judge found that: (1) Rhodes committed the murder while on parole; (2) 
Rhodes was previously convicted of a violent felony; and (3) Rhodes committed 
the murder while committing an attempted sexual battery.  In mitigation, he found: 
(1) Rhodes’s age of thirty at the time of offense; and (2) Rhodes’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired.  The judge refused to find that at 
the time of the murder Rhodes was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance or that he was under extreme duress due to alcohol 
consumption and his family history.  However, he did find as nonstatutory 
mitigation that: (1) as a child, Rhodes was abandoned by his parents; and (2) 
Rhodes never experienced a normal family life because as a child he was never 
placed in a social environment that could address his needs and he spent most of 
his life in state hospitals and prisons. 
 
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Rhodes appealed his resentencing, raising eight issues.2  We affirmed the 
sentence but agreed that the March 20, 1992 conviction for first-degree murder was 
extraneous in light of our affirmance of Rhodes’s 1985 conviction; we vacated the 
March 1992 conviction.  Rhodes, 638 So. 2d at 927. 
Rhodes filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he raised several claims and subclaims.3  The 
                                          
 
2.  Rhodes raised the following eight claims in his appeal from resentencing: 
(1) the trial court erred by sua sponte excusing two prospective jurors; (2) the court 
erred in permitting the State to present hearsay evidence during the resentencing 
proceeding; (3) the court erred in permitting the State to interject irrelevant matter 
into the proceedings, including evidence of statements Rhodes made following his 
1973 Oregon arrest, which were allegedly taken in violation of his constitutional 
rights; (4) the jury was misled regarding its role in the sentencing process and 
instructed to consider a nonstatutory aggravating factor; (5) the court erred in 
instructing the jury on and finding in aggravation that the murder was committed 
while Rhodes was engaged in committing an attempted sexual battery; (6) the 
court erred in failing to afford Rhodes an opportunity to be heard before he was 
sentenced; (7) death is not proportionately warranted in this case; and (8) one of 
the two written judgments for first degree-murder must be stricken. 
 
 
3.  Rhodes claimed the following: (1) that public records were withheld; (2) 
that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare additional mitigating 
evidence and failed to adequately challenge the State’s case; (3) that resentencing 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the  improper sexual battery 
aggravator jury instruction; (4) Rhodes was denied his right to effective 
representation by the lack of funding available to postconviction counsel; (5) the 
one year filing requirement under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 
violates due process; (6) that trial counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered 
Rhodes’s death sentence unreliable; (7) that access to Rhodes’s trial attorney file 
was improperly withheld; (8) that access to record and files in the trial judge’s 
possession were improperly withheld under Florida Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.051; (9) that lack of a reliable capital trial transcript prohibited 
meaningful appellate review; (10) that counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
 
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to the introduction of gruesome and unfairly prejudicial crime scene photos and 
video, and the use of a skeleton as demonstrative evidence; (11) that Rhodes’s 
rights under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), were denied through the 
ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate assistance of mental health 
experts; (12) that the State knowingly withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (13) that Rhodes was impermissibly prohibited 
from interviewing jurors; (14) that the State violated Rhodes’s rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object on these grounds; (15) that Rhodes failed to receive the benefit of 
an adequate mental health evaluation (same as claim 11); (16) that police lacked 
probable cause to arrest Rhodes and that the evidence thereafter obtained was 
inadmissible; (17) that Rhodes is innocent of first-degree murder and innocent of 
the death penalty; (18) that Rhodes was denied his constitutional rights by the 
State’s use of Rhodes’s fellow inmates as witnesses during the guilt phase of the 
trial; (19) that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the standard by 
which they must judge expert testimony presented during the penalty phase; (20) 
that the State knowingly presented misleading testimony from witness Harvey 
Duranseau; (21) that newly discovered evidence supports an assertion that FBI 
Agent Michael Malone’s expert trial testimony concerning hair evidence was 
inadmissible and unreliable; (22) that Rhodes was denied a fair trial as a result of 
the trial court’s failure to sequester the jury due to alleged pretrial publicity; (23) 
that cumulative errors by the trial court during the guilt phase of trial rendered 
Rhodes’s conviction fundamentally unfair; (24) that the cumulative effect of 
multiple instances of improper closing argument by the State deprived Rhodes of a 
fair trial; (25) that the introduction of nonstatutory aggravating factors before the 
jury during resentencing resulted in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the 
death penalty; (26) that Rhodes was denied a fundamentally fair resentencing trial 
as a result of the State’s suggestion to the jury during voir dire that the law 
required it to recommend death; (27) that Florida’s capital sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional; (28) that Rhodes is innocent of the death penalty; (29) that the 
sentencing jury was misled and incorrectly instructed that a majority of the jury 
was required for a recommendation of death and counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the instruction; (30) that the sentencing jury was misled by comments 
and instructions that inaccurately diluted the jury’s sense of responsibility towards 
sentencing; (31) that penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted the burden 
to the defendant to prove death was inappropriate and the sentencing judge 
employed an improper standard in sentencing; (32) that the trial court erred in 
failing to find and weigh all mitigating circumstances; (33) that Rhodes was denied 
effective assistance of trial counsel during voir dire of his resentencing jury; (34) 
 
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trial court held an evidentiary hearing on some of the issues, but subsequently 
denied relief on all claims.  
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Rhodes raises four claims on appeal:  (A) that the State withheld material 
and exculpatory evidence and knowingly presented false or misleading evidence; 
(B) that resentencing counsel was ineffective in his investigation and presentation 
of mitigation evidence; (C) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
depose the State’s DNA expert; and (D) that the trial court erred in summarily 
denying several of his postconviction claims.  We address each in turn. 
A. BRADY / GIGLIO VIOLATIONS 
 
Rhodes first contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 87 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  His claims stem 
from hair evidence examined by, and testimony taken from, FBI Agent Michael 
Malone.  Rhodes first contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that 
the State violated Brady by failing to disclose material exculpatory hair evidence.  
He also argues that the State violated Giglio by knowingly presenting Agent 
Malone’s testimony when it was in fact false.  We discuss each claim in turn. 
                                                                                                                                        
that Rhodes was denied a proper direct appeal due to omissions in the resentencing 
record; (35) that Rhodes was denied a fair resentencing trial due to the cumulative 
procedural and substantive errors; and (36) that Rhodes’s sentence of death by 
electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States and Florida Constitutions.         
 
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1.  The Brady Claim 
 
Rhodes contends that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose that 
Agent Malone falsely testified about exculpatory hair evidence found in the 
victim’s hand.  Agent Malone had analyzed the hairs found on various items of 
evidence and compared them to known hair samples taken from Rhodes and the 
victim.  He testified that all of the unknown hairs given to him from the victim, or 
from the area where the victim was found, microscopically matched the victim’s 
hair or were hairs that were “basically no good.”  Agent Malone explained that the 
hairs that were “no good” were just hair fragments that could not be identified and 
therefore could not be linked to anyone.  Agent Malone testified that “the bottom 
line as far as the hair from the victim or area where she was found is that there 
were no foreign hairs at all.”  A foreign hair was identified as “a hair that 
originates from somebody else besides the victim.” 
On cross-examination, defense counsel highlighted the insignificance of 
Agent Malone’s testimony, stating “Mr. Malone, is the bottom line you can’t help 
us out in this case at all?”  Agent Malone answered, “Well, there were no other 
hairs except hairs of the victim that I could come up with, yes.  That’s about it.”  
About sixteen years later, Agent Malone admitted that he falsely testified at 
trial that the hair evidence in the victim’s left hand was hers.  Agent Malone was 
called to testify at Rhodes’s postconviction evidentiary hearing.  On the morning 
 
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he was scheduled to testify, Agent Malone admitted, after checking his handwritten 
bench notes, that the hair in the victim’s left hand, which he originally identified as 
belonging to the victim, was in fact not suitable for testing.  Rhodes argues that 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different had this evidence been disclosed to him.  See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 
154; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 
 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  373 U.S. at 87.  To establish a Brady 
violation, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) the evidence was favorable to 
the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or because it was impeaching; (2) 
it was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) it was 
material, thereby causing prejudice to the defendant.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). 
Agent Malone’s trial testimony concerning the hair in the victim’s left hand 
was admittedly false.  The trial court denied the claim, however, because the false 
testimony was neither withheld, favorable to the accused, nor prejudicial.  Giving 
deference to the trial court on questions of fact, we review de novo the application 
of the law, and independently review the cumulative effect of the suppressed 
 
- 8 -
evidence.  See Green v. State, 32 Fla. Law Weekly S619, S621, 33 Fla. L. Weekly 
S87 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2008) (citing Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 169 (Fla. 2004); 
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 913 (Fla. 2000)). 
  
We agree with the trial court that Agent Malone’s testimony was not 
favorable to Rhodes.  Favorable evidence encompasses both exculpatory evidence 
and evidence that impeaches the testimony of a witness when the reliability or 
credibility of that witness may determine guilt or innocence.  See United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 766.  Agent Malone 
testified, both at the original trial and the evidentiary hearing, that he was unable to 
identify any hairs other than those belonging to the victim.  The only difference 
between his original testimony and his postconviction testimony was that a hair 
located in the victim’s left hand was found not suitable for testing.  
Notwithstanding that error, Agent Malone’s ultimate conclusion—that all of the 
identifiable hairs recovered from the victim’s body, or the immediately 
surrounding area, belonged to the victim—remained unchanged.  Because all of the 
identifiable hairs belonged to the victim, the hair evidence neither inculpated nor 
exculpated Rhodes.  The change in Agent Malone’s testimony could not be used to 
impeach Malone or exonerate Rhodes and therefore does not warrant relief under 
Brady. 
 
- 9 -
Even assuming that the evidence was favorable, however, the hair evidence 
was neither suppressed nor prejudicial.  The Brady rule only applies to “the 
discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but 
unknown to the defense.”  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  Here, 
it is undisputed that both the State and defense counsel were apprised of the error 
in Agent Malone’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing on Rhodes’s 
postconviction motion.  In fact, Agent Malone did not become aware of the 
discrepancy between his trial testimony and his notes until preparing to testify on 
the morning of the hearing.  Without demonstrating that the State suppressed 
evidence, Rhodes is not entitled to relief under Brady. 
Finally, Agent Malone’s testimony did not prejudice Rhodes.  To satisfy 
Brady’s prejudice prong, a defendant must show that the suppressed evidence was 
material.  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).  Evidence is material if 
there is “a reasonable probability that had the suppressed evidence been disclosed 
the jury would have reached a different verdict.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Green, 32 Fla. 
Law Weekly at S621 (citation omitted).  A new trial is only warranted when “the 
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Id. (quoting Strickler, 
527 U.S. at 290).  Here, Agent Malone’s testimony could not reasonably place the 
 
- 10 -
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.  His 
testimony did not exclude either Rhodes or the victim as the source of the 
unidentifiable hairs.  Further, subsequent DNA testing on the hair evidence proved 
inconclusive and therefore, again, did not exculpate Rhodes.  
We denied Brady relief under similar circumstances in Allen v. State, 854 
So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2003).  In Allen, we found that a forensic hair analysis the State 
had withheld was not material, even though it excluded the defendant as a source 
of the hair, because the analysis did not exclude the victim as the source and 
therefore neither supported nor negated the defendant’s argument that an 
unidentified person perpetrated the murder.  Id. at 1260.  Similarly, the change in 
Agent Malone’s testimony does not support or negate Rhodes’s contention that an 
unidentified third party committed the murder.  In other words, the fact that Agent 
Malone incorrectly identified a hair not suitable for testing as belonging to the 
victim does not present Rhodes with new evidence from which he could present a 
plausible and persuasive theory of innocence.  Thus, we conclude that even given 
the benefit of Agent Malone’s amended testimony, no prejudice has been 
established. 
Contrary to Rhodes’s suggestion, this case is distinguishable from our 
decision in Hoffman v. State, 800 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2001).  In Hoffman, the State 
failed to disclose the results of an exculpatory hair analysis.  We ordered a new 
 
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trial.  An important issue in the case was whether the defendant was even present 
at the crime scene.  Id. at 180.  Therefore, “any evidence tending to prove or 
disprove [that] fact would be highly probative.”  Id.  Unlike the evidence in this 
case, however, the evidence in Hoffman excluded the defendant as the source of 
the hair, as well as the victim and the codefendant.  Id. at 179.  Hair found clutched 
in the victim’s hand provided proof of recent contact between the victim and a 
person present at the crime scene when the victim died.  Id.  We found that defense 
counsel could have strenuously argued that the defendant was not present at the 
crime scene and was not the assailant.  Id. at 180.  The hair evidence in this case 
does not have the same probative value; it is not exculpatory.  
 Based on the above, we agree with the trial court that Rhodes failed 
to establish a Brady violation. 
2.  The Giglio Claim 
The trial judge also concluded that Rhodes did not prove that the State 
knowingly presented false testimony at trial from Agent Malone, in violation of 
Giglio.  To establish a Giglio violation, a defendant must show that: (1) the 
prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew 
the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material. See Guzman v. 
State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006).  Once the first two prongs are 
established, the false evidence is deemed material if there is any reasonable 
 
- 12 -
possibility that it could have affected the jury's verdict.  See id.  Under this 
standard, the State has the burden to prove that the false testimony was not material 
by demonstrating it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.; see also 
Mordenti v. State, 894 So.2d 161, 175 (Fla. 2004).   
Rhodes argues that Agent Malone falsely testified concerning the number of 
hairs he examined and the identity of the hairs in the victim’s left hand.  The trial 
court found that Agent Malone admitted to falsely testifying as to the numbers of 
hairs he tested and the identity of hairs clutched in the victim’s hands; however, it 
denied relief because the State did not knowingly present the false evidence and 
because it was not material. 
We find that competent substantial evidence supports the conclusion that 
Agent Malone falsely testified about the hair clutched in the victim’s left hand; 
however, the record does not support the court’s conclusion that Agent Malone 
testified falsely about the quantity of hairs tested.4  See Green, 32 Fla. L. Weekly 
at S620 (noting that we defer only to those factual findings supported by 
competent, substantial evidence and review de novo the application of the law to 
the facts).  Notwithstanding the falsity of the testimony, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of Rhodes’s 
 
Giglio claim because even if Rhodes satisfied the first two 
                                          
 
4.  The record demonstrates that Agent Malone maintained both at trial and 
the postconviction hearing that he examined all of the hairs submitted to him.  
There is insufficient record evidence to refute that claim. 
 
- 13 -
prongs under Giglio, he cannot demonstrate that Agent Malone’s testimony was 
material.  Agent Malone’s testimony helped neither the State nor the defense.  
Forensic testing of the hair evidence at the time of trial, and later during Rhode
postconviction proceeding, revealed that the hair evidence collected on or aroun
the victim’s body either belonged to the victim or was inconclusive.  As the trial 
court found, “the inconclusive test results do not exclude the Defendant, the victi
or a third person as a potential source of the hair.”  Because the hair evidenc
not identify or exclude Rhodes as a source, it did not exonerate Rhodes or 
inculpate a third party.  Therefore, Agent Malone’s false testimony concernin
hair evidence was not sufficiently material and thus there is no “reasonable 
possibility that [it] could have affected the judgment of the factfinder.” 
s’s 
d 
m 
e did 
g the 
Guzman, 
941 So. 2d at 1051.  As defense counsel aptly stated during trial, “the bottom l
[is Agent Malone] can’t help us out in this case at all.”  Accordingly, we deny 
relief o
ine 
n this issue. 
                                          
B.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF RESENTENCING COUNSEL 
Rhodes next argues that his resentencing counsel failed to fully investigate 
or prepare his mitigation.  Specifically, Rhodes contends counsel failed to locate 
and call witnesses who would have testified about Rhodes’s abusive childhood.5  
 
5.  Rhodes also vaguely argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
“file motions challenging the statutory aggravators,” and for failing to challenge 
 
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Although we recognize that “the obligation to investigate and prepare for the 
penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated,” and that attorneys have a 
“strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant’s background for 
possible mitigating evidence,”  Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d 359, 369 (Fla. 2003) 
(quoting State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002), and Ragsdale v. State, 
798 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 2001)), we find Rhodes’s claim is without merit.   
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Rhodes must 
show: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient––i.e., unreasonable under 
prevailing professional norms; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced the defense––
i.e., that it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial by creating “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 965-66 
(Fla. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
                                                                                                                                        
the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty.  However, Rhodes neither alleges 
upon what ground counsel should have challenged the State’s evidence in 
aggravation nor upon what basis Florida’s death penalty is unconstitutional.  We 
cannot find counsel ineffective absent specific allegations of overt acts or 
omissions.  See Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1277 (Fla. 2007) (citing Freeman 
v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000)) (“The defendant has the burden of 
alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”).   
 
 
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Here, a determination of whether counsel was ineffective requires an 
examination not only of counsel's alleged failure to investigate and present 
possibly mitigating evidence, but the reasons for doing so.  See Rose v. State, 675 
So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) 
(“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after 
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91)).  Moreover, Rhodes must demonstrate 
that counsel's performance actually “deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty 
phase proceeding.”  Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998).   
Rhodes contends that resentencing counsel was deficient for failing to call 
several family members and Lorraine Armstrong, a nurse at the state hospital 
where Rhodes resided for a portion of his youth.  Rhodes contends that sufficient 
evidence of childhood abuse would have resulted in substantial mitigation and the 
imposition of a life sentence.  The circuit court concluded that Rhodes proved 
neither deficient performance nor prejudice.  We agree.   
At resentencing, counsel called Dr. Donald Taylor and James Rhodes.  After 
examining and evaluating Rhodes, Dr. Taylor concluded that Rhodes “is probably 
the most severely abused and neglected person that I’ve ever come across.” Dr. 
 
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Taylor explained that Rhodes was born to two migrant workers, who both 
physically and sexually abused him when he was under the age of five.  When 
Rhodes was five years old, his parents abandoned him and his two brothers.  From 
that point on, Rhodes resided in several different foster and boys’ homes.  When he 
was about nine, Rhodes was returned to his father, who again physically and 
sexually abused him.  At age ten, he was permanently removed from his father’s 
home.  Two years later, he was placed in the psychiatric unit at Napa State 
Hospital, where he stayed until he was eighteen. 
Dr. Taylor opined that Rhodes was severely emotionally disturbed and that 
during the commission of the first-degree murder, he was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  Dr. Taylor also opined that at the time 
of the offense Rhodes was under duress and his ability to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. 
Rhodes’s brother James corroborated much of Dr. Taylor’s testimony and 
relayed a first-hand account of his and Rhodes’s upbringing.  Specifically, James 
testified that his parents were alcoholics and abandoned them when they were 
young.  James characterized his mother as “a very sick woman;” James testified 
that six years before his testimony, his mother visited him and “the first thing she 
wanted to do was go to bed with him.”  James also testified that Rhodes confided 
in him that he had been sexually abused.  James explained that as kids they 
 
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suffered from malnutrition and went very long periods without adult supervision.  
James recounted that Rhodes spent roughly five years in Napa State Hospital’s 
psychiatric ward, and after being institutionalized Rhodes did not communicate 
well with others and exhibited social difficulties.  James opined that Rhodes’s 
upbringing had a lot to do with his current situation. 
Based on this testimony, the resentencing court found that Rhodes’s capacity 
“to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired.”  As support, the trial court stated: 
The Defendant’s background is a laundry list of experiences that 
almost predicate a life of crime and violence.  He was abandoned at a 
young age by both his parents, although he later spent some time with 
his natural father.  He was certainly neglected and there was some 
evidence that he had been sexually abused.  As a child he was 
hyperactive and diagnosed as having a character disorder.  He grew up 
in various foster homes.  There was little or no stability to his 
existence since he would cause such problems in the household that 
he would have to be removed.  During his youth there was a history, 
reflected in the records introduced at the Penalty Phase, of killing 
animals, sexual play with children, and compulsive lying.  Unable to 
coexist in the home of his father and stepmother, or foster homes, the 
Defendant was eventually placed in Napa State Hospital in California.  
There he remained from the time he was twelve until he turned 
eighteen.   
 
   
The court also considered as nonstatutory mitigation the fact that Rhodes 
was abandoned, had an abnormal family life, and was never deinstitutionalized for 
more than a few months at a time.  
 
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At the evidentiary hearing below, Rhodes’s postconviction counsel 
presented three witnesses to demonstrate other evidence that could have been 
offered during the penalty phase: Eileen Meis, Lorraine Armstrong, and Kenneth 
Rhodes.  Although this additional testimony presented greater detail about 
Rhodes’s abusive childhood, it contributed virtually nothing new and was 
cumulative of the testimony presented during the second penalty phase.  See 
Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1105-06 (Fla. 2002) (finding that trial counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence cumulative to that 
presented at the penalty phase). 
 
Notwithstanding the cumulative nature of the testimony, we review whether 
resentencing counsel was deficient in failing to present the additional witness 
testimony.  In analyzing whether counsel was deficient in failing to investigate and 
present mitigating evidence, we first determine “whether a reasonable investigation 
should have uncovered such mitigating evidence.  If so, then a determination must 
be made whether the failure to put this evidence before the jury was a tactical 
choice by trial counsel.”  Gudinas, 816 So. 2d at 1104 (quoting Middleton v. 
Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th Cir. 1988)).  If counsel’s failure to present the 
mitigating evidence was an oversight, and not a tactical decision, “then a 
harmlessness review must be made to determine if there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
 
- 19 -
have been different.  Thus, it must be determined that defendant suffered actual 
prejudice due to the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel before relief will be 
granted.”  Id. (quoting Middleton, 849 F.2d at 493). 
Rhodes contends that resentencing counsel should have investigated the 
additional witnesses mentioned above because their names appeared somewhere in 
his medical records.  While it is true that these witnesses’ names were scattered 
throughout Rhodes’s voluminous records, there was no testimony demonstrating 
that Rhodes told resentencing counsel that he wanted these witnesses contacted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be 
determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or 
actions.”).  Moreover, as the postconviction court noted, none of these witnesses 
testified at Rhodes’s first sentencing hearing and there is no indication that 
Rhodes’s original trial counsel considered the above people as possible defense 
witnesses.         
Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “it is simply not 
reasonable for an attorney to attempt to ascertain the identity and relationship of 
each and every person named in defendant’s records, attempt to determine if that 
person is living, attempt to locate and contact that witness, and finally, determine if 
that person would be able to provide favorable testimony.” 
 
- 20 -
Moreover, resentencing counsel made a strategic choice not to call other 
identified witnesses.  For example, counsel testified that he refrained from calling 
prison ministry personnel because he did not want the jury to realize that Rhodes 
had previously been sentenced to death.6  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 
1048 (Fla. 2000) (“Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current 
counsel disagrees with trial counsel's strategic decisions.”) (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. . . .”)).   
Even if we were to find counsel’s conduct deficient, Rhodes cannot 
demonstrate prejudice.  Any testimony the additional witnesses would have 
provided would have been cumulative to that provided by the witnesses at 
resentencing.  As discussed above, trial counsel are not ineffective for failing to 
present cumulative evidence.  See Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417, 429-30 (Fla. 
2002) (“[C]ounsel is not required to present cumulative evidence.”).  Moreover, 
the cumulative mitigation testimony would not have outweighed the State’s 
evidence in aggravation.  See, e.g., Bell v. State, 965 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2007) (finding 
that the defendant did not demonstrate the prejudice prong because the unpresented 
                                          
 
6.  Counsel decided not to call other witnesses for various practical reasons.  
For instance, Rhodes’s two half-brothers were not contacted because they were 
serving in Operation Desert Shield and stationed in Saudi Arabia.  Also, 
resentencing counsel was unable to contact Rhodes’s grandmother, Mary Vailes; 
however, Dr. Taylor, Rhodes’s psychiatrist, contacted her and her statements were 
presented to the jury through his testimony.  
 
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penalty phase testimony could not have countered the quantity and quality of the 
aggravating evidence); see also Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 516 n.14 
(Fla.1999) (“Prejudice, in the context of penalty phase errors, is shown where, 
absent the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances would have been different or the deficiencies 
substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.”).  The 
additional testimony would only have added to the mitigation already found.  Even 
if given more weight, the mitigation would not outweigh the three strong 
aggravators: (1) Rhodes committed the murder while on parole; (2) Rhodes was 
previously convicted of a violent felony; and (3) the murder was committed while 
Rhodes was engaged in the commission of an attempted sexual battery.  
C.  MOTION TO DEPOSE DNA EXPERT 
Rhodes next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to depose 
the State’s DNA expert.  We do not decide this issue because it was not preserved.  
While Rhodes filed a motion to depose the State’s DNA expert, he did not obtain a 
ruling.  Absent fundamental error, an appeal may not be taken from a trial court’s 
judgment or order unless properly preserved.  See § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (2006).  
To be preserved, the issue or legal argument must be raised and ruled on by the 
trial court.  See § 924.051(1)(b); see also Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate 
Practice, § 8.1, at 148 (2007 ed.) (“The aggrieved party must obtain an adverse 
 
- 22 -
ruling in the lower tribunal to preserve an issue for review.  The appellate courts 
review only the decisions of lower tribunals . . . .  Without a ruling or decision, 
there is nothing to review.”).  Further, without a ruling, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Rhodes’s discovery request.  
See Panda Energy Int’l v. Jacobs, 813 So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 2002) (holding that 
postconviction discovery decisions are within the trial court’s authority and are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion).  Thus, because Rhodes failed to follow the 
well-established practice requiring a party to secure a ruling on its motion before 
seeking appellate review, he waived the issue.  See Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786, 
797 (Fla. 2001) (“The failure of a party to get a timely ruling by a trial court 
constitutes a waiver of the matter for appellate purposes.”); Richardson v. State, 
437 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 1983) (noting that appellant, having failed to pursue or 
obtain a ruling on his motion, did not preserve the issue for appeal); Carratelli v. 
State, 832 So. 2d 850, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (listing the “plethora of Florida 
cases” supporting the notion that a party must obtain a ruling from the trial court in 
order to preserve an issue for appellate review). 
D.  CLAIMS DENIED WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Rhodes argues that the trial court summarily denied various claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel which he argues warranted an evidentiary hearing.  
We disagree. 
 
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This Court reviews the summary denial of 3.850 claims under the following 
standard: “To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a 3.850 
motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the 
record.  Further, where no evidentiary hearing is held below, we must accept the 
defendant's factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record.”  
Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 
253, 257 (Fla.1999)).   
“To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance, 
the defendant must allege specific facts that are not conclusively rebutted by the 
record and which demonstrate a deficiency in performance that prejudiced the 
defendant.”  Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 65 (Fla. 2003).  “Failure to sufficiently 
allege both prongs results in a summary denial of the claim.”  Spera v. State, 971 
So. 2d 754, 758 (Fla. 2007) (citing Thompson v. State, 796 So. 2d 511, 514 n.5 
(Fla. 2001)). 
Rhodes argues that the trial court improperly denied him an evidentiary 
hearing on several claims of ineffective assistance of guilt phase and resentencing 
counsel.7  We conclude that the trial court was correct in summarily denying these 
                                          
 
7.  Rhodes argues that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase 
because he (1) failed to properly preserve his objection during jury selection; (2) 
failed to impeach a State witness; (3) failed to object to improper testimony by 
detectives; and (4) failed to object to testimony from Dr. William Ross Maples, a 
forensic anthropologist.  Rhodes contends that resentencing counsel was 
 
- 24 -
claims either because the record refutes the allegations; because, assuming the 
facts are true, Rhodes cannot demonstrate any deficiency on the part of counsel; or 
because, again assuming the facts are true, any deficiency is insufficient to 
undermine our confidence in the outcome.8  
                                                                                                                                        
ineffective for failing to (1) adequately challenge the trial testimony of the 
jailhouse informants; and (2) object to jury instruction error.  
 
8.  Rhodes also lists several claims, denied below, that he recognizes have 
been rejected in other death penalty cases, and concedes are being presented for 
preservation purposes only.  See Sireci v. State, 773 So. 2d 34, 41 n.14 (2000) 
(directing petitioners wishing to raise claims solely for the purpose of preserving 
them to designate the issues as such, noting that “[w]e will consider the issues 
preserved for review in the event of a change in the law if counsel so indicates by 
grouping these claims under an appropriately entitled heading and providing a 
description of the substance”).  Rhodes submits the following claims for 
preservation: (1) Claim XXX, failure to object to various comments and arguments 
by the State on the ground that they diminished the jurors’ sense of responsibility, 
in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); (2) Claims XVII and 
XXVIII, Rhodes is innocent of first-degree murder and the death penalty; (3) 
Claim XXXI, penalty phase instructions improperly shifted the burden to the 
defense to prove that death was the inappropriate sentence and trial counsel failed 
to object; (4) Claim XXVII, jurors received inadequate guidance on the 
aggravating factors and Florida’s statute is unconstitutionally vague; (5) Claim 
XIII, denial of constitutional rights and right to collateral counsel due to rules 
prohibiting juror interviews; (6) Claim X, the State improperly introduced 
gruesome and prejudicial photographs, videos and a skeleton at trial; (7) Claim XI, 
Rhodes was denied effective and adequate mental health assistance; (8) Claim 
XIV, the State violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Rhodes’s 
statements were improperly admitted; (9) Claim XVI, the police lacked probable 
cause to arrest Rhodes; (10) Claim XIX, the trial court erroneously instructed on 
judging expert testimony; (11) Claims XX and XXIV, the State’s use of misleading 
and improper argument; (12) Claim XXII, the trial court failed to sequester the 
jury; (13) Claim XXIX, the jury was misled and incorrectly informed of its 
function; (14) Claim XXV, the State improperly introduced nonstatutory 
 
- 25 -
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's denial of Rhodes’s motion 
for postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
QUINCE,  J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
While I agree with all other aspects of the majority decision, I cannot agree 
that the alleged error with regard to the motion to depose the State’s DNA expert is 
appropriately considered as part of the instant appeal from the denial of the rule 
3.850 motion.  Strangely, Rhodes filed the motion to depose during the evidentiary 
hearing for the rule 3.850 motion.  Specifically, the motion to depose was filed 
after closing arguments but prior to the trial court’s order that denied the rule 3.850 
motion for relief.  Notwithstanding the timing of this filing, Rhodes conceded in 
the motion to depose that the “DNA issue is a separate matter from the issues that 
are already before this Court in closing argument.”  Additionally, the trial court 
                                                                                                                                        
aggravating circumstances; (15) Claim XXXII, the trial court failed to find 
mitigation in the record; (16) and Claim XXXVI, electrocution is unconstitutional. 
 
 
- 26 -
had previously agreed with Rhodes that the two issues were distinct:  “[T]he DNA 
deal is apparently going to be a separate deal from the three, you know, 850, 
anyway.”  Thus, the record establishes that both the trial court and Rhodes 
operated under the belief that the DNA testing and subsequent discovery with 
regard to that testing was a separate issue from the rule 3.850 motion.  The trial 
court apparently decided not to rule immediately on the motion to depose because 
the rule 3.850 proceeding had not yet concluded.  Therefore, in my view, the 
alleged error with regard to the motion to depose is beyond the scope of the instant 
appeal from the denial of the rule 3.850 motion.  The majority’s improper 
consideration of this claim and its holding that Rhodes “waived the issue” should 
not hinder any future attempt by him to seek further review of this claim. 
Moreover, I conclude that the trial court should be directed to rule on the 
motion to depose the State’s DNA expert.  The majority correctly recognizes that 
the failure of the trial court to rule on this motion presents a current impediment for 
this Court to review the claim, but then, strangely, does not direct the trial court to 
remove this obstacle.  Regardless of the fact that the motion to depose was filed 
during the rule 3.850 proceeding, Rhodes was entitled to a ruling on this motion at 
some later point in time.  There is nothing within the record which establishes that 
Rhodes made any affirmation to the trial court that indicated a desire to waive this 
motion.  Thus, the failure of the trial court to rule on the motion to depose after the 
 
- 27 -
conclusion of the rule 3.850 proceeding was likely a mere oversight, which 
supports that the trial court should be directed to rule on this motion.  See Miller v. 
Miller, 709 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (remanding for the trial court’s 
disposition of a pending counterpetition after concluding “that its omission from 
the order under review was an oversight” (emphasis added)). 
For any future appeal, the lack of an order on the motion to depose would 
create the same obstacle that the majority encounters when it erroneously attempts 
to provide review of the claim under the instant rule 3.850 appeal.  The options 
available to Rhodes to seek further review of this claim should not be limited by 
the fact that the trial court failed to issue an order on the motion to depose after the 
conclusion of the rule 3.850 proceeding.  See State v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 
697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1997) (“[W]e routinely entertain appeals from final orders 
in death penalty collateral proceedings and on occasion review interlocutory orders 
in such proceedings. . . .  [I]n addition to our appellate jurisdiction over sentences 
of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types of collateral 
proceedings in death penalty cases.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)); cf. 
Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702, 707 (Fla. 2000) (discussing the requirements for a 
defendant in a capital case to obtain relief through an interlocutory appeal of a 
postconviction discovery “order” (emphasis added)).  If the trial court never rules 
on the motion to depose, Rhodes would likely be forced to file a petition for writ of 
 
- 28 -
 
- 29 -
mandamus should he wish to seek further review of the claim in this Court.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const. (authorizing this Court to issue writs of mandamus).  I 
conclude that Rhodes should not be relegated to seeking the extraordinary and 
discretionary remedy of mandamus to compel the trial court to perform such a 
basic duty when a mere directive from this Court in the instant appeal to rule on 
the pending motion would suffice.   
Accordingly, I dissent in part. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
W. Douglas Baird, Judge – Case No. CRC84-03982 CFANO-D 
 
Terri L. Backhus of Backhus and Izakowitz, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert J. Landry and 
Katherine V. Blanco, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee