Title: Bogenberger v. Pi Kappa Alpha Corp., Inc.
Citation: 2018 IL 120951
Docket Number: 120951
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 19, 2018

2018 IL 120951 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket Nos. 120951, 120967, 120986 cons.) 
GARY L. BOGENBERGER, Appellant, v. PI KAPPA ALPHA 
CORPORATION, INC., et al., Appellees. 
Opinion filed January 19, 2018. 
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Justices Thomas, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion. 
Justice Theis concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion, joined by 
Justice Kilbride. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
David Bogenberger attended a pledge event at the Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity 
house at Northern Illinois University, where an evening of vodka-laden hazing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ensued. By the end of the night, his blood alcohol level would reach more than five 
times the legal limit. David lost consciousness and died during the night. 
¶ 2 
At issue here is whether plaintiff’s complaint alleged a cause of action for 
negligence against defendants, who included the fraternity’s national 
organizations; the local chapter and its officers, pledge board members, and active 
members; and certain nonmember sorority women. The circuit court of Cook 
County dismissed the complaint in its entirety pursuant to section 2-615 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014)). The appellate 
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 2016 
IL App (1st) 150128, ¶ 51. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as to 
the fraternity’s national organizations and the nonmember sorority women. Id. 
¶¶ 11, 51. The court reversed the dismissal as to the local chapter and its officers, 
pledge board members, and active members. Id. 
¶ 3 
For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the fraternity’s national 
organizations. We affirm the reversal of the dismissal of the local chapter and its 
officers, pledge board members, and active members. We reverse the dismissal of 
the nonmember sorority women. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
¶ 4 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 5 
In the fall of 2012, David began his freshman year at Northern Illinois 
University in DeKalb, Illinois. He became a prospective pledge of the Eta Nu 
chapter of Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity (NIU Chapter). As a prospective pledge, he 
was required to attend a pledge event called “Mom and Dad’s Night.” A day or two 
prior to the event, a plan for the night was approved and adopted by certain 
unknown NIU Chapter officers, pledge board members, and active members. The 
plan designated seven rooms in the fraternity house to which two or three “Greek 
couples” would be assigned. The members were directed to obtain vodka for the 
pledges to consume during the event and to contact sorority women to serve as 
“Greek Mothers.” Each member would select a pledge for whom he and a sorority 
woman would serve as the pledge’s “Greek Mother and Father.” Couples were to 
ask the pledges various questions and give them a specific amount of alcohol, 
regardless of their answers. Pledges would be divided into groups of two or three 
- 2 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and would rotate from room to room every 10 minutes. The plan called for most, if 
not all, pledges to become unconscious. Certain areas of the house were designated 
as places where pledges could “pass out.” Pledges would be checked periodically, 
and their heads and bodies would be positioned in such a way so that if they 
vomited, they would not choke. Officers kept Breathalyzers and would use them to 
measure the pledges’ blood alcohol level. 
¶ 6 
Members informed the pledges of the “Mom and Dad’s Night” event, which 
would be held on November 1, 2012. They also indicated that attendance was 
mandatory and that the pledges would be required to drink excessive amounts of 
alcohol during the event. The pledges believed that attending and participating in 
the event was a required condition to gaining membership in the fraternity. The 
pledge event was not registered with the university as required by the university’s 
policy. 
¶ 7 
As directed, David and the other pledges arrived at the fraternity house at 7:30 
p.m. for “Mom and Dad’s Night.” They were divided into groups of two or three 
and given a list of rooms in the house to which they were to proceed, in a designated 
order, every 10 minutes. Each pledge was given a four-ounce plastic cup to bring 
with him from room to room, where it was filled with vodka by the members and 
the sorority women. The pledges were asked questions by the “Greek couples” and 
tried to determine whether the couples were their “Greek parents.” They were 
directed and required to consume the vodka in their cups based on their answers. If 
pledges were reluctant to drink, they were called derogatory names by the couples. 
When a pledge asked a couple whether they were his Greek parents, he was told 
they were not, even when they were, and he was required to drink another 
four-ounce cup of vodka. Over the course of about an hour and a half, each pledge, 
including David, had consumed three to five cups of vodka in each room. The 
pledges, who could no longer walk without assistance, were taken to the basement 
and told the identity of their Greek parents and were given T-shirts and pledge 
paddles. They were also given “vomit buckets” that had been decorated by the 
women. As pledges began to lose consciousness, they were brought to the 
previously designated places in the house. David was placed in a bed in his “Greek 
father’s” room by one of the members, who oriented his head and body so that he 
would not choke if he vomited. At approximately 11 p.m., the NIU Chapter 
president and an officer sent a text message to other officers and members telling 
- 3 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
them and the sorority women to delete any pictures or videos they had of a “passed 
out” pledge. Throughout the night, pledges were occasionally checked and adjusted 
so that they would not choke if they vomited. Members discussed whether to obtain 
medical attention for the pledges but decided not to and told others not to call 911 
or seek medical care for them. Sometime during the night, David died. His blood 
alcohol level was 0.43 mg/dl. As a result of the pledge event, the NIU Chapter’s 
charter was suspended and ultimately revoked. 
¶ 8 
Plaintiff, Gary L. Bogenberger, as special administrator of David’s estate, filed 
a 12-count, fifth amended complaint for negligence against defendants on May 28, 
2014. Defendants are the Pi Kappa Alpha national organizations, the NIU Chapter, 
the officers and pledge board members individually and in their official capacities, 
the active members, and the nonmember sorority women.1 Plaintiff alleged that 
defendants owed David a duty of reasonable care and sought damages pursuant to 
the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2012)) and the Survival Act 
(755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2012)). 
¶ 9 
Plaintiff’s counsel attached an affidavit to the complaint, averring that many of 
the allegations in the complaint, especially those made “upon information and 
belief,” were based on counsel’s reading of “various summary reports, recorded 
witness statements and media reports.” Counsel also averred that he was unable to 
initiate discovery of any of the defendants, other than an officer of the Pi Kappa 
Alpha national organizations, due to the pendency of criminal charges stemming 
from David’s death. 
¶ 10 
Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. All 
of the motions asserted that plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege a duty in light of 
the case law that prohibits social host liability with regard to alcohol. They further 
argued that the complaint failed to allege specific facts to impose a duty with regard 
to voluntary undertaking, concerted action, or joint liability. 
¶ 11 
The circuit court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss with prejudice and 
dismissed the complaint. The court noted the decisions in Quinn v. Sigma Rho 
Chapter of the Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 155 Ill. App. 3d 231 (1987), and Haben v. 
1The landowner of the fraternity house was also named as a defendant in counts XI and XII but 
was subsequently dismissed, and plaintiff does not challenge that ruling in this court. 
- 4 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anderson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1992), which recognized a cause of action against a 
fraternity and a university lacrosse club, respectively, where the plaintiffs were 
required to drink alcohol to the point of intoxication to become a member of the 
organization. Nevertheless, it questioned the viability of those cases after this 
court’s decisions in Charles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482 (1995), and Wakulich v. 
Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223 (2003), which declined to create any form of social host 
liability regarding alcohol consumption. The court further found that even if Quinn 
and Haben remained viable, plaintiff’s complaint was insufficient because it failed 
to plead specific facts and the allegations in the complaint were conclusory. 
¶ 12 
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as to the Pi Kappa 
Alpha national organizations and the nonmember sorority women. 2016 IL App 
(1st) 150128, ¶¶ 11, 51. The court reversed the dismissal as to the NIU Chapter, its 
officers and pledge board members, and the active members. Id. Additional 
pertinent facts will be included in the analysis of the issues reviewed on appeal. 
¶ 13 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 14 
Plaintiff appeals from the appellate court’s opinion and contends that the court 
erred in affirming the dismissal of the Pi Kappa Alpha national organizations and 
the nonmember sorority women. Defendants, the NIU Chapter, its officers and 
pledge board members, and its active members also appeal and contend that the 
court erred in reversing the dismissal of the complaint as to them. We consolidated 
the appeals. We also allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an 
amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 
¶ 15 
Social Host Liability 
¶ 16 
Initially, we address an argument made by all defendants that the rule against 
social host liability bars plaintiff’s claim. Regarding social host liability, we have 
said, “few rules of law are as clear as that no liability for the sale or gift of alcoholic 
beverages exists in Illinois outside of the Dramshop Act.” Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 
490. This rule is based on over a century of precedent. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 
229-30. The rationale behind the rule is that the drinking of the intoxicant, not the 
furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of the intoxication and the resulting injury. 
- 5 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 486. As a matter of public policy, the furnishing of alcoholic 
beverages is considered too remote to serve as the proximate cause of the injury. Id. 
As a result, we have declined to impose any form of social host liability for 
alcohol-related injuries. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 237. 
¶ 17 
Whether the rule against social host liability applies to the factual situation 
presented here is a matter of first impression in this court. In Wakulich, we noted 
the appellate court opinions of Quinn and Haben, which held that the required 
consumption of alcohol to gain admission into a fraternity and lacrosse club, 
respectively, were an “exception” to the rule against social host liability. Wakulich, 
203 Ill. 2d at 239. We characterized Quinn and Haben as addressing the “limited 
situation in which a college fraternity, or similar college organization, requires 
those seeking membership to engage in illegal and dangerous activities, in violation 
of the hazing statute.” Id. at 239-40. Ultimately though, we did not address whether 
the holdings in Quinn and Haben were compatible with our rule against social host 
liability because the plaintiff in Wakulich was not involved in a hazing event. Id. at 
240. We are now confronted with such a factual scenario. 
¶ 18 
We would be turning a blind eye if we failed to acknowledge the differences 
between a social host situation and an alcohol-related hazing event. A social host 
situation involves the sale or gift of alcohol. An alcohol-related hazing event 
involves the required consumption of alcohol in order to gain admission into a 
school organization in violation of Illinois’s hazing statute (720 ILCS 120/5 (West 
2010)).2 We cannot fairly characterize such hazing events as involving the sale or 
gift of alcohol. This type of hazing does not fit within the social host situation. 
Alcohol is not merely furnished to an individual; the individual is required to 
consume alcohol, often at a near-lethal level, to gain admission into a school 
organization. This required consumption of alcohol is not too remote to serve as the 
2The hazing statute provides, “[a] person commits hazing when he or she knowingly requires 
the performance of any act by a student or other person in a school, college, university, or other 
educational institution of this State, for the purpose of induction or admission into any group, 
organization, or society associated or connected with that institution, if: (a) the act is not sanctioned 
or authorized by that educational institution; and (b) the act results in bodily harm to any person.” 
720 ILCS 120/5 (West 2010). The legislature has recodified this provision since the events at issue 
but left the substance unchanged. See Pub. Act 97-110 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (recodifying 720 ILCS 
120/5, 10 as 720 ILCS 5/12C-50). 
- 6 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
proximate cause of intoxication and the resulting injury. Thus, we find that the rule 
against social host liability is inapplicable to an alcohol-related hazing event. We 
caution, though, that our determination here is quite narrow. To reiterate our words 
from Wakulich, our above finding only applies in the limited situation in which the 
consumption of alcohol is required to gain admission into a school organization in 
violation of the hazing statute. Nothing more is intended. 
¶ 19 
Having determined that plaintiff’s claim is not barred by the rule against social 
host liability, we now turn to the general principles of negligence to determine 
whether plaintiff’s complaint alleges a cause of action for negligence. 
¶ 20 
Negligence 
¶ 21 
Where the plaintiff seeks recovery based on the defendant’s alleged negligence, 
the plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of a duty owed by the defendant, a 
breach of that duty, and injury proximately resulting from that breach. Bruns v. City 
of Centralia, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 12. Defendants’ contentions are limited to the 
question of duty; therefore, our analysis focuses on that element. Whether a duty 
exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 
Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2007). 
¶ 22 
We have long recognized that “ ‘every person owes a duty of ordinary care to 
all others to guard against injuries which naturally flow as a reasonably probable 
and foreseeable consequence of an act, and such a duty does not depend upon 
contract, privity of interest or the proximity of relationship, but extends to remote 
and unknown persons.’ ” Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, 
¶ 19 (quoting Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 138 Ill. 2d 369, 373 (1990) (collecting 
cases)). Thus, where an individual’s course of action creates a foreseeable risk of 
injury, the individual has a duty to protect others from such injury. Id. The duty 
inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff and the defendant stood in such a 
relationship to one another that the law imposed upon the defendant an obligation 
of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff. Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 
2d 132, 140 (1990). Whether a duty exists is also an inquiry shaped by public 
policy. LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 388 (1998). There are four 
traditional duty factors that guide our analysis: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of 
the injury, (2) the likelihood of the injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of 
- 7 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
  
guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the 
defendant. Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 18. 
¶ 23 
The question presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to section 
2-615 of the Code is whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts that, if proved, 
would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 485-86. Such a motion 
challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 228. 
The critical inquiry is whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon 
which relief may be granted. Id. In making this determination, all well-pleaded 
facts in the complaint must be taken as true. Id. We review an order granting a 
section 2-615 motion to dismiss de novo. Id. 
¶ 24 
We now consider whether plaintiff’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to 
support his negligence claim. Addressing the counts in the order they appear in the 
complaint, we first turn to counts I and II, which were directed at the Pi Kappa 
Alpha national organizations.3 
¶ 25 
Counts I and II—The Pi Kappa Alpha National Organizations 
¶ 26 
Plaintiff contends that the Pi Kappa Alpha national organizations (Nationals) 
are vicariously liable for the misconduct of the NIU Chapter and its members 
because the NIU Chapter and the members were their agents. Plaintiff also 
contends that the Nationals are directly liable since they owe a duty to the pledges 
to refrain from encouraging and directing local chapters to engage in hazing. 
¶ 27 
The Nationals contend that they are not vicariously liable for the NIU Chapter’s 
hazing activities because no agency relationship exists. They also argue that even if 
this court were to find that an agency relationship exists, the hazing acts of the NIU 
Chapter and its members were outside the scope of the agency, which defeats a 
finding of liability. The Nationals further maintain that they are not directly liable 
and have no duty of care to the pledges of local chapters since they have no 
day-to-day control over local chapters. 
3The Pi Kappa Alpha national organizations are Pi Kappa Alpha International Fraternity and Pi 
Kappa Alpha Corporation, Inc. 
- 8 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 28 
Turning to plaintiff’s agency or respondeat superior theory of liability, in order 
to prove that the Nationals are liable for the alleged negligent actions and omissions 
of the NIU Chapter and its members, plaintiff must prove that the NIU Chapter and 
the members were their agents. Wilson v. Edward Hospital, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 18. 
A complaint relying on an agency relationship must plead facts that, if proved, 
could establish the existence of an agency relationship. Connick v. Suzuki Motor 
Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 498 (1996). A mere allegation of agency is insufficient to 
establish actual agency. Id. Proof of actual agency requires a showing that (1) a 
principal/agent relationship existed, (2) the principal controlled or had the right to 
control the conduct of the agent, and (3) the alleged conduct of the agent fell within 
the scope of the agency. Wilson, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 18. 
¶ 29 
Counts I and II of plaintiff’s complaint are substantively identical, though count 
I is brought pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act and count II is brought pursuant to 
the Survival Act. The counts alleged that the Nationals “[t]hrough [their] agents 
and employees[,] encouraged local chapters, including Eta Nu, to hold events 
similar to ‘Mom and Dad’s Night’ because they were good for member and pledge 
retention, therefore increasing revenue and income to the defendants through dues 
and fees.” The complaint also alleged the following. The Nationals were “engaged 
in the business of organizing, promoting, and recruiting membership” in local 
chapters and “as further part of their business, supervised, advised, required and 
controlled the activities and conduct” of their local chapters. The local chapters 
were required to adhere to the Nationals’ fraternity constitution; chapter codes; risk 
assessment manual; its quarterly publication, The Shield and Diamond; and The 
Garnet and Gold pledge manual. These documents included and referenced a 
hazing policy that prohibited any hazing action as well as hazing that utilized 
alcohol. The Nationals had the right and the power to “expel, suspend or place 
restrictive remedial conditions on continued operations of local chapters;” to “assist 
local chapters in the conduct of rush or pledging activities or require alcohol or 
hazing education;” to “expel, suspend or place individual members of local 
chapters on ‘alumni status;’ ” and to “ban and prohibit pledging activities outright 
at local chapters.” The Nationals obtained knowledge about the conduct and 
operations of local chapters through the reports from chapter consultants who 
conducted on-site, weeklong assessments of the chapters. The consultants analyzed 
each chapter’s recruitment performance, continuing risk awareness education, 
alumni relations, finances, housing, management, athletics, scholarship, campus 
- 9 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
involvement, community service, and public relations. The Nationals knew, 
through their consultants’ reports, that for at least three years prior to David’s 
death, the NIU Chapter did not provide continuing risk education to members, did 
not have a risk awareness program, had no written crisis management plan, had no 
functioning risk management committee, and had a reputation as a fraternity of 
“meatheads.” The Nationals were supported by fees collected by local chapters and 
derived at least 75% of their gross income from undergraduate dues and fees and 
were dependent on continued and increasing such dues and fees, which included 
fees from pledges. 
¶ 30 
As to the first factor, we find no support for a principal/agent relationship. 
Plaintiff’s complaint did not allege facts that the Nationals authorized the NIU 
Chapter to act on their behalf or that the Nationals held out the NIU Chapter as their 
agent. See Connick, 174 Ill. 2d at 498-99 (a complaint relying on an agency 
relationship must contain allegations that the principal expressly or impliedly gave 
authority to the agent to act on the principal’s behalf or that the principal held out 
the individual as his agent). As to the second factor, plaintiff’s complaint alleged 
that the Nationals “controlled the activities and conduct” of their local chapters; 
could “assist local chapters in the conduct of rush or pledging activities or require 
alcohol or hazing education;” and had “the right and the power to expel, suspend or 
place restrictive remedial conditions on local chapters.” However, the above 
allegations fall short of establishing “control.” The Nationals have promulgated 
rules that the local chapters are to follow, yet the complaint does not allege that the 
Nationals dictate how the local chapters implement these rules. The complaint did 
not allege that the Nationals had any control over which pledging events chapters 
actually held or that the Nationals could control how chapters planned or carried 
out the events. It only alleged that the Nationals “encouraged” pledging events 
“similar” to “Mom and Dad’s Night.” Also, the Nationals’ power to expel or 
discipline local chapters or members was remedial only. The power to take 
remedial action “after the fact” does not amount to the right to direct or control a 
local chapter or member’s actions. As to the third factor, the NIU Chapter’s hazing 
conduct fell outside the scope of any alleged agency relationship. The NIU Chapter 
could plan and hold pledging events, but it was against the Nationals’ rules to 
include hazing within those pledging events. Pledging and hazing are not 
synonymous. We find the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint insufficient to allege 
- 10 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
an agency relationship and, accordingly, insufficient to hold the Nationals 
vicariously liable for the conduct of the NIU Chapter and its members. 
¶ 31 
Regarding plaintiff’s direct theory of liability, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that 
the Nationals owed a duty to David to “prevent the foreseeable consequences of 
required excessive consumption of alcohol during [an] initiation ritual.” The 
complaint further alleged that the Nationals permitted dangerous pledge events to 
occur, failed to warn local chapters about the dangers and risks of “required alcohol 
related pledge events,” failed to adopt policies for the local chapters to follow to 
prevent dangerous pledge events, failed to take reasonable steps to insure its local 
chapters followed the Nationals’ policies regarding pledge events, failed to take 
reasonable steps to learn whether its local chapters were following the Nationals’ 
policies, failed to ban pledging events outright at all of its local chapters when they 
knew pledge events were likely to result in bodily harm and death to pledges, failed 
to insure that the NIU Chapter had a continuing risk education policy and 
functioning risk awareness committee although they knew through their chapter 
consultant’s reports that it had not had a program or committee for at least three 
years before David’s death, and were otherwise careless and negligent. 
¶ 32 
Here, plaintiff seeks to hold the Nationals directly liable, through their acts or 
omissions, for the criminal conduct of the NIU Chapter, its members, and the 
nonmember sorority women. Essentially, what plaintiff’s complaint alleges is that 
the Nationals should have taken certain affirmative action to protect the pledges 
from hazing and to control the criminal conduct of those who participated in the 
hazing. 
¶ 33 
In Illinois, an affirmative duty to aid or protect another against an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm or to control the conduct of another arises only within the 
context of a legally recognized “special relationship.” Doe-3 v. McLean County 
Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 24; Hills v. Bridgeview 
Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 234 (2000); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 314, 314A, 315 (1965). We have recognized the following four 
relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to aid or protect another against an 
unreasonable risk of physical harm: common carrier and passenger, innkeeper and 
guest, custodian and ward, and possessor of land who holds it open to the public 
and member of the public who enters in response to the possessor’s invitation. 
- 11 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 20. We have also recognized a duty to a third party to 
control the individual who is the source of the harm when a defendant has a special 
relationship with that person, such as a parent-child relationship and a 
master-servant or employer-employee relationship. Id. Absent a special 
relationship, there can be no affirmative duty imposed on one for the benefit of 
another to warn or protect against the criminal conduct of a third party. Iseberg v. 
Gross, 227 Ill. 2d 78, 101 (2007); Hills, 195 Ill. 2d at 228 (one has no affirmative 
duty to control the conduct of another to prevent a criminal attack on a third party in 
the absence of a special relationship). 
¶ 34 
The appellate court found that the Nationals did not owe a duty to the pledges of 
the local chapters because imposing such a duty would present an “unrealistic 
burden.” 2016 IL App (1st) 150128, ¶ 47. The court did not consider, and the 
parties did not raise, the “no-affirmative-duty” rule and the special relationship 
doctrine. Similarly here, the parties’ contentions on appeal omit mention of the rule 
and doctrine and instead argue the issue of duty pursuant to the traditional four duty 
factors. 
¶ 35 
Nevertheless, since plaintiff’s complaint alleges direct liability on behalf of the 
Nationals for the criminal conduct of the NIU Chapter, its members, and the 
nonmember sorority women, we must first consider whether a legally recognized 
special relationship exists between the parties. If no special relationship exists that 
would impose an affirmative duty upon the Nationals to protect the pledges or to 
control the conduct of those who hazed the pledges, then the Nationals owe no 
affirmative duty to the pledges. Since Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, 
plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts, not mere conclusions, that establish a viable 
cause of action. Iseberg, 227 Ill. 2d at 86. When we read the allegations in 
plaintiff’s complaint, we find that they do not plead specific facts that would come 
within any of the above legally recognized special relationships. The complaint 
does not sufficiently plead any of the special relationships of common carrier and 
passenger, innkeeper and guest, custodian and ward, or possessor of land and 
public invitee, nor does it adequately plead a parent-child relationship or 
master-servant or employer-employee relationship. Accordingly, absent a special 
relationship, there can be no affirmative duty imposed on the Nationals for the 
benefit of the pledges. 
- 12 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 36 
Our finding is consistent with this court’s precedent. For example, in Hills, the 
plaintiff was coaching a Little League baseball team when he was attacked by the 
manager and assistant coaches for the opposing team. The plaintiff filed suit against 
his attackers, as well as the opposing team’s sponsor and the host of the baseball 
tournament. We determined that the sponsor of the opposing team had no 
affirmative duty to control the attackers and the host had no affirmative duty to 
protect the plaintiff from the attackers because no special relationship existed 
between the parties. Hills, 195 Ill. 2d at 242, 252. 
¶ 37 
In Iseberg, the plaintiff was shot and paralyzed by a former business investor 
who suffered financial losses. The plaintiff filed suit against the investor, as well as 
other business partners for failing to warn him that the investor had made threats 
against the plaintiff’s life. We ultimately found that there was no special 
relationship between the business partners and the plaintiff and therefore no 
affirmative duty to warn or protect. Iseberg, 227 Ill. 2d at 101. Of particular 
relevance, here, is what we said in response to one of the plaintiff’s arguments. The 
plaintiff had also advanced an argument that in situations where “some type of 
relationship” exists between the parties, whether an affirmative duty may be 
imposed should be decided based upon consideration of the four traditional duty 
factors. Id. at 89. We took the opportunity to reiterate this court’s long history of 
adherence to the no-affirmative-duty rule and the special relationship doctrine 
before rejecting the plaintiff’s argument and reaffirming that the rule and doctrine 
“stand as the law of this state.” Id. at 101. 
¶ 38 
Additionally, our appellate court has rejected attempts to hold universities 
liable for harm perpetrated by one student upon another in the absence of a special 
relationship. See Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan University, 161 Ill. App. 3d 348, 
361-63 (1987) (university neither had a duty to protect student, who was injured as 
a result of a fraternity prank, in its capacity as landlord, nor had it voluntarily 
assumed or placed itself in a custodial relationship with its students); Leonardi v. 
Bradley University, 253 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690-91 (1993) (university had no duty to 
protect student from sexual assault that occurred at a fraternity house since the 
student did not qualify as a business invitee of the university). 
¶ 39 
Regarding cases that specifically address a national fraternity’s liability, we 
note Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840 (Ky. 
- 13 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005). In Carneyhan, the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained that the “key” to 
imposing a duty based on a special relationship is that the defendant’s relationship 
with either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff “places the defendant in the best position to 
protect against the risk of harm.” Id. at 850. It further explained that the defendant’s 
ability to control the person who caused the harm “must be real and not fictional 
and, if exercised, would meaningfully reduce the risk of the harm that actually 
occurred.” Id. at 851. In declining to hold the national fraternity liable for the 
actions of the local chapter in serving the underage plaintiff alcohol, which resulted 
in the plaintiff’s death when she crashed her automobile into a utility pole, the court 
relied on the national organizations’ inability to affirmatively monitor their local 
chapters. Id. at 854. The court reasoned that national organizations do not have 
sufficient resources to monitor the activities of their local chapters 
contemporaneously with each chapter’s events and can only discipline a chapter 
“after the fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Shaheen v. Yonts, 
394 Fed. App’x 224, 229-30 (6th Cir. 2010) (national fraternity not liable for 
fraternity member who drove away from local fraternity house party while 
intoxicated and struck and killed pedestrian); Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha 
Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Iowa 2000) (national fraternity had no duty to 
protect pledge from his excessive drinking that occurred after a big brother/little 
brother ceremony since the national fraternity neither furnished the alcohol nor 
forced him to consume any alcohol); Walker v. Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity, 
96-2345, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97); 706 So. 2d 525, 529-30 (national 
fraternity had no duty to prevent local chapter’s hazing of pledge by physical abuse 
since the national fraternity was unable to control the day-to-day actions of the 
local chapter, which was located several states away from the national fraternity); 
Millard v. Osborne, 611 A.2d 715, 719-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (national fraternity 
had no duty to control the actions of its local chapter’s members, who furnished 
alcohol at the fraternity house to a student who was killed shortly thereafter in a 
motorcycle accident). 
¶ 40 
We also acknowledge, however, that some courts have held that a national 
fraternity may be liable for the actions of its local chapters. See Grenier v. 
Commissioner of Transportation, 51 A.3d 367, 389 (Conn. 2012) (the extent of the 
national fraternity’s control over its local chapter’s actions raised a question of 
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment); Brown v. Delta Tau Delta, 
2015 ME 75, ¶ 10, 118 A.3d 789, 792 (national fraternity owed a duty based on a 
- 14 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
theory of premises liability to student who was sexually assaulted during fraternity 
party); Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 31,805, p. 16 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
5/7/99); 738 So. 2d 1105, 1118-19 (national fraternity was liable to a pledge for the 
actions of its local chapter because it had voluntarily assumed a duty to prevent 
hazing but had acted negligently in performing its duty). 
¶ 41 
Notwithstanding the varied nuances of other jurisdictions’ determinations of a 
national fraternity’s liability for the actions of a local chapter, Illinois jurisprudence 
regarding an affirmative duty is clear. We find no basis to impose an affirmative 
duty upon the Nationals absent a special relationship. Moreover, in Iseberg, we 
stated that this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control 
based upon consideration of the traditional four duty factors in the absence of a 
special relationship. Iseberg, 227 Ill. 2d at 98. 
¶ 42 
Since we conclude that the Nationals did not owe a duty to the pledges, plaintiff 
cannot establish a claim for negligence against them. See Bell v. Hutsell, 2011 IL 
110724, ¶ 11 (unless a duty is owed, there can be no recovery in tort for 
negligence). We affirm the appellate court’s dismissal of counts I and II of the 
complaint. 
¶ 43 
Counts III through VIII—The NIU Chapter, Its Officers 
and Pledge Board Members, and Active Members 
¶ 44 
We next turn to counts III through VIII of plaintiff’s complaint, which name the 
NIU Chapter, its officers and pledge board members, and its active members. 
Counts III and IV are directed at the NIU Chapter and its officers and pledge board 
members (collectively officers) in their official capacities. Counts V and VI are 
directed at the officers individually. Counts VII and VIII are directed at the active 
members. 
4 Defendants contend that they did not owe a duty to the pledges, 
including David, either directly or based on a theory of voluntary undertaking. 
- 15 ­
4The named officers are Alexander M. Jandick, James P. Harvey, Omar Salameh, Patrick 
Merrill, Stephen A. Libert, John Hutchinson, and Daniel Biagini. The named active members are 
Michael J. Phillip Jr., Thomas F. Costello, David R. Sailer, Alexander D. Renn, Michael A. 
Marroquin, Estafan A. Diaz, Hazel A. Vergaralope, Michael D. Pfest, Andres Jimenez Jr., Isiah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
  
¶ 45 
Plaintiff alleged in counts III and IV of his complaint that the NIU Chapter and 
officers required pledges, including David, to participate in the “Mom and Dad’s 
Night” pledge event as a condition of membership in the NIU Chapter and further 
required the consumption of excessive and dangerous amounts of alcohol in 
violation of the hazing statute. The counts also alleged that the officers failed to call 
911 or seek medical attention for David, dissuaded others from obtaining medical 
attention for him, and instead placed him on a bed in a room where he would not be 
observed by others. Further, it was alleged that the officers failed to implement a 
continuing risk education program, failed to create a continuing risk education 
committee, and were otherwise careless and negligent. 
¶ 46 
To determine whether the NIU Chapter and officers owed a duty to the pledges, 
we look to the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, the likelihood of the injury, 
the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of 
placing that burden on the defendant. In deciding reasonable foreseeability, an 
injury is not reasonably foreseeable where it results from “freakish, bizarre, or 
fantastic circumstances.” Doe-3, 2012 IL 112479 ¶ 31. Regarding the first two 
factors, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, an injury resulting from hazing is 
freakish, bizarre, or occurs under fantastic circumstances. The existence of hazing 
statutes across the country, including the Nationals’ written policy against hazing 
as well as Illinois’s hazing statute, indicates that injury due to hazing is reasonably 
foreseeable. We also find that injuries resulting from hazing events, especially 
those involving the consumption of large amounts of alcohol, are likely to occur. 
When pledges are required to consume large quantities of alcohol in short periods 
of time, their risk of injury is great—not only physical injury due to their inebriated 
condition but injury or death resulting from alcohol poisoning. Regarding the last 
two factors, we find that the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury is 
small and the consequences of placing that burden on the NIU Chapter and officers 
are reasonable. To require the NIU Chapter and officers to guard against hazing 
injuries is infinitesimal. Hazing is not only against the law in Illinois, it is against 
the university’s rules as well as the Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity’s rules. There can be 
no real burden to require the NIU Chapter and officers to comply with the law and 
Lott, Andrew W. Bouleanu, Nicholas A. Sutor, Nelson A. Irizarry, John Wallace, Daniel S. Post, 
Nsenzi K. Salasini, Russell P. Coyner, Gregory Petryka, Kevin Rosetti, and Thomas Bralis. 
- 16 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
the university’s and fraternity’s rules. And it seems quite reasonable to place that 
burden on the very people who are in charge of planning and carrying out the 
pledge event. We find that the NIU Chapter and the officers owed a duty to the 
pledges, including David, and plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for 
negligence against them. Since we conclude that a duty exists, we need not 
determine whether a duty arose based on the theory of voluntary undertaking. We 
affirm the appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal of counts III and IV. 
¶ 47 
Plaintiff alleged in counts V and VI of his complaint that the officers 
individually “knowingly and willingly approved, organized, planned, promoted, 
required and participated” in the “Mom and Dad’s Night” pledge event where 
pledges would be required to consume dangerous and excessive amounts of alcohol 
“to a point of insensate intoxication” as a condition to membership in the NIU 
Chapter. The counts also alleged that the officers designated certain rooms and 
areas in the fraternity house in which to place pledges, including David, who 
became dangerously intoxicated and unconscious, failed to seek necessary medical 
attention for the pledges, and were otherwise careless and negligent. 
¶ 48 
When we consider the four duty factors, we again find that the first two factors 
weigh in favor of a duty because a hazing injury is reasonably foreseeable and is 
likely to occur. Similarly, we find that the magnitude of the burden of guarding 
against injury is small and the consequences of placing that burden on the officers 
are reasonable. As stated above, requiring the officers to comply with the law and 
the university’s and fraternity’s rules against hazing is an infinitesimal burden. 
Placing that burden on the officers who are alleged to have planned, promoted, and 
participated in the hazing event is reasonable. We find that the officers individually 
owed a duty to the pledges, including David, and plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 
claim for negligence against them. Again, since we conclude that a duty exists, we 
need not determine whether a duty arose based on the theory of voluntary 
undertaking. We affirm the appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal of counts V 
and VI. 
¶ 49 
Plaintiff alleged in counts VII and VIII of his complaint that the active members 
“knowingly and willingly agreed” to participate in the “Mom and Dad’s Night” 
pledge event that required pledges to consume dangerous and potentially fatal 
amounts of alcohol as a condition of being accepted for membership in the NIU 
- 17 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter. The complaint further alleged that the members failed to seek medical 
attention for David after he became dangerously intoxicated and unconscious, 
placed him in a room where he would not be seen by others, and were otherwise 
careless and negligent. 
¶ 50 
Considering the duty factors, as stated above, the first two factors weigh in 
favor of a duty because a hazing injury is reasonably foreseeable and is likely to 
occur. Also, as stated above, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury 
is small, and the consequences of placing that burden on the members are 
reasonable. Placing the burden on those members who are alleged to have 
knowingly and willingly agreed to participate in the hazing event is reasonable. We 
find that the members owed a duty to the pledges, including David, and plaintiff has 
sufficiently alleged a claim for negligence against them. Since a duty exists, we 
need not consider whether a duty arose based on voluntary undertaking. We affirm 
the appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal of counts VII and VIII. 
¶ 51 
Counts IX and X—The Nonmember Sorority Women 
¶ 52 
Plaintiff alleged in counts IX and X of his complaint that the nonmember 
sorority women participated in the “Mom and Dad’s Night” hazing event by filling 
the pledges’ cups with vodka, asking the pledges questions, directing the pledges to 
drink vodka based on the pledges’ answers, calling the pledges derogatory names, 
and decorating “vomit buckets” for the pledges.5 The complaint further alleged that 
the nonmember women “encouraged” and “required” the pledges, including David, 
to consume dangerous amounts of alcohol in violation of the hazing statute, gave 
David excessive and dangerous amounts of alcohol after he had become obviously 
and dangerously intoxicated, failed to seek medical attention for David, and were 
otherwise careless and negligent. 
5The named nonmember sorority women are Alyssa Allegretti, Jessica Anders, Kelly Burback, 
Christina Carrisa, Raquel Chavez, Lindsey Frank, Danielle Glennon, Kristina Kunz, Janet Luna, 
Nichole Minnick, Courtney Odenthal, Logan Redfield, Katherine Reporto, Tiffany Scheinfurth, 
Adrianna Sotelo, Prudence Willret, Karissa Azarela, Megan Ledone, Nicole Manfredini, Jillian 
Merril, and Monica Skowron. 
- 18 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 53 
The nonmember women argue they owe no duty to the pledges because the 
hazing statute cannot apply to nonmembers of the organization into which 
admission is sought since nonmembers cannot “require” prospective members to 
perform any act. Further, they adopt the Nationals’ arguments that they do not owe 
the pledges a duty because they have no control over the NIU Chapter’s activities. 
¶ 54 
As we have already determined above, a hazing injury is reasonably foreseeable 
and is likely to occur. We also find that the magnitude of the burden of guarding 
against the injury is minor for the aforementioned reasons. Yet whether the 
consequences of placing this burden on nonmembers are reasonable is a much 
thornier determination. On the one hand, the nonmember women were not alleged 
to have had any part in planning the event, and they could not vote as to which 
pledges would be admitted into the NIU Chapter. Yet they willingly agreed to 
participate in the hazing event and actively did so by filling the pledges’ cups with 
vodka, asking the pledges questions, directing the pledges to drink, calling the 
pledges derogatory names, and decorating “vomit buckets.” We see little difference 
between the nonmember women’s participation in the hazing event and the 
members’ participation. As we noted in our analysis regarding the members, it 
seems quite reasonable to impose a duty on those individuals who actively 
participated in the hazing event. The appellate court found that the nonmember 
women did not have a duty because they could not have “required” David to drink 
as provided in the hazing statute. However, the hazing statute does not include 
language limiting its application to members of the organization in which a person 
is seeking to join. The statute provides that “[a] person commits hazing when he or 
she knowingly requires the performance of any act *** for the purpose of induction 
*** into any group.” 720 ILCS 5/12C-50 (West 2012). Here, the message conveyed 
to the pledges, whether by the members or the nonmember women, was the same: 
Drink the vodka to become a member of the fraternity. The purpose of the hazing 
statute is to prevent hazing. We refuse to read into it such a loophole that would 
absolve a nonmember’s participation when the statute has no such limiting 
language. The women were more than mere guests encouraging the pledges to 
drink. They were an integral part of the event and, for purposes of that event, 
occupied a similar position of influence over the pledges as the members did. 
Further, we believe that public policy dictates imposing a duty. Hazing is illegal, 
and those individuals who choose to participate in such acts should bear the 
consequences of their actions. Under the circumstances alleged here, we find that 
- 19 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the nonmember women owed a duty to the pledges, including David, and plaintiff 
has sufficiently alleged a claim for negligence against them. We reverse the 
appellate court’s dismissal of counts IX and X. 
¶ 55 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 56 
In summary, the complaint is dismissed as to the Pi Kappa Alpha national 
organizations. The complaint may proceed against the NIU Chapter, its officers and 
members, and the nonmember sorority women. 
¶ 57 
Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s dismissal of counts I and II of the 
complaint. We affirm the appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal of counts III 
through VIII of the complaint. We reverse the appellate court’s dismissal of counts 
IX and X of the complaint. We remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶ 58 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
¶ 59 
Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
¶ 60 
Cause remanded. 
¶ 61 
CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
¶ 62 
Like Justice Theis, I join the majority’s opinion, except as to counts I and II of 
the plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint. I agree with Justice Theis that those counts 
should not have been dismissed. Reversal of the dismissal of those counts is 
mandated by our decision in Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, and the four traditional 
duty factors. However, unlike Justice Theis, I would refrain from addressing the 
special relationship doctrine. Therefore, I do not join the views expressed under the 
headings “1. Special Relationships Between Defendants and Tortfeasors” and 
“2. Special Relationships Between Defendants and Plaintiffs” of her partial 
concurrence and partial dissent. See infra ¶¶ 79-100. 
- 20 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 63 
JUSTICE THEIS, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
¶ 64 
I join the majority’s opinion, except as to counts I and II of the plaintiff’s fifth 
amended complaint. In my view, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a negligence 
claim against the national organizations, Pi Kappa Alpha Corporation and Pi Kappa 
Alpha International Fraternity. 
¶ 65 
This case comes before us on appeal from the trial court’s decision to grant the 
national organizations’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint under section 
2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014). Our review 
of such a decision is de novo. Better Government Ass’n v. Illinois High School 
Ass’n, 2017 IL 121124, ¶ 57. We must determine whether the allegations of the 
plaintiff’s complaint and any reasonable inferences that arise from those 
allegations, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient 
to state a claim. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 33. We must accept as true 
all well-pleaded facts, and we can affirm a section 2-615 dismissal only if it is 
clearly apparent that no set of facts entitles the plaintiff to recover. Cowper v. 
Nyberg, 2015 IL 117811, ¶ 12. 
¶ 66 
The majority begins its analysis of the plaintiff’s complaint by addressing the 
two counts directed at the national organizations. According to the majority, the 
plaintiff contends that the national organizations are vicariously liable for the 
negligence of Northern Illinois University’s Pi Kappa Alpha chapter (NIU Chapter) 
and its members and that the national organizations are also directly liable for their 
own negligence. As the majority notes, both counts are substantively identical.  
Count I is brought under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 
2016)), and count II is brought under the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 
2016)). Neither count contains allegations of an agency relationship that would 
support a vicarious liability claim. Despite the plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, 
he did not offer sufficient facts to show that members of the NIU Chapter were 
agents of the national organizations. The plaintiff maintained only that the 
organizations “conducted their business of organizing, promoting[,] and recruiting 
membership in Pi Kappa Alpha fraternities and organization through, among 
others, [the NIU Chapter].” That statement is simply not enough to survive a 
motion to dismiss. 
- 21 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 67 
As the plaintiff reminds us, however, he faced a serious obstacle before the trial 
court. The plaintiff conducted some initial discovery to learn the identities of the 
NIU Chapter members and the nonmember women who were involved in the 
events leading to David’s death, adding those individuals as defendants. Further 
discovery was halted when the trial court granted the individual defendants’ motion 
to stay discovery due to the pending criminal cases against them and the 
accompanying fifth amendment concerns. The plaintiff later filed a motion for 
leave to take discovery, stating that the criminal cases were nearing dispositions, 
which would remove any such concerns. At a hearing on August 20, 2014, the trial 
judge stated that she wanted “to get a good handle on what’s going on in DeKalb 
after the criminal proceedings” before ruling on the plaintiff’s motion. On October 
16, 2014, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion without comment about those 
proceedings. On December 11, 2014, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
complaint with prejudice, foreclosing any further fact development. Now that the 
criminal charges against the individual defendants have been resolved, this court 
should vacate the trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with 
prejudice and lift the trial court’s bar on discovery. The national organizations 
acknowledge in their brief that active members of the NIU Chapter “were arguably 
‘employed’ to secure new members for the ongoing stability of the national 
Fraternity.” Allowing the plaintiff to depose the NIU Chapter members may 
provide details about their interactions with the national organizations that could 
establish an agency relationship and, therefore, vicarious liability.6 See Kenner v. 
6Some courts have taken that route in determining that national organizations may be liable for 
the conduct of local chapters and their members. See Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 352 
S.E.2d 488, 496 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a national organization “was bound by the acts of 
its local chapter *** since they were performed within the apparent scope of its authority”); 
Marshall v. University of Delaware, 1986 WL 11566, *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 1986) (holding that 
“one might reasonably conclude” a local chapter’s “alleged failure to control its members was 
within the scope of its alleged agency” with the national organization); Edwards v. Kappa Alpha Psi 
Fraternity, Inc., No. 98 C 1755, 1999 WL 1069100, *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999) (denying a national 
organization’s summary judgment motion on a plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim because the 
organization “may have possessed some control over its local members and their houses”); see also 
Butler v. Gamma Nu Chapter of Sigma Chi, 445 S.E.2d 468, 482 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); Supreme 
Lodge of World, Loyal Order of Moose v. Kenny, 73 So. 519 (Ala. 1916); Thompson v. Supreme 
Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World, 82 N.E. 141 (N.Y. 1907); Mitchell v. Leech, 48 S.E. 290 
(S.C. 1904). 
- 22 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 2002 PA Super 269, ¶ 15 (stating that the trial 
court erred in failing to “consider the full scope of the relationship as established by 
the parties’ deposition testimony”). 
¶ 68 
The plaintiff’s chief allegations concern the direct liability of the national 
organizations. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts that 
show the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, the defendant 
breached that duty, and that breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
damages. See Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 14. The 
crux of this case is the duty element.7 The plaintiff must convince us that the 
national organizations owed David a duty because “[u]nless a duty is owed, there is 
no negligence.” American National Bank & Trust Co. v. National Advertising Co., 
149 Ill. 2d 14, 26 (1992). The existence of a duty is a matter of law. Choate v. 
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 2012 IL 112948, ¶ 22. 
¶ 69 
The threshold inquiry in this case is whether the national organizations, by their 
own acts or omissions, contributed to a risk of harm to David. See Simpkins, 2012 
IL 110662, ¶ 21; see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965) (“An 
act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other 
or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is 
criminal.”); Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm § 37, cmt. d (2012) (“The Restatement Second of Torts § 302B, Comment e, 
provides for a duty of care when ‘the actor’s own affirmative act has created or 
exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such 
[third-party] misconduct.’ ”). If the answer to that question is yes, the analysis is 
familiar. The court must weigh public policy considerations to determine whether 
the national organizations owed David a duty of reasonable care. Simpkins, 2012 IL 
Notably, the same attorney represented both the national organizations and the NIU Chapter 
before the trial court, and new attorneys represent both the national organizations and the NIU 
Chapter before this court. The relationship between those defendants may be closer than the national 
organizations are willing to admit. See generally Cassandra Coolidge, Fraternizing With 
Franchises: A Franchise Approach to Fraternities, 66 Emory L.J. 917 (2017). 
7Neither the national organizations nor the majority address or even dispute that the plaintiff’s 
allegations of breach, causation, and damages are sufficient. I believe that they are, so I confine my 
discussion to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations as they concern duty. 
- 23 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110662, ¶ 21. Traditionally, we have reduced those considerations to four factors: 
(1) the foreseeability of the plaintiff’s injury, (2) the likelihood of that injury, 
(3) the magnitude of the burden to guard against that injury, and (4) the 
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. Id. ¶ 18. Generally, we 
balance the foreseeability and likelihood of harm against the burdens and 
consequences of imposing a duty on the defendant for the benefit of the plaintiff 
(Hutchings v. Bauer, 149 Ill. 2d 568, 571 (1992)), and the weight accorded to those 
factors depends upon the details of the case (Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014 IL 
116998, ¶ 14). However, if the answer to the threshold question is no, the analysis 
shifts. The court must look for a so-called “special relationship” that establishes a 
duty. Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 21. 
¶ 70 
The majority ignores the threshold question and rushes to the conclusion that 
the plaintiff seeks to hold the national organizations liable for “the criminal conduct 
of the NIU Chapter, its members, and the nonmember sorority women.” Supra 
¶ 32. The majority recharacterizes the plaintiff’s allegations: “Essentially, what 
[the] plaintiff’s complaint alleges is that the [national organizations] should have 
taken certain affirmative action to protect the pledges from hazing and to control 
the criminal conduct of those who participated in the hazing.” Supra ¶ 32. The 
majority then states that an affirmative duty to aid or protect arises only when there 
is a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff or between the 
defendant and the third party who injured the plaintiff. Supra ¶ 33. The majority 
concludes that the national organizations did not owe a duty to David because this 
case does not involve such a relationship. Supra ¶ 35. 
¶ 71 
The majority’s casual logic is troubling for two reasons. First, the majority 
abandons the principle of party presentation, and second, the majority compounds 
that error by oversimplifying the unbriefed issues that it chooses to address 
sua sponte. 
¶ 72 
Our precedent counsels adherence to the principle of judicial restraint. See 
People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 153 (“courts of review *** are not free rangers 
riding about the legal landscape looking for law to make”). Undoubtedly, a 
reviewing court has the power to decide issues that the parties have not raised (see 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)) but should refrain from doing so when it 
would transform the court from arbiter to advocate. As this court has stressed, we 
- 24 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
follow the principle of party presentation, relying on the parties to frame the issues 
for decision. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 323 (2010). Our adversary system 
works best when the parties themselves advance their best arguments (Greenlaw v. 
United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244 (2008)) and we hear from both sides pursuant to 
our motto, audi alteram partem. When we address unbriefed issues, we are “forced 
to speculate as to the arguments that the parties might have presented had these 
issues been properly raised before this court. To engage in such speculation would 
only cause further injustice ***.” People v. Rodriguez, 336 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14 
(2002); see People v. Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2010) (“it is not appropriate to 
address the issue in this case where the parties have not raised or argued it”); accord 
Roberts v. Northland Insurance Co., 185 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). 
¶ 73 
As the majority recognizes, the parties here focused on only the four traditional 
duty factors and did not raise the so-called “no-affirmative-duty” rule and the 
special relationship doctrine in either the appellate court or this court. Supra ¶ 34. 
The majority acknowledges that shortcoming but proceeds with a “nevertheless” 
shrug to discuss those issues anyway (supra ¶ 35), ultimately holding in a case of 
first impression that national fraternal organizations have no special relationship 
either with their local chapters and members or with their pledges and, 
consequently, owe no duty to pledges who die during membership or initiation 
events purportedly encouraged and sanctioned by the organizations. 
¶ 74 
The Special Relationship Doctrine 
¶ 75 
The majority presents the relevant blackletter law superficially. This court has 
stated that a defendant has no affirmative duty to protect a plaintiff from a 
third-party tortfeasor, absent a special relationship between either the defendant 
and the plaintiff or the defendant and the tortfeasor. See Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, 
¶ 20. That is a paraphrase of section 315 of the Second Restatement of Torts: 
“There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent 
him from causing physical harm to another unless 
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or 
- 25 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives 
to the other a right to protection.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 
(1965). 
Section 37 of the Third Restatement similarly provides, “An actor whose conduct 
has not created a risk of physical or emotional harm to another has no duty of care 
to the other unless” one of the affirmative duties listed in sections 38 to 44 applies. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 37 
(2012). 
¶ 76 
This court has recognized four special relationships between defendants and 
plaintiffs that may give rise to duties: common carrier/passenger, innkeeper/guest, 
possessor of land/invitee, and custodian/ward. See Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 20 
(citing Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 438 (2006)); Iseberg v. 
Gross, 227 Ill. 2d 78, 88 (2007) (“The existence of one of these four ‘special 
relationships’ has typically been the basis for imposing an affirmative duty to act 
where one would not ordinarily exist.”); see generally Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 314A (1965); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm § 40(b) (2012). This court also has recognized several special 
relationships between defendants and tortfeasors—parent/child and master/servant 
or employer/employee—that also may give rise to duties. Simpkins, 2012 IL 
110662, ¶ 20; see Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 84 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. 
Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 234 (2000) (master/servant); see 
generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965); Restatement (Third) 
of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). 
¶ 77 
The majority states that “this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to 
protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four duty factors in 
the absence of a special relationship.” Supra ¶ 41 (citing Iseberg, 227 Ill. 2d at 98). 
The majority forgets that special relationships between defendants and tortfeasors 
or between defendants and plaintiffs are not a closed set. Comment g to section 37 
of the Third Restatement instructs, “The Sections recognizing certain relationships 
as imposing an affirmative duty are stated nonexclusively, leaving to the courts 
whether to recognize additional relationships as sufficient to impose an affirmative 
duty.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
§ 37, cmt. g (2012); see Iseberg, 227 Ill. 2d at 88 n.4 (noting that section 40 of the 
- 26 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 final draft of the Third Restatement added new special relationships); see 
generally Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 359 (W. Page Keeton 
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (“Changing social conditions lead constantly to the 
recognition of new duties.”). 
¶ 78 
The Restatement plainly establishes that what the majority terms the special 
relationship doctrine continues to evolve, as courts and commentators across the 
country grapple with its scope and its application in new contexts. The issues 
presented by the doctrine involve arguments over public policy, but the parties in 
this case have been robbed of an opportunity to make those arguments by the 
majority, which has abandoned our typical search for a careful and deliberate 
decision via the adversarial system for a simple, result-oriented answer by fiat. 
Because the majority has chosen that ill-advised route, and offered a truncated 
special-relationship argument on behalf of the national organizations that they 
never imagined, I will offer some more comprehensive points that the plaintiff 
might have raised. I will address in turn both the defendant/tortfeasor and the 
defendant/plaintiff aspects of the special relationship doctrine. 
¶ 79 
1. Special Relationships Between Defendants and Tortfeasors 
¶ 80 
Regarding a special relationship between a defendant and a tortfeasor that may 
give rise to a duty in favor of a plaintiff, the majority concludes that the plaintiff’s 
complaint does not “adequately plead a parent-child relationship or master-servant 
or employer-employee relationship.” Supra ¶ 35. That conclusion seems to be 
based upon Simpkins, where the court offered the aforementioned exceptions to the 
general rule of no affirmative duty. See Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 20 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965)). Of course, there is no way that 
the plaintiff could plead that the national organizations and the NIU Chapter 
members stood in a parent-child or employer-employee relationship, so the 
majority’s reference to those exceptions is specious. Further, as I have noted, the 
plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded a master-servant relationship between the 
national organizations and the local members, though facts establishing such a 
relationship could become known through discovery. 
- 27 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 81 
The primary weakness of the majority’s opinion is its incompleteness. The 
Second Restatement, cited so prominently in Simpkins, also contains section 319, 
which provides: 
“One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to 
be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing 
such harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965). 
Section 41 of the Third Restatement has replaced sections 316, 317, and 319 of the 
Second Restatement and states: 
“(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes a duty of 
reasonable care to third parties with regard to risks posed by the other that arise 
within the scope of the relationship. 
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection (a) 
include: 
(1) a parent with dependent children, 
(2) a custodian with those in its custody, 
(3) an employer with employees when the employment facilitates the 
employee’s causing harm to third parties, and 
(4) a mental-health professional with patients.” Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). 
Notably, comment i to that section instructs, “the list of special relationships *** is 
not exclusive,” so “[c]ourts may decide that additional relationships justify 
exceptions to the no-duty rule.” Id. § 41, cmt. i. 
¶ 82 
Both section 319 of the Second Restatement and section 41 of the Third 
Restatement intimate that when the relationship between the defendant and the 
tortfeasor involves a measure of control, a duty may exist for the benefit of a 
plaintiff. See Marshall, 1986 WL 11566, *4 (“By using the language ‘take charge’, 
the [Second] Restatement finds the duty to control the conduct of another primarily 
in the extent to which one has the power or ability to control another.”); 
- 28 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41, cmt. 
c (“the relationships identified in this Section are ones in which the actor has some 
degree of control over the other person”); Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing 
Risks in College Fraternities: Re-Evaluating Vicarious and Custodial Liability of 
National Fraternities, 7 Rev. Litig. 191, 224 (1988) (counseling national 
organizations to “sever ties to whatever extent is necessary to counterbalance the 
implication of control”). 
¶ 83 
The majority discusses a sole out-of-state case, Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of 
Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840 (Ky. 2005), involving a national fraternal 
organization. In Carneyhan, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a national 
organization owed no duty to a young woman who drank alcohol at a local chapter 
and later died when the automobile that she was driving collided with a traffic pole. 
The court stated that, in evaluating negligence claims involving “less well-settled 
special relationships,” the key has been “an ability to control in a manner that 
would be meaningful in the prevention of the harm that actually occurred.” Id. at 
852. That is, “ ‘in order for a special relation to exist between the defendant and the 
third person, the defendant must have the ability to control the third person’s 
conduct.’ ” Id. at 853 (quoting Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling 
Center, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1322 (Ohio 1997)). The court clarified that “the ability of 
control is not the fictitious control which provides the basis for vicarious liability” 
but, rather, control “in a very real sense” that “includes some sort of leverage” that 
could prevent “the harm caused by the person under control.” (Internal quotation 
marks omitted.) Id. The court determined that the national organization’s sole 
means of control over the local chapter was the ability to revoke its charter and 
concluded that that ex post facto sanction was not actual control that would support 
imposition of a duty on the national organization. Id. at 853-54. 
¶ 84 
The result in Carneyhan is fact specific, but its holding that “less-settled” 
special relationships—i.e., special relationships beyond those mentioned in the 
Restatements—may be established by showing that the defendant somehow 
exercised control over the tortfeasor is important. That point is echoed in the other 
cases cited by the majority. See Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 
N.W.2d 647, 654 (Iowa 2000); Walker v. Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity, 96-2345, pp. 
8-9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97); 706 So. 2d 525, 529; Shaheen v. Yonts, 394 Fed. 
App’x 224 (6th Cir. 2010); Millard v. Osborne, 611 A.2d 715, 719 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
- 29 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1992). It is further echoed in cases that the majority fails to cite. See Smith v. Delta 
Tau Delta, Inc., 9 N.E.3d 154, 163 (Ind. 2014); Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d 
509, 521 (Ind. 2014); Foster v. Purdue University Chapter, The Beta Mu of Beta 
Theta Pi, 567 N.E.2d 865, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Colangelo v. Tau Kappa 
Epsilon Fraternity, 517 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Alumni Ass’n v. 
Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1990). The courts in those cases all agree that 
national organizations lack control over local chapters and their members, but their 
reasoning is underdeveloped. Essentially, the courts mention distance and the 
logistical impediments that it poses to control. 
¶ 85 
Courts in several additional states have looked more closely at the relationship 
between national organizations and local chapters and found that national 
organizations may exercise some measure of control over local chapters and their 
members. See Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 51 A.3d 367, 389 
(Conn. 2012) (“plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact that [the national organization] was sufficiently involved with the 
activities of [the local chapter] to owe [the plaintiff’s decedent] a duty of care”); 
Marshall, 1986 WL 11566, *8 (holding that the national organization “has a duty to 
take reasonable steps to control the conduct” of the local chapter and its members); 
Brown, 2015 ME 75, ¶ 23 (“In short, the national fraternity does more than simply 
suggest that its members conform to certain norms; it enforces its rules, regulations, 
and codes of conduct through constant monitoring, oversight, and intervention.”); 
Kenner, 2002 PA Super 269, ¶ 15 (“The consequences of imposing this duty on 
[the fraternity] is minimal as it has taken steps to protect initiates by banning hazing 
and instituting new intake procedures.”); Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 
Inc., No. W2012-00972-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1188954, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 22, 2013) (“that [the national organization] undisputedly does not supervise 
the day-to-day operations of its local chapters does not equate to a finding that it 
could not exercise such supervision if it desired to do so or that it should not 
exercise such supervision based upon public policy considerations” (emphases in 
original)); Alexander v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 751, 756 
(M.D. Tenn. 2006) (denying the national organization’s motion for summary 
judgment, stating “a reasonable jury could conclude that [the organization] was on 
notice that hazing may have been occurring at [the local chapter],” so the 
organization “had a duty to prevent hazing-related injuries from taking place 
there”). 
- 30 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 86 
The reasoning in those cases is significantly more robust than the cases cited by 
the majority. Together, the latter set of cases stands for the proposition that control 
depends upon more than distance. Control depends upon facts, including the 
national organization’s constitution and bylaws; the national organization’s 
financial ties to local chapters; the national organization’s rules and guidelines 
regarding risk and crisis management; the national organization’s ability to dictate 
to local chapters specific procedures regarding recruitment and initiation; the 
national organization’s ability to censure and punish local chapters and their 
members; the national organization’s oversight via its own personnel to ensure 
compliance with fraternity and university policies, as well as local laws; and the 
national organization’s knowledge that its policies are not being followed or that 
the local chapter is engaging in inappropriate behavior. Those facts have allowed 
those courts to establish that national organizations owe a duty of reasonable care. 
¶ 87 
Here, the national organizations discuss control in the context of the four 
traditional duty factors, but their arguments are relevant to whether there is a 
special relationship between the organizations and the NIU Chapter that could 
support a duty. The national organizations contend that they suffer from a “basic 
inability to reasonably control the day-to-day operations of hundreds of chapters 
across the country” and insist that they are “simply unable to prevent local 
members from hazing activities without the imposition of essentially impossible 
burdens.” The national organizations, however, do not describe or quantify those 
burdens, other than to imagine daily telephone calls from their Memphis, 
Tennessee, headquarters to local chapters across the country for assurances that no 
alcohol consumption or hazing is taking place in each chapter house. The national 
organizations further posit “the need to station a monitor in each chapter house.” 
According to the national organizations, both scenarios would be “astronomically 
expensive—and at a cost that could only be passed on to the members of the 
fraternity.” 
¶ 88 
The plaintiff’s complaint forcefully counters the national organizations’ feeble 
insistence that they lacked control over the NIU Chapter. The plaintiff alleged that 
the pledge event at which David died, a “Mom and Dad’s Night” or “Greek Family 
Night,” is “a common fraternity pledging activity practiced in the same or similar 
forms by chapters of *** Pi Kappa Alpha *** and other fraternities and sororities 
- 31 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
throughout the country.”8 The plaintiff then alleged that representatives of the 
national organizations told local chapter officers and members that such events 
were “good for pledge and member retention” and encouraged the officers and 
members to hold a “Greek Family Night” event as part of the NIU Chapter’s 
pledging process. The officers and members supposedly took that coaxing to heart, 
feeling that a family night “would improve the fraternity’s retention of pledges as 
active members, thereby benefitting the entire Pi Kappa Alpha organization 
through increased income from member dues.” 
¶ 89 
The plaintiff’s description of the national organizations’ advice dovetailed into 
his description of their business. According to the plaintiff, the national 
organizations were “engaged in the business of organizing, promoting, and 
recruiting membership” in local chapters. The plaintiff alleged that the national 
organizations, “as further part of their business, supervised, advised[,] required[,] 
and controlled the activities and conduct” of local chapters and specifically the NIU 
Chapter. That control included “specifically binding, mandatory[,] and required 
adherence to the fraternity Constitution [and] Risk Assessment Manual[,] Chapter 
Codes[,] and its quarterly publication The Shield and Diamond and The Garnet and 
Gold pledge manual.” The plaintiff claimed that collectively those items 
established an antihazing policy and “directed local chapters to employ certain 
recruiting techniques.” 
¶ 90 
The plaintiff continued by alleging that the national organizations’ documents 
and publications gave them powers over the local chapters and their members: 
“Through the fraternity Constitution, Chapter Codes, Risk Assessment 
Manual[,] and publications such The Garnet and Gold and The Shield and 
Diamond[,] [the national organizations] had the right and the power to expel, 
suspend[,] or place restrictive remedial conditions on continued operations of 
local chapters without notice or proof of a violation of any standard, law[,] or 
rule, and particularly reserved the right and power to assist local chapters in the 
conduct of rush or pledging activities or require alcohol or hazing education; 
and further, through the same sources, had the right and power to expel, 
8Indeed, a similar event—“Pledge Dad Night”—led to the plaintiff’s injury in Quinn v. Sigma 
Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 155 Ill. App. 231, 233-34 (1987). 
- 32 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
suspend[,] or place individual members of local chapters on ‘alumni status’ 
without notice of proof of a violation of any standard, law[,] or rule; further [the 
national organizations] had the right[,] power[,] and authority to ban and 
prohibit pledging activities outright at local chapters, including [the NIU 
Chapter].” 
¶ 91 
Those allegations create an inference that some of the national organizations’ 
publications and documents, particularly those related to risk assessment and 
management, provided rules for local chapters and their members to follow, 
violations of which could subject local chapters and their members to removal from 
the fraternity.9 
9That inference is more than borne out by the specifics of the national organizations’ risk 
management manual, to which the plaintiff refers. 
Pi Kappa Alpha is a member of the Fraternity Executives Association (FEA). See Fraternity 
Members, Fraternity Executives Ass’n, http://fea-inc.org/fraternity-members.html (last visited Jan. 
16, 2018). The FEA created the Fraternal Information & Programming Group (FIPG), whose risk 
management manual labels it “[a] risk management association of men’s and women’s national and 
international fraternities and sororities.” FIPG Risk Management Manual, FIPG, Inc. (Jan. 2013), 
http://0104 nccdn.net/1_5/161/330/2d3/FIPG_MANUAL.pdf. At the time of David’s death in 2012, 
the 2007 version of the manual was in effect. That manual, in turn, contained an appendix with a 
crisis management plan. See Caitlyn Flanagan, The Dark Power of Fraternities, The Atlantic (Mar. 
2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/03/the-dark-power-of-fraternities/ 
357580/ (“[T]he Fraternal Information and Programming Group’s chillingly comprehensive 
crisis-management plan was included in its [risk management] manual for many years. But in 2013, 
the plan suddenly disappeared from its pages.”). Both documents are widely available online 
through college and university websites, as well as fraternity and sorority websites. See, e.g., FIPG 
Training 
and 
Resource 
Manual 
(Sara 
Hillis 
ed., 
Spring 
2009), 
https:// 
www.lycoming.edu/StudentPrograms/pdfs/FIPGManual.pdf; see also FIPG Risk Management 
Manual, FIPG, Inc. (Dec. 2003), http://deanofstudents.utexas.edu/sfl/downloads/fipg.pdf (2003 
version of the FIPG Risk Management Manual). 
The 2007 crisis management plan offered step-by-step “procedures to be followed” by chapter 
presidents in the event of “a situation, emergency or tragedy.” Those procedures are very specific. 
Chapter presidents were given a script entitled “Ask these questions” for an “emergency planning 
session” with other officers and at least one alumnus. Those questions involved developing a list of 
seven worst-case scenarios because “[n]o one enjoys discussing a tragic fire or the death of a 
member, but those occur.” Chapter presidents were instructed to inquire of their colleagues how to 
prepare for each listed situation and to make a “Who to call” list of police and fire departments, 
regional and local fraternity volunteers, and even college or university administrators. The plan 
cautioned, however, “Be certain to check with your Headquarters staff as to contacting 
- 33 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 92 
The national organizations allegedly engaged in some level of supervision over 
the local chapters that gave them specific and alarming information about the NIU 
Chapter. The plaintiff asserted: 
“Through annual Chapter Consultant on site week long assessments of each 
local operations sought and obtained detailed, granular knowledge about the 
conduct and operations of local chapters, preparing detailed Chapter Consultant 
Reports analyzing each chapters’ recruitment performance, continuing risk 
awareness education, alumni relations, finances, housing, management, 
athletics, scholarship, campus involvement, community service, [and] public 
relations; in particular, [the national organizations] knew through its Chapter 
Consultant’s reports that [the NIU Chapter] for at least three years before and 
on November 1, 2012[,] that [the NIU Chapter] did not provide continuing risk 
education to members, did not have a risk awareness program, had no written 
crisis management plan and, upon information and belief, had no functioning 
risk management committee; and further [the national organizations] knew, 
administrators—in some cases, someone from the national organization may wish to make that 
call.” In bold letters, the plan reiterated: 
“Regardless of the situation, circumstances or day or time….it is always better to call your 
national headquarters or a volunteer. Let them ‘make the call’ as to whether a situation is an 
emergency or less significant. Someone will be available. They would much rather hear about a 
situation from you at 3:27 a.m. than receive an 8:01 a m. telephone call from a reporter asking 
for a comment about, ‘The situation involving your chapter at ___.” 
The plan then provided more directions for chapter presidents once a situation has occurred. 
Chapter presidents were told to “[o]btain the facts” (emphasis in original) and relay them to persons 
on the call list, then call a meeting of local chapter members and pledges at which the president 
exhibits control over the situation. Chapter presidents should inform the members and pledges about 
what occurred and about the need for confidentiality. Chapter presidents are “the primary or key 
contact person” and will represent the chapter at any meetings or hearings. Chapter presidents, 
however, may defer any spokesperson duties to the national headquarters staff. The plan, again in 
bold letters, emphasizes the role of the national organizations: “Your national organization may 
have a different procedure to follow and that will be your guide.” 
The penultimate item in the plan concerned a special situation: “IF A MEMBER IS INJURED, 
BECOMES SERIOUSLY ILL, OR DIES.” On that topic, the plan directed: 
“Do not notify parents or other family members. Leave notification of the parents to the 
professionals—law enforcement, medical staff, university administrators. 
These situations do require immediate notification of the appropriate national headquarters 
staff member and/or volunteers. They can advise you as to the appropriate response to a 
situation.” 
- 34 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
through their Consultant Reports that [the NIU Chapter] had a reputation, 
stigma[,] and image on the Northern Illinois University campus as a fraternity 
of ‘meatheads’ and recommended diversifying their activities on campus to 
develop a more positive image.” 
¶ 93 
Then the plaintiff continued by addressing why the national organizations were 
“present in and engaged in” recruitment of new members. According to the 
plaintiff, the national organizations are “supported by fees collected by local 
fraternity chapters, including [the NIU Chapter], from fraternity members and 
prospective members or pledges.” The plaintiff further stated that the national 
organizations “derived at least 75% of [their] gross income from undergraduate 
dues and fees and were therefore acutely dependent on continued and increasing 
such dues and fees.” Thus, the officers and members of the NIU Chapter knew that 
staying in the good graces of the national organizations required a steady cash flow 
from such dues and fees. The national organizations “specifically authorized, 
directed, required[,] and empowered [their] local fraternity chapters, including [the 
NIU Chapter,] to collect initiation and other fees from fraternity pledges and to 
initiate pledges” into the fraternity. 
¶ 94 
Reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the national 
organizations exercised “some degree of control” over the NIU Chapter and its 
members. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
§ 41, cmt. c (2012). The national organizations’ documents and publications, 
including their risk assessment manual, established rules to govern the conduct of 
local chapters and their members; violations of those rules, even without notice of 
proof, could subject chapters and members to expulsion or suspension. The 
national organizations were concerned with member recruitment and retention, and 
they maintained the power to assist rush or pledging activities at local chapters or to 
ban such activities altogether. Additionally, there were financial ties between the 
national organizations and local chapters. Not only do the national organizations 
rely heavily upon dues and fees generated and collected by local chapters, they also 
review the finances of local chapters on an annual basis.10 Finally, the national 
10The national organizations concede many of those points in their brief, where they state that 
“a national fraternity has the right to suspend or revoke a chapter’s charter after a violation occurs; 
provide advice; issue rules and standards; and receive dues from the chapter.” 
- 35 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
organizations, through its chapter consultants, exercised oversight of local 
chapters. And the chapter consultant responsible for the NIU Chapter had specific 
knowledge that that chapter had had no risk management program or crisis 
management plan for three years before David died. 
¶ 95 
If the plaintiff had made this argument, I may well have concluded that the 
national organizations exercised sufficient control over the NIU Chapter and its 
members to find a special relationship that justifies imposing a duty on the national 
organizations. That conclusion remains conditional because I do not know how the 
national organizations would have responded. 
¶ 96 
2. Special Relationships Between Defendants and Plaintiffs 
¶ 97 
Regarding a special relationship between a defendant and a plaintiff that may 
give rise to a duty, the majority concludes that the plaintiff’s complaint does not 
“plead specific facts that would come within any of the [four] legally recognized 
special relationships”—common carrier/passenger, innkeeper/guest, possessor of 
land/invitee, and custodian/ward. Supra ¶ 35. That conclusion is correct but 
deficient. 
¶ 98 
Section 314A of the Second Restatement catalogs those four special 
relationships (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965)), and section 40(b) of 
the Third Restatement adds three more—employer/employee, school/student, and 
landlord/tenant (Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm § 40(b) (2012)). Comment o to section 40 of the Third Restatement reiterates 
that that list of relationships is not exclusive (Id. § 40, cmt. o), and comment h 
offers a rationale for this branch of the special relationship doctrine and explains 
when it may be appropriate to expand it: 
“The term ‘special relationship’ has no independent significance. It merely 
signifies that courts recognize an affirmative duty arising out of the relationship 
where no duty would exist pursuant to § 37. Whether a relationship is deemed 
special is a conclusion based on reasons of principle or policy. 
*** No algorithm exists to provide clear guidance about which policies in 
which proportions justify the imposition of an affirmative duty based on a 
- 36 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
relationship. The special relationships established by this Section are justified 
in part because the reasons for the no-duty rule in § 37 are obviated by the 
existence of the relationship. *** In addition, some relationships necessarily 
compromise a person’s ability to self-protect, while leaving the actor in a 
superior position to protect that person. Many of the relationships also benefit 
the actor.” Id. § 40, cmt. h. 
See also id. § 40, Reporter’s Note, cmt. h (“Courts frequently rely on the 
differential capacity for protection resulting from the relationship as a justification 
for finding the relationship to be special. *** That a defendant derives a 
commercial advantage from the relationship has also been influential in the 
identification of special relationships.”). 
¶ 99 
The relationship between the national organizations and pledges like David 
appears to check both boxes. Though the relationship between national 
organizations and their pledges has been termed “fraternal” and “a fellowship of 
equals” (Sullivan, 572 A.2d at 1213), the reality is quite different; it is coercive and 
financial. As the plaintiff has alleged, the national organizations were engaged in 
the business of recruiting new members and derived most of their income from fees 
paid by members and pledges. See Kenner, 2002 PA Super 269, ¶ 15 (stating that 
the relationship between a national fraternity and prospective member “is, at a 
minimum, contractual in nature, requiring performance by both parties”). The 
national organizations also dictated the contents of the pledgeship and initiation 
process, encouraging events such as “Mom & Dad’s Night” because they served 
the dual goals of recruitment and retention. To pledges like David, that event was 
mandatory, a prerequisite for membership. Seeking the prestige of what being a Pi 
Kappa Alpha meant, as well as housing for the following school year, pledges put 
themselves at the mercy of the fraternity. And in doing so, they became unable to 
protect themselves. See Krueger v. Fraternity of Phi Gamma Delta, Inc., No. 
004292G, 2001 WL 1334996, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001) (accepting the 
plaintiff’s argument that the national organization “had a strong interest in 
recruiting new pledges to bolster its ranks and that this, combined with [the 
plaintiff’s decedent’s] need for university housing and desire to become a fraternity 
brother, created a situation where he was pressured or coerced into performing the 
fraternity rituals” that killed him); Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity 
Inc., 667 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (stating that no moral “revulsion seems 
- 37 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
justified” against imposing liability “in relation to the injuries and deaths sustained 
by adolescents who, however unwisely, trade their insecurities and free will for the 
promise of acceptance, and prestige, that fraternity membership appears to 
confer”); Thomas v. Lamar University-Beaumont, 830 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1992) (reversing the trial court’s summary judgment order in favor of the 
national organization, stating that the organization “clothed its members with the 
indicia of a fraternal organization and a mystique powerful enough to entice adult 
university students to run around a building carrying cups or brand Greek letters on 
their bodies”); see also Ballou, 352 S.E.2d at 496 (concluding that the plaintiff 
“placed himself at the local chapter’s disposal on hell night only because he wanted 
to become an active brother” of the national organization). “[T]he more prestigious 
the fraternity, the greater the pressure applied to the pledge seeking admission, and 
the more culpable the national fraternity in donating its good name to be used to 
convince pledges to submit themselves to the very activities that caused them 
injury—implicating the national directly.” Jared S. Sunshine, A Lazarus Taxon in 
South Carolina: A Natural History of National Fraternities’ Respondeat Superior 
Liability for Hazing, 5 Charlotte L. Rev. 79, 127 (2014); cf. Haben v. Anderson, 
232 Ill. App. 3d 260, 266 (1992) (stating that when club membership is a “much 
valued status” and “great pressure” is applied to comply with de facto membership 
qualifications, a college student may be “blinded to the dangers he was facing”); 
Quinn, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 237 (highlighting the “high esteem” in which a fraternal 
organization is held). 
¶ 100 
Thus, if the plaintiff had made that argument, I may well have concluded that 
the relationship between the national organizations and pledges like David was 
akin to other special relationships so as to justify imposing a duty on the national 
organizations. Again, that conclusion remains conditional because I do not know 
how the national organizations would have responded. To reiterate: The parties did 
not brief any issues surrounding the special relationship doctrine. Our analytical 
attention would be better spent elsewhere. 
¶ 101 
Simpkins and the Four Traditional Duty Factors 
¶ 102 
Any speculation as to arguments that the parties may have made under the 
special relationship doctrine is not only unwise (Sunshine, supra, at 130 (“the 
- 38 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘special relationship’ approach *** creates powerfully perverse incentives for the 
national [organization] to be derelict in its duties”)) but also unnecessary. 
¶ 103 
Comment e to section 302B of the Second Restatement teaches: 
“There are *** situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to 
anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of 
others. In general, these situations arise where the actor is under a special 
responsibility toward the one who suffers the harm, which includes the duty to 
protect him against such intentional misconduct; or where the actor’s own 
affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree 
of risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take 
into account.” (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. e 
(1965). 
See id. § 302B, cmt. e, illus. D (“Where the actor has brought into contact or 
association with the other a person whom the actor knows or should know to be 
peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which 
afford a peculiar opportunity or temptation for misconduct.”). 
¶ 104 
A fair reading of counts I and II of the plaintiff’s complaint reveals that he 
alleges the national organizations, through their own affirmative acts or omissions, 
contributed to the risk of harm that ultimately killed David. Specifically, the 
plaintiff alleges that the national organizations “[p]ermitted and allowed dangerous 
pledge events being undertaken by local *** chapters, including [the NIU Chapter], 
which required excessive and dangerous consumption of alcohol to the point of 
insensate intoxication in violation of the [Hazing Act];” “[f]ailed to warn local *** 
chapters, including [the NIU Chapter,] about the dangers and risks of required 
alcohol related pledge events, although it knew, or should have known such rituals 
are often fatal;” “[f]ailed to adopt reasonable and effective policies to be followed 
by its local fraternity chapters, including [the NIU Chapter], to prevent dangerous 
pledge events and activities involving excessive required and dangerous 
consumption of alcohol to the point of insensate intoxication;” “[f]ailed to take 
reasonable steps to [ensure] its local chapters, including [the NIU Chapter], 
followed policies and procedures it claimed to have adopted regarding required 
pledge events and activities;” “[f]ailed to take reasonable steps to learn whether its 
local chapters, including [the NIU Chapter] were following policies and procedures 
- 39 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
limiting required initiations it claimed to have adopted;” “encouraged local 
chapters, including [the NIU Chapter,] to hold events similar to ‘Mom and Dad’s 
Night’ because they were good for member and pledge retention, therefore 
increasing revenue and income to the defendants through due and fees;” “[f]ailed to 
ban pledging events and activities outright at all of its local chapters[,] although 
they knew pledge events and activities were likely to result in bodily harm and 
death to fraternity pledges;” and “[f]ailed to take necessary and appropriate steps 
within [their] rights and powers to [ensure] [the NIU Chapter] implemented a 
continuing risk education policy and functioning risk awareness committee,” 
despite their knowledge through annual inspections and audits by their chapter 
consultants that the NIU Chapter had not had such a committee or a risk awareness 
program for at least three years before David’s death. 
¶ 105 
In short, the plaintiff’s allegations against the national organizations are all 
aimed at risk, and the risk to which they purportedly contributed—bodily injury or 
death following the forced consumption of alcohol at membership activities 
encouraged and perhaps required by the organizations—was one that ultimately 
took a college freshman’s life. In sum, the plaintiff asserted that the national 
organizations, by their own acts or omissions, contributed to a risk of harm to 
David. The answer to Simpkins’s threshold question is yes, and the proper analysis 
vis-à-vis the national organizations involves not special relationships but the four 
traditional duty factors. That is how the parties presented this case to us, and it is 
how the majority should have analyzed it. I suspect the majority’s inexplicable 
refusal to engage the parties’ arguments in this regard stems from a recognition that 
they lead unavoidably to one result: The plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that the 
national organizations owed a duty to David. 
¶ 106 
The majority concedes that the first two factors—the foreseeability and the 
likelihood of the plaintiff’s injury—are present in this case. According to the 
majority, the existence of hazing statutes across the country, including our own, as 
well as the national organizations’ written policy against hazing, “indicates that 
injury due to hazing is reasonably foreseeable.” Supra ¶ 46. And such injuries, 
particularly when the hazing involves forced consumption of alcohol, “are likely to 
occur.” Supra ¶ 46. The majority continues, “When pledges are required to 
consume large quantities of alcohol in short periods of time, their risk of injury is 
- 40 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
great—not only physical injury due to their inebriated condition but injury or death 
resulting from alcohol poisoning.” Supra ¶ 46. 
¶ 107 
The second two factors—the magnitude of the burden to guard against the 
plaintiff’s injury and the consequences of placing that burden on the 
defendant—also weigh in favor of finding that the national organizations owed a 
duty of care. To some extent, the national organizations have already shouldered a 
large part of the burden to protect pledges like David via their antihazing policies, 
risk management education initiatives, and chapter monitoring programs that the 
plaintiff outlined in the complaint. Thus, the burden of shouldering a duty of 
reasonable care for the benefit of pledges like David is not unreasonable. See 
Edwards, 1999 WL 1069100, *7 (“It does not seem unduly burdensome to impose 
some duty on the national organization of a fraternity to guard, to some extent, 
against hazing based violence.”). 
¶ 108 
The consequence of placing the burden of a duty on the national organizations 
cuts both ways. Of course, one consequence would be the expense incurred by the 
national organizations. Another consequence would be a decrease in hazing and 
accompanying injuries and deaths. The prevalence of Greek-letter organizations on 
college campuses actually makes the latter consequence more important. 
¶ 109 
“There is a Grand Canyon-size chasm between the official risk-management 
policies of the fraternities and the way life is actually lived in countless dangerous 
chapters.” Flanagan, supra. National organizations across the country portray 
themselves as mildly interested onlookers, extolling certain virtues and establishing 
certain standards to guide their members. Pi Kappa Alpha, like many national 
organizations, has adopted a strongly worded antihazing policy. See Position on the 
Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity Standards, The Pi Kappa Alpha International 
Fraternity, Inc. (2010), https://www.pikes.org/~/media/pikes_org/images%20 
and%20documents/about%20pike/6-1%20values%20position%20and%20relation 
ship%20statements/resolution%20on%20hazing.ashx; The Pi Kappa Alpha 
International Fraternity Standards, https://www.pikes.org/~/media/pikes_org/ 
images%20and%20documents/about%20pike/6-1%20values%20position%20and 
%20relationship%20statements/standards%202016.ashx?la=en (last visited Jan. 
16, 2018). That policy indicates that the national organizations have recognized the 
- 41 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
problem of hazing and have taken concrete steps to address it.11 Through their 
chapter consultants, the organizations can even gauge whether local chapters and 
their members are observing the antihazing policy and following the risk 
management manual. Yet, as shown by the tragedy in this case, the national 
organizations’ enforcement of their own rules has been lax. Perhaps that is by 
design. See Coolidge, supra n.6, at 921 (“[T]he public generally does not realize 
the extent to which national organizations go to prevent liability. National 
organizations have learned what subjects them to liability and have evolved in 
response.”). 
¶ 110 
Universities in the Midwest—Indiana University, the University of Iowa, the 
University of Michigan, the Ohio State University, and the University of 
Iowa—and beyond—Florida State University, Louisiana State University, Penn 
State University, and Texas State University—recently have taken matters into 
their own hands, suspending or highly regulating Greek activities on campuses 
across the country. Anemona Hartocollis, No Wild Parties, No Pledging as 
Universities Crack Down on Fraternity Excesses, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/us/fraternities-deaths-crackdown.html. 
Such initiatives are welcome but misplace responsibility for fixing a Greek system 
spinning wildly out of control due to surging membership and anemic oversight 
from headquarters.12 
11The national organizations, in their “FRATERNITY STANDARDS,” try to have the best of 
both worlds. They state that each chapter shall abide by certain rules “as a condition of its charter as 
a chapter in good standing with the Fraternity” and that each member also shall abide by those rules 
“as a condition to maintain his membership in good standing with the chapter.” The Pi Kappa Alpha 
International Fraternity Standards, https://www.pikes.org/~/media/pikes_org/images%20and%20 
documents/resources/general/ standards%20with%20acknowledgment.ashx?la=en (last visited Jan. 
16, 2018). The standards later provide, “It should be understood that the Fraternity DOES NOT and 
CANNOT oversee, monitor, supervise[,] or direct the daily or any other activity of hundreds of 
chapters and thousands of members located throughout the United States and Canada.” Id.; see also 
The Pi Kappa Alpha International Fraternity Standards, https://www.pikes.org/~/media/pikes_org/ 
images%20and%20documents/resources/general/standards%20with%20acknowledgment.ashx?la 
=en (last visited Jan. 16, 2018) (defining the relationship between the national organizations and 
local chapters). 
12Notably, a criminal court in Pennsylvania earlier this month convicted a national organization 
of eight felonies in connection with a hazing death in 2014. See Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, No. 
CP-45-CR-2578-2015 (Ct. Com. Pl. Monroe County, Pa.) (docket summary available at 
- 42 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 111 
The national organizations suggest that “[t]here is nothing absurd about 
compelling each of those hundreds of chapters to manage its own affairs, and 
members.” There is also nothing absurd about compelling the national 
organizations, whose very existence flows from the influx of new members, to 
exercise reasonable care on their behalf. The plaintiff’s complaint asserts that the 
national organizations owed David “a duty to prevent the foreseeable consequences 
of required excessive consumption of alcohol during [an] initiation ritual.” 
Imposing such a duty on the national organizations to exercise reasonable care with 
respect to pledge events would “meaningfully reduce the risk” of deaths or injuries 
from hazing by forced consumption of alcohol. Such a duty would not require the 
national organizations to maintain continuous contact with local chapters or to 
become a central planning and policing authority. Such a duty also would not 
require the national organizations to control the day-to-day operations of local 
chapters. That duty would simply require them to enforce their own rules for a few 
membership and initiation activities per school year—activities where hazing (a 
violation of state law) and the consumption of alcohol by minors (also a violation of 
state law) are probable and the dangers that arise when the two mix are well 
known.13 
¶ 112 
Hazing is not going away on its own. The lessons that should have been learned 
from generations of deaths have been largely ignored, except by the families of the 
victims. See Coolidge, supra, at 923 (“National organizations have the resources 
and ability to reform their local chapters, but incidents continue and the 
consequences often fall on their local chapters and individual members.”). In fact, 
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CourtSummaryReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-45-CR­
0002578-2015 (last visited Jan. 16, 2018)). That organization was fined more than $110,000 and 
barred from operating in the state as a condition of its probation. Rick Rojas, Fraternity Is Banned 
From Pennsylvania After Student’s Hazing Death 
, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/nyregion/fraternity-pennsylvania-hazing-death-baruch­
college html. 
13Pi Kappa Alpha’s Wikipedia page contains a list of misconduct allegations, each with a 
citation to a news source, many of which involve hazing, alcohol abuse, or both. See Pi Kappa 
Alpha, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi_Kappa_Alpha#Misconduct_allegations (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2018). David’s death is on the list. Id. (citing Barbara Vitello, Father of NIU Frat 
Hazing Victim Tells 22 Convicted, ‘You Left Him Alone to Die,’ Daily Herald, May 8, 2015, 
http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20150508/news/150508898/). 
- 43 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
one study has documented at least one college hazing death every year since 1961. 
See Hank Nuwer, Hazing Deaths, Hank Nuwer’s Hazing Clearinghouse (last 
updated Jan. 14, 2018), http://www.hanknuwer.com/hazing-deaths/. 
Unfortunately, David was one of three fraternity hazing deaths in 2012. See List of 
Hazing Deaths in the United States, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
List_of_hazing_deaths_in_the_United_States#2010s (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
There have been more, including four in 2017. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 18 Penn 
State Students Charged in Fraternity Death, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/us/penn-state-fraternity-death-timothy 
-piazza.html; Travis M. Andrews, LSU Freshman Dies After “Potential Hazing 
Incident” at Fraternity, Police Say, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/15/lsu­
freshman-dies-after-potential-hazing-incident-at-fraternity-police-say/; Sarah 
Larimer, Florida State Suspends Fraternities, Sororities in Wake of Pledge’s 
Death, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/grade-point/wp/2017/11/06/florida-state-suspends-fraternities-sororities-in­
wake-of-pledges-death/; Maggie Astor, Texas State Halts Greek Activities After 
Fraternity Pledge Dies 
, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2017, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/us/texas-state-greek-life.html. And the facts of 
those cases are eerily familiar: death from forced consumption of alcohol at pledge 
events, or what the national organizations in their brief blithely call “physical 
discomfort through the use of alcohol.” 
¶ 113 
The national organizations’ insistence that they garner “no benefit from hazing” 
glosses over the fact that they do benefit from pledging. And if hazing is a 
foreseeable part of the pledging and initiation process, then the national 
organizations should carry some responsibility for protecting against it. Our duty 
analysis involves balancing. I would strike the balance here in favor of young 
people like David. In my view, the foreseeability and likelihood of the injury here 
outweigh the burden and consequence of placing a duty of reasonable care on the 
national organizations for the benefit of pledges. I would reverse the trial court’s 
decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against the national organizations and 
remand for further proceedings. 
¶ 114 
For the reasons that I have stated, I concur in part and respectfully dissent in 
part. 
- 44 ­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 115 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent. 
- 45 ­