Title: Clark v. Zane
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 573, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KAYLA M. CLARK,1 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 573, 2011 
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  C.A. No. CN10-05201 
GARRETT S. ZANE, 
 
 
§  Petition No. 10-42021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  April 18, 2012 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  April 23, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 23rd day of April, 2012, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
The petitioner-appellant, Kayla M. Clark (the “Mother”), 
appeals from a Family Court order granting conditional joint legal custody 
and shared residential placement of the parties’ children to the respondent-
appellee, Garrett S. Zane (the “Father”).  The Mother argues that the Family 
Court incorrectly applied the statutory best-interests-of-the-child factors (the 
“best-interests factors”).  We remanded the case to the Family Court for a 
supplemental opinion explaining its analysis of the best-interests factors.  
                                          
 
1 The Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties by Order dated October 26, 
2011.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
2 
 
The Family Court’s supplemented reasoning is logical, supported by the 
record, and properly applied the law to the facts of this case.  Therefore, the 
judgment of the Family Court is affirmed.  
 
2) 
The Mother and the Father are the parents of two young 
children.  On October 1, 2010, the Mother and the Father separated.  Less 
than a month later, the Mother was awarded sole legal custody and primary 
residential placement of the children, under an Order of Protection from 
Abuse entered against the Father.  The Father retained visitation rights on 
alternate weekends.   
 
The Order of Protection from Abuse against the Father arose from “a 
series of domestic violence charges [against the Father] in October of 2010,” 
including Terroristic Threatening, Assault in the Third Degree, and two 
counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Minor.  In September 2010, a month 
before the separation, the Mother was also criminally charged with five 
counts of Obtaining Controlled Substances by Misrepresentation or Fraud, 
related to an April 2010 incident.  The Mother entered a drug diversion 
program in November 2010, and the charges were later dropped.  As the 
Family Court found, the Mother “acknowledged that she was abusing the 
prescription drug, Percocet, which she became addicted to . . . after taking 
the drug as a pain medication.” 
3 
 
 
3) 
On September 28, 2011, the Family Court held a hearing to 
determine permanent custody.  In an opinion issued October 3, 2011, the 
court made passing reference to the Father’s domestic abuse (“slamming a 
door on [the Mother’s] arm”), and referred to “a great deal of lingering anger 
by father who initially expressed a reluctance to even participate in co-
parenting counseling.”  The Mother (the court stated obliquely) “believes 
father to be very upset by her pregnancy during the time that the parties were 
living together.”  The Family Court further observed that “application of the 
custody statute [best interests of the children] factors do favor continuing 
residential custody with mother,” but ordered joint custody nonetheless.  
Because the Family Court had not elaborated its reasoning by discussing the 
best-interests factors, we remanded this case for that purpose.   
4) 
On remand, the Family Court analyzed each of the best-
interests factors and relevantly found that:  the Mother had the “slight 
advantage” of a closer relationship with the children, as the Father “was not 
in the children’s company as much” because he had previously worked two 
jobs; the Father “currently has [an] excellent support structure available to 
him in the form of his parents, with whom he resides, while the Mother lives 
alone with a newborn demanding her time and attention,” a factor favoring 
the Father; the Mother failed to inform the Father that one of their children 
4 
 
was seriously ill, which also favored the Father; and although there was one 
incident of the Father’s domestic violence on record, favoring the Mother, 
the charges were dropped and “[t]he actual abuse involved shutting a door 
on the Mother’s arm, which was not a premeditated act.”  Moreover, the 
Family Court observed that “[t]here does not appear to be a history of 
domestic violence on the part of either party.”   
5) 
Summarizing its findings, the Family Court found that the best-
interests factors supported joint custody, and that “[i]t is in the current and 
long term best interests of these children to receive the benefits [of custody] 
from both of their parents and spend as much quality time as possible with 
each parent.”  On that basis, the Family Court reaffirmed its order requiring 
that the parties engage in counseling before April 1, 2012, at which point the 
parents would share custody and residency of the children.  This appeal 
followed. 
6) 
On appeal, the Mother claims that the Family Court erred 
because the court incorrectly analyzed the best-interests factors in its opinion 
on remand, and deviated from its findings in its earlier opinion.  We review 
a Family Court custody and visitation order for abuse of discretion.2  To the 
extent an appeal implicates findings of facts, the scope of our review is 
                                          
 
2 Potter v. Branson, 2005 WL 1403823, at *2 (Del. June 13, 2005) (citing Jones v. Lang, 
591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991)). 
5 
 
limited to whether the findings are sufficiently supported by the record and 
are not clearly wrong.3  Questions of law are reviewed de novo.4 
7) 
The Family Court “shall determine the legal custody and 
residential arrangements for a child in accordance with the best interests of 
the child,”5 based upon the statutory factors set forth in title 13, section 
722(a) of the Delaware Code.  Those factors are: (1) the wishes of the 
parents; (2) the wishes of the children; (3) the children’s relationships with 
the parents and other householder members; (4) the children’s adjustment to 
“home, school and community;” (5) the mental and physical health “of all 
individuals involved;” (6) past and present compliance by both parents with 
their parental rights and responsibilities; (7) evidence of domestic violence; 
and (8) the criminal histories of the parents and household members. 
8) 
The Mother takes issue with the Family Court’s analysis of 
factors three, four, six, and seven.  As to the third factor, the Family Court 
found that the Mother’s closer relationship with the children only “slightly” 
favored her, and thus concluded that the Father “cannot be penalized for 
working a second job to better support his children.”  The Mother claims 
                                          
 
3 Id. ("We will also not substitute our own opinion for the inferences and deductions 
made by the Family Court where those inferences and deductions are supported by the 
record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process."). 
4 Warner v. Dep’t of Serv. for Children, Youth & Their Families, Div. of Family Servs., 
2008 WL 5008828, at *2 (Del. Nov. 26, 2008). 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722(a). 
6 
 
that was error, because the third best-interests factor is concerned only with 
the quality of the children’s relationships with their parents, not the reasons 
therefor.  The Mother’s claim disregards the Family Court’s duty, which is 
to balance the statutory factors.  Nothing in section 722 prevents the Family 
Court from inquiring into the reasons one factor favors (or disfavors) a 
particular parent in order to determine how much weight to afford that 
factor.  Therefore, this claim fails. 
9) 
As to factor four, the Mother claims the Family Court erred by 
finding that the Father’s “support structure” of his parents at home favored 
Father over Mother (who lives alone), because the Mother works only part-
time whereas the Father works full-time.  That point alone does not 
demonstrate that the Family Court abused its discretion.  For that reason, this 
claim also lacks merit. 
10) 
The Mother next challenges the Family Court’s analysis of the 
sixth best-interests factor: the extent to which the parents have fulfilled their 
parental responsibilities.  The Father alleged that the Mother had failed to 
inform him that their son had pneumonia, during a period of time when the 
protective order against the Father remained in place.  Although the Family 
Court faulted the Mother for not having tried to inform the Father of their 
son’s illness through a third party, it found that fact only “slightly favors 
7 
 
[the] Father’s position.”  Because that factor was insignificant in the best-
interests analysis and the court’s reasoning is supported by the record, the 
Family Court did not abuse its discretion as to this factor.  
11) 
The last factor the Mother claims that the Family Court 
incorrectly analyzed is the evidence of domestic violence, which she agrees 
involved “Father . . . intentionally shutting a door on Mother’s arm.”  The 
Mother does not dispute the Family Court’s finding that that act was not 
premeditated.  Nor does the Mother dispute the Family Court’s statement 
that no other evidence of domestic violence existed.  She claims, however, 
that “a brutal physical attack of this magnitude should carry significant 
weight against Father.”  The Mother is no doubt correct that evidence of 
domestic violence such as this incident should be afforded considerable 
weight in a best-interests analysis.  Nevertheless, section 722 does not 
impose a per se bar against joint custody for a parent against whom evidence 
of domestic violence is introduced.  The Family Court evaluated all the 
evidence presented.  The Mother has not shown that the weight (or lack 
thereof) that the Family Court afforded the domestic violence factor in its 
best-interests determination amounted to an abuse of discretion.   
12) 
Finally, the Mother claims the Family Court disregarded its 
earlier finding that the parties are unable to communicate.  That finding, the 
8 
 
Mother claims, requires that she be granted sole custody.  The problem with 
this claim is that the Family Court did not fail to consider the issue.  To the 
contrary, the Family Court actually fashioned a custody and residential order 
with that particular issue in mind: the court ordered that the Mother and the 
Father engage in counseling before the shared custody and residential 
arrangement begins.  Therefore, this claim also fails. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Family Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice