Title: People v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93163
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2003

Docket No. 93163-Agenda 3-November 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
	 							LATOYA JOHNSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 18, 2003.
	
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	In an appeal brought by the State from an order of the circuit court
suppressing evidence, the defendant raised, in support of the judgment, an
alternative argument which had been rejected by the circuit court. Based
on this argument, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court and then modified it to include the suppression of additional
evidence. No. 1-00-1988 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). The State filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315), arguing that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction both
when it affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on a ground other than
the one relied upon by the circuit court and also when it ordered the
suppression of additional evidence. We granted the State's petition. For
the reasons that follow, we hold that the appellate court did not exceed its
jurisdiction when it affirmed the circuit court judgment on an alternative
ground but that it did exceed its jurisdiction when it modified the circuit
court's judgment to include the suppression of additional evidence.

BACKGROUND
	The defendant, 17-year-old LaToya Johnson, was charged in the
circuit court of Cook County with the first degree murder and robbery of
her great aunt, Annie Jones. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress
certain statements which she had given to the police. At a hearing held on
defendant's motion, the following evidence was introduced.
	Sometime after 11 p.m., on March 18, 1998, Chicago police officers
received a report from defendant that Jones, with whom defendant
resided, was dead. Police officers went to Jones' home and, after
speaking with defendant and examining Jones' body, brought defendant
to Area Two Violent Crimes headquarters. Defendant arrived at the police
station at approximately 3:15 a.m. on March 19.
	At the station, defendant was placed in a locked, windowless
interview room by Detective Raymond Krakausky. Some 10 hours later,
at 1 p.m. on March 19, Krakuasky learned from the medical examiner
that Jones had died of strangulation and multiple blunt trauma. At
approximately 1:30 p.m., defendant was told of the medical examiner's
findings. She then gave an inculpatory statement to Krakausky and was
placed under arrest.
	Sometime between 2:30 p.m. and 3 p.m., attorney R. Eugene
Pincham, who had been retained by defendant's family without her
knowledge, phoned Area Two. Pincham informed a police sergeant that
he was defendant's attorney and that he wished to speak with her. This
request was denied. Pincham then told the sergeant that defendant was not
to be questioned and that she was not to make any statements.
	At approximately 5 p.m., Krakausky had a short conversation with
defendant. During this conversation, defendant added to the inculpatory
statement which she had made at 1:30 p.m. Soon thereafter, at
approximately 5:15 p.m., Krakausky learned from his supervisor that
Pincham had phoned the police station and asked that defendant not
speak to the police.
	Shortly before 6 p.m., Assistant State's Attorney Kenneth Rickert
arrived at Area Two to speak with defendant. Krakausky told Rickert that
defendant's attorney had phoned the police station earlier in the day. At
approximately 6 p.m., defendant gave an oral statement to Rickert. At
9:30 p.m., defendant signed a handwritten statement which had been
prepared by Rickert.
	Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the oral and written
statements which she made while at Area Two on March 19, 1998.(1) A
hearing was held on defendant's motion over a period of four days, from
May 1, 2000, to May 4, 2000. On the third day of the hearing, the circuit
court gave leave to defendant to file a motion to quash arrest. Additional
testimony was taken subsequent to the filing of this motion. In total,
testimony was presented on three of the four days of the hearing.
	During closing arguments at the hearing, on May 4, 2000, defense
counsel clarified that there were four statements made by defendant which
were at issue before the circuit court: the 1:30 p.m. and 5 p.m. statements
which defendant made to Krakausky, and the 6 p.m. and 9:30 p.m.
statements which defendant made to Rickert. With respect to defendant's
motion to suppress, defense counsel argued that all four of the statements
should be suppressed because the police had failed to apprise defendant
of her Miranda rights each time she was questioned. In addition, counsel
maintained that the police officers at Area Two had failed to inform
defendant that her attorney had phoned the station and instructed her not
to speak to the police. From this, defense counsel argued that defendant
could not, and did not, knowingly waive her right to counsel for the
statements she made after her attorney phoned (the 5 p.m., 6 p.m. and
9:30 p.m. statements) because she was unaware that her attorney was
attempting to contact her. Thus, counsel argued, defendant was denied her
right to counsel under article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of
1970 (see People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994)), and these latter
three statements should be suppressed.
	With respect to the motion to quash arrest, defense counsel argued
that defendant had been arrested without probable cause when she was
transported to the police station and locked in the interview room. Thus,
counsel maintained that defendant's arrest violated the fourth amendment
and that all four statements she made while at the police station should be
suppressed as the fruit of the illegal arrest.
	Looking first to defendant's motion to quash arrest, the circuit court
found that defendant had "voluntarily accompanied the police to Area
Two so the officers could conduct and conclude their investigation with
regards to the case." Further, the court determined that defendant was not
arrested until after she gave her first statement to Krakausky at 1:30 p.m.,
at which time there was probable cause for the arrest. Based on these
findings, the court denied defendant's motion, stating that "the Motion to
Quash Arrest for lack of probable cause be and the same is hereby denied
and denied accordingly."
	Addressing defendant's motion to suppress, the circuit court found
that defendant had received and waived her Miranda rights before giving
her first statement to Krakausky at 1:30 p.m. and that this statement was
given "freely, voluntarily, and intelligently." The court also found that
defendant received and waived her Miranda rights before giving her
second statement to Krakausky at 5 p.m. Moreover, the court found that
Krakausky did not know that defendant's attorney had phoned the police
station until after defendant made her second statement. The circuit court
thus concluded that defendant's second statement, like the first, was
"freely and voluntarily made." Accordingly, the court denied defendant's
motion to suppress as it related to the two statements defendant gave to
Krakausky.
	However, with respect to the oral and written statements defendant
made to Rickert, the circuit court reached a different conclusion. The court
found that, before speaking to Rickert, defendant was told that an attorney
had been retained for her and that he had phoned the police station. The
court further found, however, that defendant was unaware that her
attorney had advised her not to speak with the police. Citing to People v.
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994), and People v. Milestone, 283 Ill.
App. 3d 682 (1996), the circuit court held that defendant's waiver of her
right to counsel for the oral and written statements she made to Rickert
was not "an intelligent, knowing waiver" and, thus, that defendant's right
to counsel under article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970,
had been violated.(2) Accordingly, the court suppressed the oral and written
statements defendant gave to Rickert.
	The State appealed the circuit court's suppression of the two
statements defendant made to Rickert pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). Citing to a decision of this court
which had been decided after the circuit court's ruling, People v.
Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 203-14 (2000), the State contended in its
appellate brief that defendant's right to counsel under McCauley had not
been violated and that the circuit court erred in suppressing the two
statements. Defendant, in her appellate brief, distinguished Chapman and
maintained that the circuit court properly suppressed the two statements
pursuant to McCauley. Defendant also argued, however, that "the trial
court's suppression order was warranted" under the fourth amendment
because defendant was arrested without probable cause. Defendant
requested the appellate court to "affirm the trial court's order suppressing
her statement[s]." In its reply brief, the State repeated its argument that,
under Chapman, defendant's right to counsel had not been violated. The
State also maintained that defendant was not arrested until after she gave
her first inculpatory statement to Krakausky, at which time there was
probable cause for the arrest, and, hence, that there was no fourth
amendment violation.
	The appellate court affirmed the order of the circuit court as
modified. No. 1-00-1988 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). In its opinion, the appellate court noted that the State's appeal was
taken from "an order of the circuit court granting defendant's motion to
suppress a written and oral statement she made to Assistant State's
Attorney (ASA) Rickert." The appellate court further observed that the
circuit court had ordered the suppression of the two statements on the
basis that defendant's right to counsel had been violated. However, citing
the rule that a judgment on appeal may be affirmed on any ground of
record, the appellate court chose to put the question of whether
defendant's right to counsel had been violated to one side and, instead,
consider defendant's fourth amendment argument.
	Although the appellate court accepted all the factual findings made by
the circuit court, the appellate court did not mention or review any of the
circuit court's discussion of the legality of defendant's arrest. Addressing
the parties' contentions on the fourth amendment issue, the appellate court
concluded that defendant was arrested without probable cause when she
was placed in the locked interview room. The appellate court stated:
		"Here, the defendant was 17 years old and agreed to
accompany the police to further the investigation of her aunt's
death, but was placed in a locked interview room for 10 hours
before anyone spoke to her about the case. Additionally,
defendant was allowed to use the restroom only when she
knocked on the locked door and was escorted to and from the
facilities by Detective Krakausky. No one ever told defendant
that she was free to leave. As in [People v. Young, 206 Ill. App.
3d 789 (1990), People v. Halmon, 225 Ill. App. 3d 259
(1992), and People v. Wallace, 299 Ill. App. 3d 9 (1998)], a
reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would not have felt
free to leave in these circumstances."
Pointing to "the length of the detention, the lack of intervening
circumstances, and the purpose of the conduct in locking the 17-year-old
defendant inside a windowless interview room for 10 hours until the
medical examiner's report came in," the appellate court also held that
defendant's statements to Rickert were not sufficiently attenuated from the
illegal arrest to purge the taint of the illegality. Accordingly, the appellate
court affirmed the circuit court's order which suppressed the two
statements defendant made to Rickert.
	Importantly, however, the appellate court's opinion did not end with
a simple affirmance of the judgment of the circuit court. Instead, based on
its holding that defendant had been illegally arrested, the appellate court
modified the circuit court's judgment sua sponte and suppressed the 1:30
p.m. and 5 p.m. statements defendant gave to Krakausky.
	The State subsequently filed a petition for rehearing in which it argued
that the appellate court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Supreme Court
Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) by addressing defendant's
fourth amendment argument. More specifically, the State contended that,
by addressing defendant's fourth amendment argument, the appellate court
had "in effect" permitted defendant to cross-appeal from the circuit court's
denial of defendant's motion to quash arrest. The State argued that no rule
permits such an appeal by a defendant and, therefore, that the appellate
court had erred in considering defendant's fourth amendment argument.
	The appellate court rejected the State's contentions. Again citing the
principle that a reviewing court may affirm the circuit court on any basis in
the record, the appellate court stated that "we examined the record and
affirmed the circuit court's suppression order based on defendant's illegal
arrest under the fourth amendment." The court then reiterated that it was
"affirm[ing] the order of the circuit court as modified to include the
suppression of the 1:30 p.m. and 5 p.m. statements made to Detective
Krakausky." The State's appeal to this court followed.

ANALYSIS
	Before this court, the State does not challenge the correctness of the
appellate court's fourth amendment analysis. Instead, the State argues only
that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction. The State maintains that
the appellate court acted without jurisdiction in two respects.
	First, repeating the argument it raised on rehearing before the
appellate court, the State contends that the appellate court exceeded its
jurisdiction under Rule 604(a)(1) when it affirmed, on an alternative
ground, the circuit court's order suppressing the two statements defendant
made to Rickert. According to the State, when the appellate court
addressed defendant's fourth amendment argument, and affirmed the
circuit court's suppression of the two statements defendant made to
Rickert on fourth amendment grounds, "the reality" was that the appellate
court was impermissibly allowing defendant to cross-appeal from the
circuit court's denial of her motion to quash arrest. The State notes that
neither Rule 604(a)(1) nor any other rule permits such an appeal by a
criminal defendant. Thus, the State argues that the appellate court had "no
jurisdiction to consider" defendant's fourth amendment argument and that
the appellate court erred when it affirmed the circuit court's suppression
of the two statements defendant made to Rickert on fourth amendment
grounds.
	Second, the State contends that, even if the appellate court did not
exceed its jurisdiction when it affirmed the circuit court on an alternative
ground, the appellate court did exceed its jurisdiction when it modified the
circuit court's order to suppress the 1:30 p.m. and 5 p.m. statements
defendant made to Krakausky. The State maintains that "the appellate
court acted without jurisdiction" when it suppressed "further evidence
which the trial court had not suppressed." According to the State, under
Rule 604(a)(1), the appellate court had "no jurisdiction to modify the
lower court's order as it did."
	We address each of the State's contentions in turn.

	Did the Appellate Court Exceed Its Jurisdiction When It Affirmed the
Circuit Court's Order on an Alternative Ground?


	It is a fundamental principle of appellate law that when an appeal is
taken from a judgment of a lower court, "[t]he question before [the]
reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the lower court
and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was
reached." People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994); accord People
v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 428 (1988); People v. Tobe, 49 Ill. 2d 538, 547 (1971); People v. York, 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 (1963); see also 2A
Ill. L. &amp; Prac. Appeal &amp; Error §402, at 93 (2002). As one court has
stated:
		"[A]ppeals have to be taken from final judgments, not from
judicial rationales. And court judgments may of course be
supported by any sound judicial argumentation-or by none at all
if they are correct legally. Judges have at least the solace of
knowing that only judicial deeds-not judicial words-may
constitute legal error." Cook v. Hirschberg, 258 F.2d 56, 57
(2d Cir. 1958).
See also United States v. Shirley, 359 U.S. 255, 261 n.5, 3 L. Ed. 2d 789, 794 n.5, 79 S. Ct. 746, 749 n.5 (1959) ("This Court reviews
judgments, not arguments assailing them or seeking to sustain them").
	A logical corollary to the foregoing principle is the rule that a
reviewing court "can sustain the decision of a lower court for any
appropriate reason, regardless of whether the lower court relied on those
grounds and regardless of whether the lower court's reasoning was
correct." Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 101. The rule that a lower court decision
may be sustained on any ground of record is both universally recognized
and long established. Almost 80 years ago, the United States Supreme
Court provided what has become the leading expression of the rule,
stating that an
		"appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of
a decree any matter appearing in the record, although his
argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower
court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it."
United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425,
435, 68 L. Ed. 1087, 1093, 44 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1924).
In a later opinion, Justice Cardozo declared it "inveterate and certain" that
an appellee may " 'urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the
record.' " Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191, 81 L. Ed. 593, 597, 57 S. Ct. 325, 327-28 (1937),
quoting American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S.  at 435, 68 L. Ed.  at 1093,
44 S. Ct.  at 564; see also 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §828 (1995).
	The rule that an appellate court may affirm a lower court's judgment
on any ground of record has been applied in appeals taken from a wide
variety of judicial orders. See, e.g., 2A Ill. L. &amp; Prac. Appeal &amp; Error
§§403 through 407, at 94-98 (2002) (listing cases). In People v. York,
29 Ill. 2d 68 (1963), this court specifically recognized that the rule is
applicable in an interlocutory appeal brought by the State from an order
suppressing evidence.
	In York, the defendants moved to quash a search warrant and
suppress certain evidence seized under the warrant. The motion to quash
was granted by the trial court on the ground that the complaint failed to
state facts which would establish probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant. The State brought an interlocutory appeal from the ruling. York,
29 Ill. 2d  at 69.
	This court reversed the circuit court's finding that probable cause had
not been established. We then stated the following:
			"Defendants' motion to quash asserted other defects in the
proceedings. The People have urged that since the ground upon
which the trial court quashed the search warrant in question was
the lack of probable cause for its issuance, these other alleged
defects should not be considered. But the question before a
reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by a trial
court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that
result was reached. (People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 231, 238; Troup v. Hunter, 300 Ill. 110, 112; City of
Chicago v. Farwell, 260 Ill. 565, 569.) The other grounds
upon which the defendants seek to support the order are
therefore properly before us." York, 29 Ill. 2d  at 71.
See also People v. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423, 432 (1996).
	Our conclusion in York that a criminal defendant may rely on an
alternative legal argument in support of an order suppressing evidence is
in accord with the weight of authority found elsewhere. The federal courts
of appeals, for example, uniformly hold that when the government appeals
an order suppressing evidence under 18 U.S.C. §3731 (the federal
counterpart to our Rule 604(a)(1)),(3) the defendant may present "any
arguments he may have advanced in the district court which would provide
an alternative basis for affirming the order of suppression." United States
v. Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d 266, 267 (6th Cir. 1994), citing United States
v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 447 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Cunningham, 113 F.3d 289, 296 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Cahalane, 560 F.2d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Moody,
485 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 1974); see also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller &amp; E.
Cooper, Federal Practice &amp; Procedure §3919.3, at 627 (1992) (on
appeal from a pretrial suppression order, a defendant may "defend the
appeal by urging affirmance on grounds not accepted by the trial court");
5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §328 (1995) (same); M. Tigar &amp; J.
Tigar, Federal Appeals Jurisdiction &amp; Practice §2.11, at 128 (3d ed.
1999) (same).
	The foregoing cases and principles are well settled and may be
readily applied to the present case. The issue before the appellate court
in this case, as that court acknowledged at the outset of its opinion, was
the correctness of the circuit court's decision to suppress the two
statements defendant made to Rickert. Defendant offered two arguments
in support of the circuit court's decision, one of which was the argument
that she was arrested without probable cause. The factual basis for this
fourth amendment argument had been fully developed over the course of
three days of testimony presented in the circuit court and was fully briefed
on appeal. After analyzing the fourth amendment issue, the appellate court
"affirmed the circuit court's suppression order based on defendant's illegal
arrest under the fourth amendment." Given that a judgment on appeal may
be affirmed on any ground of record, it appears "inveterate and certain"
(Morley Construction Co., 300 U.S.  at 191, 81 L. Ed.  at 597, 57 S. Ct.
at 328) that the appellate court did not exceed its jurisdiction when it
affirmed, on fourth amendment grounds, the circuit court's decision to
suppress the two statements defendant made to Rickert.
	The State, however, contends that the appellate court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it addressed defendant's fourth amendment argument.
The State cites four opinions from our appellate court in support of its
position: People v. DeSantis, 319 Ill. App. 3d 795 (2000), People v.
Bielawski, 255 Ill. App. 3d 635 (1994), People v. Perez, 72 Ill. App. 3d
790 (1979), and People v. Kepi, 65 Ill. App. 3d 327 (1978). Contrary
to the State's contention, the earliest of these decisions, Kepi, does not
stand for the proposition that an appellate court's jurisdiction on appeal
from an order suppressing evidence is limited to the specific rationale
relied upon by the circuit court. Rather, Kepi stands for the more limited
principle that a defendant may not seek, on appeal, to have evidence
suppressed by the appellate court which was not suppressed by the circuit
court in the first instance. See Kepi, 65 Ill. App. 3d at 331 (dismissing, as
an impermissible cross-appeal, the defendant's argument that a jacket
which was not suppressed by the circuit court should have been).
	Two of the remaining opinions cited by the State, DeSantis and
Bielawski, are somewhat more helpful to its position. In those decisions,
the defendants sought to raise an alternative ground on appeal which had
been rejected by the circuit court both as a means to affirm the circuit
court's order of suppression and to suppress additional evidence which
had not been suppressed by the circuit court. Without distinguishing
between these two concepts, the appellate court in both cases simply
declined to consider the alternative argument on the basis that a defendant
is not permitted to cross-appeal from the denial of motion to suppress.
DeSantis, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 808; Bielawski, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 640.
DeSantis and Bielawski thus implicitly hold, in part, that a defendant may
not raise an alternative legal argument in support of a circuit court's order
of suppression when that argument was rejected by the circuit court.
	The clearest and strongest authority for the State is found in People
v. Perez, 72 Ill. App. 3d 790 (1979). In that case, the circuit court
concluded that the defendant's arrest was valid but suppressed certain
statements which he had made on fifth amendment grounds. On appeal,
the defendant argued that the circuit court was correct to suppress the
statements on fifth amendment grounds. However, the defendant also tried
to argue that the statements were properly suppressed because he was
illegally arrested. The appellate court dismissed this alternative argument,
stating:
			"Defendant has raised various points related to the validity of
his arrest in support of his position that the trial court properly
suppressed his statements. We recognize the effect a claim of
illegal arrest might have upon the accused's subsequent
statements. (Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254.) However, the trial court had previously
found that probable cause existed for defendant's arrest. To
consider defendant's assertion at this juncture would, in effect,
permit a cross-appeal by defendant of a denial of a motion to
suppress evidence. This is impermissible. (People v. Kepi
(1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 327, 331, 382 N.E.2d 642.) Moreover,
should trial occur, there exists the possibility that additional
evidence could be presented which could affect the prior
decision on the issue of probable cause. (People v. Braden
(1966), 34 Ill. 2d 516, 520, 216 N.E.2d 808.) Thus, we will not
consider defendant's arguments concerning the validity of his
arrest as it might relate to the admissibility of his statements."
Perez, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 797.
	The State contends that the reasoning found in Perez, DeSantis and
Bielawski is compelling and asks us to adopt the principles set forth in
those decisions here. We decline to do so. Perez, DeSantis and
Bielawski improperly define appellate jurisdiction in terms of a legal
rationale without any recognition of the fundamental principle that it is the
correctness of a lower court's result which is at issue on appeal and not
the lower court's reasoning. Moreover, none of the appellate decisions
cited by the State acknowledge this court's decision in York and our
holding that, in an interlocutory appeal taken from an order suppressing
evidence, an appellate court may affirm on any ground of record.
	The holding of Perez is based, in part, on the conclusion that the
defendant's alternative, fourth amendment argument could not be
addressed because of the possibility that evidence presented at trial might
have a bearing on that argument. Perez, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 797. Citing to
this reasoning, the State argues in the present case that the appellate
court's ruling on defendant's fourth amendment argument was premature.
This argument may be summarily rejected. If the position taken by the
State and Perez were correct, then the appellate court could never
review, on a State's appeal, an order of the circuit court granting a motion
to suppress based on a fourth amendment violation. Such a ruling would,
under the logic of Perez, be premature, since evidence introduced at trial
might have an effect upon the issue. This is clearly not the law and never
has been.
	Further, while there may be instances where it is inappropriate to
address an argument advanced in support of a judgment on appeal
because the factual basis for the argument is not sufficiently of record, this
is not such a case. The factual basis for defendant's contention that she
was arrested without probable cause was fully developed over the course
of three days of testimony at the hearing in the circuit court. The issue was
then fully briefed and argued in the appellate court. The State has not
pointed to any additional evidence which would have a bearing on this
issue. Thus, under these circumstances, the appellate court's decision to
address defendant's fourth amendment argument was not premature.
	Perez, DeSantis and Bielawski are not well-reasoned opinions.
Moreover, decisions from other courts have squarely rejected their logic.
For example, in People v. Fenelon, 88 Ill. App. 3d 191 (1980), the
defendants, Fenelon and Greer, filed motions to suppress physical
evidence and quash a search warrant. The circuit court found that
probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant. However, the
court determined that the warrant was overbroad and, accordingly,
suppressed certain evidence. The State appealed. Before the appellate
court, Fenelon argued that the order of suppression could be sustained
both because the warrant was overbroad and because there was no
probable cause for its issuance. The Stated objected to the defendant's
attempt to raise the question of probable cause. Relying on York, the
appellate court rejected the State's position:
		"Preliminarily, the State argues defendant Fenelon is precluded
from seeking review of the probable cause issue because it
would amount to allowing a criminal defendant an impermissible
interlocutory cross-appeal. The State cites People v. Perez
(1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 790, and People v. Kepi (1978), 65 Ill.
App. 3d 327, for this proposition; however, we find these cases
distinguishable in that the defendants in those cases sought to
present either new issues or defenses on appeal, whereas the
issue of probable cause in the instant case was included in the
defendants' motion to suppress and was argued before the trial
court. As such, we consider People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, to be on point for the proposition that the question before a
reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the
trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which
the result was reached. Therefore, in determining whether the
court's ruling was manifestly erroneous (People v. Rogers
(1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 1046), the issues of probable cause and
overbreadth are both properly before this court." Fenelon, 88
Ill. App. 3d at 193.
	Other jurisdictions, relying on basic principles of appellate law, have
also rejected the argument advanced by the State here. In United States
v. Cunningham, 113 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 1997), the defendants sought to
raise an alternative argument on appeal in support of a district court order
which had suppressed certain evidence. The government objected, arguing
that the defendants' alternative ground would not only support the order
suppressing evidence which had been appealed by the government, but
would also undermine a different order entered by the district court in
which it had declined to suppress other evidence. The First Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the government's argument:
		"[The government] argues that the alternative ground is really a
Trojan horse effort to review an unappealable order.
			The argument is clever but unpersuasive. The fact that the
[alternative argument] may have implications for two different
orders does not prevent us from considering that issue so far as
it pertains to a reviewable order. The cases cited by the
government, e.g., United States v. Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d 266,
267 (6th Cir. 1994), are not on point. Indeed, if we thought that
the suppression order were clearly valid, but on a ground
different than that offered by the district court, it would be bizarre
to overturn it." Cunningham, 113 F.3d  at 295-96.
	In United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 1974), the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals provided additional reasons for rejecting
the logic of Perez, DeSantis and Bielawski. In Finn, the federal district
court suppressed certain evidence which had been gathered against
multiple defendants by electronic surveillance. The suppression order was
based on a statutory ground. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed that
ruling. However, some of the defendants argued that the evidence should
be suppressed because there was a lack of probable cause for the
surveillance. The court of appeals stated:
			"Some defendants argue that the showing of probable cause
was insufficient. The Government questions our jurisdiction to
consider this issue, arguing that 18 U.S.C. §§2518(10)(b) and
3731 make no provision for cross-appeals and that the district
judge did not pass on the probable cause issue. We see no
reason not to apply the general rule that an appellee may rely on
any ground in support of the judgment. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-539, 51 S. Ct. 243, 75 L. Ed. 520; Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475-476, n.6, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491. The order appealed from is that certain evidence be
suppressed, and if we should find that the warrant issued without
probable cause, that order must be affirmed. We of course have
discretion to remand this issue to the district court if we wish the
benefit of that court's views or if the record is incomplete.
Dandridge, supra. But we need not do so, and any rule that we
must would be inconsistent with considerations of judicial
economy and judicial restraint. Such a procedure could easily
trigger two pretrial appeals by the Government, a result
inconsistent with the reason behind the statutory direction that
appeals under Sections 2518(10)(b) and 3731 be diligently
prosecuted. It is also easy to imagine a case where the
Government's proposed rule would require us to resolve a
constitutional issue when the case could be disposed of on the
basis of a statutory issue overlooked by the parties below. We
conclude that the Government's appeal conferred jurisdiction to
determine whether there was probable cause for electronic
surveillance." Finn, 502 F.2d  at 940.
See also United States v. Moody, 485 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 1973),
Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 766 N.E.2d 50 (2002);
Commonwealth v. Mottola, 10 Mass. App. 775, 781-82, 412 N.E.2d 1280, 1284-85 (1980), cited with approval in Commonwealth v.
LeBlanc, 407 Mass. 70, 73 n.5, 551 N.E.2d 906, 908 n.5 (1990).
	The decisions in Fenelon, Cunningham, and Finn are persuasive
and are consistent with this court's decision in York. The principles set
forth in these decisions resolve the question presented here. There is no
reason why the appellate court in this case should be precluded from
relying upon the rule that a lower court decision may be affirmed on any
ground of record, nor is there any reason why the appellate court should
be required to address only the legal rationale relied upon by the circuit
court. Accordingly, we hold that the appellate court did not exceed its
jurisdiction when it affirmed, on an alternative ground, the order of the
circuit court which suppressed the two statements defendant made to
Rickert. To the extent that the decisions in Perez, DeSantis and
Bielawski are inconsistent with this holding, those decisions are overruled.

Did the Appellate Court Exceed Its Jurisdiction When It Modified the
Circuit Court's Order?
	Neither Rule 604(a)(1) nor its federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. §3731,
permit a defendant to appeal from an order of a trial court denying a
motion to suppress evidence. See, e.g., People v. Kepi, 65 Ill. App. 3d
327, 331 (1978); United States v. Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d 266, 267 (6th
Cir. 1994). Thus, when the government appeals an order of the trial court
granting a motion to suppress evidence, the appeal brings before the
appellate court only that evidence which was actually suppressed by the
trial court. The reviewing court has no jurisdiction over evidence not
suppressed by the trial court and may not entertain arguments by a
defendant to suppress evidence which was not suppressed by the trial
court in the first instance. See, e.g., Kepi, 65 Ill. App. 3d at 331;
Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d  at 267 (a defendant may not "raise any arguments
as to evidence not ordered suppressed by the district court"); United
States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 447 (9th Cir. 1991) ("What we may not
consider is any defense argument seeking suppression of additional
evidence which the district court did not suppress"); see generally 5 Am.
Jur. 2d Appellate Review §328 (1995).
	Applying the foregoing principles here, it is clear that the appellate
court erred in modifying the circuit court's order so that all of defendant's
statements were suppressed. The State appealed from the order of the
circuit court which suppressed the two statements defendant made to
Rickert. As discussed, under established principles of appellate law, the
appellate court could rely on any argument of record raised by defendant
in support of affirming the circuit court's order suppressing those two
statements. However, the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the 1:30
p.m. and 5 p.m. statements defendant made to Krakausky since those
statements were never suppressed by the circuit court. Thus, the appellate
court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the circuit court's order
to suppress the two statements defendant made to Krakausky.
	Defendant contends, however, that the appellate court did not
exceed its jurisdiction when it modified the circuit court's judgment. In
support, defendant points to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6). That provision states, "The
Appellate Court may exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to the
complete determination of any case on review." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§6. Defendant maintains that, once the State appealed the suppression of
the two statements made to Rickert, the appellate court obtained "original
jurisdiction" of the case and that this original jurisdiction included the
authority to suppress the two statements defendant made to Krakausky.
We disagree.
	For purposes of this appeal, the significant language in article VI,
section 6, is not the phrase "original jurisdiction" but is, instead, the
language which states that the appellate court obtains original jurisdiction
"of any case on review." The constitution authorizes this court to
promulgate rules "for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final
judgments." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. The "case on review" mentioned
in article VI, section 6, is defined by our Rule 604(a)(1). That rule, in turn,
limits the "case on review" to the evidence actually suppressed by the
circuit court. In other words, under article VI, section 6, the appellate
court obtains original jurisdiction over the evidence suppressed by the
circuit court when the State files an appeal. The appellate court does not,
however, obtain jurisdiction over evidence that was not suppressed by the
circuit court. Such evidence is simply not part of the case which may be
reviewed pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1).
	Finally, defendant argues that principles of judicial economy would
permit the appellate court to modify the circuit court's judgment.
Defendant notes that the appellate court's holding that defendant was
arrested without probable cause is the law of the case and is binding on
the circuit court. Thus, based on the appellate court's holding, defendant
could return to the circuit court and obtain a ruling suppressing the 1:30
p.m. and 5 p.m. statements defendant made to Krakausky. See, e.g.,
People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 387 (1994) ("a trial court retains
jurisdiction to reconsider an order it has entered, as long as the cause is
pending before the trial court"). Accordingly, defendant maintains that
judicial economy would be served by permitting the appellate court to
suppress the two statements made to Krakausky, rather than requiring
defendant to go through additional proceedings in the circuit court.
	The difficulty with this argument is that the bar to the appellate court
suppressing the two statements defendant made to Krakausky is
jurisdictional. Under Rule 604(a)(1), the appellate court has no jurisdiction
to suppress evidence that was not suppressed by the circuit court in the
first instance. Allowing the appellate court to modify the judgment in the
case at bar would subvert this principle. Principles of judicial economy
may not trump the jurisdictional barrier erected by Rule 604(a)(1) in this
case.

CONCLUSION
	As earlier noted, the State does not challenge the correctness of the
appellate court's fourth amendment holding on the merits. Accordingly, we
affirm the appellate court judgment in part and reverse in part. We affirm
that portion of the appellate court judgment which affirmed the circuit
court's suppression of the two statements defendant made to Rickert. We
reverse that portion of the appellate court's judgment which modified the
ruling of the circuit court to include the suppression of the two statements
defendant made to Krakausky. The cause is remanded to the circuit court
of Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
	I concur in the portion of the majority opinion holding that it was
error to modify the trial court's order so as to suppress all of defendant's
statements since there was no appellate jurisdiction over the oral and
written statements she made to Krakausky. In arriving at that conclusion,
the majority correctly recognizes that this case does not involve an appeal
of a final judgment; rather, it concerns the State's interlocutory
appeal in a criminal case. Slip op. at 12. By this court's constitutional
authority to issue rules governing interlocutory appeals, we created Rule
604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604), to limit the State's right to appeal in
criminal cases. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6 ("The Supreme Court
may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than
final judgments of Circuit Courts"). In that rule, this court expressly
mandated a limited State right to appeal in criminal cases that excludes the
right to appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress. Slip op. at 18.
	Here, the State filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's
ruling suppressing the oral and written statements defendant gave to
Rickert because she could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived her
right to remain silent when she was unaware that retained counsel had
called the station and advised her not to speak to the police. As the
majority acknowledges, the trial court also denied defendant's motion to
quash arrest based on the absence of probable cause, but the State did
not appeal that ruling, nor could it have appealed pursuant to Rule
604(a)(1). Slip op. at 18. The result reached by the majority, however,
indirectly permits what our rules prohibit, namely, interlocutory appeals
from the denial of a motion to quash arrest.
	The majority's reliance on our decision in People v. York, 29 Ill. 2d 68 (1963), in reaching this conclusion is misplaced. First, York did not
purport to address a jurisdictional question. The only mention of
jurisdiction explained why this court, rather than the appellate court, was
hearing the interlocutory appeal. York, 29 Ill. 2d  at 69. Second, York
involved only a single motion seeking to quash a search warrant and
suppress evidence seized pursuant to that warrant. That one motion
asserted several " 'defects in the proceedings.' " (Emphasis added.)
Slip op. at 9, quoting York, 29 Ill. 2d  at 71. Under those circumstances,
I agree with the majority that the appellate court could affirm the lower
court's ruling on any of the alleged defects supported by the record. See
slip op. at 9.
	This case differs, however, because here appellate jurisdiction in
interlocutory appeals is the primary issue. Moreover, defendant in this
case filed two separate motions, each based on a different legal
theory, covering two sets of statements. The first motion, seeking to
suppress only defendant's statements to Rickert, was based on an alleged
violation of her right to counsel. The second motion sought to quash
defendant's arrest based on a lack of probable cause, a fourth amendment
violation. If granted, that motion would have precluded the admission of
any statements defendant made while at the police station. The critical
distinction between this set of facts and York is that here no single
motion incorporated both grounds.
	Consequently, in this case the trial court made two separate rulings,
one suppressing the statements to Rickert and the other refusing to quash
the arrest. Since this case involves an interlocutory appeal rather than an
appeal from a final judgment, even the majority acknowledges (slip op. at
17-18) that only rulings falling within the restricted scope of appellate
jurisdiction imposed by Rule 604(a)(1) could be subject to review. See
188 Ill. 2d R. 307 (limiting interlocutory appeals as of right); 155 Ill. 2d
R. 308 (listing the requirements for seeking an interlocutory appeal by
permission); 188 Ill. 2d R. 604 (limiting the scope of State appeals in
criminal cases). See also Murges v. Bowman, 254 Ill. App. 3d 1071,
1080 (1993) (" 'An appeal under Rule 307 does not open the door to a
general review of all orders entered by the trial court up to the date of the
order that is appealed.' [Citation.]"). Thus, only the ruling suppressing
the statements to Rickert was, or even could have been, reviewed
prior to issuance of the final judgment in the case. See 188 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1).
	It is indisputable that the denial of defendant's motion to quash arrest
may not be the subject of interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1). The
appellate court's reliance on the fourth amendment rationale in defendant's
motion to quash to suppress the statements to Rickert is tantamount to a
direct review of the denial of that motion. Such review is not permitted
under the limited scope of interlocutory jurisdiction imposed by our
own rules. Yet, here, in direct contradiction to this rule, the majority
upholds the appellate court's review of the order denying defendant's
motion to quash arrest on fourth amendment grounds as an alternative
basis for suppressing her statements to Rickert.
	By ignoring our rule's explicit restrictions, the majority expands
appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory matters to include issues that could
not otherwise be reviewed prior to the issuance of a final judgment. See
188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1) (restricting appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory
appeals brought by the State, in relevant part, to orders "quashing an
arrest ***; or suppressing evidence"). While I agree that after entry of
a final judgment, a reviewing court " 'can sustain the decision of a lower
court for any appropriate reason, regardless of whether the lower court
relied on those grounds and regardless of whether the lower court's
reasoning was correct' " (slip op. at 8, quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994)), courts possess no such luxury in interlocutory
appeals due to the strictures of Rule 604(a)(1).
	Even though early review of other matters may appear to promote
the goal of judicial efficiency, "[p]rinciples of judicial economy may not
trump the jurisdictional barrier erected by Rule 604(a)(1) in this case."
Slip op. at 18. By refusing to enlarge the trial court's suppression order to
include defendant's statements to Krakausky, the majority claims to
uphold this fundamental principle. It fails, however, to apply this same
principle, read in conjunction with the mandatory jurisdictional limitations
of Rule 604(a)(1), to the statements defendant made to Rickert.
	Moreover, case law already provides a possible avenue for obtaining
interlocutory jurisdiction over trial court rulings not expressly under
appeal. In Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433-36 (1979), this court considered the threshold question of whether the
appeal of a judgment entered on a specific date also conferred appellate
jurisdiction over an otherwise nonappealable prior order. We explained
that:
		"When an appeal is taken from a specified judgment only, or
from a part of a specified judgment, the court of review acquires
no jurisdiction to review other judgments or parts thereof not so
specified or not fairly to be inferred from the notice as intended
to be presented for review on the appeal. If from the notice of
appeal itself and the subsequent proceedings it appears that the
appeal was intended, and the appellant and the appellee so
understood, to have been taken from an unspecified judgment or
part thereof, the notice of appeal may be construed as bringing
up for review the unspecified part of the order or judgment. Such
a construction would be appropriate where the specified order
directly relates back to the judgment or order sought to be
reviewed." Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d  at 434.
We then stated that a prior unspecified order is reviewable only "if it is a
'step in the procedural progression leading' to the judgment specified in
the notice of appeal. [Citation.]" Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d  at 435.
	Although Burtell involved the appeal of a final judgment, the same
rationale logically, and even more forcefully, applies to interlocutory
appeals since, by definition, they have a limited scope of review. See 188
Ill. 2d R. 307 (limiting interlocutory appeals as of right), 155 Ill. 2d R. 308
(listing the requirements for seeking an interlocutory appeal by permission)
188 Ill. 2d R. 604 (limiting appeals by the State in criminal cases). See
also Ericksen v. Village of Willow Springs, 279 Ill. App. 3d 210, 214
(1995) ("An interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of all of the
controversy between the parties"); Murges, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 1080
(" 'An appeal under Rule 307 does not open the door to a general review
of all orders entered by the trial court up to the date of the order that is
appealed.' [Citation.]"). Since Burtell limits the appellate court's
jurisdiction in appeals from even final judgments, we may not broaden that
court's jurisdiction in the context of inherently narrower, interlocutory
appeals.
	Under Burtell, the appellate court's judgment in this matter must be
reversed. The State's requisite certificate of substantial impairment
accompanying its notice of appeal specified that "the order suppressing
evidence *** substantially impairs the People's ability to prosecute said
case and *** therefore, the People are taking an appeal from said
suppression order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1)." (Emphasis
added.) That order relied on only defendant's inability to knowingly and
voluntarily waive her right to remain silent since she was unaware that
counsel had been retained and had called to advise her not to talk to the
police. The State's interlocutory appeal was limited, therefore, to the
grounds for suppressing evidence alleged in that particular motion. Here,
the motion to suppress asserted that defendant was not given proper
access to counsel. It did not allege that her statements to Rickert should
be suppressed because she was improperly arrested. That ground
appeared only in defendant's second motion, seeking to quash her arrest,
that was ultimately denied by the trial court. Slip op. at 3. Neither the
State's notice of appeal nor its certificate of substantial impairment raised
the propriety denying defendant's motion to suppress on fourth
amendment grounds, nor could they have done so under Rule 604(a)(1).
	Since the only judgment before the appellate court was the trial
court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress, decided on grounds
based on defendant's restricted access to counsel, under Burtell we must
determine whether the unspecified order denying defendant's claim of
improper arrest is either a " 'step in the procedural progression leading'
to the" specified judgment (Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d  at 435, quoting Elfman
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977))
or whether the proceedings and the parties' conduct demonstrate that the
appeal was intended to include that denial.
	I conclude that the denial of the fourth amendment motion to quash
was unrelated to the suppression of evidence on counsel grounds because
the two issues do not involve similar factual or legal allegations.
Defendant's fourth amendment claim is based on her 10-hour detention
in a locked interview room after voluntarily accompanying officers to the
police station at 3:15 a.m. Her right to counsel claim concerns allegations
that she was not properly informed that her family had retained legal
counsel for her and that retained counsel had called with instructions not
to speak to the police. Furthermore, these two claims are based on
separate constitutional provisions and would, if accepted by the trial court,
suppress different sets of statements. The trial court's denial of
defendant's fourth amendment motion was not a procedural step leading
to the grant of her motion to suppress based on access to counsel.
Accordingly, the trial court's order rejecting defendant's fourth
amendment claim was not reviewable as part of the State's appeal of the
separate ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress.
	In addition, the appellate briefs and arguments of the parties
demonstrate that the State, as appellant, did not intend its interlocutory
appeal to incorporate the propriety of the trial court's denial of
defendant's fourth amendment claim. Indeed, the State did not have the
right to seek review of an order refusing to suppress evidence. See 188
Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).
	Since the denial of defendant's motion to suppress on fourth
amendment grounds does not satisfy the criteria outlined in Burtell and
could not have been reviewed on interlocutory appeal under Rule
604(a)(1), it was outside the appellate court's scope of review. By
prematurely reviewing the case on the fourth amendment grounds alleged
in defendant's motion to quash, that court violated Rule 604(a)(1) and
acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction. Its order should not be
permitted to stand. Thus, I believe the appellate court's judgment should
be vacated and the cause remanded to that court to consider the propriety
of suppressing defendant's statements to Rickert on the grounds stated in
her motion to suppress. Because I believe that the majority opinion in this
case unwisely and unjustifiably expands the scope of appellate jurisdiction
in interlocutory criminal appeals by the State, in direct contravention of the
constraints imposed by our own Rule 604(a)(1), I respectfully dissent
from that portion of the opinion.
	 
	 
1.  1None of defendant's pretrial motions are included in the record before this
	court. However, the transcript of the circuit court proceedings held on the motions is of record and, for purposes of this appeal, the
	contents of the motions can be fairly discerned therefrom.        
           
              
     

2.  2Before this court, the parties describe the circuit court's ruling as resting on
	fifth amendment grounds. This is incorrect. In suppressing the statements defendant made to Rickert, the circuit court relied on McCauley
	and Milestone, decisions which interpreted article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.  
          
          
          
   

3.  3This court has previously referred to federal case law analyzing 18 U.S.C. §3731 when
	interpreting our Rule 604(a)(1). See, e.g., People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234 (1980).