Title: STATE EX REL RUSSELL CENTER v MIS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12769
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 1975

No. 12769 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A STATE O F M O N T A N A , ex r e 1 RUSSELL CENTER, a Limited Partnership Comprised of John W. Martin Construction e t a l . , Relator and Appellant, CITY O F MISSOULA , M O N T A N A , a Municipal Corporation, City Council of t h e City of Missoula e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula , Montana Sam E. Haddon argued and Thomas H. Boone appeared, Missoula, Montana For Respondents : Worden, Thane, Haines & Williams, Missoula, Montana Jeremy G. Thane argued, Missoula, Montana Fred C. Root and Victor F. Valgenti, Missoula, Montana Submitted: November 22, 1974 Filed : Q2.2 3 1 4 9 7 5 Clerk Honorable Gordon Bennett, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, delivered the Opinion of the Court: Relators appeal from the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Missoula County, denying and dismissing t h e i r p e t i t i o n f o r various w r i t s of mandate and prohibition and from t h a t c o u r t ' s orders denying motions t o amend and supplement findings of f a c t and cnnclu- sions of law and f o r a new t r i a l . The cause was t r i e d t o the court without a jury. Relators, appellants here, a r e the owners of a 38.79 acre t r a c t i n Missoula, 32.78 acres of which were zoned "C-1 Commercial", the remaining s i x acres were zoned "planned Unit Development (P. U. D.)-Residential." O n October 15, 1973, the Missoula c i t y council adopted a resolution of intention t o rezone the "C-1 Commercial" area t o "R-2" ( r e s i d e n t i a l ) , and referred the matter t o i t s zoning commission. O n o r about October 24, 1973, appellants applied t o the c i r y f o r a building permit and an o f f - s t r e e t parking permit f o r a shopping center t o be constructed on t h e i r property. The area zoned P.U.D. was t o be used f o r o f f - s t r e e t parking. O n Friday, November 2, 1973, the c i t y building inspector issued a building permit t o appellants, without an o f f - s t r e e t parking permit. The following Monday, November 5, 1973, the c i t y council, meeting i n regular session, revoked by resolution the building permit. By l e t t e r dated November 6, 1973, an a s s i s t a n t building inspector advised appellants t h a t the building permit had been revoked by order of the c i t y council. Appellants f i l e d t h i s action November 9, 1973, seeking, i n t e r a l i a , w r i t s of mandate directing respondent c i t y of Pfissoula t o issue a new permit t o replace the revoked building permit and a parking permit as applied f o r ; as well a s w r i t s of prohibition against interference with the issuance of such permits. N o such r e l i e f could be rendered by the d i s t r i c t court, nor can it be by t h i s Court. A w r i t of mandate i s authorized solely f o r the purpose of requiring public o f f i c i a l s t o perform a c l e a r l e g a l duty. Section 93-9102, R.C.M. 1947. Courts may enjoin by w r i t of prohibition only such a c t s by public o f f i c i a l s a s a r e c l e a r l y unlawful. Section 93-9201, R.C.M. 1947. The d i s t r i c t court concluded the building permit issued by the c i t y building inspector was void f o r three reasons: 1. It was issued without reasonable compliance with Chapter 32 of the Missoula City Code dealing with parking required a s a condition f o r issuance of a building permit under another section of the Code. 2. Use of the area zoned P.U.D.-Residential f o r o f f - s t r e e t parking, a s proposed i n the plan presented i n the application f o r the permit, would v i o l a t e a c i t y zoning ordinance. 3. Authority granted i n the permit t o use the P.U.D. area f o r o f f - s t r e e t parking constituted a rezoning of the area without meeting the requirements f o r rezoning s e t f o r t h i n section 11-2705, R.C.M. 1947. W e agree with the d i s t r i c t court on a l l three reasons. Reason 1: Section 5-1, Chapter 5 , of the Missoula City Code provides i n p a r t : "The c i t y building inspector s h a l l issue the building permit only a f t e r determination t h a t the building, the survey and the application comply with the terms of t h i s chapter and Chapter 32." Chapter 32, Section 32-14.1 of the c i t y code, provides i n part : "SECTION I V : PLAN REQUIREMENTS: Two (2) copies of the plans of the proposed parking area s h a l l be submitted t o the City Building ~ n s p e c t o r ' s o f f i c e a t the time of the application f o r building permit f o r which the parking area i s required. Said plans s h a l l be drawn t 9 a scale of not l e s s than one (1) inch, equal t c ~ f i f t y (50) f e e t , showing locations of a l l pertinent buildings, driveways, s t r e e t s , parking arrangements, c i r c u l a t i o n patterns, t r a f f i c signs and markings, l i g h t i n g , landscaping, pedes- t r i a n walks, curbing, drainage and other pertinent features." On November 1, 1973, one day before the building inspector approved the building permit, the c i t y engineer informed him by written memorandum t h a t the plans f o r the parking area submitted with the building permit application were deficient i n respect t o these features required t o be s e t f o r t h by Section 32-14.1: (1) s c a l e of drawing, (2) drainage, (3) landscaping, (4) l i g h t i n g , and (5) parking arrangements. The existence of these deficiencies i n the application a s submitted and as i t stood on that day i s e s s e n t i a l l y uncontradicted i n the evidence, and there i s no evidence they had been corrected by the next day when the building permit was approved. Reason 2. The building permit authorized an unlawful land use i n violation of a zoning ordinance. The s i x acre P.U.D.- Residential area authorized by the permit t o be used f o r parking had been duly zoned by the cicy council under City Ordinance No. 1512, dated August 14, 1972, pursuant t o City Ordinance No. 1306 which authorized such rezoning. Ordinance No. 1512 was i n f u l l force and e f f e c t on the day the building permit was approved. The 1972 p e t i t i o n f o r rezoning, required by Ordinance No. 1306, included a plan f o r r e s i d e n t i a l development i n the area. Ordinance No. 1306 requires t h a t construction follow the plan a s submitted and approved. Section 5-3 of the Elissoula City Code adopts the "Uniform Building Code1', of which Sec. 302(a) provides: "The application, plans, and specifications f i l e d by an applicant f o r a permit s h a l l be checked by the Building Official. Such plans may be reviewed by other departments of the c i t y t o check compliance with the laws and ordinances under t h e i r jurisdiction. I f the Building O f f i c i a l i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t the work described i n an application f o r permit and the plans f i l e d there- with conform t o the requirements of t h i s Code and other pertinent laws and ordinances, and t h a t the fee specified i n Section 303(A) has been paid, he s h a l l issue a permit therefor t o the applicant. I I Clearly the plan submitted by appellants, providing f o r parking f o r a commercial development i n an area then zoned f o r r e s i d e n t i a l development, did not conform t o the c i t y zoning ordinances. Under the above c i t e d section of the building code, the building inspector was not authorized t o approve the plan. I f the six-acre t r a c t were t o be excluded.from the plan a s providing f o r a use i n violation of the ordinances, then the whole plan would f a i l because, a s the evidence showed, without t h i s area f o r parking the project would not meet the parking space requirements f o r a shopping center a s s e t f o r t h i n the c i t y codes. Section 32-14.1. Reason 3. The permit was void because i t had the e f f e c t of rezoning the s i x acre P.U.D.-Residential t r a c t without complying with section 11-2705, R.C.M. 1947. There can be no question but t h a t the permit authorized a d i s t i n c t change i n use of the t r a c t from r e s i d e n t i a l development, a s authorized by the ordinance noted above, t o commercial parking. To e f f e c t such a change, the provisions of section 11-2705, R.C.M. 1947, together with section 11-2704, should have been implemented. This would have required notice of the proposed change, a hearing, and, i n case of p r o t e s t , a favorable vote of three-fourths of the c i t y council. These requirements were not met i n any way, prior t o the issuance of the permit. A building permit issued i n violation of a municipal ordinance o r other s t a t u t e i s void ab i n i t i o and creates no l e g a l r i g h t s . Weiner v. City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.Rptr. 733, 441 P.2d 293; Ramaker v. C i t i e s Services O i l Co., 27Wisc,2d 143, 133 N.W.2d 789; Simeone Stone Corp. v. Oliva, 350 Mass. 31, 213 N.E.2d 230; Bingham v. City of F l i n t , 14 Mich.App.377, 165 N.W.2d 628; Plum v. City of Healdsburg, 237 C.A.2d 308, 46 Cal.Rptr. 827. Appellants argue t h a t t h e uniform building code having been adopted by t h e c i t y of Missoula, Section 302(e) thereof makes revocation of a building permit the exclusive domain of the building inspector who issued it. That section provides: "(e) Suspension o r Revocation. The Building O f f i c i a l may, i n writing, suspend o r revoke a permit issued under provisions of t h i s Code whenever the permit i s issued i n e r r o r o r on the basis of incorrect information supplied, o r i n violation of any ordinance o r regulation o r any of the provisions of t h i s Code. I I Section 302 i s permissive and sets f o r t h the b a s i s f o r revocation and the means of notice thereof. It does not e x p l i c i t l y , nor impliedly , leave sole discretion with he Building ~ f f i c i a l " a s t o whether the permit w i l l be revoked. I f the Missoula c i t y council ever made a specific o r exclusive delegation of i t s power t o revoke building permits, no evidence t o t h a t e f f e c t was offered the d i s t r i c t court. For lack of any such evidence, we would con- clude t h e c i t y council has reserved t o i t s e l f the power granted i n section 11-904, R.C.M. 1947: "The c i t y or town council has power: To f i x the amount, terms and manner of issuing and revoking licenses; but the council may refuse t o issue licenses when i t may deem i t b e s t f o r the public i n t e r e s t s . I l Here, the a s s i s t a n t building inspector, acting f o r the building inspector, who presumably i s the "Building Official" referred t o i n Section 302(e) of the Uniform Building Code, seems e s s e n t i a l l y t o have f u l f i l l e d h i s r o l e under t h a t section. H e gave notice of the revocation of the building permit. H e c i t e d the c i t y council's resolution a s h i s authority f o r the revocation, but he could j u s t a s well have given a s h i s reason the f a c t t h a t the permit was issued i n violation of the ordinances referred t o above. The permit being void ab i n i t i o , the form of the n o t i f i c a t i o n , the reasons given i n the notice o r even the procedure followed i n revocation a r e not c r i t i c a l . The c r i t i c a l f a c t i s that a v a l i d permit was never issued. The "revocation" by the c i t y council and the notice thereof by the a s s i s t a n t building inspector a r e more matters of form than substance and c o n s t i t u t e mere recognition o r affirmation t h a t the permit was and i s invalid f o r a l l purposes. In substance, the c i t y council refused t o issue the permit and t h i s Court i s asked t o order i t t o do so. But, under the l a s t clause of section 11-904, the City is empowered t o so refuse i n the public i n t e r e s t and, again, there i s no evidence t h a t the Missoula City Council has delegated t h a t power t o any person o r agency. There i s copious evidence i n the t r a n s c r i p t s of the council's meetings t h a t i t deemed the refusal t o be i n the public i n t e r e s t . In addition t o i t s finding on the building permit, the d i s t r i c t court a l s o found the appellants "failed t o provide the necessary information i n i t s application f o r an o f f - s t r e e t parking permit, as required by ordinance, and therefore may not compel the issuance of a permit by t h i s action." On the b a s i s of the s u b s t a n t i a l evidence before t h i s Court we concur. A s noted, Section 32-14.1 of the Missoula City Code s e t s f o r t h the requirements f o r issuance of a parking permit. Under Section V of t h a t section, parking plans must be reviewed by the building inspector and the c i t y engineer t o insure conformity t o the re- quirements f o r o f f - s t r e e t parking s e t f o r t h i n other portions of the section. The c i t y engineer i s charged with reviewing and approving II the proposed t r a f f i c control f o r the o f f - s t r e e t parking areas and i t s impact t o City s t r e e t t r a f f i c prior t o the issuance of the permit." I n Section V I , c e r t a i n minimum standards f o r o f f - s t r e e t parking areas a r e s e t forth. A t t h e time of t r i a l i n the d i s t r i c t court appellants had not supplied the c i t y engineer or the building inspector with data required by Plissoula Ordinance 1543 t o be supplied f o r t h e i r con- sideration of the parking permit. O n November 12, 1973, the c i t y engineer s e t f o r t h the deficiencies i n the application i n a l e t t e r t o appellant John W. Martin Construction Co.. From the data t h a t was supplied, the c i t y engineer concluded the t r a f f i c c i r c u l a t i o n was inadequate because: the kind of surfacing proposed f o r the parking area was not indicated; data on drainage was i n s u f f i c i e n t ; data which was supplied indicated t o the c i t y engineer t h a t the drainage system proposal did not meet ordinance requirements; screening of the parking area, required by the ordinance, was not described; and, no description of l i g h t i n g o r signs was given, a s required by the ordinance. It i s true that a l l negotiations between appellants and the City i n regard t o the parking permit were suspended on and a f t e r November 5 , 1973, because of the c i t y council's action t h a t day revoking the building permit and ordering t h a t no parking permit be issued. But, the d i s t r i c t court could not supply the missing data, much l e s s determine i t s adequacy f q r the c i t y engineer o r the building inspector. It could not therefore d i r e c t the issuance of a parking permit, nor forbid the c i t y council t n deny i t s issuance. The d i s t r i c t court found that Section V of Ordinance Section 32-14.1 of the ~ l i s s o u l a City Code, enacted a s a part of City Ordinance 1543, i s valid. Appellants disagree, maintaining it unconstitutional on i t s face and a s applied i n t h i s case. Section V provides: "PLAN REVIEW: The proposed plans w i l l be reviewed by the Building Inspector and City Engineer t o insure conformity t o requirements contained i n t h i s Section. The City Engineer s h a l l review and approve the proposed t r a f f i c control f o r the o f f - s t r e e t parking areas and i t s impact t o City s t r e e t t r a f f i c p r i o r t o issuance of the permit. 11 Appellants i n s i s t t h i s provision v i o l a t e s the due process pro- visions of the Fourteenth Amendment t o the United States Constitution and Section 1 7 , A r t . I1 of t h e Montana Constitution; Section 29, A r t . I1 of the Montana Constitution, prohibiting the taking of private property f o r public use without j u s t compensation; and Section 31 of A r t . I1 of the Montana Constitution, prohibiting ex post f a c t o laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Appellants argue t h i s i s so because the c i t e d section purports by i t s language t o grant t~ the c i t y engineer authority t o withhold issuance of a parking permit without reference t o any standard s e t f o r t h i n the ordinance. This, they maintain, i s an unconstitutional delegation of ,-- -- a u t h o r i t y @ f j t h e c i t y engineer amounting t o a delegation of l e g i s l a - t i v e power. W e find no such unconstitutional infirmity i n Section V. In i t s f i r s t sentence copious guidelines a r e l a i d down f o r the building inspector and c i t y engineer by reference t o specific requirements s e t f o r t h i n the r e s t of the ordinance. In i t s second sentence it assigns t o the c i t y engineer a f a c t finding function, i . e . he must discover what impact the proposed plan w i l l have on s t r e e t t r a f f i c and on t h a t basis approve o r disapprove of the plan. This c a l l s f o r an exercise of expertise and judgment that would be ex- tremely d i f f i c u l t t o define s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n an ordinance o r s t a t u t e and f o r which the c i t y council must r e l y on the c i t y engineer. I n S t a t e ex r e l . Bennett v. Stow, 144 Pfont. 599,619, 399 P.2d t h i s Court said: I l It would appear t h a t an administrative o f f i c e r , bureau, agent o r employee of the City may be invested with t h e power t o ascertain and determine whether the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , f a c t s , o r conditions comprehended i n and required under the provisions of an ordinance e x i s t , and whether the provisions of the ordinance so fixed and declared have been complied with. I n our view, the f a c t t h a t such an ordinance does impose the duty of ascertaining f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o public health, safety, welfare, and so on, upon an administrative o f f i c e r , bureau, agent o r employee of the City cannot be said t o confer l e g i s l a t i v e power upon such employees. In Montana, where members of c i t y councils a r e not full-time o f f i c i a l s , they must depend upon administrative o f f i c e r s , bureaus, agents and employees t o do the leg-work necessary i n any type of investigation and, f u r t h e r , we would assume t h a t those t o whom i s delegated t h i s labor would be those familiar with the business, the functions of the City with respect thereto, and the provisions of the ordinance which must be complied with." Constitutional provisions should not be so interpreted a s t o impose unreasonable requirements upon municipalities f o r the speci- f i c a t i o n of i t s o f f i c i a l s ' duties with regard functions t h a t a r e necessarily discretionary. A n ordinance t h a t attempted t o define i n d e t a i l what " t r a f f i c impact" i s would e i t h e r be so technical a s t o be unworkable or would f a l l short of being s u f f i c i e n t l y compre- hensive. Nor do we find the application of Section V by the c i t y engineer t o be unconstitutional. In t h i s case the c i t y engineer i n s i s t e d t h a t a t r a f f i c survey be made by appellants t o a s s i s t him i n determining the t r a f f i c impact. The proposed project encompassed 410,000 square f e e o f leaseable area, more area than existed i n a l l of "downtown" Missoula a t t h a t time, with three major tenants and approximately 50 specialty shops and s t o r e s within a c l i - matically controlM and covered mall. Paved and lighted parking f o r i n excess of 2,800 c a r s was planned. The project was i n the v i c i n i t y of a schocl, another major shopping center, and two major thorough- fares. It i s not unreasonable that the c i t y engineer f e l t the necessity f o r some kind of survey t o determine t r a f f i c impact. O n the contrary, it would seem he would be remiss i n not doing so. To forbid the c i t y engineer t o require a t r a f f i c survey under the c i r - cumstances present here would be t o forbid him t o carry out the responsibility given him under the ordinance and t o forbid the City t o carry out the responsibility i t has under Montana law t o protect t h e safety and welfare of i t s c i t i z e n s . Finally, appellants ask t h i s Court t o apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Missoula, and on such basis order the City t o reissue the building permit and issue the parking permit. Several f a c t s a r e pertinent: On August 31, 1973, the c i t y building inspector advised M r . Boone, attorney f o r appellants, by l e t t e r "As t o using the now zoned P U D t o the north of t h i s project, f o r a parking l o t I wquld not be able t o answer. " On September 26, 1973, the building inspector further advised Fir. Boone: 11 A s you know, a portion of the property located t o the North of the project is zoned P U D . While t h i s zoning i s applicable t o the specific project proposed by M r . William Curran of Curran Construction Co., Inc. I have been advised by the City Attorney that t h i s area which i s zoned 'PUD' i s t o be used f o r parking purposes i n connection with the shopping center. A copy of t h e l e t t e r by Fred C. Root, City Attorney f o r the City of Missoula i s attached f o r your information. 11 The c i t y attorney's l e t t e r referred to, dated September 25, 1973, s t a t e s i n part: 11 You have requested m y opinion a s t o whether you may authorize the building o f a structure which q u a l i f i e s under C - I or C - I 1 zoning ordinances and which building would be adjacent t o an area zoned P-U-D and allow the builders t o use a portion of the P-U-D zoned area f o r a parking l o t . I I Your question predisposes t h a t both areas a r e i n a single ownership. Where t h i s s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s , you may authorize such a s t r u c t u r e and permit the builder t o use an area i n the P-U-D zone t o meet t h e parking requirements of the structure. I I On October 15, 1973, M r . Boone appeared and participated on behalf of appellants a t the c i t y council meeting which culminated i n the passage of the resolution of intention t o rezone the area, which carried 9 t o 1, with one member absent and another not voting. It w i l l be recalled the building permit was issued November 2 , 1973, (without the parking permit being approved) and the c i t y council ordered i t revoked on November 5 , 1973. To summarize, M r . Boone, appellants' attorney and presumably t h e i r agent, was advised by the City on August 31 t h a t it was unknown a s t o whether the P.U.D. area could be used f o r parking. H e was advised on September 25 t h a t i n the opinion of the c i t y attorney i f both the commercial area and the P.U.D. area were i n single ownership the building inspector could permit the builder t o use the P.U.D. area t o meet parking requirements, nothing whatever was said about complying with zoning ordinances and building codes. O n October 15 M r . Boone was made personally aware that the c i t y council did not approve of the commercial development and intended t o rezone the area t o r e s i d e n t i a l . A Saturday and a Sunday passed between the time the building permit was issued and the time i t was revoked. There i s no evidence of any change i n appellants' position over t h a t weekend. On the other hand, i t i s c l e a r the proposed project would have an enormous impact on the c i t y of Missoula and a particularly acute impact on the t r a f f i c , safety and commerce of the area i n which i t was t o be located. A reading of the lengthy t r a n s c r i p t s of meetings of the c i t y council makes i t patent t h a t a healthy majority of i t s members were s t o u t l y opposed t o the project before and a f t e r the building inspector issued the building permit, on the ground the surrounding area was incapable of handling the develop- ment. The e n t i r e record makes i t c l e a r t h a t appellants, during September and October 1973, were i n a race t o beat impending rezoning. Under these circumstances should the doctrine of equitable estoppel be applied t o the municipality? W e think not. Prior t o the issuance of the building permit, appellants had nothing t h a t would r i s e t o the dignity of an assurance from the City o r any of i t s agents t h a t a permit would be issued i n any event or t h a t the P.U.D. area could be used f o r parking. U p t o t h i s point expenditures could not be said t o have been made i n reliance on any assurance from the City. It was the ordinary case of a developer spending i t s money i n the hope t h a t approval would f i n a l l y be obtained. To hold i n such a case t h a t negotiations between the developers and the City a u t h o r i t i e s somehow commits the City t o the granting of authority, would have the e f f e c t of discouraging a l l such negotiations i n the future, a highly undesirable r e s u l t . A s there i s no showing of change of position on the part of appellants between the time the permit was issued and the time i t was revoked, estoppel could not be invoked f o r t h i s period. Even i f appellants had i n f a c t r e l i e d upon representations of the City t o i t s detriment, which we hold i s not the case, there would remain the matter of balancing the i n t e r e s t of the munici- p a l i t y against that of appellants. In S t a t e ex r e l . Barker v. Town of Stevensville, M o n t . , 523 P.2d 1388, 1391, 31 St. Rep. 496, 500, it was held: I I In 2 1.llunlcipal Corporation Law, Antieau (1973 Ed.) 516A.06, a t e s t i s suggested f o r circum- stances i n which the doctrine should apply: "'1t i s suggested t h a t there should be no general r u l e that estoppel i s not t o be applied i n police power situations. Rather courts should be encouraged t o weigh i n every case the gravity of the i n j u s t i c e t o the c i t i z e n i f the doctrine i s not applied against the injury t o the common weal i f the doctrine i s applied i n t h a t case. Where anv danger t o the public i s s l i g h t and a c i t i z e n has made a good f a i t h and s u b s t a n t i a l change i n position i n reasonable reliance upon the conduct or representations of municipal o f f i c i a l s and agents, several courts have estop ed t h e local government from exercising t h e i r power" i n a way in- consistent with t h e i r p r i o r representations o r actions. I "We agree with t h i s approach. In cases of t h i s kind, there should be a balancing of the municipal corporation's unwarranted assumption of r i s k of l i a b i l i t y f o r a c t s or statements of i t s agents or employees made i n excess of t h e i r authority against the harm done t o good f a i t h , innocent and unknowledgeable t h i r d p a r t i e s who a c t i n reliance upon those representations. It follows t h a t each case w i l l necessarily have t o be judged upon i t s own unique f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n . I I The factual s i t u a t i o n here leaves no doubt t h a t the equitable balance i s i n favor of the municipality. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. Hon. Gordon Bennett, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. We Concur: