Title: Matter of Nicolini
Citation: 168 Ariz. 448, 814 P.2d 1385
Docket Number: 88-1141, 88-1404, 88-1712, 88-1765, 88-1912, SB-91-0030-D
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: August 6, 1991

168 Ariz. 448 (1991) 814 P.2d 1385 In the Matter of a Member of the State Bar of Arizona, Daniel Armando NICOLINI, Respondent. No. SB-91-0030-D. Disc. Comm. Nos. 88-1141, 88-1404, 88-1712, 88-1765 and 88-1912. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. August 6, 1991. *449 Snell &amp; Wilmer by William T. Tinney, Tucson, for respondent. State Bar of Arizona by Harriet L. Turney, Chief Bar Counsel and Yigael M. Cohen, Staff Bar Counsel, Phoenix, for State Bar. CAMERON, Justice. The State Bar of Arizona (Bar) submitted this matter for review on the record. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 17A A.R.S.Sup.Ct.Rules, rule 53(e). II. QUESTION PRESENTED Daniel Armando Nicolini (respondent) and Bar Counsel accepted the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona (Commission). We consider the following issues: (1) Whether the effective date of respondent's two-year suspension is retroactive to 15 July 1989, the date he voluntarily ceased practicing law, or to 14 May 1990, the date the Hearing Committee (Committee) made its report and (2) Whether respondent's probation period is for one or two years. III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Bar filed a four count complaint against respondent on 23 October 1989, and amended the complaint on 15 March 1990, adding one more count. Respondent was charged with and admitted to violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, Ariz.Sup.Ct. Rules, rule 42. Specifically, he violated ethical rules 1.3 (Diligence) in failing to diligently represent his clients, 1.4 (Communication) in failing to clearly and adequately communicate with and advise his clients, and 8.1 (Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession) in refusing and failing to cooperate with the Bar in this matter. Respondent is also charged with violating rules 51(h) and (i) in failing to timely respond to Bar inquiries, to comply with Bar requests, and in refusing to cooperate with the Bar in this matter. Respondent's violation of the ethical rules is attributed to his growing addiction to cocaine and alcohol. The Committee recommended a two-year suspension from the practice of law effective 14 May 1990, followed by a one-year probation period. The Commission adopted the Committee's recommendation, but set the suspension date for 15 July 1989, the date respondent voluntarily withdrew from the practice of law, and recommended a two-year probation period. Neither respondent nor the Bar objected to this recommendation. The Commission found several mitigating factors, including the following: IV. DISCUSSION 1. Effective date of suspension We have reviewed the record as the ultimate trier of fact, considered the Bar's recommendation, and found that there is clear and convincing evidence, see In re Cardenas, 164 Ariz. 149, 151, 791 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1990), that respondent violated the ethical rules noted above. Because neither the respondent nor the Bar objects to the sanctions imposed, we need only determine the effective date of the suspension. Normally, the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986) (Standards) are a "useful tool in determining the sanction to [apply]." Cardenas, 164 Ariz. at 152, 791 P.2d at 1035. In this case, however, the Standards do not provide an answer. We believe that for policy reasons, the effective *450 date of the suspension should run from the date that respondent voluntarily withdrew from the practice of law. The purpose of bar discipline is not to punish the respondent, but to protect the public. See In re Anderson, 163 Ariz. 362, 365, 788 P.2d 95, 98 (1990); Standard 1.1. When an attorney who has a drug and alcohol problem voluntarily withdraws from the practice of law and seeks to rehabilitate himself, the public is protected. We therefore agree with the Commission's recommendation that the suspension in this case should commence from the day respondent voluntarily withdrew from the practice of law. 2. Probation The Committee recommended a one-year probation period following the suspension, whereas the Commission recommended a two-year probation period. The Commission set the following terms and conditions upon the probation: In setting these terms and conditions, as well as increasing the term of probation period to two years, the Commission stated: We agree with the Commission's terms and conditions of probation, as well as its reasons for increasing the term of probation to two years. V. DISPOSITION Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for two years commencing 15 July 1989.[1] Following the suspension, he shall be on probation for two years commencing *451 as of the date of this opinion, subject to the terms and conditions noted above, and he is ordered to pay costs in the amount of $3,831.96 to the Bar. GORDON, C.J., and MOELLER and CORCORAN, JJ., concur. FELDMAN, V.C.J., did not participate in this matter. [1] As of the date of this opinion, respondent's suspension is no longer in effect.