Title: In re S.B.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S112260
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2004

1 
Filed 5/27/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re S.B. et al., Persons Coming 
)  
Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
____________________________________) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY  
) 
DEPARTMENT OF  
) 
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S112260 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B154825 
S.M., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CK39821 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
At a permanent plan hearing in a juvenile dependency matter (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 366.26),1 the court appointed legal guardians for the minor, S.B. and, 
without objection from the mother, ordered that visitation between the two be 
determined by the legal guardians.  We address two issues:  (1) whether, by not 
objecting to the visitation order, the mother forfeited her right to challenge that 
order on appeal; and (2) whether the court erred in having the legal guardians 
determine the question of visitation. 
                                             
 
1  
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Welfare 
and Institutions Code. 
 
2 
 
We hold that the mother’s failure to challenge the visitation order in 
juvenile court did not preclude the Court of Appeal from considering the issue on 
appeal, and that the juvenile court can under current law delegate to a legal 
guardian the decision whether to allow parental visitation.   
I 
 
In November 1999, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and 
Family Services (Department) took custody of S.B., then 11 years old, and her half 
brother, J.M., then 7 years old.  The Department filed a dependency petition under 
section 300 alleging that the children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court.  The petition alleged, among other things, that the children’s mother failed 
to ensure that the children attended school, that because of her emotional problems 
she did not provide the children with the basic necessities of life, and that she was 
unable to care regularly for the children.  The petition further alleged that the 
identity and whereabouts of the children’s fathers were unknown.  This appeal 
concerns only the minor S.B. 
 
At the initial detention hearing (§ 319), the juvenile court ordered the 
Department to detain the two children and to monitor visits with the mother.  The 
court appointed separate counsel for the children and the mother.  At the 
jurisdictional hearing (§ 345 et seq.), the court sustained the petition; it appointed 
psychologist Steve Ambrose to evaluate the children and their mother.   
 
At the dispositional hearing (§ 358), the court found that removal of the 
children from the mother’s custody was necessary to protect them from substantial 
danger to their physical health, and that they were suffering severe emotional 
damage.  It declared the children dependents of the court, placed them in the care 
of the Department for suitable placement, and ordered the Department to provide 
family reunification services.  The Department placed the two children in separate 
foster homes. 
 
3 
 
Reunification services were not successful.  The mother canceled some of 
the Department-supervised visits with the children, and she was late for many 
others.  When she did visit, she verbally abused S.B.  The court-appointed 
psychologist concluded that the mother suffered from a “debilitating mental illness 
that significantly impaired her ability to cooperate with a reunification case plan 
and to provide a stable home life for her children.” 
 
On July 27, 2001, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and 
scheduled a permanent plan hearing.  (§ 366.26.)  At that hearing, the mother was 
represented by counsel.  Although the mother was in the courthouse, she did not 
appear at the hearing.  The court did not terminate the mother’s parental rights, but 
it did appoint S.B.’s foster parents as her legal guardians.  Without objection from 
the mother’s attorney, the court ordered the legal guardians to make all decisions 
concerning parental visits between S.B. and her mother.  On appeal, the mother 
challenged that order, contending that the issue of visitation could be determined 
only by the juvenile court, not the legal guardians.   
 
A divided Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case to the juvenile 
court, directing it to comply with the statutory language of either ordering 
visitation with guidance as to the time, place, and manner of visits; or denying 
visitation because of the detrimental effect on the child’s physical or emotional 
well-being.  
 
We granted the Department’s petition for review challenging the Court of 
Appeal’s holding that the juvenile court erred in leaving it to the minor’s legal 
guardians to determine visitation, if any, between S.B. and her mother.  Our order 
granting review directed the parties to brief the additional issue whether the 
mother could challenge on appeal the juvenile court’s order notwithstanding her 
failure to object in the juvenile court.  While this case was pending before this 
court, the Legislature amended the controlling statute, section 366.26, subdivision 
 
4 
(c)(4), effective January 1, 2004.  At this court’s request, the parties filed 
supplemental briefs addressing the effect, if any, of the amendment. 
II 
 
The Department contends that the failure of S.B.’s mother to object to the 
juvenile court’s order granting the legal guardians the authority to determine 
visitation precluded the Court of Appeal from considering that issue.  We disagree. 
 
It is true that, as the Department contends, a reviewing court ordinarily will 
not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not 
made in the trial court.  (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590.)2  The 
purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the 
trial court, so that they may be corrected.  (Id. at p. 590.)   
 
Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.  (See, e.g., In re Dakota 
S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to obtain supervising agency’s 
assessment of prospective guardian under § 366.22, subd. (b)]; In re Lorenzo C. 
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339 [failure to request court to order bonding 
study]; In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886 [failure to challenge 
setting of § 366.26 permanency planning hearing when court determined that no 
reasonable reunification efforts were made].) 
 
But application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.  (Hale v. Morgan 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394; see People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 
6 [party’s failure to object in trial court does not deprive appellate court of 
                                             
 
2  
Although the loss of the right to challenge a ruling on appeal because of the 
failure to object in the trial court is often referred to as a “waiver,” the correct 
legal term for the loss of a right based on failure to timely assert it is “forfeiture,” 
because a person who fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim.  In contrast, a 
waiver is the  “ ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ ”  
(People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097, fn. 9; People v. Saunders, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 590, fn. 6.)     
 
5 
authority].)  But the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be 
exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.  (See 
Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 722, fn. 17; Hale v. Morgan, supra, at 
p. 394.)  Although an appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims 
extends to dependency cases (Rosa S. v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 
1181, 1188; Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1459), the 
discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters.  “Dependency 
proceedings in the juvenile court are special proceedings with their own set of 
rules, governed, in general, by the Welfare and Institutions Code.”  (In re Chantal 
S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200.)  Because these proceedings involve the well-being 
of children, considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount 
importance.  (§ 366.26.)  
The Court of Appeal majority here did not abuse its discretion in 
entertaining the mother’s challenge to the visitation order notwithstanding her 
failure to object to it in the juvenile court.  The appeal presented an important 
issue of law:  whether a juvenile court in a dependency case may delegate to the 
child’s legal guardian the authority to decide whether a parent may visit the child, 
a question that has divided the Courts of Appeal.  Moreover, because the juvenile 
court here had neither allowed nor prohibited visitation, but instead had delegated 
to the legal guardians the authority to either allow or prohibit visitation, an 
appellate determination on the validity of that delegation would add certainty and 
stability to the child’s visitation. 
III 
 
At the time of the juvenile court proceedings in this case, former section 
366.26, subdivision (c)(4) (hereafter former section 366.26 (c)(4)) provided in 
relevant part:  “If the court finds that adoption of the child or termination of 
parental rights is not in the best interest of the child . . . the court shall either order 
 
6 
that the present caretakers or other appropriate persons shall become legal 
guardians of the child or order that the child remain in long-term foster care . . . .  
The court shall also make an order for visitation with the parents or guardians 
unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would 
be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”  (Italics 
added.) 
 
The italicized sentence had been construed by the Courts of Appeal in In re 
Jasmine P. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 617 (Jasmine P.) and in In re Randalynne G. 
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1156 (Randalynne G.), with conflicting interpretations.  
Jasmine P. held that the juvenile court could delegate to a legal guardian the issue 
of visitation between parent and child.  In the court’s words:  “[W]here the child is 
left in long-term foster care and not in a legal guardianship, then the juvenile court 
shall order visitation with the parents or guardians unless the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the 
physical or emotional well-being of the child.”  (91 Cal.App.4th at p. 621, original 
italics.)  The section 366.26 hearing in this case occurred on November 27, 2001; 
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jasmine P. was filed on July 12, 2001.  Here, in 
leaving to the minor’s appointed guardians the determination of visitation between 
the minor and her mother, the juvenile court’s ruling was in accord with the 
Jasmine P. decision.   
 
After the permanent plan hearing in this case, the Court of Appeal in 
Randalynne G., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, disagreed with the holding of 
Jasmine P., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 617.  It held that the juvenile court in a 
dependency proceeding may not delegate to a minor’s legal guardian the issue of 
visitation between child and parent.  The Court of Appeal here followed 
Randalynne G.   
 
The statutory language directing the juvenile court to determine visitation 
between parent and child, which was construed by the Courts of Appeal in 
 
7 
Jasmine P., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 617, in Randalynne G., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 
1156, and on appeal in this case, came at the end of a long paragraph concerning 
both legal guardianships and long-term foster care placements.  This created 
uncertainty as to whether the statutory mandate that only the juvenile court, not the 
legal guardian, determine the issue of visitation applied solely to foster care or to 
both foster care and legal guardianships.  Not surprisingly, this ambiguity has led 
to different interpretations of the statutory language in the Courts of Appeal. 
 
The ambiguity has now been eliminated by a statutory amendment that took 
effect on January 1, 2004, while this case was pending before us.  (Stats. 2003, ch. 
813, § 7.)  Whereas former section 366.26 (c)(4) comprised a long paragraph 
lumping together legal guardianships and foster care placements, the amended 
version deals with these two subjects in two separate paragraphs, designated 
section 366.26 (c)(4)(A) and (B). 
 
Section 366.26 (c)(4)(A), which pertains to legal guardianships, provides:  
“If the court finds that adoption of the child or termination of parental rights is not 
in the best interest of the child, because one of the conditions in subparagraph (A), 
(B), (C), (D), or (E) of paragraph (1) or in paragraph (2) applies, the court shall 
either order that the present caretakers or other appropriate persons shall become 
legal guardians of the child or order that the child remain in long-term foster care.  
Legal guardianship shall be considered before long-term foster care, if it is in the 
best interests of the child and if a suitable guardian can be found.  A child who is 
10 years of age or older who is placed in a group home shall be asked to identify 
any individuals who are important to the child to identify potential guardians.  The 
agency may ask any child who is younger than 10 years of age to provide that 
information, as appropriate.” 
 
Section 366.26 (c)(4)(B), which concerns foster care placements, says:  “If 
the child is living with a relative or foster parent who is willing and capable of 
providing a stable and permanent environment, but not willing to become a legal 
guardian, the child shall not be removed from the home if the court finds the 
 
8 
removal would be seriously detrimental to the emotional well-being of the child 
because the child has substantial psychological ties to the relative caretaker or 
foster parents.  The court shall also make an order for visitation with the parents 
or guardians unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the 
child.”  (Italics added.) 
 
The italicized sentence in section 366.26 (c)(4)(B) makes it clear that the 
juvenile court’s obligation to “make an order for visitation” is triggered only when 
the court decides to leave the child with a caretaker who is not willing to become 
the child’s legal guardian, and not when, as here, the court appoints the child’s 
caretaker as the child’s legal guardian.  Thus, under the Legislature’s amendment 
to section 366.26 (c)(4), a juvenile court is not precluded from delegating to the 
appointed guardian the determination whether visitation is to occur between the 
parent and the child.  Here, the mother has not argued that this construction of the 
amendment is in error.3 
                                             
 
3  
After the parties submitted supplemental briefs on the effect of the 
enactment of the January 1, 2004 amendment to section 366.26(c)(4), and after 
oral argument, the mother requested that we judicially notice Assembly Bill No. 
2807 and the analysis of that bill by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary.  That 
legislation, introduced in the Assembly on February 4, 2004, would again amend 
section 366.26(c)(4) by moving the sentence concerning visitation when the child 
is placed with a relative or foster parent, and not a legal guardian, into a separate 
and new subdivision that would then apply to “parents or guardians.”  The 
committee’s analysis contains a brief discussion under the heading “Author’s 
amendment,” stating that this change is “to correct a drafting error” in Assembly 
Bill No. 408, the legislation that amended the statute effective January 1, 2004.   
 
The request for judicial notice of Assembly Bill No. 2807 and the analysis 
of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary is granted.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. 
(c).)  The existence of the legislation and the committee analysis does not, 
however, affect our decision here.  The bill has not been enacted into law, and we 
generally “do not rely on evidence of the individual views of proponents of 
legistlation.”  (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 780, fn. 9; see also Quintano 
v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062 & fn. 5.) 
 
9 
 
Rather, the mother argues that applying the amended provision to this case 
would constitute an improper retrospective application.  She correctly points out 
the general rule that statutes do not operate retrospectively unless the Legislature 
plainly indicates otherwise.  (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 828, 840.)  “A statute has retrospective effect when it substantially 
changes the legal consequences of past events.”  (Western Security Bank v. 
Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243.)  Application of a statute that clarifies 
existing law is not retrospective, because the true meaning of the statute has not 
changed.  (Ibid.)   
 
Here, we need not decide whether the Legislature’s recent amendment to 
section 366.26 (c)(4) changed the statute or merely clarified its meaning.  If the 
amendment simply clarified the meaning of the existing statutory provision, the 
juvenile court acted properly in leaving it to the court-appointed legal guardian to 
determine the issue of visitation.  If, on the other hand, the recent amendment did 
change existing law, then the juvenile court erred in delegating the visitation issue 
to the guardian.  But because on remand the amended statutory provision would 
control, the juvenile court at that time, in compliance with the amended provision, 
could again delegate control of visitation to the legal guardians.  (See Tapia v. 
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 [laws addressing future acts are 
prospective in nature].)  We therefore reject the mother’s contention that we 
should remand the matter to the juvenile court directing that the court itself, rather 
than the court-appointed legal guardians, determine the issue of visitation.4  This 
                                             
 
4  
Contrary to the mother’s assertion, our conclusion will not disrupt existing 
guardianships in cases in which the juvenile court, rather than the legal guardian, 
determined the issue of visitation.  Section 366.26 (c)(4) as amended does not 
prohibit a juvenile court from deciding the issue of visitation when it appoints a 
legal guardian.  Our holding that the juvenile court is not required to issue a 
visitation order when a guardian is appointed does not mean that such orders are 
statutorily prohibited.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1465(d)(2) [court may issue 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
10 
conclusion does not mean, however, that the mother has no legal recourse.  
Section 388 allows any parent to petition the juvenile court and section 385 allows 
the court on its own motion to change, modify, or set aside any order previously 
made by the court. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
visitation orders when appointing legal guardian].)  Thus, our holding has no 
effect on existing visitation orders in other cases where the juvenile court 
appointed legal guardians for the minor.   
 
 
11 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re S.B. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 103 Cal.App.4th 739 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S112260 
Date Filed: May 27, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: S. Patricia Spear, Temporary Judge* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Kathleen Murphy Mallinger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, Sterling Honea, Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Gary P. Gross, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Ann Miller Ravel, County Counsel (Santa Clara) and Charles W. Nickell, Deputy County Counsel, for 
Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
William Wesley Patton for Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
*Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21. 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kathleen Murphy Mallinger 
1762 Columbia Street 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 234-2266 
 
Sterling Honea 
Principal Deputy County Counsel 
648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 
500 West Temple Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90012-2713 
(323) 526-6270