Title: State v. John P. Krueger
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP002663-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2663-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
John P. Krueger,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  217 Wis. 2d 292, 577 N.W.2d 388 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 16, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Kinney 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Gary S. Cirilli and Cirilli Law Offices, S.C., 
Rhinelander and oral argument by Gary S. Cirilli. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Sandra L. Tarver, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2663-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
John P. Krueger, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 16, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State 
v. Krueger, No. 97-2663-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 10, 1998), which reversed an order of the Circuit Court for 
Oneida County, Robert E. Kinney, Judge.  The circuit court 
dismissed with prejudice the criminal complaint brought against 
defendant John P. Krueger.   
¶2 
The issue presented is whether a circuit court has the 
inherent power to dismiss a criminal complaint with prejudice 
prior to the attachment of jeopardy when the defendant's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial is not implicated.   
¶3 
The defendant asks the court to reexamine and expand 
State v. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 297 N.W.2d 808 (1980), in 
which this court held that "trial courts of this state do not 
possess the power to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
2 
prior to the attachment of jeopardy except in the case of a 
violation of a constitutional right to a speedy trial."  Id. at 
586. 
¶4 
We decline the defendant's request.  Adhering to 
Braunsdorf, we conclude that the circuit court erred in this 
case in dismissing the criminal complaint with prejudice.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review. 
 On July 16, 1995, in a previous prosecution, the State charged 
the defendant with publicly and indecently exposing his genitals 
by masturbating in his car in the vicinity of young children, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.20(2) (1993-94).1  The State moved 
to admit evidence that on February 17, 1995, at approximately 
6:30 a.m., a woman and her children observed the defendant 
masturbating in his truck outside their home.  The State sought 
to introduce this evidence as "other acts evidence" under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2) (1995-96).2   
                     
1 No. 95-CM-313, Circuit Court of Oneida County, Judge 
Robert E. Kinney. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) (1995-96) provides:  
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. 
 This subsection does not exclude the evidence when 
offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
3 
¶6 
On January 17, 1996, at a motion hearing on the 
admissibility of this other acts evidence, the circuit court, 
Judge Kinney presiding, ruled the other acts evidence admissible 
over the defendant's objection.  Judge Kinney commented in his 
ruling that if the State introduced the February 17, 1995, other 
acts evidence at trial, the State could not later prosecute the 
defendant for the February 17, 1995, conduct.  The judge's 
comments are as follows: 
 
But I'll tell you this, . . . that if the state 
goes to trial and it is permitted to utilize this 
evidence, they are not going to be able to come back 
if they lose and charge Mr. Krueger with this offense 
in February of 1995.  I won't permit that. 
 
 
They've kind of elected . . . . 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
So I regard this as an election that the state is 
making here to abandon charging him with the earlier 
offense.  They're charging him with one offense.  
They're gonna try to use this evidence of the other 
crime.  If they do not succeed, they're not gonna be 
back here charging him again because they're done as a 
matter, I 
think, 
of 
due 
process, constitutional 
fairness. 
¶7 
At trial on March 21, 1996, the State introduced the 
other acts evidence.  The defendant's testimony in his own 
defense at trial included testimony about the February 17, 1995, 
conduct.  The jury acquitted him on March 22, 1996. 
¶8 
On February 13, 1997, the State filed charges in the 
present case against the defendant based upon the February 17, 
1995, conduct that it had used as the other acts evidence in the 
prior trial. 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
4 
¶9 
On March 12, 1997, the defendant moved the circuit 
court, Judge Kinney again presiding, to dismiss the complaint on 
the basis of the comments the circuit court made in ruling on 
the 
motion 
to 
admit 
other 
acts 
evidence 
in 
the 
prior 
prosecution.  The circuit court dismissed the criminal complaint 
with prejudice on "general due process grounds."  
¶10 The State appealed the dismissal.  Relying upon 
Braunsdorf, the court of appeals reversed the order of the 
circuit court and held that because the defendant had not 
claimed that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was 
violated, the court of appeals had no alternative but to reverse 
the circuit court's dismissal of the criminal case.  The court 
of appeals concluded that a circuit court has no authority to 
admit evidence on a condition that prohibits the State from 
later exercising its discretion to prosecute on the basis of 
that evidence.   
II 
¶11 The defendant asks this court to reexamine Braunsdorf, 
98 Wis. 2d 569, and to hold that a circuit court has the 
inherent power to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice on the 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
5 
grounds of a circuit court's sense of fairness.3  We decline to 
follow the defendant's proposal in this case.   
¶12 In Braunsdorf, this court carefully considered whether 
a circuit court has the inherent power to dismiss a criminal 
case with prejudice.  The Braunsdorf court extensively reviewed 
Wisconsin cases, as well as cases from the federal courts and 
courts of other states, involving the inherent powers of a trial 
court to dismiss a prosecution with prejudice.  After this 
extensive review, the Braunsdorf court concluded that "the trial 
courts of this state do not possess the power to dismiss a 
criminal case with prejudice prior to the attachment of jeopardy 
except in the case of a violation of a constitutional right to a 
speedy trial."  Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 586.   
¶13 The Braunsdorf court recognized that a circuit court's 
power to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice before the 
attachment of jeopardy would be a great intrusion into the realm 
                     
3 The defendant relies on three federal cases to support his 
proposition that the circuit courts should, like the federal 
courts, have a broad inherent power to dismiss a criminal 
prosecution.  See United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098, 1104 
(2d Cir. 1975) (dismissal of a prosecution with prejudice for 
prosecutorial delay not rising to constitutional dimensions); 
Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394, 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 896 (1962) (dismissal for want of prosecution 
but "not compelled by the Speedy Trial Clause"); United States 
v. Mark II Electronics of Louisiana, 283 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D. 
La. 
1968) 
(dismissal 
for 
delay 
in 
prosecution 
on 
non-
constitutional 
grounds). 
 
These 
federal 
cases 
are 
not 
persuasive.  All three were decided prior to the Braunsdorf 
decision, and the Furey case was carefully considered in the 
Braunsdorf opinion.  See Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 580, 584.  
The Furey case, in turn, discusses both Mann and Mark II.  See 
Furey, 514 F.2d at 1103-04. 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
6 
of prosecutorial discretion.  The court concluded that "the 
balance weighs heavily in favor of society's interests, and for 
this reason we do not recognize such a power of dismissal with 
prejudice in criminal cases to be necessary by reason of public 
policy or economy of judicial resources."  Braunsdorf, 98 
Wis. 2d at 586.   
¶14 The defendant argues that the Braunsdorf holding 
should be expanded to recognize that a circuit court has the 
inherent power to dismiss a prosecution if the circuit court's 
sense of fairness has been violated.  The defendant equates a 
violation of the circuit court's sense of fairness with a 
violation of due process.  
¶15 According to the circuit court, the defendant would 
face two types of unfairness were the State allowed to introduce 
the other acts evidence in the first prosecution and then bring 
a second prosecution based on the other acts evidence.  First, 
the circuit court viewed it to be potentially unfair to the 
defendant to allow the State to bring both an earlier and later 
prosecution because the defendant would be unable to move to 
have the prosecutions consolidated to save himself the added 
economic and emotional expense of two consecutive prosecutions. 
 Second, the circuit court viewed it as potentially unfair to 
allow the State to bring two such prosecutions because a due 
process concern might arise if the State introduced the 
defendant's testimony at the first trial against him during a 
second trial.  In its ruling in the present case, the circuit 
court made the following comments about fairness: 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
7 
 
But I felt at the time that fairness dictated that the 
state not be permitted to use in this case this same 
evidence again if they lost the original prosecution 
in a new case against Mr. Krueger.  I believed that 
that was correct at the time as a matter of fairness. 
 You're right, I didn't research it, but I did say it, 
and it was something that I expected that would be 
abided by.  Now Mr. Krueger is in the position of 
facing a new prosecution based on this very thing.  I 
don't know how we can level the playing field once 
again. 
 
 
There are a number of things that have been lost, 
a number of things have gone over the dam that we 
can't get back.  One of them has to do with this 
question of whether he would or would not have 
testified.  Another would have been consolidation.  He 
would have had a right to move to consolidate those 
two cases and have them tried at one time at 
considerable [less] expense to him economically and 
emotionally.  He has been deprived of that by the 
procedure that's been followed by the state in this 
case. 
 
. . . . 
 
Well, I'm granting the motion to dismiss it on 
the basis of general due process. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . . 
I'm 
simply 
saying 
that 
under 
the 
circumstances as they existed in this case, due 
process dictates, requires that we not permit this 
prosecution to go forward.   
 
¶16 The State argues that a circuit court does not have 
the inherent power to dismiss a complaint with prejudice on the 
two grounds set forth by the circuit court in the instant case. 
  
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
8 
¶17 First, the State asserts that the circuit court cannot 
dismiss this prosecution with prejudice on the ground that the 
State's second prosecution for a different offense would impose 
on the defendant additional economic and emotional expense.  The 
State argues that the circuit court's determination in this case 
about which charges the State should bring in one prosecution, 
rather than in successive prosecutions, is the type of intrusion 
into the realm of prosecutorial discretion that the Braunsdorf 
decision condemned.  We agree with the State.   
¶18 Our cases have repeatedly acknowledged a prosecutor's 
broad discretion in determining whether to charge an accused,4 
which offenses to charge,5 under which statute to charge,6 
whether to charge a single count or multiple counts when the 
conduct may be viewed as one continuing offense,7 and whether to 
                     
4 State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 472, 484 N.W.2d 138 
(1992); Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 133, 287 N.W.2d 785 
(1980); State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 607, 285 N.W.2d 729 
(1979). 
5 Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 133, 287 N.W.2d 785 
(1980). 
6 The legislature, recognizing that conduct may violate more 
than 
one 
criminal 
statute, 
has 
specifically 
granted 
a 
prosecuting attorney the power to choose the statute under which 
to proceed. Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 134, 287 N.W.2d 785 
(1980).  See Wis. Stat. § 939.65 (1995-96) providing that "[i]f 
an act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than 
one statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any or 
all such provisions." 
7 State v. Glenn 199 Wis. 2d 575, 584, 545 N.W.2d 230 
(1996); State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 587, 335 N.W.2d 583 
(1983). 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
9 
join all offenses in a single prosecution or to bring successive 
prosecutions.8  In sum, a prosecutor generally has discretion 
whether to bring one or several charges and whether to join all 
offenses in a single prosecution or to bring successive 
prosecutions.  Although there are limits upon the State's 
prosecutorial discretion to avoid arbitrary, discriminatory or 
oppressive results,9 the court has explained that in general the 
district attorney is answerable to the people of the state and 
not to the courts or the legislature in the way he or she 
exercises prosecutorial discretion.10  These cases leave no doubt 
that the State in this case had the discretion whether and when 
to charge the defendant for criminal acts that occurred with 
different victims five months apart. 
¶19 Nevertheless the circuit court and the court of 
appeals perceived an unfairness in the State's bringing this 
prosecution.  In reversing the order of the circuit court, the 
court of appeals commented that its holding "does not mean that 
                     
8 The State may bring successive prosecutions as long as a 
subsequent prosecution requires "proof of a fact for conviction 
which the other does not require."  State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 
330, 334-35, 579 N.W.2d 35 (1998); Wis. Stat. § 939.71 (1995-
96). 
9 State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 608-09.  See also State 
v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d at 472 (abuse of prosecutorial discretion 
to bring charges when evidence is clearly insufficient to 
support 
conviction; 
constitutional 
violation 
possible 
in 
selective prosecution deliberately based on an unjustified 
standard 
such 
as 
race, 
religion 
or 
other 
arbitrary 
classification).  
10 State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d at 473. 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
10
this court approves of the State's decision to prosecute this 
case."  The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that 
it seemed unfair for the State to have another chance to convict 
the defendant using the same evidence used in the earlier trial, 
which resulted in a jury's not guilty verdict.  The unfairness 
that both the circuit court and court of appeals discerned does 
not, however, rise to the level of oppressive conduct warranting 
judicial circumscription of prosecutorial discretion.  The 
defendant does not, and cannot, assert in the present case that 
this 
prosecution 
violates 
any 
limitation 
imposed 
on 
prosecutorial discretion.   
¶20 We conclude that the State's exercise of discretion to 
proceed with the prosecution in the instant case falls within 
the generally accepted bounds of a prosecutor's discretion in 
deciding whether to prosecute and how to prosecute.  Adhering to 
well-accepted law governing prosecutorial discretion in charging 
decisions, we conclude that the State lawfully exercised its 
charging discretion in bringing the present prosecution.  The 
circuit court's conclusion that the State's conduct violated a 
sense of fairness cannot displace the State's lawful exercise of 
well accepted prosecutorial discretion.  
¶21 The second type of unfairness that the circuit court 
perceived in its ruling dismissing the criminal complaint was a 
concern about a violation of due process if the State were 
allowed to introduce the defendant's testimony at the first 
trial against the defendant in a second prosecution.  During 
oral argument to this court, the State recognized that on remand 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
11
there could be a question of fundamental fairness, that is, due 
process, should the State seek to use the defendant's testimony 
at the prior trial in a second trial.  That issue has not yet 
arisen, and we therefore do not address it. 
¶22 Finally the defendant argues that the State is 
precluded from bringing this prosecution.  He argues that the 
state waived its right to bring this second prosecution by 
electing to introduce the other acts evidence in the earlier 
prosecution and that the State is therefore estopped from filing 
a 
complaint 
based 
on 
the 
February 
17, 
1995, 
conduct.  
Specifically, the defendant argues that the State made this 
claimed election and waiver by failing to object to the circuit 
court's comments concerning unfairness.   
¶23 At the admissibility 
hearing, the 
circuit 
court 
announced that if the State went to trial and did not succeed it 
would dismiss a subsequent prosecution if one were brought on 
the basis of the other acts evidence.  The circuit court further 
remarked that it considered the prosecutor's silence as a "kind 
of" election not to bring such a subsequent prosecution.  
Although the circuit court had no authority to grant admission 
of the other acts evidence upon a condition that would constrain 
the prosecuting attorney's charging discretion, this case might 
well not have come to us had the prosecuting attorney alerted 
the circuit court to its lack of authority to bind prosecutorial 
discretion.  We do not, however, view the failure of the 
prosecutor to alert the circuit court as rising to the level of 
an election or waiver under the circumstances of this case.  The 
No. 
97-2663-CR 
 
12
circuit 
court 
gave 
warning 
of 
a 
dismissal 
of 
a 
later 
prosecution.  The State was not required to object to the 
circuit court's warning until the State brought the prosecution 
and the defendant moved the circuit court to dismiss.  Any 
issues arising from the defendant's testifying in the prior 
prosecution on his understanding that the circuit court would 
dismiss a second prosecution will be determined as this case 
progresses on remand. 
¶24 In conclusion, this court, like the court of appeals, 
adheres to the reasoning and precedent of Braunsdorf. The 
defendant has presented no facts justifying an expansion of the 
inherent powers of the Wisconsin courts to dismiss a criminal 
complaint with prejudice prior to the attachment of jeopardy 
when the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is 
not implicated.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
1