Title: DEWAR v CITY OF GREAT FALLS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13821
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 1978

No. 13821 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 ROBERT DEWAR I Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- CITY OF GREAT FALLS et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John M. McCarvel arqued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Larsen and Gliko, Great Falls, Kontana David V . Gliko argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: December 7, 1977 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: P l a i n t i f f , a police o f f i c e r with the City of Great F a l l s , Montana, was char&eu ~ i t h the t h e f t of LVJO bicycles from che Great F a l l s Police Department storage area during October 1974. Charges were i n i t i a t e d before the Police Commission of the City of Great F a l l s and the o f f i c e r suspended December 26, 1974. Hearing was commenced before the Police Commission on February 19, 1975. A n imbroglio ensued concerning the authority of the Commission t o compel testimony. This matter reached the Montana Supreme Court, Cause 1113115, decided April 6, 1976, In the Matter of Charges Against Robert DeWar, Police Officer, - Mont . , 548 P.2d 149, 33 St. Rep. 353. O n February 19, 1975, the Commission was comprised of Joseph R. Marra, Chairman, who was appointed f o r an unexpired term and reappointed May 11, 1970 f o r a three year term, which expired May 1, 1973. He was reappointed September 21, 1973 f o r a three year term but no evidence of confirmation appears i n the record. D. S. Harris, member, appointed 1968, reappointed May 15, 1972, confirmed, expired May 1975, reappointed May 4, 1976. Marion C. Heffern, member, appointed 1971 t o f i l l vancancy, reappointed May 15, 1972 and confirmed. D. S. Harris was serving a s a member on an expired term; Joseph Marra's term would expire May 1, 1976 and Marion Heffern's term would expire May 1, 1975. The c i t y administration upon expiration of t e r m s appointed two new members t o the Commission, Maurice Clark, Jr. and Charles C. Abernathy, Jr., and reappointed D. S. Harris, as Chairman. The appointments were confirmed May 4, 1976. The interrupted hearing was recommenced on May 25, 1976, with the new Commission. P l a i n t i f f objected t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Commission (1) because the o r i g i n a l commission had not been properly appointed i n t h a t there was a f a i l u r e t o comply with section 11-180&, R.C.M. 1947 and it lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o consider the case; (2) t h a t the appointment of two new commissioners constituted "prosecutorial manipulation1' ; and (3) t h a t i n proceeding plaintiff-appellant was denied due process. P l a i n t i f f was offered a new hearing but agreed t o c e r t i f y the record of the old Commission and proceed from t h a t point, reserving h i s r i g h t s of challenge t o j u r i s d i c t i o n and lack of due process. After an adverse ruling, p l a i n t i f f commenced an action i n the D i s t r i c t Court, Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Cascade, Hon. B . W. Thomas from the Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , presiding. Summary judgment was entered against p l a i n t i f f by the court on January 20, 1977: "The motion of defendants f o r summary judgment came on f o r hearing before t h i s Court on the 27th day of December, 1976. P l a i n t i f f was represented by h i s counsel, M r . John M. McCarvel, and defendants were represented by t h e i r counsel, David V. Gliko. After hearing o r a l arguments, the Court granted counsel time t o f i l e b r i e f s . Now, a f t e r considering the b r i e f s and the o r a l statements made a t the hearing, and a l s o the pleadings and a f f i d a v i t s on f i l e , the Court finds t h a t there is no genuine issue a s t o any material f a c t ; t h a t the only issues t o be determined involve questions of law, and a s t o them the Court concludes: " (1) The members of the Police Commission of the City of Great F a l l s during the period from January 2, 1975 t o May 4, 1976, were validly holding over i n t h e i r offices a f t e r expiration of t h e i r terms and before appointment and qualification of t h e i r successors. A s defacto members of the commission, they validly exercised the functions and powers thereof during t h a t period and had jurisdiction t o receive and t o hear the complaint against the p l a i n t i f f . "(2) The members of the Police Commission of the City of Great F a l l s who were appointed and confirmed on May 4, 1976, were validly and legally appointed and confirmed a s successors t o the members who had been holding over, and from and a f t e r t h a t date consti- tuted the Police Commission of the City of Great F a l l s , with the r i g h t t o exercise the functions and powers thereof and thereafter had jurisdiction of the complaint f i l e d against p l a i n t i f f . "(3) The change i n the membership of the Police Commission of the City of Great F a l l s on May 4 , 1977, under the circumstances shown, did not c o n s t i t u t e t prosecutorial manipulation' and did not deprive plain- t i f f of due process. "(4) The proceedings against p l a i n t i f f before the Poliqe Commission were not criminal i n nature, and the resumption of those proceedings a f t e r the change i n membership of the Commission, did not subject plain- t i f f t o double jeopardy. "(5) Defendants a r e e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. "It is, therefore, hereby O R D E R E D t h a t the motion of defendants f o r summary judgment be and it i s hereby granted, and t h a t judgment be entered accordingly." P l a i n t i f f appeals the questions of law enunciated i n the summary judgment. The Court, a f t e r a review of the record and the law, affirms the summary judgment a s entered on the 5 questions of law: (1) W e do not agree with p l a i n t i f f ' s contention t h a t S t a t e f . I. v . Swanberg, (1956),130 Mont. 202, 299 P.2d M&, turns on the statutory language "* * * the term of o f f i c e of the appointed member of the board s h a l l be four (4) years and u n t i l h i s successor s h a l l have been appointed and confirmed.",(Section 92-104, R.C.M. 1947), insofar a s authority t o hold over beyond the s t a t u t o r y term. Swanberg i t s e l f d i r e c t s us t o S t a t e ex r e l . Sandquist v. Rogers, (1933), 93. Mont. 355, 3 6 2 , 9 1 8 P.2d 617, wherein it is plainly s t a t e d ' t h a t every o f f i c e r must continue t o discharge the duties of h i s o f f i c e although h i s term has expired, u n t i l h i s successor has quali5ied. It is a r i g h t and a duty. This r i g h t is qualified only by express o r c l e a r implication of prohibition i n the language of t)ie s t a t u t e . W e find no such express o r implied language claimed i n the instant cause. See: 3 McQuillin on Municipal Corp. 3d ed., 5 12.110, p. 472; 63 Am J u r 2d, Public Officers and Employees, 5157; Section 59-406, R.C.M. 1947. (2) The holding under question of law No.(l), renders No. (2) moot. (3) W e do not recommend the proceeding here a s precedent f o r any kind of administrative hearing. Yet, the judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court is e n t i t l e d t o a presumption of correctness and w i l l only be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. A s we have s t a t e d , there have been procedures indulged i n here t h a t should not be repeated, but froin a l l of t h a t one can draw only an inference of misconduct and not s u f f i c i e n t showing t o overcome the statutory presumption. ( 4 ) and (5). These questions of law were not seriously argued on any f a c t s not included i n Nos. 1, 2 and 3 above, therefore they must f a l l t o the same conclusions. The judgment of the t r i a l court s affirmed. 2 J u s t i c e # W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e n , "