Title: Bilbao v. PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Citation: 479 P.2d 226
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 1971

479 P.2d 226 (1971)
Shirley BILBAO, Respondent,
v.
PACIFIC POWER &amp; LIGHT COMPANY, a Maine Corporation, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 1.
Argued and Submitted October 28, 1970.
Decided January 13, 1971.
David P. Templeton, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were John C. Beatty, Jr., Charles Robinowitz, and Dusenberry, Martin, Beatty, Bischoff &amp; Templeton, Portland.
Burl L. Green, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Green, Richardson, Griswold &amp; Murphy, Portland.
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, HOLMAN and HOWELL, JJ.
HOWELL, Justice.
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when she fell over a cable on land owned and maintained by defendant. A judgment was entered on a verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
*227 For its first assignment of error the defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in its favor.
For several years the defendant has maintained a portion of its land at Lake Merwin, Washington, as a public recreation area for swimming, boating and picknicking. No fees are charged. The defendant constructed in the lake a float which was anchored to the shore by a metal cable approximately one inch in diameter.
On the day of the accident the plaintiff, her husband and her three children were attending a picnic at the lake. The plaintiff became apprehensive about her small daughter who was playing in the water at the edge of the lake, ran to help her, and tripped and fell over the cable, sustaining injuries to her hand.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to mark the cable and in failing to warn plaintiff "by a sign or otherwise" of the exposed cable.
The parties have stipulated that the Washington statute, RCW 4.24.210, applies to this case. That statute and the preceding section provide as follows:
The parties have devoted substantial portions of their respective briefs to an attempt to classify the status of the plaintiff  either as a licensee, as the defendant contends, or as an invitee, as the plaintiff contends.
The defendant argues that RCW 4.24.200 and RCW 4.24.210 were adopted by the legislature in reaction to the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in McKinnon v. Wash. Fed. Sav. &amp; Loan Ass'n, 68 Wash. 2d 644, 414 P.2d 773 (1966). There, an adult leader of a girl scout troop was injured while attending a meeting at a building owned by defendant and made available to the girl scouts without charge. The court held that plaintiff was an invitee and that the defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care to make the premises safe for the purpose for which they were held open to the public.
The defendant also argues that the Washington Legislature, in enacting RCW 4.24.210, intended to limit the liability of owners of recreational land and to charge such owners with the duty owed to mere licensees  to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct. Dotson v. Haddock, 46 Wash. 2d 52, 278 P.2d 338 (1955).
It is not necessary that we categorize plaintiff's status under common law principles relating to invitees or licensees. Plaintiff's status and the defendant's duty to plaintiff are clearly defined by the Washington statute, RCW 4.24.210, which the parties agree applies to this case. Plaintiff was a member "of the public" using the defendant's land "for the purpose of outdoor recreation." The defendant is liable *228 for "injuries sustained * * * by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted * * *."
The trial court properly overruled the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. It was for the jury to decide from the evidence produced whether the cable was a "known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted" under the terms of the statute. The evidence disclosed that the cable was rusty in color, unpainted, and not readily discernible because it blended with the color of the ground. One witness testified that the cable was not readily visible from a distance of eight to ten feet. Another witness testified that she also tripped over the cable on the same day of plaintiff's accident. The cable extended about four inches above the ground and many people, including children, walked and played in this area. No attempt was made to mark the cable or place signs warning of its presence. Under these circumstances we cannot say as a matter of law that the cable was not a known dangerous artificial latent condition.
For its second assignment of error the defendant contends that the court erred in giving the following instruction regarding an invitee and the duty owed by the defendant toward an invitee:
In effect, the court told the jury that plaintiff was an invitee and that the defendant owed her a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for her protection. This instruction imposed a higher duty upon the defendant than the duty imposed by the Washington statute, and the court erred in giving such instruction. It is true that the court also read the statute, RCW 4.24.210, to the jury and instructed the jury that they must determine if the cable constituted a hidden danger known to defendant and not apparent to plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable care. However, the court did not tell the jury that plaintiff's status and defendant's duty to plaintiff were to be determined according to the statute. By instructing the jury regarding both the duty owed to plaintiff as an invitee and the duty owed to plaintiff under the statute, the court in effect left it up to the jury to decide which instruction applied to the parties in this case.
The court should have confined the instruction to plaintiff's status under the statute and to the question of whether the cable constituted "a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted."
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.