Title: Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101411
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2012

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANTHONY COLLELO  
 
v.  Record No. 101411  
   OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. 
LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  January 13, 2012 
GEOGRAPHIC SERVICES, INC. 
 
GEOGRAPHIC SERVICES, INC. 
 
v.  Record No. 101421 
 
 
ANTHONY COLLELO, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
In these appeals, we consider whether the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County erred when it: (1) granted the 
motion to strike filed by the Boeing Company, Autometric, 
Inc., and Anthony Collelo (together, "the defendants") 
and dismissed the suit by Geographic Services, Inc. 
("GSI") against the defendants, alleging breach of 
contract, tortious interference with a contract, and 
violations of the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
Code §§ 59.1-336 through -343 ("the Trade Secrets Act"); 
and (2) denied the motion for attorneys' fees made by 
Anthony Collelo ("Collelo"). 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
GSI subcontracts with various United States 
government prime contractors, including the Boeing 
Company ("Boeing"), to perform what is known as 
 
2 
geographic names, or "geonames," work.  Specifically, 
geonames work includes referring to a specific named 
feature on a map, and entering information about that 
feature into a spreadsheet.  The spreadsheet contains up 
to thousands of pieces of data including, among other 
things, the name of the map feature, the feature's 
location and type, and the language used on the map.  
Once all of the map feature information is collected and 
verified, GSI then submits the spreadsheet to the prime 
contractor or the United States government, through the 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which then 
uploads certain geonames information to a publicly 
accessible website, commonly referred to as the 
Geographic Names Data Base. 
GSI's geonames work requires it to generate large 
quantities of data that must be as accurate as possible.  
Accordingly, GSI has developed a systematic method for 
performing geonames work, including identifying and 
correcting errors in the data entered into the 
spreadsheet.  GSI calls this its "Geographic Names 
Procedure" ("GNP") and has memorialized its GNP in 
several documents. 
GSI's GNP includes a data entry step known as 
Research Librarian ("RL"), a quality control ("QC") step, 
 
3 
and a quality assurance ("QA") step.  In the RL step, GSI 
reviews each named feature on a map, such as a city or 
body of water, and enters the relevant data about that 
feature into a spreadsheet.  When performing the QC step, 
a senior geonames employee at GSI reviews each of 
thousands of pieces of data entered during the RL step, 
checking for the types of errors that are most likely to 
occur, based on his training and experience.  Finally, 
the QA step includes running two GSI-developed error-
finding software tools that reduce errors and increase 
productivity and efficiency.  GSI refers to these two 
software tools as the "QC tool" and the "edge-matching 
tool."  The QC tool scans the data to identify possible 
errors, and is based upon a set of "rules," that GSI 
developed through its years of geonames work. 
GSI works on several maps simultaneously in its 
geonames work, with each map representing a portion of 
the total region or country at issue.  Certain map 
features, such as rivers, for example, often cross 
several maps.  Accordingly, the edge-matching tool 
enables GSI to scan the data across all of the maps for a 
given country or region, identify possible errors related 
to the features near the edges of the maps, and correct 
any errors.   
 
4 
GSI claims that its QC and edge-matching tools 
enable GSI to produce highly accurate data much more 
efficiently than is possible without such tools.  GSI 
considers its entire GNP a proprietary, confidential 
trade secret, and has undertaken efforts to maintain its 
secrecy. 
In 2006, GSI hired Collelo, who had never done 
geonames work before, and trained Collelo to do geonames 
work, exposing him to its confidential information and 
alleged trade secrets.  Specifically, Collelo worked with 
GSI's GNP, including GSI's QC and edge-matching tools.  
Upon his employment with GSI, Collelo and GSI executed an 
employment contract which contained three documents 
(together, the "contract"): (1) an "Employment 
Agreement;" (2) a document entitled "Addendum A;" and (3) 
an "Employee Confidential Information, Non-Competition, 
Non-Disparagement, and Non-Solicitation Agreement" 
("Addendum B").  The Employment Agreement specifically 
incorporated Addendum B by reference and further stated 
that "[t]his Agreement and any Addenda hereto, constitute 
the entire agreement between [Collelo and GSI]." 
Significantly, for the purposes of this case, 
Addendum B included a "non-disclosure provision," 
prohibiting Collelo from disclosing GSI's confidential 
 
5 
information "to any person or entity without first 
obtaining [GSI's] written consent," and a "non-
solicitation provision" prohibiting Collelo from 
soliciting, performing, or attempting to perform any 
"Conflicting Services for a Customer or . . . contractor 
of [GSI's]" for a period of one year after Collelo's 
employment with GSI ended. 
In early 2008, Collelo resigned from GSI and was 
hired by Boeing to work in a non-geonames capacity.  
During his exit interview, GSI reminded Collelo of his 
continuing obligations under the contract and Addendum B, 
in particular.   
GSI subsequently learned, in June 2008, that Collelo 
was performing geonames work at Boeing when Collelo came 
to GSI's office as part of a Boeing team to work on a 
future Boeing-GSI geonames project.  GSI advised Boeing 
that Collelo was in violation of Addendum B's non-
solicitation provision.  Specifically, GSI believed that 
Collelo was in breach of the non-solicitation provision 
because he was performing geonames work for GSI's 
customer, Boeing, and because Boeing had pressured GSI to 
reduce its rates and hours on a bid for geonames work 
under a subcontract with Boeing.  The parties attempted 
 
6 
to resolve the matter, but were unable to agree on a 
resolution.   
Thereafter, GSI learned that Collelo had performed 
geonames work at Boeing and that he had created a QC tool 
for Boeing to use in its geonames work.  Just four months 
after Collelo began working at Boeing, Collelo wrote a 
memo to his superiors claiming that he had developed a QC 
tool and an edge-matching tool, and that he had 
"dramatically increased production" and efficiency in 
geonames work at Boeing, such that Boeing was now "three 
weeks ahead of schedule," even though Boeing had had a 
significant backlog of geonames work prior to Collelo's 
arrival.   
GSI filed suit against Boeing, Autometric, Inc. 
("Autometric"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boeing, and 
Collelo, alleging that: (1) Collelo breached his contract 
with GSI by performing conflicting services for Boeing 
and by disclosing "GSI's confidential information" to 
Boeing; (2) GSI is entitled to recover its reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to section 5.8 of the 
Employment Agreement, if it prevailed in its complaint 
for breach of contract; (3) Collelo violated the Trade 
Secrets Act; (4) Boeing and/or Autometric violated the 
Trade Secrets Act; and (5) Boeing and/or Autometric 
 
7 
tortiously interfered with GSI's contract with Collelo.  
GSI sought: (1) damages in an amount to be determined at 
trial, but not less than $10 million; (2) reasonable 
royalties from the defendants' improper and unauthorized 
use of GSI's trade secrets; (3) an injunction against use 
or disclosure of GSI's trade secrets; (4) an injunction 
requiring Collelo to abide by the terms of the employment 
agreement; (5) attorneys' fees and costs; and (6) 
punitive damages of $350,000.   
Two expert witnesses testified at trial for GSI 
regarding damages.  Specifically, the expert witnesses 
testified regarding: (1) the amount that GSI's value had 
decreased due to Collelo's and Boeing's actions; (2) 
GSI's cost to develop its trade secrets and confidential 
information; (3) Boeing's unjust enrichment as a result 
of its acquisition and use of GSI's trade secrets and 
confidential information; and (4) reasonable royalties 
for Collelo's disclosure and Boeing's use of GSI's trade 
secrets.   
At the conclusion of GSI's case in chief, the 
defendants filed a motion to strike, arguing that, among 
other things: (1) GSI offered no evidence that Boeing 
"directly competes" with GSI for geonames work and, as a 
result, Collelo cannot be found in breach of the non-
 
8 
solicitation provision in the contract; (2) GSI is not 
entitled to any damages for its breach of contract claim 
because GSI has not presented any evidence or expert 
opinion on damages for that claim; (3) GSI cannot recover 
as damages both the alleged cost of developing its trade 
secret and the lost value to the company as a result of 
misappropriation because awarding both measures of 
damages would amount to a double recovery; (4) GSI cannot 
recover damages based on the loss of the trade secret 
because GSI admits the value of its trade secret has not 
been destroyed and has not been publicly disclosed 
outside Boeing; and (5) GSI cannot obtain punitive 
damages because there are no allegations sufficient to 
show willful or malicious conduct by defendants.   
The trial court found that GSI had established the 
existence of trade secrets but did not make a ruling 
regarding whether the defendants actually misappropriated 
GSI's trade secrets.  Neither did the trial court permit 
the jury to make such a finding.  Instead, the trial 
court granted the defendants' motion to strike at the 
close of GSI's evidence and dismissed GSI's entire case 
with prejudice, reasoning that, "even if Mr. Collelo had 
taken something, and [despite the fact that Boeing] was a 
customer of GSI, Boeing is not doing and has not been 
 
9 
doing the same work as GSI."  While the trial court did 
conclude that "[t]here has been no loss of business to 
GSI," and "[t]here has been no [showing] that Boeing has 
made more money because it has used these trade secrets," 
it did so based on its conclusion that "[t]here is no way 
that the jury could find that Boeing has taken GSI's 
secret in order to do the work that that secret was 
designed for." 
Following the trial court's dismissal of GSI's suit, 
Collelo filed a motion for attorneys' fees, alleging that 
he was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 
section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement.  Section 5.8 of 
the Employment Agreement stated that, "[i]n the event of 
a dispute arising out of the interpretation or 
enforcement of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs."  Collelo also argued that GSI was estopped from 
taking inconsistent positions as to which attorneys' fees 
provision governs within this action because it had 
cited, at all times relevant, section 5.8 of the 
Employment Agreement as the provision governing 
attorneys' fees.   
 
The trial court ultimately ruled that GSI was not 
estopped from arguing that section 10.2 of Addendum B 
 
10 
applied because GSI's earlier position that it was 
entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to section 5.8 of 
the Employment Agreement "was a legal position . . . but 
it was not a factual position which it now seeks to back 
away from."  The trial court also found that "only 
[A]ddendum B is at issue in this case," and that the 
subject matter contained in Addendum B was "the subject 
of this lawsuit and the trial that was had in this 
matter."  Consequently, the trial court found, as a 
matter of law, that the section 10.2 attorneys' fees 
provision in Addendum B governed any attorneys' fees 
dispute in this case.  
GSI and Collelo timely filed their notices of appeal 
and we granted these appeals on the following assignments 
of error:   
For Geographic Services, Inc. v. Collelo, et al., Record 
No. 101421: 
1. 
The Circuit Court erred by requiring evidence 
of competition between GSI and Boeing to 
establish liability or a right to a remedy 
under the [Trade Secrets Act]. 
 
2. 
The Circuit Court improperly weighed evidence 
and credibility, disregarded GSI's evidence or 
otherwise failed to consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to GSI when ruling on 
Respondent's Motion to Strike that GSI 
purportedly failed to present evidence of 
competition between GSI and Boeing. 
 
11 
3. 
The Circuit Court erred by dismissing all of 
GSI's claims against all Respondents because 
only the part of the breach of contract claim 
against Collelo based on the non-solicitation 
provision of his Employment Agreement even 
arguably required a showing of competition 
between GSI and Boeing, and Respondents had 
only sought dismissal of that part of the 
breach of contract claim against Collelo and 
exclusion of certain other evidence. 
 
For Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc., Record No. 
101411: 
 
1. 
The trial court erred in concluding that, 
because GSI was reversing position on a 
question of law, not a question of fact, GSI 
was not estopped from reversing its position 
with respect to the applicability of a two-way 
fee-shifting provision.  That holding violates 
this Court's long-standing doctrine of estoppel 
by inconsistent legal positions. 
 
2. 
The trial court erred in denying attorneys' 
fees to Collelo because it (i) construed an 
addendum to an employment agreement as a 
separate contract, in violation of this Court's 
precedent and the plain language of the 
agreement itself; and (ii) failed to give full 
effect to all clauses of the contract, even 
where there was no conflict between provisions, 
in violation of this Court's precedent. 
 
II. Analysis 
A. Geographic Services, Inc. v. Collelo, et al. 
Record No. 101421 
 
1. Standard of Review 
 
We have clearly articulated the standard of review 
for cases of statutory interpretation: 
[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a 
pure question of law which we review de 
novo.  When the language of a statute is 
 
12 
unambiguous, we are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language.  Furthermore, we 
must give effect to the legislature’s 
intention as expressed by the language used 
unless a literal interpretation of the 
language would result in a manifest 
absurdity.  If a statute is subject to more 
than one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the 
legislative intent behind the statute. 
 
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 
96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted).  
 
Additionally, we have stated that, 
 
[g]ranting a motion to strike at the 
end of plaintiff's case, if done 
erroneously, can lead to a substantial 
waste of judicial resources – a consequence 
to be avoided.  This is particularly true 
in a situation where the motion to strike 
was granted on a ground raised by the court 
sua sponte.   
 
 
To guard against the waste that can be 
occasioned by granting a motion to strike 
at the end of plaintiff's evidence, this 
Court has developed rules that govern the 
way in which a trial court must view 
plaintiff's evidence when considering such 
a motion. 
 
DHA, Inc. v. Leydig, 231 Va. 138, 139-40, 340 S.E.2d 831, 
832 (1986) (citation omitted).  Specifically,  
[w]hen the sufficiency of a plaintiff's 
evidence is challenged by a motion to 
strike, the trial court should resolve any 
reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of 
the evidence in plaintiff's favor and 
should grant the motion only when it is 
conclusively apparent that plaintiff has 
proven no cause of action against 
defendant, or when it plainly appears that 
 
13 
the trial court would be compelled to set 
aside any verdict found for the plaintiff 
as being without evidence to support it. 
 
Banks v. Mario Indus. of Virginia, Inc., 274 Va. 438, 
454-55, 650 S.E.2d 687, 696 (2007) (quoting Saks Fifth 
Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 272 Va. 177, 188, 630 S.E.2d 
304, 311 (2006)).  "According to well-settled principles 
of appellate review, when the trial court grants a motion 
to strike the plaintiff’s evidence, we review the 
evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff."  Green v. Ingram, 269 Va. 281, 284, 608 
S.E.2d 917, 919 (2005) (citing Perdieu v. Blackstone 
Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 264 Va. 408, 411, 568 S.E.2d 
703, 704 (2002) and Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28, 30-31, 486 
S.E.2d 536, 537 (1997)). 
Lastly, it should be noted that while GSI complains 
that the trial court improperly dismissed all of GSI's 
claims even though the defendants did not request the 
relief granted by the trial court, a trial court may 
properly grant a motion to strike on a ground raised by 
the trial court sua sponte.  See DHA, 231 Va. at 139, 340 
S.E.2d at 832 (acknowledging that a trial court may grant 
a motion to strike "on a ground raised by the court sua 
sponte"). 
2. GSI's Claims Under the Trade Secrets Act 
 
14 
 
We have previously recognized that the plain 
language of the Trade Secrets Act "reflects the General 
Assembly's decision to protect the owner of a trade 
secret from another's misuse of that secret.  Because the 
General Assembly has enacted legislation addressing this 
subject, the role of the courts is limited to construing 
and applying the terms set forth in the [Trade Secrets] 
Act."  MicroStrategy Inc. v. Li, 268 Va. 249, 263, 601 
S.E.2d 580, 588 (2004).  Additionally, we have held that, 
"[i]n order for a plaintiff to establish that [its 
alleged trade secret] has been the subject of a trade 
secret violation, two statutory elements must be proved, 
namely, the existence of a 'trade secret' and its 
'misappropriation' by the defendant."  Id. at 263, 601 
S.E.2d at 588 (citing Code § 59.1-336).   
 
The Trade Secrets Act defines "trade secret" as: 
information, including but not limited to, 
a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, 
that:  
 
1. Derives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and  
 
2. Is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.  
 
15 
 
Code § 59.1-336. 
 
The trial court ruled that GSI had established the 
existence of trade secrets, thereby satisfying the first 
requirement to establish a claim under the Trade Secrets 
Act.  See Code § 59.1-336; MicroStrategy, 268 Va. at 263, 
601 S.E.2d at 588.  The defendants did not assign error 
to that ruling. 
 
However, the trial court did not rule regarding 
whether the defendants actually misappropriated GSI's 
trade secrets.  Neither did the trial court permit the 
jury to make such a finding.  Instead, the trial court 
granted the defendants' motion to strike at the close of 
GSI's evidence and dismissed GSI's entire case with 
prejudice, stating that "even if Mr. Collelo had taken 
something, and [despite the fact that Boeing] was a 
customer of GSI, Boeing is not doing and has not been 
doing the same work as GSI." 
 
The trial court, when addressing the defendants' 
motion to strike with regard to GSI's breach of contract 
claim, found that,  
[t]here has been no evidence offered that 
there has been any loss of business by GSI 
because of competitive conduct on the part 
of [Boeing].  There has been no evidence 
that Boeing has benefitted [sic] from using 
this tool in a manner that would affect the 
 
16 
business of GSI, namely, the substantive 
business of its Geonames work. 
 
 
Similarly, the trial court ruled, when addressing 
GSI's claim under the Trade Secrets Act, that: 
the reason [for the Trade Secrets Act is] 
that if you have a secret you have 
developed for a particular work and it is 
taken by someone else, then [they] will be 
in violation of the terms of the [Trade 
Secrets A]ct, and . . . the holder of the 
trade secret[] will be entitled to damages. 
 
 
And the damages are now codified.  
They are set out in the [Trade Secrets 
A]ct.  And what are they?  The loss to the 
business of the person who has had its 
trade secret taken, the unjust enrichment 
to the entity that has been able to do the 
business of the person holding the trade 
secret or some portion of that, and the 
reasonable royalties, if there is nothing 
else, for the use of that particular . . . 
trade secret. 
 
 
But, again, the reason for the rule is 
to avoid a person benefiting by doing the 
type of work which this trade secret 
enables to the detriment of the creator of 
the trade secret.  And, once again, Boeing 
is not doing that work.  There simply has 
been no evidence whatsoever, not merely 
that Boeing is not competing with GSI, but 
in response to the trade secret aspect, 
that Boeing is even doing the same work as 
GSI. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
And, so, it would be far easier for 
the Court to send this matter to the jury 
but what damages will a jury have to 
consider? . . . There has been no loss of 
business to GSI.  There has been no 
[showing] that Boeing has made more money 
 
17 
because it has used these trade secrets to 
do the same kind of work . . . .  There is 
no way that the jury could find that Boeing 
has taken GSI's secret in order to do the 
work that that secret was designed for.  
Boeing is simply not doing that kind of 
work. 
 
 
For these reasons, the motion of the 
defendants to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence is granted. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Therefore, it is clear that, contrary to the 
defendants' claim, the trial court did not rule that "GSI 
had utterly failed to present any evidence of harm or 
injury caused by the [d]efendants."  Rather, the trial 
court found that "the reason for the [Trade Secrets Act] 
is to avoid a person benefiting by doing the type of work 
which this trade secret enables to the detriment of the 
creator of the trade secret," and that there had been "no 
evidence whatsoever," that Boeing is "competing with 
GSI," or "that Boeing is even doing the same work as 
GSI."  While the trial court did conclude that "[t]here 
has been no loss of business to GSI," and "[t]here has 
been no [showing] that Boeing has made more money because 
it has used these trade secrets," it did so based on its 
conclusion that "[t]here is no way that the jury could 
find that Boeing has taken GSI's secret in order to do 
the work that that secret was designed for."  (Emphasis 
 
18 
added.)  We disagree with the underlying premise of the 
trial court's ruling. 
 
Significantly, for the purposes of this case, the 
Trade Secrets Act defines "misappropriation" by providing 
two alternative definitions.  Code § 59.1-336.  The Trade 
Secrets Act first defines "misappropriation" as the 
"[a]cquisition of a trade secret of another by a person 
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was 
acquired by improper means."  Code § 59.1-336.  The Trade 
Secrets Act also defines "misappropriation" as: 
2. Disclosure or use of a trade secret of 
another without express or implied consent 
by a person who  
 
 
a. Used improper means to acquire 
 
knowledge of the trade secret; or  
 
 
b. At the time of disclosure or use, 
knew or had reason to know that his 
knowledge of the trade secret was  
 
 
 
(1) Derived from or through a 
 
person who had utilized improper means 
to  acquire it;  
 
 
 
(2) Acquired under circumstances 
giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use;  
 
 
 
(3) Derived from or through a 
person who owed a duty to the person 
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy 
or limit its use; or  
 
 
(4) Acquired by accident or 
mistake.  
 
 
19 
Code § 59.1-336.   
 
Accordingly, the Trade Secrets Act does not require 
that one who is accused of misappropriating a trade 
secret use the allegedly misappropriated trade secret to 
compete with the holder of the trade secret.  See Code 
§ 59.1-336.  Rather, given that the trial court found 
that GSI had established the existence of its trade 
secrets, all that GSI was required to show in order to 
recover against Boeing and/or Autometric under the Trade 
Secrets Act was that Boeing and/or Autometric acquired 
GSI's trade secrets and they knew or had reason to know 
that the trade secrets were acquired by improper means 
and that GSI suffered compensable damages or was 
otherwise entitled to relief.  Code § 59.1-336.  
Similarly, given that GSI established the existence of 
its trade secrets, all that GSI was required to show in 
order to recover against Collelo under the Trade Secrets 
Act was that Collelo disclosed GSI's trade secret without 
GSI's consent and he knew or had reason to know that, at 
the time of his disclosure of GSI's trade secrets, his 
knowledge of the trade secrets was acquired "under 
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy" and that GSI suffered compensable damages or was 
otherwise entitled to relief.  Code § 59.1-336.   
 
20 
 
The evidence at trial supported GSI's allegations 
that the defendants misappropriated GSI's trade secrets.  
For example, Dr. Michael I. Shamos ("Shamos") testified 
for GSI as an expert in the field of computer science 
regarding the extent to which the defendants disclosed, 
used, or acquired GSI's trade secrets, including GSI's 
GNP.  Shamos testified that the QC tool software Collelo 
developed with another employee at Boeing, and that 
Boeing used in its geonames work, was all but identical 
to, and substantially derived from, GSI's QC tool--an 
integral part of GSI's GNP.   
 
Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that while 
Collelo was employed at Boeing, he took over the QA of 
all of Boeing's geonames projects, created a system to 
track errors, as GSI does, redesigned Boeing's QA 
tracking system, and derived a process for checking the 
names of features on neighboring maps.  Collelo also 
wrote distinct rules and guidelines that were integrated 
into a QA tool that performs edge-matching for Boeing.   
 
Significantly, the evidence also demonstrated that 
Boeing was aware of Collelo's obligations to GSI, yet 
Boeing: (1) requested and permitted Collelo to do 
Geonames work for Boeing immediately after Collelo began 
to work for Boeing; (2) asked Collelo to improve the 
 
21 
efficiency and quality of Boeing's geonames work; and (3) 
asked Collelo to train other Boeing employees to perform 
geonames work– all despite Collelo's reluctance to do so 
because of his obligations to GSI.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to GSI, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the defendants misappropriated GSI's trade 
secrets.   
 
Once a complainant has established the 
misappropriation of a trade secret, the Trade Secrets Act 
provides that the "complainant is entitled to recover 
damages for misappropriation," including "both the actual 
loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment 
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account 
in computing actual loss."  Code § 59.1-338.  The Trade 
Secrets Act also states that, "[i]f a complainant is 
unable to prove a greater amount of damages by other 
methods of measurement, the damages caused by 
misappropriation can be measured exclusively by 
imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a 
misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a 
trade secret."  Code § 59.1-338.   
The defendants argue on appeal that GSI did not 
prove its damages; consequently, the trial court properly 
 
22 
granted the motion to strike.  This contention ignores 
the actual ruling made by the trial court.  The trial 
court's ruling was based upon the faulty premise that 
competition must be shown in order to have a cause of 
action based upon the Trade Secrets Act and that damages 
must flow from the proof of competition.  As a result, 
the trial court's analysis of the proper showing of 
damages was based upon losses as a result of competition.  
Illustrative of this premise are the trial court's 
explanatory remarks when granting the motion to strike: 
Boeing is not doing and has not been doing 
the same work as GSI.  
 
. . . . 
 
There has been no evidence offered that 
there has been any loss of business by GSI 
because of competitive conduct on the part 
of The Boeing Corporation.  
 
. . . . 
 
[T]he reason for the rule is to avoid a 
person benefiting by doing the type of 
work which this trade secret enables to 
the detriment of the creator of the trade 
secret.  And, once again, Boeing is not 
doing that work.  There simply has been no 
evidence whatsoever . . . that Boeing is 
even doing the same work as GSI.  
 
. . . . 
 
 
And, so, it would be far easier for 
the Court to send this matter to the jury 
but what damages will a jury have to 
consider?  What damages?  There has been 
 
23 
no loss of business to GSI.  There has 
been no profitability shown on the part of 
Boeing that Boeing has made more money 
because it has used these trade secrets to 
do the same kind of work or similar work. 
 
. . . There is no way that the jury could 
find that Boeing has taken GSI's secret in 
order to do the work that that secret was 
designed for.  Boeing is simply not doing 
that kind of work.   
 
 
For these reasons, the motion of the 
defendants to strike the plaintiff's 
evidence is granted. 
 
 
Whether GSI presented sufficient evidence of damages 
under a proper analysis of the Trade Secrets Act was not 
the subject of the trial court's granting of the motion 
to strike.  The trial court's ruling was based upon a 
faulty premise and the trial court erred in granting the 
motion to strike.  Nonetheless, upon consideration of the 
evidence in the light most favorable to GSI, we cannot 
say as a matter of law that GSI did not present 
sufficient evidence on the question of damages to survive 
a motion to strike. 
3. GSI's Breach of Contract and Tortious 
 Interference with a Contract Claims 
 
 
We have previously stated that, 
[a]s a general rule, damages for breach of 
contracts are limited to the pecuniary loss 
sustained.  Proof of damages is an 
essential element of a breach of contract 
claim, and failure to prove that element 
warrants dismissal of the claim.  The 
 
24 
plaintiff also has the burden of proving 
with reasonable certainty the amount of 
damages and the cause from which they 
resulted; speculation and conjecture cannot 
form the basis of the recovery. 
 
Sunrise Continuing Care, LLC v. Wright, 277 Va. 148, 156, 
671 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2009) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  We have also 
recognized that 
the tort of intentional interference with 
performance of a contract by a third party 
is a permissible cause of action in 
Virginia.  The elements required for a 
prima facie showing of the tort are: (i) 
the existence of a valid contractual 
relationship or business expectancy; (ii) 
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy 
on the part of the interferor; (iii) 
intentional interference inducing or 
causing a breach or termination of the 
relationship or expectancy; and (iv) 
resultant damage to the party whose 
relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted. 
 
Lewis-Gale Med. Ctr., LLC v. Alldredge, 282 Va. 141, 149, 
710 S.E.2d 716, 720 (2011) (quoting DurretteBradshaw, 
P.C. v. MRC Consulting, L.C., 277 Va. 140, 145, 670 
S.E.2d 704, 706 (2009) (citing Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 
112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985))) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
The contract in this case included a non-disclosure 
provision, which provided that Collelo would "not 
disclose [GSI's] Confidential Information to any person 
 
25 
or entity without first obtaining [GSI's] written 
consent."  The contract also included a non-solicitation 
provision, which stated that Collelo agreed that  
for the one (1) year period after the date 
[his] employment [with GSI] ends for any 
reason [he would] not, as an officer, 
director, employee, consultant, owner, 
partner, or in any other capacity, either 
directly or through others . . . solicit, 
perform, or attempt to perform any 
Conflicting Services for a Customer . . . 
or contractor of [GSI's] with whom I had 
. . . contact or whose identity I learned 
as a result of my employment with [GSI].   
 
 
GSI alleged in its complaint both that "Collelo's 
performance of Conflicting Services for Autometric and/or 
Boeing is a breach of the [contract]," and "Collelo's 
disclosure of GSI's confidential information to 
Autometric and/or Boeing is [a] breach of the 
[contract]."  GSI also alleged in its complaint that 
"Autometric and/or Boeing intentionally interfered with, 
induced, or caused Collelo to breach his obligations to 
GSI." 
 
At trial, GSI offered the testimony of two expert 
witnesses regarding damages incurred as a result of the 
defendants' actions in this case.  In addition to 
testifying for GSI as an expert on the quantification of 
damages concerning unjust enrichment and reasonable 
royalties, Riley testified as an expert on the 
 
26 
quantification of damages stemming from the disclosure of 
confidential information.  Significantly, however, Riley 
stated at trial that she would not testify regarding any 
damages related to GSI's tortious interference with a 
contract claim.  Upon cross-examination, the following 
exchange occurred: 
[Defendants' Counsel:] I want to talk first 
about what you are offering an opinion 
 
on and what you are not.  You 
 
understand that there are . . . 
 
multiple claims in this case; 
correct? 
 
[Riley:] I do. 
 
[Defendants' Counsel:] And one of those 
 
claims is what's been called tortious 
 
interference with [a] contract or the 
 
interference with a contract at issue. 
You  understand that's a claim; right? 
 
[Riley:] I do. 
 
[Defendants' Counsel:] That, ma'am, is not 
something you are offering an opinion 
 
on; correct? 
 
[Riley:] My opinions relate to trade secret 
 
misappropriation and misuse of 
 
confidential information. 
 
 
In addition to her testimony regarding unjust 
enrichment and reasonable royalties, Riley also testified 
regarding GSI's cost to develop its trade secrets and 
stated that she agreed with GSI's determination that the 
cost to develop its trade secrets was about $3.3 million 
 
27 
– the value of which represented an "actual loss to GSI" 
because "the value [of GSI's trade secret has] decreased 
because of Boeing's use of the trade secret."  
Significantly, however, while Riley testified regarding 
GSI's cost to develop its trade secrets, Riley did not 
testify as to the actual value of GSI's trade secrets or 
the actual diminution in value of either GSI's trade 
secrets or GSI, itself, as a result of the defendants' 
actions.  Riley's testimony, as a whole, only supported 
GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act. 
 
Additionally, Kace G. Clawson ("Clawson") testified 
for GSI as an expert in the field of business valuation.  
Clawson stated, however, that he would testify solely 
regarding trade secret misappropriation.  Upon voir dire 
examination for qualification as an expert, the following 
exchange occurred: 
[Defendants' Counsel:] Sir, I'm correct 
that you are not providing an opinion 
or calculation for the contract claim 
in this case; correct? 
 
[Clawson:] That's correct. 
 
[Defendants' Counsel:] And you are [also 
not] providing an opinion with respect 
 
to tortious interference, are 
you? 
 
[Clawson:] That's correct. 
 
 
28 
[Defendants' Counsel:] Sir, you believe you 
are providing an opinion solely on the 
issue of trade secret misappropriation 
 
damages; correct, sir? 
 
[Clawson:] That's correct. 
 
Accordingly, Clawson's testimony was only offered in 
support of GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act and, 
in fact, he only testified regarding two valuations he 
conducted concerning GSI. 
 
First, Clawson valued GSI, with its trade secrets 
and confidential information intact, at just over $34.1 
million.  Second, Clawson valued GSI, when considering 
the risk of loss to its projected cash flow as a result 
of its trade secrets and confidential information not 
being intact, at about $29.7 million – resulting in a 
loss to GSI's overall value of around $4.3 million. 
 
GSI offered the testimony of two expert witnesses 
regarding damages incurred by GSI as a result of the 
defendants' actions but, significantly, Clawson's 
testimony was offered only for GSI's claims under the 
Trade Secrets Act, and Riley's testimony was competent 
only to establish GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets 
Act.   
 
Accordingly, after viewing the evidence on appeal in 
the light most favorable to GSI, we hold that the 
 
29 
evidence was insufficient to: (1) prove, with any 
reasonable certainty, the amount of damages incurred as a 
result of Collelo's alleged breach of contract; and (2) 
prove that GSI incurred damages as a result of 
Autometric's and/or Boeing's tortious interference with a 
contract.  As a result, we hold that the trial court did 
not err in striking GSI's breach of contract and tortious 
interference with a contract claims.    
4. GSI's Claim for Attorneys' Fees in Connection  
with its Breach of Contract Claim 
 
 
In its complaint, GSI claimed that it was entitled 
to recover its attorneys' fees and costs in connection 
with its breach of contract claim, pursuant to section 
5.8 of the Employment Agreement.  However, because GSI 
cannot prevail on its breach of contract claim, we hold 
that the trial court did not err in dismissing GSI's 
claim for attorneys' fees in connection with its breach 
of contract claim.  
5. Collelo's Claim for Attorneys' Fees in Connection 
 with the Breach of Contract Claim 
 
Following the trial court's dismissal of GSI's suit, 
Collelo filed a motion for attorneys' fees, alleging that 
he was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 
section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement.  The trial court 
ultimately ruled that "only [A]ddendum B is at issue in 
 
30 
this case," and the subject matter contained in Addendum 
B was "the subject of this lawsuit and the trial that was 
had in this matter."  Consequently, the trial court 
denied Collelo's motion for attorneys' fees, finding, as 
a matter of law, that only the section 10.2 attorneys' 
fees provision in Addendum B governed and, under that 
provision, only GSI could be awarded attorneys' fees.  
The contract in this case was made up of three 
documents: (1) the "Employment Agreement;" (2) "Addendum 
A;" and (3) "Addendum B," which included the non-
solicitation and non-disclosure provisions.  
Significantly, the contract included two different 
attorneys' fees provisions; one in the Employment 
Agreement and one in Addendum B.  By the plain language 
of the contract, each attorneys' fee provision only 
applies to the contract document in which it is found. 
 
Specifically, the Employment Agreement stated: "THIS 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is made and 
entered into . . . between [GSI and Collelo]."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement stated 
that, "[i]n the event of a dispute arising out of the 
interpretation or enforcement of this Agreement, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs."  (Emphasis added.)   
 
31 
 
Additionally, Addendum B stated that: 
I [(Collelo)] hereby enter into this 
Employee Confidential Information, Non-
Competition, Non-Disparagement and Non-
Solicitation Agreement (the "Agreement") 
and agree as follows: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
10.2  I agree that if [GSI] is 
successful in whole or in part in any 
legal or equitable action against me under 
this Agreement, the Company shall be 
entitled to payment of all costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, from 
me. 
 
(Emphasis added and in original.) 
 
The trial court denied Collelo's motion for 
attorneys' fees and costs, explaining that, 
these parties had contract documents that 
contained two different fee-shifting 
provisions for two different documents 
which were part of the contract documents, 
namely, the [E]mployment [Agreement] and 
[Addendum B].  This suit was only as to 
the nonsolicitation or noncompetition 
contract [(Addendum B)]. 
 
 
That being the case, the fee 
provision which is at issue and which 
would allow for the recovery of fees 
allows for the recovery of fees only as to 
GSI if it prevails.  It did not prevail. 
 
 
The trial court did not err in ruling that the 
attorneys' fees provision in the Employment Agreement 
applies to disputes arising out of that document and the 
attorneys' fees provision in Addendum B applies to 
 
32 
disputes arising out of the subject matter of that 
document.  Further, the trial court did not err in 
holding that Collelo could not recover attorneys' fees 
under Addendum B. 
 
An examination of GSI's complaint demonstrates that 
GSI's breach of contract claim ("Breach of Contract – 
Collelo") was based entirely upon the subject matter of 
Addendum B.  Specifically, GSI alleged that: (1) "Collelo 
was obligated not to perform Conflicting Services for any 
of GSI's current or potential customers"; (2) Collelo's 
"performance of Conflicting Services for GSI's customer, 
Autometric and/or Boeing [was] a breach of the Employment 
Agreement"; (3) "Collelo was obligated to maintain the 
secrecy of all of GSI's confidential information"; and 
(4) "Collelo's disclosure of GSI's confidential 
information to Autometric and/or Boeing [was] a breach of 
the Employment Agreement."  Significantly, Addendum B's 
non-solicitation provision prohibited Collelo from 
soliciting, performing, or attempting to perform any 
"Conflicting Services for a Customer or . . . of [GSI's]" 
for a period of one year after Collelo's employment with 
GSI ended.  Similarly, Addendum B's non-disclosure 
provision provided that Collelo would "not disclose 
[GSI's] Confidential Information to any person or entity 
 
33 
without first obtaining [GSI's] written consent."  
Accordingly, a careful review of the pleadings and the 
arguments made at trial and on appeal reveals that the 
trial court did not err when it concluded that the 
subject of the breach of contract claim involved matters 
arising out of Addendum B. 
 
Finally, we address Collelo's arguments that the 
trial court erred by permitting GSI to argue that 
Addendum B attorneys' fee provisions applied when it had 
previously pled that section 5.8 of the Employment 
Agreement applied.  First, Collelo argues that judicial 
estoppel prohibits this change of position.  We disagree.  
As we have previously observed, "[t]he doctrine of 
judicial estoppel applies where the position taken is 
inconsistent relative 'to the same fact or state of 
facts.' " Lofton Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 
268 Va. 377, 382, 601 S.E.2d 648, 651 (2004) (quoting 
Burch v. Grace St. Bldg. Corp., 168 Va. 329, 340, 191 
S.E. 672, 677 (1937)). 
Next, Collelo argues that the trial court erred in 
permitting GSI to take a legal position inconsistent with 
is pleadings in violation of the prohibition against 
approbation and reprobation.  "The prohibition against 
approbation and reprobation forces a litigant to elect a 
 
34 
particular position, and confines a litigant to the 
position that she first adopted."  Matthews v. Matthews, 
277 Va. 522, 528, 675 S.E.2d 157, 160 (2009).  The 
principle stated by Collelo is certainly correct; 
however, it does not apply in this case.  GSI's pleadings 
did assert that section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement 
provided for an award of attorneys' fees in the event 
that it prevailed on the breach of contract claim.  This 
position is not inconsistent with its later position that 
Collelo was not entitled to attorneys' fees under 
Addendum B.  The trial court did not err in denying 
Collelo's motion for attorneys' fees in relation to GSI's 
breach of contract claim. 
III. Conclusion 
We hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed 
GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act.  We also hold 
that the trial court did not err when it dismissed GSI's: 
(1) breach of contract claim; (2) tortious interference 
with a contract claim; and (3) claim for attorneys' fees 
in connection with its breach of contract claim.  
Finally, we hold that the trial court did not err when it 
denied Collelo's motion for attorneys' fees in relation 
to GSI's breach of contract claim. 
 
35 
Accordingly, we will affirm in part and reverse in 
part the judgment of the trial court and remand this case 
for a new trial on GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets 
Act. 
 
 
 
 
Record No. 101411 – Affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
Record No. 101421 – Affirmed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
 
While I agree with the majority's holdings in this case 
in all other respects, I disagree with the majority holding in 
part II.A.2.  The majority reverses the trial court's 
dismissal of Geographic Services Inc.'s (GSI) claims under the 
Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Trade Secrets Act), Code 
§§ 59.1-336 through -343.  The trial court, in my opinion, 
reached the correct result regarding GSI's Trade Secrets Act 
claims when it granted the motion filed by the Boeing Company, 
Autometric, Inc. and Anthony Collelo (collectively, the 
defendants) to strike GSI's evidence offered in support of 
those claims.  I reach that conclusion because I believe GSI 
failed, as a matter of law, to present evidence sufficient to 
submit those claims for damages to the jury under any of GSI's 
theories for recovery under the Trade Secrets Act. 
I. 
 
36 
The Trade Secrets Act provides that the complainant, upon 
establishing the misappropriation of a trade secret, is 
"entitled to recover damages" to the extent the complainant 
can also prove "the actual loss caused by misappropriation," 
or "the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is 
not taken into account in computing actual loss."  Code 
§ 59.1-338(A) (emphasis added).  Additionally, as a third 
alternative, "[i]f a complainant is unable to prove a greater 
amount of damages by other methods of measurement, the damages 
caused by misappropriation can be measured exclusively by 
imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a 
misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade 
secret."  Id. (emphasis added). 
To establish a prima facie case under this statutory 
scheme during its case-in-chief, GSI had the burden to show 
" 'with reasonable certainty the amount of [its] damages and 
the cause from which they resulted [i.e., misappropriation of 
its trade secret]; speculation and conjecture cannot form the 
basis of the recovery.' "  Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 
274 Va. 438, 455, 650 S.E.2d 687, 696 (2007) (quoting Saks 
Fifth Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 272 Va. 177, 188, 630 S.E.2d 
304, 311 (2006)); See Sunrise Continuing Care, LLC v. Wright, 
277 Va. 148, 154, 671 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2009) ("The plaintiff 
bears the burden to establish the element of damages with 
 
37 
reasonable certainty." (citation omitted)).  In order to make 
that showing, GSI was thus required to demonstrate " 'a causal 
connection between the defendant[s'] wrongful conduct and the 
damages asserted.' "  Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 
(quoting Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 189, 630 S.E.2d at 
311).  Furthermore, GSI had to establish " 'the amount of 
those [alleged] damages by using a proper method and factual 
foundation for calculating damages.' "  Id. 
The defendants "test[ed]" the legal sufficiency of GSI's 
evidence of damages under the Trade Secrets Act by filing 
their motion to strike GSI’s evidence, Supervalu, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 276 Va. 356, 369, 666 S.E.2d 335, 342 (2008); Little 
v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718, 652 S.E.2d 129, 141 (2007); and 
the sufficiency of that evidence is squarely before us on 
appeal, which, as an issue of law, we review de novo.  Syed v. 
ZH Techs., Inc., 280 Va. 58, 68, 694 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2010); 
Banks, 274 Va. at 451, 650 S.E.2d at 694.  See Costner v. 
Lackey, 223 Va. 377, 382, 290 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1982) ("In 
considering the motion to strike the plaintiffs' evidence, the 
trial court was not sitting as the fact finder but was ruling 
on a matter of law to determine whether the [plaintiffs] had 
made out a prima facie case."). 
Just as with GSI's other claims in this case, the circuit 
court's granting of the defendants' motion to strike should be 
 
38 
affirmed as to GSI's Trade Secrets Act claims if "'it is 
conclusively apparent that [GSI] has proven no cause of action 
against [the] defendant[s] [under the Trade Secrets Act], or 
[if] it plainly appears that the trial court would [have been] 
compelled to set aside any verdict found for [GSI] [under the 
Trade Secrets Act] as being without evidence to support it.' "  
Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Saks Fifth 
Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 188, 630 S.E.2d at 311).  The majority 
summarily concludes that GSI presented sufficient evidence on 
the elements of damages under the Trade Secrets Act.  I 
disagree.  
II. 
At trial, GSI offered the testimony of two expert 
witnesses regarding its alleged damages recoverable against 
the defendants under the Trade Secrets Act as a result of 
their actions in this case.  Michele Riley (Riley) testified 
for GSI as an expert on the quantification of damages 
concerning unjust enrichment, reasonable royalties and 
disclosure of confidential information - all in the context of 
trade secrets misappropriation.  Kace Clawson (Clawson) 
testified for GSI as an expert in the field of business 
valuation. 
A. Actual Loss 
 
39 
Regarding actual loss, GSI presented (i) Clawson's 
testimony as to two valuations he conducted concerning GSI; 
and (ii) Riley's testimony regarding GSI's cost to develop its 
alleged trade secret in relation to its geonames procedure. 
(i) Clawson.  According to Clawson, he valued GSI, with 
its trade secret and confidential information intact, at just 
over $34.1 million.  Clawson then valued GSI by purportedly 
taking into consideration the risk of loss to GSI's projected 
cash flow as a result of the disclosure of its trade secret 
and confidential information.  This variable, Clawson stated, 
reduced GSI's value to about $29.7 million – resulting in a 
loss to GSI's overall value of around $4.4 million. 
This evidence was insufficient, however, to submit the 
question of "actual loss" to the jury.  Clawson admitted that 
his testimony regarding his two valuations of GSI had nothing 
to do with GSI's actual loss.  Upon voir dire examination for 
qualification as an expert, the following exchange occurred: 
[Defendants' counsel:] Sir, if I wanted to know or 
the [c]ourt wanted to know or the jury wanted to know how 
much money was actually lost by GSI, out-of-pocket loss, 
your opinion does not deal with that issue; true? 
 
[Clawson:] That's correct. 
 
[Defendants' counsel:] You are not offering an 
opinion that GSI lost one, three, five, or any amount of 
millions of dollars because of the allegations of the 
misappropriation here in terms of actual dollars; 
correct? 
 
 
40 
[Clawson:] That's correct. 
 
 
Clawson also admitted that his valuations purportedly 
measured GSI's total worth on only one particular date, 
February 28, 2008, before Collelo joined Boeing in March 2008; 
and that he did not "take into account any real world events," 
and did not consider whether GSI lost or gained any customers 
or contracts following Collelo's employment at Boeing. 
(ii) Riley.  Riley testified that she agreed with GSI's 
determination that the cost to develop its trade secret was 
about $3.3 million.  Riley indicated that this sum represented 
an "actual loss to GSI" in that "the value [of GSI's trade 
secret had] decreased because of Boeing's use of the trade 
secret."  Yet, Riley did not testify as to the actual value of 
GSI's trade secret or the actual diminution in value of either 
GSI's trade secret or GSI, itself, as a result of the 
defendants' actions.  Moreover, Riley admitted that there was 
no evidence of Boeing taking any contracts away from GSI. 
The insufficiency of the testimony of both Clawson and 
Riley as evidence of actual loss to GSI allegedly caused by 
the defendants is reinforced by the testimony of GSI's 
operations manager, Jennifer Lopatin.  Lopatin admitted that 
GSI could not "point to any money, whether it's a million or 
half a million, that was actually lost in terms of a contract 
 
41 
or any actual money."  In short, she stated, GSI "ha[d not] 
actually lost [any] money." 
In the context of a trade secret case, I find no legal 
authority, nor has GSI cited any, supporting an award of 
either (a) the alleged diminished value of a business or (b) 
the development costs of a trade secret, as damages for 
"actual loss" to the plaintiff, where the plaintiff, as here, 
remains a viable business, continues to fully utilize the 
trade secret process, and has not, in fact, shown any lost 
profits as a result of the misappropriation.  
As a result, I would hold that GSI did not use " 'a 
proper method and factual foundation for calculating' " actual 
loss damages; and that it thus failed to prove " 'with 
reasonable certainty' " any actual losses it may have 
sustained.  Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting 
Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 189, 630 S.E.2d at 311).  
Consequently, in my view, GSI's proof of damages on this issue 
was insufficient to submit to the jury. 
B. Unjust Enrichment 
To recover on its claim for unjust enrichment under the 
Trade Secrets Act, GSI had to prove (1) it conferred a benefit 
on Boeing, albeit involuntarily; (2) Boing knew of the benefit 
and should reasonably have expected to repay GSI; and (3) 
Boing accepted or retained the benefit without paying for its 
 
42 
value. See Schmidt v. Household Finance Corp., 276 Va. 108, 
116, 661 S.E.2d 834 (2008) (setting forth elements of unjust 
enrichment claim).  
In quantifying GSI's unjust enrichment claim, Riley 
testified that she multiplied the total amount of revenue 
billed by Boeing for geonames work following Collelo's arrival 
(approximately $5.8 million) by the profit margin earned by 
Boeing on its geonames work as testified to by Boeing's 
corporate designee (12 percent).  Accordingly, Riley concluded 
that Boeing received almost $700,000 in unjust enrichment. 
Riley admitted, however, to attributing Boeing's total 
geonames revenue following Collelo's arrival at Boeing to the 
acquisition of GSI's trade secret, despite the fact that two-
thirds of the contracts Riley relied upon in her calculation 
were in place before Collelo worked at Boeing.  In so doing, 
Riley did not attempt to distinguish between Boeing's just 
enrichment, in the form of geonames profits earned on 
contracts which were in place before Boeing hired Collelo, and 
Boeing's alleged unjust enrichment, in the form of any 
earnings received due to the misappropriation of GSI's trade 
secret. 
Moreover, Riley admitted that her unjust enrichment 
calculation did not "try to figure out how much better, faster 
or stronger things became" at Boeing, or "how much more 
 
43 
efficient" Boeing became following Collelo's arrival.  Rather 
than providing a factual basis upon which a jury could discern 
between Boeing's just and unjust enrichment, Riley testified 
that "the jury can decide for itself how to work the numbers 
out." 
I therefore would hold that GSI did not use " 'a proper 
method and factual foundation for calculating' " unjust 
enrichment damages; and that GSI thus failed to prove " 'with 
reasonable certainty' " the amount Boeing may have been 
unjustly enriched due to its misappropriation of GSI's trade 
secret.  Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting 
Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 189, 630 S.E.2d at 311).  
Consequently, in my view, GSI's proof of damages on this issue 
was also insufficient to submit to the jury. 
C. Reasonable Royalty 
Finally, regarding a reasonable royalty, Riley testified 
that she used the "rule of thumb" commonly used in her 
practice called the "25 percent rule."  Application of this 
rule, Riley stated, would result in GSI receiving 25 percent 
of the profit attributable to Boeing's use of GSI's trade 
secret as a reasonable royalty.  Riley stated this would 
amount to almost $175,000.  Most significantly, Riley 
explained that she derived this sum by multiplying Boeing's 
 
44 
alleged $700,000 unjust enrichment profit margin following 
Collelo's arrival by 25 percent. 
This means Riley's reasonable royalty calculation was 
based entirely upon her flawed unjust enrichment calculation 
discussed above.  I therefore would hold that GSI did not use 
" 'a proper method and factual foundation for calculating' " a 
reasonable royalty; and that GSI thus failed to prove " 'with 
reasonable certainty' " the amount of any reasonable royalty 
it may have been entitled to.  Id.  Consequently, in my 
opinion, GSI's proof of damages on this issue was likewise 
insufficient to submit to the jury. 
III. 
After considering the evidence on appeal in the light 
most favorable to GSI, I would hold that GSI did not present 
evidence sufficient to submit its claims for damages to a jury 
under any of GSI's theories of recovery under the Trade 
Secrets Act.  It plainly appears to me that GSI "'has proven 
no cause of action against [the] defendant[s]'" under the 
Trade Secrets Act; and that the trial court would have been 
" 'compelled to set aside any verdict found for [GSI] as being 
without evidence to support it.' "  Id. (quoting Saks Fifth 
Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 188, 630 S.E.2d at 311).  Thus, despite 
the trial court's error in concluding that one who is accused 
of misappropriating a trade secret must use the trade secret 
 
45 
to compete with the holder of the trade secret, I would hold 
that the trial court properly sustained the defendants' motion 
to strike in relation to GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets 
Act.