Title: Kevin Don Foster v. State of Florida – Corrected Opinion
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC18-860
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-860 
____________ 
 
KEVIN DON FOSTER, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
December 6, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Kevin Don Foster, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals a circuit court 
order denying his successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the denial of 
relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Foster, leader of the “Lords of Chaos,” was convicted in Lee County of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1996 murder of Riverdale High 
School band director Mark Schwebes.  See Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 909 
 
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(Fla. 2000).  The facts, which are fully set forth in the opinion on direct appeal, are 
summarized as follows. 
In April 1996, Foster and two other teenagers formed the “Lords of Chaos,” 
a gang which was intended “to create disorder in the Fort Myers community 
through a host of criminal acts.”  Id. at 909.  The membership grew to include 
others, including several who were involved in the murder of Schwebes or the 
events immediately preceding his death.  Id. 
On April 30, 1996, the group decided to vandalize Riverdale High and set 
the school’s auditorium on fire.  Id. at 910.  Foster and two others (Christopher 
Black and Thomas Torrone) entered the school and stole various items, including a 
fire extinguisher that they intended to use to break the auditorium windows.  Id.  
Several others stood watch outside.  Id. 
However, the group was interrupted by Schwebes, who came to the school 
auditorium after leaving a nearby school function.  Id.  Foster ran when he saw 
Schwebes, leaving Black and Torrone behind.  Id.  Schwebes confronted Black and 
Torrone, retrieved the stolen items, and told them that he was going to report them 
to the campus police the following day.  Id. 
Black and Torrone later rejoined Foster and the others and described their 
encounter with Schwebes.  Id.  Convinced that Schwebes would follow through on 
his promise to report them, Black stated that Schwebes “has got to die.”  Id.  Foster 
 
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agreed, offering to kill Schwebes if Black could not bring himself to do it.  Id.  
They discussed how to carry out the murder and ultimately agreed to go to 
Schwebes’ house and kill him.  Id.  After calling 411 to get Schwebes’ address and 
obtaining a map to find the location of the house, Foster and others traveled there, 
where Foster, armed with a shotgun, shot Schwebes in the face and pelvis.  Id.  The 
medical examiner testified that the shot to the face would have killed Schwebes 
instantly.  Id. 
 
The jury recommended death in a nine-to-three vote.  Id. at 912.  In 
imposing a sentence of death, the trial court found two aggravating factors: (1) the 
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, 
and (2) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (CCP).  Id.  The trial court considered and rejected as a 
statutory mitigating circumstance that Foster was eighteen years old at the time of 
the murder, and it also did not find the existence of any of the nonstatutory 
mitigation presented by the defense.  Id. 
 
Foster appealed his conviction and sentence to this Court, both of which 
were affirmed and became final upon issuance of the mandate in 2001.  Id. at 923.  
He timely filed his initial motion for postconviction relief in 2001, and he filed an 
amended motion in 2010.  Following the trial court’s summary denial of relief, he 
 
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appealed to this Court, which affirmed in 2013.  See Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40, 
76 (Fla. 2013). 
In 2016, Foster filed a successive motion for postconviction relief in light of 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016) (Hurst v. Florida), and this Court’s decision on remand, Hurst v. State, 202 
So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Hurst).  In Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that 
Florida’s death penalty statute violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to the extent that: (1) it required the judge, not the jury, to make the 
factual findings necessary to increase a defendant’s maximum punishment for first-
degree murder from life imprisonment to a death sentence, and (2) it deemed the 
jury’s sentencing recommendation “advisory.”  136 S. Ct. at 622.  On remand, this 
Court held that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida requires that all 
the critical findings necessary before the trial court may consider imposing a 
sentence of death must be found unanimously by the jury.”  202 So. 3d at 44. 
This Court further held that the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution require that if the death penalty is to be imposed, the jury’s 
recommendation of death must be unanimous.  Id.  However, Hurst did not resolve 
whether the decision would be applied retroactively.  That issue was later decided 
in Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016).  In Asay, this Court held that Hurst did 
not apply retroactively and that relief was not available to defendants whose death 
 
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sentences became final before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
Because Foster’s conviction and sentence became final before the United 
States Supreme Court decided Ring, the trial court denied relief, and Foster 
appealed to this Court.  See Foster v. State, 235 So. 3d 294, 295 (Fla. 2018).  
However, we stayed Foster’s appeal pending our decision in Hitchcock v. State, 
226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2018).  We reiterated in Hitchcock that Hurst is not to be 
retroactively applied to cases where the defendant’s death sentence became final 
before Ring was decided.  Id. at 217.  Subsequently, this Court issued an order 
requiring Foster to show cause why his appeal should not be governed by 
Hitchcock.  Upon review, this Court held that Hitchcock was dispositive and 
affirmed the denial of relief.  235 So. 3d at 295. 
Thereafter, Foster filed another successive motion for postconviction relief.  
In that motion, he raised two issues: (1) the jury did not find all of the elements 
required to convict him of what he terms “capital first-degree murder,” and 
(2) Foster’s age of eighteen years old at the time of the murder should preclude the 
imposition of the death penalty.  The trial court summarily denied relief, and this 
appeal followed. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
First-Degree Murder Claim 
As we have previously held, because Foster’s death sentence became final 
before the United States Supreme Court decided Ring, it is subject to the 
retroactivity holdings in Asay and Hitchcock.  However, we write to address 
Foster’s argument regarding the elements of “capital first-degree murder,” and to 
explain why this argument has no merit. 
Under Florida’s revised capital sentencing statute, and consistent with Hurst, 
in order for a defendant to be sentenced to death, the jury must: (1) unanimously 
find at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) identify all 
aggravating factors that it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt; 
(3) unanimously determine whether sufficient aggravating factors exist to impose a 
sentence of death; (4) determine whether any mitigating circumstances exist and 
unanimously determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh those mitigating 
circumstances; and (5) unanimously determine that the defendant should be 
sentenced to death.  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 57; § 921.141(2), Fla. Stat. (2018); 
ch. 2017-1, Laws of Fla.  If the jury makes these findings, it only does so after a 
jury has unanimously convicted the defendant of the capital crime of first-degree 
murder that is delineated in section 782.04, Florida Statutes (2018). 
 
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Hurst reflected a change in this state’s decisional law and, in Asay, we 
concluded “that Hurst should not be applied retroactively to [a] case, in which the 
death sentence became final before the issuance of Ring.”  210 So. 3d at 22. 
However, Foster, whose sentence became final in 2001, asserts that a defendant 
who is convicted of first-degree murder has a substantive right to a life sentence 
unless a unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of 
“capital first-degree murder”—which Foster defines as “murder plus the . . . 
elements the jury is required to find unanimously under revised § 921.141, Fla. 
Stat.”  He argues that a conviction for “capital first-degree murder” requires not 
only the statutorily defined elements of first-degree murder, but the specific 
unanimous penalty phase findings set forth in Hurst; section 921.141, Florida 
Statutes, which was revised to incorporate the Hurst requirements; and chapter 
2017-1, Laws of Florida, which amended section 921.141 to require that a jury’s 
recommendation of death be unanimous.  Foster asserts that he was not convicted 
of all of the elements of “capital first-degree murder” and that his due process and 
Eighth Amendment rights were violated as a result.  We first turn to Foster’s due 
process argument, and then we turn to his Eighth Amendment argument. 
Due Process 
Long-recognized “[a]mong the attributes of due process is the requirement 
that the state must prove an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
 
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Cohen, 568 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1990).  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt extends to 
every element of the crime, “every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which [the accused] is charged.”  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
Before we proceed, we note that under Florida law, there is no crime 
expressly termed “capital first-degree murder.”  Florida law prohibits first-degree 
murder, which is, by definition, a capital crime.  This distinction, while subtle, is 
essential, because contrary to Foster’s argument, it is not the Hurst findings that 
establish first-degree murder as a capital crime for which the death penalty may be 
imposed.  Rather, in Florida, first-degree murder is, by its very definition, a capital 
felony. 
Florida’s substantive statute on murder, codified at section 782.04, Florida 
Statutes, provides as follows: 
 
782.04 Murder.— 
 
(1)(a) The unlawful killing of a human being: 
 
 
1. When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the 
death of the person killed or any human being; 
 
2. When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration 
of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any: [enumerated felonies a.-s.] or 
 
3. Which resulted from the unlawful distribution by a person 
18 years of age or older of any of the following substances, or mixture 
containing any of the following substances, when such substance or 
mixture is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user: 
[enumerated controlled substances a.-i.] 
 
is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082. 
 
 
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(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Thus, the crime of first-degree murder, of which Foster was convicted, is 
defined in section 782.04 as a capital felony—this is regardless of whether the 
death penalty is ultimately imposed.  Moreover, section 921.141(1), “Separate 
Proceedings on Issue of Penalty,” begins as follows: “Upon conviction or 
adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a 
separate proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to 
death or life imprisonment as authorized by s. 775.082.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Further, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112(b) defines a capital trial as “any 
first-degree murder case in which the State has not formally waived the death 
penalty on the record.” 
 
These statutes and the rule of procedure illustrate that the Hurst penalty 
phase findings are not elements of the capital felony of first-degree murder.  
Rather, they are findings required of a jury: (1) before the court can impose the 
death penalty for first-degree murder, and (2) only after a conviction or 
adjudication of guilt for first-degree murder has occurred.  Thus, Foster’s jury did 
find all of the elements necessary to convict him of the capital felony of first-
degree murder—during the guilt phase. 
In sum, a conviction for first-degree murder, a capital felony, solely consists 
of the jury having unanimously found the elements set forth in the substantive first-
 
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degree murder statute and the relevant jury instruction.  The conviction for first-
degree murder must occur before and independently of the penalty-phase findings 
required by Hurst and its related legislative enactments.  The Florida Statutes 
clearly establish the elements of first-degree murder required for a conviction, and 
upon conviction, the required findings in order to sentence a defendant to the death 
penalty.  There is no, as Foster asserts, greater offense of “capital first-degree 
murder.”  Foster’s guilt-phase jury considered all of the elements necessary to 
convict him of first-degree murder, a capital felony.  Thus, his due process 
argument fails. 
Eighth Amendment 
We also reject Foster’s argument that the failure to convict him of every 
element of “capital first-degree murder”—as he defines it—violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  Moreover, as to the argument that his nonunanimous death sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment, an identical claim was raised and rejected in 
Hitchcock.  226 So. 3d at 217 n.2.  Foster is not entitled to relief. 
Roper Claim 
Foster, who was eighteen years old at the time of the murder, argues that the 
trial court erred when it summarily denied his claim that his death sentence is 
unconstitutional.  He encourages this Court to adopt a more expansive view than 
that in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005) (holding unconstitutional the 
 
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imposition of the death penalty upon individuals who were under the age of 
eighteen at the time the murder was committed).  In Roper, the Court said: 
 
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the 
objections always raised against categorical rules.  The qualities that 
distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual 
turns 18.  By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a 
level of maturity some adults will never reach.  For the reasons we 
have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. . . .  The age of 18 is 
the point where society draws the line for many purposes between 
childhood and adulthood.  It is, we conclude, the age at which the line 
for death eligibility ought to rest. 
 
Id. at 574.  Foster argues that newly discovered evidence reveals an emerging 
consensus in the scientific community that young adults are developmentally akin 
to juveniles, and he asks this Court to extend the protection in Roper.  For the 
reasons explained below, Foster is not entitled to relief. 
In order to obtain relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, “the 
evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the 
time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not 
have known of it by the use of diligence.”  Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 
2009).   Additionally, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  Id. 
As newly discovered evidence, Foster cites articles from 2016, 2017, and 
earlier that focused on young adults ages eighteen to twenty-one and concluded 
that their cognitive development renders them more likely to engage in impulsive 
 
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and risky behavior such as criminal activity.  He also highlights objective indicia 
of consensus, including a national trend against sentencing young adult offenders 
to death and against carrying out the execution of those already sentenced.  Foster 
suggests that recent actions by state legislatures support the prohibition of death 
sentences for defendants who were age twenty-one and under at the time of their 
crimes, but he admits that no state has passed a law specifically geared toward that 
age group.  Foster also cites a 2018 American Bar Association resolution which 
recommended that the death penalty be prohibited as to defendants twenty-one 
years of age and younger at the time of their crimes.  In sum, Foster argues that 
evolving standards of decency render his death sentence invalid under the Eighth 
Amendment.  As he acknowledges, however, this Court has rejected similar claims 
of newly discovered evidence—most recently in Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981 
(Fla. 2018). 
Eric Scott Branch, while under a death warrant, argued that his death 
sentence was unconstitutional because he was twenty-one years old at the time of 
the murder.  Id. at 985.  In a manner very similar to Foster, and citing some of the 
same research, Branch argued that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that 
young people in their late teens and early twenties lack the cognitive development 
that is necessary to be eligible for the death penalty.  Id.  This Court rejected 
Branch’s argument on procedural grounds and also rejected the claim of newly 
 
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discovered evidence, saying: “[W]e have rejected similar claims on the basis that 
scientific research with respect to brain development does not qualify as newly 
discovered evidence.”  Id. at 986.  Importantly, this Court also reaffirmed its 
adherence to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Roper.  Id. at 987.  This 
Court observed: 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has continued to 
identify eighteen as the critical age for purposes of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 
465, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (prohibiting 
mandatory sentences of life without parole for homicide offenders 
who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 
(2010) (prohibiting sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide 
offenders who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen). 
Therefore, unless the United States Supreme Court determines that the 
age of ineligibility for the death penalty should be extended, we will 
continue to adhere to Roper. 
 
Branch, 236 So. 3d at 987. 
Foster attempts to distinguish his case from Branch because Branch was 
twenty-one years old while Foster was eighteen years old at the time of their 
respective crimes.  In light of Roper, this distinction has no merit.  As we did in 
Branch, we reaffirm our adherence to Roper.  Foster is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Foster’s 
successive motion for postconviction relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
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PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concur in result. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
WITHIN SEVEN DAYS.  A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
AFTER THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION.  NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD 
EXPIRES TO FILE A REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF 
FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lee County,  
Joseph Fuller, Jr., Judge - Case No.  361996CF001362000BCH 
 
Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Scott Gavin, Assistant 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,  
  
for Appellant  
  
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,  
  
 
for Appellee