Title: State v. Purdy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-843
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-843 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNETH PURDY,  
Respondent. 
 
August 30, 2018 
 
LAWSON, J. 
We accepted review of the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Purdy v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D272 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 27, 2017), to answer 
the following certified question: 
WHEN A JUVENILE OFFENDER IS ENTITLED TO A 
SENTENCE REVIEW HEARING, IS THE TRIAL COURT 
REQUIRED TO REVIEW THE AGGREGATE SENTENCE THAT 
THE JUVENILE OFFENDER IS SERVING FROM THE SAME 
SENTENCING PROCEEDING IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO 
MODIFY THE OFFENDER’S SENTENCE BASED UPON 
DEMONSTRATED MATURITY AND REHABILITATION? 
 
Purdy v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D967, D967 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr. 28, 2017) 
(certifying question).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We 
 
 
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answer the certified question in the negative and quash the Fifth District’s decision, 
which held that chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, requires modification of the 
overall sentence whenever a juvenile establishes rehabilitation at a statutorily 
required sentence review hearing.    
BACKGROUND 
I.  Legal Context 
In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids a sentence of life 
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders and requires that any life 
sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender be accompanied by “some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation” before the end of the sentence and during the offender’s natural life.   
 
Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), the 
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a 
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide 
offenders.  Although the holdings of Graham and Miller are narrow and specific, 
the discussion in both cases broadly outlines Eighth Amendment principles 
requiring states to take into account, as part of the sentencing process, the 
immaturity of those under the age of 18—and the consequent ability of younger 
 
 
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offenders to reform as they mature.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 567 U.S. 
at 471-72.    
In response, the Florida Legislature adopted chapter 2014-220, Laws of 
Florida, codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida 
Statutes, to address the Eighth Amendment principles articulated in Graham and 
Miller.  Although the effective date of these statutes was prospective as of July 1, 
2014, this Court later unanimously held that Miller applied retroactively, see 
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 962 (Fla. 2015), and that when a juvenile sentence 
imposed before July 1, 2014, violates Miller, the appropriate remedy is 
resentencing pursuant to chapter 2014-220.  Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 405-
06 (Fla. 2015); see also Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015) 
(unanimously holding that resentencing pursuant to chapter 2014-220 is the proper 
remedy for a sentence that violates Graham).        
Significantly, in this case, the parties present and argue the certified question 
as one of statutory construction, which is answered by the plain language of the 
relevant statutes.  See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (“[W]hen the 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation 
and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” 
(quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931))).   
 
 
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Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.  See Borden v. 
East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006).   
II.  Relevant Statutes 
Sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2015), now 
provide special sentencing rules for juveniles convicted of “certain serious 
felonies” identified in those statutes.  Ch. 2014-220 (title); see also § 921.1402, 
Fla. Stat. (2015) (“Review of sentences for persons convicted of specified offenses 
while under the age of 18 years.”) (emphasis added).1  Those provisions, by their 
express terms, apply only to homicide offenses, which are defined in section 
782.04, Florida Statutes (2015), and nonhomicide offenses that can be punished by 
life.  §§ 775.082(1)(b), 775.082(3)(a)5., 775.082(3)(b)2., 775.082(3)(c)., Fla. Stat. 
(2015).  As drafted, the special sentencing rules created by chapter 2014-220 do 
not apply to any other offenses.  Id.  For the “specified offenses,” each subsection 
provides an early release mechanism, based on a finding of maturity and 
rehabilitation, for the sentence imposed pursuant to that subsection on the specified 
offense.  Id.; see, e.g., § 775.082(3)(c) (explaining that a juvenile convicted of a 
nonhomicide offense that is punishable by life or a term of years not exceeding 
                                          
 
 
1.  While the 2015 version of the Florida Statutes applies to the case at issue 
and is therefore the version cited in this opinion, the current 2018 version of the 
Florida Statutes is the same for sections 921.1401, 921.1402, and 775.082. 
 
 
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life, and who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment “of more than 20 years is 
entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(d)”). 
To fully understand chapter 2014-220, it is important to first recognize that 
the Legislature grafted its juvenile sentencing fix into the preexisting general 
statute that set the penalties applicable to each felony offense, by degree—section 
775.082, Florida Statutes.  Immediately prior to the enactment of chapter 2014-
220, section 775.082(1) provided that the only sentences available for a capital 
felony were death or life.  § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2013).  Section 775.082(2) dealt 
with the death penalty.  Id.  Then, section 775.082(3) listed the penalties associated 
with lesser felony offenses, beginning with life felonies and ending with third-
degree felonies.  Id.  For example, section 775.082(3)(c) simply provided that a 
person convicted of a second-degree felony could be punished “by a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.”  Id. 
With the enactment of chapter 2014-220, the Legislature amended section 
775.082(1) to provide new sentencing options for juveniles convicted of capital 
offenses.  For example, a new subsection (1)(b)1 now provides: 
A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the 
victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 [the homicide statute] of 
a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, 
which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall 
be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing 
hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the 
court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence.  If the 
court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such 
 
 
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person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40 
years.  A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph [for a capital 
felony] is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance 
with s. 921.1402(2)(a). 
 
§ 775.082(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2015).  Section 921.1402(2)(a) then provides in 
pertinent part that “[a] juvenile sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b)1. [for a capital 
felony] is entitled to review of his or her sentence after 25 years.”                           
§ 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added).  The only sentence 
referenced as eligible for review in this subsection is the sentence “under s. 
775.082(1)(b)1.,” which is the sentence on the capital felony for a person who 
“actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.”                             
§ 775.082(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2015).  This formula continues in similar fashion for 
the other enumerated serious felonies: other homicide offenses and any 
nonhomicide offense classified as a “life felony” or as a “first-degree felony 
punishable by life” (commonly referenced by trial courts and in sentencing 
documents as an “F1-PBL”).  § 921.1402(2)(b)-(d), Fla. Stat. (2015).  Chapter 
2014-220 did not add any special juvenile sentencing provisions for lower-level 
offenses.  For example, section 775.082 still simply provides that a felony of the 
second degree is to be punished “by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 
years.”  § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2017).  And, no review mechanism is provided 
for first-degree felonies (except for F1-PBLs), second-degree felonies, or third-
degree felonies.  
 
 
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The new juvenile sentencing provisions seem complex because the 
sentencing rules for life felonies and F1-PBLs are complex.  Life felonies 
committed before October 1, 1983, are punishable “by a term of imprisonment for 
life or a term of at least 30 years.”  § 775.082(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2017).  Life 
felonies committed on or after October 1, 1983, but before July 1, 1995, are 
punishable “by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding 40 years.”  § 775.082(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2017).  Life felonies committed 
on or after July 1, 1995, are generally punishable “by a term of imprisonment for 
life or by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.”                
§ 775.082(3)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2017).  However, there are additional sentencing rules 
for some life felonies committed after September 1, 2005, and July 1, 2008.            
§ 775.082(3)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2017).  F1-PBLs are punishable “by imprisonment for 
a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.”  § 775.082(3)(b)1., Fla. Stat. 
(2017).   
 
The new juvenile sentencing rules for life felonies and F1-PBLs are 
categorized based upon whether the underlying offense is a homicide offense or 
nonhomicide offense and the length of sentence imposed.  For example, a juvenile 
sentenced for a nonhomicide life felony to a term-of-years sentence of more than 
20 years is entitled to review of that sentence after 20 years and, for longer 
sentences, is entitled to a second review 10 years after the initial review.              
 
 
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§§ 775.082(3)(c), 921.1402(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2015).  As seen in these examples, 
and in the text itself, the review provisions added by the Legislature are clearly and 
unequivocally linked to those offenses specified in chapter 2014-220.  Although a 
review mechanism is provided for some term-of-years sentences, this is only 
because life felonies and F1-PBLs can be punished by a term-of-years sentence, 
and because a juvenile can now be sentenced to a term-of-years sentence for a 
capital offense.  §§ 775.082(1)(b), 775.082(3)(a)5., 775.082(3)(b)2., 
775.082(3)(c)., Fla. Stat. (2015).   
III.  Procedural History of the Case 
 
Kenneth Purdy was convicted in 1997 of first-degree murder (a capital 
felony), armed robbery (an F1-PBL), and armed carjacking (an F1-PBL).  He was 
sentenced to life without parole for the murder (the only sentence available at the 
time) and to 112.7 months (approximately 9.4 years) for the armed robbery and 
armed carjacking convictions, to run concurrently with one another but consecutive 
to the life sentence.  Purdy was 17 at the time he committed the offenses.  Purdy’s 
convictions and sentences became final in 1998.    
In 2015, Purdy filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.800, arguing that his life sentence violated Miller.  Purdy did not seek 
relief on the sentences imposed consecutively to the life sentence.  The trial court 
granted the relief requested and resentenced Purdy to 40 years for the murder 
 
 
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conviction pursuant to chapter 2014-220, in accordance with Horsley, with no 
change to the 112.7-month sentences.  Consistent with sections 921.1402(2) and 
(4), Florida Statutes (2015), the trial court later conducted the required review and 
determined that Purdy was “rehabilitated and that it reasonably believed [Purdy] to 
be fit to reenter society.”  Purdy, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D272.  Based upon this 
determination, the judge reduced the 40-year sentence to 20 years, 6 months and 13 
days—the amount of time already served on that sentence—followed by 10 years 
of probation.  Determining that the statute did not authorize review of the other 
sentences, Purdy was returned to prison to begin serving the 112.7-month 
sentences.  Because probation is tolled during incarceration, Evans v. Singletary, 
737 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 1999), Purdy will begin serving the probationary term 
now associated with the murder conviction after serving the 112.7-month 
sentences, unless further relief is granted.   
On appeal, the Fifth District reversed and remanded for the trial court to 
conduct another review hearing, holding that a trial court is required to review a 
juvenile offender’s aggregate sentence at a sentence review hearing in order to 
determine whether to modify the sentence based on maturity and rehabilitation.  
Purdy, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D273.  The textual basis for this holding is unclear.  
The Fifth District also certified the question as one of great public importance.  Id. 
at D967. 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Because the plain language of section 921.1402, Florida Statutes, only 
provides for review of the sentence imposed for Purdy’s murder conviction 
pursuant to the new provisions added by chapter 2014-220 as sections 
775.082(1)(b) and 921.1402(2)—and because no other provision authorizes 
resentencing on consecutive sentences—the trial court was correct in determining 
that the statute does not provide any basis for resentencing for the 112.7-month 
sentences.  See Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219.  Although section 921.1402(2)(d) 
authorizes review of sentences for nonhomicide F1-PBLs imposed pursuant to 
section 775.082(3)(c), Purdy never sought relief from the sentences imposed for 
his armed robbery and armed carjacking convictions, the consequence being that 
he was not resentenced pursuant to chapter 2014-220 on those convictions.  Even if 
Purdy had been resentenced pursuant to section 775.082(3)(c) for the additional 
convictions, the 112.7-month sentences would not qualify for review because the 
plain language of section 921.1402(2)(d) only provides for review if the juvenile is 
sentenced “to a term of 20 years or more under s. 775.082(3)(c) [on the 
nonhomicide F1-PBL]” and Purdy was sentenced to less than 10 years on each F1-
PBL.    
On appeal, we have been presented with arguments pointing to several gaps 
and anomalies in the statutory scheme enacted to address the Eighth Amendment 
 
 
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issues associated with juvenile sentencing.  First, by limiting the review provisions 
to sentences imposed on crimes that carry a potential life sentence, chapter 2014-
220 failed to address all potential Eighth Amendment violations.  Henry, 175 So. 
3d 679-80 (unanimously holding that stacked consecutive term-of-years sentences 
that in combination exceed the life expectancy of a juvenile nonhomicide offender 
and do not provide a review mechanism violate the Eighth Amendment).   
Second, because the statute limits the review provisions and does not deal 
with the overall sentence, there will be other cases, like this one, where the 
sentencing court is required to consider whether the offender “is rehabilitated and 
is reasonably believed to be fit to reenter society” even though the offender will 
continue to be incarcerated irrespective of the outcome of the hearing.  Amicus 
points out that the continued incarceration of an offender on offenses arising from 
a single criminal episode under these circumstances—long after a judicial 
determination that the juvenile offender is rehabilitated—may raise additional 
Eighth Amendment issues.2      
Third, by limiting the review provisions to certain serious offenses, the 
Legislature has placed juveniles convicted of serious violent felonies in a better 
                                          
 
 
2.  Cognizant of these issues, we observe that our decision today only 
addresses the statutory construction issue presented and does not foreclose Purdy 
from challenging his consecutive 112.7-month sentences in the trial court on 
Eighth Amendment grounds. 
 
 
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position than juveniles who commit less serious nonviolent offenses.  For example, 
section 775.082(1)(b) provides that a juvenile convicted of homicide (a capital 
offense) but who did not “actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim” 
is entitled to review of his or her sentence—and potential release from prison—
after 15 years.  § 775.082(1)(b).  By contrast, a juvenile convicted of one count of 
sale or delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school commits a 
first-degree felony and can be sentenced to 30 years in prison with no review and 
no opportunity for early release.  §§ 893.13(1)(c)1., 775.082(3)(b)1., Fla. Stat. 
(2015). 
But the existence of these limitations in the coverage of section 921.1402 
provides no basis for a judicial expansion of the statute that ignores the 
unambiguous statutory provisions.  See, e.g., State v. Weeks, 202 So. 3d 1, 7 (Fla. 
2016) (“[W]e are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way 
which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and 
obvious implications.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We recognize that the 
scope of the existing statutory scheme has arisen in a context that is evolving and 
has to date focused more narrowly on the categorical rule announced in Graham, 
and on Miller, both of which found Eighth Amendment violations associated with 
juvenile life sentences.  Given that context, and the fact that chapter 2014-220 was 
 
 
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enacted prior to Henry, it is understandable that the Legislature would have crafted 
a statute dealing only with offenses that carry potential life sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the plain language of the juvenile sentencing statutes does not 
provide for aggregation of sentences at judicial sentence review, we answer the 
certified question in the negative, quash the Fifth District’s decision below, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., concurs. 
QUINCE, J., dissents.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.  
 
 
The narrow certified question in this case is whether the trial court should 
have considered Purdy’s aggregate sentence resulting from criminal acts that arose 
from one criminal episode that occurred at the same time on the same day.  I would 
answer that question in the affirmative because failing to consider a juvenile 
defendant’s aggregate prison sentence for crimes that arose from a single criminal 
episode when determining whether the sentence is constitutional violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
 
 
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In 1997, Kenneth Purdy was sentenced to life without parole for a 1995 first-
degree murder and a consecutive sentence of 9.4 years for armed robbery and 
armed kidnapping (concurrent with each other but not to the first-degree murder), 
all of which arose from the same criminal episode that occurred on the same day at 
the same time.  At his resentencing hearing in 2015, conducted pursuant to the 
United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), 
the trial court made the constitutionally required determinations and found that 
Purdy was “rehabilitated” and “fit to reenter society.”  Yet, considering itself 
constrained by its interpretation of the applicable sentencing statutes, which the 
plurality adopts today, the trial court concluded that it did not have the authority to 
consider Purdy’s aggregate sentence of life plus 9.4 years.  In my view, that result, 
if compelled by the plain reading of the statute, as the plurality suggests, leads to a 
clear Eighth Amendment violation in Purdy’s case. 
 
 The result reached by the plurality today ignores and cannot be reconciled 
with the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48 (2010), and Miller and this Court’s subsequent opinions in Henry v. State, 175 
So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015), and Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 405 (Fla. 2015).  
Leighdon Henry received an aggregate term-of-years’ sentence of ninety-years’ 
imprisonment but, unlike Purdy, was granted relief by this Court.  See Henry, 175 
So. 3d at 676.  Henry, like Purdy, was seventeen at the time of his crimes and was 
 
 
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convicted of a number of crimes, including two counts of robbery and one count of 
kidnapping.  Id.  In granting Henry resentencing, this Court held that “the Eighth 
Amendment will not tolerate prison sentences that lack a review mechanism for 
evaluating this special class of offenders for demonstrable maturity and reform in 
the future because any term of imprisonment for a juvenile is qualitatively different 
than a comparable period of incarceration is for an adult.”  Id. at 680. 
    Purdy’s sentence was the result of a single criminal episode, for which he 
has been found rehabilitated.  Accordingly, I would conclude, based upon this 
Court’s opinion in Henry, that sections 775.082(1)(b) and 921.1402 required the 
trial court to consider and modify Purdy’s aggregate sentence at the resentencing 
hearing.  §§ 775.082(1)(b), 921.1402, Fla. Stat. (2015).  Because the plurality’s 
analysis is one that the Legislature clearly did not contemplate or intend and is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, I dissent.   
ANALYSIS 
It is well-established that juvenile offenders have “diminished culpability” 
relative to adults.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).  As a result, the 
United States Supreme Court held in Graham that if a state sentences a juvenile to 
life for a nonhomicide offense, it must provide “some meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”  560 U.S. at 75.  
Likewise, in Miller, the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
 
 
- 16 - 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders,” including those convicted of homicide offenses.  567 U.S. at 
479.   
It was against this backdrop that the Legislature adopted chapter 2014-220, 
Laws of Florida.  See §§ 775.082, 921.1401, 921.1402, Fla. Stat. (2015); plurality 
op. at 3.  Chapter 2014-220 provides for “sentence review proceedings to be 
conducted after a specified period of time by the original sentencing court for 
juvenile offenders convicted of certain offenses.”  Ch. 2014-220, Laws of Fla. 
(emphasis added); see § 921.1402(2), (6), Fla. Stat. (2015).  “If the court 
determines . . . that the juvenile offender has been rehabilitated and is reasonably 
believed to be fit to reenter society,” section 921.1402(7) provides that “the court 
shall modify the sentence and impose a term of probation of at least 5 years.”  Id. 
§ 921.1402(7) (emphasis added).  Shortly after the Legislature enacted chapter 
2014-220, this Court unanimously concluded that “applying chapter 2014–220, 
Laws of Florida, to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional 
under Miller is the appropriate remedy.”  Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 405.   
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Graham and 
Miller and this Court’s subsequent opinions in Henry and Horsley, courts 
reviewing sentences under section 921.1402 must have the authority to modify a 
 
 
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juvenile’s aggregate sentence, in order to preserve the statute’s constitutionality.  
As we have previously explained: 
This Court has an obligation to construe a statute in a way that 
preserves its constitutionality.  See State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315, 
316-17 (Fla. 1978) (construing section 812.021(3), in a constitutional 
manner where the statute was procedurally flawed); see also Fla. 
Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609 (Fla. 2004) 
(stating that the Court has an obligation to construe a statute in a way 
that preserves its constitutionality).  It is this Court’s duty to “save 
Florida statutes from the constitutional dustbin whenever possible.”  
Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934 (Fla. 1998).  This Court is 
bound to “resolve all doubts as to the validity of the statute in favor of 
its constitutionality, provided the statute may be given a fair 
construction that is consistent with the federal and state constitutions 
as well as with legislative intent.”  Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 
963 So. 2d 189, 207 (Fla. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 
Perry v. State, 210 So. 3d 630, 638-39 (Fla. 2016).   
 
As a consequence of its interpretation of the statute, the plurality opinion 
correctly concedes that proportionality concerns may arise, stating “by limiting the 
review provisions to certain serious offenses, the Legislature has placed juveniles 
convicted of serious violent felonies in a better position than juveniles who commit 
less serious nonviolent offenses.”  Plurality op. at 11-12.  However, a “sentence 
lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to 
the offense.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.  When continued incarceration advances no 
penological purpose, the punishment runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  See id. at 59 (“The concept of 
 
 
- 18 - 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”).  Indeed, this Court has 
previously held that some juvenile sentences are unconstitutional for this reason: 
Our conclusion that Landrum’s sentence is unconstitutional is also 
compelled by the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should 
be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”  Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (internal quotation omitted).  Upholding 
Landrum’s sentence would violate this precept, as a juvenile 
convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree murder would 
receive a harsher sentence than a juvenile convicted of first-degree 
murder. 
 
Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 460-61 (Fla. 2016).   
  Despite the undeniable proportionality concerns, the plurality declares itself 
bound by the strict language of chapter 2014-220, concluding that “the existence of 
these limitations,” or anomalies, “in the coverage of section 921.1402 provides no 
basis for a judicial expansion of the statute that ignores the unambiguous statutory 
provisions.”  Plurality op. at 12.  Of course, in reaching this conclusion, the 
plurality ignores that we have stated time and again that “a sterile literal 
interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results.”  State 
v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 95 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442, 
448 (Fla. 2006)).   
   
Contrary to the plurality’s assertions, a constitutional interpretation of 
sections 775.082(1)(b) and 921.1402 is possible.  By interpreting section 921.1402 
in a way that permits sentencing courts to review the offender’s “sentence” under 
subsection (7)—which includes the entire sentence for any one criminal episode, 
 
 
- 19 - 
not just the sentence for a particular crime within a criminal episode—this Court 
can preserve the statute’s constitutionality.  Moreover, this interpretation is 
consistent with both this Court’s and the United States Supreme Court’s juvenile 
sentencing jurisprudence.   
In Henry, this Court held that Graham applies with equal force to aggregate 
sentences that do “not afford any ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based 
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ ”  Henry, 175 So. 3d at 679 (quoting 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).  Therefore, Henry’s 90-year aggregate sentence, 
resulting from consecutive sentences imposed on nine separate offenses, violated 
the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 676, 679.  Henry’s offenses, however, like Purdy’s, 
were not all capital, life, or first-degree felonies punishable by life.  Id. at 676.  
Nevertheless, this Court determined that Henry’s consecutive sentences for 
multiple offenses were unconstitutional because the aggregate sentence failed to 
link a meaningful opportunity for release to demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.  Id. at 679-80.  The Court’s remedy would be meaningless if it did 
not apply to each link in the chain creating that constitutional infirmity. 
THIS CASE 
 
In 1995, at the age of seventeen, Purdy committed several crimes during the 
course of one criminal episode.  Consequently, Purdy’s entire sentence—life in 
prison without the possibility of parole plus 9.4 years—arose from the same 
 
 
- 20 - 
criminal episode.  Thus, when the trial court deemed Purdy to be “rehabilitated” 
and “fit to reenter society” this determination was not the byproduct of the trial 
court’s consideration of only the offense of first-degree murder, but rather, the trial 
court’s consideration of all of the crimes which Purdy committed that day.    
Accordingly, I would conclude, as this Court has done previously, that section 
775.082(1)(b) afforded the trial court the authority to review and modify Purdy’s 
aggregate prison sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is an anomaly that Kenneth Purdy, who has proven to the courts of this 
State that he has moved past his previous crimes and is ready to be a contributing 
member of society, must continue to be imprisoned.  That anomaly is 
unconstitutional.  I would, instead, read the applicable statutes as the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal did—to require the trial court to review and allow it to modify a 
juvenile offender’s aggregate sentence for multiple convictions arising out of the 
same criminal episode.  I would thus answer the certified question in the 
affirmative and approve the result reached by the Fifth District.  But, since the 
plurality decision does not reach that result, I urge the Legislature to review the 
unconstitutional incongruities demonstrated by this case.  
LABARGA, J., concurs. 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D16-370 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Wesley Heidt, Bureau 
Chief, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Matthew R. McLain of McLain Law, P.A., Maitland, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Roseanne Eckert, Florida International University College of Law, Miami, Florida, 
and Amy Weber, Fair Punishment Project, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,  
 
Amici Curiae Florida Juvenile Resentencing and Review Project at the FIU 
College of Law and Fair Punishment Project