Title: Johnson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 399, 2021
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GREGORY W. JOHNSON, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 399, 2021 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1804008647 (N) 
§                                      
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 16, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
June 7, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 
Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
After careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion 
to affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Gregory Johnson, appeals the Superior Court’s denial of 
his first motion for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a motion to affirm the 
judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Johnson’s opening 
brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
On January 23, 2019, Johnson pled guilty to one count of possession of 
a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”), one count of first-degree 
reckless endangering, one count of second-degree assault, and one count of third-
degree assault.  As part of the plea agreement, Johnson agreed that he was a habitual 
2 
 
offender and subject to sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d).  In exchange for his 
plea, the State agreed to nolle prosse the remaining fifteen charges in the indictment, 
declare Johnson a habitual offender only on the PFDCF offense, and cap its 
sentencing recommendation to 25 years of incarceration on the PFDCF conviction 
(the minimum-mandatory term under Section 4212(d)).  Following a presentence 
investigation, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion to declare Johnson a 
habitual offender and sentenced Johnson, in accordance with the plea agreement, to 
a total of 25 years of unsuspended Level V incarceration, followed by decreasing 
levels of supervision.  Johnson did not appeal. 
 
(3) 
In July 2019, Johnson filed a motion for sentence modification.  The 
Superior Court denied the motion, noting that the unsuspended portion of Johnson’s 
sentence was a minimum-mandatory term and could not be reduced or suspended.  
In October 2019, Johnson filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence.  The 
Superior Court denied the motion, observing that the plain language of Section 
4214(d) required the court to impose a sentence of 25 years for Johnson’s PFDCF 
conviction. 
 
(4) 
On October 26, 2020, more than a year after his conviction became 
final, Johnson, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion for postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  Johnson alleged that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to retain a psychologist to attest to Johnson’s psychiatric 
3 
 
disorder that “substantially disturbed his thinking, feeling, and behavior” and for 
failing to request a separate hearing on the State’s motion to declare Johnson a 
habitual offender.  Johnson claimed that, but-for counsel’s failure to obtain a mental 
health expert, he would have pled guilty but mentally ill.  In December 2020, the 
Superior Court noted that the motion was untimely but found that it would be 
beneficial to hear trial counsel’s response to Johnson’s allegations of ineffective 
assistance for the court’s “miscarriage of justice” analysis under Rule 61(i)(5).  
Accordingly, the court directed trial counsel to conduct a review of Johnson’s file 
and submit an affidavit responding to the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.  
After expanding the record with the affidavit from trial counsel and briefing, the 
Superior Court granted Johnson’s request to amend his motion for postconviction 
relief limited to his assertion that, but-for counsel’s failure to obtain a mental health 
expert, he would have pled not guilty by reason of insanity.  The Superior Court 
ultimately denied Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief, and this appeal 
followed.  
 
(5) 
On appeal, Johnson tweaks the arguments he made below and argues 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (i) pursue a defense of not guilty by 
reason of insanity, (ii) retain an independent psychologist to aid counsel in 
presenting this defense, and (iii) adequately advise Johnson on the availability of the 
defense of insanity.  Johnson’s claims are unavailing. 
4 
 
(6) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1  The procedural bars of Rule 61 
must be considered before any substantive claims are addressed.2  Rule 61(i)(1) bars 
a motion for postconviction relief “filed more than one year after the judgment of 
conviction is final….”3  This time limitation does not apply, however, to a claim that 
the court lacked jurisdiction or, if the movant was convicted after a trial, he pleads 
with particularity either (i) new evidence of actual innocence or (ii) a claim that a 
new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law applies to his case.4 
(7) 
Johnson’s motion was undeniably filed more than one year and three 
months after his conviction became final on July 22, 2019,5 and his motion does not 
meet the pleading requirements to excuse the procedural default.6  Accordingly, we 
affirm the Superior Court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief on 
the alternative basis that it was procedurally barred as untimely filed.7 
 
1 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
3 Del. Super. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
4 Id. at 61(i)(5). 
5 See id. at 61(m)(1) (in the event the defendant does not file a direct appeal, the judgment 
of conviction is final 30 days after the Superior Court imposes a sentence).  
6 A 2014 amendment to Rule 61 eliminated the “miscarriage of justice” exception to the 
procedural bars. 
7 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (noting that the 
Court may affirm a trial court’s judgment for reasons different than those articulated by the 
trial court). 
5 
 
(8) 
Even if Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief had been timely 
filed, however, Johnson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail on the 
merits.  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the two-pronged 
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.8  In order to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel after a defendant has entered a guilty plea, the 
defendant must demonstrate that (i) trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness9 and (ii) counsel’s actions were so prejudicial 
“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”10  Although 
not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was 
professionally reasonable.11   
(9) 
Johnson makes a conclusory argument that he “may have been 
suffering from severe mental illness during the commissions of the crimes” to which 
he pled guilty,12 but there is no evidence in the record to suggest that he was.  In his 
sworn affidavit filed in response to Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief, trial 
counsel averred that he determined that there were no grounds for further scrutiny 
 
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
9 Id. at 687-88. 
10 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  
11 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
12 Opening Br. at 7. 
6 
 
of Johnson’s mental health after he (i) spent hours speaking with Johnson, (ii) 
discussed Johnson’s mental health with Johnson’s prior counsel, and (iii) reviewed 
Johnson’s case with a psycho-forensic evaluator as Johnson requested.  In our view, 
Johnson’s claims do not overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s 
performance was professionally reasonable.13  And we note that Johnson did not 
present any information to the Superior Court in connection with these proceedings 
to support his claim that he suffers, or suffered, from any mental health issue that 
might have impaired his ability to make an informed decision to plead guilty.  Simply 
put, there is no evidence to support Johnson’s claim that trial counsel’s assistance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves 
Justice  
 
 
 
13 For the first time on appeal, Johnson alleges that he “informed his counsel prior to 
pleading guilty that he wished to undergo a psychiatric examination so that he could present 
a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity defense.” Id. at 6-7.  Absent plain error, which we do 
not find here, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Del. Supr. 
Ct. R. 8.  “This general rule is particularly appropriate in the context of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims because trial counsel was not afforded the opportunity to 
respond to the claim in the first instance.” Palmer v. State, 2022 WL 871024, at *2 n. 8 
(Del. Mar. 23, 2022).  This allegation also appears to contradict Johnson’s claim that he 
was unaware of the insanity defense.