Title: Markel v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co.
Citation: 100 Ariz. 53, 410 P.2d 662
Docket Number: 7525
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 2, 1966

100 Ariz. 53 (1966) 410 P.2d 662 Edna (Van-y) MARKEL, Appellant, v. PHOENIX TITLE &amp; TRUST CO., Trustee, and Virginia R. Van-y, Appellees. No. 7525. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division. February 2, 1966. *54 Alan Philip Bayham, Phoenix, for appellant. Carl W. Divelbiss, Phoenix, for appellees. *55 BERNSTEIN, Vice Chief Justice. Plaintiff, Edna Markel, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, granting defendant's motion for judgment at the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff was divorced from Earl E. Van-y in December of 1939 in Wichita, Kansas. Defendant, Virginia Van-y was married to Earl E. Van-y from February 1941, to the time of his death, in Wichita, in April, 1959. Before her husband's death defendant sold a parcel of land situate in Arizona previously held in his name. It is this sale which gave rise to the present cause of action. Simply stated, plaintiff seeks to impose a constructive trust on one-half of the $25,000 realized from the sale of this realty in Maricopa County, Arizona. On December 13, 1939, the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas, entered the following judgment in the divorce proceedings: The following is Exhibit A, part of the property settlement approved by the Kansas court: Defendant contends this Kansas settlement was in lieu of alimony in that it was not for a definite and fixed sum and it was void. However, Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 204 P.2d 742 holds that property settlements, as distinguished from alimony, need not be for a fixed sum. The following quote from the Feldmann case supports plaintiff: Further, defendant is attempting to collaterally attack a sister state judgment without first showing there was a lack of jurisdiction over the parties or of the subject matter. In Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186, the Supreme Court said: Defendant further contends the judgment of the Kansas court attempted to transfer title to land situated in Arizona and this is in violation of the principle enunciated in Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65 which prohibits one jurisdiction from directly affecting title to land in another jurisdiction. The Kansas court expressly left title in the name of Earl E. Van-y and gave plaintiff a "one-half interest in any funds * * * obtained through lease or sale" (emphasis added) of the property. We believe MacDonald v. Dexter, 234 Ill. 517, 85 N.E. 209, is quite similar to the case before us. There, a Missouri court denied a party an interest in the proceeds of land situated in Illinois. All parties in interest were before the Missouri court. Illinois held that an adjudication *57 as to an interest to proceeds in land situated in Illinois was not an adjudication directly as to the title of the land itself. The court explained its holding as follows: Defendant contends there is a lack of privity between her and her deceased husband so that she takes his land free of the constructive trust plaintiff asserts exists in her favor. We find the law is against defendant on this issue for, No useful purpose would be served in taking up in minute detail all of the various encumbrances and conveyances prior to the date defendant obtained her warranty deed to the land in issue. Suffice it to say that on February 12, 1957 Earl E. Van-y transferred a warranty deed to his attorney O.W. Helsel; that on May 5, 1957, O.W. Helsel transferred a quit claim deed to Galen Childers (defendant's brother-in-law); that on May 17, 1957 Galen Childers transferred a warranty deed to defendant and on September 6, 1957, Earl E. Van-y gave defendant a disclaimer deed. Defendant admitted, at trial, she was at all times aware of plaintiff's property settlement of 1939. Further, the consideration in the final conveyance to her was $500 and the land shortly thereafter sold for $25,000. When a judgment is decided against plaintiff at the close of his case, the appellate tribunal must consider the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to plaintiff. We believe the facts in this case brought out at trial create a prima facie case of constructive fraud. See Joseph v. Tibsherany, 88 Ariz. 205, 354 P.2d 254. *58 A constructive trust expresses the idea that a defendant is under an equitable duty to give the complainant the benefit of property held. A wrongful holding begs relief whether the type of injustice is old or new regardless of whether actual fraud exists. See Bogert on Trusts, § 471, Second edition. Finally, appellee contends that appellant's first assignment of error does not specify with particularity the error relied upon. However, Rule 5(c), 17 A.R.S. having been deleted by this court there is no merit in this argument. Nor do we believe that the defense of laches is here applicable. It was not necessary for appellant to enforce her right to an interest in one-half of the funds from the sale of the twenty acres until there was a bona fide sale. In that defendant never presented her case there must be a new trial consistent with this decision. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and UDALL, J., concurring.