Title: State v. Dominguez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 106288
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2014

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 106,288 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JIMMY DOMINGUEZ, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
If a defendant is charged with first-degree murder under alternative theories of 
premeditated and felony murder, a trial court errs by failing to instruct the jury that both 
theories are separate types of first-degree murder and both theories must be considered 
before the jury arrives at a verdict regarding the charge of first-degree murder. It is 
strongly recommended that a trial court use the pattern instructions and verdict form 
specifically designed for use with alternative charges of first-degree murder—PIK Crim. 
3d 56.02-A (felony murder and premeditated murder are two alternative theories to prove 
first-degree murder); PIK Crim. 3d 68.15 (verdict instruction where first-degree murder 
is presented in alternative theories); PIK Crim. 3d 68.16 (verdict form where first-degree 
murder is presented in alternative theories).  
 
2.  
 
PIK Crim. 3d 52.18, which instructs a jury to consider an accomplice's testimony 
with caution, should not be given when the jury will be determining the guilt or 
innocence of the testifying accomplice. But PIK Crim. 3d 52.18 should be given if the 
testifying accomplice is not on trial in the case being heard by the jury.  
 
2 
 
3. 
 
Voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense to a specific intent crime if there was 
no evidence presented to demonstrate that the defendant was so intoxicated that his or her 
ability to form the requisite intent was impaired. 
 
4. 
 
 
As a general rule, an appellate court does not decide moot questions. 
 
 
Appeal from Lyon District Court; JEFFRY J. LARSON, judge. Opinion filed May 23, 2014. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and vacated in part, and remanded. 
 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant. 
 
 
Amy L. Aranda, first assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Goodman, county 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Jimmy Dominguez appeals after a jury convicted him of 
premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and discharge of a firearm at an 
occupied building. He raises three claims of instructional error and one sentencing issue. 
 
 
First, he argues clear error resulted from the trial court's failure to use the pattern 
jury instructions and pattern verdict form specifically designed for trials in which the 
State presents alternative theories of first-degree murder, i.e., premeditated and felony 
murder. These pattern instructions inform the jurors that they must consider both 
alternative theories in arriving at a verdict on the charge of first-degree murder. In 
contrast, the trial judge in this case did not specifically instruct the jurors that they had to 
consider felony murder. Instead, the instructions suggested the jurors should only 
3 
 
consider felony murder if they had a reasonable doubt regarding whether Dominquez was 
guilty of premeditated murder. Consequently, we have no confidence the jury 
appropriately considered the alternative of felony murder, and we are firmly convinced 
the jury would have reached a different verdict if the instructional errors had not 
occurred. We, therefore, reverse Dominguez' first-degree murder conviction.  
 
 
In his other issues regarding jury instructions, Dominguez objects to the trial 
court's failure to give an accomplice instruction and an involuntary intoxication 
instruction. Based on these alleged errors, Dominguez asks us to reverse all of his 
convictions. While we find that it was error to not give the accomplice instruction, we 
hold the error was harmless. As to the involuntary intoxication instruction, we conclude 
the trial court did not err because there was not a factual basis for the instruction. Hence, 
we reverse only Dominguez' first-degree murder conviction, and we affirm his 
convictions for aggravated battery and discharge of a firearm at an occupied building.  
 
 
Dominguez' final issue—that his hard 50 sentence should be vacated—is moot 
because Dominguez' hard 50 sentence relates to his first-degree murder conviction, which 
is being reversed. Therefore, his sentence is vacated without consideration of the merits 
of his arguments. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The events in this case occurred in the early morning hours of December 20, 2009, 
and culminated in the shooting death of Jose Antonio Leyva, a/k/a Samuel Torres 
Rosado, and the gunshot wounding of Juan Rosales, Jr. The law enforcement 
investigation led to the identification of Dominguez as the shooter and of Jorge Jurado as 
the potential instigator and an aider and abettor.  
 
4 
 
The shooting followed an altercation several hours earlier at a bar where the 
codefendants—Dominguez and Jurado—and the shooting victims—Leyva and Rosales—
were drinking. Each of the men was in the company of others, many of whom testified at 
Dominguez' trial. The jury learned that Jurado was at the bar with his brother and their 
friend, Manuel Garcia-Velazquez, who came to the bar with Dominguez. Garcia-
Velazquez testified that Jurado and Dominguez had not met before that night. Likewise, 
Leyva was at the bar with others, including his wife and his wife's sister, Rosa Arteaga, 
who was pregnant with Jurado's child. The other shooting victim, Rosales, was also at the 
bar with several of his family members. 
 
The altercation began when two women started fighting. Leyva's wife and her 
sister, Arteaga, attempted to stop the fight, but Jurado pulled Arteaga away from the 
skirmish, later indicating he wanted to protect his unborn child. Leyva's wife objected to 
Jurado grabbing Arteaga and started calling Jurado names. Jurado then grabbed Leyva, 
and the two men began to argue. According to Jurado, he "just laughed" at Leyva and 
"didn't really say nothing to him, and [he] just told him [he] was trying to help." Garcia-
Velazquez, however, heard "disgust words" or fighting words exchanged between Jurado 
and Leyva, and he, along with several others, separated the two men.  
 
Rosales watched the altercation and testified that he could tell Jurado and Leyva 
"wanted to fight" and would have if they had not been restrained. Rosales asked Leyva 
what was going on, and Leyva told him he "was having an argument" with Jurado. 
Rosales then noticed Dominguez standing with Jurado. Because Rosales did not know 
Dominguez, Rosales asked Dominguez for his name; Dominguez replied, "I'm nobody," 
and turned away.  
 
According to Jurado, a second altercation occurred when Leyva began arguing 
with a friend of Jurado. Jurado told his friend to calm down, gave him some money to 
buy drinks, and told him to leave Leyva alone. This resolution did not please Dominguez 
5 
 
and others who were angry that Jurado "didn't do nothing" to Leyva, who had not shown 
proper "respect" to Jurado. Dominguez told Jurado he should have "whipped [Leyva's] 
ass." Jurado was overheard saying that "he couldn't do anything while he was there at the 
bar because the cops were looking for him. But . . . once they left, he would take care of 
them and his homeboys would back him up."  
 
At closing time, when all the patrons started leaving the bar, Leyva's wife saw 
Jurado talking to Dominguez and pointing to Leyva. Then, she saw Dominguez following 
them into the parking area. She thought Dominguez "cussed" at her before she got into a 
vehicle with Leyva.  
 
After the bar closed, several of the patrons congregated at two separate parties. 
One party was at Leyva's house, and the other was at Jurado's house.  
 
Dominguez and Garcia-Velazquez went to Jurado's house, where they continued 
to drink. During the party, Dominguez told Jurado he wanted to buy a gun. According to 
Jurado, he called his uncle who had an "SKS rifle" for sale. Jurado's uncle came over and 
met with Dominguez outside Jurado's house. Dominguez paid for the rifle, and Jurado's 
uncle placed the rifle in the passenger seat of an SUV that Jurado had borrowed from 
Arteaga.  
 
Garcia-Velazquez gave a different account of how the rifle got into the SUV. He 
testified he saw Jurado walk from the back of the house carrying a blanket and, although 
he could not see what was inside the blanket, it looked like it was wrapped around 
something. Garcia-Velazquez followed Jurado and got into the backseat of the SUV 
because Jurado had agreed to drive Garcia-Velazquez home. Dominguez was in the front 
passenger seat. Once in the SUV, Garcia-Velazquez realized the blanket was wrapped 
around an item that looked like the barrel of a long gun. He "didn't know what they were 
going to do with it [and] . . . didn't expect . . . that they would do something with it." 
6 
 
 
Jurado and Garcia-Velazquez also gave different versions of what happened once 
they were in the SUV with Dominguez. Jurado testified that Dominguez wanted to test-
fire his newly purchased rifle, so Jurado drove out to the countryside. After testing the 
rifle, Jurado drove his passengers back into town; but before dropping them off, Jurado 
wanted to pick up Arteaga, who was at Leyva's house. Jurado testified that he did not tell 
his passengers that they would be stopping at Leyva's; although at another point in his 
testimony, he stated he told Dominguez he was going to pick up Arteaga from her sister's 
house. For his part, Garcia-Velazquez denied leaving town to test-fire the rifle. When 
Garcia-Velazquez recognized that Jurado was not driving him home, Jurado merely said 
that "[h]e had to pass by somewhere first" without telling the others where they were 
going. 
 
Jurado drove through the alley behind Leyva's house and parked the SUV behind 
the detached garage. As Jurado turned off the headlights, he heard music playing inside 
the garage. Jurado began looking for his cell phone so he could call Arteaga. Meanwhile, 
Dominguez jumped out of the SUV with the rifle and ran to the side of Leyva's garage. 
Garcia-Velazquez testified that from inside the SUV he saw a door swing open on the 
garage. Light filtered out of the doorway, and a person exited through it. Dominguez then 
fired the rifle, and Garcia-Velazquez heard gunshots and saw "two flashes." 
 
Rosales testified that just before he was shot, several men were partying in the 
garage. He and Leyva decided to step outside, and Leyva opened the door. Leyva was 
immediately and fatally shot in the abdomen, and Rosales was shot in the leg. There were 
no lights outside, so Rosales could only see "the light of the shooting" and somebody 
dressed in a black sweatshirt and a hat—clothing like he had seen Dominguez wearing at 
the bar.  
 
7 
 
Jurado started the SUV and "kind of took off" without Dominguez. Jurado stopped 
to pick up Dominguez after Jurado looked in his rearview mirror and saw Dominguez 
running down the alley. They returned to Jurado's house; and although Jurado and 
Garcia-Velazquez asked Dominguez what happened, Dominguez did not say anything. 
Garcia-Velazquez suggested that they go to his girlfriend's house because nobody would 
try to look for them there. They stayed there until the next day, but nobody discussed the 
shooting.  
 
The State filed criminal charges against Jurado and Dominguez. Dominguez was 
charged with the premeditated first-degree murder of Leyva or, in the alternative, felony 
murder; the attempted first-degree murder of Rosales; and discharge of a firearm at an 
occupied building. Jurado was charged with aiding and abetting first-degree murder and 
attempted first-degree murder. Jurado, however, entered into a plea agreement with the 
State. In exchange for his testimony, the State agreed to amend the charges against 
Jurado, and he pleaded no contest to solicitation to commit intentional second-degree 
murder and aiding and abetting the discharge of a firearm at an occupied building.  
 
When Dominguez' case came to trial, Jurado testified as a State's witness. He 
acknowledged his plea arrangement and indicated he expected to receive a shorter 
sentence because of his agreement with the State, although he had not yet been sentenced. 
This trial resulted in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict. Before Dominguez' 
retrial, Jurado was sentenced. At Dominguez' second trial, which is the subject of this 
appeal, Jurado was scheduled to be called as a witness, but he did not testify. Instead, 
Jurado invoked his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. As a result, the trial court found Jurado unavailable as a witness and 
allowed the transcript of Jurado's testimony from the first trial to be read to the jury. 
Jurado's plea agreement was also admitted into evidence at the second trial. 
 
8 
 
 
The second jury convicted Dominguez of the premeditated first-degree murder of 
Leyva, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401(a); the aggravated battery of Rosales, in violation 
of K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(A), which was a lesser included offense of the charged offense 
of attempted first-degree murder; and discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-4219(b). Dominguez received a controlling sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 50 years.  
 
Dominguez timely appealed, and this court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-
3601(b)(1) (off-grid crime; maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed). As we 
have noted, Dominguez raises four issues:  (1) Did the trial court commit clear error in 
failing to give the pattern jury instructions and pattern verdict form specifically designed 
for trials in which the State presents alternative theories of first-degree murder to the 
jury? (2) Did the trial court commit clear error in failing to give a cautionary accomplice 
instruction? (3) Did the trial court commit clear error in failing to give a voluntary 
intoxication instruction? and (4) Is Dominguez' hard 50 life sentence unconstitutional 
because a jury did not determine the underlying facts?  
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES 
 
 
In State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 283 P.3d 202 (2012), this court set out a 
progression of analysis and the corresponding standards of review for deciding a jury 
instruction issue. "First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue 
from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of 
review." 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1. Applying this step in this case, as we have indicated, we 
have jurisdiction to consider Dominguez' attack on his conviction, so our only concern is 
with preservation, which is addressed in K.S.A. 22-3413(3). Under that provision, the 
complaining party must have objected prior to jury deliberations in order to preserve 
appellate review of a claimed instructional error unless the objecting party is able to 
establish that the instruction or the failure to give the instruction was "'clearly 
9 
 
erroneous.'" State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 512, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). Regardless of 
whether an objection has been stated, after considering jurisdiction and preservation, an 
appellate court must first determine whether there was error and, if so, the effect of the 
error on the verdict. 295 Kan. at 515-16 (discussing analysis if no objection was made); 
Plummer, 295 Kan. at 161-62 (discussing analysis if there was an objection).  
 
 
In determining if there was error in giving or failing to give a jury instruction, an 
appellate court must examine whether the instruction was legally and factually 
appropriate. The appellate court utilizes an unlimited standard of review to analyze the 
legal question of whether the instruction fairly and accurately states the applicable law. 
See Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 4; Plummer, 295 Kan. at 161. Then, in considering 
whether the jury instruction was factually appropriate, an appellate court determines if 
there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the 
requesting party, to support a factual basis for the instruction. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 
Syl. ¶ 4; Plummer, 295 Kan. at 161. "Such an inquiry is closely akin to the sufficiency of 
the evidence review frequently performed by appellate courts in criminal cases." 295 
Kan. at 162. 
 
Finally, if the appellate court concludes the trial court erred in giving or failing to 
give the jury instruction, the appellate court must make a reversibility determination. If 
there was an objection, the appellate court must determine whether the error was 
harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 
541, 565, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). Plummer, 295 Kan. 
at 162-63. If there was no objection, the test for clear error requiring reversal is "whether 
the reviewing court is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict had the instruction error not occurred." Williams, 295 Kan. at 516.  
 
 
The assessment of whether an instructional error is clearly erroneous requires a 
review of the entire record and a de novo determination. The burden of showing clear 
10 
 
error remains with the complaining party, rather than shifting to the party benefitting 
from the error as happens in a Ward harmless error analysis. 295 Kan. at 516. 
 
 
These same considerations apply to jury verdict forms. See State v. Burnett, 293 
Kan. 840, 847, 270 P.3d 1115 (2012) (citing Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 
1197-98, 221 P.3d 1130 [2009]). 
 
As we will discuss in more detail, Dominguez concedes the clearly erroneous 
standard applies to two of his instruction issues—the alternative theory instructions (and 
corresponding verdict form) regarding first-degree murder and the voluntary intoxication 
instruction—but he argues the more favorable Ward standard applies to the cautionary 
accomplice instruction issue.  
 
FIRST-DEGREE MURDER INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM 
 
First, Dominguez argues the trial court erred by failing to give the jury the pattern 
jury instructions and pattern verdict form specifically designed for trials in which the 
State presents alternative theories of first-degree murder to the jury. See PIK Crim. 3d 
56.02-A (felony murder and premeditated murder are two alternative theories to prove 
first-degree murder); PIK Crim. 3d 68.15 (verdict instruction where first-degree murder 
is presented in alternative theories); PIK Crim. 3d 68.16 (verdict form where first-degree 
murder is presented in alternative theories). 
 
Dominguez concedes that he did not request the alternative theory instructions or 
verdict form, nor did he object to the instructions that were given by the trial court. 
Hence, he must meet the clear error standard. See K.S.A. 22-3413(3). Dominguez argues 
he has done so because the judge failed to convey to the jury—either through the jury 
instructions or the verdict form—that premeditated murder and felony murder are 
11 
 
alternative theories of first-degree murder. Thus, according to Dominguez, the jury did 
not understand how to consider whether he was guilty of felony murder.  
 
In response, by not arguing to the contrary, the State implicitly concedes that the 
alternative theory instructions and verdict form formulated by the PIK Committee were 
legally and factually appropriate. Nevertheless, citing State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 71, 
936 P.2d 727 (1997), the State notes the use of PIK instructions is not mandatory. The 
State further argues the trial court's instructions in this case were proper, fairly stated the 
law, and could not have reasonably misled the jury.  
 
Given the State's implicit concession as to the legal and factual appropriateness of 
the pattern alternative theory instructions and verdict form, we need not spend much time 
discussing the first two steps of the analysis, at least as those steps relate to the 
instructions that Dominguez says should have been given. We, too, conclude that the 
pattern alternative theory instructions and verdict form would have been legally and 
factually appropriate in this case and the trial court would not have erred if it had used 
them. See State v. Mireles, 297 Kan. 339, Syl. ¶ 8, 301 P.3d 677 (2013) (first-degree 
murder encompasses the two alternative means of premeditated murder and felony 
murder); State v. Starr, 259 Kan. 713, 720, 915 P.2d 72 (1996) ("Premeditated and felony 
murder are not separate and distinct offenses but are two separate theories under which 
the crime of first-degree murder may be committed."); PIK Crim. 3d 56.02, Comment 
("The statute merely provides alternative methods of proving the deliberation and 
premeditation which are required for a first-degree murder conviction under K.S.A 21-
3401.").  
 
What we must determine is whether the trial court's instructions adequately 
covered the essential information contained in those alternative theory pattern 
instructions—that is, whether the instructions that were given were legally appropriate. 
As this court has frequently stated, although the use of PIK instructions is generally not 
12 
 
required, it is strongly recommended absent a particular need to alter the instructions 
because of the facts of a case. State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 67, 209 P.3d 675 (2009). This 
court has explained the wisdom of using the PIK instructions, stating:  "When a district 
court ventures from the standard language of a pattern instruction, the court runs the risk 
of . . . omitting words that are essential to a clear statement of law." State v. Tully, 293 
Kan. 176, 197, 262 P.3d 314 (2011). 
 
To understand whether the result forecast in Tully occurred here, we need to 
examine what the jurors would have learned had they received the pattern alternative 
theory instructions and verdict form—PIK Crim. 3d 56.02-A, PIK Crim. 3d 68.15, and 
PIK Crim. 3d 68.16—and what the jurors were told through the trial court's instructions.   
 
Alternative Theory Instructions and Verdict Form 
 
The first alternative theory instruction is PIK Crim. 3d 56.02-A, which explains 
that the defendant has been charged "with one offense of murder in the first degree and 
[the State] has introduced evidence on two alternate theories of proving this crime." It 
continues by setting out the two alternatives of felony murder and premeditated murder 
and informing the jurors:  "Where evidence is presented on the two alternate theories of 
proving the crime charged, you must consider both in arriving at your verdict." (Emphasis 
added.). PIK Crim. 3d 56.02-A. The instruction then directs the jurors to those 
instructions where the court has stated the elements of felony and premeditated first-
degree murder. The instruction concludes by instructing the jury to enter a verdict of 
guilty if it determines the State has proven first-degree murder on either or both theories, 
to enter a verdict of not guilty if the State has failed to establish guilt on both theories, or, 
if applicable, to consider the defendant's guilt on lesser included offenses.  
 
The Notes on Use to PIK Crim. 3d 56.02-A instruct:  "Where the information and 
evidence include both felony murder and premeditated murder, this instruction must be 
13 
 
given in addition to [the elements instructions found at] PIK [Crim.] 3d 56.01, Murder in 
the First Degree, and PIK [Crim.] 3d 56.02, Murder in the First Degree—Felony 
Murder." (Emphasis added.) In the present case, the trial court only gave the element 
instructions. It did not give the additional instruction found in PIK Crim. 3d 56.02-A. 
 
The second alternative theory instruction, PIK Crim. 3d 68.15, guides the jurors on 
the order of their deliberations. It instructs them to first decide if the defendant is guilty 
of murder in the first degree and clearly directs them to determine whether one, both, or 
neither alternative theory was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction further 
explains that if first-degree murder is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury 
should consider the lesser included offenses instructed upon. The order for that 
consideration is then set out.  
 
The Notes on Use to PIK Crim. 3d 68.15 indicate that the pattern instruction 
"should be given along with PIK [Crim.] 3d 68.16, Murder in the First Degree—
Premeditated Murder and Felony Murder in the Alternative—Verdict Form, when the 
defendant is charged with murder in the first degree under the alternative theories of 
premeditated murder and felony murder." (Emphasis added.) The verdict form found at 
PIK Crim. 3d 68.16 leads the jury step by step through the sequence of deliberations 
outlined in PIK Crim. 3d 68.15.  
 
The pattern verdict form, PIK Crim. 3d 68.16, first requires the jury to determine 
whether the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury is given three 
options, which are listed as Theory 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c):  1(a) "We, the jury, unanimously 
find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of premeditated 
murder"; 1(b) "We, the jury, unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of felony murder"; or 1(c) "We, the jury, unable to agree under 
Theory 1(a) or 1(b), do unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree on the combined theories of premeditated murder and felony murder." PIK Crim. 
14 
 
68.16. If the jury does not find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, the verdict 
form then directs the jury to consider any lesser included offenses. There is also an option 
for the jury to sign the form indicating the defendant is not guilty. 
 
The trial court in this case used neither PIK Crim. 3d 68.15, explaining the 
progression outlined on the verdict form, nor PIK Crim. 3d 68.16, the verdict form. 
 
Jury Instructions and Verdict Form Given at Trial 
 
 
The failure to give these instructions or use the corresponding verdict form 
resulted in the omission of significant points. The jury instructions that were given to the 
jury did not explain that first-degree murder has two alternative theories or that felony 
murder must be considered in reaching a verdict on the charge of first-degree murder. 
Further, if anything, the wording and ordering of the instructions made it appear that 
felony murder was a lesser included offense.  
 
 
First, in Instruction No. 13, the trial court gave the elements instruction for 
premeditated first-degree murder, PIK Crim. 3d 56.01 (Murder in the First Degree). This 
instruction identified premeditated murder as murder in the first degree. It made no 
mention of felony murder. 
 
 
The next instruction, Instruction No. 14, addressed the consideration of second-
degree murder as a lesser included offense. In doing so, the court instructed:  "Under 
Count One you may find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, murder in the 
second degree, felony murder or not guilty." (Emphasis added.) The instruction explained 
that if "there is a reasonable doubt as to which of three offenses a defendant is guilty 
under Count One, he may be convicted of the lesser offense only." Instruction No. 14 was 
based on PIK Crim. 3d 68.09 (Lesser Included Offenses). The Notes on Use to PIK Crim. 
3d 68.09 specify that "[t]his instruction should not be used when the crime is first-degree 
15 
 
murder under the alternative theories of premeditated murder and felony murder. Instead 
use PIK [Crim.] 3d 68.15 and 68.16." (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
As PIK Crim. 3d 68.09 indicates, this pattern instruction was intended to be used 
when the jury is instructed as to one principal offense and its lesser included offenses. 
Using this instruction in a case involving both theories of first-degree murder is 
obviously confusing. Moreover, as argued by Dominguez on appeal, the placement of 
felony murder after second-degree murder in the italicized portion of the jury instruction 
did not (1) explain when to consider felony murder or (2) clarify that premeditated 
murder and felony murder are simply alternative theories of first-degree murder. If 
anything, the instruction implied that the three charges—premeditated murder, second-
degree murder, and felony murder—were to be considered sequentially, with felony 
murder being the last in the sequence.  
 
The next jury instruction was the felony-murder instruction, Instruction No. 15, 
which was based on PIK Crim. 3d 56.02 (Murder in the First Degree—Felony Murder). It 
did not cure the misleading nature of the prior instructions. In fact, rather than explaining 
that felony murder is an alternative charge to premeditated murder and is a form of first-
degree murder, the first words of the instruction were:  "As an alternative charge to 
Murder in the First Degree, the defendant is charged in Alternative Count I with the 
crime of Felony Murder." (Emphasis added.) The remainder of the instruction correctly 
listed the elements of felony murder as stated in PIK Crim. 3d 56.02 instruction.  
 
The statement that felony murder is an alternative to murder in the first degree was 
added by the trial court in place of language in the pattern instruction which states that 
"[t]he defendant is charged with the crime of murder in the first degree." PIK Crim. 3d 
56.02. This alteration was an apparent attempt to adapt the instruction to recognize 
alternative theories, but the alteration missed its goal because it did not explain that 
felony murder was an alternative basis for finding Dominguez guilty of first-degree 
16 
 
murder; instead, the altered instruction indicated felony murder was something different 
than first-degree murder.  
 
Next, the trial court gave Instruction No. 16, which again addressed the jury's 
consideration of second-degree murder and stated, in part, that "[i]f you do not agree that 
the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, you should consider the lesser 
included offense of murder in the second degree." (Emphasis added.) This instruction 
informed the jury that second-degree murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree 
murder, which is the term the trial court used to identify only premeditated murder. But, 
as Dominguez notes, Instruction No. 16 did not explain the hierarchical relationship 
between second-degree murder and felony murder.   
 
Like the combination of instructions used by the trial court, the verdict form did 
nothing to clarify that premeditated murder and felony murder are alternative theories of 
first-degree murder. Nor did it clarify the appropriate sequencing for the jury's 
deliberations. This is true even though the transcript of the instructions conference shows 
the prosecution expressed concern that the jury would be confused about whether felony 
murder is a "higher-level felony" than second-degree murder. After this concern was 
expressed, the court agreed to swap the sequencing in one part of the verdict form and 
listed felony murder after premeditated murder and before second-degree murder. The 
resulting form provided the options of finding Dominguez (1) "guilty of murder in the 1st 
degree as charged in Count One"; (2) "guilty of felony murder as charged in Alternative 
Count I"; (3) "guilty of murder in the 2nd degree"; or (4) "not guilty under Count I, 1st 
Degree Murder, the lesser included offense of 2nd Degree Murder and Alternative Count 
I, Felony Murder." In stating these options, the verdict form, again, did not identify 
felony murder as first-degree murder. Furthermore, any ameliorating impact of the 
reordering of the first three options was wiped out by a subsequent listing of the offenses 
in option four on the verdict form, which listed felony murder after second-degree 
murder. Hence, at best, the verdict form was ambiguous and, at worst, a portion of the 
17 
 
verdict form implied that the three charges were to be considered sequentially, with 
felony murder being the last in the sequence. 
 
Simply put, neither the jury instructions nor the verdict form in this case provided 
the jurors with information that allowed them to understand the need to consider felony 
murder as part of their deliberations regarding the first-degree murder charge. Further, as 
Dominguez argues, the sequencing of instructions and words within the instructions 
suggested that felony murder was not on "equal footing" with premeditated murder. 
Consequently, we conclude the instructions given by the trial court were legally 
inappropriate and, therefore, erroneous. 
 
Reversibility Inquiry 
 
The final step in our analysis is the reversibility inquiry. As Dominguez concedes, 
because he did not object to the instructions, he must persuade us to the point we are 
"firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction 
error not occurred." See Williams, 295 Kan. at 516. He does so, although we do not 
accept all of his arguments. 
 
Principally, we do not agree with Dominguez' argument that the jury's verdict on 
the lesser included offense of aggravated battery as to the shooting of Rosales, rather than 
the charged offense of attempted first-degree murder, was inconsistent with a verdict of 
premeditated murder as to Leyva. There was substantial evidence from which 
premeditation could be inferred as to the killing of Leyva—the earlier fight, Jurado's 
statements about getting Leyva later with his "home-boys" backing him up, and 
Dominguez' efforts at acquiring a gun. See State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 205, 290 
P.3d 640 (2012) ("'premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the established 
circumstances of a case, provided the inference is a reasonable one.'"), cert. denied 134 S. 
Ct. 148 (2013). Nothing in the record suggests the same level of antagonism toward 
18 
 
Rosales, and the jury could have believed that Dominguez did not have the intent to kill 
Rosales.  
 
Nevertheless, we do not accept the State's arguments either. The State, in its 
appellate brief, recognizes this court and the Court of Appeals have reversed verdicts 
when jury instructions failed to accurately convey the appropriate sequencing of jury 
deliberations, but the State argues these cases are distinguishable. The two cases 
discussed by the State are State v. Miller, 293 Kan. 46, 259 P.3d 701 (2011), and State v. 
Cribbs, 29 Kan. App. 2d 919, 34 P.3d 76 (2001).  
 
In Miller, the defendant, who was charged with premeditated first-degree murder, 
requested instructions for second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter as lesser 
included offenses. In one instruction, the trial court correctly instructed the jury to 
simultaneously consider the two lesser included offenses; but in a separate, conflicting 
instruction, the court erroneously told the jury that it could consider voluntary 
manslaughter only if it could not agree as to the defendant's guilt on the second-degree 
murder charge. This court found reversible error, in part because one could not presume 
the jury followed the correct instruction—the simultaneous consideration of the lesser 
included offenses—and disregarded the improper instruction. 293 Kan. at 53. Further, 
during closing arguments, "both the prosecutor and defense counsel separately discussed 
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter in that order, 
implying that the crimes should be considered sequentially." 293 Kan. at 53-54. And the 
verdict form "did nothing to clarify the contradictory instructions." 293 Kan. at 54. 
 
In the second case cited by the State, Cribbs, the Court of Appeals held that 
second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter must be considered simultaneously 
during a jury's deliberations. Applying this holding, the court found the trial court erred 
because it essentially told the jury "it need not bother considering attempted voluntary 
manslaughter unless and until it failed to agree on his guilt of attempted second-degree 
19 
 
murder." 29 Kan. App. 2d at 924. This "'reordering' deprived the jury of the opportunity 
to consider the mitigating circumstances of heat of passion or sudden quarrel which 
reduce an intentional homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter." State v. 
Graham, 275 Kan. 831, 836-38, 69 P.3d 563 (2003) (discussing Cribbs). 
  
As the State points out, the trial court in this case did not include a blatant 
misstatement of the law in the instructions such as found in Miller or Cribbs. The same 
distinction applies to yet another case, which was not cited by the parties, State v. Young, 
277 Kan. 588, Syl. ¶ 5, 87 P.3d 308 (2004). In Young, the trial court explicitly instructed 
the jury that felony murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated murder. In 
contrast, the trial court's error in this case was more of omission than commission. 
Nevertheless, the instructions in this case essentially suggested the same thing as the trial 
court's misstatement in Young, i.e., that felony murder is a lesser included offense of 
premeditated first-degree murder. This is especially true given the sequence of the jury 
instructions and the listing of felony murder after second-degree murder in Instruction 
No. 14 and in part of the verdict form. Overall, the instructions left the impression that 
felony murder was to be considered after premeditated first-degree murder and second-
degree murder. Plus, there was no affirmative statement explaining that felony murder is 
first-degree murder or that felony murder had to be considered before the verdict was 
reached on first-degree murder. In other words, while the State draws a point of 
distinction, the distinction has no significance. 
 
The State also contrasts the circumstances of this case to those in Miller where the 
attorneys' closing arguments reinforced the misstatement; in this case, the prosecutor 
correctly explained that felony and premeditated murder are "different theories" of first-
degree murder and told the jurors that if they found "neither of them, then you would 
move to second degree." While these statements were helpful, they still did not explain 
that the jury had to consider felony murder as well as premeditated first-degree murder 
before reaching a verdict on Count I. Also, while appellate courts presume a jury follows 
20 
 
the trial court's instructions—especially given that the jurors in this case were instructed 
that they must apply the instructions—there is no similar presumption relating to 
arguments of counsel. See PIK Crim. 3d 51.02 (Consideration and Binding Application 
of Instructions); see also K.S.A. 22-3403(3); State v. McClanahan, 212 Kan. 208, 215-17, 
510 P.2d 153 (1973).  
 
We, therefore, find ourselves with the same concern that arose in Miller, Cribbs, 
and Young—the jury was either misdirected or lacked direction regarding the order of its 
deliberations. In the circumstances of this case, that meant the jury was not told it had to 
simultaneously consider the alternative theories of first-degree murder. Such a situation 
does not always lead to reversal, however. In Young, this court concluded "there was no 
reasonable possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the district 
court had not made the mistake of calling felony murder a 'lesser offense' of premeditated 
murder." 277 Kan. at 597. 
 
We do not reach the same conclusion under the facts of this case for several 
reasons, however. First, we note that, although not discussed by Dominguez, the trial 
court also instructed the jury in Instruction No. 21 that "[e]ach crime charged against the 
defendant is a separate and distinct offense." Instruction No. 21 was based on PIK Crim. 
3d 68.07 (Multiple Counts-Verdict Instruction)—an instruction that is not to be given 
when a defendant is charged under alternative theories of first-degree murder. See PIK 
Crim. 3d 68.15, Notes on Use. This clearly is a misstatement of the law, since 
premeditated murder and felony murder are theories relating to the same offense, first-
degree murder. Second, there was substantial evidence of the underlying felony, criminal 
discharge of a firearm at an occupied building. Hence, under the facts of this case, we are 
firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict. This conclusion is 
buttressed by the fact the jury empanelled in Dominguez' first trial was unable to 
unanimously agree on whether Dominguez was guilty of premeditated murder or felony 
murder. 
21 
 
 
One may ask whether this difference in the verdict would matter because under 
any of the three alternatives the jury should have been given—(1) unanimously finding 
Dominguez guilty of premeditated first-degree murder, (2) unanimously finding him 
guilty of first-degree felony murder, or (3) unanimously finding him guilty of first-degree 
murder but splitting votes between the two alternative theories—Dominguez would have 
been guilty of first-degree murder. The answer is that the verdict would have had a 
significant impact on Dominguez' minimum sentence. The legislature has chosen to 
impose a different minimum sentence for first-degree felony murder—at the time of 
Leyva's death a 20-year minimum—than for premeditation first-degree murder—up to a 
50-year minimum. See K.S.A. 21-3401 (murder in first degree is off-grid person felony); 
K.S.A. 21-4635(b) (conviction of first-degree murder based upon finding of 
premeditation subject to mandatory term of up to 50 years imprisonment); K.S.A. 21-
4706(c) (sentence for off-grid crimes shall be imprisonment for life); K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 
22-3717(b)(2) (20-year minimum for life sentence with exceptions including K.S.A. 21-
4635). Further, if the jury would have found Dominguez guilty of first-degree murder 
based on a combination of votes for the two alternative theories, the sentencing court 
could have only imposed a sentence for felony murder. See State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 
116, 140-41, 977 P.2d 941 (1999) ("Where the sentencing court cannot ascertain whether 
the jury unanimously convicted the defendant of both premeditated murder and felony 
murder, but the jury convicted the defendant of the inherently dangerous underlying 
felony, the sentencing court may not sentence the defendant for premeditated murder but 
must impose the sentence for felony murder"; where jury unanimously found defendant 
guilty of premeditated murder and felony murder, sentence for premeditated murder is 
not illegal); State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 264, 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (same), 
disapproved on other grounds by State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). 
 
Consequently, Dominguez has established clear error, and we reverse his 
conviction for first-degree murder and remand the case to the trial court.  
22 
 
ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION 
 
Next, Dominguez argues that the trial court erred in failing to give PIK Crim. 3d 
52.18, which instructs the jury to consider an accomplice's testimony with caution. 
Dominguez argues that Jurado, having been found guilty of crimes related to the shooting 
death of Leyva and the wounding of Rosales, was clearly an accomplice and, 
consequently, the instruction was legally and factually appropriate. The State agrees that 
Jurado was involved in the crimes and was an accomplice, but it argues the instruction 
was not legally appropriate because Jurado was also a codefendant. It bases its argument 
on the Notes on Use for PIK Crim. 3d 52.18, which state:  "This instruction should not be 
given when the accomplice is also a co-defendant."  
 
The trial court discussed this PIK Committee notation with counsel during the 
instructions conference and also pointed out the Court of Appeals' decision on which it is 
based, State v. Land, 14 Kan. App. 2d 515, 794 P.2d 668 (1990). Dominguez' counsel 
responded by saying, "[S]ince [Jurado] wasn't a codefendant charged in this particular 
case, he's not a codefendant, but I think it's very disingenuous of me to say that." The trial 
court thanked counsel for his candor, ruled that Jurado was a codefendant, and 
determined that PIK Crim. 3d 52.18 would not be given in light of the PIK Committee's 
Notes on Use and the holding in Land. 
 
On appeal, Dominguez asks us to adopt the argument his trial counsel labeled as 
disingenuous. While that situation makes us initially skeptical, we ultimately conclude 
Dominguez' appellate argument is correct and the instruction should have been given.  To 
explain, we need to discuss the holding in Land, which provides context to the Notes on 
Use to PIK Crim. 3d 52.18, and to clarify that the holding is limited to situations where 
two or more accomplices are on trial before the same jury.  
 
 
23 
 
Legally and Factually Appropriate 
 
In Land, 14 Kan. App. 2d 515, Sonja L. Land was prosecuted in a joint trial with 
two other codefendants and was the only defendant who testified. Although the State's 
theory was that Land was an accomplice, making the cautionary accomplice instruction 
applicable, Land argued it would be inappropriate to instruct the jury to view any 
accomplice's testimony with caution. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating the instruction 
"was not neutral . . . . [I]t arbitrarily singled out [the defendant's] testimony and would 
cause a jury to scrutinize it differently than other testimony." 14 Kan. App. 2d at 520. 
 
 
Dominguez does not question the soundness of the holding in Land but argues it 
should be limited to situations in which accomplices are jointly tried. We agree. The 
Land court's concern about undermining the testimony of a defendant only arises in cases 
where two or more accomplices are on trial before the same jury. In contrast, in the 
present case, an accomplice instruction would not have singled out Dominguez, who was 
the only defendant in the case. Further, the State offers no justification for extending the 
Land rationale to a situation where only one accomplice is on trial.  
 
Also, while the Notes on Use do not distinguish between accomplices in the same 
trial and accomplices who are tried separately on charges based on the same criminal 
activity, other authorities do. Our decisions have stressed that the better practice is to give 
the cautionary instruction regardless of whether there is corroborating evidence, "as long 
as the accomplice is not also a codefendant in the trial." (Emphasis added.) State v. 
Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 262-63, 311 P.3d 399 (2013) (citing PIK Crim. 3d 52.18, Notes 
on Use); see State v. Tapia, 295 Kan. 978, 996, 287 P.3d 879 (2012) (same); State v. 
Simmons, 282 Kan. 728, 734, 148 P.3d 525 (2006) (same); see also State v. Buehler-May, 
279 Kan. 371, 384-85, 110 P.3d 425 (discussing the fact that two accomplices were 
questioned at defendant's trial about their plea bargain arrangements in front of the jury; 
24 
 
trial court's failure to give cautionary accomplice instruction was not clearly erroneous; 
no characterization of witnesses as codefendants), cert. denied 546 U.S. 980 (2005). 
 
 
In addition, "codefendant" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 293 (9th ed. 2009) 
as "[o]ne of two or more defendants sued in the same litigation or charged with the same 
crime." Admittedly, we are often imprecise in referring to "codefendants" simply because 
charges arise from the same criminal act, even if the defendants are not charged in the 
same case or with the same crimes. Regardless, the definition does not fit in this case:  
Jurado and Dominguez were not charged in the same case or with the same crimes, 
although the State did file charges against both men involving the same victims and the 
same event.  
 
 
Moreover, the facts of this case underscore the appropriateness of distinguishing 
between an accomplice whose guilt or innocence will be determined by the jury which 
hears the accomplice's testimony and an accomplice whose guilt or innocence is not 
being judged by the jury hearing the testimony. A jury has reason to view with caution 
the testimony of an accomplice who, like Jurado, received a benefit from testifying—the 
State's agreement to amend charges to a lesser included offense in exchange for 
testimony. In fact, this is exactly the situation the cautionary instruction is designed to 
address. And it did so without singling out Dominguez, who chose not to testify in his 
defense.  
 
In summary, the trial court erred in extending the holding in Land to 
circumstances where an accomplice is not being tried before the same jury.  
 
Not Reversible Error 
 
We must next determine whether this error requires us to reverse all of 
Dominguez' convictions. In arguing for reversal, Dominguez suggests he is entitled to the 
25 
 
more favorable harmless error standard of review instead of the clearly erroneous 
standard applied in Issue I. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 162-
63, 283 P.3d 202 (2012). He bases this position on the fact he requested the instruction.  
 
Nevertheless, as we have discussed, Dominguez' counsel also told the trial court it 
was disingenuous to suggest the instruction was appropriate. Under those circumstances, 
we conclude Dominguez is not entitled to the more favorable standard of review. This 
court recently considered a situation where defense counsel stated that he was "'not going 
to agree' with not giving the instruction" but did not advance any legal arguments that 
would have explained why the instruction should be given. State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan. 
632, 316 P.3d 136 (2014). This court found Littlejohn's situation akin to one where a 
defendant objects to an instruction on one ground at trial but asserts a different argument 
on appeal. In those circumstances this court has held the clearly erroneous standard of 
review applies. 298 Kan. at 644-46; see State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 1139, 221 P.3d 
1105 (2009), cert. denied 560 U.S. 966 (2010); see also Tapia, 295 Kan. at 995 (clearly 
erroneous standard of review applied on appeal to defendant's jury instruction issue when 
defendant's request for jury instruction before district court was interpreted as being so 
indistinct as to not clearly communicate the request or, alternatively, as being different 
from the request being made on appeal). 
 
 
In the same way, a clearly erroneous standard of review applies in the present case 
where Dominguez basically conceded at the instructions conference that the instruction 
was not appropriate. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 867, 281 
P.3d 1112 (2012). Hence, reversal is only required if we are firmly convinced the jury 
would have reached a different verdict had the instruction been given. Dominguez 
maintains the burden of establishing clear error under K.S.A. 22-3414(3). See State v. 
Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 515-16, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). He fails to carry this burden. 
 
 
26 
 
 
This court has stated: 
 
"[N]o reversible error occurs due to a trial court's failure to give a cautionary accomplice 
witness instruction if a witness' testimony is corroborated by other evidence and the 
witness' testimony does not provide the sole basis for a resulting conviction. [Citations 
omitted.]. . . 
"Further, a failure to provide the jury with the cautionary accomplice witness 
instruction of PIK Crim. 3d 52.18 is not error when the defendant's guilt is plain or when 
the jury is cautioned about the weight to be accorded testimonial evidence in other 
instructions. [Citation omitted.]" Simmons, 282 Kan. at 740. 
 
Consequently, we begin our analysis by examining the extent and importance of Jurado's 
testimony, as well as any corroborating testimony. See Tapia, 295 Kan. at 996-97; State 
v. DePriest, 258 Kan. 596, 605, 907 P.2d 868 (1995); State v. Moore, 229 Kan. 73, 80-
81, 622 P.2d 631 (1981); see also State v. Moody, 223 Kan. 699, 702-03, 576 P.2d 637 
(failure to give accomplice instruction can create trial error, particularly when the 
accomplice testimony is uncorroborated), cert. denied 439 U.S. 894 (1978). 
 
While Jurado's testimony was damaging to Dominguez' defense, it was largely 
corroborated by Garcia-Velazquez' testimony. The one significant point of disagreement 
between Jurado and Garcia-Velazquez was how the rifle came to be in the SUV:  Jurado 
testified that Dominguez wanted to buy a gun, so Jurado contacted his uncle who sold the 
rifle to Dominguez behind Jurado's house and placed it inside Jurado's SUV; Garcia-
Velazquez testified Jurado carried the rifle wrapped in a blanket from inside the house 
and took it out to Jurado's SUV. Garcia-Velazquez' version is arguably more favorable to 
Dominguez on the element of premeditation. Nevertheless, the evidence was undisputed 
that it was obvious there was a rifle in the SUV, and Dominguez would have been aware 
of the rifle's presence from the time they left the party until they drove to Leyva's house. 
Even under Garcia-Velazquez' explanation, the jury could infer Jurado and Dominguez 
had discussed taking the gun with them and had a plan and purpose for doing so. Also, 
27 
 
defense counsel cross-examined Jurado on the inconsistency between his version of how 
Dominguez acquired the rifle and Garcia-Velazquez' version, and Jurado admitted that if 
his uncle were questioned about the firearm sale, he would probably not corroborate 
Jurado's version.  
 
Witnesses other than Garcia-Velazquez corroborated many other aspects of 
Jurado's testimony. Rosales identified the shooter as being dressed in clothes like those 
worn earlier in the evening by Dominguez. Also, several witnesses testified to 
Dominguez' reaction when, in Dominguez' view, Jurado had not stood up for himself 
when Leyva failed to show Jurado a proper level of respect at the bar. Rosales and others 
testified to the exchange between Leyva and Jurado, and Leyva's wife testified she 
believed Dominguez had cussed at her and Leyva as they were leaving the bar. 
 
In addition, defense counsel in the first trial had effectively called into question 
Jurado's veracity, and the entire transcript, including defense counsel's cross-examination 
of Jurado, was read into the record at the second trial. Defense counsel had elicited that 
Jurado was initially charged with more serious offenses—aiding and abetting first-degree 
murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, and solicitation to 
commit intentional second-degree murder—and Jurado avoided longer prison time by 
pleading no contest to solicitation to commit the second-degree murder of Leyva and 
aiding and abetting the discharge of a firearm at an occupied building belonging to 
Leyva. Also, on cross-examination Jurado admitted he had lied to investigating law 
enforcement officers. Finally, defense counsel questioned Jurado about why he fled the 
community after the shooting if he had done nothing wrong and why he pleaded guilty to 
offenses, such as solicitation to commit second-degree murder. (Jurado actually pleaded 
no contest).  
 
In addition to the thorough cross-examination of Jurado and the corroboration of 
some of Jurado's testimony through other witnesses, the jury was given the general jury 
28 
 
instruction on witness credibility. Instruction No. 2, which conformed to PIK Crim. 3d 
51.04 (Consideration of Evidence), stated, in part:  "In your fact finding you should 
consider and weigh everything admitted into evidence. This includes testimony of 
witnesses." Finally, there was strong evidence of Dominguez' guilt on the charges of 
aggravated battery and discharge of a firearm at an occupied building. 
 
Considered in this light, Dominguez fails to convince us that the cautionary 
accomplice instruction would have changed the jury's verdict. 
 
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION INSTRUCTION 
 
 
For his final issue regarding the jury instructions, Dominguez argues that the trial 
court committed clear error in failing to give a voluntary intoxication instruction. See PIK 
Crim. 3d 54.12-A-1 (instructing that voluntary intoxication may be a defense where "the 
evidence indicates that such intoxication impaired a defendant's mental faculties to the 
extent that [he][she] was incapable of forming the necessary state of mind"). 
 
Legally and Factually Appropriate 
 
 
First, we must consider whether it was error to fail to give the instruction. This 
inquiry requires us to consider whether the voluntary intoxication instruction was legally 
and factually appropriate.  
 
 
As to legal appropriateness, a defendant may rely on the defense of voluntary 
intoxication when the crime charged requires a specific intent. State v. Gadelkarim, 247 
Kan. 505, Syl. ¶ 1, 802 P.2d 507 (1990). In a proper case, such as one involving a charge 
of premeditated first-degree murder, voluntary intoxication may be used as a valid 
defense and would, therefore, be legally appropriate. See Ellmaker, 289 Kan. at 1142 
29 
 
(State required to prove specific intent to kill and premeditation to convict a defendant of 
premeditated first-degree murder). 
 
 
The stumbling block Dominguez faces, however, is that a voluntary intoxication 
instruction was not factually appropriate. Notably, voluntary intoxication is not a valid 
defense if there is no evidence presented to demonstrate that the defendant was so 
intoxicated that his or her ability to form the requisite intent was impaired. State v. 
Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 607, 257 P.3d 767 (2011); State v. Johnson, 258 Kan. 475, 
485-86, 905 P.2d 94 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Everett, 296 Kan. 
1039, 297 P.3d 292 (2013); State v. Brown, 258 Kan. 374, 386, 904 P.2d 985 (1995); see 
also State v. Kessler, 276 Kan. 202, 210-11, 73 P.3d 761 (2003) (in order for voluntary 
intoxication instruction to be required, there must be evidence defendant was so 
intoxicated he or she was robbed of mental faculties). 
 
 
Here, Dominguez bases his argument on evidence that he had been drinking at the 
bar and Jurado's party. But this evidence does not establish how much alcohol 
Dominguez drank. More critically, Dominguez points to no evidence presented at trial 
that would have convinced a jury he was so intoxicated as to be unable to form the 
specific intent necessary for the commission of premeditated first-degree murder. See 
Hernandez, 292 Kan. at 607 (evidence that defendant consumed alcohol and marijuana, 
or that defendant was "'high'" or "'intoxicated'" does not permit an inference that 
defendant was so impaired that he was unable to form requisite intent). In fact, there was 
testimony that just before the shootings, Dominguez was communicating with Jurado and 
test-firing the rifle.  
 
 
Without more, Dominguez' voluntary intoxication arguments fail. We, therefore, 
conclude a voluntary intoxication instruction was not factually appropriate in this case. 
Therefore, there is no need to move to the reversibility step of the clearly erroneous 
30 
 
standard of review. The trial court's failure to give the instruction was not clearly 
erroneous. 
 
HARD 50 SENTENCE 
 
Finally, Dominguez argues his hard 50 sentence is unconstitutional because a jury 
did not determine the underlying facts that allowed for increasing his minimum sentence. 
We do not reach this issue, however, because we are reversing Dominguez' first-degree 
murder conviction. The result of this reversal is that his hard 50 sentence for first-degree 
murder must be and is vacated. Consequently, his attack on his hard 50 sentence is moot 
and will not be addressed. See State v. Montgomery, 295 Kan. 837, 840, 286 P.3d 866 
(2012) (as a general rule, appellate courts do not decide moot questions).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In summary, we reverse Dominguez' first-degree murder conviction and vacate his 
hard 50 sentence for first-degree murder. We affirm his convictions for aggravated 
battery and discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling. 
 
 
Affirmed in part, reversed and vacated in part, and remanded.