Title: HUMAN RIGHTS COM'N v. Dept. of Defense
Citation: 627 A.2d 1005
Docket Number: 
State: Maine
Issuer: Maine Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 1993

Decided July 6, 1993. John E. Carnes (orally), Maine Human Rights Com'n, Augusta, for plaintiff. Christian T. Chandler (orally), Curtis, Thaxter, Stevens, Broder & Micoleau, Augusta, for Parker A. Denaco. Paul Stern (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for Dept. of Defense. *1006 Before ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS, RUDMAN and DANA, JJ. CLIFFORD, Justice. The Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Mead, J.) dismissing for failure to state a claim its complaint against the Maine Department of Defense and Veterans' Services (Department) and Parker A. Denaco, an officer in the Maine Air National Guard. Because we agree with the Superior Court that the Maine Human Rights Act, pursuant to which this action is brought, does not apply to officers and enlisted personnel of the Maine National Guard, we affirm the judgment. The Commission's complaint alleges the following facts. Morris Wayne Jacobs and Parker Denaco both worked at the Maine Labor Relations Board (MLRB). Each was also an officer in the Maine National Guard. In 1988, Jacobs, counsel to the MLRB, reported that Denaco, MLRB executive director, was using employee services, materials, and equipment for his own personal benefit. Following Jacobs' report and an investigation by the MLRB and the Governor's office, Denaco resigned from his position with the MLRB. In 1989, Jacobs, an officer in the Maine Army National Guard, applied for either of two vacant Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG) positions with the Maine Air National Guard. After Jacobs' application was submitted, Denaco, a colonel in the Air National Guard, made disparaging remarks about Jacobs on several occasions in front of other officers. Jacobs was not selected for either JAG position. Jacobs then filed charges of discrimination with the Maine Human Rights Commission, see 26 M.R.S.A. § 834-A (1988) & 5 M.R.S.A. § 4611 (1989), alleging that he was not hired because of his whistleblowing activities at the MLRB.[2]See 26 M.R.S.A. § 833 (1988). In 1990, Jacobs applied for another JAG position with the Air National Guard. He was the first to apply for the position and met the minimum qualifications, but was not selected. Jacobs then filed an additional charge of discrimination with the Commission claiming that he was discriminated against by the Guard for filing his first complaint with the Commission. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(E) (Supp.1992). Following its investigation, the Commission found reasonable grounds to believe unlawful discrimination had occurred in regard to Jacobs' second application. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4612 (1989 & Supp.1992). Jacobs filed a complaint in the Superior Court in which he alleged the State, the Department,[3] the Governor, and Denaco violated the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. §§ 831-840 (1988), and the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4632 (1989 & Supp.1992). He also included a claim of defamation against Denaco.[4] The Commission successfully moved to intervene as a party plaintiff and filed its own complaint. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4612(4)(A); see also M.R.Civ.P. 24. In its complaint, the Commission alleges that (1) defendant Denaco's interference with the Air National Guard's selection process in retaliation for Jacobs's whistleblowing at the MLRB constituted unlawful discrimination in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(10)(D);[5] and (2) the defendant Department's refusal to hire Jacobs for the position for which he applied in his second *1007 application violated 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(E)[6] because the Department's decision amounted to a retaliation for Jacobs' initial complaint to the Commission.[7] On the motions of the Department and Denaco, the Superior Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Commission's appeal is now before us. The Commission's complaint was brought pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act. We first consider the applicability of that Act to uniformed personnel of the Maine National Guard.[8] The Maine Human Rights Act is our state's counterpart to the federal discrimination law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and has been construed consistently with the analogous federal statute. Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253 , 1261 (Me.1979). The interpretation by federal courts of provisions of Title VII has provided guidance in the construction of our own Human Rights Act. Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Local 1361, 383 A.2d 369 , 375 (Me.1978); see Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 , 1511 (D.Me.1991); Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 295 , 298-99 (D.Me.1985). The substantive provisions in the Maine statute that the Commission alleges have been violated are similar to the provisions in federal law. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(E), prohibiting employment discrimination in retaliation for making a charge under the Human Rights Act, is similar to the anti-retaliatory provision in Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (West 1981). The Maine Whistleblowers' Protection Act is also comparable to its federal counterpart, 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West Supp.1993). Most federal courts have construed Title VII, the federal employment discrimination statute, as not applying to uniformed military personnel, and have concluded that had Congress intended that it so apply, Congress would have provided for such application "in unmistakable terms." Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir.1978); see also Roper v. Department of the Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir.1987); Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir.1983); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th *1008 Cir.1981). Certainly there is nothing in the Maine Human Rights Act, or in the Maine Whistleblowers' Protection Act, expressing "in unmistakable terms" a legislative intent that those statutes are applicable to uniformed military personnel of the Maine National Guard.[9] Moreover, 37-B M.R.S.A. § 142 (1989) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the qualifications for appointment of officers and enlistment of enlisted personnel and the procedures for promoting, transferring, discharging, equipping, uniforming and training personnel of the state military force shall be consistent with federal laws and regulations prescribed for the National Guard. In view of the legislatively expressed intent that there be uniformity with federal law in the military personnel area, the interpretation of Title VII laws as not applying to uniformed military personnel, and the absence of any clearly expressed intent to make the Maine Human Rights Act applicable to military personnel, we conclude that the Human Rights Act cannot and should not be construed to apply to the allegations in the Commission's complaint. See Wright v. Department of Defense & Veterans Servs., 623 A.2d 1283 (Me.1993) (Freedom of Access Act not applicable to Air National Guard discharge proceedings). Because the Commission's allegations hinge on the applicability of the Maine Human Rights Act, the Superior Court correctly dismissed the entire complaint. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.