Title: Williams v. Mitchell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 314, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DANA WILLIAMS,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN MITCHELL, RICHARD 
DENNIS, ROBERT HAMPTON, 
DEANNA, BARBARA, MARIA, 
CLAIRE READER, and LINDA A. 
BARNETT,  
 
Defendants Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 314, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  C.A. No. 02C-10-032 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 15, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 29, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 29th day of August 2006, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Dana Williams, filed a pro se notice of 
appeal from the Superior Court’s June 17, 2005 orders, which, first, granted 
the motion of defendant-appellee Robert Hampton to vacate the entry of 
default judgment against him and, second, granted the motion to dismiss of 
the remaining defendants-appellees.   
 
(2) 
On July 26, 2006, the Clerk issued a notice, pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 29(b), directing Williams to show cause why his appeal 
 
2
should not be dismissed based on his failure to comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 42 when taking an appeal from an apparent interlocutory order.1  
Rather than responding to the notice to show cause, Williams, on August 15, 
2006, filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of his appeal.2   
 
(3) 
When a civil action involves multiple claims and multiple 
parties, a judgment regarding any claim or any party does not become final 
until the entry of the last judgment that resolves all claims as to all parties 
unless an interlocutory ruling as to a claim or party is certified pursuant to 
Superior Court Civil Rule 54(b).3  Moreover, an order of the Superior Court 
is final only if it constitutes the court’s “final act” in a case.4  Absent 
compliance with Supreme Court Rule 42, the appellate jurisdiction of this 
Court is limited to the review of final orders.5 
 
(4) 
Under the above authorities, the Superior Court’s order of 
dismissal as to all defendants except for Robert Hampton is an interlocutory 
order, as is the Superior Court’s order vacating the default judgment against 
Robert Hampton.  Williams could have sought the entry of a final judgment 
                                                 
1 It is undisputed that Robert Hampton remains as a defendant in the Superior Court case.   
2 Because the defendants already responded to Williams’ opening brief and did not 
stipulate to a dismissal, Williams may not voluntarily dismiss his appeal.  Supr. Ct. R. 
29(a). 
3 Harrison v. Ramunno, 730 A.2d 653, 654 (Del. 1999).  
4 J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., 303 A.2d 648, 650 (Del. 
1973).   
5 Julian v. State, 440 A.2d 990, 991 (Del. 1982).  
 
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with respect to the defendants dismissed by the Superior Court pursuant to 
Superior Court Civil Rule 54(b), but he did not do so.  Nor did he attempt to 
comply with Supreme Court Rule 42 when appealing from the Superior 
Court’s interlocutory order vacating the default judgment against Robert 
Hampton.  Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this interlocutory appeal 
is DISMISSED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice