Title: State v. Anthony D.B.
Citation: 2000 WI 94
Docket Number: 1998AP000576
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2000

2000 WI 94 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0576 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Anthony D.B.,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 185, 603 N.W.2d 748 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Karen E. Timberlake, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 94 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0576  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Anthony D.B., 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Petitioner Anthony D.B. 
requests review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming an order of the circuit court.  The circuit 
court found Anthony D.B., who had been committed as a sexually 
violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1995-96),1 not 
competent to refuse medication, and issued an order authorizing 
involuntary medication.  The question presented is whether the 
circuit court had authority to issue such an order to an 
individual committed under ch. 980.  Because those individuals 
committed under ch. 980 are defined as "patients" in Wis. Stat. 
                     
1 All references are to the 1995-96 volume of the statutes, 
unless noted otherwise. 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
2 
§ 51.61(1), 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
statutory 
provision 
in 
§ 51.61(1)(g), 
authorizing 
a 
court 
to 
order 
medication 
regardless of the patient's consent, along with the relevant 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.20, apply.  The circuit court had 
statutory authority to issue its order and, accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  In 1997 
Anthony D.B. was committed as a sexually violent person pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Anthony D.B. previously had been 
convicted of second-degree sexual assault and sentenced to six 
years in prison.  After the conviction for sexual assault, and 
before his ch. 980 commitment, Anthony D.B. was committed under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.17, as a person found not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect, to a non-sexual offense.  As part of 
the § 971.17 commitment, an order was issued finding that 
Anthony D.B. was not competent to refuse medication.   
¶3 
Anthony D.B.'s Wis. Stat. ch. 980 placement was 
scheduled to occur after the expiration of his Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.17 commitment, and the order for involuntary medication.  
In anticipation of the termination of the order for involuntary 
medication, the State filed a motion for a new involuntary 
medication order pursuant to Anthony D.B.'s ch. 980 commitment. 
¶4 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Timothy G. Dugan 
presided at a hearing on the State's motion.  Doctor Martha 
Rolli testified that involuntary medication was necessary to 
protect Anthony D.B. from himself, and to protect others from 
him.  According to Dr. Rolli, Anthony D.B. suffered from a 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
3 
mental disease and was dangerous when not medicated.  She stated 
that if not on medication, Anthony D.B. became psychotic, 
aggressive, sexually focused, bites his own lip and refuses to 
eat or drink.  Dr. Rolli further testified that Anthony D.B. 
would not take his medication unless ordered to do so.  Dr. 
Rolli stated that Anthony D.B. did not understand the advantages 
and disadvantages of the medication, although she had attempted 
to explain these matters to him on numerous occasions.  In Dr. 
Rolli's opinion, Anthony D.B. would appropriately be committed 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 51.   
¶5 
Anthony D.B. conceded that if the circuit court had 
the 
authority 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
980 
to 
order 
him 
involuntarily medicated, then Dr. Rolli's testimony established 
that he should be involuntarily medicated.  However, Anthony 
D.B. argued that ch. 980 provides no independent authority for 
ordering involuntary medication.  According to Anthony D.B., the 
State was required to initiate commitment proceedings under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 51 before seeking an order for involuntary medication. 
¶6 
In a written order issued in January 1998 Judge Dugan 
stated that the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.61 applied to 
individuals committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Section 
51.61(1)(g) provides a procedure 
for 
ordering 
involuntary 
medication of a patient under certain circumstances.  Judge 
Dugan concluded that if the procedures in § 51.61(1)(g) are 
complied with, then the court that commits an individual 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 has the authority to order 
involuntary medication.   
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
4 
¶7 
Anthony D.B. appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  Subsequently, Anthony D.B petitioned this court for 
review pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 808.10, which we granted. 
¶8 
The issue presented in this case is whether a court 
may issue an involuntary medication order for an individual 
committed pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Resolution of this 
issue requires that we interpret ch. 980 and Wis. Stat. § 51.61 
and 
the 
interaction 
of 
these 
provisions. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.  
State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 404, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999).  
The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of 
the legislature.  Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 
327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996). 
I 
¶9 
As a preliminary matter, we note that it is undisputed 
by the parties that Anthony D.B. is mentally ill.  The record 
indicates that Dr. Rolli testified to the circuit court that 
Anthony D.B. has schizophrenia.  Other individuals committed 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 may not suffer from this type of 
disabling condition.  Our conclusions in this case are limited 
to individuals committed pursuant to ch. 980 and who also suffer 
from a chronic mental illness such as schizophrenia. 
¶10 Anthony D.B. asserts that neither Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
nor Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) authorizes a court to issue an 
involuntary medication order for an individual committed under 
ch. 980.  He contends that because ch. 980 does not include 
statutory 
provisions 
explicitly 
authorizing 
involuntary 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
5 
medication orders, the legislature unambiguously intended that 
such orders cannot be issued to individuals committed only under 
ch. 980.  Anthony D.B. does not challenge here the propriety of 
his ch. 980 commitment.  Instead, he contends that to obtain 
such an involuntary medication order, a Wis. Stat. ch. 51 
commitment 
must be 
pursued 
in addition to 
the ch. 980 
commitment.  We disagree. 
¶11 Our decision is guided by well-established rules of 
statutory interpretation.  Wisconsin Stat. chs. 980 and 51 both 
govern individuals committed as sexually violent persons.  When 
construing several statutes that deal with the same subject, it 
is our duty to give each provision full force and effect.  State 
v. Aaron D., 214 Wis. 2d 56, 66, 571 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997). 
If two statutes that apply to the same subject are in conflict, 
the more specific controls.  Jones v. State, 226 Wis. 2d 565, 
576, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999).  Conflicts between statutes are not 
favored and will not be held to exist if the statute may be 
reasonably interpreted otherwise.  Id.  
¶12 The underlying purpose for civil commitment, including 
commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, "'is to treat the 
individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his 
potential dangerousness.'" State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 308, 
541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 
354, 368 (1983)).  Chapter 980 is a civil commitment procedure 
enacted "to protect the public and to provide concentrated 
treatment to convicted sexually violent persons, not to punish 
the sexual offender."  State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
6 
541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  This court has found treatment to be a 
"bona fide goal" of ch. 980.  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 308.  Those 
who are determined to be sexually violent persons are committed 
for "control, care and treatment" from the state.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.06(1).   
¶13 In upholding the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. ch. 
980 
in 
Post, 
we 
specifically 
concluded 
that 
individuals 
committed pursuant to ch. 980 are entitled to the patients' 
rights set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 51.  Id. at 309.  Chapter 51 
is the Mental Health Act and Wis. Stat. § 51.61 is Wisconsin's 
Patients' Rights Statute.  Section § 51.61(1) defines "patient" 
to include individuals committed under ch. 980.  In Post we 
found that persons committed pursuant to ch. 980 are entitled to 
the rights set forth in Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(f).  Post, 197 
Wis. 2d at 309.  Section 51.61(1)(f) provides that committed 
individuals "[h]ave a right to receive prompt and adequate 
treatment . . . appropriate for his or her condition . . . ."  
In 
ch. 
51, 
"treatment" 
is 
defined 
as 
"psychological, 
educational, social, chemical, medical or somatic techniques 
designed 
to 
bring 
about 
rehabilitation 
of 
a 
mentally 
ill . . . person."  Wis. Stat. § 51.01(17).   
¶14 Although Anthony D.B. correctly points out that Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 does not set forth specific procedures for 
involuntary medication, Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3 provides in 
relevant part:  
 
 
Following a final commitment order, . . . [each 
patient shall] have the right to exercise informed 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
7 
consent with regard to all medication and treatment 
unless the committing court or the court in the county 
in which the individual is located . . . makes a 
determination, 
following 
a 
hearing, 
that 
the 
individual is not competent to refuse medication or 
treatment or unless a situation exists in which the 
medication 
or 
treatment 
is necessary 
to 
prevent 
serious physical harm to the individual or others.  
¶15 We conclude that the legislative intent in these 
statutes is to provide a statutory mechanism for the treatment 
of sexually violent persons.  The legislature has provided that 
these individuals are to have the statutory rights under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.61, 
pursuant 
to 
the 
inclusion 
of 
individuals 
committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 in § 51.61(1).  Section 51.61 
provides patients with the right to make informed decisions 
regarding medication, except in those circumstances where, 
following a constitutionally sufficient procedure, the patient 
is determined to be not competent to refuse medication.  Under 
these 
circumstances, 
§ 51.61(1)(g) 
authorizes 
orders 
for 
involuntary 
administration 
of 
medication 
for 
individuals 
committed under ch. 980. 
¶16 Anthony D.B. offers a number of arguments against this 
conclusion, none of which we find persuasive. 
¶17 First, Anthony D.B. contends that the legislative 
history of Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(b) illustrates that the 
legislature did not intend the medication provisions in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) to apply to individuals committed under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980.  Anthony D.B. points out that Wis. Stat. ch. 51 
originally applied only to individuals committed under ch. 51.  
Subsequently, the legislature amended § 51.61(1) to included 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
8 
individuals who are criminally committed or transferred under 
Wis. Stat. chs. 971 or 975.  § 96, ch. 428, Laws of 1977.  As a 
result of this amendment, the rights extended to patients 
civilly committed under ch. 51 were extended to patients who are 
criminally committed.   
¶18 In 
1987 
this 
court 
held 
that 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.61(1)(g) (1985-86) applied to individuals involuntarily 
committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 971.  State ex rel. Jones v. 
Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 745, 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987).  
Subsequently, 
the 
legislature 
repealed 
and 
re-created 
§ 51.61(1)(g) in 1987 Wis. Act 366, § 18.  The following 
session, separate involuntary medication provisions were enacted 
for those committed under ch. 971 and Wis. Stat. ch. 975.  1989 
Wis. Act 334, § 5; 1989 Wis. Act 31, §§ 2854d, 2854h, 2885m.   
¶19 The conclusion Anthony D.B. draws from this history is 
that the legislature sought to limit the applicability of the 
Wis. Stat. ch. 51 medication provisions to those individuals 
committed under ch. 51.  We are not persuaded.   
¶20 In our decision in Post, this court interpreted Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 and explicitly stated that the patients' rights 
provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 51 applied to persons committed 
under 
ch. 
980. 
 
Post, 
197 
Wis. 2d 
at 
309. 
"Having 
authoritatively construed a statute, well-established principles 
of judicial decision-making require that the chosen construction 
be maintained unless and until the legislature either amends or 
repeals the statute."  Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 470, 290 
N.W.2d 510 (1980).  Rather than a condemnation of using the ch. 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
9 
51 procedures where involuntary medication orders are sought for 
those committed under ch. 980, we conclude that the legislative 
history supports the conclusion that the procedures in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.61 apply unless and until the legislature provides 
alternative provisions.  To date the legislature has not elected 
to add specific involuntary medication provisions to ch. 980.  
Therefore the provisions of § 51.61(1)(g), and the relevant 
provisions in Wis. Stat. § 51.20, control involuntary medication 
orders for persons committed under this chapter.  
¶21 Next, Anthony D.B. argues that requiring a Wis. Stat. 
ch. 51 commitment to obtain an involuntary medication order 
comports with the logic of State ex rel. Roberta S. v. Waukesha 
County Human Services Department, 171 Wis. 2d 266, 491 N.W.2d 
114 (Ct. App. 1992) and K.N.K. v. Buhler, 139 Wis. 2d 190, 407 
N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1987).  Each of these cases involve the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 55.  Chapter 55 "provides for 
the protective placement of an individual for the primary 
purpose of providing care and custody following a determination 
of incompetency in accordance with ch. 880, Stats."  K.N.K., 139 
Wis. 2d at 197.  We agree with the State that the holdings in 
Roberta S. and K.N.K. are limited to the statutory provisions at 
issue in each case.   
¶22 In Roberta S., the court of appeals held that an order 
for guardianship and protective services under Wis. Stat. ch. 
880 did not authorize forcible administration of psychotropic 
medications.  Roberta S., 171 Wis. 2d at 274.  At the time 
Roberta S. was decided, Wis. Stat. § 880.33 (1991-92) authorized 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
10
a court to appoint a guardian for the purpose of consenting to 
or refusing psychotropic medication, but the statute did not 
specifically provide that the guardian may be authorized to 
consent to forcible administration of medication to the ward.2  
Id. at 275.  The court of appeals concluded that the statutory 
guardianship did not authorize the involuntary medication of a 
ward who refused to take medication.  Id. at 274.  The court of 
appeals held that "an order for forcible administration of 
psychotropic medication may only be issued in a ch. 51, Stats., 
proceeding after a finding has been made of dangerousness 
because of recent acts or omissions."  Id. at 277-78.  It 
concluded that a separate Wis. Stat. ch. 51 proceeding would 
need to be brought if forcible administration of medications was 
determined to be necessary.  Id. at 278.   
¶23 The State correctly points out that in Roberta S., the 
court of appeals did not consider whether either Wis. Stat. chs. 
55 or 880 had treatment as a primary purpose.  In addition 
Roberta S. did not consider whether Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1) 
applied to individuals receiving protective services under ch. 
55 and did not note that § 51.61(1) includes individuals 
committed 
under 
ch. 
55 
in 
the 
definition 
of 
"patient."  
Additionally, the statute at issue in Roberta S. established a 
mechanism for obtaining the consent or refusal of medication, 
                     
2 Following the decision in State ex rel. Roberta S. v. 
Waukesha County Human Services Department, 171 Wis. 2d 266, 491 
N.W.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1992), the legislature amended Wis. Stat. 
ch. 880 to allow a court to give a guardian this authority under 
certain circumstances.  1993 Wis. Act. 316, § 8.  
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
11
but did not address involuntary medication.  As a result, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
construed 
the 
statute 
to 
exclude 
such 
provisions.  That is not our case.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 
contains no provision for involuntary medication.  Therefore, 
the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 51 apply. 
¶24 In K.N.K., the court of appeals also considered the 
propriety of a court order for involuntary medication of an 
individual who is under an order for protective placement 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 55.  The court of appeals noted that 
Wis. Stat. § 55.07 provided that the patients' rights set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 51.61 (1985-86) applied to those committed under 
ch. 55.  K.N.K., 139 Wis. 2d at 205.  The court of appeals 
examined § 51.61 and concluded that it permitted an order for 
the involuntary administration of medication prior to the final 
commitment order, but provided no authority for such an order to 
be entered following a protective placement.  Id. at 205-06.  
The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court's order to 
involuntary medicate, issued 
subsequent 
to 
the 
protective 
placement order, was without basis in statute and therefore 
ineffective.  Id. at 206.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) was 
subsequently interpreted by our decision in Gerhardstein and 
revised by the legislature to address post-commitment rights.  
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3.  The K.N.K. decision illustrates the 
necessity for statutory authority to issue an order for 
involuntary medication.  We conclude that this authority is 
found in reading Wis. Stat. ch. 980 together with § 51.61. 
No. 
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12
¶25 Finally, Anthony D.B. contends that amendments adopted 
in 1997 Wis. Act. 284 to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 support his 
position.  These amendments address pharmacological treatment 
using an antiandrogen of the individuals who are "serious child 
sex offenders."3  According to Anthony D.B., if the legislature 
intended that an order for involuntary medication could be 
issued under ch. 980, then this 1997 amendment addressing 
antiandrogen would be unnecessary.  The 1997 amendment, as the 
State points out, does not address the situation presented by 
individuals 
such 
as 
Anthony 
D.B., 
who 
are 
diagnosed 
as 
schizophrenic, need medication, and are not competent to refuse 
medication.  Providing a specific plan for child sex offenders 
does not erode the conclusion that the court has the authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) to address the need of an 
individual such as Anthony D.B. 
¶26 We hold that the rights and procedures in Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.61 for involuntary medication apply in this case.  The 
circuit court issued its order pursuant to the procedure 
outlined under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3.  The initial order of 
the circuit court, therefore, was properly issued. 
                     
3 A "serious child sex offender" as defined by 1997 Wis. Act 
284, § 4: 
means a person who has been convicted, adjudicated 
delinquent or found not guilty or not responsible by 
reason of insanity or mental disease, defect or 
illness 
for 
committing 
a 
violation 
of 
a 
crime 
specified in s. 948.02(1) or (2) [sexual assault of a 
child] or 948.025(1) [engaging in repeated acts of 
sexual assault of the same child] against a child who 
had not attained the age of 13 years. 
No. 
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13
II 
¶27 Having concluded that the involuntary medication order 
was grounded upon the statutory authority in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
and Wis. Stat. § 51.61, we turn to consider the procedure for 
review of that order.  Patients have a liberty interest under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in avoiding 
the involuntary administration of drugs.  Enis v. Department of 
Health and Soc. Serv., 962 F.Supp. 1192, 1197 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
 As a result, due process requires regular review of the 
involuntary medication order.  Id. at 1201.   
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) does not specifically 
set forth a procedure for the regular review of involuntary 
medication 
orders. 
 
Anthony 
D.B. 
points 
out 
that 
civil 
commitments ordered under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 expire and must 
necessarily be reevaluated.  As a result, an order for the 
involuntary medication of a person committed under ch. 51 
expires and is reevaluated during the procedures for involuntary 
commitment for treatment set forth in Wis. Stat. § 51.20.   
¶29 In contrast, commitments under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 do 
not expire at a specific time.  Instead, a periodic review of 
the person's status is conducted at least once every 12 months. 
 Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  This review is undertaken to determine 
if the person committed under ch. 980 "has made sufficient 
progress to be entitled to transfer to a less restrictive 
facility, to supervised release or to discharge."  Id.  The 
State suggests that this periodic reexamination of commitments, 
combined with the court's authority to order reexamination of 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
14
the committed individual under Wis. Stat. § 980.07(3), and the 
individual's right to petition the court for supervised release 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.08, provides sufficient opportunity for 
review of the involuntary medication order.   
¶30 In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 232-33 (1990) 
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not 
require the decision to involuntarily medicate a prison inmate 
to be made by the judiciary if adequate alternative procedures 
exist.  Id. at 231-33.  The Court examined a policy for 
involuntary treatment with drugs developed by the Washington 
Department of Corrections Special Offender Center.  The policy:  
 
requires that the decision whether to medicate an 
inmate against his will be made by a hearing committee 
composed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the 
Center's 
Associate Superintendent. 
 None 
of the 
committee members may be involved, at the time of the 
hearing, in the inmate's treatment or diagnosis; 
members are not disqualified from sitting on the 
committee, however, if they have treated or diagnosed 
the inmate in the past.  The committee's decision is 
subject to review by the Superintendent; if the inmate 
so desires, he may seek judicial review of the 
decision in a state court. 
Id. at 229.  Of particular importance to the Court was the 
independence of the decision maker in the Washington policy.  
Id. at 233.  In contrast, periodic reexamination under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.07 does not contain any specific provision requiring 
an independent evaluation of an involuntary medication order.  
Although under § 980.07(2) a report of the examination is to be 
filed with the court that ordered the commitment, we conclude 
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
15
that due process requires an independent review of the medical 
order in the first instance as well.   
¶31 The periodic review of an individual's commitment 
provided under Wis. Stat. § 980.07 should be read together with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.61(1)(g) 
and 
with 
the 
judicial 
holdings 
requiring, as a matter of due process, the regular review of 
involuntary medication orders.  We determine here that as part 
of the annual review under § 980.07, an involuntary order for 
medication must also be reviewed.  To insure that this review is 
independent, the procedure for the subsequent review of an 
involuntary medication order is the same procedure followed to 
obtain the initial order, § 51.61(1)(g).  Section 51.61(1)(g) is 
the statutory mechanism provided by the legislature that both 
explicitly addresses issuance of involuntary treatment order and 
that clearly applies to individuals committed under Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980.  
¶32 Three points are essential to the implementation of 
this review process.  First, we note that the statutory 
provisions for issuing an involuntary medication order under 
Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g), explicitly provide that a hearing must 
be held in compliance with the procedures set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(5).  Under § 51.20(5), a hearing must be conducted 
in conformance with the "essentials of due process and fair 
treatment," including rights such as a right to counsel, to an 
open hearing with the ability to request a closed hearing, the 
right to remain silent and the right to present and cross-
examine witnesses.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(5).  The only right set 
No. 
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16
forth in § 51.20(5) that is inapplicable to a proceeding 
involving a medication order is the right to a jury trial.  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)(3). 
¶33 Second, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(d) 
allows individuals committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, and 
subject to an involuntary medication order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.61(1)(g), to petition the court for review of that 
medication order.  Section 51.61, set forth in relevant part 
below,4 gives patients the right to petition the court for review 
of the commitment order using the procedures provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(16).  Because those committed under ch. 980 are 
patients, as defined in § 51.61(1), and because the order for 
involuntary medication is 
specifically 
issued 
pursuant to 
§ 51.61(1)(g), the right to petition for judicial review of that 
medication order under § 51.61(1)(d) applies. 
¶34 Third, we conclude an order for the involuntary 
medication of a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 patient expires unless it 
receives the appropriate periodic review.   
¶35 "The 
forcible 
injection 
of 
medication 
into 
a 
nonconsenting 
person's 
body 
represents 
a 
substantial 
interference with that person's liberty."  Harper, 494 U.S. at 
229.  To the extent there is some additional right for the 
patient in Wis. Stat. § 51.20 that is clearly relevant to an 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. 51.61(1)(d) states in part that each 
patient shall "have the right to petition the court for review 
of the commitment order or for withdrawal of the order or 
release from commitment as provided in s. 51.20(16)."  
No. 
98-0576 
 
 
17
order for involuntary medication, such as a request to modify 
the order for medication brought under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(16), a 
court, reviewing the application of such an order to an 
individual committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, should assure 
that the patient's rights and liberty are protected. 
¶36 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 and Wis. 
Stat. ch. 51 provide the statutory basis for a court to issue an 
involuntary medication order for individuals committed pursuant 
to ch. 980. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
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1