Title: Ex parte Lacy Ray Butler. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Lacy Ray Butler v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051636
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 2007

REL: 03/16/07 Ex parte Lacy Ray Butler
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051636
_________________________
Ex parte Lacy Ray Butler
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Lacy Ray Butler
v.
State of Alabama)
(Autauga Circuit Court, CC-84-160;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-0189)
WOODALL, Justice.
In 1984, Lacy Ray Butler was convicted of first-degree
rape and first-degree robbery and was sentenced for each
1051636
2
offense, as a habitual felony offender, to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.  See § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code
1975.  In March 2005, Butler filed a motion pursuant to § 13A-
5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, asking the trial court to reconsider
his sentences and to resentence him to life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole.
"[T]he trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to § 13A-5-
9.1 to consider [Butler's] motion to reconsider his sentence."
Kirby v. State, 899 So. 2d 968, 972 (Ala. 2004).  In Kirby,
this Court discussed the classes of habitual offenders
eligible for resentencing, as well as the factors to be
considered by the trial court in determining whether an inmate
is a nonviolent offender, stating, in pertinent part:
"Reading § 13A-5-9.1 in conjunction with § 13A-5-9
[the Habitual Felony Offender Act ('HFOA')], it is
clear that a sentencing judge or a presiding judge
can resentence only two narrowly defined classes of
habitual offenders: those who had been sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
under the mandatory provisions of the HFOA upon
conviction of a Class A felony with no prior Class
A felony convictions; and those who had been
sentenced to life imprisonment under the mandatory
provisions of the HFOA upon conviction of a Class B
felony.  Moreover, of those habitual offenders, the
judge can resentence only those who are nonviolent
offenders.
1051636
3
"We conclude that the state's trial judges have
the authority under the statute to determine whether
a defendant is a nonviolent offender and that those
judges are competent to make that determination
based upon the nature of the defendant's underlying
conviction, other factors brought before the judge
in the record of the case, and information submitted
to the judge by the DOC [Department of Corrections]
and the Parole Board concerning the inmate's
behavior while incarcerated.  It is axiomatic that
only the sentencing judge or the presiding judge
should evaluate the inmate's crime and his or her
conduct associated with that crime in deciding
whether the inmate is a nonviolent offender, just as
the judge evaluated those factors at the time the
inmate was originally sentenced.  Another factor in
determining whether the inmate is a nonviolent
offender, however, should be a consideration of the
inmate's conduct while incarcerated, which knowledge
is within the purview of the DOC.  Section 13A-5-9.1
provides that the DOC will conduct an evaluation of
the inmate's performance while incarcerated and
submit its evaluation to the court so the judge can
take that information into account in determining
whether the inmate is eligible for reconsideration
of his or her sentence."
899 So. 2d at 974 (emphasis added).
On July 13, 2005, Judge John Bush, the presiding judge of
the Autauga Circuit Court, granted Butler the relief he
sought, stating, in pertinent part:
"This matter is before the Court upon [Butler's]
Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence pursuant to
Section 13A-5-9.1 and the Kirby decision.
"....
1051636
4
"In determining whether [Butler] is a non-
violent offender this Court is to look to the nature
of [Butler's] underlying conviction, [Butler's]
prison record, information submitted concerning
[Butler's] behavior while incarcerated, and other
factors in the record of the case.
"Since [Butler] was tried and convicted in
October, 1984 before the Hon. Walter C. Hayden, Jr.,
prior to this Judge coming to the bench, this Court
has 
very 
little 
information 
concerning 
the
underlying conviction.  The District Attorney did
provide information to the Court at the hearing from
his file that indicated that [Butler] abducted a 17-
year-old female from a convenience store when she
got off of work and took her off and raped her and
then returned to the store and forced her to open
the safe and took some $3000.00.
"The Court has reviewed the records submitted by
the Department of Corrections. [Butler] has received
ten 
(10) 
behavior 
citations 
and 
twenty 
(20)
disciplinaries over the almost 21 years that he has
been incarcerated.  None of those contained any
violence. [Butler] did receive a positive report
from his work supervisor indicating that he was a
good worker, was respectful to others and did not
create a problem.
"[Butler's] prior felonies upon which his
sentence was enhanced were all class C, breaking and
entering convictions out of North Carolina. These
convictions would be the equivalent of burglary[-in-
the-third-degree] 
convictions 
in 
Alabama. 
Upon
reviewing the North Carolina records of [Butler's]
prior convictions, the Court also located a 1982
case where [Butler] was convicted of assault on a
female, a misdemeanor.
"Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds in
weighing all of the factors that [Butler] may be
considered a 'non-violent' offender and that the
1051636
5
sentence previously imposed upon him is due to be
modified."
On July 26, 2005, the State filed a motion asking the
trial court to reconsider its ruling on Butler's motion.  The
State requested that the trial court give greater weight to
the violent nature of the offenses of which Butler had been
convicted.  On August 2, the State supplemented its motion to
include a statement from the victim.
On September 2, 2005, the trial court entered an order
purporting to set aside its July 13 order and to reinstate
Butler's 
sentences 
of 
life 
imprisonment 
without 
the
possibility of parole.  In its September 2 order, the trial
court stated: "Although the defendant meets the criteria for
being a non-violent offender based upon his prior felony
convictions and his prison record, the facts underlying his
convictions in this case establish that he is a violent
offender who is not eligible for a reduced sentence under
Kirby."  Thus deprived of the relief he had sought, and
initially obtained, Butler appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's
September 2, 2005, order denying Butler's motion for
1051636
6
reconsideration of his sentences.  Butler v. State, [Ms. CR-
05-0189, June 30, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the "general rule
[that] a court retains jurisdiction to modify its ruling for
30 days after the ruling being modified was issued."  Butler,
___ So. 2d at ___ (citing State v.  Monette, 887 So. 2d 314
(Ala. Crim. App. 2004)).  However, according to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, the 30-day rule is inapplicable where the
challenged judgment is void, because "[a] void judgment has no
legal effect on later proceedings in a case."  Butler, ___ So.
2d at ___.  
Although the September 2 order was entered more than 30
days after the July 13 order, the Court of Criminal Appeals
held that the September 2 order was valid because "the July
13, 
2005, 
order 
was 
void 
for 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the [trial] court retained jurisdiction to
substitute its September 2, 2005, legal order."  Butler, ___
So. 2d at ___.  According to the Court of Criminal Appeals,
the July 13 order was void because "the circuit court ...
exceeded its discretion in initially granting Butler's motion
for reconsideration."  Butler, ___ So. 2d at ___.  
1051636
7
Butler petitioned this Court for certiorari review,
arguing that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts
with its prior decisions in Loggins v. State, 910 So. 2d 146,
148 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)("It is well settled that a circuit
court generally retains jurisdiction to modify a judgment for
only 30 days after the judgment is entered."); and Ex parte
Bishop, 883 So. 2d 262, 264 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)("We can
find no case that holds that a timely filed motion to
reconsider, filed at the end of a criminal case, extends the
jurisdiction of the lower court beyond 30 days.").  Relying
upon these prior decisions, Butler argues that the trial court
was without jurisdiction to enter its September 2, 2005, order
denying 
his 
motion 
for 
sentence 
reconsideration 
and
reinstating the original sentences.  We agree with Butler;
thus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
"[A] trial court derives its jurisdiction from the
Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code."  Ex parte Seymour,
[Ms. 1050597, June 30, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006).
Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to
1051636
8
adjudicate a case, not the merits of the court's decision in
the case.  
"Jurisdiction is '[a] court's power to decide a
case or issue a decree.'  Black's Law Dictionary 867
(8th ed. 2004). Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns
a court's power to decide certain types of cases.
Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 303, 57 So. 754, 755
(1911)('"By jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
meant the nature of the cause of action and of the
relief sought."' (quoting Cooper v. Reynolds, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 316 (1870))).  That power is
derived from the Alabama Constitution and the
Alabama Code.  See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.
625, 
630-31 
(2002)(subject-matter 
jurisdiction
refers to a court's 'statutory or constitutional
power' to adjudicate a case)."  
Seymour, ___ So. 2d at ___.
Faced with this Court's decision in Kirby, the State
concedes, as it must, that "the [trial court] possessed
subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Butler's Kirby
motion under Section 13A-5-9.1."  State's supplemental brief,
at 3.  Necessarily included within the trial court's power was
"the authority under the statute to determine whether a
defendant is a nonviolent offender."  Kirby, 899 So. 2d at
974.  Consequently, the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction to enter its July 13 order regardless of any
alleged error in its decision.  Thus, the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in holding that the July 13 order was void for
1051636
9
lack of jurisdiction.  Consequently, the premise for the Court
of Criminal Appeals' holding that the trial court retained
jurisdiction to enter its September 2, 2005, order fails as a
matter of law.
The State argues that an alternative rationale supports
the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the trial
court's July 13 order was void.  Specifically, the State
contends that "Butler's modified sentence -- following the
grant of his Kirby motion -- was an illegal sentence."
State's supplemental brief, at 5.  This argument, however, is
without merit.
"[A] 
trial 
court 
does 
not 
have 
[subject-matter]
jurisdiction to impose a sentence not provided for by
statute."  Hollis v. State, 845 So. 2d 5, 6 (Ala. Crim. App.
2002).  However, in this case, the trial court did not "impose
a sentence not provided for by statute."  Instead, after
exercising its authority to determine whether Butler is a
nonviolent offender, the trial court resentenced Butler to
life imprisonment, a sentence provided for by the Habitual
Felony Offender Act as amended in 2000.  See § 13A-5-9(c)(3),
Ala. Code 1975 (applied retroactively pursuant to § 13A-5-
1051636
Because the trial court's July 13 order is not void, we
1
need not consider the procedure, if any, by which a party may
challenge a void judgment.
10
9.1).  At its core, the State's illegal-sentence argument is
"based on [its contention] that, because Butler was a 'violent
offender,' the trial court did not possess jurisdiction to
modify his sentence."  State's supplemental brief, at 4.
Thus, the State's alternative rationale and the rationale of
the Court of Criminal Appeals share a fundamental flaw.  Each
rationale improperly focuses on the merits of the trial
court's initial decision instead of only the jurisdictional
issue, namely, the trial court's authority to make that
decision.   
1
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Lyons and Bolin, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur in the result.
Stuart, J., dissents.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1051636
11
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  In so doing, I do not find
it necessary to express, and I do not intend by my vote to
express, any view as to whether an inmate's eligibility for
relief under § 13A-5-9.1 may turn solely on the nature of the
offense of which he or she was convicted.
In concurring in the main opinion, I conclude that the
"sentencing judge and the presiding judge" have jurisdiction
to decide the cases of inmates asserting that they are non-
violent convicted offenders within the contemplation of
§ 13A-5-9.1, as opposed to only those cases where it is
ultimately determined that the inmate is a nonviolent
convicted offender.  Even if the latter interpretation were
correct, however, I do not see how the result in this case
would change.  
The trial judge entered a judgment on July 13, 2005, in
which he determined that Butler was a nonviolent convicted
offender.  This issue was fully and fairly litigated by the
parties, and the determination of the issue was necessary to
the judgment entered by the trial judge.  The trial court in
the present case, i.e., the circuit court, is a court of
1051636
12
general jurisdiction and has "exclusive original jurisdiction
of all felony prosecutions."  Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-30(2).
As such, the circuit court "has the judicial power to
determine the question of its own jurisdiction.  This does not
mean that the decision may not be erroneous, but it does mean
that such a decision stands until [properly] set aside by the
court of last resort."  Ex parte Textile Workers Union of
America, 249 Ala. 136, 141, 30 So. 2d 247, 250 (1947)
(citations omitted).  As this Court stated in Carter v.
Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287, 292, 142 So. 514, 518 (1932):
"When a court has the right to decide as to its own
jurisdiction, its decision in favor of that
jurisdiction, if within its ordinary powers, will
have the same effect and conclusiveness as would its
decision on any other matter, especially when
dependent on a fact which it is required to
ascertain."   
In his July 13 judgment, the trial judge determined that
Butler was a nonviolent convicted offender.  Thus, even if
§ 13A-5-9.1 gave the trial judge jurisdiction only in those
cases in which it is ultimately determined that the inmate
seeking sentence reconsideration is a nonviolent convicted
offender, the July 13 judgment was tantamount to a decision by
the trial judge that Butler's case met the jurisdictional
1051636
13
requirements of that statute.  Furthermore, that decision and
the concomitant relief ordered by the trial judge constituted
a final judgment, which, after 30 days, the trial court no
longer had jurisdiction to alter, amend, or vacate.  As the
main opinion recognizes, "'[i]t is well settled that a circuit
court generally retains jurisdiction to modify a judgment for
only 30 days after the judgment is entered.'" __ So. 2d at __
(quoting  Loggins v. State, 910 So. 2d 146, 148 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2005)); see also Ex parte Bishop, 883 So. 2d 262, 264
(Ala. Crim. App. 2003). 
The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned in this case that
"a void judgment has no legal effect upon later proceedings in
a case," __ So. 2d at __; however, for that rule to operate
there must in fact be proper "later proceedings."  Here, there
were not.  The State argues that its motion to reconsider the
July 13 judgment should be treated as a motion under Rule 24,
Ala. R. Crim. P.  See Rule 24.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. (generally
extending to 60 days the time within which the trial court has
jurisdiction to consider a Rule 24 motion filed within 30 days
after the pronouncement of sentence).  By its terms, however,
Rule 24 is not available to the State.  The State does not
1051636
14
argue that the motion it filed following the entry of the
July 13 judgment constitutes any other recognizable motion or
petition that would have served to extend the trial court's
jurisdiction beyond 30 days from its July 13 judgment.  Nor
does this case involve an effort by the State to seek some
form of appellate relief directly from the July 13 judgment.
1051636
15
SEE, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result; some of the language of the main
opinion might be taken as contrary to the view I expressed in
my special writing in Holt v. State, [Ms. 1050800, December
22, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006) (See, J.,
dissenting).  
1051636
16
STUART, Justice (dissenting).
Because I disagree with the conclusion in the main
opinion that the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain
Butler's motion for sentence reconsideration and to enter its
July 13 order, I must respectfully dissent.
In my dissent in Holt v. State, [Ms. 1050800, December
22, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006), I stated:  "[I]f an
inmate has been convicted of a violent offense, he is a
violent 
offender 
and 
is 
not 
eligible 
for 
sentence
reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975."  Thus, in
my opinion, a court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for sentence reconsideration filed by an inmate who has
been convicted of an offense that is statutorily defined as a
violent offense.   
Section 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"The provisions 
of 
Section 
13A-5-9 
[the 
Habitual
Felony Offender Act] shall be applied retroactively
by the sentencing judge or presiding judge for
consideration of early parole of each nonviolent
convicted offender based on evaluations performed by
the Department of Corrections and approved by the
Board of Pardons and Paroles and submitted to the
court."
(Emphasis added.)
1051636
17
This Court applied a strict construction to this statute
in Kirby v. State, 899 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 2004), to determine
the issue whether a court had jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for sentence reconsideration filed pursuant to § 13A-5-
9.1, Ala. Code 1975.  This Court stated:
"Normally, a trial court loses jurisdiction to
modify a sentence in a criminal case if a request
for modification is not filed within 30 days of
sentencing.  Massey v. State, 587 So. 2d 448 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991).  By requiring in § 13A-5-9.1 that
the provisions of § 13A-5-9 are to be applied
retroactively, 
however, 
the 
Legislature 
vested
jurisdiction 
in 
the 
sentencing 
judge 
or 
the
presiding judge to reopen a case more than 30 days
after a defendant has been sentenced. ... Clearly,
the Legislature has the power to vest circuit courts
with the authority to reopen a case that had
previously been deemed closed and in which the
court's decision was deemed final. See Ex parte
Jenkins, 723 So. 2d 649, 660 (Ala. 1998)."
899 So. 2d at 971  (emphasis added).  Thus, the Court strictly
construed § 13A-5-9.1 to mean that jurisdiction to consider a
motion for sentence consideration filed pursuant to § 13A-5-
9.1 vests only in the "sentencing judge or presiding judge."
See also Ex parte Sandifer, 925 So. 2d 290 (Ala. Crim. App.
2005)(holding that because the Court of Criminal Appeals was
bound by this Court's decision in Kirby, that court had to
conclude that a presiding judge of a circuit court did not
1051636
18
have the authority to appoint a special presiding judge to
entertain motions for sentence reconsideration filed pursuant
to § 13A-5-9.1).
I maintain that a consistent strict construction of §
13A-5-9.1 also requires that jurisdiction vests in "the
sentencing judge or presiding judge" to consider motions for
sentence reconsideration only when the motion is filed by a
"nonviolent convicted offender."  Therefore, if an inmate has
been convicted of an offense that is defined by statute as a
violent offense, he is a violent offender, and the sentencing
judge or the presiding judge does not have jurisdiction to
entertain the motion.  To the extent this statement conflicts
with Kirby, I would overrule Kirby.
Here, Butler was convicted of first-degree rape and
first-degree robbery, which are both violent offenses as
defined by the legislature, see §§ 12-25-32(12), 12-25-
32(13)(a)(10) and (28), Ala. Code 1975.  Butler is a violent
offender as a matter of law; consequently, neither the
sentencing judge nor the presiding judge had  jurisdiction to
consider Butler's motion for sentence reconsideration under §
13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975.  Because in my opinion the court
1051636
19
never acquired jurisdiction to consider Butler's motion for
sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975,
the court did not have jurisdiction to enter its July 13
order, and that order is void.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.