Title: State v. Farmer
Citation: 400 P.2d 580, 97 Ariz. 348
Docket Number: 1373
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 1965

97 Ariz. 348 (1965) 400 P.2d 580 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Bobby Joe Frederick FARMER, Appellant. No. 1373. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. March 31, 1965. *349 Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., William E. Eubank, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Patrick E. Eldridge, Ronald G. Cooley, Phoenix, for appellant. LOCKWOOD, Chief Justice. Defendant, Bobby Joe Frederick Farmer, appeals his conviction of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.05. The material facts on appeal are as follows: Defendant was stopped by two police *350 officers at approximately 4:40 A.M. on April 2, 1963, as he was leaving Helsing's Restaurant in Phoenix. After making inquiries as to his identity, the officers proceeded with the defendant to the latter's car which was parked in the parking lot of the restaurant. Upon searching the defendant's car, the officers discovered a package of marijuana and placed the defendant under arrest. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial and asserts two propositions of law in support of the claimed error. His first contention is that the police officers conducted an illegal search and seizure of his car and consequently the evidence seized should have been excluded from evidence. The State contends that the search was not illegal because the defendant consented to it. This Court has recently held that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search may be waived by unequivocal words or conduct expressing consent. State v. Tigue, 95 Ariz. 45, 386 P.2d 402 (1963). This view is not in conflict with that of the United States Supreme Court in administering the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S. Ct. 1277, 90 L. Ed. 1477 (1946). In the present case a hearing was held by the court in the absence of the jury on defendant's motion to suppress. At this hearing, Officer Chestnut, one of the arresting officers, testified as follows: Even though the defendant denied ever having said such a thing, we are of the opinion that the testimony quoted above is sufficient to warrant a conclusion by the trial judge that the defendant consented to the otherwise illegal search. This evidence is similar to that in State v. Tigue, supra, where we found consent evidenced by the following testimony: Accordingly, we hold that the defendant's first contention is without merit because the trial court found that the defendant unequivocally consented to the search. Defendant next contends that prejudicial error was committed when a police officer stated that he had seen the defendant's picture in the police files. The defendant refers us to State v. Jacobs, 94 Ariz. 211, 382 P.2d 683 (1963), wherein we held that reference to a police photograph of a defendant by a state's witness in a criminal trial was prejudicial error as implying a prior criminal conviction. The State contends, however, that the defense "opened the door" to the reference to police photographs by impeaching the state's witness on the basis of an allegedly prior inconsistent statement made by the witness at the preliminary hearing. This Court has repeatedly held that a party may not invite error at the trial and then assign it as error on appeal. State v. Gortarez, 96 Ariz. 206, 393 P.2d 670 (1964); State v. Paramo, 92 Ariz. 290, 376 P.2d 554 (1962). The testimony about which defendant complains developed at the trial, beginning with cross-examination of Officer Chestnut by defense counsel, as follows: Defense counsel had adequate notice of the nature of the answer which would be forthcoming from the officer. This notice is indicated by the warning response the officer made to a question put to him on cross-examination as quoted above and also by the officer's testimony at the preliminary hearing preceding the portion quoted by defense counsel as an allegedly prior inconsistent statement. The pertinent testimony at the preliminary hearing proceeded as follows: A situation analogous to the one presented here occurred in Riley v. State, 50 Ariz. 442, 73 P.2d 96 (1937). In Riley, defense counsel objected to the admission of testimony on redirect examination which amounted to an attack upon the character of the defendant as being a turbulent and violent man, when his character was not a proper issue in the case. We noted that: In addition to the analogy of the Riley case, the general rule is that the impeached witness may endeavor to explain away the effect of the supposed inconsistency by relating whatever circumstances *354 would naturally remove it. Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3 (8th Cir.1944); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1044, 1045 (3d ed. 1940). To preclude the State from rehabilitating one of its impeached witnesses by this mode of rehabilitation would allow the defendant an unwarranted advantage in impeaching a witness with an assurance that his credibility would remain impaired. Where the defense counsel has notice of the nature of the rehabilitating evidence, as he did here, the initial choice is with him. He can choose not to impeach the credibility of a state's witness on the basis of prior inconsistent statements, but if he elects to do so, he cannot complain when an alleged inconsistency is explained away in a manner involving prior crime evidence about which he had notice. What we have said above does not conflict with the recent cases of State v. Smith, 96 Ariz. 150, 393 P.2d 251 (1964) and State v. Hunt, 91 Ariz. 149, 370 P.2d 642 (1962) where we held that the door had not been opened to prior crime evidence. In Smith, supra, the prejudicial testimony was injected into the case by a witness in an unresponsive answer to a question put to him on cross-examination by defense counsel. In Hunt, supra, codefendant's counsel asked the question resulting in the prior crime testimony. In neither case did defense counsel have notice of the nature of the response and hence the initial choice was not with him. Finally, defendant contends that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. We have reviewed the record and find that the only serious contradiction offered by the defense was on the issue of consent to the search of defendant's car. The testimony of the police officers and the introduction of the package of marijuana into evidence were sufficient to enable a jury to reach a verdict of guilty. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and BERNSTEIN, UDALL and McFARLAND, JJ., concur.