Title: In Re: Aaron Thomas M., et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 30600
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 27, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA September 2002 Term FILED RELEASED November 27, 2002 No. 30600 November 27, 2002 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA OF WEST VIRGINIA IN RE: AARON THOMAS M., DELTA DAWN M., AND LUKE BRIAN M. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wood County Honorable Jeffrey B. Reed, Judge Juvenile Abuse and Neglect Nos. 01-JA-20; 01-JA-21; and 01-JA-22 AFFIRMED Submitted: November 6, 2002 Filed: November 27, 2002 Joseph P. Albright, Jr., Esq. Bradley & Albright, PLLC Parkersburg, West Virginia Attorney for the Appellant, Christina L. Ira M. Haught, Esq. Harrisville, West Virginia Guardian ad Litem for the minor children Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Esq. Attorney General Rocco S. Fucillo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Fairmont, West Virginia Attorneys for the Appellee, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM. JUSTICE STARCHER dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion. JUSTICE ALBRIGHT, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate in the decision of this case. JUDGE EAGLOSKI, sitting by temporary assignment. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject tode novo review,whenanaction,suchasanabuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without ajury,thecircuit court shall make a determinationbasedupontheevidenceandshallmake findingsoffactandconclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearlyerroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would havedecidedthecasedifferently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syllabus point 1, In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 2. “Ajudgmentwillnotbereversedforanyerrorintherecord introduced byorinvitedbythepartyseekingreversal.” Syllabus point 21,Statev.Riley,151W.Va.364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966). 3. “As a general rule the least restrictive alternative regarding parental rights tocustodyofachild...willbeemployed;however,courts are notrequiredtoexhaustevery speculative possibility of parental improvement before terminating parental rights where it i appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened[.]” Syllabus point 1, in part, In re R. J. M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). 4. “Terminationofparentalrights...may be employed without the use of interveninglessrestrictivealternativeswhenitisfoundthatthereisnoreasonable likelihood under W. Va. Code § 49-6-5(b) that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, in part, In re R. J. M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). ii Per Curiam: The appellant herein and respondent below, Christina L.1, appeals from the January8,2002,order of the Circuit Court ofWoodCountyterminatingherparentalrights toherminorchildrenAaronThomasM.,DeltaDawnM.,andLuke Brian M. upon a finding of abuse and neglect. Before this Court, Christina L. asserts that the circuit court erred by (1) findingthatshehadusedcontrolled substances in her children’s presence; (2) concluding that her alleged use of controlled substances in her children’s presence constituted abuse; (3) requiring her to testify during the adjudicatory hearing; and (4) terminating her parental rights. Uponareviewoftheparties’arguments,the record submitted forappellatereview,andthe pertinent authorities, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The facts upon which the circuit court based its decision are as follows. On June 14,2001,theappelleehereinandpetitionerbelow,theWestVirginiaDepartmentofHealth andHumanResources[hereinafterreferredtoasthe“DHHR”],filedapetition in the Circuit 1“We followourtraditional practice in cases involving sensitive facts and use initials to identify the parties rather than their full names.” In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 24, 26 n.1, 435 S.E.2d 162, 164 n.1 (1993). 1 CourtofWoodCountyallegingthat Aaron Thomas M., 2DeltaDawnM.,3andLukeBrianM.4 wereabusedand/orneglectedchildrenpursuanttoW.Va.Code§49-1-3 (1999) (Repl. Vol. 2001).5 In particular, the petition alleged fifteen counts of abuse and/or neglect by the children’smother,ChristinaL. Included in the petition was an allegation that on December 11, 2000,school officials confiscated amarijuanapipefromAaron. It was further alleged that Aaron“effectivelydemonstrate[d] how to use, take apart, and clean the pipe.” Aaron also stated that “sometimes his five-year-old sister smokes his mother’s cigarettes when she doesn’t know it.” The petition additionally averred that Christina L. repeatedly tested positive for marijuana use and failed to attend or otherwise comply with various substance abuse rehabilitation programs, parenting classes, and counseling services, which the DHHR indicated were necessarytomaintaincustodyofherchildren. Furthermore, a DHHR official observed Aaron adDeltaplayingunsupervisedinthestreetinfrontoftheirhome. Finally, it was alleged that Aaron had approximately thirty-two unexcused absences from school during the 2000-01 academic year. The unexcused absences resulted in the filing of a truancy petition for 2Aaron was seven years old at the time the subject petition was filed. 3Delta was five years old when the instant proceedings were initiated. 4Luke was two years old when DHHR filed the abuse and neglect petition. 5Priortotheinstantpetitionbeingfiled,DHHRhadpreviouslybeen involved withChristinaL. During the adjudicatory hearing in this case there was testimony that DHHR tried to work with Christina L. in 1999. During that time Christina L. was referred for assistance with the Intensive Out-Patient Group, Positive Parenting and Recovery Group and IndividualTherapy.AsaresultofChristinaL.’snoncompliance with DHHR’s initial efforts to stabilize her family, services to her were terminated in April of 2000. 2 educational neglect. By order entered June 14, 2001, the circuit court found the children to beinimminentdangerandtransferredthemtothetemporarycustodyofthe DHHR pending further adjudication. Anadjudicatoryhearingwasheld,afterwhichthecircuit court, on August 27, 2001,entered an order adjudicating thethreechildrentobeabusedand/or neglected based upon the above-described allegations. Specifically, the court concluded that “not getting a sevenyearoldchild to school so that he can obtain a proper education is neglect” and “using apipeenoughtimesinthepresenceofaseven-year-old for him to acquire the information that thisseven-year-oldhasacquired...is abuse.” The circuit court further found that Christina L.’scontinued“useofmarijuanahasaffected the Respondent Mother’s ability to supervise and care for these children and as a result they are abused and neglected children.” Following the adjudicatory hearing, the DHHR recommended, and the circuit court granted, on September 20, 2001, Christina L. a six-month post-adjudicatory improvementperiod. The terms of this improvement period required Christina L. to attend in- patient substance abuse treatment, Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous meetings, outpatientcounseling,andparentingclasses; to report such attendance to the DHHR; to submit torandom drug screens; to apply to HUD for housing assistance; to maintain adequate housing forthechildren;tocooperate with in-home services designed to improve her parenting skills; toattendGEDclassesinordertoqualifyfortheWestVirginiaworksprogram;toensure the 3 childrengo to school; andtoseverherrelationshipwithacertainRaymondJ.ifhedoesnot, among other requirements, receive treatment and counseling for substance abuse and domestic violence. During this improvement period, Christina L. retained physical custody of her children. Upon Christina L.’s ultimate failure to comply with the terms of her improvement period, the circuit court, by order entered November 28, 2001, terminated such improvement period and transferred custody of the minor children to the DHHR. Thereafter, a dispositional hearing was held, and, on January 8, 2002, the circuit courtenteredadispositionalorderterminating Christina L.’s parental rights. In its order, the circuitcourtobservedthatChristinaL.“exhibitedapatternofcontinued drug use . . . and a lack ofcooperationtocomplywithanyofthetermsor conditions of the improvement period.” The court further found that “the Respondent Mother is addicted to controlled substances or drugs totheextentthatproperparenting skills have been impaired[,] and the Respondent Mother has notrespondedto or followed through with the recommended and appropriate treatment which couldhaveimproved the capacity for adequate parental functioning.” Accordingly, the circuit court finally concluded that, “pursuant to West Virginia Code, § 49-6-5(b), there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be corrected in the near future,” and that “it is necessary for the welfare of the children to terminate the parental rights” of Christina L. From this dispositional order, Christina L. appeals to this Court. 4 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Inappealsofabuseandneglectcasesweapplythe following standard of review: Althoughconclusionsoflawreachedby a circuit court are subjectto denovo review,when an action,such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shallmakefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawasto whether suchchildisabusedorneglected. These findings shall not be set asidebyareviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearlyerroneouswhen,althoughthereisevidence to support the finding,thereviewingcourtontheentire evidence is left with the definiteandfirmconvictionthatamistake has been committed. However, a reviewing courtmaynotoverturnafindingsimply because it would have decidedthecasedifferently,and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. Syl. pt. 1, In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). With this standard in mind, we proceed to consider the parties’ arguments. III. DISCUSSION BeforethisCourt,ChristinaL.raisesfourassignmentsoferror:(1)thecircuit courterredbyfinding that she had used controlled substances in her children’s presence; (2) the circuit court improperly concluded that her alleged use of controlled substances in her children’s presence constituted abuse; (3) the circuit court erroneously required her to testify duringtheadjudicatoryhearing;and(4)thecircuitcourt improperly terminated her parental 5 rights. We will address each of these issues in turn. A. Use of Controlled Substances in Children’s Presence Christina L. first complains that the circuit court erred by finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that she had used controlled substances in the presence of her children. This Court observed in Syllabus point 1, in part, of In re of S.C., 168 W. Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981), that W. Va. Code § 49-6-2(c) requires DHHR, “in a child abuse or neglectcase,toprove‘conditionsexistingatthetimeof the filing of the petition ...byclear and convincing proof.’” See Syl. pt. 3, State v. Julie G., 201 W. Va. 764, 500 S.E.2d 877 (1997). We made clear in Julie G. that “[t]he burden of proving that a child is abused or neglected is placed upon the DHHR.” Julie G., 201 W. Va. at 774, 500 S.E.2d at 886. Theevidencereliedupon bythetrialcourttofindthatChristinaL.useddrugs inthepresenceofherchildrencame,inpart,from statementsmadebyAaron,regardingthe marijuana pipe found in his possession. 6 In its adjudicatory order, the circuit court found that theevidenceestablishedthat“Aaronhadbeenaroundtheuseofthatpipe enough times to be able to demonstrate how touseit,takeit apart and clean the pipe[.]” In addition, there was conclusive evidence that Christina L. had a drug problem. 6Christina L. asserted that the marijuana pipe in question was not hers, but belonged to a friend. However, Aaron indicated that the pipe belonged to his mother. 6 We agree with the trial court’s determination that Aaron, at seven years old, couldnotlearnhowtotakeapartandcleanamarijuanapipe, absent repeated exposure to this. Inaddition,thefactthatChristinaL.wasadruguserleadstoareasonable inference thatshe repeatedlyusedthemarijuanapipeinAaron’spresence,“ifnotallthreeofthechildren.” In view of these facts, we have no difficulty in holding that the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding Christina L. used drugs in the presence of her children. B. Use of Drugs in Children’s Presence Constitutes Abuse ChristinaL.nextclaimsthattheDHHRfailedtoprovebyclear and convincing evidence that her alleged use of controlled substances in front of her children caused physical, mental,or emotionalinjurytothechildren. We have previously noted that “W. Va. Code § 49-1-3(a),in pertinent part,defines abusedchildtomeanachildwhosewelfareorhealth is harmedor threatened by ‘[a] parent ...whoknowinglyorintentionallyinflicts. . . physical injuryormentaloremotionalinjury,uponthechild[.]’” State ex rel. Diva P. v. Kaufman,200 W. Va. 555, 566, 490 S.E.2d 642, 653 (1997). Thecircuitcourt’sadjudicatoryorderfoundthat“usingapipe enough times in thepresenceofaseven-year-oldforhimtoacquiretheinformationthatthisseven-year-old has acquired . . . is abuse.” The DHHR asserts that Christina L.’s substance abuse caused emotionalinjurytoherchildren,evidenced,inpart,byastatementAaronmadeconcerning whether his mother was still smoking. It was also pointed out by DHHR that one of the 7 dispositive factors found in the termination of parental rights in W.V.D.H.H.R. ex rel.Millsv. BillyLeeC.,199W.Va.541,545 n.2,485 S.E.2d 710,714 n.2 (1997),wasthat“bothparents drank alcohol and smoked marijuana in the presence of the children.” We believe that the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding the children were emotionally abused by Christina L.’s repeated drug use in their presence. C. Requiring Christina L. to Testify under Immunity Christina L. additionally argues that, despite her attempts to assert her constitutionalrightnottoincriminateherself,7thecircuitcourtneverthelessrequiredherto answer a question during the adjudicatory hearing that she deemed self-incriminating. ChristinaL.assertsthatthe circuit court lacked the authority to grant her “use immunity” 8for the purpose of compelling her to answer the question. 7“The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not limited to the contextofcriminaltrials but can be claimed in any proceeding, whether it is criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory.” Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Osburn v. Cole, 173 W. Va. 596, 319 S.E.2d 364 (1983). 8“Use immunity refers to an order of court that compels a witness to give self-incriminating testimonywhileatthesametimeprohibitingthe use of such testimony in a subsequent prosecution of the witness. Use immunity protects a witness only against the actualuseofthecompelled testimony and evidence derived directly or indirectly from such testimony.” State v. Simpson, 587 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa 1998). See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2294-95, 101 L. Ed. 2d 98, 114 (1988) (“Testimony obtained pursuant to a grant of statutory use immunity may be used neither directly nor derivatively.” (citations omitted)). 8 Areviewoftherecordindicatesthatthe state asked Christina L. ifAaronhad asked her if she was still smoking (marijuana). Defense counsel initially objected on the grounds that a response to the question would be self-incriminating. After the objection, the following exchange occurred between the attorneys and the court: TheCourt:Areyouwillingto offer her immunityinthis case? TheState:InregardtothebehaviorthatI’mreferring to from the incident yesterday, answering that question I’m not going to use that in future prosecution, no, Your Honor? The Court: Mr. Albright? DefenseCounsel:Idon’tknowthathespokethemagic words. But if the Court’sgoingtograntimmunitybasedon that, I’m sure that would overcome my objection. ThecircuitcourtwentontograntChristinaL.useimmunity,andsheansweredthe question byrespondingthatshedidtellAaronshewasstillsmoking. In this appeal, the State correctly points out that any error in requiring Christina L. to answer the question was invited and therefore waived. We agree. ThedecisionsofthisCourthavebeen quite clear in holding that “[a] judgment will notbereversedforanyerrorintherecordintroducedbyorinvited by the party seeking reversal.” Syl. pt. 21, State v. Riley, 151 W. Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966). See Syl. pt. 4, State v. Johnson, 197 W. Va. 575, 476 S.E.2d 522 (1996). That is, “[a] litigant may not . . . activelycontribute to such error, and then raise that error as a reason for reversal on appeal.” 9 Syl. pt 1, in part, Maples v. West Virginia Dep’t. of Commerce, 197 W. Va. 318, 475 S.E.2d 410 (1996). In the instant case, defense counsel expressly approved of Christina L. waiving her right against self-incrimination, if the circuit court granted her immunity. Therefore, ChristinaL.cannotnowcomplainonappeal that the circuit court did not have authority to grant her immunity. WeagreewithChristinaL.thatnostatutory authority existed for the trial court to grant her immunity in a civil abuse and neglect proceeding.9 Further, for the sake of 9The record is not clear, but it appears that the trial court relied upon W. Va. Code§57-2-3(1965)(Repl.Vol.1997),asthesource of authority to grant immunity. This statute states: Inacriminalprosecution other than for perjury or false swearing, evidence shall not be given against the accusedof any statement made by him as a witness upon a legal examination. Id. Christina L. correctly points out that we have held that “[t]he language of [the statute] addresses only the admissibility of a statement in court, and does not address a statement’s possible ‘use’ for other purposes related to a criminal investigation or prosecution.”Stateex rel. Wright v. Stucky, 205 W. Va. 171, 174-75, 517 S.E.2d 36, 39-40 (1999), disapproved on other grounds, In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002). TheactualgeneralimmunitystatuteinthisState is applicable only to testimony giveninacriminalproceeding. See W. Va.Code§57-5-2(1923)(Repl.Vol.1997)(“In any criminal proceeding no person shall be excused from testifying or from producing documentary or other evidence upon the ground that such testimony or evidence may criminate or tend to criminate him, if the court in which he is examined is of the opinion that the ends ofjustice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence. And if, but for this section, the person would have been excused from so testifying or from producing such evidence,then if the personissocompelledtotestifyorproduceotherevidenceand if such (continued...) 10 argument,hadthisissuebeenproperlypreservedwewoulddeem the error harmless.10 The testimonygivenbyChristinaL.merelyaffirmedthatshemade a statement to Aaron indicating that she was still smoking. The statement itself was introduced into evidence independent of ChristinaL.’sconfirmationthatitwasmade by her. Consequently, had there been no purported grant of immunity and Christina L. had not responded to the question, our cases permitted the circuitcourtto“consider...[her] silence asaffirmativeevidenceof...culpability.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, W.V.D.H.H.R. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W. Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996). See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810, 821 (1976) (“[T]he prevailing rule [is] that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferencesagainstpartiestocivilactionswhentheyrefusetotestifyinresponsetoprobative evidence offered against them[.]”). 9(...continued) testimony or evidence is self-criminating, such self-criminating testimony or evidence shall not be used or receivable in evidence against him in any proceeding against him thereafter takingplace other than a prosecution for perjury in the giving of such evidence, and the person so compelled to testify or furnishevidenceshallnotbeprosecutedfortheoffensein regard to which he is socompelledtotestifyorfurnishevidence,and he shall have complete legal immunity in regard thereto.” (emphasis added)). See also Syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. Graziani, 157 W. Va. 167, 200 S.E.2d 353 (1973) (“It is generally held that immunity statutes apply only to criminal prosecutions.”). 10Theactual“harm”thatcouldhaveresultedfromthiserror would have arisen if the State brought a criminal action against Christina L., based upon her answer to the question in the abuse and neglect proceeding. If that had occurred, we would then have to determine whether such a criminal action could follow based upon an erroneous grant of immunityinthecivilabuseandneglectproceeding. However, that specific issue is not before us. 11 D. Termination of Parental Rights Christina L. lastly asserts that the circuit court’s termination of her parental rights was improper. She contends that her use of marijuana and her failure to ensure one child’s attendance at school during one school year do not amount to child abuse so as to requiretheterminationofherparentalrights. This Court has held that “[a]s a general rule the least restrictive alternative regarding parental rights to custody of a child . . . will be employed; however, courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvementbeforeterminating parental rights where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened[.]” Syl. pt. 1, in part, In re R. J. M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). We have made clear that “[t]ermination of parental rights . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonablelikelihood under W. Va. Code § 49-6-5(b) that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, In re R. J. M. See In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 337, 540 S.E.2d 542, 553 (2000). Intheinstantcase,thecircuitcourtfoundthatthechildren were abused and that itwasintheirbestinteresttoterminateChristina L.’s parental rights. The parental termination decisionwasmadefromacombinationofevidentiaryfactors. For instance, the circuit court foundthatChristinaL.“isaddictedtocontrolledsubstancesordrugs to the extent that proper parenting skills have been impaired[.]” It was found that Christina L. failed to “follow[] through withtherecommended andappropriate treatment which could have improved the capacity for 12 adequate parental functioning.” The circuit court also determined that Christina L. “has not respondedtoorfollowedthroughwithareasonablefamilycase plan or rehabilitative efforts . . . designed to reduce and prevent the abuse and neglect of the children[.]” The DHHR correctlypointsoutthatunderW.Va.Code§49-6-5(b) (1998) (Repl. Vol. 2001), drug abuse andfailuretocomplywithafamilycaseplanaregroundsforterminatingparental rights. 11 See 11The relevant provisions under W. Va. Code § 49-6-5(b) (1998) (Repl. Vol. 2001) provide as follows: (b)Asusedinthissection, “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected” shall mean that, based upon the evidence before the court, the abusingadult or adults have demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect, on their own or with help. Such conditions shall be deemed to exist in the following circumstances, which shall not be exclusive: (1)The abusing parent or parents have habitually abused or are addicted to alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, to the extentthatproperparenting skills have been seriously impaired and such person or persons have not responded to or followed through[with]therecommended and appropriate treatment which could have improved the capacity for adequate parental functioning; (2) The abusing parent or parents have willfully refused or are presently unwilling to cooperate in the development of a reasonablefamilycaseplan designed to lead to the child’s return to their care, custody and control; (3) The abusing parent or parents have not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts of social,medical,mental health or other rehabilitativeagencies designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or neglect of the child, as evidenced by the continuation or (continued...) 13 In re of Micah Alyn R., 202 W. Va. 400, 406,504 S.E.2d 635, 641 (1998) (“[I]f the abusing parentwillfullyrefusedorispresentlyunwillingtocooperate in the development of a family case plan, a finding of ‘no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected’ under thestatuteiswarranted.”); NancyViola R. v. Randolph W., 177 W. Va. 710, 713, 356 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1987) (“[T]he legislature has stated expressly that the ‘conditionsofneglectorabuse’whichconstitutegroundsforterminationofparentalrights include...‘[t]heabusingparentorparentshavehabituallyabused or are addicted to alcohol ...totheextentthatproperparentingskillshavebeenseriouslyimpaired[.]’”). Insofar as the evidencesupportedastatutorybasisforterminatingChristina L.’s parental rights, we affirm the trial court’s decision. IV. CONCLUSION The January 8, 2002, order of the Wood County Circuit Court terminating ChristinaL.’sparentalrightsinherminorchildren,AaronThomasM.,Delta DawnM.,and Luke Brian M. is affirmed. Affirmed. 11(...continued) insubstantial diminution of conditions which threatened the health, welfare or life of the child[.] 14