Title: State v. Derek Anderson
Citation: 2005 WI 54
Docket Number: 2003AP003478-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2005

2005 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP3478-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Derek Anderson,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 4, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 12, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the concurrence. 
BUTLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins ¶94 of the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Neil C. 
McGinn and William J. Tyroler, assistant state public defenders, 
and oral argument by Neil C. McGinn. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 54 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP3478-CR 
(L.C. No. 
03 CF 286) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Derek Anderson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 4, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Jefferson 
County, William F. Hue, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   This 
case 
comes 
to 
us 
on 
certification from the court of appeals.  The defendant, Derek 
Anderson, formerly known as Andrew Krnak, appealed an order of 
the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, William F. Hue, Judge, 
binding him over for trial for the murder of his father, Allen 
Krnak.  Anderson claimed that the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing failed to establish probable cause for 
territorial jurisdiction in Wisconsin and venue in Jefferson 
County.   
 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
2 
 
I. 
ISSUES 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified two questions to this 
court:  1) Whether the mens rea component of first-degree 
intentional homicide constitutes a "constituent element" of that 
crime within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 939.03(1)(a) (1997-98),1 
such that the state has territorial jurisdiction over a charge 
of first-degree intentional homicide if an individual commits an 
act in Wisconsin manifesting an intent to kill; and 2) Whether a 
Wisconsin county where an act manifesting intent to kill 
occurred may claim venue under Wis. Stat. § 971.19(2).  In 
addition, the court of appeals noted that the State was 
challenging an evidentiary ruling made by the circuit court that 
struck certain hearsay evidence, contending that there was 
probable cause to establish territorial jurisdiction and venue 
with this evidence admitted.   
¶3 
We conclude, based on the language of § 939.03(1)(a) 
and its legislative history, that the mens rea element of first-
degree intentional homicide constitutes a "constituent element" 
under § 939.03(1)(a).  Section 939.03(1)(a), which requires that 
one of the constituent elements of an offense "takes place" in 
Wisconsin for the state to have territorial jurisdiction, is 
satisfied upon proof that the defendant committed an act in 
Wisconsin manifesting an intent to kill.  Further, we conclude 
that the circuit court erred in striking certain hearsay 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  The criminal 
complaint alleged that Allen Krnak was murdered in 1998.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
3 
 
evidence at the preliminary hearing and that with this evidence 
properly admitted under the residual hearsay exception, the 
State 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
of 
venue 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.19(1) because the State established that there 
is probable cause to believe that Anderson killed his father in 
Jefferson County.   
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Derek Anderson's family——Thomas (his brother), Donna 
(his mother), and Allen (his father)——disappeared on or around 
July 2, 1998.  They were last seen by Anderson as they were 
preparing to leave their home in Jefferson County for their 
cabin in Waushara County over the Fourth of July holiday.  In 
December 1999, the skeletal remains of Allen Krnak were found in 
a remote, wooded area of Jackson County, North Carolina.  On 
August 18, 2003, the State filed a criminal complaint against 
Anderson, charging him with first-degree intentional homicide of 
his father on or about July 2, 1998, in the town of Sullivan, 
Jefferson County.2  
¶5 
The preliminary hearing was set for October 6, 2003.  
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the parties agreed to the 
following stipulation:   
1. 
Allen Krnak was the father of the Defendant in 
the above captioned matter. 
 
a. 
Allen Krnak is deceased. 
                                                 
2 Anderson was initially charged in North Carolina, where 
his father's skeletal remains were found.  Those charges were 
subsequently dismissed.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
4 
 
2. 
The 
Defendant 
attended 
Western 
Carolina 
University from December 1990 through August 
1991.  
3. 
On July 2, 1998 at 3:10 p.m. a phone call was 
placed from the Krnak residence on Lundt Road to 
Allen Krnak's place of employment, Wisconsin 
Electric Power Company.   
The following is a summary of the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing.   
¶6 
The site where Krnak's remains were found in North 
Carolina is a national forest, which is located approximately 
seven to ten miles from Western Carolina University.  Anderson 
had previously attended school here.  The cause of Krnak's death 
was attributed to blunt-force trauma to the head and face.    
¶7 
Anderson told law enforcement officials that his 
parents and brother left their place of residence on July 2, 
1998, for their cabin in Waushara County and were due home on 
Sunday, July 5.  Krnak planned to visit a friend and coworker, 
James Gradel, who owned lake property near the Krnaks' cabin.  
On July 2, just before he left work for the holiday weekend, 
Gradel provided Krnak with a hand-drawn map of his property and 
the surrounding area, as Krnak had never been there.  Gradel 
testified that Krnak placed the map in a briefcase or other 
carrying device.  Gradel testified that Krnak was generally in a 
good mood that day and was looking forward to a long Fourth of 
July weekend.  Gradel left work around 3:00 or 3:30 p.m. and 
never saw Krnak again.  Anderson told police that his father 
returned home from work around 4:30 p.m.  
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
On July 2, 1998, at 3:10 p.m., a phone call was placed 
from the Krnak residence in Jefferson County to Allen Krnak's 
place of employment.  Anderson initially told police that he did 
not recall phoning his father at work on July 2, 1998.  However, 
Anderson later informed his aunt that he called his father at 
work that day because he was at his parents' residence working 
on his car and needed to find a tool.  In addition, Anderson 
told police that his brother returned home from work between 
3:20 and 3:25 p.m. and his mother returned home shortly after 
4:00 p.m.   
¶9 
Another one of Krnak's coworkers, Bill Connelly, 
testified that he had a conversation with Krnak shortly before 
4:00 p.m. on July 2, 1998, and that Krnak seemed "extremely kind 
of distressed."  Connelly testified that he had known Krnak 
since 1972 and could not remember ever seeing him that upset 
before.  According to Connelly, Krnak told him that "I have to 
fly out of here" and that "[w]e may have to go to a funeral."  
Connelly testified that he recalled that Krnak had an Army buddy 
who was ill in Minnesota, although he was unclear if that was 
the reason why Krnak was upset.  Krnak was scheduled to leave 
work at 4:00 p.m.   
¶10 During the criminal investigation, Detective Howe of 
the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department asked Anderson to 
prepare an activity log to account for his whereabouts over the 
Fourth of July weekend.  The entry in the activity log for 
Thursday, July 2, indicated that after spending some time at UW-
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
6 
 
Whitewater, Anderson arrived at his parents' residence at about 
4:00 p.m.  Anderson stated that when he arrived:  
Tom was working on my computer.  Mom got home shortly 
after I did and started packing for the weekend.  I 
worked on my Mustang for a few hours and then watched 
TV.  Dad got home before 5 and loaded up the truck.  
Tom grabbed his stuff on the way out the door and 
drove down the driveway.  It was probably 5:15 by now.  
This was the last I saw of them.    
¶11 Anderson indicated that on Friday, July 3, he mainly 
worked on his car, watched television, and played on his 
computer.  Anderson noted that on Saturday, July 4, he worked on 
his car, drank alcohol, and watched the fireworks.  On Sunday, 
July 5, Anderson indicated that he worked on his car some more, 
watched television, made a campfire, and cooked some brats.  
Anderson stated that his family was "due back before dark but 
when they didn't show, I just figured they stayed an extra night 
to fish or something like they sometimes do.  They hadn't come 
home by the time I went to bed around 11:30."   
¶12 Anderson indicated that on Monday, July 6, he woke up 
early because classes were starting and he had a 10:45 a.m. 
class.  He indicated that he noticed that his family had yet to 
return home, thought this "was odd," but went to school anyway.  
Anderson indicated that when he returned home from classes at 
4:00 p.m. he began to get worried.  He stated: 
Tom wasn't home yet which was strange since he always 
gets home at 3:30.  Nothing had changed at home so I 
started to get worried.  Mom and dad didn't get home 
on time so about 5:00 I drove up to the cabin.  I was 
definitely worried by now since dad always calls if 
plans change.  There wasn't anyone home at the cabin.  
And I talked to the neighbors . . . . They didn't 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
7 
 
remember seeing anyone home all weekend.  I called the 
Waushara Co. Sheriff to see if there had been an 
accident.  They had no report and said to check the 
State Patrol and check with relatives in the area.  I 
also stopped at a deputy's house a mile down the road 
and asked him to watch for Tom's truck.  He hadn't 
remembered any activity at the cabin for awhile.  When 
I got home I called one of mom's relatives.  They 
hadn't seen anybody so I called the State Patrol.  
They had no reports of an accident and said to wait.  
A Jeff. Co. deputy came by Tuesday to check if anyone 
was home here.  I guess Aunt Mary didn't realize I was 
here.   
¶13 On July 10, 1998, Anderson contacted Warden Scott Bowe 
in Sauk County.  He informed Bowe that his parents and brother 
were missing and needed help locating them.  Anderson informed 
Bowe that his family might have been in the Mirror Lake area 
scouting hunting ground.  Anderson told Bowe that his parents 
were driving a pickup truck and described the pickup truck.  
Anderson told Bowe that his family left for their cabin in 
Waushara County on July 2 and were due home July 5, but he 
believed that they never made it to their cabin.   
¶14 Bowe 
asked 
Anderson 
why 
he 
was 
contacting 
a 
conservation warden and Anderson responded that the sheriff's 
department was not being helpful.3  Anderson provided Bowe with a 
list of possible locations where his family may have gone.  
Relying on the information provided by Anderson, Bowe located 
the pickup truck in about 90 minutes in the Dell Creek Wildlife 
Area in Sauk County.  The pickup truck was empty, except for a 
                                                 
3 Bowe testified that it is not the responsibility of a 
warden to investigate missing persons.  Bowe's duty area did not 
include Waushara County.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
8 
 
small notebook on the front seat.  Bowe then contacted the Sauk 
County Sheriff's Department.  On July 24, 1998, Anderson met 
with Bowe and drove around Sauk and Juneau Counties searching 
for his family.   
¶15 Detective 
Howe 
testified 
that 
during 
his 
investigation, he spoke with Anderson concerning the mileage on 
one of the family vehicles.  The Krnaks owned a black Chevy 
pickup truck, a green Ford F-150, and a black Buick sedan.  They 
kept very detailed mileage logs in all three vehicles.  On July 
21, Detective Howe went to the Krnak residence to obtain the 
mileage logs on the vehicles and the current mileage figures.  
The current mileage on the black pickup truck as of July 21 was 
127,452.  Detective Howe testified that "there was approximately 
2,600 miles difference in the mileage that he [Anderson] had 
given me and the mileage that was written in the book."  The 
last entry date in the mileage log for the black pickup truck 
was June 24, and at that time the vehicle had 124,834 miles 
logged.  When asked about the excess mileage, Anderson failed to 
provide an explanation for the large amount of mileage on the 
vehicle other than stating that he had been driving the vehicle.  
Another detective testified that the distance between the Krnak 
residence and the area where Krnak's remains were discovered in 
North Carolina is approximately 1560 miles round-trip.   
¶16 Detective Howe also testified that he received a map 
from the Whitewater Police Department that was recovered from 
the black Buick owned by Donna Krnak.  The vehicle was at the 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
9 
 
Schopen Wrecker in Whitewater.4  The map was found in the glove 
compartment of the vehicle and was sent to the Wisconsin Crime 
Lab for analysis.  The Wisconsin Crime Lab identified Anderson's 
thumbprint on the map.   
¶17 Shortly after his family went missing, Anderson phoned 
his aunt to inquire as to whether they stopped by her place.  
Although his aunt was very concerned because his parents were 
very prompt people who were always on time, Anderson told her 
"[o]h, don't worry."  Anderson's aunt testified that during 
another telephone conversation with Anderson, he informed her 
that there was a search party at the Krnak residence and stated:  
"[G]ive them a week and they'll forget this."  He also told his 
aunt:  "They will never find them."  His aunt also stated that 
during the conversation "he was very nonchalant."  In addition, 
an acquaintance of Anderson, who attended summer school in 
Whitewater 
with 
him 
around 
the 
time 
of 
his 
family's 
disappearance, informed police that Anderson told her he was not 
too concerned about his parents but missed the family dog.   
¶18 Patricia Ellifson, one of Krnak's coworkers, testified 
that 
she 
had 
a 
conversation 
with 
Krnak 
regarding 
their 
respective children at work on April 17.  She informed Krnak 
that one of her sons was at college and was being very moody.  
In response, Krnak inquired as to whether Ellifson's son had 
                                                 
4 As explained in the State's criminal complaint, Anderson 
was apparently arrested for operating under the influence in 
Whitewater, where he attended school, after being involved in an 
accident while driving his mother's Buick.     
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
10 
 
ever threatened her.  Krnak then informed Ellifson that his son 
had threatened him and had attacked him one night after work.  
Krnak stated that his son had tried to club him with something 
and was waiting for him when he came home.  
¶19 Ellifson stated that it was her understanding that the 
incident 
had 
occurred 
recently, 
although 
Krnak 
did 
not 
specifically state when it occurred.  She further stated that 
Krnak was very upset and frightened when relaying this story.  
Ellifson stated that Krnak was visibly shaking when he told this 
story and his face was red.  Ellifson herself became upset as a 
result of this story.  When Ellifson asked if he told anybody or 
was going to do something, Krnak responded:  "What's to do.  I 
guess at least you know how you are going out of this world, how 
you are going to die."  Ellifson specifically inquired as to 
which son Krnak was referring.  Krnak stated he was referring to 
his son Andrew (Derek Anderson).   
¶20 At the end of the preliminary hearing, the circuit 
court granted the defendant's motion to strike the testimony of 
Ellifson as hearsay for the purpose of the preliminary hearing.  
Nonetheless, the circuit court found that there was probable 
cause that a homicide occurred and that Anderson committed the 
homicide.  The circuit court also found sufficient evidence for 
jurisdiction and venue, as it concluded that there was evidence 
that Anderson formed the intent to kill his father in Jefferson 
County. 
 
The 
court 
found 
that 
there 
was 
an 
"implication . . . that a scheme was formed to cause Mr. Allen 
Krnak's death" in Jefferson County.  The court stated that the 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
11 
 
telephone call to Krnak's place of employment was "part of a 
scheme to get him to the house for the purpose of causing his 
demise."   
¶21 The circuit court clarified that although it found an 
inference that Anderson formed the intent to kill his father in 
Wisconsin, it found no evidence that Anderson performed an act 
in furtherance of that intent in Wisconsin.  On December 12, 
2003, the circuit court entered a written order binding the 
defendant over for trial and denying a defense motion to dismiss 
the criminal complaint.  Anderson appealed and the court of 
appeals certified the aforementioned questions to this court. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 This 
case 
concerns 
whether 
the 
State 
provided 
sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to establish 
probable cause for jurisdiction in Wisconsin and venue in 
Jefferson County for the charged offense.5  Thus, resolution of 
                                                 
5 During a criminal prosecution, the State is required to 
establish both jurisdiction and venue at trial, although they 
are not technically elements of a criminal offense.  Wisconsin 
law is clear that the State is required to prove venue beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, ¶19, 261 
Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 12 ("[A]lthough venue in Wisconsin must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not an element of the 
crime, but rather a matter of procedure, which refers to the 
place of trial.").  Similarly, "the State is obligated in all 
prosecutions to establish its territorial jurisdiction over a 
defendant for charged crimes."  State v. Brown, 2003 WI App 34, 
¶25, 260 Wis. 2d 125, 659 N.W.2d 110.  Territorial jurisdiction 
is an issue for the jury if it involves unresolved factual 
disputes; however, whether Wisconsin has jurisdiction under the 
law for a crime based on an undisputed set of facts is an issue 
of law for the circuit court.  Id., ¶¶25-27. 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
12 
 
this case requires an analysis of the statutes governing 
territorial jurisdiction and venue and an inquiry into whether 
the State's evidence at the preliminary hearing established 
probable cause that the requirements in those statutes were met. 
¶23 We 
begin 
by 
setting 
forth 
the 
rules 
governing 
statutory interpretation:   
When interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect 
to the language in the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶43, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We begin by looking to 
the language of the statute because we "assume that 
the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory 
language."  Id., ¶44.  Technical terms or legal terms 
of art appearing in the statute are given their 
accepted 
technical 
or 
legal 
definitions 
while 
nontechnical words and phrases are given their common, 
everyday meaning.  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  Terms that 
are specifically defined in a statute are accorded the 
definition 
the 
legislature 
has 
provided. 
 
Wis. 
Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. DNR, 2004 
WI 40, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612.  In 
addition, we read the language of a specific statutory 
section in the context of the entire statute.  Id.  
Thus, we interpret a statute in light of its textually 
manifest scope, context, and purpose.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶48 & n.8.   
Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶23, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157.  
Therefore, 
extrinsic 
sources 
of 
interpretation, 
such 
as 
legislative history, are not consulted unless the statute is 
ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  A statute is ambiguous 
if reasonably susceptible to being understood in two or more 
fashions.  Id., ¶47.  Statutory interpretation is an issue of 
law, reviewed de novo by this court.  State v. Waushara County 
Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, ¶14, 271 Wis. 2d 547, 679 
N.W.2d 514.  
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
13 
 
¶24 Next, we review the standards governing probable cause 
at a preliminary hearing.  "[T]he purpose of a preliminary 
examination is to determine if there is probable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed by a defendant.  Section 
970.03(7) then commands the court to bind the defendant over for 
trial if probable cause is found to exist."  State v. Dunn, 121 
Wis. 2d 389, 394, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984).  "A preliminary hearing 
as to probable cause is not a preliminary trial or a full 
evidentiary trial on the issue of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Id. at 396.  "It is intended to be a summary proceeding 
to determine essential or basic facts as to probability."  Id. 
at 396-97.  As such:  
The focus of the judge at a preliminary hearing is to 
ascertain 
whether 
the 
facts 
and 
the 
reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom support the conclusion that 
the defendant probably committed a felony. . . . [A] 
preliminary hearing is not a proper forum to choose 
between conflicting facts or inferences, or to weigh 
the state's evidence against evidence favorable to the 
defendant. . . . If the hearing judge determines after 
hearing the evidence that a reasonable inference 
supports the probable cause determination, the judge 
should bind the defendant over for trial.  Simply 
stated, probable cause at a preliminary hearing is 
satisfied when there exists a believable or plausible 
account of the defendant's commission of a felony. 
Id. at 397-98.   
¶25 Thus, the circuit court must "bind a defendant over 
for trial when there exists a set of facts that supports a 
reasonable inference that the defendant probably committed a 
felony . . . ."  Id. at 398.  "All that is needed is a 
believable or plausible account of the defendant's commission of 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
14 
 
a felony."  State v. Cotton, 2003 WI App 154, ¶12, 266 
Wis. 2d 308, 668 N.W.2d 346 (citing Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 398). 
¶26 When reviewing a circuit court's bindover decision, 
"we will examine the factual record ab initio and decide, as a 
matter of law, whether the evidence constitutes probable cause."  
Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 399.  As such, our review of the circuit 
court's bindover decision is de novo.  State v. Phillips, 2000 
WI App 184, ¶37, 238 Wis. 2d 279, 617 N.W.2d 522.  "On review, 
this court will search the record for any substantial ground 
based on competent evidence to support the circuit court's 
bindover decision."  State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 704, 499 
N.W.2d 152 (1993).   
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶27 Anderson 
challenges 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
regarding bindover, contending that there was insufficient 
evidence at the preliminary hearing to support territorial 
jurisdiction in Wisconsin and venue in Jefferson County.   
The term "venue" refers to the locality of the 
prosecution; 
venue 
sets 
the 
particular 
judicial 
district in which a criminal charge is to be filed and 
in which it will be tried.  Venue is to be 
distinguished from "jurisdiction," which refers to the 
authority or power of the court to take action on a 
particular charge. . . .  
 . . .  
To 
say 
that 
the 
judiciary 
has 
such 
jurisdiction . . . is not to say that every judicial 
district within that judiciary is a proper locality 
for the prosecution of the offense.   
4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 16.1(a), at 458 
(2d ed. 1999). 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
15 
 
¶28 Section 939.03 sets forth the scope of Wisconsin's 
territorial jurisdiction:   
(1) A person is subject to prosecution and punishment 
under the law of this state if:  
(a)  The person commits a crime, any of the 
constituent elements of which takes place in this 
state; or  
(b)  While out of this state, the person aids and 
abets, conspires with, or advises, incites, commands, 
or solicits another to commit a crime in this state; 
or 
(c)  While out of this state, the person does an 
act with intent that it cause in this state a 
consequence set forth in a section defining a crime; 
or  
(d)  While out of this state, the person steals 
and subsequently brings any of the stolen property 
into this state. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.03.  Both parties agree that § 939.03(1)(a) is 
the applicable statutory provision in this case.   
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(1) governs venue and states: 
"Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the crime 
was committed, except as otherwise provided."  Subsections (2) 
through (10) of § 971.19 then set forth several exceptions to 
the above rule.  Anderson contends that § 939.03(1)(a) requires 
the State to prove an actus reus element of the underlying 
offense occurred in Wisconsin in order for Wisconsin to have 
jurisdiction over an offense.  Specifically, with regard to the 
charge of first-degree intentional homicide, Anderson argues 
that the State must demonstrate that the act causing death 
occurred in Wisconsin.  Anderson also argues that the State has 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
16 
 
failed to establish the requisite proof of venue in Jefferson 
County.  Anderson asserts that § 971.19(2)6 is inapplicable 
because this subsection plainly applies only where an offense 
contains two or more actus reus elements and a charge of first-
degree intentional homicide contains only one actus reus 
element.   
¶30 The State, on the other hand, argues that Wisconsin 
has territorial jurisdiction over a charge of first-degree 
intentional homicide under § 939.03(1)(a) if it is demonstrated 
that the defendant formed the intent to kill in Wisconsin and 
committed one act in furtherance of that intent in Wisconsin.  
The State contends this standard has been met because the 
evidence demonstrated that the phone call Anderson made to his 
father at work on July 2 is an act in furtherance of his intent 
to kill.  Alternatively, the State argues, based on the evidence 
admitted at the preliminary hearing, that it established 
probable cause that Anderson killed his father in Wisconsin.  
The State's final argument with respect to jurisdiction is that 
the circuit court erroneously struck the testimony of Ellifson, 
and that with this evidence properly admitted, the State 
established probable cause that Anderson killed his father in 
Wisconsin.   
¶31 With regard to venue, the State argues that an act in 
furtherance of intent to kill is sufficient to venue a case in 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.19(2) provides:  "Where 2 or more 
acts are requisite to the commission of any offense, the trial 
may be in any county in which any such acts occurred."   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
17 
 
the 
county 
where 
such 
act 
occurred 
under 
§ 971.19(2).  
Alternatively, the State maintains that the evidence submitted 
at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to establish venue 
under § 971.19(1) because the evidence was sufficient to support 
an inference that Anderson actually killed his father in 
Jefferson County, with or without Ellifson's testimony. 
A. 
Territorial Jurisdiction 
¶32 "'It is elementary that a court may act only upon 
crimes committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
sovereignty seeking to try the offense.'  Without jurisdiction, 
criminal proceedings 'are a nullity.'"  State v. Randle, 2002 WI 
App 116, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 743, 647 N.W.2d 324 (quoting Hotzel v. 
Simmons, 258 Wis. 2d 234, 240-41, 45 N.W.2d 683 (1951)).  As 
noted, 
the 
pertinent 
provision 
governing 
territorial 
jurisdiction 
provides 
that 
Wisconsin 
has 
territorial 
jurisdiction over a criminal offense if "[t]he person commits a 
crime, any of the constituent elements of which takes place in 
this state[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 939.03(1)(a).  The dispute in this 
case concerns the meaning of the phrase "any of the constituent 
elements of which takes place in this state," and whether it is 
possible and sufficient for purposes of § 939.03(1)(a) to 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
18 
 
establish that the mens rea element of first-degree intentional 
homicide "took place" in Wisconsin.7  
¶33 We begin by addressing the meaning of the phrase 
"constituent elements."  This phrase is a legal term of art, 
and, as such, we accord it its accepted legal definition.  
"[C]onstituent" is defined as "([o]f a component) that helps 
make up or complete a unit or a whole <a constituent element of 
the criminal offense>."  Black's Law Dictionary 306 (7th ed. 
1999).  "[C]onstituent element" is defined as "[a]n essential 
component of a crime or cause of action."  Id. at 306.  
Similarly, the phrase "elements of a crime" is defined as "[t]he 
constituent parts of [a] crime——usu. consisting of the actus 
reus, mens rea, and——that the prosecution must prove to sustain 
a conviction."  Id. at 538.  As such, it is clear that the 
phrase "constituent elements" refers to those elements that make 
up the underlying criminal offense.  In other words, the 
"constituent elements" of an offense are those elements of the 
criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt in the prosecution of the offense.   
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01 
sets 
forth 
the 
crime 
of 
first-degree intentional homicide and provides, in pertinent 
                                                 
7 While we ultimately conclude in our venue analysis that 
the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that 
Anderson probably killed his father in Jefferson County——thus 
technically rendering the first certified question a moot point—
—we 
nonetheless 
address 
the 
issue 
of 
whether 
intent 
is 
sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction, as this issue was 
the primary reason the case was certified and it presents a 
novel question of statewide importance.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
19 
 
part, that "whoever causes the death of another human being with 
intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A 
felony." 
 
Thus, 
"Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01, 
first-degree 
intentional homicide, has two elements:  (1) the causing of 
death, (2) with intent to kill."  State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, 
¶59, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244.  The first of these 
elements is an "actus reus" element, that is, the "wrongful deed 
that comprises the physical component[]" of the crime of first-
degree intentional homicide.  Black's Law Dictionary 37 (7th ed. 
1999).  Conversely, the second element is the "mens rea" element 
of first-degree intentional homicide, that is, "[t]he state of 
mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove 
that a defendant had when committing [the] crime."  Id. at 999.  
See also Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 484-85, 302 
N.W.2d 421 (1981)("[T]he 'depraved mind' element . . .  is a 
heinous type of mens rea which constitutes a distinct and 
blameworthy element of three statutory crimes.").  Therefore, 
the crime of first-degree intentional homicide is comprised of 
two constituent elements:  a single actus reus element——the 
causing of death——and a corresponding mens rea element——with 
intent to kill.   
¶35 While it is clear that the phrase "constituent 
elements" refers to the elements of the underlying offense and 
that "intent to kill" is a constituent element of first-degree 
intentional homicide, it is not apparent that an individual's 
formation of the intent to kill in Wisconsin, in and of itself, 
is sufficient to confer Wisconsin jurisdiction over a charge of 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
20 
 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
under 
§ 939.03(1)(a).  
Although 
the 
definition 
of 
"constituent 
element" 
in 
§ 939.03(1)(a) is clear, that section also requires that at 
least one of the constituent elements of an offense "takes place 
in this state" in order for Wisconsin to have jurisdiction over 
the criminal offense.   
¶36 The dictionary definition of "occur" is "[t]o take 
place, come about" or "[t]o be found to exist or appear."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1251 (3d 
ed. 1992).  Likewise, the definition of "exist" is "[t]o 
continue to be; persist" or "[t]o be present under certain 
circumstances or in a specified place; occur."  Id. at 642.  
Utilizing these definitions, the question then becomes when the 
mens rea element of a criminal offense can be said to "exist," 
"be present," or "occur" in this state.  We agree with the State 
that at this point § 939.03(1)(a) becomes ambiguous.  As noted 
supra, a statute is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible 
to 
being 
understood 
in 
two 
or 
more 
fashions. 
 
Here, 
§ 939.03(1)(a) is ambiguous as to when the mens rea element of 
first-degree intentional homicide can be said to "take place" in 
Wisconsin.   
¶37 Anderson argues that the "intent to kill" element of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
cannot 
"take 
place" 
in 
Wisconsin without the commission of the actus reus element of 
first-degree intentional homicide in Wisconsin.  Anderson notes 
that the intent to kill element cannot exist apart from the act 
causing death in order to sustain a conviction for first-degree 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
21 
 
intentional homicide.  Because both elements must occur at the 
same time, they are "telescoped" into one for purposes of 
jurisdiction.   
¶38 In contrast, the State argues that the intent to kill 
"takes place" in Wisconsin anytime an individual commits an act 
in furtherance of that intent in this state.  In addition, the 
circuit court offered a third possible interpretation of 
§ 939.03(1)(a).  The circuit court essentially concluded that 
"intent to kill" can be said to "take place" in Wisconsin 
anytime the State proves that the defendant formed the intent to 
kill in Wisconsin.  That is, according to the circuit court's 
interpretation of § 939.03(1)(a), the mens rea element of first-
degree intentional homicide can be said to "take place" in 
Wisconsin if there is evidence that the intent to kill "existed" 
in Wisconsin, even in the absence of an act in furtherance of 
that intent.   
¶39 Based upon the above definitions, we conclude that all 
three of these interpretations are reasonable readings of 
§ 939.03(1)(a) 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
crime 
of 
first-degree 
intentional homicide.  Because § 939.03(1)(a) is ambiguous as to 
when the mens rea element of first-degree intentional homicide 
"takes place" in Wisconsin, we turn to extrinsic sources to 
guide our statutory interpretation.   
¶40 The present version of § 939.03(1)(a) was enacted 
pursuant to Section 1, Chapter 696, Laws of 1955, as part of the 
wholesale revision of Wisconsin's Criminal Code.  See Randle, 
252 Wis. 2d 743, ¶12 (citing William A. Platz, The Criminal 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
22 
 
Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350, 350-59).  The new criminal code was 
originally proposed as 1951 Senate Bill 784 and was resubmitted 
as 1953 Assembly Bill 100 A, which ultimately was enacted into 
law.  William A. Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 
350, 351.  The Wisconsin Legislative Council Judiciary Committee 
provided 
comments 
to 
both 
bills. 
 
"The 
language 
of 
[§ 939.03(1)(a)] is essentially the same as 1953 Assembly Bill 
100 and 1951 Senate Bill 784."  Randle, 252 Wis. 2d 743, ¶12 
(citing William A. Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 
350, 350-59).   
¶41 Previously, Wisconsin's territorial jurisdiction was 
divided 
into 
two 
separate 
statutory 
sections.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 353.28 (1953) provided:  "Any person who 
commits an act or who omits to do an act which act or omission 
constitutes a part of a crime by the laws of this state shall be 
punished the same as if he had committed the whole of such crime 
within the state."  Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 353.29 (1953) 
provided:   
Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime, does 
any act or omits to do any act within this state in 
execution or part execution of such intent, which 
culminates in the commission of a crime, either within 
or without this state, such person is punishable for 
such crime in this state in the same manner as if the 
same had been committed entirely within this state.  
¶42 As 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
§ 939.03(1)(a) 
indicates, the new provisions on territorial jurisdiction were 
intended 
to 
significantly 
expand 
Wisconsin's 
territorial 
jurisdiction.  The Legislative Council comments to 1951 Senate 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
23 
 
Bill 784, discussing the revision of Wisconsin's territorial 
jurisdiction provisions, explain:  
This 
section 
deals 
with 
problems 
of 
territorial 
jurisdiction of the state over persons committing 
crime.  The common law followed the territorial 
commission principle which, if strictly interpreted, 
meant that every element of the crime had to occur 
within the boundaries of the state in order for the 
state to obtain jurisdiction. . . . [In response], the 
American states have in effect adopted the territorial 
security principle, a principle which is based on the 
theory that a state has sufficient interest in a crime 
to 
assume 
jurisdiction 
over 
it 
if 
either 
its 
commission or its effect takes place within the state 
boundaries.  This section extends the territorial 
jurisdiction of the state to the limits of the 
territorial security principle. . . .  
Paragraphs (a) and (d) merely restate old law.  
Paragraphs (b) and (c) extend the jurisdiction of the 
state, but this does not mean that the state is bound 
to exercise that jurisdiction in any particular case.   
7 Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on 
the Criminal Code 41 (1950). 
¶43 Likewise, the Wisconsin Legislative Council comments 
to 1953 Assembly Bill 100 A provide:   
Subsection (1)(a) deals with the situation where part 
or all of the crime is committed in this state.  There 
is no problem where the whole crime is committed 
within this state, and subsection (1)(a) makes it 
clear that the same rule applies even though only one 
element of the crime occurs in this state.  Under 
(1)(a) two states may have concurrent jurisdiction 
over the same crime.   
 . . . . 
This section extends the state's jurisdiction in 
accordance with the territorial security principle, a 
principle which is based on the theory that a state 
has 
sufficient 
interest 
in 
a 
crime 
to 
assume 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
24 
 
jurisdiction over it if either its commission or its 
effect takes place within the state. . . . Modern 
criminals have little regard for boundary lines, and 
the 
legislatures 
of 
most 
states 
have 
found 
it 
necessary to extend jurisdiction to crimes which were 
not 
wholly 
committed 
within 
the 
state 
boundaries. . . .  
Sections 
covered. 
 
353.28 
Part 
of 
Crime 
Punishable Same as Whole Crime and 353.29 Part of 
Crime Committed in This State Same As If All Committed 
Here are substantially restated in subsection (1)(a) 
of the new section.  Subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c) of 
the new section are new law while subsection (1)(d) is 
a restatement of part of old section 356.01(5).   
5 Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on 
the Criminal Code 3 (1953)(first emphasis added).  
¶44 In addition, a prominent law review article written 
shortly 
after 
the 
revision 
of 
Wisconsin's 
criminal 
code 
explained 
the 
historical 
significance 
of 
the 
changes 
to 
Wisconsin's territorial jurisdiction provisions: 
At common law the territorial commission theory of 
jurisdiction over crimes was uniformly accepted.  By 
application of this theory only that sovereign within 
whose territorial boundaries a crime was committed 
could punish for its commission.  The locus of the 
crime was easily fixed if all of its material elements 
took place in a single jurisdiction. 
Cletus D. Howard, Note, Jurisdiction Over Crimes:  Territorial 
Applicability Provisions of Wisconsin's Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. 
L. Rev. 496, 497.  Further, the article explains that in 
response to several difficulties with the stringent common-law 
rule:  
Early statutes were enacted as specific problems arose 
and out of them grew what is now known as the 
territorial 
security 
principle 
of 
criminal 
jurisdiction. 
 
This 
principle 
is 
based 
on 
a 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
25 
 
recognition of the fact that criminal conduct often 
threatens the security of the state or its citizens 
regardless 
of 
its 
locus. . . . The 
territorial 
applicability 
provision 
of 
the 
[new 
Wisconsin] 
criminal code incorporates the territorial security 
principle and also some far-reaching extensions of 
that principle which establish landmarks in criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 498.  The article concluded that § 939.03(1)(a) "provides 
for jurisdiction although the crime is only partially committed 
within the state."  Id. at 503.   
¶45 Based upon the legislative history of § 939.03, we 
reject Anderson's 
interpretation of 
the prerequisites for 
territorial jurisdiction.  While Anderson's argument is facially 
appealing, his interpretation of § 939.03 is essentially the 
same as the common-law standard for territorial jurisdiction, 
which required that every element of the completed offense occur 
in Wisconsin in order for the state to have jurisdiction over a 
crime.  As indicated by the legislative history of § 939.03, the 
revised statute pertaining to jurisdiction was clearly intended 
to broaden Wisconsin's territorial jurisdiction beyond that 
allowed under the common law and statutes then in existence.  
Anderson's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 939.03(1)(a) 
would 
actually 
render the statute narrower than its predecessors, which allowed 
for jurisdiction if the defendant committed an act that 
constituted part of a crime, or if the defendant committed an 
act in execution or part execution of an intent to commit a 
crime.  Wis. Stat. §§ 353.28, 353.29 (1953).   
¶46 Furthermore, those who analyzed the revised provisions 
on territorial jurisdiction agreed that the new § 939.03 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
26 
 
conferred jurisdiction to the state over an offense if part of 
the offense were to occur in Wisconsin.  Section 939.03(1)(a) 
clearly provides that Wisconsin has jurisdiction over an offense 
"even though one element of the crime occurs in this state."  5 
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on the 
Criminal Code 3 (1953).   
¶47 We conclude that § 939.03(1)(a) is satisfied upon 
proof 
that 
the 
defendant 
committed 
an 
act 
in 
Wisconsin 
manifesting the intent to kill.  Specifically, intent to kill, 
which is a constituent element of first-degree intentional 
homicide, may be said to take place——that is, "exist," "occur," 
or "be present"——in Wisconsin if the defendant commits an act in 
this state that manifests or exhibits an intent to kill.  We 
reach this conclusion for several reasons. 
¶48 First, our previous discussion of the legislative 
history of § 939.03 reveals that the revised statute pertaining 
to jurisdiction clearly was intended to broaden Wisconsin's 
territorial jurisdiction beyond that allowed under the common 
law and statutes then in existence.  Under the previous 
jurisdictional statutes, Wisconsin possessed jurisdiction over 
an offense "[w]henever a person, with intent to commit a crime, 
does any act or omits to do any act within this state in 
execution or part execution of such intent, which culminates in 
the commission of a crime, either within or without this 
state[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 353.29 (1953).  A writer commenting on 
§ 939.03 
indicated 
that 
"[t]he 
territorial 
applicability 
provision of the criminal code incorporates the territorial 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
27 
 
security principle and also some far-reaching extensions of that 
principle which establish landmarks in criminal jurisdiction."  
Cletus D. Howard, Note, Jurisdiction Over Crimes:  Territorial 
Applicability Provisions of Wisconsin's Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. 
L. Rev. 496, 498.   
¶49 Second, § 940.01, which sets forth the crime of first-
degree intentional homicide, does not require premeditation or 
proof of acts committed in preparation for the crime.  It 
contains a single mens rea component:  the existence of intent 
to kill.  Allowing for jurisdiction upon proof of an act 
committed in this state manifesting an intent to kill is 
consistent with the normal methods of proof in a trial for 
first-degree intentional homicide.  Unless the State obtains a 
confession from the defendant indicating that he formed the 
intent to kill in Wisconsin, it is unlikely that there will be 
direct evidence of the defendant's intent.  When there is not 
direct evidence of a defendant's intent, "the defendant's intent 
is necessarily inferred from the historical facts."  Dunn, 121 
Wis. 2d at 399 (emphasis added).  Often an act of the defendant 
that exhibits his intent to kill may be the best circumstantial 
evidence of such intent.   
¶50 Third, this interpretation is consistent with other 
jurisdictions 
that 
have 
similar 
territorial 
jurisdiction 
statutes and have addressed the issue.  See, e.g., State v. 
Willoughby, 892 P.2d 1319, 1324, 1328-29 (Ariz. 1995); Lane v. 
State, 388 So.2d 1022, 1027-29 (Fla. 1980); State v. Wedebrand, 
602 N.W.2d 186, 189-90 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999); State v. Lane, 771 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
28 
 
P.2d 1150, 1153-56 (Wash. 1989).  All of these courts found that 
the presence of a mens rea element of a criminal offense, as 
exhibited 
by 
the 
defendant's 
conduct 
in 
the 
state, 
was 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the state over the offense 
under statutes that allowed for jurisdiction if any element of 
the crime occurred in the state.   
¶51 Therefore, we conclude that the phrase "constituent 
elements" in § 939.03(1)(a) refers to the elements of the 
underlying offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt in order to secure a conviction.  A constituent element of 
a criminal offense may be either an actus reus element or a mens 
rea element.  Intent to kill is a constituent element of first-
degree intentional homicide in Wisconsin.  Thus, intent to kill 
is a constituent element for purposes of § 939.03(1)(a).  
Further, we conclude that the State offers sufficient proof that 
a mens rea element of first-degree intentional homicide "takes 
place" in Wisconsin for purposes of § 939.03(1)(a), if there is 
proof that the defendant committed an act in this state that 
manifests an intent to kill.   
¶52 While it is unnecessary to apply this standard to the 
facts of the case in light of our holding below that the State 
presented evidence that Anderson probably killed his father in 
Jefferson County, a majority of this court believes that the 
standard we have articulated above concerning jurisdiction would 
be met in this case.  As discussed infra, the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing establishes a reasonable inference 
that Anderson probably formed the intent to kill his father in 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
29 
 
Wisconsin and made the phone call to his father at work on July 
2.  The evidence further creates a reasonable inference that 
Anderson probably made this phone call for the purpose of luring 
his father home early in order to murder him.  As such, the 
phone call constitutes an act committed in Wisconsin manifesting 
Anderson's intent to kill his father.  We turn now and address 
the question of venue.   
B. 
Venue 
¶53 The second question certified by the court of appeals 
is whether an act committed in a county manifesting an intent to 
kill is sufficient to establish venue in that county in a 
prosecution 
for 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
under 
§ 971.19(2).  As noted supra, § 971.19(2) is one of several 
enumerated exceptions to the general rule in § 971.19(1) that 
"[c]riminal actions shall be tried in the county where the crime 
was committed[.]"  However, we need not decide whether the 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing would satisfy the 
exception in subsection (2) because we conclude that with the 
testimony from Ellifson properly admitted, the State proved that 
there was probable cause to believe that Anderson killed his 
father in Jefferson County, and thus satisfied the general venue 
requirement in § 971.19(1).   
¶54 The circuit court excluded the testimony of Ellifson 
only for purposes of the preliminary hearing.  The circuit court 
believed that the State had put forth sufficient evidence to 
establish venue without the testimony and that therefore it was 
not necessary to comprehensively examine the admissibility of 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
30 
 
the Ellifson testimony.  Therefore, the circuit court excluded 
the testimony for purposes of the preliminary hearing but left 
open the possibility that it could be used at trial.  While we 
appreciate the circuit court's sensitivity to issues of judicial 
economy, we nonetheless conclude that the Ellifson testimony 
should have been admitted into evidence.  Specifically, we 
conclude that the testimony of Ellifson, which recounted a 
conversation she had with Krnak, was admissible under the 
residual hearsay exception.  While Anderson argues that the 
State waived any claim that this testimony would qualify under 
the residual exception, this court must "search the record for 
any substantial ground based on competent evidence to support 
the circuit court's bindover decision."  Koch, 175 Wis. 2d at 
704.   
¶55 We begin our analysis by noting that "[t]he rules of 
evidence apply at a preliminary hearing."  State v. Sorenson, 
143 Wis. 2d 226, 240, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988).  Krnak's statement 
to Ellifson clearly qualifies as hearsay as it "is a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted."  Wis. Stat. § 908.01(3)(2003-04).8  The State 
argues that this testimony qualifies under the residual hearsay 
exception because it comes close to qualifying as an excited 
utterance under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2), or a statement of recent 
                                                 
8 Because the preliminary hearing was held in 2003, the 
references to the evidentiary rules in this section are to the 
current version of the Wisconsin statutes.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
31 
 
perception under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2), and bears comparable 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  Anderson argues that it is 
inappropriate to admit hearsay under the residual exception if 
it comes close to qualifying under one of the other enumerated 
hearsay exceptions but ultimately fails to meet the statutory 
criteria.   
¶56 The 
Wisconsin 
Rules 
of 
Evidence 
contain 
two 
identically 
worded 
"residual" 
hearsay 
exceptions:  
Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24) and Wis. Stat. § 908.045(6).  Section 
908.03(24) applies if the declarant is available to testify 
whereas § 908.045(6) applies if the declarant is unavailable.  
However, Wisconsin case law treats the two residuals as 
equivalents and recognizes there is no substantive difference 
between them.  Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 242, 250 n.9.; State v. 
Jenkins, 168 Wis. 2d 175, 191 n.6, 483 N.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 
1992); Daniel Blinka, 7 Wisconsin Practice:  Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 803.24, at 682 (2d ed. 2001)[hereinafter Wisconsin Evidence].  
"The residuals are a compromise between concerns that reliable 
evidence might be unreasonably excluded by static rules and the 
law's obsessive fear of hearsay."  Id.9   
                                                 
9 As we explained in State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 
242-43, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988): 
The residual hearsay exception was initially 
created as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
adopted in Wisconsin as part of Chapter 908 in 1974.  
The Federal Advisory Committee Notes, 59 Wis. 2d R301, 
R302, R323 (1974), explain that it was designed 
because not every hearsay contingency was anticipated 
by specific rules.  This exception was to provide 
flexibility needed to permit growth and development in 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
32 
 
¶57 Both statutes provide an exception to the hearsay rule 
for "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing 
exceptions 
but 
having 
comparable 
circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness."  Wis. Stat. §§ 908.03(24) & 
908.045(6).  See also Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 242.  However, as 
the declarant, Krnak, is unavailable to testify, we will refer 
to the exception listed in § 908.045(6).   
¶58 This court has previously stated that "the drafters 
did not intend to restrict the use of the residual exceptions to 
situations which are completely different from those covered by 
specifically enumerated hearsay exceptions."  Mitchell v. State, 
84 Wis. 2d 325, 331, 267 N.W.2d 349 (1978).  Thus, this court 
"has specifically rejected the . . . argument that the residuals 
should not be used where the evidence is 'similar' to one of the 
enumerated exceptions but nonetheless fails to qualify under 
it[.]"  Wisconsin Evidence § 803.24, at 683.  As we stated in 
Mitchell:  
[W]e cannot accept the . . . argument that evidence 
which is similar to an enumerated hearsay exception 
cannot be a residual exception under sec. 908.03(24), 
Stats.  On the contrary, since the enumerated hearsay 
exceptions represent types of evidence traditionally 
considered to have strong circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, hearsay admitted under the residual 
exception is more likely than not to have close 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 
law 
of 
evidence. 
 
While 
not 
contemplating 
unfettered judicial discretion, its use was intended 
to 
allow 
admission 
of 
evidence 
under 
new 
and 
unanticipated 
situations 
which 
demonstrate 
a 
trustworthiness consistent with that required under 
other specifically stated exceptions.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
33 
 
affinities to the exceptions specifically enumerated 
by the rules.   
Mitchell, 84 Wis. 2d at 332.   
¶59 We agree with the State that while Krnak's statement 
to 
Ellifson 
does 
not 
technically 
qualify 
as 
an 
excited 
utterance,10 or statement of recent perception11 due to timing 
                                                 
10 Section 908.03(2) sets forth the excited utterance 
exception for "[a] statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition."  Thus, the excited 
utterance exception requires three foundational facts:  "1. 
There was a startling event or condition; 2. The statement 
related to the startling event or condition; [and] 3. The 
declarant 
made 
the 
statement 
while 
under 
the 
stress 
of 
excitement caused by the startling event."  Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 803.2, at 598.  While Krnak's proferred hearsay statement 
clearly satisfies the first two foundational requirements, it 
fails to satisfy the third requirement.   
As we stated in Christensen v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 
77 Wis. 2d 50, 57-58, 252 N.W.2d 81 (1977), when assessing the 
third foundational fact: 
[T]iming, the lapse between the triggering event and 
the 
utterance 
is 
a 
key 
factor. . . . Under 
sec. 
908.03(2) time is measured by the duration of the 
condition of excitement rather than mere time lapse 
from 
the 
event 
or 
condition 
described. 
 
The 
significant factor is the stress or nervous shock 
acting on the declarant at the time of the statement.  
The statements of a declarant who demonstrates the 
opportunity and capacity to review the [event] and to 
calculate the effect of his statements do not qualify 
as excited utterance.   
Thus, while the statement need not be contemporaneous with 
the startling event to qualify as an excited utterance, the 
statement must be made while the declarant was still under the 
stress of the startling event, that is, before there has been an 
opportunity for the excitement and stress of the event to lose 
its effect.  Id.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
34 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
While Ellifson's testimony clearly indicates that Krnak's 
story related to a startling event and that Krnak was visibly 
upset when making these statements, we simply do not know when 
his son's alleged attack occurred, be it a few days or few 
months earlier.  In other words, there is no way of determining 
whether Krnak's stress at the time of making the statement 
existed continuously since the time of the alleged attack.   
11 Section 908.045(2) sets forth the statement of recent 
perception exception for: 
A statement, not in response to the instigation of a 
person 
engaged 
in 
investigation, 
litigating, 
or 
settling 
a claim, which 
narrates, 
describes, or 
explains an event or condition recently perceived by 
the 
declarant, 
made 
in 
good 
faith, 
not 
in 
contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in 
which the declarant was interested, and while the 
declarant's recollection was clear. 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2).   
"The recent perception exception is similar to the hearsay 
exceptions for present sense impression and excited utterances, 
'but was intended to allow more time between the observation of 
the event and the statement.'"  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶15, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485(quoting Kluever v. Evangelical 
Reformed Immanuels Congregation, 143 Wis. 2d 806, 813-14, 422 
N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1988)).  The purpose of the exception is to 
"'admit probative evidence which in most cases could not be 
admitted under other exceptions due to the passage of time.'"  
Id., ¶15 (quoting Kluever, 143 Wis. 2d at 814). Specifically, 
the exception "'is based on the premise that probative evidence 
in the form of a noncontemporaneous, unexcited statement which 
fails to satisfy the present sense impression or excited 
utterance exceptions would otherwise be lost if the recently 
perceived statement of an unavailable declarant is excluded.'"  
Id. (quoting Kluever, 143 Wis. 2d at 814). 
Here, while Ellifson's testimony reveals that Krnak's 
statement describes an event and satisfies most of the limiting 
factors contained in § 908.045(2), her testimony does not 
indicate when the event Krnak described occurred, other than 
that it was her "understanding" that the alleged assault by his 
son occurred not long ago.  As such, there is no basis to 
conclude that Krnak's statement was made after "recently" 
perceiving the event. 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
35 
 
problems, it does qualify under the residual hearsay exception 
because it contains several 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness 
similar to those found in statements admitted under the excited 
utterance exception.  In Sorenson, this court discussed the 
prerequisites to utilizing the residual hearsay exception: 
To 
apply 
the 
residual 
exception 
requires 
establishment 
of 
"circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness" comparable to those existing for 
enumerated exceptions.  Sec. 908.045(6), Stats.  The 
guarantees of trustworthiness which are found in the 
enumerated hearsay exceptions [are as follows]: 
"a. Where the circumstances are such that a 
sincere and accurate statement would naturally be 
uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed;  
b. 
Where, even though a desire to falsify might 
present itself, other considerations such as the 
danger of easy detection or the fear of punishment 
would probably counteract its force;  
c. 
Where the statement was made under such 
conditions of publicity that an error, if it had 
occurred, 
would probably 
have been detected and 
corrected." 
Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 243-44 (quoting 5 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 1423, at 254 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)).12 
¶60 We conclude that Ellifson's testimony bears sufficient 
indicia of trustworthiness because "the circumstances are such 
                                                 
12 In Sorenson, we developed a five-factor test for courts 
to utilize in analyzing hearsay statements of minors who were 
the victims of sexual assault under the residual exception.  
Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 245-46.  Although this test has been 
applied beyond the specific facts of Sorenson, it has not been 
extended beyond the context of a minor child's statements 
concerning abuse.  See State v. Oliver, 161 Wis. 2d 140, 144, 
467 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1991).  
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
36 
 
that a sincere and accurate statement would naturally be 
uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed."  Id. (quoting 
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1423, at 254 (Chadbourn rev. 1974)).  The 
testimony at issue here arises from two coworkers who were 
engaged in an intimate conversation about problems they were 
experiencing with their adult sons.  Krnak revealed a shocking 
story about a close family member——his son Andrew——who attacked 
and threatened to kill him.13  We can find no motive to fabricate 
based on the nature of this conversation, especially considering 
the fact that Krnak indicated that he was not going to be 
contacting the authorities about the assault.  His remark about 
knowing how one was going to die demonstrates his sincerity in 
making the statement.  There is no indication that Krnak was 
joking when making these comments.  Further, the fact that 
Krnak's statement indicated that it was a close family member 
who attacked him, rather than an unidentified stranger, is 
significant in that such an allegation might open oneself and 
his or her family to criticism and/or embarrassment.   
¶61 Moreover, Krnak became visibly upset when relating 
this story, so much so that his face was red and he began 
shaking.  Krnak appeared so distressed that Ellifson herself 
became upset upon hearing the story.  Thus, Krnak was clearly 
under a great deal of stress when recounting his son's attempt 
to do away with him.  Also of significance is the fact that the 
                                                 
13 As noted infra, the defendant changed his name from 
Andrew Krnak to Derek Anderson.   
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
37 
 
conversation between Krnak and Ellifson appears to have been 
spontaneous, as there is no indication they planned to discuss 
this topic.   
¶62 "The excited utterance exception . . . is based on 
spontaneity 
and 
stress 
which 
endow 
such 
statements 
with 
sufficient trustworthiness to overcome the reasons for exclusion 
of hearsay."  Christensen v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 77 
Wis. 2d 50, 56, 252 N.W.2d 81 (1977).  While Krnak's statement 
does not technically qualify as an excited utterance because of 
the lack of evidence regarding when the attack occurred, the 
statement does demonstrate that it was made spontaneously under 
a great deal of stress caused by a startling event.  The fact 
that the statement was made under circumstances similar to those 
forming the basis for the excited utterance exception weighs 
heavily in favor of its admissibility.   
¶63 Therefore, 
we conclude the 
testimony 
offered by 
Ellifson at the preliminary hearing was admissible under the 
residual hearsay exception.  We further conclude that when this 
evidence is considered in conjunction with the other evidence 
presented at the hearing, the State presented sufficient 
evidence to create a reasonable inference that Anderson probably 
killed his father in Jefferson County.   
¶64 We reiterate that all that is necessary to support a 
bindover 
decision 
following 
a 
preliminary 
hearing 
is 
"a 
believable and plausible account of the defendant's commission 
of a felony[,]" notwithstanding any alternative explanations the 
defendant offers for the evidence.  Koch, 175 Wis. 2d at 706.  
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
38 
 
At this stage in a criminal proceeding, it is not proper to 
"choose between conflicting facts or inferences, or weigh the 
state's evidence against evidence favorable to the defendant."  
Id. at 704.  All that is necessary is a "set of facts that 
supports a reasonable inference that the defendant probably 
committed a felony."  Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 398.   
¶65 The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing 
established that Krnak, along with his wife and son, disappeared 
on July 2, 1998.  Krnak's skeletal remains were found at a 
location in North Carolina that was approximately ten miles from 
where Anderson had previously attended college.  There is no 
evidence that Krnak planned to visit North Carolina over the 
Fourth of July weekend.  One of the Krnak family pickup trucks 
had approximately 2600 miles unaccounted for between June 24 and 
July 2, despite the fact that the Krnaks kept meticulous mileage 
logs on all of their vehicles.  The distance between the Krnak 
family home and the location of Krnak's remains is approximately 
1560 miles round-trip.   
¶66 This large amount of unaccounted for mileage is 
consistent with someone making a trip from the Krnak residence 
in Jefferson County to the place Krnak's remains were ultimately 
located.  When asked by police about the excessive mileage on 
the vehicle, Anderson provided no explanation other than that he 
had been driving the vehicle.  Given that the Krnaks kept 
meticulous mileage logs on all their vehicles, Anderson was the 
only individual with access to the vehicle over the Fourth of 
July weekend, and Anderson admitted to driving the vehicle, it 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
39 
 
is reasonable to infer that Anderson himself was responsible for 
the unaccounted for mileage.   
¶67 There was evidence that Krnak was in a good mood at 
work the day of his disappearance until receiving a phone call, 
which call was traced to the Krnak residence at 3:10 p.m.  There 
was evidence that Anderson probably placed this call.  Anderson 
initially denied making the phone call to police.  However, 
Anderson also told police that his brother returned home from 
work between 3:20 and 3:25 p.m., his mother returned home 
shortly after 4:00 p.m., and that he was home when they 
returned.  Therefore, the only person who could have made the 
call was Anderson.  Anderson later admitted to his aunt that he 
called his father at work to inquire as to the location of a 
tool that he needed for working on his car.   
¶68 Krnak was visibly distressed after receiving this 
call.  A coworker, James Connelly, testified that he had known 
Krnak for over 20 years and had never seen him that upset 
before.  Krnak told Connelly that "I have to fly out of here" 
and that "[w]e may have to go to a funeral."  When Krnak left 
work that afternoon, shortly before he was scheduled to leave, 
he was never seen again by any of his coworkers.   
¶69 Krnak never made it to the family cabin in Waushara 
County and never visited his friend James Gradel as planned.  
Anderson's activity log indicated that the neighbors near the 
family cabin in Waushara County had not seen anyone at the Krnak 
cabin all weekend.  Anderson's activity log for July 2 indicated 
that he was home when his parents packed up the pickup truck and 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
40 
 
prepared to leave.  Thus, Anderson was the last person to see 
his father alive.  As apparent from Anderson's activity log for 
the next two days, Anderson had no alibi for the Fourth of July 
weekend.  The activity log stated that he mainly watched 
television, worked on his car, and drank at his parents' 
residence.   
¶70 Ellifson's testimony created a reasonable inference 
that Anderson had previously attempted to kill his father by 
lying in wait for him when he returned home from work and 
attempting to club him.  While Ellifson's testimony could not be 
used to directly prove that Anderson acted in conformity with 
the prior attack on July 2, 1998, it could be used to establish 
Anderson's intent to kill his father, or the identity of 
Anderson as the killer.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2); State v. 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 783, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); Wisconsin 
Evidence § 404.7, at 166. 
¶71 Anderson's log for Sunday, July 5, states that his 
family was "due back by dark but when they didn't show, I just 
figured they stayed an extra night to fish or something like 
they sometimes do."  However, this statement is inconsistent 
with the entry for the following day, where Anderson states "dad 
always calls if plans change."  This latter statement is 
corroborated by the testimony of Anderson's aunt, who testified 
that the Krnaks were very prompt people who were always on time.   
¶72 Despite the fact that his family, who were very prompt 
people, failed to return home as planned and failed to call to 
indicate a change of plans, Anderson's log for Monday, July 6, 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
41 
 
indicated that he went to UW-Whitewater to attend the start of 
summer school classes.  Having returned from classes, he then 
apparently became worried that his family had not returned and 
drove up to the cabin in Waushara County in search of them.  
Anderson's log indicated that the neighbors near the cabin had 
not seen anyone at the family cabin all weekend.  Anderson then 
contacted a number of individuals, including law enforcement, to 
inquire as to his family's whereabouts.  One of the individuals 
he contacted was his aunt.  His aunt testified that she 
expressed concern over the family's disappearance and Anderson 
responded, "[o]h, don’t worry."   
¶73 Following 
his 
family's 
disappearance, 
Anderson 
contacted 
a 
conservation 
warden 
rather 
than 
local 
law 
enforcement to assist in the search for his family.  The warden 
was able to locate the Krnaks' vehicle in a large wooded area 
around Mirror Lake in a relatively short period of time based on 
the information provided by Anderson.  Curiously, despite 
Anderson's willingness to drive from the Krnak residence in 
Jefferson 
County 
to 
their 
cabin 
in 
Waushara 
County, 
he 
apparently was unwilling to drive the comparable distance to 
Mirror Lake to search for his family himself.  The Krnaks' 
pickup truck, which was found near Mirror Lake, was completely 
empty, despite the fact that Anderson's activity log indicated 
that his family packed their belongings into the truck and that 
the neighbors never saw the Krnaks at their cabin.   
¶74 Krnak did not know the precise location of the cabin 
of his friend, James Gradel, whom he was supposed to visit and 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
42 
 
needed Gradel to draw a map to his property.  Anderson's 
fingerprint was found on this map, and the map was found in 
Whitewater in the glove compartment of his mother's sedan.  
Anderson's activity log indicated that his family packed up the 
pickup truck for their vacation.  Given the fact that Krnak 
needed his friend to draw him a map of his property and that 
Krnak packed his pickup truck, there is a reasonable inference 
that Anderson probably took the map from his father and placed 
it in the sedan, the vehicle he later drove to UW-Whitewater.   
¶75 During a conversation with his aunt, when authorities 
were searching for his family, Anderson told his aunt "[t]hey 
will never find them."  His aunt further testified that in this 
conversation Anderson was "very nonchalant" about his family's 
disappearance.  In addition to his statements to his aunt, 
Anderson also made suspicious statements to a fellow student, 
indicating that he did not really miss his parents but missed 
the family dog.   
¶76 Considering all this evidence together, we believe the 
State presented sufficient evidence to create a reasonable 
inference that Anderson probably killed his father in Jefferson 
County. 
 
While 
admittedly 
the 
State's 
case 
is 
entirely 
circumstantial and there exist reasonable explanations for each 
of the above items of evidence, the court is not to weigh 
competing inferences at the preliminary hearing stage.  All that 
is required is a reasonable inference that Anderson probably 
killed his father and did so in Jefferson County.  The evidence 
creates a reasonable inference that Anderson probably had the 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
43 
 
intent to kill his father and was most likely his murderer.  The 
evidence creates a reasonable inference that Anderson called his 
father at work on July 2, 1998, for the purpose of luring him 
home early in order to kill him.  In addition, the evidence 
creates a reasonable inference that after murdering his father, 
Anderson probably drove the body to North Carolina and disposed 
of it close to where he used to attend school.   
¶77 The State has presented a plausible account of 
Anderson's commission of his father's murder, which is all that 
is required to bind a defendant over for trial.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to 
establish venue in Jefferson County under § 971.19(1).  Because 
the State presented evidence that creates a reasonable inference 
that Anderson killed his father at his home in Jefferson County, 
in addition to establishing probable cause for venue under 
§ 971.19(1), 
the 
State 
established 
probable 
cause 
for 
jurisdiction under § 939.03(1)(a), as the killing of a human 
being is a constituent element of first-degree intentional 
homicide.  
V. 
SUMMARY 
¶78 We conclude, based on the language of § 939.03(1)(a) 
and its legislative history, that the mens rea element of first-
degree intentional homicide constitutes a "constituent element" 
under § 939.03(1)(a).  We hold that section 939.03(1)(a), which 
requires that one of the constituent elements of an offense 
"takes place" in Wisconsin, is satisfied upon proof that the 
defendant committed an act in Wisconsin manifesting an intent to 
No. 
2003AP3478-CR   
 
44 
 
kill.    Further, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
striking certain hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing and 
that with this evidence properly admitted under the residual 
hearsay exception, the State presented sufficient evidence of 
venue under § 971.19(1) because the State established that there 
is probable cause to believe that Anderson killed his father in 
Jefferson County.   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed.   
 
 
 
No.  2003AP3478-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶79 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the analysis of the majority concerning territorial jurisdiction 
and venue.  I write separately, however, because of the 
majority's unnecessary reliance on one of the residual hearsay 
exceptions.  Majority op., ¶3.  Unlike the majority, I believe 
that the evidence at the preliminary hearing established 
probable cause that Allen Krnak was killed in Jefferson County, 
even without Patricia Ellifson's testimony.   
¶80 As noted by the majority opinion, the circuit court 
excluded the testimony of Patricia Ellifson only for purposes of 
the preliminary hearing, leaving open the possibility that it 
could be used at trial.  Id., ¶54.  The court determined that 
the State had put forth sufficient evidence to establish venue 
without the testimony.  In its brief, the State agreed with the 
decision for bindover, submitting that, "even without Patricia 
Ellifson's 
testimony, 
the 
preliminary 
hearing 
established 
probable cause that Allen Krnak was killed in Wisconsin."   
¶81 From the facts of this case, there are two principal 
reasons to support the circuit court's decision.  First, a 
plausible explanation from the evidence is that Allen Krnak (as 
well as his wife and son) made it home from work on July 2, 
1998, but never left for the family's cabin in Waushara County, 
despite plans to spend the Fourth of July weekend there.  This 
inference is supported by the discovery of their empty pickup 
truck in Wisconsin, which contained no personal effects or 
belongings other than a notebook.  Thus, it is plausible that 
No.  2003AP3478-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
all three Krnaks were killed on that day, after which Anderson 
dumped his father's body in North Carolina.  
¶82 Second, the explanation advanced by Anderson——that his 
father was killed in North Carolina——is also plausible but it 
relies upon two unlikely sets of circumstances.  One is that 
Allen Krnak voluntarily accompanied his son to North Carolina 
instead of going on vacation with his wife and son.  The other 
is that Anderson kidnapped his father from Wisconsin, kept him 
alive until they reached North Carolina, where he then decided 
to kill 
him. 
 As the 
State recognizes, 
both 
scenarios 
conveniently 
fail 
to 
account 
for 
the 
contemporaneous 
disappearance of Krnak's wife and son. 
¶83 Two standards of preliminary hearing jurisprudence 
should guide this analysis.  First, if conflicting inferences 
are equally plausible from undisputed facts, then probable cause 
for purposes of the preliminary hearing is satisfied.  State v. 
Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 400, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984).  Second, as 
the majority acknowledges, this court will "search the record 
for any substantial ground based on competent evidence to 
support the circuit court's bindover decision."  Majority op., 
¶26 (quoting State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 704, 499 N.W.2d 152 
(1993)).    
¶84 If the majority truly employed these standards here, 
it would not have reached the issue of whether the circuit court 
erred in striking Patricia Ellifson's testimony.  Consequently, 
it would not have needed to rely on the residual hearsay 
exception to make that testimony admissible.   
No.  2003AP3478-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶85 The residual hearsay exception should be sparingly 
used.  The necessary indicia of reliability, which is the 
hallmark of hearsay exceptions, is often more attenuated with 
the 
residual 
exception 
than 
with 
other 
well-established 
exceptions.  Indeed, unbridled use of the residual hearsay 
exception may swallow the need for other hearsay exceptions.14  
¶86 Accordingly, I would not have relied upon the residual 
hearsay exception.  Rather, I conclude that even without the 
testimony of Patricia Ellifson, the evidence at the preliminary 
hearing established probable cause that Allen Krnak was killed 
in Jefferson County.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurring opinion.   
 
 
                                                 
14 For further discussion of the perils of the residual 
hearsay exception, see James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay 
Exception Reconsidered, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 787 (1993). 
 
No. 2003AP3478-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶88 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion with respect to its conclusion that territorial 
jurisdiction is satisfied in this matter.  While I generally 
agree with the sentiments expressed by Justice Bradley's 
concurrence that the residual hearsay exception should be 
sparingly 
used, 
Justice 
Bradley's 
concurrence, 
¶85, 
I 
nevertheless share the majority's conclusion that Patricia 
Ellifson's 
testimony 
bears 
sufficient 
indicia 
of 
trustworthiness.15  Majority op., ¶68.  I write separately, 
                                                 
15 Besides objecting on hearsay grounds, Anderson also 
objected to this testimony as inadmissible "904.04(2) evidence."  
In other words, Anderson objected to this evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts as being inadmissible to prove his 
character in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith, absent a statutorily recognized exception.  The 
majority suggests that this evidence could be used to establish 
Anderson's intent to kill his father, or the identity of 
Anderson as the killer.  Majority op., ¶78.  That may or may not 
be true.  The preliminary hearing court chose to disregard 
Ellifson's preliminary hearing testimony on both hearsay and 
other acts evidence grounds, and the State has not advanced any 
arguments as to how the evidence is admissible for other acts 
purposes. 
 
At trial on remand, the trial court must carefully consider 
whether the intent exception has been met before admitting her 
testimony.  See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 781-93, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998) (establishing three-step analytical framework 
to determine admissibility of other acts evidence); State v. 
Watkins, 39 Wis. 2d 718, 727, 159 N.W.2d 675 (1968) ("Timeliness 
and similarity of situation are the important factors involved 
in finding evidence of prior occurrences to be relevant and thus 
admissible on the question of intent."); and Whitty v. State, 34 
Wis. 
2d 
278, 
294, 149 
N.W.2d 557 
(1967)("We 
think the 
admissibility of prior-crime evidence does not depend upon 
admission or conviction for prior criminal conduct but upon its 
probative value which depends in part upon its nearness in time, 
place and circumstances to the alleged crime or element sought 
to be proved.").  See also State v. Cartagena, 99 Wis. 2d 657, 
No. 2003AP3478-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
however, because I do not join the majority's analysis with 
respect to venue. 
¶89 The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine 
whether there is probable cause that a felony has been committed 
by the defendant.  State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 394, 359 
N.W.2d 151 (1984).  It is a summary proceeding to determine 
essential or basic facts as to probability.  Id. at 396-97.  
Probable cause is satisfied at a preliminary hearing when there 
exists a believable or plausible account of the defendant's 
commission of a felony.  Id. at 398.  Thus, the court must bind 
the defendant over for trial when a set of facts supports a 
reasonable inference that the defendant probably committed a 
felony.  Id. 
¶90 These principles make it clear that before bindover 
can be ordered, (1) there must be a reasonable inference, with 
the operative word being "reasonable," that (2) the defendant 
probably committed a felony, with the operative word being 
                                                                                                                                                             
669-70, 299 N.W.2d 872 (1981).  The trial court must also 
establish whether Ellifson's testimony would be admissible to 
establish identity.  See State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 
305, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999)("In Wisconsin, the threshold measure 
for similarity in the admission of other acts evidence with 
regard to identity is nearness of time, place, and circumstance 
of the other act to the crime alleged."); and State v. Kuntz, 
160 Wis. 2d 722, 746, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991)("To be admissible 
for the purpose of identity, the other-acts evidence should have 
such a concurrence of common features and so many points of 
similarity with the crime charged that it 'can reasonably be 
said that the other acts and the present act constitute the 
imprint of the defendant.'" (citation omitted)).  See also State 
v. Rushing, 197 Wis. 2d 631, 647-48, 541 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 
1995).    
 
 
No. 2003AP3478-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
"probably."  While the court does not have to choose between 
competing inferences, any believable or plausible account of the 
defendant's "commission of a felony" must necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that the defendant probably committed a felony.  
Thus, we must look at the evidence to determine whether it can 
be reasonably inferred that Anderson probably killed his father 
in Jefferson County.  Probabilities, not possibilities, are what 
count. 
¶91 Here is what we know from the preliminary hearing.  
Allen Krnak, along with his wife Donna and his son Thomas, 
disappeared on July 2, 1998.  Krnak's skeletal remains were 
found in North Carolina.16  His wife and son are still missing.  
The last place Krnak was seen was at the Krnak residence in 
Jefferson County, and the last person who allegedly saw him 
alive was Anderson.  Shortly before Krnak disappeared, while at 
work in Waukesha County, Krnak told a coworker that "I have to 
fly out of here" and that "[w]e may have to go to a funeral."  
There is no indication of where he would have to fly to, what he 
meant by that, or where any funeral might be.  Krnak was 
scheduled to leave on vacation to the family cabin in Waushara 
County, though no one actually saw him there.  The Krnaks' 
                                                 
16 See Wis. Stat. § 971.19(5) (2003-04), which provides: 
 
(5) If the act causing death is in one county and 
the death ensues in another, the defendant may be 
tried in either county.  If neither location can be 
determined, the defendant may be tried in the county 
where the body is found.   
 
No. 2003AP3478-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
family vehicle was found in a large wooded area around Mirror 
Lake, which is in Sauk County.   
¶92 The evidence establishes multiple inferences as to 
where the homicide occurred.  It is entirely possible that the 
offense was committed in Jefferson County, where Anderson last 
saw his father alive.  It is entirely possible that the offense 
occurred in Waukesha County, where Krnak's coworker last saw him 
alive.  It is entirely possible that Krnak was killed where the 
family vehicle was found, in Sauk County.  Krnak could have been 
killed en route to Waushara County, or he may have arrived and 
been killed there.  If Krnak did indeed plan to fly out of the 
area (that is, actually get on a plane) to go to a funeral, he 
may have been killed at his arrival location.  Krnak's remains 
were found in North Carolina, another location where he may have 
been killed.  Inferences can be drawn to support the conclusions 
that the homicide may possibly have occurred in any of these 
locations.  But what makes it "probable" that the homicide 
occurred in Jefferson County?  There is no set of facts that 
supports a reasonable inference that the defendant probably 
committed the homicide in Jefferson County.  See Dunn, 121 Wis. 
2d at 398.  There is simply no way to tell where Krnak was 
killed based on the evidence presented.   
¶93 The legislature has apparently not contemplated a 
situation 
where 
one 
cannot 
discern 
where 
an 
offense 
is 
committed.  This is certainly an area that the legislature 
should consider in light of the problems created by the facts of 
No. 2003AP3478-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
this case.17  The laws that currently exist must, however, be 
interpreted, considering the legal and practical consequences, 
to avoid unreasonable and absurd results.  See, e.g., Strenke v. 
Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶48, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  It would 
be unreasonable to interpret the venue statute in a manner that 
would allow a criminal to escape criminal liability because he 
or she got rid of the evidence while keeping quiet.    
¶94 When the evidence adduced at a preliminary hearing 
fails to establish where a homicide occurred, it is reasonable 
to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the 
death occurred at the location where the victim was last seen 
alive.  Such a presumption would cover the multiple situations 
that might occur when a person is kidnapped but never found.  It 
certainly covers the dearth of information as to where the 
homicide occurred in this case.   
¶95 Venue is not an element of a criminal offense but 
refers to the place of trial.  State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 
486, 501, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969).  It is a matter of procedure 
and designates where the matter should be tried.  Id. at 502.  
Nevertheless, on remand, venue must be proved at trial beyond a 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure, 
§ 16.1(e), at 487 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing broader legislation 
that provides that "where an attorney general concludes that an 
offense was committed somewhere within the state, but 'it is 
impossible to determine in which county it occurred, the offense 
may be alleged in the indictment to have been committed and may 
be prosecuted . . . in such county as the attorney general 
designates.'" (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 762.3 and Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 227, § 57A; Idaho Code § 19-304(3); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§ 452.620; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 910.03)). 
 
No. 2003AP3478-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
reasonable doubt.  Id.  While venue may be established by proof 
of facts and circumstances from which it may be reasonably 
inferred,18 such proof must be forthcoming at trial.   
¶96 I would conclude that venue is proper in Jefferson 
County because that is where Krnak was last seen alive. 
¶97 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins ¶94 of this concurring opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See Smazal v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 360, 363-64, 142 N.W.2d 
808 (1966); and State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, 261 Wis. 633, 
646, 660 N.W.2d 12. 
No. 2003AP3478-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
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