Title: Walker v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 19, 2007
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 20, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEMERRIS WALKER, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 19, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 0203014277 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 13, 2007 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: September 20, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 20th day of September 2007, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Demerris Walker, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that a Superior Court jury convicted Walker 
of three counts of second degree rape and one count each of first degree 
burglary, attempted first degree robbery, theft of a senior, and second degree 
 
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conspiracy.  This Court affirmed Walker’s convictions on appeal.1 Walker 
filed his first petition for postconviction relief in September 2006, which the 
Superior Court denied.  This appeal followed. 
(3) 
Walker raises four issues in his opening brief on appeal.2  He 
asserts that: (i) the Superior Court erred in failing to disqualify a biased 
juror; (ii) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have a hair tested; 
(iii) the Superior Court erred in allowing the admission of certain “illegal” 
evidence; and (iv) the Superior Court erred in allowing the prosecution to 
use perjured testimony.   
(4) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.3  We will consider the 
procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before considering the 
merits of any underlying claim.4  In this case, the Superior Court concluded 
that Walker’s claims regarding the admission of “illegal” evidence and the 
admission of perjured testimony were procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3)5 
                                                 
1 Walker v. State, 2003 WL 22998847 (Del. Dec. 18, 2003). 
2 Walker raised additional claims in his Superior Court petition.  Having failed to 
raise those additional issues in his opening brief on appeal, the Court deems those claims 
to be waived.  Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997). 
3 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551 (Del. 1998). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) provides that “[a]ny ground for relief that was 
not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction…is thereafter 
barred” unless the petitioner can establish cause and prejudice. 
 
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and that Walker had failed to establish cause or prejudice in order to 
overcome the procedural hurdle.  We find no abuse of the Superior Court’s 
discretion is finding these claims procedurally barred.   
(5) 
Furthermore, Walker’s claim of juror bias was raised and 
rejected by the Superior Court at trial.  He did not argue this issue in his 
direct appeal.  To the extent the Superior Court already rejected his 
argument, we do not find that the interests of justice warrant reconsideration 
of this previously adjudicated claim.6  Moreover, having failed to raise it as 
an issue on appeal, Walker has waived his right to have this Court consider it 
now for the first time, absent a showing of cause for his failure to raise it on 
direct appeal and actual prejudice.7  Walker has failed to establish either.  
Accordingly, we find his claim of juror bias also to be procedurally barred. 
(6) 
With respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Walker was required to establish: (a) that his defense counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability 
                                                 
6 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4), which holds that any postconviction claim that 
was previously adjudicated is thereafter barred unless reconsideration is warranted in the 
interest of justice. 
7 Oney v. State, 482 A.2d 756, 758 (Del. 1984). 
 
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that the outcome of the case would have been different.8  There is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable.9   
(7) 
In this case, the Superior Court concluded defense counsel’s 
failure to have a hair tested for DNA evidence did not fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. As the Superior Court pointed out, the 
codefendant’s testimony against Walker on the rape charges established that 
Walker had used a condom in digitally penetrating the victim.  Accordingly, 
testing on the hair recovered from the victim would not have provided any 
basis to contradict the testimony establishing the rape.  We agree with the 
Superior Court’s analysis.  Accordingly, we find that the Superior Court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
9 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988).