Title: Baxter v. DFS and CASA
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 506, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2006

The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court
1
Rule 7(d).
See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 26.1(a) (providing for continuing obligation of trial counsel
2
in appeal from termination of parental rights).
The children were ages eight and six when they were removed from Baxter and
3
placed in  care.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LINDELL R. BAXTER, II,
§
1
§
No. 506, 2005
Respondent Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below--Family Court
§
of the State of Delaware, in
v.
§
and for Sussex County in
§
File No. 03-11-03TS.
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES §
and CASA,
§
§
Petitioners Below,
§
Appellees.
§
Submitted: February 21, 2006
Decided:
May 31, 2006
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 31  day of May 2006, it appears to the Court that:
st
(1)
The appellant, Lindell R. Baxter, through his court-appointed trial
counsel, has appealed the Family Court’s decision of September 16, 2005, that
terminated his parental rights  in two minor children.   The Family Court
2
3
The Family Court attempted to hold the preliminary protective hearing on January
4
2, 2003; however, the hearing had to be rescheduled when the court determined that the
parties had not been served.
2
terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother, based on the mother’s
consent.
(2)
Baxter’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw on the basis that
she is unable to present a meritorious argument in support of the appeal.  At the
Court’s direction, counsel submitted an opening brief presenting Baxter’s
arguments in support of the appeal.
(3)
The appellees, Division of Family Services (DFS) and Court-
Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), have each responded to the opening brief
and have moved to affirm the Family Court’s decision.  We agree and affirm.
(4)
On December 18, 2002, DFS filed a petition seeking emergency
custody of the children.  DFS alleged homelessness, lack of parental
involvement, lack of employment, lack of medical care, failure to provide
appropriate education, and a history of agency involvement in both Delaware
and Maryland.  The Family Court granted the petition by ex parte order.
(5)
Baxter did not appear at the February 2003 preliminary protective
hearing.   At the conclusion of that hearing, the Family Court concluded that
4
there was probable cause to continue the custody order.
3
(6)
Baxter appeared at the March 20, 2003 adjudicatory hearing and
was appointed counsel.  Baxter stipulated to a finding of dependency based on
lack of income and housing, and he agreed to participate in a substance abuse
evaluation.  The Family Court concluded, after finding that DFS had made
reasonable efforts toward reunification, that it was in the best interests of the
children to award custody to DFS.
(7)
Baxter and DFS entered into a reunification case plan that was
formally adopted by the Family Court on April 17, 2003.  The case plan
required that Baxter (i) obtain appropriate housing and employment; (ii) attend
weekly family visits, medical appointments for the children, parenting classes,
and anger management classes; and (iii) complete a substance abuse evaluation
and follow through on any recommended substance abuse treatment.
(8)
Under the case plan, DFS was required to make appropriate
referrals to state agencies on Baxter’s behalf for housing assistance, financial
support, medical and dental care, parenting classes, anger management classes,
and substance abuse treatment.  DFS was also required to arrange for and
supervise the weekly family visits.
(9)
Baxter did not attend mandated review hearings that were held in
July and October 2003.  The Family Court determined at both hearings that
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5) (1999).
5
Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).
6
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a) (listing additional elements for
7
termination).
In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989) (quoting In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638,
8
649 (Del. 1986)).
4
DFS had utilized reasonable efforts toward reunification and that continued
placement was in the children’s best interests.
(10)
In November 2003, DFS filed a petition to terminate Baxter’s
parental rights.  DFS sought termination on the basis of Baxter’s failure to
adequately plan for the children’s physical needs or mental and emotional
health and development.   On January 15, 2004, the Family Court approved a
5
permanency plan of parental rights termination for the purpose of adoption.
(11)
The Family Court may terminate parental rights if DFS  proves by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of a statutory basis for termination,
and that termination is in the best interest of the child.   When, as here,
6
termination is based on failure to plan, DFS must also  prove by clear and
convincing evidence the existence of one or more additional statutory
elements,  and that DFS  made bona fide reasonable efforts to reunite the
7
family.8
The hearing took place on May 19-21, 2004, December 9 and 15, 2004, February
9
24, 2005, and March 10, 2005.
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(1), (3) (listing state placement of one
10
year and extended incarceration as additional elements for termination).
In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995).
11
5
(12)
The seven-day termination hearing began on May 19, 2004 and
concluded on March 10, 2005.   Baxter, who had previously been incarcerated
9
in January 2004, remained incarcerated for the duration of the hearing.
(13)
In its decision and order terminating Baxter’s parental rights, the
Family Court found that DFS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that
Baxter had failed to plan for the children’s needs despite DFS’ bona fide
reasonable efforts to reunite the family.  The Family Court further found that
Baxter was incapable of discharging his parental responsibilities due to
extended incarceration, and that the children had been in State care for more
than one year.   Finally, the Family Court found that DFS had proven by clear
10
and convincing evidence that it was in the best interests of the children that
termination take place.
(14)
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights, this Court
will uphold the Family Court’s factual findings if they are sufficiently
supported by the record and are not clearly wrong.   To the extent that the
11
In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995).
12
Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983).
13
6
Family Court’s rulings implicate questions of law, this Court exercises de novo
review.   The Court will not disturb inferences and deductions that are
12
supported by the record and that are the product of an orderly and logical
deductive process.13
(15)
In his opening brief on appeal, Baxter argues that DFS’
reunification efforts were unreasonable because the case plan did not
adequately address his substance abuse problem.  Baxter’s claim is not
supported by the record.
(16)
The record reflects that substance abuse treatment was a key
element of the case plan and was crucial to Baxter’s successful reunification.
According to the case plan, Baxter was to participate in a substance abuse
evaluation and follow through with all recommendations for treatment.  
(17)
After consulting with Baxter, DFS scheduled three separate
appointments for his initial evaluation.  Baxter, however, failed to appear for
any of the appointments.  It is clear from the record that Baxter’s failure to even
show up for the initial evaluation made it impossible for DFS to address his
substance abuse problem.
7
(18)
Baxter argues that DFS “proved its intent to break [Baxter’s] ties
[with the children] by hiding evidence that [he] had taken a urine test.”  The
record does not support Baxter’s claim.
(19)
It is true that DFS’ substance abuse liaison assigned to Baxter’s
case neglected to bring the results of a urine screen to the termination hearing
and thus was unable to testify as to the results.  That oversight does not,
however, support Baxter’s claim that DFS made an orchestrated effort to
sabotage reunification.
(20)
To the contrary, the record reflects that DFS attempted on
numerous occasions and in various ways to assist Baxter in meeting his
responsibilities under the case plan so that he could reunite with the children.
Unfortunately, Baxter failed to show up for court hearings as well as for
important appointments that he had scheduled.  He participated in only a small
fraction of the weekly visits, did not obtain appropriate housing or employment,
and did not attend parenting and anger management classes.  In short, despite
DFS’ efforts to assist him, the record reflects that Baxter took virtually no steps
to comply with the case plan.
(21)
Third, Baxter argues that termination of his parental rights is not
in the best interest of the children.  Baxter expresses concern that the children
See 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722(a) (2004) (listing relevant factors for determining
14
best interest of child). 
8
are in different foster homes and will not be adopted by the same family. Baxter
contends that it would be in the children’s best interest to stay together and to
live with him when he is released from prison.  He maintains that he was a
positive influence on the children before his drug involvement.  Baxter states
that he behaved appropriately during visits with the children, and that the
children were happy to see him.
(22)
In determining whether termination of Baxter’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests, the Family Court carefully weighed the relevant
statutory factors as required.   The Family Court found that five of the eight
14
factors favored termination.  The evidence in the record amply supports those
findings.
(23)
There is clear and convincing in the record that logically supports
the Family Court’s decision that Baxter failed to plan for the children’s physical
needs or mental and emotional health and development.  The record further
supports the Family Court’s finding that DFS made bona fide reasonable efforts
to reunify Baxter with the children and that, ultimately, the termination of
Baxter’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
9
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the appellees’ motions to
affirm are GRANTED.  The judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED.  The
motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice