Title: St. Clair County Home Builders Association et al. v. City of Pell City et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080403
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 10, 2010

Rel 09/10/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1080403
_________________________
St. Clair County Home Builders Association et al.
v.
City of Pell City et al.
Appeal from St. Clair Circuit Court
(CV-07-140)
PER CURIAM.
The St. Clair County Home Builders Association; Buck,
Inc.; and QCC, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"the home builders"), appeal the trial court's judgment
against them in a declaratory-judgment action the home
1080403
2
builders brought against the City of Pell City ("the City");
the City Council of the City of Pell City ("the city
council"); Gregg Gossett, J.T. Carter, Ed Pennington, Donnie
Todd, Jr., and Gaston Williams in their representative
capacities as members of the city council; Earl Sims, in his
capacity as the utility supervisor of the City; and Adam
Stocks, in his capacity as the mayor of the City ("the mayor")
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the defendants"),
challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 2007-1925, adopted
by the City on April 19, 2007, styled "An Ordinance
Establishing Impact Fees for Sewer Service and Capital
Recovery Fees for Water Service" ("the ordinance").  We
affirm.  
Facts and Procedural History
The City, a municipal corporation organized and existing
under the laws of Alabama, owns its water and sewer systems,
through which it provides water and sewer services to its
customers.  In 1999, the City employed Municipal Consultants,
Inc., an engineering consultant, to evaluate the City's water
and sewer systems.  According to the affidavit of Byron Woods,
a professional engineer employed by Municipal Consultants who
1080403
3
has personally worked with the City since 2000, Municipal
Consultants recommended that the City perform studies on the
City's water and sewer systems to determine the efficiencies
of the existing systems, as well as any recommended
improvements that were then needed or that would be needed in
the future.  Woods further testified: 
"In 2000, we prepared The City of Pell City
Water Study and Capital Improvements Plan ('2000
Water Study').... In order to prepare the 2000 Water
Study, we mapped the City's existing water system
and determined pipe locations and pipe sizes. We
also looked for weaknesses in the existing system,
and areas that required improvements. We also looked
at the current water demand of the City, and
projected future water demand through the year 2020.
As can be seen on page 4-6 of the 2000 Water Study,
in 2000 the City's peak day demand was 3.617 million
gallons per day, and the supply was 4.262 million
gallons per day. Basing our projections on increases
in water demands over the past several years in the
City, we projected that by the year 2020 the City's
peak day demand would be 6.965 million gallons per
day, which we calculated would require 9.287 million
gallons per day of pumping capacity. Based on our
calculations, in order to be able to accommodate the
projected demand by the year 2020, the City would
need 5.025 million gallons per day in additional
water supply. We recommended several projects that
would be necessary to meet this future demand, and
calculated the cost of these improvements in 2000 at
$9,027,200."  
Woods also testified that Municipal Consultants conducted
another study on the City's sewer system in 2003:
1080403
4
"In 2003, we prepared The City of Pell City
Sewer System Study ('2003 Sewer Study').... Like the
2000 Water Study, we began by mapping the system and
determining what capacity and facilities the City
had currently. The City also hired DWC Technologies
to perform a sewer system flow monitoring to
determine the average and peak flows through the
City's sewer system. Using the data from our mapping
and the flow monitoring, we prepared the 2003 Sewer
Study detailing the efficiencies of the existing
system, and recommended improvements to the system
that would both increase the efficiency of the
existing system and provide additional capacity for
future growth in the City.
"... The sewer system was and is in need of
substantial 
repairs 
to 
better 
serve 
existing
customers which should create additional capacity
for new customers. The 2003 Sewer Study also
contained several alternatives for improving both
the collection system and the wastewater treatment
plant. However, in determining what improvements
were required, the City and Municipal Consultants
decided to upgrade the system in a manner that would
increase capacity to allow for future growth in the
City. The City chose Collection System Alternative
2 and Treatment Alternate A, with a collective cost
in 2003 of $23.3 million. (Exh. '1,' p. V-1). This
cost included both repairs to the existing system as
well as expansion and upgrades to provide additional
capacity for future growth."
In July 2004, the former mayor of the City, Guin
Robinson, acting in his official capacity as mayor, formed an
infrastructure committee ("the committee") to "review the
present and future needs of water and sewer" for the City and
to "review the present water and sewer system and advise the
1080403
5
elected officials of the [C]ity on how the [C]ity may provide
infrastructure for current and anticipated growth."  The
committee was reauthorized by the mayor when he took office in
2004.  The committee met on nine occasions over the course of
five months, and subcommittees conducted several meetings with
various professionals.  Municipal Consultants provided the
committee with the 2000 Water Study and the 2003 Sewer Study
and also met with the committee on numerous occasions to
answer any engineering questions relating to the City's water
and sewer systems.  
In late 2004, the committee presented its final report to
the mayor detailing its conclusions on improvements needed in
the City's water and sewer systems, as well as recommendations
on how to fund those improvements.  The committee found, in
pertinent part:
"It is well documented that a major upgrade to
the sewer system is essential if the City of Pell
City is going to be able to serve the growth that is
sure to be available. The upgrade will be in the
form of improvements to certain lift stations,
increased capacity to the Dye Creek Wastewater
Treatment Plant, and/or the construction for an
additional waste water treatment plant in the Eden
vicinity, completion of a northern interceptor, the
addition of additional lift stations and a major
rehabilitation of existing trunk lines. 
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6
"The estimated cost of these improvements is
approximately 
twenty 
three 
million 
dollars
($23,000,000). Due to the limited number of water
and sewer customers and the high percentage of these
families that are of low to moderate income, it is
not feasible to expect customers to absorb these
costs through rate increases."
With respect to funding recommendations, the committee first
recommended "[a]n immediate implementation of a reasonable
impact fee, to be paid by developers of new commercial,
industrial, and residential properties."  Included in the
committee's final recommendation was information regarding
impact fees charged by other municipalities.  Also during this
time, Woods calculated the amount of impact fees that could be
justified based on the capital improvements to the water and
sewer systems needed to provide additional capacity for future
growth.  
In February 2006, the City received a notice of violation
from the Alabama Department of Environmental Management
("ADEM") for overflows in the City's sewer system.  On May 30,
2006, Woods wrote a letter to ADEM proposing a series of
projects that would both eliminate the overflows in the City's
system and expand and upgrade the system to provide for future
growth.  On September 14, 2006, the mayor and ADEM executed a
1080403
7
consent order incorporating the projects proposed in Woods's
letter as well as improvements to the water system.  The
consent order set forth the following relevant facts:
"1. [The City] operates a wastewater treatment
facility known as the Pell City Dye Creek Waste
Water Treatment Plant located on First Avenue North
in Pell City, St. Clair County, Alabama. The
wastewater treatment facility discharges pollutants
from a point source into the Coosa River, a water of
the state. 
"....
"4. The Department issued a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter 'NPDES')
Permit to [the City] on June 4, 2003, authorizing
the discharge of pollutants from the Pell City Dye
Creek [Wastewater Treatment Plant] to the Coosa
River. The Permit requires that [the City] monitor
its discharges and submit periodic  Discharge
Monitoring Reports (hereinafter 'DMRs') to the
Department describing the results of the monitoring.
The Permit also requires that [the City] maintain in
good working order all systems used by [the City] to
achieve compliance with the terms and conditions of
the Permit. 
"5. On May 27, 2005, the Department received the
Pell City Dye Creek WWTP 2003 Municipal Water
Pollution Prevention (hereinafter 'MWPP') Annual
Report. The report indicated that [the City] had
experienced significant bypasses or sanitary sewer
overflows 
(hereinafter 
'SSOs') 
of 
untreated
wastewater resulting from rain events. The 2003 MWPP
Annual Report indicated 136 SSO events occurred
prior to the headworks of the Wastewater Treatment
Plant (hereinafter 'WWTP'). No such events occurred
at the WWTP. Furthermore, [the City] estimated that
it implemented resolutions for 18 of the reported
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8
events so that future events at the same location
are not anticipated. The report also indicated that
[the City] had experienced one bypass or overflow
event of untreated wastewater prior to the headworks
of the WWTP due to equipment failure. 
"6. On May 11, 2005, the Department received
[the] Pell City Dye Creek WWTP 2004 MWPP Annual
Report. The report again indicated that [the City]
had experienced bypasses or sanitary sewer overflows
of untreated wastewater resulting from rain events.
[The City] reported that fifty-one SSOs occurred
prior to the headworks of the WWTP. No bypasses were
reported to occur at the WWTP. Furthermore, [the
City] reported none of the fifty-one SSOs had been
fully resolved such that future events at the same
location would likewise be prevented. The 2004 MWPP
Annual Report also indicated that [the City]
experienced two bypass or overflow events of
untreated wastewater prior to the headworks of the
WWTP due to equipment failure. 
"7. On February 6, 2006, the Department observed
a major SSO event at the intersection of Golf Course
Road and County Road #4, leading to a discharge of
perhaps several hundred gallons per minute of
untreated sewage to Blue Springs, ultimately leading
to Logan Martin Lake, for an extended period of
time. 
"8. ADEM has also become aware that [the City]
has historically pumped untreated sewage to Dye
Branch in an attempt to prevent other SSO-related
maintenance concerns (e.g. back up of sewage into
homes). 
"9. The [City's] WWTP is presently permitted to
discharge 2.0 mgd, but has reported some monthly
average flow rates exceeding the 2.0 mgd design
flow, providing further evidence of the limited
existing design capacity. The excessive flow rates
reported by [the City] are in part the result of
1080403
Ordinance No. 2008-1967 amended the ordinance by adding
1
Section 4, which established the sewer-impact fees and the
water-capital-recovery fees for hotels or motels, apartments,
nursing homes or assisted-living facilities, and hospitals.
9
excessive infiltration and inflow."
The City adopted the ordinance to help finance the
completion of the water- and sewer-system projects.  The
ordinance, as amended by Ordinance No. 2008-1967,  states: 
1
"SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF SEWER IMPACT FEES.
The owner of any property not categorized in Section
4 below who or which connects said property to the
City's sewer system shall pay a nonrefundable impact
fee in the amount of $2,300.00 for each unit on said
property to be serviced by the City's sewer system.
Said fee is payable at the time a building permit is
issued for said property. Said impact fee is payable
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other fee
now existing or hereafter established by the City.
The fees generated pursuant to this section shall be
used by the City only for capital improvements to
the City's sewer system.
"SECTION 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF WATER CAPITAL
RECOVERY FEES. The owner of any property not
categorized in Section 4 below who or which connects
said property to the City's water system shall pay
a 
nonrefundable 
capital 
recovery 
fee 
in 
the
following amount:
Size of Line
Fee
3/4"
$1,550.00
1"
$1,974.00
1-1/2"
$2,538.00
1080403
10
2"
$4,089.00
3"
$15,510.00
4" and above
$19,740.00
for each unit on said property to be serviced by the
City's water system. Said fee is payable at the time
a building permit is issued for said property. Said
water capital recovery fee is payable in addition
to, and not in lieu of, any other fee now existing
or hereafter established by the City. The fees
generated pursuant to this section shall be used by
the City only for capital improvements to the City's
water system. 
"SECTION 3. DEFINITION OF 'UNIT.' A unit, for
purposes of this Ordinance, is hereby defined as
follows: A structure having a roof supported by
columns or walls for the shelter, support, or
enclosure of persons; and when supported by division
walls from the ground up without ingress and egress
provided 
between 
such 
divisions 
by 
suitable
openings, each portion of such building so divided
shall be deemed a separate unit. For residential
purposes, any portion of a building used as a
separate abode for a family shall be considered a
'unit.' For commercial and industrial purposes, any
portion of a building used as separate quarters for
the operation of a separate business shall be
considered a 'unit.'   
"SECTION 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF SEWER IMPACT AND
WATER CAPITAL RECOVERY FEES FOR HOTELS/MOTELS,
APARTMENTS, 
NURSING 
HOMES/ASSISTED 
LIVING
FACILITIES, and HOSPITALS. 
"A. HOTELS/MOTELS.
"1. SEWER IMPACT FEE. The owner of any property
who or which constructs a hotel or motel on said
property and connects said property to the City's
1080403
11
sewer system shall pay a nonrefundable sewer impact
fee in an amount determined by multiplying the
number of rooms in the hotel/motel by .46 by the
amount set forth in Section 1 above. Said fee is
payable at the time a building permit is issued for
said property. Said impact fee is payable in
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other fee now
existing or hereafter established by the City. The
fees generated pursuant to this section shall be
used by the City only for capital improvements to
the City's sewer system.
"2. WATER CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE. The owner of any
property who or which constructs a hotel or motel on
said property and connects said property to the
City's water system shall pay a nonrefundable
capital recovery fee in an amount determined by
multiplying the number of rooms in the hotel/motel
by .46 by the amount set forth for a 3/4 inch line
in Section 2 above. Said fee is payable at the time
a building permit is issued for said property. Said
water capital recovery fee is payable in addition
to, and not in lieu of, any other fee now existing
or hereafter established by the City. The fees
generated pursuant to this section shall be used by
the City only for capital improvements to the City's
water system.
"B. APARTMENTS. 
"1. SEWER IMPACT FEE. The owner of any property
who or which constructs apartments on said property
and connects said property to the City's sewer
system shall pay a nonrefundable sewer impact fee in
an amount determined by multiplying the number of
apartments by .57 by the amount set forth in Section
1 above. Said fee is payable at the time a building
permit is issued for said property. Said impact fee
is payable in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
other fee now existing or hereafter established by
the City. The fees generated pursuant to this
section shall be used by the City only for capital
1080403
12
improvements to the City's sewer system.
"2. WATER CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE. The owner of any
property who or which constructs apartments on said
property and connects said property to the City's
water system shall pay a nonrefundable capital
recovery fee in an amount determined by multiplying
the number of apartments by .57 by the amount set
forth for a 3/4 inch line in Section 2 above. Said
fee is payable at the time a building permit is
issued for said property. Said water capital
recovery fee is payable in addition to, and not in
lieu of, any other fee now existing or hereafter
established by the City. The fees generated pursuant
to this section shall be used by the City only for
capital improvements to the City's water system. 
"C. NURSING HOMES/ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES. 
"1. SEWER IMPACT FEE. The owner of any property
who or which constructs a nursing home or assisted
living facility on said property and connects said
property to the City's sewer system shall pay a
nonrefundable 
sewer 
impact 
fee 
in 
an 
amount
determined by multiplying the number of beds in the
nursing home/assisted living facility by .29 by the
amount set forth in Section 1 above. Said fee is
payable at the time a building permit is issued for
said property. Said impact fee is payable in
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other fee now
existing or hereafter established by the City. The
fees generated pursuant to this section shall be
used by the City only for capital improvements to
the City's sewer system. 
"2. WATER CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE. The owner of any
property who or which constructs a nursing home or
assisted living facility on said property and
connects said property to the City's water system
shall pay a nonrefundable capital recovery fee in an
amount determined by multiplying the number of beds
in the nursing home/assisted living facility by .29
1080403
13
by the amount set forth for a 3/4 inch line in
Section 2 above. Said fee is payable at the time a
building permit is issued for said property. Said
water capital recovery fee is payable in addition
to, and not in lieu of, any other fee now existing
or hereafter established by the City. The fees
generated pursuant to this section shall be used by
the City only for capital improvements to the City's
water system. 
"D. HOSPITALS. 
"1. SEWER IMPACT FEE. The owner of any property
who or which constructs a hospital on said property
and connects said  property to the City's sewer
system shall pay a nonrefundable sewer impact fee in
an amount determined by multiplying the number of
beds in the hospital by 1.02 by the amount set forth
in Section 1 above. Said fee is payable at the time
a building permit is issued for said property. Said
impact fee is payable in addition to, and not in
lieu of, any other fee now existing or hereafter
established by the City.  The fees generated
pursuant to this section shall be used by the City
only for capital improvements to the City's sewer
system.
"2. WATER CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE. The owner of any
property who or which constructs a hospital on said
property and connects said property to the City's
water system shall pay a nonrefundable capital
recovery fee in an amount determined by multiplying
the number of beds in the hospital by 1.02 by the
amount set forth for a 3/4 inch line in Section 2
above. Said fee is payable at the time a building
permit is issued for said property. Said water
capital recovery fee is payable in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any other fee now existing or
hereafter 
established 
by 
the 
City. 
The 
fees
generated pursuant to this section shall be used by
the City only for capital improvements to the City's
water system."  
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14
The moneys collected pursuant to the ordinance are deposited
into separate accounts specifically earmarked for water- and
sewer-system improvement projects.  There is no dispute that
the anticipated revenues from the fees imposed by the
ordinance will not exceed the projected costs of the
improvements needed to add the capacity necessary for growth
and that the revenues will actually be much less than the
projected costs of adding that capacity.  It is unquestioned
that the Alabama Legislature has passed no specific enabling
legislation authorizing the City to enact the ordinance, nor
has the legislature passed legislation authorizing the City to
charge 
and 
collect 
sewer-impact 
fees 
or 
water-capital-recovery
fees.  
On May 14, 2007, following the City's adoption of the
ordinance, the home builders, who are in the business of
residential construction and development, filed a "Class
Action Complaint" against the defendants in the St. Clair
Circuit Court, alleging: an inverse-condemnation claim under
the Alabama Constitution; a violation of § 223, Ala. Const.
1901; an inverse-condemnation claim under the United States
Constitution, alleging due-process violations; a violation of
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the home builders' equal-protection rights under the United
States Constitution; the creation by the ordinance of an
unconstitutional 
condition; and the imposition by 
the
ordinance of an "unlawful tax."  With their complaint, the
home builders simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction to stop the imposition of the fees authorized by
the ordinance.  On May 15, 2007, the home builders filed an
amended complaint adding Attorney General Troy King as a
defendant pursuant to § 6-6-227, Ala. Code 1975.  The attorney
general filed an "acceptance and waiver" on June 1, 2007, and
is not a defendant.  
On June 28, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, asking the trial court to dismiss all the named
defendants except the City.  The defendants also moved the
trial court to dismiss the home builders' inverse-condemnation
claim brought under the Alabama Constitution.  On July 16,
2007, the home builders filed a motion seeking to dismiss
their class claims.  On October 5, 2007, the trial court
entered an order granting the home builders' motion to dismiss
their class claims.  The order also dismissed, pursuant to the
1080403
Accordingly, 
from 
this 
point 
forward, 
the 
term
2
"defendants" will no longer include the city council.  
16
defendants' motion, the city council as a defendant  and the
2
home builders' inverse-condemnation claim brought under the
Alabama Constitution.  On October 15, 2007, the defendants
answered the home builders' complaint and first amended
complaint.  
On December 17, 2007, the home builders filed a "motion
for partial summary judgment," arguing that the ordinance was
invalid on its face.  On February 8, 2008, the trial court
entered an order denying the home builders' motion for a
partial summary judgment.  
On September 8, 2008, the defendants filed a motion for
a summary judgment.  The home builders filed a response in
opposition to the defendants' summary-judgment motion on
September 26, 2008.  
The case was set for a nonjury trial, which began on
September 29, 2008.  On November 10, 2008, the trial court
entered a judgment for the defendants, upholding the validity
of the ordinance.  The home builders appealed.  
Standard of Review
Because the trial court heard ore tenus evidence during
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17
the bench trial, the ore tenus standard of review applies:
"'When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a
judgment based on findings of fact based on that testimony
will be presumed correct and will not be disturbed on appeal
except for a plain and palpable error.'"  Smith v. Muchia, 854
So. 2d 85, 92 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996)).
"'The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the principle
that when the trial court hears oral testimony it
has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and
credibility of witnesses.' Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So.
2d 408, 410 (Ala. 1986). The rule applies to
'disputed issues of fact,' whether the dispute is
based entirely upon oral testimony or upon a
combination 
of 
oral testimony and documentary
evidence. Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala.
1995). The ore tenus standard of review, succinctly
stated, is as follows:
"'[W]here the evidence has been [presented]
ore tenus, a presumption of correctness
attends the trial court's conclusion on
issues of fact, and this Court will not
disturb the trial court's conclusion unless
it is clearly erroneous and against the
great weight of the evidence, but will
affirm 
the 
judgment 
if, 
under 
any
reasonable aspect, it is supported by
credible evidence.'"
Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 791,
795 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Raidt v. Crane, 342 So. 2d 358, 360
(Ala. 1977)).  However, "that presumption [of correctness] has
1080403
18
no application when the trial court is shown to have
improperly applied the law to the facts."  Ex parte Board of
Zoning Adjustment of Mobile, 636 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala. 1994).
Concerning questions of law presented on appeal, this Court
reviews a trial court's ruling de novo.  Ex parte Forrester,
914 So. 2d 855, 858 (Ala. 2005).  
Discussion
The home builders first argue that the ordinance is
facially invalid.  The home builders argue that the City
lacked the power to impose the impact fees and capital-
recovery fees because, they say, there is no constitutional
provision or legislation providing the City with such taxing
authority.  However, as the defendants note in their appellate
brief, in order to determine whether the City had the
authority to impose the fees, this Court must first determine
whether the impact fees and the capital-recovery fees are
considered taxes or service fees.  
Concerning the foundational issue whether the fees
imposed by the ordinance are taxes or service fees, the trial
court determined that because the ordinance requires that the
fees collected under the ordinance be used solely for capital
1080403
19
improvements to the City's water and sewer systems, the fees
"are incident to the provision of a particular service, in
this case water and sewer, [and] consequently do not
constitute a general revenue tax."  We agree. 
Under Alabama law, fees charged by a municipality to
defray the costs of providing its residents a specific service
are generally considered service fees, as opposed to "taxes,"
which are imposed to generate general revenue for a
municipality.  In Martin v. City of Trussville, 376 So. 2d
1089 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), a municipality adopted an
ordinance "providing for the collection and disposal of
garbage and the assessment of fees for providing such
service."  376 So. 2d at 1091.  A landowner challenged the
ordinance arguing, among other things, that "the ordinance is
a taxation ordinance exceeding the powers of taxation granted
to a municipal corporation." 376 So. 2d at 1092.  In holding
that the fees imposed by the ordinance constituted a service
fee, which a municipality has the power to impose independent
of its powers of taxation, which must be expressly granted,
the Court of Civil Appeals held, in pertinent part:
"As to the issue of whether the municipal
corporation exceeded its taxation authority, we note
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20
71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 11 (1973)
recognizes that all revenue received by a city is
not 'accurately' characterized as a tax. ... Oral
testimony reveals the ordinance was passed to defray
the costs of garbage collection. The charge involved
is actually a fee for a service provided by the city
which had previously been provided at no cost to its
citizens. Consequently, we will consider the garbage
charge in this case a 'service charge' rather than
a tax."
376 So. 2d at 1092.  
Ten years after Martin was decided, this Court further
clarified the distinction between a fee and an unlawful tax in
Town of Eclectic v. Mays, 547 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1989).  In Mays,
as in Martin, the issue was whether a municipal ordinance
instituting a mandatory garbage-collection fee constituted an
illegal tax.  In analyzing the issue, the trial court found
the following facts significant:
"'At all times relevant to this proceeding, the
monies collected from the garbage service have been
paid into the general fund of the Town of Eclectic.
At no time have these garbage service monies been
separated or segregated into any separate account.
"'....
"'... No money raised by the garbage service has
been set aside for replacing capital equipment used
in providing the garbage service. Any serious
discussion 
concerning 
replacement 
of 
capital
equipment began after the filing of this lawsuit.'"
547 So. 2d at 100.  The trial court then held that "'[t]he
1080403
21
Town of Eclectic's garbage service fees have been and are
being used to provide general revenue for the town.
Consequently, the garbage service fees are in reality a form
of tax.'" 547 So. 2d at 101.  This Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment and held that the fees imposed by the
ordinance constituted an unlawful tax, basing its decision on
evidence indicating that "the garbage service fees were used
to provide general revenue for the town and that revenues from
the garbage service fees were spent in municipal departments
other than the garbage department."  547 So. 2d at 103.  
Martin and Mays stand for the proposition that a fee
imposed by a municipality is considered a service fee when the
municipality charges a fee that is related to defraying the
costs of a specific service and the moneys collected from the
imposition of that fee are earmarked for that specific service
and are not used as general revenue for the municipality.
This 
principle 
is 
further 
illustrated 
in 
Lightwave
Technologies, LLC v. Escambia County, 804 So. 2d 176 (Ala.
2001), upon which the home builders rely.  In Lightwave,
Escambia County charged a telecommunications company a $1.00
per-linear-foot charge for each foot of a right-of-way it used
1080403
22
in installing some 17 miles of fiber-optic cable along the
county's highway right-of-way.  The charge purportedly related
to regulation of Escambia County's rights-of-way.  However,
this Court held that the charge "was not a 'fee,' but was in
reality an impermissible tax."  804 So. 2d at 180.  This Court
held that because "the charge was designed to generate revenue
for the County" and the moneys collected pursuant to the
charge were spent on other governmental purposes and "not for
maintenance of the County's rights-of-way," the charge was an
impermissible tax rather than a fee.  804 So. 2d at 180. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the ordinance limits
the use of the impact fees and the capital-recovery fees
collected to capital improvements to its water and sewer
systems; the fees are not considered general revenue to be
used for any purpose.  The evidence reveals that the City
plans on using the fees imposed by the ordinance to defray the
costs of providing water and sewer services to its residents.
Further, it is undisputed that the fees are deposited in
separate 
accounts 
specifically 
earmarked 
for 
capital
improvements to the water and sewer systems.  Therefore, the
impact fees and the capital-recovery fees are properly
1080403
In a related argument, the home builders argue that
3
although the ordinance limits the use of the fees to capital
improvements to the water and sewer systems, nothing prevents
the City from redefining the term "capital improvements" and
from thereby using the fees as general revenue for the City.
This argument, however, is pure speculation.  The home
builders point to no evidence indicating that an effort to
redefine "capital improvements" has been attempted or will be
attempted. 
23
characterized as service fees rather than taxes.   
3
Simply characterizing the fees as service fees incident
to the provision of a particular service does not, however,
end our analysis.  This Court must next determine whether the
City had the authority to impose the service fees.  This Court
has held that "[a] municipality may exercise those powers that
are explicitly granted to it by the legislature, as well as
those powers that are necessarily implied from an express
grant of power."  City of Birmingham v. Graffeo, 551 So. 2d
357, 360 (Ala. 1989) (citing Spear v. Ward, 199 Ala. 105, 74
So. 27 (1917)).  Further, "[a]lthough municipalities exercise
'such power ... as is conferred upon [them] by law,' a
municipality need not predicate its every action upon some
specific express grant of power.  Alabama's cities possess
certain implied powers that derive from the nature of the
powers expressly granted to them by the legislature."  Wilkins
1080403
24
v. Dan Haggerty & Assocs., Inc., 672 So. 2d 507, 509 (Ala.
1995).  
Several statutes expressly grant Alabama municipalities
broad powers, including the power to construct, operate, and
maintain water and sewer systems for the health and welfare of
their residents:
"Municipal corporations may from time to time
adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent
with the laws of the state to carry into effect or
discharge the powers and duties conferred by the
applicable provisions of this title and any other
applicable provisions of law and to provide for the
safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity,
and 
improve 
the 
morals, 
order, 
comfort, 
and
convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality,
and may enforce obedience to such ordinances."
§ 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975.
"All cities and towns in this state shall have
the power to maintain the health and cleanliness of
the city or town within its limits and within the
police jurisdiction thereof."
§ 11-47-130, Ala. Code 1975.
"Cities and towns shall have the right to
establish, 
purchase, 
maintain, 
and 
operate
waterworks or contract for a supply of wholesome
water for their inhabitants ...."
§ 11-50-1, Ala. Code 1975.
"All cities and towns may make all needful
provisions for the drainage of such city or town,
may construct and maintain efficient sanitary and
1080403
25
stormwater sewers or sewer systems, either within or
without the corporate limits of the city or town,
may construct and maintain ditches, surface drains,
aqueducts, and canals and may build and construct
underground 
sewers 
through 
private 
or 
public
property, either within or without the corporate
limits of such city or town, but just compensation
must first be made for the private property taken,
injured, or destroyed."
§ 11-50-50, Ala. Code 1975. 
"Any city or town may extend or alter its sewer
system and extend the mains whenever in the opinion
of the city or town it may be necessary or expedient
to do so ...."
§ 11-50-52, Ala. Code 1975.
"All cities and towns of this state shall have
the power to establish or build drains and may
require private or public premises to be connected
with the sewer system for proper drainage or
sanitation and shall have the power to regulate the
manner of connection therewith. ..."
§ 11-50-53, Ala. Code 1975.
"All cities and towns of this state shall have
the power to prescribe the location and manner in
which drainage from private premises may be disposed
of and to prescribe the manner in which plumbing
shall be constructed and to forbid the use of the
same while out of order or defective and may
discontinue or forbid the use of sinks, pits,
cesspools, dry wells, and surface closets and may
regulate and compel the connection of private or
public premises with the sewer system of the town or
city ...."
§ 11-50-54, Ala. Code 1975.
1080403
See Town of Leeds v. Cason, 217 Ala. 444, 445, 116 So.
4
519, 519 (1928) (stating that the predecessor statute to § 11-
50-55 "is an exercise of the police power in the conservation
of the public health rather than the taxing power, as in case
of local assessments for betterments to the property").  
26
"All cities and towns of this state shall have
the power to regulate privies, water closets, and
septic tanks and the construction thereof and to
compel the installation of same and to regulate the
connection of such water closets with such septic
tanks or with the sewerage system of the city or
town ...."
§ 11-50-55, Ala. Code 1975.  
4
"Each municipality owning a sewer system shall
have the power to establish and collect and from
time to time alter charges for service furnished by
or from said sewer system. ..."
§ 11-50-121, Ala. Code 1975.  
It is clear from the above statutory provisions that
Alabama municipalities have been granted the authority to
establish and maintain water and sewer systems for their
residents.  These statutes also make clear that the
municipalities may charge their residents for such services.
In light of the express statutory language, the City properly
exercised its authority in imposing service fees for the home
builders' connections to the City's water and sewer systems.
Further, this Court has held that a municipality's police
power provides it with the authority to control sanitation in
1080403
27
its municipal limits:
"[B]ecause a municipality has the authority under
its police powers to control sanitary matters within
its limits by operating a sewer system, it has the
corresponding 
authority 
to 
generate 
sufficient
revenues from its residents, the persons who benefit
from it most, to carry out its undertaking to
operate a sewer system."
 
Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of the City of Mobile v.
Yarbrough, 662 So. 2d 251, 254 (Ala. 1995).  In addition to
the express statutory language previously quoted, Yarbrough
makes clear that an Alabama municipality "has the authority
under its police powers to control sanitary matters within its
limits by operating a sewer system," 662 So. 2d at 254, which
includes collecting sufficient revenues from its residents to
carry out the task.  
The City's imposition of service fees through its
adoption of the ordinance is a valid exercise of the City's
powers, whether derived from the express statutory language
granting it the authority to construct, operate, and maintain
water and sewer systems or under the City's police power
allowing it to control sanitary matters within its municipal
limits by operating a sewer system.  Undoubtedly implied
within the City's power to construct, operate, and maintain
1080403
28
its water and sewer systems is the power to charge the users
of those systems fees to defray the cost of providing such
services.  Therefore, the City's assessment of the service
fees through its adoption of the ordinance was proper.  The
trial court's holding determining that the ordinance is not
facially invalid is without error.  
In further support of their argument that the City needed
specific enabling legislation in order to adopt the ordinance,
the home builders cite § 45-2-243.80 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
("the Baldwin County legislation"), which authorizes Baldwin
County to impose "impact fees."  The home builders argue that
because enabling legislation was necessary before Baldwin
County could impose such fees, the fees must be imposed under
a municipality's taxing authority and not its statutory
authority or its police powers.  Further, the home builders
argue, the maxim of statutory construction expressio unis est
exclusio alterius applies.  
The impact fees authorized by the Baldwin County
legislation are distinguishable from the service fees in the
present case.  The Baldwin County legislation authorizes the
imposition of impact fees on new development, which may be
1080403
29
used 
to 
fund 
"governmental infrastructure" within 
the
jurisdiction of the county or a municipality within the
county.  "Governmental infrastructure" is defined in the
Baldwin County legislation as 
"[a]ny facilities, systems, or services that are
owned and operated by or on behalf of a political
subdivision for any of the following purposes:
"a. Storm water, drainage, and flood control.
"b. Roads and bridges.
"c. 
Capital 
expenditures 
related 
to 
law
enforcement and public safety, fire protection,
emergency 
medical 
services, 
public 
park 
and
recreational facilities, and public schools.
"d. Maintenance and upkeep of facilities or
resurfacing of roadways where needed because of the
impact of new development."
 
§ 45-2-243.81, Ala. Code 1975. 
Both sides also cite numerous cases from foreign
jurisdictions.  However, given that Alabama statutory law and
this Court's caselaw is directly applicable, there appears to
be no reason to examine the caselaw from other jurisdictions.
Next, the home builders argue that, even if the ordinance
withstands a facial challenge, "the method of the computation
of the fees" imposed through the ordinance is "arbitrary and
unreasonable."  Preliminarily, the home builders argue that
1080403
30
the trial court erred by placing the burden of proving that
the fees were arbitrary and unreasonable on the home builders.
In so arguing, the home builders rely on Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  Both Dolan and Nollan
involved the forced dedication of land from an individual to
a municipal corporation.  In those cases, the forced
dedication was a result of an individualized adjudicative
determination regarding specific parcels of property and not
a generally applicable legislative action, such as the
ordinance in the present case.  The Dolan Court observed that
the United States Supreme Court's precedent concerning
generally applicable land-use regulation was different from
the challenged individualized adjudicative decision in two
significant respects:
"First, [the Supreme Court precedent] involved
essentially legislative determinations classifying
entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made
an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's
application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not
simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make
of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed
portions of the property to the city."
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.  The Dolan Court concluded that when
1080403
The defendants also note that the Dolan/Nollan burden
5
shifting does not apply here because its application has been
limited to cases involving the forced dedication of land, not
cases involving the payment of fees. 
31
a municipal corporation forces the dedication of land through
an individualized adjudicative determination for a specific
piece of property, the municipal corporation bears the burden
of showing the reasonableness of the required dedication.  The
Dolan Court made clear, however, that this unique burden
shifting did not apply to a challenge to a legislative action,
such as the ordinance in the present case:
"Justice STEVENS' dissent takes us to task for
placing the burden on the city to justify the
required dedication. He is correct in arguing that
in evaluating most generally applicable zoning
regulations, the burden properly rests on the party
challenging 
the 
regulation 
to 
prove 
that 
it
constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property
rights. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Here, by contrast,
the city made an adjudicative decision to condition
petitioner's application for a building permit on an
individual parcel. In this situation, the burden
properly rests on the city." 
512 U.S. at 391 n.8.  
Accordingly, Dolan does not apply to generally applicable
legislative enactments, such as the ordinance.   As the Dolan
5
Court noted, in reviewing such ordinances, the burden rests on
the party challenging the ordinance to prove that it is
1080403
32
arbitrary and unreasonable.  Alabama law supports this
conclusion.  
It is well settled in Alabama that when challenging a
municipal ordinance, the burden of proof rests on the
challenger:
"It is, without question, a settled rule of law
in Alabama that: 
"'municipal ordinances are presumed to be
valid and reasonable, to be within the
scope of the powers granted municipalities
to adopt such ordinances, and are not to be
struck 
down 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable.' Cudd v. City
of Homewood, 284 Ala. 268, 270, 224 So. 2d
625 (1969)."
Hall v. City of Tuscaloosa, 421 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Ala. 1982).
It is therefore axiomatic that "an ordinance enacted by a
local governing body 'is presumed reasonable and valid, and
that the burden is on the one challenging the ordinance to
clearly show its invalidity.'" Brown v. Board of Educ. of
Montgomery, 862 So. 2d 73, 75 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Jefferson
County v. Richards, 805 So. 2d 690, 706 (Ala. 2001)).  The
trial court did not err by placing the burden of proof on the
home builders to show that the ordinance was invalid, and the
home builders do not dispute the application of the above
1080403
33
Alabama law.  Therefore, the trial court's holding that the
ordinance is presumed to be valid absent a showing by the home
builders that it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable is
without error.
The fact that the Dolan/Nollan standard does not apply to
the case at hand nullifies two of the home builders' other
arguments.  First, the home builders argue that, under
Dolan/Nollan, the ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional
condition that results in a taking of private property without
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  The home
builders argue that for a municipal corporation to impose such
a condition it must satisfy the "rough proportionality"
standard set forth in Dolan.  However, in City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999),
the United States Supreme Court held that "we have not
extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the
special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning
approval of development on the dedication of property to
public use."  Therefore, for this reason as well, the
Dolan/Nollan standard does not apply to this case.  
1080403
34
Second, based on the home builders' argument that the
Dolan/Nollan standard applies, the home builders conclude that
"the trial court committed reversible error in dismissing
their inverse condemnation claim."  (Home builders' brief, at
55.)  This is a peculiar contention given that it was the home
builders' 
inverse-condemnation 
claim 
brought 
under 
the 
Alabama
Constitution that was dismissed, and not its inverse-
condemnation 
claim 
brought 
under 
the 
United 
States
Constitution.  The home builders appear to base their
allegation that the trial court's dismissal of the inverse-
condemnation claim brought under the Alabama Constitution was
error on federal law.  This analysis is flawed.  In dismissing
the home builders' state-law inverse-condemnation claim, the
trial court held that the imposition of the impact fees and
the capital-recovery fees "did not constitute a taking or
condemnation as contemplated under the law."  The home
builders 
present 
no 
legal 
authority 
concerning 
what
constitutes a "taking" under Alabama law, and it is not this
Court's function to create legal arguments for the appellant.
Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; see also Asam v. Devereaux,
686 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)("[A]ppellate
1080403
35
courts do not, 'based on undelineated propositions, create
legal arguments for the appellant.'  McLemore v. Fleming, 604
So. 2d 353, 353 (Ala. 1992).  This court will address only
those issues properly presented and for which supporting
authority has been cited.").  
Next, the home builders argue that, even if the service
fees were properly imposed, they were improperly calculated
and, thus, arbitrary and unreasonable; the home builders
contend that there is no relationship between the fees charged
and the benefits realized by the home builders.  The home
builders fail to cite any Alabama law to support their
argument, instead urging this Court to adopt a Florida
standard.  It is not necessary to do so, however, because
Alabama law has already set forth the standard for determining
if an ordinance imposing service fees is arbitrary or
unreasonable.  
In Densmore v. Jefferson County, 813 So. 2d 844, 853
(Ala. 2001), the appellants argued before this Court that a
county 
ordinance 
imposing 
storm-water 
fees 
was 
an
unconstitutional tax because "there [was] no relationship
between the amount of the storm-water fee imposed on a parcel
1080403
36
of property and the amount of benefit the property owner
receives."  This Court initially held that the storm-water fee
was not a tax, but a service fee.  This Court went on to agree
with the county's argument in defense of the ordinance "that
Alabama law does not require that fees precisely comport with
the benefits provided to property owners."  813 So. 2d at 853.
In so holding, this Court relied on Yarbrough, supra, as
follows: 
"This 
Court, in 
Board of Water & Sewer
Commissioners of the City of Mobile v. Yarbrough,
662 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1995), upheld the rationale
that, for a fee to be sustained as valid, the
benefit conferred on property owners need not relate
directly to the exact amount paid. The Court said
that a 'substantial indirect benefit' to a property
owner would suffice to uphold the validity of a fee.
662 So. 2d at 255. In Yarbrough, the Board was
created to operate Mobile's water and sewer systems
and to address such problems as the fact that 'raw
sewage was being emptied into Mobile Bay and other
public waterways.' Id. at 252. The plaintiff, whose
property was not connected to the sewer system, sued
the Board when it began charging residents who were
not connected to its sewer system a flat monthly fee
purportedly relating to sewer service. Formerly, the
Board had charged a combined fee for water and sewer
services to all residents, whether they used the
sewer service or not. This Court upheld the Board's
prior fee structure and held that a municipal
utility is authorized to set fees so as to create a
surplus. The Court also held that any surplus
resulting from the operation of the water service
could lawfully be used for the sewer service, which,
this 
Court 
found[,] benefitted all residents,
1080403
37
'regardless of whether the customer received sewer
service.' Id. at 253. This Court also upheld the new
fee 
structure, 
which 
charged 
a 
separate
sewer-related fee to residents who lacked sewer
service, concluding that every member of the
community received a 'substantial indirect benefit'
from the sewer service, regardless of whether the
resident was connected to the system. This Court
agreed with the Board's statement in a 1954
resolution that '[t]he citizens of the City of
Mobile ... are directly or indirectly affected by
the results of the pollution of [public] waters and
the beneficial results to be obtained by the
elimination of the pollution will be a public
benefit to the entire community and citizens
thereof.' 662 So. 2d at 254."
Densmore, 813 So. 2d at 854.  This Court concluded that "a
valid fee may be sustained based upon the indirect benefit or
a public benefit to the persons assessed the fee."  813 So. 2d
at 855.  
In the present case, as in Densmore and Yarbrough, the
service fees imposed by the ordinance certainly pass the
"substantial indirect benefit" test.  That test does not
require a showing that each person against whom the service
fees are assessed receives a proportional direct benefit.
Instead, all that need be shown is that each person against
whom the service fees are assessed received at least a
substantial indirect benefit.  Owners of property who wish to
connect to the City's water and/or sewer system will certainly
1080403
38
benefit.  It cannot seriously be contested that there is not
at least a substantial indirect benefit from being connected
to the City's water and/or sewer system. 
In the same vein, the home builders spend considerable
time discussing the methods the City used in arriving at the
amount of the service fees assessed.  The home builders allege
that the City arbitrarily arrived at the amount to charge for
the service fees.  However, based on the evidence in the
record, this allegation is without merit.  As this Court
stated in Densmore: "Alabama law does not require that fees
precisely comport with the benefits provided to property
owners."  813 So. 2d at 853.  The City conducted numerous
studies to determine the cost of correcting the City's
problems with its water and sewer systems and the cost of
expanding its water and sewer systems to allow for further and
future development.  The City relied on experts, engineers,
and other municipalities' studies in arriving at the
appropriate amount to charge.  The City did not act
arbitrarily in assessing the amount of the service fees, and
the home builders certainly received a benefit.  
Therefore, the trial court's holding that the ordinance
1080403
39
is not arbitrary and unreasonable is without error.  
Next, the home builders argue that the ordinance violates
their due-process rights under the United States Constitution.
The home builders rely on Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269
(1898), and argue that to the extent the service fees in the
present case exceed the benefit bestowed upon the home
builders, such excess constitutes a taking under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In Norwood, the
Supreme Court of the United States held, in pertinent part:
"In our judgment, the exaction from the owner of
private property of the cost of a public improvement
in substantial excess of the special benefits
accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a
taking, under the guise of taxation, of private
property for public use without compensation. We say
'substantial excess,' because exact equality of
taxation is not always attainable ...."
172 U.S. at 279.  However, the Supreme Court of the United
States has since held that "[t]his Court has never held that
the amount of a user fee must be precisely calibrated to the
use that a party makes of Government services."  United States
v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60 (1989).  "On the contrary,
the Just Compensation Clause 'has never been read to require
the ... courts to calculate whether a specific individual has
suffered burdens ... in excess of the benefits received' in
1080403
40
determining whether a 'taking' has occurred."  493 U.S. at 61
n.7 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 491 n. 21 (1987)).  Rather, "[a]ll that [the
Supreme Court of the United States has] required is that the
user fee be a 'fair approximation of the cost of benefits
supplied.'" 493 U.S. at 60 (quoting Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444, 463 n. 19 (1978) (plurality)).  Further,
"a reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for
the reimbursement of the cost of government services. 'A
governmental body has an obvious interest in making those who
specifically benefit from its services pay the cost....'" 493
U.S. at 63 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S.
at 462).  
As discussed above, the home builders certainly received
a benefit from the availability of water and of sewage
disposal.  Further, the City determined what the cost of
improving its water and sewer systems to allow areas of new
development to connect to its water and sewer systems.  The
moneys collected from the service fees imposed in the present
case will not cover the amount required to repair and improve
the City's water and sewer systems.  The service fees are not
1080403
41
in "substantial excess" of the benefit bestowed upon the home
builders; rather, the fees are a "fair approximation of the
cost of benefits supplied."  Therefore, the trial court's
holding that the ordinance does not violate the home builders'
due-process rights is without error.  
Next, the home builders argue that the ordinance denies
them "the right to equal protection of the law."  (Home
builders' brief, at 73.)  In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985), the Supreme Court
of the United States held:
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that
all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike. ... The general rule is that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. ... When
social or economic legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide
latitude, ... and the Constitution presumes that
even 
improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic processes."
Further, 
"a classification neither involving fundamental
rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is
accorded a strong presumption of validity. ... Such
a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal
Protection 
Clause 
if 
there 
is 
a 
rational
1080403
42
relationship between the disparity of treatment and
some legitimate governmental purpose. ... Further,
a legislature that creates these categories need not
'actually articulate at any time the purpose or
rationale 
supporting 
its 
classification.' 
...
Instead, a classification 'must be upheld against
equal 
protection 
challenge 
if 
there 
is 
any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.'
...
"A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification. '[A] legislative choice is not
subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on
rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical 
data.' 
... 
A 
statute 
is 
presumed
constitutional, ... and '[t]he burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it,' ...
whether or not the basis has a foundation in the
record."
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993).  
The home builders make a bald accusation that the
ordinance is "irrational and wholly arbitrary."  However, it
is undisputed that the service fees imposed by the ordinance
are intended to help defray the costs of providing water and
sewer services to the home builders' property by charging new
users a fee for the costs of adding the capacity needed to
service those new users.  Such a fee certainly has a rational
basis to a legitimate government interest.  The service fees
have a rational basis in that they are related to the City's
1080403
43
interest of fulfilling its duty to provide sanitation to its
residents, as discussed above.  The trial court's holding that
the ordinance does not violate the home builders' equal-
protection rights is without error.  
Next, the home builders argue that the fees imposed by
the 
ordinance 
"violate[] 
Section 
223 
of 
the 
Alabama
Constitution."  (Home builders' brief, at 76.)  This argument
is based on the home builders' earlier argument that the fees
imposed by the ordinance are taxes and not service fees.
However, based on our holding that fees imposed by the
ordinance are service fees imposed under the City's police
power or under express statutory power, and not taxes under §
223, this argument must fail.  
Lastly, the home builders argue that the fees imposed by
the ordinance are "not a regulatory measure."  (Home builders'
brief, at 83.)  However, this argument has already been
addressed in our holding that the ordinance imposes a service
fee and not a tax.  
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
1080403
44
AFFIRMED. 
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Smith, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.