Title: State v. Brita
Citation: 158 Ariz. 121, 761 P.2d 1025
Docket Number: CR-87-0068-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: September 1, 1988

158 Ariz. 121 (1988) 761 P.2d 1025 STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Robert John BRITA, Appellee. No. CR-87-0068-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. September 1, 1988. *122 Thomas E. Collins, Maricopa County Atty. by H. Allen Gerhardt, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for appellant. Richard R. Brennan, Scottsdale, for appellee. MOELLER, Justice. JURISDICTION In this case the defendant moved to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test performed on a blood sample taken from him. After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court suppressed the test results because the test was not taken in accordance with the implied consent law, A.R.S. § 28-691, or the exception for medical purposes under A.R.S. § 28-692(M). The state appealed. In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the blood extraction violated the implied consent statute and did not fall within the medical purpose exception. State v. Brita, 154 Ariz. 517, 744 P.2d 429 (App. 1987). However, the court of appeals reversed the suppression order on grounds not raised or considered in the trial court, namely, A.R.S. § 13-3925, the "good faith exception" statute. We granted review and have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. We agree with the court of appeals' opinion except that portion permitting the belated insertion of a new issue on appeal. We affirm the suppression order. FACTS The defendant was involved in an automobile accident in which two people were killed and two others were injured. He was taken to a hospital for medical treatment. There he told a police officer that he had consumed two beers at a friend's house prior to the collision. The officer noted that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and that his breath smelled of alcohol. Although the officer believed that he had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, he did not arrest him at that time.[1] Instead, the officer asked the defendant to sign an implied consent form for a blood test. Defendant was told that if he did not sign the form he would lose his driver's license for a year. The defendant signed the form and a blood sample was extracted by medical personnel at the direction of the officer. The officer was unaware that a blood sample had been drawn earlier for medical reasons. That sample is not involved in this case. It was apparently disposed of by medical personnel *123 and was never available to the police. After the second sample had been taken, the defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of manslaughter and two counts of aggravated assault. The defendant moved to suppress the test results. The state, throughout the trial court proceedings, contended that the sample was legally obtained. At no time did the state rely upon or call to the attention of the trial court A.R.S. § 13-3925, the "good faith exception" statute. The trial court, after a two-day evidentiary hearing, suppressed the test results. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION The court of appeals first noted that a suspect's blood sample may be taken with his consent after his arrest in accordance with the implied consent statute, A.R.S. § 28-691, which states in pertinent part: (Emphasis added.) The only exception to the arrest requirement of A.R.S. § 28-691, according to the court of appeals, is § 28-692(M), which provides: The court of appeals then discussed this court's decision in State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 709 P.2d 1336 (1985). In Cocio, we held that a formal arrest is not a constitutional prerequisite to obtaining a blood sample pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-692(M). We noted that, while Arizona's implied consent law ordinarily governs the administration of blood alcohol tests, A.R.S. § 28-692(M) provides a narrow exception. We stated: 147 Ariz. at 286, 709 P.2d at 1345. Following the evidentiary hearing in the instant case, the superior court held that the test had to be suppressed because it had not been taken post-arrest as required by the implied consent law, and it did not fall within the medical purpose exception of A.R.S. § 28-692(M) as interpreted in Cocio. The court of appeals, in a thorough analysis we approve, agreed with the trial court. THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONSIDERATION OF A.R.S. § 13-3925 Having concluded that the trial judge had correctly decided the issues presented to him, the court of appeals reversed his ruling on an issue which had not been presented to him. In doing so, the court of appeals said: 154 Ariz. at 522, 744 P.2d at 434. We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that an appellate court is freer to reverse on issues raised for the first time on appeal than it would be on issues presented and litigated in the trial court. It is particularly inappropriate to consider an issue for the first time on appeal where the issue is a fact-intensive one. We are mindful that the defendant failed to object to the state's insertion of this new issue on appeal. However, a litigant's failure to object does not require an appellate court to decide unlitigated issues when to do so violates sound principles of judicial policy. Although the court of appeals only referred to and discussed subsection A of A.R.S. § 13-3925, the "good faith exception" statute, the statute, in its entirety, reads: It is obvious merely from reading the statute that its applicability in a particular case depends upon the resolution of questions which are peculiarly factual in nature. While the state had ample opportunity to plead and argue the statute in the trial court, it did not elect to do so. Had it done so, the two-day evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress might well have taken a decidedly different twist. It is highly undesirable to attempt to resolve issues for the first time on appeal, particularly when the record below was made with no thought in mind of the legal issue to be decided. Under the circumstances of this case, which deals with an obvious legal issue which could and should have been raised at the hearing, we hold that the state, never having presented the issue to the trial court even by way of a motion for reconsideration, has waived it. The court of appeals should not have considered the alleged applicability of A.R.S. § 13-3925 for the first time on appeal. Hyman v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 150 Ariz. 444, 724 P.2d 63 (App. 1986); see also State v. Luttrell, 80 Or. App. 771, 723 P.2d 1071 (1986) (appellate court refused to entertain a defendant's *125 challenge to a blood test on appeal when the defendant had not raised the issue in the trial court). Since we do not reach the issue of the applicability of the statute, we obviously also do not reach any issues relative to the statute's constitutionality. Also, since the issues were not raised, we do not consider the possible applicability of any non-statutory federal or state good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974); State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 402 n. 2, 636 P.2d 637, 650 n. 2 (1981).[2] CONCLUSION We vacate the two portions of the court of appeals' opinion designated "The Good Faith Exception to the Suppression of Evidence" and "Conclusion," and approve the rest of the opinion. We affirm the trial court's order of suppression to the effect that the results of the test may not be used in the prosecution of the defendant. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and CAMERON and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur. [1] The trial court specifically found that there had been no arrest of defendant at the time the officer requested and received the blood sample from him. The trial court also found that the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had been driving while intoxicated prior to requesting the sample. [2] We also note that we recently denied review in an unrelated case, State v. Nahee, 155 Ariz. 114, 745 P.2d 172 (App. 1987). In that case the court of appeals applied A.R.S. § 13-3925 and cited its own earlier opinion in this case. The petition for review in Nahee presented no issue relative to the validity of A.R.S. § 13-3925.