Title: Skidgel v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S250149
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 19, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
TAMARA SKIDGEL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS 
BOARD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S250149 
 
First Appellate District, Division Five 
A151224 
 
Alameda County Superior Court 
RG16810609 
 
 
August 19, 2021 
 
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban concurred.  
 
 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
S250149 
 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
 
The In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 12300 et seq.) authorizes certain disabled and 
elderly Californians to receive in-home services from third 
parties or family members, paid for with public funds.  Under 
one program option — which we will refer to as the Direct Hiring 
method — service recipients directly hire their own providers, 
and the providers are then paid either by the recipients with 
funds they have received from a public entity or by a public 
entity itself.  We granted review in this case to consider whether, 
under these circumstances, a provider who is the recipient’s 
minor child, parent, or spouse is covered by the state’s 
unemployment insurance program.  The Court of Appeal 
answered this question in the negative, reasoning that sections 
631 and 683 of the Unemployment Insurance Code1 exclude 
such a provider from coverage.  (Skidgel v. California 
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 574, 
577–578 (Skidgel).)  For reasons that follow, we agree with the 
Court of Appeal’s conclusion and affirm its judgment. 
 
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the 
Unemployment Insurance Code. 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
2 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In October 2015, the California Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board (CUIAB) ruled in a Precedent Benefit Decision 
(PBD) — In re Caldera (2015) CUIAB Precedent Benefit Dec. 
No. P-B-507  — that an IHSS caregiver who was providing 
services to her son was not entitled to unemployment benefits.  
It based its conclusion on two provisions of the Unemployment 
Insurance Code:  sections 631 and 683.  The former provides:  
“ ‘Employment’ does not include service performed by a child 
under the age of 18 years in the employ of his father or mother, 
or service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, 
daughter, or spouse, except to the extent that the employer and 
the employee have, pursuant to Section 702.5, elected to make 
contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Disability 
Fund.”  (§ 631.)  The latter states in relevant part that 
“ ‘Employer’ also means any employing unit which employs 
individuals to perform” IHSS services, pays at least $1000 in 
wages for such services during a specified time frame, “and is 
one of the following:  [¶] (a) The recipient of such services, if the 
state or county makes or provides for direct payment to a 
provider chosen by the recipient or to the recipient of such 
services for the purchase of services, subject to the provisions of 
Section 12302.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”  (§ 683, 
subd. (a).)  These statutes, the CUIAB reasoned, “confirm that 
IHSS caregivers who care for their own children are employed 
by that care recipient with the consequence that the wages 
earned in that work cannot be used to support a claim for 
unemployment insurance benefits,” regardless of whether some 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
3 
other entity — such as the state or a county — “might possibly 
represent an additional employer.”  (Caldera, at p. 4.) 
 
 
Only one year earlier, the CUIAB had reached the 
opposite conclusion in a nonprecedential decision, ruling that a 
woman providing care to her son and receiving direct payments 
from a public entity qualified for unemployment benefits 
notwithstanding section 631 based on her joint employment by 
the public entity.  (In re Ostapenko (2014) CUIAB Dec. No. AO-
336919.)  In December 2014, the State Department of Social 
Services and the Employment Development Department sent 
letters to the CUIAB disagreeing with Ostapenko, asserting that 
section 631 renders IHSS providers ineligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits in this context, and urging the CUIAB not to 
adopt Ostapenko as a PBD.  
 
In April 2016, about six months after the CUIAB issued 
Caldera, plaintiff Tamara Skidgel challenged that decision by 
filing this action under section 409.2, which authorizes 
interested persons to obtain a judicial declaration as to the 
validity of a PBD.  She alleged the following:  She had been an 
IHSS provider for her daughter since May 2013 and expected to 
be eligible for unemployment insurance when her employment 
ended.  Caldera would “cause [her] to be denied unemployment 
insurance when her employment . . . ends” because it “held that 
IHSS providers who provide services for their children . . . are 
ineligible for Unemployment Insurance.”  Caldera “is invalid” 
for two reasons:  (1) “IHSS providers who provide services for 
their children . . . are eligible for unemployment insurance 
under . . . Section 683”; and (2) because such providers have “a 
joint employer” in addition to the recipient — either “the county” 
providing the services or “the public authority” that the county 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
4 
has “establish[ed] and contract[ed] with . . . to provide [those] 
services” — section 631 “does not preclude them from being 
eligible for unemployment insurance.”  Based on a joint record 
consisting of the comments submitted to the CUIAB and the 
parties’ briefing, the trial court affirmed Caldera’s validity and 
entered judgment for the CUIAB. 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that “the relevant 
statutes,” though “not patently clear,” are “best read[] . . . in 
light of their plain language and legislative history” as 
establishing that IHSS recipients are “the sole employers of 
IHSS providers under” the Direct Hiring method “for purposes 
of unemployment insurance coverage.  It follows that . . . section 
631 excludes IHSS providers who serve close-family-member 
recipients.”  (Skidgel, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 586, fn. 
omitted.) 
 
We then granted plaintiff’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
PBDs “are akin to agency rulemaking, because they 
announce how governing law will be applied in future cases.”  
(Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. 
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 109 (Pacific Legal Foundation).)  
Accordingly, in declaratory relief actions under section 409.2 
challenging PBDs, courts “determine whether the [CUIAB’s] 
decision accords with the law that would govern were the rule 
announced articulated as a regulation.”  (Pacific Legal 
Foundation, at p. 111.)  “[I]n light of the Board’s expertise, its 
interpretation of a statute [that] it routinely enforces is entitled 
to great weight . . . .”  (American Federation of Labor v. 
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1017, 1027.)  
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
5 
Ultimately, however, “[s]tatutory construction is a matter of law 
for the courts [citation], and administrative interpretations 
must be rejected where contrary to statutory intent.”  (Pacific 
Legal Foundation, at p. 111.)  Thus, “[a]lthough” a PBD’s 
interpretation of a statute is entitled to “ ‘great weight,’ ” we will 
not “accept” it “if ‘[the CUIAB’s] application of legislative intent 
is clearly unauthorized or erroneous.’ ”  (United Educators of 
San Francisco etc. v. California Unempl. Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 
8 Cal.5th 805, 820.) 
 
The PBD at issue here relates to operation of the 
unemployment insurance law — principally sections 631 and 
683 — in the context of the IHSS program.  After summarizing 
that program and analyzing the relevant statutes within that 
context, we conclude, like the Court of Appeal, that IHSS 
caregivers who provide services to a family member specified in 
section 631 are not eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefits. 
 
A.  The IHSS Program 
 
IHSS is a social welfare program that, through a 
combination of state and federal funding, provides in-home 
supportive care for aged, blind, and disabled persons.  (Reilly v. 
Marin Housing Authority (2020) 10 Cal.5th 583, 587–588 
(Reilly).)  It “is specifically ‘designed to avoid institutionalization 
of incapacitated persons.’  [Citation.]  Providers perform 
nonmedical supportive services for IHSS recipients, such as 
domestic services, personal care services, protective supervision, 
and accompaniment to health-related appointments.”  (Id. at p. 
588.)  “ ‘[T]he vast majority of home care is provided by family 
and friends.’ ”  (Id. at p. 589.)    
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
6 
 
“The State Department of Social Services (Department) 
administers the IHSS program in compliance with state and 
federal law” and “promulgates regulations to implement the 
relevant statutes.”  (Reilly, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 588.)   
Counties “administer[] the program locally on behalf of the state 
in accordance with the statutes and state regulations 
establishing a uniform range of services available to all eligible 
recipients.”  (Service Employees Internat. Union v. County of Los 
Angeles (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 761, 765.)  “Each county is 
obligated to ensure that services are provided to all eligible 
recipients during each month of the year in accordance with [a] 
county plan.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12302.)   
 
There are several authorized methods through which 
IHSS providers may be engaged.  Counties “may hire” providers 
“in 
accordance 
with 
established 
county 
civil 
service 
requirements 
or” 
otherwise 
applicable 
“merit 
system 
requirements.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12302.)  Counties may 
also “contract” with individuals and various public and private 
entities (ibid.; see id., § 12301.6, subd. (a)(1)), or “[e]stablish, by 
ordinance, a public authority to provide for the delivery of” 
services (id., § 12301.6, subd. (a)(2)).  Alternatively, through the 
Direct Hiring method, providers may be directly “hir[ed]” by 
recipients (id., § 12304, subd. (a)) and paid either by the 
recipients with public funds that they receive “in advance” each 
month (ibid.), or by the state or county (id., §§ 12302, 12302.2).  
In the Direct Hiring context, the State Department of Social 
Services (Department) is required by statute to “perform or 
ensure the performance of all rights, duties, and obligations of 
the recipient relating to those services as required for [various] 
purposes,” 
including 
“unemployment 
compensation, 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
7 
unemployment compensation disability benefits, [and] workers’ 
compensation.”   (Id., § 12302.2, subd. (a)(1).)   
 
B.  California’s Unemployment Insurance Program 
 
Since 1935, when Congress adopted the Social Security 
Act, “federal law has provided powerful incentives to” states to 
enact their own unemployment insurance programs.  (City of 
Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 58.)  
California, anticipating the Social Security Act’s passage, 
enacted its own unemployment insurance program in 1935 
(Stats. 1935, ch. 352, § 1 et seq.) “and has sought to maintain 
federal compliance ever since” (City of Sacramento, at p. 58).  
The California program “is part of a national system of reserves 
designed to provide [benefits] for workers ‘unemployed through 
no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment 
and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum.’ ”  (American 
Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 1024.) 
 
For purposes of coverage, the original 1935 California law 
first 
broadly 
defined 
“ ‘employment’ ” 
to 
“mean[] 
any 
employment by an employer” meeting specified criteria, “under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.”  (Stats. 
1935, ch. 352, § 7, p. 1227.)  However, it also expressly excluded 
several types of work from covered “ ‘employment,’ ” including, 
as here relevant, service performed (a) “by an individual in the 
employ of his son, daughter, or spouse,” (b) “by a child under the 
age of twenty-one in the employ of his father or mother,” and (c) 
“in the employ of a State, a political subdivision” of a state, or 
“any unit or agency of government.”  (Id., at p. 1228.)   
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
8 
 
In 1953, the Legislature repealed the 1935 law and 
enacted the current Unemployment Insurance Code, with the 
unemployment insurance program contained in part 1 of 
division 1.  (Stats. 1953, ch. 308, pp. 1457–1458, 1553.)  In 
setting forth that program’s “Scope or Coverage,” the 
Legislature first broadly defined “ ‘Employment’ ” to “mean[] 
service . . . performed for wages or under any contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied.”  (Stats. 1953, ch. 308, § 601, 
p. 1470 [adding § 601].)  It then limited the scope of coverage by 
excluding specific services from the definition of “employment.”  
One excluded service — as specified in section 631 — was 
“service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, 
daughter, or spouse, and service performed by a child under the 
age of 21 in the employ of his father or mother.”  (Stats. 1953, 
ch. 
308, 
§ 631, 
pp. 
1473–1474.) 
 
Another 
generally 
excluded service — as specified in former section 633 — was 
“service performed in the employ of a state” or one of its 
“political subdivisions” or “instrumentalit[ies].”  (Stats. 1953, ch. 
308, § 633, p. 1474.)  However, these public entities could, at 
their option, elect to have the services of their employees — 
other than those “holding civil service or permanent tenure 
positions” — “constitute employment.”2  (Stats. 1953, ch. 308, 
§ 709, p. 1479.)   
 
In the almost 70 years since section 631’s enactment, the 
statute has been amended only twice.  In 1971, it was revised in 
two ways:  (1) the order of the services mentioned was reversed, 
 
2  
Also, “service performed in the employment of a public 
housing administration agency” was expressly included in the 
term “ ‘[e]mployment.’ ”  (Stats. 1953, ch. 308, § 605, p. 1470.) 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
9 
such that the statute excluded from “ ‘Employment’ . . . service 
performed by a child under the age of 21 years in the employ of 
his father or mother, or service performed by an individual in 
the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse”; and (2) a clause was 
added to provide, “except to the extent that the employer and 
the employee have, pursuant to Section 702.5, elected to make 
contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Disability 
Fund.”  (Stats. 1971, ch. 1447, § 1, p. 2858.)  The section to which 
the added clause referred — section 702.5 — was itself a new 
section enacted through the same legislation, which provided 
that services excluded by section 631 from the term 
“employment” would be “deemed to constitute employment” for 
purposes of unemployment compensation disability benefits 
upon the filing of “a written election, agreed to by both the 
employing unit and the individuals in its employ.”  (Stats. 1971, 
ch. 1447, § 2, p. 2858.)  The purpose and effect of these 
amendments 
were 
to 
“[p]ermit[] 
elective 
disability 
compensation coverage for individuals in [the] employ of 
specified relatives.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill. No. 
1420, 3 Stats. 1971 (1971 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 213.) 
 
The statute was amended again in 1972, lowering from 21 
to 18 the limit on the age of the child whose services were 
excluded.  (Stats. 1972, ch. 579, § 46, p. 1014.)  Since then, the 
statute has provided:  “ ‘Employment’ does not include service 
performed by a child under the age of 18 years in the employ of 
his father or mother, or service performed by an individual in 
the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse, except to the extent 
that the employer and the employee have, pursuant to Section 
702.5, elected to make contributions to the Unemployment 
Compensation Disability Fund.”  (§ 631.)   
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
10 
 
The other provision at the center of this dispute — section 
683 — was added to the Unemployment Insurance Code in 1978 
(Stats. 1978, ch. 463, § 3, p. 1571) and has never been amended.  
Unlike section 631, which appears in the article entitled 
“Excluded Services,” section 683 appears in the article entitled 
“Subject Employers.”  It states in relevant part that “ ‘Employer’ 
also means any employing unit” that “employs individuals to 
perform” IHSS services and “is one of the following:  [¶] (a) The 
recipient . . . if the state or county makes or provides for direct 
payment to a provider chosen by the recipient or to the 
recipient . . . for the purchase of services . . . . [¶] (b) The 
individual or entity with whom a county contracts to provide in-
home supportive services.  [¶] (c) Any county which hires and 
directs in-home supportive personnel in accordance with 
established county civil service requirements or merit system 
requirements for those counties not having civil service 
systems.”  (§ 683.) 
 
C.  The Meaning of the Statutes 
 
“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our 
fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent 
so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.”  (People v. Murphy (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 136, 142.)  “We begin by examining the statutory 
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.  
[Citation.]  We do not, however, consider the statutory language 
in isolation; rather, we look to the entire substance of the 
statutes in order to determine their scope and purposes.  
[Citation.]  That is, we construe the words in question in context, 
keeping in mind the statutes’ nature and obvious purposes.  
[Citation.]  We must harmonize the various parts of the 
enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
11 
framework as a whole.  [Citation.]  If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.  If, however, the 
language supports more than one reasonable construction, then 
we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to 
be achieved and the legislative history.”  (People v. Cole (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 964, 975.)  And, as noted above, the CUIAB’s 
interpretation of a statute “it enforces is entitled to great weight 
unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized.”  (Pacific Legal 
Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 111.) 
 
According to plaintiff, the language of section 631, 
construed “[i]n accordance with” its “plain,” “usual, [and] 
ordinary meaning,” “does not preclude” coverage of IHSS 
providers in the Direct Hiring context.  She reasons as follows:   
“The operative phrase” in the statute is “ ‘in the employ of,’ ” and 
that phrase “can [under the law] include joint employment 
relationships.”  “Joint employment exists when an employee is 
subject to the control of two or more employers.”  In the Direct 
Hiring context, IHSS providers are “subject to the control of two 
employers, the recipient and the public entities — the county or 
the public authority and the state — that have direct control 
over the manner and payment of work.”  In addition, because 
“the state and the county or public authority are intricately 
involved in paying IHSS providers for their work,” “the county 
and the state [are] employers for [unemployment insurance] 
purposes” under section 13005, subdivision (a), which provides 
that “ ‘Employer’ means,” among other things and with one 
specified exception, “the State of California or any political 
subdivision or agency thereof, . . . or any political body not a 
subdivision or agency of the state, and any . . . department[] or 
agency thereof, making payment of wages to employees for 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
12 
services performed within this state.”  For these reasons, in the 
Direct Hiring context, IHSS providers are not only “in the 
employ of” the recipient for purposes of section 631, they are 
simultaneously “ ‘in the employ of’ a joint governmental 
employer.”  By its terms, section 631 precludes coverage only 
insofar as eligibility is “based on employment by a spouse or 
child,” i.e., it “excludes only IHSS services performed ‘in the 
employ of’ the [provider’s] spouse or child.”  Its exclusion does 
not apply insofar as eligibility may be “simultaneously . . . based 
on joint employment by . . . a county or IHSS public authority,” 
i.e., it “allows [coverage] for services performed in the employ of” 
various public agencies.  Thus, “[s]ervice performed [by the 
IHSS provider] in the employ of [the public agencies] does confer 
eligibility for unemployment insurance.”   
 
Section 683, plaintiff further asserts, confirms and 
reinforces this reading of section 631.  By specifying that the 
word “ ‘Employer’ also means . . . [¶] [t]he recipient of [IHSS] 
services’ ” in the Direct Hiring context, section 683 “broadens 
the definition of ‘employer’ beyond the general definition[s]” set 
forth elsewhere in the Unemployment Insurance Code.  The 
section’s “plain language” thus makes the IHSS recipient “the 
employer” of the provider “in addition to the public entity.”  In 
this way, the statute “supports a construction of section 631 
under which IHSS providers for a spouse or child are eligible for 
unemployment insurance through their joint employment by a 
public entity.”  “In short, [it] is a basis for . . . eligibility in 
addition to any other bases.”     
 
We 
find 
plaintiff’s 
dual-employment 
argument 
unpersuasive because we agree with the Court of Appeal that 
the language of section 683, read in context and with reference 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
13 
to the statutory framework of which it is a part, “designate[s] 
the recipient as the IHSS provider’s sole employer for purposes 
of unemployment insurance coverage” in the Direct Hiring 
context.  (Skidgel, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.)  As the Court 
of Appeal noted, section 683 “specifically addresses” what the 
term “ ‘ “Employer” ’ ” means with respect to “IHSS service 
delivery.”  (Skidgel, at p. 582.)  It sets forth two criteria for 
defining the term.  The first is that the person or entity pays a 
threshold amount of wages for IHSS services:  $1,000 “during 
any calendar quarter in the calendar year or the preceding 
calendar year.”  (§ 683).  The second criterion is that the person 
“is one of the following:  [¶] (a) The recipient of such services, if 
the state or county makes or provides for direct payment to a 
provider chosen by the recipient or to the recipient of such 
services for the purchase of services, subject to the provisions of 
Section 12302.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.  [¶] (b) 
The individual or entity with whom a county contracts to 
provide in-home supportive services.  [¶] (c) Any county which 
hires and directs in-home supportive personnel in accordance 
with established county civil service requirements or merit 
system requirements for those counties not having civil service 
systems.”  (§ 683, italics added.)  Notably, when the Legislature 
enacted section 683 in 1978, these three options precisely 
tracked the three ways that counties were authorized by statute 
to carry out their duties regarding the provision of IHSS 
services:  (1) “make direct payment to a recipient for the 
purchase of services”; (2) “contract with” specified entities or an 
individual; or (3) “hire” providers “in accordance with 
established county civil service requirements or merit system 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
14 
requirements for those counties not having civil service.”3  (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 12302; see Stats. 1977, ch. 1252, § 813, p. 4662.)  
In 
other 
words, 
section 
683, 
after 
specifying 
that 
“ ‘Employer’ also means” an “employing unit” that “is one of the 
following,” designates one person or entity for each of the three 
ways through which IHSS providers could, at the time of the 
statute’s enactment, be engaged.  In light of this statutory 
context, we agree with the Court of Appeal that “the most 
natural reading” of section 683 is that it modifies the general 
definition of “employer” for purposes of the Unemployment 
Insurance Code by specifying, with respect to the provision of 
IHSS services, who the sole employer is for each method of 
engaging providers.  (Skidgel, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 586.)  
In the Direct Hiring context — i.e., where “the state or county 
makes or provides for direct payment to a provider chosen by the 
recipient or to the recipient of such services for the purchase of 
services” — that sole employer is “[t]he recipient of such 
services.”  (§ 683, subd. (a).) 
 
Supporting this conclusion is the fact that section 683, 
subdivision (a) makes the designation of the recipient as 
employer in the Direct Hiring context expressly “subject to the 
provisions of Section 12302.2 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code.”  The latter section specifies that in the Direct Hiring 
context —  i.e., when “the state or a county makes or provides 
 
3  
It was not until 1992 that the Legislature first passed a 
statute authorizing counties to “[e]stablish, by ordinance, a 
public authority to provide for the delivery of” IHSS services.  
(Stats. 1992, ch. 722, § 54, p. 3411 [Welf. & Inst. Code, former 
§ 12301.6, subd. (a)(2)].)  We discuss the effect of that statute 
later in this opinion. 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
15 
for direct payment to [an IHSS] provider chosen by a recipient 
or to the recipient for the purchase of in-home supportive 
services” — the state, acting through the Department, “shall 
perform or ensure the performance of all rights, duties, and 
obligations of the recipient relating to [IHSS] services as 
required for [various] purposes,” including “unemployment 
compensation.”   (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12302.2, subd. (a)(1), 
italics added.)  It also specifies that “[t]hose rights, duties, and 
obligations include . . . withholding . . . amounts to be withheld 
from the wages of the provider by the recipient as an 
employer, . . . and transmitting those amounts along with 
amounts required for all contributions, premiums, and taxes 
payable by the recipient as the employer to the appropriate 
person or state or federal agency.”  (Ibid., italics added.)   
 
Several things are evident from these statutes read 
together.  First, in the Direct Hiring context, the only designated 
employer is “[t]he recipient of [IHSS] services.”  (§ 683, subd. 
(a).)  Second, where a county contracts for the provision of 
services, the only designated employer is “[t]he individual or 
entity with whom [the] county contracts.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  Third, 
where a county “hires and directs in-home supportive personnel 
in accordance with established county civil service requirements 
or merit system requirements,” the only designated employer is 
the county.  (Id., subd. (c).)  Fourth, the state is not designated 
as employer in any of the IHSS scenarios.  Instead, its expressly 
designated role is to “perform or ensure the performance of all 
rights, duties, and obligations” that otherwise would be the legal 
responsibility “of the recipient” in the Direct Hiring context, 
including the duties of “the recipient as an employer” to withhold 
specified amounts “from the wages of the provider” and to 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
16 
“transmit[] those amounts along with amounts required for all 
contributions, premiums, and taxes payable by the recipient as 
the employer to the appropriate person or state or federal 
agency.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12302.2, subd. (a)(1), italics 
added.)  These provisions send the message that in the Direct 
Hiring context, the recipient is the sole employer, with the 
recipient’s legal duties as employer being the responsibility of 
the state.  They foreclose plaintiff’s view that a public entity is 
simultaneously an employer in this context.   
Relevant extrinsic sources confirm our interpretation.  
According to the legislative history of section 683 and Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 12302.2 — which the Legislature 
simultaneously enacted through passage of a single bill — 
eligibility 
for 
unemployment 
insurance 
and 
workers’ 
compensation benefits was expanded during the 1970s to 
include domestic employees, including IHSS providers.  (Dept. 
of Finance, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977–
1978 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1978, p. 1.)  As to IHSS providers hired 
and paid directly by recipients, “it [was] not clear who [was] the 
‘employer’ for the purposes of these programs” (Sen. Industrial 
Relations Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977–1978 
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, p. 2), with courts and 
enforcement agencies holding counties liable as “employers” 
(Health & Welf. Agency, Employment Development Dept., 
Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977–1978 Reg. 
Sess.) July 10, 1978, p. 1) based on the “considerable control” 
they exercised “by providing the wages and determining the 
level of service and number of hours to be worked” (Sen. 
Industrial Relations Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 
(1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, p. 2).  There 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
17 
was concern that counties, “in order to avoid paying” benefit 
costs “as the employer,” would abandon the Direct Hiring 
method and use other, far more expensive “delivery methods” — 
hiring IHSS providers as “county civil service employees” and 
engaging “contract providers” — that would cost the state, 
respectively, “an additional” $80 million and $116 million per 
year.  (Health & Welf. Agency, Dept. of Social Services, Enrolled 
Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3028 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) July 7, 
1978, p. 2.)   
 
The Legislature sought to address this concern through 
the 1978 legislation, by enacting several provisions — including 
section 683 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 
12302.2 — to establish a less “expensive option” that would 
“save[] the State from having to assume” these increased costs.  
(Assem. Ways and Means Com., Staff Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 3028 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, pp. 
1–2.)  The statutes were intended to achieve this goal by 
“resolv[ing] the [question] of who is the employer of” IHSS 
providers “selected by . . . recipients” in the following way:  
“designating the recipient[s] as the employer . . . , requiring the 
State to assure collection and payment of all contributions 
through a payrolling system, and requiring the State to pay the 
employer’s share of mandated benefits.”  (Health & Welf. 
Agency, Dept. of Social Services, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. 
Bill No. 3028 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) July 7, 1978, p. 2; see Sen. 
Industrial Relations Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 
(1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, pp. 2, 3 
[legislation “would specify that the recipient of . . . services is 
the ‘employer’ of the provider” in the Direct Hiring context, with 
“the state . . . assum[ing] the cost of the recipients’ share of the 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
18 
taxes and premiums for these programs” and the department 
“responsible for performing, or assuming performance by 
contract, the recipients[’] rights, duties and obligations under 
these programs”].)  Although these provisions were expected to 
increase the state’s annual costs by approximately $13 million, 
compared to the alternatives, they would actually “save the 
State either $67 million or $103 million” annually. (Assem. 
Ways and Means Com., Staff Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3028 
(1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 8, 1978, p. 2.)  In short, 
as plaintiff explains, the legislative history “shows” that the 
Legislature enacted section 683, in conjunction with Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 12302.2, in order “to relieve the 
state of the $103 million burden it [c]ould face” if counties 
abandoned the Direct Hiring method to avoid the costs they 
would incur “if . . . found to be employers of IHSS providers” in 
this context.  The statutes accomplish this cost-savings purpose 
by making recipients the sole employer in the Direct Hiring 
context and shifting the costs of unemployment insurance to the 
state.  Plaintiff’s contrary reading of the statutes — that they 
make recipients employers in addition to counties and other 
public entities — could defeat this purpose and perpetuate the 
very problem the Legislature sought to solve.     
 
Section 683’s failure to mention public authorities — 
which plaintiff asserts are also joint employers — does not affect 
our conclusion.  This silence is not surprising given that the 
Legislature enacted section 683 14 years before adding a 
provision regarding public authorities in the IHSS context.  (See 
Stats. 1992, ch. 722, § 54, p. 3411.)  Moreover, the text of the 
later-added provision on public authorities — Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 12301.6, subdivision (a)(2) — suggests 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
19 
a legislative intent to preserve section 683’s operation in the 
Direct Hiring context.  The statute identifies two “mode[s]” by 
which public authorities may “provid[e] for the delivery of” IHSS 
services — “by contract in accordance with [Welfare and 
Institutions Code] Sections 12302 and 12302.1” and “by direct 
payment to a provider chosen by a recipient in accordance with 
[Welfare and Institutions Code] Sections 12302 and 12302.2” — 
and specifies that public authorities “shall comply with and be 
subject to, all statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to 
the respective delivery mode.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12301.6, 
subd. (d).)  The statutory “provisions applicable to” the Direct 
Hiring mode — and that public authorities are thus made 
“subject to” (ibid.) —  include:  (1) section 683, subdivision (a), 
which, as earlier explained, designates “[t]he recipient” as 
employer in this context; and (2) Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 12302.2, which, as earlier explained, directs the state, 
through the department, to “perform or ensure the performance 
of” (id., subd. (a)(1)) various duties and obligations “on the 
recipient’s behalf as the employer” (id., subd. (a)(2)) or “as an 
employer” (id., subd. (c)).  Indeed, “the state’s responsibility” to 
perform the duties of the recipient as employer is expressly 
preserved by Welfare and Institutions Code section 12301.6, 
subdivision (i)(1), which provides:  “This section does not affect 
the state’s responsibility with respect to the state payroll 
system, unemployment insurance, or workers’ compensation 
and other provisions of [Welfare and Institutions Code] Section 
12302.2.”  These provisions indicate that the Legislature, in 
authorizing counties to establish public authorities, intended to 
preserve section 683’s designation of the recipient as the sole 
employer in the Direct Hiring context.  
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
20 
 
The legislative history of Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 12301.6 is consistent with this conclusion.  In 1996, the 
Legislature amended that statute in several ways, including the 
following:  (1) specifying in subdivision (b)(2)(B) that a public 
authority “shall be,” among other things, an entity “that makes 
or provides for direct payment to a provider chosen by the 
recipient for the purchase of services pursuant to Sections 12302 
and 12302.2” (Stats. 1996, ch. 206, § 22, p. 1674); (2) specifying 
in subdivision (c)(1) that “[r]ecipients shall retain the right to 
hire, fire, and supervise the work of any [IHSS] personnel 
providing services to them”; and (3) adding subdivision (d) to 
specify that public authorities, “when providing for the delivery 
of services . . . by contract” or “by direct payment to a provider 
chosen by a recipient,” “shall comply with and be subject to, all 
statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to” those 
“delivery mode[s]”  (Stats. 1996, ch. 206, § 22, p. 1675).  
According to the legislative history, these provisions had the 
following purposes:  (1) “[c]larif[ying]” that public authorities 
“have the ability to administer the county Individual Provider 
mode” (Dept. of Finance, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1780 
(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) July 9, 1996, p. 6); (2) “[r]equir[ing]” 
public authorities “to adhere to the current state statutory and 
regulatory requirements, regardless of which mode is 
administered by” the public authority (ibid.); (3) preserving “the 
state’s responsibility with respect to the state payroll system, 
unemployment insurance or workers compensation” (ibid.); and 
(4) “mak[ing] clear that providers in a Public Authority (PA) 
county remain Individual Providers (IPs) in the IP Mode, with 
the PA administering the IP Mode,” in order to prevent such 
providers from being classified as “employees of the PA” in this 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
21 
mode (Health & Welf. Agency, Dept. of Social Services, Enrolled 
Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1780 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) July 16, 
1996, p. 7).  These statements, like the text of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 12301.6, are consistent with the 
conclusion that the Legislature, while authorizing counties to 
establish public authorities, intended to preserve section 683’s 
designation of the recipient as the sole employer in the Direct 
Hiring context. 
 
Plaintiff puts forth several textual arguments in support 
of her contrary reading of the statutes, but none proves 
persuasive.  As noted earlier, regarding section 683, she focuses 
on a single word in the statute — “also” — which, she asserts, 
“[d]ictionaries define . . .  as ‘in addition.’ ”  But this approach to 
interpreting the statute — “isolat[ing] one word and ignor[ing] 
the rest of the language” — “is contrary to bedrock principles of 
statutory construction.”  (Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court 
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 647, 667.)  As we have explained, “[t]he 
interpretation of a statute . . . should not end . . . with a 
dictionary definition of a single word used therein.”  (Pearson v. 
State Social Welfare Bd. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 184, 194.)  Instead, to 
interpret a statute, we consider all of its language “in context” 
and with reference to “provisions relating to the same subject” 
and “the whole system of law of which [the statute] is a part.”  
(People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 776.)  For reasons 
already explained, we conclude that the language of section 683, 
read in context and in light of its legislative history, makes the 
recipient the sole employer in the Direct Hiring context, rather 
than an employer in addition to a public agency, as plaintiff 
asserts. 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
22 
 
Related provisions defining the term “employer” for 
purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Code cast further 
doubt on plaintiff’s heavy reliance on the word “also” in section 
683’s opening phrase, “ ‘Employer’ also means.”  (Italics added.)  
That same phrase appears throughout the article of the 
Unemployment Insurance Code that contains section 683 —
article 3 of division 1, part 1, chapter 3 — which is entitled 
“Subject Employers.”  (§§ 676, 677, 682, 684–686.)  In each 
instance, it appears to reference the general definition of 
employer set forth in the first section of the article, section 675:  
“ ‘Employer’ means any employing unit, which for some portion 
of a day, has within the current calendar year or had within the 
preceding calendar year in employment one or more employees 
and pays wages for employment in excess of one hundred dollars 
($100) during any calendar quarter.”  Viewed in this context, the 
phrase “also means” in section 683 appears to signal a 
refinement, for purposes of applying the Unemployment 
Insurance law in the IHSS context, of the general definition 
appearing at the beginning of the article, rather than a 
considered legislative choice to expand the definition by 
designating additional employers in that context.  This 
understanding of the phrase, unlike plaintiff’s, is fully 
consistent with section 683’s purpose, as disclosed by the 
legislative history previously discussed.   
 
This analysis also answers plaintiff’s related textual 
argument that our reading of section 683 renders “meaningless” 
the word “also” in the statute’s opening phrase, and thus 
contravenes the interpretive canon directing courts to “ ‘give 
meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and [to] avoid a 
construction making any word surplusage.’ ”  As just discussed, 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
23 
under our construction of the statute, the word “also” in section 
683’s opening phrase signals that the statute sets forth 
refinements to — i.e., additional components of — what the 
term “ ‘Employer’ . . . means” (ibid.) in the IHSS context.  Our 
construction does, in fact, give meaning to the word “also,” just 
not the meaning plaintiff proffers.  In any event, “the canon 
against 
surplusage 
is 
[merely] 
a 
guide 
to 
statutory 
interpretation and is not invariably controlling.”  (People v. 
Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 381.)  We will not use it “to defeat 
legislative intent” as gleaned from available sources, including 
the rest of the words in the statute, related statutes, the 
“legislative history and the ‘wider historical circumstances’ of 
the enactment.”  (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 782, 783.)  
As already explained, it would defeat the Legislature’s intent to 
adopt plaintiff’s view that the word “also” in section 683’s 
opening phrase means that the statute designates the recipient 
as the employer in the Direct Hiring context in addition to a 
public entity.   
 
Plaintiff also offers several arguments based on the 
language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2, but 
none is persuasive.  She first emphasizes the fact that the 
statute twice refers to the recipient as “an employer” (id., subds. 
(a)(1) & (c), italics added) and argues that “the word ‘an,’ ” like 
the word “also” in section 683, “contemplates more than one 
employer.”  However, the statute alternatively refers several 
times to the recipient as “the employer,” once in a sentence that 
also contains the phrase “an employer.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 12302.2, subd. (a)(1), (2), italics added.)  As the Court of Appeal 
concluded, in light of this circumstance, the statute’s use of the 
phrase “an employer” “reveal[s] little about the Legislature’s 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
24 
intent.”  (Skidgel, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 580, fn. 5.)  
Plaintiff candidly acknowledges the “uncertainty” arising from 
the statute’s use of these alternative phrases, but she then errs 
by arguing that this uncertainty “is not otherwise resolved.”  As 
earlier explained, the cost-savings purpose of the legislation 
through which Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2 — 
in tandem with section 683 — was enacted is only achieved by 
interpreting the statutes as making recipients the sole employer 
in the Direct Hiring context.  As also earlier explained, 
plaintiff’s contrary reading of the statutes — that they make 
recipients employers in addition to counties — could defeat this 
purpose and perpetuate the very problem the Legislature sought 
to solve. 
 
Nor are we persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that because 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2, subdivision 
(a)(1), “require[s] the state to make” unemployment insurance 
contributions in the Direct Hiring context “for all IHSS 
providers without exception,” it would “def[y] reason” to read 
section 683 as “mak[ing] a large class of those workers ineligible 
to receive [the] benefits for which those contributions are made.”  
The language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2, 
subdivision (a)(1) simply fails to support the premise of 
plaintiff’s argument:  that the state must make unemployment 
insurance contributions as to IHSS workers providing services 
that section 631 excludes from “ ‘[e]mployment.’ ”  As here 
relevant, the text of that subdivision requires the state to 
perform the “duties” and “obligations of the recipient relating to 
those services as required for purposes of unemployment 
compensation,” including the making of “contributions . . . 
payable by the recipient as the employer.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
25 
§ 12302.2, subd. (a)(1).)  A separate subdivision addresses 
payment of “[c]ontributions . . . resulting from liability incurred 
by the recipient as employer for unemployment compensation.”  
(Id., subd. (a)(3).)  As to services that section 631 excludes from 
“ ‘Employment,’ ” there are no “contributions . . . payable by the 
recipient as the employer” or other  “duties” or “obligations of 
the recipient . . . required for purposes of unemployment 
compensation.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12302.2, subd. (a)(1).)  
Nor is any “liability incurred by the recipient as employer for 
unemployment compensation.”  (Id., subd. (a)(3).)  Unlike 
plaintiff, we therefore find nothing unreasonable — or even 
arguably anomalous — about reading section 683 to exclude 
certain IHSS providers from the unemployment compensation 
program, notwithstanding the state’s duty under Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 12302.2 to make unemployment 
insurance contributions for IHSS providers in the Direct Hiring 
context. 
 
We also reject a third argument plaintiff makes based on 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12302.2:  that the state’s 
“ ‘payroll function’ ” under that section — “handl[ing] payroll 
deductions, which includes deducting for” unemployment 
insurance — “makes  . . . the state [an] employer[] for 
[unemployment insurance] purposes” under section 13005, 
which states in relevant part that “ ‘Employer’ means . . . the 
State of California or any” of its political subdivisions, agencies, 
and departments, “making payment of wages to employees for 
services performed within this state.”  As explained above, in 
performing its duties under Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 12302.2, the state is carrying out the “duties” and 
“obligations of the recipient . . .  as the employer” (id., subd. 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
26 
(a)(1)).  Indeed, the statute expressly specifies that in paying or 
transmitting “[c]ontributions, premiums, and taxes,” the state 
is acting “on the recipient’s behalf as the employer” (id., subd. 
(a)(2)) or “as an employer” (id., subd. (c)), and not as an employer 
in its own right.   
 
Section 13005 does not alter this conclusion.  It appears in 
division 6 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, which is 
entitled “Withholding Tax on Wages,” not in the division of the 
code — division 1 — that contains sections 631 and 683 and is 
entitled 
“Unemployment 
and 
Disability 
Compensation.”  
Nothing suggests that section 13005’s definition of “employer” 
applies outside of division 6 or that the Legislature intended or 
understood that it would.  In fact, both division 1 and division 6 
contain provisions suggesting precisely the contrary.  Section 
125, which is part of division 1, states, “Except where the context 
otherwise clearly indicates, the definitions set forth in this 
article shall govern the construction of the provisions of this 
division.”  Division 6 contains a similar limiting provision — 
section 13003, subdivision (a) — which states in relevant part, 
“Except where the context otherwise requires, the definitions set 
forth in this chapter . . . shall apply to and govern the 
construction of this division.”  Given that division 1 contains a 
separate article — article 3 of part 1, chapter 3 — that defines 
the 
term 
“employer” 
for 
purposes 
of 
unemployment 
compensation, and that section 683 of article 3 specifically 
addresses the meaning of that term in the circumstances of this 
case, “the context” here (§§ 125, 13005, subd. (a)) neither 
“requires” (§ 13005, subd. (a)) us to apply the definition in 
division 6, nor “clearly indicates” (§ 125) that it would be 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
27 
appropriate for us to do so.  For these reasons, plaintiff’s reliance 
on section 13005 is unpersuasive. 
 
We 
find 
plaintiff’s 
remaining 
arguments 
also 
unconvincing.  In urging us to interpret the statutes to provide 
coverage, plaintiff invokes the rule of liberal construction, which 
generally directs courts to “liberally construe[]” provisions of the 
Unemployment Insurance Code “to further the legislative 
objective of reducing the hardship of unemployment.”  (Sanchez 
v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 575, 584.)  
“[I]t is true” that the provisions here at issue, as “remedial” 
statutes, “should be liberally construed so as to afford all the 
relief” that their “language . . . indicates . . . the Legislature 
intended to grant.”  (Cal. Emp. Com. v. Kovacevich (1946) 27 
Cal.2d 546, 549.)  But the construction we adopt “should not 
exceed the limits of the statutory intent.”  (Id. at p. 550.)  
Because “ ‘the purpose of’ ” the liberal construction rule “ ‘is to 
effectuate . . . 
legislative 
intent,’ ” 
courts “ ‘ “should 
not 
blindly . . . follow[] [the rule] so as to eradicate the [legislation’s] 
clear language and purpose.” ’ ”  (City of Huntington Beach v. 
Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 472 [involving 
pension legislation].)  Thus, we may not apply the rule to 
“ ‘enlarge[] or restrict[]’ ” a statute’s “evident meaning” 
(Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 844), to “ ‘ “allow eligibility for 
those for whom it was obviously not intended” ’ ” (City of 
Huntington Beach, at p. 472), “to defeat the overall statutory 
framework or to disregard the legislative intent” (Massey v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 674, 686).  
“Because,” as explained above, the relevant “legislative history” 
shows that plaintiff’s reading of the statutes would restrict their 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
28 
evident meaning, disregard the Legislature’s intent, defeat the 
overall statutory framework, and extend coverage to those for 
whom it obviously was not intended, adopting that reading 
“ ‘would [impermissibly] rewrite the statute[s] in the guise of 
[liberally] construing’ ” them.  (Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 
Cal.3d 564, 580.) 
 
Nor does plaintiff’s reliance on In-Home Supportive 
Services v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 
720 (In-Home) alter our conclusion.  There, the court held that 
IHSS providers who would be excluded by statute from workers’ 
compensation coverage based on their employment relationship 
with 
recipients 
are 
nevertheless 
eligible 
for 
workers’ 
compensation benefits because “the state is also the employer 
of” such providers and “[t]he workers’ compensation law 
provides 
for 
coverage 
based 
upon 
dual 
employment 
relationships.”  (Id. at p. 725.)  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court rejected the argument that in the Direct Hiring context, 
the recipient is the provider’s sole employer by virtue of Labor 
Code section 3351.5, subdivision (b), which first states that the 
term “ ‘Employee’ includes” those “who perform[] domestic” 
IHSS services, and then states that “[f]or purposes of” applying 
the workers’ compensation scheme’s statutory exclusions, any 
“such person shall be deemed an employee of the recipient of 
such services . . . if the state or county makes or provides for 
direct payment to such person or to the recipient of in-home 
supportive services for the purchase of services, subject to the 
provisions of Section 12302.2 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code.”  (See In-Home, at pp. 734–740.)  This decision, plaintiff 
argues, shows that “IHSS providers . . . are jointly employed by 
the public agencies and the IHSS recipient,” and that a “single 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
29 
[coverage] exclusion” based on a provider’s employment 
relationship with one employer — the recipient — “should not 
necessarily apply to all employers.”  
 
For 
several 
reasons, 
In-Home is 
distinguishable.  
Although the statute there at issue — Labor Code section 
3351.5, subdivision (b) — and section 683 bear some linguistic 
similarities, they are different in important ways.  Section 683 
is part of an article entitled “Subject Employers” and defines 
what the term “ ‘Employer’ . . . means” in the IHSS context, 
whereas Labor Code section 3351.5, subdivision (b), is part of an 
article entitled “Employees” and sets forth what the term 
“ ‘Employee’ includes.”  The latter statute declares that, for 
purposes of workers’ compensation, the IHSS provider “shall be 
deemed an employee of the recipient” in the Direct Hiring 
context.  (Lab. Code, § 3351.5, subd. (b), italics added.)  The In-
Home court, in reaching its conclusion, “emphasized” the 
statute’s use of the indefinite article “ ‘an,’ ” reasoning that the 
statute says “not [that] the IHSS recipient is ‘the only’ employer 
of the IHSS worker,” but that “the recipient is ‘an’ employer of 
the worker.”  (In-Home, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d p. 740, fn. 26.)  
By contrast, as explained above, section 683 first specifies that 
“ ‘Employer’ also means” an “employing unit” that “is one of the 
following,” and then designates one person or entity for each of 
the three ways through which IHSS providers could, at the time 
of the statute’s enactment, be engaged:  “[t]he recipient” in the 
Direct Hiring context, “[t]he individual or entity with whom a 
county contracts to provide” IHSS services, or the “county” when 
it hires providers “in accordance with” civil service or merit 
system requirements.  (Id., subds. (a), (b), (c), italics added.)  In 
light of these functional, structural, and linguistic differences, 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
30 
In-Home’s interpretation of Labor Code section 3351.5, 
subdivision (b) in the context of the workers’ compensation 
scheme offers little, if any, help in interpreting the meaning of 
section 683 in the context of the unemployment insurance 
scheme. 
 
Finally, we address plaintiff’s assertion that weighty 
“policy” considerations warrant adopting her reading of the 
statutes.  In her view, the cost of adopting the CUIAB’s statutory 
construction — denying coverage to “approximately 135,000” 
IHSS providers who care for family members — cannot be 
“justif[ied]” in terms of section 631’s “core purpose,” i.e., 
“prevent[ing] collusion between family members to obtain 
unemployment insurance.”  Public entities, she asserts, have 
numerous “means . . . to prevent and detect collusive fraud” and 
“to take action if” any is suspected.  By statute, they have 
“substantial control over hiring through background checks and 
required orientation”; they “alone[] fix[] the terms and 
conditions of employment,” including the tasks providers may 
perform and the time allowed for each task; they “enforce[] 
overtime restrictions through audits and fraud investigations”; 
and they “impos[e] penalties for violations, including barring 
providers from employment for” extended periods of time and 
“terminating . . . persistent violator[s] from” the IHSS program 
“altogether.”  According to plaintiff, because “the Legislature 
has provided these means for” public entities to prevent and 
detect collusion and “to nip . . . in the bud” any that occurs, 
section 631’s “anti-fraud purpose” can be served without 
construing it to “single[] out family member IHSS providers and, 
in 
Draconian 
fashion, 
wholly 
exclude[] 
them 
from 
unemployment insurance.”   
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
31 
 
Although we appreciate the significance of plaintiff’s 
policy arguments, they do not overcome the statutes’ evident 
meaning.  Where “statutory language and legislative history are 
unclear” (Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior 
Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1042), “[p]olicy considerations 
may of course be useful in interpreting” a statute (Taylor v. 
Board of Trustees (1984) 36 Cal.3d 500, 509, fn. 9).  “[B]ut it is 
the Legislature’s policy that ultimately must control, and in 
determining that policy we must pay heed to available evidence 
of legislative intent,” including “the history of the pertinent 
statutes.”  (Ibid.)  Where “the application of firmly established 
rules of statutory construction” establish a statute’s meaning, 
we “may not rest” our decision “on the weighing and balancing 
of public policy considerations.”  (Torres v. Automobile Club of 
So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 782.)  Because, as 
explained above, “the statutory language, purpose, and context 
all point to [our] interpretation,” plaintiff’s argument that the 
statutes could or “should have been written differently [is] more 
appropriately addressed to the Legislature.”  (Kim v. Reins 
International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 90, fn. 6.)  
That lawmaking branch of government, “which can study the 
various policy and factual questions and decide what rules are 
best for society” (Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 1132, 1140), can consider plaintiff’s view that 
denying unemployment insurance benefits to close family 
caregivers comes at a steep cost:  leaving people who have cared 
for their disabled family members — often forgoing better 
paying and less demanding employment — without a safety net 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
32 
when their family members die or can no longer safely be cared 
for at home.4 
 
Indeed, the Legislature has, in fact, been focused on this 
very issue in recent years.  In 2016, it passed a bill establishing 
an advisory committee to, among other things, recommend 
“steps the state can take to ensure that all IHSS providers who 
provide supportive services to a spouse or child have access to 
employment-based supports and protections, including . . . state 
unemployment insurance benefits.”  (Assem. Bill No. 1930 
(2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as enrolled Aug. 25, 2016.)  Last 
year, it passed a bill amending section 631 to specify that “for 
purposes 
of 
unemployment 
benefits 
under 
this 
part, 
‘employment’ includes services performed by an individual in 
the employ of their father or mother, or service performed by an 
individual in the employ of their son, daughter, or spouse, if that 
individual is providing services through the [IHSS] program ….”  
(Assem. Bill No. 1993 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as enrolled 
Sept. 1, 2020.)  The Governor vetoed both bills.  The CUIAB 
argues that these measures and their legislative histories 
confirm that “close-family IHSS providers are not eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefits” under current law.  Plaintiff 
responds that the material is irrelevant because (1) the 
Legislature’s recently expressed views on the meaning of section 
 
4  
We note that our conclusion is consistent not only with 
Caldera, but also, as earlier discussed, with the position 
communicated to the CUIAB by the Employment Development 
Department and the Department of Social Services in 
connection with Ostapenko.  Thus, our decision is unlikely to 
take unemployment insurance benefits away from anyone 
currently receiving them. 
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
33 
631, which was last amended in 1972, “is of little use, if any”; 
and (2) “no inferences can be drawn from vetoed legislation.”  We 
need not — and do not — address these arguments because the 
language of the existing statutes, read in light of their 
legislative histories and the statutory scheme as a whole, 
resolves the case.  We simply note these legislative 
developments to show that the Legislature — which is the 
branch of our government “charged . . . with ‘mak[ing] law . . . 
by statute’ ” (People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 14) — has very 
recently been “weigh[ing]” the “competing interests” and 
considering what “social policy” should be in this area (Bunn, at 
p. 15).5 
 
In light of our analysis, we also need not resolve the 
parties’ disagreement about the weight or deference to which 
the CUIAB’s position, as set forth in the PBD, is entitled.  As 
earlier noted, as a general principle, when a court reviews a 
PBD, the agency’s “view of a statute [that] it enforces is entitled 
to great weight unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized.”  
(Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 111.)  Plaintiff 
argues that the PBD here is “entitled to [no] deference” because 
the CUIAB’s position on the coverage question in this case has 
been “inconsistent” and “vacillating,” with the agency reaching 
“the opposite conclusion in Ostapenko” just “a year prior to” 
issuing the PBD.  The CUIAB responds that the inconsistency 
is irrelevant because Ostapenko was the decision of an 
 
5  
Pending in the Legislature is a bill, introduced a few 
months after the Governor’s second veto, that would amend 
section 631 only by changing the phrases “his father” and “his 
son” to “their father” and “their son.”  (Assem. Bill No. 330 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Jan. 27, 2021.)   
SKIDGEL v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
34 
“individual Appeals Board panel[],” whereas the PBD we are 
reviewing, like all PBDs, was “a decision of the Board ‘acting as 
a whole’ . . . after a full and public process, with input from 
stakeholders and other entities with relevant experience and 
expertise.”  Because our conclusion that section 631’s exclusion 
applies in the Direct Hiring context is consistent with the PBD 
and follows from the language and structure of the statutory 
scheme, viewed in light of relevant legislative history, we need 
not further discuss the deference question. 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JENKINS, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Skidgel v. California Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 24 Cal.App.5th 574 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S250149 
Date Filed: August 19, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: Alameda  
Judge: Robert B. Freedman  
_______________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Legal Services of Northern California, Stephen E. Goldberg, Wade 
Askew; Downey Brand and Jay-Allen Eisen for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Carole Vigne, Katherine Fiester; Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, 
Anthony R. Segall, Hannah Weinstein; Anna Kirsch; Jenna Lauter 
Miara; Daniela Urban; Anthony Mischel, Catherine Ruckelhaus and 
Nayantara Mehta for Bet Tzedek, Center for Workers’ Rights, Legal 
Aid at Work, National Employment Law Project, United Domestic 
Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930, AFL-CIO and Women’s 
Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate University School of Law as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.  
 
Laurel R. Webb for Service Employees International Union Local 2015 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Edward DuMont and Michael J. 
Mongan, State Solicitors General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy 
 
 
State Solicitor General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez and Cheryl L. Feiner, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Susan M. Carson, Gregory D. Brown and 
Hadara R. Stanton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Stephen E. Goldberg 
Legal Services of Northern California 
517 12th Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 551-2181 
 
Janill L. Richards 
Principal Deputy State Solicitor General 
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 879-0958