Title: State v. Robert A. Figueroa
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-38-06
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 26, 2007

In this appeal, the Supreme Court must determine whether a supplemental charge to a jury reporting a deadlock that did not repeat certain admonitions that the jury not surrender their honest convictions merely to return a verdict, and that suggested that deliberations would continue until unanimity was achieved, constitutes reversible error. Figueroa was indicted for murder, attempted murder, and various weapons offenses. The charges arose out of a confrontation outside of a bar between Figueroa, Jeffrey Colon (his co-defendant), Samir Pretlow, Phillip Austin, and Willie Davis. Pretlow was shot three times and died at the hospital. Austin was shot in the leg. At trial, the jury faced significant issues of credibility. Austin and Davis had given multiple conflicting statements to the police and to Figueroa s investigator, variously stating that they did not recall anything or could not identify the shooter; that shots were fired as part of an unrelated fight between two women; or that the men had a dispute, Colon gave Figueroa a gun, and Figueroa used it. The initial jury charge included instructions that the jury not surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. The jury began deliberations at 2:45 p.m. on Tuesday, October 26, 2004. Around 2:25 p.m. the next day, the jury sent the court a note advising that we cannot unanimously agree on the verdict. The court told that jury that one day does not a deliberation make, and asked them to continue deliberations after providing a supplemental instruction that did not repeat the not surrender your honest convictions language. The judge also stated I got to be here tomorrow. I got to be here Friday. I got nothing going on Saturday, and Giants are playing away on Sunday, so we will be here as long as it takes you to go through this process. I want you to continue, but I want you to do so keeping in mind what I said both now and earlier, the basic instructions that I gave you yesterday. Figueroa s counsel objected to the supplemental instruction, arguing it was too forceful and improperly failed to remind the jurors not to surrender their honest convictions merely to return a verdict. Figueroa s counsel also asked the court to explain to the jurors that they would not be held through the weekend if they failed to return a unanimous verdict. The court declined to provide further explanation. About one hour later, the jury reported that it had reached a verdict on all charges. When the court polled the jury, they were unanimous in finding Figueroa not guilty of the murder of Pretlow but guilty of aggravated manslaughter, and not guilty of attempted murder or aggravated assault of Austin. One juror dissented from the purported guilty verdicts on the weapons charges. Thereafter, the trial court denied a motion for a mistrial, instructed the jury that a non-unanimous vote was not a legal verdict, and instructed the jury to continue deliberations on those charges. Twenty minutes later, the jury returned with a unanimous guilty verdict. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed Figueroa s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The panel concluded that the trial court s comments in the supplemental charge relating to potential weekend deliberations tainted the process and were impermissibly coercive. The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification. 188 N.J. 358 (2006). HELD: The trial court s supplemental jury charge, which did not include any repetition of the language from the appropriate initial charge that jurors not surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict, and which suggested that deliberations might continue through the end of the week and into the weekend, had the effect of coercing the dissenting juror or jurors into agreeing with the verdict announced shortly after the supplemental charge and thus Figueroa is entitled to a new trial. 1. The Court s modern view of supplemental charges given to a jury reporting a deadlock is traced to State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980), where the Court held that continued use of the Allen charge was inappropriate. The Allen charge focused on dissenting jurors, admonishing them to reexamine their views and consider extraneous factors such as the expense and delay of retrial, and effectively asking them to acquiesce to the will of the majority. The Allen charge thus was inherently coercive and undermined the requirement that verdicts in criminal cases reflect unanimity of agreement freely arrived at by each juror. (pp. 17-21) 2. In Czachor, the Court instructed that the initial jury instructions in all criminal cases describe the process of deliberation and include specific instructions regarding the situation when the jury is directed to continue deliberations, with language to reduce its coercive effect. The Court declined to adopt a per se rule about when and how often the language could be given as a supplemental charge, leaving it to the discretion of trial courts, but cautioning them to consider factors such as the trial s length and complexity and whether a reasonable period of deliberations preceded the report of deadlock. (pp. 21-23) 3. Where it appears that the jury is deadlocked, the court should inquire of the jury whether further deliberations will likely result in a verdict. If the difference of opinion between jury members is clearly intractable, the jury is deadlocked and a mistrial should be declared. (pp. 25-26) 4. Following Czachor, the Appellate Division in other cases has reversed guilty verdicts reached where there was coercion, such as where a supplemental charge imposed a deadline and reminded jurors that a deadlock would lead to a retrial; where a distraught holdout juror was instructed to continue deliberations; and where a sua sponte new charge of a lesser-included offense was offered in response to an apparent deadlock. The issue is always whether the supplemental instruction improperly influences the dissenting jurors to change their votes. (pp. 26-27) 5. In considering the circumstances where a supplemental charge is given, the Court also is guided by concern for the weighty role the judge plays in the courtroom; juries may be affected by even subtle behaviors of a judge. A judge s general inquiry about the progress of deliberations may present issues of coercion, while inquiries coupled with emphasis that no pressure to reach a verdict is intended have not been found to be coercive. Thus, in reviewing whether a supplemental charge was impermissibly coercive, the Court considers what the judge said, the context in which the judge said it, and how the jury understood the words and their implications. (pp. 27-28). 6. In this case, in light of the brevity of the deliberations at the time the jury reported it could not agree, the trial court did not err by not inquiring whether further deliberations would likely result in a verdict or by requiring the jury to continue deliberations. (p. 30) 7. The supplemental charge, however, violated the directives of Czachor in two ways. First, by failing to repeat the reminder that jurors not surrender your honest convictions solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or to return a verdict, a supplemental charge poses a grave risk of being misunderstood by the jurors and thus of being coercive. In light of the complexity of the case and significant credibility issues, the Court cannot be confident that the jury, listening to the supplemental charge, understood it in the context of the admonitions given in the earlier complete charge. (pp. 30-32) 8. Second, reference to the possibility that deliberations might continue through the end of the week and into the weekend had the capacity to coerce the jury into reaching a verdict it might not otherwise have reached. Although the court s intention was to convey that ample time would be afforded for deliberations, the words implied otherwise. (p. 33-34) 9. Taken together, the failure to utilize the model charge for further deliberations with its cautionary language and the reference to continuing to deliberate throughout the remainder of the week and through the weekend impermissibly coerced the dissenting juror or jurors into reaching a verdict with which he, she or they did not honestly agree. (p. 34) The decision of the Appellate Division that reversed the verdict and remanded for a new trial is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO has filed a separate DISSENTING opinion, expressing the view that there was no coercion because the trial court appropriately charged the jury in its initial instructions the day before the supplemental charge, the supplemental charge referenced the initial charge, and the trial court s comments concerning how long it would be available for deliberations were innocuous. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN and WALLACE join in JUSTICE HOENS opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO has filed a separate dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 38 September Term 2006 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT A. FIGUEROA, Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 30, 2007 Decided April 26, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Sara B. Liebman, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Theodore J. Romankow, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Anthony J. Pope, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. JUSTICE HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1980, we announced guidelines to govern trial courts faced with the questions of whether and how to direct juries that had reported themselves to be deadlocked to continue their deliberations. State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980). In particular, we concluded that the charge then generally utilized was inherently coercive, and we directed trial courts to use instead an alternate form of the charge that would avoid pressuring dissenting jurors into surrendering their honest convictions about guilt or innocence merely to reach a unanimous verdict. Id. at 405 n.4. The concerns that supported that decision motivated us to direct that our model charges be revised to include a general charge that would advise jurors of their obligations to consult and deliberate with each other and would authorize them to re-examine and change their own views when appropriate, but which would also remind them not to reach an agreement that would do violence to individual judgment. Ibid. At the same time, we approved the use of a portion of that modified charge in response to a jury s report of a deadlock. We left whether, in an individual trial, that charge could be given or repeated to the discretion of the trial court. The question presented in this case is whether a supplemental charge to the jury reporting a deadlock that did not repeat those admonitions, and that suggested that deliberations would continue until unanimity was achieved, constitutes reversible error. Because we have concluded that the language used by the trial court, which was not tempered by any repetition of the language of the modified, supplemental charge, had the effect of coercing the dissenting juror or jurors into agreeing with the verdict announced shortly thereafter, we direct that defendant be afforded a new trial. And in response to your note I just want to speak with you for a minute or two. I want to speak about the jury deliberation process to be sure that you fully understand just what is contemplated. It is a process in which you are asked to do two things. You are asked to listen to what is being said by the other jurors with a view towards accepting what you hear, and at the same time you are asked, when it s your turn to speak, to speak with a view towards persuading the others to what you are saying, and it works when jurors are able to do both. It s not that difficult to do when you realize what it is a rational deliberative process and it s a process of which you are requested, as you listen to what the others are saying, to receive that with an open mind, in other words, in a receptive frame of mind to be persuaded to what you are hearing. Then, as I say, when you speak you are also to speak with a view towards persuading the others to what you are saying. Now, that, obviously, is an ongoing process, but functions when the jurors are only able to do both and you do that in a building block fashion, a building block fashion, if you will, where you start out with some rather basic simple facts and begin to move on from there to other facts and you talk about the evidence and then address, are we satisfied with this, that, or the other thing has been established and exists, and what you are doing is building a foundation, if you will, a factual foundation, and then when you ve done that you begin to then address, what does that mean? What does this tell us? What may we properly and reasonably infer from what we ve concluded are the basic facts and what is a strong rational inference or is it not? Are we persuaded we should draw that inference and only when you ve gone through that, still just dealing with the facts and drawing inferences from those facts do you get, then, to the elements of the offense and ask yourselves, now, has the State established this element beyond a reasonable doubt, but all throughout that process it is both a speaking and listening deliberation and each juror is expected to listen with a view to be persuaded by what the others may be stating and what the juror hears at the time, and also speaking with a view towards persuading others as to what is to be said at the time. Through that deliberation, through that rational process you begin to go and build those blocks. I got to be here tomorrow, I got to be here Friday. I got nothing going on Saturday, and Giants are playing away on Sunday, so we will be here as long as it takes you to go through this process. I want you to continue, but I want you to do so keeping in mind what I said both now and earlier, the basic instructions that I delivered to you yesterday. I think if you focus on that process and what is being asked of you as a deliberating jury that, maybe, that will be of some assistance to you. [(emphasis added).] Defendant immediately objected to this instruction, arguing that it was inappropriate because the trial court failed to remind the jurors that they should not surrender their honest convictions merely to return a verdict. Referring to the language used by the court as too forceful, defendant asked the court to clarify the underscored comments by explaining to the jurors that they would not actually be held for the remainder of the week and even over the weekend if they failed to return a unanimous verdict. The trial court declined to explain or clarify, in part because the supplemental charge generally referred back to the initial instructions which had included all of the appropriate cautionary language. Defendant then requested that the court specifically remind the jury about the relevant part of that initial instruction concerning the process of deliberations. The court, however, refused to do so because the court did not agree that the supplemental charge was itself inappropriate. Approximately one hour later, the jury reported that it had reached a verdict See footnote 3 on all counts. As the trial court reviewed the verdict sheet and polled the jury on each of the questions, all were unanimous in finding defendant not guilty of the murder of Pretlow but guilty of the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter of Pretlow. The jury also unanimously agreed that defendant was not guilty of either attempted murder or aggravated assault of Austin. However, when polled about the other charges, the jury was not unanimous. Rather, one juror dissented from the jury s purported guilty verdicts on the charges of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court told the jury that a non-unanimous vote was not a legal verdict, advised them that their verdicts on the charges other than the two weapons offenses would be accepted as final and instructed the jury to continue . . . deliberations and advise [the court] when [the jury] reached a verdict on those charges. The court did not inquire about whether additional deliberations would be fruitful and did not provide any new, supplemental, or additional instructions. Both defendants moved for a mistrial, arguing that the jury s non-unanimous response to some of the charges demonstrated that the supplemental charge had been coercive. They reasoned that because one juror had openly expressed her dissent on the weapons offenses, her apparent agreement with the aggravated manslaughter charges must have been motivated only by pressure to avoid being held in deliberations all weekend. In denying the motion for a mistrial as to all charges, the trial court stated in part: First of all, let me put to bed this observation by the defense, for obvious appellate purposes, that the court somehow coerced the jury by telling the jury that it was going to be here tomorrow, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. I think that the tenor of the comments, when taken in the totality of the circumstances up close and live with an opportunity to observe here, as opposed to the written word, was that there was no rush to judgment required here. I told them that one day does not make a deliberation and that we can be back here any of those days, and they could feel comfortable that they could continue with their deliberations and reach a decision at their leisure on any of those days. I didn t suggest that they had to come back with a verdict today. See footnote 4 Approximately twenty minutes later, the jury returned with a unanimous verdict, finding defendant guilty of both of the unlawful gun possession charges. See footnote 5 In mid-December 2004, defendant filed his motion for a new trial. He again argued that the supplemental charge and the court s order to the jury to continue when they returned with a non-unanimous verdict were unduly coercive and that the verdict should therefore be set aside. In denying the motion, the trial judge explained the disputed instructions: I think what was being conveyed to the jury is that they have as much time as it needs to reach a decision in this case. It didn t have to do it that day, I was going to be here for days afterward and whatever it took for them to proceed with the process that we discussed before was fine with me. It didn t have to come back by 4 o clock because court normally ends at 4 o clock. In point of fact if they wanted to deliberate into the Giants game it was okay with me because we wanted the process to be a deliberative and cautious one. In January 2005, defendant was sentenced to a term of twenty years, to which the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, applied, on the lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated manslaughter. The count for second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose merged for sentencing purposes and defendant was sentenced to a concurrent five-year term for third-degree unlawful possession of weapon. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed defendant s conviction and remanded for a new trial. That decision was based on the panel s conclusion that the trial court s comments in the supplemental charge relating to potential weekend deliberations tainted the process. See footnote 6 Describing the language as impermissibly coercive, the panel found that, taken literally, the instruction suggested that the jury would be required to remain in the courthouse until a unanimous verdict was reached, even if deliberations continued through the weekend. The panel concluded that, although the court did not believe that the jury understood those remarks to mean that, the trial court failed to appreciate the effect [the] comments might have on the jury, in light of the judge s exalted position of authority. The State filed a petition for certification, urging us to conclude that the suggestion to the jury that deliberations might continue through the weekend was not impermissibly coercive. We granted that petition, 188 N.J. 358 (2006), and we now affirm. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT A. FIGUEROA, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting. In this case, the last words the jury heard before it began its deliberations were the following: Very shortly, you will retire to the jury room to commence your deliberations and apply the law that I ve instructed to the facts as you determine [them] to be for the purpose [of] arriving at a fair and correct verdict. Now, this verdict must represent the considered judgment of each of you, and must be unanimous. It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another with a view towards reaching an agreement, if you can do so without any violence to your own individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourselves, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and/or change your opinions, if you are convinced they are erroneous, but do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. You are not partisans, you are judges, you [are] judges of the facts, and your sole interest [is] to ascertain the truth from the evidence that has been admitted. . . . . You are now in charge of the courtroom. You could deliberate as long as you want, and stop whenever you want and come back tomorrow, if you do. So we will be here for you . . . . The jury retired to deliberate; it was 2:44 p.m. on Wednesday, October 26, 2004. The jury deliberated that afternoon and returned to its deliberations the following morning. Less than twenty-four hours after starting its deliberations, the jury sent a note stating that it cannot unanimously agree[] on the verdict. The trial court noted that one day does not a deliberation make [because s]ometimes it takes time to go through the process. The trial court explained the deliberative process the jury should undertake and closed with these cautionary observations: I want you to continue, but I want you to do so keeping in mind what I said both now and earlier, the basic instructions that I delivered to you yesterday. I think if you focus on that process and what is being asked of you as a deliberating jury that, maybe, that will be of some assistance to you. Would you please resume your deliberations. Thank you. Counsel for defendant Robert Figueroa and his co-defendant jointly complained that the jury instructions the trial court had just provided were too forceful and requested that the jurors be reinstructed that you should not surrender your views, etc., etc. The trial court demurred, explaining that I already told the jury in the basic charge and, which I encompassed by reference in the last charge, that [ ]it is your duty as jurors to consult with one another [and] to deliberate with a view towards reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourselves, but do so only after impartial consideration of the evidence with fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinions, if convinced they are erroneous, but do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.[ ] . . . . And in that last charge [asking that the jury resume its deliberations,] I incorporate, by reference, my previous charge and tell them they must remember all aspects of it. Tellingly, defense counsel specifically explained that no mistrial was sought because [w]e want this jury. From this factual setting, the majority explains that it is squarely within the sound discretion of the trial court to decide whether repeating the [Czachor See footnote 11 ] charge is appropriate when a jury reports that it is unable to agree. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2007) (slip op. at 23). The majority rightly notes that, in this context, our focus, in general, has been on limiting any kind of interference with the deliberative process, rather than on particular applications of the guidance in Czachor relating to jury deadlocks. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 25) (citations omitted). Stated differently, the majority emphasizes that the question is whether the supplemental instruction has improperly influenced the dissenting jurors to change their votes. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 27). The majority recognizes that [i]n light of the brevity of the deliberations, [there is] no error in the trial court s decision not to inquire specifically about whether further deliberations would likely result in a verdict . . . [and] because the jury had been deliberating only briefly, neither do[es the majority] fault the trial court for deciding to require the jury to continue its deliberations. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 30). It is in the application of these principles to this case that I must part company with the majority. In the majority s view, the supplemental charge violated the directives of Czachor in two fundamental respects. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 30). As to the former, the majority is of the view that [a] supplemental charge that directs a jury to continue deliberating but does not remind them of their obligation [to not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect on the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict See footnote 12 ] poses a grave risk of being misunderstood by the jurors and therefore, of being coercive. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 30-31) (footnote omitted). In respect of the latter, the majority concludes that the jury misunderstood -- and was coerced by -- the trial court s following comment: I got to be here tomorrow [Thursday], I got to be here Friday. I got nothing going on on Saturday, and [the] Giants are playing away on Sunday, so we will be here as long as it takes you to go through this process. In the majority s view, [w]hile suggesting to a jury on a Wednesday that deliberations will continue through the weekend may simply convey to them that an abundant amount of time will be afforded to them to carefully weigh and analyze the evidence, the words themselves imply otherwise. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 33-34). The majority cannot agree that the jurors were not in fact under the impression that they would be required to continue to deliberate for as long as it might take to reach unanimity. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 34). The majority thus concludes that taken together, the failure to utilize the model charge for further deliberations with its cautionary language and the reference to continuing to deliberate throughout the remainder of the week and through the weekend impermissibly coerced the dissenting juror or jurors into reaching a verdict with which he or she did not honestly agree. Ibid. Because the majority reaches its conclusions by isolating portions of the jury charge, I disagree. In this context, our inquiry must begin and end with the core proposition that a jury charge must be examined in its entirety. We have made clear that [i]n passing on the propriety of a trial court s charge, an appellate court reviews all that was said on the particular subject being challenged, and if on reading the charge as a whole, prejudicial error does not appear, then the verdict must stand. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 280 (1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This court has repeatedly held that portions of a charge alleged to be erroneous cannot be dealt with in isolation but the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect. State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973). See also State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005) ( The charge must be read as a whole in determining whether there was any error. ); State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 387 (2002) ( A portion of a charge alleged to be erroneous, however, cannot be dealt with in isolation and should be examined as whole to determine its overall effect. The standard for assessing the soundness of a jury instruction is how and in what sense, under the evidence before them, and the circumstances of the trial, would ordinary jurors understand the instructions as a whole. (citations, quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 106-07 (1997) (quoting Wilbely, supra, 63 N.J. at 422); State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997) ( In determining whether a charge was erroneous, the charge must be read as a whole. (citing Wilbely)); State v. Loftin (I), 146 N.J. 295, 379 (1996) ( In reviewing claims of erroneous jury instructions, the passage in question should be evaluated in the context of the charge as a whole. (citing Wilbely)); State v. Marshall (I), 123 N.J. 1, 145 (1991) ( [T]he prejudicial effect of an omitted instruction must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances--including all the instructions to the jury, [and] the arguments of counsel . . . . (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789, 99 S. Ct. 2088, 2089, 60 L. Ed. 2d 640, 643 (1979))); State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 579 (1994) ( In determining the propriety of the charge, we must view the charge as a whole. ); State v. Biegenwald (II), 106 N.J. 13, 43 (1987) ( Challenged portions of a jury charge must not be read in isolation; rather, the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect. (quoting Wilbely)); State v. Freeman, 64 N.J. 66, 69 (1973) ( In assaying the measure of success in the jury charge, we bear in mind the established principle that the reviewing court does not excise and examine in isolation those statements alleged to be obscure or ambiguous, but looks to the charge as a whole. ). The principle that a challenged jury charge is to be reviewed in the context of the entire instruction extends to a challenged supplemental charge. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237, 108 S. Ct. 546, 550, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568, 578 (1988) (stating that the Court consider[s] the supplemental charge given by the trial court in its context and under all the circumstances (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S. Ct. 1059, 1060, 13 L. Ed. 2d 957, 958 (1965)); State v. Young, 181 N.J. Super. 463, 472-73 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that an Allen charge was not coercive [u]nder all the circumstances[,] and after reviewing the surrounding circumstances of [the] seven week jury trial[,] the length of the jury deliberations, and the fact that [t]here was no repeated giving of the [Allen] charge over a short period of time ), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 222 (1982); see also United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1975) ( Where it is alleged that a supplemental charge coerced the jury in its decision-making, this court examines not only the language of the additional instruction but also the facts and circumstances which formed the context for the judge s remarks. (citing United States v. Jenkins, supra)). See footnote 13 We have also made clear that [n]o party is entitled to have the jury charged in his or her own words; all that is necessary is that the charge as a whole be accurate. State v. Jordan, supra, 147 N.J. at 422. This must be so because [i]t is fundamental that a trial court is not bound to instruct a jury in the language requested by a party. State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 411 (1971). Those precepts, in my view, forbid the restricted approach adopted by the majority. Their fair application in this case leads me to conclude that, because the trial court had -- less than twenty-four hours before -- charged the jury in the very words defendant claims should have been repeated here and because the trial court referenced its earlier charge in summing up the supplemental charge, I see no coercion here. Furthermore, the trial court s comments concerning how long he would be placed at the jury s disposal, including over the upcoming weekend, were innocuous when viewed in their proper context. First, the trial judge made clear that his expressions concerning being there for several days were made immediately after his explanation of precisely what we would want juries to undergo during the deliberations process. Second, the trial court explained that we will be here as long as it takes you to go through this process without once tilting the jury towards any verdict; again, the clearly understood focus was on the jury deliberations process, and not its result. Finally, in closing on the supplemental charge, the trial court reminded the jury that it was to continue its deliberations keeping in mind what I said both now and earlier, the basic instructions that I delivered to you yesterday. Because I cannot conclude that the jury instructions as a whole -- both the principal jury instructions and the supplemental jury instructions -- were erroneous, and because I cannot find that the instructions, in whole or in part, were coercive, I cannot justify vacating this conviction and remanding the case for a new trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-38 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT A. FIGUEROA, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED April 26, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Hoens CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto