Title: Joshua B. Duncan v. Michael W. Moore
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-628
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2000

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC95628
____________
JOSHUA B. DUNCAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE and THE FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
[March 23, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Joshua B. Duncan petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus.  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.
Because we find this case is controlled by our decision in Dowdy v.
Singletary, 704 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1998), we deny the petition.  We write to make
clear that our decision in Dowdy applies equally to both Control and Conditional
Releasees, and to clarify some additional issues not specifically addressed in
Dowdy.
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FACTS AND ARGUMENT
As pertinent to the instant inquiry, Duncan is serving a prison sentence for an
aggravated battery which was committed on May 21, 1994.  Duncan has been
informed that when he is released from prison, he will be placed under Conditional
Release supervision.  Duncan objects, asserting that when he is released, his release
should not be made conditional upon his complying with certain terms and
conditions but, rather, it should be unconditional.  He asserts that his placement on
supervision will result in (1) the improper forfeiture of earned gain time; (2)
violation of his double jeopardy rights; (3) violation of his ex post facto rights; (4)
violation of his due process rights; (5) violation of his equal protection rights; (6)
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.
ANALYSIS
Contrary to Duncan's assertion, his placement on Conditional Release
supervision will not automatically result in the forfeiture of earned gain time.  When
Duncan has served enough time and earned enough gain time, he will be released
from prison.  See  § 944.291(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Nevertheless, as we have
explained before, the retention of gain time is now dependent not only upon
satisfactory behavior while in prison but also upon satisfactory behavior while under
supervision after release.  See Dowdy v. Singletary, 704 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1998). 
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Since 1988, the law has provided that for certain more "at risk" inmates, while gain
time awards will shorten the length of their incarceration, they will have to remain
under supervision after release from prison for a period of time equal to the amount
of gain time awarded.  See Rivera v. Singletary, 707 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla.
1998)(describing program as "an additional post-prison supervision program for
certain types of offenders that the legislature has determined to be in need of further
supervision after release"); see also §§ 947.1405, 944.28(1), 944.291(2), Fla. Stat.
(1999); Lincoln v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 643 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 1st DCA
1994).  
The Legislature has determined that habitual offenders and offenders who
have committed certain types of violent offenses after having served a prior
commitment to prison should receive supervision after release.  See § 947.1405, Fla.
Stat. (1999).  This supervision should help these former inmates in bridging the gap
between prison and the outside world.  To encourage releasees to comply with the
terms and conditions of supervision, the program provides that if the releasee fails to
do so, the releasee will be returned to prison and his gain time will be forfeited. 
Therefore, while Duncan's gain time will not automatically be forfeited when he is
released to Conditional Release supervision, if Duncan fails to satisfactorily
complete his supervision, then his gain time will be forfeited.  See § 944.28(1), Fla.
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Stat. (1999).  
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Duncan also seems to believe that when he is released from prison he will
have completely served his sentence and the imposition of supervision and the
possible revocation of that supervision could result in his having to serve his
sentence "over again," which he believes would constitute a violation of double
jeopardy.   See art. 1 § 9, Fla. Const.;  U.S. Const. amend. V.  We disagree.
The statutes affecting Duncan's sentence were in effect when he committed
his crime and when he pled guilty.  By statute, Duncan's sentence has always
included a period of supervision.  See § 947.1405, Fla. Stat. (1999).  Duncan's
sentence does not expire when the incarcerative portion of his sentence ends; it only
expires when the entire sentence, including the supervisory period, has been
satisfactorily completed.  See §§ 947.1405, 944.28(1), 944.291(2), Fla. Stat. (1989-
1999).  
It has long been accepted that the placement of an inmate on supervision after
a period of time incarcerated is a legitimate form of punishment for crime.  See
Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 475 (1972)(discussing the concept of parole). 
Also accepted has been the notion that if the releasee violates his or her supervision,
the releasee may be returned to prison to finish serving the releasee's original
1 Of course, the releasee's underlying criminal offense must have been committed on or
after the effective date of the statute providing for forfeiture of gain time upon Conditional
Release revocation.  See Dowdy v. Singletary, 704 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Fla. 1998); § 974.141;
944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  The Conditional Release statute covers eligible offenders whose
relevant offense dates were committed on or after October 1, 1988.  See § 947.1405(2)(a), Fla.
Stat. (1999).
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sentence.  Id. at 478.  Further, in some types of revocation proceedings, the releasee
may be subjected to new or enhanced punishment without violating double jeopardy
because it is the releasee's intervening misconduct which triggers the new sentence. 
See Lawson v. State,  24 Fla. L. Weekly D2683, D2684 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 1,
1999)(discussing community control revocation); Franklin v. State, 526 So. 2d 159
(Fla. 5th DCA 1988)(same), approved, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1989), disapproved in
part on other grounds, State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1990).
Therefore, we find that requiring that a Conditional Release eligible inmate
finish his or her sentence by satisfactorily completing a period of post-prison
supervision equal to the amount of gain time awarded does not violate double
jeopardy.  Further, returning a Conditional Release violator to prison to continue
serving his or her sentence without credit for the prior awarded gain time does not
constitute a violation of double jeopardy.1  See also Gibbs v. Wainwright, 302 So.
2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)(concerning forfeiture of gain time upon parole
revocation).
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EX POST FACTO
Petitioner Duncan also asserts that subjecting him to Conditional Release
constitutes an ex post facto violation.  See art. 1 § 10, Fla. Const.;  U.S. Const.  art.
I § 9.  Again, we must disagree.  
It is well settled that the Ex Post Facto Clause is triggered when a later-
enacted law "increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime
was consummated." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (emphasis added). 
To violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, such a law need only make the punishment
more onerous than the law in effect at the time the offense was committed.  See
Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499, 507 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 67
(1999).  Nevertheless, the Conditional Release statute and its corresponding gain
time forfeiture statute had gone into effect years before Duncan committed the crime
of aggravated battery on May 21, 1994.  Therefore, there is no retrospective
application of a later-enacted statute to Duncan, and thus there is no ex post facto
violation.
DUE PROCESS
Duncan also claims that his placement on Conditional Release constitutes a
violation of due process because it improperly takes away his vested liberty interest
in the gain time he has been awarded.  See art. 1 § 9, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const.
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amend. XIV, § 1.  We disagree.
First of all, as we have previously noted, even after having received gain time,
the retention of that gain time has always been contingent upon the inmate's
continued good behavior while on supervision.  Therefore, Duncan does not have a
vested liberty interest in his gain time, he only has a conditional interest.  Duncan
may retain his gain time only if he complies with the conditions under which it was
given.  Since 1988, the gain time statutes have provided that when inmates subject
to Conditional Release receive gain time, that gain time must be served as
supervision upon release and is subject to forfeiture if the releasee violates the terms
and conditions of his or her supervision.  See §§ 947.1405, 944.28(1), Fla. Stat.
(1999).  Furthermore, even if a warrant is issued after Duncan is released on
Conditional Release charging him with violation of the terms and conditions of his
supervision, by statute and rule, Duncan must be provided with the opportunity to
have a due process hearing.  In that hearing the State will have to prove that Duncan
did indeed violate his supervision before it can revoke his release and forfeit his gain
time.  See § 947.141, Fla. Stat. (1999); Fla. Admin. Code R. 22-23.011(4). 
Therefore, if Duncan loses his gain time, it will only be after due process of law. 
Thus, Duncan's placement on Conditional Release does not constitute a violation of
due process.
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EQUAL PROTECTION
Duncan also asserts that his placement on Conditional Release will result in a
violation of equal protection because other prisoners are not placed on Conditional
Release.  See art. 1 § 2, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Equal protection is not violated merely because some persons are treated
differently than other persons.  It only requires that persons similarly situated be
treated similarly.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985).  In the absence of a fundamental right or a protected class, equal
protection demands only that a distinction which results in unequal treatment bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.  Id. at 440-41; See also
Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1978).  This is known as the rational
basis test.  Since there is no fundamental right or suspect class at issue here, the
State need only meet that test.  
As we have observed before, inmates subject to Conditional Release are
those which, due to their prior criminal history, have been deemed by the
Legislature to need additional supervision after release from prison.  Accordingly,
they are not similarly situated to inmates who do not have similar criminal histories
and are not subject to Conditional Release.  The Conditional Release statute clearly
has two purposes: (1) rehabilitation of the releasee and (2) protection of society.  If
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the releasee's supervisor sees that the releasee has failed to comply with the terms
and conditions of his or her release, thereby indicating that the releasee is not
amenable to further supervision, the releasee can be returned to prison to continue
serving his or her sentence under a more secure setting.  For releasees, the
knowledge that they can be returned to prison relatively easily if they begin to
wander astray would clearly be a rather persuasive incentive for these former
inmates to strive to become law-abiding citizens.  We find that attempting to
dissuade releasees from returning to a life of crime is clearly a legitimate state
purpose.  Further, we find that maintaining such releasees under supervision is a
reasonable means of achieving that goal.  Therefore, we find that the State has
satisfied the rational basis test and thus there is no equal protection violation.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Finally, Duncan asserts that his placement on Conditional Release and any
subsequent revocation that might occur will result in the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment.  See art. 1 § 17, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  
We find this argument to be utterly meritless.  Duncan committed an
aggravated battery on his victim with a baseball bat.  He was sentenced to 42
months in prison for that crime.  Due to the award of gain time, Duncan will be
released from prison before actually serving 42 months.  The remaining time will be
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served on supervision.  Even if Duncan violates his supervision and is returned to
prison to serve 42 months "day-for-day," we can hardly say that such a sentence
constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment."  Aggravated battery is a second-degree
felony and the statutory maximum is 15 years in prison.  See §§ 784.045(2), 
775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Duncan's sentence is considerably less than the
maximum.  A criminal penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment if it, among
other things, "involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Provenzano
v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied,  120 S. Ct. 1222 (2000), or
otherwise "shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people,"  United States
v. Rosenburg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir.1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952),
based on  "evolving standards of decency." Provenzano, 744 So. 2d at 415.  We do
not believe that Duncan's punishment meets any of those tests.  Accordingly, we
find that imposition of Conditional Release supervision does not result in cruel and
unusual punishment. 
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based upon the foregoing reasons we hold that imposition of a
period of Conditional Release supervision after release from prison in which the
releasee will have to comply with reasonable terms and conditions or be returned to
prison to continue serving the eligible sentence without credit for gain time awarded
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does not violate any of the releasee's constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection
Clause; nor does it impose cruel and unusual punishment.  Accordingly, we deny the
instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Joshua B. Duncan, pro se, Polk City, Florida,
for Petitioner
William L. Camper, General Counsel, and Kim M. Fluharty, Assistant General
Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, Florida; and Judy Bone, Assistant
General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent