Title: Root v. Allen
Citation: 377 P.2d 117
Docket Number: 19750
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 1962

377 P.2d 117 (1962) William B. ROOT, Plaintiff in Error, v. Robert E. ALLEN, Defendant in Error. No. 19750. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. December 24, 1962. *118 Donald W. Marshall, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Phillip Hornbein, Jr., H. Ted Rubin, S. Morris Lubow, Denver, for defendant in error. DAY, Chief Justice. Plaintiff in error William B. Root filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Denver District Court to obtain the custody of his daughter Sharon Ann. He will be hereinafter referred to by name or as the father. The defendant in error was the respondent in the lower court and will be referred to by name. The father in his petition alleged the birth of the child to himself and his then wife Rachel Root on October 21, 1949. Other allegations, all admitted by Allen, are that Mr. and Mrs. Root were divorced in Kansas in 1950 and by agreement custody of Sharon was given to the mother subject to the father's visitation rights. The father agreed to pay $50.00 monthly for child support and at all times from the divorce until the death of the mother in January, 1958, made his payments. In February, 1953, Mrs. Root moved to Colorado where she married Allen and remained here with him until her death. The father has been a resident of California since 1956. When the child's mother died in 1958 Allen informed the father and requested his consent to the adoption of the child, which the father declined. The father requested Allen to relinquish the child back to him, which Allen declined to do, hence the petition by the father to obtain the child. After hearing the trial court rendered exhaustive findings in which it concluded that it was for the best interests of the child that Sharon Ann remain in the custody of Allen. Petition for habeas corpus was denied, new trial was dispensed with, and it is to that judgment that the father brings this writ of error. The findings of the trial court pretty much give the picture between the time of the divorce in 1950 up to the hearing for custody. We can do no better than to relate the court's findings here as follows: We have underlined several portions of the trial court's finding, pointing up many factors involved in the testimony given the court. When appraising the evidence, either from the standpoint of Mr. Allen or when giving every favorable inference to the father, the court came to the conclusion that it was for the best interest of the child that she remain in the environment in which she has grown up. One paramount question, therefore, presents itself in this case: This question is answered in the negative. In the recent case of Coulter v. Coulter, 141 Colo. 237, 347 P.2d 492, a divorced mother sought to regain custody of her child from the child's paternal grandparents. In that case the child had been in the custody of its paternal grandparents for seven years, during which time she was visited by her mother, and knew of the identity of her mother. This court recognized the presumption that ordinarily a child's welfare will be best served through the custody of the natural parent, but held that under the evidence adduced, the trial court had properly reached the conclusion that in the particular case the welfare of the child would be promoted by leaving it with its grandmother. In discussing Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 P. 21, 30 L.R.A.,N.S., 507, the court stated: The court also quoted from Hochheimer's Custody of Infants, as follows: "Unquestionably when the power of the court is invoked to place an infant into the custody of its parents and to withdraw such child from other persons, the court will scrutinize all the circumstances and ascertain `if a change of custody would be disadvantageous to the infant.' If so, the change will not be made, `and it matters not whether it is through the fault or the mere misfortune of the legal guardian *121 that the infant has come to be out of his custody.'" Prior to the Coulter case, in Devlin v. Huffman, 139 Colo. 417, 339 P.2d 1008, this court therein held that the right of a parent to have the custody of his natural child must give way where the welfare of the child requires it. In that case the children were in the custody of the maternal grandparents and the mother sought to regain custody through habeas corpus. The grandparents had had custody of the children for six years. The trial court denied the petition and this court affirmed, stating: In another case this court affirmed the order of the district court which denied custody of a minor child to the natural mother. The language of the trial court, approved by the Supreme Court, was inter alia: It will thus be seen that this court has held that the presumption that a child's welfare is best served through custody of the natural parent is a rebuttable one, and that where the evidence establishes that the welfare of the child will not be promoted by the parent's custody, such custody will not be granted. We believe that these decisions are controlling in this case. The Trial court not only found that the welfare of Sharon would not be furthered by placing her custody in the petitioner, but also found that such action would be extremely detrimental to the child and would likely result in permanent damage to her personality and development. Although the court found that the father was a fit and suitable person to have custody of the daughter, he did not find that the home to which the child would be taken as a stranger was a suitable one. Mr. Root had remarried, and Sharon would be placed not only in the company of a father whom she did not know but also with a stepmother who, in addition to being a total stranger, was shown by the testimony to be having considerable personal problems. No good purpose would be served here by relating the difficulties of the present Mrs. Root, suffice it to say that in 51 folios of testimony there is ample support for the court's conclusion that it would not be for the best interests of Sharon to place her in this home, particularly in view of the trauma to which Sharon had already been subjected in the death of her mother. The trial court took note of the age of the child, that in a short time she would be entering the age of puberty which is generally associated with emotional conflict, inner struggle and normally increased difficulties in adjustment. It is fairly well established that children handle the problem of the transition to young manhood and womanhood in a more satisfactory fashion when they are helped and surrounded by stable, loving persons who have helped them through their childhood. This is not the time to make drastic changes in a child's life. The sum of the testimony, including expert witnesses, was that Sharon, for all practical purposes, was the true daughter of respondent Allen, accepted as such and treated as such. There was mutual love between the two, and Mr. Allen even more so than Sharon's own mother was devoted, understanding, and did everything he could to make her happy and secure and help her grow as a normal, happy child. *122 Usually authorities are no longer cited for the purpose that in controversies of this nature the court is bound by the findings of the trial court, but we feel it apropos here to reiterate the statement in Wiederspahn v. Wiederspahn, 146 Colo. 214, 361 P.2d 125, as follows: The judgment is affirmed. MOORE, J., not participating.