Title: West v. Director, Dept. of Corrections
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 052263
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2007

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser*, Lemons, Koontz, 
and Agee, JJ. 
 
JAMES DARRELL WEST 
 
v. Record No. 052263    OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  January 12, 2007 
DIRECTOR OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
This petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed under 
our original jurisdiction.  We consider whether the petitioner, 
James Darrell West, is entitled to relief for his claim that he 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  West bases his claim on counsel’s failure to raise at 
trial a double jeopardy challenge to West’s convictions of both 
aggravated involuntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. 
I. Proceedings 
West was indicted for aggravated involuntary manslaughter of 
Burlia Gene Jenkins, Jr., in violation of Code § 18.2-36.1, 
common law involuntary manslaughter of Jenkins, punishable under 
Code § 18.2-36, and operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol (DUI), in violation of Code § 18.2-266.  
West was convicted of these offenses after a bench trial in the 
Circuit Court of Henrico County. 
The circuit court sentenced West to ten years’ imprisonment 
with five years suspended for the aggravated involuntary 
                                                 
* Justice Kinser did not participate in the decision of this 
case. 
 
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manslaughter conviction, five years’ imprisonment for the common 
law involuntary manslaughter conviction, and a suspended jail 
sentence of 30 days for the DUI conviction.  The circuit court 
ordered that the sentences for aggravated involuntary 
manslaughter and common law involuntary manslaughter be served 
concurrently. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed West’s convictions.  West v. 
Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 597 S.E.2d 274 (2004).  We 
affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment by order, holding that 
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded West did not preserve at 
trial the double jeopardy argument he asserted on appeal.  West 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 041641 (March 18, 2005).  
 
West filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this 
Court invoking our original jurisdiction under Code § 8.01-654.  
We placed this proceeding on our privileged docket, limited to 
the following question:  
Was counsel’s failure to object to petitioner’s convictions 
for both involuntary manslaughter and aggravated 
involuntary manslaughter as violating double jeopardy 
prejudicial within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), and, if so, can this Court grant 
relief where the remedy will not result in petitioner’s 
release from prison as his sentences are being served 
concurrently? 
 
II. Facts 
 
 
On April 17, 2002, Burlia Gene Jenkins, Jr. died from 
injuries sustained in a car accident.  The accident occurred when 
the vehicle West was driving struck the rear of Jenkins’ truck, 
causing the truck to veer from the road and overturn.  Two hours 
 
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after the accident, West was given a test to determine his blood 
alcohol content.  The test showed that West’s blood alcohol 
content was .10 by weight by volume. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth asserted that the Fifth Amendment 
Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar a conviction for both 
involuntary manslaughter and aggravated involuntary manslaughter.  
The Commonwealth contended that the common law offense of 
involuntary manslaughter was not a lesser-included offense of the 
statutory crime of aggravated involuntary manslaughter.  At the 
sentencing hearing, however, the Commonwealth asked that the 
circuit court “let the Court of Appeals determine which conviction 
lies.” 
 
In response, West moved to strike the aggravated involuntary 
manslaughter conviction, arguing that the Commonwealth was 
required to “make an election” between that offense and the 
involuntary manslaughter conviction.  West did not state, however, 
that his argument rested on constitutional or double jeopardy 
grounds. 
III. Discussion 
 
West argues that based on his counsel’s failure to raise a 
double jeopardy objection to his convictions for both aggravated 
involuntary manslaughter and common law involuntary 
manslaughter, he was prejudiced within the meaning of 
Strickland.  West contends that absent counsel’s ineffective 
 
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assistance, West would not have been convicted of common law 
involuntary manslaughter.  He further asserts that if he had not 
been convicted of that offense, he would have qualified under 
the sentencing guidelines provided pursuant to Code § 19.2-
298.01 for a lower recommended sentence on the aggravated 
involuntary manslaughter conviction.  Thus, West maintains, the 
circuit court would have imposed a shorter penitentiary 
sentence. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that West was not 
prejudiced within the meaning of Strickland because he has 
failed to establish that the circuit court would have imposed a 
lesser punishment had the common law involuntary manslaughter 
charge been dismissed.  According to the Commonwealth, because 
the sentencing guidelines are not mandatory, any increase in the 
guideline range of punishment resulting from West’s conviction 
on both manslaughter charges would not support a conclusion of 
prejudice.  Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that even if 
West was prejudiced by counsel’s error, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to vacate West’s common law involuntary 
manslaughter conviction because such relief would not result in 
his immediate release. 
 
In deciding these issues, we first consider whether West 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel based on 
counsel’s failure to argue at trial that the Fifth Amendment 
 
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Double Jeopardy Clause barred West from being convicted of both 
the aggravated involuntary manslaughter and the common law 
involuntary manslaughter charges.  The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.  Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); Yarbrough v. Warden, 
269 Va. 184, 196, 609 S.E.2d 30, 36 (2005); Lovitt v. Warden, 
266 Va. 216, 248, 585 S.E.2d 801, 820 (2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 1006 (2004).  This constitutional guarantee entitles a 
defendant in a criminal trial to reasonably competent counsel 
who provides assistance that is within the range of competence 
required of attorneys in criminal cases.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 196, 609 S.E.2d at 37; see Wiggins 
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 
 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a petitioner ordinarily must satisfy both parts of the two-part 
test stated in Strickland.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; 
Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 196, 609 S.E.2d at 37; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 
249, 585 S.E.2d at 820.  The petitioner first must show that 
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521.  In resolving this issue, the court 
reviewing the habeas petition “must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
 
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professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Yarbrough, 269 
Va. at 196, 609 S.E.2d at 37. 
 
When a reviewing court concludes that counsel’s performance 
was deficient under the first part of the Strickland test, the 
petitioner is required, under the second part of the Strickland 
test, to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Wiggins, 539 
U.S. at 534; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 250. 
 
In the present case, we conclude that counsel’s performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  The Fifth 
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause provides three guarantees: 1) 
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal of that offense; 2) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction of that 
offense; and 3) protection against multiple punishments for the 
same offense.  Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1980); North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Stephens v. 
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 58, 62, 557 S.E.2d 227, 229-30 (2002); 
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 196, 199, 539 S.E.2d 732, 733 
(2001); Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 227, 509 S.E.2d 293, 
300 (1999); Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 
 
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796, 797 (1981).  In the single-trial context applicable here, 
“the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring 
that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by 
imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.”  Brown, 432 
U.S. at 165; Stephens, 263 Va. at 62, 557 S.E.2d at 230; Coleman, 
261 Va. at 199-200, 539 S.E.2d at 734; Payne, 257 Va. at 227, 509 
S.E.2d at 300; Blythe, 222 Va. at 725, 284 S.E.2d at 798. 
 
In determining whether a defendant who has been convicted of 
two offenses may receive multiple punishments, the test to be 
applied is “whether each [offense] requires proof of a fact which 
the other does not.”  Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932); Brown, 432 U.S. at 166; Commonwealth v. Hudgins, 269 
Va. 602, 605, 611 S.E.2d 362, 364 (2005); Alston v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 433, 438, 570 S.E.2d 801, 804 (2002); 
Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734.  In applying this 
test, the two offenses must be considered in the abstract, rather 
than in the context of the facts of the particular case being 
reviewed.  Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 694 n.8 (1980); 
Hudgins, 269 Va. at 606, 611 S.E.2d at 365; Coleman, 261 Va. at 
200, 539 S.E.2d at 734. 
 
We conclude that when viewed in the abstract, the charges in 
the present case do not qualify as separate offenses within the 
meaning of the Blockburger test.  The offense of common law 
involuntary manslaughter does not require proof of a fact 
different from those required for a conviction of aggravated 
involuntary manslaughter under Code § 18.2-36.1. 
 
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The statutory offense of aggravated involuntary manslaughter 
has three elements: 1) driving under the influence in violation 
of Code § 18.2-266 or a substantially similar ordinance; 2) 
unintentionally causing the death of another as a result of this 
conduct; and 3) acting in a manner “so gross, wanton and culpable 
as to show a reckless disregard for human life.”  Code § 18.2-
36.1; Stevens v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 481, 487, 634 S.E.2d 305, 
309 (2006).  In contrast, the crime of common law involuntary 
manslaughter has two elements: 1) the accidental killing of a 
person, contrary to the intention of the parties; and 2) the 
death occurs in the defendant’s prosecution of an unlawful but 
not felonious act, or in the defendant’s improper performance of 
a lawful act.  Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 240, 415 
S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992); Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 470, 
536 S.E.2d 437, 443 (2000); Gooden v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 565, 
571, 311 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1984).  To constitute involuntary 
manslaughter, the “improper” performance of a lawful act must 
amount to an unlawful commission of that lawful act, manifesting 
criminal negligence.  Cable, 243 Va. at 240, 415 S.E.2d at 220; 
Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 847, 44 S.E.2d 409, 413 
(1947). 
 
Because the common law crime of involuntary manslaughter 
does not require proof of a fact that is not also required for a 
conviction of aggravated involuntary manslaughter under Code 
§ 18.2-36.1, convictions for both these offenses resulted in West 
receiving multiple punishments for the same offense.  Thus, a 
timely assertion of the bar of double jeopardy would have 
 
9
protected West from receiving multiple punishments for those 
convictions.  See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165; Stephens, 263 Va. at 
62, 557 S.E.2d at 230; Coleman, 261 Va. at 199, 539 S.E.2d at 
734; Payne, 257 Va. at 227, 509 S.E.2d at 300; Blythe, 222 Va. at 
725, 284 S.E.2d at 798.  We hold that reasonably competent 
counsel would have asserted this constitutional guarantee on 
West’s behalf at trial, and that counsel’s failure to do so “fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88. 
 
Having concluded that West did not receive effective 
assistance of counsel at trial, we turn to consider the second 
part of the Strickland test, commonly referred to as the 
“prejudice” prong.  We must determine whether counsel’s failure 
to assert the bar of double jeopardy at trial prejudiced West, 
creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
failure, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 
We hold that West suffered prejudice as defined by 
Strickland.  The additional manslaughter conviction resulted in 
West being convicted of two felonies with two distinct 
punishments imposed, instead of one felony conviction with one 
punishment.  The fact that the circuit court imposed the 
sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively, does not alter 
our conclusion that West was prejudiced.  The sentences were 
separately imposed and, but for counsel’s failure, West would 
have received only one felony conviction with one accompanying 
punishment. 
 
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In reaching this conclusion, we reject West’s argument that 
he also suffered prejudice because his conviction of the two 
felony offenses made him subject to an increased range of 
punishment under the sentencing guidelines.  West’s argument is 
without merit because the guidelines provided by Code § 19.2-
298.01 are discretionary, rather than mandatory.  Under that 
statute, the circuit court was required only to consider the 
sentencing guidelines before sentencing West and to file with the 
record of the case a written explanation of any departure from 
the indicated range of punishment.  Code § 19.2-298.01(B). 
 
Moreover, the statute further provides that the “failure to 
follow any or all of the provisions in this section or the 
failure to follow any or all of the provisions of this section in 
the prescribed manner shall not be reviewable on appeal or the 
basis of other post-conviction relief.”  Code § 19.2-298.01(F).  
Thus, the fact that the sentencing guidelines in West’s case may 
have been different had he been convicted only of one, instead of 
two felonies, does not provide him any basis for post-conviction 
relief on the aggravated involuntary manslaughter conviction in 
this habeas corpus petition. 
 
Because West suffered prejudice as defined by Strickland, we 
must consider the appropriate relief that he should be afforded.  
The Commonwealth requests that this Court, in the exercise of its 
discretion, decline to grant West relief from his common law 
involuntary manslaughter conviction by applying the “concurrent 
sentencing doctrine.”  The question whether we should apply this 
 
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“doctrine” presents an issue of first impression in this 
Commonwealth. 
 
Other jurisdictions, through application of the “concurrent 
sentencing doctrine,” have selectively exercised their discretion 
to decline review of the validity of a defendant’s criminal 
conviction when 1) a defendant has received two or more 
concurrent sentences on multiple counts of an indictment; 2) one 
or more of those convictions is not challenged or is upheld as 
valid; and 3) a ruling in the defendant’s favor on the remaining 
conviction would not reduce the period of imprisonment the 
defendant is required to serve on the valid conviction or 
convictions.  See Williams v. Maggio, 714 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Smith, 601 F.2d 972, 973 (8th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Weems, 414 F.2d 417, 418-19 (2nd Cir. 1969); 
State v. Edwards, 755 P.2d 821, 822 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Smith 
v. State, 443 A.2d 985, 995 (Md. App. 1982).   The “concurrent 
sentencing doctrine” is not applied, however, in cases in which a 
defendant would suffer prejudice or be exposed to a “substantial 
risk of adverse collateral consequences that might flow from an 
invalid but unreversed conviction.”  Smith, 601 F.2d at 973-74 
(quoting Sanders v. United States, 541 F.2d 190, 193 n.1 (8th 
Cir. 1976)).         
 
The “concurrent sentencing doctrine” is essentially a rule 
grounded in judicial economy and convenience.  See Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 792 (1969); United States v. Stovall, 
825 F.2d 817, 824 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Fuentes-
 
12
Jimenez, 750 F.2d 1495, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985); Atkins v. Hopper, 
216 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Ga. 1975); Frizzell v. State, 238 So.2d 67, 
69 (1970).  Addressing the merits of this doctrine, we observe 
that the doctrine assigns a higher priority to concerns of 
judicial efficiency than to relief entitled a petitioner under 
our federal constitution.  Because acceptance of such a 
perspective would close the doors of our courts to many 
petitioners regardless of the merits of their claims, we decline 
to apply the “concurrent sentencing doctrine” in Virginia.  
Instead, we adopt the view expressed by the Supreme Court of 
Georgia that the burden of any inconvenience in the 
administration of our justice system “should rest on the 
shoulders of the judiciary rather than on those of an imprisoned 
petitioner.”  Atkins, 216 S.E.2d at 91.  Therefore, we hold that 
West is entitled to habeas corpus relief from his common law 
involuntary manslaughter conviction and sentence. 
 
We find no merit in the Commonwealth’s argument that based 
on our holding in Virginia Parole Bd. v. Wilkins, 255 Va. 419, 
421, 498 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1998), we lack jurisdiction to grant a 
writ of habeas corpus because our granting of the writ will not 
result in West’s release from his immediate detention.  In 
Wilkins, we considered an appeal in which a circuit court had 
granted a writ of habeas corpus, ordering that a prisoner “be 
reviewed for parole” within a specified year.  Id. at 420, 498 
S.E.2d at 695-96.  We held that the circuit court erred in 
 
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granting the writ because the writ “is available only [when] the 
release of the prisoner from his immediate detention will follow 
as a result of an order in his favor.”  Id. at 420-21, 498 S.E.2d 
at 696.  
 
Although West is serving concurrent sentences on the two 
manslaughter convictions, our judgment granting a writ of habeas 
corpus with regard to his common law involuntary manslaughter 
conviction will result in his release from immediate detention on 
that conviction and sentence.  Therefore, our decision complies 
with the purpose and scope of the writ of habeas corpus, which is 
to test the legality of a prisoner’s detention.  See Code § 8.01-
654; Wilkins, 255 Va. at 420, 498 S.E.2d at 696; McClenny v. 
Murray, 246 Va. 132, 134, 431 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1993); Smyth v. 
Midgett, 199 Va. 727, 730, 101 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1958). 
 
Accordingly, for these reasons, we will grant a writ of 
habeas corpus with regard to West’s common law involuntary 
manslaughter conviction and vacate his conviction and sentence on 
that offense.  We will dismiss the remainder of West’s petition 
including his request for relief on the aggravated involuntary 
manslaughter conviction. 
Writ granted in part and dismissed in part.