Title: State v. McDonnell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S41231
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 1999

FILED: OCTOBER 7, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, 

	Respondent,

	v.

MICHAEL MARTIN McDONNELL,

	Appellant.

(CC J8500004; SC S41231)

	On automatic and direct review of the sentence of death
entered by the Circuit Court for Douglas County.

	Argued and submitted May 3, 1996; resubmitted June 11, 1998.

	Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for appellant.  With him on the briefs was Sally L.
Avera, Public Defender.

	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With her on the briefs were Theodore
R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor
General, and David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Leeson, Justices.*

	DURHAM, J.

	The sentence of death is vacated, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.

	*Unis, J., retired June 30, 1996, and did not participate in
this decision; Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.  Kulongoski and
Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case. 

	DURHAM, J.

	Defendant appeals from a judgment that imposed a
sentence of death following his conviction for aggravated murder. 
The judgment is subject to automatic review in this court.  ORS
163.150(1)(g).  For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
sentence of death and remand this case to the circuit court for
further penalty phase proceedings.

	Defendant assigns error to the circuit court's refusal
to permit the jury, under ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) (quoted
below), to consider the option of sentencing defendant to life in
prison without the possibility of parole and, consistent with the
ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions,
to permit defendant to waive any objection to the jury's
consideration of that option.(1)  We restate below the procedural
history of the case that pertains to that assignment.

	On December 22, 1984, defendant killed Joey Keever. 
The facts regarding that crime are set out in State v. McDonnell,
313 Or 478, 481-82, 837 P2d 941 (1992) (McDonnell II).  At that
time, ORS 163.150 (1985) (Or Laws 1985, ch 3, § 3, which became
effective December 6, 1984) provided a choice between two
possible sentences for aggravated murder:  death or life
imprisonment with a 30-year minimum term of imprisonment
(ordinary life).  The statute required the jury in an aggravated
murder sentencing proceeding to answer three questions.  If the
jury answered all the questions in the affirmative, the court was
required to sentence the defendant to death.  If the jury
answered any question in the negative, the court was required to
impose a sentence of ordinary life.(2) 

	In 1988, a jury found defendant guilty of aggravated
murder in Keever's death and answered affirmatively the three
death penalty questions.  Accordingly, the court sentenced
defendant to death.  On direct review, this court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to permit the trial court to
consider whether defendant should be permitted to plead guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement.  State v. McDonnell, 310 Or 98, 794
P2d 780 (1990) (McDonnell I).  

	On remand from McDonnell I, the circuit court
reinstated the judgment and sentence of death.  On a second
direct review, this court in 1992 affirmed the conviction for
aggravated murder but vacated the sentence of death and remanded
the case for further proceedings, because the trial court's
instructions on mitigating evidence during the penalty phase were
inadequate.  McDonnell II, 313 Or at 506.  This appeal is from
those proceedings.  

	In 1989 and 1991, the legislature adopted amendments to
Oregon's death penalty statute that were in effect during the
penalty phase proceeding on remand from McDonnell II.  The 1989
amendments increased the number of available sentencing options
for aggravated murder by adding the choice of life imprisonment
without the possibility of release or parole (true life).  Or
Laws 1989, ch 720, §§ 1, 2.  The 1991 amendments added a
procedure governing imposition of a sentence for aggravated
murder after a reviewing court sets aside a death sentence and
remands the case to the trial court.  Or Laws 1991, ch 885, § 2. 
In this opinion, we refer to that penalty phase proceeding on
remand as the remand proceeding.  As a consequence of those
amendments, at the time of defendant's remand proceeding, ORS
163.150 (1993) provided, in part:

		"(1)(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is
guilty of aggravated murder, the court, except as
otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section,
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(c),
life imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole, as described in ORS 163.105(1)(b), or death. 

	* * *.

		"(b) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall submit the following
issues to the jury:

		"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;

		"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;

		"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and

		"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence.

		"* * * * *

		"(f) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on
each issue considered under paragraph (b) of this
subsection, the trial judge shall sentence the
defendant to death.

		"* * * * *

		"(2)(a) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall also instruct the jury
that if it reaches a negative finding on any issue
under subsection (1)(b) of this section, the trial
court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment
without the possibility of release or parole, as
described in ORS 163.105(1)(b), unless 10 or more
members of the jury further find that there are
sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life
imprisonment, in which case the trial court shall
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as
described in ORS 163.105(1)(c).

		"(b) If the jury returns a negative finding on any
issue under subsection (1)(b) of this section and
further finds that there are sufficient mitigating
circumstances to warrant life imprisonment, the trial
court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment
in the custody of the Department of Corrections as
provided in ORS 163.105(1)(c).

		"* * * * *

		"(5) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a) of this
section, the following shall apply:

		"(a) If a reviewing court finds prejudicial error
in the sentencing proceeding only, the court may set
aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the
trial court.  No error in the sentencing proceeding
shall result in reversal of the defendant's conviction
for aggravated murder.  Upon remand and at the election
of the state, the trial court shall either:

		"(A) Sentence the defendant to imprisonment for
life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as
provided in ORS 163.105(1)(c); or

		"(B) Impanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose
of conducting a new sentencing proceeding to determine
if the defendant should be sentenced to:

		"(i) Death;

		"(ii) Imprisonment for life without the
possibility of release or parole as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(b); or

		"(iii) Imprisonment for life in the custody of the
Department of Corrections as provided in ORS
163.105(1)(c).

		"* * * * *

		"(d) The new sentencing proceeding shall be
governed by the provisions of subsections (1) and (2)
of this section. * * *.

		"(e) The provisions of this section are procedural
and shall apply to any defendant sentenced to death
after December 6, 1984."

		ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) required the trial court, at
the state's election, to submit to a new jury the sentencing
choices of death, true life, and ordinary life.  The jury was
required to answer four, rather than three, death penalty
questions, but the court still was obligated to sentence
defendant to death if the jury answered the four questions in the
affirmative.  If the jury answered any question in the negative,
the court was required to sentence defendant to true life
imprisonment, unless 10 or more jurors found that ordinary life
imprisonment was the appropriate sentence.  In the latter case,
the court was required to sentence the defendant to ordinary
life.  As noted, the legislature made the 1991 amendments
regarding resentencing after remand applicable to "any defendant
sentenced to death after December 6, 1984."  ORS 163.150(5)(e).

		Before the start of the remand proceeding following
McDonnell II, defendant asked the court to apply ORS 163.150(5)
(1993), not the former statute that had been in effect at the
time of defendant's crime.  Defendant also stated that he waived
any objection, including an ex post facto objection, to the
application of ORS 163.150(5) (1993) to the remand proceeding. 
The state acquiesced in defendant's request to apply ORS
163.150(5) (1993).(3)

		The trial court refused to apply ORS 163.150(5) (1993)
to the remand proceeding.  It reasoned, first, that it was
obligated to sentence defendant under the law in effect at the
time of his crime in 1984, not under ORS 163.150(5) (1993), and,
second, that a defendant is not entitled to waive an ex post
facto objection to a post-offense amendment to the death penalty
statute.  The court then convened the remand proceeding.  The
jury returned a verdict in which it answered affirmatively the
four questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b).  The court again
sentenced defendant to death.  This appeal followed.

		Defendant contends that the true life option applies to
the remand proceeding in this case by reason of ORS 163.150(5)
(1993); that this court's decision in State v. Wille, 317 Or 487,
858 P2d 128 (1993), which addressed an ex post facto issue under
ORS 163.150(2) (1989), does not preclude application of ORS
163.150(5) (1993) in this case; and that, in any event, defendant
was entitled to waive his potential ex post facto objection to
the application of the true life option to his case.  Defendant
also argues that Wille was decided incorrectly.  The state,
citing Wille, responds that the trial court's action was not
erroneous, because applying the true life option in the remand
proceeding to a crime that predated the legislature's adoption of
the true life option in 1989 would constitute an ex post facto
violation.  The state also asserts that the trial court was not
obligated to accept defendant's ex post facto waiver and that
defendant's waiver was insufficient. 

		We begin by acknowledging that the legislature
generally has plenary authority to enact laws governing matters
of criminal procedure and the sentences for criminal offenses,
subject to applicable constitutional restrictions.  See State v.
Baker, 328 Or 355, 358, 976 P2d 1132 (1999) ("Criminal procedure
is a subject over which the legislature generally has plenary
authority, subject to constitutional restrictions.").  The
prohibition on ex post facto laws in Article I, section 21, of
the Oregon Constitution, is one pertinent constitutional
restriction.  Before we assess whether the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws is subject to waiver, it
first is necessary to construe the pertinent statutes to
determine which statute controls the remand proceeding.  See
State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 343, 667 P2d 996 (1983) ("As this
court has repeatedly stated, the proper sequence begins with an
examination of ordinary rules of law and the scope and limits of
legal authorization before reaching any constitutional issue 

* * *.").  Only if we first determine that the legislature
intended to adopt retrospective legislation that applies to
defendant's 1984 crime would we proceed to consider whether
defendant was entitled to, and did, waive a constitutional ex
post facto objection.  Our initial inquiry, therefore, is a
question of statutory interpretation to which the methodology
described in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), applies.

		ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) required the trial court in a
capital case to follow the specified remand procedure only if a
reviewing court found prejudicial error in the sentencing
proceeding and remanded the case to the trial court.  This case
was in that precise procedural posture after this court's
decision in McDonnell II, in which this court stated:

	"* * * Accordingly, we vacate defendant's death
sentence and remand this case to the circuit court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

		"* * * We find no error as to the guilt phase of
defendant's trial.  We find error as to the penalty
phase of his trial and reverse as to the penalty phase
only."

McDonnell II, 313 Or at 506.

	Because the state on remand elected to conduct a new
sentencing proceeding, ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) by its terms
obligated the trial court to submit to a new jury three
sentencing options:  death, true life, and ordinary life.  ORS
163.150(5)(e) made that remand procedure applicable "to any
defendant sentenced to death after December 6, 1984." 
Unquestionably, defendant's case met that requirement because, at
the time of the remand proceeding in 1994, defendant had been
sentenced to death two times after December 6, 1984. 

	The trial court declined to apply ORS 163.150(5)(a)
(1993), because it interpreted one of our precedents, State v.
Isom, 313 Or 391, 837 P2d 491 (1992), to impose a general
requirement that criminal defendants must be tried and sentenced
under the law in effect when the crime was committed.  We
conclude that the trial court misread Isom. 

	The applicability of an amended statute to a pending
criminal proceeding is a matter within the legislature's control,
subject to ex post facto or other constitutional restraints.  See
State v. Kephart, 320 Or 433, 440, 887 P2d 774 (1994) (amended
statute regarding appellate review of criminal sentences applied
to criminal cases pending on appeal).  

	In Isom, this court held that a defendant who had been
convicted of aggravated murder was not entitled to the benefit of
a post-offense statutory amendment that would have precluded an
aggravated murder charge.  This court stated:

	"* * * 'The power to declare what punishment may be
assessed against those convicted of crime is not a
judicial, but a legislative, power, controlled only by
the provisions of the Constitution.'  State v. Smith,
128 Or 515, 524, 273 P 323 (1929).  Because the power
of punishment is legislative, when the legislature
changes the punishment for a crime, Oregon courts must
apply the sentence that the legislature intended."  

Isom, 313 Or at 395.  The court interpreted the pertinent
statute, ORS 161.035(4),(4) and concluded:

		"It is clear from ORS 161.035(4) that the
legislature intends that Oregon courts sentence
criminal defendants under the statutory scheme in force
when a particular criminal act was committed."

Ibid.  The trial court interpreted that statement broadly to
preclude the application of any post-offense amendments to
statutes regarding criminal sentences in Oregon criminal
proceedings.(5)  But that statement carried one import in the
context of Isom:  the legislature did not intend to apply the
particular post-offense statutory amendment at issue in that case
to the defendant.  Isom did not announce a free-floating rule of
criminal law that courts must apply the law in effect when a
defendant committed an offense regardless of any later expression
of legislative intention that a post-offense statutory amendment
should apply instead.  Rather, Isom confirmed that courts must
determine the applicability of a post-offense statutory amendment
in a criminal case, including an amendment to the preexisting
statutory sentence, by examining, first, the legislature's
intention and, second, any pertinent state and federal
constitutional restrictions.  Isom concluded that, subject to
constitutional restrictions, "Oregon courts must apply the
sentence that the legislature intended."  Ibid.

	In this case, ORS 161.035(4) maintained ORS 163.150
(1985) in force, despite later amendments to ORS 163.150 (1985), 
for the purpose of authorizing punishment of defendants for
crimes committed before the effective date of the amendments. 
For purposes of our present statutory analysis, ORS 163.150(5)(a)
(1993) obviated the need to exercise that authority, because,
subject to constitutional restraints, ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993)
prescribed the range of punishment that the court was required to
impose in the 1994 remand proceeding.  Because ORS 163.150(5)(a)
(1993) required the court to impose one of the listed statutory
sentences in the remand proceeding, the court had no reason to
exercise the authority to punish defendant that ORS 161.035(4)
had preserved.

	The foregoing statutory analysis demonstrates that the
legislature intended that ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) would apply to 
the remand proceeding in this case.  That brings us to the
state's contention that the trial court's refusal to apply that
statute nonetheless was correct, because defendant was not
entitled to waive an objection that the retroactive application
of ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) violates the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.  In response, defendant
points out that, at trial, the state did not object (and, in
fact, agreed) to the application of the true life option, or
argue that defendant could not waive an ex post facto objection
to the application of the true life option.

	As noted, the parties agreed below that the court
should apply the true life option and instruct the jury
accordingly, but the trial court refused.(6)  The court concluded
that defendant was not entitled either to waive an ex post facto
objection or to consent to be sentenced under an ex post facto
statute.

	The issue on appeal is the same issue that the trial
court faced when it rejected the parties' mutual request to apply
the true life option:  If a defendant does not assert an ex post
facto objection to the retroactive application of the true life
sentencing option, as required by the legislature, does the court
err in addressing and deciding the ex post facto issue?  We
address that issue first under Oregon's ex post facto provision. 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant's conduct
waived any ex post facto objection and that the court's decision
to decline to give effect to defendant's waiver was error.

	At the outset, we emphasize that ORS 163.150(5)(a)
(1993) is the statute that the legislature chose to apply to
defendant's remand proceeding even though defendant's offense
predated that statute's enactment.  This case does not involve an
attempt by the parties, by stipulation or otherwise, to induce
the court to apply a statute that clearly is inapplicable for
reasons apart from its potential vulnerability to an ex post
facto objection.  Parties cannot stipulate, for example, to the
retroactive application of a post-offense sentencing statute that
the legislature did not make retroactive.  See State v. Lyon, 304
Or 221, 231, 744 P2d 231 (1987) (parties "may not by stipulation
change the law * * *").  This case presents no such issue.

	The state contends that, because the constitutional ex
post facto provisions are addressed in text to the lawmaking
function, they protect not only a defendant's personal right but
also serve to limit legislative power and to uphold the
separation of powers.  In so arguing, the state seeks to
distinguish the right protected by Article I, section 21, of the
Oregon Constitution, from other personal constitutional rights
that a defendant may waive,(7) and 
to analogize Article I, section
21, to Article I, section 10 ("[n]o court shall be secret"),
which this court has held announces an institutional rule
forbidding secret adjudications, not an individual right that one
person may waive.  See State ex rel Davey v. Frankel, 312 Or 286,
289, 823 P2d 394 (1991):

		"[T]he command that '[n]o court shall be secret'
is not a statement of an individual right that may be
waived or compromised by the individual. * * * Rather
it 'is one of those provisions of the constitution that
prescribe how the functions of government shall be
conducted.'"

	We do not agree with the state's argument that Article
I, section 21, is analogous to the prohibition against secret
courts in Article I, section 10.  The text of the two provisions
demonstrates that they have materially different objectives. 
Article I, section 10, specifies a rule for the operation of
courts that courts must observe regardless of any choice by an
individual to waive or compromise that rule.  By contrast,
Article I, section 21, addresses the lawmaking function at the
time of enactment, not the process of adjudication by courts. 
That provision bears a greater textual and structural similarity
to other provisions of the state constitution that also prohibit
the enactment of certain types of laws, such as, for example,
Article I, sections 8, 9, and 20, of the Oregon Constitution,
which prohibit, respectively, the enactment of certain laws
regarding free expression, searches and seizures, and the
granting of privileges and immunities.  Among other things, the
latter constitutional provisions entitle a criminal defendant to
seek protection against an attempt by the state to enforce a
constitutionally forbidden statute.  But the enforceability of
those provisions in a criminal proceeding usually depends on the
defendant's timely invocation of the constitutional protection
that those provisions offer.  Those provisions are not a mandate
to courts, in any "jurisdictional" sense or otherwise, to strike
down or to refuse to enforce statutes that may violate their
prohibitions even if the defendant never has claimed their
protection.  A criminal defendant can waive the protection of
those constitutional provisions by failing to invoke them.

	Article I, section 21, functions in the same manner. 
That provision entitles a criminal defendant to invoke it against
the state's attempt to enforce an ex post facto law.  Contrary to
the trial court's view, that provision does not obligate a
criminal defendant to object to the application, in trial or at
sentencing, of a statute that arguably may implicate the ex post
facto clause.  Moreover, that provision does not make the trial
court responsible for its enforcement even if the defendant has
waived the protection of that provision.  As is true in many
other legal settings, a criminal defendant may knowingly and
intentionally relinquish, and thereby waive, the protection of a
pertinent statute or constitutional provision:

		"Rights, even of constitutional dimension, can be
waived.  See, e.g., State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 132,
831 P2d 666 (1992) (illustrating principle -- waiver of
right to counsel). * * *

		"* * * * *

		"'A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.'  State v.
Meyrick, supra, 313 Or at 132.  Although a waiver must
be intentional, there is no particular formula for
determining whether a waiver has occurred.  'Whether
there has been an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege will depend
upon the particular circumstances of each case * * *.' 
Ibid."

State v. Hunter, 316 Or 192, 199-201, 850 P2d 366 (1993).

	Our examination of the circumstances here leads us to
conclude that, under the definition of waiver set out in Hunter,
defendant's decision not to invoke the protection of the ex post
facto clause in Article I, section 21, in a timely manner against
the application of ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) in the remand
proceeding constituted a waiver of his right to that protection. 
Defendant made it clear to the trial court that he wanted the
jury to consider his case under ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993), in
order potentially to receive a true life sentence.  Defendant's
arguments to the trial court demonstrate that he was aware that
he could invoke his constitutional right to protection against
the enforcement of ex post facto laws, but that he chose
intentionally to relinquish that right.  The written waiver that
defendant filed, in which he expressed in elaborate terms his
desire to waive his constitutional rights, amply confirms that
defendant's decision not to invoke his constitutional protection
against ex post facto laws was an intentional relinquishment of a
known right.

	As the state correctly contends, the ex post facto
clause also serves important institutional interests, such as the
interest in safeguarding the separation of powers, and does not
protect only the individual rights of criminal defendants. 
However, the state's contention does not lead logically to the
conclusion that a criminal defendant may not waive the protection
of the ex post facto clause.

	As with other constitutional restrictions on the
substance of legislation, Article I, section 21, directs the ex
post facto prohibition at lawmakers at the point of their
enactment of a proposed law.  See Cookman, 324 Or at 26
(discussing characteristics of a prohibited ex post facto law). 
That provision does not invite the enactment of ex post facto
laws, leaving it solely to the courts to invalidate them in
individual cases.  See State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 412 n 10,
649 P2d 569 (1982) (similarly analyzing constitutional
restriction on laws restraining the free expression of opinion).

	Once the legislature has acted, however, constitutional
enforcement of the prohibition against ex post facto laws depends
in the main on the courts and the process of adjudication. 
Adjudication, in turn, resolves legal and factual issues framed
by litigants through familiar legal procedures, including
pleadings, motions, and legal argument.  Courts generally confine
their judgments to the issues that the litigants have raised and
submitted for decision.  See State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766
P2d 373 (1988) (discussing justifications for requiring
preservation of claims of error in trial court).  Consistent with
the adjudicatory process, courts generally will refrain from
deciding whether an applicable post-offense sentencing statute is
an ex post facto law if the criminal defendant has not asserted
such a claim.

	Returning to the state's argument, we fail to see how
adherence by courts to the adjudicatory procedures described
above -- in particular, refraining from deciding sua sponte an ex
post facto issue that a criminal defendant has waived -- somehow
will induce the legislature to become less attentive to its
responsibility under Article I, section 21, to avoid enacting ex
post facto laws.  The proscription in that provision remains
absolute.  Consequently, our conclusion that a criminal defendant
may waive the constitutional protection against application of ex
post facto laws does not undermine the doctrine of separation of
powers.

	Finally, the state contends that the trial court was
not required to "accept" defendant's waiver of his constitutional
protection against ex post facto laws.  That argument fails to
focus properly on the procedural act that effected defendant's
waiver.  As noted above, defendant sought the application of ORS
163.150(5)(a) (1993) in the remand proceeding.  At that point, he
asserted no timely objection or claim that that statute was an ex
post facto law.  That claim was defendant's to assert, and he did
not do so.  Defendant's choice effected a waiver of his
constitutional protection and eliminated any ex post facto issue
for decision by the trial court.

	Having determined that defendant was entitled to, and
did, waive the protection against ex post facto laws afforded by
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, we turn to the
question whether defendant's waiver of the protection of the ex
post facto clause in Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution is subject to the same analysis.  The United States
Supreme Court has not decided that question.  However, that
Court's pertinent decisions uniformly involve proceedings in
which a criminal defendant has asserted that a retrospective
statute offends the federal constitutional proscription against
ex post facto laws.  See, e.g., California Dept. of Corrections
v. Morales, 514 US 499, 115 S Ct 1597, 131 L Ed 2d 588 (1995) (in
response to prisoner's habeas corpus proceeding, Court held that
retroactive application of post-offense statute decreasing
frequency of parole suitability hearings did not violate federal
ex post facto provision); Miller v. Florida, 482 US 423, 107 S Ct
2446, 96 L Ed 2d 351 (1987) (post-offense revision of sentencing
guidelines, applied over the defendant's objection, violated
federal ex post facto clause); Weaver v. Graham, 450 US 24, 101 S
Ct 960, 67 L Ed 2d 17 (1981) (Court sustained prisoner's pro se
habeas corpus proceeding challenging retroactive application by
prison officials of a post-offense statute reducing accumulation
of monthly gain time credits); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 US 282, 97
S Ct 2290, 53 L Ed 2d 344 (1977) (the defendant objected, on ex
post facto grounds, to sentencing under post-offense death
penalty statute; held: no ex post facto violation occurred
because statutory changes were only procedural and, on the whole,
ameliorative).

	One recent decision implies that a criminal defendant
may waive his protection under the federal ex post facto clause. 
In Lynce v. Mathis, 519 US 433, 117 S Ct 891, 137 L Ed 2d 63
(1997), the Court held that the cancellation of provisional
credits toward release, pursuant to a post-offense statute,
violated the federal ex post facto clause because the new scheme
was retrospective and increased the punishment for the
defendant's crime.  The Court noted that the petitioner had not
advanced his ex post facto claim in state court.  Rather, he
filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus directly in
federal court.  The Court also observed that the state
respondents had challenged the petitioner's failure to exhaust
his state remedies on that issue, but later had abandoned that
argument.  The Court stated that the petitioner was not required
to exhaust his state remedies because the Florida courts already
had rejected the same ex post facto claim.  As a consequence,
"exhaustion would have been futile."  Lynce, 519 US at 436-37 n
4, 117 S Ct at 893 n 4, 137 L Ed 2d at 69 n 4.

	The logical import of that discussion in Lynce is that
a criminal defendant may lose his right to challenge a state
statute on ex post facto grounds in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding by failing to raise that claim in state court, unless
the effort to exhaust state remedies would be futile.  The only
purpose served by that discussion is to confirm that a criminal
defendant's federal ex post facto protection is subject to loss
if not asserted in a timely manner.

	The foregoing discussion satisfies us that the United
States Supreme Court would conclude that defendant may, and in
this case did, waive his federal ex post facto protection by
choosing not to assert an objection to the application of ORS
163.150(5)(a) (1993) in the remand proceeding.  That Court's
jurisprudence indicates that defendant's rights under the federal
ex post facto clause are subject to waiver.  We conclude that
defendant waived his federal ex post facto protection by choosing
not to object to the application of ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) in
the remand proceeding.

	The trial court's decision not to apply ORS
163.150(5)(a) (1993) in the remand proceeding was not a harmless
error.  A properly instructed jury might have returned a verdict
supporting a sentence other than death.  As a consequence, we
must vacate the sentence of death and remand the case for further
proceedings.

	We have examined defendant's other assignments of
error.  Those assignments either are not well taken or raise
issues that may not recur on remand.  We decline to address those
assignments in greater detail.

	The sentence of death is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

1. 	Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part: "No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be
passed * * *."  Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution, provides, in part:  "No State shall * * * pass any
* * * ex post facto Law * * *."  For a discussion of the history
of the Oregon ex post facto clause, see State v. Cookman, 324 Or
19, 25-31, 920 P2d 1086 (1996).  

2. 	ORS 163.150 (1985) provided, in part:

		"(1) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty
of aggravated murder, the court shall conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the
defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or
death. * * *

		"(2) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of
the evidence, the court shall submit the following
issues to the jury:

		"(a) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;

		"(b) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society.  In
determining this issue, the court shall instruct the
jury to consider any mitigating circumstances offered
in evidence, including, but not limited to, the
defendant's age, the extent and severity of the
defendant's prior criminal conduct and the extent of
the mental and emotional pressure under which the
defendant was acting at the time the offense was
committed; and

		"(c) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.

		"* * * * *

		"(5) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on
each issue considered under this section, the trial
judge shall sentence the defendant to death.  If the
jury returns a negative finding on any issue submitted
under this section, the trial judge shall sentence the
defendant to imprisonment for life in the custody of
the Corrections Division as provided in ORS 163.105."

3. 	After arguing initially that State v. Wille, 317 Or
487, 858 P2d 128 (1993), had held that the true life sentence was
inapplicable, the state ultimately agreed to defendant's request
that the court should apply ORS 163.150(5) (1993), including the
true life sentence option, but on the condition that defendant
agree to the ex post facto waiver terms that the state proposed. 
Defendant agreed to those terms.

4. 	ORS 161.035(4) provides:

		"When all or part of a criminal statute is amended
or repealed, the criminal statute or part thereof so
amended or repealed remains in force for the purpose of
authorizing the accusation, prosecution, conviction and
punishment of a person who violated the statute or part
thereof before the effective date of the amending or
repealing Act."

5. 	This court quoted the statement in Isom in dictum in
State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 254 n 5, 839 P2d 692 (1992), on
recons 318 Or 28, 31, 861 P2d 1012 (1993).  Langley concluded
ultimately that the ex post facto determination in Wille, not the
statement in Isom, precluded retroactive application of the true
life sentencing option to the defendant's offense.  Similarly, in
State v. Pinnell, 319 Or 438, 444, 877 P2d 635 (1994), the court
in dictum stated that Langley and Wille had held that the true
life sentencing option was inapplicable to preenactment offenses.

		The dictum in Pinnell was inaccurate.  Langley and
Wille sustained ex post facto objections to the retroactive
application of the true life sentencing option in the particular
circumstances of those cases.  The premise for that conclusion
was the court's recognition that the legislature made the true
life sentencing option apply retroactively to govern in each
defendants' case.  The court's construction and application of
the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions,
not the statement in Isom, prevented the true life option from
applying retroactively, as the legislature had required, in those
cases.

6. 	Several weeks before requesting that the trial court
apply ORS 163.150(5)(a) (1993) in this proceeding, defendant had
filed a wide-ranging attack on the constitutionality of the
statutes and procedures concerning his continued prosecution for
aggravated murder.  The court at the time denied his objection
that post-offense amendments to ORS 163.150 were ex post facto. 
Defendant subsequently requested the court to apply ORS
163.150(5)(a) (1993) in the remand proceeding.  The trial court's
denial of that request is the ruling that is now before this
court.

7. 	The state relies on Article I, section 9, which
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects"; section 11, which provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have * * *"
rights, among others, to counsel, to confrontation, and to a jury
trial; and section 12, which provides that "[n]o person shall be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offen[s]e[.]" (Emphasis
added.)