Title: Terry Wayne Burleson and Donna B. Montgomery, as coadministrators of the estate of Stanley Duane Burleson, deceased v. RSR Group Florida, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050360
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 2007

REL:09/21/07burleson
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1050360
_________________________
Terry Wayne Burleson and Donna B. Montgomery, as
coadministrators of the estate of Stanley Duane Burleson,
deceased
v.
RSR Group Florida, Inc.
Appeal from Marion Circuit Court
(CV-01-102)
BOLIN, Justice.
Terry Wayne Burleson and Donna B. Montgomery, as co-
administrators of the estate of Stanley Duane Burleson ("the
plaintiffs"), sued Sportarms of Florida, Inc., Donna J.
1050360
2
Newton, 
and 
certain 
fictitiously 
named 
parties 
("the
defendants"), on May 21, 2001, alleging claims under the
Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("the
AEMLD").  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants defectively designed and manufactured a firearm
that proximately caused the death of Stanley Duane Burleson.
On August 24, 2001, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to
assert their AEMLD claims against RSR Group Florida, Inc.  RSR
answered 
the 
complaint 
and raised certain affirmative
defenses, including assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence. 
Thereafter, 
the 
plaintiffs 
amended 
their 
complaint
a second time to add as a defendant Mack Brown d/b/a The
Trading Post, from whom Stanley purchased the firearm.
On March 28, 2005, RSR moved the trial court for a
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate that the firearm by which Stanley was killed was
defectively designed; that there is no causal connection
between RSR's activities regarding the firearm and Stanley's
death; and that RSR is not liable for Stanley's death because,
RSR argued, Stanley assumed the risk and was contributorily
negligent. On May 23, 2005, the plaintiffs responded to RSR's
1050360
3
summary-judgment motion. Following a hearing, the trial court,
on November 15, 2005, entered a summary judgment in favor of
RSR.  The trial court certified the summary judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The plaintiffs appeal.
In reviewing the disposition of a motion for a summary
judgment, we apply the same standard the trial court used in
determining whether the evidence before it presented a genuine
issue of material fact and whether the movant was entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.  Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531
So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988);  Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
When the movant makes a prima facie showing that no genuine
issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an
issue.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1989).  Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such
weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance
Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  This Court
must review the record in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the
1050360
4
movant.  Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412
(Ala. 1990). 
The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs indicates the following:  The firearm that killed
Stanley is a Herbert Schmidt brand, model 21S, .22 caliber,
single-action revolver manufactured in Germany. The revolver
was imported into the United States by Sportarms of Florida.
On May 25, 1984, Sportarms of Florida sold the revolver to RSR
Wholesale Guns Dallas, Inc., from which RSR acquired the
revolver on December 21, 1984. On January 8, 1985, RSR sold
the revolver to Mack Brown d/b/a The Trading Post, a federally
licensed retail firearms dealer located in Hamilton, Alabama.
On April 26, 1985, Stanley completed a federally mandated
Firearms Transaction Record and purchased the revolver from
The Trading Post.
The revolver holds six cartridges in its cylinder; it is
a single-action revolver, which means that the hammer must be
manually placed in the "full cock" position and the trigger
pulled before the revolver will fire.  The hammer is in the
"full cock" position when it is at the farthest point from the
firing pin.  Once the trigger is pulled, the hammer is
1050360
5
released and falls forward, striking the firing pin, which in
turn strikes the cartridge primer, discharging the revolver.
The hammer may be lowered to the "half cock" position by
placing one's thumb on the hammer and pulling the trigger
until the hammer is released.  The finger is then removed from
the trigger and the hammer is slowly lowered to the "half
cock" position.  The "half cock" position is midway between
the "full cock" position and the firing pin.  The "half cock"
position allows the cylinder to spin and facilitates loading
and unloading the revolver.
The hammer may also be lowered to the "safety cock"
position in the same manner in which it is lowered from the
"full cock" position to the "half cock" position.  The hammer
is full forward in the "safety cock" position with its face
resting on the head of the firing pin.  If the trigger is
pulled while the hammer is in the "safety cock" position, the
revolver will not fire. 
The revolver is also equipped with a manual safety that,
when engaged by the operator, imposes a mechanism between the
face of the hammer and the firing pin that blocks the fall of
the hammer and prevents it from contacting the firing pin.  If
1050360
6
the manual safety is engaged, the revolver will not discharge
under any foreseeable circumstance, including pulling the
trigger or dropping the revolver. The owner's manual for the
revolver recommends that those who "care much about safety"
load the revolver with only five cartridges, leaving empty the
chamber aligned with the hammer.
John T. Butters, the plaintiffs' expert, testified that
the revolver could be discharged in only two ways; in both
ways, the manual safety must be disengaged. He described the
normal mode of discharge as pulling the trigger when the
hammer is in the "full cock" position while a cartridge is in
a chamber in line with the hammer and the firing pin.  He
described the second manner of discharge as occurring when
force is applied to the back of the hammer when the hammer is
in the "safety cock" position and resting on the head of the
firing pin while a cartridge is in a chamber in line with the
hammer and the firing pin. 
On April 2, 2000, Stanley was hanging the revolver in its
holster on a gun rack in his home when the revolver fell from
the holster; it struck a desk and discharged.  Stanley was
struck in the abdomen by the discharged round and died as a
1050360
7
result of the wound. Stanley was 51 years old at the time of
his death.  Stanley's wife, Bernice, testified that Stanley
had a "rule" that all firearms he kept in the house be stored
unloaded.  Bernice further stated that Stanley had not had any
firearm-related accidents before the one that killed him.
Terry, Stanley's son, testified that Stanley was "safety
conscious" and had taught him the importance of never keeping
a live round chambered in line with the hammer and the firing
pin.
The plaintiffs contend that the revolver was defective
because, they say, it was designed without an internal passive
safety device that would have prevented it from discharging
when it fell and struck the desk, regardless of whether the
manual safety was engaged.  RSR argues that the revolver as
designed is not defective because, it says, 1) the manual
safety would have prevented the discharge of the revolver in
this case; 2) there is no causal connection between RSR's
activities as a distributor of the revolver and Stanley's
death; and 3) Stanley was contributorily negligent because he
failed to engage the manual safety and he was putting the
revolver away with a cartridge chambered directly in line with
1050360
8
the hammer and the firing pin.  Assuming, without deciding,
that the revolver was defective as designed and that there was
a causal connection between RSR's activities as a distributor
of the revolver and Stanley's death, we conclude that
Stanley's own contributory negligence bars recovery in this
case.
This Court has stated:
"In Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d
839 (Ala. 2002), this Court stated the following
principles 
concerning 
the 
application 
of
contributory negligence at the summary-judgment
stage of an action:
"'A plaintiff cannot recover in a
negligence action where the plaintiff's own
negligence is shown to have proximately
contributed to his damage, notwithstanding
a showing of negligence on the part of the
defendant. 
Likewise, 
a 
plaintiff's
contributory 
negligence 
will 
preclude
recovery in an AEMLD action.  The question
of contributory negligence is normally one
for the jury. However, where the facts are
such that all reasonable persons must reach
the 
same 
conclusion, 
contributory
negligence may be found as a matter of law.
"'To 
establish 
contributory 
negligence
as a matter of law, a defendant seeking a
summary 
judgment 
must 
show 
that 
the
plaintiff put himself in danger's way and
that 
the 
plaintiff 
had 
a 
conscious
appreciation of the danger at the moment
the incident occurred.  The proof required
for 
establishing 
contributory 
negligence 
as
1050360
9
a matter of law should be distinguished
from an instruction given to a jury when
determining whether a plaintiff has been
guilty of contributory negligence.  A jury
determining whether a plaintiff has been
guilty of contributory negligence must
decide only whether the plaintiff failed to
exercise reasonable care.  We protect
against the inappropriate use of a summary
judgment 
to 
establish 
contributory
negligence as a matter of law by requiring
the defendant on such a motion to establish
by 
undisputed 
evidence 
a 
plaintiff's
conscious appreciation of danger.'"
Tell v. Terex Corp., [Ms. 1051128, January 12, 2007] __ So. 2d
__, __ (Ala. 2007).
The evidence is undisputed that the manual safety on the
revolver was disengaged when Stanley was placing the holstered
revolver on the gun rack.  The evidence indicates that if the
manual safety is engaged, the revolver could not fire under
any foreseeable conditions, including a pull of the trigger or
an accidental drop.  The  evidence is further undisputed that
Stanley had a chambered cartridge in line with the hammer and
the firing pin when the revolver was being placed on the gun
rack.  Obviously, the revolver could not discharge if a
cartridge was not chambered in line with the hammer and the
firing pin.  The owner's manual accompanying the revolver
recommends that those who "care much about safety" leave empty
1050360
10
the chamber aligned with the hammer and the firing pin.  Terry
testified that Stanley was "safety conscious" and that Stanley
had taught him the importance of never keeping a live round
chambered in line with the hammer and the firing pin.  Bernice
testified that Stanley had a "rule" that all firearms stored
in the house be unloaded.  Butters testified that storing the
revolver fully loaded, unless it was anticipated that the
revolver would be needed for rapid deployment, was an unsafe
firearm-handling practice.
The dissent concludes that there is no evidence in this
case to indicate that Stanley had a conscious appreciation of
the danger, i.e., that he actually knew that the revolver was
loaded with a cartridge chambered in line with the hammer and
the firing pin.  We think Serio v. Merrell, Inc., 941 So. 2d
960 (Ala. 2006), is instructive on that point. In Serio, the
plaintiff pulled her vehicle into the path of an oncoming
tractor-trailer despite the fact that the tractor-trailer had
the right-of-way.  The accident occurred early in the
afternoon on a clear and sunny day.  Visibility was described
as good.  The plaintiff stated that she looked both ways
before entering the intersection but that she never saw the
1050360
11
approaching tractor-trailer.  The plaintiff sued the owner of
the tractor-trailer, asserting that its driver had operated
the tractor-trailer negligently and wantonly.  The owner of
the tractor-trailer raised the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence as a defense.  Id.
In affirming a summary judgment for the owner of the
tractor-trailer, this Court stated:
"Direct evidence of such an appreciation of
danger is not required if the evidence admits of no
conclusion except that the plaintiff must have
appreciated the hazard involved.  It is enough if
the plaintiff understood, or should have understood,
the danger posed. Ridgeway [v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
723 So. 2d 600, 606 (Ala. 1998)].
"The danger of pulling out from a stop sign onto
a public highway traversed by two-way traffic having
the right-of-way and traveling at highway speeds,
without making a final observation to one's left
sufficiently attentive to detect in the daylight the
impending arrival of a truck of such size as to be
inescapably obvious to one taking the precaution of
making such an observation, is self-evident, and all
reasonable people would logically have to conclude
that [the plaintiff] would have, or should have,
consciously appreciated that danger when she drove
forward into the intersection."
Serio, 941 So. 2d at 965 (emphasis added).
   Likewise, the danger of handling a firearm with a live
cartridge chambered in line with the hammer and the firing pin
without having first engaged the manual safety is self-
1050360
12
evident, especially to an experienced and safety-conscious gun
owner like Stanley, so that reasonable people would have to
logically conclude that he should have at least appreciated
the danger associated with doing so. 
We conclude that Stanley placed himself in danger's way
by handling the revolver with the manual safety disengaged and
with a cartridge chambered in line with the hammer and the
firing pin.  Tell, supra (quoting Hannah v. Gregg, Bland &
Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839, 860-61 (Ala. 2002)).  Further, as
evidenced by Stanley's awareness of the importance of never
storing a loaded firearm, much less one with a cartridge
chambered in line with the hammer and the firing pin, we
conclude that he should have had a conscious awareness of the
danger in which he placed himself.  Tell, supra (quoting
Hannah).  Accordingly, Stanley's own contributory negligence
bars the plaintiffs' recovery in this case.
AFFIRMED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1050360
13
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  Nothing in the record or the
materials before this Court, even taking the facts as
presented by RSR Group Florida, Inc., one of the defendants
below, shows that the decedent knew that a cartridge was under
the hammer of the revolver or that the manual safety was not
engaged.  However, it is readily  inferable from the facts in
this case that the decedent believed that there was no
cartridge under the hammer, in light of the evidence that he
had instructed his son that a revolver should not be stored
loaded that way because of safety concerns.  
Generally, questions of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk are questions for the jury.  Halsey v.
A.B. Chance Co., 695 So. 2d 607 (Ala. 1997), and Hicks v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 211 (Ala. 1995).  In
Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839 (Ala.
2002), this Court addressed the plaintiff's wrongful-death
claim based on the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine ("the AEMLD") arising from her husband's death in an
industrial accident, again noting the legal principle that
questions of contributory negligence are usually questions of
1050360
14
fact for the jury.  The decedent in Hannah was crushed to
death between two large industrial machines.   With respect to
the decedent's appreciation of the danger when standing
between the machines and his use of a safety device, the Court
said:
"Based upon Hannah's evidence, a jury could conclude
that at the time of his accident, Jerry Hannah was
standing in  what he may have believed to be a safe
position, on the outer edge of the recoiler and that
he did not appreciate the danger posed by the belt
wrapper. A jury could also conclude that Hannah may
have inserted the safety pin, believing that it was
set, but that the bend in the pin did not allow it
to properly lock. Either way, we cannot say that the
facts are such that all reasonable persons must
reach the same conclusion regarding whether Hannah
was contributorily negligent. Whether Hannah was
contributorily negligent is a question that must be
left to the finder of fact to determine."
840 So. 2d at 861-62 (emphasis added).  
In Horn v. Fadal Machining Centers, LLC,  [Ms. 1051161,
February 9, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007), a case similar
to Hannah in which the decedent was killed in an accident
involving a milling machine, and his personal representative
brought an AEMLD claim, the Court discussed  the requirements
for both contributory negligence and assumption of the risk in
the context of AEMLD claims:
1050360
15
"'In order to establish assumption of the risk
as a matter of law, the evidence must show that the
plaintiff discovered the alleged defect, was aware
of the danger, proceeded unreasonably to use the
product, and was injured.' Sears v. Waste Processing
Equip., Inc., 695 So. 2d 51, 53 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997) (emphasis added). '"[T]he plaintiff's state of
mind is determined by [a] subjective standard,"' not
the objective standard of reasonability. H.R.H.
Metals, Inc. v. Miller, 833 So. 2d 18, 27 (Ala.
2002) (emphasis added) (quoting McIsaac v. Monte
Carlo Club, Inc., 587 So. 2d 320, 324 (Ala. 1991)).
'Assumption of the risk proceeds from the injured
person's actual awareness of the risk.' 587 So. 2d
at 324. 'The plaintiff must know that a risk is
present and must understand its nature.' Id.
"'To establish contributory negligence as
a matter of law, [as Cardinal seeks to do
here,] a defendant seeking a summary judgment
must show that the plaintiff put [herself] in
danger's way and that the plaintiff had a
conscious appreciation of the danger at the
moment the incident occurred. See H.R.H.
Metals, Inc. v. Miller, 833 So. 2d 18 (Ala.
2002); see also Hicks v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 652 So. 2d 211, 219 (Ala. 1994). The proof
required 
for 
establishing 
contributory
negligence as a matter of law should be
distinguished from an instruction given to a
jury when determining whether a plaintiff has
been guilty of contributory negligence. A jury
determining whether a plaintiff has been guilty
of contributory negligence must decide only
whether the plaintiff failed to exercise
reasonable 
care. 
We 
protect 
against 
the
inappropriate use of a summary judgment to
establish contributory negligence as a matter
of law by requiring the defendant on such a
motion to establish by undisputed evidence a
plaintiff's conscious appreciation of danger.
See H.R.H. Metals, supra.'
1050360
16
"Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d
839, 860-61 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis added). Thus,
assumption of the risk and contributory negligence
as a matter of law are both subjective standards,
focusing on the risk as known and appreciated by the
plaintiff."
___ So. 2d at ___ (some emphasis original; some emphasis
added).
Thus, our caselaw makes clear that a summary judgment for
the defendant in an AEMLD case must be based upon evidence of
the plaintiff's awareness of the dangerous condition.  There
is no evidence in this case that the decedent had a "conscious
appreciation," i.e., that he actually knew, that the revolver
was loaded with a cartridge under the hammer or that the
manual safety was not engaged.  The reference in the main
opinion to Serio v. Merrell, Inc., 941 So. 2d 960 (Ala. 2006),
with respect to the danger evident upon pulling out from a
stop sign into an intersection without looking for traffic
approaching from the left presents no analogy to this case.
Unlike Serio, in which the danger was evident upon
observation, there is no evidence in this case that it would
have been immediately evident to the decedent from his
observation of the holstered revolver that a bullet was
1050360
The Court is not presented with the different question
1
whether the record is insufficient from which to conclude that
the decedent's handling of the revolver (including the manner
of handling and the circumstances under which he was doing so)
was negligent as a matter of law even if done with knowledge
that the revolver was loaded and the manual safety was
disengaged or that it had not been checked in that regard.
17
chambered under the hammer or that the manual safety was
disengaged.  The fact remains that the record contains no
evidence to support an inference that the decedent actually
knew that a bullet was chambered under the hammer or that the
manual safety was not engaged.   Under our law as noted above,
1
I do not believe that the Court can properly conclude that
there is no genuine issue of material fact about contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk, so that RSR is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.  Accordingly, I dissent.
Murdock, J., concurs.