Title: Bacote v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47861
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2001

FILED:  November 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DENNIS BACOTE,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
DAN JOHNSON,
Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 98-06-29826M; CA A105109; SC S47861)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 7, 2001.
	Bob Pangburn, Caldwell, Idaho, argued the cause and filed
the brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief was
Rebecca Neal-Richardson, Caldwell, Idaho.
	Daniel J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With
him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and Balmer Justices.**
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals regarding assessment of
costs is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court regarding
assessment of costs is reversed.  The case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.  
	*Appeal from Malheur County Circuit Court, J. Burdette Pratt, Judge. 169 Or App 44, 7 P3d 729 (2000).
	**De Muniz, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
LEESON, J.
		In this post-conviction proceeding, petitioner alleged 
that he had received inadequate assistance of counsel at trial
and that his sentences were illegal.  The circuit court denied
relief and assessed costs against petitioner in the amount of
$975.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Bacote v. Johnson, 169 Or
App 44, 46, 7 P3d 729 (2000).  That court declined to address
petitioner's argument regarding costs of appointed counsel,
because it believed that petitioner had not preserved that
argument.  Id.  This court allowed review of only two issues: 
whether petitioner preserved his argument and whether the circuit
court erred in assessing $975 in costs of appointed counsel
without first determining petitioner's ability to pay those
costs.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals regarding costs, reverse the circuit court's
assessment of costs, and remand the case to the circuit court.
		The following facts are not in dispute.  In June 1998,
petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging
that the sentences he had received after pleading guilty to
charges of attempted assault and delivery of a controlled
substance were illegal and that he had received inadequate
assistance of counsel.  Petitioner also filed an affidavit of
indigence and requested appointed counsel to represent him in the
post-conviction proceeding.  The circuit court appointed counsel
to represent petitioner.  After the court denied relief on the
merits of petitioner's claim, the court stated that it intended
to order petitioner to repay the costs of his appointed counsel. 
The parties agree that the court was relying on ORS 151.505 (1)
 as
authority for ordering petitioner to repay the costs of court-appointed counsel.  Petitioner objected to the assessment of
costs as follows: 
		"[COUNSEL]:  * * * On behalf of [petitioner] I
object to the imposition of the $975.00 in attorney
reimbursement fees.  The basis for my objection is that
there's been no showing that [petitioner] has the
ability to pay.  There has not even been an inquiry as
to whether he has the ability to pay that he -- without
undue hardship.  He is indigent, he has been declared
indigent by this Court.  He [is] scheduled to be in the
institution for still some period of time and he is --
and those rare occasions when he is employed he is
making maybe less than one twentieth of minimum wage. 
Consequently -- and that money still has to go to pay
for shaving supplies, health care products * * *,
tennis shoes, things of that nature.  Consequently, we
believe that he is unable to pay and that it should not
be imposed."
		"THE COURT:  Your objection is noted.  I'll have -- indicate copies of the order and judgment need to be
sent to the parties.  Anything else we need to
address?"
(Emphasis added.)  The court included in its judgment an order
requiring petitioner to repay $975, the amount that petitioner's
court-appointed counsel had charged the state to represent him in
the post-conviction proceeding.
		On appeal, petitioner assigned error to the circuit
court's failure to make a determination that petitioner is or may
be able to pay costs.  As noted, a panel of the Court of Appeals,
with one judge dissenting, declined to address that claim on the
ground that petitioner had not preserved it.  Bacote, 169 Or App
at 46.  We begin with the preservation issue.
		Petitioner contends that his objection challenged the
circuit court's authority to impose the costs of appointed
counsel under ORS 151.505 because there had been no determination
that petitioner is or may be able to pay costs.  Petitioner's
objection at the post-conviction hearing stated, in part, that
"[t]here has not even been an inquiry as to whether [petitioner]
has the ability to pay."  That objection was sufficient to alert
the court and defendant to petitioner's claim that the court
erred in assessing costs under ORS 151.505 without first
determining his ability to pay those costs.  See State v. Wyatt,
331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (holding party must provide
trial court with explanation of objection specific enough to
ensure that court can identify alleged error and correct it
immediately if correction warranted).  The Court of Appeals erred
in holding that petitioner had failed to preserve that issue.  We
turn to the merits, namely, whether the circuit court erred in
assessing $975 in costs of appointed counsel without first
determining petitioner's ability to pay those costs.
		Petitioner contends that ORS 151.505(4) requires the
court to determine that a person is or may be able to pay the
costs of appointed counsel before the court may impose costs.  He
argues that nothing in the record indicates that the court made
that kind of determination in his case.  Defendant responds that
petitioner's objection to the assessment of costs demonstrated
that he had the ability to pay costs, because his objection
established that he earns at least some money when he works in
prison.  Moreover, defendant contends, a reviewing court should
presume that the circuit court complied with the requirements of
ORS 151.505(4) so long as there is evidence in the record to
support its order.
		To resolve the parties' dispute over what a court must
do in determining a person's ability to pay costs under ORS
151.505, we must construe the statute.  Our task is to discern
the intent of the legislature.  ORS 174.020; (2) see PGE v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
(summarizing methodology for construing statutes). 
		By its terms, ORS 151.505(1) authorizes a trial court,
at the conclusion of a case or matter filed after January 1,
1998, to include in its judgment an order requiring a person who
has received appointed counsel to repay in full or in part the
costs of the legal and other services related to the provision of
appointed counsel.  ORS 151.505(2) identifies the costs that are
repayable under ORS 151.505, which include a reasonable attorney
fee and a reasonable amount of expenses authorized under ORS
135.055.  ORS 151.505(3) provides that costs under the statute do
not include costs imposed and paid under a previous order under
ORS 151.487.  However, costs under the statute may include costs
imposed under ORS 151.487 that are unpaid at the time when the
judgment is filed.  
		ORS 151.505(4) is the source of the interpretive
dispute in this proceeding regarding a person's ability to pay
costs.  That subsection contains a limitation on the authority
that is granted in ORS 151.505(1).  A court may not order a
person to pay costs unless the person "is or may be able to pay"
the costs.  The words "is" and "may be able to" refer to the
person's present or future ability to pay costs.  Only a person
who presently is able, or who may be able in the future, to pay
costs may be ordered to do so.  Subsection (4) further provides
that the determination of the person's ability to pay costs and
the amount of costs to be repaid "shall be subject to the
guidelines and procedures issued by the State Court Administrator
under ORS 151.487."  The term "shall" is a command expressing
what is mandatory.  See Preble v. Dept. of Rev., 331 Or 320, 324,
14 P3d 613 (2000) (so stating).  Finally, subsection (4) directs
the court to determine the amount and the method of payment of
costs.  The statute provides that the court, in making that
determination, "shall take account of" the person's financial
resources and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will
impose. 
		ORS 151.505(4) thus contemplates a two-step process. 
First, the court must determine if the person is or, in the
future, may be able to pay costs and the amount of costs to be
repaid.  The determination of the person's ability to pay costs
and the amount of costs to be repaid is subject to the guidelines
and procedures issued by the State Court Administrator.  Next,
assuming that the person has the ability to pay costs, the court
must determine the amount and the method of payment of costs.  In
making that determination, ORS 151.505(4) directs the court to
"take account of" the person's financial resources and the nature
of the burden that payment of costs will impose.
		As noted, this case involves only the first step of
that two-step process.  Under that step, the statute provides
that the determination of a person's ability to pay and the
amount of costs to be repaid is subject to the guidelines and
procedures issued by the State Court Administrator.  Because the
legislature has declared in mandatory terms how the court is to
determine the person's ability to pay costs and the amount of
costs to be repaid, the record must indicate that the court made
that determination subject to the guidelines and procedures
issued by the State Court Administrator.  
		In this case, after petitioner objected to the
imposition of costs on the ground that there had been no inquiry
about his ability to pay, the circuit court merely noted the
objection and then imposed costs equal to the amount that
petitioner's court-appointed counsel had charged the state to
represent petitioner.  We find no indication in the record that
the court made the determination of petitioner's ability to pay
costs and the amount of costs to be repaid in the manner
prescribed by ORS 151.505(4), namely, subject to the guidelines
and procedures issued by the State Court Administrator. 
		The decision of the Court of Appeals regarding
assessment of costs is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit
court regarding assessment of costs is reversed.  The case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.


1. 	ORS 151.505 provides, in part:
		"(1) At the conclusion of a case or matter in
which the first accusatory instrument or petition in
the trial court was filed after January 1, 1998, and in
which the court appointed counsel to represent a
person, a trial * * * court may include in its judgment
an order that the person repay in full or in part * * *
the costs of the legal and other services that are
related to the provision of appointed counsel.
		"(2) Costs repayable under this section include a
reasonable attorney fee for counsel appointed to
represent the person and a reasonable amount for
expenses authorized under ORS 135.055. * * *
		"(3) Costs repayable under this section do not
include costs imposed and paid under a previous order
under ORS 151.487, but may include costs imposed under
an order under ORS 151.487 that are unpaid at the time
the judgment is filed.
		"(4) The court may not order a person to pay costs
under this section unless the person is or may be able
to pay the costs.  In determining the amount and method
of payment of costs, the court shall take account of
the financial resources of the person and the nature of
the burden that payment of costs will impose.  The
determination of the ability of a person to pay costs
and the amount of costs to be paid shall be subject to
the guidelines and procedures issued by the State Court
Administrator under ORS 151.487."
2. 	The legislature amended ORS 174.020 in 2001.  Or Laws 
2001, ch 438.  Those amendments relate, in part, to a court's use
of legislative history in the interpretation of statutes.  Those
amendments apply only to actions commenced on or after June 18,
2001.  Or Laws 2001, ch 438, §§ 2 &amp; 3.  Petitioner filed his
petition for post-conviction relief on June 24, 1998.  Therefore,
the amendments to ORS 174.020 do not apply in this case.