Title: Commonwealth v. Holley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11385
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2016

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SJC-11385 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JERMAINE HOLLEY. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     September 9, 2016. - December 19, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Expert 
opinion.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Grand jury 
proceedings, Prosecutor's conflict of interest, Opening 
statement, Argument by prosecutor, New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 29, 2007. 
 
 
The case was tried before Robert J. Kane , J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on October 3, 2014, was considered by 
him. 
 
 
 
David H. Mirsky (Joanne T. Petito with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Shoshana Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  In December of 2011, a jury convicted the 
defendant, Jermaine Holley, of murder in the first degree on a 
2 
 
 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty in connection with the 
death of the victim, Susy Goulart, in April, 2005.1 
 
On appeal, the defendant asserts errors in (1) the presence 
of police officers in the grand jury room while the Commonwealth 
presented witness testimony in support of the murder indictment; 
(2) the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion for the 
appointment of a special prosecutor; (3) several evidentiary 
rulings by the trial judge; (4) the prosecutor's opening 
statement and closing argument; and (5) the trial judge's denial 
of his motion for a new trial.  The defendant also seeks relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After full consideration of the 
trial record and the defendant's arguments, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction and the denial of his motion for a new 
trial, and we decline to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for discussion of specific 
issues.  The victim lived in a multibuilding public housing 
development in Fall River.  On the day of her death, the 
victim's former friend and neighbor, Patricia Moran, moved out 
of her apartment because she had been evicted as the result of 
both nonpayment of rent and a then-pending criminal charge of 
                     
 
1 The jury declined to convict the defendant of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. 
3 
 
 
assaulting the victim during a dispute over a debt.  Moran's boy 
friend and his brother, the defendant, had often visited Moran 
at the development.  The defendant was among those who helped 
move Moran's belongings into a truck after which the group drank 
alcohol outside her building.  The defendant told one of these  
people that the victim owed Moran money.  The defendant was 
still at Moran's building at approximately 8 P.M.  At 
approximately 9 P.M., a neighbor saw the victim walking home 
from the direction of Moran's building.  The victim then stopped 
to smoke a cigarette while with her downstairs neighbors near 
the back door of her own building.  As the victim was walking 
upstairs afterward, the neighbors saw an African-American man 
also walk upstairs.  He did not respond when the victim asked 
him, "Are you here for me?"  The hood the man was wearing 
blocked most of his face.  Earlier in the day, a resident had 
seen the defendant wearing a "hoodie." 
 
Soon after the victim and the man walked up the stairs, the 
neighbors she had been smoking with heard the victim's apartment 
door lock and then the sound of loud music.  A neighbor who 
lived next door to the victim, also heard people enter the 
apartment.  Later, this neighbor heard a scream but could not 
tell the source.  Shortly after that, she saw smoke coming from 
the victim's apartment and telephoned the fire department.  No 
one saw or heard anyone else enter or leave the apartment, and 
4 
 
 
the victim did not answer her friend's telephone calls at 10:13 
P.M. and 11:32 P.M. 
 
Police, fire fighters, and paramedics responded to the 
scene.  A pot on the stove was on fire, blood was seen 
throughout the living room and kitchen, and the victim was dead 
on the floor, wearing only a shirt and holding a severed 
telephone line.  An autopsy showed that she had died as a result 
of forty stab wounds and thirteen cutting wounds.  The knife 
used in the killing was never found. 
 
Investigators took samples of blood, clothing (including a 
bloody sock), and powder and gelatin lifts of fingerprint and 
footwear impressions from the victim's apartment, as well as 
fingernail scrapings, a blood sample, and oral, vaginal, and 
anorectal swabs from the victim's body.  The State police crime 
laboratory compared deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples from the 
evidence collected to DNA samples from the victim, the 
defendant, the defendant's brother, and the first police officer 
to respond to the fire.  Over the course of the investigation, 
the police also found and seized a pair of the defendant's 
shoes, the soles of which were consistent with footprint 
impressions found in blood in the victim's apartment. 
 
Residents of the housing complex told police that they had 
seen the defendant with a knife on the day the victim was 
killed.  At around noon, the defendant showed his knife to one 
5 
 
 
resident who had stopped by Moran's apartment.  It was 
approximately eleven inches long with a black handle and black 
sheath.  That afternoon, the defendant visited another 
resident's apartment to demand money that the resident's former 
boy friend owed to the defendant.  When the resident told the 
defendant that she was not responsible for the debt, the 
defendant lifted his hoodie and shirt to show her a knife with a 
black and silver handle in a "holster," and said he would be 
back.  A third resident, José Torres, said that the defendant 
had waved a large knife at Torres and his friends on the day of 
the murder. 
 
Five days after Goulart's death, the police went to speak 
with the defendant.  He was brought to the police station, where  
an officer noticed a cut on the defendant's hand.  A test for 
blood on both of his hands was negative. 
 
After giving the defendant the Miranda warnings, the police 
interviewed him about the victim's death.  During the interview, 
the defendant denied being at the housing complex on the day of 
the murder and denied knowing personally or having sex with the 
victim (he even initially denied knowing Moran).2  He also 
falsely stated that he and his girl friend had gone to Newport, 
                     
 
2 Vaginal and anorectal swabs taken from the victim both 
contained two deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiles:  hers and 
the defendant's.  At trial, the fact that the defendant and the 
victim had sex on the day of the murder was uncontested. 
6 
 
 
Rhode Island, on the day of the victim's death.  When the police 
asked the defendant if he could think of anything worse than 
murder, he said, "You can snitch on somebody.  That's like 
taking somebody's life."  At some point, the defendant 
apparently had told his girl friend that the victim was a 
snitch. 
 
At trial, the defendant pointed to the victim's former boy 
friend as the murderer, suggesting that the police had narrowed 
their search too quickly to African-American men, and 
highlighting a number of reasons that the boy friend had to kill 
the victim, including their turbulent relationship and the fact 
that she had had sex with the defendant.  The defendant also 
presented evidence that the boy friend had been in the housing 
complex on the day of the murder.  The defense stressed the lack 
of fingerprint evidence linking the defendant to the murder and 
argued that the number and type of stab wounds were indicative 
of the victim's boy friend's obsession with and anger at her.  
The victim's boy friend had been seen elsewhere on the evening 
of the murder. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Unauthorized persons in the grand jury 
room.  In the defendant's motion for a new trial, and again on 
appeal, he argued that his indictment must be dismissed because 
of the presence of unauthorized persons in the grand jury room.  
Two police officers involved in the investigation of this case, 
7 
 
 
who were witnesses before the grand jury in the matter, were 
present in the grand jury room for most, if not all, of the 
other witnesses' testimony.  Both parties agree that the 
officers' presence was improper.  The defendant contends that 
this error rendered his indictment void ab initio, requiring not 
only the vacation of his conviction but also the dismissal of 
the indictment under the United States Constitution and the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Alternatively, the 
defendant argues that if the indictment was not void, he is 
nevertheless entitled to a new trial based on the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, who failed to move to dismiss the 
indictment or even to raise the issue prior to trial.  We 
conclude that the indictment was voidable rather than void, and 
that, in this case, the defendant has failed to show that he was 
prejudiced by either the grand jury irregularity or his 
counsel's failure to raise the issue. 
 
Secrecy is of fundamental importance to grand jury 
proceedings, not only to protect the reputation of the accused, 
but also "to shield grand jury proceedings from any outside 
influences having the potential to 'distort their investigatory 
or accusatory functions.'"  Commonwealth v. Pezzano, 387 Mass. 
69, 73 (1982), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 915, 
918 (1977).  A limited category of authorized persons, such as 
counsel for witnesses, interpreters, court officers, and 
8 
 
 
stenographers, may be present during grand jury proceedings.3  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 5 (c), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1505 
(2004); Pezzano, supra at 72 n.5.  This court has disapproved of 
the presence of "unauthorized" individuals, especially 
investigating police officers, because their presence has the 
potential to compromise the integrity of the process by, among 
other things, influencing witness testimony through 
intimidation.  Pezzano, supra at 74-75.  In Opinion of the 
Justices, 232 Mass. 601, 604 (1919), we stated that the 
"essential characteristics of the grand jury would be broken 
down if a police officer or other person who had investigated 
the evidence, interviewed the witnesses, and formulated a plan 
for prosecuting the accused should be permitted to be present 
during the hearing of testimony. . . .  The attendance of a 
police officer would afford opportunity for subjecting witnesses 
to fear or intimidation, for preventing freedom of full 
disclosure by testimony, and for infringing the secrecy of the 
proceedings."  Accordingly, we have held that "the presence of 
an unauthorized person before a grand jury will void an 
                     
 
3 Rule 5 (c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1505 (2004), provides in 
relevant part:  "Attorneys for the Commonwealth who are 
necessary or convenient to the presentation of the evidence, the 
witness under examination, the attorney for the witness, and 
such other persons who are necessary or convenient to the 
presentation of the evidence may be present while the grand jury 
is in session." 
9 
 
 
indictment."  Pezzano, supra at 72–73, citing Commonwealth v. 
Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 586-587 (1919).  In Pezzano, supra at 70, 
and Harris, supra at 585, the defendants challenged their 
indictments prior to trial.  Here, however, the defendant did 
not contest the validity of the indictment until after his trial 
and conviction.  Thus, we must determine whether the presence of 
unauthorized persons during grand jury proceedings automatically 
voids an indictment even in cases where there is no challenge 
made until after conviction. 
 
The defendant's right to indictment by a grand jury is 
protected by the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.4  Harris, 
231 Mass. at 585-586; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329, 347 (1857).  
By waiting until after his conviction, however, the defendant 
has waived his right to object under Massachusetts law to 
                     
 
4 There is no Federal constitutional right to a grand jury 
indictment in State proceedings.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 477 n.3 (2000).  Where a State does provide a right to 
a grand jury, however, it must implement this right in 
accordance with the United States Constitution.  Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 557 n.7 (1979).  The Supreme Court has 
held that a violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (d), which precludes 
unauthorized persons from Federal grand jury proceedings, does 
not require an automatic dismissal of the subsequent conviction.  
See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) (trial 
jury's guilty verdict "means not only that there is probable 
cause to believe that [a] defendant[] [is] guilty as charged, 
but also that [he or she is] in fact guilty as charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt").  Thus, the United States Constitution does 
not render the defendant's indictment void ab initio for such a 
deficiency in a State proceeding. 
10 
 
 
defects in the underlying grand jury proceeding.5  G. L. c. 277, 
§ 47A (failure to object to grand jury defects before trial 
constitutes waiver). See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (c) (2), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004) (motion to dismiss must be 
raised before trial).  Compare Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 421 
Mass. 547, 553 (1995) (right to object to indictment not waived 
and properly preserved where defendant moved to dismiss before 
trial), with Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 622 n.4 
(1986) ("alleged flaws in the grand jury proceedings, argued on 
appeal for the first time, are not generally before us because 
they were not seasonably asserted").  Thus the defendant must 
show that the grand jury irregularity caused a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in the trial jury's 
verdict.  See Mayfield, supra. 
 
The defendant has not shown that the presence of the police 
officers caused those who testified before the grand jury to 
feel coerced or intimidated.6  The majority of the grand jury 
witnesses testified again at trial, where they were subject to 
                     
 
5 The defendant points out that defenses and objections 
"based upon . . . the failure to charge an offense . . . shall 
be noticed by the court at any time."  G. L. c. 277, § 47A.  The 
issue here is not a failure to charge, but rather a defect in 
the grand jury process that culminated in the charge. 
 
 
6 The affidavits presented in support of the defendant's 
motion for a new trial did not state that the officers' presence 
caused any coercion or intimidation -- only that the officers 
were present. 
11 
 
 
cross-examination by the defendant, and the trial jury found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Moreover, the only portion of the grand jury testimony that 
the trial judge admitted substantively was the testimony of 
Torres, after the judge properly found that he was feigning a 
lack of memory on the stand.  See Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 
Mass. 405, 422-423 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 
Mass. 735, 745 & n.12 (2000).  See also Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A) (2016).  As to this testimony, however, the 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that Torres was influenced 
in any way by the presence of officers in the grand jury room.  
The trial judge conducted a voir dire examination of Torres 
before he testified at trial.  During his voir dire examination 
and thereafter before the trial jury, Torres confirmed that he 
had taken an oath and had answered questions before the grand 
jury to the best of his ability.7  He did not recant any of the 
detailed statements he made to the grand jury or indicate that 
                     
 
7 Torres had testified before the grand jury that the 
defendant had threatened him and several other teenage residents 
with a large knife.  Torres told the grand jury that the 
defendant had gotten angry because two girls made fun of him for 
stumbling down a hill while drunk.  Torres also stated that he 
recognized the man from a previous snowball fight and from 
playing basketball.  He identified the man as "Jermaine" and 
described him as approximately six feet, three inches tall, of 
medium build, and frequently driving a silver motor vehicle.  At 
trial, however, Torres stated that some "random dude" who was 
African-American pulled a knife on him. 
12 
 
 
he had felt intimidated in any way by the officers' presence.  
Finally, even if Torres's grand jury testimony about seeing the 
defendant with a knife had been tainted, there was other 
evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant 
had a knife on the day of the murder, including that he had 
threatened another resident with that knife. 
 
Therefore, the defendant has not shown that the presence of 
investigators during the grand jury proceedings caused a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice such that his 
indictment must be voided after a conviction.  Moreover, because 
the defendant failed to make this showing, his claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel must also fail, even assuming 
that it was error for his counsel not to challenge the 
indictment.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014) (under § 33E review, 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed under 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice standard). 
 
b.  Motion for appointment of a special prosecutor.  An 
assistant district attorney (attorney) in the Bristol County 
District Attorney's office was formerly in private practice with 
the prosecutor in this case.  While in private practice, the 
attorney had represented the defendant in a prior, unrelated 
13 
 
 
criminal matter.8  For this reason, prior to trial the defendant 
moved for a special prosecutor, i.e., someone from outside the 
Bristol County district attorney's office, to prosecute the 
case.9  At the motion hearing and in the Commonwealth's response 
to the defendant's motion, the prosecutor represented to the 
judge that the attorney had been screened from any involvement 
in the case and never shared any knowledge of the defendant with 
the prosecutor.10  The defendant nevertheless argues that the 
denial of his motion constitutes reversible error.  We disagree. 
 
Complete disqualification of an entire district attorney's 
office and the appointment of a special prosecutor are not 
                     
 
8 The representation of the defendant in the prior matter 
spanned approximately four months and took place seven years 
prior to the trial in this matter; all of the charges against 
the defendant were dismissed. 
 
 
9 The defendant cited a press release describing the 
attorney and the prosecutor as "influential in helping [the 
district attorney's] office bring charges against suspects in 
three previously unsolved murder cases," including this case, as 
evidence that the attorney had worked on this case.  The 
defendant argues that the fact that the Commonwealth did not 
inform him of the attorney's employment and that the defendant 
did not consent to the prosecution of the matter by the Bristol 
County district attorney's office, in essence, should create a 
presumption against the office. 
 
 
10 According to the prosecutor, he reviewed the file and 
informed the attorney that there was a potential match between 
the defendant and some DNA recovered at the crime scene.  The 
attorney stated he might have represented the defendant, which 
he confirmed after reviewing his records.  As a result, the 
attorney was never assigned to and was never involved in the 
investigation of this case. 
14 
 
 
required when a lawyer who previously represented a defendant 
currently being prosecuted by the district attorney's office 
joins that office.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.11 comment [2], as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1370 (2015) ("Because of the special 
problems raised by imputation within a government agency, 
paragraph [d] [providing rules for lawyers serving as public 
officers or employees] does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer 
currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to 
other associated government officers or employees");11 Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.10 (f) and comment [4], as appearing in 471 Mass. 
1363 (2015) (rules of imputation are different for lawyers 
serving as public employees); Pisa v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 
724, 727-728 (1979).  Instead, rule 1.11 (d) (2) provides, "[A] 
lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee . . . 
shall not . . . participate in a matter in which the lawyer 
participated personally and substantially while in private 
practice or nongovernmental employment."12 
                     
 
11 The earlier version of this rule, in effect at the time 
of the defendant's motion for appointment of a special 
prosecutor, provided essentially the same protection, stating 
that disqualification of one public employee "[did] not 
disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in 
question [had] become associated."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.11 
comment [9], 426 Mass. 1352 (1998). 
 
 
12 An identical version of this provision was previously 
located at Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.11 (c) (1), 426 Mass. 1352 
(1998). 
15 
 
 
The attorney who formerly represented the defendant did not 
participate in this case.  In addition, the prior association 
between the prosecutor and the attorney in private practice 
disqualifies neither the prosecutor nor the district attorney's 
office where, as here, the prosecutor affirms that he did not 
represent the defendant and had no actual knowledge of him.13  
See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.9 comment [5], as appearing in 471 Mass. 
1359 (2015) (no disqualification where lawyer did no work on 
matter and acquired no information about the client).14  There 
has been no showing that any confidential information was ever 
imparted to the prosecutor, much less used against the defendant 
at trial.  There was no error in denying the defendant's motion 
for appointment of a special prosecutor. 
 
c.  Evidentiary rulings.  i.  Prior bad act testimony.  As 
discussed, at trial, one resident testified that on the day of 
the homicide, the defendant lifted his hoodie to show her a 
large knife during a dispute about a debt.  In addition, Torres 
stated in his grand jury testimony, which was admitted in 
                     
 
13 The prosecutor told the motion judge that the attorney 
had represented hundreds of criminal defendants during his time 
in private practice, but that the two did not discuss these 
cases.  In addition, they maintained separate offices and filing 
cabinets relating to their cases. 
 
 
14 Comment [9] to rule 1.10 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1346 (1998), articulated the 
same principle. 
16 
 
 
evidence at trial, that the defendant had waved a knife at 
Torres and his friends.  The defendant argues that the probative 
value of this prior bad act evidence did not outweigh its 
prejudicial nature, and that the case was overwhelmed with prior 
bad act evidence.  We disagree. 
 
Although prior bad act evidence is generally inadmissible 
to show one's propensity to commit a crime, such evidence may be 
admitted, "if relevant, for some other purpose, such as proving 
common scheme, pattern of operation, preparation, opportunity, 
nature of relationship, knowledge, intent, motive, identity, 
. . . absence of accident or mistake," Commonwealth v. 
Cheremond, 461 Mass. 397, 408 (2012), or state of mind, 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 738 (2014).  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2016). 
 
Here, the evidence was relevant to show that the defendant 
had access to a knife that could have been used in committing 
the murder, particularly given the medical examiner's testimony 
about the size and depth of the victim's stab wounds.  See 
Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 356 (1985).  The fact that 
the defendant lifted his hoodie to show the knife to a resident 
was probative of identity, given that the last person seen 
entering the victim's apartment was wearing a hoodie.  The 
defendant's effort to collect on a debt was relevant to show 
motive, as he had discussed the victim's debts with another 
17 
 
 
person on the day she died.  The testimony was also probative of 
the defendant's state of mind, as both the resident and Torres 
testified about acts that took place shortly before the murder.  
We note that the judge limited consideration of Torres's grand 
jury testimony to consideration of "the identity of the person 
who he saw with a knife." 
 
Moreover, given the amount of other evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, the bad act evidence was not overwhelming.  
The defendant had sex with the victim on the day she died, and 
the jury could have inferred that he had left footprints in her 
blood.  He lied about his alibi and denied knowing the victim 
well or having sex with her -- until DNA evidence showed 
otherwise.  Initially, he denied being at the housing complex 
that day or knowing his brother's girl friend, even though he 
had been there to help her move.  He had a cut on his hand five 
days after the murder and encouraged his girl friend not to 
testify at trial.  In the face of this evidence, much of which 
showed consciousness of guilt, the testimony about prior bad 
acts was not overwhelming. 
 
Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
admitting the testimony. 
 
ii.  Reliability of shoe print analysis.  The defendant 
contends that the judge committed reversible error in allowing a 
Commonwealth expert to testify about whether it was possible to 
18 
 
 
match the defendant's shoes to prints found in the victim's 
blood, arguing that the opinion was based on unreliable methods.  
We disagree. 
 
The Commonwealth introduced evidence including gelatin 
lifts of shoe prints found in the victim's blood, the 
defendant's shoes, and photographs of the shoes' soles.  The 
Commonwealth's experts testified that the prints were consistent 
with the model of the shoe and that gum and pebbles were 
retrieved from the soles of the defendant's shoes.15  The 
totality of the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth would 
support a conclusion that shoes of the type the defendant owned 
had been in the victim's blood.  The judge ruled that the 
prosecutor could introduce testimony related to individual 
characteristics of the defendant's shoes and characteristics of 
the shoes' model generally, but the judge instructed the jury 
that the final determination of any "match" between the shoes 
and the shoe prints found at the crime scene would be left to 
them. 
 
At sidebar in response to an anticipatory objection by 
defense counsel, the judge held a voir dire examination of one 
of the Commonwealth's expert witnesses, who had worked with 
lifts of the shoe prints but not with the shoes.  The 
                     
 
15 The defendant does not contest that the shoes belonged to 
him. 
19 
 
 
Commonwealth sought to elicit testimony related to the expert's 
method of recognizing an "anomaly" on the lift of a shoe print 
impression and determining what caused the anomaly.  The judge 
asked the expert questions related to the reliability of his 
method, based on the expert's twenty-five years of experience in 
crime scene investigation, his level of certainty regarding his 
findings, and his explanation of how items stuck to the bottom 
of shoes could affect a shoe print.  The judge decided to allow 
limited testimony on the subject.16 
 
The Commonwealth's expert testified that a characteristic 
such as stones or gum could "sometimes be used to make a 
positive identification" of a particular shoe, "but it's rarely 
done with a single identifying characteristic."  In response to 
a hypothetical question, the expert also said that it would be 
possible for him to match a shoe to a gelatin lift. 
 
Expert opinion testimony based on a reliable process or 
theory is admissible where "specialized knowledge would be 
helpful" to the jury.  Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 
                     
 
16 The judge agreed that the witness could describe what he 
saw with respect to the footwear impressions and that the 
gelatin lifts showed an "anomaly" due to a characteristic of the 
shoe.  However, the judge ruled that the witness could not state 
what caused the identifying characteristic and that the concept 
of a "match" must be left to the jury's own determination.  The 
witness referred only to the possibility of matching identifying 
characteristics, but did not say that any particular shoe was a 
positive match. 
20 
 
 
827, 844 (2011).  The trial judge "has broad discretion to 
determine how to assess the reliability of expert testimony."  
Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 111 (2006).  Here, the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the 
method was reliable because the fact that someone could 
potentially match a shoe print to a shoe based on items stuck to 
the shoe made sense, particularly in light of the expert's 
experience and explanation during the voir dire examination.  
See Commonwealth v. Torres, 469 Mass. 398, 406-408 (2014) 
(expert testimony comparing defendant's footwear to impressions 
made in blood at crime scene was admissible to assist jury and 
was properly introduced where "[i]t was made clear to the jury 
that this was a matter they could weigh for themselves").  We 
note that the expert qualified the value of any comparison, and 
that the defendant had the opportunity to challenge the validity 
of the testimony through cross-examination.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994).  There was no error. 
 
d.  Prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.  
The defendant also alleges that improper statements made by the 
prosecutor during his opening statement and closing argument 
warrant reversal because they materially misled the jury. 
 
i.  Opening statement.  The defendant alleges two errors in 
the opening statement.  First, the prosecutor told the jury that 
the defendant's shoes tested positive for occult blood and for 
21 
 
 
human DNA, "but not enough to give a conclusive result."  Where 
inconclusive DNA evidence is not "probative of an issue of 
consequence," it is inadmissible.  Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 
Mass. 236, 254 (2008).  The defendant objected at the time of 
the prosecutor's reference to the DNA, and the judge immediately 
gave a curative instruction to the jury.17  Considering the 
judge's forceful contemporaneous instruction and his general 
instruction to the jury before the opening statement to the 
effect that the opening was not evidence, and because we 
"presume[] the jury understood and followed" the judge's 
instructions, the prosecutor's improper comment did not 
prejudice the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 
146, 158 (1999). 
 
Second, the defendant claims that the prosecutor's 
reference in his opening to DNA evidence from the bathroom sink18 
                     
 
17 The judge told the jury, "I sustain the objection.  I 
said that DNA evidence that has no figure attached to it means 
nothing.  It is to be disregarded by this jury.  Totally 
disregarded." 
 
 
18 The prosecutor stated: 
 
 
"When they go to the sink knobs, you'll hear they find 
a mixture.  The major -- there's a mixture of a larger 
amount and a smaller amount.  The larger amount they'll say 
-- they'll find the blood was [the victim's}.  There's also 
DNA that's found in the mixture, the minor profile, which 
is consistent with the defendant's profile; and in fact the 
statistical analysis on finding somebody else in a random 
 
22 
 
 
impermissibly misled the jury because it implied that there was 
"less than one-third of one percent" probability that the 
defendant was innocent.  However, the prosecutor's remark did 
not refer to a likelihood of guilt or innocence, but instead was 
an attempt to explain how likely it was that the consistency 
between the defendant's DNA and the sample was a coincidence.  
The remarks did not track the exact formulation of the "random 
match probability" statistic, but his use of the words 
"consistent" and "random drawing" conveyed the same general 
idea.  See Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 407 n.13 
(2011) ("The random match probability . . . calculation measures 
how rare a given DNA sample is among the general population"); 
United States v. Pritchard, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008) ("The [random match probability] represents the 
chance that a single randomly selected unrelated individual 
would match the evidence profile by coincidence" [citation 
omitted]).  There was no error. 
 
Moreover, as with closing arguments, we consider any 
improper remarks in the opening statement "in light of the 
'entire [statement], as well as in light of the judge's 
                                                                  
drawing of people in the African-American community would 
be one in 305.  So less than one-third of 1%." 
 
 
The prosecutor had previously described the statistic 
as "the likelihood that somebody else having that profile 
would be found in the African-American population." 
23 
 
 
instruction to the jury and the evidence at trial.'"  
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 463 Mass. 402, 415 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 684, 694 (2004).  The lack of 
objection to this statement, the judge's earlier charge 
explaining that opening statements are not evidence, and the 
detailed expert testimony on random match statistics made the 
prosecutor's imprecise phrasing of the random match probability 
relatively inconsequential in the context of the entire trial.  
See Commonwealth v. Jones, 439 Mass. 249, 260–261 (2003), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. at 158 (prosecutor's 
opening statement "must be judged in light of the entire 
[statement], the judge's instructions to the jury, and the 
evidence actually introduced at trial"). 
 
ii.  Closing argument.  The defendant also points to two 
portions of the Commonwealth's closing argument as error.  
First, the prosecutor stated that blood found on the bathroom 
light switch contained DNA profiles belonging to three people -- 
that one belonged to the victim and the other two profiles were 
insufficient for testing.19  He argued that "the [S]tate lab was 
actually more discriminating, picked up two small minute samples 
                     
 
19 This was a misstatement of the evidence -- the 
Commonwealth's expert testified that there was one other profile 
present, not two -- but the defendant does not object to this 
characterization of the evidence, presumably because it tends to 
support his third-party culprit theory. 
24 
 
 
that they can't even do further testing on" and, moreover, that 
the defense expert testified that there was only one contributor 
to the light switch sample.  He also asked the jury to infer 
that the blood on the light switch was left by the first officer 
to respond to the scene, based on the officer's testimony.  The 
defendant argues that this was improper because the prosecutor 
impermissibly relied on inconclusive DNA evidence to support his 
inference that a third-party culprit was not responsible for the 
blood on the light switch.20 
 
The judge agreed that the prosecutor had misstated the 
evidence and gave a curative instruction to the jury to clarify 
that the defendant had been excluded as a possible contributor 
                     
 
20 The defendant also argues that the Commonwealth 
improperly introduced the underlying DNA evidence because the 
comparison between the sample and the officer's DNA was 
inconclusive.  Experts for both parties agreed that the sample 
from the light switch contained DNA belonging to the victim and 
to one other person.  Because there was so little minor profile 
DNA present, the defense expert concluded that there was 
essentially one contributor to the sample -- the victim.  The 
Commonwealth's expert testified that the fraction of minor 
profile DNA that was present was sufficient to exclude the 
defendant as a contributor to the sample, but insufficient to 
make any conclusive comparison to the officer's DNA.  In light 
of the efforts by the prosecutor, the judge, and the testifying 
expert to clarify that the result meant that the information was 
too limited to do more definitive testing, the admission of 
nonexclusive evidence was not in error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 855 (2010). 
 
25 
 
 
to the DNA on the light switch.21  See Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 
458 Mass. 776, 789 (2011) (specific curative instruction deemed 
sufficient to mitigate possible prejudice).  The defendant did 
not object at trial to the rest of the statement -- that the 
officer had touched the light switch.  In light of the fact that 
the defense expert said that only one profile was present and 
that defense counsel did not discuss the light switch in the 
closing argument, the prosecutor's comments were unlikely to 
affect the third-party culprit defense.  In addition, this was a 
collateral issue and the officer had already testified about his 
actions that night, so the prosecutor's misstatement was 
unlikely to have had any effect on the verdict, let alone create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
The second allegedly improper argument was that the gelatin 
lift of the shoeprint "matche[d]" the photograph of the sole of 
the defendant's shoe.  "This is then in the blood.  This then 
tests positive for blood.  Do we expect to have blood on our 
shoes?  These shoes were in [the victim's] blood.  This was 
after he killed her."  Although defense counsel objected to 
these statements following the Commonwealth's closing argument, 
                     
 
21 The judge stated, "Jurors, I want you to know and I want 
you to keep in mind that the evidence in this case indicated 
that the defendant was excluded from what was left in the area 
of the light switch.  So bear that in mind in deliberating upon 
this case." 
26 
 
 
we agree with the trial judge that these statements by the 
prosecutor did not materially mislead the jury because the 
argument was based on inferences that the jury could have made 
from the evidence presented at trial.  Commonwealth v. Guy, 441 
Mass. 96, 110 (2004) ("Prosecutors must limit the scope of their 
closing arguments to facts in evidence and the fair inferences 
that may be drawn therefrom"). 
 
e.  Motion for new trial.  The issues raised in the 
defendant's motion for a new trial are essentially the same as 
those raised in his direct appeal.  For the reasons we have 
already discussed, and because the defendant did not explain the 
reasons an evidentiary hearing was necessary, the judge was well 
within his discretion to deny the motion without a hearing.  
Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 Mass. 398, 404 (2015).  Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  After reviewing the entire record, we 
discern no reason to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.