Title: Madison Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court for Dane County
Citation: 2011 WI 72
Docket Number: 2009AP002845-W
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2011

2011 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2845-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Madison Metropolitan School District, 
          Appellant, 
     v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County and the Honorable 
David T. Flanagan, III presiding, 
          Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 1, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan, III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. and BRADLEY, J. join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondents-petitioners there were briefs and oral 
argument by Bruce Meredith, Madison. 
For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by 
Matthew William Bell, associate general counsel, Madison School 
Metropolitan, Madison. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP2845-W   
(L.C. No. 
2009JV419) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Madison Metropolitan School District, 
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Dane County and the  
Honorable David T. Flanagan, III presiding, 
 
          Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision and order of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision and order of the court of appeals1 granting 
a writ of prohibition and vacating a circuit court order 
requiring 
the 
Madison 
Metropolitan 
School 
District 
(the 
District) to develop and implement an educational plan for M.T., 
                                                 
1 Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
No. 2009AP2845-W, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. June 30, 
2010). 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
2 
 
a juvenile who was adjudged delinquent after the District had 
expelled him from school. 
¶2 
The case presents important issues related to the 
authority of circuit courts to order educational services for 
students who are subject to delinquency petitions and also have 
been expelled from school.  The principal questions presented 
may be stated as follows. 
¶3 
First, does a circuit court have authority to order a 
school district to provide alternative educational services to a 
juvenile who has been expelled from school by a lawful and 
unchallenged expulsion order? 
¶4 
Second, did the court of appeals err in utilizing a 
supervisory writ to review the order of the circuit court? 
¶5 
We conclude: 
(1) Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 120.13(1)(c)1.2 
gives 
a 
school 
district express authority to expel a student from school. 
(2) A circuit court does not have statutory authority to 
order a school district to provide alternative educational 
services to a juvenile who has been expelled from school by a 
lawful and unchallenged expulsion order but is still residing in 
the community. 
(a) Wisconsin Stat. § 120.12(18) requires a school 
board to cooperate with the juvenile court and the agency 
designated by the court to prepare an educational plan under 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(e) for a pupil or former pupil who is 
subject to a dispositional order under Wis. Stat. § 938.34 or 
Wis. Stat. § 938.355. 
(b) Wisconsin Stat. § 120.12(18) requires a school 
district 
to 
"[c]oordinate 
and 
provide 
for 
continuity 
of 
educational 
programming" 
for 
pupils 
receiving 
educational 
services as the result of a court order under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.34(7d). 
(c) Wisconsin Stat. § 120.12(18) does not require a 
school board or a school district to provide alternative 
educational resources to a juvenile who has been expelled from 
school under Wis. Stat. § 120.13(1)(c)1. 
(d) Wisconsin Stat. § 938.34(7d) authorizes a circuit 
court to order a juvenile to attend a variety of educational 
programs, but it does not authorize a circuit court to order a 
school district to create an educational program or contract for 
an educational program. 
(e) Wisconsin Stat. § 938.45 applies only to natural 
persons, not legal entities like school districts. 
(3) The court of appeals did not err in utilizing a 
supervisory writ to review the Order to Provide Appropriate 
Educational Resources in this case. 
¶6 
Consequently, the decision and order of the court of 
appeals is affirmed. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
On June 5, 2009, M.T., age 15, brought nine bags of 
marijuana to the campus of Madison East High School, a public 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
4 
 
school operated by the Madison Metropolitan School District.  
M.T. was a student at the school.  When his conduct was 
discovered, M.T. was arrested and charged with possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver. 
¶8 
The District immediately filed a complaint seeking the 
expulsion of M.T. from the District.  The District sent all 
notices required by law, and an independent hearing examiner was 
appointed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 120.13(1)(e).  Hearing 
Officer Helen Marks Dicks held an abbreviated hearing on June 
26, 2009, and a full hearing on July 6, 2009.  The District 
presented two witnesses at the hearing; M.T. and his mother 
appeared by telephone but did not testify or present evidence.  
The hearing was closed to the public at M.T.'s request. 
¶9 
On July 12 the hearing officer issued an order 
concluding that M.T. engaged in conduct that constituted grounds 
for expulsion under Wis. Stat. § 120.13(1) and that the 
interests of the school demanded M.T.'s expulsion.  As requested 
by the District, she ordered M.T. expelled for three semesters.  
She adopted the District's recommendations as to the conditions 
of expulsion, which included giving M.T. the right to apply for 
readmission after one semester provided certain conditions were 
met.3  The District Board of Education approved the order with 
modifications on July 21, 2009.  The expulsion order denied M.T. 
                                                 
3 M.T. complied with early readmission requirements and was 
reinstated by the District as a full-time student on January 25, 
2010.   
No.  2009AP2845-W 
5 
 
any educational services from the District for at least one 
semester, namely, the fall semester of 2009-10. 
¶10 A separate proceeding commenced on July 9, 2009, when 
Dane County authorities filed a delinquency petition against 
M.T. in the Dane County Circuit Court.  The case was assigned to 
Circuit Judge David T. Flanagan who held a plea hearing on 
August 8 and a dispositional hearing on August 26, 2009.   
¶11 Prior to the dispositional hearing, Judge Flanagan 
ordered the Dane County Department of Human Services (DHS) to 
submit a predisposition report.  Wis. Stat. §§ 938.33(1) and 
938.38(1)(a).  A predisposition report must include: "A plan for 
the provision of educational services to the juvenile, prepared 
after consultation with the staff of the school in which the 
juvenile is enrolled or the last school in which the juvenile 
was enrolled."  Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(e). 
¶12 On August 18, 2009, the DHS submitted a report that 
suggested 
15 
specific 
rules 
of 
supervision, 
including 
a 
recommendation that M.T. attend school regularly "with no 
unexcused absences."  The report also advised the court that the 
District was refusing to provide education programming for M.T. 
because he had been expelled. 
¶13 The court's August 26 dispositional order included the 
provision that M.T. "Attend school regularly without unexcused 
absences." 
¶14 On September 14 Judge Flanagan sent a letter to the 
Superintendent of the District, Daniel A. Nerad.  Judge 
Flanagan's letter reads in part: 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
6 
 
 
I 
am 
a 
Dane 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
Judge 
responsible for cases in the Juvenile Court. . . .  I 
have available an impressive range of resources, 
including direct supervision by experienced social 
workers of the Dane County Department of Human 
Services.  Remarkably, I find I do not have available 
what I believe to be the key resource, a bare minimum 
of educational opportunity and activity.  I am advised 
that this is because the District has expelled this 
student and will exclude him for possibly three 
semesters and certainly for one semester. 
 
This young man lives with his mother.  I have 
concluded that she is genuinely concerned for her son 
and willing to cooperate with efforts to get him back 
on the proper path.  I am advised that this family 
cannot afford private tutoring.  I have contacted 
several alternative educational programs and I can 
find nothing for him. 
 
. . . . 
I can understand a determination that the safety and 
security of East High may be well served by excluding 
a student from the facility.  I cannot, however, 
fathom the need to deny to a young man all possibility 
of 
participating 
in 
some 
educational 
activity, 
somehow, somewhere.  It need not be fun; it need not 
be comfortable, but some minimal opportunity should be 
available. . . .  
 
It certainly is not my place to supervise or 
second-guess the complex operation of East High or any 
other educational facility. . . .  I simply suggest 
that the juvenile court and the District can and 
should be working together in this situation.  I am 
confident 
that 
the 
legitimate 
interests 
of 
the 
District can be fully met without the potentially 
destructive total exclusion that has been imposed. 
¶15 On September 28 social worker Maureen Murphy of the 
Dane County Department of Human Services sent a memorandum to 
Judge Flanagan, advising him that she had contacted the 
District's 
Expulsion 
Coordinator, 
without 
avail. 
 
Murphy 
reported on the various educational options she had explored and 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
7 
 
that she had recommended that M.T.'s mother fill out the 
paperwork for home schooling.  Murphy's report noted, "Once this 
is done, she has access to resources available through the WI 
Dept. of Public Instruction [DPI].  There are many free online 
resources and programs . . . .  His mother is home during the 
day and has a computer with internet service."  Then Murphy 
added: 
I am aware that the Court has sent correspondence to 
the Madison School District expressing concern about 
the lack of education options for [M.T.] and I am 
appreciative of this support. . . .  Unfortunately, 
[M.T.] is (like many students who are expelled) a 
young man who has already struggled in school with 
attendance 
and 
behavior 
problems. 
 
His 
current 
expulsion will only further his "disconnect" from 
school and getting a much needed education. 
¶16 In a letter dated October 4, 2009, the District 
replied to Judge Flanagan's letter.  Chief of Staff Steve 
Hartley wrote that the District's "policies and systems do not 
currently provide for the type of services for expelled students 
as envisioned in your letter."  He asked for an appointment with 
the court.  He also acknowledged receiving a draft Order to Show 
Cause. 
¶17 Judge Flanagan issued an Order to Show Cause to the 
District on October 5.  The order said that the court had been 
advised that the District "refuses to provide even minimal 
educational opportunity" to M.T. at any District facility "and 
refuses to provide even home school materials . . . to use under 
the supervision of his mother who is home during the day." 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
8 
 
¶18 The court said that, working through the Dane County 
DHS, it was willing to craft a supervisory plan to serve the 
reasonable concerns of the District "at whatever location or 
manner it 
offers . . . M.T. access to reasonably adequate 
educational opportunity." 
¶19 Then the court added: 
 
In light of the foregoing the court concludes 
that the refusal on the part of the [District] to make 
some reasonable effort to provide minimally adequate 
educational resources to [M.T.] . . . has impaired the 
ability of the court . . . to discharge its statutory 
obligations 
pursuant 
to 
the 
Juvenile 
Code 
of 
Wisconsin.  Therefore, pursuant to sec. 938.45(1), 
Wis. Stats., the court orders the [District] to show 
cause at 9:30 a.m. Friday, October 16, 2009 . . . why 
the court should not order it to provide [M.T.] 
reasonably 
adequate 
educational 
resources, 
at 
a 
location and in a manner subject to the supervision of 
the court. 
¶20 In a letter dated October 12, 2009, the District 
expressed its objection to the order to show cause, and 
reiterated its position that the court's actions would usurp the 
District's statutory expulsion authority.   
¶21 The show cause hearing took place on October 16, 2009, 
with oral arguments provided by the District and an assistant 
district attorney.  During the hearing, the District argued that 
defining the terms of a student's expulsion are within its 
authority, and the court was attempting to usurp that authority 
by amending the terms of M.T.'s expulsion to provide him with 
educational services.  In response to the court's concerns about 
continuity of educational services, the District offered M.T. 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
9 
 
access to its public curriculum, but the court found this option 
to be insufficient.  
¶22 Accordingly, on the same day, the court issued an 
"Order to Provide Appropriate Educational Resources," directing 
the District to provide M.T. with services "not less than those 
provided in the Dane County Juvenile Detention Center . . . at 
whatever location and in whatever manner the District deems to 
be safe and educationally appropriate."  In support of its 
order, the circuit court stated that the District's refusal to 
attempt or consider a reasonable educational "challenge and 
opportunity" contributes to the delinquency of the juvenile 
under Wis. Stat. § 938.45.  Judge Flanagan also concluded that 
the District is a "person" under § 938.45 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(26).  The circuit court's order did not, however, 
oppose the District's decision to expel M.T., and it conceded 
that the District had a proper basis for doing so.  
¶23 Following the hearing, the District developed an 
educational program for M.T.4 providing 10 hours per week of 
                                                 
4 The plan provided specifically: 
a. 
The District shall implement the provision 
of daily instruction one-on-one to [the juvenile] for 
not less than two hours with assignment of appropriate 
independent work to be completed by [the juvenile] 
outside of instructional time, beginning with two high 
school courses, commencing October 28, 2009. 
b. 
The District shall monitor attendance and 
academic progress as well as progress towards meeting 
early 
readmission 
conditions 
and 
shall 
advise 
Department of Human Services Social Worker . . . as to 
such matters. 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
10 
 
direct instruction, and the court accepted the District's 
proposal.  At the same time the District submitted its 
educational program, it also filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 
a Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, and a Motion 
to Clarify.  The circuit court denied the District's Motion for 
Reconsideration on October 21, 2009.   
¶24 The District next filed a timely Notice of Appeal and 
a Notice of Intent to Pursue Postdisposition Relief on November 
5, 2009.  On appeal, it argued that the circuit court had acted 
outside the authority afforded by the Juvenile Justice Code when 
it ordered the District to offer an expelled student direct 
educational services.  The District also sought a determination 
to restrict future attempts by courts, and others, from 
unilaterally amending lawful expulsion orders.   
¶25 On January 12, 2010, M.T. filed a motion to withdraw 
because he was not the real party in interest.5  On February 17, 
in response to the motion, court of appeals Judge Paul B. 
Higginbotham permitted M.T. to withdraw and substituted the 
Circuit Court for Dane County and Judge Flanagan as respondents, 
thus framing the issue around a circuit court's authority to 
                                                                                                                                                             
c. 
The teacher assigned to provide instruction 
shall contact Social Worker Murphy, on a not less than 
weekly basis to advise as to attendance, behavior and 
academic progress.  
 
5 M.T. filed a motion to dismiss in the alternative, which 
the court of appeals denied.  
No.  2009AP2845-W 
11 
 
direct the school district to provide educational services to a 
student who had been expelled.  Judge Higginbotham also 
construed the District's appeal as a petition for a supervisory 
writ.6   
¶26 In its decision and order dated June 30, 2010, a full 
panel of the court of appeals determined that the circuit court 
could not rely on Wis. Stat. §§ 120.12(18) or 938.45 to override 
the District's prior determination to expel a juvenile under 
Wis. Stat. § 120.13(1)(c)1.  Madison Metro., No. 2009AP2845-W at 
7, 10-11.   
¶27 In 
addition, 
the 
court 
held 
that 
the 
District 
satisfied the five criteria for granting a supervisory writ: (1) 
an appeal would be an inadequate remedy; (2) the duty of the 
circuit court is plain; (3) its refusal to act within such duty 
or its intent to act in violation of such duty is clear; (4) the 
results of the circuit court's action would not only be 
prejudicial, but also incur extraordinary hardship; and (5) the 
request for relief was made promptly and speedily.  Id. at 6 
(citing State ex rel. Dressler v. Circuit Court for Racine 
County, 163 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991)).   
¶28 Specifically, the court reasoned that "the possibility 
that the school district might be required in the future to 
provide similar educational services to an undetermined number 
of expelled students under the circuit court's interpretation of 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.51 is the appellate rule that 
governs petitions for a "[s]upervisory writ and original 
jurisdiction to issue prerogative writ." 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
12 
 
the relevant statutes" satisfied the "extraordinary hardship" 
requirement.  Madison Metro., No. 2009AP2845-W at 6.   
¶29 The court of appeals reasoned:  
In sum, the school district had the explicit 
statutory authority to refuse to provide educational 
services to a juvenile pursuant to a valid expulsion 
order, and the circuit court had no explicit authority 
to 
order 
the 
school 
district 
to 
provide 
any 
educational services which the district did not itself 
recommend as part of its plan.  We therefore conclude 
that the challenged order in this case clearly 
violated the circuit court's plain duty to act within 
its authority. 
Id. at 11.   
¶30 Accordingly, the court of appeals granted the District 
a writ of prohibition and vacated the circuit court's order to 
provide educational services to M.T.  Id. at 12. 
¶31 The circuit court petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted on October 27, 2010. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶32 The first issue is whether the circuit court had the 
authority to order the District to provide educational services 
to a lawfully expelled student.  This requires us to determine 
the scope of the circuit court's authority under the Juvenile 
Justice Code,7 in tandem with the District's authority and duties 
under the School District Government statutes.8  This analysis 
implicates both judicial authority and statutory analysis, both 
of which are questions of law.  See State v. McClaren, 2009 WI 
                                                 
7 Wis. Stat. ch. 938. 
8 Wis. Stat. ch. 120. 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
13 
 
69, ¶14, 318 Wis. 2d 739, 767 N.W.2d 550; Konneker v. Romano, 
2010 WI 65, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432. 
¶33 The second issue is whether the court of appeals 
properly exercised its discretion in issuing a supervisory writ.  
A person may request the court of appeals to exercise its 
supervisory jurisdiction to issue a prerogative writ over a 
court and its presiding judge.  Wis. Stat. § 809.51.  A 
supervisory writ is an extraordinary remedy to prevent a court 
from refusing to perform, or from violating, its plain duty.  
Dressler, 163 Wis. 2d at 630.  In this case, the court of 
appeals issued a writ of prohibition.  "A writ of prohibition is 
an extraordinary remedy traditionally employed to restrain an 
inferior tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction."  City of 
Madison v. Wis. DWD, 2003 WI 76, ¶9, 262 Wis. 2d 652, 664 
N.W.2d 584.  It may also be employed to prevent a public entity 
from exceeding its statutory authority.  State ex rel. DPI v. 
DILHR, 68 Wis. 2d 677, 686-87, 229 N.W.2d 591 (1975). 
¶34 The decision to issue a supervisory writ involves an 
exercise of discretion.  Dressler, 163 Wis. 2d at 630.  A 
discretionary 
determination 
is 
reviewed 
for 
an 
erroneous 
exercise of that discretion.  City of Madison, 262 Wis. 2d 652, 
¶10.  Accordingly, we will affirm a court's discretionary 
decision if "the court examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational 
process, reached a conclusion which a reasonable judge could 
reach."  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
14 
 
¶35 This case exposes the tension between a school 
district and a circuit court when a juvenile has been expelled 
from school for delinquent conduct but has not been committed by 
the juvenile court to an institution or program that is required 
by statute to provide educational services.  In this situation, 
the issue of whether the juvenile must receive educational 
services is uncertain. 
¶36 The powers of a school board are enumerated in Wis. 
Stat. § 120.13.  The first power listed is related to suspension 
and expulsion. 
School board powers. The school board of a common 
or union high school district may do all things 
reasonable 
to 
promote 
the 
cause 
of 
education, 
including establishing, providing and improving school 
district programs, functions and activities for the 
benefit of pupils, and including all of the following: 
(1) School 
government 
rules; 
suspension; 
expulsion.   
 . . . . 
(c)1. 
The school board may expel a pupil from 
school whenever it finds the pupil guilty of repeated 
refusal or neglect to obey the rules . . . or finds 
that the pupil engaged in conduct while at school or 
while under the supervision of a school authority 
which endangered the property, health or safety of 
others . . . and is satisfied that the interest of the 
school demands the pupil's expulsion. 
Wis. Stat. § 120.13(1). 
¶37 The power to expel students from a public school is 
not new.  For instance, § 54, ch. XXIII, Revised Statutes of 
State of Wisconsin (1871), reads: 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
15 
 
 
The board shall have power to make all needful 
rules and regulations for the organization, graduation 
and government of the school or schools established in 
the district; said rules to take effect and be in 
force when a copy of the same, signed by a majority of 
the board, shall be filed with the clerk; to suspend 
any pupil from the privilege of the school for non-
compliance with the rules established by them, or by 
the teacher, with their consent; and to expel from 
school any pupil who shall persistently refuse or 
neglect to obey the rules and regulations above 
mentioned, whenever, upon due examination, they shall 
become satisfied that the interests of the school 
demand such expulsion. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶38 In State ex rel. Dresser v. District Board of School 
District No. 1 [St. Croix Falls], 135 Wis. 619, 627-28, 116 N.W. 
232 (1908), the court stated: 
 
This 
court . . . holds 
that 
the 
school 
authorities have the power to suspend a pupil for an 
offense . . . which 
has 
a 
direct 
and 
immediate 
tendency to influence the conduct of other pupils 
while in the school room, to set at naught the proper 
discipline of the school, to impair the authority of 
the teachers, and to bring them into ridicule and 
contempt.  Such power is essential to the preservation 
of order, decency, decorum, and good government in the 
public schools. 
 . . . . 
The school authorities must necessarily be invested 
with 
a 
broad 
discretion 
in 
the 
government 
and 
discipline of the pupils, and the courts should not 
interfere with the exercise of such authority unless 
it has been illegally or unreasonably exercised. 
¶39 These sentiments, expressed more than a century ago, 
are qualified now by a student's due process protections and 
individual rights.  Nonetheless, there is no dispute that a 
school district may expel students who violate certain rules, 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
16 
 
and there is no challenge to the propriety of the expulsion of 
M.T. in this case.  In a real sense, the dispute here boils down 
to whether the legislature has modified the statutes so that 
expulsion today does not mean the same as it meant in the past, 
that 
is, 
expulsion 
from 
the 
entire 
district, 
without 
qualification, unless the district chooses otherwise. 
¶40 The term "expel" is not defined in the School District 
Government statutes.  The DPI, however, has long interpreted the 
term to mean that a school district bears no responsibility for 
providing an education to expelled students.  See Remer v. 
Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668 n.3 (E.D. 
Wis. 2001) (citing Susan Marie H. v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 
State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction Decision and Order No. 
157 (June 28, 1988); Ricardo S. v. Sch. Dist. of Wis. Rapids, 
Superintendent of Pub. Instruction Decision and Order No. 145 
(Sept. 5, 1986)).9   
¶41 This construction is supported by the statutory scheme 
in the School District Government statutes.  For example, no 
school district may be required to enroll an expelled student 
                                                 
9 The 2001 Remer decision followed a decision in the United 
States Court of Appeals, Remer v. Burlington Area School Dist., 
205 F.3d 990, 997 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000), in which the Seventh 
Circuit also cited the two decisions of the State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction.  The court said: "In one of its 
submissions to the district court, the School District explained 
that 'once a student has been expelled from a school, the 
district no longer has the responsibility to provide educational 
services to the student.'"  Id.   
No.  2009AP2845-W 
17 
 
while an expulsion order is in effect in another district.  Wis. 
Stat. § 120.13(1)(f).   
¶42 Furthermore, while the DPI encourages school districts 
to provide alternative education to expelled students, it has 
concluded that such programming is not required, and a failure 
to provide such alternative education is not a violation of an 
expelled student's constitutional rights.  See C.M. v. Kenosha 
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., Superintendent of Pub. Instruction 
Decision and Order No. 616 (April 17, 2008).   
¶43 The DPI has memorialized its construction of the 
expulsion authority in two documents intended for the public: 
"My 
child 
has 
been 
expelled. 
Now 
what?" 
("Parents 
are 
responsible for finding an educational program for their 
expelled child.") and "Answers to Frequently Asked School 
Discipline Questions" ("In general, expulsion from a Wisconsin 
public school district removes a pupil's right to receive a free 
public education from any Wisconsin public school.").  These 
documents are available on the DPI's website: www.dpi.wi.gov.  
(last examined on July 8, 2011).  The DPI's longstanding 
interpretation of expulsion is entitled to deference. 
¶44 According to the District, the fact that an expelled 
student also has been adjudicated delinquent does not change a 
school 
district's 
authority 
to 
expel 
a 
student 
without 
educational programming. 
¶45 The circuit court stakes out a different position.  It 
contends that under the Juvenile Justice Code adopted in 1995, 
see 1995 Wis. Act 77, "circuit courts have been given a 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
18 
 
preeminent role in juvenile dispositions and are entitled to 
exercise 
their 
discretion, 
unless 
restricted 
by 
explicit 
statutory or constitutional limitations on their authority."  
(Petitioner's brief at 19)(Emphasis added.)  This theory 
effectively eliminates the need to find statutory authority for 
the court's order in a juvenile disposition. 
¶46 The circuit court adds that provisions in the code 
"strongly support a circuit court's authority to provide 
educational services to juveniles residing at home or outside of 
a detention center, regardless of whether the juvenile was 
expelled."  (Petitioner's brief at 24-25)  This proposition 
would inject the circuit court into a district's educational 
programming. 
¶47 Finally, the circuit court asserts: 
 
The legislature needed an umpire to manage all of 
the distinct interests and parties, as well as to 
prevent agencies from unduly encroaching on each 
other's authority or from cost-shifting from one unit 
of government to another.  The most logical umpire is 
the circuit court judge, who is in the best position 
to see the big picture and coordinate all of the 
required 
services. 
 
This 
logic 
applies 
to 
all 
juveniles, including those who have been expelled.  
(Petitioner's brief at 26-27) 
This formulation of the circuit court's power in juvenile 
dispositions under Wis. Stat. § 938.355 is not limited to 
educational services. 
¶48 To support its position, the circuit court relies on 
several 
statutory 
provisions, 
including 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.34(7d), 120.12(18), and 938.45. 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
19 
 
¶49 As noted above, before its disposition of a juvenile 
adjudged to be delinquent, the circuit court designates an 
agency to prepare a report with background information and 
recommendations on various matters including a "plan for the 
provision of educational services to the juvenile, prepared 
after consultation with the staff of the school in which the 
juvenile is enrolled or the last school in which the juvenile 
was enrolled."  Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(e).  "If the court 
adjudges a juvenile delinquent, the court shall enter an order 
deciding one or more of the dispositions of the case as provided 
in this section under a care and treatment plan."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.34. 
¶50 These dispositions include: 
(7d) EDUCATION PROGRAM.  (a) Except as provided 
in par. (d), order the juvenile to attend any of the 
following: 
1. 
A 
nonresidential 
educational 
program, 
including a program for children at risk under s. 
118.153, provided by the school district in which the 
juvenile resides. 
2. 
Under 
a 
contractual 
agreement 
with 
the 
school district in which the juvenile resides, a 
nonresidential 
educational 
program 
provided 
by 
a 
licensed child welfare agency. 
3. 
Under 
a 
contractual 
agreement 
with 
the 
school district in which the juvenile resides, an 
educational program provided by a private, nonprofit, 
nonsectarian agency that is located in the school 
district in which the juvenile resides and that 
complies with 42 USC 2000d. 
4. 
Under 
a 
contractual 
agreement 
with 
the 
school district in which the juvenile resides, an 
educational program provided by a technical college 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
20 
 
district located in the school district in which the 
juvenile resides. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(7d)(a).10 
¶51 This 
provision 
has 
been 
part 
of 
the 
juvenile 
disposition statute since 1988.  See § 12, 1987 Wis. Act 285, 
creating Wis. Stat. § 48.34(12) (1988).  The provision was 
added, without any written explanation, as part of a Senate 
substitute amendment to Assembly Bill 389.   
¶52 In its decision, the court of appeals discussed 
subsection (7d) as follows: 
 
The circuit court points out that Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.34(7d) authorizes it to order a delinquent 
juvenile to attend "[a] nonresidential educational 
program . . . provided by the school district in which 
the juvenile resides" and that Wis. Stat. § 938.355(1) 
authorizes it to employ "those means necessary to 
promote the objectives" of the juvenile justice code.  
It claims these provisions allow it to order a school 
district to provide educational services, even to an 
expelled student. 
 
We note . . . that the power to order a juvenile 
to attend a provided program is not the same as the 
power to order a school district to provide a program.  
Rather, it is implicit in Wis. Stat. § 938.34(7d) that 
a program must already be provided by the school 
district before the court can order the juvenile to 
attend it.  Indeed, the process of having the school 
district 
recommend 
an 
educational 
plan 
for 
a 
delinquent student serves the function of identifying 
                                                 
10 This section 
governing dispositions for educational 
programming is not discussed in the legislative notes for 1995 
Wis. Act 77.  It has not been changed in any substantive fashion 
since 
its 
enactment, apart from the addition of a new 
subdivision which became effective May 2010.  2009 Wis. Act 302 
§ 104.  We find no discussion of the legislature's intent 
regarding the interplay of this statute with the School District 
Government statutes. 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
21 
 
for the court exactly what program(s) the school 
district can provide for the juvenile.  When a school 
district has expelled a student and ordered that no 
educational services be provided for a certain period 
of time, logic dictates that there are no programs 
provided by the district available to the student 
during that expulsion period. 
Madison Metro., No. 2009AP2845-W at 9. 
¶53 In sum, the court of appeals concluded that the 
District had the explicit statutory authority to refuse to 
provide educational services to a juvenile who has been expelled 
pursuant to a valid expulsion order, and that authority is not 
overridden by Wis. Stat. § 938.34(7d). 
¶54 The court of appeals was correct.  We are unable to 
interpret § 938.34(7d) as broadly as the circuit court suggests 
because it would empower the court to order school districts to 
create programs or enter into contracts.  The language in 
subsection (7d)(a)——"order the juvenile to attend"——is quite 
different from the language in subsection (7d)(b)——"order the 
school board to disclose"  The latter language is a clear 
directive to the school board; the former is not. 
¶55 The circuit court relies upon (and disputes the court 
of appeals' interpretation of) Wis. Stat. § 120.12(18), which is 
part of the list of school board duties: 
 
The school board of a common or union high school 
district shall: 
 
. . . . 
(18) Coordinate and provide for continuity of 
educational 
programming 
for 
pupils 
receiving 
educational services as the result of a court order 
under s. 48.345 (12) or 938.34 (7d), including but not 
limited to providing a report to the court assigned to 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
22 
 
exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938 and the 
agency which is required to submit an educational plan 
for a child under s. 48.33 or 938.33 (1)(e).  The 
report shall describe the child's educational status 
and 
make 
recommendations 
regarding 
educational 
programming for the child.  The report shall be in 
writing, except that if the educational plan under s. 
938.33 (1)(e) is presented orally at the dispositional 
hearing the report may be presented orally to the 
court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 
and 938 and the agency at the dispositional hearing.  
If written, the report shall be provided to the court 
assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 
938 and the agency at least 3 days before the date of 
the child's dispositional hearing. 
Wis. Stat. § 120.12(18). 
¶56 This provision, though amended, also predates the 
Juvenile Justice Code.  See Wis. Stat. § 120.12(18) (1988), 
created by § 30, 1987 Wis. Act 285. 
¶57 The court of appeals concluded that there is nothing 
in § 120.12(18) that requires a school district to provide any 
specific educational services to a delinquent juvenile who has 
been expelled.  The school board does have a duty to provide 
assistance to the court and the agency producing the report 
required under Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(e) and, generally, to 
coordinate and provide for continuity of educational programming 
for 
juveniles 
receiving 
educational 
services 
under 
a 
dispositional order.  Some of those pupils could be sent by a 
dispositional order to an institution like Ethan Allen; some 
could 
be 
sent to 
a local detention center; some could 
participate in alternative schooling provided by the school 
district; some might not be suspended or expelled at all.   
No.  2009AP2845-W 
23 
 
¶58 The statutory language is broad because there are 
numerous situations in which the school district would be 
heavily involved with a juvenile's education, while there are 
other situations in which the juvenile would be totally removed 
from the school district, even without expulsion.  Participation 
by the school district in attempting to provide for a continuity 
of educational programming would nearly always be in order 
without implying that the school district has a duty to deliver 
direct educational services to a student after expulsion. 
¶59 We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit 
court erred by relying on Wis. Stat. § 938.45 as authority to 
bind 
the 
District 
and to support its Order to Provide 
Appropriate Educational Resources. 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.45 is titled, "Orders applicable 
to adults."11  In pertinent part, the statute provides: 
(1) Orders when adult contributed to condition 
of juvenile. 
(a) If in the hearing of a case of a juvenile 
alleged to be delinquent under s. 938.12 or in need of 
protection or services under s. 938.13 it appears that 
any person 17 years of age or older has been guilty of 
                                                 
11 The circuit court cited this section in its Order to Show 
Cause, issued on October 5, 2009, and in its Order to Provide 
Appropriate Educational Services, issued on October 16, 2009.  
In its reply brief to this court, the circuit court states that 
it is no longer claiming Wis. Stat. § 938.45 "as a significant 
basis for its authority," but instead is relying broadly on the 
Juvenile Justice Code and Wis. Stat. § 120.12(18).  However, 
because the circuit court cited Wis. Stat. § 938.45 as the 
original basis for its exercise of authority over the District, 
we find it appropriate to address whether such exercise was 
proper. 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
24 
 
contributing to, encouraging, or tending to cause by 
any act or omission, such condition of the juvenile, 
the court may make orders with respect to the conduct 
of that person in his or her relationship to the 
juvenile, including orders relating to determining the 
ability of the person to provide for the maintenance 
or care of the juvenile and directing when, how, and 
where funds for the maintenance or care shall be paid. 
(b) An act or failure to act contributes to a 
condition of a juvenile . . . if the natural and 
probable consequences of that act or failure to act 
would be to cause the juvenile to come within the 
provisions of s. 938.12 or 938.13. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.45(1)(a)-(b). 
¶61 An "adult" is defined in turn under § 938.02(1) as "a 
person who is 18 years of age or older," except for the purposes 
of prosecuting or investigating a crime allegedly committed by a 
17-year-old.  The term "person" is not defined in the Juvenile 
Justice Code.   
¶62 Under Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26), the term "person" is 
generally defined to include "all partnerships, associations and 
bodies politic or corporate."  However, Wis. Stat. § 990.01 
provides that the following definitions set forth in ch. 990 
"shall be construed as indicated unless such construction would 
produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature."  (Emphasis added.)  The District asserts that it 
would 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
manifest 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature to interpret the term "person" to encompass the 
District in this context.   
¶63 We have not previously had the opportunity to construe 
the meaning of the term "person" in the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.45(1).  When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
25 
 
begin with the language of the statute and give it its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  When that meaning is plain, courts will look no 
further.  Id.  We interpret statutory language in context——that 
is, in relation to surrounding or other closely related statutes 
and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  Id., 
¶46.   
¶64 We conclude that the plain meaning of "person" as it 
is used in Wis. Stat. § 938.45(1) refers to natural persons.  
Consequently, a school district is not capable of contributing 
to the delinquency of a minor under the plain language of this 
statute because a school district is not a natural person.  
Accordingly, the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it 
relied on this provision to obtain authority over the District. 
¶65 Section 938.45 uses the term "adult" in the title of 
the statute ("Orders when adult contributed to condition of 
juvenile."), and it refers to an "adult" when it uses the phrase 
"any person 17 years of age" in the text in connection with 
alleged criminal conduct.  The use of the term "adult" is 
significant because it is a defined term in the Juvenile Justice 
Code.  By specifying that this section addresses "adults," not 
No.  2009AP2845-W 
26 
 
merely "persons," the legislature invoked the age requirements 
set forth in § 938.02(1).12 
¶66 Under Wis. Stat. § 938.02(1), the general principle is 
that an "adult" is a person who is 18 years of age or older.  To 
interpret § 938.45(1)(a) as including governmental bodies and 
entities such as the District would render an unreasonable 
result.  Because the section governs an adult contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor, any "person" falling within the 
statute is subject to the age requirements of § 938.02(1).  
There would be no rational justification for including entities 
such as the District within a circuit court's authority in a 
delinquency proceeding, but only if the entity had been in 
existence for 17 or 18 years.   
¶67 As the District noted, one school district has the 
same rights and obligations and duties as another, regardless of 
how long it has been in existence.  There is no rational basis 
for the argument that a recently created district would be 
exempted by the statute, while another that had been in 
existence for 18 years would be subject to the circuit court's 
authority.   
¶68 The legislative intent behind establishing a minimum 
age for contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile is clear.  
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 990.001(6) reads: "STATUTE TITLES AND 
HISTORY