Title: State v. Danny C. Eesley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001839-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1839-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Danny C. Eesley,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  217 Wis. 2d 291, 577 N.W.2d 387 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 30, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland 
 
JUDGE: 
Norman L. Yackel 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was 
a brief by Kyle H. Torvinen and Hendricks, Knudson, Gee, Hayden & 
Torvinen, S.C., Superior and oral argument by Kyle H. Torvinen. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Michael R. Klos, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1839-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Danny C. Eesley,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
APR 30, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Petitioner, Danny C. Eesley 
(Eesley), requests review of a court of appeals’ decision that 
affirmed his conviction.  Eesley, urging a dismissal of the 
charges, argues that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
used to deliver him to Wisconsin, was a detainer within the 
meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD” or 
“Agreement”).  Therefore, he argues, according to the provisions 
of the IAD the failure to bring him to trial within 120 days of 
his arrival in Wisconsin results in mandatory dismissal of the 
Wisconsin charges.  Because we conclude that a writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer, the IAD was not 
triggered, and Eesley is not afforded the protections of the 
IAD.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
2 
¶2 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are limited, and 
for purposes of this appeal, are conceded.  While Eesley was 
serving a federal prison sentence at the Federal Correctional 
Institute in Sandstone, Minnesota (FCI, Sandstone), he was 
charged with a total of 12 separate state offenses in the State 
of Wisconsin (State).  Nine of the charges were filed in Ashland 
County and three charges were filed in neighboring Bayfield 
County.  By stipulation, all charges were prosecuted in Ashland 
County. 
¶3 
On January 5, 1996, a State of Wisconsin Special 
Prosecutor filed a petition and writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum addressed to the circuit court.  The petition 
stated that Eesley was “scheduled to appear for initial 
appearances on felony charges as shown in the attached criminal 
complaints in the above cases on January 26, 1996 at 9:30 A.M. 
in the Circuit Court for Ashland County, Wisconsin, before the 
Honorable Norman L. Yackel, Acting Circuit Judge . . . .”   
¶4 
Judge Yackel granted the petition and signed the writ 
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum which was directed to the U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons.  The writ “commanded” that the Bureau of 
Prisons deliver Eesley to a member of the Ashland County 
Sheriff’s Department on January 25, 1996, so that he could 
appear “in the above-titled action” on January 26, 1996.  The 
writ also indicated that the Ashland County Sheriff’s Department 
would return Eesley immediately after the proceeding unless 
otherwise ordered by the court.   
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
3 
¶5 
The federal prison warden at the FCI, Sandstone 
delivered Eesley to the Ashland County Sheriff as requested by 
the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.  Eesley made his 
initial appearance on January 26, 1996, on 11 of 12 charges.  
(One of the Ashland County charges was not filed against Eesley 
until March 7, 1996.)  After the initial appearance, Eesley was 
returned to the FCI, Sandstone. 
¶6 
On May 9, 1996, again pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum issued by the Ashland County Circuit 
Court, Eesley was transferred from the FCI, Sandstone to the 
custody of the Ashland County Sheriff, for a preliminary hearing 
to be held on May 10, 1996.  Eesley was also served with the 
original complaint regarding the twelfth charge that had been 
filed in Ashland County, and the court conducted the preliminary 
hearing on that charge as well.  Following the preliminary 
hearing, 
Eesley 
was 
again 
transported 
back 
to 
the 
FCI, 
Sandstone. 
¶7 
On June 4, 1996, again pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum, Eesley was transported from FCI, 
Sandstone to the Ashland County Circuit Court to appear for 
arraignments scheduled for June 5, 1996.  Following the 
arraignments, Eesley was transported back to the FCI, Sandstone. 
 At no time at his initial appearance, preliminary hearing, or 
arraignments, was the IAD, Wis. Stat. § 976.05 (1993-94),1 
mentioned by any of the parties. 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
4 
¶8 
On July 10, 1996, Eesley filed a motion to dismiss all 
state charges pending against him on the grounds that the State 
had violated the IAD.  The IAD requires that after a detainer is 
filed against a prisoner in another jurisdiction a trial must be 
held within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the state 
in which trial is to be had on untried indictments, informations 
or complaintsthe “speedy trial” provision.  After a detainer 
has been filed and a prisoner transferred to a different state 
for prosecution, the IAD forbids returning the prisoner to the 
“sending” 
state until 
the 
trial 
is 
conductedthe 
“anti-
shuttling” provision.  
¶9 
The sanction for noncompliance with the provisions of 
the IAD is dismissal of the pending charges with prejudice.  
Eesley 
alleged 
that 
the 
speedy 
trial 
and 
anti-shuttling 
provisions had been violated.  He argued that a trial had not 
been held within 120 days of Eesley’s arrival in Ashland County 
for his initial appearance on January 26, 1996, and he had been 
transported back to the FCI, Sandstone before the trial was 
completed.  Therefore, Eesley argued, the IAD was violated and 
the criminal charges pending against him should be dismissed. 
¶10 The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Eesley’s 
motion 
for 
dismissal.  Reserving all rights to appeal the circuit court’s 
decision denying his motion, Eesley then entered into a plea 
agreement on all 12 state charges.  Pursuant to the plea 
agreement, he was convicted of two counts of armed burglary and 
one count of arson.  Again, by writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum, Eesley was transferred from the FCI, Sandstone to 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
5 
appear for a plea and sentencing hearing, scheduled for December 
13, 1996.  The circuit court imposed a sentence for these three 
counts to run consecutively to other sentences already imposed 
against Eesley. 
¶11 Eesley appealed his convictions, arguing that the 
circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on 
violations of the IAD.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
convictions, reasoning that the writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum used to obtain Eesley’s custody for prosecution of 
the state charges was not a detainer within the meaning of the 
IAD.  Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned, the IAD was not 
triggered and the protections afforded by the Agreement were not 
available to Eesley.  This court granted Eesley’s petition for 
review. 
¶12 The issue presented by this case is whether a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum constitutes a detainer under the 
IAD.  If it does, the IAD is triggered, and the State must 
comply with the speedy trial and anti-shuttling provisions of 
the Agreement.  If a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does 
not constitute a detainer, the IAD is not triggered.   
¶13 Whether a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
constitutes a detainer under the IAD and thereby triggers the 
IAD and its protections requires that we interpret the IAD, Wis. 
Stat. § 976.05.  This is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  State v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 414, 542 N.W.2d 774 
(1996).  The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the 
intent of the legislature.  Id.  We begin by looking at the 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
6 
plain language of the statute.  State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 214 Wis. 2d 605, 613, 571 N.W.2d 385 
(1997).  If the plain language does not set forth the 
legislature’s intent, we may look to the history, scope, 
context, subject matter, and object of the statute.  Id. at 614. 
  
¶14 The IAD was enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature in 
1969, currently found at Wis. Stat. § 976.05.  See § 63, ch. 
255, Laws of 1969.  The IAD prescribes “procedures by which a 
member State may obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in 
another member jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may demand 
the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against him in 
another jurisdiction.”  United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 
343 (1978).  The IAD defines the “receiving state” as the state 
in which the trial on the indictment, information or complaint 
is to be conducted.  § 976.05(2)(a).  The “sending state” is the 
state in which the prisoner is incarcerated when he or she 
initiates disposition of untried offenses or when a prosecutor 
initiates a request for custody or availability of the prisoner. 
 § 976.05(2)(b). 
 
For 
purposes 
of 
the 
IAD, 
the 
federal 
government is considered a state.  § 976.05(2)(c). 
¶15 The central provisions of the IAD are Articles III and 
IV, enacted in Wisconsin as Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3) and (4).  
Generally, Article III, § 976.05(3) (reprinted in part below),2 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(3) provides in pertinent part: 
(3) ARTICLE III.  (a) Whenever a person has entered 
upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
7 
provides procedures whereby a prisoner against whom a detainer 
has been lodged, can demand a speedy disposition of the charges. 
 Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351.  When a detainer is filed against a 
prisoner, the warden must promptly inform the prisoner of such 
                                                                  
institution of a party state, and whenever during the 
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is 
pending 
in 
any 
other 
party 
state 
any 
untried 
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of 
which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, 
the prisoner shall be brought to trial within 180 days 
after the prisoner has caused to be delivered to the 
prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the 
prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of 
the place of his or her imprisonment and his or her 
request for a final disposition to be  made of the 
indictment, information or complaint, but for good 
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the 
prisoner’s counsel being present, the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or 
reasonable continuance.  The request of the prisoner 
shall 
be 
accompanied 
by 
a 
certificate 
of 
the 
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, 
stating the term of commitment under which the 
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the 
time remaining to be served on the sentence, the 
amount of good time earned, the time of parole 
eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the 
department relating to the prisoner.   
. . .  
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a 
prisoner under par. (a) shall operate as a request for 
final 
disposition 
of 
all 
untried 
indictments, 
informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from 
the state to whose prosecuting official the request 
for final disposition is specifically directed.  . . . 
 If trial is not had on any indictment, information or 
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of 
the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, 
such indictment, information or complaint shall not be 
of any further force or effect, and the court shall 
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e)  
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
8 
detainer and of his or her right to demand disposition.  Id.; 
§ 976.05(3)(c).  If the prisoner makes such a request, the trial 
must commence within 180 days of the request.  § 976.05(3)(a).  
If the receiving state fails to have a trial on the outstanding 
indictment, information or complaint within the prescribed time 
period and before the prisoner is transported back to the 
original place of imprisonment, the court is required to dismiss 
such charges with prejudice.  § 976.05(3)(d). 
¶16 Article IV, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(4) (reprinted below),3 
provides the procedures whereby a prosecutor in the receiving 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(4) provides: 
(4) ARTICLE IV.  (a) The appropriate officer of the 
jurisdiction 
in 
which 
an 
untried 
indictment, 
information or complaint is pending shall be entitled 
to have a prisoner against whom the officer has lodged 
a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment 
in any party state made available in accordance with 
sub. (5)(a) upon presentation of a written request for 
temporary custody or availability to the appropriate 
authorities of the state in which the prisoner is 
incarcerated: 
provided 
that 
the 
court 
having 
jurisdiction 
of 
such 
indictment, 
information 
or 
complaint has duly approved, recorded and transmitted 
the request: and that there shall be a period of 30 
days after receipt by the appropriate authorities 
before the request is honored, within which period the 
governor of the sending state may disapprove the 
request for temporary custody or availability, either 
upon the governor’s own motion or upon motion of the 
prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer’s written request 
under par. (a), the appropriate authorities having the 
prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a 
certificate stating the term of commitment under which 
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the 
amount of good time earned, the time of parole 
eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
9 
state lodges a detainer against a prisoner in a sending state 
and secures the prisoner’s presence for disposition of the 
charges.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351; § 976.05(4).  Once a 
prosecutor has filed a detainer against a prisoner in another 
jurisdiction, he or she may secure the prisoner’s presence by 
presenting the sending state with a “written request for 
temporary custody.”  § 976.05(4)(a).  Such a written request may 
be a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 
362.  A trial must be commenced within 120 days after the 
arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state.  § 976.05(4)(c). 
                                                                  
state parole agency relating to the prisoner.  Said 
authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other 
officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state 
who lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar 
certificates and with notices informing them of the 
request for custody or availability and of the reasons 
therefor. 
(c) In respect to any proceeding made possible by 
this subsection, trial shall be commenced within 120 
days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving 
state, but for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel being present, the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary or reasonable continuance.  
(d) Nothing contained in this subsection shall be 
construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which 
the prisoner may have to contest the legality of the 
prisoner’s delivery under par. (a), but such delivery 
may not be opposed or denied on the grounds that the 
executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If 
trial 
is 
not 
had 
on 
any 
indictment, 
information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to 
the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment 
under 
sub. 
(5)(e), 
such 
indictment, 
information or complaint shall not be of any further 
force or effect, and the court shall enter an order 
dismissing the same with prejudice.  
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
10
 If a trial is not held on the charges within 120 days or prior 
to the prisoner being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment, the charges no longer have any effect, and the 
court must enter an order dismissing the charges with prejudice. 
 § 976.05(4)(e).  See also § 976.05(5)(c).     
¶17 A “detainer” is not defined in the IAD, Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05.  Accordingly, we look to the history of the Agreement 
to discern the definition.  The United States House and Senate 
reports defined a detainer as a “‘notification filed with the 
institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising 
that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another 
jurisdiction.’”  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
91-1018, p.2 (1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2 (1970)). 
¶18 In contrast to a detainer, a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum is issued by a court “when it is necessary to bring 
a person who is confined for some other offense before the 
issuing court for trial.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) 
at 709.  A court’s authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum is statutory.  Courts have the power “to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus, to bring before them any prisoner for 
trial or as a witness.”  Wis. Stat. § 782.44.  
¶19 We rely on Mauro, the leading decision regarding writs 
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and detainers under the IAD, to 
resolve this case.  As in the present case, two of the 
defendants in Mauro, a consolidated case, were serving sentences 
in one jurisdiction when they were transferred to a different 
jurisdiction pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
11
for prosecution on other charges.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 344.  
Before trial on the federal charges, the defendants were 
returned to their respective state prisons until shortly before 
their trials on federal charges.  Id. at 345.  The defendants 
filed motions to dismiss the federal charges, asserting that the 
anti-shuttling provisions of the IAD had been violated.  Id.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed 
the 
district 
court’s 
dismissal 
of 
the 
charges, 
determining that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was a 
detainer and had triggered the IAD and its protections.  Id. 
¶20 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second 
Circuit, relying in part on the several distinctions between a 
detainer and a writ to conclude that a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum is not a detainer.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 361.  A writ 
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum can only be issued by a court. 
 Id. at 358; Wis. Stat. § 782.44.  In contrast, a detainer may 
be lodged against a defendant by a prosecutor or law enforcement 
officer.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 358; Wis. Stat. § 976.05(4)(a) 
(referring to “[t]he appropriate officer”).  A writ requires the 
immediate presence of a prisoner whereas “a detainer merely puts 
the officials of the institution in which the prisoner is 
incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in another 
jurisdiction for trial upon his release from prison.”  Mauro, 
436 U.S. at 358.  A detainer is not enough to effectuate the 
transfer of a prisoner.  Something more, such as a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, is necessary to actually obtain 
the temporary custody of a prisoner.  Id.  Also, because writs 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
12
must be immediately executed, they are valid for only a short 
period of time.  In contrast, prior to the decision in Smith v. 
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), that a defendant is entitled to a 
speedy trial though incarcerated elsewhere, detainers could be 
lodged against a prisoner for a very long time, often for the 
duration of the prisoner’s sentence.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 358-59. 
 See also Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 97 (Ind. 1998).  
Because of these distinctions, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that a writ is not a detainer.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 
349.  
¶21 The Mauro court also recognized that the purpose of 
the IAD was to address specific problems caused by detainers.  
Prior to the enactment of the IAD, jurisdictions would file 
detainers in the jurisdiction holding the prisoner but then 
never act on the untried charges.  The detainer might remain in 
the prisoner’s file for a long period of time without the 
requesting jurisdiction ever taking any action on it.   
 
When 
a 
state 
informed 
prison 
officials 
of 
the 
possibility of a future demand for the rendition of a 
prisoner, his status within the prison system was 
often profoundly affected.  Such a prisoner might be 
treated as an escape risk, or be denied trusty status 
and other significant institutional privileges.  The 
mere awareness that a detainer had been lodged could 
have a “corrosive” effect on a prisoner’s attitude and 
diminish the likelihood of his taking advantage of 
whatever rehabilitative opportunities existed at the 
institution in which he was incarcerated.  A filed 
detainer could affect the length as well as the terms 
of confinement by limiting the prospects for executive 
clemency and even reducing the likelihood of parole.  
Absent the power to expedite the prosecution of out-
of-state 
charges, 
the 
prisoner 
often 
lost 
the 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
13
possibility that the second sentence, if imposed at 
all, might run concurrently with the first. 
Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Nonconstitutional Errors: 
The Cognizability of Violations of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 975, 978-79 (1983) (footnotes 
omitted).  See also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 353 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
91-1018, p. 3 (1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 3 (1970)).  The 
IAD developed out of a growing concern about the effect 
outstanding detainers have on prisoners themselves and the 
prison system in general.  See generally Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349-
50.  Thus, in its explicit findings, the IAD recognized that 
outstanding criminal charges in another jurisdiction “produce 
uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation.”  Wis. Stat. § 976.05(1).   
¶22 The IAD serves two express purposes.4  The first is to 
protect prisoners by “encourag[ing] the expeditious and orderly 
disposition of such [outstanding] charges [against a prisoner] 
and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints.”  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 976.05(1). 
 
The 
second 
purpose 
is 
to 
provide 
“cooperative procedures” to effectuate a more uniform and 
efficient system of interstate rendition.  Id.  See also Note, 
83 Colum. L. Rev. at 977.   
                     
4 The Wisconsin Legislature enacted the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers (IAD) in 1969, effective July 1, 1970.  § 63, ch. 
255, Laws of 1969.  The United States Congress also enacted the 
IAD in 1970, joining the United States and District of Columbia 
as parties to the Agreement.  Pub.L. 91-538; 18 U.S.C.A. App., 
pp. 585-620 (West, 1985).   
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
14
¶23 The problems associated with detainers and the need 
for “expeditious and orderly disposition” in the IAD do not 
arise if a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is filed to 
obtain temporary custody of a prisoner for prosecution in 
another jurisdiction.  See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 361.  Because 
writs of habeas corpus must be executed immediately, see Wis. 
Stat. § 782.13 (requiring that writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum be executed at the time and place specified in the 
writ), the IAD is not needed to achieve their expeditious 
disposition.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 360.  This fact, combined with 
the long history of writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, 
convinced the Mauro Court that “Congress was well aware of the 
use of such writs by the Federal Government to obtain state 
prisoners and that when it used the word ‘detainer,’ it meant 
something quite different from a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum.”  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 360.   
¶24 Wisconsin also has a long history, dating to the first 
version of Wisconsin’s Revised Statutes, of using writs of 
habeas corpus to obtain prisoners for trial.  See § 50, ch. 124, 
R.S. 1849.  We can presume that the legislature was aware of 
court authority to issue such writs when it enacted the IAD.  
See Roberta Jo W. v. Leroy W., 218 Wis. 2d 225, 233, 578 N.W.2d 
185 (1998) (citing State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 641, 498 
N.W.2d 661 (1993)).  See also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 360.  As the 
Mauro Court concluded, the problems meant to be addressed by the 
IAD do not arise when a court uses a writ of habeas corpus ad 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
15
prosequendum to obtain temporary custody of a prisoner for 
prosecution.   
¶25 Based on all of the above, we hold that a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer under the IAD.  
Because a detainer was not filed in this case, the IAD and its 
protections were never triggered. 
¶26 Eesley argues that the writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum in this case served as a detainer because the 
criminal complaints for the pending charges were attached to the 
writ.  He argues that attaching the criminal complaints notified 
the FCI, Sandstone that Eesley was facing pending criminal 
charges in Wisconsin.  However, there is nothing in the record 
to support Eesley’s assertion that the writ, directed to the 
U.S. Bureau of Prisons, actually had the pending criminal 
complaints attached.  In fact, the record indicates that the 
complaints were attached to the petition for the writ but not to 
the writ itself when it was sent to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. 
¶27 The prosecutor filed a “Petition & Writ of Habeas 
Corpus ad Prosequendum” with the circuit court.  The Petition 
explained that Eesley was scheduled to appear for his initial 
appearances “on the felony charges as shown in the attached 
criminal complaints . . ..”  Based on this, the prosecutor 
requested a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum directing the 
U.S. Bureau of Prisons to release Eesley to the Ashland County 
Sheriff’s Department so that he could appear in the action.   
¶28 The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, signed by 
the circuit court, commanded the U.S. Bureau of Prisons to 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
16
deliver Eesley to the Ashland County Sheriff’s Department so 
that he could appear in the “above-entitled action.”  The writ 
itself 
said 
nothing 
about 
attached 
criminal 
complaints.  
Although the criminal complaints may have been attached to the 
petition, there is simply nothing in the record to indicate that 
the criminal complaints were attached to the writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum when it was sent to the U.S. Bureau of 
Prisons.  
¶29 Even if criminal complaints were attached to the writ 
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, our determination would be no 
different.  As discussed above, a writ and detainer are very 
different documents.  A writ demands the presence of a prisoner 
at a certain time and at a certain place, whereas a detainer is 
simply a notice that there are outstanding charges against the 
prisoner.  Attaching criminal complaints to a writ does not 
change the nature and function of a writit still demands the 
presence of the prisoner and the problems associated with 
detainers do not arise. 
¶30 Eesley also argues, relying on United States ex rel. 
Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837 (3d. Cir. 1975), that the 
IAD was meant to be the exclusive means by which a prisoner 
could be transferred from a state in which he or she is 
incarcerated to another state for prosecution.  We are not 
persuaded by Groomes for two reasons.  First, the Groomes court 
stated that the IAD was the exclusive means of transfer “when it 
is available,” Groomes, 520 F.2d at 837, and “if it is 
available,” id. at 838.  However, as discussed above, a writ is 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
17
not a detainer and until a prosecutor files a detainer with the 
“sending state,” the IAD is not triggered and its provisions and 
remedies are not available. 
¶31 Furthermore, Groomes was decided before the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Mauro.  Although not 
mentioning Groomes, the Court in Mauro determined that the IAD 
is not the exclusive means by which to transfer prisoners 
between jurisdictions.  As noted above, the IAD is only 
triggered if the receiving state files a detainer.  Mauro, 436 
U.S. at 343.  If the receiving state fails to file a detainer it 
may nevertheless obtain a state prisoner by filing a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 364 n. 30.  
This determination is consistent with legislative history cited 
by the dissent in Mauro, 436 U.S. at 367, that the IAD was not 
meant to be the exclusive means of transferring a prisoner 
between jurisdictions.  Id. at 364 n. 30.  Since Mauro, many 
jurisdictions have followed this decision and determined that 
the IAD is not the exclusive means of obtaining temporary 
custody of a prisoner from one jurisdiction for prosecution of 
charges in another jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d 
86; People v. McLemore, 311 N.W.2d 720 (Mich. 1981) (per 
curiam); State v. Fender, 268 S.E.2d 120 (W.Va. 1980). 
¶32 Eesley finally argues that the IAD must be the 
exclusive means of transferring prisoners from federal prison to 
a state because federal jurisdictions are not required to honor 
No. 
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18
writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by state courts.5  
He argues that because there is no guarantee that state court-
issued writs will be honored by the federal authorities, the 
purposes of the IAD would be defeated.  We disagree.   
¶33 Early 
in 
our 
country’s 
history, 
federal 
courts 
interpreted “habeas corpus” to be a “generic term including the 
writ ‘necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute him 
in the proper jurisdiction wherein the offense was committed.’” 
 Mauro, 436 U.S. at 357 (citing Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 
(1807)).  “Since the time of Ex parte Bollman, the statutory 
authority of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum to secure the presence, for purposes of trial, of 
                     
5 At 
oral 
argument, 
counsel 
for 
Eesley 
raised 
a 
constitutional argument for the first time.  Without citing any 
case law, Eesley argued that U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, 
the “executive privilege” clause, prohibits federal authorities 
from honoring a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by 
a state court.  He argued that a transfer of a prisoner across 
state lines can only be achieved if the executive authorities of 
such states confer.   
This 
court 
may, 
in 
its 
discretion, 
consider 
a 
constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal.  State 
v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 970, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991) (citing 
In Interest of Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 448, 335 N.W.2d 
846 (1983)).  “This court will exercise this discretion if ‘it 
is in the best interests of justice to do so, if both parties 
have had the opportunity to brief the issue and if there are no 
factual issues that need resolution.’”  Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d at 
970 (quoting Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d at 448).   
Because this issue was raised for the first time at oral 
argument before this court, neither party in this case briefed 
the issue of the “executive privilege” clause of the United 
States Constitution.  Therefore, we decline to exercise our 
discretion to consider this issue. 
No. 
97-1839-CR 
 
19
defendants in federal criminal cases, including defendants then 
in state custody, has never been doubted.”  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 
357-58.  As the Mauro Court noted, the authority of courts to 
issue writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum has a history 
dating long before the IAD.  Id. at 358. 
¶34 Wisconsin state courts also have authority “to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus, to bring before them any prisoner for 
trial or as a witness.”  Wis. Stat. § 782.44.  Wisconsin courts 
have had this authority to issue writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum since 1849, the beginning of Wisconsin’s statehood. 
 § 50, ch. 124, R.S. 1849 (Courts have the power “to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus, when necessary to bring before them any 
prisoner for trial, in any criminal case lawfully pending in the 
same court . . . .”). 
¶35 Contrary to Eesley’s argument, both statutes and case 
law support state courts’ authority to issue writs of habeas 
corpus 
ad 
prosequendum 
directed 
to 
federal 
authorities.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 782.44, authorizing writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum, makes no distinction between Wisconsin courts 
issuing such writs to other state authorities or to federal 
authorities.   
¶36 Case law also does not support Eesley’s argument.  
While it is true that federal authorities may not be compelled 
to honor writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by state 
courts, federal authorities have consistently honored such writs 
as a matter of comity.  Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261-62 
(1922).  See also State ex rel. Fredenberg v. Byrne, 20 Wis. 2d 
No. 
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20
504, 508, 123 N.W.2d 305 (1963); People v. Gaval, 294 N.W.2d 
215, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Florence, 387 
N.E.2d 152, 153 (Mass. Ct. App. 1979)).  “[W]e have no doubt 
that [comity] exists and is to be exercised with the consent of 
the Attorney General.  In that officer, the power and discretion 
to practice the comity in such matters between the federal and 
state courts is vested.”  Ponzi, 258 U.S. at 262.  
¶37 We recognize that a federal institution may not be 
compelled to honor a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
issued by a state court.  However, if a federal authority 
refuses to honor a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued 
by a state court as a matter of comity, the state can turn to 
the IAD to obtain temporary custody of the prisoner.  Once a 
state has lodged a detainer against a prisoner, the state must 
comply with all the provisions of the IAD.  That is not the case 
here. 
¶38 In the present case, the State did not lodge a 
detainer against Eesley in the federal prison.  Rather the 
prosecutor petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum which the court granted and forwarded to 
the federal prison warden.  Because a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum is not a detainer, we conclude that a the IAD was 
never triggered in this case.  Therefore, the State did not need 
No. 
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21
to comply with the anti-shuttling provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05(4)(e) nor the speedy trial provision of § 976.05(4)(c).6 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
  
 
                     
6 Eesley filed a motion to supplement the record in this 
case.  Because we resolve the issues presented by this case 
without consideration of the materials sought to be submitted by 
Eesley, we deny his motion to supplement the record.  
 
 
1