Title: Inquiry Concerning Judge Dana Marie Santino
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-362
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-362 
____________ 
 
 
INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO. 16-534 
RE: DANA MARIE SANTINO. 
 
October 19, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
On July 2, 2018, this Court issued an order removing Dana Marie Santino 
from the office of county judge of Palm Beach County, Florida.  The order 
provided that an opinion would follow explaining the reasons for removal.1 
CHARGES, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
On March 6, 2017, the Investigative Panel of the JQC filed a notice of 
formal charges against then-Judge Dana Marie Santino finding probable cause 
existed for formal proceedings to be brought against her based upon violations of 
canons 7A(3)(a), 7A(3)(b), 7A(3)(c), 7A(3)(e)(i), and 7A(3)(e)(ii) of the Florida 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 12(c), Fla. Const. 
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Code of Judicial Conduct, and rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.2(b) of the Rules Regulating 
the Florida Bar.  The specific allegations were as follows: 
1.  During your 2016 campaign for Palm Beach County Judge, you 
paid over $143,000 for the campaign consulting services [of] Richard 
Giorgio and Francine Nelson, of Patriot Games, Inc. 
 
2.  In October of 2016, your campaign published an e[-]mail 
addressed to potential voters, which lists your experience as a 
probation officer, a victim services advocate for victims of rape, 
homicide and domestic violence.  Your advertisement then states that 
your opponent’s legal practice is “limited to criminal defense—
representing murderers, rapists, child molesters and other criminals.” 
 
a.  Your campaign e[-]mail advertisement prompted the 
Palm Beach Post to run an article about your statements 
titled “PBC race gets ugly—some say—in Donald 
Trump-like way”.  Rather than retracting or apologizing 
for your campaigns [sic] disparaging remarks, you told 
the Palm Beach Post newspaper that, “I completely 
respect, and I’m proud of our justice system, and while 
every person is entitled to a defense, Mr. Lerman is not a 
public defender, and chooses to represent individuals 
who commit heinous crimes.” 
 
b.  Significantly, your statement that Mr. Lerman is not a 
public defender, but chooses to represent individuals who 
commit heinous crimes, undeservedly impugns the 
integrity of the entire judicial system by demeaning the 
work of private attorneys who represent accused persons.  
In light of your own experience working in a public 
defender’s office, you attempt to draw a distinction 
between public defenders and private defense attorneys 
and the quality of their character. 
 
3.  Ms. Nelson, of Patriot Games consultants, also registered a 
political organization named ‘Taxpayers for Public Integrity.’  This 
political organization promoted your candidacy by attacking your 
opponent, Gregg Lerman. 
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a.  During the 2016 campaign, ‘Taxpayers for Public 
Integrity’ produced a Facebook webpage, titled ‘The 
Truth About Gregg Lerman.’  The headline banner of this 
page proclaimed that, “Attorney Gregg Lerman has 
made a lot of money trying to free Palm Beach 
County’s worst criminals.  Now he’s running for 
judge!”  Below that, a photograph of Mr. Lerman was 
surrounded by the words, “CHILD PORNOGRAPHY,” 
“DRUG TRAFFICKING,” “MURDER[,]” “Identity 
Theft,” “RAPE,” “Sexual Assault,” “Internet 
Solicitation of Minors,” and “PEDOPHILES.” 
[emphasis used in original]. 
 
b.  This webpage also highlights several cases where Mr. 
Lerman represented persons accused of high-profile 
crimes.  In describing these crimes, the website states: 
 
“Instead of representing victims of crime, 
Gregg Lerman chose to represent convicted 
serial killer Ronald Knight who targeted gay 
men and brutally murdered them.  Now, he’s 
running for Judge!” 
 
“Instead of representing the victims of 
crime, Gregg Lerman chose to represent one 
of the convicted accomplices in the 
‘Turnpike Murder’ of a family of four, 
including two children ages 3 and 4.  Now, 
he’s running for Judge!” 
“Instead of representing the victims of 
crime, Gregg Lerman chose to represent one 
of the four convicted codefendants in the 
‘Three Amigos’ robbery-murder.  Now, he’s 
running for Judge!” 
 
“Instead of representing the victims of 
crime, Gregg Lerman chose to represent one 
of the convicted ‘Thanksgiving Day’ 
murderers.  Now, he’s running for Judge!” 
 
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c.  In addition to the wholly inappropriate connotation 
and tenor of these statements, the substance of the 
statements is also false.  In three of the cases, Mr. 
Lerman was court-appointed to represent the accused 
person.  The website is no longer viewable. 
 
4.  In response to your conduct, your opponent filed a complaint with 
the Palm Beach County Bar Association’s Judicial Campaign 
Practices Commission (“JCPC”), a group that renders advisory 
opinions about perceived misconduct in Palm Beach judicial 
campaigns. 
 
a.  In responding to the JCPC complaint, you steadfastly 
defended your conduct by stating that[:] (1) your e[-]mail 
truthfully states Mr. Lerman’s experience, (2) that the 
Facebook post was made by an ECO [electioneering 
communications organization] independent of you, and is 
truthful, including the statement that Mr. Lerman has 
made a lot of money representing criminal defendants, 
and (3) that the statements in the e-mail, in the Facebook 
post, and to the Palm Beach Post merely are efforts to 
highlight the differences between you and Mr. Lerman.  
Specifically, your response to the JCPC stated, “I have 
been an advocate for the victims of rape, homicide and 
domestic violence while Mr. Lerman has chosen to 
represent the criminal defendants convicted of those 
crimes.” 
 
b.  On November 2, 2016, in [the] final days before the 
November election, the JCPC, by a vote of 11-0, found 
your campaigns’ [sic] statements and conduct violated 
the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The JCPC wrote that your 
e-mail advertisement was “inflammatory,” and “rife with 
innuendo that Mr. Lerman would favor even the worst of 
the worst from the bench, whereas by implication, Ms. 
Santino would not.”  This, the JCPC found, “. . . invites 
the voter to choose based on a candidate’s supposed 
predisposition—or in Ms. Santino’s case an implied 
pledge—that is inconsistent with the impartial 
performance of judicial duties.” 
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c.  The JCPC also noted that your e-mail and other 
campaign messages “. . . omits important context: the 
presumption of innocence, the constitutional right to 
counsel that persons accused of crimes are afforded, and 
the system of court-appointed counsel that supports that 
right.”  The advisory Committee also found that your   
e[-]mail “implies that representing such persons is 
dishonorable and antithetical to the public good, when, in 
fact, the representation of person[s] accused of crimes—
even heinous crimes—is an essential component of our 
criminal justice system.” 
 
d.  In responding to the JCPC’s unanimous decision, you 
told the Palm Beach Post, in a November 2 article titled 
PBC judge hopeful Dana Santino violated judicial 
canons advisory panel finds, that the JCPC’s decision 
was, “just their opinion,” and that your statements were, 
“an honest comparison.”  Your campaign manager also 
referred to Mr. Lerman as “desperate,” for filing the 
complaint about your conduct. 
 
e.  At the time the JCPC released its decision, you also 
commented to Mr. Lerman that your campaigns’ [sic] 
statements were “nobody’s business,” and that you have 
a right to free speech.  Prior to this, you also informed 
Mr. Lerman that it was your belief that you were not 
responsible for whatever others, including your campaign 
consultants, said or did on your behalf.  You also made a 
similar claim to an audience at a campaign forum shortly 
after your October e-mail message became a topic of 
public discussion.  This is contrary [to] the requirements 
of Canon 7. 
 
5.  In your response to the Commission’s Notice of Investigation, and 
again in your sworn testimony before the Investigative Panel, you 
appeared remorseful and apologetic.  You accepted “full 
responsibility” for your campaigns [sic] conduct, and you recognized 
that the language used was “not appropriate and was inconsistent with 
the dictates of Canon 7.”  You called the statements about your 
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opponent “disparaging,” and acknowledged that the statements could 
lead a reasonable person to question your impartiality. 
 
6.  When your appearance before the Investigative Panel is contrasted 
with your prior repeated, and steadfast defense of your misconduct, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that you and your campaign 
consultants employed a ‘win-at-all-costs,’ and pay the fine later 
strategy.  This conduct is antithetical to the conduct expected of 
judicial candidates.  Further, your inability to understand and comply 
with, or willingness to overlook the requirements of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct represent [sic] a clear and present unfitness for 
office. 
 
(Fifth alteration in original.) 
 
A final hearing was held before the JQC Hearing Panel, and on 
September 28, 2017, the panel issued its findings and conclusions. 
Judge Santino admits violating Canon 7A(3)(a) and 7A(3)(b), 
and Rule 4-8.2(b) of the Rules [Regulating] the Florida Bar.  Her 
admissions are supported by clear and convincing evidence.  See In re 
Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 89-90 (Fla. 2003).  This Panel concludes that 
Judge Santino also violated Judicial Canon 7A(3)(c), (e)(i), and (e)(ii) 
and Rule 4-8.2(a), Rules of Professional Conduct, for the same 
reasons reached by the JCPC.  Candidate Santino did not merely 
compare her background, qualifications, character and integrity with 
that of her opponent.  She imputed guilt to those that were merely 
accused.  She also expressly stated and implied that Lerman was not 
impartial, was predisposed to favor criminals, while she was 
predisposed to victims, and courted votes based on each candidate’s 
supposed predisposition.  Her entire campaign was inflammatory and 
rife with innuendo.  She repeatedly implied that representing persons 
charged with crimes was, by its very nature, dishonorable and 
antithetical to the public good.  See generally Little Bridge Marina, 
Inc. v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 673 So. 2d 77, 78-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) 
(impeachment of a critical witness by resort to his past career as a 
criminal defense attorney warranted reversal for inflaming the passion 
of a jury).  Santino expressly stated or implied that Lerman could not 
be trusted “for laboring in an occupation that serves to breathe life and 
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meaning into the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. [at 79.]  Her published 
comments, as well as the Facebook page, falsely communicated to the 
reader that Lerman was unfit for judicial office because of the type of 
law he practiced, and the type of clients he represented.   
Candidate Santino did not prohibit or discourage campaign 
personnel from doing what she was prohibited from doing, even 
though they were subject to her control.  By her own account, Santino 
allowed such personnel to operate unfettered or unrestrained. 
Candidate Santino, individually, and through her campaign 
manager, made statements about Mr. Lerman’s integrity, with reckless 
disregard of the truth.  She claimed evident partiality and bias on 
Lerman’s part, based solely on his employment as a criminal defense 
attorney.  The Taxpayers for Public Integrity Facebook website, 
established by Santino’s campaign manager, encapsulated Lerman’s 
photograph, with bold prominent displays of crimes, in an attempt to 
portray Lerman as a criminal or, [sic] one who associates with 
criminals.  It was specifically designed to evoke base human emotions 
that our legal system, this profession, and our State and Federal 
Constitutions all seek to overcome.  It was a calculated, tactical 
decision to ensure that Santino won her election for a judgeship.  
While she disclaims her role in this process, Judge Santino was 
reckless in delegating decision-making to her campaign manager, 
without supervision, and permitting him to speak and act on her behalf 
continuously even after the filing of the JCPC complaint (October 25, 
2016), when she believed she had been misled. 
 
The Hearing Panel concluded that removal was the only appropriate discipline in 
this case.   
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
 
This disciplinary matter against Santino arose out of both false and 
misleading statements that Santino made about her opponent, Gregg Lerman, in 
e-mail advertisements and on social media during her 2016 election campaign for 
the office of county judge for Palm Beach County.  In April 2016, the Palm Beach 
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County judge seat became available after the sitting judge resigned.  We 
determined that the vacancy was to be filled by election rather than appointment, 
Lerman v. Scott, No. SC16-783, 2016 WL 3127708, *1 (Fla. June 3, 2016), and 
Santino entered the race after the original qualifying period was reopened by this 
Court.  Attorney Gregg Lerman was one of two candidates who had qualified prior 
to the date that Lerman issued. 
 
Santino hired Richard Giorgio of Patriot Games, Inc., as her campaign 
manager.  She testified that she reviewed the judicial canons, attested under oath 
that she understood all requirements, and received a pamphlet on understanding 
Canon 7.  Nonetheless, Santino admitted that she failed to review the case law 
attached to the pamphlet pertaining to her ethical obligations in her judicial 
campaign.  Furthermore, Santino did not attend the local judicial campaign conduct 
forum. 
The third candidate seeking the judicial seat was subsequently eliminated 
during the primary election, leaving a runoff between Santino and Lerman.  
Approximately one month later, on September 23, 2016, a Facebook page titled 
“The Truth About Gregg Lerman” was created by Taxpayers for Public Integrity, 
an electioneering communications organization (ECO) formed and administered by 
Patriot Games, Inc.  The header of the Facebook page stated “Attorney Gregg 
Lerman has made a lot of money trying to free Palm Beach County’s worst 
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criminals.  Now he’s running for judge!”  Additionally, the page contained posts 
that outlined Lerman’s representation in four high-profile homicide cases, stating 
that he “chose” to represent the defendants.  Lerman testified before the Hearing 
Panel that he was court-appointed on three of those cases, and was privately 
retained on the fourth.  He is also one of a limited number of attorneys in Florida 
who meets the qualifications to represent defendants in cases where the State is 
seeking the death penalty.   
The Facebook page was viewable for approximately one month, from 
September 23, 2016, until October 21, 2016.  Santino testified that she had 
discussed a Facebook page with Giorgio that would juxtapose the candidates’ 
relative positions.  However, Santino testified that she was not aware of the content 
of the page before it was posted and, upon her request after she was informed by 
two prominent attorneys that it was being “ill-received,” the page was taken down.   
On October 12, 2016, Santino’s campaign sent out an e-mail that stated 
Lerman’s legal practice was “limited to criminal defense—representing murderers, 
rapists, child molesters and other criminals.”  Santino admitted at the final hearing 
that this statement was inappropriate and violated the canons.  She testified that 
Giorgio had convinced her it was not a violation because the language was true, 
and Lerman advertised it on his own website. 
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The Palm Beach Post published an article on October 21, 2016, entitled 
“Facebook New Weapon in Nasty PBC Judicial Race.”  Four days later, a local 
attorney filed a complaint about Santino with the Palm Beach County Bar 
Association’s Judicial Campaign Practices Commission (JCPC).2  In her response 
to the complaint, Santino defended her actions by indicating her statements about 
Lerman’s experience were truthful, the Facebook page was made by an ECO 
independent of her campaign and was truthful, and the statements were attempts to 
highlight differences between herself and Lerman.  On October 27, 2016, the Palm 
Beach Post published another article titled “PBC Court Race Gets Ugly—Some 
Say—in Donald Trump-Like Way.”  In the article, Santino defended her 
statements concerning Lerman’s “choice” to represent criminal defendants by 
stating, “I completely respect and I’m proud of our judicial system and while every 
person is entitled to a defense, Mr. Lerman is not a public defender and chooses to 
represent individuals who commit heinous crimes.”  She further defended her 
statements by claiming that she was pointing out differences between herself and 
Lerman.   
                                          
 
 
2.  The JCPC is a group of attorneys from the Palm Beach County Bar 
Association that attempts to moderate judicial campaigning in the Fifteenth 
Judicial Circuit by rendering advisory opinions about allegations of misconduct in 
Palm Beach County judicial campaigns.  The JCPC is not a body of the JQC or 
The Florida Bar. 
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The advisory opinion issued by the JCPC less than one week before the 
general election unanimously concluded that Santino had violated judicial canons.  
The JCPC concluded that Santino knowingly mischaracterized Lerman’s 
experience through inflammatory statements that failed to take into account the 
presumption of innocence to which an accused is entitled, the constitutional right 
to counsel, and the constitutional right of indigent defendants to court-appointed 
counsel.  It further concluded Santino made statements that invited voters to 
choose a candidate based on an alleged predisposition.  The same day, the Palm 
Beach Post published an article about the JCPC’s findings.  Santino again 
defended her actions, stating, “I appreciate the opinion of the commission; 
however, as the commission itself discloses in their letter, it is just that—their 
opinion.”   
On November 3, 2016, Lerman and Santino were present at an early voting 
site and exchanged words over alleged misrepresentations made to putative voters.  
During a deposition, Lerman recalled stating to Santino, “We’ll see what the JQC 
and the Florida Bar have to say . . . about what you’ve done,” to which Santino 
responded, “It’s none of their business, the JQC’s or the Florida Bar’s business, 
anything about this.”  Lerman later testified that Santino also stated, “We didn’t do 
anything wrong.  I didn’t do anything wrong.”  (Emphasis added.) 
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Santino defeated Lerman in the general election and was sworn in as a Palm 
Beach County Court judge on January 3, 2017.  She was subsequently asked at a 
social gathering whether misconduct charges could possibly lead to her removal.  
According to the individual who asked the question, Santino responded to the 
following effect: “No.  I think it . . . won’t rise to that.  It will be probably a fine.  
It’s not a big deal.”  (Emphasis added.) 
On March 6, 2017, the Investigative Panel of the JQC filed a notice of 
formal charges against Santino, alleging she made false or misleading statements 
about her opponent in advertisements and social media during her campaign for 
election to judicial office.  Additionally, the charges addressed her defense of these 
statements in response to the complaint filed with the JCPC.  In her answer to the 
formal charges, Santino acknowledged that her comments drawing a distinction 
between public defenders and private defense attorneys were inappropriate.  While 
explaining that the Facebook page was taken down at her direction, Santino 
admitted the statements were inappropriate, wrong, and used language that violated 
the canons.   
Santino testified at the final hearing that all of the conduct alleged in the 
formal charges occurred in the last three and a half weeks of the campaign.  
Regarding the Facebook page, Santino again admitted at the final hearing that the 
page was inappropriate and violated the canons.  She explained she had not been 
- 13 - 
 
aware of the content of the Facebook page prior to it being posted and ultimately 
had the page taken down after hearing from prominent attorneys that it was being 
“ill-received.”  As to the e-mail sent out by Santino’s campaign on October 12, 
2016, she took full responsibility for the language that outlined Lerman’s legal 
practice as “limited to criminal defense—representing murderers, rapists, child 
molesters and other criminals.”  In response to an inquiry by a Hearing Panel 
member as to why she waited until after the election to apologize to Lerman, 
Santino answered:  
Mr. Lerman, after the election was over, had made it clear that he was 
going to file a JQC complaint against me, so I did not know how to 
handle the matter of apologizing to him, and as soon as everything 
became official, the first thing I discussed with [my lawyer] was 
apologizing to [Lerman] and apologizing to the JCPC. 
Moreover, Santino was asked, “So as a candidate, you never said to the citizens of 
this county, ‘what was on that Facebook page was a violation of the rules I agreed 
to follow and it was deplorable and atrocious’?  Did you ever say anything like that 
during the campaign at any time?”  Santino responded that she did not. 
The Hearing Panel of the JQC concluded that Santino violated canons 
7A(3)(a), 7A(3)(b), 7A(3)(c), 7A(3)(e)(i), and 7A(3)(e)(ii) of the Florida Code of 
Judicial Conduct, and rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.2(b) of the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar and recommended that she be removed from office.   
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ANALYSIS 
In removing Santino from judicial office, we fully agreed with the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendation of the JQC. 
The supreme court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part 
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the commission 
and it may order that the justice or judge be subjected to appropriate 
discipline, or be removed from office with termination of 
compensation for willful or persistent failure to perform judicial 
duties or for other conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary 
demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office . . . .   
 
Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.  “Removal is proper when clear and convincing 
evidence is presented that the judge has engaged in ‘conduct unbecoming a 
member of the judiciary demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office.’ ”  In re 
Hawkins, 151 So. 3d 1200, 1216 (Fla. 2014) (quoting art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. 
Const.). 
 
Where a judge commits misconduct in office, this Court has examined the 
issue of “present fitness” from two perspectives: “its effect on the public’s trust 
and confidence in the judiciary as reflected in its impact on the judge’s standing in 
the community, and the degree to which past misconduct points to future 
misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.”  
In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046, 1055 (Fla. 2006); see also In re Murphy, 181 So. 3d 
1169, 1177 (Fla. 2015).  However, the Court has also considered “present fitness” 
from a different vantage point where the misconduct at issue involves campaign 
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violations in the course of seeking judicial office.  See, e.g., In re McMillan, 797 
So. 2d 560, 573 (Fla. 2001) (“[T]o allow someone who has committed such 
misconduct during a campaign to attain office to then serve the term of the 
judgeship obtained by such means clearly sends the wrong message to future 
candidates; that is, the end justifies the means and, thus, all is fair so long as the 
candidate wins.”).   
 
In the present case, we first considered the effect that Santino’s actions had 
on the public’s trust in the judiciary.  “Florida has a compelling interest in 
protecting the integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in 
an impartial judiciary . . . .”  Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379, 385 (Fla. 
2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015); see also In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 
2003); In re Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons 1, 2, & 7A(1)(b)), 603 So. 2d 494, 
497 (Fla. 1992).   As this Court has explained: 
“The concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily 
reduce to precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by 
documentary record.  But no one denies that it is genuine and 
compelling.”  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. at 1667.  A 
judicial candidate who knowingly misrepresents any fact concerning 
the candidate or an opponent necessarily intends to mislead the public 
concerning the judicial election, thus undermining the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.  See, e.g., In re Renke, 933 
So. 2d 482, 495 (Fla. 2006).  Such conduct “raises an appearance of 
impropriety and calls into question, in the public’s mind, the judge’s” 
integrity.   
 
- 16 - 
 
In re Shepard, 217 So. 3d 71, 78 (Fla. 2017) (citation omitted) (quoting Williams-
Yulee, 138 So. 3d at 385).  
According to the Hearing Panel: 
Santino reviewed the Judicial Canons and signed a form, under 
oath, attesting that she understood their requirements.  She also 
received and said she reviewed an “Aid to Understanding Canon 7,” a 
pamphlet given to judicial candidates which addresses campaign 
pitfalls and restrictions.  She did not review any case law hyperlinked 
by the pamphlet.  Nor did Santino attend the local judicial campaign 
conduct forum sponsored jointly by the Florida Supreme Court and 
the Florida Board of Governors held in West Palm Beach.   
Despite the resources available to her to run a professional, ethical campaign in 
accordance with Canon 7, the JQC Hearing Panel concluded: 
Candidate Santino, individually, and through her campaign 
manager, made statements about Mr. Lerman’s integrity, with reckless 
disregard of the truth.  She claimed evident partiality and bias on 
Lerman’s part, based solely on his employment as a criminal defense 
attorney.  The Taxpayers for Public Integrity Facebook website, 
established by Santino’s campaign manager, encapsulated Lerman’s 
photograph, with bold prominent displays of crimes, in an attempt to 
portray Lerman as a criminal or, [sic] one who associates with 
criminals.  It was specifically designed to evoke base human emotions 
that our legal system, this profession, and our State and Federal 
Constitutions all seek to overcome.  It was a calculated, tactical 
decision to ensure that Santino won her election for a judgeship.  
While she disclaims her role in this process, Judge Santino was 
reckless in delegating decision-making to her campaign manager, 
without supervision, and permitting him to speak and act on her behalf 
continuously even after the filing of the JCPC complaint (October 25, 
2016), when she believed she had been misled. 
 
- 17 - 
 
Moreover, the JQC concluded that these messages were not just present in one 
campaign advertisement or a single post on a Facebook page, but rather, were the 
“theme of [Santino’s] entire campaign.”   
 
We agreed with the JQC that it “strain[ed] credulity to believe that [] Santino 
never looked at the Facebook []page she knew was going to be created, when it 
was available to the public, after she received telephone calls from prominent 
lawyers telling her it was not being ‘well received,’ or even, as she said, before 
telling her campaign consultant to take it down.”  As noted by the Hearing Panel, 
“[n]othing in Canon 7 permitted Santino to delegate to her campaign manager the 
responsibility for written materials created or distributed by the campaign.”  
Santino’s conduct cannot be deemed the product of “missteps” in the course of a 
heated campaign.  Accordingly, the actions of Santino—individually and through 
her campaign, for which she was ultimately responsible—unquestionably eroded 
public confidence in the judiciary.   
We next examined the degree to which Santino’s past misconduct points to 
future misconduct.  We were mindful that before the JQC and this Court, Santino 
accepted full responsibility for her actions.  Additionally, we recognized that 
Santino sent apology letters to Lerman and the members of the JCPC following the 
election.  Finally, we noted the exemplary character testimony received at the 
hearing.   
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However, although Santino accepted responsibility for her actions, she did 
not do so until the JQC complaint was filed against her.  Until that occurred, 
Santino demonstrated a consistent refusal to accept responsibility for her actions.  
For example, after the JCPC issued its unanimous advisory opinion concluding she 
had violated the judicial canons, Santino was quoted in a news article as stating 
that, while she “appreciate[d] the opinion of the commission . . . it is just that—
their opinion.”  When Santino and Lerman discussed at an early voting site what 
The Florida Bar and the JQC would say about her campaign comments, she 
responded, “It’s none of their business, the JQC’s or the Florida Bar’s business, 
anything about this,” and that she did nothing wrong. 
This Court has previously warned judicial candidates that serious campaign 
violations could warrant removal.  See, e.g., In re Renke, 933 So. 2d 482, 493-96 
(Fla. 2006); McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 572-73; In re Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369, 1370 
(Fla. 1997).  Santino correctly observed that prior election cases ordering removal 
based on violations of Canon 7 involved some type of additional misconduct.  See 
Renke, 933 So. 2d at 494 (judge accepted illegal campaign contributions); 
McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 569-70 (judge presided over first appearance and set 
excessive bond in a case to which he was not assigned and in which he personally 
observed and reported to the police the conduct of the defendant).  However, even 
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if we had not previously imposed the discipline of removal for violations of 
Canon 7 alone, nothing prohibited us from doing so here. 
 
Santino’s reliance on In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, to support rejection of the 
JQC’s recommended sanction was misplaced because her misconduct was far more 
egregious.  While Santino was correct that, similar to Kinsey, her campaign made 
wholly improper statements asserting that her opponent favored a particular group, 
Santino failed to acknowledge that she did not merely imply that Lerman would 
favor criminal defendants if elected.  She also personally attacked his character, 
demeaned private criminal defense attorneys, and implied she would favor the 
State in criminal trials.  Moreover, Santino, in an effort to discredit and attack her 
opponent, evidenced a clear bias against criminal defendants.  As the Hearing 
Panel determined: 
Candidate Santino did not merely compare her background, 
qualifications, character and integrity with that of her opponent.  She 
imputed guilt to those that were merely accused.  She also expressly 
stated and implied that Lerman was not impartial, was predisposed to 
favor criminals, while she was predisposed to victims, and courted 
votes based on each candidate’s supposed predisposition.  Her entire 
campaign was inflammatory and rife with innuendo.  She repeatedly 
implied that representing persons charged with crimes was, by its 
very nature, dishonorable and antithetical to the public good.  See 
generally Little Bridge Marina, Inc. v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 673 So. 
2d 77, 78-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (impeachment of a critical witness 
by resort to his past career as a criminal defense attorney warranted 
reversal for inflaming the passion of a jury).  Santino expressly stated 
or implied that Lerman could not be trusted “for laboring in an 
occupation that serves to breathe life and meaning into the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id. [at 79].  Her published comments, as well as the 
- 20 - 
 
Facebook page, falsely communicated to the reader that Lerman was 
unfit for judicial office because of the type of law he practiced, and 
the type of clients he represented.   
 
(Emphasis added.) 
Santino’s numerous statements during her campaign evidenced a bias 
against criminal defendants, toward whom she imputed guilt; against criminal 
defense attorneys, whom she implied had some character fault because they 
“choose” to represent criminal defendants; and in favor of victims, whom she 
boasted that she worked to protect during her legal career.  Such statements are 
sufficient to create fear on the behalf of criminal defendants—who are entitled to a 
presumption of innocence under the basic tenets of our judicial system—that they 
would not receive a fair trial or hearing. 
In removing Santino from office, we did not take this sanction lightly.  
However, despite the significant mitigation in this case, we agreed with the JQC’s 
recommendation.  The JQC clearly considered the mitigation presented and 
ultimately concluded: 
 
Judge Santino’s post-election remarks that discipline would 
“probably be a fine” and was “no big deal” confirm that a fine or 
suspension would be inadequate, and treated as the routine cost of 
doing business.  See Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 99-10[0] (Lewis, J).  A 
suspension without pay would also have the “unavoidable 
consequence” of punishing the circuit and its citizens by a vacancy in 
the position.  Id. at 95-96 (Pariente, J). 
 
We likewise agree. 
- 21 - 
 
Simply stated, Santino’s conduct does not evidence a present fitness to hold 
judicial office.  It is “difficult to allow one guilty of such egregious conduct to 
retain the benefits of those violations and remain in office.”  Alley, 699 So. 2d at 
1370.  We refuse to endorse a “win-at-all-costs-and-pay-the-fine-later” strategy, 
especially in light of our past warnings and stated intolerance for the kinds of 
campaign violations at issue here.  By her own admission, had we imposed a fine 
as a sanction, it would confirm that Santino’s violations were “not a big deal.”  
Moreover, if this Court imposed a suspension, it would send a message to all 
attorneys campaigning for judicial office that they may commit egregious 
violations of Canon 7 during their campaigns and if they win, a suspension or a 
fine or both will be the only result.  They will be allowed to reap the benefits of 
their misconduct by continuing to serve the citizens of this state.  This we cannot 
condone.  Accordingly, we continue to share the sentiments of the JQC: 
We are mindful of—and heavy-hearted about—the testimony 
of Judge Santino’s witnesses that she is beloved by many, and a 
judge with a strong work ethic.  However, were we to countenance 
her studied and continued refusal to abide by Canon 7, we would 
ourselves be undermining the rules governing judicial elections. 
 
- 22 - 
 
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons discussed above, by order dated July 2, 2018, Dana Marie 
Santino was removed from judicial office. 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring in result only. 
 
Today, the majority has chosen to sanitize and soften the facts surrounding 
the campaign misconduct committed in this case apparently in the interest of 
political correctness or for some other reason.  The circumstances of this case, 
however, are so egregious and so reprehensible that any attempt to refine them 
does a disservice to the bench and to our judicial system as a whole and it further 
diminishes the citizen’s trust in the judiciary beyond the damage that Santino has 
already inflicted.  I simply cannot endorse the sanitized rendition of the facts with 
the omission of the actual published material along with the analysis that the 
majority adopts.  Nevertheless, I support the JQC’s recommended sanction of 
removal, given the nature of the facts in this case and this Court’s precedent, which 
has long stated our intolerance for judicial candidate misconduct such as that at 
issue in the present case.   
- 23 - 
 
In determining that removal was the appropriate discipline, the Hearing 
Panel concluded as follows: 
First, we reject the notion that candidate Santino merely made 
“mistakes” or “missteps” in the course of a heated campaign.  Her 
conduct “was not simply the product of an isolated instance of 
indiscretion, a momentary lapse of judgment; or the exposure of 
human frailty from which we all suffer from time to time.  The 
conduct here was repeated, intentional, direct action with a designed 
purpose which cast aspersions and doubt onto the heart of the judicial 
system and the elected judicial office sought by [the] Judge . . .”  In re 
Kinsey, [842 So. 2d 77, 97 (Fla. 2003)] (Lewis, J, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  Santino knew, and acknowledged without a 
shadow of a doubt, that she had violated Canon 7 after the JCPC 
issued an adverse unanimous opinion, but chose to take no curative 
action for fear it would cost her the election. 
Second, it strains credulity to believe that Judge Santino never 
looked at the Facebook webpage she knew was going to be created, 
when it was available to the public, after she received phone calls 
from prominent lawyers telling her it was not being “well received,” 
or even, as she said, before telling her campaign consultant to take it 
down.  Nor does this Panel accept Judge Santino’s explanation that 
she was too busy or sleep-deprived to manage, let alone pay attention 
to her campaign. 
Third, the Florida Supreme Court has now been warning 
judicial candidates about the same type of serious campaign violations 
at issue for some 20 years.  In re Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369, 1370 (Fla. 
1997); In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d [560, 572 (Fla. 2001)]; In re 
Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 91-92; In re Renke, 933 So. 2d [482, 494-96 
(Fla. 2006)].  Seminars and forums are regularly conducted in election 
years, district-wide, presented by the JEAC.  An entire pamphlet has 
been devoted to ensure that every judicial candidate understands 
Canon 7 and abides by it.  Even JEAC 98-27, cited by Giorgio, quoted 
extensively from Alley supra, and warned of the need to carefully 
craft advertisements to avoid improper pledges, misrepresentations or 
personal attacks.  Candidate Santino’s failure to read pertinent case 
law, or to attend the Palm Beach County seminar does not favor 
mitigation. 
 
- 24 - 
 
 
This case arose from both false and misleading statements that Santino made 
about her opponent in e-mail advertisements and on social media during her 2016 
election campaign for the office of County Court Judge for Palm Beach County.  In 
April 2016, the Palm Beach County judge seat became available after the sitting 
judge resigned.  Two candidates for the vacant seat, Gregg Lerman and Tom 
Baker, petitioned this Court to determine whether the vacancy would be elected or 
appointed.  On June 3, 2016, in Lerman v. Scott, No. SC16-783, 2016 WL 3127708 
(Fla. June 3, 2016), we determined that the county court vacancy should be filled 
by election, and Santino then entered the race after the original qualifying period 
was reopened by this Court.   
 
Santino has been an attorney for fifteen years with a majority of her practice 
being in probate, guardianship, wills and trusts, and real estate.  Santino has no 
prior disciplinary measure with the Florida Bar.  Santino hired Richard Giorgio of 
Patriot Games, Inc., as her campaign consultant.  She testified that she reviewed 
the judicial canons, attested under oath that she understood all requirements, and 
received a pamphlet on understanding Canon 7.  Nonetheless, Santino admitted 
that she failed to review any of the case law attached to the pamphlet pertaining to 
her ethical obligations in her judicial campaign.  Furthermore, Santino did not 
attend the local judicial campaign conduct forums. 
- 25 - 
 
On August 30, 2016, Baker was eliminated during the primary election, 
leaving a runoff between Santino and Lerman.  About a month later, on September 
23, 2016, a Facebook page titled “The Truth About Gregg Lerman” was posted by 
Taxpayers for Public Integrity, an electioneering communications organization 
(ECO) formed and administered by Patriot Games, Inc.  See Appendix.  The 
header of the Facebook page stated “Attorney Gregg Lerman has made a lot of 
money trying to free Palm Beach County’s worst criminals.  Now he’s running for 
judge!”  Additionally, the page contained posts that outlined Lerman’s 
representation in four high-profile homicide cases, stating that he chose to 
represent them and now wishes to be a judge.  Lerman testified that he was court 
appointed on three of the featured cases, and was privately retained for the fourth 
case.  Lerman is on the rotating list of attorneys and is one of the limited number of 
death penalty qualified attorneys in Florida.  He testified that there is a process for 
the selection of conflict registry counsel and he has provided counsel under that 
system.  Lerman testified that he was on the conflict registry to provide counsel 
after being appointed to represent indigent defendants if his name was next on the 
list.   
The majority has chosen to omit the photographic evidence of Santino’s 
advertisements.  The visual impact of these advertisements, however, says far more 
- 26 - 
 
than words could ever convey.  These posts exhibit just how far Santino was 
willing to go, and how low she was willing to travel to win this election.   
The Facebook page remained up for approximately one month, from 
September 23, 2016, until October 21, 2016.  Santino testified that she was not 
aware of the content of the Facebook page before it was posted and that, upon her 
request after being contacted by two prominent attorneys, the page was removed.  
Santino testified that she had discussed a Facebook page with Giorgio that would 
juxtapose the candidates’ relative positions.   
On October 12, 2016, Santino sent an e-mail that included the statement that 
her opponent’s experience is “limited to criminal defense – representing murderers, 
rapists, child molesters and other criminals.”  On October 12, 2016, Santino’s 
campaign also sent out an e-mail that stated that Lerman’s legal practice was 
“limited to criminal defense – representing murderers, rapists, child molesters and 
other criminals.”  Santino testified and finally admitted at the hearing and in her 
response to the notice of formal charges that this statement was inappropriate and 
violated judicial canons.  She testified that Giorgio, her campaign manager, had 
convinced her it was not a violation because the language was true and Lerman had 
published this information on his own website. 
On October 21, 2016, the Palm Beach Post published an article entitled 
“Facebook New Weapon in Nasty PBC Judicial Race.”  On October 25, 2016, a 
- 27 - 
 
local attorney filed a complaint about Santino with the Palm Beach County Bar 
Association’s Judicial Campaign Practices Commission (JCPC).3  In her response 
to the JCPC complaint filed, Santino defended her actions by indicating that her 
statements about Lerman’s experience were truthful, that the Facebook page was 
made by an ECO independent of her campaign and was truthful, and that the 
statements were attempts to highlight differences between Santino and Lerman.  
On November 2, 2016, less than a week before the general election, the JCPC’s 
advisory opinion unanimously concluded that Santino had violated several 
provisions of the Judicial Canons, finding that she knowingly misrepresented 
Lerman’s qualifications on numerous occasions, she made inflammatory 
statements out of context, and she made statements that attempted to lead the 
voters to choose a candidate based on an alleged predisposition.  That same day, 
the Palm Beach Post published an article about the JCPC’s findings against 
Santino.  In that article, Santino was quoted defending her actions again, stating, “I 
appreciate the opinion of the commission; however, as the commission itself 
discloses in their letter, it is just that–their opinion . . . .”  In addition, Santino’s 
                                          
 
 
3.  The JCPC is an advisory body consisting of lawyers from the Palm Beach 
Bar Association who attempt to moderate judicial campaigning in the Fifteenth 
Judicial Circuit by offering advisory opinions about allegations of ethical 
misconduct by judicial candidates.  The JCPC is not a body of the JQC or the 
Florida Bar. 
- 28 - 
 
campaign advisor, Giorgio, described Lerman as “desperate” and characterized the 
JCPC complaint as “an attempt to generate press for his failing campaign.”   
On October 27, 2016, the Palm Beach Post published another article titled 
“PBC Court Race Gets Ugly–Some Say–in Donald Trump Like Way.”  Santino 
was quoted in the article defending her statements concerning Lerman’s choice to 
represent criminal defendants, stating, “I completely respect and I’m proud of our 
judicial system and while every person is entitled to a defense, Mr. Lerman is not a 
public defender and chooses to represent individuals who commit heinous crimes.”  
She further defended her statements by claiming to be pointing out differences 
between herself and Lerman.   
On November 3, 2016, Lerman and Santino were on opposite sides of an 
early voting site and exchanged words over alleged misrepresentations made to 
primary voters.  Lerman recalled the exchange between them as Lerman stating, 
“we’ll see what the Florida Bar and the JQC has to say about that,” to which 
Santino responded, “it’s none of the business of the Florida Bar, the local Palm 
Beach County Bar or the JQC.  It has nothing to do with that.  We didn’t do 
anything wrong.  I didn’t do anything wrong.”   
On November 8, 2016, Santino defeated Lerman in the general election.  
Santino never released an apology or a retraction about the statements made before 
the election on November 8.  Santino was sworn in as Palm Beach County Court 
- 29 - 
 
Judge on January 3, 2017.  After being elected, Santino was questioned at a social 
gathering with regard to whether misconduct charges could possibly lead to her 
removal.  Santino responded to the effect that “No.  I think it will be – won’t rise to 
that.  It will be probably a fine.  It’s not a big deal . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 
On March 6, 2017, the Investigative Panel of the JQC filed a notice of 
formal charges against Santino.  The charges alleged that Santino made statements 
that were false or misleading or both about her opponent in advertisements and 
social media during her campaign for election to judicial office.  Additionally, the 
charges also addressed her defense of these statements in response to the JCPC 
complaint.  In her answer, Santino acknowledged that her comments drawing a 
distinction between public defenders and private defense attorneys were 
inappropriate.  While explaining that the Facebook page was taken down at her 
direction, Santino admitted that the statements were inappropriate, wrong, and used 
language that violated the canons.  However, she has continuously denied that the 
inappropriate conduct represents a clear and present unfitness for office.   
Santino testified at the final hearing that all of the conduct alleged in the 
formal charges occurred in the last three and a half weeks of the campaign.  As to 
the Facebook page, Santino again admitted at the final hearing that the Facebook 
page was inappropriate and violated the canons.  Santino articulated that she had 
not been aware of the content of the page prior to it being posted and ultimately 
- 30 - 
 
had the page taken down, which was after the damage had been inflicted.  As to the 
e-mail sent out by Santino’s campaign on October 12, 2016, Santino admitted full 
responsibility for the language of the e-mail that outlined Lerman’s legal practice 
as “limited to criminal defense – representing murderers, rapists, child molesters 
and other criminals.”  When asked by a panel member why she waited until after 
the election to apologize to Lerman, Santino answered:  
Mr. Lerman, after the election was over, had made it clear that he was 
going to file a JQC complaint against me, so I did not know how to 
handle the matter of apologizing to him, and as soon as everything 
became official, the first thing I discussed with [my lawyer] was 
apologizing to [Lerman] and apologizing to the JCPC. 
Moreover, Santino was asked, “So as a candidate, you never said to the citizens of 
this county, ‘what was on that Facebook page was a violation of the rules I agreed 
to follow and it was deplorable and atrocious’?  Did you ever say anything like that 
during the campaign at any time.”  Santino responded that she did not. 
As explained above, after the hearing, the Hearing Panel found Santino 
guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar, and it recommended a discipline of removal.   
Santino is guilty of serious campaign violations that warrant the most severe 
penalty.  Based on this Court’s repeated warnings in past cases with regard to this 
type of campaign behavior, I agree with the approval and confirmation of the 
JQC’s recommendation of removal.   
- 31 - 
 
The supreme court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part 
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the commission 
and it may order that the justice or judge be subjected to the 
appropriate discipline, or be removed from office with termination of 
compensation for willful or persistent failure to perform judicial 
duties or for other conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary 
demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office.   
Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.  “Removal is proper when clear and convincing 
evidence is presented that the judge has engaged in ‘conduct unbecoming a 
member of the judiciary demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office.’ ”  In re 
Hawkins, 151 So. 3d 1200, 1216 (Fla. 2014) (quoting art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. 
Const.).   
I agree with the Court’s decision to abide by the JQC’s recommendation and 
remove Santino from the bench for her egregious conduct during her campaign 
because her decisions throughout her campaign, and her lack of authentic remorse 
after being investigated and being found to have committed these campaign 
violations, clearly demonstrated a present total unfitness to serve.   
This Court has declared from time immemorial that the lack of 
bias and partiality is an essential prerequisite to service as a judicial 
officer.  The promise of “Equal Justice Under Law” is essentially 
predicated upon an independent judiciary committed to fairness and 
justice in the application of the law to the facts of each individual 
case.  In Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992), we reaffirmed this 
long established and oft-repeated principle in our jurisprudence: 
 
The impartiality of the trial judge must be beyond 
question.  In the words of Chief Justice Terrell: 
 
- 32 - 
 
This Court is committed to the doctrine that 
every litigant is entitled to nothing less than 
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. . . . 
The exercise of any other policy tends to 
discredit the judiciary and shadow the 
administration of justice. 
 
. . . The attitude of the judge and the 
atmosphere of the court room should indeed 
be such that no matter what charge is lodged 
against a litigant or what cause he is called 
on to litigate, he can approach the bar with 
every assurance that he is in a forum where 
the judicial ermine is everything that it 
typifies, purity and justice.  The guaranty of 
a fair and impartial trial can mean nothing 
less than this. 
 
State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 519-20, 194 
So. 613, 615 (1939). 
 
Id. at 1183.  Accordingly, no other principle is more essential to the 
fair administration of justice than the impartiality of the presiding 
judge. 
In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 571.   
 
This Court may order that a judge be removed from office for “conduct 
unbecoming a member of the judiciary demonstrating a present unfitness to hold 
office.”  Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.   
We examine judicial misconduct for present fitness to hold 
office “from two perspectives: its effect on the public’s trust and 
confidence in the judiciary as reflected in its impact on the judge’s 
standing in the community, and the degree to which past misconduct 
points to future misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with the 
responsibilities of judicial office.”  [In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046, 
1055 (Fla. 2006).]  To preserve the integrity of the judiciary, a judge 
- 33 - 
 
must observe a high standard of personal conduct, [and] “act at all 
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary,” . . . . Fla. Code of Jud. Cond. Canons 1, 
3.  We have repeatedly held that “[r]emoval is an appropriate 
discipline where the actions of the judge simply ‘should erode 
confidence in the judiciary,’ even where it does not appear that the 
public has lost confidence, and even where the Hearing Panel has 
recommended a lesser sanction than removal.”  Hawkins, 151 So. 3d 
at 1215 (quoting Sloop, 946 So. 2d at 1055 (emphasis in original)).  
See also In re Henson, 913 So. 2d [579, 588 (Fla. 2005)] (finding 
removal appropriate because “the respect of the public [is] essential to 
[the judiciary’s] mission as the third branch of government.”); In re 
LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 518 (Fla. 1977) (finding removal proper 
even where misconduct does not appear to have shaken public faith in 
the judiciary).  Even where a judge has an outstanding record, 
removal is the appropriate sanction for a judge whose misconduct is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office 
or strikes at the heart of judicial integrity.  See, e.g., In re Graziano, 
696 So. 2d 744, 749 (Fla. 1997); In re Johnson, 692 So. 2d 168, 172 
(Fla. 1997) (“We cannot dispute Judge Johnson’s otherwise 
unblemished judicial record.”); In re Garrett, 613 So. 2d 463, 464 
(Fla. 1993) (removing Judge Garrett based on one incident of petit 
theft despite an “unblemished career of public service”). 
Our inquiry into judicial misconduct must also consider its 
future implications on the offending judge’s ability to serve.  Our 
determinations of appropriate discipline are based in part on the 
likelihood of that misconduct reoccurring.  Compare, e.g., In re 
Crowell, 379 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. 1979) (removing Judge Crowell 
for unfitness “substantially due to his tendency to lose his temper”) 
and Sloop, 946 So. 2d at 1059 (removing Judge Sloop because “we 
[were] unconvinced that [he could] both effectively manage his 
temper and remain an effective jurist”) with In re Wood, 720 So. 2d 
506, 509 (Fla. 1998) (finding public reprimand appropriate given 
Judge Wood’s candor and commitment to ongoing treatment for anger 
and stress management).  This Court has found removal appropriate 
even where a judge seeks treatment for a medical condition related to 
his or her severe misconduct.  See, e.g., Sloop, 946 So. 2d at 1056 
(finding removal appropriate for arresting traffic defendants who were 
in the wrong courtroom as a result of being misdirected, where the 
judge blamed his conduct on his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
- 34 - 
 
Disorder); Garrett, 613 So. 2d at 464 (finding removal appropriate for 
a one-time theft of electronics where the judge suffered from 
depression).  Furthermore, a pattern of misconduct is not necessary for 
removal.  See Sloop, 946 So. 2d at 1056; Garrett, 613 So. 2d at 464. 
In re Murphy, 181 So. 3d 1169, 1177-78 (Fla. 2015).   
 
Thus, the first step in the analysis requires examining the effects of Santino’s 
actions on the public’s trust in the judiciary.  Again, the question is not only 
whether Santino’s campaign misconduct did erode the public’s confidence in the 
judiciary, but also whether “the actions of the judge simply ‘should erode 
confidence in the judiciary,’ even where it does not appear that the public has lost 
confidence” in the judiciary.  In re Hawkins, 151 So. 3d at 1215 (quoting In re 
Sloop, 946 So. 2d at 1055).  Here, it is indisputable that repeated comments 
indicating Santino’s prejudice against criminal defendants and their legal counsel 
should—and does—erode the public’s confidence in the fairness and impartiality 
of members of the judiciary.  Santino’s campaign used e-mails, news articles, and 
Facebook posts to target Lerman and to imply his inability to be a good member of 
the judiciary, based solely on his legal practice as a criminal defense attorney—
three cases of which were undertaken based on court appointment from a conflict 
registry for indigent defendants—a fact that Santino ignored and failed to mention 
in her smear campaign.  These types of misadventures cause the public to lose trust 
and confidence in the judiciary.  See In re Dempsey, 29 So. 3d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 
2010) (“It is clear that a member of the judiciary or judicial candidate should not 
- 35 - 
 
mislead the public by placing factually incorrect statements in campaign 
materials.”); see also id. (stating that this Court has “repeatedly placed judicial 
candidates on notice that this type of misconduct will not be tolerated”).  
Furthermore, Santino’s repeated lack of remorse and her numerous pompous 
statements to various members of the public defending her misconduct as being 
beyond reproach further erode the public’s confidence in the judiciary.  “Given the 
clear erosion of public confidence in the judiciary caused by [her] misconduct, 
removal is an appropriate sanction.”  In re Murphy, 181 So. 3d at 1178; see also id. 
at 1177 (“Even where a judge has an outstanding record, removal is the appropriate 
sanction for a judge whose misconduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
responsibilities of judicial office or strikes at the heart of judicial integrity.” (citing 
In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 749; In re Johnson, 692 So. 2d at 172; In re Garrett, 
613 So. 2d at 464)).   
The next step in the analysis requires an examination of the likelihood of 
future misconduct.  Although there was testimony that Santino served in the civil 
division, her egregious campaign conduct presented serious issues of fairness and 
impartiality, should she ever have been assigned to serve in the criminal division of 
any court.  How could criminal defendants believe that Santino would be a fair and 
impartial arbiter of the law after her comments during her campaign, especially 
when represented by a private attorney?  Every aspect of her judicial campaign 
- 36 - 
 
violations demonstrated that Santino’s conduct was “fundamentally inconsistent 
with the responsibilities of judicial office.”  In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 753.  
Moreover, as this Court has repeatedly emphasized, a pattern of misconduct is not 
a necessary prerequisite for removal.  Here, Santino’s clean prior record alone 
could not absolve her of the sanction of removal, given her very public and 
repeated statements concerning her opinion on private criminal defense attorneys 
and criminal defendants in general.  In re Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (Fla. 
1993) (“Conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary may be proved by 
evidence of specific major incidents which indicate such conduct, or it may also be 
proved by evidence of an accumulation of small and ostensibly innocuous 
incidents which, when considered together, emerge as a pattern of hostile conduct 
unbecoming a member of the judiciary.” (quoting In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 566 
(Fla. 1970))).   
In addition, Santino attempted to justify her poor judgment, stating that she 
was too busy and sleep deprived to appropriately manage her campaign.  I would 
be remiss, however, to accept this unjustified and feeble justification.  Members of 
the judiciary often face times of high stress, busyness, and sleep deprivation; yet, 
they are nonetheless expected to maintain appropriate judicial composure during 
these high-pressure situations.  It lends no consolation that, under times of stress, 
busyness, or sleep deprivation in the future, Santino would potentially lash out 
- 37 - 
 
again against criminal defendants and their counsel.  Additionally, because Santino 
may at some point during her time on the bench have been rotated to the criminal 
division of her court, I cannot say with any degree of certainty that future 
misconduct was unlikely—especially in times of high stress.  Therefore, based on 
Santino’s clear and repeated erosion of public faith in our court system and the 
unmistakable possibility that she may have repeated this misconduct in the future, I 
necessarily agree that Santino was presently unfit to serve.  See In re Renke, 933 
So. 2d at 495 (“[O]ne who obtains a [judicial] position by fraud or other serious 
misconduct . . . is by definition unfit to hold that office.”).   
This Court also considers mitigating factors when reviewing the 
recommendations of the JQC, including, among other things, an expression of 
genuine remorse, acceptance of full responsibility for the actions committed, 
apologizing to the harmed parties, and seeking treatment or guidance for the 
problematic behaviors.  In re Contini, 205 So. 3d 1281, 1284 (Fla. 2016).  As I will 
discuss at length below, however, Santino repeatedly attempted to defend and 
justify her campaign violations, until the moment when a JQC complaint was filed 
against her, at which point she decided to apologize to Lerman and the JCPC.  
Therefore, despite any positive character testimony presented in her favor, I am 
unpersuaded by the mitigation Santino attempted to present.  In re Murphy, 181 
So. 3d at 1178; see also id. at 1177 (“Even where a judge has an outstanding 
- 38 - 
 
record, removal is the appropriate sanction for a judge whose misconduct is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office or strikes at 
the heart of judicial integrity.” (citing In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 749; In re 
Johnson, 692 So. 2d at 172; In re Garrett, 613 So. 2d at 464)).  Furthermore, 
although the majority attempts to commend the mitigation Santino presented in her 
favor, this mitigation, in my view, is nothing more than another attempt at 
rationalizing her campaign misconduct.   
 
Santino attempted to reduce her flagrant misbehavior during her campaign to 
simple “mistakes” that were caused by the erroneous advice of a ruthless campaign 
advisor and her failure to attend the local judicial campaign conduct forum 
sponsored by this Court and the Florida Board of Governors.  However, Santino 
signed a form under oath attesting that she reviewed the judicial canons and 
understood her obligations under those canons.  She also allegedly reviewed a 
pamphlet she received that explained Canon 7 and discussed campaign pitfalls and 
restrictions.  Nevertheless, she admitted that she failed to review any of the case 
law attached to the pamphlet pertaining to her ethical obligations in her judicial 
campaign.  Despite having failed to perform her due diligence with regard to her 
ethical obligations as a judicial candidate, Santino sought to be excused by this 
Court for her violations.  I cannot, however, reconcile Santino’s willful blindness 
with the concept of due diligence or with the obligation of all attorneys and judges 
- 39 - 
 
to comport themselves in a manner consistent with the ethical and professional 
obligations that every single member of The Florida Bar swore an oath to uphold.  
Further, it was not Santino’s “rogue” campaign manager who was responsible for 
informing her of her ethical obligations during her judicial campaign.  The duty to 
inform herself of the requirements and limitations of judicial election campaigns 
was Santino’s and hers alone, and her reliance on her campaign manager’s every 
word further buttressed her questionable judgment.   
 
In fact, Santino’s campaign behavior is exactly the behavior that I cautioned 
would arise in the aftermath of In re Kinsey, when Judge Kinsey was not removed 
from office as the JQC had recommended.  See 842 So. 2d at 97-100 (Lewis, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In re Kinsey involved a series of 
campaign literature and interviews that portrayed Judge Kinsey as “pro law 
enforcement” and as a judge who, if elected, would favor victims and police 
officers over defendants in criminal cases due to her prosecutorial background.  Id. 
at 80-85.  This Court imposed a $50,000 fine and a public reprimand in response to 
these campaign violations.  Id. at 92-93.  In my separate opinion, I detailed my 
frustrations with simply imposing a fine for these very serious campaign 
violations, specifically predicting that dirty campaign schemes would become the 
trend in the future, as long as candidates were able to pay the fine.  Id. at 99 
(Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
- 40 - 
 
In my view, the imposition of this fine, the amount of which is 
clearly designed and intended to represent the enormity of the 
reprehensible behavior, sends the message to future candidates that 
they may violate the Code and commit ethical breaches, if they are 
prepared to pay a monetary fine following the election.  The kinds of 
promises and type of condemnable campaign behavior demonstrated 
here tarnishes the very purpose for which the judiciary was 
established—to fairly and impartially consider any and all matters, 
without preconceived notions or positions about the merits of each 
case.  Judges should not pledge to be prosecutors or defense attorneys; 
they should pledge to administer the law neutrally and justly. . . . I 
conclude that if the actions are so reprehensible that the majority 
believes the imposition of a $50,000 fine is justified, those actions 
must certainly justify removal from the office so tainted.  Selecting an 
enormous fine as discipline only sends the message that “anything 
goes” in judicial elections if a candidate has the financial ability to 
pay the monetary consequences.  Indeed, in this era in which many 
judicial candidates in Florida are able to produce significant campaign 
funds from donations or personal assets, there may come a day when 
candidates simply maintain monetary reserves to pay fines following 
the election and then only the economically powerful can successfully 
compete in the election process. 
Id.   
To make matters worse, in the instant case, after being sworn in as a Palm 
Beach County judge, Santino was questioned with regard to whether her 
misconduct during the election campaign could possibly lead to her removal.  
Santino’s response to this questioning was:  
‘No.  I think it will be – won’t rise to that.  It will probably be a fine.  
It’s not a big deal . . . .’ 
(Emphasis added.)  However, as this Court has repeatedly cautioned in past 
precedent, I believe that what she has done to obtain the judicial office is a big 
- 41 - 
 
deal.  See In re Renke, 933 So. 2d at 493-95 (discussing this Court’s repeated 
warnings in past case law concerning campaign violations).  I refuse to endorse 
Santino’s “win-at-all-costs-and-pay-the-fine-later” strategy, especially in light of 
this Court’s past warnings and stated intolerance for the kinds of campaign 
violations at issue here.  By her own admission, if this Court simply imposed a fine 
in an attempt to evidence the enormity of Santino’s reprehensible behavior, it 
would be seen as “no big deal” in her eyes.   
 
Furthermore, Santino asserted that she accepted responsibility for her actions 
and felt remorse for her conduct during her campaign.  However, contrary to her 
assertion, Santino demonstrated a consistent and repeated lack of remorse and 
refusal to accept responsibility for her actions throughout her campaign, which this 
Court has repeatedly deemed to be a sufficient basis for removal.  See In re 
McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 572 (citing In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2008); In re 
Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273).  Specifically, in response to the complaint filed against 
Santino with the JCPC, Santino responded that her statements concerning her 
opponent were truthful statements that were meant to highlight the differences 
between her and Lerman, and that the Facebook posts in question had been created 
by an ECO.4  In response to a news article covering her comments concerning 
                                          
 
 
4.  Although Santino claims that the ECO was responsible for the 
problematic Facebook posts, this ECO was formed and controlled by Santino’s 
campaign consultant, Patriot Games, Inc.  Moreover, the misleading Facebook 
- 42 - 
 
Lerman’s criminal defense practice, she defended herself by saying that she was 
simply stating the facts and attempted to draw a distinction between public 
defenders who represent indigent criminals and private criminal defense attorneys, 
stating “Lerman is not a public defender and chooses to represent individuals who 
commit heinous crimes.” (Emphasis added.)  After the JCPC issued its unanimous 
advisory opinion finding that Santino had violated several judicial canons, Santino 
nevertheless continued to attack Lerman for representing persons accused of 
crimes and made no efforts to retract prior statements or to instruct her campaign 
manager to conform his behavior to the campaign rules.  Additionally, the same 
day that the JCPC’s opinion was issued, Santino was quoted in a news article 
stating that the JCPC’s findings were “just . . . their opinion” and her campaign 
manager described Lerman as “desperate.”  While at an early voting site, Santino 
and Lerman discussed what The Florida Bar and the JQC would say about her 
campaign comments, and she responded, “It’s none of the business of the Florida 
Bar, the local Palm Beach County Bar, or the JQC.  It has nothing to do with that.  
We didn’t do anything wrong.  I didn’t do anything wrong.” (Emphasis added.)  In 
                                          
 
posts about Lerman were clearly under Santino’s control, as evidenced by the fact 
that, when the Facebook posts at issue began to receive negative pushback from 
prominent attorneys in the area, Santino ordered that the posts be deleted and her 
request was immediately honored.  Thus, despite her attempt at deflecting 
responsibility, these reprehensible Facebook posts were created by Santino’s 
campaign agents and were the direct product of her election campaign.   
- 43 - 
 
sum, Santino’s campaign strategy was quite literally one of win-at-all-costs and it’s 
better to beg for forgiveness than to follow the law. 
Now, when faced with a JQC investigation and possible removal from the 
bench, Santino reversed course and attempted to play nice after being caught and 
being held accountable for her shameful actions.  Santino’s obvious lack of 
authentic remorse or genuine apology throughout her campaign and the JQC 
investigation5 reflect deep-rooted character flaws that should have, on their own, 
served as a basis for removal due to her unfitness to serve on the bench.  Further, 
her obvious bias against lawyers who choose engage in criminal defense work, 
specifically those who represent non-indigent criminal defendants, showed an 
alarming disregard for the fundamental constitutional values that every judicial 
                                          
 
 
5.  The JQC was in the best position to determine the genuineness of 
Santino’s asserted remorse.  The JQC, however, made it clear that it did not 
consider Santino’s apology after the fact to be a credible one.  “It is worth pointing 
out, however, that [Santino’s] acceptance of responsibility, and expressions of 
remorse came only after the JQC had provided a Notice of Investigation.  
Throughout her campaign, Santino did not apologize for her campaign’s 
inflammatory and derogatory statements about her opponent.  Indeed, time and 
again, when presented with an opportunity, [Santino] defended her misconduct.”  
Because the JQC was in the best position to view Santino, and take into account all 
of the testimony presented for and against her, I defer to its findings on the 
credibility and genuineness of her acceptance of responsibility.  See In re 
Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 753 (“If the [JQC] findings meet [the clear and convincing 
evidence] standard, then they are of persuasive force and are given great weight by 
this Court.  This is so because the JQC is in a position to evaluate the testimony 
and evidence first-hand.”  (citation omitted)).   
- 44 - 
 
officer swears to uphold.  See In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 571 (“[T]he Court has 
often pointed out that judges should be held to higher ethical standards than 
lawyers by virtue of their position in the judiciary and the impact of their conduct 
on public confidence in an impartial justice system.” (citing In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 
13, 21 (Fla. 1975))).  Therefore, Santino’s disingenuous apologies and assertions of 
remorse did not provide adequate mitigation to persuade me against the sanction of 
removal.  See In re Graham, 620 So. 2d at 1276 (“A judge who refuses to 
recognize his [or her] own transgressions does not deserve the authority or 
command the respect necessary to judge the transgressions of others.”).   
Most concerning, however, is that Santino’s campaign violations again 
remind us that this Court’s prior precedent with regard to these kinds of violations 
are being repeatedly ignored, while the conduct itself becomes more and more 
aggravated.  See In re Renke, 933 So. 2d at 493-95 (discussing this Court’s 
repeated warnings in past case law concerning campaign violations); see also In re 
Angel, 867 So. 2d 379, 383 (Fla. 2004) (“Certainly, in very egregious cases, where 
a judge’s misconduct included implications that he or she would make partisan 
decisions on the bench, the JQC has recommended a substantial fine in addition to 
a public reprimand and even removal.” (emphasis added) (citing In re Kinsey, 842 
So. 2d at 92; In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 572)).  In In re Alley, this Court 
addressed these kinds of campaign violations and cautioned future judicial 
- 45 - 
 
candidates against their repetition.  699 So. 2d 1369.  Four years later, this Court 
again voiced its disapproval of similar, but more egregious, campaign violations in 
In re McMillan.  797 So. 2d 560.  Then, only two years later, in In re Kinsey, the 
Court was again faced with even more serious campaign violations that were in the 
same vein as those of the cases that preceded it.  842 So. 2d 77.  Now, the Court is 
yet again addressing campaign violations similar to those in cases past.  Moreover, 
the campaign violations that Santino committed are the most flagrant to date, and 
her lack of remorse is the most blatant yet.  Thus, I reemphasize this Court’s 
previously stated no-tolerance practice in these situations and conclude that the 
only result worthy of yet another case involving conduct that ignores our judicial 
canons on campaign misconduct was removal.   
In sum, I believe that: 
Chief Justice Terrell’s words guaranteeing to all “the cold 
neutrality of an impartial judge” have special application here where 
the personal political aspirations and subsequent vindictiveness of an 
individual judge have been allowed to tarnish the robes of justice.  
Further, as we attempted to make clear in In re Alley, to allow 
someone who has committed such misconduct during a campaign to 
attain office to then serve the term of the judgeship obtained by such 
means clearly sends the wrong message to future candidates; that is, 
the end justifies the means and, thus, all is fair so long as the 
candidate wins.   
In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 573.  “A judgeship is a position of trust, not a 
fiefdom.  Litigants and attorneys should not be made to feel that the disparity of 
power between themselves and the judge jeopardizes their right to justice.”  In re 
- 46 - 
 
Graham, 620 So. 2d at 1277.  We must remember lawyers represent citizens when 
charged with crimes.  Some citizens are found to be guilty but others are found not 
guilty.  Who will be there to defend the innocent citizens when wrongly charged by 
our government if we allow judicial candidates to batter and demean lawyers who 
afford legal representation?  This type of campaign conduct is a full attack on the 
system of equal justice and the right to counsel. 
Accordingly, I agree that Judge Santino’s misconduct clearly 
“demonstrate[d] a present unfitness to hold office.”  Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.  
Therefore, pursuant to this Court’s precedent, removal was not only warranted, it 
was the only appropriate result.  However, for the reasons set forth above, although 
I concur in the result of Santino’s removal, I cannot sign on to a majority that is not 
fully developed and presented.   
 
- 47 - 
 
APPENDIX 
 
- 48 - 
 
- 49 - 
 
- 50 - 
 
 
- 51 - 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
In this matter involving serious campaign misrepresentations in violation of 
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, I would impose a very severe discipline of a 
90-day suspension without pay, a $50,000 fine plus the cost of these proceedings, 
and a public reprimand.  However, unlike the majority, I would not follow the 
JQC’s recommendation of removal because removal is not consistent with our 
precedent involving this type of serious campaign misconduct.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On March 6, 2017, the Investigative Panel of the JQC filed a notice of 
formal charges against Judge Dana Santino.  The charges alleged that Judge 
Santino made false or misleading statements about her opponent in advertisements 
and social media during her judicial campaign.  Additionally, the charges 
concerned Judge Santino’s defense of these statements in response to a complaint 
filed with the Palm Beach County Bar Association’s Judicial Campaign Practices 
Commission (JCPC).  In her answer, Judge Santino acknowledged that her 
comments were inappropriate, and she expressed regret for them.  She explained 
that the Facebook page that was viewable for approximately one month was taken 
down at her direction.  And Judge Santino acknowledged that the statements were 
- 52 - 
 
inappropriate and violated the canons.  However, she denied that those mistakes 
represent a clear and present unfitness for office.   
On August 2, 2017, a final hearing was held before the Hearing Panel of the 
JQC.  Santino’s opponent for judicial office, Gregg Lerman, testified that he dealt 
with the other candidate for the seat “on an extremely friendly and personal basis” 
and “took the position with Ms. Santino that I not deal with her at all.”  Lerman 
testified that he “was admittedly unhappy that she was running on [his] dime, to 
put it bluntly, because [he] had been the one to sue the governor and paid the fees 
to sue the governor, and she jumped in after that.”  Lerman also was asked about 
derogatory statements he made about Judge Santino during the campaign.  
Specifically, when asked whether he commented, “I don’t have the luxury of being 
an attractive woman riding on my husband’s coattails,” Lerman answered that he 
said something to that effect.  Additionally, on the night of the primary, Lerman 
gave an interview where he stated that “the gloves are going to come off in the 
upcoming months.”  Shortly after, Lerman sent an email that stated, “I need your 
help in order to protect the integrity of the bench from becoming a vanity prize.”   
Judge Santino testified at the final hearing that all of the conduct alleged in 
the formal charges occurred in the last three and a half weeks of the campaign.  As 
to the Facebook page, Judge Santino testified at the final hearing that the Facebook 
page was inappropriate and violated the canons.  Judge Santino articulated that she 
- 53 - 
 
had not been aware of the content of the page prior to it being posted and had the 
page taken down immediately when she learned of its existence.  As to the email 
sent out by her campaign on October 12, 2016, Judge Santino admitted full 
responsibility for its language.  Judge Santino testified that in the 5 days between 
the release of the JCPC advisory opinion and the final day of voting in the election 
on November 8, 2016, she did not release an apology or a retraction about the 
statements she had previously made or fire her campaign manager.  However, 
Santino testified that she sent apology letters to Lerman and the members of the 
JCPC after the election was over.   
Additionally, the Hearing Panel of the JQC heard testimony from witnesses 
on behalf of Judge Santino.  Judge Jeffrey Colbath testified that he was serving as 
the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit when Judge Santino became a 
sitting judge in January 2018.  Judge Colbath testified that he never got any 
complaints about Santino and that she volunteered to help out colleagues.  Judge 
Colbath testified that Judge Santino volunteers for weekend civil drug court that 
carries no extra compensation.  When asked if Judge Santino was presently fit to 
sit as a county court judge, Judge Colbath stated, “I think she’s presently fit.  I 
think what’s happened is unfortunate and worthy of your attention and 
consideration, but as far as her ability to do her job not only efficiently, but 
exemplary in the Palm Beach County Courthouse, I think she’s good to go.”   
- 54 - 
 
Judge Theodore Booras, who has served as a Palm Beach County Judge for 
11 years, testified that he has known Judge Santino since 1993, when he was an 
assistant state attorney and she worked as a probation officer.  Judge Booras 
testified that he also worked with Judge Santino when she worked for a 
community-based drug treatment program where she advocated for eligible 
individuals to be offered diversion programs.  Judge Booras acted as Judge 
Santino’s unofficial mentor in the civil division.  Judge Booras testified that Judge 
Santino has a strong work ethic, is helpful to colleagues, well-regarded by 
practitioners, and has worked hard to manage her caseload.  When asked about 
Judge Santino’s fitness to serve as a judge, Judge Booras stated that Judge Santino 
is an excellent judge.  The Hearing Panel also heard testimony from two lay 
witnesses who gave exemplary character references for Judge Santino. 
As detailed by the majority, the Hearing Panel concluded that Judge 
Santino’s statements violated Canon 7 of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, and 
it recommended her removal from office. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
While I agree with the JQC and the majority that Judge Santino is guilty of 
serious campaign violations that warrant a severe penalty, I disagree with removal.   
“The supreme court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the commission and it may order 
- 55 - 
 
that the justice or judge be subjected to appropriate discipline, or be removed from 
office with termination of compensation for willful or persistent failure to perform 
judicial duties or for other conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary 
demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office. . . . ”  Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. 
Const. (emphasis added).  “Removal is proper when clear and convincing evidence 
is present that the judge has engaged in ‘conduct unbecoming a member of the 
judiciary demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office.’ ”  In re Hawkins, 151 
So. 3d 1200, 1216 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.).   
This Court’s imposition of removal in prior cases involving Canon 7 
violations was dependent on misconduct in addition to campaign 
misrepresentations.  See, e.g., In re Renke, 933 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2006); In re 
McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2001).  In In re McMillan, this Court ordered 
removal after Judge McMillan committed serious violations while campaigning 
and committed additional violations while a sitting judge.  797 So. 2d at 573.  
During his campaign, Judge McMillan represented that he would favor the State 
and police in court proceedings and would side against the defense.  Id. at 562.  
The JQC further alleged that, after taking the bench, Judge McMillan violated the 
canons when he presided over the first appearance of a DUI case that he personally 
witnessed and provided a statement to the police, a clear conflict of interest.  Id. at 
564.  While acknowledging the severity of Judge McMillan’s improper and 
- 56 - 
 
misleading campaign tactics, this Court explained that his conduct “after he 
became a judge also places this case in a different category.”  Id. at 572.  This 
Court concluded that the “combined effect of the proven misconduct, culminating 
in a blatant breach of the fundamental principles of judicial ethics while sitting as a 
judge, demonstrate Judge McMillan’s lack of fitness for office.”  Id. at 573. 
This Court was once again faced with campaign misrepresentations plus 
additional conduct in In re Renke, 933 So. 2d at 484.  In his campaign materials, 
Judge Renke misrepresented that he was an incumbent, misrepresented his position 
on the Southwest Florida Water Management District, misrepresented his judicial 
experience, misrepresented endorsements, misrepresented his experience as a 
lawyer, and misrepresented the qualifications of his opponent.  Id. at 485-86.  
Additionally, Judge Renke accepted illegal donations from his father, disguised as 
compensation, in violation of state finance laws.  Id. at 495.  In concluding that 
Judge Renke was presently unfit to hold office, which warranted removal, this 
Court explained that “[t]he JQC’s finding of guilt on the severe campaign finance 
improprieties evidenced here, when coupled with Judge Renke’s efforts to mislead 
the voting public as to his experience and qualifications to serve as judge, lead us 
to conclude that his conduct during his judicial campaign was ‘fundamentally 
inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.’ ”  Id. at 495.  (quoting In re 
Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997)).   
- 57 - 
 
More recently, in In re DuPont, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S337 (Fla. Sept. 6, 2018), 
this Court determined that removal was appropriate where the judge not only 
committed violations by making inappropriate campaign statements but also 
committed violations while serving on the bench.  While campaigning, Judge 
DuPont falsely claimed that his opponent’s wife and daughter had been arrested 
multiple times, improperly implied that his opponent changed his name to hide his 
past, falsely asserted that his opponent received a traffic ticket for passing a school 
bus with children on it, and inappropriately promised to never find a statute 
unconstitutional.  Id. at S337-40.  However, in addition to these wrongful 
campaign statements, Judge DuPont also violated the canons by conducting first 
appearance hearings earlier than his judicial assistant had advised and when there 
were no lawyers present for the State or the defendants.  Id. at S340.  And during a 
hearing involving support for a minor child, he ordered a deputy to search a party 
and to seize any money found after the party asserted an inability to pay for a 
parenting class.  Id. at S387.  Further, the Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial 
Circuit “testified that he received far more complaints about Judge Dupont than 
any other judge.”  Id. at S340.  In In re DuPont, this Court explained that “[b]ased 
on the misrepresentations Judge DuPont made during his campaign to attain his 
office as well as the other instances of misconduct during his time in office, we 
- 58 - 
 
conclude that Judge DuPont has demonstrated a present unfitness to hold office 
and approve the recommended discipline of removal from office.”  Id. at S342. 
In contrast, in determining the appropriate discipline in a case involving only 
serious improper campaign statements, in In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003), 
this Court affirmed a public reprimand, fine of $50,000, and the cost of the 
proceedings.  During her campaign, Judge Kinsey distributed campaign literature 
aligning herself with law enforcement, including several pamphlets that 
proclaimed a judge’s role was to protect victims and put criminals behind bars in 
support of law enforcement.  Id. at 80-85.  Specifically, Judge Kinsey included a 
brochure where she was “standing with ten heavily armed police officers that was 
captioned ‘Who do these guys count on to back them up?’ ”  Id. at 87.  In 
determining Judge Kinsey’s present fitness in relation to the violations, this Court 
explained that “[w]hile a reprimand alone is insufficient, there was no evidence 
that Judge Kinsey is presently unfit to hold office other than her misconduct 
involved in winning the election.”  Id. at 92 (quoting JQC findings).  This Court 
supported the decision of a $50,000 fine, noting that this severe penalty was “to 
warn any future judicial candidates that this Court will not tolerate improper 
campaign statements which imply that, if elected, the judicial candidate will favor 
one group of citizens over another or will make rulings based upon the sway of 
popular sentiment in the community.”  Id.  Accordingly, this Court determined that 
- 59 - 
 
the appropriate discipline was a $50,000 fine, proceeding costs, and a public 
reprimand.  Id.   
The misconduct detailed in In re Kinsey is similar to the misconduct 
involved in the present case.  In In re Kinsey, this Court determined that removal 
was not warranted when the judge utilized campaign materials to make improper 
campaign statements that implied she would favor a particular group in her rulings.  
See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 92.  Here, Judge Santino utilized a Facebook page 
and a campaign e-mail to make improper statements regarding her opponent’s 
favoring of a particular group.  Thus, similar to the discipline appropriate in In re 
Kinsey, Judge Santino’s conduct warrants discipline other than removal.   
Unlike this Court’s prior election cases ordering removal, Judge Santino’s 
misconduct is limited to campaign misrepresentations.  It is undisputed that Judge 
Santino engaged in conduct amounting to serious campaign violations.  The posted 
Facebook page suggested that Lerman was unfit as he was pro-defense, 
highlighting his extensive experience in criminal defense.  Additionally, Santino’s 
campaign e-mail framed her opponent’s experience as “limited to criminal 
defense-representing murderers, rapists, child molesters and other criminals.”  
However, this Court’s prior cases resulting in removal for improper campaign 
statements involved additional misconduct by the judge.  Judge Santino’s 
misconduct does not rise to that level.  Unlike the judge in In re Renke, Judge 
- 60 - 
 
Santino did not commit serious campaign finance violations that amounted to 
illegal conduct.  In re Renke, 933 So. 2d at 484.  Additionally, unlike the judge in 
In re McMillan or the judge in In re DuPont, Judge Santino did not commit any 
violations upon taking the bench that would suggest a present unfitness for office.  
In re McMillian, 797 So. 2d at 565; In re DuPont, 43 Fla. L. Weekly at S338, 
S341-42.  Because Judge Santino committed serious campaign misrepresentations 
without some additional misconduct establishing present unfitness, the 
recommendation of removal is not the appropriate discipline.   
To be clear, the nature of Judge Santino’s misconduct should be central to 
our analysis, but this Court also considers mitigating factors when reviewing the 
recommendation of the JQC.  See In re Eriksson, 36 So. 3d 580, 595 (Fla. 2010).  
While acknowledging the severity of Judge Santino’s improper and misleading 
campaign tactics, her conduct after becoming a judge aids in the determination of 
present fitness for office.  Judge Santino accepted full responsibility for her actions 
at every stage of these proceedings.  Although it was a contentious election, as 
evidenced by the record, Santino did not attempt to excuse her conduct during the 
hearing and did not attempt to justify her actions in her two briefs to this Court.  
Additionally, after the election, Judge Santino sent apology letters to Lerman and 
the members of the JCPC.  See In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 405 (Fla. 1994)  
(“Where a judge admits wrongdoing and expresses remorse before the 
- 61 - 
 
Commission, this candor reflects positively on his or her present fitness to hold 
office and can mitigate to some extent a finding of misconduct.”). 
This mitigation is considered alongside the exemplary character testimony 
received at the hearing.  Judge Colbath, who served as the Chief Judge when Judge 
Santino joined the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, testified that in his opinion, Judge 
Santino was presently fit to sit as a county court judge, pointing to her efficient and 
exemplary work at the courthouse.  Additionally, Judge Booras, from the civil 
division, opined that Judge Santino is an excellent judge who has a strong work 
ethic, is helpful to colleagues, and well-regarded by practitioners.   
Accordingly, Judge Santino’s misconduct, although serious, is not sufficient 
to “demonstrate[] a present unfitness to hold office.”  Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. 
Const.  Therefore, a severe penalty rather than removal is warranted.   
III.  CONCLUSION  
Based on our prior precedent involving serious and improper campaign 
statements but no additional misconduct, I would suspend Judge Santino without 
pay for 90 days, order her to pay a fine of $50,000, plus the costs of these 
proceedings, and remand this case to the JQC for a determination of the amount of 
such costs.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
- 62 - 
 
Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission 
Eugene Pettis, Chair, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Michael Louis Schneider, 
Executive Director and General Counsel, Alexander J. Williams, Assistant General 
Counsel, Judicial Qualifications Commission, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lauri 
Waldman Ross of Ross & Girten, Counsel to the Hearing Panel of the Florida 
Judicial Qualifications Commission, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner 
 
Jeremy J. Kroll of Bogenschutz, Dutko & Kroll, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Judge Dana Marie Santino, Respondent