Title: Prine v. Wood
Citation: 447 So. 2d 725
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 9, 1984

447 So. 2d 725 (1984)
Carol PRINE
v.
Clifford M. WOOD, Executor of the Estate of Julian C. Prine; Kay Prine; and Ray Prine.
82-836.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 9, 1984.
Ralph Loveless of Loveless &amp; Banks, Mobile, for appellant.
John Earle Chason of Chason &amp; Chason, Bay Minette, for appellee Katherine Wren Prine.
*726 Charles Partin of Stone, Partin, Granade &amp; Crosby, Bay Minette, Guardian ad Litem for Ray Prine.
ADAMS, Justice.
This is an appeal taken pursuant to Code 1975, § 12-22-22, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Baldwin County reversing an order of the Baldwin County Probate Court. In its judgment the circuit court held that Carol Prine should not be allowed to dissent from the will of her deceased husband, Julian C. Prine, and that she was not entitled to dower in his lands. We affirm on the authority of Land v. Bowyer, 437 So. 2d 524 (Ala.1983).
Julian C. Prine executed his last will and testament on December 7, 1979. Included in the will was the following item:
The remainder of Prine's estate was left to his two children, Kay and Ray Prine, under other items of the will.
On February 25, 1980, Julian C. Prine died, leaving his widow, Carol R. Prine (the former Carol Reed), and two children of a prior marriage, Kay and Ray Prine. Ray was a minor, while Kay was an adult living in another state.
At the time of the probate of Prine's will, March 18, 1980, the trailer park known as Mobile Manor II was involved in litigation concerning a boundary line dispute. Another piece of property in the estate was also involved in litigation. Because of this, and also because the executor told her that she had twelve months in which to file a dissent, Carol Prine did not file a dissent and request for dower within six months. However, on September 23, six months and five days after the probate of the will, she was notified of the approximate value of the estate, and she then informed the executor of her intention to dissent. On June 17, 1981, one day less than fifteen months after probate of the will, she filed in probate court her dissent from the will and her petition to have dower set aside. Following a hearing, at which all parties were represented by counsel, the probate judge on August 18, 1981, issued an order which concluded:
Both of Prine's children filed notice of appeal to the circuit court pursuant to Code 1975, § 12-22-21, which provides that an appeal may be taken either to the circuit court or to the supreme court. It then developed that the transcript of the probate court proceedings could not be found. On December 1, 1982, after several efforts to produce or reproduce the evidence, a settled and approved statement of the evidence was prepared and filed according to *727 the procedure outlined under Rule 10(d), A.R.A.P.
This court's opinion in Hall v. McBride,[1] invalidating the statute[2] providing for a widow's dissent from her husband's will, was rendered on June 30, 1982. The appeal of the case before us was then pending in the circuit court, and Hall was briefed and argued in that court by counsel for the parties. On May 18, 1983, the judge of the circuit court reversed the order of the probate judge, stating:
The initial issue to be considered in this case is whether the circuit court erred in refusing to dismiss this case for lack of proper or diligent prosecution after the timely taking of the appeal. The appellant argues that her opponents failed to conform to the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure in their appeal to the circuit court. She states in her brief:
It is the appellant's contention that this language mandates procedure as set out in the A.R.A.P.
When Grisset v. Hughes was decided, Code 1923, § 6115 (a predecessor of Code 1975, § 12-22-21), provided:
That language was subsequently modified, so that Code 1975, § 12-22-21 reads:
Rule 1, A.R.A.P., provides:
We find nothing in this rule or the statute to indicate that an appeal from the probate court to the circuit court is governed *728 by the A.R.A.P. In the absence of rule or statute setting out the procedure to be followed in such a case, we conclude that the circuit court acted within its discretion in determining procedural matters in the appeal. Finding no abuse of that discretion, we hold that there was no error with regard to the prosecution of the appeal.
We now come to the substantive issue of whether Mrs. Prine is entitled to dissent from her husband's will and claim dower.
As noted above, this court's opinion in Hall v. McBride was rendered while the appeal of this case was pending in circuit court. In August 1983, this court issued its opinion in Land v. Bowyer, in which we set out the cases to which Hall v. McBride would be applied retroactively. There, we said:
Land v. Bowyer, supra.
In the case before us, although the probate judge held that the appellant was entitled to dower, dower has not yet been assigned. The appellant herself, in her reply brief, pointed out:
Where dower has not been assigned, so that there is no vested right to be divested, we must apply Hall v. McBride retroactively. For that reason, we opine that the holding of Hall must apply in this case, and the appellant is not entitled to dissent from her husband's will. The judgment of the circuit court is due to be, and hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
ALMON, J., concurs specially.
ALMON, Justice (concurring specially).
The basis of my special concurrence begins with Peddy v. Montgomery, 345 So. 2d 631 (Ala.1977), which ultimately led to the view I expressed in Hall v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986 (Ala.1982). In the Hall case I predicted that certain widows would be unduly denied their right to dower. This is such a case.
[1]  Hall v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986 (Ala.1982).
[2]  Code 1975, § 43-1-15.