Title: James M. Honeycutt v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR02-554
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: March 6, 2003

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM MARCH 6, 2003 JAMES M. HONEYCUTT Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee CR 02-554 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY, NO. CR 98-952, HONORABLE NORMAN WILKINSON, JUDGE AFFIRMED Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the third degree and admitted the allegations of a petition to revoke a probationary sentence for theft by receiving. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that trial counsel pressured him into accepting the State's negotiated plea offer. At the hearing, the State argued that appellant's claims were not sufficient for withdrawal of a guilty plea under Ark R. Crim. P. 37. It appears that the trial court agreed that the motion should be treated as one for postconviction relief under the rule. Appellant's motion was denied and from that order comes this appeal. Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(a): A defendant may withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right before it has been accepted by the court. A defendant may not withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right after it has been accepted by the court; however, before entry of judgment, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant towithdraw his or her plea to correct a manifest injustice if it is fair and just to do so, giving due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of his or her motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant's plea. A plea of ··²SDU_2²····²SDU_2²··guilty or nolo contendere may not be withdrawn under this rule after entry of judgment. Once a sentence has been placed into execution, a motion under Rule 37 is necessary in order to obtain relief from a guilty plea. Swopes v. State, 338 Ark. 217, 219, 992 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1999). "A sentence is placed into execution when the court issues a commitment order unless the trial court grants appellate bond or specifically delays execution upon other valid grounds." Id. Because appellant's motion followed the issuance of the judgment and commitment order, it was properly considered a motion for postconviction relief. Id. When a defendant has pled guilty and challenges that plea under Rule 37, the only claims cognizable are those which allege that the plea was not made voluntarily and intelligently or was entered without the effective assistance of counsel. State v. Herred, 332 Ark. 241, 251, 964 S.W.2d 391, 397 (1998). Prior to presenting testimony at the hearing on appellant's motion, counsel told the court that "the reason [appellant] wants to withdraw his plea is because after he went back to the jail and thought about what he had done, he felt like that initially he and I had discussed him trying to get into [a] sexual offender's program here ... and he expressed his desire to try and get a suspended sentence ...." Counsel went on to state, "However, the State did not ever offer that to the Defendant despite numerous attempts to get them to. I think he is just basically dissatisfied with the plea bargain he entered into and feels like he is going to spend too much time up there." During his testimony, appellant agreed with counsel's statements regarding his reasons for wanting to withdraw his plea. Appellant went on to allege that the plea was improper because his former counsel, Judge Marschewski, who represented him on the underlying charge in the petition to revoke, is now a judge. Although appellant acknowledges that a different judge presided over hisplea, he alleges that "there is a conflict of interest because Marschewski is a [j]udge." Appellant also testified that he was unaware of the sentence he would receive for the theft by receiving charge, the underlying felony offense for which his probation was revoked. Finally, he added that he was taking medication for anxiety. According to the trial court, before appellant entered his guilty plea, the court: [M]ade certain that those pleas were voluntary and that he understood what he was doing and I covered the Plea Statement and the Terms and Condition [sic] with him and went through it just as good as I could to make sure that he understood his rights and understood what rights he was waiving and that he was entering those pleas voluntarily and his answers were in the affirmative. There was no mention that day of anything about Judge Marschewski. The court found that appellant did not meet any of the conditions for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty and that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. On appeal, appellant does not argue the voluntariness of the plea or specifically how counsel's performance affected his decision to plead guilty. Instead, he claims that "proper procedure was not followed in allowing the appellant to develop his theory that he was pressured into the plea and denied effective assistance of counsel." He claims that the impropriety occurred when the attorney who represented him at the time his plea was taken, also argued at the hearing on his behalf for the withdrawal of that plea. According to appellant, the trial court should have appointed him counsel at the hearing so that his theory could be developed by an impartial attorney, "rather than the one being attacked by the appellant." There is no entitlement to counsel at postconviction proceedings. McCuen v. State, 328 Ark. 46, 56, 941 S.W.2d 397, 402 (1997). Although the rule authorizes appointment of counsel to represent an indigent person at a postconviction proceeding in non-death cases, it is within the discretion of the trial court. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(b). Moreover, appellant did not object tocounsel's representation at the hearing. We have held that where a petitioner does not object to counsel and accepts his or her services at a postconviction proceeding, the petitioner is not thereafter entitled to appointment of different counsel. Franklin v. State, 327 Ark. 537, 539, 939 S.W.2d 836, 837 (1997). Because appellant accepted counsel's representation and did not object, we find no error and affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motion. Affirmed. Corbin, J., not participating.