Title: Lawyer Regulation System of the State of Wisconsin v. James R. Duchemin
Citation: 2003 WI 19
Docket Number: 2001AP002227-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 20, 2003

2003 WI 19 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2227-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against James R. Duchemin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Lawyer Regulation System of the State of 
Wisconsin, by Ronald R. Smith, Special 
Investigator,  
 
Complainant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
James R. Duchemin,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DUCHEMIN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 20, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 23, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Paul W. 
Schwarzenbart, 
Madison, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Paul 
W. 
Schwarzenbart. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Webster 
A. Hart, Stephanie L. Finn and Herrick, Hart, Duchemin, Spaeth, 
Sullivan & Schumacher, S.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by 
Webster A. Hart. 
 
 
2003 WI 19 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2227-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against James R. Duchemin, Attorney at Law: 
 
Lawyer Regulation System of the State of  
Wisconsin, by Ronald R. Smith, Special  
Investigator,  
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
James R. Duchemin,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 20, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.  Proceeding dismissed.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   The 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
System 
(LRS) 
appeals from the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law entered following a hearing held on the LRS complaint filed 
with this court on August 21, 2001, against Attorney James R. 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
2 
 
Duchemin.1  That complaint alleged that Attorney Duchemin had 
violated SCR 20:1.6 by revealing to an acquaintance, Jill 
Johnson, the fact that Johnson's daughter, Jennifer Mayer, had 
contacted him about possibly retaining him to represent her 
(Jennifer Mayer) in a divorce action.  The LRS asserted that 
Mayer had not expressly authorized Attorney Duchemin to disclose 
that information to Johnson or to discuss with Johnson the 
circumstances surrounding gifts or loans of money by Johnson to 
Mayer and her husband.  Furthermore, the LRS asserted that the 
disclosures made by Attorney Duchemin were not impliedly 
authorized as necessary to carry out his possible representation 
of Mayer, nor were such disclosures made under circumstances 
                                                 
1 At the time of the events involved in this matter, the 
respondent, Attorney James R. Duchemin, was a member of the 
District 8 Professional Responsibility Committee.  Effective 
October 1, 2000, Wisconsin's attorney disciplinary process 
underwent a substantial restructuring.  The name of the body 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases involving 
attorney misconduct was changed to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation and the supreme court rules applicable to the Lawyer 
Regulation System were also revised.  Because Attorney Duchemin 
was a lawyer regulation system participant, the grievance filed 
against 
him 
in 
this 
matter 
was 
referred 
to 
a 
special 
investigator pursuant to SCR 22.25(1).  The special investigator 
subsequently submitted his report to the special preliminary 
review panel established pursuant to SCR 22.25(5); that panel, 
pursuant to SCR 22.25(7), then determined that there was cause 
to proceed and the special investigator then filed a complaint 
against Attorney Duchemin pursuant to SCR 22.08(2) and SCR 
22.11. 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
3 
 
listed in SCR 20:1.6.2  The LRS asked this court to issue a 
private reprimand to Attorney Duchemin for his alleged violation 
of SCR 20:1.6. 
¶2 
Following a public hearing the referee appointed in 
this matter, Attorney John Fiorenza, concluded that Attorney 
Duchemin had not violated SCR 20:1.6; further, the referee 
recommended that the LRS's complaint against Attorney Duchemin 
be dismissed and that no costs be assessed against him.  Based 
on the undisputed facts as found by the referee, which we 
determine to be not clearly erroneous and which we therefore 
adopt, see In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 
WI 130 ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 675, 636 N.W.2d 718, we conclude 
that Attorney Duchemin's disclosures, which were the focus of 
the LRS's complaint, were impliedly authorized in order for him 
to carry out his then nascent representation of Jennifer Mayer.  
Accordingly, 
we 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
his 
recommendation, we dismiss the LRS complaint against Attorney 
Duchemin, and we absolve him of any costs in this matter.  
¶3 
Attorney James R. Duchemin was licensed to practice 
law in Wisconsin in 1970 and has never before been the subject 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.6 prohibits lawyers from revealing information 
related to the representation of a client to others without 
client consent after consultation, or unless such disclosure is 
impliedly 
authorized 
or 
otherwise 
required 
by 
the 
rule.  
Specifically, SCR 20:1.6(a) provides as follows: "(a) A lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a 
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for 
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation . . . ." 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
4 
 
of a disciplinary proceeding.  He practices law in Eau Claire 
where he primarily engages in family law and divorce work.   
¶4 
The referee heard the following testimony at a public 
hearing held on the LRS's disciplinary complaint against 
Attorney Duchemin and, based on the testimony, made several 
findings of fact.  
¶5 
Attorney Duchemin frequents a public restaurant near 
his office.  Jill Johnson has worked at that establishment for 
several years as a cook and she and Attorney Duchemin have been 
acquainted for approximately 11 years.  Sometime before August 
7, 2000, Johnson told her daughter, Jennifer Mayer, who was then 
experiencing marital difficulties, 
that 
she 
should 
retain 
Attorney Duchemin to represent her; Johnson recommended Attorney 
Duchemin to Jennifer as a "good lawyer" for her to hire.   
¶6 
On August 7, 2000, Attorney Duchemin encountered Jill 
Johnson at the restaurant.  Ms. Johnson asked Duchemin if he 
would mind speaking to her daughter, Jennifer, whom he did not 
know, about representing Jennifer in a possible divorce action.  
Attorney Duchemin told Ms. Johnson that he would "be happy to 
talk to her." 
¶7 
When Attorney Duchemin returned to his office he 
received a message asking him to call Jennifer Mayer who had 
just called seeking an appointment.  Attorney Duchemin returned 
Ms. Mayer's call and in their subsequent telephone conversation, 
Duchemin obtained certain preliminary information, including the 
fact that that morning Ms. Mayer's husband had an appointment 
with his lawyer to discuss the couple's marital difficulties.  
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
5 
 
Attorney Duchemin informed Ms. Mayer what his fees would be if 
she retained him and told her that he would send her a packet of 
information concerning his representation.  At the conclusion of 
that telephone conversation, Attorney Duchemin understood that 
Jennifer Mayer had not retained him, nor had she instructed him 
to start a divorce action on her behalf.  As he told her he 
would, Attorney Duchemin mailed Jennifer Mayer the packet of 
information and forms to complete, anticipating that she would 
schedule an appointment when she was ready to proceed and retain 
him to represent her in a divorce action. 
¶8 
During 
their 
five- 
to 
ten-minute 
telephone 
conversation, Jennifer Mayer told Attorney Duchemin that before 
and during the marriage, Jill Johnson had provided both Jennifer 
and her husband, Randy, with money to support the family's 
trucking business.  However, it was unclear to Attorney Duchemin 
from Ms. Mayer's report whether that money had been advanced by 
Jill Johnson as loans or as gifts.  Jennifer Mayer later 
testified that she asked Attorney Duchemin "if I brought it [the 
agreement the Mayers had with Ms. Johnson] in if he could look 
at it, because my mother had wanted me to ask him about it."  
Mayer also acknowledged in her testimony that both she and her 
mother were concerned about the money Ms. Johnson had provided 
and Jennifer Mayer agreed that she wanted her mother to be 
protected.  Jennifer Mayer later claimed, however, that she 
never told Attorney Duchemin that she wanted him to represent 
her in a divorce action, nor had she authorized him to file a 
divorce action for her.  She also asserted that she never told 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
6 
 
Attorney Duchemin that he should talk to her mother about the 
loans or gifts of money or anything else relating to a possible 
divorce between Ms. Mayer and her husband. 
¶9 
After his telephone conversation with Jennifer Mayer 
Attorney Duchemin later that day returned to the restaurant 
where he again spoke with Jill Johnson.  Attorney Duchemin told 
Ms. Johnson that her daughter had called him that morning.  
Attorney Duchemin then asked Ms. Johnson about the financial 
agreements she had with her daughter and son-in-law.  He asked 
Ms. Johnson if she had loaned or given the money to the couple; 
he also asked Ms. Johnson if she had any documentation 
concerning these transactions.  Attorney Duchemin told Ms. 
Johnson that she should, if she could, provide all the details 
and documentation about the money advances because it would be 
important if a divorce action were to be commenced.  
¶10 Attorney Duchemin acknowledged that he had not told 
Jennifer Mayer that he was going to talk to her mother about 
these money transactions and he also acknowledged that he had 
not been formally retained by Jennifer Mayer at that point.  
Attorney Duchemin asserted, however, that he believed he was 
authorized to discuss the issue of representation and the issue 
of finances with Jill Johnson because he needed to find out 
" . . . whether or not there were loans or gifts to this young 
lady if I was going to competently be able to assist her in her 
case and to do so in a timely manner."   
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
7 
 
¶11 Jennifer Mayer never returned the forms to Attorney 
Duchemin retaining him as her attorney.  Attorney Duchemin 
subsequently sent her a $90 bill for his services.  
¶12 Jennifer Mayer thereafter filed a grievance with the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
against 
Attorney 
Duchemin 
complaining that she had neither expressly nor impliedly 
authorized him to discuss any part of her telephone conversation 
with Duchemin with her mother.  Ms. Mayer admitted, however, 
that she knew that Attorney Duchemin and her mother were 
friends, and also that she knew her mother understood that Ms. 
Mayer was going to call Attorney Duchemin about representing her 
in 
a 
possible 
divorce 
action. 
 
Furthermore, 
Ms. 
Mayer 
acknowledged that she had told Attorney Duchemin that she was 
concerned that her mother be "protected" and that she did not 
want her husband to avoid repayment of the money to her mother. 
Jennifer Mayer also conceded that she had never told Attorney 
Duchemin 
not 
to 
tell 
her 
mother 
about 
the 
telephone 
conversation, nor had she instructed Attorney Duchemin not to 
talk to or ask her mother about the money transactions.  
¶13 The 
LRS 
complaint 
against 
Attorney 
Duchemin 
subsequently asserted that his conversation with Jill Johnson 
after his telephone conversation with Jennifer Mayer violated 
SCR 20:1.6 because Jennifer Mayer had not expressly authorized 
Attorney Duchemin to disclose to Ms. Johnson information related 
to Ms. Mayer's "possible retention of [Duchemin] relative to a 
divorce action . . . ."  The LRS complaint also alleged that the 
disclosure 
made 
by 
Duchemin 
to 
Ms. 
Johnson 
was 
not 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
8 
 
" . . . impliedly authorized as necessary to carry out the 
possible representation" nor was it made under circumstances 
permitted by SCR 20:1.6. 
¶14 As noted, after a public hearing, the referee issued 
his report detailing the facts as presented at the hearing and 
making specific findings of fact which, in pertinent part, 
state: 
 . . . . 
3. 
On August 7, 2000, Jill Johnson asked the 
Respondent 
[Attorney 
Duchemin] 
if 
he 
would 
represent her daughter and if he would talk to 
her concerning a divorce matter.  
4. 
That on August 7, 2000, Jennifer Mayer contacted 
the Respondent and left a message for him to call 
her back. 
5. 
That on August 7, 2000, the Respondent returned 
Mrs. Mayer's call and there was a discussion 
concerning a potential divorce case.  
6. 
That on August 7, 2000, the Respondent and 
Jennifer 
Mayer 
had 
a 
telephone 
conversation 
concerning the potential divorce case. 
7. 
That on August 7, 2000, Jill Johnson and the 
Respondent had a conversation at the restaurant 
at approximately 1:30 p.m. 
8. 
That the only other person in the restaurant at 
the time of the conversation between Jill Johnson 
and the Respondent was Larry Bryn.  
9. 
That Mr. Bryn did not hear any part of the 
conversation 
between 
Jill 
Johnson 
and 
the 
Respondent.  
10. That the Respondent asked Jill Johnson a question 
about the loans during that conversation. 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
9 
 
11. That 
the 
Respondent 
did 
not 
disclose 
any 
information which he obtained from Mrs. Mayer 
during their phone conversation.  
12. That during the conversation of August 7, 2000 
with Mrs. Johnson, the Respondent did not make 
any derogatory references to Randy Mayer.  
¶15 Based on these findings, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Duchemin did not violate SCR 20:1.6.  And as noted, the 
referee recommended that the complaint be dismissed and that no 
costs be assessed against Attorney Duchemin.   
¶16 The LRS's primary argument on its appeal is that 
Finding of Fact #11 to the effect that Attorney Duchemin had not 
disclosed any information he had obtained from Ms. Mayer during 
the phone conversation, is actually a conclusion of law; 
according to the LRS, that conclusion is erroneous as a matter 
of law because SCR 20:1.6 broadly proscribes disclosure of 
information "relating to representation."  The LRS maintains the 
rule does not proscribe disclosure of information "obtained from 
a client."  But see In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Harman, 2001 WI 71, 244 Wis. 2d 438, 628 N.W.2d 351, where the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation had alleged, the referee so found, 
and this court agreed that a lawyer had violated SCR 20.1.6(a) 
by disclosing information the lawyer had "obtained" while 
representing a client.  Id. at ¶¶2, 30, 33.  The LRS insists 
that because there was no express or implied authorization for 
any disclosure, Attorney Duchemin's admitted conversation with 
Jill Johnson after his telephone conversation with his potential 
client, Jennifer Mayer, constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.6(a) 
as a matter of law.  
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
10 
 
¶17 Moreover, according to the LRS, common sense suggests 
that until Jennifer Mayer decided to proceed with a divorce 
action with Attorney Duchemin representing her, Duchemin should 
not have disclosed any details of Ms. Mayer's contact with him 
to Jill Johnson even though Johnson had recommended Attorney 
Duchemin to her daughter as a good lawyer to represent her in a 
divorce action.  The LRS also maintains that by initiating a 
discussion with Jill Johnson about her financial agreements with 
her 
daughter 
and 
son-in-law, 
Attorney 
Duchemin 
revealed 
information to Jill Johnson about representation of a client.  
Therefore, the LRS insists that the referee erred as a matter of 
law in concluding that Attorney Duchemin's discussion with 
Johnson did not involve a disclosure within the meaning of SCR 
20:1.6(a).  Furthermore, the LRS asserts that based on the 
undisputed facts, there is no reasonable scenario under which it 
could be concluded that Jennifer Mayer had impliedly authorized 
the disclosure.  
¶18 We disagree.  We assume, for purposes of this opinion, 
that the conversation between Attorney Duchemin and Jennifer 
Mayer 
created 
a 
lawyer-prospective 
client 
relationship 
sufficient to subject Attorney Duchemin to the duties regarding 
client confidentiality set out in SCR 20:1.6.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS  § 15 (2000) at page 140, which 
notes that a lawyer must treat information disclosed by a 
prospective client as confidential even if the client or lawyer 
decides not to proceed with the representation.  We believe, 
however, that under the particular facts and circumstances of 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
11 
 
this case, Attorney Duchemin was impliedly authorized to discuss 
with Jill Johnson not only the fact that her daughter, as 
Johnson 
suggested, 
had 
contacted 
him 
about 
possible 
representation, but also to ask Johnson about documentation she 
may have regarding the money transactions she had with her 
daughter and son-in-law.  These facts, none challenged by the 
LRS on this review and none clearly erroneous include: (1) Jill 
Johnson recommended Duchemin as a good lawyer for her daughter 
to hire to represent her in a possible divorce; (2) Jill Johnson 
asked Duchemin, whom she had known for 11 years, if he would 
talk to her daughter about possible representation; (3) Jennifer 
Mayer in fact, as her mother urged, telephoned Duchemin about 
possibly representing her in the divorce action; (4) during that 
conversation Ms. Mayer told Duchemin that she wanted her mother 
"protected" with respect to the money her mother had advanced 
both before and during the marriage; (5) complying with her 
mother's request, Jennifer Mayer asked Duchemin if he would look 
at the agreement; and (6) Jennifer Mayer had not instructed 
Duchemin not to talk to her mother nor mention to her mother 
that Ms. Mayer had called him as her mother had suggested.   
¶19 We conclude under these circumstances that even though 
Attorney Duchemin had not been formally retained by Jennifer 
Mayer to represent her, any disclosures he may have made to Jill 
Johnson after his telephone conversation with her daughter, were 
at the very least, impliedly authorized so that he could carry 
out his then pending representation of Ms. Mayer.  We conclude 
under these particular facts and circumstances that Attorney 
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
12 
 
Duchemin was impliedly authorized to discuss the matter with 
Jill Johnson.  Accordingly, we adopt the referee's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and we accept the referee's 
recommendation that this proceeding be dismissed without costs. 
¶20 IT IS ORDERED that this disciplinary proceeding is 
dismissed without costs.  
¶21 JON P. WILCOX, J. did not participate.  
No. 
01-2227-D   
 
 
 
1