Title: Ex parte Berry Stephens.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190457
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 28, 2020

REL: August 28, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1190457
____________________
Ex parte Berry Stephens
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Berry Stephens
v.
Pauline Youngblood)
(Coffee Circuit Court, CV-19-65)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
Berry Stephens ("Stephens") petitions for a writ of
mandamus directing the Coffee Circuit Court to appoint him
1190457
administrator ad litem of the estate of his mother, Louise
Gennuso.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
I.  Facts
In the 1990s Gennuso opened two accounts with Army
Aviation Federal Credit Union ("the credit union"); Gennuso
was the sole owner of those accounts.  On September 29, 2006,
Gennuso executed a will.  The primary beneficiaries under the
will were Gennuso's two sons -- Stephens and Stephen Stephens. 
Gennuso's niece, Pauline Youngblood ("Youngblood"), was also
a beneficiary under the will; she was to receive $20,000.  The
will noted that, at the time of its execution, Gennuso held
seven promissory notes given to her in exchange for loans she
had made to Youngblood and her husband Dan Youngblood that
totaled $695,000.  Under the terms of Gennuso's will, $100,000
of the loan amount was to be paid to her estate at the time of
Gennuso's death, $100,000 more would be due six months after
her death, and the loans were to be completely paid off,
including interest, by the time Youngblood died.  The will
further provided that, at Gennuso's death, Gennuso's sons
would be entitled to the principal and interest owing from
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those promissory notes.  The will named Youngblood as personal
representative of Gennuso's estate. 
On July 10, 2013, Gennuso, who was then 83, was admitted
to Wiregrass Medical Center ("WMC") for combative and
uncooperative behavior while she had been a physical-therapy
patient at Enterprise Health and Rehab.  Youngblood, who was
living with Gennuso, accompanied Gennuso to WMC.  During
Gennuso's stay at WMC, she was diagnosed with dementia that
included "moderate to severe cognitive impairment."  Medical
records from WMC state that Gennuso had "little family
involvement.  She has one son [Stephens] that is somewhat
involved with her care.  Her other son [Stephen] is not
involved at all with her care.  Both sons were in agreement
that her niece, Pauline Youngblood, have [power of 
attorney]." 
Youngblood related to WMC personnel that Gennuso "'has no
friends and no one likes her,'" and she also claimed that
Gennuso 
"has 
'two 
personalities.'"  
A 
psychological 
evaluation
of Gennuso on July 17, 2013, concluded that Gennuso's
"[t]hought process 
is 
generally 
disorganized," that 
she 
"tends
to be generally delusional," that her "[a]ttention span and
concentration were poor," and that her "[i]nsight and 
judgment
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were poor."  The medical records indicated that Gennuso's
family members had decided to place Gennuso in a skilled long-
term nursing-home facility upon her discharge from WMC 
because
Youngblood could no longer provide Gennuso with the level of
care she required, given Gennuso's condition.
On September 30, 2014, Youngblood accompanied Gennuso to
the credit union and they executed documents to change
Gennuso's two accounts into joint accounts with a right of
survivorship naming both Gennuso and Youngblood as owners.  At
that time, one of those accounts had a balance of
approximately $465,000; the other account had a balance of
approximately $152,000. Youngblood had her own account with
the credit union. At that time, Youngblood's account had a
balance of $909.70.  Gennuso contributed all the funds to the
two joint accounts; Youngblood contributed no  funds to those
accounts.
On September 20, 2015, Gennuso died at the age of 86 from
chronic obstructive pulmonary lung disease.  Within one month
of her death, Youngblood withdrew nearly all the funds from
the two joint accounts and deposited the funds into
Youngblood's personal account.  In October 2015, the joint
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account that had had an initial balance of approximately
$465,000 showed a balance of $1,000.  The joint account that
had had an initial balance of approximately $152,000 showed a
balance of $5,000.  The balance of Youngblood's account at the
credit union had increased $418,000.
On March 7, 2016, Youngblood filed in the Coffee Probate
Court a "Petition for Probate of Will" that declared that
Gennuso's sole heirs were Stephens and Stephen Stephens and
that the will named Youngblood as personal representative of
the estate.  Both of Gennuso's sons submitted to the probate
court waivers agreeing that the will should be admitted to
probate.  On March 9, 2016, the probate court entered an order
admitting the will to probate and granting Youngblood letters
testamentary as personal representative of Gennuso's estate. 
On February 11, 2019, Stephens filed in the Coffee Circuit
Court a "Petition for Removal of Estate" seeking removal of
Gennuso's estate to the circuit court.  On June 14, 2019, the
circuit court entered an order removing Gennuso's estate from
the probate court to the circuit court.
On June 14, 2019, Stephens filed a "Motion for
Appointment of Administrator Ad Litem" in which he asserted
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that he had recently discovered that Youngblood had
transferred funds from the joint accounts she and Gennuso held
at the credit union into Youngblood's personal account before
Youngblood had filed the petition to probate the will.  He
contended in the motion that the transferred funds were
intended to be part of Gennuso's estate, that Youngblood had
taken advantage of Gennuso's mental state in September 2014
when she had Gennuso change her accounts at the credit union
to joint accounts with a right of survivorship in the names of
both Gennuso and Youngblood, that Youngblood had wrongfully
withdrawn nearly all the funds from the two joint accounts
immediately following 
Gennuso's 
death, 
and 
that 
Youngblood, as
personal representative of the estate, had a conflict of
interest.  Stephens further argued that § 43-2-250, Ala. Code
1975, mandated the appointment of an administrator ad litem
under such circumstances and that the circuit court should
appoint Stephens to that position.  Along with the motion,
Stephens submitted an affidavit asserting that he 
had 
personal
knowledge of Gennuso's mental state and detailing what had
occurred with the funds in her accounts at the credit union. 
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On July 11, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on
Stephens's motion.  On August 21, 2019, because the circuit
court had not ruled on the motion, Stephens filed a "Motion
for Ruling on Administrator Ad Litem Motion" that requested
action by the circuit court on his earlier motion.  On
September 3, 2019, Youngblood filed a "Response in Opposition
to 'Motion for Ruling on Administrator Ad Litem Motion.'"  In
her filing, Youngblood asserted that Stephens's only support
for his motion to have an administrator ad litem appointed was
his 
"unsubstantiated affidavit" 
alleging 
that 
Gennuso 
had 
been
diagnosed with a "severe cognitive impairment."  Youngblood
admitted to transferring funds from the joint accounts to her
personal account but contended that 
"[a]n examination of the face of those bank records
reveal[s] a perfectly normal transaction between the
Credit Union, [Gennuso], and Youngblood, which
accounts operated to transfer money in them to
Youngblood upon the death of Gennuso outside the
estate of Gennuso, and, contrary to the claim of
[Stephens] in his Motion, he has not presented to
this Court any admissible evidence otherwise."
On September 24, 2019, Stephens filed a "Reply to
Youngblood['s] Opposition" in which he again contended that
the facts related in his affidavit were based on personal
knowledge.  In addition, Stephens attached to that filing
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copies of bank-statement records from the credit union showing
the balances and transfers from the pertinent joint accounts
to Youngblood's personal account. On November 14, 2019,
Stephens filed a second "Motion for Ruling on Administrator
Ad Litem Motion," again seeking a ruling from the circuit
court.
On November 15, 2019, Youngblood filed a "Motion to
Strike and Renewed Objection to Motion for Administrator
Ad Litem."  In that filing, Youngblood requested that the
circuit court strike Stephens's affidavit on the ground that
the affidavit lacked any admissible supporting evidence that
Gennuso had been diagnosed in July 2013 with a "severe
cognitive impairment."  Youngblood additionally argued that
Stephens
"was 
not 
present 
at 
the 
Credit 
Union 
on
September 30, 2014 when Gennuso created the two
joint accounts with Youngblood, did not observe
Gennuso on that occasion, has not presented any
statement from any other witness who did observe
Gennuso on that occasion, and therefore, he could
not possibly know what Gennuso's condition was on
that exact occasion when she signed the account
forms at the Credit Union."
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Youngblood attached to that filing copies of the documents
from the credit union establishing the joint accounts in
September 2014.  Youngblood also asserted in that filing:
"Pursuant to the language in the joint account
creating documents signed by Gennuso and Youngblood
and approved by the Credit Union, Youngblood could
have taken all of the money out of the accounts at
any time but did not do so until after the death of
Gennuso.  Since those were 'survivorship accounts,'
the survivor, Youngblood, had every legal right to
take the money out of them after Gennuso died on
September 20, 2015.  Due to the operation of the
survivorship provision contained in the account
documents, the funds in the accounts passed directly
to Youngblood under Alabama law and did not pass to
or through Gennuso’s estate."
On January 13, 2020, Stephens filed a "Reply to
Youngblood['s] Motion to Strike."  Stephens noted in that
filing that he was attaching Gennuso's medical records from
WMC that he had obtained pursuant to a subpoena.  The
highlights from those medical records have already been
related at the outset of this rendition of the facts. 
Stephens contended that the medical records were admissible
under the Alabama Rules of Evidence and that his personal
observations 
about 
Gennuso's 
condition 
were 
likewise
admissible.  Stephens also reiterated his position that
§ 43-2-250 mandated the appointment of an administrator
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ad litem under the circumstances presented to the circuit
court.
On January 24, 2020, the circuit court entered an order
denying Stephens's motion for the appointment of an
administrator ad litem.  The order expressly stated that
"[t]he Court, however, reserves its right to appoint an
administrator ad litem in the future."  On March 5, 2020,
Stephens filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.
II.  Standard of Review
"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."
Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995). 
The circuit court's order refusing to appoint an
administrator ad litem is an interlocutory order, not
susceptible to review by appeal.  Moreover, Stephens
persuasively 
argues 
that 
waiting 
until 
the 
estate
administration is final to seek review of the circuit court's
order denying his motion to have an administrator ad litem
appointed is not an adequate remedy given:  (1) the length of
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1190457
time that has already transpired with the administration of
this estate, (2) the fact that the funds in question allegedly
constitute the bulk of Gennuso's assets, and (3) the fact that
Youngblood could dissipate those assets at any time.  This
Court has permitted mandamus review of similar rulings by
circuit courts.  See Ex parte Adams, 168 So. 3d 40, 46 (Ala.
2014) (concluding that the petitioner, the coexecutor of the
estate, had "a clear legal right to have [the testator's son]
removed as coexecutor," but ultimately denying the mandamus
petition because the circuit court had not yet ruled on the
petitioner's motion to remove the testator's son as
coexecutor).  Consequently, we conclude that a petition for a
writ of mandamus is the appropriate avenue for review of the
circuit court's order denying Stephens's motion seeking the
appointment of an administrator ad litem.
III.  Analysis
Stephens 
contends 
that 
§ 
43-2-250 
requires 
the
appointment 
of 
an 
administrator 
ad 
litem 
under 
the
circumstances presented in this case.  Section 43-2-250
provides:
"When, in any proceeding in any court, the
estate of a deceased person must be represented, and
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there is no executor or administrator of such
estate, or he is interested adversely thereto, it
shall be the duty of the court to appoint an
administrator ad litem of such estate for the
particular proceeding, without bond, whenever the
facts rendering such appointment necessary shall
appear in the record of such case or shall be made
known to the court by the affidavit of any person
interested therein."
(Emphasis added.)  In Ex parte Riley, 247 Ala. 242, 250, 23
So. 2d 592, 599 (1945), this Court explained the three
requirements of § 43-2-250:
"Under the statute three things must concur to
justify the appointment: (1) The estate of the
deceased person 'must be represented,' which means
that 
the 
interests 
of 
the 
estate 
require
representation. (2) 'There is no executor or
administrator of such estate, or he is interested
adversely thereto.' (3) 'The facts rendering such
appointment necessary shall appear in the record of
such case, or shall be made known to the court by
the affidavit of any person interested therein.'"
Stephens argues that he has met all three requirements
under § 43-2-250 because the interests of Gennuso's estate had
to 
be 
represented, 
Youngblood's 
personal 
interests 
are 
adverse
to the interests of the estate, and he presented facts making
known Youngblood's adverse interests in the form of Gennuso's
medical records from WMC and bank statements from the credit
union.  Stephens explains that he believes it is clear in this
case that Youngblood has 
interests adverse to Gennuso's estate
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because, he says, she is in personal possession of funds that
he says belong to the estate, as evidenced by the large funds
transfers from the two joint accounts to 
Youngblood's personal
account.  Stephens adds that the creation of the joint
accounts was contrary to the terms of the will with respect to
the amount of money Youngblood owed Gennuso, which raises
doubt about the propriety of that transaction.  Stephens
further contends that he has produced evidence indicating that
Youngblood exerted undue influence upon Gennuso before her
death to obtain the funds that were originally held in
accounts 
controlled 
solely 
by 
Gennuso. 
 
Specifically, Stephens
asserts that, at the time Youngblood accompanied Gennuso to
the credit union in September 2014 to set up the two joint
accounts with a right of survivorship, Gennuso had been
diagnosed with dementia that indicated severe cognitive
impairment, as evidenced by the medical records from WMC that
he produced.
Stephens notes that, although normally no inquiry can be
made regarding the ownership of a joint-survivorship account
that is clear upon its creation, that is not the case if there
is evidence of undue influence upon, or a competency issue
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regarding, one of the owners.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Sims, 501
So. 2d 453, 457 (Ala. 1986) (observing that Alabama law
"preclude[s] post-death inquiries into the ownership of funds
in a joint savings and loan account, 'absent allegations of
fraud, duress, mistake, incompetency or undue influence'"
(quoting Hines v. Carr, 372 So. 2d 13, 14 (Ala. 1979)));
Campbell v. Colonial Bank, 678 So. 2d 189, 191 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996) (explaining that, "if an instrument is unambiguous and
complete on its face regarding survivorship status, no reason
exists to allow extrinsic evidence to contradict these
findings, absent allegations of fraud, duress, mistake,
incompetency, or undue influence").  
Stephens draws parallels between this case and McCollough
v. Rogers, 431 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. 1983).  In McCollough, the
defendant at trial, Willie B. McCollough, worked and cared for
Mary Lee Rogers, an elderly woman, for two years.  During that
period, Rogers was hospitalized twice for serious conditions,
including a stroke.  In the second year, McCollough
accompanied Rogers to a bank at which Rogers had an existing
account, and they opened a joint account with a right of
survivorship naming both McCollough and Rogers as owners. 
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McCollough began withdrawing funds from the joint account
shortly before Rogers's death, and she withdrew the remainder
of the funds shortly after Rogers's death.  An heir of Rogers,
Christine Rogers, sued McCollough regarding ownership of the
funds that were formerly in the joint account.  After an
ore tenus trial, the trial court awarded the funds to
Christine Rogers.  McCollough appealed, contending that there
was insufficient evidence of a confidential relationship and
that she had overcome the presumption of undue influence. 
After noting that "undue influence or incompetency could be
made a defense to a property disposition like the one before
us," 431 So. 2d at 1248, this Court explained:
"'The 
law 
presumes 
the
exercise of undue influence in
transactions inter vivos where
confidential 
relations 
exist
between the parties, and puts
upon the donee or grantee, when
shown to be the dominant party in
the 
relation, 
the 
burden 
of
repelling 
the 
presumption 
by
competent 
and 
satisfactory
evidence.  [Citations omitted.]'
[(Quoting Webb v. Webb, 250 Ala.
194, 203, 33 So. 2d 909, 915
(1948), quoted with approval in
McEniry v. Coats, 333 So. 2d 568,
570-71 (Ala. 1976).)]
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"Thus, in order to establish the presumption of
undue influence, a confidential relationship must be
shown to have existed. Such a relationship may
spring from 'those multiform positions in life
wherein one comes to rely upon and trust another in
his important affairs.'  Raney v. Raney, 216 Ala.
30, 34, 112 So. 313, 316 (1927), and so that kind of
relationship could have arisen between Mrs. Rogers
and Mrs. McCollough in this instance.  Once that was
established it was incumbent upon the plaintiff here
to establish that Mrs. McCollough was the dominant
party in that relationship."
Id.  The McCollough Court concluded that the record supported
the existence of a confidential relationship and that it was
a question of fact, left to the trial court's judgment, as to
whether McCollough had overcome the presumption of undue
influence.  
Stephens asserts that, as in McCollough, because he has
introduced evidence indicating that in September 2014 Gennuso
was not of sound mind and because Youngblood had been caring
for Gennuso and held her power of attorney, a presumption of
undue influence arises that calls into doubt Youngblood's
right to the funds that were in the two joint accounts she
shared with Gennuso.  Because of the possibility that those
funds were assets belonging to the estate, Stephens contends
that Youngblood's interests are clearly adverse to the
interests of the estate.  Accordingly, Stephens argues, §
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43-2-250 mandates that an administrator ad litem should have
been appointed by the circuit court. 
Youngblood presented two arguments below in response to
Stephens.1  First, she argued that documents from the credit
union concerning the creation of the joint accounts showed
that it was "a perfectly normal transaction between the Credit
Union, [Gennuso,] and Youngblood."  But those documents shed
no light on the condition of Gennuso's mental faculties at the
time the joint accounts were opened.  Thus, Youngblood's only
pertinent argument was her contention that Stephens's
affidavit should be stricken because, she says, it was not
based on personal knowledge or evidence with respect to the
accusation that Gennuso had been diagnosed with "severe
cognitive impairment" in July 2013.  We have nothing before us
indicating that the circuit court ruled on 
Youngblood's motion
to strike Stephens's affidavit.  In any event, Stephens
eventually supported his assertion with respect to Gennuso's
mental state with medical records from WMC obtained through a
subpoena.  The medical records corroborated the statements in
Stephens's affidavit, and Youngblood did not file a response
1Youngblood did not file a respondent's brief with this
Court.
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to Stephens's submission of the medical records.  Thus,
Youngblood's arguments below did not weaken in any way the
case presented by Stephens for the appointment of an
administrator ad litem.  
In her filings below, Youngblood openly admitted
transferring nearly all the funds in the joint accounts held
at the credit union to her personal account immediately after
Gennuso's death.  She contended that her actions were
perfectly permissible, but she did not counter Stephens's
evidence of Gennuso's mental capacity at the time the joint
accounts were opened or the presumption of undue influence
that could arise from such facts.  Accordingly, the facts
showed that Youngblood, the personal representative of
Gennuso's estate, had an interest adverse to the estate. 
Therefore, under § 43-2-250, the circuit court had a duty to
appoint an administrator ad litem for the estate, but it
failed to do so. See, e.g., Loving v. Wilson, 494 So. 2d 68,
70 (Ala. 1986) (observing that, "[s]ince all of the elements
necessary to require an appointment of an administrator ad
litem are present, it was error for the trial court not to
appoint one for each of the estates"); Cannon v. Birmingham
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Tr. & Sav. Co., 212 Ala. 316, 319, 102 So. 453, 456 (1924)
(stating that an identical predecessor statute to § 43-2-250
"makes it the duty of the court, in any proceeding where the
personal 
representative is 
interested 
adversely to 
the 
estate,
to appoint an administrator ad litem").
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for the
writ of mandamus, and we direct the circuit court to appoint
Stephens as administrator ad litem for the estate of Gennuso.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers,
Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
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