Title: State v. Galaviz-Torres
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 249PA14
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 11, 2015

NO. COA14-549 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 18 November 2014 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
T.L.H. 
 
Guilford County 
No. 13 JT 59 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by respondent mother from order entered 4 February 
2014 by Judge Tabatha Holliday in Guilford County District 
Court.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 October 2014. 
 
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
 
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Sye T. Hickey, for 
guardian ad litem. 
 
 
ELMORE, Judge. 
 
 
Respondent mother appeals from the trial court’s order 
terminating 
her 
parental 
rights 
to 
the 
juvenile 
T.L.H.  
Respondent contends the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to inquire into whether it was necessary to appoint her 
a guardian ad litem (GAL), when the allegations supporting 
termination of her rights were focused on her serious mental 
health disorders.  We reverse the order terminating respondent’s 
-2- 
 
 
parental rights and remand for a hearing to determine whether 
respondent requires a GAL. 
I. 
Background 
In addition to the juvenile T.L.H., who was born in 2013, 
respondent has two older children who were removed from her 
care.  The Guilford County Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) became involved with this juvenile at the time 
of the juvenile’s birth, after respondent informed the hospital 
that she had no place to take the juvenile and a hospital 
psychiatrist evaluated respondent and determined the juvenile 
would not be safe with her.  Respondent has a substance abuse 
history and is schizophrenic.  According to DHHS, respondent 
“has a history of substance abuse and has diagnoses of 
schizophrenia, chronic paranoid type, chronically noncompliant, 
marijuana dependence, personality disorder,” and DHHS stated it 
needed to “rule out borderline intellectual functioning.”  
Respondent requested that DHHS “take custody of [the juvenile] 
until [respondent] could obtain her own housing and other things 
needed for her and her baby.”   
On 12 April 2013, DHHS filed a petition alleging the 
juvenile was neglected and dependent, and the juvenile was 
placed in non-secure custody.  The petition alleged that 
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respondent had “a substance abuse history and is schizophrenic 
and has poor mental health compliance;” respondent had two 
children removed from her care due to substance abuse, domestic 
violence and her unresolved mental health issues; and respondent 
was hospitalized on several occasions in the past year due to 
mental health complications. 
Deputy County Attorney Robert W. Brown, III requested that 
the trial court appoint respondent a GAL at an 18 April 2013 
hearing to determine the need for the continued nonsecure 
custody of the juvenile.  Judge Betty Brown (Judge Brown) 
appointed attorney Amy Bullock as respondent’s GAL on that date.  
Judge Brown did not indicate whether the GAL was appointed in a 
substitutive capacity or an assistive capacity.  The trial court 
dismissed the neglect allegation but adjudicated the juvenile 
dependent in an order entered 5 June 2013.  The order also 
relieved DHHS of the duty to make reasonable efforts toward 
reunification, although it permitted DHHS to continue to make 
such efforts. 
The matter came on for a permanency planning hearing on 11 
July 2013, and respondent testified at the hearing.  The trial 
court changed the permanent plan for the juvenile to adoption.  
On 9 September 2013, DHHS filed a petition to terminate the 
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parental rights of respondent and the juvenile’s unidentified 
father.  As grounds for termination of respondent’s rights, the 
petition 
alleged: 
(1) 
neglect; 
(2) 
dependency; 
and 
(3) 
respondent’s rights to another child had previously been 
terminated and she lacked the ability to establish a safe home.  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1, 6, 9) (2013).  A pretrial 
hearing was conducted before Judge Thomas Jarrell (Judge 
Jarrell), following which Judge Jarrell entered an order on 19 
November 2013 stating:  “Attorney Amy Bullock was released by 
operation of law effective October 1, 2013 as [respondent’s] 
guardian ad litem attorney of assistance.”  Respondent proceeded 
in this matter without the assistance of a GAL.  The case came 
on for a termination hearing on 6 January 2014.  Respondent was 
not present for the hearing, and her attorney made a motion to 
continue on her behalf.  According to the attorney, he had been 
unable to send respondent notice of the hearing because she had 
moved and DHHS had not provided him with her new address.  The 
attorney had sent correspondence to respondent’s former address 
in November and December of 2013.  DHHS contended that a social 
worker had informed respondent of the termination hearing date 
and that respondent had not been present for any court dates 
since the July permanency planning hearing.  The trial court 
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denied the motion to continue, and terminated respondent’s 
parental rights based on all three grounds alleged in the 
petition.  The trial court’s order also terminated the parental 
rights of the juvenile’s unidentified father.  Respondent 
appeals. 
II. Appointment of GAL 
In her sole argument on appeal, respondent contends the 
trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an 
inquiry into whether it was necessary to appoint her a guardian 
ad litem.  We agree. 
In 2013, our General Assembly enacted amendments to Article 
11 of the Juvenile code that apply to all proceedings occurring 
on or after 1 October 2013.  2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, §§ 32, 
42.   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1(c) no longer allows the trial 
court to appoint a GAL for a parent with diminished capacity.  
Instead, subsection (c) specifies:  “On motion of any party or 
on the court’s own motion, the court may appoint a guardian ad 
litem for a parent who is incompetent in accordance with G.S. 
1A-1, Rule 17.”  As such, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1 now 
contemplates the appointment of a GAL only for the substitution 
for a parent who is incompetent in accordance with N.C. Gen. 
Stat. 1A-1, Rule 17.   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1 (2013). 
-6- 
 
 
In line with this amendment is the well-settled rule that 
“[a] trial judge has a duty to properly inquire into the 
competency of a litigant in a civil trial or proceeding when 
circumstances are brought to the judge’s attention, which raise 
a substantial question as to whether the litigant is non compos 
mentis.”  In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 72, 623 S.E.2d 45, 49 
(2005).  “Whether the circumstances . . . are sufficient to 
raise a substantial question as to the party’s competency is a 
matter to be initially determined in the sound discretion of the 
trial judge.”  Id. (citation and quotation omitted).  Thus, 
although 
a 
dependency 
allegation 
no 
longer 
automatically 
triggers appointment of a GAL, allegations of mental health 
problems that raise a question regarding a parent’s competence 
require the trial court to inquire into whether a GAL need be 
appointed.  In re N.A.L., 193 N.C. App. 114, 118-19, 666 S.E.2d 
768, 771-72 (2008).  This Court has recently explained the 
process 
which 
must 
be 
followed 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
appointment of a parental guardian ad litem pursuant to N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1(c) as follows: 
[T]he trial court . . . must conduct a 
hearing in accordance with the procedures 
required under [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1,] 
Rule 17 in order to determine whether there 
is a reasonable basis for believing that a 
parent is incompetent or has diminished 
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capacity and cannot adequately act in his or 
her own interest.  If the court chooses to 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
to 
appoint 
[a 
guardian ad litem] under N.C. Gen. Stat § 
7B-1101.1(c), then the trial court must 
specify 
the 
prong 
under 
which 
it 
is 
proceeding, 
including 
findings 
of 
fact 
supporting its decision, and specify the 
role that the [guardian ad litem] should 
play, 
whether 
one 
of 
substitution 
or 
assistance.  
 
In re P.D.R., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 737 S.E.2d 152, 159 
(2012). There is no record evidence that Judge Brown conducted a 
hearing to determine in what capacity respondent’s GAL would 
serve.  In the present case, “the record clearly reflects that 
the trial court failed to delineate the precise role to be 
played by Respondent-Mother’s guardian ad litem during the 
termination proceeding as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1101.1(c).”  In re B.P., ___, N.C. App. ___, 748 S.E.2d 773, 
2013 WL 3379659 at *7 (2013).  Though Judge Jarrell indicated 
that he believed respondent’s GAL was serving in an assistive 
capacity, there is no record evidence that he conducted any 
hearing before making the determination.  We believe B.D. and 
P.D.R. required that he do so before removing respondent’s GAL.   
To illustrate the effect of the amendment, we look to an 
unpublished opinion recently authored in this Court, In re H.B., 
762 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).   In re H.B., the respondent-
-8- 
 
 
mother argued that the trial court erred in failing to inquire 
as to whether she needed a GAL based on the fact that the trial 
court had before it evidence of her diminished capacity and 
because, at the time of the termination hearing, N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 7B-1101.1(c) (2011) authorized the appointment of a GAL based 
on evidence of incompetency and/or diminished capacity.  This 
Court noted that, as amended, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1, 
applied to any future proceedings occurring on or after 1 
October 2013. Id.  Given that the termination order was entered 
after the amendment date, we held that the record must have 
shown evidence of incompetency to require the trial court to 
consider whether to appoint a GAL in the cause.  Because there 
was no such evidence in the record and because DHHS did not 
allege dependency as a ground for terminating the respondent’s 
parental rights, we concluded the trial court did not err.  Id. 
In In re N.A.L., the juvenile petition alleged that the 
juveniles were dependent and that the respondent-mother was 
“incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of 
the minor child” because of her “problems in controlling her 
anger outbursts; her significant tendency to be aggressive 
towards 
others, 
including 
her 
child; 
and 
her 
lack 
of 
understanding of her prior neglect of the minor child.”  N.A.L., 
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193 N.C. App. at 118-19, 666 S.E.2d at 771.  Further, the 
respondent was also diagnosed as having Personality Disorder NOS 
and Borderline Intellectual Functioning.  Id.  In the order 
terminating the respondent’s parental rights, the trial court 
found that she “has significant mental health issues which 
impact her ability to parent this child and meet his needs.”  
Id. at 119, 666 S.E.2d at 771.  Despite DHHS’s allegations and 
its own findings of mental health issues, the trial court did 
not inquire whether the appointment of a GAL was appropriate.   
On appeal, the respondent-mother argued, and we agreed, that the 
trial 
court 
should 
have 
“properly 
inquired 
into” 
the 
respondent’s competency pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 
17 to determine whether she was a candidate for the appointment 
of a GAL.  Id. at 119, 666 S.E.2d at 771-72.  
Here, respondent challenges the trial court’s failure to 
inquire into her need for a GAL based on the evidence of her 
incompetency and the DHHS petition alleged dependency as a 
ground for termination.  As in In re N.A.L., the allegations 
against 
respondent 
in 
this 
case 
partly 
revolve 
around 
respondent’s multiple, serious mental health conditions.  DHHS 
alleged that respondent had schizophrenia, had poor mental 
health compliance, and was not taking her medication.  A 
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hospital psychiatrist evaluated respondent and determined that 
“there was no way this newborn child can be safe with this 
mother.”  DHHS also noted that respondent’s parental rights to 
her two other biological children were terminated, in part, due 
to her unresolved mental health issues.  In the petition to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights filed 9 September 2013, 
DHHS requested that the trial court make an inquiry to determine 
whether 
a 
guardian 
was 
necessary 
to 
proceed 
with 
the 
termination.  There is no indication in the record, however, 
that the trial court ever made such an inquiry at the 
termination stage.  The petition also noted that respondent’s 
mental illness was one of the facts that led to the juvenile’s 
removal to DHHS custody, and that respondent received Social 
Security benefits based on her mental health diagnoses. 
In the termination order, the trial court made the 
following findings of fact: 
16. The mother has been diagnosed with 
Bipolar 
Disorder, 
Schizophrenia, 
Schizo-
Affective Disorder, and Narcolepsy.  The 
mother also has a long history of failing 
and refusing to take her mental health 
medications as prescribed and recommended.  
As a result of the Narcolepsy, the mother 
falls asleep unexpectedly and may remain 
asleep for hours.  The mother has also been 
diagnosed with Cannabis Dependence, has a 
long history of the same, tested positive 
for Marijuana, and failed to submit to a 
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substance abuse assessment as requested. 
 
. . . . 
 
26. The mother’s mental illness, consistent 
refusal 
to 
comply 
with 
mental 
health 
medications, 
narcolepsy, 
and 
[Cannabis] 
Dependence render the mother incapable of 
providing proper care and supervision of the 
juvenile, such that the juvenile is a 
dependent juvenile within the meaning of 
N.C.G.S. 
§ 
7B-101. 
 
These 
conditions 
contributed to the juvenile being removed 
from 
the 
home 
and 
the 
dependency 
adjudication on May 16, 2013.  The mother’s 
long history of the same conditions despite 
[DHHS] 
intervention 
in 
2000 
and 
2004 
evidences a reasonable probability that such 
incapability 
will 
continue 
for 
the 
foreseeable future. The mother has failed to 
come forward with an appropriate alternative 
child care arrangement. 
 
Given the serious nature of respondent’s multiple ongoing mental 
health 
conditions, 
the 
trial 
court’s 
reliance 
on 
those 
conditions to support grounds to terminate her parental rights, 
and the probable impact of respondent’s mental health status on 
her ability to participate in the proceedings, we believe the 
record demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion 
by failing to conduct an inquiry into respondent’s competency 
and the need for a guardian ad litem.  See In re N.A.L., 193 
N.C. App. at 119, 666 S.E.2d at 772 (trial court erred by 
failing to make inquiry in light of evidence raising issues of 
-12- 
 
 
respondent’s competence).  There was evidence before Judge Brown 
which could reasonably have allowed her to appoint the GAL in a 
substitutive capacity, but Judge Brown failed to make the 
determinations required by P.D.R., supra.  There is no record 
evidence that Judge Jarrell conduced a hearing pursuant to 
P.D.R.  In light of this evidence, we remand for the purpose of 
determining respondent’s “need for a GAL and the proper role of 
that GAL.”  P.D.R., ___, N.C. App. at ___, 737 S.E.2d at 159, 
and “conducting any additional proceedings that might be needed 
dependent upon the determination made at that time.”  B.P., ___ 
N.C. App. at ___, 748 S.E.2d 773, ___, 2013 WL 3379659 at *7.  
Accordingly, we reverse the termination order as to respondent, 
and remand for a hearing for the trial court to determine 
whether respondent is in need of a GAL. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Chief Judge McGEE concurs. 
Judge HUNTER, Robert C., dissents by separate opinion.
NO. COA14-549 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 18 November 2014 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
T.L.H. 
 
Guilford County 
No. 13 JT 59 
 
 
 
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., dissenting. 
 
 
Because I believe that the record shows that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to inquire as to 
respondent’s competency at the termination hearing, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
“On motion of any party or on the court’s own motion, the 
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent who is 
incompetent in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17.”  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 7B-1101.1(c) (2013).  Although the statute formerly 
allowed the trial court to appoint a GAL for a parent who was 
incompetent or had diminished capacity, it was amended in 
October 2013 to delete language permitting appointment of GALs 
for parents who have diminished capacity.  The statute now only 
allows appointment of a GAL for incompetent parents.  An 
incompetent adult: 
[L]acks sufficient capacity to manage the 
adult’s 
own 
affairs 
or 
to 
make 
or 
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communicate important decisions concerning 
the adult’s person, family, or property 
whether the lack of capacity is due to 
mental 
illness, 
mental 
retardation, 
epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, 
senility, disease, injury, or similar cause 
or condition. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7) (2013). 
“A trial judge has a duty to properly inquire into the 
competency of a litigant in a civil trial or proceeding when 
circumstances are brought to the judge’s attention, which raise 
a substantial question as to whether the litigant is non compos 
mentis.”  In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 72, 623 S.E.2d 45, 49 
(2005).  “Whether the circumstances . . . are sufficient to 
raise a substantial question as to the party’s competency is a 
matter to be initially determined in the sound discretion of the 
trial judge.”  Id.  “A ruling committed to a trial court’s 
discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset 
only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not 
have been the result of a reasoned decision.”  In re A.R.D., 204 
N.C. App. 500, 504, 694 S.E.2d 508, 511, aff’d per curiam, 364 
N.C. 596, 704 S.E.2d 510 (2010). 
Previously, a trial court was required to appoint a GAL 
when the petition alleged dependency as a ground to terminate 
the parent’s rights.  In re J.D., 164 N.C. App. 176, 180, 605 
-3- 
 
 
S.E.2d 643, 645, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 732, 601 S.E.2d 
531 (2004).  However, a dependency allegation no longer 
automatically 
triggers 
appointment 
of 
a 
GAL, 
although 
allegations of mental health problems may still require the 
trial court to inquire into appointment of a GAL.  In re N.A.L., 
193 N.C. App. 114, 118-19, 666 S.E.2d 768, 771-72 (2008). 
On appeal, respondent contends that the “trial court . . . 
had a duty to properly inquire whether [respondent] was 
incompetent, and required the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem.  The trial court’s failure to conduct such an inquiry is 
an 
abuse 
of 
discretion 
and 
requires 
reversal.” 
 
Citing 
respondent’s 
mental 
illness 
and 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
treatment, respondent alleges that there was a substantial 
question as to respondent’s competency.  For the following 
reasons, I disagree. 
To resolve whether the trial court abused its discretion, I 
believe it is necessary to detail the procedural history of the 
case prior to the termination stage.   Based on the allegations 
in the juvenile petition filed 12 April 2013, the trial court 
appointed Amy Bullock as respondent’s provisional GAL at the 
first hearing on the petition.  At the time, the trial court 
exercised its then-existing authority under section 7B-1101.1(c) 
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to appoint a GAL for a parent with diminished capacity. 
Respondent’s GAL assisted respondent in a number of hearings 
including the adjudication and disposition hearing on 16 May 
2013, the permanency planning hearing on 11 July 2013, and the 
pretrial hearing on 18 November 2013.  It was only after the 
statute change in October 2013 that the trial court released the 
GAL, noting that a parent with diminished capacity was no longer 
entitled to a GAL. 
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
the record demonstrates respondent’s incompetency to such a 
level that its failure to conduct another inquiry as to her 
competency once the statute changed constituted an abuse of 
discretion.  In contrast, while I do believe that the evidence 
would support a finding of diminished capacity, I cannot say 
that the evidence rose to such a level that the trial court 
abused its discretion.  As discussed, the trial court initially 
appointed the GAL based on its finding of diminished capacity 
but released the GAL once the statute changed in October 2013.  
Implicit in this decision is that the trial court concluded that 
respondent was not incompetent as of October 2013; otherwise, 
the trial court would not have dismissed the GAL despite the 
statute change.  Thus, the issue is whether the trial court was 
-5- 
 
 
presented 
with 
sufficient 
evidence 
that 
respondent 
was 
incompetent to render the failure to conduct an inquiry at the 
termination hearing an abuse of discretion.   
“[A] person with diminished capacity is not incompetent, 
but may have some limitations that impair their ability to 
function.”  In re P.D.R., __ N.C. App. __, __, 737 S.E.2d 152, 
158 (2012).  Therefore, the fact that respondent was initially 
appointed a GAL based on diminished capacity has little bearing 
on the determination of whether she was/is incompetent.  As 
noted 
above, 
for 
purposes 
of 
a 
section 
7B-1101.1(c) 
determination of whether a parent should be appointed a GAL, 
incompetency means that the parent is unable to manage her 
affairs or communicate important decisions due to, among other 
conditions, mental illness.     
Respondent cites her mental health diagnoses as sufficient 
evidence requiring an inquiry into her competency, and it is 
undisputed that she has a long history of mental illness.  
However, respondent has identified no specific information in 
the record that indicates she is incapable of managing her own 
affairs due to her mental conditions, including in this 
termination  matter.  At the July 2013 permanency planning 
hearing, respondent testified that she began receiving social 
-6- 
 
 
security benefits.  When she received the first check, she used 
it to pay back rent and bills.  In November 2013, respondent 
applied for and obtained new housing away from her boyfriend 
with whom she had a long history of domestic violence.  In 
December 2013, she came to DSS and applied for new benefits.  
Finally, by releasing the GAL appointed based on the lower 
threshold of diminished capacity, the trial court implicitly 
indicated that respondent is not incompetent.  Accordingly, I am 
unable to conclude that the trial court’s decision to release 
the GAL was so arbitrary that it could only have been the result 
of an unreasoned decision; since respondent exhibited some level 
of sufficiency at managing her affairs, I do not think the trial 
court abused its discretion in releasing the GAL. 
Finally, the majority’s reliance on In re N.A.L. is 
misplaced.  There, despite allegations that the respondent had 
serious mental health issues, the trial court failed to conduct 
any inquiry as to whether she was entitled to a GAL under 
section 7B-1101.1(c).   In re N.A.L, 193 N.C. App. at 119, 666 
S.E.2d at 771.  Therefore, the Court held that the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to conduct any inquiry as to 
whether the respondent should be appointed a GAL.  Id. at 119, 
666 S.E.2d at 772. 
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However, unlike In re N.A.L., here, the trial court 
actually appointed a GAL under section 7B-1101.1(c) based on the 
circumstances alleged in the juvenile petition that suggested 
that respondent had diminished capacity.  It was only after the 
statute changed in October 2013 that the trial court released 
the GAL because parents with diminished capacity were no longer 
entitled to a GAL.  Furthermore, In re N.A.L. was decided before 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1(c) changed.  Thus, this Court had to 
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to raise a 
substantial question as to the respondent’s incompetency and 
diminished capacity, a lesser standard than incompetency.  See 
generally In re P.D.R., __ N.C. App. at __, 737 S.E.2d at 158.  
Accordingly, In re N.A.L. is distinguishable from the present 
case and is not controlling.   
Finally, I believe that the Court’s recent decision in In 
re H.B., No. COA13-1474, 2014 WL 2507835 (June 3, 2014) 
(unpublished), 
provides 
guidance, 
and 
I 
would 
adopt 
its 
reasoning.  In In re H.B., the trial court originally appointed 
the respondent a GAL prior to the adjudication hearings.  Id. at 
*2.  However, although the GAL participated in the hearings 
through the permanency planning review hearing, she did not 
attend any further hearings nor was there any indication in the 
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record why she no longer participated.  Id.  On appeal, the 
respondent argued that the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to inquire into her competency or diminished capacity 
because “nothing in the record indicate[d] that her need for a 
GAL had lessened.”  Id.  After noting that her appeal as to 
diminished capacity was moot based on the change in N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 7B–1101.1, this Court found no abuse of discretion as to 
the trial court’s failure to inquire into her competency.  Id. 
at *3.  
Here, like In re H.B., respondent was initially appointed a 
GAL before the statute changed in October 2013.  However, once 
the statute changed, the trial court released the GAL, noting 
that parents with diminished capacity were no longer entitled to 
a GAL.  Furthermore, I do not believe that respondent’s 
circumstances had worsened to the extent that the trial court’s 
decision to not inquire as to her competency at the later 
termination hearing was so arbitrary that it could not have been 
the result of a reasoned decision.  In contrast, I believe that 
the evidence shows that her circumstances had improved.  After 
the appointment of the GAL based on diminished capacity, 
respondent began receiving social security benefits, paid back 
bills and rent, applied for new benefits, and obtained new 
-9- 
 
 
housing away from her boyfriend.  Accordingly, I would find no 
abuse of discretion. 
In sum, I believe that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion 
by 
failing 
to 
re-inquire 
as 
to 
respondent’s 
competency at the termination hearing.  Although respondent 
clearly had a long history of mental illness, she was able to 
apply for and obtain new housing, apply for new benefits at DSS, 
and use her social security benefits to pay back rent and bills.  
Thus, given this evidence of competency, I am unable to say that 
the trial court’s decision was so arbitrary that it could have 
only resulted from an unreasoned decision.  Therefore, I would 
affirm the order terminating her parental rights.