Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. LOELIGER
Citation: 127 P.3d 591, 2005 OK 79
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2005

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. LOELIGER Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. LOELIGER 2005 OK 79 127 P.3d 591 Case Number: SCBD-5055 Decided: 11/01/2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel.OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. DANIEL LEE LOELIGER, Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINE PROCEEDING ¶0 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, Daniel Lee Loeliger, with one count of professional misconduct associated with the respondent's misrepresentation to a client that he had secured a settlement when, in fact, the cause was time-barred by the statute of limitations. The respondent admitted his conduct. After a hearing, the trial panel recommended that the respondent be disciplined by a public censure and that costs be imposed. The trial panel did not discuss the charge of misrepresentation. We hold that: 1) clear and convincing evidence supports a determination that respondent is guilty of ethical violations; and 2) the respondent's misconduct, his lack of a prior disciplinary history, discipline administered in similar cases, and the fact that apparently his actions did not result in economic harm to his client warrants a sixty-day suspension and the payment of $348.42 in costs. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. Nathan Lockhart, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. Charles F. Alden, III, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, Daniel Lee Loeliger, with one count of professional misconduct regarding his misrepresentation to a client that he had secured a settlement when, in fact, the case was time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Bar Association alleged that the respondent's behavior involved incompetent representation, ¶2 Upon a de novo review,FACTS8 ¶3 This case arises from respondent's relationship with a single client, Charles Sullivan (Sullivan). On October 21, 1998, Sullivan was injured while operating a forklift. Sullivan retained attorney Richard Berger (Berger) to represent him in a workers' compensation claim and a separate negligence action against Westquip, the manufacturer of the forklift. Berger filed the workers' compensation action on June 25, 1999, and ultimately settled the case in November of 2000. In October 2000, Berger filed a negligence action, but decided not to handle the matter further. On February 14, 2001, Berger dismissed the case without prejudice and withdrew from representing Sullivan. Berger wrote to Sullivan, informing him that he had one year to refile the case or it would be time-barred. ¶4 In August of 2001, Sullivan met with respondent to discuss representation of Sullivan's negligence claim. Respondent asked for Sullivan's hospital records and workers' compensation records. Sullivan contends that he signed a contingency fee contract with respondent at this time. Respondent insists that no contract was ever signed. ¶5 In October of 2001, Sullivan indicated to respondent that he would like to finish the case before the end of 2002. On January 18, 2002, respondent's father died of a sudden and unexpected heart attack. Respondent did not file any action on Sullivan's behalf before or after Sullivan's negligence claim became time-barred on February 14, 2002. ¶6 The next time respondent spoke to Sullivan, some six months later, respondent told Sullivan that he was negotiating with Westquip. Respondent informed Sullivan that Westquip had only offered a fifteen thousand dollar ($15,000) settlement. Respondent also confirmed to Sullivan that a claim had been filed on his behalf in federal court, when in fact, no such suit had been filed. Over the next eighteen months respondent continued to mislead Sullivan, telling Sullivan in October of 2003, that he and Westquip were still locked in heated negotiations over the negligence claim. ¶7 In January of 2004, Sullivan again asked for assurance from respondent that the case had been filed. Again, respondent misled his client, claiming that settlement negotiations were in their final stages and reassuring Sullivan that his petition had been filed. Sullivan requested a copy of the petition and on February 26, 2004, respondent faxed him the original petition filed by Berger some three years earlier. On the same day, respondent and Sullivan again discussed the alleged $15,000 settlement offer. Within days, respondent called to inform Sullivan that Westquip's offer was $5,800. ¶8 Finally, on March 2, 2004, respondent informed Sullivan that Westquip had increased its offer to $7,400. On March 7, 2004, Sullivan went to respondent's office where respondent tendered a check for $7,400. The check was funded by respondent's personal bank account. At this time, respondent also required Sullivan to sign a release form, which allegedly absolved Westquip of all liability in consideration of the $7,400 "settlement." ¶9 Respondent's inconsistent behavior aroused Sullivan's suspicion, prompting Sullivan to discover, via the internet, that respondent had never filed the claim against Westquip. Sullivan filed a grievance with the Bar Association on June 30, 2004. The Bar Association forwarded the grievance to the respondent on August 2, 2004, requesting a reply within two weeks. The Bar Association sent another letter on August 27, 2004, indicating that it had received only a partial, incomplete fax on the matter, and asking for a written response in five days. The Bar Association received a partial response from the respondent on September 7, 2004, which was dated August 16, 2004. On September 14, 2004, the Bar Association notified the respondent that it was opening the matter for a formal investigation. The Bar Association sent a final request for a response on October 6, 2004, and the respondent sent a second response letter to the Bar Association, which was received on October 12, 2004. ¶10 On May 10, 2005, the Bar Association filed this cause as a Rule 6 proceeding. ¶11 At the hearing, the respondent testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the incident. He expressed remorse, acknowledged his wrongdoing and recognized how his behavior reflected poorly on the entire Bar. The respondent's law partner testified that the respondent personally disclosed the matter to him and that, regardless of what discipline was imposed, he would be willing to work with the respondent again. ¶12 On July 14, 2005, the trial panel filed its report, relying on the respondent's testimony and the agreed stipulations of the parties. It found that the respondent's misconduct violated the provisions of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4(a) and (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 1.3, Rules Governing Disciplinary Procedures, but made no specific finding regarding a violation of Rule 8.4(c). ¶13 The Bar Association filed its brief-in-chief and an unopposed application to assess costs on August 10, 2005. The respondent filed his response brief on August 25, 2005. On September 2, 2005, the Bar Association waived the opportunity to file a response brief. I. ¶14 CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A DETERMINATION THAT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF ETHICAL VIOLATIONS. ¶15 In disciplinary matters, this Court possesses exclusive original jurisdiction. ¶16 Respondent did not diligently and promptly represent his client. Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." Although it is disputed as to when the respondent's representation of Sullivan began, it is undisputed that respondent was aware of Sullivan's genuine belief that such a relationship existed prior to February of 2002. The record also clearly establishes that respondent failed to take any action whatsoever on behalf of his client prior to February of 2002. Accordingly, there was a clear violation of Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. ¶17 Respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed and to expedite litigation, pursuant to rules 1.4 and 3.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. ¶18 In February of 2004, two years after the tolling of the statute of limitations in Sullivan's negligence claim, Sullivan requested a copy of the petition, which respondent had allegedly filed in federal court. Three days later, respondent faxed a copy of a petition filed by Berger, Sullivan's previous attorney. Respondent sent the petition with the knowledge that it had been filed and dismissed more than three years prior. Respondent's egregious behavior steps far beyond failure to inform and apprise one's client. Respondent acted to affirmatively deceive his client for more than two years. Such behavior is a clear violation of Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. ¶19 Respondent's misrepresentations to his client rise to the level of "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" pursuant to Rule 8.4(c). II. ¶21 The Bar argues that respondent should be suspended for sixty days. The respondent contends that the professional responsibility tribunal's recommended public reprimand is appropriate punishment. Respondent does not oppose the imposition of costs. ¶22 This Court has not considered facts identical to those presented. However, in similar situations, we have administered discipline ranging from a public reprimand to a two-year suspension. ¶23 Respondent's actions, although a clear violation of the high standards of the legal profession, are not without mitigating circumstances. Respondent has never been disciplined before. Although motivated by respondent's desire to disguise his own negligence, apparently this negligence did not lead to any grave economic harm to the client. We agree with the finding of the tribunal that the shock of respondent's father's sudden death mitigates his failure to file the common law action in a timely fashion. However, we also concur with the tribunal's finding that respondent's loss in no way excuses or mitigates any actions he took to continue his charade after his failure to file Sullivan's claim in a timely manner. Further, payment to Sullivan, out of respondent's own finances, is indicative of respondent's desire to remedy his negligence. However, respondent's behavior is an inexcusable violation of his client's trust and will not be tolerated by this Court. CONCLUSION ¶24 This Court is the sole arbiter of bar discipline. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, COLBERT, JJ., concur. WATT, C.J., concurs in part, and joins Opala, J., dissenting. TAYLOR, J., dissents. OPALA, J., with whom Watt, C.J., joins, dissenting. I would impose a more severe discipline. FOOT