Title: Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP000146
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 2017

2017 WI 19 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP146 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Carry, Inc. and Thomas Waltz, 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Madison, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 7, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Ellen K. Berz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. joined by Abrahamson, J. 
dissent (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners-appellants-petitioners, there was a 
brief by John R. Monroe and John Monroe Law PC, Rosewell, GA, 
and oral argument by John Monroe 
 
For the respondent-respondent, the cause was argued by John 
Walter Strange Jr., assistant city attorney, with whom on the 
brief was Michael P. May, city attorney. 
 
For the amicus curiae, there was an amicus curiae brief by 
Misha Tseytlin, 
solicitor general, Brad Schimel, attorney 
general, and oral argument by Ryan J. Walsh, Lake Mills on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Department of Justice. 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 19 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.  
No. 2015AP146  
(L.C. No. 
2014CV61) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
  : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Carry, Inc. and Thomas Waltz, 
 
     Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioner, 
 
   v. 
 
City of Madison, 
 
     Respondent-Respondent-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAR 7, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.  The question before the court is 
whether the City of Madison (the "City"), through its Transit 
and 
Parking 
Commission 
(the 
"Commission"), 
may 
prohibit 
passengers from bearing weapons on the buses it operates as 
"Metro Transit."1 
                                                 
1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2015 WI App 
74, 365 Wis. 2d 71, 870 N.W.2d 675, affirming the circuit 
court's dismissal of a complaint seeking declaratory relief 
against Respondent. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
2 
 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The Commission adopted a rule on July 12, 2005, to 
address the conduct of passengers using Metro Transit's public 
transportation services (the "Rule").2  The Rule identifies 
several types of unacceptable conduct, any one of which subjects 
the offending individual to potential expulsion from city buses. 
As relevant here, the Rule says: 
The following conduct is prohibited in all Metro 
facilities, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to, 
buses . . . .  Any individual observed engaging in the 
conduct may be told by a Bus Operator or Supervisor or 
other authorized individual to leave the facilities 
immediately and may be subject to arrest by proper 
authorities[:] 
 
. . . . 
 
 Bringing any items of a dangerous nature on-
board 
buses 
including: 
weapons 
(pistols, 
rifles, knives or swords) . . . .3 
                                                 
2 Although the Rule's terms provide the impetus for this 
case, neither party ever identified the operative language we 
are supposed to be considering. Nor does the Rule appear 
anywhere in the record.  Inasmuch as the City does not deny 
enforcing a policy against carrying weapons on city buses, we 
take notice of the Rule as found on the City's website 
(http://www.cityofmadison.com/metro/documents/ 
RulesofConduct.pdf) and include relevant portions as Appendix A.  
The same prohibition appears in the City's "Ride Guide" 
(relevant portions of which we reproduce as Appendix B) and we 
take notice of it as well.  We may take notice of this material 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2)(b) & (3) (2013–14). 
 
3 Rule at 4; Appendix A at 2. The Ride Guide is similar: 
"For the safety and comfort of all riders: . . . No weapons 
allowed of any kind."  Ride Guide at 6; Appendix B at 2. 
 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
3 
 
¶3 
Petitioners, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. and Thomas Waltz 
("Wisconsin Carry"), contacted Metro Transit4 and asked that it 
amend the Rule to harmonize it with 2011 Wisconsin Act 35 ("Act 
35"), 
which 
(amongst 
other 
things) 
authorized 
Wisconsin 
residents to carry concealed weapons upon obtaining the required 
license.  Wisconsin Carry also asserted that Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0409 (2013–14)5 deprived the City of its erstwhile authority 
to enforce the Rule's prohibition of weapons on the City's 
buses.  This statute, which imposes restrictions on certain 
local regulations, states that: 
Except as provided in subs. (3) and (4), no political 
subdivision may enact or enforce an ordinance or adopt 
a 
resolution 
that 
regulates 
the . . . possession, 
bearing, [or] transportation . . . of any knife or any 
firearm . . . unless the ordinance or resolution is 
the same as or similar to, and no more stringent than, 
a state statute. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2).6 We will refer to this statute as the 
"Local Regulation Statute".  
¶4 
Metro Transit declined Wisconsin Carry's invitation to 
amend 
the 
Rule. 
 
Wisconsin 
Carry 
subsequently 
filed 
a   
                                                 
4 "Metro Transit" is a sub-unit of the City of Madison.   
See infra part III.B.1.b. 
 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
6 This statute defines "political subdivision" as "a city, 
village, town or county." Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(1)(b). 
 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
4 
 
complaint7 seeking a declaration that the City of Madison's 
authority to enforce the Rule has been preempted by state law.  
The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Petitioners 
filed an amended complaint that, as relevant here, identified 
Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.14(4)(h), as the legislation 
offending the Local Regulation Statute. 
¶5 
That ordinance created the City's Department of 
Transportation, as well as the Commission.  It charges the 
Commission with the responsibility to 
develop and recommend to the Common Council policies 
on the various elements of transit and parking and 
transit and parking facilities for the purpose of 
providing for the safe, efficient and economical 
movement of persons and goods in the City of Madison 
and 
the 
metropolitan 
area 
consistent 
with 
the 
Commission's mission to support the City's distinct 
and quality neighborhoods where people will want to 
live, work, do business, learn and play by providing 
comfortable, safe and efficient transportation.  
Madison, 
Wis., 
Gen. 
Ordinances 
§ 3.14(4)(g) 
(2007) 
(the 
"Ordinance").  In pursuit of those ends, the Ordinance empowers 
the Commission to adopt certain written requirements: 
To accomplish these objectives the Transit and Parking 
Commission 
shall 
adopt 
and 
publish 
in 
writing 
                                                 
7 Petitioners styled their pleading as a "petition"; except 
in circumstances not present here, however, our rules identify 
the initial pleading as a "complaint."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.01(1).  For the sake of uniformity across our opinions, we 
will 
refer 
to 
the 
petitioners' 
initial 
pleading 
as 
a 
"complaint."  
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
5 
 
standards, 
warrants, 
objectives 
and 
criteria 
for 
transit, parking and paratransit operations, services 
and facilities in order that such operations, services 
and 
facilities 
function 
as 
an 
integrated 
and 
coordinated part of the overall adopted transportation 
policy. 
Id.  It may also establish rules and procedures as necessary to 
implement its duties: "The Transit and Parking Commission shall 
be empowered to establish such rules and procedures as may be 
necessary to carry out the purpose and provisions of this 
ordinance."  Id., § 3.14(4)(h). 
¶6 
After Wisconsin Carry filed its amended complaint, the 
City renewed its motion to dismiss, which the circuit court8 
granted.  Wisconsin Carry appealed and the court of appeals, in 
a published opinion, affirmed.  We granted Wisconsin Carry's 
petition for review, and now reverse. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a 
complaint, which a court will grant only if there are no 
conditions under which a plaintiff may recover.  Kaloti Enters., 
Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 
699 N.W.2d 205.  Such a motion requires a court to accept all of 
the complaint's factual assertions as true, along with the 
reasonable inferences one may take from them.  Id.  Resolving a 
                                                 
8 The Honorable Ellen K. Berz presiding. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
6 
 
motion to dismiss, therefore, involves only a question of law.  
John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶12, 303 
Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827.  We review questions of law de novo; 
we do not defer to the circuit court or the court of appeals, 
but we benefit from their analyses.  State v. Popenhagen, 2008 
WI 55, ¶32, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Constitutional Background 
¶8 
Wisconsin Carry claims the Rule abridges the right to 
possess weapons on the City's buses,9 so we will begin our 
analysis with a brief rehearsal of the nature of the right at 
issue.10  The United States Constitution commands that "[a] well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not 
be infringed."  U.S. Const. amend. II.  More recently (less than 
twenty years ago, in fact), the people of Wisconsin enshrined 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Carry, in its complaint, said it instituted this 
action to "determine the legality of the policies and practices 
of [the City] from prohibiting possession of weapons by persons 
riding Madison Metro buses . . . ."  Wisconsin Carry also says 
that it "[has] an interest in [its] rights to carry firearms on 
Madison Metro buses," and that "[The City's] policies and 
practices prohibit persons from riding Madison Metro buses while 
armed . . . ." 
10 We address the constitutional provisions regarding the 
right to keep and bear arms to provide background and context 
for our application of the statutes and ordinances Wisconsin 
Carry puts at issue. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
7 
 
the protection of this right in our own constitution: "The 
people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, 
defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 25. 
¶9 
This 
is 
a 
species 
of 
right 
we 
denominate 
as 
"fundamental," reflecting our understanding that it finds its 
protection, but not its source, in our constitutions.11  The 
right's 
existence 
precedes, 
and 
is 
independent 
of, 
such 
documents.  Bearing arms "is not a right granted by the 
Constitution.  Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that 
instrument for its existence."  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 553 (1875); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) ("[I]t has always been widely 
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth 
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.  The very text of the 
                                                 
11 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–94 
(2008) ("By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had 
become fundamental for English subjects.  See [J. Malcolm, To 
Keep and Bear Arms 122–134 (1994)].  Blackstone, whose works, we 
have said, 'constituted the preeminent authority on English law 
for the founding generation,' Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 
(1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of 
the 
fundamental 
rights 
of 
Englishmen. 
 
See 
[1 
William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 136, 139–140 
(1765)]."); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 
605 N.W.2d 328 (Wilcox, J.) (plurality opinion) ("We find that 
the state constitutional right to bear arms is fundamental."). 
Notwithstanding Heller's careful demonstration that this 
right has been fundamental since before our Nation's founding, 
(continued) 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
8 
 
Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the 
right 
and 
declares 
only 
that 
it 
'shall 
not 
be 
infringed . . . .'"). 
¶10 Whether the Second Amendment protects this right only 
when corporately exercised in the context of a militia, as 
opposed to a person exercising it individually, has been a 
source of contention.  That question, however, received an 
authoritative answer in Heller.  After extensive textual and 
historical analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
purpose of the amendment is to "guarantee the individual right 
to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."  Heller, 
544 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added).  Wisconsin's protection of 
this right does not contain the grammatical and linguistic 
oddities that necessitated Heller's exhaustive treatment of the 
question.  It is, instead, a straightforward declaration of an 
individual right to keep and bear arms for any lawful purpose. 
¶11 One way in which people in Wisconsin may exercise this 
individual right is by obtaining a license to carry concealed 
weapons.  The genesis of this opportunity was Act 35, now 
codified (in part) as Wis. Stat. § 175.60.  Upon obtaining such 
a license, the "licensee or . . . out-of-state licensee may 
                                                                                                                                                             
the dissent says it is something less.  But it does not say when 
or how it was demoted. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
9 
 
carry a concealed weapon12 anywhere in this state except as 
provided under subs. (15m) and (16) and ss. 943.13(1m)(c) and 
948.605(2)(b)1r."  Wis. Stat. § 175.60(2g).  We will refer to 
this statute as the "Concealed-Carry Statute". 
¶12 Act 
35 
also 
eliminated 
the 
prohibition 
against 
carrying a loaded handgun in a vehicle.  The statutory provision 
governing the interaction between weapons and vehicles now says: 
"Except as provided in sub. (4), no person may place, possess, 
or transport a firearm . . . in or on a vehicle, unless one of 
the following applies: 1. The firearm is unloaded or is a 
handgun."  Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b).  We will refer to this 
statute as the "Vehicle Statute."  A "firearm" is "a weapon that 
acts by force of gunpowder."  Wis. Stat. § 167.31(1)(c).  For 
the purpose of this statute, "vehicle" means "every device in, 
upon, or by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a highway, except railroad trains."  
Wis. Stat. §§ 167.31(1)(h), 340.01(74). 
¶13 With that brief refresher, we turn now to the Rule. 
B. 
Effect of the Local Regulation Statute 
¶14 Wisconsin Carry tells us that the City's Common 
Council, and all of its subordinate entities, may regulate the 
                                                 
12 A "weapon" is "a handgun, an electric weapon, as defined 
in 
s. 
941.295(1c)(a), 
or 
a 
billy 
club." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 175.60(1)(j). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
10 
 
possession, bearing, and transportation of arms only to the 
extent allowed by the Local Regulation Statute.  One of the key 
limitations 
imposed 
by 
that 
statute, 
they 
say, 
is 
that 
regulations on this subject may be no more stringent than 
analogous state statutes.  They argue that, inasmuch as the Rule 
entirely forbids the possession, bearing, and transportation of 
arms on city buses, the City may no longer enforce it because 
there is no state statute so stringent.  
¶15 The City responds that the Local Regulation Statute 
has nothing to say about the Rule.  First, it asserts that the 
Rule is no more stringent than state statutes.  Additionally, 
because it owns the buses, the City says it may keep them 
weapon-free just as readily as a private individual may prohibit 
weapons in his own vehicle.  Second, even if it were more 
stringent 
than 
state 
statutes, 
the 
City 
says 
the 
Local 
Regulation Statute's plain terms express the legislature's 
decision to leave municipal regulations like the Rule alone.  
The statute applies only to "political subdivisions," which 
(according to the internal definitions) comprise only cities, 
villages, towns and counties.  Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(1)(b).  The 
Commission is none of those and so, according to the City, it is 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
11 
 
unencumbered by the statute.13  Further, the statute's strictures 
apply 
to 
a 
political 
subdivision's 
"ordinances" 
and 
"resolutions."  Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2).  The City says a "rule" 
is different from ordinances and resolutions, and therefore lies 
beyond the statute's reach. 
¶16 Resolving this case will therefore require that we 
determine whether the Local Regulation Statute applies to the 
Commission and the rules it adopts, and (if so) whether the Rule 
is impermissibly more stringent than analogous state statutes.14  
We must also compare the Rule to the Concealed-Carry Statute to 
determine whether the latter preempts the former. 
1. 
Applicability to the Commission 
¶17 We will begin with whether the Local Regulation 
Statute affects rules adopted by the Commission.  If it does 
not, there is no need to determine whether the Rule is more 
stringent than a state statute. 
                                                 
13 The City made this argument explicitly before the Circuit 
Court.  Here, it is an implicit part of its argument that the 
Local Regulation Statute does not apply because it addresses 
only ordinances and resolutions (which are the legislative 
devices of political subdivisions). 
14 We express no opinion on the City's authority to regulate 
the possession of weapons on its buses prior to enactment of the 
Local Regulation Statute, the Concealed-Carry Statute, and the 
current version of the Vehicle Statute. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
12 
 
¶18 With its frequent reference to the "plain text" of the 
Local Regulation Statute, the City urges us (sotto voce, to be 
sure) to engage the "plain meaning" rule as we consider the 
statute's relationship to the Commission and its Rule.  This 
axiom, which is the bedrock of the judiciary's methodology, says 
that "[i]f the plain meaning of the statute is clear, a court 
need not look to rules of statutory construction or other 
extrinsic aids.  Instead, a court should simply apply the clear 
meaning of the statute to the facts before it."  UFE Inc. v. 
Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281–82, 548 
N.W.2d 57 (1996) (citation omitted). 
¶19 We must, however, keep in mind that this axiom does 
not reduce the judicial function to mechanically comparing the 
words of a statute to the name given a legislative enactment, or 
the body enacting it.  We are not merely arbiters of word 
choice.  If we were, we would need do nothing more than confirm 
that 
"rule" 
is 
a 
word 
different 
from 
"ordinance" 
and 
"resolution," and that "commission" is etymologically distinct 
from "city," "village," "town," and "county." 
¶20 It is, instead, the "plain meaning" of a statute we 
must apply.  We find that meaning in the statute's text, 
context, and structure: "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with 
the language of the statute.' . . .  [It] is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
13 
 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes . . . ."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110  
(quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659).  We examine the statute's contextualized words, 
put them into operation, and observe the results to ensure we do 
not arrive at an unreasonable or absurd conclusion.  Id., ¶46 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.").15  Here, the process requires 
us to survey how a city's legislative authority is affected by a 
statute forbidding it from enacting or enforcing an ordinance or 
resolution on a given subject.  If a city's governing body 
thereby loses authority to legislate on that subject, we must 
then 
consider 
whether 
a 
city's 
sub-unit 
can 
nonetheless 
legislate on that subject when authority is denied to the 
governing body itself. 
a. 
Municipal Authority 
¶21 It is true, and ever has been, that cities exercise 
only such authority as they receive from our constitution and 
                                                 
15 The dissent faults us for emphasizing that the "plain 
meaning" doctrine focuses on the statute's meaning.  We think 
discovering the meaning of a statute is not just a worthy 
endeavor, but also an exhaustive recitation of the judiciary's 
authority when interpreting a statute.  We find the statute's 
meaning in its words, context, and interaction with closely-
related statutes, just as Kalal describes. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
14 
 
statutes.  "[C]ities are creatures of the state legislature that 
have no inherent right of self-government beyond the powers 
expressly granted to them."  Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 
47, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333 (quoting Madison 
Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶89, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 
N.W.2d 337 (citing Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 
72–73, 267 N.W. 25 (1936) (citing City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 
262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923)))) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
And if a statute may confer authority on a city, a statute may 
take it away.  City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 187 ("A municipality 
is merely a department of the state, and the state may withhold, 
grant, or withdraw power and privileges as it sees fit."). 
¶22 One necessary corollary to this principle is that a 
city may not create authority ex nihilo, either for itself or 
its divisions.  Were it otherwise, the ability of a constitution 
and legislature to control a city's quantum of authority would 
come to naught——upon the loss of some measure of authority, an 
enterprising city could simply declare it reinstated.  But this 
is not part of a city's remit, and so there is no mechanism by 
which it may regain withdrawn authority but by legislative 
decree or constitutional amendment. 
¶23 In light of these principles, we must determine what 
the Local Regulation Statute means when it says "no political 
subdivision may enact or enforce an ordinance or adopt a 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
15 
 
resolution that regulates the . . . possession, bearing, [or] 
transportation . . . of any knife or any firearm . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0409(2).  The City acknowledges that this provision 
eliminates the common council's authority to enact or enforce an 
ordinance or resolution on the identified subject (unless it 
falls within the saving clause).  Therefore, the question (at 
this 
stage 
of 
the 
analysis) 
is 
whether 
ordinances 
and 
resolutions comprise a municipal governing body's complete 
legislative authority.  If they do, then losing the ability to 
adopt an ordinance or resolution on a particular subject 
represents the complete withdrawal of authority to legislate on 
that subject.  And if the City has no legislative authority with 
respect to that subject, it necessarily has nothing to delegate 
to its divisions.16 
¶24 With 
respect 
to 
the 
nature 
of 
ordinances 
and 
resolutions, the City directs our attention to Cross v. 
Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 331, 288 N.W.2d 779 (1980).  There, we 
said: 
                                                 
16 This proposition follows by necessary implication from 
the fact that municipalities have no authority but what they are 
given.  Willow Creek Ranch, LLC v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 
¶17, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (citing First Wis. Nat'l 
Bank of Milwaukee v. Town of Catawba, 183 Wis. 220, 224, 197 
N.W. 1013 (1924) ("Municipal bodies have only such powers as are 
expressly conferred upon them by the legislature or are 
necessarily implied from the powers conferred.")). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
16 
 
A municipal ordinance or by-law is a regulation of a 
general, permanent nature, enacted by the governing 
council 
of 
a 
municipal 
corporation. . . . 
 
A 
resolution, or order as it is sometimes called, is an 
informal enactment of a temporary nature, providing 
for 
the 
disposition 
of 
a 
particular 
piece 
of 
administrative 
business 
of 
a 
municipal 
corporation. . . .  And it has been held that even 
where the statute or municipal charter requires the 
municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is 
passed in the manner and with the statutory formality 
required in the enactment of an ordinance, it will be 
binding and effective as an ordinance. 
Id. at 342 (citing Wis. Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Ft. Atkinson, 
193 Wis. 232, 243-44, 213 N.W. 873 (quoting 19 Ruling Case Law 
895, § 194 (1917)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
¶25 From this we may derive three principles useful to our 
inquiry.  First, ordinances are municipal legislative devices, 
formally enacted, that address general subjects in a permanent 
fashion.  Second, resolutions are those informal municipal 
legislative 
acts 
that 
address 
particular 
pieces 
of 
administrative business in a temporary fashion.  And third, the 
label given to a legislative device is not dispositive——one 
identifies the device's taxonomy functionally.  
¶26 The 
scope 
of 
legislative 
activity 
covered 
by 
ordinances and resolutions, therefore, extends to formal and 
informal enactments that address matters both general and 
specific, in a manner meant to be either temporary or permanent, 
and which can be characterized as administrative or otherwise.  
And we will treat a municipality's legislative device as an 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
17 
 
ordinance 
or 
resolution, 
regardless 
of 
how 
it 
may 
be 
denominated, so long as it functions within the scope of this 
definition.17 
¶27 It is apparent from this that there is no legislative 
action a municipality could take, either in form or function, 
that would not come within the ambit of "ordinance" or 
"resolution."  Consequently, if a statute removes the authority 
of a municipality's governing body to adopt an ordinance or 
resolution on a particular subject, the governing body loses all 
legislative authority on that subject. 
                                                 
17 This 
generality 
comports 
well 
with 
the 
dictionary 
definition of "ordinance":  "An authoritative law or decree; 
specif., a municipal regulation, esp. one that forbids or 
restricts an activity."  Ordinance, Black's Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014).  It also compares favorably with Doe v. Medford Sch. 
Dist. 549C, 221 P.3d 787 (Or. App. 2009), a case the City cited 
in its discussion about the nature of ordinances.  There, the 
court said: 
The term "ordinance," as it is used in ordinary 
communications, has both a narrow and a broader 
meaning. [In its narrow meaning] [i]t can refer to "a 
public 
enactment, 
rule, 
or 
law 
promulgated 
by 
governmental 
authority: 
as . . . a 
local 
law 
or 
regulation enacted by a city council or other similar 
body under powers delegated to it by the state." . . .  
The word "ordinance" also has a broader common 
meaning, however.  At least in some contexts, the term 
may not be limited to enactments of law but, more 
generally 
to 
an 
"established 
rule, 
policy, 
or 
practice."  
Id. at 793 (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 
1588 (unabridged ed. 1993)). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
18 
 
¶28 Thus, the plain meaning of the Local Regulation 
Statute is that the legislature withdrew from the City's 
governing body all authority to legislate on the subjects it 
identifies, 
including 
the 
"possession, 
bearing, 
[or] 
transportation . . . of any knife or any firearm" unless the 
legislation is "the same as or similar to, and no more stringent 
than, a state statute."  Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2).  Because a 
municipality cannot delegate what it does not have, the City is 
entirely powerless to authorize any of its sub-units to 
legislate on this subject.18 
¶29 The City notes, and properly so, that it has no 
ordinance 
addressing, 
in 
explicit 
terms, 
the 
possession, 
bearing, or transportation of knives or firearms.  In the 
absence of such an ordinance, the City says there is nothing on 
which the Local Regulation Statute may operate. 
¶30 But 
the 
City 
itself 
necessarily 
identifies 
the 
Ordinance as the legislation that authorizes the regulation of 
firearms.  This is so because the City must appeal to it for the 
Rule's efficacy.  Unless the Commission has some source of 
authority independent of the City, its authority to adopt the 
Rule must flow from the City to the Commission through the 
Ordinance.  By claiming the Rule is authoritative, the City is 
                                                 
18 See supra n.16. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
19 
 
itself telling us that the Ordinance contains a firearms-
regulating grant of authority.  And that is how the Ordinance 
comes within the Local Regulation Statute's purview. 
¶31 Put another way, the City may not simultaneously 
maintain that the Commission has the authority to regulate 
firearms while denying that any of its ordinances authorize the 
regulation of firearms.  Cities may, and often do, delegate 
authority to their sub-units without explicitly describing each 
and every subject the sub-unit may address.  The broader the 
grant of authority, the more general the language.  That is true 
here——the Ordinance is a very generalized grant of authority to 
the Commission to address mass transit issues.  
¶32 But the generalization does not mean the grant of 
authority to regulate firearms is not there; it just means it is 
not explicit.  It is the Ordinance's implicit grant of firearm-
regulating authority on which the Local Regulation Statute 
performs its work.  And that work consists of restricting the 
Ordinance's grant of firearm-regulating authority.  So, if the 
Commission 
has 
the 
authority 
to 
regulate 
firearms 
more 
stringently than state statutes, it must find the source of that 
authority somewhere other than the City. 
b. 
Potential Alternative Sources of Commission Authority 
¶33 To discover the full scope of the Commission's 
authority, we must determine what manner of entity it is, and 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
20 
 
whether it draws regulatory authority from some source other 
than the City.  The City's ordinances say a "commission" is "a 
Sub-unit 
of 
the 
City." 
 
Madison, 
Wis., 
Gen. 
Ordinances 
§ 33.01(3)(c).  The City creates "standing" sub-units (which are 
those meant to exist permanently) by ordinance.  See id. 
§ 33.01(3)(e) & (4)(b).  The Ordinance makes the Commission a 
standing sub-unit. 
¶34 The Ordinance provides that the Commission is a public 
utility within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 66.0805.  This 
statute 
grants 
municipalities 
the 
authority 
to 
create 
commissions to govern public utilities, but it contains no 
independent grant of authority to such commissions.19  As a 
public utility, the Commission exercises its authority under the 
supervision of the City: "The board of commissioners, under the 
general control and supervision of the governing body, shall be 
responsible for the entire management of and shall supervise the 
operation of the utility."  Wis. Stat. § 66.0805(1).  The City 
exercises 
its 
supervisory 
authority 
via 
ordinance: 
"The 
governing body shall exercise general control and supervision of 
the commission by enacting ordinances governing the commission's 
operation."  Id.  
                                                 
19 "[T]he governing body of a city shall . . . provide for 
the nonpartisan management of a municipal public utility by 
(continued) 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
21 
 
¶35 The Ordinance says the Commission is also a transit 
commission within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 66.1021.  This 
section 
grants 
municipalities 
the 
authority 
to 
create 
transportation systems as well as commissions to govern them: "A 
city . . . may 
enact 
an 
ordinance 
for 
the 
establishment, 
maintenance and operation of a comprehensive unified local 
transportation 
system . . . . 
 
'Transit 
commission' 
or 
'commission' means the local transit commission created under 
this section."  Wis. Stat. § 66.1021(1), (3)(b).  The statute 
does not directly grant the Commission any authority, but it 
does identify some of the authority the Commission must be 
furnished by the municipality's enacting ordinance,20 none of 
which is at issue here. 
¶36 The Ordinance contains its own description of the 
authority the Commission is to exercise.  So, for example, it 
has the authority to recommend transit-related policies to the 
common council for its consideration: "The Transit and Parking 
Commission shall make recommendations to the Common Council 
regarding policies on all transit and parking matters . . . ."  
Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.14(4)(a); see also id. 
                                                                                                                                                             
creating 
a 
commission 
under 
this 
section." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0805(1). 
20 For example, the statute says a transit commission may 
appoint certain employees, conduct hearings, hold regular 
meetings, adopt a seal, etc.  Wis. Stat. § 66.1021(6) & (7). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
22 
 
§ 3.14(4)(g) ("It shall be the general duty of the Transit and 
Parking Commission to develop, and recommend to the Common 
Council policies on the various elements of transit and parking 
and transit and parking facilities for the purpose of providing 
for the safe, efficient and economical movement of persons and 
goods 
in 
the 
City 
of 
Madison 
and 
the 
metropolitan 
area . . . ."). 
¶37 Finally, 
the 
Commission 
may 
adopt 
"standards, 
warrants, objectives and criteria for transit, parking and 
paratransit operations" pursuant to its authority under the 
Ordinance.  Id.  It may also establish rules and procedures as 
necessary to implement its duties.  Id. § 3.14(4)(h).  With 
respect to transit, the Commission's duty is to "provide overall 
management, operation and control of the assets of the City of 
Madison transit and paratransit transportation system to ensure 
that it functions as an integrated part of the overall 
transportation system."  Id. § 3.14(4)(h)2.  
¶38 The City has not identified, and we have not found, 
any authority for the Commission's existence apart from what we 
just described.  It is apparent from these provisions that the 
Commission is entirely a creature of the City and exercises only 
that amount and type of authority it receives from the City.  
The Ordinance, by its express terms, created the Commission and 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
23 
 
infused it with enumerated responsibilities.21  Although the 
statutes relating to public utilities and transit commissions 
describe certain attributes the governing commissions must have, 
they do not, by their own force, call the Commission into 
existence or endow it with authority independent of what they 
confer on the City.  Instead, they simply grant municipalities 
the authority to create the commissions in the manner and with 
the attributes the statutes prescribe. 
¶39 The Commission has no authority but for what it 
received from the City, and the City has no authority to 
legislate contrary to the boundaries established by the Local 
Regulation Statute.  This means that if the Rule is more 
stringent than a state statute, then to that extent the City no 
longer has authority to enforce it. 
c. 
Purpose of the Local Regulation Statute 
¶40 Before we measure the Rule's stringency, we pause to 
address the City's argument that this result would frustrate the 
                                                 
21 Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.14(4)(a) ("There is 
hereby created a Transit and Parking Commission charged with the 
duties and responsibilities contained herein."). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
24 
 
statute's purpose.22  The City speculates that the legislature 
wished to limit a city's authority to regulate firearms, but 
only when the city's governing body acts qua governing body.  It 
says the statute's plain reference to only ordinances and 
resolutions demonstrates that the legislature intended to leave 
intact a municipal sub-unit's authority to regulate firearms.23  
                                                 
22 We may consider the statute's purpose while conducting a 
"plain meaning" analysis, so long as we refer only to the 
statute's text and structure.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶48, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
("[S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a 
plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long 
as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the 
text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic 
sources, such as legislative history."). 
23 The dissent wishes we had consulted legislative history 
on this question, and suggests we did not do so because it would 
contradict our interpretation of the Local Regulation Statute.  
We did not address legislative history for two reasons.  First, 
we had no difficulty finding the statute's meaning without it 
(as Kalal contemplates).  And second, the history the dissent 
identified has no instructive merit.  The two failed municipal 
gun-control 
referenda 
mentioned 
in 
State 
v. 
Cole, 
264 
Wis. 2d 520, 
¶¶62–63 
(Prosser, 
J., 
concurring), 
and 
the 
statements of one assemblyman, might be able to tell us what 
motivated the legislature to enact the Local Regulation Statute.  
But motivation and meaning are not necessarily the same thing.  
Even if every legislator publicly announced the intent behind 
the way he or she voted, that knowledge would give us no aid in 
understanding the Local Regulation Statute.  We find the 
legislature's intent in the words it adopts, not the expressed 
(or unexpressed) subjective reasons the 132 legislators had for 
adopting those words.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52.  Cherry-
picking the statements of one such legislator, as the dissent 
does, just gives us 1/132 of a body of information that tells us 
nothing about the meaning of the statute. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
25 
 
¶41 In the City's reading of the statute, the legislature 
made a conscious decision to withdraw firearms-regulating 
authority 
from 
a 
municipality's 
democratically-accountable 
governing 
body, 
while 
leaving 
that 
authority 
entirely 
undiminished 
when 
exercised 
by 
the 
municipality's 
democratically-unaccountable sub-units.24  The only explanation 
offered for why the legislature would trust firearms-regulating 
authority to a municipal sub-unit, but not the governing body to 
which it owes its existence and power, is that the latter's 
legislative authority is broader than that of the former.  The 
implication 
is 
that 
municipalities 
are 
eager 
to 
impose 
aggressive firearms regulations, and that impulse must be curbed 
by ensuring that any such regulations could be adopted only 
piecemeal, within the limited portfolio of each democratically-
unaccountable sub-unit. 
¶42 But if the City's speculation is correct, if the 
legislature really did adopt the Local Regulation Statute to 
restrict the scope of any given municipal firearms regulation, 
                                                 
24 The Commission's members are appointed, not elected: "The 
Transit and Parking Commission shall consist of nine (9) voting 
members to serve without compensation consisting of three (3) 
members of the Common Council, six (6) citizens and two (2) 
alternates . . . at least one (1) of whom shall be a citizen."  
Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.14(4)(b).  "Citizen members of 
the Transit and Parking Commission shall be appointed by the 
Mayor subject to confirmation by the Common Council."  Id. 
§ 3.14(4)(d). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
26 
 
it chose a singularly ineffective means of doing so.  It does 
not require mastery of three-dimensional chess, nor even 
checkers, to devise a strategy for defeating such an objective.  
¶43 Deprived of native authority to regulate firearms, a 
city might simply create a "public-safety commission" with a 
mandate to secure the public's well-being in all publicly-
accessible spaces. The enabling ordinance would make no specific 
reference to firearms, so (under the City's theory) it would 
escape the Local Regulation Statute's attention.  The public-
safety commission would then adopt the same city-wide firearms 
regulation the city's governing body could not itself adopt.  
The scope of the resulting regulation would not have suffered 
the least restriction by virtue of the Local Regulation Statute.  
Alternatively, a municipality bent on adopting comprehensive 
firearms regulations could simply create a number of limited-
portfolio sub-units whose cumulative scope of authority would 
equal that of the municipality.  The sub-units could then adopt 
firearms regulations that would differ in no meaningful way from 
a single regulation adopted by the municipality's governing 
body.  Functionally, this imputed purpose would leave the 
statute with neither meaning nor effect. 
¶44 In 
light 
of 
these 
obvious 
workarounds, 
we 
are 
unwilling to join the City's speculation that the legislature 
chose to entrust firearms-regulating authority to municipal sub-
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
27 
 
units, but not their democratically-accountable progenitors.25  
If the legislature actually intended such an easily thwarted 
purpose, it gave us no textual clues by which to discern it. 
¶45 Finally, the City asserts that if the legislature had 
intended 
to 
include 
"rules" 
in 
the 
realm 
of 
prohibited 
legislative acts, it would have said so.  It observes that other 
states, when they restricted local firearms regulations, listed 
other types of legislative devices in their prohibitions.  For 
instance, it notes that Idaho's statute applies to "any law, 
rule, regulation, or ordinance."  Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3302J 
(2016).26  And Florida's statute refers not just to ordinances, 
but also administrative regulations and rules.  Fla. Stat. Ann. 
                                                 
25 The City argued that this conclusion would "deprive the 
people of Wisconsin [of] the right to democratically decide if 
public buses are an appropriate place for loaded handguns."  
Actually, it protects that very thing.  The people of Wisconsin, 
through their duly-elected legislators, have had their say on 
this issue.  Allowing an unelected body like the Commission to 
overrule 
the 
people's 
decision 
would 
not 
protect 
their 
democratically-expressed will, it would thwart it. 
26 The relevant portion of the Idaho statute says: 
(2) Except as expressly authorized by state statute, 
no county, city, agency, board or any other political 
subdivision of this state may adopt or enforce any 
law, rule, regulation, or ordinance which regulates in 
any manner the sale, acquisition, transfer, ownership, 
possession, transportation, carrying or storage of 
firearms or any element relating to firearms and 
components thereof, including ammunition. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3302J(2) (2016). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
28 
 
§ 790.33 (West 2007 & Supp. 2016).27  And Kansas's statute covers 
"administrative actions."  Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,124 (Supp. 
2015).28  And so on. But if the label of a legislative act is 
dispositive, then Idaho's local communities are vulnerable to 
local "policies" regulating firearms, Florida would presumably 
allow 
"resolutions" 
restricting 
firearms, 
and 
Kansas 
(apparently) is willing to countenance local regulations in the 
form of an "ordinance."  Here in Wisconsin, the legislature 
                                                 
27 The relevant portion of the Florida Statute says: 
(1) Preemption.--Except as expressly provided by the 
State Constitution or general law, the Legislature 
hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field 
of regulation of firearms and ammunition, including 
the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, 
ownership, possession, storage, and transportation 
thereof, to the exclusion of all existing and future 
county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or any 
administrative regulations or rules adopted by local 
or 
state 
government 
relating 
thereto. 
Any 
such 
existing ordinances, rules, or regulations are hereby 
declared null and void. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.33(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2016). 
28 The relevant portion of the Kansas statute says: 
(a) No city or county shall adopt or enforce any 
ordinance, resolution or regulation, and no agent of 
any city or county shall take any administrative 
action, governing the requirement of fees, licenses or 
permits for, the commerce in or the sale, purchase, 
transfer, ownership, storage, carrying, transporting 
or 
taxation 
of 
firearms 
or 
ammunition, 
or 
any 
component or combination thereof. 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,124(a) (Supp. 2015). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
29 
 
would need to be even more cognizant of the labels a 
municipality might attach to its legislation: The Ordinance, for 
example, authorizes the Commission to adopt, amongst other 
things, rules, procedures, standards, warrants, and objectives.  
¶46 Accepting 
the City's argument would require 
the 
legislature to list every possible label for a legislative act 
before we could conclude that its intention was to withdraw from 
a municipality the authority to regulate a particular subject.  
And it would further require that the legislature amend the 
statute every time a municipality conceived of a new label for 
its legislative acts.  But this is law-making as comedy, with a 
hapless legislature chasing about a wily municipality as it 
first enacts an ordinance on a forbidden subject, and then a 
policy, then a rule, then a standard, and on and on until one of 
them wearies of the pursuit or the other exhausts the 
thesaurus.29  The City advocated its interests in a competent and 
                                                 
29 As an alternative to listing a multitude of labels for 
prohibited legislation, some states instead use a catch-all 
phrase to describe the method by which the legislative act is 
adopted.  Arkansas, for example, states that local governments 
"shall not enact any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or 
regulate in any other manner" the identified subjects.  Ark. 
Code. Ann. § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) (2013) (emphasis added). Kansas, 
on the other hand, forbids local "administrative action" related 
to firearms.  Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,124 (Supp. 2015).  But 
this does not end the lexical chase, it just shifts it to the 
label 
given 
to 
the 
municipal 
action 
that 
produces 
the 
legislation. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
30 
 
professional manner, so we are confident it does not really 
intend that we understand the legislative process in this 
fashion.30  Thus, in the absence of any discernible reason to do 
so, we will not.31 
2. 
Stringency 
¶47 Because we conclude that the City——acting either 
through its governing body or sub-units——has no authority to 
"regulate[] the . . . possession, bearing, [or] transportation 
. . . of any knife or any firearm . . . unless the ordinance or 
resolution is the same as or similar to, and no more stringent 
than, a state statute,"32 we must now determine whether the Rule 
                                                 
30 Under the guise of "judicial restraint," however, this is 
how the dissent would have us understand the Local Regulation 
Statute.  Its two-sentence statutory analysis comprises, in its 
entirety, this:  "The bus rule is neither an 'ordinance' nor a 
'resolution,' and it was not enacted by the city. That should be 
the end of the analysis."  Dissent at ¶73.  But "judicial 
restraint" does not mean superficial or incomplete.  The dissent 
is 
curiously 
incurious 
about 
whether 
municipalities 
have 
legislative authority outside of "ordinances" and "resolutions." 
Instead, without analysis, it simply assumes they do, and 
further assumes the Commission's authority to adopt the Rule 
flows from that phantom authority.  While that analysis is 
certainly 
original, 
it 
has 
nothing 
to 
do 
with 
judicial 
restraint. 
31 Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is 
interpreted . . . reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."). 
32 Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
31 
 
satisfies 
the 
stringency 
standard.33 
 
It 
is 
the 
City's 
prerogative to choose the legislation against which we will 
compare the Rule (at least initially), and it has chosen the 
Vehicle Statute. 
¶48 The 
Vehicle 
Statute 
governs 
the 
safe 
use 
and 
transportation of firearms.  The specific portion of the statute 
the City recommends for our consideration prohibits the placing, 
possession, or transportation of a firearm in a vehicle unless 
it is unloaded or a handgun.  Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b)1.  That 
is to say, the Vehicle Statute allows a person to carry a loaded 
handgun, or an unloaded firearm of a different type, in a 
vehicle.  A vehicle (for purposes of this statute) includes 
"every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or 
may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except railroad 
trains," as well as snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles and 
electric 
personal 
assistive 
mobility 
devices. 
 
Id. 
§§ 167.31(1)(h), 340.01(74).  We trust it is beyond cavil that a 
bus is a vehicle within the scope of this definition. 
                                                 
33 The Local Regulation Statute authorizes local legislation 
so long as it is both the "same as or similar to" and "no more 
stringent than" a state statute.  Because the stringency 
analysis resolves this matter, we need not inquire into whether 
the Rule or Ordinance is the same as or similar to a state 
statute. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
32 
 
¶49 So in choosing the Vehicle Statute for comparison, the 
City asserts that a total ban on carrying any firearm on a bus 
is no more stringent than a statute that bans only loaded non-
handguns on a bus.  These provisions occupy almost perfect 
legislative antipodes.  Unless the City has a method by which it 
can explain how the distance between the two is more apparent 
than real, we must conclude the Rule is impermissibly more 
stringent than the Vehicle Statute. 
¶50 The City says it can harmonize the Vehicle Statute and 
the Rule by observing that the former allows an individual to 
carry a firearm only in "a" vehicle, not "any" vehicle or "all" 
vehicles.  The City does not explain what difference it would 
make if the legislature had chosen "any" or "all" instead of 
"a."  Instead, it skips almost immediately to the conclusion 
that the legislature's word choice created maneuvering room for 
restrictive municipal firearms regulations.  There is no 
readily-apparent 
principle 
that 
would 
link 
the 
City's 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
33 
 
proposition to its conclusion, and we will not further explore 
this argument when the City has chosen to remain silent.34 
¶51 The City also says it can harmonize the two provisions 
because the Vehicle Statute does not say a person must carry a 
firearm on a bus.  It is true the Vehicle Statute is prohibitory 
(as the City pointed out), and it is also true that an exception 
from a prohibition is not the same thing as a mandate.  This 
means that although the Vehicle Statute does not prohibit a 
person from carrying a firearm in a vehicle (except as described 
above), it also does not require a person to carry such a weapon 
in a vehicle.  But this can give the City no succor.  The City 
bans the carrying of all firearms on its buses.  So its burden 
is not to find a statute that neither bans nor requires carrying 
firearms, its burden is to identify a statute that does ban, and 
does so at least as restrictively as the Rule.  As relevant 
here, the Vehicle Statute prohibits only the carrying of loaded 
non-handguns in a vehicle.  Consequently, the Vehicle Statute 
justifies the Rule only in that regard.  By also banning the 
                                                 
34 As an entirely practical matter, an individual can carry 
a weapon in only one vehicle at a time, so there is no need to 
use "any" or "all" in the statute.  "Any" bus in the City's 
fleet becomes "a" bus within the meaning of this statute the 
instant an individual boards it with a permissible firearm.  The 
same is true of "all" city buses.  So there is no point in 
distinguishing between "a" bus, on the one hand, and on the 
other "any" or "all" buses. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
34 
 
carrying of knives, handguns (whether loaded or not), and 
unloaded non-handguns, the Rule is dramatically more restrictive 
than the Vehicle Statute. 
¶52 The City also says the Rule is no more restrictive 
than Wisconsin's Statutes because, as owner of its buses, it has 
the same authority to ban the carrying of weapons as individuals 
have in banning weapons from their private vehicles.  There are 
two reasons this cannot justify the Rule.  The first, and most 
obvious, is that an individual's right to ban weapons from his 
vehicle is not statutory, and so cannot serve as the point of 
comparison.  He may keep weapons from his vehicle because he has 
the right to exclude others from his property.  He needs no 
statutory grant, and he has received none; his authority is 
incident to his property right in the vehicle.  He can keep 
weapons out of his car because he can deny a person entry for 
any reason he may choose.35  So if he does not want weapons in 
                                                 
35 "Property rights in a physical thing have been described 
as the rights to possess, use and dispose of it . . . .  The 
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the 
most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights."  
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 
(1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("One of the main rights 
attaching to property is the right to exclude others . . . ." 
(citing W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1")); Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 618, 563 N.W.2d 154 
(1997) ("[T]he private landowner's right to exclude others from 
his or her land is 'one of the most essential sticks in the 
(continued) 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
35 
 
his vehicle, he may simply deny the person carriage unless he 
first divests himself of his weapons.  Thus, there is no sense 
in which the Rule can be described as "the same as or similar 
to, and no more stringent than, a state statute."36 
¶53 Second, the City's ownership rights in its buses are 
not the same as an individual's ownership rights in his private 
vehicle.  It is possible the City means its argument to assert 
that the Local Regulation Statute's reference to "a state 
statute" as the point of comparison is meant to be longhand for 
"law," thereby giving us leave to compare the Rule's stringency 
against non-statutory sources of law.  If that is what the 
reference means——and we do not believe it is——the City would 
still be unable to justify the Rule.  The City's argument is 
dependent on demonstrating that its authority to exclude 
passengers from its buses is coextensive with an individual's 
authority to deny carriage to another.  For the following 
reasons, it is not. 
¶54 Governments, whether great or small, exercise only 
that amount of authority they rightfully receive from those they 
                                                                                                                                                             
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" 
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994))). 
 
36 Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2) (emphasis added). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
36 
 
represent.37  And they must use that authority only in ways that 
are appropriate to achieve the ends for which they were granted 
the authority.38   
¶55 With respect to property entrusted to its care, the 
City notes that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of 
                                                 
37 "[T]he people of the several States are the only 
true source of power . . . .  All powers that the Constitution 
neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the 
States are controlled by the people of each State."  U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 847-48 (1995); see also 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) 
("There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or 
of the nature or origin of its authority.  We set up government 
by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those 
in 
power 
any 
legal 
opportunity 
to 
coerce 
that 
consent.  
Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public 
opinion by authority."); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 43 
(1907) ("It is not extravagant to say that to all lovers of the 
country [the American flag] signifies government resting on the 
consent of the governed . . . ."); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 700 (1868) ("A State, in the ordinary sense of the 
Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, 
occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under 
a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, 
and established by the consent of the governed."); Goodall v. 
City of Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 32, 38 (1856) ("In England, the 
Parliament is said to be supreme, omnipotent, and to its 
mandates the highest, as well as the lowest, in all their rights 
and acquisitions must yield. Not so here; all departments of 
government derive their powers from the prescribed consent of 
the people who are governed". 
 
38 "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional."  M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
421, (1819).  Johnston v. City of Sheboygan, 30 Wis. 2d 179, 
186, 140 N.W.2d 247 (1966) (quoting M'Culloch). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
37 
 
property, has power to preserve the property under its control 
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."  Adderley v. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).  The City lawfully dedicated 
its buses to providing "safe, efficient and economical movement 
of persons and goods in the City of Madison and the metropolitan 
area consistent with the Commission's mission to support the 
City's distinct and quality neighborhoods where people will want 
to live, work, do business, learn and play by providing safe and 
efficient transportation."  Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances 
§ 3.14(4)(g).  Thus, the City says, Adderley gives it authority 
to exercise over its buses the rights typical of private 
ownership in pursuit of those enumerated purposes.  So we must 
determine whether Adderley allows the City to pursue these 
purposes by banning weapons on the same basis that a private 
individual bans weapons from his private vehicle.  We conclude 
it does not.  
¶56 An individual may ban weapons because he has unlimited 
discretion to bar anyone and everyone from his vehicle for any 
reason, or even no reason at all.  The City enjoys no such 
latitude with respect to bus passengers.  Indeed, the City's 
ability 
to 
exclude 
passengers 
is 
subject 
to 
significant 
circumscription. The most significant is that, whatever property 
rights it might have, it may not use them in derogation of the 
law: 
"[A] 
municipality 
cannot 
lawfully 
forbid 
what 
the 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
38 
 
legislature has expressly licensed, authorized or required, or 
authorize what the legislature has expressly forbidden."  Fox v. 
City of Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 545, 275 N.W. 513 (1937). 
¶57 Adderley 
is 
entirely 
incapable 
of 
pushing 
that 
principle aside.  Adderley is a First Amendment case (as are the 
other cases the City cited in support of its "ownership" 
argument), in which the Court analogized public ownership of 
property to private ownership as an aid in determining whether 
the property in question constituted a public forum for speech 
purposes.  This case, of course, has nothing to do with the 
First Amendment.  Thus, the City's argument on this point 
consists entirely of an analogy to free speech cases, the 
foremost of which (Adderley) tangentially employed an analogy 
between public and private ownership as part of a much broader 
constitutional analysis.39  Analogies are sometimes helpful in 
contextualizing an issue, but an analogy on top of an analogy 
rarely conveys useful information.  Such is the case here. 
                                                 
39 The other First Amendment cases the City cited rely, at 
least in part, on Adderley.  See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (citing 
Adderley in the process of analyzing First Amendment challenge 
to Postal Service's right to restrict access to mailboxes); 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) 
(citing Adderley in the process of analyzing First Amendment 
challenge to City's right to deny advertising request on public 
buses). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
39 
 
¶58 Adderley can teach us nothing about the question at 
hand because the City's recursive analogies left no room for the 
Local Regulation Statute.  To conclude that the City's property 
rights allow it to exclude law-abiding members of the public 
from its buses, we would first have to conclude that those 
property rights enjoy a permanence so profound that they are 
immune from statutory alteration.  Those analogized rights, 
however, are not untouchable.  The scope and nature of property 
rights are defined by our laws.40  If the law modifies a property 
right, therefore, one may not assert the previous version of the 
property right to trump the very law that changed the right.  
The Local Regulation Statute (as discussed above) forbids the 
City from forbidding weapons on its buses when otherwise carried 
in conformance with the law.  Thus, to the extent the City 
previously had a property-based right to exclude riders in 
possession of weapons, that right ceased with the advent of the 
Local Regulation Statute.  To claim a property right to exclude 
                                                 
40 "Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution.  Rather they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law——rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of 
entitlement to those benefits."  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also, Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power 
Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 480, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997) (quoting Roth's 
proposition, supra, that property interests are created and 
defined by independent sources such as state law). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
40 
 
weapons-carrying passengers from its buses is to invoke a right 
that no longer exists (if it ever did). 
¶59 From all of this we may deduce that the City's 
ownership interest in its buses does not allow it to arbitrarily 
exclude potential passengers a la private vehicle owners.  
Instead, any decision to exclude must be tied to a lawful basis.  
With respect to a prospective passenger who is complying with 
the Vehicle Statute, state law offers no such basis.  And the 
Local Regulation Statute says the City (and its sub-units) may 
not create such a basis.  Because the City cannot exclude 
passengers from its buses without a lawful basis, and none 
exists with respect to passengers who comply with state weapons 
laws, the City's ownership interest in its buses gives it no 
authority to promulgate or enforce the Rule.  
3. 
The Concealed-Carry Statute 
¶60 Thus far we have considered only the Local Regulation 
Statute's impact on the Rule's proscription of "knives" and 
"firearms" on the City's buses.  We addressed only those weapons 
in that analysis because those are the types of weapons included 
in the statute's mandate.  But there are other types of weapons, 
and other statutes that speak to their regulation.  Amongst 
these is the Concealed-Carry Statute, which covers not just 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
41 
 
handguns but electric weapons and billy clubs as well.41  So we 
now determine whether the Rule may lawfully prohibit the 
carrying of these types of concealed weapons.42 
¶61 In relevant part, the Concealed-Carry Statute says a 
"licensee or an out-of-state licensee may carry a concealed 
weapon anywhere in this state except as provided under subs. 
(15m) and (16) and ss. 943.13(1m)(c) and 948.605(2)(b)1r."  Wis. 
Stat. § 175.60(2g)(a).  The exceptions need not detain us, 
because none address buses.  So, because we have already 
concluded 
that 
the 
City 
cannot 
regulate 
firearms 
more 
stringently than state statutes, all we must do here is decide 
whether city buses are mobile negations of "anywhere in this 
state." 
¶62 The City's argument did not engage the language of the 
Concealed-Carry Statute other than to assert that the word 
"anywhere" cannot really mean anywhere.  There are, of course, 
two limitations on this right to carry concealed weapons in 
Wisconsin.  We find the first in the statute itself, which 
contains a list of situations and places to which the statute's 
                                                 
41 "'Weapon' means a handgun, an electric weapon, as defined 
in 
s. 941.295(1c)(a), 
or 
a 
billy 
club." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 175.60(1)(j). 
42 The City's authority to ban handguns has been withdrawn 
by the Local Regulation Statute, as described above. 
 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
42 
 
mandate does not apply.43  The second lies in the principle that 
the legislature is aware of the state's existing laws, and that 
                                                 
43 The exceptions cover only the following: 
 
Certain restrictions imposed by employers on their 
employees (Wis. Stat. § 175.60(15m); 
 
Certain types of buildings, consisting of (Wis. Stat. 
§ 175.60(16)): 
1. 
Any portion of a building that is a police 
station, sheriff's office, state patrol station, or 
the office of a division of criminal investigation 
special agent of the department; 
2. 
Any portion of a building that is a prison, jail, 
house of correction, or secured correctional facility; 
3. 
The facility established under § 46.055 [secure 
mental health facility for sexually violent persons]; 
4. 
The 
center 
established 
under 
§ 46.056 
[the 
Wisconsin Resource Center located on the grounds of 
the Winnebago Mental Health Institute]; 
5. 
Any secured unit or secured portion of a mental 
health institute under § 51.05, including a facility 
designated as the Maximum Security Facility at Mendota 
Mental Health Institute; 
6. 
Any portion of a building that is a county, 
state, or federal courthouse; 
7. 
Any portion of a building that is a municipal 
courtroom if court is in session; 
8. 
A place beyond a security checkpoint in an 
airport; 
 
Restrictions imposed by authorized persons on lands, 
residences, 
commercial 
buildings, 
special 
event 
locations, 
buildings that are owned, occupied, or controlled by state or 
local governmental units, and university or college grounds or 
buildings 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.13(1m)(c)); 
and 
 
 
School grounds (Wis. Stat. § 948.605(2)(b)1r). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
43 
 
it adopts new legislation against that backdrop, leaving the 
present law undisturbed except so far as necessary to make room 
for the new.44  As significant here, the Concealed-Carry Statute 
contains no text suggesting that "anywhere" includes a place the 
licensee has no permission or right to be.  That is to say, a 
concealed-carry license is not a writ authorizing the licensee 
to force his way into a place he may not lawfully occupy.  Thus, 
when the Concealed-Carry Statute speaks of "anywhere," it refers 
to anywhere the licensee may lawfully be, exclusive only of the 
exceptions contained in the statute itself. 
¶63 Whether the Rule's prohibition of concealed weapons 
survives enactment of the Concealed-Carry Statute depends on 
whether the latter has preempted the former.  We begin our 
analysis by recognizing that cities enjoy both constitutional 
and statutory grants of authority.  The Wisconsin Constitution 
provides that "[c]ities and villages organized pursuant to state 
law may determine their local affairs and government, subject 
only to this constitution and to such enactments of the 
                                                 
44 Town of Madison v. City of Madison, 269 Wis. 609, 614, 70 
N.W.2d 249 (1955) ("All statutes are presumed to be enacted by 
the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of 
the law and with reference to it, . . . they are therefore to be 
construed in connection with and in harmony with the existing 
law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of 
jurisprudence, that is, they are to be construed with a 
reference to the whole system of law of which they form a 
part."). 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
44 
 
legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect 
every city or every village."  Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3.  Our 
legislature describes a city's authority broadly:  
Except as elsewhere in the statutes specifically 
provided, the council shall have the management and 
control of the city property, finances, highways, 
navigable waters, and the public service, and shall 
have power to act for the government and good order of 
the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the 
health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may 
carry 
out 
its 
powers 
by 
license, 
regulation, 
suppression, 
borrowing 
of 
money, 
tax 
levy, 
appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and 
other necessary or convenient means.  The powers 
hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other 
grants, and shall be limited only by express language. 
Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5). 
¶64 Consequently, just because a municipal legislative act 
treats a subject also addressed by the legislature does not mean 
the former has been preempted: "[M]unicipalities may enact 
ordinances in the same field and on the same subject covered by 
state 
legislation 
where 
such 
ordinances 
do 
not 
conflict 
with . . . the state legislation."  City of Milwaukee v. Childs 
Co., 195 Wis. 148, 151, 217 N.W. 703 (1928).  We have developed 
a disjunctive list of considerations that assists us in 
determining whether a local legislative act must defer to state 
legislation:  
The tests for determining whether such a legislatively 
intended withdrawal of power which would necessarily 
nullify the local ordinance has occurred are: 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
45 
 
(1) 
whether 
the 
legislature 
has 
expressly 
withdrawn the power of municipalities to act; 
(2) whether the ordinance logically conflicts 
with the state legislation; 
(3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of 
the state legislation; or 
(4) whether the ordinance goes against the spirit 
of the state legislation. 
Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 120 
Wis. 2d 391, 397, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984).  The Concealed-Carry 
Statute does not mention local regulation at all, so it does not 
represent an express withdrawal of a municipality's power to 
regulate concealed weapons within the meaning of the first 
Anchor test.  The parties have not expounded on the "spirit" of 
the 
Concealed-Carry 
Statute, 
so 
there 
is 
insufficient 
information available to us to make the fourth Anchor test 
instructive.  We will, therefore, concentrate on the second and 
third tests. 
¶65 The second test inquires into whether the Rule (as an 
expression of the legislative authority contained in the 
Ordinance) logically conflicts with the Concealed-Carry Statute.  
That statute creates a singularly expansive right to carry 
concealed weapons.  It extends to "anywhere in this state" 
except as described above.  It is difficult to imagine a more 
comprehensive description of where the right may be exercised 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
46 
 
than "anywhere."  But the legislature did not have to create the 
right in this manner.  If its paramount concern was not 
comprehensiveness, it could have instead provided a list of 
places in which the right to carry a concealed weapon could be 
exercised.  This would almost necessarily have led to a 
patchwork 
"carry" 
landscape 
in 
which 
one 
would 
need 
a 
constantly-updated, GPS-enabled smartphone app to determine from 
instant to instant whether one was complying with the Concealed-
Carry Statute. 
¶66 The logic inherent in the legislature's decision to 
define the right as all-encompassing, subject only to carefully 
delimited exceptions, is that the right is meant to extend as 
far 
as 
is 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
its 
internally-defined 
limitations.  There is no room in the Concealed-Carry Statute 
for a municipality to define "anywhere" as something other than 
the comprehensive expanse it was meant to be.  If there were 
such room, Wisconsin's municipalities could instantly create the 
patchwork landscape the text of the Concealed-Carry Statute 
indicates the legislature meant to avoid. 
¶67 This analysis also indicates the Rule fails the third 
Anchor test.  The Concealed-Carry Statute's evident purpose is 
to allow the carrying of concealed weapons as broadly as 
possible, subject only to limited exceptions identified by the 
statute itself.  This breadth, coupled with the assurance that 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
47 
 
only 
the 
legislature 
can 
add 
new 
restrictions, 
allows 
individuals to move about the entire state with confidence they 
are not violating the law.  If it were otherwise, people 
traveling the interstate with a concealed weapon might find 
themselves compliant as they drive through a carry-philic town, 
only to find themselves law-breakers a moment later as they pass 
into an adjacent carry-phobic community.  In practice, this 
would mean (for example) that the municipality along the 
Madison-Milwaukee corridor with the most restrictive weapon 
regulation would effectively set the concealed-carry standard 
for everyone traveling between the two cities.  This would 
certainly defeat the Concealed-Carry Statute's purpose in 
creating a uniform standard for the entire state.45 
¶68 In sum, the City may not enforce the Rule against 
concealed-carry licensees who are in compliance with the 
Concealed-Carry Statute. 
                                                 
45 There are, of course, certain and well-defined places one 
may not carry a concealed weapon, e.g., jails, mental health 
institutions, courthouses, etc.  See Wis. Stat. § 175.60(16)(a).  
The nature of these exceptions reinforces the uniformity 
inherent in the Concealed-Carry Statute.  The common thread 
running through each is that they describe places where there 
are obvious and elevated security concerns.  This statute is 
exactly what one would expect of a law aimed at maximizing 
statewide 
uniformity 
while 
simultaneously 
controlling 
for 
legitimate security concerns. 
No. 
 2015AP146 
 
48 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶69 We hold today that the Local Regulation Statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0409, has withdrawn authority from the City to 
regulate, either through its governing body or its sub-units 
(and without regard to the label it affixes to its regulation or 
manner of regulating), the subjects identified in the Local 
Regulation Statute in a manner that is more stringent than an 
analogous state statute.  We also hold that the Concealed-Carry 
Statute, Wis. Stat. § 175.60, preempts the City's authority to 
restrict a licensee's right to carry concealed weapons on the 
City's buses so long as the licensee complies with the statute's 
requirements.  Finally, we hold that neither the City nor any of 
its sub-units or employees may enforce the Rule to the extent it 
purports to prohibit carrying any knife or firearm (as defined 
by the Local Regulation Statute) or weapon (as defined by the 
Concealed-Carry Statute), so long as such carrying is not 
forbidden by (and is done in compliance with) the Vehicle 
Statute, Wis. Stat. § 167.30, the Concealed-Carry Statute, and 
all other statutes that may from time to time become applicable. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Appendix A 
1 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
No. 2015AP149 
 
2 
 
Appendix A 
 
No. 2015AP149 
 
3 
Appendix B 
 
No. 2015AP149 
 
1 
 
Appendix B 
 
No. 2015AP149 
 
2 
 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
1 
 
¶70 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The public 
policy and safety considerations involved in allowing weapons on 
a city bus may be hotly debated, but those issues are not before 
the court.  Nor is the complexity of the constitutional right to 
bear arms at issue here.  This case presents a straightforward 
question of statutory interpretation. 
¶71 The issue here is whether Wis. Stat. § 66.0409 
preempts a rule adopted by the City of Madison's Transit and 
Parking Commission that prohibits a person from traveling on a 
city bus with a weapon (the "bus rule"). 
¶72 Judicial restraint requires that courts "assume that 
the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language" 
chosen by the legislature.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
And that is exactly what the circuit court and a unanimous court 
of appeals did here. 
¶73 Applying a plain meaning interpretation, both courts 
determined that the bus rule is not preempted by state statute.  
They concluded that the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 66.0409 
(the 
"Preemption 
Statute") 
clearly 
limits 
preemption 
to 
municipal "ordinances" and "resolutions" enacted or adopted by a 
"city, village, town or county."  See Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(1)(b) 
& (2).1  Further they determined the bus rule is neither an 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion refers to this same statute as the 
"Local Regulation Statute."  Like the court of appeals, I use 
the term "Preemption Statute." 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
2 
 
"ordinance" nor a "resolution," and it was not enacted by the 
city.  That should be the end of the analysis. 
¶74 A majority of this court, however, fails to exercise 
the same restraint.  Discarding seminal rules of statutory 
interpretation, the majority slips into legislative mode, and 
ignores 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
words 
chosen 
by 
the 
legislature.  It rewrites the statute in a manner it wishes the 
legislature had chosen, a manner chosen by several other states—
—but not Wisconsin. 
¶75 The majority evinces a further lack of judicial 
restraint when it reaches out to address constitutional issues 
not raised or briefed by the parties. 
¶76 Contrary to the majority, I agree with the circuit 
court and the court of appeals that the legislature meant what 
the words of the statute clearly provide.  The rule adopted by 
the City of Madison's Transit and Parking Commission that 
prohibits a person from traveling on a city bus with a weapon is 
not preempted by state statute. 
¶77 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶78 As a harbinger of things to come, the majority begins 
its analysis not with the statute to be examined, but with a 
discussion of the Second Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, examining the constitutional right to bear arms. 
Majority op., ¶¶8-12. 
¶79 Cases that turn on statutory interpretation generally 
begin the analysis by setting forth the text of the statute.  
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
3 
 
For example, in the first paragraph of its analysis, the 
petitioner's brief sets forth the relevant statute in full.  
Following suit, the City likewise presents front and center the 
statute to be examined, setting it forth in full in the second 
paragraph of the brief's analysis.  But where is the Preemption 
Statute set forth in full in the majority's analysis?  Nowhere. 
¶80 This 
omission 
underscores 
that 
the 
majority's 
statutory interpretation is less about the text of the statute 
and more about lengthy and intertwining legal arguments.  The 
absence obscures the ability to compare the plain text of the 
statute with the majority's interpretation of it.  Wisconsin's 
Preemption Statute, Wis. Stat § 66.0409(2), provides: 
[With exceptions not relevant here], no political 
subdivision may enact or enforce an ordinance or adopt 
a resolution that regulates the sale, purchase, 
purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, 
possession, 
bearing, 
transportation, 
licensing, 
permitting, registration or taxation of any knife or 
any firearm or part of a firearm, including ammunition 
and reloader components, unless the ordinance or 
resolution is the same as or similar to, and no more 
stringent than, a state statute. 
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(1)(b) defines "political 
subdivision" as "a city, village, town or county." 
¶81 It is noteworthy that when the majority does reach the 
issue actually before this court, it claims to be engaging in a 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation. 
 
Yet, 
its 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation does not come close to tracking the words of the 
statute it is examining. 
¶82 The majority determines that "the plain meaning of the 
[Preemption] Statute is that the legislature withdrew from the 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
4 
 
City's 
governing 
body 
all 
authority 
to 
legislate 
on 
the . . . 'possession, bearing [or] transportation . . . of any 
knife or any firearm' unless the legislation is 'the same as or 
similar to, and no more stringent than, a state statute.'"  
Majority op., ¶28 (citation omitted). 
¶83 In reaching this "plain meaning" interpretation of the 
statute the majority discards seminal rules of statutory 
interpretation, slips into legislative mode, and re-writes the 
statute the way it wishes the legislature would have written it.  
I address each in turn. 
A 
¶84 Although it pays lip service to seminal rules of 
statutory interpretation set forth in Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
one wonders what is left of those rules after reviewing the 
majority's 
truncated 
exposition 
of 
a 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation. 
¶85 When Kalal was decided, essentially two approaches to 
statutory interpretation had evolved.  One approach was more 
holistic and inquired what was meant by the statute.  Another 
focused on the words of the statute chosen by the legislature 
and instructed that the words be given their plain meaning.  The 
majority in Kalal adopted the latter textual approach. 
¶86 Curiously, the majority in this case appears to 
backtrack from the majority's approach in Kalal.  Rather than 
inquire what the text does provide, the majority here asks what 
does the statute mean.  It even supplies emphasis in the 
original, underlying "meaning" as an apparent shorthand signal 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
5 
 
of a reinvigorated holistic approach.  Majority op., ¶20.  After 
explaining that to be bound by the words of the statute chosen 
by the legislature would render it a mechanical and mere 
"arbiter[] of word choice," the majority emphasizes "[i]t is, 
instead, the 'plain meaning' of a statute we must apply."  Id., 
¶¶19-20. 
¶87 In the majority's search for meaning, it discards 
seminal rules of statutory interpretation that emphasize the 
primacy of the words chosen by the legislature.  Brushed aside 
are rules that require an interpretation using the statutory 
common and ordinary meaning of those chosen words as well as an 
examination of those words in the statutory context in which 
they are used.  The majority's departure from these seminal 
rules includes those set forth below. 
¶88 First, "Judicial deference to the policy choices 
enacted into law by the legislature requires that statutory 
interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  As noted above, the majority 
asserts that it is not the words of the statute that are 
significant, but the "plain meaning" of a statute that must be 
applied.  Majority op., ¶20. 
 
 "We must, however, keep in mind that this axiom [to apply 
the plain meaning of the statute] does not reduce the 
judicial function to mechanically comparing the words of 
a statute to the name given a legislative enactment, or 
the body enacting it."  Majority op., ¶19. 
 
 "We are not merely arbiters of word choice. If we were, 
we would need do nothing more than confirm that 'rule' is 
a word different from 'ordinance' and 'resolution,' and 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
6 
 
that 'commission' is etymologically distinct from 'city,' 
'village,' 'town,' and 'county.'"  Id., ¶19. 
 
¶89 Second, "statutory interpretation begins with the 
language of the statute."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  The majority opinion does 
not set forth the full text of the statute anywhere in its 
statutory analysis, which obscures a comparison to the text of 
the statute with the majority's "plain meaning" interpretation 
of it.  Rather than beginning its analysis with the language of 
the statute, it begins with a discussion of the Second 
Amendment.  Majority op., ¶¶8-12. 
 
¶90 Third, "[s]tatutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.    
Although the majority accurately quotes Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 
Wis. 2d 331, 342, 288 N.W.2d 779 (1980), which defines the 
common 
and 
ordinary 
meaning 
of 
both 
"ordinance" 
and 
"resolution," it declines to apply the common and ordinary 
meaning to those terms.2  Majority op., ¶¶24-28. 
                                                 
2 Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 288 N.W.2d 449 
(1980) (citations omitted) provides: 
A municipal ordinance or by-law is a regulation of a 
general, permanent nature, enacted by the governing 
council 
of 
a 
municipal 
corporation. . . . A 
resolution, or order as it is sometimes called, is an 
informal enactment of a temporary nature, providing 
for the disposition of a particular piece of the 
administrative 
business 
of 
a 
municipal 
corporation. . . . And it has been held that even 
where the statute or municipal charter requires the 
municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
7 
 
¶91 Instead, the majority superimposes on Kalal a new 
approach.  It creates alternative interpretive principles, 
including examining the ordinance's "taxonomy functionally."  
Majority op., ¶25.  Ultimately, it arrives at a plain meaning 
interpretation based on these principles. 
 
 The majority "derive[s] three principles useful to 
our 
inquiry": 
 
(1) 
"ordinances 
are 
municipal 
legislative devices, formally enacted, that address 
general subjects in a permanent fashion"; (2) 
"resolutions 
are 
those 
informal 
municipal 
legislative acts that address particular pieces of 
administrative business in a temporary fashion"; and 
(3) "the label given to a legislative device is not 
dispositive——one identifies the device's taxonomy 
functionally."  Majority op., ¶25. 
 
 "Thus, the plain meaning of the [Preemption] Statute 
is that the legislature withdrew from the City's 
governing body all authority to legislate on the 
subjects it identifies . . ."  Id., ¶28. 
 
¶92 Fourth, "statutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  The 
majority does not analyze the statutory context or language of 
closely-related statutes.  Instead, it analyzes the result and 
reasons that the result is not what the legislature intended. 
 
 "We examine the statute's contextualized words, put 
them into operation, and observe the results to 
                                                                                                                                                             
passed in the manner and with the statutory formality 
required in the enactment of an ordinance, it will be 
binding and effective as an ordinance. 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
8 
 
ensure we do not arrive at an unreasonable or absurd 
conclusion."  Majority op., ¶20. 
 
¶93 The process that the majority employs in its plain 
meaning 
interpretation 
is 
one 
that 
is 
almost 
entirely 
disconnected 
from 
the 
actual 
language 
of 
the 
statute.  
Ultimately, it is apparent that in abandoning or reconfiguring 
seminal rules of statutory interpretation, the majority fails to 
honor the words chosen by the legislature. 
B 
¶94 Instead the majority dons its collective legislative 
hat and rewrites the Preemption Statute in a manner chosen by 
several 
other 
states——but 
not 
Wisconsin. 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
legislature could have, but did not, use expansive language 
intended to more broadly prohibit local agency regulation of 
firearms.  In re Incorporation of Portion of Town of Sheboygan, 
2001 WI App 279, ¶9, 248 Wis. 2d 904, 637 N.W.2d 770 ("It is 
presumed that the legislature is cognizant of what language to 
include or omit when it enacts laws."). 
¶95 Other jurisdictions provide examples of how the 
Wisconsin legislature could have more broadly written its 
preemption statute.  For example, in Kansas, the preemption 
statute prohibits the adoption of ordinances and resolutions, 
but also says that "no agent of any city or county shall take 
any administrative action" to regulate firearms.  Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 12-16,124(a) (2013). 
¶96 A multitude of other states have done exactly what the 
Wisconsin legislature did not do, but what the majority wishes 
this legislature had done.  See Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-915A (2012) 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
9 
 
(no agent of any locality "shall take any administrative 
action . . . "); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a) (2014) (no city 
"shall occupy any part of the field of regulation . . . "); 
Mich. 
Comp. 
Laws 
§ 
123.1102 
(2015) 
(no 
city 
shall 
"enact . . . any 
ordinance . . . or 
regulate 
in 
any 
other 
manner"); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) (2011) (local 
governments "shall not enact any ordinance or regulation 
pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner . . . "); Fla. 
Stat. 
§ 790.33(1) 
(2011) 
(preempting 
"any 
administrative 
regulations or rules"); Idaho Code § 18-3302J(2) (2014) ("no [] 
city, agency, board or any other political subdivision . . . may 
adopt or enforce any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance, which 
regulates 
in 
any 
manner . . . "); 
Ky. 
Rev. 
Stat. 
Ann. 
§ 65.870(1) (West 2012) (prohibiting a ban by "any person acting 
under the authority of any . . . organization[] . . . "). 
¶97 The 
majority 
ultimately 
justifies 
its 
creative 
approach to statutory interpretation by emphasizing a desire to 
avoid an absurd result.  Majority op., ¶46 n.31.  However, it 
appears that the majority may be confusing a desire to avoid an 
absurd result with reaching a statutory interpretation it 
desires. 
II 
¶98 Contrary to the majority, I begin as our case law 
instructs, with the plain language of the statute.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the 
language of the statute.") (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).  "If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
10 
 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Id.  We give statutory language 
its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their definitional meaning.  Id.  "[L]egislative history 
is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation."  Id., ¶51 (citation omitted). 
¶99 I agree with the City, the circuit court and a 
unanimous court of appeals that the statute plainly preempts 
only 
"ordinances" 
and 
"resolutions." 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 
66.0409(2) provides that "no political subdivision may enact or 
enforce an ordinance or adopt a resolution" that regulates the 
bearing of any firearm unless it is no more stringent than a 
statute: 
 
[With 
exceptions 
not 
relevant 
here], 
no 
political 
subdivision may enact or enforce an ordinance or adopt a 
resolution that regulates the sale, purchase, purchase 
delay, 
transfer, 
ownership, 
use, 
keeping, 
possession, 
bearing, 
transportation, 
licensing, 
permitting, 
registration, or taxation of any knife or any firearm or 
part of a firearm, including ammunition and reloader 
components, unless the ordinance or resolution is the same 
as or similar to, and no more stringent than, a state 
statute. 
¶100 The bus rule is not an "ordinance" or "resolution."  A 
municipal "ordinance" is "a regulation of a general, permanent 
nature, enacted by the governing council of a municipal 
corporation . . . "  Cross, 94 Wis. 2d at 342.  A "resolution" 
is an "informal enactment of a temporary nature, providing for 
the disposition of a particular piece of the administrative 
business of a municipal corporation."  Id. 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
11 
 
¶101 The meaning of the statute is plain and our inquiry 
may stop here.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  However, we 
also look to legislative history to confirm our plain meaning 
interpretation.  Id., ¶51.  Absent from the majority opinion is 
any discussion of the legislative history of the Preemption 
Statute. 
 
Likely 
it 
is 
absent 
because 
it 
supports 
an 
interpretation completely at odds with the majority's statutory 
interpretation. 
¶102 As Justice Prosser's concurrence in State v. Cole, 
2003 
WI 
112, 
¶¶60-64, 
264 
Wis. 2d 520, 
665 
N.W.2d 328, 
explained, the Preemption Statute was enacted in 1995 to address 
gun control ordinances proposed by the cities of Milwaukee, 
Kenosha, and Madison.  In response to these proposed ordinances, 
Representative 
DuWayne 
Johnsrud 
introduced 
legislation 
"to 
preempt municipalities from enacting gun control ordinances that 
were stricter than state law."  Id., ¶64 (emphasis added). 
¶103 Looking at how other states have interpreted similar 
statutory 
language 
also 
confirms 
our 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation.  The Oregon court of appeals decision in Doe v. 
Medford Sch. Dist. 549C, 221 P.3d 787 (2009) is instructive 
because 
of 
Oregon's 
analogous 
Preemption 
Statute, 
which 
prohibits only ordinances.3  The Medford court reasoned that "the 
                                                 
3 Oregon's Preemption Statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.170(2) 
(2016), provides: 
Except as expressly authorized by state statute, no 
county, 
city 
or 
other 
municipal 
corporation 
or 
district may enact civil or criminal ordinances, 
including but not limited to zoning ordinances, to 
regulate, restrict or prohibit the sale, acquisition, 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
12 
 
legislature intended the term 'ordinance' to refer to the 
equivalent of a law or other enactment of a municipal 
corporation that carries the force of law and is enforceable 
against the public generally."  Id. at 792.  Thus, Medford 
determined that a school district could issue a policy barring 
district employees from bearing arms on school district property 
despite its preemption statute, because it was not enforceable 
against the general public.  Id. at 799. 
¶104 Similar to the school district policy in Medford, the 
bus rule is not a generally-applicable legislative enactment 
like an ordinance.  Bus policies are limited in scope and apply 
only to members of the public who choose to ride a Madison Metro 
bus.  See also John E.D. Larkin, Guns in Government Parks & 
Buildings——Municipal Enforcement of Safety Rules Without Running 
Afoul of State Preemption, 86 Pa. B. Ass'n Q. 128, 137 (July 
2015) ("government conduct does not rise to the level of 
'regulation' when the government acts in its capacity as a 
private owner."); Wolfe v. Twp. of Salisbury, 880 A.2d 62, 69 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (township could ban hunting, despite a 
statewide preemption statute, in township parks because the 
township did not act to regulate hunting throughout the 
municipality, but only on its own property).  Like in Medford, 
the bus rule here is appropriately based on the agency's limited 
                                                                                                                                                             
transfer, 
ownership, 
possession, 
storage, 
transportation or use of firearms . . . Ordinances 
that are contrary to this subsection are void. 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
13 
 
authority because it applies only to persons who choose to ride 
a Madison Metro bus, rather than to the general public. 
¶105 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the plain 
meaning of Wisconsin's Preemption Statute does not clearly 
preempt the bus rule.  This plain meaning interpretation is 
confirmed by the legislative history and informed by examining 
the interpretation given to similar language. 
¶106 Additionally, the plain meaning interpretation set 
forth in this dissent is consistent with that previously 
rendered by the Wisconsin Attorney General.  It is conspicuous 
by its absence from the majority's analysis.  After the Vehicle 
Statute was amended, see 2011 Wis. Act 35, § 31, the Attorney 
General opined that "public and private entities may prohibit or 
restrict the possession and transport of weapons."4  I agree. 
III 
¶107 Having determined that the legislature meant what it 
said in the text of the Preemption Statute, the statutory 
interpretation exercise may come to an end.  Accordingly, there 
is no need to address whether the bus rule is more stringent 
than state law, when it is not preempted by state law.  I pause, 
however, to briefly comment on the observation set forth at the 
outset of this dissent. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Department of Justice, Wisconsin's Carrying 
Concealed Weapon Law Questions and Answers 45 (June 1, 2013), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dles/ccw/ccw-
faq.pdf. 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
14 
 
¶108 The majority strays far afield from the question of 
statutory 
interpretation 
presented 
here 
by 
beginning 
its 
analysis with a discussion about the right to bear arms under 
the 
Second 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  
Majority op., ¶¶8-12.  It contends that this summary discussion 
of the Second Amendment provides context and background for the 
statutory analysis.  Id., ¶8 n.10. 
¶109 However, both parties repeatedly advised the court 
that this case, as presented, has nothing to do with the 
constitutional right to bear arms.  The parties intentionally 
and strategically framed this case as a case of statutory 
interpretation only.  Nevertheless, the majority evinces a 
further lack of judicial restraint when it reaches out to 
address constitutional issues not raised or briefed by the 
parties. 
¶110 A litany of refrains makes clear that it is the 
position of the parties that the constitutional right to bear 
arms is not implicated here, either under the United States 
Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution.  Counsel for 
Wisconsin Carry repeatedly stated: 
 " . . . We 
could 
have 
brought 
that 
issue 
(the 
constitutional right to bear arms on a city bus), we 
didn't.  I am not here today to argue it." 
 "We did not raise any constitutional issues in this 
case." 
 "No, we did not raise any constitutional issues." 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
15 
 
 "We did not bring any state or federal constitutional 
issues in th[is] case." 
Counsel for the City agreed: 
 "Well there's a reason the petitioners didn't raise 
any constitutional issues in this case.  And one of 
them is [that] the Vehicle Statute has been in play 
since before Act 35." 
 "There [have] been no constitutional issues in this 
case." 
¶111 Undaunted by counsel's protestations to the contrary, 
the majority embarks on a discussion of the Second Amendment.  
It observes the "extensive textual and historical analysis" 
employed by the court in D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 
(2008), and notes that the Wisconsin Constitution has very 
distinctive language from that contained in the United States 
Constitution.  Majority op., ¶10.  Without any analysis, the 
majority then declares that the Wisconsin right to bear arms is 
also fundamental and is an "individual right."  Id. 
¶112 The lack of nuance in the majority's declaration 
underscores the folly in reaching out to discuss constitutional 
issues not presented, briefed or argued.  For example, the 
majority's discussion of a "pre-existing" fundamental right may 
suggest that such a right is absolute.  See majority op., ¶9.  
However, as counsel for the City stated at oral argument, the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms "is not an absolute right.  
It's subject to reasonable restrictions.  And for years, the 
State had a restriction against carrying guns in vehicles and 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
16 
 
it's been articulated in cases what the safety reasons for that 
[are]." 
¶113 In Heller, the United States Supreme Court explained 
"[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment 
is not unlimited."  554 U.S. at 626.  The Heller court further 
observed that "[f]rom Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, 
commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was 
not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any 
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
¶114 This is the same lack of nuance that Justice Prosser 
warned against in Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶¶60-79, (Prosser, J., 
concurring), which was the first time our court interpreted the 
new Wisconsin Constitutional Amendment on the right to bear 
arms.  Justice Prosser explained that the amendment requires a 
"nuanced interpretation."  Id., ¶60.  Tracing the legislative 
history and changes in the text of the proposed amendment as it 
worked its way through the initial legislative process, he made 
clear 
that 
merely 
labelling 
the 
right 
"fundamental" 
was 
insufficient.  Id., ¶¶60-79. 
¶115 Justice Prosser's concurrence in Cole cautioned that 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms in the Wisconsin 
Constitution "is not a fundamental right in the same sense that 
freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right to remain 
silent, and the right to a jury trial are fundamental rights."  
Id., ¶79.  Additionally, the concurrence emphasized the need for 
nuance 
when 
examining 
the 
individual 
nature 
of 
the 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
17 
 
constitutional right.  It clarified that the choice of the 
wording "the people" at the beginning of the amendment to the 
Wisconsin Constitution was intended to de-emphasize the nature 
of the individual right: 
First, although the legislature wanted to establish a 
right that would benefit hundreds of thousands of 
individual gun owners, it wanted to deemphasize the 
'individual' 
nature of this right. The original 
amendment provided that 'Every individual, except an 
individual restricted in accordance with federal law, 
has the right to keep and bear arms . . . but the 
manner of bearing arms may be regulated []' . . . By 
removing this limiting clutter from the draft, the 
legislature removed any impediment to a reasonable 
exercise of the police power.  By shifting the right 
from 'Every individual' to 'The people,' the amendment 
underlined the fact that the police power in Wisconsin 
may 
reasonably 
restrict 
specific 
individuals 
and 
classifications of people (e.g., domestic abusers, 
minors) in ways that it may not restrict the people as 
a whole. 
Id., ¶77. 
¶116 The majority's far reaching constitutional discussion 
also tackles the Wisconsin Home Rule Amendment, art. XI, § 3, 
although neither party briefed or argued the issue.5  In fact 
neither party even cites it in passing in their briefs.  
                                                 
5 Wisconsin's Home Rule Amendment provides in relevant part: 
Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law 
may determine their local affairs and government, 
subject 
only 
to 
this 
constitution 
and 
to 
such 
enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as 
with uniformity shall affect every city or every 
village.  The method of such determination shall be 
prescribed by the legislature. 
Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1). 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
18 
 
Admittedly, 
the 
non-party 
amicus 
does 
cite 
to 
this 
constitutional provision, but then clarifies that "[i]n creating 
the [bus] Rule, Madison did not rely upon the Home Rule 
Amendment, so the issue is whether the Rule is preempted under 
statutory [not constitutional] home-rule analysis." 
¶117 Having raised the Home Rule Amendment, the majority 
then fails to consider the amendment when analyzing the scope of 
municipal authority.  Perhaps as a result, the majority makes 
some 
broad 
statements 
about 
the 
scope 
of 
authority 
of 
municipalities without nuance or substantiation. 
¶118 The majority's broad statements appear to sub silentio 
eviscerate 
the 
constitutional 
potency 
of 
the 
Home 
Rule 
Amendment.  For example, it proclaims that "if the City has no 
legislative 
authority 
with 
respect 
to 
that 
subject, 
it 
necessarily has nothing to delegate to its divisions."  Majority 
op., ¶23; see also id., ¶28 ("Because a municipality cannot 
delegate what it does not have, the City is entirely powerless 
to authorize any of its sub-units to legislate on this 
subject."). 
¶119 Adopted in 1924, the Home Rule Amendment was meant to 
give local government significant powers separate from those 
bestowed through legislative enactments.  Because Home Rule 
powers derive from the Wisconsin Constitution and not from the 
Wisconsin legislature, there are limits on the legislature's 
ability to circumscribe municipal authority through legislative 
enactments.  Yet, the majority's analysis fails to account for 
such possible limitations. 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
19 
 
IV 
¶120 For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the 
Preemption Statute does not apply to the bus rule because it is 
not an ordinance or resolution enacted by the City.  Judicial 
restraint 
requires 
that 
this 
court 
"assume 
that 
the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language" 
chosen by the legislature.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  
"It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is 
binding. . . . "  Id. 
¶121 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶122 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2015AP146.awb 
 
1