Title: Gudzelak v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 288, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 1, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDREW GUDZELAK, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 288, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court   
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0407020818 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 1, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
September 1, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 1st day of September 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Andrew Gudzelak, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denials of his second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The State has filed a motion to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgments on the basis that it is manifest on the face of 
Gudzelak’s opening brief that this appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
On September 14, 2005, Gudzelak pled guilty before a Superior Court 
judge to one count of Rape in the Fourth Degree.  On November 18, 2005, 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
2
Gudzelak was sentenced by a different Superior Court judge to five years at Level 
V incarceration suspended after two years for three years of decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Gudzelak did not appeal his guilty plea or sentence. 
 
(3) 
Gudzelak filed his first motion for postconviction relief in July 2006.  
Gudzelak raised the following four claims:  (1) conflict of interest by sentencing 
judge; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) 
actual innocence.  Pursuant to a brief scheduled established by the Superior Court, 
Gudzelak’s former defense counsel filed an affidavit (and supplemental affidavit) 
in response to Gudzelak’s allegations of ineffectiveness, and Gudzelak filed a 
reply.  The State also filed a response to the motion. 
 
 
(4) 
By decision dated January 31, 2007, the Superior Court judge who 
had presided over Gudzelak’s September 14, 2005 guilty plea colloquy, considered 
the claims concerning prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, 
and actual innocence, and denied those claims on the merits.  That judge then 
referred the motion to Gudzelak’s sentencing judge for consideration of the 
conflict of interest claim.   
 
(5) 
By decision dated March 6, 2007, the sentencing judge denied the 
conflict of interest claim after performing the requisite analysis to determine 
whether her disqualification was appropriate.2  Gudzelak did not appeal from the 
                                          
 
2 See Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381 (Del. 1991) (establishing two-part analysis to determine judicial 
impartiality).  
 
3
January 31, 2007 and March 6, 2007 decisions denying his first motion for 
postconviction relief. 
 
 
(6) 
Gudzelak filed his second motion for postconviction relief in January 
2009.  Gudzelak raised the following three claims:  (1) involuntary plea; (2) 
sentencing judge should have recused herself; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct.   
 
(7) 
By order dated March 30, 2009, the Superior Court judge who 
accepted Gudzelak’s guilty plea, considered the claims concerning involuntary 
plea and prosecutorial misconduct under the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)3 as 
required4 and denied those claims as untimely5 and as formerly adjudicated.6  That 
judge then referred the motion to Gudzelak’s sentencing judge for consideration of 
the recusal claim.  
 
(8) 
The sentencing judge referred Gudzelak’s recusal claim to a Superior 
Court commissioner for a report and recommendation.  By report and 
recommendation dated April 2, 2009, the commissioner applied the procedural 
bars of Rule 61(i) and recommended that the sentencing judge deny the recusal 
                                          
 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to postconviction relief). 
4 See Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991) (providing that “[t]he first inquiry in any 
analysis of a postconviction relief claim is whether the petition meets the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61”). 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring postconviction motion filed more than one year 
after judgment is final or after newly recognized retroactively applicable right).  In this case, 
Gudzelak’s conviction became on December 19, 2005, upon the expiration of his appeal period 
thirty days after sentencing.  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1). 
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (providing that “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly 
adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a 
postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless 
reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.”). 
 
4
claim as untimely, repetitive,7 procedurally defaulted,8 and as formerly 
adjudicated.  By order dated April 21, 2009, the sentencing judge accepted the 
commissioner’s report and denied the recusal claim for the reasons set forth in the 
report.  This appeal followed. 
 
(9) 
Having carefully considered the parties’ positions on appeal and the 
Superior Court record, the Court concludes that this appeal should be affirmed on 
the basis of the Superior Court’s decisions of March 30, 2009 and April 21, 2009.  
In the absence of a colorable claim of a manifest injustice because of a 
constitutional violation and any indication that consideration of Gudzelak’s claims 
is warranted in the interest of justice, the Superior Court did not err in its dual 
denials of Gudzelak’s motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred. 
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (providing that “[a]ny ground for relief that was not 
asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding . . . is thereafter barred unless consideration of the 
claim is warranted in the interest of justice.”). 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (providing that any ground for relief that was not 
previously asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is barred unless the 
movant demonstrates “[c]ause for relief from the procedural default” and “[p]rejudice from 
violation of the movant’s rights”).