Title: Empress Health and Beauty Spa, Inc. v. Turner
Citation: 503 S.W.2d 188
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 1973

503 S.W.2d 188 (1973) EMPRESS HEALTH AND BEAUTY SPA, INC., Petitioner, v. Ruth TURNER, Respondent. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 17, 1973. *189 Max Shelton, Memphis, for petitioner. Walter Lee Bailey, Jr., Memphis, for respondent. FONES, Justice. Ruth Turner was plaintiff and Empress Health &amp; Beauty Spa, Inc. was defendant in the trial court, and they will be referred to herein in that status. Plaintiff sued defendant for personal injuries, alleging that she had entered into a contract with the defendant, obligating it to give her instructions and provide weight reducing machinery that would cause her to reduce her weight; that she was instructed to use a vibrating machine on September 1, 1970, and "that while plaintiff was using said machine the belt around plaintiff, connected to said machine, broke." The specific acts of negligence alleged were: Defendant answered, denying any act of negligence and asserting an exculpatory clause in the contract as a complete bar to the plaintiff's cause of action. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by the discovery deposition of plaintiff, wherein she identified the contract entered into with the defendant, acknowledged her signature thereon, and same is an exhibit to said deposition. The provision in the contract urged by the defendant as a bar to plaintiff's action is as follows: No counteraffidavits, depositions or other proof was presented by plaintiff in opposition to motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for "such further proceedings as the law directs." We granted defendants petition for the writ of certiorari and have heard oral argument. The Court of Appeals held that the contractual provision relied upon by defendant was ambiguous and "... subject to more than one interpretation in relation to whether or not the plaintiff absolved the defendant of liability for its negligence. From a reading of the language a person might conclude either way on the issue." It is well settled in this State that parties may contract that one shall not be liable for his negligence to another but that such other shall assume the risk incident to such negligence. Said rule was stated and applied in Moss v. Fortune, 207 Tenn. 426, 340 S.W.2d 902 (1960), where the agreement signed by plaintiff read, "I am hiring your horse to ride today and all future rides at my own risk." Further, it is not necessary that the word "negligence" appear in the exculpatory clause and the public policy of Tennessee favors freedom to contract against liability for negligence. See Trailmobile, Inc. v. Chazen, 51 Tenn. App. 576, 370 S.W.2d 840, at 844 (1963). In its opinion, the Court of Appeals further said: We disagree. The first duty of the Court is well stated in the following quote from 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 245: A contract is ambiguous only when it is of uncertain meaning and may fairly *191 be understood in more ways than one. A strained construction may not be placed on the language used to find ambiguity where none exists. We find the contractual provision in question has an inescapable certainty of meaning that requires no construction or interpretation beyond the clear import of the words used. There is nothing inconsistent or uncertain in plaintiff assuming the risk of injury and agreeing to indemnify defendant, in the same sentence. We approve the following principle from 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 249, and it is significant here: The Court of Appeals also held: The exculpatory clause of the contract between the parties is unambiguous, valid, and a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery, as a matter of law. Defendant's motion for a summary judgment was the appropriate procedure for disposition of this case. The Court of Appeals is reversed, the trial court affirmed and the suit dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff. DYER, C.J., CHATTIN and McCANLESS, JJ., and LEECH, Special Justice, concur.