Title: Damren v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC2023-0015
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 14, 2023

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2023-0015 
____________ 
 
FLOYD WILLIAM DAMREN, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
September 14, 2023 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
Floyd William Damren, a prisoner under sentence of death, 
appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his second 
successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Damren was convicted of the 1994 first-degree murder of Don 
Miller and sentenced to death.  Damren v. State, 696 So. 2d 709, 
710-11 (Fla. 1997).  This Court affirmed Damren’s convictions and 
 
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sentences1 on direct appeal.  Id. at 714.  We thereafter affirmed the 
denial of Damren’s initial motion for postconviction relief and 
denied his habeas petition.  Damren v. State, 838 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 
2003).  We also affirmed the denial of Damren’s first successive 
motion for postconviction relief.  Damren v. State, 236 So. 3d 230 
(Fla. 2018). 
On June 10, 2022, Damren filed his second successive 
motion, in which he raised two claims: (1) newly discovered 
evidence of his autism spectrum disorder (ASD) renders his death 
sentence unreliable; and (2) newly discovered evidence of his post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at the time of the offenses renders 
his death sentence unreliable.  Damren claimed that these 
diagnoses qualified as newly discovered evidence because ASD was 
not being diagnosed or recognized in adults at the time of his 1995 
trial and his PTSD was undiagnosed because it was being “masked” 
by his previously undiagnosed ASD.  His claims relied on a report of 
a 2021 neuropsychological evaluation by Marlyne Israelian, Ph.D., a 
 
1.  Damren was also convicted of armed burglary and 
aggravated assault arising out of the same incident, for which he 
was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to life imprisonment 
and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively. 
 
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clinical psychologist, which resulted in the ASD and PTSD 
diagnoses.   
The postconviction court summarily denied Damren’s motion 
as untimely.  The postconviction court found that there did not 
appear to be any dispute that Damren exhibited the symptoms of 
ASD prior to 2019, yet Damren provided no explanation why he 
could not have been diagnosed in 2019 or any time prior to 2021 
through due diligence.  The court noted that Dr. Israelian’s report of 
her recent evaluation of Damren cited to articles related to adults 
with ASD that were published in 2019 and 2020.  As to the PTSD 
diagnosis, the postconviction court assumed that it could have only 
been discovered in conjunction with Damren’s ASD, but because 
Damren provided no explanation why he could not have been 
diagnosed with ASD in 2019 or any time prior to 2021, the 
postconviction court found that there was also no reason his PTSD 
could not have been discovered prior to 2021.  This appeal followed. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
We find no error in the postconviction court’s summary denial 
of Damren’s second successive motion for postconviction relief.  
Damren’s claims were facially insufficient and untimely. 
 
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In Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998), this Court 
set forth the test for a conviction to be set aside on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence as follows: 
First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the 
evidence “must have been unknown by the trial court, by 
the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must 
appear that defendant or his counsel could not have 
known [of it] by the use of diligence.” 
Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of 
such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal 
on retrial.   
(Alteration in original) (citations omitted); see Jones v. State, 591 
So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991).  Because Damren sought to vacate his 
death sentence rather than his conviction, the second prong of 
Jones “requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably 
yield a less severe sentence”—i.e., a life sentence—rather than an 
acquittal.  Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 249 (Fla. 2018) (quoting 
Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d 760, 767 (Fla. 2013)).  Thus, to raise a 
facially sufficient claim based on newly discovered evidence here, it 
was necessary for Damren to assert that there is evidence that was 
not and could not have been known by the use of due diligence at 
the time of trial and that the evidence is of such nature that it 
would probably produce a life sentence on retrial.  See Hutchinson 
 
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v. State, 343 So. 3d 50, 53 (Fla. 2022) (“To be facially sufficient, a 
claim of newly discovered evidence must meet the two-part Jones 
test.”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 601 (2023).   
Damren failed to allege the second prong of the Jones 
standard in both claims of his second successive motion.  In his 
first claim, Damren alleged that evidence of his  
ASD and PTSD, discussed in Claim 2, coupled with his 
use of copious amounts of alcohol on the night of the 
murder would have offered the judge and jury proof that 
his ability to conform his conduct was impaired, 
diminishing his moral culpability.  This would not have 
excused his conduct, but it would have lessened his 
moral responsibility and made a life sentence a 
reasonable and merciful sentence. 
Alleging that the asserted newly discovered evidence would have 
“made a life sentence a reasonable and merciful sentence” is a far 
cry from alleging that it would probably produce a life sentence on 
retrial.  In his second claim, Damren alleged that “[h]ad the jury or 
the sentencing court heard [evidence that Damren has PTSD] there 
is a reasonable probability that the sentence would have been life.”  
Alleging a reasonable probability of a life sentence at retrial is not 
equivalent to alleging a probable life sentence at a retrial and yields 
a facially insufficient claim.  
 
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The requirement in the second prong of the Jones test that the 
alleged newly discovered evidence be of such a nature that it would 
“probably” produce an acquittal on retrial is on par with the “more 
likely than not” standard of prejudice.  See Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 
2d 1243, 1247 n.3 (Fla. 2002) (noting that the “more likely than 
not” standard is “invoked when a defendant asserts entitlement to a 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence”).  The 
“reasonable probability” prejudice standard—which is used, for 
example, in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or 
the materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the 
defense by the prosecution—is a lower standard of prejudice than 
“preponderance of the evidence” or “more likely than not.”2  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984); see also 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-12 (2011) (noting that 
Strickland’s “reasonable probability” prejudice standard “does not 
require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not 
 
2.  We have explained that “[a] ‘preponderance’ of the evidence 
is defined as ‘the greater weight of the evidence,’ Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 1999), or evidence that ‘more likely than 
not’ tends to prove a certain proposition.”  Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 
2d 276, 280 n.1 (Fla. 2000) (citing American Tobacco Co. v. State, 
697 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). 
 
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altered the outcome’ ”); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) 
(explaining that when the “reasonable probability” of a different 
result standard of prejudice is employed, “[t]he question is not 
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict”).  In other words, while the “reasonable 
probability” prejudice standard means a probability higher than 
mere chance, it does not mean a probability greater than fifty 
percent; conversely, the “probably” prejudice standard (and, 
accordingly, the “more likely than not” standard) does mean a 
probability greater than fifty percent.  Thus, because Damren failed 
to allege that he probably would be sentenced to life if the jury or 
trial court were told that he has ASD or PTSD, his claims of newly 
discovered evidence were facially insufficient.  We therefore affirm 
the summary denial of relief.  
 
We also affirm the summary denial because Damren has not 
established that his claims were timely.  A motion for postconviction 
relief must be filed within one year of the date that the defendant’s 
conviction and sentence became final.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1).  
Damren’s convictions and sentences became final when the United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of his direct appeal 
 
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proceedings on January 12, 1998.  Damren v. Florida, 522 U.S. 
1054 (1998); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(B) (“For the purposes of 
this rule, a judgment is final . . . on the disposition of the petition 
for writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, if filed.”).  
The one-year time limit therefore expired in 1999.  But there is an 
exception to the one-year time limit for motions alleging “the facts 
on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or 
the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the 
exercise of due diligence.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).  “To be 
considered timely filed as newly discovered evidence, [a] successive 
rule 3.851 motion [i]s required to have been filed within one year of 
the date upon which the claim became discoverable through due 
diligence.”  James v. State, 323 So. 3d 158, 160 (Fla. 2021) (quoting 
Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008)), cert. denied, 
142 S. Ct. 1678 (2022). 
For purposes of this proceeding, we accept as true Damren’s 
assertion that the 2021 ASD and PTSD diagnoses are the facts on 
which his claims are based.  Damren claims that Dr. Israelian 
informed counsel on June 10, 2021, that he has ASD and PTSD 
and thus believes the claims were timely filed one year later on 
 
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June 10, 2022.  As to timeliness, Damren argued that his ASD 
diagnosis “could not have been raised at the time of the initial trial 
in 1994 as autism, or Asperger’s as it was known then,[3] was not 
diagnosed in adults.”  He argued that his PTSD could not have been 
diagnosed before he was diagnosed with ASD because “without the 
benefit of knowing that he suffered from ASD, a clinician could not 
have accurately evaluated whether he met diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD because he or she would lack the ability to judge the 
magnitude and severity of symptom presentation”—in other words, 
the ASD “masked” the PTSD.  
At the case management conference on his motion, Damren’s 
counsel advised the postconviction court that Damren was 
evaluated in 1995 for “organic deficits” and in 2017 “for traumatic 
brain injury”   
[a]nd as [counsel] sort of spoke with friends of [Damren’s] 
and got to see the photos he had taken in Vietnam, we 
sort of felt that there was no way that he had, you know, 
 
3.  “Asperger syndrome, or Asperger’s, is a previously used 
diagnosis on the autism spectrum.  In 2013, it became part of one 
umbrella diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 (DSM-5).”  
What is Asperger Syndrome?, Autism Speaks, 
https://www.autismspeaks.org/types-autism-what-asperger-
syndrome (last visited June 5, 2023). 
 
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served in Vietnam and not been affected by that 
experience.  So we did hire another expert in 2020, and 
that was a neuropsych[ologist] with a military 
background.  However, that was sort of at the height of 
COVID and that particular doctor refused to go to the 
prison in person, and they wouldn’t allow him to evaluate 
Mr. Damren by Zoom. 
Now, sort of by happenstance, we had retained Dr. 
Israelian in another case and knew that she was willing 
to go see him in person, and so it was really just chance 
that we ended up with this particular expert evaluating 
him, who does have—and she does have a strong 
background in both PTSD and autism.  So that was how 
the evaluation came about. 
Damren also argued below that “[n]ot having asked Dr. Israelian to 
assess for ASD, it was mere serendipity that she had extensive 
training and experience in diagnosing and treating ASD in adults 
and was able to diagnose him.”  
 
Instead of enlightening the postconviction court or this Court 
as to when ASD became diagnosable in adults so as to establish 
when Damren’s ASD and PTSD became discoverable by the exercise 
of due diligence, Damren seems to argue that regardless of when 
ASD became diagnosable in adults, no amount of diligence could 
have led to his diagnoses before June 10, 2021, because ASD was 
only diagnosed at that time by “chance,” “happenstance,” or 
“serendipity”—due to the substitution of Dr. Israelian in place of the 
 
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doctor who was supposed to have evaluated Damren in 2020—and 
the PTSD could not be diagnosed until the ASD was diagnosed.  We 
disagree.   
Damren’s ASD diagnosis became discoverable through due 
diligence whenever it was that ASD became diagnosable in adults.  
That date would have served as the triggering date for filing a claim 
based on newly discovered evidence of ASD within one year under 
rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).  Cf. Dillbeck v. State, 304 So. 3d 286, 288 (Fla. 
2020) (“Thus, the facts on which the claim is predicated—a 
diagnosis of ND-PAE and qEEG results—could have been 
discovered by the exercise of due diligence as early as 2013, when 
ND-PAE became a diagnosable condition.”).  Damren’s claim that 
there was no indication to counsel that he suffered from ASD 
strains credibility.  Dr. Israelian’s report noted that Damren has 
exhibited since childhood a number of the better-known 
characteristics of ASD—at least some of which we would expect 
qualified capital counsel to have recognized—including difficulty 
recognizing different expressions of speech; a tendency to interpret 
things very literally; difficulty initiating and maintaining a 
reciprocal conversation; speaking extensively about his interests 
 
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regardless of their relevance to the task at hand or the interests of 
his audience; a flat affect; and difficulty maintaining eye contact.  
See Am. Psych. Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 56 (5th ed., text rev., 2022).  In any event, counsel’s 
ignorance does not result in a triggering date that manifests only 
when counsel decides to enlighten himself.   
“It is incumbent upon the defendant to establish the 
timeliness of a successive postconviction claim,” Mungin v. State, 
320 So. 3d 624, 626 (Fla. 2020), but without credibly offering the 
date on which his claims became discoverable, Damren has failed to 
establish that they were timely raised.  Thus, the postconviction 
court did not err in denying Damren’s motion as untimely. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s summary 
denial of Damren’s second successive motion for postconviction 
relief. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Clay County, 
Steven B. Whittington, Judge 
Case No. 101994CF000537XXAXMX 
 
Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and 
Elizabeth Spiaggi, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy 
A. Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee