Title: P. v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S106681
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 2003

1 
 
Filed 11/24/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S106681 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F036242 
DANIEL SAPIEN LOPEZ, 
) 
 
) 
Fresno County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 640276-2 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The crime of carjacking requires the “felonious taking” of a motor vehicle.  
(Pen. Code, § 215.)1  Similarly, the crime of robbery requires the “felonious 
taking” of personal property.  (§ 211.)  California courts, following common law, 
have long held that the “taking” element of robbery requires that a defendant gain 
possession of the victim’s property and asport or carry it away.  (See People v. 
Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165 (Cooper); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law 
(3d ed. 1982) § 2, pp. 343-344 (Perkins).)  Does the felonious taking element of the 
crime of carjacking, like robbery, require asportation or movement of the motor 
vehicle?  We conclude that it does.  Because the Court of Appeal came to a 
contrary decision, we reverse that court’s judgment. 
                                             
 
1  
Except as otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On July 1, 1999, Wa Vue Yang was seated inside his van in a parking lot 
when defendant approached him and offered to sell him a watch.  When Yang 
replied that he had a watch, defendant pulled out a gun and shot at the ground.  He 
pointed the gun at Yang and ordered him out of his van.  Yang complied, but left 
his keys in the ignition.  Defendant sat in the van and threw his backpack onto the 
passenger seat.  As Yang began to leave, he remembered that he had left some 
checks inside the van.  Deciding that defendant’s weapon was an air gun, Yang’s 
fear subsided.  He returned to the van to retrieve his checks.  Defendant pointed his 
gun at Yang and pulled the trigger twice, but the gun did not fire.  Defendant fled 
from the van and left his backpack, containing identification, in the van.    
Defendant committed a series of other unrelated crimes.  After a court trial, 
the trial court found defendant guilty of multiple felony offenses, including 
carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) for the criminal activity against Yang (count V).  
Under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), the 
court imposed a lengthy term of imprisonment.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed the carjacking conviction.  It rejected 
defendant’s claim that, because the vehicle had not been moved or the engine 
started, there was insufficient evidence of a completed carjacking and he was guilty 
only of attempted carjacking.  Determining that carjacking and robbery are not 
analogous crimes, the court held that actual movement of a motor vehicle is not 
required to complete the offense of carjacking.  We granted review to settle the 
conflict between this case and People v. Vargas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 456 
(Vargas), which held that carjacking requires movement of the vehicle because 
robbery is an analogous statute and it requires movement of the property taken.   
3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Carjacking is defined as “the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the 
possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the 
person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or 
her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person 
in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means 
of force or fear.”  (§ 215, subd. (a), italics added.) 
Robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the 
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear.”  (§ 211, italics added.) 
Defendant relies on Vargas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 456.  He argues that, 
because the Legislature used the same “felonious taking” phrase in defining 
carjacking, it intended that the phrase be given the same meaning as the analogous 
provision in the robbery statute.  Following the common law crime of larceny, 
California courts have construed the taking element of robbery to include two 
necessary elements:  caption or gaining possession of the victim’s property, and 
asportation or carrying away the loot.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 852; 
Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165; see also People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 
935, 945-947; Perkins, supra, § 2, pp. 343-344.)  The Attorney General responds 
that the Legislature created a new crime of carjacking, which, although resembling 
the crime of robbery in some respects, is a separate crime with meaningful 
differences.  Although we agree with the Attorney General that “[t]he analogy 
between robbery and carjacking is imperfect” (People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
853, 860), “[t]here is no evidence the Legislature intended to adopt a ‘felonious 
taking’ requirement different from that for robbery.”  (Vargas, supra, 96 
Cal.App.4th at p. 463.)  
4 
 
In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as 
to effectuate the purpose of the law.  (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 
621.)  In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because 
they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  (People v. Lawrence 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230.)  If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, 
the plain meaning of the statute governs.  (Id. at pp. 230-231.)  “If, however, the 
language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may consider ‘a 
variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to 
be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative 
construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.’  [Citation.]  
Using these extrinsic aids, we ‘select the construction that comports most closely 
with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than 
defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would 
lead to absurd consequences.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
205, 211-212.) 
 
Section 215, subdivision (a), requires the “taking” of a motor vehicle.  
Defendant claims that the plain meaning of the word “taking” requires proof of 
asportation.  However, terms such as “asportation,” “carries or drives away,” or 
“movement” do not appear in the statute.  The plain meaning of “taking” does not 
necessarily impute an asportation requirement.  (See Carter v. United States (2000) 
530 U.S. 255, 272 [comparing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (b), one of which required 
a taking while the other specified taking and carrying away].)  In contrasting 
“taking” from “carrying away,” one commentator  noted that “A taking occurs 
when the offender secures dominion over the property, while a carrying away 
requires some slight movement away of the property.”  (3 LaFave, Substantive 
Criminal Law (2003) LarcenyTaking and Carrying Away, § 19.3, p. 74, italics 
added.)  Thus, we must look to extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent. 
5 
The Legislature created the crime of carjacking in 1993.  (Stats. 1993, ch. 
611, § 6, p. 3508.)  Prior to the enactment of section 215, the forcible taking of a 
motor vehicle was charged and prosecuted as a second degree robbery.  (See 
People v. Duran (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1376; People v. Hamilton (1995) 40 
Cal.App.4th 1137, 1141-1142; see also Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 
Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 8, 
1993, p. 1.)  The legislative history reveals the underlying purpose for creating the 
new crime of carjacking:  “According to the author [of the legislative bill]:  [¶] 
There has been considerable increase in the number of persons who have been 
abducted, many have been subjected to the violent taking of their automobile and 
some have had a gun used in the taking of the car.  This relatively ‘new’ crime 
appears to be as much thrill-seeking as theft of a car.  If all the thief wanted was the 
car, it would be simpler to hot-wire the automobile without running the risk of 
confronting the driver.  People have been killed, seriously injured, and placed in 
great fear, and this calls for a strong message to discourage these crimes.  
Additionally law enforcement is reporting this new crime is becoming the initiating 
rite for aspiring gang members and the incidents are drastically increasing.  [¶]  
Under current law there is no carjacking crime per se and many carjackings cannot 
be charged as robbery because it is difficult to prove the intent required of a 
robbery offense (to permanently deprive one of the car) since many of these gang 
carjackings are thrill seeking thefts.  There is a need to prosecute this crime.”  
(Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) 
July 13, 1993, p. 1, italics added.)   
Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that carjacking was made a 
separate offense because of perceived difficulties with obtaining convictions under 
the robbery statute.  (People v. Hamilton, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1141-1142.)  
In addition, because of the potentially violent nature of the taking and growing 
6 
frequency of the crime, the Legislature made the punishment for carjacking greater 
than that for second degree robbery.  (People v. Antoine (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 
489, 495; People v. Hamilton, supra, at p. 1141.)   
As the Attorney General asserts, there are significant differences between 
the crimes of carjacking and robbery.  First, carjacking requires either an intent to 
permanently or temporarily deprive; robbery requires an intent to permanently 
deprive.  (People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 418.)  As reflected 
above, the Legislature changed the intent requirement of carjacking “to close a 
potential loophole.”  (People v. Hamilton, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141.) 
Second, “[u]nlike robbery, which requires a taking from the person or 
immediate presence of the possessor (§ 211), the Legislature expanded the taking 
element to a taking from the person or immediate presence of either the possessor 
or any passenger.  (§ 215, subd. (a).)”  (People v. Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 860, 
italics omitted.) 
Third, robbery can involve any type of personal property, while carjacking 
involves only vehicles.  (In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 373; People 
v. Alvarado (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 156, 160.) 
As introduced, the Assembly bill defined carjacking as “the felonious taking 
or seizure of, or the exercise of control over, a motor vehicle . . . .”  (Assem. Bill 
No. 6 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Dec. 7, 1992, italics added.)  The 
italicized language was later deleted from the Assembly bill.  (Assem. Bill No. 6 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 23, 1993.)  From this amended deletion, 
defendant infers that the Legislature intended that the “taking” include a movement 
or asportation requirement.  However, we do not find the deletion particularly 
telling.  We agree with the Attorney General that it was just as likely that the 
Legislature dropped the language as surplusage, or did so to conform to the original 
7 
version of the Senate’s carjacking bill, which only specified a “taking.”  (Sen. Bill 
No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 4, 1993.) 
Also, in one version of the Senate bill, the Legislature redefined the offense 
of carjacking to include “the attempt to take, a vehicle.”  (Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-
1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993.)  In the next Senate amendment, the 
Legislature deleted the “attempt to take” language from the definition of 
carjacking.  (Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 8, 1993.)  
Defendant argues that the Legislature was presumably aware that the absence of 
asportation—not just caption—is a recognized basis for distinguishing attempts 
from completed taking offenses such as larceny and robbery.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 753; People v. Shannon (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649, 
654; People v. Green (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 991, 1000.)  He posits that the deletion 
of an attempted taking from the definition of carjacking reflects that the Legislature 
intended to require the elements of caption and asportation for a completed 
carjacking.  In other words, it intended to maintain the usual distinction between a 
completed taking offense and an attempted taking offense. 
However, another difference between completed and attempted offenses is 
the punishment imposed.  Persons guilty of attempting an offense are sentenced to 
one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed upon a conviction of the offense 
attempted.  (§ 664, subd. (a).)  Indeed, a staff analysis prepared for a legislative 
committee suggests that the Legislature focused on the difference in punishments 
that are generally imposed for completed and attempted offenses.  The staff 
analysis comments:  “This bill would include an attempt within the definition of 
carjacking, thereby providing for a full term for attempted carjacking.  [¶]  
Proponents have not indicated why attempted carjacking should be treated 
differently from virtually all other attempts.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993, p. 4.)  Thus, it 
8 
appears more likely that the Legislature’s subsequent deletion of the “attempt to 
take” language from the definition of carjacking reflected a desire to maintain the 
general punishment scheme for attempted offenses, rather than a commentary on 
the substantive elements of the crime. 
Nevertheless, the carjacking statute’s language and legislative history—
reflected in the author’s explanation for the new crime—demonstrate that 
carjacking is a direct offshoot of robbery and that the Legislature modeled the 
carjacking statute on the robbery statute.  The definition in the carjacking statute 
(§ 215, subd. (a)) tracks the language in the robbery statute (§ 211).  “Both involve 
‘the felonious taking’ of property that is ‘in the possession of another’ person.  
Both require that the taking be from the ‘person or immediate presence’ of the 
person.  Both are ‘accomplished by means of force or fear.’ ”  (In re Travis W., 
supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 373; cf. Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 
235 [federal carjacking statute modeled on federal robbery statutes].)   
The carjacking statute itself reflects the overlap between carjacking and 
robbery.  It states, “This section shall not be construed to supersede or affect 
Section 211.  A person may be charged with a violation of this section and Section 
211.  However, no defendant may be punished under this section and Section 211 
for the same act which constitutes a violation of both this section and Section 211.”  
(§ 215, subd. (c); see People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 700 [§ 215 permits 
multiple convictions of carjacking and robbery based on the same conduct, but 
prohibits multiple punishment for the same act].)  
In the related crime of unlawful driving or taking of a motor vehicle, the 
statute similarly proscribes the taking of a vehicle under specified conditions.  
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).)  Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), 
provides:  “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without 
the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or 
9 
temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the 
vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a 
party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or 
stealing, is guilty of a public offense . . . .”  (Italics added.)  “To satisfy the 
asportation requirement for robbery, ‘no great movement is required, and it is not 
necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim.’  (2 
Witkin & Epstein [Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988)] Crimes Against Property, § 
641, p. 723.)  ‘[S]light movement’ is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.  
(Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165; People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 
65 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 636].)”  (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 852.)  Consistent 
with the common law on takings of larceny and robbery, California courts have 
long construed the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle to also require 
asportation—“ ‘[a]ny removal, however slight.’ ”  (People v. White (1945) 71 
Cal.App.2d 524, 525; see also People v. Ragone (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 476, 479; 
People v. Lewis (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 119, 125; 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal 
Law (3d ed. 2000) § 67, pp. 95-96.)  
When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on a 
similar subject uses identical or substantially similar language, the usual 
presumption is that the Legislature intended the same construction, unless a 
contrary intent clearly appears.  (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329; see 
also People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 112 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).)  Moreover, 
if a term known to the common law has not otherwise been defined by statute, it is 
assumed that the common law meaning was intended.  (3 Wharton, Criminal Law 
(15th ed. 1995) §  342 , p. 350; see also § 7, par. 16; Carter v. United States, supra, 
530 U.S. at p. 266 [“we have not hesitated to turn to the common law for guidance 
when the relevant statutory text does contain a term with an established meaning at 
common law”]; People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 946 [by adopting the 
10 
phrase “felonious taking” as used in the common law with regard to larceny and 
robbery statutes, the Legislature in all likelihood intended to incorporate the same 
meanings attached to those phrases at common law].)  Because the “felonious 
taking” in the crime of robbery has an established meaning at common law and the 
same “taking” language appears in the carjacking, robbery, and unlawful taking or 
driving of a vehicle statutes, we presume that the Legislature intended the same 
meaning, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.   
The Attorney General claims that because the Legislature expanded the 
taking element to include the possessor or any passengers (§ 215, subd. (a)), a 
contrary intent does appear for construing the “taking” element for carjacking 
differently.  He relies on People v. Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th 853, in which we 
commented that “[t]he analogy between robbery and carjacking is imperfect. . . . 
By extending carjacking to include a taking from a passenger, even one without a 
possessory interest (assuming the other elements of the crime are present), the 
Legislature has made carjacking more nearly a crime against the person than a 
crime against property.”  (Id. at p. 860.)  Moreover, we refused to construe the 
element “against his or her will” in lockstep with the robbery statute and held that 
an infant can be the victim of a carjacking even though he or she is unaware of the 
taking or too young to give or withhold consent.  (Id. at pp. 855, 860-861.) 
Using Hill as a springboard, the Attorney General further argues that 
because carjacking is “more nearly a crime against the person than a crime against 
property” (People v. Hill, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 860), movement of the vehicle is 
unrelated to the serious potential for harm to the victim, and thus is not required.  
Using the facts of this case as illustration, he claims that a defendant who gains 
possession and control of a vehicle using threats of violence, exposes the victim to 
the same risks, irrespective of whether the vehicle moves.  However, the legislative 
history indicates that the Legislature was specifically concerned with the 
11 
“considerable increase in the number of persons who have been abducted” in their 
vehicles and the associated danger to the driver or passenger.  (Assem. Com. on 
Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 
1.)  Indeed, the facts in Hill illustrate the increased risks involved with abductions 
during a carjacking.  There, defendant took the victim’s car and drove off with the 
victim and her seven-month-old daughter still in the car.  The infant was unbuckled 
from her carseat, and rolled around the front seat as the vehicle moved.  Given the 
unique nature of the taking and the identical threat of violence and serious potential 
for harm to all occupants of the car, we analogized the crime of carjacking with 
kidnapping and found no reason in logic or policy for the Legislature to have 
precluded an infant from being a victim of a carjacking.  (People v. Hill, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at pp. 859-860.)   
The Attorney General admits that by limiting section 215 to one specific 
type of property, a motor vehicle, the Legislature focused on criminal conduct akin 
to hijacking that preys on victims in vulnerable circumstances.  (People v. Hill, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 859-860; People v. Duran, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1376 [§ 215 “was passed in 1993 to address what was then an increasingly 
dangerous problem of people being abducted from their cars, sometimes at 
gunpoint”].)  Nevertheless, he is correct that a completed carjacking occurs 
whether the perpetrator drives off with the carjacking victim in the car or forcibly 
removes the victim from the car before driving off.  (People v. Duran, supra, at pp. 
1375-1377 [vehicle driven with victims inside]; People v. Hamilton, supra, 40 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [vehicle driven without victims inside].)  The inherent 
dangers and risk of harm to the victim is the same whether the perpetrator drives 
off or remains stationary after forcibly removing the victim from the vehicle.  The 
Attorney General further argues that the purpose of an asportation requirement in 
larceny and robbery is to provide an external and observable manifestation of the 
12 
wrongdoer’s possession and control over the property.  (See People v. Alamo 
(1974) 34 N.Y.2d 453, 457-458 [315 N.E.2d 446, 449]; Dressler, Understanding 
Criminal Law (2d ed. 1995) Theft, § 32.05, pp. 515-516; 2 Burdick, The Law of 
Crime (1946) § 500, pp. 265-266.)  Unlike robbery of personal property, in which 
dispossession is made by physically removing the property from the victim’s 
possession, the forcible removal or expulsion of the victim from his van and 
defendant’s entry into that van perfected the caption requirement, without the need 
for the observable act of moving the van.  (See People v. Alamo, supra, 34 N.Y.2d 
at p. 458 [movement or motion of car not essential to show possession and control 
of car under larceny statute].)  Thus, he posits that the legislative concern with 
abductions means only that movement of the vehicle should be a sufficient, but not 
a necessary condition for carjacking. 
Although the Attorney General’s arguments are reasonable, we agree with 
defendant that they are policy arguments reserved for the Legislature.  As it stands, 
based on the language of the statute and its legislative purpose, carjacking adapts 
and expands specific elements of robbery to address increasing auto theft incidents 
by perpetrators who may not intend to permanently deprive possession of the 
vehicle, but whose criminal acts nevertheless heighten the risk of harm to a broader 
range of victims than were covered under the existing crime of robbery.  Thus, the 
Legislature expanded the taking element to include takings from either the 
possessor or any passenger, including an infant, but neither the words of the 
carjacking statute nor the legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended 
to alter the meaning of “felonious taking” with respect to the requirement of 
asportation.  The legislative history is replete with comparisons between robbery 
and the new crime of carjacking.  Noting the deficiencies in charging and 
prosecuting a carjacking under the robbery statute, the Legislature affirmatively 
adjusted the carjacking elements—as distinct from robbery—to include a taking 
13 
from a passenger, even one without a possessory interest, and to include an intent 
to temporarily deprive a person of possession of the motor vehicle.  (§ 215, subd. 
(a).)  Yet the legislative history is silent as to whether the Legislature intended to 
further distinguish the crime of carjacking from the crime of robbery by 
eliminating the asportation requirement.  In the absence of a contrary intent, we 
presume that in adopting the phrase, “felonious taking,” from the robbery statute, 
the Legislature intended that those same words within section 215 be given the 
same construction.   
Finally, the Attorney General contends that even if there is an asportation 
requirement, defendant’s act of forcibly removing the victim from his van satisfied 
it.  Again asserting that asportation serves only as an observable manifestation of 
dominion and control, he argues that “[t]here is no reason in logic or policy why 
physical dispossession may be made by slight movement of the property but not 
the exile of the owner.”  That may be so, but the argument is not supported by the 
plain language of the statute.  Section 215, subdivision (a), requires “the felonious 
taking of a motor vehicle . . . from . . . [the] person or immediate presence” of the 
possessor or passenger.  (Italics added.)  It does not require the felonious taking of 
the possessor or passenger from the motor vehicle.2  Consequently, defendant’s 
conduct is punishable as an attempted carjacking.  (Vargas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 463 [carjacking conviction reduced to lesser included offense of attempted 
carjacking].)  
                                             
 
2  
We disapprove People v. Alvarado, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pages 161-162, 
to the extent it suggests that the victim’s flight from the vehicle satisfies the 
asportation requirement of carjacking.  
14 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal relating to the carjacking 
conviction (count V) and remand the case to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is otherwise 
affirmed. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
15 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lopez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 97 Cal.App.4th 583 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S106681 
Date Filed: November 24, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Fresno 
Judge: Lawrence Jones 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Joseph Shipp, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Whalen, Michael A. Canzoneri and Brian G. 
Smiley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joseph Shipp 
Post Office Box 20347 
Oakland, CA  94620 
(510) 530-9043 
 
Brian G. Smiley 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5286