Title: State v. James E. Erickson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1998AP000273-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0273-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
v. 
James E. Erickson,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 8, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 13, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas H. Barland 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross respondent the 
cause was argued by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general.  
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross appellant 
there was a brief and oral argument by Glenn L. Cushing, 
assistant state public defender. 
 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James E. Erickson,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire 
County, Thomas H. Barland, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (1997-98).1  The circuit court concluded that the 
defendant, James E. Erickson, was entitled to a new trial under 
State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), because 
he did not receive the correct number of peremptory challenges 
during jury selection.2  The State argues that because Erickson’s 
attorney did not object to the number of peremptory challenges, 
this case is properly analyzed under the ineffective assistance 
                     
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, Thomas H. Barland, 
Judge. 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
2 
of counsel standard rather than the automatic reversal standard 
of Ramos.  We agree.  Further, because we decline to presume 
prejudice every time there is a denial of an equal number of 
peremptory strikes to both the defense and the prosecution and 
because Erickson did not show actual prejudice, the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim must fail. 
¶2 
Erickson also argues that the circuit court erred in 
refusing to strike a prospective juror for cause.  He contends 
he needed to expend one of his peremptory challenges to correct 
the circuit court’s error, an act entitling him to a new trial 
under Ramos.  Because a review of the record indicates that the 
circuit court was well within its discretion in refusing to 
strike that juror for cause and in light of the defendant’s 
failure to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, we 
reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand the cause 
to 
that 
court 
with 
instructions 
to 
reinstate 
Erickson’s 
conviction. 
¶3 
The 
facts 
are 
neither 
disputed 
nor 
extensive.  
Erickson was charged with one count of second degree sexual 
assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) and one 
count of child enticement contrary to § 948.07(1).  He had 
previously been convicted twice of second degree sexual assault 
of a child.   
¶4 
The court began jury selection with 21 prospective 
jurors in the panel and indicated that from that panel twelve 
jurors and an alternate would hear the case.  In addition, the 
court indicated that whenever a juror from the panel was struck 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
3 
for cause, that stricken juror would be replaced by another 
prospective juror.  The State and the defense were each granted 
four peremptory strikes which, when exercised, reduced the panel 
to its final size. 
¶5 
Four peremptory strikes, however, was not the correct 
number.  Because Erickson had already been convicted of “serious 
child 
sex 
offense[s]” 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m), 
a 
conviction on either of the two charges in this case would 
automatically subject him to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b).  As a result 
of this potential penalty, the State and Erickson should have 
each received an additional two strikes.  Wis. Stat. § 972.03.  
Further, because the court included a thirteenth juror the State 
and Erickson should have each been granted an additional strike. 
 Id.  Thus under the statutes, both the State and Erickson 
should have had a total of seven peremptory challenges rather 
than the four the court granted them.  This error went unnoticed 
by the circuit court, by the State, and by Erickson’s attorney.  
¶6 
During voir dire one of the prospective jurors, Juror 
L, indicated that she had experienced sexual abuse.  When 
questioned individually, Juror L revealed that at the age of 
twelve she was fondled by a contractor working at her family’s 
home.  When the circuit court asked whether she would give the 
victim’s testimony any more weight because of her experience, 
Juror L responded, “No, I don’t think so.”3  When the circuit 
                     
3 That portion of the voir dire transcript is as follows: 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
4 
court asked if she could be fair and impartial, Juror L 
responded, “I think so.”4 
¶7 
Based on her responses in the individual voir dire, 
Erickson sought to have Juror L struck for cause.  The circuit 
court refused, concluding that Juror L could be a fair and 
impartial juror.  The court opined that her assault had occurred 
nearly forty years ago, that she spoke of the assault calmly and 
without emotion, and that her assault occurred under notably 
different circumstances than those at issue in this case.5 
                                                                  
THE COURT: 
Now, would that experience that you had 
when you were that age make it difficult for you to be 
fair and impartial in this case? 
 
JUROR L: I’m not sure.  It’s really hard to tell. 
 
THE COURT: 
I suppose it depends upon what evidence 
there is. 
 
JUROR L: True.  It’s been a long time ago, but it’s 
something I never forgot. 
 
THE COURT: 
Yes.  It often happens in cases of this 
nature that it’s one person’s word against the other, 
and so you have to judge which one is telling the 
truth.  Would you tend to favor the child’s story 
simply because of what you underwent? 
 
JUROR L: No, I don’t think so.  I think I could 
4 That portion of the voir dire transcript is as follows: 
THE COURT: 
If you’re selected to sit on this jury, 
we’ll have all of those of you selected to raise your 
hands and give an oath that you will be fair and 
impartial and you’ll follow the instructions of law.  
If you were asked to undertake that oath, would you be 
able to carry out that oath? 
 
JUROR L: I think so. 
5 The circuit court stated: 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
5 
¶8 
In light of the circuit court’s ruling, Erickson used 
one of his peremptory strikes to remove Juror L.  In the end, 
the parties each exhausted their four peremptory strikes and it 
is undisputed that an impartial jury of thirteen members was 
impaneled.   
¶9 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted 
Erickson on the second degree sexual assault charge but found 
him guilty of child enticement.  Consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m)(b), the court sentenced Erickson to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.   
¶10 Erickson sought post-conviction relief, arguing that 
because he received fewer peremptory strikes than were provided 
under the statute he was entitled to a new trial as a matter of 
law under Ramos.  As a second ground for relief, Erickson argued 
that to the extent that the circuit court’s error had not been 
preserved for appeal with a timely objection, it constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the federal and state 
constitutions.   
                                                                  
Well, [Juror L] is well into her 60’s.  The event took 
place when she was about 12 years of age.  She talked 
about it without showing any emotion.  She was open 
and seemed to be free of stress in discussing it.  Her 
explanation that she didn’t report it because she was 
ashamed is I think a very natural reaction.  There 
[have] been considerable writings in the press that 
the average person is likely to read which report 
similar reactions from victims.  Her contact was 
sudden and forced upon her and of a sexual contact 
nature, a brief encounter, wholly different from what 
would be presented here.  I’m satisfied that she can 
act fairly and impartially. 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
6 
¶11 At 
the 
post-conviction 
hearing, 
Erickson’s 
trial 
attorney indicated that he was genuinely unaware that Erickson 
was entitled to seven peremptory strikes under the law.  He 
further stated that if he had been given the additional strikes, 
he would have used them all.  Specifically, Erickson’s trial 
attorney identified a particular juror who, although there was 
no basis to remove for cause, was someone that he had identified 
as a person likely to be sympathetic to the State’s case.  Due 
to the erroneous number of strikes, that juror remained on the 
jury and was chosen as the jury’s foreperson.   
¶12 In rendering its decision, the circuit court concluded 
that Erickson had been denied the effective assistance of 
counsel.  Noting that peremptory challenges are “one of the most 
important rights belonging to an accused,” the circuit court 
reasoned that prejudice to the defendant was to be presumed.  As 
a result, although Erickson did not timely object to the error 
and was judged guilty by a fair and impartial jury, the circuit 
court determined that the reasoning in Ramos led to the 
conclusion that prejudice from deficient performance of trial 
counsel must be presumed and that Erickson was entitled to a new 
trial.  The State appealed the automatic reversal, and Erickson 
cross-appealed the circuit court’s failure to remove Juror L for 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
7 
cause.  The court of appeals certified the appeal to this court.6 
  
I. 
¶13 We address first whether this case should be analyzed 
under the automatic reversal standard of Ramos or under the 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  Erickson urges this court 
to disregard the fact that his trial attorney failed to object 
to the circuit court’s error in awarding peremptory strikes.  He 
asks us to decide the case on its merits, which means 
ascertaining 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court’s 
denial 
of 
the 
additional peremptory strikes mandates automatic reversal under 
Ramos.  Noting that the waiver rule is one of judicial 
administration rather than jurisdiction, Erickson initially 
urges this court to ignore the waiver because the importance of 
this case warrants a decision on its merits.  Wirth v. Ehly, 93 
Wis. 2d 433, 443-44, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980).  However, Erickson 
also concedes that this case can properly be analyzed under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
¶14 We are well aware that the waiver rule is one of 
judicial administration and that appellate courts have authority 
to ignore the waiver.  However, the normal procedure in criminal 
cases is to address waiver within the rubric of the ineffective 
                     
6 The court of appeals certified the appeal for this court 
“to determine whether prejudice should be presumed when the 
trial court fails to grant the parties all of the peremptory 
strikes allowed under § 972.03 Stats., and trial counsel fails 
to object.” 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
8 
assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 374 (1986); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 380 
n.6 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); State v. Smith, 207 
Wis. 2d 258, 273, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997) (failure to object to 
prosecutor’s breach of plea agreement); State v. Vinson, 183 
Wis. 2d 297, 306-07, 515 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994) (failure to 
object to witness’ improper testimony about the credibility of 
another witness).   
¶15 The waiver rule exists to cultivate timely objections. 
 Such objections promote both efficiency and fairness.  By 
objecting, “both parties and courts have notice of the disputed 
issues as well as a fair opportunity to prepare and address them 
in a way that most efficiently uses judicial resources.”  State 
v. Agnello, No. 96-3406-CR, op. at 7-8 (S. Ct. May 20, 1999).  
If the waiver rule did not exist, a party could decline to 
object for strategic reasons and raise the error only when that 
party needed 
an advantage 
at some 
point 
in 
the 
trial.  
Similarly, judicial resources, not to mention the resources of 
the parties, are not best used to correct errors on appeal that 
could have been addressed during the trial.  State v. Corey 
J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998); State v. 
Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604-05, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997). 
¶16 In Ramos, the error was brought to the circuit court’s 
attention when the defendant objected to the court’s refusal to 
remove a particular juror for cause.  Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 14-
15.  As a result, the circuit court was made aware of its error 
and had the opportunity to correct it.  The case only reached 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
9 
this court because the circuit court declined the opportunity to 
correct the error.   
¶17 In light of these considerations, we will not directly 
consider the effect of the circuit court’s error in light of 
Ramos.  That is to say, we decline to approach this case as if 
Erickson had properly preserved his loss of peremptory strikes 
with an objection at the time of the circuit court’s error. 
¶18 The court of appeals recognized such an approach in 
State v. Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d 169, 200-01, 567 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1997).  It noted that waiver may be enforced even where the 
error, if preserved, could entitle the defendant to a new trial. 
 In Damaske, the defendant neglected to request a substitution 
from a particular judge.  Id. at 197. 
¶19 The denial of a timely-filed substitution request, 
much like the denial of a peremptory strike, is grounds for 
automatic reversal.  See County of Vilas v. Danber, 106 Wis. 2d 
438, 439, 316 N.W.2d 346 (1982) (per curiam); State v. Holmes, 
106 Wis. 2d 31, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  Nevertheless, the court 
of appeals concluded that “there is a significant distinction 
between the consequences on appeal of a trial-court error and 
the consequences of that same error when it is raised in an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
context.” 
 
Damaske, 
212 
Wis. 2d at 200 (referencing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 
(1986)).   
¶20 The fact that a preserved error could lead to 
automatic reversal does not necessarily mean that the same 
result need be reached when that error is waived.  Like the 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
10
court in Damaske, we decline to ignore Erickson’s waiver.  As is 
normally done in criminal cases, we will analyze the waiver 
within the ineffective assistance of counsel framework. 
II. 
¶21 Appellate review of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is a mixed question of fact and law.  State ex 
rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 609, 516 N.W.2d 362 
(1994); State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 633-34, 369 N.W.2d 711 
(1985).  We will not disturb the circuit court’s findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  However, the ultimate 
determination of whether the attorney’s performance falls below 
the constitutional minimum is a question of law which this court 
reviews independently of the legal determinations rendered by 
the circuit court.  Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 634.  
¶22 This state, borrowing from the United States Supreme 
Court, 
employs 
a 
two-pronged 
inquiry 
for 
an 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  To find success, a defendant must 
show both (1) that his counsel’s representation was deficient 
and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced him so that there is a 
“probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the 
outcome” of the case.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; State v. 
Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990). 
¶23 In this case, the truly contested prong of Strickland 
is the secondwhether any error on the part of Erickson’s 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
11
attorney caused Erickson prejudice.7  Prejudice occurs where the 
attorney’s error is of such magnitude that there is a reasonable 
probability 
that, 
absent 
the 
error, 
“the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694; Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 129.   
A. 
¶24 Erickson urges this court to follow the lead of the 
circuit court and to presume prejudice every time there is a 
denial of equal numbers of peremptory strikes to both the 
defense and the prosecution.  He notes that this court’s 
decision in Ramos indicated that, when preserved for appeal, a 
defendant’s right to effectively exercise all of his peremptory 
                     
7 In its brief to this court, the State contends that 
Erickson’s trial attorney did not perform deficiently.  The 
State argues that this case is not unique in its facts.  Noting 
that at least six other Wisconsin cases are currently pending 
involving waived peremptory strike error, the State posits that 
such a number indicates widespread confusion in this area of the 
law.  Thus, the State maintains, the sheer number of nearly 
identical cases indicates that Erickson’s trial counsel did not 
provide legal services “outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
690 (1984). 
The State’s position in this court is a 180-degree 
turnaround from its position below, where it quite readily 
conceded deficient performance.  Because we conclude that 
Erickson cannot show any prejudice from his trial attorney’s 
error, we do not need to decide whether the State’s “switch in 
time” is permissible, State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 144, 
569 N.W.2d 577 (1997), and whether Erickson’s trial counsel 
performed deficiently.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (courts need 
not address both prongs when defendant makes insufficient 
showing on one); State v. O’Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 324, 588 
N.W.2d 8 (1999). 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
12
strikes was so important that a denial of even one strike 
entitled a defendant to a new trial without a showing of actual 
prejudice.  He argues that if actual prejudice need not be shown 
where the error is preserved for appeal, actual prejudice ought 
to be presumed where the error is not preserved for appeal.  We 
disagree. 
¶25 To be sure, there are instances where a court will 
presume prejudice; those instances, however, are rare.  In one 
category of cases, prejudice has been presumed when the 
effective assistance of counsel has been eviscerated by forces 
unrelated to the actual performance of the defendant’s attorney. 
 In such cases the inquiry is not on the conduct of the 
defendant’s counsel but on the environment in which the judicial 
proceeding occurs.  For example, courts have presumed prejudice 
when a defendant was denied counsel altogether at critical 
stages of the adjudicative process.  See, e.g., Geders v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 
(1963) (per curiam); State v. Behnke, 155 Wis. 2d 796, 805-06, 
456 N.W.2d 610 (1990).   
¶26 Similarly, prejudice has been presumed when, although 
the defendant is actually given counsel, “the likelihood that 
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective 
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is 
appropriate.”  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 
(1984) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).  These 
cases involve actions by the court as well as actions by the 
prosecutor.  Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864 (1975) 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
13
(denial of a defendant’s right to make a closing argument at the 
conclusion of a trial); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988) 
(denial of the right to counsel in non-frivolous appeal); Smith, 
207 Wis. 2d at 280-81; see also State v. Pultz, 206 Wis. 2d 112, 
131-32, 556 N.W.2d 708 (1996) (declaration of defendant’s 
indigency). 
¶27 In other, more limited, circumstances the actual 
assistance rendered by a particular attorney has been deemed so 
outside the bounds necessary for effective counsel that a court 
has presumed prejudice.  In these cases, the conduct of the 
particular 
attorney, 
rather 
than 
the 
environment 
of 
the 
proceeding, has been the focus of the inquiry.  For example, 
where an attorney has labored on behalf of a defendant while 
harboring a conflict of interest, prejudice is automatic.  
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980); State v. Kaye, 
106 Wis. 2d 1, 8-16, 315 N.W.2d 337 (1982).  In similar vein, 
courts have presumed prejudice when an attorney fails to present 
known 
evidence 
to 
the 
court 
calling 
into 
question 
the 
defendant’s competency to stand trial.  State v. [Oliver Ross] 
Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 223-24, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986).   
¶28 This particular case presents none of these scenarios. 
 We are mindful that “the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the 
effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair 
trial.”  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.  With this underlying purpose 
in mind, we are persuaded that prejudice need not be presumed in 
this case.   
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
14
¶29 There is little doubt that Erickson was judged by an 
impartial jury; even he admits as much.  This fact alone 
distinguishes the present case from many of those in which 
prejudice was presumed.  It is difficult to believe that 
defendants would make this same concession were they denied 
counsel at a hearing in which they enter a plea, White, 373 U.S. 
at 60, or were they denied the opportunity to offer a summation, 
Herring, 422 U.S. at 864, or were they required to stand trial 
even though they may well lack competency to do so, [Oliver 
Ross] Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 223-24. 
¶30 This case is also to be distinguished from Ramos as 
that defendant, unlike Erickson, in effect not only received 
fewer peremptory strikes than provided for by statute, but also 
received fewer strikes than did the prosecutor.  Here both sides 
were equally affected by the oversight.  The error in this case 
did not lead to an “unlevel playing field.”  Not only do the 
parties concede that the jury was fair and impartial, but they 
acknowledge that both sides equally lost out on the use of 
peremptory strikes.  Under these circumstances we decline 
Erickson’s invitation to presume prejudice every time the 
defendant does not get the number of peremptory strikes allowed 
by statute but the State and the defendant get an equal number 
of peremptory strikes. 
¶31 Yet again this court is called upon to interpret our 
decision in Ramos and encouraged to expand its reach.  We will 
not do so.  As we concluded in State v. Mendoza, No. 97-0952-CR, 
op. at 22 (S. Ct. July 8, 1999), Ramos does not entitle a 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
15
defendant to a new trial if the circuit court erroneously 
removes jurors for cause.  As we conclude in this case, Ramos 
does not entitle a defendant to a new trial when both the State 
and the defense are given an equal number of peremptory strikes, 
even if the number is less than provided for in the statute.  
Simply stated, Ramos entitles a defendant to automatic reversal 
only in limited circumstances:  a circuit court, after the 
defendant 
has 
challenged 
a 
juror 
for 
cause, 
incorrectly 
concludes that the juror does not need to be removed for cause. 
 Under such a fact scenario, the defendant uses peremptory 
strikes to correct a circuit court error, effectively receiving 
fewer strikes than provided for in the statute and receiving 
fewer strikes than received by the State.  Ramos stands for 
nothing more and we decline to expand its reach beyond those 
facts. 
B. 
¶32 Absent a presumption of prejudice, Erickson must make 
a showing of actual prejudice.  It is not enough for a defendant 
to merely show that the error “had some conceivable effect on 
the outcome” of the trial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.  
Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that but for his trial 
attorney’s 
error 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
probabilitya 
“probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine 
confidence 
in 
the 
outcome”that the result of his trial would have been different. 
 Id. at 694; Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 129.   
¶33 Because 
he 
is 
challenging 
the 
validity 
of 
his 
conviction, Erickson must show that “absent the errors, the 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
16
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” 
 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  To determine whether Erickson has 
satisfactorily made his required showing, a court looks to the 
totality of the evidence in the case.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 
129-30.   
¶34 Erickson candidly admitted at oral argument that 
meeting his required burden to show actual prejudice is very 
difficult in this case.  Had the circuit court granted the 
correct number of peremptory strikes, such action would not have 
affected only Erickson.  It would also have affected the State 
and the voir dire proceeding as a whole.  Wisconsin law grants 
both the plaintiff and the defendant the same number of strikes. 
 Wis. Stat. § 972.03.  Thus, any benefit Erickson would have 
realized from three additional strikes may have been offset by 
the three additional strikes given to the State.   
¶35 Aside from Erickson having his additional strikes 
offset by those granted to the State, under the jury selection 
system employed by the circuit court, the panel of prospective 
jurors would have also been enlarged by six persons.  We can 
only speculate the effect that the additional six persons, 
coupled with the six additional peremptory strikes, would have 
had on the ultimate composition of the jury.   
¶36 In the end, we can do no better than speculate on what 
would have been the result of his trial had the circuit court 
not erred, which is also the best that Erickson can offer.  That 
is not enough, for Strickland and Johnson require that Erickson 
offer more than rank speculation to satisfy the prejudice prong. 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
17
 Because he failed to do so, he has suffered no prejudice from 
his 
trial 
attorney’s 
error 
and 
we 
deny 
his 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  
III. 
¶37 Erickson’s 
final 
hope 
for 
the 
reversal 
of 
his 
conviction and the receipt of a new trial rests in his argument 
that the circuit court erred in not striking Juror L for cause. 
 He contends that Juror L’s bias was manifest and that the 
circuit court’s purported error required him to use a peremptory 
strike to remove her from the panel in violation of State v. 
Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 661 (1998). 
¶38 The resolution of this issue depends upon the answer 
to one question:  did the circuit court err when it declined to 
strike Juror L for cause?  A review of the record reveals that 
it did not and Erickson’s claim to the contrary must be 
rejected.   
¶39 The decision of whether a prospective juror is biased 
and should be struck from the panel for cause is a matter 
largely left to the circuit court’s discretion.  State v. Gesch, 
167 Wis. 2d 660, 666, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992).  That court, being 
able to fully observe the prospective juror during voir dire, is 
in a far superior position to ascertain bias than is an 
appellate court whose only link to the voir dire is through the 
“bare words on a transcript” of the proceedings.  Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d at 508 (Geske, J., dissenting).  This court will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court so long as 
the circuit court’s decision does not extend beyond the 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
18
boundaries set by the law.  Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d at 666.  As a 
result, on review we will uphold the discretion of the circuit 
court unless it is shown to be an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 280-81, 588 
N.W.2d 1 (1999). 
¶40 In Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 492-93, we reiterated that a 
juror must be struck for cause if a review of the record reveals 
that a juror exhibits bias.  Bias can exist in various forms:  
(1) when a prospective juror subjectively is unable or unwilling 
to judge the case in a fair and impartial manner; or (2) when a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
prospective 
juror’s 
position 
objectively could not judge the case in a fair and impartial 
manner.8  State v. Faucher, No. 97-2702-CR, op. at 15-18 (S. Ct. 
July 8, 1999); Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 498.  
¶41 Erickson argues that Juror L exhibited both types of 
bias.  First, he concludes that she should have been struck for 
cause 
because 
her 
answers 
on 
voir 
dire 
demonstrate 
her 
subjective inability to commit to impartiality.  Second, he 
posits that her experience of being sexually assaulted as a 
                     
8 Bias can also exist by way of statute.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.08.  In these limited cases, a court is not interested in 
determining whether a particular juror in an individual case 
exhibits bias.  Instead, those persons are legally biased 
because the legislature has concluded that such persons are so 
“inherently prone to partiality that an individual case-by-case 
inquiry is not worth the time or effort.”  State v. Kiernan, No. 
97-2449-CR, op. at 8 (S. Ct. July 8, 1999).  There is no 
suggestion of statutory bias in this case. 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
19
child makes her objectively unable to be impartial.  We 
disagree. 
¶42 Addressing Erickson’s first argument, we reiterate 
what we said in Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 502 n.9:  a prospective 
juror need not respond to voir dire questions with unequivocal 
declarations of impartiality.  Indeed, we expect a circuit court 
to use voir dire to explore a prospective juror’s fears, biases, 
and predilections and fully expect a juror’s honest answers at 
times to be less than unequivocal.  Id. at 507 (Geske, J., 
dissenting). 
¶43 Erickson seizes largely on Juror L’s answer of “I 
think so” to the circuit court’s question of whether she would 
be able to fairly and impartially weigh the evidence.  As the 
State noted at oral argument, the transcript cannot reveal Juror 
L’s inflections when she stated those words.  She may have 
stated them with timidity or she may have stated them with 
earnestness.  An appellate court cannot know which is the more 
apt description. 
¶44 However, a circuit court can.  This circuit court 
concluded that Juror L spoke of her assault without emotion and 
free of stress.  We can find no reason to question either the 
circuit court’s detailed findings on this matter or its 
conclusion that Juror L could be a fair and impartial juror. 
¶45 Likewise, we find no merit to Erickson’s second 
assertion that because of Juror L’s own sexual assault, a 
reasonable person in her position could not be fair and 
impartial.  Erickson’s assertion comes close to arguing that any 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
20
victim of sexual assault, at least if the assault occurred while 
the victim was a child, must be categorically excluded from 
serving on his jury.  We have been “repeatedly reluctant to 
exclude groups of persons from serving as petit jurors as a 
matter of law.”  State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 479, 457 
N.W.2d 484 (1990) (collecting cases).   
¶46 We remain reluctant.  Nothing in the voir dire 
transcript or circuit court’s findings would suggest that Juror 
L was anything other than a person both willing and able to act 
as an impartial juror.  Accordingly, the circuit court was well 
within its discretion when it refused to strike Juror L for 
cause and Erickson was not forced to expend a peremptory strike 
to correct the circuit court’s error.   
¶47 In sum, we conclude that in light of the failure of 
Erickson’s attorney to object and preserve for appeal the 
deprivation of three peremptory strikes, the proper framework 
for analyzing his claim is that of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish prejudice.  
Since we decline to presume prejudice where there is a denial of 
an equal number of peremptory strikes to both the defense and 
the prosecution and since Erickson has failed to show actual 
prejudice, the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must 
fail.   
¶48 Additionally, Erickson’s claim of automatic reversal 
under Ramos fails because a review of the record illustrates 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
No. 98-0273-CR 
 
21
discretion when it refused to strike Juror L for cause.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and 
remand the cause to that court with instructions to reinstate 
Erickson’s conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause remanded. 
 
 
 
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