Title: In the Matter of Trista A. Hudson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 64S00-1705-DI-325
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2018

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 64S00-1705-DI-325 
In the Matter of 
Trista A. Hudson 
 Respondent. 
Decided: August 29, 2018 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer William N. Riley 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 29 2018, 12:12 pm
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Per Curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Trista Hudson, committed attorney 
misconduct by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and by prosecuting 
a charge she knew was not supported by probable cause. For this 
misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should be suspended for at 
least eighteen months without automatic reinstatement. 
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer 
appointed by this Court on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary 
Commission’s verified disciplinary complaint. Respondent’s 1998 
admission to this state’s bar subjects her to this Court’s disciplinary 
jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
Procedural Background and Facts 
At relevant times, Respondent served as a deputy prosecuting attorney 
in Porter County. In 2013, “Defendant” was charged with five counts of 
child molesting, the first four of which were tried together and are at issue 
here. Counts I and II alleged criminal deviate conduct involving 
Defendant’s stepchildren K.C. and E.C., respectively. Counts III and IV 
alleged fondling with respect to K.C. and E.C. The four counts were based 
upon statements made by the children to various police officials, and there 
was no physical or medical evidence of child molesting. 
Five days before trial, Respondent interviewed E.C. in preparation for 
trial with a detective present. During this interview E.C. recanted the facts 
underlying Count II, stating he had lied at the request of his and K.C.’s 
biological father. Respondent believed E.C.’s recantation was truthful. 
However, Respondent did not disclose E.C.’s recantation to defense 
counsel, nor did she withdraw Count II at any point prior to or during 
trial. During her direct examination of E.C. at trial, Respondent avoided 
asking any questions about the allegations underlying Count II. E.C.’s 
recantation, and the fact his father had coached him to lie, was revealed at 
trial during defense counsel’s questioning of E.C. and other witnesses. 
Respondent did not immediately disclose to the court that she had known 
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about E.C.’s recantation for nearly one week. After the prosecution 
concluded its case-in-chief, the trial court addressed Respondent’s failure 
to disclose the recantation and determined that the appropriate remedy 
was to enter judgment of acquittal for Defendant as to all four counts.1  
The Commission charged Respondent with violating Indiana 
Professional Conduct Rules 3.8(a), 3.8(d), and 8.4(d) in connection with the 
conduct described above. Following a hearing, the hearing officer filed his 
report to this Court concluding that Respondent violated each of those 
three rules as charged. 
The Commission also charged Respondent with violating Rules 8.1(a) 
and 8.4(c), based on the Commission’s allegation that Respondent’s 
response to the Commission’s request for investigation was knowingly 
false. The hearing officer concluded that the Commission had not met its 
burden of proving these charges by clear and convincing evidence.  
Discussion and Discipline 
Respondent concedes a violation of Rule 3.8(a) but seeks our review of 
the hearing officer’s conclusions that she violated Rules 3.8(d) and 8.4(d) 
as well as certain underlying findings made by the hearing officer. The 
Commission does not seek our review of the hearing officer’s conclusions 
that the Commission failed to prove the Rule 8.1(a) and Rule 8.4(c) 
charges. Both parties also have filed briefs addressing the question of 
appropriate sanction.  
The Commission carries the burden of proving attorney misconduct by 
clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 
23(14)(g)(1). We review de novo all matters presented to the Court, 
including review not only of the hearing officer’s report but also of the 
entire record. See Matter of Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194, 1196 (Ind. 2017). The 
hearing officer’s findings receive emphasis due to the unique opportunity 
                                                 
1 The State did not appeal this decision, and Respondent’s employment with the prosecutor’s 
office was terminated following Defendant’s trial. 
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for direct observation of witnesses, but this Court reserves the right to 
make the ultimate determination. Id. 
Rule 3.8(a) forbids a prosecutor from prosecuting a charge that she 
knows is not supported by probable cause. Respondent concedes that she 
violated this rule but attempts to cast her violation as merely a “formal” 
one, in that (according to Respondent) Count II technically was left “in the 
case” as Defendant’s trial commenced but otherwise was abandoned by 
the prosecution. (Mem. in Support of Pet. for Review at 42-43). The 
hearing officer did not agree with this reductive view, nor do we. 
Respondent gave no indication that Count II was being abandoned when 
the court reviewed with counsel the proposed preliminary instructions 
(which included an instruction on the Count II charge), nor did she do so 
when those instructions were given to the jury orally and in writing. And 
immediately after the preliminary instructions were given to the jury, 
Respondent told the jury in her opening statement that “[a]t the end of the 
evidence . . . I will ask you to find this Defendant guilty in what he is 
charged with, the four counts of child molesting.” (Ex. 5 at 26). 
Respondent also admits that she failed to disclose E.C.’s recantation to 
the defense, but she argues that Rule 3.8(d) did not require her to do so. 
We disagree. Respondent’s argument is premised on the tenuous notion 
that E.C.’s recantation was merely impeachment evidence, which 
Respondent contends Rule 3.8(d) does not encompass. But Rule 3.8(d) in 
relevant part expressly requires timely disclosure of “all evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused” (emphasis added). Rule 3.8(d) contains one limited exception not 
applicable here involving information subject to a protective order. But 
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there is no exception for impeachment evidence.2 Further, under the 
circumstances of this case we cannot agree that E.C.’s recantation was 
merely impeaching. Respondent concedes E.C.’s recantation was evidence 
tending to negate Defendant’s guilt on Count II, and as discussed above 
we reject Respondent’s contention that the inclusion of Count II in the trial 
was a trivial formality. And in a case in which all remaining counts 
likewise were founded entirely upon reports made by Defendant’s two 
stepchildren, we find it very difficult to characterize direct evidence that 
the stepchildren’s father successfully coached at least one of them to lie 
about what Defendant had done as mere impeachment.    
Finally, Respondent argues in her briefing to this Court that her 
conduct was not “prejudicial to the administration of justice” within the 
meaning of Rule 8.4(d). Again, we cannot agree. The first component of 
Respondent’s argument echoes one addressed above; namely, 
Respondent’s contention that Defendant was never actually at risk of 
conviction of Count II, notwithstanding its inclusion in the trial, because 
Respondent elicited no evidence to support that count. This argument 
conflates prejudice to the defendant with prejudice to the administration 
of justice; they are not the same, and the focus of Rule 8.4(d) is the latter. 
See Neary, 84 N.E.3d at 1197. The second component of Respondent’s 
argument is that the trial court “overreacted” in entering judgment of 
acquittal on all four counts and instead should have taken less drastic 
remedial action, such as declaring a mistrial and then retrying Defendant 
on Counts I, III, and IV. (Mem. in Support of Pet. for Review at 66-68). 
                                                 
2 Respondent devotes much of her memorandum in support of her petition for review to 
analyzing the disclosure requirements under the criminal-law Brady doctrine. See Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). But in this attorney discipline case, our focus is on the 
requirements of Rule 3.8(d). Accord Matter of Smith, 60 N.E.3d 1034, 1036 (Ind. 2016). We note 
that in applying similar versions of Rule 3.8(d), some jurisdictions have treated the duties 
imposed by the rule coextensively with the duties imposed under Brady. See, e.g., In re 
Seastrunk, 236 So.3d 509, 518-19 (La. 2017). Other jurisdictions have held that a prosecutor’s 
ethical obligations under the rule are broader than those imposed by Brady. See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 678 (N.D. 2012). We need not choose today 
between these two approaches because we find Respondent’s conduct runs afoul of Rule 
3.8(d) under either approach.    
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Even assuming that the trial court had other options within its discretion 
to exercise, we are not inclined to shift culpability for the prejudicial 
effects of an attorney’s misconduct onto the court forced to take remedial 
action to address that misconduct.3 Accord Neary, 84 N.E.3d at 1197. We 
also note that Respondent testified as follows at the final hearing in this 
matter: 
Whether or not I thought Judge Alexa should’ve done 
something a little different still doesn’t negate the fact that 
but for my lack of making a better decision he never 
would’ve been put in that place and ultimately, as I 
mentioned, victims not getting justice, the State of Indiana 
being harmed, the potential of, God forbid, [Defendant] 
doing something to someone else, none of that would be a 
consideration if I had done something different. 
(Tr. at 204-05). Respondent’s testimony accurately captures the thrust of 
Rule 8.4(d). 
In sum, we find sufficient support for the hearing officer’s findings and 
conclusions. Accordingly, we find that Respondent violated Rules 3.8(a), 
3.8(d), and 8.4(d), and we find in favor of Respondent on the remaining 
charges. We turn now to the matter of sanction. 
Quite thankfully, we have not previously had occasion to consider the 
question of an appropriate sanction for a Rule 3.8(a) or Rule 3.8(d) 
violation. There can be little doubt that prosecuting a charge known to 
lack probable cause, and failing to disclose known information or 
evidence tending to negate a defendant’s guilt, are among the most 
serious ethical violations a prosecutor could commit. “The State is never 
more awesomely powerful, nor is the individual more vulnerable, than in 
a criminal prosecution[.]” State v. Taylor, 49 N.E.3d 1019, 1023 (Ind. 2016). 
                                                 
3 Regardless, different remedial action still would have resulted in prejudice to the 
administration of justice. For example, a mistrial would have resulted in a delay in the 
prosecution, the expenditure of additional judicial resources, the selection and impanelment 
of a second jury, and the need for witnesses (including E.C. and K.C.) to testify a second time.  
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These rules of professional conduct are central to the prosecutorial 
function and essential to ensuring the integrity and fairness of our 
criminal justice system.   
Respondent urges us to impose a public reprimand, arguing that she 
committed only a “formal” Rule 3.8(a) violation and likening her case to 
Matter of Henderson, 78 N.E.3d 1092 (Ind. 2017). As discussed above, 
Respondent’s rule violations were not so limited. Moreover, the nature of 
Respondent’s misconduct in this case significantly differs from the ill-
advised book deal negotiated by the prosecutor in Henderson and affected 
the underlying criminal case far more directly. 
The Commission urges us to impose a four-year suspension without 
automatic reinstatement, likening this case to Neary, in which the 
prosecutor eavesdropped on confidential attorney-client discussions in 
two separate criminal cases. The types of misconduct at issue in this case 
and in Neary are extremely serious and erode public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. Without attempting to parse which prosecutorial 
transgression is qualitatively worse, we find Respondent’s conduct in this 
one single case distinguishable from the prosecutor’s repeated violations 
in Neary. Additionally, during her testimony in this case Respondent 
expressed some measures of contrition, regret, and insight into her 
misconduct that distinguish her from the prosecutor in Neary.4 
After careful consideration of this matter, we conclude that Respondent 
should be suspended for a period of at least eighteen months and required 
to go through the reinstatement process before resuming practice. 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Tr. at 170 (“[T]his is completely on me, it was my case”), at 192 (describing her 
failure to disclose E.C.’s recantation to defense counsel as “ridiculous, quite frankly” and 
explaining “[i]t’s almost like I shut everything else out, every other reasonable thought that 
you would think a person in my position, meaning my experience, would’ve done”), at 193 (“I 
can’t explain to you the amount of guilt I feel [that K.C. and E.C. did not get a verdict on 
Counts I, III, and IV].  I struggle with that because I was supposed to protect them and also I 
was supposed to protect, if the jury found him guilty, any other children in the future from 
him, and because I failed to recognize an issue that will forever be on my shoulders”), and at 
204-05 (quoted above). 
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Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated Professional Conduct 
Rules 3.8(a), 3.8(d), and 8.4(d). The Court finds in favor of Respondent on 
the remaining charges. 
For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court suspends 
Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of at least 
eighteen months, without automatic reinstatement, effective October 10, 
2018. Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under 
Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At the conclusion of the minimum 
period of suspension, Respondent may petition this Court for 
reinstatement to the practice of law in this state, provided Respondent 
pays the costs of this proceeding, fulfills the duties of a suspended 
attorney, and satisfies the requirements for reinstatement of Admission 
and Discipline Rule 23(18). 
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The 
hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged.          
All Justices concur. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  RESP O N D E NT  
Donald R. Lundberg 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T 
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Director 
Seth Pruden, Staff Attorney 
Larry Newman, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana