Title: Suter v. Arrowhead Inv. Co., Ltd.
Citation: 387 So. 2d 815
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 1980

387 So. 2d 815 (1980)
Richard SUTER and Gail Suter
v.
ARROWHEAD INVESTMENT CO., LTD.
79-256.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 29, 1980.
*816 Marlin M. Mooneyham, Montgomery, for appellants.
Richard B. Garrett of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston &amp; Garrett, Montgomery, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting specific performance to the seller and awarding the seller incidental damages and other relief. The trial judge heard the testimony ore tenus and after considering documentary evidence introduced, made extensive findings of facts and conclusions of law, which we incorporate herein:
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
(1) Did the trial court err in overruling appellants' motion for new trial on the ground that the order of specific performance was contrary to the law and evidence of the case?
(2) Did the trial court err in awarding damages in the amount of $10,231.22?
(3) Did the trial court err in ordering that damages be increased at the rate of $22.42 per day up to the date of closing?
As to the first issue raised by the appellants, it is well settled that the granting or denying of a motion for a new trial is a matter resting primarily in the discretion of the trial judge and the exercise of discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness. Taylor v. Birmingham News Co., 341 So. 2d 689 (Ala.1977).
Appellants' main argument is that the parties orally agreed to change the closing date and that the trial judge erred in holding that the "original written contract could not be modified or changed by oral agreement."
We interpret this statement of law by the trial judge in his decree to be a statement by him of the general rule to the effect that a contract required by the statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be modified by subsequent parol agreement. Weatherwax v. Heflin, 244 Ala. 210, 12 So. 2d 554 (1943). From a reading of the *818 entire decree, we find that it is apparent that the trial judge applied equitable principles in decreeing specific performance. In any event, the trial judge did not consider that any oral modification of the written contract was of a nature which could be set up as a bar to specific performance. See Cowin v. Salmon, 244 Ala. 285, 13 So. 2d 190 (1943). This Court stated in Cowin that:
244 Ala. at 295, 13 So. 2d  at 198. Under the facts of this case, however, we do not hold that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the buyers to set up the alleged oral modification as a bar to specific performance. As this Court recently said in Wray v. Harris, 350 So. 2d 409 (Ala.1977):
350 So. 2d  at 412. Also, the decision by the trial court to grant specific performance was based on testimony heard ore tenus. Unless the decision by the Court is plainly and palpably erroneous and contrary to the great weight of the evidence, we should affirm it. Hall v. Polk, 363 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 1978).
The appellant also contends that the trial judge made his decision, or a part thereof, without sufficient evidence to support his findings. The trial judge did find that the parties agreed "that the closing attorney would hold $300.00 in escrow" until the repairs were complete. The evidence does not directly show that there was such an agreement; however, the evidence does show that the seller did discuss the escrow with appellant, Mrs. Suter, and that the seller did contact the closing attorney requesting that he put $300.00 in escrow. There was sufficient evidence, therefore, upon which the trial judge could infer that the seller was acting in good faith and attempting to protect the buyers while closing the loan at the earliest possible time. We hold that the buyers have failed to show by this argument that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting specific performance.
As a second issue, the buyers contend that the trial court erred in awarding as incidental damages $10,231.22 when the seller only claimed $9,921.36 at trial. We note that seller's complaint mentions no specific dollar amount as damages. Rather, seller asked for such other relief as "in equity and good conscience it may be entitled." Rule 54(c), ARCP, states in pertinent part:
The award of $10,231.22 by the trial court was not error, because it was supported by credible evidence. In a litigated case, the prayer does not necessarily limit the amount of recoverable damages. Cf. Brown v. Burr-Brown Research Corporation, 378 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967).
Likewise, the decision by the trial court that the incidental damages should be increased by $22.42 per day, up to the time of closing, is within the discretion of a court sitting in equity. The amount awarded represents the sum computed by the trial judge to be in excess of the discount rate at the time of the original closing. We find no error in that aspect of the court's decree because the trial court, applying equitable principles, was authorized to make those findings under the evidence presented.
The judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.