Title: RUMPH v DALE EDWARDS INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14607
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1979

No. 14607 INTHESwREBEmUfiTOFTHEsrmOFMX;1TANA 19 7 9 HUBEEiT C . RUMPH and MARGEW RUMPH, Plaintiffs and Respondents, -vs- DALF: INC. , a Pbntana Corporation, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal f m : District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial ~istrict, Homrable Alfred B . Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Sandall & Cavan, Billings, Mntana John R . Carr, Miles City, Mntana For Respondents: Lucas and hbnaghan, Miles City, mntana Submitted o n briefs: April 25, 1979 Filed: JUN 6 1 9 7 9 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i n t h i s appeal i s t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o g r a n t summary judgment i n favor of respondents. A s evidenced by t h e D i s t r i c t Court f i l e and t h e p a r t i e s ' b r i e f s herein, w e f i n d t h a t a b s o l u t e l y no genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t a r e p r e s e n t i n t h i s l a w s u i t and t h a t respondents a r e e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. The purpose of t h i s appeal i s t o determine t h e r i g h t f u l owner of a small ranch located a d j a c e n t t o t h e Powder River near Broadus, Montana. For many years p r i o r t o September 22, 1965, t h i s ranch, which c o n s i s t s of approximately 523 acres of land and a residence, w a s owned by R. C. Hubbard of Broadus, Montana. Hubbard, who i s now deceased, was n o t l i v i n g on h i s ranch i n t h e spring of 1965. H e allowed Hubert Rumph, one of t h e respondents herein, t o move onto t h e ranch t h a t spring. A formal l e a s e agreement, dated September 22, 1965, was l a t e r executed by Hubbard and Rumph. This lease agreement provided f o r a t e r m of f i v e y e a r s from and a f t e r A p r i l 1, 1965. The annual consideration f o r t h e l e a s e of t h e property w a s $523 o r $1.00 per acre. The l e a s e agreement contained t h e following provision granting Rumph t h e exclusive option t o purchase t h e property: "That t h e Lessor does hereby g i v e and g r a n t t o t h e Lessee, h i s h e i r s , executors, a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and assigns, t h e exclusive r i g h t , p r i v i l e g e and option of purchasing t h e hereinabove described real property f o r t h e sum of Twenty Seven Thous- sand Five Hundred Dollars ($27,500.00). That t h i s option may be exercised by t h e Lessee a t any t i m e a f t e r A p r i l 1, 1968 and n o t later than A p r i l 1, 1970, by giving w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e Lessor within t h e t i m e s e t f o r t h h e r e i n f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of t h i s option. That s a i d n o t i c e s h a l l be s e n t by r e g i s t e r e d m a i l t o t h e Lessor a t Broadus, Montana." I n February 1969, Rumph decided t o e x e r c i s e h i s option t o purchase t h e property. This d e c i s i o n was duly communi- cated t o Hubbard who acquiesced t o t h e planned s a l e . Hubbard and Rumph concluded t h a t t h e sale could n o t be completed i n February 1969. Both Hubbard and Rumph became concerned with t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s a l e could n o t be completed p r i o r t o A p r i l 1, 1970, t h e e x p i r a t i o n d a t e of t h e option t o purchase found i n t h e l e a s e agreement. Therefore, on February 13, 1969, Hubbard and Rumph m e t a t t h e Hubbard home t o r e s o l v e t h i s problem. I t was mutually agreed t h a t t h e b e s t way t o s o l v e t h e problem w a s t o extend t h e l e a s e and option t o purchase f o r an a d d i t i o n a l t e n years. During t h i s conversation, Rumph made notes of t h e p a r t i e s ' under- standings. Later t h a t evening, h i s wife Margery prepared a document e n t i t l e d " l e a s e r i d e r " according t o t h e mutually agreed upon terms. The following day t h e Rumphs returned t o t h e Hubbard home t o execute t h e l e a s e r i d e r . Bonnie Rumph, a Notary Public, accompanied them t o n o t a r i z e t h e s i g n a t u r e s . Hubbard and Rumph then examined t h e l e a s e r i d e r t o confirm t h a t it properly r e f l e c t e d t h e agreement reached t h e previous day. One s i g n i f i c a n t change contemplated by t h e p a r t i e s w a s an i n c r e a s e i n t h e annual l e a s e payment from $523 t o $623. The l e a s e r i d e r provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t : ". . . t h i s lease s h a l l run f o r t e n ( 1 0 ) more y e a r s , expiring on A p r i l 1, 1980, i n s t e a d of A p r i l 1, 1970." The Rumphs' option t o purchase t h e property was extended u n t i l A p r i l 1, 1980, by t h e following language of t h e Lease r i d e r : "That t h e l e s s e e , Hubert C. Rumph and/or Margery Rumph, has t h e option t o renew t h i s lease a s w e l l a s t h e option t o buy." ¾ he sum of $523 was p a i d t o Hubbard f o r t h e y e a r s 1965 through 1969. Pursuant t o t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e r i d e r , t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n p a i d i n 1970 and a l l subsequent y e a r s w a s i n c r e a s e d t o $623. R. C. Hubbard d i e d on January 7, 1971. A t t h e t i m e of h i s d e a t h , t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n had n o t y e t been con- veyed t o t h e Rumphs. For economic reasons, t h e d e c i s i o n w a s made by t h e a t t o r n e y and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of Hubbard's e s t a t e t o sell t h e p r o p e r t y a t a p u b l i c s a l e . The administra- t o r ' s s a l e was duly and properly c a r r i e d o u t . The n o t i c e of s a l e of r e a l p r o p e r t y was duly published. That n o t i c e s t a t e d i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t : "Ranch s u b j e c t t o s u r f a c e l e a s e t o H. C. Rumph." While no r e f e r e n c e was made i n t h e n o t i c e t o respondents' i n t e r e s t , t h e purchaser w a s aware of h i s i n t e r e s t . The a d m i n i s t r a t o r ' s s a l e was conducted i n t h e courtroom o f t h e Powder River County courthouse on October 27, 1972. P r i o r t o t h a t d a t e , Rumph spoke w i t h t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e e s t a t e , Robert J. Brooks, and was assured by Brooks t h a t t h e purchaser a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r ' s sale would t a k e t h e land s u b j e c t t o Rumphs' l e a s e and o p t i o n t o purchase. The record a l s o r e f l e c t s t h a t Dale Edwards, t h e p r e s i d e n t of t h e a p p e l l a n t c o r p o r a t i o n , D a l e Edwards, I n c . , a l s o spoke w i t h Brooks p r i o r t o t h e sale. I n a d d i t i o n , Edwards was provided w i t h a copy of both t h e l e a s e agreement and l e a s e r i d e r p r i o r t o t h e d a t e of t h e s a l e . P r i o r t o t h e sale, o r a l announcements w e r e made by t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e estate t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e s a l e was s u b j e c t t o t h e Rumphs' l e a s e and o p t i o n t o purchase. Copies of t h e lease agreement and l e a s e r i d e r w e r e c i r c u l a t e d among p r o s p e c t i v e purchasers a t t h e sale. Q u e s t i o n s w e r e asked regarding t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e lease and o p t i o n t o purchase and Brooks d e f e r r e d h i s answers t o o t h e r a t t o r n e y s who w e r e p r e s e n t and r e p r e s e n t i n g prospective bidders. These f a c t s i n d i c a t e it was unnecessary t o i n c l u d e it i n t h e n o t i c e f o r sale. Purchaser had ample n o t i c e . The property was purchased by Dale Edwards, on behalf o f Dale Edwards, Inc. The purchase p r i c e was $21,173.40, which was 90 p e r c e n t of t h e appraised v a l u e of t h e property. Subsequent t o t h e s a l e , b u t p r i o r t o t h e a c t u a l c l o s i n g , Edwards' a t t o r n e y , M r . C a r r , reviewed an a b s t r a c t of t i t l e t o t h e property. C e r t a i n t i t l e work had t o b e done includ- i n g t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of a q u i t claim deed from a M r . Dahl, who h e l d a l i e n on t h e property. Considerable d i f f i c u l t y w a s encountered by Brooks and Carr i n o b t a i n i n g t h i s deed from Dahl. I n f a c t , a t one p o i n t , cash c o n s i d e r a t i o n was o f f e r e d t o Dahl f o r t h e deed. A t no t i m e was any q u e s t i o n r a i s e d a s t o t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e Rumphs' l e a s e and o p t i o n t o purchase. The Rumphs have been i n continuous possession of t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e A p r i l 1965. They have performed a l l of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s under both t h e l e a s e agreement and t h e lease r i d e r . N o n o t i c e of d e f a u l t has ever been served upon t h e Rumphs by Dale Edwards, I n c . , a s r e q u i r e d f o r any breach of t h e l e a s e agreement. A l l annual lease payments have been made by t h e Rumphs t o Dale Edwards, I n c . , by c a s h i e r ' s checks. On March 15, 1977, pursuant t o t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e agreement and l e a s e r i d e r , t h e Rumphs e x e r c i s e d t h e i r o p t i o n t o purchase t h e property f o r t h e sum of $27,500. Dale Edwards, Inc., refused t o perform under t h e l e a s e agreement and l e a s e r i d e r and w i l l n o t convey t h e property t o t h e Rumphs. The amount of $27,500, representing f u l l payment f o r t h e property, has been tendered t o t h e Clerk of t h e Powder River County D i s t r i c t Court by means of an irrevok- a b l e l e t t e r of c r e d i t . This s u i t f o r s p e c i f i c performance followed Edwards' r e f u s a l t o convey t h e property t o t h e Rumphs. Summary judgment i n favor of t h e Rumphs was entered by t h e D i s t r i c t Court from which D a l e Edwards, I n c . , appeals t o t h i s Court. Before considering t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s s u e s , w e w i l l d i s c u s s t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r t a i n i n g summary judgment motions i n t h i s matter. Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides t h a t summary judgment i s proper i f : ". . . t h e pleadings, depositions, answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e , together with t h e a f f i d a v i t s , i f any, show t h a t t h e r e i s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a matter of law." Thus, summary judgment i s appropriate when t h e moving p a r t y shows a complete absence of any genuine i s s u e a s t o a l l f a c t s which a r e m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of those s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e him t o a judgment as a matter of law. Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613. This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t , under Rule 56, t h e p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment has t h e i n i t i a l burden o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e complete absence of any genuine i s s u e of material f a c t . Mustang Beverage Co., Inc. v. Jos. S c h l i t z Brewing Co. (1973), 162 Mont. 243, 511 P.2d 1. To s a t i s f y i t s burden t h e moving p a r t y must make a showing t h a t i s q u i t e c l e a r of what t h e t r u t h is, and exclude any r e a l doubt a s t o t h e existence of any genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . Kober v. Stewart (1966), 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476. The primary policy and general purpose underlying Rule 56 i s t o encourage j u d i c i a l economy through t h e prompt elimination of questions n o t deserving of r e s o l u t i o n by t r i a l . Silloway v. Jorgenson (1965), 146 Mont. 307, 406 While t h e i n i t i a l burden of proof must a t t a c h t o t h e moving p a r t y , t h a t burden s h i f t s where t h e record d i s c l o s e s no genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . Under t h e s e circum- stances, t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion must come forward with s u b s t a n t i a l evidence r a i s i n g t h e i s s u e . Rickard v. Paradis (1975), 167 Mont. 450, 539 P.2d 718; Roope v. Ana- conda Company (1972), 159 Mont. 28, 494 P.2d 922; Flansberg v. Montana Power Company (1969), 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263. Once t h e burden has s h i f t e d , t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion i s held t o a standard of proof which i s as s u b s t a n t i a l a s t h a t i n i t i a l l y imposed upon t h e moving p a r t y . Harland v. Anderson, supra. This standard of proof w a s c l e a r l y defined i n Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. a t 310, 406 P.2d a t 169, where t h i s Court s t a t e d : p r e s e n t l a w w i l l t h e p a r t y opposing [ t h e ] motion must f a c t s i n proper form--conclusions of n o t s u f f i c e ; and t h e opposing p a r t y ' s f a c t s must be m a t e r i a l and of a s u b s t a n t i a l nature, not f a n c i f u l , f r i v o l o u s , gauzy, nor merely suspicions.'" W e f i n d t h a t a l l f a c t s m a t e r i a l t o t h e l e g a l i s s u e s involved i n t h i s appeal have been presented. There a r e no genuine i s s u e s of f a c t . The p a r t i e s concede t h a t no i s s u e s of f a c t e x i s t i n t h i s case. The i n d i v i d u a l i s s u e s presented t o t h i s Court a r e : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly construe and i n t e r - p r e t t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e agreement and l e a s e r i d e r ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n i t s adoption of cer- t a i n o r a l testimony concerning t h e circumstances of t h e execution of t h e l e a s e r i d e r ? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n holding t h a t respon- d e n t s ' option t o purchase w a s n o t extinguished by t h e t e r m s of s e c t i o n 67-408, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 70-26-207 M C A ? 4. Did a p p e l l a n t waive its r i g h t t o c o n t e s t t h e v a l i d i t y o r existence of t h e option t o purchase? The f i r s t i s s u e concerns t h e construction and i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n of t h e l e a s e agreement and lease r i d e r . Both p a r t i e s i n d i c a t e t h a t a primary question t o be answered here i s "what do t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t provide?" W e agree. The i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n t r a c t s is d e t e r - mined by reading t h e l e a s e agreement and l e a s e r i d e r i n f u l l . Appellant chooses t o d i s s e c t t h e c o n t r a c t s , takes c e r t a i n i s o l a t e d words and phrases from them, and argues t h a t t h e s e minute p i e c e s express t h e t r u e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s r a t h e r than an a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n t r a c t s i n f u l l . W e f i n d t h a t t h e i n t e n t of t h e c o n t r a c t s is c l e a r . The Rumphs were granted t h e option t o purchase t h e property i n question which w i l l , by i t s t e r m s , e x p i r e on A p r i l 1, 1980. I n i t i a l l y , it i s important t o note t h a t t h e l e a s e r i d e r i s merely an extension of t h e l e a s e agreement with c e r t a i n enumerated changes. I n view of t h e c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e documents, they must be construed together t o determine t h e t r u e i n t e n t of Hubbard and Rumph regarding t h e o p t i o n t o purchase. Section 13-708, R.C.M. 1947, now sec- t i o n 28-3-203 MCA, provides: "Several c o n t r a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e s a m e m a t t e r s , between t h e s a m e p a r t i e s , and made a s p a r t s of s u b s t a n t i a l l y one t r a n s a c t i o n , are t o be taken together." Therefore, i n discussing t h e r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e two c o n t r a c t s herein w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s one. The following r u l e s of construction a r e c o n t r o l l i n g upon t h i s Court i n i t s determination of t h e i n t e n t of t h e c o n t r a c t . A c o n t r a c t must be construed according t o t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n t r a c t a t t h e time of contracting. Section 13-702, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-3- 301 MCA; Brown v. G r i f f i n (1968), 150 Mont. 498, 436 P.2d 695. The language of a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t governs i t s i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n i f t h e language i s c l e a r and e x p l i c i t and does n o t involve an ambiguity. Section 13-704, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-3-401 MCA. I n t h e event of an ambiguity, sec- t i o n s 13-702 and 13-713, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 28-3-301 and 28-3-402 MCA, e x p l i c i t l y allow t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e x t r i n s i c evidence t o explain t h e t r u e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s . McNussen v. Graybeal (1965), 146 Mont. 173, 405 P.2d 447. A n ambiguity e x i s t s when, taken a s a whole, t h e con- t r a c t ' s wording o r phraseology i s reasonably s u b j e c t t o two d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . S - W Company v. Schwenk (1977), Mont. , 568 P.2d 145, 34 St.Rep. 865; W i l l i a m s v. Insurance Company of North America (1967), 150 Mont. 292, 434 P.2d 395. Where t h e t e r m s of an agreement a r e uncertain and ambiguous, par01 evidence i s admissible t o prove t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n meant by t h e p a r t i e s . Sutton v. Masterson (1930), 86 Mont. 530, 284 P. 264. I n a d d i t i o n , where t h e language of t h e c o n t r a c t i s doubtful and ambiguous, t h e conduct of t h e p a r t i e s under t h e c o n t r a c t i s one of t h e b e s t i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e i r t r u e i n t e n t . Brown v. riff in, supra; Musselshell Valley Farming & Livestock Co. v. Cooley (1929), 86 Mont. 276, 283 P. 213. This Court s t a t e d i n Kintner v. Harr (1965), 146 Mont. 461, 472, 408 P.2d 487, 494, t h a t : ". . . It i s a fundamental r u l e t h a t i n t h e con- s t r u c t i o n of c o n t r a c t s t h e c o u r t s may look n o t only t o t h e language employed, b u t t o t h e sub- ject-matter and t h e surrounding circumstances, and may a v a i l themselves of t h e same l i g h t which t h e p a r t i e s possessed when t h e c o n t r a c t was made. See Merriam v. United S t a t e s , 107 U.S. 437, 4 4 1 , S.Ct. 536, 540, 27 L.Ed. 531, 533. To a s c e r t a i n t h e i n t e n t i o n , regard must be had t o t h e n a t u r e of t h e instrument i t s e l f , t h e condition of t h e p a r t i e s executing it, and t h e o b j e c t s which they had i n view. The words employed, i f capable of more than one meaning, a r e t o be given t h a t meaning which it i s ap- p a r e n t t h e p a r t i e s intended them t o have. 1 Beach on Modern Law of Contracts, 702. See Smith v. School D i s t r i c t No. 18, 115 Mont. 102, 139 P.2d 518; 12 Am J u r , S S 236, 249." I t i s a well-established p r i n c i p l e of c o n t r a c t u a l construction t h a t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g a w r i t t e n instrument, t h e c o u r t w i l l not i s o l a t e c e r t a i n phrases of t h e instrument t o garner t h e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s , b u t w i l l grasp t h e i n s t r u - ment by i t s four corners and i n t h e l i g h t of t h e e n t i r e instrument, a s c e r t a i n t h e paramount and guiding i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . Mere i s o l a t e d t r a c t s , c l a u s e s and words w i l l n o t be allowed t o p r e v a i l over t h e general language u t i l i z e d i n t h e instrument. Ward v. Mattuschek (1958), 134 Mont. 307, 330 P.2d 971; Steen v. Rustad (1957), 132 Mont. 96, 313 P.2d 1014. The words of t h e c o n t r a c t a r e t o be understood i n t h e i r ordinary and proper sense. Section 13-710, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-3-501 MCA. P a r t i c u l a r c l a u s e s of t h e agreement a r e subordinate t o t h e general i n t e n t of t h e c o n t r a c t . Section 13-716, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-3-307 MCA. Any repugnancies i n t h e c o n t r a c t must be reconciled, i f p o s s i b l e , by an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which w i l l give some e f f e c t t o t h e repugnant clauses, subordinate t o t h e general i n t e n t and purpose of t h e c o n t r a c t . Section 13-718, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-3-204 MCA. Furthermore, words i n a c o n t r a c t which a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e general n a t u r e of t h e c o n t r a c t o r t h e main i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s a r e t o be r e j e c t e d . Section 13-719, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-3-503 MCA . One f i n a l r u l e of c o n t r a c t u a l construction i s involved herein. I n case of an ambiguity, t h e language of t h e con- t r a c t i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d most s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y causing t h e uncertainty t o e x i s t . Section 13-720, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 28-3-206 MCA. Appellant i n d i c a t e s t h a t s i n c e Rumph a s s i s t e d i n t h e composition of t h e l e a s e r i d e r and h i s wife typed t h e agreement, t h e agreement should be construed most strongly a g a i n s t t h e Rumphs. However, t h i s r u l e of construction has l i t t l e , i f any, a p p l i c a b i l i t y i n t h e i n s t a n t case. The testimony i s undisputed t h a t Rumph and Hubbard j o i n t l y drew up t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e r i d e r . Thereafter, Margery Rumph transcribed t h e agreement reached i n t o i t s p r e s e n t form. After t h i s t r a n s c r i p t i o n , both Rumph and Hubbard reviewed t h e document t o confirm t h a t it cor- responded t o t h e i r agreement. I t appears t h a t any ambiguity c r e a t e d was j o i n t l y c r e a t e d and t h a t Rumph should n o t a t t h i s p o i n t be s o l e l y chargeable with t h e ambiguity. I t should a l s o be noted t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e agreement was d r a f t e d by an unknown a t t o r n e y a t t h e r e q u e s t of Hubbard. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t a p p e l l a n t devotes ap- proximately e i g h t pages of i t s b r i e f t o a discussion of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between a " l e a s e " and "option t o purchase." By means of an extremely t e c h n i c a l and somewhat imaginative argument, a p p e l l a n t concludes t h a t t h e use and placement of t h e words, "lease" and "option t o purchase", i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e option t o purchase ended with t h e t e r m of t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e agreement and was not extended t o April 1, 1980 by t h e l e a s e r i d e r . Appellant i s picking i s o l a t e d words and phrases from the two c o n t r a c t s and attempting t o r e b u t t h e i r c l e a r and convincing general i n t e n t . I t c e r t a i n l y i s t r u e t h a t t h e t e r m s "lease" and "option t o purchase" have d i f f e r e n t meanings. However, a l l p a r t i e s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s transaction with t h e exception of Dale Edwards, Inc., considered t h e option t o purchase t o be a portion of the lease. The l e a s e agreement is t i t l e d j u s t t h a t : Lease Agreement, n o t Lease Agreement and Option t o Purchase. There c e r t a i n l y i s no contention, even by Dale Edwards, Inc., t h a t t h e option t o purchase i s not a p a r t of t h a t lease. I n addition, t h e n o t i c e of s a l e indicated t h a t t h e s a l e was subject t o t h e surface l e a s e t o Rumph. Therefore, w e f i n d t h a t t h e t e r m "lease" a s found i n t h e l e a s e r i d e r should be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean l e a s e and option t o purchase. I f it i s necessary t o d i s s e c t t h e agreements i n question t o determine t h e i r t r u e i n t e n t , w e f i n d t h a t t h i s d i s s e c t i o n i s more accurate than t h e one suggested by appellant. Appellant comments a t length on t h e Rumphs' f i n a n c i a l condition. Appellant i n d i c a t e s t h a t they w e r e unable t o arrange financing f o r t h e purchase of t h e land u n t i l as- s i s t e d by t h e i r attorney. There i s absolutely no evidence i n t h e record t o support t h i s a s s e r t i o n . I n f a c t , t h e r e i s absolutely no conclusive evidence concerning t h e Rumphs' f i n a n c i a l condition. I n any event, t h i s e n t i r e discussion i s moot i n t h a t t h e money was a v a i l a b l e when t h e Rumphs ultimately decided t o exercise t h e i r option t o purchase. I n conclusion, when t h i s Court reads t h e l e a s e agree- and ment and lease r i d e r i n t o t a l / i n t e r p r e t s them by grasping them by t h e i r f o u r corners t o determine t h e i r o v e r a l l in- t e n t , t h e conclusion i s inescapable t h a t t h e Rumphs' option t o purchase survives u n t i l April 1, 1980. I s s u e No. 2 involves t h e p r o p r i e t y of c e r t a i n o r a l testimony. Appellant complains t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by incorporating c e r t a i n evidence i n t o its f i n d i n g s of f a c t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t f i n d s f a u l t with Findings O f Fact Nos. 3 through 6. Appellant's a t t a c k i s two pronged, claiming t h a t t h e evidence i s inadmissible f i r s t under t h e p a r o l evidence r u l e and second under t h e r u l e s of evidence, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e dead man's s t a t u t e . W e f i n d t h a t t h e evidence which i s t h e b a s i s of Find- i n g s of F a c t Nos. 3 through 5 i s inadmissible under t h e p a r o l evidence r u l e . Montana c o u r t s , when c a l l e d upon t o i n t e r p r e t t h e t e r m s of c o n t r a c t s , have long held t h a t where t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t are c l e a r and unambiguous t h e c o u r t w i l l n o t allow p a r o l evidence. Safeco Insurance Company v. Munroe (1974), 165 Mont. 185, 527 P.2d 64; Merritt v. Merritt (1974), 165 Mont. 172, 526 P.2d 1375; and Kielmann v. Mogan (1970), 156 Mont. 230, 478 P.2d 275. W e have held under I s s u e No. 1, however, t h a t t h e l e a s e agreement and l e a s e r i d e r are c l e a r and unambiguous, giving respondents a l e a s e and option t o purchase u n t i l ~ p r i l 1, 1980. The i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s i s c l e a r , and t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court could s o f i n d i n i t s Finding of Fact No. 6 without t h e use of p a r o l evidence. Appellant f u r t h e r contends t h a t t h e evidence underlying Findings of Fact Nos. 3 through 5 i s a l s o inadmissible under t h e dead man's s t a t u t e . Because of our r u l i n g t h a t t h i s evidence is inadmissible under t h e p a r o l evidence r u l e , w e need n o t make a f i n d i n g on t h i s p o i n t . I t should be pointed o u t , however, t h a t t h e dead man's s t a t u t e , which was for- merly c o d i f i e d a t s e c t i o n 93-701-3(3), R.C.M. 1947, has been abolished by Rule 601, Mont.R.Evid. I s s u e No. 3 concerns p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 67- 408, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 70-26-207 MCA. Appellant a l l e g e s t h a t t h e l e a s e r i d e r i s i n v a l i d and void a s being i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 67-408, which l i m i t s t h e d u r a t i o n of l e a s e s of a g r i c u l t u r a l lands t o t e n years. There i s cer- t a i n l y no doubt t h a t t h e lands i n question are a g r i c u l t u r a l lands and t h a t t h e r e n t a l arrangement d i d e x i s t . However, w e f i n d t h a t by i t s t e r m s t h e lease r i d e r extended t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e f o r a term of t e n y e a r s and t e n years only. I t i s uncontested t h a t t h e l e a s e r i d e r was executed on February 1 4 , 1969. Appellant makes an i s s u e of t h e f a c t t h a t approximately one year and s i x weeks w e r e remaining on t h e t e r m of t h e l e a s e agreement on t h e d a t e of execution of t h e l e a s e r i d e r . This, it argues, supports i t s contention t h a t t h e l e a s e r i d e r was t h e document i n e f f e c t f o r t h e period February 15, 1969 through A p r i l 1, 1970. O n t h i s b a s i s , a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e l e a s e r i d e r i s a l e a s e of a g r i c u l t u r a l lands f o r more than t e n years. It i s i n t e r - e s t i n g t o note, however, t h a t t h e l e a s e r i d e r , while an extension of t h e o r i g i n a l lease agreement, contains t e r m s and p a r t i e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e agreement. A s indicated previously, t h e consideration f o r t h e l e a s e w a s increased by t h e l e a s e r i d e r . This increased consideration took e f f e c t on A p r i l 1, 1970, t h e d a t e t h e l e a s e r i d e r became e f f e c t i v e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e l e a s e r i d e r c o n t a i n s a provision granting Hubbard t h e p r i v i l e g e of placing a t r a i l e r house on t h e premises. This provision was n o t contained i n t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e agreement. Furthermore, Margery Rumph i s a p a r t y t o t h e l e a s e r i d e r while only Hubbard and Hubert Rumph w e r e p a r t i e s t o t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e agreement. By i t s t e r m s , t h e language of t h e l e a s e r i d e r i n d i c a t e s change from t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e agreement. The i n i t i a l and c l o s i n g paragraphs of t h e document speak t o "changes" i n t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e . The l e a s e r i d e r was c l e a r l y an e x t e n s i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e , b u t upon s i g n i f i c a n t l y changed t e r m s . The c a s e involves a five-year lease w i t h a ten-year renewal upon s u b s t a n t i a l l y changed c o n d i t i o n s . There is no v i o l a - t i o n of s e c t i o n 67-408. The f i n a l i s s u e , No. 4 , involves p o s s i b l e waiver of c e r t a i n r i g h t s by a p p e l l a n t . I n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t t h e c o u r t determined t h a t a p p e l l a n t , i n allowing t h e Rumphs t o p l a c e s u b s t a n t i a l improvements upon i t s p r o p e r t y a f t e r a p p e l l a n t purchased t h e same, waived i t s r i g h t t o c o n t e s t t h e v a l i d i t y o r e x i s t e n c e of t h e o p t i o n . The l e a d i n g c a s e on abandonment i n Montana i s Conway v. Fabian (1939), 108 Mont. 287, 89 P.2d 1022. "~bandonment" was t h e r e defined a s : ". . . t h e relinguishment of a r i g h t ; t h e g i v i n g up of something t o which one i s e n t i t l e d . I n determining whether one has abandoned h i s p r o p e r t y o r r i g h t s t h e i n t e n t i o n i s t h e f i r s t and paramount o b j e c t i n q u i r y . This i n t e n t i o n i s a s c e r t a i n e d n o t only from t h e statements which may have been made by t h e owner of t h e property, b u t a l s o from t h e a c t s of t h e owner . . ." 108 Mont. a t 306, 89 P.2d a t 1029. T h i s d e f i n i t i o n was r e c e n t l y affirmed i n McEwen v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc. (1976), 169 Mont. 1 4 1 , 545 P.2d 665. The t e r m "abandonment" i s f u r t h e r explained i n 1 Am J u r 2d Abandoned Property 81: "The term 'abandonment' a s applied t o property and property r i g h t s has acquired a well-defined and t e c h n i c a l meaning which i s n o t t o be confused with t h e d o c t r i n e of laches o r estoppel. I n i t s general sense, abandonment means t h e a c t of in- t e n t i o n a l l y r e l i n q u i s h i n g a known r i g h t a b s o l u t e l y and without reference t o any p a r t i c u l a r person o r f o r any p a r t i c u l a r purpose. Abandoned property i s t h a t t o which t h e owner has v o l u n t a r i l y re- linquished a l l r i g h t , t i t l e , claim, and possession, with t h e i n t e n t i o n of terminating h i s ownership, b u t without v e s t i n g it i n any o t h e r person and with t h e i n t e n t i o n of n o t reclaiming f u t u r e pos- s e s s i o n o r resuming i t s ownership, possession o r enjoyment. . ." To e s t a b l i s h an abandonment of property, a c t u a l a c t s of relinquishment accompanied by t h e i n t e n t i o n t o abandon must be shown. The primary elements are t h e i n t e n t i o n t o abandon and t h e e x t e r n a l a c t by which t h a t i n t e n t i o n i s c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t . 1 Am J u r 2d Abandoned Property S15. There i s no proof t h a t Dale Edwards, Inc., ever intended t o abandon i t s r i g h t s i n t h e leased property. To t h e con- t r a r y , it never recognized t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e o p t i o n , and, indeed, i n 1973 following her husband's death, Mrs. Dale Edwards t o l d Margery Rumph t h a t "under no circumstances" would she ever want t o sell. From t h e t i m e M r s . Edwards t o l d t h e Rumphs she d i d n o t recognize t h e i r r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e t h e option, t h e question was n o t r a i s e d again u n t i l March 1977. A t t h a t t i m e , t h e Rumphs sought t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r option and a p p e l l a n t i m - mediately refused t o do so. This a c t i o n ensued. The Rumphs' improvements consisted of c e r t a i n r e p a i r s upon t h e leased premises. They w e r e e n t i t l e d t o do s o under t h e i r tenancy. The r e p a i r s and improvements which t h e Rumphs made upon t h e property were n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i r tenancy and i n no way gave them any g r e a t e r r i g h t s i n t h e land. Under t h e s e circumstances we f i n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t waive i t s r i g h t t o c o n t e s t t h e v a l i d i t y o r e x i s t e n c e of t h e option t o purchase. B e t h a t a s it may, t h i s i s only harmless e r r o r and cannot be a b a s i s f o r reversing t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Halko v. Anderson (1939), 108 Mont. 588, 93 P.2d 956; H i l l v. Chappel Bros. (1934), 97 Mont. 305, 33 P.2d 819. Therefore, t h e summary judgment granted respondents by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: w - Chief J u s t i c e - --. ' % &a,- ,/'/ J u s t i c e s C/