Title: Roumbos v. Samuel G. Vazanellis & Thiros and Stracci, PC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 45S03-1710-CT-635
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 2018

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 45S03-1710-CT-635 
Elizabeth Roumbos, 
Appellant (Plaintiff), 
–v– 
Samuel G. Vazanellis & 
Thiros and Stracci, PC, 
Appellees (Defendants), 
Argued: November 9, 2017 | Decided: April 12, 2018 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court 
 No. 45D01-1501-CT-2 
The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals  
No. 45A03-1606-CT-1424 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Apr 12 2018, 3:23 pm
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 45S03-1710-CT-635 | April 12, 2018 
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Slaughter, Justice. 
This case is nominally about lawyer malpractice but really about 
premises liability. Plaintiff was 85 years old when she fell and severely 
fractured her leg while visiting her husband in the hospital. Plaintiff 
retained Defendants—a lawyer and his law firm—to represent her against 
the hospital. Defendants missed the filing deadline by failing to sue the 
hospital within the applicable statute of limitations. Under the “trial-
within-a-trial” doctrine, a client alleging legal malpractice must prove not 
only that the lawyer’s conduct fell below the governing duty of care but 
also that the client would have prevailed had the lawyer not been 
negligent. Neither side disputes that missing a filing deadline breaches the 
duty of care lawyers owe to clients. So this case is about the second prong: 
Would Plaintiff have won her claim against the hospital had the lawyer 
timely sued? 
The law firm invokes a defense the hospital would have asserted—that 
the hospital did not breach its duty under premises-liability law because 
Plaintiff’s fall was caused by a known or obvious condition: the wires and 
cords lying on the floor on which she allegedly tripped. We granted 
transfer to consider whether, as the Court of Appeals held, the landowner 
bears the burden on summary judgment to disprove that the invitee was 
distracted from or forgot about a known danger on the premises when the 
invitee made no such claim and designated no such evidence herself. But 
after oral argument, it is clear this issue is not squarely before us. Both 
parties now concede the invitee did not know of the tripping risk that she 
claims caused her fall. Although we have previously vacated grants of 
transfer when the factual premise for our grant proves false, we elect to 
decide this case on its merits.  
We hold that Defendants, as movants on summary judgment, failed to 
negate the causation element of Plaintiff’s malpractice claim. Specifically, 
Defendants failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff would not 
have succeeded in her premises-liability claim against the hospital. We 
reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for Defendants 
and remand. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 45S03-1710-CT-635 | April 12, 2018 
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Factual and Procedural History 
During the wee morning hours, Plaintiff, Elizabeth Roumbos, called an 
ambulance to rush her elderly husband to the emergency room at St. 
Anthony Hospital in Crown Point, Indiana. The hospital eventually 
admitted him and assigned him to a single-occupancy room. For a few 
hours, Roumbos stayed in the room by his side before going home to rest. 
At about noon, she returned to the hospital to check on his condition and 
spend time with him. After about twenty minutes, he asked for a glass of 
water. She got up from her seat and walked around the foot of the bed to a 
table on the other side. She poured him some water and handed him the 
glass. He took a few sips and returned the glass, which she put back on 
the table. As she was returning to her seat, she tripped and fell, fracturing 
her femur. Roumbos originally claimed the cause of her fall was a 
“dangerous mess of cords and wires on the floor”, which she only saw 
after she fell. Most recently, Roumbos specified the telephone cord was the 
cause. 
Roumbos retained Samuel Vazanellis and his law firm, Thiros and 
Stracci, PC, to sue the hospital for negligence under a theory of premises 
liability. The firm did not sue within the applicable statute of limitations, 
so Roumbos sued the firm for malpractice. The firm moved for summary 
judgment, arguing Roumbos could not prove injury resulting from the 
firm’s negligence because she would not have prevailed against the 
hospital in any event. The trial court entered summary judgment for the 
firm. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that summary judgment 
was improper because even if Roumbos knew of the tripping hazard, the 
firm designated no evidence the hospital could not have reasonably 
anticipated the harm Roumbos sustained. We granted transfer, and at oral 
argument the parties acknowledged Roumbos did not know of the 
telephone cord or other wires on the floor.  
Discussion and Decision 
We hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the 
law firm. The designated evidence establishes a genuine issue of material 
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fact—whether the phone cord and other wires posed an obvious danger. 
Although we can imagine scenarios when the dangerous condition is so 
clearly obvious that no reasonable factfinder could conclude otherwise, 
this is not such a case. We assess obviousness from a reasonable person’s 
perspective and hold on this record that obviousness is a question for the 
finder of fact. Thus, because the firm failed to prove that Roumbos could 
not prevail against the hospital, the firm did not negate the causation 
element of her malpractice claim. We reverse and remand. 
The law firm also argued that Roumbos equivocated about the 
condition of the premises that she contends was dangerous and caused 
her fall. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument in its initial opinion, 
see Roumbos v. Vazanellis, 71 N.E.3d 64, 66 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), and 
again on rehearing, 78 N.E.3d 1114, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. 
granted. We find that Roumbos has consistently identified wires on the 
floor generally or the telephone cord specifically as the cause of her fall 
and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
I. 
The viability of Roumbos’s malpractice claim 
against the law firm turns on the merits of her 
underlying premises-liability claim against the 
hospital. 
A. Causation element of legal-malpractice claim and trial-
within-a-trial doctrine 
To prevail on her malpractice claim against the law firm, Roumbos has 
to prove three things: 1) She retained the firm to represent her legal 
interests, so that the firm owes her a duty of care; 2) the firm breached its 
duty of care by failing to exercise the ordinary skill and knowledge 
expected of lawyers; and 3) the firm’s breach was the proximate cause of 
Roumbos’s injury. Reiswerg v. Statom, 926 N.E.2d 26, 30 (Ind. 2010) 
(citation omitted). Only the third element—whether the firm’s breach 
proximately caused her injury—is at issue here. At least for summary-
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judgment purposes, the firm does not contest that it owed Roumbos a 
duty, or that it breached that duty. 
In support of summary judgment, the firm invokes the “trial within a 
trial” doctrine that governs claims for legal malpractice. Picadilly, Inc. v. 
Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by 
Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ind. 2007). Under this doctrine, the 
client must show the outcome of the botched representation would have 
been more favorable to the client had the lawyer not been negligent. 
Flatow v. Ingalls, 932 N.E.2d 726, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In other words, 
the client must prove the lawyer’s negligence proximately caused her 
injury. Hill v. Bolinger, 881 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Thus, 
Roumbos must prove she would have recovered damages against the 
hospital in the underlying premises-liability claim had the firm timely 
sued on her behalf. 
B. Elements of premises-liability claim against hospital 
For purposes of this appeal, the parties agree that when Roumbos fell 
she was the hospital’s invitee. In Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 
1991), we adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 332 definition 
of invitee, which refers to either a “public invitee” or a “business visitor”. 
Id. at 642. Although the parties do not specify which definition applies to 
Roumbos, she appears to satisfy at least the definition of a business visitor: 
“a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly 
or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the 
land.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965)).  
Under Indiana premises-liability law, the owner or possessor of land 
owes the highest duty of care to its invitees: the duty to exercise 
reasonable care for their protection while they are on the premises. Id. at 
639 (citation omitted). Restatement Section 343 provides: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, 
he 
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(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would 
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the 
danger. 
569 N.E.2d at 639-40 (citing Restatement § 343). 
The Restatement instructs that Section 343 should be read together with 
Section 343A. Restatement § 343, cmt. a. Under Section 343A, the 
landowner is generally not liable for injuries resulting from “known or 
obvious” dangers on the land. But there is an exception if a reasonable 
landowner would anticipate the harm despite the invitee’s knowledge or 
the danger’s obviousness. “A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees 
for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land 
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should 
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Restatement 
§ 343(A)(1). See, e.g., Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. 2004) 
(quoting Restatement § 343A(1)).  
Based on these principles, the law firm argued on appeal that the 
hospital would not have been liable to Roumbos because the telephone 
cord was a “known” or “obvious” hazard that the hospital had no reason 
to believe she would fail to avoid. What follows from this, according to the 
firm, is that “Ms. Roumbos had no premises liability claim against St. 
Anthony Hospital and, consequently, has no legal malpractice claim 
against the Thiros law firm.”  
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II. 
Summary judgment for the law firm was improper 
because genuine issues of material fact remain on 
the causation element of Roumbos’s premises-
liability claim. 
After construing the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of 
Roumbos, as required by our summary-judgment standard, we conclude 
the firm did not satisfy its burden of negating the proximate-causation 
element of her legal-malpractice claim because it did not negate an 
essential element of her premises-liability claim against the hospital. 
Whether the wires generally, or the phone cord specifically, posed a 
danger that was known to Roumbos, or should have been obvious to her, 
are factual questions for the finder of fact and not legal questions for the 
court. 
A. Not “known” 
A condition to land or premises is “known” under Section 343A if the 
plaintiff is both aware of the condition and appreciates its danger. 
Restatement § 343A, cmt. b. In its initial opinion, the Court of Appeals 
accepted the law firm’s argument that Roumbos knew about the wires. 
Roumbos, 71 N.E.3d at 69. Despite this finding, the law firm acknowledged 
during oral argument in our Court that Roumbos did not know about the 
wires after all. We agree with the firm. Roumbos testified unequivocally 
that she did not see the wires until after she had fallen and was lying on 
the floor.  
Q. 
So you knew that the wires were there when you 
walked over, didn’t you?  
A. 
No. 
Q.  
You didn’t see them?  
A. 
No. 
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We construe all inferences in Roumbos’s favor on the firm’s summary-
judgment motion. Thus, we assume the wires were unknown to her. 
B. Not “obvious” 
Though conceding Roumbos did not know of the wires’ presence, the 
firm still claims the hospital did not breach any duty since the wires 
should have been “obvious” to her. A condition is “obvious” under 
Section 343A if both the condition and the risk are apparent to, and would 
be recognized by, a reasonable person in the position of the visitor 
exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment. Restatement § 
343A, cmt. b.  
The second prong of our Section 343 analysis asks a similar question 
about the obviousness of the condition, but does so from the perspective 
not of the invitee but of the landowner. Section 343 considers whether the 
landowner should expect that invitees will fail to discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it. When analyzing 
breach of duty under Section 343, we evaluate a landowner's knowledge 
under an objective, reasonable-person standard. See Smith v. Baxter, 796 
N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ind. 2003). Thus, the same analysis applies, whether 
viewed from the landowner’s perspective under Section 343 or from the 
invitee’s under Section 343A. Either way, it is an issue of reasonableness: 
What should the landowner expect will not be discovered under Section 
343? And what should be obvious to the invitee under Section 343A? 
Whether a risk is obvious is a question courts can sometimes resolve on 
summary judgment. For example, we found no issue of material fact 
regarding a golf-course operator’s objectively reasonable expectation that 
persons on the course would “realize the risk of being struck by an errant 
golf ball and take appropriate precautions.” Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 
N.E.2d 392, 406 (Ind. 2011). Viewed through the lens of Section 343A, we 
could also say that the risk of errant golf balls is apparent to and 
recognized by a reasonable person on a golf course exercising ordinary 
perception, intelligence, and judgment.  
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We have likewise held that a professional baseball club would have no 
reason to believe that a spectator in the stands would not realize the 
danger of or fail to protect herself from foul balls entering the stands. S. 
Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 910 (Ind. 2014) (holding that 
danger’s obviousness was highlighted by warning printed on her ticket, 
warning sign in aisle near her seat, and public-address announcement 
made before beginning of game). From the vantage point of the reasonable 
invitee, the risk of baseballs entering the stands was obvious. 
Unlike the obvious risks in those cases, however, we conclude that a 
material factual dispute remains here: Does the firm’s designated evidence 
establish that the various wires on the hospital-room floor and the risks 
they pose would be apparent to a reasonable person? Construing the 
designated facts most favorably to Roumbos and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in her favor, we hold that a jury could reasonably find the wires 
were not obvious to the ordinary reasonable person in Roumbos’s 
position. 
The law firm tries to establish the wires on the floor should have been 
apparent to Roumbos. Although Roumbos’s husband had been a patient 
at the hospital a “number of times”, the record does not establish that his 
prior rooms were all identically configured—or, relevant here, that they 
all had wires lying on the floor that posed a tripping risk.  
For all we know, the hospital bed and table obstructed the wires from 
view until Roumbos was right on top of them. And by then it was too late. 
Roumbos testified the room where she fell had at least three different 
wires or cords running along the floor—one each for oxygen, a telephone, 
and a computer. The fact that Roumbos acknowledged she “probably” 
would have seen the wires if she had been looking down at the floor 
makes the issue of obviousness here a close call. But Roumbos testified the 
wires ran partially “underneath the table” on the opposite side of the 
hospital bed from where she was sitting. The table Roumbos refers to—
where the pitcher of water was resting—is a typical hospital-room table 
that could be rolled into place over or alongside the patient’s bed. As 
Roumbos explained, it was a “portable kind of table that you could put – 
slide in front of him”. The wires were lying flush on the floor but were not 
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secured or “held down by anything”. We know Roumbos had already 
traversed the wires successfully when she went to the other side of the 
room from where she had been sitting to pour her husband’s water. And 
only while returning to her seat did she trip over one or more of them and 
fall. 
As to the phone cord specifically, Roumbos acknowledged that before 
she fell she saw a phone on the table but no cords or wires on the floor. 
The firm argues that any adult knows that a telephone has a cord that 
connects to the wall. But even if that were true, it misses the point. Some 
phones are plugged into the wall only inches from the floor, making it 
more likely that a cord runs along the floor. Other phones plug into the 
wall well off the floor, meaning the cord may not touch the floor at all, 
especially if it is taut, with little or no slack. And yet other hospital-room 
phones plug directly into the bed, along with other cords and wires. The 
mere presence of a phone on the portable hospital table did not 
necessarily mean that a dangerous tripping threat existed on the floor that 
should have been obvious from Roumbos’s vantage point. Whether the 
wires generally, or the phone cord specifically, were obvious because they 
would have been apparent to a reasonable person under the 
circumstances is a disputed issue of material fact on this record that 
precludes summary judgment. 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary 
judgment for the law firm and remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Mark S. Pantello 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
David C. Jensen 
Robert J. Feldt 
Hammond, Indiana