Title: Aurora Consol. Health Care v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n
Citation: 2012 WI 49
Docket Number: 2010AP000208
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2012

2012 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP208 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Aurora Consolidated Health Care and Sentry 
Insurance, a Mutual Company, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Jeffrey 
Schaefer, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 330 Wis. 2d 804, 794 N.W. 2d 520 
(Ct. App 2010 – Published) 
PDC No: 2010 WI App 173 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 11, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT   
 
COUNTY: 
MILWAUKEE 
 
JUDGE: 
MAXINE A. WHITE 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (Opinion filed).    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
filed by Daniel Zitzer, Carrie May Poniewaz and Otjen, Van Ert & 
Weir, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Daniel Zitzer. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, the cause was argued by R. Duane Harlow, assistant 
attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Jeffrey Schaefer, there was a 
brief filed by Robert T. Ward and Ward Law Firm, Waukesha, and 
oral argument by Robert T. Ward. 
 
 
2012 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP208 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV10142) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Aurora Consolidated Health Care and Sentry 
Insurance, a Mutual Company, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and 
Jeffrey Schaefer, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 11, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  The petitioners, Aurora 
Consolidated Health Care and Sentry Insurance, A Mutual Company 
(collectively, "Aurora") seek review of a decision of the court 
of appeals, which upheld a decision of the Labor and Industry 
Review Commission (LIRC) determining that Jeffrey Schaefer was 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of a work injury.1  
                                                 
1 Aurora Consol. Health Care v. LIRC, 2010 WI App 173, 330 
Wis. 2d 804, 794 N.W.2d 520 (affirming a decision of the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, Maxine A. White, J., presiding, 
which upheld LIRC's decision). 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
2 
 
LIRC made this determination after denying Aurora's last-minute 
request to cross-examine or make further inquires of Dr. Jerome 
Ebert, an independent physician appointed by the Department of 
Workforce Development (the Department) to examine Schaefer and 
report on the cause of his disability.    
¶2 
Aurora asserts that it has both a statutory and a 
constitutional due process right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.  It 
contends that LIRC erroneously exercised its discretion by 
denying its requests to cross-examine or make further inquiries 
of Dr. Ebert.    
¶3 
We determine that neither Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g) 
nor Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(d)2 provides Aurora a statutory right 
to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, an independent physician appointed 
by the Department.  We further determine that LIRC did not 
violate Aurora's due process rights when it declined to remand 
for cross-examination.   
¶4 
Finally, we conclude that LIRC did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion.  When it declined to remand for a third 
time to allow Dr. Ebert to be questioned further, LIRC 
considered the relevant facts, applied the proper standard of 
law, and reached a determination that a reasonable person could 
reach.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.   
I 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Schaefer was hired by Aurora Consolidated Health Care 
in 1981.  In 2001, he suffered a work-related injury.  After his 
injury, Schaefer continued to perform various unskilled tasks 
for Aurora until he was terminated in 2006 due to Aurora's 
inability to accommodate his physical restrictions.3  Schaefer 
filed a worker's compensation claim for permanent and total 
disability.      
¶6 
The medical and procedural facts in this case are 
complex.  We begin by setting forth facts related to Schaefer's 
medical history, and then we turn to the procedural facts 
related to his worker's compensation claim.  In setting forth 
these facts, we rely on the factual findings made by LIRC. 
¶7 
Schaefer has an extensive medical history, including 
at least two work-related injuries, several injuries that are 
not work-related, and other medical conditions.  Although much 
of 
Schaefer's 
medical 
history 
was 
at 
issue 
during 
the 
proceedings before the Department, only two of Schaefer's 
conditions remain at issue in this appeal: (1) a back condition 
that was caused, Schaefer asserts, by a 2001 work-related 
injury; and (2) non-work-related avascular necrosis of the hips 
that developed in 2005 and resulted in a 2006 hip replacement.  
                                                 
3 There is evidence in the record suggesting that Schaefer 
stopped working in 2005, rather than 2006.  In its decision, 
LIRC determined that Schaefer was terminated in July of 2006 due 
to Aurora's inability to accommodate his various physical 
restrictions.  Aurora does not challenge this finding of fact as 
clearly erroneous.  
No. 
2010AP208   
 
4 
 
In setting forth Schaefer's medical history, we focus on these 
two conditions. 
¶8 
The work-related injury at issue in this case occurred 
on February 27, 2001, when Schaefer slipped and fell on a patch 
of ice while making a delivery for his employer.  Six days after 
the February 27, 2001 incident, Schaefer sought treatment from 
Dr. James Cain and was diagnosed with a L5-S1 recurrent disc 
herniation.  Dr. Cain performed a lumbar fusion in June of 2001.  
Schaefer temporarily returned to work, but the fusion did not 
heal properly, and Dr. Cain performed a second lumbar fusion in 
February of 2002.     
¶9 
At the time, Aurora conceded worker's compensation 
liability for Schaefer's injury and surgeries, and it paid 
temporary 
total 
disability 
benefits, 
temporary 
partial 
disability benefits, and some medical expenses.  Following the 
2002 surgery, Schaefer temporarily returned to work on a full-
time basis.     
¶10 In the fall of 2004, however, Schaefer began to 
experience recurrent low back and bilateral leg symptoms and 
pain, and Dr. Cain referred Schaefer to Dr. Ali Sadeghi for pain 
management.  According to the medical records, Schaefer saw Dr. 
Sadeghi on a regular basis over a period of years, and they 
experimented with a variety of strategies to control the pain 
such 
as 
trigger 
point 
injections, 
Botox 
injections, 
and 
narcotic-based pain medication.     
¶11 In 2005, Schaefer also developed pain in his right 
hip, and he underwent a total hip replacement on August 15, 2006 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
5 
 
with a positive result.  Schaefer has not claimed that the right 
hip pain and the hip replacement surgery resulted from any work-
related injury.     
¶12 Even after the hip replacement surgery, Schaefer 
continued to experience pain.  In 2007, Schaefer underwent a 
third back surgery with a new doctor, who removed the fusion 
hardware and determined that the fusion was solid.   
¶13 With the above as background, we turn to the facts 
related to Schaefer's present worker's compensation claim.  
Schaefer filed a claim with the Department, asserting that as a 
consequence of his work-related injury, he was permanently and 
totally disabled.    
¶14 To support his claim of permanent total disability, 
Schaefer relied in part on a Lumbosacral Spine Impairment 
Medical Assessment Form completed by Dr. Sadeghi on July 10, 
2006, just prior to his hip replacement surgery.  In that form, 
Dr. Sadeghi noted that Schaefer had been diagnosed with post-
laminectomy pain syndrome and bilateral avascular necrosis of 
the hips, and he imposed extreme physical restrictions that 
severely limited Schaefer's ability to work.     
¶15 According 
to 
Dr. 
Sadeghi, 
Schaefer 
could 
not 
continuously sit for more than 15 minutes.  He could not 
continuously stand for more than 30 minutes, and after standing 
for that duration, he would need to lie down.  Dr. Sadeghi 
reported that during an eight-hour workday, Schaefer could sit 
less than two hours and stand or walk less than two hours, and 
he would require more than ten unscheduled breaks.  Further, 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
6 
 
Schaefer could lift less than 10 pounds only rarely, and could 
never twist, stoop, or bend.  Dr. Sadeghi concluded that 
Schaefer would frequently experience symptoms which interfere 
with attention and concentration needed to perform even simple 
tasks, that he would be unable to perform routine, repetitive 
tasks at a consistent pace, and that he would likely be absent 
from work "more than four days per month" due to impairments or 
treatment.  He concluded that the above restrictions are "likely 
to be permanent."    
¶16 Both parties agreed that the restrictions imposed by 
Dr. Sadeghi were severe, and if adopted, the restrictions would 
mean that Schaefer was permanently and totally disabled.  
Additionally, both parties agreed that because Schaefer did not 
claim that his hip problem was work-related, any residual 
effects of the hip problem should not be taken into account when 
assessing 
Schaefer's 
disability 
for 
worker's 
compensation 
purposes.    
¶17 The parties' disagreement revolved around the extent 
to which Schaefer's pain and the resulting restrictions were 
caused by the February 27, 2001 work-related injury.  Aurora 
contended that Schaefer's pain and physical restrictions were 
not caused by the February 27 injury, and were instead caused by 
other injuries and medical conditions, including Schaefer's non-
work-related hip problem.    
¶18 To resolve the dispute, a hearing was held in front of 
an administrative law judge employed by the Department.  At the 
hearing, 
Schaefer 
was 
the 
only 
witness 
to 
testify.  
No. 
2010AP208   
 
7 
 
Additionally, both parties presented the opinions of medical 
experts, and both parties retained vocational experts to 
evaluate Schaefer's post-injury earning capacity.  In lieu of 
testifying, these experts submitted certified written reports.   
¶19 Dr. Cain opined that Schaefer's work-related injury 
directly caused the recurrent disc herniation, that it was a 
substantial factor necessitating the lumbar fusion surgeries, 
and that Schaefer would not have needed the surgeries but for 
the work-related injury.  By contrast, Aurora's medical expert 
opined that Schaefer's February 27 injury resulted in a minor 
sprain, that the effects of this injury were temporary, and that 
Schaefer's recurrent herniation and pain were caused by other 
preexisting and unrelated medical conditions including his 
necrosis of the hips.   
¶20 Aurora's 
vocational 
expert 
opined 
that 
if 
Dr. 
Sadeghi's restrictions were accurate and reflected the effects 
of the work-related injury, rather than the effects of other, 
non-work-related injuries, Schaefer had sustained a permanent 
total loss of earning capacity.  As a consequence of Schaefer's 
inability to maintain a consistent work schedule coupled with 
his 
physical 
restrictions 
and 
inability 
to 
maintain 
concentration, "he would have access to such a limited number 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
8 
 
and type of jobs that I would consider him 'odd lot.'"4  However, 
relying on Aurora's medical expert's conclusion that the 
February 27 fall was not the cause of Schaefer's continuing 
disability, Aurora's vocational expert asserted, "if there is no 
connection between a condition and industrial exposure, there 
can be no vocational impact or loss attributable thereto."   
¶21 Because 
the 
parties 
disputed 
the 
cause 
of 
the 
restrictions imposed by Dr. Sadeghi, the administrative law 
judge agreed to hold the record open and allow the parties to 
make additional inquiries.  In a post-hearing submission, Dr. 
Sadeghi clarified that the restrictions he imposed were limited 
to Schaefer's lower back condition and were not necessitated by 
his hip condition.  In pertinent part, he wrote: 
As per our discussion, this is a clarification 
regarding the restrictions that were outlined in a 
lumbosacral spine impairment medical assessment form 
that was filled out by me.  Please note that the 
restrictions only apply to Mr. Schaefer's lumbosacral 
spine and does not apply to any other organ system or 
musculoskeletal system such as the hips.     
¶22 After receiving this clarification, the administrative 
law judge issued a written decision dated February 22, 2008.  
Finding the opinions of Dr. Cain and Dr. Sadeghi to be credible 
                                                 
4 The essential idea behind the "odd lot" doctrine is that 
permanent total disability under worker's compensation law 
"should not be taken literally to mean complete and utter 
helplessness, because some injured workers find themselves, 
because of their age, education, training, and overall capacity, 
'incapable of becoming ordinary workmen of average capacity in 
any well known branch of the labour market.'"  Beecher v. LIRC, 
2004 WI 88, ¶31, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29 (quoting Cardiff 
Corp. v. Hall, 1 K.B. 1009 (1911)).  
No. 
2010AP208   
 
9 
 
and persuasive, he concluded that Aurora was liable for the 
medical treatment necessitated by the February 27 injury.  Based 
on Dr. Sadeghi's clarification that the restrictions resulted 
exclusively from Schaefer's low back problem and the opinions of 
both parties' vocational experts, he further concluded that 
Schaefer was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the 
February 27 injury.   
¶23 Aurora sought LIRC's review.  It argued that Dr. 
Sadeghi's post-hearing clarification was not credible.  In 
support, Aurora explained that at the time that Dr. Sadeghi 
imposed the restrictions, he made direct reference to Schaefer's 
avascular necrosis of the hips, and various doctors had opined 
that Schaefer's hip problem was the primary source of his pain.  
Additionally, 
Aurora 
contended, 
the 
record 
revealed 
that 
Schaefer's condition improved after his hip replacement surgery.   
¶24 LIRC remanded the matter to the Department for the 
appointment of "an independent physician to assess [Schaefer's] 
functional disabilities, not including any functional disability 
that may be attributable to his right hip condition or right hip 
surgery."  See Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g) (permitting the 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
10 
 
appointment of an impartial physician).5  Additionally, LIRC 
ordered that the parties would be allowed to supplement the 
record with medical opinions in response to the independent 
physician's opinion, and thereafter, the matter would be 
returned to LIRC for a decision.   
¶25 Pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), 
the 
administrative law judge appointed Dr. Ebert, who examined 
Schaefer and provided a written report.  Dr. Ebert concluded 
that 100 percent of Schaefer's disability was due to work-
related back problems, and that even without the hip problem, 
his restrictions would be the same:  
Jeff Schaefer has failed back surgery syndrome with 
activity-limiting low back pain but also with some 
chronic radicular symptoms.  I was able to detect some 
problems that are attributable to the hip, namely some 
weakness in the right hip girdle which is very common 
after hip joint replacement but from a functional 
standpoint, this would not cause him to have very many 
limitations.  The only restrictions I would give him 
for his hip would be perhaps no climbing ladders or 
carrying heavy objects frequently.  In other words, I 
would not have him doing heavy duty work, but 
otherwise he does not need any restrictions with 
regard to his hip.  I would say 100% of his disability 
at this point is due to his back.  In other words, if 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) 
provides 
that 
the 
Department 
may 
direct 
the 
appointment 
of 
an 
"impartial" 
physician.  LIRC's order remanded for the appointment of an 
"independent" physician.  For the sake of consistency, we use 
the 
adjective 
"independent" 
throughout 
this 
opinion 
when 
referring to a physician appointed to render an impartial 
report.  An independent physician appointed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) should not be confused with an independent 
medical examiner (IME) retained by one of the parties to refute 
the opposing party's case.      
No. 
2010AP208   
 
11 
 
he had no hip problem whatsoever, his restrictions 
would be the same.6  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶26 Dr. Ebert opined that the following restrictions were 
necessary as a result of Schaefer's disability: "Sit for 1/2-
hour, stand for 1/2-hour, drive for 1/2-hour, walk 1/2-mile 
maximum.  Sedentary duty lifting 10 pounds frequently, 20 pounds 
maximal with change in position every 1/2-hour."   
¶27 In response to Dr. Ebert's evaluation, Aurora obtained 
a supplemental report from its vocational expert.  She opined 
that Schaefer was "qualified for a variety of jobs in the open 
labor market, such as security guard, counter clerk, retail 
sales, etc."     
¶28 Schaefer submitted a letter to LIRC, asserting that 
Dr. Ebert's report made clear that "Dr. Sadeghi was not 
including restrictions attributable to a non work related hip 
condition 
when 
assessing 
the 
applicant's 
functional 
disabilities."  However, Schaefer contended, Dr. Ebert's opinion 
was incomplete because it failed to address "the critical issue 
in the case: To what extent does the low back disability impact 
                                                 
6 In support of his conclusion that Schaefer's disability 
was due to work-related back problems, Dr. Ebert reported: 
[Schaefer's] current pain is in the low back with 
radiation all the way down the right leg with some 
numbness in the right greater than left feet.  He has 
pain whenever he sits or stands for too long, and it 
is about 1/2-hour tolerance in each position.  He 
reports this pain is essentially the same before he 
began having the hip pain and it remained unchanged 
after the hip surgery.   
No. 
2010AP208   
 
12 
 
the applicant's ability to maintain a consistent work schedule."  
Schaefer argued that "the necessity to take several unscheduled 
breaks during the day and the likelihood that the applicant 
would be absent from work more than four times per month 
dictates that a reasonably stable labor market does not exist 
for the applicant."    
¶29 LIRC 
remanded 
the 
matter 
for 
the 
second 
time, 
instructing the administrative law judge to ask Dr. Ebert to 
address the following questions: 
(1) how many hours of work in an average workday would 
the applicant be able to tolerate, given his physical 
restrictions; 
(2) 
would 
the 
applicant's 
physical 
restrictions require him to take unscheduled breaks 
during an average workday, and if so, what is the 
estimate of how many such breaks would be required; 
and (3) would Dr. Ebert expect the effects of the 
applicant's low back disability to cause him to miss 
work time on a recurring basis, and if so, what is the 
estimate of how often this missed work time might 
occur?     
¶30 Dr. Ebert responded to the questions in writing, 
estimating that given his restrictions, Schaefer would be able 
to work eight hours per day and that approximately two 10-minute 
breaks per day would be required.  Dr. Ebert asserted: "Chronic 
back pain of this nature does tend to flare at times.  Sometimes 
the flares are so severe that work would not be possible.  I 
would estimate that this would occur approximately 2 times per 
month."  The supplemental report was distributed to the parties 
on March 16, 2009.    
¶31 Upon receiving this supplemental report, Aurora did 
not immediately request the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
13 
 
Ebert.  Rather, both parties requested 30 days to submit 
additional vocational reports.     
¶32 Schaefer's 
vocational 
expert 
opined 
that 
because 
Schaefer would require unscheduled breaks and "would essentially 
miss 24 days (nearly five full work weeks) of work strictly 
because of his back condition," he was unemployable.  Schaefer's 
expert explained that "few if any employers would find this 
level of absenteeism acceptable."   
¶33 On April 17, 2009, Aurora requested a two-week 
extension to "provide our supplemental report in response to the 
most recent opinions of Dr. Ebert."  It asserted: "We will 
submit our report on or before May 1, 2009."       
¶34 On 
May 
1, 
Aurora 
submitted 
a 
report 
from 
its 
vocational expert.  Aurora's vocational expert "appreciate[d], 
and to some extent, under[stood]" that the necessity for 
unscheduled breaks was "at least on its face, of issue," and 
that 
two 
absences 
each 
month 
would 
have 
"more 
onerous 
implications."  
¶35 Nevertheless, she opined that Schaefer could be 
retrained 
for 
professional 
or 
skilled 
employment 
in 
an 
environment which would allow Schaefer more freedom to take 
unscheduled breaks.  She acknowledged that Schaefer would need 
computer literacy training and additional education, "at least a 
select Associate degree but more likely a Baccalaureate."    
¶36 Further, 
Aurora's 
vocational 
expert 
opined 
that 
Schaefer's absenteeism could potentially be covered under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  She contended: "The 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
14 
 
benefits 
afforded 
by 
the 
FMLA 
become 
of 
even 
greater 
significance when one considers the understanding that Mr. 
Schaefer need not disclose to his employer ahead of time, i.e. 
during the interview process, that he will be absent from work 
twice monthly as that is not 'guaranteed,' but is rather, in Dr. 
Ebert's own words, an 'estimate.'"    
¶37 Then, on May 1, 2009, Aurora sent a letter to LIRC, 
requesting that it remand the matter for a third time to allow 
for cross-examination of Dr. Ebert:  
I would like to have an opportunity to explore Dr. 
Ebert's opinions further on this issue.  Therefore, I 
am requesting that the case be remanded again to the 
department, either for a continued hearing to elicit 
additional testimony from Dr. Ebert regarding his 
opinions, or to obtain a deposition of Dr. Ebert 
regarding these opinions.     
Alternatively, Aurora's counsel asked that three additional 
questions be submitted to Dr. Ebert: 
(1) Is your estimate that Mr. Schaefer will miss work 
approximately two times per month due to his chronic 
back pain an opinion which you hold to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability? 
(2) Would it still be your estimate that Mr. Schaefer 
would miss work approximately two times per month if 
he worked on a part time basis within the restrictions 
you previously assigned? 
(3) What level of work could Mr. Schaefer perform that 
would not lead you to estimate that he would miss 
approximately two days from work per month due to the 
condition of his back, and what permanent functional 
restrictions would be appropriate for him in that 
situation?     
No. 
2010AP208   
 
15 
 
¶38 During the oral argument before this court, Aurora's 
attorney clarified that the sole reason he requested a hearing 
was to cross-examine or otherwise question Dr. Ebert:   
The court: You did not request any hearing beyond the 
hearing for purposes of taking Dr. Ebert's testimony.  
Is that correct, or am I incorrect on that? 
Aurora's attorney: That is correct.  At the time I 
made that request, there was already an opinion from a 
treating surgeon in the record that was helpful to my 
case. 
 
I 
already 
had 
an 
independent 
medical 
examination that was part of the record that was 
helpful for my case.   I had the first set of 
restrictions from Dr. Ebert that were helpful to my 
case.  The only problem that I had was that second 
report of Dr. Ebert and the vocational opinions that 
followed it.  Your honor, honestly, the only thing I 
wanted to do is ask Dr. Ebert some questions about his 
opinions, and I think I had the right to do that under 
the statute.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶39 Four weeks after it received Aurora's request, LIRC 
issued a decision on the merits.  In the decision, LIRC declined 
Aurora's request to order a third remand.  It explained that 
further inquiry of Dr. Ebert was unnecessary because it would 
serve no useful purpose: "The commission is familiar with Dr. 
Ebert, because he has provided tiebreaker medical opinions in 
numerous cases, and the commission is satisfied that his medical 
opinions are routinely given to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability."  Further, LIRC "fail[ed] to see any useful purpose 
in questioning Dr. Ebert regarding part-time work or theoretical 
'levels' of work."     
No. 
2010AP208   
 
16 
 
¶40 On the merits, LIRC determined that Schaefer was 
permanently and totally disabled under the odd lot doctrine.  It 
rejected Aurora's assertion that the restrictions imposed by Dr. 
Sadeghi were due, in part, to Schaefer's hip condition.  In 
reaching 
that 
conclusion, 
it 
relied 
on 
"Dr. 
Sadeghi's 
unambiguous assurance to the contrary, and the substantial 
degree of disability inferred from all the evidence to be 
attributable to the work-related back injury."        
¶41 Additionally, LIRC rejected Aurora's assertion that 
Schaefer could be retrained for professional work.  It explained 
that Schaefer was a 47-year-old unskilled worker with a GED, and 
that 
retraining 
would 
be 
"extremely 
difficult, 
if 
not 
impossible" because Schaefer can sit comfortably only for one-
half hour at a time and because he takes a narcotic-based pain 
medication that interferes with his ability to think.     
¶42 Finally, LIRC determined that Schaefer's frequent 
absences could not be overcome by invoking the provisions of the 
FMLA.  It explained, "the FMLA is only applicable to employers 
who would have employed the applicant for more than 52 weeks for 
at least 1,000 hours during those 52 weeks," and with his 
expected absenteeism, Schaefer would be unlikely to retain a job 
for long enough to invoke the protections of the FMLA.    
¶43 Aurora filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking 
review of LIRC's decision.  It asserted that it had a statutory 
and a due process right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, and that 
LIRC erroneously exercised its discretion when it declined 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
17 
 
Aurora's request for a remand.7  The circuit court affirmed 
LIRC's decision.  
¶44 The court of appeals likewise affirmed.  Aurora 
Consol. Health Care v. LIRC, 2010 WI App 173, 330 Wis. 2d 804, 
794 N.W.2d 520.  Judge Fine dissented, contending that a right 
to 
cross-examine 
an 
independent 
expert 
appointed 
by 
the 
Department "is an irreducible minimum of 'fair play.'"  Id., ¶48 
(Fine, J., dissenting).     
II 
¶45 Although the medical and procedural facts of this case 
are complex, the questions before this court are discrete: does 
Aurora have either a statutory right or a constitutional due 
process right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, an independent 
physician 
appointed 
by 
the 
Department 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g)?   
¶46 If Aurora does not have a statutory or constitutional 
right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, then LIRC's decision not to 
remand for cross-examination is discretionary.  See Theodore 
Fleisner, Inc. v. DILHR, 65 Wis. 2d 317, 327, 222 N.W.2d 600 
(1974).  An agency's exercise of discretion will be upheld if it 
                                                 
7 In addition, Aurora contended that LIRC erred by relying 
on the opinions of Dr. Sadeghi, which, it asserted, were not 
credible, and that there was no credible evidence to support 
LIRC's conclusion that it would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for Schaefer to be retrained for professional work.  
Aurora appears to have raised similar arguments about the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the court of appeals.  See 
Aurora, 330 Wis. 2d 804, ¶¶16, 38 n.3.  However, it does not 
raise these arguments in this court, and we therefore do not 
address them.             
No. 
2010AP208   
 
18 
 
was made "based upon the relevant facts by applying a proper 
standard of law and represents a determination that a reasonable 
person could reach."  Verhaagh v. LIRC, 204 Wis. 2d 154, 160, 
554 N.W.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶47 To resolve the question of whether Aurora has a right 
to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, we are required to interpret the 
worker's compensation statute, Wis. Stat. ch. 102.  Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law, which a court generally 
reviews independently of other court and agency determinations.  
Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 18, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997).  
Nevertheless, a court will at times defer to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute.  Id.   
¶48 A reviewing court will employ one of three levels of 
deference 
when 
considering 
an 
administrative 
agency's 
interpretation of a statute: no weight, due weight, or great 
weight.  Id.  With all three levels of deference, the court must 
interpret the statute itself to determine whether the agency's 
interpretation is reasonable.  Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. 
State, 2006 WI 86, ¶15, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184. 
¶49 In resolving this case, we are also required to 
interpret the constitutional demands of due process.  Whether 
LIRC violated Aurora's due process rights by declining to remand 
for cross-examination is a question of law.  Although this court 
may, in some cases, defer to an agency's interpretation of a 
statute, we will not defer to an agency's interpretation of the 
constitution.  See Wright v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 289, 296, 565 
N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1997).  Accordingly, we answer this 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
19 
 
question of law independently of the determinations rendered by 
LIRC, the circuit court, and the court of appeals.  
III 
¶50 We begin by addressing Aurora's claim that it has a 
statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.  Then, we turn to 
Aurora's claim that its due process rights were violated by 
LIRC's refusal to allow cross-examination.  Finally, we address 
whether LIRC erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
declined to remand for a third time to allow Dr. Ebert to be 
questioned further.  
A 
¶51 In its argument to this court, Aurora asserts that the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. §§ 102.17(1)(g) and 102.17(1)(d)1 
grants it a right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.  At the outset, we 
observe 
that 
Aurora's 
letter 
to 
LIRC 
requesting 
cross-
examination did not cite these statutes or specifically assert 
that there was a statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.  
Accordingly, 
LIRC 
did 
not 
provide 
any 
analysis 
squarely 
addressing the interpretation of these statutes.  Nevertheless, 
because it denied Aurora's request, LIRC's decision can be 
construed as making an implicit determination that the relevant 
statutes contain no absolute right of cross-examination.   
¶52 In another situation, we might accord great weight or 
due weight deference to LIRC's interpretation of the statutes 
governing worker's compensation proceedings.  Here, however, 
deference may be inappropriate given that LIRC's apparent 
interpretation was implicit and unsupported by analysis.  In any 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
20 
 
event, it is unnecessary to determine what level of deference to 
give LIRC's implicit interpretation because we reach the same 
result regardless of the level of deference applied.   
¶53 We turn next to the relevant statutes.  Dr. Ebert's 
report was not presented by one of the parties in support of its 
case.  Rather, he was an independent physician appointed by the 
administrative law judge.  Accordingly, to determine whether 
there is a statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, we 
examine first Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), the subsection in the 
worker's 
compensation 
statute 
that 
addresses 
appointed 
physicians.   
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(1)(g) 
provides 
that 
the 
administrative law judge can appoint an independent physician to 
examine the applicant:  
Whenever 
the 
testimony presented at any hearing 
indicates a dispute or creates a doubt as to the 
extent or cause of disability . . . , the department 
may 
direct 
that 
the 
injured 
employee 
be 
examined, . . . , by or from an impartial, competent 
physician, 
chiropractor, 
dentist, 
psychologist 
or 
podiatrist designated by the department who is not 
under contract with or regularly employed by a 
compensation 
insurance 
carrier 
or 
self-insured 
employer. . . .    
¶55 Subsection 
(1)(g) 
provides 
further 
that 
the 
independent physician will submit a written report and the 
parties shall be given an opportunity to rebut that report:   
The report of the examination, autopsy, or opinion 
shall be transmitted in writing to the department and 
a copy of the report shall be furnished by the 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
21 
 
department 
to 
each 
party, 
who 
shall 
have 
an 
opportunity to rebut such report on further hearing.8 
¶56 Aurora 
asserts 
that 
its 
right 
to 
"rebut" 
the 
independent physician's report necessarily includes the right to 
rebut the report through cross-examination of the independent 
physician.  We disagree.   
¶57 "Rebut" is a general term, and it could encompass many 
different strategies employed by attorneys to undermine the 
credibility of an independent physician's report.  For example, 
a party might rebut the conclusion of a report by pointing to 
internal inconsistencies, by presenting contrary opinions, or by 
introducing additional evidence, such as surveillance videos, 
that undermine the credibility of the report.  It is not clear 
that the legislature intended to provide an absolute right to 
cross-examine the independent physician just because it provided 
the parties an opportunity to rebut the independent physician's 
written report.9  
                                                 
8 As set forth above at ¶38, Aurora's only purpose in 
seeking a remand was to cross-examine or otherwise question Dr. 
Ebert.  Therefore, we do not address whether under other 
circumstances, a party would have a right to a hearing for other 
purposes. 
9 The dissent's conclusion that "LIRC's action is contrary 
to the explicit statutory provision," dissent, ¶83, is based 
upon an assertion that the term "rebut" means the right of 
cross-examination, id., ¶109.  However, the dissent fails to 
provide any authority in support of this assertion.  Rather, it 
cites only to the definition of "rebut" found in Black's Law 
Dictionary 
(a 
definition 
which 
does 
not 
mention 
cross-
examination) and to a paragraph of Judge Fine's dissent in the 
court of appeals.          
No. 
2010AP208   
 
22 
 
¶58 We interpret statutory terms "in the context in which 
[they are] used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes[.]"  C. Coakley Relocation Sys. v. City of Milwaukee, 
2008 WI 68, ¶17, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900.  Our review of 
the surrounding and closely related statutes reveals that when 
the legislature intends to specifically provide a right of 
cross-examination, it has done so with express language.10  
¶59 For example, although sub. (1)(g) uses the general 
word "rebut" when discussing independent physicians, the very 
next subsection specifically provides for cross-examination of a 
different type of expert.  Wisconsin Stat. § 102.17(1)(h) 
provides: "The contents of certified reports of investigation, 
made 
by 
industrial 
safety 
specialists 
who 
are 
employed, 
contracted, or otherwise secured by the department and available 
for 
cross-examination, . . . shall constitute prima facie 
evidence as to matter contained in those reports."  (Emphasis 
added.)  
¶60 Further, in various statutes involving court-appointed 
witnesses and experts, the legislature has likewise provided the 
                                                 
10 Curiously, the dissent implies that by specifying a right 
to cross-examine witnesses in some statutes, the legislature 
intended 
that 
the 
response 
be 
limited 
solely 
to 
cross-
examination.  Dissent, ¶108 (citing Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(d)1).  
Under this rationale, Aurora would be precluded from responding 
to Schaefer's prima facie case by introducing evidence in the 
form of its own experts' reports, argument, or other contrary 
proof.  The dissent's approach would mark an extreme departure 
from current practice.      
No. 
2010AP208   
 
23 
 
right of cross-examination by using express language.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 906.14(1), which deals with witnesses that are called by 
a judge, specifically provides that the parties are entitled to 
cross-examine such witnesses:  
The judge may, on the judge's own motion or at the 
suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties 
are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called. 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶61 Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1), which deals with 
court-appointed experts, expressly provides that the experts 
shall be subject to cross-examination:   
. . . The judge may appoint any expert witnesses 
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses 
of the judge's own selection. . . .  A witness so 
appointed shall advise the parties of the witness's 
findings, if any; the witness's deposition may be 
taken by any party; and the witness may be called to 
testify by the judge or any party. The witness shall 
be 
subject 
to 
cross-examination 
by 
each 
party, 
including a party calling the expert witness as a 
witness. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶62 By 
contrast, 
when 
the 
legislature 
drafted 
the 
subsection at issue in this case, Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), it 
chose to use the general term "rebut."  Because it did not 
specify 
the 
right 
to 
cross-examination, 
it 
appears 
the 
legislature left to the Department's discretion whether to allow 
cross-examination in circumstances where it might provide 
relevant and probative evidence. 
¶63 Having determined that sub. (1)(g), the subsection 
that addresses independent physicians, does not provide an 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
24 
 
absolute right of cross-examination, we turn to Aurora's 
argument about another subsection of the statute.  Aurora relies 
on Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(d), which provides in relevant part: 
The contents of certified medical and surgical reports 
by physicians [and the reports of other professionals] 
licensed in and practicing in this state, and of 
certified 
reports by experts concerning loss of 
earning capacity . . . , presented by a party for 
compensation constitute prima facie evidence as to the 
matter contained in those reports, . . .  Certified 
reports of physicians [and the reports of other 
professionals], wherever licensed and practicing, who 
have examined or treated the claimant, and of experts, 
if the practitioner or expert consents to being 
subjected to cross-examination also constitute prima 
facie evidence as to the matter contained in those 
reports . . . .    
(Emphasis added.)   
¶64 Aurora appears to acknowledge that the first sentence, 
which references experts "presented by a party," is not 
implicated here.  However, it urges us to focus on the second 
sentence.  It contends that by virtue of the second sentence of 
sub. (1)(d), Dr. Ebert has consented to cross-examination 
because he is a physician who examined Schaefer and provided a 
report.   
¶65 Under 
our 
established 
methodology, 
we 
interpret 
statutes "not in isolation but as part of a whole."  C. Coakley 
Relocation Sys., 310 Wis. 2d 456, ¶17 (citing State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  On its face, sub. (1)(d) governs 
experts that are presented by a party to establish a prima facie 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
25 
 
case,11 not experts appointed by the Department to provide an 
impartial report.12  Therefore, sub. (1)(d) is not implicated by 
Dr. Ebert's report.  We determine that neither Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) nor Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(d) provides Aurora a 
statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, an independent 
physician appointed by the Department.   
B 
¶66 Even if there is no statutory right to cross-examine 
an independent physician appointed by the Department, Aurora 
contends that the right to cross-examine witnesses is a basic 
necessity of due process.  It asserts that LIRC violated the due 
                                                 
11 We recognize that in its decision, LIRC wrote: "Dr. 
Ebert's functional restrictions are credible, and [Schaefer's 
vocational expert] has credibly opined that based on those 
restrictions, the applicant falls into the 'odd lot' category 
. . . . The applicant therefore submitted a prima facie case for 
permanent total disability, which the commission finds that 
respondents have not successfully rebutted."  
Dr. Ebert's report was not part of Schaefer's prima facie 
case 
for 
permanent 
total 
disability. 
 
Rather, 
Schaefer 
established a prima facie case when he submitted the medical 
reports of Dr. Sadeghi and Dr. Cain, which the administrative 
law judge found to be credible, as well as the report of his 
vocational expert.  Because Aurora also submitted credible 
evidence, LIRC remanded for an independent opinion from Dr. 
Ebert.     
12 The parties did not address Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
80.22(2), which provides: "Use of reports shall be permitted in 
any case in which claim for compensation is made, provided the 
reporting doctor is available for cross examination."  Given 
that the interpretation of this administrative regulation was 
not briefed or argued by the parties, we do not interpret it 
here.  Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶48, 286 
Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645.    
No. 
2010AP208   
 
26 
 
process rights guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution, Art. I, 
§ 1 when it declined to remand for cross-examination.13   
¶67 "The function of due process is to minimize the risk 
of erroneous decisions."  W.J.C. v. County of Vilas, 124 Wis. 2d 
238, 
242, 
369 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1985) (Cane, P.J., 
concurring).  We pause to observe that an independent physician 
appointed by the Department poses less of a risk of an erroneous 
decision than an expert hired by one of the parties to render a 
favorable decision. 
¶68 In support of its argument that due process requires 
cross-examination, Aurora relies on Illinois Steel Co. v. Jeka, 
123 Wis. 419, 101 N.W. 399 (1904).  In that case, the plaintiff 
brought an ejection action in circuit court, and the defendant 
argued that he had acquired the property in dispute by adverse 
possession. 
 
On 
review, 
this 
court 
stated 
that 
"cross-
examination is regarded one of the most efficient means of 
discovering the truth, and so long as there is any reasonable 
ground to suppose that it is being pursued legitimately it 
should not be disturbed . . . . The use of it is not a mere 
privilege subject to discretionary judicial authority,——it is a 
right."  Id. at 429.    
¶69 We 
acknowledge 
the 
important 
role 
that 
cross-
examination plays in the adversarial system, in which the goal 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Const. Art. I § 1 provides: "All people are 
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
27 
 
is a search for the truth.  Nevertheless, it does not rise to 
the level of a due process right in all instances.   
¶70 It is significant that the above-quoted language from 
Jeka was made in the context of a judicial proceeding in circuit 
court, prior to the advent of Wisconsin's worker's compensation 
statute and the rise of the modern administrative state.14  The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that "procedural due 
process in the administrative setting does not always require 
application of the judicial model."  Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 
(1977).15    
¶71 In an administrative proceeding, the "ultimate test to 
determine whether due process of law has been accorded a party 
. . . is the presence or absence of fair play."  Bituminous Cas. 
Co. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 730, 734, 295 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 
1980).  Our cases have determined that there are three elements 
                                                 
14 "Although 
administrative 
and 
quasi-administrative 
agencies have existed for quite some time, indeed the roots of 
administrative law can be traced back to Federalist era in the 
1780s, it was not until the early part of this century, first 
with the progressive era and then with the New Deal, that the 
modern regulatory state emerged with any prominence."  Sam 
Kalen, The Transformation of Modern Administrative Law: Changing 
Administrations and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 Ecology 
L.Q. 657, 662 (2008). 
15 In a prison disciplinary proceeding, for example, inmates 
do not have a due process right to cross-examine witnesses 
against them.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-68 (1974).  
Even in judicial proceedings, courts have determined that there 
is not always an independent, absolute right to confront and 
cross-examine expert witnesses under the state and federal 
constitutions.  See, e.g., Walworth County v. Therese B., 2003 
WI App 223, ¶10, 267 Wis. 2d 310, 671 N.W.2d 377.   
No. 
2010AP208   
 
28 
 
of fair play in an administrative proceeding: (1) the right to 
seasonably know the charges or claims preferred; (2) the right 
to meet such charges or claims by competent evidence; and (3) 
the right to be heard by counsel upon the probative force of the 
evidence adduced by both sides and upon the law applicable 
thereto.  Id.   
¶72 Here, there is no dispute that Aurora was seasonably 
informed of Schaefer's claims and that it was represented by 
able counsel.  Additionally, Aurora had ample opportunity to 
present competent evidence about the cause and extent of 
Schaefer's disability, and it was represented by competent 
counsel who made compelling arguments about the force of the 
evidence adduced by both sides.       
¶73 In the two months following Dr. Ebert's supplemental 
report, Aurora was given the opportunity to rebut the report 
with additional medical evidence as well as the opportunity to 
submit 
an 
additional 
vocational 
report. 
 
Although 
LIRC 
ultimately rejected Aurora's vocational expert's opinion that 
Schaefer's absenteeism could be overcome by invoking the 
provisions of the FMLA, the opinion was offered, it was 
introduced into evidence, and it was considered by LIRC when it 
rendered its decision.  We conclude that LIRC did not violate 
Aurora's due process rights when it declined to remand for 
cross-examination.     
C 
¶74 Given our determinations that Aurora had no statutory 
or constitutional right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, LIRC's 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
29 
 
decision to decline Aurora's request was discretionary.  See 
Theodore Fleisner, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d at 327.  In its written 
decision, LIRC declined to grant Aurora's last-minute request 
for 
a 
third 
remand 
because 
it 
concluded 
that 
further 
clarification from Dr. Ebert was unnecessary and would serve no 
useful purpose.   
¶75 LIRC explained that there was no need to remand to 
question Dr. Ebert about "part-time work or theoretical 'levels' 
of work."  Dr. Ebert asserted that back pain tends to flare up.  
Under those circumstances, LIRC could reasonably infer that the 
absenteeism that would result from unpredictable flare ups would 
interfere with Schaefer's ability to work on a part-time or 
reduced basis, just as it would interfere with his ability to 
work on a full-time basis.     
¶76 Additionally, LIRC explained that there was no need to 
remand to ask Dr. Ebert if his opinion was given to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability, the standard of admissibility for 
medical opinions.  See Drexler v. All Am. Life & Cas. Co., 72 
Wis. 2d 420, 432, 241 N.W.2d 401 (1976).  Dr. Ebert's written 
reports were created pursuant to the Department's request, and 
Dr. Ebert, who had prepared many such reports for the Department 
in the past, was aware that they would be used in administrative 
proceedings.  Because LIRC had received Dr. Ebert's past reports 
and 
knew 
that 
he 
was 
familiar 
with 
the 
standard 
of 
admissibility, LIRC was satisfied that Dr. Ebert's supplemental 
report was given to a reasonable degree of medical probability.   
No. 
2010AP208   
 
30 
 
¶77 Under these facts, we conclude that LIRC reasonably 
determined that a remand was unnecessary and would serve no 
useful purpose.  Further, we conclude that LIRC's refusal to 
remand for a third time was all the more reasonable, given the 
last-minute nature of Aurora's request.   
¶78 Dr. Ebert's first report was provided to the parties 
on November 11, 2008, and Aurora submitted no request to cross-
examine or further question him at that time.  Even after March 
16, 2009, the date that the parties were provided with Dr. 
Ebert's supplemental report, Aurora submitted no immediate 
request to cross-examine or further question Dr. Ebert.  Rather, 
Aurora requested 30 days to submit an additional vocational 
report, and then on April 17, it requested a two-week extension 
to provide a "supplemental report."  Aurora asserted: "We will 
submit our report on or before May 1, 2009."  It was only on May 
1 that Aurora requested the opportunity to cross-examine or 
further question Dr. Ebert.     
¶79 When it declined to remand for a third time to allow 
Dr. Ebert to be questioned further, LIRC considered the relevant 
facts, applied a proper standard of law, and reached a 
determination that a reasonable person could reach.  See 
Verhaagh, 
204 
Wis. 2d at 
160. 
 
Accordingly, 
it 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion. 
IV 
¶80 In 
sum, 
we 
determine 
that 
neither 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) nor Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(d) provides Aurora a 
statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, an independent 
No. 
2010AP208   
 
31 
 
physician appointed by the Department.  We further determine 
that LIRC did not violate Aurora's due process rights when it 
declined to remand for cross-examination.   
¶81 Finally, we conclude that LIRC did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion.  When it declined to remand for a third 
time to allow Dr. Ebert to be questioned further, LIRC 
considered the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and reached a determination that a reasonable person could 
reach.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.     
DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶82 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).  Statutory 
procedures for worker's compensation actions matter because they 
provide a level playing field for both employees and employers.  
When the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) does not 
follow statutory procedures and this court affirms what LIRC has 
done, the court's decision harms both employees and employers by 
changing the process the legislature has created to fully and 
fairly resolve worker's compensation claims.   
¶83 In the case now before us, LIRC arbitrarily prevented 
the employer, Aurora Consolidated Health Care, from rebutting, 
by cross-examination, the medical expert opinion upon which LIRC 
based its decision.  LIRC's action is contrary to the explicit 
statutory provision under which LIRC proceeded when it appointed 
the 
medical 
expert. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g).  
Furthermore, LIRC's arbitrary decision denied due process to the 
employer.   
¶84 Permitting the parties to a worker's compensation 
action to question all expert opinions, no matter by whom the 
experts were retained, is consistent with ch. 102 and with due 
process.  Because the majority opinion decides otherwise, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶85 On February 27, 2001, Jeffrey Schaefer slipped and 
fell while making a delivery for Aurora.  He injured his lower 
back in the fall.   
¶86 Mr. 
Schaefer has a complicated medical history, 
including a preexisting back injury, for which he had back 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
2 
 
surgery in 2000, and necrosis of both hip joints, for which he 
had hip replacement surgery.  Although it is without question 
that Mr. Schaefer injured his back due to the slip and fall, 
evaluation of the extent of his work-related disability was 
complicated by the existence of multiple pre-existing medical 
conditions.   
¶87 On 
November 8, 
2007, 
a 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development (DWD) administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing 
on Mr. Schaefer's worker's compensation claim.1  Mr. Schaefer was 
the 
only 
witness. 
 
However, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(d), both Mr. Schaefer and Aurora submitted written 
reports from medical experts opining on the extent of Mr. 
Schaefer's disability that was work-related. 
¶88 Dr. James Cain, Mr. Schaefer's medical expert, opined 
that Mr. Schaefer had reached a healing plateau and had a 40 
percent permanent partial disability.  Dr. Cain stated that 80 
percent of his 40 percent disability (i.e., 32 percent) was 
work-related.2  Dr. Cain's opinion is contained in his April 26, 
2006, response to a request for information about Mr. Schaefer's 
medical condition.   
¶89 Dr. 
Sridhara 
Vasudevan, 
Aurora's 
medical 
expert, 
opined that Mr. Schaefer had a 35 percent permanent partial 
                                                 
1 The record was closed on December 13, 2007, and the ALJ 
issued his written decision February 21, 2008.   
2 LIRC misstates Dr. Cain's opinion as a 40 percent 
permanent functional disability due to Mr. Schaefer's work-
related injury, rather than 80 percent of 40 percent, as Dr. 
Cain reported. 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
3 
 
disability, but that none of his disability was work-related.  
Dr. Vasudevan's opinion is set out in an October 22, 2007, 
report made after his examination of Mr. Schaefer.  Subsequent 
to the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision that concluded 
that Mr. Schaefer had 100 percent permanent disability, due to 
his work-related injury. 
¶90 On September 18, 2008, after LIRC's review of the 
ALJ's decision and the record, LIRC remanded the case to DWD to 
appoint an "impartial" physician, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g), to assess what portion of Mr. Schaefer's 
functional disability was due to his hip condition and hip 
surgery.  DWD retained Dr. Jerome Ebert.   
¶91 Dr. Ebert examined Mr. Schaefer and issued a written 
report on November 6, 2008, in which he opined that Mr. Schaefer 
could stand, sit, or drive for one half hour before changing 
positions.  He also said that Mr. Schaefer should not lift more 
than ten pounds on a frequent basis, with 20 pounds being his 
maximum lifting limitation.  Dr. Ebert attributed all of the 
restrictions on Mr. Schaefer to his work-related injury. 
¶92 On February 24, 2009, at Mr. Schaefer's request, LIRC 
remanded to DWD a second time because Mr. Schaefer said that Dr. 
Ebert's opinion was incomplete.  As part of its remand, LIRC 
gave Dr. Ebert a list of questions to address.   
¶93 On March 3, 2009, Dr. Ebert responded to LIRC's 
questions.  Dr. Ebert said that Mr. Schaefer should be able to 
work eight hours per day if Mr. Schaefer remained within the 
restrictions 
set 
out 
in 
Dr. 
Ebert's 
November 6, 
2008, 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
4 
 
communication, 
and 
that 
Mr. 
Schaefer 
should 
be 
given 
approximately "two brief 10 minute breaks per day."  In 
addition, Dr. Ebert stated, "Chronic back pain of this nature 
does tend to flare at times.  Sometimes the flares are so severe 
that work would not be possible.  I would estimate that this 
would occur approximately 2 times per month." (Emphasis added.)  
Dr. Ebert did not say whether the "flares" would occur two times 
per month or whether they would be so severe two times per month 
that he would miss work two times per month.  He also did not 
assign any percentage of bodily disability to Mr. Schaefer's 
physical limitations.  
¶94 Based on Dr. Ebert's March 3 report, Aurora requested 
a remand to DWD to permit it to rebut Dr. Ebert's opinion by 
questioning him about his opinions.  This is the first and only 
time that Aurora requested a remand to DWD; the other two 
remands were at LIRC's or Mr. Schaefer's request.  LIRC denied 
Aurora's request to remand stating, 
There is no ambiguity in the opinions [Dr. Ebert] has 
provided in this case, and the commission sees no 
reasonable basis to question whether they were given 
to a reasonable degree of medical probability.   
 
The commission also fails to see any useful 
purpose in questioning Dr. Ebert regarding part-time 
work or theoretical "levels" of work. 
LIRC made no mention of Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g) under which 
Dr. Ebert was appointed, even though § 102.17(1)(g) contains 
specific directives about the rights of the parties following a 
report by a physician DWD has retained.   
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
5 
 
I.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶95 We review LIRC's decision to prevent Aurora from 
questioning Dr. Ebert, not the decisions of the court of appeals 
or the circuit court.  Beecher v. LIRC, 2004 WI 88, ¶22, 273 
Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29.  At issue in this case is whether 
LIRC correctly interpreted and applied Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g) 
when it denied Aurora's request to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.  
Interpretation and application of a statute are questions of 
law.  County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶14, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 
759 N.W.2d 571.   
¶96 Generally, we give LIRC's interpretation of a statute 
one of three levels of deference:  great weight deference, due 
weight deference or no deference, sometimes referred to as 
de novo review.  Id.  We may grant great weight deference to 
LIRC's interpretation of a statute when:  (1) LIRC is charged 
with administration of the statute; (2) LIRC's interpretation is 
one of long standing; (3) LIRC employed its expertise or 
specialized knowledge in arriving at its interpretation; and (4) 
LIRC's "interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency 
in the application of the statute."  Id., ¶16 (citation 
omitted).  If we accord great weight deference, we will uphold 
LIRC's interpretation if it is reasonable, even if another 
interpretation is more reasonable.  Id.   
¶97 We may grant LIRC's interpretation of a statute due 
weight deference when:  (1) LIRC is charged with administration 
of the statute; and (2) LIRC has some prior experience 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
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interpreting it, but such experience does not place it in a 
better position than the courts to interpret the statute.  Id., 
¶17.  If we accord due weight deference, we will uphold LIRC's 
reasonable interpretation of the statute, so long as another 
interpretation is not more reasonable.  Id.   
¶98 I do not dispute that the legislature charged LIRC 
with interpreting Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), or that LIRC 
probably has done so on other occasions.  However, I can give no 
deference to LIRC's refusal to remand for a further hearing in 
this case because LIRC's interpretation is contrary to the words 
of the statute.  Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 506-07, 493 
N.W.2d 14 (1992) (explaining that no deference is due LIRC when 
its 
interpretation 
clearly 
contravenes 
the 
words 
of 
the 
statute).  In addition, there is nothing in LIRC's written 
decision 
to 
show 
that 
LIRC 
employed 
its 
expertise 
and 
specialized knowledge in denying a further hearing as the 
statute requires.  Accordingly, I grant no deference to LIRC's 
interpretation of § 102.17(1)(g).   
¶99 Aurora also claims that its due process rights were 
violated by LIRC's refusal to permit it to question Dr. Ebert.  
We grant LIRC no deference when a claim of constitutional due 
process is at issue.  Coulee Catholic Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 
¶31, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.   
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶100 Because Dr. Ebert was retained by DWD pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), the interpretation and application of 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
7 
 
§ 102.17(1)(g) are at issue.  Section 102.17(1)(g) provides in 
relevant part: 
 
Whenever the testimony presented at any hearing 
indicates a dispute or creates a doubt as to the 
extent or cause of disability . . ., the department 
may direct that the injured employee be examined . . . 
by . . . an impartial, competent physician . . . .  
The 
report 
of 
the 
examination 
. . . 
shall 
be 
transmitted in writing to the department and a copy of 
the report shall be furnished by the department to 
each party, who shall have an opportunity to rebut 
such report on further hearing.  
¶101 Statutory interpretation begins with the words the 
legislature chose because it is through those words that we 
determine what the legislature meant.  Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. v. Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶27, 325 
Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369.  Statutory language is interpreted 
in the context in which it is used and to promote, rather than 
contravene, the statute's purpose. Id., ¶28.  If the words 
chosen by the legislature are plain and unambiguous, we apply 
the statute as written and go no further.  Id., ¶27. 
¶102 Here, 
the 
legislative 
mandate, 
"shall 
have 
an 
opportunity to rebut such report on further hearing," is plain 
and unambiguous when read in the context of DWD's retaining a 
medical expert under Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), as DWD did here.3  
If the expert presents a report as Dr. Ebert did, then both 
parties "shall have an opportunity" for a "further hearing."  
¶103 In order to come within the parameters of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) and remand to DWD to retain a medical expert, 
                                                 
3 The majority opinion agrees that LIRC employed Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) when DWD retained Dr. Ebert.  Majority op., ¶25. 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
8 
 
LIRC must have concluded that the testimony presented at the 
hearing before the ALJ indicated a dispute or a doubt as to the 
extent or cause of Mr. Schaefer's disability.  This is so 
because concerns about the extent or cause of an employee's 
disability are the statutory prerequisites for DWD to retain a 
medical expert.  Therefore, the record created before the ALJ 
must have been insufficient to answer the worker's compensation 
questions that Mr. Schaefer's condition presented.   
¶104 However, even though LIRC remanded to appoint an 
expert under Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), in its May 29, 2009, 
written 
decision, 
LIRC 
did 
not 
mention 
the 
mandated 
"opportunity" that § 102.17(1)(g) accords both parties when a 
report is presented by a medical expert that DWD retained.  
Instead of applying § 102.17(1)(g), LIRC stated that "[t]here is 
no ambiguity in the opinions [Dr. Ebert] has provided in this 
case, and the commission sees no reasonable basis to question 
whether they were given to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability."   
¶105 However, there is ambiguity in Dr. Ebert's saying that 
the "flares" of Mr. Schaefer's back pain may occur with "some 
frequency" and that some of those flares may require a missed 
day of work, without explaining whether all "flares" would 
require a missed day of work.  Perhaps if asked, Dr. Ebert would 
have opined that flares could occur two times per month, but 
that not every flare would require a missed day of work.  This 
possibility is entirely reasonable because Dr. Ebert also 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
9 
 
concluded that Mr. Schaefer could work an eight hour day with 
only "two brief 10 minute" breaks.   
¶106 It is impossible for anyone to determine what Dr. 
Ebert would have said.  However, what Dr. Ebert might have said 
is not what causes me to dissent.  I dissent because Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) unambiguously provides that if DWD employs a 
physician expert who provides a report, then each party "shall 
have an opportunity to rebut such report on further hearing."  
Aurora asked for such "opportunity," and LIRC refused without 
addressing the statutory requirements.   
¶107 The majority affirms LIRC's decision by opining that 
Aurora had no statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert.4  
However, Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g) does not say there is no 
right to cross-examine the expert retained by DWD.  Rather, 
§ 102.17(1)(g) 
grants 
two 
rights 
to 
parties 
in 
worker's 
compensation actions where DWD has retained an expert:  (1) the 
opportunity to "rebut" the report; and (2) the opportunity of a 
"further hearing."5 
¶108 It is true that some of the statutory provisions that 
relate to reports presented in a worker's compensation hearing 
limit responses to those reports to cross-examination.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 102.17(1)(d)1.  However, § 102.17(1)(g) is not so 
limiting because it grants a right to "rebut" the report of a 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶63. 
5 The majority opinion ignores the statutory mandate of the 
"opportunity" for a "further hearing."  Yet, Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) plainly requires a "further hearing" under the 
circumstances presented here. 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
10 
 
medical expert that DWD retains and to do so at a hearing held 
after the receipt of the report.   
¶109 "Rebut" is a term that encompasses more, not less, 
than a provision providing only for cross-examination.  As 
Black's Law Dictionary explains, "rebut" means "To refute, 
oppose, or counteract (something) by evidence, argument, or 
contrary proof, [e.g.,] rebut the opponent's expert testimony."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1381 (9th ed. 2009).  Evidence may be 
presented 
by 
direct questioning and by cross-examination.  
Furthermore, the most powerful evidence is often obtained by 
cross-examination.  See Aurora Consol. Health Care v. LIRC, 2010 
WI App 173, ¶46, 330 Wis. 2d 804, 794 N.W.2d 520 (Fine, J., 
dissenting). 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g) affords both parties the opportunity to present 
additional evidence at a future hearing, which evidence may be 
presented by direct examination and by cross-examination.  
¶110 And in addition, there is no need for the majority to 
affirm the court of appeals, as this court must review the 
opinion of LIRC, not that of the court of appeals.  Beecher, 273 
Wis. 2d 136, ¶22.  However, instead of reviewing LIRC's 
decision, the majority does what the court of appeals did.  The 
majority opinion interprets a statute that LIRC ignored.  In so 
doing, it permits LIRC to ignore the will of the legislature and 
creates precedent that limits rights that the legislature 
established in Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g).  
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
11 
 
C.  Due Process 
¶111 Aurora asserts that in addition to violating the 
rights the legislature accorded under Wis. Stat. § 102.17(1)(g), 
LIRC violated Aurora's right to due process of law, as 
guaranteed 
by 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The foundation of due process is a fair 
proceeding.  See Wright v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 289, 296, 565 
N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1997).  However, arbitrary decision making 
trammels fundamental fairness.  It has long been the rule in 
Wisconsin that an order issued in an agency proceeding where 
there has not been a full hearing on the evidence underlying the 
order is a denial of due process.  See Bituminous Cas. Co. v. 
DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 730, 735, 295 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1980).  
¶112 Here, Aurora asked for a hearing to question Dr. Ebert 
about the opinions he gave in his March 3 report.  LIRC denied 
that request because LIRC saw "no reasonable basis to question" 
whether Dr. Ebert's opinions were given to a reasonable medical 
probability.  However, Dr. Ebert opined that "flares" of back 
pain could occur and "sometimes" the flares would require a day 
off work.  Dr. Ebert also "estimate[ed]" that the flares could 
occur twice a month.  The words Dr. Ebert chose are not those 
one usually sees in opinions given to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty.  See Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Flynn, 2011 WI 
App 112, ¶7 n.3, 335 Wis. 2d 495, 801 N.W.2d 466.   
¶113 Furthermore, LIRC said it saw no "useful purpose" in 
Aurora's request for questions about part-time work.  However, 
Dr. Ebert said Mr. Schaefer could work eight hours per day, with 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
12 
 
only two, brief ten minute breaks.  How that opinion lines up 
with Dr. Ebert's opinion on "flares" of back pain is anything 
but clear.   
¶114 Because this was an opinion DWD ordered and upon which 
LIRC relied, both parties should have been permitted to 
participate in a hearing to explore that opinion by questioning.  
Denial of a hearing on Dr. Ebert's report is the denial of the 
constitutional right to a fair hearing, as well as a statutory 
violation.  See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. LIRC, 2008 WI App 50, ¶9, 
308 Wis. 2d 763, 747 N.W.2d 782 (stating the elements necessary 
for a fair hearing).  Due process is violated because Dr. 
Ebert's opinion could not be explored and it was the basis for 
LIRC's order.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶115 I conclude that LIRC arbitrarily decided to prevent 
Aurora from rebutting, by cross-examination, the medical expert 
opinion on which LIRC based its decision.  LIRC's action is 
contrary to the explicit statutory provision under which LIRC 
proceeded when it retained the medical expert.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.17(1)(g).  Furthermore, LIRC's arbitrary decision denied 
due process to the employer.   
¶116 Permitting the parties to a worker's compensation 
action to question all expert opinions, no matter by whom the 
experts were retained, is consistent with ch. 102 and with due 
process.  Because the majority opinion decides otherwise, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2010AP208.pdr 
 
 
 
1