Title: Windom v. Ungerer, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 590, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEBORAH J. WINDOM as next 
) 
friend of BRANDON WINDOM, 
)  No. 590, 2005 
a minor, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 01C-10-196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
WILLIAM C. UNGERER, W.C. 
) 
UNGERER INSURANCE AGENCY,) 
MICHAEL T. ALPAUGH,  
 
) 
MICHAEL T. ALPAUGH  
 
) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellees.  
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 25, 2006 
Decided:  June 15, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED 
in part, and REMANDED. 
 
 
Philip M. Finestrauss, Philip M. Finestrauss, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware 
for appellant. 
 
 
Stephen P. Casarino, Casarino, Christman & Shal, P.A., Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellees William C. Ungerer and W.C. Ungerer Insurance Agency. 
 
 
Paul Cottrell, Tighe, Cottrell & Logan, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellees Michael T. Alpaugh and Michael T. Alpaugh Insurance Agency. 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
2
 
 
Plaintiff Below, Brandon Windom,1 was injured while participating in a 
football practice supervised by the Capital Trail Football League on October 21, 
1999.  Windom sued the League for his injuries and the League then discovered 
that it did not have commercial liability insurance.  A default judgment was 
entered against the League and the League assigned any claims it may have had 
against an insurer to Windom. 
 
Windom brought claims against Michael T. Alpaugh,2 the League’s former 
Nationwide Insurance agent, and William C. Ungerer,3 a general insurance agent.  
Alpaugh wrote insurance for the League through Nationwide Insurance Company 
until September of 1999.  When Nationwide’s policy expired, Nationwide and 
Alpaugh informed the League that Nationwide would no longer issue a commercial 
liability policy covering the League’s activities.  Alpaugh, exclusively a 
Nationwide agent, contacted Ungerer with the League’s knowledge to determine if 
Ungerer, a general agent, could find a carrier that would provide the coverage the 
League desired.  Ungerer received a proposal for insurance coverage from 
                                                 
1  
Deborah Windom brought suit as next friend of Brandon Windom.  For ease of 
discussion we refer to plaintiffs collectively as “Windom.” 
 
2  
Michael T. Alpaugh and his agency, Michael T. Alpaugh Insurance Agency, are named 
defendants.  We refer to them collectively as “Alpaugh.” 
 
3  
William C. Ungerer and his agency, William C. Ungerer Insurance Agency, are named 
defendants.  We refer to them collectively as “Ungerer.” 
 
 
3
Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Company and the League accepted the proposal.  
Ungerer then provided the League with a temporary insurance certificate which 
purported to provide coverage dependent upon payment of a premium until the 
carrier issued or declined to issue a policy providing the coverage the League 
desired.  On its application for coverage the League supplied both a property 
address and a mailing address as requested.  Ungerer claims he sent a letter to the 
property address on the application notifying the League that Pawtucket declined 
to issue a policy.  The League asserts it never received the letter.  The League 
further asserts it had reason to believe Pawtucket provided coverage at the time of 
Windom’s injury. 
 
Before the case went to trial, Alpaugh and Ungerer both moved for summary 
judgment.  Alpaugh asserted that he had no duty to notify the League of 
Pawtucket’s declination because he merely acted as a messenger and specifically 
told the League that he could not provide coverage to them because he worked 
exclusively with Nationwide.  Ungerer acknowledges his duty to notify the League 
but asserts that he acted reasonably in carrying out that duty by notifying the 
League that Pawtucket declined to issue a policy by mailing a letter so indicating 
to the League’s property address.  The trial judge granted summary judgment to 
both Alpaugh and Ungerer. 
 
4
 
Windom now claims on appeal that the trial judge erred by granting 
summary judgment in favor of Alpaugh.  Windom suggests that Alpaugh had a 
duty to notify the League of Pawtucket’s declination because he acted as a 
“broker” when he contacted Ungerer to determine if Ungerer could provide 
coverage to the League and because he relayed all communications between the 
League and Ungerer.  Windom also claims that the trial judge erred by granting 
summary judgment in favor of Ungerer because Ungerer acted unreasonably in 
carrying out his conceded duty to notify the League of Pawtucket’s declination 
when he sent a letter to the League’s property address rather than the League’s 
mailing address.  We find that Alpaugh owed no duty to the League because he 
merely acted as a messenger between the League and Ungerer.  He informed the 
League, and they clearly knew from past dealings, that he could not provide them 
with insurance because he dealt exclusively with Nationwide and Nationwide 
would not renew the League’s policy.  Moreover, we find genuine issues of 
disputed material fact about whether Ungerer acted reasonably when notifying the 
League that Pawtucket declined to issue a policy, by allegedly sending a letter to 
the League’s property’s address rather than to its mailing address.  Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in part, and reversed in part. 
 
5
I. 
A.  Facts 
The League is a junior football program for minors.  On October 21, 1999, 
Windom fractured his femur while participating in a football team evening practice 
supervised by the League at a site where the lights were inoperable.  At the time of 
Windom’s injury, the League did not have commercial liability insurance.  The 
facts surrounding the lack of insurance form the basis of the Windom’s claims. 
Beginning in 1986, Alpaugh procured insurance for the League through 
Nationwide.  Alpaugh is an exclusive agent for Nationwide.  On May 25, 1999, 
Nationwide notified Alpaugh that it would not renew the League’s commercial 
liability policy when it expired on September 1, 1999.  Nationwide also sent notice 
directly to the League on May 26, 1999.  Chris Verucci, President of the League, 
contacted Alpaugh on June 17, 1999 to discuss Nationwide’s decision not to renew 
the policy.  Alpaugh informed Verucci that he could not procure alternative 
coverage because he dealt exclusively with Nationwide, and suggested that she 
contact a few other agencies.  On September 14, 1999, Alpaugh learned during a 
telephone conversation with Verucci that the League had yet to obtain alternative 
insurance coverage.4  Alpaugh then told Verucci that he would “check around” to 
see if he could find a general agent that could procure commercial liability 
                                                 
4  
Verucci called Alpaugh in reference to another matter. 
 
 
6
insurance coverage for the League.  After his conversation with Verucci, Alpaugh 
happened to “run into” William C. Ungerer at a local bank.  Alpaugh explained the 
League’s situation to Ungerer.5  Ungerer, who operated a general insurance 
agency, indicated that he might be able to procure insurance for the League 
through Pawtucket. 
Alpaugh then provided Ungerer with the League’s information and, on 
September 27, 1999, Ungerer sent Alpaugh a proposal for comprehensive general 
liability insurance coverage for the League, to be underwritten by Pawtucket.  
Alpaugh contacted Verucci to notify her that he had obtained a proposal from 
Ungerer.  Verucci orally accepted the proposal, and Alpaugh relayed Verucci’s 
acceptance to Ungerer.  Ungerer then prepared an application for coverage for the 
League to complete. 
On September 29, 1999, Verucci and Darla Chaffin, the League’s Treasurer, 
met with Alpaugh to sign the insurance application.6  Verucci and Chaffin also 
                                                 
5  
In particular, Alpaugh explained that the League needed insurance immediately because 
the football season had already started. 
 
6  
Alpaugh met Verucci and Chaffin at a skating rink where the League was holding a party.  
Alpaugh claimed that Ungerer assured him that the Pawtucket insurance proposal would be in 
force and effective on the date the League signed the application.  Alpaugh relayed this message 
to the League, and the League believed it had insurance as of September 29, 1999. 
 
At the meeting Alpaugh explained to Verucci and Chaffin that he “was unable to process 
the application or have anything to do with the insurance since it was being placed through 
Ungerer’s agency with an insurer other than Nationwide.”  He further explained that Ungerer’s 
agency “was handling this insurance application and policy and that any questions about it would 
have to be directed to Mr. Ungerer or his agency.” 
 
 
7
gave Alpaugh the initial insurance premium payment of six hundred dollars.7  The 
next day Alpaugh hand delivered the application and payment to Ungerer.  Ungerer 
gave Alpaugh a certificate of insurance from Pawtucket for Alpaugh to give to the 
League.8 
 
On October 7, 1999, Ungerer received a fax from Pawtucket indicating that 
it would not issue a policy to the League.9  Five days later on October 12, 1999, 
Ungerer also received a letter from Pawtucket in which it declined to issue a policy 
along with the League’s uncashed six hundred dollar check.  Ungerer claims that 
on October 14, 1999 he sent to the League the uncashed check together with a 
letter stating that Pawtucket had declined coverage.  Ungerer mailed the letter and 
uncashed check to the League’s property address as indicated on the League’s 
                                                 
7  
The payment was by check. 
 
8  
The certificate was dated September 29, 1999 and listed the policy number as 
“Pending/Binder,” the producer as Ungerer Insurance Agency, the insurer as Pawtucket Mutual, 
and the insured as the League.  After Ungerer gave Alpaugh the certificate, Alpaugh informed 
Ungerer that the League would need a certificate for each school where football games were 
played.  Ungerer said that was not a problem and “gave [Alpaugh] a completed certificate with 
instructions to have either the league just photocopy it and insert the names (names of schools), 
or I (Alpaugh) could do that and give it to them.”  Alpaugh decided to make the copies and fill in 
the “certificate holders” names and he then gave all the certificates to the League. 
 
After giving the certificates to the League, Alpaugh had no contact with the League or 
Ungerer concerning the insurance policy until this lawsuit.  
 
9  
Ungerer was surprised at the denial because Pawtucket’s underwriter previously had 
informed Ungerer that there would not be a problem.  Pawtucket claimed the potential risk was 
high and it was not prepared to undertake the risk. 
 
 
8
application for insurance.10  The League claimed that they never received 
Ungerer’s letter and therefore had reason to believe that it had commercial liability 
insurance coverage in place on the date of Windom’s injury.  The League asserts 
that it first learned that it had no coverage when it informed Ungerer and 
Pawtucket of Windom’s injury. 
B. Procedural History 
 
Windom filed a complaint against the League, Ungerer, Alpaugh, and 
Pawtucket.  The League failed to plead, appear, or otherwise defend against 
Windom’s complaint and Windom took a default judgment against the League.  
The League assigned its rights, if any, under the Pawtucket insurance policy to 
Windom.11  Windom then claimed that Alpaugh and Ungerer were negligent by 
unreasonably failing to fulfill their respective duties to notify the League that 
Pawtucket had declined to issue a commercial liability policy to the League.  
Alpaugh and Ungerer moved for summary judgment and the trial judge granted 
both motions.  Windom now appeals the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment 
in Alpaugh’s and Ungerer’s favor.   
                                                 
10  
The application for insurance asked for and the League supplied both a mailing address 
and a property address. 
 
11  
Pawtucket eventually settled with Windom and is no longer part of this action. 
 
 
9
II. 
 
We review a trial judge’s grant of summary judgment de novo.12  We will 
affirm a trial judge’s grant of summary judgment when, viewing the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,13 there are no 
genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.14 
A. 
Windom’s claim that the trial judge erred by granting summary 
judgment in favor of Alpaugh. 
 
 
Windom claims that Alpaugh’s actions to help the League procure 
alternative liability insurance constituted the voluntary assumption of the duties of 
a professional broker engaged in the insurance business.  Windom further claims 
that Alpaugh, as a professional broker, had a legal duty to notify the League of 
Pawtucket’s decision to decline to issue a policy of commercial liability coverage 
to the League.  Alpaugh claims that he did not owe the League any duty because he 
merely acted as a messenger and specifically told the League that he could not 
provide coverage to them because he worked exclusively with Nationwide. 
                                                 
12  
Pike Creek Chiropractic Center, P.A. v. Robinson, 637 A.2d 418, 420 (Del. 1994) (citing 
Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99 (Del. 1992)). 
 
13  
Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1375-76 (Del. 1996) (citing Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright 
Corporation, 535 A.2d 840, 844 (Del. 1987). 
 
14  
Merrill, 606 A.2d at 99-100;  Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 
 
 
10
 
The trial judge assumed for the purpose of argument that Alpaugh acted as a 
broker with respect to the League and found that “even assuming that Alpaugh 
acted as a broker with respect to the League, the course of dealing between 
Alpaugh[] and the League did not create an affirmative legal duty requiring 
Alpaugh to notify the League that its insurance application had been denied by 
Pawtucket.”  The reason was that Alpaugh was not contacted by Pawtucket 
regarding the decision to decline coverage, nor did Ungerer inform Alpaugh of 
Pawtucket’s decision.15 
 
The Delaware Insurance Code defines “broker” as “a licensee who, for 
compensation, negotiates on behalf of others contracts for insurance from 
companies he or she is not appointed.”16  Here, we find that the uncontested facts 
demonstrate that Alpaugh did not act as the League’s broker. 
 
Alpaugh’s actions were limited to those of a messenger.  Alpaugh did not 
solicit Pawtucket, negotiate with Pawtucket, prepare the League’s application, or 
receive any compensation.  The insurance certificate received by the League listed 
                                                 
15  
Windom points out that the trial judge’s holding relies on contested facts.  In particular, 
the trial judge appears to rely on Alpaugh’s deposition testimony that Ungerer never informed 
him of Pawtucket’s decision despite the fact that Ungerer claimed that he told Alpaugh of 
Pawtucket’s decision to decline coverage.  We recognize that the trial judge failed to view the 
facts in the light most favorable to Windom but find the error harmless because we affirm the 
trial judge’s ruling on other grounds (as discussed below), and whether Ungerer told Alpaugh 
about Pawtucket’s declination is not material to our holding.  See Infra n. 19. 
 
16  
18 Del. C. §1702(5). 
 
 
11
the producer as Ungerer Insurance Agency, and the insurer as Pawtucket Mutual.  
Alpaugh told the League that he acted exclusively for Nationwide and that he 
could not provide insurance through any other carrier.  He explained that any 
questions should be directed to Ungerer.  The League knew from past dealings that 
Alpaugh acted exclusively for Nationwide.  Thus, no reasonable person in the 
League’s position would believe that Alpaugh either acted as the League’s broker 
or held himself out as being capable of doing so. 
 
Moreover, the fact that the League never attempted to contact Alpaugh 
following Windom’s accident demonstrates that the League knew that Alpaugh 
was not its broker and that Alpaugh had no direct relationship with Pawtucket.  
Because the uncontested facts demonstrate that Alpaugh was not acting as a broker 
and that he did not hold himself out as such, we find that he owed no legal duty to 
the League to notify them of Pawtucket’s decision to decline to issue a policy of 
commercial liability insurance to the League.17  We therefore affirm the trial 
judge’s grant of summary judgment to Alpaugh.18 
                                                 
17  
Because we find that Alpaugh had no legal duty to notify the League of Pawtucket’s 
declination of coverage, whether or not Ungerer told Alpaugh of Pawtucket’s decision is not a 
material fact in issue. 
 
 
18  
While the judge articulated a different rationale for her ruling in this case, we may affirm 
on grounds other than those relied on by her.  Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361 (Del. 1995)).   
 
 
12
 
B. 
Windom’s claim that the trial judge erred by granting Ungerer’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
The trial judge granted Ungerer’s motion for summary judgment because 
there “is no statutory requirement that a decision to decline an insurance 
application be sent by certified mail … and it was not unreasonable for Ungerer to 
use the League’s property address instead of the League’s mailing address.”  
Windom claims that the trial judge erred by granting Ungerer’s motion for 
summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute 
relevant to whether Ungerer acted reasonably or at all in compliance with his duty 
to inform the League that Pawtucket declined to issue the policy with the coverage 
the League sought.19  Ungerer asserts that no genuine issues of material fact are in 
dispute because he satisfied his duty to notify the League by sending a letter to the 
                                                 
19  
It is undisputed that Ungerer had a duty to notify the League of Pawtucket’s decision not 
to provide insurance coverage.  Ungerer’s counsel conceded the point at oral argument: 
 
THE COURT:  
What is your understanding of the duty, if any, that Mr. Ungerer      
 
owed to the league? 
 
COUNSEL: 
Well, he undertook to get insurance for the league, there is no 
doubt about that.  He sent in the insurance application, and when 
the insurance company declined insurance, his duty was to 
reasonably notify the league that it did not have insurance 
coverage.  And that is the issue in the case.  Did he reasonably do 
that.  I think everybody concedes that he should have notified, by 
proper notice, that there was a declination of coverage. 
 
  
 
 
13
League’s property address.  Ungerer claims that despite the League’s denial that it 
ever received his letter, it is presumed that the League received the letter because it 
was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed.  Therefore, in Ungerer’s view, we 
must find that he satisfied his duty to notify the League because the League has 
provided nothing to overcome the presumption. 
 
“Generally speaking, the law requires that notice be actually received in 
order to be effective.”20 “The mere deposit in the mail of a notice, under the 
general law, is not sufficient to bind a person who never receives it.”21  “If the 
mailed notice is in fact not received, then the notification is without any legal 
effect.”22 “However, there is a presumption that mailed matter, correctly 
addressed, stamped and mailed, was received by the party to whom it was 
addressed.”23 “This presumption may be strengthened, weakened or overcome by 
proof of attendant pertinent circumstances.”24 Merely denying receipt does not 
                                                 
20  
State ex rel. Hall v. Camper, 347 A.2d 137, 138-39 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).   
 
21  
Id. 
 
22  
Id. 
 
23  
Id.  See also Schneider v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 Del. LEXIS 796, at *3 
(Del. Supr. Dec. 26, 2002). 
 
24  
Graham v. Commercial Credit Co., 194 A.2d 863, 865-66 (Del. Ch. 1963). 
 
 
14
rebut the presumption, but it may create an issue of fact to be determined by the 
jury.25   
 
Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute about whether 
Ungerer reasonably complied with his duty well beyond the League’s mere denial 
that it received the letter Ungerer claims he mailed.  It is uncontested that if 
Ungerer sent the letter, he sent it to the League’s listed property address even 
though the application for insurance indicated a different and distinct mailing 
address.  That fact, coupled with the League’s assertion it never received the letter, 
creates a genuine issue of fact material to whether Ungerer acted reasonably – a 
disputed fact only a jury can resolve.  A jury could fairly conclude that there was 
some meaningful purpose in asking for both a “property” and a “mailing” address 
on the application for a policy as if it were important to the insurer to know if they 
were different.  Windom also provided evidence to suggest that Ungerer never 
mailed the letter.  In particular, Windom produced Alpaugh’s deposition testimony 
which questions the validity of the copy of the letter that Ungerer claims he sent.  
Therefore, because genuine issues of material fact are in dispute about whether 
                                                 
25  
Jackson v. UIAB, 1986 Del. Super. LEXIS 1367, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1986) 
(“This presumption may be rebutted, but the addressee's mere denial of receipt is generally not 
enough to rebut.  It may create an issue of fact, however.”); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 
266  (“…the rule followed by most of the courts is that the denial of the receipt of the letter 
raises an issue of fact to be determined by the jury.   In such cases, the question of the credibility 
of the rebutting testimony is for the trier of fact.”). 
 
 
15
Ungerer reasonably satisfied his conceded duty to notify the League, we must 
reverse the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ungerer.26 
III. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Alpaugh is AFFIRMED.  The Superior Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Ungerer is REVERSED, and the case is remanded for trial. 
                                                 
26  
Windom’s brief also suggests that there was a genuine issue of material fact in dispute 
about whether a temporary insurance binder was in effect on September 29, 1999.  Windom 
suggests that this is a material fact because Ungerer would have a heightened notice requirement 
(e.g. certified mail) if a temporary insurance binder did exist.  We do not need to address this 
issue because Windom’s counsel abandoned the issue at oral argument when he claimed that the 
argument that “Ungerer may have had a heightened duty under the circumstances… really is not 
sustainable.”  The ultimate inquiry is whether Ungerer reasonably satisfied his conceded duty to 
notify the League of Pawtucket’s declination.