Title: People v. Hood
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97486
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2004

Docket No. 97486-Agenda 16-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
FREDERICK E. HOOD, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 2, 2004.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	 Following a jury trial in Macoupin County, defendant Frederick
Hood was convicted of illegal transportation of alcohol (625 ILCS
5/11-502(a) (West 2000)), failure to yield to a pedestrian in the
crosswalk (625 ILCS 5/11-1002(a) (West 2000)), and reckless
homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2000)), and sentenced to three
years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed,
arguing in relevant part that the trial court erred by allowing the
State's expert to testify in rebuttal. A majority of the appellate court
agreed with defendant that the rebuttal testimony was improper
because the State had violated the expert disclosure provisions of
Supreme Court Rule 412 (188 Ill. 2d R. 412). The appellate court
affirmed defendant's convictions for illegal transportation of alcohol
and failure to yield to a pedestrian in the crosswalk, but reversed
defendant's conviction for reckless homicide and remanded for a new
trial. 343 Ill. App. 3d 1245.
	For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment of the
appellate court reversing defendant's reckless homicide conviction and
remand to the appellate court for consideration of the balance of
defendant's arguments on appeal.

BACKGROUND
	On the afternoon of November 28, 2000, defendant was driving
his van westbound on Main Street in Mt. Olive, Illinois. As defendant
made a left turn from Main Street onto southbound Poplar Street, his
van struck 95-year-old Marie Schwab, causing serious injury. Schwab
died approximately three weeks later.
	David Smith, a Mt. Olive resident who witnessed the accident,
testified for the State. Smith stated that on November 28, 2000, at
about 3 p.m., he and his girlfriend, Tricia Marietta, picked up his son
from school. Smith drove eastbound on Main Street and stopped at
the stop sign at Poplar Street. The intersection of Main and Poplar is
a four-way stop. The speed limit is 20 miles per hour. Smith observed
a van coming from the east at a "pretty good rate of speed." Although
it was Smith's turn to proceed through the intersection, he waited
because he believed the van was not going to stop. To his right, on
Poplar Street, Smith could see a woman, later identified as Marie
Schwab, about halfway through the crosswalk. The van failed to stop
at the stop sign and rounded the corner "at a pretty good clip ***
rock[ing] to the right." Schwab raised her left hand, but the van did
not stop. The van struck Schwab, lifting her off her feet and throwing
her about five feet. Smith proceeded to the police station, which was
a block away, to report the accident. As he drove through the
intersection, he saw defendant exit the van, "kind of stumble and lean
against the door."
	Tricia Marietta similarly testified that the van defendant was
driving did not stop or slow down as it approached Poplar Street. As
the van turned onto Poplar, Marietta saw that defendant was looking
north. Marietta saw Schwab raise her left hand, but the van did not
stop until it struck her. Smith and Marietta, as well as an employee of
the ambulance service that responded to the accident, testified that the
weather was cloudy and overcast.
	John Tandy, formerly a patrolman with the Mt. Olive police
department, arrived first on the scene. He testified that Marie Schwab
was lying motionless in the center of the road, south of the crosswalk.
Defendant was leaning against one of the van doors, holding his 18-month-old son, Lucas. Tandy admitted meeting defendant on a couple
of occasions but denied having a "confrontation" with him. Defendant
told Tandy he was driving west on Main Street, came to a stop at
Poplar Street, turned left and heard a thump or a thud, and then
stopped. Tandy noticed a strong odor of beer on defendant's breath
and that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Defendant did not make
eye contact with Tandy. Defendant produced his license, but said he
did not have his insurance card. Defendant offered to go home to get
it. When Tandy asked defendant for the telephone number of a relative
who could pick up Lucas, defendant had trouble relaying the number
correctly. Defendant's speech was "a little slurred, a little garbled,
mumbly."
	Tandy further testified that he noticed an open cooler between
the two front seats of the van. In the cooler were seven unopened, 12-ounce cans of Busch beer, five empty cans, one partially filled can,
which was still cold, and some ice. Tandy smelled the open can to
verify that it contained beer. Defendant told Tandy that he had two
beers earlier in the day at Tillie's, a local tavern. According to Tandy,
defendant refused to take any field sobriety tests and volunteered that
he would not take a breath test. Tandy placed defendant under arrest
for driving under the influence of alcohol and hitting a pedestrian.
	After checking on Schwab's condition and taking some
measurements of the accident scene, Tandy transported defendant,
who was handcuffed, to a hospital for the purpose of collecting blood
and urine samples. As they walked through the hospital parking lot,
a distance of 50 to 100 feet, Tandy had to take defendant by the arm
a couple of times to keep him from falling. Defendant was "uneasy on
his feet," "stumbling a little bit, staggering a little bit, weaving from
side to side." A blood sample was collected at 5:40 p.m.,
approximately 2½ hours after the accident. During their wait at the
hospital defendant stood the entire time. After the samples were
collected, Tandy drove defendant to an ATM so that he could get
cash in order to post bond, and then drove defendant back to Mt.
Olive. Tandy testified that defendant had "sobered up quite a bit." The
parties stipulated that defendant's blood sample indicated an alcohol
concentration of 0.077.
	Randy Gorman, a deputy with the Macoupin County sheriff's
department, also responded to the scene. Gorman testified that he
found Marie Schwab's sunglasses wedged in between the bug shield
and the hood of defendant's van. Gorman observed no skid marks on
the pavement. Upon speaking with defendant, Gorman noticed a
strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath and that his eyes were
bloodshot and "glossy." Defendant's speech was mumbled and his
walk was "wobbly." Gorman believed defendant was intoxicated.
When Gorman asked defendant what happened, defendant said, "I
guess the sun was in my eyes. I didn't see her." Gorman recalled that
it was sunny and partly cloudy that day. Gorman further testified that
a cooler, containing several cans of Busch beer, was in the van behind
the driver's seat. An open can of beer, partially full and still cold,
stood upright in the cooler. Gorman escorted Tandy and defendant to
the hospital. As they walked approximately 75 feet through the
hospital parking lot, Gorman saw defendant staggering and swaying.
Gorman left the hospital immediately after defendant's blood and urine
samples were taken. At that time, defendant "appeared to be sobering
up some."
	The State also called Dr. Travis Hindman, a forensic pathologist
who performed the autopsy of Marie Schwab. Dr. Hindman testified
that the cause of her death was brain trauma due to injuries sustained
in the collision on November 28, 2000. The State attempted to elicit
"reverse extrapolation" testimony from Dr. Hindman in order to
establish defendant's blood-alcohol level at the time of the accident,
as opposed to the time defendant's blood was tested.(1) Defendant
objected, arguing that the State had failed to disclose Dr. Hindman as
an expert in this area. The trial court sustained the objection and the
State rested.
	Defendant called Bob Bonacorsi, who was acquainted with
defendant through a mutual friend. Bonacorsi testified that he was
driving west on Main Street shortly before the accident and that he
had to stop his vehicle and look out the window because the "sun was
in [his] eyes so bad *** [he] couldn't see anything."
	Danielle Shelton, a bartender at J.C.'s Tap in Mt. Olive, testified
that defendant entered the bar on the day of the accident at about 1:30
or 2 in the afternoon, looking for someone to help him move. With
defendant was his young son. Defendant stayed for 30 to 45 minutes,
drank one beer, and left. Defendant did not appear to be intoxicated.
Joanne Cartwright, Shelton's mother and the owner of J.C.'s Tap,
also recalled seeing defendant and his son at J.C.'s on the day of the
accident. When Cartwright left J.C.'s, defendant did not appear
intoxicated.
	Denise Vojas, a bartender at Tillie's tavern in Mt. Olive, testified
that she served defendant on the day of the accident. Defendant
arrived about 1:30 p.m. or later with his son and stayed for 25 to 30
minutes. Defendant had a bottle of Busch beer, ordered another beer,
drank half of it and left. Defendant did not appear intoxicated.
	Defendant's mother, Hervana Hood, testified that she went to the
accident site after receiving a call from the police to pick up Lucas.
When she arrived, defendant was standing at the side of the van,
holding his son. He did not have trouble standing and did not slur his
words. Mrs. Hood did not notice any odor of alcohol on defendant's
breath.
	Defendant also called his longtime friend Kent Potillo. Potillo
testified that on the day of the accident, at about 3 p.m., he was
standing in front of a gas station on Main Street three blocks from the
accident site. According to Potillo, "[W]e could see the police car
with its lights on, but the sun was right practically on top of this
building in the sky *** and you couldn't see down the street."
	Defendant testified on his own behalf regarding a prior
confrontation with Officer Tandy. According to defendant, on a
Sunday afternoon in June or July 2000, defendant, his son, Lucas, and
defendant's brother, Lonnie, were at a friend's home. Defendant's
truck, which his brother had driven, was parked in the alley with the
radio playing. Tandy arrived and told defendant the radio was too
loud and to move the truck. Defendant refused, explaining that his
brother was the driver. Defendant testified that, as he held his son,
Tandy went for his gun. Defendant told Tandy, "What are you going
to do, shoot me, you son-of-a-bitch, over a radio, and I got a baby in
my arms and I don't carry a knife or gun?" The argument continued.
According to defendant, when Tandy finally left, he told defendant,
for the second time that day, "I'll get you, you son-of-a-bitch."
	With respect to the day of the accident, defendant testified that
he drove his van from his Arkansas home, arriving in Mt. Olive around
1:30 or 2 p.m. Defendant brought his son, Lucas, with him. Defendant
came to Mt. Olive to complete work on the house he was selling and
to look for people to help him move. Defendant went first to J.C.'s
and had one beer, which he testified was his first beer that day. Not
finding anyone to help him move, he finished his beer and left after 30
minutes. Defendant then went to Tillie's. Although not finding anyone
to help him move, he ordered a beer not to be rude. According to
defendant, when he returned from the bathroom, the bartender had set
up another beer. He drank part of it and left Tillie's around 3 p.m.
	Defendant testified that as he drove west on Main Street, he
pulled up to the stop sign at Poplar Street, saw another vehicle
coming and hit his breaks. At the same time, he heard a noise from the
back of the car; Lucas had thrown his bottle. Defendant testified that
the sun was in his eyes as he made his turn onto Poplar Street. He
looked back to check on Lucas, heard a "thunk" and immediately
stopped. Defendant denied that he rounded the stop sign at 20 miles
per hour or that the van was "rocking" to the side when he made the
turn. Defendant further testified that prior to the accident he saw
Marie Schwab "standing between a car on the other side of the road,"
and that he never saw her in the crosswalk. After the collision, he
jumped out of his van and saw a friend in the area, whom he asked to
get help. This friend was deceased at the time of trial.
	Defendant testified that when police arrived, he was holding his
son. Defendant said he had no trouble standing and was not leaning
against the van. In response to Officer Tandy's questions, defendant
said that he had a couple of beers at Tillie's. Tandy allegedly told him,
"[Y]ou better hope she don't die or you're going [down] for murder."
Defendant attempted to retrieve his insurance card from his briefcase
behind the driver's seat, but Tandy stopped him. Defendant testified
that he did not refuse to take any field sobriety tests; rather, he offered
to take a sobriety test to clear himself. When Tandy placed defendant
under arrest, he cuffed defendant's hands "extremely tight" behind his
back. After defendant told Tandy that he had neck surgery nine
months earlier and that being cuffed so tightly hurt him, Tandy said,
"[N]ow I've got you, you son-of-a-bitch." Tandy then shoved
defendant against the back "pillar"of the car door, injuring his back.
Defendant claimed that he had trouble walking at the hospital due to
this back injury, and that he was more comfortable standing than
sitting. Defendant testified that when they left the hospital, Tandy
drove to an ATM. Defendant denied asking Tandy to do so, but
testified that he otherwise would not have had enough money to post
bond.
 	With respect to the cooler and beer that officers found in his van,
defendant testified that the beer had probably been in the cooler at
least a couple of days. When asked to explain the ice, defendant said
he had thrown a blanket over the cooler, which kept the contents
colder. Defendant further testified that he lives in a dry county in
Arkansas and must drive 25 miles for liquor, so he transports his beer
in a cooler. Defendant stated that when he has a beer after completing
a job for different people in Arkansas, he keeps the empty beer cans
so as not to "trash up" their property. He also keeps the empty cans
for his 13-year-old son, who sells them. Defendant denied that a
partially full can of beer was in the cooler on the day of the accident.
	Finally, defendant's brother, Lonnie Hood, testified regarding the
alleged confrontation between Officer Tandy and defendant. Lonnie
testified that approximately four months before the accident, he and
defendant were at a friend's home for a barbecue. Lonnie drove there
in defendant's truck, parked it in the alley, and left the stereo playing.
Lonnie went into the house and, a little while later, saw Tandy
gesturing "very radically" at defendant. Lonnie went outside and heard
defendant say, "What are you going to do, shoot me?" Lonnie testified
he heard part of Tandy's response, which included the words "even
with you."
	Defendant rested. The trial court denied defendant's motion for
a directed verdict.
	Over defendant's objection, the State recalled Dr. Hindman to
rebut defendant's testimony of sobriety. According to Dr. Hindman,
whom the trial court qualified as an expert in toxicology, if an average
male weighing 160 to 175 pounds consumed two and a half 12-ounce
beers in a relatively short period of time, the blood-alcohol
concentration would be 0.0625% at its highest point. The doctor
further testified that the average rate at which alcohol is metabolized
is 0.015% per hour. Therefore, after 2½ hours, a loss of 0.037 would
occur and the blood-alcohol concentration at that time would be
0.0255. If, however, at 5:40 p.m., the same hypothetical person had
an alcohol level of 0.077, his alcohol level 2½ hours prior thereto
would have been 0.114%. The State elicited testimony from Officer
Tandy to establish defendant's height and weight. As shown on
defendant's driver's license, a copy of which was attached to Tandy's
report, defendant was 5 feet 7 inches tall and weighed 160 pounds.
	The State also called Officer Gorman in rebuttal. He testified that
Officer Tandy asked defendant if he would submit to field sobriety
tests, that Tandy briefly explained each test to defendant, and that
defendant refused. The State rested in rebuttal.
	Based on Dr. Hindman's testimony, the jury was instructed, in
relevant part, as follows:
			"If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the
defendant drove a vehicle that the amount of alcohol
concentration in defendant's blood or breath was .08 or
more, you may presume the defendant was under the
influence of alcohol.
			You never are required to make this presumption. It is for
the jury to determine whether the presumption should be
drawn. You should consider all of the evidence in
determining whether the defendant was under the influence
of alcohol."
The jury deliberated for 1 hour and 20 minutes and found defendant
guilty of failure to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk (625 ILCS
5/11-1002(a) (West 2000)), illegal transportation of alcohol (625
ILCS 5/11-502(a) (West 2000)), aggravated driving under the
influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2000)), and
reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2000)). Following a
hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court vacated the jury
verdict on aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, finding
that offense to be a lesser-included offense of reckless homicide. The
trial court sentenced defendant to a term of three years in the
penitentiary for reckless homicide, and imposed fines for illegal
transportation of alcohol and failure to yield to a pedestrian.
	In his posttrial motion, defendant argued, in relevant part, that the
trial court erred in permitting Dr. Hindman to testify as a rebuttal
witness on extrapolation, and that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions. The trial court denied defendant's motion and
defendant appealed. A majority of the appellate court reversed
defendant's conviction for reckless homicide, holding that the State's
conduct ran afoul of Rule 412 and that the trial court erred in allowing
Dr. Hindman to testify in rebuttal. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1252-55. The
appellate court also rejected defendant's sufficiency of the evidence
argument and affirmed his convictions for illegal transportation of
alcohol and failure to yield to a pedestrian. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1256-57. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	Before considering the merits, we address the standard of review.
A trial court's decision as to the appropriate sanction for a discovery
violation is subject to abuse of discretion review. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 221 (1989), quoting People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545,
558-59 (1982). Here, the appellate court concluded that, in light of
the State's violation of Rule 412, the trial court abused its discretion
by permitting Dr. Hindman to testify in rebuttal. 343 Ill. App. 3d at
1255. The threshold issue raised before this court, however, is not
whether the trial court ordered an appropriate discovery sanction, but
whether the State was guilty of a discovery violation in the first
instance. Where, as here, the facts giving rise to the alleged discovery
violation are not in dispute, the issue becomes one of law, which we
review de novo. See People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 201 (2001).
	Supreme Court Rule 412 requires the State, upon motion of the
defendant, to disclose certain material and information within the
State's possession or control, including the following:
			"(i) the names and last known addresses of persons whom
the State intends to call as witnesses, together with their
relevant written or recorded statements, memoranda
containing substantially verbatim reports of their oral
statements, and a list of memoranda reporting or
summarizing their oral statements. ***
* * *
			(iv) any reports or statements of experts, made in
connection with the particular case, including results of
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests,
experiments, or comparisons, and a statement of
qualifications of the expert[.]" 188 Ill. 2d R. 412(a).
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that the State
fulfilled its disclosure requirements under Rule 412 with respect to the
expert testimony the State attempted to elicit during its case in chief,
and with respect to the expert testimony it presented during its case
in rebuttal.
	The record reveals that defendant filed a "Motion for Discovery
before Trial." The State, in accordance with the trial court's order
entered on defendant's motion, timely filed its answer to discovery.
The State listed Dr. Travis Hindman, Sangamon County coroner, as
one of the witnesses it might call at trial, and provided to defendant a
copy of Dr. Hindman's autopsy report. The record further reveals
that, on the afternoon of the first day of trial, before calling Dr.
Hindman, the State disclosed to defendant that it intended to elicit
reverse extrapolation testimony from the doctor. Defendant did not
object at that time or otherwise call the matter to the trial court's
attention. When, during the course of the doctor's direct examination,
the State attempted to elicit extrapolation testimony, defendant
objected, arguing that the State had failed to disclose the doctor's
expertise in this area prior to trial. The State explained that it was
unaware of Dr. Hindman's expertise in reverse extrapolation until that
afternoon.
	Significantly, defendant did not dispute that the State had no
knowledge before the afternoon of the first day of trial that Dr.
Hindman was qualified to offer extrapolation testimony. Moreover,
defendant did not claim that the substance of the disclosure the State
made at that time was inadequate under Rule 412. Defendant only
argued that the disclosure should have come sooner. Thus, defendant
effectively argues that the State violated Rule 412 by failing to
disclose information in advance of trial that the State simply did not
possess at that time. Logic prevents us from adopting defendant's
position. The State did all that it was required to do under Rule 412
based on its knowledge prior to trial, and all that it was required to do
based on its changing knowledge during trial.
	We recognize that had the prosecutor spoken to Dr. Hindman
before trial, he might have learned that the doctor was qualified to
offer reverse extrapolation testimony. In that case, the State would
have been required to make the appropriate disclosure under Rule
412, providing to defendant any reports or statements Dr. Hindman
made in connection with the case. 188 Ill. 2d R. 412(a)(iv). For
whatever reason, however, the State did not speak to the doctor
before trial. Defendant does not suggest that the State's conduct was
a deliberate attempt to prevent disclosure of relevant information. Cf.
People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 349 (1983) (where the State
deliberately destroyed potentially discoverable memoranda of pretrial
statements by the State's key witnesses). Moreover, we will not
presume bad faith by the State based solely on its seeming lack of
advance preparation for trial. See People v. Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d 388,
418-19 (1989) (where the State was not obligated to disclose a
witness' statement which was not memorialized in writing, court
would not lightly presume bad faith based on the sole fact that
defendant was surprised by witness' trial testimony). We are aware
that "the purpose of the discovery rules is to protect the accused
against surprise, unfairness, and inadequate preparation." People v.
Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 63 (1999). But it is the defendant's burden to
demonstrate prejudice. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 63. Under the facts of
this case, defendant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced during
the State's case in chief because the trial court, correctly or
incorrectly, sustained defendant's objection to Dr. Hindman's
extrapolation testimony.
	Having found no violation of Rule 412 relative to the State's case
in chief, and no prejudice to defendant arising during the State's case
in chief from the lack of advance notice of Dr. Hindman's expertise in
reverse extrapolation, we consider whether the State violated Rule
412 in connection with its case in rebuttal.
	The State's duty to disclose a rebuttal witness arises when the
State has formed the intent to call such witness. See People v. Eveans,
277 Ill. App. 3d 36, 48 (1996); People v. Bock, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1056,
1067 (1993); People v. Fauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d 140, 162 (1991);
People v. Whitlock, 174 Ill. App. 3d 749, 777 (1988). Because
rebuttal testimony is intended to explain, contradict or disprove
defendant's evidence (People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 434 (1989),
quoting People v. Daugherty, 43 Ill. 2d 251, 255 (1969)), the State
typically cannot know the need for rebuttal until after the defense
testimony is heard. See Fauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 162; Whitlock,
174 Ill. App. 3d at 777. Thus, the State's intent to call a rebuttal
witness frequently does not arise until the defendant has presented his
or her case. This is precisely what transpired here.
	Until defendant took the stand, the State could not know what
specific testimony defendant would offer regarding his alcohol
consumption on the day of the accident. Although the State
introduced evidence through former officer Tandy that defendant
claimed he had only consumed a couple of beers that day, defendant's
purported admission on the day of the accident was not necessarily a
reliable predictor of what defendant would say at trial. When
defendant testified and persisted in his claim that he consumed only
2½ beers prior to the collision, defendant's position was made clear.
Thus, following defendant's direct testimony and before the State
began its cross-examination, the State disclosed its intent to call Dr.
Hindman as a rebuttal witness. The State explained that defendant's
testimony could not be reconciled with the stipulated evidence that his
blood-alcohol level 2½ hours after the accident was 0.077. We
conclude that the State's disclosure was proper.
	The appellate court, however, found the "nature" of the rebuttal
testimony "troublesome." 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1255. The appellate
court observed that the doctor's testimony went beyond rebutting
defendant's claim that he was not under the influence of alcohol. Dr.
Hindman's testimony allowed the jury, upon the State's request, to be
instructed on the permissive presumption of intoxication. That is, the
jury was instructed that if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant's blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the collision
was 0.08 or more, the jury could presume that defendant was under
the influence of alcohol. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Criminal, No. 23.30 (4th ed. 2000). Defendant echos the appellate
court's analysis in his brief before this court.
	We are aware of no rule, and defendant cites to none, that
prohibits rebuttal testimony simply because that testimony, if believed
by the jury, allows the jury to make a presumption adverse to
defendant. In addition, we agree with the State that the jury could
have been given the permissive-presumption-of-intoxication
instruction even in the absence of Dr. Hindman's rebuttal testimony.
Evidence presented during the State's case in chief established that the
accident occurred a little after 3 p.m. The parties stipulated that
defendant's blood-alcohol level 2½ hours later was 0.077. Without
objection from defendant, Dr. Hindman testified during the State's
case in chief that "the rule of thumb is an average-sized man weighing
somewhere between 160 and 175 pounds will metabolize alcohol, that
is, reduce the level of alcohol in the blood by approximately .015
percent or 0.15 grams per deciliter in an hour." The jury, which
observed defendant during trial, could judge for itself whether
defendant was an average-sized man. If the jury believed Dr.
Hindman's testimony, it could certainly do the simple arithmetic
necessary to determine that defendant's blood alcohol at the time of
the accident was at least 0.08-a mere three-hundredths of a percent
greater than it was 2½ hours later at the hospital.
	We also disagree with the appellate court's suggestion that Dr.
Hindman's extrapolation testimony could only be presented, if at all,
during the State's case in chief. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1254. "Evidence
which would tend to 'explain, repel, contradict or disprove the
evidence of the defendant' is admissible in rebuttal even though such
evidence would have been admissible as part of the State's case in
chief." Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d  at 434, quoting Daugherty, 43 Ill. 2d  at 255.
	The appellate court further determined that the State violated
Rule 412(a)(iv) by failing to disclose Dr. Hindman's calculations prior
to the doctor taking the stand during the State's case in rebuttal.
Although conceding that the doctor's calculations were not technically
"comparisons" for purposes of Rule 412(a)(iv), the appellate court
held that the State should have disclosed the calculations under the
"spirit" of the rule. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1253.
	We note first that defendant did not argue before Dr. Hindman
testified, or in defendant's posttrial motion, that the State should have
disclosed the doctor's calculations. This aside, the record establishes
that defendant was well aware that Dr. Hindman would be testifying
to the average rate alcohol is metabolized in the system and, using that
rate, would arrive at a number reflecting defendant's blood alcohol at
the time of the accident. Indeed, the State's direct examination of Dr.
Hindman during its case in chief provided a roadmap of the testimony
the State would likely elicit from Dr. Hindman on rebuttal. After Dr.
Hindman testified regarding the cause of death, the State questioned
the doctor regarding his training in toxicology and his knowledge of
how the body metabolizes alcohol. The State then queried the doctor
about the rate at which the average person metabolizes alcohol.
Finally, the State asked the following question, to which the trial court
sustained defendant's objection: "So if a person had .077 percent
alcohol, what would be their percent alcohol two hours prior to that
if they didn't ingest anything for a two-hour period?" Thus, the record
demonstrates that defendant was informed of the substance of Dr.
Hindman's extrapolation testimony, if not the exact arithmetic.
	Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the State should have
disclosed Dr. Hindman's calculations under the "spirit" of Rule 412,
we conclude that defendant waived any objection to the State's
introduction of the doctor's calculations on rebuttal. The record
reveals that the trial court allowed defendant the opportunity to speak
with the State's rebuttal witnesses in advance of their testimony. The
trial court expressly advised defendant: "Go talk to them if you want
to. We'll give you time." Nothing in the record indicates that
defendant acted on the trial court's advice. In addition, defendant
never requested a continuance to secure his own expert or to consider
more fully Dr. Hindman's expected testimony. Instead, the only relief
defendant sought was complete exclusion of Dr. Hindman's rebuttal
testimony. "A defendant cannot request only the most drastic
measures, such as either an immediate mistrial or the total exclusion
of testimony by a witness, and then on appeal argue that he is entitled
to a new trial when these requests are not granted." People v.
Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 78-79 (1993). When defendant elected to
forgo more moderate measures available during trial to deal with the
State's purported discovery violation, and instead proceeded with
trial, the claimed error, if any, was waived. See People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 53-54 (1995); Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 79; People v.
Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 174-75 (1987).
	Based on the foregoing, we find no reversible error based on the
State's Rule 412 disclosures. The appellate court erred in ordering a
new trial on that basis. Before determining the appropriate disposition
of this case, however, we must consider defendant's argument that the
evidence was insufficient to support his reckless homicide conviction.
Defendant argues that "[t]here is no evidence that [he] was impaired
at the time of the accident as the testimony was that [he] had two and
one-half beers." Defendant contends that in the absence of evidence
of intoxication or any other evidence of recklessness, his conviction
cannot stand.
	When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal
conviction, the critical inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trial of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Smith, 149 Ill. 2d 558, 565 (1992).
Applying this standard, we find the evidence was sufficient to support
defendant's conviction for reckless homicide. Contrary to defendant's
view of the record, the evidence was that defendant claimed he only
had 2½ beers. The jury was free to disregard defendant's testimony as
not credible, in light of the other evidence of intoxication. Apart from
Dr. Hindman's testimony regarding defendant's blood-alcohol level,
both Tandy and Gorman testified that they smelled alcohol on
defendant's breath, that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, his speech
was slurred, and his walk was unsteady. Both officers believed
defendant was intoxicated. In addition, the officers found a cooler in
defendant's van near the driver's seat containing ice, several full cans
of beers, empty beer cans and one partially full beer can. Two
eyewitnesses to the accident testified that defendant did not slow
down as he approached Poplar Street, did not stop at the stop sign,
and drove into Marie Schwab, who was in the crosswalk. The fact that
defendant testified he was not intoxicated and that the sun was in his
eyes does not mean that the jury could not find him guilty of reckless
homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. "Where there is conflicting
evidence of intoxication, it is the jury's function to determine the
credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony."
Smith, 149 Ill. 2d  at 566. The jury here resolved any conflict in the
evidence against defendant. Accordingly, we reject defendant's
sufficiency of the evidence argument as a basis for reversal.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the appellate court
judgment reversing defendant's reckless homicide conviction. Because
the appellate court found it unnecessary to consider all of the issues
raised by defendant in light of its disposition of the case (343 Ill. App.
3d at 1255), we remand to the appellate court for consideration of
those issues.
Reversed in part and remanded.
 
 
1.               Reverse extrapolation is also referred to as 
"retrograde extrapolation." E.g., People v. Latto, 304 Ill. App. 3d 791 (1999); Reuter v. Korb, 248 Ill. App. 3d 142 
(1993); Rice v. Merchants National Bank, 213 Ill. App. 3d 790 (1991).