Title: MISS. EMPLOYMENT SEC. COM'N v. Georgia-Pac. Corp.
Citation: 394 So. 2d 299
Docket Number: 52308
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 1981

394 So. 2d 299 (1981) MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Afl-Cio, Plywood Workers Local Union No. 3181 v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION. No. 52308. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 7, 1981. As Amended On Denial of Rehearing February 25, 1981. Fred J. Lotterhos, John L. Maxey, II, Cupit &amp; Maxey, Jackson, Lynn Agee, Memphis, Tenn., for appellants. *300 L. Arnold Pyle, Peyton S. Irby, Jr., Watkins, Pyle, Ludlam &amp; Stennis, Jackson, for appellee. Before ROBERTSON, P.J., and SUGG and BOWLING. ROBERTSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court: This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County reversing the findings and decision of the Mississippi Employment Security Commission (MESC) and its Board of Review. MESC's Order entered May 11, 1979, found that: The court found that the Commission's Order was erroneous as a matter of law, and that the lockout by GP was not an "unjustified lockout" but was part of a legitimate collective bargaining process for a new contract of employment for Plywood Workers Local Union No. 3181 at Georgia-Pacific's Louisville, Mississippi, plywood plant. The court also was of the opinion "that the Commission's investigation and ruling on the justifiability or reasonableness of the plaintiff's lockout was clearly preempted by the federal law." The three-year contract of employment between GP and Union No. 3181 expired on January 19, 1979. GP and the local Union had been negotiating since the middle of December, 1978, for a new contract, but had been unable to reach an agreement on all terms. The deadline of January 19, 1979, was extended by agreement of the parties, and GP and the Union continued to bargain and negotiate. On February 13, 1979, GP gave the required written notice to terminate the contract if no agreement was reached. On February 26, 1979, GP and the Union agreed to further extend the contract through March 1, 1979. Article XXIV of the contract provided: On March 2, 1979, GP informed the Union and its employees that it had no more work for them until the terms of a new contract were agreed upon and all contract disputes resolved. GP locked up its Louisville plant. On March 5, 1979, the employees began applying for unemployment compensation benefits. GP and the Union continued to negotiate and bargain and on April 13, 1979, a new contract was agreed to. Claimants began returning to work on April 15. On March 22, 1979, GP filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, in which it sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction, and declaratory judgment, to stop the proposed action of the Mississippi Employment Security Commission to determine whether the lockout of the employees for the purposes of awarding unemployment benefits was justified or unjustified. The grounds upon which the relief was requested were that the actions of MESC were contrary to federal labor policy and violated the doctrine of federal preemption and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. After hearing argument on the matter, the United States District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that GP was not *301 entitled to a prohibitory injunction "on this interlocutory, or preliminary application." MESC then proceeded to hear the matter and on May 11, 1979, entered the following order: GP appealed to the Board of Review of MESC. After hearing additional evidence, the Board of Review affirmed the Order of the Commission. Under the provisions of MCA § 71-5-531 (1972), GP then began an action in the Hinds County Circuit Court (First District) against MESC to review its decision. Section 71-5-531 provides in part: The circuit court reversed the decision of MESC and its Board of Review. The court found that, not only was the lockout justified, but also that the Commission's decision was an invasion of an area preempted by national labor policy. In their appeal to this Court, MESC and the Union have assigned as error: The doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the case at bar. GP brought suit in the Federal District Court for injunctive relief to keep MESC from even hearing the matter. In order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, four essential conditions must be met. There must be: At least two of these conditions are absent in the case at bar. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-5-3 (1972) provides in part: MCA Section 71-5-513 A (1980 Supp.) sets forth in considerable detail when an individual claimant is disqualified for benefits under the Mississippi Employment Security law. Under the first four subsections, the individual claimant is disqualified: (1) if "he left work voluntarily without good cause;" (2) if "he was discharged for misconduct connected with his work;" (3) if "he wilfully makes a false statement, a false representation of fact, or wilfully fails to disclose a material fact for the purpose of obtaining or increasing benefits under the provisions of this law;" and (4) if he fails, "without good cause, either to apply for available suitable work when so directed by the employment office or the commission, to accept suitable work when offered him, or to return to his customary self-employment (if any) when so directed by the Commission." MCA Section 71-5-513 A(5) provides: The sole and only question before MESC was whether the stoppage of work at GP's Louisville plant was due in any measure to the claimants' actions, or whether it was due to GP's actions. If it was due to GP's actions, then the claimants were entitled to unemployment compensation; if it was due to the claimants' actions, then they were not entitled to unemployment compensation. It was not the purpose of the Mississippi Employment Security law to thrust the Commission into the middle of collective bargaining negotiations between an employer and its employees. The purpose of the legislature in enacting this law, as set forth in MCA section 71-5-3 (1972) was to lighten the burden of involuntary unemployment by "the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own." (Emphasis added). On July 17, 1979, the Board of Review of MESC rendered its opinion. In its Findings of Fact, the Board of Review found as facts, among other things: In its Opinion, the Board said: This Court finds that the Findings of Fact, the Opinion and the Decision of the Board of Review that the work stoppage was occasioned by an unjustified lockout, within the meaning of the Law, and that such lockout was not occasioned or brought about by the claimants acting alone or in concert, that the claimants were ready and willing to continue working, and that their unemployment resulted not from their own action but from the action of the employer in closing the plant, are supported by substantial evidence. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-5-531 (1972) sets the limits of appellate review by the circuit court in clear and unmistakable language: The circuit court was in error in holding that the decision of MESC, as affirmed by its Board of Review, was erroneous as a matter of law and that MESC did not have the right to decide whether the claimants were voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed and whether they were, or were not, entitled to unemployment compensation. The order of the circuit court is, therefore, reversed and the order of the Mississippi Employment Security Commission reinstated. REVERSED AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH, P.J., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, J., takes no part.