Title: Commonwealth v. Davis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12484
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12484 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARK J. DAVIS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 7, 2018. - January 14, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Marijuana.  
Arrest.  Probable Cause.  Constitutional Law, Arrest, 
Probable cause, Search and seizure.  Search and Seizure, 
Arrest, Motor vehicle, Impoundment of vehicle, Inventory.  
Impoundment.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Brighton Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on July 29, 2015, and 
February 10, 2016. 
 
 
After transfer to the Central Division of the Boston 
Municipal Court Department, a pretrial motion to suppress 
evidence was heard by Tracy-Lee Lyons, J., and the cases were 
tried before her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
MarySita Miles for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Michael A. DelSignore & Julie Gaudreau, for National 
College for DUI Defense, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On an afternoon in July 2015, a State police 
officer stopped the defendant for speeding and driving 
erratically on the Massachusetts Turnpike.  After the traffic 
stop, the officer arrested the defendant for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1).  Subsequently, police officers searched the 
defendant's automobile and found bags of marijuana, a firearm, 
and ammunition in the trunk, and oxycodone and cocaine in the 
locked glove compartment.1 
 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from 
his automobile.  A Boston Municipal Court judge conducted an 
                     
1 The Commonwealth charged the defendant with six criminal 
offenses:  operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of drugs (marijuana), in violation of G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1); unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation 
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); unlawful possession of ammunition, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1); possession with intent 
to distribute a class B substance (oxycodone), in violation of 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b), as a subsequent offense; possession 
with intent to distribute a class B substance (cocaine) as a 
subsequent offense, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b); and 
possession with intent to distribute a class D substance 
(marijuana), in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a).  The 
defendant also was charged with two civil motor vehicle 
infractions:  speeding on the Massachusetts Turnpike, in 
violation of 700 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.08(6)(a) (2013) (now 
§ 7.09[6][a]); and following too closely, in violation of 700 
Code Mass. Regs. § 7.08(15) (2013) (now § 7.09[15]).  Before 
trial, the prosecutor reduced the charges of possession with 
intent to distribute oxycodone and cocaine to simple possession 
of those substances, and dismissed the charge of possession with 
intent to distribute marijuana. 
3 
 
 
 
evidentiary hearing and thereafter denied the motion to 
suppress; she found that the police had probable cause to arrest 
the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of marijuana, and that the search of the vehicle was 
justified as an inventory search.  A jury acquitted the 
defendant of all charges except unlawful possession of the drugs 
found within the locked glove compartment.  The defendant 
appealed to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case to 
this court on our own motion. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that police did not have 
probable cause to arrest him for operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of marijuana, the search of his automobile 
was not a lawful inventory search or justified by any other 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and his trial 
counsel was ineffective for conceding that the defendant 
possessed the drugs found in the glove compartment. 
We conclude that there was no error in the denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress, and that the defendant was not 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the 
motion judge, supplemented where appropriate with uncontroverted 
evidence from the suppression hearing that is not contrary to 
the judge's findings and rulings.  See Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 
4 
 
 
 
Mass. 278, 286 (2015).  We reserve for later discussion certain 
facts relevant to specific claims. 
On July 28, 2015, at 12:40 P.M., Major Daniel Risteen was 
driving eastbound on the Massachusetts Turnpike in an unmarked 
Ford Taurus cruiser.  The defendant, driving a gray Infiniti 
sedan, sped past Risteen.  Risteen observed the defendant drive 
at speeds between seventy and eighty miles per hour, and follow 
"dangerously close" to two other vehicles.  The defendant failed 
to slow down at the toll booths at Exit 18, to Brighton or 
Cambridge; he was driving seventy miles per hour in a zone with 
a posted speed limit of thirty miles per hour.  Using his public 
address system, Risteen stopped the vehicle immediately after it 
had passed through the toll booths, approximately fifty or sixty 
feet after the booths.  The defendant, who had been driving in 
the left hand lane, stopped on the left hand side of the egress 
from the toll booths. 
In addition to the driver, the vehicle was occupied by two 
passengers.  Risteen approached the driver's side door and asked 
the defendant for his license and registration.  He detected a 
strong odor of burnt marijuana and an odor of fresh marijuana 
coming from within the vehicle.  The defendant also smelled of 
burnt marijuana.  Apologizing for "moving pretty fast," the 
defendant explained that he and his two friends were traveling 
5 
 
 
 
from New York, and that one of them had to be in Somerville by 
1 P.M. 
During this initial interaction, Risteen noticed that the 
defendant's eyes were "red," "glassy," and "droopy," and that he 
was "fighting with the eyebrows, trying to keep his eyes open."  
He had "dry spit" on the sides of his mouth, his tongue was dry, 
he was "licking his lips" in responding to questions, and "his 
speech was slow and lethargic."  Suspecting that the defendant 
was impaired, Risteen returned to his vehicle and called for 
assistance.  Trooper Michael Lynch responded to the scene in a 
marked police cruiser.  When Risteen returned to the Infiniti, 
the defendant admitted to smoking marijuana "a couple of hours 
ago." 
Risteen noted that both passengers also appeared to have 
smoked marijuana and thought they "looked high."  They smelled 
of marijuana, and they had trouble staying awake during the 
roadside encounter.  The judge found, as Risteen testified, that 
the passengers' eyes were red and they appeared "sleepy."  They 
were closing their eyes and tilting their heads back as Risteen 
was talking to them.  The passengers both said that they had 
been smoking marijuana "earlier" that day. 
Risteen ordered the defendant to get out of his automobile 
so that Risteen could "check out" his condition to drive.  Based 
on the officer's testimony, the motion judge found that the 
6 
 
 
 
defendant exhibited a number of signs of impairment; "his 
coordination was slow, his head was bowing down, he had a hard 
time focusing -- [the officer] asked him four times to take his 
hands out of his pockets, [and] he was not able to follow simple 
instructions."  Risteen decided to arrest the defendant, but 
believed that it would be "prefer[able]" to have a third officer 
present, so the officers would not be outnumbered, and called 
for additional backup.2  Once a third officer arrived, Risteen 
placed the defendant under arrest for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of marijuana. 
After he was arrested and placed in the police cruiser, the 
defendant asked that one of his passengers be permitted to drive 
his vehicle.  It was Risteen's opinion that "neither one of them 
could drive, they were both high."  Because the officer believed 
the passengers were impaired and not capable of driving, he did 
not accede to the defendant's request that one of the passengers 
be allowed to drive his Infiniti.  Rather, the officers 
impounded the vehicle and called a tow truck to remove it from 
the turnpike.  Risteen told the two passengers to get out of the 
                     
 
2 Risteen did not conduct formal "field sobriety" tests of 
the defendant, as he knew from experience that "standardized 
field sobriety" tests are "not too good of an indicator 
regarding marijuana intake"; rather, he relied on his thirty 
years of training and experience with the State police, which 
included extensive specialized training in narcotics and sixteen 
years in a specialized unit. 
7 
 
 
 
vehicle, and allowed them to retrieve their personal 
belongings -- shoes, other clothing, and backpacks -- from it, 
by indicating which items were theirs.  He told them that they 
were not under arrest and could leave with the tow truck driver.  
When one of the passengers said that his backpack was in the 
trunk, Risteen removed it from the trunk, "pat frisked" it for 
weapons, and then handed it to the passenger. 
Prior to the tow, Lynch "started the inventory" of the 
automobile by searching the trunk.  There, he found a loaded 
handgun, ammunition, and three bags of marijuana sealed inside a 
plastic food container with a tight-fitting lid.  At that point, 
the defendant already had been arrested, handcuffed, and placed 
in a police cruiser.  Risteen decided to conduct a further 
search of the automobile at the State police barracks, because 
the sedan was stopped in a "precarious spot" that was causing 
traffic to back up at the tolls. 
The tow truck delivered the defendant's vehicle to the 
State police barracks at 1:50 P.M.  At some point after the 
defendant's arrest (it is unclear precisely when), Risteen 
requested the assistance of a canine "to put a drug dog on the 
vehicle."  The canine handler, Trooper Edward Blackwell, met 
Risteen and Lynch at the State police barracks and started his 
search of the vehicle at 2 P.M.  The canine sniffed around the 
outside of the vehicle and eventually alerted to the glove 
8 
 
 
 
compartment.  After attempting to open it, Lynch and Blackwell 
realized that the glove compartment was locked, and notified 
Risteen.  Risteen obtained the key, which had been in the 
defendant's pocket, from the booking officer.  Blackwell then 
used the key to open the glove compartment, where he found 
eleven oxycodone pills and two plastic bags containing a white 
powder later determined to be cocaine.  The officers also found 
in the trunk a box for the firearm, which contained a gun lock 
and ammunition. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Probable cause to arrest.  A 
warrantless arrest is lawful under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Declaration of 
Rights if supported by probable cause.  Commonwealth v. 
Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 240 (1992).  "[P]robable cause exists, 
where at the moment of arrest, the facts and circumstances 
within the knowledge of the police are enough to warrant a 
prudent person in believing that the individual arrested has 
committed or was committing an offense" (citation omitted).  Id. 
at 241.  A determination whether probable cause exists concerns 
the probability that an offense has been committed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cartright, 478 Mass. 273, 283 (2017), and cases 
cited.  "These [determinations] are not technical; they are the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men [and women], not legal technicians, 
9 
 
 
 
act" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 
174 (1982).  Under this standard, police are not required to 
resolve all of their doubts before making an arrest.  See 
Cartright, supra. 
In this case, the motion judge found that Risteen was 
justified in arresting the defendant for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, based upon the 
officer's observations of the defendant's demeanor, physical 
appearance, and behavior.  The judge determined also that the 
warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle was permissible 
under the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement. 
The defendant contends that the judge erred in denying his 
motion to suppress, because the officers at the scene did not 
have probable cause to arrest him for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of marijuana and, as a result, all of 
the evidence gathered after the unlawful arrest must be 
suppressed.  In the defendant's view, the facts known at the 
time of his arrest gave rise only to a suspicion that he had 
consumed marijuana sometime prior to the traffic stop, and, 
absent evidence of impairment, there was no crime, just the 
civil infractions of speeding and tailgating.  See Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 769-770 (2015) (odor of burnt 
marijuana, standing alone, does not create probable cause or 
even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); Commonwealth v. 
10 
 
 
 
Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 32 (2014) (odor of unburnt marijuana 
emanating from vehicle did not give rise to probable cause to 
arrest absent evidence that driver was impaired). 
We agree with the motion judge that, based upon evidence 
that the defendant's consumption of marijuana had impaired his 
ability to drive safely, the officers were justified in 
arresting the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while 
impaired. 
"While using marijuana is no longer a crime in 
Massachusetts," operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of marijuana remains a criminal offense.3  Commonwealth 
v. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. 775, 780 (2017).  General Laws c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1), prohibits an individual from operating a motor 
vehicle on a public way "while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, or of marijuana, narcotic drugs, 
depressants or stimulant substances."  We interpret this statute 
"'in light of the legislative purpose to protect the public from 
drivers whose judgment, alertness, and ability to respond 
promptly and effectively to unexpected emergencies are 
diminished because of the consumption of alcohol' or drugs."  
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 756 (2013), quoting 
                     
 
3 At the time of the events at issue here, possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana had been decriminalized, but remained 
a civil infraction.  See St. 2017, c. 55. 
11 
 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 172-173 (1985).  A 
driver operates a motor vehicle while under the influence when 
the consumption of an intoxicating substance such as alcohol or 
marijuana diminishes his or her "ability to operate a motor 
vehicle safely."  See Connolly, supra at 173.  The offense 
requires impairment of the ability to drive, as opposed to proof 
that the driver is "drunk" or "high."  See Commonwealth v. 
Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 321 (1994). 
We acknowledge that it is often difficult to detect 
marijuana impairment, because the effects of marijuana 
consumption "vary greatly amongst individuals," Gerhardt, 477 
Mass. at 780-783, 786, and as yet there are no validated field 
sobriety tests.4  Id. at 786.  Nonetheless, as we noted in 
Gerhardt, certain indicia of marijuana impairment may be 
relevant to such an inquiry.  See id. at 782-783.  "A police 
officer makes numerous relevant observations in the course of an 
encounter with a possibly impaired driver.  There is no doubt 
that an officer may testify to his or her observations of, for 
example, any erratic driving or moving violations that led to 
the initial stop; the driver's appearance and demeanor; the odor 
of fresh or burnt marijuana; and the driver's behavior on 
getting out of the vehicle."  Id.  See Daniel, 464 Mass. at 756 
                     
4 See note 2, supra. 
12 
 
 
 
(no probable cause to arrest for operating motor vehicle while 
under influence of marijuana where no evidence that defendant's 
"eyes were red or glassy, that her speech or movements were 
unusual, or that her responses to questioning were inappropriate 
or uncooperative"). 
The defendant's argument rests largely on the officer's 
testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress that, while 
he observed the defendant speeding, at times driving at speeds 
of eighty miles per hour, and driving dangerously close to the 
bumpers of two other vehicles, he did not observe the defendant 
swerving over marked lines, driving erratically, or appearing 
not to be in control of the vehicle.  Indeed, the officer 
testified that, before he reached the driver's side door, he had 
been considering a number of reasons why the operator would have 
been driving in that manner, only one of which involved driving 
while intoxicated.  Nonetheless, upon approaching the driver's 
side door of the Infiniti, Risteen detected the odor of burnt 
and unburnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle, and the odor 
of burnt marijuana coming from the defendant's person.  Among 
other things, the defendant had red and glassy eyes, he was 
struggling to keep his eyes open and his head upright, "his 
coordination was slow," he had difficulty "focusing," and he 
also had difficulty in following the officer's "simple 
directions."  The defendant told the officer that he had smoked 
13 
 
 
 
marijuana earlier that day, before he left to drive to 
Somerville.  Given this, the judge was warranted in finding that 
police had probable cause to believe that the defendant had 
operated a motor vehicle while impaired.  Contrast Daniel, 464 
Mass. at 756-757, citing Connolly, 394 Mass. at 172-173 (no 
reasonable suspicion of impairment where there was no testimony 
that defendant's "judgment, alertness, and ability to respond 
promptly and effectively to unexpected emergencies [were] 
diminished' by the consumption of marijuana").  Thus, the denial 
of the defendant's motion to suppress on this basis was proper.  
We turn to the search of the defendant's vehicle after his 
arrest. 
b.  Warrantless search of the automobile.  A warrantless 
search is "per se" unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 465 Mass. 600, 603 (2013), quoting Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  For evidence seized 
without a warrant to be admissible, the Commonwealth bears the 
burden to establish that a warrantless search fell within an 
exception to the warrant requirement.  Perkins, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 474 Mass. 10, 13 (2016); Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 48 (2011). 
The motion judge determined that the officers were 
authorized to conduct the search of the defendant's vehicle as 
an inventory search pursuant to the State police inventory 
14 
 
 
 
search policy.  She found that the officers adhered to the 
written inventory policy, and that the impoundment of the 
vehicle and its subsequent search were justified because "the 
vehicle was located on the side of the road after the toll booth 
and both passengers appeared to be under the influence of drugs 
and not able to drive." 
On appeal, as he did at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, the defendant challenges the search of his vehicle at 
the State police barracks on two grounds.  First, he asserts 
that the judge erred in finding that both passengers were unable 
to drive the vehicle safely from the turnpike toll booth.  See 
Commonwealth v. Caceres, 413 Mass. 749, 751 (1992) (police 
required to consider practical alternatives to impoundment of 
vehicle and subsequent inventory search).  Second, the defendant 
argues that the inventory search was a pretext for an 
investigatory search.  See Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 
542, 553 (1995) (purpose of inventory search is not, and may not 
be, investigatory in nature). 
An inventory search serves three separate legitimate 
purposes, none of which is investigatory.  See Commonwealth v. 
Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 108-109 (2011).  Police may impound 
and search a vehicle in order to protect the vehicle and its 
contents from the threat of theft or vandalism; to protect the 
police and the tow company from false claims; and to protect the 
15 
 
 
 
public from dangerous items that might have been left in a 
vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 478 Mass. 154, 165 
(2017).  To justify this type of warrantless search, the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing, first, that the 
impoundment was reasonable under the circumstances, and, second, 
that police conducted the inventory search in accordance with 
established written procedures.  Oliveira, 474 Mass. at 13.  See 
Alvarado, 420 Mass. at 552, quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 
U.S. 367, 376 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Law 
enforcement officers do not have discretion regarding what or 
where to search during an inventory search").  See also Ehiabhi, 
supra at 164-165.  In examining the propriety of an impoundment, 
we also consider whether a police officer's decision to tow the 
vehicle "conceal[s] an investigative motive."  Id. at 164.  
"Where the police's true purpose for searching the vehicle is 
investigative, the seizure of the vehicle may not be justified 
as a precursor to an inventory search, and must instead be 
justified as an investigative search."  Oliveira, supra at 14. 
The motion judge concluded, and we agree, that the police 
had reasonable grounds to impound the defendant's automobile.  
See Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 399-400 (2014) (court 
defers to motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent 
clear error).  The judge found that the vehicle, which was 
stopped on the left hand side of a toll exit on the 
16 
 
 
 
Massachusetts Turnpike, in the middle of the day, partially 
impeding exit from the toll booth and causing traffic delays, 
posed a public safety hazard.  See Oliveira, 474 Mass. at 14.  
The judge also determined that the police were justified in 
rejecting the defendant's request that one of his passengers be 
permitted to remove the vehicle from the highway.  She credited 
Risteen's testimony and found that "both passengers appeared to 
be under the influence of drugs and not able to drive." 
The officers' testimony at the hearing, which the judge 
credited, supports a reasonable conclusion that the passengers 
were "not able to drive."  The passengers told the officers that 
they had been smoking marijuana "all day," were in a vehicle 
that smelled of burnt marijuana, and had difficulty in staying 
awake during the traffic stop.  A determination that the 
passengers were not in a condition to operate the vehicle safely 
is fact-driven, "with the overriding concern being the guiding 
touchstone of '[r]easonableness'" (citation omitted).  See 
Eddington, 459 Mass. at 108.  It was reasonable for the officers 
to conclude that turning the vehicle over to another impaired 
driver could compromise public safety.  See Ehiabhi, 478 Mass. 
at 165. 
That the officers had reasonable grounds to impound the 
vehicle, however, does not end the analysis.  Based on Risteen's 
decision to "put a drug dog on the vehicle," the defendant 
17 
 
 
 
argues that the inventory search of his automobile was a pretext 
to search the vehicle for investigative purpose, and that the 
judge erred in determining that it was a valid inventory search.  
See Oliveira, 474 Mass. at 13. 
Unlike other types of searches, an inventory search is 
administrative, and the decision to conduct an inventory search 
must not be for investigatory purposes; the decision must be 
objectively reasonable, and the search must be conducted 
according to standard written procedures.  See Commonwealth v. 
Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 509-510 (1982) (to be permissible, 
inventory search must be conducted following established written 
procedures and there must be "no suggestion that the procedure 
was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive").  The 
use of a drug detection dog to conduct what is supposedly a 
search to safeguard property -- and not a search for drugs -- 
raises a red flag.  See Alvarado, 420 Mass. at 553 ("The 
Commonwealth's contention that the search of the Buick was an 
inventory search is also defeated by the fact that the police 
enlisted the assistance of a canine in conducting the search"); 
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 577 (2015) 
(judge's finding that inventory search was pretext was supported 
by police decision to assign traffic stop to State police 
officer "with his narcotics-sniffing dog in tow"). 
18 
 
 
 
Here, the Commonwealth failed to establish that the 
decision to "put a drug dog" on the vehicle was made for a 
noninvestigatory purpose.  See Oliveira, 474 Mass. at 13 
(reasonableness of inventory search requires inquiry into 
officer's "true purpose").  Risteen testified that he called for 
a canine search during the stop, and wrote in his police report 
that Blackwell arrived "on scene with his certified canine to 
further check the Infinit[i] sedan at E-4 [the State police 
barracks]."  Risteen did not testify as to when during the 
encounter he decided to request a canine, or what prompted him 
to do so. 
It may be that Risteen decided to call for a canine to 
search the vehicle prior to the initial roadside search, or that 
the discovery of marijuana in the trunk prompted the request.  
Because the Commonwealth had the burden of establishing that the 
police conducted a lawful inventory search, yet did not present 
any evidence to demonstrate that there was a legitimate need to 
"put a drug dog" on the defendant's vehicle, we cannot affirm 
the judge's ruling on this basis. 
c.  Automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  
Although we conclude that the motion judge's decision to deny 
the motion to suppress, on the grounds discussed, was not 
proper, we consider other reasons, advanced by the Commonwealth, 
that might support the judge's determination.  See Commonwealth 
19 
 
 
 
v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997) (reviewing court may 
affirm motion judge's decision on grounds different from those 
relied upon by judge, if those grounds are supported by record 
and judge's findings of fact).  Accordingly, we turn to whether 
the search of the defendant's Infiniti was justified under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
Due to the inherent mobility of an automobile, and the 
owner's reduced expectation of privacy when stopped on a public 
road, police are permitted to search a vehicle based upon 
probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime.  
Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 123-124 (1997).  "The 
issue of paramount importance is whether the police, prior to 
the commencement of a warrantless search, had probable cause to 
believe that they would find the instrumentality of a crime or 
evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Johnson, 461 Mass. at 49.  The scope of a 
warrantless search of a vehicle conducted pursuant to this 
exception is defined by the object of the search, and extends to 
every part of the vehicle where there is probable cause to 
believe the object may be found.  See Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 
Mass. 891, 906 (1990), citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 824 (1982).  Authority to search under the automobile 
exception exists "even when the police had ample opportunity to 
obtain a search warrant, provided that there has been no 
20 
 
 
 
unreasonable delay."  Commonwealth v. Eggleston, 453 Mass. 554, 
554 (2009).  See Johnson, supra at 46-47 (affirming search of 
vehicle for evidence of operation of motor vehicle while under 
influence of alcohol where "agitated" driver "reeked" of alcohol 
and was slurring his words and unsteady on his feet, and where 
officer observed half-empty bottle of cognac on dashboard of 
vehicle). 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth did not 
establish probable cause to believe that evidence relating to 
either the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of marijuana or possession of the loaded handgun would 
be found in the glove compartment.  He argues, in addition, that 
the automobile exception does not apply where the officers had 
ample opportunity to secure a warrant to search the impounded 
vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Agosto, 428 Mass. 31, 34-35 
(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 30-31 
(1984) (while safety concerns may permit immediate search after 
towing vehicle from highway to safe environment, "[n]onetheless, 
we have not endorsed 'giving the police carte blanche to search 
without a warrant any time subsequent to a valid stop'"). 
The Commonwealth contends that the officers' search of the 
glove compartment was permissible in order to search for 
(unspecified) evidence of separate crimes:  operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, and "based on 
21 
 
 
 
the discovery of the loaded Smith and Wesson .380 and three bags 
of marijuana [found] during the inventory at the scene."  See 
Johnson, 461 Mass. at 50.  The delay in searching the vehicle 
was reasonable, argues the Commonwealth, because it had to be 
removed from the turnpike and towed to a safe location in order 
to conduct the search. 
 
We conclude that the officers had adequate grounds to 
secure the vehicle and thereafter promptly to search the glove 
compartment for evidence related to the offense of operating the 
vehicle while under the influence of marijuana.  See Ross, 456 
U.S. at 825; Motta, 424 Mass. at 123-124.  As discussed, the 
officer had probable cause to believe, based on the defendant's 
appearance and his interactions with Risteen, as well as his 
admission to having smoked marijuana earlier, that the 
defendant's consumption of marijuana had diminished his "ability 
to operate a motor vehicle safely"; in addition, once the 
passengers had left the vehicle, Risteen saw marijuana leaves 
scattered on the rear passenger seat.  See Connolly, 394 Mass. 
at 173.  Therefore, the officers had authority to search the 
vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception, for evidence 
pertaining to the offense of operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence.  See Johnson, 461 Mass. at 50.  Contrast 
Daniel, 464 Mass. at 754-757.  The search permissibly could 
extend to the locked glove compartment (to which the officers 
22 
 
 
 
had a key) because it was reasonable for the officers to believe 
that it contained marijuana or implements used to consume 
marijuana.  See Motta, supra at 122-124 (police entitled to 
search areas of vehicle where fruits of crime or evidence of 
crime might be found); Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 
51, 55 (1974) (search legitimate where it is for 
"instrumentality" or "evidence" of crime).5 
 
Finally, we reject the defendant's contention that the 
police unreasonably delayed the search.  The tow truck arrived 
at the State police barracks at 1:50 P.M.  Blackwell promptly 
initiated the search of the vehicle at 2 P.M.  See Eggleston, 
453 Mass. at 559; Agosto, 428 Mass. at 34. 
d.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In addition to his 
challenge to the denial of the motion to suppress, the defendant 
raises, for the first time on appeal, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.6  He contends that his trial counsel's 
                     
 
5 The search of the defendant's vehicle for evidence 
relating to a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), stands 
in stark contrast to the impermissible searches conducted in 
Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 469 Mass. 16, 20 (2014), and 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 477 (2011), where "no 
specific facts suggest[ed] criminality." 
 
 
6 The defendant did not indicate, at trial, his 
"intransigent and unambiguous objection" to his counsel's 
strategic decision to admit the defendant's possession of the 
items in the glove compartment.  Accordingly, there is no 
structural error as discussed in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 
1500, 1507, 1511 (2018). 
23 
 
 
 
decision to concede that the defendant possessed the drugs found 
"under lock and key" in the glove compartment fell "measurably 
below that which would be expected of an ordinary fallible 
lawyer," and deprived him of "an otherwise available, 
substantial ground of defence."  Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96-97 (1974). 
The preferred method for raising claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel is through a motion for a new trial.  
Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 810 (2006).  "Relief on a 
claim of ineffective assistance based on the trial record is the 
weakest form of such a claim because it is 'bereft of any 
explanation by trial counsel for his actions and suggestive of 
strategy contrived by a defendant viewing the case with 
hindsight.'"  Commonwealth v. Gorham, 472 Mass. 112, 116 n.4 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 n.5 
(2002).  Relief may be afforded on such a claim "when the 
factual basis of the claim appears indisputably on the trial 
record."  Gorham, supra, quoting Zinser, supra at 811. 
Here, trial counsel made an obviously strategic decision to 
concede that his client possessed the drugs found in a locked 
glove compartment, and advised the judge of this during a 
hearing on motions in limine immediately prior to voir dire of 
the venire.  In his opening statement, counsel said, "I'm just 
going to be completely upfront with you right now, those drugs 
24 
 
 
 
were [the defendant's] drugs.  You can go ahead and find him 
guilty of those drugs, no question.  They were in his car in a 
locked glove box.  He had the key to the glove box, his drugs."  
Trial counsel then stated, by way of contrast, that the 
Commonwealth would be unable to prove the remaining (more 
serious) charges of operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of marijuana and possession of an unlawful firearm.  
"I am going to suggest to you that the Commonwealth's evidence 
on those charges are [sic] going to be insufficient.  And like I 
said, compare it to the drugs found in the glove box.  Go ahead 
and find him guilty of the drugs in the glove box.  Those are 
his.  But the rest of it rests on assumptions and speculation 
that I am going to ask you not to engage in and at the end to 
find him not guilty of the remaining charges." 
Later, in his closing argument, counsel again conceded that 
the defendant possessed the items in the glove compartment, but 
asked the jury to consider that the Commonwealth's substitute 
chemist had not established that the substances were oxycodone 
and cocaine.  Again, counsel urged the jury to compare the 
evidence from the glove compartment to the Commonwealth's proof 
that the defendant possessed the firearm and ammunition 
recovered from the trunk.  He argued, "[I]t is simply 
insufficient for the police to have found something in the trunk 
of the car where there were three people inside and where two 
25 
 
 
 
people, after [the defendant] was removed, went in and took 
their property out. . . .  So compare that to what they found in 
the glove box.  These are under lock and key.  [The defendant] 
has the key.  He's the gatekeeper.  No one's getting in without 
his key.  He possess the things in the glove box.  That does not 
prove anything about the gun." 
On this record, the defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance is not indisputable.  The Commonwealth established 
that the vehicle was registered to the defendant, and that the 
defendant had the key to the glove compartment in his front 
pocket when he was arrested.  It does not appear that trial 
counsel had any other viable theory of defense, and appellate 
counsel does not offer a viable alternative.  At trial, counsel 
skillfully utilized this inculpatory evidence to highlight the 
Commonwealth's inability to prove the other charges.  This 
strategy appeared to be successful; the jury acquitted the 
defendant of the firearms charges and of operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the motion to suppress 
is affirmed.  The judgments are also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.