Title: Hutchinson Technology, Inc. v. Labor and Industry Review Commission
Citation: 2004 WI 90
Docket Number: 2002AP003328
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2004

2004 WI 90 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3328 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Hutchinson Technology, Inc.,  
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and  
Susan Roytek,  
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  267 Wis. 2d 961, 671 N.W.2d 717 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 27, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
Benjamin D. Proctor   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Carol S. Dittmar, Teresa E. O’Halloran and Garvey, Anderson, 
Johnson, Geraci & Mirr, S.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by 
Carol S. Dittmar. 
 
For the respondent-respondent Labor and Industry Review 
Commission the cause was argued by David C. Rice, assistant 
attorney 
general, 
with 
whom 
on the 
brief 
was Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-respondent Susan Roytek there was a 
brief by Rose M. Allen, Lisa A. Wiebusch and Mudge, Porter, 
Lundeen & Seguin, S.C., Hudson, and oral argument by Rose M. 
Allen. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy G. Costello, 
Brian M. Radloff and Krukowski & Costello, S.C., Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Inc., and oral 
argument by Timothy G. Costello. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Monica Murphy and 
Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
2004 WI 90 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3328  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 124) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Hutchinson Technology, Inc.,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and  
Susan Roytek,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   Petitioner, 
Hutchinson 
Technology, Incorporated (HTI), seeks review of a court of 
appeals' decision, Hutchinson Technology, Inc. v. LIRC, No. 02-
3328, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sep. 18, 2003), 
affirming the decision of the Labor and Industry Review 
Commission 
(LIRC), 
which 
concluded 
that HTI 
discriminated 
against Susan Roytek (Roytek) on the basis of her disability.  
LIRC affirmed the decision by the administrative law judge and 
concluded that Roytek had a disability, as defined by the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), and that HTI failed to  
No. 
02-3328   
 
2 
 
provide a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed her 
to continue her employment with HTI.  The circuit court and the 
court of appeals affirmed LIRC's decision. 
¶2 
We conclude that Roytek is a person with a disability 
under the WFEA.  Roytek met her initial burden of establishing 
the reasonableness of her proposed accommodations.  HTI did not 
prove 
that 
it 
could 
not 
reasonably 
accommodate 
Roytek's 
disability, since it accommodated her disability for eight 
months.  Moreover, HTI did not introduce any evidence that 
allowing Roytek to continue to work eight-hour shifts at HTI 
would cause hardship to the business.  We are mindful that a 
business must have the right to set its own employment rules to 
encourage maximum productivity.  We caution, however, that such 
rules do not exist in a vacuum, but must bend to the 
requirements of the WFEA.  We, therefore, affirm the court of 
appeals' decision. 
I 
 
¶3 
HTI 
is 
a 
Minnesota 
based 
corporation 
with 
a 
manufacturing plant located in Eau Claire, Wisconsin.  The Eau 
Claire manufacturing plant produces suspension assemblies for 
computer hard disk drives.  Since opening, the Eau Claire plant 
has used four crews to work rotating 12-hour shifts in its 
production facilities.  HTI instituted the 12-hour shift model 
after studying production efficiency and determining employees' 
preferences.  Employees generally work three days one week and 
four days the next, with every other weekend off.  Thus, over 
the course of two weeks, an employee works seven 12-hour shifts 
No. 
02-3328   
 
3 
 
totaling 84 hours.  HTI has occasionally permitted an employee 
to work less than 12 hours per shift for a job assigned such 
hours, but these allowances have been temporary in nature. 
 
¶4 
Roytek began her employment as a production worker in 
HTI's photoetch department in June 1998.  In the photoetch 
process, a pattern is photographically imprinted onto stainless 
steel sheets.  The pattern is then etched with a chemical 
process, cleaned, inspected, sheared, and sent on to the next 
phase of processing.  All of HTI's photoetch operators rotated 
into four areas during their shifts:  inspection, shearing, 
bookwork, and bay.  Each photoetch operator had a primary 
position in one of these four areas, and the majority of each 
shift was spent doing the work of such position.  In inspection, 
an operator was required visually to inspect chemically etched 
steel sheets.  Although the job description of the inspection 
position stated that it required long periods of sitting, 
adjustable tables were available, in order to permit standing 
inspection.  The shearing position required the feeding of steel 
sheets into a machine and had to be performed while standing.  
The bookwork position was a desk job, and a person could stand 
or sit to perform such tasks.  The requirements of the bay 
position varied.  Roytek primarily worked in the inspection 
position and, at the time she was hired, understood that she 
would be required to work 12-hour days.   
No. 
02-3328   
 
4 
 
 
¶5 
In September 1998, Roytek's personal physician, Paul 
M. Ippel, M.D. (Ippel), diagnosed Roytek with lower back pain1 
and concluded that she was temporarily unable to work.  Roytek 
returned to work in November 1998, but with some restrictions.  
Roytek was limited to working six-hour days and prohibited from 
lifting anything over 20 pounds.  In January 1999, Roytek 
increased her shifts to eight-hour days.  At HTI's request 
Tuenis Zondag, M.D. (Zondag), performed a fitness for work 
evaluation on Roytek in August 1999.  Based on the results of 
the evaluation, Roytek could work steadily on an eight-hour 
shift, five days per week.  However, Roytek was incapable of 
working 12-hour shifts on a consistent basis.  Roytek's last day 
of work was August 10, 1999, and she went on short-term 
disability leave beginning August 13, 1999.  HTI terminated 
Roytek's employment on September 11, 1999, when her short-term 
disability pay ran out. 
 
¶6 
Roytek filed a complaint with the Equal Rights 
Division 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Workforce 
Development 
(Department), alleging that HTI had discriminated against her on 
the basis of disability.  After Roytek filed her complaint, 
Ippel informed the Department of further restrictions on 
Roytek's ability to work.  Such restrictions included no sitting 
for longer than two hours, no static standing, no lifting more 
than 20 pounds, and no workdays longer than eight hours.  While 
                                                 
1 Roytek was ultimately diagnosed with degenerative disk 
disease at L5-S1 with an annular tear at L5-S1. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
5 
 
some testimony was presented by HTI before the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) John L. Brown, presiding at the Department 
hearing on what these restrictions would mean in terms of 
performance of certain job functions, the determinations by the 
ALJ, and by LIRC, focused on the eight-hour day versus the 12-
hour day issue.2  HTI closed its photoetch department at the Eau 
Claire plant on June 17, 2000. 
¶7 
The ALJ concluded that Roytek had a disability, and 
that HTI had terminated her employment due to such disability.  
The ALJ concluded that, although HTI had demonstrated that 
Roytek's disability prevented her from performing certain job 
functions, HTI did not demonstrate that it attempted reasonably 
to accommodate her disability or that such accommodation would 
impose a hardship upon it.  The ALJ concluded that HTI's 
evidence was too speculative to conclude that it had met its 
burden to prove hardship.  Although HTI expressed fear that 
other employees would request reduced hours, that her fellow 
employees would experience a decline in morale, and that 
production would suffer, the ALJ concluded that HTI had 
presented no evidence that any of these scenarios had actually 
occurred.  Thus, the ALJ reasoned that HTI violated the WFEA by 
terminating Roytek's employment.  The ALJ then ordered HTI to 
reinstate Roytek to a position comparable to the position she 
had held in the photoetch department, unless Roytek stated that 
                                                 
2 During oral argument, the restrictions were discussed only 
in regard to an eight-hour day. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
6 
 
she did not want to be reinstated.  The ALJ also ordered HTI to 
make Roytek whole for the losses of pay and benefits she 
suffered as a result of her termination. 
¶8 
HTI appealed the ALJ's decision to LIRC.  LIRC 
affirmed the ALJ's decision.3  HTI sought review of LIRC's 
decision in circuit court.  The Eau Claire County Circuit Court, 
Judge Benjamin D. Proctor presiding, affirmed LIRC's decision.  
The court concluded that HTI failed to meet its burden with 
respect to reasonable accommodation and hardship.  HTI appealed. 
¶9 
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, Court of 
Appeals' Judges David G. Deininger, Margaret J. Vergeront, and 
Paul Lundsten affirmed the circuit court's judgment, stating 
that Roytek had a disability under Wisconsin's interpretation of 
"disability" as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8)(a) (2001-
02).4  The court further concluded that HTI did not proffer 
                                                 
3 LIRC made only two amendments to the ALJ's decision, 
regarding attorney fees and the submission of a compliance 
report, neither of which are material to our review of this 
case.  The dissent erroneously contends that "LIRC went directly 
to assessing whether HTI had shown a hardship under subsection 
(1)(b)."  Dissent, ¶50.  Indeed, LIRC addressed the issue of 
reasonable accommodation when it stated that "there was a 
reasonable accommodation that could have been provided for 
[Roytek] which would have enabled her to perform her job 
notwithstanding her disability, had [HTI] been willing to 
provide it." 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes 
are 
to 
the 
2001-02 
edition.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 111.32(8) 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part, 
as 
follows: 
"Individual with a disability" means an individual 
who: 
No. 
02-3328   
 
7 
 
sufficient evidence to support its contention that accommodating 
Roytek's disability would impose a hardship upon it.  Finally, 
the court concluded that HTI waived the issue of whether Roytek 
should be reinstated and receive back pay, since it did not 
raise such issues before LIRC.5 
II 
 
¶10 We now consider whether Roytek was an individual with 
a disability under the WFEA.  The issue of whether Roytek was 
disabled under the WFEA presents a question of law.  La Crosse 
Police Comm'n v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 740, 755, 407 N.W.2d 510 
(1987).6  We must decide whether there was a rational basis for 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Has a physical or mental impairment which makes 
achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity 
to work; 
(b) Has a record of such an impairment; or 
(c) Is perceived as having such an impairment. 
 
5 We agree with the court of appeals that HTI waived the 
issue of whether Roytek should be reinstated and receive backpay 
through the date of reinstatement since it failed to raise the 
issue in its brief before LIRC.  Thus, we decline to further 
address this issue. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(5) provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
The court shall set aside or modify the agency action 
if 
it 
finds 
that 
the 
agency 
has 
erroneously 
interpreted 
a 
provision 
of 
law 
and 
a 
correct 
interpretation compels a particular action, or it 
shall remand the case to the agency for further action 
under a correct interpretation of the provision of 
law. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
8 
 
LIRC's 
conclusion 
that 
Roytek 
was 
an 
individual 
with 
a 
disability.7  Id. at 756. 
 
¶11 HTI contends that Roytek is not an individual with a 
disability under Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8).  HTI asserts that 
Roytek's 
condition 
does 
not 
make 
achievement 
unusually 
difficult, as set forth in § 111.32(8).  HTI claims that 
achievement is unusually difficult when there is "a substantial 
limitation on life's normal functions or substantial limitation 
on a major life activity."  Id. at 761.  HTI maintains that an 
employee must be restricted from a vast array of jobs in order 
to be deemed substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working.  Simply because Roytek is limited in the number of 
hours she may work, HTI contends, does not mean that she has a 
disability under the WFEA.  HTI asserts that La Crosse 
interpreted the "limits the capacity to work" language of 
§ 111.32(8) too broadly, when it concluded that the language 
should be interpreted in light of a person's ability to perform 
the specific job in question.  Instead, HTI maintains, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also School Dist. of Drummond v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 126, 
132-33, 358 N.W.2d 285 (1984), which held that "[w]hen the 
legislature charges an administrative agency to apply and 
enforce a particular statute as it has with the commission and 
ch. 111, Stats., the agency's construction and interpretation of 
the statute are entitled to great weight and any rational basis 
will 
sustain 
its 
practical 
interpretations." 
 
(Citations 
omitted).  
7 We note that the phrase "individual with a disability," as 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8), has been substituted for 
"handicapped individual," which was the phrase at issue in La 
Crosse Police Comm'n v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 740, 752, 407 
N.W.2d 510 (1987). 
No. 
02-3328   
 
9 
 
language 
should 
be 
interpreted 
so 
as 
to 
lead 
to 
the 
determination of whether an individual is limited in potential 
to work any job. 
 
¶12 Roytek contends that she has demonstrated that she has 
a disability 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8), 
because a 
back 
condition may be considered an actual or perceived handicap 
under the WFEA.  Roytek also claims that she has proven that her 
disability limits her ability to perform her photoetch position.  
Based on the La Crosse decision, Roytek contends that she need 
only demonstrate her inability to perform the specific job in 
question.  Roytek asserts that she also has demonstrated that 
her disability has interfered with major life activities, such 
as performing manual tasks, walking, and sitting.  Roytek argues 
that she is further protected under § 111.32(8) because HTI 
perceived her back condition as a disability. 
 
¶13 LIRC contends that this court should not give in to 
HTI's urgings to revisit and revise our La Crosse decision.  
LIRC asserts that the language "limits the capacity to work" 
should not be interpreted as referring to one's ability to work, 
in 
general. 
 
Instead, 
LIRC 
maintains 
that 
La 
Crosse's 
interpretation 
as 
referring 
to 
one's 
ability 
to 
work 
a 
particular job is correct. 
 
¶14 The Wisconsin legislature defined "an individual with 
a 
disability" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8)(a). 
 
As 
noted 
previously, § 111.32(8)(a) states, in relevant part, that an 
individual has a disability when a physical or mental impairment 
No. 
02-3328   
 
10 
 
"makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to 
work . . . ."   
¶15 This court further explained this phrase in our La 
Crosse decision.  In La Crosse, we concluded that a person 
claiming to be an individual with a disability under the WFEA 
must establish two things.  First, the person must demonstrate 
that he or she has an actual or perceived impairment.  Id. at 
762.  Second, the person must demonstrate that this impairment 
either makes, or is perceived as making, achievement unusually 
difficult or limits one's capacity to work.  Id. 
¶16 With respect to the first step, we defined an 
impairment as "a real or perceived lessening or deterioration or 
damage to a normal bodily function or bodily condition, or the 
absence of such bodily function or such bodily condition."  Id. 
at 761.  Roytek has established that she has damage to her 
normal bodily condition, as both Ippel and Zondag concluded that 
she had back pain related to disc problems, and that such 
problems restricted her ability to work a 12-hour shift, and 
engage in prolonged static standing or sitting. 
¶17 Since we conclude that the first step is satisfied, we 
proceed to consider whether the impairment makes "'achievement 
unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work.'"  Id. 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8)(a) (emphasis added)).  Either 
condition may be satisfied in order to establish that a person 
has a disability.  With respect to the "achievement" criterion, 
we have concluded that "(t)he determination rests not with 
respect to a particular job, but rather to a substantial 
No. 
02-3328   
 
11 
 
limitation 
on 
life's 
normal 
functions 
or 
a 
substantial 
limitation on a major life activity."  Id.  With respect to the 
"limits the capacity to work" phrase, we have concluded that it 
refers to the specific job at issue.  Id. 
¶18 We conclude that Roytek is limited in her capacity to 
work in her job.  As discussed above, both Ippel and Zondag 
concluded that Roytek is limited in the amount of static 
standing and sitting she can endure before experiencing pain.  
Moreover, HTI claimed that there are certain positions in the 
photoetch department that Roytek may no longer be able to 
perform, such as the shearing and bay positions. 
¶19 Because Roytek has 
satisfied the 
criteria 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8)(a), 
we 
conclude 
that 
Roytek 
is 
an 
individual with a disability.  We are satisfied that there was a 
rational basis for LIRC's determination.  We reject HTI's 
contention that La Crosse's interpretation of "limits the 
capacity to work" is too broad.  We noted in Crystal Lake that 
"[t]he WFEA is a 'remedial statute . . . [and] should be broadly 
interpreted to resolve the problem it was designed to address.'"  
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, ¶46, 264 
Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651 (quoting McMullen v. LIRC, 148 
Wis. 2d 270, 275, 434 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
III 
 
¶20 We next consider whether LIRC's conclusion that HTI 
refused to reasonably accommodate Roytek's disability, and that 
HTI failed to demonstrate that making such accommodation would 
impose a hardship upon its business, can be upheld.   
No. 
02-3328   
 
12 
 
 
¶21 We will set aside a decision by LIRC only when "'the 
agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.'"  Crystal 
Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶27 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6)).8  
The test for substantial evidence is whether reasonable minds 
could reach the same conclusion as the agency, given the 
evidence in the record.  Id.   
 
¶22 In this case, we give LIRC's decisions concerning 
reasonable accommodation great weight deference.  Great weight 
deference is afforded to an agency's decision under the 
following circumstances:   
"(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with 
the duty of administering the statute; (2) that the 
interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; 
(3) 
that 
the 
agency 
employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; 
and (4) that the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the 
statute." 
Brauneis v. State, 2000 WI 69, ¶16, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 
N.W.2d 635 (citing Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 
660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)). 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(6) states, in relevant part, the 
following: 
If the agency's action depends on any fact found by 
the agency in a contested case proceeding, the court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency as to the weight of the evidence on any 
disputed finding of fact.  The court shall, however, 
set aside agency action or remand the case to the 
agency if it finds that the agency's action depends on 
any 
finding 
of 
fact 
that 
is 
not 
supported 
by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
13 
 
¶23 In Crystal Lake, we cited with approval the court of 
appeals' conclusion in Target Stores v. LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 576 
N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998), that LIRC's interpretation of 
"reasonable accommodation" should be afforded great weight 
deference.  Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶29 (citations 
omitted)(citing Target, 217 Wis. 2d at 13).  In Crystal Lake, we 
concluded that LIRC's interpretation of reasonable accommodation 
should be accorded great weight deference for the following 
reasons: 
"First, LIRC is charged with adjudicating appeals from 
the hearing examiner's decision on complaints under 
the 
WFEA, 
§ 111.39(5), 
Stats., 
which 
includes 
complaints 
under 
§ 111.322, 
Stats., 
for 
handicap 
discrimination.  Second, § 111.34(1), Stats., was 
enacted in 1981 and LIRC has developed experience and 
expertise in interpreting this section. . . . Third, 
by according great deference to these determinations, 
we will promote greater uniformity and consistency 
than if we did not do so.  Fourth, this determination 
is intertwined with factual determinations.  Fifth, 
this determination involves value and policy judgments 
about the obligations of employers and employees when 
an employee, or prospective employee, has a handicap. 
Id.  (Citations omitted). 
¶24 Here, we reaffirm our conclusion in Crystal Lake that 
LIRC's determination regarding reasonable accommodation should 
No. 
02-3328   
 
14 
 
be given great weight deference.9  We further conclude that 
LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
hardship 
deserves 
great 
weight 
deference as well.  In Crystal Lake, we stated that "[h]ere, any 
decision made by LIRC will be given great weight due to the 
agency's 
knowledge 
and 
experience 
in 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34," Id., ¶28 (citing Target, 217 Wis. 2d at 
13), and specifically concluded that LIRC's findings regarding 
hardship are entitled to great weight deference.  Id., ¶¶53, 79.  
We will uphold LIRC's interpretation of a statute, if it is 
reasonable and compatible with the plain meaning of the statute 
even if another interpretation may be more reasonable.  Id., 
¶30. 
¶25 HTI contends that Roytek must prove whether an 
accommodation 
is 
reasonable 
or 
unreasonable 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1).10  If the employee can prove that a 
                                                 
9 We strongly disagree with the dissent's statement that the 
appropriate standard of review is de novo.  See dissent, ¶¶50-
51.  Our decision in Crystal Lake makes it clear that great 
weight deference is the appropriate standard of review for LIRC 
decisions regarding reasonable accommodation and hardship under 
the WFEA.  Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, 
¶¶29, 53, 79, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651.  Moreover, while 
the specific facts in this case may differ from the facts of 
previous cases of reasonable accommodation and hardship dealt 
with by LIRC, it does not follow that the issues of reasonable 
accommodation and hardship are one of first impression.  If this 
were true, all decisions by LIRC would involve issues of first 
impression, because no two sets of facts are likely to be the 
same. 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(1) states, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
Employment 
discrimination 
because 
of 
disability 
includes, but is not limited to: 
No. 
02-3328   
 
15 
 
reasonable accommodation exists, HTI asserts that the burden 
then 
shifts 
to 
the 
employer 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
such 
accommodation would impose a hardship on the employer.11  HTI 
claims that the accommodations proposed here would not help 
Roytek perform her job but would, in fact, excuse her from 
performing it.  HTI maintains that it is not required to shorten 
its shift length to accommodate Roytek and that it would suffer 
hardship if it was forced to do so.  HTI contends that it did 
not offer statistical data regarding lost profits, production 
losses, and morale problems because the eight-hour shift was 
intended to be a temporary accommodation only.  HTI asserts that 
forcing it to create an eight-hour shift for Roytek strips it of 
its management prerogative of setting its own policy with 
respect to shift schedules.  Moreover, HTI contends that it may 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Contributing a lesser amount to the fringe 
benefits, 
including 
life 
or 
disability 
insurance 
coverage, of any employee because of the employee's 
disability; or 
(b)  Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's 
or 
prospective 
employee's 
disability 
unless 
the 
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise 
or business. 
11 Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Inc. (WMC) filed an 
amicus brief in this case and also participated in oral 
arguments.  WMC contends that LIRC erred in placing the burden 
on HTI to demonstrate that the accommodation was reasonable.  
Instead, WMC claims, Roytek should have had to prove that an 
accommodation was reasonable.  In addition, WMC asserts that 
Roytek was required to prove that the accommodation was 
effective and that its burden was proportional to its benefits.  
WMC contends that Roytek failed to meet any of these burdens. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
16 
 
be forced to implement a part-time or job-share program, Roytek 
will have to work on two crews under two different supervisors, 
an additional person may need to be hired to deal with 
scheduling, and there will be uncertainty as to the shortest 
shift it will be required to accommodate. 
¶26 HTI contends that simply because it could accommodate 
Roytek's condition for a short time, does not mean that it could 
do so permanently.  Aside from Roytek's hours restrictions, HTI 
claims that it would experience hardship if it were to 
accommodate all of Roytek's other physical issues, such as her 
inability to static stand or sit for a long period of time.  
Under her restrictions, HTI asserts that Roytek can fill only 
one of the four positions completely in the photoetch department 
and, regardless of the accommodation made, she will continue to 
experience pain on the job.12  HTI maintains that courts should 
not second-guess the policy judgments of a business when the 
structure of a position serves a legitimate business purpose.  
HTI contends that requiring it, in effect, to create a new job 
to accommodate Roytek would result in hardship. 
¶27 Roytek contends that, since she established that she 
had a disability under the WFEA, the burden then shifted to HTI 
to prove that the requested accommodation was unreasonable or 
would impose a hardship upon it.  Roytek claims that she worked 
                                                 
12 In Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶52, n.19, we stated 
that the emphasis should be on the employee's ability to perform 
her job responsibilities adequately, not on terms that attempt 
to quantify the number of job responsibilities the employee can 
perform. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
17 
 
eight-hour shifts for eight months and never received complaints 
about her work.  Moreover, Roytek maintains that no employees 
complained to management that they were overburdened due to 
Roytek's schedule, and no temporary workers were hired to 
compensate for the hours Roytek did not work.  Roytek asserts 
that HTI has produced no credible evidence that it experienced 
hardship by accommodating her.  Roytek contends that speculation 
as to problems that may arise in the future is not enough to 
establish hardship. 
¶28 LIRC asserts that the employer has the burden of 
proving that a proposed accommodation is unreasonable.  LIRC 
contends 
that 
the 
initial 
burden 
of 
proof 
as 
to 
the 
reasonableness of an accommodation should fall on the employee.  
Once the employee has met this initial burden of proof, LIRC 
maintains that the employer must show that the accommodation is 
unreasonable or that it would impose a hardship on the employer.  
LIRC contends that this court should not conclude that, as a 
matter of law, an employer can never be required to modify an 
employee's work schedule.  LIRC concludes that it could 
reasonably find that HTI could accommodate Roytek without 
experiencing hardship.  LIRC claims that the WFEA may require an 
employer to create modified work schedules as part of a 
reasonable accommodation, if the employer would not experience 
hardship.  Moreover, LIRC maintains that HTI has failed to 
produce any evidence that its production has suffered due to 
Roytek's modified schedule.   
No. 
02-3328   
 
18 
 
¶29 We begin by recognizing the important role that 
management prerogatives play in the success of a business.  This 
court has stated that "it is necessary to preserve the freedom 
of private enterprise to manage its business as it sees fit."  
Libby, McNeill & Libby v. WERC, 48 Wis. 2d 272, 280, 179 
N.W.2d 805 (1970).  See also Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 
Wis. 2d 234, 251, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).13  We are mindful that a 
business must have the right to set its own employment rules to 
encourage maximum productivity.  We caution, however, that such 
rules do not exist in a vacuum, but must bend to the 
requirements of the WFEA.  
¶30 Because our recent decision in Crystal Lake has direct 
bearing in this case, it is necessary to discuss it in some 
detail.  In Crystal Lake, an employee of Crystal Lake Cheese 
Factory was injured in a non-work related automobile accident 
and became a quadriplegic.  Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶9.  
Before her accident, the employee was head of a four-person 
department 
that 
consisted 
of 
the 
following 
positions:  
department head, cheese cutter, cryovacer, and labeler.  Id., 
¶6.  After her accident, the employee contacted Crystal Lake to 
                                                 
13 In 
Kelley 
Co. 
v. 
Marquardt, 
172 
Wis. 2d 234, 
493 
N.W.2d 68 (1992), which involved a different issue under the 
Family Medical Leave Act, we discussed the necessary balancing 
that must occur between management prerogatives and statutory 
rights of employees.  We stated:  "On one hand, businesses are 
not curtailed from making legitimate business decisions and 
changes, and on the other hand, an employee may take family or 
medical leave without the fear of losing his or her position in 
the 
work 
place 
which 
includes 
status, 
authority, 
and 
responsibility."  Id. at 251. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
19 
 
state that she was ready to return to work.  Id., ¶10.  Crystal 
Lake hired a consulting firm to determine what accommodations 
would need to be made that would enable the employee to do her 
job.  Id.  The firm ultimately concluded that no reasonable 
accommodations could be made to enable the employee to do her 
job.  Id.  The employee hired her own assessor who concluded 
that she could be reasonably accommodated.  Id., ¶11.  At the 
time of this assessment, the employee's department had been 
eliminated, and her former job no longer existed.  Id.  The 
employee filed suit against Crystal Lake. 
¶31 The administrative law judge concluded that Crystal 
Lake did not discriminate against the employee because there 
were no reasonable accommodations that could be made.  Id., ¶14.  
The employee appealed to LIRC.  LIRC concluded that reasonable 
accommodations could have been made, such as modifying her job 
duties to excuse her from doing more taxing physical tasks, 
without hardship befalling Crystal Lake.  Id., ¶15.  Both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals affirmed LIRC's decision.  
Id., ¶¶17-20. 
¶32 We stated that, as an initial matter, a plaintiff must 
show that he or she is an "individual with a disability" under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8) and that his or her employer took one of 
the several actions listed in Wis. Stat. § 111.322.  Id., ¶42.  
Once the employee meets the initial burden of proving that he or 
she has a disability, we stated that the employer then has the 
burden of proving a defense under Wis. Stat. § 111.34.  Id.  We 
stated that "§ 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a) require an employer to 
No. 
02-3328   
 
20 
 
prove that even with reasonable accommodations, the employee 
would not be able to perform his or her job responsibilities 
adequately or that, where reasonable accommodations would enable 
the employee to do the job, hardship would be placed on the 
employer."  Id., ¶32 (citation omitted).  Since there was no 
dispute that the employee had a disability in Crystal Lake, we 
focused our analysis on whether reasonable accommodations could 
have been made for the employee without creating hardship for 
Crystal Lake.  Id., ¶44.   
¶33 We 
rejected 
Crystal 
Lake's 
contention 
that 
a 
reasonable accommodation need only be made if it enables the 
employee to perform all of his or her job functions.14  Id., ¶47.  
After discussing cases such as Target, McMullen, and Frito Lay, 
Inc. v. LIRC, 95 Wis. 2d 395, 290 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980), we 
                                                 
14 The dissent contends that we fail to recognize the 
relationship 
between 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) 
and 
(2)(a).  
Dissent, ¶61.  To the contrary, we recognized the connection 
between those provisions in Crystal Lake and reiterate our 
discussion of the connection here.  The dissent incorrectly 
concludes that the accommodation was unreasonable "because it 
did 
not 
permit 
the 
employer 
to 
have 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities of Roytek's employment met, i.e., working for 
12-hour shifts."  Id., ¶ 62.  It is important to note that HTI 
never demonstrated that Roytek's shift change adversely affected 
its production schedule or its employee morale.  Moreover, we 
again emphasize our conclusion in Crystal Lake that:  "A 
reasonable accommodation is not limited to that which would 
allow the employee to perform adequately all of his or her job 
duties. 
 
A 
change 
in 
job 
duties 
may 
be 
a 
reasonable 
accommodation in a given circumstance."  Crystal Lake, 264 
Wis. 2d 200, ¶52.  The decisions in Target Stores v. LIRC, 217 
Wis. 2d 1, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998) and McMullen v. LIRC, 
148 Wis. 2d 270, 275, 434 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1988) were 
correctly cited by us as supporting that conclusion.   
No. 
02-3328   
 
21 
 
ultimately concluded that "[a] change in job duties may be a 
reasonable accommodation in a given circumstance."  Crystal 
Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶52.  We noted that the fact that two of 
the three other employees in the employee's department were 
willing to accommodate her change in job duties supported the 
argument that such accommodation would be a reasonable one.  
Id., ¶51.   
¶34 With respect to our analysis of hardship in Crystal 
Lake, we noted that while there is some overlap, hardship and 
reasonable 
accommodation 
are 
"'separate 
and 
distinct 
considerations that are to be addressed independently.'"  Id., 
¶75 (quoting McMullen, 148 Wis. 2d at 277).  We concluded that 
Crystal Lake could have modified the employee's job site, as 
well as her job duties, without experiencing hardship.15  Id., 
¶¶76-77.  
¶35 Applying our decision in Crystal Lake, and the cases 
we relied on for that decision, and according great weight 
deference to the LIRC decision, we conclude that HTI did not 
meet its burden in rebutting the initial burden satisfied by 
                                                 
15 The dissent incorrectly concludes that our holding in 
this case "goes far beyond our conclusions in Crystal Lake. . . 
."  Dissent, ¶64.  Rather, our decision in this case is 
absolutely consistent with our holding in Crystal Lake.  As 
explained above, we concluded that the employer in Crystal Lake 
did not demonstrate that it would experience hardship in 
providing a reasonable accommodation to its disabled employee.  
Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶76-77.  Similarly, HTI has 
failed to produce any evidence, beyond mere speculation, that it 
would experience hardship if it accommodated Roytek.  Both cases 
boil down to the failure by each of these employers, HTI and 
Crystal Lake, to satisfy the requisite burden of proof.  
No. 
02-3328   
 
22 
 
Roytek. 
 
HTI 
failed 
to 
establish 
that 
no 
reasonable 
accommodations could be made to enable Roytek to perform her 
job, or that it would experience hardship in making such 
accommodations.  We further conclude that we see no substantial 
difference in the positions of LIRC and HTI regarding which 
party has the burden of proof with respect to reasonable 
accommodation.  We conclude that the initial burden is on the 
employee to prove that a reasonable accommodation is available, 
and, 
in 
this 
case, 
Roytek 
has 
satisfied 
that 
burden.16  
Substantial and credible evidence is present in the record from 
which LIRC could hold as it did that HTI failed to reasonably 
accommodate Roytek.  Clearly, a reasonable accommodation was 
available, since HTI accommodated Roytek's eight-hour shifts for 
eight months without any problems.   
¶36 Moreover, 
HTI's 
assertions 
that 
any 
prolonged 
continuation of this schedule would create a hardship are 
unpersuasive.17  Over a two-week period, Roytek had the potential 
                                                 
16 Inexplicably, the dissent claims that we ignore a 
claimant's initial burden to demonstrate that a reasonable 
accommodation is available.  See dissent, ¶62.  We have plainly 
stated that Roytek has the initial burden of establishing that a 
reasonable accommodation exists, and has met that burden.     
17 While Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) states that a business 
must demonstrate "hardship," the Americans with Disability Act 
(ADA) refers to "undue hardship."  The provision, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) states, in relevant part, as follows: 
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term 
"discriminate" includes--  . . . not making reasonable 
accommodations 
to 
the 
known 
physical 
or 
mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
No. 
02-3328   
 
23 
 
to work only four hours fewer than her fellow employees due to a 
possible schedule of five eight-hour days weekly.18  Although HTI 
hypothesized that certain problems could arise in the future, it 
                                                                                                                                                             
such 
covered 
entity 
can 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship in the 
operation 
of 
the 
business 
of 
such 
covered 
entity. . . .  
Based on our decision in Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 
¶46, it appears quite clear that there is no real difference in 
the terms "hardship" and "undue hardship," since the "hardship" 
referred to in Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) must be substantial in 
nature, and definitely something more than mere speculation.  
The dissent is absolutely wrong when it states that we "import" 
the undue hardship test from the ADA into the standard set forth 
in § 111.34(1)(b).  See dissent, ¶59, n.6.  We merely point out 
the differences in the language and indicate that there is no 
substantial difference between the two terms, since "hardship" 
under § 111.34(1)(b) certainly must be something more than a 
slight inconvenience.  In Crystal Lake, we concluded that the 
employer failed to prove that it would experience hardship if it 
were 
required 
to 
modify 
its 
employee's 
jobsite 
and 
responsibilities, since it performed a generic evaluation of 
what limitations a wheelchair-bound person would experience 
while performing the job, and avoided talking with the employee 
to find out what her actual limitations were.  Crystal Lake, 264 
Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶76-80. 
18 In the ALJ's memorandum, he stated that HTI refused to 
put Roytek on a five-day per week schedule because they claimed 
that it would be problematic if she worked on two different 
crews and for two different supervisors.  Although HTI stated 
that problems would arise if Roytek worked on two different 
crews and for two different supervisors, it never explained in 
detail the difficulties it claimed this would impose.  While 
Roytek never worked a five-day per week schedule, it is 
certainly not the case that she offered "to continue working 
only two-thirds of her shift. . . ."  Dissent, ¶45.  In fact, 
she "offered" to work 40-hour weeks, but HTI declined such 
arrangement without offering any evidence of the difficulties 
that this modified schedule would impose upon it.  Rather, it 
offered nothing but speculation in support of its position. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
24 
 
presented no evidence that any ever did.  For example, HTI did 
not submit any evidence that other employees sought to work 
reduced shifts, that morale problems had arisen among its other 
employees, or that production had decreased as a result of 
Roytek's arrangement.  We agree with LIRC's conclusion that 
"[t]he hypothetical difficulties associated with permanent part-
time status for the complainant are simply too speculative to 
meet the respondent's burden of proof in the matter.  The 
respondent had ten months19 to determine that the complainant's 
shorter work shift caused production or profit losses, but 
failed to do so."  We further agree with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that HTI was "unable to point to significant evidence 
in the record that demonstrates hardship in this particular 
situation, rather than speculation or theoretical complaints."  
Hutchinson, No. 02-3328, unpublished slip op., ¶5.  We agree 
with these statements by LIRC and the court of appeals which 
concluded that HTI failed to meet its burden of proof on 
hardship and has failed to rebut Roytek's argument that a 
                                                 
19 The ten months refers to the two months Roytek worked 
six-hour shifts, from November 1998 to January 1999, and the 
eight months that she worked eight-hour shifts, from January 
1999 to August 1999. 
No. 
02-3328   
 
25 
 
reasonable accommodation could have been made.20  We reiterate 
our conclusion in Crystal Lake that reasonable accommodation and 
hardship are two distinct concepts that involve separate 
inquiries, since an accommodation may be reasonable, but 
nevertheless work a hardship upon a specific employer.21  Crystal 
Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶75.  See also McMullen, 148 Wis. 2d at 
277.  As the abovementioned analysis indicates, HTI failed both 
tests.  HTI did not introduce any evidence, beyond mere 
conjecture, that accommodating Roytek would impose a hardship 
upon its business. 
IV 
¶37 We conclude that Roytek is a person with a disability 
under the WFEA, and that Roytek met her initial burden of 
establishing the reasonableness of her proposed accommodations.  
                                                 
20 While the dissent lists a parade of horribles that may 
occur as a result of this decision, such an alarmist approach is 
without merit.  See dissent, ¶¶65, 68, 70-71.  Our decision in 
this case hinges on the fact that HTI was unable to provide any 
proof that providing a reasonable accommodation to Roytek would 
work hardship upon its business.  Had HTI provided anything 
beyond mere speculation as to the problems that might arise if 
it were forced to accommodate Roytek, the evidence could then 
have been evaluated to determine if such accommodation would 
have, indeed, imposed hardship.  Nevertheless, the dissent fails 
to acknowledge that HTI has not proved that it would experience 
hardship and, instead, resorts to hyperbole to reach its 
conclusion.  
21 Contrary to the dissent's contention, we do not conflate 
the applicable statutory provisions in this case.  See dissent, 
¶54.  We have analyzed, in detail, whether Roytek met her 
initial burden of demonstrating that a reasonable accommodation 
exists and whether HTI rebutted that showing and met its burden 
of demonstrating hardship, if it were forced to accommodate 
Roytek.   
No. 
02-3328   
 
26 
 
HTI did not establish that it could not reasonably accommodate 
Roytek's disability, since it accommodated her disability for 
eight months without any significant difficulties.  Moreover, 
HTI did not introduce any evidence that allowing Roytek to 
continue to work eight-hour shifts at HTI would cause hardship 
to its business.  We are mindful that a business must have the 
right to set its own employment rules to encourage maximum 
productivity.  We caution, however, that such rules do not exist 
in a vacuum, but must bend to the requirements of the WFEA.  We, 
therefore, affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  02.3328.dss 
 
1 
 
 
¶38 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (concurring).  This case is 
controlled by this court's interpretation in Crystal Lake Cheese 
Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651, 
of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the disability 
discrimination provisions in the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act 
(WFEA), Wis. Stat. § 111.34.  In Crystal Lake, this court 
concluded that compliance with the "reasonable accommodation" 
requirement 
of 
the 
WFEA 
as 
it 
pertains 
to 
disability 
discrimination may require an employer to alter the job 
responsibilities associated with the employee's or prospective 
employee's job.  Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶52.  The court 
held that "[a] change in job duties may be a reasonable 
accommodation in a given circumstance."  Id. 
¶39  In reaching this conclusion in Crystal Lake, this 
court addressed and specifically rejected an interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34 that would have reconciled the language of 
subsection (1)(b) of the statute with subsection (2)(a) of the 
statute, as argued by Justice Roggensack in dissent here.  
Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶34-52.  Subsection (1)(b) of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34 
defines 
disability 
discrimination 
as 
including "[r]efusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or 
prospective employee's disability."  However, subsection (2)(a) 
of 
the 
statute 
provides 
that 
"it 
is 
not 
employment 
discrimination . . . to refuse to hire, employ, . . . or 
terminate . . . any individual . . . [on account of disability] 
if the disability is reasonably related to the individual's 
No.  02.3328.dss 
 
2 
 
ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities 
of that individual's employment." 
¶40  The employer in Crystal Lake argued that these two 
sections of the WFEA, read together, meant that the "reasonable 
accommodation" requirement of the statute was confined to 
accommodations that would permit the disabled employee to 
perform 
the 
existing 
responsibilities 
of 
employment 
as 
determined by the employer.  Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 
¶¶33-35.  The court rejected this interpretation, instead 
holding that "a reasonable accommodation is not limited to that 
which would allow the employee to perform adequately all of his 
or her job duties."  Id., ¶52.  That is, the court held that the 
"reasonable accommodation" requirement may compel an employer to 
alter the responsibilities of employment——that is, to redefine 
the job, or create a new job——in order to avoid committing 
disability discrimination under the WFEA.  The statute allows an 
employer to defend against a disability discrimination claim by 
showing that the "accommodation would pose a hardship on the 
employer's 
program, 
enterprise 
or 
business," 
see 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b); the court in Crystal Lake affirmed 
LIRC's conclusion that the employer had not carried its burden 
of demonstrating hardship. Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶79-
80. 
¶41  Also important to the outcome here, the court in 
Crystal Lake held that LIRC's determinations of "reasonable 
accommodation" 
and 
"hardship" 
for 
purposes 
of 
No.  02.3328.dss 
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34 were entitled to great weight deference on 
judicial review.  Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶28-30. 
¶42  I disagreed with the court's resolution of these 
issues in Crystal Lake, agreeing instead with the analysis in 
Justice 
Prosser's 
dissent. 
 
Id., 
¶¶84-136 
(Prosser, 
J., 
dissenting).  Here, Justice Roggensack has identified some of 
the flaws and consequences of an interpretation of the WFEA that 
fails to reconcile the language of Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and 
(2)(a).  These arguments, however, were made by the employer in 
Crystal Lake and discussed at length in Justice Prosser's 
dissent, which I joined. 
¶43  Crystal Lake is applicable and binding precedent, and 
I cannot distinguish its interpretation of the WFEA's reasonable 
accommodation requirement as Justice Roggensack has done here.  
Crystal Lake did not define "reasonable accommodation" as an 
accommodation that would permit the employer to have the job-
related responsibilities of the individual's employment met or 
permit an employer to implement a valid management decision.  
Dissent, ¶¶1, 10, 13, 18-22.  To the contrary, Crystal Lake 
broadly held that an employer may indeed be required to alter an 
employee's job responsibilities in order to comply with the 
WFEA, 
and 
that 
LIRC's 
determinations 
of 
"reasonable 
accommodation" in this regard are entitled to great weight 
deference.  As such, although I disagreed with Crystal Lake, I 
am bound by it, and join the court's application of it in this 
case.  Any remedy will have to come from the legislature. 
No.  02.3328.dss 
 
4 
 
¶44 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence.  
   
 
 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶45 PATIENCE 
D. 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion concludes that because Hutchinson Technology, 
Inc. (HTI) refused to permit the claimant, Susan Roytek, to work 
56 hours every two weeks, rather than the 84 hours every two 
weeks that she was hired to work, it has unreasonably failed to 
accommodate her disability; and therefore, HTI has discriminated 
against her in violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act 
(WFEA).  However, I conclude no WFEA violation occurred because 
Roytek's offer to continue working only two-thirds of her shift 
is insufficient to be an "accommodation," as that term is used 
in Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) (2001-02).22  Additionally, Roytek's 
offer results in negating § 111.34(2)(a), which provides that it 
is not discrimination to refuse to employ an individual when the 
job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment are 
not met.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶46 Roytek was hired by HTI in June of 1998 in the 
photoetch department as a photoetch operator.  When she was 
hired, she was told that HTI operated 24 hours per day, seven 
days a week.  HTI explained that it had determined that 
operating in 12-hour shifts, four shifts one week and three 
shifts on the next, met the needs of HTI to increase production 
by fully utilizing its equipment and it also met the preference 
of HTI's employees who were asked whether they preferred to work 
                                                 
22 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
2 
 
eight-hour shifts five days each week or 12-hour shifts, three 
or four days per week.  She accepted the position, which 
involved rotating through four types of work throughout each 
shift:  inspection, shearing, bookwork and work in the bay.23  
Prior to being hired by HTI, Roytek had suffered from low back 
pain.  She stated that she has had problems with her back since 
March of 1990 or 1991.   
¶47 Roytek worked the 12-hour shifts for approximately 
three months, until mid-September of 1998, when she took a 
medical leave of absence, not returning until November of that 
year.  When she returned, she had a note from her treating 
physician stating that she could work only six-hour shifts so at 
that time, she worked 42 hours every two weeks.  In January of 
1999, her treating physician increased her work time to an 
eight-hour shift and then she worked no more than 56 hours every 
two weeks.24  Full-time employees in the photoetch department 
worked 84 hours every two weeks.  HTI employs no part-time 
employees.  However, HTI permitted Roytek to continue her 
                                                 
23 The record reflects that during the hours she works, 
Roytek is not able to perform all of the tasks due to her 
inability to stand or sit for the length of time required.  
However, this aspect of Roytek's inability to perform her job 
has not been addressed by the majority opinion, although it was 
briefed by HTI.  Because it is not necessary to my analysis of 
Roytek's claim, I do not discuss it further. 
24 The majority opinion implies that Roytek worked eight-
hour shifts, five days per week.  Majority op., ¶36.  However, 
the record, which contains Roytek's time-sheets, shows she never 
worked more than eight-hour shifts three days one week and four 
days the next.  There were many two-week periods where she did 
not even work those hours.  Accordingly, although she was hired 
as a full-time employee, she never returned to full-time work.   
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
3 
 
employment with the expectation that she would resume the 
required 12-hour shifts, when her back condition improved. 
¶48 In the early summer of 1999, one of the physicians who 
had examined Roytek gave his professional opinion that she could 
work no more than eight hours per shift on a permanent basis.  
When HTI learned that Roytek would never be able to work full-
time, it terminated her.   
¶49 Roytek sued HTI, claiming the back condition that 
caused her to be unable to work the full shift for which she had 
been hired was a disability within the meaning of WFEA, and that 
HTI violated WFEA when it terminated her based on the effects of 
that disability.  LIRC agreed with her contention, concluding 
that because HTI had accommodated her 56-hour per two weeks work 
schedule in the past, HTI should be required to continue that 
schedule on a permanent basis, thereby leaving HTI's equipment 
unused for 28 hours every two weeks, or 728 hours per year.25  
HTI appealed and the circuit court affirmed, as did the court of 
appeals.  We accepted review, and are now presented with the 
question of whether an employer, who makes a business decision 
to utilize its facilities 24-hours per day, will be permitted to 
do so when confronted with employees and prospective employees 
who provide medical statements that they cannot work the full 
shift necessary to accomplish that valid management decision. 
                                                 
25 If Roytek were to work eight-hour shifts five days per 
week, HTI's equipment would be unused 40 hours every two weeks 
or 1,040 hours per year. 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
4 
 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶50 Questions of statutory interpretation and application, 
which when decided by an administrative agency, such as LIRC, 
may be given deference at one of three levels:  great weight 
deference, due weight deference, or no deference in a de novo 
review.  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 
(1996).  As will be explained below, LIRC did not interpret the 
dispositive Wis. Stat. § 111.34 issue, i.e., whether working 
eight-hour shifts on a permanent basis was an "accommodation," 
as that term is used in § 111.34(1)(b).  LIRC went directly to 
assessing whether HTI had shown a hardship under subsection 
(1)(b).  Accordingly, there is nothing to which to defer.  
Additionally, the definition of "accommodation" and its effect 
on the legal sufficiency of a WFEA claim is one of first 
impression for LIRC that we would review de novo.  See Keup v. 
DHFS, 2004 WI 16, ¶16, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755; see also 
Bunker v. LIRC, 2002 WI App 216, ¶16, 257 Wis. 2d 255, 650 
N.W.2d 864 (taking up and deciding a legal issue that LIRC did 
not address). 
¶51 In order to state a claim for a WFEA violation based 
on a disability, Roytek must state an accommodation that 
satisfies Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a).  We do not 
determine whether an accommodation is reasonable or whether it 
causes a hardship until we assess whether the employee or 
prospective 
employee's 
suggestion 
permits 
the 
job-related 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
5 
 
responsibilities of that individual's employment to be met.  
This is so because it is only then that a statutorily sufficient 
accommodation has been stated.  
¶52 Whether an employee 
has 
stated an 
accommodation 
presents a question of law on which courts have extensive 
experience; therefore, we owe no deference to LIRC.  See 
Anderson v. LIRC, 111 Wis. 2d 245, 253, 330 N.W.2d 594 (1983) 
(applying a de novo standard of review to LIRC's decision 
interpreting a WFEA provision); Harrison v. LIRC, 211 Wis. 2d 
681, 685, 565 N.W.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1997) (applying a de novo 
standard of review to the question of whether Harrison's 
complaint stated a claim under WFEA).   
B. 
Roytek's WFEA Discrimination Claim 
1. 
Introduction 
¶53 Roytek must establish that she has a disability and 
that 
a 
reasonable 
accommodation 
for 
that 
disability 
is 
available.  Majority op., ¶35.  I agree that in Wisconsin, 
Roytek has a disability under long-established case law.  City 
of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 740, 752, 
407 N.W.2d 510 (1987).  However, where I part company with the 
majority is in its implicit conclusion26 that Roytek has shown an 
accommodation by working eight hours per day, three days one 
week and four days the next, because her suggestion is not an 
                                                 
26 The majority opinion does not recognize the issue upon 
which I conclude this case turns, whether permitting Roytek to 
permanently work two-thirds of the shifts she was hired to fill 
is 
an 
accommodation 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a). 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
6 
 
accommodation, under Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b).  Therefore, her 
termination 
is 
not 
a 
violation 
of 
WFEA 
according 
to 
§ 111.34(2)(a). 
¶54 In my view, the majority opinion misinterprets the 
statute in two fundamental ways.  First, it does not recognize 
the connection between Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a), 
both of which bear on the meaning of accommodation in subsection 
(1)(b).  The first clause of subsection (1)(b) focuses on the 
claimant's obligation to show an "accommodation."  Subsection 
(2)(a) requires that the plan selected permits the employer to 
have the job-related responsibilities of that individual's 
employment met.  The majority opinion, however, implicitly 
assumes by its statement, "HTI failed to provide a reasonable 
accommodation that would have allowed [Roytek] to continue her 
employment," that Roytek provided a statutorily sufficient 
accommodation in the first instance.  Majority op., ¶1.  The 
majority opinion then concludes that HTI violated WFEA because 
it did not show hardship under § 111.34(1)(b).  Majority op., 
¶36.  In so doing, it conflates three distinct statutory 
provisions: 
 
(1) 
whether 
the 
claimant 
has 
stated 
an 
accommodation; 
(2) 
if 
so, 
whether 
the 
accommodation 
is 
reasonable; and (3) if so, whether the employer has shown that 
the reasonable accommodation would pose a hardship to its 
business operation. 
¶55 Second, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
ignores 
the 
valid 
business decision of HTI to increase production by using its 
equipment 24 hours per day, and in so doing, it negates the 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
7 
 
protections afforded an employer to make such a decision under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a).  Because there is no dispute that 
Roytek's disability will not permit her to work the required 12-
hour shifts to meet HTI's production decision, the ultimate 
question is whether Roytek's failure to state an accommodation 
that is sufficient under § 111.34 causes her assertions to fail 
to 
state 
a 
claim 
for 
employment 
discrimination 
under 
§ 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a).  To address these concerns more 
fully, I begin with the interpretation of WFEA's relevant 
provisions.  
2. 
WFEA 
¶56 I interpret Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a) in 
order to determine what is an "accommodation."  When we 
interpret or apply a statute, we attempt to ascertain its 
meaning in order to give the statute its full intended effect.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ¶44, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  We begin with the words 
chosen by the legislature, giving them their plain and ordinary 
meanings.  Id., ¶45.  This is our initial focus, because as we 
have explained, "[w]e assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language."  Id., ¶44.  We are aided 
in ascertaining the meaning of a statute by the context in which 
words are placed.  Id., ¶46.  If the statute's meaning is clear 
on its face, we need go no further; we simply apply it.  Id., 
¶45.  However, if the statutory language is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
ways, then it is ambiguous.  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
8 
 
28, ¶19, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  A statute may also be 
ambiguous due to its interactions with other statutes.  State v. 
White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 295 N.W.2d 346 (1980).  If the 
statutory language is ambiguous, we may consult extrinsic 
sources to ascertain legislative intent.  Stockbridge Sch. Dist. 
v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal 
Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 223, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996).  I conclude 
that the term "accommodation" is ambiguous because it reasonably 
could be understood in two ways:  (1) as the majority does, by 
looking solely to § 111.34(1)(b) and concluding it is a plan 
that "would have allowed [Roytek] to continue her employment 
with HTI," majority op., ¶1; or (2) as I have, by reading 
§ 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a) together and concluding it is a plan 
that will permit Roytek to assist HTI in implementing its valid 
business decision to utilize its equipment 24 hours per day. 
¶57 In order to accurately assess whether Roytek has 
stated a claim for a WFEA violation based on a disability, it is 
necessary to understand the interaction between two provisions 
of WFEA, § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a).  Subsection (1)(b) provides 
that an employer must "reasonably accommodate an employee's or 
prospective employee's 
disability unless the 
employer can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship" to its 
business. 
 
Subsection 
(2)(a) 
affects 
the 
meaning 
of 
"accommodation" in subsection (1)(b) when it provides that "it 
is not employment discrimination because of disability to refuse 
to hire [or] employ" if the "disability is reasonably related to 
the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
9 
 
responsibilities of that individual's employment[.]"  These two 
provisions are related in that an accommodation under subsection 
(1)(b) must be such that it also satisfies (2)(a), by permitting 
the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment 
to be met.  Our understanding of the interaction between these 
two provisions is facilitated by a review of when and why the 
legislature created them. 
¶58 WFEA 
did 
not 
protect 
disabled 
persons 
from 
discrimination until 1965.  Ch. 230, Laws of 1965.  A provision 
substantially similar to Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a), explaining 
that it is not discrimination contrary to WFEA to refuse to 
provide the employee or prospective employee with work if the 
disability of that person is related to the individual's 
inability to do the job, was a part of those initial provisions.  
Id. at § 3. 
¶59 In the 1981-82 legislative session, WFEA was revised, 
in part due to our decision in American Motors Corp. v. DILHR, 
101 Wis. 2d 337, 305 N.W.2d 62 (1981), which addressed a 
religious discrimination claim.  Those revisions included what 
is now Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b), requiring an employer to make 
a reasonable accommodation for the individual's disability, 
unless to do so would pose a hardship on the employer.  § 17, 
ch. 334, Laws of 1981; Wis. Legis. Council, Information 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
10 
 
Memorandum 82-17, at 7 (1982)27  Subsection 111.34(1)(b) did not 
remove the protection for the employer found in § 111.34(2)(a).  
Subsection (2)(a) remained unchanged during the amendments.  
Giving each section an independent, yet related, function 
permits an employer lawfully to refuse to employ an individual 
who does not have an accommodation to the disability that will 
permit 
the 
adequate 
undertaking 
of 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities of the individual's employment. 
                                                 
27 The modifier, "undue," for the term, "hardship," was 
included in the religious accommodation revisions made during 
the same legislative session as that in which the disabilities 
section 
was 
revised. 
 
However, 
the 
word, 
"undue," 
was 
intentionally 
deleted 
from 
the 
disability 
discrimination 
provisions.  Wis. Legis. Council, Information Memorandum 82-17, 
at 7 (1982).  This gave an employer a lower burden in regard to 
when it must make a reasonable accommodation for a disability as 
compared with a religious-based accommodation.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 111.337(1), 
the WFEA provision that 
addresses 
religious 
discrimination, continues to place a heavier burden on the 
employer to accommodate religious practices as it requires a 
reasonable accommodation unless the "employer can demonstrate 
that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship . . . ."   
The 
majority 
opinion 
erroneously 
imports 
the 
"undue 
hardship" test from federal law, asserting that "it appears 
quite clear that there is no real difference in the terms 
'hardship' and 'undue hardship,' since the 'hardship' referred 
to in Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) must be substantial in nature 
. . . ."  Majority op., ¶36 n.17.  I disagree, as the 
legislative history cited above from the 1981-82 amendments, as 
well as the "undue hardship" standard that was chosen for 
accommodations to religious choices in § 111.337(1), show.  In 
my view, the disposition of Roytek's claim does not require us 
to proceed as far as a hardship assessment.  However, if it did, 
I would conclude that the majority opinion uses an incorrect 
standard in this regard. 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
11 
 
3. 
Application of WFEA to Roytek's claim 
¶60 As I have noted above, analysis of a WFEA claim 
involves three steps:  (1) The employee must prove he or she has 
a disability.  City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm'n, 139 
Wis. 2d at 760.  (2) The employee must prove an accommodation 
exists, 
that 
the 
accommodation 
is 
reasonable, 
but 
notwithstanding that reasonable accommodation, the employer 
refused employment.  See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 
391, 401-02 (2002).28  (3) If the employee succeeds on these 
first two elements, the employer must then prove that the 
suggested accommodation is a hardship, in order to avoid a 
violation of WFEA.  Geen v. LIRC, 2002 WI App 269, ¶15, 258 
Wis. 2d 498, 654 N.W.2d 1.  However, if the employee does not 
prove an accommodation that permits the employee to adequately 
undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's 
employment, the employer may refuse to employ that individual 
without violating WFEA.  Wis. Stat. § 111.34 (1)(b) and (2)(a); 
see also Geen, 258 Wis. 2d 498, ¶15.  This makes sense because 
otherwise an employer would be required to hire all individuals 
without regard for the job-related responsibilities the employer 
                                                 
28 The decision in US Airways is instructive in regard to 
the foundational issue of an accommodation because it begins 
with a statement showing that a reasonable accommodation is one 
that permits the employee to perform the essential functions of 
the job.  US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002).  
It then explains that an accommodation must be shown to be 
reasonable only on its face, in that with this change the 
employee can do the essential functions of the job.  Id. at 401.  
The burden will then shift to the employer to show hardship.  
Id. at 402.  Here, as we explain throughout, the plan offered by 
Roytek was not sufficient on its face. 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
12 
 
sought to accomplish by making the job available in the first 
instance. 
¶61 Courts 
must 
keep 
the 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.34(2)(a) in mind when considering whether what has been 
offered is an "accommodation" under § 111.34(1)(b) because 
subsection (1)(b) requires an employer to employ the individual 
when the accommodation satisfies subsection (2)(a), unless the 
employer proves a hardship.29  If the analysis shifts too quickly 
to whether the employee's suggestion creates, or does not 
create, a hardship for the employer, the initial analysis of 
whether what is offered is actually a statutory "accommodation" 
will be lost, as will the employer's right to make valid 
business decisions without violating the law.  Therefore, an 
accommodation that is sufficient under the statutes permits the 
employee to work and at the same time, it permits the employer 
to have the job-related responsibilities of that individual's 
employment met.  Target Stores v. LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 576 
N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶62 Here, Roytek proved she has a disability under WFEA.  
However, she did not prove an "accommodation" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.34(1)(b). Her suggestion of permanent eight-hour shifts 
did not permit HTI to implement its valid management decision of 
increasing production by using its equipment 24 hours per day.  
Stated another way, her suggestion was not an "accommodation" 
                                                 
29 This is very similar to the reasoning in US Airways, 
where the accommodation must permit the employer's job to be 
done or no accommodation was provided.  See US Airways, 535 U.S. 
at 402. 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
13 
 
because it did not permit the employer to have the job-related 
responsibilities of Roytek's employment met, i.e., working for 
12-hour shifts.  Section 111.34(2)(a) requires this condition in 
order to make a prima facie showing of an accommodation.  See US 
Airways, 535 U.S. at 402.  The majority opinion ignores this 
obligation of a WFEA claimant by repeatedly stating that HTI has 
not shown hardship.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶34 n.15, ¶35. 
¶63 The 
majority 
opinion 
relies 
extensively 
on 
our 
decision in Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, 
264 Wis. 200, 664 N.W.2d 651, where we held that it was a 
reasonable accommodation without hardship to the employer to 
require the employer to retain an employee who could not do all 
the tasks that she had been hired to perform.  Id., ¶51.  We 
concluded that the employer was required to partially reassign 
the employee's duties to two of the three other employees in the 
disabled worker's department because those employees said they 
would complete the tasks that the disabled worker could not 
perform.  Id., ¶78.  Additionally, the employer had not shown 
that 
the 
requested 
physical 
modification 
necessary 
to 
accommodate a wheelchair was a hardship.  Id., ¶80.   
¶64 It is important to note that the majority decision 
here goes far beyond our conclusions in Crystal Lake because 
Crystal Lake focused on the tasks that comprised the job that 
the disabled worker was hired to perform.  Id., ¶70.  In Crystal 
Lake, we concluded that because the tasks the job required would 
continue to be fully accomplished, albeit not all by the 
disabled employee, what the employee offered was a reasonable 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
14 
 
accommodation.  Id., ¶78.  In other words, the valid management 
decision the employer made about what tasks it needed done, got 
done.   
¶65 Here, by contrast, HTI made a valid management 
decision to increase production by implementing 12-hour shifts, 
two per day.  Roytek suggested an eight-hour work schedule, 
which may seem to be an accommodation from her perspective 
because she could do it.  However, it is not a statutory 
accommodation, because HTI is not being permitted to use its 
equipment 24 hours a day for a full team of workers on each 
shift.  And contrary to the accommodation in Crystal Lake where 
other workers offered to do the tasks that the disabled worker 
could not do, no other worker has offered to do Roytek's missing 
four hours per shift.  That no such offer was made is 
understandable because the other workers were already working 12 
hours per shift, four hours of which were the same four hours 
that Roytek was not working. 
¶66 Furthermore, if the accommodation to work less than a 
full shift is held to be sufficient to meet the employee's 
burden under Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b), then that interpretation 
cancels the employer's right under § 111.34(2)(a) to make a 
valid management decision to run its manufacturing business 24 
hours per day.  This was never the intent of the legislature in 
enacting WFEA.  Rather, the purpose of WFEA was to encourage 
employers to evaluate an employee or applicant for employment 
based 
upon 
the 
employee's 
or 
applicant's 
individual 
qualifications.  Section 111.31(2). 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶67 The majority also relies on HTI's permitting Roytek to 
work partial shifts while her back condition was improving to 
support its conclusion that HTI should be required to continue 
with shortened shifts on a permanent basis.  Majority op., ¶35.  
This conclusion appears to be based in part on the court of 
appeals decision in Target, which in my view, the majority 
misinterprets. 
¶68 In Target, the employee was cited by Target for 
repeatedly sleeping on the job.  Management suggested that she 
see a physician to determine why she kept dosing off at work.  
She did so and learned she had a type of sleep apnea.  The 
physician 
suggested 
treatments, which 
the 
employee 
began.  
However, shortly thereafter, she was again cited for sleeping on 
the job, and even though management knew that she was undergoing 
treatment for a sleep disorder, it terminated her, rather than 
waiting a reasonable amount of time to see if the treatment 
would be effective.  The employee sued under WFEA, claiming 
discrimination due to disability, and LIRC concluded that Target 
violated WFEA by not continuing her employment.  LIRC said 
because she was actively treating her disability and it would in 
"all likelihood be [resolved on] a short-term basis," Target 
should have given the treatment a chance to succeed.  Target, 
217 Wis. 2d at 8-9.   
¶69 The court of appeals agreed with LIRC.  However, it 
did not require a permanent change in expectations in regard to 
the employee's not sleeping on the job, but rather a "temporary 
accommodation to permit medical treatment which, if successful, 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
16 
 
will remove the difficulty in performing the job-related 
responsibility."  Id. at 19.  Here, the majority permits a 
permanent disregard of the employer's business decision about 
how to increase production.  In so doing, the majority uses 
HTI's forbearance from termination while Roytek was attempting 
to resolve her back condition against HTI.  This puts employers 
between the proverbial rock and a hard place:  Target requires 
an employer to wait a reasonable time when an employee is being 
treated to resolve a medical condition and the majority opinion 
herein concludes that an employer who waits to see if a medical 
condition will resolve, will have that used against it, if the 
condition becomes permanent and the employee is fired. 
¶70 Also of importance to the case at hand is the court of 
appeals explanation in Target of the interrelationship between 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a): 
When read together, the only reasonable construction 
of these two provisions is that the purpose of 
reasonable accommodation is to enable employees to 
adequately undertake job-related responsibilities. 
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  The relationship between these two 
statutes 
is 
the 
issue 
here 
too, 
but 
the 
majority's 
interpretation 
ignores 
it. 
 
In 
so 
doing 
it 
cancels 
§ 111.34(2)(a), which protects an employer from having to employ 
individuals 
when 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities 
of 
the 
individual's employment will not be met.   
¶71 It is interesting to note that the majority says: 
We begin by recognizing the important role that 
management prerogatives play in the success of a 
business.  This court has stated that "it is necessary 
to preserve the freedom of private enterprise to 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
17 
 
manage its business as it sees fit."  Libby, McNeill & 
Libby v. WERC, 48 Wis. 2d 272, 280, 179 N.W.2d 805 
(1970) [additional citations omitted].  We are mindful 
that a business must have the right to set its own 
employment rules to encourage maximum productivity. 
Majority op., ¶29.  However, these are hollow assurances because 
after the release of the decision in this case, no employer will 
be able to say that a certain number of hours must be worked in 
a shift or that it will use its equipment 24 hours per day and 
seven days a week, if employees and potential employees have 
notes from their doctors that say that those individuals have 
disabilities that prevent them from working more than a stated 
number of hours in a shift.   
¶72 This is a sea change in Wisconsin employment law 
because heretofore employers were not required to forego valid 
business decisions, such as using equipment 24 hours per day, to 
suit employees and prospective employees who were not able to 
undertake those job-related responsibilities.  It is important 
to note that although Roytek wanted to work eight-hour shifts, 
the majority opinion applies equally to other employees and 
prospective employees who can work only six hours of an eight-
hour shift.  For example, when the General Motors plant in 
Janesville works three eight-hour shifts per day and one or more 
employees or prospective employees have statements from a 
physician that the individual can work only six-hour shifts, 
General Motors will be required to let its equipment stand idle 
for two hours each shift for each employee who has such a 
disability.  This cannot be what the legislature had in mind 
when it amended WFEA in 1981. 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
18 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶73 I conclude no WFEA violation occurred because Roytek's 
offer to continue working only two-thirds of her shift is 
insufficient to be an "accommodation," as that term is used in 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b).  Additionally, Roytek's offer results 
in negating § 111.34 (2)(a), which provides that it is not 
discrimination to refuse to employ an individual when the job-
related responsibilities of that individual's employment are not 
met.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent. 
 
No.  02-3328.pdr 
 
 
 
1