Title: Griffith v. State
Citation: 584 So. 2d 383
Docket Number: 07-KA-58672
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 1991

584 So. 2d 383 (1991) Richard Lee GRIFFITH v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 07-KA-58672. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 3, 1991. *384 M. Charles May, Jackson, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen., elected Supreme Court Justice Jan. 3, 1989, Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Pat S. Flynn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court: On February 11, 1987, Richard Lee Griffith was indicted for the sexual battery of Sally S., a ten-year-old mentally retarded female, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95. He was charged with having committed the offense on or about November 9, 1985. On July 21, 1987, Griffith was convicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County of the felonious sexual penetration with his finger of Sally S., and was sentenced to fifteen years, ten of which were suspended. Because of the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony by the victim's teacher, we reverse. We also furnish guidelines for the courts to use in determining whether out-of-court statements made by a victim of child sexual abuse should be admitted into evidence before a jury. At Griffith's trial, the first witness for the State was Sally S. The defense objected to her testimony on the basis that she was not a competent witness. Sally's mother, Betty Jean, was the next witness. She testified that her daughter was mentally retarded. She said Sally was sometimes truthful and had a very short memory span. She also testified that she did not believe the defendant had sexually abused Sally, although she did believe someone else had done so. Judy Thompson, a psychometrist with the Jackson Public Schools, had conducted a mental evaluation of Sally in 1985. She testified that the child was mentally retarded, with an I.Q. ranging from 62 to 67, and was below average in "academics, social interaction, and intellectual activities." Dr. Nina Bess Goss Moffatt, director of the out-patient clinic and the Department of Psychiatry at the University Medical Center, examined Sally on June 19, 1987. Dr. Moffatt is a practicing and teaching psychiatrist. Sally's mother brought Sally to Dr. Moffatt so that she could determine if Sally was telling the truth. Dr. Moffatt told her that she could not any more make that determination about Sally than she could about Sally's mother. From her examination of Sally, Dr. Moffatt determined that Sally had congenital encephalopathy with a small head, and paralysis. Sally had suffered from seizures and a paralysis on her right side but had improved. She was friendly and cooperative, and when questioned about the alleged sexual abuse, admitted that it had occurred. "She did say that she had been molested but she did not tell us who this person was. Her speech is very simple with two or three word sentences." Dr. Moffatt was of the opinion that Sally could not testify in court. "We really didn't think she could because she was easily intimidated and we really didn't feel that it was an appropriate thing to do with this little girl." Dr. Moffatt also indicated that she believed that Sally, with a reading level of a first grader and an I.Q. of mild retardation, was not capable of being cross-examined in court. "I think that it would be harmful to this little girl to subject her to this. I think it would scare her to death." Dr. Moffatt did testify that she believed that Sally was capable of relating the truth about what had happened to her to someone who was used to dealing with children and who Sally trusted. Dr. Moffatt said that if she had seen Sally over a period of time, she could have developed that kind of relationship with Sally. *385 Sue Vaughn holds a master's degree and teaches mentally retarded children. In 1985, she was employed at the Lake Elementary School in Jackson. Sally was one of her pupils. She testified about Sally's behavior on November 9, 1985: Vaughn further testified that Sally said that when her mother returned from the grocery store and was told what had happened, her mother said, "Sally, he didn't do that." The circuit court admitted this testimony over defense objection. Dr. Mary Gail Armstrong, a physician with a specialty in family practice, examined Sally on March 6, 1986. She testified that Sally did not have an intact hymen. The introitus, or opening to the vagina, was enlarged to a point beyond what she would have expected for a child of Sally's age. When asked about causation for this condition, she replied, "One of the strong opinions that I might have might be sexual abuse." Dr. Armstrong further testified that Sally told her that Griffith had touched her on her private parts. She said that Griffith was the "only person that the child related *386 any possible problem with." Dr. Armstrong found no sign of tearing, scarring or bruising. When the State rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court overruled the motion. Griffith then testified in his own defense. He denied having sexually molested Sally in any way. Instead, he suggested that his stepson, who he said was also mentally retarded, had abused Sally. Griffith testified that he had seen the two "wrestling," which Griffith considered improper. In his first assignment of error, Griffith contends that the court erred in permitting Sally to testify. Since Sally's testimony was innocuous, we do not address the assignment. Griffith also complains of the admission of hearsay testimony through Drs. Nina Moffatt and Mary Gail Armstrong and through Sally's teacher, Sue Vaughn, who were allowed to testify as to what Sally told them. The circuit court found the statements admissible under Rule 803(2), (3), and (4) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Those provide as follows: During Dr. Moffatt's examination of Sally, Sally merely informed Dr. Moffatt that she had been molested. She did not name the person. Therefore, Dr. Moffatt's testimony was admissible under Rule 803(4). Dr. Armstrong's testimony was also admissible under Rule 803(4) since the services she rendered were medical. See Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1147 (Miss. 1990); Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 398 (Miss. 1989). Sue Vaughn was allowed to testify as to statements made to her by Sally. The court allowed admission of these statements under Rules 803(2) and (3). However, the testimony by Sue Vaughn does not indicate when those statements were made to her by Sally. Because the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the statements were made by Sally while she "was under stress of excitement caused by the event or condition" or that the statements were of Sally's "then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition," we must reverse and remand for a new trial. We note that Sue Vaughn was also allowed to testify that in her opinion, Sally had told her the truth because Sally "could not have told this story twice and almost word for word if she had not experienced it. That is the reason why I truly believe her." A direct opinion offered by a witness in a child sexual abuse case as to the child's veracity has been held by a majority of courts to be inadmissible. State v. Holloway, *387 82 N.C. App. 586, 587, 347 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1986); Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1988); State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 385, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (1986); People v. Oliver, 745 P.2d 222, 225 (Colo. 1987); see generally cases cited in Myers, et al., Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complaints in Sexual Abuse Prosecution, 68 Neb.L.Rev. 1, 121, fn. 528 (1989). We have indicated that such testimony is, at best, "of dubious competency." Williams v. State, 539 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Miss. 1989). See also Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1153 (Miss. 1990); Hosford v. State, 560 So. 2d 163, 166-167 (Miss. 1990); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 821-823 (Miss. 1984). On remand, we caution the court against allowing direct comments as to Sally's veracity. On remand, the court must determine whether the statements made to Vaughn by Sally are admissible hearsay. That determination must take into account the recent additions to the Rules of Evidence. First, the court should decide if any of the statements come under either the "excited utterance" exception of Rule 803(2) or the "then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition" exception of Rule 803(3) if Sue Vaughn is able to pinpoint the date when Sally made the statements to her. See generally, U.S. v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.1984); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984); U.S. v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919, 102 S. Ct. 1777, 72 L. Ed. 2d 179; U.S. v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S. Ct. 578, 66 L. Ed. 2d 476; U.S. v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 61 (1972). The court must also examine Sally's statements to Sue Vaughn in light of Rule 804(a)(6), a recent adoption by this Court. Rule 804(a)(6) provides that a declarant is unavailable in the following situation: Rule 804(a)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 617 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, another recent enactment. Rule 617 allows a child sexual abuse victim to testify by way of closed-circuit television upon a finding by the court that "there is a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer traumatic emotional or mental distress if compelled to testify in open court and, in the case of a criminal prosecution, if compelled to testify in the presence of the accused." The U.S. Supreme Court approved such a procedure in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990). In order to justify using the procedure, the State must make an adequate showing of necessity. *388 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 3169, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 686 (1990). The availability of the child to testify is not measured solely in terms of physical presence but refers as well to the child's ability to communicate in a trial setting. We note that Sally's ability to communicate in court may be jeopardized by her retarded mental condition. Once the court determines that Sally is or is not available to testify, the court should determine whether the statements made by Sally to Sue Vaughn are admissible under 803(25). That Rule provides: In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1990), the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to whether hearsay statements bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" which would render them admissible under the Confrontation Clause. The Court noted: Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 3150, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 656. Finally, in examining the inherent trustworthiness of such hearsay testimony prior to admitting it into evidence before the jury, the circuit court cannot consider other corroborating evidence of Griffith's guilt. "To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial." Id. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 3150, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 657. Although Rule 803(25) requires corroborating evidence of the act where the child is unavailable as a witness before the hearsay statement may be admitted into evidence, the fact that there is corroborating evidence does not by itself render the statement admissible. The statement has to bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" in order to be admitted. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON and BANKS, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, P.J., concurs in result only. *389 McRAE, J., dissents, without separate written opinion. PITTMAN, J., not participating.