Title: Ballard RN Center, Inc. v. Kohll's Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc.
Citation: 2015 IL 118644
Docket Number: 118644
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 22, 2015

2015 IL 118644 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 118644) 
BALLARD RN CENTER, INC., Appellant, v. KOHLL’S PHARMACY AND 
HOMECARE, INC., Appellee. 
 
 
Opinion filed October 22, 2015. 
 
 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Karmeier, Burke, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
This appeal involves our decision in Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 241 Ill. 
2d 450 (2011), holding that a class action may be dismissed as moot when the 
defendant tenders relief to the named plaintiff prior to the filing of a motion for 
class certification. Specifically, we are asked to decide whether Barber requires 
any sort of threshold evidentiary or factual basis for the motion for class 
certification, and whether Barber permits a “partial” tender on a single count of a 
multicount class action complaint to render that single count moot. 
¶ 2 
 
In this case, plaintiff concurrently filed a three-count “junk fax” class action 
complaint and a motion for class certification prior to defendant’s tender of relief 
 
 
- 2 - 
 
on one of the counts. Rejecting defendant’s interpretation of Barber on the 
sufficiency of plaintiff’s class certification motion, the circuit court certified the 
class on all three counts of plaintiff’s complaint. On interlocutory appeal, the 
appellate court affirmed class certification on two of the counts but reversed 
certification on the single count that defendant tendered relief. 2014 IL App (1st) 
131543, ¶ 64. 
¶ 3 
 
For the following reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part the appellate 
court’s judgment. 
 
¶ 4 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 5 
 
On April 20, 2010, plaintiff, Ballard RN Center, Inc., filed a three-count class 
action complaint in the circuit court of Cook County, alleging that on March 3, 
2010, defendant, Kohll’s Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc., sent plaintiff an unsolicited 
fax advertisement. The complaint alleged that defendant’s conduct: (1) violated the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (Protection Act) (47 U.S.C. § 227 
(2006)) (count I); (2) violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 
Practices Act (Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2010)) (count II); and (3) 
constituted common-law conversion of plaintiff’s ink or toner and paper (count 
III). Each of the three counts included class allegations indicating that plaintiff was 
filing the action on behalf of a class estimated at over 40 individuals. The complaint 
sought actual damages, statutory damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. 
¶ 6 
 
The complaint specifically alleged that plaintiff did not have a prior business 
relationship with defendant and plaintiff did not authorize defendant to send fax 
advertisements to plaintiff. The complaint further alleged that defendant’s fax 
advertisement did not provide the requisite “opt out notice” required by the 
Protection Act when faxes are sent with consent or pursuant to an established 
business relationship. The complaint asserted, on information and belief, that the 
fax was part of a “mass broadcasting of faxes” and defendant transmitted similar 
unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois.  
¶ 7 
 
Plaintiff attached a copy of the one-page fax advertisement to its complaint. 
The fax advertises defendant’s “Corporate Flu Shots” and provides estimates of the 
costs associated with employees missing work because of illness. It also provides a 
toll-free contact number for a “free quote” and an associated website. At the bottom 
 
 
- 3 - 
 
of the fax, under the heading “Removal From List Request,” it advises that “[i]f you 
have received this information in error or if you are requesting that transmissions 
cease in the future, please notify the sender to be removed as the recipient of future 
transmissions.” The instructions provide two contact telephone numbers and an 
email address for removal requests.  
¶ 8 
 
Concurrent with its filing of the complaint on April 20, 2010, plaintiff also filed 
a motion for class certification pursuant to section 2-801 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-801 et seq. (West 2010)). Referencing the 
description in plaintiff’s class action complaint, the motion sought certification of 
the following classes: 
 
“All persons and entities with facsimile numbers (1) who, on or after April 
20, 2006, or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of 
defendant Kohll’s Pharmacy & HomeCare, Inc., (2) were sent faxes by or on 
behalf of defendant Kohll’s Pharmacy & HomeCare, Inc., promoting its goods 
or services for sale (3) and who were not provided an ‘opt out’ notice that 
complies with federal law. (Count I)  
 
All persons and entities with Illinois fax numbers (1) who, on or after April 
20, 2007, or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of 
defendant Kohll’s Pharmacy & HomeCare, Inc., (2) were sent faxes by or on 
behalf of defendant Kohll’s Pharmacy & HomeCare, Inc., promoting its goods 
or services for sale (3) and who were not provided an ‘opt out’ notice that 
complies with federal law. (Count II) 
 
All persons and entities with Illinois fax numbers (1) who, on or after April 
20, 2005, or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of 
defendant Kohll’s Pharmacy & HomeCare, Inc., (2) were sent faxes by or on 
behalf of defendant Kohll’s Pharmacy & HomeCare, Inc., promoting its goods 
or services for sale (3) and who were not provided an ‘opt out’ notice that 
complies with federal law. (Count III).” 
¶ 9 
 
Plaintiff’s class certification motion further asserted that “[s]everal courts have 
certified class actions under the [Protection Act],” and cited as examples a number 
of decisions from state and federal courts in Illinois and other states. The motion 
provided that plaintiff would file a supporting memorandum of law “in due 
course.”  
 
 
- 4 - 
 
¶ 10 
 
On June 28, 2012, defendant filed a motion seeking summary judgment solely 
on count I of plaintiff’s complaint that sought recovery under the federal Protection 
Act. In its motion, defendant alleged that on three separate occasions defendant 
tendered plaintiff an unconditional offer of payment exceeding the total 
recoverable Protection Act damages. Plaintiff, however, rejected all three tenders. 
Defendant further alleged that plaintiff did not file a motion for class certification 
despite the case being open for “over two years.” Citing this court’s decision in 
Barber, defendant argued that plaintiff’s Protection Act claim in count I of its 
complaint was rendered moot by the three tenders because this court held that a 
class action is moot when a defendant offers tender before the plaintiff files a 
motion for class certification. 
¶ 11 
 
Defendant attached to its motion for summary judgment three letters that it 
mailed to plaintiff offering tender of relief. The first, dated June 29, 2011, included 
a check for $1,600; the second, dated June 5, 2012, included a check for $1,500; the 
third, dated June 28, 2012, included a check for $2,500. Plaintiff rejected all three 
offers and returned the checks.  
¶ 12 
 
On September 7, 2012, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment. Contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiff argued that its 
action was not moot under Barber because plaintiff timely filed a motion for class 
certification concurrently with its class action complaint on April 20, 2010. 
Plaintiff further argued that defendant tendered relief only on count I of plaintiff’s 
three-count complaint and, thus, did not offer the complete relief required to moot 
the action.  
¶ 13 
 
Regarding defendant’s observation that plaintiff’s action was pending for over 
two years, plaintiff contended that it “diligently pursued the discovery necessary to 
present the Court with briefing on the class certification issue,” and that “[a]ny 
delay in proceeding on class certification is a direct result of [d]efendant’s 
obfuscation of discovery in this case.” Plaintiff noted that it filed two motions to 
compel discovery, a motion to compel inspection to identify relevant third parties 
and potential class members, and also propounded discovery on third parties. 
Plaintiff indicated that it engaged in efforts to enforce discovery through March 
2012. 
¶ 14 
 
On October 9, 2012, defendant filed a reply in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. Citing Barber, defendant argued that summary judgment in its 
 
 
- 5 - 
 
favor on count I was proper because defendant tendered full damages on the 
Protection Act claims in count I and “no appropriate or even complete motion for 
class certification is pending.” Defendant contended that “the linchpin of 
[plaintiff’s] entire argument is an incomplete motion that has not been pursued for 
over two years.” Alternatively, defendant asserted that plaintiff’s motion for class 
certification should be denied as insufficient under section 2-801 of the Code (735 
ILCS 5/2-801 et seq. (West 2010)). 
¶ 15 
 
On November 19, 2012, plaintiff filed an amended motion for class 
certification, seeking to certify a class of “(a) all parties (b) who, on or about March 
3, 2010, (c) were sent advertising faxes by defendant and (d) with respect to whom 
defendant cannot provide evidence of consent or a prior business relationship.” 
Plaintiff asserted that its action satisfied the prerequisites for a class action under 
section 2-801 of the Code. Specifically, plaintiff contended that its action satisfied 
the numerosity requirement because discovery revealed that defendant contracted 
with third parties to purchase over 4,700 fax numbers and send blast fax 
advertisements to those numbers. Ultimately, 4,142 faxes were successfully 
transmitted by a third party on defendant’s behalf. Plaintiff noted that defendant did 
not present any evidence that any of the faxes were sent to recipients that consented 
to receipt of advertisements or otherwise had a prior business relationship with 
defendant. 
¶ 16 
 
Plaintiff further asserted that questions of law and fact common to the class 
predominated over any questions affecting only individual members, including: (1) 
whether defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; 
(2) whether defendant thereby violated the federal Protection Act; (3) whether 
defendant thereby converted plaintiffs’ toner and paper; and (4) whether defendant 
thereby engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of the Fraud 
Act. Plaintiff also asserted that it would fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class and that a class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. 
¶ 17 
 
On November 29, 2012, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment on count I of plaintiff’s complaint. The court reasoned that 
defendant did not offer tender on count I before plaintiff filed its motion for class 
certification and, therefore, the claim was not moot under Barber. Disagreeing with 
defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s motion for class certification was merely a 
 
 
- 6 - 
 
“shell” motion, the circuit court concluded that “Barber requires only that a motion 
for class certification be filed. It does not require that it meet any certain standard.”  
¶ 18 
 
On March 14, 2013, defendant filed a response in opposition to plaintiff’s 
motion for class certification, arguing that plaintiff’s motion should be denied 
because plaintiff failed to establish that a class action should proceed under section 
2-801 of the Code. Specifically, defendant argued that unresolved questions of fact 
existed that were unique to each potential class member, including whether: (1) 
defendant had existing business relationships with any of the unnamed plaintiffs; 
(2) defendant performed acts rising to the standards of conversion regarding the ink 
and toner paper; and (3) plaintiff adequately represented the class. Defendant 
further argued that class certification was inappropriate on the Protection Act 
claims when only one plaintiff had come forward and over three years had elapsed 
since the alleged transmission of the fax advertisement.  
¶ 19 
 
On April 15, 2013, the circuit court granted plaintiff’s amended motion for 
class certification. The court found that numerosity was satisfied because over 
4,000 fax advertisements were sent and that common class questions predominated 
because defendant was alleged to have acted wrongly in the same general way to all 
class members. The court also found that plaintiff was an adequate class 
representative and that a class action was an appropriate method for resolution of 
the claims. Defendant appealed.  
¶ 20 
 
On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s order 
certifying the class on counts II and III but reversed the court’s class certification 
on count I. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, ¶ 64. The appellate court agreed with 
defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s initial motion for class certification, filed 
concurrently with its class action complaint, was a “shell” motion that was 
insufficient under our decision in Barber. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, ¶ 60.  
¶ 21 
 
While acknowledging that Barber did not expressly set forth requirements for a 
valid motion for class certification, the appellate court nonetheless concluded that 
“implicit” in Barber was a requirement that “a motion must contain sufficient 
factual allegations so that it does, in fact, bring the interests of the other class 
members before the court.” 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, ¶ 57. Explaining its 
interpretation of Barber, the appellate court stated that “[o]therwise, the court has 
no basis upon which to determine whether an actual controversy exists between the 
other class members and the defendant, as would avoid mooting the issue.” 2014 IL 
 
 
- 7 - 
 
App (1st) 131543, ¶ 57. Reviewing plaintiff’s initial motion for class certification, 
the court concluded that because the motion lacked factual allegations in support of 
class certification, plaintiff “had not yet filed a motion for class certification within 
the meaning of Barber” to avoid a finding of mootness. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, 
¶ 60. 
¶ 22 
 
On the adequacy of defendant’s tender of relief on Count I, the appellate court 
noted that plaintiff did not contest defendant’s assertion that the $2,500 tendered by 
defendant was sufficient to satisfy count I and that defendant conceded at oral 
argument that its tender only pertained to count I. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, 
¶¶ 62-63. Consequently, the court concluded that defendant’s tender operated to 
moot only count I of plaintiff’s complaint but not counts II and III. The court then 
reversed the trial court’s class certification on count I but affirmed its certification 
on counts II and III. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, ¶ 64. 
¶ 23 
 
We allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 
2013). We also allowed G.M. Sign, Inc. and the Illinois Association of Defense 
Trial Counsel to file amicus curiae briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).  
 
¶ 24 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 25 
 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the appellate court erroneously construed 
Barber to require the motion for class certification filed with its class action 
complaint to contain sufficient factual allegations and “evidentiary materials 
adduced through discovery” to avoid mootness when a defendant tenders relief to 
the named class representative. Plaintiff urges this court to reject that interpretation 
and, instead, adopt the procedure employed by the federal courts. Specifically, 
plaintiff maintains that “[w]hile federal courts in Illinois also require the filing of a 
class certification motion with the complaint, they expressly recognized that 
information about the size of the class and nature of defendant’s practices will have 
to be obtained during discovery and supplied later.” Plaintiff further argues that the 
appellate court improperly construed Barber to permit a class action defendant to 
moot selectively a single count of a multicount complaint by making “partial” 
tender on that count. 
¶ 26 
 
Defendant responds that the appellate court correctly concluded that plaintiff’s 
initial motion for class certification was a “shell” or “placeholder” motion with 
 
 
- 8 - 
 
insufficient factual allegations to bring the interests of the class before the trial 
court for purposes of Barber. Thus, defendant asserts that plaintiff’s motion could 
not operate to preclude a finding of mootness under Barber. Defendant further 
argues that permitting a named plaintiff in a class action to file an unsubstantiated 
motion for class certification concurrently with the class action complaint to avoid 
mootness would “eviscerate” this court’s holding in Barber. Accordingly, 
defendant contends that the appellate court properly reversed the circuit court’s 
class certification on count I in this case because defendant tendered relief on that 
count before plaintiff filed a proper motion for class certification. Defendant, 
however, does not respond to plaintiff’s argument that a “partial tender” of relief is 
improper under Barber.  
¶ 27 
 
Defendant also devotes a significant portion of its brief to arguing that the 
appellate court’s decision should be “affirmed on other grounds.” Specifically, 
defendant argues that the appellate court erroneously found that class certification 
was an appropriate method of resolution of this case, erroneously concluded that 
common issues of fact and law predominated over individual defenses, and 
erroneously determined that plaintiff was an adequate representative. 
¶ 28 
 
To resolve the issues presented in this appeal, we must determine whether the 
appellate court properly interpreted our decision in Barber. Because the contested 
issues present questions of law, our review is de novo. Center Partners, Ltd. v. 
Growth Head GP, LLC, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 27. 
¶ 29 
 
We first consider whether the appellate court properly interpreted Barber to 
require the motion for class certification filed with a class action complaint to 
contain sufficient factual allegations and “evidentiary materials adduced through 
discovery” to avoid mootness when a defendant tenders relief to the named 
plaintiff. To answer this question, we must review our decision in Barber.  
¶ 30 
 
In Barber, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the defendant 
airline company based on the defendant’s alleged refusal to refund a prepaid $40 
baggage fee after her scheduled flight was cancelled. The plaintiff’s two-count 
complaint alleged a single count of breach of contract and a single class action 
count seeking recovery on behalf of similarly situated persons. The plaintiff, 
however, did not file a motion for class certification. Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 452-53. 
¶ 31 
 
Less than a month after the plaintiff’s complaint was filed, the defendant in 
Barber offered to refund the $40 baggage fee, but the plaintiff refused to accept the 
 
 
- 9 - 
 
refund. Ultimately, the defendant refunded the $40 fee to the plaintiff’s credit card, 
the original form of payment. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing, in relevant part, that the class action complaint 
was moot because the defendant had refunded the contested $40 fee to the plaintiff. 
Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on 
mootness grounds. A majority of the appellate court reversed and remanded, 
concluding that the plaintiff’s claim was not moot. Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 453-54.  
¶ 32 
 
On appeal to this court, the defendant in Barber argued that the appellate court 
majority erred in reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. 
The defendant argued that the underlying cause of action must be dismissed as 
moot when a class action defendant tenders the named plaintiff the relief requested 
before a motion for class certification is filed. Because the defendant tendered the 
contested $40 baggage fee to the plaintiff and refunded that amount to her credit 
card, the defendant argued that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s 
class action complaint as moot. Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 454-55. 
¶ 33 
 
In response, the Barber plaintiff argued that defendant’s tender was an unfair 
attempt to “pick off” her claim as class representative to defeat the proposed class 
action. The plaintiff argued that the appellate court properly rejected the 
defendant’s attempt to defeat the class action under the so-called “ ‘pick off’ 
exception” that had developed in the Illinois appellate court. Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 
455.  
¶ 34 
 
Turning to the merits of the parties’ arguments in Barber, this court focused on 
mootness principles applicable to class actions. Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 456 (citing 
Wheatley v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 99 Ill. 2d 
481 (1984)). Specifically, this court explained that: 
 
“[T]he important consideration in determining whether a named 
representative’s claim is moot is whether that representative filed a motion for 
class certification prior to the time when the defendant made its tender. 
[Citations.] Where the named representative has done so, and the motion is thus 
pending at the time the tender is made, the case is not moot, and the circuit court 
should hear and decide the motion for class certification before deciding 
whether the case is mooted by the tender. [Citation.] The reason is that a motion 
for class certification, while pending, sufficiently brings the interests of the 
other class members before the court ‘so that the apparent conflict between 
 
 
- 10 - 
 
their interests and those of the defendant will avoid a mootness artificially 
created by the defendant by making the named plaintiff whole.’ ” Barber, 241 
Ill. 2d at 456-57 (quoting Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 
869 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
We further explained in Barber, however, that the situation is different when the 
tender is made before the filing of a motion for class certification. In that situation, 
the interests of the other class members are not before the court, and the case may 
properly be dismissed. Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 457. Thus, this court concluded that 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s class action was proper in Barber because there was no 
motion for class certification pending when the defendant refunded the contested 
$40 baggage fee to the named plaintiff, thereby mooting her claim. Barber, 241 Ill. 
2d at 457.  
¶ 35 
 
Lastly, this court in Barber rejected the so-called “pick off” exception that had 
developed in the Illinois appellate court. We concluded that the “pick off” 
exception lacked a valid legal basis and also contradicted applicable mootness 
principles when the named plaintiff in a class action is granted the requested relief. 
Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 460. 
¶ 36 
 
Having carefully reviewed Barber, it is clear that Barber contains no explicit 
requirement for the class certification motion, other than the timing of its filing. In 
other words, Barber does not impose any sort of threshold evidentiary or factual 
basis for the class certification motion.  
¶ 37 
 
Nevertheless, the appellate court here discerned an “implicit” requirement for 
the class certification motion, concluding that Barber required the motion for class 
certification to “contain sufficient factual allegations so that it does, in fact, bring 
the interests of the other class members before the court.” 2014 IL App (1st) 
131543, ¶ 57. The appellate court also concluded that the motion should contain 
“evidentiary materials adduced through discovery.” (Emphasis omitted.) 2014 IL 
App (1st) 131543, ¶ 58. The appellate court expressed concern that “if a putative 
class action plaintiff could circumvent the holding of Barber merely by filing a 
contentless ‘shell’ motion for class certification contemporaneously with its 
complaint, then it would effectively eviscerate the Barber decision.” 2014 IL App 
(1st) 131543, ¶ 59. 
¶ 38 
 
While we agree in principle with the appellate court’s suggestion that a 
“contentless ‘shell’ motion,” or otherwise frivolous pleading, would be insufficient 
 
 
- 11 - 
 
to preclude a mootness finding under Barber, we disagree with the court’s 
determination that plaintiff’s motion for class certification here was a “shell” 
motion that lacked content. To the contrary, plaintiff’s motion for class certification 
identified defendant, the applicable date or dates, and the general outline of 
plaintiff’s class action allegations. More specifically, plaintiff’s motion sought 
certification of three separate classes of individuals with fax numbers who received 
fax advertisements from defendant during a specific time period and were not 
provided the requisite “opt out” notice. The motion also referenced the description 
of the classes in plaintiff’s concurrently-filed class action complaint, a pleading that 
provided additional factual allegations. Thus, it is simply inaccurate to characterize 
plaintiff’s motion as a frivolous “shell” motion when it contains a general outline of 
plaintiff’s class membership, class action allegations, and effectively 
communicates the fundamental nature of the putative class action.  
¶ 39 
 
Even assuming that plaintiff’s motion for class certification was insufficient for 
purposes of class certification under section 2-801 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-801 
et seq. (West 2010)), our decision in Barber did not hold that the motion for class 
certification must be meritorious. To the contrary, the focus of Barber is on the 
timing of the plaintiff’s filing a motion for class certification—there is no mention 
of the ultimate merits of that motion. As this court explained in Barber, “a motion 
for class certification, while pending, sufficiently brings the interests of the other 
class members before the court ‘so that the apparent conflict between their interests 
and those of the defendant will avoid a mootness artificially created by the 
defendant by making the named plaintiff whole.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Barber, 241 
Ill. 2d at 457 (quoting Susman, 587 F.2d at 869); see also Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 461 
(Kilbride, C.J., specially concurring) (emphasizing that Barber “hinges its analysis 
on the filing of a motion for certification”) . 
¶ 40 
 
Focusing on the timing of the filing of the motion for class certification rather 
than on its ultimate merit is also consistent with the approach taken in the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. It is settled that we may consider federal case law for 
guidance on class action issues because the Illinois class action statute is patterned 
on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mashal v. City of Chicago, 
2012 IL 112341, ¶ 24 (citing Smith v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 223 Ill. 2d 441, 
447-48 (2006)). Here, plaintiff directs our attention to the Seventh Circuit’s 
 
 
- 12 - 
 
decision in Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011)1. The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach also addresses defendant’s concern with the potential 
delay in litigation resulting from discovery efforts while the motion for class 
certification is pending. 
¶ 41 
 
Consistent with Barber, the Seventh Circuit holds that tender of relief to the 
named plaintiff before a motion for class certification is filed renders the action 
moot but a tender made after a certification motion is filed does not. Espenscheid v. 
DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 874 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Damasco, 662 
F.3d at 896 (citing Barber and recognizing that this court’s approach on the issue is 
the same as the Seventh Circuit). More specifically, the court has explained “ ‘the 
mooting of the named plaintiff’s claim in a class action by the defendant’s 
satisfying the claim does not moot the action so long as the case has been certified 
as a class action, or ... so long as a motion for class certification has been made and 
not ruled on, unless ... the movant has been dilatory.’ ” Espenscheid, 688 F.3d at 
874 (quoting Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 546-47 (7th Cir. 
2003)). 
¶ 42 
 
Relevant to the controversy here, the Seventh Circuit has also thoroughly 
addressed the competing interests of the defendant and the named plaintiff on the 
issue of tender mooting the class action. Rejecting the class action defendant’s 
concern that a plaintiff may have an incentive to move for class certification 
prematurely without the fully developed facts or discovery required to obtain 
certification, the court explained that: 
“If the parties have yet to fully develop the facts needed for certification, then 
they can also ask the district court to delay its ruling to provide time for 
additional discovery or investigation. In a variety of other contexts, we have 
allowed plaintiffs to request stays after filing suit in order to allow them to 
complete essential activities. [Citations.] *** We remind district courts that 
they must engage in a ‘rigorous analysis’—sometimes probing behind the 
pleadings—before ruling on certification. [Citation.] Although discovery may 
in some cases be unnecessary to resolve class issues [citation], in other cases a 
                                                 
 
1After the parties filed their briefs and this court heard oral argument in this appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit overruled Damasco and a number of other decisions from that court “to the extent they hold 
that a defendant’s offer of full compensation moots the litigation or otherwise ends the Article III 
case or controversy.” (Emphasis added.) Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 
2015). Here, plaintiff does not rely on Damasco for that legal issue and we do not consider Damasco 
on that question. 
 
 
- 13 - 
 
court may abuse its discretion by not allowing for appropriate discovery before 
deciding whether to certify a class [citations].” Damasco, 662 F.3d at 896-97. 
We believe this approach is entirely consistent with our decision in Barber and 
correctly affords the trial court discretion to manage the development of the 
putative class action on a case-by-case basis. See Smith, 223 Ill. 2d at 447 (citing 
Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 125-26 
(2005) (noting that “[d]ecisions regarding class certification are within the 
discretion of the trial court”)). In addition, it also properly balances the competing 
interests of the named plaintiff and defendant in class actions. 
¶ 43 
 
Accordingly, because Barber did not impose any explicit requirements on the 
motion for class certification, let alone a heightened evidentiary or factual basis for 
the motion, we conclude that plaintiff’s motion for class certification in this case 
was sufficient for purposes of Barber. In cases when additional discovery or further 
development of the factual basis is necessary, as occurred here, those matters will 
be left to the discretion of the trial court. 
¶ 44 
 
Here, plaintiff undisputedly filed its motion for class certification before 
defendant’s purported tender of relief on count I. As we explained in Barber, “the 
important consideration in determining whether a named representative’s claim is 
moot is whether that representative filed a motion for class certification prior to the 
time when the defendant made its tender.” Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 456.  Simply put, 
defendant's tender of relief, “partial” or otherwise,2 after plaintiff filed its class 
certification motion could not render moot any part of plaintiff's pending action 
under Barber. See Barber, 241 Ill. 2d at 456-47 (explaining why mootness does not 
apply when a motion for class certification is pending when the defendant tenders 
relief to the named representative). The appellate court erred in reaching the 
opposite conclusion, and we reverse that part of its decision. 
¶ 45 
 
Lastly, defendant, as the appellee, argues that “[t]he decision of the appellate 
court to deny class certification should be affirmed on other grounds.” We note, 
however, that the circuit court ruled in favor of plaintiff on all three counts and 
                                                 
 
2Because plaintiff filed its motion for class certification before defendant tendered relief, the 
adequacy of defendant’s “partial” tender of relief under Barber is immaterial to our disposition. 
Thus, we do not address plaintiff’s argument on the adequacy of defendant’s “partial” tender here. 
See In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351 (2009) (generally, Illinois courts do not render advisory 
opinions or consider issues that have no impact on the outcome regardless of how the issue is 
decided). 
 
 
- 14 - 
 
certified the class on all counts. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment on counts II and III of plaintiff’s complaint. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, 
¶ 64. Based on its understanding of Barber, the appellate court reversed the trial 
court’s class certification only on count I of plaintiff’s complaint. See 2014 IL App 
(1st) 131543, ¶ 64 (appellate court concluding “[w]e therefore reverse the trial 
court’s class certification insofar as it pertains to count I, but we affirm in all other 
respects”). 
¶ 46 
 
While the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order certifying the class on 
count I on the basis of its interpretation of Barber, we have already resolved that 
issue in plaintiff’s favor. See supra ¶¶ 31-48. Nonetheless, defendant argues in its 
alternative argument to affirm the appellate court’s judgment that the court “erred” 
when it found that class certification was an appropriate method of resolution. 
Defendant further argues that the appellate court “erred” in determining that 
common issues of fact and law predominate over individual defenses regarding the 
Protection Act claim (count I) and conversion claim (count III). Contrary to the 
appellate court’s conclusion, defendant also argues that class certification should 
have been denied because plaintiff is an unacceptable “tainted” class 
representative.  
¶ 47 
 
Notably, like the circuit court, the appellate court found in favor of plaintiff on 
all of these class certification issues. 2014 IL App (1st) 131543, ¶¶ 20-32, 43, 52. In 
other words, defendant’s contentions in its alternative argument to affirm the 
appellate court’s judgment have been considered, and rejected, by both the circuit 
court and appellate court. More to the point, as plaintiff correctly observes in its 
reply brief, “[a]lthough no other issues related to the appellate court’s ruling were 
raised in the petition for leave to appeal, [defendant] asks the court to hold that class 
certification was improper for other reasons.” As plaintiff’s observation 
demonstrates, defendant, as the appellee, effectively seeks reversal of the circuit 
court’s judgment on these class certification issues despite both the trial court and 
appellate court having considered those certification issues on their merits and 
resolving them in plaintiff’s favor. 
¶ 48 
 
Defendant, however, fails to advance clearly its argument that the appellate 
court's judgment “should be affirmed on other grounds.” Moreover, defendant's 
alternative argument omits citation to the record for a number of its claims, in 
contravention of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7), (i) (eff. 
Feb. 6, 2013)), and relies significantly on nonprecedential unpublished decisions 
 
 
- 15 - 
 
from the federal courts or the Illinois circuit court. Under these circumstances, we 
decline to consider the merits of defendant's alternative argument. See, e.g., People 
ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶¶ 
56-57 (observing that a reviewing court is entitled to clear presentation of the issues 
and citation to pertinent authority, and concluding that an issue was forfeited for 
failure to comply with Rule 341(h)(7), (i)).  
 
¶ 49 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 50 
 
For these reasons, we reverse the part of the appellate court’s judgment that 
reversed the circuit court’s order certifying the class on count I and affirm the 
remaining parts of its judgment. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment and remand 
the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
 
¶ 51 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
¶ 52 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
¶ 53 
 
Cause remanded.