Title: Kaltman v. All American Pest Control
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 092541
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Koontz, S.J.* 
 
ALVIN KALTMAN, ET AL. 
OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v. Record No. 092541 
March 4, 2011 
 
ALL AMERICAN PEST  
CONTROL, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Marcus D. Williams, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, a husband and wife filed complaints 
against a pest control company and its employee after the 
employee allegedly treated the couple’s home with a pesticide 
that was not approved for residential use.  We consider 
whether the circuit court erred in sustaining demurrers to the 
homeowners’ claims of negligence, willful and wanton conduct, 
and negligence per se.  The principal issue we decide is 
whether the alleged acts of the company and employee sound in 
tort or contract.  
BACKGROUND 
 
Since the circuit court decided this case upon a demurrer 
without an evidentiary hearing, we will summarize the facts as 
alleged in the pleadings.  Eagles Court Condominium Unit 
Owners Ass’n v. Heatilator, Inc., 239 Va. 325, 327, 389 S.E.2d 
304, 304 (1990)).  In doing so, we consider the facts stated 
                     
* Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
and all those reasonably and fairly implied in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving parties, Alvin and Gwendolyn 
Kaltman (“the Kaltmans”).  Yuzefovsky v. St. John’s Wood 
Apartments, 261 Va. 97, 102, 540 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2001). 
 
In 1996, the Kaltmans hired All American Pest Control, 
Inc. (“AAPC”) to treat and prevent pest infestation at their 
home on a quarterly basis.  On October 23, 2006, AAPC employee 
Patric J. Harrison performed the Kaltmans’ quarterly pest 
control treatment.  At the time, Harrison was not a licensed 
pesticide technician in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
 
Three days before treating the Kaltmans’ home, Harrison 
treated a commercial establishment with Orthene pesticide.  
After applying Orthene at that business, Harrison “fail[ed] to 
thoroughly clean his pesticide application equipment.”  As a 
result, Harrison applied “Orthene dilution as a fan spray” to 
the baseboards and adjoining floor surfaces throughout the 
Kaltmans’ home, including “the untreated, porous concrete 
surfaces in the basement and garage.” 
 
As the pesticide was being applied, the Kaltmans 
complained to Harrison about the “unusual and extraordinarily 
pungent” odor.  Harrison told them the smell would dissipate, 
but it did not.  Later that day, the Kaltmans telephoned AAPC 
to report their concern about the “overwhelming stench” from 
the pesticide treatment.  They were told that Harrison had 
 
2
applied an inappropriate pesticide that had a “very strong and 
unpleasant odor.”   
 
The Kaltmans reported the incident to the Virginia 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“VDACS”).  
During the investigation by VDACS, Harrison admitted that he 
applied an Orthene dilution to the Kaltmans’ home.  Harrison 
also admitted that he falsified the pertinent work order by 
documenting that he applied different pesticides.   
 
Laboratory analyses performed by VDACS revealed 
concentrations of acephate – a key toxic ingredient in Orthene 
PCO Pellets – in the Kaltmans’ home.1  Orthene PCO Pellets are 
not licensed for residential use by VDACS.  The material 
safety data sheet for Orthene PCO Pellets states the 
following:  “This product is not for indoor residential use,” 
“is for use in places other than private homes,” and “do not 
treat unpainted masonry floors in poorly ventilated areas such 
as garages or basements . . . since persistent odor could 
develop.”2 
                     
1 The Kaltmans allege that exposure to acephate is known 
to cause irreversible nerve damage and to cause cancer in 
laboratory animals. 
2 Regulations promulgated by the United States Department 
of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
require chemical manufacturers and importers to obtain or 
develop a material safety data sheet for each hazardous 
chemical they produce or import.  29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) 
(2010).  These sheets include such information as the physical 
and health hazards of the chemical, warnings and instructions 
 
3
 
AAPC informed the Kaltmans that although the odor from 
Orthene was unpleasant, it did not represent a health hazard.  
The Kaltmans therefore made more than a dozen attempts to 
eradicate the odor by washing the treated surfaces on their 
hands and knees without using any protective equipment.  They 
also had their home professionally cleaned.  However, high 
concentrations of acephate remained in their home.  Because of 
the “noxious fumes,” their home was rendered uninhabitable for 
a year, they sustained physical and emotional injuries, and 
they incurred expenses to “remediate” the damage to their home 
and personal effects. 
 
On September 5, 2008, the Kaltmans each individually 
filed complaints against AAPC and Harrison in the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County.  Each complaint contained eleven 
identical counts.  The cases subsequently were consolidated by 
consent order. 
 
AAPC and Harrison filed motions craving oyer for the 
service agreement between the Kaltmans and AAPC.  The circuit 
court granted their motions and the “Pest Control Service 
Agreement” between the Kaltmans and AAPC became a part of the 
pleadings.  This agreement lists the pests to be controlled 
and states that AAPC agrees “to apply chemicals to control 
                                                                
about the proper use of the chemical, and first aid procedures 
to employ in the event of improper exposure.  Id.  
 
4
above-named pests in accordance with terms and conditions of 
this Service Agreement.  All labor and materials will be 
furnished to provide the most efficient pest control and 
maximum safety required by federal, state and city 
regulations.”   
 
AAPC and Harrison filed demurrers to all the claims 
asserted against them.  As will be discussed in more detail, 
the circuit court sustained the demurrers to the Kaltmans’ 
claims of negligence (Counts One, Two, and Three), willful and 
wanton conduct (Counts Four and Five), and negligence per se 
(Counts Ten and Eleven).3  The Kaltmans appeal.  
DISCUSSION 
 
The principles guiding our resolution of the issues 
presented in this appeal are well-established.  The purpose of 
a demurrer is to determine whether a complaint states a cause 
of action upon which relief may be granted.  Tronfeld v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 712-13, 636 S.E.2d 
447, 449 (2006).  A demurrer admits the truth of all properly 
pleaded facts to which it is addressed, as well as any facts 
that may be reasonably and fairly implied and inferred from 
those allegations.  Dodge v. Randolph-Macon Woman’s College, 
                     
3 Counts Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine alleging negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and nuisance were ultimately 
non-suited by the Kaltmans even though the circuit court had 
denied AAPC’s and Harrison’s demurrers to these counts. 
 
5
276 Va. 1, 5, 661 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2008).  A demurrer tests 
the legal sufficiency of facts alleged in the pleadings, but 
not the strength of proof.  Glazebrook v. Board of 
Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003).  
Because the decision whether to grant a demurrer is a question 
of law, we review the circuit court’s decision de novo.  Mark 
Five Construction, Inc. v. Castle Contractors, 274 Va. 283, 
287, 645 S.E.2d 475, 477 (2007). 
I. Negligence 
 
The Kaltmans’ first assignment of error asserts that the 
circuit court erred in sustaining demurrers to their 
negligence counts (Counts One, Two, and Three).  Count One 
alleges that AAPC was negligent and breached its duty to 
exercise the skill and diligence of a reasonably prudent pest 
control company by authorizing and allowing Harrison to apply 
commercial pesticide without a commercial pesticide 
certification or without first being registered as a pest 
control technician as required by former Code § 3.1-
249.52(A)(1994).4  Count Two alleges that AAPC is vicariously 
                     
4 Former Code § 3.1-249.52(A), which was repealed and 
replaced effective on October 1, 2008 by Code § 3.2-3930(A), 
stated in relevant part: “No person shall, in exchange for 
compensation of any kind . . . use, except under supervised 
conditions of training for certification, or supervise the use 
of any pesticide without first obtaining certification as 
either a commercial applicator or registered technician in 
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Board.”  Code 
 
6
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the 
negligence of its employee Harrison, who was acting within the 
scope of his employment when he applied a pesticide that was 
not licensed and appropriate for use in residential settings.  
Count Three alleges that Harrison was negligent in that he had 
a duty to exercise the skill and diligence of a reasonably 
prudent pest control technician, but he breached that duty by 
improperly applying a pesticide that was not licensed and 
approved for use in a residential setting, and by applying a 
commercial pesticide without a commercial pesticide 
certification or without first being registered as a pest 
control technician as required by Code § 3.2-3930(A).  All 
three counts allege that the Kaltmans were injured as a 
proximate result of AAPC’s and Harrison’s negligence. 
 
The Kaltmans assert that, independent of the service 
contract, AAPC and Harrison were required to exercise prudence 
in their application of pesticides to the Kaltmans’ home.  The 
Kaltmans stress they are not seeking recovery for damage 
caused by a failure of AAPC and Harrison to control pest 
infestation in their home.  Rather, the Kaltmans maintain they 
are claiming personal injuries and damages to their property 
                                                                
§ 3.2-3930(A) features substantially similar language.  
Accordingly, we will hereafter cite the current Code section.   
 
7
resulting from breaches of duties imposed by the common law 
and statutes.  
 
In response, AAPC and Harrison contend that because their 
duties arose from the service contract the Kaltmans cannot 
maintain a cause of action for negligence against them.  AAPC 
and Harrison accept that the company assumed a contractual 
duty to apply the appropriate pesticide to the Kaltmans’ home.  
But this duty, according to AAPC and Harrison, exists whether 
Harrison was licensed or not.  And a breach of that duty, AAPC 
and Harrison maintain, can only give rise to a breach of 
contract claim.  We disagree. 
 
In support of their position, AAPC and Harrison rely 
primarily on our decisions in Richmond Metropolitan Authority 
v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 256 Va. 553, 507 S.E.2d 344 
(1998) and Dunn Construction Co. v. Cloney, 278 Va. 260, 682 
S.E.2d 943 (2009).  In Richmond Metropolitan Authority, a 
municipal corporation entered into an agreement with a 
contractor for the construction of a baseball stadium.  256 
Va. at 555, 507 S.E.2d at 345.  Many years later, the 
municipal corporation learned that the contractor failed to 
comply with the design specifications set forth in the 
contract, despite its prior representations under oath that it 
completed the construction work.  Id. at 556, 507 S.E.2d at 
345.  As a result, the municipal corporation filed an action 
 
8
against the contractor, alleging actual and constructive 
fraud.  Id. at 556, 507 S.E.2d at 346.   
 
The issue on appeal was whether the contractor’s 
misrepresentations about its compliance with the contract and 
its “false applications under oath to induce payments” were 
“separate and independent wrongs that [went] beyond [the] 
contractual duties” and supported causes of action for actual 
and constructive fraud.  Id. at 557, 507 S.E.2d at 346.  We 
explained that the determination whether a cause of action 
sounds in contract or tort depends on the source of the duty 
violated.  Id. at 558, 507 S.E.2d at 347.  Because the 
municipal corporation’s allegations of constructive fraud were 
“nothing more than allegations of negligent performance of 
contractual duties,” we held they were not actionable in tort. 
Id. at 559, 507 S.E.2d at 347.  Likewise, because “each 
particular misrepresentation by [the contractor] related to a 
duty or an obligation that was specifically required by the 
. . . [c]ontract,” we held that the contractor’s 
misrepresentations did not give rise to a cause of action for 
actual fraud.  Id. 
 
In Dunn Construction, after the contractor failed to 
build the front foundation wall of the property owner’s house 
in accordance with the standard required by the building code, 
cracks appeared in the wall and a portion of it bowed out 
 
9
several inches.  278 Va. at 263, 682 S.E.2d at 944.  The 
property owner later paid the contractor the amount due under 
the contract after the contractor falsely assured the owner 
that he had repaired the defects.  Id. at 263-64, 682 S.E.2d 
at 944.  The property owner then filed suit against the 
contractor, seeking damages under theories of breach of 
contract, negligence, and fraud.  Id. at 264, 682 S.E.2d at 
944-45. 
 
On appeal, the issue was whether the contractor’s 
fraudulent act was independent of the contractual relationship 
between the contractor and the property owner such that the 
owner could maintain an action for both breach of contract and 
fraud.  Id. at 266, 682 S.E.2d at 946.  We recognized that “a 
single act or occurrence can, in certain circumstances, 
support causes of action both for breach of contract and for 
breach of a duty arising in tort, thus permitting a plaintiff 
to recover both for the loss suffered as a result of the 
breach and traditional tort damages.”  Id. at 266-67, 682 
S.E.2d at 936 (citing Foreign Mission Bd. v. Wade, 242 Va. 
234, 241, 409 S.E.2d 144, 148 (1991)).  We nonetheless held 
that the duty breached by the contractor was one arising out 
of the contract, not out of any common law duties.  Id. at 
268, 682 S.E.2d at 947.  Under the contract, the contractor 
had a duty to construct the foundation wall “in a workmanlike 
 
10
manner according to standard practices.”  Id.  The contractor 
was required to make repairs under that same duty and, 
therefore, the contractor’s false representation that he had 
made the repairs related to a duty that arose under the 
contract.  Id.  We explained that “[t]he fact that the 
representation was made in order to obtain payment from [the 
property owner] does not take the fraud outside of the 
contract relationship, because the payment obtained was also 
due under the original terms of the contract.”  Id. 
 
Most recently, in Abi-Najm v. Concord Condominium, LLC, 
280 Va. 350, 354-55, 699 S.E.2d 483, 485 (2010), purchasers of 
condominiums brought suit against the seller for breach of 
contract, fraud in the inducement, and violation of the 
Virginia Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”), Code § 59.1-196 et 
seq., after they discovered that the condominiums they 
purchased did not contain the agreed upon hardwood flooring.  
Regarding the purchasers’ fraud and VCPA’s claims, the circuit 
court sustained the seller’s demurrer, finding that the 
economic loss doctrine precluded a separate action in tort.  
Id. at 356, 699 S.E.2d at 486. 
 
We considered on appeal whether the purchasers alleged 
that the seller breached a duty owed to them independent of 
any of the contractual duties assumed by the seller.  Id. at 
361, 699 S.E.2d at 489.  In doing so, we restated the 
 
11
principles expressed in Richmond Metropolitan Authority and 
Dunn Construction that whether a cause of action sounds in 
contract or tort is ultimately determined by the source of the 
duty violated, and that a single act or occurrence can, in 
certain circumstances, support causes of action both for 
breach of contract and for breach of duty arising in tort.  
Id.  As to the purchasers’ VCPA claims, we held the trial 
court erred in sustaining the demurrers to these claims 
because the VCPA imposes a statutory duty “not to misrepresent 
the quality, grade, or style of goods” that exists independent 
of the contracts.  Id. at 362, 699 S.E.2d at 489.  We likewise 
reversed the demurrers to the purchasers’ fraud claims.  
Distinguishing cases such as Dunn Construction and Richmond 
Metropolitan Authority, we noted that the purchasers alleged 
that the seller perpetrated a fraud “before a contract between 
the two parties came into existence,” therefore, the duty the 
seller allegedly breached could not logically find its source 
in the parties’ contracts.  Id. at 363, 699 S.E.2d at 490 
(emphasis in original).  
 
AAPC and Harrison assert that Abi-Najm is distinguishable 
from this case because the Kaltmans made no complaint about 
the company’s pre-contract conduct.  AAPC and Harrison also 
assert that the Kaltmans’ statutory claims are not akin to the 
VCPA claims in Abi-Najm because the VCPA expressly provides a 
 
12
right of action for actual damages, whereas the pesticide 
statutes do not.  See Code § 59.1-204.  We are not persuaded 
by these suggested distinctions. 
 
“The primary consideration underlying tort law is the 
protection of persons and property from injury, while the 
major consideration underlying contract law is the protection 
of bargained for expectations.”  Filak v. George, 267 Va. 612, 
618, 594 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2004).  “The law of torts provides 
redress only for the violation of certain common law and 
statutory duties involving the safety of persons and property, 
which are imposed to protect the broad interests of society.” 
Id.  “[L]osses suffered as a result of the breach of a duty 
assumed only by agreement, rather than a duty imposed by law, 
remain the sole province of the law of contracts.”  Id. 
 
Here, the Kaltmans are seeking redress for injuries to 
their persons and property as a result of alleged breaches of 
common law and statutory duties.  The Kaltmans contracted with 
AAPC for the treatment and prevention of pests in their home.  
Under the terms of that contract, AAPC agreed “to apply 
chemicals to control” pests in the Kaltmans’ home.  Just 
because the application of pesticides is included in AAPC’s 
contractual duty to control pests, it does not follow that the 
Kaltmans have contracted away their common law and statutory 
rights.  Because the Kaltmans have alleged that AAPC and 
 
13
Harrison breached common law and statutory duties independent 
of the company’s contractual duty to control pests, we hold 
the trial court erred when it sustained the demurrers to the 
Kaltmans’ negligence counts. 
II. Willful and Wanton Conduct5 
 
The Kaltmans’ second assignment of error asserts that the 
circuit court erred in sustaining demurrers to their willful 
and wanton conduct counts (Counts Four and Five).  Count Four 
alleges Harrison acted recklessly in a manner that amounted to 
willful and wanton disregard to the Kaltmans’ rights.  As 
evidence of this willful and wanton conduct, the Kaltmans 
allege, among other things, that Harrison acted recklessly by 
not thoroughly cleaning his pesticide equipment, by applying a 
pesticide inconsistent with its labeling, and by falsifying 
the work order.  Count Five alleges AAPC is liable for 
Harrison’s reckless actions, and AAPC itself acted recklessly 
by authorizing and instructing Harrison to apply a commercial 
pesticide without a license in violation of Code § 3.2-3930, 
and by ratifying Harrison’s falsified work order.  The 
Kaltmans seek damages as a result of the willful and wanton 
conduct of AAPC and Harrison, including punitive damages. 
                     
5 The terms “willful and wanton conduct” and “[w]illful 
and wanton negligence” are different names for the same tort.  
See Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 239 Va. 572, 
581-82, 391 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1990). 
 
14
 
The Kaltmans assert that Harrison showed a reckless 
indifference to the consequences of his actions when he 
applied Orthene in violation of the permissible uses set out 
in its labeling.  The Kaltmans point to Harrison’s 
falsification of the work order as an indication that Harrison 
knew his conduct probably would cause injury to the Kaltmans.  
As to AAPC, the Kaltmans maintain that by authorizing and 
instructing Harrison to apply commercial pesticides without a 
license, and ratifying the falsified work order, AAPC’s 
conduct also was willful and wanton.   
 
AAPC and Harrison respond by contending that the Kaltmans 
do not allege any facts that would suggest anything more than 
an inadvertent oversight by Harrison to “thoroughly clean his 
pesticide application equipment” when going from a commercial 
job to a residential job.  AAPC and Harrison assert that the 
Kaltmans do not allege any facts that Harrison had a conscious 
awareness of the danger and probable consequences of his 
actions, and that he recklessly decided to proceed 
notwithstanding that awareness.  AAPC and Harrison further 
assert that the facts alleged do not support a theory that 
AAPC “authorized” and “instructed” Harrison to apply Orthene 
in the Kaltmans’ home.  Thus, AAPC and Harrison maintain that 
the Kaltmans’ allegations cannot support a claim for willful 
and wanton conduct.  We agree.  
 
15
 
“Willful and wanton negligence is action taken in 
conscious disregard of another’s rights, or with reckless 
indifference to consequences that the defendant is aware, from 
his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, would 
probably result from his conduct and cause injury to another.” 
Alfonso v. Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 545, 514 S.E.2d 615, 618 
(1999); Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. 336, 340-41, 486 S.E.2d 99, 
101 (1997).  Each case raising an issue of willful and wanton 
negligence must be evaluated on its own facts.  Alfonso, 257 
Va. at 545, 514 S.E.2d at 618; Harris, 253 Va. at 341, 486 
S.E.2d at 102. 
 
The facts as alleged indicate that AAPC’s unlicensed 
technician, Harrison, failed to “thoroughly clean his 
pesticide application equipment” before applying an “Orthene 
dilution” to the Kaltmans’ home.  These facts do not support a 
claim that AAPC and Harrison acted with reckless indifference 
to the consequences of their actions and with knowledge of 
circumstances indicating that they would probably cause injury 
to others.  Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did not err 
in sustaining the demurrers to the Kaltmans’ willful and 
wanton conduct counts. 
III. Negligence Per Se 
 
The Kaltmans’ final assignment of error asserts that the 
circuit court erred in sustaining demurrers to their 
 
16
negligence per se counts (Counts Ten and Eleven).  Count Ten 
alleges AAPC was negligent per se by violating former Code 
§ 3.1-249.64(A) (1994), which states, in relevant part, that 
“[i]t [is] unlawful for any person to use or cause to be used 
any pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling.”6  
The Kaltmans allege that this statute was enacted for public 
safety and that the Kaltmans are members of the class of 
persons for whose benefit this statute was enacted.  Count 
Eleven makes the same allegations against Harrison.  Both 
counts allege that as a proximate result of AAPC’s and 
Harrison’s violations of Code § 3.2-3939(B), the Kaltmans were 
injured. 
 
The Kaltmans assert that like the VCPA in Abi-Najm, Code 
§ 3.2-3939(B) imposes duties on AAPC and Harrison separate and 
apart from the contract, and that the violation of this 
statute by AAPC and Harrison constitutes negligence per se.7  
The Kaltmans maintain that Code § 3.2-3939(B) was enacted for 
public safety and that they are members of the class of 
                     
6 Former Code § 3.1-249.64(A) has been repealed and 
replaced by Code § 3.2-3939(B) effective October 1, 2008.  The 
language of Code § 3.2-3939(B) is substantially similar to 
former Code § 3.1-249.64(A).  Accordingly, we will hereafter 
refer to the current Code section. 
7 The Kaltmans also contend that the licensing provisions 
of Code § 3.2-3930 provide a basis for their negligence per se 
claims.  Counts Ten and Eleven of their complaints make no 
such allegation.  Therefore, we will not consider this 
argument on appeal.  
 
17
persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted.  This is 
so, the Kaltmans contend, because the purpose for legislation 
regulating potentially hazardous products such as pesticides 
is “the need to provide the particular consumer and the 
general public with a higher and surer degree of protection 
than is afforded by exclusive recourse to common-law 
remedies.”  McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 
Va. 842, 851, 75 S.E.2d 712, 717-18 (1953).   
 
Relying on their earlier arguments in opposition to the 
Kaltmans’ negligence claims, AAPC and Harrison contend that 
the Kaltmans cannot assert a claim for negligence per se for 
what amounts to a breach of contract.  Assuming, however, that 
an ordinary negligence cause of action could be asserted 
against them, AAPC and Harrison maintain that the Kaltmans 
cannot also assert a claim for negligence per se.  We 
disagree.  
 
The doctrine of negligence per se represents the adoption 
of “the requirements of a legislative enactment as the 
standard of conduct of a reasonable [person].”  Butler v. 
Frieden, 208 Va. 352, 353, 158 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1967).  The 
elements of negligence per se are well-established.  First, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant violated a statute 
enacted for public safety.  MacCoy v. Colony House Builders, 
Inc., 239 Va. 64, 69, 387 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1990); Virginia 
 
18
Elec. & Power Co. v. Savoy Const. Co., 224 Va. 36, 45, 294 
S.E.2d 811, 817 (1982).  Second, the plaintiff must belong to 
the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was 
enacted, and demonstrate that the harm that occurred was of 
the type against which the statute was designed to protect.  
McGuire v. Hodges, 273 Va. 199, 206, 639 S.E.2d 284, 288 
(2007); Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 259 Va. 171, 176-
77, 523 S.E.2d 823, 825 (2000).  Third, the statutory 
violation must be a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.  
Thomas v. Settle, 247 Va. 15, 20, 439 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1994); 
Hack v. Nester, 241 Va. 499, 503-04, 404 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1990). 
 
The first and second of these elements are issues of law 
to be decided by a trial court, while the third element is 
generally a factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact.  
Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club, 268 Va. 74, 79, 597 S.E.2d 43, 
46 (2004).  Therefore, in deciding whether the Kaltmans can 
maintain their negligence per se claims, we will consider 
whether Code § 3.2-3939(B) was enacted for public safety, 
whether the Kaltmans are in the class of persons for whose 
benefit the statute was enacted, and whether their injuries 
were of the type that the statute was designed to protect.  
 
19
 
In McClanahan, we considered whether the former Virginia 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Law8 imposed on a 
manufacturer of a fungicide used to treat apple orchards a 
duty to warn consumers of the unusual hazards involved with 
the use of its product.  194 Va. at 850, 75 S.E.2d 717.  In 
doing so, we concluded that the “Virginia insecticide statute” 
was modeled after the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act, former 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k.  Id.  We further 
concluded that at the heart of “both the federal and Virginia 
statutes lies the need to provide the particular consumer and 
the general public with a higher and surer degree of 
protection than is afforded by exclusive recourse to common-
law remedies.”  Id. at 851, 75 S.E.2d at 717-18.  Comparing it 
to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, we found that the 
Virginia insecticide statute commands a “liberal 
interpretation” and “that violation of the statute constitutes 
negligence as a matter of law precluding the need for 
establishing the common-law elements of negligence.  The 
statute itself creates the standard of conduct required.”  Id. 
at 851-52, 75 S.E.2d at 718.  We stated that the fact the 
Virginia insecticide statute imposes a criminal penalty is 
evidence of the high standard of care exacted of the 
manufacturer.  Id. at 852, 75 S.E.2d at 718.  We further 
                     
8 Former Code § 3-198 et seq. (1950). 
 
20
stated that “[i]t was the legislative intent to protect the 
public against the use of harmful products, whether the harm 
be to the user, the person or object on which used, or 
strangers.”  Id. at 859, 75 S.E.2d at 722.  
 
Since the McClanahan decision in 1953, the General 
Assembly has amended the insecticide statutes a number of 
times.  Their current form exists as the Virginia “Pesticide 
Control” Act, Code § 3.2-3900, et seq. (the “Act”).  The 
Kaltmans base their negligence per se claims on the following 
section of the Act: 
It is unlawful for any person to use or cause to be 
used any pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its 
labeling or regulations of the Board, provided that 
such deviation may include provisions set forth in 
Section 2 (ee) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.). 
 
Code § 3.2-3939(B).  In deciding whether this statute was 
enacted for public safety, the statute cannot be read in 
isolation.  It must be construed in conjunction with the other 
pesticide control statutes.  Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 
Va. 401, 405, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957) (“statutes are not to be 
considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as 
parts of a great connected, homogeneous system, or a single 
and complete statutory arrangement”) (citation omitted); see 
also Evans v. Evans, 200 Va. 76, 84-85, 695 S.E.2d 173, 177 
(2010) (citing and quoting Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 
 
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759, 652 S.E.2d 456, 462 (2007)(statutes dealing with a 
specific subject must be construed together in order to arrive 
at the object to be accomplished)). 
 
In considering the Act as a whole, we perceive that its 
dominant purpose has not changed since our decision in 
McClanahan.  For example, the Act still provides a criminal 
penalty for violation of its provisions.  See Code § 3.2-3947.  
We therefore are of the opinion that the Act was enacted to 
protect the public against the use of harmful chemicals.  Cf. 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 224 Va. at 44, 294 S.E.2d at 817 
(finding that the dominant purpose of the Building Code is to 
provide comprehensive protection of the public health and 
safety); Butler, 208 Va. at 354, 158 S.E.2d at 123 (finding 
that the purpose of a dog leash ordinance is to protect the 
public against hazards created by dogs running at large).  
Accordingly, we find that Code § 3.2-3939(B) is a public 
safety statute.  Furthermore, as consumers who allegedly were 
injured as a result of an improper use of a pesticide, the 
Kaltmans are members of the class of persons for whose benefit 
the statute was enacted and who suffered an injury of the type 
against which the statute protects.  Because we find the 
Kaltmans’ allegations support the first two elements of 
negligence per se, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
 
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sustaining the demurrers to the Kaltmans’ negligence per se 
counts. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court sustaining AAPC’s and Harrison’s demurrers to 
Counts One, Two, Three, Ten, and Eleven of the Kaltmans’ 
complaints.  We will affirm the court’s judgment sustaining 
AAPC’s and Harrison’s demurrers to Counts Four and Five of the 
Kaltmans’ complaints.  The case will be remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
  and remanded. 
 
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