Title: Lawrence v. Hethcox
Citation: 283 So. 2d 41
Docket Number: 42373
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 5, 1973

283 So. 2d 41 (1973)
Milton LAWRENCE, Petitioner,
v.
Catherine H. HETHCOX, Respondent.
No. 42373.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 5, 1973.
*42 Alan R. Schwartz, Horton, Schwartz &amp; Perse, and Welsh &amp; Carroll, Miami, for petitioner.
Charles A. Hayes, Preddy, Haddad, Kutner &amp; Hardy, Miami, for respondent.
McCAIN, Justice.
By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, reported at 260 So. 2d 909, which conflicts with Highland Insurance Company v. Walker Memorial Sanitarium and Benevolent Association, 225 So. 2d 572 (Fla.App.2d, 1969). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Const., Article V, Section 3(b)(3) (1973), F.S.A.
Plaintiff-petitioner brought a negligence action against Hethcox for injuries sustained in an automobile accident on November 26, 1970. Subsequently, petitioner sought to amend his complaint to add one James Gist as a party defendant. In substance, petitioner alleged that he was involved in a second collision on January 5, 1971 with an automobile owned and operated by Gist; that the injuries sustained in both accidents were overlapping and not apportionable; that he was desirous of joining Gist "Because of the difficulties in apportionment of damages ... and to allow the jury to determine which defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's respective injuries"; and that the "rights of the parties will not be prejudiced by this amendment. However, if leave is not granted the Plaintiff's rights will be greatly prejudiced for each defendant will allege that the Plaintiff's injuries were caused by the other defendant".
With the motion for joinder petitioner submitted a proposed amended complaint suing Hethcox and Gist individually and jointly and alleging, inter alia:
The Circuit Court denied the joinder motion in a form order. On common law certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, the action of the trial court was sustained as follows: "Per Curiam. Certiorari denied."
We granted certiorari because of apparent conflict with Highland Insurance Co. v. Walker Memorial Sanitarium and Benevolent Association, supra. In that case, a medical malpractice acton, Dr. Courtney operated on plaintiff for a back injury. Therefore, after a second operation involving the same area of plaintiff's back was performed by Dr. Larsen. Damage to plaintiff's spinal cord was allegedly caused, and plaintiff brought suit for negligence against both surgeons. However, on motion of Dr. Larsen, the trial court severed the actions for trial pursuant to Rule 1.270 (b), RCP, 30 F.S.A. Plaintiff took an interlocutory appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District. That court reversed the order below holding that under Rule 1.210(a), RCP, the joinder was proper even though the alleged negligent acts were not concurrent and arose in different counties and ordered a single trial. In part the District Court was persuaded by the decision of the California Supreme Court in Kraft v. Smith, 24 Cal. 2d 124, 148 P.2d 23 (1944). In that case the California Court noted, among other things:
It is true that in Kraft the California Court was construing a California statute somewhat different in content than Rule 1.210(a), RCP. However, in our view the construction adopted therein is compatible with the provisions of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, especially, (as the District Court noted in Highland) in light of the public policy of this State as expressed in Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969) favoring,
Thus, in our judgment, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, announced the better rule in the Highland decision, supra, and we accordingly conclude that the trial court in the case sub judice abused its discretion in denying the motion for joinder sought by plaintiff. Moreover, inasmuch as the order of the trial court failed, in a manner calculated to cause material and irremediable injury to plaintiff, to conform to the essential requirements of law, the District Court also erred in denying the petition for writ of certiorari.
In so deciding, we note that should it clearly appear from pretrial discovery measures that the damages sustained in the two accidents are readily apportionable, and that joinder was therefore improper, then the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion may order severance for trial purposes pursuant to Rule 1.270 (b). In such event neither party would be bound by the terms of the judgment against the other. On the other hand, should it become apparent as a result of pretrial discovery measures that although joinder was proper because of difficulty or impossibility of apportionment of damages, prejudice to either defendant would nevertheless result from a single trial, severance for trial purposes only would be permissible with the same limitations as provided in Shingleton v. Bussey, supra, and Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970). Essentially, the effect of those cases is to permit severance but to require the moving party to be bound by the resulting judgment. In Shingleton, we observed:
We clarified our position in this respect in Beta Eta House, supra, wherein we held:
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is quashed and the cause remanded to the District Court with directions for a further remand to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN and ADKINS, JJ., and SPECTOR, District Court Judge, concur.
CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS and DEKLE, JJ., dissent.