Title: STATE v WILLIAMSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85-195
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: October 9, 1985

No. 85-195 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1985 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- RICHARD MELVIN WILLIAMSON, Defendant and Appel l a n t . APPEAL FROM: District Court o f t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lewis & C l a r k , The Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: Cannon & Sheehy; Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mike McGrath, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Carolyn Clemens, Deputy County Atty., Helena Filed: Submitted on b r i e f s : J u l y 2 5 , 1985 Decided: October 9 , 1985 a%- & Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. This i s an appeal from t h e D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis and Clark, t h e Honorable Gordon R. Bennett p r e s i d i n g . The appeal i s from an o r d e r denying withdrawal o f a g u i l t y p l e a on charges o f t h e f t and arson. W e a f f i r m . The a p p e l l a n t , Williamson, was charged i n 1983 w i t h t h e o f f e n s e o f arson a l l e g e d t o have been committed on ,January 11, 1983; and w i t h t h e charge o f t h e f t , a l l e g e d t o have occurred between January 10 and February 1 2 , 1983. The t h e f t charge was f i l e d p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e a r s o n information. A f t e r numerous p r e - t r i a l proceedings, t h e arson charge was set f o r t r i a l May 31, 1983, and t h e t h e f t charge was set f o r June 30, 1983. Williamson was represented on both o f t h e s e c a s e s by Richard J. Pyfer, Esq. M r . Pyfer f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s and a motion t o suppress some evidence developed i n t h e arson case. These motions w e r e heard May 11, 1983. The t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e motions b u t gave Williamson's counsel an o p p o r t u n i t y t o submit a d d i t i o n a l memorandum on t h e arguments being r a i s e d i n b o t h motions. T h e r e a f t e r t h e D i s t r i c t Court noted no such a d d i t i o n a l memorandum w e r e e v e r f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u r t . O n o r about May 23, 1983, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r denying t h e motion t o d i s m i s s and t h e motion t o suppress i n t h e arson case. P r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , t h e r e had been no d i s c u s s i o n between t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e and defense counsel w i t h regard t o a p l e a bargain. On o r about May 23, 1983, defense counsel was approached by t h e county a t t o r n e y w i t h regard t o t h e t r i a l , which was set w i t h i n t h e week. A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , t h e county a t t o r n e y advised counsel t h a t i f t h e appe'l l a n t would e n t e r a g u i l t y p l e a t o both felony charges, t h e S t a t e would forego seeking increased punishment a g a i n s t him a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony o f f e n d e r . I n exchanqe f o r t h e g u i l t y p l e a , t h e S t a t e a l s o s a i d it would ask f o r a t e n y e a r sentence on each charge t o run concurrently. Williamson's counsel approached him with t h e S t a t e ' s o f f e r . Williamson was advised o f t h e plea bargain on o r about May 2 5 , 1983, and requested t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y come t o him p e r s o n a l l y w i t h h i s counsel t o d i s c u s s t h e p l e a bargain. H e a l l e g e d a t t h a t t i m e t h e county a t t o r n e y , i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n , s a i d i f he d i d n o t change h i s plea by 10:OO a.m. t h e next morning, which was t h e t i m e set t o select a jury f o r t h e a r s o n c a s e , t h e plea b a r g a i n would n o t be o f f e r e d a t a l a t e r d a t e . Williamson, a f t e r f u l l d i s c u s s i o n with h i s c o u n s e l , P y f e r , and t h e County Attorney, McGrath, d i d a g r e e on May 2 6 , 1983, t o t h e plea bargain and Williamson changed h i s p l e a t o g u i 1 t y . The D i s t r i c t Court, on J u l y 2 7 , 1983, sentenced t h e a p p e l l a n t on both charges on t h e b a s i s o f h i s g u i l t y p l e a . Williamson received t e n y e a r s on t h e t h e f t charge; and on t h e arson charge he received twenty y e a r s w i t h t e n y e a r s suspended, on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t he would pay $36,000 i n r e s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e arson. Williamson then sought sentence review from t h e Montana Sentence Review Board. H i s a p p l i c a t i o n was denied and he f i l e d w i t h t h i s Court a p r o se p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f . A t t h e same t i m e , i n J u l y 1 9 8 4 , Williamson f i l e d a pro se motion i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o withdraw h i s p l e a . T h i s Court on August 31, 1984, e n t e r e d an o r d e r holding t h e p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f i n abeyance u n t i l t h e District Court r u l e d on Williamson's motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . New counsel was appointed by t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r Williamson t o r e p r e s e n t him on t h i s motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . O n November 30, 1984, t h e District Court held a f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o withdraw t h e g u i l t y p l e a , and on February 1 2 , 1985, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r and opinion denying t h e motion t o withdraw t h e g u i l t y p l e a . It i s from t h i s o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t Williamson i s appealing. The s o l e i s s u e presented i n t h i s c a s e i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying t h e motion t o withdraw FJilliamson's g u i l t y p l e a . The a p p e l l a n t , i n h i s p r o se motion t o withdraw t h e g u i l t y plea argues he was coerced i n t o e n t e r i n g it and was n o t given e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel a t t h e t i m e t h i s m a t t e r was argued. The coercion argument stemmed from Williamson's testimony t h a t he e n t e r e d i n t o t h e g u i l t y plea t o avoid t h e i n c r e a s e d punishment f o r being a p e r s i s t e n t felony o f f e n d e r . Five y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e charges t h a t he faced i n t h i s cause, he had been sentenced t o a t e n y e a r p r i s o n t e r m . Appellant a l l e g e s h i s counsel, M r . P y f e r , advised him t h e S t a t e could n o t i c e him a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony o f f e n d e r , which a d v i c e was erroneous. The testimony a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e withdrawal o f t h e plea i n d i c a t e d M r . Pyfer t o l d Williamson a t t h e t i m e t h e p l e a b a r g a i n was made he was n o t c e r t a i n and would c o n s u l t more experienced counsel. However, a f t e r r e s e a r c h i n g t h e s t a t u t e , counsel agreed a t a l a t e r h e a r i n g held w i t h t h e county a t t o r n e y and t h e d i s t r i c t judge, t h e a p p e l l a n t could n o t have been charged a s a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n due t o t h e s t a t u t e ' s five-year l i m i t a t i o n . Williamson contends t h e p l a i n language o f t h e s t a t u t e , S 46-18-501, MCA, was misconstrued by h i s o r i g i n a l counsel, M r , P y f e r , t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e , and t h e D i s t r i c t Court. S e c t i o n 46-18-501, MCA, r e a d s a s follows: A " p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y offender" i s an o f f e n d e r who h a s p r e v i o u s l y been convicted o f a felony and who i s presently being sentenced for a second felony committed on a different, occgsion than the first. An offender is considered to have been previous1 y convicted of a felony if: (1) The previous felony conviction was for an offense committed in this state or any other jurisdiction for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of 1 year could have been imposed; (2) Less than 5 years have elapsed between he commission of the present offense and either: (a) the previous felony conviction; or (b) the offender's release on parole or otherwise from prison or other commitment imposed as a result of the previous felony conviction; and (3) the offender has not been pardoned on the ground of innocence and the conviction has not been set aside in a postconviction proceeding. It is Williamson's position that having entered a guilty plea to the theft charges, and then pleading guilty to the arson charges, he could not be found a persistent felony offender because the two felonies were committed at approximately the same time and his pleas were entered at the same time. The State's position is the statute's definition of a "persistent felony offender" is not wholly consistent with the statute ' s definition of "previously convicted" and thus the rules of statutory construction require that the statute be read and construed in its entirety. State ex re1 Cashmore v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. 175, 500 P.2d 921, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L.Ed.2d 593. The State submits that this is precisely what Judge Bennett did, and hence no abuse of discretion could be shown. The substantive argument revolves around the terms "commission" and "conviction" of prior and subsequent felonies, which was clearly summarized and decided in Judge Bennett's order: The p r i s o n e r u r g e s t h a t 46-15-501 be construed t o ban t h e use o f t h e s t a t u t e where t h e second o f f e n s e was committed p r i o r t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n on t h e f i r s t one. I f c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e i s r e q u i r e d , it must b e , i f a t a l l p o s s i b l e , construed i n f a v o r o f t h e defendant. The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e t e r m i s c r y s t a l c l e a r and needs no c o n s t r u c t i o n : "A ' p e r s i s t e n t felony o f f e n d e r ' i s an o f f e n d e r who has p r e v i o u s l y been convicted o f a f e l o n y and who i s p r e s e n t l y being sentenced f o r a second f e l o n y committed on 2 d i f f e r e n t occasion than t h e f i r s t . I' (46-18-501) T h i s d e f i n i t i o n , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , would n o t permit t h e q u e s t i o n now r a i s e d by t h e p r i s o n e r . I t simply r e q u i r e s a p a s t conviction and sentencing on a subsequent one. . . But then t h e same s t a t u t e goes on t o d e f i n e a previous felony c o n v i c t i o n . It f i r s t d e f i n e s a f e l o n y , which is t o t a l l y unnecessary (see 45-2-101 (21) ) , and t h e n it d e f i n e s "previous" by l i m i t a t i o n : it i s n ' t previous i f more t h a n f i v e y e a r s elapsed between t h e commission o f t h e c r i m e f o r which a sentence i s being imposed and t h e previous felony conviction. The p r i s o n e r argues t h a t he h a s , under t h i s s t a t u t e , a s o r t of "window o f opportunity." H e can commit a l l manner o f f e l o n i e s between t h e t i m e be commits h i s f i r s t f e l o n y and h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e f o r and b e immune from p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y d e s i g n a t i o n because t h e f i v e y e a r clock d o e s n ' t s t a r t running u n t i l a f t e r t h e f i r s t c o n v i c t i o n . There i s no evidence i n t h e s t a t u t e , o r anyplace else, t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o provide such an open season. b 7 e have o f t e n h e l d , t h e r u l e s o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n d i c t a t e t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n must be read a s a who3.e i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . The most r e c e n t holding on t h i s i s s u e i s S t a t e v. Magnuson (Mont. 1984), 682 P.2d 1365 F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t b u t t r e s s e s h i s argument w i t h a vague and unsupported a t t e m p t t o d i s t i n g u i s h " d i f f e r e n t occasions" from " t h e same t i m e frame." The s t a t u t e speaks c l e a r l y o f two f e l o n i e s being committed on d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s , which are t h e f a c t s i n t h i s case. Appellant d e f i n e s "occasions" a s "time frames" without t h e burden o f any a u t h o r i t y . The t r i a l judge characterized this terminology as "deriving from the Watergate hearings" and refused "to open another window of opportunity under the statute." In his argument appellant cites three recent cases of this Court covering our latest holdings on the problem of a prosecutor's notice of intention to increase punishment to a defendant pursuant to Montana's persistent felony offender statute. State v. Seitzinger (1979), 180 Mont. 136, 589 P.2d 655; State v. Johnson (1978), 179 Mont. 61, 585 P.2d 1328; and State v. Sather (1977), 172 Mont. 428, 564 P.2d 1306. In this case, we find there is no dispute that the appellant was told from the outset the persistent felony offender designation would be sought if no bargain could be struck. In addition, there is no dispute he was free at all times to accept or reject this offer. Although appellant attempts to generate some confusion and to attribute to the State an improper motive, it is clear the State did nothing improper in refusing to give the persistent felony offender notice until after the appellant had been convicted of the first felony, the felony in which he entered a plea. Throughout appellant's retaliation argument he confuses bargaining with coercion. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have explicitly rejected this type of "Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of bargaining process. By hypothesis, the plea may have been induced by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial. " Johnson, 179 Mont. at 69, 585 P.2d at 1333. F i n a l l y a s t o a p p e l l a n t Williamson's a l l e g a t i o n performance o f h i s o r i g i n a l defense counsel, M r . Pyfer was n o t w i t h i n " t h e range o f competence demanded o f a t t o r n y s i n c r i m i n a l cases'' w e c i t e S t a t e v. Rose (1980), 187 Mont 74, 86, 608 P.2d 1074, 1081. The s t a n d a r d s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e M r . P y f e r ' s a c t i o n s w e r e w i t h i n t h e range set f o r t h i n Rose, supra. M r . Pyfer c o n s u l t e d with o t h e r c r i m i n a l counsel regarding t h e q u e s t i o n o f a p e r s i s t e n t felony d e s i g n a t i o n and d i d a l l t h i n g s p r o p e r l y t o defend t h i s man who faced s e r i o u s c r i m i n a l charges. W e n o t e t h i s was n o t t h e f i r s t t i m e a p p e l l a n t graced t h e county courthouse doors i n h i s a c t i v i t i e s a s an o f f e n d e r . The record i n d i c a t e s M r . Pfyer d i d everything p o s s i b l e t o i n v e s t i g a t e and a d v i s e t h e a p p e l l a n t b e f o r e he e n t e r e d h i s p l e a s o f g u i l t y . It is i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t i n h i s c u r r e n t b r i e f a p p e l l a n t makes no e f f o r t t o address t h e i s s u e o f M r . P y f e r ' s performance a s measured by t h e S t a t e v. Rose s t a n d a r d . H e has f a i l e d t o show M r . P y f e r ' s counseling was inadequate o r incompetent o r t h a t t h e t r i a l judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t g r a n t i n g t h e withdrawal o f h i s p l e a s . The d e c i s i o n o f t h e District Court is affirmed. W e concur: