Title: Bonander v. Town of Tiburon
Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 646
Docket Number: S151370
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2009

1 
Filed 6/8/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JIMMIE D. BONANDER et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S151370 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 1/3 A112539 
TOWN OF TIBURON et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Marin County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. CV052703 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Under the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 10000 
et seq.), an assessment district may be formed and assessments may be levied on 
real property for various purposes, including moving overhead utility wires 
underground, as occurred here.  Under article XIII D of the state Constitution, 
however, any assessment on real property must be in proportion to the special 
benefit conferred on that property.  (See Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. 
Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 443.)  When a 
lawsuit challenges the assessments imposed on specific parcels of real property for 
(among other things) noncompliance with article XIII D, must the plaintiff comply 
with the requirements governing validation proceedings brought under Code of 
Civil Procedure sections 860 through 870.5?  We conclude that the answer is “no.”  
Because the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion, we reverse its 
judgment. 
2 
I 
In May 2003, owners of 116 parcels in the Town of Tiburon (hereafter the 
Town) in Marin County petitioned the Town to create an assessment district in Del 
Mar Valley to install underground utility wires carrying electricity, telephone 
signals, and other cable services, replacing overhead wires strung from poles. 
On June 4, 2003, the Town‟s council adopted a resolution of intention to 
form the proposed assessment district under the Municipal Improvement Act of 
1913.  The Town then engaged a civil engineer to prepare a report analyzing the 
proposed project.  On March 10, 2005, the civil engineer submitted a preliminary 
engineer‟s report, which the Town‟s council approved on March 16, 2005.  As the 
special benefit that would be conferred on the 221 parcels located in the proposed 
district, the report identified the new underground electrical, telephone, and cable 
facilities that would be “the direct source of service to the properties.”  In 
determining the special benefit conferred on each individual parcel, the report 
assigned points based on three benefit categories:  (1) aesthetic benefit from 
removal of unsightly poles and overhead wires, (2) improved safety because of the 
reduced risk of downed poles and wires, and (3) greater service reliability because 
of new wiring and equipment.  The estimated cost of the project was $4,720,000, 
of which construction costs represented $3,900,611.  The proposed individual 
assessments ranged from about $7,200 to about $31,200 per parcel, with 
$21,717.04 being the most frequent assessment. 
On March 30, 2005, notices of a public hearing and ballots were sent to the 
owners of parcels within the proposed assessment district.  Each ballot was 
weighted to reflect the amount of the proposed assessment for the parcel in 
question.  Owners of parcels representing 71 percent of the total proposed 
assessment voted in favor of the project. 
3 
On May 12, 2005, the Town received a final engineer‟s report, and on May 
18, 2005, the Town‟s council voted unanimously to approve that report, to order 
the improvements, to establish the Del Mar Valley Utility Undergrounding 
Assessment District, and to confirm the proposed individual assessments.  On May 
27, 2005, assessment notices were sent to property owners within the new 
assessment district. 
Two couples, Jimmie and Jean Bonander and Frank and Shelley Mulberg, 
had previously objected to inclusion of their parcels in the district.  The 
assessment levied against each of their parcels was $31,146.62.  On June 16, 2005, 
the Bonanders and the Mulbergs filed a “Petition for Writ of Administrative 
Mandamus or Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” 
(hereafter complaint) in the superior court, alleging four causes of action — three 
of them for administrative mandate and the fourth seeking declaratory relief.  The 
complaint named as defendants the Town, its council, and 20 unnamed Does. 
The complaint alleged that the assessment district, as formed, violated 
article XIII D of the state Constitution because the apportionment method used by 
the district resulted in assessments against plaintiffs‟ parcels that exceeded the 
special benefit to be conferred on those parcels.  According to plaintiffs, their lots 
would receive no aesthetic benefit at all and little, if any, safety or reliability 
benefit, because after the project‟s completion utility poles and overhead wires 
would remain nearby.  The complaint further alleged that the assessment district 
was infirm because (1) the petition initiating the creation of the district was 
inadequate, (2) the Town‟s resolution of intention to form the district was also 
inadequate, (3) the Town‟s engineers had drawn the district‟s boundaries by 
“cherry picking and gerrymandering,” (4) the boundaries adopted were the product 
of “tainted voting,” and (5) the zones created within the district prevented a fair 
allocation of construction costs.  The complaint sought not only to set aside the 
4 
assessments on plaintiffs‟ parcels but also to invalidate the Town‟s May 18, 2005, 
resolution, which established the assessment district and confirmed the individual 
assessments. 
On June 17, 2005, plaintiffs served the summons and complaint on the 
Town, but they did not serve the owners of the other 219 parcels within the 
district. 
On August 2, 2005, the Town answered the complaint, alleging several 
affirmative defenses, including that plaintiffs‟ claims were barred as untimely 
under Streets and Highways Code section 10400 and that plaintiffs had failed to 
file, within 60 days of the complaint‟s filing date, proof of service by newspaper 
publication, as required under Code of Civil Procedure sections 861 and 863. 
On August 15, 2005, the 60th day after the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs 
mailed a modified copy of the summons and complaint to the record owners of the 
parcels in the assessment district.  To a copy of the summons (which was directed 
only to the Town, the Town‟s council, and 20 unnamed Does) plaintiffs added this 
handwritten notation:  “8/15/05 — To All Interested Parties  [¶]  SEE NOTICE 
ATTACHED TO SUMMONS.”  The attached sheet, addressed to “ALL 
PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE MATTER OF THE DEL MAR UTILITY 
UNDERGROUNDING ASSESSMENT DISTRICT,” advised:  “You may contest 
the legality or validity of the matter by appearing and filing a written answer to the 
complaint not later than SEPTEMBER 20, 2005.”  That same day, plaintiffs filed 
proof of service by mail of the modified summons on the other property owners. 
On August 17, 2005, plaintiffs applied ex parte for an order amending the 
caption on their summons to include “all interested persons,” thereby attempting to 
bring the summons into compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 863.  
Plaintiffs, however, did not concede that this statute applied. 
5 
The trial court granted plaintiffs‟ application and authorized issuance of the 
amended summons.  Plaintiffs then published the amended summons and its 
attached notice in a local newspaper, once per week, for four successive weeks, 
from August 19 through September 9, 2005, thereby attempting to come into 
compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 861.  On September 9 — 85 
days after the complaint was filed — plaintiffs filed proof of publication of the 
amended summons. 
On September 23, 2005, the Town filed a motion to dismiss based on 
plaintiffs‟ failure to timely comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 861, 
861.1, and 863, which require — in actions to which they apply — that the 
summons be directed to “ „all persons interested‟ ” (id., § 861) and that proof of 
publication be filed within “60 days from the filing of [the] complaint” (id., 
§ 863).  Plaintiffs had missed that deadline by 25 days. 
On November 3, 2005, the trial court ordered dismissal of the complaint.  
Based on the complaint‟s allegations and requests for relief, the court ruled that 
plaintiffs‟ action was a “special statutory action challenging the formation of a 
local public improvement district or assessment district and the subsequent levy of 
an assessment,” making the action a validation proceeding “subject to special 
statutory [procedures] codified in . . . Code of Civil Procedure [section 860 et 
seq.]”  Because plaintiffs had failed to file proof of service by publication within 
the requisite 60 days from the filing of the complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 863), and 
because they had failed to show good cause for their delay (ibid.), the trial court 
dismissed the complaint.  The Court of Appeal affirmed. 
II 
The issue before us is whether the general validation procedure set forth in 
Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 through 870.5 applies when a property 
owner contests an individual assessment levied under the Municipal Improvement 
6 
Act of 1913 (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 10000 et seq.).  To shed light on what the 
Legislature intended by provisions that it enacted in the early part of the last 
century, we must examine the history of special assessment districts in California 
and, in particular, the ways in which property owners have contested the validity 
of those districts. 
A.  Early Cases in Which Property Owners Contested the Validity of 
Special Assessments 
For well over a century, California law has allowed public agencies to use 
special assessment districts to finance specific types of improvements that benefit 
the real property located within the district.  Many of the early assessment districts 
were created for the purpose of reclaiming swampland, although assessment 
districts were also frequently used to finance street improvements. 
An interested property owner could participate in the proceedings that led 
to the creation of the assessment district, and after the district was formed and the 
assessments levied, property owners frequently brought actions contesting the 
validity of their individual assessments.  When the boundaries of the district and 
the amount of the individual assessments were determined by a local board 
exercising discretionary authority, property owners could petition the superior 
court for a writ of review, and in that way contest the validity of the proceedings 
that led to the assessment.  (See, e.g., Miller & Lux v. Board of Supervisors (1920) 
189 Cal. 254; Imperial Water Co. v. Supervisors (1912) 162 Cal. 14; Peterson v. 
Board of Supervisors (1924) 65 Cal.App. 670.)  In other cases, property owners 
brought actions for declaratory or injunctive relief (see, e.g., Imperial Land Co. v. 
Imperial Irr. Dist. (1916) 173 Cal. 668; Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist. 
(1916) 173 Cal. 660; Southwick v. Santa Barbara (1910) 158 Cal. 14), or, because 
the assessment was a lien against the property, they brought actions to quiet title 
(see, e.g., Larsen v. San Francisco (1920) 182 Cal. 1; Ahlman v. Barber Asphalt 
7 
Pav. Co. (1919) 40 Cal.App. 395).  In addition, property owners could challenge 
the validity of an assessment as a defense in an action brought to enforce the 
assessment.  (See, e.g., Swamp Land etc. Dist. 341 v. Blumenberg (1909) 156 Cal. 
539, 541; Reclamation Dist. 531 v. Phillips (1895) 108 Cal. 306, 311; Reclamation 
Dist. No. 108 v. Evans (1882) 61 Cal. 104, 107.)  In some cases, the legislative act 
authorizing formation of the assessment district expressly conferred on property 
owners the right to bring actions challenging their individual assessments.  (See, 
e.g., Stats. 1897, ch. 189, § 69, p. 276.) 
These were private law actions between the property owner and the public 
agency levying the assessment, or sometimes between the property owner and the 
contractor, and no special rules of procedure governed these actions.  If a property 
owner successfully contested the assessment against his or her property, that 
owner was relieved of the obligation to pay the assessment, but other property 
owners who had not challenged their assessments remained obligated.  (See 
Reclamation Dist. No. 108 v. Evans, supra, 61 Cal. at p. 107.)  Thus, in some 
cases the revenue of the assessment district might fall short of what was originally 
contemplated.  This shortfall might result in scaling down the planned 
improvements, adding or increasing financial contributions by the local 
government, or levying a new assessment to raise additional funds. 
To address the uncertainties associated with property owners bringing 
actions to contest their assessments, the Legislature enacted former Political Code 
section 3493 1/2 (Stats. 1893, ch. 176, § 1, pp. 208-210), relating specifically to 
assessment districts created to reclaim swampland.  (See Swamp Land etc. Dist. 
341 v. Blumenberg, supra, 156 Cal. at pp. 541-542; Reclamation Dist. No. 551 v. 
Runyon (1897) 117 Cal. 164, 166.)  Former Political Code section 3493 1/2 
permitted public agencies to bring validation actions against the owners of 
properties within an assessment district to have the district (and the individual 
8 
assessments) judicially approved.  If the public agency prevailed, the validity of 
the individual assessments could not be contested in any later action.1  This was 
the first validation provision applicable to assessment districts in California. 
B.  Improvement Acts of 1911 and 1913 
Over the next several decades, new acts of the Legislature authorized public 
agencies to form assessment districts for a variety of specified purposes, in some 
cases replacing previous legislative enactments.  One such act was the 
Improvement Act of 1911 (Stats. 1911, ch. 397, §§ 1-83, pp. 730-769), which 
provided for improvement of streets within municipalities and further provided for 
the issuance of street improvement bonds to pay for the improvements.  Another 
such act was the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 (Stats. 1913, ch. 247, §§ 1-
20, pp. 421-429), which provided for the construction of water works, electric 
power works, gas works, lighting works, and other public utilities; for the 
assessment of costs upon the benefited properties; and for the issuance of 
improvement bonds. 
The Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 is the act at issue here.  When 
first enacted, section 6 provided:  “The validity of an assessment levied under this 
act shall not be contested in any action or proceeding unless the same is 
                                            
1 
Specifically, former Political Code section 3493 1/2 provided:  “At any time 
within one year after the filing of the list [of the charges assessed against each tract 
of land], the Board of Trustees of the [reclamation] district may, in the name of the 
district, commence and prosecute an action in the Superior Court of the county in 
which the district is situated . . . to determine the validity of the assessment; and in 
said action, any one or more of the owners of land embraced within the district 
may . . . be made defendants in said action.  [¶] . . . [¶] . . .  [T]he judgment given 
and made in the action brought under the provisions of this section shall be 
conclusive between the parties thereto as to the validity or invalidity of the 
assessment . . . .”  (Stats. 1893, ch. 176, § 1, pp. 208-210.) 
9 
commenced within thirty days after the time said assessment is levied . . . .”  
(Stats. 1913, ch. 247, § 6, p. 424.)  Although this provision reads as a statute of 
limitations, it implicitly authorizes property owners to bring actions to contest 
assessments.  It has not been substantively amended since its original enactment.  
(See Sts. & Hy. Code, § 10400.) 
In 1937, the Legislature amended the Improvement Act of 1911 to allow the 
legislative body conducting the proceedings to bring a validation action.  
Specifically, section 16 of the Improvement Act of 1911 was amended to provide, 
in part:  “At any time after bids have been received [for a street improvement] and 
prior to the date fixed for the beginning of work, the legislative body conducting 
the proceedings may bring an action in the superior court of the county in which 
the city lies to determine the validity of such proceedings and the validity of any 
contract entered or to be entered pursuant thereto.  Any contractor to whom a 
contract has been awarded may . . . bring such an action to determine the validity 
of such proceedings and of such contract.  Such action shall be in the nature of a 
proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction of all parties interested may be had by 
publication of summons . . . in some newspaper of general circulation published in 
the county where the action is pending . . . . [¶] . . .  If the validity of the 
proceedings and of the contract or proposed contract is sustained, the validity of 
such proceedings or contract shall not thereafter be contested in any action . . . .”  
(Stats. 1937, ch. 602, § 1, pp. 1673-1674.) 
In 1941, the Legislature incorporated this validation scheme from the 
Improvement Act of 1911 into the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913.  At that 
time, section 18 of the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 (later codified, in 
relevant part, as Sts. & Hy. Code, § 10601 (Stats. 1953, ch. 192, § 4, p. 1192)) was 
amended to provide, in part:  “The city council, at any time after the publication of 
any resolution of intention adopted hereunder, or the ordering of the improvement 
10 
or acquisition, or the confirmation of the assessment, or ordering the issuance of 
bonds, and any contractor, at any time after the award of contract to him, may 
bring an action in the superior court of the county in which said city is located, to 
determine the validity of said proceedings, assessment, bonds, contract, 
improvement or acquisition, or any thereof.  Such action shall be brought pursuant 
to and be governed by the provisions of, and shall have the effect, as provided in 
Section 16 of [the] Improvement Act of 1911, except as herein otherwise 
provided.”  (Stats. 1941, ch. 35, § 7, p. 93.)  As noted, section 16 of the 
Improvement Act of 1911 provided for notice by newspaper publication.  (Stats. 
1937, ch. 602, § 1, p. 1673.) 
Significantly, only the “city council” (later broadened to be the “legislative 
body” (Stats. 1953, ch. 192, § 4, p. 1192)) and the “contractor” could bring the 
validation action contemplated by this 1941 amendment to the Municipal 
Improvement Act of 1913.  Obviously these parties were interested in confirming 
the validity of the assessment, not contesting it:  The legislative body had levied 
the assessment and generally would have no reason to contest its validity, and the 
contractor had an interest in confirming the assessment in order to ensure full 
payment.  Therefore, actions to contest the validity of the assessment were not 
governed by section 18 of the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913, including its 
requirement of notice by newspaper publication.  Rather, section 6 of that act 
(later codified as Sts. & Hy. Code, § 10400 (Stats. 1953, ch. 192, § 4, p. 1186))2 
continued to be the only statute governing such actions, and it did not require any 
special notice procedures. 
                                            
2  
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Streets 
and Highways Code. 
11 
C.  General Validation Procedure (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 860 through 870) 
By 1961, the California codes contained a patchwork of provisions 
governing validation proceedings, with each set of provisions dedicated to a 
different statutory scheme.  In that year, the Legislature sought to replace this 
patchwork with a general validation procedure.  (Stats. 1961, ch. 1479, §§ 1-3, 
pp. 3331-3332.)  This procedure, which the Legislature codified as Code of Civil 
Procedure sections 860 through 870, does not, in itself, authorize any validation 
actions; rather, it establishes a uniform system that other statutory schemes must 
activate by reference.  At the time the Legislature enacted this general validation 
procedure, it revised 80 statutory schemes, deleting existing provisions governing 
validation proceedings and referring instead to the new uniform system.  (Stats. 
1961, chs. 1480-1559, pp. 3333-3381.) 
The judgment in a proceeding brought under the general validation 
procedure is “binding and conclusive . . . against the agency and against all other 
persons . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 870, subd. (a), italics added.)  Because the 
proceeding is in the nature of an action against the entire world, “[j]urisdiction of 
all interested parties may be had by [newspaper] publication of summons” and 
such other notice as the court may order.  (Id., § 861.)  More important, the 
general validation procedure is broad enough to include actions to invalidate 
public agency matters (sometimes called reverse validation actions).  Code of Civil 
Procedure section 863 permits “any interested person [to] bring an action . . . to 
determine the validity of [the] matter” (italics added), and the phrase “any 
interested person” might of course include a party contesting the matter in 
question. 
III 
The Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 was one of the statutory schemes 
that the Legislature revised in 1961 to make reference to the new general 
12 
validation procedure.  Section 10601 (which codified the relevant portion of what 
had been section 18 of the act) was amended to read:  “An action to determine the 
validity of the assessment, bonds, contract improvement or acquisition may be 
brought by the legislative body or by the contractor pursuant to Chapter 9 
(commencing with Section 860) of Title 10 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. . . .  Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the action authorized 
by this section shall not be brought by any person other than the legislative body 
or the contractor, nor except when permitted by Section 10400 shall the action be 
brought after the date fixed for the beginning of work.”  (Stats. 1961, ch. 1526, 
§ 1, p. 3364.) 
The apparent intent of the Legislature in making this 1961 amendment to 
section 10601 was to incorporate the general validation procedure into the 
Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 but without otherwise substantively changing 
the law.  Under the previously existing procedure, validation actions under section 
10601 had to be brought in accordance with the provisions governing validation 
actions brought under the Improvement Act of 1911 (Stats. 1941, ch. 35, § 7, 
p. 93), and therefore they had to be brought “prior to the date fixed for the 
beginning of work” (Stats. 1937, ch. 602, § 1, pp. 1672-1674).  Accordingly, when 
the Legislature amended section 10601 to incorporate the general validation 
procedure, it expressly provided that the action could not “be brought after the 
date fixed for the beginning of work.”  (Stats. 1961, ch. 1526, § 1, p. 3364.) 
More important, under the previously existing procedure only the 
legislative body or the contractor could bring a validation action (see p. 10, ante), 
and these actions were, by implication, aimed at confirming the validity of the 
assessment proceedings, not at contesting that validity.  The general validation 
procedure, however, is broad enough to include reverse validation actions aimed at 
contesting the validity of public agency matters.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 863.)  
13 
Therefore, when the Legislature in 1961 amended section 10601 to incorporate the 
general validation procedure, it expressly limited which parties might avail 
themselves of the new procedure:  “Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, 
the action authorized by this section shall not be brought by any person other than 
the legislative body or the contractor . . . .”  (Stats. 1961, ch. 1526, § 1, p. 3364.) 
The legislative history of the 1961 amendment to section 10601 supports 
this analysis.  The amendment was enacted by Assembly Bill No. 1462 (1961 Reg. 
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1462).  As originally introduced, Assembly Bill 1462 would 
have amended section 10601 to provide in relevant part:  “An action to determine 
the validity of the assessment, bonds, contract, improvement or acquisition may be 
brought pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 860) of Title 10 of Part 2 
of the Code of Civil Procedure.”  (Assem. Bill 1462, as introduced Feb. 8, 1961.)  
Later in the legislative process, this sentence was revised, to insert the words “by 
the legislative body or by the contractor.”  (Assem. Bill 1462, as amended in Sen., 
May 29, 1961, italics added.)  In addition, the sentence was added that reads:  
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the action authorized by this section 
shall not be brought by any person other than the legislative body or the 
contractor, nor except when permitted by Section 10400 shall the action be 
brought after the date fixed for the beginning of work.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  
These changes confirm that the Legislature specifically intended to preserve the 
existing limitations in section 10601, and therefore that it did not intend to 
incorporate the uniform validation procedure in its entirety into the Municipal 
Improvement Act of 1913. 
It would seem, therefore, that in amending Streets and Highways Code 
section 10601 in 1961, the Legislature intended to activate the general validation 
procedure set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure only for actions to validate 
assessments, not for actions to contest assessments.  Actions to contest 
14 
assessments continue to be governed solely by section 10400, as they have been 
since 1913, and therefore they are not subject to the general validation procedure, 
and in particular they are not subject to the requirement of newspaper publication.  
This conclusion makes sense because actions to contest individual assessments 
have always been private law actions that are binding only on the parties to the 
action, and therefore service on and notice to other property owners by newspaper 
publication is not necessary.  (See Dumas v. City of Sunnyvale (1965) 231 
Cal.App.2d 796, 802 [plaintiffs‟ assessments invalidated because they were levied 
without regard to the amount of special benefit conferred on the assessed 
properties; assessments of property owners who did not bring challenges remained 
unaffected]; Reclamation District v. Bonbini (1910) 158 Cal. 197, 205-206 
[plaintiff‟s assessment invalidated on individual grounds; assessments of property 
owners who did not bring challenges remained unaffected].)3 
Although, as we have just said, our statutory construction appears to reflect 
the Legislature‟s intent, the problem with this interpretation is the statement in 
section 10601 that the validation action authorized by that section shall not, 
“except when permitted by Section 10400,” be brought after the date fixed for 
beginning work.  As noted, section 10400 permits actions to contest an assessment, 
which by implication would be an action brought by some party other than the 
legislative body that levied the assessment, or the contractor, which wants the 
                                            
3  
An action contesting an individual assessment cannot obligate nonparties, 
but it might affect nonparties by removing an obligation.  The latter would occur 
when the assessment is declared generally invalid as to all assessed properties 
within the district.  (See Harrison v. Bd. of Supervisors (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 852, 
863-865 [assessment invalidated in its entirety because the improvements 
conferred general benefits only and conferred no special benefit on any of the 
assessed properties].) 
15 
assessment validated to ensure payment.  Under the express terms of section 
10601, however, the legislative body and the contractor are the only parties that 
can bring validation actions. 
Hence, we are confronted with an internal inconsistency in the statutory 
scheme.  If we read section 10601 as authorizing a reverse validation action by a 
property owner aimed at contesting an assessment, then we give effect to the 
cross-reference in that statute to section 10400, but we contradict the express 
limitation of that statute to actions brought by the legislative body or the 
contractor.  Conversely, if we hold that only the legislative body or the contractor 
may bring validation actions, then we render the cross-reference to section 10400 
essentially meaningless, because it is hard to imagine either of those parties 
wanting to prosecute an action to contest the validity of the assessment after it is 
levied. 
In our view, the better interpretation of section 10601 is to give effect to the 
limiting language in that section even at the cost of rendering meaningless the 
section‟s cross-reference to section 10400.  We conclude that in 1961, when the 
Legislature amended section 10601, it intended to incorporate the general 
validation procedure into the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913, without 
otherwise substantively changing the law, and therefore without changing the 
existing rule that validation actions could be brought only by the legislative body 
that had approved the assessment or the contractor that would perform the work.  
Because these parties would be highly unlikely to contest the assessment, the 
cross-reference to section 10400 is confusing, but we can think of at least one 
possible explanation for this cross-reference.  Perhaps the drafters of the 1961 
amendment to section 10601 were concerned that the statement requiring the 
validation action to be brought before the start of the work might be read broadly 
as applying not only to validation actions but also to actions brought under section 
16 
10400 to contest assessments.  To avoid this broad interpretation, the drafters may 
have added the savings clause (“except when permitted by Section 10400”) 
without being aware of the internal inconsistency that the clause effected. 
In summary, an action under section 10400 to contest an assessment can 
merely invalidate that assessment, either generally or as to one or more individual 
properties — it cannot impose an obligation on nonparties to pay an assessment — 
and therefore service on and notice to other property owners by newspaper 
publication is unnecessary.  Accordingly, there was no reason for the Legislature 
to apply the protections of the general validation procedure to actions under 
section 10400.  It is true that the success of such an action would reduce (and 
might eliminate) the funds available to finance the planned improvements, and 
therefore it would indirectly affect other assessed properties (either by reducing 
the scope of the project or by necessitating a new assessment or some alternative 
source of funding), but there are countless situations in the law in which third 
parties will be negatively affected by the success of a pending lawsuit, and the law 
does not require formal notice to those third parties.  If notice to nonparties is 
appropriate in the context of a property owner‟s action contesting an assessment 
under the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913, then it is for the Legislature to 
require such notice.  It has not done so in section 10400, and by its terms, section 
10601 does not apply to actions brought by property owners to contest 
assessments. 
IV 
We conclude that the general validation procedure set forth in Code of Civil 
Procedure sections 860 through 870.5 does not apply here, where property owners 
are contesting individual assessments levied under the Municipal Improvement Act 
of 1913.  Because the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion, we 
reverse  
17 
its judgment and remand the case to that court with instructions to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Bonander v. Town of Tiburon 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 147 Cal.App.4th 1116 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S151370 
Date Filed: June 8, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Marin 
Judge: James R. Ritchie 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Frank I. Mulberg and Brett D. Mulberg for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Jack D. Cohen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Trevor A. Grimm, Jonathan M. Coupal and Timothy A. Bittle for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Ann R. Danforth, Town Attorney; McDonough Holland & Allen, Thomas R. Curry, Andrea S. 
Visveshwara and Kevin D. Siegel for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Colantuono & Levin, Michael G. Colantuono and Amy C. Sparrow for League of California Cities and 
California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Frank I. Mulberg 
655 Redwood Highway, Suite 300 
Mill Valley, CA  94941 
(415) 388-0605 
 
Thomas R Curry 
McDonough Holland & Allen 
1901 Harrison, 9th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 273-8780 
 
Michael G. Colantuono 
Colantuono & Levin 
11406 Pleasant Valley Road 
Penn Valley, CA  95946-9024 
(530) 432-7359