Title: John O. Norquist v. Cate Zeuske
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP001812-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1812-OA 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
John O. Norquist, Kevin M. Crawford, Michael R. 
Miller, Joseph Laux, Dan Thompson, Edward Huck 
and Gerald Jorgensen, 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Cate Zeuske, in her official capacity as 
secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 25, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 1, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioners there was a brief by Robert 
Horowitz, Kristine A. Euclide and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & 
Hansen, Madison and oral argument by Robert Horowitz. 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by Alan 
Lee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James 
E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by H. Dale 
Peterson, Sverre David Roang, and Stroud, Stroud, Willink, 
Thompson & Howard, Madison for The Wisconsin Farm Bureau 
Federation, Cooperative, The Farmers Educational & Cooperative 
Union of America, Wisconsin Division, The National Farmers 
Organization, The Wisconsin Agribusiness Council, The Wisconsin 
Agri-Service Association, Inc., The Wisconsin Cattlemen's 
Association, Cooperative, The Wisconsin Corn Growers Association, 
Inc., The Wisconsin Federation of Cooperatives, The Wisconsin 
Pork Producers Association, Cooperative, The Wisconsin Potato & 
Vegetable Growers Association, Inc., The Wisconsin Soybean 
Association, Inc., and The Wisconsin State Cranberry Growers 
Association. 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard J. 
Stadelman, Executive Director, Shawano, for the Wisconsin Towns 
Association. 
 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John O. Norquist, Kevin M. Crawford, 
Michael R. Miller, Joseph Laux, Dan 
Thompson, Edward Huck and Gerald 
Jorgensen, 
 
  
Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Cate Zeuske, in her official capacity as 
secretary of the Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL 
ACTION for 
declaratory 
judgment.  
Dismissed 
without prejudice. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  On June 25, 1996, John Norquist, 
mayor of the City of Milwaukee; Kevin Crawford, mayor of the 
City of Manitowoc; Michael Miller, mayor of the City of West 
Bend; Joeseph Laux, mayor of the City of Menasha; Dan Thompson, 
executive director of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities; 
Edward Huck, executive director of the Wisconsin Alliance of 
Cities; and Gerald Jorgenson, an owner of agricultural land in 
Wisconsin, sought leave to commence an original action against 
Mark Bugher, in his capacity as the secretary of the Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue pursuant to WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3(2) and 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
2 
Wis. Stat. § 809.70(1)(1995-96).
1  We accepted the petition to 
commence an original action on October 21, 1996.  On February 6, 
1997, this court granted a joint motion by the parties to 
substitute the new secretary of the Department of Revenue, Cate 
Zeuske, for the former secretary of the Department of Revenue, 
Mark Bugher. 
¶2 
Three issues are identified for our consideration: (1) 
whether 
the 
petitioners 
have 
standing 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), (2) whether §§ 
70.329(2r)(a) and (b) violate the Uniformity Clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, and (3) whether §§ 70.32(2r)(a) and (b) 
are severable from § 70.32(2r)(c).  We hold that Jorgensen, who 
owns 
agricultural 
land, 
has 
standing 
to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality of § 70.32(2r) and that given the state of the 
record, a decision by this court would be premature.    
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Wis. Stat. § 
70.32(2r) was enacted by Wis. Act 27, § 3362h and became 
effective January 1, 1996.  Section 70.32(2r) provides: 
 
2r (a) For the assessments as of January 1, 1996, and 
January 1, 1997, or until the farmland advisory council 
under s. 73.03(49) makes its final recommendation, but 
not to extend beyond January 1, 2009, the assessed 
value of each parcel of agricultural land is the 
assessed value of that parcel as of January 1, 1995. 
(b) For each year beginning with 1998 or upon 
completion 
of 
the 
farmland 
advisory 
council's 
recommendation and promulgation of rules and ending no 
later than December 31, 2008, the assessed value of the 
parcel shall be reduced as follows: 
1. Subtract the value of the parcel as determined 
according to the income that is or could be generated 
                     
1 Unless otherwise stated, all future statutory references 
are to the 1995-96 volume. 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
3 
from its rental for agricultural use, as determined by 
rule, from its assessed value as of January 1, 1996. 
2. Multiply .1 by the number of years that the 
parcel 
has 
been 
assessed 
under 
this 
paragraph, 
including the current year. 
3. Multiply the amount under subd. 1. by the 
decimal under subd. 2. 
4. Subtract the amount under subd. 3. from the 
parcel's assessed value as of January 1, 1996. 
(c) For the assessment as of January 1 after the 
valuation method under par. (b) no longer applies and 
for each assessment thereafter, agricultural land shall 
be assessed according to the income that could be 
generated from its rental or agricultural use. 
  
¶4 
Thus, 
the 
statute 
provides 
for 
three 
phases 
in 
transforming agricultural land
2 assessments for property taxes 
from a market value system
3 to a use value system.  The first 
phase, 
created 
by 
subsection 
(a), 
freezes 
assessments 
of 
agricultural land at the January 1, 1995, assessment level.  This 
freeze, which began in 1996, will last for at least two years.  
Subsection (b) provides for a mixed assessment system that will 
last from the end of the initial freeze until 2009.  During this 
period, agricultural land will be assessed based partly on the 
frozen market value assessments and partly on land's agricultural 
use value.  In each year during this phase, the market value 
assessment is reduced by ten percent and the use value portion of 
the assessment is increased by ten percent.  In 2009, the mixed 
                     
2 
Agricultural 
land 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
70.32(2)(c)(1) as: 
1. "Agricultural 
land" 
means 
land, 
exclusive 
of 
buildings 
and 
improvements, 
that 
is 
devoted 
primarily to agricultural use, as defined by rule.  
3 Before January 1, 1996, agricultural land, like other real 
property, was assessed at the "full value which could ordinarily 
be obtained therefor at private sale."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) 
(1993-94).  
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
4 
assessment period ends and agricultural land will be assessed 
based entirely on its agricultural use value. 
¶5 
Jorgensen owns agricultural land in the State of 
Wisconsin and pays real property taxes on that land.  His land is 
subject to the freeze in the assessments of agricultural land 
created in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(a).  The remaining petitioners, 
including the mayors, each own land in the State of Wisconsin 
that is not designated as agricultural land and each pays real 
property taxes on that land. 
¶6 
The petitioners brought this action to challenge the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r).  The petitioners 
contend that the freeze established in subsection (a) violates 
the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. WIS. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 1.  The petitioners further contend that subsection 
(b) also violates the Uniformity Clause because the market value 
portion of the mixed assessment is based on the frozen amount 
designated in subsection (a).  Finally, the petitioners assert 
that because subsections (a) and (b) are not severable, § 
70.32(2r) must be invalidated in its entirety.  Zeuske not only 
disagrees 
with 
the 
petitions 
contentions 
regarding 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
§ 
70.32(2r) 
and 
the 
severability 
of 
subsections (a) and (b), but also maintains that the petitioners 
lack standing to challenge the statute. 
 
I. 
  
¶7 
The first issue that we consider is whether the 
petitioners have standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r).  The central standing question is whether 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
5 
"a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." 
State ex rel. First National Bank of Wisconsin Rapids v. M&I 
Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 307-08, 290 N.W.2d 321 
(1980), quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). 
 Wisconsin employs a two-step standing analysis.  The analysis 
requires the court to determine (1) whether the plaintiff has 
suffered a threatened or actual injury, and (2) whether the 
interest asserted is recognized by law.  Waste Management of 
Wisconsin, Inc., v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988); First 
National Bank, 95 Wis. 2d at 308; Wisconsin's Environmental 
Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 69 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 230 
N.W.2d 243 (1975). 
¶8 
The petitioners assert that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) 
violates the Uniformity Clause. The Uniformity Clause as set 
forth in Article VIII, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides 
in relevant part: 
 
The rule of taxation shall be uniform, but the 
legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to 
collect and return taxes on real estate located therein 
by optional methods. . . . Taxation of agricultural 
land and undeveloped land, both as defined by law, need 
not be uniform with the taxation of each other nor with 
the taxation of other real property. 
 
(emphasis added). The last sentence of the Uniformity Clause, 
quoted above, was established in 1974.  This amendment makes 
clear that agricultural land need not be uniformly taxed as 
compared to other types of property, but it must be taxed 
uniformly as compared to other agricultural land.  See McManus v. 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
6 
Department of Revenue, 155 Wis. 2d 450, 454-455, 455 N.W.2d 906 
(Ct. App. 1990)("Under the amendment, agricultural land may be 
taxed in a manner that is not uniform with the taxation of other 
real property.  However the uniformity requirement still applies 
within the agricultural classification itself."). 
 
¶9 
The petitioners claim that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(a) 
violates the Uniformity Clause because the freeze of assessments 
at 1995 levels will result in more preferential tax treatment for 
some agricultural land than for other agricultural land.  They 
point out that, inevitably, the value of some agricultural land 
will decrease and the value of other agricultural land will 
increase during the period of the freeze.  Thus, according to the 
petitioners, the freeze in assessments will result in non-uniform 
taxation. 
¶10 One of the petitioners, Jorgensen, owns agricultural 
land.  As he owns agricultural land, his status is logically 
related to his claim that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) violates the 
Uniformity Clause.  Jorgensen, however, must also satisfy the 
actual injury requirement. 
¶11 Jorgensen asserts that he has proven actual injury 
because he may be compelled to pay higher property taxes as a 
result of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r).  This possibility of higher 
taxes derives from the fact that Jorgensen owns agricultural land 
which is subject to the market value freeze created by subsection 
(a).  The property value of at least some agricultural land will 
increase each year to the benefit of the owners of that land; 
however, the market value of some agricultural land will 
inevitably decrease resulting in an assessment that is relatively 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
7 
higher under the freeze for those land owners.  Jorgensen 
maintains that because the value of his agricultural land could 
decrease and will inevitably change by a degree different from 
other agricultural land, he has demonstrated the injury necessary 
for standing. 
 
¶12 We agree.  The injury necessary for standing must be 
actual or threatened.  Jorgensen's property values may decrease 
resulting in higher real property taxes relative to other 
agricultural land.  In addition, it is certain that during the 
freeze, the value of Jorgensen's property will change by an 
amount different from other agricultural land.  Thus, even if 
Jorgensen does benefit from the freeze he will not benefit by the 
same amount as other owners of agricultural land.  As we have 
determined that Jorgensen has satisfied both the actual injury 
and logical nexus requirements, we conclude that he has standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 70.32.
4   
 
 
II. 
 
 
¶13 The next issue that we address is whether Wis. Stat. §§ 
70.32(2r)(a) and (b) violate the Uniformity Clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  All 
legislative 
acts 
are 
presumed 
constitutional and every presumption must be indulged to uphold 
the law if at all possible.  Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 
Wis. 2d 408, 415, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967) (citations omitted).  The 
party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the 
                     
4 We need not consider the standing of the other petitioners 
as we conclude that Jorgensen has standing to challenge the 
statute. 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
8 
burden to prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 263, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995).   
Constitutional challenges to a statute must 
overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality.  State v. 
Theil, 188 Wis.2d 695, 706, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994).  We must not 
construe a statute to violate the constitution if it can possibly 
be construed consistent with the constitution.  Demmith v. 
Wisconsin Judicial Conference,166 Wis. 2d 649, 664 FN 13, 480 
N.W.2d 502 (1992).  Finally, when the statute concerns a tax 
measure, the presumption of constitutionality is the strongest.  
Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987). 
¶14 In State ex rel Fort Howard Paper Co. v. State Lake 
Dist. Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 491, 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978), this court 
considered what is required of a taxpayer who challenges a 
statute on the basis that it violates the Uniformity Clause.  In 
that case, the petitioner alleged that a statute required him to 
pay a disproportionate amount of property taxes in violation of 
the Uniformity Clause.  The statute provided that beginning in 
1974 the department of revenue was to revalue each year as many 
taxation districts as the availability of staff would permit.  It 
further required that the department of revenue complete the 
valuation of all manufacturing property in the state every four 
years.  Before the statute was enacted the local assessor had 
conducted annual property assessments.  The petitioner was 
reassessed in 1975.  This reassessment resulted in a 57% increase 
in the assessed value of the petitioner's property.  Id. at 497. 
 Based on this increase and the fact that other property owners 
might not be reassessed until three years later, the petitioner 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
9 
alleged that the statute was unconstitutional.  Specifically, the 
petitioner maintained that the four year cyclical valuation plan 
created by the statute violated the Uniformity Clause.  Id. at 
510. 
¶15 We described the basis for finding that the petitioner 
in Fort Howard had not proven non-uniform valuation as follows:  
 
Before the petitioner can begin to carry its heavy 
burden of proving unconstitutionality, it must first 
prove that a number of valuations were incorrect.  For 
1975, the petitioner must prove that its improvements 
were overvalued and that Green Bay residents or other 
Lake District manufacturers were undervalued. 
Id. at 507-508.  Accordingly, to satisfy the burden of proving a 
statute unconstitutional due to a violation of the Uniformity 
Clause, a taxpayer must initially prove that his property has 
been overvalued or over assessed while other property has been 
undervalued or under assessed.
5 
 
¶16 Jorgensen has not offered any evidence that his 
property is over assessed or that other agricultural land is 
under assessed.  Jorgensen asserts that because some agricultural 
land will change in value, it will not be taxed uniformly, and, 
therefore, Jorgensen's property will not be treated uniformly.  
The State maintains that this information is not a sufficient 
basis 
to 
declare 
the 
statute 
either 
constitutional 
or 
unconstitutional.  At oral argument, the State asserted that it 
                     
5 As was noted by this court in Fort Howard the same 
analysis applies to allegations of both non-uniform assessments 
and non-uniform valuations: "[The] difference [between non-
uniform assessment and non-uniform valuation] is unimportant 
because Art. VIII, § 1, requires both uniform rates and uniform 
valuations."  Fort Howard, 82 Wis. 2d at 507 fn. 6, citing 
Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410, 421 (1859). 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
10
should not win now and that this court should not have taken this 
case.  We agree that the record is not sufficiently developed and 
that a decision in this case would be premature. See Fort Howard, 
82 Wis. 2d at 510. 
¶17 In determining that Jorgensen's action is premature, we 
do 
not 
declare 
the 
statute 
either 
constitutional 
or 
unconstitutional.  A determination of the constitutionality of § 
70.32(2r) must await a more developed record.  Although this 
petitioner's claim is premature, a property owner may be able to 
prove the statute unconstitutional in the future.  
¶18 To prove the statute unconstitutional, an owner of 
agricultural land will have to (1) satisfy the initial burden by 
proving that his agricultural land is over assessed and that 
other agricultural land is under assessed as a result of the 
statute, and (2) demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
70.32(2r) 
does 
not 
create 
uniform 
taxation 
of 
agricultural land to the extent practicable.
 6   
    
III. 
                     
6  In Gottlieb, we made clear that the Uniformity Clause 
requires practical uniformity rather than absolute uniformity.  
In that case, we set forth that the Uniformity Clause dictates 
that those within a class of property "must be taxed on a basis 
of equality so far as practicable . . ."  Gottlieb, 33 Wis. 2d at 
424.  We further stated in Gottlieb that "[t]here can be 
variations in the mechanics of property assessment or tax 
imposition so long as the resulting taxation shall be borne with 
as nearly as practicable equality on an ad valorem basis with 
other taxable property."  Gottlieb, 33 Wis. 2d at 424; see also 
Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 198 Wis. 368, 224 
N.W. 121 (1929).  Thus, taxation need only be uniform to the 
extent practical under the circumstances. 
No. 96-1812-OA 
 
11
¶19 As we conclude that this action is premature, we do not 
reach the question of whether §§ 70.32(2r)(a) and (b) are 
severable from § 70.32(2r)(c).  
By the Court.—Dismissed without prejudice.