Title: Dana Point Safe Harbor v. Super. Ct.
Citation: 51 Cal. 4th 1
Docket Number: S180365
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 2010

Filed 12/9/10 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
DANA POINT SAFE HARBOR  
) 
COLLECTIVE, 
) 
S180365 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 
 
 
) 
G042878 
 
v. 
) 
  
 
 
) 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE  
) 
COUNTY, 
) 
Orange County Super. Ct. No. 
 
 
) 
30-2009-00298200 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
 
) 
CITY OF DANA POINT, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
[and four related cases*] 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The Point Alternative Care, Inc., v. Superior Court (City of Dana Point, Real 
Party in Interest) (Orange County. Super Ct. No. 30-2009-00298187; Ct. App. 4/3, 
No. G042893 [S180468]); Holistic Health v. Superior Court (City of Dana Point, 
Real Party in Interest) (Orange County. Super. Ct. No. 30-2009-00298196; Ct. 
App. 4/3, No. G042883 [S180560]); Beach Cities Collective v. Super. Ct. (Orange 
County Super. Ct. No. 30-2009-00298208; Ct.App. 4/3, No. G042880 [S180749]); 
Dana Point Beach Collective v. Super. Ct. (Orange County Super. Ct. No. 30-
2009-00298206; Ct.App. 4/3, No. G042889 [S180803]). 
 
2 
 
 
The question posed by these consolidated cases is whether a trial court‟s 
order compelling compliance with a legislative subpoena (Gov. Code, § 37104 et 
seq.) is appealable.  We conclude that it is.  Accordingly, we reverse the orders 
dismissing these appeals and remand the cases to the Court of Appeal for further 
proceedings. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Government Code section 37104 gives cities the power to issue legislative 
subpoenas.1  In 2009, the City of Dana Point (the City) subpoenaed documents 
from five medical marijuana dispensaries:  Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective, 
The Point Alternative Care, Inc., Beach Cities Collective, Dana Point Beach 
Collective, and Holistic Health, Inc. (collectively “dispensaries”).  The purpose of 
the subpoenas was to “gather[] information that could assist the City with its 
investigation as to whether medical marijuana dispensaries located in the City 
[were] in compliance with applicable law.”  The subpoenas requested documents 
related to all aspects of the dispensaries‟ business activities, including their 
business licenses, payroll arrangements, and purchasing activities, and information 
about their members.  Though some of the dispensaries partially responded to the 
subpoenas, all of the dispensaries objected to production of much of the requested 
information. 
When the dispensaries refused to produce the requested documents, the 
City‟s mayor reported that fact to the superior court, as required by the relevant 
statute.  The superior court held a hearing to determine whether the dispensaries 
were required to comply with the subpoenas.  Following the hearing, the court 
issued a single “Final Ruling” applicable to all five dispensaries.  In that 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise stated, statutory references are to the Government Code. 
3 
 
document, the court found “that the City‟s subpoenas were properly served in the 
furtherance of a proper legislative purpose” and ordered the dispensaries to 
comply with the subpoenas, subject to a protective order.   
The dispensaries separately appealed the order.  The Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeals on the ground that the order was not appealable.  The 
dispensaries sought review on the question of appealability.  We granted review to 
resolve a split among the Courts of Appeal on that issue. 
DISCUSSION 
A.  General Principles of Appealability 
The right to appeal is wholly statutory.  (Powers v. City of Richmond 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 108.)  Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 lists appealable 
judgments and orders.  Chief among them is a “judgment” that is not interlocutory, 
e.g., a final judgment.2  A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the 
parties (Code Civ. Proc., § 577) “ „when it terminates the litigation between the 
                                              
2  
Code of Civil Procedure 904.1, subdivision (a) provides: “An appeal, other 
than in a limited civil case, is to the court of appeal.  An appeal, other than in a 
limited civil case, may be taken from any of the following:  
 
“(1) From a judgment, except (A) an interlocutory judgment, other than as 
provided in paragraphs (8), (9), and (11), or (B) a judgment of contempt that is 
made final and conclusive by Section 1222.  [¶]  . . .  [¶] 
 
“(8) From an interlocutory judgment, order, or decree, hereafter made or 
entered in an action to redeem real or personal property from a mortgage thereof, 
or a lien thereon, determining the right to redeem and directing an accounting. 
 
“(9) From an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition determining the 
rights and interests of the respective parties and directing partition to be made.  [¶]  
. . .  [¶] 
 
“(11) From an interlocutory judgment directing payment of monetary sanctions 
by a party or an attorney for a party if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars 
($5,000).” 
4 
 
parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by 
execution what has been determined.‟ ”  (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 288, 304, quoting Doudell v. Shoo (1911) 159 Cal. 448, 453.)  “ „It is 
not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is 
determinative. As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular 
circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for 
future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the 
terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the 
nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination 
of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.‟ ”  (Griset v. Fair Political 
Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 698, italics added, quoting Lyons v. Goss 
(1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 670.) 
As we explained in Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
725, the purpose of the final judgment rule is to prevent “ „piecemeal disposition 
and multiple appeals‟ ” which “ „tend to be oppressive and costly.  [Citation.]  
Interlocutory appeals burden the courts and impede the judicial process in a 
number of ways:  (1) They tend to clog the appellate courts with a multiplicity of 
appeals. . . .  (2) Early resort to the appellate courts tends to produce uncertainty 
and delay in the trial court. . . .  (3) Until a final judgment is rendered the trial 
court may completely obviate an appeal by altering the rulings from which an 
appeal would otherwise have been taken.  [Citations.]  (4) Later actions by the trial 
court may provide a more complete record which dispels the appearance of error 
or establishes that it was harmless.  (5) Having the benefit of a complete 
adjudication . . . will assist the reviewing court to remedy error (if any) by giving 
specific directions rather than remanding for another round of open-ended 
proceedings.‟  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 741, fn. 9.)  We address the appealability of 
subpoenas under section 37104 with these principles in mind. 
5 
 
B.  Application 
“It long has been recognized that a legislative body may conduct an 
investigation in order to assist its decisionmaking regarding legislative or 
appropriative matters.”  (Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 807, 814.)  The broad subpoena power set forth in section 37104, et. seq. 
is in aid of the legislative power of inquiry.  (23 Cal.4th at p. 813.) 
Section 37104 provides:  “The legislative body may issue subpenas[3] 
requiring attendance of witnesses or production of books or other documents for 
evidence or testimony in any action or proceeding pending before it.”  In the event 
a witness declines to comply with the subpoena, “the mayor shall report the fact to 
the judge of the superior court of the county.”  (§ 37106.)  “The judge shall issue 
an attachment directed to the sheriff of the county where the witness was required 
to appear, commanding him to attach the person, and forthwith bring him before 
the judge.”  (§ 37107.)  “On return of the attachment and production of the 
witness, the judge has jurisdiction.”  (§ 37108.)  Refusal to comply with a 
subpoena may subject the witness to contempt proceedings, in which case the 
witness has the same rights the witness would have in a civil trial “to purge 
himself of the contempt.”  (§ 37109.) 
The City issued subpoenas and obtained compliance orders pursuant to this 
statutory scheme.  Whether those orders are appealable as a final judgment under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a) turns on whether they 
                                              
3  
This spelling of subpoena “was, until 1986, the spelling recommended by 
the Government Printing Office Style Manual.  Subpoena, however, is by far the 
more common spelling and for that reason alone is to be preferred.  The form with 
the digraph œ (*subpœna) is pedantic at best in modern writing.”  (Garner, 
Garner‟s Modern American Usage (3d ed. 2009)  p. 782.) 
6 
 
terminate the litigation between the parties, leaving only the issue of compliance 
or noncompliance.  Much of the case law on this question involves administrative 
subpoenas.  They are analogous to legislative subpoenas but issued by 
administrative agencies.  (See, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 11180-11191.)  On the question 
of whether such compliance orders are appealable, the Courts of Appeal are 
divided, with the evolving view favoring appealability. 
Although this court has yet to weigh in on the issue, we have sometimes 
assumed without deciding that an order compelling compliance with an 
administrative subpoena is appealable.  (See, e.g., Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 
Cal.4th 4, 18 [noting that the parties did not question the Court of Appeal‟s 
conclusion that such orders are appealable]; Younger v. Jensen (1980) 26 Cal.3d 
397 [addressing merits of appeal without discussion of the appealability issue].)  
These opinions, of course, are not authority for a proposition they did not directly 
address.  (People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 978, fn. 7.)   
In Gue v. Dennis (1946) 28 Cal.2d 616, we considered the appealability of 
an order compelling compliance with an administrative subpoena under Labor 
Code section 92.  That order required the defendant contractor to comply with the 
Labor Commissioner‟s subpoenas within a certain period of time “ „or be adjudged 
in contempt.‟ ”  (Gue, at p. 617.)  In a five-paragraph opinion, we held that such an 
order was unappealable because “an order directing compliance, which expressly 
contemplates a further order, is intermediate in character.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  
As we later noted, however, Gue‟s conclusion applies only where the court‟s order 
“specifically states that further proceedings in contempt are contemplated.”  
(Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. (1987) 43 
Cal.3d 696, 703 (Tex-Cal).  That is not the case before us and Gue is thus not 
controlling. 
7 
 
In the Courts of Appeal, three Second Appellate District decisions have 
held that orders enforcing administrative subpoenas are not appealable.  (Bishop v. 
Merging Capital, Inc. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1803 (Bishop); People ex rel. 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 526; Barnes v. 
Molino (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 46.)  Only one of those decisions — Bishop — 
provides any meaningful analysis of the issue.4 
Bishop involved an appeal by Merging Capital, Inc. (MCI), a corporation,  
and Link 900 Partners (Link), a general partnership, of an order compelling 
compliance with an administrative subpoena issued by the Department of 
Corporations (DOC).  Although both sides urged the appellate court to treat the 
order as appealable, the court declined to do so and dismissed the appeal.  (Bishop, 
supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1805.)  The court noted that such orders are not 
specified as appealable orders under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.  It 
considered and rejected as not binding decisions by this court and other Courts of 
Appeal that had assumed, without deciding, that such orders are appealable.  
(Bishop, at pp.1806-1807.)  It went on to reject as inapposite our discussion in 
Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, about the appealability of declaratory 
judgments because “we are not called upon to apply the general test of 
                                              
4 
Barnes v. Molino, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 46, which involved an appeal 
from an order to comply with administrative subpoenas issued by the 
Commissioner of Corporations, summarily concluded that such orders are not 
appealable, stating that an administrative subpoena “is not one of the orders listed 
as appealable in Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.  It is not a judgment 
within the definition of Code of Civil Procedure section 577 („A judgment is the 
final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding‟) because 
it does not make a final determination of those rights . . . [citation].”  (Id. at p. 51.)  
People ex rel. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d 526, 
535, simply followed Barnes without comment. 
8 
 
appealability of a declaratory judgment, which, if final, is specifically appealable 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a).  Rather, we 
must determine whether an order to compel, which is not made appealable by 
statute, is nonetheless an appealable order.”  (Bishop, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at 
p.1808.) 
The decisive factor in the court‟s conclusion that an order compelling 
compliance with an administrative subpoena is not appealable was its assertion 
that MCI and Link had not yet suffered an adverse consequence as the result of the 
order.  “[I]n this case, MCI and Link were ordered to produce documents, they did 
not comply with that order, and nothing happened. . . .  Consequently, any ruling 
rendered by this court would be in the nature of an advisory opinion.  That is to 
say, if we were to rule in favor of the DOC, we would simply be advising the 
appellants that, if the DOC pursues contempt proceedings, and the trial court finds 
MCI and Link in contempt, we will uphold that ruling on appeal.  Similarly, our 
decision in favor of appellants would amount to no more than our advice to the 
DOC that contempt proceedings will ultimately prove fruitless.”  (Bishop, supra, 
49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1808.) 
Bishop‟s analysis was examined and rejected in City of Santa Cruz v. Patel 
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 234 (Patel), which specifically considered whether an 
order compelling compliance with a legislative subpoena is appealable.5  In Patel, 
                                              
5 
Earlier decisions reaching the same conclusion with respect to 
administrative subpoenas did so without significant analysis.  (Millan v. 
Restaurant Enterprises Group, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 477, 485 [“Numerous 
cases, including cases from our Supreme Court, have decided appeals taken from 
similar orders on the merits without discussion of the appealability issue”]; Wood 
v. Superior Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1140 [“the orders requiring 
compliance with the subpoenas are appealable as final judgments in special 
proceedings . . . ”]; Franchise Tax Board v. Barnhart (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 274, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(fn. continued on next page) 
9 
 
the City of Santa Cruz obtained orders from the superior court directing nine 
hotels to comply with legislative subpoenas issued by the City pursuant to section 
37104 et seq., requiring the production of records necessary for a tax compliance 
audit.  Before addressing the merits of the dispute, the Court of Appeal took up the 
question of whether the orders were appealable.  The court found that they were 
because the orders constituted a final judgment.  “The superior court‟s order 
determined all of the parties‟ rights and liabilities in the proceedings; the only 
determination left was the question of future compliance, which is present in every 
judgment.  [Citation.]  We conclude that the orders herein must be deemed final 
judgments and are, therefore, appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1).”  (Patel, at p. 243.) 
In reaching this conclusion, the court observed:  “A judgment is the „final 
determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.‟  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 577.)  The statutory scheme at hand provides for an original proceeding in 
the superior court, initiated by the mayor‟s report to the judge, which results in an 
order directing the respondent to comply with a city‟s subpoena.  Indeed, the 
compliance order is tantamount to a superior court judgment in mandamus, which, 
with limited statutory exceptions, is appealable.  [Citations.]  Whether the matter 
is properly characterized as an „action‟ (Code Civ. Proc., § 22) or a „special 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(fn. continued from previous page) 
277 [“An order made under the authority of sections 11186-11188 requiring 
individual compliance with an administrative subpoena can be viewed as a final 
judgment in a special proceeding, appealable unless the statute creating the special 
proceeding prohibits such appeal”]; see also City of Vacaville v. Pitamber (2004) 
124 Cal.App.4th 739 [reaching merits of appeal from order compelling 
compliance with subpoena issued pursuant to § 37104 et seq.; no discussion of 
appealability].) 
10 
 
proceeding‟ (id., § 23), it is a final determination of the rights of the parties.  It is 
final because it leaves nothing for further determination between the parties except 
the fact of compliance or noncompliance with its terms.  [Citation.]”  (Patel, 
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 242.) 
Patel rejected the proposition advanced in Bishop that, unless and until 
there were further proceedings to enforce orders of compliance by way of 
contempt proceedings, the orders were not final.  “The fact that an intransigent 
witness may be subject to a contempt order does not mean that the order 
compelling compliance is not final.  The normal rule is that „injunctions and final 
judgments which form the basis for contempt sanctions are appealable. . . . The 
purpose of any judicial order which commands or prohibits specific conduct is to 
make the sanction of contempt available for disobedience.  As we have noted, this 
fact does not render such an order „nonfinal,‟ and thus nonappealable.‟  
[Citation.]”  (Patel, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 242, quoting Tex-Cal, supra, 43 
Cal.3d at p. 704.)  Indeed, as the court in Patel went on to explain, because a 
contempt judgment is not appealable, but reviewable only by a writ which may be 
summarily denied, “review of the underlying order [compelling compliance] can 
reliably be had only if that order is appealable.”  (Patel, supra, at p. 243.) 
Patel was followed by State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet 
Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841 (Pet Food Express), which involved an 
order compelling compliance with an administrative subpoena.  On the threshold 
issue of appealability of the order, the court stated:  “Like the legislative subpoena 
in Patel, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at page 243, the trial court in this case concerning 
an administrative subpoena determined all of the parties‟ rights and liabilities at 
issue in the proceeding; the only determination left was the question of future 
compliance, which is present in every judgment.”  (Pet Food Express, supra, 165 
Cal.App.4th at p. 851.)  The court went on to expressly decline to follow Bishop 
11 
 
on the question of whether the order was final, finding “the reasoning of Patel . . . 
more persuasive.”  (Pet Food Express, at p. 852.)  The court rejected the argument 
advanced by the Department of Pesticide Regulations that the order compelling 
compliance was analogous to a discovery order in civil litigation.  “Such discovery 
orders, however, are made in connection with pending lawsuits which have yet to 
be resolved.  A discovery order does not determine all of the parties‟ rights and 
liabilities at issue in the litigation.  The Department argues the same applies here, 
because even with the documents the Department cannot impose administrative 
penalties unless an administrative hearing is held if such a hearing is requested.  
However, it is possible an administrative hearing may not be requested and, even 
if it is requested, it will not necessarily end up in court.  In contrast to this case, 
pending civil litigation in which a discovery order occurs already involves the 
court and will continue to do so.”  (Ibid.; fn. omitted.) 
Although not cited in Pet Food Express on this point, its conclusion that an 
administrative subpoena is not equivalent to a discovery order is consistent with 
Arnett v. Dal Cielo, supra, 14 Cal.4th 4.  In Arnett, we held that an administrative 
subpoena issued by the Medical Board of California was not a discovery request 
under Evidence Code section 1157, which exempts the records of a hospital peer 
review committee from discovery.  (Arnett, at pp. 18-24.)  We observed that, as 
used in that statute, discovery meant “a formal exchange of evidentiary 
information between parties to a pending action, and that meaning does not 
include a subpoena issued, as here, by an administrative agency for purely 
investigative purposes.”  (Id. at p. 24.) 
Pet Food Express was followed in People ex rel. DuFauchard v. U.S. 
Financial Management, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1502 (U.S. Financial 
Management) which also involved an administrative subpoena.  As was the case in 
Patel and Pet Food Express, the court rejected Bishop‟s finality analysis:  “In this 
12 
 
case, the trial court‟s order compelling compliance with the Commissioner‟s 
administrative subpoena constituted a final determination of the parties‟ rights, 
notwithstanding the possibility that further proceedings might be required to gain 
U.S. Financial Management‟s compliance with that order.  [Citation.]  As such, 
the order constitutes an appealable final judgment pursuant to Code of Civil 
Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a).”  (U.S. Financial Management, at 
p. 1511.) 
Thus, every case after Bishop has rejected its finality analysis in the 
context of either legislative or administrative subpoenas.  We agree with Patel, Pet 
Food Express and U.S. Financial Management that an order compelling 
compliance with such subpoenas is an appealable final judgment.6  As noted, “[a] 
judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or 
proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.)  We have repeatedly held that judgments 
are final when they leave nothing to the party against whom judgment is rendered 
except to comply.   (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 25 Cal.4th 
688, 698; Tex-Cal, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 703; Olson v. Cory, supra, 35 Cal.3d 
390, 399; Knodel v. Knodel (1975) 14 Cal.3d 752, 761, fn. 11; People v. Succop 
(1966) 65 Cal.2d 483, 486; Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213, 217; In re 
L.A. County Pioneer Society (1953) 40 Cal.2d 852, 858; Bakewell v. Bakewell 
(1942) 21 Cal.2d 224, 227; Lyons v. Goss, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 670.)  The order 
here does exactly that.  It concludes that the dispensaries must respond to the 
subpoenas, subject to a protective order.  At no point does the order contemplate 
                                              
6 
Accordingly, we disapprove Bishop v. Merging Capital, Inc., supra, 49 
Cal.App.4th 180, People ex rel. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 164 
Cal.App.3d 526, and Barnes v. Molino, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 46, to the extent 
they are inconsistent with our holding. 
13 
 
future proceedings nor otherwise indicate that it is not final.  Thus, the order is 
final for purposes of appeal. 
Moreover, the rule we adopt here is the same rule that applies in federal 
court.  (Reich v. National Eng’g & Contracting Co. (4th Cir. 1993) 13 F.3d 93, 96 
[“orders enforcing subpoenas in connection with administrative investigations, by 
contrast, may be appealed immediately because there is no judicial proceeding in 
process that such appeals would delay”]; see also ibid.  [“every court of appeals to 
address the appealability of orders enforcing subpoenas in various types of 
administrative investigations has determined that these orders are immediately 
appealable”].)  “In light of all of these opinions, one leading treatise states that it 
has been „a longstanding practice‟ to allow appeals from district court orders 
enforcing subpoenas issued in connection with administrative investigations.  [15B 
Wright et al., Fed. Practice and Procedure:  Jurisdiction (2d ed. 1992)] 
§ 3914.26, at 193; see also 4 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 
26.83[4], at 26-438 to 26-440 (1993) (indicating that, with limited exceptions that 
do not apply here, „when an administrative agency initiates proceedings in the 
district court to enforce an administrative subpoena, the decision of the court . . . 
enforcing . . . the subpoena is final for purposes of appeal‟).”  (Reich, supra, 13 
F.3d at pp. 96-97, fn. omitted.)  Our sister jurisdictions have reached the same 
result.  (E.g., Las Vegas Police Protective Ass’n  v. Dist. Ct. (Nev. 2006) 130 P.3d 
182, 189 [“other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion under similar 
finality requirements”]; see also id. at p. 189 & fns. 14-16 [citing cases].) 
The City advances a number of arguments against finality based on the 
potential for future actions or proceedings.  Central to the City‟s position is the 
notion that potential disputes over the scope of the compliance order with respect 
to particular records precludes deeming the order to be a final judgment.  We 
disagree.  The order directs the dispensaries to comply with the subpoenas, thus 
14 
 
representing a rejection by the trial court of the various grounds advanced by the 
dispensaries — like the privacy interests of their customers — for refusing to turn 
over the records.  Whether or not the parties haggle over the existence of a 
particular document does not undermine the finality of the order.  Nor does the 
possibility that the dispensaries might simply defy the order and persist in refusing 
to turn over the records.7  Similarly, the possibility of further proceedings 
regarding the scope of the protective order does not affect the finality of the order.  
As noted in Patel, “the question of future compliance . . . is present in every 
judgment” (Patel, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 243), and if the potential for the 
sort of future proceedings described here were the standard for assessing finality, 
few judgments would ever be final. 
The City also suggests that, because legislative subpoenas often precede 
lawsuits, a compliance order should be treated like a discovery order in a civil suit, 
which is not subject to appeal.  As noted, both we in the Arnett decision and the 
Court of Appeal in the Pet Food Express decision have rejected the analogy 
                                              
7 
We reject the City‟s claim that deeming the compliance order to be 
appealable would “clog” the appellate courts because a noncompliant party might 
also seek review of a subsequent contempt order.  The assertion is based on the 
speculative assumption that parties ordered to comply with an investigative 
subpoena would refuse to do so in such numbers that their petitions for writ review 
would create logjams in the appellate courts.  Moreover, as noted, if the potential 
for later contempt proceedings were determinative of whether a judgment or order 
is appealable, no judgment or order would ever be final for purposes of appeal.  
This clearly is not the rule.  (Patel, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 242.)  For the 
same reason, we reject the City‟s perfunctory claim that, if there is no contempt 
order, there may be no need for appeal because the noncompliant party has not 
been harmed — finality does not hinge on whether a party is held in contempt.  
15 
 
between investigative subpoenas and discovery orders.  (Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 24; Pet Food Express, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.)8 
Finally, the City argues that the ability of legislative bodies to conduct 
investigations using subpoenas will be compromised if compliance orders can be 
appealed, because of the delay that might result from such appeals.  The City 
points out that, because of term limits, the body that issued the subpoena could be 
reconstituted while the order was on appeal and the new body might not wish to 
pursue the investigation.  The fortuity of changes in the legislative body that 
issued the subpoena is not relevant to the legal question of whether such orders are 
appealable; that question turns, not on the tides of politics, but on whether the 
order is a final judgment, which it is.   
In sum, the trial court‟s order enforcing the City‟s legislative subpoenas 
was a final judgment subject to appeal under Code of Civil Procedure section 
904.1, subdivision (a)(1).9 
                                              
8 
Even if this subpoena were akin to a discovery request, the appropriate 
analogy would be to discovery orders ancillary to cases pending in other 
jurisdictions, which have been held to be final judgments for purposes of 
appealability.  (Adams v. Woods (1861) 18 Cal. 30; H.B. Fuller v. Doe (2007) 151 
Cal.App.4th 879, 885-886; Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 
1041.)  
9  
Our holding is limited to the question before us of whether a compliance 
order is appealable. We do not address the separate and distinct question of 
whether an appealing party is entitled to a stay of enforcement of the subpoena 
pending appeal.  (See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Garner (9th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 1138, 
1142 [reviewing an appeal from an order enforcing an administrative subpoena 
where a stay was denied]; United States v. Judicial Watch, Inc. (D.D.C. 2003) 241 
F.Supp.2d 15, 17-18 [declining to grant a stay pending appeal of an Internal 
Revenue Service summons].) 
16 
 
DISPOSITION 
The orders dismissing the appeals are reversed and the matters are 
remanded to the Court of Appeal to consider the merits of the appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S180365 
Date Filed: December 9, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Gloria Sanders 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys: 
 
Evans, Brizendine & Silver and William D. Evans for Petitioner Dana Pont Safe Harbor Collective. 
 
Lee J. “Petros” Petrohilos ad Christopher Glew for Petitioner The Point Alternative Care. 
 
Alison Minet Adams for Petitioner Holistic Health, Inc. 
 
Law Offices of Jacek W. Lentz, Jacek W. Lentz and Jackie-Lynn Adams for Petitioner Beach Cities 
Collective. 
 
Logan Retoske and Garfield Langmuir-Logan for Petitioner Dana Point Beach Collective. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Rutan & Tucker, A. Patrick Muñoz and Jennifer Farrell for Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lee J. “Petros” Petrohilos 
1851 East First Street, #857 
Santa Ana, CA  92705 
(714) 542-3110 
 
Alison Minet Adams 
12400 Ventura Boulevard, #701 
Studio City, CA  91604 
(818) 358-2507 
 
Jacek W. Lentz 
Law Offices of Jacek W. Lentz 
1055 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1996 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 250-7200 
 
A. Patrick Muñoz 
Rutan & Tucker 
611 Anton Boulevard, Fourteenth Floor 
Costa Mesa, CA  92626-1931 
(714) 641-5100