Title: State v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95481
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 2017

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC95481 
) 
ANGELO JOHNSON, 
) 
) 
Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Thomas J. Prebil, Judge 
A jury convicted Angelo Johnson of five counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, 
three counts of first-degree statutory rape, three counts of incest, and one count of second-
degree statutory rape.  At sentencing, the circuit court found Johnson to be a predatory 
sexual offender pursuant to § 558.018.5(3)1 and sentenced Johnson to the corresponding 
mandatory minimum sentence, life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, for each of 
the five first-degree statutory sodomy convictions and three first-degree statutory rape 
convictions.  Johnson appeals these eight sentences, arguing the circuit court improperly 
sentenced him as a predatory sexual offender.  The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.  
1 Statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013. 
Opinion issued August 22, 2017
2 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
The State charged Johnson with 13 felony counts stemming from the sexual abuse 
of his two step-daughters, D.P. and R.J., and his biological daughter, L.J.  The specific 
charges were: six counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and three counts of first-degree 
statutory rape as to D.P. and R.J.; three counts of incest as to D.P., R.J., and L.J.; and one 
count of second-degree statutory rape as to L.J.  For the first-degree statutory sodomy 
charges and first-degree statutory rape charges (which involved only D.P. and R.J.2), the 
State also charged Johnson as a predatory sexual offender pursuant to § 558.018, section 
558.018 defines "predatory sexual offender" and subjects a defendant, found by the circuit 
court to be a predatory sexual offender and also found guilty of a predicate offense, to a 
mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.  Prior to 
trial, Johnson waived his statutory right to jury sentencing.  
After the close of evidence and prior to submission of the case to the jury, the circuit 
court, outside of the jury's presence, initially considered the State's request to find Johnson 
to be a predatory sexual offender.  The charges against Johnson involved multiple victims.  
The State argued Johnson was a predatory sexual offender pursuant to § 558.018.5(3), 
which provides a person is a predatory sexual offender if the person "[h]as committed an 
act or acts against more than one victim."  Johnson argued § 558.018.5(3) did not apply 
because that section applies only to prior acts, not acts that are the bases for the current 
                                                          
 
2 The offenses involving L.J. were not predicate offenses for purposes of finding Johnson to be a 
predatory sexual offender.  
 
3 
 
charges.  The circuit court initially agreed with Johnson and denied the State's request to 
find Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender.  
The case was submitted to the jury, which found Johnson guilty on 12 of 13 counts 
and acquitted him on one count of first-degree statutory sodomy.  At sentencing, the State 
again requested the circuit court find Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender pursuant 
to § 558.018.5(3).  Johnson again argued that section did not apply to him because it applies 
only to prior acts.  Johnson did not, however, argue the circuit court was precluded by 
§ 558.021.2 from finding him to be a predatory sexual offender because the case had 
already been submitted to the jury.  The circuit court reconsidered its prior interpretation 
of § 558.018.5(3), was persuaded the State's interpretation of the statute was correct, and, 
therefore, found Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender.3  Based on that finding, 
Johnson was sentenced to eight concurrent terms of life imprisonment with eligibility for 
parole after 25 years for his first-degree statutory sodomy and first-degree statutory rape 
convictions.4  Johnson appealed the sentences.  After opinion by the court of appeals, this 
Court transferred the case pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution.  
 
 
                                                          
 
3 In its written findings of fact, the circuit court found Johnson committed the acts in Count I (first-
degree statutory rape) and Count II (first-degree statutory sodomy) as to D.P. and the acts in Count 
VI (first-degree statutory rape) and Count VIII (first-degree statutory sodomy) as to R.J.  
4 To run concurrent to Johnson's life sentences, the circuit court also sentenced Johnson to four 
years' imprisonment for each of his three incest convictions and seven years' imprisonment for his 
second-degree statutory rape conviction.  Johnson does not challenge these four other sentences.  
 
4 
 
Analysis 
A "predatory sexual offender" is statutorily defined as a person who:   
(1) Has previously been found guilty of committing or attempting to 
commit any of the offenses listed in subsection 1 of this section, or 
committing child molestation in the first degree when classified as a 
class B felony or sexual abuse when classified as a class B felony; 
or  
(2) Has previously committed an act which would constitute an 
offense listed in subsection 4 of this section, whether or not the act 
resulted in a conviction; or  
(3) Has committed an act or acts against more than one victim which 
would constitute an offense or offenses listed in subsection 4 of this 
section, whether or not the defendant was charged with an additional 
offense or offenses as a result of such act or acts. 
  
Section 558.018.5.  "In a jury trial, the facts shall be pleaded, established and found prior 
to submission to the jury outside of its hearing . . . ."  Section 558.021.2.  If the circuit court 
finds the defendant is a predatory sexual offender and the defendant is found guilty of 
committing or attempting to commit one of several predicate crimes, then the defendant is 
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of 
parole.  Sections 558.018.4, 558.018.6.  
Relevant here, the predicate crimes include first-degree statutory sodomy and first-
degree statutory rape.  Sections 558.018.1, 558.018.4.  Because the jury found Johnson 
guilty on five counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and three counts of first-degree 
statutory rape, and because the circuit court found Johnson to be a predatory sexual 
offender pursuant to § 558.018.5(3), the circuit court sentenced Johnson to life 
imprisonment with eligibility for parole on each of those eight convictions.  Had the circuit 
court not found Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender, the circuit court could have still 
5 
 
sentenced Johnson to life imprisonment for each of the eight convictions, but Johnson 
would have been subject to a lesser mandatory minimum sentence of either 5 years or 10 
years, depending on the conviction.5  Johnson presents two points on appeal and asks this 
Court to remand his case for resentencing on the eight convictions without the possibility 
of sentencing him as a predatory sexual offender.  
Section 558.018.5(3) Applies to Charged Acts and Is Not Facially Unconstitutional 
Johnson argues the circuit court erred in finding him to be a predatory sexual 
offender pursuant to § 558.018.5(3), alleging that section applies only to prior acts, not acts 
that are the bases for the current charges.  As an extension of this argument, Johnson argues 
interpreting § 558.018.5(3) to apply to charged acts violates his right to a jury trial 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and 
article I, § 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.6  "Statutory interpretation is an issue of law 
that this Court reviews de novo."  S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee's Summit, 278 
S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. banc 2009).  
                                                          
 
5 Johnson was convicted of two counts of first-degree statutory rape as to a victim less than 12 
years old, which carries a possible sentence of 10 years to life imprisonment, and one count of 
first-degree statutory rape as to a victim less than 14 years old, which carries a possible sentence 
of 5 years to life imprisonment.  Section 566.032. Johnson was convicted of three counts of first-
degree statutory sodomy as to a victim less than 12 years old, which carries a possible sentence of 
10 years to life imprisonment, and two counts of statutory sodomy as to a victim less than 14 years 
old, which carries a possible sentence of 5 years to life imprisonment.  Section 566.062. 
6 The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., State 
v. Alexander, 620 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Mo. banc 1981).  "[Article] I, § 18(a) of the Missouri 
Constitution protects the same rights as the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution." 
State v. Hester, 801 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. banc 1991).  Johnson also references article I, § 10 of 
the Missouri Constitution and the due process provision, but makes no separate and distinct due 
process argument.  
 
6 
 
Generally, to preserve an allegation of error, it must be presented to the circuit court 
in a motion for new trial.  E.g., State v. Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Mo. banc 1999); Rule 
29.11(d).  Here, however, the claim of error relates to the circuit court applying 
§ 558.018.5(3) to Johnson, which he raised at the first opportunity and again at sentencing; 
therefore, this claim of error is preserved.  
"This Court's primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue."  Parktown Imps., Inc. v. 
Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009).  "It is a basic rule of statutory 
construction that words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning whenever 
possible."  State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Mo. banc 2013) (internal 
quotations omitted).  This Court may not add language to an unambiguous statute.  State v. 
Collins, 328 S.W.3d 705, 709 n.6 (Mo. banc 2011).  "This Court must presume every word, 
sentence or clause in a statute has effect, and the legislature did not insert superfluous 
language."  Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Mo. banc 2013).  "When the words 
are clear, there is nothing to construe beyond applying the plain meaning of the law."  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Treasurer of State-Custodian of Second Injury 
Fund v. Witte, 414 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Mo. banc 2013) ("Only where the language is 
ambiguous will the Court resort to other rules of statutory construction.").  
Section 558.018.5(3) is unambiguous.  It refers simply to "an act or acts against 
more than one victim."  Nowhere does it refer to "prior" acts or "previous" acts.  To hold, 
as Johnson argues, that § 558.018.5(3) applies only to prior acts, this Court would not only 
have to impermissibly add language to an unambiguous statute, but also impermissibly find 
7 
 
§ 558.018.5(3) to be superfluous.  Section 558.018.5(2) already encompasses the same 
general types of acts as § 558.018.5(3)—those which would constitute an offense pursuant 
to § 558.018.4—but § 558.018.5(2) specifically refers to acts "previously committed."  
Therefore, giving effect to legislative intent reflected in the unambiguous plain language, 
§ 558.018.5(3) applies not only to prior acts, but also applies to acts that are the bases for 
the current charges.  With nothing for this Court to construe, this is not a case in which this 
Court must apply principles of statutory construction to choose between plausible, 
competing interpretations.  See Bateman, 391 S.W.3d at 446; Witte, 414 S.W.3d at 461.  
Johnson also argues this "interpretation" is unconstitutional.  But because this is not 
a matter of construction or competing interpretations—merely one of applying 
§ 558.018.5(3)'s unambiguous plain language—Johnson's argument is necessarily a 
challenge to the constitutional validity of § 558.018.5(3) on its face.  See New Garden 
Rest., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 471 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Mo. banc 2015).  This part of Johnson's 
argument was not presented to the circuit court at any point and, therefore, has not been 
preserved.  See State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015) ("To preserve a 
constitutional claim of error, the claim must be raised at the first opportunity with citation 
to specific constitutional sections.").  Nevertheless, because this is the first challenge to the 
constitutional validity of § 558.018.5(3) to reach this Court, this Court will exercise its 
discretion to review this argument ex gratia.  
"Generally, to prevail in a facial challenge, the party challenging the statute must 
demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute may be 
constitutionally applied."  State v. Jeffrey, 400 S.W.3d 303, 308 (Mo. banc 2013).  "Thus, 
8 
 
the general rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not 
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally 
to others in situations not before the Court."  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  In this case, 
there is no error, plain or otherwise, because § 558.018.5(3) is not facially unconstitutional.   
Johnson's constitutional challenge is premised on the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).  In Alleyne, the Supreme Court 
held, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, "Any fact that, by law, 
increases the penalty for a crime is an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury and found 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 2155.  That is, "any fact that increases the mandatory 
minimum [sentence] is an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury."  Id.  The Supreme 
Court reasoned, "When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to 
aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be 
submitted to the jury."  Id. at 2162.  
Johnson argues that, in applying to the currently charged acts, § 558.018.5(3), in 
conjunction with § 558.021, is unconstitutional because it "allow[s] for the trial court to 
find in a jury trial that the defendant actually committed the crimes with which he has been 
charged before the case is submitted to the jury" and thus "force[s] the trial court to find 
facts which increase the mandatory minimum punishment in violation of Alleyne." 
Pursuant to § 558.018.5(3), the fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is that 
the defendant committed acts against more than one victim.  According to Alleyne, this fact 
must be submitted to and found by the jury.  133 S. Ct. at 2155.  That this fact may be 
found based on the current charges does not run afoul of Alleyne.  If anything, it means 
9 
 
that, despite a statutory scheme requiring only the circuit court to find the fact, the fact will 
necessarily also be submitted to the jury for determination.  
Here, for example, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt Johnson committed 
acts against more than one victim in that Johnson committed first-degree statutory sodomy 
and first-degree statutory rape as to both D.P. and R.J.  Therefore, no constitutional 
violation resulted in subjecting Johnson to an increased mandatory minimum sentence.  See 
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.  That the circuit court did not follow the timing requirement of 
§ 558.021.2 is immaterial to the constitutional analysis.  Even if the circuit court would 
have applied the plain language of § 558.018.5(3) and, in accordance with § 558.021.2, 
determined prior to submission of the charges to the jury that Johnson was a predatory 
sexual offender based on findings he committed the charged acts against D.P. and R.J, that 
pre-submission determination, by itself, would not have violated Johnson's constitutional 
right.7  Alleyne held only that the jury must find the necessary facts, not that a statute may 
not require a trial court to also find these facts.8  The circuit court's pre-submission findings 
of predicate facts does not necessarily preclude the jury from also having to subsequently 
find the same predicate facts thereafter.  Simply because the jury may not always find the 
                                                          
 
7 Johnson argues the circuit court's pre-submission findings in this context would "inappropriately 
force the trial court to abandon neutrality and determine the defendant's guilt before the case has 
even been submitted to the jury."  "The United States and Missouri Constitutions guarantee a 
criminal defendant an impartial tribunal."  State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Mo. banc 1996).  
Pre-submission findings do not mean the circuit court is not impartial any more than a guilty 
verdict returned by the jury means the jury is not impartial.  Furthermore, the circuit court's pre-
submission findings of fact do not remove the defendant's right to have the jury determine the same 
facts occur outside of the jury's hearing so as to not influence its verdict.  § 558.021.2. 
8  Requiring a trial court to also find the necessary facts is a layer of protection above and 
beyond that required by Alleyne. 
10 
 
facts after the circuit court's pre-submission findings does not mean the jury never will or 
never can.  This is not a case where "no set of circumstances exists under which the statute 
may be constitutionally applied."  Jeffrey, 400 S.W.3d at 308.  Applying the statute with 
the backdrop of Alleyne, if either the circuit court or the jury would fail to find the required 
predicate facts, the defendant could not be sentenced as a predatory sexual offender.  That 
the statute could not be constitutionally applied when the jury does not also find the 
predicate facts would render the statute unconstitutional as applied under those 
circumstances, but not facially unconstitutional. Johnson's constitutional challenge, 
therefore, is without merit.  
Johnson Has Not Established Manifest Injustice Resulted From the Circuit Court's 
Violation of § 558.021.2 
 
Johnson argues the circuit court erred or plainly erred in finding him to be a 
predatory sexual offender after the case had already been submitted to the jury because this 
violated § 558.021.2 and his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and article I, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution.  At the 
sentencing hearing, Johnson did not object to the circuit court finding him to be a predatory 
sexual offender on the basis that doing so violated § 558.021.2.  An objection "must be 
specific and made contemporaneously with the purported error."  Driskill, 459 S.W.3d at 
426.  Because Johnson failed to preserve this claim of error, it is entitled only to plain error 
review.  Id.  
"[P]lain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the 
court when the error has resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice."  State v. 
11 
 
Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Mo. banc 2014).  "First, the Court must determine whether 
the claimed error is, in fact, 'plain error[] affecting substantial rights.'"  Id.  "An error is 
plain if it is 'evident, obvious, and clear.'"  Id.  "Substantial rights are involved if, facially, 
there are significant grounds for believing that the error is of the type from which manifest 
injustice or miscarriage of justice could result if left uncorrected."  Id.  "Second, if plain 
error affecting substantial rights is found, the Court determines whether the error actually 
did result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice."  Id.  "Manifest injustice is 
determined by the facts and circumstances of the case, and the defendant bears the burden 
of establishing manifest injustice."  State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. banc 2006).  
"To be entitled to relief under the plain error rule, an appellant must go beyond a mere 
showing of demonstrable prejudice to show manifest prejudice affecting his substantial 
rights."  Winfield, 5 S.W.3d at 516.  "In other words, the appellant must show that the error 
affected his rights so substantially that a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice will 
occur if the error is left uncorrected."  Id.  
The circuit court here did not find Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender until 
his sentencing, after the case had been submitted to the jury.  Section 558.021.2 requires 
the circuit court to make the predicate findings prior to submission of the case to the jury. 
This Court has emphasized the importance of statutory timing requirements when the 
circuit court finds the defendant to be a status offender (e.g., prior, persistent, or chronic 
offender).  See Collins, 328 S.W.3d at 709–10; State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 644–45 
(Mo. banc 2010); State v. Teer, 275 S.W.3d 258, 260–62 (Mo. banc 2009); State v. Emery, 
95 S.W.3d 98, 101–02 (Mo. banc 2003).  The circuit court's failure to comply with the 
12 
 
timing requirement is evident, obvious, and clear.  See In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 
S.W.3d 793, 809 (Mo. banc 2011) ("Here, the statutory errors are evident, obvious, and 
clear from the record, so the issue is whether they resulted in manifest injustice or a 
miscarriage of justice.").  The circuit court's error facially involves substantial rights 
because a violation of "section 558.021.2 "implicates a defendant's liberty."  See Teer, 275 
S.W.3d at 261; see also Hunt, 451 S.W.3d at 260 ("Applying step one, the liberty of a 
criminal defendant is a substantial right that, when violated, can lead to manifest injustice 
or miscarriage of justice.").  The remaining question is whether the circuit court's timing 
error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.  
Johnson points to several cases in which this Court or the court of appeals found 
either prejudice or manifest injustice resulted when the defendant was sentenced as a status 
offender after the circuit court violated similar statutory requirements and the defendant 
was subjected to a punishment greater than the maximum sentence would have been had 
the defendant not been found to be a status offender.  Johnson analogizes his case to these 
because he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence greater than the mandatory 
minimum sentence he would have been subjected to had he not been sentenced as a 
predatory sexual offender.  Assuming without deciding Johnson is correct - that there is no 
basis to distinguish between a higher maximum sentence and a higher minimum sentence 
- he still fails to recognize that the nature and context of the circuit court's statutory 
violation is of the utmost importance in determining whether manifest injustice has 
resulted.  See Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 652 ("Manifest injustice is determined by the facts 
and circumstances of the case . . . .").  Manifest injustice does not automatically result 
13 
 
simply because the circuit court violated § 558.021.2, and the cases relied upon by Johnson 
are readily distinguishable.  
This Court has held either prejudice or manifest injustice results when the defendant 
is sentenced as a status offender without the State offering the evidence necessary to 
establish such status.  See Collins, 328 S.W.3d at 708–10; Severe, 307 S.W.3d at 642–645; 
Emery, 95 S.W.3d at 101–02.  The court of appeals also has held manifest injustice results 
when the circuit court sentences a defendant as a status offender without finding the 
necessary facts, see State v. Wilson, 343 S.W.3d 747, 750–51 (Mo. App. 2011), and when 
the circuit court sentences a defendant as a status offender after allowing the State to offer 
evidence after submission of the case to the jury because its pre-submission evidence was 
insufficient, see State v. Starnes, 318 S.W.3d 208, 210–18 (Mo. App. 2010).  There is 
prejudice or manifest injustice in these cases because the respective defendants were 
sentenced based on an offender status never proved by the State or never expressly found 
by the circuit court—i.e., the necessary preconditions to sentencing a defendant as a status 
offender were altogether absent—or the State was unfairly given "'two bites at the apple' 
when the statute allows only one bite."  Severe, 307 S.W.3d at 645.  
Here, however, Johnson does not argue that any of the necessary preconditions were 
altogether absent or that the State was unfairly given more than one opportunity to carry 
its burden of proof.  Rather, Johnson argues he was prejudiced because the circuit court's 
findings were not made prior to submission to the jury and Alleyne required submission to 
the jury for determination.  Johnson is incorrect.   
14 
 
In Teer, this Court held the defendant was prejudiced by the circuit court’s failure 
to follow § 558.021.2 by finding the defendant to be a status offender after the jury had 
already recommended a sentence.  275 S.W.3d at 260.  Although the circuit court also erred 
in allowing the State to untimely charge the defendant as a status offender and untimely 
offer its evidence, the principal opinion focused on the timing of the circuit court's findings 
in determining prejudice:  
The jury determined that a maximum sentence of four years of 
incarceration in the county jail was an appropriate sentence while the 
circuit court sentenced Teer to a total of 20 years imprisonment in 
the Missouri Department of Corrections.  The failure to follow 
section 558.021.2 resulted in Teer being subjected to a much 
longer sentence than that recommended by a jury of his peers.  
 Id. at 262 (emphasis added).9   
Unlike Teer, the circuit court's untimely findings in this case did not remove 
Johnson's right to jury sentencing and did not deprive Johnson of the benefit of a more 
lenient jury-recommended sentence.  Further, Johnson waived jury sentencing prior to trial 
and did not reacquire his right to jury sentencing simply because the circuit court failed to 
find he was a predatory sexual offender prior to submission of the case.  Finally in its 
written findings, the circuit court independently found the predicate facts, without 
reference to or reliance on the jury's verdicts.  
                                                          
 
9 In contrast, the separate opinion concurring in the result in Teer focused on the fact that, after the 
case had already been submitted to the jury, the circuit court allowed the State to amend its 
information to charge the defendant as a status offender and then offer evidence to establish such.  
Id. at 263 (Fischer, J., concurring in result) ("The prejudice to the defendant in this case is that the 
rules of the game were changed after the game was over. . . . [H]ad he known there would not be 
jury sentencing, he would have employed a different trial strategy.").  
 
15 
 
Ultimately, Johnson received the same sentence he would have received if the 
circuit court had not initially believed, mistakenly, that § 558.018.5(3) did not apply to 
charged acts.  Johnson has established only that his sentence did not reflect the circuit 
court's initial mistake in law because the circuit court realized its mistaken reading of the 
statute and corrected its mistake prior to sentencing Johnson.  Though the circuit court's 
correction was untimely, and thus error, it did not deprive Johnson of any possible benefits 
of jury sentencing, did not allow the State an unfair advantage, and did not lack 
foundational support in the State's charging or evidence.  The appellate decisions relied 
upon by Johnson are inapposite, and Johnson has shown no specific reason that, 
considering the facts and circumstances unique to his case, the circuit court's error resulted 
in manifest injustice.  Accordingly, Johnson has failed to carry his burden on plain error 
review.  See Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 652; Winfield, 5 S.W.3d at 516.  
Conclusion 
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.  
 
___________________________ 
Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice 
 
Wilson, Russell, and Powell, JJ., concur;  
Breckenridge, J., concurs in separate opinion filed;  
Stith, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;  
Draper, J., concurs in opinion of Stith, J. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC95481 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
ANGELO JOHNSON, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
CONCURRING OPINION 
 
 
I concur in the principal opinion’s finding that section 558.018.5(3)1 applies to 
currently charged acts and is facially constitutional.  Nevertheless, I write separately 
because I disagree with the principal opinion’s analysis of Mr. Johnson’s claims that the 
statute is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
 
A statute is facially constitutional unless there is “no set of circumstances . . . under 
which the statute may be constitutionally applied.”  State v. Jeffery, 400 S.W.3d 303, 308 
(Mo. banc 2013).  Section 558.018.5 provides three ways a defendant can be deemed a 
“predatory sexual offender.”  Subdivision (3) of section 558.018.5, the subparagraph at 
                                              
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013.  
2 
 
issue in Mr. Johnson’s case, defines a “predatory sexual offender” as a person who “[h]as 
committed an act or acts against more than one victim which would constitute an offense 
or offenses listed in [section 558.018.4],2 whether or not the defendant was charged with 
an additional offense or offenses as a result of such act or acts.”   
As reasoned by the principal opinion, section 558.018.5(3) applies to an act or acts 
listed in subsection 4 committed against more than one victim, charged or not, that is or 
are the basis for the current charges.  But such language can also encompass prior acts, 
including prior offenses against more than one victim for which the defendant has been 
convicted.  Prior convictions are not facts that must be submitted to the jury for purposes 
of sentencing enhancement.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  Therefore, 
section 558.018.5(3)’s statutory scheme may be constitutionally applied when prior 
convictions involving multiple victims are used to establish the defendant’s status as a 
predatory sexual offender.  It follows that, because section 558.018.5(3) can be 
constitutionally applied under such circumstances, the statute is facially constitutional.   
                                              
2 Section 558.018.4 provides:  
The court shall sentence a person to an extended term of imprisonment as 
provided for in this section if it finds the defendant is a predatory sexual 
offender and has been found guilty of committing or attempting to commit 
any of the offenses listed in subsection 1 of this section or committing child 
molestation in the first degree when classified as a class B felony or sexual 
abuse when classified as a class B felony to an extended term of 
imprisonment as provided for in this section if it finds defendant is a 
predatory sexual offender.  
Section 558.018.4, therefore, encompasses all offenses listed in subsection 1 as well as 
child molestation and child abuse when classified as class B felonies.  
3 
 
The principal opinion, however, reasons section 558.018.5(3) is facially 
constitutional because, when based on current charges, the fact there was more than one 
victim “will necessarily also be submitted to the jury for determination.”  That the issue of 
whether there was more than one victim could be and was, in this case, ultimately submitted 
to the jury does not render constitutional the procedure for establishing predatory sexual 
offender status pursuant to section 558.018.5(3). 
Section 558.021.2 requires the circuit court to make the predatory sexual offender 
finding “prior to submission to the jury.”  If a defendant is found to be a predatory sexual 
offender and is found guilty of committing one of the predicate crimes, the circuit court 
must enter an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.  
Section 558.018.6.  It follows that sections 558.018 and 558.021 require the circuit court 
to make findings regarding offenses addressed by subdivision (3) that would increase a 
defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence prior to submission of the case to the jury.  Such 
procedure violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as found by the 
Supreme Court in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
 
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court explained that, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to a jury trial, “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ 
that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 2155.  It 
then reasoned that “[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime”; 
therefore, “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be 
submitted to the jury.”  Id.  
4 
 
 
Because the fact there was “an act or acts against more than one victim” increases 
the mandatory minimum under section 558.018.5(3), that fact must be submitted to the 
jury.  But section 558.018 requires this finding be made by the circuit court prior to 
submitting the case to the jury.  Consequently, any finding by the circuit court that the 
defendant is a predatory sexual offender pursuant to section 558.018.5(3) violates the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by requiring such findings to be made 
by the judge rather than the jury.   
The principal opinion attempts to circumvent this problem by finding that whether 
there was more than one victim is a fact that will necessarily be submitted to the jury.  But 
the plain language of section 558.018.2 requires the finding of predatory sexual offender 
status pursuant to subsection 5 be made by the trial court prior to the case being submitted 
to the jury.  That the jury may later find the defendant guilty of committing the same acts 
the circuit court found prior to submission may be relevant to whether the defendant was 
prejudiced, but it does not render the statute constitutional.    
Moreover, a person can be found to be a predatory sexual offender for “an act or 
acts [committed] against more than one victim . . . whether or not the defendant was 
charged with an additional offense or offenses as a result of such act or acts.”  Section 
558.018.5(3).  Such language allows the circuit court to find the defendant committed an 
act or acts involving more than one victim that may not be a charged offense.  The 
statement, therefore, allows the circuit court to find a defendant committed offenses against 
multiple victims the jury does not subsequently find the defendant guilty of committing.   
5 
 
The principal opinion further excuses the circuit court’s disregard for the statutory 
procedure mandated by section 558.021.2.  This principal opinion’s unprecedented 
blessing of the circuit court’s violation of a statutory mandate will only invite and 
encourage courts to violate the procedural mandates of this and other statutes to correct 
perceived errors in legislative enactments.  It is not the place of the courts to rewrite 
legislation to correct errors made by the legislature.  State ex rel. Heart of Am. Council v. 
McKenzie, 484 S.W.3d 320, 327 (Mo. banc 2016).   
I, therefore, would find section 558.018.5(3) unconstitutional as applied when it is 
used to classify a defendant as a predatory sexual offender based on acts committed against 
multiple victims for which the defendant has not been previously convicted, as occurred in 
this case.  Nevertheless, under the facts and circumstances of this case, I would conclude 
that the Alleyne violation does not require reversal of Mr. Johnson’s convictions.   
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the commission of a constitutional error at 
trial alone does not entitle a defendant to automatic reversal.”  Washington v. Recuenco, 
548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006).  Rather, “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”  Id. 
(internal quotation omitted).  In fact, the Supreme Court has held “[f]ailure to submit a 
sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural 
error” and, therefore, is subject to harmless-error review.  Id. at 222.  Likewise, the federal 
circuit courts addressing the issue have concluded “Alleyne did not recognize or create a 
structural error requiring per se reversal” and have reviewed such matters for harmless 
error.  United States v. McCray, 563 F. App’x 705, 709 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United 
States v. Mann, 786 F.3d 1244, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Lewis, 802 F.3d 
6 
 
449, 454 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284, 297-98 (1st Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Carr, 761 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Long, 748 
F.3d 322, 329 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 608 (6th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 721 F.3d 554, 557-58 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Baylor, 
537 F. App’x 149, 164 (4th Cir. 2013).  Alleyne violations, therefore, do not require 
automatic reversal if such errors prove to be harmless.  
But as the principal opinion explains, Mr. Johnson failed to preserve his challenge 
to the constitutional validity of section 558.018.5(3) by failing to raise it before the trial 
court.  State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015).  Accordingly, this Court’s 
review is limited to plain error.  Id.  “Plain error is found when the alleged error facially 
establishes substantial grounds for believing a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice 
occurred.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  
 
Here, Mr. Johnson cannot establish manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice 
resulted from the Alleyne violation.  The jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt,                   
Mr. Johnson committed the offenses of statutory rape in the first degree and statutory 
sodomy in the first degree against D.P.  The jury also found, beyond a reasonable doubt 
Mr. Johnson committed the offenses of statutory rape in the first degree and statutory 
sodomy in the first degree against R.J.  The jury, therefore, determined, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Mr. Johnson committed acts against more than one victim that constitute 
offenses referenced in section 558.018.4.  It follows that, despite the constitutionally 
defective procedures set out under section 558.018.5(3), the facts that increased                   
Mr. Johnson’s mandatory minimum sentence – that he committed acts against more than 
7 
 
one victim – were submitted to and found by the jury.  Accordingly, I would conclude no 
plain error occurred in this case and would affirm Mr. Johnson’s convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95481 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
ANGELO JOHNSON, 
  
 
 
)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I dissent.  The trial judge was not authorized to ignore the procedural requirements 
of sections 558.018 and 558.021,1 and he plainly erred by doing so.  Had the trial judge 
adhered to these procedural requirements, he would not have been able to enhance the 
defendant’s sentence because to do so would have violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  In holding otherwise, the majority has done more than merely 
“interpret” the statute in a constitutional manner; it has added nonexistent provisions and 
ignored explicit statutory requirements.  While the legislature could and should change the 
statute to make it comport with the Sixth Amendment, courts do not have authority to 
engage in what this Court previously has criticized as “a judicial emasculation of the 
legislative direction” by simply substituting its own statutory provision for that adopted by 
                                              
1 Statutory citations are to RSMo 2013 unless otherwise stated. 
 
2 
the legislature.  State v. Teer, 275 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Mo. banc 2009). 
Further, the majority opinion errs in holding that subdivision 558.018.5(3) 
unambiguously permits a trial judge to base the predatory sexual offender determination 
on the very charges being tried in the case before the trial judge.  That is not what the statute 
provides, and such a reading is not consistent with either the purpose or the language of 
the statute.  Further, permitting the trial judge to base the determination on facts found by 
the trial judge rather than the jury contravenes the Sixth Amendment.   
For these reasons, Mr. Johnson’s sentence should be vacated. 
 
I. 
 THE FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY 
SECTIONS 558.018 AND 558.021 PRECLUDES A PREDATORY SEXUAL 
OFFENDER FINDING  
 
Mr. Johnson’s sentence must be vacated because the trial judge committed plain 
error and violated section 558.021.2, which provides “the facts shall be pleaded, 
established and found prior to submission to the jury outside of its hearing.”  None of these 
mandatory requirements were complied with in this case.  While section 558.021.2 requires 
the State to present any evidence outside the jury’s hearing, the State did not.  While section 
558.021.2 requires the trial judge to make the evidentiary findings prior to submission, he 
did not.  While the trial judge’s predatory sexual offender finding must be based on the 
evidence presented outside the jury’s presence, it was not.  While the trial judge’s finding 
is not permitted to be based on the evidence presented to the jury, it was.   
Indeed, the trial judge turned the statute on its head; he required no facts to be 
separately established outside the jury’s hearing, made the evidentiary findings after rather 
than before submission, and specifically stated his determination was “based on the 
 
3 
evidence that was presented at trial, the testimony that was presented by the three victims 
and, of course, by the verdicts that were returned by the jury in this number of counts.”  In 
short, the trial judge held that if the evidence at trial was good enough for the jury to find 
Mr. Johnson guilty, it was good enough for the trial judge to find him a predatory sexual 
offender under section 558.018, even if the trial judge had to violate the procedures 
mandated by the statute to do so.  Our legislature’s requirements cannot and should not be 
so easily disregarded.  
While the majority holds the failure to comply with these statutory procedural 
requirements was just a minor and non-prejudicial variation from the required procedure 
and certainly does not amount to plain error, it is wrong.  Even when objection is not timely 
made, to ensure accuracy in the outcome of the trial, “appellate courts have the discretion 
to nonetheless review for plain error if manifest injustice would otherwise result.”  Deck v. 
State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 427-28 (Mo. banc 2002); see Rule 30.20.  Plain error is found “if the 
error was outcome determinative.”  Id. at 427.  “Manifest injustice is dependent upon the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case.”  State v. Zindel, 918 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Mo. 
banc 1996).  
The majority concedes the trial judge’s failure to comply with the procedural 
requirements of section 558.021.2 was “evident, obvious, and clear.”  Slip op. at 11.  But 
the majority is wrong in refusing to recognize the manifest injustice that resulted from this 
error.  Id. at 15.  Because Mr. Johnson was found to be a predatory sexual offender, he was 
sentenced to life in prison with his first parole eligibility at 25 years.  See § 558.018.6. (“A 
person found to be a predatory sexual offender shall be imprisoned for life with eligibility 
 
4 
for parole …”).  Of course, that parole could be denied.  
By contrast, without the predatory sexual offender finding Mr. Johnson would have 
been entitled to unconditional release after serving 25 years even if he received the 
maximum sentence.  §§ 558.011, 558.018.6.  “Being sentenced to a punishment greater 
than the maximum sentence for an offense constitutes plain error resulting in manifest 
injustice.”  State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Mo. banc 2010).  This principle applies 
when a trial judge fails to comply with the procedural requirements of section 558.021.2 
when designating a defendant as a status offender warranting a greater sentence.  See State 
v. Collins, 328 S.W.3d 705, 709-10 (Mo. banc 2011); Severe, 307 S.W.3d at 644-45; Teer, 
275 S.W.3d at 260-62; State v. Emery, 95 S.W.3d 98, 101-02 (Mo. banc 2003). 
Here, it was the trial judge’s violation of section 558.021.2 that allowed him to 
designate Mr. Johnson as a predatory sexual offender and enhance his sentence.  Under 
section 558.021.2, the State was permitted to present its evidence prior to submission to 
the jury, and it was then the trial judge was required to make a finding.  In a conference 
among the trial judge and counsel prior to submission to the jury, the State asked the trial 
judge to designate Mr. Johnson as a predatory sexual offender, and the trial judge 
determined subdivision 558.018.5(3) did not apply to Mr. Johnson.  At that point, the trial 
judge had heard the evidence presented at trial and the testimony presented by the three 
victims, which he determined was not enough to find Mr. Johnson was a predatory sexual 
offender.   
Yet, after the jury returned its verdicts, the State asked the trial judge to reconsider 
applying subdivision 558.018.5(3), and the trial judge stated he had “changed his mind” 
 
5 
and found Mr. Johnson was a predatory sexual offender.  He stated his determination was 
“based on the evidence that was presented at trial, the testimony that was presented by the 
three victims and, of course, by the verdicts that were returned by the jury in this number 
of counts.”   
Section 558.021.2 makes clear the trial judge’s predatory sexual offender 
determination must be based on evidence presented outside the jury’s presence and the 
legislature’s inclusion of that requirement is purposeful.  The word “shall” makes the 
procedure mandatory, not discretionary.  Teer, 275 S.W.3d at 261.  Why require the 
determination to be made outside the jury’s presence based on evidence presented to the 
trial judge when the trial judge has just heard all of the evidence presented to the jury?  
Because the predatory sexual offender determination is to be based on evidence other than 
that being submitted to the jury. 
Additionally, the statute sets out only a single exceptional circumstance in which 
the trial judge is permitted to make the determination after submission based on the 
evidence at trial.  This exception is not when the trial judge is deciding whether the 
defendant is a predatory sexual offender under subdivision 558.018.5(3), the situation 
presented in this case.  Rather, the exception applies only to prove a defendant is a 
“dangerous offender” under subdivision 558.016.4(1); the statute provides only that issue 
“may be established by judicial notice of prior testimony or before the jury.”  § 558.021.2.   
As this Court long has recognized, “the express mention of one thing implies the 
exclusion of another.”  Yellow Freight Sys. v. Mayor’s Comm’n on Human Rights of City 
of Springfield, 791 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo. banc 1990).  Had the legislature intended to allow 
 
6 
the trial judge to simply base the determination on the evidence presented at trial, it would 
have included subdivision 558.018.5(3) in the exception set out in section 558.021.2.  It 
did not.  The predatory sexual offender determination cannot be based on the evidence 
presented to the jury on the current charges.  
As this Court stated in Teer, “[i]f the courts continue to indulge the laxity which has 
characterized so many cases of extended term sentencing, a judicial emasculation of the 
legislative direction will be the accepted procedural norm [citation omitted].”  275 S.W.3d 
at 262 (holding the trial judge’s violation of section 558.021.2 required reversal of the 
defendant’s sentence).  The majority opinion constitutes just such a judicial emasculation 
of the legislative directive.  It does so first by allowing the trial judge to reshape the 
statutory requirements of sections 558.018 and 558.021 so they fit Mr. Johnson’s case, 
even though by doing so, the trial judge improperly exercised legislative powers delegated 
exclusively to the legislature by article II, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution.  See also 
Severe, 307 S.W.3d at 645. “Fixing of the punishment for crime is a legislative and not a 
judicial function.”  State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 246 (Mo. banc 2013) (citation omitted).  
If a statutory penalty cannot be applied to the facts of the case without violating the 
constitution, “the statute is void” with respect to the particular case.  Id.     
Further, as this Court held in Severe, 307 S.W.3d at 645, the State is not permitted 
“‘two bites at the apple’ when the statute allows only one bite,” and this “Court cannot 
make an exception to the statutory requirement.”  Under section 558.021.2, the State was 
not permitted to again ask the trial judge to consider applying subdivision 558.018.5(3) 
after the jury had returned its verdicts, and the trial judge was not permitted to consider the 
 
7 
jury verdicts as a basis for his determination that Mr. Johnson was a predatory sexual 
offender.  Such verdicts could only exist after the case had been submitted to the jury and 
could not have been presented by the State prior to submission and outside the jury’s 
presence.  The statute does not allow the State to present new evidence after submission, 
and this Court cannot create an exception to that statutory requirement allowing the trial 
judge to make the finding based on the jury verdicts.  Mr. Johnson was improperly 
sentenced to a term greater than what he could have received had the trial judge not violated 
section 558.021.2, and that violation resulted in a manifest injustice.  See Severe, 307 
S.W.3d at 642, 644-45.   
Allowing the trial judge to designate Mr. Johnson as a predatory sexual offender 
also violated his Sixth Amendment rights.  As the majority recognizes, Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2161 (2013), held that under the Sixth Amendment, “Any fact that, 
by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury 
and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 2155.  This includes any fact increasing the 
mandatory minimum of a sentence.  Id.  The Supreme Court reasoned:  “[w]hen a finding 
of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily 
forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury.”  Id. at 2162.  
Just last year, the Supreme Court applied these principles and refused a state’s argument 
that because a similar state statute made “the additional requirement that a judge also find 
an aggravator” it “only provide[d] the defendant additional protection.”  Hurst v. Florida, 
136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016).  Hurst held the state statute, which required “findings by the 
court that such person shall be punished by death,” was unconstitutional even though the 
 
8 
jury also made the findings allowing the trial judge to enhance the sentence.  Id., citing, 
Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1).  This was because the statute “allow[ed] a sentencing judge to find 
an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that [was] necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty.”  Id. at 624. 
Applying these principles here, the trial judge’s violation of section 558.021.2 was 
determinative of Mr. Johnson being sentenced as a predatory sexual offender.  Section 
558.021.2 expressly requires the trial judge in a jury trial to base its finding that the 
defendant is a predatory sexual offender on facts “pleaded, established and found prior to 
submission to the jury outside of its hearing.”  Had the trial judge followed these procedural 
requirements and determined subdivision 558.018.5(3) applied, he could not have 
enhanced Mr. Johnson’s sentence because under the requirements of these statutes, it is the 
trial judge alone that makes the factual finding necessary to enhance a defendant’s sentence 
and before submission of the case to the jury.  This violates the Sixth Amendment because 
it unequivocally would permit what Alleyne prohibits – using a trial judge’s findings to 
increase the mandatory minimum.   
The majority opinion relies on its assertion that “[r]equiring a trial court to also find 
the necessary facts is a layer of protection above and beyond that required by Alleyne.”2  
This may be true, but the statute cannot require the trial judge to make that finding alone 
and independent of the jury.  Missouri’s legislature did not have the benefit of the Supreme 
                                              
2 See Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (finding the argument that the statute “only provides the 
defendant additional protection” unpersuasive).   
 
9 
Court’s decision in Alleyne when it adopted these provisions, but as the parties recognize, 
the two are incompatible to the extent the statute permits an enhancement to be based on 
offenses the defendant is found by the trial judge to have committed beyond a reasonable 
doubt but of which defendant has not been convicted by the jury.3 
The constitutional concerns raised by these statutory provisions, in light of Alleyne, 
are self-evident.  The majority’s solution would be to allow the trial judge to ignore section 
558.021.2 and permit his findings to be made after the verdict, rather than before the 
verdict, and based on the jury’s findings even though the statute on its face requires the 
findings to be those of the judge.  The majority’s claim to the contrary notwithstanding, 
this is not simply a case of applying the adage that “[i]f a statutory provision can be 
interpreted in two ways, one constitutional and the other not constitutional, the 
constitutional construction shall be adopted.”  State v. Mixon, 391 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Mo. 
banc 2012) (citations omitted).  Rather, the majority is rewriting the statute by adding 
provisions contrary to the very requirements of the statute itself.  Such judicial rewriting 
of the statute is itself unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.  
Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 246-47. 
                                              
3 For example, subdivision 558.018.5(3) permits the mandatory minimum sentence for a 
crime to be enhanced if the defendant “[h]as committed an act or acts against more than 
one victim which would constitute an offense or offenses listed in subsection 4 of this sec-
tion, whether or not the defendant was charged with an additional offense or offenses as a 
result of such act or acts.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This is what Alleyne prohibits.  The 
defendant has a right to have a jury determine any fact that increases the defendant’s max-
imum or minimum punishment.  Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.   
 
 
10 
 
Prejudice exists under the plain error rule where the error complained of impacts the 
rights of a defendant so substantially that a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice 
will result if the error is not corrected.  State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 616 (Mo. banc 
2009).  Had the trial judge properly followed the procedure required by section 558.021.2, 
he could not have found subdivision 558.018.5(3) applied to Mr. Johnson.  For the reasons 
noted, properly following the procedure required by section 558.021.2 would be unconsti-
tutional.  See City of Charleston ex rel. Brady v. McCutcheon, 227 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Mo. 
banc 1950).  Accordingly, the trial judge’s failure to follow section 558.021.2 was deter-
minative of whether Mr. Johnson was or was not a predatory sexual offender and amounted 
to plain error.  
II. 
SECTION 558.018.5 DOES NOT PERMIT CURRENT CHARGES AS THE 
BASIS OF THE PREDATORY SEXUAL OFFENDER DESIGNATION  
Even were the majority permitted to rewrite the statute’s procedural provisions and 
allow the predatory offender determination to be made after trial and based on the jury’s 
verdict – something expressly prohibited – reversal would be required because the statute 
does not authorize use of the present charges as a basis to make the predatory offender 
determination.  Yet that is what the trial judge admittedly did.  The State bases its argument 
on the fact that, unlike subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 558.018.5, subdivision (3) does 
not use the term “previously” in providing what charges can form the basis of a predatory 
sexual offender finding under that section.  It follows, the State argues, that if the State is 
not limited to previous conduct, then this means it can base the predatory sexual offender 
determination on the very charges being submitted to the jury.   
 
11 
The “then” of the State’s reasoning, however, does not follow from its premise.  In 
effect, the State is arguing subdivision (3) of section 558.018.5 provides that an act can 
form the basis of finding a defendant a predatory sexual offender whether or not defendant 
was charged with committing that act or acts in the current charges.  But that is not what 
the subdivision provides.  To the contrary, it provides the predator determination is to be 
based on “whether or not the defendant was charged with an additional offense or offenses 
as a result of such act or acts.”  § 558.018.5(3) (emphasis added).  This begs the question 
– an offense additional to what?  The language “whether or not the defendant was charged 
with an additional offense” only can mean additional to the currently charged offense or 
offenses.  In other words, the purpose of the statute is to allow the trial judge to consider 
conduct in addition to that charged in the current case, whether or not that additional 
conduct itself resulted in other charges.  But the actual offenses charged cannot be 
“additional” to themselves, and so they, or evidence supporting them, cannot form the basis 
of the enhancement.  
Interpreting subdivision 558.018.5(3) as applying only to additional charged and 
uncharged conduct, whenever committed, that the trial judge prior to submission finds to 
have occurred beyond a reasonable doubt is the only interpretation true to the subdivision’s 
statutory purpose.  As the majority correctly notes, “This Court’s primary rule of statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the 
statute at issue.”  Parktown Imps., Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 
2009); slip op. at 6.   
Subdivision 558.018.5(3), in conjunction with subdivision 558.018.5(2), attempts 
 
12 
to increase the minimum punishment for those defendants who are repeatedly bad actors, 
even if they have not come to trial or been charged for all of their bad acts.  Though such 
an approach has serious constitutional flaws in light of Alleyne, the legislature could not 
have been aware of these issues at the time of the section’s enactment.   
The majority’s interpretation is equally incompatible with the legislature’s evident 
purpose in enacting the predatory sexual offender provisions.  The majority’s holding 
means the enhanced mandatory minimum applies in every case with more than one victim, 
as it requires the trial judge to determine prior to submission whether the evidence shows 
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant committed a listed act against more than one 
victim.  If the trial judge did not so find, the trial judge would not find the defendant to be 
a predatory sexual offender and would have to refuse to submit the charges at all and 
instead enter a judgment of acquittal on them.  This is because the defendant could not be 
convicted of an act based on evidence insufficient to support such a finding.  If the trial 
judge did find the defendant had committed the charged acts beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then the charges would be submitted to the jury.  For each charge submitted, the defendant 
would either be acquitted and so subject to no sentence or be convicted and automatically 
subject to the enhanced mandatory minimum.   
The one thing that will never happen is for the defendant to receive the sentence 
actually prescribed by the statute based on the jury’s verdict.  This cannot be what the 
legislature intended.  Had the legislature wanted every offender who commits charged 
crimes against multiple victims and against whom a submissible case was made 
automatically to receive an enhanced mandatory minimum, it would have so provided.  It 
 
13 
did not.  It provided a minimum 10-year sentence unless the trial judge found “additional” 
acts occurred beyond a reasonable doubt; only then would the offender have to receive at 
least the enhanced mandatory minimum sentence.  This requirement of “additional” acts 
would be nonsensical if every offender would be subject to subdivision (3)’s enhanced 
penalty based on the already submitted acts.  
III. 
CONCLUSION  
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the trial judge’s determination that 
Mr. Johnson was a predatory sexual offender and remand for resentencing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  __________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE