Title: Schrader-VanNewkirk v. Daube
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 423, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DIANE SCHRADER-VanNEWKIRK, 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SHARON C. DAUBE, 
 
          Defendant Below, 
          Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 423, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for Kent County 
§  C.A. No. 08C-02-089 
§   
§ 
 
 
Submitted: April 13, 2012 
 
Decided: 
May 30, 2012 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 30th day of May 2012, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Diane Schrader-VanNewkirk, filed this appeal 
from the Superior Court’s order, dated July 13, 2011, denying her motion to reopen 
the judgment dismissing her personal injury complaint.  The judgment of dismissal 
was entered because plaintiff failed to respond to the Superior Court’s directive to 
confirm in writing her intent to attend the trial scheduled for February 14, 2011.  
Under these unique circumstances, we find that the ultimate sanction of dismissal 
was not reasonable.  Thus, we conclude that the Superior Court’s denial of 
 
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plaintiff’s motion to reopen was an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand. 
(2) 
The record reflects that plaintiff filed her complaint in February 2008, 
seeking damages for personal injuries that she and her daughter suffered as a result 
of an automobile accident in Dover, Delaware.  At the time she filed her complaint, 
plaintiff and her daughter were residents of Virginia.  Defendant, Sharon Daube, 
filed an answer.  Thereafter, the case went to arbitration.  The arbitrator found in 
plaintiff’s favor and awarded damages of $18,000 to her and $1,000 to her 
daughter.  Defendant demanded a trial de novo, and a trial date was set for May 
2009, but was rescheduled for August 2009 at defendant’s request.  In June 2009, 
defendant requested another continuance due to plaintiff’s inability to attend her 
scheduled independent medical examination (IME).  Plaintiff had since moved to 
California and was having financial difficulties affording travel to Delaware.  
Thereafter, a new trial date was set for January 25, 2010.  In December 2009, the 
parties filed a pretrial stipulation indicating that defendant would not contest the 
issue of liability, only the issue of plaintiff’s damages.  Defendant reached a 
settlement with plaintiff’s daughter and made an offer of judgment to plaintiff prior 
to trial, which was later withdrawn. 
(3) 
On January 25, 2010, plaintiff failed to appear at the scheduled trial.  
Upon returning to his office in Wilmington, plaintiff’s counsel contacted the 
 
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Superior Court indicating that plaintiff had left him voicemail messages prior to 
the start of trial indicating that she had had a medical emergency while in the 
airport and had been unable to board her airplane.  On February 17, 2010, 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to appear at trial, 
which the Superior Court denied.  In May 2010, defendant scheduled a follow-up 
deposition for plaintiff but refused to agree to allow plaintiff to participate via 
videophone or Skype.  When plaintiff indicated that she could not appear for the 
deposition because she could not afford the airfare, defendant filed a second 
motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery.  Following oral 
argument, the Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss and set a new trial date 
for February 14, 2011.  
(4) 
Thereafter, defendant’s counsel requested an office conference to 
discuss his client’s concern over the “leniency” the trial court had afforded to the 
plaintiff.  Following the status conference, the trial judge orally indicated that 
plaintiff’s failure to appear on February 14, 2011, the rescheduled trial date, would 
result in dismissal of her complaint.  Thereafter, the Superior Court held the 
pretrial conference on January 11, 2011.  Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he had 
had no recent communication with his client and expressed concern regarding 
plaintiff’s attendance at the upcoming trial. Following that conference, the 
Superior Court directed the plaintiff, through her counsel, to write to the trial court 
 
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by February 1, 2011 confirming her intent to appear for trial on February 14 or else 
her case would be dismissed.  This Superior Court directive is reflected on the 
docket in the entry of a “Judicial Action Form” on January 11, 2011 setting forth 
the trial court’s oral order.  Unfortunately, the Superior Court record does not 
reflect the entry of a written order directing plaintiff to respond or risk dismissal, 
nor does it appear that the Superior Court Prothonotary provided written notice to 
plaintiff of the trial court’s oral directive that she respond in writing by February 1.  
On February 2, plaintiff’s counsel filed a letter indicating that he had not heard 
from his client.  On February 3, 2011, the Superior Court dismissed plaintiff’s 
complaint prior to the scheduled trial date.  
(5) 
On February 15, 2011, plaintiff filed a pro se motion seeking to 
reopen the Superior Court’s judgment of dismissal.  Plaintiff asserted that she was 
unaware of the Superior Court’s directive that she provide a written response by 
February 1 confirming her intent to appear on February 14.  Plaintiff contended 
that she had purchased a plane ticket and had been prepared to appear on February 
14, the scheduled trial date.  The Superior Court held argument on the motion to 
reopen on July 8, 2011and denied the motion on July 13, 2011. 
(6) 
A motion to open a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.1  In reviewing whether the trial 
                                                 
1 Tsipouras v. Tsipouras, 677 A.2d 493, 495 (Del. 1996). 
 
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court abused its discretion, this Court will consider: (i) whether the conduct 
resulting in the entry of the default judgment was the result of excusable neglect; 
(ii) whether the outcome of the action may be different if the judgment is reopened; 
and (iii) whether the nonmoving party will suffer substantial prejudice if the 
judgment is reopened.2  
(7) 
 Upon review of the record, we conclude that the Superior Court 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to reopen the default judgment.  
Had plaintiff failed to appear for trial for the second time on February 14, 2011, 
dismissal of her complaint clearly would have been warranted.  That is not the 
case, however.  Her complaint was dismissed prior to the trial date because she 
failed to indicate her intent to appear.  The Superior Court record does not reflect 
that the court provided plaintiff herself with notice of its directive.  The Superior 
Court relegated that responsibility to plaintiff’s counsel, who previously had 
informed the court of his inability to contact plaintiff.  Under the unique 
circumstances of this case in which the attorney-client relationship appeared to be 
at an impasse, the Superior Court should have given notice directly to the plaintiff 
of its intent to dismiss her case if she failed to respond to its oral directive.  We 
cannot conclude on this record that plaintiff’s failure to respond to her attorney is 
equivalent to a willful failure to respond to the Superior Court. 
                                                 
2 Id. at 495-96. 
 
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(8) 
Moreover, it is clear that the outcome of this case very likely will be 
different if plaintiff has her day in court.  Delaware has a strong public policy that 
favors permitting a litigant a right to a day in court.3  Delaware courts should apply 
Rule 60(b) with a “liberal construction”4 because of the public policy favoring a 
trial on the merits as opposed to a judgment based on a default.  Finally, because 
the default judgment was simply a dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, we find no 
substantial prejudice to the defendant, who admitted liability and was excused 
from having to even attend the trial, if the judgment is reopened and the Superior 
Court hears the plaintiff’s claim for damages.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is REVERSED.  The matter is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice 
                                                 
3 Dishmon v. Fucci, 32 A.3d 338, 346 (Del. 2011). 
4 Beckett v. Beebe Med. Ctr., 897 A.2d 753, 758 (Del. 2006) (quoting Old Guard Insur. Co. v. 
Jimmy’s Grille, Inc., 2004 WL 2154286 (Del. Sept. 21, 2004)).