Title: El-Amin v. Virginia State Bar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 981994
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 16, 1999

PRESENT:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice  
 
SA'AD EL-AMIN 
 
 
 
 
                    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 981994           SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
 
 
 
                   April 16, 1999 
 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, ex rel. 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COMMITTEE  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Clifford R. Weckstein, Chief Judge Designate, Dixon L. Foster 
and J. Warren Stephens, Judges Designate 
 
 
Asserting that Sa'ad El-Amin, a lawyer licensed to practice 
in Virginia, had violated certain of its disciplinary rules, the 
Virginia State Bar initiated disciplinary proceedings against 
him.  The preamble to the Virginia Code of Professional 
Responsibility states, in pertinent part: 
 
The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility 
consists of three separate but interrelated parts: 
Canons, Disciplinary Rules, and Ethical 
Considerations. 
 
 
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, 
expressing in general terms the standards of 
professional conduct expected of lawyers in their 
relationships with the public, with the legal system, 
and with the legal profession. They embody the general 
concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and the 
Ethical Considerations are derived. 
 
 
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Canons and 
Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character, as 
stated in DR 1-102(A)(1). The Disciplinary Rules state 
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can 
fall without being subject to disciplinary action. 
 
Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, Pt. 6, § II. 
 
In a hearing before a three-judge court conducted under the 
provisions of Code § 54.1-3935, the court concluded that El-Amin 
had committed 15 violations of 9 of the disciplinary rules in 
his representation of Annie H. Fant, Grace R. Williams, and 
Vernon El-Amin, and the court suspended his license to practice 
law for a period of four years.  El-Amin exercised his statutory 
right to appeal eight of those findings involving his alleged 
misconduct, competence and promptness, causing prejudice to a 
client, failure to refund advanced fees, and failure to avoid 
the appearance of professional impropriety. 
 
In reviewing the findings of a three-judge court in an 
attorney disciplinary proceeding, we use the same standard that 
we apply to the findings of disciplinary boards: 
[O]n review we will make an independent examination of 
the whole record, giving the factual findings . . . 
substantial weight and viewing them as prima facie 
correct.  While not given the weight of a jury 
verdict, those conclusions will be sustained unless it 
appears they are not justified by a reasonable view of 
the evidence or are contrary to law. 
 
Myers v. Virginia State Bar, 226 Va. 630, 632, 312 S.E.2d 286, 
287 (1984)(quoting Blue v. Seventh District Committee, 220 Va. 
1056, 1061-62, 265 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1980)(appeal from 
disciplinary board)).  And, consistent with well-established 
appellate principles, we view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most 
 
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favorable to the State Bar, the prevailing party in the trial 
court.  Gunter v. Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 619, 385 
S.E.2d 597, 598 (1989). 
I. The Fant Matter 
 
Considering the cases arising under El-Amin's 
representation of each client, we begin with his representation 
of Fant.  Fant employed El-Amin in June 1994 to represent her in 
an employment discrimination case.  El-Amin agreed to begin 
working on the case immediately and required Fant to advance a 
retainer fee of $4,000, which she did by check.  He indicated to 
Fant that he would withdraw funds as he worked on the case and 
told Fant that he would deposit the retainer in an escrow 
account.  Instead, El-Amin cashed the check and produced no 
record of having deposited the proceeds in any account. 
 
During the following five months, El-Amin had little 
contact with Fant, despite her numerous telephone calls, 
letters, and visits to his office.  Because of El-Amin's failure 
to respond to her inquiries, Fant wrote him a letter in late 
November 1994 discharging him as her counsel and asking for a 
refund of the retainer.  El-Amin telephoned Fant several days 
later and, admitting to her that he had not done certain work on 
the case as promised, agreed to refund "the money" by mail on 
December 5. 
 
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Fant testified that when El-Amin did not refund the money 
as promised, she sued him in the General District Court and 
mailed him a copy of the warrant.  Thereafter, El-Amin contacted 
Fant and promised to pay "$4,000 on December the 20th, 1994, at 
11 a.m."  Fant went to El-Amin's office at the specified time 
and he told her that because his wife, who was his law partner, 
had been hospitalized, he had "taken [his wife's] load," and 
further that he could not charge Fant any money because he had 
done no work on her case. 
 
However, El-Amin refunded only $1,000 at that time.  In 
response to Fant's question of why the payment was in that 
amount in view of the fact that the $4,000 deposit was "supposed 
to be in escrow," El-Amin said "I don't have the money."  El-
Amin promised to pay the additional $3,000 on January 11, 1995 
at 11:00 a.m. 
 
When El-Amin failed to refund the remaining $3,000 on 
January 11, Fant wrote to the State Bar asking for its help in 
getting her refund.  Although Fant delivered a copy of her 
letter to El-Amin's office on January 12, she received no 
response from him. 
 
On January 17, Fant retained attorney Bradley O. Wein to 
collect the balance.  El-Amin agreed to see Wein at a fixed time 
on January 23, 1995 in El-Amin's office and to pay the $3,000 
balance to Wein at that time.  However, El-Amin was not at his 
 
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office at the appointed time and did not refund the promised 
sum. 
 
Only after Wein had generated a file of over 1,000 pages, 
expended more than 100 hours during a period of 18 months, and 
incurred costs of $754.72 did El-Amin refund $2,500 of the 
$3,000 balance in settlement of Fant's claim.  After the 
deduction of Wein's fee and expenses, Fant realized only $911.95 
of the $3,000 balance of her deposit. 
 
El-Amin has not appealed three of the court's four findings 
in the Fant matter.  They are that he violated the following 
disciplinary rules: (1) DR 9-102(A)(2), which requires that 
client funds be deposited in an identifiable trust account; (2) 
DR 9-102(B)(3), which requires that a lawyer maintain "complete 
records of all funds, securities, and other property of a client 
coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate 
accounts to his client regarding them"; and (3) DR 9-102(B)(4), 
which requires that an attorney "[p]romptly pay or deliver to 
the client . . . funds . . . in the possession of the lawyer 
which such person is entitled to receive." 
 
El-Amin contends, however, that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish, clearly and convincingly, that he 
violated DR 1-102(A)(3), which proscribes a lawyer's commission 
of a "deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law."  We disagree with El-Amin. 
 
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In our opinion, the evidence that El-Amin cashed Fant's 
$4,000 retainer check, used the proceeds without earning the 
fee, and delayed refunding the retainer fee, sufficiently 
supports the finding that he committed "a deliberately wrongful 
act that reflects adversely on [his] fitness to practice law," 
in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
trial court's finding on that issue. 
II. The Williams Matter 
 
We next consider the charges relating to El-Amin's 
representation of Williams, which began in early May of 1994.  
Williams, like Fant, employed El-Amin to represent her in an 
employment discrimination case. 
 
As in the Fant matter, El-Amin appeals only one of the 
findings of disciplinary rule violations in his representation 
of Williams.  He has not appealed the court's findings that, in 
representing Williams, he violated the pertinent provisions of 
the following disciplinary rules: (1) DR 2-108(D), which 
provides that, "[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take reasonable steps for the continued protection of a 
client's interests, including . . . refunding any advance 
payment of fee that has not been earned."; (2) DR 6-101(B), 
which states that a "lawyer shall attend promptly to matters 
undertaken for a client"; (3) DR 6-101(C), which provides that a 
"lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in 
 
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which the lawyer's services are being rendered."; and (4) DR 9-
102(B)(4), which requires that a lawyer promptly pay to a client 
funds the client is entitled to receive. 
 
Thus, the appeal in the Williams matter is limited to the 
court's finding that El-Amin violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  It 
prohibits a lawyer from engaging "in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which reflects 
adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law." 
 
At the initial consultation, El-Amin told Williams his fee 
would be $7,000.  When she told him that she did not have "that 
kind of money," but would ask her relatives to help her make 
payments on the fee, El-Amin agreed that he would begin working 
on the case.  Williams and her relatives paid El-Amin over 
$1,700.  However, despite numerous office visits and telephone 
calls, Williams was unsuccessful in her attempts to see or talk 
to El-Amin about what he had done during the ensuing five-month 
period.  Consequently, Williams wrote El-Amin on November 2, 
1994, discharging him as her counsel and asking for a refund of 
the amounts paid on the fee.  The letter was delivered by 
certified mail to El-Amin's office and signed for by his 
secretary on November 3, 1994.  El-Amin did not respond to the 
letter. 
 
El-Amin testified that his secretary neither gave him the 
certified letter nor told him of Mrs. Williams' office visits 
 
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and that he did not know he "had a problem with Mrs. Williams 
until after [he] received a complaint from the Virginia State 
Bar."  Although El-Amin claimed he had done some research on the 
Williams case, he produced no records to substantiate his 
testimony and admitted that "the entire situation fell through 
the cracks.  And it just did.  And I don't have an explanation." 
 
Yet when interviewed during a preliminary investigation 
about his failure to refund the fee, El-Amin told a State Bar 
investigator that he had not refunded the money because "he felt 
like he had earned the fees" up to the time of his discharge.  
Although El-Amin denied making this statement to the 
investigator and claimed that the money was still in an escrow 
account, at trial El-Amin produced no records of any such 
account and could only say that he "assume[d]" the money was 
still there. 
 
In our opinion, this evidence clearly and convincingly 
supports the conclusion that El-Amin violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by 
using the retainer without earning it and by attempting to 
deceive the investigator in claiming the retainer had been 
earned.  That is "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on [El-Amin's] 
fitness to practice law".  DR 1-102(A)(4).  Hence, we will 
affirm this finding. 
III. The Vernon El-Amin Matter 
 
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Finally, we consider El-Amin's dealings with his client 
Vernon El-Amin (Vernon), who is of no relation to him.  At the 
time of their contract in 1990, Vernon was incarcerated 
following his convictions for four murders.  Vernon was 
represented by other counsel in those criminal cases. 
 
El-Amin and Vernon agreed that if Vernon's pending appeal 
of those convictions was unsuccessful, El-Amin would represent 
him in a habeas corpus proceeding claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In the meantime, El-Amin was to secure 
the release of Vernon's 1986 Lincoln Continental from police 
impoundment, have the car put into condition to sell, deduct the 
cost thereof, and hold the net proceeds of sale as a retainer 
fee. 
 
As it turned out, the appeal by other counsel was 
successful and El-Amin did little work on this matter.  However, 
Vernon was again convicted on retrial, remained in confinement, 
and asked El-Amin to keep the retainer as a credit for future 
representation. 
 
El-Amin obtained the car, had it repaired, and began using 
it himself.  He later decided to trade the car for a newer one 
and received a credit of $4,636.04 on the purchase price of the 
newer car.  The newer car was titled in El-Amin's name and he 
eventually executed a lien on that car in favor of another 
client.  El-Amin did not note in his records or on the title to 
 
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the newer car that he held either the 1986 car or Vernon's 
interest in the proceeds, i.e., the credit, in trust.  Nor did 
El-Amin deposit funds in his trust account once he received the 
credit.  Although El-Amin testified in another proceeding in 
July 1991 that the agreed value of the car was "$10,000, less 
any amounts necessary to repair it and put it in marketable 
condition," he testified before the three-judge court in 1988 
that the agreed value was $6,500 less the cost of repairs.  
 
El-Amin contends that the court erred in finding he had 
violated six disciplinary rules during his representation of 
Vernon El-Amin.  We do not agree with El-Amin.  We conclude that 
clear and convincing evidence supports all of the trial court's 
findings. 
 
Dealing first with violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-
102(A)(4), discussed above, involving a "deliberately wrongful 
act," deceit and misrepresentation, we reject El-Amin's argument 
that there is a distinction between his activities and the 
activities of other lawyers who committed crimes and were 
disciplined.  As we pointed out in Gunter, 238 Va. at 621, 385 
S.E.2d at 600, "conduct may be unethical, measured by the 
minimum requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 
even if it is not unlawful."  The evidence shows that El-Amin 
not only personally used Vernon's car, but he also traded it for 
a newer one without reflecting the resulting $4,636.04 credit on 
 
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the title to the newer car.  In our opinion, this sufficiently 
supports the trial court's findings of violations of both of 
these disciplinary rules. 
 
We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show 
that El-Amin prejudiced Vernon's rights by using and disposing 
of the car in violation of DR 7-101(A)(3).  That disciplinary 
rule provides that a lawyer shall not intentionally "[p]rejudice 
or damage his client during the course of the professional 
relationship."  A comparison between El-Amin's 1991 testimony 
and his 1998 testimony concerning the value of the car, coupled 
with his decision not to reflect the unearned retainer or 
Vernon's consequent interest in the newer car, sufficiently 
indicates that Vernon's rights were prejudiced in this matter.  
It is of no consequence that El-Amin later earned the fee by 
handling other matters for Vernon, as he argues.  The fact is 
that at the time in question, Vernon's rights were prejudiced by 
El-Amin's activities. 
 
The final group of charges arises under Canon 9, which 
provides: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of 
Professional Impropriety."  One of the charges under this canon 
involves a violation of DR 9-102(A), which requires a lawyer to 
deposit "[a]ll funds received or held by the lawyer or law firm 
on behalf of a client . . . in one or more identifiable trust 
accounts." 
 
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El-Amin contends that he had no obligation to deposit funds 
to reflect the credit in question since the word "funds" as used 
in the rule refers to money and that, since he did not obtain 
money from the trade, but only obtained a credit, there could be 
no violation of DR 9-102(A).  We reject this contention for the 
following reasons. 
 
The form of the retainer fee changed when El-Amin, who held 
Vernon's car as a bailee for the purpose of securing the payment 
of legal fees to be incurred in the future by Vernon, converted 
the car into a credit, which El-Amin received on the purchase of 
his new car.  Vernon had an interest in that credit because it 
took the place of his car as the retainer fee, or fund, for the 
payment of the future legal fees. 
 
The terms "fund or funds" have been defined in part as 
"[a]n asset or group of assets set apart for a specific 
purpose."  Black's Law Dictionary 673 (6th ed. 1990).  Because 
the credit represented the retainer fee, it became a "fund" set 
aside for a specific purpose, the payment of fees to be billed 
by El-Amin in the future. 
 
Considering the scope and purpose of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, we do not think that the term 
"funds" as used in DR 9-102(A) is confined to items such as 
"money" or "cash," as El-Amin contends.  Indeed, we have not 
limited the term to money or cash, but, instead, have used the 
 
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term "fund" or "funds" in a generic sense in a number of 
situations.  See, e.g.,  Somers v. Godwin, 182 Va. 144, 147, 27 
S.E.2d 909, 910 (1943)(applying word "funds" to intangible 
personal property); Fireman's Mutual Aid Assoc. v. Commonwealth, 
166 Va. 34, 36, 184 S.E. 189, 190 (1936)(applying word "funds" 
to "bonds, notes, etc., and money");  Rixey's Ex'rs v. 
Commonwealth, 125 Va. 337, 343-44, 99 S.E. 573, 574 
(1919)(describing intangible property held by executor as "funds 
arising from . . . the sales of real and personal property to 
others"). 
 
In sum, given the context and purpose of the disciplinary 
rules, and our previous uses of the words "fund" and "funds," it 
is our opinion that, under the facts of this case, the credit 
El-Amin received upon trading Vernon's car became "funds" within 
the meaning of DR 9-102(A)(2) and that the rule required El-Amin 
to deposit a sum representing that credit into his trust 
account. 
 
 The evidence also supports the conclusion that El-Amin 
violated DR 9-102(B)(2), which requires that a lawyer 
"[i]dentify . . . properties of a client . . . and place them in 
a . . . place of safekeeping as soon as practicable."  El-Amin 
testified that "at first I was going to drive the vehicle.  
However, and I drove it."  But after an encounter with a man who 
"look[ed] very angry" and asked him if the car was Vernon's and 
 
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if El-Amin was related to him, El-Amin decided, "I don't want to 
have anymore parts of this.  So I rapidly ran out to Capital 
Lincoln and said, 'What will you give me for this vehicle.'"  
El-Amin's personal use of the car and his failure to document 
Vernon's interest in the credit El-Amin received for selling the 
car sufficiently show that El-Amin failed to identify the car or 
the proceeds from its sale as Vernon's property or keep either 
in "a place of safekeeping," all in violation of DR 9-102(B)(2).   
 
Finally, we consider the violation of DR 9-102(B)(3).  It 
requires a lawyer to "[m]aintain complete records of all funds, 
securities, and other properties of a client coming into the 
possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his 
client regarding them."  El-Amin simply argues that "[t]he 
evidence established that El-Amin maintained records regarding 
the car given by Vernon El-Amin," but El-Amin does not say what 
those records were.  
 
El-Amin was the only witness who testified about the 
records regarding Vernon's car.  El-Amin's testimony indicated 
that he regarded his record-keeping obligation to Vernon as 
limited to accounting for the repair expenditures and that this 
obligation was discharged by notations of Vernon's name on the 
checks he had written on his attorney trust account to pay for 
the repairs to Vernon's car.  Although no monies had been 
deposited in the trust account in Vernon's name, El-Amin said he 
 
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charged the amounts of these checks against other clients' 
retainer fees that had been earned by El-Amin.  El-Amin says 
nothing about his obligation to keep a record of the agreed 
amount of the retainer or the work El-Amin had done to earn the 
retainer.  We conclude that this evidence sufficiently supports 
the conclusion that El-Amin violated the provisions of DR 9-102 
(B)(3). 
IV. Length of Suspension 
 
El-Amin argues that "[t]he trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to consider El-Amin's mitigating 
circumstances."  He overlooks the following statement made by 
the court at the time the sanctions were imposed.  "We have 
taken into account the evidence in aggravation and the evidence 
in – and argument in mitigation."  Accordingly, we reject El-
Amin's argument. 
 
Even so, El-Amin contends that the four-year suspension was 
unwarranted in view of the mitigating evidence of his wife's and 
daughter's illnesses during the periods in question, the 
revision of his office procedures to provide that he alone would 
sign for certified letters addressed to him, his remorse, and 
his refunds to Fant despite having done considerable work for 
her.  The State Bar responds that El-Amin's "revision" of his 
office procedures was merely an avoidance of future 
responsibility, and that his alleged remorse was put in question 
 
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because even after protracted litigation he refunded only a 
portion of Fant's retainer.  These considerations may well have 
diminished the effect of any mitigating evidence presented by 
El-Amin. 
 
El-Amin also contends on brief that "[t]here was no 
evidence of a pattern of misconduct by El-Amin."  In response, 
the State Bar notes the evidence in the record of his "prior 
record since 1987 includ[ing] no less than seven founded 
disciplinary violations relating, like [these], to client 
neglect; failure to keep clients informed; failure to account 
for fees collected; and failure to refund unearned fees, among 
other things."  We think this evidence is sufficient to 
establish a pattern of misconduct. 
 
In sum, our independent review of the entire record 
discloses that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
suspending El-Amin's license for four years. 
V. Conclusion 
 
Finding no merit in El-Amin's assignments of error, we will 
affirm the judgment of the court below suspending El-Amin's 
license to practice law for a period of four years. 
Affirmed. 
 
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