Title: Jackson v. Allen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190026
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2021

Rel: June 30, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
_________________________
1190026
_________________________
Patrick Jackson
v.
Voncille Allen, as the personal representative of the Estate of
Valerie Allen, and Penn Tank Lines, Inc.
Appeal from St. Clair Circuit Court
(CV-18-900049)
STEWART, Justice.
Patrick Jackson appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor
of Voncille Allen, as the personal representative of the estate of Valerie
1190026
Allen ("the estate"), and Penn Tank Lines, Inc. ("PTL"). For the reasons
discussed below, we affirm the judgment in part and reverse the judgment
in part.
Facts and Procedural History
On March 30, 2016, Jackson was injured in an automobile accident
while undergoing training and riding as a passenger in a tractor-tanker
trailer commercial motor vehicle ("the CMV") driven by Valerie Allen
("Allen"). Allen died as a result of the accident. Jackson was an employee
of PTL and was being trained by Allen at the time of the accident. Allen
owned the CMV, and PTL was leasing the vehicle from Allen, who worked
for PTL, delivering fuel, under an independent-contractor agreement.
Jackson received medical treatment for his injuries after the accident, and
PTL's workers' compensation insurance covered the costs of the treatment.
On February 27, 2018, Jackson sued the estate and PTL, alleging
claims of negligence and "gross negligence and/or wantonness" against the
estate and a claim of negligent or wanton hiring, training, and supervision
against PTL; in addition, Jackson sought to hold PTL vicariously liable for
Allen's actions through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Jackson
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initially asked for the appointment of an administrator ad litem for the
estate, and, after one was appointed, he filed an amended complaint
naming the administrator ad litem, on behalf of the estate, as a defendant.
PTL filed an answer denying the allegations in the amended
complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses. The administrator
ad litem filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of the estate, asserting that
both PTL and the estate were immune from suit under § 25-5-52 and § 25-
5-53, Ala. Code 1975, commonly referred to as "the exclusive-remedy
provisions" of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-
1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Section 25-5-52 provides, in part:
"Except as provided in [the Act], no employee of any
employer subject to [the Act], ... shall have a right to any other
method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an
injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupational
disease proximately resulting from and while engaged in the
actual performance of the duties of his or her employment and
from a cause originating in such employment or determination
thereof." 
Under § 25-5-53, 
"[t]he rights and remedies granted in [the Act] to an
employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the
employee, his or her personal representative, parent,
dependent, or next of kin, at common law, by statute, or
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otherwise on account of injury, loss of services, or death.
Except as provided in [the Act], no employer shall be held
civilly liable for personal injury to or death of the employer's
employee, for purposes of [the Act], whose injury or death is
due to an accident or to an occupational disease while engaged
in the service or business of the employer, the cause of which
accident or occupational disease originates in the employment.
In addition, immunity from civil liability for all causes of
action except those based upon willful conduct shall also
extend ... to an officer, director, agent, or employee of the same
employer ...."
(Emphasis added.) Jackson filed a response in opposition to the motion to
dismiss, asserting that Allen had been an independent contractor and not
an agent of PTL and that, as a result, his claims against the estate were
not barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions. 
Jackson filed a second amended complaint substituting Voncille
Allen, Allen's mother, as the personal representative of the estate, as a
defendant. In his second amended complaint, Jackson specifically alleged,
among other things, that, at the time of the accident, Allen was acting as
the agent of PTL, within the line and scope of her employment with PTL,
and in furtherance of the business purposes of PTL. Voncille, on behalf of
the estate, and PTL ("the defendants") filed separate answers denying, in
part, the allegations in Jackson's second amended complaint and asserting
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various affirmative defenses, including that Jackson's claims were barred
by the exclusive-remedy provisions because Jackson had received workers'
compensation benefits under the Act and because, they asserted, Allen
had been PTL's agent and had been "acting in the line and scope of such
agency" at the time of the accident.
The defendants filed a joint motion for a summary judgment in
which they argued that PTL had complete immunity from Jackson's
claims and that the estate had limited immunity from Jackson's claims
because, they asserted, Allen had been an agent of PTL. In support of
their argument, the defendants alleged, among others, the following
undisputed facts. Allen owned the CMV and was leasing it to PTL at the
time of the accident, and Allen and PTL had entered into an independent-
contractor agreement. Pursuant to the terms of both the CMV lease and
the independent-contractor agreement, PTL was to have exclusive
possession, control, and use of the CMV "as required by the rules and
regulations of the United States Department of Transportation"
("USDOT"). Also, pursuant to the terms of the independent-contractor
agreement, Allen was required to remain "qualified" as a driver under
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USDOT regulations and state regulations. The independent-contractor
agreement also specified that PTL would provide commercial "public
liability" insurance for Allen and the CMV while it was being used in
furtherance of PTL's business. 
The defendants also alleged that it was undisputed that, at the time
of the accident, in addition to delivering fuel for PTL, Allen was training
Jackson on behalf of PTL. The defendants submitted deposition testimony
showing, among other things, that Allen and Paul Ooten, Allen's former
manager, had entered into an oral agreement pursuant to which Allen
would become a "driver trainer" for PTL. Ooten sent Allen to a PTL safety
class in 2013 where she was instructed on how to train new drivers on
fuel-loading and -unloading procedures. Ooten testified that PTL utilized
both employees and independent contractors as trainers but that
independent contractors, like Allen, received additional compensation to
train new PTL employees. The defendants also submitted in support of
their summary-judgment motion a training manual that contained
specific, daily instructions and a checklist for tasks a trainer was required
to perform while training.
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The defendants also argued in their summary-judgment motion that
Allen had been performing a nondelegable duty on behalf of PTL and that
the performance of such a duty had made Allen an agent of PTL. The
defendants pointed to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
("FMCSA") regulations, specifically 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1), which
requires a motor carrier leasing a CMV to have exclusive possession,
control, and use of the vehicle and to assume complete responsibility for
the operation of the vehicle. The defendants further stated that, under
FMCSA regulations, an owner-operator of a CMV, despite his or her
status as an independent contractor, will be deemed to be the employee
of the motor carrier while operating a CMV. The defendants argued that
those types of obligations created by law a nondelegable duty and that,
therefore, Allen had been PTL's agent.
Jackson filed a response in opposition to the defendants' summary-
judgment motion in which he argued that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to the amount of control PTL had exercised over Allen and as
to whether Allen had been PTL's agent. In support of his argument,
Jackson alleged that Allen had been responsible for training Jackson
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pursuant to USDOT regulations and "a loose PTL training program."
Jackson alleged that the independent-contractor agreement required Allen
to use her own judgment when conducting her work, and, he asserted,
there were no other written agreements affecting the relationship between
Allen and PTL. Jackson further alleged that PTL had not possessed the
authority to require Allen to accept specific assignments and that PTL had
not withheld taxes from Allen's paychecks. Jackson also alleged that,
although Allen had been required to comply with PTL's policies and
procedures, Allen had been required by the independent-contractor
agreement to provide her own safety clothing, shoes, and equipment and
that her authority to enter a loading ground to fill the CMV tank had
come from the operator of the loading ground, not from PTL. In support
of his response, Jackson submitted documentary evidence and testimony
that had already been submitted by the defendants in support of their
summary-judgment motion. 
On August 8, 2019, the trial court entered a summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. Jackson filed a motion to alter or amend the
summary judgment, in which he asked the trial court to specify the basis
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upon which it had entered a summary judgment. On September 20, 2019,
after a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it granted
Jackson's motion and included more specific language explaining the
bases for its summary judgment. The trial court found, in pertinent part:
"A. [Jackson] did not contest any of the material facts set forth
in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts as contained
within Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
likewise did not contest any of the additional material facts set
forth in paragraph 8 of the Supplemental Submission in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; thus,
the Court adopts and finds the said material facts, including
the following:
"a. At the time of the accident made the basis of
this action, truck driver Valerie Denise Allen,
deceased ('Allen'), who held a valid State of
Alabama commercial driver's license ('CDL'), was
an agent for Defendant Penn Tank Lines, Inc.
('PTL') and was performing nondelegable duties on
behalf of PTL, a federally registered interstate
motor carrier of property possessing operating
authority granted by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration ('FMCSA').
"b. At the time of the accident made the basis of
this action, [Jackson] was an employee of PTL
under the Act who subsequently sought and
obtained workers' compensation benefits available
under the Act from his employer, PTL, and its
worker's compensation insurer in relation to the
injuries [Jackson] suffered in the said accident.
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"c. No evidence has been presented to the Court
indicating that Allen's conduct was willful nor does
[Jackson] allege that Allen engaged in any willful
conduct 
with 
[Jackson's] 
operative 
Second
Amended Complaint stating claims for negligence
(Count 
one) 
and 
gross 
negligence 
and/or
wantonness (Count two) in relation to Allen.
"B. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, regulations of the
FMCSA, and the common law, this Court finds and declares as
follows:
"a. Because [Jackson's] alleged injuries from the
accident occurred while working for his employer,
Defendant PTL, said Defendant PTL has complete
immunity under the Act from liability in relation to
the claims against it contained in [Jackson's]
Second Amended Complaint.
"b. Allen, in turn, has limited immunity under the
Act that bars all claims against her and her Estate
contained in the Second Amended Complaint, none
of which are based on willful conduct, because she
was an agent of [Jackson's] employer, to-wit: PTL,
at the time of the accident."
Jackson timely filed a notice of appeal.
Standard of Review
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo.
Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
(Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial
court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the
movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
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of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
952-53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1986).
Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to produce 'substantial evidence' as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
(Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. '[S]ubstantial evidence
is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably
infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' West v.
Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989)."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004).
Discussion
At the outset, we note that Jackson does not challenge the summary
judgment insofar as the trial court found that PTL was entitled to
complete immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act.
Accordingly, the summary judgment as to the claims asserted against PTL
is affirmed. See Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala. 1982)("When an
appellant fails to argue an issue in its brief, that issue is waived."). 
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Jackson challenges the trial court's judgment insofar as it found that
Allen had been an agent of PTL. First, Jackson argues that the question
whether an agency relationship existed between Allen and PTL is a jury
question that should not have been resolved by a summary judgment.
Jackson cites Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784 So. 2d 1022, 1028 (Ala.
2000), in which this Court stated: "Whether the agency existed is, we
conclude, a question for a jury to decide." Jackson further argues that,
even if the trial court properly considered Allen's agency status at the
summary-judgment stage, there were nonetheless genuine issues of
material fact that precluded a determination, as a matter of law, that
Allen was an agent of PTL. This Court has explained that "the court may
grant a motion for a summary judgment" only "[w]here ... all the basic
facts are undisputed and the matter is one of interpretation or of reaching
a conclusion of law by the court." Studdard v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,
356 So. 2d 139, 141 (Ala. 1978)(citing Bible Baptist Church v. Stone, 55
Ala. App. 411, 316 So. 2d 340 (1975)). 
The issue, then, is whether the circumstances presented a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Allen was an agent of PTL's at the
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time the accident occurred. The parties correctly note that "agent" is not
defined in the Act. Jackson contends that, to determine whether Allen was
an agent, the test to be applied is contained in Morrison v. Academy Life
Insurance Co., 567 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1990), and asks whether, at the time
of the accident, Allen was authorized as a fiduciary of PTL, whether she
had the power to make PTL a party to a transaction, or whether she was
subject to PTL's control over her conduct. Jackson argues that there is no
evidence indicating that Allen was authorized to act as a fiduciary for PTL
or that she was authorized to make PTL a party to a contract, and he
argues that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the scope of PTL's
control over Allen. 
The defendants argue that their summary-judgment motion was not
based on the traditional right-of-control test, discussed infra, but, instead,
on Allen's undisputed legal status as a commercial driver and driver-
trainer for PTL who, at the time of the accident, was delivering fuel for
PTL and providing training to Jackson on behalf of PTL, which, they
assert, made her an agent as a matter of law.
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This Court has previously explained that the test for determining
whether one is an agent or an independent contractor is whether the
employer "retained a right of control" and that it does not matter whether
the employer actually exercised such control. Turner v. ServiceMaster,
632 So. 2d 456, 458 (Ala. 1994). In Turner, a hospital had contracted with
ServiceMaster as an independent contractor to train and supervise
hospital-employee housekeeping staff. A nurse employed by the hospital
fell and suffered an injury, and she sued the hospital seeking workers'
compensation benefits. Additionally, she sued ServiceMaster, alleging
claims of negligent and wanton training and supervision. ServiceMaster
asserted that it was immune from liability, pursuant to § 25-5-11, Ala.
Code 1975, of the Act, because, it alleged, it was an agent of the hospital
and, therefore, only claims involving willful conduct were permitted
against it.1 Id. at 457. This Court explained: "The test for determining
1Section 25-5-11 permits an injured employee to bring a cause of
action against a third party, including, among others, a co-employee or an
agent of the employer, who is jointly liable with the employer for the
employee's injury, but only if the third party's willful conduct contributed
to the injury, and does not affect the immunity afforded the designated
persons in § 25-5-53. See Padgett v. Neptune Water Meter Co., 585 So. 2d
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whether ServiceMaster's role in its relationship with [the h]ospital was
that of an independent contractor or that of an agent, is whether [the
h]ospital retained a right of control over the means ServiceMaster
employed to manage and train the housekeeping personnel, not whether
the hospital actually exercised such control." Turner, 632 So. 2d at 458. 
Turner's right-of-control test continues to be an appropriate standard to
be used in determining the existence of an agency relationship, and
neither party has asked this Court to overturn it.2
In support of his right-of-control argument, Jackson raises the same
arguments he made in his response in opposition to the defendants'
summary-judgment motion. In particular, Jackson points to the
independent-contractor agreement between Allen and PTL that expressly
identified Allen as an independent contractor and stated that Allen was
to use her own judgment in determining how to perform under the
agreement. Jackson also asserts that any oral agreement outside the
900 (Ala. 1991). 
2The defendants argue that their agency argument is not based on
the right-of-control test, but, nevertheless, they cite Turner in support of
their position.
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written independent-contractor agreement, i.e., the alleged oral training
agreement, is ineffective because the independent-contractor agreement
provided that the parties to that agreement did "not intend to create any
other type of relationship between themselves" and that "any verbal or
prior agreements between the parties have no force or effect." 
Jackson also asserts that Allen had the right to accept or reject
assignments and that Allen's authority to enter a loading ground where
the CMV tank would be filled had come from the operator of the loading
ground, not from PTL. In addition, Jackson asserts that Allen was paid as
an independent contractor, that PTL did not withhold taxes from her
compensation, and that, if Allen was assigned additional duties, i.e.,
trainer work, PTL would negotiate with her and she would receive
additional compensation. Jackson also asserts that there was no evidence
indicating that PTL retained the right to control Allen's daily schedule or
hours.
Jackson further asserts that, although Allen had been required to
comply with PTL's policies and procedures, she had been required by the
independent-contractor agreement to provide her own clothing, safety
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shoes, and equipment. Jackson cites Parr v. Champion International
Corp., 667 So. 2d 36 (Ala. 1995), in support of his argument, in which this
Court explained that an agency relationship is not created by an
employer's retention of the right to supervise or inspect an independent
contractor's work. Parr, 667 So. 2d at 39 (quoting Weeks v. Alabama Elec.
Coop., Inc., 419 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Ala. 1982)). 
Jackson also argues that Allen's position as a trainer did not render
her an agent of PTL, asserting that, even though Allen had been required
to follow instructions and to fill out a detailed training form while training
Jackson, that level of control does not create an agency relationship
because, Jackson contends, there is no evidence to indicate that PTL
supervised the manner in which Allen performed her training and,
pursuant to the training manual, PTL's training program " 'afforded
latitude for a trainer and trainee's style.' " Jackson's brief at 23. Citing
Pugh v. Butler Telephone Co., 512 So. 2d 1317 (Ala. 1987), and Pate v.
United States Steel Corp., 393 So. 2d 992 (Ala. 1981), Jackson asserts that
the right to supervise or inspect an independent contractor's work to
ensure compliance does not create a master-servant relationship and that
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there must be a right of control over the manner in which the independent
contractor performs his or her work.3
Applying Turner, the resolution of the question whether Allen was
an independent contractor or an agent depends on whether PTL retained
the right of control over the means Allen used in performing her job duties
of delivering fuel and training Jackson. Turner, 632 So. 2d at 458.
Furthermore, "[b]ecause working relationships take a wide variety of
forms, each case must depend on its own facts, and all features of the
relationship are considered together. Burbic Contracting Co. v. Willis, 386
3In Pugh, this Court stated: 
"In the absence of a non-delegable duty, the mere retention of
the right to supervise or inspect the work of an independent
contractor as the work progresses to ensure compliance with
the terms of an agreement does not operate to create a
master-servant relationship. There must be a retention of
control over the manner in which the work is done, before an
agency relationship is created." 
512 So. 2d at 1318. In Pate, this Court explained the principle that
retaining the right to supervise or inspect work of an independent
contractor, to monitor the progression of the work, does not create a
master-servant relationship. 393 So. 2d at 995.
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So. 2d 419 (Ala. 1980)." Sessions Co. v. Turner, 493 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Ala.
1986).
The facts demonstrated that Allen was acting in furtherance of
PTL's business by delivering fuel and by training Jackson at the time the
accident occurred. There was a dispute, however, as to the amount of
control PTL retained over Allen. For instance, although PTL did not
control Allen's daily schedule, Allen was required to follow PTL's policies
and procedures in performing her duties and maintaining her equipment,
in addition to being required to comply with USDOT regulations and
FMCSA regulations while delivering fuel. Moreover, although Allen was
required to follow PTL's detailed training manual and checklist while
training Jackson, she was permitted to implement whatever style she
chose. In addition, Allen was required to provide her own equipment and
had the discretion to accept or reject assignments.  
Based on the facts before the trial court, we conclude that there was
a dispute as to whether PTL retained a right of control over the manner
in which Allen performed her responsibilities at the time the accident
occurred, and that dispute should have been submitted to a jury for
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resolution. Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly concluded that, as a
matter of law, Allen was PTL's agent. Turner, 632 So. 2d at 458. Based on
our holding, we pretermit discussion of any other issues raised by the
parties.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment insofar as the trial court determined that
PTL was entitled to complete immunity from Jackson's claims against it
pursuant to the exclusive-remedy provisions of Act. We reverse the
judgment insofar as the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that
Allen was PTL's agent under the purview of the exclusive-remedy
provisions of the Act, and we remand the cause for further proceedings. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Mitchell, J., concurs specially.  
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in
the result.  
Bolin and Sellers, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).
Whether one is an agent of another is a question of fact, not law. 
Our cases are clear on this.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Western Sizzlin Corp.,
857 So. 2d 71, 77 (Ala. 2003) ("[S]ummary judgment on the issue of agency
is generally inappropriate because agency is a question of fact to be
determined by the trier of fact."); Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784 So.
2d 1022, 1028 (Ala. 2000) ("As this Court has held, 'the existence and
scope of an agency relationship are questions of fact to be determined by
the jury.' " (citation omitted)).  Because the existence of an agency
relationship is a question of fact, "it is not the trial court's function to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."  Nix v. Franklin
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 234 So. 3d 450, 456 (Ala. 2017) (cleaned up). 
Thus, the trial court in this case had to determine whether, in response
to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Patrick Jackson
produced substantial evidence that Valerie Allen had not been an agent
of Penn Tank Lines, Inc. ("PTL").
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That determination turned on whether PTL "retained a right of
control" over Allen's conduct on the job, even if PTL did not "actually
exercise[] such control."  Turner v. ServiceMaster, 632 So. 2d 456, 458
(Ala. 1994).  Jackson produced substantial evidence that PTL did not
retain control.  Specifically, as the main opinion notes, Jackson presented
evidence that Allen had signed an agreement expressly identifying her
role as an independent contractor and requiring her to use her own
judgment in performing her obligations under the agreement; that PTL
had not withheld taxes from her pay and that she would be paid extra if
she agreed to perform additional work; that PTL had no right to control
her schedule or hours; that she had the right to accept or reject PTL's
assignments; and that she had been required by her independent-
contractor agreement to provide her own clothing and safety equipment.
Based on that and other evidence submitted in response to the
defendants' summary-judgment motion, it is clear to me that Jackson met
his burden by producing substantial evidence of a genuine dispute of
material fact -- that is, whether PTL had retained a right of control over
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Allen.  Thus, the trial court should not have entered summary judgment
on Jackson's claims against Allen's estate.
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BOLIN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the main opinion that the trial court correctly
determined that Penn Tank Lines, Inc. ("PTL"), was entitled to complete
immunity from Patrick Jackson's claims against it based on the exclusive-
remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.  However, I
respectfully dissent to reversing the summary judgment in favor of
Voncille Allen, as the personal representative of the estate of Valerie
Allen.  I believe that Valerie Allen was an agent of PTL because  Valerie
was acting as PTL's agent while she trained Jackson on behalf of
PTL.  That is, Valerie was wearing her "agent" hat while she trained
Jackson as a PTL driver.    
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent from that part of the main opinion reversing
the summary judgment in favor of Voncille Allen, as the personal
representative of the estate of Valerie Allen ("Allen's estate").  The trial
court held as a matter of law that Valerie Allen ("Allen") was an agent of
Penn Tank Lines, Inc. ("PTL"), at the time of the accident in question and,
that thus, Patrick Jackson's claims against Allen's estate were barred by
the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Alabama Workers' Compensation
Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  See § 25-5-53, Ala. Code
1975 (extending immunity for causes of action based upon willful conduct
to, among others, agents of the same employer).  The main opinion
reverses the summary judgment in favor of Allen's estate because, it
concludes, a jury question is presented regarding whether an agency
relationship did in fact exist between Allen and PTL at the time of the
accident. 
Whether someone is classified as an independent contractor or an
agent is an important distinction because there are benefits, detriments,
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and risk-shifting associated with those classifications. The Internal
Revenue Service, for instance, gives the following guidance: 
"The general rule is that an individual is an independent
contractor if the payer has the right to control or direct only
the result of the work and not what will be done and how it
will be done. ...
"....
"You are not an independent contractor if you perform services
that can be controlled by an employer (what will be done and
how it will be done)."4
See also Black's Law Dictionary 920 (11th ed. 2019) (defining
"independent contractor" as "[s]omeone who is entrusted to undertake a
specific project but who is left free to do the assigned work and to choose
the method for accomplishing it"). 
There are circumstances in which a person can be both an
independent contractor and an agent or employee depending on the
specific duties that are being performed.  In this case, Allen delivered
4As of the date of this decision, June 30, 2021, this material could be
found 
at: 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/independent-contractor-defined.   A copy of the material is
available in the case file of the clerk of the Alabama Supreme Court.
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wholesale fuel for PTL under an independent-contractor agreement.  Allen
also had an oral agreement with Paul Ooten, Allen's former manager, in
which Allen consented to train employees regarding PTL's procedures for
loading and unloading fuel tankers.  Ooten testified that Allen was paid
an additional weekly stipend to be available to train others, regardless of
whether she did so or not. Ooten further testified that, although Allen was
an independent contractor, she was required to follow PTL's loading and
unloading procedures and that she was afforded no discretion to deviate
from those procedures. The training manual outlining those procedures
states, in relevant part, that the program "requires a very specific order
of sequenced training and must be adhered to by all parties." Allen was
also required to complete a daily checklist form for each day she trained
a driver; that checklist was in turn forwarded to PTL's risk department.
Allen, in fact, filled out three checklists in March 2016 in conjunction with
training Jackson.  In other words, it was undisputed that Allen was
afforded no freedom to deviate from PTL's procedures for training
employees like Jackson on how to load and unload fuel tankers.  Rather,
pursuant to its strict procedures, PTL reserved the right of complete
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control over how Allen was to train drivers; thus an agency relationship
was created.  See Pugh v. Butler Tel. Co., 512 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Ala.
1987) (noting that "[t]here must be a retention of control over the manner
in which the work is done, before an agency relationship is created").  See
also  Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Stevens, 783 So. 2d 804, 808 (Ala.  2000) (noting
that "whether an agency exists is determined from the facts, not by how
the parties choose to characterize their relationship").  Factually, the only
reason Jackson was riding in the tractor-tanker trailer commercial motor
vehicle ("the CMV") being driven by Allen was for training purposes.  If
Jackson had not been riding with Allen at the time of the accident, Allen
would have been acting solely in her capacity as an independent
contractor.  However, Jackson's presence in the CMV changed the nature
of Allen's relationship with PTL; Jackson's presence created an agency
relationship legally resulting in Allen's estate being exempt from suit
under § 25-5-53 of the Act.  In our modern world, with the ever-increasing
development and general understanding of quantum physics, one concept
that is more widely accepted is that something or somebody can be two
seemingly mutually exclusive things at the same time. For instance, while
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justice and mercy are opposites, a judge can possess both qualities and yet
be completely consistent.  The same is true here: a person can be an
independent contractor and an agent at the same time. Once Jackson
entered the CMV with Allen, Allen's role as an independent contractor
was subsumed by her role as an agent, i.e., a driver trainer for PTL. 
Accordingly, I would affirm that part of the trial court's judgment holding
that Allen was an agent of PTL at the time of the accident. 
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