Title: Johnson v. Marshall Field & Co.
Citation: 478 P.2d 735, 78 Wash. 2d 609
Docket Number: 41479
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 1970

78 Wn.2d 609 (1970) 478 P.2d 735 JULIUS G. JOHNSON et al., Petitioners, v. MARSHALL FIELD &amp; COMPANY, Respondent.[*] No. 41479. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. December 24, 1970. Ralph B. Potts and Sten H. Dagg, for petitioners. *610 William R. Lanthorn and Leo A. Anderson, for respondent. McGOVERN, J. February 16, 1970, this court granted plaintiffs' petition to review a decision of the state Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court in this matter. See 1 Wn. App. 655, 463 P.2d 645 (1969). The record reveals the following situation. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the wife, Willabelle Johnson, while a customer in defendant's store, was riding on an escalator and was injured through defendant's negligence. Plaintiffs also claimed that after the escalator was stopped, Mrs. Johnson was not given proper care and attention by defendant's employees, although she was in fear of bleeding to death and was begging for help. The prayer of the complaint was for $60,000 general damages and $1,500 special damages. Several months prior to the trial, plaintiffs filed a notice of trial amendment which stated: *611 After trial, the jury returned the following verdict: Defendant thereafter moved for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial on eight of the nine grounds stated in CR 59. The motion was argued on May 26, 1967, and again on September 8, 1967. On each occasion the trial court orally stated its reasons for its decision to grant a new trial on the second cause of action unless the plaintiffs within 10 days thereafter elected to accept a reduced award of $2,500. October 24, 1967, the trial court entered its order granting defendant a new trial unless the plaintiffs should consent to a reduction of the verdict from $20,000 to $2,500. Plaintiffs elected not to consent to the trial court's reduction of the verdict and appealed from its order conditionally granting a new trial as to the second cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the trial court. We, however, reverse. Plaintiffs first challenge the authority of the trial court to grant the defendant a new trial upon the grounds of passion or prejudice, RCW 4.76, and under the governing Civil Rules for Superior Court, CR 59(f), formerly Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 59.04W. While the order of October 24, 1967, which granted the defendants a new trial on the second cause of action did not specifically state whether the order was based "upon the record or upon facts and circumstances outside the record which cannot be made a part thereof", as required by CR 59(f), the record otherwise indicates that it was based upon matters in the record. We treat it accordingly and find that the assignment of error has merit. Despite the trial court's general statement that "the amount of the award indicates passion and prejudice", other statements by the court clearly indicate that passion or prejudice did not result from anything that may have *612 occurred during the course of the trial. The trial judge said: Our extensive examination of the record also fails to disclose anything that occurred during the course of the trial that might reasonably be said to have unfairly resulted in passion or prejudice detrimental to the defendant's cause, nor has counsel for defendants directed our attention to any such prejudicial matter. The trial court therefore committed error in granting a new trial on the grounds of passion or prejudice in the record. Plaintiffs' remaining assignments of error challenge the trial court's second basis for granting a new trial, i.e., the failure of substantial justice because of an excessive verdict not justified by the evidence. The trial court's order stated: (Italics ours.) It must be pointed out that plaintiffs' second cause of action was not predicated solely upon the ground that the defendant's failure to provide adequate care and attention for Mrs. Johnson after the accident contributed to the injuries or that they inhibited her recovery from those injuries. Nor was medical testimony necessary it would have added nothing to plaintiff's claim on the second cause *613 of action. The testimony of Mrs. Johnson alone was obviously accepted by the jury when it awarded her a $20,000 verdict, and her testimony was sufficient to support that verdict. Plaintiff's testimony as it related to her second cause of action was as follows: Plaintiff was obviously in fear of losing her life and that fear was generated by her belief that the defendant's agents were depriving her of essential medical assistance. In support of that proposition was the testimony of Mrs. *616 Elsie Gibson, another shopper at the defendant's store, who happened upon the scene of the accident. She testified: That the jury could, and no doubt did, believe that the plaintiff was in fear of losing her life finds support from the trial judge who said that plaintiff possessed such a state of mind. When the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of its order of reduction in verdict, the learned judge said: The jury must have concluded that plaintiff's fear of bleeding to death was based upon a reasonable belief. The record indicates that Mrs. Johnson lost a substantial amount of blood before she arrived at the hospital. Even the defendant's witnesses admitted that she had bled "profusely". Dr. Hugh Toomey, who treated the plaintiff in the emergency room upon her belated arrival at the hospital, said: Concerning that second cause of action, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: No exception was taken to that instruction. It thus became the law of the case and plaintiff's evidence well supported a verdict under it. [1, 2] Was the $20,000 verdict too large in amount? Certainly the subject matter of the damages, i.e., plaintiff's fear of death because of the defendant's failure to provide her with necessary care and attention, is an element uncertain in character and not susceptible of being fixed with mathematical certainty. But that fact should not deprive the jury of its right to return a true verdict, nor should it give to the trial court the right to arbitrarily reduce the amount of the verdict to 12 1/2 per cent of what the jury thought it should be. Courts must be extremely hesitant to interfere with the jury's verdict. Ma v. Russell, 71 Wn.2d 657, 430 P.2d 518 (1967). Considering all the facts of the case, a verdict of $20,000 for the plaintiff was not unreasonable and the trial court *618 usurped the authority and responsibility of the jury when it reduced that verdict to $2,500. Justice Finley's statement in Hogenson v. Service Armament Co., 77 Wn.2d 209, 218, 461 P.2d 311 (1969), is appropriate to the facts before us: We are not shocked by the amount of the verdict only by the fact that the trial court reduced the verdict. To preserve the integrity of the fact-finding system in the jury trial, we reverse the trial court and reinstate the verdict of the jury. We remand the cause to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance herewith. HUNTER, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, HALE, and STAFFORD, JJ., concur. DONWORTH, J.[] (dissenting) I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion and will briefly state my reasons for dissenting. The record in this case reveals an unusual situation. In the amended complaint the plaintiffs alleged that the wife, while a customer in defendant's store in Seattle, was riding on an escalator and was injured through the defendant's negligence in that her scalp was nearly torn off by a descending step. The complaint also contained allegations to the effect that, after the escalator was stopped, Mrs. Johnson was not given proper care and attention by defendant's employees, although she was in fear of bleeding to death and was begging for help. The prayer of the complaint was for $60,000 general damages, and $1,500 special damages. Several months prior to the trial, plaintiffs filed a notice of trial amendment (quoted in the majority opinion) which stated that the plaintiffs would insert in the complaint a *619 separate paragraph, listing the further acts of negligence occurring after the escalator accident consisting of failure to give her reasonable and proper care as follows: It is to be noted that no change was made in the prayer of the complaint and no segregation of the $60,000 amount originally prayed for, as between the two alleged causes of action, was requested. At the trial, the court instructed the jury with respect to each cause of action, and in instruction No. 8 told the jury regarding this second cause of action: No exception was taken by either party to this instruction. The jury returned the following verdict: *620 The trial court later stated in discussing plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration: Defendant moved for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial on eight of the nine grounds stated in CR 59. This motion was twice argued. Originally, it was heard on May 26, 1967, and later, on motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1967. In each instance the trial court orally stated its reasons for its decision to grant a new trial on the second cause of action unless the plaintiffs within 10 days elected to accept a reduced award of $2,500. On October 24, 1967, the trial court entered its order granting defendant a new trial unless the plaintiffs should consent to a reduction of the verdict from $20,000 to $2,500 within 10 days. Plaintiffs elected not to consent to the trial court's reduction of the verdict and appealed from its order conditionally granting a new trial as to the second cause of action. The notice of appeal was directed to the Supreme Court of the state of Washington, but the case was subsequently transferred to Division One of the Court of Appeals for hearing and decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order and stated: Johnson v. Marshall Field &amp; Co., 1 Wn. App. 655, 463 P.2d 645 (1969). *621 The test to be applied is whether the amount of the verdict shocks the conscience of the appellate court. See Hogenson v. Service Armament Co., 77 Wn.2d 209, 461 P.2d 311 (1969), and cases cited therein. The trial court's reasons for conditionally granting a new trial were stated as follows: In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conditionally granting a new trial. The applicable decisions of this court are cited and discussed in the decision of the Court of Appeals. It should be borne in mind that we cannot consider the adequacy or inadequacy of the jury's verdict on the first cause of action. However much we may sympathize with appellants because the wife was denied any recovery for the serious injuries she received in the original accident, that phase of the case cannot be considered at this stage of the proceedings. I see no occasion to extensively discuss the matter of passion and prejudice as a separate ground for granting a new trial. While appellants assigned error to the order appealed from (granting a new trial) and the court erred in holding in its order that there was passion and prejudice, actually, the trial court's order was inconsistent in this *622 respect.[1] I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in granting a new trial on the ground of passion and prejudice. Nevertheless, I am firmly of the opinion that, for the reasons stated by the trial court (quoted above), the amount of the verdict is flagrantly outrageous and extravagant in the light of the evidence. Mrs. Johnson's treatment by respondent's employees, or their lack of proper care given her during the period of 45 minutes before they obtained the ambulance for her, could not, in view of her own testimony, have possibly resulted in $20,000 damages to her. Therefore, I would hold that the verdict shocks the conscience of this court, and would affirm the trial court's order conditionally granting a new trial in this case. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's reversal of that order. NEILL, J. (dissenting) I dissent as I am in accord with the opinion of the Court of Appeals. [*] Reported in 478 P.2d 735. [] Justice Donworth is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const. art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38). [1] See 1 Wn. App. 655 at 659-660.