Title: Molina v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060267
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2006

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
JAIME SALVADOR MOLINA 
 
v.  Record No. 060267  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
  November 3, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider two issues: (1) whether the 
trial court erred in granting an instruction including use of 
the victim's mental incapacity in a rape case; and (2) whether 
there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of 
forcible sodomy. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A.  Prior Proceedings 
On October 24, 2003, a jury in the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County found Jaime Salvador Molina (“Molina”) guilty 
of rape and forcible sodomy of Stephanie A. Moroffko 
(“Moroffko”).  Molina was sentenced to ten years imprisonment 
on each conviction.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
convictions.  Molina v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 624 
S.E.2d 83 (2006).  We granted Molina's petition for appeal on 
four assignments of error:  (1) The Circuit Court erred in 
granting Instruction 14.  (2) The Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that there was evidence to support an instruction 
(Instruction 14) that the rape was committed through the use 
of mental incapacity of the complaining witness.  (3) The 
Court of Appeals erred in holding that granting Instruction 14 
was harmless error.  (4) The Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of 
forcible sodomy. 
B.  Facts 
 
During the morning on September 28, 2002, Moroffko left 
her house and walked to a nearby convenience store.  After 
buying some milk and wine and leaving the store, she stopped 
and sat on a brick wall near the store and began drinking the 
wine.  Molina approached Moroffko, sat down next to her and 
they talked.  Moroffko and Molina then began kissing.  While 
sitting with Molina on the brick wall, Moroffko's head was 
either “hit by something hard” on the back of her head or she 
fell and “hit against something.” 
 
Later that morning, a police officer noticed Molina 
standing behind a bush at the rear of the convenience store 
about 130 or 140 feet from the place on the wall where 
Moroffko had been sitting.  The officer also found Jose 
Membrano lying on the ground.  Within 20 seconds of the 
arrival of the police, Molina looked in the direction of the 
officer, then began to walk away.  Molina's face was flushed, 
his eyes were somewhat "reddish," and the officer smelled 
alcohol on his person. 
 
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The officer looked behind the bush and saw Moroffko 
unconscious and partially naked lying near a dumpster behind 
the convenience store.  The officer attempted to awaken 
Moroffko and, thereafter, called the rescue squad when she was 
non-responsive.  The emergency medical technician who arrived 
at the scene noticed some puffiness in Moroffko's face and 
foam around her mouth, which the technician stated is 
indicative of a seizure. 
 
The police arrested Molina for being drunk in public.  
Upon interrogation, Molina told the police that after engaging 
in consensual vaginal sex with Moroffko some distance from the 
brick wall, Molina left Moroffko who stayed behind to sleep.  
According to Molina, he then spoke to some friends in the 
parking lot, bought some lunch, and came back to the area 
behind the store.  According to Molina, when he returned, Jose 
Membrano was on top of Moroffko.  Moroffko was screaming and 
had "started to foam at the mouth."  Police arrived shortly 
thereafter. 
 
Upon arrival at the hospital, Moroffko was still non-
responsive.  She awoke in the hospital where she spent three 
days with facial lacerations, broken bones in her face and a 
cut on her head.   Moroffko testified that she does not 
remember anything from the time she sustained a blow to the 
head until waking up in the hospital.  She stated that she was 
 
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unconscious during that period.  When Moroffko was examined, 
spermatozoa were found on her “thighs, external genitalia, 
vaginal cervical, perianal buttocks and anal/rectum smears.”  
The Sexual Assault Nurse who examined Moroffko at the hospital 
found only minor abrasions in the genital-rectal area, not 
visible to the naked eye.  There was no blood found on the 
anal/rectal swabs.  Blood was present “on the vaginal, 
cervical and [lips/lip] area swabs, on the dental floss and in 
the oral rinse.”  After DNA testing, Membrano was eliminated 
as a possible contributor of the sperm found, but Molina was 
not.  The probability that a randomly chosen unrelated 
individual would have the same DNA pattern displayed in the 
sample as Molina was "1 in greater than 6.0 billion." 
 
Moroffko has a history of bipolar disorder, with both 
manic and depressive episodes, drug and alcohol abuse, 
depression, and seizures accompanied by blackouts involving 
memory loss.  She was prescribed lithium for her bipolar 
condition.  These “blackouts” or losses of memory occur when 
Moroffko abuses medication, alcohol, or other drugs. 
 
When Moroffko was examined at the hospital, 
benzodiazepines and cocaine were found in her blood.  She also 
had a blood alcohol level almost three times the legal limit 
for the operation of a motor vehicle.  Moroffko's lithium 
level, however, was lower than that of a person taking the 
 
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proper dosage for bipolar disorder.  Moroffko's psychiatrist 
testified that failure to take the lithium as directed could 
result in either depression or hypomania, a state 
characterized by increased energy and impulsive behavior. 
 
Although Moroffko admitted she kissed Molina, she 
maintains that she did not consent to sexual intercourse with 
anyone.  Additionally, Moroffko does not recall moving from 
the wall where she was sitting with Molina to the area where 
she was found.  In contrast, Molina stated that at Moroffko's 
request, they went behind the store and had consensual vaginal 
intercourse.  Molina denied having anal intercourse with 
Moroffko.  He told the police he "had no idea that [Moroffko] 
was injured or how she was injured." 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
Our “sole responsibility in reviewing [jury instructions] 
is to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the 
instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly 
raises.”  Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 
856, 858 (1982).  In determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we review the evidence and “all reasonable 
inferences flowing therefrom” in the “light most favorable” to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.  
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 
 
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(2003).  Additionally, we must “regard as true all the 
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair 
inferences to be drawn therefrom.”  Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 
Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980) (citations omitted).  
We “will not disturb the trial court's judgment unless it is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  Hedrick v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 340, 513 S.E.2d 634, 641 (1999). 
B.  Instruction 14 
 
Virginia Code § 18.2-61(A), in effect at the time of this 
offense, provided: 
 
If any person has sexual intercourse with a 
complaining witness who is not his or her spouse 
or causes a complaining witness, whether or not 
his or her spouse, to engage in sexual 
intercourse with any other person and such act is 
accomplished (i) against the complaining 
witness's will, by force, threat or intimidation 
of or against the complaining witness or another 
person, or (ii) through the use of the 
complaining witness's mental incapacity or 
physical helplessness, or (iii) with a child 
under age thirteen as the victim, he or she shall 
be guilty of rape. 
The statute defined four distinct circumstances of sexual 
intercourse:  (i) against a victim's will by force, threat or 
intimidation, (ii) through the use of the victim's mental 
incapacity, (iii) through the use of the victim's physical 
helplessness, or (iv) with a victim under age thirteen.  The 
only issue before us involves whether mental incapacity of the 
 
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victim was properly included in the jury instruction as a 
method of commission of rape under the facts of this case. 
Jury Instruction 14 was given to the jury.  It 
stated: 
 
The Court instructs the jury that the 
defendant is charged with the crime of rape.  
The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the following elements of that 
crime: 
     (1) That the defendant had sexual 
intercourse with Stephanie Moroffko who was not 
then the defendant's spouse; and 
     (2) That it was against her will and 
without her consent; and 
     (3) That it was by force, threat or 
intimidation; or by the use of her mental 
incapacity or physical helplessness. 
     If you find from the evidence that the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the above elements of the offense 
as charged, then you shall find the defendant 
guilty but you shall not fix punishment until 
your verdict has been returned and further 
evidence has been heard by you. 
     If you find that the Commonwealth has 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either 
of the above offenses, then you shall find the 
defendant not guilty. 
 
Among other arguments, Molina maintains that the instruction 
is erroneous because it is "confusing" and because its 
disjunctive nature permits a less than unanimous finding by 
the jury concerning the method employed to commit the crime.  
The Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the 
instruction was erroneous and held that, if erroneous, it was 
harmless error.  However, our review of the record reveals 
 
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that these two arguments were waived because Molina did not 
make those arguments to the trial court.  In oral argument 
before this Court, counsel for Molina conceded that no 
argument was made at trial based upon "confusion" or potential 
non-unanimous verdict prior to submission of the instruction 
to the jury.  Accordingly, these objections will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal.  Rule 5:25; see 
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 523, 619 S.E.2d 16, 57 
(2005); Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60, 63, 418 S.E.2d 861, 863 
(1992). 
 
Molina did argue at trial that there was insufficient 
evidence of mental incapacity of the victim to include that 
condition in Instruction 14.  "Mental incapacity," a statutory 
term that applies to rape and other sex crimes, in Chapter 4, 
Article 7 of Title 18.2 of the Code of Virginia, is defined as 
"that condition of the complaining witness existing at the 
time of an offense . . . which prevents the complaining 
witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the 
sexual act involved in such offense and about which the 
accused knew or should have known."  Code § 18.2-67.10(3).  
Molina argues that the statutory term "mental incapacity" is 
limited to a permanent mental condition such as retardation 
rather than a transitory condition such as voluntary 
intoxication.  Accordingly, Molina maintains that there was no 
 
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evidence of a permanent mental condition suffered by Moroffko 
such that she did not understand "the nature and consequences 
of the sexual act involved." 
 
We disagree with Molina's narrow construction of the 
statute.  Nothing in the statutory definition itself limits 
the definition of "mental incapacity" to a permanent 
condition.  Instead, the meaning is found in the incapacity 
described:  "which prevents the complaining witness from 
understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act."  
Further, the definition refers to a condition existing "at the 
time of an offense" and does not limit its scope to non-
transitory conditions.  We hold that the term "mental 
incapacity" may extend to a transitory circumstance such as 
intoxication if the nature and degree of the intoxication has 
gone beyond the stage of merely reduced inhibition and has 
reached a point where the victim does not understand "the 
nature or consequences of the sexual act."  Code § 18.2-
67.10(3). 
Other states that have considered the issue, 
understandably, focus upon the inability to give consent to 
the act itself.  The cause of the victim's lack of ability to 
give consent is not dispositive.  See State v. Farnum, 554 
N.W.2d 716, 721 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that 
although incapacity "is generally applied in cases of retarded 
 
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or low-functioning victims," it may be applied to a seriously 
intoxicated victim); State v. Al-Hamdani, 36 P.3d 1103, 1107 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("It is important to distinguish between 
a person's general ability to understand the nature and 
consequences of sexual intercourse and that person's ability 
to understand the nature and consequences at a given time and 
in a given situation." (emphasis added)), review denied, 60 
P.3d 1211 (Wash. 2003); see also State v. McDowell, 427 So. 2d 
1346, 1350 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (in rape cases, the fundamental 
question is whether or not the mental condition of the victim 
is so impaired that legal consent cannot be exercised or 
given.) 
 
Considering the definition of "mental incapacity," we 
must review the record to determine whether there was prima 
facie evidence presented to support inclusion of "mental 
incapacity" as a method of committing the crime of rape.  The 
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth includes the fact that, at the time of the sexual 
acts, Moroffko was under the influence of benzodiazepines and 
cocaine, an opiate.  Her lithium blood levels were below 
therapeutic dosage.  Her blood alcohol levels were almost 
three times the legal limit for the lawful operation of an 
automobile in Virginia.  Even Molina's expert witness 
described Moroffko's combination of medication, drugs, and 
 
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alcohol as "deadly."  This evidence was sufficient to enable a 
jury to conclude that Moroffko was mentally incapable of 
understanding "the nature or consequences of the sexual act 
involved" at the time of the assault.  Additionally, Moroffko 
had been struck on the head and evidence was presented in 
support of the conclusion that she suffered a seizure.  We 
hold that there was sufficient evidence to instruct the jury 
that they could find Molina guilty of rape based upon 
Moroffko's mental incapacity of which he "knew or should have 
known" at the time of the sexual acts.  Code § 18.2-67.10(3). 
C.  Forcible Sodomy 
 
Molina argues that the evidence was insufficient to show 
force in the commission of sodomy.  We disagree.  Code § 18.2-
67.1(A) provides: 
An accused shall be guilty of forcible sodomy if 
he or she engages in . . . anal intercourse with 
a complaining witness . . . and . . . [t]he act 
is accomplished against the will of the 
complaining witness, by force, threat or 
intimidation of or against the complaining 
witness or another person. . . . 
 
Molina denies that he had anal intercourse with Moroffko.  
However, spermatozoa were found approximately one to two 
inches inside Moroffko's anal cavity.  DNA analysis of the 
spermatozoa revealed that the probability that a randomly 
chosen unrelated individual would have the same DNA pattern 
displayed in the sample as Molina was "1 in greater than 6.0 
 
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billion."  Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence 
that a jury could reasonably conclude that Molina and Moroffko 
engaged in anal intercourse. 
Additionally, there is sufficient evidence that a jury 
could reasonably conclude that Molina used force to sodomize 
Moroffko.  First, there is evidence that as Molina sat with 
Moroffko on the brick wall Moroffko was either “hit by 
something hard” on the back of her head or she fell and “hit 
against something.”  Moroffko, however, does not know who or 
what hit her and she did not see who or what hit her.  Second, 
Moroffko lost consciousness after being hit or hitting her 
head and suffered facial lacerations, broken bones in her face 
and a cut on her head.  Third, the evidence reasonably 
suggests that Moroffko was dragged from the brick wall to the 
area near the bush and dumpster behind the convenience store.  
After being hit or hitting her head, Moroffko does not recall 
getting up from the brick wall or moving to the bush behind 
the convenience store where she was found unconscious.  
Furthermore, Molina concedes that he had sex with Moroffko 
some distance from the brick wall.  Finally, although Moroffko 
admitted to kissing Molina, she maintains that she did not 
consent to any form of sexual intercourse with anyone on that 
day. 
 
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When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence on appeal, we must view the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly 
deducible therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth.  Higginbotham v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 
537 (1975).  We will not disturb the fact 
finder's verdict unless it is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  Stockton v. 
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145, 314 S.E.2d 371, 
385, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984). 
 
Ward v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 648, 654, 570 S.E.2d 827, 831 
(2002). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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