Title: Gately v. El Paso County Bar Association
Citation: 328 P.2d 381
Docket Number: 18231
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: July 28, 1958

328 P.2d 381 (1958) John H. GATELY, Plaintiff in Error, v. EL PASO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, Defendant in Error. No. 18231. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. July 28, 1958. John H. Gately, pro se. George M. Gibson, Colorado Springs, for defendant in error. HALL, Justice. The parties appear here in the same order as they appeared in the trial court. We refer to plaintiff in error as plaintiff or Gately, and to defendant in error as defendant or the Association. Gately, a practicing attorney at Colorado Springs, brought this action, seeking to obtain a declaratory judgment defining his rights to the use of a law library in the possession and control of the defendant, said defendant having either complete or limited ownership thereof. The facts are not in dispute. *382 On July 30, 1954, Henry McAllister died leaving a will which, among other things, provided: The defendant elected "to accept this bequest," obtained suitable quarters in Colorado Springs for housing a law library, and removed the books thereto. The defendant added numerous volumes to the library and adopted rules and regulations for maintenance and use of said library by its members who, on payment of an annual library fee of $32, have access to and use of the library and its facilities. Gately, a practicing attorney in Colorado Springs, is not a member of the defendant, El Paso County Bar Association, his application for membership therein having been rejected. However, he offered to pay the established library fee and demanded the right to use the library. His demand was refused, whereupon this action was brought. Plaintiff claims that the library was given to the defendant in trust for "the use of its members, the courts of El Paso County, Colorado, and others interested therein" and that plaintiff comes under the clause "others interested therein" and he is therefore entitled to use said library. The trial court held that the will did not create a trust and that defendant received the library as an absolute gift, free of all restrictions on the use or disposition thereof. Plaintiff is here by writ of error seeking reversal. Only one question is presented: namely, does the will provide for an absolute transfer of the library, or is the library actually held in trust for the use and benefit of the three groups of persons mentioned in the will? In resolving this question, it is important to bear in mind the fact, as shown by the record and well known to the members of this court, that the testator, Mr. McAllister, was a lawyer of wide experience and marked ability and unquestionably well versed in preparation of wills including trust provisions. Nowhere in said will do we find the word "trust." The bequest is absolute, subject only to acceptance by the defendant, as provided in the will, Had the testator intended to leave the property in trust or to qualify the gift in any manner, it is fair to assume that in providing for acceptance he would have provided for acceptance of the property in trust rather than for acceptance of the bequest. He would have provided for acceptance of title subject to all of the terms, limitations and conditions of the trust provision. Further support for the above construction is found in the following language: Here are words of the testator expressing what he expected of the defendant upon acceptance of the bequest. These words are precatory in nature and do not make the gift conditional. The nature of the property bequeathed also negatives the idea of a trust. A law library is not something complete, static and finished; rather it is a thing that, to be of value, must be constantly expanded and enlarged to keep it current and useful, as lawyers, including the testator, well know, at great expense for books, shelving and space. It is inconceivable that Mr. McAllister, with his avowed appreciation of the privilege of having spent the youthful and formative years of his personal and professional life in El Paso County, and with its people and his then fellow members of the bar, ever intended to vest the defendant with a bare legal title to his then library and to saddle it with the burden of keeping said library up to date and to maintain it for the use of the public in general; it is equally inconceivable that he donated this library to the association with the thought in mind that nothing would be done to keep it current and useful, and thus soon become of very limited value as a law library. Clearly he intended to make an outright gift to the defendant. He trusted fellow members of the bar in the community in which he grew up to keep the library current and useful. Testator's words do not express conditions on or limitations of the title conveyed. These words express his wish, desire, expectation and recommendation, and his hope to establish a foundation upon which to build for the future. These words are not used in an imperative sense; they cannot be construed as the manifestation of an experienced, astute and learned lawyer to create a trust. Rather, the words are words of advice and guidance given in a spirit of helpfulness to less mature members of his profession. To establish a testamentary trust, it is necessary that the intention to create a trust must be clear and there must be an explicit declaration of trust. The general rule is stated in 89 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 43, 44, pp. 776, 783, 785, as follows: "The use of formal or technical words, however, is important in determining whether or not a trust was intended, and it is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether a *384 trust was created. The fact that such words are used is evidence of an intention to create a trust, and their absence is significant where it is claimed that a trust was created. * * *. In construing a lawyer's will, in Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 Colo. 25, 129 P. 210, 214, we find the following pertinent language, which is applicable in this case, to wit: By the same token it is clear that had Mr. McAllister intended to bequeath his property in trust to a trustee and to separate the legal and equitable title, he well knew how to accomplish such purpose and would have used words of known and indisputable meaning, such as "trustee," "in trust," "cestui que trust," "beneficiary," or similar terms. Significantly he used no such words, but instead used words equally well known and of indisputable meaning"I give and bequeath." These words were used by the testator in eight of the nine articles of the will, which served to dispose of the whole of testator's property. None of these bequests is in trust. In Walton v. Wormington, 89 Colo. 355, 2 P.2d 1088, 1090, this court said: The judgment is affirmed. SUTTON, J., not participating.