Title: State v. John R. Maloney
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2003AP002180
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2005

2005 WI 74 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2180 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
John R. Maloney,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 141 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 N.W.2d 620 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Peter Naze   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Lew A. Wasserman and Kies & Wasserman, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Lew A. Wasserman. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2180 
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 693) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John R. Maloney, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
June 10, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Jurisdiction 
is retained until further order of the court. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, John Maloney, 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals 
affirming 
a 
circuit 
court 
order 
denying 
his 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.1  He contends that he was afforded 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.   
                                                 
1 State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, 275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 
N.W.2d 620 (affirming an order of the circuit court for Brown 
County, Peter J. Naze, Judge). 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Maloney asserts three areas of deficient performance:  
(1) failing to challenge the admissibility of videotape evidence 
based on an alleged violation of SCR 20:4.2 by the special 
prosecutor; (2) failing to challenge the admissibility of 
videotape evidence under Wisconsin's Electronic Surveillance 
Control Law; and (3) impermissibly inviting the State's lead 
investigator to comment on Maloney's credibility.  Because he 
has failed to demonstrate deficient performance, we ultimately 
conclude that Maloney has not shown ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.   
¶3 
However, we do not affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals at this time.  Rather, we retain jurisdiction and ask 
the parties to file additional briefs on the following two 
issues: 
(1) 
Whether this court has authority to remand to the 
circuit court for a motion for postconviction 
relief based upon the interest of justice. 
(2) 
If so, whether this court should act upon that 
authority and remand as described above.2 
I 
 
¶4 
The facts for the purposes of this review are as 
follows.  John and Sandra Maloney were married in 1978 and had 
                                                 
2 Although referenced by the court at oral argument, the 
question of whether Maloney is entitled to a new trial in the 
interest of justice was not before us.  It was neither raised 
nor briefed by the parties.  Accordingly, we ask for additional 
briefs and direct the parties' attention to the order in this 
case issued on this date.  
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
3 
 
three children together.  John Maloney (hereinafter "Maloney") 
was employed as a detective with the Green Bay Police Department 
and also worked as an investigator for the Brown County Arson 
Task Force.  In May of 1997, he moved out of the family home.  
Maloney subsequently filed for divorce from his wife Sandra. 
 
¶5 
On February 11, 1998, Sandra's corpse was discovered 
on the living room couch.  Her death was caused by the 
combination of a blunt force blow to the back of the head, 
manual strangulation, and suffocation.  The couch, along with 
Sandra's body, was then set on fire.3 
 
¶6 
Investigators concluded that Sandra's death was a 
homicide and her estranged husband, Maloney, became a suspect.  
In May of 1998, Maloney's then girlfriend, Tracy Hellenbrand, 
encouraged him to hire an attorney.  Maloney retained Attorney 
Gerald Boyle, who promptly notified Special Prosecutor Joseph 
Paulus of his engagement.4  Paulus sent Boyle a letter indicating 
that Maloney was a suspect in the case.   
¶7 
During 
the 
course 
of 
the 
murder 
investigation, 
Hellenbrand approached the State and offered to wear a concealed 
recording device in an attempt, according to her, to prove 
                                                 
3 Initial reports from the Green Bay Fire Department and the 
Brown County Arson Task Force actually labeled the fire an 
accident.  Dr. Gregory Schmunk, the medical examiner in the 
case, has since indicated that this evidence was withheld from 
him, which may have affected his ruling. 
4 The Brown County District Attorney recused himself from 
the 
case 
because 
Maloney 
was 
a 
police 
officer 
in 
his 
jurisdiction.  Joseph Paulus, the Winnebago County District 
Attorney, was appointed Special Prosecutor. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
4 
 
Maloney's innocence.  Subsequent conversations that took place 
in Las Vegas between Hellenbrand and Maloney were videotaped, 
under supervision of Wisconsin authorities, with Hellenbrand's 
consent and cooperation. 
 
¶8 
Rather than proving Maloney's innocence, the recorded 
conversations contained inculpatory statements from him.  At one 
point in the videotape, Maloney admitted to being at the scene 
of the death.  He claimed, however, that his wife's death 
resulted from an accidental fall, that it occurred early in the 
morning, and that the fire might have been started when a 
candlestick fell over.  Maloney also stated that he went to his 
wife's house to talk about the divorce.  He wanted to get it 
over with because he was "sick of the delays" and was doing this 
for the children.   
 
¶9 
After the Las Vegas recordings, Maloney was arrested 
and charged with first-degree intentional homicide, arson, and 
mutilation of a corpse, all in connection with the murder of his 
wife.  He filed a pretrial motion seeking suppression of the 
videotaped conversations on grounds that the statements had been 
involuntary, that the government had engaged in outrageous 
conduct in obtaining the statements, and that his right to 
counsel had been violated.  The circuit court denied the 
pretrial motion. 
 
¶10 At trial, portions of the Las Vegas recordings were 
played for the jury.  Apparently, Paulus was personally involved 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
5 
 
in the editing process.5  Despite this videotape evidence, 
Maloney maintained his innocence and asserted that Hellenbrand 
was responsible for the murder.  The jury ultimately convicted 
Maloney of the three charges.  He appealed, renewing his 
challenge to the admissibility of the videotaped conversations.  
The court of appeals rejected all of Maloney's arguments and 
affirmed his convictions.  State v. Maloney, No. 1999AP3069-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2000).6 
 
¶11 Maloney then hired new counsel and filed a motion for 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (1997-98), 
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.7  He maintained 
that counsel should have challenged the admissibility of the 
videotape evidence based on the special prosecutor's alleged 
                                                 
5 Paulus sent the hours of recordings to a private, outside 
company, supposedly to cut them down for time, not to alter 
their content.  However, there was an initial $27,000 editing 
bill, and a note from Paulus to the editor explaining that he 
had replaced, modified, or added new excerpts to be included in 
the tape.  There was also an editor's note indicating that some 
of Paulus's clips were so short that they seemed choppy. 
6 Since Maloney's first appeal was decided, Paulus has been 
convicted of 22 counts of bribery and tax evasion and is serving 
a prison term of nearly five years in connection with taking 
bribes to fix cases.  Because of concern that Paulus may have 
mishandled the investigation, in March 2004, the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice launched an independent investigation into 
the death of Sandra Maloney.  On February 24, 2005, the 
Department released a report, authored by Madison Attorney 
Stephen Meyer, confirming that Sandra Maloney's death was a 
homicide and not accidental.  The report is available online at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/news/maloney.pdf. 
7 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
6 
 
violation of SCR 20:4.2 and based on Wisconsin's Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law (WESCL).  Additionally, he argued that 
counsel impermissibly invited the State's lead investigator, Kim 
Skorlinski, to comment on Maloney's credibility. 
 
¶12 The circuit court denied the motion.  The court 
determined that the pre-charging undercover investigation of 
Maloney did not violate SCR 20:4.2, and even if it had, 
suppression was not an available remedy.  It further determined 
that there was no violation of WESCL because Hellenbrand, being 
a party to the Las Vegas encounter with Maloney, consented to 
the surveillance.  Finally, the circuit court concluded that 
trial counsel made sound strategic decisions in how he examined 
Agent Skorlinski to demonstrate to the jury that Skorlinski was 
closed-minded and biased against Maloney.  Accordingly, it held 
that Maloney failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel 
in any respect.   
 
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit 
court denying the motion for postconviction relief.  The court 
of appeals did not decide whether special prosecutor Paulus 
violated SCR 20:4.2 because it concluded that suppression of 
evidence was not an available remedy for an ethics violation.  
State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App 141, ¶¶11-12, 275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 
N.W.2d 620.  Additionally, the court held that there was no 
violation 
of 
WESCL 
because 
Hellenbrand 
consented 
to 
the 
surveillance and Maloney offered no proof that she did so with 
the intent to commit an "injurious act."  Id., ¶¶15-17.  
Finally, the court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
7 
 
trial counsel had employed a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, 
strategy 
in 
his 
approach 
to 
Agent 
Skorlinksi's 
cross-
examination.  Id., ¶22-23.  Maloney filed a petition for review.8 
II 
 
¶14 The question we address in this case is whether 
Maloney's trial counsel was ineffective.  A claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel invokes the analysis set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  To find success, 
a 
defendant 
must 
demonstrate 
both 
that 
(1) 
counsel's 
representation was deficient; and (2) this deficiency was 
prejudicial.  Id. at 687.  We need not address both components 
of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one.  Id. at 697. 
 
¶15 Our review of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. McDowell, 
2004 WI 70, ¶31, 272 Wis. 2d 488, 681 N.W.2d 500 (citing State 
v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999)).  We 
will not disturb the circuit court's findings of fact unless 
                                                 
8 Shortly before oral argument, the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice sent a letter advising the court that on Saturday, March 
26, 2005, the CBS Television Network devoted a segment of its 
news show "48 Hours" to the investigation and prosecution of 
Maloney.  Attached to the letter was a transcript of the show.  
Maloney did not object to the court receiving the transcript. 
In its letter, the Department of Justice noted that various 
statements in the "48 Hours" segment were attributed to 
Winnebago County Assistant District Attorney Michael Balskus.  
It then disassociated itself from Balskus, explaining that he 
lacked any authority to speak on behalf of the State and did not 
represent it in the Brown County criminal prosecution, the 
direct appeal, or the collateral proceedings. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
8 
 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  However, the ultimate 
determination of whether the attorney's performance falls below 
the constitutional minimum is a question of law subject to 
independent appellate review.  Id. 
III 
¶16 In this case, Maloney contends that he was afforded 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in three respects:  (1) 
failing to challenge the admissibility of the videotape evidence 
based on an alleged violation of SCR 20:4.2 by special 
prosecutor Paulus; (2) failing to challenge the admissibility of 
videotape evidence under WESCL; and (3) impermissibly inviting 
the 
State's 
lead 
investigator 
to 
comment 
on 
Maloney's 
credibility.  We examine each claim in turn.   
A. 
¶17 Maloney's first argument is that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of the 
videotape evidence based on an alleged violation of SCR 20:4.2 
by special prosecutor Paulus.  Supreme Court Rule 20:4.2 is an 
ethical rule governing the behavior of members of the Wisconsin 
Bar.  It provides: 
In 
representing 
a 
client, 
a 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
communicate about the subject of the representation 
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by 
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has 
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by 
law to do so. 
¶18 According to Maloney, special prosecutor Paulus's 
conduct in this case constituted an egregious violation of SCR 
20:4.2.  He maintains that the Las Vegas videotapes should have 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
9 
 
been suppressed because Paulus knew Maloney had retained 
counsel, Paulus was present at the meeting when Hellenbrand 
agreed to the electronic surveillance, and Paulus was kept 
generally apprised of the undercover activities throughout the 
summer by Agent Skorlinski.  Trial counsel's failure to make 
this 
argument, 
Maloney 
asserts, 
constitutes 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 ¶19 The applicability of SCR 20:4.2 to the investigative 
stage of a criminal case is a matter of first impression for 
this court.9  Many courts examining the issue have held that pre-
charging noncustodial contact with a represented person during a 
criminal investigation is permitted under the applicable rules 
of ethics.  See, e.g., Grievance Comm. for the Southern Dist. of 
New York v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 647-49 (2d Cir. 1995); In re 
Criminal Investigation of John Doe, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 375, 377 
(D. Mass. 2000) (and cases cited therein); United States v. 
Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000, 1004-05 (N.D. Ill. 1995).  See also 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law:  The Law Governing Lawyers, § 99 
cmt. h at 75-76, and Reporter's Note to cmt. h at 83-86 (2000). 
¶20 Consistent with these interpretations, the commentary 
to 
the 
ABA 
Model 
Rules 
recognizes 
that 
pre-charging 
investigative conduct of the type that occurred here is 
                                                 
9 Although Maloney cites two ethics opinions in support of 
his argument, Wisconsin Ethics Opinions, E-91-6 (1992) and E-96-
3 (1997), he ultimately acknowledges that "[t]he issue presented 
is one that has not been directly before this court." 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
10 
 
"authorized by law" and, therefore, is not prohibited by the 
rules of ethics. 
Communications authorized by law may also include 
investigative 
activities 
of 
lawyers 
representing 
governmental 
entities, 
directly 
or 
through 
investigative agents, prior to the commencement of 
criminal or civil proceedings.  When communicating 
with the accused in a criminal matter, a government 
lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to 
honoring the constitutional rights of the accused. 
American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 4.2 cmt. at 91 (2003). 
There is much authority for the proposition that 
communication with represented criminal suspects as 
part of noncustodial interrogations, before formal 
proceedings are initiated, are not subject to the 
anticontact rule. 
American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 4.2 at 427-28.   
¶21 Against these authorities, Maloney cites United States 
v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), which held a rule 
similar to SCR 20:4.2 applicable in a pre-charging criminal 
investigative setting.10  In Hammad, a prosecutor issued a 
counterfeit subpoena for an informant, who then met with a 
suspect and recorded their conversation.  The principal question 
presented to the court was "to what extent does [the "no-
contact" rule] restrict the use of informants by government 
prosecutors prior to indictment, but after a suspect has 
                                                 
10 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988) has 
been endorsed by other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000); State v. Miller, 
600 N.W.2d 457, 467 (Minn. 1999).  
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
11 
 
retained counsel in connection with the subject matter of a 
criminal investigation."  Id. at 839. 
¶22 In its opinion, the Hammad court noted that a 
prosecutor 
is 
"authorized 
by 
law" 
to 
employ 
legitimate 
investigative techniques, including the use of informants, when 
conducting or supervising criminal investigations.  Id.  Still, 
it observed that in some instances prosecutors might overstep 
their authority and violate the ethical precepts of the "no-
contact" rule.  Id. at 839-40.  Under the peculiar facts of its 
case, the court determined that the use of the counterfeit 
subpoena "contributed to the informant's becoming that alter ego 
of the prosecutor" and therefore violated the "no-contact" rule.  
Id. at 840.  The court further recognized the exclusionary 
rule's applicability to "breaches of ethical precepts enforced 
pursuant to the federal courts' supervisory authority."  Id. at 
841.  However, it declined to suppress the recordings, reasoning 
that "the government should not have its case prejudiced by 
suppression of evidence when the law was previously unsettled in 
this area."  Id. at 842. 
¶23 The split of authorities described above is important 
in considering whether Maloney's trial counsel was ineffective 
in failing to challenge the admissibility of the videotape 
evidence based on an alleged violation of SCR 20:4.2.  Ignorance 
of 
well-defined 
legal 
principles, 
of 
course, 
is 
nearly 
inexcusable.  Smith v. Singletary, 170 F.3d 1051, 1054 (11th 
Cir. 1999).  However, because the law is not an exact science 
and may shift over time, "'the rule that an attorney is not 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
12 
 
liable for an error of judgment on an unsettled proposition of 
law is universally recognized . . . .'"  Id. (quoting 2 Ronald 
E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 17.4, at 497 
(4th ed. 1996) (citing cases));11 United States v. De La Pava, 
268 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Carroll, 327 
F. Supp. 2d 386, 398 (D. Del. 2004).   
¶24 In the end, we need not determine which line of cases 
Wisconsin will ultimately follow regarding the applicability of 
SCR 20:4.2 to the pre-charging criminal investigative setting.12  
Here, we are called upon to decide the narrower question of 
whether Maloney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
make this argument.  As noted above, in order to establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that 
counsel's 
performance was 
both deficient and 
prejudicial.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  To prove deficient performance, 
defendants must show that their counsel "made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Id.   
                                                 
11 Because a lawyer's performance is evaluated under 
prevailing professional norms, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 
668, 
688 (1984), 
case 
law 
and 
treatises 
on 
legal 
malpractice can be instructive in our analysis.  As the 11th 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Smith v. Singletary, 170 
F.3d 1051, 1054 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1999), "ordinarily, at least, 
lawyers' acts or omissions that do not rise to the level of 
professional malpractice, a fortiori, cannot amount to a 
constitutional violation."   
12 Likewise, we need not decide whether suppression is an 
available remedy for an ethics violation. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
13 
 
¶25 Judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance is 
highly deferential.  Id. at 689.  After all, "[i]t is all too 
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance 
after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for 
a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved 
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of 
counsel was unreasonable."  Id. (citation omitted).  As a 
result, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires 
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances 
of 
counsel's 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time."  Id. 
¶26 In State v. Thayer, 2001 WI App 51, ¶14, 241 
Wis. 2d 417, 626 N.W.2d 811, the court of appeals recognized 
that "counsel is not required to argue a point of law that is 
unclear."  There, a Wis. Stat. Ch. 980 committed patient named 
Thayer alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present evidence at a Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) probable cause 
hearing.  Id., ¶9.  Counsel subsequently testified that he did 
not believe his client had the right to present evidence at such 
a hearing based upon his reading of State v. Paulick, 213 
Wis. 2d 432, 570 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1997).  Id., ¶10.  The 
court of appeals disagreed.  Id. 
¶27 Examining Paulick, the court of appeals explained that 
the decision's language implicitly allows for the submission of 
a second, independent medical examination by the committed 
patient.  Id., ¶15.  However, the court also noted that there 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
14 
 
was no evidence in the record to suggest that Thayer requested 
or retained an independent medical examiner at the time of his 
reexamination, as required by Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  Id.   The 
court 
of 
appeals 
therefore 
concluded 
that 
counsel's 
understanding of Paulick, that he was prohibited from presenting 
any evidence at the probable cause hearing, was a reasonable one 
under the circumstances.  Id. 
¶28 In State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 84, 519 N.W.2d 
621 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals observed that "counsel 
is not required to object and argue a point of law that is 
unsettled."  McMahon was convicted of several sexual offenses 
involving his first cousin, including one count of incestuous 
intercourse, which occurred between October 10 and November 20, 
1990.  Id. at 79.  On appeal, he complained that lumping 
together in a single count the "sheer number of incidents" which 
allegedly took place during that time period amounted to an 
improper joining of two or more criminal offenses.  Id.13  
McMahon cited State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 586, 335 N.W.2d 
583 (1983), for the proposition that duplicitous charging may 
deprive a defendant of jury unanimity.  Id.  He then argued that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for not having made such a 
motion.  Id. at 80. 
¶29 After discussing Lomagro at length, the court of 
appeals determined that the case could be reasonably analyzed in 
                                                 
13 There were 12 alleged incidents spread out over the 
course of the one-and-a-half-month period.  State v. McMahon, 
186 Wis. 2d 68, 79, 519 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
15 
 
two different ways and was therefore unsettled law.  Id. at 84.  
It wrote, "[a]lthough it might have been ideal for counsel to so 
object and assert an interpretation of Lomagro that would 
benefit his client, the fact is that he was not deficient in 
failing to do so."   Id.  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
the area of law was "murky" enough that counsel was not 
deficient for failing to raise the issue.  Id.  It explained, 
"[w]e think ineffective assistance of counsel cases should be 
limited to situations where the law or duty is clear such that 
reasonable counsel should know enough to raise the issue."  Id. 
at 85.  
¶30 Given the unclear and unsettled nature of SCR 20:4.2's 
applicability 
in 
Wisconsin 
to 
the 
pre-charging 
criminal 
investigative setting, we conclude that trial counsel's failure 
to challenge the admissibility of the videotape evidence on this 
ground did not constitute deficient performance.  Although it 
might have been preferred for Maloney's counsel to advance the 
Hammad position in his motion to suppress, basing an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on his failure to do so would be to 
engage in the kind of hindsight examination expressly disavowed 
by 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Strickland, 
466 
U.S. 
at 
689.  
Accordingly, we reject Maloney's first claim.   
B. 
¶31 Maloney contends next that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of the 
videotape evidence under WESCL.  His claim involves two sections 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
16 
 
of WESCL, Wis. Stat. §§ 968.31(2)(b) and (c).  Under these 
provisions, it is not unlawful: 
(b) For a person acting under color of law to 
intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, 
where the person is a party to the communication or 
one of the parties to the communication has given 
prior consent to the interception. 
(c) For a person not acting under the color of law to 
intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication 
where the person is a party to the communication or 
where one of the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent to the interception unless the 
communication 
is intercepted for 
the 
purpose of 
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation 
of the constitution or laws of the United States or of 
any state or for the purpose of committing any other 
injurious act. 
 
¶32 In pretrial motions, Maloney's counsel argued that 
Hellenbrand had been acting under color of law, which was a 
necessary element to the alleged Miranda14 violation that counsel 
also raised.  Counsel later explained at the postconviction 
Machner15 hearing that it would have been futile to raise a 
challenge under Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(b) because Hellenbrand 
was a party to the communication and had consented to the 
videotaping. 
 
¶33 The circuit court rejected counsel's Miranda argument, 
concluding that Hellenbrand had not been acting under color of 
                                                 
14 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
15 Under State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), a hearing may be held when a criminal 
defendant's trial counsel is challenged for allegedly providing 
ineffective assistance.  At the hearing, trial counsel testifies 
as to his or her reasoning on the challenged action or inaction. 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
17 
 
law.  Maloney now asserts that trial counsel should have argued 
in the alternative that if Hellenbrand was not acting under the 
color of law, then the tapes were obtained contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 968.31(2)(c).  Under that provision, consent is 
insufficient if the communication is intercepted to commit an 
"injurious act."  According to Maloney, Hellenbrand was taping 
their conversations to injure him. 
 
¶34 Again, we need not determine whether Hellenbrand was 
operating under color of law to resolve Maloney's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In either event, trial 
counsel 
would 
have 
had 
no 
basis 
for 
objecting 
to 
the 
admissibility of the videotape evidence under WESCL.  If, as 
Maloney initially argued, Hellenbrand was acting under color of 
law, the videotapes were admissible at trial under Wis. Stat. § 
968.31(2)(b).  This is because Hellenbrand was a party to the 
communication who had clearly given prior consent to the police 
interception of her encounter with Maloney in the Las Vegas 
hotel room.   
 
¶35 If, as Maloney now suggests, Hellenbrand was not 
acting under color of law, the videotapes were still admissible 
at trial under Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(c) because she consented 
to their interception by police and did not do so for the 
purpose of committing an illegal act.  Although Maloney contends 
that Hellenbrand's attempt to record incriminating statements 
was an "injurious act" warranting suppression, we are not 
persuaded.   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
18 
 
¶36 Like the court of appeals, we know of no law "that 
suggests an individual, who volunteers to aid the authorities in 
a lawful albeit surreptitious investigation, commits an injury 
against 
the 
investigated 
party 
simply 
by 
participation."  
Maloney, 275 Wis. 2d 557, ¶16.  Indeed, such a rule would make 
"sting" operations a thing of the past.  Undercover informants 
must 
surely 
realize 
that 
evidence 
they 
receive 
may 
be 
potentially harmful to the target of the investigation, but this 
is not the type of "injurious" act contemplated by the statute.  
 
¶37 Accordingly, we are satisfied that the videotapes were 
lawfully obtained in conformity with WESCL and were admissible 
at trial.  Counsel does not render deficient performance for 
failing to bring a suppression motion that would have been 
denied.  See State v. Harvey, 139 Wis. 2d 353, 380, 407 N.W.2d 
235 (1987).  We therefore conclude that Maloney has failed to 
carry the burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of 
counsel for his second claim.16 
C. 
¶38 Finally, Maloney asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective 
for 
impermissibly 
inviting 
the 
State's 
lead 
investigator to comment on Maloney's credibility.  Such a 
                                                 
16 Even if there were some sort of a violation of WESCL, we 
note that Hellenbrand could still have taken the witness stand 
at trial and testified about her encounter with Maloney in Las 
Vegas.  Only the videotapes of that encounter would be 
inadmissible.  State v. Smith, 72 Wis. 2d 711, 714, 242 N.W.2d 
184 (1976); State v. Maloney, 161 Wis. 2d 127, 129-32, 467 
N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1991).   
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
19 
 
strategy, Maloney contends, was violative of the rule that no 
witness may give an opinion regarding whether another competent 
witness is telling the truth.  State v. Haseltine, 120 
Wis. 2d 92, 96 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984).17   
 
¶39 Agent Skorlinski was the lead investigator in the case 
at hand.  At trial, he testified at length about the 
investigation and the steady compilation of evidence against 
Maloney.  There was nothing in Agent Skorlinksi's background or 
character that would call into question his credibility.   
 
¶40 Having 
no 
independent 
basis 
to 
attack 
Agent 
Skorlinski's credibility, Maloney's trial counsel turned to the 
investigation itself.  In a lengthy cross-examination spanning 
approximately 
140 
pages 
of 
transcript, 
counsel 
repeatedly 
brought out the fact that Agent Skorlinski did not believe 
Maloney.  At one point, counsel asked, "[Y]ou had to say [at 
some point] maybe he didn't do it."  Agent Skorlinksi replied, 
"I did not believe [Maloney's] denials."  Agent Skorlinski 
further testified that he believed Maloney lied to Hellenbrand 
about a number of things on the Las Vegas videotapes. 
                                                 
17 In State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 
(Ct. App. 1984), the defendant was charged with sexual contact 
with his daughter.  At trial, the daughter's psychiatrist 
testified that there "was no doubt whatsoever" that the daughter 
was an incest victim.  Id. at 95-96.  The court of appeals 
determined that this statement invaded the province of the jury, 
as it was tantamount to saying that the daughter was telling the 
truth.  Id. at 96.  Accordingly, the court of appeals held that 
no witness, expert or otherwise, should be permitted to give an 
opinion that another competent witness is telling the truth.  
Id.  
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
20 
 
 
¶41 At the Machner 
hearing, 
Maloney's 
trial counsel 
explained 
that 
his 
strategy 
had 
been 
to 
criticize 
the 
investigative techniques used in this case.  Specifically, he 
sought to demonstrate that Agent Skorlinski had focused on his 
client so quickly that he failed to consider other possible 
suspects.  Counsel felt that his line of questioning, in which 
Agent Skorlinski indicated his belief that Maloney was a liar, 
would reveal this fixation. 
 
¶42 The circuit court found trial counsel's strategy to be 
a commonly used tactic, particularly for Maloney's theory of 
defense.  It observed:  
Attorney 
Boyle 
was 
attempting 
to 
portray 
the 
investigative 
team as 
overly zealous 
and 
closed 
minded . . .   [T]hey focused on his client as the 
prime suspect and did not adequately consider other 
suspects.  It is a common and widely accepted defense 
tactic to criticize the investigation, while not 
risking alienation of the jury by making the attack 
personal. 
. . . [Maloney's] theory of defense was that someone 
else committed the murder, and that law enforcement 
unreasonably focused on the defendant as the sole 
suspect.  Part and parcel of that defense would be an 
attempt to establish 
that the 
lead investigator 
[Skorlinski] was closed-minded by showing that he 
unreasonably 
refused 
to 
believe 
the 
defendant's 
version of events in spite of evidence supporting that 
version. 
 
¶43 When reviewing trial counsel's cross-examination of 
Agent Skorlinski, we are mindful that, "[t]here are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.  Even 
the 
best 
criminal 
defense 
attorneys 
would 
not 
defend 
a 
particular client in the same way."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
21 
 
689.  Accordingly, "a court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 
action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"  Id. 
(quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).   
¶44 Again, we conclude that Maloney has failed to show 
that his trial counsel's performance was deficient.  Here, the 
purpose 
and 
effect 
of 
the 
cross-examination 
was 
not 
to 
impermissibly comment on the credibility of Maloney.  Rather, it 
was to impeach Agent Skorlinksi by portraying him as a good but 
closed-minded 
investigator 
who 
failed 
to 
consider 
other 
suspects.  As such, the questioning was not violative of the 
Haseltine rule.  State v. Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d 431, 437-38, 523 
N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1994).  See also State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 
94, ¶¶2, 19-24, 26, 273 Wis. 2d 626, 681 N.W.2d 901.  The fact 
that the strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful does not make 
it any less reasonable for purposes of evaluating Maloney's 
claim.   
IV 
¶45 In sum, Maloney claims ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  He asserts three areas of deficient performance:  (1) 
failing to challenge the admissibility of videotape evidence 
based on an alleged violation of SCR 20:4.2 by the special 
prosecutor; (2) failing to challenge the admissibility of 
videotape evidence under WESCL; and (3) impermissibly inviting 
the 
State's 
lead 
investigator 
to 
comment 
on 
Maloney's 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
22 
 
credibility.  Because he has failed to demonstrate deficient 
performance, we ultimately conclude that Maloney has not shown 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.   
¶46 However, we do not affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals at this time.  Rather, we retain jurisdiction and ask 
the parties to file additional briefs on the following two 
issues: 
(1) Whether this court has authority to remand to the 
circuit court for a motion for postconviction relief 
based upon the interest of justice. 
(2) If so, whether this court should act upon that  
authority and remand as described above. 
By the Court.—Jurisdiction is retained until further order 
of the court. 
 
No. 
2003AP2180   
 
 
 
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