Title: Iliades v. Dieffenbacher North America, Inc. (Opinion on Application)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 154358
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 23, 2018

ILIADES v DIEFFENBACHER NORTH AMERICA INC 
 
 
Docket No. 154358.  Argued on application for leave to appeal November 7, 2017.  
Decided May 23, 2018. 
 
 
Steven Iliades (plaintiff) and Jane Iliades brought a products-liability action in the 
Oakland Circuit Court against Dieffenbacher North America Inc., alleging negligence, gross 
negligence, and breach of warranty after plaintiff was injured by a rubber molding press 
manufactured by defendant.  The press was equipped with a presence-sensing device called a 
“light curtain” that stops the press when beams of light in front of the press opening are 
interrupted.  Once the light curtain was no longer interrupted, the press would resume its cycle 
automatically.  Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to retrieve parts that had fallen to the 
floor inside the press by reaching behind the light curtain without first placing the press into 
manual mode.  Because of plaintiff’s position behind the light curtain, the light curtain was not 
interrupted, the press resumed its automatic operation, and plaintiff was trapped between the two 
plates of the press.  The court, Martha D. Anderson, J., granted summary disposition to 
defendant, ruling that plaintiff had misused the press given the evidence that he had been trained 
not to reach into the press while it was in automatic mode, knew how to place the press into 
manual mode, knew that the light curtain was not meant to be used as an emergency stop switch, 
and knew that the press would automatically begin its cycle if the light curtain was no longer 
interrupted.  The court further ruled that plaintiff’s misuse was not reasonably foreseeable 
because plaintiff had not presented any evidence that defendant could have foreseen that a 
trained press operator would crawl beyond a light curtain and partially inside a press to retrieve a 
part without first disengaging the press.  The Court of Appeals, RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and 
STEPHENS, J. (JANSEN, J., dissenting), reversed and remanded in an unpublished per curiam 
opinion issued July 19, 2016 (Docket No. 324726), holding that, regardless of whether plaintiff 
had misused the press, defendant could be held liable because plaintiff’s conduct was reasonably 
foreseeable.  Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and 
heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action.  500 
Mich 965 (2017). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice ZAHRA, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to 
appeal, held: 
 
 
Defendant would be liable under MCL 600.2947(2) for injuries sustained by plaintiff if 
plaintiff’s conduct constituted misuse of the press under MCL 600.2945(e) and that misuse was 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
reasonably foreseeable.  Whether the misuse was reasonably foreseeable depends on whether 
defendant knew or should have known of the misuse, not on whether plaintiff was grossly 
negligent in operating the press.  Because the majority of the Court of Appeals did not decide 
whether and how plaintiff misused the press, and because it did not apply the common-law 
meaning of reasonable foreseeability, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed and the case 
was remanded to that Court to reconsider the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor 
of defendant under the standards articulated in this opinion. 
 
 
1.  MCL 600.2947(2) provides that a manufacturer or seller is not liable in a products- 
liability action for harm caused by misuse of a product unless the misuse was reasonably 
foreseeable.  This provision further states that whether there was misuse and whether that misuse 
was reasonably foreseeable are both legal issues to be resolved by the court.  Thus, the plain 
language of MCL 600.2947(2) clearly sets forth a two-part test for manufacturer liability 
pertaining to reasonably foreseeable product misuse: in order for a manufacturer to be liable for 
the misuse of its product, a court must first decide whether there was misuse of the product, and, 
if so, the court must then decide whether the particular misuse was reasonably foreseeable by the 
manufacturer.   
 
 
2.  MCL 600.2945(e) defines “misuse” as “use of a product in a materially different 
manner than the product’s intended use.”  Under this provision, “misuse” includes (1) uses 
inconsistent with the specifications and standards applicable to the product, (2) uses contrary to a 
warning or instruction provided by the manufacturer, seller, or another person possessing 
knowledge or training regarding the use or maintenance of the product, and (3) uses other than 
those for which the product would be considered suitable by a reasonably prudent person in the 
same or similar circumstances.   
 
 
3.  The phrase “reasonably foreseeable” is not defined under the statute, but the 
Legislature is presumed to have adopted the common-law definition of that phrase when it 
enacted MCL 600.2947(2).  Under Michigan common law, foreseeability depends on whether a 
reasonable person could anticipate that a given event might occur under certain conditions.  
When dealing with the foreseeability of a product’s misuse, the crucial inquiry is whether, at the 
time the product was manufactured, the manufacturer was aware, or should have been aware, of 
that misuse.  Whether a manufacturer should have known of a particular misuse may depend on 
whether that misuse was a common practice, or whether foreseeability was inherent in the 
product. 
 
 
4.  The Court of Appeals majority erred by failing to squarely address whether plaintiff’s 
conduct constituted misuse of the press under MCL 600.2945(e), which affected its reasonable-
foreseeability analysis.  For instance, the majority improperly framed the issue as whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that press operators at plaintiff’s place of employment would rely on the 
light curtains as exclusive safety devices.  This overly broad account of misuse is inconsistent 
with the wording of MCL 600.2947(2), which specifically asks whether “the misuse” of the 
product was reasonably foreseeable.  In other words, the question for purposes of foreseeability 
is whether defendant knew or should have known of plaintiff’s particular misuse.  Without 
deciding whether and how plaintiff had misused the press, the majority could not properly assess 
whether that misuse was reasonably foreseeable. 
 
5.  The Court of Appeals erred by importing the standard applicable to criminal gross 
negligence into its interpretation of MCL 600.2947(2).  Had the Legislature intended to use this 
criminal standard for reasonable foreseeability in civil products-liability cases, as opposed to the 
common-law definition, the Legislature would have done so.  Because the Legislature has not 
plainly shown a contrary intent, the common-law meaning of “reasonably foreseeable” must 
apply for purposes of MCL 600.2947(2). 
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings. 
 
 
Justice CLEMENT took no part in the decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018 State of Michigan 
FILED  May 23, 2018 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
STEVEN T. ILIADES and JANE ILIADES, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
 
v 
No. 154358 
 
DIEFFENBACHER NORTH AMERICA 
INC., 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except CLEMENT, J.) 
 
ZAHRA, J.  
This products-liability action presents a question of first impression in regard to 
the proper interpretation of MCL 600.2947(2).1  That provision provides that a 
                                              
1 Although this Court’s analysis in Greene v A P Prod, Ltd, 475 Mich 502; 717 NW2d 
855 (2006), tangentially touched upon product misuse, that case was limited to 
addressing the scope of a manufacturer’s duty to warn of product risks under MCL 
600.2948(2). 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
 
 
 
2
manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by the misuse of a product unless that misuse 
was reasonably foreseeable.   
In this case, plaintiff Steven Iliades sustained serious injuries after he reached 
inside a 500-ton press machine to retrieve molded rubber parts from the floor and became 
trapped when the press started its automatic cycle.2  Iliades places fault with defendant 
Dieffenbacher North America Inc., the manufacturer of the press.  If Iliades’s conduct 
constituted misuse of the press, however, Dieffenbacher would only be liable if that 
particular misuse was reasonably foreseeable by Dieffenbacher. 
In an unpublished, split decision, the Court of Appeals concluded that, regardless 
of whether Iliades misused the press, Dieffenbacher can be held liable for the harm 
sustained by Iliades because his conduct was reasonably foreseeable under a criminal 
gross-negligence standard.  The Court of Appeals erred by applying that standard in this 
context. 
The Legislature set forth a clear two-part test in MCL 600.2947(2) for 
manufacturer liability arising from product misuse.  First, a court must decide whether 
there was misuse of the product.  Second, if there was misuse, a court must decide 
whether that particular misuse was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.  
Although the Legislature defined “misuse” in MCL 600.2945(e), it did not provide a 
definition for “reasonably foreseeable.”  Nevertheless, under longstanding principles of 
                                              
2 Steven Iliades’s wife, Jane Iliades, is also a party in this action with an independent 
claim for loss of consortium, which would be derivative of her of husband’s legally 
cognizable bodily injury.  In this opinion, use of the singular “Iliades” refers to Steven 
only. 
 
 
 
3
statutory construction, the phrase “reasonably foreseeable” must be construed in 
accordance with its common-law meaning.  And under Michigan common law, 
foreseeability depends on whether a reasonable person could anticipate that a given event 
might occur under certain conditions.  When dealing with the foreseeability of a 
product’s misuse in particular, the crucial inquiry is whether, at the time the product was 
manufactured, the manufacturer was aware, or should have been aware, of that misuse.   
Because the majority of the Court of Appeals did not decide whether and how 
Iliades misused the press, and because it improperly used a criminal gross-negligence 
standard to determine whether Iliades’s misuse was reasonably foreseeable instead of the 
common-law meaning of that phrase, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and remand this case to that Court to reconsider whether the trial court’s grant of 
summary disposition in favor of Dieffenbacher was proper under the standards articulated 
in this opinion.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Flexible Products Company supplies molded rubber parts for the automotive 
industry.  As of June 10, 2011, Iliades had more than a year of experience working on 
presses at Flexible Products.  Although he usually worked on Press Number 1, that press 
was temporarily inoperable that day, so Iliades was operating Press Number 25, a 500-ton 
vertical rubber molding press machine manufactured by Dieffenbacher.  The press creates 
injection-molded rubber parts by pressing together two large plates called “platens,” 
which hold interchangeable molds, and then injecting rubber into the molds.  Each cycle 
 
 
 
4
of the press takes less than 10 minutes to complete.  Upon completion, the press stops and 
the finished product is manually removed by the operator.   
Press Number 25 is also equipped with a presence-sensing device, often referred 
to as a “light curtain,” whereby beams of light pass in front of the opening to the press.  
When this light curtain is interrupted by, for example, a hand or arm crossing the light 
beams, the press stops its cycle.  While some of the presses would have to be manually 
reset once the light curtain was intact and no longer interrupted, other presses, like Press 
Number 25, would resume their cycle automatically. 
Although the presses were generally set to cycle automatically, they could also 
operate in manual mode.  Because the presses do not always eject the rubber parts 
properly, causing some parts to fall to the floor of a press, operators were instructed to 
place a press in manual mode before reaching into the press to remove any wayward part.  
Operators were also instructed to use a “parts grabber” to reach into the press to remove 
these parts.   
After returning from a break on this particular day, Iliades sought to retrieve parts 
that had fallen to the floor inside Press Number 25 by using his parts grabber.  Iliades, 
however, did not place the press into manual mode before doing so.  In reaching into the 
press, Iliades’s torso and back were completely inside the press, while his right knee 
rested on top of the guard or metal skirting on the front of the press.  Despite having his 
left foot still touching the floor, Iliades’s body was positioned in such a way that he was 
behind the light curtain.   
With the light curtain no longer interrupted, the press resumed its automatic 
operation and trapped Iliades between the two plates of the press.  Iliades was able to 
 
 
 
5
bang a tool against the side of the press and attract the attention of the foreman.  After 
approximately 15 minutes, the press was partially disassembled, freeing Iliades.  Iliades 
sustained serious fractures in his back and severe burns, and he continues to suffer from 
post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic pain, and major depression.  
In 2012, Iliades filed this products-liability action against Dieffenbacher, alleging 
negligence, gross negligence, and breach of warranty.  Following discovery, 
Dieffenbacher moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that, 
pursuant to MCL 600.2945(e) and MCL 600.2947(2), Iliades’s actions in climbing 
partway into the press constituted misuse that was not reasonably foreseeable.  In 
response, Iliades argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
he engaged in unforeseeable misuse of the press. 
At the conclusion of the motion hearing on September 17, 2014, the trial court 
agreed with Dieffenbacher and granted the motion.  The trial court found that Iliades 
misused the press, as the record evidence demonstrated that he was trained not to reach 
into the press while it was in automatic mode.  He also knew how to place the press into 
manual mode, that the light curtain was not meant to be used as an emergency stop 
switch, and that the press would automatically begin its cycle if the light curtain was no 
longer interrupted.  The trial court then concluded that Iliades’s misuse was not 
reasonably foreseeable because Iliades did not present any evidence that Dieffenbacher 
 
 
 
6
could have foreseen that a trained press operator would crawl beyond a light curtain and 
partially inside a press to retrieve a part without first disengaging the press.3   
On July 19, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished, split decision 
reversing the trial court.4  The majority chose not to expressly decide whether Iliades’s 
conduct constituted misuse, claiming instead that “the dispositive issue is whether 
[Iliades’s] conduct was foreseeable.”5  Employing the criminal-law standard for 
distinguishing ordinary negligence from gross negligence to define foreseeability, the 
majority focused on whether Dieffenbacher should have reasonably expected that press 
operators, like Iliades, would rely on light curtains as exclusive safety devices.  The 
majority concluded that it was common practice for operators to routinely disregard their 
training and rely on light curtains as the sole safety device when removing finished parts.  
The majority also concluded that Iliades had no reason to know that the light curtain on 
Press Number 25 “would be cleared if one got between the light curtain and the 
press . . . .”6  Therefore, the majority concluded that the evidence did not show that 
                                              
3 Iliades filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an order issued on 
October 9, 2014.  Iliades thereafter filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the 
Court of Appeals. 
4 Iliades v Dieffenbacher North America Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, issued July 19, 2016 (Docket No. 324726). 
5 Id. at 3.  Nevertheless, the majority did recognize that “misuse,” as defined under MCL 
600.2945(e), includes “ ‘uses contrary to a warning or instruction provided by the 
manufacturer, seller, or another person possessing knowledge or training regarding the 
use or maintenance of the product’ ” and that Iliades acted in a manner that “appears to 
have been contrary to instruction provided by his employer.”  Id. 
6 Id. at 4. 
 
 
 
7
Iliades “obviously committed gross negligence” and that it was reasonably foreseeable to 
Dieffenbacher that press operators would rely entirely on light curtains for safety. 
In her dissent, Judge JANSEN would have affirmed the trial court’s grant of 
summary disposition.  According to Judge JANSEN, the evidence showed that Iliades 
misused the press by acting contrary to instructions provided by Joe Whiteside, who was 
an employee at Flexible Products with knowledge and training regarding the use of the 
press.  Specifically, Whiteside instructed Iliades to never reach inside the press when it 
was in automatic mode.  Whiteside also trained Iliades to never transgress the light 
curtain.  Nevertheless, that is precisely what Iliades did here.  Judge JANSEN also 
concluded that Dieffenbacher could not have reasonably foreseen Iliades’s particular 
misuse because there was no evidence that anyone had ever suffered the type of injury 
that Iliades sustained as a result of partially climbing into a press and because there was 
no evidence that partially climbing into a press while it was in automatic mode was 
common practice among press operators. 
Dieffenbacher applied for leave to appeal in this Court.  We directed the Clerk to 
schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action.7  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.8  When interpreting a 
statute, this Court’s primary goal is to “ ‘ascertain the legislative intent that may 
                                              
7 Iliades v Dieffenbacher North America Inc, 500 Mich 965 (2017). 
8 Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 500 Mich 191, 199; 895 NW2d 
490 (2017), citing Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 57; 860 NW2d 67 (2014). 
 
 
 
8
reasonably be inferred from the words in [the] statute.’ ”9  If the statute’s language is 
clear and unambiguous, then the statute must be enforced as written.10  A necessary 
corollary of this principle is that a “ ‘court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute 
that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the 
statute itself.’ ”11 
This Court must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and, in 
particular, consider the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its 
placement and purpose in the statutory scheme, to avoid rendering any part of the statute 
nugatory or surplusage.12  If a statutory word or phrase is undefined, it must be accorded 
its plain and ordinary meaning.13  A legal term of art, on the other hand, must be 
construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning.14  Consequently, 
                                              
9 Covenant Med Ctr, 500 Mich at 199, quoting People v Couzens, 480 Mich 240, 249; 
747 NW2d 849 (2008). 
10 Covenant Med Ctr, 500 Mich at 199, citing People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 50; 753 
NW2d 78 (2008). 
11 Covenant Med Ctr, 500 Mich at 199, quoting Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 
Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). 
12 SBC Health Midwest, Inc v City of Kentwood, 500 Mich 65, 70-71; 894 NW2d 535 
(2017). 
13 Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 515; 821 
NW2d 117 (2012), citing Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 155; 802 NW2d 
281 (2011). 
14 Hannay, 497 Mich at 57, citing In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367, 377; 835 NW2d 
545 (2013); see also Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 377 (“While terms must be construed 
according to their plain and ordinary meaning, words and phrases ‘as may have acquired 
a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood 
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.’ ”), quoting MCL 8.3a. 
 
 
 
9
when the Legislature uses an undefined term with a “ ‘settled, definite, and well known 
meaning at common law,’ ” that settled meaning applies “ ‘unless a contrary intent is 
plainly shown.’ ”15  
III.  ANALYSIS 
As part of major tort reform efforts in 1995,16 the Legislature amended the 
Revised Judicature Act17 to provide that a “manufacturer or seller is not liable in a 
product liability action for harm caused by misuse of a product unless the misuse was 
reasonably foreseeable.”18  The statute further provides that whether there was misuse, 
and whether that misuse was reasonably foreseeable, are both “legal issues to be resolved 
by the court.”19  Thus, the plain language of MCL 600.2947(2) clearly sets forth a two-
part test for manufacturer liability pertaining to reasonably foreseeable product misuse: in 
order for a manufacturer to be liable for the misuse of its product, a court must first 
decide whether there was misuse of the product, and, if so, the court must then decide 
whether the particular misuse was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. 
                                              
15 People v March, 499 Mich 389, 398; 886 NW2d 396 (2016), quoting People v 
Covelesky, 217 Mich 90, 100; 185 NW 770 (1921), superseded by statute on other 
grounds. 
16 See 1995 PA 161 and 1995 PA 249. 
17 MCL 600.101 et seq. 
18 MCL 600.2947(2). 
19 Id. 
 
 
 
10 
Turning to the first part of the test, MCL 600.2945(e) defines “misuse” as “use of 
a product in a materially different manner than the product’s intended use.”20  This 
provision defines “misuse” to include the following: (1) “uses inconsistent with the 
specifications and standards applicable to the product,” (2) “uses contrary to a warning or 
instruction provided by the manufacturer, seller, or another person possessing knowledge 
or training regarding the use or maintenance of the product,” and (3) “uses other than 
those for which the product would be considered suitable by a reasonably prudent person 
in the same or similar circumstances.”21   
The second part of the test requires a court to decide whether the particular misuse 
of the product was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.  Unlike “misuse,” 
“reasonably foreseeable” is not defined under the statute.  As a matter of statutory 
construction, however, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the common-law 
definition of “reasonably foreseeable” when it enacted MCL 600.2947(2).22   
Under Michigan common law, foreseeability depends on whether a reasonable 
person “could anticipate that a given event might occur under certain conditions.”23  
                                              
20 MCL 600.2945(e). 
21 Id. 
22 March, 499 Mich at 398; Hannay, 497 Mich at 57; In re Bradley, 494 Mich at 377; see 
also People v Moreno, 491 Mich 38, 46; 814 NW2d 624 (2012) (“We must presume that 
the Legislature knows of the existence of the common law when it acts.”) (quotation 
marks and brackets omitted). 
23 Samson v Saginaw Prof Bldg, Inc, 393 Mich 393, 406; 224 NW2d 843 (1975); see also 
Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 452; 506 NW2d 175 (1993), quoting 
Samson, 393 Mich at 406; Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644, 668; 557 NW2d 
289 (1996) (MALLETT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining 
 
 
 
 
11 
When dealing with the foreseeability of a product’s misuse in particular, the crucial 
inquiry is whether, at the time the product was manufactured, the manufacturer was 
aware, or should have been aware, of that misuse.24  Whether a manufacturer should have 
known of a particular misuse may depend on whether that misuse was a common 
practice,25 or if foreseeability was inherent in the product.26   
                                              
“foreseeability” to similarly mean, in part, “whether the reasonable person . . . could 
anticipate the likelihood that a particular event would occur”), citing Samson, 393 Mich 
at 406; accord Moore v Sky Chefs, Inc, 79 F Appx 130, 135 (CA 6, 2003), quoting 
Samson, 393 Mich at 406.  Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “foreseeability” as 
the “quality of being reasonably anticipatable.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed).   
24 See Villar v E W Bliss Co, 134 Mich App 116, 121; 350 NW2d 920 (1984) (“[T]he 
specific use to which plaintiff’s employer put the machine was not foreseeable without 
some evidence that defendant knew or should have known of the purchaser’s unsafe 
use.”). 
25 See, e.g., Mach v Gen Motors Corp, 112 Mich App 158, 163; 315 NW2d 561 (1982) 
(“The crucial inquiries under this test [of foreseeability by the manufacturer] are whether 
the use made of the product was a common practice and whether the manufacturer was 
aware of that use.”); accord Gootee v Colt Indus, Inc, 712 F2d 1057, 1064 (CA 6, 1983) 
(“Crucial inquiries in determining whether a use is foreseeable include whether the use 
made of the product was a common practice and whether the manufacturer was, or should 
have been aware, of that use.”), citing Mach, 112 Mich App 158. 
26 See, e.g., Portelli v I R Constr Prod Co, Inc, 218 Mich App 591, 599; 554 NW2d 591 
(1996) (“Foreseeability of misuse may be inherent in the product or may be based on 
evidence that the manufacturer had knowledge of a particular type of misuse.”); Van 
Eizenga v Straley, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 
31, 1998 (Docket No. 198819), p 4, quoting Portelli, 218 Mich App at 599; accord 
Adams v Mestek Machinery, Inc, unpublished opinion of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued November 9, 2017 (Case No. 16-cv-11764), 
p 8, quoting Portelli, 218 Mich App at 599.  Although the design of a product may be 
enhanced with the passage of time and improvements in technology, the adequacy of a 
design and foreseeability of misuse is measured at the time the product is in fact 
manufactured, not at the time of injury. 
 
 
 
12 
Accordingly, under MCL 600.2947(2), Dieffenbacher would not be liable for 
Iliades’s injuries caused by the misuse of the press unless that misuse was reasonably 
foreseeable at the time the press was manufactured.  This necessarily requires a court to 
first decide whether Iliades’s conduct constituted misuse of the press under MCL 
600.2945(e).  Next, under the established common-law meaning of the phrase, Iliades’s 
alleged misuse of the press would only be “reasonably foreseeable” if Dieffenbacher 
could have anticipated that the “given event”—here, Iliades reaching inside the press to 
remove rubber parts and transgressing the light curtain while the press was in automatic 
mode—might occur under certain conditions.  To answer this question, a court would 
look to the record evidence to decide whether Dieffenbacher knew or should have known 
of Iliades’s conduct. 
Although it recognized that Iliades likely misused the press under MCL 
600.2945(e), the Court of Appeals majority failed to squarely address the first prong of 
the test.  This apparently deliberate decision was problematic for several reasons.  Not 
only did the majority disregard the Legislature’s clear directive that a court must decide 
whether a person misused the product, it also failed to focus specifically on Iliades’s 
conduct, which affected its reasonable-foreseeability analysis.  For instance, the majority 
improperly framed the issue as whether it was reasonably foreseeable that press operators 
at Flexible Products would rely on the light curtains as exclusive safety devices.  This 
overly broad account of misuse in this case is inconsistent with the wording of MCL 
600.2947(2), which specifically asks whether “the misuse” of the product was reasonably 
 
 
 
13 
foreseeable.27  In other words, the question for purposes of foreseeability is whether 
Dieffenbacher knew or should have known of Iliades’s particular misuse.  Without 
deciding whether and how Iliades misused the press, the majority could not properly 
assess whether that misuse was reasonably foreseeable. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals majority does not explain why it opted to 
disregard the wealth of reasonable-foreseeability jurisprudence when it imported the 
standard applicable to criminal gross negligence into its interpretation of MCL 
600.2947(2).  Had the Legislature intended to use this criminal standard for reasonable 
foreseeability in civil products-liability cases, as opposed to the common-law definition, 
the Legislature would have done so.  Because the Legislature has not plainly shown a 
contrary intent, the common-law meaning of “reasonably foreseeable” must apply for 
purposes of MCL 600.2947(2). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court concludes that Dieffenbacher would be liable under 
MCL 600.2947(2) for injuries sustained by Iliades if Iliades’s conduct constituted misuse 
of the press under MCL 600.2945(e) and that misuse was reasonably foreseeable.  
Whether the misuse was reasonably foreseeable depends on whether Dieffenbacher knew 
or should have known of the misuse, not whether Iliades was grossly negligent in 
operating the press.  Because the majority of the Court of Appeals did not decide whether 
and how Iliades misused the press, and because it did not apply the common-law 
                                              
27 Emphasis added. 
 
 
 
14 
meaning of reasonable foreseeability, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and remand this case to that Court to reconsider the trial court’s grant of summary 
disposition in favor of Dieffenbacher under the standards articulated in this opinion.  We 
do not retain jurisdiction. 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
 
CLEMENT, J., took no part in the decision of this case.