Title: State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation v. Keith J. Peterson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP002718
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2718 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Keith J. Peterson, Chairman, Douglas County 
Condemnation Commission,  
 
Respondent-Respondent, 
Harbor Mall Properties Limited Partnership, 
Henry Cohen and Edith Cohen,  
 
Intervening-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  218 Wis. 2d 473, 581 N.W.2d 539 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 8, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gallagher 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Kathleen M. Ptacek,, assistant attorney generals, 
with whom on the briefs was Charles R. Larsen, assistant attorney 
general and James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent and intervening-
respondents there was a brief by Robert R. Kanuit and Weiby, 
Maki, Durst, Ledin, Bick & Lehr, S.C.; Keith J. Peterson, all of 
Superior, of counsel, Don Bye, Duluth, MN and oral argument by 
Robert R. Kanuit. 
 
No. 
97-2718 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2718 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of  
Transportation,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Keith J. Peterson, Chairman, Douglas  
County Condemnation Commission,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Harbor Mall Properties Limited  
Partnership, Henry Cohen and Edith Cohen,  
 
 
          Intervening-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (DOT) seeks review of a published court of 
appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the 
DOT’s petition for writ of prohibition.1  The DOT asserts that 
since the property owners incorrectly served the State of 
Wisconsin rather than the DOT with their notice of application 
for appeal, the circuit court was without authority to assign 
that appeal to the county condemnation commission.  Because we 
                     
1 DOT v. Peterson, 218 Wis. 2d 473, 581 N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 
1998) (affirming order of Circuit Court for Douglas County, 
Thomas J. Gallagher, Judge).  
No. 
97-2718 
 
2 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9) (1995-96)2 can reasonably be 
interpreted as permitting the property owner to serve the State 
of Wisconsin and that the circuit court had authority to assign 
the appeal, we affirm the court of appeals. 
¶2 
In 1994, the DOT condemned property belonging to Henry 
and Edith Cohen and to Harbor Mall Properties (collectively, 
“the Cohens”) and recorded the award of damages with the Douglas 
County Register of Deeds.  Nearly two years later the Cohens 
sought to challenge the amount of the damage award by initiating 
an appeal under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9).  Rather than serving the 
DOT directly, the Cohens served the attorney general who is the 
designated service agent for the State of Wisconsin.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 801.11(3).  Though the application for appeal was 
                     
2 32.05 
Condemnation 
for 
sewers 
and 
transportation 
facilities . . . (9) APPEAL FROM AWARD BY OWNER OR OTHER PARTY IN 
INTEREST.  (a) Any party having an interest in the property 
condemned may, within 2 years after the date of taking, appeal 
from the award . . . by applying to the judge of the circuit 
court for the county wherein the property is located for 
assignment 
to 
a 
commission 
of 
county 
condemnation 
commissioners . . . .  This 
application 
shall 
contain 
a 
description of the property condemned and the names and last-
known addresses of all parties in interest but shall not 
disclose the amount of the jurisdictional offer nor the amount 
of the basic award.  Violation of this prohibition shall nullify 
the application.  Notice of the application shall be given to 
the clerk of the court and to all other persons other than the 
applicant who were parties to the award.  The notice may be 
given by certified mail or personal service.  Upon proof of the 
service the judge shall forthwith make assignment. 
All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
97-2718 
 
3 
addressed to and served upon the attorney general, the Cohens 
named the DOT as the condemnor in the application for appeal. 
¶3 
In December of 1996 the circuit court acted on the 
application and assigned the appeal to Keith Peterson, the 
Chairman of the Douglas County Condemnation Commission.  Three 
months later, the DOT filed a petition for supervisory writ of 
prohibition in the circuit court enjoining the condemnation 
commission from hearing the Cohens’ appeal.  The DOT contended 
that the Cohens had not properly appealed their award of damages 
because they failed to serve the condemnor, the DOT, as required 
by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9).   
¶4 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
DOT’s 
petition, 
determining that Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9) could reasonably be 
interpreted to allow a property owner to obtain jurisdiction 
over the DOT by serving the attorney general.  The DOT appealed 
and the court of appeals affirmed.   
¶5 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
agreed 
that 
the 
service 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9) did not clearly indicate 
whether service of the notice of the appeal “should be made on 
the state agency privy to the award or the State as an entity.” 
 DOT v. Peterson, 218 Wis. 2d 473, 484, 581 N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 
1998).  As a result, citing Kyncl v. Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 
547, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968), the court of appeals concluded that 
any “reasonable or strict construction” of § 32.05(9) would 
suffice to appeal the DOT’s award of damages.  Peterson, 218 
Wis. 2d at 484.   
No. 
97-2718 
 
4 
¶6 
The 
resolution 
of 
this 
case 
depends 
upon 
the 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
to 
undisputed 
facts. 
 
The 
interpretation of statutes presents a question of law that we 
review independently of the legal determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Deutsches Land, Inc. v. 
City of Glendale, No. 96-2489 (S. Ct. Apr. 16, 1999). 
¶7 
We are asked to decide a discrete issue:  whether Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(9) 
can 
reasonably 
be 
interpreted 
to 
allow 
jurisdiction over the DOT to be effectuated with service on the 
State of Wisconsin.  The issue in this case is not whether the 
State of Wisconsin as an entity may condemn property under 
chapter 32 and therefore has consented to be sued.3  That issue 
involving the question of sovereign immunity was answered in the 
negative years ago.  Konrad v. State, 4 Wis. 2d 532, 538-39, 91 
N.W.2d 203 (1958).4   
¶8 
Property owners who have had their property condemned 
under chapter 32 may appeal from the award of damages given by 
the condemning entity.  To do so, the property owner must follow 
the “complete and exclusive” procedures set forth in that 
                     
3 However, the Cohens apparently raised that issue in the 
courts below.  See Peterson, 218 Wis. 2d at 481 n.8.   
4 As we have often stated, the constitutional guarantee of 
sovereign immunity bars the State of Wisconsin as an entity from 
being sued unless it so consents.  Fiala v. Voight, 93 Wis. 2d 
337, 341-42, 286 N.W.2d 824 (1980); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 
17 Wis. 2d 26, 40-41, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  See also Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 27.  Similarly, once the State consents to 
being sued, one may only do so “in the manner and under the 
procedure by which it has consented to be sued.”  Konrad v. 
State, 4 Wis. 2d 532, 538, 91 N.W.2d 203 (1958). 
No. 
97-2718 
 
5 
chapter.  City of Madison v. Tiedeman, 1 Wis. 2d 136, 143, 83 
N.W.2d 694 (1957).   
¶9 
Within two years after the taking occurs, the property 
owner must file an application for appeal in the circuit court 
for the county in which the property is located.5  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(9)(a).  Though the property owner applies for the appeal 
in the circuit court, the circuit court does not hear the 
appeal.  Instead the circuit court, acting in its administrative 
capacity, assigns the appeal to that county’s condemnation 
commission.  Schroedel Corp. v. State Highway Comm., 34 Wis. 2d 
32, 42, 148 N.W.2d 691 (1967); Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9)(a).  
However, for the circuit court to have authority to assign the 
appeal to the county condemnation commission, a property owner 
must serve “all other persons other than the applicant who were 
parties to the award” with notice of the appeal.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(9); State ex rel. Milwaukee County Expressway Commission 
v. Spenner, 51 Wis. 2d 138, 142-43, 186 N.W.2d 298 (1971); City 
of La Crosse v. Shiftar Bros., 162 Wis. 2d 556, 560-61, 469 
N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1991).   
¶10 The service provision in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9)(a) 
provides: 
 
                     
5 This general procedure is slightly modified where the 
condemning entity is a housing authority (Wis. Stat. § 66.40-
66.404), 
redevelopment 
authority 
(§ 66.431), 
or 
community 
development authority (§ 66.4325).  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9)(a).  
The special procedures in those instances are not applicable to 
this case. 
No. 
97-2718 
 
6 
Notice of the application shall be given to the clerk 
of the court and to all other persons other than the 
applicant who were parties to the award. The notice 
may be given by certified mail or personal service.  
(emphasis added) 
The term “person” is defined in chapter 32 at § 32.01:  “the 
state, a county, town, village, city, . . .” (emphasis added).6  
The Cohens acknowledge that it is necessary to serve the DOT, as 
the condemnor, with notice of the appeal under the service 
provision.  They argue only that the language of chapter 32 
quoted above allows service on the DOT to be accomplished by 
serving the State of Wisconsin through the attorney general. 
¶11 The DOT contends that this court in Konrad addressed 
this very issue and concluded that chapter 32 does not permit 
service on a department of the State to be accomplished by 
serving the State through the attorney general.  Konrad, 4 
Wis. 2d at 527-38.  While we agree with the DOT’s reading of 
Konrad, we note that portions of chapter 32 have since been 
                     
6 As the initial language of Wis. Stat. § 32.01 indicates, 
the enumerated definition of “person” applies “unless the 
context clearly requires otherwise.”  Thus, for example, should 
a railroad corporation condemn property under § 32.02(3), the 
context of the condemnation would “clearly require” the term 
“person” be defined as something other than the terms listed in 
§ 32.01. 
No. 
97-2718 
 
7 
modified in pertinent ways making that discussion in Konrad 
inapplicable to this case.7   
¶12 In Konrad, a landowner attempted to initiate an 
inverse condemnation under chapter 32.  The landowner contended 
that the Wisconsin Conservation Commission inversely condemned 
his land by constructing a dike along a river, which caused his 
land to flood.  Konrad, 4 Wis. 2d at 533-34.  In initiating his 
inverse condemnation proceeding, the landowner served a copy of 
the petition on the attorney general rather than on the 
conservation commission.  The State objected, arguing that the 
court had no jurisdiction because the proper state defendant had 
not been served.  Id.   
¶13 At the time Konrad was decided, the notice provision 
in Wis. Stat. § 32.05 (1955-56) required that “[n]otice of [the] 
hearing shall be served upon all interested at least twenty days 
before said hearing . . .” (emphasis added).  This court 
concluded that service on the attorney general on behalf of the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin 
did 
not 
satisfy 
§ 32.05 
because 
the 
commission, rather than the State of Wisconsin, was the 
“interested” party.  Konrad, 4 Wis. 2d at 537-38.  As a result, 
this court concluded that the court did not have jurisdiction 
                     
7 Konrad addressed two issues arising under chapter 32:  (1) 
whether serving the State of Wisconsin through the attorney 
general effectuated service upon a subdivision of the State, 
Konrad, 4 Wis. 2d at 537-38; and (2) whether chapter 32 
empowered the State of Wisconsin, as a separate entity, to 
condemn property and therefore allowed it to be sued directly, 
id. at 538-39.  We are only addressing the first issue in this 
case. 
No. 
97-2718 
 
8 
over the commission and held that the chapter 32 proceeding 
against the commission was void.  Id.   
¶14 In the four decades since Konrad was decided, Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05 has changed in an important way.  Instead of 
requiring that notice be given to “all interested” as was the 
case when Konrad was decided, the statute now requires that 
notice be given to “all persons”which by definition includes 
“the state.”  We believe that this change in phraseology, though 
seemingly minor, reasonably permits the interpretation that 
service on the State of Wisconsin confers jurisdiction over one 
of the State’s departments.8   
¶15 We have already under slightly different circumstances 
concluded that the notice provision in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9) is 
not a paragon of clarity.  Kyncl, 37 Wis. 2d at 555-56.  In 
Kyncl, a county highway committee under the orders of the state 
highway 
commission 
condemned 
property 
for 
expanded 
state 
highways under Wis. Stat. § 84.09(3) (1965-66).  The relevant 
part of that statute allowed the county highway commission to 
condemn the property under chapter 32 if it could not purchase 
the property “expeditiously within the appraised price.”  Id.   
¶16 The county highway commission did condemn property 
under chapter 32 and the landowner appealed the amount of the 
                     
8 We 
also 
note that 
among the entities 
specifically 
enumerated as “persons” in Wis. Stat. § 32.01, no mention is 
made of state departments, only “the state.”  
No. 
97-2718 
 
9 
award of damages.9  Kyncl, 37 Wis. 2d at 551-52.  In the process 
of initiating his appeal, the landowner served the county 
involved in the condemnation but did not serve either the county 
highway committee or the state highway commission.  Id. at 549. 
 The county argued that service upon it was improper, contending 
that the county highway committee as the actual condemnor under 
chapter 32 was the proper entity for service.  Id. at 553.   
¶17 This court disagreed, noting that the statutes did not 
specifically articulate the identity of the condemnor.  Id. at 
554-55.  Additionally, the court observed that while the county 
highway committee was involved in the condemnation, the county 
ultimately controlled the committee and had the title of the 
condemned property placed in its name.  Id.  The court concluded 
that in light of the statutory indefiniteness the landowner’s 
service on the county was a logical selection that had the legal 
effect of authorizing the court to hear the appeal.  Id. at 555. 
¶18 We think that the same rule applies in this case.  
Here, unlike in Kyncl, the Cohens were reasonably sure of the 
condemning authority’s identity, although the award of damages 
                     
9 Unlike this case, the property owners in Kyncl exercised 
their right to appeal directly to the circuit court rather than 
having their appeal first heard by the county condemnation 
commission.  Kyncl v. Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 552, 155 
N.W.2d 583 (1968); Wis. Stat. § 32.05(11) (1967-68). 
No. 
97-2718 
 
10
document may have caused some confusion in that regard.10  
However, 
the 
Cohens’ 
uncertainty 
emanates 
from 
the 
interpretation of Wis. Stats. § 32.05(9) and § 32.01.   
¶19 On the one hand, the Cohens believed that the DOT was 
responsible for condemning their property.  Service on the DOT 
would seem intuitively correct.  See Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 
417, 434, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983) (“the aggrieved landowner must 
sue the state agency which has taken the property”).  However, 
on the other hand the term “person” in § 32.05(9) is defined in 
§ 32.01 as “the state” and not as any department of the state.  
As a result, a literal reading of § 32.05(9) indicates that the 
state, rather than any department like the DOT, should be the 
entity served.   
¶20 We have long adhered to the rule that “strict 
compliance with procedural statutes is necessary to obtain 
jurisdiction to review administrative agency decisions.”  Trojan 
                     
10 The Cohens had been negotiating with the DOT for some 
time prior to the actual condemnation, so they quite reasonably 
concluded that the DOT was the authority that finally condemned 
their property.  However, the award of damages document 
presented to the Cohens could be interpreted as casting some 
doubt on that conclusion.   
Although the award of damages document was signed by an 
official of the DOT and indicated at various points that the 
“State 
of 
Wisconsin, 
Department 
of 
Transportation” 
was 
condemning the property, the document also contained numerous 
references to the “State of Wisconsin.”  For example, the 
document was entitled “Award of Damages, State of Wisconsin” and 
stated that the “State of Wisconsin has determined it necessary 
to acquire [the property].”  The language of the award of 
damages document appears to exacerbate the uncertainty created 
by Wis. Stats. § 32.05(9) and § 32.01. 
No. 
97-2718 
 
11
v. Board of Regents, 104 Wis. 2d 277, 283, 311 N.W.2d 586 
(1981); see also 519 Corp. v. DOT, 92 Wis. 2d 276, 286-88, 284 
N.W.2d 643 (1979); Brachtl v. Department of Revenue, 48 Wis. 2d 
184, 187, 179 N.W.2d 921 (1970).  However, a “companion rule is 
that the statutes must clearly set forth the procedural 
requirements” necessary to pursue such review.  Trojan, 104 
Wis. 2d at 284; see also Brachtl, 48 Wis. 2d at 186-87 
(concluding that the statute was unambiguous).   
¶21 As we have previously said, where a procedural statute 
lacks “specific direction” clearly indicating who is to be 
served with notice, “an ambiguity exists.”  Kyncl, 37 Wis. 2d at 
555; Trojan, 104 Wis. 2d at 283.  Additionally, where an 
ambiguity exists “[p]rocedural statutes are to be liberally 
construed so as to permit a determination upon the merits of the 
controversy if such construction is possible.”  Kyncl, 37 
Wis. 2d at 555-56; State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 204-05, 240 
N.W.2d 168 (1976). 
¶22 The upshot of these maxims is that where a procedural 
statute does not provide specific direction for compliance, the 
ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the person appealing the 
condemning entity’s award of damages.  Kyncl, 37 Wis. 2d at 555-
56.  We are satisfied that in this instance Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(9) lacks specific direction, resulting in an ambiguity. 
 Faced with this ambiguity, the Cohens’ action of naming the DOT 
as the condemnor but serving the State of Wisconsin was a 
reasonable 
and 
logical 
course 
of 
action 
under 
the 
No. 
97-2718 
 
12
circumstances.11  See id. at 555; see also Sunnyview Village, 
Inc. v. DOA, 104 Wis. 2d 396, 411-12, 311 N.W.2d 632 (1981).  
“To cut off [the Cohens’] right to a review of the [DOT’s] 
decision when [they] complied with the literal language of the 
service 
requirement 
in 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(9)] 
would 
be 
extraordinarily harsh.”  Trojan, 104 Wis. 2d at 284.  We decline 
to do so. 
¶23 The legislature can, of course, amend Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(9) to clarify the procedures a property owner must 
follow when applying for an appeal of an award of damages.  Even 
without legislative action, a condemning entity can take steps 
to eliminate any confusion.  It is a better practice to have the 
notification 
of 
an 
agency’s 
decision 
accompanied 
by 
an 
explanation of the procedures that must be followed in order to 
appeal that decision.  See, e.g., Weisensel v. DHSS, 179 Wis. 2d 
637, 645 n.4, 508 N.W.2d 33 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting notice from 
Department of Health and Social Services’ final order); Gomez v. 
LIRC, 153 Wis. 2d 686, 695, 451 N.W.2d  475 (Ct. App. 1989) 
                     
11 We recognize that the we have on a prior occasion 
concluded that service on the State of Wisconsin cannot confer 
jurisdiction over an unknown, unnamed state employee.  Miller v. 
Smith, 100 Wis. 2d 609, 620, 302 N.W.2d 468 (1981).  That rule 
retains its vitality but must be distinguished in this case.  
Miller was a decision that interpreted Wis. Stat. § 801.11 
rather than § 32.05(9).  Since it is the language of § 32.05(9), 
as defined by § 32.01, that created the Cohens’ reasonable 
confusion, the general rule enunciated in Miller is not 
applicable.  Cf. Weisensel v. DHSS, 179 Wis. 2d 637, 644-45, 508 
N.W.2d 33 (Ct. App. 1993) (statute requiring service on “the 
agency or one of its officials” would not allow service to be 
accomplished by serving agency’s legal counsel). 
No. 
97-2718 
 
13
(Sundby, J., concurring).  Such notice provided by a condemning 
entity would remove any confusion that might exist in perfecting 
a Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9) application for appeal of an award of 
damages.   
¶24 This is not the first time this court has offered such 
a suggestion in connection with an appeal of an agency decision. 
 Sunnyview 
Village, 
104 
Wis. 2d 
at 
412-13; 
Wisconsin’s 
Environmental Decade, Inc. v. PSC, 84 Wis. 2d 504, 534, 267 
N.W.2d 609 (1978).  In interpreting a different chapter’s notice 
requirement, we said in Sunnyview Village, 104 Wis. 2d at 412: 
 
We 
acknowledge . . . that 
it 
is 
important 
that 
citizens 
not 
be 
defeated 
in 
their 
redress 
of 
grievances by the maze of governmental entities.  A 
person aggrieved by an administrative decision should 
not have to guess which governmental entity to name 
and serve as the respondent in proceedings for 
judicial review.   
Apparently, the DOT has not taken our advice to heart.  Had it 
done so, perhaps the present issue would not have arisen and 
this case would not have appeared before this court.  In any 
event, we strongly encourage a condemning entity to include with 
its award of damages a notification of the process a property 
owner must undertake for appeal. 
¶25 In sum, we determine that Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9) is 
ambiguous and can reasonably be interpreted as permitting a 
property owner to serve the State of Wisconsin rather than the 
DOT.  As a result, when the Cohens served the attorney general 
with notice of their application for appeal, the circuit court 
had authority to assign the appeal to the county condemnation 
No. 
97-2718 
 
14
commission and properly denied the DOT’s writ of prohibition.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
1