Title: People v. Norris
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97231, 97272, 97816
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2005

Nos. 97231, 97272, 97816 cons.-Agenda 10-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
ROBERT E. NORRIS et al., Appellants.-THE VILLAGE OF
FRANKFORT, Appellant, v. RUSSELL JOHNSON et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed January 21, 2005. 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Each of the defendants in these consolidated appeals was charged
with Class A misdemeanor traffic offenses. The State sought to nol-pros the charges, which the circuit court of Will County allowed. The
State later refiled the charges against each defendant. Each defendant
moved to dismiss the new charges, citing Supreme Court Rule 505
(166 Ill. 2d R. 505). In each case, the motion was granted, and an
appeal followed. In People v. Norris, Nos. 3-02-0841, 3-02-0842,
3-02-0843, 3-02-0844, 3-02-0845, 3-02-0846, 3-02-0847,
3-02-0848, 3-02-0849, 3-02-0850, 3-02-0851, 3-02-0852,
3-02-0853, 3-02-0854, 3-02-0863, 3-02-0964, 3-02-0966,
3-02-0967, 3-02-0968, 3-02-0969 cons. (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23), the appellate court reversed the dismissals.
In Village of Frankfort v. Johnson, Nos. 3-02-0173, 3-02-0174,
3-02-0175, 3-02-0176, 3-02-0177, 3-02-0178 cons. (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23), the appellate court affirmed the
dismissals. We granted leave to appeal in both cases (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)) and ordered the causes to be consolidated.

BACKGROUND
People v. Norris, Nos. 97231, 97816 cons.
	In appeal Nos. 97231, 97816 cons., defendant Robert Norris and
18 other defendants were each charged by uniform traffic citation with
either driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501
(West 2000)) or driving while their licenses were suspended or
revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2000)). None of the defendants
filed a written notice of either an intention to plead not guilty or to
request a jury trial, but each indicated at his initial appearances that he
wanted a jury trial. The causes were continued for various pretrial
proceedings. Thereafter, each defendant appeared on the date set for
trial, only to have the State nol-pros the charges because the officer
who issued the citation failed to appear. In four of the cases, the
arresting officer had failed to appear on a prior occasion, and the
circuit court had, at that time, granted the State a continuance. In the
other cases, the officer failed to appear at the first scheduled trial date.
After the State obtained its nolle prosequi on the initial charges, the
State subsequently recharged each defendant by information with the
same offense or offenses. Each defendant then filed a motion to
dismiss the new charges on the basis of Supreme Court Rule 505 (166
Ill. 2d R. 505), which the circuit court granted.
	A divided appellate court reversed, holding that Rule 505,
standing alone, does not explicitly require a trial on the merits at a
defendant's first appearance. The court noted that while Supreme
Court Rule 504 (166 Ill. 2d R. 504) requires a trial on the merits on
defendant's first appearance, it does not mean that Rule 505 also so
requires. The court further held that there was no justification for
grafting the requirements of Rule 504 onto Rule 505.
	Justice Holdridge specially concurred to point out that, in
addition to reasons articulated in the majority opinion for finding Rule
505 inapplicable in this case, the right to counsel implicated by a
misdemeanor charge "necessitates a pre-trial procedure different from
that provided by Rule 505."
	Justice Lytton filed a single-sentence dissent "on the basis of
Justice McDade's analysis in her majority opinion in Village of
Frankfort v. Johnson, 3-02-0173 (cons. w/ 174, 175, 176, 177, and
178) (2003)."

Village of Frankfort v. Johnson, No. 97272
	In appeal No. 97272, the Village of Frankfort (Village) charged
defendants Russell Johnson and Hall Hanes by uniform citation and
complaint with various traffic violations. Each defendant appeared at
his first scheduled court appearance and entered a plea of not guilty.
Each defendant also demanded a jury trial. The circuit court entered
a number of continuances for pretrial petitions and proceedings. In
each case, a trial date of May 15, 2001, was set.
	Before the date the trials were to begin, the Village sought
continuances because the arresting officers in the cases were
unavailable to testify. The circuit court denied the requests, and on the
date of the trials, the Village sought to nol-pros the charges against
each defendant, which the court allowed. Subsequently, the Village
filed a new information against each defendant, alleging the same
offenses. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges on the basis
that the Village was barred by Rule 505 from reinstating the charges.
The circuit court granted the motions.
	A divided appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The court held
that dismissal under these circumstances was proper because it "serves
the essential purpose of Rule 505." The court interpreted Rule 505 as
protecting defendants in traffic cases from multiple court appearances
by ensuring a trial either at the first appearance or a reasonable time
thereafter. The court noted that the plain language of the rule does not
"clearly rule out a trial on the first appearance date. The defendant
who fails to give prior notice to the clerk may waive his or her right
to trial at that time, but the court is still given discretion by rule to
proceed with trial at the first appearance." (Emphases in original.) The
court acknowledged that Rule 505 was not "a model of clarity"
despite various amendments, but insisted the Village's interpretation
was not supported by "either the letter or the spirit of Rule 505."
	Justice Slater dissented. In his view, Rule 505 did not grant a
defendant the right to a decision on the merits on the first trial date.
Justice Slater noted that the court had improperly grafted language
from Rule 504 onto Rule 505.

ANALYSIS
	The Village and the State (jointly, the State) argue that Rules 504
and 505 (166 Ill. 2d Rs. 504, 505) are inapplicable in these cases
because the defendants were not charged with petty or business
offenses, as opposed to misdemeanor, traffic offenses. Defendants
counter that the rules are applicable insofar as they were charged with
traffic offenses by use of a uniform traffic citation. Not surprisingly,
defendants urge that the appellate court in Frankfort correctly
interpreted Rule 505 while the State maintains that the appellate
court's analysis in Norris is more correct.
	Our rules are to be construed in the same manner as statutes (134
Ill. 2d R. 2; People v. Fitzgibbbon, 184 Ill. 2d 320, 328 (1998); see
also Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2004)
(setting out rules of construction)), and our review is de novo (People
v. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 488 (2000)).
	We note, at the outset of our discussion, that Rules 504 and 505
have been amended several times since their 1968 effective date, with
the latest amendment occurring in May 1995. In light of the numerous
amendments to the rules, we agree with both panels of the appellate
court that past decisions addressing previous versions of these rules
provide very little guidance in addressing the issue before the court.
	Rule 504 applies to all traffic offenses defined by Supreme Court
Rule 501.(1) Rule 505 applies only to Rule 501 traffic offenses that are
charged by a "Uniform Citation and Complaint," a conservation
complaint or a "Notice to Appear" in lieu of either. Rule 504, entitled
"Appearance Date," provides:
			"The date set by the arresting officer or the clerk of the
circuit court for an accused's first appearance in court shall
not be less than 14 days but within 60 days after the date of
the arrest, whenever practicable. It is the policy of this court
that, if the arresting agency has been exempted from the
requirements of Rule 505, an accused who appears and
pleads 'not guilty' to an alleged traffic or conservation
offense punishable by fine only should be granted a trial on
the merits on the appearance date or, if the accused demands
a trial by jury, within a reasonable time thereafter. A failure
to appear on the first appearance date by an arresting officer
shall, in and of itself, not normally be considered good cause
for a continuance." 166 Ill. 2d R. 504.
Rule 505, entitled "Notice to Accused," provides:
			"When issuing a Uniform Citation and Complaint, a
conservation complaint or a Notice to Appear in lieu of
either, the officer shall also issue a written notice to the
accused in substantially the following form:
					
AVOID MULTIPLE COURT APPEARANCES
				If you intend to plead 'not guilty' to this charge, or if,
in addition, you intend to demand a trial by jury, so notify
the clerk of the court at least 10 days (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays or holidays) before the day set for
your appearance. A new appearance date will be set, and
arrangements will be made to have the arresting officer
present on that new date. Failure to notify the clerk of
either your intention to plead 'not guilty' or your intention
to demand a jury trial may result in your having to return
to court, if you plead 'not guilty' on the date originally set
for your court appearance.
		Upon timely receipt of notice that the accused intends to
plead 'not guilty,' the clerk shall set a new appearance date
not less than 7 days nor more than 60 days after the original
appearance date set by the arresting officer or the clerk of the
circuit court, and notify all parties of the new date and the
time for appearance. If the accused demands a trial by jury,
the trial shall be scheduled within a reasonable period. In
order to invoke the right to a speedy trial, the accused if not
in custody must file an appropriate, separate demand, as
provided in section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963, as amended (725 ILCS 5/103-5). The proper
prosecuting attorney shall be served with such separate
written demand for speedy trial. If the accused fails to notify
the clerk as provided above, the arresting officer's failure to
appear on the date originally set for appearance may be
considered good cause for a continuance. Any state agency
or any unit of local government desiring to be exempt from
the requirements of this Rule 505 may apply to the
Conference of Chief Circuit Judges for an exemption." 166
Ill. 2d R. 505.(2)
	Rule 504 requires "the arresting officer" or "the clerk of the
circuit court" to set a first appearance date "not less than 14 days but
within 60 days" after the ticket is issued. With respect to trials, the
rule encourages, in stating as policy only, that an accused pleading
"not guilty" should receive a trial on that first appearance date in some
situations. The rule conditions the policy on two factors: (i) that the
offense be one punishable by a fine only, and (ii) that the "arresting
agency" be exempt from Rule 505.
	Rule 505 addresses setting an appearance date different from that
initially required under Rule 504. By its terms, Rule 505 operates in
three mutually exclusive situations: (i) cases, such as those involved
here, that are initiated upon "Uniform Citations[s] and Complaint[s],"(3)
(ii) cases initiated upon "conservation complaint[s]," and (iii) cases
initiated upon "Notice[s] to Appear in lieu of either" uniform citations
or conservation complaints. In these three situations, defendants who
intend to plead "not guilty," or in addition "intend to demand a jury
trial," are directed to so notify the clerk of the court at least 10 days
before the appearance date initially set under Rule 504. Upon receipt
of such notice, Rule 505 directs the clerk to set a new date "not less
than 7 days nor more than 60 days" after the original date set required
by Rule 504 and to notify all parties of the new date and time. The
Rule further provides that if a defendant "fails to notify the clerk as
provided *** the arresting officer's failure to appear on the date
originally set for appearance "may be considered good cause for a
continuance."
	Rule 505 has dual goals. As the committee comments to the rule
make clear, it was drafted so as to accommodate "the unique
situation" of "statewide jurisdiction" by the Illinois State Police. ILCS
Ann. R. 505, Committee Comments, at 518 (Smith-Hurd 2004). The
rule also reflects a policy, as acknowledged by this court, of
"provid[ing] a defendant with an early hearing on the merits of his
traffic offense and to avoid multiple court appearances, which
eliminates undue hardship on the accused, law enforcement agencies
and the courts." People v. Williams, 158 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (1994).
	With respect to trials, Rule 505 requires that if a defendant
demands a jury trial, "the trial shall be scheduled within a reasonable
period." The rule also references the speedy-trial provisions contained
in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West
2000)) and requires a defendant who seeks to invoke the right to a
speedy trial to file an appropriate separate demand. Rule 505 does not
change a traffic defendant's right to have a jury trial commenced
within the time frames provided in the statute. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5
(West 2000).(4)
	Both panels of the appellate court in these cases focused on
whether Rule 505 grants defendants the right to a trial on the merits
on the first trial date set by the court. As we have explained, however,
Rule 505 does not speak in such terms. Rule 505 merely provides the
procedure by which traffic defendants can schedule alternative first
appearance dates. If that procedure is not followed, a defendant may
be subjected to multiple appearances. As for trials by jury, the rule
directs that such trials shall be scheduled within a reasonable period
of time. The scheduling of the jury trial itself is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial judge. The rule provides that this discretion may
be limited by the choice of a defendant who files a speedy-trial
demand, which means that the State must bring him or her to trial
within 120 days if the defendant is in custody or within 160 days if the
defendant is not in custody.
	In addressing one of the motions to dismiss filed in this case, the
circuit court entered a written decision in which it stated the
following:
		"Although Rule 505 does not contain the disposition on the
merits language contained in Rule 504, an interpretation of
the rule which made the requirement defendant receive a jury
trial within a reasonable period of time directory rather than
mandatory would nullify the rule. *** The reasonable
standard allows trial judges in the various circuits to deal with
the logistical problems created by a jury demand. *** The
reasonable period also allows the trial judge to take into
account problems unique to a particular case. But the
exercise of discretion must always take place within the
stated purpose of the rule: to avoid multiple court
appearances and to afford the defendant a trial at the earliest
reasonable date. Once that date is set, unless the case is
continued by the court for good cause, the defendant is
entitled to his trial or a dismissal of the case and any
subsequent refiling of the case."(5)
In the cases involved here, the trial dates were pushed back due to
extensive pretrial litigation, resulting in the defendants having had to
appear multiple times in court. This is not unusual, particularly in DUI
cases. It is also not unusual for DUI trials to be complex, oftentimes
requiring more than the testimony of a single eyewitness. In such
cases, it is common to have witnesses testify as to chemical tests,
toxicology reports, and medical examinations. Thus, while our policy
may be one of avoiding multiple appearances for defendants, the
complexity of a case may render that goal unattainable in a practical
sense. It is important to keep in mind that Rules 504 and 505 concern
the setting of first appearance dates and can, in some, but not all,
cases be used to accommodate the granting of a trial on that first
appearance date. But, we must stress that nowhere in either Rule 504
or Rule 505 is a trial on the merits absolutely guaranteed on the first
appearance date. Even the language contained in Rule 504 that
addresses the more routine, fine-only offenses is couched in terms of
"should" as opposed to "shall," thereby connoting something less than
an absolute mandatory obligation. Rule 504 further provides that an
arresting officer's failure to appear on the first appearance date shall
not "normally" be considered good cause for a continuance. The word
"normally" conditions the "shall not" phrase, thereby indicating that,
in some cases, such a failure to appear may, in fact, be considered
good cause for a continuance. Thus, it is entirely possible under Rule
504 that, in some circumstances, a trial judge may deem an officer's
failure to appear on the first appearance as good cause for a
continuance in even the routine, fine-only offenses. Of course, in such
a case, it would then be impossible for the defendant to receive a trial
on the merits on the first appearance date under Rule 504. The use of
such conditional language, as opposed to more absolute expressions
of intent, reinforces the notion that what is being set in Rule 504 and
505 is the mere "policy" of this court and not an inexorable command.
Both rules allow for the trial judge to have complete discretion over
what should occur in a particular case. Therefore, we believe that if,
as Rule 504 explicitly provides, the trial judge may deem an officer's
failure to appear on the first appearance date set for fine-only cases as
good cause for a continuance, then likewise the same discretion must
be afforded to trial judges in the more severe cases such as the Class
A misdemeanors involved here.
	The record does not reveal, in all of the cases, what reasons were
offered by the State in the motion to continue and under what
circumstances the trial judges denied the motions.(6) To the extent that
any of the continuance motions were denied solely because the judges
felt they did not have the discretion to do anything else, we hold that
such a decision was erroneous. Rule 505 in no way so limits a trial
judge's discretion.
	Once the trial judges denied the State's motions for continuances
in these cases, the State moved to nol-pros the charges against each
defendant and, subsequently, refiled the new charges against each
defendant. Defendants moved to dismiss the new charges on the basis
of Rule 505. Having explained the function of Rule 505, we believe
the relevant issue in this case is not whether Rule 505 bars the refiling,
but whether the State had the right to refile the charges under these
circumstances.
	A nolle prosequi is the formal entry of record by the prosecuting
attorney which denotes that he or she is unwilling to prosecute a case.
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §770 (1981). This court has recognized:
		" 'A nolle prosequi is not a final disposition of the case, and
will not bar another prosecution for the same offense. It is
not an acquittal, but it is like a nonsuit or a discontinuance in
a civil suit, and leaves the matter in the same condition in
which it was before the commencement of the prosecution.'
[Citation.] Again, it has been said that the ordinary effect of
a nolle prosequi is to terminate the charge to which it is
entered and to permit the defendant to go wherever he
pleases, without entering into a recognizance to appear at any
other time. If it is entered before jeopardy has attached, it
does not operate as an acquittal, so as to prevent a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense." People v.
Watson, 394 Ill. 177, 179 (1946).
Thus, when a nolle prosequi is entered before jeopardy attaches, the
State is entitled to refile the charges against the defendant. Watson,
394 Ill.  at 179. The State is not barred from proceeding upon a refiled
charge "absent a showing of harassment, bad faith, or fundamental
unfairness." People v. DeBlieck, 181 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606 (1989)
(and cases cited therein).
	A trial judge has the discretion to continue a case as he or she
deems is appropriate, taking into account the diligence of the parties
and whether the continuance best serves the ends of justice, and that
decision will not be disturbed upon review absent abuse. See People
v. Williams, 92 Ill. 2d 109 (1982); Leathers v. Leathers, 13 Ill. 2d 348
(1958). Not even a defendant's speedy-trial demand prevents a trial
judge from granting the State a continuance if the judge believes that
good cause exists for it. Rule 505 does not alter that discretion.
Without a record or a transcript, it cannot be known whether the
State's motions for continuances might have been granted if the trial
judges knew that Rule 505 does not mandate a trial on the first
appearance date. For these reasons, we believe it necessary to remand
the matters to the circuit court so that each case can be individually
addressed with a complete record of the underlying proceedings. It
may be that, in some of these cases, the defendants may be able to
show harassment, bad faith, or fundamental unfairness on the part of
the State in the refiling of the charges. Given our conclusions
regarding the scope of Rule 505, we are of the view that such a
disposition protects the rights of both the State and the defendants
under these unusual circumstances.

CONCLUSION
	For reasons expressed in this opinion, the judgment of the
appellate court in Nos. 97231, 97816 cons., is affirmed, and the
judgment of the appellate court in No. 97272 is reversed. The causes
are remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consonant
with this opinion.
Nos. 97231, 97816 cons.-Appellate court affirmed;
causes remanded.
No. 97272-Appellate court reversed;
causes remanded.
 
1.         Rule 501(f) defines "traffic offense" as "[a]ny case which charges 
a violation of any statute, ordinance or regulation relating to the operation or use of motor vehicles, the use of streets and highways by 
pedestrians or the operation of any other wheeled or tracked vehicle, including cases charging violations under chapter 6 of the Illinois 
Vehicle Code, as amended." 166 Ill. 2d R. 501(f). The rule provides for six exclusions, all of which concern felony traffic offenses.  
            
   
  
            
   

2.       Section 16106 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides that a similar 
notice to "AVOID MULTIPLE COURT APPEARANCES" as is found in Rule 505 shall be given when traffic tickets or citations or notices to appear 
are issued "[f]or offenses committed under the provisions of this Act or the ordinances of any municipality, park district or county which 
involve the regulation of the ownership, use or operation of vehicles [by] the police officers and officials of such municipalities and park 
districts, and sheriffs *** in counties other than Cook." 625 ILCS 5/16106 (West 2000). The only material difference between the two notice 
provisions is that section 16106 requires a defendant to give notice at least 5 days before the date set for the original appearance date 
and that upon timely notice, the clerk set the new date not less than 7 days nor more than 49 days after the original appearance date set by 
the officer. This appears to be a reference to an earlier version of Rule 505, which provided for the same time periods. The remainder of 
the language of the notice provision is the same as that currently found in Rule 505.
3.               
            
              
          

Supreme Court Rule 552 provides for uniform citation and complaint forms to be approved by the Conference of Chief 
Circuit Judges and adopted for use by municipalities. 134 Ill. 2d R. 552. Rule 505 does not operate for municipal offenses that are not 
initiated by uniform citation and complaint forms.
4.                 
            
The record contains demands for trial under the Speedy Trial Act filed by some, but not all, of the defendants 
involved in these cases.                
            
                
            

5.                
         
           
     
This written order was incorporated by reference in the orders of dismissal concerning the defendants involved in the 
Norris appeal, Nos. 97231, 97816 cons. The orders of dismissal in the Frankfort appeal, No. 97272, dismissed the actions without comment.

6.                  
         The record before us does not contain the record and transcripts from the initial proceedings which ended 
with the entry of the State's nolle prosequi. The record contains both the common law record and the transcripts from the proceedings 
which were commenced upon the State's refiling of the charges.