Title: Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP002510
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2020

2020 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2510 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Antoinette Lang and Jim Lang, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Wisconsin State Department of Health & Human 
Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., Ace 
American Insurance Company, Rhythm Method, LLC 
and Administrator of Health Care Financing 
Administration, 
          Defendants, 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Fryed Audio, LLC, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 520,920 N.W.2d 329 
PDC No:2018 WI App 69 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 5, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 4, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William Sosnay   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and delivered 
an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined.  
DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Neal C. Schellinger and Schellinger & Associates, LLC, 
Waukesha. There was an oral argument by Neal C. Schellinger. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Anthony J. Skemp and Martin Law Office, S.C., Oak Creek. There was 
an oral argument by Anthony J. Skemp. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association for Justice by William C. Gleisner, III, Brookfield. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Defense Counsel by Brian D. Anderson and Everson, Whitney, Everson 
& Brehm, S.C., Green Bay; Monte Weiss and Weiss Law Office, Mequon; 
and Timothy Johnson and Crivello Carlson, Eau Claire. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2510 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV3866 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Antoinette Lang and Jim Lang,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Wisconsin State Dept. of Health & Human 
Services,   
 
 
Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
 
v. 
 
Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., Ace 
American Insurance Company, Rhythm Method, LLC 
and Administrator of Health Care Financing 
Administration,   
 
 
Defendants, 
 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Fryed Audio, LLC,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and delivered 
an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined.  
DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of the circuit court2 
that granted summary judgment in favor of Fryed Audio, LLC on the 
ground that it was entitled to recreational immunity pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) (2017–18).3  Fryed Audio is a member of 
Rhythm Method, LLC, with whom the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, 
Inc. contracted to provide music for its 2012 festival at a 
Milwaukee County park.  The sole member of Fryed Audio, Steven 
Fry, laid Rhythm Method's electronic and electric cords on the 
floor of the music tent for the Lions Club event.  Antoinette Lang 
allegedly tripped on a cord, which led to this lawsuit.  
¶2 
Because the Lions Club is a statutory owner pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1., Fryed Audio moved for summary 
judgment citing § 895.52(2), which provides that agents of owners 
have immunity from claims by those who enter land of a statutory 
owner to engage in recreational activity.  The circuit court 
concluded that Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club and 
therefore entitled to recreational immunity.  The court of appeals 
reversed, reasoning that the Lions Club lacked the right to control 
Fryed Audio. 
                                                 
1 Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2018 WI App 69, 
384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 N.W.2d 329 (2018). 
2 The Honorable William Sosnay of Milwaukee County presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We conclude that there are no issues of material fact in 
regard to the Lions Club's right to control Fryed Audio in regard 
to laying the cords for Rhythm Method's amplified sound and that 
Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club who lawfully acted 
through its subagent, Steven Fry.  Because the Lions Club was a 
statutory owner, Fryed Audio, as its agent, is entitled immunity 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The Lions Club is a nonprofit entity.  Annually, it has 
organized a fundraising event called the Sweet Applewood Festival.  
The Festival has been a Lions Club event for fourteen years. 
¶5 
The Festival has operated similarly year-to-year and has 
involved many of the same participants.  The event has used the 
same park, located in Milwaukee County.  The tents, including the 
music tent, have been in approximately the same location.  
Furthermore, the inside of the music tent has been set up 
similarly.  As a co-chair of the 2012 event, Frank Miller, a Lions 
Club member, testified:  "We've used the same location for several 
years, so siting of the tents and other equipment is pretty 
straightforward.  Everyone just knows where things go." 
¶6 
The Lions Club has controlled the grounds and determined 
how the Festival has run.  Among other things, it controls how and 
where tents are placed; the selection of vendors; and ensures 
necessary services such as security, first responders, and garbage 
disposal are provided. 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The Lions Club decided where the band was located and it 
set up the stage.  Furthermore, the Lions Club was responsible for 
general electrical work.  To quote Miller's deposition: 
The Lions Club has an electrical service that is run 
into the park with our own breakers and disconnects.  We 
run wiring out of that service to both tents to supply 
power for lighting, food, and for the bands to connect 
to. 
¶8 
In 2012, Miller applied for a special event permit on 
behalf of the Lions Club.  The event description stated, "COMMUNITY 
FESTIVAL FEATURING FOOD, BEVERAGES, MUSIC, CARNIVAL RIDES, 
RAFFLES.  FESTIVAL IS RUN AS THE MAJOR ANNUAL FUNDRAISER FOR THE 
CUDAHY LIONS CLUB." 
¶9 
The application noted that the event would include 
"amplified sound," and the instructions on the application 
explained that the Lions Club would need to provide a copy of a 
Noise Variance Permit.  Furthermore, the instructions stated:  
Amplified sound must be directed away from residences.  
Amplified sound must comply with Section 47.022, Noise, 
of Chapter 47 of the Milwaukee County Ordinances.  It is 
the responsibility of the Event Organizer to provide 
electrical requirements to support the event. 
¶10 The Lions Club contracted with Rhythm Method for music.  
The contract stated that "sound and lights" would be provided by 
Rhythm Method.  It also stated, "[p]rofessional covered stage and 
power by purchaser."  Additionally, the contract provided that 
each member of Rhythm Method was individually obligated to adhere 
to its terms and conditions and that the leader of Rhythm Method 
was an agent of the Lions Club: 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
5 
 
The Performer(s) are engaged severally on the terms and 
conditions of this agreement.  The leader represents 
that the Performer(s) already designated have agreed to 
be bound by said terms and conditions.  Each performer, 
not yet chosen, shall also be bound by said terms and 
conditions upon acceptance.  
. . . . 
The leader shall, as the agent of the Purchaser, enforce 
disciplinary measures for just cause and carry out 
instructions as to selections and manner of performance. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶11 Rhythm Method, LLC had five people as members plus Fryed 
Audio, another LLC.  Steven Fry was the sole member of Fryed Audio.  
The contract with the Lions Club was signed, "Steven Fry," on 
behalf of Rhythm Method, LLC. 
¶12 Mrs. Lang allegedly tripped on a cord run by Steven Fry 
between a sound board and the stage.  She and her husband sued 
several parties for negligence.  At this point, the only defendant 
remaining is Fryed Audio. 
¶13 During a deposition, Steven Fry explained that he had 
not received specific instructions from the Lions Club on how to 
lay electric and electronic cords.  Miller said he had not provided 
"any prohibitions, or specific instructions, or directives as to 
how [those who set up the bands' equipment] [a]re supposed to run 
their wires from that sound board in the middle of the tent to the 
stage at that time which they're performing."  However, the Lions 
Club had the right to control how the electronic and electric cords 
were placed, as is apparent in the terms of the contract and from 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
6 
 
the control the Lions Club exercised in Festivals subsequent to 
2012.4     
¶14 In years past, before a Festival began, a Lions Club 
official performed a walkthrough looking for, among other things, 
trip hazards.  Miller testified he did not specifically recall 
performing a walkthrough in 2012; however, he testified that it 
had been his practice each year.  His deposition provided a 
detailed description of the typical walkthrough: 
I'm looking for issues with the pavement.  The festival 
is held on a basketball court that needs to be 
resurfaced.  I'm looking for any obvious holes or 
problems with the pavement, making sure we have the 
cooking areas where we have grills and fr[y]ers, making 
sure that area is fenced off so the public can't wander 
through there.  We have electrical service to feed 
lighting and music in the tents that we're responsible 
for and make sure that that wiring, the electrical 
                                                 
4 In subsequent years, the Lions Club asserted more control 
over Rhythm Method, requiring that their electronic and electric 
cords be suspended from the ceiling.  Fryed Audio cites this 
control to contend that it was subject to the Lions Club's control 
in 2012.  Generally, courts hesitate to rely on subsequent remedial 
measures.  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.07 provides: 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken 
previously, would have made the event less likely to 
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in 
connection with the event.  This section does not require 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when 
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, 
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if 
controverted, or impeachment or proving a violation of 
s. 101.11. 
In this particular case, Fryed Audio sought to use evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures as evidence of "control," a 
permissible use under § 904.07.   
No.  2017AP2510   
 
7 
 
wiring, is safe, and the electrical cabinets are secured 
and the public can't get access to those cabinets. 
¶15 Steven Fry explained that a band's sound engineer and 
setting up a band's sound equipment were two different functions:   
[A] sound engineer is the guy who sits and turns 
knobs and everything else.  You can be an engineer 
and not touch a piece of gear. . . . I can walk in 
and be an engineer and it's not my stuff.  
Q 
So you can walk into a gig that provides the 
equipment and you would still be considered an 
engineer? 
A 
Yes sir. 
¶16 Notably, Rhythm Method had a prior relationship with the 
Lions Club.  It had played at the festival in past years, including 
2011.  In the past, when the Lions Club determined that cords 
needed to be covered, it provided the mats to do that.  It also 
placed orange cones to alert frequenters to a potential hazard.   
¶17 The circuit court concluded that Fryed Audio was an agent 
of the Lions Club; however, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court because it concluded that the absence of reasonably 
precise specifications regarding the placement of cords negated 
the possibility of an agency relationship.  Lang v. Lions Club of 
Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2018 WI App 69, ¶4, 384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 
N.W.2d 329 (2018).  We granted Fryed Audio's petition for review 
and now reverse. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶18 "We review a grant or denial of summary judgment 
independently, applying the same standards employed by the circuit 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
8 
 
court and court of appeals, while benefitting from their 
discussions."  Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, 
¶16, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (citing Dufour v. Progressive 
Classic Ins. Co., 2016 WI 59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 881 
N.W.2d 678).  "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is 
no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party has 
established his or her right to judgment as a matter of law."  
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶16 (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2013–
14); Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶10, 342 
Wis. 2d 311, 818 N.W.2d 819).  Here, the material facts are not in 
dispute.  The outcome turns on statutory interpretation and 
application and whether the undisputed facts establish an agency 
relationship. 
¶19 "Statutory interpretation and application are questions 
of law that we review independently."  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 
¶17 (citing Highland Manor Assoc. v. Bast, 2003 WI 152, ¶8, 268 
Wis. 2d 1, 672 N.W.2d 709).  Notably, the statute at issue provides 
immunity to an "agent of an owner."   
¶20 At times, the existence of an agency relationship is a 
question of fact because the determination turns on "the 
understanding between the alleged principal and agent."  Soczka v. 
Rechner, 73 Wis. 2d 157, 163, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976) (citing Bigley 
v. Brandau, 57 Wis. 2d 198, 203 N.W.2d 735 (1973)).  However, 
whether undisputed facts establish an agency relationship 
therefore entitling the agent to recreational immunity under Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(2) is a question of law that we review 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
9 
 
independently.  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶17 (citing Highland 
Manor Ass'n, 268 Wis. 2d 1, ¶8). 
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
1.  General Principles 
¶21 "The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine 
what the statute means so that it may be properly applied."  
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110).  We look first to the language of the statute.  
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45).  "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, clear 
statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is applied 
according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms."  Westmas, 
379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (quoting State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 
311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769).  In determining the plain meaning 
of a statute, a court should consider the context of the language.  
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶19 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46).  A statute's purpose, as expressed in its text, can inform 
its plain meaning.  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶19 (citing Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48).  Additionally, "legislative history is 
sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 (citing Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶¶51–52, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(2) states: 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
10 
 
[N]o owner and no officer, employee or agent of an owner 
owes to any person who enters the owner's property to 
engage in a recreational activity: 
1.  A 
duty 
to 
keep 
the 
property 
safe 
for 
recreational activities. 
2.  A duty to inspect the property, except as 
provided under s. 23.115(2). 
3.  A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, 
use or activity on the property. 
The statute provides a broad definition of both "owner" and 
"recreational 
activity." 
 
An 
owner 
can 
be 
a 
"nonprofit 
organization, 
that 
owns, 
leases 
or 
occupies 
property."  
§ 895.52(1)(d)1.  Recreational activity means: 
any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of 
exercise, relaxation or pleasure, including practice or 
instruction in any such activity.  "Recreational 
activity" includes hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, 
picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, 
horseback 
riding, 
bird-watching, 
motorcycling, 
operating an all-terrain vehicle or utility terrain 
vehicle, operating a vehicle, as defined in s. 340.01 
(74), on a road designated under s. 23.115, recreational 
aviation, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking, tobogganing, 
sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating, 
water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or 
removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal 
training, 
harvesting 
the 
products 
of 
nature, 
participating in an agricultural tourism activity, sport 
shooting 
and 
any 
other 
outdoor 
sport, 
game 
or 
educational activity.  "Recreational activity" does not 
include any organized team sport activity sponsored by 
the owner of the property on which the activity takes 
place. 
§ 895.52(1)(g). 
¶23 "In 1983, the Wisconsin legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52, which dramatically expanded liability protection for 
landowners who open their private property for public recreational 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
11 
 
use."  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶21.  The legislation included a 
purpose statement: 
The legislature intends by this act to limit the 
liability of property owners toward others who use their 
property for recreational activities under circumstances 
in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal 
pecuniary benefit. 
1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1.  "As our cases have explained, 'the impetus 
for this law is the continual shrinkage of the public's access to 
recreational land in the ever more populated modern world.'"  
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶22 (quoting Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 
2016 WI 20, ¶28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492).  In keeping 
with the goal of the legislature to protect property owners, courts 
have interpreted the statute broadly in their favor.  Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶22. 
¶24 The parties do not dispute that the Lions Club was an 
owner under the statutory definition, nor do they dispute that the 
festival was a recreational activity in which Mrs. Lang was 
participating when she fell.  Their dispute centers on whether 
Fryed Audio was an "agent of an owner," i.e., an agent of the Lions 
Club. 
a.  Agency 
¶25 People and businesses sometimes act through others.  As 
a general principle, a person or business acting on behalf of 
another, and subject to control of another, is an agent and the 
person or business they are acting on behalf of, a principal.  
Agency law provides a series of rules that apply to such 
relationships.  Among these rules are provisions that govern when 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
12 
 
a principal is liable for the actions of its agent.  Ronald C. 
Wyse, A Framework of Analysis for the Law of Agency, 40 Mont. L. 
Rev. 31, 32 (1979) ("Agency analysis . . . is not concerned with 
whether there is any liability, but to whom the liability runs.").  
"The foundational principle of agency law is that the principal, 
who has chosen to conduct her business through an agent, must bear 
the foreseeable consequences created by that choice."  Paula J. 
Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 495, 497 
(2011).  This principle arises from the benefit that the principal 
derives from acting through the agent whom the principal controls.  
Id. 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 does not define agent.  
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶26.  Furthermore, we have had few 
occasions to address the concept of agency within the confines of 
recreational immunity.  When we have, however, we have given the 
word "agent" its plain meaning as a legal concept.  Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶30-33.  Our conclusion that agent should be given 
its meaning in the law is supported by the legislature's directive:  
In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and 
phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated 
unless such construction would produce a result 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
manifest 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature: 
(1) GENERAL RULE.  All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to common and approved usage; but 
technical words and phrases and others that have a 
peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according 
to such meaning.   
Wis. Stat. § 990.01.   
No.  2017AP2510   
 
13 
 
¶27 Furthermore, the drafting file of 1983 Wisconsin Act 
418, which created the recreational immunity statute, includes a 
letter that confirms that agent, as that term is employed in Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52, has a particular meaning in the law.  The letter 
discusses § 895.52(5), which states that a nonprofit organization 
may be liable, despite the immunity provided by § 895.52(2), for 
the "malicious acts" of its agents.  The letter explains: 
The intent is that a nonprofit organization is to be 
liable only for its malicious acts.  It would be liable 
for the malicious acts of its agents only when they can 
be attributed to it by the regular law of agency.  The 
agents of a nonprofit organization are liable only for 
their own malicious acts. 
Letter to Ruth Reinl, Office of Senator David Helbach, from John 
R. Zillmer, Attorney, at 3 (Oct. 11, 1983) (Drafting File, 1983 
Wis. Act 418) (on file with the David T. Prosser, Jr. State Law 
Library).  The reference to "the regular law of agency" confirms 
that it was expected that agent would be given its meaning in the 
law. 
¶28 We have cited the Restatement Second's definition of 
agency with approval:  "'[A]gency' [is] 'the fiduciary relation 
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to 
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other so to act.'"  Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶30 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) 
(1958)).   
¶29 We have concluded that an agency relationship "results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
14 
 
consent by the other so to act."  Hoeft v. Friedel, 70 
Wis. 2d 1022, 1034, 235 N.W.2d 918 (1975); see also, Wyse, supra, 
at 38 (explaining an "assent, benefit, and control test").  An 
agent may be either an employee or an independent contractor; 
however, when "an independent contractor has no fiduciary 
obligations to and is not subject to control by the principal, no 
agency relationship has formed."  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶31 
(quoting Romero v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, ¶40, 
371 Wis. 2d 478, 885 N.W.2d 591).  In the present dispute, the 
parties do not contest that the Lions Club assented to Rhythm 
Method acting on its behalf or the benefit of Rhythm Method's music 
for the Lions Club's festival.  Instead, they focus on whether the 
Lions Club had the right to control Fryed Audio, a member of the 
independent contractor, Rhythm Method.   
¶30 The principal's right to control the injury causing 
conduct is crucial to both the existence of an agency relationship 
and the scope of the agency.  It does not matter whether the 
conduct that caused the injury is complex or simple.  What matters 
in forming an agency relationship is that the principal has the 
right to control that conduct.  Hoeft, 70 Wis. 2d at 1034.  A 
principal is liable for the conduct of an agent when the injury 
causing conduct is "of the same general nature as authorized, or 
incidental to the conduct authorized."  Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 229(1).  Stated otherwise, the principal is liable only 
if the principal had the "right to control" the injury causing 
conduct.  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶42.  A principal does not 
have to exercise that right; however, without the right to control 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
15 
 
the injury causing conduct, an agency cannot exist relative to 
that conduct.  Id., ¶38.  
¶31 In Westmas, we interpreted the word agent within the 
context of recreational immunity.  There, a property owner 
contracted with a tree-trimming service.  Id., ¶39.  The contract 
provided "[n]o means or methods" controlling how the trees were to 
be trimmed or whether safety precautions were to be employed.  Id.  
We emphasized that the property owner had "no background or 
knowledge 
on 
how 
to 
perform 
tree-trimming." 
 
Id., 
¶42.  
Furthermore, the property owner did not know that the tree-trimming 
service was working at the time its conduct caused an injury.  Id., 
¶40.  We quoted the court of appeals, which stated: 
From the decision regarding whether or not to use a rope 
to bring down the branch that killed [the plaintiff], to 
where safety cones would be placed, to how "spotters" 
would be utilized, the record is clear that [the tree-
trimming service, not the property owner] maintained 
control over the details of its work, particularly the 
actions that led to [the plaintiff's] death. 
Id., ¶41.   
¶32 In concluding that an agency relationship did not exist, 
we noted the lack of "reasonably precise specifications" for tasks 
that required knowledge about trimming trees and in regard to 
safety precautions that were needed for tree trimming.  Id., ¶¶34, 
42, 43.  The tree-trimming service argued that an emphasis on the 
lack of reasonably precise specifications would "deny agency 
status, and therefore immunity, to all independent contractors of 
a landowner who lacks employees with the expertise to control and 
supervise the details of the contractor's work."  Id., ¶43.  We 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
16 
 
rejected this argument, noting it was unpersuasive because the 
question of agency is "fact-specific" and "fact-bound."  Id., ¶¶36, 
43.  To summarize, in Westmas the property owner merely had the 
right to expect a result as opposed to the right to control the 
injury causing conduct, i.e., the means by which tree-trimming was 
accomplished.  2A C.J.S. Agency § 18 (2019).  Therefore, although 
there was a contract between the tree trimmer and the property 
owner, no agency relationship existed because the property owner 
did not have the right to control the tree trimmer's conduct that 
caused the injury.   
¶33 In the present case, the court of appeals split because 
of a difference of opinion regarding the proper reading of Westmas.  
The majority quoted Westmas for the assertion that "'absent 
reasonably precise specifications,' there can be 'neither control 
nor the right to control the conduct that cause[s] the injury.'"  
Lang, 384 Wis. 2d 520, ¶25 (quoting Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶34).  
The dissent responded: 
I believe the agency standard set forth in Westmas 
involves an encompassing analysis of the level of 
control the principal exerted or had the right to exert 
over the injury-causing conduct of the proposed agent, 
which includes a determination of whether there was 
"reasonable precise control" of the conduct as evidenced 
by "reasonably precise specifications" provided by the 
principal.  The determination of agency is a "fact-
specific" inquiry.  Therefore, in my view, the Westmas 
court's statement regarding its focus on "specific 
directions" provided by the property owner was not a 
separate inquiry, but rather a reflection of the fact 
set of that case. 
Lang, 384 Wis. 2d 520, ¶41 (Brash, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted).   
No.  2017AP2510   
 
17 
 
¶34 We agree with Judge Brash's reading of Westmas.  Westmas 
emphasized that its inquiry was fact-specific, and its conclusion 
rested on several facts:  (1) the written agreement did not 
contemplate control of the methods used to trim trees or safety 
precautions required of the tree trimmers who had caused the 
injury; rather, the contract provided a "vision and concept" and 
the property owner did not supplement the writing with more 
specific instructions, Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶42; (2) the 
property owner had "no background or knowledge on how to perform 
tree-trimming," id.; and (3) the property owner was not aware that 
the tree-trimming service was working on the day the injury 
occurred, id., ¶40.  Together, these facts demonstrated that the 
property owner hired the tree-trimming service to achieve a result 
but did not have the right to control the injury causing conduct.  
Stated otherwise, the property owner did not have the right to 
control the process used to remove the tree limb that caused the 
injury at issue.   
¶35 The right to control the conduct that caused the injury 
is critical to evaluating whether an agency exists, and if so, the 
scope of the agency.  However, whether the injury-causing task is 
simple or requires some degree of specific knowledge by the 
contracting party affects the weight we give to the absence or 
presence of "reasonably precise specifications."  For example, in 
Geise v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 331 N.W.2d 585 
(1983), a father told his son to cut the lawn, and the son 
negligently injured a minor child while doing as his father asked.  
We concluded: 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
18 
 
[The son] was acting as [his father's] servant at the 
time of the accident.  This finding does not rest on the 
domestic relationship between [father and son], or the 
fact that the activity can be labeled a "domestic chore."  
The finding of a master-servant relationship rests on 
the fact that [the father] directed [his son] to perform 
the task, he had the right to control [his son's] 
performance 
of 
the 
task 
and, 
[the 
father] . . . benefited from its performance. 
Id. at 416–17.  We did not discuss or emphasize the precision, or 
lack of precision, in the father's directions to his son.  Doing 
so would have made little sense given the simple nature of the 
task.  Instead, our emphasis was the father's right to control his 
son's actions, actions that resulted in injury.   
¶36 Fryed Audio's placement of electronic and electric cords 
was a simple task that Fryed Audio had performed at the Lions 
Club's festivals in years’ past, including the 2011 Festival.  
However, both the written contract and the testimony of Miller 
showed that the Lions Club had a right to control how the cords 
were placed and whether mats were used to cover them. 
¶37 The contract specified that Rhythm Methods and its 
individual members, which included Fryed Audio, were "bound by the 
terms and conditions" of the contract, thereby subjecting them to 
the Lions Club's control. 
The Performer(s) are engaged severally on the terms and 
conditions of this agreement.  The leader represents 
that the Performer(s) already designated have agreed to 
be bound by said terms and conditions.  Each performer, 
not yet chosen, shall also be bound by said terms and 
conditions upon acceptance.  
The contract, which bore the signature, "Steven Fry," on behalf of 
Rhythm Method, also specified that the leader of Rhythm Methods 
was "the agent" of the Lions Club:   
No.  2017AP2510   
 
19 
 
The leader shall, as the agent of the Purchaser, enforce 
disciplinary measures for just cause and carry out 
instructions as to selections and manner of performance. 
Here, Fryed Audio was the leader of Rhythm Method for purposes of 
setting up the sound system, and its sole member, Steven Fry, was 
the leader in regard to contracting on behalf of Rhythm Method.  
As an agent of the Lions Club, Fryed Audio was subject to the Lions 
Club's right to control the injury causing conduct.  Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶38, 42.  
¶38 The testimony of Miller demonstrated the control that 
the Lions Club had on placing of cords needed for the amplified 
sound of Rhythm Method.  He said that, since Mrs. Lang's fall in 
2012 the Lions Club "require[s] sound companies to either cover 
their wiring or run it over head from the soundboards to the 
stages."  Miller also testified as follows: 
Q 
What, if anything do you do to protect your patrons 
from tripping on these cords? 
A 
We have matting on the cords and orange cones. 
Q 
From whom do you get the matting? 
A 
We own the matting. 
Q 
When you say we, do you mean the Cudahy Lions Club? 
A 
The Cudahy Lions Club owns the matting. 
Q 
And 
the 
Cudahy 
Lions 
Club 
is 
specifically 
responsible for putting the matting on the exposed 
wires? 
A 
Yes.   
By contract, Fryed Audio, was individually bound to the contract's 
terms.  As the leader of Rhythm Method in placing the electronic 
and electric cords, Fryed Audio was the "agent" of the Lions Club, 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
20 
 
thereby giving the Lions Club the right to control the conduct 
that is alleged to have caused injury.  Miller's testimony further 
explained the relationship between Rhythm Method and the Lions 
Club that gave the Lions Club the right to control the injury 
causing conduct, i.e., the placing and covering cords that were 
used to provide amplified sound.  Fryed Audio was the agent of the 
Lions Club, because the Lions Club had the right to control Fryed 
Audio in many respects, including the placing of electronic and 
electrical cords for the amplified sound of Rhythm Method.  
b.  Subagency 
¶39 Sometimes, an agent hires people or businesses to 
perform tasks on behalf of its principal.  The hired people or 
businesses are known as subagents.  3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 7 (2019) 
("A subagent is a person employed by the agent to assist him or 
her in conducting the principal's affairs.").  As the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency illustrates: 
P Corporation retains A Corporation to manage its 
investment portfolio.  S, a senior vice-president of A 
Corporation, is placed in charge of the management of P 
Corporation's portfolio.  S is P Corporation's subagent. 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. b, Ill. 2. 
¶40 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Agency provides: 
(1) A subagent is a person appointed by an agent to 
perform functions that the agent has consented to 
perform on behalf of the agent's principal and for whose 
conduct 
the 
appointing 
agent 
is 
responsible 
to 
principal.  The relationships between a subagent and the 
appointing agent and between the subagent and the 
appointing agent's principal are relationships of 
agency. . . .  
No.  2017AP2510   
 
21 
 
(2) An agent may appoint a subagent only if the 
agent has actual or apparent authority to do so. 
Id., § 3.15; see also Booker v. United American Ins. Co., 700 
So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Ala. 1997) (quoting 3 C.J.S. Agency § 265 
(1973)) ("When one employs an agent who has either express or 
implied authority to employ a subagent, the subagent will also be 
the agent of the principal.").5 
                                                 
5 Though some of the most concise statements about subagency 
are found in the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the concept is 
decades old.  See, e.g., Estes v. Crosby, 171 Wis. 73, 79, 175 
N.W. 933 (1920) (discussing subagency in the context of a real 
estate sale).   
Indeed, one article, reprinted in the Reporter's Notes of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, explains: 
A principal as such is not, without special agreement, 
liable to a subagent for compensation.  That the subagent 
is nevertheless his agent now seems clear beyond 
doubt. . . .  [F]or many years the courts have been 
practically unanimous, whatever their dicta may say, in 
making the principal responsible for the subagent's 
conduct in all the ways in which the conduct of a 
nonservant agent may make a principal liable.  Thus the 
courts now consistently hold that the principal is bound 
by the knowledge of the subagent as if he had been 
directly appointed, with only an occasional dictum to 
the contrary. . . . 
[I]f at any time the subagent is in fact under the 
control of the principal, his conduct in obedience to 
the principal's directions would make him a servant for 
whose conduct the principal, now a master, would be 
responsible. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 5, Reporter's Notes (Appendix 
vol. 3) (reprinting Warren A. Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 665–66 (1955)).   
The substance of the Restatement (Third) of Agency is similar 
to the Restatement (Second) of Agency.  Restatement (Third) of 
Agency §3.15, Reporter's Notes at a. 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
22 
 
¶41 A subagent owes duties to both the principal and the 
appointing agent.  2A C.J.S. Agency § 263 (2019) ("[A] subagent 
who knows of the existence of the ultimate principal owes the 
principal the same duties owed by the agent.").  In particular, 
"[a] subagent owes a duty of obedience to the principal as well as 
to the appointing agent."  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 
cmt. d.  However, "the principal's rights as to the subagent are 
superior to rights of the appointing agent, even in the event of 
conflict or disagreement between principal and appointing agent."  
Id. 
¶42 "An agent has actual authority to create a relationship 
of subagency when the agent reasonably believes, based on a 
manifestation from the principal, that the principal consents to 
the appointment of a subagent."  Id. cmt. c.  "The agent's 
authority to appoint a subagent may be inferred from those powers, 
customs, and usages positively established, but if the agent has 
no authority, express or implied, to make the person so appointed 
the agent of the principal, that person is simply the agent of the 
agent and not the principal."  3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 7; see also 
McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 89, 43 N.W. 800 (1889) (concluding 
that an agent is assumed to have authority to appoint a subagent 
to perform tasks that are "purely executive or ministerial, and 
the principal is bound by the acts of such subagent."). 
¶43 "When an agent is itself a corporation or other legal 
person, its officers, employees, partners, or members who are 
designated to work on the principal's account are subagents." 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. b.  Stated otherwise, 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
23 
 
when a principal creates an agency relationship with a legal 
person, such as an LLC, the principal implicitly consents to 
someone other than the agent performing the work, i.e., a person 
that exists only as a matter of law must act through others.  An 
LLC may act through its members, at least if it is member managed.  
Wis. Stat. § 183.0301(1)(a) ("Each member is an agent of the 
limited liability company, but not of the other members or any of 
them, for the purpose of its business.").  Therefore, a contract 
that creates an agency relationship with an LLC necessarily implies 
an agency relationship with at least some of its members, officers, 
employees, or other agents. 
¶44 When a subagent is an agent of the principal, a principal 
is liable for the tortious actions of a subagent.  To explain: 
As between a principal and third parties, it is 
immaterial that an action was taken by a subagent as 
opposed to an agent directly appointed by the principal.  
In this respect, subagency is governed by a principle of 
transparency that looks from the subagent to the 
principal and through the appointing agent.  As to third 
parties, an action taken by a subagent carries the legal 
consequences for the principal that would follow were 
the action instead taken by the appointing agent. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 727 F. Supp. 2d 765, 774 (D. Minn. 
2010) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. d (2006)).  
Stated otherwise, "[o]nce a third party is validly appointed a 
subagent, the principal is liable for the subagent's actions."  
3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 7. 
3.  Application 
¶45 In the case-at-hand, Steven Fry laid the cables on which 
Mrs. Lang is alleged to have tripped.  He is the sole member of 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
24 
 
Fryed Audio, and Fryed Audio is a member of Rhythm Method, the 
band that the Lions Club contracted with to perform at the 2012 
festival.  Fryed Audio, through the actions of Steven Fry, 
connected the sound system that Rhythm Method needed to fulfill 
its contract with the Lions Club.   
¶46 Fryed Audio had no other contract with the Lions Club 
because as a member of Rhythm Method, Fryed Audio was individually 
a party in the contract between the Lions Club and Rhythm Method.  
This is so because the written contract anticipated a contractual 
relationship with each individual member of Rhythm Method.  It 
provided:   
The Performer(s) are engaged severally on the terms and 
conditions of this agreement.  The leader represents 
that the Performer(s) already designated have agreed to 
be bound by said terms and conditions.  Each performer, 
not yet chosen, shall also be bound by said terms and 
conditions upon acceptance.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶47 The terms and conditions of the contract also provided 
that: 
The Performer(s) shall do everything necessary to 
prosecute the work in an expeditious and workman-like 
manner pursuant to the standards of the trade and all 
work performed will be in accordance with generally 
accepted trade practices.  The Performer(s) shall 
perform said work at the time and place herein specified 
and will be punctual and will provide his own equipment 
for said work unless otherwise specified herein.  
. . . .  
The leader shall, as the agent of the Purchaser, enforce 
disciplinary measures for just cause and carry out 
instructions as to selections and manner of performance.   
No.  2017AP2510   
 
25 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶48 As we have explained above, an agency relationship is 
driven by "the manifestation of consent by one person to another 
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, 
and consent by the other so to act."  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 
¶30 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) (1958)); Hoeft, 
70 Wis. 2d at 1034-35.  There is no dispute that the Lions Club 
requested Rhythm Method to act on its behalf to provide music for 
its 2012 festival and that Rhythm Method consented so to act.  
Furthermore, the Lions Club had broad contractual control.   
¶49 First, the language of the contract gave the Lions Club 
the right to control each member of Rhythm Method, as they are 
severally bound to its terms and conditions.  Second, it gave the 
Lions Club the right to control Rhythm Method and its members for 
everything from showing-up on time, to selecting music and its 
manner of performance, to disciplining members of Rhythm Method 
when its leader was instructed by the Lions Club that discipline 
was requested. 
¶50 As the dissent to the court of appeals opinion capably 
explained: 
According to the record, the band had a contract with 
the Lions Club to play at the festival; Fryed did not 
have a separate contract with either the Lions Club or 
the band.  Given these facts, Fryed's presence at the 
festival was directly related to his role as a member of 
the band, and the tasks he performed were linked to the 
band's contract with the Lions Club. 
Lang, 384 Wis. 2d 520, ¶35 (Brash, J., dissenting). 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
26 
 
¶51 Steven Fry laid cords on the floor of the music tent 
that are alleged to be central to Mrs. Lang's injuries.  Fryed 
Audio, while severally bound by the Lions Club contract, could not 
actually lay the cords upon which Mrs. Lang focuses.  Fryed Audio, 
an LLC, is a legal person that required an actual person to place 
the cords for Rhythm Method's sound system.  We conclude that 
Steven Fry was Fryed Audio's agent for that task and therefore, 
the subagent of the Lions Club for that task as well.  Restatement 
(Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. d; see also Brennan v. Healy, 157 
Wis. 37, 46, 145 N.W.641 (1914) (reasoning that an instruction 
that the agent had authority to do what was necessary "to effect 
the main purpose of the agency, including the employment of a 
subagent" was a proper instruction).   
¶52 Although we can identify no express permission from the 
Lions Club to create a subagency, as we have explained, "Express 
authority to appoint subagents is not always necessary, as such 
authority is usually to be implied when the agency obviously and 
from its very nature is such as to make the employment of subagents 
necessary and proper."  Halls v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 193 
Wis. 16, 19, 213 N.W.649 (1927) (quoting 2 Corp. Jur. 688).  Fryed 
Audio had authority to create a subagency relationship with Steven 
Fry because the Lions Club created an agency with a legal person 
to perform tasks that required a natural person to perform.  Id.  
¶53 Furthermore, the Lions Club had legal responsibility, 
stemming from its permit from Milwaukee County, to provide sound 
in accordance with local ordinance.  Neither Rhythm Method nor its 
members had authority to provide amplified sound independent of 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
27 
 
its relationship with the Lions Club.  As explained above, Rhythm 
Method's contract with the Lions Club subjected it and its 
individual members to the Lions Club's control.   
¶54 Mrs. Lang's primary assertion is that Fryed Audio 
provided sound engineering, which she characterizes as a 
complicated task.  She argues the Lions Club lacked expertise to 
direct such a complicated task, as evidenced by the lack of 
reasonably precise specifications.  Her argument is unpersuasive 
for at least three reasons. 
¶55 First, the task that is alleged to have caused injury 
was the laying of cords on the floor of the music tent.  It was 
not sound engineering, i.e., determining an electronic mix that 
was used to produce the requisite sound.  While the Lions Club may 
have lacked sufficient knowledge to direct a sound engineer, it 
had the ability to require safety measures that attended the laying 
of cords on the music tent floor from the sound system to the 
stage.  Indeed, the Lions Club owned mats for the purpose of 
covering cords, and it had the right to control their placement 
according to Miller's testimony.  Furthermore, the Lions Club had 
the right to control placement of the electronic and electric cords 
by requiring that they be suspended at the ceiling of the tent, 
rather than running on the floor.  In 2012, the Lions Club required 
suspension of the cords in the food tent.  The Lions Club also 
possessed orange safety cones that it could have placed.  These 
facts show the Lions Club's right to control and are far removed 
from the factual underpinnings in Westmas. 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
28 
 
¶56 In Westmas, we focused on the injury causing conduct, 
i.e., the methods chosen for removal of the tree branch and for 
the safety of persons on the ground.  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 
¶40.  We also focused on the agreement between Conference Point 
and Creekside, which described only general concepts.  Id., ¶ 39.  
We concluded that "no facts were presented supportive of the 
conclusion that Conference Point either controlled or had the right 
to control the details of Creekside's work."  Id., ¶38.   
¶57 Second, and relatedly, the absence of reasonably precise 
specifications cannot weigh significantly against the existence of 
an agency relationship when the task that is alleged to have caused 
the injury was the simple task of running cords from the sound 
equipment to the stage.  Geise, 111 Wis. 2d at 416-17.  The Lions 
Club believed that it had done a walk-through after the cords were 
placed, as had been its habit.  It did not direct anyone associated 
with Rhythm Method to cover the cords, but it had the right to 
control where the cords were placed and whether they would be 
covered.   
¶58 Third, the Lions Club and Rhythm Method had a prior 
relationship, wherein Rhythm Method had provided music for other 
Sweet Applewood Festivals.  Rhythm Method had performed the task 
of laying cords from the sound system to the stage in 2011.  
Detailed instructions were not needed in 2012, but the right to 
control where and how the cords were placed did exist, as Miller 
explained. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
No.  2017AP2510   
 
29 
 
¶59 We conclude that there are no issues of material fact in 
regard to the Lions Club's right to control Fryed Audio in regard 
to laying the cords for Rhythm Method's amplified sound and that 
Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club who lawfully acted 
through its subagent, Steven Fry.  Because the Lions Club was a 
statutory owner, Fryed Audio, as its agent, is entitled immunity 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2). 
¶60 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶61 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the lead opinion that Fryed Audio, LLC was an agent of Lions Club 
of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc. and therefore entitled to immunity under 
Wisconsin's recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52 
(2015-16).1  I join the mandate reversing the court of appeals 
decision.  I write separately because I disagree with the lead 
opinion's agency analysis, which derives from Westmas v. Creekside 
Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶¶26-36, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 
N.W.2d 68.  For purposes of recreational immunity, the court 
concluded in Westmas and the lead opinion concludes in this case 
that a property owner relinquishes the right to control the 
activities of third parties it hires to perform services on the 
property unless the property owner:  (1) expressly reserves that 
right by detailing "reasonably precise specifications" the 
contractor must follow; and (2) has the expertise the court deems 
necessary to control the work.  Because property owners have the 
right to control what happens on their own property even in the 
absence of a contractual reservation of rights or expertise in the 
subject matter of the contract, I cannot join the lead opinion's 
reasoning and I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶62 The parties agree on a number of undisputed facts: 
 Lions Club is an "owner" within the meaning of the 
recreational immunity statute. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
2 
 
 Antoinette Lang was engaged in recreational activity at 
the time she tripped on the electrical cords. 
 Lions Club is immune from liability under the recreational 
immunity statute. 
 Lions Club procured the tents, stages, and other festival 
activities and decided where and when the bands performed. 
 Lions Club was responsible for providing electricity at 
the festival and it set up the power outlets used by the 
band for its equipment.  A Lions Club member, Francis 
Miller, testified:  "We have electrical service to feed 
lighting and music in the tents that we're responsible for 
and make sure that that wiring, the electrical wiring, is 
safe[.]" 
 As it had in the past, Lions Club hired Rhythm Method, LLC 
to provide music for the festival. 
 Fryed Audio is a member of Rhythm Method. 
 Steven Fry is the sole member of Fryed Audio and he plugged 
the band's electrical cords into the outlet provided by 
Lions Club, running the cord along the ground to the band's 
equipment. 
 Miller testified that a Lions Club official does a 
walkthrough before the festival begins to make sure there 
are no trip hazards after the band and vendors have set up 
their equipment. 
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
3 
 
 Lang tripped on Rhythm Method's electrical cord laid by 
Fry.2 
¶63 Under these undisputed facts, the circuit court granted 
Lions Club's motion for summary judgment, concluding it was 
entitled to recreational immunity as an "owner" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52.  Subsequently, the circuit court also granted Fryed 
Audio's motion for summary judgment, applying the recreational 
immunity statute to Fryed Audio as an agent of Lions Club.  Lang 
appealed the grant of summary judgment to Fryed Audio, and the 
court of appeals reversed in a 2-1 decision.  The majority of the 
court of appeals applied its understanding of the "reasonably 
precise specifications" test from Westmas, under which it 
concluded that Fryed Audio was not an agent of Lions Club because 
"there is no evidence that Fryed 'was following [the owner's] 
specific directions' when it placed the cords[.]"  Lang v. Lions 
Club, 2018 WI App 69, ¶4, 384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 N.W.2d 329.  
Interpreting Westmas' "reasonably precise specifications" test 
differently, Judge William Brash dissented.  Id., ¶¶33-46.  Judge 
Brash 
determined 
the 
"reasonably 
precise 
specifications" 
requirement was "implicit in the [Lions] Club's extensive 
involvement in the set up of the stage and power sources."  Id., 
¶43. 
                                                 
2 There is also no dispute that the electrical cord was a 
condition of the land under Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc., 2015 
WI App 61, ¶¶15-22, 364 Wis. 2d 658, 869 N.W.2d 515 (concluding 
that alleged negligence relating to the temporary placement of an 
electrical cord on the ground for a band performance at a picnic 
was related to maintenance or a condition of the land). 
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶64 Westmas imported the "reasonably precise specifications" 
agency test from our governmental immunity jurisprudence, under 
which it erroneously concluded that the property owner in Westmas 
had no right to control the tree-trimmer it hired.   Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶34.  As the Westmas dissent explained, a separate 
statute governs governmental immunity, and its principles are 
tailored to "the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions" 
which 
"have 
been 
collectively interpreted to include any act that involves the 
exercise of discretion" by the government.  Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶66 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Kelly, JJ., 
dissenting) (quoted source omitted).  In determining whether 
governmental immunity extends to the government's agent, the 
"reasonably precise specifications" test identifies the extent to 
which the government exercised control over its agent's actions; 
if 
the 
government's 
contractor 
followed 
the 
government's 
"reasonably precise specifications" then governmental immunity 
extends to the contractor.  Id., ¶¶66-67 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley 
and Kelly, JJ., dissenting).  Because the "reasonably precise 
specifications" test examines the level of governmental discretion 
exercised by a government contractor, it should not have been used 
to decide whether the tree-trimmer was an agent of the owner in a 
recreational immunity case.  Id., ¶¶66-67 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley 
and Kelly, JJ., dissenting).  I would overrule Westmas and apply 
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
5 
 
the agency analysis set forth in the Westmas dissent.  See id., 
¶¶58-77.3 
II 
¶65 Because Wis. Stat. § 895.52 does not define an "agent" 
entitled 
to 
recreational 
immunity, 
well-established 
legal 
principles governing agency control the analysis.  Applied to the 
undisputed facts in this case, those principles establish Fryed 
Audio as an agent of Lions Club.  This conclusion does not depend 
on whether the allegedly injury-causing task was simple or required 
expertise Lions Club lacked.  Nor does it hinge on whether Lions 
Club provided "reasonably precise specifications" to Fryed Audio.  
An agency relationship exists when one person either controls or 
has the right to control the activity of another.  Id., ¶60.  
Because Lions Club, the "owner," had the right to control Fryed 
                                                 
3 Justice Rebecca F. Dallet's dissent would "respect Westmas 
as binding precedent."  Justice Dallet dissent, ¶75 n.2.  "While 
adhering to precedent is an important doctrine for lending 
stability to the law, not every decision deserves stare decisis 
effect.  After all, the purpose of stare decisis 'is to make us 
say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be 
held to be true, all in the interest of stability.'"  State v. 
Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶86, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Antonin Scalia, 
A Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and the Law 138-40 
(1997)).  Adhering to Westmas perpetuates bad law and will result 
in arbitrary applications of the recreational immunity statute.  
"Reflexively cloaking every judicial opinion with the adornment of 
stare decisis threatens the rule of law, particularly when applied 
to interpretations wholly unsupported by the statute's text."  
Manitowoc Co., Inc. v. Lanning, 2018 WI 6, ¶81 n.5, 379 
Wis. 2d 189, 
906 
N.W.2d 130 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring).  "The principle of stare decisis does not compel us 
to adhere to erroneous precedents or refuse to correct our own 
mistakes."  State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 
¶31, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376. 
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
6 
 
Audio's placement of the electrical cords, Fryed Audio was an agent 
of the owner and entitled to recreational immunity under § 895.52. 
¶66 The same general agency principles discussed in the 
Westmas dissent apply equally in this case.  See Westmas, 379 
Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶61-65 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Kelly, JJ., 
dissenting).   Decades ago, this court adopted the definition for 
agent set forth in the Restatement of Agency.  In Meyers v. 
Matthews, we determined an agent is "a person authorized by another 
to act on his account and under his control."  270 Wis. 453, 467, 
71 N.W.2d 368 (1955) (quoting Restatement (First) of Agency  § 1 
cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1933)).  The court applied this definition 
of agency consistently and frequently in a variety of factual 
contexts, regardless of whether the right to control was actually 
exercised by the owner.  See, e.g., Schmidt v. Leary, 213 Wis. 587, 
590, 252 N.W. 151 (1934) (agency established because "[t]he 
plaintiff as the owner of the car had the right to control the 
actions of the driver in driving it on the trip, whether she had 
occasion to exercise it or not."). 
¶67 The court reaches the correct conclusion:  Fryed Audio 
is an agent of Lions Club, entitling it to recreational immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  The record establishes that Lions Club 
had the right to control the placement of electrical cords running 
from the power outlet to the band equipment.  Lions Club provided 
the location of the stage as well as the power sources and was in 
charge of electricity at the festival.  The Lions Club member in 
charge walked through the grounds performing a safety check to 
identify and rectify potential tripping hazards.  Lions Club often 
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
7 
 
covered cords with mats to protect patrons from tripping.  Lions 
Club hired the band, and the language of their contract establishes 
Lions Club's right to control where electrical cords were placed.  
Nothing in the contract relinquished this right to control to the 
band and nothing in the record evidences Lions Club otherwise 
surrendered it. 
¶68 The lead opinion complicates the right-to-control 
analysis by considering the complexity or simplicity of the 
allegedly injury-causing task, a new element the lead opinion 
introduces in order to distinguish this case from Westmas.  Whether 
an owner under the recreational immunity statute has the "right to 
control" another's act, however, has nothing to do with whether 
the act is simple or complicated.  The lead opinion further 
distinguishes this case from Westmas by contrasting the experience 
of Lions Club personnel in laying electrical cords with the 
unfamiliarity of the owner in Westmas with tree-trimming.  
Assessing the relative knowledge or expertise of the owner 
regarding the task the owner hired its agent to perform likewise 
has no bearing on whether the owner retained the right to control 
the agent's execution of the work. 
¶69 The owner in Westmas did not need expertise in tree-
trimming in order to control the tree-trimmer it hired to work on 
its property; "[i]f Conference Point had endeavored to tell 
Creekside how to trim trees, it is certainly possible, and maybe 
even likely, that its lack of expertise would cause it to exercise 
that control unwisely, or ineffectually.  But lack of competency 
does not negate the right to control, it just makes it imprudent."  
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
8 
 
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶73 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Kelly, 
JJ., dissenting).  Similarly, the lead opinion attempts to 
distinguish this case from Westmas by contrasting the simplicity 
of laying electrical cords with the complexity of trimming trees.  
As explained by the dissent in Westmas, "the danger presented in 
this case has nothing to do with expertise in tree-trimming.  It 
is the danger of a heavy object falling on someone walking 
by. . . . This danger, and the means of avoiding it, are known to 
quite literally everyone:  Do not be where the branch falls."  Id.  
Preventing injury from falling branches is no more complicated 
than preventing injury from electrical cords; regardless, the 
degree of difficulty associated with each task has nothing to say 
about a property owner's right to control their execution. 
III 
¶70 The new agency analysis the court adopted in Westmas 
forced the lead opinion to attempt to distinguish Westmas from 
this 
case. 
 
Instead, 
the 
court 
should 
abandon 
Westmas' 
misapplication of the governmental immunity test and return to a 
traditional agency analysis in recreational immunity cases.  Under 
well-established agency principles, Lions Club had the right to 
control where Fryed Audio placed the electrical cord; therefore, 
Fryed Audio was an agent of Lions Club and entitled to recreational 
immunity. 
¶71 The court correctly reverses the court of appeals and 
holds that Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club because the 
undisputed facts demonstrate Lions Club had the right to control 
the placement of the electrical cord on which Lang tripped.  
No.  2017AP2510.rgb 
 
9 
 
Importing the "reasonably precise specifications" test from 
governmental immunity cases muddied the right-to-control test in 
recreational immunity cases.  In attempting to distinguish Westmas 
from this case, the lead opinion further complicates the analysis 
by adding yet another ill-fitting consideration of the simplicity 
or complexity of the allegedly injury-causing task.  None of this 
is necessary because well-established agency principles already 
answer the question of whether an owner has the right to control 
its agent, thereby entitling the agent to recreational immunity. 
¶72 I join the mandate reversing the court of appeals because 
I agree that Fryed Audio was an agent of Lions Club based on Lions 
Club's right to control how Fryed Audio laid the electrical cord.  
The circuit court correctly granted summary judgment to Fryed 
Audio, which is immune from liability to Lang under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52.  I cannot join the lead opinion's reasoning because it 
relies on the erroneous agency analysis of Westmas, while adding 
additional considerations irrelevant to the determination of 
whether an owner ceded the right to control its agent.  The lead 
opinion erodes private property rights by determining that an owner 
loses its right to control the actions of a third party hired to 
perform services on the property unless the owner dictates the 
details of the work's execution and possesses the expertise to do 
so.  I respectfully concur. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY joins 
this concurrence. 
No.  2017AP2510.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶74 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  Before this 
court is a straightforward question:  is Fryed Audio, LLC an 
"agent" of the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., so as to be 
entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52?  Fryed 
Audio consists of one member, Steven Fry, who is also a member of 
the band Rhythm Method, LLC.  Rhythm Method contracted to play at 
a festival hosted by the Lions Club and tasked Fryed Audio with 
setting up its sound equipment.  Fryed Audio never entered into a 
separate contract with the Lions Club.  Antoinette Lang allegedly 
tripped on an electric cord laid by Fryed Audio, which led to this 
lawsuit.1 
¶75 The lead opinion concludes that Fryed Audio is an agent 
of the Lions Club because the Lions Club had the "right to control 
Fryed Audio in regard to laying the cords for Rhythm Method's 
amplified sound and that Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions 
Club who lawfully acted through its subagent, Steven Fry."  Lead 
op., ¶3.  Neither the lead opinion nor the concurrence provide a 
coherent stopping point for recreational immunity, and both go 
beyond the bounds of even a liberal statutory interpretation.  
Applying the plain statutory language and our controlling 
precedent, Westmas v. Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 2018 WI 12, 
379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68, I conclude that Fryed Audio is not 
                                                 
1 As the lead opinion correctly notes, Lang sued several 
parties and Fryed Audio is the only remaining defendant. Lead op., 
¶12. 
No.  2017AP2510.rfd 
 
2 
 
entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52.2  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶76 The legislature enacted the recreational immunity 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52, in light of "the continual shrinkage 
of the public's access to recreational land in the ever more 
populated modern world."  Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 
Wis. 2d 486, 489, 431 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1988).  The stated 
purpose of § 895.52 is to limit the liability of property owners, 
and their officers, employees, and agents, to encourage them to 
open their lands to the public for recreational activities.  See 
Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 
N.W.2d 492.  Although the legislature has indicated that the 
recreational immunity statute should be construed liberally in 
favor of property owners, see 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1, this does 
not mean that it affords limitless immunity.  As this court has 
explained:   
The benefits of granting immunity, i.e., encouraging 
landowners to open their lands to the public, comes from 
immunizing people or municipalities in their capacities 
as landowners . . . . Extending immunity to landowners 
for negligently performing in a capacity unrelated to 
the land . . . will not contribute to a landowner's 
decision to open the land for public use. 
Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶36 (quoting Linville v. City of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 719, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994)).  
                                                 
2 The concurrence "would overrule Westmas and apply the agency 
analysis set forth in the Westmas dissent."  Concurrence, ¶64.  I 
respect Westmas as binding precedent and apply the test enunciated 
by a majority of the court in that case just two years ago.  Westmas 
v. Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 2018 WI 12, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 
N.W.2d 68.   
No.  2017AP2510.rfd 
 
3 
 
¶77 This 
case 
involves 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation regarding a single word in Wis. Stat. § 895.52:  
"agent."  We recently interpreted the term "agent" in the 
recreational immunity context in Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471.  In 
Westmas, the plaintiff was walking on a public path on property 
owned by Conference Point when she was struck and killed by a tree 
branch trimmed by Creekside Tree Service.  Id., ¶13.  Conference 
Point had contracted with Creekside for pruning and removal of 
trees overhanging the path.  Id., ¶8.  Creekside sought immunity 
under the recreational immunity statute as an "agent" of Conference 
Point, the statutory "owner."  Id., ¶25.  After examining agency 
law in other contexts, most notably the governmental immunity 
statute, the Westmas court concluded:  "an agent is one who acts 
on behalf of and is subject to reasonably precise control by the 
principal for the tasks the person performs within the scope of 
the agency.  Whether an independent contractor is an agent is a 
fact-specific inquiry."  Id., ¶36 (emphasis added).  Applying this 
test to the undisputed facts, the Westmas court determined that 
"Creekside was not an agent of Conference Point because Conference 
Point had neither control of, nor the right to control, the details 
of Creekside's work, including the acts that caused injury to [the 
plaintiff]."  Id., ¶3. 
¶78 The lead opinion here purports to apply Westmas, but its 
analysis misses the mark.  In distinguishing Westmas, the lead 
opinion asserts that the placement of cords is a "simple task" for 
which no reasonably precise specifications need be given and that 
"both the written contract and the testimony of [Frank] Miller 
No.  2017AP2510.rfd 
 
4 
 
showed that the Lions Club had a right to control how the cords 
were placed and whether mats were used to cover them."  Lead op., 
¶36.  The concurrence would overturn Westmas, but similarly finds, 
in conclusory fashion, that the "language of [the] contract 
establishes Lions Club's right to control . . . ."  Concurrence, 
¶67.   
¶79 Neither the contract nor Miller's testimony, however, 
support the conclusion of the lead opinion or the concurrence.  
The contract does not say that the Lions Club had "the right to" 
control the sound setup.  Instead, it says the exact opposite:  
"Sounds and lights by band."  Miller's deposition further confirms 
this understanding:  "The sound companies who were providing 
services to the bands weren't contracted by us, so we did not get 
involved in how they set up their equipment."  This evidence 
demonstrates the contract left the "means and methods" for setting 
up the band's sound to the band.  This is no different from Westmas, 
where the landowner left the "means and methods" of tree-trimming 
to the tree trimmer as demonstrated by the lack of "reasonably 
precise" specifications for how the work was to be performed.  See 
Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶36, 40.  
¶80 The lead opinion attempts to circumvent Westmas's 
requirement of reasonably precise specifications by contending 
that laying cords is a "simple task" for which no reasonably 
No.  2017AP2510.rfd 
 
5 
 
precise specifications are necessary.3  See lead op., ¶¶36, 57.  
Such a rule is really no rule at all.  Its amorphous nature gives 
no clarity to courts and litigants moving forward and will 
inevitably generate more litigation.  By contrast, the rule set 
forth in Westmas is clear:  whether the principal provided 
reasonably precise specifications for the task.  In this case, the 
rule set forth in Westmas dictates a result contrary to that 
reached by a majority of this court because no specifications were 
given for Fryed Audio's work, much less reasonably precise ones. 
¶81 Simply saying that the Lions Club retained the right to 
control everything at the festival, whether it exercised that 
control or not, results in the extension of broad immunity not 
contemplated by the recreational immunity statute.  The lead 
opinion and the concurrence, by phrasing their conclusions in this 
expansive way, nullify the "fact-specific" and "fact-bound" 
inquiry required by Westmas.   
¶82 In addition to nullifying Westmas's fact-specific 
inquiry, a majority of this court extends immunity outside of the 
confines of Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  The lead opinion creates immunity 
not only for an owner and its officers, employees, and agents, as 
provided by the statute, but also for "subagents," a formulation 
                                                 
3 The lead opinion initially claims that "[i]t does not matter 
whether the conduct that caused the injury is complex or simple," 
lead op., ¶30, but quickly reverses course by holding that "whether 
the injury-causing task is simple or requires some degree of 
specific knowledge  . . . affects the weight we give to the absence 
or presence of 'reasonably precise specifications,'" lead op., 
¶35.  The lead opinion's undoing of Westmas's reasonably precise 
specifications requirement relies entirely on its amorphous 
simple-complex distinction. 
No.  2017AP2510.rfd 
 
6 
 
not briefed or argued by any party.  That is, not an agent of an 
owner, but an agent of an agent of an owner.  Under both the lead 
opinion's formulation of "subagency" and the concurrence's 
definition of "right to control," nearly every person associated 
with the festival would be entitled to immunity.  The Lions Club 
has the broad "right to control" what goes on at its festival, so 
everyone from the president of the Lions Club to a delivery driver 
supplying cotton candy supplies to a food truck would likely enjoy 
recreational immunity under the new standards offered by a majority 
of this court.4 
¶83 Further, the lead opinion's discussion of subagency is 
premised on secondary sources and foreign cases.  The precious 
little support for the lead opinion's discussion on Wisconsin law 
comes from century-old cases that do not perform any in-depth 
exploration of the topic.  See lead op., ¶40 n.5 (citing Estes v. 
Crosby, 171 Wis. 73, 79, 175 N.W. 933 (1920)); id., ¶42 (citing 
McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 89, 43 N.W. 800 (1889)).  But the 
authority that the lead opinion cites makes one thing clear:  
agency and subagency are two separate and distinct legal concepts.  
And to the extent the law recognizes this distinct category of 
subagent, it is not included in the discrete list of "officer, 
employee or agent of an owner" provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(2)(b).  We must presume that the legislature "'carefully 
and precisely' chooses statutory language to express a desired 
meaning."  Indus. to Indus., Inc. v. Hillsman Modular Molding, 
                                                 
4 After all, the Lions Club could control what route the 
delivery driver takes when driving on the property. 
No.  2017AP2510.rfd 
 
7 
 
Inc., 2002 WI 51, ¶19 n.5, 252 Wis. 2d 544, 644 N.W.2d 236 (quoted 
source omitted).  Implementing this principle, we must conclude 
that the legislature knew what it was doing when it included 
"agents" but not "subagents" within its grant of recreational 
immunity in § 895.52(2)(b).  
¶84 Essentially, the majority of this court is telling 
members of the public that when they enter any community festival, 
they do so at their own risk.  This result is far afield from the 
immunity necessitated to achieve the stated purpose of the 
recreational immunity statute——to encourage property owners to 
open their lands to the public to engage in recreational 
activities.  Fryed Audio played no part in opening the land and 
its liability here would not deter the Lions Club from hosting its 
festival again, yet the majority of this court extends to it 
immunity.  This conclusion is contrary to the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) and a faithful application of our 
precedent to the record in this case.  
¶85 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
1 
 
¶87 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
An 
agency 
relationship is not the same as a contract for services.  The 
outcome in this case takes us further from that principle.  The 
key question in agency law is whether the principal has the right 
to control the agent's activities——that is, the means and manner 
of the agent's work.  Underlying this case, however, is an injury 
arising from a particular type of activity:  negligent physical 
conduct.  Our law has long distinguished between the physical 
conduct of the two types of agents——independent contractors and 
servants.  An independent contractor is one whose physical conduct 
is not subject to the control of another, while a servant's 
physical conduct is. 
¶88 Wisconsin's recreational immunity statute includes 
within its grant of immunity "agents" of an owner.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(2) (2017-18).1  This of course doesn't apply to "agents" 
not acting within the scope of their agency.  That is, for immunity 
to be granted to an agent, the physical conduct that caused the 
injury must be within the scope of any agency relationship.  By 
definition, the physical conduct of independent contractors is not 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
any 
independent 
contractor 
agency 
relationship.  This means the only kind of agency relationship 
that includes within its scope negligent physical conduct that 
causes injury is a master-servant relationship, where the physical 
conduct of the servant is always under the control of and 
attributable to the master.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
2 
 
§ 250 (1958) (stating the general rule that a "principal is not 
liable for physical harm caused by the negligent physical conduct 
of a non-servant agent"). 
¶89 Thus, the question of whether Fryed Audio, LLC was acting 
as an agent of the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc. when 
carrying out the injury-causing conduct is premised on whether the 
Lions Club and Fryed Audio were in a master-servant relationship.  
Under our law, no such relationship was present here.  Fryed Audio 
was therefore not acting within the scope of any agency 
relationship when laying the cords and is not entitled to immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).  I respectfully dissent. 
 
I 
¶90 We have adopted and applied the definition of agency 
from the Restatement (Second) of Agency:  "Agency is the fiduciary 
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."  
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1); see, e.g., Strupp v. Farmers 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 158, 167, 109 N.W.2d 660 (1961).  
"It is well established that the most important factor in 
determining whether a person is an agent is the extent of the 
control retained over the details of the work."  Kablitz v. Hoeft, 
25 Wis. 2d 518, 521, 131 N.W.2d 346 (1964). 
¶91 Our law has distinguished between two types of agents.  
Agents may be either servants or independent contractors. 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
3 
 
¶92 All servants are agents, but agents of a particular kind.  
Saunders v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 85 Wis. 2d 70, 77 & n.1, 270 
N.W.2d 176 (1978).  "A servant is one employed to perform service 
for another in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical 
conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the 
other's control or right to control."  Heims v. Hanke, 5 
Wis. 2d 465, 468, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958), overruled in part by Butzow 
v. Wausau Mem'l Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).  The 
typical example is the employee-employer relationship.  Romero v. 
W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, ¶39, 371 Wis. 2d 478, 885 
N.W.2d 591.  When employees are acting within the scope of their 
employment, they are acting as agents of the employer.  Kerl v. 
Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶23, 273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 
N.W.2d 328; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219.  Masters have 
the right to control, and are therefore liable for, the physical 
conduct of their servants.  This is true whether masters exercise 
that control, whether it is spelled out in a contract, or whether 
reasonably precise specifications have been prescribed.  The 
nature of the right to control the physical conduct necessary to 
establish a master-servant relationship has a broader body of law 
to guide us.  That will be discussed below. 
¶93 Independent contractors, in contrast, may or may not be 
agents.  Saunders, 85 Wis. 2d at 77 & n.1; Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 2(3).  Sometimes independent contractors are simply hired 
to perform a service.  The contract may contain reasonably precise 
specifications or other performance and quality-oriented details.  
It also may not.  But none of that is key to whether the independent 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
4 
 
contractor is acting as an agent with respect to the independent 
contractor's physical activities. 
¶94 While an independent contractor may enter into a 
contractual relationship to do something for another, the 
independent contractor "is not controlled by the other nor subject 
to the other's right to control with respect to his physical 
conduct."  Romero, 371 Wis. 2d 478, ¶40 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 2(3)).  In other words, one who engages an 
independent contractor, whether an agent or not, does not have the 
right to control the physical conduct of the independent 
contractor.  Even a contract that requires certain outcomes or 
appears to retain control over certain areas does not, with respect 
to the physical conduct of the independent contractor, constitute 
the right to control necessary to establish a fiduciary agency 
relationship.  Hence, even an independent contractor agent is, 
with respect to his physical conduct, not acting within the scope 
of the agency relationship. 
¶95 By way of example, if I pay a lawn company to mow my 
lawn, I could demand control over certain things or require 
specific results——cut once per week and no higher than 1.5 inches, 
and remove sticks ahead of time.  Suppose the lawn company missed 
a stick, and it was flung into a passerby, causing injury.  Now I 
certainly could have gone out and told the company, "You missed a 
stick over there; go pick it up."  In that respect, one might 
describe that as a right to control.  But with respect to the 
negligent physical conduct causing the injury, the lawn company is 
not acting as my agent.  I do not have the type of relationship 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
5 
 
where the lawn company is acting as a fiduciary on my behalf, and 
with my consent.  This is merely an independent contractor hired 
to perform a contract for services.  See generally Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 14N (describing non-agent and agent 
independent contractors).  A results-oriented contract, whether 
detailed or not, does not mean the lawn company is acting as my 
agent in carrying out these physical activities. 
¶96 An inverse example comes by way of our 1983 decision in 
Giese, where we concluded that a son cutting the lawn at the 
direction of his father was an agent.  Giese v. Montgomery Ward, 
Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 416-17, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983).  But there, 
we explained that in order for the father to be liable for the 
physical harm to third persons caused by the tortious conduct of 
his son, "the master-servant relationship must exist."  Id. at 
415.  This is because physical harm to third persons caused by the 
physical conduct of independent contractors is, by definition, not 
attributable to the principal.  The kind of agency that would 
ascribe liability to the father must instead be rooted in a master-
servant relationship.  And we ultimately concluded the son was 
acting as his father's servant——that was the basis for liability.  
Id. at 416. 
¶97 Another example helps illustrate the distinction.  If I 
hire an attorney from a law firm to represent me in a case, I have 
hired an independent contractor.  For purposes of the attorney's 
representation, the attorney acts as my agent——having the 
authority to act on my behalf with my consent, and subject to my 
control.  However, I have no control over the attorney's physical 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
6 
 
conduct.  Therefore, an attorney who negligently injures another 
while driving to represent me in a deposition is not acting on my 
behalf.  I am not liable for that conduct.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. e ("The salesman of a real estate 
broker, while driving T, a prospective customer, to view a house, 
negligently injures him.  The broker, but not the broker's 
principal, is subject to liability to T."); Restatement (Second) 
of Agency § 250 cmts. a & b ("[T]he principal is not liable for 
the negligent physical conduct of an attorney, a broker, a factor, 
or a rental agent, as such."; "There is no inference that because 
a principal has authorized an act to be done which would be non-
tortious if done carefully, he is liable for the act of a non-
servant if the latter was negligent in his performance."). 
¶98 A 1978 decision of this court shows why the difference 
between independent contractors and servants is key to this case.  
In Arsand v. City of Franklin, the surviving spouse and estate 
representative of Mr. Arsand sued the City after an airplane 
accident caused his death.  83 Wis. 2d 40, 42-43, 264 N.W.2d 579 
(1978).  They argued the pilot, whose negligence the parties 
stipulated to, was acting as the City's agent.  Id. at 43.  The 
jury instructions framed the question accordingly, and the jury 
agreed the pilot was an agent.  Id. at 43-45.  We reversed, 
however.  The question, we said, is not whether an agency 
relationship exists.  Id. at 49.  Because this was an injury 
arising from the physical conduct of the pilot, the determination 
of an agency relationship was insufficient to answer the question.  
Id.  Since agency encompasses independent contractor agents, and 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
7 
 
principals are not responsible for the physical conduct of 
independent contractors, the jury instruction did not sufficiently 
establish liability.  Id. at 49-50.  The real question, and what 
the jury should have been asked, is whether the pilot was a servant 
of the City.  Id. at 50.  Therefore, we reversed and remanded.  
Id. at 57. 
¶99 With 
this 
distinction 
in 
mind, 
we 
examine 
the 
relationship between Lions Club and Fryed Audio. 
 
II 
¶100 Because this case involves an injury to a third party 
due to the negligent physical conduct of Fryed Audio, the key 
question is whether Fryed Audio was a servant of the Lions Club.  
If Fryed Audio was an independent contractor of the Lions Club (or 
something less), then by definition its physical conduct was not 
within the scope of any agency relationship, regardless of any 
contractual control or specifications.  On the other hand, if Fryed 
Audio was a servant of the Lions Club, it was acting as an agent 
with respect to its physical conduct——the conduct that caused the 
injury. 
¶101 While, "[t]he right to control is the dominant test in 
determining whether an individual is a servant," we have affirmed 
that other factors inform the analysis.  Pamperin v. Trinity Mem'l 
Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 188, 199, 423 N.W.2d 848 (1988).  These include:  
"the place of work, the time of the employment, the method of 
payment, the nature of the business or occupation, which party 
furnishes the instrumentalities or tools, the intent of the parties 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
8 
 
to the contract, and the right of summary discharge of employees."  
Id. 
¶102 The Restatement (Second) of Agency, which we have cited 
and approved with regularity in this area, similarly provides this 
framework:   
In determining whether one acting for another is a 
servant or an independent contractor, the following 
matters of fact, among others, are considered:   
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the 
master may exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a 
distinct occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, 
in the locality, the work is usually done under the 
direction of the employer or by a specialist without 
supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the 
person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the 
job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular 
business of the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating 
the relation of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2). 
¶103 As 
these 
factors 
reflect, 
though 
an 
employment 
relationship is not the only type of master-servant relationship 
that can be created, it is paradigmatic.  The Restatement (Second) 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
9 
 
of Agency notes that most statutes used the word "employee" in 
lieu of "servant," and that in general, the term "is synonymous 
with servant."  Id. at cmt. g.  The Restatement (Third) of Agency 
goes even further.  It eliminates the use of "master" and 
"servant," replacing it with a determination of whether the actor 
is an "employee" acting within the scope of his or her employment.  
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 & cmt. a (2006). 
¶104 The relationship between Fryed Audio and the Lions Club 
looks nothing like a master-servant relationship.  At the outset, 
there is no formal relationship between Fryed Audio and the Lions 
Club at all.  There is no contractual relationship between these 
two entities establishing the Lions Club's authority to determine 
how Fryed Audio carried out the means and manner of its sound 
system set-up responsibilities.  As one court helpfully explained:   
The most common language used to flesh out the right of 
control, however, typically references the principal's 
power to determine the "means and details" of the agent's 
work.  Thus, the right of control "includes not only the 
right to assign tasks, but also the right to dictate the 
means and details of the process by which an agent will 
accomplish the task." 
Cardinal Health Sols., Inc. v. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., 643 
F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (quoted source omitted).  No 
contractual language of this kind exists here.  Nothing else in 
the record suggests the Lions Club had the right to control the 
means and manner of how Fryed Audio set up the sound system.  Id. 
("A right of control requires more than a general right to order 
the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or receive 
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not 
necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations. . . . There 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
10 
 
must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the 
contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way."). 
¶105 None of the other related indicia of a master-servant 
relationship are found here either.  The Lions Club does not 
purport to have told Fryed Audio when to do its job.  Setting up 
band sound systems was not a normal part of the Lions Club 
operations, nor did it furnish equipment or training or expertise 
for such a task.  This was a one-time job orchestrated by a 
different entity——Rhythm Method, LLC.  Moreover, the Lions Club 
didn't even have an obligation to pay Fryed Audio.  Pamperin, 144 
Wis. 2d at 201–02 ("[F]actors which indicate a master-servant 
relationship, e.g., a fixed monthly salary and withholding of taxes 
and social security, are not present in this case.").  The Lions 
Club had no contractual right to fire Fryed Audio.  There was no 
agreement for fees, no sharing of offices or billing, no shared or 
mandated insurance, and no oversight by the Lions Club in 
determining who Fryed Audio could serve.  See id. at 201 (examining 
factors including maintaining separate offices, billing and 
collection 
responsibility, 
authority 
to 
establish 
fees, 
responsibility for malpractice insurance, and permission to work 
for others). 
¶106 While some limited kinds of control may have been present 
here by virtue of Fryed Audio doing work at an event Lions Club 
was organizing, this comes nowhere close to a master-servant 
relationship.  Because that is the only kind of relationship where 
agency would extend to control of Fryed Audio's physical conduct 
by the Lions Club——the kind of conduct that caused the injury——
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11 
 
Fryed Audio was not acting as the agent of the Lions Club by laying 
down the cords. 
 
III 
¶107 The key question in agency is the right to control.  But 
this means more than a contractual agreement for services 
establishing some types of control.  It means the right to control 
the means and manner of accomplishing the work performed or at 
issue.  Only masters have the requisite right to control the 
physical conduct of their servants.  Independent contractors are 
not, with respect to their physical conduct, acting within the 
scope of any agency relationship that might exist.  Because Fryed 
Audio was not in a master-servant relationship with the Lions Club, 
its negligent physical conduct cannot be said to be within any 
agency relationship.  Therefore, Fryed Audio is not entitled to 
immunity under the recreational immunity statute. 
No.  2017AP2510.bh 
 
 
 
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