Title: Watson v. Comminssioner Stanley Taylor, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 194, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 4, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TERRENCE WATSON a/k/a  
SIDDIQ A. ALEEM, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER STANLEY 
TAYLOR, WARDEN RAPHAEL 
WILLIAMS, et al., 
 
Defendants Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 194, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 02C-02-230 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 9, 2003 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:   August 4, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 4th day of August 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellees’ motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Terrence Watson a/k/a Siddiq A. 
Aleem, filed an appeal from the Superior Court’s April 15, 2003 order 
granting the defendants-appellees’ motion for summary judgment. 1  The 
                                                                 
1 In connection with this appeal we also review two earlier Superior Court orders dated 
March 5, 2002 and November 21, 2002, which dismissed certain of Watson’s claims as 
frivolous and denied others as moot or without any factual or legal basis. 
 
2
State of Delaware, as the real party in interest, has moved to affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of Watson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) 
On April 12, 2002, Watson, a prison inmate, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s March 5, 2002 order dismissing his civil 
complaint as frivolous.2  The complaint alleged that Watson’s constitutional 
rights were violated due to improper placement in the prison system and lack 
of access to rehabilitation, and overcrowded, unsanitary and inhumane 
conditions at the Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility at Gander Hill (the 
“MPCJF”).3  The Superior Court dismissed Watson’s complaint on the 
ground that he had failed to state a claim concerning his placement in the 
prison system and his lack of access to rehabilitation.  It did not address 
Watson’s claims alleging violations of his constitutional rights due to 
conditions at the MPCJF.  Watson appealed to this Court from the Superior 
Court’s decision. 
 
(3) 
On September 23, 2002, this Court remanded the matter to the 
Superior Court so that Watson’s constitutional claims concerning conditions 
                                                                 
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8803(b) (1999). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 
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at the MPCJF might be addressed.4  On remand, the Superior Court issued an 
order on November 21, 2002 dismissing Watson’s constitutional claims 
concerning conditions at the MPCJF as moot, since Watson was no longer 
an inmate at that facility. 5  However, the Superior Court determined that 
Watson’s claims for damages arising out of exposure to the conditions at the 
MPCJF to have been sufficiently well-pleaded to withstand summary 
dismissal and directed the defendants to file an answer to those claims. 
 
(4) 
  In lieu of an answer, the defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment, with supporting affidavits, on the ground that Watson 
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies6 and failed to support his 
claims with facts sufficient to state a claim for damages arising out of his 
confinement at the MPCJF.7  Following a hearing, the Superior Court 
granted the motion for summary judgment.   
 
(5) 
In the instant appeal, Watson claims that the Superior Court 
abused its discretion and committed legal error by dismissing his claims of 
improper classification and lack of rehabilitation as frivolous, dismissing his 
                                                                 
4 Watson v. Taylor et al., Del. Supr., No. 185, 2002, Walsh, J. (Sept. 23, 2002). 
5 The Superior Court also dismissed a request by Watson for protection from retaliation 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
6 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Prison Litigation Reform Act).   
7 SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 56. 
 
4
claims regarding conditions at the MPCJF as moot and granting defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.  Watson also claims that the Superior Court 
failed to address the matters this Court directed it to consider on remand and 
failed to address his motion for the appointment of counsel. 
 
(6) 
We find no merit to Watson’s claims.  In its March 5, 2002 
order, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Watson’s claims of 
constitutional violations due to improper classification within the prison 
system and lack of rehabilitation as frivolous and for failing to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.  We find no error of law or abuse of 
discretion on the part of the Superior Court in so ruling. 8  With respect to the 
Superior Court’s November 21, 2002 order, the Superior Court properly 
dismissed Watson’s claims regarding conditions at MPCJF as moot since 
Watson had already been moved from that facility to another facility within 
the Delaware prison system.9     
 
(7) 
We review de novo the Superior Court’s April 15, 2003 order  
granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 10  Summary 
                                                                 
8 Nicholson v. Snyder, Del. Supr., No. 320, 1992, Walsh, J. (Oct. 19, 1992) (an inmate 
does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his classification status). 
9 GMC v. New Castle County, 701 A.2d 819, 823 (Del. 1997) (although there may have 
been a justiciable controversy at the time the litigation was commenced, the action will 
be dismissed if that controversy ceases to exist). 
10 Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002). 
 
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judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact, 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 11  In order to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is required to 
present some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support all of the 
elements of the claim. 12  A motion for summary judgment is properly granted 
against a plaintiff who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to the plaintiff’s case, and on which the 
plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial. 13   
 
(8) 
We find no error or abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s 
determination that Watson failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to 
damages arising out of his confinement at the MPCJF.  While Watson 
complains about conditions such as confinement in an overcrowded cell, 
exposure to cigarette smoke, and a lack of adequate sanitary facilities, he 
does not demonstrate a nexus between those conditions and any specific 
harm to him personally, an issue upon which he would bear the burden of 
                                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Reybold Group, Inc. v. Chemprobe Technologies, Inc., 721 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Del. 
1998). 
13 Id. at 1271 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). 
 
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proof at trial. 14  Thus, the Superior Court properly granted the State’s motion 
for summary judgment. 15   
 
(9) 
Watson’s last two claims also are without merit.  We have 
reviewed the Superior Court’s order on remand and conclude that there is no 
factual basis for Watson’s claim that the Superior Court did not address the 
issues we directed it to address on remand.  Finally, although the Superior 
Court did not rule on Watson’s request for the appointment of counsel, that 
error was harmless, since Watson failed to demonstrate any special 
circumstances justifying the appointment of counsel. 16 
 
(10) It is manifest on the face of Watson’s opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion. 
                                                                 
14 Duphily v. Delaware Electric Cooperative, Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 828-29 (Del. 1995). 
15 Reybold Group, Inc. v. Chemprobe Technologies, Inc., 721 A.2d at 1271 (citing 
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).  We do not address the State’s claim that 
Watson improperly failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 
16 Jackson v. Division of State Police, Del. Supr., No. 323, 1992, Moore, J. (Oct. 7, 1992). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice