Title: Meagher v. Quale
Citation: 77 N.W.2d 878
Docket Number: 7561
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 1956

77 N.W.2d 878 (1956) E. J. MEAGHER and E. M. Meagher, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Alice J. QUALE, Defendant and Respondent. No. 7561. Supreme Court of North Dakota. July 13, 1956. *879 Lyche &amp; Lyche, Grand Forks, for appellants. Shaft, Benson, &amp; Shaft, Grand Forks, for respondent. GRIMSON, Judge. This is an action brought to foreclose a mechanic's lien. It appears from the record that on the 11th day of June 1949, the plaintiffs, a co-partnership, entered into a contract with Alice J. Quale and Alice W. Rafter, to raise an apartment building on Lots 3 and 4, Viet's Addition to the City of Grand Forks; that the defendant, Alice J. Quale, was the owner of said premises and Alice W. Rafter had a life estate therein. The plaintiffs claim that there is due for the work done under contract, $734.25, for which amount they duly filed a mechanic's lien against the premises on Sept. 20, 1949. On the 23rd day of September, 1949, Alice J. Quale and Alice W. Rafter commenced an action against the plaintiffs for damages to the building in the sum of $3,000 which they claim was caused by the carelessness and negligence of the plaintiffs in raising said building. In that action the plaintiffs herein filed an answer denying all carelessness. They counterclaimed for $734.25 claimed to be due for services under the contract. They asked that the plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint and defendants be awarded a judgment in their favor in the sum of $734.25, together with interest and costs. The plaintiffs in that action, defendants in this action, replied on March 1, 1950, claiming that the agreement provided that the services for raising the building would not be in excess of $225 and as a separate defense that the plaintiffs herein had not qualified for that work under the ordinances of the City of Grand Forks. Nothing further seems to have been done about the matter in issue until the plaintiffs commenced this action for the foreclosure of the mechanic's lien on May 27, 1954. In that complaint they allege the contract for raising the building, the performance of the plaintiffs under that contract; the demand for payment; the filing of the mechanic's lien; the death of Alice W. Rafter so that the defendant, Alice J. Quale, is the sole owner of the property. They further allege that the notice of intention to foreclose was mailed to the defendant and received by her April 12, 1954, pursuant to Section 35-1221, NDRC 1943. They claim that there is due under the contract $743.25 and ask that said sum be adjudged a lien against the real estate described and for the foreclosure of said lien for that amount and costs. To this complaint the defendant, Alice J. Quale, answers making a general denial and alleging as a separate defense that "there is another action pending between the plaintiffs and the defendant for the same cause of action." She further alleges a defense that the plaintiffs did not qualify for the work under the ordinances of the City of Grand Forks and as a counterclaim she alleges the negligence of the plaintiffs in performing the work thereby damaging the property in the sum of $3,000. To this answer the plaintiffs make a general denial. After this action had been noticed for trial a pretrial conference was held at which time this matter of another action pending was argued. The district court took judicial notice of the pleadings, papers and files in the case of Alice J. Quale and Alice W. *880 Rafter v. E. J. Meagher and E. M. Meagher, co-partners, and after consideration of the matter and the briefs filed the court ordered this action dismissed on the grounds "that the issues in both actions are identical, and that the issues set forth in the pleadings in this action can be finally resolved in the first action wherein Alice J. Quale and Alice W. Rafter are plaintiffs and E. J. Meagher et al. are defendants." Plaintiffs appeal from the order of the district court dismissing this action and ask for a trial de novo. Counsel on both sides agree that the only issue on this appeal is whether the court erred in dismissing the appeal on the grounds that there was another action involving the same matters pending. The question for determination is, therefore, whether the two actions are sufficiently identical to support that finding. The first action brought by Alice J. Quale and Alice W. Rafter against the defendants is for damages arising out of the work performed by the plaintiffs herein, E. J. Meagher et al. They counterclaimed for the value of that work. They also have a right to a mechanic's lien for that work. Section 35-1203, NDRC 1943. They did not avail themselves of that right in connection with their counterclaim. That is a cumulative remedy which may be exercised even though a money judgment was obtained. 57 C.J.S., Mechanics' Lien, § 266, p. 874. The present action brought by the plaintiffs is for the purpose of enforcing their mechanic's lien. It is not affected in any way by their counterclaim for that amount in the prior action brought by the defendant. The lien is not involved in that action at all. Even if the plaintiffs recovered judgment on their counterclaim in the prior action they would still have to bring an action in equity to enforce their lien. In Erickson v. Russ, 21 N.D. 208, 129 N.W. 1025, 1026, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 1072, this court said: In the case of Erickson v. Russ, supra, the court held: There is no such requirement in our laws. The general rule is that a lien claimant may bring personal action against owner for debt as cumulative remedy without waiving right to lien. Roseliep v. Herro, 206 Wis. 256, 239 N.W. 413, 415. In Smith v. Fleischman, 23 App.Div. 355, 48 N.Y.S. 234, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract in writing by which the plaintiff undertook to do certain work and furnish certain materials for the completion and decoration of the defendant's store. Plaintiff was to be paid the sum of $5,375 for the work. Because of interference by Fleischman plaintiff was unable to complete the work. He filed a lien as provided by law for $2,135 claimed to be the unpaid balance of the contract. On Sept. 9, 1896, the defendant, Fleischman, brought an action against Smith for damages by reason of the breach of the contract. On Oct. 12, 1896, Smith brought an action against Fleischman for the foreclosure of his mechanic's lien. Fleischman in his answer claimed the pendency of the damage action brought by him was a good plea in abatement; that all matters in controversy on that issue were necessarily embraced in the issues of the first action. The court said: The defense of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause is a dilatory plea, technical in its nature. A person interposing such defense must clearly show himself entitled thereto. Such a plea is not sustained where full relief cannot be obtained in the first action. The actions now under consideration are not by the same plaintiff but although between the same persons their relations are reversed. 1 Am.Jur., Abatement and Revival, Sec. 26, Same Parties in Reverse Order, p. 33. The actions are not for the same thing. The first action brought by Alice J. Quale and Alice W. Rafter is an *882 action at law for damages and involves only the results of a tort claimed to have been committed in the fulfillment of a contract. The second action, brought by Meagher et al., involves not only the determination of the amount due for the work performed on the contract but for the enforcement of the lien filed for that account. The purposes of the actions are entirely different and the relief demanded is also different. The two actions are not identical. While a judgment for the plaintiffs in the first action, if it is shown that the defendants' claim, secured by their lien, is credited thereon, would be a bar to the second action, there is no certainty of such results. The plaintiff in that action had not brought it on for trial for almost five years. Full relief of the defendants in the first action cannot be obtained in that action because they would still have to bring an action to foreclose their lien. A "plea of former action pending is not good where, though actions relate to same subject-matter, their nature is essentially different." Reichart v. Pure Oil Co., 172 Minn. 8, 214 N.W. 669. In McLain v. Nurnberg, 16 N.D. 138, 149, 112 N.W. 245, 246, this court says: We find that the issues in the two actions here involved are not identical and that the first action brought by Alice J. Quale, defendant in this action, does not operate as a bar to this second action. The motion to dismiss this action because of the prior action pending should, therefore, have been denied. The order of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings according to law. BURKE, C. J., and JOHNSON, SATHRE, and MORRIS, JJ., concur.