Title: Jackson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 239, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 2005

Supr.  Ct.  R.  25(a).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JACKIE JACKSON,
§
§
No.  239, 2005
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below–Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in
v.
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and for Sussex County in IS01-
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08-0268; IS01-08-0275 to 0277
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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IS01-09-0481; IS01-08-0599
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to 0602.
Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Def.  ID No.  0107021899
Submitted: August 16, 2005,
Decided:
November 10, 2005
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 10  day of November 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s
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opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Jackie Jackson, has appealed from the Superior
Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").  The State of Delaware has
moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Jackson’s opening brief that the appeal is without
merit.   We agree and affirm.
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See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988) (establishing guidelines governing
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the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts).
Jackson v.  State, 2003 WL 161250 (Del.  Supr.).
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(2)
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, Jackson was convicted
of two counts of Burglary in the Second Degree, two counts of  Conspiracy in
the Second Degree, and one count each of Misdemeanor Theft, Receiving
Stolen Property, Unlawful Use of a Credit Card and Criminal Impersonation.
On February 22, 2002, the Superior Court sentenced Jackson to a total of
twenty-four years at Level V, suspended after thirteen years, for seven years at
Level III and four years at Level II.
(3)
On direct appeal, Jackson argued in part  that he was prejudiced
as a result of a witness’ trial testimony that was offered in support of an
attempted burglary charge that was later vacated.  According to Jackson, the
testimony was impermissible hearsay that violated his right of confrontation.
Moreover, Jackson argued that the testimony was admitted without a proper
limiting instruction and thus compromised the jury’s ability to be impartial
when considering the other burglary charges.   On those two claims as well as
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Jackson’s other claims on direct appeal, this Court disagreed and affirmed his
conviction and sentence.    
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Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not asserted in the
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proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is barred, unless the movant can establish
cause for the procedural default and prejudice from the violation of the movant’s rights. 
Rule 61(i)(4) bars a claim that is formerly adjudicated unless reconsideration is
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warranted in the interest of justice.
State v. Jackson, 2003 WL 22833992 (Del. Super.).
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Jackson v. State, 2005 WL 528673 (Del. Supr.).
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(4)
In May 2003, Jackson filed a motion for postconviction relief.  The
motion, as later amended, raised numerous claims of error, including Jackson’s
previous claim that the admission of certain impermissible hearsay evidence
violated his right of confrontation.  Jackson also argued in part that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument.  Nonetheless, the
Superior Court applied the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(3)  and/or (i)(4)  to
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deny those claims.   On appeal, this Court affirmed.
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(5)
On May 9, 2005, Jackson filed his second motion for
postconviction relief.  For the third time, Jackson raised the claim that the
admission of certain hearsay evidence violated his right of confrontation.
Moreover, Jackson returned to the claim, first raised and rejected on direct
appeal, that the same hearsay evidence was admitted without a required limiting
instruction and thus tainted the jury as to the other burglary charges.  Jackson
also claimed that the Superior Court erred when it did not require the State to
See Rule 61(d)(4) (providing that the judge may enter an order of summary dismissal
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“[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior
proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief).
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respond to his claims of prosecutorial misconduct that he raised in his first
postconviction motion.
(6)
By order dated May 18, 2005, after denying Jackson’s request for
a thirty-day extension of time to submit a memorandum of law in support of his
second postconviction motion, the Superior Court summarily denied the
postconviction motion on the basis that the claims were barred by Rule 61(i)(3)
and (i)(4).  This appeal followed.
(7)
On appeal, Jackson advances both of his claims arising from the
hearsay evidence as well as his claim that the Superior Court erred when it did
not require the State to respond to his prior claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
Jackson also argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it denied
his request to submit a memorandum of law in support of his postconviction
motion.
(8)
It is clear from the record that the Superior Court properly
exercised its discretion when summarily disposing of Jackson’s second
postconviction motion without a supporting memorandum of law.   Jackson has
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presented no basis upon which to conclude that reconsideration of any of his
See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990) (procedurally barring formerly
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adjudicated claims pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4)).
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claims, all of which were formerly adjudicated at one or more points in the
proceedings, is warranted in the interest of justice.   
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(9)
We find it manifest on the face of the opening brief that the
judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed.  The issues on appeal are
controlled by settled Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the appellee’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs      
                             Justice