Title: Elliott (Richard) v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 003014
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
RICHARD J. ELLIOTT 
 
v.  Record No. 003014 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
JONATHAN O'MARA 
 
v.  Record No. 010038 
    OPINION BY 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
          MARCH 5, 2004 
 
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, we 
consider the proper construction of the prima facie evidence 
provision of Code § 18.2-423 and the severability of the 
provision from the core provisions of the statute.  
Additionally, we consider whether the convictions of the 
defendants should be vacated and dismissed, vacated with the 
opportunity for the Commonwealth to retry the defendants, or 
whether the convictions should be affirmed. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On the night of May 2, 1998, Richard J. Elliott, 
("Elliott") and Jonathan S. O'Mara ("O'Mara") erected a cross 
in the yard of James S. Jubliee, Elliott's next-door neighbor, 
and attempted to ignite it.  According to the record, Elliott 
conceived of the cross burning as revenge against Jubliee 
because Jubliee had complained to Elliott's mother about 
gunfire in Elliott's backyard.  Elliott convinced two friends, 
O'Mara and David Targee, to aid him in the burning. 
 
The Commonwealth prosecuted Elliott and O'Mara for 
attempted cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross burning 
under Code §§ 18.2-423, 18.2-16, and 18.2-22.  O'Mara pled 
guilty to attempted cross burning and conspiracy to commit 
cross burning but conditioned his plea upon the reservation of 
his right to challenge the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-
423 on appeal.  Elliott chose to be tried by a jury.  The 
trial court instructed the jury that in order to find Elliott 
guilty of attempted cross burning, "The Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [t]hat the defendant had 
the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons."  
No instruction based upon the prima facie evidence provision 
of Code § 18.2-423 was given.  A jury found Elliott guilty of 
attempted cross burning but acquitted him of conspiracy to 
commit cross burning. 
 
In Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 553 S.E.2d 738 
(2001), an appeal consolidating the Elliott and O'Mara cases 
with a third case involving Barry E. Black ("Black"), who was 
charged under § 18.2-423 for burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan 
rally, we held that § 18.2-423 was facially invalid as 
selective regulation of speech based upon content.  Our ruling 
 
2
was premised upon the language of the statute and our 
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  We held that 
the statute was underinclusive, because it singled out "a 
particular form of intimidating symbolic speech" for 
punishment while leaving other forms unregulated.  Black v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. at 773-76, 553 S.E.2d at 743-45.  
Additionally, we held that the language of the prima facie 
evidence provision of the statute was overbroad because of its 
chilling effect upon the exercise of free speech under the 
First Amendment.  Id. at 777-78, 553 S.E.2d at 746. 
 
The Commonwealth appealed our decision to the United 
States Supreme Court.  In a plurality opinion authored by 
Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth 
may engage in content discrimination "[w]hen the basis for the 
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason 
the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable."  
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361 (2003).  Thus, the 
Commonwealth may prohibit cross burning with intent to 
intimidate, even though it fails to prohibit the burning of 
other objects, because cross burning is significantly more 
likely to intimidate.  Id. at 363. 
 
Although it concluded that the core provisions of Code 
§ 18.2-423 were constitutional, the Supreme Court held that 
 
3
the prima facie evidence provision of the statute was 
unconstitutional because it "strips away the very reason why a 
State may ban cross burning" − the intent to intimidate.  Id. 
at 365.  Using the language of the jury instruction given in 
the case involving Black as the interpretation of the prima 
facie evidence provision, the Supreme Court held that the 
provision "as interpreted by the jury instruction" was 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. at 364. 
 
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Black v. 
Commonwealth, dismissed the case against Black, and remanded 
the Elliott and O'Mara cases to this Court to determine 
whether the jury instruction given in Black's trial was the 
proper interpretation of the prima facie evidence provision, 
whether the prima facie evidence provision could be severed 
from the statute if a constitutional interpretation could not 
be found, and the proper disposition of the cases against 
Elliott and O'Mara.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 367-68. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Constitutionality of the  
Prima Facie Evidence Provision 
 
Code § 18.2-423, in effect at the time defendants 
committed the offenses, provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or 
persons, with the intent of intimidating any 
person or group of persons, to burn or cause to 
 
4
be burned, a cross on the property of another, 
a highway or other public place . . . 
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima 
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a 
person or group of persons. 
A violation of this section is punishable as a Class 6 felony. 
 
 
In Black v. Commonwealth, we held that the prima facie 
evidence provision "sweeps within its ambit for arrest and 
prosecution, both protected and unprotected speech."  262 Va. 
at 778, 553 S.E.2d at 746.  We based our holding directly on 
the language of the statute, not the language of the jury 
instruction used at Black's trial, because the statute itself 
was the common thread among the three procedurally and 
factually distinct cases. 
 
Although the Commonwealth suggests an alternate 
interpretation for the prima facie evidence provision,* we hold 
that the instruction given at Black's trial properly 
interprets the prima facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-
423.  The instruction provided:  "The burning of a cross, by 
itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the 
required intent."  Of course, no one jury instruction contains 
all of the applicable law in a given case.  The law applicable 
to the case is contained in multiple instructions which, taken 
                     
* The Commonwealth argues that adding a statement to the 
instruction explaining to the jury that prima facie evidence 
is rebuttable would properly interpret the statute and remove 
all concerns regarding constitutionality. 
 
5
collectively, give proper guidance to the jury.  See Van Duyn 
v. Matthews, 181 Va. 256, 261, 24 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1943); 
Adamson v. Norfolk & Portsmouth Traction Co., 111 Va. 556, 
561, 69 S.E. 1055, 1058 (1911). 
The subject instruction must be read in context with the 
general instructions given in virtually every criminal jury 
trial in Virginia concerning reasonable doubt, presumption of 
innocence, and the credibility of witnesses.  These additional 
instructions reflect general principles of criminal law and 
procedure including that the defendant is not required to 
produce any evidence, that the Commonwealth bears the burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of the 
offense, that the jury must give impartial consideration to 
all the evidence presented, and that the jury must weigh the 
credibility of witnesses but may not arbitrarily disregard 
believable testimony.  Taken in context of the other 
instructions, the subject instruction concerning the prima 
facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-423 properly 
interprets the provision, but it does not save the provision 
from unconstitutionality. 
 
In Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. at 777-78, 553 S.E.2d 
at 745-46, we held that the statutory provision concerning 
prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate affects both 
 
6
protected and unprotected speech, and consequently, is 
overbroad.  The plurality in Virginia v. Black agreed: 
The prima facie evidence provision permits a 
jury to convict in every cross-burning case in 
which defendants exercise their constitutional 
right not to put on a defense.  And even where 
a defendant like Black presents a defense, the 
prima facie evidence provision makes it more 
likely that the jury will find an intent to 
intimidate regardless of the particular facts 
of the case.  The provision permits the 
Commonwealth to arrest, prosecute, and convict 
a person based solely on the fact of cross 
burning itself. 
It is apparent that the provision as so 
interpreted " 'would create an unacceptable 
risk of the suppression of ideas.' "  The act 
of burning a cross may mean that a person is 
engaging in constitutionally proscribable 
intimidation.  But that same act may mean only 
that the person is engaged in core political 
speech.  The prima facie evidence provision in 
this statute blurs the line between these two 
meanings of a burning cross.  As interpreted by 
the jury instruction, the provision chills 
constitutionally protected political speech 
because of the possibility that a State will 
prosecute − and potentially convict − somebody 
engaging only in lawful political speech at the 
core of what the First Amendment is designed to 
protect. 
538 U.S. at 365 (citations omitted).  The plurality opinion in 
Virginia v. Black properly noted that we "had the opportunity 
to expressly disavow the jury instruction."  538 U.S. at 364.  
We did not disavow it then and we do not accept the invitation 
to do so now.  Accordingly, we affirm our prior holding that 
 
7
the prima facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-423 is 
overbroad. 
B.  Severability of the Prima 
Facie Evidence Provision 
 
 
Elliott and O'Mara have argued that the unconstitutional 
prima facie evidence provision cannot be severed from the 
remainder of the statute and that, even if it is otherwise 
possible to sever the prima facie evidence provision, the 
procedural history of these cases prevents us from severing 
the provision on remand.  We reject both arguments. 
1.  Severability 
 
Code § 1-17.1, first enacted in 1986, provides that 
"[t]he provisions of all statutes are severable unless (i) the 
statute specifically provides that its provisions are not 
severable; or (ii) it is apparent that two or more statutes or 
provisions must operate in accord with one another."  Prior to 
the enactment of this statute, "[a]bsent a severability 
provision, a legislative act [was] presumed to be non-
severable."  Board of Sup. of James City County v. Rowe, 216 
Va. 128, 147, 216 S.E.2d 199, 214 (1975).  Code § 1-17.1 
changed that rule and provided a rule of construction for the 
courts to apply to interpret even statutes passed prior to 
1986.  If the General Assembly intended for § 1-17.1 to apply 
only to statutes passed after 1986, it could have included 
 
8
such language in the section.  Instead, the statute refers 
broadly to "[t]he provisions of statutes in this Code," 
without reference to dates of enactment. 
 
Code § 18.2-423 does not fall within either of the 
exceptions to the rule of severability established in § 1-
17.1.  The cross burning statute does not contain language 
stating that its parts are not severable, nor is the prima 
facie evidence provision necessary to the operation of the 
remainder of the statute.  The fact that the provision is not 
inextricably intertwined with the rest of the statute is 
illustrated by the fact that the cross burning statute, now 
codified at § 18.2-423, existed for 16 years, from 1952 to 
1968, without the prima facie evidence provision.  See Code 
§ 18.1-365 (Supp. 1968).  The statute was and can be effective 
now in punishing intimidation without the prima facie evidence 
provision.  Therefore, we hold that the prima facie evidence 
provision is severable. 
2.  Waiver of Severability 
 
Elliott and O'Mara argue in this proceeding that the 
Commonwealth waived the issue of severability by failing to 
raise it prior to the appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court.  We disagree. 
 
First, it would be incongruous to place the burden of 
raising severability on the Commonwealth in this case when 
 
9
neither Elliott nor O'Mara relied specifically on the 
unconstitutionality of the prima facie evidence provision 
prior to the Commonwealth's appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court.  The Commonwealth properly responded to the 
arguments raised by Elliott and O'Mara in their briefs to this 
Court, which revolved around the unconstitutionality of 
banning cross burning as a general matter. 
 
A more elemental flaw in the waiver argument advanced by 
Elliott and O'Mara is that it presumes that severability is an 
issue that must be raised by one of the parties.  
Severability, as codified in § 1-17.1, is a rule for judicial 
construction of statutes.  As such, the possibility of 
severance cannot be waived by a party to a suit by failure to 
raise it.  Rather, it is the duty of the Court, faced with a 
constitutional challenge to a statute, to consider sua sponte 
whether an invalid portion of a statute may be severed to 
permit the continued operation of the constitutional portion 
of the statute.  The Court cannot be forced to accept a flawed 
construction of a statute or prevented from saving a statute 
from invalidity simply because of an oversight or tactical 
decision by one or both of the parties.  For these reasons, we 
hold that the prima facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-
423 is severable from the remainder of the statute. 
C.  Application of the Brandenburg Standard 
 
10
Because we held that Code § 18.2-423 was unconstitutional 
for other reasons in Black v. Commonwealth, we found it 
unnecessary to address challenges to the constitutionality of 
the statute based upon Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
(1969).  Nonetheless, the parties addressed Brandenburg issues 
before the United States Supreme Court.  The plurality opinion 
of the United States Supreme Court is silent concerning 
Brandenburg; however, the language of the opinion precludes 
any consideration of Brandenburg on remand. 
 
The oft-cited case of Brandenburg v. Ohio involved a Ku 
Klux Klan rally not unlike the facts presented in Black's 
case.  The United States Supreme Court held that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech 
and free press do not permit a State to forbid 
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action. 
395 U.S. at 447. 
 
 
Elliott and O'Mara argue that because we chose not to 
address Brandenburg challenges in Black v. Commonwealth and 
the United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in Virginia 
v. Black is silent concerning Brandenburg, that we should 
consider such a challenge on remand.  We disagree. 
 
Clearly, Brandenburg addresses First Amendment concerns.  
Equally clearly, the United States Supreme Court plurality 
 
11
opinion in Virginia v. Black held that "[a] ban on cross 
burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is fully 
consistent with our holding in R.A.V. and is proscribable 
under the First Amendment."  538 U.S. at 363.  With the 
Brandenburg issues before the Supreme Court of the United 
States, it is inconceivable that the Court could make such a 
clear statement about cross burning with the intent to 
intimidate being "proscribable under the First Amendment" if 
it had any concerns about failure to meet the Brandenburg 
tests. 
D.  Constitutionality of § 18.2-423 
under the Virginia Constitution 
 
 
In Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. at 778 n.10, 553 S.E.2d 
at 746 n.10, we declined to address claims that Code § 18.2-
423 violates Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia.  
On remand, quoting Robert v. City of Norfolk, 188 Va. 413, 
420, 49 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1948), Elliott and O'Mara argue that 
the "Constitution of Virginia is broader than that of the 
United States in providing that − 'any citizen may freely 
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects.' "  
Elliott and O'Mara accurately recite the statement from 
Robert; however, it is dictum.  We take this opportunity to 
declare that Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia 
is coextensive with the free speech provisions of the federal 
 
12
First Amendment.  Consequently, consistent with the plurality 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Virginia v. 
Black, we hold that, after severance of the provision 
concerning prima facie evidence of intent, Code § 18.2-423 
does not violate the First Amendment or Article I, § 12 of the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
E.  Disposition of Elliott and O'Mara's Convictions 
 
In the trial court, Elliott was tried by a jury; however, 
no jury instruction involving the prima facie evidence 
provision was given.  In the trial court, O'Mara pled guilty, 
reserving his right to challenge the constitutionality of Code 
§ 18.2-423 on appeal.  In its remand, the Supreme Court of the 
United States "[left] open the possibility that . . . Elliott 
and O'Mara could be retried under § 18.2-423."  538 U.S. at 
367.  Elliott and O'Mara argue that retrial would violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  It is not 
necessary to address their concerns regarding retrial because 
we hold that retrial is not required under the procedural 
postures of these cases. 
 
Elliott was convicted by a jury that did not receive an 
instruction regarding the prima facie evidence provisions.  He 
was convicted by the jury as if the provision was not in the 
statute.  He cannot be heard to complain about the 
 
13
unconstitutionality of a provision of the statute, found 
severable, that played no part in his trial. 
 
O'Mara's plea agreement in the trial court recites in 
part: 
Pursuant to Section 19.2-254 of the Code of 
Virginia, the Commonwealth consents to allowing 
the defendant to plead guilty to both charges, 
conditioned upon the reservation of right to 
appeal the ruling . . . regarding the 
constitutionality of Section 18.2-423 of the 
Code of Virginia.  If the defendant prevails at 
the conclusion of the appeal process, he shall 
be allowed to withdraw his plea. 
Additionally, a written Stipulation of Facts was signed by 
O'Mara, his counsel, and the attorney for the Commonwealth 
that stated: 
On May 2, 1998, David Targee had approximately 
fifteen individuals, including Jonathan O'Mara 
and Richard Elliott, at his residence in 
Virginia Beach.  They were all consuming 
alcohol.  Elliott complained to Targee and 
O'Mara about his neighbor and about how he 
wanted to "get back" at him.  It was suggested 
(not by O'Mara) that they burn a cross in 
Elliott's neighbor's yard.  O'Mara and Targee 
agreed, and they all went to Targee's garage 
where a cross was built.  They all got in 
Targee's truck and drove to Munden Point Road 
in Virginia Beach.  Targee was driving, with 
O'Mara in the front passenger seat and Elliott 
in the back seat.  Once there, Elliott handed 
the cross to O'Mara, who also grabbed a can of 
lighter fluid and went outside and placed the 
cross in the yard of Elliott's neighbor.  He 
then poured lighter fluid on the cross, set it 
on fire, and ran back to the car.  Targee drove 
them back to his house.  The next morning, 
Elliott's neighbor, James Jubilee, came out of 
his house and observed the partially burned 
 
14
cross in his yard.  He broke the cross and 
placed [it] in the garage.  He later called the 
police. 
Lastly, on the form entitled "Questions Asked the Defendant 
Before the Court Accepts a Plea of Guilty," O'Mara answered 
"yes" to the written question, "Are you entering the plea of 
guilty because you are, in fact, guilty of the crime(s) 
charged?" 
 
On appeal to this Court from the trial court, O'Mara 
never argued that the prima facie evidence provision of the 
statute rendered the statute unconstitutional.  His claim of 
unconstitutionality was based upon arguments related to the 
R.A.V. case and the Brandenburg case.  The prima facie 
evidence provision clearly played no part in his plea 
agreement and no part in his appeal to this Court.  O'Mara has 
waived any claim of error based upon the unconstitutionality 
of the prima facie evidence provision.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Finally, in our order of August 29, 2003, we directed the 
parties to address certain issues on remand from the United 
States Supreme Court.  One of those issues concerning the 
prima facie evidence provision was: 
If the final sentence is not amenable to an 
interpretation that would render it 
constitutional, but it is severable, could 
Richard J. Elliott and/or Jonathan O'Mara be 
retried under § 18.2-423?  More specifically, 
should the Court order (a) that Elliott's 
and/or O'Mara's convictions stand with no right 
 
15
to retrial, (b) that Elliott's and/or O'Mara's 
convictions are vacated, but the Commonwealth 
may retry either or both appellants, or (c) 
that Elliott and/or O'Mara's convictions are 
vacated, but the Commonwealth may not retry 
either or both defendants?  
In response, O'Mara only argued that his conviction should be 
vacated and that he should not be retried.  We note that 
O'Mara does not assert that he has the right to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  Further, we note that O'Mara has not prevailed 
on any issue he raised on appeal. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the prima 
facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-423 is 
unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment and 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia.  We hold that 
the statute is severable and that the core provisions of the 
statute that remain do not violate the First Amendment or 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia.  There is no 
need to order retrials; consequently, the convictions of 
Richard J. Elliott and Jonathan S. O'Mara will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
16