Title: Robert Louis Elkins v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR07-597
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2007

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 07­597 ROBERT LOUIS ELKINS Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered November 15, 2007 APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL; APPELLANT’S PRO SE MOTIONS TO STAY APPEAL AND TO AMEND [CIRCUIT COURT OF MILLER COUNTY, CR 2004­627, HON. KIRK JOHNSON, JUDGE] APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL GRANTED; PRO SE MOTION TO STAY APPEAL TREATED AS MOTION TO FILE BELATED BRIEF AND DECLARED MOOT; PRO SE MOTION TO AMEND MOOT. PER CURIAM In 2006, appellant Robert Louis Elkins was found guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and being a felon in possession of a firearm. An aggregate sentence of 1,200 months’ imprisonment was imposed, which was to run consecutively to sentences he received in seven prior criminal cases. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Elkins v. State, CACR 06­529 (Ark. App. Dec. 13, 2006). Subsequently, appellant timely filed in the trial court a verified pro se petition for relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and appellant has lodged an appeal here from the order. Now before us are a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the State after appellant failed to timely file his brief, appellant’s pro se motion to stay the appeal and pro se motion to amend the Rule 37.1 petition and for appointment of counsel. We treat appellant’s motion to stay the appeal as a 1 Attached to the motion to stay the appeal were a motion for extension of time and a motion for appointment of counsel. According to the motion to stay, the attached motions “should have been before the court long before expiration date for brief due.” However, neither the motion for extension of time nor motion for appointment of counsel were ever filed of record in this court. ­2­ motion to file a belated brief. 1 It is apparent that appellant could not prevail in this appeal if it were permitted to go forward. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal, and hold appellant’s motions moot. An appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam). In his Rule 37.1 petition, appellant set forth six bases for relief. The allegations were: (1) the trial court failed to suppress evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure; (2) the trial court failed to suppress evidence obtained from an unlawful arrest; (3) appellant’s privilege against self­incrimination was violated; (4) an excessive sentence resulted from prosecutorial misconduct; (5) appellant was denied a fair and impartial jury; (6) appellant was actually or constructively denied effective assistance of counsel. Postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 is a means to collaterally attack a conviction, and is not a means for direct attack on the judgment or a substitute for an appeal. Wainwright v. State, 307 Ark. 569, 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992) (per curiam). Postconviction proceedings under Rule 37.1 do not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised in the trial or argued on appeal. Davis v. State, 345 Ark. 161, 44 S.W.3d 726 (2001). Even constitutional issues must be raised at trial or on direct appeal. Williams v. State, 346 Ark. 54, 56 S.W.3d 360 (2001). The presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks. Id. ­3­ Here, the first five arguments were a direct attack on the judgment. Thus, appellant’s arguments were not cognizable under Rule 37.1. Wainwright, supra. Specifically, arguments regarding evidentiary issues are not the proper basis for a Rule 37.1 petition. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). As a result, appellant’s first two arguments regarding suppression of evidence cannot form a basis for Rule 37.1 relief. Moreover, a constitutional violation is not in itself enough to trigger application of Rule 37.1. Cotton v. State, 293 Ark. 338, 738 S.W.2d 90 (1987). Therefore, appellant’s third and fifth claims regarding self­incrimination and a fair and impartial jury likewise did not support a Rule 37.1 petition. Finally, although allegations related to excessive sentences may constitute the proper basis for a claim, allegations regarding prosecutorial misconduct do not. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). Thus, appellant’s fourth argument failed to state a valid basis for Rule 37.1 relief. Appellant’s finalargument was actualor constructive denialofcompetent counsel. The entire argument stated, “Lawyers . . . failed to move for a directed verdict at the proper time, in order to preserve the insufficient [sic] of the evidence. Both lawyers blatantly disregarded the timing aspect of the rule. And there was no rebuttal of the witnesses.” The claim may have arisen from appellant’s assertion on direct appeal that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated robbery and that he proved the affirmative defense of renunciation. The court of appeals declined to address these arguments because trial counsel failed to renew appellant’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence, as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1. In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a petition under Rule 37.1 premised on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearlyerred in holding that counsel’s performance was not ineffective under ­4­ the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient through a showing that counselmade errors so serious that counselwas not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Additionally, a petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001) (per curiam). There is a strong presumptionthat counsel’s conduct falls withinthe wide range ofreasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Here, appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective. Although trial counsel failed to renew the motion for directed verdict, that act in itself did not constitute ineffective assistance. Instead, appellant was required to state specific facts in support of his underlying claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam); Jackson, supra. The standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel places the burden on appellant to provide facts to support his claims of prejudice. Nelson, supra. Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Id. Conclusory statements cannot be the basis of postconviction relief. Jackson, supra. There was no showing that, but for trial counsel’s failure to timely renew the motion for directed ­5­ verdict, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Greene, supra. Likewise, with respect to appellant’s conclusory statement that there was no rebuttal of witnesses, he failed to meet his burden of showing that there were specific rebuttal witnesses available. Appellee’s motion to dismiss appeal granted; pro se motion to stay appeal treated as motion to file belated brief and declared moot; pro se motion to amend moot.