Title: Dodgeland Education Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
Citation: 2002 WI 22
Docket Number: 2000AP000277
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2002

2002 WI 22 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0277 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Dodgeland Education Association,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission  
and Dodgeland School District,  
 
Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 260 
Reported at:  240 Wis. 2d 287, 623 N.W.2d. 159 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 28, 2002 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge   
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew P. Bissonnette   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Melissa A. Cherney, Chris Galinat, Bruce Meredith and 
Wisconsin Education Association Council, Madison, and oral 
argument by Melissa A. Cherney. 
 
For 
the 
respondent-respondent, 
Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations Commission, the cause was argued by William H. Ramsey, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. 
Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Dodgeland School District, 
there was a brief by Kirk D. Strang and Lathrop & Clark LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Kirk D. Strang. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jack D. Walker, Douglas 
E. Witte and Melli, Walker, Pease & Ruhly, S.C., Madison, and 
there was oral argument by Jack D. Walker, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Association of School Boards. 
 
 
 
1
2002 WI 22 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-0277  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 41) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dodgeland Education Association,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission  
and Dodgeland School District,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 28, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J. 
 
 
Dodgeland 
Education 
Association (Association) appeals from an order affirming a 
Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission 
(WERC) 
decision 
finding that an item, such as the teacher preparation time 
memorandum, must be a mandatory subject of bargaining in order 
to 
be 
a 
"fringe 
benefit" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a. 
(1997-98),1 
and 
that 
teacher 
                                                 
1 The relevant portions of Wis. Stat. § 111.70 are quoted 
and discussed below.  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes 
are to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
2 
 
preparation time is not a mandatory but rather a permissive 
subject of bargaining and, therefore, is not a fringe benefit.  
The Association first argues that teacher preparation time is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining because it is primarily related 
to wages, hours and conditions of employment.  Second, the 
Association claims that the Dodgeland School District (District) 
did not submit a qualified economic offer (QEO) because teacher 
preparation time is a fringe benefit which must be maintained in 
order to have a QEO.  We conclude that we must afford great 
weight deference to WERC's decision that teacher preparation 
time is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, and due weight 
deference to WERC's interpretation of fringe benefits under 
§ 111.70, and we, therefore, affirm WERC's ruling on both 
matters. 
¶2 
With 
regard 
to 
WERC's 
decision 
that 
teacher 
preparation time (hereinafter prep time) is a permissive rather 
than a mandatory subject of bargaining, we conclude that WERC's 
decision was reasonable because it employed the "primarily 
related" balancing test.  Affording WERC's decision great weight 
deference, we affirm WERC's holding because it has a rational 
basis.  We note, however, that we would affirm WERC's decision 
under the due weight deference standard as well, because the 
Association's view of teacher prep time as a mandatory subject 
of bargaining is not more reasonable than WERC's decision. 
¶3 
We also find that WERC's decision that an item must be 
a mandatory subject of bargaining in order to be a fringe 
benefit 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a), 
is 
reasonable 
and 
No. 
00-0277   
 
3 
 
furthers the purpose of the statute.  While the Association's 
interpretation of fringe benefits is also reasonable, under the 
due weight deference standard, the Association's interpretation 
is not more reasonable and we affirm WERC's ruling.   
¶4 
Finally, 
we 
affirm 
WERC's 
conclusions 
that 
the 
District submitted a valid QEO and that the Association cannot 
proceed to interest arbitration over the impact proposal.  
Because teacher prep time is not a fringe benefit under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a), the District was not required to 
continue the prep time guarantee, and the District's proposal 
was a valid QEO.  Subsequently, we also affirm WERC's conclusion 
that the impact proposal is not subject to interest arbitration, 
because in the presence of a valid QEO neither party can proceed 
to interest arbitration over economic issues. 
I 
¶5 
Before discussing the facts of this case, we briefly 
review 
the 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70, 
the 
Municipal 
Employment Relations Act (MERA), and the "qualified economic 
offer" (QEO) amendments.  MERA provides procedures for the 
collective 
bargaining process 
for 
municipal 
employers and 
employees.  Since its inception,2 MERA has defined collective 
bargaining, in part, as: 
 
 . . . the performance of the mutual obligation of a 
municipal employer . . . and the representative of its 
municipal 
employes . . . to 
meet 
and 
confer 
at 
                                                 
2 The Municipal Employment Relations Act was originally 
enacted as Chapter 178, Laws of 1977. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
4 
 
reasonable times, in good faith, with the intention of 
reaching an agreement . . . with respect to wages, 
hours and conditions of employment . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a). 
 
The 
definition 
of 
collective 
bargaining also specifically distinguishes matters subject to 
bargaining from those that are not. 
 
. . . The municipal employer shall not be required to 
bargain 
on 
subjects 
reserved 
to 
management 
and 
direction of the governmental unit except insofar as 
the manner of exercise of such functions affects the 
wages, hours and conditions of employment of the 
municipal employes in a collective bargaining unit. 
 . . .  
Id.   
¶6 
This court has acknowledged that conflict over whether 
certain matters are subject to bargaining is inevitable because 
a matter involving wages, hours, and conditions of employment 
may also relate to public policy.  Beloit Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 
73 Wis. 2d 43, 52-53, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976).  The "primarily 
related" test was adopted to resolve such conflict.  Id. at 54.  
"The question is whether a particular decision is primarily 
related to the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the 
employees, or whether it is primarily related to the formulation 
or management of public policy."  Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
WERC, 81 Wis. 2d 89, 102, 259 N.W.2d 724 (1977).  Accordingly, 
we have consistently applied the "primarily related" standard as 
a balancing test: 
 
If the employees' legitimate interest in wages, hours, 
and conditions of employment outweighs the employer's 
concerns 
about 
the 
restriction 
on 
managerial 
prerogatives or public policy, the proposal is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.  In contrast, where 
No. 
00-0277   
 
5 
 
the management and direction of the school system or 
the formulation of public policy predominates, the 
matter is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 357 N.W.2d 534 
(1984). 
¶7 
Prior to the 1993 amendments, if the parties to a 
municipal 
employment 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
"are 
deadlocked with respect to any dispute . . . over wages, hours 
and conditions of employment . . . either party, or the parties 
jointly, 
may 
petition 
the 
commission . . . to 
initiate 
compulsory, 
final 
and 
binding 
arbitration . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)6. 
 
This 
"interest 
arbitration" 
however, is available only for mandatory subjects of bargaining.  
Beloit Educ. Ass'n, 73 Wis. 2d at 54.  To state this another 
way, interest arbitration is available only for disputes 
primarily related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 
¶8 
In 1993, the legislature amended MERA as it applies to 
bargaining units "consisting of school district professional 
No. 
00-0277   
 
6 
 
employes . . . "  See Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)5s.3  Under the 
revised statute, a school district can submit a "qualified 
economic offer" (QEO) and subsequently "no economic issues are 
subject to interest arbitration."  Id.  In order to submit a 
valid QEO, a municipal employer must submit a proposal providing 
a statutorily required increase in the cost of wages and fringe 
benefits and maintain all fringe benefits existing on the 90th 
day prior to expiration of the previous collective bargaining 
                                                 
3 We take strong issue with the position advanced by the 
dissent that this court is eliminating another significant right 
for teachers by our holding in this case.  See dissent at ¶52.  
Rather, we are applying the statutory scheme adopted by the 
Wisconsin legislature to the facts presented in this case.  We 
take no position——for or against——the wisdom of the statutes at 
issue, since that determination involves, appropriately, the 
legislative 
branch 
of 
Wisconsin 
government, 
and 
such 
determination is not for this court.  See Vincent v. Voight, 
2000 WI 93, ¶52, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388.  Furthermore, 
we disagree with the dissent's reliance on the dissenting 
commissioner's opinion, contending that WERC's holding that 
fringe benefits do not include permissive subjects of bargaining 
is contrary to legislative intent.  See dissent at ¶53.  We rely 
on the WERC majority decision that examined the legislative 
intent and found to the contrary. 
Lastly, we observe that we have no extraneous evidence 
of a legislative intent to define "fringe benefits" in 
a way which would include permissive subjects of 
bargaining.  If the legislature had intended that the 
quid pro quo for use of the qualified economic offer 
was 
the 
loss 
of 
employer 
control 
over 
matters 
primarily 
related 
to 
educational 
policy, 
such 
a 
significant concept would surely have found its way 
into the evidence of legislative history . . . which 
is part of the record in this case. 
Dodgeland Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 29490, 23 (WERC, 1/99). 
No. 
00-0277   
 
7 
 
agreement. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.4 
 
Under 
§ 111.70(4)(cm)5s., either a district or a bargaining unit may 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70(nc)1 
states 
the 
complete 
definition of a QEO and provides in full:  
(nc) 1. 
"Qualified economic offer" means an offer made to  
a labor organization by a municipal employer that includes all 
of the following, except as provided in subd. 2.: 
a. 
A proposal to maintain the percentage contribution by 
the municipal employer to the municipal employes' existing 
fringe benefit costs as determined under sub. (4)(cm)8s., and to 
maintain all fringe benefits provided to the municipal employes 
in a collective bargaining unit, as such contributions and 
benefits existed on the 90th day prior to expiration of any 
previous collective bargaining agreement between the parties, or 
the 90th day prior to commencement of negotiations if there is 
no previous collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
b. 
In any collective bargaining unit in which the 
municipal employe positions were on August 12, 1993, assigned to 
salary 
ranges 
with 
steps 
that 
determine 
the 
levels 
of 
progression within each salary range during a 12-month period, a 
proposal to provide for a salary increase of at least one full 
step for each 12-month period covered by the proposed collective 
bargaining agreement, beginning with the expiration date of any 
previous collective bargaining agreement, for each municipal 
employe who is eligible for a within range salary increase, 
unless the increased cost of providing such a salary increase, 
as determined under sub. (4)(cm)8s., exceeds 2.1% of the total 
compensation and fringe benefit costs for all municipal employes 
in the collective bargaining unit for any 12-month period 
covered by the proposed collective bargaining agreement plus any 
fringe benefit savings, or unless the increased cost required to 
maintain the percentage contribution by the municipal employer 
to the municipal employes' existing fringe benefit costs and to 
maintain all fringe benefits provided to the municipal employes, 
as determined under sub. (4)(cm)8s., in addition to the 
increased cost of providing such a salary increase, exceeds 3.8% 
of the total compensation and fringe benefit costs for all 
municipal employes in the collective bargaining unit for any 12-
month period covered by the proposed collective bargaining 
agreement, in which case the offer shall include provision for a 
salary increase for each such municipal employe in an amount at 
least equivalent to that portion of a step for each such 12-
month period that can be funded after the increased cost in 
excess of 2.1% of the total compensation and fringe benefit 
costs for all municipal employes in the collective bargaining 
unit plus any fringe benefit savings is subtracted, or in an 
amount equivalent to that portion of a step for each such 12-
month period that can be funded from the amount that remains, if 
any, after the increased cost of such maintenance exceeding 1.7% 
of the total compensation and fringe benefit costs for all 
municipal employes in the collective bargaining unit for each 
12-month period is subtracted on a prorated basis, whichever is 
the lower amount. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
c. 
A proposal to provide for an average salary increase 
for each 12-month period covered by the proposed collective 
bargaining agreement, beginning with the expiration date of any 
previous collective bargaining agreement, for the municipal 
employes in the collective bargaining unit at least equivalent 
to an average cost of 2.1% of the total compensation and fringe 
benefit costs for all municipal employes in the collective 
bargaining unit for each 12-month period covered by the proposed 
collective bargaining agreement plus any fringe benefit savings, 
beginning with the expiration date of any previous collective 
bargaining agreement, including that percentage required to 
provide for any step increase and any increase due to a 
promotion 
or 
the 
attainment 
of 
increased 
professional 
qualifications, as determined under sub. (4)(cm)8s., unless the 
increased 
cost 
of 
providing 
such 
a 
salary 
increase, 
as 
determined under sub. (4)(cm)8s., exceeds 2.1% of the total 
compensation and fringe benefit costs for all municipal employes 
in the collective bargaining unit for any 12-month period 
covered by the proposed collective bargaining agreement plus any 
fringe benefit savings, or unless the increased cost required to 
maintain the percentage contribution by the municipal employer 
to the municipal employes' existing fringe benefit costs and to 
maintain all fringe benefits provided to the municipal employes, 
as determined under sub. (4)(cm)8s., in addition to the 
increased cost of providing such a salary increase, exceeds 3.8% 
of the total compensation and fringe benefit costs for all 
municipal employes in the collective bargaining unit for any 12-
month period covered by the collective bargaining agreement, in 
which case the offer shall include provision for a salary 
increase for each such period for the municipal employes covered 
by the agreement at least equivalent to an average of that 
percentage, if any, for each such period of the prorated portion 
of 2.1% of the total compensation and fringe benefit costs for 
all municipal employes in the collective bargaining unit plus 
any fringe benefit savings that remains, if any, after the 
increased cost of such maintenance exceeding 1.7% of the total 
compensation and fringe benefit costs for all municipal employes 
in the collective bargaining unit for each 12-month period and 
the cost of a salary increase of at least one full step for each 
municipal employe in the collective bargaining unit who is 
eligible for a within range salary increase for each 12-month 
period is subtracted from that total cost. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
10 
 
request that WERC determine whether the district has submitted a 
valid QEO, which would preclude compulsory interest arbitration 
of economic issues.5   
II 
¶9 
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  The 
Dodgeland Education Association (Association) is the collective 
bargaining representative of teachers employed by the Dodgeland 
School District (District).  During the period of the 1995-1997 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement, 
the 
District 
and 
the 
Association had a memorandum of understanding (memorandum) 
setting forth the minimum prep time that would be available to 
teachers in the school district.  The memorandum guaranteed 
that, "absent mutual agreement by the parties to modify the 
number of preparation periods," middle school and high school 
teachers were to have two prep periods per day, and elementary 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70(1)(dm) defines economic issues 
and states in full:   
(dm)  "Economic issue" means any issue that 
creates a new or increased financial liability upon 
the municipal employer, including salaries, overtime 
pay, sick leave, payments in lieu of sick leave usage, 
vacations, clothing allowances in excess of the actual 
cost of clothing, length-of-service credit, continuing 
education credit, shift premium pay, longevity pay, 
extra duty pay, performance bonuses, health insurance, 
life insurance, vacation pay, holiday pay, lead worker 
pay, 
temporary 
assignment 
pay, 
retirement 
contributions, severance or other separation pay, 
hazardous duty pay, certification or license payment, 
job security provisions, limitations on layoffs and 
contracting or subcontracting of work that would 
otherwise be performed by municipal employes in the 
collective bargaining unit with which there is a labor 
dispute. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
11 
 
teachers were to have them during art, music, and physical 
education classes and at lunch.  The prep time memorandum 
expired on June 30, 1997. 
¶10 Prep time is a period when a teacher does not have 
assigned teaching responsibility.  WERC found that it was the 
general expectation and practice for teachers to use that time 
for preparation activities, including lesson planning, meeting 
with students, grading schoolwork, making phone calls to 
parents, maintaining student records, ordering supplies, and 
other activities related to teaching.  Dodgeland Sch. Dist., 
Dec. No. 29490, 5-8 (1/99).  The teacher may also use that time 
as a break if he or she chooses to accomplish preparation tasks 
at times other than prep time.  Id. 
¶11 In the spring of 1997, the parties began negotiating a 
successor collective bargaining agreement.  The Association 
proposed a continuation of the prep time guarantee, as reflected 
in the memorandum.  The District's proposal did not renew or 
continue the prep time memorandum guarantee.  In a letter dated 
April 25, 1997, District Superintendent Terry McLeod advised 
teachers that although he did "understand the importance of 
adequate prep time and would not support action to unnecessarily 
reduce such a valuable resource," the "financial picture for the 
District is not very bright," and "it may be necessary for 
everyone to make concessions."  On December 22, 1997, McLeod 
sent a letter to Bob Sweeney, President of the Association.  The 
letter stated, "the District hereby disavows any alleged past 
practice relating to guaranteed teacher prep time" and it was 
No. 
00-0277   
 
12 
 
"the District's intention to discontinue the alleged teacher 
prep time past practice commencing with the next semester." 
¶12 The District and the Association were unable to reach 
agreement on a 1997-1999 collective bargaining agreement.  The 
District submitted a salary offer, intending to meet the 
requirements of a QEO under Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a.  The 
District then filed a petition with the Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission (WERC) for a declaratory ruling that its 
offer comported with the requirements of the QEO law, that the 
provisions of the prep time memorandum did not constitute a 
fringe benefit or economic issue under the QEO law, and that the 
Association could not proceed to interest arbitration over 
continuation of the memorandum.6  In proceedings before WERC, the 
Association submitted an impact proposal, stating that if the 
District "chooses to establish a schedule for a teacher which 
includes less preparation time" than that set forth in the 
previous prep time memorandum, then the teacher would be 
compensated as "work overload" based on a formula related to his 
or her regular teaching salary. 
                                                 
6 The 
District 
sought 
the 
declaratory 
ruling 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70(4)(b), 111.70(4)(cm)5s., 111.70(4)(cm)6.g. 
and 227.41.   
No. 
00-0277   
 
13 
 
¶13 In a split decision,7 WERC concluded:  (1) the prep 
time memorandum is a permissive subject of bargaining; (2) the 
prep 
time 
memorandum 
is 
neither 
an 
"economic" 
nor 
a 
"noneconomic" 
issue 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(dm) and (4)(cm)5s.; (3) because the prep 
time memorandum is a permissive subject of bargaining, prep time 
is 
not 
a 
"fringe 
benefit" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
§ 111.70(1)(nc)1.a.; (4) the Association's impact proposal is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and an "economic issue" within 
the meaning of § 111.70(1)(dm); and (5) the District's proposal 
is a QEO within the meaning of § 111.70(1)(nc)1.  Based on these 
conclusions of law, WERC issued a declaratory ruling:  (1) the 
District does not have a duty to bargain over the inclusion of 
the prep time memorandum; (2) the District does have a duty to 
bargain over inclusion of the Association's impact proposal; (3) 
because the Association proposal to continue the prep time 
memorandum is not an economic issue or a noneconomic issue, the 
Association 
cannot 
utilize 
interest 
arbitration 
to 
seek 
inclusion of the prep time memorandum; and (4) because the 
District has made a QEO and because the Association's impact 
proposal (asking for compensation for work overload) is an 
                                                 
7 Commissioner Hempe dissented.  He found that prep time is 
a 
fringe 
benefit 
and, 
therefore, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a., the District did not make a 
valid 
QEO. 
 
He 
further 
emphasized 
that 
the 
majority's 
distinction 
between 
permissive 
and 
mandatory 
subjects 
of 
bargaining is unnecessary because § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a. requires 
continued maintenance of all fringe benefits, not just mandatory 
fringe benefits.   
No. 
00-0277   
 
14 
 
economic 
issue, 
the 
Association 
cannot 
utilize 
interest 
arbitration to seek inclusion of the impact proposal. 
¶14 In finding that the prep time memorandum is a 
permissive subject of bargaining, WERC relied on previous WERC 
decisions and employed the "primarily related" balancing test.  
WERC found that prep time is primarily related to educational 
policy rather than wages, hours, and conditions of employment.   
¶15 WERC also held that prep time is not a fringe benefit.  
Because "fringe benefit" is not defined in MERA or elsewhere in 
the statutes, WERC gave the term its ordinary and accepted 
meaning based on dictionary definitions.  WERC concluded that 
while prep time could be viewed as non-wage or indirect 
compensation, 
the 
dictionary 
examples 
and 
previous 
WERC 
decisions are persuasive that fringe benefits do not include 
permissive subjects of bargaining.  The prep time memorandum, 
therefore, is not a fringe benefit.  Consequently, WERC held 
that the District is not required to maintain the prep time 
memorandum as part of its QEO. 
¶16 Finally, WERC concluded that the Association's impact 
proposal (asking for compensation for work overload) is an 
economic issue which cannot proceed to arbitration.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)5s., if a QEO exists, neither party 
can proceed to interest arbitration over "economic issues."  The 
Association's 
proposal 
is 
an 
economic 
issue 
under 
§ 111.70(1)(dm) 
because 
it 
implicates 
teachers' 
salaries.  
Accordingly, because of the valid QEO, WERC concluded that the 
No. 
00-0277   
 
15 
 
Association could not proceed to interest arbitration on the 
impact proposal.  
¶17 The 
Dodge 
County 
Circuit 
Court 
affirmed 
WERC's 
decision.  The circuit court afforded the decision due weight 
deference because, while the determination of a fringe benefit 
under the QEO amendments is a relatively new issue, WERC has 
considerable experience dealing with prep time and determining 
mandatory 
and 
permissive 
subjects 
of 
bargaining. 
 
After 
examining 
the 
Association's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
QEO 
amendments, the court concluded that WERC's decision furthers 
the purpose of the QEO amendments and there is no more 
reasonable interpretation of the law than that made by the 
agency. 
¶18 The Association appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed WERC's decision.  Dodgeland Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 2000 
WI App 260, 240 Wis. 2d 287, 623 N.W.2d 159.  Applying the due 
weight standard of review, the court of appeals held that WERC's 
decision that the teacher prep time memorandum is not a fringe 
benefit is "reasonable" and "rationally based on the historical 
treatment 
of 
fringe 
benefits 
as 
mandatory 
subjects 
of 
bargaining." 
 
Id. 
at 
¶20. 
 
Because 
the 
Association's 
interpretation of fringe benefit was not more reasonable, WERC's 
conclusion was affirmed.  Id. at ¶24.  With regard to whether 
prep time is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining, 
the court of appeals applied great weight deference to WERC's 
decision.  The court of appeals affirmed WERC's conclusion that 
the teacher prep time memorandum is a permissive subject of 
No. 
00-0277   
 
16 
 
bargaining because WERC's decision was reasonable.  Id. at ¶¶31-
32. 
¶19 The Association filed a petition for review, which 
this court granted. 
III 
¶20 As an appellate court, we review WERC's decision, but 
we benefit from the analyses by the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  See Racine Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 2000 WI App 149, 
¶16, 238 Wis. 2d 33, 616 N.W.2d 504, review denied, 2000 WI 121, 
239 Wis. 2d 309, 619 N.W.2d 92.  In this case, we review WERC's 
decision on both issues:  (1) whether the teacher prep time 
memorandum is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining, 
and (2) whether the teacher prep time memorandum is a fringe 
benefit 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a.8 
 
Both 
issues 
require that we interpret provisions of § 111.70.   
¶21 The ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to 
determine the intent of the legislature.  Racine Educ. Ass'n, 
2000 WI App 149, ¶15.  We first look to the language of the 
statute.  See UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281, 548 
N.W.2d 57 (1996).  If the plain meaning of the statute is clear, 
we simply apply the clear meaning of the statute to the facts of 
the case.  Id.  If the statute is ambiguous, however, we must 
examine the scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose 
of the statute.  Id. at 282.  If an administrative agency has 
                                                 
8 We do not review number three of WERC's Declaratory Ruling 
because the parties, in their briefs before this court, did not 
address the issue. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
17 
 
been charged with the statute's enforcement, we may also look to 
the agency's interpretation.  Racine Educ. Ass'n, 2000 WI App 
149, ¶15. 
¶22 Whether WERC properly interpreted Wis. Stat. § 111.70 
is a question of law and we are not bound by WERC's 
interpretation. 
 
See 
Harnischfeger 
Corp. 
v. 
LIRC, 
196 
Wis. 2d 650, 
659, 
539 
N.W.2d 98 
(1995). 
 
In 
certain 
circumstances, however, courts should defer to an administrative 
agency's interpretation of a statute.  Id.  If the agency's 
"experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid 
the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute, 
the agency's conclusions are entitled to deference by the 
court."  West Bend, 121 Wis. 2d at 12.  This court has generally 
applied three levels of deference to conclusions of law in 
agency decisions.  Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290, 485 
N.W.2d 256 (1992). 
 
First, if the administrative agency's experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid 
the agency in its interpretation and application of 
the statute, the agency determination is entitled to 
"great weight."  The second level of review provides 
that if the agency decision is "very nearly" one of 
first impression it is entitled to "due weight" or 
"great bearing."  The lowest level of review, the de 
novo standard, is applied where it is clear from the 
lack of agency precedent that the case is one of first 
impression for the agency and the agency lacks special 
expertise or experience in determining the question 
presented. 
Id. at 290-91 (citations omitted).  Because this case involves 
two principal issues, although interrelated, and because the 
No. 
00-0277   
 
18 
 
parties dispute what standard of review is to be applied for 
both, we review each issue in turn. 
IV 
¶23 We first turn to whether WERC correctly decided that 
teacher prep time is a permissive subject of bargaining.  The 
Association contends that the teacher prep time memorandum is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining because it is analogous to 
employee break time and is primarily related to wages, hours, 
and conditions of employment. 
¶24 The parties dispute what level of deference we should 
afford WERC's decision.  The Association argues that in making 
its decision, WERC failed to examine how teachers use the prep 
time, and all of WERC's precedent regarding break periods.  If 
WERC had done this analysis, the Association contends that WERC 
would have found prep time analogous to a break period, which is 
a mandatory subject of bargaining.  The Association does not 
directly argue, however, that we should review WERC's decision 
under any particular standard.  Instead, the Association merely 
takes the position that prep time is analogous to break time.  
It would appear that the Association is asking this court to 
afford WERC's decision due weight on the basis that this is not 
an issue of first impression, nor has WERC established long-
standing precedent that prep time is a permissive subject of 
bargaining.   
¶25 The District and WERC argue that we should afford 
WERC's decision great weight deference because the decision 
meets all four factors to be afforded great weight deference: 
No. 
00-0277   
 
19 
 
 
1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; 
2) 
the 
interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; 
3) the agency employed its specialized knowledge or 
expertise in forming the interpretation; and 4) the 
agency's interpretation will provide consistency and 
uniformity in the application of the statute. 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. State, 209 Wis. 2d 310, 318, 562 
N.W.2d 594 (1997).  Specifically, the District and WERC contend:  
(1) WERC is charged by the legislature with the duty of 
administering 
MERA; 
(2) 
WERC 
has 
consistently 
held 
that 
preparation time is a permissive subject of bargaining; (3) 
WERC's specialized knowledge and expertise in making these 
decisions has been recognized by Wisconsin's appellate courts; 
and (4) WERC's interpretation of mandatory and permissive 
subjects of bargaining has been uniform and consistent.  Based 
on these four factors, the District and WERC argue we should 
afford great weight deference to WERC's decision that prep time 
is a permissive subject of bargaining.   
¶26 We 
agree 
that 
the 
great 
weight 
standard 
is 
appropriate.  The first factor is clearly met as the legislature 
has charged WERC with the duty of administering MERA.  WERC's 
decision 
also 
meets 
the 
second 
factor 
because 
WERC's 
interpretation 
of 
permissive 
and 
mandatory 
subjects 
of 
bargaining is long-standing.  WERC first decided that teacher 
prep time is a permissive subject of bargaining in 1974.  See 
Oak Creek-Franklin Joint City Sch. Dist. No. 1, Dec. No. 11827-D 
(WERC, 9/74).  WERC has also decided this specific issue at 
least twice more, not including the present case.  Racine 
No. 
00-0277   
 
20 
 
Unified Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 28859-B (WERC, 3/98); Milwaukee Bd. 
of Sch. Dir., Dec. No. 20093-A (WERC, 2/83).  Furthermore, in 
Blackhawk Teachers' Federation v. WERC, 109 Wis. 2d 415, 421-
424, 326 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1982), the court of appeals 
discussed at length how WERC's administrative experience had 
evolved since its decision in Beloit Education Association, and 
that WERC's determinations concerning whether provisions are 
mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining should be 
afforded great weight deference.  In 1984, this court recognized 
WERC's expertise in deciding mandatory or permissive subjects of 
bargaining, even when WERC had no experience on the specific 
subject of the rule at issue.  Sch. Dist. of Drummond v. WERC, 
121 Wis. 2d 126, 133, 358 N.W.2d 285 (1984) (applying great 
weight even though the commission had no experience with anti-
nepotism rules).  "In any case where the commission is asked to 
determine whether a subject matter is mandatorily or permissibly 
bargainable, this court will apply the great weight——any 
rational basis standard to its 'primary relation' conclusion."  
Id. 
¶27 The only difference between WERC's decision here and 
WERC's decisions in Oak Creek, Milwaukee Board, and Racine 
Unified, is that this case also involves questions regarding the 
QEO amendments.  However, the QEO amendments did not change 
WERC's long-standing interpretation of what is a permissive or 
mandatory subject of bargaining.  The distinction between 
permissive and mandatory subjects of bargaining remains the 
same.  WERC's previous decisions that teacher prep time is a 
No. 
00-0277   
 
21 
 
permissive subject of bargaining, therefore, establish a long-
standing interpretation. 
¶28 WERC's decision also meets the third and fourth 
factors, affording the decision great weight deference.  In West 
Bend Education Association v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 357 
N.W.2d 534 (1984), this court recognized WERC's creation of the 
"primarily related" balancing test and acknowledged WERC's 
expertise in determining the bargaining nature of proposals.  
"WERC, in contrast to the courts, has special competence in the 
area of collective bargaining and has developed significant 
experience in deciding cases involving the issue of mandatory 
bargaining."  West Bend, 121 Wis. 2d at 13 (footnotes omitted).  
Finally, WERC's decision is afforded great weight deference 
under the fourth factor because, since the Oak Creek decision in 
1974, WERC has uniformly and consistently interpreted teacher 
prep time as a permissive subject of bargaining.  See Racine 
Unified Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 16598 (WERC, 3/98); Milwaukee Bd. 
of Sch. Dir., Dec. No. 20093-A (WERC, 2/83). 
¶29 We note, however, that even if we were to afford 
WERC's decision due weight deference, we would still affirm 
WERC's decision that teacher prep time is a permissive subject 
of bargaining.  The Association argues that teacher prep time is 
analogous to an employee break period and WERC has consistently 
determined that employee break periods are a mandatory subject 
of bargaining.  See Brown County (Dept. of Soc. Serv.), Dec. No. 
20623 (WERC, 5/83); Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 16598 
(WERC, 10/78).  Although the Association acknowledges that WERC 
No. 
00-0277   
 
22 
 
has historically treated teacher prep time differently than 
break periods, the Association submits that here, prep time is 
analogous to a break period, because teachers do not have a work 
assignment.9  The Association further argues that the manner in 
which the District calculated overload, and the District's cost-
based reason for eliminating prep time, also suggest teacher 
prep time is a break period and therefore, a mandatory subject 
of bargaining.  While our analysis proceeds under the great 
weight standard, we would affirm WERC's decision under the due 
weight standard as well, because the Association's view of 
teacher prep time as analogous to break time, is not more 
reasonable than WERC's decision. 
¶30 Applying the great weight standard, we will affirm 
WERC's conclusion that teacher prep time is a permissive subject 
of bargaining if "the agency's view of the law is reasonable 
even though an alternative view is also reasonable."  West Bend, 
121 Wis. 2d at 13-14.   We will uphold WERC's conclusion if it 
has "any rational basis."  Blackhawk Teachers' Fed'n, 109  
Wis. 2d at 424.  We are satisfied that WERC's determination that 
teacher prep time is a permissive subject of bargaining has a 
rational basis, because WERC's decision is consistent with 
                                                 
9 The Association, however, does not distinguish how teacher 
prep time in this case is used differently than prep time in 
WERC's previous decisions. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
23 
 
previous decisions, and in making its decision, WERC employed 
the "primarily related" test.10 
¶31 In order to determine if teacher prep time is 
primarily related to educational policy or primarily related to 
wages, hours, and conditions of employment, WERC examined the 
record and used the balancing test.  Relying on testimony of 
District Superintendent McLeod, WERC found that the educational 
policy implications of the allocation of a teacher work day 
outweighed the impact on teacher hours and conditions of 
employment.  Specifically, WERC stated,  
 
[W]e are satisfied that the amount of preparation time 
provided to teachers during the workday directly 
impacts on fundamental educational policy issues such 
                                                 
10 We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that WERC 
erroneously concluded that teacher preparation time is a 
permissive subject of bargaining because WERC relied on Oak 
Creek-Franklin Joint City Sch. Dist. No. 1, Dec. No. 11827-D 
(WERC, 9/74), dissent at ¶¶75-76, and WERC "never conducted any 
real balancing of the interests in this case."  Dissent at ¶78.  
We also disagree with the dissent's assertion that WERC did not 
"provide[] any real reasons why the interests in school 
management outweigh the interests of teachers in maintaining 
their negotiated hours and working conditions."  Id.  The 
dissent, however, ignores the proper standard of review to be 
applied to WERC's decision on this issue.  Based on the fact 
that all four factors of MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. State, 209 
Wis. 2d 310, 318, 562 N.W.2d 594 (1997), have been met, we 
review WERC's decision under the great weight deference standard 
and uphold the decision because it has a rational basis.  See 
Blackhawk Teachers' Fed'n v. WERC, 109 Wis. 2d 415, 424, 326 
N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1982).  Accordingly, we uphold WERC's 
decision on this issue as reasonable, because WERC did examine 
the record and did use the proper balancing test.  Further, our 
analysis of this issue involves application of the great weight 
standard of review, and because the dissent does not give WERC's 
decision the great weight, or even the due weight, that should 
be accorded to it, we disagree with the dissent's conclusion. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
24 
 
as:  (1) how many and what types of classes can be 
offered to students; (2) how will existing school 
buildings be used; and (3) how should the student day 
be structured.  Balanced against this impact on 
educational policy choices is the impact on employe[e] 
hours and conditions of employment generated by the 
reality that:  (1) if teachers do not receive 
preparation time during the scheduled work day, the 
various 
tasks 
typically 
accomplished 
during 
preparation time . . . will need to [be] performed at 
times outside the scheduled work day; and (2) to the 
extent preparation time can legitimately be used as 
paid break time, reduced preparation time reduces 
break time. 
Dec. No. 29490 at 20.  Based on this analysis, we arrive at the 
same conclusion as the court of appeals:  "[T]he commission 
engaged in a proper balancing of the impacts of teacher 
preparation time on educational policy, as opposed to its impact 
on teachers' hours and conditions of employment, and reached a 
rationally-based conclusion that the former outweighed the 
latter." 
 
Dodgeland 
Educ. 
Ass'n, 
240 
Wis. 2d 
287, 
¶32.  
Accordingly, we affirm WERC's decision that teacher prep time is 
a permissive subject of bargaining. 
V 
¶32 We next examine whether WERC correctly decided that 
teacher 
prep 
time 
is 
not 
a 
"fringe 
benefit" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a.  The parties again dispute what 
level 
of 
deference 
this 
court 
should 
apply 
to 
WERC's 
interpretation of the statute.  The Association argues that de 
novo review is proper because the definition of fringe benefit, 
within the context of a QEO, is an issue of first impression.  
Although WERC has had previous experience interpreting the 
bargaining system, the Association contends that the QEO system 
No. 
00-0277   
 
25 
 
represents 
a 
very 
different 
dispute 
resolutions 
system.  
Accordingly, the Association argues this court should give no 
deference to WERC's decision. 
¶33 In contrast, the District and WERC argue that WERC's 
decision that prep time is not a fringe benefit is entitled to 
great weight deference.  The District and WERC contend that, in 
this instance, WERC's decision meets all four factors to be 
afforded great weight deference.  See MCI Telecomm. Corp., 209 
Wis. 2d at 318.  The District and WERC argue that WERC meets the 
first factor because the legislature has clearly charged WERC 
with applying and enforcing the MERA.  The District argues that 
the second factor is met because WERC has been resolving QEO and 
fringe benefit issues for almost ten years.  WERC takes a more 
conservative position on the second factor, conceding that the 
dispute here centers on whether WERC's interpretation is long-
standing.  WERC frames the issue as whether a QEO exists and 
recognizes that in Racine Education Association v. WERC, 2000 WI 
App 149, 238 Wis. 2d 33, 49, 616 N.W.2d 504, review denied, 2000 
WI 121, 239 Wis. 2d 309, 619 N.W.2d 92, the court of appeals 
applied due weight deference to that same question.   WERC 
submits, however, that great weight deference should be applied 
here because in promulgating Wis. Admin. Code § ERC 33, it 
gained 
extensive 
additional 
experience 
with 
interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a. 
¶34 According to the District and WERC, the third and 
fourth factors are also met.  WERC used its experience and 
expertise in determining whether a QEO exists, as well as 
No. 
00-0277   
 
26 
 
whether a bargaining subject is mandatory or permissive.  Under 
the fourth factor, deference to WERC's decision will provide 
uniformity in applying and harmonizing the provisions of MERA, 
including the QEO amendments.   
¶35 We are satisfied that WERC's decision meets three of 
the four factors.  Clearly, WERC was charged with the duty of 
administering Wis. Stat. § 111.70.  WERC has had considerable 
experience in interpreting fringe benefit issues in other 
contexts and interpreting many aspects of the QEO provisions.  
WERC's 
interpretation 
will 
also 
provide 
consistency 
and 
uniformity in the application of MERA.  This case, however, 
presented WERC with its first opportunity to consider whether a 
district's failure to renew a teacher prep time memorandum 
precludes it from making a QEO under § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a., 
because prep time is a fringe benefit.  Accordingly, there is no 
long-standing interpretation of fringe benefits in this context 
and the question before us is at least "very nearly" one of 
first impression.  Under the circumstances, we afford due weight 
deference to WERC's decision that teacher prep time is not a 
fringe benefit under § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a. 
¶36 Under the due weight standard, "a court need not defer 
to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is not 
the interpretation which the court considers best and most 
reasonable."  Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 660 n.4.  Due weight 
deference 
breaks 
the 
tie 
between 
competing 
reasonable 
conclusions in favor of the agency's decision.  UFE Inc., 201 
Wis. 2d at 287.  We will "not overturn a reasonable agency 
No. 
00-0277   
 
27 
 
decision that comports with the purpose of the statute unless 
[we] determine[] that there is a more reasonable interpretation 
available."  Id. at 286-287.  In this case, we will only 
overturn WERC's decision if we determine that the Association's 
interpretation that teacher prep time is a fringe benefit is 
more reasonable. 
¶37 We first look at WERC's decision to determine if it is 
reasonable 
and 
if 
it 
furthers 
the 
purpose 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70.  In deciding that teacher prep time is not 
a fringe benefit, WERC first looked at MERA as it existed prior 
to the QEO amendments, and what the District's obligations would 
have been with regard to both the prep time memorandum and the 
Association's impact proposal.  Dec. No. 29490 at 21.  Because 
the prep time memorandum is a permissive subject of bargaining, 
the District would:  1) have had the right to allocate 
preparation time as it saw fit once the memorandum expired by 
its own terms; 2) have had no duty to bargain over the inclusion 
of the memorandum in a successor agreement; and 3) have had no 
obligation to proceed to interest arbitration over the inclusion 
of the memorandum in a successor agreement.  Id.  With regard to 
the Association's impact proposal (requesting compensation for 
work overload), however, as a mandatory subject of bargaining, 
the District would have had an obligation to bargain over the 
impact proposal and could be compelled to proceed to interest 
arbitration over the inclusion of the impact proposal in 
successor agreements.  Id. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
28 
 
¶38 After 1993 Wis. Act 16, the District must make a valid 
QEO to avoid interest arbitration of "economic issues."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)5s.  In order to make a valid QEO, 
pursuant to § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a., the District must maintain all 
"fringe benefits."  In its decision, WERC proceeded to evaluate 
how a permissive subject of bargaining affected this QEO 
requirement, concluding that "fringe benefits" do not include 
permissive subjects of bargaining.  Dec. No. 29490 at 23-24. 
¶39 We find that WERC's interpretation of fringe benefits 
is reasonable because it is based on the ordinary and accepted 
meaning.  Since the term "fringe benefits" is not defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70, or elsewhere in the statutes, WERC looked 
to dictionary definitions to apply the ordinary and accepted 
meaning.  See Brown County Attorneys Ass'n v. Brown County, 169 
Wis. 2d 737, 742, 487 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1992).  WERC looked 
to Roberts' Dictionary of Industrial Relations (4th ed., BNA, 
1994), defining "fringe benefits" as:  "Non-wage or indirect 
compensation received by workers, paid for in whole or in part 
by employers, including such items as vacations, sick leave, 
holidays, pensions and insurance."  WERC also looked to the 
definition 
of 
fringe 
benefits 
in 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International Dictionary 912 (Unabr. 1976), as cited in Brown 
County Attorneys Ass'n, 169 Wis. 2d at 742:  "[A]n employment 
benefit . . . granted by an employer that involves a money cost 
No. 
00-0277   
 
29 
 
without affecting basic wage rates."11  In order to determine 
reasonableness, we also look to the definition of fringe 
benefits from Black's Law Dictionary 151 (7th ed. 1999):  "A 
benefit (other than direct salary or compensation) received by 
an employee from an employer, such as insurance, a company car, 
or a tuition allowance."  Based on the ordinary and accepted 
definitions, WERC concluded that fringe benefits do not include 
prep time.  Although prep time may be viewed as "non-wage" or 
"indirect compensation," WERC concluded that the examples of 
fringe benefits were distinguishable from prep time because the 
examples were all mandatory subjects of bargaining.  WERC's 
interpretation of fringe benefits, based on the ordinary and 
accepted meaning, is therefore, reasonable. 
¶40 WERC's interpretation of fringe benefits is also 
reasonable because permissive subjects of bargaining have never 
been deemed fringe benefits in Wisconsin courts.  WERC reviewed 
numerous instances wherein Wisconsin courts used the term 
"fringe benefit," and in all instances the fringe benefit was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.12  WERC also noted that in 
                                                 
11 The District points out that the court of appeals in 
Brown 
County 
Attorneys 
Association 
v. 
Brown 
County, 
169 
Wis. 2d 737, 487 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1992), failed to cite the 
complete definition of "fringe benefits" from Webster's Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary. 
 
The 
complete 
dictionary 
definition of fringe benefits states:  "[A]n employment benefit 
(as a pension, a paid holiday, or health insurance) granted by 
an employer that involves a money cost without affecting basic 
wage rates."   
12 In its decision, WERC cited the following cases: 
No. 
00-0277   
 
30 
 
previous 
WERC 
decisions 
interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a., the fringe benefits in question 
were mandatory subjects of bargaining.  See Madison Metro. Sch. 
Dist., Dec. No. 27612-B (WERC 4/95) (holidays, convention days 
and snow days); Campbellsport Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 27578-B (WERC 
8/94) (health insurance).  Finally, WERC looked at other 
instances where the phrase "fringe benefits" is used in 
Wisconsin Statutes and found nothing suggesting that the matters 
referenced include permissive subjects of bargaining.13  WERC's 
consistency 
with 
previous 
decisions, 
and 
other 
statutes, 
strengthens the reasonableness of WERC's interpretation that 
fringe 
benefits 
do 
not 
include 
permissive 
subjects 
of 
bargaining. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brown County, supra – seminar fees and bar dues, 
beeper 
pay, 
mileage 
reimbursement, 
casual 
day 
disability plan; City of Brookfield v. WERC, 153 
Wis. 2d 238 
(Ct. 
App. 
1989) 
– 
health 
insurance 
benefits; Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 123 
Wis. 2d 490 (Ct. App. 1985) – insurance (medical, 
dental[,] vision, life, travel accident, personal 
accident) 
retirement, 
stock 
ownership, 
relocation 
benefits; Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154 (1985) – 
bonus, pension plan; Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. LIRC, 95 
Wis. 2d 558 (Ct. App. 1980) – disability insurance; 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. DILHR, 87 Wis. 2d 56 
(Ct. App. 1978) – sickness and disability payments; 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Amodt, 29 Wis. 2d 441 (1966) 
– use of a car.   
13 WERC examined the following Wisconsin Statutes:  Sections 
7.33; 11.01; 11.40; 16.336; 16.964; 19.21; 20.455; 20.475; 
20.865; 20.925; 20.928; 40.02; 40.05; 46.935; 50.05; 66.11; 
67.04; 100.201; 111.17; 111.34; 111.91; 111.92; 111.93; 118.245; 
119.55; 165.85; 230.12; 230.26; 230.36; 234.94; 440.945; 560.14; 
753.07; 758.19; 978.045; 978.12. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
31 
 
¶41 In addition to being reasonable, WERC's interpretation 
of fringe benefits furthers the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 111.70.  
WERC's decision that fringe benefits do not include permissive 
subjects of bargaining is consistent with the purpose of MERA, 
requiring only that municipal employers bargain over matters 
that 
are 
mandatory 
subjects 
of 
bargaining. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a).  The QEO amendments did not change 
the underlying purpose of MERA, still reserving educational 
policy decisions for school districts.  By interpreting fringe 
benefits so as not to include permissive subjects of bargaining, 
WERC established a reasonable line of demarcation for deciding 
what is a fringe benefit, furthering the purpose of MERA. 
¶42 In order to apply the due weight standard, we now look 
to the Association's interpretation of fringe benefits to 
determine if it is reasonable.  The Association argues that the 
term "fringe benefits" under Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a., 
should be interpreted to include teacher prep time and should 
not be limited to mandatory subjects of bargaining.  The 
Association acknowledges that MERA does not define "fringe 
benefits," but argues that the legislature intended to use the 
definition of fringe benefits previously established in Brown  
County.  See State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 194-95, 560 
N.W.2d 266 (1997) (assuming lawmakers know the law in effect at 
the time the legislature acted).  Relying on that definition, 
the Association argues that prep time is a fringe benefit 
because it involves "'a money cost [to employers] without 
affecting basic wage rates.'"  See Brown County, 169 Wis. 2d at 
No. 
00-0277   
 
32 
 
742-43 (quoting dictionary definition).  Providing teacher prep 
time has a cost to the District, because allowing prep time 
requires hiring additional teachers to cover the hours of prep 
time.  Furthermore, the Association contends prep time is a 
fringe benefit because it is of substantial value to the 
teachers and is not reflected in the basic wage rates. 
¶43 The Association also takes the position that its 
interpretation of fringe benefits is more reasonable than WERC's 
decision, because WERC's limitation of fringe benefits to 
mandatory subjects of bargaining was unreasonable and beyond its 
authority.  The Association contends that when enacting the QEO 
amendments, the legislature's failure to specify that fringe 
benefits 
only 
include 
mandatory 
subjects 
of 
bargaining, 
demonstrates fringe benefits should not be so restricted.  The 
Association argues that its interpretation of fringe benefits is 
more reasonable because many matters primarily related to 
educational 
policy——and 
which 
are 
permissive 
subjects 
of 
bargaining——also have a benefit to teachers and a money cost to 
the District——and would be a fringe benefit.  Accordingly, the 
Association contends that the mandatory/permissive distinction 
is not an appropriate factor for interpreting fringe benefits. 
¶44 The Association further argues that its interpretation 
of fringe benefits is reasonable because the QEO amendments were 
intended only to give the District a choice.  The District can 
live with the status quo on all current fringe benefits and 
avoid interest arbitration on all economic issues, or it can 
propose changes and engage in traditional bargaining.  The 
No. 
00-0277   
 
33 
 
Association contends that the QEO amendments were not intended 
to limit fringe benefits to mandatory subjects of bargaining, 
essentially allowing a District to submit a QEO but refuse to 
maintain fringe benefits that are permissive subjects of 
bargaining. 
¶45 We find the Association's interpretation of fringe 
benefits in Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a. is also reasonable.  
The Association's interpretation is reasonable because "It 
focuses on the language of the statute, arguably relevant case 
law, and colorable claims as to the legislative purpose and 
intent 
behind 
the 
qualified 
economic 
offer 
provisions."  
Dodgeland, 2000 WI App, ¶24. 
¶46 Applying the due weight standard of review, however, 
we do not find the Association's interpretation more reasonable 
than WERC's interpretation.14  By enacting the QEO amendments, 
the legislature intended to limit the occasions that a school 
district can be required to submit to interest arbitration.  
                                                 
14 We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the 
Association's definition of fringe benefit (from Brown County 
Attorneys Ass'n v. Brown County, 169 Wis. 2d 737, 487 N.W.2d 312 
(Ct. App. 1992) is more reasonable than WERC's definition.  
Dissent at ¶¶65-66.  The dissent reasons that WERC's definition 
ignores the proper balance between labor and management, fails 
to give credence to the legislature's specific word choice, and 
is circuitous.  Dissent at ¶¶67-69.  The dissent, however, does 
not address the fact that WERC's definition of fringe benefit is 
based on the ordinary and accepted meaning, is consistent with 
previous decisions and other statutes, and furthers the purpose 
of MERA.  Applying the due weight standard of review to this 
issue, we therefore disagree with the dissent's conclusion that 
the 
Association's 
definition 
of 
fringe 
benefit 
is 
more 
reasonable than WERC's definition. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
34 
 
WERC's interpretation of fringe benefits, as not including 
permissive subjects of bargaining, furthers this purpose.  In 
addition, we do not agree with the Association and the dissent 
that the definition of fringe benefits stated in Brown County is 
controlling.  See dissent at ¶65.  In that case, the court of 
appeals interpreted the meaning of fringe benefits under 
Wis. Stat. § 978.12(6);15  the obligations and rights under MERA 
and the QEO amendments were not at issue.  Furthermore, in 
deciding that fringe benefits do not include permissive subjects 
of bargaining, WERC was being consistent with previous WERC 
decisions, previous case law, and other statutes.  We conclude, 
therefore, that WERC's decision that under § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a., 
fringe 
benefits 
do 
not 
include 
permissive 
subjects 
of 
bargaining, should be upheld. 
VI 
¶47 In sum, we affirm WERC's decision on all issues.  We 
first affirm WERC's decision that teacher prep time is a 
permissive subject of bargaining.  Based on WERC's long-standing 
interpretation 
of 
permissive 
and 
mandatory 
subjects 
of 
bargaining, we reviewed WERC's decision under the great weight 
deference standard.  WERC made its decision by employing the 
"primarily related" balancing test, holding that teacher prep 
                                                 
15 In Brown County Attorneys Association v. Brown County, 
169 Wis. 2d 737, 487 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of 
appeals 
interpreted 
fringe 
benefits 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 978.12(6), which provided that prosecutors making 
the transition to state employment could opt to remain covered 
by a county's fringe benefit plan in lieu of state benefits. 
No. 
00-0277   
 
35 
 
time is a permissive subject of bargaining because it is 
primarily related to educational policy.  Accordingly, we affirm 
WERC's decision because it had a rational basis.  
¶48 We also reviewed WERC's decision that teacher prep 
time is not a fringe benefit under Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a).  
Affording that decision due weight deference, we found that 
WERC's interpretation of fringe benefits is reasonable and 
furthers the purpose of MERA, because it is based on the 
ordinary and accepted meaning, and is consistent with previous 
case law.  We found the Association's interpretation of fringe 
benefits under § 111.70(1)(a) also reasonable, but not more 
reasonable than WERC's interpretation.  Under the due weight 
deference standard, we, therefore, affirm WERC's decision that 
teacher prep time is not a fringe benefit under § 111.70(1)(a). 
¶49 Finally, we also affirm WERC's conclusions on two 
additional issues:  (1) that the District submitted a valid QEO 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)5s., 
and 
(2) 
that 
the 
Association cannot proceed to interest arbitration over the 
impact proposal (asking for compensation for work overload).  
Because teacher prep time is a permissive subject of bargaining 
and is, therefore, not a fringe benefit, the District was not 
required to continue the prep time guarantee in order to submit 
a valid QEO.  We affirm WERC's conclusion that the District 
submitted a valid QEO under § 111.70(1)(nc)1.   
¶50 With regard to the second additional issue, under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(cm)5s., neither party can proceed to 
interest arbitration over economic issues if there is a valid 
No. 
00-0277   
 
36 
 
QEO.  WERC concluded that the Association's impact proposal was 
an economic issue because it implicates salaries, extra duty 
pay, and temporary assignment pay, all components of an economic 
issue as defined in § 111.70(1)(dm).  We have already determined 
the District submitted a valid QEO.  Consequently, we also 
affirm WERC's decision that the Association cannot proceed to 
interest arbitration over the impact proposal because it is an 
economic issue. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
1
 
¶51 WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
When 
examining the history of collective bargaining legislation 
concerning teachers and schools in Wisconsin and the expressed 
intent of the legislature, it is clear that the purpose of this 
legislation has been to place the parties on equal footing, 
thereby 
promoting 
good 
faith 
bargaining 
and 
voluntary 
settlements 
between 
the 
parties. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(6)(1997-98).  Indeed, even when voluntary 
settlements are not obtainable, the legislature has implemented 
fair, effective, speedy, and peaceful procedures to resolve 
impasse.   
¶52 In some 
instances, 
however, 
the 
legislature has 
eliminated significant rights of teachers normally afforded to 
others in the collective bargaining process.  One example is the 
legislature's elimination of the teachers' right to strike.  A 
more recent example is 1993 Wis. Act 16 (the QEO law), which 
eliminated the rights of teachers to bring certain issues to 
interest arbitration when a valid qualified economic offer (QEO) 
is submitted.  Today, the majority opinion, not the legislature, 
adds to the list by eliminating another significant right for 
teachers——the right to bargain over an established fringe 
benefit, teacher preparation time.   
¶53 I agree with the well-reasoned dissent of Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commissioner A. Henry Hempe from this case 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
2
that it is one thing for the legislature to create this 
imbalance but quite another for a court to do so.16   
¶54 In its interpretation of 
"fringe 
benefits," the 
majority fails to recognize the significant bargaining power 
granted to school districts under the QEO law and fails to 
interpret the statute in light of the overall purpose of 
collective bargaining legislation, that is, to maintain a level 
playing field for both labor and management.  The effect of the 
majority opinion is further chip away at the collective 
bargaining rights of teachers.  Indeed, if the QEO law is 
interpreted to permit school districts to unilaterally eliminate 
something as valuable to teachers as preparation time without 
their ability to bargain collectively on this issue, the future 
for fair collective bargaining between Wisconsin teachers and 
school districts is bleak.  I therefore must respectfully 
dissent.   
                                                 
16 In relevant part, Commissioner Hempe stated: 
Moreover, as demonstrated by this case, excluding 
fringe benefits that 
are 
permissive subjects of 
bargaining 
from 
the 
purview 
of 
Sec. 
111.70(1)[(nc)]1.a., Stats., is simply unfair.  Under 
apparent color of law the teachers are peremptorily 
stripped of their previous legal right to arbitrate 
the economic impact of the loss of their benefit 
without any compensatory recourse.  For this to be 
done by the Legislature is one matter.  But for it to 
be done in the course of a quasi-judicial review in 
the absence of a legislative mandate to do so is quite 
another, and in this instance in total disharmony with 
apparent legislative efforts to create a balanced quid 
pro quo.   
Dodgeland Sch. Dist. v. Dodgeland Educ. Ass'n, Dec. No. 29490 
(WERC 1/99), 29 (Hempe, dissenting).   
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
3
I 
¶55 The threshold issue in this case is whether teacher 
preparation time is a fringe benefit.  A valid QEO must include 
all preexisting fringe benefits.  The Dodgeland School District 
(District) discontinued a memorandum of understanding regarding 
teacher preparation time before submitting its QEO.  If the 
guarantee of teacher preparation time is a fringe benefit, the 
QEO is not valid and the issue is subject to bargaining or 
arbitration.  If it is not a fringe benefit, the QEO is valid 
and the issue is not subject to arbitration.  Thus, the battle 
lines are drawn.  I conclude that teacher preparation time is a 
fringe benefit.   
¶56 Before defining "fringe benefit" under the statute, it 
is important to examine the history of municipal employee 
collective 
bargaining legislation in 
Wisconsin 
to provide 
necessary context to the definition.   
¶57 In 1959, Wisconsin became one of the first states in 
the country to provide for collective bargaining rights to 
municipal employees through legislation.17  Municipal employees 
were granted significant rights under the new legislation, 
including the right to self-organize, to affiliate with labor 
organizations, and to negotiate with their municipal employers.18  
The legislation was, however, limited:  negotiations were 
                                                 
17 Chapter 509, Laws of 1959.   
18 Charles C. Mulcahy & Gary M. Ruesch, Wisconsin's 
Municipal Labor Law: A Need for Change, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 103, 
107 (1980) (citing Wis. Stat. § 111.70(2)(1959)).   
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
4
restricted to questions of wages, hours and conditions of 
employment, no impasse resolution procedures were provided, and 
no requirement to negotiate in good faith was contained in the 
law.19   
¶58 In 1961, new legislation was enacted that further 
encouraged fair collective bargaining, including authority to 
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (which later became the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission) to function as a 
mediator in disputes and to administer fact-finding procedures.20  
Despite this progress, the law was still limited in its fair 
resolution procedures:  it did not provide for compulsory 
binding 
impasse 
procedures 
and 
it 
depended 
on 
voluntary 
agreements between the parties.21  At the same time, employees 
were denied significant leverage when strikes were expressly 
prohibited under the law.22  In 1971, amendments were again 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Chapter 663, Laws of 1961; Mulcahy & Ruesch, supra, at 
107-08 (citing Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(b),(f)(1961)). 
21 Id. at 108.   
22 Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(L)(1961).  Mulcahy and Ruesch also 
observed the following: 
The right of a union to strike is a necessary 
component 
to 
balance 
the 
relationship 
between 
municipal 
employers 
and 
public 
employee 
unions.  
Absent this right, unions are without the leverage 
which 
traditionally has 
been available 
to 
their 
private sector counterparts.  As a result of this 
denial, 
the 
public 
sector 
collective 
bargaining 
process remained unbalanced until public employee 
unions resorted to illegal strikes. 
Mulcahy & Ruesch, supra, at 121.   
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
5
enacted, which provided for binding interest arbitration for law 
enforcement officials and firefighters.23  At that time, however, 
arbitration was not permitted for school employees.   
¶59 Fair collective bargaining in schools came to the 
forefront in the early 1970s due to the frequency of teacher 
strikes during that time.  Indeed, even though illegal, strikes 
were the only real leverage tool for teachers if the school 
districts refused to bargain in good faith.  The most noted 
teacher strike took place in Hortonville in 1974 when 95 
teachers went on strike and the Hortonville School District 
subsequently fired and replaced all of the teachers.24  This and 
other strikes in large part contributed to a new political 
climate for change in the collective bargaining law.25   
¶60 Reform came in 1977 with the introduction of the 
mediation arbitration law, which provided for compulsory final 
and binding interest arbitration for nearly all municipal 
employees not governed by the 1971 amendments.26  From the 
introduction of this law to the time of the enactment of the QEO 
law in 1993, public school teachers in Wisconsin received higher 
raises in salary than many of their counterparts in other 
states.27  This rise in teacher salaries left some with the 
                                                 
23 Chapters 124, 246, 247, 307, and 336, Laws of 1971.   
24 Mulcahy & Ruesch, supra, at 104, n.4.   
25 Id. at 106.   
26 Chapter 1978, Laws of 1977. 
27 Lawrence Sussman, Teachers Gain Under State's Arbitration 
Law, Milwaukee J., Nov. 26, 1992, at B3.   
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
6
impression that the teachers had the upper hand in collective 
bargaining.28  New legislative proposals were again examined. 
¶61 In 
1993, 
the 
legislature 
amended 
the 
municipal 
employee relations law.29  These amendments were regarded as 
efforts not only to shift some bargaining power to the school 
districts, but also to allow municipalities to control rising 
property taxes by controlling teacher salaries.30  The amendments 
attempted to achieve these goals by allowing the school 
districts to avoid collective bargaining if it submitted a valid 
QEO.   
¶62 This history, leading up to the current QEO law, 
reveals the constant struggle by the legislature to maintain 
equal footing for labor and management to ensure fair and 
effective collective bargaining.  We must bear this overall 
objective in mind in our interpretation of "fringe benefits" 
under the current QEO law.   
¶63 Indeed, the QEO law created a new procedure in teacher 
and school collective bargaining.  School districts may now 
avoid collective bargaining on certain issues and maintain their 
costs by submitting a valid QEO.  A valid QEO guarantees that 
school districts will not be subject to any additional costs 
beyond the statutory increase for wages and fringe benefits.  
                                                 
28 Jeff Mayers, Budget Seeks to Cap Teachers, Wis. St. J., 
Feb. 3, 1993, at D3. 
29 1993 Wis. Act 16. 
30 
Richard 
P. 
Jones, 
Governor 
Seeks 
Tax 
Relief 
on 
Arbitration, Mandates, Milwaukee J., Feb. 3, 1993, at 1.  
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
7
The statute ensures this by allowing the district to avoid 
interest arbitration on "economic issues," which are defined as 
"any issue that creates a new or increased financial liability 
upon the municipal employer . . . ."31  Clearly then, this law 
was designed to provide the school districts with more control 
over their costs and resulted in increased bargaining power for 
the school districts.   
¶64 This 
law, 
however, 
does 
not 
provide 
a 
win-win 
situation for the school districts.  At the same time the 
statute allows the districts to avoid arbitration and provide 
only a minimum statutory increase, they must maintain all fringe 
benefits.32  In other words, school districts are not permitted 
the benefit of both avoiding new costs and eliminating old 
costs.  Indeed, in light of the advantages provided to school 
districts 
under 
this 
law 
and 
the 
overall 
objective 
of 
maintaining equal bargaining power between the parties, it makes 
sense 
to 
interpret 
"fringe 
benefits" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a.(1997-98) broadly to encompass any 
costs that the schools currently incur.  Indeed, it makes sense 
to interpret this term consistent with the definition for 
"economic issues," that is, as any "financial liability upon the 
municipal employer."  Such an interpretation gives full effect 
to the legislature's efforts to maintain a level playing field 
and recognizes the balance that the statutory scheme requires.   
                                                 
31 Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(dm),(4)(cm)5s.(1997-98).   
32 Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(nc)1.a.(1997-98). 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
8
¶65 To this end, I would adopt the court of appeals' 
definition of "fringe benefits" in Brown County Attorneys Ass'n 
v. Brown County, 169 Wis. 2d 737, 487 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 
1992).  The court properly identified "fringe benefits" as costs 
to the employer.  This definition defines a "fringe benefit" as: 
"'[A]n employment benefit . . . granted by an employer that 
involves a money cost without affecting basic wage rates.'"  Id. 
at 742-43 (citation omitted).   
¶66 I conclude that this definition is more reasonable 
than the definition provided by the Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission (WERC) in this case for several reasons.   
¶67 First, 
WERC's 
interpretation 
ignores 
the 
proper 
balance that must be achieved between labor and management when 
interpreting this statute.   
¶68 Second, WERC's definition 
of fringe 
benefits as 
"mandatory subjects of bargaining" fails to give credence to the 
legislature's 
specific 
word 
choice. 
 
The 
legislature 
specifically incorporated the phrase "fringe benefits," not 
"mandatory subjects of bargaining" into the statute.  The 
legislature certainly could have used this latter phrase, as it 
has in other sections of the collective bargaining law.  It did 
not.  Indeed, instead of providing an actual definition for 
"fringe 
benefits," 
WERC 
essentially 
rewords 
the 
statute, 
replacing 
"fringe 
benefits" 
with 
"mandatory 
subjects 
of 
bargaining."  The legislature could not have intended this 
result.   
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
9
¶69 Third, WERC arrives at the definition of "fringe 
benefits" through highly circuitous and questionable reasoning.  
In essence, it defines fringe benefits by arriving at the 
conclusion first.  It essentially begins its analysis with the 
conclusion that fringe benefits are "mandatory subjects of 
bargaining," 
and 
then 
examines 
prior 
definitions 
and 
interpretations of "fringe benefit" to determine whether they 
are consistent with "mandatory subjects of bargaining."  WERC 
then determines that teacher preparation time cannot be a fringe 
benefit because it is a permissive subject of bargaining.  This 
approach is particularly problematic in light of the fact that, 
before it even begins its effort to define "fringe benefits," 
WERC had already determined that teacher preparation time was a 
permissive subject of bargaining.   
¶70 Collectively, these concerns lead me to the conclusion 
that WERC's definition is unreasonable.  Accordingly, under any 
level of deference, I would reverse WERC's decision. 
¶71 Having established a reasonable definition for "fringe 
benefit," the next question becomes whether teacher preparation 
time falls under this definition.  I conclude that it does 
because it is a benefit that involves a true money cost to the 
employer.   
¶72 Teacher preparation time is time during the academic 
day that the teachers spend to prepare for their lessons.  The 
teachers negotiate this time so that they may prepare during the 
academic day and spend less time preparing outside the academic 
day, which is time that is uncompensated.  Thus, there is a real 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
10
value for teachers in this preparation time and a real cost to 
employers because the teachers would likely require increased 
pay for additional student contact time.  Indeed, the District 
recognized 
as 
much 
in 
this 
case 
by 
offering 
additional 
compensation to the teachers for any teacher that was willing to 
work during their preparation time.   
¶73 To equate teacher preparation time with break time 
ignores the practical significance of it to teachers.  Teachers 
must be prepared to conduct their lessons every day and provide 
quality education to our children.  A full day of lessons 
without any preparation time during the day results not only in 
a lower wage rate for teachers because additional uncompensated 
hours are required outside of the classroom, but also in lower 
quality of education for our children.  Thus, preparation time 
is a "fringe benefit."  Accordingly, I conclude that the 
District failed to submit a valid QEO.   
II 
¶74 I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
WERC's decision must be affirmed based on the definition of 
"fringe benefits" as "mandatory subjects of bargaining."  In its 
decision, WERC concluded that teacher preparation time is not 
primarily related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment.  
The "primarily related" test is applied on a case-by-case basis, 
which weighs the competing interests of the public, employee, 
and the employer in determining "whether a proposed subject for 
bargaining should be characterized as mandatory."  West Bend 
Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984).  
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
11
Applying this test, I conclude that teacher preparation time is 
primarily related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment, 
and accordingly a mandatory subject of bargaining.   
¶75 Under any level of deference, I would not affirm 
WERC's decision in this respect because I find its analysis 
incomplete and unreasonable.  In its determination, WERC relied 
in part on Oak Creek-Franklin Joint City Sch. Dist. No. 1, Dec. 
No. 11827-D (WERC, 9/74).  In Oak Creek-Franklin, WERC reviewed 
a proposal put forth by the Oak Creek Education Association 
concerning the teachers' load, which included (1) a required 
number of hours with students, (2) a required number of classes 
for each teacher to teach and a number of required preparations 
for these classes, and (3) guaranteed preparation periods per 
day.  See Dodgeland Sch. Dist. v. Dodgeland Educ. Ass'n, Dec. 
No. 29490 (WERC 1/99), 18-19 (discussing Oak Creek-Franklin).  
WERC concluded that this proposal from the Oak Creek Education 
Association concerned permissive subjects of bargaining, stating 
that 
"[s]uch 
decisions 
directly articulate 
the 
District's 
determination of how quality education may be attained and 
whether to pursue the same."  See id. at 19.  The circuit court 
reviewed 
this 
Oak 
Creek-Franklin 
decision 
from 
WERC 
and 
affirmed, stating: 
 
We recognize that the subjects of the proposal 
here may have a significant effect on teacher's total 
workload.  But one could also look at the proposals 
from another perspective:  The Association's proposals 
relate to the allocation of a teacher's work day.  The 
allocation of the time and energies of its teachers is 
a consequence of basic educational policy decisions on 
the part of the District.  It is not without reason to 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
12
conclude that those decisions significantly affect the 
quality of education offered in the District.   
See id. (emphasis added).  
¶76 I certainly agree with the conclusions reached in Oak-
Creek Franklin that any decision by school districts concerning 
the allocation of a teacher's time and energies significantly 
affects the quality of education.  But that only begins the 
inquiry.  It is difficult to imagine any significant decision 
made by a school district as not affecting the quality of 
education.  Even wages can affect the quality of education.  
Thus, Oak-Creek Franklin's analysis was incomplete, and WERC 
should not have relied on it in this case.   
¶77 There can be no question that teacher preparation time 
directly and clearly impacts the hours and conditions of 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
13
employment of employees.33  It is negotiated not because it 
affects the quality of education but because it directly impacts 
the hours of teaching.  The only real question is whether and 
for how long it will be compensated.  The teachers bargain for 
it in order to avoid preparation time outside the academic day 
that is not compensated.  Indeed, this does not take into 
consideration the numerous hours teachers spend volunteering for 
different 
school-related 
activities, 
including 
lunch 
supervision, after-school clubs, parent-teacher conferences, and 
                                                 
33 
This 
conclusion 
is 
supported 
by 
a 
number 
of 
jurisdictions:  Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-Kansas City v. Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 500, Wyandotte County, 608 P.2d 415, 418 (Kan. 1980) 
(holding that a proposal for a seven and one-half hour work day 
including 30 minutes daily teacher preparation time without 
assigned duties during such period reasonably fell within  the 
category of "hours and amounts of work" and therefore was 
mandatorily negotiable); Foley Educ. Ass'n v. Indep. Sch Dist. 
No. 51, 353 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Minn. 1984) (court held that school 
district's decision to reduce teacher preparation time was a 
mandatory negotiable subject because such a decision increases 
student contact time and may lengthen teachers' hours of 
employment); Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee 
Mgmt. Relations Bd., 530 P.2d 114, 116-17, 119 (Nev. 1975) 
(court upheld determination by agency as reasonable that teacher 
preparation time significantly related to wages, hours, and 
working conditions and was therefore negotiable); Red Bank Bd. 
of Educ. v. Warrington, 351 A.2d 778, 784 (N.J. 1976) (court 
held that decision by school board to require teachers to teach 
during a previously unassigned and free period was a decision 
that directly concerned the teachers' work load and thus clearly 
affected the terms and conditions of their employment).  Compare 
Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. 
Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416, 423 (Alaska 1977) (court held that 
elementary school teachers' request for planning period during 
the academic portion of the day presented a policy question 
because, even though a mere request for planning time might be 
negotiable, this question presented an additional complication, 
that is, whether elementary school children were old enough to 
be taught by different people throughout the day). 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
14
many other activities.  As a result, teacher preparation time 
must be considered a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
¶78 In addition, in this case, although WERC argued that 
teacher workload also impacts on other educational policy 
issues——including (1) the types of classes offered to students, 
(2) building use, and (3) student schedules——it never conducted 
any real balancing of the interests in this case nor provided 
any real reasons why the interests in school management outweigh 
the interests of teachers in maintaining their negotiated hours 
and working conditions.  Dodgeland Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 29490 at 
20.  WERC merely concluded:  
 
Here, based on the record before us, we conclude 
that when the preparation time memorandum's impact on 
educational policy is balanced against the impact on 
teachers' hours and conditions of employment, the 
memorandum is primarily related to educational policy 
and thus is a permissive subject of bargaining. 
Id.  The majority simply adopts this reasoning as "proper 
balancing."  Majority op. at ¶31.  I would not.   
¶79 For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  00-0277.wab 
 
 
 
1