Title: State v. Forest S. Shomberg
Citation: 2006 WI 9
Docket Number: 2004AP000630-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2006

2006 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP630-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Forest S. Shomberg, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  278 Wis. 2d 813, 691 N.W.2d 927 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 31, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 30, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Fiedler 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Charles W. Giesen and Giesen Law Offices, S.C., Madison, and 
Morris D. Berman and Berman Law Office, Madison, and oral 
argument by Charles W. Giesen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. Findley, John 
A. Pray, and Byron C. Lichstein, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project of the Frank J. Remington Center, 
University of Wisconsin Law School. 
 
 
2006 WI 9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP630-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF846) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Forest S. Shomberg, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner   
FILED 
 
JAN 31, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals.  Petitioner Forest 
S. Shomberg (Shomberg) appeals the decision of the court of 
appeals upholding the judgment and order of the circuit court.  
We address three main issues on appeal.  First, we must examine 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in refusing to allow Shomberg to present expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification.  Second, we are asked to determine 
whether the circuit court's exclusion of the expert testimony 
violated Shomberg's constitutional right to present a defense.  
Finally, this court must resolve whether the circuit court erred 
in refusing to allow in evidence the fact that Shomberg had 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
2 
 
offered to take a polygraph examination.  Shomberg asks this 
court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand 
his case to the circuit court for a new trial in the interest of 
justice.   
¶2 
We conclude that the circuit court did not, at the 
time 
of 
its 
decision 
in 
2002, 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion in excluding the expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification proffered by Shomberg.    We also determine that 
even if the circuit court did commit error, any such error was 
harmless.  Further, we hold that the absence of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification did not deprive Shomberg of his 
constitutional right to present a defense.  In addition, we 
determine that Shomberg should not be granted a new trial in the 
interest of justice, as the real controversy in this case has 
been fully tried.  Finally, we conclude that the offer to take a 
polygraph was properly excluded, because there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to find either that Shomberg had 
initiated the offer to take a polygraph examination, or that he 
believed the results of the test were admissible. 
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  S.B., a 
University of Wisconsin undergraduate, was walking home from a 
party at approximately 2:45 on the morning of March 9, 2002, 
when she heard footsteps behind her.  When she turned to see who 
was there, she saw the face of a male approximately 12 inches 
behind her.  When S.B. turned away from him to flee, the 
assailant grabbed her from behind, placing both hands over her 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
3 
 
mouth.  With his hands still over her mouth, he lifted S.B. off 
the ground, and carried her into an alleyway adjacent to the 
Frances Street parking ramp near the University of Wisconsin 
campus.  He forced S.B. to her knees with the weight of his 
body.  She managed to pry his hands off her mouth, and she 
screamed for help.  The assailant again covered her mouth with 
his hands, then, with his right hand, reached under her skirt 
and grabbed her vaginal area through her pantyhose and panties.  
S.B. was able to pry his left hand loose and scream again for 
help.   
¶4 
Alan Ferguson (Ferguson), a private security guard, 
was in his patrol vehicle at the Frances Street parking ramp 
working on his shift report when he heard S.B.'s screams.  He 
got out of the car, and followed the sounds down to the alleyway 
adjacent to the parking ramp.  When Ferguson reached the 
alleyway, he saw a man on the ground on his knees and what 
appeared to be a person beneath the man.  Ferguson then switched 
his radio to the main dispatch channel, which caused his radio 
to beep.  The assailant turned and looked at Ferguson, got up 
from the ground and ran away toward an apartment building.  
Ferguson ran after the man.  Ferguson testified at trial that, 
during the chase, the man slipped on some snow, looked over his 
shoulder in Ferguson's direction and then continued to flee.  
Ferguson did not apprehend the man he had chased.   
¶5 
S.B. described her assailant as being 20 or 30 years 
old, about 5'10" tall, lean, athletic build, with blue eyes.  
She indicated he had no facial hair and no glasses.  She could 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
4 
 
not recall anything about his hair, but at cross-examination  
she indicated she knew he was wearing long pants and a long-
sleeved shirt.  S.B. did not notice any tattoos on her 
assailant's hands, nor deformities to his fingers.   
¶6 
Ferguson described the assailant in his incident 
report as a white male in his mid 20's, who was 5'8" to 5' 10" 
tall (and to police as 5'8"), with a muscular build and a shaved 
head.  Ferguson said the assailant had no facial hair or 
glasses, and that he saw no scars on his face or head, nor any 
tattoos on his body.  He described the man as wearing a gray, 
long-sleeved shirt, possibly a sweatshirt, and blue jeans or 
dark-colored trousers.   
¶7 
On April 4, 2002, S.B. and Ferguson each attended a 
lineup.  S.B. was told that she would see a lineup that may or 
may not include the man they arrested for assaulting her.  All 
of the individuals in the lineup were wearing jail outfits.  
Both S.B. and Ferguson independently identified suspect number 
five on their individual Witness Line-Up Identification Forms.  
Shomberg was suspect number five, although he was the second 
person to enter the room.   
¶8 
Shomberg waived his right to a jury trial and a trial 
to the court, Judge Patrick J. Fiedler, took place on April 8 
and 9, 2003.  Shomberg was found guilty of second-degree sexual 
assault, false imprisonment, and two counts of bail jumping, all 
as a habitual offender pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(a), 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
5 
 
940.30, and 946.49(1)(b) (2003-04).1  He was sentenced to one 20-
year term, with an initial confinement of 12 years, and two 10-
year sentences, each to run concurrently.  On November 14, 2003, 
Shomberg filed a motion for a new trial and sentencing 
memorandum.  A hearing was held on the motion for a new trial on 
February 2, 2004.  The motion was denied on that same day.   
¶9 
Shomberg filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court 
on February 25, 2004.  The court of appeals filed an unpublished 
decision on December 23, 2004, affirming the judgment of the 
circuit court and denying Shomberg's post-conviction motion.  
This court granted review on March 8, 2005.   
II 
¶10 "The admissibility of expert opinion testimony lies in 
the discretion of the circuit court."  State v. St. George, 2002 
WI 50, ¶37, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777 (citing Martindale 
v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698; State 
v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 186, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999)).  "We 
review a circuit court's decision to admit or exclude evidence 
under 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
standard."  
Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶28 (citations omitted).  We apply 
the 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
standard 
to 
both 
evidentiary issues in this case.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 The inquiry into a circuit court's exercise of 
"discretion 
in 
making 
an 
evidentiary 
ruling 
is 
highly 
deferential. . . ."  Id., ¶29.  As we have previously stated: 
The question on appeal is not whether this court, 
ruling initially on the admissibility of the evidence, 
would have permitted it to come in, but whether the 
trial court exercised its discretion in accordance 
with accepted legal standards and in accordance with 
the facts of record.  The test is not whether this 
court agrees with the ruling of the trial court, but 
whether appropriate discretion was in fact exercised. 
Id. (citations omitted).   
"We will not find an erroneous exercise of discretion if there 
is a rational basis for a circuit court's decision."  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02 provides "[I]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise."  Wis. Stat. § 907.02.   
¶13 The circuit court denied Shomberg's request to allow 
expert testimony on the factors that may influence a witness's 
ability 
to 
identify 
a 
stranger, 
including 
the 
relative 
reliability of sequential versus simultaneous lineups, relative 
judgment, transference, the absence of a reliable relationship 
between confidence of the witness and the accuracy of the 
identification, and examples of people wrongly convicted of 
crimes based solely on an incorrect identification.  The circuit 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
7 
 
court felt that "'everything that the expert would testify to in 
essence is within the common knowledge and sense and perception 
of the jury.'"  State v. Blair, 164 Wis. 2d 64, 76-77, 473 
N.W.2d 566 (1991) (footnote omitted).   
¶14 Counsel 
for 
Shomberg 
was 
unable 
to 
articulate 
satisfactorily for the circuit court the basis upon which the 
factors 
influencing 
the 
reliability 
of 
eyewitness 
identifications would assist the trier of fact.  The factors 
that Shomberg's lawyer offered were, in the court's estimation, 
ones that could be adequately explored by cross-examining a 
testifying witness, and in opening statements and closing 
arguments.  
THE COURT:  It sounds like the factors involved 
here, how much light was available, how long did the 
person have to view the individual, how close was the 
individual, was there anything that obstructed the 
individual's face, had the person who is making the 
identification been drinking or taking drugs, et 
cetera, these are all matters of perception within the 
realm of lay people, aren't they? 
MR. COHEN (COUNSEL FOR SHOMBERG):  What about the 
area that a person viewing six people tends to use 
relative judgment?  Natural inclination to say to pick 
somebody out, it must be the person, rather than 
there's a reason for – - 
THE COURT:  Do you have anything beyond that? 
MR. COHEN:  No. 
THE COURT:  So what we're back to is, you want to 
call this individual who will opine that sequential 
lineups are better than simultaneous lineups? 
MR. COHEN:  And the reason why, not just that 
they're better, but here's why.  Here's the problems 
with simultaneous ones. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
8 
 
THE COURT:  Because, in part, it's a process of 
elimination as opposed to positive identification. 
MR. COHEN:  The fact that exactly, at least part 
of what the victim said, when she put down her answer, 
"Well, I knew it wasn't one and three because they 
were too big.  I knew it wasn't two and four because 
they were too old." 
THE COURT:  But isn't that something that you 
would also ask the witness on cross-examination? 
MR. COHEN:  I sure could.  I sure could, but it's 
a process that, I think it's important.  What I was 
impressed with was the experiments that they have 
done.  That really sort of, you know, sewed it up for 
me.  This was really a much better way of doing it.   
THE COURT:  Well, are you seeking to elicit his 
opinion that there have been a hundred cases in which 
identification testimony secured a conviction, later 
found to be faulty, due to subsequent DNA testing? 
MR. COHEN:  No. 
THE COURT:  So what we're back to is his opinion 
that sequential is better than simultaneous. 
MR. COHEN:  And why. 
THE 
COURT:  Because 
simultaneous 
means the 
person, the witness, in essence, has the burden of 
making a positive identification as opposed to simply 
eliminating people that the witness does not feel were 
the perpetrator with the, I guess implicit within the 
witness's belief, that one of these people must be the 
perpetrator. 
MR. COHEN:  Yes.  Relative judgment. 
THE COURT:  Anything else? 
MR. COHEN:  No. 
¶15 In 2002, at the time of the circuit court's decision 
to exclude testimony from Shomberg's expert, New Jersey was the 
only state to mandate sequential rather than simultaneous lineup 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
9 
 
procedures.  In the intervening years, much has been learned 
about the processes and limitations of memory.  There has been a 
wealth of information that has come to the public that has 
increased awareness of some of the inherent difficulties with 
eyewitness identification.2   
¶16 In State v. Dubose, this court recognized that "[t]he 
research 
strongly 
supports 
the conclusion 
that 
eyewitness 
misidentification is now the single greatest source of wrongful 
convictions in the United States, and responsible for more 
wrongful convictions than all other causes combined."  State v. 
Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶30, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 699 N.W.2d 582.  
Indeed, just this year the Wisconsin Department of Justice 
published 
recommended 
guidelines 
for 
law 
enforcement 
on 
eyewitness 
identification, 
including 
a 
Model 
Policy 
and 
Procedure for Eyewitness Identification and a Comprehensive 
Review & Analysis of Best Practices.3  In a similar vein, a 
legislative task force was created in December 2003 to examine 
cases of wrongful convictions, and develop recommendations on 
ways to improve the criminal justice system.4  Indeed, just this 
year, the Criminal Justice Reform Act was signed into law 
                                                 
2 For a non-exhaustive list of some of the more recent 
studies examining identification evidence, see State v. Dubose, 
2005 WI 126, ¶29, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 699 N.W.2d 582.   
3 Available 
at: 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/ 
news/nr030905_PL.asp.    
4 Available 
at: 
 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/ 
eyewitness_guidelines.htm. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
10 
 
implementing many of the recommendations of the task force 
regarding, among other things, eyewitness identification reform.5   
¶17 Were this case to come before the circuit court today, 
given the developments that have occurred in the interim, it is 
highly likely that the judge would have allowed the expert to 
testify on factors that influence identification and memory.  
However, the issue before us is not what we would have done, or 
what a court might do today.  The issue is whether, at the time 
of the decision, the bases upon which the circuit court decided 
to exclude Shomberg's expert testimony constituted an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  The court clearly felt that the 
limitations of eyewitness identification, as articulated by 
counsel for Shomberg, were known and understood by the court.6  
Neither counsel's written motion nor oral advocacy at the motion 
hearing was sufficient to satisfy the court that Shomberg's 
eyewitness expert would assist the trier of fact "to determine a 
fact in issue," especially since the arguments were known and 
                                                 
5 2005 Wisconsin Act 60.  Although the new act became 
effective December 31, 2005, the provision requiring law 
enforcement agencies to adopt written policies for eyewitness 
identification procedures will take effect on December 1, 2006. 
6 Since Justice Butler's dissent spends time discussing 
jurors and jury instructions (Justice Butler's dissent, ¶72), it 
must again be noted that this case was tried to the court, 
without a jury.  Judge Fiedler was informed, before he made his 
ruling on the admissibility of the expert testimony, that 
Shomberg would be waiving his right to a jury trial.  In fact, 
that waiver occurred immediately after the circuit court's 
ruling on the admissibility issue. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
11 
 
understood by the court.7  Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  We conclude that 
the "'court exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted 
legal standards and in accordance with the facts of the 
record,'" and therefore it was not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion for the circuit court to deny Shomberg's motion to 
admit expert eyewitness testimony.  Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 
¶29 (citations omitted).8   
 
                                                 
7 Contrary to Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, we do not 
seek to justify the circuit court's exclusion of Shomberg's 
expert witness "on the ground that the expert witness would 
offer 
a 
relatively 
new 
explanation 
of 
the 
weakness 
of 
simultaneous lineups."  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶53.  
As we have previously noted, Judge Fiedler had read and was 
familiar with the contents of the expert's report.  Because he 
knew the case would be tried to the bench, the judge made 
repeated attempts to evoke a response from defense counsel that 
would tell him what the expert would testify to that he had not 
already gleaned from that report.  The testimony was excluded 
because the court determined Shomberg's expert would not assist 
the trier of fact.   
8 Justice Butler's dissent is wrong when it states that "the 
decision of the trial court to exclude the expert testimony 
regarding the factors surrounding eyewitness identification was 
clearly erroneous."  Justice Butler's dissent, ¶74.  Justice 
Butler's dissent is also wrong when it concludes that "the 
proffered expert testimony in this case is relevant, because the 
proffered expert testimony would assist the trier of fact. . . 
."  Id.  The circuit court concluded that the proposed testimony 
would not assist the trier of fact.  In addition, the court 
focused on specific portions of the proposed testimony, and 
found they were not relevant.  At the time of the motion 
hearing, the circuit court had in front of it the report of the 
expert and his proposed testimony.  While the circuit court did 
not 
specifically 
reference 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03, 
it 
can 
reasonably be inferred from the court's oral decision that the 
court was also concerned about confusion of the issues and the 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
12 
 
III 
¶18 This court has found that there was no erroneous 
exercise of discretion by the circuit court.  However, even if 
the circuit court had erred, the error was harmless here.  The 
test for harmless error was set forth by this court in State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  
Applying the test laid out by the United State Supreme Court in 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999), the 
Harvey court articulated the harmless error inquiry as whether 
it is "'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?'"  
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d, ¶46 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).  "In 
other words, if it is 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have [rendered the same verdict] absent the 
error,' then the error did not 'contribute to the verdict,'" and 
is therefore harmless.  Hannemann v. Boyson, 2005 WI 94, ¶57, 
282 Wis. 2d 664, 698 N.W.2d 714 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 
18).   
¶19 Applying Harvey and Neder to this case, we conclude 
that even if the circuit court's exclusion of Shomberg's expert 
testimony did amount to error, the error was harmless.  We 
believe it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have reached the same result as the circuit court did 
for two reasons.  First, although the court was limited to 
basing the decision on evidence in the record as a jury would 
have been, there was a vigorous cross-examination of three key 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
13 
 
witnesses.9  During the cross-examinations, counsel was able to 
flesh out factors that could cast doubt on the reliability of a 
witness's identification.  Second, in addition to the eyewitness 
identifications, there was strong evidence in the record of 
Shomberg's guilt.   
¶20 There are several other pieces of evidence which 
support our conclusion that a rational jury would find Shomberg 
guilty of the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, 
Shomberg was immediately identified from the police sketch by 
both his parole officer, and by an acquaintance who resided with 
Shomberg in February 2002 in a drug rehabilitation facility.  
When each viewed the sketch that had been published in the 
newspaper, each independently contacted the police identifying 
the person in the sketch as Shomberg. 
¶21 Second, Shomberg wrote a letter to his friends/alibi 
witnesses, asking them to corroborate his story.  Shomberg's 
letter recounts in great detail the version of the events he had 
related to police concerning his whereabouts on March 8 and 9, 
2002, and his being in the presence of these persons at the time 
of the assault.  The police had asked Shomberg repeatedly about 
contact with his alibi witnesses, lest their credibility be 
called into question.  On April 10 Shomberg wrote a letter to an 
alibi witness, Elizabeth Granby, who, at the time, lived in an 
apartment with her boyfriend, Pat Fiegel, another of Shomberg's 
friends and alibi witnesses.  On April 11 Detective Wall met 
                                                 
9 See Infra, ¶¶28-29. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
14 
 
with Shomberg and specifically asked him if he had contacted 
Granby or Fiegel.  Shomberg said he had not.   
¶22 Third, Ferguson had reported to the police that the 
assailant was wearing a long-sleeved gray knit shirt or 
sweatshirt.  In court, Ferguson positively identified a long-
sleeved gray sweater that police had recovered from Shomberg's 
grandmother as belonging to Shomberg.  Shomberg often stayed 
with his grandmother.   
¶23 Fourth, Shomberg's alibi witnesses were not determined 
to be credible by the circuit court.  The trier of fact is in 
the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses.  In 
this case, the circuit court found that various inconsistent 
statements, admissions of lies or a willingness to lie to 
police, and difficulties answering questions directly, destroyed 
the credibility of Shomberg's alibi witnesses.   
¶24 Finally, it is significant that although the lineups 
were simultaneous in form, they were sequential in fact.  Both 
S.B. and Ferguson stated that they recognized Shomberg as soon 
as he walked through the door.  Shomberg was the second person 
to enter the room.  S.B. told the court on direct examination 
that "I was looking at each one trying to see if they resembled 
the person that assaulted me that night, and right away I picked 
out number five [Shomberg].  His face and just the way his body 
was built 
was exactly like 
the 
man 
who 
assaulted 
me."  
Similarly, Ferguson's trial testimony on direct examination 
indicates that the problems of relative judgment and the 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
15 
 
comparative nature of simultaneous lineups were not a factor in 
this case.   
MR. KAISER, Q. As you were watching the people come 
onto the stage, who, if anyone, did you see?   
FERGUSON, A.  I saw the perpetrator that I had 
identified the night of the attack.   
Q. Did you recognize him as he was walking through the 
door?   
A.  Yes, I did.   
¶25 From this testimony it appears clear that what 
occurred 
was 
recognition 
memory, 
not 
relative 
judgment.  
Therefore, for all of these reasons, we conclude that even if 
excluding Shomberg's expert eyewitness testimony had constituted 
error, the error was harmless.   
IV 
¶26 Next, we must determine whether Shomberg was denied 
his 
constitutional 
right 
to 
present 
a 
defense. 
 
"This 
determination is a question of 'constitutional fact' that this 
court determines independently of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses."  St. 
George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶16 (footnote omitted).  We conclude 
that the court's decision to exclude expert eyewitness testimony 
did not deprive Shomberg of his constitutional right to present 
a defense.   
¶27 In St. George, this court held that the circuit 
court's exclusion of testimony of a defense expert about the 
victim's recantation, and about interview techniques particular 
to child sexual assault cases, unconstitutionally deprived the 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
16 
 
defendant of his right to present a defense.  St. George, 252 
Wis. 2d 499, ¶73.  In St. George, this court applied a two-part 
inquiry "[f]or the defendant to establish a constitutional right 
to the admissibility of the proffered expert witness testimony. 
. . ."  Id., ¶53.  "In the first part of the inquiry, the 
defendant must satisfy each of the following four factors 
through an offer of proof."  Id., ¶54.  First, the testimony of 
the expert must meet "the standards of Wis. Stat. § 907.02 
governing the admission of expert testimony."  Id. (footnote 
omitted).  Second, the expert witness's testimony must be 
"clearly relevant to a material issue in [the] case."  Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Third, the expert testimony must be 
"necessary to the defendant's case."  Id. (footnote omitted).  
Finally, "[t]he probative value of the testimony of the 
defendant's expert witness [must] outweigh[] its prejudicial 
effect."  Id.  If the defendant is able to satisfy "these four 
factors to establish a constitutional right to present the 
expert testimony, a court undertakes the second part of the 
inquiry by determining whether the defendant's right to present 
the proffered evidence is nonetheless outweighed by the State's 
compelling interest to exclude the evidence."  Id., ¶55 
(footnote omitted).   
¶28 Applying the facts of this case to the first part of 
the inquiry, we conclude that even though the first, second and 
fourth factors are arguably met (making no assessment as to the 
qualification of the individual to testify as an expert), 
Shomberg 
failed 
to 
establish 
that 
the 
expert 
eyewitness 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
17 
 
testimony was necessary to his case.  Although the expert 
himself did not testify, Shomberg's counsel was able to convey 
adequately the concepts of relative judgment and recognition 
memory, as well as the factors present in this case that would 
tend to render the eyewitness' testimony unreliable in his 
cross-examinations of both S.B. and Ferguson.   
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF S.B. 
MR. COHEN, Q.  And it's 3:00 in the morning, so we 
know it's dark out, right? 
. . . . 
S.B., A. Yes. 
Q. The street light's on, but that's it, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. And the only lighting there is very shadowy, 
right? 
A. Right.  
. . . . 
Q. And the person you saw when you saw that face, you 
saw that face for a split second, right? 
A. Right. 
. . . . 
A. 
I turned around and saw his face, and he like 
whipped me off into the air at that same split 
second.  You know, it happened very fast. 
Q. 
Okay.  Very fast.  All right.  And you never see 
the suspect again? 
A. No. 
. . . . 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
18 
 
Q. 
So the only way you knew that you could estimate 
as to what his body was like was how he felt 
behind you? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay, Because you never – you never could look at 
his body, right?  You never did in fact look at 
his body, did you? 
A. No.   
. . . . 
Q. Okay.  You didn't say look, I'd recognize that guy 
in a minute, I really got just a great look at 
this guy.  You said possibly. 
A. Yeah.  I said possibly. 
Q. Now, you went to the lineup, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How did you know to come to a lineup? 
A. I got a phone call telling me to come. 
. . . . 
Q. 
And so this was now about a month after the 
incident, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. 
And you thought well, sounds like the police did 
their work and they might have somebody, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. 
And you went to that lineup, and they brought six 
people out and they were all in jail outfits, 
right? 
A. Right. 
Q. 
So you knew that whoever it was was already 
arrested, right? 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
19 
 
A. Right. 
. . . . 
Q. 
And the person you picked out was essentially the 
best of the six people there, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. But you really weren’t sure, were you? 
A. I was not a hundred percent sure. 
Q. 
You weren't even –- basically, what you were sure 
is he was the best of the six, but that's all you 
were sure of, right? 
A. Right. 
. . . . 
Q. 
He very well could have not been the guy; he just 
was the best of the six? 
A. Right. 
Q. And basically, I think you said to the police 
officer he was the closest, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. Never said that's the guy, did you? 
A. No, not that I remember. 
Q. Because you weren't really sure. 
A. Right. 
Q. And when they brought the six people in, you know 
right away it couldn't be number one, three, and 
six because they were too big, right? 
A. Right. 
. . . . 
Q. And that left two, four, and five, right? 
A. Right. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
20 
 
Q. 
And you knew it couldn't be two and four because 
they were too old, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. What did that leave? 
A. Five. 
Q. Number five, and that's why you picked him out, 
right? 
A. Right. 
Q. He was the best, and in fact, he was the only one 
left after you eliminated the other five people? 
A. That's right.   
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ALAN FERGUSON 
MR. COHEN, Q.:  Now, you got a call to come to the 
lineup, right? 
FERGUSON, A.:  Yes 
. . . . 
Q. 
Okay. 
 
And 
she 
[Detective 
Ricksecker] 
said 
something like hey, we've caught a suspect, want 
you to come down and look at a lineup? 
A. Something like that. 
. . . . 
Q. Okay.  Now, you picked out the person who was 
number five at the lineup, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you said he looks familiar from the assault? 
A. Okay.  Yes. 
Q. Those are the words you used, familiar? 
A. That sounds – 
Q. Familiar, does that mean like similar? 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
21 
 
A. It's semantics.  . . . . 
Q. Well, your words were he looked familiar from the 
sexual assault? 
. . . . 
A. Right. 
. . . . 
Q. And then you went on to say he looked very similar 
to the person I saw that I followed? 
A. Correct. 
Q. 
You didn’t say that's the guy.  You said he looks 
similar to the guy? 
A. Correct. 
. . . . 
Q. They asked you how sure you were, and you said I'd 
say about 90 percent? 
A. Right. 
¶29 In addition, in his cross-examination of Detective 
Marion Morgan, counsel for Shomberg was able to convey the 
concept that some experts believe sequential lineups are 
relatively more reliable than simultaneous lineups, and the 
reasoning thereof, as Detective Morgan had attended training on 
eyewitness identification given by Shomberg's expert, which was 
also attended by Shomberg's counsel.   
MR. COHEN, Q:  Did you go to any kind of training on 
lineup, sequential versus simultaneous? 
DET. MORGAN, A:  Yes, I did. 
. . . . 
Q. 
And you learned why simultaneous lineups like the 
one that occurred tend to be unreliable, right? 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
22 
 
. . . . 
A. 
There 
were 
some 
discussion 
about 
why 
that 
presenter didn't believe they were as reliable. 
Q. 
Part of the problem is that it gets to be 
comparative.  The witness who is watching the 
lineup tries to figure out which one most 
resembles the person, right? 
A. 
That's what the instructor said, yes. 
Q. 
And the instructor also gave us examples how, 
when they remove the actual suspect from a lineup 
and show another lineup without that person, 
other people tend to get picked out because they 
remove the actual suspect, right? 
. . . . 
A. 
I don't remember that specific example. 
Q. 
Do you remember 
many discussions 
about the 
problems, though, with comparison when you look 
at six people? 
A. 
Yes, and actually, I believe most of that was 
directed toward photo arrays as opposed to in 
person. 
Q. 
And lineups too? 
A. 
Okay.   
Q. 
City of Madison is now doing a sequence lineup 
program now, are they not? 
. . . . 
A. 
Yes, we will be trained in that. 
Q. 
Because it tends –- because statistics tends to 
show that you have less false positives that way, 
right? 
A.  That's part of the training that they plan to 
present. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
23 
 
¶30 We do not believe the exclusion of the expert 
testimony deprived Shomberg of his constitutional right to 
present a defense, as it had in St. George.  In that case, the 
five-year-old daughter of the defendant's long-term girlfriend 
told her mother that the defendant had fondled her vagina the 
previous night as the three slept in the mother's bed.  St. 
George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶¶7-8.  Over the next few months, the 
daughter "allegedly also reported the fondling to a doctor and a 
social worker."  Id., ¶8.  "The defendant was charged with 
first-degree 
sexual 
assault 
of 
a 
child, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(1999-2000)." Id. (footnote omitted). 
¶31 "At trial, [the daughter] denied the incident had ever 
occurred and even that she had ever made some of the reports."  
Id., ¶9.  The defendant sought to introduce his own expert to 
testify on recantation in child sexual assault cases, but the 
court excluded the testimony.  Id., ¶5.  A jury found the 
defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison.  
Id., ¶10.  The defendant challenged his conviction by arguing 
that the circuit court's exclusion of the testimony of his 
expert witness deprived the defendant of his constitutional 
right to present a defense.  Id., ¶30.  This court agreed, 
concluding that "exclusion of the testimony of the expert 
witness about recantation and interview techniques denied the 
defendant his constitutional right to present evidence clearly 
central to his defense." Id., ¶73.  
¶32 The facts of St. George are distinguishable from this 
case in three critical respects.  First, St. George involved the 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
24 
 
recantation of an alleged victim of child sexual assault.  
Recantation is a subject clearly beyond the common knowledge or 
understanding of a jury or other fact finder.  As such, it is an 
example of an area of "specialized knowledge that will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue" as contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  Second, 
the state in St. George relied upon expert testimony to support 
its case.  The defendant was prevented from presenting expert 
testimony to rebut that of the state.  Third, the state 
emphasized in closing argument that the defendant had failed "to 
rebut the testimony of the State's two expert witnesses."  Id., 
¶65.   
¶33 In contrast, Shomberg's expert was to testify on 
eyewitness identifications.  The difficulties with eyewitness 
identification are something we all have some appreciation for 
as part of our common knowledge and understanding.  In addition, 
in this case, the State of Wisconsin presented no expert 
testimony 
supporting 
the 
accuracy 
of 
the 
eyewitness 
identifications.  Therefore, unlike the defendant in St. George, 
there was no expert testimony to rebut, and no inference of 
guilt due to the absence of rebuttal.   
¶34 In addition, Shomberg presented an entirely separate 
alibi defense.  There were two elements to Shomberg's defense.  
First, 
that 
S.B. 
and 
Ferguson 
misidentified 
him 
as 
the 
assailant.  Second, that on the evening of March 8 and through 
the night until the morning of March 9, he was 30 blocks from 
the scene of the assault, at an apartment with several friends.   
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
25 
 
¶35 The dissent's reliance on the use of the word "might" 
in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (Justice 
Butler's dissent, ¶75) is misplaced.  A more recent discussion 
from the United States Supreme Court has clarified the right to 
present a defense by use of an expert witness.  The Court has 
repeatedly held that "[a] defendant's right to present relevant 
evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable 
restrictions."  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 
(1998) (citing   Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 
U.S. 44, 55 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 
(1973) 
(footnote 
omitted)). 
 
Therefore, 
under 
some 
circumstances, "[a] defendant's interest in presenting such 
evidence may thus 'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests 
in the criminal trial process.'"  Id.  (citations omitted).  
Moreover, the Court has found "the exclusion of evidence to be 
unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it 
has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  The Court noted that the exclusions of 
evidence 
it 
had 
declared 
unconstitutional 
"significantly 
undermined fundamental elements of the defendant's defense."  
Id. at 315.  The same cannot be said here.   
¶36 Here, as in Scheffer, "the court  . . . heard all the 
relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of 
the accused," and the exclusion of expert testimony "did not 
preclude him from introducing any factual evidence."  Id. at 
317.  The Scheffer court concluded that "respondent was barred 
merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
26 
 
own credibility," and therefore concluded that "respondent's 
defense was [not] significantly impaired by the exclusion. . . 
."  Id. 
¶37 When 
we 
consider 
the 
information 
elicited 
by 
Shomberg's 
counsel 
during 
cross-examination 
of 
the 
three 
witnesses 
noted 
earlier, 
opening 
statements 
and 
closing 
arguments, and his alibi defense, we conclude that the testimony 
of 
Shomberg's 
expert 
was 
not 
necessary 
to 
his 
defense.  
Therefore, Shomberg's constitutional right to present a defense 
was 
not 
violated 
by 
the 
exclusion 
of 
expert 
eyewitness 
testimony.  As the first portion of the inquiry was not 
satisfied, we need not proceed to the second part of the St. 
George inquiry.   
V 
¶38 We are satisfied that Shomberg should not be granted a 
new trial in the interest of justice.  "This court may exercise 
its power of discretionary reversal under the first part of 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06, 
without 
finding 
the probability 
of a 
different result on retrial when it concludes that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried."  State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 
2d 150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996)(citations omitted).  We have 
explained that we will determine that the real controversy has 
not been fully tried if the fact finder "was erroneously not 
given the opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on 
an important issue of the case. . . ."  Id.  In Hicks, the court 
found that the jury had not heard about DNA evidence that 
excluded Hicks as the donor of one of the hair specimens.  Id. 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
27 
 
at 161.  As the excluded DNA evidence was relevant to the 
critical issue of identification, the court in Hicks determined 
the real controversy had not been fully tried.  Id. at 172.  As 
we stated earlier, the circuit court as the fact finder in this 
case was not denied the opportunity to hear important testimony 
regarding the identification of Shomberg, since such testimony 
was provided through cross-examinations discussed herein, and 
such issues were also referred to extensively during opening 
statements and closing arguments.  We conclude that the real 
controversy in this case has been fully tried, and, therefore, 
Shomberg should not be granted a new trial. 
VI 
¶39 Finally, we determine that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in refusing to admit 
testimony regarding Shomberg's offer to take a polygraph 
examination.   The result of a polygraph test is inadmissible in 
Wisconsin.  See State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 278-79, 307 
N.W.2d 628 (1981).  Yet, "an offer to take a polygraph test is 
relevant to an assessment of the offeror's credibility and may 
be admissible for that purpose."  State v. Pfaff, 2004 WI App 
31, ¶26, 269 Wis. 2d 786, 676 N.W.2d 562 (citing State v. 
Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 217, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982)).  
However, such an offer is only "relevant to the state of mind of 
a person making the offer as 'long as the person making the 
offer believes that the test or analysis is possible, accurate, 
and admissible.'"  Neumann v. Neumann, 2001 WI App 61, ¶65, 242 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
28 
 
Wis. 2d 205, 626 N.W.2d 821 (quoting State v. Santana-Lopez, 
2000 WI App 122, ¶4, 237 Wis. 2d 332, 613 N.W.2d 918).   
¶40 The 
evidence 
in 
the 
record 
is 
insufficient 
to 
establish that Shomberg offered to take a polygraph examination, 
as opposed to agreeing to take one.  See Neumann, 242 Wis. 2d, 
¶64.  During the court's ruling on the motion to admit the 
polygraph offer, Shomberg's counsel first explained:  "I talked 
to Mr. Shomberg fairly soon after this case got started as to 
whether or not he'd be willing to take a polygraph.  He said he 
would."  Shortly thereafter, however, counsel for Shomberg 
clarified: "When I talked to Mr. Shomberg about this, and I'm 
sorry if I sound like I'm back-peddling.  I stated it off hand 
before.  We talked about the lie box, and I suspected it was Mr. 
Shomberg who first brought that up to me, 'hey, can I take a lie 
box. . . .'"  Shomberg himself did not testify about whether he 
offered to take a polygraph.  We believe, therefore, there is 
insufficient support in the record to conclude that Shomberg 
initiated the offer to take a polygraph test.  
¶41 Neither does evidence in the record support the second 
requirement to admit an offer to take a polygraph —— that 
Shomberg believed the results of a polygraph would be admissible 
in court.  Again, Shomberg did not testify on his belief 
concerning admissibility.  Counsel for Shomberg stated "He was 
aware that the general rule is it's not admissible, but there 
was also this new stuff coming in from the Department of 
Corrections where they were using them all the time, and the 
hope was that the Court would let us get these results in."  
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
29 
 
With no other facts in the record to indicate that Shomberg 
believed the results of a polygraph test would be admissible in 
court, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in its 
exclusion of Shomberg's offer to take a polygraph examination.   
VII 
¶42 In its amicus brief, the Innocence Project of the 
Frank J. Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, 
asked this court to adopt a presumption of admissibility of 
expert eyewitness 
testimony 
in cases 
involving 
eyewitness 
identification.  We decline to do so.  Our concern is that 
adopting a presumption would all but eliminate the discretion of 
the circuit court on such evidentiary matters.  Most troubling 
is that if we did adopt such a presumption, there is no clear 
guidance as to when and how such a presumption could be 
overcome.   
¶43 However, 
we 
encourage 
circuit 
court 
judges 
to 
carefully consider, in each case, whether the admissibility of 
eyewitness expert testimony would be helpful to the trier of 
fact.  Because of our growing appreciation for the difficulties 
inherent in eyewitness identification, we appreciate the work of 
the Department of Justice and the legislative task force in the 
development, education and promotion of better practices and 
procedures for eyewitness identification including, but not 
limited to, lineups.    
VIII 
¶44 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not, at 
the time of its decision in 2002, erroneously exercise its 
No. 
2004AP630-CR   
 
30 
 
discretion in excluding the expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification proffered by Shomberg.  We also determine that 
even if the circuit court did commit error, any such error was 
harmless.  Further, we hold that the absence of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification did not deprive Shomberg of his 
constitutional right to present a defense.  In addition, we 
determine that Shomberg should not be granted a new trial in the 
interest of justice, as the real controversy in this case has 
been fully tried.  Finally, we conclude that the offer to take a 
polygraph was properly excluded, because there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to find either that Shomberg had 
initiated the offer to take a polygraph examination, or that he 
believed the results of the test were admissible. 
 
By the Court.  The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  This case 
turns on eyewitness identification and alibi evidence.   
¶46 I agree with Justice Butler that a significant failure 
of communication occurred between the circuit court and defense 
counsel regarding the nature of the expert witness testimony 
proffered 
by 
the 
defendant 
Shomberg 
on 
eyewitness 
identification.  The record evidences a disconnect between the 
expert evidence proffered by Shomberg regarding eyewitness 
identification and the circuit court's appreciation of the 
significance of the proffered evidence.   
¶47 The defense expert witness sought to emphasize the 
weakness of an identification made in a lineup in which all 
persons are shown to an eyewitness at the same time (a 
simultaneous lineup),10 as compared to an identification made 
                                                 
10 The defense motion stated the following factors about 
which the defense expert, Paul Carroll, would testify: 
Mr. Carroll would testify about several factors that 
psychologists specializing in the field of human 
perception and memory agree have an important bearing 
on a witness'[s] ability to identify a stranger.  
These factors are, among others:  That sequential 
line-ups are much more reliable and accurate than 
simultaneous line-ups; relative judgment, which occurs 
when a witness at a line-up eliminates who the 
perpetrator could not be rather than identifies the 
actual perpetrator; transference, a mental process 
that can occur when some period of time separates the 
initial perception and the later identification; the 
absence 
of 
a 
reliable 
relationship 
between 
the 
confidence a witness has in his identification and the 
accuracy of that identification; how I.D. evidence is 
often unreliable and there are scores of examples of 
people wrongly convicted of crimes based solely on an 
incorrect I.D. witness; that the factors present in 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
when the persons are shown to an eyewitness one at a time 
(sequential lineup) and the eyewitness is asked to state after 
seeing each person whether that person is or is not the suspect.   
¶48 The circuit court did not appear to appreciate the 
import of the proffered expert witness testimony relating to 
simultaneous lineups compared to sequential lineups.  Instead of 
focusing on the weaknesses inherent in a simultaneous lineup in 
determining whether to admit expert testimony, the circuit court 
kept returning to the expert's testifying to other weaknesses of 
eyewitness identification, many familiar to triers of fact, such 
as the effect of stress, darkness, and limited opportunity to 
observe on the reliability of eyewitness identification.  The 
circuit court then excluded the expert's testimony as not 
helpful.  
¶49 If the majority opinion is saying that the circuit 
court already knew about "relative judgment" in simultaneous 
lineups, then it was proper not to admit the testimony.  The 
interaction between the circuit court and defense counsel 
clearly demonstrates, however, that the circuit court did not 
fully understand Shomberg's offer of proof.  The circuit court 
repeatedly strayed away from factors that require expert 
testimony such as relative judgment and back to factors such as 
                                                                                                                                                             
this case would tend to render the eyewitnesses' 
testimony unreliable. 
At oral argument the State asserted that the defense's 
offer of proof was inadequate. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
lack of light and whether the eyewitness had been drinking, 
which are decidedly different.   
¶50 Furthermore, the circuit court conceded that, at least 
prior 
to 
the 
offer 
of 
proof, 
it 
lacked 
knowledge 
or 
understanding of relative judgment, stating that it had never 
heard of the term "relative judgment" prior to reading the 
expert report.  The court and defense counsel's exchange was as 
follows: 
THE COURT:  So what we're back to is his opinion that 
sequential is better than simultaneous. 
MR. COHEN [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And why. 
THE COURT:  Because simultaneous means the person, the 
witness, in essence, has the burden of making a 
positive 
identification 
as 
opposed 
to 
simply 
eliminating people that the witness does not feel were 
the perpetrator with the, I guess implicit within the 
witness's belief, that one of these people must be the 
perpetrator. 
MR. COHEN:  Yes.  Relative judgment. 
 
. . . . 
For 
instance, 
I 
didn't 
know 
the 
term 
relative 
judgment, in terms of how it affects someone selecting 
somebody in a six-person lineup.  That's not a term I 
was familiar with.  I don't know if the Court was. 
THE COURT:  No. 
But as it relates to these areas, I'm having a problem 
seeing why this could not be adequately explored by 
cross-examination of any witness who testifies, as to 
identification . . . . 
¶51 If the majority opinion is saying that the circuit 
court read the offer of proof (which included the expert's 
report) and gleaned from that report any relevant testimony that 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
the 
defense 
expert 
would 
have 
given, 
this 
analysis 
is 
problematic.  It clearly would have been error for the circuit 
court 
to 
consider 
expert 
testimony 
that 
it 
had 
ruled 
inadmissible. 
¶52 The dialogue between defense counsel and the circuit 
court showing the miscommunication on this issue is set forth in 
Appendix A at the end of this dissenting opinion. 
¶53 When Shomberg's trial was held in 2002, many judges 
and counsel in Wisconsin evidently had not yet explored the 
problems 
associated 
with 
simultaneous 
lineups.11 
 
Indeed, 
simultaneous lineups were the norm and any attack on a well-
conducted lineup was counter to then-held views.  The majority 
opinion appears to justify upholding the circuit court's 
exclusion of the defendant's expert witness on the ground that 
the expert witness would offer a relatively new explanation of 
the weakness of simultaneous lineups.12  The majority opinion 
acknowledges that the problems associated with simultaneous 
lineups are not even so well-known in 2006 as to render expert 
testimony not helpful to a finder of fact.13   
¶54 As I see it, that the expert opinion offered was 
relatively unknown information is the very reason the circuit 
court should have admitted the testimony in the present case.  
The subject of the expert testimony was not generally known to 
triers of fact in Wisconsin in 2002.  The proffered testimony 
                                                 
11 See majority op., ¶15.   
12 See majority op., ¶17.   
13 Id. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
was apparently specialized knowledge at the time of Shomberg's 
trial.  These factors are precisely why the expert testimony 
would have been of assistance to the trier of fact in the 
present case, was essential to the defense, and should have been 
admitted.14    
¶55 The circuit court did not fully appreciate, as the 
expert witness would have testified, that when a witness is 
given a simultaneous presentation of subjects, the witness tends 
to make relative judgments, comparing one person in the lineup 
with the others and identifying the person who looks most like 
the actual perpetrator.  This tendency to make relative 
judgments does not usually pose a problem if the actual 
perpetrator is present; the witness will ordinarily identify the 
perpetrator.  But if the perpetrator is not in the lineup, the 
witness will tend to identify the person in the lineup who looks 
most like the witness's recollection of the suspect.  A 
simultaneous lineup thus encourages a witness to select the 
"best" match, making a comparative judgment about the persons in 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02 provides that "[i]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
the lineup, rather than making an absolute judgment about each 
person presented.15 
¶56 Researchers have learned that presenting persons one 
at a time, sequentially, helps witnesses to make absolute 
judgments rather than comparative ones.  Research suggests that 
the value of identifications made under sequential presentations 
is 
significantly 
greater 
than 
that 
of 
those 
made 
under 
simultaneous presentations.16 
¶57 Relying 
on 
what 
it 
describes 
as 
"scientific 
rationale," emphasizing relative judgment and suggestiveness, 
the Wisconsin Department of Justice recently adopted a model 
policy calling for sequential lineups.17  A Wisconsin legislative 
                                                 
15 Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Model Policy and Procedure for 
Eyewitness Identification at 5 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. 
 
See 
also Legislative Task Force (Avery Task Force), Eyewitness 
Identification Procedure Recommendations at 2-3, available at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eyewitness_guidelines.htm; 
Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and 
Reform, The Champion, Apr. 2005, at 14. 
16 Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Model Policy and Procedure for 
Eyewitness Identification at 5 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. 
 
See 
also Legislative Task Force (Avery Task Force), Eyewitness 
Identification Procedure Recommendations at 2-3, available at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eyewitness_guidelines.htm; 
Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and 
Reform, The Champion, Apr. 2005, at 14. 
17 Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Model Policy and Procedure for 
Eyewitness Identification at 5 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. 
 
The 
policy also recommends numerous other changes in eyewitness 
identification procedure. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
task force charged with addressing wrongful convictions has 
recently made a similar recommendation.18  These recommendations 
are the result of extensive study that demonstrates that, 
contrary to the previously held view, there are substantial 
problems 
with 
eyewitness 
identification 
in 
general 
and 
simultaneous lineups in particular.  In the recent Dubose case, 
the court identified the problems and risks associated with 
eyewitness identification in general.19  This case presents the 
problems and risks associated with simultaneous lineups in 
particular. 
¶58 That the circuit court did not fully appreciate the 
import of the evidentiary offer is understandable and, in 
essence, makes Shomberg's point.   
¶59 The majority opinion concludes that the lineup in 
which Shomberg was identified was "sequential in fact."20  
Defense counsel's cross-examination of the eyewitness made 
clear, however, that even if she believed she recognized 
Shomberg as he entered the lineup, her identification was a 
product of relative judgment.  The witness testified as follows: 
Q 
And when they brought the six people in, you knew 
right away it couldn't be number one, three, and six 
because they were too big, right? 
A 
Right. 
                                                 
18 Legislative Task Force (Avery Task Force), Eyewitness 
Identification 
Procedure 
Recommendations, 
available 
at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eyewitness_guidelines.htm. 
19 State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶30, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 699 
N.W.2d 582. 
20 Majority op., ¶24.   
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
. . . . 
Q 
And that left two, four, and five, right? 
A 
Right. 
Q 
And you knew it couldn't be two and four because 
they were too old, right? 
A 
Right. 
Q 
What did that leave? 
A 
Five. 
Q 
Number five, and that's why you picked him out, 
right? 
A 
Right. 
Q 
He was the best, and in fact, he was the only one 
left after you eliminated the other five people? 
A 
That's right. 
Q 
And you didn't pick him out because for sure that 
was the guy, just he was the best of the six? 
A 
Right. 
¶60 The majority opinion asserts that the defense was able 
to convey through cross-examination of Detective Marion Morgan, 
a state witness, "the concept that some experts believe 
sequential 
lineups 
are 
relatively 
more 
reliable 
than 
simultaneous lineups."21  The detective's testimony on cross-
examination was based on attending training on eyewitness 
identification given by Shomberg's proffered expert.  It is 
extraordinarily weak.  The cross-examination fails to explain 
the research or to make the points that the defense's expert 
witness could have made about a witness's relative judgment in a 
simultaneous lineup.   
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶29. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶61 The 
defense 
counsel 
obviously 
tried 
to 
drag 
information favorable to the defendant out of the State's 
witness but was hampered by the witness and the assistant 
district attorney's objections. 
¶62 Furthermore, the detective insisted that her training 
about simultaneous and sequential identification related to 
identifications from a photo array, not to the kind of lineup 
involved in the present case.  Her cross-examination is set 
forth in Appendix B at the end of this dissenting opinion.     
¶63 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  I conclude that 
the defense's expert witness testimony relating to relative 
judgment 
in 
simultaneous 
lineups 
was 
necessary 
to 
the 
defendant's case; its exclusion was a due process violation of 
Shomberg's right to present a defense.22   
APPENDIX A. Defense Dialogue with Circuit Court 
¶64 At 
the 
motion 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
and 
Shomberg's attorney then had the following exchange regarding 
the offer of proof: 
MR. COHEN [defense counsel]:   . . . When you 
look at six people in a lineup, you think to yourself 
which is the person that most looks like the person 
I'm looking for, and you use relative judgment, and 
that's 
what 
makes 
a 
simultaneous 
lineup 
very 
unreliable.    
. . . . 
Mr. Carroll can tell you . . . that by using a 
sequential lineup, you tend to eliminate all the false 
                                                 
22 See State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 
N.W.2d 777. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
positives 
without 
eliminating 
the 
correct 
positives . . . . 
Why that's important, when we bring somebody in 
for a lineup, they tend to think, hey, I'm here for a 
lineup, they must have caught the guy, now I got to 
figure out which of these six people did it, and that 
is relative judgment. 
. . . . 
 
I think the most important thing this expert can 
tell you is why the process we're using leads to 
mistakes. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  . . . I'll make a preliminary ruling. 
 
First of all, as it relates to the opinions that 
the defense is seeking to elicit from Mr. Carroll, I'm 
not going to allow that for the following reasons: 
 
The bottom line is, the defense seeks to ask Mr. 
Carroll, in his capacity as an expert, or perception 
as an expert, as to the reliability of identification 
by the complaining witness and by the security guard. 
 
I think that does invade the province of the jury 
and, yet, I don't see how it assists the jury.23 
. . . . 
 
This holding would be consistent with the Hampton 
case, as well as Blair and Wilson. 
 
Specifically, the judge in the Hampton case ruled 
that "the defendant's expert witness would be limited 
in his testimony to simply listing the different 
factors affecting human perception, but would not be 
allowed to give an opinion as to the reliability of 
the specific identification of the defendant by Mrs. 
Schlieve." . . .  
                                                 
23 But see Wis. Stat. § 907.04 (providing that "[t]estimony 
in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is 
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact"). 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
 
. . . . 
Now Mr. Cohen's motion . . . indicates that the 
expert would testify that there are factors that may 
influence a witness's ability to identify a stranger. 
. . . . 
Mr. Cohen, how is this going to, if I allow this, 
is this going to assist the trier of fact? 
. . . . 
 . . . I cannot in any way envision allowing the 
trier of fact to hear the fact that New Jersey 
mandates sequential lineups as opposed to simultaneous 
lineups.  I don't see what bearing that has. 
MR. COHEN:  Mandates is not that important, but 
what is important, the reasons why it's become the 
preferred method of doing it. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  So what we're back to is, you want to 
call this individual who will opine that sequential 
lineups are better than simultaneous lineups? 
MR. COHEN:  And the reason why, not just that 
they're better, but here's why.  Here's [sic] the 
problems with simultaneous ones. 
THE COURT:  Because, in part, it's a process of 
elimination as opposed to positive identification. 
MR. COHEN:  The fact that exactly, at least part 
of what the victim said, when she put down her answer, 
"Well, I knew it wasn't one and three because they 
were too big.  I knew it wasn't two and four because 
they were too old." 
THE COURT:  But isn't that something that you 
would also ask the witness on cross-examination? 
MR. COHEN:  I sure could.  I sure could, but it's 
a process that, I think it's important.  What I was 
impressed with was the experiments that they have 
done.  That really sort of, you know, sewed it up for 
me.  This was really a much better way of doing it. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  So what we're back to is his opinion 
that sequential is better than simultaneous. 
MR. COHEN:  And why. 
THE 
COURT:  Because 
simultaneous 
means the 
person, the witness, in essence, has the burden of 
making a positive identification as opposed to simply 
eliminating people that the witness does not feel were 
the perpetrator with the, I guess implicit within the 
witness's belief, that one of these people must be the 
perpetrator. 
MR. COHEN:  Yes.  Relative judgment. 
. . . . 
For instance, I didn't know the term relative 
judgment, in terms of how it affects someone selecting 
somebody in a six-person lineup.  That's not a term I 
was familiar with.  I don't know if the Court was. 
THE COURT:  No. 
But as it relates to these areas, I'm having a 
problem seeing why this could not be adequately 
explored by cross-examination of any witness who 
testifies, as to identification and, again, what we're 
back to is, how much light was available, how much did 
someone have to drink, did you take any drugs, were 
you under any type of stress, how close was the 
person, was their fact in any way obstructing [sic], 
what was the period of time between which this 
occurred and you were first shown this lineup. 
I don't see so far how any of those factors would 
require the assistance of an expert witness. 
. . . . 
I don't think the areas we're talking about 
require the assistance of an expert because it gets 
down to the same factors that the trier of fact would 
consider . . . . 
. . . . 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
I say that having reviewed . . . Mr. Carroll's 
report, as well as his CV, and when I look at page 
three of that report, taking up those opinions one by 
one . . . I realize they're offered as the basis for 
his 
opinion, 
that 
ultimately 
the 
reliability is 
suspect, of the eyewitness identification, number one, 
several minor inconsistencies found in police reports, 
that's something that can be brought out on cross-
examination. 
Number two, again, that's his opinion when he 
states, "Neither the victim or the witness identify 
the suspect." 
The trier of fact will hear the exact testimony 
in that regard.  I don't think anybody under the 
auspices of being an expert witness would be allowed 
to testify, "If we are to convict suspects on this 
type identification, then at least 10 percent of those 
convicted would be innocent." 
. . . . 
Number 
three, 
again, 
"Victim 
B[.] 
isn't 
identifying the person that she remembers from the 
incident, but is instead identifying those persons who 
couldn't have committed the crime," that's a matter 
that the trier of fact can consider unassisted by Mr. 
Carroll. 
Four, "Eyewitness identification remains as one 
of the most influential types of evidence.  Studies 
indicate that jurors believe eyewitness evidence more 
than fingerprint evidence." 
I don't see how that's relevant or should be 
considered by the trier of fact. 
And then, five, again, relates to his opinion 
about when eyewitness testimony is more reliable, but 
it would consider the same types of factors that the 
trier of fact would as it relates to those studies. 
As it relates to those studies, I don't believe 
that would assist the trier of fact, it would simply 
invade their province, so for all of those reasons, 
I'm 
going 
to 
deny 
the 
motion 
to 
admit 
expert 
eyewitness testimony. 
 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
APPENDIX B. 
Defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Morgan 
¶65 The following is the cross-examination relating to 
simultaneous and sequential lineups: 
Q [defense counsel] Did you go to any kind of training 
on lineup, sequential versus simultaneous? 
A [Detective Morgan] 
Yes, I did. 
Q 
Same one I was at? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And you learned why simultaneous lineups like the 
one that occurred tend to be unreliable, right? 
 
MR. 
KAISER 
[Assistant 
District 
Attorney]:
 
Objection; relevance. 
 
THE COURT: 
Overruled. 
A 
There were [sic] some discussion about why that 
presenter didn't believe they were as reliable. 
Q 
Part of the problem is that it gets to be 
comparative.  The witness who is watching the lineup 
tries to figure out which one most resembles the 
person, right? 
A 
That's what the instructor said, yes. 
Q 
And the instructor also gave us examples how, 
when they remove the actual suspect from a lineup and 
show another lineup without that person, other people 
tend to get picked out because they remove the actual 
suspect, right? 
MR. KAISER: 
Objection; relevance of specific 
examples of other lineups and how they were 
conducted. 
THE COURT: 
Well, this relates to her training 
and so I think it's within her general realm of 
knowledge, so overruled. 
Q 
You understand my question, right? 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
A 
One more time, please? 
Q 
The instructor showed you examples where six 
people are in a photo array and someone, a group of 
people have seen what the person looked like and 
they're supposed to pick out which of the six it was, 
and then they do the same thing again but take out the 
one who's picked out by the highest percentage of the 
witnesses, run the whole thing again, and the other 
five, their percentages all go up as a result, right? 
MR. KAISER: 
Objection; 
relevance 
of 
photo 
arrays. 
THE COURT: 
Overruled. 
Q 
Do you remember that? 
A 
I don't remember that specific example. 
Q 
Do you remember 
many discussions 
about the 
problems, though, with comparison when you look at six 
people? 
A 
Yes, and actually, I believe most of that was 
directed towards photo arrays as opposed to in person. 
Q 
And lineups too? 
A 
Okay. 
Q 
City of Madison is now doing a sequence lineup 
program now, are they not? 
MR. KAISER: 
Objection; relevance. 
THE COURT: 
Overruled. 
A 
Yes, we will be trained in that. 
Q 
Because it tends –- because statistics tends to 
show that you have less false positives that way, 
right? 
A 
That's part of the training that they plan to 
present. 
Q 
But you know that already, right? 
No.  2004AP630-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
A 
I'm not trying to be difficult, but I really 
think that the training was specifically directed 
towards photo lineups. 
 
 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶66 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
concludes that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in excluding the expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification proffered by the defendant, and that the absence 
of such testimony did not deprive him of his constitutional 
right to present a defense.  Because I disagree with these 
conclusions, and because I conclude that there was a significant 
failure of communication between the trial court and defense 
counsel regarding the admissibility of some of the proffered 
expert testimony, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶67 Wisconsin has a low threshold when it comes to the 
admission of expert testimony.  State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, 
¶39, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777.  Expert witness testimony 
is governed by Wis. Stat. § 907.02 (2003-04),24 which provides 
that if specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
qualified witness may testify.  Id.  Admissible expert testimony 
in the form of an opinion or inference is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact.  Wis. Stat. § 907.04.  Further, evidence is "relevant" 
if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  All relevant evidence is admissible unless 
                                                 
24 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are from 2003-
04. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
otherwise precluded by the constitution, statute, or court rule.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.02.  A trial court may preclude certain 
relevant evidence, "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.03.   
¶68 Once relevancy and the expert's qualifications are 
established, the reliability of the expert's testimony is a 
credibility issue to be determined by the fact finder.  State v. 
Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d 224, 234, 397 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1986); 
State v. Shaw, 124 Wis. 2d 363, 367, 369 N.W.2d 772 (Ct. App. 
1985).  "Whether such relevant evidence should be excluded [] 
goes to the trial court's discretion to weigh the probative 
value of the evidence against the possibility of prejudice or 
other factors which might impede the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of the issues at trial."  State v. Wollman, 86 
Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979) (citing Chapin v. State, 
78 Wis. 2d 346, 353, 254 N.W.2d 286 (1977); Kelly v. State, 75 
Wis. 2d 303, 319, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977)).  As such, in 
exercising its discretion regarding expert testimony, the trial 
court must articulate a reasonable explanation that demonstrates 
that the court considered whether the probative value of the 
testimony 
was 
substantially 
outweighed 
by 
its 
potential 
prejudicial 
effects, 
or 
whether 
any 
other 
statute, 
constitutional 
provision, 
or 
court 
rule 
impacts 
its 
admissibility.  This decision is guided by, and the result 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
should be consistent with, the State's approach of liberally 
admitting expert testimony. 
¶69 Applying the erroneous exercise of discretion standard 
of review to the facts of this case, the majority concludes that 
the trial court's decision to exclude the expert testimony was a 
proper exercise of its discretion in accordance with accepted 
legal standards and in accordance with the facts of the record.  
Majority op., ¶¶10—17.  The majority bases its determination on 
the fact that the circuit court felt that everything the expert 
would testify to with respect to the factors that may influence 
a witness's ability to identify a stranger was within the common 
knowledge and sense and perception of the jury.  Majority op., 
¶13.  The majority further finds fault with defense counsel's 
inability to articulate the basis upon which the factors 
influencing the reliability of eyewitness identifications would 
assist the trier of fact.  Majority op., ¶14.  I respectfully 
disagree with the majority's analysis and its conclusion. 
¶70 Numerous factors can influence a witness's ability to 
accurately identify a person or an event.25  Such factors 
include, but are not limited to, (1) the stressfulness of the 
event for the eyewitness;26 (2) whether the race, gender, or age 
                                                 
25 In general, people overestimate eyewitness accuracy and 
fail to understand the factors that affect it.  See Gary L. 
Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Annu. Rev. 
of Psychol. 277, 284-85 (2003). 
26 See United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 
1985) ("There is evidence that stress decreases the reliability 
of 
eyewitness 
identifications, 
contrary 
to 
common 
understanding.").  
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
of the witness differs from that of the person observed;27 and 
(3) whether the event involved "weapon focus."28  Just last term, 
we recognized that "[t]he research strongly supports the 
conclusion that eyewitness misidentification is now the single 
greatest source of wrongful convictions in the United States, 
and responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other 
causes combined."  State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶30, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 699 N.W.2d 582.  We should not expect the ordinary 
person in the community, without assistance, to be able to grasp 
and comprehend the complicated processes and limitations of how 
memory, cognition, relative judgment, and transference work.  
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 
1985) ("Those experienced in criminal trial work or familiar 
with the administration of justice understand that one of the 
great problems of proof is posed by eyewitness identification, 
especially in cross-racial identification.") (citation omitted);  
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(The available data, while not exhaustive, unanimously supports 
the widely held commonsense view that members of one race have 
greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a 
different race . . . . Yet, we have developed a reluctance——
almost a taboo——to even admit the existence of the problem, let 
alone provide the jury with the information necessary to 
evaluate its impact."); John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: 
The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 Am. J. Crim. 
L. 207 (2001); Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis 
of Facial Identification Studies, 100 Psychol. Bul. 139 (1986) 
(studies have found that race and gender play a role in the 
accuracy of facial identification); Daniel B. Wright & Joanne N. 
Stroud, Age Differences in Lineup Identification Accuracy: 
People Are Better With Their Own Age, 26 Law Hum. Behav. 641 
(2002). 
28 Otto H. MacLin, M. Kimberly MacLin, Roy S. Malpass, Race, 
Arousal, Attention, Exposure, and Delay: An Examination of 
Factors Moderating 
Face 
Recognition, 
7 
Psychology, 
Public 
Policy, & Law 134 (2001) (Weapon focus is "the phenomenon 
whereby the presence of a weapon diverts attention from other 
aspects of a scene."). 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
¶71 Furthermore, several recent scientific studies have 
proven the significant negative impact that certain factors have 
on an eyewitness's identification of a stranger.29  As the 
majority 
recognizes, 
these 
factors 
include 
the 
relative 
reliability of sequential versus simultaneous lineups, relative 
judgment, transference, the absence of a reliable relationship 
between the confidence of a witness and the accuracy of the 
identification, and examples of people wrongly convicted of 
crimes based solely on an incorrect identification.  See 
majority op., ¶13.  These factors also include, (1) whether the 
eyewitness is told prior to the photo array or lineup that a 
suspect 
has 
been 
detained 
and 
may 
be 
present 
for 
the 
identification;30 
(2) 
whether 
the 
"fillers" 
match 
the 
                                                 
29 See United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 
1986) ("The scientific validity of the studies confirming the 
many weaknesses of eyewitness identification cannot be seriously 
questioned at this point."); United States v. Langan, 263 
F.3d 613, 622 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he science of eyewitness 
perception has achieved the level of exactness, methodology, and 
reliability 
of 
any 
psychological 
research." 
 
(internal 
quotations omitted)). 
30 Studies have shown that when eyewitnesses are instructed 
prior to an identification that the real perpetrator "may or may 
not be present" in the photo array or lineup and that the 
investigation will continue regardless of the identification, 
the instruction can reduce mistaken identification by up to 41.6 
percent.  Wells & Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, supra. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
eyewitness's description of the perpetrator;31 and (3) whether 
the eyewitness is given positive feedback during or immediately 
following the identification.     
¶72 The defense in this matter was that someone other than 
the defendant committed these offenses, and that Shomberg was 
mistakenly 
identified 
as 
the 
perpetrator. 
 
Relying 
on 
established scientific research, the expert testimony that he 
sought to introduce would have addressed factors that have a 
significant bearing on a witness's ability to identify a 
stranger, as well as explained how these factors impact the 
accuracy of a witness's recollection.  Notwithstanding the 
cross-examination of the eyewitnesses and jury instructions, 
expert testimony would still have assisted the trier of fact.32  
                                                 
31 See, 
e.g., 
Technical 
Working 
Group 
on 
Eyewitness 
Evidence, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 
Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 29 (1999) 
("Select fillers who generally fit the witness' description of 
the perpetrator. When there is a limited/inadequate description 
of the perpetrator provided by the witness, or when the 
description of the perpetrator differs significantly from the 
appearance of the suspect, fillers should resemble the suspect 
in significant features."). 
32 Jurors often place too much emphasis on eyewitness 
confidence. 
 
See 
Jennifer 
Devenport 
et 
al., 
Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 
Psychol., Pub Pol'y & L. 338, 347-48 (1997).  See also Farris v. 
State, 
818 
N.E.2d at 
72-73 
(Ind. 
2004) 
("investigators' 
unintentional cues (e.g., body language, tone of voice) may 
negatively impact the reliability of eyewitness evidence.").  
While Judge Fiedler had been informed that Shomberg would waive 
his right to a jury trial, no waiver had been accepted by the 
trial court at the time Judge Fiedler made his ruling regarding 
the admissibility of expert testimony.  The court had no way of 
knowing whether Shomberg would change his mind prior to 
accepting Shomberg's waiver.   
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
This testimony would certainly have had a tendency to make the 
existence of each witness's identification of Shomberg as the 
perpetrator less probable than it would have been without it, 
and therefore relevant to his innocence.  This court has 
previously recognized that the ability of a witness to perceive 
persons, objects, and events, and then to correctly recall and 
relate 
those 
perceptions 
at 
trial, 
is 
relevant 
to 
the 
credibility of that witness's testimony.  Hampton v. State, 92 
Wis. 2d 450, 455-56, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979).  Indeed, the trial 
court in Hampton recognized that the expert was permitted to 
testify regarding those factors which the expert believed could 
influence eyewitness identifications.33  Id. at 458.  See also 
                                                                                                                                                             
Some 
studies 
show 
that 
jury 
instructions 
"do 
not 
effectively teach jurors about how to evaluate eyewitness 
testimony."  Michael R. Lieppe, The Case for Expert Testimony 
About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 909, 923 
(1995) (citing Brian Cutler, et al., Nonadversarial Methods for 
Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence, 20 J. Applied 
Psychol. 1197 (1990)).  See also United States v. Downing, 753 
F.2d 1224, 1230 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) ("To the extent that a 
mistaken witness may retain great confidence in an inaccurate 
identification, cross-examination can hardly be seen as an 
effective way to reveal the weakness in a witness' recollection 
of an event.") 
33 In Hampton, this court assumed that some expert testimony 
should have been permitted that would make available to the jury 
the scientific evidence the defendant deemed necessary for the 
determination of the issue.  Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 
455-56, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979).  This court nevertheless upheld 
the limitations that precluded the expert from applying those 
factors to the concrete circumstances of that case and from 
giving 
his 
own 
opinion 
as 
to 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
identification of the defendant.  Id. at 458-59.  The majority, 
sub silencio, now apparently rejects this assumption that was 
readily accepted in Hampton, and would allow a trial court to 
preclude 
scientific 
evidence 
concerning 
eyewitness 
identifications and the factors that can influence them from 
being presented to the jury, notwithstanding its relevance.    
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
8 
 
Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d at 235 (where the court of appeals 
concluded that bite mark evidence presented by an expert witness 
can be a valuable aid to a jury in understanding and 
interpreting evidence); and Shaw, 124 Wis. 2d at 368-69 (where 
the court of appeals concluded that the expert witness's 
testimony 
that 
fingernail 
clippings 
could 
be 
useful 
for 
identification purposes and that the defendant's clippings 
matched those found at the scene tended to make the fact of 
defendant's guilt more probable than it would be without the 
evidence).              
¶73 Defense counsel raised these issues concerning the 
admissibility of Shomberg's expert witness testimony prior to 
the trial.  The areas of testimony sought were included in the 
motion.  The background and qualifications of the expert were 
attached to the motion.  Defense counsel attempted to explain 
the relevance of the testimony in the pretrial hearing prior to 
the waiver of any jury.34  Because the scientific analysis of 
perception and memory recollection is beyond the general 
knowledge and experience of the average juror, as well as many 
judges, there can be no doubt that the testimony of the expert 
would have assisted the trier of fact.  Cross-examining the 
eyewitness 
is 
simply 
no 
substitute 
for 
expert 
testimony 
                                                 
34 Unlike the majority, I conclude that counsel's efforts at 
presenting the issue before the trial court more than satisfied 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(b).  The substance of 
the testimony was made known to the judge in the motion, the 
attachment to the motion, and at the hearing prior to the jury 
waiver and the trial.   
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
9 
 
regarding 
the 
witness's 
ability 
to 
make 
a 
correct 
identification.35 
¶74 In this matter, it is obvious that what we have here 
is failure to communicate between the trial court and defense 
counsel.  The whole point of calling an expert witness to the 
stand is to provide the trier of fact with information in the 
form of testimony it would not otherwise have available to it in 
rendering a decision in contested litigation.  Such testimony 
was available to the trier of fact in this action, but the trial 
court excluded that testimony from the evidence.  Because 
relevance 
is 
the 
standard 
for 
admissibility 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02 and the proffered expert testimony in this 
case is relevant, because the proffered expert testimony would 
assist the trier of fact, and because the witness in this case 
is qualified to give the testimony proffered,36 I would conclude 
that the decision of the trial court to exclude the expert 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
factors 
surrounding 
eyewitness 
identification was clearly erroneous.    
II 
¶75 In a criminal trial, an accused's right to due process 
is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend 
against the State's accusations.37  The right to call witnesses 
                                                 
35 See, supra, n.9. 
36 This was not contested at the trial court level. 
37 The constitutional right to present evidence is grounded 
in the Confrontation and Compulsory Clauses of Article I, § 7 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 72, 580 
N.W.2d 181 (1998). 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
10 
 
on one's own behalf has long been recognized as essential to due 
process.  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).  At a minimum, criminal 
defendants have "the right to put before the [trier of fact] 
evidence that might influence the determination of guilt."  
Taylor 
v. 
Illinois, 
484 
U.S. 
400, 
408 
(1988) 
(quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987)).  Few rights 
are more fundamental. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972); 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).  This right is an 
essential attribute of the adversary system itself.  Taylor, 484 
U.S. at 408-09 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 
(1974)).   
¶76 An accused does not have an unfettered right to offer 
testimony 
that 
is 
"incompetent, 
privileged, 
or 
otherwise 
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."38  Taylor, 484 
U.S. at 410; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.  Accordingly, this court 
                                                 
38 The majority asserts that United States v. Scheffer, 523 
U.S. 303, 308 (1998), has narrowed the Court's holding in Taylor 
v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988), with regard to a 
defendant's right to present a defense.  Majority op., ¶35.  
However, 
Scheffer 
cites 
Taylor 
with 
approval 
and 
simply 
recognizes some of the types of limitations discussed in Taylor.  
These "other legitimate interests" that may constitutionally 
limit a defendant's right to present eyewitness testimony are 
the established rules of evidence.  As Taylor explicitly 
recognized, a defendant does not have an unfettered right to 
present testimony that is "incompetent, privileged, or otherwise 
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."  Taylor, 484 
U.S. at 410.  Following the Taylor rationale, Scheffer upheld a 
rule that made polygraph evidence inadmissible because it was 
consistent 
with 
other 
rules 
of 
evidence 
regarding 
the 
reliability of evidence, and therefore did not "implicate a 
sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant to raise a 
constitutional concern."  Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309. 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
11 
 
has developed a two-part inquiry with respect to a defendant's 
constitutional right to the admissibility of proffered expert 
witness testimony.  St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶54.   
¶77 First, 
the 
defendant 
must 
satisfy 
each 
of 
the 
following four factors regarding admissibility: 
1) The testimony of the expert witness [meets] the 
standards of Wis. Stat. § 907.02 governing the 
admission of expert testimony. 
2) The 
expert 
witness's 
testimony 
[is] 
clearly 
relevant to a material issue in this case. 
3) The expert witness's testimony [is] necessary to 
the defendant's case. 
4) The probative value of the testimony of the 
defendant's 
expert 
witness 
outweigh[s] 
its 
prejudicial effect. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Second, if the defendant satisfies 
these four factors to establish a constitutional right to 
present expert testimony, a court must determine whether the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
present 
the 
proffered 
evidence 
is 
nonetheless outweighed by the State's compelling interest to 
exclude the evidence.  Id., ¶55. 
 
¶78 As to the first part of the inquiry, the majority 
concludes that the first, second, and fourth factors are 
arguably met (making no assessment about the qualifications of 
the expert).  Majority op., ¶28.  The majority focuses on the 
third factor, concluding that the defendant failed to establish 
that the expert eyewitness testimony was necessary to his case.  
Id.  The majority reasons that defense counsel was able to 
convey 
adequately 
the 
concepts 
of 
relative 
judgment 
and 
recognition memory, as well as the factors relevant to the 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
12 
 
unreliability 
of 
eyewitnesses' 
testimony, 
in 
his 
cross-
examinations of each of the eyewitnesses.  Id.  The majority is 
mistaken.  Although cross-examination may have touched upon each 
witness's 
perceptions 
and 
recollections 
of 
the 
event 
in 
question, cross-examination did not allow the defense the 
opportunity to explain to the trier of fact how the factors that 
impact the perception, memory, and recollection, as established 
through scientific research, would have affected the ability of 
each witness to correctly identify the perpetrator of these 
offenses. 
¶79 Furthermore, 
the 
majority's 
reasoning 
fails 
to 
properly take into account what would satisfy the "necessary to 
the defendant's case" prong from St. George, and therefore leads 
to a faulty conclusion.  In Taylor, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that, under the Sixth Amendment, an accused not only 
has the right to confront the prosecution's witness through 
cross-examination in order to challenge their testimony, the 
accused also "has the right to present his [or her] own 
witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental 
element of due process of law." Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409 
(citation omitted).  The right to present the testimony of 
witnesses "provides the defendant with a sword that may be 
employed to rebut the prosecution's case."  Id. at 410.  "The 
decision whether to employ [that right] in a particular case 
rests solely with the defendant."  Id.  But that right includes 
"the right to put before [the trier of fact] evidence that might 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
13 
 
influence the determination of guilt."  Id. at 408 (quoting 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56.  
¶80 The majority asserts that "'as in Scheffer, the 
court . . . heard all the relevant details of the charged 
offense from the perspective of the accused,' and the exclusion 
of expert testimony 'did not preclude him from introducing any 
factual evidence.'"  Majority op., ¶36 (citing United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998)).  The majority points out 
that Scheffer was merely precluded from "'introducing expert 
opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility,' and therefore 
concluded that 'respondent's defense was [not] significantly 
impaired by the exclusion . . . .'" Id.  This is not what 
occurred here.  The defendant did not offer the expert testimony 
merely to bolster his credibility.  Instead, the defendant 
offered the expert testimony to address factual concerns, rooted 
in scientific studies, regarding the problems inherent in 
eyewitness testimony.  Had the proffered testimony been merely 
cumulative, I would agree with the majority.  It is not. 
 
¶81 Expert testimony becomes necessary to the presentation 
of the defense if it might influence the determination of guilt 
or innocence.  Given the facts here that Shomberg's defense was 
that someone else committed these offenses, that the victim 
could not identify him at all but picked him out of the lineup 
because he was the best of six in the lineup, and that the other 
witness was told that a lineup would be performed after the 
suspect was caught, and he was only 90 percent sure of his 
identification, I would conclude that the testimony of the 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
14 
 
expert witness, under these circumstances, certainly could 
affect the determination of guilt or innocence in this case.  
Consequently, this evidence was necessary to the defendant's 
case.  While Shomberg may have been able to cross-examine each 
of the eyewitnesses, he was nevertheless deprived of his 
opportunity to present his own witness with respect to the 
factors that impact eyewitness identification. 
 
¶82 Having concluded that Shomberg has satisfied all four 
factors in the first part of the St. George inquiry, I also 
conclude that the State has failed to satisfy the second prong, 
that it had a compelling interest to exclude the evidence.  
Accordingly, the exclusion 
of Shomberg's expert 
testimony 
violated his constitutional right to present a defense. 
III 
 
¶83 The State argues that even if the circuit court erred 
in excluding the expert witness testimony in this case, the 
error is harmless.  I disagree.  Where the exclusion of the 
evidence deprives a criminal defendant of the constitutional 
right to present a defense, the harmless error rule is 
inapplicable.  See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 655-56, 
456 N.W.2d 325 (1990); State v. Stutesman, 221 Wis. 2d 178, 187-
88, 585 N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1998).   
IV 
¶84 The circuit court's decision to exclude Shomberg's 
expert witness from testifying about the factors that have a 
bearing on an eyewitness's ability to identify a stranger was 
clearly erroneous.  Shomberg was therefore deprived of his 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
15 
 
constitutional right to present a defense.  In addition, the 
harmless error rule is inapplicable under these circumstances.  
I would therefore reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand 
this matter to the circuit court to conduct a new trial.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP630-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1