Title: GRINDE v TINDALL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13504
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 1977

No. 13504 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 ARTHUR GRINDE , ARTHUR F . WIEDEMAN, LEON JACOBS, JOE C. WICKS, ROBERT L. DISSLY, of the CITY-COUNTY AIRPORT COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF LEWISTOWN and COUNTY OF FERGUS, STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiffs and Respondents, FRANCIS M. TINDALL and MARIAN B. TINDALL, his wife, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Robert L. Johnson, Lewistown, Montana Torger S. Oaas argued, Lewistown, Montana For Respondents : Bradley B. Parrish argued, Lewistown, Montana Submitted: January 26, 1977 Decided: 'APR - 6 19n Filed: 1YFi j 3 j T Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. I n a claim and delivery action t r i e d before t h e d i s t r i c t court, Fergus County, without a jury, the court found p l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o the possession of c e r t a i n property constituting a f u e l tank i n s t a l l a t i o n . Defendants appeal. During World War I1 the United States government constructed and placed a fueling system on land belonging t o Frank and Mary Hruska. The s i t e was adjacent t o the Lewistown A i r Force Base and the government entered i n t o a lease with Hruskas f o r the 7 acres of land upon which the fueling system was located. The lease provided t h a t the structures placed on the land would remain property of the government and could be removed o r otherwise disposed of by the government. I n 1947, the lease was renewed f o r a 10 year period. I n June 1948, the government transferred and quitclaimed the fueling system and the fence surrounding it t o the city-county a i r p o r t commission of the c i t y of Lewistown and county of Fergus, which p l a i n t i f f s herein represent. I n July 1957, t h e commission entered i n t o another lease with Hruskas. Again i n May 1969, an- other lease was entered i n t o with Hruskas similar t o the leases of 1947 and 1957. The 1969 lease was f o r a period of 3 years with an option f o r an additional 3 years. The r e n t a l was $40 per year and Hruskas were paid $75 a t the time of the execution of the 1969 lease. I n June 1970, Hruskas sold c e r t a i n r e a l property t o de- fendants herein Francis and Marian Tindall. This s a l e included the 7 acres leased by p l a i n t i f f commission. I n Y3 of the contract for deed appears t h i s statement: "The Airport Commission leases about 7 Acres i n the South part of S E 114 S W 114 and/or S W 114 SE 114 of said Section 17, and Buyer w i l l take said land subject thereto and he shall be entitled t o a l l rents hereafter paid thereon. The s i x fuel storage tanks and stands thereon are owned by said Commission and they do not go with the land." When the 1969 lease expired the commission attempted t o gain possession of the fueling installation but were refused posses- sion by defendants who contend the fuel tanks are fixtures t o the land. Defendants argue that while the United States govern- ment retained right of removal, the right did not pass t o the commission and even i f it did pass those rights terminated in 1972 when the 1969 lease expired, or i n 1970 when the commission stopped paying rent. While the parties argue the controlling issue i s whether the fueling installation i s real o r personal property, we find the above quoted statement from 13 of the contract for deed controls. However, we w i l l consider the issues raised. Defendants argue section 67-209, R.C.M. 1947, is controlling. However, i n Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Co-op, 117 Mont. 467, 161 P.2d 526, t h i s Court in interpreting that s t a t u t e held it t o be merely a rule for general guidance concerning i t s e l f more with ultimate than with probative facts. This Court's cases hold the proper t e s t for determining whether a particular object has become a fixture or not, i s said to comprise (1) annexation t o the realty, (2) an adaption t o the use t o which the realty i s devoted and (3) intent that the object become a permanent accession t o the land. O f these three, the intent of the parties has the most weight and is the controlling factor. Montana E l e c t r i c Co. v. Northern Valley Mining Co., 51 Mont. 266, 153 P. 1017; Sanders v. Butte Motor Co., 142 Mont. 524, 385 P.2d 263; Shipler v. Potomac Copper Co., 69 Mont. 86, 220 P. 1097; Butte E l e c t r i c Ry. Co. v. B r e t t , 80 Mont. 12, 257 P. 478. Considering the evidence before the t r i a l court c l e a r l y t h e i n t e n t of a l l p a r t i e s , prior t o defendants a r r i v a l , was t h a t the fueling system i n s t a l l a t i o n was t o be considered personal property a f t e r it was placed on the Hruska property. Defendants argue the t r i a l court erred i n t h a t it went beyond the agreed statement of f a c t s and included f a c t s i n i t s findings of f a c t s and conclusions of law t h a t came from a deposition taken from Frank Hruska. W e find no merit t o t h i s allegation. True, a deposition was taken from Hruska and included i n the court f i l e , but we note the deposition was properly noticed and when taken no representative of defendants appeared. That f a c t i s not controlling here f o r the general r u l e i s , i n considering an agreed statement of f a c t s , t h a t a court may make any l e g i t i - mate o r reasonable inference o r inferences of which the f a c t s may r i g h t l y be susceptible. The court may draw-the reasonable and legitimate inferences i n the same way and t o the same extent had the f a c t s agreed upon been adduced by the taking of testimony i n open court. 83 C.J.S. Stipulations 3 25, p. 73. When a court f e e l s it needs evidence other than t h a t presented i n the agreed statement of f a c t s t o make a decision, it may r e f e r t o other evidence than the agreed statement i n arriving a t i t s decision. S t a t e ex r e l . Nelson v. D i s t r i c t Court, 107 Mont. 167, 81 P.2d 699; 83 C.J.S. Stipulations 1 25, p. 70. Defendants further argue t h a t even though the f a c i l i t y i s held t o be personal property, the commission i s foreclosed from removing the property by t h e running of t h e 2 year s t a t u t e of limitations a s applied t o recovery of personal property. Not so! Whether o r not the commission ceased t o pay r e n t , and t h i s i s a question, t h i s of i t s e l f does not mean the lease was automatically terminated. The 1969 lease contained no default clause and there was no evidence before the court t h a t defendants terminated o r attempted t o terminate the l e a s e before it expired on April 30, 1972. under W e f i n d l t h e f a c t s t h a t the lease was voidable and not void and the s t a t u t e did not begin t o run u n t i l there was a demand by the commission and a refusal by defendants. Gates v. Powell, 77 Mont. 554, 252 P. 377; I n t e r s t a t e Mfg. Co. v. I n t e r s t a t e Products Co., 146 Mont. 449, 408 P.2d 478; 51 Am J u r 2d, Limita- tions of Actions, $107, p. 680, 4484, p. 959. Judgment of the t r i a l court is affirmed. p r : - 6 Chief J u s t i c e