Title: Ex parte Cristian Dragomir. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: James Pike v. CRST Malone, Inc., and Cristian Dragomir)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1091504
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 2010

REL: 12/17/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1091504
____________________
Ex parte Cristian Dragomir
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: James Pike
v.
CRST Malone, Inc., and Cristian Dragomir)
(Tallapoosa Circuit Court, CV-09-900077)
SMITH, Justice.
Cristian Dragomir, one of the defendants in an action
filed by James Pike in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, petitions
1091504
2
for the writ of mandamus requesting this Court to direct the
trial court to vacate its order denying Dragomir's motion to
dismiss the claims against him for lack of personal
jurisdiction.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Factual Background and Procedural History
The underlying case arose from an accident that occurred
in December 2008 on Interstate 80 near Iowa City, Iowa.  The
accident involved a tractor-trailer driven by Pike and a
tractor-trailer driven by Dragomir.  At the time of the
accident, Pike, an Alabama resident, was employed by Mount
Vernon Mills, Inc., d/b/a Avondale Trucking ("Avondale"), and
was 
driving 
a 
tractor-trailer 
belonging 
to 
Avondale.
Dragomir, a resident of Michigan, was employed by CRST Malone,
Inc. ("CRST"), and was driving a tractor-trailer he had leased
to CRST.
In May 2009, Pike sued Avondale, Dragomir, and CRST,
among others, in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court seeking damages
for various injuries he sustained in the accident.  In August
2009, Dragomir moved to dismiss the claims against him under
Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., asserting that the trial court
did not have personal jurisdiction over him.  Pike filed a
1091504
3
written response to the motion, and the trial court held a
hearing in August 2009 on the motion.  The trial court,
however, postponed ruling on the motion until the parties
could conduct limited discovery on the issue of personal
jurisdiction and until a further hearing could be held.
On May 4, 2010, the trial court entered an order setting
the matter for trial on August 2, 2010.  The trial court's
order also required Dragomir to appear on June 8, 2010, for a
deposition limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction.
After the deposition, Dragomir renewed his motion to dismiss.
The trial court held a hearing on Dragomir's motion to
dismiss on June 25 and then gave the parties additional time
to submit evidence on the issue of personal jurisdiction.  On
July 22, 2010, the trial court denied Dragomir's motion.  The
trial court's order denying the motion states that Dragomir's
contacts with Alabama "were continuous and systematic and were
purposefully directed toward Alabama" and that "Dragomir could
reasonably anticipate being haled into an Alabama court."  
Dragomir petitioned this Court for the writ of mandamus
and moved for a stay of the trial of the matter pending this
Court's resolution of his petition.  We granted Dragomir's
1091504
4
motion for a stay and ordered Pike to file an answer and
brief.
Standard of Review
"'"'The writ of mandamus is a drastic
and extraordinary writ, to be "issued only
when there is: 1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court."  Ex parte United Serv. Stations,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see
also Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134
(Ala. 1995).' Ex parte Carter, [807 So. 2d
534,] 536 [(Ala. 2001)]."
"'Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala.
2001).  "An appellate court considers de novo a
trial court's judgment on a party's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."  Elliott
v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 2002).'"
Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 100 (Ala. 2010)
(quoting Ex parte Bufkin, 936 So. 2d 1042, 1044-45 (Ala.
2006)).
Discussion
In Excelsior Financial, 42 So. 3d at 100-02, this Court
provided the following summary of the law in Alabama regarding
personal jurisdiction: 
"'The extent of an Alabama court's
personal jurisdiction over a person or
1091504
5
corporation is governed by Rule 4.2, Ala.
R. Civ. P., Alabama's "long-arm rule,"
bounded by the limits of due process under
the federal and state constitutions. Sieber
v. Campbell, 810 So. 2d 641 (Ala. 2001).
Rule 4.2(b), as amended in 2004, states:
" ' " ( b )  
B a s i s  
f o r
Out-of-State 
Service. 
An
appropriate 
basis 
exists 
for
service of process outside of
this state upon a person or
entity in any action in this
state when the person or entity
has such contacts with this state
that 
the 
prosecution 
of 
the
action against the person or
entity in this state is not
i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  
t h e
constitution of this state or the
Constitution of the United States
...."
"'In 
accordance 
with 
the 
plain
language of Rule 4.2, both before and after
the 2004 amendment, Alabama's long-arm rule
consistently has been interpreted by this
Court to extend the jurisdiction of Alabama
courts to the permissible limits of due
process.  Duke v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37
(Ala. 1986); DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit
Indus., Inc., 350 So. 2d 447 (Ala. 1977).
As this Court reiterated in Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 802 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Sudduth v. Howard, 646 So. 2d 664,
667 (Ala. 1994)), and even more recently in
Hiller Investments Inc. v. Insultech Group,
Inc., 957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006):
"Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., extends the
personal jurisdiction of the Alabama courts
to the limit of due process under the
1091504
6
federal 
and 
state 
constitutions." 
(Emphasis
added.)
"'This Court discussed the extent of
the personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts
in Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726,
730 (Ala. 2002):
" ' " T h i s  
C o u r t  
has
interpreted 
the 
due 
process
guaranteed 
under 
the 
Alabama
Constitution to be coextensive
with the due process guaranteed
under 
the 
United 
States
Constitution. 
See 
Alabama
Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431
So. 2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983), and
DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Indus.,
Inc., 350 So. 2d 447, 449 (Ala.
1977).  See also Rule 4.2, Ala.
R. Civ. P., Committee Comments on
1977 Complete Revision following
Rule 4.4, under the heading 'ARCP
4.2.' 
('Subparagraph 
(I) 
was
included by the Committee to
insure 
that 
a 
basis 
of
jurisdiction 
was 
included 
in
Alabama 
procedure 
that 
was
coextensive with the scope of the
federal due process clause....').
"'"The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment permits
a 
forum 
state 
to 
subject 
a
nonresident 
defendant 
to 
its
courts only when that defendant
has sufficient 'minimum contacts'
with 
the 
forum 
state.
International 
Shoe 
Co. 
v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66
S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).
The critical question with regard
1091504
7
to the nonresident defendant's
contacts is whether the contacts
are such that the nonresident
defendant 
'"should 
reasonably
anticipate 
being 
haled 
into
court"' 
in 
the 
forum 
state.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 473, 105 S. Ct.
2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985),
quoting 
World-Wide 
Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
295, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d
490 (1980)."'
"Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 643-44 (Ala.
2009)(footnote omitted).
"'Furthermore, 
this 
Court 
has
explained:
"'"... The sufficiency of a
party's contacts are assessed as
follows:
"'"'Two 
types 
of
contacts 
can 
form 
a
basis 
for 
personal
jurisdiction: 
general
contacts and specific
c o n t a c t s .  
G e n e r a l
contacts, 
which 
give
r i s e  
to 
general
personal jurisdiction,
c o n s i s t  
o f  
t h e
defendant's 
contacts
with the forum state
that are unrelated to
the cause of action and
t h a t  
a r e  
b o t h
" c o n t i n u o u s  
a n d
s y s t e m a t i c . "
Helicopteros Nacionales
1091504
8
de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
n.9, 415, 104 S. Ct.
1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404
(1984); 
[citations
omitted]. 
Specific
contacts, 
which 
give
rise 
to 
specific
jurisdiction, 
consist
of 
the 
defendant's
contacts with the forum
state that are related
to the cause of action.
Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 
471 
U.S.
462, 472-75, 105 S. Ct.
2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1985).  Although the
related contacts need
not be continuous and
systematic, they must
rise to such a level as
to cause the defendant
to 
anticipate 
being
haled into court in the
forum state. Id.'
"'"Ex parte Phase III Constr.,
Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.
1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in
the result)....
"'"In the case of either
general in personam jurisdiction
or 
specific 
in 
personam
jurisdiction, 
'[t]he 
"substantial
connection" between the defendant
and the forum state necessary for
a finding of minimum contacts
must come about by an action of
the 
defendant 
purposefully
directed toward the forum State.'
1091504
9
Asahi 
Metal 
Indus. 
Co. 
v.
Superior Court of California, 480
U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct. 1026,
94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987)."
"'Elliott [v. Van Kleef], 830 So. 2d [726,]
730-31 [(Ala. 2002)] (emphasis added).'
"Sverdrup Tech., Inc. v. Robinson, 36 So. 3d 34, 42-
49 (Ala. 2009)."
Because the underlying accident occurred in Iowa and
Dragomir is a resident of Michigan, Pike acknowledges that the
trial court could not find personal jurisdiction over Dragomir
under a specific-jurisdiction analysis.  See, e.g., Ex parte
Gregory, 947 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 2006).  Pike contends, however,
that Dragomir's contacts with Alabama were "continuous and
systematic" and that the trial court therefore could find
personal jurisdiction over Dragomir on a general-jurisdiction
basis.
In Excelsior Financial, this Court quoted the following
regarding 
the 
"appropriate 
analysis 
and 
the 
parties'
respective burdens on a personal-jurisdiction issue":
"'The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
trial court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.  Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904
So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2004).'  J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. West, 991 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala.
2008).
1091504
10
"'"'In considering a Rule
12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion
to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, 
a 
court 
must
consider as true the allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco
& Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th
Cir. 
1996), 
and 
Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network
Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829
(11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict,
the ... court must construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff." Robinson, 74 F.3d
at 255 (quoting Madara v. Hall,
916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.
1990)).'"
"'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &
Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d
795, 798 (Ala. 2001)). However, if the
defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary
showing that the Court has no personal
jurisdiction, 
"the 
plaintiff 
is 
then
required 
to 
substantiate 
the 
jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits
or other competent proof, and he may not
merely reiterate the factual allegations in
the complaint."  Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)(citing Future
Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See
also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D.
471, 
474-75 
(D. 
Del. 
1995)("When 
a
defendant 
files 
a 
motion 
to 
dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and
1091504
11
supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those
affidavits with his own affidavits or other
competent evidence in order to survive the
motion.") (citing Time Share Vacation Club
v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1984)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d
226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004) (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)."
42 So. 3d at 103.
Pike's complaint, as amended, alleges that at the time of
the accident Dragomir was the "operator" of the tractor-
trailer "entrusted to him by ... CRST ... while in the line
and scope of his employment" with CRST.  In support of his
motion to dismiss, Dragomir submitted an affidavit stating (1)
that he was not a resident of Alabama at the time of the
underlying accident; (2) that the underlying accident occurred
in Iowa; (3) that he was an independent contractor for CRST;
(4) that he owned the tractor-trailer he was driving at the
time of the accident but had leased it to CRST; and (5) that
his primary contact with CRST was through its Rockport,
Indiana, "terminal office."  This affidavit testimony was
sufficient to shift the burden to Pike to present evidence
1091504
12
substantiating that jurisdiction existed over Dragomir.  See
Excelsior Fin., 42 So. 3d at 103.
In attempting to demonstrate that Alabama has general
jurisdiction 
over 
Dragomir, 
Pike 
cites 
evidence 
indicating 
(1)
that Dragomir, before he moved to Michigan, had been an
Alabama resident from approximately 1992 to 1998 and (2) that
Dragomir had some sporadic contact with Alabama after the
accident in Iowa.  However, Dragomir's prior residency in
Alabama--some 10 years before the accident in Iowa--is
temporally too remote to serve as a basis for establishing
that Dragomir had "continuous and systematic" contacts with
Alabama that would sustain jurisdiction over Dragomir in the
underlying action.  Ex parte Phil Owens Used Cars, Inc., 4 So.
3d 418, 426-27 (Ala. 2008) (rejecting, as too remote to
support general jurisdiction, the defendant's contacts with
Alabama that had occurred approximately 15 years before the
accrual of the plaintiffs' causes of action).  Further,
Dragomir's sporadic contacts with Alabama after the accident
in Iowa are irrelevant because "'[o]nly contacts occurring
prior to the event causing the litigation may be considered.'"
Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 731 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
1091504
13
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907
F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Pike also cites, in support of his contention that
general 
jurisdiction 
over 
Dragomir 
exists, 
Dragomir's 
business
relationship with CRST.  Pike argues that Dragomir's "business
or work-related contacts with Alabama" were both "substantial
and systematic." 
The evidence that Pike and Dragomir submitted regarding
Dragomir's business relationship with CRST indicated the
following.  CRST is a Delaware corporation with a "terminal
office" in Trussville, Alabama, as well as "terminal offices"
in Indiana, Iowa, and Oklahoma.  In 2006, Dragomir applied to
become a driver for CRST.  Dragomir applied at CRST's facility
in Rockford, Indiana, and his orientation occurred at that
facility.  According to the deposition testimony of Randy J.
Kopecky, the corporate representative for CRST, Dragomir
filled out and signed his application in Rockford, Indiana,
and the application was then forwarded to CRST's Trussville
office for approval.  The Trussville office then notified
Dragomir that he had been approved to become a driver for
CRST.
1091504
14
CRST 
initially 
provided 
Dragomir 
with 
a 
tractor.
Dragomir later purchased the tractor from CRST, with CRST
financing the purchase over a three-year period.  Dragomir
also initially leased a trailer from CRST but later bought his
own trailer.  Dragomir testified that he entered into the
purchase agreement and the lease agreements in Indiana; the
materials before us do not indicate whether CRST's Trussville
office ultimately considered or approved those agreements. 
Dragomir also entered into an "exclusive operator's
agreement" with CRST under which he leased his tractor-trailer
to CRST and drove only for CRST.  The materials before us,
however, do not indicate whether CRST's Trussville office
considered or approved the exclusive operator's agreement or
whether that agreement was made in Indiana.  Dragomir's
tractor-trailer also had a Michigan license plate and a
placard 
displaying 
CRST's 
Department 
of 
Transportation 
("DOT")
registration from the State of Alabama.
As a driver for CRST, Dragomir made deliveries across the
United States.  On at least a few occasions, he hauled and
delivered loads within Alabama.  In November 2007, while
Dragomir was driving through Alabama to make a delivery in
1091504
15
Georgia or South Carolina, Dragomir stopped on the shoulder of
an interstate exit.  While he was stopped, an Alabama State
Trooper issued a citation to Dragomir for improper parking.
Dragomir was required to submit "driver logs" as well as
bills of lading to CRST on roughly a weekly basis.  Dragomir
initially mailed these materials directly to the Trussville
office.  However, after the first few weeks, Dragomir began
submitting his driver logs via TRANSFLO, a faxing system.  The
materials before us do not indicate where TRANSFLO was
located; however, Kopecky testified that TRANSFLO transmitted
the logs to another third-party contractor, Rair, which
Kopecky stated is located in Wisconsin.  Rair made the logs
available electronically for viewing by CRST for a six-month
period.  Dragomir testified that he did not know where the
documents he transmitted through TRANSFLO went or which CRST
office received or viewed them.  The materials before us do
not indicate whether Dragomir continued to mail his bills of
lading or whether he also began submitting them to TRANSFLO.
CRST paid Dragomir a commission or "settlement" rather
than a salary.   At his deposition, Dragomir answered in the
affirmative when he was asked if his "payroll came out of
1091504
16
Birmingham."  However, Dragomir also testified that CRST never
issued checks to him. Instead, CRST paid Dragomir by using a
"Com Data" card in which funds were deposited in an account
that Dragomir could access with a debit card.  Kopecky
testified that he thought the Trussville office "processed"
Dragomir's commission or "settlement."  However, the materials
before us do not indicate the location from which the funds
were sent to the Com Data card or the location of the account
in which the funds were deposited.
In summary, the extent of Dragomir's contacts with
Alabama pertaining to his employment with CRST was as follows:
(1)
CRST's Trussville office ultimately approved the
employment application Dragomir submitted in Indiana
and 
"processed" 
Dragomir's 
commissions 
or
"settlements";
(2)
Dragomir's tractor-trailer, which had a Michigan
license plate, had a placard displaying CRST's DOT
registration from the State of Alabama;
(3)
On at least a few occasions, Dragomir had hauled and
delivered loads within Alabama on behalf of CRST;
(4)
Dragomir received a citation in Alabama for improper
parking in November 2007 while he was en route to
make a delivery in Georgia or South Carolina; and
(5)
Dragomir mailed a few driver logs and bills of
lading to CRST's Trussville office when he first
began driving for CRST, and Dragomir possibly
continued to mail bills of lading, perhaps on a
1091504
Pike also relies upon Burger King Corp. v. Ruczewicz, 
471
1
U.S. 462 (1985).  Burger King, however, is addressed to
specific jurisdiction rather than general jurisdiction and
therefore is not helpful in determining whether Dragomir had
"continuous and systematic" contacts with Alabama.  See Ex
parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.
1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result) ("Specific
contacts, which give rise to specific personal jurisdiction,
consist of the defendant's contacts with the forum state that
are related to the cause of action.  Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-75, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d
528 (1985).  Although the related contacts need not be
continuous and systematic, they must rise to such a level as
to cause the defendant to anticipate being haled into court in
the forum state.  Id.").
17
weekly basis, to CRST's Trussville office after he
began submitting his driver logs to TRANSFLO.
In support of his argument that these contacts are
sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over
Dragomir, Pike relies upon Leithead v. Banyan Corp., 926 So.
2d 1025 (Ala. 2005), and Ex parte Newco Manufacturing Co., 481
So. 2d 867 (Ala. 1985).   In Leithead, this Court found that
1
the Alabama trial court had general jurisdiction over Banyan
Corporation, a foreign corporation, based on the following
contacts with Alabama:  Banyan's representatives placed an
estimated 270 telephone calls to the plaintiff in Alabama;
Banyan signed and then mailed an employment contract to the
plaintiff in Alabama; Banyan mailed certificates to the
1091504
In Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d 1069, 1076 (Ala. 2005),
2
this 
Court 
observed: 
"Personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
an 
individual
corporate officer or employee 'may not be predicated upon
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
corporation 
itself.'" 
(Quoting 
Thames 
v.
Gunter-Dunn, Inc., 373 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1979).)  Thus,
our analysis focuses on whether the contacts of Dragomir, an
employee of CRST, are sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
Dragomir.  The question of the sufficiency of contacts to
confer jurisdiction over CRST is not before us. 
18
plaintiff in Alabama indicating the plaintiff's acquisition of
Banyan stock; Banyan had an agreement with the plaintiff under
which his "activities in Alabama constituted, at least in
part, a business presence by Banyan in [Alabama]"; Banyan
employed an Alabama resident as one of its bookkeepers.  926
So. 2d at 1031.  In Newco, this Court held that Newco
Manufacturing Company was subject to general jurisdiction in
Alabama because Newco had engaged in a total of 2,000
transactions in Alabama over a 6-year period with annual sales
of between $65,000 and $85,000 during that time.  481 So. 2d
at 869.
We disagree with Pike's contention that Dragomir's
contacts with Alabama are analogous to the substantial
contacts the defendant corporations had with Alabama in
Leithead and Newco.   Rather, we agree with Dragomir's
2
contention that his contacts with Alabama are more analogous
1091504
19
to those of the defendant in Sporting Goods Distributors, Inc.
v. Whitney, 498 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Fla. 1980).  Whitney
involved an attempt by Sporting Goods Distributors, Inc., to
enforce a default judgment entered in Alabama against James
Whitney, a salesman, in an action arising out of an employment
contract between Sporting Goods and Whitney.  Whitney's
contacts with Alabama consisted of two brief visits and an
unspecified number of telephone calls and letters directed to
Sporting Goods' headquarters in Mobile.  The Whitney court
rejected those contacts as sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction, stating:
"The contacts were not important and in no way could
be construed as placing Whitney in a position where
he relied on and enjoyed the benefits of Alabama's
laws.  The visits were brief and not important to a
business which was carried on primarily through the
United States mail.  As significant contacts with
Alabama the phone calls and letters are particularly
inadequate.  Interstate communication is today an
almost inevitable accompaniment to doing business
and cannot fairly be considered a contact justifying
exercise of jurisdiction.  See, Lakeside Bridge and
Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., Inc.,
597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); Aaron Ferer and Sons
Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206
(8th 
Cir. 
1977). 
 
Whitney's 
two 
visits 
are
peripherally related to the cause of action.  He
made them during performance of the contract
involved.  But they are not related to either the
breach or the conversion and were at Sporting Goods'
urging."
1091504
20
498 F. Supp. at 1091.  
In the present case, Pike offered evidence indicating
that Dragomir's employment application, which was submitted to
CRST's facility in Rockford, Indiana, was ultimately forwarded
by CRST to its Trussville office for processing and final
approval by CRST.  However, that isolated contact with Alabama
was not sufficient to confer general jurisdiction over
Dragomir, particularly because Pike did not offer evidence
indicating that Dragomir had had any continuous and systematic
contact with Alabama during the course of his employment with
CRST.  Rather, Dragomir's contact with Alabama was sporadic
and isolated.  Pike did not offer evidence indicating that
Dragomir continuously and systematically used the mail or
other interstate facilities to contact CRST in Alabama;
instead, the evidence indicated that Dragomir mailed bills of
lading and his driver logs to the Trussville office on only a
few occasions at the beginning of his employment.  As noted
above, the materials before us do not indicate whether, after
he began submitting his driver logs to TRANSFLO, Dragomir
continued to mail bills of lading to CRST's Trussville office.
See Whitney, supra; see also Leithead, 926 So. 2d at 1031
1091504
21
(noting that "'"[t]he use of interstate facilities (telephone,
the mail) ... [is a] secondary or ancillary factor[] and
cannot alone provide the 'minimum contacts' required by due
process"'" (quoting Steel Processors, Inc. v. Sue's Pumps,
Inc. Rentals, 622 So. 2d 910, 913 (Ala. 1993) (additional
citations omitted))).  Additionally, Pike has not demonstrated
that the decision to "process" Dragomir's commissions or
"settlements" at CRST's Trussville facility was because of any
contact that Dragomir purposefully directed toward Alabama.
In view of these isolated, sporadic contacts with Alabama, it
is of no consequence that the tractor-trailer Dragomir was
driving at the time of the accident had a placard displaying
an Alabama DOT registration.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Ward, 4
N.Y.3d 516, 520, 829 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (N.Y. 2005) (rejecting,
in a specific-jurisdiction analysis under New York law, the
possession of a New York license and registration as
sufficient 
to 
confer 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
the
nonresident defendant who had been involved in an accident in
New Jersey).  Under these circumstances, Pike has not shown
that Dragomir's contacts with Alabama are "continuous and
systematic" so as to confer jurisdiction over a claim against
1091504
22
him for events occurring outside Alabama.  Accordingly,
Dragomir has demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal
of the complaint on the basis that the trial court lacks
personal jurisdiction over him.
Conclusion
Dragomir's petition is granted.  The trial court is
directed to vacate its order denying Dragomir's motion to
dismiss and to enter an order dismissing Pike's claims against
Dragomir.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker,
Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur.