Title: Flavorland Foods v. Washington County Assessor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47940
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 19, 2002

Filed:  September 19, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

FLAVORLAND FOODS,
now doing business as
New Season Foods, Inc.,
		Respondent,
	v.
WASHINGTON COUNTY ASSESSOR,
a political subdivision of the
State of Oregon,
and DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
State of Oregon
Appellants.
(OTC 4393; SC S47940)

	En Banc
	On appeal from the Oregon Tax Court.*
	Carl N. Byers, Judge.
	Argued and submitted January 10, 2002.
	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for appellant Department of
Revenue.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Elmer M. Dickens, Assistant County Counsel, Hillsboro, filed
the brief for appellant Washington County.
	David L. Canary, of Garvey, Schubert &amp; Barer, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.  With him on
the brief was Richard Baroway.	
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Tax Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
	*15 OTR 182 (2000).
	LEESON, J.
	The Department of Revenue and Washington County
Assessor (taxing authorities) appeal from a judgment of the
Oregon Tax Court granting summary judgment in favor of Flavorland
Foods (taxpayer).  Flavorland Foods v. Washington County
Assessor, 15 OTR 182 (2000).  For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the decision of the Tax Court and remand the case for
further proceedings.
	At issue is the meaning of the phrase "each unit of
property in this state" in Ballot Measure 50 (1997).  Measure 50
amended Article XI, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. (1)  The
legislature referred Measure 50 to the voters to replace a
property tax limitation measure that the voters had approved in
1996, which had been known popularly as Ballot Measure 47.  As
this court recently explained,
	"Measure 47 was a short-lived constitutional amendment
aimed at closing what its supporters considered to be a
significant loophole in the property tax limitation
goal of Measure 5 [an amendment to the Oregon
Constitution adopted in 1990].  Certain practical and
technical difficulties in the application of Measure 47
led the legislature to propose, and the people to
adopt, Measure 50 as its effective replacement."
Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or 101, 107 n 6, 36 P3d 954
(2001), modified on recons, 334 Or 11, 45 P3d 107 (2002)
(citations omitted).  
	Measure 50 was superimposed on an ad valorem real-property tax system in the State of Oregon in which taxes were
levied on a property's real market value.  See ORS 308.232 (1995)
("All real or personal property within each county shall be
valued and assessed at 100 percent of its real market value."). 
The assessment rolls set out separate values for the land and the
improvements.  ORS 308.215(1)(e), (f) (1995).  However, real
property generally was taxed as a whole.  See Shields v. Dept. of
Rev., 266 Or 461, 470, 513 P2d 784 (1973) (with some exceptions,
real property taxed as whole); ORS 307.010 (1995) (real property
includes land itself and all buildings, improvements, machinery,
equipment, or fixtures).
	As amended by Measure 50, Article XI, section 11(1)(a),
of the Oregon Constitution provides:
		"For the tax year beginning July 1, 1997, each
unit of property in this state shall have a maximum
assessed value for ad valorem property tax purposes
that does not exceed the property's real market value
for the tax year beginning July 1, 1995, reduced by 10
percent."
(Emphasis added.)  A property's maximum assessed value may
increase by no more than three percent per year.  Or Const, Art
XI, § 11(1)(b).  The property is taxed on the lesser of the
maximum assessed value or the real market value.  See Or Const,
Art XI, § 11(1)(a) (establishing "maximum assessed value" as
upper limit on assessment) (emphasis added); Or Const, Art XI,
§ 11(1)(f) ("Each property's assessed value shall not exceed the
property's real market value.").  Thus, if the real market value
of property exceeds the property's maximum assessed value, then
property tax is levied based on the maximum assessed value, not
the real market value, of the property. (2)
	As noted, the issue in this case is the meaning of the
phrase "each unit of property in this state" in Article XI,
section 11(1)(a).  That issue comes to this court in the context
of facts to which the parties have stipulated.
I.  FACTS

	Taxpayer owns a parcel of commercial property in
Washington County.  Taxpayer and taxing authorities agree that,
for 1995-96, the real market value of taxpayer's land was
$455,000, and that the real market value of the improvements on
that land was $3,267,820, for a total of $3,722,820.  As noted
above, 1995 is the year that forms the basis for calculating a
property's maximum assessed value under the "cut and cap"
provisions of Article XI, section 11(1)(a).  In 1998-99, the tax
year at issue here, the real market value of taxpayer's land had
increased to $691,130, but the real market value of the
improvements on that land had decreased to $2,080,030.  
	In the Washington County Assessor's view, Article XI,
section 11(1)(a), created a cap on the value of the property as a
whole.  Thus, he concluded that, in calculating the maximum
assessed value of taxpayer's property, Article XI, section
11(1)(a), permitted him to increase the assessed value of the
land up to its real market value in 1998-99, so long as the total
assessed value of all the property in taxpayer's tax account did
not exceed the total maximum assessed value of all the property
in the tax account for the 1997-98 tax year, plus three percent.
	Taxpayer challenged the assessor's calculation of the
maximum assessed value for its property before the Washington
County Board of Property Tax Appeals (board).  The board rejected
taxpayer's challenge.  Taxpayer then filed its complaint in the
Tax Court.  Before that court, the parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment.  Taxpayer contended that Article XI,
section 11(1)(a), required the assessor to calculate separate
maximum assessed values for land and improvements.  Under that
approach, taxpayer argued, the maximum assessed value of its land
for the 1998-99 tax year was $421,785, which was $270,345 less
than the real market value of the land.  Taxpayer did not
challenge the assessed value that the assessor had assigned to
its improvements for the 1998-99 tax year.  The tax court granted
summary judgment for taxpayer.  Flavorland, 15 OTR at 185. 
Relying on its decision in Taylor v. Clackamas County Assessor,
14 OTR 504, modified on recons, 14 OTR 581 (1999), decision
withdrawn by order January 11, 2000 (2000 WL 31987), the Tax
Court held that the phrase "each unit of property in this state"
in Article XI, section 11(1)(a), refers to each unit of
assessable property.  Flavorland, 15 OTR at 184-85.  Because land
and improvements are assessed separately, the Tax Court
concluded, Article XI, section 11(1)(a), requires separate
maximum assessed values for land and improvements.  Id.
II.  ANALYSIS

	On review, taxing authorities contend that the phrase
"each unit of property in this state" in Article XI, section
11(1)(a), means "all property under one property tax account,
including land and improvements."  Taxpayer argues that the
phrase "each unit of property in this state" refers to land and
improvements separately.  To resolve the parties' dispute, we
must construe Article XI, section 11(1)(a).  This court recently
summarized the methodology that it employs when interpreting an
initiative measure:
		"When we interpret either initiated or referred
constitutional provisions, we attempt to discern the
intent of the voters.  Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,
331 Or 38, 56-57, 11 P3d 228 (2000).  That is so
because, 'with respect to [such] provisions, it is the
people's understanding and intended meaning of the
provision in question * * * that are critical to [this
court's] analysis.'  Id. at 57.  The best evidence of
the voters' intent is the text of the provision itself. 
Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm.,
318 Or 551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994); Roseburg School
Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595
(1993).  If the voters' intent is clear after
consideration of text and context, then the court's
inquiry is over.  Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 559. 
The court, however, will not lightly conclude that the
text is so clear that further inquiry is unnecessary. 
If any doubt remains, the court will consider the
history of an initiated or referred constitutional
provision in an effort to resolve the matter.  Id."
Shilo Inn, 333 Or at 116-17 (brackets and ellipsis in original). 
We begin with the text of the phrase "each unit of property in
this state."
A.  Text
	When interpreting the text and context of a
constitutional amendment adopted by initiative or referendum,
this court typically gives words of common usage their plain,
natural, and ordinary meaning.  See Ester v. City of Monmouth,
322 Or 1, 9, 903 P2d 344 (1995) (so stating).
	Article XI, section 11, does not state what is meant by
the phrase "each unit of property in this state," and it does not
define any of the words in that phrase.  Neither does the phrase
"each unit of property in this state" have an established legal
meaning.  We thus begin our interpretive analysis by determining
the plain, ordinary meanings of the words of common usage in the
phrase in question.  Id.  We begin with the central term,
"property," which, in this context, is
	"2 a :  something that is or may be owned or possessed
:  WEALTH, GOODS; specif a piece of real estate * * * c
:  something to which a person has a legal title :  an
estate in tangible assets * * *[.]"  
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1818 (unabridged ed 1993). 
That definition makes clear that the word "property" refers to a
general class of things that can be owned.  There is no dispute
that, in this context, "property" refers to real estate.   
		We turn to the words "unit of," which modify the word
"property."  The term "unit" has the following potentially
relevant definitions:
	"2 a :  a single thing * * * that is a constituent and
isolable member of some more inclusive whole :  a
member of an aggregate that is the least part to have
clearly definable separate existence and that normally
forms a basic element of organization within the
aggregate  
* * *[.]"
Id. at 2500.  Reading the definition of "unit" together with the
definition of "property," a "unit of property" is the
"constituent and isolable member" or "the least part to have
clearly definable separate existence and that normally forms a
basic element" of "something that is or may be owned or
possessed," which, in this case, is real estate.  
		The definition of property that emerges from the plain,
ordinary meaning of the words in the disputed phrase is broad
enough to encompass both taxing authorities' and taxpayer's
arguments regarding maximum assessed value under Article XI,
section 11(1)(a).  On the one hand, the unit that has a
"definable separate existence" for purposes of ad valorem
property taxation could be the parcel of real property which, as
noted above, includes both land and improvements.  That
perspective supports taxing authorities' contention that the
phrase "each unit of property in this state" refers to all the
property contained in an individual tax account.  On the other
hand, taxpayer is correct that land and improvements each have a
"definable separate existence" that can be owned or possessed. 
That perspective supports taxpayer's argument that, in adopting
Measure 50, the voters intended that land and improvements shall
have separate maximum assessed values.  Because the disputed text
plausibly supports both parties' interpretations, we conclude
that the text itself does not assist us in resolving the question
of what the voters intended when they adopted Measure 50.  
B.  Context
		We turn to context, which includes other relevant
constitutional provisions and case law from this court.  See
Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 560 (first level of analysis
includes provisions of same and related measures); Stranahan, 331
Or at 61-62 (context includes relevant case law).
	1.  Other Provisions of Article XI, Section 11
		We begin with other provisions of Article XI, section
11.  Taxpayer argues that Article XI, section 11(1)(c), provides
evidence that the voters intended the phrase "each unit of
property in this state" to refer separately to land and
improvements.  
		Article XI, section 11(1)(c), creates a ratio method
for valuing property in some circumstances.  It provides: 
		"(c)  Notwithstanding paragraph (a) or (b) of this
subsection [described above], property shall be valued
at the ratio of average maximum assessed value to
average real market value of property located in the
area in which the property is located that is within
the same property class, if on or after July 1, 1995:
		"(A)  The property is new property or new
improvements to new property;
		"(B)  The property is partitioned or subdivided;
		"(C)  The property is rezoned and used
consistently with the rezoning;
		"(D)  The property is first taken into account as
omitted property;
		"(E)  The property becomes disqualified from
exemption, partial exemption or special assessment; or
		"(F)  A lot line adjustment is made with respect
to the property, except that the total assessed value
of all property affected by a lot line adjustment shall
not exceed the total maximum assessed value of the
affected property under paragraph (a) or (b) of this
subsection."
Taxpayer argues that, "[i]n light of the 'exception value'
structure" in Article XI, section 11(1)(c), "it is inconceivable"
that the voters intended maximum assessed value to be calculated
with respect to a parcel of property as a whole.  As an example,
taxpayer notes that, if "property" refers to land and
improvements collectively, then Article XI, section 11(1)(c)(A),
would authorize a tax assessor to revalue both land and
improvements when new improvements alone are added to a property. 
Similarly, if "property" refers to land and improvements
collectively, then Article XI, section 11(1)(c)(B), which permits
alternative valuation when "property" is partitioned, would
permit revaluation of both land and improvements when the
partition involves only the land.  Taxpayer provides additional
examples under Article XI, section 11(1)(c), all of which, it
contends, lead to the same conclusion, namely, that Article XI,
section 11(1)(c), makes clear that the voters could not have
intended the phrase "each unit of property in this state" to mean
all the property in a tax account.  Taxpayer apparently believes
that that is so because taxing authorities' understanding of the
phrase does not yield as much reduction in ad valorem property
taxes as does taxpayer's proffered meaning of the phrase.
		Taxpayer's arguments under Article XI, section
11(1)(c), do not advance the analytical effort here, because
those arguments assume, rather than demonstrate, the voters'
intent in adopting the phrase "each unit of property in this
state" in Article XI, section 11(1)(a).  Taxpayer describes the
effects that it believes will result if the phrase "each unit of
property in this state" means all the property in a property tax
account.  However, without additional textual evidence that the
voters did not intend those effects, taxpayer's argument does not
provide contextual evidence that the voters intended the phrase
to refer to land and improvements separately.
	2.  Measure 47
		We turn to other relevant context, which includes the
provisions of other related measures.  Taxing authorities have
identified two measures that, in their view, provide relevant
context:  Measure 47 (1996) and Measure 5 (1990).  As noted
earlier in this opinion, Measure 47 was the predecessor to
Measure 50.  Taxing authorities contend that Measure 47 is a
vital part of the context of Measure 50 because both measures
aimed generally at tax reduction and Measure 50 was adopted "in
the historical and legal shadow" of Measure 47.  Section 11g(1)
of Measure 47 provided: 
		"(1) Except as provided in subsections (3), (4),
and (5) of this section, the ad valorem property tax on
each property for the tax year 1997-98, excluding the
portion of the tax that is levied to pay bonded
indebtedness or interest thereon, shall not exceed the
lesser of the following:  (i) the ad valorem property
tax on the same property for the tax year ending June
30, 1996, reduced by ten percent (10%), or (ii) the ad
valorem property tax on the same property for the tax
year ending June 30, 1995."
(Emphasis added.)  Taxing authorities argue that the phrase "each
property" in Measure 47 unambiguously referred to all the
property in a property tax account, because property taxes never
have been calculated on the individual components of a property
tax account.  Although Measure 50 adjusted the manner in which
tax relief is achieved, taxing authorities continue, Measure 47
provides evidence that the voters intended to apply the
limitation on taxes in Measure 50 to property as a whole. 
	Taxpayer disagrees that Measure 47 is relevant context
for interpreting the voters' intent in Measure 50.  According to
taxpayer, Measure 47 sought to achieve property tax relief "by
limiting the amount of the tax as applied to the whole property
tax account."  (Emphasis in original.)  Measure 50, by contrast,
"attacked the assessed value component of the tax equation," not
the tax itself.  (Emphasis in original.)
		Taxing authorities are correct that Measure 47 has a
close enough relationship to Measure 50 to provide relevant
context.  However, the text of Measure 47, without more, supports
neither party's argument in this case.  That is so, because
Measure 47 used the phrase "each property" in describing property
to be taxed.  Measure 50, by contrast, used the phrase, "each
unit of property in this state" in referring to the maximum
assessed value of property.  We agree with taxpayer that,
standing alone, the text of Measure 47 does not help to explain
the voters' intent regarding the meaning of the phrase "each unit
of property in this state" in Measure 50.
	3.  Measure 5
		We turn to taxing authorities' argument regarding 
Measure 5 as context for understanding the voters' intent
regarding Measure 50.  Measure 5, which the voters approved in
1990, became Article XI, section 11b, of the Oregon Constitution. 
See Shilo Inn, 333 Or at 105 n 2 (explaining history of Measure
5).  There is a close link between Article XI, section 11b, and
Measure 50, which, as noted, became Article XI, section 11. 
Indeed, Article XI, section 11, which is at issue in this case,
makes more than 10 references to provisions of Article XI,
section 11b.  See, e.g., Or Const, Art XI, §§ 11(3)(a)(A),
11(3)(a)(B), 11(3)(h), and 11(5)(b)(B) (referring to section
11b).  Article XI, section 11, also provides that the term "real
market value" shall have the same meaning under Article XI,
section 11, and Article XI, section 11b.  See Article XI,
§ 11(11) (so stating).
		In April 1997, the month before the voters adopted
Measure 50 in a special election, this court held that the word
"property" in Measure 5 means "a specific unit of realty (with or
without improvements) that is identified by the appropriate
authority by tax lot number or by some other method."  Shatzer v.
Dept. of Rev., 325 Or 211, 219, 934 P2d 1119 (1997).  The voters
thus were on notice when they adopted Measure 50 that this court
had interpreted the word "property" as being synonymous with the
phrase "unit of realty," with or without improvements, that is
identified by tax lot number or by some other method.
		Taxpayer disagrees that this court's interpretation of
the word "property" in Shatzer properly is considered as part of
the context in seeking to understand the voters' intent in
Measure 50.  For that proposition, taxpayer relies on the
following statement in Stranahan:
		"Our first level of analysis under Ecumenical
Ministries also includes relevant case law interpreting
Article IV, section 1.  See Coultas[ v. City of
Sutherlin, 318 Or 584, 589-90, 871 P2d 465 (1994)]
(examining earlier case law construing initiated
constitutional amendment in question)."
331 Or at 61 (emphasis added).  According to taxpayer, the phrase
"in question" in the parenthetical explanation of Coultas means
that the only case law from this court that is relevant context
for interpreting an initiative measure is case law interpreting
the same initiative measure.  Taxpayer concludes that, because
Shatzer interprets Measure 5, not Measure 50, Shatzer's holding
regarding the meaning of "property" in Measure 5 has no relevance
in seeking to understand the intent of the voters in Measure 50.
	Taxpayer misreads Stranahan.  In a footnote immediately
following the portion of Stranahan quoted above, on which
taxpayer relies, the court stated:  "The first level of analysis
also includes context, including related constitutional
provisions that were in place when the provision in question was
adopted."  Stranahan, 331 Or at 62 n 15 (emphasis added).  
Constitutional provisions or amendments that are created through
either legislative referral or initiative petition are adopted by
the people against the backdrop of an existing constitutional
framework.  Id. at 57.  That framework includes this court's
interpretation of related constitutional provisions.  
		Measure 5 was in place as Article XI, section 11b, when
the voters approved Measure 50 and, as we have explained above,
Measure 5 and Measure 50 are closely related.  We conclude that
both the text of Measure 5, and the interpretation of the word
"property" in Measure 5 in Shatzer, provide context that is
helpful in determining the voters' intent when they adopted the
phrase "each unit of property in this state" in Measure 50.  We
agree with taxing authorities that Measure 5, and this court's
holding in Shatzer that the word "property" means "unit of
realty," with or without improvements, that is identified by a
tax lot number or by some other method, suggests that the voters
intended "each unit of property in this state" in Measure 50 to
refer to all the property in a property tax account.  See ORS
308.245 (1995) (each land parcel subject to assessment assigned
tax lot or account number).  
	4.  ORS Chapter 308
		Finally, taxpayer contends that tax statutes in effect
when the voters adopted Measure 50, particularly those in ORS
chapter 308, provide relevant context and support taxpayer's
interpretation of the phrase "each unit of property in this
state."  Specifically, taxpayer argues that, under ORS 308.215,
land and improvements have been treated as separate parts of
property for assessment purposes.  See ORS 308.215(1)(e), (f)
(1995) (providing that, for each parcel of real property,
assessor shall set down in assessment roll assessed value of land
and assessed value of improvements).  For decades, those separate
assessed values have appeared on the tax bills that taxpayers
receive.  Accordingly, taxpayer concludes, when they adopted
Measure 50, the voters were aware that the tax rolls include
separate entries for the values of land and improvements. 
Moreover, the voters also were aware that taxpayers may appeal
the real market values of land and improvements separately.  See
Nepom v. Dept. of Rev., 272 Or 249, 256, 536 P2d 496 (1975)
(holding taxpayer entitled to challenge value of improvements
only without putting value of land at issue). (3)  It follows,
taxpayer argues, that the voters intended the phrase "unit of
property" to refer to land and improvements separately.  Taxing
authorities respond that the connection between the statutory
form in which the assessment roll must be prepared and Measure
50, which limits taxes on real estate, is too remote to provide
meaningful insight into the voters' intent in adopting Measure
50.
		We agree with taxing authorities.  Taxpayer reads too
much into the requirement in ORS 308.215(1) (1995) that the tax
rolls include separate values for land and improvements.  
Nothing in ORS chapter 308 referred to land and improvements as
"units." (4)  Moreover, the statutes governing the form of the
assessment rolls also required the assessor to include on the
assessment role "[t]he total assessed value and real market value
of each parcel of real property assessed."  ORS 308.215(1)(i)
(1995).  We believe that, to the extent that the voters
considered those statutes, it is just as likely that they
intended the phrase "each unit of property in this state" to
refer to the total assessed value for each parcel of real
property assessed, ORS 308.215(1)(i) (1995), as it is that they
intended that phrase to refer to individual assessed values, ORS
308.215(1)(e), (f) (1995).
		Our review of the relevant context of Article XI,
section 11(1)(a), suggests that the voters most likely intended
the phrase "each unit of property in this state" to refer to all
the property in a property tax account rather than to land and
improvements separately.  We turn to a consideration of the
history surrounding the enactment of Measure 50.
C.  History
		In examining the history of a referred measure, this
court considers relevant materials contained in the voters'
pamphlet, such as the ballot title and the explanatory statement. 
Shilo Inn, 333 Or at 129-30 (so indicating).  We turn to the
relevant materials regarding the history of Measure 50.
	1.  Ballot Title and Estimate of Financial Impact
		The ballot title for Measure 50 does not mention the
phrase "each unit of property in this state."  Neither does the
ballot title indicate that approval of Measure 50 would require
county tax assessors to calculate separate maximum assessed
values for land and improvements in each property tax account. 
Rather, the ballot title describes the measure as limiting the
assessed value of property for tax purposes.  The ballot title
caption for Measure 50 states: 
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION:  LIMITS ASSESSED VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR TAX PURPOSES; LIMITS PROPERTY TAX RATES"
Official Voters' Pamphlet, Special Election, May 20, 1997, 5
(emphasis added).  Similarly, the "yes" vote result statement
states:  "A 'yes' vote adopts amendment limiting property taxes
through restrictions on assessed value of property and property
tax rates."  Id. (emphasis added).  Finally, the ballot title
summary explains the measure, in part, as follows:
		"This measure changes current provisions relating
to property taxation.  The measure establishes the
maximum assessed value of property in this state for
the 1997-1998 tax year as 90 percent of the property's
real market value in the 1995-1996 tax year and then
limits any increase in maximum assessed value for tax
years following 1997-1998 to three percent per year
* * *.  This reduction will reflect Measure 47 cuts by
basing the cuts on the lesser of the 1995-1996 tax
minus 10 percent or the 1994-1995 tax, adjusted for
voter-approved levies * * *."
Id. (emphasis added).  In describing Measure 50, the ballot title
caption, the "yes" vote result statement, and the summary do not
use the phrase "each unit of property in this state."  Rather,
they refer to the assessed value of "property."  As we have
explained above, the word "property" refers to the general class
of things that can be owned, or, in the context of real property,
to real estate in general.  The use of the word "property" in the
ballot title for Measure 50, rather than "each unit of property,"
suggests that the voters intended the phrase "each unit of
property in this state" in Measure 50 to refer to all the
property in a property tax account.
		Reading the summary together with the "estimate of
financial impact" bolsters that conclusion.  The estimate of
financial impact states that Measure 50 "replaces Measure 47
* * *."  The summary, quoted above, states that the property tax
reductions under Measure 50 "will reflect Measure 47 cuts."  As
we have explained earlier in this opinion, Measure 47 dealt with
ad valorem property tax on "each property," and taxes on real
property were not levied on the individual components of a
property tax account.  See ORS 307.010(1) (1995) ("real property"
includes land and improvements). 
	2.  Explanatory Statement
		We turn to the explanatory statement for Measure 50
that the 1997 Legislative Assembly provided.  That statement
first notes that, in 1996, the voters approved Measure 47, which
limited "the amount of property taxes that may be collected from
each parcel of property."  Voters' Pamphlet at 6 (emphasis
added).  The statement then explains that Measure 50 "would
replace the percentage of tax limitations in Measure 47 with a
reduction in the maximum assessed value of property for the 1997-1998 tax year * * *."  Id. (emphasis added).  Notably, the
explanatory statement describes the tax limitations in Measure 47
as applying to "parcels" of property and then draws a correlation
between those limitations and the limitations in Measure 50. 
Moreover, in describing the differences between Measure 47 and
Measure 50, the explanatory statement does not use the phrase
"each unit of property in this state."  Voters who read the
explanatory statement likely would have understood that the
property tax limitation in Measure 50, like the limitation in
Measure 47, applied to parcels of property.  The explanatory
statement thus suggests that voters intended the phrase "each
unit of property in this state" to refer to all the property in a
property tax account.
	3.  Legislative Argument in Favor of Measure 50
		Finally, we turn to the legislative argument in support
of Measure 50.  That argument recommends a "yes" vote "to ensure
you receive the property tax relief expected under Measure 47[.]" 
Id. at 7.  The legislative argument in favor of Measure 50 also
states that Measure 50 delivers the property tax relief that
Measure 47 had promised to the voters, that Measure 50 maintains
"a 17% tax cut and a 3% growth cap as promised by Measure 47,"
that Measure 50 would save millions of dollars each year because
it is easier and cheaper to administer than Measure 47 or Measure
5, and that Measure 50 maintains the funding priorities for
schools and public safety that Measure 47 had promised.  Id. 
Finally, the legislative argument in support of Measure 50 states
that the measure "rolls assessed property values back to 90% of
their 1995-96 level."  Id.  
		Significantly, the legislative argument in support of
Measure 50 does not mention the phrase "each unit of property in
this state" or land and improvements as separate aspects of
property.  As we have explained above with respect to the
explanatory statement, the use of the term "property," and the
references to Measure 47 in the legislative argument in favor of
Measure 50, are an indication that the phrase "each unit of
property in this state" in Measure 50 refers to all the property
in a property tax account. (5)
III.  CONCLUSION

		In summary, we hold that the text of the phrase, "each
unit of property in this state," in Article XI, section 11(1)(a),
plausibly refers either to land and improvements separately, or
to all the property in a property tax account.  However, the
context surrounding Measure 50 and the history of the measure
clarify the voters' intent.  We conclude that the voters intended
the phrase "each unit of property in this state" to refer to all
the property in a property tax account, which, in this case,
includes both land and improvements.  By requiring each unit of
property in this state to have a maximum assessed value for
purposes of ad valorem property taxes, Article XI, section
11(1)(a), provides that each property tax account shall have a
maximum assessed value for purposes of ad valorem property taxes.
		The decision of the Tax Court is reversed, and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings.




1. Measure 50 repealed the prior version of Article XI,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.  Unless otherwise noted,
all references to Article XI, section 11, are to that provision
as amended by Measure 50.  In this opinion, we use the terms
"Measure 50" and "Article XI, section 11," interchangeably.

2. In 1997, the legislature enacted ORS 308.142 (1997) and
amended ORS 308.215 (1997) to implement Measure 50.  Those
statutes appeared to be contradictory in that ORS 308.142(1)(a)
defined "property," for purposes of Article XI, section 11, as
"[a]ll property included within a single property tax account
* * *," while ORS 308.215(1)(e) and (f) provided for the listing
of separate maximum assessed values for land and improvements. 
In 1999, the legislature again amended ORS 308.215, eliminating
the requirement that the taxing authorities list separate maximum
assessed values for land and improvements.  See ORS 308.215(1)(e)
and (f) (1999) (providing only for real market value of land and
improvements).  We conclude that none of those statutes is
relevant to the interpretive issue presented here.  

3. We note that, in Nepom, the court did not define the
word "property" and did not refer to land and improvements as
"units" of property.  Instead, the court in Nepom assumed that
the "unit" of property was the parcel as a whole.  See 272 Or at
255 ("We appreciate that some property, particularly residential,
is valued in the marketplace as a unit.") (emphasis added).

4. The word "unit" in ORS 380.215(1)(g) (1995) refers to
condominium "units" under ORS 100.005 to 100.910.

5. Taxpayer notes that the text of Measure 50, which
contains the disputed phrase "each unit of property in this
state," also appears in the voters' pamphlet.  In taxpayer's
view, the appearance of the phrase in the voters' pamphlet is
historical evidence establishing the voters' intent.  We already
have examined the plain meaning of the text and found that it
plausibly can be read to support both taxpayer's and taxing
authorities' arguments.