Title: Shannon Nichols v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.
Citation: 2008 WI 20
Docket Number: 2006AP000364
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 2008

2008 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP364 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Shannon Nichols, Lee C. Nichols, Brooke A. 
Nichols and Brittney M. Nichols, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, Wisconsin Laborers' 
Health Fund and University of Wisconsin Hospital 
and Clinics Authority, 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, Beth C. 
Carr and Michael J. Schumate, 
          Defendants, 
 
Edward Niesen, Julie A. Niesen, Berry and 
Roxbury Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 300 Wis. 2d 580, 730 N.W.2d 460 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 25, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 28, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard L. Rehm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, Jr., J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Arnold P. Anderson and Mohr & Anderson, LLC, Madison, 
and Rick J. Mundt and Winner, Wixson & Pernitz, Madison, and 
oral argument by Arnold P. Anderson. 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Jason J. 
Knutson and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by 
Jason J. Knutson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, Milwaukee; Linda V. 
Meagher and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Waukesha; and Lora A. 
Kaelber and End, Hierseman & Crane, LLC, Milwaukee, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP364 
(L.C. No. 
2005CV11) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Shannon Nichols, Lee C. Nichols, 
Brooke A. Nichols and Brittney M. Nichols, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, Wisconsin Laborers’ 
Health Fund and University of Wisconsin 
Hospital and Clinics Authority, 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 
Beth C. Carr and Michael J. Schumate, 
 
 
Defendants, 
 
Edward Niesen, Julie A. Niesen, and 
Berry and Roxbury Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
2 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 affirming in part, 
reversing in part, and remanding with directions, an order of 
the Circuit Court for Columbia County, Judge Richard L. Rehm. 
¶2 
Petitioners, Edward and Julie Niesen (the Niesens) and 
their homeowner's insurance carrier, Berry and Roxbury Mutual 
Insurance Company (BRMIC), seek review of that unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals.  The court of appeals allowed 
the claim of Shannon, Lee, Brooke, and Brittney Nichols (the 
Nichols) 
to 
proceed 
against 
the 
Niesens 
for 
common-law 
negligence.  The Nichols claimed that the Niesens were social 
hosts, who did not provide any alcoholic beverages to underage 
guests, but allegedly were aware that minors were on their 
property consuming alcoholic beverages.  After leaving the 
Niesens' premises, one of these guests allegedly caused injuries 
while driving intoxicated.  The circuit court had granted the 
Niesens' and BRMIC's motion to dismiss the Nichols' complaint, 
after concluding that the complaint failed to state a claim in 
common-law negligence.  The primary issue upon review is whether 
a claim for common-law negligence should be permitted against 
social hosts under these circumstances. 
¶3 
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  
Doing so, we hold that, based on public policy grounds, a claim 
for common-law negligence cannot be maintained against social 
                                                 
1 Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2006AP364, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007). 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
3 
 
hosts, such as the Niesens, who allegedly were aware that minors 
on their property were consuming alcohol, but who did not 
provide the alcohol, when an underage guest later allegedly 
caused an alcohol-related car accident.  To hold otherwise would 
be a significant extension of common-law liability.  If that is 
to occur, in this instance, it should be done by the 
legislature, not by this court. 
I 
¶4 
On June 5, 2004, the Nichols were in a motor vehicle 
on County Trunk Highway J in Columbia County, Wisconsin, when 
that vehicle was struck by another motor vehicle, driven by Beth 
Carr (Carr), which had crossed the highway's center line.  The 
Nichols alleged that the accident was caused by Carr’s "failure 
to properly manage and control the vehicle she was operating, 
due in part to the voluntary ingestion by her of intoxicating 
beverages."  As a result of the accident, Shannon Nichols 
"suffered very severe personal injuries," and Brittney, Brooke, 
and Lee Nichols "suffered injuries requiring medical care and 
treatment." 
¶5 
On the night of June 4, 2004, and into the early 
morning of June 5, 2004, the Nichols alleged that "a large 
gathering of underage high school students" congregated and 
consumed alcohol at the premises controlled by the Niesens.2  The 
                                                 
2 The premises actually were owned by SweetWater Farms, 
Inc., but the Niesens were alleged to have controlled the 
premises "for their own benefit or for the benefit of said 
corporation." 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
4 
 
Nichols further alleged that the Niesens "knowingly permitted 
and failed to take action to prevent the illegal consumption of 
alcoholic beverages by underage persons, including . . . Carr on 
premises under their control contrary to Section 125.07(1)(a)3."  
On information and belief, the Nichols alleged that "the Niesens 
were aware that the minors on their property were consuming 
alcohol."  The Nichols did not allege that the Niesens knew, in 
advance, that the students would be consuming alcohol.  The 
Nichols contended that the Niesens "had a duty to supervise and 
monitor the activities on their property" and that they were 
negligent because they failed to do so. 
¶6 
The Nichols contended that the consumption of alcohol 
by Carr was a substantial factor in causing the accident.  
Defendant Michael Shumate (Shumate),3 "or one or more adult 
residents of his household[,]" not the Niesens, was alleged to 
have provided the alcohol that was consumed by Carr on the 
Niesens' property.  There was no allegation that Shumate was at 
the Niesens' property. 
¶7 
The Nichols filed suit against Carr and her automobile 
insurance 
company, 
Progressive 
Northern 
Insurance 
Company 
(Progressive).  The Nichols also filed a complaint against the 
Niesens 
and 
their 
homeowner's 
insurance 
company, 
BRMIC.  
Progressive settled for its policy limits with the Nichols, and 
was excused from further defense of Carr in this lawsuit.  The 
                                                 
3 The Nichols' Second Amended Complaint spells the name 
"Shumate," but the Niesens' brief spells the name "Schumate."  
We will utilize the spelling in the Nichols' complaint. 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
5 
 
Niesens then moved to dismiss the Nichols' complaint for failure 
to state a claim.  The circuit court dismissed the Nichols' 
complaint, because it agreed with the Niesens that the Nichols' 
reliance on Wis. Stat. §§ 125.07(1)(a)3 and 125.035 (2003-04)4 
was misplaced, and also because it agreed with the Niesens that 
the Nichols had not stated a claim in common-law negligence.  
The Nichols did not allege a violation of § 125.035 in any of 
the three versions of their complaint, so there was no need for 
the circuit court to address that statute.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's holding that none of those statutes 
could provide the basis for civil liability against the Niesens, 
and the Nichols did not seek review of that ruling before this 
court.  The court of appeals did, however, allow the Nichols to 
proceed with their common-law negligence claim against the 
Niesens. 
II 
¶8 
We begin with a discussion of the standard of review.  
This case is before us in the context of a motion to dismiss.  A 
motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's 
complaint.  Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 
331, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).  When reviewing such a motion, we 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.  We note that, 
while the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, in an amicus 
brief, introduced arguments based on Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)4, 
the Nichols did not plead a violation of this subsection in any 
of the three versions of their complaint.  Accordingly, such 
arguments are not properly before this court, and we will not 
address them. 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
6 
 
accept the alleged facts and the reasonable inferences as true, 
but we draw all legal conclusions independently.  Walberg v. St. 
Francis Home, Inc., 2005 WI 64, ¶6, 281 Wis. 2d 99, 697 N.W.2d 
36. 
 
A 
complaint 
should be liberally construed, and a 
plaintiff's claims should be dismissed only "if it is 'quite 
clear' that there are no conditions under which that plaintiff 
could recover."  John Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 
123, ¶20, 284 Wis. 2d 307, 700 N.W.2d 180 (citations omitted).  
We review the circuit court’s decision, and that of the court of 
appeals, de novo, but we benefit from those decisions.  Id., 
¶19. 
III 
¶9 
On review, the Nichols claim that the Niesens' conduct 
was negligent, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that 
someone drinking on the Niesens' property would cause an 
accident.  The Nichols argue that they are not seeking "an 
expansion of liability as it relates to alcohol law in 
Wisconsin."  Instead, they contend that they are "simply asking 
that the Niesens' behavior be analyzed against [Wisconsin's] 
well-established negligence standard."  The Nichols contend that 
this case does not merit unique consideration because alcohol 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
7 
 
was involved.5  The Nichols also claim that public policy factors 
do not require that the Niesens be granted immunity from their 
alleged negligence, especially because Wisconsin's public policy 
supports both the reduction of driving while intoxicated and the 
reduction of underage drinking.  The Nichols contend that, if 
the legislature had wanted to create immunity for conduct like 
the Niesens' conduct, it would have done so explicitly. 
¶10 On review, the Niesens argue that knowledge of someone 
drinking on one's premises does not create a foreseeable risk of 
harm to others, and that public policy issues preclude liability 
in cases such as this one.  The Niesens argue that the court of 
appeals created a new basis of liability for social hosts in 
Wisconsin.  They argue that social hosts have never been held 
liable in Wisconsin solely because they were aware that an 
underage person had been consuming alcohol.  To allow the court 
of appeals' decision to stand would mean that liability would 
                                                 
5 The reliance by the Nichols and the Wisconsin Academy of 
Trial Lawyers (now, the Wisconsin Association for Justice) in 
their respective briefs on Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 
N.W.2d 857 (1985), seems somewhat misplaced given that the 
holding of that case was clarified later in 1985 by the passage 
of Wis. Stat. § 125.035(4)(b).  In Koback, this court held that 
furnishing or giving alcoholic beverages to a minor constituted 
negligence per se and that social hosts were liable to third 
parties in proportion to the extent to which the provision of 
alcohol led to the harm.  Koback, 123 Wis. 2d at 266.  The 
statute eliminated the holding of Koback that such actions were 
negligence per se.  Section 125.035(4)(b) stated that providers 
of alcohol to minors were liable only "if the provider knew or 
should have known that the underage person was under the legal 
drinking age" and if the provision of such alcohol was "a 
substantial factor in causing injury to a 3rd party."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.035(4)(b). 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
8 
 
apply to any social hosts who knew of underage drinking, 
regardless of where the alcohol was possessed or consumed, which 
would lead to liability with no sensible stopping point.  The 
Niesens argue that they had limited involvement with the party 
outside of their alleged knowledge of underage drinking at the 
party, and, as a result, they should not be held liable.  To 
hold social hosts liable in such circumstances would place an 
unreasonable burden on social hosts.  The Niesens argue that a 
reasonable person would not foresee that knowledge of some 
unidentified 
underage 
person 
drinking 
would 
create 
an 
unreasonable risk to others.  Rather, a reasonable person would 
conclude that any such risk was created by the provider of the 
alcohol and the underage drinker.  The Niesens contend that, 
because they played no role in procuring or furnishing the 
alcohol, a negligence analysis should not be applied to their 
actions in this matter.  Finally, the Niesens argue that the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is the branch of Wisconsin's 
government that should impose any new liability on social hosts 
who do not provide alcoholic beverages to underage guests. 
¶11 Whether the Nichols' complaint states a claim for 
common-law negligence depends on whether they sufficiently pled 
facts, which if proven true, would establish all four required 
elements of an actionable negligence claim.  Hoida, Inc. v. M & 
I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶23, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 
17.  First, the plaintiff must establish "'the existence of a 
duty of care on the part of the defendant . . . .'"  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Second, the plaintiff must establish that 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
9 
 
the defendant breached that duty of care.  Id.  Third, the 
plaintiff must establish "'a causal connection between the 
defendant's breach of the duty of care and the plaintiff’s 
injury . . . .'"  Id.  Fourth, the plaintiff must establish that 
he or she suffered an actual loss or damage that resulted from 
the breach.  Id.  
¶12 However, in Wisconsin, the elements of duty and breach 
are usually presented to the trier of fact in a question asking 
whether the defendant was negligent, and then the elements of 
causation and damages are addressed.  See Wis JI——Civil 1005 
(2006).  Even if a plaintiff adequately establishes all four 
elements of a common-law negligence claim, Wisconsin courts have 
"reserved the right to deny the existence of a negligence claim 
based on public policy reasons . . . ."  Hoida, Inc., 291 Wis. 
2d 283, ¶24.  This court is restricted "to applying the policy 
the legislature has chosen to enact, and [we] may not impose 
[our] own policy choices."  Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2004 WI 62, ¶16, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345 (citation 
omitted).  As a result, "even if all the elements for a claim of 
negligence are proved, or liability for negligent conduct is 
assumed by the court, the court nonetheless may preclude 
liability based on public policy factors."  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 
2004 WI 101, ¶39, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923 (citation 
omitted).  This is so because "'negligence and liability are 
distinct concepts.'"  Hoida, Inc., 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶25 
(citation omitted). 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
10 
 
¶13 The first element of a common-law negligence claim 
requires the plaintiff to establish "'the existence of a duty of 
care on the part of the defendant . . . .'"  Id., ¶23 (citation 
omitted).  The court of appeals noted that foreseeability of 
harm is an element of the duty of care and not of causation.  
Butzow v. Wausau Mem'l Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 286-87, 187 N.W.2d 
349 (1971).  As this court has stated, "The test of negligence 
is whether the conduct foreseeably creates an unreasonable risk 
to others."  Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 732, 
275 N.W.2d 660 (1979) (citations omitted).  As a result, the 
court of appeals held that the appropriate standard to apply to 
the present case was that "the Niesens owed the Nichols a duty 
'to refrain from any act which [would] cause foreseeable harm' 
to anyone."  Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2006AP364, 
unpublished slip op., ¶15 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007).  To 
allege appropriately a duty of care, the Nichols' complaint was 
required to "'state general facts setting forth that the 
[defendant] had knowledge or should have had knowledge of a 
potential and unreasonable risk . . . .'"  Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, 284 Wis. 2d 307, ¶36 (citation omitted). 
¶14 The court of appeals held that the Nichols had met 
this standard because they had "alleged that the Niesens 
knowingly permitted underage persons to drink alcohol on their 
property prior to the accident between Carr and the Nichols."  
Nichols, No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶18.  That court 
then stated that a "reasonable inference" from that allegation 
was that the Niesens "knew some of those underage students would 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
11 
 
drive away from their property after consuming alcohol."  Id.  
The court of appeals then assumed that the Niesens must have 
known that some of these underaged individuals would drink to 
the point of intoxication, even though that allegation is not in 
the Nichols' complaint.  Id.  
¶15 The court of appeals framed the issue for the first 
element of the test for common-law negligence as "whether the 
Niesens owed a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting minors 
to consume alcohol on their property, thus enabling them, 
including Carr, to drive away from their property while 
intoxicated."  Id.  As a result, the court held that the first 
factor had been met because "it was reasonably foreseeable that 
permitting underage high school students to illegally drink 
alcohol on the Niesens’ property would result in harm to some 
person or something," and because the Nichols had adequately 
"alleged the Niesens had a duty to refrain from knowingly 
permitting underage high school students from engaging in 
illegal alcohol consumption on their property."  Id., ¶23. 
¶16 Relying on its analysis of the first factor, the court 
of appeals also determined that the Nichols had appropriately 
alleged the second factor of an actionable common-law negligence 
claim, which is that the Niesens had breached a duty of care 
that they owed to the Nichols.  Id., ¶24.  The court stated, 
"Because the Nichols' complaint alleges the Niesens knowingly 
permitted and failed to supervise underage alcohol consumption 
on their property, it alleges 'a breach of their duty to 
exercise ordinary care.'"  Id.  The court of appeals also held 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
12 
 
that the Nichols' complaint had alleged "'a causal connection 
between the defendant's breach of the duty of care and the 
plaintiff's injury . . . .'"  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶17 The court also held that the Nichols had established 
the third factor of a common-law negligence claim by showing "'a 
causal connection between the defendant's breach of the duty of 
care and the plaintiff's injury . . . .'"  Hoida, Inc., 291 Wis. 
2d 283, ¶23 (citations omitted).  That court stated, "The 
Nichols have sufficiently alleged that the Niesens' permitting 
underage alcohol consumption on their property was a substantial 
factor in causing the automobile accident that resulted in their 
injuries."  Nichols, No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶25. 
¶18 The court of appeals further held that the Nichols had 
appropriately 
alleged 
the 
fourth 
factor 
of 
a 
common-law 
negligence claim, that they had suffered an actual loss or 
damage that resulted from the Niesens' breach.  Hoida, Inc., 291 
Wis. 2d 283, ¶23.  That court was satisfied that the Nichols had 
alleged an actual loss or damage that resulted from the Niesens' 
breach "by claiming they were injured in the automobile accident 
with Carr."  Nichols, No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶25.  
As a result, the court of appeals decided that the Nichols had 
established 
all 
four 
required 
elements 
of 
a 
common-law 
negligence claim, and it then turned to an analysis of public 
policy factors, which the court found did not bar the Nichols' 
common-law negligence claim.  Id., ¶¶25, 33. 
¶19 For purposes of our public policy analysis, we will 
assume, without deciding, that the court of appeals was correct 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
13 
 
in holding that the Nichols had stated a common-law negligence 
claim.  As we noted previously, even if a plaintiff adequately 
establishes all four elements of a common-law negligence claim, 
Wisconsin courts have "reserved the right to deny the existence 
of a negligence claim based on public policy reasons . . . ."  
Hoida, Inc., 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶24.  As a result, "even if all 
the elements for a claim of negligence are proved, or liability 
for negligent conduct is assumed by the court, the court 
nonetheless may preclude liability based on public policy 
factors."  Smaxwell, 274 Wis. 2d 278, ¶39.  This is so because 
"'negligence and liability are distinct concepts.'"  Hoida, 
Inc., 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶25 (citation omitted). 
¶20 In turning to our analysis of the public policy 
factors that bear on the Nichols' common-law negligence claim 
against the Niesens, it is instructive to note what is not 
alleged by the Nichols.  The Nichols do not allege that the 
Niesens provided alcohol to Carr, that the Niesens were aware 
that Carr (specifically) was consuming alcoholic beverages, that 
the Niesens knew or should have known that Carr was intoxicated, 
or that the Niesens knew or should have known that Carr was not 
able to drive her motor vehicle safely at the time of the 
accident.  We note that there also is no allegation by the 
Nichols that the Niesens aided, agreed to assist, or attempted 
to aid Carr or any other person in the procurement or 
consumption of alcohol on premises under their control.  There 
also are no allegations that the Niesens knew in advance that 
any underage individuals would be drinking. 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
14 
 
¶21 Whether 
"public 
policy 
considerations 
preclude 
liability is a question of law that this court determines 
without deference to any other court."  Gritzner v. Michael R., 
2000 WI 68, ¶27, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906 (citation 
omitted).  This analysis may be performed without "a full 
factual resolution of the cause of action by trial."  Stephenson 
v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶42, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 
641 N.W.2d 158 (citations omitted).  If one or more of the 
public policy "factors so dictates, the court may refuse to 
impose liability in a case."  Id., ¶43. 
¶22 The first public policy factor upon which recovery 
against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "the injury 
is too remote from the negligence . . . ."  Stephenson, 251 Wis. 
2d 171, ¶43 (citations omitted).  Here, it is argued that the 
Niesens' generalized knowledge that an underage person was 
drinking on their property was too remote from the automobile 
accident that was caused by Carr, who procured her alcohol from 
Shumate before Carr arrived at the Niesens' property.  Shumate 
was never at the Niesens' property, and there is no allegation 
that the Niesens knew of Carr's condition.  The Niesens and 
their insurer claim that it is reasonable to assume that Carr, 
who already had illegally obtained her alcohol elsewhere, would 
have consumed the alcohol with or without the party on the 
Niesens' property.  In response, the Nichols assert that their 
injuries were directly connected to Carr's intoxication and that 
Carr was driving away from the Niesens' property when the 
accident occurred. 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
15 
 
¶23 The second public policy factor upon which recovery 
against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "the injury 
is too wholly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability 
. . . ."  Id.  Here, the Niesens and their insurer argue that 
the injury was wholly out of proportion to the Niesens' 
culpability.  The Nichols made no allegation that underage 
individuals gathered at the Niesens' property because they knew 
that the Niesens would let them consume alcohol that was 
obtained elsewhere.  Liability based on the Nichols' theory 
would be liability based solely on knowledge that someone was 
drinking, which is a generality and an inference rather than 
knowledge of specific facts about a specific guest.  As a 
result, they claim that the injury in this case is wholly out of 
proportion to a social host's liability for the later driving by 
an unidentified guest who procured her alcohol from someone who 
was not at the party.  In response, the Nichols argue that the 
Niesens should have foreseen that an automobile accident would 
occur when an intoxicated teenager drove away from their 
property. 
¶24 The third public policy factor upon which recovery 
against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "in 
retrospect 
it 
appears 
too 
highly 
extraordinary 
that 
the 
negligence should have brought about the harm . . . ."  Id.  
Here, the Niesens and their insurer argue that, in retrospect, 
it was too highly extraordinary that the negligence would have 
brought about the harm in question.  The Nichols did not allege 
that the Niesens knew that Carr was unfit to drive.  In 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
16 
 
retrospect, they claim that it was highly extraordinary that the 
Niesens' generalized knowledge that someone, at some point, had 
been drinking on the property that they controlled should have 
brought about the accident by Carr, as a result of the alcohol 
procured from Shumate.  In response, the Nichols allege that the 
injuries they suffered were exactly the types of injuries that 
should be expected when an underage, intoxicated person operates 
a motor vehicle. 
¶25 The fourth public policy factor upon which recovery 
against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "allowing 
recovery would place too unreasonable a burden upon the 
tortfeasor . . . ."  Id.  Here, the Niesens and their insurer 
argue that allowing recovery against the Niesens in this case 
would place upon them an unreasonable burden.  The Nichols did 
not allege that the Niesens allowed underage drinking, only that 
they knew about underage drinking at some point during the 
evening.  Liability for a social host who did not specifically 
know of the particular person drinking and who did not provide 
the alcohol places too unreasonable of a burden on that social 
host.  Furthermore, such a requirement would force social hosts 
to do such things as check identification cards, screen all 
guests for alcohol consumption, and figure out who is driving 
and then whether or not those drivers are fit to drive.  As 
here, social hosts cannot be expected to control the consumption 
of alcohol before or after people are on the property that they 
control.  The Niesens and their insurer claim that the court of 
appeals' decision places too unreasonable a burden on social 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
17 
 
hosts, in that the only way for social hosts to avoid liability 
would be never to allow a gathering on property under their 
control that includes individuals under the age of 21.  In 
response, the Nichols argue that holding adults accountable for 
injuries that result from allowing underage drinking to occur on 
their property will discourage such adults from allowing such 
behavior. 
¶26 The fifth public policy factor upon which recovery 
against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "allowing 
recovery would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent 
claims . . . ."  Id.  Here, the Niesens and their insurer, 
BRMIC, argue that there is a likelihood for fraudulent claims, 
as underage drinkers might testify that they had, at some time, 
been at a person's property to trigger that person's liability.  
Regardless of when, how much, or where the underage guest had 
been drinking or regardless of the source of the alcohol, they 
claim that a social host will be sued when underage drinkers and 
their alcohol-providers attempt to shift at least part of their 
responsibility to the social host.  In response, the Nichols 
assert that such cases are not susceptible to fraud, because 
there usually will be several witnesses to testify as to what 
occurred. 
¶27 The sixth, and here perhaps the most significant, 
public policy factor upon which recovery against a negligent 
tortfeasor may be denied is when "allowing recovery would have 
no sensible or just stopping point . . . ."  Id.  We conclude 
that this sixth factor is applicable to preclude liability 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
18 
 
against the Niesens.  In Stephenson, this court refused on 
public policy grounds to permit a recovery against a defendant 
who did not carry through on his promise to drive an intoxicated 
co-worker home.  That co-worker later caused the death of 
another person in an automobile accident.  Id., ¶¶41-51.  The 
defendant had made the promise so that the bartender would 
continue to serve alcohol to his intoxicated co-worker.  Id., 
¶2.  While we concluded that the defendant had breached a duty 
that he owed to the plaintiff by not following through on his 
promise to drive his intoxicated co-worker home, we held that 
the plaintiff's claim should have been dismissed.  Id., ¶50.  We 
did so because "the possibilities for expanding liability would 
simply have too much potential to grow out of control," and also 
would "threaten to run counter to the legislative enactments 
regarding immunity."  Id. 
¶28 Here, the Niesens and their insurer argue that there 
would be no sensible or just stopping point if the court of 
appeals' decision stands.  They claim that the decision of the 
court of appeals would put tort law on the path of strict 
liability for anyone who owns property in Wisconsin, and who 
knows even scant details of an underage person consuming alcohol 
on the property under his or her control.  They argue that the 
next step, beyond such a proposed expansion in common-law 
negligence liability, may be to include in the framework of 
liability not just social hosts but anyone who knows that an 
underage person was drinking on property that is not even under 
their control, or to include anyone, not just property owners, 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
19 
 
who knows that any underage individual has had too much to 
drink.  We are not persuaded by the Nichols' argument that the 
facts of this case would limit the dramatic expansion of 
liability that the Nichols seek. 
¶29 We note that there is no allegation by the Nichols 
here that the Niesens knew Carr was intoxicated, impaired, or 
unable to safely drive a vehicle.  The Niesens argue that they 
could not have foreseen that people coming onto their property, 
who already had broken the law before they arrived, would break 
the law again after leaving.  The Niesens could not reasonably 
have foreseen that an underage guest who they were not 
specifically aware was intoxicated, and who arrived at the 
premises under their control with alcohol purchased elsewhere, 
would cause foreseeable harm to others. 
¶30 We agree with the Niesens and BRMIC that allowing 
recovery here would have no sensible or just stopping point.  As 
this court noted in Stephenson, allowing liability under such 
circumstances would provide too much potential for the out of 
control growth of liability, which would "run counter to the 
legislative enactments regarding immunity."  Id., ¶50 (footnote 
omitted).  Liability for injuries that are caused by an 
underage, intoxicated individual has always been premised upon 
the affirmative acts of a defendant, such as procuring, 
furnishing, or dispensing alcohol for that underage individual.  
Liability has never been premised on the conduct that the 
Nichols alleged.  See, e.g., id.; Smith v. Kappell, 147 Wis. 2d 
380, 433 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1988). 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
20 
 
¶31 If the Nichols' claim were allowed to proceed, the 
expansion of liability might also include liability for parents 
who allegedly should have known that drinking would occur on 
their property while they were absent, based on the proclivities 
of teenagers in a given area to consume alcohol.  Imposing such 
liability would be only a short step away from imposing strict 
liability upon property owners for any underage drinking that 
occurs on property under their control.  As Judge David G. 
Deininger stated in his dissent in the court of appeals, "if 
liability is permitted to extend to parents and property owners 
who fail to 'supervise and monitor the activities on their 
property,'" as the Nichols contend of the Niesens, "then parents 
or other owners of property occupied by sixteen- to twenty-year-
olds" would "be well-advised to never leave home, or if they 
must, to ensure that all underage persons go elsewhere as well.  
I conclude the potential burdens imposed by permitting a 
recovery on the facts alleged in this case are, as in 
Stephenson, 
unreasonable 
and 
unrealistic." 
 
Nichols, 
No. 
2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶44.  As a result, even 
assuming that the Nichols had pled a viable claim for common-law 
negligence against the Niesens using the four-factor test, we 
are satisfied that the Nichols' claim should be barred on public 
policy considerations, since allowing recovery here would have 
no sensible or just stopping point. 
¶32 We are satisfied that whether to expand common-law 
negligence to cover situations like the one alleged here is more 
appropriately a decision for the legislature rather than for 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
21 
 
this court.  If there is to be such an expansion of common-law 
negligence to cover facts such as those presented here, that 
decision, which involves policy choices, should be made by the 
legislature.  We encourage the legislature to address the 
question of whether to hold social hosts accountable for the 
types of actions alleged in this case. 
¶33 We are aware that no prior Wisconsin case has held a 
social host liable for the results of a guest's intoxication 
when that social host did not provide the alcohol.  Furthermore, 
Wis. Stat. § 125.035 abrogates immunity only for vendors and 
social hosts who supply alcohol to underage drinkers.  Nothing 
in the Wisconsin statutes renders the Niesens' conduct unlawful.  
Liability has never been applied to conduct like that of the 
Niesens, 
and 
liability 
has 
required 
active, 
direct, 
and 
affirmative acts, such as the provision of alcohol.  See, e.g., 
Stephenson, 251 Wis. 2d 171, ¶¶41-51.  Neither the legislature 
nor this court has expanded liability to social hosts who have 
not provided alcohol to minors.  The legislature is the 
appropriate governmental branch to expand liability if it 
desires to do so.  As a result, for the reasons stated herein, 
we reverse the court of appeals, and hold that such an expansion 
of liability should come from the legislature, if it is to occur 
at all.  We conclude that a claim for common-law negligence 
cannot be maintained against social hosts who allegedly were 
aware that minors on their property were consuming alcohol, but 
who did not provide the alcohol, when an underage guest later 
was involved in an alcohol-related car accident. 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
22 
 
IV 
¶34 As a final point, we note that the court of appeals' 
decision could be read as, at least, implicitly suggesting that 
Hoida had overturned or backed away from cases such as Gritzner, 
235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶1, and Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 
541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).  Hoida was not intended to overturn prior 
case law, but to resolve the case presented.  See also 
Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, 277 Wis. 2d 
21, 690 N.W.2d 1. 
¶35 For example, the majority in the court of appeals 
stated that Hoida held that "[d]uty has not become just another 
policy factor.  . . .  In a nutshell, Hoida returned Wisconsin 
negligence law to its pre-Bowen[6] analysis . . . ."  Nichols, 
No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶22.  The court of appeals 
did recognize that Hoida required, as part of the analysis used 
in a negligence determination, the application of "public policy 
factors to the specific facts presented."  Id., ¶31. 
¶36 Where the majority in the court of appeals may have 
caused some confusion in its reading of Hoida is that it seemed 
to believe that this court had somehow returned to an emphasis 
on duty and foreseeability as a way of limiting liability in a 
negligence case.  While that has been a legitimate inquiry, 
liability in negligence cases in Wisconsin more often has been 
                                                 
6 Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 
N.W.2d 432 (1994). 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
23 
 
limited by consideration of public policy factors, as shown in 
the Rockweit and Gritzner decisions. 
¶37 In Hoida, we held that a subcontractor who incurred 
losses on a construction project, when the general contractor 
and 
the 
property 
owner fraudulently misappropriated about 
$650,000 of the project's construction loan proceeds, had not 
provided sufficient facts to controvert the defendant-lenders' 
"prima facie showing that it did not breach the duty of ordinary 
care under the circumstances . . . ."  Hoida, Inc., 291 Wis. 2d 
283, ¶1.  Hoida claimed that the defendant-lenders breached 
their duty of care by failing to perform certain project 
oversight tasks that Hoida claimed they were obligated to 
perform.  Hoida argued that such a failure was contrary to the 
"'basic industry standards'" of conduct for such lenders, such 
as verifying that "sufficient work on the project had been 
completed to 'justify disbursement . . . .'"  Id., ¶20.  Hoida 
claimed that, by the defendant-lenders failing to perform such 
tasks, it was "reasonably foreseeable that subcontractors and 
materialmen [would] be harmed."  Id.  
¶38 We disagreed with Hoida's claims and held that Hoida's 
negligence claim against M&I Midstate Bank was precluded because 
the bank did not breach the duty of ordinary care under the 
circumstances.  We also held that, "Hoida's negligence claim 
[against McDonald Title] would be precluded by judicial public 
policy[,]" even if we were to conclude that McDonald Title had 
breached its duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.  
Id., ¶2.  This court went on to hold that allowing Hoida's 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
24 
 
claims "would place too unreasonable a burden on McDonald Title, 
who acted solely at the direction of M & I."  Id., ¶43 (citation 
omitted).  We so held in addition to holding that the defendant-
lenders did not owe a duty of care to Hoida.  Id., ¶¶44-45.  As 
noted previously in this decision, a court may preclude a 
negligence claim on public policy grounds, even if all elements 
of a negligence claim have been appropriately pled or even if we 
assume, as we did on some claims in Hoida, that a claim has been 
appropriately pled so that the case can then be decided on 
public policy grounds. 
¶39 In Rockweit, a young child, Anthony Rockweit, sued an 
invited guest, Ann Tynan (Tynan), for alleged negligence for 
failing to extinguish hot embers from a campfire in a fire pit 
that Anthony Rockweit later fell into, causing him severe 
injuries.  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 413.  This court held that, 
"although Tynan owed Anthony a duty of ordinary care which the 
jury determined was breached, . . . imposing liability on Tynan 
in this case would contravene public policy."  Id.  In Rockweit, 
we found that all four elements of a common-law negligence claim 
had been established.  Id.  We reiterated that the proper 
analysis under Wisconsin law of the duty of care "'of any person 
is the obligation of due care to refrain from any act which will 
cause foreseeable harm to others even though the nature of that 
harm and the identity of the harmed person or harmed interest is 
unknown at the time of the act . . . .'"  Id. at 419-20. 
¶40 Rockweit argued that Tynan, being one of the last 
people to go to bed at the campground that evening "had a duty 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
25 
 
to extinguish the fire because it was foreseeable to a 
reasonable person that someone could be hurt if she did not do 
so."  Id. at 420.  While this court found that Tynan owed 
Rockweit a duty of care under Wisconsin law, we held that public 
policy factors precluded liability against Tynan, even though 
Rockweit had established all four elements of a common-law 
negligence claim.  Id. at 425. 
¶41 We held that "'once it is determined that a negligent 
act has been committed and that the act is a substantial factor 
in causing the harm, the question of duty is irrelevant and a 
finding of nonliability can be made only in terms of public 
policy.'"  Id. (citations omitted).  A finding of nonliability 
on the basis of "public policy is a question of law which the 
court alone decides."  Id. (citations omitted).  Our decision 
"to deny liability is essentially one of public policy rather 
than of duty or causation."  Id. (citation omitted).  We stated 
that this approach represents the minority viewpoint of Palsgraf 
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting), that we adopted in Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway 
Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952), and Klassa v. 
Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).  We 
declined to adopt the "no-duty, no-liability concept of the 
majority in Palsgraf."  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 420. 
¶42 The Rockweit court then listed the six public policy 
factors described in detail previously in this opinion, and we 
held that the imposition of liability against Tynan, who did not 
"start, maintain, or provide any necessary incendiary materials 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
26 
 
for the fire[,] . . . would place an unreasonable burden upon a 
guest in Tynan’s position."  Id. at 427.  We also noted that 
Rockweit's injuries were "wholly out of proportion to the 
alleged culpability of Tynan."  Id.  As a result, imposing 
liability in such a case "would unnecessarily allow the law of 
negligence to enter a field that has no sensible or just 
stopping point."  Id. at 428. 
¶43 In Gritzner, the parents of a four-year-old girl, 
Tara, who was sexually abused by a ten-year-old neighbor, 
Michael, 
brought 
suit 
against 
Michael's 
mother 
and 
her 
boyfriend, Roger Bubner (Bubner).  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 
¶1.  Tara's parents sued Bubner, alleging that he had been 
entrusted with Tara's care while she was visiting his home, 
"that Bubner had custody and control of Michael, and that Bubner 
knew or should have known that Michael might engage in 
inappropriate sexual acts if left alone with Tara."  Id., ¶2.  
Based on these allegations, Tara's parents "brought claims 
against Bubner for (1) negligent failure to warn them of 
Michael's propensity to engage in inappropriate sexual acts, and 
(2) negligent failure to control Michael’s conduct."  Id.  
¶44 The lead opinion upheld prior caselaw that the claim 
for negligent failure to warn was not a viable claim, but 
allowed the negligent failure to control claim to go to trial.  
Id., ¶5.  The lead opinion also held that the negligent failure 
to warn claim was prohibited by public policy considerations, 
whereas the failure to control claim was not barred by public 
policy considerations given it could be "imposed on distinct, 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
27 
 
narrow grounds that do not raise the same public policy 
considerations that preclude liability for failure to warn."  
Id.  Bubner was aware that Michael had "engaged in inappropriate 
sexual acts with another child or children, including his half-
sister."  Id., ¶7. 
¶45 In Gritzner, we reiterated our position in Rockweit 
that "Wisconsin courts address public policy concerns directly, 
rather than asking whether the defendant owed a 'duty' to the 
particular victim."  Id., ¶24 (footnote omitted).  As a result, 
in a negligence case, a defendant's conduct "'is not examined in 
terms of whether or not there is a duty to do a specific act, 
but rather whether the conduct satisfied the duty placed upon 
individuals to exercise that degree of care as would be 
exercised by a reasonable person under the circumstances.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
¶46 In Gritzner, the lead opinion then looked to the 
public policy factors described previously in this decision, 
reiterated the legal conclusions discussed in Rockweit, and held 
that imposing liability for negligent failure to warn would 
allow liability with no definable and sensible starting or 
stopping point.  Id., ¶¶34, 36. 
¶47 We reiterate that Gritzner and Rockweit are still good 
law in Wisconsin.  Nothing in Hoida was intended to overrule or 
change the principles of law expressed in Gritzner and Rockweit.  
While liability has been limited in a negligence case based on 
the absence of a duty, liability in the vast majority of 
negligence cases in Wisconsin is guided, when determining 
No. 
2006AP364 
 
28 
 
whether to limit liability, by consideration of public policy 
factors, as Gritzner and Rockweit demonstrate. 
V 
¶48 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  
Doing so, we hold that, based on public policy grounds, a claim 
for common-law negligence cannot be maintained against social 
hosts, such as the Niesens, who allegedly were aware that minors 
on their property were consuming alcohol, but who did not 
provide the alcohol, when an underage guest later allegedly 
caused an alcohol-related car accident.  To hold otherwise would 
be a significant extension of common-law liability.  If that is 
to occur, in this instance, it should be done by the 
legislature, not by this court. 
¶49 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2006AP364.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that a claim for common law negligence 
cannot be maintained in the present case.  I agree, however, 
with the reasoning of the circuit court rather than the 
reasoning of this court: The decision in the present case rests 
on legislative policy, not on judicial public policy grounds.1  
Although a claim for common law negligence does not require a 
violation 
of 
the 
statutes, 
I 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.07(1)(a)4. should be read as providing a stopping point on 
the Niesens' liability with respect to underage drinking on 
their property under the circumstances of the present case.    
¶51 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)4. provides that "no 
adult may intentionally encourage or contribute to a violation 
of sub. (4)(a) or (b)."  When § 125.07(1)(a)4. is read together 
with (4)(a) and (b), the statute (relevant to the facts of the 
instant case) declares that no adult may intentionally encourage 
or contribute to an underage person procuring alcohol beverages 
from a licensee or permittee or intentionally encourage or 
contribute to an underage person knowingly possessing or 
consuming alcohol beverages.  Any adult violating this statute 
may be subject to a civil forfeiture or convicted of a 
misdemeanor.       
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.035(4)(b) provides that a provider  
is not immune from civil liability if the provider of alcohol 
beverages knew or should have known that the underage person was 
under the legal drinking age and if the alcohol beverages 
provided to the underage person were a substantial factor in 
causing injury to a third party.    
No.  2006AP364.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶52 The complaint alleges that the Niesens were negligent.  
It does not allege that the Niesens intentionally encouraged or 
contributed to an underage person procuring alcohol beverages 
from a licensee or permittee or intentionally encouraged or 
contributed to an underage person knowingly possessing or 
consuming alcoholic beverages.2  
¶53 Although the statutes do not bar all negligence causes 
of action relating to adult behavior, alcohol beverages, and 
underage persons, Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)4., in my opinion, 
provides a "sensible and just stopping point" to the Niesens' 
liability under the circumstances set forth in the complaint in 
the instant case relating to underage drinking on the Niesens' 
property.      
¶54 I write further to express my reservations about the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
sketchy 
analysis 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.07(1)(a)3. in its decision in the present case and its 
dismissal of the Niesens' complaint alleging a cause of action 
under § 125.07(1)(a)3.   
¶55 The complaint alleges that the Niesens knowingly 
permitted and failed to prevent the illegal consumption of 
alcohol beverages by underage persons on premises under their 
control "contrary to Section 125.07(1)(a)3."   
                                                 
2 The complaint alleges that the Niesens were negligent in 
failing "to take reasonable steps to supervise and monitor the 
activities on their property, which on information and belief 
included a large group of minors consuming alcohol.  On 
information and belief the Niesens were aware that the minors on 
their property were consuming alcohol." 
No.  2006AP364.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶56 Section 
125.07(1)(a)3. 
prohibits 
an 
adult 
from 
"knowingly permit[ting] or fail[ing] to take action to prevent 
the illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by an underage 
person on premises owned by the adult or under the adult's 
control" (emphasis added).  The court of appeals concluded that 
this section does not apply in the present case because 
"premises" is defined in § 125.02 as the area described in a 
municipal license authorizing the sale of alcohol beverages or 
in a Department of Revenue permit issued under chapter 125 (the 
chapter governing alcohol beverages).3  The Niesens' property is 
not an area described in such a license or permit.  
¶57 Although the parties do not raise this issue before 
this court, it is arguable that the word "premises" in Wis. 
Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)3. is not used, as the court of appeals 
held, in its defined meaning to be an area described in a 
municipal license authorizing the sale of alcohol beverages or 
in a Department of Revenue permit issued under chapter 125.  The 
word "premises" in § 125.07(1)(a)3. is limited to premises owned 
by an adult or under the adult's control, and the last sentence 
of § 125.07(1)(a)3. provides as follows: "This subdivision does 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 125.02(14m) defines "premises" to mean 
"the area described in a license or permit."  Section 125.02(9) 
defines "license" to mean "an authorization to sell alcohol 
beverages issued by a municipal governing body under this 
chapter."  Section 125.02(13) defines "permit" to mean "any 
permit issued by the [Department of Revenue] under this 
chapter."   
No.  2006AP364.ssa 
 
4 
 
not apply to alcohol beverages used exclusively as part of a 
religious service."4   
¶58 If the word "premises" in Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)3. 
means an area described in a municipal license authorizing the 
sale of alcohol beverages or in a Department of Revenue permit 
issued under chapter 125, rather than property, as the court of 
appeals concludes, why would the legislature explicitly prohibit 
an adult from knowingly permitting or failing to prevent the 
illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by underage persons on 
premises under the adult's control and also explicitly state 
that the prohibition does not apply to alcohol beverages used 
exclusively as part of a religious service?  The court of 
appeals' interpretation of § 125.07(1)(a)3. is puzzling.   
¶59 Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)3. appears to be 
the only provision within § 125.07 in which the legislature has 
used the word "premises" without modifying it.  Elsewhere in 
§ 125.07, 
the 
legislature 
denotes 
licensed 
or 
permitted 
                                                 
4 According to the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau's 
Bill Drafting Manual, § 3.01 at 63 (2007-2008), the word 
"subdivision" refers to 3. of § 125.07(1)(a).  
No.  2006AP364.ssa 
 
5 
 
premises.5  If the legislature intended for the word "premises" 
in § 125.07(1)(a)3. to mean licensed or permitted premises, why 
wouldn't the legislature have said so as it did throughout the 
remainder of § 125.07? 
¶60 When Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)3. is read in context 
and in its entirety, the word "premises" in § 125.07(1)(a)3. 
seems to mean property, not an area described in a municipal 
license authorizing the sale of alcohol beverages or in a 
Department of Revenue permit issued under chapter 125.  This 
reading of § 125.07(1)(a)3. gives meaning to all the words of 
the statute. 
¶61 For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate. 
                                                 
5 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.07(3)(a) 
(regulating 
underage 
persons' right to enter, knowingly attempt to enter, or be on 
"premises for which a license or permit for the retail sale of 
alcohol beverages has been issued"); Wis. Stat. § 125.07(3)(b) 
(specifying a forfeiture penalty for a licensee or permittee who 
permits an underage person to enter or be on "a licensed 
premises"); Wis. Stat. § 125.07(4)(a)2. (making it a violation 
for an underage person to possess or consume alcohol beverages 
"on licensed premises" unless the underage person is accompanied 
by a parent, guardian or spouse who is not underage); Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.07(4)(a)3. (making it a violation for an underage person 
to enter, knowingly attempt to enter "licensed premises" in 
violation of § 125.07(3)(a)). 
No.  2006AP364.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2006AP364.ssa 
 
1