Title: MAYOR, ETC., OF EL DORADO v. El Dorado Broadcasting
Citation: 544 S.W.2d 206
Docket Number: 76-99
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 1976

544 S.W.2d 206 (1976) The MAYOR &amp; CITY COUNCIL OF EL DORADO, Appellants, v. EL DORADO BROADCASTING COMPANY and Carl Connerton, Appellees. No. 76-99. Supreme Court of Arkansas. In Banc. December 20, 1976. J. V. Spencer, III, City Atty., El Dorado, for appellants. No brief filed by appellee. BYRD, Justice. Following some complaints by the black residents of the City of El Dorado about the use of federal revenue funds, the mayor held a conference in his office, at which four of the city's eight aldermen were in attendance, together with the city attorney and a man from the Mediation Service of the U. S. Department of Justice. Carl Connerton, a news reporter, was refused admittance to that conference. The record indicates that as a result of that meeting the city attorney was directed to prepare a resolution for the next formal city council meeting. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment to the effect that a meeting of any number, less than a quorum, of the members of the city council is subject to the Freedom of Information Act if the members of the council discuss, or take action on any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken. The trial court's order also emphasized that the Freedom of Information Act did not apply to meetings of any number of the city council for purposes of only obtaining information. The city councilmen appeal contending that the Freedom of Information Act should not be applied to a group of individual members of a governing *207 body, less in number than a quorum, who meet either formally or informally on a matter on which foreseeable action might be taken, and who are not delegated on behalf of the governing body to perform any function whatsoever. In other words, appellants contend that the Freedom of Information Act should not be extended past the "Committee" level envisioned in Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350 (1975). We cannot agree with appellants. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 12-2802 (Repl.1968), provides: Ark.Stat.Ann. § 12-2805 provides: In discussing informal meetings the Court in Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968) stated: In the Gazette case, supra, we pointed out: The Freedom of Information Act applies alike to formal and informal meetings and since we are required to give the Act a liberal interpretation, we cannot agree with appellants that it applies only to meetings of officially designated committees. We can think of no reason for the Act specifying its applicability to informal meetings of governmental bodies unless it was intended to cover informal but unofficial group meetings for the discussion of governmental business as distinguished from those contacts by the individual members that occur in the daily lives of every public official. Any other construction would obliterate the word "informal" as applied to meetings and make it simpler to evade the Act than to comply with it. It has been suggested that the judgment appealed from is too far reaching in that it would apply to any chance meeting of any two members of a governmental agency or body. The suggestion that the trial court's order is too broad has not been raised by the appellants. The appellants' argument as set forth in their conclusion is as follows: Furthermore, we do not interpret the trial court's judgment as applying the Freedom of Information Act to a chance meeting or even a planned meeting of any two members of the city council. By its very terms the trial court's order applies only to those group meetings such as the facts here showedi. e. any group meeting called by the mayor or any member of the city council at which members of the city council, less in number than a quorum meet for the purpose of discussing or taking any action on any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the city council. Affirmed. HARRIS, C. J., and FOGLEMAN, J., dissent. HARRIS, Chief Justice (dissenting). I would affirm the judgment, if modified to confine the holding to the particular facts of this case, which I consider to be in violation of the Freedom of Information Act. However, the opinion, in my view, goes much further, and I accordingly dissent. FOGLEMAN, Justice (dissenting). My task would be easier if I could be certain exactly what the majority has held. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. The majority states that it held that a meeting of any number less than a quorum of the members of the City Council of El Dorado is subject to the Freedom of Information Act, if the members of the council discuss, or take action on any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken. Then by invisible legerdemain, it does not construe the judgment to apply to any two members of the city council. And then it says that by its very terms the trial court's order applies only to those group meetings called by the mayor or any member of the city council, less in number than a quorum, for the purpose of discussing or taking any action on any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the council. No two of the three statements relating to the court's holding are consistent with each other. I would first suggest that we should modify the court's judgment so that it applies to the facts of the particular controversy only. That related to a meeting called by the mayor, with four of eight council members and the city attorney present. It is a fair inference that the preparation of a resolution for action by the council was the direct result of this meeting, although the proposition is not without dispute. If the only question involved was whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the particular meeting involved violated the Freedom of Information Act, I would agree that the judgment should be affirmed. Anything beyond that was an advisory opinion, the giving of which is consistently shunned by this court and beyond the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Andres v. First Arkansas Development Co., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97. I submit that the action taken here is subversive of the salutary purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Such a result could, and should, be easily avoided. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act was considered in Andres. There it was pointed out that the requisite precedent condition to declaratory relief is a justiciable controversy, i. e., a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. It was also emphasized that a declaratory judgment should not be granted unless the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff is present, not contingent upon the happening of hypothetical events, and that the prejudice to his position is actual and genuine, and not merely possible, speculative, contingent and remote. Whatever the reasons for not responding, appellees' failure to file a brief here is clearly indicative that they have no present danger or dilemma and that any issue, beyond the propriety of the meeting actually held, which gave rise to the controversy, is contingent, indeed, upon the happening of hypothetical future events. It also makes their prejudice appear *209 to be highly speculative, contingent and remote. The court before which a proceeding is pending cannot enlarge the issue beyond those raised by the pleadings. Weber v. Pryor, 259 Ark. 153, 531 S.W.2d 708. Both the trial court and this court have extended the issues. The appellees, who did not even favor us with a brief, and who have not pursued their cross-appeal,[1] had requested notice of the following: The city recognized appellees' entitlement to notice in accordance with Item 1 but not Items 2 and 3. The point relied on by appellants for reversal is: Not only does the majority, in saying that appellant did not argue that the trial court order was too broad, overlook the statement of the only point urged for reversal, it totally ignores a vital part of appellant's argument, viz: No application of this or any similar act has been so far reaching. The hypothetical meeting of less than a quorum dealt with in the majority opinion would not be a committee, would not be authorized to take or recommend any action and may meet for purposes in addition to discussion of matters on which "foreseeable action" will be taken. I fail to see how any decision binding either on the city council or the participants could have been made at the gathering proscribed by this opinion. I cannot escape the conclusion that the majority has not read the act beyond its first section, the declaration of public policy. Then the majority has undertaken to usurp a legislative function, i. e., implementation of the policy declared by creating the "foreseeable action" requirement. A meeting must fall within a classification of legality or illegality at the time it is held. This act carries criminal penalties for violation. This "if so" "then so" interpretation has serious constitutional implications. By applying the majority interpretation, it will never be necessary to decide whether there was a "meeting," so long as three (or is it two?) members participate at the behest of one of them. Or can two members do just anything without violating the act? Just what "action" by councilmen constituting neither a committee nor a majority of the city's governing body is, I don't suppose will ever be defined. And what does "taking any action on any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the city council" mean? For that matter what is the meaning of "foreseeable action will be taken"? If the action is foreseeable, then what is the significance of the minority's "action"? *211 I submit that the majority's construction of the act cannot be found anywhere in its language, even by inference. I daresay that the most ardent advocate of the Freedom of Information Act never dreamed that its scope could possibly be taken to be so extensive or confused. If the act is so comprehensive, it was a foolish extravagance to waste so much judicial time and talent in arriving at the conclusion that a meeting of a committee of a governing board must be a public meeting in Arkansas Gazette Company v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350. In my concurring opinion in the Pickens case I observed that the extension of the act, to cover meetings of committees which were less than a quorum and did not have authority to act, was accomplished by rhetoric rather than reason. Here, I find both missing. I find only judicial legislation amending the Freedom of Information Act. By it the court has extended the scope of the act beyond any statutory or judicial decision in any jurisdiction. In the most extreme position taken by any other court prior to the decision of this court in Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, supra, an intermediate court in Florida, in Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645, 647 (Fla.App.1974) said: The proper application of the "public meetings" provision is expressed in McLarty v. Board of Regents, 231 Ga. 22, 200 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1973) thus: I feel so strongly about the matter that I am compelled to repeat a part of my concurring opinion in Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, supra when I said: Likewise, an Ohio court has recognized the impossibility of satisfactory accomplishment of the desired freedom of discussion and exchange of ideas essential to clear understanding and thinking under a spotlight or before a microphone. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 28 Ohio App.2d 95, 274 N.E.2d 766 (1971). See also, Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California, (Blum) 54 California Law Review 1650, 1651, 1655 (1966). In Bassett, the Florida Supreme Court said: I would also reiterate my belief in the act and the policy declared in it. The Florida Supreme Court in Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla., 1969) articulated these views better than I can. The court said: *213 The right of the public to be present and to be heard during all phases of enactments by boards and commissions is a source of strength in our country. During past years tendencies toward secrecy in public affairs have been the subject of extensive criticism. Terms such as managed news, secret meetings, closed records, executive sessions, and study sessions have become synonymous with "hanky panky" in the minds of public-spirited citizens. One purpose of the Sunshine Law was to maintain the faith of the public in governmental agencies. Regardless of their good intentions, these specified boards and commissions, through devious ways, should not be allowed to deprive the public of this inalienable right to be present and to be heard at all deliberations wherein decisions affecting the public are being made. In Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1960), I find this appropriate language: I must call attention to the fact that the meeting being discussed in Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968) included all of the county supervisors and several other county officials. The injunction issued applied only to a majority of the board, not less. I must also point out that this judicial implementation of the act will subject far more persons to prosecution under the act than the General Assembly intended. It is at least arguable that there is a possibility that many acts of governing bodies and boards may be voided for causes over which a majority had no control. I would reverse the circuit court judgment to the extent indicated. If, however, the court would, it could modify the judgment of the trial court to limit it to the sustention of the position of appellees as to the particular meeting and to eliminate from it any declaratory judgment beyond that particular issue. In addition to the reasons previously given for so limiting our judgment in this case, there are others. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 34-2505 (Repl. 1962) permits a court to refuse to enter a declaratory judgment where the judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings. In this respect the remarks of Dean Joe Covington, an advocate of liberal use of the procedure are appropriate. In his article, "Act 274, The Declaratory Judgment Act," 7 Ark. Law Review 306, 310, he said: The courts definitely have the discretion to deny declaratory relief in proper cases. Prof. Borchard, perhaps the father of declaratory judgment procedure in the United States addresses this subject in the light of the section which appears as § 34-2505. In his work, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed.), p. 304, et seq., he says: He also says: If the court would exercise its discretion to modify the judgment to limit it as I have indicated, I would concur. [1] Certainly the cross-appeal should be dismissed.