Title: Ex parte Endo Health Solutions Inc. et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1200470
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 19, 2021

Rel: November 19, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300
Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
_________________________
1200470
_________________________
Ex parte Endo Health Solutions Inc. et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  The DCH Health Care Authority et al.
v.
Purdue Pharma L.P. et al.)
(Conecuh Circuit Court, CV-19-7)
SELLERS, Justice.
Several entities that own or operate hospitals in Alabama ("the
plaintiffs") commenced an action in the Conecuh Circuit Court ("the trial
1200470
court") against manufacturers of prescription opioid medications,
distributors of those medications, and retail pharmacies ("the
defendants"), alleging that the defendants' marketing or selling of the
medications resulted in an epidemic of opioid abuse in Alabama.1  The
1According to the complaint filed in the trial court, the plaintiffs,
who are the respondents in this mandamus proceeding, are the DCH
Health Care Authority; the Healthcare Authority for Baptist Health, an
affiliate of UAB Health System; Medical West Hospital Authority, an
affiliate of UAB Health System; Evergreen Medical Center, LLC; Gilliard
Health Services, Inc.; Crestwood Healthcare, L.P.; Triad of Alabama, LLC;
QHG of Enterprise, Inc.; Affinity Hospital, LLC; Gadsden Regional
Medical Center, LLC; Foley Hospital Corporation; the Health Care
Authority of Clarke County; BBH PBMC, LLC; BBH, WBMC, LLC; BBH
SBMC, LLC; BBH CBMC, LLC; and BBH BMC, LLC.
The defendants identified as petitioners in this mandamus
proceeding are Endo Health Solutions Inc.; Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc.;
Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.; Par Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc.; Abbott
Laboratories; Abbott Laboratories, Inc.; Allergan Finance, LLC; Allergan
Sales, 
LLC; 
AmerisourceBergen 
Drug 
Corporation; 
Amneal
Pharmaceuticals LLC; Anda, Inc.; Assertio Therapeutics, Inc., f/k/a
Depomed, Inc.; Cardinal Health, Inc.; CVS Pharmacy, Inc.; CVS Indiana,
L.L.C.; Johnson & Johnson; Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Kroger Co.;
Kroger Limited Partnership, II; Noramco, Inc.; Rite Aid of Alabama, Inc.;
Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc.; Henry Schein, Inc.; H.D. Smith, LLC, f/k/a
H.D. Smith Wholesale Drug Co.; Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.;
Cephalon, Inc.; Watson Laboratories, Inc.; Actavis LLC; Actavis Pharma,
Inc.; Walgreen Co.; Walgreen Eastern Co., Inc.; Walmart Inc.; and
Wal-Mart Stores East, LP.
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plaintiffs sought to recover unreimbursed medical expenses incurred in
treating individuals with opioid-related medical conditions.  Among other
theories of liability, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants had created
a public nuisance in the form of the epidemic.  
The trial court entered a case-management order directing the
parties to try each of the plaintiffs' causes of action separately.  The
public-nuisance claim is to be tried first and is itself to be bifurcated into
two separate trials.  The first trial on the public-nuisance claim is to
involve "liability," and the second trial is to involve "special damage."  The
defendants, asserting that the trial court had erred in bifurcating the
public-nuisance claim, petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to vacate the relevant portion of the case-
management order.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.2
2The defendants' mandamus petition also challenges the portion of
the case-management order directing the parties to try each of the
plaintiffs' causes of action separately.  This Court, however, by a separate
order issued on July 19, 2021, summarily denied all aspects of the
mandamus petition other than the portion directed at bifurcation of the
public-nuisance claim.
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"Nuisances are either public or private. A public nuisance
is one which damages all persons who come within the sphere
of its operation, though it may vary in its effects on
individuals. A private nuisance is one limited in its injurious
effects to one or a few individuals. Generally, a public nuisance
gives no right of action to any individual, but must be abated
by a process instituted in the name of the state. A private
nuisance gives a right of action to the person injured."
§ 6-5-121, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).  However, "[i]f a public
nuisance causes a special damage to an individual in which the public
does not participate, such special damage gives a right of action."  §
6-5-123, Ala. Code 1975.  Thus, a nuisance that can be considered public
in nature can nevertheless be the basis of a cause of action brought by an
individual plaintiff if the plaintiff incurs " 'special damage' that is different
in 'kind and degree from [the damage] suffered by the public in general.'
City of Birmingham v. City of Fairfield, 375 So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. 1979);
Ala. Code 1975 § 6-5-123."  Russell Corp. v. Sullivan, 790 So. 2d 940, 951
(Ala. 2001).  See also First Ave. Coal & Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 171 Ala.
470, 475, 54 So. 598, 600 (1911) ("A nuisance may be at the same time
both of a public and of a private character.").  In their complaint, the
plaintiffs asserted that they had "suffered a special injury, different from
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that suffered by the public at large, by individual users [of the opioid
medications] and by governmental entities, namely that Plaintiffs have
provided uncompensated care for patients suffering from opioid-related
conditions and incurred elevated operational costs."
The trial court's case-management order provides:
"Pursuant to Rule 42(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.], the Court is
scheduling as Track 1 claims by the plaintiffs under the public
nuisance count of the complaint.  To avoid unduly burdening
the jury, this issue will be bifurcated and tried in two separate
and distinct phases.  On May 16, 2022, this matter is
scheduled for a jury trial on the issue of the defendants'
liability for public nuisance.  Special damage claims caused by
the public nuisance, if any, shall be set for a separate jury trial
upon conclusion of the initial trial phase, if necessary.  All
other claims brought by the Plaintiffs are stayed pending
resolution of the initial public nuisance trial."
After entry of the case-management order, the defendants timely filed
their petition for a writ of mandamus.3
3Before filing their mandamus petition, the defendants filed a motion
requesting that the trial court reconsider and vacate the case-
management order.  There is no order before us on the motion to
reconsider and vacate.  However, after the mandamus petition was filed,
the trial court entered another case-management order setting forth a
discovery schedule with respect to the public-nuisance claim.  The
plaintiffs, in their brief to this Court, assert that the mandamus petition
should be dismissed because the defendants did not supplement their
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" 'The standard governing our review of an
issue presented in a petition for the writ of
mandamus is well established:
" ' "[M]andamus 
is 
a 
drastic 
and
extraordinary writ to be issued only
where there is (1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; (2)
an 
imperative 
duty 
upon 
the
respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." '
"Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772, 774-75 (Ala. 2000) (quoting
Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989))."
Ex parte Webber, 157 So. 3d 887, 891 (Ala. 2014).   A petition for a writ of
mandamus is an appropriate means of seeking review of an order calling
for separate trials.  Ex parte Brookwood Med. Ctr., 994 So. 2d 264, 268
(Ala. 2008); Ex parte Skelton, 459 So. 2d 825 (Ala. 1984).
petition to challenge the latest case-management order.  However, nothing
in the latest case-management order alters the portion of the earlier case-
management order directing that the public-nuisance claim be tried in
separate phases.  In fact, the latest case-management order notes that,
pursuant to the earlier case-management order, "the [trial court] has
scheduled a bifurcated trial on the Plaintiffs' public nuisance claim."  That
aspect of the earlier case-management order has not been superseded and
is still controlling in the trial court.
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The defendants describe the requirement that an individual prove
"special damage" to obtain a remedy for an otherwise public nuisance as
implicating the individual's "standing" to seek a remedy for the nuisance. 
And, because "[t]he question of standing implicates the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the court," Bernals, Inc. v. Kessler-Greystone, LLC, 70 So.
3d 315, 319 (Ala. 2011), and because subject-matter jurisdiction has been
described as a "threshold" issue, Moore v. City of Center Point, 319 So. 3d
1223, 1228 (Ala. 2020), the defendants assert that the plaintiffs should be
required to establish first that they suffered special damage from the
alleged public nuisance.  Thus, they argue, the trial court erred in
directing that the issue of special damage be tried after the issue of the
defendants' "liability."
In support of their jurisdiction-based argument, the defendants point
to Russell Corp. v. Sullivan, 790 So. 2d 940, 951 (Ala. 2001), which simply
acknowledges that an individual who has incurred special damage can
seek to remedy a nuisance that would otherwise be considered a purely
public nuisance.  Russell Corp. makes no mention of standing or subject-
matter jurisdiction.  The defendants also point to Sloss-Sheffield Steel &
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Iron Co. v. Johnson, 147 Ala. 384, 386, 41 So. 907, 908 (1906), which
states:
"The general rule is that a private individual, who suffers
no damage different from that sustained by the public at large,
has no standing in court for the abatement of a public
nuisance; but, if he sustains an individual or specific damage
in addition to that suffered by the public, he may sue to have
the same abated if the remedy at law is inadequate."
Although the Court in Sloss-Sheffield did state that an individual without
special damage "has no standing in court for the abatement of a public
nuisance," id., the opinion in that case makes no express mention of
subject-matter jurisdiction.  Sloss-Sheffield does not clearly hold that an
individual who brings a public-nuisance action and alleges facts that are
claimed to constitute special damage, but ultimately is unable to prove
those facts, lacks standing and, thus, that the trial court never acquired
subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.  Russell Corp. and Sloss-
Sheffield are the only cases cited in the mandamus petition in support of
the defendants' assertion that the plaintiffs must prove special damage to
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demonstrate the "standing" necessary for the trial court to acquire
subject-matter jurisdiction over the public-nuisance claim.4
In Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 159 So. 3d 31 (Ala.
2013), this Court considered two trial-court rulings in separate ejectment
actions commenced pursuant to § 6-6-280(b), Ala. Code 1975, which
requires a plaintiff in such an action to establish that he or she "was
possessed of the premises or has the legal title thereto."  The Court held
that arguments asserting that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that
they had possession or legal title to the properties at issue did not
4In their reply brief, the defendants cite Lower Commerce Insurance,
Inc. v. Halliday, 636 So. 2d 430, 432 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994), which held that
a plaintiff seeking to enjoin an alleged public nuisance had failed to allege
and prove special damage and therefore "did not meet her burden to show
that she ha[d] standing as an individual to maintain an action to enjoin
a public nuisance."  Like the other cases upon which the defendants rely,
there was no mention of the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction in
Lower Commerce Insurance.  Likewise, two unreported cases from federal
district courts applying Alabama nuisance law, although they used the
term "standing" when concluding that the plaintiffs did not incur special
damage, did not discuss subject-matter jurisdiction.  In any event, the
opinions in those cases are not binding on this Court.  The other opinions
in cases cited by the defendants in their reply brief that refer to an
individual's "standing" to pursue a public-nuisance claim were issued by
courts in other jurisdictions, are not binding here, and did not involve
public-nuisance actions under Alabama law. 
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implicate standing and subject-matter jurisdiction.  Rather, this Court
held, establishing possession or legal title was simply an element of the
plaintiffs' ejectment claims.  In other words, if the plaintiffs in BAC Home
Loans  had failed to demonstrate that they had possession or legal title,
they did not "have a 'standing' problem" but, instead, "a 'failure to prove
one's cause of action' problem."  159 So. 3d at 46.  In so holding, the Court
noted that, in past decisions, the Court had "been too 'loose' in its use of
the term 'standing.' " Id. at 39.  The Court indicated that the concept of
standing, as it affects subject-matter jurisdiction, is generally relevant
only in public-law cases as opposed to private-law cases:
"[T]he concept [of standing] appears to have no necessary role
to play in respect to private-law actions, which, unlike public-
law cases (for example, a suit against the Secretary of Interior
to construe and enforce an environmental regulation designed
to protect wildlife), come with established elements that define
an adversarial relationship and 'controversy' sufficient to
justify judicial intervention.  In private-law actions (e.g., a
claim of negligence or, as here, a statutory claim for
ejectment), if the elements are met, the plaintiff is entitled to
judicial intervention; if they are not met, then the plaintiff is
not entitled to judicial intervention."
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Id. at 44.  See also Ex parte Skelton, 275 So. 3d 144, 151 (Ala. 2018)
("[T]he doctrine of standing (particularly as a jurisdictional concept) has
no application in this private-law case.").
 The defendants, as the petitioners, bear the burden here.  We are
not convinced by their arguments that the special-damage requirement is
a prerequisite to an individual's obtaining standing or the court's
obtaining subject-matter jurisdiction rather than simply being one of the
requirements necessary for an individual to state a valid claim seeking to
remedy an alleged public nuisance.  See BAC Home Loans, 159 So. 3d at
45 (noting that " '[t]he question whether the law recognizes the cause of
action stated by a plaintiff is frequently transformed into inappropriate
standing terms' " (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice & Procedure § 3531 (2008))).   The defendants have not
demonstrated that if the plaintiffs ultimately fail to prove that they have
suffered special damage, then they lack standing, as opposed to simply
having failed to prove an element of their claim.  Id. at 46 (overruling
precedent to the extent it held "that a plaintiff in an ejectment action
lacks 'standing' if it cannot prove one of the elements of its claim (namely,
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legal title or the right to possession of the property) and that the trial
court in turn lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim").5
The defendants assert that, even if the special-damage requirement
does not implicate what they describe as "threshold" issues of standing
and subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court nevertheless erred in
ordering separate trials on "liability" and "special damage" because, they
assert, the two trials will involve significant overlapping issues and
evidence.  We agree.
The defendants assert that "injury is an essential element on the
nuisance count" and that the plaintiffs therefore "will need to prove in the
liability phase that they incurred uncompensated costs [of providing
medical care] proximately caused by Defendants' alleged wrongful
conduct."  Petition at 21.  They assert that doing so will require evidence
demonstrating that unreimbursed medical costs were incurred by the
plaintiffs as a result of their patients' use of opioid medications, evidence
of the circumstances under which patients obtained the medications, and
5We are not tasked in this mandamus proceeding with determining
whether the plaintiffs have indeed suffered special damage.
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evidence demonstrating that the defendants' conduct caused the plaintiffs
to incur the costs.  In their reply brief, the defendants make a related
assertion that, because a defendant is liable to an individual seeking to
remedy a public nuisance only if the individual can show the existence of
special damage, "any trial to adjudicate Defendants' alleged liability on
the public nuisance claim would have to include an adjudication of all
elements of that claim, including special damages."  Defendants reply
brief at 8.  Regarding the second trial, which, according to the case-
management order at issue, will involve "[s]pecial damage claims caused
by the public nuisance," the defendants assert that the plaintiffs will
again be required to prove that they incurred uncompensated costs of
providing medical care.  Thus, according to the defendants, the two trials
will essentially require presentation of the same evidence to two different
juries and will result in "having two different juries consider the same
question."  Petition at 18.
For their part, the plaintiffs appear to suggest that the first trial will
involve only the issue whether the defendants created a public nuisance,
while the second trial will involve whether the plaintiffs suffered special
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damage as a result of that nuisance and, if so, the amount of their
damages.  Although statements made by the trial-court judge during the
hearing on the defendants' motion to reconsider and vacate the case-
management order, see note 3, supra, could be construed as offering some
support for the plaintiffs' interpretation of that order, the actual language
used in the order to describe the topic of the first trial -- namely, "the
defendants' liability for public nuisance" -- is certainly broad enough to
include the issue of special damage.  See Black's Law Dictionary 1097
(11th ed. 2019) (defining "liability" as "[t]he quality, state, or condition of
being legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or
to society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment").  It is
uncontested that, for an individual plaintiff to establish that a defendant
is legally accountable to, or has legal responsibility to, the plaintiff for a
public nuisance, the plaintiff must prove special damage.  In other words,
the parties agree that the existence of special damage is an element of 
liability.  As the defendants assert, their "liability" depends on proof that
their conduct proximately caused the plaintiffs to incur uncompensated
costs in treating opioid-related medical conditions and that that damage
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is different in kind and degree than the damage suffered by the general
public.
This Court's precedent indicates that we should construe the trial
court's order based on the literal meaning of its language.  See Deutsche
Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Karr, 306 So. 3d 882, 888 (Ala. 2020) ("In
interpreting the substance of [an] order, we must examine the language
used in that order. 'Judgments and decrees are to be construed like other
written instruments. Schwab v. Schwab, 255 Ala. 218, 50 So. 2d 435
[(1951)]; Johnson v. Harrison, 272 Ala. 210, 130 So. 2d 35 [(1961)]. The
legal effect must be declared in the light of the literal meaning of the
language used.' Wise v. Watson, 286 Ala. 22, 27, 236 So. 2d 681, 686
(1970).").  Based on the literal meaning of the language used in the trial
court's order, the first trial necessarily must involve the issue of special
damage proximately caused by the defendants' conduct.
The plaintiffs rely in part on Coburn v. American Liberty Insurance
Co., 341 So. 2d 717 (Ala. 1977), in which this Court held that a trial court
had not exceeded its discretion in ordering separate trials on the issues of
liability and the amount of damages in a personal-injury action involving
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multiple parties and multiple theories of liability.  In doing so, however,
the Court offered the following word of caution:
"Nothing contained in this opinion should be construed as
approving the separation of the issues of liability and damages
in personal injury cases as a matter of routine. Ordinarily,
these issues are not to be separated for purposes of trial; and
any speculative savings of time and expense, which may result
from routine bifurcation of jury negligence trials, does not
constitute sufficient grounds for exercise of the severance
prerogatives of Rule 42(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]. Within the spirit
of Rule 42(b), separation of issues of liability from those
relating to damages, while authorized, is to be ordered
sparingly and in those rare and exceptional cases of which the
instant case should serve as an example."
341 So. 2d at 719.  Moreover, Coburn did not involve an attempt by an
individual to remedy a public nuisance when the issues of liability and
damages are so closely intertwined.
Rule 42(b) authorizes separate trials "in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy."  See generally Ex parte Skelton, 459 So. 2d at
826 ("In a case such as this, a separate trial should be granted only if it
appears prejudice to a defendant or inconvenience to the trial court
demands such treatment.").  "Although we have recognized that a trial
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court has broad discretion to 'shape the order of trial' and to order
severance or separate trials, Ex parte Humana Medical Corp., 597 So. 2d
670 (Ala. 1992), that discretion is not unbounded."  Ex parte Daniels, 264
So. 3d 865, 870 (Ala. 2018).
In sum, for an individual plaintiff to hold a defendant liable in a
public-nuisance case, the plaintiff must show the existence of special
damage.  This will require the plaintiffs in this case to identify and
quantify all the damage caused by the defendants and the damage
incurred by the plaintiffs to establish that the damage to the plaintiffs is
different in kind and degree than the damage experienced by the general
public.  Sophisticated testimony regarding uncompensated medical costs
and how those costs damaged each plaintiff in a way that was not felt by
the general public must be adduced.  And, the evidence needed to prove
special damage that will establish "liability" in the first trial would be the
same evidence required in the second trial, resulting in a duplication of
effort and the squandering of judicial resources.  Accordingly, conducting
a trial on the issue of the defendants' "liability" for a public nuisance and
a second trial on "special damage" neither avoids prejudice nor furthers
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convenience, expedition, or economy.  See Rule 42(b).  We can only
conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion.  We therefore grant
the defendants' petition and issue a writ of mandamus.  The trial court is
directed to vacate the relevant portion of the case-management order in
a manner consistent with this opinion.
PETITION GRANTED;  WRIT ISSUED.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Bolin, J., concurs specially.
Wise and Stewart, JJ., concur in the result.
Parker, C.J., and Mendheim, J., dissent.
Mitchell, J., recuses himself.
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BOLIN, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the main opinion that the defendants (manufacturers
of prescription opioid medications, distributors of those medications, and
retail pharmacies) are entitled a writ of mandamus ordering the trial
court to vacate its case-management order insofar as it provides for
bifurcated trials on liability for a public nuisance and, if necessary, on
"special damage."    
In their complaint, the plaintiffs (entities that own or operate
hospitals in Alabama) alleged that they had suffered special damage  from
the alleged public nuisance caused by the defendants:
"As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have
suffered a special injury,  different from that suffered by the
public at large, by individual users and by governmental
entities, namely that Plaintiffs have provided uncompensated
care for patients suffering from opioid-related conditions and
incurred elevated operational costs.
"The public nuisance -- i.e., the opioid epidemic -- created,
perpetuated, and maintained by Defendants can be abated and
further recurrence of such harm and inconvenience can be
abated.
"Defendants should be required to pay the expenses
Plaintiffs have incurred or will incur in the future to fully
abate the nuisance.
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"....
"The acts forming the basis of the nuisance claim against
the Defendants were wanton, malicious and/or attended with
circumstances of aggravation.
"Therefore, Plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor
against the Defendants for injunctive relief, abatement of the
public nuisance, and for damages in an amount to be
determined by a jury, together with all cost of this action,
including prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, costs
and expenses, attorney fees, and such other  relief as this
Court deems just and equitable."
I  recognize that the trial court, in its case-management order,
sought to avoid overwhelming the jury with the possibility of the specter
of voluminous special damages incurred by the plaintiffs.  I write specially
to opine that  the use of a special master appointed pursuant to Rule 53,
Ala. R. Civ. P., could aid the trial court and the jury in this complicated
case.    
"The appointment of a special master lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision to appoint
a special master should not be reversed unless the trial court
clearly exceeds that discretion. Hall v. Mazzone, 540 So. 2d
1353 (Ala.1988). In a jury trial, a case should be referred to a
special master only if the issues are 'complicated'; those
matters to be tried without a jury are to be referred to a
special master only upon finding of 'some exceptional
condition' requiring such referral, unless a claim requires an 
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accounting or a difficult computation of damages. We
emphasize the sentence in Rule 53(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] that
precedes the applicable standard (jury or nonjury) that tells us
that the reference to a special master is the exception not the
rule."
Ex parte Alabama State Pers. Bd., 54 So. 3d 886, 892-93  (Ala.  2010).
Assuming that a jury finds in favor of the plaintiffs on their alleged
causes of action, a court-appointed special master  may well be of benefit
to the trial court in conserving the finite judicial resources available to it,
as well as in relieving the jury of the substantial burden of hearing
testimony or reviewing records pertaining to an accounting of the costs of
treatment of each individual patient found to be affected.
I applaud the trial-court judge for trying to conduct the proceedings
in this case in a manner that fully secures the rights of each party to this
litigation while fairly limiting the jurors' time and the court's time in
reaching a verdict and a judgment in this matter.      
     
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