Title: Lexington Public Schools v. K.S.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13151
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-13151 
 
LEXINGTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS  vs.  K.S. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 3, 2021. - March 18, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Child Requiring Assistance.  Unauthorized Practice of Law.  
Statute, Construction.  School and School District. 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Middlesex County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department on April 7, 2021. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Kenneth J. King, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Michael F. Kilkelly for the child. 
Kay H. Hodge (John M. Simon also present) for the 
petitioner. 
Maria L. Remillard for the mother. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In this case we are asked to decide whether an 
employee of a school district who is not an attorney, here an 
assistant school principal, may on behalf of a school district 
file and advocate for a petition under G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 
 
 
2 
 
asserting that a child requires assistance, where the child has 
been "habitually truant" from school, see G. L. c. 119, § 21, 
and other efforts to encourage the child's attendance have been 
unsuccessful.  We conclude that the assistant principal, who was 
also the supervisor of attendance, see G. L. c. 76, § 19, of a 
middle school in the Lexington public schools did not engage in 
the unauthorized practice of law in filing and pursuing such a 
petition.  Accordingly, we affirm the Juvenile Court judge's 
order denying the child's motion to dismiss the petition on the 
ground that the assistant principal had engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law. 
 
1.  Background.  In April of 2021, an assistant principal 
and attendance supervisor of a middle school in the Lexington 
public schools filed a petition under G. L. c. 119, § 39E, the 
child requiring assistance (CRA) statute, in the Juvenile Court, 
asserting that the twelve year old child needed assistance 
because he had "excessive absences" and willfully had failed to 
attend school for forty-eight days that school year.  The 
petition asserted that in addition to his absences from school, 
the child had not attended two meetings the school undertook 
with his parents by audio-visual conference, and the child and 
his family had not participated in a truancy prevention program. 
 
 
3 
 
 
At a preliminary hearing later that month,1 a Juvenile Court 
judge accepted the petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 39E, and 
concluded that a fact-finding hearing was necessary.  The child 
subsequently moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that, 
by pursuing the petition on behalf of the school district, the 
assistant principal, a nonattorney, was engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law. 
 
A remote hearing on the child's motion to dismiss was 
conducted in May of 2021, prior to the previously scheduled 
fact-finding hearing.  See G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  The assistant 
principal, the probation officer who had conducted the initial, 
statutorily mandated inquiry, a social worker with the 
Department of Children and Families (DCF) who had been involved 
with the family, the child and his attorney, and the child's 
mother and father were present electronically. 
 
During the hearing, counsel for the child presented the 
child's position that "a liquid entity such as a school 
district . . . is required to be represented by an attorney."  
The judge then asked the assistant principal whether she 
"wish[ed] to speak [with] respect to that."  The assistant 
principal responded: 
"General Laws [c. 119, § 39G,] actually does allow me, as a 
 
 
1 General Laws c. 119, § 39E, requires that a preliminary 
hearing be conducted no more than fifteen days after the filing 
of the petition. 
 
 
4 
 
petitioner, to file, and throughout . . . the statute it 
particularly refers to the school district representative.  
It does not say attorney or counsel.  Almost implying that 
the legislature when they created the law knew that 
requiring an attorney for every CRA would almost deter us 
from filing them and helping children." 
 
Observing that "historically . . . school officials have been 
authorized to file and that's been the way these petitions have 
been handled,"2 the judge denied the motion to dismiss. 
 
At the ensuing fact-finding hearing, which followed 
immediately upon the judge's ruling, the assistant principal 
testified as the sole witness for the school, and also 
represented the school district.  By that point, the child had 
eighty-three absences from school, seventy-four of which were 
unexcused, and approximately six weeks of which were because his 
father had not enrolled him in school until mid-October.  The 
assistant principal testified that the father had "worked very 
hard" to get the child enrolled in school, over obstacles; the 
father then had worked with the school to develop a plan to 
ensure the child's attendance; and "it went well for a little 
while and then it started to go down hill, again."  The school 
then met with the mother, the child, the social worker, and the 
 
 
2 See G. L. c. 76, § 20 (providing that supervisors of 
school attendance "may apply for petitions under the provisions 
of [G. L. c. 119, § 39E]"); Juvenile Court Standing Order 3-
21(a) commentary ("supervisors of school attendance may file 
applications [on behalf of the school district] alleging that 
the child is truant"). 
 
 
5 
 
school counselor, forming another plan that worked briefly and 
then "went south."  School social workers and school counselors 
also had "reached out multiple times trying . . . multiple 
different plans," including having a social worker go with the 
child to school, "even to just get [the child] in for a portion 
of the day," but none had succeeded.  Early in the school year, 
the child was to have attended school in a hybrid fashion, 
partly in person and partly through remote learning, due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  When the school returned to full-time, in-
person classes on April 28, 2021, the child did not return to 
class. 
 
Eventually, after the child was tested and found not to 
have any learning disabilities that might require an individual 
education plan, the school psychologist conducted a "school 
refusal assessment" to identify the reasons for the child's 
excessive absences.  The assessment revealed that the child 
experienced school as stressful in part because of all the 
schooling he had missed.  In addition, when the child was not in 
class, "he [was] allowed to play video games, ride his bike and 
do things that he really enjoy[ed] doing." 
 
DCF had been involved with the family beginning in 
approximately November of 2020, apparently due to the child's 
absences from school.  According to DCF, the fraught 
relationship between the child's parents, and their lack of 
 
 
6 
 
communication, contributed heavily to the child's negative 
emotions toward attending school.  The family's DCF worker had 
reported that the child required therapy and was experiencing 
emotional issues; therapy had begun but had been discontinued.  
DCF had sent a family intervention specialist to the child's 
home multiple times a week, "without any result." 
 
The child did not offer any documentary evidence or present 
any witnesses.  At the close of the evidence, the judge 
determined that the allegations in the CRA petition had been 
proved "beyond a reasonable doubt."  Specifically, he found that 
the child was between the ages of seven and seventeen, the child 
had missed more than eight days of school in the current 
quarter, and the child's refusal to attend school was willful.  
The judge therefore ruled that the child required assistance. 
 
At the time of the hearings, the child's parents were 
separated.  They shared legal custody of the child and his 
younger sibling, but the child's father had physical custody, 
and the child resided with his father in Fitchburg; his mother 
lived in Lexington.  The child continued to be enrolled in the 
Lexington public schools through the provisions of the McKinney-
Vento Homeless Education Assistance Act, because "he [was] 
considered homeless under those provisions and his last 
 
 
7 
 
residence was in Lexington."3  The probation officer 
characterized the parents' relationship as "fractured" and 
having "a lasting impact on [the child] and the behaviors." 
 
At various times in the past, the child's father had 
refused to communicate with the child's mother, putting the 
child and his younger sibling in the middle of their parents' 
relationship and causing emotional issues for both children.  As 
stated, a DCF worker cited the fraught relationship between the 
child's parents, and their lack of communication, as being 
specifically detrimental to the child, as well as to his younger 
sibling, and as contributing heavily to the child's aversion to 
attending school. 
 
The parents' vitriolic relationship, and their hostility 
towards each other, is abundantly evident in their statements to 
 
3 The McKinney-Vento Homeless Education Assistance Act was 
enacted to "ensure the enrollment, attendance and the 
opportunity to succeed in school for homeless children and 
youth."  Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 
https://www.doe.mass.edu/sfs/mv [https://perma.cc/25KK-MGFJ].  
Homeless children who are covered under the McKinney-Vento 
provisions are allowed to stay in their "school of origin for 
the duration of homelessness and until the end of the academic 
year in which they obtain permanent housing, if it is in their 
best interest."  SchoolHouse Connection, McKinney-Vento Act:  
Quick Reference, https://schoolhouseconnection.org/mckinney-
vento-act/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI1b_zmqPs8wIV4QmICR0l_AP2EAAYASAAEgK 
_WvD_BwE#_edn18 [https://perma.cc/K5PF-5JA6].  Both State 
educational agencies and local education agencies "must develop, 
review, and revise policies to remove barriers to the 
identification, enrollment, and retention of homeless students 
in school, including barriers due to fees, fines, and absences."  
Id. 
 
 
8 
 
the judge, often about each other.  At one point during the 
fact-finding hearing, the judge asked the child to leave the 
room so that he could address the adults, and then he told the 
parents, repeatedly and in no uncertain terms, that, based on 
his observations of their interactions during the two hearings, 
their continual "sniping" with each other and inability to speak 
civilly to one another, or to communicate at all, was 
"absolutely destructive to [their children's] emotional well 
being and their ability to grow up and mature." 
 
According to DCF records, the child's father reported that 
the child would not "listen to him" and would not go to school.  
DCF records also indicated that the child was reported to 
"sneak[] out of the house when dad turns his back" and "refuse[] 
to comply with his [father's] rules."  Although she was not 
called as a witness, the child's mother told the judge that the 
child attended school and did his homework when he was staying 
with her, which he had done apparently for approximately one 
month.  The mother also said that, during the time that he was 
with her, the child had begun to refuse to attend school, at 
which point she said that she would "push[] forward [the] CRA 
just so he knows that this is a serious thing."  The mother 
maintained that the child was "absolutely 110 percent 
responsible for himself," and urged that the child be placed in 
DCF custody, in the apparent belief that, thereafter, DCF 
 
 
9 
 
immediately would return the child to her custody.  It appeared 
to have been difficult for both parents to monitor the child's 
school attendance, particularly when the child was attending 
school remotely.  Even when the child did attend classes, he did 
not engage in class discussions or produce any written 
assignments. 
 
The probation officer who had conducted the initial inquiry 
recommended that the child be placed in DCF custody.  Once this 
recommendation was made, the judge informed the child's parents 
that they had the right to counsel at any hearing at which 
custody may be at issue, and he inquired whether they wished to 
be appointed counsel; they both responded affirmatively.  The 
mother again asserted that she supported placing the child in 
DCF custody.  The child's attorney objected to placement in DCF 
custody before the final hearing on disposition, and the child 
agreed that he would attend school prior to the hearing on 
disposition, without the need for DCF intervention. 
 
The judge scheduled a hearing on disposition for the 
following week.  The judge then admonished the child, "I'm very 
close to placing you in the custody of DCF.  I'm going to give 
you the week to show us that you're good to your word."  The 
child sought relief from the denial of his motion to dismiss 
from a single justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 119, § 39I, and G. L. c. 231, § 118.  The single justice 
 
 
10 
 
allowed the appeal to proceed before a panel of the Appeals 
Court, and we allowed the child's petition for direct appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Statutory provisions governing CRA proceedings.  The 
Legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme mandating the 
attendance of children at school and requiring school districts 
to enforce their attendance and to investigate every case where 
a child living in the district is not enrolled in or attending 
school.  School districts or attendance supervisors also are 
required to make detailed reports on each child in the city or 
town's registration and attendance. 
 
The school attendance provisions in G. L. cc. 72, 76, and 
1194 mandate that the school committee of each municipality is 
responsible for enforcing the attendance at school of "all 
children" who reside in that municipality, G. L. c. 76, § 1;5 
define the roles and responsibilities of the supervisor of 
attendance, G. L. c. 76, § 19; authorize the supervisor of 
attendance to file CRA petitions where children are not 
complying with attendance requirements; and, if the court so 
orders, authorize that supervisor of attendance to have 
 
 
4 See G. L. c. 119, §§ 21, 39E-39I; G. L. c. 72, §§ 2, 2A, 
3; G. L. c. 76, §§ 1, 19, 20. 
 
 
5 General Laws c. 76, § 1, requires "[t]he school committee 
of each town [to] provide for and enforce the school attendance 
of all children actually residing therein." 
 
 
11 
 
"oversight" over such children, G. L. c. 76, § 20. 
 
To facilitate its duty to enforce school attendance, each 
school committee "shall appoint . . . one or more supervisors of 
attendance."  See G. L. c. 76, § 19.  "Supervisors of 
attendance, under the direction of the committee and 
superintendent of schools, shall have charge of the records 
required by [G. L. c. 72, § 2], shall be responsible for their 
completeness and accuracy, and shall receive the co-operation of 
principals, teachers and supervisory officers in the discharge 
of their duties hereunder."  G. L. c. 72, § 2.  Among other 
required reports, supervisors of attendance, under the direction 
of the school committee, must maintain a record of all school-
age children residing in the town and must "examine carefully 
into all cases where children of school age are not enrolled in, 
and attending school, as required by [G. L. c. 76, § 1]."  G. L. 
c. 72, § 2. 
 
The school committee of each town is charged with enforcing 
the legislative mandate that children attend school "during the 
number of days required by the board of education in each school 
year."  G. L. c. 76, § 1.  Supervisors of attendance "shall 
inquire into all cases" where a child is habitually absent from 
school and "may apply for petitions under the provisions of 
[G. L. c. 119, § 39E]."  G. L. c. 76, § 20.  Pursuant to G. L. 
c. 119, § 39E, 
 
 
12 
 
"A school district may initiate an application for 
assistance in [the Juvenile Court] stating that said child 
is not excused from attendance in accordance with the 
lawful and reasonable regulations of such child's school, 
has willfully failed to attend school for more than [eight] 
school days in a quarter or repeatedly fails to obey the 
lawful and reasonable regulations of the child's school.  
The application for assistance shall also state whether or 
not the child and the child's family have participated in 
the truancy prevention program, if one is available, and a 
statement of the specific steps taken under the truancy 
prevention program to prevent the child's truancy; and if 
the application for assistance states that a child has 
repeatedly failed to obey the lawful and reasonable 
regulations of the school, a statement of the specific 
steps taken by the school to improve the child's conduct." 
 
Moreover, G. L. c. 76, § 20, provides that, "if the court so 
orders," supervisors of attendance shall 
"have oversight of children placed on probation . . . and 
of children admitted to or attending shows or 
entertainments in violation of [G. L. c. 140, § 197].  They 
may apprehend and take to school without a warrant any 
truant or absentee found wandering in the streets or public 
places." 
 
 
When a CRA petition is presented for filing, the statute 
encourages attempting to resolve the matter without proceeding 
with the filing, and requires the clerk to "inform" the 
petitioner that "the petitioner may delay filing the request and 
choose to have the child and the child's family referred to a 
family resource center, community-based services program or 
other entity designated by the secretary of health and human 
services to provide community-based services . . . and return to 
court at a later time to file an application for assistance, if 
needed."  G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  The statute also mandates that 
 
 
13 
 
the clerk "prepare, publish and disseminate to each petitioner 
educational material relative to available family resource 
centers, community-based services programs and other entities 
designated by the secretary of health and human services."  Id. 
 
Upon the filing of an application under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39E, the clerk "shall request the chief probation officer or a 
designee to conduct an immediate inquiry to determine whether in 
the officer's opinion the best interest of the child require 
that assistance be given."  A preliminary hearing must be held 
"as soon as possible," and no later than fifteen days after the 
filing "to determine whether assistance is needed."  Id.  At the 
preliminary hearing, a Juvenile Court judge "shall receive the 
recommendation of the probation officer" who conducted the 
inquiry.  Id.  The judge then may 
"(i) decline to accept the application for assistance 
because there is no probable cause to believe that the 
child and family are in need of assistance; (ii) decline to 
accept the application for assistance because it finds that 
the interests of the child would best be served by informal 
assistance, in which case the court shall, with the consent 
of the child and the child's parents or guardian, refer the 
child to a probation officer for assistance; or 
(iii) accept the application for assistance and schedule a 
fact-finding hearing." 
 
Id. 
 
If, after a fact-finding hearing, a judge determines that 
the statements in the petition have been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the judge may deem the child to be in need of 
 
 
14 
 
assistance.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G.  The judge then must convene a 
conference to receive recommendations "as to the best 
disposition" of the matter from the probation officer who 
conducted the initial inquiry, the child and the child's 
attorney, a representative from DCF if DCF is involved with the 
family, a representative of any community-based services program 
that is involved with the family, a representative from the 
child's school, the petitioner, the child's parent or legal 
guardian, and "any other person who may be helpful in 
determining the most effective assistance available to be 
offered to the child and family."  Id.  See G. L. c. 119, § 39F.  
The judge may decide to allow the child to remain with his or 
her parents or legal guardian, place the child in the care of 
another adult or private organization qualified to care for the 
child, or place the child in the custody of DCF.  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39G. 
 
The child has the right to counsel at all hearings, must be 
present at the fact-finding hearing and the subsequent 
conference on disposition, and has the right to be heard.  G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 39F, 39G.  The parents or legal guardians of the 
child have the right to notice and to be heard and the right to 
counsel if custody of the child is at issue.  Id.  A judge may 
allow a motion to dismiss upon a filing by one of the parties or 
the probation officer if the judge determines that dismissal 
 
 
15 
 
would be in the best interests of the child, or by agreement of 
the parties.  G. L. c. 119, § 39G. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The child argues that the CRA adjudication 
should be vacated and the matter remanded to the Juvenile Court 
with instructions to dismiss because the school district was 
represented by a nonlawyer, the assistant principal, who engaged 
in the unauthorized practice of law.  The crux of the child's 
argument is that a school district is a corporation under G. L. 
c. 71, § 16, and therefore is required, under G. L. c. 221, 
§ 46, and the common law, to be represented in court by an 
attorney.  Both statutory interpretation and determinations 
under common law are legal questions that the court reviews de 
novo.  See Concord v. Water Dep't of Littleton, 487 Mass. 56, 60 
(2021). 
 
The child maintains that, regardless of whether the CRA 
statute permits a school district to be represented in court by 
a supervisor of attendance who is not an attorney, "[t]he 
assistant principal does not have the legal authority to . . . 
prosecute an action on behalf of the Lexington School 
Department."  Although the child acknowledges that G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39E, on its face permits a "school district" to "initiate" a 
CRA petition, in his view either G. L. c. 221, § 46, or the 
common law, preclude a supervisor of attendance from pursing a 
 
 
16 
 
CRA petition in court, because to do so would constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law. 
 
a.  Unauthorized practice of law.  As the child argues, the 
consequences of nonlawyers engaging in the practice of law are 
well known and have been discussed in detail in our prior 
decisions.  "Long experience has demonstrated that such 
activities [i.e., those that constitute 'practicing law'] cannot 
be carried on with fairness to the persons whose rights are 
involved . . . except by those who have specially fitted 
themselves for the task by long study and preparation, who are 
subject to professional discipline . . . ."  Matter of the Shoe 
Mfrs. Protective Ass'n, 295 Mass. 369, 372 (1936) (Matter of 
Shoe).  The ultimate purpose of the prohibition against 
nonlawyers practicing law is to protect the public welfare, so 
that people are not "advised and represented in legal matters by 
incompetent and unreliable persons, over whom the judicial 
department could exercise little control."  See Lowell Bar Ass'n 
v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 180 (1943) (Loeb). 
 
"The judicial department is necessarily the sole arbiter of 
what constitutes the practice of law."  Id.  We have long 
recognized that "[i]t is not easy to define the practice of 
law," as members of other professions engage in many of the 
same, or similar, activities as lawyers.  Id.  See Real Estate 
Bar Ass'n for Mass. v. National Real Estate Info. Servs., 459 
 
 
17 
 
Mass. 512, 518 (2011).  For instance, "accountants routinely 
provide advice to their clients that requires knowledge and 
understanding of the law and that also has legal ramifications."  
Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., supra at 518 n.9.  Similarly, 
"[p]olice prosecutors, who normally are not members of the bar, 
customarily prosecute offenses . . . in the District and 
Municipal Courts of the Commonwealth."  Furtado v. Furtado, 380 
Mass. 137, 148 (1980).  Thus, "[w]hether a particular activity 
constitutes the practice of law 'must be decided upon its own 
particular facts' because 'it is impossible to frame any 
comprehensive and satisfactory definition' of the term."  Real 
Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., supra at 517, quoting Matter of 
Shoe, 295 Mass. at 372. 
 
While "[c]ourts are the ultimate arbiters of who may 
practice law before them, . . . we give substantial deference to 
the views of the Legislature on such a subject."  Furtado, 380 
Mass. at 147-148.  Here, the Legislature has determined that a 
school district "may initiate an application for assistance in 
[the Juvenile Court] stating that [a] child is not excused from 
attendance in accordance with the lawful and reasonable 
regulations of such child's school, [and] has willfully failed 
to attend school for more than [eight] school days in a 
quarter."  G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  Similarly, a school supervisor 
 
 
18 
 
"may apply for [CRA] petitions under the provisions of [G. L. 
c. 119, § 39E]."  G. L. c. 76, § 20. 
 
The child does not address the specific statutory 
provisions under G. L. c. 76, § 20, and G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 
giving school supervisors authority to file CRA petitions, nor 
does he acknowledge that the Legislature may abrogate the common 
law.  "[A] statutory repeal of the common law will not be 
lightly inferred," see Passatempo v. McMenimen, 461 Mass. 279, 
290 (2012), "[b]ut a common-law rule may be replaced or amended 
by the Legislature even where 'there is no indication of 
legislative intent to preempt the common law' if the enacted 
statute preempts the common law by 'necessary implication'" 
(citation omitted), Chelsea Hous. Auth. v. McLaughlin, 482 Mass. 
579, 591 (2019). 
 
Because the Legislature has expressly authorized both a 
school district, G. L. c. 119, § 39E, and a supervisor of 
attendance, G. L. c. 76, § 20, to apply for CRA petitions, we 
turn to consideration of the statutory provisions governing CRA 
proceedings to determine whether they purport to allow a 
supervisor of attendance to engage in the unauthorized practice 
of law by doing so. 
 
b.  Statutory authority to pursue a CRA petition.  "A 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is that a 
statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the 
 
 
19 
 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved use of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment . . . and the main 
object to be accomplished . . . ."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  
Where the language of a statute is "clear and unambiguous," the 
plain meaning of the language must be given effect, as the key 
insight into legislative intent.  See Cohen v. Commissioner of 
the Div. of Med. Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 409 (1996), cert. 
denied sub nom. Kokoska v. Bullen, 519 U.S. 1057 (1997).  See 
also Furtado, 380 Mass. at 147-148.  The plain meaning of words 
is to be derived from "their use in other legal contexts and 
dictionary definitions."  Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 
Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  "Only if the legislative history 
compelled a different conclusion might we depart from the plain 
meaning of the statute."  Cohen, supra.  If the statutory 
language is ambiguous, however, then a court turns to external 
sources, particularly the legislative history, to derive 
legislative intent.  See Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872 
(1985). 
 
We begin with the observation that the CRA statute, G. L. 
c. 119, § 39E, provides an avenue for a school district to 
address the root causes of a child's excessive absences from 
 
 
20 
 
school.  The initiation of CRA proceedings in the Juvenile Court 
facilitates a family's access to community resources and 
services, and ultimately may allow the Juvenile Court to 
"intervene in the custody arrangements" of the child.  See 
Millis Pub. Sch. v. M.P., 478 Mass. 767, 781 (2018) (Millis); 
G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  The Legislature's decision to allow a 
school district to pursue a CRA petition without counsel was 
made in furtherance of the Commonwealth's strong interest in 
ensuring the education of children through their consistent 
attendance at school.  See Care & Protection of Charles, 399 
Mass. 324, 334 (1987) (discussing "the substantial State 
interest in the education of its citizenry"); Attorney Gen. v. 
Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 377, 380-381, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 
(1982) (State's interest in compulsory education is 
"compelling").  The language of G. L. c. 119, § 39E, and G. L. 
c. 76, § 20, is clear and unambiguous as to the authority of the 
school district and the supervisor of attendance to apply for 
CRA petitions, and consistent with this purpose. 
 
Nothing in the statutory language, however, suggests that 
pursuing a CRA petition in the Juvenile Court requires the 
practice of law.  To the contrary, the Legislature plainly 
intended that individuals other than attorneys may apply for 
such petitions, and that the court should provide materials to 
help them during their appearance in court.  In addition to a 
 
 
21 
 
school district or attendance supervisor, the Legislature 
authorized a parent, custodian, or legal guardian to file a CRA 
petition.  See G. L. c. 119, § 39E; G. L. c. 76, § 20.  "If the 
petitioner is a parent, legal guardian or custodian the clerk 
shall provide to the petitioner informational materials, 
prepared by the court that explain the court process and shall 
include the types of orders that the court may issue and the 
possibility of changes in the custody of the child and may 
include an explanation of the services available through the 
court process, including language translation services and the 
manner in which those services are delivered."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39E.  For all petitioners, when a petition is presented, the 
clerk is obligated, before accepting it for filing, to notify 
the petitioner "that the petitioner may delay filing the request 
and choose to have the child and the child's family referred to 
a family resource center, community-based services program or 
other entity designated by the secretary of health and human 
services . . . and return to court at a later time to file an 
application for assistance, if needed."  Id.  In addition, for 
all petitioners, the clerk is to "prepare, publish and 
disseminate to each petitioner educational material relative to 
available family resource centers, community-based services 
programs and other entities designated by the secretary of 
health and human services.  Id. 
 
 
22 
 
 
CRA proceedings are intended to be relatively informal.  In 
2012, the Legislature replaced the children in need of services 
(CHINS) statute, which it had adopted in 1973, with the CRA 
statute, with the goal of making such proceedings "less 
adversarial."  See Millis, 478 Mass. at 778-779; An Act 
regarding families and children engaged in services, St. 2012, 
c. 240.  Among other modifications, the Legislature removed the 
requirement of a jury trial and replaced it with a fact-finding 
hearing by a judge, if the judge determines that such a hearing 
is in the best interests of the child.  See Millis, supra at 779 
n.13, citing R.L. Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.1 
(Supp. 2017); G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  The determinations the judge 
must make at such hearings are heavily fact-intensive:  whether 
the child is between six and eighteen years of age (exclusive), 
whether the child has had more than eight unexcused absences in 
a quarter, and, if so, whether those absences were willful.  
G. L. c. 119, § 39E. 
 
The Juvenile Court has adopted and promulgated a short and 
simple form to be used by a school district in initiating a CRA 
petition, titled "School District Application for Child 
Requiring Assistance"; the school superintendent here used such 
a form to submit her petition.  See Juvenile Court Standing 
Order 3-21, "Child Requiring Assistance Proceedings" ("This new 
standing order sets forth a standard statewide process in the 
 
 
23 
 
Juvenile Court for child requiring assistance [CRA] proceedings 
that is in keeping with the mission of the Juvenile Court to 
assist children and strengthen families").  The fact-finding 
hearing on an accepted petition is described in the standing 
order as "flexible" in nature, and the order states that, due to 
this flexibility, hearsay evidence should be admitted.  See id.  
Consequently, a school official representing a school district 
in CRA proceedings need not possess a "thorough familiarity with 
procedural and substantive rules of law."  See Varney Enters., 
Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 81 (1988). 
 
Moreover, while the child must be represented by an 
attorney at all CRA proceedings, and the parent or legal 
guardian is entitled to an attorney if the question of custody 
arises, a school district may "initiate" a CRA application and 
"may be represented by counsel" (emphasis added), but, as a 
petitioner, a school district "shall" be present at the 
proceedings (emphasis added).  See G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 39G; 
Juvenile Court Standing Order 3-21.  Neither the statutory 
provisions nor the Juvenile Court order states that a school 
district "must" be represented by counsel at such proceedings.  
The judge's comment at the fact-finding hearing that 
"historically . . . school officials have been authorized to 
file and that's been the way these petitions have been handled" 
is consistent with these provisions. 
 
 
24 
 
 
This practice furthers the legislative purpose to ensure 
that children attend school for the mandatory number of days 
each year.  Interpreting the filing of a CRA petition otherwise, 
as the practice of law, would require school districts instead 
to retain attorneys to represent them at CRA proceedings, and 
would disrupt this established practice in a manner that likely 
would be detrimental to children.  "[C]ustom and practice may 
play a role in determining whether a particular activity is 
considered the practice or law."  Real Estate Bar Ass'n for 
Mass., 459 Mass. at 518. 
 
We have, in other circumstances, approved the prosecution 
of complaints by individuals who are not members of the bar, 
particularly where the individual acts "pursuant to his 
statutory duties."  See Furtado, 380 Mass. at 147.  In Furtado, 
for example, we held that a probation officer permissibly could 
appear in the Probate and Family Court to pursue a contempt 
proceeding for nonpayment of child support without engaging in 
the unauthorized practice of law.  We noted that a probation 
officer is statutorily mandated to "bring into court when 
necessary . . . all persons who are delinquent in making 
payments ordered or decreed by the court" and possesses full 
power to "do each and every[ thing] necessary, including 
initiating contempt proceedings, to collect any and all 
delinquent payments."  Id., quoting G. L. c. 276, §§ 85A, 85B.  
 
 
25 
 
Because "[t]he State's interest in compliance with support 
orders is substantial," and probation officers are charged with 
ensuring that support payments are made, we concluded that it 
would not be improper for a probation officer to prosecute a 
contempt complaint.  Furtado, supra at 147-148.  Similar 
reasoning supports a conclusion that the assistant principal did 
not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by filing the CRA 
petition and pursuing it in the Juvenile Court. 
 
In filing a CRA petition, a supervisor of attendance is 
undertaking the enforcement actions that are statutorily 
mandated for the position.  A supervisor of attendance is 
obligated to monitor the enrollment of children in school and 
their daily school attendance, see G. L. c. 72, § 2 
("Supervisors of attendance . . . shall have charge of the 
records [of school registration]" and "shall be responsible for 
their completeness and accuracy"); G. L. c. 76, § 20 (supervisor 
of attendance "shall inquire into all cases arising under" 
statutory sections pertaining to school registration and daily 
attendance).  Thus, the Legislature reasonably expected that a 
supervisor of attendance often would be the one to pursue a CRA 
petition.6 
 
 
6 Prior to the 2012 overhaul of the CHINS system, G. L. 
c. 119, § 39E, provided that "[a]ny supervisor of attendance" 
could initiate a CRA petition alleging habitual truancy or 
school disobedience.  See St. 1973, c. 1073, § 5.  The current 
 
 
26 
 
 
We have recognized the difficulty in providing a precise 
definition of the practice of law, because members of other 
professions engage in many of the same, or similar, activities 
as lawyers, such as making "legally binding obligations and 
commitments."  Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., 459 Mass. 
at 518.  A determination whether an individual's actions 
constitute "practicing law" is a fact-specific inquiry.  Matter 
of Shoe, 295 Mass. at 372.  An action "generally [must] fall 
'wholly within' the practice of law" in order for nonlawyers to 
be prohibited from engaging in it (citation omitted).  See Real 
Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., supra. 
 
version, by contrast, provides that "a school district" may 
initiate a CRA petition for such reasons.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39E.  Notably, the Legislature in 2012 made no changes to the 
language of G. L. c. 76, § 20, which was enacted in 1973 along 
with the original G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  General Laws c. 76, 
§ 20, continues to permit a supervisor of attendance to "apply 
for" CRA petitions.  See St. 1973, c. 1073, § 1.  Thus, the 
Legislature's use of the words "school district" in place of 
"supervisor of attendance" in the text of G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 
was not meant to revoke the power of supervisors of attendance 
to file and pursue CRA petitions.  To the contrary, the language 
appears to authorize other school officials, in addition to the 
supervisor of attendance, to represent a school district at CRA 
proceedings. 
 
 
It is reasonable for the Legislature to have authorized 
other school officials to represent a school district in CRA 
proceedings.  There may be another individual at a school who 
has worked more closely with the child and is more familiar with 
the child's circumstances than the supervisor of attendance.  It 
would make sense for this individual to participate in CRA 
proceedings instead of the supervisor of attendance, as this 
individual would likely have a better understanding of the child 
and family's needs. 
 
 
27 
 
 
For instance, "[f]illing out standard government forms for 
others is not necessarily the practice of law."  Id. at 525, 
citing Loeb, 315 Mass. at 185.  See LAS Collection Mgt. v. 
Pagan, 447 Mass. 847, 850 (2006) ("there are circumstances where 
the mere preparing of forms is not the practice of law").  Here, 
as the school district asserts, all that the assistant principal 
did to apply for the CRA petition was "complet[e] a simple form 
provided by the Trial Court's Juvenile Court Department."  See 
Furtado, 380 Mass. at 147 (filing complaint is not unauthorized 
practice of law where it is done "pursuant to . . . statutory 
duties").  See also Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., 459 Mass. 
at 525, and LAS Collection Mgt., supra (simple act of filing 
form is not necessarily unauthorized practice of law). 
 
Although her claim was filed on a form explicitly created 
for that purpose, in filing the CRA petition, the outcome of 
which affects the rights of the child and his parents, and in 
representing the school district at the hearing, the assistant 
principal indeed did "direct[] and manag[e] the enforcement of 
legal claims" and "draft[] documents by which such [legal] 
rights are created, modified, surrendered or secured."  See 
Matter of Shoe, 295 Mass. at 372.  "[I]n general the practice of 
directing and managing the enforcement of legal claims and the 
establishment of the legal rights of others, where it is 
necessary to form and act upon opinions as to what those rights 
 
 
28 
 
are and as to the legal methods which must be adopted to enforce 
them, . . . and the practice . . . of drafting documents by 
which such rights are created, modified, surrendered or secured 
are all aspects of the practice of law."  Id.  At the same time, 
the assistant principal's conduct at the fact-finding hearing 
involved only presenting information about the child's 
attendance and the efforts that the school had undertaken to 
ameliorate his ongoing absence from school, and responding to 
questions from the judge and the child's attorney.  As the 
school district maintains, these actions do not constitute "the 
type of legal representation and/or prosecution activity 
reserved for members of the bar."  See LAS Collection Mgt., 447 
Mass. at 849-851; Loeb, 315 Mass. at 183.  Because the assistant 
principal's actions did not fall "'wholly within' the practice 
of law," Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., 459 Mass. at 518, her 
conduct cannot be described as the unauthorized practice of law. 
 
Fundamentally, a CRA proceeding is not a legal proceeding 
where the parties necessarily are on opposing sides of a legal 
outcome.  All sides are to be guided by what services are 
available to best meet the needs of the child, to allow a child 
to obtain an education, G. L. c. 119, § 39E, and thereby be 
positioned to become a contributing member of society.  Indeed, 
the Legislature clearly contemplated that such petitions often 
will be filed by parents or legal guardians themselves, seeking 
 
 
29 
 
assistance for their child.  Recommendations submitted by social 
workers, mental health professionals, parents, and teachers 
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 39E, which a judge may consider in 
reaching a disposition, are decidedly not suggestions of legal 
strategies to follow in order to prevail in a complaint.  The 
provisions of G. L. c. 119, § 39E, permit those who know the 
child best to offer their guidance as to how best to help the 
child attend school.  They are suggestions that the judge may 
accept and consider in his or her discretion.  Nothing in this 
type of proceeding indicates that a petitioner filing and 
pursing a CRA petition is practicing law. 
 
The child argues that a nonlawyer would be less likely to 
"understand and present to the court the custody status of the 
child," and therefore less able to comply with the requirement 
of G. L. c. 119, § 39E, that a description of the child's 
custody status be provided.  The statute also requires, however, 
that a probation officer be assigned as soon as a petition is 
filed, to conduct an inquiry and provide a recommendation to the 
court.  See G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  In addition, the statute 
mandates that DCF, if it is involved with the child, be present 
at the hearing to determine whether the child is in need of 
services, as well as at the hearing on disposition, and DCF, the 
school, and the probation officer all have a right to present 
recommendations as to disposition.  See id.  Thus, the judge 
 
 
30 
 
would have access to reports and recommendations from all of the 
experts who have been involved with the child, and also could 
call on "any other person" whose information might "be helpful 
in determining the most effective assistance available to be 
offered to the child and family."  See G. L. c. 119, § 39G.  
Otherwise put, any risks attendant to nonlawyers filing and 
pursing a CRA petition are mitigated by express statutory 
provisions.  Moreover, the statute also requires that a 
petitioner file with a petition all of the steps that the school 
took to ameliorate the situation and have the child present in 
school.  G. L. c. 119, § 39E.  A school official from the 
child's school likely would be in the best position to have that 
knowledge and to be able to provide it cogently to the judge, 
whereas parents filing such petitions might experience emotional 
burdens that could detract from an accurate and objective 
presentation of the relevant facts. 
 
Although the child goes to great lengths to point out the 
"complexity" of the legal and factual issues that arise at such 
proceedings, CRA proceedings are specifically designed not to be 
adversarial.  See Millis, 478 Mass. at 778-779; St. 2012, 
c. 240.  As this court emphasized in Millis,  supra at 784, "a 
finding of wilfulness is a fact-based inquiry that will depend 
on the circumstances of each case. . . .  Each child's purpose 
or reasons for missing school should be examined individually in 
 
 
31 
 
order to determine whether the absences are wilful beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  A CRA proceeding on truancy is relatively 
straightforward and requires little by way of legal argument; 
the sole determination to be made, by the judge, is whether the 
child is in need of assistance as the statute defines it and, if 
so, what disposition, including remaining with the parents, 
would be in the child's best interests.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39E.  A determination of the child's best interests is made 
without reference to any other case or any specific guidelines.  
The individuals who may be present at the hearing, and who may 
recommend the appropriate disposition, are clearly nonlawyers.  
In addition to the child and the parents, legal guardian, or 
custodian, they include a DCF social worker or representative, 
the school district, and the probation officer who conducted the 
mandatory initial inquiry.  Moreover, as stated, "any other 
person" may be asked to make a recommendation, or, as happened 
at this hearing, the parents may request that another individual 
be present and make a recommendation as to disposition.  See 
G. L. c. 119, §§ 39F, 39G. 
 
The child also argues that having an attorney at a CRA 
fact-finding proceeding would help to ensure that "the court has 
better evidence because lawyers know how to operate within the 
rules of court, producing more reliable evidence," and that 
"[h]aving legal counsel could also promote settlement of cases 
 
 
32 
 
outside of court."  With respect to the efforts that have been 
attempted to bring the child into school, and the reasons that 
those have not been successful, the school representatives who 
engaged in the efforts will be familiar with the efforts 
undertaken by the school district and will be able to present 
them straightforwardly as facts on the ground, rather than as an 
advocate.  Additionally, the statute contains multiple 
provisions encouraging not filing a CRA petition at all, and 
requirements that the court clerk advise the parties of 
alternatives and the possibility of a delay in filing; nothing 
in this shows that having an attorney would be more likely to 
allow the parties to reach a "settlement" outside of court.  In 
any event, the child's arguments are policy suggestions that the 
Legislature could have, but did not, choose to implement. 
 
The child also argues that the petitioner's representation 
by an attorney "would help to ensure" that the constitutional 
requirements of notice, such as to the parents, are met.  Under 
the plain terms of G. L. c. 119, § 39E, however, parents and 
guardians, as well as the child, are entitled to notice at each 
stage of the proceeding, notice that presumably is sent by the 
clerk upon the filing of the petition and the scheduling of 
hearings, just as the clerk must ask the chief probation officer 
or designee to conduct the relevant investigation.  See id. 
 
 
33 
 
 
The conclusion that filing a CRA petition and pursuing it 
in the Juvenile Court is not the practice of law comports with 
the legislative purpose in enacting the CRA provisions.  The 
school district argues in its brief that "requiring a lawyer for 
every CRA Application may very well deter the filing of such 
applications and would allow parents and children to miss school 
without consequence."  The assistant principal testified at the 
fact-finding hearing that a requirement that an attorney 
represent a school in a CRA proceeding could discourage school 
districts from filing such petitions due to the time and expense 
involved, as well as potential unwelcome publicity. 
 
Public school districts, as the Legislature undoubtedly is 
aware, do not have unlimited funding, and retaining an attorney 
to prosecute every CRA petition would be prohibitively costly 
for many districts.  For example, in 2019, school districts in 
Suffolk County alone filed 503 CRA petitions related to truancy.  
See Juvenile Court & Probation Service, Child Requiring 
Assistance Periodic and Annual Report, January 1, 2019 -- 
December 31, 2019 (Jan. 28, 2021).7  As the mother argues, an 
interpretation of G. L. c. 119, § 39E, that resulted in such 
deterrence ultimately would be inconsistent with the 
 
 
7 Available at https://www.mass.gov/doc/2019-child-
requiring-assistance-court-report/download [https://perma 
.cc/N4AM-VFZ8]. 
 
 
34 
 
Commonwealth's "clear public policy that highlights the 
importance of a child's education and attendance at school, 
which is reflected in the compulsory attendance law."  See Care 
& Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. at 335; Bailey, 386 Mass. 
at 377, 380-381.  Because the Legislature has concluded that 
obtaining an education is in a child's best interests, and 
because the best interests of the child are a guiding factor in 
CRA proceedings, an interpretation requiring attorney 
representation of petitioning schools at such proceedings, and 
the consequent potential deterrent effect, could result in harm 
to the very students the Legislature sought to protect. 
 
c.  School district as corporation.  In addition to his 
implicit argument that G. L. c. 119, § 39E, improperly attempts 
to extend the practice of law by allowing school districts and 
supervisors of attendance to initiate and pursue CRA petitions, 
the child contends that, as a corporation, the school district 
was statutorily precluded from appearing in court without being 
represented by an attorney.  See G. L. c. 221, § 46.  The child 
also relies on the common-law rule that a corporation "must 
appear and be represented in court, if at all, by attorneys."  
See Varney Enters., Inc., 402 Mass. at 82. 
 
Because we have concluded that a supervisor of attendance 
who files and pursues a CRA petition under G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 
does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law, we need not 
 
 
35 
 
reach these arguments.  Nonetheless, a few observations are in 
order. 
 
A school district, under G. L. c. 70, § 2, is defined as, 
inter alia, "the school department of a city or town" or "a 
regional school district."  Pursuant to G. L. c. 40, § 1, cities 
and towns are deemed "bodies corporate, and, except as otherwise 
expressly provided, shall have the powers, exercise the 
privileges and be subject to the duties and liabilities provided 
in the several acts establishing them and in the acts relating 
thereto."  Moreover, as defined in G. L. c. 71, § 16, "[a] 
regional school district established under the provisions of the 
preceding section shall be a body politic and corporate with all 
the powers and duties conferred by law upon school committees." 
 
Thus, while a school district indeed is a corporate body, 
it is first and foremost a municipal corporate body.  Municipal 
bodies are governed by an entire chapter of law that is distinct 
from the statutory provisions governing corporations.  See G. L. 
c. 39, "Municipal Government."  There are sound reasons for 
different requirements to apply to "public or municipal 
corporations" and to "private or moneyed corporations."  See 
O'Donnell v. North Attleborough, 212 Mass. 243, 245-246 (1912).  
The school district notes that "each of the cases [the child] 
cites deals with private, commercial enterprises and 
 
 
36 
 
activities," entities that are subject to different statutory 
provisions from municipal corporations.8 
 
General Laws c. 221, § 46, provides that "[n]o corporation 
or association shall practice or appear as an attorney for any 
person other than itself in any court in the commonwealth" 
(emphasis added).  In filing the CRA petition, the school 
district performed its statutorily mandated duty to enforce 
school attendance, part of "its lawful business."  See G. L. 
c. 221, § 46.  Even if there were any doubt whether the 
provisions applicable to legal representation with respect to 
for-profit corporations also are applicable to municipal 
corporations, the more specific CRA statutes, G. L. c. 76, § 20, 
and G. L. c. 119, § 39E, would control over the more general 
corporate statute.  See Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 
Mass. 109, 118 (1973) ("If a general statute and a specific 
 
 
8 LAS Collection Mgt., 447 Mass. at 847, involved a property 
management company; Loeb, 315 Mass. at 177, involved tax 
preparation services for individuals; and Matter of Shoe, 295 
Mass. at 370, involved a business in the collection and 
adjustment of commercial accounts for goods sold, mainly on 
behalf of wholesale merchants and manufacturers in the shoe 
business.  Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., 459 Mass. at 513-
514, involved certain real estate settlement services to 
mortgage lenders.  Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 
Mass. 542, 543 (2018), involved a property manager who brought a 
summary process action in the Housing Court in the name of his 
sole proprietorship, which was not the owner or lessor of the 
property.  Varney Enters., Inc., 402 Mass. at 80, involved a 
small claims action between two corporations. 
 
 
37 
 
statute cannot be reconciled, the general statute must yield to 
the specific statute"). 
 
Most significantly, as O'Donnell, 212 Mass. at 245-246, 
makes clear, given the distinction between "private or moneyed 
corporations" and "public . . . municipal corporations," a 
statutory requirement that applies to the former is applicable 
to the latter only where such a requirement is "express[ly] 
enact[ed]" by the Legislature.  See, e.g., Mrugala v. Boston, 
330 Mass. 707, 708 (1953); New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods 
Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 329 Mass. 243, 
250 (1952).  Nothing in the language of G. L. c. 221, § 46, 
provides that it is applicable to municipal corporations, in 
addition to private, moneyed corporations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to dismiss affirmed.