Title: Kiser v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 375, 1999
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LAMONT KISER,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§ No. 375, 1999
§
v.
§ Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in and
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§ for Kent County
§ Cr.A. Nos. IK97-09-0518 through
Plaintiff Below,
§ 0520 and IK97-10-0777.
Appellee.
§
Submitted: January 30, 2001
Decided:
April 9, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE,
Justices, constituting the Court En Banc.
Appeal from Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Lloyd A. Schmid, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public
Defender, Dover, Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Dover, Delaware, for Appellee.  
WALSH, Justice:
2
In this appeal from the Superior Court, the Appellant/defendant-below,
Lamont Kiser (“Kiser”), claims error with respect to the trial court's refusal to admit
certain evidence of prior misidentifications of Kiser by law enforcement officials.
Kiser also contends the trial court erred by refusing to permit his brother to be called
as a witness for the purpose of demonstrating the resemblance between them.  While
we find no error in the refusal to permit Kiser’s brother to offer limited testimony,
we conclude that the trial judge erred in barring the evidence of prior
misidentifications because that evidence was clearly relevant to the defense of
mistaken identity asserted at trial.  Accordingly, we remand for a new trial.
 I 
In May and June 1997, the Delaware State Police Special Investigations Unit
conducted an undercover investigation of an open air drug market in the Willow
Grove area of Kent County, Delaware.  The police received information that crack
cocaine was being distributed along a dirt road in the vicinity of Route 10.  In
connection with the investigation, Delaware State Police Officers Dan Wright and
Donald Boulerice made three undercover purchases of crack cocaine from an
1 The purchases occurred on May 27, June 3, and June 16 at the Willow Grove drug
market.  Detective Wright made a $40 purchase on May 27 and a $60 purchase on June 16.  On
June 3, Officer Boulerice made a $100 crack cocaine purchase. 
2An individual cooperating with the police provided some of the photographs used while
others were obtained as a result of prior investigations conducted in the area. 
3
individual they identified as  Kiser.1  The officers encountered more than one
individual on each occasion and the purchases were of short duration —
approximately 35-40 seconds. 
Following the purchases, the officers briefly reviewed more than 12
photographs of suspected drug dealers in the Willow Grove area2 in an effort to
match the known dealers with the persons the officers encountered.  These
photographs included a picture of Kiser and two pictures of his brother, Donald
Kiser. Using these photographs, the officers identified Kiser as the individual from
whom they had purchased drugs on three occasions.  Prior to these alleged
encounters, the officers had never had any contact with Kiser.  Upon learning of
outstanding warrants issued in his name for his alleged involvement in the Willow
Grove drug market, Kiser turned himself in to the Delaware State Police.  Kiser was
charged with three counts of Delivery of a Controlled Substance and one count of
Conspiracy.  Following a jury trial, Kiser was found guilty of all the charges.  
4
At trial, Kiser’s sole defense was mistaken identity.  The core of Kiser’s
defense was that it was common for law enforcement officials to mistake him for one
of his family members.  To support this claim, Kiser sought to present evidence that
he was mistaken for one of his cousins or brothers on at least three occasions in the
last ten years.  The proffered evidence was in the form of testimony of his mother,
Goldie Charlotte (“Charlotte”) and a Superior Court bailiff, Joseph Sanchez
(“Sanchez”).  In addition, Kiser attempted to call as a witness his brother, Donald
Kiser, to demonstrate the resemblance between the two and establish the potential
for confusion. 
The State objected to the presentation of all three witnesses and the trial court
permitted voir dire of Charlotte and Sanchez.  Charlotte proposed to testify that
Kiser was often mistaken for one of his brothers or cousins.  She indicated that this
was because his relatives often used Kiser’s name when confronted by law
enforcement officials, especially because Kiser has a driver’s license and most of his
relatives do not.  More importantly, Charlotte described two incidents with the
police where Kiser was mistakenly identified as one of his family members.  In
addition,  Sanchez testified that he detained Kiser on a capias issued in his name by
the Family Court only to determine later that the capias was improperly issued in
5
Kiser’s name and that one of his relatives was the individual wanted.  Finally,
although Donald Kiser offered to testify, he indicated that he would invoke his Fifth
Amendment right not to incriminate himself if asked any questions other than his
name and relationship to the defendant.  
The trial court ruled that Kiser would not be permitted to present the testimony
of any of the three witnesses before the jury.  The court determined that the
testimony of Charlotte and Sanchez was not relevant because neither witness testified
to the factual basis for the misidentification.  Moreover, the court ruled that, even
if relevant, the testimony of Kiser’s mother and the bailiff created the danger of
confusing the issues or misleading the jury.  In addition, the trial  court ruled that
permitting Donald Kiser to testify would unfairly prejudice the State due to his
intention to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights if asked any questions other than his
name and relationship to Kiser and that such evidence would be cumulative because
two photographs of Donald Kiser were already in evidence.
II
Kiser asserts that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of
Charlotte and Sanchez.  Specifically, Kiser claims the trial court erred in
6
misconstruing Charlotte’s testimony when it determined  that there was no factual
basis for it.  Kiser argues that Sanchez’ testimony was relevant because it
corroborated the testimony of Charlotte by establishing that members of Kiser’s
family used his name, thereby causing misidentification of Kiser by law enforcement
officials.  Finally, Kiser contends the court erred in refusing to allow him to present
Donald Kiser as a witness because the probative value of such testimony was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the State.  The State
counters that Charlotte’s testimony was not relevant  because it did not involve
instances of prior misidentification by the two officers involved in this case and there
was no evidence presented to determine the basis for the mistakes.  Lastly, the State
asserts that Donald Kiser was properly excluded from testifying at trial because it
would have been denied effective cross-examination as a result of Donald Kiser’s
intention to assert his Fifth Amendment rights. 
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude otherwise legal evidence is
reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion.  See Williamson v. State, Del.
Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 354 (1999); Farmer v. State, Del. Supr., 698 A.2d 946, 948
(1997).  We also review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to
exclude relevant evidence under Delaware Rule of Evidence (“DRE”) 403.  See
7
Pope v. State, Del. Supr., 632 A.2d 73, 78-79 (1993); Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. v.
Norman Gershman’s Things to Wear, Inc., Del. Supr., 596 A.2d 1358, 1366 (1991).
 "An abuse of discretion occurs when 'a court has ... exceeded the bounds of reason
in view of the circumstances,' [or] ... so ignored recognized rules of law or practice
... to produce injustice."  Lilly v. State, Del. Supr., 649 A.2d 1055, 1059
(1994)(quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 567,
570 (1988)).  To constitute reversible error, there must be a clear abuse of
discretion.  See Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 600 A.2d 356, 360 (1991).  
Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable than it would be without the evidence.”  DRE 401. All relevant evidence
is admissible at trial unless excluded by rule or statute.  See DRE 402.  Pursuant to
DRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded at trial “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of ... confusion of the issues or misleading
the jury.”  
Generally, the purpose for which evidence is offered must be examined to
determine whether the evidence is relevant.  See Farmer, 698 A.2d at 948.  In order
to be considered relevant, the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
8
material and probative.  See Lilly, 649 A.2d at 1060.  Evidence is material to the
action if the fact that the evidence is offered to prove is “of consequence to the
action.”  Farmer, 698 A.2d at 948; see also Getz v. State, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d
726, 731(1988)(“Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which
the evidence is offered and the issues, or ultimate facts, in the case.”).  Evidence has
probative value if it “advance[s] the likelihood of the fact asserted.”  Farmer, 698
A.2d at 948; see also Getz, 538 A.2d at 731(“Probative value is concerned with the
tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.”).
Therefore, to be admissible, the fact sought to be established by the evidence must
be “of consequence” to the action and the evidence offered to prove that fact must
further “the probability that it is as a party claims it to be....”  Getz, 538 A.2d at
731.  
Here, Kiser sought to establish — through the testimony of Charlotte,
Sanchez, and Donald Kiser — that the officers mistakenly identified Kiser as the
individual from whom they purchased crack cocaine.  Where a defendant in a
criminal case claims he or she was not the one who committed the crime, a central
issue, or ultimate fact, necessarily becomes the identity of the perpetrator.  Whether
the officers were mistaken in their identification of Kiser, as Kiser claims, is not only
9
a material issue but also the core defense in this case.  The question then becomes
whether the disputed evidence offered to establish this fact had probative value.  The
testimonial value of each witness must be separately addressed.
 
A.  Goldie Charlotte
Kiser sought to have Charlotte testify concerning two events where Kiser was
mistaken for one of his relatives.  During voir dire, Charlotte testified that, on one
occasion, she was a passenger in an automobile driven by Kiser when a Dover police
officer stopped the vehicle.  Charlotte stated that the officer insisted that Kiser was
his brother, Lamar Kiser.  According to Charlotte, Kiser informed the police that he
was Lamont Kiser and the officer responded that he believed he was Lamar Kiser.
Charlotte specifically stated that the officer “said that [Lamont] was Lamar Kiser.
They claimed they knew him.”  Then, in response to the trial judge’s question
whether Charlotte heard the officer say anything she stated “They called him Lamar
... he told him he was Lamar Kiser, because he knew him.”  Charlotte testified that
she and Kiser were detained for some time while the officer verified, through
conferring with another officer and looking at photographs, that Kiser was not his
brother Lamar.  Finally, Charlotte stated that the car was insured, registered and that
10
the tags were in order.  The second incident of misidentification testified to by
Charlotte involved the Delaware State Police at Troop 3, the same agency that
arrested Kiser on the charges brought against him in the present case.  Charlotte
stated that she had to go to Troop 3 to inform the police that it was one of Kiser’s
cousins, and not Kiser, that the police were searching for in connection with a
particular investigation. 
The trial court ruled that Charlotte’s testimony concerning the stop was
inadmissible because there was no foundation to establish the officer’s basis for the
misidentification.  On this ground, the court concluded that the testimony was not
relevant.  Specifically, the court stated: 
We don’t know what precipitated the stop, whether it was a driver’s
license tag that was in the computer or whether it was the police officer
just observing them.  I don’t recall the police officer saying ‘I know
who you are, I have seen you, you are Lamar’, I don’t recall that
testimony.  
In addition, the trial court ruled that Charlotte’s testimony regarding the second
incident of misidentification was not relevant because it was unclear as to why the
police were searching for Kiser.  The court held that to the extent the testimony
regarding either incident was relevant, it “would be outweighed by the danger of
confusing the jury and the issues.”  
3  This evidence is especially relevant in light of Kiser’s subsequent testimony about the
incident.  It is apparent from Kiser’s testimony that the source of the police confusion was the
resemblance between Kiser and his cousin. During direct examination, Kiser stated that the police
had mistaken him for his cousin who was suspected of stealing a car.  Kiser testified that his
cousin “stole a car one time and the cop didn’t catch him, but he seen him running from the car,
and he thought it was me.”  Kiser further testified that he and Charlotte “had to go down there
to Troop 3 and get it straightened out, and I had to have the cop look at me and got straight from
there.” 
11
It is evident the trial court did not accurately recall the testimony concerning
the stop and the State so concedes.  The record indicates that Charlotte specifically
stated that the officer stopped the vehicle because he believed the driver was Lamar
Kiser.  Contrary to the trial court’s comments, there were sufficient factual grounds
for determining the basis for the stop.  The evidence of misidentification on that
occasion had probative value in this case because it makes it more probable that the
police could have mistaken Kiser for someone else.  Furthermore, the testimony
regarding the mixup with Troop 3 should have been admitted because it shows that
law enforcement officials had mistaken him for one of his relatives in the past.3  In
connection with the other evidence of misidentification, this testimony makes it more
probable, however slight the level of probability, that Kiser was misidentified in this
case. It is not necessary, as the State claims, that the misidentification evidence relate
to instances where the officers in the present case mistook Kiser for someone else.
It is sufficient if the evidence establishes that the fact sought to be proven, here the
12
claim of misidentification, is more probable when supported by the proffered
evidence than it would be without it.  See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 185 (5th
ed. 1999).  To be sure, the strength of probability that this evidence of prior
misidentification supports a claim of present misidentification is arguable but that
contention affects the weight not the admissibility of the disputed testimony. 
Finally, we find that Charlotte’s testimony should not have been excluded
under DRE 403.  In the first instance, it appears the trial judge applied the wrong
standard when he ruled the testimony was inadmissable because it was “outweighed
by the danger of confusing the jury and the issues.”  Rule 403 requires the probative
value of relevant evidence to be “substantially outweighed” by the danger of
confusing the issues or misleading the jury.  Moreover, because Kiser’s defense was
based on his claim of misidentification, relevant misidentification evidence is highly
probative of a material issue in the case. Where misidentification is the sole defense
at trial, excluding relevant evidence pertaining to misidentification constitutes an
abuse of discretion.  Thus, we conclude  the Superior Court erred in refusing to
permit this testimony.  
13
B.  Joseph Sanchez
To further support his defense of misidentification, Kiser sought to call
Sanchez, a Superior Court bailiff, to testify at trial.  During voir dire, Sanchez stated
that as Kiser was leaving the court following a pretrial matter, Sanchez detained him
because there was an outstanding capias issued by the Family Court in the name of
Lamont Kiser.  Sanchez stated that the basis for detaining Kiser was solely the name
on the capias. When confronted, Kiser insisted that it was a mistake.  Sanchez
escorted Kiser to the Sheriff’s office to determine if he was in fact wanted on the
capias.  The capias contained Kiser’s name and pertinent information.  The physical
description, however, indicated that the individual wanted on the capias had
discoloration on his right hand.  Because Kiser did not have any discoloration on his
right hand, he was released. 
The trial court ruled that Sanchez’ testimony was not relevant because there
was no basis for determining the circumstances upon which the capias was issued.
The judge stated:
we don’t know why the Family Court issued the capias.  We don’t
know that it was issued on the basis of mistaken description or because
whoever they were looking for gave the defendant’s name and the
driver’s license number or something else to the Family Court.  So I
think Mr. Sanchez’ testimony would not be relevant in the case and
would in fact ... even if it were relevant, unduly confuse the jury, so I
14
am going to rule that he has no relevant testimony to offer.  
Sanchez’ testimony establishes, however, that a capias was issued by the
Family Court in Kiser’s name when, in fact, he was not the proper subject of the
capias.  Standing alone, this testimony is only marginally relevant on the issue of
misidentification because, as the trial court correctly noted, the basis for Kiser’s
detention was the fact that the capias was issued in his name.  This testimony,
however, supports the other evidence of past misidentifications offered by Kiser and
lends further weight to his contention that he had been mistakenly identified by law
enforcement officials as one of his relatives in the past.  As such, this evidence is
probative of whether Kiser was misidentified in this case.  In ruling this evidence
inadmissible under Rule 403, because it would“unduly confuse the jury,” the trial
judge again misstated the standard governing application of the rule of evidence by
failing to apply a substantial outweighing factor.  We conclude that, under these
circumstances, the testimony of Sanchez is relevant and should have been admitted.
C.  Donald Kiser
Finally, Kiser sought to call his brother, Donald Kiser.  Through separate
counsel, Donald Kiser indicated that he intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment
15
right not to incriminate himself if asked any questions concerning his involvement
in the activities at the Willow Grove open air drug market.  Kiser stated that he
planned to ask Donald Kiser two questions: (i) his name, and (ii) his relationship to
Kiser.  Kiser wished to place his brother before the jury to demonstrate the physical
similarities between the two individuals in an attempt to explain the potential for
misidentification.  
The trial court determined that the limited questioning of Donald Kiser should
be excluded for two reasons.  First, the court found the evidence was cumulative
because there were already two photographs of Donald Kiser in evidence.  Second,
the court ruled that the State would be unfairly prejudiced if Donald Kiser were
permitted to testify because the State would be unable to cross-examine him in an
effort to establish that there was no mistaken identification.  
Donald Kiser’s appearance and identification could lead the jury to infer that
he, and not his brother, was the individual who sold crack cocaine to the officers at
the Willow Grove drug market.  But his refusal to answer any questions other than
his name and relationship to Kiser, precluded the State from effectively cross-
examining him to dispel the inference that he was present at the time and place of
the sale of drugs to the undercover officers.  Cf. Farmer, 698 A.2d at 949.  Here,
4 In its brief, the State acknowledges that an alternative to having a third person take the
witness stand, where the identification or physical characteristics of a defendant in a criminal case
are at issue, is to have the person identified in court.  The in-court identification of the person as
an exhibit is subject to the usual rules of evidence.  The decision of the trial court to admit such
evidence is measured by an abuse of discretion standard.  In this case, an acceptable procedure
on remand would be to have the defendant’s mother identify Donald Kiser in the courtroom during
the course of her testimony about confusion.  See  People v. Diaz, N.Y. Supr., 445 N.Y.S.2d
888 (1981); accord State v. Kaiama, Haw. Supr.,  911 P.2d 735 (1996) and People v. Ward, Ill.
App. Ct., 550 N.E.2d 576 (1990).
16
the defense sought to restrict the State from conducting the cross-examination to
which it was clearly entitled.  The trial court did not err in refusing to permit the
defense to set the parameters for the State’s cross-examination.  Finally, because
there were already two photographs of Donald Kiser in evidence that were viewed
by the jury, it was not error for the trial judge to determine that the State would be
unduly prejudiced if Donald Kiser was permitted to testify.4
III
The claim of misidentification did not present a peripheral issue in this
case  —  it was the core of the defense.  Exclusion of such evidence deprived the
defendant of the opportunity to pursue his sole defense.  Under the circumstances,
the trial court’s rulings directed to prior misidentification constituted an abuse of
discretion  and must be reversed.
17
 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Superior Court is REVERSED
and the matter REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this opinion.