Title: Boulay v. Boulay
Citation: 393 A.2d 1339
Docket Number: 
State: Maine
Issuer: Maine Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 1978

Joan BOULAY v. Normand O. BOULAY. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. November 8, 1978. Rocheleau & Fournier by Ronald P. Lebel, Lewiston (orally), for plaintiff. Isaacson, Isaacson & Hark by Robert S. Hark, Lewiston (orally), for defendant. Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ. McKUSICK, Chief Justice. Defendant Normand O. Boulay and plaintiff Joan Boulay have appealed and cross-appealed, respectively, from a judgment of the Superior Court denying both plaintiff wife's claim and defendant husband's counterclaim for divorce. Both parties sought a divorce on the ground of cruel and abusive treatment.[1] *1340 After completing hearings extending over two days in June 1977, the presiding justice died without having rendered a decision. The case was taken over by a second justice, who both parties agreed should decide the case on the basis of the trial transcript. Had the parties not consented to this procedure, the second justice would have had no alternative to ordering a new trial. Cf. McKenney v. Wood, 108 Me. 335, 80 A. 837 (1911); Annot., "Successor Judge: Power to Decide Case," 22 A.L.R.3d 992 (1968). Rule 63, M.R.Civ.P., does not authorize a second justice to act, in absence of the consent of the parties, where the justice who heard the testimony died before announcing his decision. But "with the parties' consent [the second justice] may act in all respects as if he had heard the case."[2] 2 Field, McKusick and Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 63.3, p. 94 (2d ed. 1970). The second justice entered a judgment denying both parties' claims for divorce, concluding that neither had satisfied the applicable burden of proof rule that requires a showing both 1) that the other spouse was guilty of cruel and abusive conduct and 2) that such conduct caused the complaining spouse to suffer physical or mental injury, or that a continuation of the marriage would jeopardize that spouse's physical or mental health. Gruber v. Gruber, 161 Me. 289, 292, 211 A.2d 583 , 585 (1965). See also Husbands v. Husbands, Me., 239 A.2d 686 , 687 (1968); Dresser v. Dresser, Me., 225 A.2d 395 , 397 (1967). Under the procedural circumstances of this case, the normal standard of appellate review, the "clearly erroneous" test of Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., is inapplicable. "[W]here the trial judge decides a factual question on written evidence alone, [the Law Court] is as able as he to [be the] judge of credibility and so it will give no weight to his findings." 1 Field, McKusick and Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 52.8, p. 692 (2d ed. 1970). See Page v. Nissen, Me., 254 A.2d 592 , 594 (1969); In Re Will of Edwards, 161 Me. 141, 149, 210 A.2d 17 , 21 (1965); Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 160 Me. 22, 23, 197 A.2d 59 , 60 (1964). Having conducted our own independent review of the record in this case, we conclude that the justice below was correct. *1341 Neither spouse presented convincing evidence with regard to the second element of cruel and abusive treatment, requiring proof of actual or imminent mental or physical injury. In response to the leading question, "Are you feeling better since you have been separated?", the wife testified: "Yes. Everybody tells me I look good, and I'm OK." Similarly, the husband gave equivocal testimony regarding the alleged aggravation of an ulcer condition, conceding that he had been troubled by ulcers both before he met his wife in 1954 and since their separation. He also admitted that his drinking habits might be responsible for his ulcers. Such evidence falls short of the requisite proof of physical or mental injury. The Superior Court did not err in refusing to grant a divorce to either party on the ground of cruel and abusive treatment. The entry must be: Appeal and cross-appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. It is further ordered that the husband pay to the wife $550 for her counsel fees on the appeal and cross-appeal. Costs on the appeal and cross-appeal are also allowed to the wife. Case remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to enter an order for counsel fees allowed on appeal and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. POMEROY, J., did not sit.