Title: Dallaire v. Bank of Am., N.A.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 51PA13
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2014

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA10-796
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  1 March 2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
Buncombe County
Nos. 08 CRS 54104
BRUCE LEE GRIFFIN
09 CRS 126
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 11 February 2010 by
Judge Laura J. Bridges in Buncombe County Superior Court.  Heard in
the Court of Appeals 21 February 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State.
William B. Gibson, for defendant-appellant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendant 
Bruce 
Lee 
Griffin appeals from a judgment sentencing
him to a minimum term of 133 months and a maximum term of 169
months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department
of Correction based upon jury verdicts convicting him of failing to
appear on a felony and having attained the status of an habitual
felon.  On appeal, Defendant contends (1) that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss the failing to appear charge
for lack of sufficient evidence and (2) that his sentence, as
enhanced by his habitual felon status, constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment imposed in violation of his rights under the
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Eighth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
After careful consideration of Defendant’s challenges to his
conviction and sentence in light of the record and the applicable
law, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to any relief on
appeal.
I. Factual Background
A. Substantive Facts
Marcia Hipps, an administrative assistant in the Buncombe
County District Attorney’s Office, testified that her duties
included setting calendars for criminal sessions of the Superior
Court.  The types of calendars that she generates include
administrative setting calendars, motion and plea calendars, trial
calendars, and addendum or add-on calendars.  There is only one
motion and plea calendar for each week that Superior Court is in
session.  At the first calendar setting after a defendant has been
indicted by a grand jury, the assistant district attorney and
defense counsel responsible for that defendant’s case decide upon
future court dates for the case, including the dates upon which the
case will be placed on the motion and plea calendar.  At that
point, the assistant district attorney provides the court dates to
Ms. Hipps, who enters them into the computer for the purpose of
generating the relevant calendars.
Ms. Hipps places motion and plea calendars on the Internet one
week in advance of the scheduled court date.  In addition, she
sends copies of the calendars to the Clerk of Superior Court’s
office.  Printed copies of the calendars are kept in the offices of
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the Clerk of Superior Court, the Public Defender, and the District
Attorney.  Ms. Hipps does not personally contact the defendants
whose cases are listed on a calendar when they are represented by
counsel; rather, she only contacts a defendant directly when he or
she is not represented by counsel.
On occasion, Ms. Hipps attends the calendar call, at which the
prosecutor calls out the names of the defendants as they appear on
the calendar.  If a defendant fails to appear when his or her name
is called, the prosecutor will request the presiding judge to have
the bailiff call that person out.  In the event that such an event
occurs, Ms. Hipps then marks a copy of the calendar to indicate
that the defendant failed to appear.
On 4 April 2008, Defendant was released from custody after
being charged with aiding and abetting armed robbery by executing
an appearance bond in Case No. 08 CR 54104, which was then pending
in the Buncombe County District Court.  In order for Defendant to
make the $10,000.00 bond that had been set in that case, a member
of his family authorized the use of his or her home as collateral.
The bond document advises defendants that they must appear in court
or risk having the property used to secure their bond sold.
Defendant appeared in court in connection with his aiding and
abetting armed robbery case at least two times between the date
upon which he was released on bond and December 2008.
Defendant’s 
aiding 
and abetting armed robbery case appeared on
a motion and plea calendar in the Buncombe County Superior Court
for 8 December 2008.  The calendar designated Defendant’s case as
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Case No. 08 CRS 54104, indicating that Defendant’s case now had a
Superior Court designation.  This calendar, which was published a
week in advance of the court date, listed Defendant’s name, his
case number, the date and time at which court would be held, the
courtroom number, the name of the presiding judge, the name of the
assistant district attorney assigned to that session of court, and
the name of Defendant’s attorney.  Defendant appeared in court on
8 December 2008 with his attorney, Howard McGlohon.
Subsequently, 
Defendant’s 
aiding 
and 
abetting 
an 
armed 
robbery
case appeared on a motion and plea calendar in the Buncombe County
Superior Court for 5 January 2009.  The 5 January 2009 calendar was
printed and published one week in advance of the court date and
listed Defendant’s name and case number and indicated that he had
a pending felony charge.
Tracy Ballard, a courtroom clerk serving in the Buncombe
County Superior Court, testified that, in the event that a
defendant failed to appear and was “called and failed,” she would
make a notation and issue an order for the defendant’s arrest.  Ms.
Ballard stated that Defendant did not appear in the Buncombe County
Superior Court on 5 January 2009, so that notations were made
beside his name reading “CF” for “called and failed;” “OF” for
“order of forfeiture,” meaning that, since Defendant had posted a
bond and had failed to appear, his bond would be forfeited; and
“OA” for “order for arrest.”  The order for Defendant’s arrest was
issued on 9 January 2009.
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Deputy 
United 
States 
Marshal 
Forrest 
Howard 
arrested 
Defendant
pursuant to the warrant for arrest issued as a result of
Defendant’s failure to appear on 9 January 2009.  Defendant did not
act as if he was surprised to have been taken into custody.
B. Procedural Facts
On 4 March 2009, the Buncombe County grand jury returned bills
of indictment charging Defendant with failing to appear on a felony
and having attained habitual felon status.  The cases against
Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at
the 8 February 2010 session of the Buncombe County Superior Court.
At the close of the State’s evidence and again at the close of all
of the evidence, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the
failure to appear charge for lack of sufficient evidence.  On 10
February 2010, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the failure
to appear charge.  After the trial court accepted the jury’s
verdict, the issue of Defendant’s status as an habitual felon came
on for hearing.  At the conclusion of the State’s evidence,
Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the habitual felon
charge.  On 10 February 2010, the jury returned a verdict finding
that Defendant had attained the status of an habitual felon.  At
the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had
accumulated twelve prior record points and should be sentenced as
a Level IV offender.  Based upon these determinations, the trial
court sentenced Defendant to a minimum term of 133 months and a
maximum term of 169 months imprisonment in the custody of the North
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Carolina Department of Correction.  Defendant noted an appeal to
this Court from the trial court’s judgment.
-7-
II. Legal Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
First, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motions to dismiss the failure to appear charge on the grounds
that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support his
conviction.  We disagree.
In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of the evidence, “the trial court must decide
‘whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential
element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the
perpetrator of the offense.’”  State v. Davis, 130 N.C. App. 675,
678, 505 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1998) (quoting State v. Lynch, 327 N.C.
210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990)).  Substantial evidence can be
either direct or circumstantial and consists of “evidence from
which a rational finder of fact could find the fact to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (citing State v. Vause, 328 N.C.
231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)).  When considering such a
dismissal motion, all evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences which
may be drawn from that evidence.  Id. at 679, 505 S.E.2d at 141
(citing State v. Mitchell, 109 N.C. App. 222, 224, 426 S.E.2d 443,
444 (1993)).  “‘Any contradictions or discrepancies arising from
the evidence are properly left for the jury to resolve and do not
warrant dismissal.’”  Id. (quoting State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 36,
468 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1996)).
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-543 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a)
In addition to forfeiture imposed under
Part 2 of this Article, any person released
pursuant to this Article who willfully fails
to appear before any court or judicial
official as required is subject to the
criminal penalties set out in this section. 
(b)
A violation of this section is a Class I
felony if:
(1)
The violator was released in
connection with a felony charge
against him[.]
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-543 (2009).
Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss a charge
of felonious failure to appear, the State must
present 
substantial 
evidence: 
(1) 
the
defendant was released on bail pursuant to
Article 26 of the North Carolina General
Statutes in connection with a felony charge
against him or, pursuant to section 15A-536,
after conviction in the superior court; (2)
the defendant was required to appear before a
court or judicial official; (3) the defendant
did not appear as required; and (4) the
defendant’s failure to appear was willful.
State v. Messer, 145 N.C. App. 43, 47, 550 S.E.2d 802, 805 (citing
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-543), aff’d per curiam, 354 N.C. 567, 556
S.E.2d 293 (2001).  “‘Wilful’ as used in criminal statutes means
the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or
the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of
law.”  State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348, 349, 141 S.E.2d 473, 474
(1965).
In his brief, Defendant concedes that the State presented
substantial evidence of each of the first three elements of the
offense defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-943(b)(1).  Defendant
does, however, contend that the record does not support a
-9-
reasonable inference that he wilfully failed to appear.  In
advancing 
this 
contention, Defendant argues that the evidence fails
to show that he knew that he was supposed to appear in Buncombe
County Superior Court on 5 January 2009, whether by knowledge of
the published court calendar or by communication from his attorney,
and that the State’s evidence to the effect that he failed to
protest or act surprised at his 9 January 2009 arrest does not cure
this deficiency in the State’s evidence.  After reviewing the
evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the
State, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to
support a jury finding that Defendant wilfully failed to appear in
court.
According to the record evidence, Defendant was released from
custody on 4 April 2008 on a pending felony charge.  Defendant was
released under the terms of an appearance bond that required him to
appear in court or risk forfeiting the property that a relative put
up as collateral.  Defendant appeared in court on at least two
occasions between that date and 8 December 2008, when he appeared
in court on the same pending felony charge for a third time
accompanied by his attorney.  At the 8 December 2008 session, the
State’s evidence reflects that the prosecutor and Defendant’s
counsel would have discussed future court dates.  The case against
Defendant was calendared for 5 January 2009, having been published
one week earlier, on 29 December 2008.  The calendar for the 5
January 2009 session listed Defendant’s name and case number; was
published on the Internet for viewing by defendants, defense
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attorneys, and the general public; and was also made available in
the offices of the Clerk of Superior Court, the District Attorney,
and the Public Defender’s office.  Despite the availability of
multiple sources of information indicating that he was required to
appear in court on 5 January 2009, Defendant failed to appear on
that date or at any time between 5 January 2009 and his arrest on
9 January 2009.  We find that this evidence, taken in the light
most favorable to the State, was sufficient for a jury to conclude
that Defendant knew that he was required to appear in court in
connection with his pending felony charge on 5 January 2009 and
that his failure to appear on that date was wilful.  As a result,
we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s
dismissal motion.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Secondly, 
Defendant 
asserts that the sentence that he received
in this case violates the prohibition on the imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment set out in the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  According to
Defendant, his sentence for failure to appear, as enhanced based on
the jury’s finding concerning his status as an habitual felon, is
excessive and disproportionate to the offense for which he was
convicted.  Defendant did not object to his sentence on
constitutional grounds in the trial court; for that reason, this
issue was not properly preserved for appeal.  See State v. Cortes-
Serrano, 195 N.C. App. 644, 658, 673 S.E.2d 756, 765 (concluding
that Eighth Amendment arguments not raised at trial are not
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  Defendant filed a certiorari petition for the purpose of
1
attempting to obtain review of his cruel and unusual punishment
claim on the merits.  However, in attempting to utilize certiorari
in this fashion, Defendant fails to recognize that certiorari is an
alternative method for obtaining review of a trial court’s judgment
or decision, State v. Coleman, 181 N.C. App. 568, 572, 640 S.E.2d
784, 786, disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 571, 651 S.E.2d 223 (2007)
(stating that “a ‘writ of certiorari is used . . . as a substitute
for an appeal’” and holding that “the granting of a petition for
writ of certiorari does not alter the determination of when a case
becomes final”) (quoting State v. Moore, 210 N.C. 686, 690, 188
S.E. 421, 424 (1936) and citing State v. Hasty, 181 N.C. App. 144,
147, 639 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2007)), and not an alternative method for
avoiding the usual effect of a failure to preserve an issue in the
trial court.  As a result, we conclude that Defendant’s certiorari
petition should be denied.
adequately preserved for appellate review), disc. review denied,
363 N.C. 376, 679 S.E.2d 138 (2009).   In addition, this Court has
1
considered and rejected Defendant’s position with respect to this
exact issue in State v. Dammons, 159 N.C. App. 284, 298-99, 583
S.E.2d 606, 615, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 579, 589 S.E.2d 133
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 951, 158 L. Ed. 2d 382, 124 S. Ct.
1691 (2004).  In Dammons, this Court addressed the issue of whether
a Defendant sentenced for felonious failure to appear as an
habitual felon had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment
and determined that such a sentence was not excessive or grossly
disproportionate 
to 
the 
crime committed as a constitutional matter.
Id.As in Dammons, Defendant’s sentence in this case was properly
imposed given that the jury convicted Defendant of the substantive
offense with which he had been charged and found that he had
attained habitual felon status.  In light of the fact that binding
precedent establishes that Defendant is not entitled to relief on
this claim, we decline to review Defendant’s challenge to the
-12-
constitutionality of his sentence pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2.
Therefore, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to appellate
relief on the grounds that his sentence violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment set out in the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that
Defendant received a fair trial and sentencing proceeding that was
free from prejudicial error.  As a result, Defendant is not
entitled to appellate relief in this case.
NO ERROR.
Judges STEPHENS and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).