Title: Donohue v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 602, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FREDERICK B. DONOHUE, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 602, 2008 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 0703025024 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 31, 2009 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: May 5, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This fifth day of May 2009, upon consideration of the opening brief, 
the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Frederick Donohue, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  The 
State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of Donohue’s opening brief that his appeal is without 
merit. We agree.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Donohue was arrested in March 2007, 
for an incident of domestic violence involving his wife and two daughters. 
 
2
After his arrest, his daughters reported to authorities that Donohue had 
abused them sexually over the course of many years.  He was indicted on 
153 charges.  In October 2007, he pled no contest to one count of Rape in 
the Second Degree and two counts of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.  
He also pled guilty to one count each of Aggravated Menacing and Reckless 
Endangering in the First Degree.  The Superior Court sentenced Donohue, in 
accordance with his plea agreement, to seventy-two years at Level V 
imprisonment to be suspended after serving twenty-three years in prison for 
one year at Level IV home confinement and ten years of probation.  
Donohue did not appeal.  Instead, he filed a motion for postconviction relief 
in October 2008, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective, the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and his sentence was excessive.  The 
Superior Court denied his motion.  This appeal followed. 
(3) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Donohue contends that the 
Superior Court abused its discretion in denying postconviction relief.  
Donohue asserts that his guilty plea was involuntary because: (i) his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to investigate his case and prepare a defense; (ii) 
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and coerced him into pleading guilty; 
and (iii) the sentence imposed by the Superior Court was not the sentence 
 
3
Donohue agreed to; therefore, Donohue contends that the plea agreement 
must have been altered after he signed it. 
(4) 
This 
Court 
reviews 
the 
Superior 
Court’s 
denial 
of 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.1  To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the case of a guilty plea, a defendant 
must establish that (i) his trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted 
on going to trial.2  The defendant must set forth and substantiate concrete 
allegations of actual prejudice.3 Moreover, there is a “strong presumption” 
that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.4 
 (5) 
In this case, the Superior Court concluded that Donohue’s claim 
that his counsel was ineffective was wholly unsubstantiated and was 
contradicted by Donohue’s own sworn statements during the plea colloquy.  
The Court also concluded that Donohue’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
and coercion was procedurally barred because Donohue could have raised a 
claim on direct appeal but did not. Finally, the Superior Court concluded that 
                                                 
1 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
2 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-59 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 
(1985)).  See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
3 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
4
Donohue’s sentencing claim was not appropriate for a Rule 61 petition, but 
further stated that the claim failed on its merits because the sentence 
imposed by the Superior Court was the exact sentence the court discussed 
with Donohue on the record during the plea colloquy and the exact terms to 
which Donohue agreed to be sentenced.  
 (6) 
We agree.  During the plea colloquy, counsel reviewed the 
State’s evidence, which included the testimony of Donohue’s two daughters.  
Donohue acknowledged that he was pleading no contest to the three sexual 
offenses because he did not want to go to trial on the 139 counts of sexual 
offenses charged in the indictment and risk having a jury believe his 
daughters’ testimony.  He further acknowledged that he was pleading guilty 
to the remaining offenses because he, in fact, was guilty.  He also 
acknowledged that he had a history of depression for which he was treated 
with medication.  He stated that he only took the prescribed dosage and that 
the medication did not affect his ability to understand the plea proceeding.  
The Superior Court specifically found that Donohue was competent to enter 
a plea and that his plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
The trial court reviewed the sentence with Donohue, and Donohue 
acknowledged it was the sentence he agreed to in his plea form.  Donohue 
 
5
also stated under oath that no one had coerced him into entering a plea and 
that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. 
(7) 
Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of the Superior 
Court’s discretion in denying Donohue’s postconviction motion.  In the 
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Donohue is bound 
by the answers on his guilty plea form and his sworn statements to the judge 
during the plea colloquy.5    
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).