Title: Florida Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles v. George McLaughlin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-2394
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2330 
____________ 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY  
AND MOTOR VEHICLES, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WILLIAM HERNANDEZ,  
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2394 
____________ 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY  
AND MOTOR VEHICLES, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
GEORGE MCLAUGHLIN,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 9, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
The issue we address is whether an individual‟s driver‟s license can be 
suspended by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 
 
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(DHSMV) under section 322.2615, Florida Statutes (2006),1 for the refusal to 
submit to a test of his or her breath-alcohol level where the refusal is not incident 
to a lawful arrest and, if not, whether the hearing officer has authority to review 
whether the refusal was incident to a lawful arrest.2  In the cases under review, 
Hernandez v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 995 So. 2d 1077 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2008), and McLaughlin v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor 
Vehicles, 2 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), the First and Second District Courts of 
Appeal reached opposite conclusions as to the scope of the hearing officer‟s 
authority to review the suspension.3  The First District also certified the following 
questions of great public importance to this Court in Hernandez, 995 So. 2d at 
1080: 
Can the DHSMV suspend a driver‟s license for refusal to submit to a 
breath test, if the refusal is not incident to a lawful arrest?  If not, is 
DHSMV hearing officer required to address the lawfulness of the 
arrest as part of the review process? 
                                          
 
 
1.  Hernandez involved the 2007 version of the statute, and McLaughlin 
involved the 2006 version.  The current 2010 version of section 322.2615, Florida 
Statutes, is the same as the 2006 and 2007 versions for purposes of this decision.  
Section 322.2615 was minimally revised in 2007 and 2010.  See ch. 2010-223, § 
35, Laws of Fla.; ch. 2010-163, § 6, Laws of Fla.; ch. 2007-5, § 45, Laws of Fla.  
These changes have no bearing on this decision. 
 
2.  The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed an amicus 
brief in support of Respondent McLaughlin in Case No. SC08-2394.  
 
3.  These cases were consolidated for oral argument, and we now 
consolidate the cases for disposition. 
 
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We have jurisdiction based on express and direct conflict and based upon a 
certified question of great public importance.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const. 
Because the certified question involves two separate but related issues, we 
rephrase them and answer them separately.  The first certified question as 
rephrased is: 
Can the DHSMV suspend a driver‟s license under section 322.2615, 
Florida Statutes, for refusal to submit to a breath test if the refusal is 
not incident to a lawful arrest?  
The second certified question as rephrased is: 
 
Is the issue of whether the refusal was incident to a lawful arrest 
within the allowable scope of review of a DHSMV hearing officer in a 
proceeding to determine if sufficient cause exists to sustain the 
suspension of a driver‟s license under section 322.2615, Florida 
Statutes, for refusal to submit to a breath test? 
 
We agree with the First District in Hernandez, 995 So. 2d at 1079, and the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles 
v. Pelham, 979 So. 2d 304, 305-08 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), review denied, 984 So. 2d 
519 (Fla. 2008), that a suspension can be predicated upon a refusal to take a breath 
test, but only if the refusal is incident to a lawful arrest.  We further agree that the 
driver whose license is suspended should be able to challenge whether the refusal 
was incident to a lawful arrest in the proceedings before the hearing officer, who is 
reviewing the legality of the suspension.  We thus answer the first certified 
 
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question in the negative and the second certified question in the affirmative, 
approve Hernandez, approve of the reasoning in Pelham, and quash McLaughlin. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In Hernandez, William Hernandez challenged the suspension of his driver‟s 
license for refusal to submit to a breath test, asserting that the request for a breath 
test was not incident to a lawful arrest.  In the hearing to determine if the 
suspension should be sustained, the DHSMV hearing officer did not consider 
whether the request that Hernandez submit to a breath test was made incident to a 
lawful arrest.  Hernandez, 995 So. 2d at 1078.  Accordingly, the DHSMV 
sustained the suspension of the driver‟s license.  Upon petition for writ of certiorari 
to the circuit court, which is the authorized statutory route for review of a decision 
made by the DHSMV, see § 322.2615(13), Fla. Stat., the circuit court agreed that 
the legality of the arrest was outside of the scope of consideration for the hearing 
officer under section 322.2615(7), Florida Statutes (2007).  The First District, 
relying on the reasoning of the Fifth District in Pelham, concluded that section 
322.2615(7)(b), Florida Statutes, governing proceedings to review license 
suspensions must be read together with section 316.1932(1)(a)1.a., Florida Statutes 
(2007), Florida‟s implied consent law, because under the “statutory scheme, the 
lawfulness of the suspension is central to any determination that there is „sufficient 
 
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cause‟ to „sustain‟ ” the suspension.  Hernandez, 995 So. 2d 1079 (quoting Pelham, 
979 So. 2d at 308). 
 
The Second District in McLaughlin engaged in an opposite statutory 
analysis regarding the scope of the hearing officer‟s authority based on its 
determination that the plain language of section 322.2615(7)(b) limits the hearing 
officer‟s scope of review to the three specific determinations set forth in the 
statute, none of which includes consideration of whether the person was placed 
under lawful arrest.  McLaughlin, 2 So. 3d at 991-92.  The Second District in 
McLaughlin never specifically addressed whether the DHSMV could suspend a 
driver‟s license for refusal to submit to a breath test if the refusal was not incident 
to a lawful arrest. 
ANALYSIS 
Because the two rephrased certified questions present issues of statutory 
interpretation, our review is de novo.  Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 
189, 194 (Fla. 2007).  “Legislative intent guides statutory analysis, and to discern 
that intent we must look first to the language of the statute and its plain meaning.”  
Fla. Dep‟t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009).  In 
this regard, “legislative intent is determined primarily from the text” of the statute.  
Cont‟l Cas. Co. v. Ryan, Inc. E., 974 So. 2d 368, 374 (Fla. 2008). 
As this Court has previously announced: 
 
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When the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look 
behind the statute‟s plain language for legislative intent or resort to 
rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.  In such instance, the 
statute‟s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to 
an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent. 
Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1230-31 (Fla. 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Daniels v. Fla. Dep‟t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005)).  “However, if the 
statutory intent is unclear from the plain language of the statute, then „we apply 
rules of statutory construction and explore legislative history to determine 
legislative intent.‟ ”  Id. at 1231 (quoting BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 
863 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003)).  Among the basic principles of statutory 
construction is that statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read 
together, or in pari materia.  Fla. Dep‟t of State v. Martin, 916 So. 2d 763, 768 
(Fla. 2005) (“The doctrine of in pari materia is a principle of statutory construction 
that requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed 
together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature‟s intent.”). 
I.  Answering the First Rephrased Certified Question:  
The DHSMV cannot suspend a driver’s license under section 322.2615, 
Florida Statutes, for refusal to submit to a breath test if the refusal is not 
incident to a lawful arrest. 
Florida law does not require an individual to submit to a breath alcohol-
detection test simply because that person possesses a driver‟s license.  The 
obligation to submit to breath-alcohol testing emanates from section 316.1932, 
 
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Florida Statutes (2006),4 commonly known as the implied consent law.  See State 
v. Miles, 775 So. 2d 950, 952 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing section 316.1932, Florida 
Statutes, as part of Florida‟s “implied consent law”).5  The statute provides that any 
person driving within Florida is deemed to have consented to testing to determine 
“the alcoholic content of his or her blood or breath if the person is lawfully arrested 
for any offense allegedly committed while the person was driving or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic 
beverages.”  § 316.1932(1)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  The statute further 
provides that the test “must be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at the 
request of a law enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe such 
person was driving or was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle within 
this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, the Legislature has authorized the administration of a breath test only 
if it is incident to a lawful arrest and based on probable cause to believe that the 
person driving was under the influence of alcoholic beverages.  As stated by the 
Fifth District in Pelham, 979 So. 2d at 306, “It necessarily follows that an 
                                          
 
 
4.  The current 2010 version of section 316.1932, Florida Statutes, remains 
unchanged from the 2006 version. 
 
5.  There is a separate statute that requires an individual under the age of 21 
to submit to a breath test if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe 
that the individual is driving under the influence, which provides for its own 
separate scheme of license procedures and review by a hearing officer.  See § 
322.2616, Fla. Stat. (2010).  That statute is not before us in this case. 
 
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individual does not violate the Implied Consent Law when he or she refuses to take 
a test that is not incidental to a lawful arrest.” 
Further, under the implied consent law, the person must be advised of the 
punishment for refusing to submit to a test: 
The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to any lawful 
test of his or her breath will result in the suspension of the person‟s 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 1 year for a first 
refusal, or for a period of 18 months if the driving privilege of such 
person has been previously suspended as a result of a refusal to submit 
to such a test or tests, and shall also be told that if he or she refuses to 
submit to a lawful test of his or her breath and his or her driving 
privilege has been previously suspended for a prior refusal to submit 
to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, he or she commits 
a misdemeanor in addition to any other penalties. 
§ 316.1932(1)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). 
Section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, the statute before us in this case 
governing the suspension of an individual‟s driver‟s license and the right to review 
of such a suspension, authorizes a law enforcement officer, on behalf of the 
DHSMV, to suspend the driver‟s license of any person who refuses to submit to a 
“lawful” breath test.  § 322.2615(1)(b)1.a., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  
Specifically, the statute requires that a notice of suspension be sent to the driver to 
inform him or her as follows: 
The driver refused to submit to a lawful breath, blood, or urine test 
and his or her driving privilege is suspended for a period of 1 year for 
a first refusal or for a period of 18 months if his or her driving 
privilege has been previously suspended as a result of a refusal to 
submit to such a test . . . . 
 
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Id. (emphasis added).  Despite using the adjective “lawful” in section 322.2615, 
nowhere in that section does the Legislature define or provide notice as to what 
constitutes a lawful breath-alcohol test.  The only location in the Florida Statutes 
where the definition can be found is section 316.1932(1)(a), which provides that a 
driver is only required to submit to an breath-alcohol test if the driver is (1) 
operating a motor vehicle within this state and (2) subject to a lawful arrest for (3) 
an offense allegedly committed while driving or in the actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.  Nowhere else 
does the Legislature mandate the circumstances under which an individual must 
submit to a breath-alcohol test or else face suspension of his or her driver‟s license 
under section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, in this context.6 
 
The only definition of a lawful breath test under section 322.2615 is found in 
section 316.1932(1)(a).  For that reason, the statutes must be read in pari materia.  
In other words, section 316.1932 is the only statute that defines the parameters of a 
lawful breath-alcohol test in section 322.2615.  If the statutes are not read in pari 
materia, then there is no notice as to when citizens are required to submit to the test 
or else face suspension of their driver‟s licenses.  Accordingly, we hold that a 
                                          
 
 
6.  We do not address sections 322.63 and 322.64, Florida Statutes (2010) 
(pertaining to commercial motor vehicles). 
 
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“lawful test” under section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, is one that is requested 
incident to a lawful arrest, as specified in section 316.1932, Florida Statutes. 
For this reason, we conclude that the DHSMV cannot suspend a driver‟s 
license under section 322.2615 for refusal to submit to a breath test under section 
316.1932 if the refusal is not incident to a lawful arrest.  Thus, we answer the first 
rephrased certified question in the negative. 
II.  Answering the Second Rephrased Certified Question  
and Resolving the Certified Conflict:  
The issue of whether the refusal was incident to a lawful arrest is within the 
allowable scope of review of a DHSMV hearing officer in a proceeding to 
determine if sufficient cause exists to sustain the suspension of a driver’s 
license under section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, for refusal to submit to a 
breath-alcohol test. 
This second question is related to the first question and concerns the method 
of challenging a suspension for refusal to submit to a breath test.  After an 
individual‟s driver‟s license is suspended under section 322.2615 for refusing to 
submit to a breath test under section 316.1932, that section entitles the driver to 
request a formal or informal review of the validity of the suspension.  § 
322.2615(1)(b)3., Fla. Stat.; see also §§ 322.2615(4), (6), Fla. Stat.  The statute 
defines what the hearing officer may review in either a formal or informal review 
hearing: 
(7) In a formal review hearing under subsection (6) or an 
informal review hearing under subsection (4), the hearing officer shall 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether sufficient 
 
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cause exists to sustain, amend, or invalidate the suspension.  The 
scope of the review shall be limited to the following issues: 
 
. . . . 
(b) If the license was suspended for refusal to submit to a 
breath, blood, or urine test: 
1. Whether the law enforcement officer had probable cause to 
believe that the person whose license was suspended was driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while under the 
influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances. 
2. Whether the person whose license was suspended refused to 
submit to any such test after being requested to do so by a law 
enforcement officer or correctional officer. 
3. Whether the person whose license was suspended was told 
that if he or she refused to submit to such test his or her privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for a period of 1 year or, 
in the case of a second or subsequent refusal, for a period of 18 
months. 
 
§ 322.2615(7), Fla. Stat. 
In the prior version of the statute, the hearing officer‟s scope of review 
included consideration of the additional issue of “[w]hether the person was placed 
under lawful arrest for a violation of s. 316.193.”  § 322.2615(7)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2005), amended by ch. 2006-290, § 45, Laws of Fla.  Because the Legislature 
deleted this statutory language and made other deletions in the amended statute, the 
DHSMV contends that the issue of whether a person was placed under a lawful 
arrest is no longer a consideration in the suspension process. 
As noted by the circuit court in McLaughlin, although the Legislature‟s 
removal of the “lawful arrest” requirement from section 322.2615(7) may seem 
clear, the Legislature left that requirement in the implied consent law.  McLaughlin 
 
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v. Fla. Dep‟t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, No. 2007-CA-001672, order at 
4 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. Sept. 18, 2007) (order denying petition for writ of certiorari) 
(stating that the Legislature had created an “unnerving quagmire”).  We agree with 
the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal that section 322.2615 cannot be read 
in isolation but must be read in concert with section 316.1932, which defines the 
scope of the driver‟s obligation to submit to a breath test.  As the Fifth District 
cogently explained: 
Section 322.2615 does not establish any obligation on the part 
of a driver to take a test upon the request of law enforcement; it only 
establishes consequences for refusal.  Section 316.1932 is what 
creates and defines the scope of the obligation, and its mandate is 
certain: the test must be incident to a lawful arrest.  These statutes 
cannot be construed in isolation, therefore, as Petitioner urges, 
because they are interdependent.  Instead, we must consider them in 
pari materia.  See Ferguson v. State, 377 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 1979) 
(basic rule of statutory construction that statutes which relate to the 
same or to a closely related subject or object are regarded as in pari 
materia and should be construed together and compared with each 
other).  When we do, the conclusion is inescapable that a suspension 
may not be predicated on refusal to take a test that is the product of a 
unlawful arrest. 
Pelham, 979 So. 2d at 307 (emphasis added). 
 
We further agree with the statutory construction analysis utilized by the Fifth 
District in construing section 322.2615(7): 
Nor have we overlooked the language of subsection 
322.2615(7), which purports to “limit” the scope of review to three 
issues.  The first issue, probable cause, is a concept that is often 
inextricably intertwined with the lawfulness of the detention as it is in 
this case.  The second issue directs the hearing officer to address 
 
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whether the driver “refused to submit to any such test.”  (Emphasis 
added).  § 322.2615(7)(b)2., Fla. Stat.  We construe “any such test” to 
refer to the “lawful” test that the suspension must be “pursuant to.”  
The final issue, the provision of notice, relates to the form of notice 
mandated by the same statute, which too refers to a “lawful” test.  
Therefore, we do not construe this so-called limitation on the hearing 
officer‟s scope of review to nullify the statute‟s directive that the 
hearing officer “determine . . . whether sufficient cause exists to 
sustain, amend, or invalidate the suspension.”  § 322.2615(7), Fla. 
Stat. (2007).  Under the statutory scheme, the lawfulness of the 
suspension is central to any determination that there is “sufficient 
cause” to “sustain” it. 
Id. at 307-08 (citation omitted). 
To fail to read these related statutes together would also have serious 
constitutional implications.  A driver whose license is unlawfully suspended must 
have a means to challenge that suspension, and the only means by which a driver 
can challenge the suspension of his or her driver‟s license for failure to submit to a 
breath test is through section 322.2615. 
Whether denominated a “right” or a “privilege,” the loss of a driver‟s license 
is most definitely an extreme hardship.  In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 
(1971), the United States Supreme Court stated: “Once licenses are issued . . . their 
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.”  In the 
almost forty years since Bell was decided, driving has become an increasingly 
important part of American life and a near necessity in obtaining and maintaining 
employment.  The Bell Court explained: 
 
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Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that 
adjudicates important interests of the licensees.  In such cases the 
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.  This is but an application of 
the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state 
power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is 
denominated a “right” or a “privilege.” 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
With regard to due process rights, in N.C. v. Anderson, 882 So. 2d 990, 993  
(Fla. 2004), this Court stated: 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law.”  This same protection is 
provided in the Florida Constitution.  See Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.  
“Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment 
through the proper administration of justice where substantive rights 
are at issue.”  Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 
So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991).  Procedural due process requires 
both reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  See 
id.  The notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.  The 
notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required 
information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested 
to make their appearance.”  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Here, the interpretation of the statutes urged by DHSMV 
would allow the DHSMV to suspend a driver‟s license without reasonable notice 
and no possibility of a meaningful process to review the lawfulness of the 
suspension. 
 
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A reading of section 322.2615 to prohibit review of an unlawful license 
suspension would lead to an unreasonable result that would render the statutory 
scheme constitutionally infirm.  We have held that “[s]tatutes, as a rule, „will not 
be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.‟ ”  State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 
1371, 1373 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 
1986)).  Further, “[t]his Court has an obligation to give a statute a constitutional 
construction where such a construction is possible.”  Tyne v. Time Warner Entm‟t 
Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 810 (Fla. 2005).  We conclude that the only reading of the 
statute that avoids an unreasonable and unconstitutional result is to construe 
sections 322.2615 and 322.1932 in pari materia and allow the hearing officer to 
review whether the test was administered incident to a lawful arrest. 
We conclude, as did the First and Fifth Districts, that reading the two 
statutes together leads to the conclusion that there must be a means for challenging 
the legality of the suspension when the request for a breath test was not incident to 
a lawful arrest.  Once section 322.2615 and section 316.1932 are read together, it 
becomes clear that under the statutory scheme, “sufficient cause” to sustain the 
suspension under section 322.2615(7) and “whether the person whose license was 
suspended refused to submit to any such test” require that the hearing officer make 
the determination of whether the test was administered incident to a lawful arrest, 
as required by section 316.1932, Florida Statutes. 
 
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Accordingly, we answer the second rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative.  Because the Legislature has mandated that an individual need only 
consent to a test under section 316.1932 if the test is administered incident to a 
lawful arrest and has provided the procedure for challenging a suspension for a 
refusal, an individual must be able to challenge the legality of the suspension if the 
refusal was not incident to a lawful arrest.  To read the statute otherwise would 
produce an unreasonable—and unconstitutional—result. 
The dissent contends that licensed drivers are chargeable with knowledge of 
the laws and that the lawfulness of a suspension will be upheld without regard to 
whether the suspension was incident to a lawful arrest.  However, the dissent 
overlooks the fact that a driver is on notice that he or she must consent to a breath 
test or else face suspension of his or her driver‟s license only if the test is 
administered incident to a lawful arrest.  That is what the Legislature has expressly 
provided for in section 316.1932.  To remove that consideration from the hearing 
officer‟s review would allow illegal suspensions without any possibility of a 
meaningful process to challenge the legality of the suspension.  Under the dissent‟s 
view, an illegal suspension that is contrary to the implied consent statute would be 
automatically upheld.   
The dissent also asserts that our reading of the statute abrogates legislative 
intent.  To the contrary, such a reading is necessary in order to save the legislative 
 
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scheme from constitutional infirmity and the unreasonable result that while a driver 
need only submit to a breath test incident to a lawful arrest, the absence of that 
legislatively imposed requirement cannot be challenged.  Under the dissent‟s view, 
police may suspend an individual‟s driver‟s license on a whim without following 
the requirements of law set forth by the Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we answer the first rephrased certified question in 
the negative and hold that the DHSMV cannot suspend a driver‟s license for 
refusal to submit to a breath test if the refusal is not incident to a lawful arrest.  We 
answer the second rephrased certified question in the affirmative and hold that the 
issue of whether the refusal was incident to a lawful arrest is within the allowable 
scope of review of the DHSMV hearing officer.  Accordingly, we quash the 
decision of the Second District in McLaughlin.  We approve the decision of the 
First District in Hernandez and the reasoning of the Fifth District in Pelham. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS,  and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON and LABARGA, 
JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
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QUINCE, J., concurring in result only. 
 
 
I concur in the result here because to do otherwise would leave the 
respondents in the untenable position of having a right with no remedy.  It is 
unmistakably clear to me that a person‟s privilege to drive on the highways of this 
State can only be taken away if he refuses a test of his blood alcohol level and that 
refusal is incident to a lawful arrest.  In other words, a driver‟s license cannot 
lawfully be suspended unless the request to take the test and the refusal are 
incident to a lawful arrest.  In situations, such as the ones before us, where there 
has been no opportunity to judicially test the lawfulness of the arrest and the 
hearing officer cannot inquire into that issue, a person‟s license will nonetheless be 
suspended without the critical issue of lawful arrest having ever been determined.  
Thus, I agree that the driver must have an opportunity to challenge the issue prior 
to suspension of his license. 
 
However, I cannot concur in the majority‟s statutory construction that the 
hearing officer is statutorily authorized to determine the lawfulness of the arrest.  
But I acknowledge that there must be a mechanism by which a driver can 
challenge the lawfulness of the arrest.  Without such a method, the statutory 
scheme would be unconstitutional. 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
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I would adopt the reasoning of the Second District in McLaughlin v. 
Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 2 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008), and accordingly answer the rephrased first certified question in the 
affirmative and the second rephrased certified question in the negative.  The 
contrary view adopted by the majority here effectively rewrites the text of section 
322.2615(7), Florida Statutes (2006), to expand the scope of the hearing officer‟s 
review beyond the ambit unequivocally laid down in the statute. 
 
The other statutory provisions relied upon by the majority were adopted by 
the Legislature prior to the adoption of chapter 2006-290, section 45, Laws of 
Florida, which removed from the hearing officer‟s scope of review the issue of 
whether the license holder “was placed under lawful arrest for a violation of s. 
316.193.”  “[W]hen two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute 
should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent.”  McKendry v. State, 641 
So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994). 
 
Section 322.2615(7) expressly limits the issues which may be considered by 
the hearing officer in a proceeding challenging an administrative suspension.  The 
majority transgresses the limits set forth in the text by reading back into section 
322.2615(7) the provision repealed by the Legislature in 2006 which permitted the 
hearing officer to consider whether the suspension was incident to a “lawful arrest 
 
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for a violation of s. 316.193.”  A more direct abrogation of legislative intent is hard 
to imagine. 
 
In analyzing the issue of constitutionality—an issue not addressed in either 
of the decisions on review—the majority fails to acknowledge that with the 
adoption of chapter 2006-290, section 45, Laws of Florida, the Legislature clearly 
provided that an administrative suspension may not be invalidated on the ground 
that the license holder had not been “placed under lawful arrest for a violation of s. 
316.193.”  Contrary to the majority‟s reasoning, the legislative limitation of the 
grounds for challenging an administrative suspension does not result in authorizing 
the Department “to suspend a driver‟s license without reasonable notice and no 
possibility of meaningful process to review the lawfulness of the suspension.”  
Majority op. at 14.  Licensed drivers are chargeable with knowledge of the laws 
promulgated by the Legislature.  They are therefore on notice of the limited 
grounds for challenging an administrative suspension and that the lawfulness of a 
suspension will be upheld without regard to whether the suspension was incident to 
a lawful arrest for a violation of section 316.193. 
 
The majority fails to explain why procedural due process precludes the 
Legislature from restricting the substantive grounds on which an administrative 
suspension may be invalidated.  Neither the respondents nor the majority have 
provided any basis for concluding that it is unconstitutional for the Legislature to 
 
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authorize administrative suspension of a license when the license holder has not 
been subjected to a lawful arrest for a violation of section 316.193. 
POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
Case No. SC 08-2330: 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D08-1424 
 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Robin F. Lotane, General Counsel, Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles and Douglas D. Sunshine, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, 
Florida, and Heather Rose Cramer, Assistant General Counsel, Lake Worth, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Susan Z. Cohen and David M. Robbins, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
Case No. SC08-2394 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-4891 
 
 
(Polk County) 
 
Robin F. Lotane, General Counsel, Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles and Douglas D. Sunshine, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, 
 
- 22 - 
Florida, and Heather Rose Cramer, Assistant General Counsel, Lake Worth, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Tony C. Dodds, Lakeland, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Michael Ufferman, Chair, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
as Amicus Curiae