Title: Manassas Autocars v. Couch
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 061458
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2007

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MANASSAS AUTOCARS, INC., 
T/A MANASSAS CHRYSLER 
 
v.  Record No. 061458     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 8, 2007 
DANIEL T. COUCH, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Rossie D. Alston, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the trial court erred 
in interpreting a regulation promulgated pursuant to Code 
§ 46.2-1581(12)(a), and in submitting to the jury claims under 
the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Code § 59.1-196 et seq. 
(the VCPA) and the revocation of acceptance statute, Code 
§ 8.2-608. 
 
Manassas Autocars, Inc., t/a Manassas Chrysler (Manassas) 
is an automobile dealer licensed by the Virginia Motor Vehicle 
Board.  In February 2004, Daniel T. and Crystal L. Couch (the 
Couches) went to Manassas' showroom in response to a newspaper 
advertisement for a Chrysler Town & Country Touring minivan.  
The advertisement contained a picture of the minivan and 
listed a stock number, the principal equipment of the vehicle, 
and the sales price.  Upon arriving at the dealership, the 
Couches were told that the minivan in the advertisement was 
not available because it had already been sold.  The Manassas 
salesperson offered the Couches a Town & Country LX model 
minivan for a price slightly higher than the Touring model 
 
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featured in the advertisement.  The Couches ultimately agreed 
to purchase a new red LX model minivan.  Manassas did not have 
a red LX model in stock but arranged to have one delivered 
from another dealership that day. 
The Couches returned to the dealership a few hours later 
to pick up the LX model.  While waiting for the vehicle to be 
cleaned, they filled out the purchase and financing agreements 
and made a $2,000 down payment.  When the Couches saw the 
minivan, they noticed a grey circular "splotch" approximately 
seven to eight inches in diameter with a "drip" mark streaking 
three to four inches down to the wheel well of the passenger 
side rear panel.  The Manassas salesperson told the Couches to 
make an appointment to bring the vehicle back and Manassas' 
detailer would remove the stain.  The Couches made the 
appointment and drove the vehicle home. 
Over the next few weeks, Manassas tried unsuccessfully to 
remove the stain.  Ultimately Manassas repainted the area 
affected by the stain without telling the Couches or getting 
their permission to do so.  The Couches subsequently attempted 
to return the vehicle to Manassas, stating that they had 
purchased a new vehicle, not a repainted vehicle.  Manassas 
refused to accept the repainted vehicle on the ground that 
title to the vehicle had passed. 
 
3
 
The Couches subsequently notified Manassas by letter that 
they were revoking acceptance of the vehicle, and returned the 
vehicle to Manassas, but Manassas had it towed back to the 
Couches' residence.1  At that point, the vehicle had been 
driven approximately 1,100 miles.  
 
The Couches filed an amended motion for judgment against 
Manassas claiming that they properly revoked acceptance of the 
vehicle under Code § 8.2-608, and had suffered monetary 
damages as a result of the revocation.  They also claimed that 
the use of the stock number in the advertisement of the Town & 
Country Touring vehicle, without any indication of limited 
availability, was a deceptive practice under Code § 46.2-
1581(12)(a) and, because the advertisement related to a 
consumer transaction, it violated Code § 59.1-200(A)(8) of the 
VCPA.2 
 
Manassas responded to the Couches' VCPA claim by citing a 
regulation adopted by the Motor Vehicle Board, 24 VAC § 22-30-
30(L), ("the regulation") which, according to Manassas, 
permits an advertisement for new vehicles to list such 
vehicles by stock number as "one means of satisfactorily 
                     
1 The Couches also notified Suntrust Bank (Suntrust), the 
lender for the purchase, of the revocation.  Suntrust 
eventually repossessed the vehicle. 
2 The amended motion for judgment contained additional 
claims which are not at issue in this appeal, including claims 
against Suntrust, which was eventually dismissed as a party. 
 
4
disclosing a limitation of availability." Manassas argued that 
the advertisement complied with the regulation and, because 
acts "authorized under laws or regulations of this 
Commonwealth" are excluded from the VCPA under Code § 59.1-
199(A), the Couches could not pursue a claim under the VCPA 
based on the advertisement. 
 
At trial, Manassas sought to introduce the regulation as 
evidence that the advertisement containing the stock number 
was permissible.  The trial court refused to admit the 
regulation, ruling that it was inconsistent with Code § 46.2-
1581(12)(a), and that statutes prevail over regulations in the 
event of a conflict.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the Couches, awarding damages of $3,993 on the revocation 
claim and $2,375 on the VCPA claim.  The VCPA damages were 
increased to $7,125 because the jury found the violation 
"willful" under Code § 59.1-204(A).  Manassas appeals. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
The VCPA claim 
Manassas seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling that 
the regulation was inconsistent with Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a), 
and that Manassas therefore could not introduce the regulation 
or argue that compliance with the regulation was a defense to 
the Couches' claim of deceptive advertising.  Manassas also 
complains that the trial court erred in allowing the Couches 
 
5
to maintain an action under the VCPA based on a violation of 
Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a). 
 
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' 
statements that regulations of state agencies such as the 
Motor Vehicle Board have the force of law, Sargent Electric 
Co. v. Woodall, 228 Va. 419, 424, 323 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1984), 
and that an agency's interpretation of its governing statutes, 
as reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight.  
Commonwealth v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary, 202  
Va. 13, 19, 116 S.E.2d 44, 48 (1960).  Regulations, however, 
may not conflict with the authorizing statute.  Judicial 
Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 115, 630 
S.E.2d 485, 494 (2006).  Whether a regulation is inconsistent 
with its enabling legislation is properly a subject of 
judicial review.  See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Dep't of 
Taxation, 268 Va. 289, 292-95, 602 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 
(2004)(holding regulation promulgated by Department of 
Taxation was inconsistent with statute); Virginia Department 
of Taxation v. Blanks Oil Co., 255 Va. 242, 246-47, 498 S.E.2d 
914, 916 (1998)(holding regulation promulgated by Department 
of Taxation was not inconsistent with statute); WTAR Radio-TV 
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 877, 879-80, 234 S.E.2d 245, 
246-47 (1977)(holding regulation promulgated by the 
 
6
Commissioner of the Revenue was not "unwarranted extension" of 
statute). 
Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a) prohibits a motor vehicle dealer 
from advertising for sale a vehicle which the dealer has no 
intention to sell at the price or terms advertised.  That 
section states: 
If a specific vehicle is advertised, the seller 
shall be in possession of a reasonable supply of 
said vehicles, and they shall be available at the 
advertised price.  If the advertised vehicle is 
available only in limited numbers or only by 
order, that shall be stated in the advertisement.  
For purposes of this subdivision, the listing of 
a vehicle by stock number or vehicle 
identification number in the advertisement for a 
used vehicle is one means of satisfactorily 
disclosing a limitation of availability.  Stock 
numbers or vehicle identification numbers shall 
not be used in advertising a new vehicle unless 
the advertisement clearly and conspicuously 
discloses that it relates to only one vehicle. 
 
Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a).  The regulation promulgated by the 
Motor Vehicle Board pursuant to this statute states in 
relevant part: 
If the advertised vehicle is available only in 
limited numbers or only by order, that shall be 
stated in the advertisement.  The listing of 
vehicles by stock numbers or vehicle 
identification numbers is permissible and is 
one means of satisfactorily disclosing a 
limitation of availability, provided a separate 
number is used for each vehicle. 
 
24 VAC § 22-30-30(L).  Manassas argues that Code § 46.2-
1581(12)(a) specifically allows the use of stock numbers in 
 
7
advertising new vehicles "as long as the advertisement clearly 
and conspicuously discloses that the stock number used in the 
ad relates to only one vehicle."  The regulation, according to 
Manassas, is consistent with the statute because the 
regulation states that, if a separate stock number is used for 
each car in the advertisement, the stock number satisfactorily 
discloses limitation of availability. 
Manassas' interpretation ignores the prohibition in Code 
§ 46.2-1581(12)(a) against using a stock number in the 
advertisement of new cars to indicate limited availability 
"unless the advertisement clearly and conspicuously discloses 
that it relates to only one vehicle."  The plain meaning of 
this section is that, for new car advertisements, the stock 
number alone is insufficient to show limited availability and 
that something in the advertisement, in addition to the stock 
number, must clearly and conspicuously indicate that only one 
vehicle is available.  The regulation, however, specifically 
allows the use of the stock number alone in an advertisement 
for a new car to serve as an indication of limited 
availability.  Therefore, the regulation and the statute are 
in conflict and the trial court correctly concluded that the 
statute prevailed.  See General Motors, 268 Va. at 293, 602 
S.E.2d at 125 ("It is equally well established, however, that 
if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a 
 
8
regulatory interpretation . . . that is in conflict with the 
plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.").  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow 
Manassas to introduce the regulation or argue as a defense 
that the advertisement at issue complied with the regulation.3  
 
Manassas also asserts the trial court erred in allowing 
the Couches to "maintain a VCPA claim based on their 
allegations that a violation of Code § 46.2-1581.12(a) was a 
fraudulent act or practice under the VCPA."  While this 
assignment of error appears straightforward, Manassas' 
arguments at trial, and on brief and in oral argument in this 
Court encompass different legal issues.  At oral argument 
Manassas addressed this assignment of error by arguing that 
the trial court did not have "subject matter jurisdiction" to 
consider a violation of Code § 46.2-1581 under the VCPA.  
Manassas based this position on the fact that Code § 46.2-1581 
is not included among the sections of Title 46.2 which are set 
forth in Code § 59.1-200 as possible violations of the VCPA.  
In other words, according to Manassas, the failure to include 
Code § 46.2-1581 in Code § 59.1-200 vested enforcement of that 
                     
3 On brief and at oral argument before this Court, 
Manassas argued that the introduction of the regulation should 
have been allowed to rebut the Couches' allegation that the 
advertisement was a willful violation of the VCPA.  However, 
Manassas never raised that argument as a grounds for admission 
 
9
section solely in the Motor Vehicle Board.  Manassas did not 
make this argument in the trial court, however, and we 
therefore do not consider it.  Rule 5:25. 
Manassas did argue on brief and at the trial court, 
however, that the Couches had no claim under the VCPA because 
of the provision in Code § 59.1-199(A) that the VCPA does not 
apply to "[a]ny aspect of a consumer transaction which aspect 
is authorized under laws or regulations of this Commonwealth. 
. . ."  Manassas construes this language to mean that any 
aspect of a consumer transaction that is regulated by Title 
46.2, or by regulations adopted pursuant to that Title, 
becomes an "authorized" aspect of the transaction and is 
therefore exempt from the VCPA.  Applying this logic to the 
case before us, Manassas argues that the advertisement at 
issue was exempt from a claim under the VCPA because it was 
"an aspect of the consumer transaction" between Manassas and 
the Couches, and dealer advertising is regulated and therefore 
"authorized" by Code § 46.2-1581 and the regulation. 
Manassas' construction of Code § 59.1-199(A) equates the 
word "authorized" with "regulated."  This interpretation, if 
correct, would provide an exemption from the VCPA to all motor 
vehicle dealer advertising regardless of content, since such 
                                                                
of the regulation before the trial court and we therefore do 
not consider it here.  Rule 5:25. 
 
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advertising is regulated pursuant to Title 46.2.  Section 
59.1-199(A), however, exempts only those aspects of a consumer 
transaction that are "authorized."  Authorized actions are 
those sanctioned by statute or regulation.  Manassas was not 
entitled to exemption from a VCPA claim on the sole ground 
that motor vehicle dealer advertising is regulated by other 
statutory provisions and regulations.  Accordingly, we find no 
error in the trial court's ruling that the Couches could 
pursue a claim under the VCPA in this case. 
II.  Revocation of Acceptance 
 
Code § 8.2-608 allows a buyer to revoke acceptance of 
goods if the goods contain a non-conformity that 
"substantially impairs its value to him" and if the buyer 
accepted the goods on the assumption that the nonconformity 
would be cured.  Code § 8.2-608.  The revocation must occur 
within a reasonable time after the nonconformity was 
discovered by the buyer and before there is any substantial 
change in the condition of the goods purchased.  The buyer may 
recover damages incurred as a result of the revocation.  Id. 
 
Manassas claims that the trial court erred in denying its 
motions to strike the Couches' revocation claim because the 
evidence did not establish that the nonconformity 
substantially impaired the vehicle's value to the Couches.  
Specifically, Manassas argues that under Gasque v. Mooers 
 
11
Motor Car Co., 227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384 (1984), the measure 
of substantial impairment of value to the buyer is not 
diminution in the value of the goods on the open market; 
rather, unless the evidence establishes otherwise, the usual 
and customary purpose of the goods ― in this case, 
transportation ― is presumed to be the reason for the purchase 
and the measure by which the value of the goods is determined.  
Considering this purpose, Manassas points out that there was 
no evidence that the nonconformity adversely affected the 
vehicle's "drivability."  The only evidence offered at trial 
regarding value was the Couches' expert witness who testified 
that the repainting diminished the value of the vehicle by 20 
percent.  Manassas contends that the Couches therefore failed 
to carry their burden of proof on their revocation claim and 
the trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury.  
We disagree with Manassas' proposed application of Gasque. 
The plaintiffs in Gasque sought to revoke their 
acceptance of a new 1979 Fiat vehicle based on a number of 
problems such as a water leak, heater malfunction, inoperative 
clock and interior light, automatic choke problems, excessive 
oil consumption, loud vibrations, and other noises and 
rattles.  The plaintiffs had driven the vehicle with these 
various defects for at least 4,500 miles prior to revocation, 
and the vehicle had been driven over 8,000 miles at the time 
 
12
of trial.  The trial court struck the plaintiffs' evidence and 
entered judgment for the defendant dealer, holding that, under 
a "driveability" test, there was no substantial diminution in 
the value of the vehicle to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs 
did not notify the dealer of the revocation within a 
reasonable time. 
On appeal to this Court, one issue was whether the 
"driveability" test used by the trial court was correct.  The 
plaintiffs argued that the appropriate test was a subjective 
test, "under which the buyers need only persuade the fact-
finder that their 'faith has been shaken' in the product."  
227 Va. at 160, 313 S.E.2d at 389.  We rejected this argument, 
holding that while a "driveability" test "would not be of 
universal application," the application of the test in that 
case was not erroneous "where the buyers failed to prove any 
need for the car beyond ordinary transportation."  Id. at 161, 
313 S.E.2d at 389. 
The record in this case shows that Mr. Couch testified he 
wanted to purchase a new vehicle, not a repainted vehicle, and 
that the repainted vehicle was not the vehicle they purchased.  
Mrs. Couch testified that, if she had been told that Manassas 
intended to cure the defect in the vehicle by repainting it, 
she would not have given permission because she "purchased a 
vehicle at new car standards and if you paint it, then, it is 
 
13
no longer a new car."  The Couches' expert witness then 
testified that the vehicle lost 20 percent of its value in its 
repainted condition. 
This record thus demonstrates that the Couches intended 
to buy not only a means of transportation but a new vehicle. 
When the nonconforming condition was repaired by repainting, 
the value of the vehicle to the Couches ― as a new vehicle ― 
was impaired.  The expert's testimony that the repainting 
caused a 20 percent decrease in value supports a determination 
that the impairment was substantial.  Therefore the trial 
court did not err in submitting the Couches' revocation of 
acceptance claim to the jury. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
Affirmed.