Title: Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89679
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 22, 2002

Docket No. 89679-Agenda 21-March 2001.
ZACHARY DONALDSON et al., Appellees, v. CENTRAL 
ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY et al. (Central Illinois
								 Public Service Company, Appellant).
Opinion filed February 22, 2002.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	This is a toxic tort case. Plaintiffs are the parents of four
children suing, on their own behalf and on behalf of their children,
inter alia, Central Illinois Public Service Company (CIPS), the
owner of a former manufactured gas plant in Taylorville, Illinois
(Site). The plaintiffs alleged that certain acts or omissions by
CIPS, and three of its contractors, during the cleanup of the Site
caused their children to develop neuroblastoma, a rare form of
cancer. The litigation spanned six years and included the exchange
of hundreds of thousand of documents and more than 250
depositions of numerous witnesses. After a four-month jury trial,
at which 77 witnesses testified, a jury returned a $3.2 million
verdict for plaintiffs against CIPS. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court judgment (313 Ill. App. 3d 1061), and we granted
CIPS's petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315). For the
reasons discussed below, we now affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.

BACKGROUND 
In this toxic tort case, plaintiffs allege that exposure to an
environmental condition caused their children to develop
neuroblastoma, a peripheral nervous system cancer. In most cases,
neuroblastoma develops in young children and infants. Statistics
show that 9 out of every 1 million children born develop
neuroblastoma.
	Taylorville, located in Christian County, is a town which
recorded 520 live births in 1988. Statistically, a case of
neuroblastoma occurs one time every 29 years in a community the
size of Taylorville. Between March 1989 and August 1991, during
approximately a two-year period, three infants and a teenager in
Taylorville were diagnosed with neuroblastoma. Zachary
Donaldson was conceived in December 1987 and was born on
September 7, 1988. Six months later, in March 1989, Zachary was
diagnosed with neuroblastoma. At the time of trial, Zachary was
in remission from his illness. Chad Hryhorsysak was conceived in
April 1989 and was born January 12, 1990. Chad was diagnosed
with neuroblastoma six months after his birth, in March 1990. As
a result of his illness, Chad is paralyzed from the waist down.
Erika May was conceived in February 1989 and was born
November 27, 1989. She was diagnosed with neuroblastoma two
months later, in January 1990. At the time of trial, she was in
remission from her illness. Lastly, Brandon Steele was born on
March 17, 1978. On August 9, 1991, at age 13, Brandon was
diagnosed with neuroblastoma. Brandon died on January 19, 1993.
	Plaintiffs claim that the statistical excess of neuroblastoma
cases in Taylorville was caused by their exposure to potent
chemical carcinogens released, in part, during the cleanup of the
Site. The Donaldsons lived one mile from the Site, the
Hryhorsysaks lived three miles from the Site, and between 1985
and 1989 the Mays lived in several locations near the Site, the
closest one-half mile away and the farthest eight miles away.
During his lifetime, Brandon Steele lived two miles from the Site.
We now turn to the Site.
	Prior to the widespread use of natural gas, the United States
relied upon gas produced from fossil fuels, generally coal, to
generate heat and light. In 1892, Taylorville Gas and Electric
Company constructed a gas plant on the southern edge of
Taylorville. CIPS purchased the Site in 1912 and continued plant
operations until 1932. During this 20-year period, CIPS produced
gas at the Site through a commonly used gasification process. This
process produced tar byproducts called coal tar. Coal tar was often
stored in underground tanks and later sold for use as roofing tar,
road oil, or weed killer. In 1939, CIPS decommissioned the Site.
This included the destruction and dismantling of above-ground
structures. However, large underground tanks and containers with
50,000 gallons of residual coal tar were left buried. CIPS used the
Site for storage until its sale in 1961, at which time the 50,000
gallons of residual coal tar buried underground was not disclosed.
	In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.
§9601 et seq. (1982)) to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites. CERCLA imposed retroactive liability for the disposal of
hazardous waste and ordered all companies that owned and
operated hazardous waste facilities to notify the federal
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 42 U.S.C. §9603(c)
(1982). An internal CIPS memorandum, dated May 1981,
indicates that CIPS understood this reporting provision, but
determined that because the notification requirement was not
"mandatory," there was "no advantage to be gained in prematurely
notifying *** because of the potential consequences of such a
disclosure." Therefore, CIPS did not disclose to the USEPA the
existence of the underground coal tar storage tanks at the Site.
	In the early 1980s, the carcinogenic potential of coal tar
gained increased publicity and concern in the utility and regulatory
industries. For example, one newspaper article, entitled "Coal
Gasification May Yield Cancer-Causing Chemicals," discussed
coal tar and its cancer-causing potential. CIPS internally circulated
this article and noted that the issue was generating increased
"concern at the national and state level." Additionally, a published
study in the Handbook on Manufactured Gas warned that some
chemicals in coal tar "are among the most powerful carcinogens
known to exist." Aware of the risk, CIPS, through its
environmental affairs department, conducted an independent on-site investigation of its manufactured gas plants and drafted a final
report discussing the condition of, and potential risk at, each of its
abandoned gas-manufacturing sites, including the Site. CIPS
forwarded this report to its insurer and applied for "Gradual
Environmental Impairment" insurance to cover "potential claims."
CIPS did not report the coal tar sites to any state or federal agency
or notify current owners of the potential risk.
	In October 1985, contamination was discovered at the Site by
its then owner, Apple Contractors. A contractor for Apple
Contractors, while attempting to place a private septic line in the
ground for sewage disposal, noticed strong odors, discolored soil,
and a dark viscous material throughout the soil. Unaware that the
soil was hazardous, the contractor removed the surface soil and
transported it to a farm in nearby Moweaqua, Illinois. At the same
time the surface soil was disturbed, Taylorville authorities
recorded complaints about strange odors near the Site and in the
adjacent public park. Notably, the Site is bordered by private
residences to the north, a wooded area to the south where some
homes exist, and Manners Park, a public recreation area to the
east.
	Less than one month later, in November 1985, CIPS notified
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) that the Site
contained buried contaminants. CIPS hired an independent
contractor, Hanson Engineering, Inc. (Hanson), to complete a
"remedial investigation/feasibility study" to assess the extent of
soil contamination at the Site and the area south of the Site.
Monitoring revealed extremely high concentrations of volatile
chemicals on the Site, in the area surrounding the Site, and in the
adjacent public park to the east. In some areas, monitoring
detected soil contamination at a depth of 95 feet. A Hanson
employee recommended "use of the lot south of the building be
immediately prohibited." A second contractor, hired by CIPS to
detect and minimize emissions, observed that the presence of such
high levels of volatile agents, coupled with the Site's close
proximity to residents living to the north, required "a strong effort
to detect and reduce these emissions."
	Soon after, CIPS met with the IEPA. The IEPA notified CIPS
that it would review cleanup activities to ensure their adequate
completion. Before beginning soil excavation, CIPS assessed the
Site to determine the extent of contamination in the soil, tank, and
groundwater, and to identify potential off-site contamination. CIPS
called this assessment "Phase I." Coal tar may contain up to
10,000 different chemicals; CIPS tested for approximately 190
different compounds. This testing detected the presence of various
carcinogenic compounds, including polynuclear organic (aromatic)
hydrocarbons (PAHs) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs).
Although contained in initial drafts of the Phase I report, risk
assessment and health information was deleted from the final
report submitted to the IEPA.
	Approximately six months later, in July 1986, the IEPA
issued a notice under section 4(q) of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act (hereinafter, 4(q) Notice) (415 ILCS 5/4(q) (West
2000)), a formal administrative order. The 4(q) Notice imposed
deadlines and reporting requirements and required that CIPS
conduct an "immediate removal action" to excavate the
underground structures and other contaminated material on the
Site before April 1987. CIPS was required to submit cleanup
plans, including air monitoring, safety and quality assurance plans,
and a feasibility study for the immediate removal action. Cleanup
plans were developed by CIPS's contractors, approved by CIPS,
and submitted to the IEPA to guarantee regulatory compliance.
Five months later, CIPS completed its assessment and submitted
a "Phase II" report to the IEPA. This final report detailed the
substances at the Site, discussed their impact upon the public and
the environment, and outlined procedures planned for the
immediate remedial action.
	As part of the immediate removal action, CIPS implemented
an air-monitoring plan to measure particulate emissions and
identify the ambient air quality during the excavation. Emissions
particles vary in size, such that matter may be small enough to be
easily respirable and undetectable to sensory perception such as
smell, taste, or sight. Particles, including coal tar chemicals, may
bond to soil particles. Moreover, wind speed and temperature
influence emissions. Therefore, CIPS approved the use of
stationary equipment placed in trailers to monitor emissions 24
hours a day, while technicians also performed spot testing several
times a day with portable hand-held instruments. If the ambient air
quality reached certain levels, defined within the remediation plan,
workers took safety precautions and the Site was shutdown.
	CIPS initiated air monitoring, in part, to "minimize liability
from 'real' or frivolous lawsuits." Internal documents encouraged
"minimal data collection necessary to quantitatively document the
principal compounds of concern, thus providing a data base for use
in response to potential inquiries or claims from the nearby
residents or Manners Park users" because "without [emissions
data] they [CIPS] have no data if neighbors claim damages." By
the time of discovery, the computer data base and original data had
disappeared. In its place, CIPS offered a summary of the data,
prepared internally, called the Air Monitoring Report, as its "best
evidence." The report was offered during trial, and to government
agencies during final remediation discussions, as a basis to show
that exposure did not occur.
	CIPS began the remediation on January 20, 1987. Workers
removed building debris, an above-ground gas holder, two
underground structures (separators), and 9,000 cubic yards of soil.
CIPS required the use of gas masks and protective clothing during
removal of the buried structures. Hanson and Parsons Engineering
Services, Inc. (Parsons), the on-site contractors, recommended
relocating residents during removal of the buried structure, but
CIPS declined to follow their suggestion. Excavated material and
soil were removed from the Site by truck, and soil that was not
trucked away at the end of the day was covered with plastic foam.
	Air monitoring detected emissions above the National Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) primary health based standard for
particulate emissions on seven days during the first three months
of excavation. Additionally, on February 8, 1987, a Site security
guard reported that high winds blew dust "all over." Two days
later, on February 10, 1987, an air-monitoring station reported a
NAAQS exceedance, and a local resident was hospitalized with an
intense headache, nausea, blurred vision, and convulsions. She
was diagnosed with an acute attack caused by some toxic cause.
The Site diary indicates that CIPS was advised of the incident. On
February 11, 1987, the Site project manager expressed "great
concern" about air emissions at the Site, and "wanted to be on
record as pushing for shutdown and resident relocation." During
this same time, truck drivers removing the soil and waste
complained of nausea. As a result, the drivers were advised to
wear respirators once they crossed the railroad tracks near the Site.
However, residents living in this same area were not warned or
relocated. At trial, CIPS maintained that NAAQS exceedances
were the result of other sources, such as truck exhaust and burning
leaves, and not the excavated soil.
	The Site was shutdown, and the initial cleanup completed, on
March 2, 1987. CIPS did not backfill the excavation with soil.
CIPS and the IEPA disagreed about the scope of further
remediation and the proper depth of excavation; the IEPA believed
that further excavation and soil removal were necessary. Internal
CIPS documents state that the meetings were "adversarial
(swearing, rolling of eyes, threats of bad communication)." The
IEPA attributed CIPS's refusal to conduct further remediation to
"economic concerns rather than best judgment." During this
conflict, with IEPA approval, CIPS covered the hole with
styrofoam and plywood sheets to reduce dust emissions and
volatilization.
	For two years, between March 1987 and spring 1989,
plywood and stryofoam covered the hole. CIPS and the IEPA
continued to disagree about further remediation measures. In July
1987, CIPS discontinued particulate testing and dismantled the air-monitoring program and, instead, took weekly emission
measurements around the perimeter of the Site. CIPS discontinued
particulate matter testing because once excavation was completed,
CIPS felt that an increase in particulate matter was not likely. The
readings gathered from the weekly tests did not detect unusual
emissions or NAAQS violations. Eventually, in April 1989, the
IEPA granted CIPS approval to permanently backfill the hole.
 	The Illinois Department of Public Health (Department)
examined the unusually high statistical incidence of neuroblastoma
cases in Taylorville. Initially, the Department studied the genetic
relatedness between families; scientific testing defeated this
theory. In June 1990, the Department prepared a final draft
"Preliminary Health Assessment" report for the Site. The report
was available to the public for review and made available to CIPS
for comment. The report concluded that the Taylorville
"population had been exposed to *** dust entrained contaminants
*** largely as the result of limited remedial action on the part of
CIPS." Further, the report stated that the Site "is considered to be
of potential public health concern because of the risk to human
health caused by the possibility of exposure to hazardous
substances. *** The contaminants are present at the site in large
quantities and the presence of significant quantities of
contaminated soils represents a source of continuing release to the
environment."
	CIPS argued to the Department that its report was misleading,
stating that more recent CIPS air-monitoring data contradicted the
Department's assessment and that the report "should be based on
current Site conditions." CIPS maintained that this current data
was available in its Air Monitoring Report, the only available
source of information regarding ambient air at the Site. Based
upon CIPS's Air Monitoring Report, the Department's report was
modified to state that "the lack of likely completed exposure
pathways makes the CIPS site an unlikely cause of the
neuroblastoma excess." The Department's report was finalized as
modified despite commentary from the USEPA that because "air
emissions occurred during the excavation and likely occurred
while the excavation was left open for two years, it appears to be
likely that some exposure occurred to residents surrounding the
Site."
	In 1991, the May and Hryhorsak families filed a complaint
against CIPS and Hanson in Christian County. This complaint
contained counts of negligence, nuisance, conspiracy, willful and
wanton conduct, and spoliation of evidence. Approximately four
years later, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this lawsuit, and refiled
a second action three months later in Sangamon County, adding
conspiracy and negligent remediation counts, as well as additional
plaintiffs, the Donaldson and Steele families, and additional
defendants, Haztech, Inc., and Parsons. In 1996, upon CIPS's joint
motion to tranfer for forum non conveniens, the cause was
transferred to Christian County.
	Prior to trial, Haztech, Inc., settled with plaintiffs, and the trial
court dismissed the Steeles' claims against Hanson and Parsons.
Further, the trial court denied plaintiffs' claims for punitive
damages. At trial, plaintiffs called three experts to connect the
neuroblastomas to the toxins at the Site. Plaintiffs called Dr. Shira
Kramer, an epidemiologist specializing in childhood cancers; Dr.
Harlee Sue Strauss, a toxicologist specializing in molecular
biology; and Dr. Thomas Winters, a physician specializing in
occupational and environmental medicine. CIPS responded with
numerous experts and plaintiffs' own treating physicians, all of
whom testified that the cause of neuroblastoma is unknown, and
that they could not testify within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that exposures from the Site caused the particular
neuroblastomas in this case.
	At the close of plaintiffs' case, the trial court denied CIPS's
motion to strike plaintiffs' expert testimony and its motion for a
directed verdict. The jury returned a $3.2 million verdict in favor
of plaintiffs against CIPS alone, finding CIPS liable for negligence
and public nuisance. The trial court entered judgment on the
verdict on March 27, 1998, and CIPS appealed.
	On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court on both negligence and public nuisance. 313 Ill. App.
3d 1061. The appellate court concluded that "there was adequate
evidence of causation," and that the verdict was not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1079. This
appeal followed. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
I. The Admission of Expert Testimony
 	As an initial matter, CIPS suggests that the trial court
committed reversible error when it denied CIPS's motion for a
Frye evidentiary hearing to determine whether the testimony of
plaintiffs' experts, Drs. Kramer, Winters, and Strauss, was
admissible. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that any
error was harmless.
	CIPS filed its Frye motion two weeks before trial. On October
21, 1997, the trial court denied the motion. As observed by the
appellate court, on October 21 the trial court "dealt with 30
separate motions or issues and [the order] was nine pages in
length." We also recognize, as did the appellate court, that CIPS's
late effort played a part in the trial court's ruling: "[a] Frye hearing
would not only be extremely time consuming in light of the time
remaining until trial, but it would be a considerable expense to the
parties."
	Furthermore, in effect, although informally, the trial judge
conducted a Frye hearing. The hearing transcripts from October 21
indicate that the issues subject to the Frye hearing were discussed
during the hearing and previously addressed on numerous
occasions by the court in the months before the trial. CIPS
conceded during the hearing that it was motivated to seek a Frye
hearing simply to "create a good articulable record that is zeroed
in on those very points [Frye issues]." In prior motions before the
trial court, such as CIPS's "Motion to Exclude Testimony of
Plaintiffs Expert Witnesses Kramer, Strauss, and Winters" and its
"Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on Issue of Generic
Causation," the trial court addressed the same issues subject to a
Frye hearing. In ruling on these motions, the trial judge examined
thousands of pages of deposition testimony, including four
depositions of Dr. Kramer, two depositions of Dr. Strauss, and
three depositions of Dr. Winters. As a result, the trial judge was
well versed in the experts' methodologies, as his commentary
during the pretrial hearings show. Thus, although the trial court
denied CIPS's request for a formal Frye hearing immediately
before trial, we find that CIPS was not prejudiced and any error
was harmless.
	Second, CIPS maintains that, contrary to Frye, the "trial court
failed in its role as 'gatekeeper' by permitting unfounded expert
opinion testimony." We review Frye issues under an abuse of
discretion standard. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187-88
(1996); People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 211-12 (1989).
	Illinois law is unequivocal: the exclusive test for the
admission of expert testimony is governed by the standard first
expressed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 187-88; People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500,
517 (1990); Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d at 211-12; People v. Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d 284, 293 (1989); People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208 (1984);
People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 241 (1981). The Frye standard,
commonly called the "general acceptance" test, dictates that
scientific evidence is only admissible at trial if the methodology or
scientific principle upon which the opinion is based is "sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." Frye, 293 F.  at 1014.
	First, "general acceptance" does not concern the ultimate
conclusion. Rather, the proper focus of the general acceptance test
is on the underlying methodology used to generate the conclusion.
If the underlying method used to generate an expert's opinion are
reasonably relied upon by the experts in the field, the fact finder
may consider the opinion-despite the novelty of the conclusion
rendered by the expert. See generally People v. Basler, 193 Ill. 2d 545, 551 (2000); see also Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("When the underlying basis or
methods of an expert's opinion are of a type reasonably relied
upon by the experts in the field, the court must allow the opinion
to be assessed by the factfinder-even if the opinion reaches a
novel conclusion"), citing Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464, 1467-68 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing novel
methodologies from controversial or novel conclusions).
	Second, general acceptance of methodologies does not mean
"universal" acceptance of methodologies. The medical community
may entertain diverse opinions regarding causal relationships, but
this diversity of opinion does not preclude the admission of
testimony that a causal relationship exists if the expert used
generally accepted methodology to develop the conclusion. "In
determining whether a novel scientific procedure is 'generally
accepted' in the scientific community, the issue is consensus
versus controversy over a particular technique. *** Moreover, the
mere existence of a dispute does not preclude a finding that the
procedure is generally accepted." People v. Dalcollo, 282 Ill. App.
3d 944, 957-58 (1966); see also Ferebee, 736 F.2d  at 1535-36
("[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by
animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that,
in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic
methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, ***
products liability law does not preclude recovery until a
'statistically significant' number of people have been injured or
until science has had the time and resources to complete
sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical"); Frye, 293 F.  at
1014 ("[J]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized"). Simply stated, general
acceptance does not require that the methodology be accepted by
unanimity, consensus, or even a majority of experts. A technique,
however, is not "generally accepted" if it is experimental or of
dubious validity. Thus, the Frye rule is meant to exclude methods
new to science that undeservedly create a perception of certainty
when the basis for the evidence or opinion is actually invalid.
	Further, despite CIPS's contention, Frye does not make the
trial judge a "gatekeeper" of all expert opinion testimony. The trial
judge's role is more limited. The trial judge applies the Frye test
only if the scientific principle, technique or test offered by the
expert to support his or her conclusion is "new" or "novel."
Basler, 193 Ill. 2d  at 550-51. Only novelty requires that the trial
court conduct a Frye evidentiary hearing to consider general
acceptance. We recognize that a "new" or "novel" scientific
technique is not always easy to identify, especially in light of
constant scientific advances in our modern era. Generally,
however, a scientific technique is "new" or "novel" if it is
"original or striking" or does "not resembl[e] something formerly
known or used." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1546 (1993).
	Once a principle, technique, or test has gained general
acceptance in the particular scientific community, its general
acceptance is presumed in subsequent litigation; the principle,
technique, or test is established as a matter of law. For example,
DNA analysis does not require a Frye hearing because the
principle has been found to be generally accepted. See People v.
Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 277 (1997); see also Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at
187-88 (DNA analysis admissible in light of expert's testimony
and appellate court decisions approving of the technique);
Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d  at 518 (the appellate court in a prior case held
that electrophoresis is generally accepted; thus, "[d]efendant's
challenges to the process *** were held in the proper forum; that
is, in front of the jury by cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses and presentation of defendant's own witnesses"); Eyler,
133 Ill. 2d  at 211-12 (discussing the "superglue" technique to
enhance fingerprints and "electrophores" to identify blood traits
under the Frye standard); Dalcollo, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 955
("[w]here the question of the general acceptance" is raised the
court often "establish[es] the law of the jurisdiction for future
cases"); M. Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois
Evidence §702.4, at 627-28 (7th ed. 1999) (hereinafter Handbook
of Illinois Evidence).
	CIPS suggests that Illinois law follows a modified Frye
standard called the "Frye-plus-reliability" standard. We observe
that this modified standard has been adopted by some appellate
court panels. See Harris v. Cropmate Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d 364,
365 (1999); First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ill. App. 3d
416, 427 (1998); see also Handbook of Illinois Evidence §702.4,
at 626 ("Application of the Frye standard calls for a judicial
determination *** that the test's reliability is generally accepted
in the particular scientific field in which the test belongs"). Under
the "Frye-plus-reliability" standard, a court considers the
following questions:
			"(1) Can the scientific technique or method employed
be empirically tested, and if so, has it been? (2) Has the
technique or method been subjected to peer review and
publication? (3) What is the technique or method's known
or potential error rate? (4) Are its underlying data
reliable? (5) Is the witness proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research she
has conducted independently of the litigation, or has the
witness developed her opinion solely for the purpose of
testifying? and (6) Did the witness form her opinion and
then look for reasons to support it, rather than doing
research that led her to her conclusion?" Harris, 302 Ill.
App. 3d at 375, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 482-83, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-97 (1993).(1)
In other words, under the "Frye-plus-reliability" standard, after
having determined that a technique or methodology is generally
accepted, the court must still consider whether the opinion is
reliable. See Harris, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 374-76; First Midwest
Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 427.
	Today, we clarify that this is not the standard in Illinois. The
trial court is not required to conduct a two-part inquiry into the
both the reliability of the methodology and its general acceptance.
The determination of the reliability of an expert's methodology is
naturally subsumed by the inquiry into its general acceptance in
the scientific community. Simply put, a principle or technique is
not generally accepted in the scientific community if it is by nature
unreliable. See Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d  at 293. Additionally, the Frye-plus-reliability test impermissibly examines the data from which
the opinion flows, while the technique remains generally accepted.
Questions concerning underlying data, and an expert's application
of generally accepted techniques, go to the weight of the evidence,
rather than its admissibility. See, e.g., People v. Pope, 284 Ill.
App. 3d 695, 702-03 (1996) (" ' "any question concerning the
specific procedures used by the company or expert goes to the
reliability of the evidence and is properly considered by the jury in
determining what weight to give this evidence" ' " (emphasis
omitted)), quoting People v. Johnson, 262 Ill. App. 3d 565, 569
(1994), quoting People v. Lipscomb, 215 Ill. App. 3d 413, 432
(1991); People v. Dalcollo, 282 Ill. App. 3d 944, 957 (1996)
(challenges to the application of a specific technique go to the
reliability and weight of the evidence); Ferebee, 736 F.3d  at 1534
("Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to
resolve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the
attempt to link low-level exposure to toxic chemicals with human
disease. On questions such as these, which stand at the frontier of
current medical epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to
testify that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to
credit such testimony"); Handbook of Illinois Evidence §702.4, at
629 (questions raised with respect to the actual procedures
employed to conduct the particular scientific process, technique,
or test are properly considered by the trier of fact as going to the
weight of the evidence). Trial judges decide the general acceptance
of the technique; a jury decides whether it will accept the expert's
conclusion which is based on that technique.
	With this background, we consider CIPS's claim that the
expert testimony was inadmissible under the Frye standard. CIPS
insists that testimony from plaintiffs' experts is inadmissible under
Frye because the experts' conclusions are novel and are not
supported by specific scientific research establishing a cause and
effect relationship between coal tar and neuroblastoma. Plaintiffs'
experts relied upon the technique of "extrapolation"(2) to form the
basis of their opinions. Essentially, CIPS argues that if a true cause
and effect relationship existed, scientific research could verify it.
Thus, according to CIPS, extrapolation by nature is inadmissible
because it is a method used only by experts who cannot support
their theories. Over CIPS's objection, the trial court admitted
plaintiffs' expert testimony. During pretrial hearings, the trial
court expressly relied upon Duran v. Cullinan, 286 Ill. App. 3d
1005 (1997). Duran discussed the scientific technique of
extrapolation, which plaintiffs' experts in the present case also
utilized. The appellate court, like the trial court, relied upon Duran
and held that plaintiffs' expert opinions were admissible because
the experts "utliz[ed] the accepted extrapolation method." 313 Ill.
App. 3d at 1075. The appellate court held the admission of
scientific testimony which is based on the method of extrapolation
is routine or settled in law, such that the trial court was not
obligated to conduct a Frye evidentiary hearing. 313 Ill. App. 3d
at 1075.
	 Therefore, our threshold question concerns whether Duran
held that the scientific method of extrapolation is generally
accepted. Where the question of general acceptance of a scientific
technique is raised for the first time a court is generally asked to
establish the law for future cases. See Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 234-37;
Dacallo, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 955; see also Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 204
(McMorrow, J., specially concurring) (" 'in attempting to establish
such general acceptance for purposes of the case at hand, the
proponent will also be asking the court to establish the law of the
jurisdiction for future cases' "), quoting Jones v. United States,
548 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. App. 1988).
	In Duran, plaintiffs' expert relied on 43 epidemiological
studies, and extrapolated from those studies to conclude that
plaintiff's ingestion of Ovulen-21, a contraceptive, caused her
child's multiple birth defects. Defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the method of extrapolation used
by plaintiffs' experts was not generally accepted. Plaintiffs
opposed the motion for summary judgment with, inter alia, an
affidavit stating that the method of extrapolation used by their
expert was "generally accepted" in the relevant scientific
community. The trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment in favor of defendant, and the appellate court reversed,
holding that the trial court abused its discretion "in finding that the
plaintiffs' extrapolation from the studies was not a technique
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in this
particular scientific field." Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.
	At first glance, Duran appears to conclude that the method of
extrapolation is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1011 ("the principal issue at stake here
is the scientific community's general acceptance of the
extrapolation technique employed by the plaintiffs' experts").
However, the appellate court only considered this issue in the
context of a summary judgment motion. Specifically, in granting
the defendant's summary judgment motion the appellate court
held, "[t]aking as true the plaintiffs' expert's affidavit asserting
that the extrapolation method is commonly used by the scientific
community as well as various federal agencies *** we find that the
trial court abused its discretion ***." (Emphasis added.) Duran,
286 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. As has been observed in the context of
Frye, "relying exclusively upon prior judicial decisions to
establish general scientific acceptance can be a ' "hollow ritual" '
if the underlying issue of scientific acceptance has not been
adequately litigated." Basler, 193 Ill. 2d  at 554 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.), quoting People v. Kirk, 289 Ill.
App. 3d 326, 333 (1997), quoting 1 J. Strong, McCormick on
Evidence §203, at 870 n.20 (4th ed. 1992); see also Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 206-07 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring) ("to resolve the
general acceptance question, care must be taken so that the
practice is not abused *** [f]or '[u]nless the question *** has been
thoroughly litigated *** reliance *** is a hollow ritual' "), quoting
2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §203, at 870 n.20 (4th ed.
1992). Neither the trial court, nor the appellate court in Duran,
resolved the issue of the general acceptance of the extrapolation
technique. Thus, Duran does not stand for the proposition that
extrapolation is generally accepted.
	However, we disagree with CIPS's contention that plaintiffs'
expert testimony is inadmissible under Frye. Although not
controlling, Duran does contain a helpful discussion of
extrapolation, explaining that extrapolation is commonly used by
scientists in certain limited instances. Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at
1011-13. Specifically, extrapolation is utilized in the scientific
community when the medical inquiry is new or the opportunities
to examine a specific cause and effect relationship are limited.
Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1012 (discussing Ferebee, 736 F.2d 1529, and the issue of frontier medical inquiries); but see Zayas,
131 Ill. 2d  at 295 (holding that evidence of hypnotically induced
recall is inadmissible under Frye because it is not generally
accepted and the scientific literature is "replete with articles
imploring courts to reject such evidence because of its many
flaws"); Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190
(1st Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's expert testimony based on extrapolation
was not generally accepted because the cause and effect
relationship offered in the opinion was the subject of extensive
studies and no study showed a cause and effect relationship). In
some cases, medical science is simply unable to establish the cause
and origin of disease. In others, medical science does not seek to
establish the existence of a cause and effect relationship-for
example, in this instance, the small number of neuroblastoma
cases limits study of the disease. As a result, extrapolation offers
those with rare disease the opportunity to seek a remedy for the
wrong they have suffered. Thus, in these limited instances, an
expert may rely upon scientific literature discussing similar, yet
not identical, cause and effect relationships. The fact that an expert
must extrapolate, and is unable to produce specific studies that
show the exact cause and effect relationship to support his
conclusion, affects the weight of the testimony rather than its
admissibility. Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.
	We also find instructive Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,
736 F.3d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which considered the admission
of expert testimony when that testimony offered a new causal link.
In Ferebee, plaintiff's experts testified that exposure to a toxic
chemical caused the decedent's illness and death. Defendant
argued that the opinion was inadmissible because no study ever
suggested a link between plaintiff's injury and the toxic chemical.
The federal appeals court held:
		"As long as the basic methodology employed to reach
such a conclusion is sound, such as use of tissue samples,
standard tests, and patient examinations, products liability
law does not preclude recovery until a 'statistically
significant' number of people have been injured or until
science has had the time and resources to complete
sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical. In a
courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a
tort suit of this type is not scientific certainty but legal
sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the
expert testimony that [the chemical] paraquat more likely
than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that another jury
might reach the opposite conclusion or that science would
require more evidence before conclusively considering the
causation question resolved is irrelevant. That Ferebee's
case may have been the first of its exact type, or that his
doctors may have been the first alert enough to recognize
such a case, does not mean that the testimony of those
doctors, who are concededly well qualified in their fields,
should not have been admitted." (Emphasis in original.)
Ferebee, 736 F.2d  at 1535-36.
See also Mendes-Silva, 980 F.2d  at 1487 (admitting expert
testimony even though the epidemiological question "is on the
frontier of medical science in the sense that no clear answer has
been found").
	Furthermore, we observe that the method of extrapolation
does not concern a technique new to science that may instill a
sense of "false confidence" or carry a misleading sense of
scientific "infallibility." See Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d  at 294 (observing
that hypnotically induced evidence of recall intrudes upon the
"proper functioning of the jury by the admission of evidence
which 'is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility,
akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi' "), quoting Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 
at 244. For example, in the case of "machines or procedures which
analyze physical data *** [l]ay minds might easily, but
erroneously, assume that such procedures are objective and
infallible." People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989) (a jury may find that machines are objective
and infallible, and may assume testimony based upon procedures
which analyze physical data provides a definitive truth). By
contrast, extrapolation by nature admits its fallibility-the lack of
specific support to establish the existence of a known cause and
effect relationship. The jury is left to judge the veracity of the
expert's conclusion. See Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d  at 295 ("modern
evidence rules *** allow the jury to hear all the evidence and draw
its own conclusions, unless the trial judge determined that certain
evidence was excessively prejudicial").
	In the instant case, plaintiffs' experts offered opinions about
a new medical epidemiological inquiry. Medical research does not
specifically establish a cause and effect relationship between coal
tar and neuroblastoma. However, it is also true that medical
research does not specifically reject that a cause and effect
relationship exists. The relationship between coal tar and
neuroblastoma has simply not been the subject of extensive study
and research. One expert explained that because few people are
diagnosed with neuroblastoma, the disease is simply not the
subject of extensive funding and study. Further, plaintiffs' experts
testified that few studies exist regarding the specific cause and
effect relationship at issue in this case because ethical
considerations prevent exposing the human population to coal tar
for research purposes. Moreover, plaintiffs' experts explained that
scientific research is limited because the cases of environmental
exposure are often detected after the onset of illness, which
prevents proper controlled settings to study the effects of
exposure. Therefore, all of plaintiffs' experts testified that they
utilized the method of extrapolation, and that the technique is
generally accepted in their fields. Like plaintiffs' experts in Duran,
however, plaintiffs' experts in the instant case relied upon the only
available source of information to form the basis of their
conclusions-similar, yet not identical, scientific studies and
theories. From these studies, plaintiffs' experts concluded that coal
tar caused these plaintiffs' neuroblastomas. CIPS offers no
evidence to suggest that this method, extrapolation, is not utilized
or generally accepted among the scientific community. Instead,
CIPS insists the conclusion is not generally accepted in the
scientific community; therefore, the methodology is not generally
accepted. Again, in the interest of clarity, an expert's conclusion
is subject to challenge by traditional efforts such as cross-examination. The general acceptance test should not replace the
role of the advocate, who may expose shaky but admissible
evidence by vigorous cross-examination or the presentation of
contrary evidence.
	As the Frye standard does not demand unanimity, consensus,
or even a majority to satisfy the general acceptance test, we find
that extrapolation is sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in these limited circumstances. Traditional methods,
such as cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses, offered CIPS the
opportunity to challenge the experts' conclusions in the proper
forum, during trial in front of the jury. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in admitting the testimony of plaintiffs' experts.

II. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
a. The Standard of Review
	In its post-trial motion, CIPS sought a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied. Before
this court, CIPS argues that insufficient evidence of causation
required that the trial court grant its motion. CIPS maintains that
this error is subject to de novo review. Plaintiffs, however, argue
that the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is reviewed under the same standard applied by the trial
court. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that this court must consider
whether " 'the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable
to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no
contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.' " Maple
v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992), quoting Pedrick v.
Peoria &amp; Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967).
	Although it appears the parties ask us to apply different
standards, in reality, the parties request the same standard. See
Gaffney v. City of Chicago, 302 Ill. App. 3d 41, 48 (1998). A
denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion is
reviewed under the de novo standard. McClure v. Owens Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132 (1999). In doing so, a
reviewing court considers that: " '[j]udgment notwithstanding the
verdict should not be entered unless the evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly
favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence
could ever stand.' " McClure, 188 Ill. 2d  at 131-32, quoting
Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 109 (1997); Thacker
v. UNR Industries, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 343, 353-54 (1992); Maple,
151 Ill. 2d  at 453; Pedrick v. Peoria &amp; Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967). In making this assessment, a reviewing court
must not substitute its judgment for the jury's, nor may a
reviewing court reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility
of the witnesses. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452-53; Gaffney, 302 Ill.
App. 3d at 48.

b. Causation
	CIPS maintains that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their overall
burden to show causation. CIPS points to the record as support,
and argues that it shows only a "mere possibility" of causation,
rather than that causation is "more probably true than not."
According to CIPS, a showing of causation includes both "generic
causation"-i.e., coal tar is capable of causing neuroblastoma-and
"specific causation"-i.e., exposure to coal tar from the Site did in
fact occur and actually caused the neuroblastomas. CIPS also
argues that in toxic tort litigation, causation also includes a
showing of "exposure," which must be quantified with evidence
of the level or dose of exposure. CIPS asserts that a plaintiff may
establish this exposure requirement with evidence of biological
markers, such as trace fibers or particles found in the body,
proximity to the defendant's product, or personal or environmental
monitoring.
	We disagree with defendant's characterization of Illinois law
on causation. First, Illinois law does not define causation in terms
of "generic" or "specific" causation. Rather, our case law clearly
states that in negligence actions, the plaintiff must present
evidence of proximate causation, which includes both "cause in
fact" and "legal cause." Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d  at 354; Smith v. Eli
Lilly &amp; Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 232 (1990). A plaintiff may show
"cause in fact" under the substantial factor test, showing that the
defendant's conduct was a material element and substantial factor
in bringing about the alleged injury. Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d at 354-55;
Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455 (1992).
"Legal cause" examines the foreseeability of injury-whether the
injury is " 'of a type which a reasonable man would see as a likely
result of his conduct.' " Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 456, quoting Masotti v.
Console, 195 Ill. App. 3d 838, 845 (1990). Defendant does not
allege that plaintiffs failed to show legal cause.
	Turning to "cause in fact," a plaintiff may meet his or her
burden of causation with circumstantial evidence-evidence from
which a " 'jury may infer other connected facts which usually and
reasonably follow according to *** common experience.' "
Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d  at 357, quoting Devine v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166,
179-80 (1916). This is to say, Illinois law does not require
unequivocal or unqualified evidence of causation. Dixon v.
Industrial Comm'n, 60 Ill. 2d 126 (1975); National Castings
Division of Midland-Ross Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 198, 204 (1973); see also Dominguez v. St. John's Hospital, 260
Ill. App. 3d 591 (1993). To the contrary, we have held that where
"there exists limited medical knowledge of a malady *** medical
testimony pertaining to causation may not be unqualified and
unequivocal." National Castings, 55 Ill. 2d  at 204.
	Additionally, we reject CIPS's assertion that causation
includes a showing of exposure, which must be quantified. A
plaintiff must establish that he or she came into contact with
chemicals produced by the defendant. See Mitchell v. Gencorp,
Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999). In this context, however,
Illinois law does not require that plaintiffs quantify the level of
exposure. CIPS relies upon cases that address exposure to
asbestos-containing products in an occupational setting. See, e.g.,
Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 447 (1996) (plaintiffs alleged
exposure while working for Union Asbestos and Rubber Company
and its successor company); Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d 343 (plaintiffs
alleged exposure while working for Union Asbestos and Rubber
Company and its successor company); Johnson v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 313 Ill. App. 3d 230 (2000) (plaintiffs alleged
exposure during their tenure at Keystone Steel &amp; Wire Company).
These cases hold that in order to show causation in an asbestos
case, a plaintiff must "produce evidence of exposure to a specific
product on a regular basis over some extended period of time in
proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked," commonly
called the "frequency, regularity and proximity" test. Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d  at 363 (adopting the "frequency, regularity and proximity"
test as the rule of law in Illinois asbestos cases). In this instance,
we are not compelled to adopt this rule and depart from traditional
concepts of causation. Environmental exposure cases, like the
instant case, do not afford litigants the opportunity to specify with
such certainty the exact level and dose of exposure. In most
instances, the details of exposure, including information of exactly
when or where exposure occurred, is not available. Here, plaintiffs
were not required to show the exact amount of exposure. See
La Salle National Bank v. Malik, 302 Ill. App. 3d 236 (1999) (the
inability to show the level of exposure did not bar an expert's
opinion); Harris, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 371 (discussing causation
testimony that did not calculate the concentration of exposure, but
instead reached the conclusion that exposure occurred based upon
their "generalized knowledge *** and firsthand experience with
and observations of the effects of exposure").
	Accordingly, we review whether there was evidence from
which a jury could conclude that CIPS's conduct was a material
element and substantial factor in bringing about the
neuroblastomas.
	Plaintiffs presented testimony from Dr. Winters, an expert in
occupational and environmental medicine. Dr. Winters testified
that in the case of environmental exposure, like the instant matter,
it is difficult to quantify exposure to individual community
members. However, his review of evidence in this case, including
the IEPA 4(q) immediate removal action plans, Department
reports, USEPA reports, family medical histories and interviews,
and Site reports that discussed the level of soil contamination and
methods of removal, as well as the open and unmonitored status
of the Site for two years, led him to conclude that cumulative
exposure occurred here.
	Further, plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence of
community exposure. The jury heard evidence regarding the
potential of particulate matter to travel undetected for several
miles. The jury was advised of Taylorville weather conditions
during the period of remediation, including high wind and
unseasonably warm weather, which facilitate the travel of air-borne contaminants. Plaintiffs offered evidence that during the
period of remediation, on-site workers complained of symptoms
consistent with exposure to toxic substances. At that same time,
the record shows that a local resident, who lived within several
hundred feet of the Site, was hospitalized with dizziness,
headaches, vomiting, and seizures, and later diagnosed with
exposure to an unknown toxic cause. This individual testified that
"[e]verything just reeked from it [coal tar]. It even penetrated into
the homes." She later added the Site cast a "heavy mist over the
whole area, like a fog" and that workers at the Site dressed in
protective gear.
	Additionally, air-monitoring results showed emissions above
the NAAQS primary health based standard for particulate
emissions on seven days during the first three months of
excavation. In 1987, preremediation soil monitoring revealed
extremely high concentrations of volatile chemicals on the Site, in
the area surrounding the Site, and in adjacent Manner's Park.
Plaintiffs presented testimony that they frequented Manner's Park,
as well as homes and businesses near the Site. Moreover, the
record shows that each plaintiff lived within four miles of the Site.
Plaintiffs lived within this radius during the remediation and
following the remediation when the Site was an open 10-foot hole
with unsupported side walls covered with plywood and styrofoam.
	Moreover, in 1990, the Department in its final "draft" health
assessment acknowledged human exposure to site contaminants by
dust-entrained contaminants. Although later revised at CIPS's
request, the USEPA concurred with the Department's original
draft and wrote that because "air emissions occurred during the
excavation and likely occurred while the excavation was left open
for two years, it appears to be likely that some exposure occurred
to residents surrounding the Site."
	Plaintiffs presented testimony from Dr. Kramer, an expert
witness who testified regarding causation. Dr. Kramer received her
Ph.D. in epidemiology from Johns Hopkins University, a master's
degree in human genetics from Johns Hopkins University, and a
bachelor's degree in bio-chemistry from Johns Hopkins
University. During her 20-year career as an epidemiologist, Dr.
Kramer published a textbook of epidemiology, studied the etiology
of childhood cancer at the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, and
published studies on the etiology of neuroblastoma. Her field of
study, epidemiology, is the field of public health and medicine that
studies the incidence, distribution, and etiology of disease in
human populations. Scientists in this field assume that disease is
not distributed randomly in a group of individuals and that
identifiable subgroups, including those exposed to certain agents,
are at increased risk of contracting particular diseases. Dr. Kramer
explained that epidemiology concerns whether a particular agent
is capable of causing a disease or injury. Further, she testified that
an epidemiologist may conduct one of many studies to determine
whether an agent is related to the risk of disease or adverse health
affects. As she explained, study design varies depending upon the
circumstances, including resource limitations, time constraints, or
the subject of the study. Both parties agree that under the current
scientific literature, several epidemiologic criteria are used to
judge the relation between an agent and the risk of disease,
including the temporal relationship between the disease and the
exposure; the statistical strength of association; the dose-response
relationship; the replication of findings; the biologic plausibility;
alternative causes; cessation of exposure; the association of
exposure with a single disease; and consistency with other
knowledge. According to Dr. Kramer, however, scientific
literature also explains that the science of epidemiology does not
demand satisfaction of each criteria, rather on occasion some may
be irrelevant or impossible to determine.
	Dr. Kramer testified that the carcinogens contained in coal tar
and coal tar related carcinogens from the Site were the most-likely
cause of the plaintiffs' neuroblastomas. She later quantified this as
a "greater than 50 percent probability." Dr. Kramer admitted that
no scientific consensus exists to support the theory that coal tar
causes neuroblastoma. However, in great detail she outlined the
methodology used to generate her conclusion, including her own
published studies on neuroblastoma, scientific literature on risk
factors for nervous system cancers, animal studies regarding
nervous system cancer, studies regarding the risks of expectant
mothers and infants, and her Taylorville case-specific study that
was based upon family history questionnaires and Illinois Cancer
Registry data. Her research ruled out random variability as the
cause for the sudden increase of Taylorville neuroblastoma cases.
	Dr. Kramer discussed the temporal relationship between the
release of ambient air emissions from the Site and the onset of
neuroblastoma. However, Dr. Kramer did not rely solely on an
abstract temporal connection. Dr. Kramer also examined the
increased incidence of neuroblastoma through standard scientific
calculation, and calculated the probability that the onset of
neuroblastoma was due to random chance; she concluded that the
possibility of chance was one in 10,000. Further, Dr. Kramer
discussed that coal tar is a multipotential carcinogen that can cause
cancer at multiple sites in the body. Dr. Kramer addressed
alternative sources, and determined that although alternative
sources are potential causes of neuroblastoma, only the Site was
a common risk factor among all plaintiffs. Consistent with the
science of epidemiology, Dr. Kramer performed a cancer
incidence rate analysis to measure the rate of development of
neuroblastoma and adult cancers in Taylorville. The incidence rate
examines whether the sudden or dramatic increase in cases is more
likely due to chance. In order to complete this study, Dr. Kramer
studied the incidence of neuroblastoma in four different
comparison groups during the period 1986 through 1991,
including: the National Cancer Institute Surveillance
Epidemiology and End Results Program Rates (SEER, a national
cancer registry), the State of Illinois, demographically similar zip
codes without manufactured gas plant sites, and demographically
similar zip codes with manufactured gas sites. At the conclusion
of her study, Dr. Kramer testified that there was a one in 10,000
probability that chance caused the nueroblastomas in this case.
Further, Dr. Kramer discussed fetal nervous system cancers and
the increased sensitivity of expectant mothers and young children
to carcinogens. Based upon medical research animal studies, she
testified that the fetal nervous system is 50 times more sensitive to
carcinogens. Dr. Kramer also testified that there is no safe level of
exposure to known sensitive populations, and argued that this was
a "known scientific fact" cited in the literature.
	Plaintiffs also presented Dr. Strauss, a molecular biologist and
toxicologist. Dr. Strauss received her Ph.D. in molecular biology
from the University of Wisconsin, completed a post-doctoral
fellowship on the study of toxic interactions at the cellular level
from the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences,
participated in graduate training at MIT in organic chemistry, and
received her bachelor's degree in chemistry from Smith College.
Her field of study, toxicology, examines the adverse effects of
chemicals on living organisms, and is otherwise called the
"science of poisons." Dr. Strauss explained that toxicological
studies, by themselves, rarely offer direct evidence that a disease
in any one individual was caused by a chemical exposure.
However, toxicology can rule out other risk factors known to
cause a disease and provide scientific information regarding the
increased risk of contracting a disease at any given dose.
	Dr. Strauss testified that coal tar and its general chemical
constituents were the cause of plaintiffs' neuroblastomas. Dr.
Strauss based her conclusions upon animal studies and medical
research in the area of nervous system tumors, soil samples from
the Site, health and safety diaries from the Site, and air-monitoring
logs from the Site. Additionally, Dr. Strauss discussed the volatile
potential of coal tar compounds, using studies that discussed
manufactured gas plant sites with similar site histories and VOC
contamination profiles. From this data, she compiled the potential
toxicity of the Site and the cancer potency of the coal tar. Further,
Dr. Strauss discussed the complex chemical compounds contained
in coal tar, and the "synergistic" effect that occurs when these
compounds interact to form more potent compounds. She stated
that these same compounds are multipotential, affecting several
organ sites, and transplacental, meaning that the carcinogen may
pass from the placenta to a developing fetus.
	This case presents the classic "battle of the experts" frequently
seen in toxic tort litigation. Plaintiffs' experts testified that the Site
was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiffs'
neuroblastomas, while defendants' experts testified that medical
science does not associate coal tar with neuroblastoma. When
viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
we do not find that the evidence so overwhelmingly favors CIPS
that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.
Clearly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could
conclude that CIPS's conduct was a material element and
substantial factor in bringing about the alleged injury.

C. Duty
	CIPS next claims that plaintiffs failed to satisfy its burden to
show CIPS violated any duty. CIPS does not deny the existence of
a duty; it argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
it breached its duty. We find sufficient evidence of a breach.
	In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged a breach of duty
beginning in 1939 and ending in 1989. Jury instructions
incorporated specific acts and omissions alleged in plaintiffs'
complaint: (1) the abandonment of coal tar in the underground
tanks in 1938; (2) failure to monitor the Site before contaminants
migrated off-site and were discovered by local authorities; (3)
failure to warn local authorities or residents after CIPS discovered
contamination in 1985; (4) failure to control airborne pathways
before beginning its immediate removal action in 1987; (5)
increasing volatile air and dust emissions during the immediate
removal action in 1987; (6) failure to control the volatile air and
dust emissions after the immediate removal action between 1987
and 1989; (7) failure to warn residents of any risk to human health
resulting from exposure to the Site while it remained open
between 1987 and 1989; and (8) failure to provide reliable air
monitoring of emissions while the Site remained open between
1987 and 1989.
	CIPS contends that there is no breach because it was the
industry standard to leave underground storage tanks and coal tar
in 1939. Plaintiffs, however, offered evidence that coal tar was a
concern as early as 1906. CIPS also argues that its failure to
backfill the Site for a period of two years does not establish a
breach of its duty because, according to CIPS, this act was at the
direction of the IEPA. Evidence in the record was also sufficient
for a jury to find otherwise. Plaintiffs offered an internal CIPS
memorandum, dated February 18, 1987, to show that CIPS was
not prohibited from backfilling the Site. This memorandum
described meetings between CIPS and the IEPA in 1987. The topic
of these meetings included further soil excavation. The document
discusses CIPS's objection to further soil excavation due to the
costs of additional remediation efforts, the lack of IEPA input, and
the impossible deadlines imposed by the IEPA. This same
document indicates that CIPS was advised that it could proceed
with backfilling "at its own risk," suggesting that further
excavation may be required at a later date that would necessitate
reopening the hole. Therefore, the jury was presented evidence that
the Site remained open, not as a result of the IEPA's direction, but
because CIPS refused to temporarily backfill to avoid additional
costs. We find that this evidence, although contradicted by
defendants' own witnesses, was sufficient for a jury to conclude
that CIPS breached its duty of care. We do not find that the
evidence so overwhelmingly favors CIPS that no contrary verdict
based on that evidence could ever stand.
	As a final matter, CIPS also argues that the acquittal of the
contractors who performed the excavation, and the verdict against
it, are inconsistent, and that this inconsistency warrants judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
	CIPS was sued for its own independent negligent acts or
omissions. Clearly, where the same set of facts shows one party
liable and the other not liable, they are not legally inconsistent
verdicts. For example, in this case the jury was offered evidence
that CIPS's contractors disagreed with the remediation procedures.
In one instance, contractors expressed "great concern *** about air
emissions. *** [and] [w]anted to be 'on record' as pushing for
shutdown and resident relocation," while CIPS refused to order
resident relocation, even temporarily. Thus, we find that the
verdicts are not inconsistent and are supported by evidence in the
record. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err by
denying CIPS's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

III. Public Nuisance
	Last, CIPS claims that plaintiffs' nuisance claims were
defective. First, CIPS argues that the public nuisance statute is
criminal in nature (see 720 ILCS 5/47-5 (West 2000)) and does
not authorize a private cause of action. Alternatively, CIPS argues
that the mere existence of government oversight precludes
nuisance liability. These issues raise questions of law, which we
review de novo. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167.
	At the time plaintiffs' filed their complaint, their cause of
action was authorized by section 221 of "An Act to revise the law
in relation to criminal jurisprudence" (the Public Nuisance Act)
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 100½, par. 26)-a declaration of common
law. See Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 661
(1994); see also Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1981). However, the Public Nuisance Act did not
displace common law rights: plaintiffs were free to plead and
prove either common law nuisance or statutory nuisance. People
ex rel. Burris v. C.J.R. Processing, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 3d 1013,
1019 (1995) (plaintiffs were free to plead either common law
nuisance or statutory nuisance); Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661
("while the nuisance alleged by the plaintiffs is recognized by
statute in Illinois, they were free to plead common law public
nuisance without mention of the statute"); Village of Bensenville
v. Botu, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636 (1976) ("there exists a
common law right of action to abate public nuisance independent
of any statutory right").
	Thus, in this case, in the same count of their complaint,
plaintiffs sought damages under both statutory law (see Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1989, ch. 100½, par. 26) and common law. However, after
plaintiffs filed their complaint, the legislature repealed section 221
(the Public Nuisance Act) and recodified its provisions as section
47-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (740 ILCS 5/221 (West
1996)). Pub. Act 89-234, eff. January 1, 1996.
	Importantly, however, the effect of this repeal is not necessary
to resolve this issue. Simply stated, whether or not plaintiffs'
statutory claim is defective is irrelevant: plaintiffs' claim is proper
under common law. At the time plaintiffs' filed their complaint,
plaintiffs had a common law right to claim damages for public
nuisance. People ex rel. Burris, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 1019; Gilmore,
261 Ill. App. 3d at 661-62; Village of Bensenville, 39 Ill. App. 3d
at 636.
	At common law, a public nuisance included:
			"an unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public. Earlier cases recognized that the public
had a right to clean, unpolluted air and that any
deprivation of that right was actionable as a private injury
and indictable as a public wrong. [Citation.] However, the
notion of pure air has come to mean clean air consistent
with the character of the locality and the attending
circumstances. Whether smoke, odors, dust or gaseous
fumes constitute a nuisance depends on the peculiar facts
presented by each case." City of Chicago v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 631-32
(1974).
See also Village of Wilsonville, 86 Ill. 2d  at 21-22 (a " ' "public
nuisance is the doing of or the failure to do something that
injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or
works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the
public" ' "), quoting W. Prosser, Torts §88, at 583 n.29 (4th ed.
1971), quoting Commonwealth v. South Covington &amp; Cincinnati
Street Ry. Co., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918). CIPS
does not argue that plaintiffs failed to plead and prove the
elements of common law nuisance. We find, therefore, that
plaintiffs' nuisance claim was proper.
	The second issue presented for our review is whether IEPA
direction and supervision bar nuisance liability. CIPS maintains
that the extension of nuisance liability in this context will damage
State interests by discouraging the private sector from cooperating
with the IEPA. At the heart of CIPS albeit brief argument, is the
contention that it is "unfair" to reward cooperation with exposure
to liability. CIPS warns that if this court permits liability here, it
will slow down or reduce future clean-up efforts.
	First, we reject CIPS's argument based upon the language of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. Section 45(a) of the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/45(a) (West
2000)) states that "[n]o existing civil or criminal remedy for any
wrongful action shall be excluded or impaired by this Act." See
also City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill. 2d 482
(1974) (The Environmental Protection Act provides remedies to
prevent or diminish pollution which are in addition to remedies
recognized by common law). This clear unequivocal language
demonstrates that state law does not prevent nuisance claims.
	We are, however, compelled to respond further. CIPS was not
held liable for the mere release of toxins into the ambient air
during remediation. In an industrial society odors, film, dust, and
smoke may exist. See City of Chicago, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 632
(noting that "[t]hese conditions in an industrial area have generally
not been considered to be public nuisances"). This logic is equally
true in the case of an environmental remediation. In this instance,
however, plaintiffs' allege a substantial injury different from the
general public, and claim that this injury is not based solely on
ordinary clean-up efforts, but rather negligent remedial conduct.
See Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661-62 (a law "making a nuisance
legal does not automatically destroy a common law nuisance
action where the defendant's conduct was not in compliance with
the law, [or] where the defendant was otherwise negligent ***").
We need only look to plaintiffs' allegations: CIPS is liable for, the
"release of 'coal tar' into the soil, groundwater and air in violation
of the IEPA; [c]ontamination of public water supplies in violation
of the IEPA; [r]elease of airborne carcinogens, clastogens, and
mutagens from the Site before its 'Immediate Removal Action;'
[r]elease of airborne carcinogens, clastogens, and mutagens from
the Site during its 'Immediate Removal Action;' [r]elease of
airborne carcinogens, clastogens, and mutagens after its
'Immediate Removal Action;' [m]aintaining an open pit resulting
in erosion of soil and collection of surface water which allowed
the further release of volatile air and fugitive dust emissions for
two years after its 'Immediate Removal Action." (Emphasis
added.) We do not find that liability in this case will frustrate
future remedial efforts or deter cooperation. To the contrary, it
may encourage cooperation with government agencies, and
heighten care and concern for public safety during remedial
actions.
	As a final matter, we reject CIPS's argument that it should not
be liable because the release of emissions was solely the result of
IEPA oversight. The record demonstrates otherwise. Plaintiffs
offered evidence that CIPS did not act solely at the direction of the
IEPA. For example, CIPS tested soil and evaluated the extent of
contamination before it contacted the IEPA; CIPS drafted the
remediation and monitoring plans, which although subject to IEPA
review, were based upon CIPS's own data and risk assessments;
and CIPS continually resisted and modified IEPA remedial
suggestions, and on some occasions did not notify the IEPA of
shutdowns or air emission problems until after the IEPA
discovered the problem. Moreover, CIPS's own admissions rebut
the argument that CIPS was a forced participant in the
remediation. The record is replete with CIPS's own reference to its
"voluntary" participation. In fact, the record shows that CIPS
sought voluntarily status to avoid strict federal superfund
guidelines and to maintain greater authority and control over the
remediation. Accordingly, we reject CIPS's claim that IEPA
oversight was a defense to liability.

CONCLUSION 
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of
plaintiffs.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	Although I agree that the appellate court judgment should be
affirmed, I write separately to reiterate the position I took in
People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167 (1996), that "the
all-encompassing abuse of discretion standard" is inappropriate
when reviewing "the legal issues raised by trial court applications
of the Frye standard." Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 204 (McMorrow, J.,
specially concurring). I maintain, as I did in Miller, that the more
appropriate standard for reviewing Frye "general acceptance"
issues is de novo.
	Whenever a trial court is called upon to decide whether to
admit expert testimony, the court must decide whether the expert
is qualified to testify in the subject area and whether the proffered
testimony will assist the jury in resolving the issues before it.
These determinations, like most evidentiary matters, are
traditionally left to the discretion of the trial court and its decision
should not be reversed unless it is found that the trial court abused
its discretion. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484 (1996); People v.
Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192 (1984).
	Frye evidence is a particular form of expert testimony. As the
majority correctly acknowledges, when an expert's opinion is
derived from a scientific method or technique which is alleged to
be unconventional or novel, the admission of the expert's
testimony depends on whether the trial court finds that the
scientific method employed by the expert meets the Frye "general
acceptance" test. In my view, the "general acceptance" question
should not be subject to an abuse of discretion standard. As stated
in the specially concurring opinion in Miller:
			"There are good reasons why the determination of
general acceptance in the scientific community should not
be left to the discretion of the trial court. Foremost is the
fact that the general acceptance issue transcends any
particular dispute. As one court has put it, '[t]he question
of general acceptance of a scientific technique, while
referring to only one of the criteria for admissibility of
expert testimony, in another sense transcends that
particular inquiry, for, in attempting to establish such
general acceptance for purposes of the case at hand, the
proponent will also be asking the court to establish the
law of the jurisdiction for future cases.' Jones v. United
States, 548 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. App. 1988). Application of
less than a de novo standard of review to an issue which
transcends individual cases invariably leads to
inconsistent treatment of similarly situated claims."
People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 204 (McMorrow, J.,
specially concurring).
	In addition, de novo review of the "general acceptance" issue
allows the reviewing court to look beyond the expert evidence
presented in the trial court. It allows consideration of other judicial
opinions, including those from other jurisdictions, as well as
pertinent legal and scientific commentaries. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 
at 205 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring).
	The appropriateness of employing a de novo standard when
reviewing decisions regarding "general acceptance" under Frye
has been recognized by courts in other jurisdictions. In fact, the
supreme courts in three states, citing to my special concurrence in
Miller, have adopted a de novo standard for reviewing the "general
acceptance" issue. See Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787,
796, 683 N.E.2d 671, 677 (1997); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117,
167, 699 A.2d 596, 619 (1997); Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 274
(Fla. 1997).
	On a whole, then, there is no single standard of review
appropriate when considering the admissibility of Frye evidence.
Traditional evidentiary matters, such as the expert's qualification
to testify and the relevancy of the testimony, should be left to the
discretion of the trial court. "General acceptance," however, is
more appropriately a matter subject to a de novo standard of
review.
	Adopting this dual standard of review is not unusual. This
court has recognized that the measure of deference to be afforded
any trial court determination depends on "the substantive and
procedural backdrop against which the appealed order or ruling
arose." People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378 (1998). Further,
it has been acknowledged that, at times, evidentiary issues can
present both questions of law and fact, requiring application of
different standards of review at different junctures in the inquiry.
See In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 47-48 (2000) (whether trial court
erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements
based on a claim that they were involuntarily made is subject to de
novo review, although any factual findings will be accorded great
deference).
	In the present case, the majority, without discussion or
analysis, states: "We review Frye issues under an abuse of
discretion standard." Slip op. at 10. In so doing, the majority
appears to hold that the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard
should be applied to a trial court's determination that a novel
scientific technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community and that the trial court's determination will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. At the same time,
however, the majority states, "[o]nce a principle, technique, or test
has gained general acceptance in the particular scientific
community, its general acceptance is presumed in subsequent
litigation; the principle, technique, or test is established as a matter
of law." Slip op. at 12. Later, citing to my special concurrence in
Miller, the majority states:
		"Where the question of general acceptance of a scientific
technique is raised for the first time a court is generally
asked to establish the law for future cases." Slip op. at 15.
	These statements are inconsistent. On the one hand, the
majority professes to be applying an abuse of discretion standard
when analyzing whether the trial court properly admitted expert
testimony under the Frye standard. On the other hand, the majority
expressly acknowledges that "general acceptance" is a legal
issue-and legal issues are normally subject to de novo review. In
my view, the bar and bench would be better served if the majority
took this opportunity to acknowledge that a de novo standard of
review is appropriate when reviewing issues of "general
acceptance" under Frye.
 
 
1.      1The parties have not argued, and we have not considered, the
adoption of a new standard consistent with the United States Supreme
Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469,113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). We will not raise
this issue sua sponte.

2.      2The parties, and Illinois case law, do not define "extrapolation."
However, generally, "extrapolation" is the "process of estimating an
unknown value or quantity on the basis of the known range of
variables." Black's Law Dictionary 607 (7th ed. 1999). In the case of
scientific study, extrapolation involves establishing a cause and effect
relationship based upon similar, yet not identical, scientific studies and
theories.