Title: Bowden v. State
Citation: 301 Ark. 303, 783 S.W.2d 842
Docket Number: CR 89-162
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: February 12, 1990

783 S.W.2d 842 (1990) 301 Ark. 303 Michael Dale BOWDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 89-162. Supreme Court of Arkansas. February 12, 1990. Buford Gardner and John Putnam, Harrison, for appellant. Clint Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. HOLT, Chief Justice. At his first trial, the appellant, Michael Dale Bowden, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He appealed, and we reversed on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence lineup identification testimony by a witness inasmuch as the lineup was conducted in violation of Bowden's sixth amendment right to counsel. Bowden v. State, 297 Ark. 160, 761 S.W.2d 148 (1988). Upon retrial, Bowden was again convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. As his sole argument on appeal, Bowden contends that the trial court's restriction of his cross-examination of a witness for the prosecution denied him his sixth amendment right to confront the witness. We disagree and affirm. As the facts are essentially the same as those in the first appeal, we limit our review to the matter in controversy. Tom Duck, Captain in charge of the Investigation Division of the Harrison Police Department at the time of the murders of Johnny Hefley and Cindy Bowden, was called as a witness for the State. On direct examination, Captain Duck testified concerning his investigation soon after the incident. He related that the victims were shot with a semiautomatic weapon at close range, that a murder weapon was never found, that fingerprints were not made at the crime scene, and that after conducting *843 several interviews, he was able to identify a possible suspect, Michael Dale Bowden. The prosecutor then asked, "The fact that you located a possible suspect at that point, did that mean that you ceased all effort to investigate other possible suspects?" Duck answered, "No, sir." Later in Captain Duck's testimony about his investigation, the following exchange occurred: During the course of cross-examination, Duck was asked about other suspects: At this point, the prosecutor objected, and the following dialogue occurred: After the jury was released, defense counsel proffered the following testimony: Captain Duck then related that he investigated rumors involving an incident in Newton County, one year prior to Johnny Hefley's and Cindy Bowden's murders, in which Terry Ricketts killed Roger Nichols. He explained that some evidence in the case indicated that Johnny Hefley supplied the gun used by Ricketts and that Cindy Bowden was the object of the incident. The testimony continued: The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 2, § 10 of the Arkansas Constitution guarantee the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The right of confrontation provides two types of protection for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him and the opportunity to conduct effective cross-examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985); Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987). See also Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 409, 601 S.W.2d 845 (1980). In fact, "[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); Winfrey v. State, supra. However, the right to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses is not unlimited. United States v. Cameron, 814 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.1987). Trial judges have wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned "to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra. The Confrontation Clause "guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, supra; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). In order to determine whether the restrictions placed on the right to cross-examine a witness rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation, a reviewing court must look "to the record as a whole" and resolve whether the restrictions that the trial court imposed on the defendant's cross-examination created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to elicit available, relevant information that was likely to effectively impeach the credibility of the witness. See United States v. Cameron, *845 supra; United States ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen, 688 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1072, 103 S. Ct. 1529, 75 L. Ed. 2d 950 (1983). In considering whether there has been a deprivation of meaningful cross-examination in violation of the Confrontation Clause, courts have considered various factors, such as whether an effective cross-examination would have been crucial to the defense. See United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907, 108 S. Ct. 1080, 99 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1988). In Davis v. Alaska, supra, the trial court refused to allow the defendant, on cross-examination, to ask a key government witness if the witness had been on probation for burglary at the time he provided the information to the police that led to the arrest of the defendant. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the basis that the trial court had violated the defendant's right to confrontation because the restrictions it had imposed made it impossible for the defendant to effectively impeach the witness by showing bias. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that a witness for the prosecution was biased as a result of the State's dismissal of his pending public drunkenness charge. The United States Supreme Court held that by "cutting off all questioning about an event that the State conceded had taken place and [an event] that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony," the trial court violated the defendant's rights secured by the Confrontation Clause. The case at bar is readily distinguishable from Davis and Van Arsdall. First of all, Captain Duck's testimony was not a consequential part of the prosecution's case, and therefore an effective cross-examination was not critical to the defense. The purpose of Duck's testimony was merely to show the progress of the initial stages of the investigation, including the fact that Bowden was identified as a suspect. Police investigators Gary Keeter, Wayne Cone, and Glen Redding also testified at length concerning most of the same details. Secondly, it is obvious from examining the proffered testimony by Duck that it, at the most, was marginally relevant. More importantly, if permitted, it likely would have confused the issues in the case. Duck testified concerning his investigation of the various rumors involving an incident in Newton County, prior to the murders of Johnny Hefley and Cindy Bowden, in which Terry Ricketts killed Roger Nichols. He explained that some evidence in that case indicated that Johnny Hefley supplied the gun used by Ricketts and that Cindy Bowden was the object of the incident. Granted, Captain Duck's testimony on cross-examination might have had the effect of showing that his recollection of the investigation was slight and that there was not a concerted effort to investigate other suspects. Notwithstanding, the issue of Duck's investigation of other suspects was not an important part of the State's case against Bowden. The likely effect of this testimony would have been to invite the jury to speculate that someone else committed the murders. However, there was no evidence at trial linking other suspects to the actual commission of the murders. See Maxwell v. State, 284 Ark. 501, 683 S.W.2d 908 (1985). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the restrictions the trial court imposed on the scope of Bowden's cross-examination were proper and that Bowden was not denied his constitutional right to confront the witness against him. Pursuant to Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 11(f), we have examined all other objections made at trial and find no reversible error. Affirmed.