Title: City of Myrtle Beach v. Richardson
Citation: 280 S.C. 167, 311 S.E.2d 922
Docket Number: 22034
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: January 19, 1984

280 S.C. 167 (1984) 311 S.E.2d 922 The CITY OF MYRTLE BEACH; The City of North Myrtle Beach; The City of Surfside; as bodies politic and representing a class of citizens and taxpayers of Horry County, South Carolina, Appellants, v. Julian RICHARDSON, Bob Childs, Dick Elliott, Lacy Hucks, W.G. Hucks, Jr., Jimmy Johnson, Ernest Johnson, Jr., Arthur Marlow, and Braxton Watson, as Members of Horry County Council, Respondents. Cheffo JOLLY, W. Daily Strickland, Harold R. Elvington, Carl Elliott, James E. Hayes, Robert B. Battle, A.L. Causey, Rafe Grainger, Arthur Hayes, W. E. Grantham, Eugene Strickland, Ollie Strickland, Ellis Hammond, Edward F. Hammond, Gene A. Hammond, Anderson Hammond, taxpayers of Horry County, South Carolina, Appellants, v. Julian RICHARDSON, Bob Childs, Dick Elliott, Lacy Hucks, W.G. Hucks, Jr., Jimmy Johnson, Ernest Johnson, Jr., Arthur Marlow, and Braxton Watson, as Members of Horry County Council, Respondents. 22034 Supreme Court of South Carolina. January 19, 1984. *168 James B. Van Osdell, of Van Osdell, Lester, Stewart &amp; McCutchen, Myrtle Beach, for appellants. John P. Henry, of Thompson, Henry &amp; Lovelace, Conway, for respondents. Jan. 19, 1984. LEWIS, Chief Justice: In March 1979, Horry County Council adopted a resolution establishing a fire protection system under the terms of Sections 4-19-10 and 4-19-20, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976 (originally adopted as 1974 Act No. 1167, effective July 9, 1974). Thereafter, two actions were commenced to contest the validity of this Act. The first case was brought by the cities of Myrtle Beach, North Myrtle Beach and Surfside as plaintiffs, and the second by a number of taxpayers. The actions were consolidated for trial, resulting in a judgment upholding the statute in question and the validity of the actions of County Council in creating the fire protection district. The cities and the taxpayers have appealed. *169 At the outset, the challenge to the standing of the cities to maintain their action was overruled by the trial court. We reverse this determination, concluding that their suit should have been dismissed. The issue here concerns the creation of a fire protection district to secure citizens outside the limits of the cities. Under no circumstances could the cities have a governmental right to interfere with the creation of such districts. The action by the cities is accordingly dismissed, leaving for determination those issues arising under the action by the taxpayers. This appeal turns upon a single question: was 1974 Act 1167 repealed by implication through the subsequent adoption of 1975 Act 283, popularly known as the Home Rule Act and codified as Sections 4-9-10, et seq., Code? The trial court correctly approached this issue by nothing that implied repeal of statutes is not favored and any reasonable construction will be adopted to avoid such a result. In construing the two statutes, however, the trial court overlooked a fundamental conflict, which precludes any reconciliation of their provisions. We find a clear repugnancy between these two enactments, and thus we cannot escape a repeal by implication. In our view, this conclusion is reached directly from comparison of the statutes in their express terms, making it unnecessary to determine whether or not the Home Rule Act is a general or comprehensive scheme impliedly intended to override previous similar enactments. Act 1167 authorizes the governing body of each county to establish fire protection systems for areas within the county not offered such service by existing special purpose districts or municipalities. There is a substantial dispute in this record as to the existence and nature of fire protection service already offered by the plaintiff cities to the areas encompassed by the 1979 Horry County plan. In resolving this appeal, we do not express any view of these factual issues. Act 1167 clearly grants all authority in this matter to the governing body of the given county. The power to designate "service areas" is set forth in Section 2(b) of the Act, Section 4-19-10(b), Code, and is subject only to procedural limitations imposed by Section 2-A of the Act, Section 4-19-20, Code, which we quote in full The record reveals that Horry County Council did comply with the requirements of Section 4-19-20, Code. Subsequent to a public hearing the County Council did by resolution find that the service area would be "established as a taxing district" as directed by Section 4-19-20(4), Code. In describing *171 the new service area, the resolution interchangeably employs the terms "taxing district" and "special district." Were it not for the provisions of 1975 Act 283, one could hardly sympathize with any complaint in this case. Particularly would this be so in light of Section 4-19-20(6), Code, which bars challenge to the action of the governing body made more than twenty days after the last publication of the resolution. In this instance, the plaintiffs had until the latter part of April 1979, to bring their actions. The suit by the plaintiff cities was not commenced until February 1980, and that of the taxpayers until May 1980. The trial court determined that the actions were barred under § 4-19-20(6), Code, a holding premised upon his rejection of the plaintiff's argument that 1974 Act 1167 had been repealed. This Court has said many things about the scope of the Home Rule Act, not always speaking with a single voice, to be sure. See Infinger v. Edwards, 268 S.C. 375, 234 S.E. (2d) 214; Torgerson v. Craver, 267 S.C. 558, 230 S.E. (2d) 228; Duncan v. County of York, 267 S.E. 327, 228 S.E. (2d) 92. There can be no disagreement, however, as to the plain meaning of the following emphasized excerpt from the fifth enabling clause of Section 2 of the Act, codified as Section 4-9-30(5), Code, by its terms, each county government is empowered: There is no avoiding the conclusion that after the adoption of the Home Rule Act the creation of any special tax district became a matter of free holder initiative. The procedure provided by 1974 Act 1167, whereby such power resides exclusively in the county governing body, is wholly at odds with the plain and direct language just quoted from 1975 Act 283. Not only has the initiative for fire protection districts been *173 passed from the hands of a county government, but the power to approve designated boundaries, specified services and levels of taxation now rests with freeholders and/or electors. Under the terms of 1974 Act 1167, such power resided solely in the county governing body. See Section 4-19-10(j) and (l), Code. In light of the complete repugnancy between these two enactments, we are compelled to find that 1975 Act 283 repealed by implication the grant of power to county governing bodies contained in 1974 Act 1167, in the interest of Shaw, 274 S.C. 534, 539, 265 S.E. (2d) 522; Garey v. City of Myrtle Beach, 263 S.C. 247, 256, 209 S.E. (2d) 893; City of Spartanburg v. Blalock, 223 S.C. 252, 262-263; 75 S.E. (2d) 361; McCollum v. Snipes, 213 S.C. 254, 268, 49 S.E. (2d) 12; State v. Hood, 181 S.C. 488, 491, 188 S.E. 134; S.C. Tax Commission v. Brown, 154 S.C. 55, 62, 151 S.E. 218 (and cases cited). The Home Rule Act contains no general savings clause nor is this Court guided by any general saving statute, such as exists in a number of jurisdictions. Sutherland on Statutory Construction (4th Edition) Section 23.33 and 23.37. This Court is left to determine the operation and effect of the implied repeal here found to have occurred, although we are not utterly without the benefit of settled rules. Vested rights, for example, are not destroyed by repeal of a statute. South Carolina Mental Health Commission v. May, 226 S.C. 108, 115-116, 83 S.E. (2d) 713. It has been soundly stated that, "in cases of alleged repeals by implication, the consequences of such repeal may be taken into consideration." 73 Am. Jur. (2d) Statutes Section 400, P. 513. Equally useful in the present context is the view that, "Even where no question of vested rights is involved, the presumption is that repeal of a statute does not invalidate the accrued results of its operative tenure..." 82 C.J.S. Statutes Section 435, p. 1011. The record before us amply demonstrates "accrued results" in the form of expenditures and contractual obligations on the part of Horry County. This Court is not blind to the equities in this matter, particularly since the plaintiffs have sought a Declaratory Judgment and injunctive relief. Justice will be served in this instance by a finding that the Home Rule Act repealed by implication the provisions of *174 1974 Act 1167, a finding which shall be limited in its operation to the establishment of fire protection systems commenced after the filing of this opinion. Accordingly, judgment is granted to the plaintiff taxpayers to the extent that 1974 Act 1167, codified as Sections 4-19-10, et seq., Code, is held repealed by 1975 Act 283, Sections 4-19-10, et seq., Code, as to actions of county governing bodies commenced after the filing of this opinion. All other relief is hereby denied. Suit by the plaintiff cities is dismissed. LITTLEJOHN, NESS and HARWELL, JJ., and JOSEPH R. MOSS, Acting Associate Justice, concur.