Title: Howard Michael Warren v. John Scott Hooper
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1050285
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2007

REL:10/26/07warrenvhooper
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1050285
_________________________
Howard Michael Warren
v.
John Scott Hooper
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-04-969)
BOLIN, Justice.
Howard Michael Warren appeals from a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, John Scott Hooper.  We reverse and
remand.
I. Factual Background
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2
The facts that can be gleaned from the record on appeal
are meager; however, the documents submitted by Hooper, the
admissions in his answer, and the affidavits of Warren,
Hooper, and David Eason, who is not a party to this case,
reveal the following: Warren is an investor, who at times
loaned money to individuals and businesses.  Beginning in
2000, 
Hooper, 
an 
attorney 
practicing 
in 
Montgomery,
represented Warren in various civil matters.  Hooper also
represented Eason, a real-estate developer, in unrelated
matters.
In 2001, Eason experienced business problems and
sought additional financing for some of his projects.  Hooper
introduced Eason to Warren and advised Warren that Eason was
a client of his and that  Eason "desired to borrow monies on
his properties."  Ultimately, Warren loaned Eason $200,000.
The terms of the loan were stated in a promissory note, which
was secured by a mortgage in Warren's favor on two parcels of
property in Elmore County.  Hooper did not draft the note or
the mortgage document.  Eason defaulted on the loan, and
Warren obtained a judgment against Eason in 2003.
II. Course of Proceedings Below
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3
On April 12, 2004, Warren sued Hooper asserting breach of
fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, breach of contract,
negligence, and fraud. All the claims in Warren's complaint
arise out of Warren's contention that he made the loan to
Eason based on "representations, warranties, assurances and
other 
promises" 
made 
by 
Hooper 
and 
based 
on 
the
attorney/client relationship  between Warren and Hooper.
Warren contends that without those representations and if
there had not been the relationship between him and Hooper he
would not have made the loan. Additionally, Warren contends
that Hooper had assured him that his mortgage was second in
priority, when the mortgage on one parcel was actually fourth
in priority.
On November 19, 2004, Hooper filed a motion to dismiss on
the following grounds: (1) that Warren could not prove
damages; (2) that the statute of limitations barred all claims
except the breach-of-contract claim; (3) that the Statute of
Frauds barred the breach-of-contract claim; (4) that the
doctrine of laches barred all claims; and (5) that Warren's
failure to join Hooper as a necessary party pursuant to Rule
19(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., in Warren's action against Eason for
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4
default on the loan now barred the present action.  The trial
court subsequently denied the motion. 
Before any discovery was taken, Hooper moved for a
summary judgment on the same grounds as set out in his motion
to dismiss.  Following a hearing, of which there is no
transcript in the record, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Hooper, stating, in pertinent part:
"There is no allegation(s) plead[ed] or fact
pattern stated in the hearing that [Hooper] was a
facilitator to the mortgage loan agreement between
[Warren] and Mr. Eason, and therefore there is no
general fiduciary or agency relationship or duty
established between [Warren] and [Hooper].  Thus,
after considering the above stated facts and
applicable law the court finds that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and that [Hooper] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Warren appeals.
III. Standard of Review
This Court recently reiterated the standard of review
applicable to an appeal from a summary judgment:
"In reviewing the disposition of a motion for a
summary judgment, we use the same standard the trial
court used in determining whether the evidence
before it presented a genuine issue of material fact
and whether the movant was entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.
2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
When the movant makes a prima facie showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden
1050285
In the court below, Warren stated that Hooper's arguments
1
were "not ripe for summary judgment at this time as there has
been no discovery in this case," but he did not move for a
continuance or file an affidavit under Rule 56(f), Ala. R.
Civ. P., requesting more time in which to conduct discovery.
Herring v. Parkman, 631 So. 2d 996, 1002 (Ala. 1994)("Rule
56(f) requires from the party opposing the summary judgment
motion an affidavit stating the reasons why he cannot present
essential facts."). The argument that there has been no
discovery in a case does not preclude a summary judgment.  Id.
(affirming summary judgment in legal-liability action where
plaintiffs do not satisfy Rule 56(f); affidavits challenged
merits only; objection stated that there had not been adequate
discovery and that summary judgment was premature).
5
then shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial
evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust
Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1989).
Evidence is 'substantial' if it is of 'such weight
and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise
of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'  West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989). This Court must review the
record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant
and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the
movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d
412 (Ala. 1990)."
S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 So. 2d 72, 81 (Ala. 2006).  
"This Court will not consider facts not in the record in
its review of cases on appeal."  Ex parte General Motors
Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 907 (Ala. 1999). Notably, Warren does
not argue on appeal that he was entitled to discovery before
Hooper's summary-judgment motion was granted;  he asserts only
1
that the affidavits he presented in opposition to the summary-
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6
judgment motion create genuine issues of material fact that
preclude summary judgment and that the trial court improperly
entered the summary judgment on a ground Hooper did not raise.
Accordingly, although summary judgment was entered before the
parties engaged in discovery, we will not consider whether
Warren was entitled to additional discovery, and we will
review only the evidence that was before the trial court when
it granted the motion. McGinnis v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 800
So. 2d 140, 145-46 (Ala. 2001).
IV. Scope of Review 
"This Court may affirm a trial court's judgment on 'any
valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless of
whether that ground was considered, or even if it was
rejected, by the trial court.'"  General Motors Corp. v.
Stokes 
Chevrolet, 
Inc., 
885 
So. 
2d 
119, 
124 
(Ala.
2003)(quoting Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of
Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020
(Ala. 2003)); Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr.,
901 So. 2d 84, 104 (Ala. 2004)("Subject to limited exceptions,
an appellate court will affirm a summary judgment on the basis
of a law or legal principle not invoked by the moving party or
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7
the trial court, even though an appellate court will not
reverse a summary judgment on the basis of a law or legal
principle not first argued to the trial court by the nonmoving
party." (footnote omitted)).  However, this Court has stated:
"This rule fails in application only where due-process
constraints require some notice at the trial level, which was
omitted, of the basis that would otherwise support an
affirmance, such as when a totally omitted affirmative defense
might, if available for consideration, suffice to affirm a
judgment, or where a summary-judgment movant has not asserted
before the trial court a failure of the nonmovant's evidence
on an element of a claim or defense and therefore has not
shifted the burden of producing substantial evidence in
support of that element."  University of Alabama Health
Servs., 881 So. 2d at 1020 (citations omitted).  
V. Analysis
1. Hooper was not the facilitator of the transaction 
between Warren and Eason.
Hooper based his motion for a summary judgment, filed
before any discovery was taken, on five specific grounds –-
the same grounds stated in his motion to dismiss. None of
those grounds represents an assertion of a failure of Warren's
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8
evidence on an element of a claim except the ground "that
Warren could not prove damages," and Hooper failed to support
this assertion.  Nevertheless, the trial court found that
there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Hooper had facilitated the transaction between Warren and
Eason.  This Court may affirm a trial court's judgment on any
valid legal ground presented, regardless of whether that
ground was considered, or even if it was rejected, by the
trial court.  As noted above, this rule is inapplicable when
the summary-judgment movant has not asserted before the trial
court a failure of the nonmovant's evidence on an element of
a claim or defense.  However, even assuming that this defense
is properly before us as a basis for affirmance, there are
contradicting 
statements 
in 
the 
affidavits 
presented 
regarding
Hooper's communications with Warren about the transaction.
The affidavits submitted to the trial court are in
conflict as to whether Eason and Warren communicated through
Hooper or directly with one another regarding the $200,000
loan. Eason stated that he and Warren "talked at length about
all issues of the note and mortgage." Warren stated that
"there were no negotiations between [him] and [Eason]" and
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9
that he "never spoke with [Eason]. [Hooper] handled all the
communication between the two of [them] regarding the lending
of the money and the signature of the note." The affidavits
also conflict regarding the substance of Hooper's advice to
Warren.  Hooper stated that he advised Warren that he could
not participate in, generate documents related to, or
represent either party with respect to the loan transaction.
Eason's affidavit asserts that Hooper made these statements to
him and that Hooper did not represent him or Warren with
respect to "any of the details of the note or mortgage."
However, although Warren does not expressly state that Hooper
represented him, he denies that Hooper made similar statements
to him. Additionally, it is undisputed that Warren asked
Hooper "if it was a safe deal." Warren stated that Hooper told
him regarding the transaction that "he would 'stake his
reputation on it.'" Hooper, however, stated: "I told Warren
that I had not looked up any chain of title or mortgages on
the properties. ... I advised [Warren] that he should get one
of his other attorneys to advise him on the issues of this
deal."
1050285
However, Hooper's brief fails to comply with Rule
2
28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.  Hooper cites two general
propositions of law regarding summary judgment but offers no
discussion concerning the facts in this case and the
applicability of those cases to the facts here. See Jimmy Day
Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, [Ms. 1051115, March 9,
10
Warren states in his affidavit, contrary to the facts as
stated in Hooper's affidavit, that Hooper handled all the
communications between Warren and Eason and that Warren never
spoke to Eason; that Hooper came to his house (Warren is a
quadriplegic) to work out the details of the loan and to pick
up a check representing the proceeds of the loan, which he
then delivered to Eason; and that Hooper recorded the mortgage
for him. Accordingly, the trial court erred both as a matter
of procedure and as to the merits in entering a summary
judgment in favor of Hooper on this ground.
2. Warren could not prove damages.  
In his brief to this Court, Warren addresses only the
issue whether the trial court erred in entering a summary
judgment on the ground that Hooper did not facilitate the
transaction. In his brief, Hooper argues, apparently as an
alternate basis for affirming the summary judgment, that
Warren could not prove damages and that Hooper is therefore
entitled to a summary judgment on that basis.  However, the
2
1050285
2007]     So. 2d     (Ala. 2007)(appellant's argument was
insufficient to invoke review of the allegedly excessive
compensatory-damages award to plaintiff in this personal-
injury action where appellant made only a three-sentence
argument, in which it cited only a single case in support of
a general proposition of law and offered no discussion of the
nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries); Davis v.
Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., [Ms. 1050478, January 12, 2007]
_____ So. 2d ____ (Ala. 2007)(appellant's lone citation to a
general principle of law without specific relevance to her
action against financial-services company was insufficient to
meet the requirements of the appellate rules to cite relevant
authority in support of arguments).  Rule 28(a)(10) also
applies to the appellee.  See Rule 28(b). 
11
evidence before the trial court would not have supported a
summary judgment on the ground of lack of proof of damages.
The record does not contain a copy of the promissory note; it
does, however, contain an unauthenticated copy of the
mortgage, which Hooper submitted with his summary-judgment
motion.  The mortgage purports to encumber two parcels of
property in Elmore County, requiring payment to Warren by May
15, 2002.  Regarding the priority of the mortgage, the
document indicates that there is a second mortgage on one
parcel and a fourth mortgage on another parcel.  Eason's
affidavit, submitted by Hooper, implies that Warren has not
foreclosed on the mortgage: stating only that "Mr. Warren
agreed to lend to me $200,000.00 on property that is
encumbered but worth near $4,000,000.00. The liens ahead of
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12
Mr. Warren total near $3,000,000.00. If Mr. Warren foreclosed
on each property and became first mortgagee, he would be in
position to sell the properties and realize one million
dollars in profit ...." (Emphasis added.) However, Hooper
provided no affidavit or other evidence that actually shows
that Warren has not foreclosed on the property. Based on
Eason's affidavit and unauthenticated documents purporting to
appraise the value of the mortgaged property, but without any
documents as to the amounts of the indebtedness owed on that
property, Hooper maintains that if Warren foreclosed on the
mortgage, he would recover the entire amount of the loan plus
an additional profit. Although Warren did not file a motion to
strike the unauthenticated documents, he stated in his
response to Hooper's summary-judgment motion that Hooper's
allegations regarding the alleged lack of proof of damages
Warren suffered are speculative.  Ex parte General Motors
Corp., 769 So. 2d at 909, allows the movant to obtain a
summary judgment by pointing out evidentiary gaps, "assuming
discovery has been completed."
Here, even though discovery had not even been commenced,
much less completed, Hooper could still pursue a summary
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13
judgment concerning Warren's alleged failure to show proof of
damages because, as noted earlier, Warren presented no
affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., stating the
reason (i.e., lack of discovery) he could not present
essential facts relative to his proof of damages.
However, Hooper's argument seeking a summary judgment on
this ground does not afford an alternate basis upon which to
affirm the trial court's judgment.  Even though Warren failed
to 
file 
a 
motion 
to 
strike, 
either 
as 
to 
Hooper's
unauthenticated documents concerning the appraised valuations
of the mortgaged properties or to as Eason's affidavit in the
form of a challenge to Eason's expertise and ability to assert
the valuations made in that affidavit, Warren did specifically
argue that Hooper's ground concerning his failure to show
proof of damages was speculative. Assuming that the trial
court had properly before it evidence as to the value of the
real properties subject to Warren's mortgage, Hooper failed to
provide any evidence of the balance owed on the mortgages that
were superior to Warren's mortgage. The only evidence as to
the amount owed on the senior mortgages was Eason's
unsupported and uncorroborated statement that "[t]he liens
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The issue whether Warren could be forced to foreclose on
3
his mortgage, in his status as a junior mortgagee, in order to
properly prove damages is not before the Court.
14
ahead of [Warren] total near $3,000,000.00." Accordingly,
Hooper never made a sufficient showing that there was no
genuine issue as to Warren's proof of damages so as to shift
the burden to Warren, because the amount of equity available
to Warren in the mortgaged properties to satisfy his damages
could not have been accurately determined without first
deducting the payoffs on the mortgages senior to Warren's
mortgage.3
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court
is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Stuart, Smith, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Lyons and Woodall, JJ., dissent.
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15
LYONS, Justice (dissenting).
For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Pavilion
Development, LLC v. JBJ Partnership, [Ms. 1040967, August 10,
2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007), I respectfully dissent from
the main opinion's reversal of the judgment of the trial
court.  Warren has waived the issue of the invalidity of the
alternate ground relied upon by Hooper by failing to address
it in his reply brief.  I would affirm the trial court's
judgment based solely on Warren's procedural default. 
Hooper's motion for a summary judgment relied upon, among
other grounds, the absence of any damages as a basis for his
defense to Warren's claim.  In entering the summary judgment
in his favor, the trial court relied upon a ground not
asserted by Hooper.  In his opening brief to this Court,
Warren failed to address any of the alternative grounds
asserted by Hooper in his summary-judgment motion.  Hooper
asserts in his appellee's brief the defense of lack of proof
of damages and argues the merits of that issue.  Warren's
reply brief merely notes that Hooper makes an argument as to
lack of proof of damages.  He fails to address the merits of
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16
that issue, contending that Hooper's discussion of that issue
"misses the mark." 
The main opinion deems Hooper's argument as to lack of
proof of damages insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., dealing with the content of
argument in an appellant's brief.  The main opinion then cites
several cases in which we have affirmed a trial court's
judgment where an appellant has failed to present sufficient
argument and then notes that Rule 28(b) makes the requirements
of Rule 28(a)(10) applicable to an appellee. Of course, Rule
28(a)(10) requires an argument "as to the issues presented."
Warren wholly failed to address the issue of lack of proof of
damages in his opening brief.  Thus, if Hooper had also wholly
failed to address the issue of lack of proof of damages in his
brief he would not have been in violation of Rule 28(a)(10)
because that issue had not been presented by Warren.  Further,
even where an appellee files no brief whatsoever, we assume
that the appellee seeks an affirmance.  Tri-City Gas Co. v.
Britton, 230 Ala. 283, 160 So. 896  (1935).  Nevertheless,
assuming that Hooper subjected himself to the requirements of
Rule 28(a)(10) by opening the door to the issue of lack of
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17
proof of damages, I cannot agree with the rejection in the
main opinion of the sufficiency of Hooper's brief on this
issue.  Hooper cites Baker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
907 So. 2d 419, 420 (Ala. 2005), in which this Court referred
to the necessity for proof of damages to sustain a fraud claim
and noted that the trial court could properly consider the
lack of proof of damages in granting a summary-judgment
motion.  Hooper also argues in support of his contention that
Warren failed to show proof of damages that, for all that
appears, Warren "remains with the option to foreclose the
properties."  Hooper further argues: "There remains the
possibility of [Warren's] recovering his monies and the
realization of a profit if [he] chooses to exercise his rights
to collect on his judgment [against Eason] at this time."
Although Hooper's brief is by no means a model for others to
follow, it stands head and shoulders above Warren's reply
brief, which addresses the issue of lack of proof of damages
by dismissing it solely on the contention that Hooper "misses
the mark."  Yet the main opinion rewards Warren's laxity with
a reversal while applying a more stringent standard to Hooper,
the appellee. 
Woodall, J., concurs.